project_id
stringlengths 7
7
| document_text
stringlengths 0
892k
| document_type
stringclasses 2
values |
---|---|---|
P121391 | Document
de la Banque mondiale
POUR USAGE OFFICIEL
Rapport n° : 56179-HT
DOCUMENT DâÃVALUATION DâUN PROJET
RELATIF Ã
UNE PROPOSITION DE DON
DâUN MONTANT DE 2 MILLIONS DE DTS
(CONTRE-VALEUR DE 3 MILLIONS DE DOLLARS)
à LA
RÃPUBLIQUE DâHAÃTI
POUR LA RÃALISATION DâUN
PROJET DâAPPUI Ã UN PROGRAMME DE GARANTIES PARTIELLES
DU RISQUE DE CRÃDIT POST-SÃISME
19 novembre 2010
Développement du secteur financier et du secteur privé
Unité de gestion-pays pour les Caraïbes
Région Amérique latine et Caraïbes
Le présent document est rendu public avant son examen par le Conseil des Administrateurs\. Ceci
ne saurait donc laisser présumer de lâissue de ses délibérations\. Le présent document peut être
mis à jour après son examen par le Conseil des Administrateurs et le document ainsi révisé sera
mis à la disposition du public conformément à la Politique de la Banque sur lâaccès Ã
lâinformation\.
TAUX DE CHANGE
(Taux de change en vigueur au 18 novembre 2010)
Unité monétaire Gourde haïtienne
USD 1,00 HT 39,55
HT 1,00 USD 0,002529
EXERCICE BUDGÃTAIRE
1er janvier - 31 décembre
SIGLES ET ABRÃVIATIONS
ANIMH Association nationale des institutions de microfinance dâHaïti
BNC Banque nationale de crédit
BPH Banque populaire haïtienne
BRH Banque de la République dâHaïti
CAS Stratégie dâaide-pays
DCA Development Credit Authority
SEGS Système de gestion environnementale et sociale
IFD Fonds de développement industriel
IF Intermédiaire financier
FIRST Initiative de réforme et de renforcement du secteur financier
GF Gestion financière
FOGAPE Fonds chilien de garantie partielle de crédit
FSSA Ãvaluation de la stabilité du système financier
Ex\. Exercice
PIB Produit intérieur brut
FRH Fonds de reconstruction dâHaïti
BID Banque interaméricaine de développement
IDA Association internationale de développement
IFC Société financière internationale
IFI Institution financière internationale
FMI Fonds monétaire international
IMF Institution de microfinance
MPME Micro, petites et moyennes entreprises
ORAF Cadre dâévaluation des risques opérationnels
GPC Garantie partielle de crédit
FGPC Fonds de garanties partielles de crédit
PGPC Programme de garanties partielles de crédit
PDNA Ãvaluation des besoins après-catastrophe
ODP Objectif de développement de projet
SIG Don dâinvestissement spécifique
SME Petites et moyennes entreprises
USAID Agence pour le développement international des Ãtats-Unis
USD Dollar des Ãtats-Unis
ii
Vice-présidente : Pamela Cox
Directeur-pays : Yvonne Tsikata
Directeur sectoriel : Marcelo Giugale
Responsable sectoriel : Lily Chu
Chef de lâéquipe de Juan Buchenau
projet :
iii
Table des matières
I\. Contexte stratégique\. 1
A\. Contexte du pays \. 1
B\. Contexte sectoriel et institutionnel \. 2
C\. Objectifs de haut niveau auxquels contribue le projet\. 3
II\. Objectifs de développement de projet\. 4
A\. ODP \. 4
B\. Bénéficiaires du projet\. 4
C\. Indicateurs de résultats de lâODP \. 4
III\. Description du projet\. 4
A\. Composantes du projet \. 6
a) Première composante : Soutien à lâoctroi de garanties partielles de crédit (2,5
millions de dollars)\. 6
b) Deuxième composante : Assistance technique au secteur financier (0,5 million de
dollars)\. 8
B\. Financement du projet \. 9
a) Instrument de prêt \. 9
b) Tableau de financement du projet\. 10
C\. Leçons apprises et prises en compte dans la conception du projet\. 10
IV\. Exécution\. 12
A\. Mécanismes institutionnels et dâexécution\. 12
a) Première composante : Soutien à la fourniture de garanties partielles de crédit \. 12
b) Deuxième composante : Assistance technique au secteur financier\. 13
B\. Suivi et évaluation des résultats \. 13
C\. Soutenabilité \. 14
V\. Principaux risques \. 14
A\. Première composante : Soutien à lâoctroi de garanties partielles de crédit \. 14
B\. Deuxième composante : Assistance technique au secteur financier\. 15
VI\. Résumé de lâévaluation prospective\. 16
A\. Analyse économique et financière\. 16
B\. Analyse technique\. 16
C\. Gestion financière\. 17
iv
D\. Passation des marchés \. 18
E\. Incidences sociales et environnementales \. 19
Annexe 1 : Cadre de suivi des résultats\. 21
Annexe 2 : Description détaillée du projet\. 23
Annexe 3 : Modalités dâexécution \. 29
Annexe 4 : Cadre dâévaluation des risques opérationnels (ORAF) \. 43
Annexe 5 : Plan dâappui à lâexécution \. 45
Annexe 6 : Composition de lâéquipe\. 47
Annexe 7 : Le système financier haïtien \. 48
Annexe 8 : Le Fonds de développement industriel \. 53
v
DOCUMENT DâÃVALUATION DE PROJET â FICHE DE DONNÃES
HAÃTI
DOCUMENT DâÃVALUATION DE PROJET
Région Amérique latine et Caraïbes
Unité finance et secteur privé
Date : 19 novembre 2010 Secteur(s) : Secteur financier
Directeur-pays : Yvonne Tsikata Thème(s) : Secteur financier, Financement des
Directeur sectoriel : Marcelo Giugale MPME
Responsable sectoriel : Lily Chu Catégorie dâévaluation environnementale : B
Chef(s) dâéquipe : Juan Buchenau
Numéro dâidentification du projet : P121391
Instrument de prêt : Don dâinvestissement
spécifique
Données relatives au financement du projet :
Modalités proposées :
[ ] Prêt [ ] Crédit [X ] Don [ ] Garantie [ ] Autres :
Source Montant total (en millions de dollars)
Coût total du projet : USD 35,5
Bénéficiaire : 0
Autres ressources de cofinancement : USD 32,5
Montant total du financement de la Banque : USD 3,0
BIRD 0
IDA
Financements nouveaux USD 3,0 (contre-valeur en dollars)
Bénéficiaire : République dâHaïti
Organisme responsable : Banque de la République dâHaïti (BRH) / Fonds de développement
industriel (FDI)
Personne à contacter : Lhermite François
Numéro de téléphone : 509 244 9728
Courriel : fdi@fdiHaïti\.org
vi
Montants estimatifs des décaissements (Exercice de la Banque/millions de dollars)
Ex\. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Annuel 2,5 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,0
Cumulé 2,5 2,6 2,7 2,8 2,9 3,0 3,0
Durée dâexécution du projet : 6 ans
Date prévue dâentrée en vigueur : 28 février 2011
Date prévue de clôture: 28 février 2017
Les 2,5 millions de dollars seront décaissés à titre dâavance et compteront comme des dépenses
éligibles à mesure que des demandes de paiements de garantie seront présentées\. La durée
dâexécution est fixée à 6 ans afin de donner une stabilité au Fonds de garantie partielle de crédit
(le « FGPC ») décrit dans la première composante du Projet\.
Le projet sâécarte-t-il de la Stratégie dâaide-pays du Groupe de la Non
Banque mondiale (CAS) pour Haïti pour la période de lâex\. 09 Ã
lâEx\. 12 par son contenu ou sur dâautres aspects importants ?
Le projet nécessite-t-il des dérogations aux politiques de la Non
Banque ? Néant
Ces dérogations ont-elles été approuvées/entérinées (le cas
échéant par la direction de la Banque) ? Néant
Toute dérogation à la politique est-elle soumise à lâapprobation
du Conseil ?
Le projet respecte-t-il les critères régionaux relatifs à lâétat de Oui
préparation pour la mise en Åuvre ?
Objectif de développement du projet
Le Projet vise à soutenir la mise en place dâun Programme de garantie partielle de crédit par le
Bénéficiaire en vue dâaider les i) institutions financières à relancer leurs activités de prêt ; et
ii) les emprunteurs auprès du secteur financier à surmonter lâimpact de la situation dâurgence1\.
1
Le terme « urgence » est un terme générique défini et utilisé pour toutes les opérations en Haïti pour faire référence
aux conséquences du tremblement de terre de janvier 2010\.
vii
Description du projet
La première composante du Projet consistera à soutenir lâoctroi de garanties partielles de crédit
aux institutions financières participantes en vue de réduire leurs risques de crédit sur i) les prêts
de faible montant aux emprunteurs éligibles2 et ii) les prêts aux micro, petites et moyennes
entreprises (MPME) et les prêts immobiliers par lâappui au fonctionnement dâun Fonds de
garantie partielle de crédit (le « FGPC ») qui sera créé par le Bénéficiaire dans des conditions
jugées satisfaisantes par lâAssociation, sous réserve des dispositions pertinentes de la section
IV\.B\. de lâannexe 2 Ã lâAccord de financement\.
La deuxième composante, à savoir lâassistance technique au secteur financier, fournira un appui Ã
la conception et lâexécution de mesures visant à lever les obstacles à la croissance du crédit\.
Quelles politiques de sauvegarde sont déclenchées ?
Ãvaluation environnementale (OP/BP 4\.01) x Oui Non
Habitats naturels (OP/BP 4\.04) Oui x Non
Forêts (OP/BP 4\.36) Oui x Non
Lutte antiparasitaire (OP 4\.09) x Oui Non
Ressources culturelles physiques (OP/BP 4\.11) x Oui Non
Populations autochtones (OP/BP 4\.10) Oui x Non
Réinstallation involontaire (OP/BP 4\.12) Oui x Non
Sécurité des barrages (OP/BP 4\.37) Oui x Non
Projets sur des voies dâeau internationales (OP/BP 7\.50) Oui x Non
Projets dans des zones disputées (OP/BP 7\.60) Oui x Non
Conditions et accords juridiques :
Référence de lâAccord Description de la condition/accord Date dâéchéance
de financement
Article IV Manuel opérationnel jugé satisfaisant par Entrée en vigueur
lâIDA
Article IV Signature du Protocole dâAccord MEF-FDI Entrée en vigueur
jugé satisfaisant par lâIDA3
Annexe 2, section I\.E ; Un système de gestion environnementale et Avant le premier
Annexe 2, section sociale jugé satisfaisant par lâIDA décaissement au titre de
IV\.B\.1 (b) la Catégorie 1 (a)4 et au
plus tard 6 mois après
lâentrée en vigueur
Annexe 2, section Ouverture du compte de GPC Avant le premier
IV\.B\.1 (b) décaissement au titre de
la Catégorie 1 (a)
2
Les emprunteurs admissibles sont ceux dont les prêts étaient productifs avant le tremblement de terre, qui ont subi
les conséquences néfastes de la catastrophe et qui devraient être en mesure de sâacquitter de leurs obligations selon
les modalités définies à la suite dâune restructuration de leur dette et, le cas échéant, dâun financement additionnel\.
3
Protocole dâAccord MEF-FDI pour la gestion du programme de garanties partielles du risque de crédit post-
séisme et la rétrocession des ressources\.
4
Se reporter à la page 33 pour la correspondance entre les catégories de décaissement et les composantes du projet\.
viii
Annexe 2, section Recrutement dâun consultant pour aider le Avant le premier
IV\.B\.1 (b) FDI à assurer la gestion du Pilier 1 décaissement au titre de
la Catégorie (a)
Annexe 2, section I\.A\.2 Recrutement de lâAgent fiduciaire Au plus tard le 30
(d) septembre 2011
Schedule 2, Section Création du Comité de pilotage Au plus tard le
I\.A\.1 31 décembre 2010
Schedule 2, Section Recrutement dâun vérificateur des comptes Au plus tard 6 mois
II\.B\.4 indépendant après lâentrée en vigueur
Annexe 2, section Création du Fonds de garantie partielle de Avant le premier
IV\.B\.1 (c) crédit et modalités dâexécution jugées décaissement au titre de
satisfaisantes par lâIDA la Catégorie 1 (b)
Annexe 2, section I\.E\.1 Mise à jour du système de gestion Avant le premier
(b) (ii) environnementale et sociale, jugée décaissement au titre de
satisfaisante par lâIDA la Catégorie 1 (b)
Annexe 2, section II\. Examen à mi-parcours Au plus tard 24 mois
A\.2 après lâentrée en vigueur
ix
I\. Contexte stratégique
A\. Contexte du pays
1\. Haïti est le pays le plus pauvre de lâhémisphère Ouest\. Quelque 78 % de sa population
9,6 millions dâhabitants vit en dessous du seuil de pauvreté (moins de 2 dollars par jour), dont
54 % dans une extrême pauvreté (moins de 1 dollar par jour)\. Au cours des deux dernières
décennies, il a été affecté par des événements naturels défavorables, la volatilité des prix des
matières premières et des crises économiques et sociales\.
2\. Malgré un environnement aussi incertain, lâéconomie haïtienne a montré des signes de
performance\. Le pays a réalisé des taux de croissance économique de 2,5 % par an en moyenne
au cours de la période de 2007 à 2009, tandis quâon a observé un impact minime de la crise
mondiale et une reprise après les ouragans qui ont frappé le pays\. Cette tendance sâest maintenue
pendant la période dâoctobre à décembre 2009\. La croissance a atteint 2,9 % pendant lâexercice
(Ex\.) 2009 (qui a pris fin en septembre 2009), grâce à une forte production agricole et
industrielle, tandis que lâinflation annuelle atteignait un point bas à -4,7 %, à cause de la chute
des prix mondiaux des produits de base\. En outre, le déficit budgétaire (hors dons et projets
financés par des ressources extérieures) a été contenu à 4,4 % du PIB grâce à une politique
efficace de consolidation des finances publiques\. Les exportations de produits textiles ont
augmenté suite à la Loi HOPE5 du Gouvernement américain et du faible niveau des prix des
importations\. Les exportations et le maintien à un niveau stable des envois de fonds des
travailleurs migrants ont permis de réduire le déficit du compte courant extérieur à 3,2 % du PIB
pendant lâexercice 09, contre 4,5 % pendant lâexercice 08\.
3\. Les résultats positifs enregistrés récemment par Haïti ont été réduits à néant le 12 janvier
2010 lorsque le pays a été secoué par un tremblement de terre dâune magnitude de 7,0\.
Lâépicentre du séisme était situé à seulement 17 kilomètres au sud-ouest de la zone densément
peuplée de la capitale, Port-au-Prince\. Plus de 230 000 personnes ont perdu la vie lors de la
catastrophe\. Des centaines de milliers dâHaïtiens se sont retrouvés sans toit et ont fui la zone
affectée pour se réfugier dans les provinces, aggravant ainsi une situation économique déjÃ
difficile dans ces régions\. Nombre dâentre eux sont retournés depuis à Port-au-Prince où ils
vivent dans des camps de réfugiés\.
4\. LâÃvaluation des besoins après la catastrophe (PDNA) préparée par une équipe conjointe
composée de représentants du Gouvernement haïtien et de membres de la communauté
internationale a évalué lâimpact des pertes et des dommages à 8 milliards de dollars, ce qui
correspond à 1,2 fois le PIB du pays en 2009\. Les coûts et les besoins de reconstruction sont
estimés par le PDNA à 12 milliards de dollars\. Lâimpact économique global du tremblement de
5
Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act\. Cette Loi comprend des règles
commerciales spéciales qui accordent un accès préférentiel aux importations américaines de vêtements haïtiens\.
1
terre est susceptible dâentraîner une baisse de 8,5 % du taux de croissance du PIB du pays en
2010\. On s'attend cependant à un rebond de 9,8 % pour lâexercice 11 et de 8,4 % pendant
lâexercice 12\.
5\. Le tremblement de terre a affecté de façon disproportionnée lâactivité économique, car il
est survenu près de la zone de Port-au-Prince où se trouve concentrée 65 % de lâactivité
économique\. Ses répercussions ont été particulièrement préjudiciables pour le secteur privé qui,
selon le PDNA, a subi des dommages et des pertes dâun montant de 5,7 milliards de dollars (70
% du montant total des dommages et des pertes)\. Les segments du secteur privé qui ont été les
plus touchés ont été le secteur du logement, qui a subi des dommages évalués à 2,3 milliards de
dollars, suivi par le commerce, lâenseignement privé, lâindustrie, lâalimentation et le transport\.
Le séisme a entraîné une perturbation des sources de revenu des emprunteurs tout en entamant la
qualité des actifs physiques et des stocks\. Par conséquent, le tremblement de terre a mis à mal la
capacité des acteurs du secteur privé dâhonorer les conditions de leurs prêts et a réduit la valeur
de leurs garanties\.
B\. Contexte sectoriel et institutionnel
6\. Avant le tremblement de terre, la santé du secteur financier était jugée généralement
bonne, même sâil faisait face à de sérieux problèmes de développement\. LâÃvaluation de la
stabilité du système financier (FSSA) de 20086 a conclu que le système financier en Haïti a peu
contribué à soutenir la croissance économique\. Diverses entraves ont été observées telles que les
cadres juridique et institutionnel, une situation sécuritaire fragile, une concurrence limitée entre
les banques, la mauvaise gouvernance, des coefficients de réserves obligatoires élevés et
lâabsence dâun bureau de crédit fonctionnel (se reporter à lâannexe 7 sur le secteur financier)\.
7\. En décembre 2009, le secteur bancaire en Haïti comprenait neuf banques commerciales,
dont deux banques publiques (BNC et BPH) et sept banques privées\. Le système était fortement
concentré, les trois principales banques détenant 80 % du total des actifs\. Lâaccès au crédit
bancaire était limité, car les prêts (net de provisions) représentaient seulement 30 % du montant
total des avoirs du secteur bancaire (ce ratio se situe aux alentours de 60 % dans la région)\. Les
prêts improductifs se montaient à 8,6 % pour le secteur, mais faisaient apparaître des niveaux de
performance différents entre les banques\. Le système était très liquide (le ratio des liquidités et
des investissements à court terme par rapport aux dépôts était proche de 40 %), surtout à cause
du montant important des réserves obligatoires fixées par la Banque centrale (la Banque de la
République dâHaïti, BRH) en monnaie nationale et en devises\.
8\. Les répercussions du tremblement de terre sur les institutions financières du pays se sont
manifestées à trois niveaux : i) les institutions financières ont perdu des membres de leur
personnel et ont subi des dommages dans leurs secteurs dâactivité ; ii) la qualité des portefeuilles
6
LâÃvaluation de la stabilité du système financier, comprenant un Rapport sur lâobservation des normes et codes sur
la surveillance bancaire, 27 mars 2008\.
2
sâest détériorée, car la capacité de remboursement des emprunteurs a été mise à mal et ceux
vivant dans les zones affectées ont perdu leur nantissement ; et iii) ceci a poussé les banques Ã
restreindre le crédit aux emprunteurs existants à jour de leurs échéances\. Les banques sont
parvenues à rouvrir leurs agences neuf jours après la catastrophe malgré lâampleur des pertes
humaines et matérielles\.
9\. Les données les plus récentes, établies au mois de juin 2010, montrent un ratio de prêts
improductifs de 11,9 %, ce qui représente un ratio relativement stable depuis mars\. Ce ratio
relativement faible après une catastrophe dâune telle ampleur sâexplique par le fait que les
banques ont annulé les créances irrécouvrables\. Toutefois, la part des i) prêts « à signaler » qui
correspondent aux prêts accusant plus de 30 jours dâimpayés, mais qui nâont pas encore été
classés comme créances irrécouvrables et des ii) prêts restructurés a augmenté, passant de 13,9 %
en septembre 2009 à 23,5 % en juin 2010\. En outre, les banques nâont pas repris leurs activités
de prêt\. Le stock total de prêts (net de provisions) est tombé de 33,3 milliards de gourdes en
septembre 2009 Ã 28,8 milliards de gourdes en juin 2010, soit une baisse de 13,5 %\. Outre ces
tendances très négatives, il existe un risque important de blocage du crédit, car nombre
dâemprunteurs ont perdu leurs garanties et ne pourraient vraisemblablement pas obtenir de
nouveaux prêts\.
C\. Objectifs de haut niveau auxquels contribue le projet
10\. Dans ce contexte caractérisé par des fortes entraves au crédit, mais aussi par une liquidité
robuste, la BRH a demandé aux bailleurs de fonds de soutenir un programme de garanties
partielles de crédit (comprenant, entre autres, un Fonds de garanties partielles de crédit (FGPC)
qui reste à créer) afin dâaider les prêteurs et les emprunteurs à restructurer leurs prêts et,
ultimement, à aider les banques et les coopératives à relancer leurs activités de crédit\.
11\. Au-delà de la restructuration des prêts, le projet contribuera à deux objectifs de haut
niveau :
⢠Stabilisation du secteur bancaire\. Les institutions financières éligibles pourront
restructurer les prêts sans porter atteinte à leur actif, car le risque de crédit sera partagé
avec le garant partiel du crédit\.
⢠Réhabilitation du secteur productif\. Nombre dâentreprises et dâemprunteurs ont perdu
leur garantie et ont du mal à accéder aux ressources financières pour financer la
reconstruction\. Les garanties mettront les entreprises en meilleure position pour négocier
la restructuration des prêts avec leurs institutions financières, pour obtenir de nouveaux
prêts et continuer de faire fonctionner leurs entreprises\.
12\. En fin de compte, ce projet contribuera à compenser la faible contribution du secteur
bancaire à la croissance économique en Haïti\. Ce problème a été soulevé dans la FSSA et a été
3
aggravé par le tremblement de terre\. à cette fin, ce projet comporte une petite composante
dâassistance technique\. Cet objectif à long terme nécessitera lâélaboration dâune stratégie globale
pour le secteur financier et davantage de ressources que celles apportées par cette opération\. Ceci
est conforme à la Stratégie dâaide-pays du Groupe de la Banque mondiale pour Haïti pour la
période allant de lâexercice 09 à lâexercice 12 (Rapport n° 48284-HT) examinée par le Conseil
des Administrateurs le 2 juin 2009, qui souligne lâimportance de lâamélioration de lâaccès au
financement, en particulier pour les PME et du renforcement du secteur financier\.
II\. Objectifs de développement de projet
A\. ODP
13\. Le principal objectif du projet est de soutenir lâélaboration dâun Programme de garanties
partielles de crédit par le Bénéficiaire visant à aider i) les institutions financières à relancer leurs
activités de prêt ; et ii) les emprunteurs auprès du secteur financier à surmonter lâimpact de la
situation dâurgence\. Cet objectif est conforme au Plan de redressement dâHaïti présenté par le
gouvernement en mars 2010\.
B\. Bénéficiaires du projet
14\. Les bénéficiaires du projet seront les banques et coopératives locales participant au
Programme de garanties partielles de crédit dont le risque de crédit sur les prêts garantis sera
partagé avec le garant partiel du crédit ainsi quâavec les emprunteurs (entreprises et particuliers),
plus particulièrement ceux qui ont été affectés par le séisme et qui ont besoin dâune assistance
temporaire pour continuer de faire fonctionner leurs entreprises\. Le projet permettra la
restructuration de leurs prêts à des conditions plus viables\.
C\. Indicateurs de résultats de lâODP
15\. Les indicateurs suivants du portefeuille de prêt serviront à mesurer la réalisation de
lâODP (se reporter à lâannexe 1 pour des repères quantifiés) :
⢠le volume de prêts restructurés au cours des deux premières années suivant le
tremblement de terre ;
⢠le volume total de prêts impayés à la fin de chaque année civile (ratio de prêts
improductifs) ;
⢠le volume total du portefeuille de prêts en cours à la fin de chaque année civile\.
Ces indicateurs tentent de mesurer lâimpact global du projet et pas uniquement lâutilisation du
Programme de garanties partielles de crédit (PGPC)7\.
III\. Description du projet
7
Les indicateurs de résultats de lâODP ont été déterminés au-delà de la seule utilisation du PGPC, car offrir une
garantie sur un prêt peut aider à réduire le montant des provisions, ce qui permettrait aux fonds propres des banques
de financer les prêts à un niveau supérieur au montant de la garantie\.
4
16\. Le projet aura deux composantes, Ã savoir : i) la fourniture de garanties partielles de
crédit (PCG) au secteur financier autour de deux axes ; ii) lâassistance technique à la conception
et la mise en Åuvre de mesures visant à lever les obstacles à la croissance du crédit\.
17\. Les ressources de lâIDA seront complétées par des financements sous forme de dons
provenant dâautres bailleurs de fonds et sâinscrivent dans le cadre dâune initiative plus vaste
visant à relancer le marché du crédit en Haïti\. Compte tenu de son expertise et de sa
connaissance préalable du système financier haïtien, lâIDA a participé à la conception du
programme et a fourni son concours dans dâautres domaines tels que le secteur des assurances\.
Dâautres bailleurs de fonds ont signalé que la participation de lâIDA sera déterminante, car elle
encouragera les bailleurs de fonds à fournir au PGPC des ressources sous forme de dons pour un
montant de lâordre de 32 millions environ\. La contribution de lâIDA est de faible montant, mais
compte tenu de son effet de levier, la décision a été prise en interne de donner le feu vert Ã
lâopération\.
18\. La conception du PGPC fait suite à une requête spécifique présentée en février 2010 par
la BRH et des banques privées\. Suite à cette requête, lâIDA a retenu des experts issus du Fonds
chilien de garantie partielle de crédit (Fondo de GarantÃa para Pequeños Empresarios,
FOGAPE) pour lâaider à concevoir le PGPC\. Un groupe composé de lâIDA, de la Banque
interaméricaine de développement (IADB) et du Département du Trésor américain (« Trésor
américain »), appuyé par des experts du FOGAPE, a collaboré avec la BRH à la conception du
PGPC ; dâimportantes contributions ont été apportées par la Société financière internationale
(SFI) et le Fonds monétaire international (FMI)\. Lâopération décrite à lâAnnexe 2 suit de près les
5
recommandations des experts et est soutenue par la BRH ainsi que par les organisations et
bailleurs de fonds multilatéraux impliqués\.
A\. Composantes du projet
a) Première composante : Soutien à lâoctroi de garanties partielles de crédit (2,5
millions de dollars)
19\. La première composante du projet appuiera lâoctroi de garanties partielles de crédit aux
institutions financières participantes pour leur permettre de réduire leurs risques de crédit sur i)
les prêts de faible montant accordés aux emprunteurs éligibles et ii) les prêts aux MPME et les
prêts immobiliers par lâappui au fonctionnement dâun Fonds de garantie partielle de crédit (le
« FGPC ») qui sera mis en place par le bénéficiaire dans des conditions jugées satisfaisantes par
lâAssociation, sous réserve des dispositions pertinentes énoncées à la Section IV\.B\. de
lâannexe 2 Ã lâAccord de financement\.
i\. Description sommaire du PGPC
20\. Le PGPC comporte deux piliers :
⢠Le Pilier 1 consistera à garantir les prêts aux clients i) dont les prêts étaient productifs
avant le tremblement de terre, ii) qui ont été, dâune manière ou dâune autre, affectés par la
catastrophe, et iii) qui sont considérés par les institutions financières comme capables dâhonorer
leurs obligations selon les termes définis suite à un processus de restructuration\. Cette sous-
composante sâadresse aux emprunteurs viables qui ont besoin dâune assistance temporaire ; elle
consistera également à accorder des financements additionnels aux emprunteurs existants, plus
particulièrement aux entreprises, afin de leur fournir un soutien temporaire\. Elle ne garantira que
des prêts de faible montant, qui devraient être inférieurs à 1 million de dollars8\. Le Pilier 1 ne
donnera pas lieu à la création dâun fonds organique\. Il aura un caractère temporaire et ne devrait
pas être autofinancé\.
⢠Le Pilier 2 garantira de nouveaux prêts accordés à des emprunteurs existants en dehors du
processus de restructuration ou à de nouveaux emprunteurs, en mettant un accent particulier sur
les PME et le logement\. Il conduira à la création dâun fonds organique (le FGPC) et devrait
fonctionner de façon financièrement autonome\.
8
Le plafond retenu sera défini dans lâAccord de financement qui sera conclu entre les bailleurs de fonds et le
Bénéficiaire\. Les prêts dâun montant plus élevé seront restructurés dans le cadre dâun programme analogue qui sera
financé séparément\.
6
21\. Lâopération présentée dans le présent document fournira des ressources sous forme de
dons en vue dâappuyer, en premier lieu, lâoctroi de garanties partielles de crédit (GPC) afin
dâaméliorer le profil de risque des institutions participantes et de faciliter la restructuration des
prêts de faible montant, tel que décrit au Pilier 1\. Les ressources qui ne seraient pas
éventuellement nécessaires pour le Pilier 1 ou qui seront dégagées lorsque le Pilier 1 aura rempli
le rôle qui lui est assigné de façon temporaire seront transférées au Pilier 2 pour appuyer la
fourniture des GPC par un FGPC organique qui sera mis en place pour faciliter les prêts aux
MPME et les prêts immobiliers\.
22\. Les institutions éligibles seront les banques commerciales et les coopératives qui satisfont
aux normes prudentielles haïtiennes (se reporter à lâannexe 2)\. Il est prévu que les institutions de
microfinance (IMF) seront couvertes par le fonds HELP qui est en train dâêtre mis sur pied par le
Fonds multilatéral dâinvestissement de la BID\.
ii\. Justification du PGPC
23\. Justification du Pilier 1 : un grand nombre dâemprunteurs auprès des banques, quâil
sâagisse dâentreprises ou de ménages, ont subi un choc négatif du fait du tremblement de terre
qui a mis à mal leur capacité dâhonorer les conditions des prêts tout en réduisant la valeur de leur
nantissement\. Cela est attesté par lâaugmentation brutale i) des prêts « à signaler » qui ne sont
pas encore improductifs, mais accusent au moins 30 jours dâimpayés et ii) les prêts restructurés\.
La dégradation subséquente de la qualité de crédit des actifs des banques a entraîné, à son tour, le
système dans un blocage du cycle du crédit qui met en danger lâacheminement des ressources de
financement vers le secteur productif\. Toutes ces évolutions sont intervenues dans un contexte où
le système bancaire est relativement liquide et où le crédit est particulièrement nécessaire pour
financer les efforts de reconstruction et relancer lâéconomie\.
24\. Comme le problème posé nâest pas le manque de liquidité, mais lâaggravation du risque
de crédit, il doit être traité en conséquence\. Le moyen le plus direct consiste à faciliter la
restructuration des prêts qui i) ont été accordés avant le tremblement de terre à des emprunteurs
qui étaient viables à lâépoque, et ii) pourraient être de nouveau viables après une restructuration
et, si possible, lâoctroi dâun financement additionnel\. Sâagissant des entreprises, le premier pilier
du PGPC envisagé vise à soutenir ce processus de restructuration en leur octroyant des garanties
leur permettant de poursuivre leurs activités\. Aider ces entreprises et ces banques à restructurer
leurs éléments dâactif et de passif réduira considérablement les coûts pour le secteur financier
dâun retour à la normale, ce qui est fondamental pour maintenir le flux de crédit en direction du
secteur productif\. Cela aidera aussi à réduire lâécart entre une offre réduite et une demande
accrue de crédit durant la phase de reconstruction\.
7
25\. La BRH a appuyé le processus de restructuration avec la publication de règlements
stipulant que les prêts restructurés nécessiteront la constitution de provisions moins élevées (2
%) que pour les prêts improductifs (20 % et plus en fonction du retard de paiement)\.
26\. Lâéquipe de projet a envisagé dâautres options qui permettraient dâatteindre des objectifs
analogues à ceux visés par le PGPC\. Cependant, ces autres solutions ont été jugées moins
efficaces que le PGPC pour les raisons suivantes :
⢠la recapitalisation des banques pour résoudre les problèmes dâinsolvabilité éventuels : la
qualité des portefeuilles de prêts sâest détériorée après le séisme et plusieurs créances
doivent être annulées (une partie de celles-ci lâa déjà été)\. En conséquence, certaines
banques pourraient devenir insolvables\. Cet instrument nâa pas été jugé approprié parce
que les banques haïtiennes ont indiqué que leurs actionnaires seraient capables de les
recapitaliser si cela sâavérait nécessaire\. La BRH sâest aussi exprimé dans ce sens\.
⢠Aide directe aux entreprises : la Banque envisage un projet de développement du secteur
privé qui fournira un appui direct aux entreprises et viendra en complément du PGPC\.
27\. Les précédentes expériences de post-catastrophe, telles que celles qui ont suivi le tsunami
de 2004 en Asie, ont mis en évidence le fait que lâabsence de garanties après une catastrophe
constituait un obstacle à la relance du secteur privé, surtout au détriment des PME9\. Les
évaluations des conséquences du tsunami en Indonésie et au Sri Lanka soulignent que le manque
de garanties pour les PME constituait un facteur important qui a empêché les banques dâoffrir
leurs services aux emprunteurs dans les zones affectées\. à cet égard, le Pilier 1 du PGPC
fournira des garanties aux entreprises qui ont perdu une partie ou la totalité de leur garantie
initiale ou ont besoin dâun financement-relais pour surmonter les facteurs qui limitent
temporairement leur capacité de production\.
28\. Justification du Pilier 2 : ce Pilier soutiendra de façon durable la croissance du crédit pour
faire face à une demande accrue de prêts dans le cadre du processus de reconstruction et des
plans de croissance ambitieux du pays\. Il facilitera la fourniture de prêts aux entreprises et
ménages viables dont la capacité de remboursement justifie lâoctroi de financements dâun
montant plus important que celui de la garantie quâils ont à offrir\. Ce faisant, il tirera les
enseignements de lâexpérience des entités qui ont obtenu des succès dans dâautres pays\.
b) Deuxième composante : Assistance technique au secteur financier (0,5 million de
dollars)
9
Sri Lanka, Post-Tsunami Reconstruction and Recovery, rapport conjoint du Gouvernement sri-lankais et des
partenaires de développement, décembre 2005 ; Aceh and Nias: One Year After The Tsunami: The Recovery Effort
and Way Forward ; rapport conjoint de la BRR et des partenaires de développement, décembre 2005\.
8
29\. Si le PGPC lèvera certains des obstacles à la fourniture de prêts en offrant aux
emprunteurs une couverture supplémentaire, la deuxième composante fournira un appui à la
conception et à la mise en Åuvre de mesures visant à lever les obstacles à la croissance du crédit,
suivant en cela le diagnostic et les suggestions de la FSSA\.
30\. La BRH a recommandé la constitution dâun groupe de travail consultatif du secteur
financier qui regroupera les institutions ayant participé à la conception du PGPC et qui se réunira
régulièrement pour débattre des problèmes liés au secteur financier et soutenir les activités
connexes\. Cette composante du don fournira des données techniques (études de consultants) pour
la conception et la mise en Åuvre de mesures visant à améliorer les conditions de crédit dans le
pays\. Sur la base des discussions préliminaires avec les bailleurs de fonds, les activités soutenues
pourraient intervenir dans les domaines suivants :
⢠la modernisation de lâinfrastructure financière par lâadoption de mesures telles que la
mise en place dâun registre des garanties moderne et de réglementations relatives aux
biens meubles ou le renforcement dâun bureau du crédit nouvellement créé\. Pour réduire
les coûts de transaction pour les prêteurs et les emprunteurs, elle pourrait inclure
également la modernisation du système de paiement et de sa connectivité avec les
coopératives et les institutions de microfinance (suivant ainsi la restauration de la
fonctionnalité du système de paiement du pays dans le cadre du programme
dâintervention dâurgence de la Banque mondiale)\.
⢠Améliorer les règlementations et les méthodes de surveillance en vue de favoriser une
croissance ordonnée et une consolidation du secteur des coopératives et de la
microfinance, qui pourraient constituer une source importante de prêts aux segments Ã
faible revenu du marché\.
⢠Soutenir certains intermédiaires afin dâaméliorer leur efficacité opérationnelle\.
31\. Comme indiqué, les activités entrant dans le cadre de cette composante doivent être
définies de façon stratégique par la BRH en coordination avec les autres bailleurs de fonds et
sous réserve de disponibilité dâautres sources de financement\.
B\. Financement du projet
a) Instrument de prêt
32\. La contribution de lâIDA au projet sera exécutée sous la forme dâun don dâinvestissement
spécifique (SIG) dâun montant de 2 millions de DTS (représentant la contre-valeur de 3 millions
de dollars) à la République dâHaïti\.
9
b) Tableau de financement du projet
33\. Lâestimation du financement est basée sur les chiffres relatifs au portefeuille de prêts
fourni par la BRH au 30 juin 2010, qui font ressortir un montant préliminaire de
140 millions de dollars de prêts restructurés remplissant les critères fixés, ce qui représente un
besoin de financement de 35 millions de dollars (voir annexe 2 pour des renseignements
détaillés)\.
34\. Le PGPC sera financé par des ressources provenant du Fonds de reconstruction dâHaïti
(FRH), un fonds fiduciaire multi-bailleurs créé à cet effet pour la reconstruction du pays, qui a
approuvé 12,5 millions de dollars, avec la BID comme entité partenaire\. Le financement du
PGPC qui est assuré grâce aux ressources du FRH bénéficie du soutien du Trésor américain\. En
outre, la BID a approuvé un don de 20 millions de dollars pour le financement du PGPC\. Les
contributions de lâIDA, de la BID et du FRH financeront le guichet destiné à soutenir la
restructuration des prêts de faible montant (Pilier 1)\. Toutes les ressources de ce don qui ne sont
pas nécessaires pour la réalisation du Pilier 1 ou qui seront libérées après le remboursement des
prêts restructurés seront transférées au Pilier 2\.
Tableau 1 : Tableau de financement du projet (comprenant les cofinancements)
Composante et/ou activité Contribution totale Cofinancement Total
de lâIDA de la BID/FRH
(contrevaleur en
millions de dollars)
Composante 1 : Programme de
garanties partielles de crédit
Pilier 1 â Petits prêts restructurés 2,5 32,5 35
Pilier 2 â FGPC à déterminer à déterminer à déterminer
Composante 2 : Assistance 0,5 à déterminer 0,5 / Ã
technique déterminer
Total 3 32,5 35,5
35\. Le financement du Pilier 2 nâa pas encore été défini de façon précise\. Le Pilier 2 sera
financé grâce aux fonds non utilisés du Pilier 1, qui seront complétés par des contributions
additionnelles provenant du guichet Secteur privé de la BID qui est dans la phase initiale de
préparation dâune opération et, si possible, dâautres partenaires de financement à vocation
commerciale tels que la SFI\.
C\. Leçons apprises et prises en compte dans la conception du projet
36\. La justification de lâintervention de lâIDA découle de i) son expérience en matière de
conception et de financement de fonds de garanties partielles de crédit, ii) la compétence quâelle
a acquise en matière de conception et de mise en Åuvre de programmes dâassistance technique
10
au secteur financier dans plusieurs pays, et iii) son implication active dans la conception du
programme en Haïti et la coordination dâun large éventail dâacteurs\. Jusquâici les GPC nâont
jamais été utilisées pour atténuer lâimpact des catastrophes comme prévu dans le Pilier 1, mais
plusieurs leçons très importantes ont été tirées de lâutilisation des fonds de garanties partielles de
crédit autofinancés, qui sont semblables à celui qui doit être créé au titre du Pilier 2\. Ces leçons
sont présentées au paragraphe qui suit\.
37\. Quatre mécanismes de partage des risques gérés par lâIDA/SFI ou projets de garanties
partielles de crédit destinés à soutenir le crédit aux MPME ont été approuvés à Madagascar, au
Mali, au Ghana et au Sénégal\. Un groupe spécial SFI/IDA a été créé en avril 2008 pour examiner
lâexpérience de ces mécanismes et, plus particulièrement, lâutilisation des ressources de lâIDA
dans des opérations de garanties partielles de crédit10\. Le groupe spécial a conclu que les
premiers résultats tirés de lâéchantillon réduit dâopérations de garanties partielles de crédit étaient
encourageants et a noté que les résultats du projet réalisé à Madagascar (lancé en 2006) avaient
été impressionnants\. En trois ans, les deux banques commerciales participantes ont approuvé
plus de 1 200 nouveaux prêts aux PME évalués à 30 millions de dollars ; des financements de
lâIDA dâun montant de 2,5 millions de dollars sont venus compléter un investissement de la SFI
de 10 millions de dollars et un financement des banques commerciales dâun montant de
12,5 millions de dollars\. Le groupe spécial a conclu quâil fallait sâinspirer de lâexpérience
dâautres pays et proposé la mise en place dâun programme pilote associant un petit nombre de
fonds de garantie partielle de crédit utilisant les ressources de lâIDA\. Le présent projet fait partie
du pilote\.
38\. Le Pilier 1 de lâopération envisagée est différent des expériences mentionnées plus haut :
⢠il sâagit dâune opération de restructuration : il garantira des prêts existants qui étaient
productifs avant le tremblement de terre et qui ont été restructurés afin de les rendre de
nouveau viables ;
⢠il nâest pas prévu quâil soit autofinancé ;
⢠il expire à l'issue d'une période de 5 ans\.
39\. Le Pilier 1, qui est consacré aux prêts restructurés existants qui ont été affectés par le
tremblement de terre, nâa pas de précédent connu\. Par conséquent, la conception du Pilier 1
intègre une « clause de flexibilité » en vertu de laquelle certaines dispositions (commission,
déductible, période de disponibilité, ratios de levier financier et de couverture) peuvent être
modifiées par le Comité de pilotage (voir paragraphe 40) pour tenir compte des conditions de
marché\. Lâorganisme dâexécution sera assisté par des consultants expérimentés pour ajuster les
procédures et réduire les coûts de transaction en cas de besoin\.
10
Task Force Report: Review on the Use of IDA funds for Risk Sharing Facilities and Partial Credit Guarantee
Projects, juillet 2009\.
11
IV\. Exécution
A\. Mécanismes institutionnels et dâexécution
a) Première composante : Soutien à la fourniture de garanties partielles de crédit
40\. Le projet est coordonné étroitement avec la BRH, la BID et le Trésor américain\. Un
Comité de pilotage comprenant la BRH, le ministère haïtien des finances et les bailleurs de fonds
(dont certains font office dâobservateurs, dans la mesure où cela est permis par leurs règles
respectives) superviseront la gestion du PGPC\.
41\. Lâorganisme dâexécution du PGPC (Pilier 1) sera le Fonds de développement industriel
(FDI)\. Le FDI est une institution spécialisée de la BRH dotée dâune autonomie opérationnelle et
financière et dont la mission est de promouvoir le développement du secteur privé par la
fourniture de prêts et de garanties aux PME\. Malgré sa surface financière réduite (35 millions de
dollars dâactifs au 30 septembre 2009), le FDI a fait preuve dâune gestion adéquate (avec des
bénéfices non distribués représentant 30 % des actifs) et dâune capacité institutionnelle
satisfaisante, selon une évaluation effectuée par la BID\. En outre, contrairement à la littérature
qui souligne que le choix dâune entité publique pour gérer un fonds de garanties partielles de
crédit est susceptible dâaccroître le risque de crédit11, le choix du FDI a été motivé par les
résultats satisfaisants quâil a obtenus et par lâurgence du lancement de lâopération\. Il importe de
souligner que le Pilier 1 est temporaire (il a une durée de vie estimée à 5 ans)\.
42\. Les responsabilités du FDI, en qualité dâorganisme dâexécution, seront entre autres de :
i) examiner la documentation correspondante sur les portefeuilles à garantir ; ii) approuver
lâoctroi de garanties partielles de crédit et soumettre des informations à lâagent fiduciaire ;
iii) percevoir les droits acquittés par les institutions participantes ; v) vérifier lâadmissibilité des
prêts, le respect des clauses de la garantie et le paiement de tous les frais de garantie à ce jour ;
v) vérifier que les institutions participantes remplissent toujours les critères dâéligibilité , comme
indiqué dans le Manuel opérationnel\.
43\. Un conseiller individuel ou un cabinet de consultants seront recrutés par le FDI pour
lâaider dans la gestion du programme et le transfert des connaissances\. Par ailleurs, un agent
fiduciaire veillera à lâutilisation appropriée des ressources allouées au Pilier 1\. Concrètement,
lâagent fiduciaire sera chargé de : i) lâanalyse ex-post des portefeuilles en sélectionnant et en
visitant certaines institutions financières et certains emprunteurs afin de déterminer si les
banques ont intégré dans leurs portefeuilles des créances non viables ou des créances qui violent
les dispositifs de sauvegarde sociale et environnementale ; ii) autoriser le déblocage des fonds
dès la mise en jeu des garanties\. La BID financera les coûts relatifs aux conseillers et à lâagent
fiduciaire\.
11
Beck, Klapper, Mendoza, Typology of Partial Credit Guarantee Funds around the world, document dâétude sur les
politiques de la Banque mondiale n° 4771, 2008\.
12
44\. Les opérations du Pilier 1 du PGPC seront définies dans le Manuel opérationnel, qui
sâinscrira dans le cadre de lâaccord conclu entre le FDI et le ministère haïtien des Finances\. Ces
deux documents seront une condition dâentrée en vigueur de lâAccord de financement\.
45\. Les opérations du Pilier 2 seront conçues en coordination avec les entités contribuant Ã
son financement\. Les fonds provenant du don de lâIDA appuieront le Pilier 2 Ã la condition que
le FGPC soit mis en place dans des conditions jugées satisfaisantes par lâIDA et fonctionne
suivant des modalités jugées satisfaisantes par lâIDA\. Si ces conditions sont remplies, les fonds
provenant du don de lâIDA peuvent être transférés en une ou plusieurs tranches\. Dans tous les
cas, les règles de lâIDA devront être respectées, et les modalités d'exécution du FGPC stipuler
notamment que : i) les fonds fournis au FGPC doivent être utilisés aux fins visées et pour le
financement des dépenses autorisées ou être restitués à lâIDA ; et que ii) le FGPC doit conserver
des écritures comptables adéquates, fournir des rapports réguliers à lâIDA et autoriser des visites
et des inspections de lâIDA\.
b) Deuxième composante : Assistance technique au secteur financier
46\. La deuxième composante sera exécutée par la BRH\. La BRH recrutera des consultants
afin dâaméliorer les conditions de crédit, notamment aux entreprises et exploitations agricoles, et
pour le logement\.
B\. Suivi et évaluation des résultats
47\. Les indicateurs de résultat du projet seront les suivants (se reporter à lâannexe 1) :
⢠le volume des prêts restructurés au cours des deux premières années suivant le
tremblement de terre ;
⢠le volume total de prêts impayés à la fin de chaque année civile (ratio de prêt
improductifs) ;
⢠le volume total du portefeuille de prêts en cours à la fin de chaque année civile\.
Comme lâune des principales retombées du projet est sa capacité à catalyser des fonds provenant
dâautres bailleurs de fonds, le financement additionnel mobilisé par le projet pour renforcer le
développement du secteur financier fera également lâobjet de suivi\.
48\. En outre, comme le projet fait partie dâun programme pilote visant la mise en place de
fonds de garantie partielle de crédit utilisant les ressources de lâIDA pour développer le secteur
des PME, il est envisagé de collecter également les indicateurs suivants concernant les
institutions participantes au titre du Pilier 2 du PGPC, sâils sont toutefois disponibles :
⢠nombre de comptes de prêts actifs ouverts pour des micro-entreprises (moins de
1 000 dollars) et des PME (entre 1 000 et 1 million de dollars) ;
⢠montant des comptes de prêts actifs ouverts pour des micro-entreprises et des PME ;
13
⢠portefeuille à risque moyen ;
⢠rendement des actifs\.
49\. Au plus tard 24 mois après lâentrée en vigueur, lâorganisme dâexécution soumettra un
rapport dâévaluation à mi-parcours sur : i) la mesure dans laquelle les objectifs et les résultats ont
été atteints sur la base de la matrice des résultats, et ii) les mesures qui pourraient être prises dans
le cas où le projet serait considéré comme nâayant pas atteint une grande partie de ses objectifs\.
C\. Soutenabilité
50\. En raison de lâimportance quâil accorde aux prêts restructurés, le Pilier 1 ne devrait pas
être autofinancé\. Toutefois, il contribuera à la soutenabilité globale du secteur financier en
améliorant lâactif des institutions financières et du secteur productif, et en permettant aux
entreprises touchées par le tremblement de terre dâassurer la continuité de leur exploitation\. Sâil
fonctionne avec succès, le Pilier 1 réduira les coûts que fait peser le tremblement de terre sur les
portefeuilles des banques et permettra de préserver lâaccès dâun nombre important dâemprunteurs
aux services financiers, aux conditions du marché\.
51\. Il est prévu que le Pilier 2 soit autofinancé et fasse intervenir des investisseurs à vocation
commerciale et bénéficie des expériences réussies dans dâautres pays\.
V\. Principaux risques
A\. Première composante : Soutien à lâoctroi de garanties partielles de crédit
52\. Disponibilité de financements insuffisants pour couvrir les créances présentées par les
intermédiaires financiers\. Même en procédant à une évaluation des portefeuilles de prêts au
30 juin 2010, il est très difficile dâestimer le financement nécessaire pour le Pilier 1\. Le besoin de
financement est estimé aujourdâhui à hauteur de 35 millions de dollars\. Si la demande de garantie
dépasse la capacité du PGPC, un financement additionnel devra être mobilisé ou des ajustements
devront être apportés au montant maximum des garanties\.
53\. Financement insuffisant pour faire face aux demandes de paiement de garanties\. Le
Pilier 1 du PGPC est structuré avec un levier financier représentant deux fois les ressources
disponibles (le programme peut accorder des garanties équivalant à deux fois son capital)\. Dans
lâéventualité improbable où le montant des réclamations serait supérieur aux ressources
disponibles, une règle conditionnelle applicable dans le cadre du programme sera activée, en
vertu de laquelle la BRH règlera les réclamations résiduelles qui nâont pu être remboursées avec
les ressources disponibles\.
14
54\. Absence de cofinancement\. Ce risque est jugé faible, car le financement du FRH a été
approuvé en août 2010 et celui de la BID le 29 septembre 2010\.
55\. Utilisation insuffisante du PGPC\. Comme il est prévu que les institutions financières
acquittent des frais en guise de contribution au financement des charges du PGPC, son utilisation
peut ne pas présenter dâintérêt pour certaines dâentre elles\. Dans le cas où des ressources du
Pilier 1 nâauraient pas été utilisées par lâIDA à la fin de la période de disponibilité, et si les fonds
débloqués au titre du Pilier 1 permettent de réaliser lâobjectif visé, ces fonds seront transférés au
Pilier 2, à condition que le FGPC organique soit créé et que sa gouvernance et sa gestion soient
jugées satisfaisantes\. Si une partie des ressources de lâIDA nâest pas utilisée
12 mois avant la clôture ou à une date plus avancée qui sera convenue entre le Bénéficiaire et
lâAssociation, ces ressources seront réaffectées à la composante 2 (les activités spécifiques, les
budgets et les mécanismes dâexécution devront être définis dâun commun accord entre lâIDA et
le Bénéficiaire)\.
56\. Risque de perte ou dâutilisation inappropriée\. Ãtant donné que le projet est une opération
de restructuration, il est probable que le risque de crédit lié aux prêts bénéficiant de garanties soit
plus élevé que dans le cas dâune opération de garantie relative à de nouveaux prêts et ce risque
est inhérent à lâopération\. Il est cependant difficile, à ce stade, de déterminer le montant des
pertes que supportera le Pilier 1\. Des mesures ont été prises afin dâéviter les pertes dues à la prise
en charge de prêts non viables dans le cadre du programme\. Lâagent fiduciaire veillera à les
ressources du programme soient utilisées conformément à ses principes fondateurs et limitera le
risque de fraude et de corruption\. Le Manuel opérationnel prévoira des sanctions pour les
institutions financières qui présentent des créances non viables dépassant un certain seuil\.
57\. Coordination avec dâautres mécanismes de garantie\. LâUSAID gère une facilité
degaranties partielles a faible coût en Haïti (par le biais de sa Direction des crédits de
développement, la DCA) qui pourrait éventuellement faire doublon avec le PGPC présenté ici\.
Lâéquipe a engagé des échanges avec lâUSAID/DCA afin de coordonner les actions futures\.
Dâautres institutions envisagent avec différentes banques la mise en place de mécanismes de
partage des risques qui pourraient être similaires au PGPC\.
58\. Nécessité dâaccompagner le PGPC de réformes profondes\. Le PGPC ne résoudra pas les
problèmes préalables du système financier qui empêchaient les banques dâoctroyer des crédits
avant le tremblement de terre\. Ce risque sera atténué par la deuxième composante du présent
projet qui vise à concevoir des mesures destinées à lever les obstacles à la croissance du crédit\.
B\. Deuxième composante : Assistance technique au secteur financier
15
59\. Le principal risque concernant la deuxième composante tient à la coordination
insuffisante avec les autres bailleurs de fonds, qui pourraient retarder ou empêcher la
conception et la mise en Åuvre de mesures visant à lever les obstacles à la croissance du crédit\.
Ce risque est atténué, car cette composante bénéficiera des apports techniques du groupe de
travail sur le secteur financier qui comprend en son sein quelques-unes des principales entités qui
contribuent au développement du secteur financier\.
60\. Un autre risque important est lié au manque de ressources : lâexécution de la deuxième
composante dépend de la disponibilité de financements pour la mise en Åuvre des réformes
devant être identifiées dans le cadre de lâassistance technique\.
VI\. Résumé de lâévaluation prospective
A\. Analyse économique et financière
61\. Le principal bénéfice de ce projet est quâil empêchera la faillite dâentreprises et
dâemprunteurs individuels, eu égard au fait que leurs prêts seront restructurés\. Ce bénéfice est
difficile à évaluer, mais le PGPC a été conçu dans le but de toucher le plus grand nombre
dâemprunteurs auprès des banques en sâintéressant particulièrement aux prêts de faible montant\.
Afin de garantir un bon rapport coût-efficacité, la conception du PGPC intègre également des
incitations en direction des institutions financières en vue de les encourager à assainir leur
portefeuille affecté par le tremblement de terre, soit en i) restructurant leurs prêts avant de
solliciter une garantie ou en ii) sâadressant aux emprunteurs une fois que la garantie a été mise en
jeu dans la mesure où ils partageront avec le garant les fonds recouvrés\. Enfin, lâinstrument de
garantie est un mécanisme rentable pour encourager les institutions financières à reprendre leurs
activités de prêt dans la mesure où i) il démultiplie les ressources (un dollar de financement peut
fournir une couverture partielle de garantie de crédit à quatre dollars de prêts), et ii) le paiement
du crédit à lâinstitution financière ne se fait ni à lâavance, ni dans tous les cas, mais seulement
lorsque la garantie est mise en jeu\. Comme chacune des institutions financières admissibles
prendra ses propres décisions concernant lâachat de garantie et comme leurs décisions se fondent
sur des critères commerciaux, le recours aux garanties se traduira par des taux de rendement
positifs\.
B\. Analyse technique
62\. La conception du PGPC se fonde sur une étude de faisabilité et une analyse actuarielle
effectuée par la FOGAPE\. Cette analyse a déterminé les différents guichets correspondant aux
prêts restructurés et aux nouveaux prêts, car ces deux catégories de prêts présentent des niveaux
de risque et des besoins de traitement très différents\. Lâétude a proposé pour le Pilier 1 une
commission forfaitaire afin que la structure de tarification demeure simple, et une franchise
variable par institution pour assurer que les institutions financières qui appliquaient de bonnes
méthodes de gestion avant le tremblement de terre ne subventionnent pas les prêts de faible
16
qualité octroyés par les autres banques\. Lâétude a également déterminé les conditions à remplir
pour que la mise en jeu et le paiement de la garantie sâeffectuent de la manière la plus efficace
possible de façon à créer des incitations en vue de leur recouvrement\. La conception du PGPC
sâinspire des meilleures pratiques telles que :
⢠Une tarification adéquate : une commission de 1,5 %, pour éviter les abus, et une
franchise dâun montant variable en fonction du risque de chaque banque afin dâintégrer
le paramètre de la performance\.
⢠Une gestion rationnelle du PGPC :
o la documentation doit être réduite au minimum pour les prêts de petit montant
afin dâencourager les institutions financières à recourir à la garantie ;
o les paiements doivent être traités dans un délai de 30 jours après réception des
demandes ;
o les institutions financières sont encouragées à prendre des mesures vigoureuses
pour assurer le recouvrement des prêts, car elles partageront le produit de ces
recouvrements avec le PGPC\.
⢠Une structure financière prudente : la capacité financière dont dispose le Pilier 1 du
PGPC pour répondre aux appels en garantie repose sur un faible effet de levier (deux
fois, ce qui correspond à la capacité de couvrir les pertes à hauteur de 50 % des
portefeuilles garantis) et sur un financement conditionnel de la BRH dans le cas où les
réclamations dépassent les ressources disponibles\.
63\. La composante relative à lâassistance technique au secteur financier sâattaque à plusieurs
aspects mentionnés dans la FSSA de 2008 pour Haïti\. Le groupe de travail sur le secteur
financier fournira des conseils et un soutien aux autorités haïtiennes dans la conception et la mise
en Åuvre de mesures adéquates\.
C\. Gestion financière
64\. LâIDA a procédé à une évaluation des dispositions relatives à la gestion financière du
Pilier 1 du PGPC dont le FDI est principalement responsable\. Une évaluation fiduciaire du FDI a
été également effectuée par la BID\. Une évaluation des dispositions relatives à la gestion
financière du Pilier 2 sera effectuée au moment de sa mise en place\.
65\. Les objectifs du système de gestion financière du projet sont : assurer que les fonds sont
utilisés exclusivement aux fins visées de façon rationnelle et économique tout en exécutant les
activités convenues ; permettre lâétablissement de rapports financiers exacts et transmis dans les
délais impartis ; et sauvegarder les actifs et les ressources du projet\. Afin que les fonds soient
utilisés uniquement aux fins visées, le projet veillera à ce que, pour la première composante, les
prêts faisant lâobjet de garanties soient évalués et jugés viables au moment de lâémission de la
garantie\. Ceci suppose dâassurer une surveillance appropriée des banques, une évaluation
17
efficace du portefeuille de prêts et lâadoption de procédures relatives à lâapplicabilité des
garanties\.
66\. La réalisation de ces objectifs par le FDI pourrait être compromise par divers éléments,
plus particulièrement les effectifs, lâasymétrie de lâinformation sur le marché du crédit qui
pourrait entraîner le détournement de fonds, la coordination des dispositifs permettant de rendre
compte des ressources financières du projet et lâobservation des procédures de contrôle interne
établies\. Le recrutement de lâagent fiduciaire permettra de réduire ces risques et le FDI veillera
en outre à maintenir de solides mécanismes de gouvernance et de supervision\. Le FDI veillera au
respect des procédures de crédit et surveillera la performance des portefeuilles de prêts tandis
que la BRH veillera au maintien dâune surveillance bancaire rigoureuse\. Ces risques, de même
que les mesures dâatténuation adoptées pour y faire face, sont indiqués dans lâORAF\.
67\. Le FDI maintiendra un dispositif rigoureux de contrôles et de procédures internes et
continuera dâêtre contrôlé par le département de lâaudit interne de la BRH\. Il veillera également Ã
garantir en permanence lâadéquation des des effectifs\. Son système comptable est jugé adéquat,
et ses procédures comptables sont répertoriées dans le Manuel opérationnel\. Il établira des
rapports financiers réguliers et fera vérifier ses états financiers annuels par un cabinet dâexperts-
comptables indépendants jugé acceptable par lâIDA\.
68\. Au titre de la deuxième composante, la BRH sera chargée de la gestion financière\.
69\. Lâévaluation a conclu que les mécanismes de gestion financière adoptées pour le projet
satisfont aux exigences minima de lâIDA énoncées dans lâOP/BP10\.02 et sont suffisants pour
fournir, avec un degré raisonnable de certitude, des informations exactes et à jour sur la situation
du projet, tel quâexigé par lâIDA\. Des initiatives seront également prises en vue dâatténuer les
risques mentionnés ci-dessus, ainsi quâil est décrit dans le Plan dâaction sur la gestion financière\.
D\. Passation des marchés
70\. Les activités de passation de marchés entrant dans le cadre du projet se limiteront Ã
lâassistance technique requise pour la deuxième composante et seront exécutées conformément
aux directives du Groupe de la Banque mondiale relatives à la passation de marchés et à lâemploi
de consultants, datant de mai 2004 et révisées en octobre 2006 et en mai 2010, et aux
dispositions de lâAccord de financement\. Il est prévu que seulement quelques contrats avec des
cabinets de consultants et des consultants individuels seront financés par le don dans le cadre de
cette composante dont le montant est de 500 000 dollars\. Pour chaque contrat devant être financé
par les ressources du don, le bénéficiaire et lâIDA conviendront, dans le Plan de passation des
marchés, des différentes méthodes de passation des marchés et de sélection des consultants, de la
nécessité ou non de recourir à un processus de présélection, des coûts estimatifs, des conditions
dâexamen préalable et du calendrier dâexécution\. Les fonds affectés à la deuxième composante
seront décaissés dans un compte séparé\.
18
E\. Incidences sociales et environnementales
71\. Le projet envisagé est classé dans la Catégorie B\. Aucune conséquence sociale et
environnementale majeure ne devrait découler du projet, car lâimmense majorité des prêts
bancaires en Haïti et de ceux financés par ce projet sont accordés aux secteurs du commerce et
des services et à des particuliers ; toutefois, il existe peut-être un petit nombre de prêts dans les
secteurs manufacturier, industriel et de la construction sollicitant des garanties, lesquels ourraient
avoir éventuellement quelques incidences négatives aux plans environnemental et social\. Pour
cette raison, un cadre a été élaboré pour passer au crible tous les prêts afin dâen déterminer les
impacts potentiels et les réduire, en conformité avec les dispositifs de sauvegarde
environnementale et sociale de la Banque mondiale\. Ce cadre utilise une approche à deux volets :
⢠les prêts de faible montant (dont le montant devrait se situer en dessous dâun seuil
dâenviron 62 000 dollars) dans les secteurs du commerce et des services ne devraient
avoir aucun impact sur lâenvironnement et seront ainsi examinés et traités selon une
procédure simplifiée\. Ces prêts seront examinés par rapport à une liste dâactivités qui ne
peuvent être soutenues par le PGPC, en dâautres termes une « liste négative » qui est
incluse dans le Système de gestion environnementale et sociale (SGES)12 du projet\. Ils
seront traités par lots et le FDI procédera à la vérification a posteriori de la conformité
avec les dispositifs de sauvegarde environnementale et sociale de la Banque mondiale sur
la base dâun échantillonnage\. Dans le cas où un prêt de petit montant est jugé non
conforme aux politiques de sauvegarde, des voies de recours seront disponibles, y
compris si nécessaire lâannulation de la garantie\.
⢠Un nombre limité de prêts de faible montant aux secteurs manufacturier, industriel et de
la construction identifiés a priori à partir de la base de données de la BRH, pourrait avoir
des impacts négatifs sur lâenvironnement\. Par conséquent, ces prêts seront examinés plus
en détail, en suivant les mêmes procédures résumées ci-dessous pour les prêts dâun
montant plus important et décrits intégralement dans le SGES\. La liste de ces prêts sera
incluse dans le SGES\.
⢠Les prêts dâun montant plus élevé (supérieur au seuil défini) seront également examinés
par rapport à la « liste négative »\. En outre, une évaluation individuelle de chaque prêt
sera effectuée afin dâidentifier les risques potentiels aux plans social et environnemental\.
Les mesures dâatténuation seront évaluées avant lâoctroi de la garantie\. Dans le cas où un
prêt donnera lieu au stockage, à lâachat ou à la manipulation de pesticides, la garantie ne
sera pas accordée avant lâélaboration dâun plan de gestion des nuisibles assorti dâun
budget approprié et prévoyant des dispositions en vue de sa mise en Åuvre\.
72 Le FDI évaluera les impacts environnementaux et sociaux et les risques associés Ã
lâémission des garanties\. Le SGES sera intégré dans le Manuel opérationnel du projet et sera
12
LâAccord de financement fait référence au Cadre de gestion environnementale et sociale qui est le terme général
de la Banque mondiale\. Pour ce projet particulier, ce document est intitulé « Système de gestion environnementale et
sociale »\.
19
divulgué six mois au plus tard après lâentrée en vigueur du projet conformément à lâAccord de
financement\. Il fournira des procédures relatives à lâélaboration dâun plan de gestion des
nuisibles, tel que défini dans le cadre de lâOP 4\.09, ainsi que les procédures à suivre dans le cas
où un sous-projet se trouve en présence de ressources culturelles physiques, tel que défini dans
lâOP 4\.11 durant son exécution\. Les missions de supervision de lâIDA et de la BID vérifieront le
respect des politiques de sauvegarde\.
\.
20
Annexe 1 : Cadre de suivi des résultats
HAÃTI
PROJET DâAPPUI Ã UN PROGRAMME DE GARANTIES PARTIELLES DE CRÃDIT POST-SEISME
Le principal objectif du projet est de contribuer à la mise en place dâun programme de garanties partielles de
Objectif de développement de projet (ODP) :
crédit par le Bénéficiaire afin dâaider i) les institutions financières à relancer leurs activités de crédit, et ii) les emprunteurs auprès du secteur financier
à surmonter lâimpact de la situation dâurgence
Indicateur de
Valeur cible cumulée (décembre de chaque année) Responsa Description (définition des
Niveau de Source -bilité de indicateurs, etc\.)
base
Indicateurs de résultats au Unité de Fré-
référence de la collecte
niveau de lâODP mesure 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 quence
(juin 2010) données de
données
Indicateur n° 1 : Montant 1 500 M 2 000 M 3 000 M N\.A N\.A\. N\.A\. Annuelle Rapport BRH Cet indicateur montrera le
Volume des prêts Gourdes Gourdes Gourdes volume des prêts qui ont été
restructurés après le
restructurés au cours des tremblement de terre
deux premières années
suivant le tremblement de
terre
Indicateur n° 2 : % 10,5 % 10 % 9 % 8,5 % 8 % 7 % Annuelle Rapport BRH Cet indicateur vise à montrer la
Volume total des prêts stabilisation du système
financier et des emprunteurs
non-performants à la fin après le tremblement de terre
de chaque année civile
(ratio de prêts
improductifs)
Indicateur n° 3 : Montant 28 500 M 31 000 M 32 000 M 33 000 M 34 000 M 35 500 M Annuelle Rapport BRH Cet indicateur montrera la
Volume total du Gourdes relance du crédit à mesure que
la situation économique et
portefeuille de prêts en lâenvironnement du crédit
cours à la fin de chaque sâaméliorent
année civile
RÃSULTATS INTERMÃDIAIRES
Indicateur de
Responsa Description (définition des
Niveau de
Source bilité de indicateurs, etc\.)
base
Unité de référence Fré-
Valeur cible cumulée (décembre de chaque année) de la collecte
mesure (juin quence
données de
2010)
données
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
21
Indicateur de résultats Actions Aucun pour Annuelle Supervi- BRH Description des mesures
intermédiaires : la menées lâinstant sion conçues et mises en Åuvre
pour améliorer
conception et la mise en lâenvironnement du crédit dans
Åuvre de mesures, le pays
parallèlement au PGPC,
en vue de lever les
obstacles à la croissance
du crédit
Note : Comme le projet fait partie dâun programme pilote pour la mise en place de fonds de garanties partielles de crédit utilisant
les ressources de lâIDA pour développer le secteur des PME, il collectera également les indicateurs suivants concernant les
institutions participant au PGPC, sâils sont toutefois disponibles :
⢠nombre de comptes de prêts actifs ouverts pour des micro-entreprises (moins de 1 000 dollars) et des PME (entre 1 000 et
1 million de dollars) ;
⢠montant des comptes de prêts actifs ouverts pour des micro-entreprises et les PME ;
⢠portefeuille à risque moyen ;
⢠rendement des actifs\.
Ces indicateurs ne seront collectés que pour le Pilier 2\.
22
Annexe 2 : Description détaillée du projet
Pilier 1 : Prêts existants aux emprunteurs Pilier 2 : Nouveaux prêts aux emprunteurs existants en
viables, restructurés après le séisme dehors du processus de restructuration et aux
nouveaux emprunteurs
Capital nécessaire = USD 35 millions Capital nécessaire = USD 30 millions
Levier 2x supérieur aux ressources propres Levier 4x supérieur initialement - à déterminer
Prêts existants aux microentreprises et PME Nouveaux prêts aux micro-entreprises, aux PME et pour
le logement
(prêts < USD 1 mil\.)
Garantie accordée prêt par prêt mais traités par Garantie maximum par emprunteur limitée à 5 % des
lot fonds du Pilier 2 versé en capital
Garantie accordée prêt par prêt mais traités par lot
Temporaire (clause dâexpiration au bout de 5 ans) Permanent, doté d'une structure juridique propre
Géré dans une optique commerciale
Disponibilité : 9 mois après le démarrage Pas de limitation de la période de disponibilité
Accessible aux banques et aux coopératives qui Accessibles uniquement aux banques privées et aux
respectent les normes prudentielles, qui possèdent coopératives qui sont en conformité avec les règles
des informations transparentes et des procédures prudentielles haïtiennes, des procédures de crédit
de fonctionnement et de crédit acceptables\. solidement établies et appliquant des critères relatifs à la
qualité du portefeuille de prêt
Accès sujet a une évaluation des procédures dâoctroi du
crédit et de recouvrement
Couverture de 50 % Couverture atteignant 80 %\. à déterminer
Commission de l'ordre de 2 % et déductible Commission et déductible révisés chaque année
variant d'une banque à une autre et basé sur le
taux de prêts improductifs avant le séisme
Administration : Fonds de Développement Administrateur doté d'une autonomie et d'une
Industriel en collaboration avec un conseiller indépendance en matière de gestion
international
Agent fiduciaire L'Agent fiduciaire doit être évalué par les investisseurs
participant au Pilier 2
Clause de flexibilité
a) Description du Pilier 1 du PGPC (prêts existants viables dont les emprunteurs ont
été touchés par le tremblement de terre)
23
1\. Portée\. Le Pilier 1 garantira les prêts de faible montant accordés avant le tremblement de
terre, qui ont été restructurés par la suite\. Les prêts de faible montant sont définis comme les
prêts dâun montant inférieur à 1 million de dollars\. Le plafond retenu sera défini dans lâAccord
qui sera conclu entre les bailleurs de fonds et le Bénéficiaire\. Sâagissant des prêts dâun montant
plus élevé dont le montant se situe au-dessus de 1 million de dollars, la BRH a indiqué quâelle
pourrait dégager, à titre temporaire, une partie de ses réserves de change et solliciter des
ressources additionnelles auprès des bailleurs de fonds pour fournir des garanties partielles de
crédit pour ces prêts\.
2\. Durée\. Le Pilier 1 sera un fonds temporaire, qui sâappliquera aux prêts affectés par le
tremblement de terre et comportera une clause dâexpiration au bout de 5 ans\. Il est envisagé de
réserver un traitement spécifique aux prêts hypothécaires qui avaient une durée de vie moyenne
de 10 Ã 12 ans avant le tremblement de terre\. Le Pilier 1 sera en mesure dâaccorder des garanties
pendant les 9 mois suivant son lancement, laquelle période pourrait être étendue à 12 mois\.
3\. Eligibilité des institutions\. Les banques commerciales et les coopératives qui remplissent les
normes prudentielles haïtiennes pourront avoir accès au Pilier 1\. Les banques publiques auront
accès au Pilier 1, mais tout montant qui leur sera versé sera financé par les ressources publiques
haïtiennes\. Il est prévu que les institutions de microfinance soient couvertes par le Fonds HELP
qui est en train dâêtre conçu par le Fonds multilatéral dâinvestissement de la BID\. Lâintérêt des
banques a été confirmé lors dâune mission entreprise début juillet et les banques ont fourni des
chiffres concernant leur participation éventuelle\.
4\. Eligibilité des prêts\. Les prêts admissibles aux garanties doivent avoir été productifs avant le
tremblement de terre du 12 janvier 2010 et être considérés comme viables par les institutions
financières après leur restructuration (câest-à -dire que lâemprunteur est en mesure dâhonorer les
remboursements)\. Il nâexiste aucune restriction concernant des secteurs dâactivités donnés, quand
bien même les prêts admissibles devront respecter les dispositifs de sauvegarde
environnementale et sociale de la BID et de la Banque mondiale\.
5\. Pérennité\. Il est prévu que le Pilier 1 ne soit pas autofinancé ni ne fonctionnera sur une
longue période, car il portera sur les prêts affectés par le tremblement de terre\.
6\. Commission\. Une commission forfaitaire de 1,5 % sera appliquée sur le montant garantie\. La
commission ne devrait pas couvrir toutes les créances au titre du Pilier 1 et a été déterminée suite
aux études des experts de FOGAPE de façon à tenir compte de la moyenne pondérée des pertes
du système bancaire en sâappuyant sur les chiffres disponibles au cours des dix dernières années\.
7\. Déductible\. Les institutions participantes devront supporter un déductible qui variera en
fonction du risque encouru par chaque entité\. à travers le déductible, les banques supporteront la
première perte\. Le déductible devrait être basé sur le ratio moyen de prêts improductifs de
chaque institution au cours des trois années avant le tremblement de terre et fera lâobjet
dâajustement tous les ans\.
8\. Couverture\. Le Pilier 1 paiera jusquâà 50 % du montant garanti des prêts, après prélèvement
du déductible\.
24
9\. Administration\. Le Pilier 1 sera géré par un Administrateur qui aura pour tâche, entre autres,
dâexaminer les demandes, dâoctroyer les garanties, de traiter les appels de garantie et les
documents y afférant, dâappliquer des cotes de risque aux banques et de percevoir les
commissions\. LâAdministrateur devrait être le Fonds de développement industriel (FDI), un
fonds de développement créé en 1981 avec le concours de la Banque mondiale dans le but
dâaccorder des garanties et des prêts, lequel sera assisté par un conseiller individuel ou un
cabinet-conseil\.
10\. Agent fiduciaire\. Un agent fiduciaire sera chargé de veiller à lâutilisation appropriée des
ressources du Fonds en accord avec ses principes fondateurs et ses procédures\. En particulier,
lâagent fiduciaire sera chargé de : i) lâanalyse a posteriori des portefeuilles en sélectionnant et en
visitant certaines institutions financières et certains emprunteurs afin de déterminer si les
banques ont intégré dans leurs portefeuilles des créances non viables ou des créances qui violent
les dispositifs de sauvegarde sociale et environnementale ; ii) autoriser le déblocage des fonds
dès la mise en jeu des garanties\. La BID recrutera lâagent fiduciaire et financera les coûts sây
rapportant\.
11\. Attribution des garanties\. LâAdministrateur accordera la garantie sous réserve dâun examen a
posteriori effectué par lâagent fiduciaire\. La garantie ne sera octroyée que sur le principal des
prêts (hors intérêts et commissions impayées)\.
12\. Mise en jeu des garanties : Si la garantie est mise en jeu, lâAdministrateur examinera les
appels et demandera lâautorisation nécessaire pour le déblocage des fonds auprès de lâagent
fiduciaire\. La mise en jeu de la garantie est subordonnée à la fourniture dâune preuve que
lâinstitution financière a engagé des actions de recouvrement et que les droits de recouvrement
sont subrogés au garant\. La documentation requise pour le paiement de la garantie sera définie
dans les règles de fonctionnement\.
13\. Supervision\. Le Pilier 1 sera doté dâun Comité de pilotage comprenant des représentants des
bailleurs de fonds (dont certains feront office dâobservateurs si leur statut le leur permet) et les
autorités haïtiennes\. LâAdministrateur rendra compte semestriellement au Comité de pilotage de
la gestion du programme et aux bailleurs de fonds respectifs\.
14\. Clause de flexibilité\. Comme on ne peut prévoir si les conditions définies pour le Pilier 1
seront appropriées, le Comité de Pilotage se réservera la possibilité dâaménager certaines
dispositions (commission, déductible, période de disponibilité et ratios de levier financier et de
couverture) pour tenir compte des conditions du marché\.
15\. Services de conseil et assistance technique\. Il est prévu que dâimportants services de conseil
et une assistance technique soient nécessaires pour lâexécution du Pilier 1\. Un conseiller
individuel ou un cabinet-conseil sera engagé par lâAdministrateur pour aider à gérer le
programme et pour le transfert des connaissances\. Ce conseiller sera financé par la BID\.
25
b) Description du Pilier 2 du PGPC (nouveaux prêts ciblés sur les PME et le logement)
16\. Portée\. Le Pilier 2 est consacré surtout aux prêts aux PME et aux prêts immobiliers\.
Lâadmissibilité des emprunteurs sera subordonnée à une garantie minimum par emprunteur fixée
à 5 % des fonds du Pilier 2 versés en capital\. Ce Pilier bénéficiera aux PME et à certaines micro-
entreprises, selon la catégorisation des entreprises actuellement en usage en Haïti13\.
17\. Durée\. Le Pilier 2 sera un fonds organique de garanties partielles de crédit qui aura un
caractère permanent et qui sera doté dâun cadre institutionnel plus solide (il aura sa propre
structure juridique, un personnel spécialisé) et nâaura aucune restriction sur la disponibilité de
garanties partielles\.
18\. Admissibilité\. Nâauront accès à ce Pilier que les banques privées en conformité avec les
règles prudentielles haïtiennes, dotées de procédures de prêt solides et remplissant les critères
relatifs à la qualité du portefeuille de prêt\. Lâaccès à ce Pilier sera subordonné à lâexamen des
procédures de souscription et de recouvrement des institutions participantes\.
19\. Commission et déductible\. Le Pilier 2 sera géré selon des conditions commerciales\. La
commission sera révisée chaque année pour assurer que ce Pilier peut être autofinancé\. Un
déductible sera appliqué comme câest le cas pour le Pilier 1\.
20\. Couverture\. Le Pilier 2 paiera jusquâà 80 % du montant garanti du prêt après application
de la franchise\. Ce montant est supérieur à celui retenu dans le Pilier 1 à cause du risque moindre
présenté par les prêts garantis\. Cependant, la couverture doit être révisée par les investisseurs
pour le Pilier 2\.
21\. Administration et agent fiduciaire\. Le rôle de lâAdministrateur sera semblable à celui
décrit en ce qui concerne le Pilier 1 ; toutefois, le Pilier 2 sera doté dâun personnel professionnel
spécialisé qui bénéficiera dâune autonomie de gestion\. Si lâagent fiduciaire est un élément
important du dispositif du Pilier 1, il aura un rôle temporaire dans le Pilier 2\. Le besoin
dâengager lâagent fiduciaire dans le cadre du Pilier 2 sera déterminé par les investisseurs dand ce
Pillier\.
22\. Attribution et mise en jeu des garanties\. Le processus dâattribution et de mise en jeu de la
garantie sera identique à celui du Pilier 1, avec une variation selon que lâagent fiduciaire est
retenu pour le Pilier 2 ou non\.
13
Les micro et petites entreprises ont un chiffre dâaffaires inférieur à 5 millions de gourdes (USD 125 000) ; les
entreprises moyennes ont un chiffre dâaffaires situé entre 5 et 50 millions de gourdes (soit entre USD 125 000 et
USD 1 250 000) ; les grandes entreprises ont un chiffre dâaffaires supérieur à 5 millions de gourdes
(USD 1 250 000)\. à supposer que le capital du Pilier 2 soit de 30 millions de dollars et que le capital versé soit de
7,5 millions de dollars, la limite serait fixée à 370 000 dollars par emprunteur ; ceci pourrait donner comme résultat
un prêt de
700 000 dollars, en prenant comme hypothèse une couverture de 50 %, représentant plus de la moitié du chiffre
dâaffaires des petites et moyennes entreprises\.
26
23\. Gouvernance et supervision\. Il est envisagé que le Pilier 2 soit restructuré comme une
entreprise à vocation commerciale et aura son propre conseil dâadministration, qui regroupera les
investisseurs intervenant dans le Pilier 2\. La composition détaillée des structures de gouvernance
sera définie par les investisseurs intervenant dans ce Pilier\.
c) Financement du Programme de garantie partielle de crédit
24\. Structure du financement\. Dans les deux Piliers, les institutions financières prendront la
première perte à leur charge via la franchise (déductible)\. Ensuite, les pertes seront partagées Ã
égalité entre les bailleurs de fonds/investisseurs\.
25\. Levier financier\. Il est prévu que le levier financier sera de deux fois dans le Pilier 1 (le
programme ne peut accorder des garanties que pour un montant maximum correspondant à deux
fois son financement) et de quatre fois dans le Pilier 2\. Lâécart traduit la qualité des prêts
garantis\. Le Pilier 1 visera essentiellement les prêts à plus haut risque qui ont été restructurés\.
Concernant le Pilier 1, dans le cas improbable où les réclamations seraient supérieures aux
ressources disponibles, une règle conditionnelle applicable dans le cadre du programme sera
activée, en vertu de laquelle la BRH règlera toute réclamation résiduelle qui nâa pu être acquittée
avec les ressources disponibles\. Sâagissant du Pilier 2, la règle conditionnelle sera définie par les
investisseurs\.
26\. Financement requis\. Le montant du financement nécessaire est lié au volume du
portefeuille à garantir et au ratio de perte prévu\. Les informations fournies par la BRH sur le
portefeuille de prêts des banques au mois de juin 2010 montrent quâun indicateur indirect des
prêts éligibles au Pilier 1 (les prêts restructurés dont le montant se situe jusquâà présent en
dessous de 1 million de dollars et les prêts en dessous de 1 million de dollars qui sont productifs,
mais qui accusent un retard de paiement de plus de 30 jours) pourraient être de lâordre de
95 millions de dollars\. En prenant comme hypothèse une extension de la limite des nouveaux
prêts à 50 % du portefeuille éligible, le montant des prêts éligibles au titre du Pilier 1 serait de
142 millions de dollars14\. Le financement apporté au programme pourrait être multiplié par 2 si
lâon prend pour hypothèse un ratio de perte maximum de 50 % du portefeuille de prêts garantis\.
Comme le Pilier 1 ne couvrira au maximum que 50 % des créances présentées par les institutions
financières, le financement nécessaire sera de 35,5 millions de dollars\.
27\. Il est important de noter que ces estimations sont compliquées par la restructuration
progressive des prêts, les paiements par les compagnies dâassurances et le fait que la qualité du
portefeuille de prêt évolue avec le temps\. En outre, comme cela a été noté dans le rapport
USAID/Winner15, les emprunteurs qui ont perdu leurs biens fournis en garantie aux banques sont
susceptibles dâêtre radiés du portefeuille après avoir été remboursés par les compagnies
dâassurance\. Il apparaît que ces emprunteurs sont souvent les plus réguliers dans le
14
Une enquête informelle effectuée auprès des banques éligibles début juillet 2010 a conclu à un montant inférieur
en ce qui concerne les prêts admissibles dans le cadre du Pilier 1, soit 75 millions de dollars, ce qui correspond à une
utilisation de ressources équivalant à 18,75 millions de dollars\. La proposition actuelle est basée sur lâestimation la
plus haute, car les banques interrogées nâavaient pas encore reçu la proposition intégrale du programme envisagé
ainsi que les conditions y afférentes et parce que les coopératives éligibles nâétaient pas prises en compte dans
lâenquête\.
15
USAID/WINNER, Ãtude dâimpact du séisme du 12 janvier sur le secteur privé haïtien, mars 2010\.
27
remboursement de leurs prêts\. Ainsi, le secteur bancaire pourrait perdre la partie la plus saine de
son portefeuille, ce qui est susceptible dâaccroître le taux de prêts improductifs\. Sâajoute à cela le
fait que les emprunteurs qui ne sont pas directement affectés par le tremblement de terre peuvent
devenir insolvables à cause du ralentissement de lâactivité après le tremblement de terre,
augmentant ainsi le volume de prêts improductifs et les provisions\. En raison du caractère
approximatif des estimations, les bailleurs de fonds et la BRH ont décidé de cibler un
financement atteignant 35 millions de dollars pour le Pilier 1\.
28\. Il est prévu quâil y aura un transfert des fonds du Pilier 1 au Pilier 2, au fur et à mesure
que les garanties individuelles accordées au titre du Pilier 1 expirent\. Ce transfert de financement
sera junior à ceux apportés par les investisseurs privés dans le Pilier 2\. La branche Secteur privé
de la BID pourrait apporter un financement additionnel atteignant
40 millions de dollars pour le Pilier 2\.
Figure 1 : Structure simplifiée du PGPC
29\. Répartition par tranche et réaffectation\. Il est prévu que les contributions des bailleurs de
fonds seront versées par tranches et suivront de près la mise en Åuvre des différents Piliers du
programme et la mise en place des garanties\. La période de disponibilité de 9 mois du Pilier 1
sera un test important pour évaluer le montant des créances qui seront garanties au titre de ce
Pilier\. Dans le cas où il y aurait un excédent de financement par rapport au montant des créances
garanties dans le cadre du Pilier, une fois clôturée la période de disponibilité, les ressources de
lâIDA seront réaffectées au Pilier 2\.
28
Annexe 3 : Modalités dâexécution
A\. Mécanismes institutionnels et dâexécution du projet
1\. Mécanismes dâadministration du projet
1\. Lâorganisme dâexécution du PGPC (Pilier 1) sera le Fonds de Développement Industriel\.
Le FDI est une institution spécialisée de la BRH créée en 1981 grâce à un financement de la
Banque mondiale et de lâUnion européenne\. Le directeur général du FDI est nommé par la BRH\.
Son indépendance financière et opérationnelle est suffisante pour garantir un environnement de
contrôle interne renforcé\. Lâévaluation des mécanismes de gestion financière illustre le fait que
malgré sa surface financière réduite (le FDI gère actuellement des actifs représentant environ
35 millions de dollars), il a une bonne connaissance du secteur bancaire et de ses liens avec
lâenvironnement des affaires en Haïti\. Il a également géré auparavant des fonds de garantie
analogues et a mis en place des ressources en personnel satisfaisantes et un système de contrôle
interne rigoureux\. Au sein du FDI, un Comité de crédit composé du directeur général, du
directeur du crédit et du directeur administratif et financier examine et approuve tous les crédits\.
Les capacités institutionnelles du FDI sont ainsi jugées satisfaisantes et suffisantes pour mettre
en Åuvre et exécuter le programme de façon adéquate\.
2\. Les responsabilités du FDI en matière de gestion financière seront les suivantes :
i) examiner la documentation relative au portefeuille à garantir ; ii) approuver lâoctroi de
garanties partielles de crédit et soumettre des informations à lâagent fiduciaire ;
iii) percevoir les frais acquittés par les institutions participantes ; v) vérifier lâadmissibilité des
créances, le respect des clauses de la garantie et le paiement de tous les frais de garantie à ce
jour ; v) vérifier que les institutions participantes maintiennent leur statut dâinstitutions éligibles,
comme indiqué dans le Manuel opérationnel\.
3\. Un agent fiduciaire veillera à lâutilisation appropriée des ressources allouées au Pilier 1\.
En particulier, lâagent fiduciaire sera chargé de : i) analyser a posteriori des portefeuilles en
sélectionnant et en visitant certaines institutions financières et certains emprunteurs afin de
déterminer si les banques ont intégré dans leurs portefeuilles des prêts non viables ou des
créances qui violent les dispositifs de sauvegarde sociale et environnementale ; ii) autoriser le
déblocage des fonds dès la mise en jeu des garanties\. La BID a accepté de recruter lâagent
fiduciaire et de financer les coûts sây rapportant\.
29
4\. En ce qui concerne la gouvernance et la supervision globale : au titre du Pilier 1, le PGPC
sera doté dâun Comité de pilotage comprenant des représentants des bailleurs de fonds (dont
certains feront office dâobservateurs si leur statut le leur permet) et les autorités haïtiennes\.
LâAdministrateur rendra compte semestriellement au Comité de pilotage de la gestion du
programme\. Il est envisagé que le Pilier 2 soit restructuré comme une entreprise à vocation
commerciale et disposera de son propre conseil dâadministration regroupant les investisseurs
participant au fonds\. La composition détaillée des structures de gouvernance sera définie par les
investisseurs dans ce Pilier\.
5\. En ce qui concerne la deuxième composante, lâorganisme dâexécution sera la BRH qui
assurera les activités de passation des marchés conformément aux directives de la Banque\. La
BRH sera chargée également de la gestion financière de la deuxième composante\.
6\. Les mécanismes institutionnels ont été arrêtés dâun commun accord avec tous les
bailleurs de fonds participant au financement du programme et avec la BRH\.
7\. Le FDI est dirigé par un directeur général qui rend compte au Gouverneur de la BRH\. Au
sein du personnel professionnel employé par lâorganisation, le responsable administratif et
financier est chargé de la tenue des documents comptables du projet\. En ce qui concerne
lâutilisation des fonds, il importe de noter que la structure du personnel du FDI comprend
également un directeur du crédit et quatre responsables du crédit dont le rôle sera essentiel pour
assurer que les fonds du projet sont utilisés uniquement pour la réalisation des objectifs du projet\.
8\. Le FDI a identifié le besoin de recruter 3 responsables du crédit en vue de renforcer les
capacités de son personnel qui assurera la gestion des fonds provenant des dons\. Actuellement, le
FDI est composé de 10 professionnels : le directeur général, le directeur des opérations, le
directeur administratif et financier, le directeur du crédit et 4 responsables du crédit\. La BID a
recommandé que le FDI ajoute deux nouveaux membres indépendants au sein du comité du
crédit afin de renforcer la structure organisationnelle du FDI\.
9\. Le dispositif final de dotation en personnel du FDI sera établi une fois que le conseiller
individuel/cabinet-conseil aura été recruté par le FDI afin de renforcer sa capacité à gérer le
Pilier 1 du PGPC et à assurer le transfert des connaissances\. Le conseiller sera financé par les
ressources de la BID et son recrutement sera une des clauses de lâAccord de financement\.
2\. Gestion financière, décaissements et passation des marchés
a) Gestion financière
30
Ãvaluation des risques liés à la gestion financière
10\. La Banque a procédé à une évaluation des dispositions relatives à la gestion financière du
Pilier 1 du PGPC dont le FDI est responsable au premier chef\. Une évaluation fiduciaire du FDI
a été également conduite par la BID\. Une évaluation des dispositions relatives à la gestion
financière du Pilier 2 sera effectuée au moment de sa mise en place\.
11\. Les objectifs du système de gestion financière du projet sont : assurer que les fonds sont
utilisés exclusivement aux fins visées de façon rationnelle et économique tout en exécutant les
activités convenues ; permettre lâétablissement de rapports financiers exacts et transmis dans les
délais impartis ; et sauvegarder les actifs et les ressources du projet\. Pour assurer que les fonds
sont utilisés uniquement aux fins visées, le projet devra assurer que pour sa première
composante, les créances faisant lâobjet de garantie sont évaluées et jugées viables au moment de
lâémission de la garantie\. Ceci suppose dâassurer une surveillance appropriée des banques, une
évaluation efficace du portefeuille de prêts et lâadoption de procédures relatives à lâapplicabilité
des garanties\.
12\. Les principaux risques auxquels pourrait faire face le FDI dans la réalisation de ces
objectifs ont trait à la dotation en personnel, à lâasymétrie de lâinformation sur le marché du
crédit qui pourraient entraîner un détournement des fonds, la coordination des mécanismes
permettant de rendre compte des ressources financières du projet et lâobservation des procédures
de contrôle interne définies\. Le recrutement de lâagent fiduciaire permettra de réduire ces risques
et, en outre, le FDI veillera à maintenir des dispositifs solides de gouvernance et de supervision\.
Le FDI veillera au respect des procédures de crédit et surveillera la performance des portefeuilles
de prêts tandis que la BRH veillera au maintien dâune surveillance bancaire rigoureuse\. Ces
risques, de même que les mesures dâatténuation adoptées pour y faire face, sont indiqués dans
lâORAF\.
13\. Planification et budgétisation\. Le budget du FDI est élaboré par la direction du FDI et
approuvé par la BRH avant le début de chaque exercice\.
14\. En ce qui concerne la deuxième composante (assistance technique), lâorganisme
dâexécution sera la BRH qui assurera les activités dâacquisition de biens et services,
conformément aux directives de la Banque\. Le plan de passation des marchés pour lâexécution
de cette composante a été établi dâun commun accord entre le bénéficiaire et lâéquipe de projet le
25 octobre 2010 et sera mis à jour au moins tous les ans\.
Contrôles et procédures internes
31
15\. Le FDI maintiendra un système de contrôle et de procédures internes rigoureux, qui
seront documentés dans le Manuel opérationnel\. Pour le suivi du portefeuille de crédit, le FDI
utilise un tableau MS Excel qui a été développé à lâinterne â en utilisant les fonctionnalités
avancées de MS Excel â et qui produit des rapports financiers automatisés qui comprennent,
entre autres, les données suivantes par emprunteur : cote de risque, solde des prêts, taux dâintérêt
et calcul des commissions\. Il fournit également des informations sur la facturation et le
vieillissement du portefeuille de crédit\.
16\. Les règlementations opérationnelles et du crédit sont définies sur la Déclaration générale
de politique et procédure amendée de juin 2005, qui a été approuvée par la BRH\. Ce document
définit les procédures relatives à lâordonnancement, au mouvement, à lâenregistrement et au
contrôle de toutes les opérations financières et administratives, notamment les critères
dâéligibilité, les clauses et conditions des opérations de crédit et de remboursement des
instruments financiers\. Pour lâadministration du Pilier 1 du PGPC, le FDI suivra les règles et
procédures spécifiques énoncées dans le Manuel opérationnel qui seront arrêtées dâun commun
accord avec le bailleur de fonds\.
17\. La BRH sera chargée de la gestion financière de la deuxième composante, à savoir
lâassistance technique\. La BRH compte en son sein un département de lâaudit interne et ses
comptes sont vérifiés par Mérové Pierre â Cabinet dâExperts-Comptables, un commissaire au
comptes externe qui a un accord technique avec KPMG\.
Mouvement des fonds
18\. Un compte commun sera ouvert au nom du FDI à la BRH pour lâexécution de la première
composante du projet\. Les ressources du don seront déposées dans ce compte, de même que les
fonds provenant des autres bailleurs de fonds\.
19\. La BID est le principal bailleur de fonds du PGPC\. Elle effectuera les décaissements par
tranches à la demande du FDI et sur certification de lâagent fiduciaire\. Chaque tranche sera fixée
au montant nécessaire pour couvrir le montant théorique des prêts garantis par le programme Ã
tout moment, plus une majoration de 25 % pour faciliter lâopération\. Au début du PGPC, la BID
devrait effectuer un décaissement de 5 millions de dollars pour couvrir les premières phases des
opérations\.
20\. Pour lâexécution de la deuxième composante du projet, un compte séparé sera ouvert à la
BRH\. La BRH gèrera ce compte\.
32
Mécanismes de supervision et de suivi des plans de gestion financière
21\. Les mécanismes de supervision et de suivi des plans de gestion financière convenus
seront coordonnés de façon conjointe avec la BID\. Ces mécanismes comprendront des missions
de supervision régulières et lâexamen des informations soumises régulièrement à lâIDA\.
Systèmes et procédures comptables
22\. Pour maintenir lâefficacité, lâexactitude et la transmission dans les délais impartis des
rapports financiers et faciliter lâanalyse par la direction des informations financières, le FDI
utilise un système comptable informatisé basé sur le logiciel ACCPAC\. Le système est utilisé
pour tenir les registres comptables et facilite la production de rapports financiers périodiques et
des états financiers annuels\. Le système comptable est jugé adéquat pour les besoins du don\. Les
procédures, systèmes, politiques et opérations comptables du PGPC seront documentés dans le
Manuel opérationnel\. Le Manuel opérationnel sera utilisé par lâIDA pour évaluer lâacceptabilité
des systèmes comptables, de rapport et de contrôle du projet ; le personnel par rapport à un
manuel de référence et par les vérificateurs des comptes pour évaluer les systèmes et contrôles
comptables du projet ainsi que dans la conception de procédures spécifiques dâaudit des projets\.
23\. Un plan comptable constitue le principal outil par lequel les opérations comptables seront
enregistrées de manière à faciliter le suivi de lâutilisation des fonds et lâétablissement des
rapports et états financiers\. Le plan comptable actuel du FDI sera amendé pour permettre la
saisie et le classement des données selon les différentes catégories du don\.
Rapports financiers
24\. Le FDI établira les rapports financiers du projet de façon semestrielle\. Ces rapports feront
apparaître la situation des ressources du PGPC\. En outre, le FDI établira des états financiers
annuels pour le projet\. Afin dâétablir un seul rapport pour le projet, les rapports comprendront
également la situation financière de la deuxième composante\. Les états financiers annuels
rendront également compte des indicateurs et du respect des dispositifs de sauvegarde sociale et
environnementale\.
Audits
33
25\. Le FDI et la BRH sont soumis aux procédures dâaudit interne exécutées par le
département de lâaudit interne de la BRH\. Lâaudit externe des états financiers du FDI et de la
BRH est exécuté par Mérové Pierre â Cabinet dâExperts-Comptables, qui a un accord technique
avec KPMG, et vérifie les comptes de presque toutes les entités opérant dans le secteur bancaire
et financier en Haïti\. Le cabinet a été sélectionné conformément à des critères répondant aux
exigences de lâIDA en termes dâindépendance et de compétence\. Les termes de référence seront
modifiés pour tenir compte des activités du don\. Le rapport de vérification des comptes sera
soumis à lâIDA dans les quatre mois suivant la fin de chaque exercice\. La responsabilité
dâassurer le suivi approprié des questions et des recommandations de lâaudit incombera au
Comité de Pilotage\.
Plan de gestion financière
Thème Mesure corrective Responsabilité Date dâachèvement
recommandée visée
Manuel opérationnel Mettre à jour le Manuel FDI Entrée en vigueur
et logiciel comptable opérationnel
b) Mécanismes de décaissement
26\. La part du don allouée à la première composante (fourniture de garanties partielles de
crédit â 2,5 millions de dollars) sera avancée à lâentrée en vigueur du projet, sous réserve des
conditions énoncées dans lâAccord de financement\.
27\. Toutes les ressources non utilisées affectées à lâappui des garanties ou libérées après le
remboursement des prêts garantis seront réaffectées au Pilier 2\. Les fonds provenant du don de
lâIDA soutiendront le Pilier 2 seulement si le FGPC est créé dans des conditions jugées
satisfaisantes par lâIDA et fonctionne sur la base dâun mécanisme dâexécution jugé satisfaisant
par lâIDA\. Si ces conditions sont remplies, les fonds provenant du don de lâIDA peuvent être
réaffectés en tant que de besoin\. En tous les cas, le mécanisme dâexécution assurera que les
règles de lâIDA sont respectées, y compris, entre autres : celle dâassurer que i) les fonds fournis
au FGPC sont utilisés aux fins visées et pour le financement des dépenses autorisées ou sont
restitués à lâIDA ; ii) le FGPC tienne une comptabilité continue et adéquate, fournisse des
rapports réguliers à lâIDA et autorise des visites et des inspections de lâIDA\.
28\. Dans le cas où il y aurait des ressources non utilisées de lâIDA dans le Pilier 1 avant la
clôture ou à une date plus avancée qui devra être convenue entre le bénéficiaire et lâAssociation,
ces ressources seront réaffectées à la composante 2 (activités spécifiques, budget et mécanismes
dâexécution à arrêter dâun commun accord entre lâIDA et le bénéficiaire)\.
34
29\. Il est prévu que les ressources affectées à la deuxième composante (assistance technique
â 500 000 dollars) seront décaissées pendant la période allant de lâexercice 12 Ã
lâexercice 17\.
35
Catégories de dépenses, montants et pourcentages correspondants devant être financés dans le
cadre du projet :
Catégorie Montant du don alloué Pourcentage des dépenses Ã
(exprimé en dollars) financer
(y compris les taxes)
(1) Fourniture de GPC
100 % des montants versés dans
(a) Première partie (a) du 2 500 000
le cadre des GPC
projet
(b) Première partie (b) 100 % des montants versés dans
0
du projet le cadre des GPC
(2) Biens et services de
consultants rentrant dans le
500 000 100 %
cadre de la deuxième partie
du projet
MONTANT TOTAL 3 000 000
La catégorie (1) (a) désigne les GPC fournies par le Pilier 1 du PGPC\. La catégorie (1) (b)
désigne les GPC fournies par le fonds organique de garantie partielle de crédit (soit le FGPC
également désigné « Pilier 2 » du PGPC)\. La catégorie 2 fait référence à lâassistance technique
au secteur financier\.
Comptes désignés
30\. Une avance de 2,5 millions de dollars sera versée dans un compte commun au nom du
FDI à la Banque centrale dâHaïti pour la fourniture de GPC\. Les fonds seront utilisés pour régler
les réclamations et les fonds non utilisés serviront à soutenir les garanties ou à régler les
réclamations seront transférées de temps en temps au Pilier 2 en accord avec lâannexe 2, Section
IV\.B de lâAccord de financement\. Douze mois avant la date de clôture ou avant, comme convenu
entre le bénéficiaire et lâassociation, les fonds non utilisés au titre de la composante de GPC
seront restitués à lâIDA en vue dâêtre utilisés ultérieurement dans le cadre de la deuxième
composante\. La documentation devant être fournie à lâappui de ces mouvements sera conforme
aux dispositions pertinentes de lâannexe 2, Section IV\.B\.6\.B (2) de lâAccord de financement\.
31\. Pour assurer que les fonds seront immédiatement disponibles pour lâexécution de la
composante dâassistance technique, la BRH ouvrira, tiendra et gèrera un compte désigné (CD) Ã
la Banque centrale dâHaïti\. Les dépôts sur le compte désigné et les paiements à partir de ce
compte seront effectués conformément aux dispositions énoncées dans lâAccord de financement\.
Les décaissements au titre de cette composante seront basés sur les transactions et donneront lieu
36
à la soumission de demandes de retrait pour des avances, des paiements directs et des
remboursements\. Les demandes de retrait seront préparées par la BRH et signées par les
signataires autorisés, désignés par le représentant de lâemprunteur\. Le nom de chacun des
signataires autorisés et leur spécimen de signature seront soumis à lâIDA avant les premières
demandes de décaissement\.
32\. Le plafond autorisé du compte désigné sera de 50 000 dollars\. Le compte désigné sera
reconstitué tous les mois sur la base des demandes de prêt corroborées par des documents
appropriés ou lorsque la moitié de lâavance accordée à lâIDA aura été utilisée, selon que lâun ou
lâautre de ces deux événements arrive en premier\. Le compte désigné fera lâobjet dâune
vérification annuelle par des vérificateurs externes jugés acceptables par lâIDA dans le cadre de
lâaudit général du projet\.
Utilisation dâétats des dépenses
33\. Toutes les demandes relatives au retrait des ressources du compte de dons concernant la
composante dâassistance technique seront totalement documentées, à lâexception des dépenses
découlant de contrats dâun montant estimatif : a) inférieur ou égal à 100 000 dollars pour les
cabinets de consultants et b) inférieur ou égal à 50 000 dollars pour les consultants individuels,
qui seront réclamés sur la base des états des dépenses\. Les documents accompagnant les
dépenses seront conservés au niveau de la Cellule dâexécution du projet à la Banque centrale et
seront immédiatement disponibles pour examen par le vérificateur externe et les missions
périodiques de supervision de la Banque\. Tous les décaissements seront soumis aux conditions
de lâAccord de financement et aux procédures de décaissement définies dans la Lettre relative
aux décaissements\.
c) Passation des marchés
34\. Les activités de passation de marchés entrant dans le cadre du projet seront limitées Ã
lâassistance technique requise pour la deuxième composante (500 000 dollars) et seront
exécutées conformément aux directives de passation des marchés et de recrutement des
consultants de la Banque Mondiale datées mai 2004 et révisées en mai 2006 et mai 2010, ainsi
quâavec les dispositions de lâAccord de financement\. Pour \. Il est prévu que seulement quelques
contrats avec des cabinets de consultants et des consultants individuels seront financés par le don
dans le cadre de cette composante dont le montant est de 500 000 dollars\. Pour chaque contrat
devant être financé par les ressources du don, le bénéficiaire et lâIDA conviendront, dans le Plan
de passation des marchés, des différentes méthodes de passation des marchés et de sélection des
consultants, de la nécessité ou non de recourir à un processus de présélection, des coûts
estimatifs, des conditions dâexamen préalable et du calendrier dâexécution\. Les fonds affectés Ã
la deuxième composante seront décaissés dans un compte séparé\.
37
35\. Sélection des consultants\. Le don financera les services de consultants nécessaires pour
les activités dâassistance technique destinées à développer le secteur financier et lever les
obstacles à la croissance du crédit\. Seul un petit nombre de contrats avec des cabinets de
consultants et des consultants individuels devrait être financé par lâIDA dans le cadre du projet
envisagé\. Pour les services dont le coût estimatif est inférieur à la contrevaleur de
100 000 dollars par contrat, les listes restreintes de consultants peuvent être composées
entièrement de consultants nationaux conformément aux dispositions du paragraphe 2\.7 des
Directives relatives à lâemploi de consultants\.
36\. Ãvaluation de la capacité de lâorganisme à exécuter les passations de marchés\. Les
activités de passation de marchés seront exécutées par la BRH et seront probablement limitées Ã
lâattribution de plusieurs contrats avec des consultants individuels et à un ou deux contrats avec
des cabinets-conseils\. Lâévaluation par lâIDA de la capacité de la BRH dâexécuter des activités
de passation des marchés dans le cadre du projet est basée sur une étude sommaire de la structure
actuelle des services de passation de marchés de la BRH\. Si la BRH a la capacité dâexécuter des
activités de passation de marchés selon les Directives de la Banque, le système global de
passation des marchés publics en Haïti reste peu efficace\. En dépit des récentes réformes du
cadre juridique et institutionnel de passation des marchés, lâon observe toujours un manque de
personnel qualifié connaissant les normes internationales, une capacité de planification et de
suivi limitée et lâutilisation insuffisante de documents et procédures normalisés\. En conséquence,
le risque global lié au projet reste élevé\.
37\. Plan de passation des marchés, seuils pour lâemploi des méthodes de passation des
marchés et examen par la Banque\. Le plan de passation des marchés pour lâexécution du projet
envisagé a été établi dâun commun accord entre le bénéficiaire et lâéquipe de projet le 25 octobre
2010 et est résumé ci-après au tableau 1\. Le plan sera mis à jour tous les ans\. Les seuils
recommandés pour le recours aux méthodes de passation de marchés spécifiés dans lâAccord de
financement sont décrits au tableau 2 ci-après\. Ces seuils, ainsi que lâexigence de lâexamen
préalable par lâIDA de tous les contrats se retrouvent dans tous les projets de la Banque mondiale
en Haïti et ont servi de base au plan de passation de marchés convenu\. La supervision de la
passation de marchés sera assurée principalement au moyen de lâexamen préalable et sera
complétée par des missions de supervision effectuées au moins une fois par an\.
38
Tableau 1 : Plan de passation de marchés résumé (2011-2013)
Examen Date
Méthode
par la approxima
de
Type de Coût estimatif Banque tive
Description du contrat passation
contrat (USD) (préalable/ dâattributi
de
a on du
marchés
posteriori) marché
Cabinet-conseil n°1 â AT au
secteur financier pour lever les
Services de
obstacles à la croissance du USD 300 000 QCBS Préalable 2012
conseil
crédit (architecture financière,
règlementation et supervision)
Consultant individuel n°1 â AT
Services de au secteur financier pour lever
USD 50 000 3 CV Préalable 2011
conseil les obstacles à la croissance du
crédit dans le secteur agricole
Consultant individuel n°2 â AT
au secteur financier pour lever
Services de
les obstacles à la croissance du USD 50 000 3 CV Préalable 2011
conseil
crédit (architecture financière,
règlementation et supervision)
Consultants individuels
(contrats multiples) - AT au
Services de
secteur financier pour lever les USD 100 000 3 CV Préalable 2012/2013
conseil
obstacles à la croissance du
crédit
Aucun prévu au moment des Ã
Biens Préalable
négociations déterminer
Total USD 500 000
39
Tableau 2 : Seuils déterminant le recours aux différentes procédures de passation
de marchés et à lâexamen préalable
Catégorie de dépenses Valeur du contrat (seuil) Procédures de passation de Contrats soumis Ã
En milliers de dollars marchés examen préalable
1\. Biens >100 Appel dâoffres international Tous
25-100 Appel dâoffres national Tous
<25 Consultation de fournisseurs Tous
Quelle que soit la valeur Passation des marchés par entente Tous
directe
2\. Services de
consultant
- 2\.A Cabinets QCBS, QBS, FBS, LCS Tous
Quelle que soit la valeur
<100 CQS Tous
Quelle que soit la valeur Sélection par entente directe Tous
- 2 \.B Individuels Quelle que soit la valeur Comparaison de 3 CV conformément Tous
au chapitre V des Directives
Abréviations:
ICB = Appel dâoffres international QCBS = Sélection basée sur la qualité et le coût
NCB = Appel dâoffres national QBS = Sélection basée sur la qualité
DC = Passation des marchés par entente directe FBS = Sélection dans le cadre dâun budget fixe
LCS = Sélection du moins disant
CQS = Sélection basée sur les qualifications des consultants
SSS = Sélection par entente directe
3\. Incidences environnementale et sociale (y compris les mesures de sauvegarde)
38\. Le projet envisagé est classé dans la Catégorie B\. Aucune conséquence sociale et
environnementale majeure ne devrait découler du projet, car lâimmense majorité des prêts
bancaires en Haïti et de ceux financés par ce projet sont accordés aux secteurs du commerce
et des services et à des particuliers ; toutefois, il existe peut-être un petit nombre de prêts
dans les secteurs manufacturier, industriel et de la construction sollicitant des garanties,
lesquels pourraient avoir éventuellement quelques incidences négatives aux plans
environnemental et social\. Pour cette raison, un cadre a été élaboré pour passer au crible tous
les prêts afin dâen déterminer les impacts potentiels et les réduire, en conformité avec les
dispositifs de sauvegarde environnementale et sociale de la Banque mondiale\. Ce cadre
utilise une approche à deux volets :
⢠les prêts de faible montant (dont le montant devrait se situer en dessous dâun seuil
dâenviron 62 000 dollars) dans les secteurs du commerce et des services ne devraient
avoir aucun impact sur lâenvironnement et seront ainsi examinés et traités selon une
procédure simplifiée\. Ces prêts seront examinés par rapport à une liste dâactivités qui ne
peuvent être soutenus par le PGPC, en dâautres termes une « liste négative » qui est
40
incluse dans le Système de gestion environnementale et sociale (SGES)16 du projet\. Ils
seront traités par lots et le FDI procédera à une vérification a posteriori de leur
conformité avec les dispositifs de sauvegarde environnementale et sociale de la Banque
mondiale sur la base dâun échantillonnage\. Dans le cas où un prêt de petit montant est
jugé non conforme aux politiques de sauvegarde, des voies de recours seront disponibles,
y compris, si nécessaire, lâannulation de la garantie\.
⢠Un nombre limité de prêts de faible montant aux secteurs manufacturier, industriel et de
la construction identifiés a priori dans la base de données de la BRH, pourrait avoir des
impacts négatifs sur lâenvironnement\. Par conséquent, ces prêts seront examinés de façon
plus minutieuse, en suivant les mêmes procédures résumées ci-dessous pour les prêts
dâun montant plus important et décrits intégralement dans le SGES\. La liste de ces prêts
sera incluse dans le SGES\.
⢠Les prêts dâun montant plus élevé (supérieur au seuil défini) seront également examinés
par rapport à la « liste négative »\. En outre, une évaluation individuelle de chaque prêt
sera effectuée afin dâidentifier les risques potentiels aux plans social et environnemental\.
Les mesures dâatténuation seront évaluées avant lâoctroi de la garantie\. Dans le cas où un
prêt donnera lieu au stockage, à lâachat ou à la manipulation de pesticides, la garantie ne
sera pas accordée avant lâélaboration dâun plan de lutte antiparasitaire assorti dâun budget
approprié et prévoyant des dispositions en vue de sa mise en Åuvre\.
73 Le FDI évaluera les impacts environnementaux et sociaux et les risques associés Ã
lâémission des garanties\. Le SGES sera intégré dans le Manuel opérationnel du projet et sera
divulgué six mois au plus tard après lâentrée en vigueur du projet conformément à lâaccord de
financement\. Il fournira des procédures relatives à lâélaboration dâun plan de lutte antiparasitaire,
tel que défini dans lâOP 4\.09, ainsi que les procédures à suivre dans le cas où un sous-projet se
trouve en présence de ressources culturelles physiques, telles que définies dans lâOP 4\.11 durant
son exécution\. Les missions de supervision de lâIDA et la BID vérifieront le respect des
politiques de sauvegarde\.
4\. Suivi et évaluation
39\. Le FDI et la BRH collecteront les indicateurs (les indicateurs de résultats de lâODP et des
informations complémentaires sur les prêts aux PME en fonction de leur disponibilité)\.
40\. Ãvaluation à mi-parcours\. Au plus tard 24 mois après lâentrée en vigueur, lâorganisme
dâexécution soumettra un rapport dâévaluation à mi-parcours sur : i) la mesure dans laquelle les
objectifs et les résultats ont été atteints sur la base de la matrice des résultats, et ii) les mesures
16
LâAccord de financement fait référence au Cadre de gestion environnementale et sociale qui est le terme
générique utilisé par la Banque mondiale\. Pour ce projet particulier, ce document est intitulé « Système de gestion
environnementale et sociale »\.
41
qui pourraient être prises dans le cas où le projet serait considéré comme nâayant pas atteint une
grande partie de ses objectifs\.
B\. Rôle des partenaires
41\. La BID cofinance le projet et le Trésor américain appuie le financement de ce projet Ã
travers le Fonds de reconstruction dâHaïti\.
42\. La BID est lâorganisme de cofinancement du projet et cela nécessite des dispositions
juridiques telles que les recours croisés\. Lâapplication des directives anti-corruption et des
normes de sauvegarde environnementale et sociale de la Banque a été acceptée par la BID et
celles-ci seront appliquées aux futurs organismes de cofinancement du programme\.
42
Annexe 4 : Cadre dâévaluation des risques opérationnels (ORAF)
HAÃTI
PROJET DâAPPUI Ã UN PROGRAMME DE GARANTIES PARTIELLES
DU RISQUE DE CRÃDIT POST-SÃISME
ÂÂÂÂ
  Â Â±Â  ÂÂÂÂÂÂ
Ã
Le principal objectif du projet est de contribuer à la mise en place dâun programme de garanties partielles de crédit par le
Bénéficiaire afin dâaider i) les institutions financières à relancer leurs activités de crédit, et ii) les emprunteurs auprès du
secteur financier à surmonter lâimpact de la situation dâurgence\.
ÂÂÂÂ
  Â  ² ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ
± Â Â
  Â Â° Â± Â  Â  ÂÂÂÂÂ
±Â  Â  Â Â  ² Â±  Â Â  Â
 ± Â
   Â² ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂ
 Â Â  Â  Â² Â Â
ÂÂÂÂ Â ÂÂ ÂÂÂ ÂÂ Â
 ± Â
ÂÂÂÂÂ
ÃÃ
Catégorie de risque Ãvaluation Description du risque Mesures d atténuation proposées
du risque
Risques liés aux parties  Â  Â
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ ÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ
  Â     ±Â± ±Â
±  ÂÂÂÂÂÂ
prenantes du projet  Â   Â  Â  Â Â  Â Â° ÂÂ
ÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ
ÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ ÂÂ Â ÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ Â
   ±Â  ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ Â
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂ Â
ÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ ÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂ ÂÂÂ Â
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂ
Â
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂ
ÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ
 Â   ÂÂÂÂÂÂ
±  Â Â
ÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ
ÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂÂÂ
  Â±² Â Â Â
ÂÂÂÂÂÂ
  Â  Â Â ±± Â ÂÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ
 Comité de Pilotage  Â  ÂÂ
±Â
ÂÂ
 ±Â  Â    Â
ÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂ
°Â  ÂÂÂÂÂ
Risques liés à l organisme  ±  Â Â ÂÂÂÂÂÂ
°   Â Â ±Â ÂÂÂÂÂ
  Â  ±Â± ±Â± Â
d exécution  ÂÂÂÂ
± Â
ÂÂÂÂ
± ± Â
ÂÂÂ
   ±Â Â
  ±Â  Â ÂÂ
43
±Â ±  Â  ÂÂÂÂ
±Â  Â ÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂ
± Â Â  ÂÂÂÂÂ
ÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ Â ÂÂ Â
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ Â ÂÂ Â
ÂÂÂÂÂÂ
Â
ÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ ÂÂÂ ÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ
ÂÂ ÂÂÂ Â
ÂÂÂÂ
± ÂÂ
 Â  Â±Â
ÂÂÂÂÂ
Risques liés au projet
⢠ÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂ ÂÂ
 Â  ²Â Â±  Â  ÂÂÂà  Â  Â ÂÂ
ÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ ÂÂÂ ÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ Â ÂÂÂÂÂÂ Â
ÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂ
  Â  Â  Â±Â ÂÂ
±Â  Â
 Â ±Â ÂÂÂ
±
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ
ÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ
±Â Â  ÂÂ
Â
ÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ
Â
 Âî  Â Â
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ
⢠ ÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂ ÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ
Â
± Â  Â°  Â Â  ÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ Â
  ² Â Â  Â  Â±±  Â ±Â ±Â ÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂÂ Â ÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ ÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ ÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂ
⢠  Â    ÂÂÂÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ
Â
±   Â  Â  Â  ÂÂ
ÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ
ÂÂ ÂÂ Â
ÂÂÂ
±Â   ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ
 Â  Â  Â   Â
   Â± Â ÂÂðÂ
ÂÂ ÂÂ
⢠±  Â    ² Â Â  ±± Â ÂÂÂÂÂ
  ±Â   ² ÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ
  Â Â ±Â± ±± Â  ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ Â ÂÂ ÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ
± Â ÂÂ
Â
±Â±Â  Â±Â
ÂÂÂÂÂ
Ãvaluation globale du risque Ãvaluation globale du risque
Observations
au moment de la préparation pendant l exécution
 Â ±   Â±Â
  ±Â±  Â
ÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ Â
 ÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ Â
ÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ
MI ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ Â
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ Â ÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ Â
ÂÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂÂÂ
H ÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ Â
±Â ÂÂÂ
ÂÂ Â
 ±Â Â   Â±Â  ÂÂ
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ÂÂÂ ÂÂ ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ
44
Annexe 5 : Plan dâappui à lâexécution
1\. Le Plan dâappui à lâexécution proposé ci-dessous décrit la façon dont lâIDA appuiera la
mise en Åuvre des mesures dâatténuation des risques et fournira les conseils techniques
nécessaires pour faciliter la réalisation de lâODP\.
2\. La stratégie et lâapproche définies pour le Plan dâappui à la mise en Åuvre reposent sur :
⢠Une coordination étroite avec la BRH et les autres bailleurs de fonds\. Sur
suggestion de la BRH, il a été décidé la mise sur pied, parallèlement au PGPC, un
groupe de travail consultatif afin de débattre des questions concernant le secteur
financier qui comprendra les institutions qui ont participé à la conception du
PGPC, afin de favoriser la coordination entre les bailleurs de fonds, dâune part, et
entre les bailleurs de fonds et la BRH\. Les bailleurs de fonds seront représentés au
sein du Comité de Pilotage qui supervisera les activités du PGPC\. En outre, lâIDA
coordonne avec la BID le cadre de rapport conjoint\.
⢠Flexibilité dans la conception\. Comme il nâexiste pas dâexpérience préalable de
lâutilisation de GPC pour atténuer lâimpact des catastrophes, la conception du
Pilier 1 intègre une « clause de flexibilité » en vertu de laquelle certaines
dispositions (commission, déductible, période de disponibilité et ratios de levier
financier et de couverture) peuvent être modifiées par le Comité de Pilotage pour
tenir compte des conditions du marché\. Les accords de financement prévoiront
lâutilisation alternative des ressources disponibles pour aider au développement
du système financier et accroître le volume de crédit, dans le cas où la demande
pour les garanties partielle de crédit chuterait largement en dessous des nivaux
escomptés\.
3\. Le Plan dâappui à lâexécution repose sur les éléments suivants :
⢠Une assistance technique fournie sur place à lâorganisme dâexécution par des
consultants expérimentés offrira lâappui technique nécessaire pour ajuster les
procédures et réduire les coûts de transaction selon le besoin\. Une évaluation
fiduciaire du FDI a conclu quâil était capable de gérer le programme et était déjÃ
au fait des procédures de passation de marchés des bailleurs de fonds, mais que
ses capacités devront néanmoins être renforcées\.
⢠Le système de gestion environnementale et sociale est jugé acceptable par la BID
et lâIDA et est inclus dans le Manuel opérationnel\. Le FDI sera chargé de sa mise
en Åuvre\.
⢠Un agent fiduciaire sera chargé de veiller à lâutilisation appropriée des ressources
allouées au Pilier 1\. En particulier, lâagent fiduciaire sera chargé de : i) lâanalyse
ex-post des portefeuilles en sélectionnant et en visitant certaines institutions
financières et certains emprunteurs afin de déterminer si les banques ont intégré
dans leurs portefeuilles des prêts non viables ou des créances qui violent les
45
dispositifs de sauvegarde sociale et environnementale ; ii) autoriser le déblocage
des fonds dès la mise en jeu des garanties\.
⢠La BID a accepté de financer le coût lié au recrutement du conseiller du FDI et de
lâagent fiduciaire et de fournir une formation sur les dispositifs de sauvegarde
sociale et environnementale\.
Lâappui à lâexécution portera sur les principaux aspects suivants :
Délai Thème Compétences Estimations Rôle du
nécessaires des ressources partenaire
Douze Lancement du Finances/gestion Conseiller et La BID
premiers Pilier 1 et octroi fiduciaire agent fiduciaire financera le
mois rapide des coût du
garanties conseiller et de
Lancement du lâagent
Pilier 2 fiduciaire
12 Ã 48 Traitement des Finances/gestion Conseiller et La BID
mois réclamations fiduciaire agent fiduciaire financera le
conformément coût du
aux règles du conseiller et de
PGPC lâagent
fiduciaire
II\. Ãventail de compétences nécessaires
Compétences Nombre de semaines du Nombre de voyages Observations
nécessaires personnel
Finances 12 Une fois par Missions de supervision
trimestre conjointes avec la BID
A\. Partenaires
Nom Institution/Pays Rôle
BRH Haïti Partenaire local
intervenant dans la
conception et le
suivi du projet
BID Organisme de
cofinancement
Trésor américain Ãtats-Unis Partenaire ayant
contribué à la
conception
FDI Haïti Organisme
dâexécution du
Pilier 1
46
Annexe 6 : Composition de lâéquipe
Fonctionnaires et consultants de la Banque mondiale ayant travaillé sur le projet :
Nom Titre Unité
Juan Buchenau Spécialiste principal du secteur financier LCSPF
Caroline Cerruti Spécialiste du secteur financier LCSPF
Patricia Melo Analyste des opérations LCSPF
Vyjayanti T\. Desai Ãconomiste principal IISEC
Helene Bertaud Conseiller juridique principal LEGAF
Joseph Kizito Spécialiste principal en gestion financière LCSFM
Nko Etesin Umoren Analyste de la gestion des ressources AFTFM
Patricia MacGowan Spécialiste principal en passation de LCSPT
marchés
Yingwei Wu Spécialiste principal en passation de LCSPT
marchés
Renee Desclaux Responsable financier principal AFCGH
Miguel Santiago-Oliveira Responsable financier principal CTRFC
Khalid Siraj Consultant LCSPF
Eric Palladini Consultant LCSPF
Micky Ananth Assistant de programme LCSPF
Monica Rivero Assistant de programme LCSPF
47
Annexe 7 : Le système financier haïtien
1\. Avant le tremblement de terre, le système financier était généralement considéré comme
viable, malgré quelques problèmes de développement importants\. LâÃvaluation de la stabilité du
système financier (FSSA) de 2008 a conclu que le système financier haïtien contribuait peu Ã
soutenir la croissance économique\. Des obstacles importants ont été identifiés à différents
niveaux : cadres juridiques et institutionnels, situation sécuritaire fragile, concurrence limitée
entre les banques, mauvaise gouvernance, coefficient de réserves obligatoires élevé, absence
dâun bureau du crédit fonctionnel et effet dâéviction sur prêts bancaires, car les banques
percevaient des rendements plus élevés sur les obligations de la BRH\. Cela sâest traduit par une
faible croissance du crédit, des marges dâintermédiation élevées et un accès limité au crédit\.
2\. En décembre 2009, le secteur bancaire en Haïti comprenait neuf banques commerciales, y
compris deux banques publiques (BNC et BPH) et sept banques privées\. Les trois plus grandes
banques (Unibank, Sogebank et BNC) représentaient 74 % du volume total du crédit et
80 % de lâactif total, ce qui représente un niveau de concentration élevé selon les normes
internationales et régionales\. Lâaccès au crédit bancaire était limité, car les prêts nets de
provisions représentaient seulement 30 % du montant total des actifs bancaires (850 millions de
dollars sur les 2,8 milliards de dollars dâactifs bancaires)\. Les prêts improductifs se situaient Ã
8,6 % pour le secteur, mais faisaient apparaître différents niveaux de performance entre les
banques\. Les banques publiques présentaient des ratios de prêts improductifs de plus de 30 %
pour des raisons liées à la mauvaise gouvernance (BHP) et à la résolution antérieure des
défaillances bancaires (BNC)17\. Le système était très liquide (avec un ratio de la trésorerie et des
placements à court terme par rapport aux dépôts proches de 40 %), surtout à cause des niveaux
de réserves obligatoires importants instaurés par la BRH en monnaie nationale et en devises\. Les
prêts étaient concentrés sur le commerce de gros et de détail (qui représentent respectivement 16
et 11,8 % du portefeuille total), lâimmobilier (14 %, y compris lâimmobilier commercial et de
détail), et le crédit à la consommation (12 % du portefeuille total)\. Le secteur bancaire est
supervisé par la BRH\.
17
En 2006, dans le cadre de la stratégie de résolution de la Socabank tombée en faillite, la BNC a été contrainte
dâabsorber le portefeuille de Socabank à lâaide dâune garantie de 50 % provenant de la Banque centrale\. Le ratio de
prêts improductifs de la BNC a grimpé de 4,9 % en décembre 2006 à 50,6 % en juin 2007 suite à lâabsorption du
portefeuille de la Socabank\.
48
Tableau 1 : Quelques indicateurs du secteur bancaire, décembre 2009
BNC Capital BPH
Unibank Sogebank (public) Bank Scotia CBNA Sogebel BUH (public) Système
Part de marché en
% des actifs 28\.6 30\.2 23\.4 5\.0 2\.9 2\.8 3\.3 2\.5 1\.3 100\.0
Prêts improductifs
en % des prêts
bruts 0\.5 4\.1 30\.5 1\.3 8\.3 0\.3 5\.2 14\.1 38\.0 8\.6
Rendement des
actifs % 1\.6 0\.5 1\.3 1\.5 -2\.0 1\.3 1\.5 1\.1 -0\.5 1\.2
Ratio
d'adéquation du
capital 19\.2 16\.6 -0\.3 14\.8 18\.5 21\.1 20\.3 10\.8 -10\.0 11\.7
Source : BRH\. Le calcul du capital obligatoire implique des déductions pour tenir compte de lâinsuffisance de provisions et du
non-respect des plafonds réglementaires\.
3\. Quant au secteur financier non bancaire, la FSSA a relevé que le microcrédit avait connu
un essor au cours des dernières années, mais que de nombreuses coopératives de crédit étaient
mal gérées\. Selon lâenquête effectuée en 2008 par lâUSAID, lâon dénombrait environ
200 institutions de microfinance (IMF) en Haïti, au nombre desquelles figuraient 175 unions et
coopératives dâépargne et de crédit, environ 20 fondations/ONG/associations et 4 filiales de
banques commerciales\. Sur les 200 IMF, 80 ont répondu à une enquête détaillée qui a révélé les
conclusions suivantes : un actif total de 130 millions de dollars, un montant total de prêts de
83 millions de dollars, des dépôts équivalant à 47 millions de dollars et environ
169 000 emprunteurs\.
4\. Des données plus récentes sur les IMF sont disponibles concernant lâassociation des
institutions de microfinance (Association Nationale des Institutions de Microfinance dâHaïti,
lâANIMH)18 qui regroupe 14 IMF de premier plan\. En décembre 2009, les membres de
lâANIMH possédaient un actif total de 75 millions de dollars, un portefeuille de prêts de
60 millions de dollars et fournissaient des services à plus de 128 000 clients\. Plusieurs
coopératives se sont regroupées au sein de la Fédération des Caisses Populaires Haïtiennes â Le
Levier, la première fédération nationale haïtienne des coopératives de crédit créée en juin 2007\.
Avant le tremblement de terre, elle comprenait 50 coopératives dâépargne et de crédit, comptait
340 000 membres et un actif dâenviron 52 millions de dollars et fournissait ses services à environ
un million de personnes\.
18
LâANIMH a été créée en 2002 et comprend actuellement 14 institutions de microfinance : ACLAM, ACME,
BPH, BUH/Krédi Popilè, FHAF, FINCA, FONDESPOIR, GRAIFSI, GTIH, ID, Micro Crédit Capital, Micro Crédit
National, SFF/Fonkoze et SOGESOL\.
49
5\. Les indicateurs de performance de 7 IMF haïtiennes communiquant les rapports à la
Centrale dâinformation sur la microfinance19 révèlent que ces entités (de grande taille) avaient un
solde de prêts moyen et un coût des prêts moins élevé, ainsi quâun rendement des actifs moins
élevé que la moyenne des pays de la région Amérique latine et Caraïbes (LAC)\. Ils révèlent aussi
un portefeuille à risque plus élevé que la moyenne de LAC\.
Figures 1, 2 : Quelques indicateurs de performance des IMF, moyenne pour Haïti et la
région LAC, 2008
Source: www\.mixmarket\.org/mfi ; Les chiffres concernant Haïti sont basés sur 7 IMF ayant transmis des rapports
6\. Bien que la BRH soit chargée de la réglementation des coopératives dâépargne et de
crédit, elle dispose de capacités limitées\. En raison du grand nombre de coopératives dâépargne
et de crédit, il est pratiquement impossible dâassurer un degré de supervision efficace comparable
à celle des banques\. Les IMF appartenant à un groupe bancaire sont réglementées dans le cadre
de la supervision générale de leur groupe bancaire tandis que les IMF autonomes ne le sont pas\.
7\. En décembre 2009, on dénombrait environ 15 assureurs privés locaux en Haïti ; 11 sont
membres de lâAssociation des assurances, qui compte également parmi ses membres trois
courtiers\. Toutes sont des entreprises appartenant à leurs actionnaires ; aucune nâest une société
mutuelle ou une coopérative\. Il nâexiste aucun cadre réglementaire et de surveillance, et lâon
dispose dâinformations limitées sur le secteur\. Le ministère des Finances est chargé de la
supervision, mais cette supervision se limite à la délivrance de lâagrément\. La FSSA a noté que
compte tenu du manque dâinformations sur les secteurs des assurances et des retraites, leur
importance pour la stabilité du secteur financier nâa pu être évaluée\.
8\. Lâimpact du tremblement de terre sur les institutions financières du pays se situe à trois
niveaux : i) la qualité des portefeuilles sâest détériorée, car la capacité des emprunteurs de
rembourser leurs dettes a été mise à mal et les emprunteurs dans les zones affectées ont perdu
leur nantissement ; ii) ceci a poussé les banques à restreindre le crédit aux emprunteurs existants
19
Microfinance Information Exchange, Inc\. (MIX) est une des principales institutions spécialisée dans la fourniture
dâinformation aux entreprises qui se consacrent à fournir des données et une analyse objectives sur les fournisseurs
de services de microfinance à travers le monde\.
50
en règle ; et iii) nombre dâinstitutions financières ont perdu des membres de leur personnel et ont
subi des dommages dans leurs secteurs dâactivité (surtout les IMF)\. Le système était très liquide
avant le séisme et les banques ont pu rouvrir leurs agences 9 jours après la catastrophe\.
Sâagissant du secteur des assurances, une évaluation effectuée par un consultant de la Banque Ã
la demande du ministère des Finances et de la BRH a conclu que sur les 200 millions de dollars
représentant le coût brut pour les assureurs, les réassureurs supporteront environ 75 % de ce
montant, ce qui laissera un montant de 50 millions de dollars qui sera supporté par le secteur
haïtien lui-même\. En conséquence, lâon pourrait assister à quelques défaillances de la part des
assureurs\.
9\. Les données les plus récentes, établies au mois de juin 2010, font apparaître un ratio de
prêts improductifs de 11,9 %, un taux qui est resté relativement stable depuis mars\. Ce ratio
relativement faible après une catastrophe dâune telle ampleur sâexplique par le fait que les
banques ont annulé les créances irrécouvrables après le tremblement de terre\. Toutefois, la part
des i) prêts « à signaler » qui sont des prêts accusant un retard de paiement de plus de 30 jours,
mais qui nâont pas encore été classés comme improductifs et ii) des prêts restructurés a
augmenté, passant de 13,9 % en septembre 2009 à 23,5 % en juin 2010\. En outre, les banques
nâont pas repris leurs activités de crédit\. Le stock total de prêts (net des provisions) est tombé de
33,3 milliards de gourdes en septembre 2009 Ã 28,8 milliards de gourdes en juin 2010, soit une
baisse de 13,5 %\. Outre ces tendances très négatives, il existe un risque important de blocage du
cycle du crédit, car nombre dâemprunteurs ont perdu leurs biens nantis et ne pourraient
vraisemblablement pas obtenir de nouveaux prêts\.
10\. Lâimpact du tremblement de terre a été graduel\. Comme cela a été noté dans le rapport
USAID/Winner20, les emprunteurs qui ont perdu leurs biens donnés en garantie aux banques sont
susceptibles dâêtre radiés du portefeuille une fois que leur dette aura été remboursée par les
compagnies dâassurance\. Il apparaît que ces emprunteurs sont souvent les plus à jour de leurs
remboursements\. Ainsi, le secteur bancaire pourrait perdre la partie la plus saine de son
portefeuille, ce qui est susceptible dâaccroître le taux de prêts improductifs\. Sâajoute à cela le fait
que les emprunteurs qui ne sont pas directement affectés par le tremblement de terre peuvent
devenir insolvables à cause du ralentissement de lâactivité après le tremblement de terre,
augmentant ainsi le volume de prêts improductifs et les provisions\.
Tableau 2 : Quelques indicateurs du secteur bancaire, juin 2010
BNC Capital BPH
Unibank Sogebank (public) Bank Scotia CBNA Sogebel BUH (public) Système
Part de marché en
% des actifs 30\.0 29\.4 22\.9 5\.2 3\.1 3\.0 2\.9 2\.4 1\.1 100\.0
Prêts improductifs
en % des prêts
bruts 0\.9 6\.4 35\.8 2\.0 14\.1 1\.5 17\.0 22\.2 39\.5 11\.9
20
USAID/WINNER, Etude dâimpact du séisme du 12 janvier sur le secteur prive haïtien, mars 2010\.
51
Rende-ment des
actifs % 1\.7 0\.8 0\.5 0\.2 -0\.3 -2\.0 1\.0 -0\.1 -2\.1 0\.7
Ratio
d'adéquation du
capital ND 14\.8 -1\.4 16\.6 16\.8 18\.9 20\.5 8\.4 -17\.3 10\.8
Source : BRH\. Le calcul du capital obligatoire implique des déductions pour tenir compte de lâinsuffisance de provisions et du
non-respect des plafonds réglementaires\. Le ratio pour Unibank nâest pas disponible\.
52
Annexe 8 : Le Fonds de développement industriel
1\. Créé par décret en mars 1981, le Fonds de développement industriel (FDI) est une
institution spécialisée de la BRH dotée dâune autonomie opérationnelle et financière\. Le
directeur général du FDI est nommé par le Conseil dâadministration qui est en réalité le Conseil
dâadministration de la BRH\.
2\. La mission du FDI est de promouvoir le développement économique dâHaïti en
répondant aux besoins financiers des PME qui présentent un potentiel de création dâemploi, de
production de devises et de valorisation des matières premières locales, et dont les activités nâont
pas dâeffet négatif sur lâenvironnement\.
3\. La Banque mondiale (IDA) et la BRH ont fourni les ressources de prêts par lâoctroi de
financements directs au guichet concessionnel\. LâUnion européenne est un pourvoyeur de
ressources de microcrédit dans le cadre dâun programme binational dont les bénéficiaires sont les
petites entreprises situées autour du Lac Enriquillo, le long de la frontière entre Haïti et la
République dominicaine\.
4\. Le FDI intervient par le biais dâun réseau dâinstitutions financières comprenant des
banques commerciales et de développement, et des institutions de micro-finance21\.
Produits
5\. Le FDI offre une gamme de produits de financement comprenant: le cofinancement, le
prêt participatif, le capital-risque, le prêt subordonné, la garantie de crédit, le réescompte, les
options de vente sur prêts, les microcrédits institutionnels et lâassistance technique\.
6\. Les lignes de garanties ont été lancées avec lâassistance technique de la Banque
mondiale\. Le modèle économique mis au point au FDI concernant les garanties de crédit
comprend une évaluation approfondie du risque sur ses clients\. Des garanties de crédit : i) ne
peuvent être accordées que pour de nouveaux prêts, ii) doivent être liées à des crédits individuels
accordées à une entreprise donnée pour un but spécifique, iii) sont accordées à un taux maximum
de 65 % du prêt sous-jacent de lâinstitution financière, à concurrence de 300 000 dollars pour
chaque bénéficiaire final, iv) sont amorties sur une base égale\. Une garantie peut être conservée
pour une période allant jusquâà 18 années consécutives\. Les prêts accordés pour des projets de
création, dâexpansion ou de modernisation dans un des secteurs prioritaires mentionnés ci-
dessous et ayant un ratio dette/fonds propres inférieur à 3:1 sont admissibles à une garantie du
FDI\. Les prêts de fonds de roulement ou les prêts obtenus pour rembourser dâautres prêts ne sont
pas admissibles\. Les entreprises et les gestionnaires ayant une faible cote de crédit ne sont pas
éligibles à une garantie du FDI\.
7\. La part du FDI dans un prêt syndiqué (cofinancement) ne peut excéder 90 % du montant
total du prêt ou la contrevaleur de 750 000 dollars\. Le montant maximum pour un prêt Ã
redevances est de 500 000 dollars\. Un prêt à redevances peut être accordé pour une durée
21
Les 9 banques commerciales, 3 institutions de microfinance et une IF non bancaire financée par lâUSAID\.
53
maximale de trois ans sans obligation de remboursement du principal et pour une période
supplémentaire de deux années au maximum pendant laquelle le remboursement du principal
sera fonction de la capacité de lâemprunteur de générer des flux de cash flow disponible\. à la fin
de la cinquième année, le prêt à redevances sera converti en un prêt ordinaire dâune échéance
maximale de 13 ans\.
8\. Le FDI ne peut détenir quâune participation minoritaire dans une société\. En tant que
investisseur de capital-risque, son investissement initial ne peut excéder 20 % du montant total
des capitaux propres ou la contrevaleur de 300 000 dollars\. Le FDI ne peut maintenir sa
participation au capital dâune entreprise pendant plus de 5 ans\. à lâexpiration de cette période de
5 ans, conformément à lâAccord de participation, la société émettrice est obligée de racheter les
parts du FDI dans le but de les revendre prioritairement aux actionnaires fondateurs\.
9\. La période dâamortissement dâun prêt utilisé pour financer des immobilisations ne peut
excéder 18 ans, assortis dâun différé dâamortissement de 3 ans, tandis que lâéchéance est limitée
à 2,5 ans pour les prêts dâinvestissement pour le financement de fonds de roulement (prêts
utilisés pour financer les besoins de fonds de roulement)\.
10\. Le FDI peut fournir aux nouveaux entrepreneurs une assistance financière et technique
pour lâétude de faisabilité de leurs projets\. Lâassistance technique consiste habituellement Ã
élaborer les termes de référence des études à effectuer, à recruter et sélectionner les cabinets de
consultant et à contrôler les résultats\.
Secteurs prioritaires
11\. Toute entreprise dâinvestissement ou tout projet opérant dans un des secteurs suivants est
admissible à la gamme complète des produits du FDI : agro-industrie, transformation
alimentaire, industrie du médicament, industrie chimique, construction, construction métallique,
industrie textile et du cuir, tourisme, transport et communication, enseignement supérieur et
professionnel, artisanat et services liés aux activités industrielles\.
Structure financière
12\. Le montant total des actifs du FDI sâélève à 1,5 milliards de gourdes (environ 37 millions
de dollars) Ã septembre 2009, avec un taux de croissance annuelle de 5 Ã 10 %\. Le portefeuille de
garanties du FDI représente seulement une portion très petite de son portefeuille global\.
13\. La structure de financement du FDI en septembre 2009 est répartie comme suit: i) capital,
60 % des actifs ; ii) bénéfices non distribués, 30 % des actifs ; et iii) emprunts, 10 % des actifs\.
14\. En septembre 2009, le rendement net des actifs était de 3,57 %, ce qui était supérieur à la
moyenne du système bancaire (1,2 % au mois de décembre 2009)\. Les prêts improductifs sur les
prêts et lignes de garanties (non compris les programmes spécifiques du Gouvernement haïtien)
sâélevaient à 12 %, ce qui représente un ratio supérieur à la moyenne du système bancaire (8,6 %
au mois de décembre 2009) qui sâexplique par lâaccent particulier mis par le FDI sur les clients Ã
haut risque\.
54
15\. Les comptes du FDI sont vérifiés tous les ans par le cabinet représentant KPMG en Haïti,
Mérové-Pierre and Associates\. Le dernier rapport de vérification des comptes à septembre 2009
a émis une opinion sans réserve\.
55 | APPROVAL |
P149259 | PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
ADDITIONAL FINANCING
Report No\.: PIDA18608
Project Name Regional Disaster Vulnerability Reduction Project (Additional
Finance) (P149259)
Parent Project Name Regional Disaster Vulnerability Reduction APL1 - Grenada and St\.
Vincent and the Grenadines (P117871)
Region LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN
Country Grenada
Sector(s) Forestry (40%), Flood protection (40%), Urban Transport (20%)
Theme(s) Climate change (60%), Natural disaster management (20%), Other
urban development (15%), Land administration and management
(5%)
Lending Instrument Investment Project Financing
Project ID P149259
Parent Project ID P117871
Borrower(s) Ministry of Finance Grenada
Implementing Agency Ministry of Finance, Planning, Economic Development, Trade,
Energy & Cooperatives
Environmental Category B-Partial Assessment
Date PID Prepared/Updated 29-Jan-2015
Date PID Approved/Disclosed 30-Jan-2015
Estimated Date of Appraisal 06-Feb-2015
Completion
Estimated Date of Board 30-Apr-2015
Approval
Decision
I\. Project Context
Country Context
Grenada is exposed to meteorological (high wind/excess rainfall/hurricanes and drought) and
geophysical (seismic/volcanic/tsunami) hazards, causing a high risk to its economic stability\. These
hazards often result in significant and recurrent damages to national infrastructure including
housing, transport and telecommunication networks, schools, hospitals as well as water and
electrical services\. As is the case with most island states, a single hazard event can impact the entire
population and economy of Grenada due to its small population and limited geographical area\. For
example, Hurricane Ivan (2004) resulted in national losses exceeding 200 percent of Grenadaâs
annual GDP\. Damages to government facilities virtually paralyzed the government and some 97
percent of Grenadaâs schools [74 out of 76] as well as 2/3 of the housing stock were either damaged
or completely destroyed\.
Page 1 of 4
Sectoral and institutional Context
The proposed AF would significantly contribute to the implementation of the Grenadaâs Strategic
Program for Climate Resilience (SPCR) dated March 2, 2011\. More specifically, it directly
contributes to four of the five SPCR expected outcomes, namely: (i) improved resilience of
infrastructure; (ii) restored and improved forestry resources; (iii) improved government capacity for
assessment and management of Grenadaâs water supply; and (iv) improved use of data and
geospatial analysis for climate change adaptation\. Additionally, the activities proposed under the
AF are closely linked with the objectives of the Grenada National Strategic Development Plan
(2007-2017) \. Furthermore, increasing capacity to manage risk from natural hazards and climate
change is a core outcome of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) Regional
Partnership Strategy (RPS) FY15-FY19\. It directly contributes to one of the three areas of
engagement (âResilienceâ) and, ultimately, to the overall strategic goal of supporting the OECS in
laying foundations for sustainable inclusive growth\. Grenada uses the RDVRP is one of its
principle financial vehicles to deliver on its overall climate resilience goals\. In order to minimize
transaction costs on the Government, and to address climate resilience in a comprehensive and
integrated manner in Grenada, the additional PPCR financing will be channeled as an AF to the
RDVRP\.
II\. Proposed Development Objectives
A\. Current Project Development Objectives â Parent
The Program aims at measurably reducing vulnerability to natural hazards and climate change
impacts in the Eastern Caribbean Sub-region\. The objective of the Project in Grenada is to
measurably reduce vulnerability to natural hazards and climate change impacts in Grenada and in
the Eastern Caribbean Sub-region\. The objective of the Project in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
is to measurably reduce vulnerability to natural hazards and climate change impacts in Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines and in the Eastern Caribbean Sub-region\. The achievement of the Program
Development Objectives of the Regional Disaster Vulnerability Reduction Program (RDVRP)
would be measured using the following key indicators: (a) Reduced risk of OECS population to
failure of public buildings and infrastructure due to natural hazards or climate change impacts; and
(b) Increased capacity of OECS Governments to identify and monitor climate risk and impacts\.
III\. Project Description
Component Name
Prevention and Adaptation Investments
Comments (optional)
The proposed AF would permit the completion of priority investments for flood protection and
improved drainage in urban areas\.
Component Name
Regional Platforms for Hazard and Risk Evaluation, and Applications for Improved decision making
Comments (optional)
This component finances critical building blocks to Grenadaâs technical and institutional capacity to
manage climate resilience in forest and water resource management departments, with additional
Page 2 of 4
applications for Ministry of Works, the National Disaster Management Agency (NADMA) and the
National Planning Office, which could contribute to a transformative impact on Grenadaâs capacity
to build climate resilience\.
Component Name
Project Management and Implementation Support
Comments (optional)
The AF would support strengthening the institutional capacity for project management and
coordination of SPCR implementation\. This will be accomplished through the provision of technical
advisory services, training, operating costs and acquisition of goods\.
IV\. Financing (in USD Million)
Total Project Cost: 8\.80 Total Bank Financing: 0\.00
Financing Gap: 0\.00
For Loans/Credits/Others Amount
BORROWER/RECIPIENT 0\.00
International Development Association (IDA) 0\.00
Strategic Climate Fund Credit 3\.80
Strategic Climate Fund Grant 5\.00
Total 8\.80
V\. Implementation
The AF implementation, institutional and internal quality control arrangements would remain the
same as the arrangements established under the RDVRP\. The additional activities under the AF are
within Grenadaâs current capacity to execute\. The Project Coordination Unit is reasonably staffed
and targeted training has facilitated capacity development to manage Bank-supported projects\. The
Social Specialist and Engineer will supervise safeguards for most activities, particularly for spot
field inspections during construction\. An external environmental consultant will be contracted to
provide support for specialized tasks and for more frequent inspection of intensive construction
efforts\. The Operations Manual will be updated to reference the new Environmental Management
Framework\.
The proposed AF would also scale up technical assistance provided under the RDVRP to support
improved project management capacity and financial management systems\. Additionally, a project
Steering Committee oversees the implementation and coordination of the RDVRP, will also support
the execution of the AF activities as well as monitor its implementation\. The Grenada National
Climate Change Committee (NCCC) was reactivated in July 2014 with support from GIZ and will
be meeting with frequency; this is invaluable for ensuring long term climate planning in the country
and the transformational success of the RDVRP in regards to disaster risk and climate adaptation\.
VI\. Safeguard Policies (including public consultation)
Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project Yes No
Environmental Assessment OP/BP 4\.01 â
Natural Habitats OP/BP 4\.04 â
Forests OP/BP 4\.36 â
Page 3 of 4
Pest Management OP 4\.09 â
Physical Cultural Resources OP/BP 4\.11 â
Indigenous Peoples OP/BP 4\.10 â
Involuntary Resettlement OP/BP 4\.12 â
Safety of Dams OP/BP 4\.37 â
Projects on International Waterways OP/BP 7\.50 â
Projects in Disputed Areas OP/BP 7\.60 â
Comments (optional)
VII\. Contact point
World Bank
Contact: Gaetano Vivo
Title: Disaster Risk Management Speci
Tel: 473-2448
Email: gvivo@worldbank\.org
Borrower/Client/Recipient
Name: Ministry of Finance Grenada
Contact: Mr\. Timothy Antoine
Title: Permanent Secretary
Tel: 473-440-6843
Email: timothy\.antoine@gov\.gd
Implementing Agencies
Name: Ministry of Finance, Planning, Economic Development, Trade, Energy & Cooperatives
Contact: Mr\. Timothy Antoine
Title: Permanent Secretary
Tel: 473-440-6843
Email: timothy\.antoine@gov\.gd
VIII\. For more information contact:
The InfoShop
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 458-4500
Fax: (202) 522-1500
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/infoshop
Page 4 of 4 | APPROVAL |
P071039 | Documentof
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USEONLY
Report No\. 28940-BM
INTERNATIONAL, DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION
PROGRAMDOCUMENT
FORA
PROPOSEDECONOMIC MANAGEMENT STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT CREDIT
INTHEAMOUNT OFSDR23\.2MILLION
(US$34\.0 MILLIONEQUIVALENT)
TO
BOSNIAAND HERZEGOVINA
May 17,2004
SouthEast EuropeCountryUnit
Poverty ReductionandEconomic ManagementUnit
Europeand CentralAsia Region
This document has arestricteddistribution andmaybe usedby recipients only inthe
performance o ftheir official duties\. Its contents maynot otherwise be disclosedwithout World
Bank authorization\.
CurrencvEquivalents
(Exchange Rate Effective May 14,2004)
Currency Unit =Konvertibilna Marka (KM)
1KM =US$O\.61
1 K M =EUROS1
Government FiscalYear
January 1-December 31
Weights andMeasures
Metric System
AbbreviationsandAcronyms
BAC Business Adjustment Credit IMF InternationalMonetary Fund
BEEPS Business Environment and Enterprise ITA Indirect Tax Authority
Survey MTDS Medium-Term Development
BFP Budget Framework Paper StrategyPoverty Reduction Strategy
BH Bosnia andHerzegovina Paper
CAS Country Assistance Strategy MTEF Medium-Term Expenditure
CPAR Country Procurement Assessment Framework
Report NPV Net Present Value
CPI Consumer Price Index OHR Office o f the HighRepresentative
DPA Dayton PeaceAgreement OSCE Office for Stabilization and Security
ECA Europe and Central Asia inEurope
ECBH Election Commission o f Bosnia and PEIR Public Expenditure and Institution
Herzegovina Review
EFF ExtendedFundFacility PFSAC II Second Public Finance Structural
EMSAC Economic Management Structural Adjustment Credit
Adjustment Credit PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
ERP Education ReformProject RS Republika Srpska
EU European Union SA1 Supreme Audit Institution
FBH Federation o f Bosnia and SBA Stand-by Arrangement
Herzegovina SFOR StabilizationForces
FDI ForeignDirect Investment SFRY Socialist FederalRepublic of
GDP Gross Domestic Product Yugoslavia
HEFL HigherEducationFrameworkLaw SOSAC II Second Social Sector Adjustment
ICR Implementation Completion Report Credit
IDA International Development VAT Value Added Tax
Association WTO World Trade Organization
Vice President: Shigeo Katsu
Country Director: Orsalia Kalantzopoulos
Sector Manager: BernardFunck
Team Leader: Jean-Luc Bemasconi
2
EconomicManagementStructuralAdjustment Credit
FOROFFICIAL USEONLY
CREDIT SUMMARY
Borrower: Bosnia andHerzegovina, with sub-credit Agreements with the
Federationo fBosniaandHerzegovina andthe RepublikaSrpska\.
Amount: US$ 34\.0 million equivalent inSDRs\.
Terms: ModifiedIDAterms o f 20 years maturity with 10 years grace
period\.
Commitment Fee: 0\.5 percent p\.a\.
Objectives andDescription: The proposed Economic Management Structural Adjustment
Credit (EMSAC) supports a fiscal policy reformprogram for the
transition from post-conflict aid-dependencyto self-sustained
growthby (i) reducingthe excessburdenof government inthe
economy while increasing expenditure efficiency; and (ii)
improving financial andbudgetary managementinthe public
sector\. Iti s fully consistent with the Government's Medium-
TermDevelopment StrategyPoverty Reduction StrategyPaper\.
Benefits: The expectedbenefits from the operation are to:
Enhancepublic spendingefficiency and ensure macro-fiscal
stability bygood managemento fpublic resources\.
Accommodate the medium-termmacro-economic program
andprovideroom for areductioninthe tax andcontributions
burdenonthe formal sector throughthe reduction inthe
weight ofpublic expenditure\.
Contain wages inthe general government sector, leading to a
slowdowninoverall wage inflation inthe public enterprise
sector and the formal economy ingeneral, thereby fostering
BH's competitive position\.
Improve allocative efficiency o f spending, most notablyin
the education sector\.
Clarify intergovernmental revenue and expenditure
assignments leading to improvedfunding for localpublic
service delivery\.
Increasetransparency and-accountabilityingovernment
transactions to foster efficiency and improve the overall
policy environment, therebyencouragingprivate sector
investment\.
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in
the performance of their official duties\. I t s contents may not be otherwise disclosed
without World Bank authorization\.
Risks: Among the risks faced bythe credit are:
0 The possibility o f the authorities either delaying the
implementation o f some measures or even reversing their
commitment to some parts ofthe Program\. This could
materialize ifthe authorities fail to convincingly lay out the
expected benefits o f the Program anddefuse tensions arising
from what could be perceived as a possible threat to vested
interests (e\.g\., external audit strengthening, procurement
reformor conflict o f interest legislation)\.
0 Weak administrative capacity to implement andmonitor the
Program\.
0 Macroeconomic risk arising from BH's still fi-agile position
could materialize ifthe external environment deteriorates
(lower foreign investment, persistentlysluggish external
demand for BHexports, stronger than anticipated declines in
donor aid)\. This macroeconomic risk is compoundedby fiscal
risk related to the domestic debt overhang\.
Schedule o f Disbursements: Two tranches
Poverty Category: NIA
Rate o fReturn: NIA
Project IDNumber: PO71039
Map BHmapIBRD32760
Staff and consultants who contributed duringpreparation include: Jean-Luc Bernasconi (TTL), Simon Gray, Dirk
Reinermann, Joseph Ingram, Lawrence Hannah, Bemd Spahn, Joao Oliveira, Irina Smimov, Svetlana Proskurovska,
James Anderson, James Stevens, Toby Linden, Nick Bumett, Marcelo Bisogno, Siew Chai Ting, Sanjay Vani, Shawn
Moss, Nikola Kerleta, Mark Walker, DilekBarlas, Christian Bodewig, Zorica Lesic, Zeljka Meheljic and Lejla Catic\.
Peer reviewers are William Dorotinsky (PRMPS) and Saumya Mitra (ECSPE)\. CherylGray and BernardFunck
(ECSPE) are the Sector Director and Sector Manager, respectively\.
4
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTASSOCIATION
PROGRAMDOCUMENT FOR
A PROPOSEDECONOMIC MANAGEMENT STRUCTURALADJUSTMENT CREDIT
TO BOSNIAAND HERZEGOVINA
Contents
PART I: INTRODUCTION 6
PART 11: THE ECONOMY 6
A\.InstitutionalandPolitical Background \.
\.
\.
6
B\.Recent Economic Developments \. 8
\.
D\.Current Macroeconomic PolicyFramework\.
C\.Track Record inStructural and Institutional Reforms 10
12
E\.Macroeconomic Prospects andExternalFinancingRequirement \. 13
PART111: THE COUNTRY'S STRUCTURALREFORM PROGRAM \. 14
A\.The Medium-Term Development StrategyPRSP\. 14
B\.The Fiscal Policy ReformProgram\. 15
C The Fiscal Reformsto be Supported by the Proposed Credit \.
\. 19
FirstProgramComponent: Rationalization of expenditure programs and
intergovernmental fiscal arrangements \. 19
Second ProgramComponent: Improve the management o f public expenditure
and the governance over public resources \. 25
PARTIV: THE PROPOSEDCREDIT \. 29
A\.Rationale for BankInvolvement \. 29
B\.Benefits andRisks \. 30
C Coordination with the IMF \.
\. 31
D\.NegotiationsandBoardConditions andTranche Triggers\. 31
E\.Implementation \. 35
F\.Financial Arrangements \. 36
G\.Poverty Implications \. 37
H\.EnvironmentalImpact \. 37
ANNEXES:
Annex 1 Key Economic Indicators \. 38
Annex 2 Statement o f Loans and Credits\. 40
Annex 3 IFC Portfolio inBosnia and Herzegovina \. 41
Annex 4 Timetable o f Key Processing Events \. 42
Annex 5 Letter o f Development Policy \. 43
Annex 6 PolicyReformProgramMatrix \. 57
Annex 7 BH: Country at aGlance \. 66
5
INTERNATIONALDEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION
PROGRAMDOCUMENTFORA
PROPOSEDECONOMIC MANAGEMENT STRUCTURALADJUSTMENT
CREDIT
TO BOSNIAAND HERZEGOVINA
I\.INTRODUCTION
1\. This ProgramDocument describes a proposed Economic Management StructuralAdjustment
Credit (EMSAC) to Bosnia and Herzegovina(BH) inthe amount o f SDR 23\.2 million (US$34\.0 million
equivalent) to support the Government's structuralreformprogram\. The Credit would be provided on
modifiedIDA terms o f 20 years maturity with 10 years grace period\.
2\. ThisProgramDocument is fully consistent, and shouldbereadinconjunctionwith the Country
Assistance Strategy (CAS) o f the World Bank Group for Bosnia andHerzegovina, Report No\. 20592 dated
July 12,2000, and the CAS Progress Report No\. 24978, dated October 15,2002\. The proposedEMSACis
also consistent with BH's Medium-Term Development StrategyRoverty Reduction Strategy Paper (MTDS)
and supports a fiscal policy reformprogram for the transition from post-conflict aid-dependency to self-
sustained growth by: (i) reducing the excessburdeno f government inthe economy while increasing
expenditure efficiency; and (ii) improving financial and budgetarymanagement inthe public sector\. The
proposed EMSACalso buildsupon BH'sachievements under the predecessor Second Public Finance
Structural Adjustment Credit (PFSAC 2)\.2
11\.THEECONOMY
A\. InstitutionalandPoliticalBackground
3\. Following a devastating conflict and the DaytonPeaceAgreement in 1995, BHhas made progress
inestablishing itselfas amodernandviable state, includingby(i) enhancing internal harmonization o f the
relatively autonomous sub-national entities while strengthening the coordination functions o f BH's central
state; and (ii)
increasingextemal integration by engaging inthe Stabilization and Association process
(SAP) with the European Union (EU), as well as pursuingother avenues o f international integration
(Council o f Europemembership, WTO accession, etc\.)\. However, this integrationagenda i s far from
Given that BHqualifies for IDAborrowing but lies above the IDA cut-off, the terms o fthe Credit are subject to
exceptionally hardened IDA terms, as agreed duringthe IDA XI11replenishment\.
Report No\. P-7318-BIH\.
6
complete, and the design and implementation o f reforms still has to overcome the complex political and
institutional situation, which arose from the DaytonPeace Agreement (DPA)\.3
4\. Betweenearly 2001 and late 2002, reform-oriented coalitions at the level o f State and Entitieswere
able to accelerate reforms and consolidate macroeconomic stability through sound fiscal and monetary
policies\. Progress was also made instrengthening cooperation betweenthe two Entities,by strengthening
state-level institutions to enforce countrywide standards, and by harmonizinginter-Entitypolicies (e\.g\.,
reforms o f indirect taxation undertaken under PFSAC 2)\.4Inparticular, groundbreakingreforms were
achieved inthe defense sector, with the centralization of operational and administrative command and
control structures over all BHarmed forces at the level o f the State\. However, the Governments failed to
make significant progress on some o f the most important structural reforms, such as strategic privatizations
or reformo f the social protection system\. Elections inOctober 2002 saw the return o f the parties that had
been inpower for most of the post-war period\. Since taking office, the Governments have reaffirmedthe
common overarchingobjective o f EUassociation and membership\. Policy statements andreformplans
approved since then also signal a recognition that the path to EUaccession involves deepening reforms\. A
feasibility study released by the European Commission inNovember 2003 concludes that opening of
negotiations for a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) in2004 can be envisaged, on the
condition that BHmakes significant progress ina number o f areas identified by the Commission as
priorities for a ~ t i o n \. ~
5\. Encouragingly, Entityand State government officials regularly discuss and coordinate the
formulation o freformpolicies\. Among other factors, the MTDSFRSP process has proven to be an
effective vehicle to facilitate and institutionalize national policy dialogue and consensusbuildinga6The
reformprogram i s comprehensively presented inthe recently approved MTDS, which was officially
forwardedby the authorities to the World Bank inApril 2004 \.
The Dayton PeaceAgreement (DPA) provides for four levels o f Government\. The State o f BH(the "State") is at the
highest level, while the next level i s constituted by two Entities, the Federation o fBH(FBH),mainly inhabitedby
the Bosniak (Muslim) and Croat ethnic groups, and the predominantly Serb Republika Srpska (RS)\. The FBHis a
highly decentralized Entity, divided into 10 cantons and 80 municipalities\. Incontrast, the RS is organized around
a unitary concept o f government, and consists o f 62 municipalities\. Since 2000, BHalso includes an autonomous
territory, Brcko District\. The DPA also establishes the Office o f the HighRepresentative (OHR) with a mandate
to oversee the implementation o fthe peace accords, with executive powers on civilian matters, including
legislative veto and impositionpowers, including the legal capacity to remove officials from office\.
See Implementation Completion Report o f PFSAC 2, Report No\. P-73 18\.
These 16priority areas include: compliance withexisting conditionality and international obligations; more effective
governance; more effective public administration; Europeanintegration; effective human rightsprovisions;
effectivejudiciary; tackling crime, especially organized crime; managing asylum and migration; customs and
taxation reform; budget legislation; budget practice; reliable statistics; consistent trade policy; integrated energy
market; BHsingle economic space; and public broadcasting\.
More specifically, the Coordination Board for Economic Development and European Integration, which includes
Prime Ministers andMinisters o f Finance from the State and two Entities, has met regularly since the new
Governments have beenestablished, to discuss BH's development strategy (PRSP), as well as particular policy
issues, such as indirect tax policyr e f o q labor market reforms, and domestic debt settlement\.
7
B\. Recent Economic Developments
6\. BHhasrecordedimpressive growthrates sincethe war (an average21percent inrealGDPgrowth
between 1996 and 2003 -see Table l), when compared to other post-conflict economies\. Inthe
even
immediate aftermath o f the conflict, growth was mainly spurred by intense reconstructionandrehabilitation
investmentinpublic infrastructure and private housing\. Spending has beenpredominantly financed by large
and sustained aid flows\. Private transfers, which are estimated to have averaged 12percent o f GDP over the
last five years, have also played an important role infueling domestic spending\. More recently, while
remainingpositive (an estimated 3\.5 percent in2002), growth has been slowing down, mirroringdeclining
official aid and stagnating manufacturing activity\. The trend o f decreasing aid flows i s likely to continue, as
the strategic focus underpinning donor commitments shifts from reconstruction financing and support o f
refugee retum, to providingtechnical assistanceinsupport o f structural and administrativereforms\.
7\. Money and credit\. Due to the strict adherence to the currency board arrangement introducedin
1997, inflationhas rapidly decelerated to single digit levels and has remainedbelow one percent in2002
and 2003\. The inflation differential between the two Entities has also beenreduced\. Dueto the introduction
of the euro and the associated reverse currency substitution it triggered,7 and to the successful restructuring
and modernization of the banking sector, non-government deposits grew significantly between2000 and
2002 (from 6\.5 percent o f GDP to 9\.5 percent), leadingto a credit boomin2002, especially credits to the
householdsector which more than doubled that year\. Measures to tightencredit policy were taken in2003
inthe framework ofthe IMFStand-By Arrangement (SBA)\. These measuresappearto have achieved
deceleration incredit growth\. Persistingindexationmechanisms, however, have allowed accrued andpaid
wage growth to exceed productivity, with an adverse impact on employment and corporate profitability in
bothEntities\.
8\. Fiscal outcomes\. The post-conflict growth performancewas accompanied inthe initial phase by
large fiscal and external deficits\. Onthe fiscal side, donor-funded public investment programs inpart
causedthe imbalance\. Inaddition, post-conflict recovery indomestic revenue collection also triggered
increases inrecurrent spending, especially on the public sector wage bill\. Since 2000, fiscal stabilization
efforts have led, however, to an elimination of the budgetary deficit, which hadpeaked at over 9 percent o f
GDP in 1999 while the preliminary fiscal accounts posteda small surplus in2003 worth 0\.4 percent o f
GDP (accruals, including grants)\. The reductionintotal spending from close to 70 percent o f GDP in 1999
to less than 50 percent in2003 (excluding municipal spending) was significant, even ifmost o f the
adjustment inexpenditure reflects the decline inexternally financed public investment\. Similarly,
accumulationo fnew arrears was curtailedto less than one percent o f GDP in2001, leadingthe way to a net
reduction inoutstanding payment arrears since 2002\.
9\. External accounts\. While fiscal imbalances have beenbrought under control, the external current
account deficit represents perhaps the single most important challenge faced by BH\.Large import volumes
that accompanied the reconstruction periodwere only partiallycoveredby a subdued export performance\.
While exports have grown faster than overall merchandise imports innominal (euro) terms since 2002, they
still account for only 10percent o f GDP\. Merchandiseimports, representingabout a third o f GDP, have
more recently been spurred by the growth innon-reconstruction relatedinflows, whichhave accelerated
sharply over the past three years\. These types o f imports, believed to be largely consumer goods and
constructionmaterial (inaddition to oil products), surged in2002, fueled by the sizeable increase incredit
~~
Households exchanged large amounts of Germandeutschmark they had hoarded against KMdeposits inthe domestic
banking system\.
8
to households mentionedearlier\. As a result, the current account deficit ballooned to close to 19percent o f
GDP in2002, and was mainly financedby aid flows (about halfthe gap), foreign direct investment and
private capital and a small draw down on reserves\. In2003, the tightening o f credit policies appearsto have
restrained import growthleadingto a slight easing inthe current account deficit to about 17 percent o f
GDP\.8Encouragingly, foreign direct investment increasinglyrepresents an alternative to aid financing o f
the balance o fpayments, signalingincreasedinternational investor interest inresponseto continued
macroeconomic stability\. Net FDIinflows have postedconsecutive increases in2002 and 2003, reaching
over 4 percent o f GDP\.
10\. Publicdebt\. At the endof2003, BH's extemal debt is estimated to be sustainable\. BHauthorities
were able to achieve successivereschedulingagreements, as well as the regularization and cancellationo f
old debts denominated innon-convertible currencies, while pursuingprudent externalborrowing policies\.
As a result, extemal debt was brought down from 70 percent o fGDP in 1998to below 40 percent at end-
2003\. Bank staff estimates the net present value o f total external debt at end 2003 to be equivalent to 25
percent o f GDP or 91 percent o f exports o f goods and services\. As such, BHi s classified as a moderately
indebtedmiddle-income country\. Virtually all BHexternal debt i s public debt, denominated mainly in
euros and U S dollars\. The highlyconcessional terms o f donor assistanceprovided to BHhelped ensure a
relatively comfortable position withrespect to extemal debt servicing\. The debt service profile deteriorated
in2002, asrepayments underIDAloans andthe IMFStand-By Arrangement have fallen due\. As aresult,
the debt service-to-exports ratio reached 8\.5 percent in2002, before easing slightly in2003\. Inthe full
reform scenario described below, however, this external liquidity ratio i s expected to decreasebelow 5
percentby 2007\. Inaddition, assuming the continuation of prudent external borrowing, the externaldebt-to-
GDP ratiowould declinebelow 30 percent over the projectedperiod\.
11\. The public debt situation is complicated, however, by a large overhang o f domestic claims onBH's
governments\. According to recent IMFestimates, potential domestic claims are in excesso f 200 percent o f
GDP\. The majority ofthis potential debt relates to the break up o fformer SFRY andthe ensuingwar;
including claims against the government for the freeze of foreign exchange deposits immediately before the
war (equivalent to 18percent o f 2003 GDP) and a large amount o f war claims related to material losses as
well as non-material damages including death o frelatives and other non-material damages suffered by
veterans andvictims of the war (13 1percent o f GDP)\. Additional claims and contingent liabilities
originated after the conflict, such as unusedprivatizationvouchers that were issued to citizens and that have
not yet expired, as well as public spending arrears accumulated before 2002\.
12\. As a result, State and EntityGovernments have recently committedto, within the framework o f the
IMFStand-By Arrangement, implementdomestic claims settlement plans, that wouldreduce the
outstandingburdeno f domestic claims to no more than 10percent o f 2003 GDP inNPV terms\.
Quantitative frameworks for settling the claims have been established for bothEntities, including
combinations o f cashpayments, debt write-offs or securitization invery long-term bonds (20 to 50 years)
with extended grace periods andvirtually no coupon\. Inparallel, State andEntityParliaments passed
moratoria on the court processing o fpending lawsuits related to war damages\. While the moratoria are in
place and claims verification progresses, Entitylaws that would enshrine the Governments' settlement
strategy are being drafted and are expected to be adopted before the summer o f 2004\. While these actions
are essential first steps inresolving this important issue, uncertainties aroundthe implementation o f the
settlement programremain, ranging from possible legal challenges to the debt write-offs to political
* The trade data for 2003 is being currently revised and preliminary estimates suggest a downward revisiono f imports,
and, accordingly, a reduction o fthe estimate of the current account deficit o f three percentage points o f GDP\.
9
resistance delaying the passageo f the domestic claims settlement laws\. Ifthe plan i s implemented as
currently envisaged, including the issuance of govemment bonds to settle part o f the claims, it would add
some 30percent o f GDP to the existing burden, so that total public debt (domestic and extemal) would
represent about 60 percent o f GDP at end 2004\.
Table 1\.Bosnia and Herzegovina: SelectedEconomic Indicators, 1999-2003
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Est\. Est\. Est\. Est\. Est\.
(annual percentagechange)
RealGDP growth 9\.6 5\.5 4\.4 5\.5 3\.5
Industrialproduction index 11\.9 9\.3 -2\.0 11\.5 3\.8
CPIInflation 2\.8 5\.0 3\.2 0\.3 0\.1
Gross wages 11\.4 12\.9 6\.8 6\.9 9\.4
Credit to the private sector -2\.3 8\.7 10\.9 25\.7 22\.4
(inpercentofGDP unlessotherwisenoted)
Total Investment 21\.0 20\.6 18\.9 20\.4 19\.9
National Savings 12\.8 7\.6 2\.7 1\.9 2\.5
Governmentrevenues 57\.7 53\.7 49\.7 48\.1 46\.7
Total Public Expenditure 65\.5 60\.7 53\.1 50\.4 46\.3
oiw CapitalExpenditure 14\.8 10\.9 9\.2 6\.3 4\.5
Overallbalance(accruals, incl\. -7\.8 -7\.0 -3\.3 -2\.2 0\.4
grants)
Currentaccountbalance -8\.2 -13\.1 -16\.2 -18\.5 -17\.4
Total public extemaldebt 65\.7 58\.8 48\.2 42\.2 34\.0
Extemaldebt service (in% of 9\.4 7\.3 6\.3 8\.5 7\.8
exports ofgoods and services)
Gross official reserves(in 1\.9 2\.2 5\.1 4\.6 5\.1
months ofimports)
Source: IMF,FourthSBA review,February2004; Bankstaffestimates\.
C\. Track Record in Structural and Institutional Reforms
13\. Since the end o f the war, progress instructural and institutional reforms has beenthe most strikmg
inthe financial sector andtrade policy, as well as inpublic finance\. Anchored inthe currencyboard,
financial sector reforms have focused sequentially on the dismantling o f the payment bureaus and the
establishment of a modempayment system, the state divestiture from the banking sector andthe successful
entry of strategic investors, the consolidation o f the banking sector at low fiscal costs as well as the
establishment and gradual strengthening of the prudential and regulatory framework\. Minimumcapital
requirements are being strictly enforced and the prerequisites for participation inthe recently established
deposit insurance system may lead to further consolidation inthe sector\. The IDA Enterprise and Bank
10
Privatization Adjustment Credit (EBPAC) supported many o fthese reform^\.^ Trade policy reforms have
been very pronounced with the negotiationofbilateral trade agreementsinthe Regionthat are compliant
with Stability Pact" principles andthe adoptionofthe most liberaltrade regime inthe Region\." The
perceived lack o f success o f these trade reforms to translate into improved trade performance has, however,
raisedconcerns among some policy-makers about the desirability o f further liberalization, while
protectionist lobbies have called for more restrictive policies\.
14\. Withrespect to public finance, the introductionof a modem treasury system at all levels o f
government (except municipalities) has contributedto improved spending discipline\. Significant progress
was also achieved with respect to tax policy and administrationincluding countrywide harmonization, and
improved collection enforcement\. Initial administrative reforms inthe area of public finance were
accomplished, mainly under the program supported by two Public Finance Structural Adjustment Credits
(PFSAC Iand II)\. More recently, BHhas adopted a new legal framework for indirect tax and customs
administration, establishinga single, state-level indirect revenue administration that will manageunified
customs collection\. Onthe expenditure side, significant reforms to the pension and health insurance
systems were carried out under PFSAC 11,but these are inneed o f further consolidation\. Also, significant
spendingconsolidation and staff downsizinginnon-productivefunctions of government arebeing
implemented (see Letter o f Development Policy)\.
15\. Furtherreforms inthe public sector will focus onthe preparatorywork for the introduction of
Value Added Tax (VAT) in2005 or early 2006, a reformthat i s also widely perceivedto yieldpositive
externalities for the corporate sector, as it would improve the competition and governance environment\. In
addition, revenue gains that would emerge from the introduction o f VAT should be used, at least inpart, to
reduce the overall tax and contribution burden\.Onthe expenditure side, the pace and scope for further
rationalizationo f a costly multi-layer government structure, which still absorbs above 50 percent o f GDP
(including municipalities)\. Expenditure rationalization should also focus on maintaining control over the
wage bill inorder to free resources for operations andmaintenance as well as domestically financed public
investment\. The proposed EMSAC will buildon the progress realized under PFSAC 11inthe areas o f
public expendituremanagement (see below)\. Inaddition, the Second Social Sector Adjustment Credit
(SOSAC II), which will also be presented to the Board along with the proposedEMSAC, mainly aims at
supportingthe Government's program to reform the cashtransfer system and institutional arrangements for
socialprotection\.
16\. The modest supply responseto the favorable trade regime (see para\.13) indeed signals areas where
structuralreforms have been less successful, mainlyrelatedto enterprise reformand labor market reforms\.
While an important massprivatization o f small-scale businesses was undertaken shortly after the war, it
resulted, as inother transition countries, indilutedownership and weak corporate governance structures\.
Report No\. P-7257-BH\.
lo June1999,theStabilityPactfortheregionwasadoptedataspecialmeetingofForeignMinisters,representatives
In
o f internationalorganizations, institutions and Regional agencies\. Including all EUmembers and G8 countries,
Albania, BH, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, FYR Macedonia and Turkey, as well as virtually all
major international organizations and initiatives which are active inthe Region, the Stability Pact establishes a
political commitment to a comprehensive coordinated and strategic approachto the Region\.
l1 hassignedbilateralfreetradeagreementswithCroatia, Slovenia, SerbiaandMontenegro,FormerYugoslav
BH
Republic o fMacedonia, Turkey, Romania, Albania, Moldova, and Bulgaria\.
11
The privatization of larger state-owned enterprises has lagged, however, with BHbeing an involuntary slow
starter becauseo f the conflict, and later losing ground due to lukewarmpolitical commitment\.
17\. The business environment, while modestly improving inrecent years, remains characterized by
highbarriers to market entry for newbusinesses,proliferationofbureaucratic interferenceandvirtually no
formal market exit\. The MTDScalls for an acceleration o f strategic privatizations, and improvements inthe
business and investment climate\. Specific measures currently under preparation or initial implementation
include: reforms o f the business registration system, the establishment of a single registry for movable
pledges, and streamlining o fbusiness inspection\. Importantly, harmonized bankruptcy legislation has been \.
recently adopted inbothEntities\.This package o freforms i s supportedby the IDA ongoing Business
Adjustment Credit (BAC)'*, inaddition to ongoing assistance to the strategic privatizationprogram\.
18\. Finally, labor market rigidities have persisted, despite the important changes inlabor legislation
introducedin2000, which laidthe ground for substantially greater flexibility inlabor relations, including
the facilitation o f more varied and flexible forms o f employment, the simplification o fprocedures and
entitlements related to hiring and dismissal of workers, and the formal termination o f the "wait listing"
process inherited from former SFRY\.Remainingrigidity inthe labor market i s driven by collective
agreementsor even firm-level policy, which retain outdated and costly management practiceswithrespect
to wage determination and labor re1ati0ns\.l~As a result, wage inflationhas consistently surpassed
productivity, thereby affecting the country's competitiveness\. The full impact o f the reforms, therefore,
remains to be observed inthe labor market\.
D\. Current Macroeconomic Policy Framework
19\. As is outlined inthe MTDS, BH'smacroeconomic strategy aims at preservinga stable environment
that i s conducive to the implementation o f the structural reforms and which will promote private domestic
savings and investment\. The authorities have made a commitment to maintain the currency boardand
pursue associated prudent monetary polices\. The fiscal policy stance i s gearedat further consolidation o f
public spending to generate the public sector savings required\. This strategy i s fully consistent with the
programthat receivedthe support of the mostrecent IMF Stand-By Arrangements (SBA), approved in
August 2002 and completed inFebruary2004\. The macroeconomicperformance underthe SBA has been
satisfactory with respect to growth, inflation, the fiscal balance and reservesbuild-up\.The current account
developments have not met expectations, however\. Inaddition to observingthe program's quantitative and
structuralperformance criteria, important structural benchmarks were met, including the preparation o f the
domestic claims settlement plan, adherence to cash management rules of the pension funds, and the
strengthening o fbanlung supervisionrules\.
20\. The BHauthorities have requested further IMF support and it i s envisaged that successful
completion o f the SBA will leadto an agreement on a successormedium-term program inthe course o f
2004\. The programi s expected to focus on key macroeconomic challenges highlighted, includingthe
needed increase incorporate profitabilitythrough enterprise restructuring, and the establishment o f a
coherent fiscal architecture gearedtoward coordinatedpolicy formulation\. The macroeconomic projections
l2ReportNo\.P-7530-BIH\.
l3furtherimportantreformofthenewLaborLawswastodiscontinuethemandatoryapplicationofcollective
A
agreementsto parties not represented inthe bargaining process\. However, the response from formal sector
employers indeveloping more decentralized bargaining has beenweak to date\.
12
inthe following sectionarebasedonthe mostrecent frameworkapproved at the time ofthe lastreview of
the SBA (February 2004)\.
E\. MacroeconomicProspects and External FinancingRequirement
21\. The medium-termmacroeconomic challenge faced by the BHauthorities i s to regainpre-war
output levels by the endof the decade, while moving from aid dependency to fiscal self-reliance\. The
medium-term macroeconomic program envisaged under the SBA, reproducedbelow, i s generally consistent
with the one inthe MTDSand aims to reacharobust and sustainable growthpathwitha strong emphasis
on continued fiscal discipline to ensure policy consistency with the currency board arrangement\. Underthis
scenario o f full implementationo freforms (and absence o f exogenous shocks), the share of investments in
GDP would remainhigh, although its naturewould shift from reconstructionto productive investment\.
Growth, which would steadily accelerate toward 6 percent inreal terms until2007, would be mainly driven
by foreign direct investmentand stronger domestic investment, as well aspositive spillovers fromreal
exports growth\. Inthe face o f steadily declining aid flows, BHwill have to achieve an adjustment o f its
external imbalance and establish creditworthiness inorder to attract commercial financing inthe medium
term\. Exports would grow considerably faster than imports, as private consumption growth would remain
moderate, resulting ina marked improvement of the current account\. Table 2 below highlights some o f the
key projections inthe full reformscenario\. The scenario i s predicatedupon the acceleration of structural
reforms inthe corporate sector, which would boost domestic savings and investment\.
Table 2\. Bosnia and Herzegovina: MacroeconomicFramework, 2003-2007
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Est\. Proj\. Proj\. Proj\. Proj\.
(annual percentagechange)
RealGDP growth 3\.5 5\.1 5\.7 5\.9 6\.2
CPIInflation 0\.1 0\.9 1\.7 2\.0 2\.1
(inpercentofGDP)
Total Investment 19\.9 20\.3 20\.9 21\.4 21\.9
National Savings 2\.5 4\.6 6\.0 8\.2 10\.9
o/w public savings 2\.0 1\.5 2\.6 3\.1 3\.4
Privateconsumption 88\.7 86\.1 84\.9 83\.3 81\.4
Current accountbalance -17\.4 -15\.8 -14\.8 -13\.1 -1 1\.0
Total Government revenues 46\.7 45\.8 44\.4 43\.0 41\.7
Govemment Expenditure' 46\.3 45\.9 44\.4 42\.9 41\.6
Current Expenditure' 41\.9 41\.1 39\.9 38\.7 37\.5
CapitalExpenditure' 4\.5 4\.8 4\.5 4\.2 4\.1
Overallfiscal balance(accruals, 0\.4 -0\.1 0\.0 0\.1 0\.1
incl\. grants)
'Excludes municipalspending\.
Source: IMF, Fourth SBA review, February2004; Bankstaffestimates\.
13
22\. The MTDS also presents a low-case scenario, inwhich the implementation o f reforms i s slower or
yields a less favorable supply response\.Real growth couldinthis case stagnate at around2 percent,
translating intorevenue losses and a more pronounced need for fiscal adjustment\.
23\. Ifthe positivemacroeconomic scenariolaidout abovematerializes, BHwill still needsizeable,
althoughdiminishing,extemal inflows to support its balance o fpayments (see Table 3)\. For the period
2004-05, the total financing requirement would average about US$1\.4 billion annually\. Assuming a gradual
decline inproject-related financing, the increase of FDIinflows to 6 percent o f GDP by 2005, and
persistently highlevels o f remittances, a financing gap o f US$161 million would emerge for 2004-05, that
would be covered about two-thirds by IDA through its adjustment lending (the proposedEMSAC and
SOSAC 2, as well as the remaining tranche of the BAC), with the remainder financed through European
Commissionmacroeconomic assistance\.
Table 3\. Bosniaand Herzegovina:ExternalFinancingRequirements,2004-2007
2004 2005 2006 2007
(US$ million)
Requirements 1,367 1,478 1,419 1,277
olw current account deficit (excl\. 1,338 1,346 1,288 1,169
grants)
olw debt amortization 94 85 82 58
olw change innet foreign assets -65 47 49 50
Resources 1,259 1,425 1,381 1,240
olw official transfers 235 188 137 103
olw official loans 105 94 85 81
olw private capital and FDI(net) 914 1,135 1,151 1,044
o/w debt relief 5 8 8 11
Financing gap 108 53 39 37
Source: IMF,Fourth SBA review, February 2004; Bankstaff estimates\.
111\. THECOUNTRY'S STRUCTURAL REFORM PROGRAM
A\. TheMedium-TermDevelopmentStrategy/PRSP
24\. Inthe approved 2004-07 MTDS,the BHauthorities formulate three keyobjectivesofthe country's
development program:
a Create conditions for sustainable growth that would rapidly enable the country to reachand
surpass its pre-war production capacity andreal income levels;
a Reduce poverty by some 20 percent;
a Accelerate EUintegration\.
25\. Inorder to achieve these development objectives, the MTDSfurther identifies a set ofpolicy
priorities including(i) buildingconsensus onthe reformprogram; (ii) maintaining macroeconomic stability;
14
(iii)implementing the fiscal reformprogram; (iv) securing faster growth o f an export-oriented private
sector; (v) implementing public administrationreform; (vi) establishing sustainable systems of social
protection; (vii) implementing key sectoral reforms (education, energy, telecommunications and
amculture); and (viii)concludingthe Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU; and (viii)
achieving WTO member~hip\.'~The MTDSemphasizes the key role to beplayedby fiscal consolidation and
public expenditure rationalizationto implement these policies\. This also reflects the findings o f the Public
Expenditure and InstitutionalReview (PER) undertaken with the support o f the World Bank\.'' Fiscal
reforms needto support the macroeconomic objectives as well as tackle issues related to efficiency, equity
and governance inpublic finance matters, bothwith respect to revenue mobilization and expenditure
policies\.
B\. The Fiscal Policy Reform Program
26\. Inits sectionon fiscalreforms, the MTDSstates fromthe outset that afurtherreductioninthe
share o f public spending to GDP i s keyto achieving macroeconomic targets and financial sustainability\.
The needed increase indomestic savings described above (para\. 21), would be supportedby substantive
improvements incorporate sector profitability\. However, this will take time to materialize at the desired
scale\. Hence the need, inthe short term, to further raise, even ifmarginally, domestic public savings\. The
corresponding medium-term target interms o f a primary deficit (excluding all grants and interest payments)
that would be compatible with sustainable levels of indebtedness i s estimated at around 2 percent o f GDP\.
This can only be achieved at the price offurther rationalizationonthe expenditure side given(i) needto
the
decreasethe prohibitive tax and contributions burden, and (ii) additional expenditurepressure points which
could arise, even on a temporary basis, inrelation to possible downsizing costs inthe public sector, the
implementation o f the domestic claims settlement plan, the formulation o f a package o f social mitigation
measuresto accompany corporate restructuring, or further institutional strengthening of the central State in
the process o f European integration\.
27\. Giventhat overall investment will need to remain robust (above 20 percent o f GDP), the decline in
externally financed public investment will have to be at least partly offset byhighercapital spending on
ownresources\. Similarly, inorder for this investment (as well as past capital spending) to achieve the
expected economic rates o f return, expenditure on operations andmaintenance would also have to be
raised\. Finally, even though tax reforms and improved tax administration i s expected to yield additional
revenues, these gains should, inthe mediumterm, be primarily invested inthe reduction o f the overall tax
burdenon the formal economy\. Consequently, the bulk o f the expenditure adjustment will have to be bome
by areduction (relative to GDP) inother areas ofrecurrent spending, mainlythe wage bill\.
l4 fullMTDSPRSPdocumentisavailableinEnglishat/www\.prsp\.info/\.
The
l5Bosnia andHerzegovina: FromAid Dependency toFiscal Self-Reliance,ReportNo\.24297-BH, October2002\.
15
Figure 1\. BH Medium-term Savings and Investment Balance (in percent of GDP)
-
25 in YOof GDP
Total Investment T
20
15
10
5
0
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
I Recontructionaid Other capital inflows (net) I
,
I Nat\. public savings Nat\. Private Savings I
28\. While it emphasizesthe needed reductiono f the share of public spending in GDP, the MTDS also
recognizes, however, that achieving this objective should not come at the expense o f the quality o f public
services delivered \.Therefore, the proposedProgramaims at efficiency gains through the reallocation
among and within sectoral spending programs, the reassignment of intergovernmentalfiscal responsibilities
and the reinforcement o f the management and control over public monies\. As described insection4 o f the
MTDS's chapter onmacroeconomic and fiscal framework, the authorities' mainpriorities with respect to
public expenditure reformcan be summarized as follows: l6
A\. Rationalize public spendingby
0 constraining the public sector wage bill;
0 reducing spendinginnon-productive sectors;
0 reallocating savings to operations, maintenance andpublic investment;
reassigningexpenditure andrevenues across levels o f government with a view to
achieving greater efficiency and quality inpublic service delivery; and
0 achieving efficiency gains and greater equity inspending o f social services, such as
education\.
B\. Further strengthening public expenditure management throughout the budget cycle by
improvingbudgetpreparation, and inparticular strengthening the linkages between the
budget andmedium-term policy objectives through the Medium-TermExpenditure
Framework (MTEF) process;
l6TheMTDSFiscalPolicyProgramalsoincludesessentialmeasuresrelatedtotax reforms, mainlycenteredonthe
introduction o fthe VAT, and the reform o fthe admmistration ofcustoms and indirect taxation\.
16
0 maintaining strict control over budget execution and improving reporting, including for
extra-budgetary funds; and
increasingtransparency, accountability and efficiency inpublic expenditure, primarily
through the establishment and implementation of a new legal and administrative
framework for public procurement\.
29\. These priorities are aligned with the World Bank diagnosis as presentedinthe PEIR and lessons
learned from other countries\. As can be seen from the observed expenditure patterns shown inTable 4,
some economic and functional categories o f expenditure stand out as prime candidates for expenditure
rationalization\. Inparticular, wages and salaries absorb a large share o f total expenditure (about 33 percent
o f on-budget spending)\. This category lies significantly above what i s recordedincomparator countries o f
Central and Eastern Europe, whether measuredrelative to GDP or to total budget outlays\. The MTDS is
also fully consistent with the PEIR with respect to the proposed rationalization o f spendingon public
administration, defense andpublic order and safety; the reallocationo f own-budget resources fkom wages
and salaries to operations andmaintenance, as well as to investments; and the policy and institutional
reforms inthe education sector to reduce fragmentation, and improve efficiency and equity\.
Table 4\. Summary Breakdown of Consolidated Government Expenses, 2002l
(percentage share of respective GDP)
BHTotal Federation of BH RepublikaSrpska
(incl\. StateGovernment) (incl\. municipalexpenses) (excl\. municipalexpenses)
Economic classification
Current expenditures 42\.6 45\.0 37\.4
olw wages & salaries 14\.6 16\.4 9\.3
olw goods & services 4\.4 4\.0 5\.0
olw subsidies and transfers 22\.0 23\.3 20\.4
o/w interest on foreign debt 1\.6 1\.3 2\.7
Capital expenditure 1\.7 2\.0 0\.8
Total 43\.9 47\.0 38\.2
Functional classification
General public services 5\.5 4\.8 2\.3
Defense 4\.3 4\.9 3\.5
Public order & safety 4\.2 4\.3 4\.2
Health 6\.1 6\.6 5\.9
Social protection 15\.3 16\.9 13\.5
Education 5\.6 6\.4 4\.3
Economic affairs 3\.0 2\.8 3\.6
Other 2\.2 1\.a 2\.9
Source: Authorities Budget Framework Papers 2004-2007 and Bank staffestimates\. BHtotal figures include entity
and State-level expenses\. Figures include expenses from extra-budgetary funds, but excludes principal repayment on
debt (estimated at 1 percent o f total BHGDP in2002) and foreign-financed public investment (estimated at 4\.6
percent o f total BHGDP in2002)\. Intergovernmental transfers and budget transfers to extra-budgetary funds are
netted out\. FBHdata includes estimates for municipal expenses\. RS data excludes municipal expenses, which were
estimated to represent an additional 7\.9 percent o f RS GDP and 2\.3 percent o f total BHGDP in2002\.
17
30\. Cross-cutting reforms inintergovernmental fiscal relations will be closely linkedto the above
objective, inorder to further strengthen financial discipline and hardbudget constraints at the sub-entity
level, reduce horizontal and vertical imbalances and ultimately improve the delivery o f public services at
the locallevel\. This wouldbe achieved by revising expenditure responsibilities inkey sectors (education,
health, social services), and, inparallel, reviewingtax revenue assignmentsand intergovernmentaltransfer
mechanisms\. Finally, IDA experience inmany other countries suggests that strengthened expenditure
management and public governance can be powerfultools to enforce medium-term fiscal adjustment and
expenditure allocation reforms, inparticular with respect to budget preparationandthe determination o f a
medium-termresource and expenditure framework; financial accountability andtransparency interms o f
budgetexecution, control andaudit; and limitingconflicts or interest and opportunities for corruption
(especially public procurement)\.
31\. The Fiscal Policy Reform Programdrawn from the MTDSanticipates the support o f this proposed
Credit and i s describedinmore detail inthe Letter o f Development Policy (Annex 5) submittedby the
Borrower, as well as inthe attached policy matrix (Annex 6)\. A principal Program objective is to
rationalize spending inthe short termby imposing a constraining cap on the wage bill\. Simultaneously, the
Programwill launch a process o f institutional and administrative reforms that aim at rationalizing
government inthe medium term through a redefinition o fresponsibilities acrossvarious levels\. As a
particular sector priority, the Programfocuses on higher educationfinancing given (i) the importance o f
education finance reforms to the overall development and growth strategy o f the country, given the
inefficiencies inspending especially at the secondary andtertiary level; and (ii) relatively advanced
the
policy formulation and dialogue onhigher educationfinance\. Reformo f education financing would
contribute to the reduction o f poverty as the World Bank's Poverty Assessment (Bosnia and Herzegovina
Poverty Assessment, Report No\. 25343-BM) found that poor households inBHhave lower levels of
educational attainment\. Inparallel, this Programwill also include a series o f measuresto strengthen
expenditure management and governance over public resources\. The various Programcomponents,
including those that would receive the support of the proposedCredit, are described inparagraphs 34 and
ff\.
32\. Itshouldbenotedthat thisProgramis consistent withthe reforms of socialprotection systems,
which offer important opportunities for rationalization andreallocation o fpublic spending\. The current
system mainly supports war veterans and their extended families who receive generous direct transfers and
further benefit from indirect subsidies (mainly tax andcustoms exemptions, coverage ofhealth fund
contributions, etc\.)\. On the other hand, support to children indifficult circumstances and other target
groups for social welfare i s inadequate\. Social protection reforms would receive the support o f the IDA
second Social Sector Adjustment Credit (SOSAC II),be presentedtogether with the proposedEMSAC\.
to
33\. Finally, the reduction innon-productive spending, seeninthe MTDS as an important vehicle to
reduce the cost o f general government overall, is the focus o f assistanceprovidedby other government
partners with specific mandates intheir areas o f concern\. With respect to military spending, a significant
effort o f downsizing has been undertaken since 1998, and has resultedina reduction o f forces by about
15,000 soldiers invarious rounds o fdemobilization through 2002\. Another roundwas initiated in2004, in
the context o f BH's commitment to accede to NATO's Partnership for Peaceprogram\. Similarly, analysis
of the intra-sectoralcomposition o f spending and existing inefficiencies inthe area o f public order and
safety i s also ongoing with the assistance o f the EuropeanUnionPolice MonitoringMission (EUPM)\.An
initial programof police force downsizing has already been initiated inthe Republika Srpska\.
Consequently, these rationalization efforts to improve expenditure inthe defense and public order sectors
are not being supported by IDA assistance\. The World Bank team, however, will remain associated inthe
policy dialogue on the correspondingseparateprograms as their implementationwill affect the overall
fiscal stance\.
18
C\. The Fiscal Reformsto be Supportedby the ProposedCredit
First Program component:Rationalization of expenditureprograms and intergovernmentalf cal
arrangements
Sub-component 1:Public sector employment andpay reform
34\. Policy objectives\. The policy target o fthis component i s to rein inthe public sector wage billto
serve objectives o f the dual macroeconomic stability and increased spending efficiency, while initiating
structuralreforms to modernize the wage determination system inharmony withmore general public
administration reform objectives\. As such, the Programincludes short-term measureso f strict wage bill
control, as well as medium-termprospects for introducing a new wage determination system inthe public
sector and forging aheadwith more general public administration reform\.
35\. Currentsituation andprogress to date under theProgram\. The fragmented structure o fpublic
administration compounded by weak vertical coordination has led to inadequate staffing and duplication o f
functions\. Patronage inappointments and the absenceo f an effective civil service training and development
systemhave also contributedto very unevenlevels ofprofessionalisminthe administration\. Structural and
organizationalproblems, low civil service capacity, and the absence o f analytical information all adversely
affect the formulation and implementation o fpolicies\. This assessment also reflects perceptions by the
general public, as confirmed inthe findings o f a survey among citizens, businessesand public officials
recently conducted by UNDP\. "As noted above, the general government wage bill i s also financially
unsustainable\. While the share o f government employees inBH's total population is not out o f line with
regional averages, the public sector wage bill i s unaffordable\. Inthe Federation, public sector employees
make up about 20 percent of the formal sector workforce, and the wage billrepresents close to 30 percent
o f total spendingand 16percent of GDP\. InCentral and Eastern Europe, by comparison, the average wage
billamounts to about 17percent o ftotal spending andonly 7percent ofGDP\.
36\. Inresponseto this situation, the authoritieshave adopted in2003 abroadpolicyplatformfor public
administration reform(PAR), which on one hand lays out the steps to the formulation o f a comprehensive
PAR strategy (expected inthe Fall o f 2004), and on the other hand, includes a number o freform steps
leading up to the strategy\. To informthe formulation of the PAR strategy, the authoritieshave launched,
with the support ofthe EU, a series o f functional reviews\. Inaddition, among the initialpolicy steps already
taken, the State and Entitygovernments have prepared new civil service laws, which have been approved
bythe respective parliaments\. The mainfeature ofthisnew legislationis the establishment o fprinciples o f
politicalindependence, transparency, professionalism, impartiality and effectiveness inthe civil service\.
More specifically, these laws clearly define the scope of the civil service, mandate competitive recruitment,
and introducemerit-based promotion\. Although the laws also regulatecivil service pay, they have, thus far ,
failed to introducereal reforms and merely confirmed the previously prevailing system\. Only very recently
has a discussion on payreforminthe public sector begun(see para\. 39 below)\.
37\. While functional reviews will provide guidance for a more fundamental review o f civil service
management and restructuring, the program also targets a more urgentmeasure to reduce the burdeno f the
l7Allrespondent groupsexpressedconsistentlyunfavorableperceptionsacrossallaspectsofgoodgovernance and
effective organization, emphasizing the needfor improved professionalism, strategies and approaches to public
administration, client-orientation, impartiality and non-discrimination in service provision\. Source: Governance
PerceptionSurvey inBosnia and Herzegovina\. UNDP, 2003\.
19
wage billintotal spending, by formulating and enforcing caps over the wage bill at entity-level that could
result inachieving the desired reductionduringthe period 2004-05\. To do so inrational fashion, the Entity
Ministries o f Finance have developed Budget Framework Papers(BFPs, equivalent to medium-term
expenditure frameworks) which propose a sustainable fiscal framework for the period2004-06\. These BFPs
were presented and approved by the Entitygovernments inthe Fall of 2003\. The next step envisaged was to
guide the annual budget preparationonthe basis o f the BFPs\. Inthe FBH,the task was complicatedby the
fact that the measure would have an impact only ifcantonal authorities would comply with the BFP targets,
especially with respect to the wage bill\.'* The EntityMinistryof Finance organized regular consultations
with cantonal counterparts\. As aresult, the aggregatewage bill, computed from the Entityandcantonal
budgets, displayed an overall wage billreductiono f 3 percent with respect to the 2003 figure, and lies
within the target ofthe BFP(excluding one-off severancepayments accompanying downsizing plans)\. To
achieve this, the respective authorities useda variety o f tools, depending on their particular situation (e\.g\.,
pay structure freeze, downsizing incertain sectors and so on)\.
38\. Inthe RS, the BFP, whichwas approved inOctober 2003 and supportedbythe EMSACProgram,
foresaw areduction inthe Entitygovernment wage bill of about 4\.5 percent\. However, following
negotiationswith the trade unions, the Government decided to uniformly increase the wage rate o f all
employees o f budget institutions, so that the total payrollexpenses included inthe 2004 budget would post
a 4\.4 percent increase\. While the authorities recognizedthat this policy was not inline with the medium-
term orientation o f the BFP, they justified it on the basis of the substantial wage rate differential that
separates public sector remunerationinthe RS from that inthe FBiHor the State\. This increase was also
not inline with the fiscal framework, and the RS Government hadto curtail other planned expenditure
items inorder to comply with the aggregate fiscal balance target under the SBA\. Because o f the structural
implications o f this decision interms of the composition o f spending, this decision led IDA management to
refocus and re-dimension the proposedCredit as the appraisal was ending\. The RS government, however,
decided to use the opportunity o f the increase to launcha more fundamental reform o f the wage
determination system which the Credit would support\.
39\. The public sector pay system is characterized byarigidformula drivingthe formulation ofabase
wage which i s then supplemented by a host o f allowances\. General administration employees, as other
categories of public sector personnel (teachers, judiciary staff, police, and so on), are also coveredby
collective agreementswhich further establish wage determinationrules\. While the principles of the systems
are the same throughout the country, the parameters applied vary widely from one level o f government to
the other\. At the level of the State, some o f the recently established agencies have developed their own
salary structure without reference to the current wage rates ingeneral administration\. All inall, the wage
structure i s complex, disparate, and generally compressed, not lending itselfto reward performance or
managerial responsibility\. Researchbythe World Bank has shownthat the level o f (paid) wages inthe
public administration i s higher than inmost other sectors (Labor Market in Postwar Bosnia and
Herzegovina,November 2002)\. Wider public administration and civil service reformmeasures will only
succeedifthe issue o f public sector pay i s addressed\. The authorities inthe RShave recently recognized
the importance o f this issue and have initiated a reform o f the wage determination system by (i) assigning
institutional responsibilities to assign the reform; (ii)
initiatingthe technical work to design a grading
systemthat will determine the pay structure; and (iii) drafting a new law on salaries inthe public sector\.
l82003,cantonalspendingrepresentedabout27percentoftotalpublicspendingintheFBH(includingsocial
In
funds)\. The aggregate cantonal wage billamountedto an estimated 58 percent of the total government wage bill in
the FBH\.
20
Nevertheless, to date a formal policy decisiononthe design o f anew wage structure has yet to be takenby
the RS authorities\.
40\. Prioritiesfor 2004-2005 under theProgram\. The authorities are committed to pursuethe reforms
inthis areaonthree tracks\. First,theywill implementthe 2004budgetsas adoptedwithrespectto the wage
bill androll-over the BFP for 2005-07, with aparticular emphasis onwage billcontrol\. The budgetsfor
2005 will be preparedby adhering to the guidelines o f the BFP\. Second, the technical and legalwork on the
public sector pay reform that was launched inthe RSwill be completed and implementation will start in
2005\. A similar reformwill be carried out at the level o f the State, while the FBHwill have launched the
reform, continuing the close partnership with cantonal authorities\. More efficient use o f the available
technology to manage the payrollwill be introducedinthe RS and inmajor cantons (it already exists at the
level of the FBHEntity)\.Finally, other aspectsof civil service reformwill be pursuedthrough the
implementation o f the civil service law, inparticular by adheringto the transparent hiringrules o f the law,
as well as introducingperformance appraisal\.
41\. Other measures included inthe Programto prepare medium-termreforms include (i) the
establishment o f state and entity-wide public sector employment databases; (ii) completion o f the
the
vertical functional reviews inkey sectors (health, internal security, agriculture, refugee return and social
protection) with the support o f the European Union; and (iii) the completion and adoption o f the
comprehensive PAR strategy\.
42\. EMSAC tranche-release conditions\. The secondtranche-release conditions are spelled out in
SectionD(paragraph 83)\. Prior to the secondtranche, the authorities will have achieved:
0 Effective budgetingand successful enforcement o f the wage bill caps for 2004 as evidenced
from budget executionreports (Entities, cantons);
0 Adoption o f 2005 budgets inline with the wage billtargets o f the MTDS and the BFPs
(Entities, cantons);
0 The State and RS governments have submitted to their respective Parliaments new legislation
governing pay determination inthe public sector and introducing pay grade structures for civil
servants and other categories of personnel employedbybudget institutions (RS, State)\.
Sub-component 2: Intergovernmentalfiscal relations
43\. Policy objective\. This sub-component o f the programaims at reforming the intergovernmental
fiscal relationsby (i) further improving intergovernmentalpolicy coordination; (ii) increasingbudgetary
discipline andaccountability across levels of government, throughout the system; (iii) clarifyingand
rationalizing expenditure and revenue assignments; and (iv) improvingthe systems o f intergovernmental
transfers\. The key expected outcomes are the improvement o f bothmacroeconomic policy coordination
and, inthe longer run, the delivery o fpublic services to citizens\.
44\. Current situation andprogress to date under theProgram\. The Constitution o fBH, as established
bythe DaytonPeaceAgreement (DPA), foresees a complex administrative structure of government where
key state functions (including security and fiscal powers) are performed by sub-national governments\.
Under this framework, the two Entities, with distinct administrative structures, coexist: (see Footnote 3)\.
Most o f the taxation powers and decisions onpublic service delivery are retainedbythe Entities (at the
middle o f the government spectrum), while the operations o f the State (at the top) and o f municipalities (at
21
the bottom) are essentially financed by either vertical transfers or sharedtaxes\. While not questioningthe
underpinnings o f the DPA, the PEIR and the companionreport on fiscal decentrali~ation'~ highlighta
number o fpendingissueswhich needto be tackled urgentlyinorder to overcome compounding fiscal
policy concerns\. The latter, ultimately, impinge onboththe financial sustainability o f the system and on the
provision o fpublic services\. The main current challenges to intergovernmental fiscal relations inBH
include (i) insufficient fiscal policy coordination across various levels of Government, due to the absence
of vertical andhorizontal cooperation among sub-national governments, which end up exposing the system
to unnecessary fiscal risks and economic instability; (ii) lack of hardbudget constraints at the sub-Entity
level, due to widespread off-budget operations, which have entailedlack o f fiscal transparency, and low
financial accountability; (iii) unfundedmandates, due to ill-defined expenditure assignments across levels
o f government, which have ledto inefficiencies by duplication and/or under-provision o f essential public
services; and (iv) vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances, due to a mismatchbetween expenditure
responsibilities and local revenue capacities, which, inthe absence of a well-defined compensatory transfer
mechanism, are increasingregional inequities and allocative inefficiencies\.
45\. Progress to date has been concentrated mainly on improving fiscal policy coordination\. Inthe
framework o f the indirect taxation reforms and the establishment o f a State-level Indirect Taxation
Authority, BHhas established a first formal institution for State-Entity coordination on taxation matters\.
The ITA Governing Boardregularly gathers the Ministers of Finance from the State andboth Entities to
discuss and agree on the implementation o f the plannedmergero fthe customs administration, the conduct
of indirect tax policy and, most importantly, the introduction o f VAT, foreseen to be implemented by 2005-
06\. Inthe FBH, as mentionedabove, regular fiscal policy coordinationmeetings with the cantons have been
held at the initiative o f the EntityMinistryo f Finance to discuss the BFP but also other fiscal policy issues\.
Also recognizingthat policy formulation i s not adequately informedby the currently uncoordinated
statistical and macroeconomic planning services, the State government has submitteda draft Law on
Statistics to the Parliament, that will pave the way to a unifiedwork program for statistical institutes\.
46\. Prioritiesfor 2004-05 under theProgram\. This sub-component o f the Fiscal Program addresses
the four critical areas o freformof intergovernmental fiscal relations inBHwith various degrees o f
intensity\. These are (a) further strengthening intergovernmental fiscal policy coordination; (b) increasing
budgetary discipline across levels o f governments; (c) rationalizing expenditure andrevenue assignments;
and (d) improvingthe intergovernmental transfers system\.
47\. Intergovernmentalfiscal policy coordination i s to be addressedat various levels o f government\.
First,inorder to complement the ITA Governing Board, the Programforeseesthe establishment of anew
joint institution for fiscal policy coordination gathering the Ministers o f Finance o f the State and Entities,
with a mandate to formulate nation-wide fiscal policy targets andagree onthe apportionment ofthe targets
betweenthe State and the Entities\.The Statistical Law will be implementedwith the State statistical agency
playing a central coordinating role, while the Economic Policy and PlanningUnit(EPPU) will be
established to monitor and report on the implementation o f the MTDS\.Second, the coordination between
the fiscal authorities at the Entityand cantonal levels will be strengthened, notably for the preparation o f
the 2005-07BFP and the ensuing 2005 budgets\.
48\. Budgetaly discipline across levels of Governmentwill be strengthened by (i) adoptionby the
the
Entities of fiscally sustainable borrowing ceilings that will pave the way to the adoption o f public debt
laws, currently being drafted with the technical assistanceo f the U S Treasury); and (ii) the submissiono f a
"Creatinganefficientdecentralizedfiscalsystem,June2003\.
22
draft "Fiscal Responsibilities Law" that will set basic principles o f budgetary management andwill
attribute fiscal responsibilities, including sanctions, for budget managers and authorities, across all levels of
government\. The adoption o f a FiscalResponsibility Law i s critical to BH, since it will provide the legal
basis for a meaningful implementation of the established budgetary guidelines andregulations\.
49\. Rationalization of expenditure and revenue assignmentswill builduponprevious IDA reviews and
will aimat identifyingareas o foverlapping or inadequate assignment o fresponsibilities betweenthe State
and the Entities, and withineach Entity(vis-a-vis Cantons and municipalities)\. Costs (including budget
reallocation, and incremental expenditures of new institutions) for potential reassigned responsibilities will
be estimated\. Also, a review o f sub-entitytax revenue allocation mechanisms will be undertaken, with a
view to reformingthe system inorder to reflect the new assignmentso fresponsibilities\. The introductiono f
the VAT, inthe course o f 2005, will facilitate the reform\. A programmatic, sector-by-sector approach is
called for, as the analytical work for suchreassignments is still ongoing (through the functional reviews
mentioned above, and the work undertaken inthe health sector with the help o f the IDA Social Insurance
Technical Assistance Project - SITAP)\. Specifically inthe areaoftertiary education, the reassignmentof
responsibility inthe Federation from the cantonal to the Entitylevel i s already part of the Program (see sub-
component 3 hereafter), and rapidprogress inthis area ofreformwill serve as a test for subsequent
reallocationof spending responsibilities inother areas, suchas primary health care, social assistance,
housing, infrastructures, utilityservices etc\.
50\. Intergovernmental transfer systems will be reviewed and reformed towards greater transparency
that includes a coherent structure o fnon-conditional general, and conditional specific purpose (earmarked)
grants\. Discretionaryintergovernmentalgrants will be abolished with all transfers being explicit rules-
based and, as far as possible, immune to bureaucratic andpolitical influences\. These will be initiated by an
effort to supplement the tax-sharing and grants systems with compensatory transfer mechanisms that aim at
mitigatingregional disparities\. Inregardto the Entitytransfers to the State, the agreed formula will be
established inthe framework of an ITArevenue allocation law for customs and indirect tax revenues\.
Sub-component 3: Higher Educationfinance
5 1\. Policy objectives\. The policy objective o freforms inhigher education finance i s to achieve greater
efficiency through rationalizationo f expenditure assignments and reformo f the university system\.
52\. Current situation andprogress to date\. Education spending inBHis characterized by the
consumptionof excessive resources with respect to output (intemal inefficiency), an inadequate
contribution to the economy and to livingstandards generally (allocative inefficiency), and inequity in
spending at the higher levels\. Given the sector's essential importance for long-term growth andpoverty
reduction, the authorities plan to reform education financing through increasingintemalefficiency, with
any gains realizedto be reinvested inexpenditure restructuringthat would boost the effectiveness and
equityo fthe system\. Ofparticular importance inthe context o fBH's proposedeconomic transition i s the
poor efficiency at the tertiary and secondary levels\.
53\. While most primary graduates proceedto secondary school, more than forty percent (the largest
single group) enroll inthree-year vocational programs\. These vocational programshave highunitcosts,
show poor results interms o f impact (employment and living standards), have very little general academic
content compared to other Europeancountries, and thereby preclude access to higher education\. Inthe
Federation, where spending i s particularly high, education i s now a cantonal responsibility andthere i s no
inter-cantonal pooling o f costs, resulting inwide disparities inspending per student\. As inother sectors,
23
relatively too much is spent on wages and salaries, with insufficient allocations for recurrent operations and
maintenance spending and for important non-salary inputs such as teaching material\.
54\. The tertiary system consists o f seven universities all with full programs, represented by a fairly
loose affiliation o f faculties each of which has independent legal status and receives direct public funding
from the cantons inthe Federationand from the EntityinRS\." This model leads to unnecessary duplication
of services, wasted resources, constrained interdisciplinary developments and severely restricted student
choice andmobility\. The absenceo f universal fees, as well as teaching and examination practices inherited
from the former SFRY, also result inhighattrition (completion i s estimated at 30 percent at most) and
lengthy completion duration (e\.g\., at the University o f Sarajevo only 3 percent o f students complete on
time)\. The result is very highcostsper graduate\.Inaddition, tertiary education spending lacks transparent
financial management, with respect to budget preparation, execution and auditing\.
55\. Extensive discussions with all stakeholders have focused on developing a new legislative
framework\. This calls for the consolidation o f faculties into universities, the transfer o f financing authority
for higher education at least at the level of the Entityand the introduction o f uniform financing and quality
standards for the whole of BH\.The first step inthis process, the preparationby the State Government o f a
HigherEducationFrameworkLaw (HEFL) andits submission to the State Parliament, was achieved prior
to the Negotiations o f the proposedCredit\. The legislative approval o f the HEFLproves difficult and i s still
ongoing\. Inthe FBH, the technical work hasbeen completedto amend the Law on the Allocation o f Public
Revenues, that will allow for the transfer o f expenditure responsibilities to be funded from the existingtax
base\. Finally, following the example o f Tuzla University, the EntityMinistries o f Financehave developed
draft regulations governingthe inclusion of Universities' ownrevenues into the treasury system, a measure
which, once implemented, will allow for enhancedtransparency over the use o fpublic resources while
ensuring that the Universities have exclusive access over the revenues they generate\.
56\. Prioritiesfor 2004-05 under the Program\. Many o f the technical issuesrelatedto general
education will be further definedinan upcomingprogram o f general education supported by the European
Union\. A parallel Bank-fundededucation project i s envisaged to be included inthe proposedFY05 lending
programo f the new CAS, and would support the introduction o fper-student fundingingeneral education
and for the broadreform o f secondary education, inparticular to increase: secondary enrollments, the
proportion o f students attendinggeneral and technical schools rather than vocational schools, and the
general academic content o f bothtechnical and vocational schools\. Over time these reforms should also
increase access to highereducation, especially for those from the poorest backgrounds\. Inparallel, the
MTDS targets a sharp reduction inthe number o f occupational programs taught invocational schools with
a view to provide more flexibility and greater relevance to the needs of the labor market\.
57\. EMSACtranche-release conditions\. The specific measuresthat are retainedfor the release o f the
Credit's second tranche include:
a Enactment o f fully consistent State- and Entity-level legislation, which provide for exclusive
financing responsibility for tertiary educationat the Entitylevel, abolishes the legal
~~ ~
2o One Federationuniversity, Tuzla, i s now integratedand its faculties do not have independent legal status\.
21 The solution retained takes into account that higher education spending varies across cantons, so that those cantons
without universities or other spending on higher education would not be penalized by an across the board change
inrevenue sharing rates\.
24
independence of faculties by unifyingthem into universities or colleges and establishes a
Higher EducationFinancing Council at the State levelwith supervisory functions\.
0 The provision inapproved 2005 Entitybudgets o f adequate funding for the institutions
foreseen inthe HEFL, including the State-level Certification for Information, Recognition and
Quality Assessment (CIRQA) and the Higher EducationFinancingCouncil, as well as the
Entity-level Higher Education FundingBodies\. Adequate funding for these institutions will be
provided inthe 2005 budgets\.
0 The 2005 Entitybudgets will also include adequate fundingfor the regularbudgetary transfers
to the higher education institutions\.
0 Inthe FBH,the enactment ofthe amendmentsto the LawonAllocation ofPublic Revenues
that will allow for the transfer o f expenditure responsibilities for higher education to be funded
from the existingtax base\.
0 The full inclusion o f the four faculties with the greatest numbers of students from the
Universities o f Sarajevo, Banja Luka, andMostar inthe treasury system o f the relevant Entity,
including for their own revenues accordingto the agreedrule books, for the start o f the
academic year 2005-06\. The University of Tuzla will be fully integratedinthe Federation
treasury system as well\. Fromthe same date, all other universities or faculties will be integrated
inthe Treasury systemofthe Entityfor theportionoftheir revenuesderivingfrom the Entity
budget, with a view o f full integration, including their ownrevenues, by 2006\.
Second Program Component:Improve the management of public expenditureand thegovernance over
public resources
Sub-component I:Budgetpreparation
58\. Policy objective\. Further strengthen medium-term budgetaryprogrammingthrough the regular
preparationo f Budget Framework Papers (ie\., medium-term expenditure frameworks) that will improve
annual budgetingas well as enhance fiscal policy coordination\.
59\. Current situation andprogress to date under theProgram\. Budget preparation suffers from
weaknessesbothinterms of medium-termplanning and annual budgeting\. With the support o f technical
assistanceprovided under PFSAC II, bothEntities engaged in 1999-2000 inthe formulation o f BFPs\. The
process was not, however, sustainedbecauseo f domestic capacity shortages\. Budget preparation at the sub-
entity level suffers form chronic non-compliancewith the foreseen budgetary calendar\. At the State level,
there i s still no legal framework to guide budget preparation inthe form o f an organic budget law\.
60\. As described earlier, in2003, the Entitieshavere-launchedthe medium-termprogramming process
bypreparingand then adoptingcomprehensive BFPs for the period2004-06\. The BFPs were also usedto
feed into the MTDS\. The papers are fully consistent with the macroeconomic framework agreed under the
SBA, provide a comprehensive analysis ofpast spending pattems inbothEntities (including sub-entity
govemment and extra-budgetary funds) and outline priorities for expenditure policies, indicating the related
expenditure envelopes for functional and economic spending categories\. Inthe FBH, the collection and
analysis o f sub-entitydata was particularly cumbersome, but given the regular consultation established with
cantons, cooperation has developed positively and the data collection i s expected to be facilitated for the
update o f the BFPs\. InbothEntities, cooperationwith line ministries, where budgetingcapacity is generally
weak, will needto be strengthened\. At the State level, drafting o f an organic budget law (currently entitled
as the "State Finance Law") has started\. The law would cover the current gap with respect to regulating
25
budgetpreparation, but it would also supercede and improve the rules governingbudget execution that are
currently included inthe State Treasury Law\.
61\. Prioritiesfor 2004-05 under the Program\. As an entry point to address the dual challenge o f
expenditure consolidation and rationalization, the EMSAC-supported Program targets the strengthening of
the formulation o f fiscal policypriorities and the related strategic budgeting\. Inorder to overcome
challenges to the sustainability o f the process, the Government i s implementing a technical assistance
programwith the support o f DFIDto strengthen the budget departments inthe Ministries o f Finance\. As a
result the program supported by the Credittargets the institutionalizationo f the BFPprocess as well as its
linkwiththe annualbudgetpreparationsystematthe entityandcantonal levels\. The BFPprocesswould
also be gradually introducedat the State-level in2005\. The linkages betweenthe BFP and the annual
budgethas to be further reinforced, mainlythroughjoint presentation o fthe Budget (for adoption) and the
BFPs (for information) to the respective legislatures\. Importantly, the State needs to adopt a State Finance
Law inorder to fill a critical void given the increasedresponsibilities that are being assignedto central
government\.
62\. EMSACtranche-release conditions\. The specific measuresthat are retainedfor the release o fthe
Credit's second tranche include:
0 Enactment of an organic budget law ("State Finance Law") by the State Parliament;
0 Preparationand enactment o f BFPs for 2005-07 and adoption of Entityand cantonal budgets
for 2005 that are consistent with the BFPs;
Sub-component2: Budget execution, reporting and accountability
63\. Policy objective\. The authorities intend to capitalize the progress realized with the introduction o f
the Treasury system inorder to enforce discipline inbudget execution, avoid any accumulation o fpayment
arrears and improve macroeconomic management through the preparationo fregular, timely and
comprehensive budget executionreports\.
64\. Current situation andprogress to date under the Program\. The introduction o f a single treasury
ledger and a single treasury account inbothEntities and at the State-level has greatly enhanced the
fiduciary framework for government financial management\. Recording o f every transactionina secure
information system, modernization o f the accounting framework, automated internal controls,
reconciliation o f accounts balances with that o f thirdparties (banks), andreal time reporting capacity are
amongthe mainbenefits derivedfrom the treasury system\. In2004, the treasury system was successfully
expanded to cover all ten cantons inthe FBH\.Despite the increased spending discipline brought about by
the treasury system and its automated safeguards, internal control and audit functions are not clearly
defined, as has beenhighlightedinseveral reports o f the Supreme Audit Institutions\. Fiscalreporting,
although much improved, remains fragmented and consolidated government accounts are not prepared\.
65\. Supported by PFSAC 2, the first wave o f measurestargeting the introduction o f an external audit
function inBHhas achievednot only the effective operational establishment o f the Supreme Audit
Institutions (SAIs), but also gradual progress inthe SAIs' capacity to issue audit reports o f increasing
quality, with the technical assistanceprovided by the SwedishNational Auditor's Office\. As the SAIs
established their credibility, a number o f issues have arisen however, pointing to remaining weaknessesin
the legal framework governing the SAIs, such as interference inwork programs, lack o f clarity and
consistency intheir mandates, unpredictability o f budget allocations and cash installments, and discretion
inthe appointment andremoval ofsenior SA1staff\. A seriesofcomprehensive amendments to the SAI
26
Laws have beenpreparedby a drafting team and submitted to an advisory group for review\. Also, the initial
experience with Parliaments' capacity to formally consider and discuss audit reports, and of governments to
take corrective actions, has also not been conclusive to date, and measuresto strengthen the impact o f the
audit are included inthe program supported by the proposed EMSAC\.
66\. Priorities for 2004-05 under the Program\. The Programforesees the continued implementation of
the treasury system, especially for cantons inthe FBH,where the systemhas only beenrecently introduced
and sustainability has yet to be tested\. Ina follow-up phase, the program includes the further expansion of
the system inkey municipalities ineachEntity\.Internalbudgetary controls will be strengthened, including
the adoption o f internal financial and administrativecontrol standards for all spending units that would
govern accounting and recording of transactions, enforcement o fprocurement regulation, separation o f
duties intransaction processing and approval, physicalcontrol onthe access to assets or the monitoring o f
commitments\. The Programforesees initiating the reformat the State level, and later replicating the new
systemas relevant to Entityand sub-Entityadministration\. To initiate the process, an internal audit law
would be prepared and adopted, while a review o f existing control systems will be completed\. Inan
immediate follow-up to the Law, internal audit plans would be developed and submittedto the Ministry of
Finance for clearance \.Inparallel, internal audit functions will also be created, either withinthe spending
unitor within the responsibleMinistryofFinance, depending onthe sizeofthe concerned agency\. The
respective role o f the spending agencies and o f a central unit (e\.g\., the Ministryo f Finance and Treasury) in
the internal audit function remains to be clarified as the Law is finalized\.
67\. Withrespect to budgetreporting, and consideringthe expansion of the treasury system, all the
infrastructurewill be inplace to allow for the adoption and implementation o f a fiscal reporting mechanism
from the cantonal to the Entity-level (inthe Federation), and inturn from the Entities (and Brcko District)
to the State level\. Responsibilities for the preparationo f consolidated fiscal accounts will be assigned\.
Reportingrequirements for extra-budgetary funds will also be strengthened, inorder to feed into the
consolidated accounts\.
68\. Withrespect to the external audit function, as a first step, the SAI laws will be amendedto achieve
goals o f greater harmonizationwithin the country, enhanced independence, clarity o f mandates and
responsibilities o f counterparts (Parliaments, Governments, etc\.)\. The scope o f the SAIs mandate (e\.g\.,
status o f Brcko District, authority over cantonal budget execution or extra-budgetary funds) will be better
defined, andthe nature of oversight over the SAIs themselves needs to be clarified inline with international
(INTOSAI) standards\. Subsequently, related legislation and regulation will be amended to fully ensure
formal parliamentary involvement as well as oblige governments or audited institutions to respond to
management letters with a plan o f corrective actions\.
69\. EMSACtranche-release conditions\. The specific measuresthat are retained for the release o fthe
Credit's second tranche include:
0 The enactment o f internal audit laws at State and Entitylevel and the initial submission o f
internal audit plans for selectedbudget institutions;
0 The enactment o f the amended S A I laws by State and EntityParliaments;
0 The submission by State and Entity governments of budget execution reports that describe
corrective actions takenby budget institutions inresponse to the latest publishedSA1reports\.
27
Sub-component 3: Transparencyand integrity in the management ofpublic resources
70\. Policy objective\. Reduce the scope o f corruption and influence peddlingthrough the adoption and
enforcement o f improved legislation onpublic procurementand conflict of interest\.
71\. Current situation andprogress to date\. Several surveys undertakenby the IDA and others to feed
the preparation o f an anti-corruption strategy, provide evidence of extensive state capture and
administrative corruption which, among other adverse effects, increase the cost o f government andtaint the
decision-making process on matters directly or indirectly related to public resources\. Inthe most recent
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS-2), undertaken inthe summer o f 2002,
firms were asked how problematic each o f 21 different factors were, fi-om access to finance and
macroeconomic instability, to corruption and organized crime\. Inabsolute terms, the ratings providedby
firms inBosnia and Herzegovina were among the five worst inECA\." The BEEPS-2 also confirmed that
the intermingling o f economic and political interests remains at the heart o fthe problem\. FirmsinBosnia
were muchmore likely than inany other country inECA to make unofficialpayments in order to influence
the content o f new legislation, rules, and decrees\. Both the National Anti-corruption Action Plan, adopted
inthe Springof2002, andthe anticorruption chapter inthe MTDS, whichhasreplacedthe earlier strategy
as the Government's primary strategy document relatedto fighting corruption, highlightthe importance of
regulation o f conflict of interest\.23Among the priority areas that were highlighted by the BEEPS-2, public
procurement emerged as an area needingurgent attention\. FirmsinBosnia andHerzegovina were more
likelythan firms inother ECA countries to report that bribes are usedto obtain government contracts\. The
Bank's Country Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR) corroborates these findings by identifyingthe
many loopholes inthe legislationand procedures governing public procurement, as a major potential and
effective source o f corruption\.
72\. Most o f the legislative activities foreseen inthe 2002 Anti-Corruption Action Plan have been
mostly completed\. These include the enactment o f Laws on civil service at all three levels, Criminal Laws
at all levels (introducing Money Laundering as a criminal offense, therefore creating mechanisms for its
effective prevention), accompaniedby the CriminalProcedure Laws, as well as Laws on Civil and
Executive Procedure\. A Law on Conflict of Interest is inplace at the State level and implementation o f the
Law has begun\. Untilthe Entities enact their own laws, the State Law on Conflict o f Interest applies, and it
i s currently being actively implementedby the Election Commission o f Bosnia and Herzegovina (ECBH)\.
Interms ofthe institutional component of the Anticorruption Action Plan, Courts andProsecutors Offices
at the State level were established\. The ITAreformmentionedabove i s also providingan adequate
fi-amework for a more effective fight against tax evasion\. As mentioned above, Supreme Audit Institutions
are operational, and their work has proven to be essential ensuringthe proper functioning o f budget
beneficiaries at all levels\. Also, importantly, recognizingthat public procurement is a major source o f
mismanagement o f public resources,both interms o f governance and efficiency, a draft State Law on
Public Procurement has receivedEntityendorsement and has been submittedby the Council o f Ministers to
the State Parliament\. The Law i s fully harmonized with the relevant directive o f the EuropeanUnion while
meeting the efficiency and transparency recommendations set forth inthe Bank's CPAR\.
22 Ina separateanalysis, inwhich each of the problems were ranked vis-a-vis other problems ineach country, even
stronger results were found regarding corruption as a problemfor Bosnian fm\.Inother words, evenrelative to
the other problems that Bosnian fmface, corruptionis among the most severe\.
23 It should be noted that both the NationalAction Planand the PRSP document drew heavily on the results ofBosnia
and Herzegovina -Diagnostic Surveysof Corruption, undertakenwith the support o f the World Bank\.
28
73\. Priorities for 2004-05 under the Program\. Public procurement reformthat is envisaged inthe
program includes the introduction o fnew procurement laws at the State and Entitylevels, strengthened
procedures and administrative control (see above), the adoption o f standardized biddingdocuments, the
establishment o f adherence to transparency requirements, and the definition of appeal procedures\. The
policy dialogue on these measureswill be conducted inclose association with the EuropeanCommission
which i s providingtechnical assistance inthis area\.
74\. Buildingonrecent steps taken bythe ECBHto implementthe Conflict ofInterestLaw, such as the
preparationo f detailed instructionsto accompany disclosure forms, as well as procedures to guide the
implementation o f the Law, the Programwould seek to raise the credibility and legitimacy o f conflict of
interest regulation inBH\.This would be achieved by: supportingthe enforcement o f existinglegislation
which calls for (i) adequate fundingo f the ECBH, entrusted inthe law as the repository o f declarations and
chief enforcer o f the law; (ii)
preparations for training and workshops inadvance o f the 2004 municipal
elections; (iii)requiringall coveredministries and government bodies to forward copies ofthe declarations
providedby firms participating instateprocurements to the election commission for public posting\. These
measures will increase the transparency o f interests o f firms participating inpublic procurement o f goods
and services, and facilitate the identification o f firms that violate disclosure requirements andmay be
subject to sanctions under the Conflict of Interest Law\.
75\. EMSAC tranche-release conditions\. The specific measuresthat areretained for the release o fthe
Credit's secondtranche include:
0 The enactment o f the new State Public Procurement Laws by the State Parliament\.
0 The preparationandpromulgationofimplementingregulations for publicprocurement,
including standard biddingdocuments, consistent with the framework Law\.
0 Effective implementation o f the disclosure requirements provided for inthe Conflict of Interest
Law\.
IV\. THEPROPOSED CREDIT
A\. Rationale for Bank Involvement
76\. The IDA strategy inBHwas discussed last bythe BoardinOctober, 2002, on the occasion o f the
presentation o f a Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) Progress Report\.24The CAS Progress Report outlines
Bank support to the completionby the BHauthorities o f their Medium-TermDevelopment StrategyPRSP\.
The MTDS,which was officially sent to the World Bank and the IMFon April 5,2004, will inturn guide
the preparationofthe nextfullCAS\. The CAS Progress Report adheres to the same strategic objectives that
guidedthe implementation o f the FY00-02full CAS, namely (i) strengthening institutions and governance;
(ii)fostering private sector growth; and (iii) buildingsocial sustainability\. Inorder to support and sustain
reforms inthese three areas the CAS progress report proposes to rely on three distinct adjustment
operations, inaddition to the investment and technical assistancecredits\. The proposedCredit will support
the CAS'Sfirst strategic pillar (institutional refom, governance), through the implementation o f a public
expenditure reform programthat would leadto fiscal self-reliance through expenditure rationalization (in
24 ReportNo\. 24978\.
29
terms o f a reduction inthe share o f public expenditure relative to GDP) and restructuring (interms o f
increased efficiency and equity)\.
77\. Link with lendingporlfolio\. Inits base case, the CAS Progress Report proposed two new
adjustment operations through FY04, i\.e\., the proposed EMSACand SOSAC II\. commitment o f these
Full
two SACSi sjustified byprogress inthe reforms to rationalize public expenditure (strategic CAS objective)
and overhaul social protection systems (first and third objective respectively)\. Further progress on the
second objective (private sector growth) will condition the remaining disbursement under an ongoing
adjustment operation (the Business Environment Adjustment Credit, BAC)\. The EMSACwould also aim at
dynamic consistency inIDA support as it would buildupon the numerous achievements realized under the
predecessor PFSAC11, either by expandingthe reformagendato areas that hadnot beenthe focus o f the
previous operation (e\.g\., education spending) or by supportingthe authorities inconsolidating and
sustaining the measures introduced under PFSAC 11(e\.g\., budget management, further strengtheningo f
governance over public resources, reformof intergovernmental fiscal relations, consolidation o fpension
and health financing reforms)\. As highlightedabove, the Credit would benefit from institutional capacity
buildingundertakenunder ongoingBankprojects (e\.g\., the EducationDevelopmentProject), while inturn
providing policy leverage for these operations\. Finally, the EMSACwould lay the grounds for
programmatic support inthe next CAS, as several o f the Programareas underpinningthe Credit, such as
reforms to civil service management or intergovernmental fiscal arrangements, will require support over a
prolongedperiod\.
78\. Synergies with economic and sector work\. As demonstrated above, the Credit also largely draws
upon the findings o f analytical work completed under the last CAS, including the P E R and its companion
reports, including the Country Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR), the Country Financial
Accountability Assessment (CFAA), the Anti-Comption report and a fiscal decentralizationreport\. The
EMSAC design is also influencedbythe analysis undertaken inthe recently completed Poverty
Assessment\.
B\. Benefits and Risks
The CAS progress report appropriately classifies the EMSAC as highreward andhighrisk\.The expected
benefits from the operation are:
Greater public spending efficiency, where macro-fiscal stability would increasingly be ensuredby good
management o fresources\.
The targeted reduction inthe weight of public expenditure will accommodate the authorities' medium-
term macroeconomic program andprovideroom for a reduction inthe tax and contributions burdenon
the formal sector\.
Wage containment inthe general government sector would also lead to stricter incomes policy inthe
public enterprise sector and the formal economy ingeneral, thereby fostering BH's competitive
position\.
Itis expected that efficiency gains wouldnot only be internalbutwould spill-over by facilitating a
welfare-enhancing allocation o f resources, most notably inthe education sector\.
Clarified intergovernmentalrevenue and expenditure assignments would pave the way for adequately
funded public service delivery\.
Increasedtransparency and accountability ingovernment transactions would foster efficiency but also
improve the overall policy environment and sendpositive signals to stimulate private sector investment\.
30
79\. Among the risks faced by the credit are the possibility of authorities either delayingthe
implementationo f some measuresor evenreversingtheir commitment to some parts o f the Program\. This
could materialize ifthe authorities fail to convincingly explainthe expected benefits o f the Program and
defuse tensions arising from what couldbeperceivedas deflationary policies (e\.g\., adjustment inthe public
payroll) or a possible threat to vested interests (e\.g\., extemal audit strengthening, procurementreform or
conflict o f interest legislation)\. The MTDS process, which has relied on wide consultation, has already
raisedgeneral awareness o f the reformprogram and builtinitial consensus around it\. Additional mitigation
strategies include IDAproposed interventionsinsupport of labor redeployment (inthe form o f the
proposed Second Employment Support Project)\. The slower than anticipatedprocess o f approval o f the
Higher Education Framework Law, demonstratesthe depth o fpolitical reluctance o f certain groups, even in
the presence o fbroader public support for the reform\. Even ifoverall politicalcommitment i s affirmed,
overt or hiddenresistance by interest groups may arise against some o f the reforms advocated under the
EMSAC\.Weak administrative capacity to implement andmonitor the programwill mostly be addressedby
the technical assistance providedby the Bank and other partners\. Another riskmay arise from BH's still
fragile macroeconomic position, and threats to its stability that would emerge ifthe foreign environment
deteriorates (lower foreign investment, persistently sluggishextemal demand for BHexports, stronger than
anticipateddeclines inaid)\. This macroeconomic riski s compounded by fiscal riskrelatedto the
unresolveddomestic debt overhang\. Continuedprudent macroeconomic policies that would receive the
support o f a successor IMFprogram and the orderly implementation o f the domestic claims settlement plan
would minimizemacroeconomic and fiscal risks\.
C\. Coordinationwith the IMF
80\. The EMSAChas benefitedthroughout its preparation from close collaborationwith the IMF\.The
last SBA program, worth 94\.2 million SDR, was approved by the IMFBoard inAugust 2002 and
completedinFebruary 2004 fully disbursed\. Performance under the programhas been satisfactory as
described inpara\. 22 above\. Uponthe authorities' request, it i s envisaged that the Fundwould provide
further support to BH's medium-termmacroeconomic program through a successorprogramto be
negotiatedinthe second half of 2004\. The Program supported by the proposed credit i s expected to be fully
consistent and coordinatedwith the structuralreforms to be supported by the IMF\. Second tranche release
will only be possibleifthe macroeconomic program i s on track as evidenced bya successfully completed
review o fthe successor IMFprogram\.
81\. Collaboration with other donors, most importantly the EC, has also been actively pursued, both in
terms o f technical assistanceto support the Program's implementation as well as the coordination o f
structuralbenchmarks with the European Unionmacro-financial assistance\.
D\. Negotiations and Board Conditions and Tranche Triggers
82\. The overall program to be supported by the proposedCredit will be outlined inthe Letter o f
Development Policy (Annex 5) and is summarized inthe attached Policy ReformMatrix (Annex 6)\. The
conditions that have been met prior to Negotiations and that remain to be completedbefore second tranche
release are outlinedbelow\. Inaddition to the specific Conditions, the State andboth Entitiesmust maintain
an adequate macroeconomic framework for release o f bothtranches\.
(a) Negotiation conditions:
TheState of BH:
31
0 The State Govemmenthas submittedto the StateParliamenta draft Higher Education
Framework Law, satisfactory to the Association, that assignsthe responsibility for Higher
Education financing at the level o f the Entities, that abolishes the legal independence o f
faculties byunifyingthem into universities or colleges and that establishes Higher Education
FundingBodies at the levelofthe en ti tie^\.^'
0 The State Government has, after receiving Entityendorsement, submittedto the State
Parliament a newPublic Procurement Law, satisfactory to the Association\.26
Both Entities:
0 BothEntityGovernments have approved Budget FrameworkPapers (BFPs) for 2004-06,
satisfactory to the Association andFinance Ministries have sent 2004 budget instructions
reflecting the BFP\.27
0 The Entities' Ministries ofFinance haveprovidedevidence satisfactory to the Associationthat
University revenues and expenditures are fully integratedintheir respectiveTreasury system
with respect to budgetarytransfers, andhaveprepared draft rule booksregulating the
management o fUniversity own revenues, satisfactory to the Association\.
TheFederationof BH:
0 The FederationParliament has enacteda BudgetLaw 2004, including an adjustment to the total
payroll, but excluding allocations for severancepayments, that i s satisfactory to the
Association\.28
25 Satisfactory legislation would include three core elements: First, it establishes entity-level financing responsibility
including the establishment o f a Higher Education FundineachEntity\. Second, it would also assign a supervision
function at the level o fthe State through the establishment o f a Higher Education Financing Council which would
be responsible for (i) makingrecommendations onminimumtuition fees for all students inuniversities and
colleges inBosnia and Herzegovina; (ii) makingrecommendations to the competent Entitybodies regarding one
or more schemesfor student financial support; and (iii) proposing the general terms and conditions on which
funding i s allocatedto higher education institutions, through a formula based on student numbers\. Third, the
HEFLwouldprovidethat faculties will cease to have legalstatus and only universities or colleges, as definedby
the Higher Education Framework Law, shall have full legalpersonality, includingpowers to: (i) o f and dispose
manage landandbuildings already owned by them inaccordance withapplicable laws; (ii) receive and manage
funds from any source; (iii) determine and collect tuition and other fees inaccordance withthe law; (iv) employ
staff; and (v) enter into contracts for goods and services\.
26 Satisfactory legislation includes, among other things, consistency with (i) Directive o fthe EuropeanUnion on
the
Public Procurement; (ii) the 1994 UNCITRAL Model Law onProcurement o fGoods, Construction and Services;
and (iii)the World Bank guidelines for procurement and consultant services\.
27 Satisfactory BFPs include (i)fiscal framework (expenditure and revenue projections) fully consistent withthe
a
current macroeconomic framework agreed under the SBA; (ii) inclusiono f Entityand sub-entity revenues and
full
expenditure, as well as those o f extra-budgetary funds; (iii)
expenditure policy guidelines consistent with the
objectives o fthe MTDS; and (iv) formal discussion and approval by Entitygovernment\.
28 Satisfactory budget includes total payroll expenses, excluding severance, showing a nominalreduction o f at least 10
percent with respect to the 2003 budget and that are within the 2004-06 BFP target o f KM320 million\.
32
0 The Federation Government has confirmed and has provided evidence satisfactory to the
Association that all cantonal 2004 budgets have been enacted by their respective Parliaments,
includinganaggregate adjustment to the total payroll, butexcluding allocations for severance
payments, in line with the approved BFP ceiling, that i s satisfactory to the A ~ s o c i a t i o n \. ~ ~
0 The Federation Ministry of Finance has prepared draft amendments to the L a w on Allocation
ofPublicRevenues reassigning revenues to the Entitylevel for adequate financing of Higher
Education spending, satisfactory to the A~sociation\.~'
(b) Second Tranche Conditions
TheState of BH and both Entities:
0 The State and both Entity Parliaments have enacted amendments to their respective Supreme
Audit Institutions Law, satisfactory to the Association, and the State and both Entity
Governments have included intheir final budget execution report for Fiscal Year 2004 a report
on the corrective actions taken by the budget-financed institutions in response to the latest
published audit report on budget exe~ution\.~'
0 The State Parliament has enacted a framework l a w on public procurement, satisfactory to the
Association, and the State and both Entity Governments have promulgated implementing
regulations, standard bidding documents and standard forms of contract consistent with the
fkamework public procurement law, satisfactory to the A s s ~ c i a t i o n \. ~ ~
29 Satisfactory cantonal budgetswould include (i) enactment by the respective cantonal Parliament; (ii) aggregate total
payroll expenses for the Federation(Entity and cantons) that shows a nominalreduction with respect to the 2003
approved budget; and (iii) aggregate payroll expenses (Entity and cantons) that are within the 2004-06 BFP target
o f K M 1,116million\.
30 Satisfactory draft amendments would include (i)formula reallocating revenues from cantons commensurate to the
a
expenditure inhigher educationfor those canons in2003; and (ii) provisions for the implementationo fthe
formula within the existing revenue -sharing system("RAS" system)\.
31 Satisfactory amendment to the Supreme Audit Laws would: (i) a clear mandate for the Supreme Audit
include
Institutions (SAIs) to audit all public resources; (ii) for independence interms o f staffing, internal work
provide
planning, audit planning, and reporting; (iii) specify the rules for the appointment and dismissal o fthe Auditor
General and the Deputy(ies) Auditor General; (iv) require the publicationall audit reports unless they include
sensitive information as defined by law; and (v) require SAIs to adopt and implement international audit and
ethics standards\.
32 Requirements for satisfactory legislation are listedinfootnote 28\. Satisfactory implementing regulation will clarify
and specify the application o fthe procurement law inkey areas, including, but not limited to (i) advertising and
notification; (ii)the evaluation o fbids; (iii)
record-keeping\. Satisfactory standard biddingdocuments and standard
forms o f contract will need to cover the procurement o f civil goods, civil works, services and consulting services\.
33
0 The State and both Entity Parliaments have enacted laws on internal audit, satisfactory to the
Association, and designated budget-financed institutions have submitted internal audit plans,
satisfactory to the Association, to their respective Ministries o fFinance\.33
0 The State and both Entity Parliaments have enacted laws on Higher Education, satisfactory to
the Association, which are consistent with one another, and both Entity Governments have
included an agreed list of universities and/or selected faculties in the Treasury system in their
respectivejurisdictions, including sub-accounts for ownrevenues\.34
TheState of BH:
0 The State Parliament has enacted a law on state finance (organic budget law), satisfactory to the
Association\.35
0 The State Government has submitted to the State Parliament a law on salaries for the public
sector, satisfactory to the Association, introducingnew pay grade structures for civil servants and
other employment categorieso fbudget institution^\.^^
Both Entities:
0 The Government of the Federation has submitted to the Parliament o f the Federation, and the
Government o f the Republika Srpska has submitted to the Parliament o f the RepublikaSrpska,
budget execution reports for Fiscal Year 2004, satisfactory to the Association, which reports
show, among other things, that total payroll expenses have not exceeded budgetary
appropriations\.
33 Satisfactory legislation will include (i) consistency with EU standards (acquis communautaire); (ii) adoption o f
international audit standards; and (iii) definition o f clear responsibilities o fbudget spending authorities and
internal auditors inthe areas o f internal financial control and internal audit)\. Satisfactory internal audit plans
include: (i) the identification o f staffing and resource requirements; and a time-bound internal audit program,
including submission o f internal audit reports\.
34Inparticular, satisfactory Statelegislationwould include those core elements setout infootnote 25 above\.
Satisfactory Entitylegislation on Higher Educationwould needto be fully consistent withthe Higher Education
Framework Law and include the following provisions (i) assignment o f financing responsibility at the Entity
level; (ii)introducing financing on the basis o fper-student financing; (iii) establishing mechanisms to allocate
finding to universities andnot faculties; and (iv) assigning legal autonomy to universities and colleges only\.
35 Satisfactory legislation would include (i) identification o f the responsibilities o fbudget spending units and the
clear
Ministryo fFinanceand Treasury regardingbudgetpreparation andbudget execution; (ii) provision on the
preparation and adoption o fmedium-term financial planning; (iii) clear definition o frules to provide
predictability to budget spending units inexecuting the budget; (iv) requirement to adopt budget classification
compliant withGFS standards (economic andfunctional classifications); (v) definition o f a time-bound budget
preparation, submission andapproval calendar; (vi) requirement for the budget andbudget execution reports to be
publishedimmediately upon submission to Parliament; and (vii) definitions ofclear rules for budgetrevisions\.
36 Satisfactory legislationwould include (i) introduction o f a pay grade structure with salary scales harmonized with
the
the job categories established by the civil service laws and other relevant legislation; (ii) clear definition o f
the
criteria to allocate positionand staffwithin a salary grade; (iii) the clear definition ofrules for the modification of
the salary grades; (iv) the definition o frules governing salary increase inline withperformance assessments
establishedby the civil service laws and other relevant legislation; (v) the replacement o fthe coefficient and
minimumprice oflabor systembya single basewage; and (vi) the reductioninthe number ofallowances fromthe
current system, through the inclusiono f such allowances as the hot meal or the holiday allowances inthe base
wage\.
34
0 The budgets enacted by both Entities for Fiscal Year 2005 show an adjustment in total payroll
expenses (including allowances and excluding severance payments) satisfactory to the
Association, and consistentwith the MTDStargets andthe BFP for FiscalYears 2005-07\.
0 Both Entity Ministries o f Finance have updated the respective BFP for Fiscal Years 2005-07,
satisfactory to the Association, and have presented the BFP to their respective governments, to
facilitate budgetpreparation for the FiscalYear 2005\. 37
TheRepublikaSrpska:
0 The Government of RepublibSrpska has submittedto the Parliament o f Republika Srpskaa new
law on salaries, satisfactory to the Association, introducing new pay grade structures for civil
servantsandother employment categoriesonbudget institution^\.^^
TheFederation of BH:
0 The Federation Ministry of Finance has confirmed and provided evidence satisfactory to the
Association that the consolidated cantonal budget execution reports for Fiscal Year 2004 show
total payroll expenses not exceeding the consolidated budget appropriations, and has confirmed
and provided evidence satisfactory to the Association that all cantonal budget laws for 2005 have
been enacted by the respective parliaments, and show a consolidated adjustment in payroll
expenses (including allowances and excluding severance payments) consistent with the MTDS
targets and the BFPs for Fiscal Years 2005-07\.
0 The Federation Government has reassignedrevenues to the Entitylevel for adequate financing of
higher education spending, ina manner satisfactory to the Association\.
0 The Federation Ministry o f Finance has confirmed and provided evidence satisfactory to the
Association that all cantonal budget laws for Fiscal Year 2005 have been approved by the
respective parliaments and are inline withthe Federation 2005-07 BFP\.
E\. Implementation
83\. The Ministryo fFinance andTreasury at the State level, and the Ministries o fFinance inboth
Entities are the direct counterparts for the oversight o f the overall program\. They will, among other things,
report on a regular basis to the Coordination Boardfor Economic Transition and EuropeanIntegration, a
37 Satisfactory BFPs for 2005-2007 would meet the same requirements as those outlined infootnote 27 for the 2004-
2006 BFPs\. Inparticular, they would show a (i) intotal public expenditure (including extra-budgetary
decline
finds) withrespect to GDP inboth Entities (including Cantons inthe Federation); (ii)decline inthe share o f
a
total payroll expenses(excluding one-off severance payments) intotal on-budget public expenditure inboth
Entities (including Cantons inthe Federation); (iii) an increase inthe share o f operations and maintenance as well
as self-financed public investment intotal on-budget expenditure inboth Entities (including Cantons inthe
Federation)\.
38 Satisfactory legislation would include (i) introductiono f a pay grade structure with salary scales harmonized with
the
the job categories established bythe civil service laws and other relevant legislation; (ii) clear definition o f
the
criteria to allocate positionand staff withina salary grade; (iii)the clear definition o frules for the modification o f
the salary grades; (iv) the definition o frules governing salary increase inline with performance assessments
establishedbythe civil service laws and other relevant legislation; (v) the replacement of the coefficient and
minimumprice oflabor systembya single base wage; and (vi) the reduction inthe number o fallowances fromthe
current system, through the inclusiono f such allowances as the hot meal or the holiday allowances inthe base
wage\.
35
forum gathering the head of the executives at the State and Entitylevel\. As aparticular feature of this
credit, the FederationMinistryof Finance will be responsible for overall coordinationwith the cantons for
those measureswhere action at the cantonal level i s foreseen inthe Program\.
84\. Technical oversight ofparticular credit components will be assuredbyvarious existing
coordination groups or project steering boards\. Most of the measuresproposedare supported by ongoing or
approved technical assistanceprojects\. A chart o f administrative implementation and monitoring
responsibilities as well as technical assistance will be provided as an Annex to the final Program
Document\.
F\. Financial Arrangements
85\. The Credit would be disbursedintwo tranches of SDR 6\.8 million (US$ 10million equivalent) and
SDR 16\.4 million (US$24 million equivalent) to a deposit account o f the State at the Central Bank o f
Bosnia and Herzegovina (CBBH)\. Disbursement would be made inEuros equivalent to the SDR amount of
the above tranches\. The equivalent inConvertible Marks (KM) o f the entire amount o f all disbursements
will be transferred from the State DepositAccount to the budgetary accounts o fthe Entities inthe CBBH
and then transferred to the Treasury Account of the Entities inthe correspondingcommercial banks\. The
first tranche (US$ 10million equivalent) would be disbursedupon Credit effectiveness\. The second tranche
(US$24 millionequivalent) will be released uponreview by IDA that (i) macroeconomic program i s on
the
track as evidenced by the successful first year review of the IMF-supportedprogram; (ii) the overall
adjustment program is progressing satisfactorily; and (iii) the specific tranche-release conditions have been
met as described inSectionDabove\. Fromthe secondtranche proceeds, the Entitieshave agreedthat they
will transfer the equivalent o fUS$4million to the State Budget throughthe normal transfer mechanism\.
Proceeds of the Credit will be used for approved uses only\. Disbursements will not be linked to specific
purchases, thus evidence will not beneeded to support disbursements, nor will procurementrequirements
be necessary\. Ifafter the Credit proceeds are deposited inthe Central Bank account, the proceeds are used
for ineligible purposes as defined inthe Credit Agreement, IDA will require the borrower to either (a)
returnthat amount to the Deposit Account for use for eligible purposes; or (b) refundthe amount directly to
IDA\.The Borrower will comply with standardreportingrequirements ofadjustment credits\. The
Association will exercise its right to receive audit reports on the Deposit Account after each disbursement\.
86\. Interms offinancial monitoring, the Bankhasguidelinesonfinancial management requirements in
adjustment operations which are to be appliedto the proposed Credit\. The government will maintain
accounts and records, or ensure that such items are maintained, showing that credit disbursements were in
accordance with provisions o f the Credit Agreement\. Such accounts and records will be maintainedina
form acceptableto the Association\. The external auditor will conduct an annual audit o f the Deposit
Account openedby the government inthe Central Bankto exclusively hold the Credit proceeds\. The terms
of reference o f the audit shouldbe acceptable to the Association\. The audit will examine and report on the
disbursementsfrom the Deposit Account untilsuch time that all the Credit proceedshave been fully
utilized\. Such audits will be submitted to the Association as soon as they are completed\. The Association
may require a more extensive audit o f such records by independent auditors\. The Bankwill complement its
increased emphasis on borrower public financial management inits analytic work and lending program
with stronger reportingand auditing arrangements over the disbursementsof adjustment loanproceeds\.
These controls are not intendedto restrict or prescribe the uses to which adjustment loanproceeds funds
may be appliedby borrowers\. They are rather intendedto provide assurancethat Bank funds have arrived at
their intendeddestination, havebeenusedinthe first instance for their intendedpurpose ofproviding
balance ofpayments and fiscal support, and will be subject to Borrower processes for managingpublic
resources which are known to and canbe reviewedbyboththe Bank and the Fund\.
36
G\. PovertyImplications
87\. A recently completed poverty assessmentbythe Associationprovidesthe most comprehensive
analysis o f householdlivingstandards since the end of the war\. According to survey data collected in2001,
about 20 percent of BH's population i s livingbelow a consumptionthreshold of about US$900 per year\.
While these findings mightconclude that the post-conflictrecovery effort was relatively successful in
mitigating pervasive poverty, further analysis highlightsthe vulnerability o f a large share of the population\.
Inadditionto the people livingbelow the povertyline, another 30 percent ofthepopulationis estimatedto
be near poor\. Nearly 70 percent are poor inat least one dimension o f poverty\.
88\. While it i s not directly targeted at poverty reductionactivities, the proposed Credit supports the
Government's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, and the measures underpinning the program are expected
to correct for inefficiencies and inequity inpublic spending\.
H\. EnvironmentalImpact
89\. The proposedCredit will have no direct impact onthe environment\. For the purposes of
Operational Policy 4\.01, it has been rated Category C,and therefore does not require an environmental
assessment\.
37
Annex 1
BosniaandHerzegovina Key Economic Indicators
-
; Actual Pro'ected
Indicator 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
National accounts (as "LOof GDP)
Grossdomestic producta 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Agriculture 17 14 13 18 17 17 17 17 17
Industry 30 30 28 37 35 35 36 36 36
Services 53 57 58 45 49 48 47 47 46
Total Consumption 113 109 113 113 112 111 108 105 102
Gross domestic fixed investment 21 21 19 20 20 20 21 21 22
Govemment investment 11 9 6 5 5 5 4 4
Private investment 10 10 14 15 16 16 17 18
~xports(GNFS)~ 26 26 26 26 26 28 29 30 31
Imports (GNFS) 58 56 58 59 58 59 57 55 54
Grossdomestic savings -13 -9 -13 -13 -12 -11 -8 -5 -2
Gross national savings' 13 8 3 2 3 5 6 8 11
Memorandum items
Gross domestic product 4692 4740 5006 5600 7034 8348 9006 9740 10509
(US$ millionat current prices)
GNIper capita(US$, Atlas method) 1240 1270 1280 1310 1540 1740 1940 2050 2180
Real annual growthrates (%callculated from 1999 prices)
Gross domestic productat market prices 9\.6 5\.5 4\.4 5\.5 3\.5 5\.1 5\.7 5\.9 6\.2
GrossDomestic Income 9\.6 4\.5 3\.1 1\.8 3\.3 4\.4 4\.9 5\.5 5\.5
Real annual per capita growth rates(%, calculated from 1996 prices)
Gross domestic productat market prices 6\.5 2\.8 2\.4 2\.4 2\.6 3\.7 4\.8 4\.4 4\.4
~~
Total consumption 2\.0 -3\.5
Private consumption
Balance of Payments(US%millions)
E X P O ~ ~(GNFS)~
S 1296 1288 1296 1466 1894 2248 2460 2760 3123
MerchandiseFOB 744 832 870 1046 1407 1715 1937 2210 2546
Imports (GNFS)~ 2770 2742 2899 3316 4083 4630 4863 5148 5460
Merchandise FOB 2542 2547 2701 3122 3845 4322 4532 4805 5100
Resourcebalance -1474 -1454 -1603 -1850 -2189 -2382 -2403 -2388 -2337
Net factor income 300 253 245 248 332 380 401 454 513
Net current transfers 284 580 547 566 631 684 670 660 667
Current account balance -890 -874 -1056 -1284 -1558 -1698 -1733 -1728 -1670
Net private foreign direct investment 90 150 130 230 320 420 540 570 600
Long-termloans (net) 147 68 89 84 31 149 108 80 69
Official 147 68 89 84 31 149 108 80 69
Private
Other capital (net, incl\.errors&omissions) 915 1369 878 1431 1226 1226 1175 1137 1051
Change inreserves(increase, -)d -262 -713 -41 -461 -19 -97 -90 -59 -50
Memorandum items
Resourcebalance (% o f GDP) -31\.4 -30\.7 -32\.0 -33\.0 -31\.1 -28\.5 -26\.7 -24\.5 -22\.2
Real annual growth rates ( YR96 prices)
Merchandise exports (FOB)
Primary
Manufactures
Merchandiseimports (CIF)
38
Annex 1
Bosnia and Herzegovina Key Economic Indicators
-
(Continued)
Actual Estimate Projected
Indicator 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Public finance (as % of GDP at market price$
Current revenues 57\.7 53\.7 49\.7 48\.1 46\.7 45\.8 44\.4 43\.0 41\.7
Current expenditures 50\.7 49\.8 43\.9 44\.1 41\.8 41\.1 39\.9 38\.7 37\.5
Current account surplus(+) or deficit (-) -8\.2 -13\.1 -16\.2 -18\.5 -17\.4 -15\.8 -14\.8 -13\.1 -11\.0
Capital expenditure 14\.8 10\.9 9\.2 6\.3 4\.5 4\.8 4\.5 4\.2 4\.1
Foreignfinancing 14\.0 9\.7 7\.9 5\.5 4\.2 4\.3 1\.8 1\.1 0\.9
Monetary indicators
M2/GDP 25\.2 25\.6 42\.6 43\.0 44\.5 45\.9 43\.1 41\.2 39\.5
Growth of M 2 (%) 39\.9 13\.9 89\.3 7\.0 8\.3 6\.2 4\.4 2\.5 2\.7
Private sector credit growth / 193\.9 91\.6 213\.1 110\.1 98\.3 99\.2 99\.2 99\.2 99\.2
total credit growth (%)
Priceindices(YR96 =loo)
Merchandise export price index
Merchandise import price index
Merchandise terms of trade index
Real exchangerate (US$/LCU)'
Real interest rates
Consumer price index (% change) 2\.8 5\.0 3\.2 0\.3 0\.1 0\.9 1\.7 2\.0 2\.1
GDP deflator (% change) 3\.8 5\.8 2\.4 2\.1 1\.1 1\.3 1\.9 2\.o 2\.0
a\. GDP at factor cost
b\. "GNFS" denotes"goods andnonfactor services\."
c\. Includesnet unrequited transfersexcluding official capital grants\.
d\. Includes use ofIMF resources\.
e\. Consolidated central government\.
f\. " L C U denotes "local currency units\." An increaseinUS$/LCUdenotes appreciation\.
39
Annex 3: IFC PortfolioinBosniaandHerzegovina
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Statemento fIFC's
HeldandDisbursedPortfolio
As of2/29/2004
(InUSDollarsMillions)
Held Disbursed
FYApproval Company Loan Equity Quasi Partic Loan Equity Quasi Partic
1997199101102 Bosnia Micro 3\.79 0 0 0 3\.79 0 0 0
2001104 CPB 12\.64 5\.18 0 0 0 0 0 0
1997 Enterprise Fund 0 1\.95 0 0 0 1\.26 0 0
2002 FCL 12\.64 0 0 3\.16 12\.64 0 0 3\.16
2001 PBS-SPV 13\.69 2\.31 0\.13 0 13\.69 2\.31 0\.13 0
2002 Raiffeisen-BOS 18\.35 0 0 0 10\.76 0 0 0
1998 SEFAkova 1\.23 0 0 0 1\.23 0 0 0
1999101 SEF Bosnalijek 1\.87 0 0 0 1\.87 0 0 0
1998 SEF Lignosper 2\.68 0 0 0 2\.33 0 0 0
1999 SEF Lijanovici 1\.45 0 0 0 1\.45 0 0 0
1997 Sarajevska 0\.83 0 0 0 0\.83 0 0 0
1998 Wood Agency-AL 5\.77 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wood Inga 2\.04 0 0 0 0\.41 0 0 0
Wood Konjuh 2\.9 0 0 0 2\.57 0 0 0
Wood Kozara 2\.04 0 0 0 1\.71 0 0 0
Wood Podgradci 1\.39 0 0 0 1\.14 0 0 0
Wood Vrbas 2\.04 0 0 0 0\.41 0 0 0
Total Portfolio: 85\.35 9\.44 0\.13 3\.16 54\.83 3\.57 0\.13 3\.16
Approvals PendingCommitment
Loan Equity Quasi Partic
2002 Lukavac 9\.93 0 0 2\.48
Total Pending Commitment: 9\.93 0 0 2\.48
41
Annex 4: Timetable of Key ProcessingEvents
IdentificationMission: March 2003
ICMreview: March21,2003
Pre-Appraisal: May 2003
ROC DecisionMeeting: September 5,2003
Appraisal: October 2003
Negotiations: May 2004
Boardpresentation: June 2004
42
ANNEX 5: Letter ofDevelopment Policy
Economic Management Structural Adjustment Credit to Bosnia and Herzegovina
May 12,2004
Mr\.J\. Wolfensohn
President
World Bank
1818 HSt\. NW
Washington DC, 20433,
U\.S\.A\.
LETTEROFDEVELOPMENTPOLICY
Dear Mr\.Wolfensohn:
This Letter o fDevelopmentPolicy summarizes the main features o four fiscal reformprogram,
which is an integral part o f the Medium-Term Development StrategyRoverty Reduction
Strategy Paper (MTDS) that our Governments recently approved\. Our programrelies onthe
continuedstability of a sound macroeconomic framework for the next four years\. The recently
approved final review o f our Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the InternationalMonetary
Fundhasconcludedthat our trackrecordinterms ofmacroeconomic stability hasbeenvery
satisfactory andthat the proposedframework of macroeconomic policies i s adequate\. The
Programdescribed inthis Letter is also fully consistent with the recommendations o f the SBA
review with respect to fiscal policy\. To support the implementation o f our fiscal reform
program, we, the Governments o f Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation o f Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, request financial assistancefrom the International
development Association under the proposedEconomic Management Structural Adjustment
Credit (EMSAC)\.
I\. MacroeconomicFramework:
Followinga devastating conflict andthe signature o f the DaytonPeace Agreement inDecember
1995, BHhas made progress inestablishingitself as a modem andviable state, among others
pursuingintegrationon dual tracks: (i) internally, through increased harmonization o frelatively
autonomous sub-national entities while strengtheningthe coordinating functions o f the BH's
commoninstitutions (the central state); and (ii) externally, by actively engaging into the
Stabilizationand Association Process (SAP) with the EuropeanUnion (EU), as well as pursuing
other avenues of international integration (Council o f Europe membership, WTO accession, etc\.)\.
While the objectives o fpost-conflict reconstructionare perceived as havingbeen achieved to a
large extent, many challenges relating to economic transition are yet to be fully addressed, in
order for BHto regain sustained growth inthe economy andreduce unemployment andpoverty\.
Our agenda for macroeconomic management and structuralreforms is detailed inthe MTDSthat
the State and EntityGovemments have recently approved\.
BHhasposted impressive growthrates since the war (an average21percent inrealGDP growth
between 1996 and 2003) andper capita GDP has doubled since the end o f the war, but is still
estimated to be only at two-thirds o f its pre-war level\. Immediately following the conflict, growth
was mainly spurredby intense reconstruction and rehabilitation investment inpublic
infrastructure andprivate housing\. Activity has beenpredominantly financedby large and
sustained aid flows\. Private transfers, which are estimated to have averaged 13 percent o f GDP
over the last five years, have also played an important role infuelingdomestic spending\. Recent
growth has remainedpositive, buthas been falling, mirroringdeclining official aid and
stagnating manufacturing activity\. The trend o f decreasing aid flows i s likely to continue\.
BHhasmanagedto achieve solidgrowthwithout compromisingmacroeconomic stability\.
Prudentfiscal management, and strict adherenceto a currencyboard arrangement have beenthe
mainpillars o f the Government's macroeconomic policy, supported bytwo IMF Standby
Arrangements, the second o f which we successfully completed inFebruary 2004\. Anchored in
the currency board arrangement, monetary policy hasbeen successful inrapidly stabilizing
inflation, bringingit even below average EUlevels inrecent years\. Regarding fiscal policies, we
have been able over the past few years to increase our revenue collection performance, while
alleviating the heavy burdeno f public spending inthe economy\. However, despite the fiscal
adjustment and the decline inreconstructionaid, BH's trade and current account imbalances
remain at unsustainable levels\. While we will continue to implement prudent macroeconomic
policies, restoring the country's competitiveness and reducing the current account deficit will
imperatively require further progress instructuralreforms\.
To date, progress with respect to structural and institutional reforms has beenachieved mainly in
the areas o fpublic finance, the financial sector, and foreign trade policy\. Withrespect to public
finance, the introduction o f modem treasury systems at all levels of government short o f
municipalities has contributed to improved spending discipline\. Significant progress was also
achieved intax policy and administration (including countrywide harmonization and improved
collection enforcement), and we have initiated deep institutional reforms to prepare the
introduction o f VAT\. We have also increasingly resortedto policy co-ordination mechanisms
between the State and the Entitiesinformulating our policies\. For instance, this cooperation has
greatly facilitated the preparation o fharmonizedplans to reduce the large overhang o f domestic
claims on our governments\. Similarly, State and Entityauthorities have worked closely together
to adopt fundamentalreforms insuch areas as defense\. However, there remains significant scope
to further rationalize a costly multi-layer government structure, which still absorbs above half o f
GDP, with a particular focus on controlling the wage bill inorder to free resources for operations
and maintenance and domestically financedpublic investment, as well as redirecting our social
protection programs to those who need it the most\.
Financial sector reform successes have included the early replacement o f payment bureaus with a
modempayment system, the privatization andrestructuring o f most banks at low fiscal cost, the
entry o f new strategic investors inthe banking sector, and the establishment and gradual
strengthening o f the prudential and regulatory framework\. Finally, our trade policy reforms have
ledto the adoptiono fthe most liberaltrade regime inSouth-Eastem Europeandwe have signed
bilateral free trade agreements with nine countries inthe Region\. However, we remain concerned
that this favorable trade environment has not yet materialized inincreasedprivate sector growth
and investment or inemployment creation\. As we have emphasized inour MTDSthis signals the
needto accelerate reforms inother areas, inparticular the business environment, enterprise
restructuring andthe labor market, where our progress to date has been slower\.
While legal frameworks for foreign investment and privatization have been established,
enforcement has been hampered byweak implementation capacity\. Privatization o f small and
medium scale enterprises was accomplished, buthas resulted indilutedownership and weak
corporate governance\. Most o f the large companies that could attract strategic investors are still
44
state-owned\. The business environment has improved, but obstacles to enterprise creation and
bureaucratic hasslesto companies needto be further eliminated\. Corporate governance rules
need to be changed inorder to provide the right incentives and obligations to company owners
and managers\. Finally, BHhas only very recently adopted modem bankruptcy legislation so that
many loss-making corporations can only now undergo restructuring or liquidation, and free space
for fresh investment and employment growth\.
Inthis context, our strategic macroeconomic objective is to preserve a stable environmentthat is
conducive to the implementation of the structuralreforms aimed at promoting private domestic
savings and investment\. We will continue to implement the currency board and the associated
prudent monetary polices, while our fiscal stance will generatethe necessarypublic sector
savings\. We will aim at further reducing the share of public spending to GDP, by continuing to
rationalize programs innon-productive sectors, while reallocatingexpenditures to productive
investments inhuman andphysical capital as well as targeted social transfers\. We will also
strictly adhere to the implementation o f the domestic debt settlement plan inorder to eliminate
contingent risks on our budgets, and free the necessaryfiscal space to accompany potential short-
term social costs o f the needed structuralreforms\. These structuralreforms will focus on
accelerated enterprise restructuring, including through privatization andbankruptcy, and on labor
market reforms, which will both contribute to improved competitiveness and the generation o f
productivejobs\.
11\. Objectivesof the Fiscal ReformProgram
The MTDS outlines a programo f fiscal refoms (second chapter, section four) as a key
ingredient o fthe policy package that will achieve the macroeconomic objectives described
above\. Our macroeconomic framework foresees a continued reductiono f the share o f public
expenditure inGDP, albeit at a lower rate than the one we have experienced since 1998\. The
reason for this i s that the past expenditure consolidation has mainlyreflectedthe reduction in
post-conflict public reconstructionprograms that have been financed with the help o f external
partners\. Future consolidation will mainly focus onrecurrent spending, which can only be
rationalized gradually\. We wishto achieve this adjustment without jeopardizing the delivery o f
public services\. Quite on the contrary, our Programi s also geared towards an improvement o f the
quality o f spending\.We have identified a number o f measuresthat shouldyield efficiency gains,
through: (i) the reallocationo f spendingbetween, and within sectoral programs; (ii) the
reassignment o fresponsibilities and revenues across the multiplelevels o fBH's administrative
structure; and (iii) the strengtheninginthe management and control o f the use o f public monies\.
Our programalso targets a reinforcement and modernizationo fthe tax administration, which
would eventually allow us to reduce tax and contribution rates and improve the governance
environment for our businesses\. It shouldbe further highlighted from the outset that the content
and sequencing o f the measuresproposed inthis program are fully consistent with the related
priority for reforms identifiedinthe EuropeanCommission's report on the preparedness o fBHto
negotiate a Stabilization andAssociation Agreement with the European Union\.
More specifically, on the revenue side, we will pursue the reforms we have initiated with the
adoption o fnew legislation establishinga single, State-level Indirect Tax Authority (ITA) that
will beresponsible for nation-wide customs administration, as well as the preparationand
implementationo f a Value Added Tax (VAT) to replacethe current sales tax\.
45
Onthe public expenditure side, we will focus on the followingpriorities:
Accelerate the implementation o f civil service and public sector employment reforms,
while bringingthe weighto four aggregatepublic sector wage billto sustainable levels;
Further rationalize and reduce spending innon-productive sectors, such as defense and
law and order;
Reallocate savings to non-wage operations spending, maintenance and public
investment;
Strengthen fiscal policy coordination among the various levels o f Government;
Reassign expenditure responsibilities across levels o f government on a gradual, sector-
by-sector basis, andreviewrevenue assignments inparallel to ensure adequate funding,
especially for programs that are delivered at the locallevel;
Improve efficiency and equity inspending onkey social services, such as education;
Further improve medium-termfinancial planning and annual budget formulation;
Maintain strict control over budget execution and improve fiscal reporting, including for
extra-budgetary funds;
Enhance transparency and accountability over the use o fpublic finds through new public
procurementrules, strengthened external audit or the enforcement o f the conflict o f
interest legislation\.
The remainder o fthis Letter will detail the measureswe envisage for the reformo fpublic
expenditure policies, as they are the focus o f the proposedEconomic Management Structural
Adjustment Credit\.
1\. PUBLICSECTOREMPLOYMENT AND PAYREFORM
Contextandprogress to date\. We have over the past few years initiated a major reformo f the
civil service and the public administration\. This has ledus to adopt harmonizedCivil Service
Laws at the State and Entitylevels\. Three Civil Service Agencies (CSAs) have been established,
two o f which are well engaged into the implementationo f the Law, namely at the level o f the
State of BH(hereafter the "State") and the Republika Srpska (RS), where newhiringrules are
enforcedand civil service databases are being established\. The appointment o f the Federation o f
BH(FBH) CSA Director was also completed, after some delay\. More generally, we have also
formulated a platformfor public administration reforms ("public administrationreform
pledges"), that we presented to the PeaceImplementationCouncil in2003\. While all o f these
reforms will take time to yield the desired results interms o f a performance-driven civil service,
we are confronted with a persistentlyhighgovernment wage billthat crowds out other important
items o f public spending\. The share o f the wage bill inGDP or intotal public spending i s higher
than inmany neighboring countries\. At the same time, the structure o fremuneration for
government employees is not satisfactory, as wages are highly compressed andthe wage
determination system does not lend itself to reward performance\. Another complicating factor
relates to the wide disparity o f wage rates inthe public sector throughout the country\. The
establishment of new institutions at the State level for instance, has led, inthe past to episodes o f
46
public sector wage inflationthat we needto bringunder control\. Inaddition, we recognize that
government "rightsizing" i s needednow, to generatethe fiscal space needednot only for non-
wage expenditure, but also for institutional requirements that will emerge as we progress inour
integrationwiththe European Union\.
Inorder to addressthesecomplex problems, we have first determined aggregatewagebilltargets
for bothEntities inthe framework of the Budget FrameworkPapers (BFPs, or Medium-Term
Expenditure Frameworks, MTEFs)that bothEntitygovernments have adopted inthe Fallo f
2003\. Inthe FBH,the BFP has guidedthe preparation o fbudgets at the Entityand Cantonal
levels, and, although the BFP i s not yet more than a guidingtool, we are satisfiedto observe that
the approved budgets for the Entity and the Cantons post a wage bill adjustment commensurate
with the target of the BFP\.Inthe RS, the approved budget has departed from the BFP with
respect to the wage bill, as we felt that the important wage differential betweenthis Entity and
the FBHor the State justified a moderate increase inthe wages o f the employees of budget
institutions\. While recognizingthat this one-off measurewas not fully inline with the overall
policy orientation described inthe MTDS, we are ensuringthat the increase does notjeopardize
the fiscal targets o f our macroeconomic framework\. We have, inaddition, usedthe opportunity
of this plannedincrease to initiate an important structuralreform of wage determination for RS
public sector wages\. A working group has been appointed to prepare fundamental pay grade
reformfor civil servants, administrative support personnel and other special categories o f
personnel employed bybudget institutions (such as teaching staff, judiciary staff, etc\.)\. The
working group has also begunpreparing draft legislationto modernize the wage determination
system ingovernment, andmake it consistent with the hiringandperformance appraisal rules
that have beenintroducedinthe RS Civil Service Law\.
Another important aspect of constraining the fiscal cost o f the wage billrelates to the reduction
ofexcessemployment inthe public sector\. Inline with our sectoral policy targets for Defense or
Interior Security, we have adopted downsizing plans inboth Entities, includingfiscally
affordable severance compensation\. These measures are fully coordinatedwith international
partners active inthese sectors, such as NATO inthe framework o f the Partnership for Peace
program, or the European UnionPolice Monitoringmission\. Further downsizing and staff
rationalization efforts will continue to be grounded inpublic administration reforms\. Inthis
context, the RS Governmenthas completed a comprehensive review o f the rule books for internal
organization o f each o f its budget institutions\. The rule books have all been cleared by the RS
MinistryofFinanceand, once adoptedbyGovernment, they will dictaterationalizationplans in
the RSgeneral administration\. Inparallel, we have launchedimportant functional reviews with
the support o f the EuropeanUnion, that will allow us to calibrate "rightsizing" plans\.
Priority reforms for 2004-2005\. We will pursue the reforms inthis area on three tracks\. First, we
will implement our 2004 budgets as adopted with respect to the wage billand continue prudent
fiscal planning for the next years\. Second, we will implement public sector pay reform, initially
inthe RSand at the level of the State\. We will also establish tools for improvedpayroll
management\.And finally, we will pursue civil service reform through the implementation o f the
civil service law\. Inparticular, we will:
0 Strictly adhere to the wage bill allocations inthe 2004 adopted budgets\. As it i s
possible that we will rebalance our budgets inthe course o f the year, we will not
increase the wage bill on that occasion\. Any increase inwage rates will be
compensatedby an accordingreduction instaff\. Our budget execution reports will
document that this objective has been met\. The FBHMinistry o f Finance will
47
coordinate budget rebalancing, ifany, at the cantonal level, and will report on budget
execution at that level at the end of the year\.
0 Inthe updateofour EntityBudgetFrameworkPapers(BFPs) for 2005-2007, we will
further constrain the total payroll expenses, andprovide according instructions to the
preparationo f the 2005 budgets\. Selected increasesinwage rates that would be
drivenbythe pay scalereform, willbe compensatedbydecreases inother wage
levels or by a reductioninstaffing levels\. The budgets for 2005 that we will present
to our legislatures will be inline with the BFPs, inparticular with respect to the
wage bill\.
0 Downsizing efforts inthe general administration will be aligned with the more
general public administration reforms\. Inthe RS for instance, we will undertake the
rightsizing o fgovernment inline with the approved rule books for the internal
organization o f eachbudget institution\. Inthe FBH, the CSA will launch the revision
o f the rule books on intemal organization at the Entitylevel, and issue guidelines for
a parallel revision inthe Cantons\. The revision will also closely follow the
recommendations o f the functional reviews that we will have completed with the
support o f the European Union\.
0 We will adopt new laws on salaries regulating the remunerationo f the employees o f
budget institutions inthe RS andat the level ofthe State\.We will do so by adopting
modempay scalesthat will introduce a base wage covering large part o f the total
remuneration\. Allowances will only be retained on a selective basis\. The pay scale
will be derived from thejob categories identified inour civil service laws\. For
employees that do not have civil servant status, we will identifyjob categories and
either integrate them inthe general administration pay scale or adopt special scales
to fit special categories o fpersonnel\. We will coordinate closely among levels o f
government to implement this reform, with the aim to achieve better harmonization
o f salary determinationrules and salary levels\. Wage increase will be mainly driven
byperformanceinline with the performanceappraisal systemthat will be
establishedbythe RS CSA\.
0 At the level ofthe State, we will address the unsustainable increase inthe total wage
billandthe disparate arrangements goveming wage determination, bothrelatedto
the establishment o f new institutions that introduce their ownpay scales and wage
determinationrules\. Our pay scale will be applicable to all line agencies\. For those
agencies with status of independence (such as the Supreme Audit Institutions or the
Judiciary bodies) pay scales will be fully harmonizedwith those o f regular
institutions\.
0 IntheFBH,wewilllaunchthepayscalereformsincoordinationwiththeactivities
ongoing inthe RS and at the State level\. We will closely coordinate with cantonal
authorities inthis endeavor, and adopt ajoint action planto introduce harmonized
wage determination mechanisms\.
0 With respect to payrollmanagement, we will establish public employment databases
and selectively introduce a payroll application inour treasury systems\. Inthe FBH,
the cantons of Sarajevo, Tuzla and Zenica-Doboj will have introduced the payroll
application in2005, as will the RS\.
48
B\. Reform of intergovernmentalfiscal relations
Contextandprogress to date\. The administrative complexity that derives from our
constitutional arrangements poses a number o f challenges to policy formulation and
implementation, particularly inthe fiscal area\. These challenges include the needto establish
functioning coordination mechanisms between the two Entities and the State, and within the
FBH\.Policy formulation is alsonot adequately informed, as ow statistical andmacroeconomic
planning services are still uncoordinated\. An additional problem lies inthe mismatchbetween
responsibilities and financing, which leaves important public services under-funded, especially at
the local level\. Also, giventhe tax assignment structure, we have been facing difficulties inthe
FBHo fimportantchangesinobserved revenue allocationswhile the expenditure responsibilities
remainedthe same\. We also observe large discrepancies between regionswithrespect to average
public spending per citizen, and we lack the formal mechanisms to correct them\. Our grants
betweenlevels of Government are too muchbased on ad hoc decisions and sometimes
constrained by the lack o f cash, which make budgetpreparationand execution difficult,
especially at the municipal level\. We recognize that reforms inthe area o f intergovernmental
fiscal relations i s very much inits early stage, andthis Programwill launch a certain numbero f
initiatives that will needto be built up into policy actions inthe mediumterm\. To date, our
efforts have focused on improving policy coordination, especially inthe context of the reform o f
indirect taxation, with the adoption o fthe ITA law, and the establishment o f the ITA Governing
Board that formally gathers, among others, the Ministers o f Finance from the State and both
Entities\. Inthe FBH, the Ministryo f Finance has organized regular meetings with the cantonal
counterparts to discuss the 2004-2006BFP, tax reforms and other relevant matters\. We are also
aware o f the needto strengthen the role o fmunicipalities as they are the main interface between
our govemments and our citizens\. To that end, we have prepared draft laws on local self-
govemment inbothEntities, which comply with standards set forthbythe Council o f Europe\.
Finally, we have been successful inensuring that our prudent macroeconomic and fiscal
strategies are also implemented at the sub-Entitylevel, by enforcing strict borrowingrules inthe
framework o f the Stand-By Arrangement\.
Priority reforms for 2004-2005\. We will continue our initial efforts to strengthen policy
coordination, while launching a review o f expenditure and revenue assignments inboth Entities\.
We will also gradually establish transfer mechanisms betweenlevels o f Governmentbased on
transparent rules\. Finally, we will continue to closely monitor borrowing at the local level while
allowing for selected financing o f sound localdevelopment programs within fiscally sustainable
targets\. Our program includesthe following measures:
0 We will establish ajoint institution for fiscal policy coordination (e\.g\., a "National
Fiscal Council"), gatheringthe Ministers o f Finance o f the State and Entities, with a
mandate to formulate nation-wide fiscal policy targets and agree on the
apportionment o f the target betweenthe State andthe two Entities\.
0 We will pursue the ITA reforms, inparticular by adopting a revenue allocation
mechanism and regulating the transfers from the Entities to the State;
0 We will adopt the Statistical Law at the State level, appoint a Director of State
Statistical Agency and establish the Statistical Council, inorder to prepare
harmonizedwork plans for the statistical agencies andproduce reliable, country-
wide statistics\.
49
We will also establish an Economic Policy and PlanningUnitreporting to the
Chairman of the Council o fMinisters at the State level\. This Unitwill coordinate
macroeconomicplanning and monitor the implementation o f our MTDS\.
IntheFBH,wewillinstitutionalizethefiscalcoordinationmechanismbetweenthe
Entityandcantonal Ministries ofFinance\.
We will enforce strict borrowingrules within each Entityin2004, and adopt new
Public Debt Laws at the level o f the State and the Entitiesthat will regulate
borrowing for all levels of government accordingto strict sustainability criteria,
withinaggregateborrowingtargets\.
We will also prepare and adopt a framework law on FiscalResponsibilities that will
define principles o f fiscal management and accountability across levels o f
governments;
Inthe Federation, we willreviewour revenue sharing arrangementsinlightoftax
and customs policy reforms, as well as reassignment o f expenditure responsibilities
(e\.g\., such as higher education, see below)\.
C\. Higher education financing reforms
Context andprogress to date\. As i s highlighted inour MTDS, the level o f spending on education
i s highcomparedto the outcomes the system achieves\. The inefficiencies are particularly striking
inthe vocational training andhighereducation systems, where unitcostsarehighandcompletion
rates low\. Inefficiencies inthe higher education system are directly linkedto the excessive
fragmentation o f the system, with respect to the organization o f universities andto the public
fundingmechanism\. With the exceptionofTuzla University,highereducationinstitutions are
organized around individual faculties which have legal and financial autonomy\. Inthe FBH,the
financing for higher education i s organized by cantons, which is another source o f inefficiency\.
Higher Education institutions are only loosely accountable for the quality o f their services or for
their financial management, whichremainsnon-transparent\. We realize that BH's growth
potential i s closely related to the performance o f its higher education system\. Similarly, as
secondary level enrollment will gradually shift from vocational trainingprograms to more
general secondary education, the higher education system will need to generate efficiency gains
and free the resources that will be neededto accommodate for increasednumbers o f students\. We
firmly believe that this policy will also have an impact onpoverty as more childrenwill have
access to improvedpost-primary education\.
We have achieved several important initial steps for the reform o f highereducation\. First, the
State Government has approved a Higher Education Framework Law (HEFL) that mandates the
consolidation o f faculties into universities, introduces Entity-level financing for Universities, as
well as uniform financing and quality standards for the whole o f BH\.However, the legislative
process i s still ongoing\. Second, inthe FBH, we have preparedthe draft amendments to the Law
on the Allocation o f Public Revenuesthat will allow for the transfer o f expenditure
responsibilities to be funded from the existingtax base\. Third, all universities are included inthe
Treasury System, with respect to the part o f their revenues receivedfrom the budgets, inline
with the existingregulations governing the Treasury System\. Finally, we have also, following the
example o f Tuzla University, developed draft regulations governingthe inclusion o f
Universities' own revenues into the treasury system, a measure which, once implemented, will
50
allow for enhanced transparency over the use o fpublic resourceswhile ensuring that the
Universities have exclusive access over the revenues they generate\.
Priority reforms for 2004-2005\. Our program focuses on completing the needed changes inthe
legal framework governingHigherEducationInstitutions, as well as starting the implementation
of the Laws\. Specifically, we will:
0 Enact the State level HEFL,as well as prepare and enact Entity-level Higher
Education Laws that are fully consistent with the HEFL;
0 We will establishthe institutions foreseen inthe HEFL, includingthe State-level
Certification for Information, recognition and Quality Assessment (CIRQA) and the
HigherEducationFinancingCouncil, as well as the Entity-level Higher Education
FundingBodies\. We will provide adequatefundingfor these institutions inour 2005
budgets;
0 The 2005 Entitybudgetwill also include adequate funding for transfers to the higher
education institutions;
0 We will introducethe new higher educationfundingmechanisms, on the basis o f
agreedper student funding formulas;
0 Inthe FBH,we willhave submitted to Parliamentthe amendmentsto the Lawon
Allocation o f Public Revenues, that will allow for the transfer o f expenditure
responsibilities for higher education to be funded from the existing tax base\. These
amendments will be submitted for adoption before the end of 2004 so that the
according revenues can be included inthe Entitybudget for 2005\.
0 We will initiate the legal and organizational consolidation of faculties into
universities with a view to complete it by 2006;
0 We will fully include the four faculties with the greatestnumberso f students fkom
the Universities o f Sarajevo, Banja Luka, and Mostar inthe treasury system o f the
relevant Entity,including for their own revenues accordingto the agreed rule books,
for the start of the academic year 2005-2006\. The Universityo f Tuzla will be fully
integratedinthe Federation treasury system as well\. Fromthe same date, all other
universities or faculties will be integratedinthe Treasury system o f the Entity for the
portiono f their revenues derivingfrom the Entitybudget, with a view o f full
integration, including their own revenues, by 2006\.
0 Inorder to accessbudgetfinancing in2005, universities andfaculties will have
submitted financial reports for the year 2003 and submittedto the Entity
governments a budget for 2005 includingprojections for own revenues\. Universities
will also submit auditedfinancial accounts for the year 2004 beforethe start o f the
2005-2006 academic year\.
0 We will prepare the introduction o f a policy on student fees requiring universities to
collect an affordable and mandatory fee, with exemptions for a small number o f
students on the grounds o f academic merit or financial hardship\.
51
BUDGET PLANNING REFORMS
Context andprogress to date\. While we have focused our efforts with respect to fiscal
management inrecent years on improving discipline inbudget execution, budget preparation still
suffers from weaknesses inmedium-term planning, as well as annual budgeting\. Inspite of the
existence o fbudget preparation calendars, the prolonged consultationand approval processes
often delay the final enactment o f the budgets well into the new fiscal year\. At the level o f the
State, we still needto finalize and submit to Parliamenta draft Finance Law (budget system law)
that will regulate the budgetpreparationprocess\. We have, however, revived the medium-term
planningprocess, after a first, non-sustained attempt in2000\. Inpreparationo f our MTDS, we
have preparedthe above mentioned Budget FrameworkPapers(BFPs) inboth Entities\. The BFPs
were extensively discussedwith line ministries\. Inthe FBH, as reported above, we have also
consultedwith the cantons duringthe preparationo f the BFP\.At the State level, we have
preparedan advanced draft o f the new Finance Law that establishes a calendar for the
preparation and adoption of the budget\. The Finance Law also requires the preparationo f a
medium-term financial planto guide the preparationof the annual budget\.The existing Entity
Budget System Laws have beenrecognizedto be adequate\. They will needhowever, to be
harmonizedwith the new State Law indue course\. Recognizingthe importance o f the Budget
Departments inour Ministries o f Finance, we have taken initial measuresto strengthen them in
the FBH, as well as at the level o f the State\.
Priority reforms for 2004-2005\. Inorder to further strengthen budget preparation, we will:
0 Adopt the new State-level Finance Law and prepare a medium-term financial plan
for 20005-2007 at the levelo f the State; we will submit our 2005 budget to the State
Parliamentwith the harmonized financial planannexed to it\.
0 InbothEntities,we will amendthe budgetsystem laws asnecessary, inorder to
harmonizethem with the State law and comply with the recommendations o f the
European Unionregardingthe obligations related to the Stabilization and
Association process, inparticular withrespect to medium-termplanning and
consolidated budget reporting\.
0 Inthe RSandthe FBH,we will have updatedour BFPs for the years 2005-2007,
presented it to the Cabinet andpreparedbudgetinstructions reflectingBFPpolicy
orientations\. We will submit the 2005 budgets with the harmonized BFP annexed to
it for information\. Inthe FBH,the BFPwill also havebeenpreparedinclose
consultationwith the cantons through the fiscal policy coordination mechanism\.
0 Inthe RS,we willtake the necessarymeasuresto strengthenthe BudgetDepartment
of the Ministryo fFinance\.
0 InbothEntities, the budgets ofExtra-BudgetaryFunds(RS andFBHPensionfunds,
RSHealthFund, FBHHealthSolidarity Fund, RS andFBHEmployment Funds) will
be submitted along the Entitybudgets inline with the regulation o f the respective
organic budgetlaws\.
52
E\. Budget execution, reporting and accountability reforms
Context andprogressto date\.We have made important progress inthe last couple of years with
respect to public sector accounting and payment reform\. Inparticular, we have introduced the
single treasury account and the single treasury ledger at the levels of State, the Entities and all
cantons\. The treasury system i s supported at all levels by modem database applications which
allow for real-time recordingand accounting\. The systemhas also introduced a certain number o f
automated controls that have allowed for improved spending discipline\. We have also improved
our budget reporting with respect to frequency and content\. However, beyond the controls built-
inthe treasury system, internalcontrol andinternalaudit is oftenweak or non-existent, leadingto
insufficient protection of the assets our institutions manage, as has beenrepeatedly highlighted
bythe reports of our SupremeAudit Institutions\. Also, we still needto enhance our capacity to
produce consolidated fiscal reportsbothat the level o f the State or the Entities (especially inthe
FBH)\.
Our Supreme Audit Institutions(SAIs), since their establishment in2000, have made
considerable progress inthe implementation o f their mandates\. They produce reports on a timely
and regularbasis, and the content of their report is improving every year\. There are, however,
loopholes inthe legislation goveming SAIs which affect their independence with respect to their
work program, the reporting lines they are subjected to, the coverage o f their mandates, their
timely access to budgetary resources and so on\. Evenmore importantly, the considerationo f SAI
reports inthe respectiveParliaments and the follow-up by spendingagenciesremains inadequate\.
Budgetreporting and auditing of extra-budgetary funds is also not as comprehensive as it should
be, consideringthe large amount ofpublic funds that these institutions manage\.
Priority reforms for 2004-2005\. We will focus our effort to maintain the adequate operation
treasury system, while establishing the legal and institutional foundations for internal control and
internal audit\. The legal framework and impact of extemal audit will also be reinforced\. More
specifically, we will:
Continue to implement the treasury system at the level o f the State, the Entities as
well as inall cantons\. Inthe FBH, the Ministryo f Finance will monitor adequate
implementation o f the systemthroughout the Entity\.
Prepare intemal audit laws inbothEntities and at the level o f the State\.
Mandate selectedbudget institutions that will prepare intemal audit plans\.
Publish consolidated budgetexecution reports for 20004 at the level o f the State and
the FBH;
Adopt the amendments to the laws on the Supreme Audit Institutions at the State and
Entitylevel, whichwill enhancethe independence o fthe SAIs, clarify the coverage
of their mandates, harmonize reporting deadlines with the budget laws, and
harmonize the legislation as neededbetween the State and the Entities\.
We will encourage State and EntityParliamentsto establish Public Auditing
Committees to ensure adequatereportingbetween the SAIs and the Parliaments\. We
will further assist as necessarythe Parliamentsto develop the rule books for the
Public Auditing Committees, so that they establish a formal communication channel
between the Committees and the corresponding Offices o f the Prosecutor\.
53
0 The State and the two Entitieswill include as part o f their final 2004 Budget
Execution Report a report on the corrective actions taken inresponse to the findings
andrecommendations included inthe last two publishedS A I audit reports\.
0 Similarly, budget execution reports from extra-budgetary funds (RS andFBH
Pension funds, RS Health Fund, FBHHealth Solidarity Fund, RS andFBH
Employment Funds) will include a summary o f corrective actions taken inresponse
to the findingsandrecommendations o f the SAI audit reports\.
F\. PUBLIC FINANCE GOVERNANCE PUBLICPROCUREMENT REFORMS
AND
Context andprogress to date\.In2001we requested the World Bank's assistance in
identifyingpressing corruptionactivities\. Followingthe report preparedby the Bank, inFebruary
2002 we adopted a comprehensive Anti-Corruption Action Plan\. The planenvisaged actions that
needed to be taken on three mainfronts: legislative, institutional and educational\. Inaddition to
that some other activities, such as communicationand cooperationwith civil society andmedia,
have been included inthe plan\.
Two years later, the legislative activities have beenmostly completed\. These include adoption o f
Laws on civil service at all three levels, Criminal Laws at all levels (introducing Money
Laundering as a criminal offense, therefore creating mechanisms for its effective prevention),
accompanied bythe Criminal Procedure Laws, as well as Laws on Civil and Executive
Procedure\. A Law on Conflict of Interest i s inplace at the State level and implementation o f the
law has begun\. Untilthe entities adopt their own laws, the State Law on Conflict o f Interest
applies, and it i s currently being actively implemented bythe ElectionCommission o f Bosnia
and Herzegovina\.
Interms ofthe institutional component ofour Anticorruption ActionPlan, we have established
Courts and Prosecutors Offices at the State level\. We have also formally established the Indirect
Tax Administration and appointed its Director, creating an enabling framework for a more
efficient and effective Indirect Tax collection ina unifiedway, therefore limitingpossibilities for
tax evasion\. As mentioned above, Supreme Audit Institutions are operational, and their work has
proven to be essential inensuring proper functioning o fbudget beneficiaries at all levels\.
Recognizingthat public procurement is a major source o fmismanagement o f public resources,
both interms o f governance and efficiency, we have prepareda draft State Law on Public
Procurement, which has received Entityendorsement and has been submittedbythe Council o f
Ministers to the State Parliament\.
Priority reforms for 2004-2005\. We recognizethat there i s a lot more to be done inorder to
minimize corruption inall areas highlighted by the World Bank's anti-corruption report, and we
have reflected our further commitmentsinthe MTDS\. It includes a comprehensive set o f
activities to fight corruption, including those from the Action Plan, but also the newly established
ones\. We remain committed to curb corruption, and inlight of that, pledge to take the following
actions:
0 Adopt the Public Procurement Law at the State level, inline with the requirements
for the EUaccession and the acquis communautaire\. Inaddition, through adoption
and implementationof by-laws, standard biddingdocuments and other implementing
54
regulations (consistent with the Law)\. All conflictingregulation at the Entityor
lower level will have been repealed\.
0 We will have established the Public Procurement Agency and the Public
Procurement ReviewBody and foreseen adequate financing for their operations in
the 2005 State budget\.
0 We will initiate and maintainregular publication o f all public biddingopportunities
and the results o f the awards of the contracts, inaccordance with the provisions o f
the Law on Public Procurement\. We will also beginthe submission to the
appropriate legislature o f annual reports on public procurement\.
0 Ensureappropriate implementationofthe Conflict ofInterest Law, inorder to reduce
corruption and influence peddling\. Inthe initial implementationperiod, we have
noticed some weaknesses o f the Law, and have prepared a set o f amendments to
improve the Law, which have recently been adopted\. Untilthe EntityLaws are
adopted, the implementation of the Law rests with the State-level Election
Commission\. Inlight o f that, we will provide adequate resources to the Election
Commission to ensure appropriate implementation o f the Law\. As we believe that
the law will be most effective ifits provisions are widely known, and as 2004 i s an
electionyear, we will launch an awarenesscampaign aimed specifically at local
officials and the media\.
0 We will also harmonizeprocurement-related sections of the Conflict o f InterestLaw
with the draft Public Procurement Law, bothto facilitate monitoring of compliance
and to ease the burdenonbiddingenterprises\. We will further facilitate monitoring
of compliance with the public procurement provisions found inthe Conflict o f
Interest Law by requiring that the declarations called for under Article 13 o f the Law
be forwarded from the procuringbody to the Electoral Commission o f BH\.
55
56
P
$1
u5
0
0
r 4
r= LI
4 0
21 0 0
40
e,
\.8
\.
v)
\.j
\.3
W
40
P
1
cu
0
8
m
a
AI a
"
\.: E:
31
CI
m\.
38
0
E
d
AI e
u
0
E
0 0
I
\.
I
a,
>
\.e
i-
o
a,
8
2E
B
k52
>
B
Bm
i-
a
P1
E
\.I
h a,
Annex 7: BH: Country At a Glance
BosniaandHerzegovina at a dance 5/l7/04
Bosnia Europe 8 Lower-
POVERTY and SOCIAL and Central middle-
Herzegovina Asia income
2003
Population,mid-year (millionsJ 4\.2 473 2,408
GNIpercapita(Atlas method,US$) 1,540 2\.60 2400
GNI (Atlas method,US$billions) T
6\.4 1,023 3\.372
1
Average annual growth, 1997-03 ~
Population(%) 2\.2 0\.0 0\.9
Laborforce (w 2\.4 0\.5 1\.2 GNI Gross
M o s t recent estimate (latest year available, 1997-03) , per primary
capita enrollment
Poverty(%ofpopulation belownationalpove~yline) 20 ,
Urbanpopulation(%of totalpopulation) 44 64 49
Lifeexpectancyat birth(years) 74 ,69 69 -I
Infantmortality(per(000livebirths) 15 31 32
Childmalnutrition(%of childrenunder5) 4 9 Accessto improvedwatersource
Access to an improvedwatersource (%ofpopulation) 91 61
Illiteracy(% ofpopulationage fiQ 3 0
Gross primaryenroilment (%of school-agepopulation) K13 142 ' ---Bosnia andHerzegovina
Male x)4 113
~ Lower-middle-incomegroup
Female K12 in
KEY ECONOMIC RATIOS and LONG-TERM TRENDS
I
1983 1993 2002 2003 Economic ratios"
GDP (US$ billions) 5\.6 7\.0
Gross domesticinvestmentlGDP 20\.4 8\.9
Exportsof goodsandservices/GDP 262 26\.0 Trade
Gross domesticsavings/GDP -13\.4 -42\.5
Gross nationalsavingslGDP
Currentaccount balancelGDP -e\.5 -l7\.4
InterestpaymentslGDP 12 0\.7 Domestic Investment
Total debt/GDP 42\.2 34\.0 savings
Total debt service/exporls 8\.5 7\.8
Presentvalue of debt/GDP
Presentvalue of debt/exports
Indebtedness
1983-93 1993-03 2002 2003 2003-07
(average annualgmwth)
GDP \. 7\.8 3\.9 3\.5 4\.7 ----Bosnia andHerzegovina
GDP percapita 15\.4 2\.4 2\.6 4\.4
Exports of goodsandservices 23\.7 5\.3 lt5 6\.1 ~ Lower-middle-incomeamuo
STRUCTURE of the ECONOMY
1983 1993 2002 2003 1Growth of investment and GDP ( W )
(%of GDP) I
Agriculture 17\.9 6\.7
industry 372 34\.7
Manufacturing 22\.6 21\.0
Services 44\.9 1
48\.6
Privateconsumption 98 99 00 01 02
Generalgovernmentconsumption O3 I
Imports of goodsandservices 59\.2 57\.9 -GDI -GDP
1983-93 1993-03 2002 2003
(avenge annualgmwth) Growth of exports and imports (%)
Agriculture \. 8\.0 b T II
industry \. 26\.2
Manufacturing 17\.0
Services \. 37\.2
Privateconsumption
Generalgovemmentconsumption -20 6
Gross domestic investment 35\.6
importsof goodsand services \. n\.2 -19 13\.6
Note:2003dataarepreliminaryestimates\.Group dataarefor 2002\.
'Thediamonds showfourkeyindicatorsinthecountry(inbold)comparedwith its incomegroup average,Ifdataaremissing,thediamondwiii
beincomolete\.
66
Bosnia and Herzegovina
PRICES and GOVERNMENT FINANCE
1983 1993 2002 2003 Inflation (%)
Domestic prices I
(%change) 15
Consumerprices 0\.3 0\.1 ~: 10
Implicit GDP deflator 2\.1 il
Government finance
(56 of GDP,includes current grants)
Current revenue 48\.1 46\.7 -5 -
Current budget balance 6\.3 4\.5
Overallsurplusldeficit -2\.2 0\.4 -GDP deflator -CPI I
TRADE
1983 1993 2002 2003 I
(US$ millions) I
~ Export and import levels (US$ mill\.)
Total exports (fob) 1,046 1407 15,000 -
Commodity 1
Commodity 2 4,000 *
Manufactures I
Total imports (cif) 3,P2 3,845 ,
Food
Fuelandenergy
Capital goods
Exportprice index(!995=MO) 97 98 99 00 01 02 03
Import price index(?395=M0) Exports Imports
Terms of trade (89540)
BALANCE o f PAYMENTS
1983 1993 2002 2003
(US$ millions) Current account balance t o GDP (%) I
Exports of goods andservices 1,786 2,277
Importsof goods andservices 3,387 4,t32
Resourcebalance -1601 -1855
Netincome 240
Netcurrenttransfers 566 631
Current account balance -1,035 -1224
Financingitems (net) 977 798
Changes in net reserves 58 446 -35 1
Memo: I
Reserves includinggold (US$ millions) 1,4B
Conversion rate (DEC, local/US$) 2\.1 27
EXTERNAL DEBT and RESOURCE FLOWS
1983 1993 2002 2003
(US$ millions) :omposition o f 2003 debt (US$ mill\.]
Total debt outstanding anddisbursed 2,502 2,538
IBRD 424 538 515 G:65
IDA 0 578 61)
Total debt service 150 ?3l
IBRD 0 45 42
IDA 0 4 4
Compositionof net resourceflows
Officialgrants 32
Officialcreditors 70 51
Privatecreditors B -30
Foreigndirect investment
Portfolio equity
W r l d Bank program
Commitments 0 4 - IBRD E- Bilateral
Disbursements 0 97 35 3 - IDA D-Other multilateral F Private
~
Principalrepayments 0 23 23 :-IMF G- Short-term
Netflows 0 74 P
Interestpayments 0 26 23
Net transfers 0 48 -11
Development Economics 51l7104
67
MAP SECTION | APPROVAL |
P121213 | Page 1
PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
APPRAISAL STAGE
Report No\.: 61121
(The report # is automatically generated by IDU and should not be changed)
Project Name
LIBERIA Road Asset Management Project - LIBRAMP
Region
Africa
Country
Liberia
Sector
Transport
Lending Instrument
IDA
Project ID
P121213
Borrower(s)
Government of Liberia
Implementing Agency
Infrastructure Implementation Unit of the Ministry of Public
Works
Environmental Screening
Category
[
]A [X ]B [ ]C [ ]FI [ ]TBD (to be determined)
Date PID Prepared
April 8, 2011
Date of Appraisal Completion
December 24, 2010
Estimated Date of Board
Approval
May 17, 2011
Concept Review Decision
Following the review of the concept, the decision was taken
to proceed with the preparation of the operation\.
I\.
Introduction and Context
Country Context
1\.
Since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2003 that ended the countrys 14-
year civil war, Liberia has made important progress despite the considerable challenges and risks
it faces\. Liberia has maintained political stability since the democratic election in 2005, which
enabled rebuilding of public sector institutions, delivery of essential public services, and
foundation of a local government system\. The country also has sustained strong growth since the
end of its civil war\.
1
2\.
However, Liberia remains one of Africas poorest nations, with its gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita of US$210
2
in 2009\. The new government established in 2006
inherited severely damaged infrastructure and serious challenges in governance and institutional
capacity, which has incessantly posed impediments to the countrys development\. With that
understanding, its first Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) published in March 2008 articulated
the Government of Liberias (GOLs) priorities for re-establishing of basic infrastructure and
institutional strengthening\. In particular, through highly participatory processes, where hundreds
of people across the nation were invited for consultation, the PRS identified rebuilding of the
road network as one of its top priorities\.
3
1
The real GDP has grown at 9\.5 percent in 2007, 7\.1 percent in 2008, and 4\.9 percent in 2009\.
2
Market exchange rate basis; $379 on the basis of purchasing-power-parity (PPP)
3
The Strategy reads: Rebuilding roads
is central to achieving all of the Governments other major objectives,
consolidating peace and security, facilitating inclusion, revitalizing growth throughout the country, building
Page 2
3\.
The World Bank has active
ly supported the GOLs efforts for recovery since the war
ended, particularly in the areas of the PRS priorities through its International Development
Association (IDA) resources\. The Bank also has led donor coordination, fostering collaboration
across sectors and administering a multi-donor trust fund, the Liberia Reconstruction Trust Fund
(LRTF)\. Combining funds from IDA and LRTF, more than US$300 million has been invested in
or committed for rebuilding of transport infrastructure\. The proposed Liberia Road Asset
Management Project (LIBRAMP), which will be co-funded by the LRTF, the GOL and IDA,
will address the PRS key priorities and synergize the collective impacts of previous investments,
by repairing and securing maintenance of an important link of the countrys road network\.
4\.
At the last Country Portfolio Performance Review (CPPR), both the GOL and the Bank
shared a common assessment that the country is gradually but surely moving out of an
emergency recovery situation to a normal development path, albeit with various challenges\. It
also noted that, once out of emergency status, higher standards will be required for
implementation of development policy and projects\. The GOL needs to have greater country
ownership in planning, managing and supervising its investment, and to develop and sustain its
institutional capacity, building upon the experience and lessons learned during this transition
period\.
Sectoral and Institutional Context
5\.
During the war the extensive destruction of basic infrastructure, coupled with a lack of
maintenance, contributed to the collapse of productive activities and a reversion essentially to a
subsistence economy\. In the transport sector, a vast majority of the countrys 10,000 km of
existing roads were in extreme disrepair and often impassable during the rainy season\. In
addition, the airport and seaport had become dilapidated and operations were poorly organized,
severely hampering international commerce\.
6\.
The countrys overall transport policy is guided by the National Transport Policy and
Strategy (NTPS) prepared by the government in 2008 with support of the Bank\. Adapting
international good practices to the particulars of Liberia
4
,
the NTPS set out the medium and long
term goals for the road sector\. They include (i) institutional formulation pursuing creation of an
autonomous road authority with adequate staffing and financial capacities; (ii) innovative use of
contracting techniques and partnerships with the private sector to facilitate long-term
preservation of road assets; and (iii) establishment of effective maintenance strategy through
participation by local enterprises and communities, as well as innovative contracting methods\.
The recommended investment framework implies a cost of about US$1 billion to reestablish the
countrys basic roads and bridges network\.
7\.
In order to improve capacity in the road sector, the government has put forward a
comprehensive framework for implementation of donor funded projects\. A Special
Implementation Unit (SIU) was established under the MPW as a Project Implementation Unit
(PIU) for the IDA and other donor-financed infrastructure projects across the sector in early
strong systems for local governance, promoting physical access to security and legal institutions, and making public
and other services accessible to all Liberians\.
4
The key particulars of Liberia include (i) severely deteriorated and long unattended infrastructure, (ii) fewer
workable construction days limited by a long and intense rainy season, and (iii) difficulty in attracting reputable
engineering companies and contractors due to the recent history of conflict and inadequate business infrastructure\.
Page 3
2006\. The SIU was transformed subsequently into a self-standing Infrastructure Implementation
Unit (IIU), with greater decision-making authority in 2009 under the new leadership of an
internationally-hired Program Director\.
8\.
The proposed LIBRAMP will strongly support t
he
road sectors endeavor to achieve the
NTPS objectives\. The Project will not only rehabilitate a strategically important road corridor
that is severely destroyed, but also maintain it at desirable service levels for a 10-year period\.
The road corridor connects the capital city to areas with great agricultural and natural resource
potentials and provides direct linkage to neighboring Guinea\. In addition, the Project will also
finance needed institutional capacity building in areas of planning, monitoring and project
management in the road sector\. LIBRAMPs large scale and long-term perspective will be both
an opportunity and a test for the IIU to capitalize on its recent experience and current resources
and to step up to the next level in managing on-going projects, and ultimately, the countrys road
network\.
Relationship to CAS
9\.
In 2009, the IDA, IFC and AfDB jointly prepared the Country Assistance Strategy
(CAS)\. The CAS recognized and responded to governments core strategic areas of intervention
as identified in the PRS, which include peace and security, economic revitalization,
strengthening governance and the rule of law, and infrastructure and basic services\. Fully aligned
with these core areas, the CAS sets out its three strategic themes: (i) rebuilding core state
functions and institutions; (ii) rehabilitating infrastructure to jump-start economic growth; and
(iii) facilitating pro-poor growth\.
10\.
Funded by LRTF, IDA and by governments own resources, the proposed LIBRAMP is
aligned with the CAS\. In light of the above three strategic themes of the CAS, rehabilitation of
infrastructure and long-term management and preservation of the assetthe core of the
LIBRAMP projectis viewed as the necessary precursor for reviving and sustaining economic
development, delivering basic services, and hence, improving social conditions\.
II\.
Project Development Objective(s) (PDO)
11\.
The Project will aim to reduce transport costs along the road corridor from Monrovia to
the Guinea border and to maintain the road in good condition over a 10-year period through
output and performance-based road management\.
Key Results
12\.
Achievement of the above development objectives will be measured in terms of the
following results indicators:
a) Transport costs borne by road users, including vehicle operating costs and monetary
value of travel time (measured through roughness, IRI rate in m/km);
b) Roads in good and fair condition as a share of total classified roads (percentage);
c) Direct project beneficiaries(number), of which female (percentage);
d) Share of rural population with access to an all-season road (proportion)\.
Page 4
III\. Project
Description
13\. The project consists of the following two components\.
Component 1
Design, Rehabilitation and Maintenance of Monrovia-Ganta-Guinea Border
Road (249 km)
14\.
This component will finance a 10-year Output and Performance-based Road Contracts
(OPRC) for the above-mentioned road improvement\. This road is vital to the nations
reconstruction, connecting four of the countrys five largest cities
5
and providing cross-border
connection\. Current surface condition of the road corridor varies by section, with the
northernmost 70 kilometers in the worst condition\. In that segment, 68 km need full
reconstruction in the existing right-of-way, and the final 2 km from Ganta to the Guinea border
will consist of a two-lane road upgrade of an unpaved road\.
Component 2 Consulting Services, Operating Costs, and Training
15\.
This component will finance a consultancy service by a firm that will perform as a
Monitoring Consultant (MC) for the above OPRC and it will also finance the needed technical
assistance for preparatory road feasibility studies and the development of sector institutions
through hiring of skilled staff and firms, and staff training programs including the operating
costs\.
16\.
Based on the preliminary specifications for the technical options, the total cost of the
LIBRAMP is estimated at US$249\.4 million\. The proposed IDA contribution is for $58\.3
million\. The Oversight Committee (OC) of the LRTF approved the project concept and
committed $113 million to finance this project through contributions and pledges received from
the Governments of Germany, Sweden, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Norway, the European
Commission, and the World Bank\. Administrative Agreements have been revised and signed in
September 2010, reflecting these commitments\. The Recipient will provide the remaining
counter-part funding of US$78\.1 million\.
IV\.
Safeguard Policies that might apply
Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project
Yes No
TBD
Environmental Assessment
(
OP
/
BP
4\.01) X
Natural Habitats (
OP
/
BP
4\.04)
X
Pest Management (
OP 4\.09
)
X
Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4\.11)
X
Involuntary Resettlement (
OP
/
BP
4\.12) X
Indigenous Peoples (
OP/BP
4\.10)
X
Forests (
OP
/
BP
4\.36)
X
Safety of Dams (
OP
/
BP
4\.37)
X
Projects in Disputed Areas (
OP
/
BP
7\.60)
X
Projects on International Waterways (
OP
/
BP
7\.50)
X
5
Liberias largest urban settlements and their populations are: Monrovia (1,010,970), Ganta (41,106), Buchanan
(34,270), Gbarnga (34,046), Kakata (33,945)\.
Page 5
V\. Tentative
financing
Source:
($m\.)
Borrower/Recipient 78\.1
IDA 58\.3
Others (specify) Liberia Reconstruction Trust Fund 113\.0
Total 249\.4
VI\. Contact
point
World Bank
Contact: Emmanuel A\. James
Title:
Program Coordinator
Tel:
202-458-2585
Email: ejames1@worldbank\.org
Borrower/Client/Recipient
The Republic of Liberia Ministry of Finance
Implementing Agency
Infrastructure Implementat\. Unit of the Min\. of Public Works
Contact: Akindele
Beckley
Title:
Program
Director
Tel:
+231-6-579-053/
+231-6-516-732
Email:
akindelebeckley444@hotmail\.com
VII\.
For more information contact:
The InfoShop
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 458-4500
Fax: (202) 522-1500
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/infoshop | APPROVAL |
P125630 |  DOCUMENTO DE INFORMAÃÃO DO PROJETO (DIP)
ESTÃ?GIO DE AVALIAÃÃO
Relatório nº: AB6548
Financiamento adicional para o Projeto de Redução dos impactos
TÃtulo do projeto ambientais do Sistema Ferroviário Metropolitano do Rio de
Janeiro
Região AMÃRICA LATINA E CARIBE
Setor Setor de transportes (100%)
ID do Projeto P125630
Mutuário(s) ESTADO DO RIO DE JANEIRO
Agência Implementadora CENTRAL â Companhia Estadual de Engenharia de Transportes e
LogÃstica
Categoria ambiental [ ] A [X] B [ ] C [ ] FI [ ] TBD (a ser determinado)
Data de preparação do 6 de outubro de 2011
DIP
Data de avaliação/ 24 de outubro de 2011 (previsão)
autorização
Data de aprovação pela 20 de dezembro de 2011
Diretoria
1\. Antecedentes do paÃs e do setor
O financiamento adicional em questão e o projeto do qual se origina são resultado de dois
grandes acontecimentos em nÃvel federal e estadual: (a) a descentralização do Sistema
Ferroviário Metropolitano do Rio de Janeiro, transferido da esfera federal para o Governo do
Estado, em dezembro de 1994, no contexto de um empréstimo do Banco à época (Ln\.3633- BR);
e (b) a decisão do governo empossado em janeiro de 1995 de integrar de maneira mais eficaz
todos os meios de transporte da Região Metropolitana do Rio de Janeiro (RMRJ), de reduzir os
subsÃdios aos órgãos de transporte urbano e de aumentar substancialmente a participação e os
investimentos da iniciativa privada no setor\.
Em 1998, o Banco auxiliou o Estado no programa de privatização multissetorial que incluiu a
concessão do transporte ferroviário metropolitano e do sistema metroviário a um concessionário
privado por meio do Projeto de Reforma do Estado e Privatização (P039197, Ln\.4211-BR)\. A
concessão foi adjudicada ao consórcio SuperVia â nome pelo qual a rede passou a ser conhecida\.
Estado e concessionária assumiram responsabilidades especÃficas definidas claramente em
contrato que se traduziram em melhorias no serviço\. O Estado responsabilizou-se pela renovação
da frota de trens, enquanto a concessionária ficou encarregada de realizar melhorias na pista e
nos sistemas de sinalização, modernização de algumas estações, compra de novas composições e
operação e manutenção da rede, mediante remuneração através de , uma tarifa definida em
contrato, reajustada anualmente, após aprovação da agência reguladora (AGETRANS)\. O
projeto subsequente do Banco (Rio de Janeiro Mass Transit Project â PET 2, P043421, Ln\.
4291- BR) financiou uma parte dos compromissos assumidos pelo Estado no contrato de
concessão, com a aquisição de 20 novos trens e a reforma de trens existentes na rede\. Em 2009,
foi aprovada nova operação do Banco (Rio de Janeiro Mass Transit Project â PET 2, P111996,
Ln\. 7719 -BR ) financiando a compra de 34 novos trens\. O presente financiamento adicional está
vinculado a essa última operação\. O número de passageiros vem crescendo consistentemente
desde 1998, graças ao aumento da qualidade do serviço, que atingiu 530 mil viagens em dias
úteis em 2010\. Outro dado importante é que os subsÃdios estaduais para financiar a operações do
sistema, cerca de 121 milhões de dólares por ano em 1997, foram zerados\. Atualmente, os
governos Estadual e municipais estão desenvolvendo uma agenda de projetos, planos e
intervenções na área de transportes, entre eles: (i) Um novo Plano Diretor de Transporte Urbano
(PDTU), (ii) Ampliação e melhorias no Metrô do Rio, (iii) o Bilhete Ãnico Intermunicipal
(BUI), (iv) o Bilhete Ãnico Carioca (BUC), (v) quatro corredores de sistemas de ônibus de alta
capacidade (BRT), e (vi) o Racionalização ou Serviços de Ãnibus (BRS)\.
Hoje com 11,3 milhões de habitantes, a RMRJ é a segunda maior região metropolitana do Brasil
e registra, em média, 20 milhões de viagens por semana\. Desse total, cerca de um terço são
realizadas em transporte não motorizado, aproximadamente a metade em transporte público (TP)
e o resto (um sexto) em meios de transporte individuais\. No entanto, a participação do transporte
individual vem aumentando, em detrimento das viagens em transporte público e não motorizado\.
Em Rio de Janeiro, a frota vem crescendo a um ritmo de 7% ao ano, enquanto a população
registra Ãndice de 1,1 por cento\. Esse crescimento acarreta um aumento no Ãndice de motorização
na RMRJ\. A malha metropolitana de trens, operada pela SuperVia, representa cerca de 2% d as
viagens totais, menos de 4% de todas as viagens motorizadas e menos de 5% d as viagens em
meios de transporte públicos\.
2\. Objetivos
O presente projeto tem como objetivos: a) melhorar o nÃvel dos serviços prestados aos usuários
de trens metropolitanos na RMRJ, primando pela segurança e eficiência; b) assegurar que o
sistema ferroviário metropolitano, particularmente o corredor D\. PedroâDeodoro, cresça com
emissões cada vez menores de carbono; e c) melhorar a gestão e o marco de polÃticas públicas do
setor de transportes na RMRJ\.
3\. Justificativa para a participação do Banco
a) A proposta de financiamento adicional e de reestruturação do Projeto adéqua-se perfeitamente
à lógica de envolvimento do Banco com o Brasil e com o Estado do Rio de Janeiro\. O projeto e
seus objetivos de desenvolvimento revisados são totalmente consistentes com a Estratégia do
Banco de Parceria com o PaÃs (EPC), ratificada em maio de 2010, e com a futura Estratégia de
Parceria, que está em fase de elaboração e será submetida em breve à aprovação do Conselho\. A
EPC em elaboração, particularmente, dá ênfase à necessidade de uma maior integração entre
polÃticas públicas de transporte, desenvolvimento urbano, habitação e gestão de riscos de
desastres\. A nova EPC também busca incentivar a implementação a nÃvel municipal de planos de
ação para um crescimento com baixa emissão de carbono e para mitigar as mudanças climáticas\.
O projeto proposto compreende elementos de todas essas áreas\.
b) O financiamento adicional proposto e o projeto do qual se originou estão alinhados com a
estratégia global de transporte do Banco e com a estratégia setorial formulada especificamente
para o Brasil no que se refere a: (i) melhorar o transporte público nas áreas urbanas, como forma
de facilitar o acesso ao emprego, à educação e aos serviços de saúde; (ii) contribuir para a
redução da pobreza; e (iii) aumentar o desempenho financeiro dos prestadores de serviços
melhorando a recuperação do investimento e reduzindo a dependência de subsÃdios públicos\.
c ) O financiamento adicional em questão e o projeto de origem representam a continuidade do
apoio do Banco à descentralização geral dos sistemas de transporte urbano, da esfera federal para
os Governos dos respectivos Estados, como no caso de São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Ceará e Bahia\.
Mais especificamente, trata-se da sequência lógica ao compromisso a longo prazo assumido com
o Estado, de consolidar e ampliar seus sistemas de transporte ferroviário, contemplando
importantes questões, como a integração intermodal e a implementação de uma polÃtica tarifária
sensata, que recupere investimentos e atinja metas sociais\.
4\. Descrição
O projeto proposto compreende os seguintes componentes:
(PARTE A): Infraestrutura e equipamentos:
A\.1 Aquisição de pelo menos 60 (sessenta) novos trens-unidade elétricos (TUE), com quatro
(4) carros cada e acessórios, totalizando pelo menos 376 carros a serem operados nas linhas da
CENTRAL pela concessionária (SuperVia), nos termos do Contrato da Concessionária\.
A\.2 Projeto demonstrativo para potencializar a redução de emissões de carbono causada pelo
Projeto, por meio da promoção do uso de bicicletas e/ou da implementação de medidas de
eficiência energética\.
(PARTE B): Desenvolvimento institucional e de polÃticas públicas
B\.1 Prestação de assistência técnica à SETRANS para a realização de estudos adicionais
sobre desenvolvimento de polÃticas públicas, incluindo, mas não se limitando, a: (a) formulação
de uma PolÃtica de Transporte Sustentável para o Estado do Rio de Janeiro, que contemple
medidas voltadas para a redução dos nÃveis de carbono emitido pelo sistema de transporte e para
melhorar a sustentabilidade ambiental e social; (b) elaboração e implementação de estratégia
para adaptar os sistemas de transporte e de trânsito da RMRJ aos impactos das mudanças
climáticas, dos riscos e passivos ambientais e sociais e dos desastres naturais de todos os tipos
(p\.ex\., maiores Ãndices pluviométricos); (c) formação e implementação de um centro de
monitoramento de impactos dos desastres naturais no sistema de trânsito metropolitano, inclusive
daqueles decorrentes de impactos das mudanças climáticas; em coordenação com o Núcleo de
Prevenção e Análise de Desastres Geológicos e com o Centro de Gestão de Riscos Geológicos;
(d) elaboração de estratégia para melhorar a eficiência e reduzir as emissões de carbono, os
riscos e passivos ambientais e sociais do sistema de transporte de carga do Estado; (e) estudo de
viabilidade e projeto de engenharia detalhado para possÃvel implantação de corredor de BRT na
RMRJ (Niterói-São Gonçalo); (f) criação e análise de banco de dados sobre acidentes, para
aumentar a segurança do sistema de transporte; e (g) aperfeiçoamento da estratégia da
SETRANS de realização de consultas com stakeholders, à luz do amplo espectro de reformas
que vêm ocorrendo no setor\.
B\.2 Prestação de assistência técnica à CENTRAL na gestão e supervisão de projetos,
inclusive na aquisição e recebimento dos trens (TUEs)\.
5\. Financiamento
Fonte Valor Total (US $m)
Custo total do Projeto: 600
Contrapartida:
Mutuário: 0
Financiamento total pelo Banco:
BIRD 600
IDA
Novo
Renovação
6\. Implementação
A Secretaria de Estado de Transportes do Rio de Janeiro (SETRANS) é o principal órgão do
Governo responsável pelo Projeto\. A CENTRAL é a agência implementadora e se reporta Ã
SETRANS\. O mutuário, o Estado do Rio de Janeiro, delegará a implementação do Projeto Ã
CENTRAL\. O Grupo de Implementação da Gestão do Projeto (GIGP), que ficará sediado na
CENTRAL, será responsável pela implementação dos componentes do projeto\. O GIGP será
chefiado pelo Coordenador do Projeto, que prestará contas diretamente ao Diretor responsável
pela sua implementação\. O GIGP será integrado por pessoal do quadro da CENTRAL e contará
com o apoio de consultores em gestão e supervisão de projetos, que serão responsáveis pela
assistência técnica em áreas como engenharia, aquisições, meio ambiente e gestão financeira\. A
CENTRAL tem experiência considerável com o referido GIGP, acumulada em projetos, em
curso ou já executados, com financiamento do Banco\. Os relatórios de progresso do Projeto
serão elaborados semestralmente pela GIGP e consolidados em um relatório único, que será
submetido ao Banco para análise\.
7\. Sustentabilidade
A sustentabilidade dos resultados do projeto dependerá de: (i) priorização e compromisso
contÃnuos da administração pública do Estado para com o setor de transporte urbano; (ii)
realização e financiamento de atividades de recuperação e manutenção no prazo necessário para
manter a infraestrutura e os equipamentos em boas condições; (iii) otimização da rede de ônibus
e controle das vans informais; e ( iv) manutenção e ampliação da área de cobertura da Tarifa
Integrada entre Modais (como o Bilhete-Ãnico Integrado e o Bilhete-Ãnico Carioca), que
beneficiam, sobretudo, a população de baixa renda\. O Estado tem se demonstrado empenhado no
projeto e no desenvolvimento do setor na última década, dando prioridade a investimentos na
área, mesmo em perÃodos de restrições orçamentárias\. O o financiamento da recuperação de
infraestrutura e equipamentos foi afetado durante perÃodos de restrição orçamentária, mas nem
por isso o Estado deixou de aplicar os recursos necessários para manter a infraestrutura e o
material rodante, ou de buscar mecanismos para prover os fundos\.
8\. Lições aprendidas em operações anteriores no paÃs/setor
As principais lições aprendidas com projetos anteriores no setor de transporte urbano foram:
⢠Em São Paulo, os projetos de transporte urbano demonstraram que a coordenação entre as
esferas estadual e municipal é fundamental no planejamento de médio e longo prazo e na
implementação de um sistema verdadeiramente integrado do ponto de vista tanto dos
modais como das tarifas;
⢠A polÃtica para o setor deve ser fortalecida para minimizar as distorções resultantes da
ineficiente coordenação fÃsica e financeira entre os modais e para promover a integração
multimodal;
⢠Os nÃveis tarifários devem contribuir para uma recuperação significativa dos custos e ser
complementados com mecanismos de financiamento para cobrir eventuais déficits;
⢠Estimativas de demanda projetados pelos mutuários devem ser cuidadosamente
escrutinados;
⢠Conforme demonstrou o projeto de transporte urbano de Salvador, deve-se garantir que
haja disponibilidade de fundos de contrapartida e margem para manobras no orçamento,
para evitar atrasos que encareçam as obras;
⢠As lições aprendidas no primeiro empréstimo para o Programa Estadual de Transportes
do Rio de Janeiro foram que os fundos de contrapartida devem ser minimizados e que o
Estado deve priorizar recursos para o projeto, mesmo em tempos de restrições
orçamentária, para evitar atrasos custosos na entrega das obras e dos trens; e que uma
combinação entre tarifas integradas entre modais e novos trens equipados com ar-
condicionado eleva substancialmente a procura\. Além disso, que são necessárias medidas
duras para coibir o transporte ilegal e racionalizar as redes de ônibus\.
9\. PolÃticas de salvaguarda (inclusive consulta pública)
PolÃticas de salvaguarda acionadas Sim Não
Avaliação ambiental (OP/BP 4\.01) X
Habitats naturais (OP/BP 4\.04) X
Florestas (OP/BP 4\.36) X
Manejo de pragas (OP 4\.09) X
Recursos fÃsicos e culturais (OP/BP 4\.11) X
Povos indÃgenas (OP/BP 4\.10) X
Reassentamento involuntário (OP/BP 4\.12) X
{Segurança de barragens (OP/BP 4\.37) X
Projetos em águas internacionais (OP/BP 7\.50) X
Projetos em áreas sob disputa (OP/BP 7\.60) X
10\. Relação de documentos técnicos relativos ao projeto
⢠Banco Mundial\. 2011\. Documento do Programa para o Projeto Urbano e Habitacional
Metropolitano do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (P122391), Relatório Nº 58277\.
⢠Neri, M\. 2010\. âImpactos Sociais do Bilhete Ãnico Intermunicipal no Grande Rio\.â?
www\.fgv\.br/cps/bu
⢠Secretaria Municipal de Transporte (Rio de Janeiro): âO Transporte Moderno que o Rio
Merece Começa Agora\.â? Apresentação em Power Point\. Abril de 2011\.
⢠SETRANS, Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio, CGPU, âMaracanã-Engenhão: Proposta de
Intervenção UrbanÃstica para requalificação dos Corredores Viários de conexão com os
Estádios\.â? Apresentação em Power Point\. Junho de 2010\.
⢠Gouvello, C\. 2010\. âBrazil Low-carbon Country Case Studyâ?
⢠World Bank\. 2011\. âMainstreaming Green Trucks in Brazilâ? which is part of the âBrazil
Green Freight Transport Report\.â? P123713
⢠Banco Mundial\. 2011\. âGreen Cities: Cities and Climate Change in Brazilâ?
⢠Governo do Rio de Janeiro\. Secretaria de Transportes\. Carta Consulta\. Estudo de
Viabilidade Técnico Econômico e Social\. Fevereiro de 2011\.
⢠Prefeitura do Rio\. O Transporte Moderno que o Rio Merece\. Apresentação em
Power Point
11\. Contatos:
Contato: Arturo Ardila Gomez
Cargo: Especialista Sênior em Transporte Urbano
Tel: (202) 473-5861
Fax: (202)676-9594
E-mail: aardilagomez@worldbank\.org
Destinação: Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Brasil
Ãrgão Responsável: CENTRAL - Companhia Estadual de Engenharia de Transportes e LogÃstica
Contato: Jairo Favario, PMIG Coordenador
Tel: (5521) 3816-6457
Fax: (5521) 3816-6459
E-mail: jlfavario@central\.rj\.gov\.br
12\. Para mais informações, queira contatar:
The InfoShop
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Tel: (202) 458-4500
Fax: (202) 522-1500
E-mail: pic@worldbank\.org
Site: http://www\.worldbank\.org/infoshop | APPROVAL |
P131202 | Document of
The World Bank
Report No: NCO00003591
NOTE ON CANCELLED OPERATION REPORT
(IBRD-82650)
ON A
LOAN
IN THE AMOUNT OF
US$ 6\.4 MILLION EQUIVALENT
TO THE
THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON
FOR A
MOBILE INTERNET ECOSYSTEM PROJECT
December 1, 2015
Transport and ICT Global Practice
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria Country Management Unit
Middle East and North Africa Region
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective December 1, 2015)
Currency Unit = Lebanese Pound (LBP)
LBP 1505\.5 = $1
$0\.0007 = LBP 1
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 â December 31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
CD Country Director
CMU Country Management Unit
COM Council of Ministers
CPS Country Partnership Strategy
ENoLL European Network of Living Labs
FPMT Financial and Procurement Management Team
FPPM Financial and Procurement Project Manager
GDP Gross domestic product
GoL Government of Lebanon
IBRD International Bank of Reconstruction and Development
ICT Information communication technologies
IT Information Technology
ITES Information Technology Enabled Services
KWBPF Korean World Bank Partnership Facility
LA Loan Agreement
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MENA Middle East North Africa (Region)
MICs Mobile Internet competitions
MiHub Mobile Innovation Hub
MoT Ministry of Telecommunications
MoF Ministry of Finance
NOC Notification of Cancellation
PAD Project Appraisal Document
PDO Project development objective
WB World Bank Group
Vice President: Hafez M\. H\. Ghanem
Country Director: Ferid Belhaj
Sector Manager: Boutheina Guermazi
Project Team Leader: Victor Mulas
NCO Team Leader: Cecilia Paradi-Guilford
REPUBLIC OF LEBANON
Mobile Internet Ecosystem Project
CONTENTS
Data Sheet
A\. Basic Information
B\. Key Dates
C\. Ratings Summary
D\. Sector and Theme Codes
E\. Bank Staff
F\. Ratings of Program Performance in ISRs
1\. Context, Project Development Objectives, and Design \. 1
2\. Post-Approval Experience and Reasons for Cancellation \. 7
3\. Assessment of Bank Performance \. 10
4\. Assessment of Borrower Performance \. 11
5\. Lessons Learned \. 12
Annex 1\. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes \. 14
Annex 2\. List of Supporting Documents \. 16
Annex 3\. Information on the KWPF and SSKE funds for Lebanonâ¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦\.18
A\. Basic Information
LB: Mobile Internet
Country: Lebanon Project Name: Ecosystem Project
(MIEP)
Project ID: P131202 L/C/TF Number(s): IBRD-82650
NCO Date: 08/27/2015
GOVERNMENT OF
Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower:
LEBANON
Original Total
USD 6\.40M Disbursed Amount: USD 0\.00M
Commitment:
Revised Amount: USD 6\.40M
Environmental Category: C
Implementing Agencies:
Ministry of Telecommunications
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:
B\. Key Dates
Revised / Actual
Process Date Process Original Date
Date(s)
Concept Review: 05/10/2012 Effectiveness: 10/30/2015
Appraisal: 09/27/2012 Closing: 12/31/2017 August 23, 2015
Approval: 07/31/2013
C\. Ratings Summary
Performance Rating by NCO
Outcomes: Not Applicable
Risk to Development Outcome: Not Applicable
Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory
Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory
D\. Sector and Theme Codes
Original
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Information technology 80
Telecommunications 20
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Education for the knowledge economy 61
e-Services 39
E\. Bank Staff
Positions At NCO At Approval
Vice President: Hafez M\. H\. Ghanem Inger Andersen
Country Director: Ferid Belhaj Ferid Belhaj
Practice
Boutheina Guermazi Randeep Sudan
Manager/Manager:
Project Team Leader: Victor Mulas Victor Mulas
NCO Team Leader: Cecilia Paradi-Guilford
F\. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
Actual
Date ISR
No\. DO IP Disbursements
Archived
(USD millions)
Moderately
1 12/24/2013 Unsatisfactory 0\.00
Unsatisfactory
Moderately
2 06/20/2014 Unsatisfactory 0\.00
Unsatisfactory
Moderately
3 01/14/2015 Unsatisfactory 0\.00
Unsatisfactory
Moderately
4 04/15/2015 Unsatisfactory 0\.00
Unsatisfactory
1\. Context, Project Development Objectives, and Design
Country context:
1\. Lebanon is a small and densely populated upper middle-income country, with an average
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of US$9,413 (2011)\.1 The population of Lebanon is
around 4\.5 million, with a large first- and second-generation diaspora\. More than 87 percent of
the resident population lives in urban areas, with more than half in the capital city of Beirut\. The
population is relatively young, with youth under the age of 14 representing 25\.8 percent of the
population\.
2\. Lebanon is surrounded by countries that are affected by conflict and political violence,
which impact the countryâs political system and economy\. The Syrian conflict has persisted since
2012, unleashing a full-blown humanitarian crisis in the region\. It has led to a mass exodus of the
population, with Lebanon receiving the greatest number of Syrian refugees\. Regional security
has been further undermined by the emergence of ISIS, operating across Syria and Iraq\. The
Israeli-Palestinian conflict also prevails to the South of Lebanon, with escalations since 2014 and
tension along the border between Israel and Lebanon continues\.
3\. Despite these adversities, the country is recognized regionally for its strong education
system and its multilingual and educated entrepreneurial population\. With literacy rates above 90
percent, and gross tertiary enrollment of 54 percent, the countryâs young graduates represent a
competitive talent pool\. It is considered a regional leader in the creative media and financial
industries, producing high-quality film, music, fashion, architecture, advertising, and design\. The
country was ranked 89 out of 142 in the 2012 World Economic Forum Competitiveness report
that recognizes Lebanonâs strong scores on education indicators and its entrepreneurial
economy\.2
4\. Nonetheless, Lebanon suffers from high youth unemployment and increasing competition
from the region\. Lebanonâs unemployment rateâparticularly youth and female unemploymentâ
is high (34 percent youth unemployment, 18 percent female unemployment, and 11 percent total
unemployment based on 2013 World Bank data) and the country faces challenges such as talent
migration which is endemic and a priority to development in the World Bank Groupâs (WB)
Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for Lebanon for FY11-14, as well as insufficient creation of
quality jobs for youth as highlighted in the Lebanon Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for
FY16-FY21\. Lebanon faces tough competition from other economies in the region (such as the
lower cost Cairo, or the better equipped Dubai) that have attracted large portions of foreign direct
investment, as well as a share of Lebanonâs most creative people\.
5\. Therefore the prospect of creating a mobile Internet ecosystem in Lebanon offers the
possibility of transformational effects on the countryâs labor market that include greater
geographic diversification, improved growth, and increased retention of skilled workers\. With
1
All dollars are in United States dollars unless otherwise indicated\.
2
World Economic Forum, Competitiveness Report, 2012\.
1
mobile technology well distributed across Lebanon, such an ecosystem can create new economic
opportunities in regions that have long been economically marginalized\. Fostering investment
and capital accumulation in new and innovative sectors that use existing domestic human
resources and skills can help unleash Lebanonâs potential for growth and over the long-term shift
the economy towards a more sustainable growth model\.
Sectoral Context:
6\. In the past, the World Bank has assisted the Ministry of Telecommunications (MoT) of
Lebanon which is the leading government institution in the telecommunications sector through
non-lending technical assistance as well as grants\. These activities consisted in analyzing policy
options and providing technical support for the strengthening of infrastructure, particularly for
the 3G network\.
7\. Wireless service in Lebanon is provided by two mobile network operators, Alfa
(previously France Telecom Mobile Liban) and Touch Lebanon (previously LibanCell), with
48\.1 and 51\.9 percent market share respectively\. Both operators are state-owned, but managed
by private operators on renewable contracts\. Mobile services in Lebanon are provided by Alfa
and MTC Touch over the government owned networks\. Both operators launched 3G/HSPA
services in October 2011, followed by 4G LTE networks more recently â however 4G is yet been
deployed nationwide\. Current wireless penetration is 91\.8 percent\.3 Fixed broadband services in
Lebanon were provided by the incumbent telecommunications provider, Ogero, which has a 90
percent market share, while the other players share the remaining 10 percent\. As of June 2015,
there were 391,000 fixed broadband subscribers, corresponding to a 32\.9 percent penetration of
households, below the average penetration in the region (38\.2 percent), and far below the
average penetration in GDP per capita (89\.2 percent)\.4
8\. Lebanonâs innovation in information communication technologies (ICT) has been
concentrated in the development of new business opportunities and a growing startup ecosystem\.
These include Lebanonâs first technology incubator, Berytech 5 , launched in 2001, the Bader
Young Entrepreneurs6 program and Lebanon for Entrepreneurs7, AltCity8 and Coworking9619,
which have all supported aspiring entrepreneurs and startups\. The âBeirut Digital Districtâ
initiative led by the Ministry of Telecommunications was launched in 2012 to provide the
infrastructure to cluster the ICT industry in four buildings, with a total surface of 15,000 square
meters with state-of-the-art facilities and high-speed fiber-optic connections\.10 The Beirut-based
ArabNet 11 and Wamda 12 , have successfully built a forum and network across the startup
3
www\.telegeography\.com
4
www\.telegeography\.com
5
www\.berytech\.org
6
www\.Baderlebanon\.com
7
www\.Lfepartnerships\.com
8
www\.Altcity\.me
9
www\.coworking961\.com
10
http://beirutdigitaldistrict\.com/
11
www\.arabnet\.me
2
ecosystem in the region\. 2015 also saw the launch of the UK Tech Hub 13 , the Speed 14
accelerator as well as the operations of Flat6 Labs15 in the country\.
9\. To ease the financial barriers to growth of this startup ecosystem and spur its
development to support job creation in the country, the Central Bank issued Circular 331 in
August 2013\. The Circular injected US$400 million into the economy to boost startup funding
and support services\. This significantly contributed to the reduction of financial constraints that
startups had faced in Lebanon\.16
10\. This, mostly organically developing startup ecosystem, supported by the GoL through the
reduction in barriers to access finance, has resulted in the emergence of a rich and dynamic
startup community\.17 However, the impact on domestic job creation and brain drain prevention
still remains to be assessed\.
11\. Stakeholders within the mobile Internet and innovation ecosystem highlight that there are
still certain constraints that impede the industry from leapfrogging to become a regional leader:
(a) insufficient specialized talents and skills available within Lebanon18 given the brain drain the
country faces; (b) lack of collaboration and exposure of the ecosystem to international markets
and best practices; and (c) deficiencies within the enabling environment related to regulation and
infrastructure\. Furthermore, although this startup ecosystem is rich in terms of efforts to support
the creation and growth of Lebanese startups, it lacks sufficient coordination, which limits scale-
up opportunities\.
Rationale for Bank assistance and Development Objectives
12\. Based on the World Bank Groupâs CPS for Lebanon for FY11-14 19 and the
Governmentâs latest Economic and Social Reform Action Plan (Private Sector Development,
Infrastructure and Human Development Pillars), the MOT requested a four-year project to
promote innovation and entrepreneurship within the mobile internet field\.
13\. The projectâs development objective, as described in the project appraisal document and
Loan Agreement, was to strengthen innovation and entrepreneurship in the Lebanese mobile
Internet ecosystem\.20
12
www\.wamda\.com
13
www\.uklebhub\.com
14
www\.speedlebanon\.com
15
www\.flat6lab\.com
16
Wamda research Lab, Country Insights, September 2015\.
http://www\.bdl\.gov\.lb/circulars/intermediary/5/37/0/Intermediate-Circulars\.html
17
http://www\.executive-magazine\.com/getarticle\.php?article=15228
18
Lebanon ranking in the ITU ICT Skill Index, which captures ICT capacity or skills in the country, has declined
from the 57th position in 2008 to the 62 position in 2010 out of 152 countries (âMeasuring the Information Society,â
ITU, 2011)\.
19
Report 54690-LB
20
The network of institutions and organizations in the public and private sectors, whose activities and interactions
initiate, import, modify, and diffuse new products, services, and technologies in the mobile Internet sector\.
3
14\. The project aimed to address identified market failures by: (a) supporting the
development of entrepreneurship and engineering skills and talent among young people,
(b) providing incentives for young entrepreneurs to remain in Lebanon, (c) reinforcing and
advancing the regional competitiveness of Lebanonâs core creative and finance industries,
(d) strengthening the capacity of Lebanonâs universities as centers of innovation and excellence,
and (e) linking Lebanonâs young talent and businesses to regional and global markets \. The
project aimed to provide specific training and mentorship to women-owned startups, and
leverage the higher education level of Lebanonâs female workers\.
Project Description, Components and Financing
15\. The project aimed to strengthen innovation and entrepreneurship in the mobile Internet
ecosystem through three components targeting the specific needs of this industry, in order to
develop international competitiveness:
16\. Component 1- Skills Development and Attraction of Talent (US$1\.75 million by IBRD,
US$1\.75 million by the GoL) would focus on increasing entrepreneurial skills and practical
training of the Lebanese talent pool to enhance its competitiveness in the industry\. The
subcomponents to be financed under Component 1 were:
1\.1 A series of Mobile Internet Competitions (MICs) with a program of structured skills
and capacity-building that would have included a training program to address mobile
Internet programming and entrepreneurship and problem-solving skills, and a mentorship
and international exchange program for entrepreneurs;
1\.2 A university-industry platform, where all universities in Lebanon could participate in
a mobile Internet industry internship program and in a learning module consisting of co-
creation (university students-industry) of mobile Internet projects\.
17\. Component 2 - Strengthening and Growth of the Mobile Internet Industry (US$2\.90
million by IBRD, US$2\.90 million by GoL) would create the instruments for the industry to
interact and develop innovation networks to increase its maturity and global competitiveness\.
The component would finance the following subcomponents:
2\.1 Creation and financing of operations of the MiHub during the course of the project
with a mandate focused on serving as a catalyst for innovation of the industry, focal point
of the industry, providing a forum for cooperation, building of synergies and transferring
of international knowledge and best practices to the Lebanese ecosystem, and on
managing the activities of Component 1 and 2;
2\.2 Creation of industry clusters with other vertical industries (media, advertising, design,
banking, etc\.), and establishment of a testing facility (living lab) and project development
platform to test mobile Internet prototypes and provide access to the MiHub community
to project development within international networks of open innovation;
2\.3 And (c) designing a structured promotion campaign, including brand image, to
develop a culture of entrepreneurship in this industry and attract talent as well as
domestic and international attention to Lebanonâs emerging mobile Internet industry\.
18\. Component 3 - Enhancement of Mobile Internet Enabling Environment (US$0\.5 million
by IBRD, US$0\.5 million by GoL) would assess Lebanonâs competitive position in ICT-enabled
4
industries to identify areas where improvements are needed, and to eventually help the
Government implement the needed reforms\.21
19\. Component 4 - Project Management (US$0\.75 million by IBRD, US$0\.75 million by the
GoL) would finance data collection on indicators to measure project progress and results and
strengthens the Financial and Procurement Management Teamâs (FPMT) capabilities\.
Project Financing
20\. The lending instrument selected was a Specific Investment Loan from the International
Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) of US$6\.4 million provided under IBRD
terms\. The GoL selected a variable spread loan, commitment-linked with a maturity of 12 years,
including a five-year grace period\. The GoL agreed to co-finance the project by matching the
IBRD loan amount (US$6\.4 million equivalent of government funds)\.
Implementation Arrangements
21\. Due to the technical nature of the project, and the need for a neutral political and
commercial structure that convenes all stakeholders from the mobile Internet ecosystem, the
project implementation was to be carried out through a two-fold institutional arrangement
structure, comprising:
a) A FPMT at MoT which would be in charge of the M&E aspects of the project;
b) A technical and independent entity, the MiHub to be created by the FPMT\.
22\. The MiHub was needed to ensure the ecosystem buy-in and commitment with the
activities of the project, and therefore support the sustainability of the project outcome\. The
MiHub was to take the form of a NGO and would be an independent and autonomous entity with
an Advisory Board that included MoT\. It would have followed specific auditing and financial
controls and salaries of its staff subject to caps, which should be competitive enough with the
private sector to attract adequate talent\. The incorporation of an independent entity representing
the ecosystem for the implementation of the project was informed by the emerging and best
practices in similar programs identified by the Task Team in the design of the project\.
Risks analysis
23\. The Overall Implementation Risk for the project was considered Substantial at appraisal
primarily because the project was innovative by nature and the first of its kind within the Bank at
the time\. Although the design of the project was based on successful proven international
examples, it was a completely new approach for the WB\. Due to the political environment and
the pressures of the conflicts in the region, the overall rating was raised to High from December
21
The network of institutions and organizations in the public and private sectors, whose activities and interactions
initiate, import, modify, and diffuse new products, services, and technologies in the mobile Internet sector in
Lebanon\. The main members of this ecosystem are represen ted in MiHubâs advisory board\.
5
2013 (first ISR) until January 2015 (3rd ISR)\. It was lowered back to Substantial again following
a decrease in security risk in Beirut, and remained at the rating until cancelation\.
Table 2\. Risk Ratings at Appraisal
Stakeholder Risk M
Implementing Agency Risk
- Capacity S
- Governance M
Project Risk
- Design S
- Social and Environmental L
- Program and Donor L
- Delivery Monitoring and Sustainability S
- Other: Incubation and Financing Capacity M
Overall Implementation Risk S
Delay of Approval
24\. The project suffered from delays since negotiations due to the worsening of the
political situation in Lebanon\. Aware of potential deterioration of the local political situation in
Lebanon with the elections scheduled in February 2013 and pre-campaign by mid-December
2012, the MoT and the Task Team conducted the project preparation at an accelerated pace\. The
Concept Note was approved on May 10, 2012 and appraisal was concluded on October 12, 2012\.
Despite this effort, project preparation suffered delays due to tensions in the political
environment at the negotiations stage\.
25\. Negotiations started on October 24, 2012, but were not concluded until April 2013
due to an internal disagreement between MoF and MoT\. The Task Team completed appraisal
of the project with the counterpart (MoT) in October 12, 2012 after several meetings between the
Task Team and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to discuss the design of the project including the
implementation arrangements\. Negotiations dates were then agreed for October 24 and 29, 2012\.
However, there was a disagreement within the Lebanese delegation during negotiations over the
sustainability of the MiHub after the project which halted the process\. The design of the project
as described in the Loan Agreement called for the creation of the MiHub which would take the
form of a NGO and would be an independent and autonomous entity but did not address the
issues raised by MoF notably the dissolution at the end of the project, as well as fiduciary aspects
including audits\.
26\. The negotiations were ultimately concluded on April 3, 2013 after establishing additional
conditions for the MiHub particularly the transfer of its revenues to MoF after its dissolution at
the end of the project, subject MiHub to audit controls, and prohibit MiHub from becoming a
company, as recorded on the Minutes of the Negotiations\.
6
27\. On March 23, 2013, few days before the agreement that concluded negotiations, the
Government resigned and entered in caretaker status\.22 Despite the governmentâs caretaker
status, the Bank took the decision to continue project preparation government and Bank board
approval was scheduled for July 31, 2013\.
28\. On June 12, 2013, to streamline effectiveness conditions, the Bank proposed the
modification of the effectiveness conditions and negotiations were reopened\. On June 27,
2013, a streamlined set of conditions were agreed with Delegation of Lebanon\. The revised
and agreed effectiveness conditions listed in the Loan Agreement (LA) were the following: (i)
establishment of the MiHub; (ii) appointment of MiHub Advisory Board; (iii) appointment of
MiHub Executive Director and adequate staffing of MiHub, and; (iv) sealing an Implementation
Agreement between the MoT and the MiHub through specifying their respective roles and
responsibilities in carrying out the project\.
29\. On July 31, 2013, the Board of Executive Directors of the Bank approved the MIEP
project\. Although there was already a caretaker government in place, the project package was
submitted to the Board, which then took action and approved\. The Bank continued to approve
other projects as well during this time as per instructions from the Regional Vice President at the
time\.
2\. Post-Approval Experience and Reasons for Cancellation
Delay of signing of Loan Agreement (LA)
30\. The Government caretaker status severely delayed the signing of the Loan
Agreement and impacted project preparation\. Following the Board approval, the LA needed
to be signed by the Council of Ministers (COM)\. However, the caretaker government did not
hold any Council of Ministers (COM) meetings and thus the signing of LA could not take place\.
In addition, the caretaker government could not make use of retroactive financing or its own
funding to advance project preparation\.
31\. The Syrian civil war heavily affected the balance of power within Lebanon, since its
main Sunni (the Future Movement) and Shia (Hezbollah) political factions support opposite sides
in the Syrian war\. Sectarian tensions further stirred, following Syrian rebelsâ attack on Shia areas
in Lebanon in November 2013\. Effectively, rival political camps prevented the caretaker
government from reaching quorum on any issue, disagreeing even on Governmentâs appropriate
functioning, including convening cabinet meetings\. The security situation in the country
deteriorated and visiting missions were suspended\. The Task Team monitored the situation and
continued engagement with the counterpart via teleconference and by meeting the FPMT
coordinator in November 2013 at a conference in Spain\.
32\. At the start of 2014, significant escalation of attacks in Beirut threatened to
undermine Lebanonâs stability and increased the urgency for a new government\. On
22
This status lasted until February 15, 2014, when an agreement to form a new government was reached\.
7
February 15, 2014, Prime Minister Tammam Salam announced the formation of a new
Government of National Interest, a compromise deal between the two blocks that ended the
longest episode of political paralysis Lebanon has experienced in decades\. On March 20, 2014,
the new cabinet received parliamentary vote of confidence\.
33\. In April 2014, the Task Team promptly reacted to these developments and
conducted a mission to engage with the new Government ministries and restart the process
of project approval and ratification by the Lebanese Government\. The team met with the
new appointed Minister of Telecommunications and the new teams from the Ministries of
Finance (MoF), Economy and Education and Higher Education (MoEHE) as well as the Vice
Governor of the Central Bank and the National ICT Strategy Coordinator for the Presidency of
the COM to reengage in the process of the Government approval and Parliament ratification of
the project and to build support among ministries involved in the projectâs activities\. The
Minister of Telecommunications expressed strong support for the project and agreed to submit
the project for approval to the MoF for further submission to the COM\. The Task Team worked
with the FPMT on a plan to implement the effectiveness conditions, including the finalization of
bylaws and the Articles of Association and reviewed technical and financial documents (e\.g\.,
Project Implementation Manual, including Financial Management and Procurement
Requirements)\. To increase the capacity of the FPMT, the World Bank Team also organized the
Procurement and Financial Management Capacity Workshop to the FPMT and MoT
representatives on April 11-17, 2014\.
34\. On May 25, 2014, MoT and MoF agreed to submit the project to the COM for
approval on a priority basis\. However, the same day, Michel Suleiman completed his term as
President of Lebanon, while the Parliament failed to agree on a next single candidacy\. In these
circumstances, all legislations were required unanimous COM approval to pass, which, once
again, resulted in both sides vetoing any contentious decisions, delaying or completely
obstructing effective policymaking\.
35\. To support project preparation, the Task Team obtained additional grant funding
from the Korean World Bank Partnership Facility (KWBPF)\. This grant funding would
serve to: (i) advance the preparation of effectiveness conditions, particularly the establishment of
the MiHub, (ii) build consensus and a coalition of support among the stakeholders of the
technology innovation ecosystem in Lebanon (who, ultimately, would implement the project),
and (iii) test and validate the activities for each of the components of the project\.
36\. The team strategically used the KWBPF and the South-South Knowledge Exchange
(SSKE) fund to support activities to build momentum and support among stakeholders beyond
the government as well as follow up closely on the progress in meeting the effectiveness
conditions and the ratification process from Parliament\. From October 2014 to August 2015, the
team conducted five missions to Lebanon funded through the KWBPF (October, 2014; February,
2015; April 2015; May 2015, and; June 2015)\.
37\. The project continued to encounter political hurdles\. The new MoF raised objection
to the requirement to establish MiHub as an NGO and then terminate it after the project closure\.
The MoF requested clarification from the MoT, and projectâs transfer to the COM was further
8
delayed\. Following the discussion with the World Bank Team, on October 28, 2014, MoT
and MoF agreed to present the project for COMâs approval\. However, political negotiations
among ministries delayed the presentation of the project to COM until December, 2014\.
38\. On January 23, 2015, the Bank received a letter from the MoT requesting a three
months extension of signing deadline (January 31, 2015)\. The letter indicated that the
Ministry transferred the project for COMâs approval on January 8, 2015, however, due to agenda
issues, discussions on the project only started on January 22, 2015\. The letter informed that the
discussions were still ongoing and would likely extend over the January 31, 2015 deadline\. It
was expected that the COM would approve the project during February 2015\. Based on the
rationale of this request, Bankâs Management agreed to extend the deadline of signing the
Loan Agreement until April 30, 2015\. The Government was specifically informed that due to
the fact that the loan has been approved by the Bank 18 months ago, this would be the final
extension of signing deadline\.
39\. The Loan Agreement for the project was signed on February 24, 2015\. Article 5\.02
of the Agreement stipulates the effectiveness deadline as 180 days after the signing date, which
fell on August 23, 2015\. To prepare the Parliament ratification process (which is part of the
effectiveness conditions), the Team met with legislators and the executive branch\. Next steps
after the signing of the Agreement and actions required for the completion of the rest of the
effectiveness conditions were also discussed\.
Delay of effectiveness
40\. During the May 2015 mission, the Team informed MoT that the Bank would âonly
agree to extend the effectiveness deadline beyond August 23, 2015 if all the necessary
conditions have been meet by the Government, and the single remaining condition is
projectâs ratification by the Parliamentâ (Management Letter dated May 11, 2015)\. To
meet this goal, the Team agreed with the MoT on a plan of action to help the Ministry to comply
with the effectiveness conditions in the remaining months before the deadline\. The MoT
informed the Team that the COM had signed the transfer Decree on April 28, 2015 and that it
was in the process of transferring it to the Parliament\.
41\. The political situation continued to deteriorate and parliament was not meeting due
to the gridlock of the Presidentâs election and the Government was paralyzed\. On August
2015, a grassroots protest movement over the collapse of waste management provision in Beirut
turned into a wider campaign against governmentâs performance, public service provision, and
corruption\. The government put forward a plan to solve the immediate waste problem, but the
deeper underlying issues remain unresolved, as Salamâs Government has been paralyzed by
political deadlock between main factions, which failed to agree on the holding of new
parliamentary elections pending for over one year, or the presidency, which has been vacant
since May 2015\.
42\. On August 13, 2015, ten days before the deadline, the MoF sent the Bank a letter
requesting for a six-month deadline extension for the effectiveness of the MIEP project\. The
letter referred to the Aide Memoire from the April-May 2015 mission stipulating that the Bank
9
would consider extending the effectiveness deadline only if all necessary conditions are in place
except ratification by the Parliament\. The letter requesting the extension of effectiveness
deadline stated that the Government had fulfilled all effectiveness conditions under its control
and the only remaining step was Parliament ratification\. The letter also listed the effectiveness
conditions and compliance date as illustrated in the table below\.
Effectiveness Condition Date Fulfilled
MiHub Legally Established August 14, 2015
Appointment of the MiHub Advisory Board July 24, 2015
MiHub staffed in adequate numbers and July 24, 2015
headed by an Executive Director
Implementation Agreement executed between August 14, 2015
MoT and MiHub
Ratification of LA package by the Parliament Not met
43\. On a letter dated August 24, 2015, the Bank communicated to the GoL that
effectiveness deadline of August 23, 2015 was not extended\. Parliament did not have any
session before the deadline of August 23, 2015; hence, no Parliament ratification occurred,
effectively terminating the project\. In this letter, the Country Director (CD) reiterated Bankâs
commitment to the policy dialogue and cooperation in the sector through other available means
and approaches that might become available\.
44\. Despite the non-extension of the project, the MiHub and the MoT requested the
continuation of the engagement of the Bank to support the technology startup ecosystem in
Lebanon\. The stakeholders represented in the MiHub (i\.e\., universities, private sector, civil
society and government) requested the Bank to explore the possibility of assisting the ecosystem
through other means other than a Bank Loan\. The MiHub deems the role of the Bank as
necessary to provide a neutral environment where all the stakeholders could be represented and
address the remaining gaps constraining the ecosystem growth and sustainability\.
3\. Assessment of Bank Performance
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
45\. During preparation: Bank performance during project preparation is rated Moderately
Satisfactory\. The Team worked with the counterparts and other government stakeholders to
evaluate the timing of project preparation and the potential risks from political tensions due to
scheduled elections\. The team was able to anticipate the risk on potential political instability and
accelerated the preparation phase accordingly\. However, the rapid deterioration of the political
situation, particularly due to the Syrian conflict was difficult to predict\. The team also included
in the operation a retroactive financing option for project preparation but external unexpected
and prolonged gridlock in the government and Parliament impeded its use\.
10
46\. During supervision: Bank performance between the Board approval and cancellation of
the project is rated Moderately Satisfactory due mainly to the very difficult and challenging
environment,
47\. Despite the delay in signing the Loan Agreement, meeting the project effectiveness
conditions, and the eventual cancellation of the loan, the Bank Team proactively worked with the
counterparts in a consultative and open-minded manner for solutions to ensure that the project
development objectives are met\. The Team managed to galvanize financial support from other
resources/grants to help the government raise awareness about the project and its benefits among
a wider set of stakeholders, as well as work with the MoT and the MoF on removing the
implementation capacity constraints of the FPMT during this period\. The availability of
resources from the KWBPTF grant was particularly instrumental in allowing the Bank to bring
international experience in support of the project preparation and meeting its effectiveness
conditions\. Nine missions were undertaken after board approval (five of them to facilitate and
supervise the KWBTF activities) and were supplemented by reverse missions in Barcelona
during the time that security situation impeded missions to the country\. In addition, the team
facilitated capacity building and trainings for the FPMT\. The project signing date was extended
one time to allow the project to move to meeting the effectiveness conditions\. Despite the project
cancellation, the preparatory work developed by the team resulted in a coalition of private and
public sector partners (through the MiHub) who are requesting the continuation of Bank support
to the strengthening of Lebanon technology ecosystem\. The performance of the Team with the
KWBPTF resulted in continuous support to the ecosystem through the MiHub\.
4\. Assessment of Borrower Performance
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
48\. Government performance: The Governmentâs willingness to co-finance the project,
instead of parallel financing, illustrated its commitment to the project and its implementation\.
This commitment is also apparent in that the Government financed the project preparation,
including the FPMT, from its own resources\. Still, the new cabinet establishment in 2014 and the
political disputes and gridlock of Parliament, created a negative operating environment for the
project, which suffered from continuous delays\. Once the new government was formed, and
despite lingering political disputes, there was an effort for meeting effectiveness conditions\.
However, the gridlock of Parliament, which is beyond Government actions, impeded meeting all
effectiveness conditions\.
49\. Implementing agencyâs performance: The MoT was responsible for the majority of
activities necessary to meet the effectiveness conditions\. However, its low capacity, especially in
qualified personnel and financial and procurement management, in addition to the changes in
Ministryâs leadership, substantially hindered preparation of the project and meeting the
effectiveness conditions\. The caretaking status of the Government impeded MoT from
implementing the actions needed to move the forward\. However, once the new government was
appointed, MoT was instrumental in taken steps towards project preparation, undertaking all the
actions that were under its control to meet effectiveness conditions\. The MoT consistently
11
supported the project within the Government and was instrumental in achieving the signing of
the Agreement and resolving the issue with the MoF leadership after the new Government had
been established\. Throughout the project preparation, the MoT consistently advocated for the
approval of the Loan Agreement by COM as well as its signature and transfer to Parliament for
ratification\. Moreover, MoT requested continuing working with the Bank through other means to
support the goals of the project\.
5\. Lessons Learned
50\. Preparation funds\. Although the project included tools for making funds available for
the counterpart to prepare the project, these could not be exploited\. Retroactive financing is not
available for a government in care taker status and MoT could not use co-financing funds
without preliminary approval of the project budget line by Parliament for\. For future projects,
tools to access preparation funds need to be assessed more carefully in lieu of potential
Government caretaker status of Parliament gridlock\.
51\. Strategic use of Trust Funds (TF) to support preparation\. In lieu of preparation
funds, the team strategically used trust funds to build a coalition of partners to support the project
activities and meet the effectiveness conditions as well as continuous engagement and support to
the government\. Without the availability of TF funding and activities, the team would have not
had enough resources to engage with the counterparts and the government actors in an effective
and continued way to unlock the political hurdles the project preparation faced at the government
level\.
52\. Coalition of partners to ensure sustainability\. The project was designed to incorporate
the technology ecosystem stakeholders in the implementation of the project\. By establishing a
PPP approach for the project implementation, the project was able to build momentum and a
coalition of partners that ensured sustainability of the activities beyond the Government\. The fact
that the private and public stakeholders are requesting the Bank to continue its involvement in
the sector through technical assistance proves that the project has strong demand and was
supported by an extended coalition of partners\.
53\. Project Readiness\. The project requirement of the MiHub establishment, which included
the ecosystems stakeholders, required extensive work from the Bank team and the counterpart\.
This would have been difficult to achieve without the additional TF funding\. For future projects
incorporating such PPP approaches, the Bank should consider either incorporating the creation of
these approaches as part of the project, where adequate funding is available, or to have them
implemented before requesting Board approval\.
54\. Technical assistance: Operations that support entrepreneurship and innovation require
strong technical assistance by the World Bank and external experts\. The World Bank Task Team
for MIEP provided heavy supervision and technical assistance under MIEP not only to support
the GoL in reaching project effectiveness but also to ensure project relevance and local capacity
building for a rapidly changing industry\. This built on continuous stakeholder engagement as
well as advice and participation from leading industry experts and practitioners\. It also relied on
the Task Teamâs initiative to raise additional financial resources, such as Trust Funds, to support
12
Bank-executed technical assistance activities amidst political standstill in Lebanon\. As a result,
the project received strong support and recognition from key stakeholders despite significant
delays in its implementation\.
55\. Project design: The design of the MIEP project provides lessons for future operations
that support innovation and entrepreneurship\. The project design reflected the critical need of
formally engaging key stakeholders in project activities in order to effectively support the startup
ecosystem, leveraging a neutral coordinating mechanism through the MiHub\. To ensure the
relevance of project design, the Task Team organized a co-creation workshop for the MiHub,
where key stakeholders helped design and validate proposed MiHub activities\. These steps were
widely supported by key stakeholders in Lebanon and recognized as effective mechanisms to
ensure their buy-in and coordination\.
56\. Choice of Bank product: An SIL (Specific Lending Instrument), particularly in a
politically complex environment such as Lebanon, may not be the most appropriate Bank
product to support innovation and entrepreneurship\. These areas are amenable to rapid change
due to technology, organic innovation, shifting market conditions or financing by other donors\.
The effectiveness of interventions in these areas rely on the active engagement and dynamic
collaboration with a broad set of stakeholders to ensure relevance and buy-in\. As such, lending
operations may prove too rigid in their structure to enable rapid iteration and amendments to the
design of these operations\. Government counterparts may also face limited capacity to ensure
quality delivery, or be subject to frequent disruptions due to political instability, such as in the
case of Lebanon\. Other products, such as Trust Funds or Reimbursable Services, where
appropriate, may provide more flexibility to support timely and quality delivery\. Therefore, it is
recommended that the type of product is carefully examined and justified for such operations to
limit the risk of disruptions and challenges in delivery\.
57\. Risk evaluation: Bankâs experience in Lebanon shows that loans prepared with caretaker
governments, are prone to disruptions following changes in government teams upon reshuffling
or elections\. This political risk is further exacerbated by rivalries between fractions\. As a result,
operations may need to be synchronized with internal and, in case of Lebanon, also with regional
political cycles to minimize disruptions and prolonged delay in government commitments\.
Furthermore, other Bank products that are more aligned with the political realities in Lebanon
and countries with similar governance challenges may need to be selected\.
58\. Extensions and notification of cancellation decision (NOC): The Borrower should be
repeatedly warned from the outset of negotiations and during the project supervision that the
extension of signing and effectiveness deadlines is an exceptional procedure granted in rare and
properly supported circumstances\. In terms of the NOC, the Bank could have provided a clear
message to the Government on the importance of reaching project effectiveness, including
Parliament approval, on time, particularly given the reputational issues that the Government
would face if the project is cancelled due to government inefficiency\.
13
Annex 1\. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes
(a) Task Team members
Lending
Name Role Title Specialization Unit
Team Leader (ADM ICT Policy
Victor Mulas -- GTIDR
Responsible) Specialist
Senior
Lina Fares Team Member Procurement -- GGODR
Specialist
Financial
Rock Jabbour Team Member Management -- GGODR
Analyst
Lead ICT Policy
Carlo Maria Rossotto Team Member -- GTIDR
Specialist
Cecilia Maria Paradi- ICT Policy
Team Member -- GTIDR
Guilford Specialist
Haneen Ismail Sayed Team Member Program Leader -- MNC02
Social
Janna El-Horr Team Member Development -- GSURR
Specialist
David Satola Team Member Lead Counsel -- LEGPS
Senior
Ilari Lindy Team Member Operations -- TWICT
Officer
Ivan Ganzalez- ICT Operations
Team Member -- TWICT
Berenguer Pena Analyst
Program
Jannina Flores Ramirez Team Member -- TWICT
Assistant
Joulan Abdul Khalek Team Member Consultant -- TWICT
Mei Wang Team Member Senior Counsel -- LEGAM
Program
Nada Abou-Rizk Team Member -- MNCLB
Assistant
Operations
Mather Pfeiffenberger Team Member -- TWICT
Analyst
Operations
Mouna Couzi Team Member -- MNCLB
Analyst
Financial
Maya Boulos Bouloas Team Member Management -- MNAFM
Specialist
Hassine Hedda Team Member Finance Officer -- CTRLA
Supervision/NCO
Team Leader (ADM ICT Policy
Victor Mulas -- GTIDR
Responsible) Specialist
Lead ICT Policy
Carlo Maria Rossotto Team Member -- GTIDR
Specialist
Cecilia Maria Paradi- ICT Policy
Team Member -- GTIDR
Guilford Specialist
Program
Ndeye Anna Ba Team Member -- GTIDR
Assistant
Senior
Ilari Lindy Team Member Operations -- GTIDR
Officer
14
Yegana Faramaz
Team Member Consultant -- GTIDR
Baghirova
(b) Staff Time and Cost
Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)
Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including
No\. of staff weeks
travel and consultant costs)
Lending 45\.11 200,735\.00
Supervision/NCO 119\.10 527,499\.27
Total: 164\.21 728,234\.27
15
Annex 2\. List of Supporting Documents
ï MIEP PAD\.
ï MIEP Loan Agreement\.
ï MIEP ISRs\.
ï MIEP Aide Memoires\.
ï Agreed Minutes of Negotiations between the Lebanese Republic and the IBRD regarding
the loan for MIEP\.
ï Letter from H\.E\. Mohamad Safadi, Minister of Finance, to Mr\. Ferid Belhaj, Country
Director, on June 27, 2013\. Subject: MIEP Modifications of Effectiveness Conditions\.
ï Letter from Mr\. Ferid Belhaj, Country Director to H\. E\. Nicolas Sehnaoui, Former
Minister of Telecommunications on June 12, 2013\. Subject: MIEP - Modification of
effectiveness conditions\.
ï Letter from Mr\. Ferid Belhaj, Country Director, to H\.E\. Ali Hassan Khalil, Minister of
Finance on January 27, 2015\. Subject: Lebanon MIEP - Extension of Signing Deadline\.
ï Letter from H\.E\. Boutros Hard, Minister of Telecommunications to Mr\. Husam Beides,
Acting Country Director, on June 29, 2015\. Subject: MIEP Financial and Procurement
Management Team Appointment\.
ï Letter from H\.E\. Ali Hassan Khalil, Minister of Finance to Mr\. Ferid Belhaj, Country
Director, on August 13, 2015\. Subject: Request for a six-month deadline extension for the
effectiveness of the MIEP 8265-LB\.
ï Letter from Mr\. Ferid Belhaj, Country Director, to H\.E\. Ali Hassan Khalil, Minister of
Finance, and H\.E\. Boutros Harb, Minister of Telecommunications, on August 24, 2015\.
Subject: Request for Extension for effectiveness of MIEP\.
ï KWPF proposal for Lebanon\.
ï South-South Knowledge Exchange program proposal for Lebanon and Chile\.
16
Annex 3\. Information on the KWPF and SSKE funds for Lebanon
Status update on the Mobile Innovation Knowledge Network funded by the KWPF
KWPF delivered the following activities up to date:
1\. Co-creation workshop to design and create the Mobile Innovation Network (MIN)
2\. The Open Innovation Week
3\. Startup Challenge
4\. Tech For Kids
These activities were linked to key deliverables of the components of MIEP project and served to
provide their foundations and to prepare their implementation\. The details of these activities is
as follows:
1\. Co-creation workshop to design and create the Mobile Innovation Network (MIN)
Cocreation workshop: The workshop took place on the week of October 20, 2014 in Beirut\.
Speakers represented lead examples â including from include models Korea (NIPA), Finland
(Forum Virium), France (Silicon Sentier), and the Netherlands (Waag Society) to guide the local
stakeholders\. The workshop started with an open event on Strengthening Lebanonâs Mobile
Internet Ecosystem on October 20, 2014\. The first day of the event was a larger, open session to
provide a platform for dialogue and knowledge sharing with leading global experts in the field of
mobile internet ecosystem; and to showcase mobile innovation experiences successfully adopted
in France, the Netherlands, Korea and Finland, which can serve as a model for mobile Internet
development in Lebanon\. The event was opened by Dr\. Walid Karam, Advisor to the Minister of
Telecommunications, and Dr\. Husam Beides, World Bank Acting Head of the Lebanon Country
Office, followed by presentations by the World Bank team, and various innovation and startup
hubs such as NUMA (France), the Waag Society (Netherlands), Forum Virium (Finland) and the
National IT Promotion Agency (Republic of Korea)\. The open session also introduced the World
Bankâs approach to fostering innovation ecosystems and developing a community of practice and
network in this area for knowledge sharing\. Between October 21 and 23, 2014, the event
proceeded with a closed co-creation workshop with a more focused approach to design the
activities of the MiHub, a non-governmental organization, which will be created by the MIEP to
manage its Components 1 and 2 under MIEP\. The participants of the workshop included
approximately 20 representatives of key stakeholders in Lebanonâs mobile Internet ecosystem,
including the government, donors, academia, students, private sector and local innovation and
startup networks, co-working spaces and accelerators\. The workshop consisted of hands-on team
working sessions facilitated by two expert moderators and leveraged the presence of the
international experts from the first day of the event\. The co-creation workshop resulted in the
below key conclusions regarding the mobile Internet ecosystem of Lebanon in general and the
MIEP specifically:
i\. The workshop participants confirmed that there is a pressing need for the project,
and for the creation of the MiHub\.
ii\. The event validated the specific activities of the MiHub outlined in the project\.
These included outreach and marketing of entrepreneurship to youth; innovation
17
competitions paired with a focused and applied multidisciplinary skills
development and training program; a platform to match students with industry
and the coordination of multisectoral stakeholders of the ecosystem\.
iii\. The event also produced specific business lines and models for these activities
that will serve to inform the MiHub implementation of activities once the project
is effective\.
iv\. The event served to establish a group of core constituency from the mobile
internet ecosystem in Lebanon that will form the basis of the MiHub and the first
composition of its advisory board\.
2\. The Open Innovation Week
The World Bank collaborated with local Lebanese technology communities to host Open
Innovation Week in Beirut at the end of February 2015, bringing speakers from prominent US-
based institutions, such as Google, Stanford University, and the Massachusetts International
Technology (MIT) for âtinkering with a purposeâ\. That purpose was to harness the power of
open source tools to fix problems and build up their technology and entrepreneurship skills\. A
series of TED-style talks and hands-on workshops introduced members of the Lebanese
government, academics, and others to a range of tools and technologies aimed at helping young
people address challenges critical to Lebanon\. Talks given by creative thinkers ranged from
topics like industrial design and 3D printing, to open source gaming and online payment
methods\. Open Innovation Week gave young people extra exposure to technologies like âdo-it-
yourselfâ computer boards, sensors, open source coding and web tools, business thinking (such
as the lean start-up methodology), and techniques like design thinking to channel creativity into
solutions relevant to Lebanese youth\. The local stakeholders also expressed commitment to
organically grow OIW and organize it on an annual basis\.
3\. Startup Challenge
Following the OIW, a Startup Challenge took place whereby 10 Lebanese startup projects
pitched in front of a [prestigious jury and two were selected to enter into an acceleration program
run by Bader Young Entrepreneurs\. The two winning team was then awarded a study tour to
London and engaged with key ecosystem actors in London, expanding the knowledge sharing
network\. After this program both winning teams obtained additional competitive funding from
accelerators and venture capital funds and are currently continuing their projects\.
18
4\. Tech For Kids
This event facilitated knowledge sharing in the area of building 21st Century skills for youth, and
informed the implementation plan for the MiHub activities\. This was a series of events held in
Beirut to expose children, teachers, and members of the Lebanese government to the use of
innovative ICT tools in problem solving and collaboration in the classroom, as well as to new
ways of fostering creativityâan issue critical to the future economy of a country where high
literacy rates and high enrollment in tertiary education produce a pool of well-educated youth,
about one third of whom (34%) are unable to find employment at home\. Launched in late April
2015, Tech For Kids aims to use technology in the classroom to improve childrenâs core
education or STEAMâscience, technology, engineering, the arts and mathematicsâby
equipping students with the tools they need to pursue careers in jobs that need them to be more
innovative\. Understanding technology, and applying some of the methodologies related to it, is a
key skillset in todayâs labor force\. The Tech for Kids program began with holding a small fair for
middle school children (age roughly 11â14), as well as for their parents and teachers\. This was
followed by a workshop at Beirut Digital District, where teachers and students from several
schoolsâpublic and privateâ worked with local and international education experts on
exploring new technology\. The technology included LEGO Education, littleBits,Scratch, 3D
printing, Raspberry Pi and a new, Lebanese-manufactured building tool, QalamSila\. The sessions
were led by Stuart Swann, a LEGO certified trainer from the UK; Sabine El Kahi, the founder
of Kids Genius; Eliane Metni, Director of International Education Association; and Jose Antonio
Galaso, an education specialist from Barcelona who previously worked at CitiLab, which
pioneered the integration of these tools, as well as other educational approaches\. Through hands-
on exercises in building and deconstructing structures, facilitators familiarized participants with
creativity, teamwork, and âlearning by doingâ\. To complement the hands-on training sessions,
the World Bank team brought government, education, and innovation stakeholders together to
talk about 21st Century Skill Development in Lebanon\. This highlighted homegrown and
international examples of using technology to improve learning, providing an opportunity to
develop collaboration between all the different stakeholders in Lebanon\.
Status update on the South-South Knowledge Exchange activity for Lebanon
The activity was completed in July 2015\. The proposed Knowledge Exchange with Chilean
stakeholders in the innovation ecosystem helped to expose Lebanese innovation ecosystem
stakeholders to other ecosystem development models from a country with similar economic
characteristics but more advanced innovation capacities, to be able to share best practices of two
innovation poles in different stages but both in an advantage position inside emerging markets\. It
was also aimed to support the development of international knowledge exchange on open
innovation and strengthen knowledge ties, capacity and dialogue among policy makers on
different approaches to support the development of a conducive environment for innovative and
competitive startups and strategies for human capital retention\.
The Chilean delegation was formed by a comprehensive team that covered different aspects of
the entrepreneurial and innovation ecosystem and included the executive director of Startup
Chile, the head of the social innovation center at Finis Terrae University, the co-founder of
19
Santiago Maker Space and the operations director of Ideas Factory, Santaigoâs organic
innovation hub\.
The targeted participants in this exchange were key public and private stakeholders whose
activities and interactions are related to management and development of product and services in
the entrepreneurship ecosystem:
- Representatives of the Government of Lebanon including officials from the Ministry of
Telecommunications (Counterpart of MIEP Project), Banque du Liban, Investment
Development Authority of Lebanon (IDAL);
- Representatives of incubators and accelerators, including Alt City, BeryTech, Cloud 5,
Endeavor Lebanon, Lebanon for Entrepreneurs, Speed;
- Representatives of the financial community for entrepreneurs such as Kafalat,
Berytech Fund, Middle East Venture Partners (MEVP), MENA Private Equity
Association;
- Representatives of the innovation and entrepreneurship community, including
Arabnet, Bader Lebanon, Startup Megaphone, Wamda;
- Entrepreneurs and initiatives in different fields that included HBR, Modeo,
Onomatopoeia, Station Beirut, SETT Partnership, Zoomal;
- Representatives of Universities that participated in the workshop, among them American
University of Beirut, Lebanese American University, Lebanese, Ecole Superieure des
Affaires, Notre Dame University, American University of Science and Technology;
- Donors and developing partners, including Beirut Digital District, UK Lebanon Tech
Hub\.
20 | APPROVAL |
P083352 |  ICRR 13895
Report Number : ICRR13895
IEG ICR Review
Independent Evaluation Group
1\. Project Data: Date Posted : 09/17/2013
Country : Armenia
Project ID : P083352 Appraisal Actual
Project Name : Renewable Energy US$M ):
Project Costs (US$M): 28\.70 30\.25
Project
L/C Number : C4159 Loan/ US$M ):
Loan /Credit (US$M): 5\.00 4\.99
Sector Board : Energy and Mining US$M):
Cofinancing (US$M ): 10\.00 9\.07
Cofinanciers : EBRD Board Approval Date : 03/29/2006
Closing Date : 12/31/2010 06/30/2011
Sector (s): Renewable energy (100%)
Theme (s): Climate change (67% - P); Other financial and private sector development (33% - S)
Prepared by : Reviewed by : ICR Review Group :
Coordinator :
Ramachandra Jammi Kristin Hallberg Soniya Carvalho IEGPS1
2\. Project Objectives and Components:
a\. Objectives:
The Project Development Objective is stated identically in the Project Appraisal Document and Credit Agreement as
follows:
"To increase privately owned and operated power generation utilizing renewable energy "
The Global Environmental Objective is stated in the Project Appraisal Document as :
"To reduce greenhouse gas (carbon dioxide) emissions by overcoming barriers to the development of renewable
energy\."
The project is assessed against the PDO as stated in the Credit Agreement \.
b\.Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?
No
c\. Components:
A\. Assistance to remove barriers and support project implementation (indicative amount : US$3 US$ 3\.65 million; At
US$ 3\.18 million ): This component was planned to support the following key areas :
completion : US$3
1\. Improvement of legal and regulatory framework and capacity building for state agencies : (a) revising the existing
legislation and regulations to improve and streamline procedures for transparent and fair allocation of resources (e\.g\.
land rights, water permits, and licenses ); (b) developing sub-legislation to operationalize the law on renewable
energy and energy efficiency; (c) reviewing and amending the rules of acceptance for small renewable generation for
the system operator; (d) strengthening the capacity of the (Public Services Regulatory Commission (PSRC), the
Ministry of Energy (MOE), State Water Committee, and Meteorological Service; (e) limited commodity support to the
PSRC and MOE\.
2\. Support in facilitating investments in renewable sub -projects: (a) Technical Assistance (TA) and capacity
building to local Financial Institutions (FIs), private investors, local engineering and consulting industry, including
information and incentives about new renewable energy technologies and associated benefits; (b) developing a
comprehensive database of renewable energy resources, with a related open source Geographic Information
System (GIS), and a web portal for identification, assessment, and monitoring of potential renewable energy projects;
(c) field survey of potential sites; (d) establishing a one-stop-shop for potential investors to facilitate the process of
obtaining required permits, licences, and other documents; (e) TA to potential investors for project preparation
activities, such as business plans, feasibility studies, and preliminary designs \.
3\. Mechanisms to leverage additional financing : Assistance to the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency
(R2E2) Fund and other implementing agencies to prepare a long -term strategy for the mobilization of additional
financing for developing renewable energy, including : (a) roadshows and conferences for potential investors; (b)
design and piloting of different financial instruments to accelerate lending to sub -borrowers, replenish funds and
enhance the leveraging impact of the Project \. These instruments were planned to to involve risk -sharing
arrangements like partial-risk guarantees, or asset -backed securities such as bonds or other suitable marketable
instruments secured against the portfolio of renewable projects \. Furthermore, syndication was considered for local
FIs to jointly finance large renewable projects that would be beyond the financing capacity of a single FI \.
4\. Project implementation and monitoring: (a) Technical assistance, equipment, and logistical support to
implementing agencies for project implementation, monitoring, supervision, collection and dissemination of lessons
learnt; (b) institutional support to the R2E2 Fund to act as an umbrella institution for Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) transactions relating to the sub -projects\. CDM capacity-building was to be funded by the Government \.
US$21\.
B\. Financing of investments (at appraisal : US$21 US$23\.
23 \.27 million ): This component
21 \.40 million; at completion : US$23
was to enable private investors to access financing for the development of renewable energy projects \. Based on
comparative analysis of economic and financial viability of different types of renewable projects, it was expected that
the financing would be mainly targeted at Small Hydropower Projects (SHPP) on natural (run-of-the-river) and
artificial (drinking water, irrigation pipes and canals ) water flows and Wind Power Projects (WPPs)\. The sub-loans
were expected to be in the range of US$ 100,000 to US$2 million with an average project size of US$ 500,000\. The
demand for financing was expected to be significant since different studies confirmed that there was significant
potential for SHPPs and WPPs that would be competitive with other forms of new generation and that under current
conditions could add over 300 MegaWatts (MW) of capacity\. Further, there were already 35 SHPPs with roughly 90
MW of total capacity that had obtained all or most of the pertinent water permits, land rights and licenses and were
ready for implementation if long-term financing was made available\. In addition to new SHPPs, there were about 45
MW of small hydropower capacity operated by the private sector, which was generally in need of rehabilitation and
had the potential to increase the electricity output \.
IDA funds were to be channeled through the R 2E2 Fund\. The R2E2 Fund would provide financing to project
beneficiaries through on-lending to CC (Cascade Credit CJSC or closed joint stock company ), licensed with the
Central Bank of Armenia and owned by the Cafesjian Family Foundation (CFF), a US based Armenian Diaspora
organization\. CC would pool IDA and EBRD funds and its own co -financing in pre-determined proportions and extend
loans to beneficiaries\.
The project was implemented in cooperation with other donors and partners involved in supporting penetration of
renewable energy in Armenia\. Specifically, EBRD and CFF provided US$ 7 million and US$3 million respectively to
co-finance the âinvestment financingâ? component of the project\. The co-financing provided by EBRD and CFF was
pooled together by CC with IDA project funds and on-lent to project developers\. Additionally, implementation of the
TA component of the project was coordinated with USAID, which provided some technical assistance to private
sector for appraisal of renewable energy projects and to PSRC for improvement of regulatory framework for
renewable energy\. Additionally, the R2E2 Fund coordinated with a TACIS-financed project supporting energy sector
policy in Armenia to update the small hydropower scheme for one of the regions (Gegharkunik Marz)\.
d\. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates:
Project cost, financing and borrower contribution : IDA financed the credit component while GEF financed the
technical assistance component (the IDA-financed Renewable Energy Project (P083352) was linked to the GEF
Renewable Energy Project (P090058)\. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) also
co-financed the project while the remaining funds were provided by the project's financing intermediaries and
sub-borrowers\.
The final project cost was US$27\.70 million, somewhat higher than the planned cost of US$ 25\.05 million\. IDA and
GEF funding at project completion was US$ 4\.99 million and US$2\.77 respectively, approximately the same as the
planned amounts (US$5\.00 million and US3\.00 million respectively)\. EBRD and borrower contributions at completion
were US$6\.30 million and US$0\.45, being marginally lower than the planned levels of US$ 7\.00 million and US$0\.45
million respectively\. The financial intermediaries and sub -borrowers made up for the rest by together providing
US$12\.59 million against a planned US$$9\.60 million\.
GEF Grant proceeds were reallocated from âtrainingâ? and âunallocatedâ? categories of the project to âincremental
operating costs\.â? The reallocation was needed because the R 2E2 Fund exhausted the originally allocated funds for
incremental operating costs due to significant depreciation of the US$ / Armenian Dram (AMD) exchange rate\. In
particular, the AMD depreciated by over 30 percent since project appraisal in December of 2005\.
Dates: Given that implementation of some activities under the GEF funded technical assistance component were
progressing slowly, the Bank agreed to the government's request to extend the project closing date from December
31, 2010 to June 30, 2011\.
3\. Relevance of Objectives & Design:
a\. Relevance of Objectives:
Since 1996, the Government of Armenia undertook structural reforms in the power sector and the sector substantially
recovered from the severe deterioration of the early 1990s\. The key challenge the countryâs power sector was facing
at appraisal was to ensure sustainable and reliable power supply by: (a) shifting reliance from costly sources of
energy (e\.g\. electricity for heating) to lower cost alternatives (home insulation, gas, solar heating); and (b) increasing
the energy diversification and achieving a higher degree of energy security through the utilization of indigenous
renewable energy resources\. \. Armenia was estimated to have significant renewable energy resources, but they
played a limited role in the countryâs energy supply\. Approximately 740 MW of small hydropower, wind and
geothermal resources was identified, which, if implemented, would represent approximately 25 percent of the total
installed capacity at appraisal date \.
The project was well aligned with the strategic objectives of the government as stipulated in the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper (PRSP) adopted by the government in October 2003\. The PRSP emphasized the need for policy
reforms in five key areas, including promotion of private sector development and improvement of public
infrastructures\. More specifically, the PRSP emphasized the importance of maintaining and strengthening energy
independence by developing indigenous and alternative energy sources and promoting energy efficiency\. The
project was also consistent with the CAS objective of promoting private sector growth by strengthening the financial
sector and reducing infrastructure bottlenecks \.
The project is relevant to current priorities of the country and Bank assistance strategy\. In particular, the project is
well aligned with the existing Energy Sector Strategy (2006) and the National Program on Renewable Energy and
Energy Efficiency (2007), which prioritizes development of renewable energy as a means of improving the countryâs
energy security and ensuring sustainable energy supply \.
The project objective is consistent with the current development priorities as reflected the Country Partnership
Strategy (CPS) with Armenia for FY 2009-2012\. One of the key objectives of the current CPS is to strengthen the
foundations for competitiveness through investments in new power generation capacity, including renewable energy
based energy\.
Relevance of objectives is rated high
b\. Relevance of Design:
The results framework was clear and logical \. The project was designed to work on several fronts : improve the legal
and regulatory framework and build capacity in relevant state agencies to reduce barriers to development of
renewable energy and energy efficiency; provide technical assistance to all stakeholders including financial
institutions and entrepreneurs on technical and administrative issues; and design and pilot different financial
instruments to accelerate lending to sub -borrowers, replenish funds and enhance the leveraging impact of the
Project\. All these actions would contribute to increasing investment in renewable energy and ultimately result in
savings in greenhouse gas emissions \. A public sector-financed credit line was necessary for various reasons
including the limited access to long -term finance and lack of experience of local financial institutions; and an
unfamiliar risk profile of borrowers together with a perception of high risk for renewable energy projects \.
Relevance of project design is rated high
4\. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy):
Project Development Objective : To increase privately owned and operated power generation utilizing renewable
energy \. Rated Substantial \.
Outputs
Financing of investments in new SHPPs The project provided financing for construction of new SHPPs on natural
and artificial water flows\. The ICR stats that the demand for funds was strong given affordable interest rates, and
loan maturities that were longer than most prevailing in the market \.
Training\. The planned training events were completed including "Renewable Energy Weeks" as well as several
workshops with sessions on preparation of business plans, new renewable energy technologies /equipment,
prospects and obstacles for development of certain renewable energy technologies in Armenia, renewable energy
resource potential assessments, and preparation of Environment Management Plans (EMPs)\.
Overcoming barriers to development of renewable energy \. The project conducted several activities to overcome
barriers to the development of renewable energy in Armenia as below :
Support for the preparation of legislative amendments for development of renewable energy in the country \.
Development and adoption of technical standards for renewable energy and regulations for dispatching and load
regulation of grid-connected renewable energy plants \. These enabled the smooth absorption of new small
renewable energy plants by the grid \.
Support for removing barriers to flow of information on investments in renewable energy \. In particular, the project
contributed to development of GIS of renewable energy resources in the country and an associated database,
which were made publicly available\. Additionally, the project supported an update of the SHPP Scheme, which
provided critical information/data on potential SHPP sites in the country with brief assessment of
economic/financial viability\. The update SHPP Scheme was made publicly available and received positive
feedback from project developers and investors as a useful resource to facilitate decision -making\. Moreover, the
R2E2 Fund prepared a detailed guide for investors /project developers with key legislation and regulations
pertaining to renewable energy sector and a comprehensive guide on development of business plans and
feasibility studies, including financial appraisal of renewable energy projects \.
Intermediate Outcomes
Improved capacity of project developers \. The project substantially contributed to strengthening of project developers â
capacity to prepare and implement renewable energy projects that were connected to the power grid, through
provision of training and finance \. The ICR states that this was evidenced by reduced demand from project
developers for R2E2 assistance in preparation of business plans /financing applications during the final years of
project implementation\.
Introduction of project financing and improvement due diligence skills of financial institutions \. Implementation of the
on-lending component of the project helped CC to strengthen its professional capacity to provide project financing
and conduct due diligence of small renewable energy projects \. Although CC was merged with Cascade Bank and the
latter was subsequently overtaken by Ameria Bank, there have been substantial âskill spill-overâ? effects as the
several of the key staff involved in the Bank project were retained \.
Outcomes
The total installed capacity of SHPPs financed by the project including EBRD and CFF co -financing was 44\.5 MW
with a total annual estimated generation of 159 GWh (GigaWatt hours)\.
The technical assistance provided by the project - which aimed at improving the investment environment for
renewable energy -, together with the strong demonstration effect of early sub -projects, contributed to leveraging
around US$48 million of private investments in other small renewable energy projects, which added another 88\.5
MW of new renewable energy capacity to the grid with estimated annual generation of 258 GWh\. The share of small
renewable projects in the total generation mix increased from 0\.5% at appraisal to 6\.5% at completion\.
Overall the project contributed to the development of 133 MW of renewable energy capacity against the target of 127
MW; and 417 GWh of renewable generation to the generation against the target of 336 GWh\.
The ICR notes that the implementation of the TA component of the project was coordinated with USAID, which also
provided some technical assistance to the private sector for appraisal of renewable energy projects and to the PSRC
(Public Services Regulatory Commission ) for improvement of the regulatory framework for renewable energy \.
Additionally, the R2E2 Fund coordinated with TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent
States" program, a technical assistance program implemented by the European Commission ) which financed a
project supporting energy sector policy in Armenia \. The project outcomes appear to have benefited from these
parallel efforts\.
The Global Environment Objective was to reduce greenhouse gas (carbon dioxide ) emissions by overcoming
barriers to the development of renewable energy \.
The global environment objective of reducing greenhouse gases was served by the project âs assistance for
increasing the capacity for renewable energy in the country, as described above \. The development of renewable
energy was in turn underpinned by the technical and policy assistance provided by the project \.
From the combined impact of TA and âfinancing of investmentsâ? components Carbon dioxide emission reductions
attributable to the project were 270,770 tCO2 (tons of carbon dioxide) compared to the project target of 218,400
tCO2 from displacement of more polluting gas -fired thermal generation\.
5\. Efficiency:
The post-completion economic and financial viability of the project was estimated using cost -benefit analysis for
framework-type projects\. The economic and financial analysis was based on the actual outputs of each component,
the actual costs during the project implementation and revised projection of costs and benefits \. The economic costs
and benefits were calculated exclusive of taxes and subsidies \.
At completion, the project was estimated to have an EIRR of 22 percent, compared to appraisal stage EIRR of 17
percent\. Improvement of the post-completion economic viability of the project is primarily due to higher actual total
investments in small hydropower plants and, thus, larger amount of more expensive gas -based thermal generation
displaced\. Additionally, the project contributed to improvement of the country âs energy security by increasing the
share of electricity supply based on indigenous energy resources \.
There was a shortfall in the Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) from appraisal estimates due mainly to a 30-35%
increase in nominal investment costs \. The ICR states that the project was financially sound despite a substantial
increase in key factors affecting the financial viability of the project \.
The financing of investments component of the project provided funding for 23 SHPPs and demonstrated the
financial and technical viability of such investments \. The demonstration effect coupled with the TA component, which
contributed to improvement of the regulatory environment for renewable energy, facilitated leveraging of around
US$48 million of private investments in renewable energy \.
Overall efficiency is rated substantial \.
ERR )/Financial Rate of Return (FRR)
a\. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) FRR ) at appraisal and the
re-
re -estimated value at evaluation :
Rate Available? Point Value Coverage/Scope*
Appraisal Yes 17% 100%
ICR estimate Yes 22% 100%
* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated\.
6\. Outcome:
The relevance of objectives and relevance of design are both rated high\. The achievement of the project
development is substantial from the increase in privately owned and operated power generation utilizing renewable
energy\. The global environmental objective is rated substantial with considerable progress in lowering barriers to
renewable energy and energy efficiency and exceeding the targeted level of greenhouse gases from the project \.
Efficiency is rated substantial given a favorable economic rate of return fore the project \. Overall outcome is rated
satisfactory \.
a\. Outcome Rating : Satisfactory
7\. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating:
The regulatory environment for development of SHPPs continues to be favorable with limited political interference\.
The feed-in tariff is automatically adjusted for changes in inflation and AMD/Euro exchange rate to compensate the
owners for changes in the local currency denominated costs of imported equipment and inflation\. The SHPPs are
run in technically sound manner with adequate operation and maintenance budget\.
However, it should be noted that future rate of increase in the share of renewable energy based power generation
might be lower given that economically/financially most viable projects have mostly been developed\. Therefore, to
maintain the momentum of small renewable energy development, the government will need to revisit its interim and
long-term renewable energy penetration targets, identify and remove the remaining obstacles to development of
renewable energy and make a decision on future feed-in tariffs in order to realize the less attractive renewable
energy potential\. The Renewable Energy Roadmap developed as part of this project would facilitate the government
thinking on those issues\.
The Government decided to continue using the R2E2 (which has gained significant experience from other Bank and
donor funded projects) to further invest and promote investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency\. In
particular, the Government plans to authorize the R2E2 Fund to use the repayments from on-lending components of
the Bank financed Renewable Energy and Urban Heating Projects to directly finance renewable energy and energy
efficiency projects or on-lend the revolving funds through financial institutions\. However, the government needs to
take several steps to further secure the sustainability of renewable and energy efficiency projects:
improve enforcement of compliance with minimum environmental flow requirements of rivers to discourage
SHPP owners from utilizing the technically possible maximum of the river volume and not honoring the minimum
environmental flow regulations\.
expedite adoption of the revised methodology for calculation of the environmental flow of rivers and maximum
allowed intake from surface waters since the existing methodology is not clear enough and creates room for
misinterpretations\.
further improve the regulatory framework for renewable energy\. Specifically, the current validity period of 3
years for water use permits should be increased, to reduce regulatory risks for investors\. Moreover, the
maximum review period allowed to the Ministry for reviewing reports on Environmental Impact Assessment
should be reduced from the current maximum of 12 months, so not to hurdle timely development of projects due
to bureaucratic delays\.
Overall, taking into account all of the above issues, the risk to development outcome is rated negligible to low \.
a\. Risk to Development Outcome Rating : Negligible to Low
8\. Assessment of Bank Performance:
a\. Quality at entry:
The project design drew upon the lessons learned from design and implementation of similar renewable
energy projects, including Turkey Renewable Energy Project (2004), Hungary Small Hydro Project financed by
GEF (2003), Macedonia Power System Improvement Project, which had a component on rehabilitation of mini
hydropower plants (1998), India Renewable Resources Development Project (1992), a number of Mexican
renewable energy projects\.
The project appropriately relied on competent private financing institutions to implement the on -lending
component, and included substantial TA to remove obstacles to development of renewable energy \.
The project was underpinned by sound economic and financial analysis \. Specifically, analysis of costs of small
renewable projects (SHPPs on natural and artificial water flows and WPPs ) was conducted to demonstrate the
cost-competitiveness of small renewable projects compared to new mid -size/large hydropower plants, new CCGT
(combined cycle gas turbine) plants, and electricity imports\. The project team also conducted a cost -benefit
analysis for investment component of the project to assess its economic and financial viability \.
Some aspects/technologies of renewable energy are quite knowledge -intensive and involve significant âlearning-
by-doing\.â? Therefore, the project design should allow sufficient flexibility to adjust project implementation
accordingly\. The TA component of the project was flexible enough to allow changes in the focus of activities
given the results/findings of various feasibility studies /estimates of renewable energy resource potential \.
Moreover, the âfinancing of investmentsâ? component did not prescribe specific types of renewable energy based
power plants that could be financed under the project, which is considered good practice in the sector \. It rather
required CC to conduct its own due diligence and ensure that the project is technically, financially and
environmentally sound\.
The project was geographically dispersed \. This served to take advantage of the renewable energy potential
across the country\. This process was aided by the update of the SHPP scheme, the GIS and the associated
database on renewable energy potential covering the entire territory of the country \.The âfinancing of investmentsâ?
component financed a total of 26 SHPPs in 8 regions (marzes) of Armenia\. The TA component of the project also
had broad geographical coverage \.
The risk assessment was thorough and focused on both PDO level risks (changes in the legal and regulatory
framework for renewable energy, lack of private sector interest to borrow for renewable energy investments ) and
component result risks (e\.g\. competency of R2E2 Fund, capacity of CC to implement the project )\. The identified
mitigation measures were appropriate and took into account the experience of similar projects implemented by
the Bank\. It should be noted that during the project implementation none of the risks materialized and
implementation of the project suffered neither from identified PDO level nor component result risks \.
The monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework was well defined with clear and measurable indicators as
discussed in section 10 a\.
at -Entry Rating :
Quality -at- Highly Satisfactory
b\. Quality of supervision:
The Bank Team carried out 12 supervision missions during the project \. Overall, the supervision missions
provided a comprehensive assessment of the implementation progress \. The skill mix of supervision missions
ensured that all the key issues arising were adequately handled and that the government received the needed
advice and guidance\. Issues arising during implementation were discussed with the government counterparts in
a constructive manner and appropriate action plans were developed and agreed \. The project team proactively
observed the situation on the ground to ensure that the project design remained relevant \. Several of the project
team members were field-based, including the operations officer, the energy consultant, the procurement
specialist, and the financial management specialist \. This allowed for more effective and quick resolution of
fiduciary issues\. During the project implementation, the task team composition did not change, which increased
the efficiency of support provided to the Government \. During supervision, the task team closely coordinated with
EBRD and the Cafesjian Family Foundation (CFF) to discuss outstanding issues and to develop a unified
approach in handling them\. The fiduciary and safeguards aspects of the project were adequately supervised \.
The financial management supervision and procurement ex -post reviews were conducted as scheduled \. The
implementation and utilization of the M&E framework was supervised effectively as described in section 10\.
Quality of Supervision Rating : Highly Satisfactory
Overall Bank Performance Rating : Highly Satisfactory
9\. Assessment of Borrower Performance:
a\. Government Performance:
Throughout the project preparation and implementation the key counterpart, the Ministry of Energy and
Natural Resources, provided the needed support to resolve various project related issues\. When the project was
designed, the Government had already established quite attractive feed-in tariffs for renewable energy based
power plants (higher than for any other generation plants at the time of appraisal) and introduced mandatory
off-take of all the electricity generated for the period of 15 years after receipt of operating license\.
The project funds under âfinancing of investmentsâ? component of the project were almost entirely disbursed by
the end of 2009\.
The implementation of the technical assistance component was delayed towards the final two years of the
project implementation\. This was primarily due to absence of consensus within the government on spending
directions for the remaining technical assistance funds\. It was planned to use those funds to finance preparation
of a pilot solar PV project, technical and economic/financial assessments of the Loriberd hydropower project, and
a study on innovative financial mechanisms for financing of renewable energy projects\. However, the
Government found a private investor for the pilot solar PV project and decided to pursue construction of the
Loriberd power plant as a private project\. Moreover, the government reached a consensus on specific focus of
the study on innovative financing mechanisms at a late stage of project implementation, which did not allow
sufficient time to complete the procurement and the study before the project closing date, which was extended by
6 months\.
Government Performance Rating Satisfactory
b\. Implementing Agency Performance:
The implementing agency of the project, the R 2E2 Fund had adequate capacity to implement the project \. The
R2E2 Fund had solid management team with adequate qualifications and extensive experience, including a
project coordinator\. The operations of the R2E2 Fund were overseen by the Board of Trustees, originally chaired
by the Prime Minister and subsequently by the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources \.
The R2E2 Fund was adequately staffed and professionally managed \. The turn-over of key staff at the R2E2
Fund was low, which ensured seamless implementation of the project \. The R2E2 Fund effectively managed both
the investment and TA components of the project \. The R2E2 Fund was effective in coordinating and providing
guidance on the project implementation to the private financial institutions, implementing the financing of
investments component of the project \. There were no major issues associated with fiduciary aspects of the
project\. The R2E2 Fund engaged on an âas neededâ? basis, an environmental expert to review the project -specific
EIAs/EMPs for SHPPs and to supervise construction and operation of SHPPs through random site visits \. All
audits were unqualified\.
Implementing Agency Performance Rating : Highly Satisfactory
Overall Borrower Performance Rating : Satisfactory
10\. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization:
a\. M&E Design:
The key outcome indicators for the project (installed capacity (MW) of renewables added to the power grid;
Renewable generation (GWh) added to the generation mix; and Carbon dioxide emission reductions (tCO2)) were
well-defined, relevant to the PDO and consistent with the project components \. The baseline data for all outcome
indicators was available at appraisal \. The R2E2 Fund had overall responsibility for monitoring and evaluation of the
project and developed a management information system meeting the project needs \. The management information
system provided information and data on the pipeline of renewable energy sub -projects; types of sub-projects;
disbursed, committed and invested amounts, cost -sharing with financing partners; repayment delays; and fund
reflows\.
b\. M&E Implementation:
Based on that information system, the R 2E2 Fund submitted regular and on-demand implementation progress
reports to the Bank, which also contained the key outcome and intermediate results indicators \. The ICR states that
the data on key outcome indicators, which was obtained from PRSC (Public Services Regulatory Commission ), was
reliable\. Specifically, data on installed capacity of renewable generation added to the power grid and renewable
energy generation added to the generation mix was provided by the PSRC â an independent multi-sectoral regulator
with well-established data collection and reporting systems \. Additionally, CC regularly submitted to the R 2E2 Fund
quarterly reports on pipelines of projects, disbursements, repayments, etc \.
c\. M&E Utilization:
The M&E system was a useful feedback for the implementing agency and Government during the project
implementation and augmented the decision -making\.
M&E Quality Rating : High
11\. Other Issues
a\. Safeguards:
Environmental and Social Safeguards : The project was designed and implemented in compliance with the Bank's
safeguard policies and procedures \. The project was assigned the âFinancial Intermediaryâ? environmental screening
category and triggered OP 4\.01 (Environmental Assessment), OP 7\.50 (Projects on International Waterways ) and OP
4\.37 (Dam Safety)\. The EMP adequately described the potential threats and their mitigations \. The Operations
Manual (OM) of the project contained an elaborate description of the environmental assessment process as well as
requirements for compliance monitoring \.
The project did not have significant or irreversible long -term environmental impacts\. On the opposite, it contributed to
reduction of GHG emissions by replacing some of the gas -fired thermal generation\. The only environmental impacts
were caused by the construction of SHPPs \. CC had a designated specialist, which reviewed all of the 26 sub-project
financing applications to ensure that the environmental assessment report and EMPs of specific projects were in
compliance with Bankâs safeguard procedures\. Additionally, the R2E2 Fund regularly hired a qualified environmental
specialist to review the environmental due diligence process at CC and conduct site visits during construction and
operation of SHPPs financed under the project \. As part of the supervision missions, the Bank âs environmental
specialist also did not identify any major environmental issues and deviations from the EMP \.
b\. Fiduciary Compliance:
Procurement: Procurement under the project was carried out in accordance with the project design and in
compliance with the legal agreement\. The R2E2 Fund had adequate procurement capacity with qualified
procurement specialists and accurate as well as comprehensive procurement filing \. The bidding documents,
evaluation reports and contracts were prepared and presented in a competent manner \. No major procurement issues
were identified during the project implementation \.
Financial Management: Financial management under the project was conducted in accordance with the Bank
guidelines and rules\. The FM staffing and organization arrangements were overall adequate and acceptable to the
Bank\. The Interim un-audited financial reports (IFRs) as well as the project and R2E2 annual financial audits were
submitted without delays and were of adequate quality \. The level and timeliness of the government co -financing was
satisfactory\. There were no qualified audits\.
c\. Unintended Impacts (positive or negative):
d\. Other:
The project had temporary and permanent impact on poverty reduction\. Specifically, several residents from the local
rural areas were temporarily hired to work on construction of 26 SHPPs financed under the project\. There was also
development of local manufacturing tied to renewable energy infrastructure\. The average construction time is
estimated at around 24-36 months and the average salary for temporary employees was around US$400/month\.
Additionally, the project contributed to long-term poverty reduction by creating permanent jobs\. In particular, each
new operational SHPP resulted in creation of 3-5 new jobs (e\.g\. power engineers, janitors)\. Therefore, the project is
estimated to have generated 100 new jobs with the average monthly salary of around US$ 200-300\.
12\.
12\. Ratings : ICR IEG Review Reason for
Disagreement /Comments
Outcome : Satisfactory Satisfactory
Risk to Development Negligible to Low Negligible to Low
Outcome :
Bank Performance : Satisfactory Highly Satisfactory Sound project design, risk assessment,
and supervision; including the M&E
framework and implementation\.
Borrower Performance : Satisfactory Satisfactory
Quality of ICR : Satisfactory
NOTES:
NOTES
- When insufficient information is provided by the Bank
for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade
the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1,
2006\.
- The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column
could cross-reference other sections of the ICR
Review, as appropriate\.
13\. Lessons:
The following two lessons are adapted from the ICR :
Market -driven choice of technology is essential for sustainable development of renewable energy \. The project
ÂMarket
did not prescribe any renewable energy resource and application of specific renewable energy technologies, but
rather focused on creation of enabling environment, specified general sub -project eligibility criteria and required
the PFI, implementing the âfinancing of investmentsâ? component, to do its own due diligence \.
Well-
Well -designed financing mechanisms for renewable energy projects are important for scale-
ÂWell scale-up of renewable
investments Introduction of project financing coupled with capacity building support to CC on project
energy investments\.
financing, technical, environmental and other aspects of renewable energy projects helped to introduce to market a
new lending product, thus, explicitly displaying the viability of commercial lending for renewable energy projects
and eliminating unwarranted perceptions of risks associated with such projects \.
14\. Assessment Recommended? Yes No
Why? Renewable energy projects have had a mixed record in different countries, both within the Eastern Europe
and Central Asia region and elsewhere \. A field-based assessment of this project as part of a cluster of similar
projects will throw light on the factors driving sustainability of renewable energy promotion efforts \.
15\. Comments on Quality of ICR:
The ICR is written in a clear, thoughtful and analytical manner \. The document provides evidence of outputs and
outcomes\. The lessons are well-grounded in the project's institutional and implementation experience \. The core
portion of the document is concise, and relevant information is provided in annexes
a\.Quality of ICR Rating : Satisfactory | APPROVAL |
P160224 | â«ÙÙ?سÙ
Ø Ø¨ÙشرÙذ٠اÙÙØ«ÙÙØ©â¬
â«ÙØ«ÙÙØ© خاصة باÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«ÙاÙستخداÙ
اÙرسÙ
Ù Ù?ÙØâ¬
â«Ø±ÙÙ
اÙتÙرÙرâªPAD2574 :â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙØ¥ÙÙشاء ÙاÙتعÙ
Ùرâ¬
â«Ø¹â¬â«ÙØ«ÙÙØ© تÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ùتر⬠â«Ø¨Ø´Ø£Ù اÙÙرض Ù?â¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙâ¬â«Ø¨ÙÙÙ
Ø© ⪠295â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ©)â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùسرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«(بÙ
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠اÙدعÙ
Ù
٠آÙÙØ© اÙÙرÙض Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¥Ù٠اÙجÙ
ÙÙرÙâ¬
â«ÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبر⬠â«Ù
٠أج٠تÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù
شرÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ?سÙ
Ø Ø¨ÙشرÙذ٠اÙÙØ«ÙÙØ©â¬
â«âª 22â¬Ø´Ø¨Ø§Øâª/â¬Ù?برâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر âª2018â¬â¬
â«ÙØاع اÙÙÙÙ ÙتÙÙÙÙÙجÙا اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات ÙااÙتصااÙتâ¬
â«Ù
ÙØÙØ© اÙشر٠اأÙÙØ³Ø ÙØ´Ù
ا٠إÙ?رÙÙÙاâ¬
â«Ø§Ù ÙÙ
Ù٠اÙÙØ´Ù? ع٠Ù
ØتÙاÙا Ù
٠دÙ٠إذ٠Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙرسÙ
Ùة⪠\.â¬Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ù Ùâ¬
â«ÙØÙ ÙÙ
Ù ÙØص٠عÙÙÙا استخداÙ
Ùا إا٠Ù?٠إØار أداء ÙاجباتÙâª/â¬Ùا⬠â«Ùذ٠اÙÙØ«ÙÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ÙÙدة اÙتÙزÙع Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø£Ø³Ø¹Ø§Ø± اÙعÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ù â Ù?٠⪠16â¬Ø´Ø¨Ø§Øâª/â¬Ù?برâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر âª)2018â¬â¬ â«(سعر اÙصرÙ? اÙسارâ¬
â«Ø© Ùâ¬
â«ÙبÙاÙÙة⬠â«Ø§ÙØاÙÙØ© = ÙÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙعÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ø© Ùâ¬
â«ÙبÙاÙÙة⬠â«âª 1â¬Ø¯Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ = ⪠1507\.5â¬ÙÙرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙØ©â¬
â«âª 1â¬ÙاÙÙ٠اÙثاÙÙâª/â¬ÙÙاÙر â ⪠31â¬ÙاÙÙ٠اأÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø¯ÙسÙ
برâ¬
â«ØاÙ?ظ غاÙÙ
âªHafez Ghanemâ¬â¬ â«Ùائب اÙرئÙس اإÙÙÙÙÙ
Ùâª:â¬â¬
â«Ø¬ ÙÙÙ
ار جا âªSaroj Kumar Jhaâ¬â¬â«Ø³Ø§Ø±Ù⬠â«Ø© اÙشر٠اأÙÙسØâª:â¬â¬
â«Ù
دÙر إدارâ¬
â«Ø®ÙسÙÙ ÙÙÙس Ø¥ÙرÙغÙÙÙÙ âªJose Luis Irigoyenâ¬â¬ â«Ù
دÙر Ø£ÙدÙ
ÙÙØاع اÙÙÙÙâª:â¬â¬
â«Ø£ÙÙÙÙ?ÙÙ٠ب⪠\.â¬Ù٠بار âªOlivier P\. Le Berâ¬â¬ â«Ù
دÙر ÙØاع اÙÙÙÙâª:â¬â¬
â«Ø²Ùاد سÙÙÙ
اÙÙÙت âªZiad S\. El-Nakatâ¬â¬ â«Ùائد Ù?رÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ùâª:â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ختصرâ¬
â«Ø§Øªâ¬
ADSCR Average Debt Service Cover Ratio Ù â«Ù
تÙسØâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠تغØÙØ© خدÙ
Ø© اÙدÙÙâ¬
BDL Banque du Liban â«Ù
صرÙ? ÙبÙاÙâ¬
BRT Bus Rapid Transit â«Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬
CCTV Closed Circuit Television Ù â«Ø© تÙÙ?زâ¬
â«ÙÙÙÙØ© Ù
غÙÙة⬠â«Ø¯Ø§Ø¦Ø±â¬
CDR Council for Development and Reconstruction â«Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ارâ¬
CFF Concessional Financing Facility â«Ùسرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ Ù? â«Ø¢ÙÙØ© اÙÙرÙضâ¬
Ù â«Ø§ÙÙ
â¬
CNG Compressed Natural Gas â«ØºØ§Ø² ØبÙع٠Ù
ضغÙØâ¬
CPF Country Partnership Framework â«Ø¥Øار اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© Ù
ع اÙبÙدâ¬
Selection Based on the Consultantsâ Qualifications â«Ù
ؤÙاÙتâ¬
Ù â«Ø£Ø³Ø§Ø³â¬ â«Ø¹ÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙختÙارâ¬
CQS
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ستشارÙÙâ¬
DA Designated Account Ù â«Ø§ÙÙ
â¬
â«Øدد⬠Ù? â«Ø§ÙØسابâ¬
Directorate General of Land and Maritime and â«Ùâ¬â«Ù ÙاÙبØر⬠Ùâ«Ø§ÙÙ
دÙرâ¬
â«ÙØ© اÙعاÙ
Ø© ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙبرâ¬
DGLMT
Transport
EIRR Economic Internal Return Ratio â«Ù
عد٠اÙعائد اÙداخÙ٠ااÙÙتصادÙâ¬
Ù
ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment â«ØªÙÙÙÙ
اأÙثر ااÙجتÙ
اع٠ÙاÙبÙئÙâ¬
ESMP Environmental and Social Management Plan Ù â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙئÙة⬠٠â«Ø®ØØ© اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬
EU European Union â«Ø§Ø§ÙتØاد اأÙÙرÙبÙâ¬
FBS Selection Under a Fixed Budget Ù â«Ø§Ø§ÙختÙار ضÙ
Ù Ù
Ùزâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙØ© ثابتةâ¬
FM Financial Management â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
Ù â«Ø§Ø¥Ùدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬
FO Financial Officer â«Ø§ÙÙ
سؤÙ٠اÙÙ
اÙÙâ¬
GBA Greater Beirut Area â«Ù⬠Ù? â«Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبرâ¬
GCF Global Climate Fund â«ØµÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
Ùاخ اÙعاÙÙ
Ùâ¬
GCFF Global Concessional Financing Facility â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
Ù â«Ùسرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ Ù? â«Ø¢ÙÙØ© اÙÙرÙضâ¬
Ù â«Ø§ÙÙ
â¬
GDP Gross Domestic Product â«Ø¥Ø¬Ù
اÙ٠اÙÙاتج اÙÙ
ØÙÙâ¬
GHG Greenhouse Gas â«ØºØ§Ø²â¬
â«Ø§Øª Ø¥Ùبعاثات اÙدÙ?Ùئةâ¬
GOL Government of Lebanon â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙØ©â¬
Ù â«Ø§ÙØÙÙÙ
Ø©â¬
GPS Global Positioning System â«Ø§ÙÙظاÙ
اÙعاÙÙ
Ù ÙتØدÙد اÙÙ
ÙاÙعâ¬
GRM Grievance Redress Mechanism â«Ø¢ÙÙØ© Ù
عاÙجة اÙØ´ÙاÙÙâ¬
Ù
GRS Grievance Redress Service â«Ø®Ø¯Ù
Ø© Ù
عاÙجة اÙØ´ÙاÙÙâ¬
ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report â«ØªÙرÙر اÙÙتائج ÙاستÙÙ
ا٠اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
ILO International Labour Organization â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙØ©â¬
Ù â«Ù
ÙظÙ
Ø© اÙعÙ
Ùâ¬
IPF Investment Project Financing â«Ùâ¬â«Ø¹ ااÙستثÙ
ارâ¬â«ØªÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙØ© ÙÙÙØاعâ¬
Ù â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØاسبÙØ©â¬
Ù â«Ø§ÙÙ
عاÙÙرâ¬
IPSAS International Public Sector Accounting Standards
â«Ø§ÙعاÙ
â¬
IRR Internal Rate of Return â«Ù
عد٠اÙعائد اÙداخÙÙâ¬
Ù
ISDB Islamic Development Bank â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اإÙساÙÙ
Ù ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
IT Information Technology â«ØªÙÙÙÙÙجÙا اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
اتâ¬
ITS Intelligent Transport Systems â«Ø£ÙظÙ
Ø© اÙÙÙ٠اÙØ°ÙÙØ©â¬
LLCR Loan Life Cover Ratio â«Ù
عد٠تغØÙØ© اÙÙرض Ù
د٠ØÙاتÙâ¬
â«ØªØÙÙ٠اÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠اأÙÙص٠Ù
٠أجÙâ¬
MFD Maximizing Financing for Development
â«Ø§ÙتÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
MoF Ministry of Finance â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
Ù â«Ø²Ø±â¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ùاâ¬
MPWT Ministry of Public Works and Transport â«Ø²Ø±â¬
â«Ø© اÙÙÙÙ ÙاأÙشغا٠اÙعاÙ
ة⬠â«Ùاâ¬
NMT Nonmotorized Transport Ù â«Ùسائ٠اÙÙÙ٠غÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¢ÙÙÙØ©â¬
NPV Net Present Value â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙØاÙÙØ© اÙصاÙ?ÙØ©â¬
OPEX Operational Expenditure â«Ø§ÙتشغÙÙÙØ©â¬
Ù â«Ø§ÙÙÙ?Ùاتâ¬
OPRC Operational Procurement Review Committee â«ÙجÙØ© استعرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶ اÙتÙرÙد اÙتشغÙÙÙâ¬
PAD Project Appraisal Document â«Ø¹â¬â«ÙØ«ÙÙØ© تÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
PDO Project Development Objective â«Ø¹ ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬â«ÙدÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
PFS Project Financial Statement(s) )â«Ø¹ اÙÙ
اÙÙ(Ø©â¬â«Ø¨ÙاÙات اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬/â«Ø¨ÙاÙâ¬
PIM Project Implementation Manual â«Ø¹â¬â«Ø¯ÙÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
PIU Project Implementation Unit â«Ø¹â¬â«ÙØدة تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
PLM Person with Limited Mobility â«Ø´Ø®Øµ Ù
ØدÙد اÙØرÙØ©â¬
PPP Public-Private Partnership Ù â«Ø§ÙÙØاعâ¬
â«Ù٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاص⬠٠â«Ø§Ùشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙâ¬
PPSD Project Procurement Strategy for Development â«Ø¹ ÙÙتÙÙ
Ùة⬠٠â«Ø§Ø³ØªØ±â¬
â«Ø§ØªÙجÙØ© تÙرÙد اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
QCBS Quality-and-Cost-Based Selection â«Ø§ÙÙÙعÙØ© ÙاÙÙÙÙ?Ø©â¬
Ù â«Ø§Ø§ÙختÙار اÙÙائÙ
عÙÙâ¬
RAP Resettlement Action Plan â«Ø®ØØ© عÙ
٠إعادة اإÙسÙاÙâ¬
ROW Right-of-Way â«Ø٠ااÙرتÙ?اÙâ¬
Ù
RPA Regional Procurement Adviser â«Ù
ستشار اÙتÙرÙد اإÙÙÙÙÙ
Ùâ¬
RPTA Railways and Public Transport Authority â«Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙâ¬
SOE Statement of Expenditure â«Ø¨Ùا٠اÙÙÙ?Ùاتâ¬
â«Ø§Ùدرâ¬/â«Ø§Ø³Ø©â¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øª ااÙستÙصائÙØ© ØÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ùدرâ¬
SPS Stated Preference Survey(s)
Ù? â«Ø§ÙتÙ?ضÙاÙتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙÙØ©â¬
STEP Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement â«Ø§Ùتتبع اÙÙ
ÙÙج٠ÙÙتباداÙت Ù?٠اÙتÙرÙدâ¬
Ù
UIFR Unaudited Interim Financial Report ÙÙ â«Ùت غÙر Ù
â¬
â«Ø¯ÙÙ⬠Ùâ«ØªÙرÙر Ù
اÙÙ Ù
ؤâ¬
Ù?
UN United Nations â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙ
Ù
اÙÙ
تØدةâ¬
UTDP Urban Transport Development Project â«Ùâ¬â«Ø¹ تØÙÙر اÙÙÙ٠اÙØضرâ¬â«Ù
شرÙâ¬
VAT Value-added Tax Ù? â«Ø§ÙضرÙبة عÙ٠اÙÙÙÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ضاÙ?Ø©â¬
WA Withdrawal Application â«ØÙب ااÙÙسØابâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«)( âªGreater Beirut Public Transport Projectâ¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
اتâ¬
â«Ø£Ø¯Ø§Ø© اإÙÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶âª:â¬â¬ â«Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ÙÙØ©Ø Ø§ÙبÙدâª/â¬Ø§ÙبÙداÙ⬠â«Ø¹ خاص بÙ
ÙØÙØ© Ù?â¬â«Ø¹ Ù
شرÙâ¬â«ÙÙ Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³ØªØ«Ù
ارâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³ØªØ«Ù
ار⬠â«Ø¹â¬ â«Ø¹â¬â«Ù
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙ⬠â«ØªÙ
ÙÙÙâ¬
â«ØªÙ
ÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ùâ¬
â«âª-â¬Øاجة Øارئة ÙÙÙ
ساعدة Ø£Ù ÙجÙد ÙÙÙد Ù
Ù?رÙضة عÙ٠اÙÙدرâ¬
â«Ø§Øªâ¬
â«Ù
اÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«âª -â¬ÙسØاء Ùâ¬
â«âª -â¬Ø³ÙسÙØ© Ù
شارÙعâ¬
â«Ù?ئة اÙتÙÙÙÙ
اÙبÙئÙâª:â¬â¬ â«ØªØ§Ø±ÙØ® ااÙÙتÙاءâª:â¬â¬ â«ØªØ§Ø±ÙØ® اÙÙ
ÙاÙ?ÙØ©âª:â¬â¬
â«ØªÙÙÙÙ
ÙاÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø£âª-â¬â¬ â«âª 31â¬Ùâª/1â¬Ø¯ÙسÙ
بر âª2023â¬â¬ â«âª 15â¬Ø£Ø°Ø§Ø±âª/â¬Ù
ارس âª2018â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتعاÙ٠بÙ٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâª/â¬Ù
ؤسسة اÙÙ
ستÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙØ©âª:â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙ
ÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
٠أ٠تابع ÙÙتض٠تÙسÙÙÙا Ùاش Ùâ¬
â«Øا⬠â«Ù
شرÙع Ù
Ù Ù⬠â«ÙعÙ
â¬
â«Ø¹ ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬â«ÙدÙ?âª/â¬Ø£ÙداÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù ÙعÙد اÙÙ
دخÙ⬠â«ÙÙابÙÙØ© ÙÙ?اذ اÙرÙاب Ø¥ÙÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبر⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙعÙتÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ø© ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
â¬â«Ø¹ ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù?٠تØسÙ٠سرâ¬â«ÙÙض٠ÙدÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ´Ù
اÙÙ ÙÙ
دÙÙØ© بÙرÙتâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙÙاتâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¥Ø³Ù
â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ?Ø© (Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دâª\.â¬Ø£âª)\.â¬â¬
â«âª230\.00â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙظÙ
⪠Øâ¬ÙاأÙسØÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙبÙÙâ¬
â«âª105\.00â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ© ÙاÙØرÙات اÙÙ
غذÙØ© ÙاÙدÙ
ج Ù?٠بÙئة ØضرÙâ¬
â«Ùة⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø®Ø¯Ù
Ø© اÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬
â«âª10\.00â¬â¬ â«Ø¹ ÙبÙاء اÙÙدرâ¬
â«Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Ø¥Ø¯Ø§Ø±â¬
â«Ø© اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬â«ÙدÙ?âª/â¬Ø£ÙداÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙرÙاب Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙرب٠ÙعÙد⬠â«ÙÙابÙÙØ© اÙÙÙ?اذ Ø¥ÙÙ٠باÙÙسبة Ø¥ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙعÙتÙاâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ø© اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
â¬â«Ø¹ ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© بتØسÙ٠سرâ¬â«ÙÙض٠ÙدÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
دخ٠اÙØ´Ù
اÙÙ ÙÙ
دÙÙØ© بÙرÙتâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙÙاتâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«)( âªGreater Beirut Public Transport Projectâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙظÙ
اتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùترض⪠:â¬Ø§ÙجÙ
ÙÙرÙâ¬
â«ÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ?ذة⪠:â¬Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ارâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«)( âªGreater Beirut Public Transport Projectâ¬â¬
â«Ø¹ (Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دâª\.â¬Ø£âª)\.â¬â¬â«Ø¨ÙاÙات تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«] â [تÙ
ÙÙÙ⬠â«] â [صÙادÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙة⬠â«][ Ù
ÙØØ© Ù
٠اÙÙ
ؤسسة⬠â«][ إئتÙ
ا٠Ù
Ù⬠â«] â [اÙبÙÙ⬠â«][ تÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¥Ø¦ØªÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
ÙظÙ
Ø© ÙظÙرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬
â«Ù
Ùاز⬠â«ÙÙتÙÙ
Ùة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤسسة⬠â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙ ÙØ¥ÙÙشاءâ¬
â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙاÙتعÙ
Ùرâ¬
â«ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ù?جÙØ© اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙâª:â¬â¬ â«Ø¹ اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙâª:â¬â¬â«Ù
جÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø¹âª:â¬â¬â«Ø¹ ÙÙÙ?Ø© اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«Ù
جÙ
Ùâ¬
â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«âª345\.00â¬â¬ â«âª345\.00â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙØ© ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
Ù٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ (اÙÙ
ؤسسةâ¬
â«ÙاÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙØ¥ÙÙشاء ÙاÙتعÙ
Ùر)â¬
â«âª225\.20â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ (Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دâª\.â¬Ø£âª)\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
بÙغ⬠â«Ù
صدر اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙâ¬
â«âª69\.80â¬â¬ â«Ùسرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø¢ÙÙØ© اÙÙرÙض Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
بÙغâ¬
â«âª225\.20â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙØ¥ÙÙشاء ÙاÙتعÙ
Ùر âª88380 -â¬â¬
â«âª50\.00â¬â¬ â«Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Øددة)⬠â«ÙØ© خاصة خار Ùâ¬
â«Ø¬ÙØ© (غÙر Ù?⬠â«Ù
صادر تجارÙâ¬
â«âª345\.00â¬â¬ â«Ø¹â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
جÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ùعة (Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دâª\.â¬Ø£âª)\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
صرÙÙ?ات اÙÙ
تÙÙâ¬
â«âª2024â¬â¬ â«âª2023â¬â¬ â«âª2022â¬â¬ â«âª2021â¬â¬ â«âª2020â¬â¬ â«âª2019â¬â¬ â«âª2018â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«)( âªGreater Beirut Public Transport Projectâ¬â¬
â«âª53\.49â¬â¬ â«âª89\.80â¬â¬ â«âª69\.86â¬â¬ â«âª39\.16â¬â¬ â«âª23\.18â¬â¬ â«âª17\.40â¬â¬ â«âª2\.11â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙسÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âª295\.00â¬â¬ â«âª241\.51â¬â¬ â«âª151\.71â¬â¬ â«âª81\.85â¬â¬ â«âª42\.69â¬â¬ â«âª19\.51â¬â¬ â«âª2\.11â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ùتر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤسسÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ù
جا٠اÙÙØاعات (اÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¦Ø¯)â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ ÙاÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙر Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«)( âªGreater Beirut Public Transport Projectâ¬â¬
â«Ù
جااÙت اÙÙØاعات Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ساÙÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ø§ÙتغÙÙر اÙÙ
Ùاخ٠ÙاÙÙØ´Ù? ع٠اÙÙÙارثâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙ
د Ùâ¬
â«Ù٠اÙÙصÙر ÙاÙØÙÙÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙعÙ
ÙÙØ© Ùرصد Ù
خاØر اÙÙÙارث ÙاÙتغÙÙر اÙÙ
Ùاخ٠عÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªÙ
اÙÙØ´Ù? ع٠ÙØ°Ùâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙدرÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øª اÙتاÙÙØ©Øâ¬
â«Ùخاذ اإÙجرâ¬
â«Ø¹ اتâ¬â«ÙÙ ÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù
ÙÙجÙØ© تشخÙصâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Øددة ÙÙ
٠خاÙÙ⬠â«Ø¹ بÙ٠اÙØ°ÙÙر ÙاإÙÙاث⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙÙ
ا عÙ٠ضÙØ¡ Ù?جÙات اÙبÙد Ù?⬠â«âª \.aâ¬Ø§ÙتØÙÙÙ ÙتØدÙد اÙÙ?جÙات اÙخاصة باÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠ÙاØار اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© Ù
ع بÙد⪠:â¬ÙعÙ
⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصادÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙضاعâ¬
â«Ø¬Ù⪠:â¬ÙعÙ
⬠â«Øددة Ù?Ù (Ø£) Ùâª/â¬Ø£Ù تØسÙ٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
رâ¬
â«Ø£Ø© أ٠اÙر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ÙØ© Ù?â¬
â«Øددة Ù
٠أج٠Ù
عاÙجة اÙÙ?جÙات اÙجÙدرÙâ¬
â«Ù
Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¡âª/â¬Ø¥Ø¬Ø±â¬
â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øª Ù?⬠â«âª \.bâ¬Ø¥Ø¬Ø±â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Øددة Ù?Ù (ب)⪠:â¬ÙعÙ
⬠â«ØصاÙت Ù
٠ااÙجرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øª Ù?⬠â«Ø§Øª Ù?٠إØار اÙÙتائج Ùرصد Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù⬠â«âª \.câ¬Ø¥Ø¯Ø±â¬
â«Ø§Ø¬ اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«ÙÙعÙ
ÙÙاتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£Ø¯Ø§Ø© تصÙÙÙ? اÙÙ
خاØر اÙÙ
ÙÙجÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙتصÙÙÙ?⬠â«Ù?ئة اÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«Ù
رتÙ?عâ¬
â«â«Ù?⬠â«âª \.1â¬Ø§ÙسÙاسة ÙاÙØÙÙÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ùâ¬â«â« جÙÙر⬠â«Ø§ÙتصادÙة⬠â«âª \.2â¬Ø§ÙÙ
خاØر اÙÙ
اÙرÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ùâ¬â«â« جÙÙر⬠â«Ø§ØªÙجÙاتÙâ¬
â«âª \.3â¬Ø³Ùاسات اÙÙØاع Ùاستر Ùâ¬
â«Ùâ¬â«â« جÙÙر⬠â«Ø¹ أ٠اÙبرÙاÙ
جâ¬â«âª \.4â¬Ø§ÙتصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙ?ÙÙ ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬â«â« جÙÙر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤسسÙØ© ÙÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° ÙااÙستداÙ
ة⬠â«âª \.5â¬Ø§ÙÙدرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ù
عتدÙâ¬
â«â«Ù?⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙئتÙ
اÙÙة⬠â«âª \.6â¬Ø§ÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ùâ¬â«â« جÙÙر⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙئÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.7â¬Ø§ÙÙ
خاØر Ùâ¬
â«Ù
رتÙ?عâ¬
â«â«Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙÙة⬠â«âª \.8â¬Ø§ÙجÙاتâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«)( âªGreater Beirut Public Transport Projectâ¬â¬
â«Ùâ¬â«âª \.9â¬Ø§ÙÙ
خاØر اأÙخرâ¬
â«Ùâ¬â«â« جÙÙر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
خاØر اÙعاÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«)( âªGreater Beirut Public Transport Projectâ¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙ
تثاÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙاسةâ¬
â«ÙØâ¬â«Ø§ÙØ© Ù
ع بÙد Ù
Ù ØÙØ« اÙÙ
ØتÙ٠أ٠Ù?٠أÙج٠Ù
ÙØÙظة أخرâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ù
٠إØار اÙشرâ¬â«ÙÙ ÙÙØÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«]â[اÙ⬠â«] [ÙعÙ
â¬
â«Ø¹ أ٠تÙازâ¬
â«Ø§Ùت ÙسÙاسات اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙØ⬠â«ÙÙ ÙÙتض٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«]â[اÙ⬠â«] [ÙعÙ
â¬
â«Ø§Ù⬠â«ÙعÙ
⬠â«Ø¹â¬â«Ø§ÙØÙ
ائÙØ© اÙت٠أØÙÙÙا اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø³Ùاسات اإÙجرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øªâ¬
â«â⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙÙÙÙ
اÙبÙئÙâªOP/BP 4\.01â¬â¬
â«â⬠â«Ø§ÙØبÙعÙØ©âªOP/BP 4\.04â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙائÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«â⬠â«Ø§Ùغابات âªOP/BP 4\.36â¬â¬
â«â⬠â«Ø¥Ø¯Ø§Ø±â¬
â«Ø© اآÙÙ?اتâªOP 4\.09â¬â¬
â«â⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ادÙØ©âªOP/BP 4\.11â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙØ«ÙاÙ?Ùة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùاردâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«â⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙصÙÙÙÙâªOP/BP 4\.10â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙاÙâ¬
â«â⬠â«ÙØ©âªOP/BP 4\.12â¬â¬
â«Ø¥Ø¹Ø§Ø¯Ø© إسÙا٠ÙسرÙâ¬
â«â⬠â«Ø³Ø§ÙÙ
Ø© اÙسدÙدâªOP/BP 4\.37â¬â¬
â«â⬠â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙØ©âªOP/BP 7\.50â¬â¬ â«Ù
Ù
رâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙÙ
ÙاÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شارÙع ØÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«â⬠â«Ø¹ عÙÙÙا âªOP/BP 7\.60â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙاز⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شارÙع Ù?٠اÙÙ
ÙاØÙ Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙاÙÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙصÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙÙساÙ
ÙاÙتÙصÙÙ?â¬
â«ÙÙ ÙØد Ø£Ùص٠بعد تارÙØ® اÙسرÙاÙâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø¹ Ù?٠غضÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø´ÙرÙ⬠â«Ùؤسس ÙØدة تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø¹ÙÙ Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ø£Ù Ù⬠â«âª\.1â¬â¬
â«Ø¹âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø¹ ÙÙÙÙا⪠\.â¬Ø§ÙجدÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ø§ÙÙسÙ
Ø£Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ù٠أ ⪠1â¬Ù
٠اتÙ?ا٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ÙØاÙ?ظ عÙÙÙا Ù?Ù Ù
رâ¬
â«Ø§Ø٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ÙباÙتاÙ٠أ٠Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«)( âªGreater Beirut Public Transport Projectâ¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙÙساÙ
ÙاÙتÙصÙÙ?â¬
â«Ø¹ ÙاعتÙ
اد٠Ù?٠غضÙÙ Ø´Ùر ÙاØد Ùâ¬
â«ÙØد Ø£Ùص٠بعد تارÙØ® اÙسرÙاÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø¹ÙÙ Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار إعداد دÙÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«âª\.2â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙجدÙ٠⪠\.2â¬Ø§ÙÙسÙ
Ø£Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ù٠ج ⪠1â¬Ù
٠ااÙتÙ?ا٠اÙÙاÙÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙÙساÙ
ÙاÙتÙصÙÙ?â¬
â«Ø¹ÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ⬠â«ÙØد Ø£Ùص٠Ù
٠تارÙØ® اÙسرÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù Ù?â¬â«Ø´Ùر Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ù٠اÙÙ
Ùترض Ø£Ù ÙØÙب Ù
Ù Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار⪠Øâ¬Ù?٠غضÙÙ âªÙ 18â¬Ø§â¬ â«âª\.3â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ù٠٠⪠1â¬Ù
٠ااÙتÙ?ا٠اÙÙاÙÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù
رضÙا ÙÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ø§ÙجدÙ٠⪠\.2â¬Ø§ÙÙسÙ
Ø£Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات ÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
ستشار Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«)( âªGreater Beirut Public Transport Projectâ¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙساÙ
ÙاÙتÙصÙÙ?â¬
â«ÙØد Ø£Ùص٠Ù
٠تارÙخ⬠â«Ø¹Ù٠اÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
Ùترضة أ٠تØÙب Ù
Ù Ù
جÙس ااÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار⪠Øâ¬Ù?٠غضÙÙ âªÙ 36â¬Ø§â¬
â«Ø´Ùر Ù⬠â«âª\.4â¬â¬
â«Ùâª/â¬Ù
شغÙÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص⪠\.â¬Ø§ÙجدÙ٠⪠\.2â¬Ø§ÙÙسÙ
Ø£Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ Ù âª( 2â¬Ø£)⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغ٠Ù
ع (Ø£) Ùâ¬
â«Ù
شغ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙسرÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù ÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ùع عÙدâª/â¬Ø¹ÙÙدâ¬
â«Ù
٠ااÙتÙ?ا٠اÙÙاÙÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙشرÙØâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙصÙÙ?⬠â«Ø¹â¬â«Ø§ÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙØ© ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار⪠\.â¬Ø§ÙÙسÙ
âª( 9\.01â¬Ø£) Ù
٠اÙشرÙØ Ø§ÙعاÙ
Ø©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ù باÙÙÙابة ع٠اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø©â¬â«ØªÙÙ?ÙØ° ااÙتÙ?ا٠اÙÙ?ر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ?اعÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹â¬â«Ù?رÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù
Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¸Ù?٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙØدة⬠â«Ø§Ø§Ùختصاص⬠â«Ø§ÙدÙر⬠â«Ø¹â¬â«Ù٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«Ù?رâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙسÙ
â¬
â«Ùائد اÙÙ?رÙÙâ¬
â«âªGTD05â¬â¬ â«Ø²Ùاد سÙÙÙ
ÙÙدâ¬
â«Ø±Ø±â¬
â«Ø§Øª)⬠â«(Ù
سؤÙ٠ع٠اتخاذ اÙ٠ا⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙسÙ
â¬
â«Ø£Ø®ØµØ§Ø¦ÙØ© اÙتÙرÙدâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âªGGOPMâ¬â¬ â«ÙÙÙا Ù?ارسâ¬
â«Ø±Ø±â¬
â«Ø§Øª)⬠â«(Ù
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠اتخاذ اÙ٠ا⬠â«âªNamâ¬â¬
â«âªGGOMNâ¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£Ø®ØµØ§Ø¦ÙØ© اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«ØÙâ¬
â«Ùش⬠â«Ø±ÙÙ
ا عبد اأÙÙ
Ùر Ù?â¬
â«ÙÙâ¬
â«âªGTD07â¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ø¶Ù Ù?Ù Ù?رÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ù⬠â«ØºØ§ âªAigaâ¬â¬â«Ø¢Ùغا ستÙÙÙÙبÙرâ¬
â«âªStokenbergaâ¬â¬
â«âªWFACSâ¬â¬ â«Ø£ÙدرÙاÙÙرÙÙا Ù
Ùشا٠إرÙ٠رâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙÙ?ا عض٠Ù?Ù Ù?رÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ùâ¬
â«âªAndrianirinaâ¬â¬ â«âªMichel Ericâ¬â¬
â«âªRanjevaâ¬â¬
â«âªRanjevaâ¬â¬
â«âªGSU05â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø¬ØªÙ
اعÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØÙ
ائÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª Chaogangâ¬Ø£Ø®ØµØ§Ø¦Ù إجرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øªâ¬ â«ÙاÙغ⬠â«ØªØ´Ø§ÙغاÙغâ¬
â«âªWangâ¬â¬
â«âªLEGAMâ¬â¬ â«ÙاÙÙÙÙة⬠â«âª Christineâ¬Ù
ستشارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ùâ¬â«Ù
اÙÙر⬠â«ÙرÙستÙÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âªMakoriâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«)( âªGreater Beirut Public Transport Projectâ¬â¬
â«âªGTPGFâ¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ø¶Ù Ù?Ù Ù?رÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø¯Ø§ÙÙ?Ùد Ù
اثÙ٠بÙÙ âªDavidâ¬â¬
â«âªMatthew Bullâ¬â¬
â«âªGTD08â¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ø¶Ù Ù?Ù Ù?رÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ù⬠â«Ù?رâ¬
â«Ø§Ù٠تاÙاÙÙدÙÙÙ âªFranckâ¬â¬
â«âªTaillandierâ¬â¬
â«âªGTD05â¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ø¶Ù Ù?Ù Ù?رÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø¨ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«ÙتÙر⬠â«Ø®Ø§Ùد Ùâ¬
â«âªGTD08â¬â¬ â«ØºÙبرÙزÙاÙسÙÙ٠عض٠Ù?Ù Ù?رÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ù⬠â«ÙÙغاش⬠â«ÙÙÙجÙتâ¬
â«âªKonjitâ¬â¬ â«âªNegashâ¬â¬
â«âªGebreselassieâ¬â¬
â«âªGTPGFâ¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ø¶Ù Ù?Ù Ù?رÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ù⬠â«ÙÙرÙÙ ÙÙÙÙÙ ÙÙÙسÙÙâ¬
â«âªMNC02â¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ø¶Ù Ù?Ù Ù?رÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ù⬠â«Ù
٠إبرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙ
â¬
â«âªGTD05â¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ø¶Ù Ù?Ù Ù?رÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø± Ù
رâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¯â¬ â«Ù
٠اâ¬
â«âªMNCLBâ¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ø¶Ù Ù?Ù Ù?رÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ù⬠â«Ùâ¬â«Ù
ÙÙ ÙÙزâ¬
â«âªGGOMNâ¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ø¶Ù Ù?Ù Ù?رÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø±Ù٠جابÙرâ¬
â«âªMNCLBâ¬â¬ â«Ù٠اÙعÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø±Ø©)⬠â«Ø©Ù?Ù Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙ⬠â«Ø¹Ø¶Ùرâ¬
â«(اإÙدا⬠â«Ø§Ù عاصÙâ¬
â«Ø±Ùâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âªLEGAMâ¬â¬ â«ÙاÙÙÙÙة⬠â«Ø©â¬
â«Ù
ستشار⬠â«Ø³Ø§Ù
ÙÙا دÙستâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âªGMTMNâ¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ø¶Ù Ù?Ù Ù?رÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ù⬠â«ÙساÙ
ØرÙÙâ¬
â«âªGEN05â¬â¬ â«Ø¨ÙئÙة⬠â«Ø²Ùاد أب٠ØسÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø£Ø®ØµØ§Ø¦Ù إجرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øª ØÙ
ائÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùسعâ¬
â«ÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ?رÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙع⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùصب⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙسÙ
â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«ÙبÙاÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبر⬠â«Ù
شرÙâ¬
â«ÙائÙ
Ø© اÙÙ
ØتÙÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ختصرâ¬
â«Ø§Øªâ¬
â«âª \.1â¬Ø§ÙسÙا٠ااÙسترâ¬
â«Ø§ØªÙجÙâ¬
â«âª \.aâ¬Ø³Ùا٠اÙبÙدâ¬
â«âª \.bâ¬Ø§ÙسÙا٠اÙÙØاع٠ÙاÙÙ
ؤسسÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ù?ÙÙا⬠â«âª \.câ¬Ø£ÙداÙ? ذات Ù
ستÙ٠أعÙÙ Ù?â¬
â«ÙساÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬â«âª \.2â¬Ø£ÙداÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬â«âª \.aâ¬ÙدÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹â¬â«âª \.bâ¬Ø§ÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ ÙÙتÙÙ
Ùة⬠â«âª \.câ¬Ù
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙÙتائج اÙÙائÙ
Ø© عÙÙ ÙدÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹â¬â«âª \.3â¬ØªÙصÙÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹â¬ â«âªÙ \.aâ¬â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙÙات اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ ÙتÙ
ÙÙÙÙâ¬â«âª \.bâ¬ÙÙÙ?Ø© اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹â¬â«âª \.câ¬Ø§ÙدرÙس اÙÙ
ستÙ?ادة ÙاÙÙ
عÙÙسة Ù?٠تصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«âª \.4â¬Ø§ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤسسÙØ© ÙترتÙبات اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.aâ¬Ø§ÙترتÙباتâ¬
â«âª \.bâ¬Ø±ØµØ¯ اÙÙتائج ÙتÙÙÙÙ
Ùاâ¬
â«âª \.câ¬Ø§Ø§ÙستداÙ
Ø©â¬
â«âª \.dâ¬Ø¯Ùر اÙشرÙاءâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.5â¬Ø§ÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø اÙÙ
خاØرâ¬â«âª \.aâ¬ØªØµÙÙÙ? اÙÙ
خاØر اÙعاÙ
Ø© Ùشرâ¬
â«âª \.6â¬Ù
Ùجز اÙتÙÙÙÙ
â¬
â«âª \.aâ¬Ø§ÙتØÙÙ٠ااÙÙتصاد٠ÙاÙÙ
اÙÙ (Øسب ااÙÙتضاء)â¬
â«âª \.bâ¬Ø§Ø£ÙÙج٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.câ¬Ø§Ø¥Ùدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«âª \.dâ¬Ø§ÙتÙرÙدâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØÙ
ائÙØ©)â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øªâ¬â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© (بÙ
ا Ù?ÙÙا اإÙجرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.eâ¬Ø§Ø£ÙÙجÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØÙ
ائÙØ©)â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øªâ¬â«âª \.fâ¬Ø§ÙبÙئة (بÙ
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠اإÙجرâ¬
â«âª \.gâ¬Ø¢ÙÙØ© Ù
عاÙجة اÙØ´ÙاÙÙ Ù?٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙØ٠⪠:1â¬ØªØ±ØªÙبات اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙØ٠⪠:2â¬Ø§Ùخرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¦Øâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø£Ùا٠٠â اÙسÙا٠ااÙستراتÙجÙâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙ? â سÙا٠اÙبÙدâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙرÙÙ٠اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙبÙغ عددÙÙ
â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø³ÙاÙ٠⪠4\.5â¬Ù
ÙÙÙÙ ÙسÙ
Ø© Ù?٠اÙعاÙ
⪠Ø2015â¬Ù
٠دÙ٠اأÙخذ بعÙ٠ااÙعتبار اÙاÙجئÙÙ⬠â«Ù
تÙØ³Ø Ø§ÙدخÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ùغ عدد Ùâ¬â«Ù⬠â«âª \.1â¬ÙبÙا٠بÙدâ¬
â«Ø¯Ø± ÙÙ
٠إجÙ
اÙ٠اÙÙاتج اÙÙ
ØÙÙ٠اÙÙ?عÙÙ ÙÙعاÙ
⪠2016â¬Ø¨Ù⪠1\.8â¬Ù?Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙÙ
ÙÙ Ù?٠اÙبÙدâªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙÙ٠اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙبÙغ عددÙÙ
âªÙ? 450000â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØÙاÙ٠⪠1\.5â¬Ù
ÙÙÙÙ ÙاÙاÙجئÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¨ÙÙØ© عÙÙ ÙØاع اÙخدÙ
ات â اÙØ°Ù ÙØاÙÙ
ا Ùا٠Ù
ØرÙ⬠â«Ù Ù⬠â«Ùر اâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙزع اÙسÙر⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙغÙاب اإÙصاÙØات⪠\.â¬ÙÙ?Ù Ùذا اÙسÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ø«â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
Ù
ا ÙعÙس ÙÙع ااÙضØرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¨Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
ئةâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø£Ø¯Ù اÙÙÙ
٠اÙÙ
تعثâ¬
â«Ùر Ù
ÙØ° اÙعاÙ
⪠2011â¬ÙاÙعبء اÙÙ
اÙ٠اÙÙبÙر⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùعائد Ø¥ÙÙ⬠â«Ø©âª \.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ù⬠â«Ù
Ù
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ø¯Ù Ø¥Ù٠تسجÙÙ ÙÙ
٠بØÙØ¡ Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠Ù?٠اÙسÙÙات اأÙØ®Ùر⬠â«ÙÙ
Ù⪠1â¬Ø£Ø³Ø§Ø³Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙا â Ùâ¬
â«Ø¯Ø§ (ØÙاÙ٠⪠140â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù?Ù ÙÙاÙØ© اÙعاÙ
⬠â«Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ø¬Ø¯ Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙاÙخدÙ
ات اÙعاÙ
ة⪠Øâ¬Ø¥Ù٠زÙادة Ùسبة اÙدÙ٠إÙ٠إجÙ
اÙ٠اÙÙاتج اÙÙ
ØÙÙ Ù?â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙ?اذ اÙاÙجئÙ٠اÙسÙرÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ٠إÙ٠اÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ù Ù?٠سÙرÙا⬠â«Ùظر Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙزâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¹ اÙجار⬠â«Ù
ØدÙدةâªÙ Øâ¬Ø§â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتصادÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ?Ù Ù
Ùازâ¬
â«Ø§Ø© Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ØªØ¨Ù٠آÙ?ا٠اÙÙÙ
Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø£Ø¯Ù باÙتاÙ٠إÙ٠تدÙÙر Ù
ÙØÙظ Ù?٠بÙئة اÙبÙد اÙÙ
اÙرÙ⬠â«âªÙ Ø)2015â¬â¬
â«Ù
Ù
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
تÙسØâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙا عÙ٠اأÙÙ
دâ¬
â«Ø بÙ٠⪠2â¬Ù⪠2\.5â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة سÙÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙا Ùترâ¬
â«Ø§Ù⬠â«Ùع اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ
Ùا Ù?عÙÙ⬠â«Ù⪠Øâ¬ÙتباØؤ اÙÙÙ
٠ااÙÙتصادÙ⪠\.â¬ÙتÙÙâ¬â«Ø§Ø¥ÙÙÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اأÙخرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùرâ¬
â«Ø§Øªâ¬ â«ÙاÙتÙتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØºÙ
Ù
٠أ٠ÙبÙا٠Ù
٠شرÙØØ© اÙبÙدا٠ذات اÙدخ٠اÙÙ
تÙØ³Ø Ø§ÙعاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ØªØ¨Ù٠بÙاÙ⬠â«Ø£Ø³Ø§Ø³Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø© عÙ٠اÙÙÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬Ø¨Ø§Ùر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Øا⬠â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙئة Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠ضغ٠Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«âª \.2â¬ØªÙ?رض اÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± Ø¥Ù
داداتÙاâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙÙبÙا٠ثاÙ٠أبرز Ù?ئة ضاغØØ© عÙ٠اÙÙÙ
Ù ÙتÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± اÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙاÙ?سÙØ© ÙÙÙ
Ùتد٠ااÙÙتصاد٠اÙعاÙÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬ØªÙ? Ùâ¬
â«âª2â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¬Ø¯Ø§âª \.â¬Ù?بØسب Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ؤشر⬠â«Ù?Ù ØاÙØ© سÙئة ÙÙâ¬
â«ØªÙ
تسÙÙØ Ø§ÙضÙØ¡ عÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ Ù?٠تشخÙص اÙبÙد اÙÙ
ÙÙج٠ÙÙبÙاÙâª\.3â¬â¬ â«ÙÙا دÙÙ Ù
جÙ
Ùعات Ùâ¬
â«Ù
تÙÙعة Ù
٠اÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙارÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙعÙتÙا Ù?عÙÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ùس٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙØ© Ù?٠اÙعاÙÙ
⪠\.â¬ØªØ¨Ùغ⬠â«ÙÙ
ا ÙØ´Ùد أعÙ٠اÙÙثاÙ?ات Ùâ¬â«Ø© ⪠Øâ¬Ø¥Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ù?ÙØ© صغÙر âª4â¬â¬
â«ÙÙ
تØضر باÙ
تÙاز⪠\.â¬Ù
ساØت٠اÙجغر Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ جغرâ¬
â«Ø§Ù?ÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø³Ø§ØÙÙ ÙسÙÙÙÙ ÙجباÙÙâªØâ¬â¬ â«âª \.3â¬ÙبÙا٠بÙد Ù
تÙÙâ¬
â«Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع Ø£Ùثر Ù
Ù ÙصÙ?ÙÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت⬠â«Ù
ÙاØÙ ØضرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØ© Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠⪠600â¬ÙسÙ
Ø©âª/â¬ÙÙ
⪠\.2â¬ÙÙعÙØ´ ØÙاÙ٠⪠87â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
٠اÙس Ùâ¬
â«Ùا٠اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ
ÙÙ Ù?Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙثاÙ?Ø© اÙس Ùâ¬
â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø© اÙبÙئة Ù?٠اÙعاÙ
⪠2005â¬ÙÙÙ?Ø© زØÙ
ة⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø© أجرتÙا ٠اâ¬
â«Ø²Ø±â¬ â«Ùدرت درâ¬â«ÙØ© Ù?٠بÙرÙØªØ ÙÙد Ù⬠â«ØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر تشÙ٠أØد أبرز Ù
شاÙ٠اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙØضرÙ⬠â«Ù⪠\.â¬Ø§Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø´Ù Ù?٠أ٠ز⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبرâ¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø§Ø¨Ø Ùسائ٠اÙÙÙÙ⬠â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± تر⬠â«ÙØ© بØÙاÙ٠⪠8â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
٠إجÙ
اÙ٠اÙÙاتج اÙÙ
ØÙÙ ÙÙبÙا٠ÙÙتذا٠⪠Øâ¬Ù?Ù ØÙÙ ÙاÙت ØرÙØ© اÙسÙر أدÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù
Ù
ا Ù٠عÙÙ٠اÙÙÙÙ
âªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«âª5â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙر اÙØضرÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙاÙÙ?Ùر Ù?٠اÙÙ
ÙاØ٠اÙÙ
تأخرâ¬
â«Ø© تÙÙ
ÙÙاÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«ØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠أبرز أسباب ØااÙت عدÙ
اÙÙ
ساÙاة⬠â«Ø§ÙØ®ÙÙ?Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùذ٠ازداد Ùâ¬
â«Ø³Ùءا بسبب ز⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙئ بÙ٠بÙرÙت ÙاÙÙ
ÙاØÙâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø³Ø¨Ø¨ غÙاب اÙÙÙ?اذ Ø¥Ù٠اÙخدÙ
ات ÙÙ?رص اÙعÙ
Ùâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø©â¬
â«ÙÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙبÙرâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø§ÙÙ
ÙØ© Ùا Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Ø¥ÙساÙÙØ© Ù?٠اÙÙر٠اÙØاد٠ÙاÙعشرÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙ?ر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¹ ÙØ£ÙسÙØ£ أزÙ
Ø© اÙجئÙÙ ÙأزÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ø© Ø£ÙÙبر Ùز⬠â«Ø§Ø© Ø°ÙÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«ØªØªØ¹Ø±Ø¶ سÙرÙا اÙÙ
جاÙر⬠â«âª \.4â¬Ù?Ù Ù
Ùازâ¬
â«âª1â¬â¬
â«ÙÙ ÙØاع اÙخدÙ
ات بشÙÙ Ù
تÙØ³Ø âª 74â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
٠إجÙ
اÙ٠اÙÙاتج اÙÙ
ØÙ٠اÙÙ?عÙÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«ÙØ´ Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙائÙØ© اÙÙ
ستخدÙ
Ø© Ùاâ¬
â«Ø£Ø®Ùر â Ù?⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù٠⪠1997â¬Ù⪠â 2011â¬Ø§ÙØسابات⬠â«Ø§ÙعاÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø¨ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«âª2â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙاÙ?سÙØ© اÙعاÙÙ
Ù âª\.2015/2014â¬â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùتد٠ااÙÙتصاد٠اÙعاÙÙ
ÙâªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«Ù
ؤشرâ¬
â«âª3â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙØد Ù
٠اÙÙ?Ùر ÙتØÙÙ٠ااÙزدÙار اÙÙ
شترÙ⪠Øâ¬ØªØ´Ø®Ùص اÙبÙد اÙÙ
ÙÙجÙâª\.103201 Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠\.2016 \.â¬ÙبÙاÙ⪠\.â¬ØªØ¹Ø²Ùز Ù⬠â«âª4â¬â¬
â«Ù
ساØØ© ÙبÙا٠⪠10452â¬Ù
âª\.2â¬â¬
â«âª5â¬â¬
â«ØªØºÙر اÙÙ
Ùاخâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¨Ø´Ø£Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø±â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙØا⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
تØدة⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙ
Ù
⬠â«Ø§ØªÙ?اÙÙة⬠â«Ø¥ÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙبÙاÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙثاÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØÙÙ⬠â«Ø© اÙبÙئة⪠\.2011 \.â¬Ø§ÙبÙاÙ⬠â«Ùاâ¬
â«Ø²Ø±â¬
â«âªPage 19 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø©âª \.â¬Ø¨ÙÙÙ
ا ÙعÙØ´ بعضâ¬
â«Ø¥ÙساÙÙØ© ÙبÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù?Ø´ Ùâ¬
â«Ù٠أزÙ
ة⬠â«ÙÙا)âªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù
Ù
ا Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شردÙ٠داخÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙÙ Ù
٠ا٠Ùâ¬
â«Ù
شردÙÙ (اÙاÙجئÙÙ Ù Ù⬠â«Ùا٠اÙسÙرÙ⬠â«ÙÙâ¬
â«Ùدر ØÙاÙ٠⪠60â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
٠اÙس Ù⬠â«ÙاÙعÙاسات Ùâ¬
â«Ø¬Ù
Ø©âªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«ÙØ© Ù
ختÙÙ?Ø©âªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù
Ù
ا ÙÙ?رض⬠â«ÙÙ?ÙØ© ÙØضرÙ⬠â«Ù
ضÙÙ?Ø© ر Ù⬠â«Ù
Ø®ÙÙ
ات⪠Øâ¬ÙعÙØ´ أغÙب اÙاÙجئÙ٠بشÙ٠عاÙ
Ù?٠ظرÙÙ? صعبة Ù?Ù Ù
جتÙ
عات Ù?⬠â«Ø© Ù?Ù Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙاÙجئÙÙ Ù?٠اÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
جاÙرâ¬
â«Ø© عÙ٠استÙعاب Ùذا اÙتدÙâ¬
â«Ù?٠اÙÙبÙر ÙاÙجئÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?ة⬠â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© اÙÙائÙ
Ø© أصاÙÙ Ù?Ù Ùذ٠اÙÙ
جتÙ
عات⪠\.â¬Ø¯Ù?ع عجز اÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
جاÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Øا ÙبÙرÙâ¬
â«Ø© عÙ٠اÙخدÙ
ات ÙاÙبÙÙ⬠â«Ø¶ØºÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø§ÙÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙÙ
ا Ø£ÙرÙباâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø© بشÙ٠رسÙ
Ù ÙغÙر رسÙ
٠إÙ٠جÙات⬠â«Ø§Ø¡ اÙساÙÙ
Ø© ÙظرÙÙ? عÙØ´ Ø£Ù?ضÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ ÙبÙر Ù
٠اÙاÙجئÙ٠إÙ٠اÙÙجر⬠â«Ø¥Ù٠سع٠اÙاÙجئÙÙ Ùرâ¬
â«ÙÙ٠اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙبØØ«Ù٠ع٠Ù
Ùجأ Ù?٠اÙعاÙ
⪠2016â¬Ø¨Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙÙ٠اÙجئ⪠\.â¬ÙباÙتاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù
ست اأÙزÙ
Ø©â¬â«Ù
Ù?Ùض اأÙÙ
Ù
اÙÙ
تØدة اÙساÙ
Ù ÙشؤÙ٠اÙاÙجئÙ٠عدد اÙاÙجئÙ٠اÙسÙرÙ⬠â«Ùدر Ùâ¬â«ÙÙâ¬â«Ù?â¬
â«ÙسÙاسÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙتÙÙ
ÙÙØ©âªØâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¥ÙساÙÙØ©âªØâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙص٠إÙÙ ØÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø© Ù
٠أجÙâ¬â«Ø¹Ø§ÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù
تضاÙ?رâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¬ÙÙداâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙا Ùاâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø§Ø±Ø² ÙÙتضÙ⬠â«ÙÙا عاÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙا ÙاÙÙÙÙ
Ù⬠â«ÙØ© تØدÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© اÙÙ
تاÙØ´Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙستضÙÙ?â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
Ù
ا زâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¯ Ù
٠اÙضغÙظ عÙ٠بÙاÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø¬ØªÙ
اعÙØ© ا٠سابÙØ© ÙÙا باÙÙسبة Ø¥ÙÙ ÙبÙاÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتصادÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙرÙÙ٠تØدÙاتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.5â¬ÙÙÙدت أزÙ
Ø© اÙاÙجئÙÙâ¬
â«Øا عÙÙ Ù
Ùارد اÙبÙدâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ùا٠اÙبÙد⪠\.â¬Ù?٠اÙÙاÙع⪠Øâ¬ØªÙ?Ù
ارس Ùذ٠اÙزÙادة اÙÙ
ÙØÙظة Ù?٠عدد Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙا٠ضغ٠Ù⬠â«Ø«ÙØ« س Ùâ¬â«ÙبÙا٠أÙبر عدد اÙجئÙÙ ÙÙÙسÙ
Ø© اÙÙاØدة Ù?٠اÙعاÙÙ
بÙسبة Ù?â¬
â«Ø© âª-2012â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ Ù?٠اÙÙ?تر⬠â«ÙÙ ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¯Ø± بÙ⪠2\.6â¬Ù
ÙÙار دÙ⬠â«ÙØ© Ù
ستÙÙات عاÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ù
ا Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙÙ
رتبØØ© باأÙزÙ
Ø© اÙسÙرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتØتÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙخدÙ
ات٠اÙعاÙ
ة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا بÙغت اÙتÙاÙÙÙ?â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙبÙاÙâ¬
â«Ø© اÙبÙÙâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙØ´ أصاÙÙ Ù?٠اÙبÙد بشÙ٠أÙبر⪠\.â¬Ù?Ù٠تعÙد Ùدرâ¬â«Ø¹Ø© اÙÙضع ااÙÙتصادÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙااÙجتÙ
اعÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙسÙاس٠Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ø²â¬â«Ø®Øر عÙ٠زâ¬
â«Ùا⬠â«ÙÙ Ùذا اÙÙضع⬠â«âª 2014â¬ÙØدÙا âªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«ÙØ´ Ùâ¬
â«âª6â¬â¬
â«Ø© عÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù
اÙÙØ© ÙبÙا٠اÙعاÙ
ة⬠â«Ø© Ùا Ùâ¬
â«Ø¶Ø§Ù?Ù Ù⬠â«Ø£Ø¹Ø¨Ø§Ø¡ ÙبÙرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª عاÙ
Ø© â Ùâ¬
â«Ù
Ù
ا ÙÙ?رض⬠â«Ø§Ùد Ùستبرز اÙØاجة اÙØارئة Ø¥Ù٠استثÙ
ار⬠â«Ø© ÙاÙ?Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø© ÙتÙبÙØ© اÙØÙب اÙÙ
تز⬠â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© اÙÙائÙ
Ø© ÙاÙÙ
تدÙÙرâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø⬠â«Ù بÙسبة تترâ¬
â«Ø§Ù⬠â«Ù Ø¥Ù٠زÙادة Ù
Ù?اجئة Ù?Ù ØرÙØ© اÙسÙر Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبر⬠â«Ù?٠⪠1\.5â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠اÙجئ سÙر⬠â«Ø§ØªâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø£Ø¯Ù تدÙ⬠â«Ø¬Ù
ة⪠\.â¬ÙبØسب اÙتÙدÙر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
عرضة أصاÙÙ ÙضغÙØ Ù⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصادÙØ© ÙزØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øª Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø© اÙÙÙÙ?ة⬠â«Ø³ÙبÙØ© Ù
ÙØÙظةâªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«Ùدرت در⬠â«Ø§ÙتصادÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¨ÙئÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙسبب اÙعÙاسات Ùâ¬
â«Ù
Ù
ا ÙزÙد Ù
٠زØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر Ù⬠â«Ø¨Ù٠⪠15â¬Ù⪠25â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئةâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø بÙ٠⪠15â¬Ù⪠25â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة⬠â«ØªØ¤Ø¯Ù زÙادة Ù?Ù Ù
ستÙÙات ØرÙØ© اÙسÙر بÙسبة تترâ¬
â«Ø§Ù⬠â«Ø بÙ٠⪠5â¬Ù⪠10â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
٠إجÙ
اÙ٠اÙÙاتج اÙÙ
ØÙ٠اÙÙØÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ù⬠â«ÙبÙا٠بÙسبة تترâ¬
â«Ø§Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙاâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙ٠سÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø بÙ٠⪠500â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ ÙÙ
ÙÙار دÙ⬠â«Ø§Ùâ¬
â«ØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠بÙسبة تترâ¬â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصادÙØ© Ùزâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
ساÙÙ
Ø© تدÙâ¬
â«Ù?٠اÙاÙجئÙÙ Ù?٠اÙÙÙÙ?ة⬠â«Ø¥ÙÙ Ù?â¬
â«Ø§Ù
ج Ù
٠أج٠تØÙ?Ùز ااÙÙتصاد ÙØ®ÙÙ Ù?رص عÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع تÙبÙØ© Øاجاتâ¬â«Ù
ØÙرÙÙ٠تستÙدÙ? بر Ùâ¬â«Ù⬠â«âª \.6â¬Ù
٠أج٠اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? Ù
٠اأÙزÙ
ة⪠Øâ¬ÙعتÙ
د ÙبÙا٠Ù
Ùارب Ùâ¬
â«Ø© Ù
ؤÙÙÙ?Ø© Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ø±Øª Ù
٠أج٠تØÙ?Ùز اÙتصاد٠ÙØ®ÙÙ Ù?رص عÙ
Ù ÙتØÙÙر⬠â«Ø§ÙتØتÙة⪠\.â¬ÙØتاج ÙبÙا٠إÙ٠استثÙ
ا اâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙÙ
ÙÙØ© عÙ٠أÙ
د Ø£ØÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙبشÙ٠خاص Ù?Ù ÙØاعات اÙبÙÙâ¬â«Ù⬠â«ÙبÙاÙâ¬
â«Ùز بشÙ٠أساس٠عÙÙ ÙØاعات Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Øªâª Øâ¬ÙرÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙÙÙÙات Ùâ¬
â«Ù
تعدد اÙÙ
ÙÙÙار⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø£Ø³Ù
اÙÙا ÙÙ?Ùâ¬
â«Ùا ر ÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙØ© بر Ùâ¬
â«ÙاÙ
جا استثÙ
ارÙÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© اÙاÙزÙ
ة⪠\.â¬ÙباÙتاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ùضعت اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ø«ÙائÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙØ© ÙشرÙائÙا اÙدÙÙÙÙÙ Ù?٠اجتÙ
اعات Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØµÙب ÙÙاشات رÙ?Ùعة اÙÙ
ستÙ٠بÙ٠اÙØÙÙÙ
ة⬠â«Ø§ÙتØتÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙعÙÙ ÙØاع اÙÙÙ٠بشÙ٠خاص⪠\.â¬Ùا٠Ùذا اÙبرÙاÙ
ج Ù?Ù Ù?⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتØتÙة⪠Øâ¬Ù?ÙستÙ?Ùد Ù
Ù ÙØاع اÙÙ
صارÙ? اÙخاصةâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ù? Ù
ختÙÙ?ة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ù
٠شأ٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© Ø£Ù Ù?â¬
â«ÙØÙ٠اÙعÙا٠ÙÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙخاص Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
شارÙع اÙبÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙ
تعددة اأÙØرâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ø³Ù
اÙ٠بشÙÙ Ù
ÙØÙظâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ø²Ø² Ùدرâ¬
â«Ø© اÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙر⬠â«Ø© Ù?â¬
â«ÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
تÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠ÙسÙÙÙت٠اÙÙبÙرâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø§Ø¡ â اÙسÙا٠اÙÙØاع٠ÙاÙÙ
ؤسسÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙاÙÙØ© اÙعاÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ستÙÙات اÙدخ٠اÙÙ
رتÙ?عة⪠Øâ¬ÙاستخداÙ
اÙÙ
رÙباتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙÙ
ÙÙØ© Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا أ٠اÙÙثاÙ?Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Øª Ùâ¬
â«Ø´Ù٠أØد Ø£Ùبر اÙÙ
شاÙÙ⬠â«âª \.7â¬Ø§Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø´Ù Ù?٠أ٠زØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر Ù?â¬
â«Ù⪠\.â¬ØµØÙØ Ø£Ù Ø§ÙØÙب اÙÙ
ÙØÙظ عÙÙ ØرÙØ© اÙسÙر ÙائÙ
Ù?٠بÙرÙت⬠â«Ø³ÙÙ
ا Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت اÙÙبر⬠â«ÙÙ
٠سرÙع ÙØجÙ
ØرÙØ© اÙسÙر⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ù Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
تÙاÙ
Ù Ùد Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ø¯Øª ÙÙÙÙا Ø¥ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙÙ
ا اÙØرÙÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ù٠باتâ¬
â«Ùجا٠بÙرÙت Ù
٠اÙÙ
ØاÙر اÙثاÙثة⬠â«Ø¨Ø´Ù٠خاص⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ٠اÙÙسÙ
اأÙÙبر ÙÙØÙب عÙÙ ØرÙØ© اÙسÙر Ùاشئ Ù
٠ضÙاØ٠اÙÙ
دÙÙØ© ÙÙ
٠اÙتÙÙâ¬
â«Ù عÙÙ ÙبÙاÙâª\.2013 \.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ØªÙÙÙÙ
اأÙثر ااÙجتÙ
اع٠ÙااÙÙتصاد٠ÙÙÙزâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¹ اÙسÙر⬠â«âª6â¬â¬
â«âªPage 20 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø£Ø³Ø§Ø³ÙØ© Ù
٠اÙØرÙات اÙسرÙعة بÙ⪠300000â¬Ù
رÙبة عÙ٠اÙØرÙ٠اÙسرÙع اÙØ´Ù
اÙÙâªØâ¬â¬â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ
ÙØ© عÙ٠أÙساÙ
â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙسرÙع اÙØ´Ù
اÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙجÙÙبÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙشرÙÙ⪠\.â¬ØªÙ? ÙÙâ¬
â«Ùدر ØرÙØ© اÙسÙرâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø§Øª ØااÙت اÙذرÙØ© بÙ٠⪠30â¬ÙÙ
â¬â«Ø سر⬠â«ÙÙا عÙ٠اÙØرÙ٠اÙسرÙع اÙشرÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ùتترâ¬
â«Ø§Ù⬠â«ÙÙا عÙ٠اÙØرÙ٠اÙسرÙع اÙجÙÙبÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙØÙاÙ٠⪠150000â¬Ù
رÙبة ÙÙÙ
Ù⬠â«Ù⪠200000â¬Ù
رÙبة ÙÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù ÙÙâ¬
â«Ùدر عدد اÙÙ
رÙبات Ù?Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ?٠اÙÙÙت اÙØاضرâªÙ? Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£ÙÙ Ù
٠⪠10â¬ÙÙ
Ù?٠اÙساعة Ù?٠اÙØ´Ùارâ¬
â«Ø¹â¬ â«Ù?٠اÙساعة عÙ٠اÙØرÙات اÙسرÙعة اÙرئÙسة ÙاÙØرÙات اÙÙ
غذÙØ© Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø³Ø¯ ØاجاتÙا Ù?Ù Ù
جاÙâ¬
â«ØºØ§ÙبÙØ© اÙÙ
ستخدÙ
Ù٠عÙ٠اÙÙ
رÙبات اÙخاصة Ù
٠أج٠Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù⪠\.â¬ÙتعتÙ
دâ¬â«ÙبÙا٠بÙ⪠1\.6â¬Ù
ÙÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
ÙÙا Ø£Ùثر Ù
٠⪠60â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت اÙÙبرâ¬
â«ÙâªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«Ùعتبر Ù
تÙØ³Ø Ùسبة Ø¥Ùشغا٠اÙÙ
رÙبات اÙباÙغ ØÙاÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Øª اÙخاصة Ø£Ùثر Ù
٠⪠80â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
٠اÙÙ
رÙبات اÙت٠تسÙر Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت اÙÙبر⬠â«ÙتشÙ٠اÙسÙارâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
تدÙÙا Ùâ¬
â«Ø¬Ø¯Ø§ âª\.â¬â¬ â«âª 1\.3â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئةâªØâ¬â¬
â«âª7â¬â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ
ÙÙ ÙرسÙÙ
اÙÙاردات عÙ٠اÙÙ
رÙبات Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠أ٠تتجاÙز ⪠50â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
Ù⬠â«Ù
صداÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
رÙبات اÙخاصةâªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù?ا⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠دÙ٠بدائ٠ذات⬠â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± اÙÙÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠Ù
ÙÙÙ⬠â«âªÙ? \.8â¬â¬
â«Ø© Ù?٠بÙرÙت⪠\.â¬ÙعÙ٠ضÙØ¡ Ùذ٠اÙعÙاÙ
ÙâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø§Øª Ù
ÙÙÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø© ÙÙادر⬠â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± Ù
ÙاÙÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙار⬠â«ÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙÙ
رÙبة بÙÙÙ
ا تÙ?Ù?رض ضرÙبة عÙ٠اÙÙÙÙد عÙ٠عÙس Ùâ¬
â«ØºØ§ÙبÙØ© اÙدÙÙ Ù?٠اÙÙ
ÙØÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا تÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙستÙصائÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙاÙ⪠\.â¬ÙتÙ?ظÙر اÙدرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Ø¨Ø§ÙÙ
صداÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ù
ا Ù
٠بدائ٠ÙÙÙ Ù
ستداÙ
Ø© باÙÙسبة Ø¥ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùع⬠â«Ù
ÙÙÙ?ا ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¬Ø¯Ø§ ÙÙ?٠غÙاب ÙظاÙ
ÙÙ٠عاÙ
ÙتÙ
ت⬠â«ÙØµØ¨Ø Ø§Ù
تاÙÙ Ù
رÙبة ÙÙÙادتÙا Ùâ¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø§Ø© Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ØªØªØ£Ø«â¬
â«Ùر⬠â«Ø§ÙصØØ© ÙاإÙسÙاÙ⪠\.â¬Ù?Ù Ù
Ùازâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùا إا٠ÙÙ?Ùات⬠â«Ø©âª Øâ¬Ù
٠بÙ٠اÙÙ?ئات اأÙعÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ù تتجاÙز⬠â«Ø¹ ÙÙ?Ùات اأÙسرâ¬â«ÙÙ ØÙاÙ٠⪠15â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
Ù Ù
جÙ
Ùâ¬â«Ø£Ù تÙاÙÙÙ? اÙÙÙ٠تش Ùâ¬
â«ÙغادرÙ٠بÙداتÙÙ
â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
صداÙÙØ© بÙ
ا أ٠اÙÙ
ÙاØÙÙ٠أ٠اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ
ÙÙ Ù?â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù بشÙÙ Ù
ÙØÙظ بÙسائ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ?Ø© اÙت٠تÙ?تÙر Ø¥ÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙÙ?Ø© اإÙسÙا٠اÙÙ
رتÙ?عة Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت اÙÙبرâ¬
â«ÙÙظر Ø¥Ù٠تÙاÙÙÙ? اÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
رتÙ?عةâªØâ¬â¬
â«Ùا⬠â«Ù
Ù
ا ÙدÙ?ع بأسعار اإÙسÙا٠إÙ٠اأÙعÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ùز Ù?رص اÙعÙ
ÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«Ùبا Ù?ÙØ Ø¨Ø´Ù٠عاÙ
) ÙÙÙتÙÙÙ٠إÙ٠بÙرÙت ØÙØ« تترÙâ¬
â«(عÙ٠بعد ⪠40â¬ÙÙ
تÙر Ùâ¬
â«ØºÙ
Ù
٠تÙاÙÙÙ? اÙعÙارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙÙ
رتÙ?عةâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤسسات اÙبÙاء Ù?٠بÙرÙت عÙ٠اÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Øª Ùâ¬
â«Ù?ضÙâ¬
â«Ù Ø¥ÙÙâ¬â«Ø© ÙاÙÙ
جÙ
Ùعات اÙÙ
ستضعÙ?Ø© اأÙخر⬠â«ÙÙعÙÙ ÙÙ?اذ اÙÙ?ئات اÙÙ?ÙÙرâ¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙØ®ÙÙ?ÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¨Ø اÙسÙØ¡ ÙÙسائ٠اÙÙÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙÙ
٠غÙر اÙÙ
تساÙ٠بÙ٠بÙرÙت ÙاÙÙ
ÙاØÙâ¬
â«âª \.9â¬ÙزÙد اÙترâ¬
â«Ø© Ù
٠اÙÙ
ÙاØÙâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙØ´Ø§Ø Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصاد٠Ù?Ù Ù
ØÙØ Ø¨ÙرÙت ÙزÙادة اÙÙجر⬠â«Ùزâ¬â«Ø§Ø¨Ø اÙسÙØ¡ ÙÙسائ٠اÙÙÙÙ Ù?٠ترÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙخدÙ
ات ÙÙ?رص اÙعÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬ØªÙ?ساÙÙ
تÙاÙÙÙ? اÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
رتÙ?عة ÙاÙترâ¬
â«Ø£Ø³Ø§Ø³ÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¡ Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ÙÙ
Ø© Ù
٠اÙبÙد ÙظÙÙر جÙÙب Ù?Ùر⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصادÙØ© بÙ٠أجزâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
Ù
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ùؤد٠إÙ٠زÙادة اÙÙ
ساÙ?ات⬠â«Ø© تÙÙ
ÙÙا٠إÙ٠بÙرÙت ÙØ¥ÙستÙ?ادة Ù
٠اÙخدÙ
ات ÙÙ?رص اÙعÙ
ÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
تأخرâ¬
â«Ùؤد٠إÙ٠تØÙÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙ Ù
٠بÙرÙتâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù
Ù
ا Ù⬠â«Ø£ÙÙ Ù
٠ساعتÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø¹Ø¯ Ù⬠â«Ùا٠اÙبÙد عÙÙ Ù?â¬â«Ø§Ø¨Ø Ùسائ٠اÙÙÙ٠أ٠Ùضع اÙÙسÙ
اأÙÙبر Ù
٠س Ù⬠â«Ù?Ù Ù
ختÙÙ? اÙÙ
ÙاØÙ⪠\.â¬Ù?Ù
٠شأ٠Ùâ¬
â«ØªØس٠ترâ¬
â«Ø³Ù٠أبرزâ¬
â«Ù Ù⬠â«Ø© ÙÙسÙع ÙاÙÙد اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© بÙÙ Ù
ختÙÙ? أجزâ¬
â«Ù
Ù
ا Ù
٠شأÙ٠أ٠Ù?â¬
â«Ø§Ø¦ÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«ÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Ø£Ùثر ساÙس Ùâ¬
â«Ù?Ùات Ù⬠â«Ø¥ÙتصادÙØ© ÙاØدة⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع تدÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùبا بشÙÙ Ù?اع٠إÙ٠سÙÙ⬠â«ÙبÙا٠بÙاÙ
Ù٠تÙر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¥ÙÙتاجÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
Ùاسبâ¬
â«Ø³Ø¯ اÙØÙب اÙÙ
تزâ¬
â«Ø§Ùد⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙÙ
صداÙÙØ© بشÙÙ ÙبÙر Ù
Ù Ùدرâ¬
â«Ø© شبÙØ© اÙÙÙ٠عÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙØد غÙاب ÙظاÙ
ÙÙ٠عاÙ
Ù
اÙئÙ
ÙÙتÙ
تâ¬
â«Ùع⬠â«Ù
ØدÙداâªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.10â¬ÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙبÙ٠تأÙ
ÙÙ ØÙÙÙ Ùسائ٠اÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶Ù اÙÙ
رتÙ?عة ÙأعÙ
اÙ⬠â«Ù
ÙÙÙ?ا ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¬Ø¯Ø§ بسبب ÙÙÙ
Ø© اأÙر⬠â«Ø© استÙعاب اÙØرÙات Ù⬠â«ÙØµØ¨Ø ØªØ¹Ø²Ùز Ùدر⬠â«Ø§Ø¶Ù Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙâªÙ? Øâ¬â¬ â«Ùا٠اÙÙ
رتÙ?عة ÙÙعÙرâ¬
â«Ø© اأÙر⬠â«Ø¨Ø´Ù٠سرÙعâªÙ \.â¬Ø§â¬
â«Ùظر Ø¥ÙÙ ÙثاÙ?Ø© اÙس Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© اÙباÙظة اÙØ«Ù
Ù⪠\.â¬Ø«Ù
Ø© ØÙاÙ٠⪠2200â¬ØاÙ?ÙØ© ÙØÙاÙ٠⪠4000â¬Ø¨Ø§Øµ صغÙر Ø£Ù Ù?ا٠ÙظاÙ
Ù Ù⪠10000â¬Ø¨Ø§Øµ صغÙر Ø£Ù Ù?ا٠غÙر ÙظاÙ
Ù Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙ⪠\.8â¬Ø¥ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙÙâ¬
â«ØاÙت Ù
ستأجرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø¹ÙØ© تعÙ
٠عÙ٠أساس Ù
شتر٠أ٠عÙ٠أساس رâ¬â«Ø© خاصة غÙر شر⬠â«Ø© أجرâ¬
â«Ø¹ÙØ© Ù⪠20000â¬Ø³Ùار⬠â«Ø© أجرâ¬
â«Ø© خاصة شر⬠â«Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠ØÙاÙ٠⪠33000â¬Ø³Ùارâ¬
â«Ùâª\.â¬â¬â«Ù ÙاÙبØر⬠â«Ø© اÙÙÙÙ ÙاأÙشغا٠اÙعاÙ
Ø©âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
دÙرÙâ¬
â«ÙØ© اÙعاÙ
Ø© ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙبر⬠â«Ø²Ø±â¬â«Ø§Ùا ÙÙ Ù
Ù Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ù٠اâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³ØªÙصائÙØ© Ù
ختÙÙ?Ø© أجرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øªâ¬ â«âª 7â¬Ø¯Ø±â¬
â«âª8â¬â¬
â«Ùâª\.â¬â¬â«Ù ÙاÙبØر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
دÙرÙâ¬
â«ÙØ© اÙعاÙ
Ø© ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙبرâ¬
â«âªPage 21 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø©âª Øâ¬ÙÙ?اÙات⪠Øâ¬Ùباصات Ù
Ùâ¬â«Ø§Øª أجر⬠â«Øددة ÙÙÙ٠بشÙ٠غÙر ÙظاÙ
ÙâªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙ
ÙÙ ØÙب سÙار⬠â«Ù
Ù⬠â«Ø© عÙÙ Ù
سارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª Ù?⬠â«("سارÙ?Ùس")⪠\.9â¬ÙبشÙ٠عاÙ
⪠Øâ¬ØªØ¹Ù
٠اÙباصات ÙاÙباصات اÙصغÙرâ¬
â«Ø© Ø¥Ù٠أ٠رخصة ÙÙ٠عاÙ
تصدر عادة٠ÙÙÙ Ù
رÙبة تسÙ
Ø Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ
ؤÙ
Ù٠اÙخدÙ
ات بأ٠ÙعÙ
ÙÙا عÙÙ⬠â«Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Øددة⪠\.â¬ØªØ¬Ø¯Ø± اإÙشار⬠â«Ø§Ùع Ù?â¬
â«Ùاب أ٠تÙدعÙÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
Ù Ù⬠â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬ÙÙÙÙا ا٠Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙ٠اÙرÙ⬠â«Ø§Ùشارâ¬
â«Ø© عÙ٠تÙÙÙد اÙعائدات Ø£Ùبر⪠\.â¬ØµØÙØ Ø£Ù Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯â¬â«Ù ØÙØ« اÙÙدر⬠â«ØºØ§ÙبÙتÙا اÙعÙ
٠ضÙ
Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Øددة)⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ٠تختار⬠â«Ø§Øª Ù?â¬â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙØ© ÙÙÙÙا (ا٠عÙÙ Ù
سارâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø£Ùرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ù٠جذرÙâ¬
â«ÙÙا Ù?Ù Ùسائ٠اÙÙÙ٠ع٠اÙÙ
رÙبات اÙخاصة⪠\.â¬Ù?٠دÙÙة⬠â«ØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر Ùâ¬
â«ØªØÙ⬠â«ÙÙÙعÙت٠سÙئة⪠\.â¬ÙÙتض٠تÙÙÙص زâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
تدÙÙا Ùâ¬
â«Ø¬Ø¯Ø§â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø§âª Øâ¬ÙÙ٠اÙعرض ÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ø±â¬ â«Ø§Ùباصات Ùد ازداد Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ؤخ Ùâ¬
â«Ù⪠Øâ¬Ù
Ùار٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø© Ù
ع استخداÙ
⬠â«ÙÙÙÙص Ù?ترâ¬
â«Ø© ااÙÙتÙا٠بشÙ٠جÙÙر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙعÙØ© Ù?â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
٠اÙشرÙØØ© اÙعÙÙا Ù
٠اÙبÙدا٠اÙÙ
تÙسØØ© اÙدخ٠عÙ٠غرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø± ÙبÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙتض٠ذÙ٠تأÙ
ÙÙ ÙظاÙ
عاÙÙâ¬
â«Ùابâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§Øª Ùâ¬
â«Ù
Ùرسة Ù
٠أج٠جذب اÙرÙ⬠â«ÙØ´Ùر Ø¥ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙظÙ
اÙØدÙثة Ù
ع Ù
سار⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
رÙبات اÙخاصةâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù
Ù
ا Ù?â¬
â«ÙÙÙ
ت درâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø© ÙÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙ
صداÙÙØ©âªÙ \.â¬â¬ â«ØªØ´Ù٠زØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠Ù
Ø´ÙÙØ© بشÙ٠أساس٠بسبب اÙÙÙÙد اÙÙ
Ù?رÙضة عÙ٠تأÙ
ÙÙ Ùسائ٠ÙÙ٠ذات Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙعÙة⬠â«âªÙ \.11â¬â¬
â«âª10â¬â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ù⪠\.â¬ØªÙ?ظÙر اÙدرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø©â¬ â«ØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبر⬠â«Ù
تعددة ÙسÙاسة اÙØÙب ÙاÙعرض عÙ٠اÙÙÙÙ ÙاÙتدابÙر ااÙستثÙ
ارÙâ¬
â«ÙØ© ذات اÙصÙØ© ÙÙÙعÙا عÙ٠تÙÙÙص ز⬠â«Ø³ÙÙارÙÙÙات Ùâ¬
â«ØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر Ùاâ¬
â«Ùظر Ø¥Ù٠غÙاب ÙسائÙ⬠â«Ø¨Ø´ÙÙ ÙØ§Ø¶Ø Ø£Ù Ø§ÙتدابÙر Ù
٠جÙØ© اÙØÙب ÙØدÙا (Ù
ث٠اÙتسعÙر⪠Øâ¬ÙرسÙÙ
اÙÙ
رÙر⪠Øâ¬ÙرسÙÙ
اÙÙ
ÙاÙÙ?) ÙÙعÙا Ù
ØدÙد عÙ٠تÙÙÙص زâ¬
â«Ø§Ø± تأÙ
ÙÙ ØÙÙ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙ
اعÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
Ø«Ù ÙظÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø¨Ø§ÙÙ
صداÙÙØ© اÙاÙزÙ
ة⪠\.â¬ÙتدابÙر اÙعرض⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠غرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙ٠بدÙÙØ© ع٠اÙÙ
رÙبات اÙخاصة تتÙ
تâ¬
â«Ùعâ¬
â«ØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر⪠\.â¬Ù
٠بÙ٠تدابÙر اÙعرض ÙÙÙÙا⪠Øâ¬ÙØÙÙ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع (اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬â«Ø§Ø§ÙستÙعابÙØ© أثر Ø£Ùبر عÙ٠تÙÙÙص زâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙشبÙØ© اÙباصات⪠Øâ¬ÙزÙادة Ùدرâ¬
â«Ø© اÙØرÙاتâ¬
â«Ù?اعÙÙØ© Ù
Ù ØÙØ« اÙÙÙÙ?ة⪠\.â¬Ù
٠شأ٠ØÙÙ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙ
اعÙâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ù⬠â«ØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر ÙÙ٠اأÙÙثرâ¬â«Ù
ع باصات Ø®ØÙØ Ù
غذÙØ©) اأÙثر اأÙÙبر عÙ٠تÙÙÙص زâ¬
â«Ø§ÙخارجÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر ÙاÙعÙاÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø± زÙادة رسÙÙ
اÙÙ
ÙاÙÙ?⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù تÙÙÙد Ø£Ùبر اÙÙ
ÙاÙ?ع Ùتأت٠بآثار Ù
ÙØÙظة Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙØد Ù
٠ز⬠â«Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠بعض أدÙات تسعÙر بسÙØة⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠غرâ¬
â«Ù
ثاÙÙØ© ÙبÙرÙت أ٠تزÙد Ù
Ù ÙظÙ
Ø¥Ù
داد اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
ÙÙسائ٠اÙÙÙ٠غÙر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¢ÙÙÙØ© (اÙÙ
ساØات ÙÙÙ
شاةâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø°Ø§Øª اÙصÙØ© بÙسبة ⪠50â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة⪠\.â¬ÙباÙتاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠شأ٠سÙاسة ÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¦Ø¨ عÙ٠اÙÙ
رÙبات) Ø£Ù⬠â«ÙجÙØ© ÙÙÙÙ?Ø© اÙÙÙ٠اÙخاص⪠Øâ¬Ø³Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ Ù
٠خاÙ٠اأÙعباء ÙرسÙÙ
اÙÙ
رÙر (رسÙÙ
اÙÙ
ÙاÙÙ?⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙÙÙÙد⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùضر⬠â«Ø§Ø¦ÙØ©)⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع زÙادة تدر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø§Øª اÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ùدرâ¬
â«Ø§Øª Ù⬠â«Ù
Ù
رâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙستداÙ
ة⬠â«ÙضÙ
اÙ⬠â«Ù
اÙئÙ
ة⬠â«ØªØ³Ø¹Ùر⬠â«Ø³Ùاسات⬠â«Ø§Ø¹ØªÙ
اد⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ
â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
Ù⬠â«Ùâ¬â«Ø³ÙÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙ
ا⬠â«Ø£Ùبرâª\.â¬â¬ â«ÙÙ⬠â«Ø¨Ø´â¬ â«Ø¨ÙرÙت⬠â«Ù?Ù⬠â«Ø§Ùخاصة⬠â«Ø§Øªâ¬â«Ø±â¬ â«ÙÙسÙا⬠â«Ø©â¬
â«Ø±â¬ â«Ù?â¬
â«Ùâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
تÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ساØات⬠â«ØªÙÙÙص⬠â«Ø®Ø§ÙÙ⬠â«Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØÙÙÙØ© اأÙÙ
د ÙÙظÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù
ع أخذ أثر Ùذ٠اÙسÙاسات عÙ٠اÙÙ
جÙ
Ùعات اÙÙ
ستضعÙ?Ø© بعÙ٠ااÙعتبار بشÙÙ Ù
اÙئÙ
âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ© ÙغÙاب ÙظÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù
اÙئÙ
Ø© Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£Ø©âª Øâ¬ÙغÙاب رÙ
ز ÙاضØ⪠Øâ¬ÙغÙاب اأÙÙظÙ
ة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠غÙر اÙÙاÙ?٠اأÙسباب⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤسسات اÙضعÙÙ?Ø© Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
جز⬠â«Ù⬠â«Øª Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø±â¬ â«âªÙ? \.12â¬â¬
â«Ø®Ùص اÙÙ
رÙبات ÙاÙسائÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù?Øص اÙÙ
رÙبات) باÙتخØÙØ⬠â«Ø§ÙداخÙÙØ© (ترâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬
â«Ø²Ø±â¬â«Ø®Ùص ÙÙشرÙات) Ù٠ا⬠â«Ø²Ø±â¬
â«Ø© اÙÙÙÙ ÙاأÙشغا٠اÙعاÙ
Ø© (اÙتخØÙØ ÙتØدÙد اÙرسÙÙ
ÙاÙتر⬠â«ØªÙ?عÙ٠٠اâ¬
â«Ø²Ø±â¬
â«Ø© اÙÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø© ع٠إÙÙ?اذ ÙاÙÙ٠اÙسÙر⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
⪠\.â¬ÙتÙ?شرÙ? ٠اâ¬â«Ø§ÙداخÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠خاÙÙ ÙÙ٠اأÙÙ
٠اÙداخÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
سؤÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± اâ¬
â«Ùزر⬠â«ÙاأÙÙظÙ
Ø© ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا تÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙÙ⬠â«Ù? Ùâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙØÙÙØ© ÙصÙاÙتÙا⪠\.â¬Ùتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙØ© اÙعاÙ
Ø© ÙÙØرÙات⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠بÙاء شبÙات اÙØرÙات ÙاÙØرÙات اÙسرÙعة⬠â«ÙاأÙشغا٠اÙعاÙ
ة⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠خاÙ٠اÙÙ
دÙرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغ٠اÙعاÙ
اأÙÙØد ÙتشغÙ٠سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠ÙبÙرÙت Ùا٠ÙاÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø© اÙÙÙÙ ÙاأÙشغا٠اÙعاÙ
Ø©âªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙØ© ٠اâ¬
â«Ø²Ø±â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
شترÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ Ù
ؤسسة تÙ
ÙÙÙا اÙدÙÙØ© تØت رâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙدÙاتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØµØºÙر Ù?ÙØ)⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ø£ÙØ§Ø ÙاÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ùا⬠â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات اÙباصات (ÙبÙÙ âªÙ 35â¬â¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ØµØ§â¬ â«ÙغاÙبÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØدÙدÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙترâ¬
â«Ø§Ù
Ùا٠اÙÙدÙÙ
âªØâ¬â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ بشÙÙ ÙبÙر بسبب اختÙ?اء اÙسÙÙ⬠â«Ùا Ùد ترâ¬
â«Ø¯Ùرâ¬
â«ØªØتÙØ© ÙبÙرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ù
ؤÙاÙت Ù?٠اÙتخØÙØ Ø§ÙÙØÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠تخØÙØ Ø§ÙÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° Ù
شارÙع بÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø§âª Øâ¬ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ù⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙبÙدÙات⪠\.â¬Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ø®Ùر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¨Ø¹Ø¶ ÙÙ?اءات اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
â¬
â«Ù
ستÙ
ر (Ù
ا ÙÙ
Ø«â¬
â«Ù٠دÙÙØ©âª-â¬Ù
دÙÙØ© Ù
Ù Ù
Ùظار⬠â«Ù⬠â«ØªØضر شبÙ⬠â«Ùظر Ø¥Ù٠أ٠ÙبÙا٠بÙد Ù
ساØت٠صغÙرâ¬
â«Ø©âª Øâ¬Ù
ع Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¡âªÙ \.â¬Ø§â¬ â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«ØددÙا Ù
جÙس اÙÙزر⬠â«Ø¹Ù?â¬â«ØµØ§ÙØÙات خاصة باÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
٠خاÙÙâ¬
â«âª9â¬â¬
â«Ùâª\.â¬â¬â«Ù ÙاÙبØر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
دÙرÙâ¬
â«ÙØ© اÙعاÙ
Ø© ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙبرâ¬
â«Ø©âª"\.â¬â¬
â«Ù
ختار⬠â«Ù ÙØ®Ùارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª سÙاسات Ù?⬠â«"اÙØد Ù
٠زØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر Ù?٠بÙرÙت⪠:â¬ØªØÙÙ٠اختبارâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª10â¬Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâª\.2017 \.â¬â¬
â«âªPage 22 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ùاâ¬
â«Ø© اÙÙÙÙ ÙاأÙشغا٠اÙعاÙ
ة⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠خاÙÙ ÙÙااÙتÙا ÙدÙائرâ¬
â«Ø²Ø±â¬â«Ø§ÙتØر٠إÙ٠تخØÙØ Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
⪠Øâ¬ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°Ù⪠Øâ¬ÙتشغÙÙ٠عÙ٠اÙÙ
ستÙ٠اÙÙØÙÙ ÙعÙ٠٠اâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªÙÙ
ÙØ© ØضرÙâ¬
â«ÙØ©)⪠Øâ¬Ùجبâ¬
â«Ø© تÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙØاع⪠\.â¬ÙÙتض٠تØÙÙر اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø´ÙÙ⬠â«Ø³ÙÙ
ا Ù?٠تØدÙد اÙسÙاسة ÙااÙستر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ØªÙجÙØ© اÙعاÙ
Ø© Ùادار⬠â«Ø§Ùدا Ù?Ù ÙØاع اÙÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ù Ù⬠â«Ø¯Ùر ر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¦Ø¯Ø§ Ù
تز Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ختÙÙ?ة⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù تÙعب Ùاâ¬
â«Ùظر Ø¥Ù٠دÙرâ¬
â«Ù ااÙÙتصاد٠ÙااÙجتÙ
اعÙ⬠â«Ø£ÙÙ ÙØاع Ù
دعÙÙ
بشÙÙ ÙبÙر عاÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙاâªÙ Øâ¬Ø§â¬ â«Ø®Ø§Øµ ÙظÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع اÙجÙ
اعÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù
ÙااÙÙ ØائÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙÙ
ا تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙØاع اÙعاÙ
⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¦Ø¯ ÙØ§Ø¶Ø ÙرÙ?Ùع اÙÙ
ستÙÙ Ù?Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ
⪠\.â¬ÙÙد ساÙÙ
ÙÙ Ù
٠دÙ٠اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙÙ
رتÙ?ع⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙÙ?Ùات اÙر Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ø³Ù
اÙÙØ© اÙضعÙÙ?ة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙتعÙÙدات اÙÙ?ÙÙØ© ÙاÙسÙاسÙØ© ÙÙÙØاع⪠Øâ¬ÙغÙاب رÙ
ز ر⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¥ÙÙ
ا٠تÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙØاعâª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙتØر٠إÙ٠أبرز Ù
شاÙ٠زØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø¯Ø¹Ù
Ù
٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ùضع برÙاÙ
ج ÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£ÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
اÙÙصÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙØ© اÙت٠أدرÙت Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.13â¬ØªØ³Ø¹Ù اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ùâ¬â«Ø¹ تØÙÙر اÙÙÙ٠اÙØضر⬠â«Ø²Ø±â¬
â«Ø© اÙÙÙÙ ÙاأÙشغا٠اÙعاÙ
ة⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùت٠دعÙ
ت Ù
شرÙ⬠â«Ø³ÙرÙز عÙ٠شبÙØ© اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت عÙ٠اأÙÙ
د اÙÙ
تÙسØ⪠\.â¬Ùضعت ٠اâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ø§Ù
شاÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ? اÙباصات⪠Øâ¬ÙÙتÙرâ¬
â«Ø© تÙÙÙÙÙا⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø¯Ø¹Ù
Ù
Ù ÙظاÙ
تÙÙÙÙ
اتÙâª\.11â¬â¬ â«Øددت ⪠20â¬Ù
سار باص ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø§Ø¯Ùا⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙØ§Ø ØªÙÙ⬠â«Ù" اÙت٠Ù⬠â«Ù
ÙÙ٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâª" Øâ¬Ø®ØØ© ÙÙÙ ÙÙ
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبر⬠â«Ø§ÙØ°Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù ÙبرÙاÙ
جâ¬â«ØªØ´Ù٠اÙعاÙ
Ùد اÙÙ?Ùرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø© Ù
٠خاÙÙ Ùضع شبÙØ© ÙÙ٠سرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ختÙÙ?ة⪠Øâ¬Ø¹ÙÙ Ùذ٠اÙدرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù ÙÙاشات Ù
ع اÙجÙاتâ¬â«Ø§Ø¹ØªÙ
د اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùذ٠أجرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
رجÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙا٠خÙار اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ØÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùرسة Ù
٠أج٠تØÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙعÙØ© اÙخدÙ
Ø© ÙاÙÙتÙر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Ùظر Ø¥ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
سار⬠â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ©âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ©âªÙ Øâ¬Ø§â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ ÙتÙاÙ
٠اÙØ®ØÙØâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø© بدائ٠أظÙرت اÙÙÙ?اءة Ù
Ù ØÙØ« اÙÙÙÙ?Ø© ÙÙ
Ø«Ù Ùذا اÙÙظاÙ
عÙ٠اأÙÙ
د اÙÙ
تÙسØ⪠\.â¬ÙÙد اعتÙ
د اÙبرÙاÙ
ج Ù
جÙس اÙÙزرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ ÙاÙÙجÙة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع اÙجÙ
اع٠اÙÙ
اÙئÙ
ÙتÙجة درâ¬
â«Ø اÙØ°Ù ØÙبت٠اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø©â¬â«Ø¹ اÙÙ
Ùتر⬠â«ÙØ´ Ùâ¬
â«Ù٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙÙÙÙØ© باÙÙسبة Ø¥Ù٠اÙبÙدâªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصادÙØ© ااÙستر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ØªÙجÙØ© ذات⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø£Ù٠أØد اÙÙ
شارÙع⬠â«Ø§Ùبر Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙÙÙ ÙاأÙشغا٠اÙعاÙ
Ø© عÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø±Øبت بÙ
شارÙØ© اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù?٠اÙبرÙاÙ
ج ÙÙ?٠تصÙ
ÙÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬Ù
Ù ØÙث⬠â«Ù أصاÙÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«ÙÙبÙاÙÙØ© Ù
رØÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø© Ø£ÙÙÙ Ù
٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
اÙشاÙ
Ù Ùذا ÙÙد ÙاÙ?Ùت جÙات Ù
اÙØØ© أخر⬠â«Ø§ Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙسÙÙÙÙ Ùذاâ¬â«ÙاÙشر Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙجÙÙبÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
بدأ⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
رØÙØ© اÙثاÙÙØ© Ù
٠اÙبرÙاÙ
ج اÙت٠ستÙظر Ù?٠تÙ
دÙد Ø®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Ø¥Ù٠ضÙاØ٠بÙرÙتâ¬
â«ÙسÙد Ù?٠اÙبÙد ÙاÙÙØاع⬠â«Ùدâ¬
â«Ù
عÙ⬠â«Ø Ø£ÙÙ ÙظاÙ
ÙÙ٠سرÙع عاد٠ÙجÙ
اع٠Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠Ù?٠غضÙ٠أÙثر Ù
Ù âªÙ 50â¬â¬
â«Ø¹Ø§Ù
ا٠Ù?٠سÙا٠اÙتصاد٠ÙسÙاس٠Ù?⬠â«Ø¹ اÙØÙ
Ùâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¨Ø⬠â«Ù
Ù
ا Ù?â¬
â«ÙساÙÙ
Ù?٠تØÙÙ٠اÙÙÙ
Ù ÙاÙتر⬠â«ØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙرâªÙ Øâ¬â¬â«ÙÙتØر٠إÙ٠زâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ ØÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤسسÙØ©)âªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙظاÙ
ÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتغÙر اÙسÙÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاأÙÙجÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙ٠غÙرâ¬
â«(اÙتخØÙØ⪠Øâ¬Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ÙÙ
صداÙÙØ© اÙاÙزÙ
Ø©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙØ© ÙتأÙ
ÙÙ ØÙÙÙ ÙÙÙ Ù
ÙبÙÙØ© Ù
Ù ØÙØ« اÙÙÙÙ?Ø© ÙتتÙ
تâ¬
â«Ùع⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¨ÙÙ Ù
ختÙÙ? اÙÙ
ÙاØÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙرÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ?ئاتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙÙ
صداÙÙØ© اÙاÙزÙ
Ø© Ø¥ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙؤÙ
Ù Ùسائ٠ÙÙÙ ÙظÙÙ?Ø© ÙÙ
ÙبÙÙØ© Ù
Ù ØÙØ« اÙÙÙÙ?Ø© ÙتتÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ØªØ¹â¬ â«Ø¹ اÙÙ
ÙØªØ±Ø Ø£Ù Ù⬠â«âª \.14â¬Ù
٠شأ٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«ÙÙا⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ù ÙستخدÙ
ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
اÙÙائÙ
سÙ٠اÙسÙرÙÙÙ ÙاÙÙبÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙشدÙد٠اÙÙ?Ùر بسبب غÙاب اÙبدائÙ⪠\.â¬Ù
٠شأ٠اÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙ
ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø®ØØ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
تÙسØØ© ÙاÙÙ
ÙØ®Ù?ضة اÙدخÙ⪠\.â¬ØاÙÙâ¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙعÙØ© اÙخدÙ
ات بشÙÙ ÙبÙر Ù?â¬
â«Ø¨ØºÙØ© Ø¥Øداث تغÙÙر Ù?٠استخداÙ
Ùسائ٠اÙÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
تÙسØØ© ÙاÙÙ
ÙØ®Ù?ضة اÙدخ٠Ù
٠خاÙ٠تØسÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙ Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ?ئات⬠â«Ù٠جذب اÙسÙرÙâ¬
â«Ø³Ø¯â¬
â«Ø£Ùضا بشÙÙ ÙبÙر عÙÙ Ùسائ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù
٠أج٠Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙ ÙعتÙ
دÙÙ Ù⬠â«ØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر أ٠اÙسÙرÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øª اإÙستÙصا Ùâ¬
â«Ø¦ÙØ© Ùز⬠â«Ù
ع اإÙبÙاء عÙ٠أسعار Ù
ÙبÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙد أظÙرت اÙدرâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ٠أصاÙ٠بÙ٠⪠30â¬Ù⪠40â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
Ù Ù
ستخدÙ
Ù ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
اÙÙائÙ
ÙÙ ÙÙâ¬
â«ØªÙÙع Ø£Ù ÙستÙ?ÙدÙا بشÙÙ ÙبÙر Ù
٠اÙخدÙ
ات اÙجدÙدة⬠â«ØاجاتÙÙ
Ù
Ù ØÙØ« اÙÙÙÙ ÙÙØ´ Ùâ¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø®ØØ ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¥Ù٠جاÙب شبÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙاصاÙت اÙÙ
غذÙØ© ذات اÙصÙة⪠Øâ¬ØÙاÙÙ ÙصÙ? اÙبÙد ÙسÙبÙغ Ø£Ùثر Ù
٠⪠50â¬Ù?Ù⬠â«Ø¹ اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت اÙÙ
ÙÙâ¬â«ØÙ Ù
شرÙâ¬â«Ø³Ùغ Ùâ¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ØسÙØ©âªÙ? \.â¬â¬ â«Ù?â¬
â«ÙÙÙ ÙاÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø© Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙÙÙ ÙاÙسÙرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ئة Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
تدÙÙØ© Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙÙ Ø°Ù٠اÙÙ
Ùارâ¬
â«Ø§Øªâ¬ â«ÙÙسÙرÙÙÙ Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø´ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø±Ø¨ عÙ
٠أساسÙا⬠â«Ø¹ Ù?رص عÙ
Ù ÙصÙرâ¬
â«Ø© اأÙÙ
د Ù?Ù ÙØاع اÙبÙاء اÙØ°Ù ÙØاÙÙ
ا Ù⬠â«âª \.15â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙد اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«âª11â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ùبة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
ØØاتâª/â¬ÙÙØ§Ø Ø§ÙتÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ?âª\.â¬â¬ â«ØªÙÙÙÙ
اتÙØ© اÙÙÙ٠إÙÙ ÙظاÙ
ÙÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ ÙسÙ
Ø Ø¨Ø§ÙتÙاص٠Ù?٠اÙÙÙت اÙÙ?عÙ٠بÙ٠اÙÙ
رÙبة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
رÙز اÙÙ
رâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªÙ?Ø´Ùرâ¬
â«âªPage 23 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø´Ù٠ثاÙÙâ¬
â«Ù Ù⬠â«Ø¸Ù? Ø£Ùثر Ù
٠⪠100000â¬Ø¹Ø§Ù
Ù (ØÙاÙ٠⪠10â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
ÙØ©)⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ø£Ù ÙØاع اÙبÙاء Ù?⬠â«Ø§Ø¹ Ù?٠سÙرÙا⪠Øâ¬Ùا٠ÙØاع اÙبÙاء ÙÙ Ù⬠â«ÙبÙاÙ⪠\.â¬Ùب٠اÙداÙع اÙÙزâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙØاع اÙبÙاء Ø¥ÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙØ© (⪠26\.5â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة)⪠\.â¬Ø§Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ùؤد٠تشغÙ٠اÙسÙرÙ⬠â«ÙÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠(⪠24\.1â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة)⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø¹Ø¯ اأÙعÙ
ا٠اÙÙ
Ùز Ù⬠â«Ø£Ùبر Ùâ¬
â«Ù
شغ٠باÙÙسبة Ø¥Ù٠اÙاÙجئÙ٠اÙسÙرÙâ¬
â«Ø© Ù
Ùâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙÙ٠بÙÙÙ
ا اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© غÙر اÙÙ
اÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£ÙÙ Ù?٠اÙعÙد اÙÙ
اضÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙØاÙÙ
ا ÙاÙت اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
اÙرâ¬
â«Ø© Ù?Ù ÙØاع اÙبÙاء Ù
Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙØ© بÙ
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³ØªØ¨Ø¹Ø§Ø¯ اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ø© Ø¥ÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ØªØ¬Ø¯Ø± اإÙشار⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙÙÙ ÙاÙسÙرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø© Ù?Ù ÙØاع اÙبÙاء Ù
جÙ
Ùعة Ø£Ùسع Ù
Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ø§Ø¯Ø©âª \.â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ÙاØ٠اأÙÙ?Ùر Ù
Ù ÙبÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬ØªØ´Ù
٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© غÙر اÙÙ
اÙر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙرÙâ¬
â«ÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Øªâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙÙÙ Ø°Ù٠اÙÙ
Ùارâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ Ù Ù⬠â«Ø§Øªâª Øâ¬Ø§Ø¥ÙسÙ
Ùت⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙشاØÙات)⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùت٠تستخدÙ
اÙسÙرÙ⬠â«(اÙÙسارâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ© Ù?٠خدÙ
ات ÙصÙاعات داعÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³ØªØداث ÙظائÙ? سÙسÙØ© اإÙÙ
داداتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتصادÙØ© Ø£Ùسع Ù
Ù ØÙØ« تØسÙ٠اÙÙÙ?اذ Ø¥Ù٠اأÙسÙا٠ÙاÙخدÙ
ات باÙÙسبة Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
جتÙ
عات اÙاÙجئÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¬ØªÙ
اعÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
ÙاÙ?عâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª Ù?٠اÙØرÙات تÙÙÙدâ¬â«Ø£Ù ااÙستثÙ
ارâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
تدÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ø²Ø±â¬
â«Ø© اÙعÙ
Ù⬠â«Ù?٠اÙسÙرÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ٠اÙÙبÙر إثر اأÙزÙ
ة⪠Øâ¬Ø£ØµØ¯Ø±Øª ٠ا⬠â«ÙÙ٠باÙعÙ
Ù Ù?Ù ÙØاع اÙبÙاء Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙ⪠\.â¬ÙعÙ٠ضÙØ¡ تدÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙØ© ÙÙسÙرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙاÙÙ
جتÙ
عات ا Ù?â¬
â«ÙÙ
ضÙÙ?ة⪠\.â¬ØªØ³Ù
Ø Ø§Ø£ÙÙظÙ
Ø©â¬
â«ÙÙ٠اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙعÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙØاع اÙبÙاء⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙتÙظÙÙ?âªØâ¬â¬â«Ø§Ø± اÙÙ
Ø°ÙÙر بشÙ٠صرÙØ Ø§ÙسÙرÙ⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙÙÙ ÙتÙÙÙدÙا⪠\.â¬ÙتعÙ?٠اÙÙ
ادة ⪠2â¬Ù
٠اÙÙر⬠â«Ø§Ø± ÙتØدÙد اÙÙظائÙ? اÙÙ
ØصÙرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«ÙرÙاâ¬
â«âª12â¬â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙ٠إÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø© اÙعÙ
Ù Ùسبة اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ø²Ø±â¬ â«ÙØد Ùرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø± آخر اÙØ٠صادر ع٠٠ا⬠â«ÙÙ٠باÙعÙ
Ù Ù?Ù Ùذ٠اÙÙØاعات اÙثاÙثةâªÙ \.â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø¹Ø© Ù
Ù Ùذ٠اÙÙÙÙدâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù
Ù
ا ÙسÙ
Ø ÙÙسÙرÙ⬠â«ÙاÙزرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙرÙâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
شارÙع اÙبÙاء بÙâª\.1:1â¬â¬
â«ÙتÙ
⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙÙÙ Ø°Ù٠اÙدخ٠اÙÙ
تدÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ø¨Øسب تÙدÙر⬠â«âª \.16â¬Ù ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª درâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø© ÙÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ Ù
ÙÙار دÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙسÙرÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ Ù
ÙÙÙÙÙ ÙÙÙ
عÙ
Ùâ¬â«ØªÙÙع Ø£Ù ÙÙÙÙد اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø©âª Øâ¬ÙغÙرâ¬
â«ÙتÙ
استØداث بÙ٠⪠100000â¬Ù⪠650000â¬ÙظÙÙ?Ø© Ù
باشر⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ù Ù?٠بÙاء اÙجسÙر ÙاÙØرÙات Ù?٠دÙÙ Ù
ختÙÙ?Ø© Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© اÙشر اأÙÙØ³Ø ÙØ´Ù
ا٠أÙ?رÙÙÙاâªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø³ØªØ«Ù
ارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª Ù?٠اÙØرÙات ÙاÙجسÙر أعÙÙâ¬â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙÙ ÙØاع⪠Øâ¬ØªÙÙÙد ااÙستثÙ
ار⬠â«Ø£ÙÙ ÙÙ
ستÙ٠شبÙÙ Ù
٠ااÙستثÙ
ار بÙÙÙ
Ø© Ù
ÙÙار دÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø© Ø¥ÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø©âª Øâ¬ÙÙ
ستØØ«â¬
â«Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا تÙ?Ø´Ùر اÙدر⬠â«Ù
باشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
دÙÙØ© ÙاÙØرÙات ÙاÙجسÙر Ùسبة Ùدâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙØ© Ø£Ù ÙØ£ÙشغاÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø© أجرتÙا Ù
Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¸Ù
Ø© اÙعÙ
Ù⬠â«Ù د درâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙÙÙÙا (اÙجدÙ٠⪠\. )1â¬ÙتؤÙâ¬
â«âª13â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ Ù
٠اÙÙظائÙ? Ù?Ù ÙØاعات Ù?â¬
â«Ø Ùسبة اÙÙدâ¬â«Ø§Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙا⪠\.â¬Ùتترâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ùسبة Ùد عاÙ
ÙØ© Ù
رتÙ?عة ÙسبÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
دÙÙØ© اÙÙ
Ø´Ù
ÙÙØ© Ù?Ù Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ø§Ù
ÙØ© Ù
رتÙ?عة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ùسبة ⪠30 -15â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة⪠\.14â¬Ø¨Ø´Ù٠عاÙ
⪠Øâ¬Ø£ÙÙØ´ØØ© اأÙشغاÙâ¬
â«Ø£Ù Ø£ÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
شارÙع تشÙ
٠بÙاء⬠â«Ø§ÙعادÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ بÙ٠⪠20â¬Ù⪠30â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئةâªØâ¬Ø§Ù ب٠أÙثر Ù
٠أعÙ
ا٠اÙØرÙات⬠â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© اÙÙ
Ø´Ù
ÙÙØ© Ù?Ù Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙعاÙ
ÙØ© Ø£ÙÙØ´ØØ© اÙبÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ? اÙباصات ÙاÙÙ
اÙجئ⪠Øâ¬ÙتØسÙ٠اأÙرصÙ?Ø© ÙاÙÙÙ?اذ Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
Ø Ùâ¬
â«Øات⪠Øâ¬Ù
ا ÙÙتض٠جÙÙد Ùد⬠â«Ø¬Ø³Ùر ÙÙÙ
شاة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ?ص٠اÙÙ
اد٠عÙ٠اÙØرÙات اÙسرÙعة⪠Øâ¬ÙترÙÙب ÙÙØ§Ø ØªÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø§Ù
ÙØ© Ù
ÙØÙظةâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø© اÙعÙ
٠رÙÙ
⪠Ø1/197â¬ÙاÙÙ٠اأÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø¯ÙسÙ
بر âª\.2014â¬â¬
â«Ø²Ø±â¬â«Ø§Ø± ٠اâ¬
â«Ùر⬠â«âª12â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© اÙشر٠اأÙÙØ³Ø ÙØ´Ù
ا٠أÙ?رÙÙÙا"âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâª" \.2013 \.â¬Ø®ÙÙ Ù?رص اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙبÙÙ⬠â«âª13â¬â¬
â«âª14â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
تÙسØÙØ© اÙشرÙÙة⪠\.â¬Ù
Ùجز تÙÙ?ÙØ°Ùâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙØ©âª" \.2015 \.â¬Ø£Ø«Ø± استثÙ
ارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙبÙ٠اأÙÙرÙب٠ÙاÙستثÙ
ار عÙ٠اÙعÙ
اÙØ© Ù?٠اÙدÙÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ù
ÙظÙ
Ø© اÙعÙ
Ùâ¬
â«âªPage 24 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©âª Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
Ø³ØªØ Ùâ¬
â«Ø«Ø© اÙت٠تÙÙÙدÙا ÙÙ?Ùات بÙÙÙ
Ø© Ù
ÙÙار دâª\.â¬Ø£âª \.â¬Ù?Ù Ù
ختÙÙ? ÙØاعات اÙبÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙجدÙ٠⪠\.1â¬Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ اÙÙظائÙ? اÙÙ
باشرâ¬
â«Ø©âª Øâ¬ÙغÙر اÙÙ
باشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙاءâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùا٠ÙÙ
ÙاÙâ¬
â«ÙØاعات⬠â«Ù
ØØات⬠â«Ø§ÙØرÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ ÙااÙتصااÙت⬠â«Ø§ÙصرÙ?⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙبÙÙة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙرباءâ¬
â«Ùâ¬â«Ø£Ø®Ø±â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙÙرباء⬠â«ÙاÙجسÙرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙصØÙâ¬
â«âª59,00â¬â¬ â«âª120,00â¬â¬ â«âª122,000â¬â¬ â«âª254,00â¬â¬ â«âª654,00â¬â¬ â«âª105,00â¬â¬ â«âª86,000â¬â¬ â«Ø¯Ø¬ÙبÙتÙâ¬
â«âª0â¬â¬ â«âª0â¬â¬ â«âª0â¬â¬ â«âª0â¬â¬ â«âª0â¬â¬
â«âª31,00â¬â¬ â«âª64,000â¬â¬ â«âª65,000â¬â¬ â«âª136,00â¬â¬ â«âª350,00â¬â¬ â«âª56,000â¬â¬ â«âª46,000â¬â¬ â«Ù
صرâ¬
â«âª0â¬â¬ â«âª0â¬â¬ â«âª0â¬â¬
â«âª17,00â¬â¬ â«âª34,000â¬â¬ â«âª35,000â¬â¬ â«âª73,000â¬â¬ â«âª189,00â¬â¬ â«âª30,000â¬â¬ â«âª25,000â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø£ÙردÙâ¬
â«âª0â¬â¬
â«âª9,000â¬â¬ â«âª18,000â¬â¬ â«âª18,000â¬â¬ â«âª38,000â¬â¬ â«âª0â¬â¬
â«âª97,000â¬â¬ â«âª16,000â¬â¬ â«âª13,000â¬â¬ â«ÙبÙاÙâ¬
â«âª25,00â¬â¬ â«âª52,000â¬â¬ â«âª52,000â¬â¬ â«âª109,00â¬â¬ â«âª283,00â¬â¬ â«âª73,900â¬â¬ â«âª37,000â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
غربâ¬
â«âª0â¬â¬
â«âª19,00â¬â¬ â«âª38,000â¬â¬ â«âª39,000â¬â¬ â«âª0â¬â¬
â«âª81,000â¬â¬ â«âª0â¬â¬
â«âª210,00â¬â¬ â«âª34,000â¬â¬ â«âª28,000â¬â¬ â«ØªÙÙسâ¬
â«âª0â¬â¬ â«âª0â¬â¬
â«Ø¹ Ù?ÙÙا⬠â«Ø¬ÙÙ
⪠-â¬Ø£ÙداÙ? ذات Ù
ستÙ٠أعÙÙ Ù?â¬
â«ÙساÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ùا Ùâ¬
â«Ù
Ù?Ùدا⬠â«Ø¹ Ù
ÙØÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙÙ
ÙÙØ© Ù?Ù ÙØاع اÙÙÙÙ Ù
ع تØÙ?Ùز ااÙÙتصاد ÙØ®ÙÙ Ù?رص عÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬Ùتâ¬
â«Ùبع تصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø³Ø¯ Øاجات ÙبÙاÙâ¬â«Ø¹ Ù
٠أج٠Ù⬠â«âªÙ \.17â¬â¬
â«ØªÙ
تصÙ
ÙÙ
Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«ØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر⪠Øâ¬ÙتØسÙ٠خدÙ
ات⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصادÙØ© اÙÙبÙرâ¬
â«Ø© Ùز⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØد Ù
٠اÙعÙاÙ
٠اÙخار Ùâ¬
â«Ø¬Ùة⬠â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ
Ø© Ù?Ù ÙØاعات اÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø³Ø¯ ØاجاتÙâ¬
â«ÙÙجÙ
Ùع Ù
٠أج٠Ù
ساعدة ÙبÙا٠عÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙ ÙاÙÙب٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙباÙتاÙ٠تخÙ?ÙÙ? اÙضغÙØ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙÙÙ Ø°Ù٠اÙدخ٠اÙÙ
ÙØ®Ù?ض Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
تÙسØ⪠Øâ¬ÙØ®ÙÙ ÙظائÙ? ÙÙسÙرÙ⬠â«ÙÙÙ Ù Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙتÙÙÙص اÙتÙاÙÙÙ? باÙÙسبة Ø¥Ù٠اÙسÙرÙâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ ÙØاجات⬠â«Ø© Ù
٠أج٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØد Ù
٠أزÙ
Ø© اÙاÙجئÙ٠اÙسÙرÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ستÙ
رâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ اÙضÙØ¡ عÙ٠جÙÙد ÙبÙاÙ⬠â«ÙسÙÙØ Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصادÙØ© اÙÙاجÙ
Ø© ع٠أزÙ
Ø© اÙاÙجئÙ٠اÙسÙرÙâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ù?⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙØÙÙØ© اÙتÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙÙÙÙات عÙÙ ÙائÙ
Ø© اÙÙ
شارÙعâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ Ù
Ù⬠â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø¹Ø§ÙÙ
ÙØ©âªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙØ© Ù
٠أج٠دعÙ
Ù Ù?٠تأÙ
Ù٠سÙعة عاÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ùدة Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
ساعدة Ù
٠اأÙسرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§ÙبÙد اÙÙ
تزâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØد Ù
Ù ÙÙع أزÙ
Ø© اÙاÙجئÙÙ ÙااÙستÙ?ادة⪠Øâ¬Ø¥Ù جاز اأÙÙ
ر⪠Øâ¬Ù
Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¢ÙÙØ© اÙÙرÙض⬠â«Ø£ÙÙÙÙØ© عاÙÙØ© Ù
٠أج٠Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªÙÙ
ÙÙØ© ذاتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙØ© عÙÙÙا عÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙا Ù
شارÙع⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙاÙ?Ùت اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùسرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø¹ Ù?٠تØÙÙ٠أÙداÙ? Ù
جÙ
Ùعة اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠ااÙستر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ØªÙجÙØ© ÙÙÙضاء عÙ٠اÙÙ?Ùر اÙÙ
دÙع ÙاÙدÙ?ع بااÙزدÙار اÙÙ
شتر٠بØرÙÙØ© Ù
ستداÙ
ة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?ة⬠â«ÙساÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«âªÙ? \.18â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙÙÙ Ø°Ù٠اÙدخ٠اÙÙ
ÙØ®Ù?ضâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ Ù Ù⬠â«Ø¹ باÙÙ
ÙÙ?عة بشÙ٠أساس٠عÙ٠اÙسÙرÙ⬠â«Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
بادئ تØÙÙ٠اÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠اأÙÙص٠أ٠Ù
ÙÙجÙØ© اÙتعبئة Ù
٠أج٠اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ø³Ùأت٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ بشÙ٠أساس٠Ù?رصâ¬â«Ø¨Ø§ÙÙ
صداÙÙØ© اÙاÙزÙ
ة⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙد اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùع⬠â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙزÙدÙÙ
بÙسائ٠ÙÙÙ ÙظÙÙ?ة⪠Øâ¬ÙØ¢Ù
Ùة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ÙبÙÙØ© Ù
Ù ØÙØ« اÙÙÙÙ?ة⪠Øâ¬ÙتتÙ
ت⬠â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
تÙØ³Ø Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت اÙÙبرâ¬
â«Ø© ااÙÙتÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠شأÙâ¬
â«ÙؤÙ
Ù ÙÙÙ
دخاÙ٠أÙ?ضÙ⪠\.â¬Ù
٠خاÙ٠تÙÙÙص Ù?تر⬠â«Ø§Ø¡ ÙØ°Ù٠اÙÙ
Ùارâ¬
â«Ù
Ù
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙÙ
تدÙÙØ© اÙعاÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«ÙبÙاÙÙÙÙ ÙاÙسÙرÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ٠اÙÙ?Ùر⬠â«Ø© اأÙÙ
د Ù Ùâ¬â«Ø¹Ù
Ù ÙصÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ Ø¥Ù٠خدÙ
ات ÙأسÙا٠أÙ?ضÙ⪠\.â¬Ø¥ÙÙ⬠â«Ø£Ùضا Ø£Ù Ùâ¬
â«ÙØس٠ÙÙ?اذ اÙÙ?Ùر⬠â«Ù
Ù
ا سÙÙ? Ùؤد٠Ùâ¬â«Ø©âªÙ Øâ¬â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
تأخرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù) ÙاÙÙ
ÙاØÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¨Ø بÙ٠اÙÙ
رÙز (بÙرÙت Ù?⬠â«Øس٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ùضا اÙتر⬠â«Ù Ùâ¬â«Ø¹ Ø£Ù Ù?â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø£Ø®Ùرâ¬
â«Ø§âªØâ¬â¬ â«Ù
شغÙÙ٠خاصÙÙ ÙÙ?Ù Ù
بادئ تØÙÙ٠اÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠اأÙÙص٠Ù
٠أج٠اÙتÙÙ
Ùة⪠\.â¬Ù Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¡ أسØÙ٠باصات Ù
Ù Ùب٠Ù⬠â«Ù Ùشر⬠â«Ù اÙجÙÙر⬠â«Ø¹ اÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙتجارâ¬â«Ùعبئ اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«Ø°ÙÙâªÙ? Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø© عÙ٠تØÙÙÙ ÙØاع اÙÙÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠ÙتØÙÙ٠ا٠Ùâ¬
â«ØªØÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙÙ
Ø Ø§Ø³ØªØ®Ø¯Ø§Ù
Ùسائ٠اÙÙÙÙ ÙااÙÙتÙا٠Ù
٠اÙÙ
رÙبات اÙخاصة Ø¥ÙÙ ÙظÙ
ÙÙ٠عاÙ
Ù?اعÙØ©âªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø¹ آثار ÙبÙرâ¬â«ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«âªPage 25 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتغÙر اÙÙ
ÙاخÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«ÙÙع ب Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ÙاÙ?ع Ù
ÙØÙظة عÙÙ Ù⬠â«ØªØªÙ
تâ¬
â«Ùخص تÙسÙع اÙÙÙ?اذ Ø¥Ù٠اÙخدÙ
ات ÙتØسÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙعÙتÙا (Ù
جا٠اÙترÙÙز اأÙÙÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØ© ÙÙبÙا٠Ù
٠خاÙ٠تØÙÙ٠أÙداÙ?Ù Ù?Ù Ù
ا⬠â«Ø¹ Ù?٠إØار اÙشر⬠â«ÙساÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«âª \.19â¬ÙÙ
ا Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°ÙÙÙ ÙÙ
جÙ
Ùعة اÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© âª( 2022-2017â¬Ø§ÙتÙرÙر رÙÙ
⪠94768-LBâ¬Ø§ÙØ°Ù ÙاÙØ´Ù Ù
جÙس اÙÙ
درâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØ©)⪠\.â¬ÙÙدÙ? Ø¥Øار اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© اÙجدÙد Ù
ع ÙبÙا٠ÙÙسÙة⬠â«Ø¥ÙØار اÙشرâ¬
â«ÙÙجا Ø´Ù
ÙÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙا⬠â«Ø°Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ ÙعÙسا٠Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙ Ù?٠⪠14â¬ØªÙ
Ùزâª/â¬ÙÙÙÙ٠⪠)2016â¬Ø¥Ù٠بÙاء اÙÙ
رÙÙØ© ÙتعزÙز اÙÙ?رص ÙÙجÙ
Ùع⪠\.â¬ÙتÙ
ØÙر Ø¥Øار اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© Ù
ع اÙبÙد ØÙÙ Ù
جاÙ٠اÙترÙÙز اÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙعÙتÙا Ù(ب)â¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© ÙÙبÙد ÙÙ
اâª( :â¬Ø£) تعزÙز اÙÙÙ?اذ Ø¥Ù٠اÙخدÙ
ات ÙتØسÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙÙ
ÙÙة⪠\.â¬Ù
جاا٠اÙترÙÙز Ø¥ÙØار اÙشرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø±Ù Ø¥ÙÙ ÙÙع أزÙ
Ø© اÙاÙجئÙÙ Ù
ع تØÙÙÙ Øاجات ÙبÙاÙâ¬â«ÙÙØªØ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© Ù
ع اÙبÙد Ù?Ù Ù
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ùخص⬠â«Ùساعد Ù?٠تØÙÙ٠اÙÙدÙ? âª\.1â¬Ø¬ Ù
٠إØار اÙشرâ¬â«Ø¹ بشÙ٠خاص Ø£Ù Ù?⬠â«Ù⪠\.â¬Ù
٠شأ٠Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصادÙØ© ÙزÙادة اÙرâ¬
â«Ø£Ø³Ù
ا٠اÙبشر⬠â«Ù⬠â«ØªØ¹Ø²Ùز اÙÙ?رصâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ© Ø¥ÙØار اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© Ù
ع اÙبÙد Ù
٠أج٠تØسÙ٠تأÙ
Ù٠اÙخدÙ
ات⪠Øâ¬ÙتØÙÙÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙساÙÙ
Ù?٠تØÙÙ٠اأÙÙداÙ?⬠â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙتØسÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙعÙتÙا" ÙØ£Ù Ù?⬠â«Ù⬠â«"تØسÙ٠اÙÙÙ?اذ Ø¥Ù٠اÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ø£Ù Ù?â¬
â«ÙساÙÙ
Ù?٠أجÙدة اÙدÙ
ج⬠â«Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ù
٠شأ٠Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù٠اÙÙ
تÙØ³Ø ÙاÙØÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ساعدة ÙبÙا٠عÙ٠اÙتعاÙ
Ù Ù
ع ÙÙع اأÙزÙ
Ø© اÙسÙرÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙ
د Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙÙ
ÙÙØ© عÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙداÙ?â¬
â«Ø§Ø¡âª Øâ¬ÙاÙÙساء⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙشباب⪠Øâ¬ÙØ°Ù٠اÙØرÙØ© اÙÙ
ØدÙدة باÙÙصÙ٠إÙ٠اأÙسÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙظائÙ?⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙخدÙ
اتâ¬
â«Ø© ع٠اÙرÙب Ù
٠خاÙ٠اÙسÙ
Ø§Ø ÙÙÙ?Ùر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
تأخرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙ?٠تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ÙاØÙâ¬
â«Ø¨Ù
صداÙÙØ© ÙبÙÙÙ?Ø© Ùâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø© ØÙÙ⬠â«Ø© Ù?٠اÙرÙÙزâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ù
باشرÙ⬠â«Ø§ØªÙجÙØ© Ù
جÙ
Ùعة اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙÙ
ÙØÙØ© اÙشر٠اأÙÙØ³Ø ÙØ´Ù
ا٠أÙ?رÙÙÙا (اÙÙ
ÙÙا)âªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«ÙساÙÙ
Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø¹ Ù?٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° استر Ù⬠â«âªÙ? \.20â¬â¬
â«ÙساÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù? ÙصÙرâ¬
â«Ø© اأÙÙ
د⬠â«ÙÙÙ ÙØ®ÙÙ Ùظائ Ùâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
رÙÙØ© Ù?Ù Ùج٠اÙصدÙ
ات اÙÙاجÙ
Ø© ع٠أزÙ
Ø© اÙاÙجئÙÙ Ù
٠خاÙÙ Ù
ساعدة ÙبÙا٠عÙ٠اÙتعاÙ
Ù Ù
ع ÙÙع أزÙ
Ø© اÙاÙجئÙ٠اÙسÙرÙâ¬
â«ÙساÙÙ
Ù?٠اÙرÙÙزâ¬
â«Ø© ØÙ٠إعادة تجدÙد اÙعÙد ااÙجتÙ
اع٠Ù
٠خاÙ٠تØسÙ٠اÙخدÙ
ات Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
جÙ
Ùعات اÙÙ
ستضعÙ?ة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙØ© ÙÙاÙجئÙ٠اÙسÙرÙâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ù?⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙ
جتÙ
عات اÙÙ
ضÙÙ?Ø©â¬
â«Ø© Ù?Ù ÙÙت اÙØ٠إÙعادة بÙاءâ¬
â«ÙÙâ¬â«ÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùت٠ستÙÙ٠ضرÙرÙ⬠â«Ø¹ Ù
Ùارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙبÙاء Ùد٠اÙاÙجئÙ٠اÙسÙرÙ⬠â«Ø¹Ø²Ø² اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø³Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§âªÙ? Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø£Ø®Ùر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
تأخرâ¬
â«Ø© ع٠اÙرÙب⪠\.â¬Ù Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙتØÙÙر اÙÙ
ÙاØÙâ¬
â«Ø³ÙرÙاâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø«Ø§ÙÙÙا â Ø£ÙداÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ø¹ ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬â«Ø£ÙÙ? â ÙدÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù ÙعÙد اÙÙ
دخ٠اÙØ´Ù
اÙÙ ÙÙ
دÙÙة⬠â«ÙÙابÙÙØ© ÙÙ?اذ اÙرÙاب Ø¥ÙÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبر⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙعÙتÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ø© ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
â¬â«Ø¹ ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù?٠تØسÙ٠سرâ¬â«âª \.21â¬ÙÙض٠ÙدÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¨ÙرÙتâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¹â¬â«Ø¨Ø§Ø¡ â اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ ÙÙ
اÙÙ?ئات اÙتاÙÙØ©âª:â¬â¬â«âª \.22â¬Ø§ÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹â¬ â«Ù Ù
باشرÙâ¬
â«Ø© Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ÙÙÙ Ø°Ù٠اÙدخ٠اÙÙ
ÙØ®Ù?ض Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
تÙØ³Ø Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙÙ
ÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت اÙÙبر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙÙÙ ÙاÙسÙرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙرÙÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙ⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙستÙ?Ùدâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«(Ø£)â¬
â«Ù Ù
ÙÙ Ù
٠خاÙ٠ترâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ زØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙرâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ùا٠آخرÙÙ ÙÙÙÙ
ÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبر⬠â«Ùسد ØاجاتÙÙ
Ù?Ù ÙØاع اÙÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا سÙستÙ?Ùد س Ùâ¬â«Ù
٠خاÙ٠استخداÙ
اÙÙظاÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù ÙÙ?٠اÙÙ
ÙاØÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙÙ
ا Ù?Ù⬠â«Ø¬ Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت اÙÙبرâ¬â«Ùا٠اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ
Ù٠خارâ¬
â«Ø£Ù
ا اÙس Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙÙعÙØ© اÙØÙاة بÙ?ض٠اÙÙظاÙ
اÙجدÙدâªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØرÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙتØسÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙعÙØ© اÙÙÙاءâªØâ¬â¬
â«ÙتØس٠Ùâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âªPage 26 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø© ااÙÙتÙاÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙØ´Ù
اÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù?سÙستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù
٠ترâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¨Ø Ø£Ù?ض٠ببÙرÙت ÙتÙÙÙص Ù?ترâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø¹ ØÙاÙÙ Ù
ÙÙÙÙÙ ÙÙÙ
عÙ
Ù ÙÙظائÙ? Ù
باشرâ¬
â«Ø© ÙصÙر⬠â«Ø§Øª اÙÙ
ØدÙدة⪠\.â¬Ù ÙÙâ¬
â«ØªÙÙع Ø£Ù ÙÙÙÙد اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙرÙÙÙ Ù
Ù Ø°Ù٠اÙÙ
Ùارâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«(ب) اÙÙ
شارÙÙÙ Ù?٠اÙÙد اÙعاÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø© Ù?٠صÙاعات سÙسÙØ© اإÙÙ
داد⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥ÙÙ⬠â«Ø¥Ø¶Ø§Ù?ÙØ© بارزâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øªâª \.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
Ø®ÙÙ ÙظائÙ?⬠â«ÙÙبÙاÙÙÙÙ ÙاÙسÙرÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ٠اÙÙÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
Ùار⬠â«Ù⬠â«ØºØ§ÙبÙتÙاâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙ
د Ù?Ù ÙØاع اÙبÙاءâªØâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙÙÙ Ø°Ù٠اÙدخ٠اÙÙ
ÙØ®Ù?ض Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯Ø§ Ø£Ùبر Ù
Ù Ù?رص اÙعÙ
٠اÙدائÙ
Ø© باÙÙسبة Ø¥ÙÙ⬠â«Ø© ÙاÙÙÙدسة Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙ⪠\.â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙد اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø®Ø¯Ù
ات ااÙستشارâ¬
â«Ø¸Ù?Ù٠اÙرسÙ
ÙâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ù
شغÙ٠اÙباصات اÙخاصة اÙجدد Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات اÙباصات Ù
ع استخداÙ
اÙÙ
Ù Ù⬠â«Øدد Ù⬠â«ÙØاع اÙÙÙÙ ÙخدÙ
ات٠(سائÙ٠باصات⪠Øâ¬ØµÙاÙØ© اÙÙ
ستÙدعات)âªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«Ø³Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø®Ø³Ø§Ø¦Ø± بسبب اÙÙظاÙ
اÙجدÙد (ستÙظرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙتÙبدÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙرسÙ
ÙÙÙ Ùد Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙ٠غÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙتأÙ
Ù٠اÙتدرÙب اÙÙ
اÙئÙ
⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙÙ?اذ Ø¥Ù٠اأÙÙ
٠ااÙجتÙ
اعÙ⪠\.â¬ØµØÙØ Ø£Ù Ø¨Ø¹Ø¶â¬
â«Ø£ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¥ÙجابÙØ© ØÙÙÙØ© اأÙÙ
د عÙ٠ااÙستخداÙ
Ù?٠خدÙ
ات اÙÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ Ù
ÙاÙ?ع⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© اÙجارÙØ© Ù?٠اÙسب٠ÙÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? Ù
Ù Ø°ÙÙ)⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ٠سÙÙÙÙ ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ùدرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øªâ¬
â«Ø© Ù
ع ⪠80â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة باÙÙسبة Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
رÙبات⬠â«ØاÙت Ù
Ùار٠Ùâ¬â«(ØاÙÙا ØÙاÙ٠⪠15â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù?ÙØ Ù
٠اÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙساÙÙ
Ù?٠تÙسÙع Øصة اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù
٠اÙسÙ٠بشÙÙ ÙبÙر⬠â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
تأثâ¬
â«ÙرÙÙ ÙÙ
ا Ùرد⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¥ÙÙ⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙÙسبة⬠â«ØªØ®Ù?ÙÙ?⬠â«ÙتدابÙر⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ù?ز⬠â«Ø⬠â«Ø¹â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ÙØ´Ù
Ù⬠â«Ø°ÙÙâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø¥ÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØاعâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù?Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬
â«ÙÙâ¬â«Ø±â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¬ÙÙ⬠â«Ø¬Ø¯Ùدةâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§â¬ â«Ù?رصâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¯â¬ â«Ùâ¬â«ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù Ù⬠â«Ø§â¬ â«Ù
Ù
⬠â«Ø§Ùخاصة)âªØâ¬â¬
â«Ø¹âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù?٠اÙÙسÙ
ر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¨Ø¹Ø§ â Ù Ù
Ù ÙØ«ÙÙØ© تÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡âª Øâ¬ÙاأÙشخاص Ø°Ù٠اÙØرÙØ© اÙÙ
ØدÙدة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙساء⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙشباب⪠\.â¬ØاÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙا⪠Øâ¬Ù
ا Ù
Ù ÙظاÙ
ÙÙ٠عاÙ
Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠آÙ
ÙâªØâ¬â¬ â«(ج) اÙÙ
جÙ
Ùعات اÙÙ
ستضعÙ?ة⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠غرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø± اÙÙ?Ùرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬ØªÙ
اع٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø© تتÙ
اش٠Ù
ع اÙÙ
Ù
ارسات⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø±Ø³ÙÙ
اâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙدÙ
اÙÙظاÙ
اÙجدÙد⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙÙ
صداÙÙØ© اÙاÙزÙ
Ø©âªÙ? Øâ¬â¬
â«ÙÙÙ
Ù٠اÙÙÙ?اذ Ø¥ÙÙ٠بسÙÙÙØ©âªÙ \.â¬â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ùعâ¬â«Ø¬Ùدة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ÙبÙÙ Ù
Ù ØÙØ« اÙÙÙÙ?ة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙتÙ
تâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙعÙتÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ø±Ø¶ÙØ© Ù
تدÙÙØ©âªØâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùبا Ø¥ÙÙ ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع باصات ذات⬠â«ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙÙÙ٠باستØاعة Ø°Ù٠اÙØرÙØ© اÙÙ
ØدÙدة اÙÙÙ?اذ باÙÙاÙ
٠تÙر Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ù Ù
٠أج٠تعزÙز اÙÙÙ?اذ Ø¥ÙÙÙا⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا ÙسÙ
Ø Ø§ÙÙظاÙ
ÙÙÙساء بااÙستÙ?ادة Ù
٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
بشÙÙ Ù
تزâ¬
â«Ø§ÙدâªØâ¬â¬ â«ÙÙ
ØØات Ù?â¬
â«ÙÙ
Ù٠اÙÙÙ?اذ Ø¥ÙÙÙا بÙاسØØ© Ù
صاعد⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ÙاصÙ?ات أخرâ¬
â«Ùع بباصات ØدÙثة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ØØات تØظÙ⬠â«ÙØ Ù
٠شأ٠اÙÙظاÙ
اÙجدÙد⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙØ°Ù ÙتÙ
ت⬠â«Ø© Ù?٠اÙÙÙت اÙØاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
Ù ØÙØ« اÙساÙÙ
Ø© ÙØ´Ùاغ٠أخر⬠â«Ø£ÙÙ Ù
Ùضع تØدÙات ÙبÙرâ¬â«Ø¨Ù
ا Ùâ¬
â«Øددة⪠Øâ¬ÙتØسÙÙ ØاÙØ© اأÙرصÙ?Ø©â¬â«Ù
Ùâ¬â«Øات⪠Øâ¬Ùرجا٠أÙ
Ù Ù?٠اÙÙ
ØØات ÙÙ?٠باصات Ù?⬠â«Ø§Øª Ù
رâ¬
â«Ø§Ùبة Ù?٠اÙباصات ÙاÙÙ
Ø Ù⬠â«Ø¬Ùدة⪠Øâ¬ÙسائÙ٠باصات Ù
ØترÙ?ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙاÙ
Ùرâ¬â«Ø© Ùâ¬â«Ø¨Ø¥Ùارâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯Ø§ Ùاâ¬
â«ÙبÙر Ù
Ù⬠â«Ø£Ø© Ù
٠خاÙ٠تأÙ
ÙÙ Ùسائ٠ÙÙÙ Ù
ستÙÙÙØ© ÙبÙÙÙ?Ø© Ù
ÙبÙÙØ© باÙÙسبة Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙساء⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا سÙجذب اÙÙظاÙ
Ù⬠â«ÙساÙÙ
Ù?٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
ر⬠â«ÙاÙÙÙ?اذ Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
Ø Ùâ¬
â«Øات⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù Ù?â¬
â«Ø§Ø¡â¬
â«ØªÙبد ÙÙÙ?Ø© شرâ¬
â«ÙÙ
ÙÙÙا Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ù Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙØØ© Ø¥Ù٠بÙرÙت ÙÙعÙ
Ù Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙا Ù
٠اÙÙ
ÙاØÙ Ù?⬠â«ØªØ§ÙÙ
ذة اÙÙ
دارس ÙØاÙب اÙجاÙ
عات⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© اÙشابة اÙت٠تÙتÙÙ ÙÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Øس٠ساÙÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر Ù
ع ترÙÙب ØÙاÙ٠⪠25â¬Ø¬Ø³Ø± Ù
شاة عÙÙ ØÙ٠اÙØرÙ٠اÙسرÙع اÙØ´Ù
اÙÙ ÙعبÙر اÙÙ
شاة ÙاÙÙصÙÙ⬠â«Ø¹ Ø£Ù Ù?⬠â«Ø£Ø®Ùرâ¬
â«Ø§âª Øâ¬Ù
٠شأ٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù
رÙبة خاصة⪠\.â¬Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù ØرÙØ© اÙÙ
شاة ÙØرÙØ© اÙسÙر عÙÙ ØÙا٠اÙØرÙ٠اÙسرÙع اÙØ´Ù
اÙÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«Øس٠بشÙ٠جذر⬠â«Ù
Ù
ا Ù?â¬
â«Ù Ù⬠â«ØاتâªÙ Øâ¬â¬â«Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
Ø Ùâ¬
â«(اÙÙسارâ¬
â«Ø§Øªâª Øâ¬ÙاÙÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙااÙسÙ
Ùت)âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙÙØ© اÙت٠تدعÙ
ÙØاع اÙبÙاءâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ اÙÙ
ÙاÙÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
ستثÙ
رÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙصÙاعات⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ù?â¬
â«Ø³ÙÙ?Ùد اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«(د) ااÙÙتصادات ÙاÙصÙاعاتâ¬
â«Ø¹ اÙØÙب عÙ٠اÙخدÙ
ات اÙخاصة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙÙة⪠\.â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙزÙد اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙÙØ© Ù
٠تØسÙ٠اÙترâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¨Ø ÙزÙادة اÙØÙب عÙ٠اÙسÙع ÙاÙخدÙ
ات⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙستستÙ?Ùد ااÙÙتصاداتâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت عÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§âª Øâ¬Ø³ØªØ³ØªÙ?Ùد اÙÙ
ؤسسات عÙÙ ØÙÙ Ù
سار⬠â«Ø£Ø®Ùرâ¬
â«ÙÙا Ø£Ùبر Ù?Ù Ùذا اÙÙØاعâªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«Øا اÙتصادÙ⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙÙÙÙ ÙÙزÙد Ù
Ù Øصة اÙسÙÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù
Ù
ا ÙÙÙÙد Ùشا Ùâ¬
â«Ùابâª\.â¬â¬â«Ø© Ùعدد اÙرÙ⬠â«ÙابÙÙØ© اÙÙÙ?اذ ÙÙ
٠زÙادة ÙبÙرâ¬
â«Ø© Ù?٠اÙتجار⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù
ر اÙØ´Ù
اÙÙ ÙÙ?٠بÙرÙت بشÙÙ ÙبÙر Ù
٠تØسÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø²Ø±â¬
â«Ø© اÙÙÙÙ ÙاأÙشغاÙ⬠â«Ø¸Ù
âªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«ØªÙ
تÙÙ
ÙØ´ دÙر Ù
ؤسسات اÙÙØاع (٠ا⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙØ© اÙÙاشØØ© Ù?Ù ÙØاع اÙÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ù?٠غÙاب ÙظاÙ
ÙÙ٠عاÙ
Ù
اÙئÙ
ÙÙ
Ùت Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«(Ù) ÙÙااÙت اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø©â¬
â«ÙÙ
سؤÙÙÙاتÙÙ
اâªØâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاصاÙØ Ø£Ø¯Ùارâ¬
â«ÙÙ
ا⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤسست Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ Ù?٠تعزÙز ÙاتÙÙâ¬â«Ø³ÙساÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙاتÙاâªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙعاÙ
Ø© ÙÙ
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙ) ÙاÙتعتÙÙ
عÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شغÙ٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص اÙÙ
ØترÙ?Ù٠أ٠Ù?â¬
â«ÙساÙÙ
Ùا Ù?٠تØدÙØ« ÙØاع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙبÙاء اÙتدرÙج٠ÙÙÙ
شارÙØ© اÙÙ?اعÙØ© ÙÙÙØاع⬠â«ÙتØدÙØ« سÙاسات اÙÙØاع⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ù
٠شأ٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ùخاص Ù?Ù Ùذ٠اÙصÙاعةâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¹ ÙÙتÙÙ
Ùة⬠â«Ø¬ÙÙ
â Ù
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙÙتائج اÙÙائÙ
Ø© عÙÙ ÙدÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«ØØ© اÙتاÙÙØ©âª:â¬â¬â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ© اÙÙ
Ùترâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª اÙÙتائج⬠â«Ø¹ ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù
٠خاÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ؤشر⬠â«Ø³ÙتÙ
رصد Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙدÙ
ÙØ٠تØÙÙÙ ÙدÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«âªÙ \.23â¬â¬
â«âªPage 27 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ© أ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت) ÙتدبÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙرسÙ
ÙØ© (اÙباصاتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ Ù
٠خاÙ٠استخداÙ
اÙباصات اÙعاÙ
ة⬠â«(Ø£) عدد اÙرÙاب بØسب Ùâ¬
â«Ø£ÙاÙ
اأÙسبÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ© أ٠اÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ئÙÙØ© ÙÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ùبات Ù?Ù ÙظاÙ
اÙباصات اÙعاÙ
Ø© اÙرسÙ
Ù (اÙباصات⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ù⪠:â¬Ø§ÙÙسبةâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشر اÙÙ?رâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Øâ¬â«ÙÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
باشرÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹âª\.â¬â¬â«Ø§ÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت) بØسب Ø£ÙاÙ
اأÙسبÙâ¬
â«Ø© Ø¥ÙتÙا٠Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ع اÙÙÙ?اذ Ø¥ÙÙ ÙØ³Ø Ù
دÙÙØ© بÙرÙت ("ساØØ© اÙØ´Ùداء") Ù?٠خاÙÙ Ù?تر⬠â«Ùâª15â¬â¬â«Ø§ÙÙبر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ئÙÙØ© ÙÙسÙا٠اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ
ÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت⬠â«(ب) اÙÙسبةâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âª 60â¬Ø¯ÙÙÙØ© بÙاسØØ© Ùسائ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙصباØÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø© ااÙÙتÙا٠عÙÙ Ù
ت٠Ùسائ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù
Ù Ù
ØØØ© Øبرجا Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
Ø Ùâ¬
â«ØØ© شار٠اÙØÙÙ Ù?٠ساعات اÙذرÙة⬠â«(ج) Ùâ¬
â«Ù
تÙØ³Ø Ù?ترâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù⪠:â¬ØªØµÙÙÙ? اÙرÙاب اإÙÙاث ÙÙ
ستÙ٠اÙرضا ع٠ÙظاÙ
اÙباصات⬠â«(د) تصÙÙÙ? اÙرÙاب ÙÙ
ستÙ٠اÙرضا ع٠ÙظاÙ
اÙباصات اÙعاÙ
Ø© اÙرسÙ
ÙØ Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ؤشر Ù?رâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعاÙ
Ø© اÙرسÙ
Ùâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø«Ø§ÙØ«Ùا⪠:â¬ØªÙصÙÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«Ø¹â¬ â«Ø£ÙÙ? â Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ÙÙÙات اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙØªØ±Ø Ø§ÙÙ
رØÙØ© اأÙÙÙÙ ÙبرÙاÙ
ج ÙÙ٠عاÙ
ÙØÙ٠شاÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙتأÙÙÙ? برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
اÙشاÙ
Ù Ù
٠شبÙØ© ÙÙ٠سرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙثاÙثة Ø®ØÙØâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹â¬ â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«âªÙ? \.24â¬â¬
â«Ø£Ø³Ø§Ø³ÙØ© Ù?Ù ÙØ³Ø Ø§ÙØرÙ٠اÙسرÙع عÙ٠اÙجاÙب اÙØ´Ù
اÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙجÙÙبÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙشرÙ٠إÙ٠بÙرÙت⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع Ø®ØÙØ ÙÙ٠سرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙ
تد ضÙ
٠بÙرÙت⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙ٠سرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬
â«Ø³ØªÙÙ
٠شبÙØ© اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ØÙاÙÙ âª20â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¨Ø بÙ٠بÙرÙت ÙاÙÙ
ÙاØÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙضÙ
٠بÙرÙت ÙØدÙا⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ© ÙتØسÙ٠اÙترâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
Ù Ø£Ø¬Ù Ø±Ø¨Ø Ø®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙثاÙثةâ¬
â«ÙÙ? اÙباصات⪠Øâ¬ÙاأÙرصÙ?ة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
ÙاÙÙ?⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
Ùشآت صعÙد Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙرÙاب)âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ø§Ø¯ÙØ© ÙÙ
غذÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠استثÙ
ارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª Ù
٠أج٠تØسÙ٠اÙÙÙ?اذ (ÙÙØ§Ø ØªÙÙ⬠â«Øا Ù
٠شبÙات باصات Ù⬠â«Ø®Ùâ¬
â«ØÙØ© اأÙÙÙÙ ÙظاÙ
ÙÙ٠سرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬â«Ø§Ø٠ثاÙث⪠:â¬ØªÙÙ٠اÙÙ
رâ¬â«ÙسÙتÙ
تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙبرÙاÙ
ج عÙÙ Ù
رâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙتجاÙز عدد باصات اأÙسØÙ٠اÙاÙزÙ
ÙÙبرÙاÙ
ج بÙاÙ
Ù٠⪠1000â¬Ø¨Ø§Øµâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø)Ø ÙتÙÙÙ
اÙÙ
رØÙØ© اÙثاÙÙØ© عÙÙ ÙظاÙ
â¬â«Ø¹ اÙÙ
Ùتر⬠â«Ù اÙخارج٠ÙبÙرÙت Ù
ع باصاتâª/â¬Ø®ØÙØ ÙÙÙ Ù
غذÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ÙÙ
ÙØ© (اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø¹Ù٠اÙØرÙ٠اÙسرÙع اÙØ´Ù
اÙÙ ÙعÙ٠اÙØرÙ٠اÙدائرâ¬
â«Ù
ÙÙ
ÙØ©Ø Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ù
ا اÙÙ
رØÙة⬠â«Ù٠تربØا٠Ù
ا بÙ٠بÙرÙت ÙاÙجÙÙب⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع باصاتâª/â¬Ø®ØÙØ ÙÙÙ Ù
غذÙØ© Ù⬠â«Ø£Ø³Ø§Ø³ÙتÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙ٠سرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت عÙ٠اÙØرÙ٠اÙسرÙع اÙجÙÙب٠ÙعÙÙ ØرÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¥Ø¶Ø§Ù?ÙØ© ضÙ
٠بÙرÙت Ù
ع باصاتâª/â¬Ø®ØÙØ ÙÙÙ Ù
غذÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£Ø³Ø§Ø³ÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙثاÙثة Ù?ÙÙ ÙظاÙ
ÙÙ٠سرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت عÙ٠اÙØرÙ٠اÙسرÙع اÙشرÙÙ ÙعÙÙ ØرÙÙâ¬
â«Ø© تÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬â«Ø¹ ÙتÙرâ¬â«Ø³Ø±â¬ â«Ø§ÙسÙرÙÙ٠اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙعÙØ´ÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùست Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ اÙÙ
ÙØªØ±Ø Ø£Ùثر Ù
٠⪠50â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
Ù⬠â«Ø§Ù?ÙØ© اÙشاÙ
ÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«âªÙ? \.25â¬â¬
â«Ø³ØªÙ?Ùد اÙتغØÙØ© اÙجغر Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙÙâ¬â«Ø«ÙÙ٠بÙ٠⪠50â¬Ù⪠70â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
٠اÙسÙرÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙÙÙ ÙاÙسÙرÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ
ÙÙ Ù?٠بÙرÙت⪠Øâ¬Ùجب٠ÙبÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙØ´Ù
ا٠ÙبÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙØ°ÙÙ ÙÙ
Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Øâ¬â«Ø¹ اÙÙ
Ùتر⬠â«Ø§ÙبرÙاÙ
ج اÙÙØÙÙâªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙÙ?Ùد اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ùبا باتجا٠جÙÙب ÙبÙا٠ÙاÙبÙاع⪠Øâ¬ØªÙÙÙد Ù?رص عÙ
Ù⬠â«ÙÙ Ù
٠اÙبرÙاÙ
ج اÙØ°Ù ÙÙâ¬
â«ÙتÙÙع بدؤ٠Ùر Ùâ¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا سÙسÙ
Ø Ø§ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙتاÙÙ ÙÙ
ا تبÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¶Ùâ¬â«Ø© عÙ٠اأÙر⬠â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙÙÙ ÙاÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ Ø¥Ù٠تسرÙع ÙتÙرâ¬
â«Ø© تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙبرÙاÙ
ج اÙÙØÙÙ Ù
٠خاÙÙ⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙÙ
صداÙÙØ© اÙاÙزÙ
ة⪠\.â¬ÙÙسع٠اÙÙظرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙÙÙ ÙاÙسÙرÙâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠ÙÙÙ?تÙا Ù
ÙبÙÙØ© ÙتتÙ
تع⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙغاÙبÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙخدÙ
ات ÙÙ٠عاÙ
â¬
â«Ø©âª \.â¬ÙÙ?Ù Ùذا اÙسÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ø¹Ø±Ø¨ Ù
اÙØÙ٠عدÙدÙ٠ع٠إÙتÙ
اÙ
ÙÙ
Ù?Ù⬠â«ÙÙ ÙصÙر⬠â«ØÙتÙÙâ¬â«Ø§ÙزÙ
ÙÙØ© Ù
ا بÙÙ Ù
رâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬
â«Ù⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع اإÙبÙاء عÙ٠اÙÙ?ترâ¬â«Ø§Ø٠اÙÙ
ختÙÙ?Ø© اÙÙاØدة تÙ٠اأÙخرâ¬â«Ø¥ØاÙ٠اÙÙ
رâ¬
â«ØÙØ© اÙثاÙÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬ÙÙد أعرب اÙبÙ٠اإÙساÙÙ
Ù ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© ع٠اÙتÙ
اÙ
Ù Ù?٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
ر⬠â«Ø§ÙبرÙاÙ
جâªÙ Øâ¬Ø§â¬
â«Ùظر Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
شارÙØ© اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙÙÙادت٠Ù?٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙÙات اÙثاÙثة اÙتاÙÙØ©âª:â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹â¬â«Ø³ÙضÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª\.26â¬â¬
â«Ù Ø¥Ù٠جب٠ÙبÙا٠ÙبÙرÙت اإÙدارÙâ¬
â«ÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬ â«ØªÙ?Ø´Ùر Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبر⬠â«âª15â¬â¬
â«âªPage 28 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø©âª 230 :â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙاÙر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
ÙÙا ⪠180â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙاÙر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙ٠تÙ
ÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùدرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت (اÙÙÙÙ?Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠اأÙÙÙ⪠:â¬Ø§ÙÙظÙ
⪠Øâ¬ÙاأÙسØÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ©)âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùسرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ù
٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙØ¥ÙÙشاء ÙاÙتعÙ
Ùر ÙØ¢ÙÙØ© اÙÙرÙض Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ù? عÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© اÙخاصة بÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⪠Øâ¬ÙبÙائÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاإÙشرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙØ© ÙÙتصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙ
ÙÙ?ص٠ÙÙبÙÙâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙسÙع⪠Øâ¬ÙاأÙشغاÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙخدÙ
ات ااÙستشارÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«âªÙ \.27â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙÙ
ÙÙ Ùذاâ¬
â«Ù?Ùة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
ستÙدعات⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
Ùشآت اÙرÙÙ ÙااÙÙصاÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙتÙاØعاتâªØâ¬â¬â«Øات اÙØر Ùâ¬â«Øات⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
Ø Ùâ¬
â«Ø¬Ù ÙبÙرÙت⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠اÙÙ
Ø Ùâ¬â«Ù اÙخار⬠â«Ø¹Ù٠اÙØرÙ٠اÙسرÙع اÙØ´Ù
اÙÙ ÙاÙØرÙ٠اÙدائرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ اÙØرÙاتâ¬
â«ÙØ© Ù
٠أج٠تÙسÙع بعض أجز⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠استÙ
اÙ٠اأÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶Ù اÙضرÙرÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø³ÙÙ
ÙÙ Ùذا⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù
رâ¬
â«Ø§Øªâª Øâ¬Ø¥Ùخ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª اÙÙ
شاة ÙجسÙر اÙÙ
شاة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙظاÙ
إدارâ¬
â«Ø© ØرÙØ© سÙر⬠â«ÙÙ
Ù
رâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات استÙ
اÙÙ⬠â«Ø¬Ø§âª \.â¬Ù ÙÙâ¬
â«ØªÙÙع أ٠تبÙغ ÙÙÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Øددة ÙاÙÙ
ØØØ© اÙØر Ùâ¬
â«Ù?ÙØ© Ù?Ù Øبر Ù?⬠â«Ù
Ù⬠â«Ø¹ÙÙ ØÙ٠اÙØرÙ٠اÙسرÙع⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠اأÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶Ù اÙاÙزÙ
Ø© ÙÙ
Ùشآت رÙÙ ÙاÙصا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙâª\.â¬â¬â«Ø§Ø¶Ù Øت٠⪠25â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø£Ùرâ¬
â«Ø£Ø±Ø¶Ùة⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ØµØ§ Ø£ÙÙردÙÙÙ ØدÙØ«Ùا Ùâ¬
â«Ù
زÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¯Ø§ بباب ÙÙ?ØªØ Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙسار Ùب Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù
ساÙÙ
Ø© اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙÙ
ØتÙ
ÙØ© Ù?٠اÙسÙع ÙاÙخدÙ
ات Ù
٠أج٠تأÙ
ÙÙ âªÙ 120â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø³ÙÙ
ÙÙ Ùذاâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.28â¬ÙÙ
اâ¬
â«ØªÙÙÙات اÙباصات اÙÙ
ختÙÙ?Ø© (غاز ØبÙع٠Ù
ضغÙØØ Ù
رÙبات⬠â«Ø§ÙباâªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«ÙتÙ
تÙÙÙÙ
Ù⬠â«Ù
ÙØ®Ù?ضة Ù?٠إØار ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø³ØªØاعة Ù٠باص استÙعاب ⪠150â¬Ø± Ùâ¬
â«ÙتÙ
تÙ
ÙÙ٠باصات اÙÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙÙÙÙÙجÙات اÙصدÙÙØ© ÙÙبÙئة اÙت٠تتÙ
اش٠Ù
ع سÙا٠ÙبÙا٠ÙØ£ÙظÙ
تÙ⪠\.â¬Ø³ Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙجÙÙØ©Ø Ø¯ÙزÙÙ ÙÙر٠⪠Ø4â¬Ø£Ù ⪠Ø5â¬Ø£Ù ⪠)6â¬Ù
٠أج٠اÙعثÙر عÙ٠أÙثرâ¬
â«ÙÙتÙ
Ù?٠اÙÙÙت اÙØاÙ٠تÙÙÙÙ
ÙØا٠Ù
ساÙÙ
Ø© اÙÙØاع اÙخاص ÙأشÙاÙÙا Ù?٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠أسØÙÙ Ù
رÙبات اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ضÙ
Ù Ùذاâ¬
â«Ø¡Ø§ Ù
٠اÙباصات⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ùسبة ⪠80â¬Ø¥Ù٠⪠100â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
٠أسØÙ٠باصات اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙÙ
ا ÙÙ Ùارد Ù?٠اÙÙسÙ
ثاÙØ«Ùا â⬠â«ÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ
Ù٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص جزÙ⬠â«ÙÙتÙÙع Ø£Ù Ù⬠â«Ù?â¬
â«Ù?ص٠بشÙ٠أÙبر اÙÙ
ساÙÙ
ة⬠â«Ù? Ùâ¬â«Ø³Øªâ¬ â«Ø§ÙتÙ⬠â«Ø©âªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙ
ؤسسة⬠â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø±â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø§Ùستشا⬠â«Ø§ÙخدÙ
اتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§ÙتØتÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙبÙÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ù
â¬â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ùعا⬠â«Ø±â¬
â«ÙاÙ
ج⬠â«Ø§Ùب⬠â«Ù
Ù⬠â«Ø¨Ø¯Ø¹Ù
⬠â«Ø©âªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø¯ÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬ â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø±â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³ØªØ´Ø§â¬ â«Ø´Ø±Ùة⬠â«ÙÙاâ¬
â«ØاÙÙ⬠â«ØªÙÙÙ
⬠â«Ø¨Ø§Ø¡âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجÙ
اÙÙØ© Ø£ÙسØÙ٠باصات اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ØÙاÙ٠⪠63â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ Ùباصات Ø£ÙÙردÙÙÙ ÙÙظاÙ
⬠â«Ù⬠â«Øددة ÙÙÙØاع اÙخاص بشرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ اÙباصات⪠\.â¬ØªØ¨Ùغ اÙÙÙÙ?ة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙ٠اÙخاصÙÙ Ù
سؤÙÙÙ٠ع٠تشغÙ٠اÙÙظاÙ
ÙصÙاÙتÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùبةâ¬
â«Ø°ÙÙØ© ÙÙظاÙ
جÙ
ع اÙرسÙÙ
⪠\.â¬Ù
٠شأ٠ÙظاÙ
جÙ
ع رسÙÙ
ÙعتÙ
د عÙÙ Ù
ر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù
ساÙÙ
Ø© اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© Ù?٠تأÙ
Ù٠اÙسÙع ÙاÙخدÙ
ات Ø£ÙÙظÙ
Ø© ÙÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø³ÙÙ
ÙÙ Ùذاâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.29â¬ÙÙ
اâ¬
â«Ø£ÙتÙÙ
اتÙÙÙØ© ÙتØدÙد Ù
ÙÙع اÙÙ
رÙبات عÙ٠أساس تÙÙÙÙÙجÙا اÙÙظاÙ
اÙعاÙÙ
Ù ÙتØدÙد اÙÙ
ÙاÙع Ø£Ù ÙسÙ
Ø Ø¨Ù
Ù
ارسةâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
زÙد بØرÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØ°ÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙعÙ
ÙÙات ÙتÙÙÙÙÙجÙا اÙبØاÙØ©â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹â¬â«Ù⪠Øâ¬ÙتÙÙ٠أÙثر صدÙÙØ© ÙÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø© تÙÙ?ز Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙÙÙØ© Ù
غÙÙØ© (Ù
٠بÙ٠أÙ
Ùر أخر⬠â«ÙعÙ
ÙÙات اÙباصات⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙØ´Ù
٠اÙÙظاÙ
ØرÙÙØ© رÙابة بÙاسØØ© دائرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø© اÙرسÙÙ
â¬
â«ÙØ© عÙ٠إدار⬠â«Ù
رâ¬
â«Ø§Ùبة Ù
رÙزÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙ)⪠\.â¬ÙبÙغ إجÙ
اÙÙ ÙÙÙ?Ø© Ø£ÙظÙ
Ø© اÙÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ°ÙÙØ© ØÙاÙ٠⪠7â¬Ù
اÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬
â«Ø©âª 104\.4 :â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙاÙر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
ÙÙا ⪠104\.4â¬Ù
ÙÙÙÙ Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùدرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØضرÙØ© (اÙÙÙÙ?Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¬Ùا Ù?٠بÙئةâ¬â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
غذÙØ© Ùادرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙثاÙÙ⪠:â¬Ø®Ø¯Ù
ات باصات اÙØ®ØÙØ⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ©)â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùسرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«ÙØ© اÙÙرÙض Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù⬠â«ØªÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙØ¥ÙÙشاء ÙاÙتعÙ
Ùر ÙØ¢ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬ÙاأÙشغا٠عÙ٠اÙØرÙات Øسب اÙØاجة عÙÙ ØÙÙ ØرÙات⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙسÙع⪠Øâ¬ÙاأÙشغاÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙخدÙ
ات ÙÙÙØ§Ø ØªÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ? اÙباصات ÙاÙÙ
اÙجئ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
Ùشآت اÙشار⬠â«âªÙ \.30â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙÙ
ÙÙ Ùذا Ùâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ØµØ§âª \.â¬ÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ØªÙض٠خØØ© اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø©â¬â«Ø¹Ùا Ù
ع Ù
ستÙ٠عا٠Ù
٠اÙخدÙ
Ø© بÙâªÙ 750â¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ø§Ø¯Ùا ÙÙ?ر ÙÙâ¬
â«Øا ÙÙâ¬â«Ø¹ أسØÙ٠اÙباصات اÙاÙزÙ
Ù
٠أج٠تشغÙ٠⪠20â¬Ø® Ù⬠â«Ùدر Ù
جÙ
Ùâ¬â«Ù ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙباصاتâªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«Ø¥Ø¶Ø§Ù?ÙØ© اÙØÙâ¬
â«Ùا⪠\.â¬ØªØ´Ù
Ù Ù
ÙاصÙ?ات⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¡ باصات⬠â«Ù
شغÙÙÙ ÙائÙ
ÙÙ Ù?٠اÙÙ
Ø® Ùâ¬
â«ØØ Ø£Ù Ø´Ø±â¬ â«Ø§Ù Ù⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ØµØ§ ÙزÙادة ØجÙ
اأÙسØÙ٠تدرÙجÙâ¬
â«ÙÙا Ù
ع ارتÙ?اع اÙØÙب Ù
٠خاÙ٠إشر⬠â«Ø¨Ø§Ùبدء بÙâªÙ 250â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙâ¬â«Ø§Øª جÙ
ع اÙرسÙÙ
(ØÙاÙ٠⪠40â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙ⬠â«Ù
جÙزâ¬
â«Ø© باÙÙظاÙ
اÙعاÙÙ
Ù ÙتØدÙد اÙÙ
ÙاÙع ÙتجÙÙز⬠â«Ø®ØÙØ Ø§Ùباصات اÙعادÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
غذÙØ© باصات ØÙÙÙØ© ØÙÙÙا âª10\.5â¬Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ? اÙباصات ÙرÙ⬠â«Ø§Ùبة ÙاÙÙظاÙ
اÙتÙÙÙÙ
ات٠اÙخاص ب٠Ù?٠اÙباصات ÙÙÙØ§Ø ØªÙÙâ¬â«Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?ÙØ© ÙÙ
رÙز اÙÙ
رâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠ااÙستثÙ
ارâ¬
â«Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø³ÙÙ
ÙÙ Ùذاâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙØ£ÙسØÙ٠بÙاÙ
ÙÙ)⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
اâ¬
â«Ùة⪠:â¬Ø®Øة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙÙØ© Ù
٠أج٠تØÙÙ٠دÙ
ج Ø£Ù?ض٠ÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Ù?٠اÙبÙئة اÙØضرÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
ساعدات Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø³ÙÙ
ÙÙ Ùذاâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù?Ù Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا⬠â«Ù
ستÙدع٠باصات إضا Ùâ¬
â«âªPage 29 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ù? ا٠Ùâ¬
â«Ù
شغÙÙ٠اÙÙ
ØÙÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاصاÙØات⬠â«Ø© اÙÙ
ÙاÙÙ?⪠Øâ¬ÙساÙÙ
Ø© اÙØرÙات⪠Øâ¬Ùاعادة ÙÙÙÙØ© شبÙØ© اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙØ®ØØ© اÙر Ùâ¬
â«Ø¦ÙسÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙاØتر⬠â«Ùسائ٠ÙÙ٠غÙر Ùâ¬
â«Ø¢ÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙدÙ
ج اÙرسÙÙ
⪠Øâ¬Ùادارâ¬
â«Ùâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø¥ØµØ¯Ø§Ø± اÙترâ¬
â«Ø§Ø®Ùص⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠بÙ٠أÙ
Ùر أخرâ¬
â«Ø± باÙÙاÙ
Ù Ù
٠عائدات Ùرض اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠بÙÙÙ
Ø© âª250â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø¡ أسØÙ٠اÙباصات⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùذ٠سÙÙÙÙ Ù
تÙÙâ¬
â«Ù? Ùا⬠â«âª \.31â¬ÙÙ
ا تÙ
ت Ù
ÙاÙشتÙâªÙÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«ÙتÙÙع أ٠تÙÙÙ Ù
ساÙÙ
Ø© اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© Ù?٠شر⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ù٠اÙخاص ÙاÙعاÙ
(اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙØاع Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øª اÙجارÙØ© ÙÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø¡ اÙباصات ÙتÙ
ÙÙÙÙا Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¢ÙÙØ© تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙرض ÙÙ
ساÙÙ
Ø© اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© ضÙ
٠اÙدر⬠â«ÙتÙ
تÙÙÙÙ
ØرÙÙØ© شرâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ØµØ§âªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙ٠اÙخاصÙÙ Ù
سؤÙÙÙ٠عÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ØµØ§)⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙ ÙÙâªÙ 250â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙتسدÙد ÙÙÙ?Ø© اÙتÙاÙ?ر Ø¥ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£Ø³Ù
اÙÙØ© Ù
٠اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© Ø¥ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ØµØ§âª Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
ÙØØ© اÙر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
باشر ÙÙâªÙ 250â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ© ÙصÙاÙتÙاâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªØ´ØºÙÙ ÙظاÙ
اÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ© ÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§Ùباصاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùسرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø¢ÙÙØ© اÙÙرÙض Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙدÙرÙة⪠10 :â¬Ù
اÙÙÙ٠دÙاÙر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
ÙÙا ⪠10â¬Ù
اÙÙÙ٠دÙاÙر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ Ù
٠تÙ
ÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ ÙبÙاء اÙÙدرâ¬
â«Ø§Øª (اÙÙÙÙ?ة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠⪠:3â¬Ø¥Ø¯Ø§Ø±â¬
â«Ø© اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«ÙاÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙØ¥ÙÙشاء ÙاÙتعÙ
Ùر)â¬
â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات اÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ©âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ù? عÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¡ Ù
٠أج٠اÙتعزÙز اÙÙ
ؤسس٠ÙØ¥Ùشر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠خدÙ
ات استشارÙâ¬
â«Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù شرÙات⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù خبر⬠â«Ù⬠â«âªÙ \.32â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙÙ
ÙÙ Ùذاâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙشبÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§Ù? عÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ù ذات اÙصÙة⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙØ´Ù
Ù Ø°Ù٠اÙÙ
ساعدة Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙÙØ© اÙخاصة باإÙشر⬠â«Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠ÙÙÙااÙت أخرâ¬
â«Ø¹ ضÙ
Ù Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار ÙدعÙ
تشغÙÙÙ ÙÙ
ساعدة Ùâ¬
â«Ù?ÙÙة⬠â«Ø³ÙÙ
ÙÙ ÙØدة تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ù
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£ÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙاإÙدارÙâ¬
â«Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø®ØÙØÙا اÙÙ
غذÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠أÙج٠اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬
â«Ø§Øªâ¬â«ØªÙدÙ
Ù?٠أÙظÙ
Ø© اÙÙÙÙ ÙسÙاساتÙا ÙتÙØÙد اÙÙ
Ùارâ¬
â«Ø§Ø² Ùâ¬â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øª اÙاÙزÙ
Ø© Ù
٠أج٠إØر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
ساعدة Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙÙØ© ÙاÙدر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø³ÙÙ
ÙÙ Ùذاâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹âª \.â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ù ÙÙ
درâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø£Ø®Ø±â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤسسÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙÙ
ا Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù⬠â«ÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتشغÙÙÙØ© ÙÙÙااÙت اÙÙØاع⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠اÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙدارÙâ¬
â«Ø§Øâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙ٠اÙÙائÙ
Ù٠عÙ٠ااÙÙخرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùخاذ اÙتدابÙر Ù
٠أج٠Ù
ساعدةâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙÙ ØÙ
ÙØ© تÙاص٠Ù
٠أج٠اÙترÙÙج ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠اتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.33â¬ÙÙ
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙÙ
ÙÙ Ùذاâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø©â¬â«Ø§Ø®Ùص ÙادارتÙا⪠Øâ¬Ùدرâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙ٠اÙÙائÙ
ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙتØسÙ٠تÙظÙÙ
اأÙØ°ÙÙ ÙاÙترâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øª Ù
٠أج٠إعادة تÙظÙÙ
اÙشبÙØ© باÙتشاÙر Ù
ع⬠â«Ø¨Ø´Ù٠أÙ?ض٠Ù?٠اÙÙظاÙ
اÙجدÙد⪠Øâ¬Ù
ث٠اÙدرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙ ÙاÙسائÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙتأÙ
ÙÙ ÙظÙ
Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات Ø£Ù?ض٠إÙ٠اÙÙ
ستخدÙ
ÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªØ¯Ø§Ø¨Ùر اإÙÙÙ?اذ اÙبدÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙتأÙ
Ù٠اÙتدرÙب Ø¥ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙÙØاعâ¬
â«Ø§Øª ÙاÙÙ?رص بشÙ٠أÙبر اÙستثÙ
ارâ¬
â«Ø© Ù
٠أج٠تØسÙ٠تخØÙØ Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°Ù Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠ÙتÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙدرâ¬
â«Ø¥Ø¶Ø§Ù?Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠درâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø³ÙÙ
ÙÙ Ùذاâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§âªØâ¬â¬
â«Ø£Ø®Ùرâ¬
â«âª \.34â¬Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ùخاص Ù?Ù ÙØاع اÙÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¹ ÙÙÙÙ?تÙâ¬â«Ø¨Ø§Ø¡ â تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Øا عادÙا بÙâª345â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø¥ÙجÙ
اÙÙØ© Ø¥Ùعداد اÙÙ
رØÙØ© اأÙÙÙÙ Ù
٠شبÙØ© اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙØ®ØØ© اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© ذات اÙصÙØ© اÙÙائÙ
Ø© عÙ٠⪠20â¬Ø® Ùâ¬â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹â¬ â«Ùدر ÙÙÙ?Ø© اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Øª ÙÙâ¬
â«âªÙ? \.35â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع ⪠70â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر⬠â«Ø§Ø¶Ù ذ٠اÙصÙØ© بÙ⪠160â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙاستÙ
اÙ٠اأÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙاÙر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ⪠\.â¬ØªÙ? ÙÙâ¬
â«Ùدر ÙÙÙ?Ø© تØÙÙر اÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ØµØ§ بÙ⪠100â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙâªØâ¬â¬ â«ÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙØ°ÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا تÙ? ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
غذÙØ© ÙØÙاÙ٠⪠20â¬Ø®Øا ÙâªÙ 250â¬â¬â«Ù⬠â«Ùدر ÙÙÙ?Ø© تÙÙ?ÙØ° شبÙØ© اÙØ®ØÙØ⬠â«Ø£Ù
ÙرÙ٠إضاÙ?Ù ÙÙباصات ÙØ£ÙظÙ
Ø© اÙÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«ØØ© ÙÙÙÙا Ø¥ØتÙاØ٠أسعار بÙسبة ⪠15â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئةâª\.â¬â¬â«Ø§Øª اÙاÙزÙ
ة⪠\.â¬ØªØ´Ù
٠اÙتÙاÙÙÙ? اÙÙ
Ùترâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øª ÙبÙاء اÙÙدرâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ ÙÙدر⬠â«ÙتÙ
تخصÙص ØÙاÙ٠⪠15â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙ⬠â«Ø¨ÙÙÙ
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ùâ¬â«Ø¹ ااÙستثÙ
ارâ¬â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ Ùâ¬â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ© ⪠295â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙاÙر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ Ù?⬠â«Ùسرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ Ù
٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙØ¥ÙÙشاء ÙاÙتعÙ
Ùر Ùâ¬
â«ÙØ¢ÙÙØ© اÙÙرÙض Ù?⬠â«âª \.36â¬Ø³ÙبÙغ تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«âªPage 30 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ© ⪠69\.8â¬Ù
ÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùسرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø£Ø¯Ø§Ø© اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙدعÙ
اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ Ùرض Ù
٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙÙتعÙ
Ùر ÙاإÙÙشاء بÙÙÙ
Ø© ⪠225\.2â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ ÙستÙ?ضÙÙ? Ø¢ÙÙØ© اÙÙرÙض Ù?â¬
â«Ø¡ Ù
٠اÙÙرضâ¬â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù?٠⪠10â¬ÙاÙÙ٠اÙثاÙÙâª/â¬ÙÙاÙر ⪠\.2018â¬Ùجب Ø£Ù ÙÙÙ٠اÙجزâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùسرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§ÙتÙجÙÙÙØ© Ø¢ÙÙÙØ© اÙÙرÙض Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø© ÙاÙ?Ùت عÙÙÙا اÙÙجÙØ©â¬
â«Ùسرâ¬
â«Ù
Ù⬠â«Ø¯Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙ٠بشرÙØ Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙ
ÙØ ÙÙ?٠اÙشرÙØ⬠â«Ùسر Ù
٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙØ¥ÙÙشاء ÙاÙتعÙ
Ùر Ù?â¬
â«Ù
Ù⬠â«Ø£Ù
ا Ù
بÙغ ⪠225\.2â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ Ù?ÙÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ùرضا غÙر Ù?⬠â«Ø© عÙ٠أساس Ù
ÙØØ©âªÙ \.â¬â¬ â«Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ùسر⬠â«Ø¨Ø´Ø±ÙØ Ù?â¬
â«Ø§Ù
Ù
Ø±ØªØ¨Ø Ø¨Ø¥Ø¹Ø§Ø¯Ø© سداد عادÙة⪠\.â¬ØªÙ?ساÙ٠اÙعÙ
ÙÙة⬠â«Ø© سÙ
Ø§Ø âª 8â¬Ø³ÙÙاتâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«ÙÙ
عد٠Ù
رجع٠ثابت⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙتز⬠â«Ùا اÙØÙÙÙ
ة⪠:â¬Ù?ترâ¬
â«Ø© استØÙا٠Ù
٠⪠31\.5â¬Ø³Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°ÙÙ Ù?تر⬠â«Ø§Ùت٠تختارâ¬
â«ÙسÙتÙ
تÙ
ÙÙÙÙ Ù
٠عائدات Ùرض غÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙ ØÙاÙ٠⪠0\.6â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ⬠â«Ùسر ÙÙÙرض⪠Øâ¬Ù
ا سÙØ´ Ùâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø¡ غÙر Ù?⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙÙÙØ© ⪠4/1â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة (⪠0\.25â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة) Ù
٠اÙجزâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø© ⪠37â¬Ø£Ø¯ÙاÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø³ÙÙ
Ù٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص Ù
بÙغ ⪠50â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙ٠اÙÙ
تبÙÙ Ù
ÙÙ ÙÙ
ا ÙÙ Ùارد Ù?٠اÙÙ?Ùر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø±âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù
ÙÙâ¬
â«Ùس⬠â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùسرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø¢ÙÙØ© اÙÙرÙض Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙØار âªÙ \.1â¬â¬
â«Ø© ÙÙ
ÙÙÙÙا اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاأÙÙ
Ù
اÙÙ
تØدة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
جÙ
Ùعة اÙبÙ٠ااÙساÙÙ
Ù ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù
٠أج٠تعبئة اأÙسرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ© شرâ¬
â«Ø§Ù Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ùسرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø¢ÙÙØ© اÙÙرÙض Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± Ùâ¬â«ØªÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø© Ù
٠اÙاÙجئÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ù
٠خاÙ٠اÙتÙÙ?Ù٠بÙÙ Ù
ساÙÙ
ات⬠â«Ø£Ø¹Ø¯Ø§Ø¯Ø§ ÙبÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙ
ÙÙÙÙØ© ÙÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
تÙسØØ© اÙدخ٠اÙت٠تستضÙÙ?â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙتØر٠إÙ٠اÙØاجاتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤÙÙØ© اÙتÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
تÙسØØ© اÙدخÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙÙدÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ùسر⬠â«Ø¢ÙÙØ© اÙÙرÙض Ù?⬠â«Ø§Ù?⪠Øâ¬ØªØ³Ù
Ø Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
تعددة اأÙØرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙجÙات اÙÙ
اÙØØ© ÙÙرÙض Ù
صارÙ? اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ùا ÙØ£Ùسرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø±Ø¯Ø§ Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ÙسÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ùسر⬠â«Ø¢ÙÙØ© اÙÙرÙض Ù?⬠â«Ø´ÙÙ Ùâ¬â«Ø¹Ø§ÙÙ
Ùة⪠\.â¬ØªÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø© Ù
٠أج٠تأÙ
Ù٠سÙعة عاÙ
ة⬠â«Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ùسر⬠â«ØªÙاج٠أزÙ
Ø© اÙجئÙ٠بأ٠تÙترض بÙ
عداÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙÙ
ÙÙØ© ÙتعزÙز اÙتÙسÙ٠بÙ٠اأÙÙ
Ù
اÙÙ
تØدة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙجÙاتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙÙساÙÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£Ø¨ اÙصدع بÙ٠اÙÙ
ساعدةâ¬â«ÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠أج٠ر⬠â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙØ© عÙ٠أزÙ
Ø© اÙاÙجئÙ٠اÙسÙرÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø© ا٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø§ÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙÙ Ù
٠اÙداÙÙ
ارÙâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ùسر⬠â«Ø¢ÙÙØ© اÙÙرÙض Ù?â¬
â«ÙÙا⪠Øâ¬ÙدعÙ
Ùâ¬
â«(اÙÙ
ضÙÙ?Ø©)⪠\.â¬ØاÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ù?⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
ستÙ?Ùدة Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
تعددة اأÙØرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙÙ
ÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙØة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
صارÙ?â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙرÙبÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙØ£ÙÙ
اÙÙا⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙاباÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙÙÙدا⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙرÙÙج⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙسÙÙد⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
Ù
ÙÙØ© اÙÙ
تØدة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙات اÙÙ
تØدةâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙدا⪠Øâ¬Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù?ÙضÙØ©â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âªPage 31 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«ØªÙÙع تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص ØÙاÙ٠⪠80â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
٠أسØÙ٠باصات اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع⬠â«ØªÙÙع Ø£Ù ÙبÙغ تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص ⪠50â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙاÙر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ù ÙÙ⬠â«âª \.37â¬Ù ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Ù?â¬
â«ÙظÙر اÙتØÙÙÙâ¬â«Ù?⬠â«Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر⬠â«Ø¯â¬ â«Ùâ¬â«Ù
ÙÙÙ⬠â«âª80â¬â¬ â«Ù⬠â«âª50â¬â¬ â«Ø¨ÙÙ⬠â«Ø©âªØâ¬â¬ â«Ùâ¬
â«Ùâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
ستØ⬠â«Ø§Ùخاص⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØاع⬠â«Ù?ائدة⬠â«Ø¥ÙÙ⬠â«Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?ة⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙتâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø±â¬
â«Ùع⬠â«Ø§Ùس⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ØµØ§Øªâ¬ â«ÙÙÙ?ة⬠â«Øâ¬â«Ø§Ùâ¬
â«Ø±â¬ â«Ø³ØªØªâ¬â«Ù⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙتâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù
ØدÙدا ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¬Ø¯Ø§âª \.â¬ØªØ¬Ø¯Ø±â¬ â«Ø§Ù Ù ÙÙâ¬
â«ØªÙÙع تÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص ÙÙا Ø£Ù Ùا٠اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
غذÙØ© غÙر ÙابÙØ© ÙÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù
Ù Ùب٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù Ù?â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙ٠أ٠شبÙØ© اÙØ®ØÙØâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙØÙÙÙة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
سؤÙÙÙة⬠â«ÙØد Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ù
Ù
ا Ù⬠â«Ø© Ø¥Ù٠أ٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص سÙعÙ٠بتشغÙ٠اÙÙظاÙ
ÙصÙاÙت٠ÙÙ ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«ØºØ§ÙبÙØ© Ùذ٠اÙتÙاÙÙÙ?âªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªÙÙع أ٠تÙ?غØ٠عائدات اÙرسÙÙ
⬠â«Ù?⬠â«Ù?⬠â«Ø§Ø¥Ùشارâ¬
â«ÙسÙتÙ
تÙÙÙÙ
Ùا بشÙ٠أÙبر Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù٠اÙخاص ÙاÙعاÙ
ÙتخصÙص اÙÙ
خاØر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØاع Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¯ÙÙا ÙÙÙÙÙØ© Ù
اÙئÙ
Ø© ÙÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙ⬠â«Ø¹âª \.â¬Ùد تبرز اÙØاجة Ø¥Ù٠ضÙ
اÙØ© دخ٠Ù?â¬â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙ
د ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«ÙسÙØ´Ù٠أØد Ø£Ù٠اÙÙ
شارÙع Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ Ù
ع اÙÙÙج اÙتعاÙبÙâ¬â«Ø¹âª \.â¬ÙÙ
ا ÙتÙ
اش٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص ÙÙذا اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«ÙØ© ÙÙÙ
عاÙ
اÙت Ù?٠خاÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«Ùب٠اÙÙÙئة ااÙستشارÙâ¬
â«Ø§Øª خاصة بÙذا اÙØجÙ
Ù?Ù ÙØاع Ù
ÙÙØ¡ باÙتØدÙاتâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙÙبÙا٠Ù
٠أج٠تعبئة استثÙ
ارâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙØ© Ù?Ù ÙÙÙبة ÙØاع اÙÙÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠ÙÙدرتÙâ¬â«Ø§ÙتØÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£ÙÙÙÙØ© ÙÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù
Ù Ùب٠اÙصÙدÙ٠اأÙخضر ÙÙÙ
Ùاخ Ùاâ¬
â«Ùظر Ø¥ÙÙ ØبÙعتÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙâ¬â«Ø¹ عÙ٠أÙâ¬â«ÙÙ
Ù٠عرض اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«âªÙ? \.38â¬â¬
â«ØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر اÙخاÙÙØ© ÙاÙÙائÙ
Ø© ÙØااÙت⬠â«Ùظر Ø¥ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ù٠أÙÙ ÙظاÙ
ÙÙ٠سرÙع جÙ
اع٠عاÙ٠اÙجÙدة Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠ÙعÙ٠ضÙØ¡ ز⬠â«Ø§Øª اÙدÙ?ÙئةâªÙ \.â¬Ø§â¬ â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙØ© ÙÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? Ù
٠اÙبعاثات غازâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØاÙÙÙÙ ÙغÙر⬠â«Ù
شغÙ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
â¬
â«ÙÙا Ù?Ù ÙÙ
Ø Ø§Ø³ØªØ®Ø¯Ø§Ù
Ùسائ٠اÙÙÙÙ ÙااÙبتعاد ع٠اÙÙ
رÙبات اÙخاصة Ùع٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ù٠جذرÙâ¬
â«ØªØÙ⬠â«ØاÙتâªÙÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ Ù⬠â«ÙتÙÙع Ø£Ù Ù?â¬
â«ÙØدث اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙتأخÙر Ù?٠اÙرâ¬
â«ØºØ§ÙبÙØ© ÙظÙ
اÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù اÙÙبÙر عÙ٠تخÙ?Ùض غازâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙبعاثات اÙدÙ?Ùئة⪠Øâ¬Ù
رتÙ?عة Ù
ÙارÙØ© Ù
ع⬠â«Ø¹ عÙ٠إØداث تغÙÙر Ù?Ù Ùسائ٠اÙÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙباÙتاÙ٠أثر⬠â«Ø© اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ?اعÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ØªÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± Ùدرâ¬
â«ÙÙا âª\.â¬â¬ â«ØªØºÙÙر Ùâ¬
â«ØªØÙ Ù⬠â«Ø Ùا⬠â«Ø¹ اÙÙ
Ùترâ¬â«ÙØدث اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù Ø¥Ù٠تØسÙ٠اأÙÙظÙ
Ø© اÙÙائÙ
Ø© تدرÙجÙâ¬
â«ÙÙا بÙÙÙ
ا Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
عبر اÙعاÙÙ
اÙت٠تسع٠عادةâ¬
â«âª16â¬â¬
â«Ø¹ Ùâ¬
â«Ù
Ùخصة Ù?٠اÙجدÙÙ âª\.2â¬â¬ â«âª \.39â¬ØªÙاÙÙÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙداÙÙÙØ© (Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙاÙر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ)â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙجدÙ٠⪠\.2â¬Ø§ÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ ÙاÙتÙاÙÙÙ?â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«ØªÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙØاع⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙداÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙاÙÙÙ?⬠â«Ø¹â¬â«Ù
ÙÙÙات اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«ÙØ¥ÙÙشاء ÙاÙتعÙ
Ùرâ¬
â«Ø§Ùخاص⬠â«ÙØ¥ÙÙشاء⬠â«(Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùرâ¬
â«ÙØ¢ÙÙØ© اÙÙرÙضâ¬
â«ÙاÙتعÙ
Ùر⬠â«Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ)â¬
â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùسرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù?⬠â«ÙØ¢ÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù
٠إجÙ
اÙ٠اÙÙÙÙ?Ø©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙرÙضâ¬
â«)âª(%â¬â¬
â«Ùسرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âª78â¬â¬ â«âª50â¬â¬ â«âª180â¬â¬ â«âª230â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠⪠:1â¬Ø£ÙظÙ
Ø© اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⪠Øâ¬ÙأسØÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙبÙاÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âª100â¬â¬ â«âª0â¬â¬ â«âª160â¬â¬ â«âª160â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت (بÙ
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠استÙ
اÙ٠اأÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶Ù)⬠â«â¢ اÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âª20â¬â¬ â«âª50â¬â¬ â«âª13â¬â¬ â«âª63â¬â¬ â«â¢ أسØÙ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬
â«âª100â¬â¬ â«âª0â¬â¬ â«âª7â¬â¬ â«âª7â¬â¬ â«â¢ Ø£ÙظÙ
Ø© اÙÙÙ٠اÙØ°ÙÙØ©â¬
â«ØضرÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠⪠:2â¬Ø¨Ø§ØµØ§Øª اÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ© ÙاÙدÙ
ج Ù?٠بÙئةâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âª100â¬â¬ â«âª0â¬â¬ â«âª104\.4â¬â¬ â«âª104\.4â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø٠اÙØÙØ© Ù
٠اÙبرÙاÙ
ج Øسب ااÙÙتضاءâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¹ ÙÙد Ùؤخذ بعÙ٠ااÙعتبار ÙدعÙ
Ù
ر⬠â«Ù إعداد تØبÙÙ ÙصÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
Ùاخ اأÙخضر Ùâ¬
â«Ø¯Ø¹Ù
ا ÙÙذا اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ùجر⬠â«âª16â¬â¬
â«âªPage 32 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«âª100â¬â¬ â«âª0â¬â¬ â«âª59\.4â¬â¬ â«âª59\.4â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙتÙÙÙÙ
اتÙة⪠Øâ¬Ùأشغا٠اÙØرÙات⬠â«â¢ Ù
Ùشآت اÙشارâ¬
â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬Ø£ÙظÙ
Ø© اÙÙÙ٠اÙØ°ÙÙØ©âª/â¬â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âª100â¬â¬ â«âª0â¬â¬ â«âª40â¬â¬ â«âª40â¬â¬ â«â¢ أسØÙ٠باصات اÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ©â¬
â«âª100â¬â¬ â«âª0â¬â¬ â«âª5â¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ù!â¬â«â¢ أسØÙ٠باصات اÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙرâ¬
â«âª5â¬â¬ â«â¢ اÙÙ
ساعدات Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§Øªâ¬
â«Ø¹ ÙبÙاء اÙÙدر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠⪠:3â¬Ø¥Ø¯Ø§Ø±â¬
â«Ø© اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«âª100â¬â¬ â«âª0â¬â¬ â«âª10â¬â¬ â«âª10â¬â¬
â«âª100â¬â¬ â«âª0â¬â¬ â«âª5â¬â¬ â«âª5â¬â¬ â«â¢ دعÙ
اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° ÙبÙاء اÙÙدرâ¬
â«Ø§Øªâ¬
â«âª100â¬â¬ â«âª0â¬â¬ â«âª5â¬â¬ â«âª5â¬â¬ â«â¢ إصاÙØات اÙÙØاع ÙØÙ
ÙØ© تÙعÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«ØªÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙØاع⬠â«ØªÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙبÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙداÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙاÙÙÙ?⬠â«Ø¹â¬â«Ù
ÙÙÙات اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«ÙØ¥ÙÙشاءâ¬
â«Ø§Ùخاص⬠â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙ⬠â«(Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙاÙرâ¬
â«ÙاÙتعÙ
Ùر ÙØ¢ÙÙØ©â¬
â«ÙØ¥ÙÙشاء⬠â«Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ)â¬
â«Ùسرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙرÙض Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù⬠â«ÙاÙتعÙ
Ùرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«ÙØ¢ÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø¥Ø¬Ù
اÙ٠اÙÙÙÙ?Ø©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙرÙضâ¬
â«)âª(%â¬â¬
â«Ùسرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âª0\.6â¬â¬ â«âª0\.6â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙرسÙÙ
ااÙÙ?تتا Ùâ¬
â«ØÙØ©â¬
â«âª85\.5â¬â¬ â«âª50â¬â¬ â«âª295â¬â¬
â«âª345â¬â¬ â«Ø¹â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
جÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹â¬â«Ø¬ÙÙ
⪠-â¬Ø§ÙدرÙس اÙÙ
ستÙ?ادة ÙاÙÙ
عÙÙسة Ù?٠تصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ù
٠إÙتزâ¬
â«Ø§Ù
سÙاس٠رÙ?Ùع اÙÙ
ستÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا⬠â«Ø§ÙجÙ
اعÙ⪠\.â¬ÙستÙ?Ùد Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«Ø£Ø³Ø§Ø³ÙØ© Ù
٠أج٠ÙØ¬Ø§Ø Ù
شارÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
اÙسرÙع Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙاسÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªØ¹ØªØ¨Ø±â¬
â«âªÙ? \.40â¬â¬
â«Ù
بر Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ
اÙÙÙÙ Ù
Ù Ù
جÙ
Ùعات⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙÙÙÙØ© ÙÙØصÙ٠عÙ٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
اÙØÙÙ ÙاعتÙ
دت٠اÙÙجÙØ© اÙبر Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙت٠تض Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ù Ù
جÙس اÙÙزرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ Ù
٠اÙÙ
شارÙع اأÙربعة عشر ذات⬠â«Ùعتبرâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø©â¬
â«Ø© Ùâ¬â«ØªÙ
ت استشارâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتØتÙة⪠\.â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª Ù?٠اÙبÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Øª اÙدÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر⬠â«Ù ÙÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© بÙÙÙ
Ø© Ù
ÙÙار⬠â«Ø¡Ø§ Ù
٠برÙاÙ
ج استثÙ
ار⬠â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± جزÙ⬠â«Ø³ÙاسÙØ© Ù
ختÙÙ?Ø© Ù?Ù Ù
Ùاسبات Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø©âª \.â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙâªÙ? Øâ¬â¬ â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù
٠أج٠اÙÙ
ساÙÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ù
اتÙا⬠â«Ø£Ùضا ضÙ
Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙÙÙات اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© Ù?٠اÙتز⬠â«Ø¹ Ù⬠â«Ø¬ Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø¹ ÙدعÙ
Ù Ù?٠اÙتظار تÙ?اصÙ٠اÙتÙÙ?Ùذ⪠\.â¬ÙÙدر⬠â«Ø¨ÙدÙات Ù?٠إØار إعداد اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØد Ù
Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتغÙر اÙÙ
ÙاخÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù?Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØضرÙØ©âªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«ÙتÙ
تصÙ
ÙÙ
⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙابÙÙØ© اÙÙÙ?اذ ÙاÙدÙ
ج Ù?٠اÙبÙئة⬠â«Ø±Ùز عÙ٠تÙاÙ
٠شاÙ
Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù
تعدد Ùسائ٠اÙÙÙÙ Ù
ع اÙترÙÙز بشÙÙ ÙبÙر عÙÙ Ù⬠â«ÙÙâ¬â«Ø¹ Ø£Ù Ù?â¬â«âª \.41â¬Ø¹Ù٠تصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø©âªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
اÙجÙ
ع بÙÙ⬠â«Ù⪠Øâ¬Ø¥Ù٠جاÙب شبÙØ© باصات Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø§Ø¯ÙØ© ÙÙ
غذÙØ© ÙبÙر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙظاÙ
Ù?٠إØار ÙظاÙ
ÙÙ٠عاÙ
شاÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع اعتبار ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت عاÙ
Ùد٠اÙÙ?Ùرâ¬
â«Ùز تصÙ
ÙÙ
Ù
Ø Ùâ¬
â«Øات اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙبÙاÙ⬠â«Ø© اÙتابعة ÙÙا Ù
٠أج٠تعزÙز تÙاÙ
٠أÙ?ضÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ?â¬
â«ÙرÙ⬠â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
غذÙØ© اÙÙ
باشرâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âªPage 33 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§Øª Ø®ØÙØ Ù
غذÙة⬠â«Ùاب⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
Ùشآت اÙرÙÙ ÙاÙصعÙد ÙÙ
سار⬠â«Ù Ù
٠خاÙÙ ØرÙ?ÙÙ ÙÙرÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© بشÙÙ ÙبÙر عÙÙ ÙابÙÙâ¬
â«ÙØ© ÙÙ?اذ اÙÙ
شاة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙساÙÙ
ة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙتباد٠Ù
ع Ùسائ٠ÙÙ٠أخر⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ تÙاÙ
٠اÙرسÙÙ
بÙ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙشبÙØ© اÙباصات ÙاÙدÙ
ج اÙÙ
اÙئÙ
ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ضÙ
٠اÙبÙئة اÙØضرÙâ¬
â«Ùة⬠â«Ù
تÙاÙ
ÙØ© بشÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø¬Ùد⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا ÙØ´Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù?٠بÙرÙت Ù
٠خاÙ٠إعادة تصÙ
ÙÙ
ØرÙØ© اÙÙ
شاة⪠Øâ¬ÙاأÙرصÙ?ة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙسØÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¹ Ù
٠ثاÙثة Ø¥ÙÙâ¬â«Ø¬Ø¯Ø§ Ù
٠أج٠تÙظÙÙ
اÙسÙÙ ÙتÙدÙÙ
خدÙ
ات Ù
اÙئÙ
ة⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙØ´Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù
ØÙÙÙÙ Ù
ÙÙ
ا Ùâ¬
â«ØºÙÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø¬Ùد باÙتعاÙÙ Ù
ع Ù
Ø´ Ù⬠â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± تصÙ
ÙÙ
ÙÙ
Ùذج تشغÙÙÙ Ù⬠â«âªÙ? \.42â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙ٠بشÙ٠أساسÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ùء⬠â«Ù
شغÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø£ØµØاب اÙ
تÙاز Ùبار ÙشبÙات اÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙعادÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⪠\.â¬Ù ÙÙâ¬
â«ØªÙÙع اختÙار Ùؤ⬠â«Ø®Ù
سة Ùâ¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ù?٠اعتÙ
اد⬠â«Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا ÙÙظر Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø¨ØºÙØ© تØسÙ٠بعض Ù
Ù
ارساتÙا اإÙدارÙ⬠â«Ø³ÙتÙ
تشجÙعÙÙ
عÙ٠اÙتعاÙÙ Ù
ع Ùâ¬
â«Ø¯ÙÙÙÙÙ Ù?â¬
â«Ù
شغÙÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙÙÙ٠اÙÙائÙ
Ù٠اÙØ°ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
٠ا Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø®Ùص اÙباصات اÙÙائÙ
ة⪠Øâ¬ÙاستخداÙ
اÙسائÙÙ٠اÙÙ
تÙÙâ¬
â«Ù?رÙÙ ÙتدرÙبÙÙ
⪠Øâ¬ÙتÙدÙÙ
⬠â«Ø§Øª اÙجدد Ù
٠أج٠شرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ أ٠استئجار عدد Ù
٠تر⬠â«Ø´Ø±ÙØ ØªÙدÙÙ
عرÙض Ø£ÙصØاب ااÙÙ
تÙازâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ
شغÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
Ù
ا ÙسÙ
Ø⬠â«Ø¹Ø§Ø¯Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع âªÙ 250â¬â¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ØµØ§âªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø¹ بشÙ٠تدرÙج٠شبÙØ© Ù⬠â«Ù
شغÙÙ٠صغار ÙاÙÙضÙ
اÙ
ÙشرÙاء Ø£Ù Ù
ساÙÙ
ÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ù?Ù Ù
Ùازâ¬
â«Ø§Ø© Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙعتÙ
د اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙØÙاÙ?ز Ùجذب Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙساÙÙ
بشÙÙ Ù
ÙØÙظ Ù?Ù⬠â«Ø¹ Ù?⬠â«ØªØ¬Ø¯Ø± اإÙشارâ¬
â«Ø© Ø¥Ù٠أ٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§âªØâ¬â¬
â«Ø£Ø®Ùرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙÙة⪠\.â¬Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙاتÙÙ
Ø¥Ù٠جاÙب بعض اÙØ®ØÙØ Ø´Ø±Ø Ø£Ù ØªØترÙ
بعض اÙشرÙØ Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙائÙ
Ù٠بÙ
ÙاصÙØ©â¬
â«Ø±Ùابا Ùâ¬
â«Ø¬Ø¯Ø¯Ø§âª \.â¬Ù?٠اÙÙاÙع⪠Øâ¬ÙÙست⬠â«Ùا جدÙدة ÙÙجذب Ù⬠â«ÙØ®Ù٠أسÙاÙ⬠â«ÙÙا Ø¥ÙÙ ØÙاÙ٠⪠30â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئةâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù
Ù
ا⬠â«Ø²Ùادة اÙØÙب اإÙجÙ
اÙ٠عÙ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù
Ù Ùسبة ⪠15â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة ØاÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¥Ø¶Ø§Ù?ÙØ© ÙتÙرÙبÙÙ
Ù
Ù ÙجÙØ© رØÙتÙÙ
âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ù رÙاب عدÙدÙÙ ÙØتاجÙ٠إÙÙ ÙسÙÙØ© ÙÙ٠عاÙ
⬠â«Ø§ÙرØاÙت ÙÙÙÙا Ù
Ø´Ù
ÙÙØ© Ù?٠اÙÙظاÙ
اÙجدÙد Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ù Ùزâ¬
â«Ø¨ØÙئا بشÙ٠عاÙ
Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠عبر اÙÙØاعات ÙاÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø©âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø¹ Ù⬠â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø«Ù? ÙاÙÙ
ستداÙ
âªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«Ù Ù⬠â«âª \.43â¬ÙÙتض٠اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ?اع٠ÙÙ?٠اÙÙÙت اÙÙ
Ùاسب دعÙ
اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠اÙÙ
Ù Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙÙع أ٠تسÙ
Øâ¬â«Ø¯Ø© Ù
Ù ØÙØ« ØبÙعتÙا عÙ٠أÙÙ
ÙØ© دعÙ
اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
ستداÙ
Ù
٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù ÙÙ⬠â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± Ù
عÙ⬠â«Ù عاÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙا اÙت٠تÙ? Ù⬠â«ØªÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø´Ø¯Ø¯ تجربة Ù
شارÙع ÙÙ٠عاÙ
أخرâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø§ÙÙØ© اÙعÙ
٠اÙÙائÙ
Ø© بÙ٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار ÙاÙÙÙااÙت اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© بتأÙ
Ù٠دعÙ
اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° ااÙئتÙ
اÙÙ ÙاÙÙ?Ù٠اÙÙ
ستداÙ
ÙاÙاÙزÙ
⪠\.â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙâªÙÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«ÙتÙÙع اÙبÙÙ⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ عبر ااÙعتÙ
اد بشÙ٠أساس٠عÙ٠اÙÙ
Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¸Ù?ÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
Ùتب اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«ÙÙ? ÙبÙتÙرâ¬
â«Ø© عاÙÙØ© Ù
٠خاÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙدÙÙ٠تأÙ
Ù٠دعÙ
اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
ÙØ«â¬
â«Ùدة بشÙÙ ÙبÙر⪠\.â¬ØªÙتض٠ÙظÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع⬠â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙات ÙأدÙار ÙاضØØ© ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° Ù
شارÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع اÙجÙ
اع٠اÙÙ
عÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙÙ
ÙØ© بÙ
Ùا٠تØدÙدâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.44â¬Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù بÙ٠اÙسÙØاتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙÙ?٠اختصاصات Ù
ختÙÙ?ة⪠Øâ¬Ø³Ùاء Ùا٠اÙتعاÙ٠بÙÙ Ù
ختÙÙ? اÙÙÙااÙتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙجÙ
اع٠اÙتعاÙ٠بÙÙ Ù
ختÙÙ? اÙÙÙااÙتâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙ
ÙØ© تبسÙØ Ø§Ø£ÙدÙارâ¬â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªØ¹Ø¯Ø¯ اÙاÙعبÙÙ Ù?٠اÙÙØاع تØدÙâ¬
â«ÙÙا Ù?٠اÙتÙÙ?Ùذ⪠\.â¬ÙتÙ?ظÙر اÙتجربة⬠â«ÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠\.â¬Ø¨Ø´Ù٠عاÙ
âªÙ? Øâ¬â¬
â«ÙØ´ Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙ ÙاÙÙÙااÙتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙØÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù بÙÙâ¬
â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙة⬠â«Ø© ÙÙثاÙ?ت٠اÙس Ù⬠â«Ùظر Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
ساØØ© ÙبÙا٠اÙجغر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ù?ÙØ© اÙصغÙر⬠â«Ø© تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ùذ٠اÙÙ
شارÙع اÙÙ
عÙÙدةâªÙ \.â¬Ø§â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ© Ù
٠أج٠إدارâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
سؤÙÙÙات ÙااÙعتÙ
اد عÙ٠عدد Ø£ÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙÙااÙتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙØÙÙØ©âªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù
Ù
ا⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ù
Ù?رÙضا عÙ٠اÙÙÙااÙتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Øا ÙØÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙا⬠â«Ù⪠\.â¬ÙباÙتاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ØªÙ?ØµØ¨Ø Ø³Ùاسات اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°Ùا شر Ù⬠â«Ùعتبر ÙبÙا٠شب٠بÙدâª-â¬Ù
دÙÙØ© Ù
Ù Ù
Ùظار اÙÙÙ٠اÙØضرâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
رتÙ?عةâªÙ? Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
تعددةâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ ÙÙÙ Ù
شتر٠ÙØ´Ù
٠ااÙختصاصاتâ¬â«Ø³ÙاسÙØ© Ù
ختÙÙ?ة⪠Øâ¬Ø¹ÙÙ Ù
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع أجÙداتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙدÙات⪠Øâ¬ÙÙد ÙاÙ?Ùت اÙسÙØاتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªØ¹Ø¯Ø¯â¬ â«ÙØد بشÙÙ ÙبÙر Ùâ¬
â«ØªØد٠Ù⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± اÙتخØÙØ Ø§ÙØ®Ø Ø§ÙÙسØ⬠â«ÙجاØا Ù?٠اÙعاÙÙ
⪠\.â¬Ø³Ù?â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙØ© باÙÙسبة Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
شارÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت اأÙÙثرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ Ø£Ù?ض٠اÙÙ
Ù
ارسات⬠â«âª \.45â¬ÙعÙس تصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«ÙÙرÙابâ¬
â«Ø¬ اÙÙ
رÙبات⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
Ùصة تØÙ
ÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ùة⪠Øâ¬ÙØر٠جÙ
ع اÙرسÙÙ
خار⬠â«Øات Ù
رÙزÙâ¬â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع Ù
Ø Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØºØ§ÙبÙØ© أجزâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ اÙبÙÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ?اص٠باÙÙاÙ
٠عÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ أسس ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙ
ÙÙÙÙÙÙ Ù?٠بÙغÙتا⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
Ùتر٠باص Ù?٠اسØÙبÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙظاÙ
ÙÙرÙتÙبا Ù?٠اÙب اâ¬
â«Ø±Ø²ÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙØ´Ù
٠تصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ÙتÙزÙÙÙÙ
⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ا Ù٠اÙØا٠Ù?٠ترâ¬
â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙØ© ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙÙ
ع Ø¥ÙاÙØ¡ Ùâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙ
ÙØ© خاصة⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙاÙتÙÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ?٠اÙÙ
عاÙÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙجاØا Ù?٠آسÙا ÙØ£Ù
ÙرÙاâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙÙÙÙا Ø£ÙÙظÙ
Ø© اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت اأÙÙثرâ¬
â«ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙ Ù?٠اÙÙظاÙ
اأÙØ®Ùر⪠Øâ¬Ø¹ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ù?ز Ø¥Ù٠ا Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ
شغÙÙ٠اÙÙائÙ
Ù٠اÙÙ
ØÙÙÙÙ ÙدÙ
جÙÙ
⬠â«Ø¹ ØÙ Ù⬠â«Ø³Ù Ùâ¬
â«ÙدÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙÙ?اذ اÙعاÙÙ
٠إÙ٠شبÙØ© اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
ÙتØÙÙ٠اÙتÙاÙ
Ù Ù
عÙاâªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«ØªØ¹Ø§ÙÙÙات باصات ÙتشغÙ٠اÙÙظاÙ
⪠\.â¬ÙتÙ?ظÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙÙÙ٠اÙÙائÙ
Ù٠إÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙ٠اÙصغارâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªÙ
تØÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø± اأÙÙ
Ø«ÙØ© اÙÙاجØØ© Ùترâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙ
ÙÙÙÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù Ù
ÙسÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù اÙغÙس⪠Øâ¬ØÙØ« Ù⬠â«ØºØ±â¬
â«âªPage 34 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغ٠اÙÙاØد اÙذ٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙدÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ا ÙÙâ¬â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙØ© Ø£ÙÙظÙ
Ø© اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت اÙÙاجØØ© اختاÙÙ? اÙترتÙبات ÙÙ
شغÙÙ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⪠Øâ¬Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ùتجربةâ¬
â«Ù
تÙ
ÙÙ٠بÙاء اÙبÙÙ⬠â«Ù
تعددÙÙ ÙشترÙ٠أسØÙ٠اÙباصات Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙؤÙ
ÙÙ٠صÙاÙتÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ا Ù٠اÙØا٠Ù?٠ترâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙ
ÙÙÙÙÙÙ Ù?٠بÙغÙتا⪠\.â¬Ùت Ù⬠â«Ù
شغÙÙ٠خاصÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØا٠Ù?٠اسØÙبÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø© تÙر Ùâ¬
â«Ùبا ÙÙ
شارÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙØ© ÙاÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت عÙÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙا Ù?٠اأÙÙ
Ø«Ùة⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø±Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¨Ø¹Ø§ ⪠-â¬Ø§ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤسسÙØ© ÙترتÙبات اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£ÙÙ? â اÙترتÙبÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© عÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹âª \.â¬ÙØاÙÙ
ا Ùا٠Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار ÙسÙÙات عدÙدة اÙÙÙاÙØ©â¬â«Ù?ذة ÙÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«âª \.46â¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙ Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار اÙÙÙاÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡â¬
â«Ø§Ø± Ù
Ù Ù
جÙس اÙÙزرâ¬â«Øدد بÙ
Ùجب Ùر⬠â«Ù
ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ù?⬠â«ÙÙØ§Ø Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ùâ¬
â«Ø¨Ù
ÙÙ
Ø© تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ù
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ©âªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø³ÙÙ
ا Ù?Ù ÙØاع اÙبÙÙâ¬â«Ø© ÙÙ
ÙÙÙÙا Ù
اÙØÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ù Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙÙ?ÙØ° Ù
شارÙع ÙبÙرâ¬
â«Ù⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùذ٠اÙتÙÙâ¬â«Ø¹ تØÙÙر اÙÙÙ٠اÙØضرâ¬â«Ù Ù
ع اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙØ§Ø¬Ø ÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«Ùخبرت٠ØÙÙÙØ© Ù?Ù Ù
جا٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ù
شارÙع ÙÙ
ÙÙÙÙا اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°ÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
جا٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙØضرâ¬
â«Ù?Ù ÙاÙÙ٠اأÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø¯ÙسÙ
بر âª\.2015â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙÙس٠Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار اÙØ°Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ ÙÙÙÙا اÙت٠Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ
ÙÙÙا Ùرض Ù
٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù
ÙÙÙات اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«âª \.47â¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙ Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ù
سؤÙاÙ٠ع٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ùâ¬
â«Ùâ¬â«Ø© اÙÙÙÙ ÙاأÙشغا٠اÙعاÙ
Ø© ÙÙ
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥ÙÙ ÙÙااÙت أخر⬠â«Ø¹ ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°Ù Ù
ع ٠اâ¬
â«Ø²Ø±â¬ â«Ø¹ إعداد اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«Ù
باشر ع٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ùا⬠â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± Ù
سؤÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ⬠â«Ù Ùâ¬â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
تÙجÙÙ Ù
ساÙÙ
Ø© اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
شغÙÙÙÙâªØâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙ
ا⬠â«Ø¹âª\.â¬â¬â«Ø¨Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§Ùخاصة⬠â«Ùاâ¬â«Ù⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ù Ùâ¬â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§ÙتØتÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙÙ⬠â«ØªÙÙ?Ùذ⬠â«Ø¹Ù⬠â«Ø§Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùâ¬â«Ù
سؤ⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙعÙ
ارâ¬â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙÙÙ
اء⬠â«Ù
جÙس⬠â«Ùâ¬â«Ø³ÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø°ÙÙâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø¥ÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙØاجةâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ùدâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙة⪠\.â¬Ù Ù?â¬
â«Ø³Ùشر٠Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙ Ù
٠خاÙÙ Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ù
٠أج٠ضÙ
ا٠اتâ¬
â«Ùسا٠اÙبÙاÙات⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ùت٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
تÙ
ÙÙÙÙا Ù
Ù Ùرض Ù
٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¥ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شغÙÙÙ ÙسÙÙÙÙ Ù
سؤ٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ØªÙا ÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø© اÙÙÙÙ ÙاأÙشغا٠اÙعاÙ
Ø© ÙÙ
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠Ù
٠أج٠إعداد شرÙØ Ø§ÙعÙد ÙاÙÙ
ÙاصÙ?ات Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙÙØ© ÙÙ
ر⬠â«Ø²Ø±â¬â«ÙاإÙعÙ
ار ٠اâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù Ù
ÙاÙشت٠Ù?Ù ÙسÙ
٠اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ù Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات اÙتÙرÙد ÙÙÙÙا اÙخاصة باÙÙ
شارÙع ÙÙ
ا جر⬠â«Ø³Ùجرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙ٠بشأ٠اÙعÙÙدâªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ù اÙتÙ?اÙض Ù
عâ¬
â«Ø¹âª\.â¬â¬â«ÙاÙتÙرÙد ÙÙØ«ÙÙØ© تÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ù? Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙ⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙÙÙ Ù
سؤÙÙÙ٠عÙ⬠â«ØºÙÙ٠خاصÙÙ Ù
سؤÙÙÙ٠ع٠تشغÙ٠اÙÙظاÙ
ÙصÙاÙتÙ⪠Øâ¬ØªØت إشر⬠â«âª \.48â¬Ø³ÙÙ? ÙتÙ
تعÙÙÙ Ù
Ø´ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£Ø¹Ù
ا٠اÙتشغÙÙ ÙاÙصÙاÙØ© ÙÙباصات⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
ØØات⪠Øâ¬ÙÙظÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙØ°ÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙظÙ
جÙ
ع اÙرسÙÙ
⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا سÙÙÙÙÙÙ Ù
سؤÙÙÙ٠ع٠صÙاÙØ© اÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبتÙÙ
ÙÙ?٠اÙعÙÙدâª/â¬Ø§Ø§ÙÙ
تÙاز⪠\.â¬ÙستØرصâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙ٠اÙخاصÙÙ ÙÙ
رâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ù? عÙÙâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùرسة ÙÙا⪠\.â¬ÙسÙÙÙÙ ÙÙ
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠Ù
ÙÙ
Ø© اإÙشر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øªâ¬â«ÙاÙÙ
سارâ¬
â«Ø§Ù
ات عÙ٠أساس شرÙØ Ø§ÙعÙد ÙÙ
ÙادÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙتعاÙدÙØ© ÙتÙص٠باÙتسدÙدات ÙاÙغرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙ Ù
ÙجباتÙÙ
â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠عÙ٠أ٠ÙØترÙ
â¬
â«Ø¨Ø§Ø¡ â رصد اÙÙتائج ÙتÙÙÙÙ
Ùاâ¬
â«(Ù
شغÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùâ¬â«Ø¹ ÙÙÙÙا⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠جÙ
عÙا Ù
Ù ÙÙاÙات أخر⬠â«Ø¹ ÙتÙÙÙÙ
Ù ÙسÙÙÙÙ Ù
سؤÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ù٠ع٠جÙ
ع بÙاÙات اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø³ÙعÙÙ Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار برصد اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«âªÙ? \.49â¬â¬
â«Ø¹ عÙ٠أساسâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
رØÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø³Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯ اÙتÙارÙر⬠â«Ø¹ ÙتÙÙÙÙ
٠بشÙ٠عاÙ
⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ù?â¬â«Ø¨Ø§ØµØ§Øª ÙÙ
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙÙ
تعاÙدÙÙ)⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠رصد اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø© اإÙباÙغ⪠\.â¬Ùجب أ٠تشÙ
Ù Ùذ٠اÙتÙارÙر⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠بÙ٠أÙ
Ùر⬠â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹Ø© ÙاÙتعÙÙ٠عÙÙÙا Ù?٠غضÙÙ âªÙ 45â¬â¬
â«ÙÙÙ
ا Ù
٠اÙتÙاء Ù?تر⬠â«ÙصÙ? سÙÙ٠اÙت٠ستÙ?رÙâ¬
â«Ù?ع Ø¥Ù٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙÙÙ
رâ¬
â«âªPage 35 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«ÙÙ⬠â«Ùâª( :â¬Ø£) تØدÙØ«Ùا ÙÙÙتائج اÙÙ
ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø© رÙ?ع اÙتÙارÙر ضÙ
Ù Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª ÙاÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙدÙ? اÙÙاردة Ù?٠إØار اÙÙØªØ§Ø¦Ø¬Ø Ù(ب) اأÙÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ?ذة Ù?٠خاÙÙ Ù?تر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØÙÙØ© عÙ٠أساس⬠â«Ù?⬠â«Ø£Ø®Ø±â¬
â«ÙÙتØر٠إÙÙÙØ§Ø Ù(د)â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Øة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙابÙØ© Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùتر⬠â«Ø§ÙتباÙا⪠Øâ¬Ø¥Ù٠جاÙب اÙتدابÙر Ù?â¬â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ اÙØ°Ù ÙÙتضÙ⬠â«Ùر عÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ© اÙت٠تؤثâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
ÙÙÙØ Ù(ج) اÙÙÙÙدâª/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
سائ٠أ٠اÙÙ
خاØر⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙئÙØ©âªØâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø±â¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø¯Ø§â¬ â«Ø§Ø¥Ù⬠â«(Ø®Øة⬠â«Ø©â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙئÙ⬠â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø¦Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØÙ
ا⬠â«Ø±â¬
â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Ø§Ø¥Ùج⬠â«Ø§Øªâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£Ø¯â¬ â«ØªÙÙ?Ùذ⬠â«Ù?Ù⬠â«Ø²â¬â«Øر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
â¬
â«Ù Ù? Ù⬠â«Ù
⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙد⬠â«Ù(Ù)⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙبÙØ©Ø⬠â«Ø§Ùستة⬠â«ÙØ£ÙØ´Ùر⬠â«Ø§ÙزÙ
ÙÙ⬠â«ØµØ±Ù?⬠â«Ø§Ù⬠â«Ø¬Ø¯ÙÙâ¬
â«ÙدÙ
â¬
â«ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ùر Ù?â¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯ Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار تÙر Ùاâ¬â«Ùس٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
دة Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙتصÙ? Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¶â¬ â«Ø¹ Ù?٠إØار ااÙستعر⬠â«Ø¹Ù
Ù Ùâ¬
â«ÙتÙدÙ
تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù تÙÙÙÙ
Ù?â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙ⬠â«ÙØ®ØØ© إعادة اإÙسÙاÙ)⪠\.â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙâªÙ? Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø³Ùجرâ¬
â«Ø© اÙت٠Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ
ÙÙÙا اÙبÙÙ⬠â«Ø¹ Øت٠Ùذا اÙتارÙخ⪠\.â¬Ùا٠Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار اÙÙÙاÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ?ذة ÙÙ
شارÙع اÙبÙ٠اÙتØتÙØ© اأÙØ®Ùر⬠â«ÙÙتÙدÙ
Ù?٠خاÙÙ Ù?ترâ¬
â«Ø© ØÙاة اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ÙÙا Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ø±Ø¶Ø§ رسÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙع باÙÙ
Ùارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙاÙزÙ
Ø©âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙ ÙÙÙ ÙتÙ
تâ¬
â«Ø¹â¬ â«Ù
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙجÙسÙة⪠\.â¬ÙØ´Ù
٠إØار اÙÙتائج Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ اأÙشغاÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙجÙدر⪠Øâ¬Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª Ùâ¬
â«Ù
Øددة Øسب اÙÙ
ÙØÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ⬠â«âª \.50â¬Ø³ÙØ´Ù
٠رصد اÙÙتائج Ù?٠خاÙ٠اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° تÙزÙع Ù
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§Øª بسÙØØ©â¬â«Ø¬Ø§ØªÙ عÙ٠أساس Ù
ؤشر⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ© ÙÙ
خرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ?اعÙÙØ© Ù?Ù ÙÙاس Ù
ØصاÙت اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹âªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«ØªÙ
تصÙ
ÙÙ
Ù Ù
٠أج٠ضÙ
اÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ© بغÙØ© رصد ÙØ¬Ø§Ø ØªÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ù?٠خاÙ٠اÙتÙÙ?Ùذ⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠خاÙ٠تÙارÙر اÙÙÙاÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ?ذة ÙتÙارÙر اÙÙتائج ÙØاÙØ© اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙصادرâ¬
â«Ø© ع٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات⬠â«ÙÙابÙØ© ÙÙÙÙاس⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙØ´Ù
٠رصد اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ Ù
٠خاÙ٠بØاÙة⬠â«Ù⪠\.â¬Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
تØدÙد اÙعاÙ
ÙÙÙ ÙÙÙÙÙ
س٠Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙجÙسÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙجÙدر⪠Øâ¬ÙÙØا٠اأÙشغا٠ÙÙÙعÙا⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠بÙ٠أÙ
Ùر أخرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª Øسب⬠â«Ùعا Ùبعض اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬â«Ø¥Ø¶Ø§Ù?ÙØ© ÙتÙز Ùâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
درجةâ¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ø©â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùزâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ù
ÙؤÙاâªØâ¬â¬ â«ÙتÙ
⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙ⬠â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙعÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø³Ø§Ø¹Ø§Øªâ¬ â«(سجاÙت⬠â«Ø©â¬ â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø±â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙا⬠â«Ø§Ùرصد⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Ø£Ø¯â¬ â«Ø®Ø§ÙÙ⬠â«Ù
Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙÙ
⬠â«Ø±ØµØ¯â¬ â«ÙتÙ
â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùس⬠â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙÙ
âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø®ØµØ©â¬â«Ø±â¬ â«Ø±ÙÙ
⬠â«Ø®Ø§ÙÙ⬠â«Ù
Ù⬠â«Ø£Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬ â«ÙÙ?Ùâ¬
â«ØªØ¹Ø± Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙستÙصائÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øªâ¬â«Ø¬ Ù
ÙÙع اÙعÙ
Ù)⪠\.â¬Ø³ØªÙ?عØ٠اÙدر⬠â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬ÙستعرضÙا عÙدئذ اÙÙ
Ùتب اأÙساس٠ÙÙÙ
ÙاÙÙ Ù
٠خار⬠â«Ø¹ Ù
Ù Ùب٠اÙÙ
شرÙ? اÙÙ
ÙداÙ٠عÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù?Ù ÙظاÙ
Ù٠أسبÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙعÙØ© اÙعاÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙØ© اÙرصد ÙÙ
رâ¬
â«Ø§Ùبة⬠â«Ø§ÙجÙسÙة⪠\.â¬ÙستضÙ
٠اÙÙÙاÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ?ذة Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ø© عÙ٠أساس اÙجÙدر⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙعÙ
ر⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
ÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ùâ¬â«Ù
Ùزâ¬
â«ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات ØÙÙ Ù
ستخدÙ
٠اÙÙظاÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ بشÙÙ Ù
ÙتظÙ
ÙتØرص عÙ٠اØترâ¬
â«Ø§Ù
اÙÙ
ÙاÙÙ⬠â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬ØªØ²Ùر Ù
ÙاÙع اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«Ø§Ù? عÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«ÙØ© ÙØ¥Ùشرâ¬
â«Ø¹ بدعÙ
Ù
٠شرÙØ© استشارÙ⬠â«Ø¸Ù?Ù ÙØدة تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ùâ¬
â«Ù
Ùرسة ÙÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù
٠خاÙÙ Ù
Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتØر٠إÙÙâ¬
â«Øرصا عÙ٠تØدÙد Ø£Ù Ø´ÙÙÙ ÙÙ
عاÙجتÙا بشÙ٠صØÙØ⪠Øâ¬Ù Ù⬠â«Ø¹ Ù⬠â«Ø¢ÙÙØ© Ù
عاÙجة اÙØ´ÙاÙÙ ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
تØÙÙر Ùâ¬
â«ÙØ©)⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ù⬠â«Ù
اÙÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ?ÙÙØ© Ø´ÙرÙ⬠â«ÙشرÙØ Ø§Ø¥ÙباÙغ (تÙارÙر Ùâ¬
â«Ùرâ¬
â«Ø§Øª ÙÙ
شاعر اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ´ اÙÙ
ØتÙ
ÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙتÙتâ¬
â«Ø¸Ù
Ù
ع Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙÙÙ Ù
ÙÙÙ
ÙÙ Ù?٠بÙرÙت ÙÙتÙ?اعÙÙ٠بشÙÙ Ù
Ùت Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£Ø®ØµØ§Ø¦Ù٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.51â¬Ø³ÙضÙ
٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠دعÙ
اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
ستÙ
رâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙÙÙØ© اÙاÙزÙ
Ø© عÙ٠اأÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
Ù
ا سÙسÙ
Ø ÙÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠بتأÙ
Ù٠اÙدعÙ
ÙÙتØÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ ÙاÙرصد⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠بعثات دعÙ
تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙصÙ?⬠â«Ø©âªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«Ù
ÙداÙÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ù
تÙرر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øªâ¬â«Ø¸Ù
Ù٠زÙارâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø¬ÙÙ
⪠-â¬Ø§Ø§ÙستداÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ø§Øª عبر⬠â«Ù
شغÙÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ Ù
Ùار⬠â«ØºÙÙ٠خاصÙÙâªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
استخداÙ
Ù⬠â«ÙÙعÙØ© Ù
Ù Ùب٠Ù
Ø´ Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات ذات Ùâ¬â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØاعÙÙ٠اÙخاص ÙاÙعاÙ
استداÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.52â¬Ø³ØªØ¶Ù
٠ترتÙبات اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙÙØ© Ù
٠أج٠اÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠ÙخدÙ
ات اÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ© ÙشبÙØ© اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø³ÙتÙ
تÙÙÙÙ
Ùدرâ¬
â«Ø§ØªÙÙ
⬠â«Ø¥Ø¬Ø±â¬
â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øª تÙدÙÙ
عرÙض Ø´ÙÙ?اÙ?Ø© ÙÙ
Ù?تÙØØ© اÙت٠Ù
٠خاÙÙÙا Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØد Ù
٠أÙ
Ùا٠اÙدعÙ
اÙتشغÙÙÙØ© ØÙØ« اإÙÙ
ÙاÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ ÙÙâ¬
â«ØªÙÙع Ø£Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙ Ù
٠أج٠Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª Ù?Ù Ù
جا٠تÙرÙد⬠â«ÙسÙتÙ
تصÙ
ÙÙ
Ù
جÙ
Ùعات اÙÙ
سار⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙت Ù?٠خاÙÙ Ù?ترâ¬
â«Ø© اÙعÙدâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعÙ
ÙÙات اÙØÙÙÙØ© اأÙÙ
د ÙÙÙØاعâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
Ù
ا ÙضÙ
٠استداÙ
Ø©â¬â«Ø¡Ø§ Ù
٠استÙاÙ٠اأÙسØÙÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬â«Ø§ÙتشغÙÙÙØ© ÙجزÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø© ÙÙسÙ
Ø§Ø Ø¨ØªØ³Ø¯Ùد اÙÙÙ?Ùاتâ¬
â«ÙØ© Ù
٠اÙرسÙÙ
ÙاÙ?Ù Ùâ¬â«ØªÙÙ٠اÙعائدات اÙتجارÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø© اÙخدÙ
ات Ù?٠إØار اÙÙظاÙ
باÙÙاÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠أج٠تÙ?اد٠ØاÙØ© اØتÙار⪠\.â¬ÙÙ?Ù Øا٠اÙسØاب Ø£Øد⬠â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø© Ùâ¬
â«Ù
شغÙÙ٠إÙدار⬠â«Ø³ÙتÙ
استخداÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§âªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø§Ùخاص⪠\.â¬Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ø®Ùرâ¬
â«Ù
شغÙÙ٠آخرÙÙ Ù
ؤÙÙÙÙ ÙتÙÙÙ٠تشغÙ٠اÙباصاتâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ù? عÙÙÙا عÙ٠اأÙÙ
د اÙØÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ù
٠شأ٠استخداÙ
خبرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ ÙÙ٠سرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Ù
٠أج٠تعزÙز⬠â«Ø§ÙعÙ
ÙÙات ÙاإÙشرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤسسÙØ© ÙتخØÙØâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª اÙÙدرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø³Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø²Ø² بÙاء اÙÙدر⬠â«âªÙ? \.53â¬â¬
â«âªPage 36 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
٠شأÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª ÙÙااÙت اÙØÙÙÙ
ة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠⪠Ø3â¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠اÙدعÙ
اÙÙ
Ùت Ùâ¬
â«Ø¸Ù
ÙÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ùدر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù
ÙÙØ© ضÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠ÙاأÙÙØ´ØØ©â¬
â«ÙâªØâ¬â¬â«Ø¸Ù?Ù٠اÙÙ
ختÙÙ?ÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠ÙÙÙااÙت أخر⬠â«Ø§Ø¡ ضÙ
٠اÙÙ
ؤسسات اÙÙائÙ
Ø© اÙتعÙÙÙ
ÙÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙا Ù?٠أثÙاء اÙخدÙ
Ø© Ù
٠اÙÙ
Ù Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³ØªØ®Ø¯Ø§Ù
Ùؤâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ¡ اÙخبرâ¬
â«Ø§Øªâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øª اÙاÙزÙ
Ø© Ù
٠أج٠تØسÙ٠أÙظÙ
Ø© اÙÙÙÙ ÙسÙاسات٠ÙتعزÙز اÙÙ
Ùار⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠⪠3â¬Ø§ÙÙ
ساعدة Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙÙØ© ÙاÙدر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øªâª \.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙÙ
ÙÙ⬠â«Ù
Ù
ا ÙسÙ
Ø Ø¨Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙتدرÙج٠ÙÙÙÙ?اءات ÙاÙخبر⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙ
اعÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùعâ¬â«Ø±â¬ â«Ø§Ùس⬠â«Ø§ÙعاÙ
⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙظاÙ
⬠â«Ø§ÙØÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙ
د⬠â«Ø¹ÙÙ⬠â«Ø±â¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¥Ùدا⬠â«Ø§Ù?âªØâ¬â¬
â«Ø±â¬ â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¥Ùش⬠â«ÙÙصÙاÙØ©âªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø©â¬ â«Ù
ؤسسÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øªâ¬
â«Ø±â¬ â«Ùد⬠â«Ø¯â¬ â«Øâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙ⬠â«Ø£Ù⬠â«Ø´Ø£ÙÙ⬠â«Ù
Ù⬠â«Ø§â¬ â«Ù
Ù
â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØاعâªØâ¬â¬ â«ÙÙÙااÙت⬠â«Ø©â¬ â«ÙتشغÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬ â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø±â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¥Ùداâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجدÙد ÙاÙتÙسعات اÙاÙØÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø®ØØ ÙÙا اÙخاصة بÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù?⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ù٠ضÙ
Ùâ¬â«Ø¨Ø¯Ù سب٠اÙتÙÙâ¬â«Ø³Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ Øاجات Ù
جÙ
Ùعات Ù
ستضعÙ?Ø© عدÙدة Ù?Ù Ù
جا٠اÙÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ù?â¬â«Ø³Ùسد اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¬ØªÙ
اعÙØ© Ù
ستداÙ
Ø© ÙبÙرâ¬
â«Ø©âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø¨ÙئÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ آثار Ù⬠â«âª \.54â¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙ ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø© ÙاÙترÙ?ÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ùâ¬
â«ÙؤدÙ⬠â«Ø§Øª Ù?â¬
â«ÙÙعØÙ Ù
جااÙ٠أÙبر ÙÙتجار⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙارâ¬
â«ÙØد Ù
٠ااÙعتÙ
اد عÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù
Ù
ا Ù⬠â«Ø§Ùد عÙÙ Ùسائ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
ÙغÙر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¢ÙÙÙØ©âªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø¨ÙرÙت بشÙ٠تدرÙج٠Ù
ع اعتÙ
اد Ù
تزâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØد Ù
٠اÙضباب Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙدخاÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙسÙ
Ù Ù?٠سÙ
اء بÙرÙتâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù
Ù
ا Ù?â¬
â«ÙساÙÙ
Ù?٠تØÙÙ٠بÙئة Ø£ÙظÙ? Ù Ù⬠â«Ø¥Ù٠اÙØ®Ù?اض Ù
ÙØÙظ Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ
ÙÙثاتâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«ÙÙ Ù
ستداÙ
ة⪠\.â¬Ø§Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø´Ù⬠â«Ø© ÙØ٠استر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ØªÙجÙØ© تÙÙ⬠â«Ø®ØÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ÙÙ
Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± Ù
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتغÙر اÙÙ
Ùاخ٠٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØد Ù
ÙÙâªÙ? \.â¬â¬ â«Ø¹ أثر Ù
ÙØÙظ عÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙÙÙ? Ù
ع Ù⬠â«âª \.55â¬ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§Øª Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا⬠â«Ø§ÙتØÙÙ Ù
٠اÙسÙارâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø³ØªØ¤Ø¯Ù Ø¥ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«ØªØºÙر ÙبÙر Ù?Ù ÙÙ
Ø Ø§Ø³ØªØ®Ø¯Ø§Ù
Ùسائ٠اÙÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع⬠â«Ù?٠أ٠اÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ© ÙÙ
سارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Ùâ¬
â«Øس٠Ùسائ٠اÙÙÙ٠غÙر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¢ÙÙÙØ© بشÙ٠أÙبرâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù Ù⬠â«ÙابÙÙØ© اÙÙÙ?اذ ÙبÙئة Ø£Ù?ض٠ÙØ£Ùثر Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ù
اÙا ÙÙÙ
شاة Ø£Ù Ù?⬠â«Øات ÙاÙتشدÙد بشÙ٠خاص عÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ù
٠شأ٠تØسÙ٠اÙÙÙ?اذ Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
Ø Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Øª Ù?٠غازâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙبعاثات⬠â«Ø© عÙ٠تØÙÙ٠ا Ùâ¬
â«Ø¯Ø®Ø§Ø±â¬ â«Ø© ÙبÙرâ¬â«Ø§ØªÙجÙØ© ÙÙ٠ذات اÙبعاثات Ù
تدÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع Ùدرâ¬
â«ÙÙعÙØ© ÙØ٠استر Ùâ¬
â«Ø© Ù⬠â«Ø¹ اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙÙ?ز⬠â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± Ù
شرÙ⬠â«ÙباÙتاÙÙâªÙ? Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙساÙÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
عاÙجة Ù
ÙاØ٠اÙضعÙ?⬠â«Ø¹ Ù?⬠â«Ø£Ù Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«Ø§ÙتغÙر اÙÙ
ÙاخÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙتÙÙÙ? Ù
ع Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ù
ÙاÙ?ع Ù
شترÙØ© Ù⬠â«Ø¹ ÙÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«ÙساÙÙ
Ù?ÙÙا تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙدÙ?Ùئة Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت (ا٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙÙ
ا⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¡Ø§ ا٠ÙØ£â¬
â«Ùتجز Ù
٠اÙبÙÙ⬠â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± اÙجسÙر⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
Ø Ùâ¬
â«Øات اÙÙ
سÙÙÙ?ة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
اÙجئ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙظاÙ
اÙصرÙ? جزÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
رتبØØ© باÙÙÙاء ÙاÙÙ?ÙضاÙات⪠\.â¬ÙتÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Ù
ÙاÙÙ
Ø© ÙÙÙ?ÙضاÙات ÙستÙ?ساعد عÙ٠جعÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¨ØªØ£Ù ÙÙ?٠اÙÙ
عاÙÙر ÙاÙÙÙاعد اÙÙائÙ
ة⪠\.â¬ÙستÙÙ٠اÙبÙÙâ¬
â«ÙسÙتÙ
تصÙ
ÙÙ
Ùا Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙÙ âª)1â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¶Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ø£Ù٠عرض Ùâ¬
â«Ø© ÙÙÙ?ÙضاÙاتâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù
ÙØÙØ© اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¯Ø§Ù â دÙر اÙشرÙاءâ¬
â«ØºØ¨Ø© اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© Ù?Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ØªØ¬Ø¯Ø¯ Ù?Ù Ù
جا٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ùر⬠â«Ø§Ù
اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù?⬠â«Ø¹ بشÙÙ ÙبÙر Ù?Ù Ù
جا٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù
٠شرÙاء Ù
ختÙÙ?ÙÙâªÙ \.â¬Ø§â¬
â«Ùظر Ø¥Ù٠إÙتز⬠â«âª \.56â¬ÙستÙ?Ùد اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù Ù
ا بÙ٠اÙعاÙ
⪠2015â¬Ù⪠2017â¬Ù
٠أج٠إعداد⬠â«Ù ÙاÙبØرâ¬â«ÙØ© اÙعاÙ
Ø© ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙبر⬠â«ÙدÙ
ااÙتØاد اأÙÙرÙب٠Ù
ÙØØ© صغÙرâ¬
â«Ø© ÙدعÙ
اÙÙ
دÙرÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙص٠إÙÙ ØÙÙÙ ÙزØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙرâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØدÙدÙØ© Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙ⪠\.â¬Ù?Ù Ù
Ùازâ¬
â«Ø§Ø© Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ø¹Ø±Ø¨ اÙبÙÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ù⪠Øâ¬Ø¨ÙÙÙ
ا Ù
ÙØ Ø§ÙبÙ٠اأÙÙرÙب٠ÙاÙستثÙ
ار Ù
ÙØØ© Ù?٠اÙعاÙ
⪠2015â¬Ù
٠أج٠درâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø© ØÙÙ٠اÙسÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø³ØªØ± Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ØªÙجÙØ© ÙÙ٠برâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙÙØ©âªØâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª عدÙدة⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ø¹Ø±Ø¨Øª اÙÙ
صارÙ?⬠â«ØÙØ© اÙثاÙÙØ© Ù
٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⪠\.â¬Ù
٠خاÙ٠استشار⬠â«Ù
ؤخ Ùاâ¬
â«Ø± ع٠اÙتÙ
اÙ
Ù Ù?٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
ر⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙساÙÙ
Ù ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ù Ù
Ù Ù
صادر Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ØÙÙØ© بشÙÙ⬠â«Ø¹ Ø¥Ù٠تعبئة اÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙخاص اÙجÙÙرâ¬â«Ø¹ ÙتشغÙ٠اÙÙظاÙ
⪠\.â¬Ùسع٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
ستثÙ
رÙ٠ع٠اÙتÙ
اÙ
ÙÙ
Ù?٠دعÙ
تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ø³Ø§Ø³Ùâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø®Ø§Ù
سا â اÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âªPage 37 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£ÙÙ? â تصÙÙÙ? اÙÙ
خاØر اÙعاÙ
Ø© ÙØ´Ø±Ø Ø§ÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙجدÙ٠⪠â 3â¬ØªØµÙÙÙ? اÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتصÙÙÙ?⬠â«Ù?ئة اÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«Ù
رتÙ?ع⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙاسÙØ© ÙاÙØÙÙÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«Ùâ¬â«Ø¬ÙÙر⬠â«Ø§ÙتصادÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
خاØر اÙÙ
اÙرÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬â«Ø¬ÙÙر⬠â«Ø³Ùاسات اÙÙØاع Ùاستر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ØªÙجÙاتÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬â«Ø¬ÙÙر⬠â«Ø¹â¬â«Ø§ÙتصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙ?ÙÙ ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬â«Ø¬ÙÙر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤسسÙØ© ÙÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° ÙااÙستداÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙدرâ¬
â«Ø§Øªâ¬
â«Ù
عتدÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙئتÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«Ùâ¬â«Ø¬ÙÙر⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙئة ÙاÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«Ù
رتÙ?ع⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙجÙاتâ¬
â«Ùâ¬â«Ø¬ÙÙر⬠â«Ø§ÙØ®Øر اÙعاÙ
â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤسسÙة⪠Øâ¬Ùأداء اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙبØÙØ¡ بشÙ٠عاÙ
â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¨Ø§Ø±Ø²â¬
â«Ø§âª Øâ¬Ø¥Ø° Ùأخذ بعÙ٠ااÙعتبار Ù
خاØر اÙبÙد⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
خاØر اÙجÙاتâ¬â«Ùعتبر تصÙÙÙ? اÙØ®Øر اÙعاÙ
Ù⬠â«âªÙ? \.57â¬â¬
â«ÙÙÙ
شارÙع اÙت٠Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ
ÙÙÙا اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù?اعÙÙت٠(Ø£Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
Ù
ا Ùد Ùâ¬
â«Ùؤخر⬠â«ØâªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùترâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª اÙÙ
ØتÙ
ÙØ© Ù?٠اÙØصÙ٠عÙÙ Ù
ÙاÙ?ÙØ© اÙبرÙÙ
ا٠عÙ٠اÙÙرض⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙاسÙØ© ÙÙ
خاØر اÙØÙÙÙ
ة⪠)1( :â¬Ø§ÙتأخÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.58â¬ØªØ´Ù
٠اÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙ
ÙÙة⪠\.â¬ØªØ¯Ø§Ø¨Ùر اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? Ù
٠اÙÙ
خاØر⪠:â¬Ø§Ø³ØªØ£ÙÙ?ت اÙÙ
ؤسساتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙاسÙØ© Ù?Ù Ù
ا Ùخص تÙ?اصÙ٠اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°Ø Ù(⪠)3â¬Ø§ÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªÙÙ?ÙØ°Ù) بشÙÙ ÙبÙØ±Ø Ù(⪠)2â¬Ø§ÙÙ?ÙارÙâ¬
â«Ùتابعا٠ع٠Ùثب Ø£Ùبر اÙسÙاسات⬠â«Ø§Ø¡ ÙاÙبرÙÙ
ا٠اÙÙÙÙ
اجتÙ
اعات Ù
ÙتظÙ
Ø© ÙÙÙ
ا Ù?⬠â«Ø¬Ùد Ù
ÙØ° اÙتخاب اÙرئÙس ÙتشÙÙÙ ØÙÙÙ
Ø© جدÙدة⪠\.â¬ÙعÙد Ù
جÙس اÙÙزر⬠â«Ø§ÙعÙ
٠بشÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡â¬â«ÙتÙ
اعتÙ
ادÙا عÙ٠أعÙ٠اÙÙ
ستÙÙات⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ا Ù
Ù Ùب٠Ù
جÙس اÙÙزر⬠â«Ø£ÙÙÙÙات اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© Ù⬠â«Ø¹ أثر ÙØÙÙ ÙÙÙ Ù
٠أÙÙÙ Ù⬠â«ÙÙ
ÙÙÙا Ù
اÙØÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصادÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
شارÙع اÙت٠Ùâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙ
ÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙبÙÙ ÙبÙا٠إØد٠اÙدÙ٠اأÙÙثر استÙرÙاâ¬
â«Ø§Ø±â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ستجدات ØÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙدÙ
اإÙعداد ÙاÙتÙÙ?Ùذ⪠\.â¬Ø¨Ø§ÙÙسبة Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
خاØر⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙÙ٠اÙبر Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ
اÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùت٠تسأ٠باÙتظاÙ
ع٠آخرâ¬
â«Ø£Ù
ÙÙØ© Ø£Ù ØااÙت اضØرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¨Ø§Øª اجتÙ
اعÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø¹ ÙتشغÙÙÙ Ù?٠اÙÙ
ÙاØ٠اÙخاÙÙØ© Ù
٠أØداث Ù⬠â«ØعةâªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«ÙتÙ
تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ØºÙ
Ù
Ù ØÙادث Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ù
ÙÙØ© Ù
ت٠Ù⬠â«Ù?٠اÙÙ
ÙØÙØ© باÙرâ¬
â«Ø©âª \.â¬ØªØ¯Ø§Ø¨Ùر تخÙ?ÙÙ? اÙÙ
خاØرâªÙ? :â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙساÙÙ
⬠â«âª \.59â¬Ø§ÙØ®Øر اÙÙ
اÙر٠اÙتصادÙ⪠:â¬Ø§Ø²Ø¯Ø§Ø¯Øª Ùسبة اÙدÙ٠إÙ٠إجÙ
اÙ٠اÙÙاتج اÙÙ
ØÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠بشÙ٠سرÙع Ù?٠اÙسÙÙات اÙÙÙÙÙØ© اأÙØ®Ùرâ¬
â«Ø©âª Øâ¬Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتصادÙØ© ÙبÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù ÙسÙسÙØ© اإÙÙ
داد⪠Øâ¬ÙخدÙ
ات اÙÙÙÙ ÙÙØاعÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا سÙÙÙÙ ÙÙ Ù
ÙاÙ?ع Ù
اÙرÙ⬠â«Ø³ÙÙ
ا Ù?Ù ÙØاع اÙبÙاء⪠Øâ¬ÙÙØاعات أخر⬠â«Ø¹ Ù?٠تØÙ?Ùز اÙÙÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ù Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù اÙÙ
اÙرÙâ¬
â«Ø¸Ø± Ø¥Ù٠آثارâ¬
â«Ø بÙ٠⪠5â¬Ù⪠10â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
٠إجÙ
اÙ٠اÙÙاتج اÙÙ
ØÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ù Ùا⬠â«ØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùت٠تÙ? ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùâ¬
â«Ùدر ÙÙÙ?تÙا بÙسبة تتر⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصادÙØ© Ùزâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØد Ù
٠اÙعÙاÙ
٠اÙخار Ùâ¬
â«Ø¬Ùة⬠â«Ø®Ø§ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ© اÙعشرâ¬
â«Ø© اÙت٠أÙص٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠بÙا Ø¥Ù٠اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© Ù
٠أجÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙصاÙØÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£Ù٠أØد أبرز اإÙجرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Ø¹ عÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø©âªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«ØªÙ
تØدÙد اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙجابÙØ© اÙÙبÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتصادÙØ©â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùسرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø¢ÙÙØ© اÙÙرÙض Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø¹ Ù
٠خاÙÙ Ùرض Ù
٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙØ¥ÙÙشاء ÙاÙتعÙ
Ùر ÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù
Ù Ù⬠â«Ø³ÙتÙ
تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«ØªØسÙ٠أدائ٠اÙÙ
اÙر٠اÙتصاد٠⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ùâ¬
â«âª17â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙÙÙÙØ© ÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© ÙبÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙرÙØ© سÙاسة ÙÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâª\.2017 Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª 17â¬Ø§Ø¥ÙصاÙØات ذاتâ¬
â«âªPage 38 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© Ù?â¬
â«ÙÙدخ٠Ù
Ù
ارسات جدÙدة⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
سؤÙÙÙاتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
Ù
ا Ù?â¬
â«ÙÙÙÙص باÙتاÙÙ⬠â«Ø¹ Ù
٠بÙ٠اÙÙ
شارÙع اأÙÙÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠اÙت٠تتضÙ
٠تعبئة اÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙخاصâªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«Ùعتبر اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø£Ø®Ùرâ¬
â«Ø§âªÙ? Øâ¬â¬ â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاصâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙØاع Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØسÙØ© ÙÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙ
Ùâ¬â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ØªÙجÙØ© ÙØاع عاÙ
ÙاضØØ© ÙÙذا اÙÙØاع⪠\.â¬ØªØ¯Ø¨Ùر اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? Ù
٠اÙÙ
خاØر⪠:â¬Ø¨ÙÙÙ
ا ÙÙ?تÙر ÙبÙا٠إÙ٠استر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ØªÙجÙØ© ÙÙØاع⬠â«âª \.60â¬Ø³Ùاسات اÙÙØاع Ùاستر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ØªÙجÙاتÙ⪠\.â¬Ù
ا Ù
٠استر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ© عÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙا⬠â«Ù⪠Øâ¬ØªØ´Ù
٠شبÙØ© اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§Ùباصات اÙÙ
غذÙØ© Ù Ù⬠â«Ù استر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ØªÙجÙØ© ÙÙØاع اÙÙÙ٠اÙبر⬠â«Ù ÙاÙبØر⬠â«Ø£Ø¹Ø¯Øª اÙÙ
دÙرÙâ¬
â«ÙØ© اÙعاÙ
Ø© ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙبر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø¹Ø§Ù
ا Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù⬠â«Ø© Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
تÙسØØ© اأÙÙ
د⪠\.â¬Ù ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø§Ø¯ÙØ© ÙشبÙØ© Ø®ØÙØ ÙÙ٠سرÙع Ù?٠أÙثر Ù
Ù âªÙ 50â¬â¬ â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬ÙÙ٠أÙ٠شبÙØ© Ø®ØÙØ Ù⬠â«ØªÙÙع Ù
٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù?⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙداÙ? اÙÙصÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Øª رÙ?Ùعة اÙÙ
ستÙÙ ÙسÙاسات Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ÙÙ
ÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø±Ø±â¬â«Ø£Ù٠سÙÙÙÙ ÙÙا٠ÙظاÙ
ÙائÙ
ÙÙتض٠٠اâ¬
â«Ùز عÙ٠سÙاسات اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© باÙÙسبة Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙØاع بÙ
ا Ù⬠â«Ø¯Ø§ ÙØ£Ù ÙرÙâ¬
â«Ù
تجد Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙ
اÙ
اâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙعØÙâ¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø¹ تÙسÙع اÙØرÙÙ⬠â«Ø¹ اأÙÙÙ ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠Ù(ب) اÙتأخÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Øª Ù?Ù Ù
شرÙ⬠â«Ø© Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙÙØ© عÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«âª \.61â¬ØªØ´Ù
Ù Ù
خاØر اÙتصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙ?ÙÙâª( :â¬Ø£) غÙاب اÙÙدرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ؤÙÙÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
جا٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع⬠â«Ø³ÙتÙ
اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? Ù
٠اÙØ®Øر اأÙÙÙ Ù
٠خاÙ٠استخداÙ
Ù
ؤسسات Ùâ¬
â«Ø¯ÙÙÙØ© Ùخبر⬠â«Ø§ÙسرÙع Ù?٠جÙÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ØªØ¯Ø§Ø¨Ùر اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? Ù
٠اÙÙ
خاØرâªÙ :â¬â¬
â«Ø¹âªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øª اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° ÙاÙتصÙ
ÙÙ
⪠\.â¬ÙÙاÙت اÙÙÙاÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ?ذة Ùد بدأت⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø¯Ø¹Ù
Ù
٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯Ø§ Ù
٠اأÙÙØ´ØØ© اÙاÙزÙ
Ø© Ù?٠خاÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙت Ù
٠أج٠دعÙ
درâ¬
â«Ø§ØªÙجÙØ© اÙتÙرÙد⪠\.â¬Ø¨Ø§ÙÙسبة Ø¥Ù٠اÙØ®Øر اÙثاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù?Ù Øا٠ÙجÙد تأخÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Øª أ٠تعÙÙدات Ù?Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØÙ
ائÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙتصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙÙدس٠اأÙÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ùاستر Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø± إعداد Ùثائ٠اإÙجرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Ø¹Ù٠غرâ¬
â«Ø¡âª\.â¬â¬â«Ø¦ تØسÙ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت عÙÙ Ù
ساÙ?Ø© ⪠6â¬ÙÙ
Ù?Ù Ùذا اÙجز⬠â«Ø¹ اÙتÙسÙع⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠شأ٠خØØ© بدÙÙØ© Ø£Ù Ø®ØØ© ØÙار⬠â«Ù
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ù?⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙصÙاÙØ© ÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
اÙسرÙع Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙ
اعÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙØ¥Ùدارâ¬
â«Ø©âª Øâ¬ÙاإÙشر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤسسÙØ© عÙ٠اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° ÙااÙستداÙ
Ø© غÙاب اÙÙدرâ¬
â«Ø© أ٠اÙÙ
Ùارد⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬â«âª \.62â¬ØªØ´Ù
Ù Ù
خاØر اÙÙدرâ¬
â«Ø¬Ù
اع٠Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙ⪠\.â¬ØªØ¯Ø§Ø¨Ùر اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? Ù
٠اÙÙ
خاØر⪠:â¬Ø³ØªØ³ØªÙ?Ùد Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء⬠â«Ø£Ù٠سÙÙÙ٠أÙÙ ÙظاÙ
ÙÙ٠سرÙع Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجدÙد بÙ
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠⪠3â¬Ù
صÙØØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤسسÙØ© ÙسÙدعÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØاع Ùâ¬
â«Ù٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاص اÙترتÙبات⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø© اÙجارÙØ© اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙ⬠â«Ø³ØªÙ?ص٠اÙدرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹âª\.â¬â¬â«Ù?ÙÙØ© Ù?٠خاÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ù
Ù Ù
ساعدة Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙØ© Ø¥Ùعداد سÙاسة ÙÙ٠عاÙ
شاÙ
ÙØ© Ù
٠أج٠تغØÙØ© اأÙÙجÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø³Ù٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠Ù
٠خاÙ٠اÙتدرÙب ÙاÙÙ
ساعدة Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠دعÙ
اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø©â¬
â«ÙÙ
ؤÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
شغÙÙÙ ÙÙ?ÙئÙÙâ¬
â«Ù٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاص Ø£Ù ÙØرص عÙ٠استخداÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØاع Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¡ تÙاÙ?س٠ÙÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙتشغÙÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙاإÙدارÙâ¬
â«Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ù
٠شأ٠استخداÙ
إجر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙظاÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ùâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙ ÙاÙÙ
ستثÙ
رÙ٠اÙخاصÙÙ Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاص Ùاشرâ¬
â«Ø§Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØاع Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
تأÙÙ ÙÙ
Ø® Ùâ¬
â«ØØ Ø§Ùشر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ù
ÙÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙا Ù?Ù Ù
جا٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⪠\.â¬Ù
٠شأ٠اÙتصÙ
ÙÙ
â¬
â«Ø¹âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù
اÙÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ?ÙÙØ© Ø£Ù
ت٠ÙÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ØªÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙظاÙ
ÙصÙاÙت٠أ٠ÙضÙ
٠استداÙ
Ø© Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¥ÙئتÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.63â¬Ø§ÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«ØªÙ
تØدÙدâ¬
â«Ø© تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙتÙرÙد اÙعاÙ
⪠\.â¬Ù Ùâ¬â«Ø© اÙتÙرÙد ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار ÙÙ
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠Ù
٠أج٠تØدÙد Ùدر⬠â«Ù تÙÙÙÙ
ÙÙدر⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙرÙد⪠\.â¬Ø£Ù?جر⬠â«â¢â¬
â«Ø§Øª بشأ٠إعداد Ù
جÙ
Ùعات⬠â«Ø±Ø±â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
خاØر اÙÙ
عتدÙØ© اÙتاÙÙØ© Ù?Ù Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ارâª( :â¬Ø£) اÙتأخÙر Ù?Ù Ù
عاÙجة اÙتÙرÙد ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°ÙØ Ù(ب) اÙتأخÙر Ù?٠اتخاذ اÙ٠اâ¬
â«Ø⬠â«Ø© اÙعÙÙد⪠\.â¬ØªÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ùتر⬠â«Ø§Ø¬ عرÙØ¶Ø Ù(Ù) إدار⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙÙØ© ÙÙØ«ÙÙØ© استدرâ¬
â«Ø§Øªâª Øâ¬Ø¥Ùخ⪠\.â¬ÙدÙ
جÙØ§Ø Ù(د) إعداد اÙÙ
ÙاصÙ?ات Ùâ¬
â«Ø²Ø±â¬â«Ù⪠Øâ¬Ù٠ا⬠â«Ø§ÙعÙÙØ¯Ø Ù(ج) اÙتÙسÙÙ Ù
ع جÙات Ùâ¬
â«Ù
عÙÙØ© أخرâ¬
â«ÙØ© Ù
جÙ
Ùعات اÙعÙÙد Ù
Ù⬠â«Ù
ÙØÙÙØ©Ø Ù(ب) جÙÙزÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتدابÙر اÙتاÙÙØ© Ù
٠أج٠اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? Ù
٠اÙÙ
خاØرâª( :â¬Ø£) Ùضع خارØØ© ÙÙ
عاÙجة اÙتÙرÙد Ù
٠أج٠تØÙÙÙ ÙÙ?اءةâ¬
â«Ø§Ù? اÙÙ
ÙداÙÙ Ù
٠أج٠رصدâ¬â«ÙÙÙ ÙØ¥Ùشر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ?اعÙÙØ©Ø Ù(د) تعÙÙ٠استشارÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¬ اÙعرÙض بØسب⬠â«Ø®Ø§Ù٠اÙتÙÙÙع عÙ٠اتÙ?ا٠عÙØ¯Ø Ù(ج) إعداد Ø£ÙÙÙ Ùثائ٠استدرâ¬
â«ÙتÙ
اÙترâ¬
â«Ø§Ø⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØاع Ùâ¬
â«Ù٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاصâªÙ \.â¬â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø© عÙÙد اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Øª Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠ÙاÙÙ
خاØر Ù
رتبØØ© بإدار⬠â«Ø§ÙعÙÙد⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ÙتÙ
بعد إثبات Ùدرâ¬
â«Ø© اÙتدرÙب ذ٠اÙصÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ùادار⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠⪠Ø3â¬ÙتØسÙÙ Ù
Ùارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙÙ
Ùارد اÙبشرÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«ØªØ¯Ø§Ø¨Ùر اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? Ù
٠اÙÙ
خاØر Ù
٠أج٠تأÙ
Ù٠دعÙ
Ù?ÙÙ Ù
ÙØ«â¬
â«ÙÙ? Ù
٠خاÙÙâ¬
â«âªPage 39 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«ÙÙ?Ø©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙØ«â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùظر Ø¥Ù٠تجربة Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار ÙتصÙÙÙ?ات٠ÙØ¥Ùدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«ÙتÙ
تØدÙد Ù
خاØر Ù
ÙØÙظة Ùا⬠â«Ø£Ùضا ÙÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù
اÙÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ø© Ù⬠â«Ù تÙÙÙÙ
إدارâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙة⪠\.â¬Ø£Ù?جرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¥Ùدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«â¢â¬
â«Ø¹ اÙذ٠سÙÙÙÙ?Ø°Ù Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙذا اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ© ÙØ¥Ùدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
رضÙØ© بشÙ٠عاÙ
Ù?٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شارÙع اÙت٠Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ
ÙÙÙا اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙÙ
خاØر⬠â«ÙÙ?â¬
â«Ø¹ Ù
ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¹Ùد ØÙØ« تÙ?شارÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙâ¬
â«ØØ¯Ø¯Ø Ù(ج) Ù
شر٠Ù?⬠â«Ø§Øª Ù?٠تÙدÙÙ
تÙارÙر تدÙÙÙ Ù?٠اÙÙÙت Ù?⬠â«ÙاإÙعÙ
ار ÙÙâª( :â¬Ø£) غÙاب سج٠Ù
اÙئÙ
ÙÙÙائÙ
اأÙصÙÙØ Ù(ب) اÙتأخÙرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙ ÙاÙشرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø© اÙÙÙÙ ÙاأÙشغا٠اÙعاÙ
Ø© ÙÙÙØÙ٠عÙÙ Ù
ساÙÙ
ات Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ø²Ø±â¬â«Ø§Ø± Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠Ù٠اâ¬â«Ù عدÙدة⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠غرâ¬â«ÙÙااÙت أخرâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ù
٠أج٠دعÙ
⬠â«Ù
اÙÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ؤÙ٠ضÙ
Ù ÙØدة تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø© Ù⬠â«Ø¸Ù? إدارâ¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? Ù
Ù Ùذ٠اÙÙ
خاØر Ù
٠خاÙÙ (Ø£) استخداÙ
Ù
Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاصâªÙ \.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙØاع Ùâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ختÙÙ?Ø©Ø Ù(ب) تشغÙÙ ÙØدة أصÙ٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
Øاسبة اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ارØâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
Ø«Ù Ùذ٠اأÙÙØ´ØØ© ÙتأÙ
Ù٠اÙتÙسÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
ا بÙ٠اÙجÙاتâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ù
٠أج٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠ااÙÙ
تثا٠اÙÙ
ستÙ
ر ÙÙتدÙÙÙØ Ù(د) Ù?ص٠اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§Ø٠اأÙÙÙÙ ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ Ù?٠اÙÙ
رâ¬
â«ÙÙا Ù
ÙبÙâ¬
â«Ø¬Ù⬠â«ÙÙâ¬
â«Ùا خار⬠â«Ù(ج) استخداÙ
Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ù
دÙâ¬
â«Ù٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاص Ùâ¬
â«ÙØ¢ÙÙاتÙاâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙØاع Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ Ù
٠أج٠عÙس اÙعاÙÙات Ù?Ù Ù
ا بÙ٠اÙÙÙااÙت⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠ترتÙبات اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙدÙÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø© ÙÙ
ؤÙتة⪠Øâ¬ÙبشÙ٠خاص Ù?٠خاÙÙ Ù
رØÙØ© اÙبÙاء⪠\.â¬ÙØ´Ù
Ù Ø°Ù٠تÙÙÙد⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙبÙØ© Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ستبÙØ© Ø£ÙÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
شارÙع ØÙ?ÙÙ? Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± اآÙثار Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙئÙة⬠â«âª \.64â¬Ø§ÙØ®Øر اÙبÙئ٠ÙااÙجتÙ
اعÙ⪠\.â¬ØªÙ? Ùâ¬
â«ÙضجÙجاâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª ÙبÙرâ¬
â«Ø© ÙاÙبعثات⬠â«Ø§Ùغبار ÙاÙضجÙج Ù?٠خاÙ٠اÙبÙاء⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥ÙÙ ÙÙ?اÙات اÙبÙاء ÙØØاÙ
Ùا⪠\.â¬Ø³ØªÙÙÙد اأÙشغا٠اÙجارÙØ© ÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
Ùاد Ù?٠خاÙ٠اÙبÙاء تأخÙرâ¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«Ù٠ع٠اÙÙ
ÙÙع Ù?٠خاÙÙ Ù
رØÙة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙاشئ Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø© اÙبÙئة تدابÙر Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙØد Ù
٠اÙغبار ÙاÙضجÙج⬠â«Ø¥Ø¶Ø§Ù?Ùا تÙتض٠خØØ© سÙر Ù
اÙئÙ
Ø© Ù?٠خاÙ٠اÙبÙاء⪠\.â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ØªØ³ØªØ®Ø¯Ù
Ø®ØØ© إدارâ¬
â«ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø©âª \.â¬ØªÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø±â¬ â«Ù
Ù?ص٠Ù?Ù Øا٠ÙاجÙت اأÙشغا٠Ù?٠اأÙرض أ٠اÙتشاÙ?ات أثرÙâ¬
â«ÙØ© بارز⬠â«Ø§Øª ÙاÙÙ
شاة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠برÙتÙÙÙÙ ÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙاء⪠Øâ¬ÙتدابÙر اÙساÙÙ
Ø© ÙØÙ
اÙØ© ØرÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙارâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ØتÙ
Ù Ù
٠اÙÙ
ساØة⬠â«Ù
شغÙ٠اÙباصاتâª/â¬Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
اÙÙائÙ
ÙÙ ÙاÙعداÙ
رضا اÙرâ¬
â«Ø£Ù اÙعاÙ
Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØتÙ
ÙØ© Ù
Ù Ùب٠Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© Ù
رتبØØ© بشÙ٠أساس٠باÙÙ
عارضة Ù?â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«Ø¹âªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«ÙتÙ
اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ?⬠â«Ø§Ø¶Ù ضÙ
Ù Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø¥Ø¶Ø§Ù?ÙØ© Ù
٠استÙ
اÙ٠اأÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¬ØªÙ
اعÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø© اÙتاÙÙة⪠\.â¬Ø«Ù
Ø© Ù
خاØرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù?صÙØ© Ù?٠اÙÙ?Ùرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª ÙاÙÙ
ÙاÙÙ? Ù?٠اÙشارâ¬
â«Ø¹âªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙÙصة ÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙسÙارâ¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙا Ù
٠خاÙ٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠استÙ
اÙ٠اأÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶Ù Ù
٠اÙÙرضâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØتÙ
٠بسبب اÙÙ
ساØØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙÙصة ÙÙ
سارâ¬
â«Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Ù
شغÙ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
âª/â¬Ø§Ùباصات اÙÙائÙ
Ø© ÙاÙعداÙ
رضا اÙرâ¬
â«Ø£Ù اÙعاÙ
Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙÙØ© ااÙÙ
عارضة اÙÙ
ØتÙ
ÙØ© Ù
Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.65â¬ÙØ´Ù
Ù Ø®Øر اÙجÙاتâ¬
â«ØºØ§ÙبÙØ© اÙدÙ٠عبر اÙعاÙÙ
âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª Ù?٠اÙشارâ¬
â«Ø¹âª \.â¬ØªØ¯Ø¨Ùر اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? Ù
٠اÙÙ
خاØر⪠:â¬Ø§ÙØ®Øر اأÙÙ٠شائع باÙÙسبة Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
شارÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاصاÙØات٠Ù?Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª ÙÙ
ÙاÙÙ? اÙسÙارâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ Ù
Ù Øصة اÙسÙ٠اÙÙ
تزâ¬
â«Ø§Ùد ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ø£Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø£ÙÙ ÙØ«Ùر اÙÙ
ÙاÙ?سة عÙ٠أÙ
د ÙصÙرâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«ÙÙÙÙÙ
⪠Øâ¬Ù?Ù ÙÙاÙØ© اÙÙ
ØاÙ?⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙستÙ?Ùد٠Ù
ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³Ù Ù⬠â«Ø¹ عÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùد Ùعتبرâ¬
â«Ù٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاص⪠Øâ¬Ù?Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¢ÙÙÙات ÙاÙØÙاÙ?ز Ù
Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØاع Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øª ØÙ٠اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙ⬠â«Ù
٠دÙ
جÙÙ
اÙتدرÙج٠Ù?٠اÙÙظاÙ
اÙجدÙد⪠\.â¬ÙتÙظر اÙدرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øª اÙجارÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠اÙدرâ¬
â«Ø®ØµØ©â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙ٠اÙجدد (استئجار اÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙ٠اÙÙائÙ
ÙÙ Ù
Ù ÙبÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¡ Ù
٠خاÙ٠استخداÙ
اÙسائÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù اÙ
تصاص⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙÙÙÙ Ù?٠اÙÙظاÙ
اÙجدÙد⪠Øâ¬Ø³Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£Ø¬Ù دÙ
جâ¬
â«Ù
شابÙØ© Ù?Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙ٠اÙÙائÙ
ÙÙ Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙ٠اÙجدد Ùدر اإÙÙ
ÙاÙ⪠\.â¬Ø¨Ø§ÙÙسبة Ø¥Ù٠اÙØ®Øر اÙثاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ø«Ø¨ØªØª Ù
شارÙع Ù?⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØ©)⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù تÙاÙ
٠اÙخدÙ
ات بÙÙ⬠â«Ø£Ù شرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¤Ùا⪠Øâ¬ØªØ±ØªÙبات اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙعاÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Øâ¬â«Ø¹ ØÙ
اÙت تÙاص٠Ù
٠أج٠شر⬠â«Ø³ÙÙ
Ù٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø±Ù اÙعاÙ
âªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø©âª Øâ¬ÙاÙØÙاة اÙØضرÙâ¬
â«Ùة⪠\.â¬Ù
٠أج٠تÙعÙØ© ا٠أ⬠â«Ø¹ Ù
ÙØÙظة ÙÙÙ
ÙاØÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙتجارâ¬â«ØºØ§ÙبÙØ© اÙÙ
د٠Ù
ÙاÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ù اÙÙ
ÙاØÙ ÙاÙتÙاص٠اÙÙ
اÙئÙ
Ø© Ù?٠خاÙÙ Ù
رâ¬
â«Ø§ØÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙتØÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙÙ
Ø Ø§Ø³ØªØ®Ø¯Ø§Ù
Ùسائ٠اÙÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙضÙ
ا٠أÙØ´ØØ© إشرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ ÙÙ
Ùزâ¬
â«Ø§ØªÙ ÙتشجÙع⬠â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬ÙتسÙÙÙ Ù
ÙاÙ?ع اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ اÙÙ
ختÙÙ?Ø©âª\.â¬â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø³Ø§Ø¯Ø³Ø§ â Ù
Ùجز اÙتÙÙÙÙ
â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙ? â اÙتØÙÙ٠ااÙÙتصاد٠ÙاÙÙ
اÙÙ (Øسب ااÙÙتضاء)â¬
â«âªPage 40 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتØÙÙ٠ااÙÙتصادÙâ¬
â«Ø¹âª \.â¬Ø´Ù
٠اÙتÙÙÙÙ
ااÙÙتصادÙâ¬â«Ù ÙÙتÙاÙÙÙ? ÙاÙÙ
ÙاÙ?ع Ù?Ù ÙØاع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù
٠أج٠تÙÙÙÙ
اأÙثر ااÙÙتصاد٠ÙÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«âªÙ \.66â¬â¬
â«ØªÙ
استخداÙ
تØÙÙÙ Ù
عÙارâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصادÙØ© بشÙ٠أساس٠Ù
Ù ØÙØ« تÙÙÙص Ù?ترâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠تÙاÙÙÙ? اÙتشغÙÙ ÙاÙصÙاÙØ© Ù
ع اØتساب اÙÙ
ÙاÙ?ع⬠â«Ø§Øª اÙر Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ø³Ù
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙستثÙ
ارâ¬
â«ÙÙعÙØ© اÙÙÙاء⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙساÙÙ
ة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙعÙارâ¬
â«Ø§ØªâªØâ¬â¬ â«ØªØس٠Ùâ¬â«Ø§Ø± Ù⬠â«Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠غرâ¬â«Ø§ÙتصادÙØ© جÙÙرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتÙا٠ÙتخÙ?Ùض تÙاÙÙÙ? تشغÙ٠اÙÙ
رÙبات⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ÙتÙ
اØتساب Ù
ÙاÙ?عâ¬
â«Ùعات بشأ٠ØÙب⬠â«ØªÙ
إعداد تÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
ØاÙاة اÙتÙاÙÙÙ? ÙاÙÙ
ÙاÙ?عâªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«Ù
تØÙÙ?ظة ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¬Ø¯Ø§âª \.â¬Ù
٠أج٠Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Øتسبة Ù?â¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصادÙØ© Ù?â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙÙتاجÙة⪠\.â¬ÙباÙتاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ØªÙ?عتÙâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø± اÙÙ
ÙاÙ?ع⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙزÙادةâ¬
â«Ù⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ø§ÙÙداع⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙداÙÙØ© (اÙÙتÙرâ¬
â«Ø© ÙااÙÙشغا٠اÙبصر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙستÙصائÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙرÙاب عÙ٠أساس بÙاÙات ØÙب ااÙÙتÙا٠اÙÙ
جÙ
Ùعة Ù
٠خاÙ٠سÙسÙØ© Ù
٠اÙدرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙ
اÙØصÙÙ⬠â«ÙاÙصعÙد ÙاÙتخØÙØ⪠Øâ¬ÙاØتساب ØرÙØ© اÙسÙر) Ù
٠أج٠تÙدÙر أرÙاÙ
اÙÙ
Ùشأâª/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
Ùصد بÙاسØØ© أداة Ù
ØاÙاة ØرÙØ© اÙسÙر "Ø¥ÙÙ
Ù" âªÙ \.EMMEâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø³Ø¯Ø¯Ø© (ااÙÙتظار Ù?Ù⬠â«Ø© برسÙÙ
اÙعبÙر Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙÙÙ Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙÙات أ٠اÙتÙاÙÙÙ?⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùت٠تÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± Ù
رتبØØ© Ù?٠اأÙÙÙات ÙاÙ? Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ÙÙ Ùتائج تØدÙد اÙÙÙ
اذج عÙ٠أساسâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øª اÙجارÙØ©â¬â«Ù⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠أساس اÙدر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
رÙبة⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙÙÙ?اذ Ø¥Ù٠اÙشبÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙااÙÙتÙاÙ)⪠\.â¬ØªØªÙ
اش٠اأÙسعار اÙÙ
ÙترØØ© Ù
ع اÙرسÙÙ
اÙÙائÙ
Ø© Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبرâ¬
â«ÙÙ?ترض أ٠تÙÙ٠بÙ٠اÙرسÙÙ
ÙائÙ
Ø© عÙ٠اÙÙ
ساÙ?Ø©âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙØ© ÙÙدÙ?ع⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ?⬠â«ÙÙتÙ?ضÙاÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø¹ ÙتÙاÙÙÙ?Ùâª\.â¬â¬ â«Øª Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± Ù
تÙÙØ© Ù?Ù Ùج٠اÙتÙÙÙبات Ù?Ù Ù
ÙاÙ?ع اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù
تعددة Ù?â¬
â«ÙÙÙØ© ضÙ
٠سÙÙارÙÙÙات Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتصادÙØ© صاÙ?ÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªØ¸Ùر Ùتائج اÙتØÙÙÙ Ù
ÙاÙ?ع⬠â«âªÙ? \.67â¬â¬
â«Ù
ؤخ Ùاâ¬
â«Ø± ÙاÙت٠تÙ?ظÙر⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø© اÙجدÙ٠اÙت٠Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙ
تÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙÙا Ù⬠â«ÙتÙ
تØدÙØ«Ùا بÙاسØØ© Øسابات در⬠â«Ù
ØاÙ?ظة عÙ٠أساس جدÙÙ Ù?â¬
â«Ù
سبÙØ©âªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø§Øª Ù?⬠â«ØªÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± اÙÙتائج اÙتاÙÙØ© تÙدÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ùبâ¬â«ØªÙÙع Ø£Ù ÙستخدÙ
ØÙاÙ٠⪠132â¬Ø£ÙÙ? ر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ Ù?Ù Ùسائ٠اÙÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙعÙ٠أساس تØÙÙ٠اÙجدÙ٠اÙÙ
سبÙØ© اÙÙ
ØاÙ?ظ⪠Øâ¬Ù ÙÙâ¬
â«ÙتØÙâ¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Ù?⬠â«Ø§Ø±ØªÙ?اع اÙØÙب عÙÙ ØرÙØ© اÙسÙر Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙÙع Ø£Ù ÙرتÙ?ع اÙØÙب عÙ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت بÙسبة ⪠4â¬Ù?Ù⬠â«ÙÙا⪠12400 Øâ¬Ù
ÙÙÙ
Ù?٠ساعات اÙذرÙØ© اÙصباØÙة⪠\.â¬Ù ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù Ù?â¬
â«Ø¹Ø§Ù
ا⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ ÙتجاÙز⬠â«ÙÙا⪠\.â¬Ù ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ ÙÙâªÙ 20â¬â¬ â«Ù
دة ØÙاة Ù
شرÙ⬠â«Ù ⪠39â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة ÙعÙÙ Ù
د٠Ùâ¬â«Ø¹Ø¯Ù عائد داخÙ٠اÙتصاد٠Ùدر⬠â«Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ù?⬠â«Ø³Ø¬Ù اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù Ùâ¬â«ÙتÙÙع Ø£Ù Ù?â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
ئة سÙÙÙ Ù?â¬
â«Ø© عÙ٠أساس⬠â«Ø¨Ù
عد٠⪠8â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة⪠\.â¬ÙتÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± اÙÙتائج Ù
تÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ù
عد٠اÙØسÙ
بÙ⪠8â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة⪠\.â¬ØªÙ? ÙÙâ¬
â«Ùدر اÙÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙØاÙÙØ© اÙصاÙ?ÙØ© بÙ⪠919â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙ⬠â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø© Ùâ¬
â«Ù
عا⪠\.â¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ø£Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙØ«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ اÙÙ
ÙاÙ?ع بÙ⪠25â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة⪠Øâ¬Ù Ùâ¬â«Ù عÙ٠أساس ارتÙ?اع اÙÙÙÙ?Ø© بÙ⪠25â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة⪠Øâ¬Ùترâ¬â«ØساسÙØ© تÙ?جرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øªâ¬â«Ø§Ø¶Ø§Øª Ù
ختÙÙ?Ø© Ù
ع اختبار⬠â«Ø§Ù?ترâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصادÙØ© بشÙ٠أÙبر عÙد أخذ ÙÙÙ?Ø© اÙÙربÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª اÙدÙ?Ùئة بشÙÙ Ù
ÙØÙظâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«ÙتÙ
تØسÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙاÙ?ع⬠â«Ø Ùâ¬
â«ÙØد Ù
٠اÙبعاثات غاز⬠â«Ø¹ اÙÙ
Ùترâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶ÙØ© Ù
ÙØ®Ù?ضة Ø£Ù Ù
رتÙ?عة ÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙربÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¨Ø¹Ù٠ااÙعتبار⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع أسعار اÙ?تر Ùâ¬
â«âªPage 41 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصادÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØساسÙØ© ÙاÙتØاÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙجدÙ٠⪠:4â¬Ø§Ø®ØªØ¨Ø§Ø±â¬
â«Ø§Øªâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶Ù Ù
رتÙ?ع ÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙربÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
ع سعر اÙ?تر⬠â«Ù
تد٠ÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙربÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶Ù Ùâ¬â«Ù
ع سعر اÙ?تر⬠â«Ù
٠دÙ٠سعر اÙ?ترâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶Ù ÙÙÙربÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙØاÙÙة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙØاÙÙة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙØاÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù
عد٠اÙعائدâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
عدÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
عدÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙصاÙ?ÙØ© (Ù
ÙÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙصاÙ?ÙØ© (Ù
ÙÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙصاÙ?ÙØ© (Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دâª\.â¬Ø£)â¬
â«Ø§ÙداخÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ùعائد⬠â«Ø§Ùعائدâ¬
â«Ø¯âª\.â¬Ø£)⬠â«Ø¯âª\.â¬Ø£)â¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصادÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙداخÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙداخÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصادÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصادÙâ¬
â«âª968â¬â¬ â«âª40\.1%â¬â¬ â«âª944â¬â¬ â«âª39\.4%â¬â¬ â«âª919â¬â¬ â«âª38\.7%â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙتائجâ¬
â«âª811â¬â¬ â«âª30\.4%â¬â¬ â«âª787â¬â¬ â«âª29\.8%â¬â¬ â«âª762â¬â¬ â«âª29\.2%â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙØساسÙة⪠:â¬Ø§ÙÙÙÙ?Ø© âª%25 +â¬â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âª645â¬â¬ â«âª36\.9%â¬â¬ â«âª621â¬â¬ â«âª35\.9%â¬â¬ â«âª597â¬â¬ â«âª34\.9%â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙØساسÙة⪠:â¬Ø§ÙÙ
ÙاÙ?ع âª%25 -â¬â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØساسÙة⪠:â¬Ø§ÙÙÙÙ?Ø© âª%25 +â¬â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âª424â¬â¬ â«âª20\.5%â¬â¬ â«âª400â¬â¬ â«âª19\.8%â¬â¬ â«âª376â¬â¬ â«âª19\.2%â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙاÙ?ع â âª%25â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصادÙØ© ÙزØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتصادÙØ© اÙÙÙÙ?Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙخارجÙØ© ÙاآÙثار اÙÙ
اÙرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øª اÙÙ
ختÙÙ?Ø© اÙت٠Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙÙÙ
اÙعÙاÙ
Ù⬠â«ØªÙدر اÙدرâ¬
â«âª \.68â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«ØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر Ù?Ùâ¬â«Ø© اÙبÙئة Ù?٠اÙعاÙ
⪠2005â¬ÙÙÙ?Ø© زâ¬â«Ø²Ø±â¬â«Ø§ÙتصادÙØ© Ù٠ا⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø©â¬
â«Ùدرت در⬠â«Ù بÙ٠⪠5â¬Ù⪠10â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
٠إجÙ
اÙ٠اÙÙاتج اÙÙ
ØÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙâªÙ \.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙبرâ¬
â«âª18â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù?â¬
â«ÙتÙÙÙÙ
اÙعاÙ
٠اÙخارج٠ااÙÙتصادÙ⬠â«Ù اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø±â¬
â«Ù
ؤخ Ùاâ¬â«Ø¯Ø±â¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø©âª19â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
د٠Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠بØÙاÙ٠⪠10-8â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
٠إجÙ
اÙ٠اÙÙاتج اÙÙ
ØÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا أجرâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø®Ø§Ø±Ø¬ÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ÙÙ
Ø©âªØâ¬â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øªâª \.â¬ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ÙتÙ
أخذ عÙاÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصادÙØ© ÙÙعÙارâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع اÙÙظر بشÙ٠أساس٠Ù?Ù ÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙÙÙت ÙاÙتÙاÙÙÙ?⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبرâ¬
â«ÙزØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§Ø¶Ø§ØªâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø³Ø©âª \.â¬ÙعÙ٠أساس Ùذ٠ااÙÙ?تر⬠â«Ø¥ÙتاجÙØ© اÙعÙ
Ùâª/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
ؤسسات بعÙ٠ااÙعتبار Ù?Ù Ùذ٠اÙدرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙ
صداÙÙØ© اÙرØÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
Ùاسبâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø± Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙعÙØ© اÙÙÙاءâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ù٠غرâ¬
â«Ù بØÙاÙ٠⪠2-1â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
٠إجÙ
اÙ٠اÙÙاتج اÙÙ
ØÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ø¹Ùد تعÙ
ÙÙ
⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصادÙØ© ÙزØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبر⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙ
ت درâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø© اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠اÙÙÙÙ?ة⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¥ÙتاجÙØ© أدÙÙ) ÙÙ
ا Ù٠اÙØا٠باÙÙسبة Ø¥Ù٠تØاÙÙ٠شبÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«(ÙÙعÙØ© اÙÙÙاء اÙسÙئة⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙØÙادثâªØâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?ÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¬ÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصادÙØ© عÙ٠اÙعÙاÙ
٠اÙخار Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙاÙÙÙ?â¬
â«Ù ØÙاÙ٠⪠5â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
٠إجÙ
اÙ٠اÙÙاتج اÙÙ
ØÙÙ Ù?Ù⬠â«Ø© ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ØªÙÙÙ ÙÙÙ?Ø© زØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبر⬠â«Ù⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙÙ
ا اÙÙاÙر⬠â«Ø£Ù?جرÙت ÙÙ
د٠أخرâ¬
â«âª20â¬â¬
â«ÙبÙاÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتصادÙØ© ÙتدابÙر سÙاسة اÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
ختÙÙ?Ø© أ٠زØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر Ù?٠بÙرÙت Ù٠بشÙ٠أساس٠ÙتÙجة عرض ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
ÙÙد⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع تدابÙر ÙÙ٠عاÙ
⬠â«Ù⬠â«âªÙ? \.69â¬â¬
â«ØªØ¸Ùر اÙÙ
ØاÙاة اÙÙ
اÙرÙâ¬
â«ÙØ© بشأ٠Ùâ¬
â«ØªØºÙر اÙÙ
Ùاخâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø²Ø±â¬
â«Ø© اÙبÙئة⪠\.2011 Øâ¬Ø¨Ùا٠ÙبÙا٠اÙÙØÙ٠اÙثاÙ٠إÙ٠اتÙ?اÙÙØ© اأÙÙ
Ù
اÙÙ
تØدة اإÙØارÙ⬠â«âª 18â¬Ù اâ¬
â«Øددة⪠"\.â¬ÙرÙØ© عÙ
Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¨ØØ«ÙØ© ÙÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ âª\.8158â¬â¬ â«Ù
Ùâ¬â«Ø§Øª سÙاسات Ù?⬠â«âª 19â¬Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâª" \.2017 \.â¬ØªÙÙÙص زØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙ⪠:â¬ØªØÙÙ٠تجرÙب٠ÙØ®Ùارâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø© ØÙ٠زØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر Ù?٠اÙÙاÙرâ¬
â«Ø©âª\.â¬â¬ â«âª 20â¬Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâª" \.2014 \.â¬Ø¯Ø±â¬
â«âªPage 42 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«ÙتصادÙØ© اأÙÙسع Ø£ÙدÙات جÙØ© اÙØÙبâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø©âª Øâ¬Ø¨Ø´ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙ
⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ø¢Ùثار اÙÙ
اÙر٠ا⬠â«Ø§ÙخارجÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ø®ØªØ¨Ø±Øª اÙدرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙتصادÙة⪠\.â¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
ØاÙاة تÙاÙÙÙ? اÙعÙاÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªÙÙÙد أعÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙاÙ?ع ااÙâ¬
â«Ø¢ÙÙات تسعÙر Ù
ختÙÙ?ة⪠Øâ¬Ù
ث٠رسÙÙ
اÙÙ
رÙر⪠Øâ¬ÙزÙادة أسعار اÙÙÙÙد⪠Øâ¬ÙزÙادة تسعÙرâ¬
â«Ø© اÙÙ
ÙاÙÙ?⪠Øâ¬Ø¨ÙÙÙ
ا تشÙ
٠أدÙات جÙة⬠â«Ù
Ø¹Ø§Ø ØªØ´Ù
٠أدÙات جÙØ© اÙØÙب Ù⬠â«ÙجÙØ© اÙعرض Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ØدÙدا⪠\.â¬ÙÙ٠اأÙدÙات جÙØ© اÙعرضâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙرâ¬â«Ø§Ùعرض تÙسÙع شبÙØ© اÙØرÙات ÙاعتÙ
اد شبÙØ© ÙÙ٠عاÙ
⪠\.â¬ÙعÙد اÙÙ
ØاÙاة⪠Øâ¬Ùا٠أثر اأÙدÙات جÙØ© اÙØÙب عÙ٠تخÙ?ÙÙ? زâ¬
â«Ø (اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Ù
ع خدÙ
ات ÙÙÙ Ù
غذÙØ©)â¬â«Ø¹ اÙÙ
Ùترâ¬â«Ø§Ø³Ø© أ٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø£ÙÙ
بÙØ«Ùر⪠Øâ¬Ø¥Ø° Ù?â¬
â«ÙظÙر ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
أعÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙØ§Ø³Ø¨Ø ÙÙ
ا أظÙرت اÙدر⬠â«Ø£Ø¸Ùرت Ù
Ùاسب Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙبÙØ© Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
ا بÙ٠⪠0\.5â¬Ù⪠1â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئةâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¬Ùة⬠â«Ù
Ù
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ùؤد٠إÙ٠تÙÙÙص اÙعÙاÙ
٠اÙخار Ù⬠â«ÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«ØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر بÙسبة ⪠16â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبر⬠â«Ù
٠شأÙ٠أ٠ÙÙÙÙص زâ¬
â«Ù
تÙسØâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù
Ù
ا ÙزÙد بشÙÙ ÙبÙر Ù
٠اÙرÙ?اÙ⬠â«ØÙØ© بشÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø¨Ø§Ø¯Ø®Ø§Ø± ⪠24â¬Ø¯ÙÙÙØ© Ù?Ù Ù٠ر⬠â«Ù
٠إجÙ
اÙ٠اÙÙاتج اÙÙ
ØÙ٠اÙÙØÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا أظÙر اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙ ÙسÙ
Ø ÙÙÙ
ستخدÙ
ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اع٠ÙÙÙ?رد اÙÙاØدâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Øتساب اÙبعاثات غازâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙدÙ?Ùئةâ¬
â«Øصة اأÙسد⪠\.â¬ÙÙبÙا٠Ùâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠استخداÙ
⬠â«Ø§Øª اÙدÙ?Ùئة اÙعاÙ
Ø© Ù?Ù ÙبÙا٠Ù
رتÙ?عة⪠Øâ¬Ø¥Ø° Ùâ¬
â«ØªØ´Ù٠اÙÙ
رÙبات اÙخاصة Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØاÙÙØ© ÙÙØاع اÙÙÙÙ Ù?٠اÙبعاثات غازâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.70â¬ØªÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± اÙÙ
ساÙÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙدÙ?Ùئة⬠â«Ù بÙ⪠80-70â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة ⪠\.â¬ØªÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø´Ù٠اÙبعاثات غاز⬠â«Ø§Øª اÙرÙاب Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبر⬠â«Ùدر Øصة سÙار⬠â«Ù
رÙبات Ù
رتÙ?ع ÙبÙغ ⪠400â¬Ù
رÙبة ÙÙ٠⪠1000â¬ÙسÙ
Ø© ÙتÙ? Ùâ¬
â«âª21â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙØÙÙØ© ÙÙد ارتÙ?عت بÙسبة ⪠3\.7â¬Ù
ÙØ° اÙعاÙ
⪠Ø1994â¬Ø¥Ø° تÙ?ساÙÙ
اÙسÙارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙخاصة بÙ⪠58â¬Ù?Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ اÙبعاثات غازâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙدÙ?Ùئة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙاجÙ
Ø© ع٠اÙÙÙ٠⪠23\.6â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
Ù Ù
جÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ئة Ù
Ù Ùذا اÙرÙÙ
âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø© Ù
ع Ù
شارÙع شبÙÙØ© Ù٠عاÙÙ
ÙاâªÙ Øâ¬Ø§â¬
â«Ùظر Ø¥ÙÙ Ùدرت٠اÙعاÙÙØ© عÙ٠استبدا٠ÙسائÙ⬠â«Ø§Øª اÙدÙ?Ùئة بشÙ٠ا٠Ù
Ø«ÙÙ ÙÙ Ù
Ùار٠Ùâ¬â«Ø¹ اÙÙ
ÙØªØ±Ø Ù
٠اÙبعاثات غاز⬠â«âªÙ \.71â¬â¬
â«ÙØد اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ عÙ٠ا٠Ùâ¬
â«ØªØÙÙ⬠â«Ùع ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± اأÙثر اÙÙ
تÙÙâ¬
â«Ù Ù⬠â«Ø¹ اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
اأÙÙÙ ÙاÙÙØÙد Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙâªÙ? Øâ¬â¬â«Ø§ÙجÙ
اع٠ÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ ÙااÙبتعاد ع٠اÙÙ
رÙبات اÙخاصة⪠\.â¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙ ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع Ùâ¬
â«ÙØÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø© ÙØ٠استر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ØªÙجÙة⬠â«Ø£Ø³Ø§Ø³Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø®ØÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Øâ¬â«Ø¹ اÙÙ
Ùترâ¬â«Ù٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«ÙÙا⪠\.â¬ÙباÙتاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙØ´ Ù⬠â«ÙÙا ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¬Ø¯Ø§ ÙسبÙ⬠â«ÙجاذبÙت٠ÙÙ
ستخدÙ
٠اÙÙ
رÙبات اÙخاصة عاÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù?Ù ÙÙ
Ø Ø§Ø³ØªØ®Ø¯Ø§Ù
Ùسائ٠اÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø³ÙتØÙ٠⪠16â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
Ù Ù
ستخدÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Øª Ùضع اÙÙÙ
اذجâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø§Øª اÙدÙ?Ùئة⪠\.â¬ÙبØسب تÙدÙر⬠â«Ø© ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¬Ø¯Ø§ ÙتÙÙÙص اÙبعاثات غاز⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبعاثات Ù
ÙØ®Ù?ضة Ù
٠أج٠ÙبÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع Ùدرâ¬
â«Ø© ÙبÙرâ¬
â«Ø© Ù?٠اÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙاØد⪠\.â¬ÙسÙØ´ Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Øª Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙظاÙ
اÙجدÙد⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø´Ù٠خاص ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù
Ù
ا ÙÙÙÙص ØرÙØ© اÙسÙر اÙÙ
ختÙØØ© بأÙثر Ù
٠⪠45000â¬Ø³Ùار⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙارâ¬
â«Ø§ÙصباØÙØ© عÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª Ù
٠⪠84â¬Ø¥Ù٠⪠70â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù?٠ساعات اÙذرÙة⬠â«Ø§Ø¢ÙÙÙØ© اÙعاÙ
Ø© بÙÙÙ
ا ستÙØ®Ù?ض Ùâ¬
â«Øصة اÙسÙار⬠â«ØاÙت Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ⪠23â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
٠اÙرâ¬
â«ØªØ¯Ø®Ø§Ùتâ¬
â«Ø© Ù
Ù Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùدرâ¬
â«Ù٠اÙÙائÙ
ة⪠Øâ¬ÙاآÙثار Ùâ¬â«Ø¬Ù
عة ÙØرÙØ© اÙسÙر⪠Øâ¬ÙشرÙØ Ø§ÙتÙÙ⬠â«Ùدر اÙبعاثات ثاÙ٠أÙسÙد اÙÙربÙ٠عÙ٠أساس اÙترÙÙبة Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙØرÙ٠اÙسرÙع اÙØ´Ù
اÙÙ⪠\.â¬ØªÙ? ÙÙâ¬
â«ØªØÙÙت Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙعâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙدÙ?Ùئة اÙÙ
رتبØØ© بااÙÙبعاثات Ù
Ù Ù
رÙبات اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
اÙت٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Øª غازâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¯Ø®Ø±â¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙدÙ?Ùئة Ù
Ù (Ø£) Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª اÙبعاثات غاز⬠â«Ø§Ø¯Ø®Ø§Ø±â¬ â«Ø¹âª \.â¬ØªÙ? ÙÙâ¬
â«Ùدر Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§Øª âª1200000â¬â¬ â«Ø¹ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§Ùدخار⬠â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø´ÙÙ Ù
جÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø§ØªâªÙ? \.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙسÙارâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتØÙ٠ع٠استخداÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª غازâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙدÙ?Ùئة اÙÙ
رتبØØ© باÙتغÙÙر Ù?Ù ÙÙ
Ø Ø§Ø³ØªØ®Ø¯Ø§Ù
Ùسائ٠اÙÙÙÙ Ù Ù⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙت Ù(ب) Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¯Ø®Ø§Ø±â¬
â«Ø¹ Ù
ع باصات عÙ٠اÙدÙزÙÙ ÙÙر٠âªÙÙ 60000( 5â¬â¬
â«ØÙا Ù
Ù Ù
ÙاÙ?ئ ثاÙ٠أÙسÙد اÙÙربÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙâ¬
â«ØÙا Ù
Ù Ù
ÙاÙ?ئ ثاÙ٠أÙسÙد اÙÙربÙ٠عÙÙ Ù
د٠âªÙ 20â¬â¬
â«Ø¹Ø§Ù
ا Ù
Ù Ù
د٠ØÙاة اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«ØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر عÙÙ⬠â«Øس٠ز⬠â«Ø§Øª غازâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙدÙ?Ùئة اÙعائدة Ù
٠ت Ù⬠â«Ù
تÙسØ)⪠\.â¬Ùذ٠اÙÙتÙجة Ù
تØÙÙ?ظة بعض اÙØ´ÙØ¡ بÙ
ا أ٠اÙØسابات ا٠تأخذ بعÙ٠ااÙعتبار Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¯Ø®Ø§Ø±â¬ â«ÙÙا بشÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø³ÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø©)âª\.â¬â¬â«(تØس٠اÙسرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
سارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª ØرÙØ© اÙسÙر اÙعاÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙ⪠\.â¬Ù
رÙز اÙØاÙØ© ⪠\.IPTâ¬Ø§ÙجÙ
ÙÙرÙâ¬
â«Ùة⬠â«Ø¨Ø±ÙاÙ
ج اأÙÙ
Ù
اÙÙ
تØدة اإÙÙÙ
ائÙ⪠\.2016 \.â¬ÙضÙÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙÙØ« اÙÙÙاء ÙÙØاع اÙÙÙ٠اÙبر⬠â«âª21â¬â¬
â«âªPage 43 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø£ÙÙÙØ© Ùغازâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙبعاثات اÙدÙ?Ùئة بØسب تÙÙÙÙÙجÙا اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⬠â«Ø§Øª Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙجدÙ٠⪠:5â¬ØªÙدÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙبعاثات غازâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙدÙ?Ùئة⬠â«Ø¹ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¯Ø®Ø§Ø±â¬ â«Ù
جÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø¹ اÙباصâ¬â«ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
تÙØ³Ø Ø§ÙسÙÙÙâ¬
â«(ØÙ Ù
Ù Ù
ÙاÙ?ئ ثاÙ٠أÙسÙد اÙÙربÙÙ)â¬
â«(ØÙ Ù
Ù Ù
ÙاÙ?ئ ثاÙ٠أÙسÙد اÙÙربÙÙ)â¬
â«âª60,590â¬â¬ â«âª1,211,808â¬â¬ â«Ø¨Ø§Øµ Ø£ÙÙردÙÙÙ ÙعÙ
٠عÙ٠اÙÙ
ازÙتâ¬
â«âª71,902â¬â¬ â«âª1,438,045â¬â¬ â«Ø¨Ø§Øµ Ø£ÙÙردÙÙÙ ÙجÙÙâ¬
â«âª71,902â¬â¬ â«âª1,438,045â¬â¬ â«Ø¨Ø§Øµ Ø£ÙÙردÙÙÙ ÙعÙ
٠عÙ٠اÙغاز اÙØبÙعÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ضغÙØâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتØÙÙ٠اÙÙ
اÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙØاعÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاص ÙÙÙ
اذج اأÙعÙ
ا٠اÙÙ
ختÙÙ?Ø© ÙÙ
شارÙØ© اÙÙØاع اÙخاصâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø© اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙ⬠â«Ø¹ Ù
٠أج٠تÙÙÙÙ
Ùدر⬠â«Ù تØÙÙÙ Ù
اÙÙ ÙÙ
رØÙØ© تشغÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«âª \.72â¬Ø£Ù?جرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø© اÙجدÙÙ Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
سبÙØ© ÙÙتÙاÙÙÙ? ÙاÙÙ
داخÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙاÙ⬠â«Ø§Øª درâ¬â«Ù اÙتØÙÙ٠اÙÙ
اÙ٠اأÙÙÙ٠عÙ٠أساس تÙدÙرâ¬â«Ø¨Øسب Ù
بادئ تØÙÙ٠اÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠اأÙÙص٠Ù
٠أج٠اÙتÙÙ
Ùة⪠\.â¬Ø£Ù?جرâ¬
â«Ù
اÙÙا" ÙتÙ
تâ¬
â«Ùع باÙ
تÙاز ÙÙظاÙ
⬠â«"Ù
شغاÙÙ â Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙ
ÙÙÙا أ٠تÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø¶ اÙÙÙÙÙØ© اÙرÙ?Ùعة اÙÙ
ستÙ٠بأ٠ÙÙئة ÙاØدة Ø£Ù ÙÙئات Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø© Ù
٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙتØÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«ÙائÙ
ا عÙ٠اÙ?ترâ¬
â«Ø´ØºÙÙÙÙا ضÙ
٠اÙÙظاÙ
عÙ٠أساس عÙد ØÙÙ٠اأÙÙ
د Ù
رتبØ⬠â«Ùâª/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙ٠اÙخاصâª/â¬Ø§ÙخاصÙÙ ÙشترÙ٠اÙباصات⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ
ÙÙÙÙÙاâªÙ? Øâ¬â¬
â«ÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ØÙØ«â¬
â«Ø£Ù٠اÙتدÙâ¬
â«Ù?Ùات⬠â«Ø© Ù
٠رؤÙس اأÙÙ
Ùا٠Ù
٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص Ù⬠â«Ù?Ùات ÙبÙرâ¬â«ÙÙ
ÙÙ ÙÙذا اÙÙÙج Ø£Ù Ùجذب تدÙ⬠â«Ù بÙÙ?سÙا âªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«âª22â¬â¬ â«Ø¨Ø§Ø£Ùداء (Ù
ثاÙâ¬
â«Ù ÙÙ
دة ⪠10â¬Ø£Ø¹ÙاÙ
) تÙ
ÙØ٠اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© ÙتÙ?دÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬ØªÙ
اعÙØ© ÙÙائÙ
Ø© عÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø±Ø³ÙÙ
اâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùâª/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا ÙÙ?ترض اÙتØÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ تÙ?Ø´Ùر Ø¥ÙÙ ÙجÙد اØتÙ
ا٠ÙÙ٠اÙسترداد اÙÙÙÙ?Ø© Ù
Ù ÙبÙâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙÙدÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ø®ØØ ÙÙا اÙرسÙÙ
اÙÙ
Ù?رÙضةâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
غذÙØ© Ù?â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©âª/â¬Ø§Ùباصات اÙÙائÙ
ة⪠\.â¬ÙتÙ?شب٠اÙرسÙÙ
عÙ٠شبÙØ© اÙباصاتâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
ساÙ?ة⪠Øâ¬ØªØªÙ
اش٠Ù
ع اÙرسÙÙ
اÙÙائÙ
Ø© عÙ٠اÙباصات اÙصغÙرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙ٠اÙÙائÙ
ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨ÙÙÙ
ا اÙرسÙÙ
عÙ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙÙست أعÙÙ Ù
٠اÙرسÙÙ
اÙÙائÙ
Ø© سÙ٠بÙ⪠30-20â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئةâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹Ø©â¬â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ©âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ© اÙخاصة بÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع Ù
ستÙÙات Ù
ترâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.73â¬Ùظر اÙتØÙÙÙ Ù?Ù Ø®Ù
سة Ø®Ùارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª "Ù
تعاÙبة" Ù
٠أج٠ÙÙÙÙØ© ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙاÙØ®ØÙØâ¬
â«ÙابÙÙØ© تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙÙÙ
شارÙعâªØâ¬â¬ â«ÙÙع بااÙÙ
تÙاز ÙÙÙ Ø®Ùار⪠Øâ¬ÙØ°Ù٠بÙدÙ? إظÙار اÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¨Ø اأÙساس٠بÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø´ØºÙ اÙØ°Ù ÙتÙ
ت⬠â«ÙاÙستثÙ
ارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙخاصة ÙاÙÙ
جازÙ?Ø© Ù
Ù Ùب٠Ù?â¬
â«Ø§Øª Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙÙÙØ© عÙ٠اÙØ´Ù٠اÙتاÙÙâª( :â¬Ø£) اÙ
تÙاز اÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ© ÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙÙÙ⬠â«Ù⪠\.â¬ÙاÙت اÙØ®Ùارâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغ٠اÙخاص⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠جÙØ© أخرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙÙØ© Ø¥ÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ⬠â«Ù
٠جÙØ©âªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«ÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«Ù
Ø¹Ø§Ø (ب) ااÙÙ
تÙاز اÙخاص باÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙØد٠(أ٠تأÙ
ÙÙ Ø®ØÙØ Ù
غذÙØ© بشÙ٠عÙÙÙ)Ø (ج) ااÙÙ
تÙاز اÙخاص باÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع⬠â«Ø§ÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Ùâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙØد٠Ù
ع ضÙ
اÙØ© اÙدخÙØ (د) ااÙÙ
تÙاز اÙخاص باÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙØد٠Ù
ع ضÙ
اÙØ© اÙدخ٠ÙدعÙ
اÙرâ¬
â«Ø£Ø³Ù
اÙØ (Ù) ااÙÙ
تÙاز اÙخاص باÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙعâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ Ù?٠ااÙÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¯Ø§Øª Ù
ع⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠اختبار اÙترâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª اÙدخÙâ¬â«Ø§Øª عÙ٠أساس تÙدÙر⬠â«Ø§Ø¶Ù (أ٠اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø©)âªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«ØªÙ
تÙÙÙÙ
اÙØ®Ùار⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙØد٠Ù
ع تسدÙد رسÙ
اÙ?ترâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶Ø§Øª اÙتاÙÙØ©âª:â¬â¬â«Ù اÙتØÙÙ٠اÙÙ
اÙ٠عÙ٠أساس ااÙÙ?تر⬠â«Ø§Øª (Ø£)⪠Øâ¬Ù(ب)⪠Øâ¬Ù(د) Ù
عرÙضة أدÙاÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙد Ø£Ù?جر⬠â«Ø§ÙØ®Ù?اض اÙدخ٠بÙسبة ⪠25â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة⪠\.23â¬ØªÙ?اصÙ٠اÙØ®Ùارâ¬
â«Ù ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø±Ø¬Ø تØدÙد Ù
ستÙÙات اÙرسÙÙ
(ÙÙ
ÙاÙسة اÙرسÙÙ
) ÙÙ
ستÙÙات اÙخدÙ
Ø© اÙدÙÙا ÙاÙÙ?اذÙا بÙ
Ùجب اÙعÙدâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù?â¬
â«âª22â¬â¬
â«ÙظاÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùعات)⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
خاØر⬠â«Ø¨Ø§Ø¦ÙÙØ© (Ù
ثاÙ٠ارتÙ?اع عدد اÙرÙâ¬
â«Ùاب ÙØصة ÙسÙÙØ© اÙÙÙ٠أدÙÙ Ù
٠اÙتÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø¯Ø§Øª اÙت٠Ùد تÙÙÙد Ù
خاØر ز Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ Ù?٠ااÙÙر⬠â«Ø¨ØÙØ© ÙاÙترâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¯Ø§Øª Ù
خاØر اÙر Ù⬠â«âª 23â¬ÙعÙس اختبار اÙترâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ Ù?٠ااÙÙرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغ٠ÙÙ
داخÙÙÙ)âª\.â¬â¬ â«ØتÙ
Ù Ù?٠عÙ
ÙØ© دÙÙÙ⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ù⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙÙ?ار Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù⬠â«(Ù
ثاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø±Ø³ÙÙ
أدÙÙ)⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
خاØر سعر اÙصرÙ? (Ù
Ø« Ùâ¬
â«âªPage 44 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتشغÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙجدÙ٠⪠:6â¬Ø§Ø§ÙÙ?ترâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶Ø§Øªâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙ?ترâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶â¬ â«Ø§ÙبÙدâ¬
â«âª 10â¬Ø³ÙÙات⬠â«Ù
دة اÙعÙد اÙتشغÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعادÙة⪠/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª 120â¬ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⪠250 Øâ¬ÙÙØ®ØÙØ⬠â«ØجÙ
اأÙسØÙÙâ¬
â«âª 103â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙÙ?Ø© اأÙسØÙÙ (اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙاÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ©)â¬
â«âª 132000â¬Ù
٠خاÙ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⪠105000 Øâ¬Ù
٠خاÙÙ⬠â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙرÙابâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعادÙة⪠/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØ®ØÙØâ¬
â«âª 108â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ (أسعار ⪠2023 â 2015â¬Ø³ÙØ©â¬
â«Ø¯Ø®Ù اÙÙظاÙ
(اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙاÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ©)â¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙ?تتاØ)âª24â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙÙÙØ© ÙتشغÙ٠اÙباصات ÙصÙاÙتÙا (اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙاÙÙÙ?â¬
â«âª 88â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ (أسعار ⪠2023 â 2015â¬Ø³ÙØ© ااÙÙ?تتاØ)â¬
â«ÙاÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ©)â¬
â«Ø±Ø³Ù
اجتÙ
اع٠ÙائÙ
عÙ٠اÙÙ
ساÙ?Ø© شبÙ٠برسÙÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
اÙÙائÙ
ة⬠â«Ø§ÙرسÙ
â¬
â«âª4%â¬â¬ â«ÙÙ
Ù ØرÙØ© اÙسÙر سÙÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙاâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجدÙ٠⪠:7â¬Ø§Ù?ترâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶Ø§Øª اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙ?ترâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶â¬ â«Ø§ÙبÙدâ¬
â«âª7\.0%â¬â¬ â«Ø¯â¬ â«Ùâ¬â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ© ÙÙدÙ٠اÙتجار⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ?Ø©â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âªaâ¬â¬
â«âª3\.5%â¬â¬ â«ÙاÙ
Ø´ ائتÙ
اÙÙâ¬
â«âª1\.0%â¬â¬ â«Ø±Ø³Ù
اÙترتÙبâ¬
â«Ø¥Ø¹Ø§Ø¯Ø© سداد Ø£ÙØ³Ø§Ø Ø³ÙÙÙة⬠â«Ø§ÙجدÙ٠اÙزÙ
Ù٠إÙعادة اÙسدادâ¬
â«âª2\.0%â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙتضخÙ
â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âª70:30â¬â¬ â«Ùسبة اÙدÙÙ٠إÙ٠رâ¬
â«Ø£Ø³ اÙÙ
اÙâ¬
â«âª20%â¬â¬ â«Ù
عد٠اÙعائد اÙداخÙ٠اÙÙدÙ?â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âª1\.40â¬â¬ â«Ù
تÙØ³Ø Ùâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠تغØÙØ© خدÙ
Ø© اÙدÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
صدر⪠:â¬Ø¹Ù٠أساس إصدار اÙÙÙرÙبÙÙد اÙسÙاد٠اأÙØ®Ùر Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ
دة ⪠10â¬Ø£Ø¹ÙاÙ
âª\.http://cbonds\.com/news/item/887409â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
سبÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙÙد اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ⪠55â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
٠دخ٠سÙØ© ااÙÙ?ØªØªØ§Ø (⪠108â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دâª\.â¬Ø£âª 55 à \.â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة = ⪠59â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دâª\.â¬Ø£âª )\.â¬Ø¨ÙÙÙ
ا تÙÙÙد خدÙ
ات اÙØ®ØÙØâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù٠أساس تØÙÙ٠اÙجدÙÙ Ù?â¬
â«âª24â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ© ⪠45â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
٠دخ٠سÙØ© ااÙÙ?ØªØªØ§Ø (⪠108â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دâª\.â¬Ø£âª 45 à \.â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة = ⪠49â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دâª\.â¬Ø£âª)\.â¬â¬
â«âªPage 45 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ùتائج اختبار اÙØ®Ùارâ¬
â«Ø§Øªâ¬
â«Ø¨ÙابÙÙØ© اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù
Ù Ùب٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«ÙعØ٠ااÙÙ
تÙاز⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ© Ùباصات اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Ù
Ù Ùب٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاصâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªØ¹ اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ اÙÙاÙ
Ù ÙÙباصات⬠â«âª \.74â¬Ø§Ù ÙتÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù اÙÙØاع اÙخاص أسØÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙتشغÙÙÙة⪠\.â¬Ø¨Ø§ÙÙسبة Ø¥ÙÙ Ùذا اÙØ®Ùار⪠Øâ¬Ùشترâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹â¬â«ØÙØ© اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
شتر٠ÙÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ© ÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت اÙتØÙÙ٠اÙÙاÙ
Ù ÙÙ
رâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ اÙباصات⪠\.â¬Ù?ÙÙÙÙد اÙدخ٠Ù?٠اÙØاÙØ© اأÙساسÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø§Ø¦Ø¯Ø§ غÙر ÙاÙ? Ù
Ù⬠â«Ø§Ù Ùâ¬
â«ÙتÙ
استخداÙ
Ø£Ù
Ùا٠عاÙ
Ø© Ù
٠أج٠شر⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ØµØ§Øª اÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ© ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ غÙر ÙاÙ? Ù
٠أج٠تغØÙØ© إعادة سداد اÙدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ا ÙÙ Ùارد Ù?٠اÙجدÙÙ⬠â«Ø£Ø¬Ù جذب ااÙستثÙ
ار اÙخاص (دÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠اÙعائد اÙداخÙ٠اÙÙدÙ?) بÙÙÙ
ا اÙدخ٠اÙÙ
ترâ¬
â«Ø¨ÙابÙÙØ© اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù
Ù Ùب٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ù ÙتÙ
تâ¬
â«Ùع⬠â«Ù
ستداÙ
ا Ù
اÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙا Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«âª \.9â¬ÙÙس Ùذا اÙØ®Ùارâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ©âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ© Ùباصات اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙÙ
تÙاز اÙباصاتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙجدÙ٠⪠:8â¬ØªØÙÙ٠ااÙستداÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙبÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙØاÙة⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙØاÙة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙدÙ?⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§Ù عائد⬠â«âª12\.6%â¬â¬ â«âª20%â¬â¬ â«Ù
عد٠اÙعائد اÙداخÙ٠٠أâ¬
â«Ø±Ø³ اÙÙ
اÙ⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«âªâ1\.04â¬â¬ â«âª1\.56â¬â¬ â«âª1\.40â¬â¬ â«Ù
تÙØ³Ø Ùâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠تغØÙØ© خدÙ
Ø© اÙدÙÙâ¬
â«âªâ1\.41â¬â¬ â«âª1\.73â¬â¬ â«âª1\.60â¬â¬ â«Ù
عد٠تغØÙØ© اÙÙرض Ù
د٠ØÙاتÙâ¬
â«âª129â¬â¬ â«âª129â¬â¬ â«Ø±Ø¤Ùس اأÙÙ
Ùا٠اÙخاصةâªØâ¬â¬
â«âª26â¬â¬ â«âª26â¬â¬ â«Ù
ÙÙا اÙÙ?ائدة (Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دâª\.â¬Ø£âª)\.â¬â¬
â«â⬠â«â⬠â«Ø§ÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© (Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دâª\.â¬Ø£âª)\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªØ³Ø¯Ùد رؤÙس اأÙÙ
ÙاÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ
ا Ù
ØÙ?ÙÙ? باÙÙ
خاØرâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ©âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ© Ù
Ù
ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¥Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.75â¬Ø§ÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙخاص Ø£ÙسØÙ٠باصات اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع اÙÙاÙ
Ù Ù
ع تÙ
ÙÙ٠عاÙ
Ø£ÙسØÙ٠اÙØ®ØÙØâ¬
â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¬Ø³Ø¯ اÙتØÙÙ٠اÙÙ
اÙ٠اÙÙ
تÙاز اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙØد٠اÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙخاص باÙÙاÙ
Ù Ùباصات اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع تÙ
ÙÙ٠عاÙ
باÙÙاÙ
Ù⬠â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙخاصة ضÙ
Ù Ùذا اÙØ®Ùار⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ Ùذا اأÙØ®Ùر Ùâ¬
â«Ù
عرض⬠â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± اÙدخ٠Ù?٠اÙØاÙØ© اأÙساسÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«ÙاÙ?Ùا Ùجذب ااÙستثÙ
ار⬠â«Ù Ù⬠â«Ø£ÙسØÙ٠باصات اÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ©âªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«Ùعتبر Ùذاâ¬â«Ø¹âª \.â¬ÙتÙجة ÙØ°ÙÙâªÙ? Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø¯Ø§Øª تدÙ?Ùات Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙدÙØ© ÙاÙ?ÙØ© Ù
٠أج٠إعادة سداد دÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§Ù ÙÙÙÙد اختبار اÙترâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ Ù?٠ااÙÙر⬠â«Ø¨Ø´ÙÙ ÙبÙر ÙÙ
خاØر اÙدخ٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹â¬ â«Ø§Ù تتÙÙ?ر Ù?ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«ÙابÙÙØ© اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù
Ù Ùب٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠عÙ٠اأÙرجØ⪠Øâ¬Ø¥Ø§Ù Ù?Ù Øا٠ضÙ
Ùت اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© بعض اÙÙ
خاØر اÙÙ
رتبØØ© باÙتر⬠â«Ø§ÙØ®Ùار Ø°Ù Ù
خاØر Ùâ¬
â«Ø¡ Ù
٠شرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ باصات ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙعâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù?٠ااÙÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¯Ø§Øª أ٠ساÙÙ
ت Ù?٠جزâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙÙ
تÙاز اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙØدÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙجدÙ٠⪠:9â¬ØªØÙÙ٠ااÙستداÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙبÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙØاÙة⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙØاÙة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙدÙ?⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§Ù عائد⬠â«âª45\.2%â¬â¬ â«âª20%â¬â¬ â«Ù
عد٠اÙعائد اÙداخÙ٠٠أâ¬
â«Ø±Ø³ اÙÙ
اÙ⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«âª0\.72â¬â¬ â«âª1\.56â¬â¬ â«âª1\.40â¬â¬ â«Ù
تÙØ³Ø Ùâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠تغØÙØ© خدÙ
Ø© اÙدÙÙâ¬
â«âªPage 46 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«âª0\.78â¬â¬ â«âª1\.73â¬â¬ â«âª1\.60â¬â¬ â«Ù
عد٠تغØÙØ© اÙÙرض Ù
د٠ØÙاتÙâ¬
â«âª83â¬â¬ â«âª83â¬â¬ â«Ø±Ø¤Ùس اأÙÙ
Ùا٠اÙخاصةâªØâ¬â¬
â«âª20â¬â¬ â«âª20â¬â¬ â«Ù
ÙÙا اÙÙ?ائدة (Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دâª\.â¬Ø£âª)\.â¬â¬
â«âª40â¬â¬ â«âª40â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© (Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دâª\.â¬Ø£âª)\.â¬â¬ â«ØªØ³Ø¯Ùد اÙرؤÙس اأÙÙ
ÙاÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص Ø£ÙسØÙ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت بÙسبة ⪠80â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© ÙباÙ٠أسØÙ٠اÙباصاتâ¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Ù
ستداÙ
اâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙ
Ùذج أعÙ
اÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø±â¬ â«âªÙ? \.76â¬â¬
â«Ø£Ø³ اÙÙ
ا٠ÙضÙ
ا٠اÙدخÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«ÙÙ
Ù٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص ⪠80â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة⬠â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ©âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ© Ùباصات اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع⪠\.â¬Ù?Ù ÙÙ
Ùذج اÙ
تÙاز اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Ù
ع دعÙ
رâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ©âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙة⪠\.â¬ØªÙÙÙص Ù
ساÙÙ
Ø© اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙر Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ø³Ù
اÙÙة⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¡ باصات اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع بÙÙÙ
ا Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙ
Ù٠اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© Ùسبة اÙÙ⪠20â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة اÙÙ
تبÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠اÙباصات⬠â«Ù
٠شرâ¬
â«Ø© Ø®Øر اÙدخ٠Ù?Ù Ù
ا بÙ٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص ÙاÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© Ù?Ù Ùذا اÙÙÙ
Ùذج Ù
٠خاÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙ
ÙÙ Ù
شاØرâ¬â«Ø§Ø¯Ø§Øªâª \.â¬ÙÙ?â¬â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ Ù?٠ااÙÙرâ¬â«ÙشاشÙØ© اÙÙØاع اÙخاص Ù?Ù Ùج٠Ù
خاØر اÙترâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙÙÙ٠اÙÙÙ?اذ Ø¥ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙ
شغÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹âª \.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ù?â¬
â«ÙÙ
ÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø¯Ø§Øª Ø£Ù
ت٠تÙÙÙ ÙاÙ?Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø© Ø¥Ùعادة تسدÙد دÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ Ù?٠ااÙÙر⬠â«Ù
Ù
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ùؤد٠إÙ٠تر⬠â«Ø¶Ù
اÙØ© اÙدخ٠Ù
Ù Ùب٠اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø©âªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø¯Ø§Øª ⪠90â¬Ù
ÙÙÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙ
Ù٠أ٠تبÙغ ضÙ
اÙØ© اÙترâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ Ù?٠ااÙÙر⬠â«ÙØد Ù
Ù Ø´Ø±Ø Ø§ÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
سب٠ÙÙÙØاع اÙخاص⪠\.â¬ÙÙ?⬠â«Ø£Ù اÙتسدÙد اÙرâ¬
â«Ø£Ø³Ù
اÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ùذا اÙÙÙ
Ùذج بشÙ٠أÙبر⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ø© اÙ
تÙاز Ù
٠⪠10â¬Ø³ÙÙاتâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙ٠عÙÙ Ù?ترâ¬â«Ø¯Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙÙ
تÙاز اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙØد٠Ù
ع دعÙ
رâ¬
â«Ø£Ø³ اÙÙ
ا٠ÙضÙ
اÙØ© اÙدخÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙجدÙ٠⪠:10â¬ØªØÙÙ٠ااÙستداÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙبÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙØاÙة⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙØاÙة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙدÙ?⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«âª11\.2%â¬â¬ â«âª64\.8%â¬â¬ â«âª20%â¬â¬ â«Ø±Ø³ اÙÙ
اÙ⬠â«Ù
عد٠اÙعائد اÙداخÙ٠٠أâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âª2\.04â¬â¬ â«âª3\.38â¬â¬ â«âª1\.40â¬â¬ â«Ù
عد٠تغØÙØ© خدÙ
Ø© اÙدÙÙâ¬â«Ù
تÙØ³Ø Ùâ¬
â«âª2\.45â¬â¬ â«âª3\.96â¬â¬ â«âª1\.60â¬â¬ â«Ù
عد٠تغØÙØ© اÙÙرض Ù
د٠ØÙاتÙâ¬
â«âª66â¬â¬ â«âª66â¬â¬ â«Ø±Ø¤Ùس اأÙÙ
Ùا٠اÙخاصةâªØâ¬â¬
â«âª16â¬â¬ â«âª16â¬â¬ â«Ù
ÙÙا اÙÙ?ائدة (Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دâª\.â¬Ø£âª)\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© (Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دâª\.â¬Ø£âª)\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªØ³Ø¯Ùد رؤÙس اأÙÙ
ÙاÙâ¬
â«âª53â¬â¬ â«âª53â¬â¬
â«Ùتائج اÙتØÙÙ٠اÙÙ
اÙÙ ÙتÙصÙاتÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ ⪠100-80â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة⬠â«Ù
ستداÙ
ا Ù
اÙÙا Ù
ع استثÙ
ار ÙÙÙØاع اÙخاص Ù
٠أج٠شر⬠â«ØºÙ â اÙÙ
اÙÙ ÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Ø£Ù ÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ
ÙÙ ÙÙÙ
Ùذج اÙÙ
Ø´ Ù⬠â«âªÙ? \.77â¬â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø© اÙÙ
ØاÙ?ظة ÙسبÙâ¬
â«ÙÙا (باÙÙسبة Ø¥Ù٠اÙرسÙÙ
ÙباÙÙسبة Ø¥ÙÙ⬠â«Ù?رâ¬â«ÙÙ
ا ÙÙتض٠ÙÙÙÙØ© Ù
تأÙÙØ© ÙÙ
عاÙجة اÙÙ
خاØر⪠\.â¬Ø¹Ù٠أساس اأÙرÙاÙ
اÙÙ
تÙÙ⬠â«Ù
٠باصات ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع⪠Øâ¬Ø¥Ùâ¬
â«Ù اÙÙØاع اÙخاص باصات⬠â«Ù
شغ٠â Ù
اÙÙ ØÙØ« Ùشترâ¬â«Ø¹ اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت (أ٠اÙØ®Ø Ø§ÙرئÙسÙ) Ù٠اÙدخ٠اÙÙاÙ?Ù ÙÙÙ
Ùذج Ùâ¬â«ÙظÙر اÙتØÙÙ٠أ٠Ù
شرÙ⬠â«ØرÙØ© اÙسÙر)âªÙ? Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø± ضÙ
اÙØ© دخÙ⪠Øâ¬ØªÙÙÙ Ùسب تÙ
ÙÙÙ⬠â«Ù?ر Ù
Ø«Ù Ùذ٠اآÙÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠غر⬠â«Ø© اÙÙ
خاØر⪠\.â¬Ù
ع تÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع⪠Øâ¬ÙÙØرص عÙ٠تشغÙÙÙا ÙصÙاÙتÙا⪠Øâ¬Ù?Ù Øا٠ÙجÙد Ùâ¬
â«Ø¢ÙÙØ© ÙÙ
شاØرâ¬
â«Ù
ستداÙ
ا سÙسÙ
Ø ÙÙÙØاعâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± اÙÙÙ
Ùذجâ¬
â«Ù Ùâ¬â«ÙتØÙ٠بعض Ù
خاØر اÙدخ٠إÙ٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص⪠\.â¬Ù
ع Ùضع ضÙ
اÙØ© دخÙâªÙ? Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø¯Ø§Øª Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ Ù?٠ااÙÙرâ¬
â«Ø© Ù?Ù Ùج٠اÙتر⬠â«Ø¹ Ù
تÙÙ Ùâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù اÙÙ
عاÙ
اÙت Ù
Ù⬠â«Ø¥Ø¶Ø§Ù?ÙØ© Ù
٠جاÙب Ù
ستشارâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¨Ø¯ Ù
٠بذ٠جÙÙد⬠â«Ø§Ø¡ باصات ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت بÙسبة ØÙاÙ٠⪠100-80â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة⪠\.â¬Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ù Ù⬠â«Ø§Ùخاص بتÙ
ÙÙ٠شرâ¬
â«Ø§Ù ÙتÙÙâ¬
â«Ùع ÙجÙد استثÙ
ار ÙÙÙØاع⬠â«Ø©Ùâ¬â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ©âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ© Ø£ÙÙ Ù
تا٠Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙشبÙØ© اÙØ®ØÙØâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± ااÙستداÙ
ة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙائÙØ© باÙÙاÙ
Ù ÙتØدÙدÙا⪠\.â¬Ù?Ù Ù
Ùازâ¬
â«Ø§Ø© Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ØªÙ? Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø£Ø¬Ù تÙÙÙÙ
اÙبÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø³ØªÙ
Ù٠اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙباصات ÙتÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ©âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ© أشب٠بÙÙ
Ùذج عÙد خدÙ
Ø© ØÙØ« Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
ØدÙدا⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙ ÙÙ
Ùذج اÙتشغÙÙ ÙشبÙØ© اÙØ®ØÙØâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ùخاص⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ?Ù Øا٠ÙجÙدÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙâ¬
â«âªPage 47 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ùظر Ø¥Ù٠اÙتÙاÙ
Ù Ù?Ù Ù
ا بÙÙÙا⪠Øâ¬ÙÙذا Ù
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
⬠â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâªÙ Øâ¬Ø§â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¬ بعض Ø®ØÙØ Ø§ÙتÙاص٠اÙÙ
غذÙØ© Ù?Ù⬠â«ÙÙ
Ù٠إدر⬠â«Ù
خاØر اÙدخ٠Ù
شترÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙâªÙ? Øâ¬â¬
â«ÙØ© اÙجارÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ستÙبÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
عاÙ
ÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªÙÙÙÙ
٠بشÙ٠أÙبر Ù?٠خاÙ٠اÙدرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øª ااÙستشارÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ù٠سÙÙارÙÙÙات اÙترâ¬â«ÙÙ
ا تبÙ٠رâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ©âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¥Ù⬠â«Ø٠عائدات اÙرسÙÙ
تÙاÙÙÙ? اÙتشغÙÙ ÙاÙصÙاÙØ© ÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع ÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§Ùباصاتâ¬
â«ØªØº Ù⬠â«âªÙÙ \.78â¬â¬
â«ÙتÙÙع Ø£Ù Ù?â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙا⪠\.â¬Ø¶Ù
Ùâ¬â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙ٠سÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø بÙ٠⪠100â¬Ù⪠150â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙ⬠â«Ø© Ùتترâ¬
â«Ø§Ù⬠â«ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ©âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ© جÙÙرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتشغÙÙÙØ© ÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع Ùباصات اÙØ®ØÙØâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¯Ø§Øªâª \.â¬ØªÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± اÙÙÙ?Ùات⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙرâ¬
â«Ù٠اÙخاص ÙاÙعاÙ
â¬â«Ø§ÙÙØاع Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙ
ÙÙ ÙÙ
داخÙ٠اÙرسÙÙ
تغØÙØ© اÙتÙاÙÙÙ?⪠Øâ¬Ø¥Ù٠جاÙب تÙاÙÙÙ? استثÙ
ار اÙÙ
رÙبات Ù?Ù Øا٠تÙظÙÙ
اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ©âªÙ? Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø³ÙÙارÙÙÙات اÙØاÙØ©â¬
â«Ø©â¬
â«Ø§ÙتشغÙÙÙØ© ÙÙÙص٠بÙ
شاØر⬠â«ÙتخصÙص اÙÙ
خاØر بشÙ٠جÙد⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù?Ù Øا٠ÙاÙت اÙÙ
داخÙ٠دÙÙ Ù
ا ÙÙ ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
تÙÙع بÙسبة ⪠25â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة⪠Øâ¬Ø«Ù
Ø© Øاجة Ø¥Ù٠دعÙ
اÙÙÙ?Ùاتâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¯Ø§Øª بÙ٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص ÙاÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© (ضÙ
٠ترتÙب ÙÙØظ اÙØد اأÙدÙÙ ÙاÙØد اأÙÙصÙ)⪠\.â¬Ù?Ù Ùذ٠اÙØاÙة⪠Øâ¬Ùد تبرز اÙØاجة Ø¥Ù٠ضÙ
اÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ Ù?٠ااÙÙر⬠â«Ù
خاØر اÙترâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ
ÙتÙ
â¬
â«Ù
عÙâ¬â«Ø¨Ø§Ø¦ÙÙØ© Ù
ستÙÙ Ù?â¬
â«Ø£Ùضا Ù
ت٠بÙغ اÙدخ٠ÙاÙز Ù⬠â«Ø© ااÙÙ
تÙاز Ù
ع Ù
شاØرâ¬
â«Ø© اÙدخ٠Ù⬠â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ Ù?٠خاÙÙ Ù?ترâ¬â«Ø§Ø¯Ø§Øª اÙباÙغ ⪠90â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙترâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ Ù?٠ااÙÙرâ¬
â«Ù
Ù?صÙة⪠\.â¬Ù
٠شأÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øª Ù⬠â«ÙسÙتÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتعÙ
Ù Ù?ÙÙا Ù?٠خاÙ٠در⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙØ© ÙÙ
داخÙ٠اإÙعاÙÙات Ù?٠اÙÙ
Ø Ùâ¬
â«Øات Ù?Ù Ùذا اÙتØÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ù
ث٠اÙÙ
داخÙ٠اÙتجارÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øتساب اÙÙ
داخÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ Ù?٠ااÙÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¯Ø§Øª ÙضÙ
اÙØ© اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙاÙزÙ
Ø©âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙØساسÙØ© Ø¥ اâ¬
â«Ø²Ø¡ سÙÙارÙÙÙات اÙتر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ù
Ø«Ù Ùذ٠اÙÙ
داخÙ٠أ٠تÙ?ساÙÙ
Ù?Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØد Ù
Ùâ¬
â«ØºÙ اÙخاص أ٠تØتÙ?ظ اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© بÙâªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«ÙØÙ٠اÙ
تÙاز اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙØدÙ⬠â«ÙتÙ
تØÙÙ٠اÙØ®Øر Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù?Ø±Ø Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
Ø´ Ù⬠â«Ø© اÙÙ
خاØرâªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«âª \.79â¬Ù?٠غÙاب Ùâ¬
â«Ø¢ÙÙØ© ÙÙ
شاØرâ¬
â«ÙÙâ¬â«Ø§ÙØ®ÙارÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¯Ø§Øª باÙÙسبة Ø¥ÙÙ⬠â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± Ø®Øر اÙترâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ Ù?٠ااÙÙر⬠â«Ù Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغ٠اÙخاص⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙâªÙ? Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
عا Ø®Øر اÙدخ٠باÙÙاÙ
٠إÙÙâ¬â«ÙاÙ
تÙاز اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙاÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶ÙØ©â¬
â«ÙØÙ٠اÙ
تÙاز اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙØد٠Ù
ع تسدÙد رسÙÙ
اÙ?تر Ùâ¬
â«Ø¨ÙابÙÙØ© اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù
Ù Ùب٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ø§Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ®ÙارÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø°Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙع Ø£Ù Ù
Ù Ù Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙ?عا ÙباÙتاÙ٠ا٠ÙتÙ
تâ¬
â«Ù
ر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ Ù?Ù Øا٠ÙاÙت Ù
داخÙ٠اÙرسÙÙ
دÙ٠تسدÙد ÙÙÙ?ة⬠â«Ø¹Ø±Ø¶ اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© Ø¥ÙÙ Ø®Øر دخ٠Ù
رتÙ?ع Ù?٠سÙÙارÙ٠اÙتر⬠â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹Ù Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص Ù?â¬
â«ÙÙ Ù⬠â«(أ٠اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø©) Ø£Ù Ø®Øر ترâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ù
٠خاÙÙ ÙÙ
اذج أعÙ
ا٠Ù
اÙئÙ
Ø© ÙتÙÙÙÙ?Ø© Ù
٠اأÙدÙاتâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ù Ù?٠اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? Ù
Ù Ù
خاØر اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øª أخر⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øª استشارÙâ¬
â«ÙØ© ØÙ٠اÙÙ
عاÙ
اÙت Ùدر⬠â«Ø§ÙخدÙ
Ø© بÙØ«Ùر⪠\.â¬Ø³ØªÙظر درâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙØ© بÙا⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠أÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙ ÙضÙ
اÙات اÙØ®Øر اÙترâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹Ù⪠\.â¬ÙÙ?Ù Øا٠برÙز اÙØاجة Ø¥Ù٠ضÙ
اÙØ© ÙÙ
ØاÙبة اÙØÙÙÙ
ة⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø± تÙدÙÙ
اÙÙ
ØÙÙ?زâ¬
â«Ø§Øª Ø¥ÙÙ⬠â«Ø¹Ù٠غرâ¬
â«ÙÙظر Ù?٠تأÙ
ÙÙ Ù
ث٠أدÙات اÙضÙ
اÙØ© ÙØ°Ù Ù?Ù Ù
رØÙØ© اÙØÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¹âª:â¬â¬â«Ø© Ù?٠خاÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ØªØ®Ø§Ø° اإÙجرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øª اÙتاÙÙØ© Ù?Ù Ù
رØÙØ© Ù
بÙر⬠â«ØªØªÙ
دعÙØ© اÙÙظرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ Ø¥Ù٠إÙ⬠â«Ø¹âªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«âª \.80â¬Ù
٠أج٠جذب تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص بشÙ٠أÙبر Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«ÙØ© ØÙÙ ØرÙØ© اÙسÙرØ⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øª استثÙ
ارÙâ¬
â«Ù٠اÙخاص ÙاÙعاÙ
Ùاعداد درâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙØاع Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
ؤÙÙÙÙ Ù
٠أج٠اÙÙ
ساعدة Ù?٠تÙظÙÙ
عÙÙد اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙ⬠â«Ù Ù
عاÙ
اÙت Ù⬠â«(⪠)1â¬Ø§Ø³ØªØ®Ø¯Ø§Ù
Ù
ستشارâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙÙØ®Ø Ø§ÙرئÙس٠ÙتÙرÙد Ùâ¬
â«Ù
شغÙ٠اÙباصاتâª/â¬Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Ù
٠أج٠اÙØد Ù
٠اأÙسØØ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ ÙØ´Ù
٠إعداد اÙبÙÙ⬠â«(⪠)2â¬ÙÙضع Ø®Ø Ø²Ù
ÙÙ ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
Ù?ص٠ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙÙÙØ©Ø (⪠)3â¬Ùاعداد Ø®ØØ© Ù
اÙئÙ
Ø© Ù
٠أج٠تÙظÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù
شغÙ٠اÙباصات اÙÙائÙ
ÙÙ ÙدÙ
جÙÙ
Ø Ù(⪠)4â¬ØªØدÙد ÙÙ
Ùذج دخ٠Ù
ثاÙ٠بÙ
ساعدة Ù
Ù Ù
ستشار Ù
عاÙ
اÙت ÙاØتÙ
اÙ⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ Ù?٠ااÙÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¯Ø§Øªâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙسÙاسÙØ© ÙÙ
خاØر اÙترâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªÙدÙÙ
تأÙ
ÙÙاتâª/â¬Ø¶Ù
اÙات Ù
Ùاب٠اÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«Ùاâ¬
â«ÙÙظر⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© اÙÙبÙرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصادÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙ
Ù
ÙÙ Ù
Ù Ùب٠اÙÙØاع اÙعاÙ
âªÙ Øâ¬Ø§â¬
â«Ùظر Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
ÙاÙ?عÙ⬠â«âª \.81â¬Ù
ÙØ٠اÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
âª\.â¬Ù
٠اÙÙ
عرÙÙ? عاÙÙ
Ùا٠أ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
ÙØاع Ù
دعÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ø£ÙÙ ÙظاÙ
ÙÙÙ⬠â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ØºØ§ÙبÙØ© اأÙØÙاء ÙاÙÙ
ÙاØÙ⪠\.â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙâªÙ? Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙا Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙؤÙ
٠تغØÙØ© ÙÙÙ Ù
اÙئÙ
Ø© Ø¥ÙÙ⬠â«Ø¥Ù٠اÙØاجة Ø¥Ù٠إبÙاء اÙرسÙÙ
عÙد أسعار Ù
ÙبÙÙØ© اجتÙ
اعÙâ¬
â«ØºØ¨Ø©â¬â«Ø¬Ø أ٠تØÙ٠دÙ٠رâ¬â«ÙرÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙ
ؤسسÙØ©âªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«ÙÙ?ÙÙØ© Ù
ÙØÙظة Ù?⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø³ÙاسÙØ©âªØâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ø§Ù
ا⪠Øâ¬ÙÙØÙ٠عÙÙ Ù
خاØرâ¬â«Ø¬Ù
اع٠ÙÙظاÙ
ÙÙ٠عاÙ
Ùاسع اÙÙØا٠Ù?٠خاÙ٠أÙثر Ù
Ù âªÙ 50â¬â¬ â«Ø³Ø±Ùع Ùâ¬
â«Ù Ù
Ù⬠â«Ø¹ اØتÙ
ا٠تعبئة تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص اÙجÙÙرâ¬â«ØºÙ
Ù
Ù Ùذ٠اÙتØدÙات ÙÙÙÙا⪠Øâ¬ÙÙØظ تصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
ستثÙ
رÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص Ù?٠تÙ
ÙÙÙ Ùذا اÙÙØاع⪠\.â¬ÙباÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ أجزâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ Ù
٠أسØÙ٠اÙباصات ÙتغØÙØ© تÙاÙÙÙ? اÙتشغÙÙ ÙاÙصÙاÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬Ø§Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙÙ
ا Ù
٠أج٠شر⬠â«Ø£Ø¬Ù تÙ
ÙÙÙ Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«âªPage 48 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø¹ Ù?Ù (Ø£) تØسÙ٠اإÙØار اÙÙ
ÙÙ?â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙ Ù
٠أج٠تØÙÙ٠اÙÙÙ?اءة⬠â«Ø³ÙساÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Ø¹ Ù
ثاÙÙ Ù
ÙÙ
ا ع٠ÙÙج تØÙÙ٠اÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠اأÙÙص٠Ù
٠أج٠اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ©âªÙ? \.â¬â¬ â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«âªÙ? \.82â¬â¬
â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù اÙÙØاع اÙخاص بتÙ
ÙÙÙ⬠â«Ù
Ù
ا ÙسÙ
Ø ÙÙ
ستثÙ
رâ¬â«Ø§Ø¬ اÙعرÙضâªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙصÙÙ ÙÙÙ
Ùارد اÙعاÙ
Ø© ÙاÙخاصة Ù(ب) إزâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بعض اÙÙÙÙد اÙÙ
ادÙØ© ÙتÙ٠اÙÙ
Ù?رÙضة عÙÙ ÙظاÙ
استدرâ¬
â«Ø§Øª Ù?٠اÙÙ
ستÙب٠Ù?٠اÙباصات اÙت٠تÙ?غ Ùâ¬
â«Ø٠اÙØ®ØÙØ⬠â«ÙØ© Ùد تجذب Ù
ز Ùâ¬
â«Ùدا Ù
٠ااÙستثÙ
ار⬠â«Ø¹ Ù?٠اعتÙ
اد Ù
Ù
ارسات تجارÙ⬠â«Ø§Øª اÙباصات⪠\.â¬ÙاأÙÙÙ
Ù
Ù Ø°ÙÙâªÙ? Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙساÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§Ù
تÙازâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ© ÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتØر٠إÙ٠زØÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø© ÙابÙØ© ÙÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° Ù
٠أجÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ضاÙ?Ø© ÙÙ
جÙ
Ùعة اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«ØªÙ
استدعاء اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù
٠أج٠Ù
ساعدة اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© عÙ٠تÙÙÙÙ
Ø®Ùار⬠â«âª \.83â¬Ø§ÙÙÙÙ
Ø© Ù?â¬
â«Ø§Øªâª Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠درâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø© ØÙ٠اÙبدائ٠(اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⪠Øâ¬Ø³Ù٠اÙØدÙد اÙØ®Ù?ÙÙ?Ø©âªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øª Ùاستشار⬠â«Ù⪠\.â¬ÙÙد دعÙ
اÙبÙÙ ÙدÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø© در⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙر Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø© جدÙÙ Ù?â¬
â«Ù
سبÙØ© ÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙÙÙ Ù?٠اÙÙØاع Ø¥Ù٠اسØÙبÙÙ Ù?٠اÙعاÙ
âª2014â¬Ø Ùدرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³ÙØ© ÙÙÙظرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡â¬ â«Ø³Ù٠اÙØدÙد اÙØ«ÙÙÙØ©âª/â¬ÙÙØ´ØÙ)Ø ÙجÙÙØ© در Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£Ùضا Ù
ع اÙسÙØاتâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø© Ùâ¬â«Ø§Øª Ù⬠â«Ø§Øªâª Øâ¬Ø£Ù?جرÙت استشارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª عÙÙ Ù
ÙاÙ?ع Ù
Ø«Ù Ùذ٠اÙÙ
شارÙع Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ?٠إØار Ùذ٠اÙÙ
بادر⬠â«Ù
٠أج٠تسÙÙØ Ø§ÙضÙØ¡ ÙصاÙع٠اÙ٠اâ¬
â«Ø±Ø±â¬
â«ÙÙا Ù
٠أج٠اÙÙ
ساÙÙ
Ø© Ù?٠رسÙ
رؤÙا اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© بشأ٠ااÙصاÙØات Ù?٠اÙÙØاع⪠\.â¬Ø¥Ø° تÙ?Ø«Ùر⬠â«Ù
ØرÙâ¬
â«Ùا أساسÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØÙÙØ© Ù?٠خاÙÙ Ùذ٠اÙÙ?ترâ¬
â«Ø©âª \.â¬ÙباÙتاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ùا٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙØÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙترØØ©âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù Ù
٠أج٠دعÙ
Ù
رâ¬
â«Ø§Ø٠اÙÙ
تابعة ÙÙØ®Øة⬠â«Ù?â¬
â«ÙÙ
Ù
ÙÙØ© أخرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùر Ù
٠جاÙب جÙات Ù
اÙØØ© Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙ
اÙ
ا Ùب Ùاâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹â¬â«Ù
ساÙÙ
ت٠ÙدعÙ
Ù ÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø§Ø¡ â اأÙÙج٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت بعد تÙÙÙÙ
Ø£ÙÙÙ ÙشرÙØ Ø®ØØ© اÙخدÙ
ة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠تØÙÙ٠اÙØÙبâªØâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.84â¬Ø§Ø§Ùتسا٠اÙÙÙدس٠ÙاÙتصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙ
ادÙâªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«ØªÙ
إعداد تصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ø© اÙÙ
ØØات ÙاÙÙ
ØØات اÙØر Ùâ¬
â«Ù?Ùة⬠â«Ø§Ùس٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙØ© اÙعاÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع Ùدر⬠â«Ø§Øª اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙØ٠ااÙرتÙ?ا٠اÙÙ
ØدÙد Ù?٠بعض اÙÙ
ÙاØ٠اÙØضرÙâ¬
â«ÙØ© ذات اÙÙثاÙ?Ø© Ù⬠â«Ø© Ù
سار⬠â«ÙÙدرâ¬
â«ÙÙâª:â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Ùâ¬
â«Ù
Ù
رÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ù٠استÙعاب اÙرÙâ¬
â«Ùاب⪠\.â¬ØªØ´Ù
٠اÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¬Ø§ Ø¥Ù٠بÙرÙت (Ù
ØØØ© شار٠اÙØÙÙâ¬â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙÙÙ
Ù
ر اÙØ´Ù
اÙÙ ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت عÙ٠⪠22\.7â¬ÙÙ
عÙÙ ØÙ٠اÙØرÙ٠اÙسرÙع اÙØ´Ù
اÙÙ Ù
Ù Øبرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªÙ
تد Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙÙ⬠â«(Ø£) Ùâ¬
â«Ø¥ÙÙ Ø®Ø ÙسØÙ Ù?اص٠باÙÙاÙ
Ù ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت (Ù
سار ÙاØد ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙÙ٠اتجاÙ)⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع ⪠27â¬Ù
ØØØ© Ù
رÙزÙâ¬
â«ÙØ© ÙÙ
تÙØ³Ø Ù
ساÙ?Ø© بÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙØرÙ?ÙØ©)âªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© ÙتÙسÙع اÙØرÙÙ Ù?٠جÙÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙبÙÙ ÙÙØرÙ٠اÙسرÙع ثاÙثة Ù
سارâ¬
â«Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Øات Ùدرâ¬
â«Ù ⪠860â¬Ù
⪠\.â¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
سار اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙعÙ٠ضÙØ¡ Ù
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ø Ùâ¬
â«Ù٠اتجا٠Ù?Ù Ùذا اÙجزâ¬
â«Ø¡ Ù
٠اÙØرÙ٠باÙÙاÙ
Ùâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø³Ùر Ù?â¬
â«Ù
ختÙØØ© عÙ٠اأÙÙÙ Ù?Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¨Ø ضÙ
٠بÙرÙت⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙعâ¬â«Ùاب Ù
Ù Ù
ÙصدÙÙ
ÙزÙادة اÙتر⬠â«(ب) Ù
Ù Ø«Ù
Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù
تد اÙÙ
Ù
ر اÙØ´Ù
اÙÙ ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Øت٠ÙØ³Ø Ø¨ÙرÙت⪠Øâ¬ÙتÙرÙب اÙرÙâ¬
â«Ø¥ÙÙ Ø®Ø ÙسØÙ Ù?اص٠ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت (Ø®Ø⬠â«Ù اÙÙسØ٠اÙÙائÙ
أصاÙÙâªÙ \.â¬â¬â«Ø§Ù
تدادا ÙÙØرÙ٠اÙدائرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¬Ù عÙÙ ØÙ٠⪠20â¬ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ÙØ´ÙÙ⬠â«Ù خارâ¬â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙت عÙÙ ØرÙ٠دائرâ¬
â«Ùة⪠\.â¬Ù
سارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Ù
Ù?صÙÙØ© عÙ٠⪠80â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة Ù
٠اÙÙ
ساØØ© ÙتبÙÙ ØرÙØ© اÙسÙر⬠â«ÙاØد ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Ù?Ù Ù٠اتجاÙ) Ù
ع ⪠19â¬Ù
Ø Ùâ¬
â«ØØ© Ù
رÙزÙâ¬
â«Ù
ختÙØØ© عÙÙ Ùسبة اÙÙ⪠20â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة اÙÙ
تبÙÙØ© Ù
٠اÙÙ
ساØØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù
Ùصات Ù
تدÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ستÙÙ ÙعÙ
٠اÙباصات اأÙÙÙردÙÙ٠ذات اأÙرضÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙØ®Ù?ضة ÙØ£ÙظÙ
Ø© جÙ
عâ¬
â«ÙÙا ÙÙ
ÙÙ?Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù
رÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ Ù
تسÙØ© Ù
رÙزÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«âª \.85â¬Ø§ÙÙ
Ø Ùâ¬
â«Øات ÙÙÙÙا عÙÙ ØÙÙâ¬
â«ØªÙ
تØدÙدâ¬
â«Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø© اÙتجارÙâ¬â«Øس٠اÙسرâ¬
â«Ù Ùâ¬â«Ù
Ù
ا Ù
٠شأÙ٠أ٠Ù?â¬
â«ÙابâªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø§Ùبة اÙÙÙ?اذ⪠\.â¬ÙسÙ
Ø Ø°Ù٠بصعÙد ÙاÙداع ÙÙÙ?اذ عÙÙ Ù
ستÙ٠أرض٠أسرâ¬
â«Ø¹ ÙÙرÙ⬠â«Ø¬ اÙÙ
ÙÙع ÙÙ
رâ¬â«Ø§ÙرسÙÙ
خارâ¬
â«ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ´Ù
اÙÙØ© Ø£Ù ÙØÙ٠دÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«ØªØ¬Ù
ع⬠â«Ù⬠â«Øات ÙØجÙ
Ùا Ù
٠أج٠تÙبÙØ© اÙØÙب اÙÙ
تÙÙع Ù?Ù ÙÙ Ù
ÙÙع⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
٠شأ٠اÙØاجة Ø¥Ù٠أسØÙ٠باصات Ùâ¬
â«Ù
زÙدة بباب عÙد اÙجÙة⬠â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ اÙÙ
Ø Ùâ¬
â«Ù٠أÙÙردÙÙÙ ØÙÙÙÙ
ا âª18â¬â¬â«Ø¨Ø§Øµ Ùâ¬
â«Øات اÙسبع ÙاÙعشرÙ٠عÙÙ ÙسÙ
اÙØرÙ٠اÙØ´Ù
اÙ٠اÙسرÙع عرض ⪠5â¬Ø£Ù
تار ÙØÙÙ ÙسÙ
Ø Ø¨Ø§Ø³ØªÙعاب Ù⬠â«Ù Ù?٠اÙÙ
Ù
ر⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ
Ø Ùâ¬â«Ø¨Ø§ØµØ§Øª أخرâ¬
â«Ù⪠Øâ¬ÙبشÙ٠خاص عرضÙاâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«ÙÙتÙÙÙ? Ù
ع Ø٠ااÙرتÙ?ا٠اÙÙائÙ
âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§âªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«ÙتÙ
اختÙار تصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙ
ØØات عÙÙ ÙÙÙبة اÙØرÙ٠اÙدائر⬠â«Ù
ترâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âªPage 49 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ù
ØتÙ
ÙØ© ÙÙ
ستÙدعات اÙباصات اÙت٠ستشÙ
٠اÙÙ
Ùشآت اÙاÙزÙ
Ø© Ù
٠أج٠اÙصÙاÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ÙاÙÙ? ÙخدÙ
Ø© اأÙسØÙ٠اإÙدارÙâ¬
â«Ùة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
Ùشآت⬠â«âªÙ \.86â¬â¬
â«ØªÙ
تØدÙد أربعة Ù
جااÙت ÙÙ
ÙاÙع Ù?â¬
â«ÙÙسائÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙخارجÙØ© Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙة⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠خاÙÙ ÙÙÙبة اÙدائرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙ Ù
٠اÙخدÙ
ات⬠â«Ø³ÙتÙ
تشغÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙع Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتشغÙÙÙØ© ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.87â¬Ø´Ø±ÙØ Ø£Ø³ØÙ٠اÙباصات ÙاÙخدÙ
اتâ¬
â«Ø© بÙ٠⪠14â¬ÙâªÙ 26â¬â¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ØµØ§ Ù
Ù ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Ù?٠اÙساعة⪠\.â¬Ù
Ù Øبرجا⪠Øâ¬Ùجب Ø£Ù⬠â«Ø اÙÙتÙر⬠â«Ø§ØªØ¬Ø§Ù عÙارب اÙساعة Ø£Ù Ù?٠عÙس اتجا٠عÙارب اÙساعة⪠\.â¬ØªØªØ±â¬
â«Ø§Ùâ¬
â«ÙØ© Ø¥Ù٠⪠40â¬ÙÙ
Ù?٠اÙساعة بÙÙ Øبرجا ÙبÙرÙت عÙ٠اÙØرÙ٠اÙسرÙع اÙØ´Ù
اÙÙ ÙاÙ٠⪠25â¬ÙÙ
⬠â«Ø¹Ø§Øª اÙتجارÙâ¬â«ÙÙ Ù?٠ساعات اÙذرÙة⪠\.â¬Ùتص٠اÙسر⬠â«ÙÙ
ر باص ÙاØد Ù٠دÙÙÙتÙÙ⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ø±Ø¶ÙØ© Ù
ÙØ®Ù?ضة تبÙغ ÙدرتÙاâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùذات⬠â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§ÙØ´Ù
اÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙجÙة⬠â«Ø¹ÙÙ⬠â«Ø¨Ø§Ø¨â¬ â«Ù
ع⬠â«ØدÙثة⬠â«Ùâ¬â«Ø£ÙÙردÙÙ⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ØµØ§Øªâ¬ â«ØªØ£Ù
ÙÙ⬠â«Ù
ع⬠â«Ø§ÙذرÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø³Ø§Ø¹Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Ù?Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙخارجÙ⬠â«Ùâ¬â«Ø§Ùدائر⬠â«ÙÙ⬠â«Ø±â¬ â«Ø⬠â«Ø§Ù⬠â«Ø¹ÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ùساعة⬠â«Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ùب Ù?٠ساعة اÙذرÙØ© Ù?٠اÙÙسÙ
اأÙساس٠Ù?Ù⬠â«ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
تÙÙع Øت٠⪠5000â¬Ø±â¬ â«Ø³ØªÙب٠Ù
Ù
رâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت اÙØÙب اÙØاÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙستÙعابÙØ© ⪠150â¬Ø±â¬
â«Ø§Ùب ÙÙ٠باصâªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø© ÙزÙادة Ù
ØتÙ
ÙØ© ÙÙØÙبâ¬
â«Ø© ÙÙÙدر⬠â«Ø§Ø¯Ø®Ø§Ø±â¬
â«Ø§Øª ÙبÙر⬠â«ÙؤÙ
Ù Ù⬠â«Ø«ÙائÙØ© اأÙÙÙردÙÙÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«ÙÙÙ
ÙÙÙا استÙعاب Øت٠⪠8200â¬Ù
ع باصات Ø£ÙÙردÙÙÙ Ù⪠14000â¬Ù
ع باصات Ùâ¬
â«Ù
Ù
ا Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙذرÙØ© Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙعÙ
ÙÙات Ù
ع تØدÙد Ù
ÙÙع اÙÙ
رÙبات اأÙÙتÙÙ
اتÙÙ٠بÙاسØØ© تÙÙÙÙÙجÙا اÙÙظاÙ
â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØ°ÙÙØ© ÙÙ
رâ¬
â«Ø§Ùبة⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ù?٠اÙÙ
ستÙبÙ⪠\.â¬Ù
٠شأ٠جÙ
ع اÙرسÙÙ
عÙ٠أساس تÙÙÙÙÙجÙا اÙبØاÙاتâ¬
â«ÙعÙ
ÙÙات اÙباصاتâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø© اÙرسÙÙ
⬠â«Ø§Ùبة اÙÙ
رÙزÙâ¬
â«ÙØ© Ø¥Ùدار⬠â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
Ù ÙتØدÙد اÙÙ
ÙاÙع أ٠تسÙ
Ø Ø¨Ø§ÙÙ
رâ¬
â«Ùاâ¬
â«Ù
سار⬠â«Ø§Øª اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Ù?٠شبÙØ© ÙÙ٠عاÙ
شاÙ
٠تشÙ
Ù âª20â¬â¬ â«âª \.88â¬ØªÙاÙ
٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
ÙتØسÙ٠اÙÙÙ?اذ ÙاÙساÙÙ
Ø©âªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
تØÙÙ٠تÙاÙ
٠اÙخدÙ
ات ÙÙ
Ù
رâ¬
â«ØسÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ستÙدعات ÙÙباصاتâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø§Ùبة Ù?â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙ⬠â«Ø© بتجÙÙزâ¬
â«Ø§Øª جÙ
ع اÙرسÙÙ
ÙاÙÙظاÙ
اÙعاÙÙ
Ù ÙتØدÙد اÙÙ
ÙاÙع⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
رÙز Ù
ر⬠â«Ùع اÙÙظاÙ
بباصات ØÙÙÙا ⪠10\.5â¬Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ù
جÙز⬠â«ÙÙباصات⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙتÙ
تâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Ø£Ù Ù
Ùâª/â¬Ø¥ÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙ
Ù٠اÙÙÙ?اذ Ø¥ÙÙÙا ضÙ
Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù
Ù
ر⬠â«Ø§Øª خدÙ
ات Ù
اÙئÙ
Ø© ÙسÙÙÙ
Ø©âªÙ? Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø¤Ù
Ù Ùذ٠اÙÙ
سارâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø ÙتÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø¥Ø¶Ø§Ù?ÙØ© ÙÙشارâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª ÙÙباصات⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
Ùشآتâ¬â«ÙÙ
سارâ¬
â«Ù
Ù
ا ÙسÙ
Ø Ø¨ØªÙاÙ
٠سÙس بÙ٠خدÙ
ات اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§Ùباصات اÙÙ
ختÙÙ?Ø© ÙتØÙÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙاÙ?ع اÙÙصÙ٠اÙÙ
تÙÙâ¬
â«Ùعة Ù
٠أÙظÙ
Ø© اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع⬠â«Ø§ØªâªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù
رâ¬
â«Ø¹ اأÙسØÙ٠اÙاÙزÙ
ÙÙذ٠اÙØ®ØÙØ âªÙ 750â¬â¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ØµØ§âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙجÙ
اعÙ⪠\.â¬ÙبÙغ Ù
جÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ? اÙباصات اÙتدابÙر Ù
٠أج٠تØسÙ٠اÙتÙاÙ
٠اÙÙ
اد٠بÙ٠أÙÙ
Ø§Ø Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙÙÙ?اذ Ø¥ÙÙÙا⬠â«âª \.89â¬Ø³ÙدعÙ
اÙتصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙ?ÙÙ ÙÙ
ØØات اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙÙÙØ§Ø ØªÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ عÙÙ Ù
ستÙÙ ÙاØد Ø£Ù Ù
٠خاÙ٠جسÙر⬠â«ÙÙ
اÙئÙ
ا ÙÙÙ
شاة⪠Øâ¬Ø³Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø°Ø§ Ùâ¬
â«Ø¢Ù
Ùا⬠â«Ø³ØªÙدÙ
اÙÙ
Ø Ùâ¬
â«Øات ÙÙÙÙا ÙÙ?ا Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¦ÙØ©)âªÙ \.â¬â¬ â«Ù (عÙ٠سبÙ٠اÙÙ
ثاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙÙ
Ø´Ù ÙاÙدرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø© اÙÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø£Ù Ùسائ٠ÙÙ٠أخرâ¬
â«ÙÙع بÙ
ÙاÙÙ? ÙÙسÙارâ¬
â«Ø§Øªâª Øâ¬ÙÙÙ?اذ سÙÙÙ
ÙØ¢Ù
Ù ÙÙÙ
شاةâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ù تتÙ
تâ¬â«Øا بÙÙ Ùسائ٠اÙÙÙÙ Ù
ع Ùسائ٠ÙÙ٠أخرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¨ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØرÙ?ÙØ© ترâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø³ØªÙدÙ
اÙÙ
Ø Ùâ¬
â«Øات⬠â«ÙÙÙ
شاة Ù
ع Ù
صاعد Øسب ااÙÙتضاءâªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«ØªÙ
â¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© ⪠410â¬Ù
ÙاÙÙ?)âªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø¬Ù (Ùجب إز⬠â«Ø¹ عÙÙ ØÙ٠اÙÙ
Ù
ر اÙÙÙÙب٠اÙخار⬠â«Ø§Øª Ù?٠اÙشار⬠â«Ù ÙÙباصات⪠\.â¬Ø¨ÙÙÙ
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
Ø¥Ùغاء Ù
ÙاÙÙ? اÙسÙار⬠â«ÙÙصاÙت Ù
اÙئÙ
Ø© Ù
ع Ù
سارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª أخرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?ÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øª ÙاÙÙ
ساعدة Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙÙة⬠â«Ø³ÙتÙ
استبداÙÙا (ÙÙ?٠بعض اÙØااÙت⪠Øâ¬Ø²Ùادة عدد اÙÙ
ÙاÙÙ?)⪠\.â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ØªÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Øس٠اÙدر⬠â«ØªØدÙد Ù
ÙاÙع Ùâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙÙØ© ÙÙ
Ùشآت اÙرÙÙ ÙاÙصعÙد اÙت٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø©â¬
â«Ø¢ÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙدÙ
ج اÙرسÙÙ
⪠Øâ¬Ùادارâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øª Ø®ØØ© Ùسائ٠ÙÙ٠غÙر Ù⬠â«Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙستشÙ
Ù Ùذ٠اÙدر⬠â«Ø§Ø¬ ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Ù?٠اÙبÙئة اÙØضرÙâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠⪠2â¬Ø¥Ø¯Ø±â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù
ÙÙÙØ© ضÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø®Ùصâª\.â¬â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاصاÙØات إصدار اÙترâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¦ÙسÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙØر Ùâ¬
â«Ù?Ùة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙاÙÙ?⪠Øâ¬ÙساÙÙ
Ø© اÙØرÙات⪠Øâ¬Ùاعادة ÙÙÙÙØ© شبÙØ© اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙØ®ØØ© اÙر Ùâ¬
â«Øرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³â¬ â«Øات Ù
٠خاÙÙ ÙجÙد Ù⬠â«Ø§Ùبة Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ù
ÙÙØ© ÙÙباصات ÙاÙÙ
Ø Ù⬠â«Ø© بشÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø¬Ùد⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ر⬠â«Ù
Ùارâ¬
â«Øات Ù?⬠â«Ø°Ø§ Ø£Ùثر Ø£ Ùâ¬
â«Ù
اÙا ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù
ع باصات ØدÙثة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
Ø Ù⬠â«Ø³ÙؤÙ
٠اÙÙظاÙ
اÙجدÙد ÙÙ?ا Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª\.90â¬â¬
â«Ù
غÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
٠شأ٠تØسÙ٠اأÙرصÙ?ة⪠Øâ¬ÙجسÙر اÙÙ
شاة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙÙ?اذ Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
Ø Ùâ¬
â«Øات⪠Øâ¬ÙبÙئة اÙÙ
شاة تعزÙز Ù
ÙاÙ?ع اÙÙظاÙ
Ù
Ù ØÙØ« ساÙÙ
Ø© اÙØرÙاتâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø© تÙÙ?ز Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙÙÙØ© Ù?⬠â«ÙÙظاÙ
دائرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙ٠اÙخاصÙÙ Ù
سؤÙÙÙ٠ع٠تشغÙ٠اÙÙظاÙ
ÙصÙاÙتÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
اâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØاعÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاص⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتشغÙÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙتعاÙب⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙÙÙØ© اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«âª \.91â¬Ø§ÙترتÙباتâ¬
â«Ù٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاصâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙØاع Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬ÙبشÙ٠خاص Ù?٠أسØÙ٠اÙباصات⪠\.â¬ØªÙÙÙÙ
اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙ⬠â«Ø¹ Ø¥Ù٠تأÙ
Ù٠اÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠اأÙÙص٠ÙÙÙØاع اÙخاص Ù?٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø³Ùسع٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙØ© ÙتÙÙÙ Ù
Ùضعâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù?ضÙØ© Ù
ع اÙØÙÙÙ
ة⬠â«Ø³ÙتÙ
ااÙتÙ?ا٠عÙ٠اÙØ®Ùارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª Ù?⬠â«Ùدرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø© ÙÙ
ÙØ°Ø Ø§Ø£ÙعÙ
ا٠ÙاÙتÙ
اÙ
اÙÙØاع اÙخاص Ù?٠اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ ÙجرÙا٠عÙÙ ÙدÙ
ÙساÙ⪠\.â¬Ù Ùâ¬
â«âªPage 50 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«ØªØ¤Ùدâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعÙ
ÙÙات⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¬ اÙعرÙض باÙÙسبة Ø¥ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاص ÙاØاÙ٠استدرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙØاع Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù اÙÙØاع اÙخاص ÙاÙسÙÙ ÙØ°ÙÙ Ùب٠ÙÙÙÙØ© اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø³ØªØ´Ø§Ø±â¬
â«Ø§Øª Ù
ع Ù
ستثÙ
رâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øª ااÙستشارÙâ¬
â«Ùة⬠â«Ø¹ اÙت٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
تØسÙÙÙا بشÙ٠أÙبر Ù?٠خاÙ٠اÙدر⬠â«Ø§ÙتشغÙÙÙØ© ÙاÙر Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ø³Ù
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙÙÙÙØ© اÙعاÙ
Ø© ÙÙتÙاÙÙÙ?â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ عÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øª اÙÙائÙ
Ø© ÙتصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§Ùدرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙائÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù?صÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙ
عاÙ
اÙت ÙاÙتصاÙ
ÙÙ
â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¬ÙÙ
â اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬
â«Ù تدÙâ¬
â«Ù?٠اأÙÙ
ÙاÙ⬠â«Ø³Ùجرâ¬
â«Ø© Ù?Ù Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ارâªÙ? \.â¬â¬ â«Ù
رÙز٠Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°ÙÙ ÙظائÙ? اÙÙ
Øاسبة⪠Øâ¬ÙاإÙباÙغ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙتدÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.92â¬Ø³ØªÙÙ٠ترتÙبات اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬
â«Ø¹â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ بتجÙ
Ùع اÙتÙارÙرâ¬â«Ø© Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار⪠\.â¬ÙستÙÙÙ
ÙØدة تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø¹ ÙÙÙ٠بإدارâ¬â«Øدد Ùجب Ù?تØÙ Ù?Ù Ù
صرÙ? ÙبÙا٠ÙÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù
٠خاÙÙ Øساب Ù?â¬
â«Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙÙس٠Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ù
ع Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠ÙتسدÙد أتعاب اÙÙ
ستشارÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ùر ØÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙدÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ÙتÙدÙÙ
Ùا Ø¥Ù٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù
ع تÙار Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙÙ
ÙÙ ÙاÙعاÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙ
جÙسâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùعتبر أداء اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ©âªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.93â¬ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار تجربة Ù
ÙØÙظة Ù?٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شارÙع اÙت٠ÙÙ
ÙÙÙÙا اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠أÙج٠اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬
â«Ù?٠اأÙÙ
ÙاÙâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠إدارâ¬
â«Ø© تدÙ⬠â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙات اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø© اÙÙ
Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙظÙÙ?ÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«ØªØªØÙ
Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ù
رضÙا⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار ÙØدةâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار ØÙ٠اÙÙ
شارÙع اÙÙ
اضÙØ© Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØاÙÙØ©â¬
â«ØªØ¶Ù
ÙØ°Ùâ¬
â«Ø¬Ù ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار تدÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شارÙع اÙت٠ÙÙ
ÙÙÙÙا اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ù Ù⬠â«Ù٠اÙخارâ¬â«Ù اÙÙ
دÙ⬠â«Ø¬Ù Ù
ÙبÙÙâªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«Ø³Ùجر⬠â«ÙاÙÙ
Øاسبة⪠Øâ¬ÙاإÙباÙغ⪠Øâ¬ÙتÙسÙر تدÙÙ٠خارâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شارÙع اÙت٠ÙÙ
ÙÙÙÙا اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙسÙÙÙ٠أØدÙÙ
Ù
سؤÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ù٠عÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø© اÙÙ
اÙئÙ
Ø© Ù?٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° ترتÙبات اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø© Ù
سؤÙÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù
اÙÙÙ٠اÙتسبÙا أصاÙ٠اÙخبر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙظÙÙ?ÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØدةâ¬
â«Ø¹âª\.â¬â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙذا اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªÙÙ?ÙØ° ترتÙبات اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬
â«Ø³ÙدÙر Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© باÙÙسبة Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ارâªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø¨Ø§Ø±Ø² Ù
رتب Ùâ¬
â«Øا باإÙدار⬠â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± غÙاب اÙصÙاÙØ© اÙÙ
اÙئÙ
Ø© ÙÙÙائÙ
اأÙصÙ٠تØدÙا Ùا⬠â«âªÙ? \.94â¬â¬
â«Ø© اÙÙ
ا Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء⬠â«Ø¹ Ù
٠أج٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØد Ù
٠اÙÙ
خاØر اÙÙ
رتبØØ© باإÙدار⬠â«Ø§Ø© ضÙ
٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شترâ¬
â«Ø© اأÙصÙÙ Ù?⬠â«ÙبرÙ
جÙات Ù
Øاسبت٠Ùâ¬
â«Øرصا عÙÙ Øس٠إدار⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙØدة اأÙصÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¹âª\.â¬â¬â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© تزÙÙد Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠بسج٠اأÙصÙ٠عÙد اÙتÙاء اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙاإÙعÙ
ارâ¬
â«Ø¯Ø§Ù ⪠-â¬Ø§ÙتÙرÙدâ¬
â«Ùظر Ø¥Ù٠تجربة Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار اÙØÙÙÙØ© Ù?٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شارÙع اÙت٠Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙ
ÙÙÙا⬠â«Ø© اÙتÙرÙد Ùد٠اÙÙÙاÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù?ذة Ù
اÙئÙ
Ø© بشÙ٠عاÙ
Ùا⬠â«âªÙ? \.95â¬â¬
â«ØªØ¹ØªØ¨Ø± Ùدرâ¬
â«Ù اÙذ٠اÙتÙÙ Ù?٠⪠31â¬ÙاÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø¹ تØÙÙر اÙÙÙ٠اÙØضر⬠â«Ø± Ù
شرÙ⬠â«ÙدÙر Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ؤخ Ùا⬠â«Ø¹ Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙØ°Ù Ùا٠Ù?⬠â«Ø¬Ùات Ù
اÙØة⪠\.â¬Ø³Ù?â¬
â«ÙÙÙÙ?Ø° اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«ÙعÙ٠باÙخبرâ¬
â«Ø© اÙاÙزÙ
Ø©âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø£Ø®ØµØ§Ø¦Ù٠تÙرÙد Ù
ÙاسبÙÙ ÙتÙ
تâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£Ø®ØµØ§Ø¦ÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù?ÙÙÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø¯ÙسÙ
بر ⪠\.2015â¬ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار بÙ٠إدارâ¬
â«Ø© صÙبة ÙعÙ
Ù Ù?ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬Øسب اÙضرÙرâ¬
â«Ø©âª Øâ¬ÙدعÙ
Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار ÙÙ
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø¥Ø¶Ø§Ù?ÙÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙØدة تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£Ø®ØµØ§Ø¦ÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙ
ا سÙتÙ
تÙظÙÙ?â¬
â«ØªÙ
تصÙÙÙ?⬠â«Ù٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاص⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ùجب Ù
Ù
ارسة اÙعÙاÙØ© Ù?Ù ØÙ?ظ اÙسجاÙت ÙضÙ
ا٠Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙعÙØ© اÙتÙÙÙÙ
âªÙ \.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙØاع Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø© عÙÙد اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شتر٠Ù?٠إدارâ¬
â«Ù أداء اÙÙÙاÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ?ذة⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ùâ¬â«Ø¹ تØÙÙر اÙÙÙ٠اÙØضرâ¬â«ÙصÙÙ? تÙرÙر اÙÙتائج ÙاستÙÙ
ا٠اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° ÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø£ÙÙا Ù?â¬
â«Ù
رضÙة⬠â«Ø¥Ø¯Ø§Ø±â¬
â«Ø© اÙعÙÙد ÙÙ
عاÙجة اÙتÙرÙد عÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«ÙتÙ
تدرÙبÙا عÙ٠إØار⬠â«Ø© عÙ٠إجرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øª ÙÙثائ٠اÙعØاءات ÙÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± اÙÙÙاÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ?ذة Ù
Ùâ¬
â«ØÙع Ù⬠â«Ù
رض⪠\.â¬ØªÙ? Ù⬠â«Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار⪠Øâ¬Ø¹ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙ Ù?â¬
â«ÙØ© ÙتÙÙÙ Ù
ÙبÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø© Ù
Ù Ùب٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹Ø© اÙÙثائ٠اÙÙ
عÙارÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø¡ تÙدÙÙ
عØاءات عÙ٠اÙÙ
ستÙ٠اÙÙ
ØÙÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø³ØªØªÙ
Ù
ر⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙرÙد اÙجدÙد ÙعÙد إجرâ¬
â«âªPage 51 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙجÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙتÙ
تØبÙ٠اأÙÙظÙ
Ø© ÙاÙØ®ØÙØ⬠â«Ø¹âª \.â¬Ù Ùâ¬â«ØªØ¨Ø¹ Ø¥Øار اÙتÙرÙد اÙجدÙد ÙÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù?٠خاÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«Ø¹ اÙتاÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùت٠تÙ⬠â«Ø³Øª ÙÙâ¬
â«Øب٠ترتÙبات تÙرÙد اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«âªÙ? \.96â¬â¬
â«Ùع Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙ
ÙÙÙا ÙرÙض اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙØ¥ÙÙشاء ÙاÙتعÙ
Ùر ÙÙ
ÙØ Ø§ÙÙÙاÙØ© اÙدÙÙÙØ© ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙائتÙ
اÙاتÙا"âªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙتÙجÙÙÙØ© ÙÙ
Ùع اÙÙ?ساد ÙااÙØتÙا٠ÙÙ
ÙاÙ?ØتÙÙ
ا Ù?Ù Ù
شار Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتاÙÙØ©âª( :â¬Ø£) اÙØ®ØÙØâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙجÙÙÙØ© ÙÙ
ÙاÙ?ØØ© اÙÙ?ساد)⬠â«Ùبدءا Ù
٠⪠1â¬ØªÙ
Ùزâª/â¬ÙÙÙÙÙ âª( 2016â¬Ø§ÙØ®ØÙØ⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹Ø© Ù?Ù ÙاÙ٠اÙثاÙÙâª/â¬ÙÙاÙر âªÙ 2011â¬â¬ â«Ø© Ù?٠⪠15â¬ØªØ´Ø±Ù٠اأÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø£ÙتÙبر ⪠2006â¬Ù Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ر Ù⬠â«Ø§Ùصادرâ¬
â«Ø© Ù?٠تÙ
Ùزâª/â¬ÙÙÙÙÙ âª2016â¬â¬ â«ÙØ© ÙغÙر ااÙستشارÙâ¬
â«ÙØ©" اÙتابعة ÙÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùصادر⬠â«Ù(ب) "اÙتÙرÙد Ù?٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شارÙع ااÙستثÙ
ارÙâ¬
â«Ùة⪠:â¬Ø§ÙسÙع⪠Øâ¬ÙاأÙشغاÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙخدÙ
ات ااÙستشارÙâ¬
â«ÙØ© عÙÙ Ùذا اأÙساس⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا⬠â«Ø³ÙتÙ
تØدÙد Øر٠اÙتÙرÙد ÙØ£ÙشغاÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙسÙع⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙخدÙ
ات غÙر ااÙستشارÙâ¬
â«Ùة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙخدÙ
ات ااÙستشارÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹Ø© Ù?٠تشرÙ٠اÙثاÙÙâª/â¬ÙÙÙ?Ù
بر âªÙ \.2017â¬â¬ â«ÙÙ?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
رâ¬
â«Ø© اÙÙÙاÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ?ذة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
ÙاءÙ
Ø© اÙسÙÙ ÙجÙÙزÙâ¬
â«Ùت٠ÙاÙستجابة ÙÙØ®Øر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù?ص٠ÙÙدرâ¬
â«ÙÙ⬠â«Ø¹ ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙÙد اإÙعداد Ù
٠أج٠تغØÙØ© اÙتÙÙÙÙ
⬠â«Ø£Ù استر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ØªÙجÙØ© تÙرÙد اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹âª \.â¬ÙبÙ
Ùجب اÙÙ?Ùرâ¬
â«Ø© ⪠5\.9â¬Ù
Ù "Ø£ÙظÙ
ة⬠â«Ø§ØªÙجÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© إعداد Ø®ØØ© تÙرÙد Ùâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙÙØ© ÙÙ
د٠ØÙاة اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ØºÙر اÙÙ
ÙظÙر ÙرزÙ
اÙتÙرÙد⪠\.â¬ÙعÙ٠أساس Ùتائج Ùذ٠ااÙستر Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
â¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹Ø© Ù?٠تشرÙ٠اÙثاÙÙâª/â¬ÙÙÙ?Ù
بر âª( )2017â¬Ø£ÙظÙ
Ø© اÙتÙرÙد)âªÙ Øâ¬â¬â«Ù
ر Ù⬠â«Ù" (اÙصادرâ¬
â«Ø© Ù?٠تÙ
Ùزâª/â¬ÙÙÙÙ٠⪠2016â¬Ùا٠Ù?⬠â«Ø¹ ااÙستثÙ
ارâ¬â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙÙتÙرÙد ÙÙ
Ùترض٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùتتبع اÙÙ
ÙÙج٠ÙÙتباداÙت Ù?٠اÙتÙرÙد) ÙÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù
٠أج٠إعداد Ø®ØØ Ø§ÙتÙرÙد⪠Øâ¬ÙاعتÙ
ادÙا⪠Øâ¬ÙتØدÙØ«Ùا⪠Øâ¬Ùاجرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ Ù
باداÙت اÙتÙرÙد ÙÙÙا باÙÙسبة⬠â«Ø§Ø³ØªØ®Ø¯Ø§Ù
ÙظاÙ
"ستاب" ( Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
سبÙâ¬
â«Ø±Ø¶ Ù?⬠â«Ø§Ø¶ اÙÙ
سب٠ÙÙ?ÙÙÙا⪠\.â¬ÙعÙÙ Ø®ØØ© اÙتÙرÙد أ٠تضÙ
عتبات ااÙستع ا⬠â«ÙستخدÙ
ÙÙ
ستÙدع ÙÙثائ٠اÙتÙرÙد ÙØ£ÙÙØ´ØØ© دÙ٠عتبات ااÙستعر⬠â«Ø¹âª \.â¬ÙÙ
ا سÙ?â¬â«Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
رتبØØ© بÙ
خاØر عÙÙد Ù?â¬
â«Ù
عتدÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙ Ù?٠اÙسÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙجب⬠â«Ø§Ø¡ بعثات اإÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§Ù? Ù
رتÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙزÙ
ÙÙØ© ÙتÙÙÙÙ
اÙعرÙض⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ùجب إجرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
ؤشر اÙÙÙ?اءة اÙÙ
Ø±ØªØ¨Ø Ø¨Ù
عاÙجة اÙتÙرÙد ÙاÙÙ?ترâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«âª \.97â¬Ø±ØµØ¯ اÙتÙرÙد⪠\.â¬Ùجب رصد Ùâ¬
â«Ø ÙÙÙ
تÙا بÙÙ âª25â¬â¬â«Ø§Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶Ùا Ùب٠Ù
ÙØ Ø§ÙعرÙØ¶Ø ÙÙجب أ٠تخضع Ù
جÙ
Ùعات اأÙشغا٠اÙت٠تتر⬠â«Øددة Ø¥Ù٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠اÙستعر⬠â«ØªÙدÙÙ
اÙÙ
عاÙ
اÙت Ù
ا Ù?Ù٠اÙعتبات Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø ÙÙÙ
Ø© خدÙ
اتÙا بÙ٠⪠6â¬Ù⪠30â¬Ù
ÙÙÙÙâ¬â«Ø§Ù⬠â«Ø ÙÙÙ
تÙا بÙ٠⪠10â¬Ù⪠75â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙشرÙات ااÙستشارÙØ© اÙت٠تتر⬠â«Ø§Ù⬠â«Ù⪠155â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙسÙع اÙت٠تترâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶ اÙتÙرÙد اÙتشغÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ùجب تÙزÙعâ¬
â«ØددتÙا ÙجÙØ© استعرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
سب٠اÙت٠Ù⬠â«Ø§Ù Ù ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶ Ù?â¬â«Øº عتبات ااÙستعر⬠â«ØªÙÙع Ø£Ù٠عÙد بÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ ÙÙ
ستشار اÙتÙرÙد اإÙÙÙÙÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬Ù Ù?⬠â«Ø¯Ùâ¬
â«Ø© اÙØÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬â«Ø§Ø¶Ùا Ù?Ù Ù?تر⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
تبÙÙØ© ÙÙÙÙا Ø¥Ù٠عÙÙات سÙÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙا Ùاستعرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØÙ
ائÙØ©)â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© (بÙ
ا Ù?ÙÙا اإÙجرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ùاء â اأÙÙجÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙبÙة⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙÙÙ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت بشÙ٠أساس٠ضÙ
Ù Ø٠ااÙرتÙ?ا٠ÙÙØرÙ٠اÙسرÙعâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¶Ù Ù
٠بÙ٠أبرز اآÙثار⬠â«âªÙ? \.98â¬â¬
â«Ùعتبر استÙ
اÙ٠اأÙرâ¬
â«ØØ© اÙØر Ùâ¬
â«Ù?ÙØ© Ù?Ù⬠â«Ø¬Ø§ Ø¥Ù٠بÙرÙت⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ستÙدع اÙباصات⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
Ø Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¶Ù اÙدائÙ
بتÙسÙع اÙØرÙ٠اÙسرÙع Ù?٠بعض أجزâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¦Ùا Ù
Ù Øبر⬠â«ÙاÙØرÙات اÙÙائÙ
ة⪠\.â¬ÙسÙسÙ
Ø Ø§Ø³ØªÙ
اÙ٠اأÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶ Ù?Ù ÙØ°Ù⬠â«ÙتÙ
تØدÙد Ù
غتصبÙâª/â¬Ù
ÙتÙÙ٠أرâ¬â«Ø§Ø¶ ÙÙÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠أ٠استÙ
اÙ٠إضاÙ?٠أÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Øبرجا⪠\.â¬ÙÙ٠تÙØÙ٠اأÙشغا٠عÙ٠اÙØرÙات⪠Øâ¬Ø¥Ù٠جاÙب اÙØرÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتشغÙÙÙØ© ⪠4\.12â¬ÙÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¶ÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«ØªÙ
إعداد Ø®ØØ© عÙ
٠إÙعادة اإÙسÙا٠عÙ٠أساس اÙسÙاسة⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙبÙØ© اÙÙ
رتبØØ© باستÙ
اÙ٠اأÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙاØÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
٠أج٠اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? Ù
٠اآÙثارâ¬
â«Ø¹ÙØ© اإÙجرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙ⪠\.â¬ØªØ´Ù
٠آثار إعادة اÙسÙ٠ااÙستÙ
اÙ٠اÙدائÙ
ÙÙ⪠22244â¬Ù
âª2â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙØÙعÙØ©) ÙبÙ
Ùجب اأÙÙظÙ
Ø© ÙاÙÙÙاÙÙ٠ذات اÙصÙØ© اÙÙ
رâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙ (إعادة اÙسÙ٠غÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶Ù⪠Øâ¬Ù
ا Ù
جÙ
Ùع٠âª26â¬â¬ â«Ùر Ø°Ù٠عÙ٠⪠5â¬Ø£Ø³Ø± Ù
Ù Ù
غتصب٠ÙÙ
ÙتÙÙ٠اأÙر⬠â«Ùر عÙ٠⪠24â¬ÙØعة أرض ÙÙ
ÙÙÙا ⪠10â¬Ù
اÙÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³Ùؤث⬠â«Ø§Ø¶Ù⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùت٠ستؤث⬠â«Ù
٠اأÙرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتصادÙØ©âªØâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³ØªÙصائÙØ© اجتÙ
اعÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Ùرâ¬
â«Ø©âª Øâ¬Ùدر⬠â«Ùجردة ÙØ£ÙصÙ٠اÙÙ
تأثâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
Ù?صاÙÙ ÙÙÙاس اÙÙ
تأثâ¬
â«ÙرÙÙâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø¥Øصاء Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªÙ
إعداد Ø®ØØ© عÙ
٠إÙعادة اإÙسÙا٠تشÙ
Ùâ¬â«Ø´Ø®ØµØ§âª \.â¬ÙÙد Ùâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§ØªÙا Ùجب اتâ¬
â«ÙباعÙا⬠â«ØªÙ?اصÙÙ ØÙ٠شرÙØ Ø³Ùاسة إعادة اإÙسÙا٠Ùاجرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹âª \.â¬ÙÙ
ا تÙ?عØÙ Ø®ØØ© اÙعÙ
٠إÙعادة اإÙسÙاÙâ¬â«ÙرÙ٠باÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§Øª Ù
ÙØ«â¬
â«ÙÙ?Ø© Ù
ع اأÙشخاص اÙÙ
تأث⬠â«Ùاستشارâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤسسÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
Ùز Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙØ© إعادة⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù
عداÙت اÙتعÙÙض⪠Øâ¬ÙتدابÙر اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? Ù
٠أج٠استرداد اÙÙ
داخÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙترتÙبات اÙرصد ÙاÙترتÙبات⬠â«Ù?٠خاÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¥ÙسÙاÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«âªPage 52 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø¡âª Øâ¬Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙÙÙÙâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø± تسÙÙÙ ØرÙØ© اÙسÙر Ùادخار ÙÙت ااÙÙتÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙتØسÙÙ ÙÙ٠اÙÙ?Ùر⬠â«Ø¥Ùجاب٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø©âª Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠غر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¬ØªÙ
اع٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø¢Ø«Ø§Ø±â¬
â«Ø¹ اÙÙ
ÙØªØ±Ø Ø¨Ø´Ù٠أساس٠Ùاâ¬â«âª \.99â¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙد اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹â¬ â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø© Ø£ÙساÙ
Ù
Ù Ùذ٠اÙÙØ«ÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙÙ
ا عÙد Ù
ÙاÙشة Ø£ÙداÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø¥Ø¶Ø§Ù?ÙØ©âªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«ØªÙ
تÙ?صÙÙ Ùذ٠اÙÙ
ÙاÙ?ع ضÙ
Ù Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙتØسÙ٠ظرÙÙ? ساÙÙ
Ø© اÙØرÙات⪠Øâ¬ÙاستØداث Ù?رص عÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙÙت سابÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«ØªÙ
تØدÙد اÙÙ
خاØر ÙاآÙثار⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙبÙØ© Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØتÙ
ÙØ© اأÙخر ⪠\.â¬Ù?٠إØار تÙÙÙÙ
اأÙثر ااÙجتÙ
اع٠ÙاÙبÙئÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.100â¬ÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ØªÙ
تØدÙد بعض اÙÙ
خاØر ÙاآÙثارâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙاÙÙÙÙÙÙØâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
شغÙ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
âª/â¬Ø§Ùباصات اÙÙائÙ
Ø©Ø Ù(ب) اآÙثار عÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù
شغÙ٠اÙباصات غÙر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØتÙ
ÙØ© Ù
Ù Ùâ¬â«Ø§Ø¶Ø§Øª Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙبÙØ© اÙÙ
ØتÙ
ÙØ© اÙتاÙÙØ©âª( :â¬Ø£) ااÙعترâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ©â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اأÙجرâ¬
â«Ø© اÙÙ
شترÙØ©Ø⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© عÙ٠سائÙ٠سÙارâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¡ اÙØرÙØ§ØªØ Ù(د) اآÙثارâ¬â«Ø¹ Ù?٠بعض أجز⬠â«Ø§ÙØ© اÙØ®Ø Ø§ÙÙسØÙ ÙاÙÙ
ÙاÙÙ? Ù?٠اÙØ´Ùار⬠â«Ù(ج) اÙÙ
ÙاÙÙ
Ø© اÙعاÙ
Ø© إزâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ إزâ¬
â«ØªÙ?اصÙ٠بشأ٠Ùذ٠اآÙثار ÙتدابÙر اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ?⪠\.â¬ÙÙ?Ù Ù
Ùازâ¬
â«Ø§Ø©â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ù(Ù) تبدÙ٠عادة اÙÙ
ÙاØÙÙ٠ااÙجتÙ
اعÙâ¬
â«ÙØ© بشأ٠استخداÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
⪠\.â¬ÙØ´Ù
٠تÙÙÙÙ
اأÙثر ااÙجتÙ
اع٠ÙاÙبÙئÙâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙØ© تÙÙÙÙ
اأÙثر ااÙجتÙ
اع٠ÙاÙبÙئ٠Ùاعداد Ø®ØØ© عÙ
٠إÙعادة اإÙسÙاÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙد Ø£Ù?جرÙت ااÙستشارâ¬
â«Ø§Øªâ¬ â«ÙÙ?Ø© Ù
ع جÙات Ùâ¬
â«Ù
عÙÙØ© Ù
ختÙÙ?Ø© Ù?٠خاÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù?جرÙت استشارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª Ù
ÙØ«â¬
â«Ù
ØÙÙÙÙâªØâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙبÙدÙات⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ستخدÙ
Ù ÙÙ٠عاÙ
Ù
ØتÙ
ÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ÙÙÙ
ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØÙÙÙ
ÙÙÙâªØâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©âª Øâ¬ÙÙ
ÙاباÙت Ùâ¬
â«Ù?ردÙØ© Ù
ع Ù
سؤÙÙÙÙ⬠â«Ùزâ¬
â«Ù
٠خاÙ٠اجتÙ
اعات عاÙ
ة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ÙاÙشات Ù
جÙ
Ùعات Ù
رÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù?صÙØ© Ù?٠تÙÙÙÙ
اأÙثر ااÙجتÙ
اع٠ÙاÙبÙئ٠ÙØ®ØØ© اÙعÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªÙ
تÙØ®Ùص اÙÙتائجâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶ÙâªÙ \.â¬â¬ â«Ø©âª Øâ¬ÙاأÙشخاص اÙÙ
تأثâ¬
â«ÙرÙ٠باستÙ
اÙ٠اأÙر⬠â«ÙÙ
شغÙ٠باصات⪠Øâ¬ÙسائÙ٠سÙارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª أجر⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø© اÙجدÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙتزÙ
Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار بإعداد Ø®ØØ Ø§Ø¥Ùدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø¥Ùعادة اإÙسÙاÙ⪠\.â¬ÙبÙ
ا أ٠تÙÙÙÙ
اأÙثر ااÙجتÙ
اع٠ÙاÙبÙئ٠Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙ
إعداد٠عÙ٠أساس درâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?ÙØ©) اÙخاصة باÙÙ
ÙÙع Ù?٠إØار Ù
جÙ
Ùعات اÙتصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙÙائÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
٠أج٠اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? Ù
٠اآÙثار عÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙئÙة⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙئÙØ© اÙخاصة باÙÙ
ÙÙع (Ø®ØØ Ø§Ø¥Ùدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø³Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ùا⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙئÙØ© اÙخاصة باÙÙ
ÙÙع⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùت٠Ù?⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØÙاتÙØ© Ù?Ù Ø®ØØ© اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø¬ Ø®ØØ© ÙتØسÙ٠اÙظرÙÙ?⬠â«ÙÙ
شغÙ٠اÙباصات اÙÙائÙ
ÙÙ ÙاÙسائÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ØªÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø¯Ø±â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØÙاتÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙظرÙÙ?â¬
â«ØâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø¥ÙÙ
ا أعربت⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙÙØ© اÙت٠Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙ
ت استشارتÙا ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت اÙÙ
Ùتر⬠â«Ù⬠â«ØºØ§ÙبÙØ© اÙجÙاتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªØ¤Ùدâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙÙعتÙ
دÙا Ùب٠اÙØاÙ٠اأÙشغاÙ⪠\.â¬ÙبشÙ٠عاÙ
âªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«ØªØªØر٠خØØ© اÙعÙ
٠إÙعادة اإÙسÙاÙâªØâ¬â¬â«Ø§Øªâª \.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات ااÙستÙ
اÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاآÙثار عÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù
شغÙ٠اÙباصات اÙÙائÙ
ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ÙاÙÙ? اÙسÙار⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ù Ø´ÙاغÙÙا بشأ٠اÙتعÙÙض عÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙÙÙÙ (ØÙاÙ?ز ÙاÙÙضÙ
اÙ
Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙظاÙ
اÙجدÙد⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù استئجارâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙ
شغÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات اÙتعÙÙض Ùاجرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øª ااÙستÙ
اÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨ÙÙÙ
ا جرت Ù
ÙاÙشة تدابÙر اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ?⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙتÙ?صÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙØ© اÙتØÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙÙ
Ø Ø§Ø³ØªØ®Ø¯Ø§Ù
ÙسائÙâ¬â«Ù?Ù ØرÙØ© اÙسÙر⪠Øâ¬ÙزÙادة Ù⬠â«(تØس٠تدÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙعÙ
ÙÙات)Ø ÙÙ
ستخدÙ
٠اÙØرÙاتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¤ÙØ§Ø Ø£Ù ØªØÙÙ٠اÙتÙاÙ
Ù Ù?Ù⬠â«ØªØ±â¬
â«Ø§Ø®Ùص Ù
ÙجÙدة أ٠شرâ¬
â«Ø© (عدد Ø£Ùبر Ù
٠اÙزبائ٠اÙÙ
ØتÙ
ÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ?اذ Ø£Ù?ض٠إÙ٠اÙÙ
تاجر) Ù?٠أÙساÙ
Ù
ختÙÙ?Ø© Ù
Ù Ùذ٠اÙÙØ«ÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ا Ù٠اÙØا٠Ù?٠اÙجزâ¬
â«Ø¡ ⪠Ø5â¬Ù
خاØر اÙجÙات⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
)Ø ÙاÙتجارâ¬
â«Ù?رâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙÙØ©âªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«ØªÙ
اÙÙØ´Ù? ع٠خØØ© عÙ
٠إعادة اإÙسÙا٠Ù?٠اÙبÙد Ù?٠⪠20â¬ØªØ´Ø±Ù٠اأÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø£ÙتÙبر âª( 2017â¬Ø¹Ù٠اÙÙ
ÙÙع ااÙÙÙترÙÙÙ ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار) ÙÙÙ Ù
تÙÙ⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙ
عرض اÙتÙرÙر اÙÙÙائ٠ÙØ®ØØ© عÙ
٠إعادة اإÙسÙا٠عÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙÙع اإÙÙÙترÙÙ٠اÙخارج٠ÙÙبÙÙ⬠â«ÙرÙÙØ© Ù?Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù
Ùر Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ù⬠â«Ø¹ÙÙ Ø´ÙÙ Ùسخات Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙ Ù?٠⪠24â¬ØªØ´Ø±Ù٠اأÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø£ÙتÙبر âª\.2017â¬â¬
â«Ø£Ø© ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
⪠\.â¬Ø´Ø§Ø±Ùت اÙÙساء⬠â«ØªØ¹ باÙÙ
صداÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ ÙÙâ¬
â«ØªÙÙع أ٠تتضاعÙ? Ùسبة استخداÙ
اÙÙ
ر⬠â«âª \.101â¬Ø³ØªØ³ØªÙ?Ùد اÙÙساء بشÙÙ ÙبÙر Ù
٠اÙÙÙ٠اآÙÙ
Ù ÙاÙÙظÙÙ? ÙاÙØ°Ù ÙتÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù Ù?â¬
â«Ø£Ø© ÙÙ
ÙاÙشتÙا⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
اâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¨ ع٠شÙاغ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙخاصة باÙÙ
رâ¬â«Ù ااÙعرâ¬â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°ÙÙ ØÙ٠تÙÙÙÙ
اأÙثر ااÙجتÙ
اع٠ÙاÙبÙئ٠Ùجرâ¬â«Ø§Øª ØÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«Ø¨Ø´ÙÙ ÙØ§Ø´Ø Ù?٠ااÙستشارâ¬
â«Ùعا ÙÙ
اÙØظات اÙÙ
شارÙÙ٠اÙÙ
سترجعة عÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Øª أجرâ¬
â«Ø©) ÙاÙÙجÙات Ø´Ù
Ùت تÙز Ù⬠â«Ø§Øªâª Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§ØµØ§Øªâª Øâ¬Ø³Ùار⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙÙØ© ÙÙسائ٠اÙÙÙÙ (سÙارâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³ØªÙصائÙØ© ØÙ٠اÙتÙ?ضÙاÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£Ù?جرÙت درâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø©â¬
â«ØاÙÙا تÙ?تÙر Ø¥Ù٠بدÙ٠آÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ø© ÙÙâ¬â«Ø§Ø§ÙستÙصائÙØ© أ٠اÙÙ
رâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øªâ¬
â«Ø§Øª ÙاÙدرâ¬â«Ø§ÙجÙسÙة⪠\.â¬ÙأظÙرت Ùتائج ااÙستشارâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ستÙ٠اÙدخÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù⬠â«Ø¹ ااÙجتÙ
اعÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ?ئة اÙعÙ
رÙâ¬â«Ø£Ø³Ø§Ø³ اÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¯Ø®ÙÙ٠أدÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùظر Ø¥ÙÙ Ø´Ùاغ٠اÙساÙÙ
Ø© Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتØرش Ù?Ù Ùسائ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
اÙÙائÙ
Ø© Ù?٠اÙÙÙت اÙØاضر⪠\.â¬Ù?تعتÙ
د اÙÙساء اÙÙÙاتÙ⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙÙ
صداÙÙØ©âªÙ Øâ¬Ø§â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùعâ¬â«ÙÙÙ
رÙبات اÙخاصة ÙتÙ
تâ¬
â«ØºÙ
٠عÙ٠استخداÙ
Ùسائ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
اÙÙائÙ
Ø© ÙغÙر اآÙÙ
Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙÙد أعربت اÙÙساء⬠â«Ø©) Ø£Ù Ù?â¬
â«Ùر⬠â«Ø© ÙاØدة ÙÙ٠أسرâ¬
â«Ø³Ùارâ¬
â«ØاجاتÙÙ Ù
Ù ØÙØ« اÙÙÙÙ (عادة Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¬ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ùسد⬠â«ØاÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙا عÙ٠أز٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ø¥ÙÙâ¬â«Ø³ÙتØر٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ØØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙÙعÙØ© اÙخدÙ
ات ÙاÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙابÙÙØ© اÙÙÙ?اذ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙدâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø٠اÙضÙØ¡ عÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙساÙÙ
Ø©âªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø¹ بشÙ٠عاÙ
Ùس٠Ù⬠â«ØªÙ
ت استشار Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙ٠ع٠دعÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙات٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Øªâ¬â«Ø¨Ø§ÙÙ
صداÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙتØسÙÙ ÙظاÙ
اأÙÙ
Ù (ÙاÙ
Ùرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Øاجات اÙÙساء Ù
٠خاÙÙ (Ø£) تØسÙ٠ساÙÙ
Ø© اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù
٠خاÙ٠تدرÙب سائÙ٠اÙباصات⪠Øâ¬ÙØ®ÙÙ ÙÙÙات Ø´ÙاÙ٠تتÙ
تâ¬
â«Ùعâ¬
â«ÙÙعÙØ© Ù
٠خاÙ٠باصات ØدÙثة ÙÙظÙÙ?ة⪠Øâ¬ÙجداÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø²Ù
ÙÙة⬠â«Ø§Ø³ Ø£Ù
Ù)Ø Ù(ب) تأÙ
Ù٠خدÙ
ات Ù?â¬
â«Ù
رÙØØ© Ùذات Ù⬠â«Øات ÙاÙباصات⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ØØات Ø¥ÙارتÙا Ùâ¬
â«Ø¬Ùدة⪠Øâ¬ÙØر⬠â«Ù?٠اÙÙ
Ø Ùâ¬
â«âªPage 53 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© Ù
Ù⬠â«ÙÙØ© اÙÙÙ?اذ Ø¥Ù٠اÙبÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Øª Ù
ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
غذÙØ©Ø Ù(ج) تØسÙÙ Ùاب Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø®ØØ ÙÙا بشÙ٠جÙد⪠Øâ¬ÙدÙ
ج جÙد ÙخدÙ
ات اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⪠Øâ¬ÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙ
سار Ù?â¬
â«Ø§Øª عبÙر ÙÙÙ
شاة Ø¢Ù
ÙØ©Ø Ù(د) تÙظÙÙ
ØÙ
اÙت ÙÙتÙعÙØ© بشأ٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتØرش اÙجÙسÙ⪠\.â¬ÙستبÙ⬠â«Ø®Ø§ÙÙ Ù
ØØات ÙسÙ٠اÙÙصÙ٠إÙÙÙا (Ù
صاعد)⪠Øâ¬ÙأرصÙ?Ø© ÙسÙ٠اÙÙÙ?اذ Ø¥ÙÙÙاâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«ÙÙ
Ù
رâ¬
â«Ø¹â¬ â«Ø¸Ø§ عÙ٠تØسÙ٠خدÙ
Ø© اÙÙÙ٠إÙ٠اÙÙساء⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع تضاعÙ? اÙÙسبة ا٠Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ئÙÙØ© Ù
٠اÙÙساء اÙÙÙات٠ÙستخدÙ
٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?٠إØار Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø£Ø«Ø± اÙجابÙâ¬
â«ÙÙا Ù
ÙØÙ Ù⬠â«Ø¹ Ùاâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجدÙدâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¹ ÙÙ
عاÙجتÙا⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ
٠اÙÙدÙ? اأÙساسÙâ¬â«Ø«Ø±Ù٠باÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù
تعددة اÙÙ
ستÙÙات ÙتسجÙ٠اÙØ´ÙاÙÙ Ù
٠جÙات Ùâ¬
â«Ù
عÙÙØ© Ù
ختÙÙ?Ø© Ùأشخاص Ù
تأ Ù⬠â«Ø¹ ترتÙبات Ùâ¬â«âª \.102â¬Ø³ÙØ´Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹â¬â«ÙرÙÙ ÙرÙ?ع اÙØ´ÙاÙÙ ÙاÙبØØ« ع٠ØÙÙ٠عÙدÙ
ا ÙعتبرÙ٠أ٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ù?٠تأÙ
ÙÙ Ùسائ٠ÙاضØØ© ÙÙابÙØ© ÙÙÙ
ساءÙØ© ÙØ£Ùشخاص اÙÙ
تأثâ¬â«Ø¢ÙÙÙØ© Ù
عاÙجة اÙØ´ÙاÙ٠اÙتابعة ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتØرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØد Ù
٠اÙØ®Øر اÙÙائÙ
عÙ٠أ٠اÙØ´ÙاÙ٠اÙت٠ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ÙتÙ
⬠â«Ø¹ Ù
٠خاÙÙ Ù⬠â«ØªÙدÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ÙتÙ?اعÙÙØ© أ٠تÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¢ÙÙØ© Ù
عاÙجة Ø´ÙاÙÙ Ù?اعÙØ©â¬
â«Ø£ÙØ٠اأÙذ٠بÙÙ
⪠\.â¬Ù
٠شأ٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اءâ¬â«Øدد Ù?Ù ÙØدة تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«Ù
ÙÙ⬠â«Ø£Ù اÙعاÙ
⪠\.â¬Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
تعÙÙ٠شخص Ù?⬠â«ÙاÙÙÙÙØ© ØÙÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù اÙتبا٠سÙب٠ÙÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª Ù?٠اÙبÙاء⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù إجرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Ø¥ÙÙÙا تÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø³Ø¨Ø¨ تأخÙرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙÙÙ٠عÙد ÙÙ Ù
ستÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø®ØÙة⪠\.â¬Ø³ØªÙÙ٠اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات ÙاÙتصا٠باأÙشخاصâ¬
â«Ø© Ø£Ù Ù⬠â«Ø´Ù?ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¡ ÙاÙت Ø´ÙÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙ Ø´ÙÙÙ ÙتدÙÙÙÙا⪠Øâ¬Ø³Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ù٠ع٠استاÙÙ
Ùâ¬â«ÙاإÙعÙ
ار ÙÙÙÙ Ù
سؤÙâ¬
â«Ø¹âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø© ÙÙرâ¬
â«Ø£Ù اÙعاÙ
Ùب٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù?رâ¬â«Ù
تÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØÙ
ائÙØ©)â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùا٠â اÙبÙئة (بÙ
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠اإÙجرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øªâ¬
â«ØªÙÙÙÙ
اâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ Ù
٠اÙÙ?ئة "Ø£ÙÙ?" ÙÙتضÙ⬠â«Ø¹ اÙÙ
ÙØªØ±Ø Ø¹Ù٠أÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ Ù
شرÙ⬠â«âª \.103â¬Ø¹Ù٠أساس اÙسÙاسة اÙتشغÙÙÙØ© âª( 4\.01â¬Ø§ÙتÙÙÙÙ
اÙبÙئÙ) ÙÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«ØªÙ
تصÙÙÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù اÙعÙ
ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙÙÙÙ
ا ÙØ£Ùثر ااÙجتÙ
اع٠ÙاÙبÙئ٠ÙÙ?٠سÙاسات اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù
٠خاÙÙ Ù
ستشار ØرÙ? ثاÙØ« Ù
ستÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙظر اÙتÙÙÙÙ
⬠â«ÙاÙ
اÙÙ ÙØ£Ùثر ااÙجتÙ
اع٠ÙاÙبÙئÙ⪠\.â¬Ø£Ø¬Ø±â¬
â«ÙبÙئÙØ© Ù
٠أج٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØد Ù
Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¬ØªÙ
اعÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬
â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬ÙÙضع Ø®ØØ© إدارâ¬â«Ø§Ø٠اÙبÙاء ÙاÙتشغÙÙ ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© Ù?٠خاÙÙ Ù
رâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙئÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙØدد ÙØا٠اآÙثارâ¬
â«Ø¹âªÙ Øâ¬â¬â«Ù?٠بدائ٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§Øª Ù?Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø© اÙجدÙÙ ÙباÙتاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ùد ÙØ Ø£â¬
â«Ø± بعض اÙتغÙÙر⬠â«Ùعة⪠Øâ¬ÙØ®ØØ© رصد Ù
ع تدابÙر تخÙ?ÙÙ?⪠\.â¬Ù Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙ
إعداد تÙÙÙÙ
اأÙثر ااÙجتÙ
اع٠ÙاÙبÙئ٠عÙ٠أساس در⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
خاØر اÙÙ
تÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙئÙØ© اÙخاصة باÙÙ
ÙÙع (Ø®ØØ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙائÙة⪠\.â¬Ù?Ù Ùذا اÙسÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙتزÙ
Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار بإعداد Ø®ØØ Ø§Ø¥Ùدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ù⬠â«ÙØا٠اأÙÙØ´ØØ© Ù
ت٠اعتÙ?Ù
دت اÙتصاÙ
ÙÙ
â¬
â«Ø¡ Ù
Ù Ù
جÙ
Ùعات اÙتصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙÙائ٠Ù
٠أج٠اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? Ù
٠أ٠Ù
٠اآÙثار غÙر اÙÙ
ضÙ
ÙÙØ© اÙت٠Ùد تÙشأ⪠\.â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¥ÙتزÙ
⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?ÙØ©) Ùجزâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙئÙة⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬â«Ø§Ø¥Ùدارâ¬
â«Ø§Ø© ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙÙ
ا⬠â«Ø§ÙØÙ
ائÙØ© ÙÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ (Ø£Ù Ù
ا ÙÙابÙÙا) ÙØ£ÙÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ?ذة Ù?Ù Ù
Ùازâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار باستخداÙ
سÙاسات اإÙجرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øªâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØرÙ٠اÙسرÙع âª\.A1â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙستØاÙعÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØÙة⬠â«Ù
عÙÙØ© Ù?٠خاÙ٠اإÙعداد ÙتÙÙÙÙ
اأÙثر اÙبÙئ٠ÙااÙجتÙ
اعÙ⪠\.â¬ÙاÙت ااÙستشارâ¬
â«Ø© اأÙÙÙÙ Ù?٠خاÙ٠اÙÙ
ر⬠â«âª \.104â¬Ø£Ù?جرÙت جÙÙتا استشارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª Ù
ع جÙات Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙائÙØ© ÙتÙÙÙÙ
اأÙثر اÙبÙئ٠ÙااÙجتÙ
اع٠Ù?٠⪠7â¬Ø£ÙÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø³Ø¨ØªÙ
برâ¬
â«Ù
سÙدة Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙتÙÙÙÙ
اأÙثر اÙبÙئ٠ÙااÙجتÙ
اع٠Ù?٠⪠19â¬ÙاÙÙ٠اÙثاÙÙâª/â¬ÙÙاÙر ⪠2017â¬ÙااÙستشارâ¬
â«Ø© اÙثاÙÙØ© Ù
ت٠صدرتâ¬
â«Ø¸Ù
ات⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙاأÙÙا Ùâ¬
â«Ø¯ÙÙ
Ùات⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
Ù Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø²Ø±â¬
â«Ø© اÙبÙئة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠٠اâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ÙÙا Ù?Ù Ùسائ٠اإÙعاÙÙ
ØضرتÙا اÙسÙØاتâ¬â«ÙØ© Ù⬠â«ØªÙ
اإÙعاÙ٠ع٠اÙجÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùت ااÙستشارÙ⬠â«âª \.2017â¬ÙÙد Ùâ¬
â«ÙØ©) Ù?٠اÙبÙد Ù?٠⪠20â¬ØªØ´Ø±ÙÙ⬠â«Ø¨ÙØ© ÙااÙÙجÙÙزÙâ¬â«Ù٠اÙعر Ùâ¬â«ØªÙ
اÙÙØ´Ù? ع٠تÙرÙر تÙÙÙÙ
اأÙثر اÙبÙئ٠ÙااÙجتÙ
اع٠(Ù
ع Ù
Ùجز تÙÙ?ÙØ°Ù Ù?٠اÙÙغتÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙØÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙرâ¬
â«Ø£Ù اÙعاÙ
⪠\.â¬Ù Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«ØºÙرâ¬
â«Ù
Ùر Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙ
عرض⬠â«Ù?ر عÙÙ Ø´ÙÙ Ùسخات Ùر Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙØ© Ù?Ù Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø£ÙتÙبر âª( 2017â¬Ø¹Ù٠اÙÙ
ÙÙع ااÙÙÙترÙÙÙ ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار) ÙÙÙ Ù
تÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙرÙر اÙÙÙائ٠ÙتÙÙÙÙ
اأÙثر اÙبÙئ٠ÙااÙجتÙ
اع٠عÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙÙع اإÙÙÙترÙÙ٠اÙخارج٠ÙÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù?٠⪠24â¬ØªØ´Ø±Ù٠اأÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø£ÙتÙبر âª\.2017â¬â¬
â«ÙÙعÙØ© اÙÙÙاء ÙÙÙÙÙص Ø¥Ùبعاثات غازâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙدÙ?Ùئة ÙÙ
ستÙÙات اÙضجÙج⬠â«Ø¥Ùجاب٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø© باÙÙسبة Ø¥ÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ سÙÙÙÙد Ùاâ¬
â«Ø¢Ø«Ø§Ø±â¬ â«âª \.105â¬Ø£Ø´Ø§Ø± تÙÙÙÙ
اأÙثر اÙبÙئ٠ÙااÙجتÙ
اع٠إÙ٠أ٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙÙØ© اÙÙاشئة ع٠عÙ
٠أسØÙ٠اÙÙÙÙ Ù
ع ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
ØªÙ Ø£ØµØ¨Ø ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع Ù?اعاÙ٠باÙÙاÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬Ùظر تÙÙÙÙ
اأÙثر اÙبÙئ٠ÙااÙجتÙ
اع٠Ù?Ù Ù
ختÙÙ? ااÙÙبعاثاتâ¬
â«âªPage 54 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø¹ Ù
ع اÙÙظر Ù?Ù⬠â«Ù
ستÙبÙÙØ© بسبب اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø© بتÙÙÙÙ
ااÙÙبعاثات اÙÙ
تزâ¬
â«Ø§Ùدة اÙ⬠â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬Øت٠اÙعاÙ
⪠\.2023â¬ØªÙض٠اÙدرâ¬â«Ø§ÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙÙ
٠دÙÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© تأثÙر اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙØ© اإÙÙبعاثات⬠â«ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù٠إÙÙ Ù
Ùز Ù⬠â«Ø£Ø¯Øª اÙÙ
ÙارÙØ© بÙ٠اÙسÙÙار Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
تÙÙع Ù?Ù ØرÙØ© اÙسÙر ÙØصص Ùسائ٠اÙÙÙ٠بسبب عÙ
Ù ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⪠\.â¬ÙÙد Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتغÙرâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙصاÙ?Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙØ´Ù
٠اÙسÙÙارÙ٠اأÙÙ٠اإÙÙبعاثات Ù
٠اأÙسØÙ٠بÙاÙ
Ù٠عÙدÙ
ا ÙÙÙÙ ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت عاÙ
اÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ ÙØ´Ù
٠باصات جدÙدة ÙØرÙØ© اÙسÙرâ¬
â«Ø©âª Øâ¬Ø´Ø§ØÙات)⪠\.â¬Ø£Ù
ا اÙسÙÙارÙ٠اÙثاÙÙ Ù?ÙØ´Ù
٠إÙبعاثات ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
اÙØاÙÙ ÙØرÙØ© اÙسÙر اÙÙ
ستØØ«â¬
â«ÙØ© Ù?٠غÙاب ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Øª رÙاب⪠Øâ¬Ø³Ùارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª أجر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ستØØ«â¬
â«ÙØ© (سÙار⬠â«Ù?â¬
â«Ù اÙÙ
ÙارÙØ© ÙÙعاÙ
⪠2023â¬Ø£ÙÙسÙد اÙÙربÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙØ£ÙسÙد اÙÙÙترÙجÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙجسÙÙ
ات اÙÙ
عÙÙÙØ© ⪠ØPM10â¬ÙØ£ÙسÙد اÙÙبرÙت⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙبعاثات غازâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙدÙ?Ùئةâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⪠\.â¬ØªÙ?جرâ¬
â«ØÙا Ù?٠اÙسÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙâªÙÙ 641\.89â¬â¬
â«ØÙا Ù?٠اÙسÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙâªÙÙ 35\.26â¬â¬
â«ØÙا Ù?Ù⬠â«Ø¹ âªÙÙ 1232\.39â¬â¬â«Ø¨Ø§ÙÙسبة Ø¥Ù٠اÙعاÙ
⪠Ø2023â¬Ø³ÙبÙغ ااÙÙØ®Ù?اض اÙسÙÙÙ ÙاÙÙبعاثات Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙâªÙÙ 35\.63â¬â¬
â«ØÙا Ù?٠اÙسÙØ© Ø£ÙÙسÙد اÙÙربÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙØ£ÙسÙد اÙÙÙترÙجÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙØ£ÙسÙد اÙÙبرÙت⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙجسÙÙ
ات اÙÙ
عÙÙÙØ© عÙ٠اÙتÙاÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا أظÙر اÙÙÙ
Ùذج غÙاب أ٠ارتÙ?اع Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتØÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙجÙ
اع٠Ù
Ù ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
اÙØاÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ùبعاث Ø£Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ÙÙØ« Ù?٠أ٠بÙدة ÙØ´Ù
ÙÙا ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⪠\.â¬ÙÙد أظÙرت Ùتائج اÙÙÙ
Ùذج Ø£Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ù
Ù?٠اÙسÙØ© Ù
Ù Ù
ÙاÙ?ئ ثاÙ٠أÙسÙد اÙÙربÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Øª اÙدÙ?Ùئة Ù?٠اÙعاÙ
⪠2023â¬Ø¥Ù٠⪠590â¬ØºÙغاغر⬠â«ÙØ®ÙÙ?ض اÙبعاثات غاز⬠â«Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙظاÙ
اÙجدÙد Ù
٠شأÙ٠أ٠Ù?â¬
â«Ø©âª Øâ¬ÙاÙشاØÙات⪠\.â¬Ø¹ÙدÙ
ا Ùâ¬
â«ÙتÙ
اÙÙظر Ù?٠اÙÙ?ئات⬠â«Ø§Øª اÙخاصة⪠Øâ¬ÙسÙارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اأÙجر⬠â«Ùسبة أعÙÙ Ù
٠أثر تÙÙ?ÙØ° ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت عÙ٠ااÙÙبعاثات اÙÙ
Ø®ÙÙ?ضة Ù
٠اÙسÙارâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø© ØرÙØ© اÙسÙر⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠شأÙ⬠â«Ø¬Ø§Øª درâ¬â«Ø§Ù
Ù?٠اÙسÙØ© Ù
Ù Ù
ÙاÙ?ئ ثاÙ٠أÙسÙد اÙÙربÙÙ Ù?٠اÙعاÙ
⪠\.2023â¬ÙعÙ٠أساس Ù
خرâ¬â«Ø¹ ⪠713\.67â¬ØºÙغاغر⬠â«ÙتÙ
تخÙ?Ùض Ù
جÙ
Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙÙا⪠Øâ¬Ø³ Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ø£Ù Ù?â¬
â«ÙساÙÙ
Ù?٠اÙÙ
ØاÙ?ظة عÙÙ ØرÙة⬠â«Ù
Ù
ا ÙÙÙÙص اÙضجÙج اÙÙاتج ع٠ØرÙØ© اÙسÙر⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
٠شأ٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«Ø¹âªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø Ø£Ù Ùâ¬
â«ÙØد Ù
٠عدد اÙÙ
رÙبات Ù?٠اÙØ´Ùار⬠â«Ø¹ اÙÙ
Ùترâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ? ÙاإÙÙØاÙÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø©âªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù
Ù
ا Ù
٠شأÙ٠أ٠ÙÙÙÙص اÙضجÙج اÙÙاجÙ
ع٠اÙسÙر بسبب اÙتÙÙ⬠â«Ù
ستÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø³Ùرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØبÙعÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù اÙÙ
Ùارد⬠â«Ø§ÙسØØÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù اÙÙ
ÙائÙ⬠â«Ø³ÙبÙØ© Ù
ÙØÙظة عÙÙ Ù
Ùارد اÙÙ
ÙاÙ⬠â«Ù٠ا٠٠ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ Ùاâ¬
â«Ø¢Ø«Ø§Ø± Ù⬠â«ØªÙÙع Ø£Ù ÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ùد اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù?⬠â«âª \.106â¬Ø£Ø¸Ùر تÙÙÙÙ
اأÙثر اÙبÙئ٠ÙااÙجتÙ
اع٠أÙâ¬
â«Ø¬Ø§âª \.â¬Ø³ÙستخدÙ
بÙاء⬠â«Ø© Ù?٠بÙرÙت ÙاÙØرÙ٠اÙسرÙع اÙØ°Ù ÙØ±Ø¨Ø Ø´Ù
ا٠بÙرÙت بØبر⬠â«Ù
تØÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙØ©â¬
â«Ø¹ Ù
ÙØÙØ© ØضرÙ⬠â«Ø¹âª \.â¬Ù
ÙÙع اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
ادÙØ© Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© تأثÙر اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØ«ÙاÙ?ÙØ©â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡âªÙÙ \.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙتÙÙع صدÙر ضجÙجâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات اÙتÙسÙع Ù?٠بعض اأÙجزâ¬
â«ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت بشÙ٠أساس٠Ø٠ااÙرتÙ?ا٠ÙÙØرÙات ÙاÙØرÙات اÙسرÙعة اÙÙائÙ
Ø© Ù
ع بعض Ùâ¬
â«Ø© اÙبÙئة Ù
٠أج٠اÙØد Ù
٠اآÙثار اÙÙ
تبÙÙØ© Ø¥Ù٠أدÙÙ⬠â«ØÙØ© اÙبÙاءâªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«ÙتÙ
تÙ?صÙ٠تدابÙر اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? Ù?Ù Ø®ØØ© إدار⬠â«ÙØ© Ù?٠خاÙÙ Ù
ر⬠â«Ùذبذبات⪠Øâ¬ÙØØاÙ
⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ?اÙات بÙاء غبارÙâ¬
â«ØÙ
Ø© اÙسÙر ÙÙ?Ù⬠â«Ø© ØرÙØ© سÙر Ù
٠أج٠تÙÙÙص ز⬠â«Ø£ÙÙ Ùجب اÙÙظر Ù?Ù Ø®ØØ© إدار⬠â«Ù
ستÙÙâªÙ \.â¬Ø§â¬
â«Ùظر Ø¥Ù٠اأÙسباب اÙÙاردة أعاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ø´Ø§Ø± تÙÙÙÙ
اأÙثر اÙبÙئ٠ÙااÙجتÙ
اع٠إÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ø³Ø§Ø³ÙØ© Ù
Ù Ù
عاÙÙر اÙتÙÙÙÙ
⪠\.â¬ÙØظ تÙÙÙÙ
اأÙثر اÙبÙئ٠ÙااÙجتÙ
اع٠أÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£ÙÙا Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ÙÙÙات⬠â«ØÙÙ
اÙÙ?Ù٠عÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ù
ÙدÙ
٠اÙعØاءات ضÙ
Ù Ù
Ùتر⬠â«Ø© اÙÙÙ?اÙات Ù
٠إعداد Ù⬠â«Ø®ØØ© إدارâ¬
â«Ù٠ااÙستشارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª Ù
ع اÙÙسÙ
اÙÙبÙاÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙعتباØÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙØ«â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø®Øر Ù
رتب Ùâ¬
â«Øا بااÙÙتشاÙ?ات⬠â«Ù Ù Ùاâ¬â«Ùعة Ù?٠خاÙ٠بÙاء Ø®Ø Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت Ùد تش Ùâ¬â«Ø§Ø£Ùشغا٠عÙ٠اأÙرض اÙÙ
تÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
ادÙØ©â¬
â«Ø«ÙاÙ?ÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ø© Ù
Ùارد Ù⬠â«Ø¡Ø§ Ù
Ù Ùثائ٠اÙعØاء⪠\.â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙتزÙ
Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار بإعداد Ø®ØØ© إدار⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙعتباØÙØ© سÙÙ٠جزÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¡ Ùâ¬
â«Ù
Ù?صاÙÙ ÙاÙÙتشاÙ?ات⬠â«ÙØ¢ÙثارâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«ÙØدد إجر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتشغÙÙÙØ© ⪠4\.11â¬ÙÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
Ù?صÙØ© Ù?Ù Øا٠ÙجÙد اÙتشاÙ? اعتباØÙ Ù
ÙØÙظ ÙÙ?٠اÙسÙاسةâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ تØÙÙر⬠â«ÙÙا Ù
رضÙØ© Ù?Ù Ù
شارÙع Ù
ختÙÙ?ة⪠\.â¬Ù?٠خاÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ù
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙئÙØ© عÙ٠أÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬
â«Ø© Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار عÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ø®ØØ© اإÙدار⬠â«âªÙ \.107â¬â¬
â«ØªÙ
تÙÙÙÙ
Ùدرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬
â«Ø¹ Ùادارâ¬â«Ø§ÙبÙئÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬â«Ø§Ù? عÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ø®ØØ© اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ù
ؤÙÙÙÙ ÙØ¥Ùشرâ¬
â«Ø¸Ù?ÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù
ÙÙ Ù
٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ø³ØªØ®Ø¯Ù
Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ù
Ù Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙØضرâ¬
â«Ù بشÙ٠أساس٠عÙ٠تØسÙÙ ØرÙØ© اÙسÙر Ù?٠بعض اأÙجزâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ اÙت٠تشÙد زØÙ
Ø© سÙر Ù?Ù⬠â«Ø¹ تØÙÙر اÙÙÙ٠اÙØضر⬠â«Ø§ÙبتÙ⪠\.â¬Ø±Ùâ¬
â«Ùز Ù
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§Ù
تثا٠اÙÙ
ÙاÙÙÙ٠بشÙÙ Ù
اÙئÙ
ÙÙ
رâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتØر٠إÙ٠اÙÙØا٠اأÙÙسع ÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙعâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¨ÙرÙت⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠خاÙ٠استخداÙ
اÙÙ?Ùاص٠اÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ØªØ¹Ø¯Ø¯Ø© اÙÙ
ستÙÙات ÙØ´Ù
Ùت بÙاء اÙجسÙر ÙاأÙÙÙ?ا٠اÙبسÙØة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
٠أجÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙتÙ
تعزÙز أدائÙÙ
Ùرصد٠ع٠Ùثبâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù
ÙرسÙÙ ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«ÙبÙئÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬ØªÙ
اعÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£Ø®ØµØ§Ø¦ÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙت اÙØاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙستخدÙ
Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ارâ¬
â«Ø¢ÙÙØ© Ù
عاÙجة اÙØ´ÙاÙÙ Ù?٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Øاء â Ùâ¬
â«âªPage 55 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø¹ أ٠إÙÙâ¬â«Ø¢ÙÙØ© Ù
عاÙجة اÙØ´ÙاÙ٠اÙÙائÙ
Ø© عÙÙ Ù
ستÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ ÙدعÙ
٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ø´ÙاÙ٠إÙÙ Ù⬠â«ÙرÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø³Ùبا بÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø¯ اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙعتÙدÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙÙ
Ùتأث⬠â«ÙÙâ¬
â«ÙدÙ
اÙÙ
جتÙ
عات ÙاأÙÙ?ر⬠â«Ùد Ù?â¬
â«Ø¹âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø¶ اÙØ´ÙاÙ٠اÙت٠تتÙÙâ¬
â«ÙاÙا بشÙ٠سرÙع Ù
٠أج٠Ù
عاÙجة اÙØ´Ùاغ٠اÙÙ
رتبØØ© باÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø®Ø¯Ù
Ø© Ù
عاÙجة اÙØ´ÙاÙ٠اÙخاصة باÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ØªØرص Ùذ٠اأÙØ®Ùرâ¬
â«Ø© عÙ٠استعرâ¬
â«Ø¹ أ٠ضرر⬠â«Ø¹ أ٠ضرر أ٠إØتÙ
ا٠ÙÙÙ⬠â«Øدد ÙÙÙ⬠â«ÙرÙ٠باÙÙ
شارÙع Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙدÙ
بشÙÙ٠إÙÙ ÙÙئة اÙتÙ?تÙØ´ اÙÙ
ستÙÙÙØ© Ù?٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠اÙت٠تÙ? Ù⬠â«ÙÙ
ÙÙ ÙÙÙ
جتÙ
عات ÙاأÙÙ?رâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¯ اÙØ°ÙÙ Ùتأث⬠â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø© اÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ø© Ø¥Ù٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ùبعد إعØاء إدارâ¬
â«Ø±â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
باش⬠â«Ø§ØºÙâ¬â«Ùâ¬â«Ø§Ùش⬠â«Ù?عâ¬
â«Ø±â¬ â«Ø¨Ø¹Ø¯â¬ â«ÙاÙ⬠â«ÙÙت⬠â«Ø£Ù⬠â«Ù?Ù⬠â«ÙØ´ÙاÙÙ⬠â«Ø§â¬ â«ØªÙدÙÙ
⬠â«Ù
ÙÙâ¬â«Ùâ¬â«Ù?⬠â«Ø±â¬
â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§ØªÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø¬â¬ â«Ø§â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙسÙاساتÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ù
تثاÙ⬠â«ÙعدÙ
⬠â«Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙتÙجâ¬
â«Ø©âª:â¬â¬ â«ÙÙÙ?ÙØ© تÙدÙÙ
اÙØ´ÙاÙ٠إÙ٠خدÙ
Ø© Ù
عاÙجة اÙØ´ÙاÙ٠اÙخاصة باÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâªÙ? Øâ¬â¬
â«Ùرج٠زÙار⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙدÙÙ٠اÙÙ?رصة Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙرد⪠\.â¬ÙÙØصÙ٠عÙÙ Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات ØÙÙâ¬
â«âª\.http://www\.worldbank\.org/en/projects-operations/products-and-services/grievance-redress-serviceâ¬â¬
â«Ø©âª\.www\.inspectionpanel\.org :â¬â¬ â«ÙÙÙ?ÙØ© تÙدÙÙ
Ø´ÙاÙ٠إÙÙ ÙÙئة اÙتÙ?تÙØ´ Ù?٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâªÙ? Øâ¬â¬
â«Ùرج٠زÙار⬠â«ÙÙØصÙ٠عÙÙ Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات ØÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«âªPage 56 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø¥Øار اÙÙتائجâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙد⪠:â¬ÙبÙاÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙتâ¬â«Ù
شرÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙبرâ¬
â«Ø¹ ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬â«Ø£ÙداÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù ÙعÙد اÙÙ
دخ٠اÙØ´Ù
اÙÙ ÙÙ
دÙÙØ© بÙرÙتâª\.â¬â¬ â«ÙÙابÙÙØ© ÙÙ?اذ اÙرÙاب Ø¥ÙÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبر⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙعÙتÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ø© ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
â¬â«Ø¹ ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù?٠تØسÙ٠سرâ¬â«ÙÙض٠ÙدÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«âªPage 57 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø¹ ÙÙتÙÙ
Ùة⬠â«Ù
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§Øª ÙدÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙاÙاتâª/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙجÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
صدر⬠â«Ø©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙتÙر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙدÙ? اÙÙÙائÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙØ®Ø⬠â«ÙØدة اÙÙÙاس⬠â«Ø§Ø£Ùساس⬠â«Ø¥Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£Ùساسâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¥ÙÙÙ
اء⬠â«Ø³ØªØ¬Ù
ع Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠عدد Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙرÙاب Ù
Ù Ù
جÙس⬠â«Ù
رتا٠Ù?٠اÙسÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª300\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.0â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ùعدد (Ø£ÙÙ?)⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙسÙ
⪠:â¬Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙرÙاب Ù?Ù ÙÙ ÙÙÙ
عÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ÙتزÙد Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ارâª/â¬Ù
صÙØØ© سÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùâ¬â«Ù
شغÙ٠اÙباصات ÙÙ
٠اÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙ
Ùاز⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙظاÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙستخدÙ
Ù٠اÙباصات اÙعاÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ø§ÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙ⬠â«ÙاإÙعÙ
ار باÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات⬠â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ© ÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙعâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«(اÙباصاتâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙت)â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙ٠اÙخاصÙÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¥ÙÙÙ
اء⬠â«Ø³ÙتÙ
اÙØصÙ٠عÙÙ Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات ØÙÙ Ù
ستخدÙ
ات اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù
Ù Ù
جÙس⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø³ÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª40\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«Ùسبة Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ئÙÙة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ئÙÙØ© ÙÙرÙاب اإÙÙاث Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙسبةâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³ØªÙصائÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شغÙÙÙ ÙÙ
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙÙ ÙاإÙعÙ
ارâª/â¬Ù
صÙØØ© سÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø±â¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Ø¯â¬ â«Ø®Ø§ÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙظاÙ
ÙØ© (اÙباصاتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ùباصات اÙعاÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ø§ÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شترÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ© ÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت)â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ù?Ù ÙÙ ÙÙÙ
عÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø±Ùاب اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
اÙØ°Ù٠جذبÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ØªØسÙ⬠â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬Ø£Ù Ùâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشر عدد اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
باشرÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ© ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت)⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙعÙس Ùذاâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙس Ùذا اÙÙ
ؤشر Ù
تÙØ³Ø Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ اÙرÙاب اÙÙÙÙ
Ù ÙÙÙظاÙ
(خدÙ
ات اÙباصات⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙصÙÙ?âªÙ? :â¬â¬
â«ÙÙابÙÙØ© اÙÙÙ?اذ Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ø©âª Øâ¬Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙعÙØ©âªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø§Ùسرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ئÙÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙسÙا٠اÙÙ
ستضعÙ?ÙÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ئÙÙØ© ÙÙرÙاب اإÙÙاث ÙاÙÙسبةâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª اÙÙ?ر Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ùة⪠:â¬Ø§ÙÙسبة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ù تØÙÙÙ Ù?ضائ٠ÙائÙ
عÙÙ ÙظاÙ
Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات عاÙÙ
Ù ÙستخدÙ
Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار⬠â«Ø³Ùجرâ¬â«Ù?⬠â«Ø³ÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª61\.00â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
ئÙÙØ© âª50\.00â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙسبة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ئÙÙØ© ÙÙسÙا٠اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ
ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙسÙ
⪠:â¬Ø§ÙÙسبةâ¬
â«Ø£Ø¹Ø¯Ùا اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠بعÙÙاÙâ¬
â«ÙØ© اÙÙÙ?اذ Ù
Ù?تÙØØ© اÙÙ
صدر Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ø¯Ø§Ø© ÙÙابÙÙ⬠â«Ù ÙÙدخÙÙ٠إÙÙ⬠â«Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبرâ¬
â«Ø" (âª)OTPAâ¬â¬â«"Ù
ØÙÙÙ Ù
Ø®ØØ Ø§ÙرØاÙت اÙÙ
Ù?تÙ⬠â«ÙØ³Ø Ø¨ÙرÙت (ساØØ© اÙØ´Ùداء) Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙدâ¬
â«Ù
دتÙا ⪠60â¬Ø¯ÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«ÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø© تÙÙâ¬â«ØºØ¶ÙÙ Ù?ترâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شترÙâª/â¬Ù
شغÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙاÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙستخدÙ
Ù٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
â¬
â«Ø§ÙسرÙع⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ⬠â«ÙظاÙ
â¬
â«âªPage 58 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙت (ÙبÙاÙات اÙÙظاÙ
â¬
â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
Ù ÙتØدÙد اÙÙ
ÙاÙع)â¬
â«Ø±Ùابâ¬
â«ÙابÙÙØ© اÙÙÙ?اذ باÙÙسبة Ø¥ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«ÙتØس٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ùâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشر ÙدÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ئÙÙØ© ÙÙسÙا٠اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙصÙÙ٠إÙÙ ÙظائÙ? ÙخدÙ
ات Ù?Ù ÙØ³Ø Ø¨ÙرÙت Ù
٠خاÙ٠خدÙ
ات اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
⪠\.â¬ÙÙØظ Ùذاâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙس Ùذا اÙÙ
ؤشر اÙزÙادة Ù?٠اÙÙسبةâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙصÙÙ?âªÙ? :â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø¥ÙÙÙ
اء⬠â«Ù
جÙس⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙاÙات Ù
تأتÙØ© Ù
Ù ÙظاÙ
اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات اÙØ°ÙÙ⬠â«Ù
رتا٠Ù?٠اÙسÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª45\.00â¬â¬ â«âª75\.00â¬â¬ â«Ø¯ÙائÙ⬠â«Ù٠عÙÙ Ù
تÙ⬠â«Ù
تÙØ³Ø Ù?ترâ¬
â«Ø© اÙتÙÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙسÙ
âª:â¬â¬
â«ÙاإÙعÙ
ارâª/â¬Ù
صÙØØ© سÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù
Ù Ù
ØØØ© Øبرجا Ø¥ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙØرÙ?ÙØ© شار٠اÙØÙÙ Ù?٠ساعاتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØØØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙصباØÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙذرÙØ©â¬
â«Ù
شغÙÙ ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙعâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬
â«ØµØ¨Ø§Øاâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØµØ¨Ø§Øا Ùâª9:00â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙصباØÙØ© بÙÙ âª7:00â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØرÙ?ÙØ©) Ù?٠ساعات اÙذرÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
تÙØ³Ø Ù?ترâ¬
â«Ø© ااÙÙتÙا٠عÙÙ Ù
ت٠Ù
رÙبات Ù?٠ساعات اÙذرÙØ© Ù
Ù Ùب٠خدÙ
ات اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù
Ù Ù
ØØØ© Øبرجا Ø¥Ù٠بÙرÙت (Ù
ØØØ© شار٠اÙØÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙصÙÙ?âªÙ :â¬â¬
â«Ø¹Ø© خدÙ
ات اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø¹ Ùâ¬
â«ÙتØس٠سر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشر ÙدÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙس Ùذاâ¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø§Ø³ØªÙصائÙØ© Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙدâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠درâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Ø³ØªÙ?جر⬠â«Ø³ÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª80\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«Ù
ئÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ùسبة Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙرÙاب اÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶Ù٠عÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙسÙ
⪠:â¬Øصة Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ
ستخدÙ
٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
عÙ٠أساس سÙÙÙ Ù?٠صÙ?ÙÙ? Ù
ستخدÙ
Ù ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙظاÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙعÙØ© ÙظاÙ
اÙباصاتâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ùباصات اÙعاÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬
â«ÙÙ
شغÙ٠اÙباصاتâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙشرÙØ© ااÙستشارÙâ¬
â«ÙØ©â¬
â«Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد⬠â«Ø¹Ù ردÙد اÙرÙاب اإÙÙاثâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشر اÙÙ?رâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø³ÙعÙس Ùذا⬠â«Ø³ÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª80\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«Ù
ئÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ùسبة Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¶Ù٠ع٠Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙعÙØ© ÙظاÙ
⬠â«Øصة Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙرÙاب اÙرâ¬
â«ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙظاÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ø¥ÙÙاث Ù
ÙÙÙ
â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ùباصاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسرÙع⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ⬠â«ÙظاÙ
â¬
â«ÙÙ
شغÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬
â«âªPage 59 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ùباصاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙشرÙØ© ااÙستشارÙâ¬
â«ÙØ©â¬
â«ÙÙعÙØ© خدÙ
ات اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
âª\.â¬â¬
â«ØªØس٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙظاÙ
Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙباÙتاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙعÙس Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙعÙØ© ÙظاÙ
اÙباصات⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشر Ù
ستÙ٠رضا Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙرÙاب ع٠Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³ØªÙصائÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙÙØظ Ùذاâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ø§Øªâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙصÙÙ?⪠:â¬Ù
٠خاÙ٠درâ¬
â«Ù
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙÙتائج اÙÙ
تÙسØØ©â¬
â«âªPage 60 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙاÙاتâª/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙجÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
صدر⬠â«Ø©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙتÙر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙدÙ? اÙÙÙائÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙØ®Ø⬠â«ÙØدة اÙÙÙاس⬠â«Ø§Ø£Ùساس⬠â«Ø¥Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£Ùساسâ¬
â«ØªÙارÙر اÙÙ
ÙاÙÙÙÙ ÙجÙ
عÙا Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار ÙÙ
ستشار٠Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار⬠â«Ø³ÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª2000\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.0â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ùعدد (Ø£ÙÙ?)⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙسÙ
⪠:â¬Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ Ø£ÙاÙ
اÙعÙ
Ù ÙÙÙظائÙ?â¬
â«ÙÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹Ùا اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø¥Ùشرâ¬
â«Ø§Ù? Ù?⬠â«Ø© اأÙÙ
د اÙÙ
ستØدثة ÙÙسÙرÙâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙصÙرâ¬
â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø©âª/â¬Ø³ÙسÙØ© اإÙÙ
داد ØÙØ« Ù?â¬
â«ÙÙ
ÙÙ ÙÙاسÙاâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø¥ÙÙ
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ùضا اÙÙظائÙ? غÙر اÙÙ
باشر⬠â«Ø¹âª \.â¬Ø³ÙØ´Ù
Ù Ø°Ù٠بشÙ٠أساس٠اÙÙظائÙ? اÙÙ
باشرâ¬
â«Ø©âªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙتÙصÙÙ?âªÙ :â¬â¬
â«Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
ÙÙاس ÙÙÙظائÙ? اÙÙ
ستØدثة ضÙ
Ù Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù
شغ٠خاص Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد⬠â«Øº ÙÙÙ
Ø© "ÙعÙ
" عÙد اÙتÙÙÙع عÙ٠اتÙ?ا٠عÙد بÙÙ Ùâ¬â«ÙتÙ
بÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬
â«Ù
ر⬠â«ÙعÙ
⬠â«Ø§Ù⬠â«ÙعÙ
âª/â¬Ø§Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙسÙ
⪠:â¬Ø§ÙتÙÙÙع عÙ٠اتÙ?ا٠عÙد ÙاØدâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙاÙØÙÙÙ
ة⬠â«Ø¹Ù٠اأÙÙÙ Ù
ع شرÙØ© خاصة Ù
٠أجÙâ¬
â«Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ارâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø§ÙستثÙ
ار Ù?Ù ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙعâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙتشغÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شغÙÙ٠خاصÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙشغÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشر اÙØ®ØÙØ© اأÙÙÙÙ ÙÙضع ÙظاÙ
ÙÙ٠عاÙ
Ù⬠â«Ù
شغ٠باص⪠\.â¬ÙعÙس Ùذا⬠â«Ø¹ اÙتشغÙÙÙØ© Ù
ع اتÙ?ا٠عÙد ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
ÙÙع Ù
ع Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشر ÙÙ?اءة اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ÙÙÙس Ùذاâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙصÙÙ?âªÙ? :â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙجÙ
ع Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات Ù
٠شرÙات اإÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§Ù? Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار⬠â«Ù
رتا٠Ù?٠اÙسÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª42\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«ÙÙ
⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
بÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙسÙ
⪠:â¬Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ ÙÙ
Ù
٠اÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù٠اÙبÙاء⬠â«ÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬
â«Ù اÙخارجÙ)â¬â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© اÙÙاÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
Ù
تدة عÙ٠⪠42â¬ÙÙ
(عÙ٠اÙØرÙ٠اÙسرÙع اÙØ´Ù
اÙÙ ÙعÙ٠اÙØرÙ٠اÙدائرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشر تÙدÙ
أعÙ
ا٠بÙاء اÙبÙ٠اÙتØتÙØ© اÙÙاÙ
ÙØ© ÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙØ٠بÙاء اÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙصÙÙ?⪠:â¬Ø³Ùرصد Ùذاâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙاÙات اÙÙ
جÙ
Ùعة Ù
Ù⬠â«Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙ⬠â«Ù
رتâ¬
â«Ùا٠Ù?٠اÙسÙة⬠â«âª20\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯â¬ â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙسÙ
⪠:â¬Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ Ø®ØÙØ Ø§Ùباصاتâ¬
â«Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد⬠â«ÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬
â«ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشر Ùضعâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙعÙس⬠â«Øددة⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙجدÙ٠اÙزÙ
ÙÙ ÙجدÙ٠اÙرسÙÙ
) اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبر⬠â«Ù
Ù⬠â«ÙÙ? ÙÙ
سارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙصÙÙ?⪠:â¬Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ Ø®ØÙØ ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت (Ø®ØØ Ø§ÙخدÙ
Ø© ÙÙÙÙا) ÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§Ùباصات اÙعادÙØ© (ÙÙØ§Ø ØªÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤÙ
ÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙدÙ? ÙظاÙ
ÙÙ٠عاÙ
Ù
٠خاÙ٠تØدÙد Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ
ÙØ© خدÙ
ات اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
â¬
â«âªPage 61 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø¥ÙÙÙ
اء⬠â«Ø³ÙجÙ
ع Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات Ù
Ù Ù
صÙØØ© سÙÙ Ù
جÙس⬠â«Ù
رتا٠Ù?٠اÙسÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª120\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯â¬ â«Ø§Ø¥ÙسÙ
⪠:â¬Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ باصات ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙعâ¬
â«Ùâª/â¬Ù
شغÙ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع ÙاإÙعÙ
ارâª/â¬Ù
صÙØØ© سÙÙâ¬â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠Ù
٠خاÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù
شغ⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙت اÙØ°Ùâª/â¬Ø§ÙØ°ÙÙ ÙدÙÙâª/â¬ÙدÙÙÙ
عدد اÙباصات اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© ÙÙ ÙÙÙ
اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙâ¬
â«Ù
شغÙÙ ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙعâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙصÙÙ?⪠:â¬Ø³ÙعÙس Ùذا اÙÙ
ؤشر Ù
ستÙ٠إÙ
داد خدÙ
ات اÙÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙبشÙ٠خاص تÙÙâ¬
â«Ù?ر أسØÙÙ ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø¥ÙÙÙ
اء⬠â«Ø³ÙجÙ
ع Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات Ù
Ù Ù
صÙØØ© سÙÙ Ù
جÙس⬠â«Ù
رتا٠Ù?٠اÙسÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª250\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯â¬ â«Ø§Ø¥ÙسÙ
⪠:â¬Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ اÙباصات اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© اÙعادÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠Ù
٠خاÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù
شغÙ٠اÙباصات اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙدÙÙÙ
ÙاإÙعÙ
ارâª/â¬Ù
صÙØØ© سÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙ⬠â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ اÙباصات اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© ÙÙ ÙÙÙ
â¬
â«Ù
شغÙ٠اÙباصاتâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙتÙجة اÙÙ
تÙÙâ¬
â«Ùعة اأÙÙÙ٠أÙÙØ´ØØ© تØÙÙر اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ø¥Ù٠جاÙب خدÙ
ات ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشر عدد اÙباصات اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© عÙ٠اÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ©âªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙصÙÙ?âªÙ? :â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙÙÙس Ùذاâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¥ÙÙÙ
اء⬠â«Ùع Ù
جÙسâ¬â«Ø³ØªÙÙ٠اÙÙÙÙ
Ø© "ÙعÙ
" عÙد استخداÙ
ÙظاÙ
Ù
Ùاز باÙÙاÙ
Ù ÙتÙ
ت⬠â«Ù
رتا٠Ù?٠اÙسÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙعÙ
⬠â«Ø§Ù⬠â«ÙعÙ
âª/â¬Ø§Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙسÙ
⪠:â¬Ø§Ø³ØªØ®Ø¯Ø§Ù
ÙظاÙ
Ù
Ùاز Ùرصد ÙظاÙ
â¬
â«ÙاإÙعÙ
ارâª/â¬Ù
صÙØØ© سÙÙ⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙÙ
صداÙÙØ© Ù?Ù Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¬Ù
ع اÙرسÙÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙدâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙ⬠â«ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشر Ùدرâ¬
â«Ø© اÙرصد Ùد٠Ù
صÙØØ© سÙÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙعÙ
ÙÙات اÙباصاتâª/â¬ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙعÙس Ùذاâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشر تÙدÙ
تÙÙ?ÙØ° ÙظاÙ
Ù
Ùاز Ù?Ù Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠Ùرصد ÙظاÙ
جÙ
ع اÙرسÙÙ
â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙصÙÙ?⪠:â¬Ø³ÙعÙس Ùذاâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
جÙ
ع اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات بشأ٠استÙاÙ٠اÙÙ
ازÙت Ù
Ù Ùب٠أسØÙÙ Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø³ÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª60000\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯â¬ â«Ø§ÙسÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øªâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
دخرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØµØ§Ù?Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙسÙ
âª:â¬â¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ØµØ§Øª ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⪠Øâ¬Ùعدد ÙÙ
اÙت٠ÙØعÙا Ùذا⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبعاثات غازâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙدÙ?Ùئة (Ø٠ثاÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙرÙاب Ù
Ù Ùب٠Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙسØÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ùعدد Ù⬠â«Ø£ÙسÙد اÙÙربÙÙ)â¬
â«Ø§ÙسرÙع⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ⬠â«ÙظاÙ
â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙ
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠عبرâ¬
â«ÙÙ
شغÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬
â«Ø§Ùباصاتâ¬
â«âªPage 62 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø¹âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§Øª اÙبعاثات غازâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙدÙ?Ùئة بÙ?ض٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشر Ùâ¬
â«Ù
دخر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙصÙÙ?âªÙ? :â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙÙÙس Ùذاâ¬
â«âªPage 63 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«âªPage 64 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙدÙ?â¬
â«Ø¹ ÙÙتÙÙ
Ùة⬠â«Ù
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§Øª ÙدÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙدÙ? اÙÙÙائÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙØ© âª5â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙسÙØ© âª4â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙسÙØ© âª3â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙسÙØ© âª2â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙسÙØ© âª1â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙØ®Ø Ø§Ø£Ùساس⬠â«Ø¥Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙرÙاب Ù?Ù ÙÙ ÙÙÙ
عÙ
Ù ÙستخدÙ
Ù٠اÙباصاتâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ Ùâ¬
â«âª300\.00â¬â¬ â«âª300\.00â¬â¬ â«âª200\.00â¬â¬ â«âª100\.00â¬â¬ â«âª40\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ© ÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙظاÙ
ÙØ© (اÙباصاتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙعاÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ø§ÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت)â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ئÙÙØ© ÙÙرÙاب اإÙÙاث Ù?٠اÙباصات اÙعاÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙسبةâ¬
â«âª40\.00â¬â¬ â«âª40\.00â¬â¬ â«âª30\.00â¬â¬ â«âª15\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ© ÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙعâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙظاÙ
ÙØ© (اÙباصاتâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙت) Ù?Ù ÙÙ ÙÙÙ
عÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ئÙÙØ© ÙÙسÙا٠اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ
ÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙسبةâ¬
â«Ù ÙÙدخÙÙ٠إÙÙ ÙØ³Ø Ø¨ÙرÙت (ساØØ© اÙØ´Ùداء)⬠â«Ø§ÙÙبرâ¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«âª61\.00â¬â¬ â«âª61\.00â¬â¬ â«âª58\.00â¬â¬ â«âª53\.00â¬â¬ â«âª50\.00â¬â¬ â«âª50\.00â¬â¬ â«âª50\.00â¬â¬
â«Ù
دتÙا ⪠60â¬Ø¯ÙÙÙØ© ÙÙستخدÙ
ÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ù?٠غضÙÙ Ù?ترâ¬
â«Ø© تÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
â¬
â«Ù٠عÙÙ Ù
ت٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù
Ù⬠â«Ù
تÙØ³Ø Ù?ترâ¬
â«Ø© اÙتÙÙ⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«âª45\.00â¬â¬ â«âª45\.00â¬â¬ â«âª45\.00â¬â¬ â«âª80\.00â¬â¬ â«âª80\.00â¬â¬ â«âª75\.00â¬â¬ â«âª75\.00â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙØرÙ?ÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
ØØØ© Øبرجا Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
ØØØ© شار٠اÙØÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙصباØÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù?٠ساعات اÙذرÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§Ø¶Ù٠ع٠Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙعÙØ© ÙظاÙ
اÙباصات⬠â«Øصة Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙرÙاب اÙرâ¬
â«âª80\.00â¬â¬ â«âª80\.00â¬â¬ â«âª70\.00â¬â¬ â«âª60\.00â¬â¬ â«âª50\.00â¬â¬ â«âª30\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙظاÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âªPage 65 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø¶Ù٠ع٠Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙعÙØ© ÙظاÙ
اÙباصات⬠â«Øصة Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙرÙاب اÙرâ¬
â«âª80\.00â¬â¬ â«âª80\.00â¬â¬ â«âª70\.00â¬â¬ â«âª60\.00â¬â¬ â«âª50\.00â¬â¬ â«âª30\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙظاÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ø¥ÙÙاث Ù
ÙÙÙ
â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âªPage 66 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ù
ؤشرات اÙÙتائج اÙÙسÙØØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙدÙ? اÙÙÙائÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙØ© âª5â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙسÙØ© âª4â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙسÙØ© âª3â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙسÙØ© âª2â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙسÙØ© âª1â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙØ®Ø Ø§Ø£Ùساس⬠â«Ø¥Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«âª2000\.00â¬â¬ â«âª2000\.00â¬â¬ â«âª2000\.00â¬â¬ â«âª1600\.00â¬â¬ â«âª700\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«Ø© اأÙÙ
د اÙÙ
ستØدثةâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ Ø£ÙاÙ
اÙعÙ
Ù ÙÙÙظائÙ? اÙÙصÙرâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبÙاÙÙÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙسÙرÙâ¬
â«ÙعÙ
⬠â«ÙعÙ
⬠â«ÙعÙ
⬠â«Ø§Ù⬠â«Ø§Ù⬠â«Ø§Ù⬠â«Ø§Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙÙÙع عÙ٠اتÙ?ا٠عÙد ÙاØد عÙ٠اأÙÙÙ Ù
ع شرÙØ©â¬
â«Ø®Ø§ØµØ© Ù
٠أج٠ااÙستثÙ
ار Ù?Ù ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙعâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙتشغÙÙÙâ¬
â«âª42\.00â¬â¬ â«âª42\.00â¬â¬ â«âª42\.00â¬â¬ â«âª35\.00â¬â¬ â«âª15\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
بÙÙØ© ÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙعâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ ÙÙ
Ù
٠اÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬
â«âª20\.00â¬â¬ â«âª20\.00â¬â¬ â«âª20\.00â¬â¬ â«âª17\.00â¬â¬ â«âª5\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ© ÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙعâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ Ø®ØÙØ Ø§Ùباصاتâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬
â«âª120\.00â¬â¬ â«âª120\.00â¬â¬ â«âª100\.00â¬â¬ â«âª50\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ باصات ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬
â«âª250\.00â¬â¬ â«âª250\.00â¬â¬ â«âª200\.00â¬â¬ â«âª150\.00â¬â¬ â«âª50\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ اÙباصات اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© اÙعادÙØ©â¬
â«ÙعÙ
⬠â«ÙعÙ
⬠â«ÙعÙ
⬠â«ÙعÙ
⬠â«ÙعÙ
⬠â«Ø§Ù⬠â«Ø§Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³ØªØ®Ø¯Ø§Ù
ÙظاÙ
Ù
Ùاز Ùرصد ÙظاÙ
جÙ
ع اÙرسÙÙ
Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙâ¬
â«âª60000\.00â¬â¬ â«âª40000\.00â¬â¬ â«âª20000\.00â¬â¬ â«âª10000\.00â¬â¬ â«âª5000\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«âª0\.00â¬â¬ â«Ø§Øª اÙدÙ?Ùئةâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙÙÙØ© اÙÙبعاثات غازâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øªâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
دخرâ¬
â«ØµØ§Ù?Ù Ùâ¬
â«(Ø٠ثاÙ٠أÙسÙد اÙÙربÙÙ)â¬
â«âªPage 67 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«âªPage 68 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙØ٠⪠:1â¬ØªØ±ØªÙبات اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙد⪠:â¬ÙبÙاÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙبر⬠â«Ù
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤسسÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªØ±ØªÙبات اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° ÙاÙترتÙباتâ¬
â«Ø© اÙت٠Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙ
ÙÙÙا جÙات⬠â«ØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اأ٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø³Ø§Ø³ÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شارÙع اÙÙبÙر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ اÙت٠ÙاÙت ÙسÙÙات عدÙدة اÙÙÙاÙØ© اÙ⬠â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار اÙÙÙئة اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ?ذة ÙÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«âªÙ? \.1â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø¡âª \.â¬ÙدÙ٠تجربة ØÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§Ø± صادر ع٠Ù
جÙس اÙÙزرâ¬â«Øدد بÙ
Ùجب Ùر⬠â«Ù
ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ù?â¬â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙÙÙÙا⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار اختصاص ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° Ù
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø³ÙÙ
ا Ù?Ù ÙØاعات اÙبÙÙâ¬â«Ù
اÙØة⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù اÙذ٠اÙتÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙاÙÙ٠اأÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø¯ÙسÙ
برâ¬â«Ø¹ تØÙÙر اÙÙÙ٠اÙØضرâ¬â«Ù Ù
ع تÙÙ?ÙØ° ÙØ§Ø¬Ø ÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«Ù?٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شارÙع اÙت٠ÙÙ
ÙÙÙÙا اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°ÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
جا٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙØضرâ¬
â«âª\.2015â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙÙس٠Ù
جÙسâ¬
â«Ø¹âªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø© ع٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ÙÙ
ÙÙÙا Ùرض اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙ Ù
سؤÙÙ Ù
باشرÙ⬠â«Ø¹ ÙÙÙÙا اÙت٠Ùâ¬â«Ù
ÙÙÙات اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«âª \.2â¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙ Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ù
سؤÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ù٠ع٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ùâ¬
â«Ù عÙد ااÙÙتضاء⪠\.â¬ÙسÙÙÙÙ Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اءâ¬â«Ø© اÙÙÙÙ ÙاأÙشغا٠اÙعاÙ
ة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙااÙت أخر⬠â«Ø¹ Ù
ع ٠اâ¬
â«Ø²Ø±â¬ â«Ø§Ø¥ÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùت٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
تÙ
ÙÙÙÙا Ù
Ù Ùرض اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹âª \.â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙتÙ
تÙجÙÙ Ù
ساÙÙ
Ø© اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© Ø¥ÙÙâ¬â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙÙÙÙا اÙÙ
رتبØØ© باÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ù
سؤÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ù٠ع٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø© اÙÙÙÙ ÙاأÙشغا٠اÙعاÙ
Ø© ÙÙ
صÙØة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙة⪠\.â¬Ø³Ùشر٠Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار ٠اâ¬
â«Ø²Ø±â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø´ØºÙÙÙ Ù
٠خاÙÙ Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ù
٠أج٠ضÙ
ا٠اتسا٠اÙبÙاÙات⬠â«Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ùâ¬â«Ø³Ùجرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙâªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù ع٠اÙÙ
Ù?اÙضات بشأ٠اÙعÙد Ù
ع⬠â«Ø§Ø¶Ùا ÙسÙÙÙÙ Ù
سؤÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙ
شغÙÙÙ Ùاستعرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø³Ù٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠Ù?٠إعداد اÙÙ
ÙاصÙ?ات Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙÙØ© ÙشرÙØ Ø§ÙعÙدâ¬
â«Ø¹âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù Ù
ÙاÙشتÙا Ù?٠اÙÙسÙ
ر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¨Ø¹Ø§ â Ø£ÙÙ? Ù
Ù ÙØ«ÙÙØ© تÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø¹ ÙÙ
ا جر⬠â«Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات اÙتÙرÙد ÙÙÙÙا اÙخاصة باÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù
شغÙÙ٠خاصÙÙ Ù
سؤÙÙÙ٠ع٠تشغÙÙ ÙصÙاÙة⬠â«Ø§Ù? Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙ⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ù
شغÙÙ٠خاصÙ٠بتشغÙ٠اÙÙظاÙ
ÙصÙاÙتÙ⪠Øâ¬ØªØت إشر⬠â«Ø³ÙعÙÙ Ù⬠â«âªÙ? \.3â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
خصصةâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øªâ¬â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙاÙÙ
سارâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ùباصات⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
ØØات⪠Øâ¬ÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙØ°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙظÙ
جÙ
ع اÙرسÙÙ
⪠\.â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙÙÙ Ù
سؤÙÙÙ٠ع٠صÙاÙØ© اÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبتÙÙ
بÙ
Ùجب اÙعÙÙدâª/â¬Ø§Ø§ÙÙ
تÙاز⪠\.â¬Ø³ØªÙ?صاد٠Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙدâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙ٠اÙخاصÙÙ ÙÙ
رâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ù? عÙÙâ¬â«Ø© ع٠اإÙشرâ¬â«ÙستÙÙÙ Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠Ù
سؤÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتعاÙدÙØ© ÙÙÙصÙ٠باÙتسدÙدات ÙاÙعÙÙبات عÙ٠أساس بÙÙد اÙعÙد ÙشرÙØÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙ ÙØترÙ
ÙÙ ÙاجباتÙÙ
â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠عÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¥Ùدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬
â«Ø¹ ضÙ
Ù Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ارâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø© Ù?Ù ÙØدة تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°ÙÙ ÙظائÙ? اÙÙ
Øاسبة⪠Øâ¬ÙاإÙباÙغ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙتدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
رÙزÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.4â¬Ø³ØªÙÙ٠ترتÙبات اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯ ÙØدة تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شارÙع اÙتÙارÙرâ¬â«Ø© Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار⪠\.â¬Ø³Øªâ¬
â«Ù? Ù⬠â«Ø¹ Ùد٠Ù
صرÙ? ÙبÙا٠ÙÙÙÙÙا٠بإدار⬠â«ÙÙ Ù?â¬
â«ÙÙ?تÙØا٠ÙÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø¯Ùâ¬â«Øد Ùâ¬
â«Ù
Ùâ¬â«ÙÙ Ù?â¬â«Øساب Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù?٠اأÙÙ
Ùا٠Ù
٠خاÙÙ⬠â«Ù تدÙâ¬â«ÙسÙجرâ¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø³Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ùس٠Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ù
ع Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠ÙتسدÙد أتعاب⬠â«Ø¹âªÙ? \.â¬â¬ â«ÙتÙدÙ
Ùا Ø¥Ù٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠إÙ٠جاÙب تÙارÙر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙدÙ
ÙÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø¹ Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ستشارÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ
ÙÙ ÙاÙعاÙ
ÙÙÙ ÙØساب Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«âªPage 69 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© باÙÙسبة Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
شارÙع اÙÙ
اضÙØ© Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØاÙÙة⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± أداء إدارتÙ⬠â«Ø© ØÙÙÙØ© Ù?٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ÙÙÙات اÙبÙاء ÙÙÙ
شارÙع اÙت٠ÙدعÙ
Ùا اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù?⬠â«âª \.5â¬ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار خبرâ¬
â«ØªØªØÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ÙظÙÙ?ÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ©âªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«Ø¥ÙÙا ÙØدة⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬
â«Ø±Ø¶Ùا ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° ترتÙبات اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ù
Ù⬠â«Ù ÙÙا٠تصÙÙÙ?٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?â¬â«Ø¹ تØÙÙر اÙÙÙ٠اÙØضرâ¬â«Ù
رضÙا⪠\.â¬ÙبشÙ٠خاص⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ?Ø° Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ù
شرÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¬Ù ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار⬠â«Ù اÙÙ
دÙâ¬
â«Ù٠اÙخار⬠â«Ø¬Ù Ù
ÙبÙÙâªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«Ø³Ùجر⬠â«Ù?٠اأÙÙ
ÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
Øاسبة⪠Øâ¬ÙاإÙباÙغ⪠Øâ¬ÙتÙسÙر تدÙÙ٠خارâ¬â«Ø© تدÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠إدارâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙات اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ اÙذ٠سÙÙÙÙ?Ø°Ù Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ù٠عÙ٠اÙØ´Ù٠اÙتاÙÙâª( :â¬Ø£) غÙابâ¬â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ© ÙÙذا اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙ
ÙÙÙا اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ Ù
خاØر اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«ØªØ¯ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شارÙع اÙت٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø±â¬
â«Ù⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠غر⬠â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø© ÙÙااÙت أخرâ¬
â«Ùدة اÙت٠تÙ?شار٠Ù?ÙÙا Ùâ¬
â«ØØ¯Ø¯Ø Ù(ج) اÙÙ
شارÙع اÙÙ
عÙâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ⬠â«Ø³Ø¬Ù ÙÙائÙ
اأÙصÙ٠اÙÙ
اÙئÙ
Ø Ù(ب) Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ùتأخر Ù?٠تÙدÙÙ
تÙارÙر اÙتدÙÙÙ Ù?٠اÙÙÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙØ ÙاÙØاجة Ø¥ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاص ÙعÙÙ Ù
ساÙÙ
ات⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØاع Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø© اÙÙÙÙ ÙاأÙشغا٠اÙعاÙ
Ø© ÙاÙت٠تعتÙ
د عÙ٠اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙ⬠â«Ø²Ø±â¬â«Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠Ù٠اâ¬
â«Ø¹ ÙÙÙÙÙÙ ÙادرÙ٠عÙ٠تÙدÙÙ
اÙÙ
Ø´Ùرâ¬
â«Ø© اÙاÙزÙ
Ø© ÙدعÙ
Ù
Ø«Ù Ùذ٠اأÙÙØ´ØØ© ÙتأÙ
Ù٠اÙتÙسÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
ا بÙÙ Ù
ختÙÙ?⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ضÙ
Ù ÙØدة تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¸Ù?Ù٠أÙÙÙ?اء Ù?٠اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ù
Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙجÙاتâ¬
â«Ø©â¬
â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Øاسب٠Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ©âª( Øâ¬Ø£) سÙØرص Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار عÙ٠أ٠تÙÙÙ ÙØدة اأÙصÙÙ ÙبرÙاÙ
ج٠Ù?⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØد Ù
٠اÙÙ
خاØر اÙÙ
رتبØØ© باإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«âª \.6â¬ÙباÙتاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠أج٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹â¬ â«Ø§Ø٠اأÙÙÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù
عتÙ
د Ù?٠اÙÙ
ر⬠â«ØÙ Ù?â¬â«Ù٠خار⬠â«Ø¹âª( Øâ¬Ø¨) ÙسÙتعاÙد اÙÙ
جÙس Ù
ع Ù
دÙâ¬â«Ù ÙاأÙصÙ٠اÙÙ
Ùتسبة ضÙ
٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù عÙ٠استÙعاب اÙعÙ
٠اÙجارâ¬â«Ùأ٠تÙÙÙ Ùادرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙ
تابعتÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙجÙد عÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§Ù? Ù⬠â«Ø© Ùâ¬
â«Øرصا عÙ٠تأÙ
Ù٠اإÙشر⬠â«Ø¥Ø¶Ø§Ù?ÙÙÙ Øسب اÙضرÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¸Ù?ÙÙâ¬â«ÙسÙتÙ
استخداÙ
Ù
Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙ
تثا٠اÙتدÙÙ٠اÙÙ
ستÙ
رâª( Øâ¬Ø¬)â¬
â«Ø¹â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙت٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
ÙضعÙا Ù
٠أج٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اإÙدار⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø³Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù?ص٠ترتÙبات اإÙدار⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙØ°Ù Ù?â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬
â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°ÙÙ Ù?ص٠ع٠اإÙدار⬠â«Ø¥Ù٠إعداد دÙÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù
Ù?صاÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«ÙعÙ
ÙÙØ© إعادة اإÙسÙا٠ÙااÙستÙ
اÙÙ ÙعاÙÙØ© اÙعÙ
٠بÙÙ Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙâªØâ¬â¬ â«ØªÙصÙÙ?ا ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
سؤÙÙÙات⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙØ´Ù
Ù Ù?ص٠اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ù⬠â«ÙتØدÙد اأÙدÙار Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاص⪠Øâ¬Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¢ÙÙات Ù
ساÙÙ
ات⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØاع Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øª اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙ⬠â«Ùاجرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙدÙر ترتÙبات اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø© اÙÙ
اÙئÙ
Ø© Ù?٠إدارâ¬
â«Ø© اÙÙ
شارÙع اÙت٠ÙÙ
ÙÙÙÙا اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙباÙتاÙ٠سÙ?⬠â«âª \.7â¬Ø§ÙتÙظÙÙ?⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ
سؤÙ٠اÙÙ
اÙ٠اÙÙائÙ
Ùد٠Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار اÙخبرâ¬
â«ÙساعدÙ⪠Øâ¬Øسب ااÙÙتضاء⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ?Ù⬠â«Ø¸Ù? Ù
اÙ٠إضاÙ?٠أ٠Ù?⬠â«ÙÙÙ
ÙÙ ÙÙ
Ù Ùâ¬â«Ø§Ù? رئÙس ÙسÙ
اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ù?⬠â«Ø¹âª \.â¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙ Ùذا اÙÙ
سؤÙ٠اÙÙ
اÙ٠تØت إشرâ¬â«ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ø£Ùثر Ùâ¬
â«ØªØ¹ÙÙداâª\.â¬â¬ â«Øا٠أصبØت Ø£ÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شارÙع اÙت٠ÙÙ
ÙÙÙÙا اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù?â¬
â«ÙÙÙ
ÙÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«ØªÙ
استخداÙ
Ù ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø¹âª \.â¬Ùضع Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار برÙاÙ
ج Ù
Øاسبة Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ÙÙÙÙ?ا Ù⬠â«âª \.8â¬Ø¨Ø±ÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
Øاسبة ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ضÙ
Ù ÙØدة تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹âª \.â¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙ Ù?رÙ٠اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© غÙر اÙÙ
دÙâ¬
â«ÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ؤÙتة ÙÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ ÙتÙÙÙد اÙتÙارÙرâ¬â«ØاسبÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
â¬
â«Ø§ÙعÙ
ÙÙات Ù?â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³ØªØ®Ø¯Ø§Ù
Ù Ù
٠أج٠تسجÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù?Ù ÙظاÙ
اÙÙ
Øاسبة ÙاÙØرصâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙعÙ
ÙÙاتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ù٠ع٠اÙتدÙÙ٠اÙÙاÙ
Ù ÙاÙدÙÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار برئاسة رئÙس ÙسÙ
اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ù
سؤÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ø£ÙتÙÙ
اتÙÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙا Ù
٠اÙÙظاÙ
âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ؤÙتة اÙاÙزÙ
Ø© ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ù٠أ٠تصدر اÙتÙارÙرâ¬
â«Ø© Ù
٠أجÙ⬠â«ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± ضرÙرÙ⬠â«Ø³ÙتÙ
إصدار اÙÙرض Ù
٠خاÙÙ ÙاÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙسÙ
Ø ÙÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠بإدرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬ أ٠تدبÙر ÙÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? Ù
٠اÙÙ
خاØر ضÙ
٠اÙترتÙبات اÙت٠تÙ? Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØ©âªÙ \.â¬â¬ â«âª \.9â¬Ø¥Ø¹Ø¯Ø§Ø¯ اÙÙ
Ùز Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§ØªÙ⬠â«Ø¹ Ù
٠خاÙ٠استخداÙ
اÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙتÙج Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙÙØ© ÙÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙسÙاساتÙ⪠Øâ¬Ùاجر⬠â«Ø³ÙتÙ
تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙعاÙ
Ø© Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙ⪠\.â¬ÙباÙتاÙÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø³Ø¯ اÙÙ?جÙات Ù?Ù ÙظاÙ
إدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹âª \.â¬Ø£Ù
ا باÙÙسبة Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
Ùز Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙة⬠â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات تدÙÙÙ ÙÙ
رâ¬
â«Ø§Ùبة ÙاباÙغ ÙÙ
Øاسبة Ù
اÙئÙ
Ø© ÙÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Øرصا عÙ٠تأÙ
ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù
ÙÙة⪠\.â¬Ø³ØªÙ?تخذ Ù
جÙ
Ùعة Ù
٠ترتÙبات اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙ
شارÙعâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ Ù?â¬
â«ÙÙصاد٠اÙبرÙÙ
ا٠عÙÙÙاâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø¹ ÙÙ?ئات اإÙÙÙ?ا٠Ù?٠اتÙ?ا٠اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ ÙعتÙ
دÙا Ù
جÙس اÙÙزرâ¬â«Ù
خصصات اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬Ù? Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
اÙÙØ´Ù? عÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¯Ø§Ø®ÙÙØ© ÙائÙ
Ø© Ù
٠أج٠إعداد اÙÙ
عاÙ
اÙت ÙاÙÙ
ÙاÙ?ÙØ© عÙÙÙا ÙÙ?ص٠اÙÙاجبات اÙÙ
تعÙÙÙØ© باÙÙ
شارÙع اÙت٠ÙÙ
ÙÙÙÙاâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙداخÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار ضÙابØâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.10â¬Ø§ÙضÙابØâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØاÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© بشأ٠اÙÙ
شارÙعâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± أداء إدارتÙ⬠â«Ù
ÙÙÙات اÙبÙاء ÙÙÙ
شارÙع اÙت٠Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ
ÙÙÙا اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار خبرâ¬
â«Ø© ØÙÙÙØ© Ù?٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹âª\.â¬â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© Ù
٠أج٠تÙ?صÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° ترتÙبات اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬ â«Ù
رضÙا⪠\.â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
إعداد Ù?ص٠ØÙ٠اإÙدار⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙاÙÙ
اضÙØ©â¬
â«âªPage 70 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ùر اأÙÙ
ÙرÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙسÙستخدÙ
⬠â«Ø¹ Ù?Ù Ù
صرÙ? ÙبÙا٠Ù?٠اÙدÙ⬠â«Ù
ÙÙâ¬
â«Øدد "ب") Ø£ÙÙ
Ùا٠Ùرض اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù
ÙÙâ¬
â«Øدد "Ø£" ÙØساب Ù?⬠â«ÙÙ (Øساب Ù?⬠â«Ø¯Ùâ¬
â«Øد Ùâ¬
â«Ù
Ùâ¬â«ÙÙ Ù?â¬â«Øساب Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù?٠اأÙÙ
ÙاÙâªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
Ù?تØ⬠â«âª \.11â¬ØªØ¯ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙÙات ÙÙÙÙا اÙت٠Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ
ÙÙÙا اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø³ØªØ«Ùاء إعادة اإÙسÙا٠(ااÙستÙ
اÙÙ)âªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Øدد "Ø£" ÙتسدÙد اÙÙÙ?Ùات اÙÙ
Ø´Ù
ÙÙØ© اÙÙ
رتبØØ© بأÙØ´ØØ© Ù⬠â«Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار اÙØساب Ù?â¬
â«ØªØس٠رصد إعادة اإÙسÙا٠Ùâ¬
â«Ùتتبع⬠â«Ù
Ù
ا ÙضÙ
Ù Ù⬠â«Øدد "بâªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
تسدÙدÙا Ù
٠اÙØساب Ù?⬠â«Ø§Ø¶Ù ÙاأÙÙ
اÙÙ Ù⬠â«ÙرÙ٠باستÙ
اÙ٠اأÙرâ¬â«Ø¨Ù
ا أ٠اÙتسدÙدات Ø¥Ù٠اأÙشخاص اÙÙ
تأثâ¬
â«Ø³Ùعد Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اءâ¬â«Ø§ÙرسÙ
Ùة⪠\.â¬Ù Ù?â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙثبÙتÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ù⬠â«Ùبرز اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙ٠اأÙÙر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙâ¬
â«Øدد "ب" عÙدÙ
ا Ù?⬠â«ØªØªÙ
اÙتسدÙدات Ù
٠اÙØساب Ù?â¬â«ÙÙ
تابعة Ø£Ù?ض٠ÙØاÙØ© اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù
Ù ØÙØ« اÙسدادâªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«Ø¹âª \.â¬ÙÙ?Ù⬠â«ÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ؤÙتة غÙر اÙÙ
دÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¡ Ù
٠اÙتÙارÙرâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ٠عاÙÙÙÙ Ùجز⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
سددÙÙ ÙÙؤâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ¡ اÙØ°Ù٠ا٠Ùز⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ùر Ù?صÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙا Ù
٠أج٠إعداد ÙائÙ
Ø© بأسÙ
اء اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ⬠â«ÙاإÙعÙ
ار تÙر Ùاâ¬
â«Ù
ÙÙâ¬
â«Øدد ÙÙ
ÙاصÙØ© تØدÙØ« اÙÙائÙ
Ø© عÙ٠أساس سÙÙÙ ØتÙ⬠â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬Ø¹ÙÙ Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار ااÙØتÙ?اظ بÙذ٠اأÙÙ
Ùا٠Ù?Ù Øساب Ù?⬠â«Øا٠عدÙ
اÙØضÙر Ù?٠خاÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙتسدÙد اÙÙÙائ٠إÙ٠اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ ÙاÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø© Øت٠بعد اÙتÙاء اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Øدد "Ø£" ÙÙÙÙ?Ùات اÙÙ
Ø´Ù
ÙÙØ© Ù?٠اÙÙ?ئة ⪠Ø1â¬Ø³ÙستخدÙ
Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار بÙا٠ÙÙ?Ùات⪠\.â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
تÙØ«Ù٠اÙØساب⬠â«âª \.12â¬Ø¹Ùد ØÙب تجدÙد اÙÙ
Ùارد Ù?٠اÙØساب Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø© Ø¥Ù٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠عÙ٠أساس Ù
بدأ اÙÙ
ساÙاة بÙ٠اÙÙسÙ
اÙذ٠ا٠ÙستÙ?Ùدâ¬
â«Ø³Ø¯Ø¯ اÙÙ
دÙ?Ùعات ÙاÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ù
Ùجز اÙستخداÙ
اأÙÙ
ÙاÙ⪠\.â¬ØªÙ? Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙâ¬
â«Øدد "ب" ÙÙÙÙ?Ùات Ù
٠اÙÙ?ئة ⪠2â¬Ù
٠خاÙ٠بÙا٠Ù⬠â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø© ÙÙÙرض اÙÙØ°ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙ
تØدÙدÙÙ
ا Ù?٠اتÙ?ا٠اÙÙرضâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ùسر⬠â«Ùسرâ¬
â«Ø© ÙاÙÙسÙ
اÙØ°Ù ÙستÙ?Ùد Ù
٠اÙشرÙØ Ù?⬠â«Ù
٠اÙشرÙØ Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙØ© ÙÙÙØاع اÙعاÙ
(⪠â )IPSASâ¬Ø§Ø£Ùساسâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ اÙت٠Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙ
إعدادÙا ÙÙ?٠اÙÙ
عاÙÙر اÙÙ
ØاسبÙة⬠â«Ùتة⪠\.â¬ØªÙ?رس٠اÙتÙارÙر اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ؤÙâ¬
â«Ùتة اÙخاصة باÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«âª \.13â¬Ø§ÙتÙارÙر اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ؤÙâ¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
ااÙتÙ?ا٠عÙÙ Ø´Ù٠اÙتÙارÙر ÙÙ
ØتÙاÙاâ¬
â«ÙØد Ø£Ùص٠بعد ÙÙاÙØ© ÙÙ Ù?صÙâªÙ \.â¬â¬ â«Ø© Ù
٠خاÙÙ ÙظاÙ
اÙÙ
Øاسبة⪠Øâ¬Ø¥Ù٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù?٠غضÙÙ âªÙ 45â¬â¬
â«ÙÙÙ
ا Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙد٠⪠-â¬ÙاÙصادرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙدÙØ© Øسب ÙÙ Ù?ئة ÙÙسÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙتÙÙØ© ÙÙ
Ù Ø«Ù
بشÙ٠ترâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
ع Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار⪠\.â¬ÙستÙÙ٠اÙتÙارÙر اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ؤÙâ¬
â«Ùتة Ù
ؤÙÙÙ?Ø© Ù
Ù⪠:â¬Ø£) بÙا٠اÙتسدÙدات ÙااÙÙصااÙتâ¬
â«ØاسبÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
اÙØظات اÙتÙ?سÙرÙâ¬
â«Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°ÙÙ ØاشÙØ© ØÙÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ù? ثاÙØ«Ø©Ø (ب) ÙاÙسÙاسات Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
⬠â«Ùاة Ù
٠أØرâ¬â«Ù
ÙØ° تارÙØ® اÙتØÙÙÙ Øت٠اÙسÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙتÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠اأÙÙ
Ùا٠اÙÙ
تÙÙâ¬
â«ÙتزÙ
بÙا⪠Øâ¬Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
سددةâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø¨ÙÙ Ù
باÙغ اÙعÙÙد Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø¹ اÙت٠تÙ? Ù⬠â«Ø© ÙÙÙاÙتÙØ§Ø (د) ÙبÙا٠إÙتزâ¬
â«Ø§Ù
ات اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØ© بداÙØ© اÙÙ?ترâ¬
â«Ù٠بÙÙ Ù
Ùز Ùâ¬
â«Ø¯Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Øد Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØساب Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ Ù?⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙزÙ
ÙÙØ©Ø (ج) ÙبÙا٠ÙتسÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙجداÙÙâ¬
â«ÙدÙ
اÙعÙ
Ùâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙØ Ù(Ù) اÙئØØ© شاÙ
ÙØ© Ù
٠اأÙصÙ٠اÙثابتة Ùت Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ø (Ù) ÙبÙا٠اÙÙÙ?Ùات ÙÙÙ Ù?ئة عÙÙ Øدة ÙÙÙ?ص٠ÙبشÙ٠تر⬠â«Ù
ÙÙع ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
سددة ضÙ
Ù Ù٠عÙد ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙغÙرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙØ© ÙÙÙØاع اÙعاÙ
(اأÙساس اÙÙÙدÙ) عÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØاسبÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªÙ
إعدادÙا ÙÙ?٠اÙÙ
عاÙÙر Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
⬠â«Ø¹ اÙت٠Ùâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹âª \.â¬Ùجب أ٠تØتÙ٠اÙبÙاÙات⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \.14â¬Ø§ÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ÙÙ Ù?ÙÙا Ø¥Ù٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù?٠غضÙ٠ستة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
دÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø³ÙÙÙة⪠\.â¬ØªÙ? ÙÙâ¬
â«ÙدÙ
اÙبÙاÙات⬠â«Ø© Ù⬠â«Ø¥ÙÙ
ا تÙ?غ Ùâ¬
â«ØÙ Ù?تر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ?صÙÙØ©âªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات ÙÙ?سÙا اÙÙاردة Ù?٠اÙتÙارÙر اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ؤÙâ¬
â«Ùتةâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ اÙÙ?Ùرâ¬
â«Ø© اÙتاÙÙØ©)âª\.â¬â¬ â«(ر⬠â«Ù
اÙÙØ©âª25â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£Ø´Ùر ÙØد Ø£Ùص٠بعد اÙتÙاء Ù٠سÙØ©â¬
â«Ø¹ ÙÙÙÙاâ¬â«Ø¹âª \.â¬ÙسÙØ´Ù
٠اÙتدÙÙ٠أÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¬Ù خاص ÙÙ
ستÙÙ Ù
عتÙ
د Ù
٠جاÙب اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù?٠اÙبÙاÙات⬠â«Ù٠خارâ¬â«ÙÙ Ù
دÙ⬠â«âª \.15â¬Ø§ÙتدÙÙ٠اÙخارجÙâªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙدÙâ¬
â«ÙسÙتÙ
تÙدÙÙ
تÙرÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù اÙتدÙÙÙ ÙÙ?٠اÙÙ
عاÙÙر اÙد٠Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙØ© ÙÙتدÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙداخÙÙØ© ÙااÙÙ
تثا٠اÙتÙ?ا٠اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙâªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«Ø³Ùجر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ùت٠ÙÙ
ÙÙÙÙا اÙÙرض⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°ÙÙ Ù
رâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹Ø© ÙÙ?اءة ÙظاÙ
اÙضÙابØâ¬
â«Ù
اÙÙة⪠\.â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙØتÙÙ Ùتاب اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«ÙØد Ø£Ùص٠بعد ÙÙاÙØ© Ù٠سÙØ© Ù⬠â«Ø© Ø¥Ù٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù?٠غضÙ٠⪠6â¬Ø£Ø´Ùر Ù⬠â«Ø¹ Ù
ع Ùتاب Ù
٠اإÙدار⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتدÙÙÙ ÙاÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ù٠اÙخارج٠Ù?Ù⬠â«Ø¬Ù ÙÙضÙØ§Ø¨Ø Ø§ÙداخÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙ
Øاسبة⪠Øâ¬ÙااÙÙ
تثا٠ÙÙصÙÙ٠اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© Ù?٠اتÙ?ا٠اÙÙرض⪠\.â¬ÙÙ ÙÙâ¬
â«ØªÙÙع اÙتعاÙد Ù
ع اÙÙ
دÙ⬠â«Ù٠اÙخار⬠â«Ø¹ عÙ٠تÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙ
دÙâ¬â«Ø¹Ù اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹âª\.â¬â¬â«ØºØ¶Ù٠⪠6â¬Ø£Ø´Ùر Ù
٠تبÙÙر ÙÙ?اءة اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª \. 16â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ?٠سÙاسة اÙÙØ´Ù? ÙااÙباÙغ اÙت٠ÙعتÙ
دÙا اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠اÙÙ
Ùترض Ù
٠خاÙÙ Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù ÙÙØ´Ù? Ø¥Ù٠اÙعÙ٠اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ù?رâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø¹ ÙØ°Ù ÙÙبÙÙا اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠تÙ?ØµØ¨Ø Ù
تÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ
دÙâ¬
â«ÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¶ ااÙستثÙ
ارÙâ¬
â«ÙØ© ÙÙÙÙا⪠\.â¬ÙباÙتاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
ت٠صدرت اÙبÙاÙات⬠â«ÙعÙ
ÙÙات ااÙÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙØ© اÙخاصة بÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ
دÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙرâ¬
â«Ø£Ù اÙعاÙ
عÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙÙع اÙشبÙÙ ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ارâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¹ Ù?٠⪠31â¬ÙاÙÙ٠اأÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø¯ÙسÙ
برâª\.â¬â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªÙتÙ٠اÙسÙة⬠â«âª25â¬â¬
â«âªPage 71 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
صرÙÙ?اتâ¬
â«ØªÙ
تØدÙدÙا Ù?Ù Ùتاب اÙÙ
صرÙÙ?ات⪠\.â¬Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
استخداÙ
اÙÙ
صرÙÙ?ات⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙجÙÙÙØ© ÙÙ
صرÙÙ?ات اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙÙÙ
شارÙع ÙÙÙ
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«âªÙ \.17â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
Ø¥ÙÙ?ا٠عائدات اÙÙرض ÙÙ?٠اÙØ®ØÙØâ¬
â«Ù
سبÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات⬠â«Ø¹âª \.â¬ÙباÙتاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ØªÙ?ØÙÙÙ ØÙبات اÙدÙ?ع Ù
٠اÙÙرض Ù
٠خاÙ٠استخداÙ
تØبÙÙات اÙسØب⪠Øâ¬Ø³Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ ÙÙ
دÙ?Ùعات Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙÙائÙ
Ø© عÙ٠اÙÙ
عاÙ
اÙت Ù?٠إØار Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø©âª \.â¬ÙÙ
ا ستشÙ
٠تØبÙÙات اÙسØب ÙÙÙÙا اÙÙثائ٠اÙداعÙ
Ø© اÙÙ
اÙئÙ
ة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ùâ¬â«ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠تسدÙدات Ù
باشر⬠â«Ø¯Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙâ¬
â«Øد Ù⬠â«ÙÙ Ù?â¬â«Ø§ÙØساب Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¥Ø¹Ø§Ø¯Ø© تسدÙد⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات تجدÙد Ù
Ùارد Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ù
ا سÙÙ? اÙØساب⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Øدد "Ø£" بÙ⪠10000000â¬Ø¯âª\.â¬Ø£âªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Øدد سÙÙ? اÙØسابâ¬â«ÙÙ ÙÙ⬠â«Ø¯Ùâ¬
â«Ù ÙâªÙ? Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Øد Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØساب Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ Ù?⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙعÙ
ÙÙات إعادة اÙتسدÙد ÙتجدÙد اÙÙ
Ùارد Ø¥ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù?صÙØ©â¬
â«ÙÙ⬠â«Ø°Ù٠بÙاÙات اÙÙÙ?Ùاتâ¬
â«Ø© ⪠6â¬Ø£Ø´Ùرâª\.â¬â¬â«Ùعات اÙÙÙ?Ùات ÙÙ?ترâ¬
â«Ù
تغÙر⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠أساس تÙÙâ¬
â«Øدد "ب" Ù?ÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«Ù ⪠10â¬Ù
اÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙرض ÙÙÙÙ?Ùات اÙÙ
ؤÙÙØ© ضÙ
٠سÙع اÙÙ?ئات⪠Øâ¬ÙخدÙ
ات اÙÙ
ستشار⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙتدرÙب⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?ة⬠â«Ø³ÙسÙ
Ø Ø¨ØªÙ
ÙÙ٠رجع٠Ùدرâ¬â«Ù?⬠â«âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙرجعÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ⬠â«âª\.â¬â¬ â«âª18â¬â¬
â«ÙÙØ© Ù?٠خاÙ٠اأÙØ´Ùر ااÙØ«Ù٠عشر Ø£Ù Ù
ا بعدÙا Ùب٠تارÙØ® اÙتÙÙÙع عÙ٠اتÙ?ا٠اÙعÙد⪠\.â¬Ùجب تسدÙد Ø«Ù
٠اÙبÙÙد Ù
Ùضع اÙتÙرÙد ÙÙ?٠إجرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Ø§ÙتشغÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ØÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¥Ù٠اÙتÙاÙÙÙ?â¬
â«Ø¹ÙØ© اإÙجرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡âª\.â¬â¬ â«ØªÙرÙد اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠اÙÙ
ر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙÙترÙÙÙة⪠\.â¬Ø§Ø¹ØªÙ
د اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠اÙصرÙ? ااÙÙÙترÙÙÙ ÙÙÙ
شارÙع اÙÙ
دعÙÙ
Ø© ÙÙÙÙا Ù?Ù ÙبÙاÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ?٠إØار اÙصرÙ? اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
اإÙباÙغ عÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات اÙصرÙ?â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª\.19â¬â¬
â«Ø¹ اÙصرÙ? اإÙÙÙترÙÙ٠بشÙÙ ÙبÙر Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات⬠â«Ø³Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø³Ø±â¬ â«ÙÙا Ù
٠خاÙÙ ÙظاÙ
Ø±Ø¨Ø Ø¹Ù
اÙØ¡ اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâªÙ? \.â¬â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
عاÙ
اÙت اÙاÙزÙ
Ø© ÙÙ
Ø³Ø Ø§ÙÙثائ٠اÙداعÙ
Ø© Ùذات اÙصÙØ© ÙÙÙÙÙا Ø¥ÙÙترÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¹âª\.â¬â¬ â«ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø³Ù٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙصرÙ? Ù?â¬
â«ÙسÙتÙ
Ù
ÙØ Ù?ترâ¬
â«Ø© سÙ
Ø§Ø Ø£Ùربعة أشÙر ÙÙسÙ
اØ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙسÙع Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
سÙÙÙ
Ø© Ù?٠تارÙØ® Ø¥ÙÙ?ا٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø³Ø¯Ø¯Ø©âª Øâ¬ÙاÙخدÙ
ات Ù Ù⬠â«âª \.20â¬Ø³ÙØترÙ
اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠اÙÙÙ?Ùات اÙÙ
عتÙ
دة Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù
تÙبدة (أ٠اÙخدÙ
ات أ٠اÙسÙع أ٠اأÙعÙ
ا٠اÙÙ
تÙÙâ¬
â«Ùاة ÙاÙÙ
ÙبÙÙØ©) Ùب٠تارÙØ® Ø¥ÙÙ?ا٠اÙÙرضâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø¨ØªØ³Ø¯Ùد Ø£Ù ÙÙ?Ùات Ù
عتÙ
دة Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ù?⪠\.â¬Ø³ØªÙ? ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¹âª\.â¬â¬ â«ÙÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ Ù?٠اÙسÙØ© عÙ٠اأÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠أساس تÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙ
خاØر ÙÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ÙظÙ
بعثة إشرâ¬
â«Ø§Ù? Ù
رت⬠â«âª \.21â¬Ø®ØØ© اإÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙرÙدâ¬
â«âª \.22â¬ÙØ´Ù
٠تÙÙÙÙ
Ùدرâ¬
â«Ø© اÙتÙرÙد Ù
ا ÙÙÙâª:â¬â¬
â«(Ø£) اإÙØار اÙÙاÙÙÙÙâª:â¬â¬
â«ØªÙدÙ
â¬
â«Ø© اÙÙÙÙ ÙاأÙشغا٠اÙعاÙ
Ø© ÙاØاÙعÙا عÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø²Ø±â¬â«Ø§Ù ٠اâ¬
â«ÙسÙتÙ
إشرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ باÙتعاÙ٠اÙÙØ«ÙÙ Ù
ع Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙâª\.â¬â¬â«(⪠)1â¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙ?Ø° Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø±Ø³Ù
Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø© Ù?Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙا⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù
٠اÙÙ
جÙس ÙÙ?٠أÙظÙ
Ø© تÙرÙد خاصة⪠Øâ¬Ø£ØµØ¨Øت⬠â«Ø£ÙÙ ÙÙاÙØ© عاÙ
Ø© Ù
ستÙÙØ© Ù
اÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙا ÙÙاÙÙÙÙ⬠â«(⪠)2â¬Ù
ÙØ° تأسÙس Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ù?٠اÙعاÙ
⪠1977â¬Ø¹ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© بÙاâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØسابÙØ© Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار اÙت٠أÙاØÙ ÙزÙر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø٠اÙÙ
عاÙ
اÙت⬠â«Ø§ÙعاÙ
⪠1980â¬Ø¨Ù
Ùجب Ù
رسÙÙ
Ù?â¬
â«Ùغ Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙ
تأسÙس Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠بÙ
Ùجب اÙÙاÙÙ٠رÙÙ
⪠Ø6479â¬Ø§Ùصادر Ù?٠⪠14â¬ÙÙساÙâª/â¬Ø£Ø¨Ø±Ù٠⪠Ø1961â¬Ø§ÙØ°Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ù اÙÙاÙÙ٠رÙÙ
⪠Ø34â¬Ø§Ùصادر Ù?Ù⬠â«( âªÙ )3â¬â¬
â«Ø²Ø±â¬
â«Ø© اÙÙÙÙ ÙاأÙشغاÙ⬠â«Ø¹Ø§ÙØ© ٠اâ¬â«Ø¢Ø°Ø§Ø±âª/â¬Ù
ارس ⪠Ø1959â¬Ù
٠خاÙ٠اÙÙ?ص٠بÙÙ "اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
" Ù"ÙÙئة اÙÙÙرباء ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
"⪠\.â¬ØªÙ?عتبر Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠تØت رâ¬
â«ÙØ© ÙاÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙ
اÙÙ ÙÙ
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø± (اÙتعدÙÙ) رÙÙ
⪠4/88â¬Ø§Ùصادر Ù?Ù ÙاÙÙ٠اÙثاÙÙâª/â¬ÙÙاÙر ⪠1988â¬Ø§Ùخاص باÙÙ
Ùارد اÙبشرÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙعاÙ
Ø© ÙتÙ
تث٠ÙÙÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ùصادر Ù?٠شباØâª/â¬Ù?برâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر âª\.1992â¬â¬
â«(⪠)4â¬Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار ÙÙ
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠Ù
ؤسستا٠تÙ
ÙÙÙÙ
ا اÙدÙÙØ© ÙتÙ
تثاÙÙ ÙÙÙ
رسÙÙ
رÙÙ
⪠4517â¬Ø§Ùصادر Ù?Ù ÙاÙÙ٠اأÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø¯ÙسÙ
بر âª1972â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø¶ اÙاÙØÙ ÙÙ
دÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ Ù
Ùتب⬠â«Ùة⪠Øâ¬ÙااÙستعرâ¬
â«Ø© اÙÙ
اÙÙâ¬
â«Ø²Ø±â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù?تشÙØ© اÙÙ
رÙزÙâ¬
â«Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ù٠ا⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
دÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙ
ارس اÙرÙابة ÙÙ Ù
Ù Ù
جÙس اÙخدÙ
ة⬠â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø±Ù? اÙÙ
ؤسسات اÙت٠تÙ
ÙÙÙا اÙدÙÙØ©âªÙ? \.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙØ°Ù Ù?â¬
â«âªPage 72 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙØÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«(ب) اÙخبرâ¬
â«Ø© Ù?٠اÙÙ
شارÙع اÙت٠ÙÙ
ÙÙÙÙا اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâª:â¬â¬
â«(⪠)1â¬ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار خبرâ¬
â«Ø© ØÙÙÙØ© Ù?٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙجÙات اÙÙ
اÙØØ© (ااÙتØاد اأÙÙرÙبÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙØ¥ÙÙشاء ÙاÙتعÙ
Ùر⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙÙ
صرÙ? اأÙÙرÙب٠ÙاÙستثÙ
ارâªØâ¬â¬
â«Ø© Ù
٠خاÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ùدة⪠\.â¬ÙÙد اعتÙ
دت اÙÙ
ؤسسة Ù
صÙ?ÙÙ?Ø© تÙظÙÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø© ÙÙ
عÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙتØر٠إÙÙ Ù
شار Ùâ¬
â«Ùع ÙبÙر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¥Ùخ⪠\.)\.â¬Ù?٠اÙÙاÙع⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ø«Ø¨Øª Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ùâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙ Ùادر عÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ ÙاÙ?ة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء⬠â«Ø©âª Øâ¬ÙتعاÙ
Ù Ù
ع Ø£Ùج٠إدارâ¬
â«Ø© اÙعÙد ÙاÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø© Ù
دÙر ÙتÙ
تâ¬
â«Ùع باÙخبر⬠â«Ø¹ Ø¥ÙÙ Ù?رÙ٠بإدارâ¬â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© ÙÙ Ù
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ ÙتÙ?ÙÙضâ¬â«Ø© اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«"استباÙ" إدارâ¬
â«Ù ÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ٠اإÙضاÙ?Ù (تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬â«Ø¹ تØÙÙر اÙÙÙ٠اÙØضرâ¬â«Ø¹ اÙت٠أدارت Ù
شرÙâ¬â«Ø¹ Ù
٠خاÙÙ ÙØدة اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ù
Ùتب رصد ÙتÙÙÙÙ
âªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹âª\.â¬â¬â«Ø© اÙÙ
اÙئÙ
ة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ا ÙÙ?رض٠تصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ÙعÙ٠باÙخبر⬠â«Ø£Ø®ØµØ§Ø¦Ù٠تÙرÙد ÙتÙ
تâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù?ÙÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ø®ØµØ§Ø¦ÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¸Ù?ÙÙ ÙدÙÙا⬠â«ÙØ¥ÙÙشاء ÙاÙتعÙ
Ùر)⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙØدة بÙ٠إدارÙâ¬
â«ÙØ© Ù
تÙÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ تØÙÙر⬠â«ØµÙÙ?ت إدارâ¬
â«Ø© اÙعÙÙد ÙÙ
عاÙجة اÙتÙرÙد⪠Øâ¬ÙتÙرÙر اÙÙتائج ÙاستÙÙ
ا٠اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° ÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ÙÙ
ا أ٠اÙعÙاÙØ© Ù
ÙØÙظة عÙد ØÙ?ظ اÙسجاÙت ÙباÙÙسبة Ø¥ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙعÙØ© اÙتÙÙÙÙ
âªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø¬â¬â«Ø§Ø¡ استدرâ¬
â«ØÙعة عÙÙ Ù
ستÙدات اÙعØاءات اÙخاصة باÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙعÙد إجرâ¬
â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± اÙÙØدة Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ù
رض Ù
Ù ØÙØ« اÙتÙÙ?Ùذ⪠\.â¬ÙتÙ? Ù⬠â«Ù أداء اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© عÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙ Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙØضرâ¬
â«ÙØ© ÙتÙÙÙ Ù
ÙبÙÙØ© Ù
٠جاÙب اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ø£Ø«Ø¨Øª Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠جÙتÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙدرتÙâ¬â«Ø§Ø¶ اÙÙثائ٠اÙÙ
عÙارÙ⬠â«Ø¹Ø±Ùض عÙ٠اÙÙ
ستÙ٠اÙÙ
ØÙÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
استعرâ¬
â«Ùرâ¬
â«Ø§Øª بشÙÙ Ù
اÙئÙ
⪠Øâ¬Ùعرض اÙعÙÙد اÙÙ
Ù
ÙÙØØ© عÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙÙع⬠â«Ø¹ÙÙ ØÙ?ظ اÙسجاÙت اÙÙ
اÙئÙ
ة⪠Øâ¬ÙتØدÙØ« Ø®ØØ Ø§ÙتÙرÙد⪠Øâ¬ÙتÙظÙÙ
اÙتÙرÙد بشÙÙ Ù?â¬
â«Ù
رض⪠Øâ¬ÙÙشر اÙÙ
Ø° Ùâ¬
â«Ø© اÙعÙÙدâªØâ¬â¬
â«ØÙØ© ØÙÙÙØ© ÙÙ?٠إدارâ¬
â«Ø± Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات Ù
ÙاÙ?ÙØ© بÙرÙ٠ا⬠â«Ø®Ø§Ø±Ø¬ÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ØªÙ?اÙØظ اÙعÙاسات Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙبÙØ© Ù?Ù Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتØر٠إÙ٠اÙØ´ÙاÙ٠بشÙ٠جدÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙتعÙÙÙ Ù
دÙâ¬
â«ÙÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙشبÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ùاâ¬
â«ÙتأخÙر Ù?٠تÙ
دÙدات اÙعÙÙد ÙتعدÙاÙتÙا⪠Øâ¬Ø¥ÙØ®âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØتÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ù Ùاâ¬
â«ØªØ£Ø®Ùر Ù?٠تسÙÙÙ
اأÙشغا٠اÙÙ
ÙتÙÙØ©âªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø§Øª ÙاÙتسدÙدات Ù?â¬
â«Ø±Ø±â¬ â«Ùاâ¬
â«ØªØ£Ø®Ùر Ù?٠صÙع اÙ٠ا⬠â«Ù
Ù
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ùسبب⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙØاع Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ù? عÙ٠عÙÙد اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙ⬠â«(⪠)2â¬ØªØ¬Ø±Ø¨Ø© Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙ⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙÙÙ
٠دÙر Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠بشÙ٠أساس٠Ù?٠اإÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§Ù٠ع٠اÙتÙرÙدâ¬
â«Ø© اÙÙÙÙ ÙاأÙشغا٠اÙعاÙ
ة⪠Øâ¬Ù
سؤÙâ¬
â«Ø²Ø±â¬â«Ø§ÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاص⪠Øâ¬Ø¨ÙÙÙ
ا سÙÙÙÙ Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار٠باÙتعاÙÙ Ù
ع Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠Ù٠اâ¬
â«Ù٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاص⪠\.â¬Ø³ØªØ³ØªÙ?Ùد Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠Ù
Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØاع Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙâ¬â«Ø§Øª اÙشر⬠â«Ùاستدرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬ اÙعرÙض ÙØ£Ùشغا٠ÙاÙخدÙ
ات⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠اÙ
تÙازâ¬
â«Ø§Ù?⬠â«ÙÙاÙÙÙÙÙÙ) Ù
٠أج٠Ù
ساعدة اÙÙ
سؤÙÙÙ٠اإÙدرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙ ÙدÙÙا عÙ٠تأÙ
Ù٠اإÙشر⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙ
اÙÙÙÙâªØâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø³Ø§Ø³ÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«(Ù?ÙÙÙÙâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙدعÙ
Ù
٠اÙÙرض Ù
٠خاÙ٠استخداÙ
Ù
ستشارÙ٠أ Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹âª\.â¬â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙئÙ
عÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¸Ù?٠اÙتÙرÙد⬠â«ÙØ© ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¬Ø¯Ø§âª \.â¬ÙÙÙÙاÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
Ù Ù⬠â«Ø§Øª اÙتÙرÙد⪠Øâ¬Ù
رÙزÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
سؤÙÙÙات⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠صÙع ٠اâ¬
â«Ø±Ø±â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ù
ÙÙâ¬
â«Øدد Ù⬠â«(⪠)3â¬Ø§ÙتÙظÙÙ?⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار ÙظاÙ
Ù
ساءÙØ© Ù?â¬
â«ÙØ©â¬â«Ø§Ø¯ ÙشرÙات استشارÙ⬠â«Ø¬ÙØ© ÙااÙستÙ?ادة Ù
Ù Ù
ستشارÙ٠أÙ?ر⬠â«Ø© عÙ٠اÙÙجÙØ¡ Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø±Ø¯ خار Ù⬠â«ØªÙ
تدرÙبÙÙ
عÙ٠اÙتÙرÙد اÙدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙÙدرâ¬
â«Ø© ÙاÙØ°ÙÙ Ùâ¬â«ÙعÙ٠باÙخبرâ¬
â«ÙدÙÙا اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙتÙ
تâ¬
â«ÙÙصا Ù?٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© Ù
Ùاب٠عدد اÙÙ
شارÙع ÙÙد اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°âªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙÙ٠اÙتعاÙ
Ù Ù
ع⬠â«Ø£ØÙاÙا Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
٠أج٠تعزÙز ÙدرتÙا عÙد اÙضرÙرâ¬
â«Ø©âª \.â¬ÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙاج٠Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ارâ¬
â«Ù
Ù
ا ÙزÙد Ù
٠اØتÙ
ا٠ارتÙاب اأÙØ®Øاء⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠⪠240â¬Ù
Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¸ÙÙ?اâª16 Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø© جÙات Ù
اÙØØ© ÙØ£ÙظÙ
تÙا بعبء إضاÙ?٠عÙÙ Ù
Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¸Ù?ÙÙاâªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹âª\.â¬â¬â«Ø© اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ù
٠أج٠اÙÙ
ساعدة Ù?٠إدارâ¬â«Ø£Ø³Ø§Ø³ÙÙÙ Ù?٠خاÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙÙÙ٠سÙØصÙÙ٠عÙ٠دعÙ
خبرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡â¬ â«ÙÙÙ Ù Ù⬠â«Ù
ÙÙÙ
Ù
٠اÙÙ
Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¸Ù?Ù٠اإÙدارÙâ¬
â«(ج) ØÙ?ظ اÙسجاÙت⪠\.â¬ÙØتÙ?ظ Ù?رÙ٠اÙتÙرÙد بسجاÙت Ø£ÙØ´ØØ© اÙتÙرÙد ÙÙÙÙا Ùد٠Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ارâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø© ØÙÙÙØ© Ù?Ù Ù
جا٠تخØÙØ Ø§ÙتÙرÙد⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ÙÙ
ا باÙÙسبة Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙØدات اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© عÙÙ Ù
شارÙع اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«(د) تخØÙØ Ø§ÙتÙرÙد⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار خبرâ¬
â«ÙÙ ÙÙ?ترâ¬
â«Ø© ثاÙثة أعÙاÙ
⪠\.â¬ÙØت٠Ùذا اÙتارÙØ®âªØâ¬â¬ â«ÙعÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
دÙ⬠â«Ø¹Ø§Ø¯Ø©âªÙ? Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùغ Ùâ¬
â«Ø٠اÙÙ
شارÙع اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ?ذة ÙÙÙÙاâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ùا Ù
ستÙاÙ٠خارجÙâ¬
â«ÙÙا Ù?⬠â«ÙÙ⬠â«(Ù) اÙتدÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ØªÙ?Ù
ارس اÙÙ
ؤسسة اÙتدÙÙ٠اÙداخÙÙ ÙتÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ÙÙ Ù
دÙâ¬
â«Ù
رضÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù
ÙÙâ¬
â«Øدد ÙÙ٠ذات Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙعÙØ© Ù?⬠â«Ù?ع تÙارÙر اÙتدÙÙÙ Ù?٠اÙÙÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù⬠â«ØµÙÙ?") ٠تÙ?رÙ⬠â«Ø±â¬
â«Ø£Ù اÙتدÙÙ٠سÙÙÙ
("غÙر Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙâ¬
â«Øددة Ù٠عÙ٠اÙØ´Ù٠اÙتاÙÙâª)1( :â¬â¬ â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«ÙتÙ
تخÙ?ÙÙ?٠إÙÙ Ù
عتدÙ⪠\.â¬Ø§ÙÙ
خاØر Ù?⬠â«ÙتÙ
تÙÙÙÙ
Ø®Øر تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙتÙرÙد اÙعاÙ
عÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ù٠جÙÙر⬠â«(Ù) Ù
خاØر تÙÙÙÙ
اÙتÙرÙد ÙاÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? Ù
ÙÙاâªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«âªPage 73 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø²Ø±â¬
â«Ø§Øªâª Øâ¬Ø¥Ùخ⪠\.â¬ÙدÙ
جÙØ§Ø Ù(⪠)4â¬Ø¥Ø¹Ø¯Ø§Ø¯â¬ â«Ù⪠Øâ¬Ù٠ا⬠â«Ø§Øª بشأ٠رزÙ
اÙعÙÙØ¯Ø Ù(⪠)3â¬Ø§ÙتÙسÙÙ Ù
ع جÙات Ùâ¬
â«Ù
عÙÙØ© أخر⬠â«Ø±Ø±â¬ â«Ø§ÙتأخÙر Ù?Ù Ù
عاÙجة اÙتÙرÙد ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°ÙØ Ù(⪠)2â¬Ø§ÙتأخÙر Ù?٠اتخاذ اÙ٠اâ¬
â«Ù
ÙØÙÙØ©Øâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙة⬠â«ÙتÙ
اÙترâ¬
â«Ø§Ø تدابÙر اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? اÙتاÙÙة⪠)1( :â¬Ø±Ø³Ù
خارØØ© ÙÙ
عاÙجة اÙتÙرÙد Ù
٠أج٠تØÙÙÙ Ù?اع Ù⬠â«Ø© اÙعÙÙدâªÙ \.â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø¬ اÙعرÙض ÙاÙÙ
ÙاصÙ?ات Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙÙØ©Ø Ù(⪠)5â¬Ø¥Ø¯Ø§Ø±â¬ â«Ùثائ٠استدرâ¬
â«Ø¸Ù?ÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù?ÙÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ÙÙدسÙÙâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ?اعÙÙØ©Ø Ù(⪠)4â¬ØªØ¹ÙÙÙ Ù
Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙØ© تÙÙÙÙ?Ø© اÙعÙÙد Ù
٠خاÙ٠اÙتÙÙÙع عÙ٠اتÙ?ا٠اÙÙØ±Ø¶Ø Ù(⪠)3â¬Ø¥Ø¹Ø¯Ø§Ø¯ Ø£ÙÙÙ Ùثائ٠اÙعرÙض بØسب⬠â«Ù(⪠)2â¬Ø¬ÙÙزÙâ¬
â«Ø§Øª Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙ⬠â«Ø§Ùبة اÙعÙÙد⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
Ùت Ùâ¬
â«Ù
بعد إثبات Ùدر⬠â«Ø§Ø¡ Ù
٠أج٠دعÙ
إعداد Ùثائ٠استدرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬ عÙÙد اÙتÙرÙد ÙÙ
ر⬠â«ÙÙ
ستشارÙÙ ÙØ¥Ùشرâ¬
â«Ø§Ù? اÙÙ
ÙداÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ùخبرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬
â«Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ùادارâ¬
â«ÙÙ?⪠Øâ¬ÙتØسÙ٠اÙÙ
Ùارد اÙبشرÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø تدابÙر تخÙ?ÙÙ? Ù
٠أج٠تأÙ
Ù٠دعÙ
Ù?ÙÙ Ù
Ùث⬠â«Ù اÙترâ¬â«Ù٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاص⪠\.â¬Ø¬Ø±â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙØاع Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø© عÙÙد اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙ⬠â«ÙØ«Ù
Ø© Ù
خاØر Ù
رتبØØ© بإدارâ¬
â«Øا⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ا Ù٠اÙØا٠باÙÙسبة Ø¥Ù٠تدخاÙت جÙات⬠â«Ùر عÙÙ Ù
عاÙجة اÙتÙرÙد Ù
٠دÙ٠أ٠ÙÙÙÙ Ù
رتب Ùâ¬â«Ù Ùد تؤثâ¬â«Ù تØدÙد Ù
خاØر Ø£Ù?خر⬠â«ÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¬Ø±â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙئÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙØاÙع ÙاÙتدرÙبâ¬
â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬Ø¥ÙØ®âª\.â¬â¬â«Ø§ÙÙاÙÙÙÙØ© ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬ÙÙ
ÙاÙÙ
Ø© Ùâ¬
â«Ù
شغÙ٠اÙباصات غÙر⬠â«Ø§Ø¡ ØرÙات Ù?٠إØار ÙØا٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙâ¬
â«Øدد ÙتÙسÙع أجز⬠â«Ù Ù?٠اÙÙÙت Ù?â¬â«Ù
اÙØØ© أخرâ¬
â«ØØ©âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Øددة ÙتدابÙر اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? اÙÙ
Ùتر⬠â«(ز) Ù
صÙ?ÙÙ?Ø© تÙÙÙÙ
Ù
خاØر اÙتÙرÙد⪠\.â¬Ø§ÙجدÙ٠⪠1\.1â¬Ù
Ùجز ع٠اÙÙ
خاØر Ù?â¬
â«âªPage 74 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙجدÙ٠⪠\.1\.1â¬Ù
صÙ?ÙÙ?Ø© تÙÙÙÙ
Ù
خاØر اÙتÙرÙدâ¬
â«Ù?ذةâ¬
â«Ø®Øر اÙتÙرÙد ÙÙÙÙئة اÙÙ
ÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙرÙÙ
â¬
â«ØªØ¯Ø§Ø¨Ùر اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ?⬠â«ØªØµÙÙÙ? اÙØ®Øر⬠â«Ø§ÙتعرÙÙ?Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙة⬠â«Ùâ¬â«Ø¬ÙÙر⬠â«âª1â¬â¬
â«Ø¥Ø¯Ø±â¬
â«Ø§Ø¬ رسÙ
خارØØ© Ù
عاÙجة اÙتÙرÙد ÙاÙÙ
صادÙات اÙداخ Ù⬠â«â¢â¬ â«Ø§ÙتأخÙر Ù?٠اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° ÙÙ
عاÙجة اÙتÙرÙدâ¬
â«Ø¹â¬â«Ù
ÙØÙÙØ© Ù?٠دÙÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
رتبØØ© بÙ?ترâ¬
â«Ø© عÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ÙØ© تÙÙÙÙ?Ø© اÙعÙÙد Ù
٠خاÙ٠اÙتÙÙÙع عÙ٠اتÙ?ا٠اÙÙرض⬠â«Ùâ¬â«Ø¬ÙÙر⬠â«âª2â¬â¬
â«Ø¬ÙÙزÙ⬠â«â¢â¬ â«Ø±Ø±â¬
â«Ø§Øª بشأ٠تÙÙÙÙ?Ø© اÙعÙÙد⬠â«Ø§ÙتأخÙر Ù?٠اتخاذ اÙ٠اâ¬
â«Ø¥Ø¹Ø¯Ø§Ø¯ Ùثائ٠اÙعØاءات اأÙÙÙ٠بØسب اÙÙÙ?اءة⬠â«â¢â¬
â«Ø© اÙتÙرÙد عÙ٠إدارâ¬
â«Ø© اÙعÙÙد⬠â«ØªØ®ØµÙص اÙدعÙ
اÙÙ?Ù٠اÙÙ
اÙئÙ
ÙÙدر⬠â«Ù
عتدÙ⬠â«Ø§Øªâª Øâ¬Ø¥Ùخ⪠\.â¬ÙدÙ
جÙاâ¬
â«Ø²Ø±â¬â«Ù⪠Øâ¬Ù٠اâ¬â«Ù
عÙÙØ© أخر⬠â«âª3â¬â¬
â«â¢â¬ â«Ø§ÙتÙسÙÙ Ù
ع جÙات Ùâ¬
â«ÙاÙÙ
صادÙØ© عÙ٠اÙÙتائجâ¬
â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬Ø³ÙستخدÙ
Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ارâ¬â«Ø¨Ø§ÙÙسبة Ø¥Ù٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù
عتدÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙÙة⬠â«âª4â¬â¬
â«â¢â¬ â«Ø¥Ø¹Ø¯Ø§Ø¯ Ùثائ٠اÙعØاءات ÙاÙÙ
ÙاصÙ?ات Ùâ¬
â«Ù?ÙÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ÙÙدسÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ùخبرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ Ù?٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع⬠â«Ø¸Ù?ÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ù
Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù ذات اÙصÙØ© Ù
٠أج٠دعÙ
â¬â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙت Ø£Ù Ù?Ù Ù
جااÙت أخر⬠â«Ùâ¬â«Ø¬ÙÙر⬠â«Ø¥Ø¯Ø§Ø±â¬
â«Ø© اÙعÙÙد (Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار)⬠â«âª5â¬â¬
â«Ù
عاÙجة اÙتÙرÙد Ùادارâ¬
â«Ø© اÙعÙÙدâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¹ÙÙ Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠خبرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ ÙضÙ
اÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¥Ø¯Ø§Ø±â¬
â«Ø© اÙعÙÙد (Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙ)⬠â«âª6â¬â¬
â«Ø³ØªÙ? Ù⬠â«â¢â¬ â«Ø¬ÙÙرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙØاع Ùâ¬
â«Ù٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاصâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø© Ù
اÙئÙ
Ø© ÙÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙ⬠â«Ø¥Ø¯Ø§Ø±â¬
â«Ùâ¬â«Ø¬ÙÙر⬠â«ØªØµÙÙÙ? اÙØ®Øر اÙعاÙ
â¬
â«âª \.23â¬ØªØ±ØªÙبات اÙتÙرÙد اÙÙ
ÙترØØ© Ù٠عÙ٠اÙØ´Ù٠اÙتاÙÙâª:â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙجÙÙÙØ© ÙÙ
Ùع اÙÙ?ساد ÙااÙØتÙا٠ÙÙ
ÙاÙ?ØتÙÙ
ا Ù?Ù Ù
شارÙعâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙجÙÙÙØ© اÙتاÙÙØ©âª( :â¬Ø£) اÙØ®ØÙØâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙتÙ
تØبÙ٠اأÙÙظÙ
Ø© ÙاÙØ®ØÙØ⬠â«Ø¹âªÙ \.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙتÙجÙÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«(Ø£) اأÙÙظÙ
Ø© ÙاÙØ®ØÙØâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹Ø© Ù?Ù ÙاÙÙ٠اÙثاÙÙâª/â¬ÙÙاÙر⬠â«Ø© Ù?٠⪠15â¬ØªØ´Ø±Ù٠اأÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø£ÙتÙبر ⪠2006â¬Ù Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ر Ù⬠â«ØªÙ
ÙÙÙا ÙرÙض اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙØ¥ÙÙشاء ÙاÙتعÙ
Ùر ÙÙ
ÙØ Ø§ÙÙÙاÙØ© اÙدÙÙÙØ© ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙائتÙ
اÙاتÙا"⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùصادرâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«ÙØ©" اÙتابعة ÙÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùصادرâ¬
â«Ø© Ù?٠تÙ
Ùزâª/â¬ÙÙÙÙÙ⬠â«Ùة⪠:â¬Ø§ÙسÙع⪠Øâ¬ÙاأÙشغاÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙخدÙ
ات ااÙستشارÙâ¬
â«ÙØ© ÙغÙر ااÙستشارÙ⬠â«âª 2011â¬Ù(ب) "اÙتÙرÙد Ù?٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شارÙع ااÙستثÙ
ارÙâ¬
â«ÙØ© عÙÙ Ùذا اأÙساسâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ùة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙخدÙ
ات ااÙستشارÙâ¬â«Ø³ÙتÙ
تØدÙد Øر٠اÙتÙرÙد ÙØ£ÙشغاÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙسÙع⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙخدÙ
ات غÙر ااÙستشارÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹Ø© Ù?٠تشرÙ٠اÙثاÙÙâª/â¬ÙÙÙ?Ù
بر âªÙ \.2017â¬â¬ â«âª 2016â¬Ù Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
رâ¬
â«Ø¹ تÙرÙد اأÙشغاÙØ Ùشرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ اÙسÙع ÙÙظÙ
تÙÙÙÙÙجÙا اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
Ø§ØªØ ÙتÙرÙد اÙخدÙ
ات غÙر⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙستشارÙة⪠\.â¬Ù ÙÙâ¬
â«ØªÙÙع Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«(ب) Øر٠اÙتÙرÙد ÙÙسÙع ÙاأÙشغا٠ÙاÙخدÙ
ات غÙرâ¬
â«Ù Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙتسÙÙØ Ù(⪠)3â¬Ø§ØªÙ?اÙات Ø¥ØØ§Ø±Ø Ù(⪠)4â¬Ø§Ø§ÙختÙار اÙÙ
باشرâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØÙÙØ© Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙØ©Ø Ù(âª)2â¬â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¬ عرÙض ÙØ£ÙسÙاÙ⬠â«ÙØ© Ù
٠خاÙ٠اÙØر٠اÙتاÙÙة⪠)1( :â¬ØÙب استدر⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙستشارÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙعÙØ© ÙاÙÙÙÙ?Ø©Ø Ù(⪠)2â¬Ø§Ø§ÙختÙار اÙÙائÙ
⬠â«Ø§Ø¯ عÙ٠أساس⪠)1( :â¬Ø§Ø§ÙختÙار اÙÙائÙ
عÙÙâ¬
â«ÙØ© ÙÙ
ستشارÙ٠أÙ?ر⬠â«(ج) اختÙار اÙÙ
ستشارÙÙâªÙÙ :â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ شرÙات استشارÙ⬠â«ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ÙتÙÙع Ø£Ù Ù?â¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«Ù
ؤÙاÙت اÙÙ
ستشارÙÙØ Ù(⪠)5â¬Ø§Ø§ÙختÙار⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØ© ثابتة (اختÙار ÙائÙ
عÙÙ Ù
Ùز Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙØ© ثابتة)Ø Ù(⪠)3â¬Ø§Ø§ÙختÙار اÙÙائÙ
عÙ٠اÙÙÙÙ?Ø© اأÙدÙÙØ Ù(⪠)4â¬Ø§Ø§ÙختÙار عÙ٠أساس Ù⬠â«Ø¹ÙÙ Ù
Ùز Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¯âª Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠إجرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øª ااÙختÙار اÙÙ
باشرâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ø¨Ø§Ø´Ø±Ø Ù(⪠)6â¬Ø§Ø®ØªÙار اÙÙ
ستشارÙ٠اأÙÙ?رâ¬
â«âªPage 75 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ù٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاص ÙتشغÙÙ Ø®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØاع Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙ
Ù٠اÙعÙÙد Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùردة بÙ
Ùجب ترتÙبات اÙشر⬠â«Ø¹ Ø£Ù Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØاعÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاص⪠\.â¬Ø¹Ù٠اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«(د) اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙâ¬
â«Ø© ⪠6\.42â¬Ø¥ÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹Ø© Ù?٠تشرÙ٠اÙثاÙÙâª/â¬ÙÙÙ?Ù
بر ⪠Ø)2017â¬Ø§ÙÙ?Ùر⬠â«Ø© Ù?٠تÙ
Ùزâª/â¬ÙÙÙÙ٠⪠2016â¬ÙاÙÙ
ر⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØاÙ?اÙت ÙاÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ© ÙصÙاÙتÙا ÙÙ?٠أØÙاÙ
Ø£ÙظÙ
Ø© اÙتÙرÙد (اÙصادرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙجÙÙÙØ© ÙÙ
ÙاÙ?ØØ© اÙÙ?ساد⪠Øâ¬ÙسÙÙÙÙ ÙÙ?٠اÙشرÙØâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ© ÙÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙسÙعÙس تØبÙÙ Ø®ØÙØ Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª 6\.45â¬ÙاÙÙ
ÙØÙ âªÙ \.14â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
ااÙختÙار ÙÙ?Ù Ù
بادئ اÙتÙرÙدâ¬
â«Ø© اÙعÙد Ø¥ÙÙâ¬
â«ÙسÙØÙ٠إدارâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات ااÙختÙار باÙتعاÙ٠اÙÙØ«ÙÙ Ù
ع Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙØÙظة Ù?٠أÙظÙ
Ø© اÙتÙرÙدâªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙدÙر Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ارâ¬
â«Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùت٠ÙدÙÙاâ¬â«Ø¹ تØÙÙر اÙÙÙ٠اÙØضرâ¬â«Ùبا اÙت٠أدارت Ù
شرÙâ¬â«Ø¹ Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ù
٠خاÙ٠اÙÙØدة ÙÙ?سÙا تÙر Ù⬠â«Ø¹âªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙدÙر اÙÙ
شر٠Ù⬠â«âª \.24â¬Ø§ÙتÙظÙÙ? اÙÙ
ÙØªØ±Ø ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا⬠â«Ø¯ÙÙÙØ© أخرâ¬
â«Ø© اÙØÙÙÙØ© Ù?٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شارÙع اÙت٠ÙÙ
ÙÙÙÙا اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙجÙات Ùâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤÙÙÙ٠باÙخبرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¸Ù?ÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øª اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙتÙ
تâ¬
â«Ùع اÙÙ
Ù Ù⬠â«ØªØ¬Ø±Ø¨Ø© ØÙÙÙØ© Ù?Ù Ù
جا٠إجرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙØاعÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø© عÙÙد اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙ⬠â«Ø¯Ø¹Ù
ا Ø¥Ùدار⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠⪠3â¬Ù
٠أج٠تعÙÙ٠اÙخبرâ¬
â«Ø© اÙÙ
اÙئÙ
Ø© ÙتخصÙصÙا Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø³ØªØ³ØªÙ?Ùد Ù
صÙØØ© سÙ٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠Ù
٠اÙدعÙ
Ù
٠خاÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاصâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø٠ترتÙبات إدارâ¬
â«Ø© اÙعÙÙد ÙاÙتÙرÙد Ù?Ù Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار ÙÙ?Ù Ù
صÙØة⬠â«Ø§ÙعÙ
ÙÙاتâªÙ? Øâ¬â¬
â«Ùغ Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ Ù
٠أج٠تØدÙد تÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬â«Ø¹âª \.â¬Ùجب إعداد دÙÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ù
شرÙâ¬â«âª \.25â¬Ø¯ÙÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø³Ù٠اÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شترÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø© اÙÙÙاÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ?ذة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
ÙاءÙ
Ø© اÙسÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙسÙÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙدرâ¬
â«Ø§ØªÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù?ص٠ÙÙدرâ¬
â«ÙÙ⬠â«Ø¹ ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙÙد اإÙعداد Ù
٠أج٠تغØÙØ© اÙتÙÙÙÙ
⬠â«âª \.26â¬Ø®ØØ Ø§ÙتÙرÙد⪠\.â¬Ø§Ø³ØªØ± Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ØªÙجÙØ© تÙرÙد اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù Ùâ¬
â«ØدثÙا⬠â«Ø¹Ù?â¬â«Ø© ØÙاة اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙÙØ© ÙÙ?ترâ¬
â«Ø© إعداد Ø®ØØ© تÙرÙد Ùâ¬â«Ø²Ø±â¬â«Ø¹ ÙÙتÙÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠اÙ٠ا⬠â«Ùعة ÙرزÙ
اÙتÙرÙد⪠\.â¬ÙعÙ٠أساس Ùتائج استر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ØªÙجÙØ© تÙرÙد اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø¹Ù٠ااÙستجابة ÙÙÙ
خاØر اÙÙ
تÙÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬â«Ø¹ ااÙستثÙ
ارâ¬â«Ø© ⪠5\.9â¬Ù
Ù "Ø£ÙظÙ
Ø© اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙÙتÙرÙد ÙÙ
Ùترض٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø©âª \.â¬ÙبÙ
Ùجب اÙÙ?Ùر⬠â«Ù٠عÙ٠اأÙÙÙ Ù?٠اÙسÙØ© Ø£Ù Øسب اÙضرÙر⬠â«ÙÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹Ùا Ù
رتÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù?â¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹Ø© Ù?٠تشرÙ٠اÙثاÙÙâª/â¬ÙÙÙ?Ù
بر âª"( )2017â¬Ø£ÙظÙ
Ø© اÙتÙرÙد)âªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
استخداÙ
ÙظاÙ
"ستاب" Ùد٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù
٠أج٠إعداد Ø®ØØ⬠â«Ø© Ù?٠تÙ
Ùزâª/â¬ÙÙÙÙ٠⪠2016â¬ÙاÙÙ
ر⬠â«(اÙصادرâ¬
â«Ø³Ø¨Ù ÙÙ
ا دÙÙÙاâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶ Ù?â¬â«ÙتÙ
استخداÙ
Ù ÙÙ
ستÙدع ÙÙثائ٠اÙتÙرÙد ÙØ£ÙÙØ´ØØ© Ù
ا Ù?Ù٠عتبات ااÙستعرâ¬
â«Ø¹âª \.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙرÙد ÙاعتÙ
ادÙا ÙتØدÙØ«Ùا Ùاجرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ تباداÙت اÙتÙرÙد ÙÙÙÙا ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø³Ø¨Ù اÙÙاردة أدÙا٠ÙاÙÙ
رتبØØ© بÙ
خاØر اÙعÙد اÙÙ
عتدÙØ© (اÙجدÙ٠⪠Ø)1\.2â¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠عتبات Øر٠اÙتÙرÙد (اÙجدÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø¶ Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù⬠â«Ùجب أ٠تشÙ
Ù Ø®ØØ© اÙتÙرÙد عتبات ااÙستعرâ¬
â«âª\.)1\.3â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹Ø© Ù?٠تشرÙ٠اÙثاÙÙâª/â¬ÙÙÙ?Ù
بر ⪠"2017â¬ØÙ٠اÙعتبة ÙÙÙج اÙتÙرÙد ÙØرÙÙ Øسب Ùâ¬
â«Ù٠بÙد⬠â«Ø© اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠اÙصادرâ¬
â«Ø© Ù?٠تÙ
Ùزâª/â¬ÙÙÙÙ٠⪠2016â¬ÙاÙÙ
ر⬠â«Ø§ÙجدÙÙ âª" :1\.2â¬Ù
Ø´Ùرâ¬
â«(آاÙÙ? دâª\.â¬Ø£âª)\.â¬â¬
â«ÙائÙ
Ø© Ù
ختصرâ¬
â«Ø© Ù
ؤÙÙÙ?Ø© Ù
Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙع⪠Øâ¬ÙتÙÙÙÙÙجÙا اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
اتâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø£ÙشغاÙâ¬
â«Ù
ستشارÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«ÙØÙÙÙÙ ÙÙس إاÙ⬠â«ÙاÙخدÙ
ات غÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙستشارÙØ©â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹ÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø¥Ùشرâ¬
â«Ø§Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙاء ÙاÙÙÙدسة â¥â¬
â«Ø§ÙخدÙ
ات⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù?تÙØة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù?تÙØØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ø¯ÙÙÙا â¤â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù?تÙØة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù?تÙØØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ø¯ÙÙÙا â¤â¬
â«ØÙب⬠â«ØÙبâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙستشارÙØ© <⬠â«ØªØ³Ø¹Ùرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«ÙØÙÙا <⬠â«Ø©â¬
â«ØªØ³Ø¹Ùر⬠â«ÙØÙÙا <â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«â¥â¬ â«â¥â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙØÙة⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙدâ¬
â«âª50â¬â¬ â«âª300â¬â¬ â«âª100â¬â¬ â«âª1,000â¬â¬ â«âª1,000â¬â¬ â«âª200â¬â¬ â«âª10,000â¬â¬ â«âª10,000â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙا⬠â«ÙبÙاÙâ¬
â«âª0â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ر Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ Ù?٠تشرÙ٠اÙثاÙÙâª/â¬ÙÙÙ?بÙ
ر ⪠2017â¬ØÙ٠عتبات⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙستثÙ
ارÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùصادر Ù?٠⪠1â¬ØªÙ
Ùزâª/â¬ÙÙÙÙ٠⪠2016â¬Ù Ù?â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙجدÙ٠⪠\.1\.3â¬Ø¥Ø¬Ø±â¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù?٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شارÙعâ¬
â«âªPage 76 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø³Ø¨Ù ÙÙ
خاØر اÙعÙÙد اÙÙ
عتدÙØ© (Ù
اÙÙÙ٠دâª\.â¬Ø£âª)\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø§Ùستعرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶ Ù?â¬
â«Ù
عتدÙ⬠â«Ø¹ اÙتÙرÙدâ¬â«ÙÙâ¬
â«âª15â¬â¬ â«ÙÙâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙØاع⬠â«Ø¨ÙÙ⬠â«Ø±â¬
â«Ø§Ùة⬠â«Ø§ÙØ´â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙترÙÙبتÙاâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø²â¬
â«Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتجÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
صاÙع⬠â«Ù
داد⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§â¬ â«ÙÙتسÙÙÙ
âªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø©â¬ â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø²â¬ â«Ø§ÙجÙÙ⬠â«Ø°ÙÙ⬠â«Ù?Ù⬠â«(بÙ
ا⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙشغاÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاص)â¬
â«âª4â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙسÙع⪠Øâ¬ÙتÙÙÙÙÙجÙا اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙخدÙ
ات غÙر ااÙستشارÙâ¬
â«ÙØ©â¬
â«âª2â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
ستشارÙÙ⪠:â¬Ø§ÙشرÙاتâ¬
â«âª0\.4â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
ستشارÙÙ⪠:â¬Ø£Ù?رâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¯â¬
â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ اÙباÙغ إجÙ
اÙÙ ÙÙÙ
ت٠⪠345â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ (بÙ
ا Ù?Ù Ø°ÙÙ Ùسبة ⪠15â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة ÙÙØااÙت اÙØارئة) بÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ©âªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙ
Ù٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹â¬ â«âª \.27â¬Ø£ÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙأسØÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙØ°Ù٠بÙÙÙ
Ø© ⪠25â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬ÙاأÙشغا٠عÙ٠اÙØرÙات بÙÙÙ
Ø© ⪠172â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
Ùشآت Ù?٠اÙØ´Ùارâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶Ùâ¬â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ©)⪠Øâ¬ÙاستÙ
اÙ٠اأÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬
â«Ùسرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ Ù
ÙÙا Ù
٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙØ¥ÙÙشاء ÙاÙتعÙ
Ùرâª/â¬Ø¢ÙÙØ© اÙÙرÙض Ù?â¬â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ (⪠53â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùباصات بÙÙÙ
Ø© ⪠103â¬Ù
اÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬
â«ØªØدÙات Ù
Ù ØÙث⬠â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ø§Ù Ù ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙÙØ© بÙÙÙ
Ø© ⪠15â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙ⬠â«Ø¨ÙÙÙ
Ø© ⪠30â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªÙÙع أ٠تÙاج٠أشغا٠اÙبÙÙ⬠â«Ù?⬠â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
ستشارÙÙ ÙاÙÙ
ساعدة Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙÙÙÙ)⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ
٠اÙØ®Øر اÙÙاجÙ
ع٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اأÙشغا٠Ù?٠إدارâ¬
â«Ø© ØرÙØ© اÙسÙر ÙتÙسÙ٠اأÙشغا٠بÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
ختÙÙ?ÙÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«(اÙدÙÙÙÙÙ Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ اأÙشغا٠ÙاÙÙدرâ¬
â«Ø© عÙ٠جذب اÙÙ
ÙاÙÙÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙستÙظرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØªÙ
ت اÙÙ
ÙاÙ?ÙØ© عÙ٠تخÙ?ÙÙ? اÙØ®Øر Ù
٠خاÙ٠اعتÙ
اد ÙØا٠Ù
ÙØÙ٠تجاÙâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙâªÙ Øâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاص ÙتÙÙâ¬
â«Ù?ر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØاع Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ÙÙسبة Ø¥ÙÙ ÙÙج اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§Øª ÙÙ
Ùذج اأÙعÙ
اÙ⪠\.â¬Øر٠اÙتÙرÙد ÙÙتائج ÙÙج اÙسÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØاع Ùâ¬
â«Ù٠اÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاص ÙØ®Ùار⬠â«Ù⬠â«ÙØ© اÙت٠تÙ?عÙ٠باÙÙ
عاÙ
اÙت Ù?٠تÙ?اصÙ٠بÙ٠اÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤسسات ااÙستشارÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙÙÙØ© Ù?â¬
â«Ù
درجة Ù?٠اÙجدÙÙ âª\.1\.4â¬â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ستخرجة Ù
Ù Ø®ØØ© اÙتÙرÙدâ¬
â«âªPage 77 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ© ÙØ®ØØ© اÙتÙرÙدâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙجدÙ٠⪠:1\.4â¬Ù
Ùجز اأÙÙØ´ØØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùدرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ?ة⬠â«Ù?ئة اÙعÙد ÙتÙصÙÙ?Ù ÙعÙÙاÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙرÙÙ
â¬
â«Ø¥Ùجاز⬠â«Ù
ÙØ Ø§ÙعÙÙد⬠â«ØرÙÙØ© اÙتÙÙÙÙ
⬠â«Øر٠ااÙختÙار⬠â«Ø±Ùابة⬠â«Ø¹ اÙعÙدâ¬â«ÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙج اÙتÙرÙدâª/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
ÙاÙ?سة⬠â«Ø¯âª\.â¬Ø£âª)\.â¬â¬ â«(Ù
ÙÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙتعرÙÙ?Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
صرÙ?â¬
â«ÙتصÙÙÙ? اÙØ®Øرâ¬
â«Ø§Ùâª/â¬ÙÙÙÙÙ âª2023â¬â¬
â«âª 30â¬ØزÙر⬠â«Ø´Ø¨Ø§Øâª/â¬Ù?برâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر⬠â«âª1â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
صÙÙ?Ø© (اÙÙÙÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©âª Øâ¬Ø§Ø§ÙختÙار اÙÙائÙ
اÙÙ
عاÙÙرâ¬
â«ØÙب تسعÙر⬠â«Ø¯ÙÙÙâª/â¬Ù
Ù?تÙØ⬠â«Ù
سبÙØ©â¬
â«Ù?⬠â«âª10â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙتصÙ
ÙÙ
ÙاإÙشر⬠â«Ø§Øªâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§Ùستشار⬠â«âª1â¬â¬
â«âª2019â¬â¬ â«Ù
Ùاب٠اÙÙ
اÙ)⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙعÙØ© ÙاÙÙÙÙ?Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹ÙÙ⬠â«Ù
تÙسØâ¬
â«âª 31â¬ÙاÙÙ٠اأÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø¯ÙسÙ
بر⬠â«Ø´Ø¨Ø§Øâª/â¬Ù?برâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر⬠â«âª1â¬â¬ â«ÙÙÙ
Ø© Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙدÙÙا⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ?Ø© Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
سبÙâªRFB Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتأÙÙÙ Ù?⬠â«Ø¯ÙÙÙâª/â¬Ù
Ù?تÙØ⬠â«Ù
سبÙØ©â¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Øات âª35â¬â¬â«Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت â اÙÙ
Ø Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙشغاÙ⬠â«âª2â¬â¬
â«âª2021â¬â¬ â«âª2019â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙÙØرÙات (بÙ
ا Ù?Ù Ø°ÙÙ Ù
تÙسØâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙاÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Øª) â شار٠اÙØÙÙ â ÙÙر اÙÙÙبâ¬â«Ø§ÙتجÙÙزâ¬
â«Ø§Ùâª/â¬ÙÙÙÙ٠⪠30â¬ØزÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ùâª/â¬ÙÙÙÙÙ âª2022â¬â¬ â«ØزÙر⬠â«âª1â¬â¬ â«ÙÙÙ
Ø© Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙدÙÙا⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ?Ø© Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙتأÙÙÙ Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
سبÙâªRFB Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø¯ÙÙÙâª/â¬Ù
Ù?تÙØ⬠â«Ù
سبÙØ©â¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Øات âª51â¬â¬â«Ø§ÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت â اÙÙ
Ø Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙشغاÙ⬠â«âª3â¬â¬
â«âª2019â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙÙØرÙات (بÙ
ا Ù?Ù Ø°ÙÙ Ù
تÙسØâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙاÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Øª) â ÙÙر اÙÙÙب â جÙÙÙÙ âª-â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙتجÙÙزâ¬
â«Øبرجاâ¬
â«ØزÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ùâª/â¬ÙÙÙÙ٠⪠31â¬ÙاÙÙ٠اأÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø¯ÙسÙ
بر⬠â«âª1â¬â¬ â«ÙÙÙ
Ø© Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙدÙÙا⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ?Ø© Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙتأÙÙÙ Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
سبÙâªRFB Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø¯ÙÙÙâª/â¬Ù
Ù?تÙØ⬠â«Ø§ÙØÙة⬠â«âª12â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙØÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙØرÙ?Ùة⪠:â¬Ø´Ø§Ø±Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØØات⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙشغاÙ⬠â«âª4â¬â¬
â«âª2021â¬â¬ â«âª2020â¬â¬ â«Ù
تدÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙ
ستÙدعات اÙباصات⪠/â¬Ù
ار Ù
خاÙÙâ¬
â«ÙاÙÙ٠⪠30â¬ØزÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ùâª/â¬ÙÙÙÙÙ âª2022â¬â¬ â«âª1â¬â¬ â«ÙÙÙ
Ø© Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙدÙÙا⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ?Ø© Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
سبÙâªRFB Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتأÙÙÙ Ù?⬠â«Ø¯ÙÙÙâª/â¬Ù
Ù?تÙØ⬠â«Ø§ÙØÙة⬠â«âª25â¬â¬ â«Øبرجا⬠â«Ø§ÙØرÙ?ÙØ©âª:â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØØات⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙشغاÙ⬠â«âª5â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø¯ÙسÙ
بر⬠â«Ù
تدÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ØبرجاâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø§Ùباصاتâª:â¬â¬ â«ÙÙ
ستÙدعاتâ¬
â«âª2020â¬â¬ â«Ø¬Ø¨ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Øرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¨Ùس (Ù
ÙÙÙ? اÙباصات)â¬
â«âª 31â¬ÙاÙÙ٠اأÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø¯ÙسÙ
بر⬠â«Ø§Ùâª/â¬ÙÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«ØزÙر⬠â«Ø§ÙدÙÙا⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ
Ø© Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ?Ø© Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
سبÙâªRFB Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتأÙÙÙ Ù?⬠â«Ø¯ÙÙÙâª/â¬Ù
Ù?تÙØ⬠â«Ø§ÙØÙة⬠â«Ù
ستÙدعات اÙباصات⪠:â¬Ù
ستدÙعات اÙشبÙØ© âª15â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø£ÙشغاÙ⬠â«âª6â¬â¬
â«âª2021â¬â¬ â«âª2020â¬â¬ â«Ù
تدÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙساÙâª/â¬Ø£Ø¨Ø±Ù٠⪠30â¬ØزÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ùâª/â¬ÙÙÙÙÙ âª2022â¬â¬ â«âª1â¬â¬ â«ÙÙÙ
Ø© Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙدÙÙا⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ?Ø© Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙتأÙÙÙ Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
سبÙâªRFB Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø¯ÙÙÙâª/â¬Ù
Ù?تÙØ⬠â«Ù
سبÙØ©â¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Ù اÙخارج٠â اÙÙ
Ø Ùâ¬
â«Øات âª16â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙØرÙ٠اÙدائر⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙشغاÙ⬠â«âª7â¬â¬
â«âª2019â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙتØتÙØ© ÙÙØرÙات (بÙ
ا Ù?Ù Ø°ÙÙ Ù
تÙسØâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙاÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتجÙÙزâ¬
â«Ø§Øª)â¬
â«Ø§Ùâª/â¬ÙÙÙÙÙ âª2020â¬â¬ â«ØزÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ùâª/â¬ÙÙÙÙ٠⪠30â¬ØزÙر⬠â«âª1â¬â¬ â«ÙÙÙ
Ø© Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙدÙÙا⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ?Ø© Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙتأÙÙ٠اÙاÙØÙâªRFB Øâ¬â¬ â«ÙØÙÙâª/â¬Ù
Ù?تÙØ⬠â«Ø§ÙØÙة⬠â«Ø§Øª Ùأشغا٠âª4\.5â¬â¬
â«Ø´Ø¨ÙØ© اÙباصات âª( 1â¬Ø§ÙتجÙÙز⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙشغاÙ⬠â«âª8â¬â¬
â«âª2019â¬â¬ â«Ù
تÙسØ⬠â«Ø¨Ø³ÙØØ©)â¬
â«âªPage 78 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùدرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ?ة⬠â«Ø§ÙرÙÙ
â¬
â«Ø¥Ùجاز⬠â«Ù
ÙØ Ø§ÙعÙÙد⬠â«ØرÙÙØ© اÙتÙÙÙÙ
⬠â«Øر٠ااÙختÙار⬠â«Ø±Ùابة⬠â«Ø¹ اÙعÙدâ¬â«ÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙج اÙتÙرÙدâª/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
ÙاÙ?سة⬠â«Ø¯âª\.â¬Ø£âª)\.â¬â¬ â«(Ù
ÙÙÙÙ⬠â«Ù?ئة اÙعÙد ÙتÙصÙÙ?Ù ÙعÙÙاÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙتعرÙÙ?Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
صرÙ?â¬
â«ÙتصÙÙÙ? اÙØ®Øرâ¬
â«Ø§Ùâª/â¬ÙÙÙÙÙ âª2020â¬â¬ â«ØزÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ùâª/â¬ÙÙÙÙ٠⪠30â¬ØزÙر⬠â«âª1â¬â¬ â«ÙÙÙ
Ø© Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙدÙÙا⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ?Ø© Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتأÙÙ٠اÙاÙØÙ⪠Øâ¬ØÙب تسعÙرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«ÙØÙÙâª/â¬Ù
Ù?تÙØ⬠â«Ø§ÙØÙة⬠â«Ø§Øª Ùأشغا٠âª4\.5â¬â¬
â«Ø´Ø¨ÙØ© اÙباصات âª( 2â¬Ø§ÙتجÙÙز⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙشغاÙ⬠â«âª9â¬â¬
â«âª2019â¬â¬ â«Ù
تÙسØ⬠â«Ø¨Ø³ÙØØ©)â¬
â«ØزÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ùâª/â¬ÙÙÙÙ٠⪠31â¬Ø¢Ø°Ø§Ø±âª/â¬Ù
ارس âª2022â¬â¬ â«âª1â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
صÙÙ?Ø© (اÙÙÙÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
عاÙÙر⬠â«Ø§ÙتأÙÙ٠اÙاÙØÙ⪠Øâ¬ØÙب تسعÙرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø¯ÙÙÙâª/â¬Ù
Ù?تÙØ⬠â«Ù
سبÙØ©â¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Ø¨Ø±ÙاÙ
ج تÙÙÙÙÙجÙا اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات ÙاÙتجÙÙزâ¬
â«Ø§Øª âª7â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø¥ÙÙ
داد ÙاÙترÙÙب⬠â«âª10â¬â¬
â«âª2019â¬â¬ â«Ù
Ùاب٠اÙÙ
اÙ)⬠â«Ù
رتÙ?ع⬠â«Ø°Ø§Øª اÙصÙØ© Ø¥Ùدارâ¬
â«Ø© اÙرسÙÙ
â¬
â«ÙاÙÙ٠⪠31â¬ÙاÙÙ٠اأÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø¯ÙسÙ
بر⬠â«âª1â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
صÙÙ?Ø© (اÙÙÙÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
عاÙÙر⬠â«ØÙب تسعÙرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø¯ÙÙÙâª/â¬Ù
Ù?تÙØ⬠â«Ù
سبÙØ©â¬
â«Ù?⬠â«ÙÙاâ¬
â«âª 40â¬Ø³ÙÙÙ⬠â«Ù
شغ٠اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¨ÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§Ùشر⬠â«âª11â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙثاÙÙâª/â¬ÙÙاÙر âª2029 2020â¬â¬ â«Ù
Ùاب٠اÙÙ
اÙ)⬠â«Ø¹ = âª400â¬â¬â«Ù
جÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙعاÙ
⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØاعÙÙâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«ÙاÙخاصâ¬
â«ÙاÙÙ٠⪠31â¬ÙاÙÙ٠اأÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø¯ÙسÙ
بر⬠â«âª1â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
صÙÙ?Ø© (اÙÙÙÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
عاÙÙر⬠â«ØÙب تسعÙرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø¯ÙÙÙâª/â¬Ù
Ù?تÙØ⬠â«Ù
سبÙØ©â¬
â«Ù?⬠â«âª12\.5â¬â¬ â«Ù
شغ٠جÙ
ع اÙرسÙÙ
â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØاعÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùشر⬠â«âª12â¬â¬
â«âª2029â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙثاÙÙâª/â¬ÙÙاÙر⬠â«Ù
Ùاب٠اÙÙ
اÙ)⬠â«Ø¹ = âª125â¬â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
جÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاصâ¬
â«âª 2020020â¬ÙاÙÙ٠⪠31â¬ÙاÙÙ٠اأÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø¯ÙسÙ
برâ¬
â«âª1â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
صÙÙ?Ø© (اÙÙÙÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
عاÙÙر⬠â«ØÙب تسعÙرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«ÙØÙÙâª/â¬Ù
Ù?تÙØ⬠â«Ù
سبÙØ©â¬
â«Ù?⬠â«âª7\.5â¬â¬ â«Ù
شغ٠شبÙØ© اÙباصات âª1â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØاعÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùشر⬠â«âª13â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙثاÙÙâª/â¬ÙÙاÙر âª2029 2020â¬â¬ â«Ù
Ùاب٠اÙÙ
اÙ)⬠â«Ø¹ = âª75â¬â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
جÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاصâ¬
â«ÙاÙÙ٠⪠31â¬ÙاÙÙ٠اأÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø¯ÙسÙ
بر⬠â«âª1â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
صÙÙ?Ø© (اÙÙÙÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
عاÙÙر⬠â«ØÙب تسعÙرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«ÙØÙÙâª/â¬Ù
Ù?تÙØ⬠â«Ù
سبÙØ©â¬
â«Ù?⬠â«âª7\.5â¬â¬ â«Ù
شغ٠شبÙØ© اÙباصات âª2â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØاعÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùشر⬠â«âª14â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙثاÙÙâª/â¬ÙÙاÙر âª2029 2020â¬â¬ â«Ù
Ùاب٠اÙÙ
اÙ)⬠â«Ø¹ =âª75â¬â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
جÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاصâ¬
â«ÙاÙÙ٠⪠31â¬ÙاÙÙ٠اأÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø¯ÙسÙ
بر⬠â«âª1â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
صÙÙ?Ø© (اÙÙÙÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
عاÙÙر⬠â«ØÙب تسعÙرâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«ÙØÙÙâª/â¬Ù
Ù?تÙØ⬠â«Ù
سبÙØ©â¬
â«Ù?⬠â«âª7\.5â¬â¬ â«Ù
شغ٠شبÙØ© اÙباصات âª3â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØاعÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØ© بÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùشر⬠â«âª15â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙثاÙÙâª/â¬ÙÙاÙر âª2029 2020â¬â¬ â«Ù
Ùاب٠اÙÙ
اÙ)⬠â«Ø¹ = âª75â¬â¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
جÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙعاÙ
ÙاÙخاصâ¬
â«âªPage 79 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«ÙÙ Ù?Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¡ بعثات اإÙشرâ¬
â«Ø§Ù? Ù
رتÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙزÙ
ÙÙØ© ÙتÙÙÙÙ
اÙعرÙض⪠\.â¬ÙÙجب إجرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ اÙجدÙ٠⪠)1\.5â¬ÙاÙÙ?تر⬠â«âª \.28â¬Ø±ØµØ¯ اÙتÙرÙد⪠\.â¬Ùجب رصد Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ؤشر اÙÙÙ?اءة اÙÙ
Ø±ØªØ¨Ø Ø¨Ù
عاÙجة اÙتÙرÙد (رâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶ Ù
ا Ùب٠Ù
ÙØ Ø§ÙعرÙØ¶Ø Ù
جÙ
Ùعات اأÙشغا٠بÙ٠⪠25â¬Ù⪠155â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر⬠â«Øددة Ø¥Ù٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙاÙستعر⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ùجب تÙدÙÙ
اÙÙ
عاÙ
اÙت Ù
ا Ù?Ù٠اÙعتبات Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Øºâ¬ â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙ٠خاضعة ÙÙ
ستشار تÙرÙد Ø¥ÙÙÙÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬Ø§Ù Ù ÙÙâ¬
â«ØªÙÙع Ø£Ù٠عÙد بÙÙ⬠â«Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙسÙع بÙ٠⪠10â¬Ù⪠75â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùر Ø£Ù
ÙرÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙشرÙات ااÙستشارÙØ© بÙ٠⪠6â¬Ù⪠30â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙâ¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø§Ø¶Ùا Ù?Ù Ù?ترâ¬
â«Ø© اÙØÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø¶ اÙتÙرÙد اÙتشغÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ùجب تÙزÙع اأÙÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
تبÙÙØ© Ø¥Ù٠عÙÙات سÙÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙا Ùاستعر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
سب٠اÙت٠Ùâ¬
â«ØددتÙا ÙجÙØ© استعر⬠â«Ø§Ø¶ Ù?â¬â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø§Øª ااÙستعرâ¬
â«Ù
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙتÙرÙد⬠â«Ø§ÙجدÙÙ âªÙ \.1\.5â¬â¬
â«ÙÙاس Ù
ÙاÙÙس اأÙداءâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙدÙ?⬠â«Ø§ÙتدبÙر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø⬠â«Øدد⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙÙ?اءة Ù
Ù ØÙØ« ⪠10â¬Ø£Ø´Ùر Ø¥Ùجرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡ Ù
Ù?تÙ⬠â«Ø§Ù
اÙÙÙت Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø±Ø¬ اØترâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ اأÙÙاÙ
بÙ٠تارÙØ® اÙدعÙØ© اÙستد ا⬠â«Ù
تÙØ³Ø ØÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙØ© اÙتÙرÙد⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙÙعÙØ© اÙتخØÙØâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙ?Ø©âªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙعرÙض ÙتارÙØ® Ù
ÙØ Ø§ÙعØاءâ¬
â«Øâ¬â«Ø§Ø¡ Ù
Ù?تÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ?اعÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ?اءة âªÙ 30â¬â¬
â«ÙÙÙ
ا Ø¥Ùجر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ØددâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø§Ù
اÙÙÙت Ù?⬠â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ اأÙÙاÙ
بÙ٠تارÙØ® Ù?ØªØ Ø§Ùعرض ÙتارÙØ® اØتر⬠â«ÙÙÙت ÙتÙÙÙÙ
اÙعرضâ¬
â«ÙÙÙعÙØ© اÙتخØÙØâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙعÙ
ÙÙØ© Ù
Ù ØÙØ« اÙÙÙÙ?Ø©âªØâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¥ÙعاÙ٠ع٠Ù
ÙØ Ø§ÙعØاءâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
عدÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù اÙÙ
ÙغاةâªØâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙعÙ
ÙÙاتâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¬ عددâ¬â«ÙÙÙعÙØ© Ùثائ٠استدرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙعÙØ© اÙتخØÙØâªØâ¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¬ اÙعرÙض⬠â«ÙعÙ
ÙÙات استدرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ئÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙسبة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙاةâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùغاة Ø£Ù Ù?â¬
â«ÙعÙ
ÙÙات Ù?â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹â¬â«Ø£Ù اÙباØÙØ©âª/â¬Ùجب أا٠ÙتجاÙز Ù
جÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙعÙ
ÙÙØ© اÙعاÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙÙعÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ø¯Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùغاة⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù اÙباØÙØ© Ùب٠اÙتÙÙÙع اÙعرÙضâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙعÙ
ÙÙات ÙÙÙÙا âª5â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ù٠اÙعÙدâ¬
â«Ùاâ¬
â«ØªØºÙÙر Ø£Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ اÙعÙÙد اÙت٠شÙدت⬠â«ÙعÙ
ÙÙØ© اÙتÙÙÙÙ
â¬
â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙعÙØ© اÙتخØÙØâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø© Ù?٠اÙÙÙتâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ
ئÙÙØ© ÙÙعÙÙد اÙÙ
Ùجزâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙسبة⬠â«ØªØºÙÙر اÙعÙد ÙتÙ
دÙدÙâ¬
â«Ø¹â¬â«ØªÙ
دÙداâª/â¬Ùجب أا٠ÙتجاÙز Ù
جÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù
ÙØÙÙØ© (Øت٠âª25â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙâ¬
â«Øدد ÙÙا ÙÙ
ع اختاÙÙ?ات⬠â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙعÙÙد ÙÙÙÙا âª5â¬â¬ â«Ù?٠اÙÙ
ئة)â¬
â«Ø§ÙØÙ
ائÙØ©)â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙئÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© (بÙ
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠اÙتدابÙرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتدابÙرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øªâ¬â«Ù اÙÙ
رتبØØ© بإجر⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙئÙØ© ÙØ®ØØ© عÙ
٠إعادة اإÙسÙا٠ÙÙاÙ?Ø© اأÙدÙات اأÙخرâ¬â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬ â«âª \.29â¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙ Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار Ù
سؤÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ù٠ع٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ø£ØÙاÙ
Ø®ØØ© اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø¹ Ù?٠اÙÙ
سائ٠ÙاÙ? Ùâ¬
â«Ø© اÙÙ
رتبØة⬠â«ÙÙا ÙبÙئÙâ¬
â«ÙÙا ÙدعÙ
ÙØدة تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ØÙ
ائÙØ© Ùرصد اÙ
تثا٠اÙÙ
ÙاÙÙÙ٠أÙØÙاÙ
اÙÙ
شارÙع⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙستخدÙ
Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار أخصائÙâ¬
â«ÙÙا اجتÙ
اعÙ⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙئÙØ© ÙØ®ØØ© عÙ
٠إعادة اإÙسÙا٠بشÙÙ Ù
Ùت Ùâ¬
â«Ø¸Ù
âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¬Ùا Ùرصد تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ø®ØØ© اإÙدارâ¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§ÙبÙئÙØ© Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا سÙستخدÙ
Ù
ستشار رصد خار ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙØد Ù
٠اÙÙ
خاØر Ùâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âªPage 80 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§ÙبÙئÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙÙÙ Ù?٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠اÙÙ
Ø´Ùرâ¬
â«Ø© Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار ØÙÙ Ùذ٠اÙÙ
سائÙ⪠\.â¬Ø³Ùرصد Ù?رÙ٠اÙعÙ
٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ø®ØØ© اإÙدار⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙخصائÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø³ÙؤÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª\.30â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Ù
ÙداÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
رâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Øªâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¶ ÙÙÙثائÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙزÙارâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات استعرâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù Ù?٠خاÙÙÙا⬠â«Ø³Ùجر⬠â«Ø§Ù? Ù?â¬
â«Ù
ÙتظÙ
Ø© Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙئÙØ© ÙØ®ØØ© اÙعÙ
٠إÙعادة اإÙسÙا٠Ù
٠خاÙ٠بعثات إشرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø´Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¦ÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬ØªÙدÙÙ
â¬â«Ø§Ø± Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬â«Ø¹ ÙدعÙ
٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠غر⬠â«ÙرÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø³Ùبا بÙ
شرÙ⬠â«âª \.31â¬Ø®Ø¯Ù
Ø© Ù
عاÙجة اÙØ´ÙاÙÙ Ù?٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâªÙ \.â¬â¬
â«ÙØÙ ÙØ£Ùشخاص اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙعتÙدÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙÙ
Ùتأثâ¬
â«ÙاÙا بشÙ٠سرÙع Ù
٠أج٠Ù
عاÙجة اÙØ´Ùاغ٠اÙÙ
رتبØØ©â¬â«Ø§Ø¶ اÙØ´ÙاÙ٠اÙت٠تتÙÙâ¬
â«Ø© عÙ٠استعرâ¬â«Ø´ÙاÙ٠إÙ٠خدÙ
Ø© Ù
عاÙجة اÙØ´ÙاÙ٠اÙخاصة باÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ØªØرص Ùذ٠اأÙØ®Ùرâ¬
â«ÙرÙ٠باÙÙ
شارÙع Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙدÙ
بشÙÙ٠إÙÙ ÙÙئة اÙتÙ?تÙØ´ اÙÙ
ستÙÙÙØ© Ù?٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠بعد ÙÙ?ت اÙتبا٠Ùذا اأÙØ®Ùر Ø¥ÙÙÙا Ù
٠خاÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙÙ
ÙÙ ÙÙÙ
جتÙ
عات ÙاأÙÙ?رâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¯ اÙØ°ÙÙ Ùتأث⬠â«Ø¹âªÙ? \.â¬â¬â«Ø¨Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø©âª:â¬â¬ â«ÙÙÙ?ÙØ© تÙدÙÙ
اÙØ´ÙاÙ٠إÙ٠خدÙ
Ø© Ù
عاÙجة اÙØ´ÙاÙ٠اÙخاصة باÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâªÙ? Øâ¬â¬
â«Ùرج٠زÙار⬠â«Ø®Ø¯Ù
Ø© Ù
عاÙجة اÙØ´ÙاÙ٠اÙÙائÙ
Ø© ÙدÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙØصÙ٠عÙÙ Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات ØÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø©âª:â¬â¬ â«ÙÙÙ?ÙØ© تÙدÙÙ
Ø´ÙاÙ٠إÙÙ ÙÙئة اÙتÙ?تÙØ´ Ù?٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâªÙ? Øâ¬â¬
â«Ùرج٠زÙار⬠â«Ù⬠â«âª \.http://www\.worldbank\.org/GRSâ¬ÙÙÙØصÙ٠عÙÙ Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات ØÙÙâ¬
â«âª\.www\.inspectionpanel\.orgâ¬â¬
â«Ø§Ùرصد ÙاÙتÙÙÙÙ
â¬
â«(Ù
شغÙ٠اÙباصات ÙÙ
صÙØØ© سÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ùâ¬â«Ø¹ ÙÙÙÙا⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠جÙ
عÙا Ù
Ù ÙÙئات أخر⬠â«Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø± Ù
سؤÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ù٠ع٠جÙ
ع بÙاÙات اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار اÙØ°Ù Ù?â¬
â«Ù Ù⬠â«Ø³Ùجرâ¬â«âªÙ? \.32â¬â¬
â«Ø¹ تÙ?رÙâ¬
â«Ù?ع Ø¥ÙÙ⬠â«ØªÙدÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø³ÙÙÙØ© ØÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ùر ÙصÙ? Ù⬠â«Ø³Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯ Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار تÙار Ù⬠â«Ø¹ اÙعاÙ
ÙتÙÙÙÙ
٠بشÙ٠عاÙ
⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ù?â¬â«Ø§ÙØدÙد ÙاÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شتر٠ÙاÙÙ
ÙاÙÙÙÙ)⪠Øâ¬Ø±ØµØ¯ اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ùâª( Øâ¬Ø£) تØدÙØ«Ùا ع٠اÙÙتائجâ¬â«Ø© ااÙباÙغ⪠\.â¬ØªØ´Ù
Ù Ùذ٠اÙتÙارÙر⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠بÙ٠أÙ
Ùر أخرâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø¯Ø¡Ø§ Ù
٠تارÙØ® اÙتÙاء Ù?تر⬠â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ØªÙا ÙاÙتعÙÙ٠عÙÙÙا Ù?٠غضÙÙ âªÙ 45â¬â¬
â«ÙÙÙ
اâªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙÙ
رâ¬
â«Ù
ÙÙÙØ Ù(ج) اÙÙ
خاØر Ø£Ù⬠â«Ø© اإÙباÙغ ضÙ
Ù ÙÙ Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Øددة Ù?٠إØار اÙÙØªØ§Ø¦Ø¬Ø Ù(ب) اأÙÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ?ذة Ù?٠خاÙÙ Ù?تر⬠â«ÙÙØ© عÙ٠أساس اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§Øª ÙاÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙدÙ? Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙâ¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø²Ù
ÙÙا ÙÙصرÙ? ÙØ£ÙØ´Ùر⬠â«ÙÙتØر٠إÙÙÙØ§Ø (د) ÙجدÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ ÙÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«ØØ© اÙÙ
ÙابÙة⬠â«Ø¹ اÙØ°Ù ÙÙتض٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙب٠إÙÙÙا باÙÙسبة Ø¥Ù٠اÙتدابÙر اÙÙ
Ùتر⬠â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙØ© اÙت٠تؤثâ¬
â«Ùر عÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙدâª/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
سائÙâ¬
â«Ù تÙÙÙÙ
⬠â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø®ØØ© عÙ
٠إعادة اإÙسÙاÙ)⪠\.â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙâªÙ? Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø³Ùجر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø©â¬ â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙئÙØ© (Ø®ØØ© اإÙدار⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙØÙ
ائÙØ©â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Øرز Ù?٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اإÙجرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙدÙ
â¬
â«Ø§Ùستة اÙÙ
ÙبÙØ©Ø Ù(Ù) Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹â¬ â«Øرز Ù?٠خاÙÙ Ù?ترâ¬
â«Ø© ØÙاة اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ÙÙتÙدÙ
Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù⬠â«Ùعرضا رسÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙا Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¹Ø¯ Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار تÙر Ùاâ¬
â«Ùر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ø¯Ø©Ø Ù?â¬
â«Ø³Ù Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø¶ اÙÙ
ÙتصÙ? Ù⬠â«Ø¹ عÙد ااÙستعر⬠â«Ù
رØÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù
Ù?ص٠ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ùع باÙÙ
Ùارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اÙاÙزÙ
Ø©âª\.â¬â¬ â«Øت٠Ùذا اÙتارÙخ⪠\.â¬Ùا٠Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ار اÙÙÙاÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ?ذة ÙÙÙ
شارÙع اأÙØ®Ùرâ¬
â«Ø© ÙÙÙÙا اÙت٠Ù
ÙÙÙÙا اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙÙÙ ÙتÙ
تâ¬
â«Ø¸Ù
Ù
ع Ù
جÙس اإÙÙÙ
اء ÙاإÙعÙ
ارâ¬â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙÙÙ Ù
ÙÙÙ
ÙÙ Ù?٠بÙرÙت ÙÙتÙ?اعÙÙ٠بشÙÙ Ù
Ùت Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£Ø®ØµØ§Ø¦Ù٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ستÙ
ر Ø¥Ù٠اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø³ÙؤÙ
٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠اÙدعÙ
â¬
â«Ù⬠â«âª\.33â¬â¬
â«Ù
رتÙÙ Ù?٠اÙسÙØ© عÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¬Ø¹Ø© ÙاÙرصد بشÙÙ Ù
ستÙ
ر⪠Øâ¬Ø¥Ù٠جاÙب بعثات اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
ØÙÙبة Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات اÙÙ
رâ¬
â«Ù
Ù
ا ÙسÙ
Ø ÙÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠بدعÙ
Ù⬠â«Ù
ÙداÙÙØ© بÙتÙرâ¬
â«Ø© عاÙÙØ©âªÙ Øâ¬â¬ â«Ù⬠â«ÙÙجرÙ٠زÙارâ¬
â«Ø§Øªâ¬ â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¯Ùر اÙشرÙاء (Ù?Ù Øا٠ÙجÙدÙÙ
)â¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø©âªØâ¬â¬
â«Ø§Øª Ùâ¬
â«ØÙØ© اÙثاÙÙØ© Ù
٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⪠\.â¬Ù
٠خاÙ٠استشارâ¬â«Ù ع٠اÙتÙ
اÙ
Ùا Ù?٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
رâ¬â«âª \.34â¬Ø£Ø¹Ø±Ø¨ اÙبÙ٠اإÙساÙÙ
Ù ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙجÙات Ù
اÙØØ© أخرâ¬
â«ÙبÙ٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠عÙ٠استشارâ¬
â«Ø§Øª ÙØ«ÙÙØ© Ù
ع اÙÙÙااÙت⬠â«Ø¹ ÙتشغÙ٠اÙÙظاÙ
âªÙ? \.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
شغÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
ستثÙ
رÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙتÙÙ
دعÙ
تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø£Ø¹Ø±Ø¨ ÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
صارÙ?â¬
â«âªPage 81 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ùسا٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ا بÙÙ Ùذ٠اÙÙ
بادرâ¬
â«Ø§Øªâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙتÙ
Ø© ÙÙÙÙا Ù
٠أج٠ضÙ
ا٠ااÙتâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«âªPage 82 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙØ٠⪠:2â¬Ø§ÙخرائØâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙد⪠:â¬ÙبÙاÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙرسÙ
⪠:2\.1â¬Ø§ÙبرÙاÙ
ج اÙÙØÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙØªØ±Ø ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬
â«âªPage 83 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙرسÙ
⪠:2\.2â¬Ø§ÙترصÙÙ? اÙعاÙ
ÙÙ
Ù
ر ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬
â«âªPage 84 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙرسÙ
⪠:2\.2â¬Ø§ÙتخØÙØ Ø§ÙعاÙ
ÙÙ
Ù
ر ÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬
â«âªPage 85 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ù اÙخارجÙâ¬â«Ø§ÙرسÙ
⪠:3\.2â¬Ø§ÙتخØÙØ Ø§ÙعاÙ
ÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت عÙ٠اÙØرÙ٠اÙدائرâ¬
â«âªPage 86 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«âªPage 87 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙرسÙ
⪠:2\.4â¬Ù
ÙاÙع اÙÙ
Ø Ùâ¬
â«Øات عÙÙ ØÙÙ Ù
Ù
ر اÙÙسÙ
اÙØ´Ù
اÙÙ ÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙتâ¬
â«Ù اÙخارج٠ÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙسرÙع باÙØاÙ?اÙت⬠â«Ø§ÙرسÙ
⪠:2\.5â¬Ù
ÙاÙع اÙÙ
Ø Ùâ¬
â«Øات عÙÙ ØÙÙ Ù
Ù
ر اÙØرÙ٠اÙدائرâ¬
â«âªPage 88 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«âªPage 89 of 59â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع اÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© بÙرÙت ا٠Ù?â¬
â«Ùبر٠(âª)P160224â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙعادÙØ© Ù Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙة⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙرسÙ
⪠:2\.6â¬Ø´Ø¨ÙØ© اÙباصاتâ¬
â«âªPage 90 of 59â¬â¬ | APPROVAL |
P079033 | Page 1
1
PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
CONCEPT STAGE
Report No\.: AB2087
Project Name
Russia
Renewable Energy Development Project
Region
EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA
Sector ECSIE
Project ID
GE-P079033
Borrower(s) RUSSIAN
FEDERATION
Implementing Agency
Environment Category
[ ] A [ ] B [ ] C [X ] FI [ ] TBD (to be determined)
Date PID Prepared
September 20, 2006
Estimated Date of Appraisal
Authorization
January 2007
Estimated Date of Board
Approval
May 2007
1\.
Key development issues and rationale for Bank involvement
Russias potential for renewable energy development is quite large\. In accordance with the OECD/IEA
study (2003) the volume of renewable energy with economic potential corresponds to about 30% of the
country's actual total primary energy supply, while the technical potential is estimated to be more than 5
times greater than the energy supply\. It includes biomass energy from the nations rich forest resources,
wind, solar, hydro, and geothermal energy resources found in many regions\. Additional triggers for
Russia's efforts to develop its renewable energy potential include the necessity to modernize the provision
of housing and communal services in most Russian cities a process in which energy saving and
renewable energy technologies can play a prominent role\.
Not more than 3\.5% of total primary energy supply is based on renewable energy, of which two-thirds are
hydro and one-third all other forms\. Renewable energy (without large hydro) accounted for 0\.5% of total
electricity generation\. Experts estimate that heat based on renewables amounts to about 4% of the total
heat in Russia\.
The importance of developing Russias renewable energy resources (RER) has been recognized by
Russian authorities also in association with the need to diversify fuel utilization and the need to protect
the environment\. The Energy Strategy until 2020 foresees that new capacities for utilization of RER can
be constructed in the period to 2010\. According to the Strategy, the level of subsidies will be gradually
reduced, which will increase the incentives for investments in increased energy efficiency and the use of
renewable energy resources\. In particular, areas remote from fossil fuel resources and being served only
by very high-priced energy are prime candidates for quick development of local renewable energy\.
Regional and municipal authorities are the main driving force for renewable energy development in
Russia\. They are trying to place renewable energy into a well developed institutional framework for
energy efficiency improvements at sub-national level\.
During the period 2002-2005, five federal target programs (FTP) were under implementation, including:
"Energy-efficient Economy", "South Russia", "Ecology and Natural Resources of Russia", "Studies and
Research under the Priority Directions of Science and Engineering", and "Economic and Social
Development of the Far East and Transbaikalian Region"\. They included components or tasks related to
Page 2
2
renewable energy resources development\. Apparently, the progress has not been impressive so far\. The
main reasons for slow development of renewable energy projects are systemic barriers, which require
special efforts from the government\.
The conditions for the development of renewable energies in Russia are characterized by the following
barriers:
Financial Barriers
:
lack of domestic and foreign investment capital; lack of longer-term affordable debt
financing; high project preparation and transaction costs; high cost of special equipment; absence of
federal financing mechanisms (such as environmental funds, etc\.); uncompetitiveness due to low fossil
fuel energy prices\.
Institutional and Ownership Barriers
:
lack of legislative support; insufficient enforcement of
environmental regulations; inflexibility of municipalities, lack of implementation capacity for RE
projects; mismatch between municipal ownership of district-heating systems and regulation of tariffs by
federal/regional authorities; insufficient private sector presence in the power and heat generation sector\.
Information Barriers
associated with lack of information about: RE technologies and opportunities; RE
potential\.
The concept and objectives of the RREP support the Banks strategy to assist the Russian Federation in
the sustainable development of its energy resources\. The Russia FY03-05 CAS was approved by the
Board in May 2002\. The CAS explicitly mentioned RREP:
A possible GEF/PCF renewable energy
facility is also under discussion\.
One of the priorities of recently developed the
Country Partnership Strategy ( CPS
)
is to support
Russias increasing global role, and to assist the country in fulfilling its global commitments\. CPS refferes
to TA operations on the introduction of low-carbon technologies and climate change mitigation\.
Another
priority area of cooperation between the Government and the Bank are diverse activities at the sub-
national level\. RREP design, with a focus on proactive participation of regions, is fully consistent with
this strategic priority\.
2\. Proposed
objective(s)
The development objective of the Project is to facilitate a sustainable market for RE by supporting the
development of an enabling policy, institutional capacity, and financing mechanisms\. Specifically, the
project will change the current unfavorable investment and incentive conditions and create an enabling
environment in Russia that fosters the development of biomass, solar, wind and other renewable energy
utilization for heating and electricity generation applications through providing financial, methodological,
informational, and institutional support
The Projects global environmental objective is to achieve significant and sustainable reduction in the
level of emissions of greenhouse gases in Russia, by reducing some of the more salient barriers to
increased utilization of renewable energy resources\.
3\. Preliminary
description
The Project will include two components:
Component A\. The Policy and Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building Component:
US$8\.0
million GEF, US$13\.6 million counterpart funds
\.
This component covers the following areas:
o
Development of Renewable Energy Policy;
o
Market Infrastructure Development
;
Page 3
3
o
Renewable Energy Program in natural reserves and national parks;
o
Partnership on Innovative Financing Mechanisms and Regulations;
o
Knowledge and information collection and dissemination;
o
Program Management, Monitoring, and Evaluation\.
Component B\. Renewable Energy Financial Facility (REFF):
US$12\.0 million GEF, US$68\.5 million
counterpart funds\.
This component will be a financing facility consisting of three instruments:
Project Preparation Window
will focus on development of a sustainable pipeline of potential projects that
can provide deal flow for the NPAF, commercial banks and investors\. Grant support will be provided to
project developers and sponsors to defray the costs of feasibility studies and other project preparatory
activities\.
Revolving Soft Loan Facility
based on the institutional framework and financial resources of the NPAF
will constitute a financial mechanism for provision of selective financial support to companies
implementing renewable energy development projects\. NPAF committed to allocate up to US$20 million
of its resources (repayments from initial sub-borrowers) for cofinancing of RREP investment sub-
projects\. The GEF resources (US$4\.5 million)
will be used for establishing of the
Contingent Grants
Window
for support of demonstration projects\. A preliminary list of demonsatration projects identified
and selected at the preparatory stage
\.
Contingent grants will be provided to cofinance subprojects, and
30% is the maximum coverage that can be paid from the GEF funds\.
B\.3\. Revolving RER Facilities
in 2-3 pilot regions will be created for testing of similar financial
instruments (cost-sharing of project preparation and contingent grants and soft loans ) at sub-national
level\.
4\.
Safeguard policies that might apply
The proposed project triggers at least OP\.01 Environmental Assessment\. Safeguard policy compliance
assessment of sub-projects will involve an environmental assessment with all its implications\. For all
subprojects Integrated Safeguards Data Sheets (ISDSs) as well as Environmental Management Plans
(EMPs) will be prepared by the project sponsors and will be reviewed in the Bank\.
5\. Contact
point
Contact: Helmut Schreiber
Title: Lead Environmental Economist
Tel: (202) 473-6910
Email: Hschreiber@worldbank\.org | APPROVAL |
P102165 | Page 1
INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS DATASHEET
APPRAISAL STAGE
I\. Basic Information
Date prepared/updated: 12/21/2006
Report No\.: AC2580
1\. Basic Project Data
Country: Kosovo
Project ID: P102165
Project Name: Avian Influenza Preparedness Project
Task Team Leader: Ibrahim Hackaj
Estimated Appraisal Date: December 1,
2006
Estimated Board Date: January 29, 2007
Managing Unit: ECSSD
Lending Instrument: Emergency Recovery
Loan
Sector: General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector (50%);Health (50%)
Theme: Natural disaster management (P);Other communicable diseases (P);Rural
policies and institutions (S);Other environment and natural resources management (S)
IBRD Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
IDA Amount (US$m\.):
3\.00
GEF Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
PCF Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
Other financing amounts by source:
BORROWER/RECIPIENT
0\.00
0\.00
Environmental Category: B - Partial Assessment
Simplified Processing
Simple [X]
Repeater []
Is this project processed under OP 8\.50 (Emergency Recovery)
Yes [X]
No [ ]
2\. Project Objectives
The project development objective is to strengthen the government of Kosovo's capacity
to prevent the spread of avian influenza among poultry, to prevent the transmission of
avian influenza from birds to other animals and humans, and to prepare for a potential
pandemic of avian influenza transmissible between humans\.
3\. Project Description
Component 1\. Public Awareness and Information (US$ 283,500) will help develop and
implement a communications policy to inform the public, particularly those more likely
to be exposed to HPAI, about the threat of HPAI and how they can minimize the risk of
transmission and spread of disease, through supporting a) Risk Communication, and b)
Communication for Behavior Change\.
Component 2\. Animal Health (US$ 1,573,300) will support a national program to
develop and implement short and long term HPAI prevention, containment, and control
and eradication activities in animals, through a) Enhancing HPAI Prevention and
Preparedness Capability; b) Strengthening Disease Control Capacities, and Improving
Surveillance, Diagnostic Capacities and Applied Research; and c) Strengthening HPAI
Page 2
Control Programs and Outbreak Containment Programs, including financing of a
Compensation Fund for culled livestock\.
Component 3\. Human Health (US$ 968,500) will support a national program to develop
and implement short and long term prevention of an outbreak of HPAI among humans
and reduce the impact of a pandemic virus, by: a) Enhancing Coordination and Program
Planning; b) Strengthening the National Public Surveillance System; and c)
Strengthening Health Care Response Capacity\.
Component 4\. Project Implementation and Monitoring and Evaluation (US$ 210,700)
will support and complement the capacity of the Project Team for effective
implementation and management of the project, through: a) Providing Support to the
Project Team; and b) supporting Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) capacity\.
4\. Project Location and salient physical characteristics relevant to the safeguard
analysis
The project will be implemented across the territory\. Some activities will be targeted
geographically where public health laboratories and other facilities exist (for
strengthening human disease surveillance and capacity to respond to human outbreaks)
and where veterinary laboratories exist (for strengthening animal disease surveillance
capacity), and in areas with a greater concentration of poultry production (for virus
eradication at the source)\.
5\. Environmental and Social Safeguards Specialists
Ms Drite Dade (ECSSD)
Mr Bekim Imeri (ECSSD)
6\. Safeguard Policies Triggered
Yes No
Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4\.01)
X
Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4\.04)
X
Forests (OP/BP 4\.36)
X
Pest Management (OP 4\.09)
X
Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4\.11)
X
Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4\.10)
X
Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4\.12)
X
Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4\.37)
X
Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP
7\.50)
X
Projects in Disputed Areas (OP/BP 7\.60)
X
II\. Key Safeguard Policy Issues and Their Management
A\. Summary of Key Safeguard Issues
1\. Describe any safeguard issues and impacts associated with the proposed project\.
Identify and describe any potential large scale, significant and/or irreversible impacts:
Activities under the Project are not expected to generate significant adverse
environmental effects as they are focused largely on public sector capacity building and
Page 3
improved readiness for dealing with outbreaks of avian influenza in domestic poultry and
human health\. These prevention-focused activities are expected to have a positive
environmental impact as the Project?s investments in facilities, equipment, and training
for laboratories will improve the effectiveness and safety of the existing avian influenza
handling and testing procedures and meet the international standards established by the
WHO and OIE\. There are three environmental issues that will be addressed in the
Operations Manual: the procedures for culling and disposal of poultry; the handling of
medical waste generated by laboratories and health care facilities; and civil works
associated with the rehabilitation of labs and the construction of the virology laboratory
for the KVFA\.
2\. Describe any potential indirect and/or long term impacts due to anticipated future
activities in the project area:
The environmental considerations for carcass disposal typically have the potential for one
or more of the following environmental impacts: health and safety hazards for the
workers and the public; soil and water pollution from leakages of the carcass waste;
excavation of materials and disposal of surplus soil/earth and other materials, risks to
environmentally sensitive areas, flora and fauna; vicinity of the disposal site to the busy
areas like national road, health centers, markets, schools or natural reserves or historic
sites; site location (avoiding flooded, eroded or sliding areas)\.
3\. Describe any project alternatives (if relevant) considered to help avoid or minimize
adverse impacts\.
NA
4\. Describe measures taken by the borrower to address safeguard policy issues\. Provide
an assessment of borrower capacity to plan and implement the measures described\.
The project supports investments in civil works (construction and rehabilitation of
laboratories and hospitals) and in carcass disposal\. An Environmental Assessment and
Environmental Management plan satisfactory to the Association (both of which are
conditions of effectiveness) will evaluate these issues and mitigating procedures\.
5\. Identify the key stakeholders and describe the mechanisms for consultation and
disclosure on safeguard policies, with an emphasis on potentially affected people\.
Environmental Assessment will be launched on or around January 31, 2007\. Two
meetings in rural areas will be held with key stakeholders and with rural community
participation to discuss environmental assessment findings between February 10 and 20,
2007\. The assessment will also be advertised through media and available for review
after February 28, 2007\.
B\. Disclosure Requirements Date
Environmental Assessment/Audit/Management Plan/Other:
Date of receipt by the Bank
01/31/2007
Date of "in-country" disclosure
02/10/2007
Page 4
Date of submission to InfoShop
03/10/2007
For category A projects, date of distributing the Executive
Summary of the EA to the Executive Directors
*
If the project triggers the Pest Management and/or Physical Cultural Resources,
the respective issues are to be addressed and disclosed as part of the Environmental
Assessment/Audit/or EMP\.
If in-country disclosure of any of the above documents is not expected, please
explain why:
A
waiver for the requirements to complete the EA and EMP during project preparation
has been sought per para\. 12 of OP 4\.01\.
C\. Compliance Monitoring Indicators at the Corporate Level (to be filled in when the
ISDS is finalized by the project decision meeting)
OP/BP/GP 4\.01 - Environment Assessment
Does the project require a stand-alone EA (including EMP) report?
Yes
If yes, then did the Regional Environment Unit or Sector Manager (SM)
review and approve the EA report?
N/A
Are the cost and the accountabilities for the EMP incorporated in the
credit/loan?
Yes
The World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information
Have relevant safeguard policies documents been sent to the World Bank's
Infoshop?
No
Have relevant documents been disclosed in-country in a public place in a
form and language that are understandable and accessible to project-affected
groups and local NGOs?
No
All Safeguard Policies
Have satisfactory calendar, budget and clear institutional responsibilities
been prepared for the implementation of measures related to safeguard
policies?
Yes
Have costs related to safeguard policy measures been included in the project
cost?
Yes
Does the Monitoring and Evaluation system of the project include the
monitoring of safeguard impacts and measures related to safeguard policies?
Yes
Have satisfactory implementation arrangements been agreed with the
borrower and the same been adequately reflected in the project legal
documents?
Yes
Page 5
D\. Approvals
Signed and submitted by:
Name
Date
Task Team Leader:
Mr Ibrahim Hackaj
12/05/2006
Environmental Specialist:
Ms Drite Dade
12/05/2006
Social Development Specialist
Mr Bekim Imeri
12/06/2006
Additional Environmental and/or
Social Development Specialist(s):
Approved by:
Regional Safeguards Coordinator:
Mr Maninder S\. Gill
12/11/2006
Comments:
Sector Manager:
Mr Juergen Voegele
12/21/2006
Comments: | APPROVAL |
P067625 | Page 1
1
PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
APPRAISAL STAGE
Report No\.: AB1247
Project Name
Renewable Energy Scale-up Program (CRESP)
Region
EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC
Sector
Sub-national government administration (50%); Renewable
energy (30%); Central government administration (20%)
Project ID
P067828
GEF Focal Area
C-Climate change
Global Supplemental ID
P067625
Borrower(s)
GOVERNMENT OF CHINA
Implementing Agency
Environment Category
[
]
A
[X] B [ ] C [ ] FI [ ] TBD (to be determined)
Safeguard Classification
[
]
S
1
[X ] S
2
[
]
S
3
[
]
S
F
[
]
TBD (to be determined)
Date PID Prepared
November 24, 2004
Date of Appraisal
Authorization
November 29, 2004
Date of Board Approval
June 21, 2005
1\.
Country and Sector Background
Main Power Sector Issues\.
To meet the continued increase in demand for electricity and in line
with the move to a market economy, the power sector in China is being restructured\. The sector
is now in a transitional phase, in which generation, transmission and distribution have been
separated\. Uncertainties surrounding the future structure of the power sector and inadequate
pricing policies hinder introduction of newer technologies, especially renewable forms of
electricity generation\. Consequently, reliance on coal is increased and the government's aim of
sustainable development is hampered\.
Renewable Energy Strategy\.
China has made significant progress in developing renewable
energy, especially small hydropower\. However, it still has abundant undeveloped resources of
small hydropower, wind, biomass, geothermal and solar energy\. Economic studies, undertaken
as part of project preparation, have demonstrated that much more of these resource can be
developed to produce electricity below the system avoided cost, particularly if institutional
barriers are lifted and external costs of damage caused by coal-fired generation is considered\.
To develop these resources, The Government of China (GoC) developed a strategy based on: (a)
development and implementation of a legal and regulatory framework, in step with the overall
reform process, which supports and encourages the development of economic renewable energy
resources; (b) access to advanced technology and techniques to improve quality, reduce cost and
permit the economic exploitation of renewable energy resources through assimilation of
research, manufacturing, assembly, installation as well as operation, and (c) strengthening of the
capacity of existing companies to develop, finance, construct and operate renewable energy on a
large scale and further opening of the sector to private investors\.
Page 2
P067828/P067625
CRESP PID (11/29/04)
Report No AB1247
\.
2
The GoC is now preparing a Renewable Energy Promotion Law (REPL), expected to be placed
before the National People's Congress in 2005; implementing regulations are expected to follow
thereafter\.
2\. Objectives
The project forms the first phase of a GEF-supported 3-phased program aimed at enabling
commercial renewable electricity supplier to provide energy to the electricity market efficiently,
cost effectively and on a large-scale\.
The project development objective is to initiate a program of industrial development and
capacity building and a sustainable large-scale contribution of renewable energy in four
provinces\. The global objective is to develop and implement the legal and regulatory framework
for a Mandated Market Policy (MMP) and support its effective implementation in four
provinces\.
The principal outcome expected from the project is to have initiated sustained efforts to scale up
electricity generation from renewable energy sources\. The project will: (a) assist central
government and provincial agencies to deepen their knowledge and to develop understanding of
the renewable energy electricity market; (b) increase the focus of research and education
institutions and Chinese manufacturers on innovation and cost reduction through transfer of
technology and access to knowledge; (c) increase the capacity of public and majority publicly
owned generators in developing large scale renewable energy projects in a legally, commercially,
technically and economically sound way; and (d) further open the market for private developers
to meet the important investment needs\.
Measures of progress towards the outcome are: (a) the enactment of the REPL and issuing of
associated regulations at national level and initiation of their effective implementation in pilot
provinces; (b) improvements to quality and reduction in cost of renewable energy equipment and
services, including increases in local content; and (c) proportion of new electricity generation
coming from renewable sources in the pilot provinces\.
The most recent full Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), discussed by the Board on January 21,
2003 (Report No\. 25141-CHA), focuses on supporting China's sustainable transition from a rural
to an urban society and from a centrally-planned to a market-based economy\. An important
theme within the CAS is to facilitate an environmentally sustainable development process,
including dealing with global environment and air quality issues\. Increased electricity
generation from renewable energy sources will contribute to improved air quality and reduce the
economic costs that result from the harmful effects of the use of coal and reduce greenhouse gas
emissions\. The program will also contribute to the GoC objectives of economic development in
the lagging regions, since much of the renewable energy resource is in those areas\.
3\.
Rationale for Bank Involvement
The Bank and GEF provided extensive support during the preparation and discussion of the
renewable energy strategy\. Studies and consultation activities supported by the Bank and GEF
introduced the concept of law- and regulation-based market-oriented support for renewable
Page 3
P067828/P067625
CRESP PID (11/29/04)
Report No AB1247
\.
3
energy\. There is now general agreement on the need to implement a market-based policy
mandating that a share of electricity consumption comes from renewable sources along lines
introduced in Australia, the Netherlands, UK and states in the US (the so-called Renewable
Portfolio Standard or RPS) or imposing an obligation on electricity suppliers to buy renewable
energy based electricity at a government determined price (the so-called Feed In Tariff)
introduced mainly in Spain and Germany\. The term MMP is used in this document to refer to
both systems\.
The continued involvement of the Bank and GEF will increase the prospects for technology
transfer and knowledge upgrade for the successful and sustained scaling up of renewable energy
use in China\. The Bank's sustained engagement, within the programmatic approach approved by
the GEF Council, will facilitate the implementation of the strategy and sustain the scaling up
through: (a) support and leverage of investment in renewable energy generation; (b) policy
advice and institutional support during the implementation of REPL based on international best
practice; and (c) transfer of technology and upgrade of renewable energy technology to improve
quality and reduce cost\.
4\. Description
The project comprises two components\.
Institutional Development and Capacity Building: GEF grant $40\.22 million, cost sharing $78
million
The Institutional Development and Capacity Building component was designed to meet national
priorities and the needs of the pilot provinces to initiate the scale up of renewable energy\. The
national level Institutional Development and Capacity Building sub-component will include:
MMP research and implementation support\. Studies on further development of the MMP
and its implementation, particularly on targets, tariff levels, policy development, sharing of
incremental cost, trading and carbon trading and long term planning and preparation of
implementing regulations\. The main counterparts for these activities will be government
bodies and the main outcome will be legislation and regulations leading to sustained scaling
up of renewable energy;
Technology improvement for wind and biomass\. This will cover technology development
based on important local investments leveraged by small grants, cost-shared grants or both,
for wind and biomass\. In addition, for wind it will cover preparation of standards, putting in
place certification and establishing a testing center\. Beneficiaries will be Chinese wind and
biomass equipment and related service suppliers, government bodies dealing with standards
and testing and accreditation agencies;
Long term capacity building\. Support will be provided to selected universities to enter into
twinning arrangements with leading international universities to develop post graduate level
or specialist renewable energy engineering courses and to offer fellowship programs to
support more senior engineers studying abroad;
Page 4
P067828/P067625
CRESP PID (11/29/04)
Report No AB1247
\.
4
At the province level, technical assistance will be provided for effective implementation of the
REPL and initiation of sustained scale up or renewable energy:
Implementation of the MMP focusing on the tasks to make the REPL effective in the pilot
provinces, aimed principally at provincial government bodies and other stakeholders;
Support to ensure the success of the investment projects, by providing assistance in design,
procurement, construction, operations and maintenance as needed by each project sponsor;
Pilot/demonstration projects to be carried out in the pilot provinces supporting technologies
other than those in the Support for Wind, Biomass and Small Hydro in Pilot Provinces
Component\. In addition a pilot offshore wind farm will be prepared for implementation in
phase 2;
Renewable resource assessments for each of the pilot provinces;
Feasibility studies aimed at companies seeking to develop renewable energy projects and
provided on a cost-sharing basis;
Capacity building for market participants\.
The Institutional Development and Capacity Building Component will include program
management and will cover the sustaining costs of the PMO, GoC and donor coordination
activities, monitoring and evaluation and administration including fiduciary duties\.
Support for Wind, Biomass and Small Hydro in Pilot Provinces:
total cost $342\.91
million,
Bank financing $222\.06 million
The Support for Wind, Biomass and Small Hydro in Pilot Provinces Component increases the
capacity to develop, finance, construct and operate renewables on a large scale in the four pilot
provinces\. It links policy, legislation and capacity building while also developing the renewable
resource and providing benchmark costs for renewable technologies country-wide\. The sub-
components are as follows:
In Fujian, a 100MW wind farm at Changjiang'ao, Pingtan Island\. The Pingtan wind farm will
consist of wind turbines, associated civil and electrical works, an extension to an existing control
room, a switchyard and a 15 km, 110 kV transmission line from the wind farm to Beicuo\. The
existing 110 kV substation at Beicuo will be upgraded\. The capacity of the individual turbines
will be in the range 1-1\.5MW and therefore their number and the precise layout of the wind
farm, will depend on the product offered by the winning bidder\. The sponsor, and currently
implementing agency, China Long Yuan Power Group (Long Yuan) intends to create a special
purpose company for the implementation and operation of the project\. Total cost of the wind
farm is expected to be $106\.39 million, of which $67 million is to be financed by the Bank\.
In Inner Mongolia, a 100MW wind farm at Huitengxile, Wulanchabu County\. The Huitengxile
wind farm will consist of wind turbines, associated electrical and civil works including a
substation, switchyard and control room; a 15 km, 110 kV transmission line to Desheng town;
and upgrading of the existing 110 kV substation there\. The capacity of the individual wind
turbines will be in the range 1-2MW therefore their number and precise layout of the wind farm
Page 5
P067828/P067625
CRESP PID (11/29/04)
Report No AB1247
\.
5
will depend on the product offered by the winning bidder\. The Inner Mongolia Wind Power
Company (IMWPC) is the implementing agency\. Total cost of the wind farm is expected to be
$101\.66 million, of which $81\.78 million is to be financed by the Bank\. IMWPC plans to
identify a source of carbon financing, and is currently developing a proposal for consideration by
the World Bank\.
In Jiangsu, a 25MW straw-fired biomass power plant at Mabei Village, Rudong County\. The
Rudong power plant will consist of one 110 tonne/hour high-temperature, high-pressure straw-
fired boiler, and one 25 MW steam turbine, and associated mechanical, electrical and civil
works\. The plant will require 176,000 tons of straw from rice and other crops drawn via
collection stations from farms within a radius of 25 km from the project site and transported to
the plant by road and water\. The plant will be connected to the grid by a short line to the nearest
transformer\. The sponsor, and currently implementing agency, Jiangsu Guo Xin Investment
Group (Guo Xin) intends to create a special purpose company for the implementation and
operation of the project\. Total cost of the power plant is expected to be $35\.71 million of which
$20 million is to be financed by the Bank\.
In Zhejiang, the Bank will finance part of the provincial small hydro new build and rehabilitation
program\. Eighteen individual projects of up to 25MW have been selected based on criteria
agreed in advance, and to be confirmed at appraisal\. The province will make sub-loans to county
governments and thence to owners/developers of individual projects with guarantees from
county governments\. It is expected that most owner/developers of rehabilitation sites will be the
public sector (including the counties themselves) while most new build will be sponsored by the
private sector\. The beneficiaries are the sponsors and owners of individual hydro projects\.
Eleven plants will be rehabilitated with outputs of 34 MW, an incremental gain of 10 MW\. New
build will be 74 MW\. Total cost of the projects is expected to be $99\.15 million, of which
$53\.28 million is to be financed by the Bank\.
All four sub-components will be appraised at the same time, but there is still uncertainty whether
all projects will obtain their required approvals in China by negotiation\. It is therefore proposed
that any projects which have not obtained the required approvals by negotiation will be slipped
to a separate project for which financing will be sought in early FY06 under the proposed
additional financing guidelines now under consideration\.
5\. Financing
Source: ($m\.)
BORROWER/RECIPIENT 82\.01
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT
222\.06
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY
40\.22
FOREIGN PRIVATE COMMERCIAL SOURCES (UNIDENTIFIED)
116\.83
Total
461\.12
6\. Implementation
Page 6
P067828/P067625
CRESP PID (11/29/04)
Report No AB1247
\.
6
Institutional and Capacity Building Component
The Institutional and Capacity Building component will be a single national program
implemented through a national PMO under the Energy Bureau of the National Development
and Reform Commission (NDRC)\. The CRESP PMO was first formed in May 2002 to
undertake project preparation and will increase its capacity by adding and training new staff
when the project enters into its implementation phase\. The PMO has the authority to enter into
contracts on behalf of NDRC and has, during preparation, demonstrated its ability to meet Bank
fiduciary requirements\.
Support for Wind, Biomass and Small Hydro in Pilot Provinces Component
Long Yuan, the developers of the Pingtan wind farm in Fujian, will establish a special purpose
company in which it will be the majority shareholder to own and operate the wind farm\. It is a
credible developer, and a shareholder in the wind farms being financed under the Renewable
Energy Development Project (REDP) Loan no\. 4488-CHA\. It has the capacity to manage the
technical, commercial and fiduciary aspects of the project\. Funds will be on-lent direct from
MoF to Long Yuan with a guarantee provided by Guodian, Long Yuan's parent company\.
The Huitengxile wind farm is being developed by IMWPC which is a state-owned enterprise
wholly owned by Northern Union Power Company Limited (NUPC)\. IMWPC is an experienced
owner and operator of wind farms; technical and Bank-specific fiduciary skills will be reinforced
through the TA program and during appraisal and supervision\. Funds will be on-lent from MoF
to Inner Mongolia and thence to IMWPC, against a guarantee from NUPC\.
The Rudong power plant is sponsored by Guo Xin Investment Group Ltd (Guo Xin), which is
owned by Jiangsu Province\. Guo Xin will establish a special purpose project company which
will own and operate the power plant\. Guo Xin is a minority owner of the Yixing Pumped
Storage power plant, financed by the Bank (Loan 4686-CHA) and has the capacity to manage the
technical and commercial aspects of the project and knowledge about financial management
procedures\. Financial technical assistance will be provided to address the fiduciary weaknesses
identified during the financial management assessment\. Funds will be on-lent from MoF to
Jiangsu and thence to the special purpose company against a guarantee from Guo Xin\.
The Zhejiang sub-component consists of several small hydro projects\. Rehabilitation projects
are mainly within state or collectively owned county-level companies\. New build projects are
mostly sponsored by private companies\. A leading group has been formed by Zhejiang Province
Government to oversee project implementation\. Capacity at the individual company level is
limited, hence the sub-component will be managed by a provincial project office (PPO) staffed
by members of the Zhejiang Hydro Power Management Development Center (ZHPMDC) which
has extensive experience in managing international cooperation projects and will oversee and
provide additional capacity for the technical, financial, procurement and safeguard aspects of the
individual projects\. Funds will be made available from MoF to Zhejiang and will be managed by
the provincial finance bureau, including preparation of sub-loans for the companies and
disbursements to them\. The sub-projects will be carried out in compliance with Bank safeguards
and fiduciary policies, according to environment and resettlement frameworks and arrangements
to be confirmed at appraisal\.
Page 7
P067828/P067625
CRESP PID (11/29/04)
Report No AB1247
\.
7
7\. Sustainability
The GoC's renewed commitment to the support and development of renewable energy is
documented in the letter of sector development policy (LSDP) reinforces the commitments it
made at the Bonn Conference on Renewable Energies in June 2004\.
The program/project's sustainability hinges on the passage of REPL and implementation
regulations to introduce an MMP and design an effective regulatory system with GEF support to
ensure adequate implementation\. Sustainability is likely because: (a) the rapid progress in
developing the law indicates the desire of the government to enact and implement REPL as soon
as practicable to meet the sector development objectives; and (b) the GEF Council has already
approved the programmatic approach and the amount of the first phase support\. The
programmatic approach provides the opportunity to exit from the program if sustainability is
threatened\.
Sustainability of the investment projects has been aided by reflecting in their institutional
arrangements the principles set out in the law, namely creating a long term requirement for
renewable electricity at the provincial level, backed by PPAs and ensuring cost recovery\. The
project supports this goal through various activities envisaged under the Institutional
Development and Capacity Building component\.
8\.
Lessons Learned from Past Operations in the Country/Sector
The evidence accumulated over some 20 years suggests a complementary set of coordinated and
focused policies are necessary to develop and sustain markets for renewable energy\. The most
important lesson is that reducing cost and improving technology and quality, including support
for investment, research, development and demonstration, standard setting and awareness are
pre-requisites for scaling up of renewable energy\. Supply-side policies alone, which provide
capital subsidies and support equipment supply and service industries are not sufficient to
develop a market, which most importantly needs to be based on an MMP\.
This is illustrated in China by the restructuring REDP to reduce the wind component from 190 to
20 MW because of the institutional problems encountered to declare it effective despite the
strong support from sponsoring government agencies\. Lessons learned indicate that
sustainability requires: (a) development of a competitive environment in the renewable energy
sub-sector to reduce technology and project development costs; (b) maintaining flexibility with
respect to changing market conditions, such as restructuring and deregulation of power sectors;
(c) minimal reliance on administrative procedures; and (d) development of exit strategies as soon
as barriers are removed\.
Lessons learned from renewable energy assistance in China include: (a) the renewable energy
resource for individual projects must be carefully assessed and checked; (b) attention must be
paid to arrangements for procurement and construction that are in line with international best
practice to ensure rapid and effective implementation; (c) key principles of all agreements that
are essential to the project functioning as envisaged (for example power purchase agreements
Page 8
P067828/P067625
CRESP PID (11/29/04)
Report No AB1247
\.
8
PPAs and voluntary pilot schemes) should be established before project appraisal; and (d)
technical assistance must be coordinated with the construction of the physical parts of the project
to ensure that the implementing agencies have adequate and timely knowledge of construction,
operation and maintenance\.
Incorporation of these lessons learned in the proposed program/project required full engagement
of all concerned Chinese agencies\. A longer than expected consultation process was required to
build consensus and to ensure full ownership of the program/project concept\.
9\.
Safeguard Policies (including public consultation)
Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project
Yes
No
Environmental Assessment
(
OP
/
BP
/
GP
4\.01) [X]
[
X
]
Natural Habitats (
OP
/
BP
4\.04)
[
X
]
[X]
Pest Management (
OP 4\.09
)
[
X
]
[X]
Cultural Property (
OPN 11\.03
,
being revised as OP 4\.11)
[
X
]
[X]
Involuntary Resettlement (
OP
/
BP
4\.12)
[X] [
X
]
Indigenous Peoples (
OD 4\.20
,
being revised as OP 4\.10)
[
X
]
[X]
Forests (
OP
/
BP
4\.36)
[
X
]
[X]
Safety of Dams (
OP
/
BP
4\.37)
[X] [
X
]
Projects in Disputed Areas (
OP
/
BP
/
GP
7\.60)
*
[
X
]
[X]
Projects on International Waterways (
OP
/
BP
/
GP
7\.50)
[
X
]
[X]
Environmental screening category is B\.
In Fujian land acquisition is mainly from state enterprises; where it is from households in no case
does it have an impact exceeding 5% of household income\. Thirty-one households and 150
people are affected\. In Inner Mongolia, land is being acquired from a state-owned stud farm and
there are no project affected households nor major environmental impacts\. In Jiangsu, 25
households consisting of 91 people are affected by land acquisition, on average losing 30-36% of
their land holding but no buildings\. Impacts on income are much lower because households will
be adequately compensated and are not wholly dependent on their land\.
In all three cases, participatory consultations on both resettlement and environment issues have
taken place during Environment Assessment (EA) and Resettlement Action Plan (RAP)
preparation\. Local consultation has taken place through surveys of affected households,
discussions with local government and businesses at town and village levels and public meetings\.
Compensation rates have been discussed and agreed and there is a system of redress in place\.
Implementing agencies' ability to implement safeguards policies is satisfactory and will be
independently monitored\. EIAs and RAPs have been disclosed as shown in the table below\.
A
safeguards framework for the small hydro projects in Zhejiang has been discussed and agreed
with stakeholder groups and will be disclosed by appraisal\. Main safeguards issues are
*
By supporting the proposed project, the Bank does not intend to prejudice the final determination of the parties' claims on the
disputed areas
Page 9
P067828/P067625
CRESP PID (11/29/04)
Report No AB1247
\.
9
potentially environmental, resettlement and dam safety\. Precise safeguards issues will be
identified on appraisal of individual sub-projects\. Based on the information available is not
expected that any project will trigger environment category A or safeguards category S1\.
Both EAs and RAPs have been disclosed as follows:
Fujian Inner
Mongolia Jiangsu
Zhejiang
Date of EA
and RAP to
Infoshop
11-24-2004 11-24-2004 11-24-2004 11-24-2004
Disclosure in
China:
Date
Location
06-30-2004
(RAP)
10-30-2004
(EIA)
Pingtan
County offices
10-31-2004
Chahaeryouyi
Zhongqi Planning
Committee,
Wulanchabu, Inner
Mongolia
11-15-2004
Rudong
County project
office
11-22-2004
(frameworks
only)
Zhejiang
Provincial
Hydropower
Development
Management
Center
10\.
List of Factual Technical Documents
11\. Contact
point
Contact: Noureddine Berrah
Title: Lead Energy Specialist
Tel: (202) 473-1132
Fax: (202) 522-1648
Email: Nberrah@worldbank\.org
12\.
For more information contact:
The InfoShop
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 458-5454
Fax: (202) 522-1500
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/infoshop | APPROVAL |
P153366 | PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
APPRAISAL STAGE
Report No\.: PIDA91686
Public Disclosure Copy
Project Name Transparency and Efficiency in Tax Administration (P153366)
Region LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN
Country Guatemala
Lending Instrument Investment Project Financing
Project ID P153366
Borrower(s) Ministry of Public Finance
Implementing Agency Superintendencia de Administracion Tributaria
Environmental Category C-Not Required
Date PID Prepared/Updated 17-Nov-2016
Date PID Approved/Disclosed 17-Nov-2016
Estimated Date of Appraisal
Completion
Estimated Date of Board 17-Jan-2017
Approval
Appraisal Review Decision
(from Decision Note)
I\. Project Context
Public Disclosure Copy
Country Context
Guatemala is a country with significant potential for growth and for improved welfare\. The
country's strategic location vis-Ã -vis international trade, its substantial natural resources, and its
young multi-ethnic population all contribute to this potential\. The country's complex topography
provides a range of climatic zones that encompass rich biodiversity and economic potential for
agriculture, forestry, and hydropower generation\. Guatemala has become a leading exporter of
agricultural products and is the fourth largest exporter of sugar in the world and the largest exporter
of cardamom\. Large mineral deposits of gold, nickel, lead, zinc, and iron, among others, add to
Guatemala's wealth of natural resources\.
However, Guatemala has the second highest poverty rate in LAC, and income growth among the
bottom 40 percent of the population has been negligible in recent years\. Poverty and extreme
poverty increased between 2006 and 2014, from 52 percent to 60 percent and 33 percent to 37
percent, respectively\. The increases in overall poverty were largely driven by price increases,
particularly for food, with low growth having a partial mitigating effect\. Additionally, mobility
analysis between 2006 and 2014 shows that there were more people that fell into poverty than those
that moved out\. Inequality has been declining (the GINI coefficient was decreased from 0\.55 in
2006 to 0\.49 by 2014), but this was mainly driven by falling incomes at the higher end of the
distribution\. There has been no shared prosperity, as average incomes of the bottom 40 percent of
the population have declined over the 2000-2014 period\. High poverty levels are also evident in the
Page 1 of 7
country's social indicators, such as chronic malnutrition, affecting in particular the poor (66
percent), rural dwellers (59 percent), and Indigenous groups (61 percent)\.
Public Disclosure Copy
Guatemala's stable macroeconomic framework has not translated into high growth or poverty
reduction\. The country is the largest economy in Central America, with a Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) of US$63\.8 billion (2015)\. Since 1990, economic volatility was less than half the regional
average, and the country experienced less of an economic deceleration during the 2009 recession
than most of the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) countries\. Much of Guatemala's economic
stability can be attributed to prudent macroeconomic policies that have kept fiscal deficits and
public debt low\. However, given that Guatemala has one of the lowest tax burdens in the world, low
fiscal deficits were achieved by modest spending on social sectors and delivery of public services\.
Moreover, per capita growth is stubbornly low at 1\.5 percent on average over the past decade (per-
capita gross national income increased to an estimated US$3,804 in 2015) and is hampering the
country's income convergence\. Today, Guatemala is the fifth-poorest economy in terms of GDP
per capita in LAC\.
Guatemala is at a historic juncture, following a political and institutional crisis in 2015, a newly
elected government is starting to take on deep-rooted development problems\. The crisis was
triggered by the uncovering of a corruption scheme that permeated the Tax Administration
Superintendence (SAT) and the highest political levels\. Subsequently, a massive social uprising
demanded the resignation of the President and the strengthening of governance\. In October 2015,
Jimmy Morales won the election with 67 percent of the vote having campaigned on a platform
against corruption\. The new Administration took office in January 2016 and, during its first three
months, developed its 20/20 Vision for Guatemala, building on the Kâââ¨â atun 2032 National
Development Plan\. Priorities include: (i) combating corruption and improving transparency; (ii)
increasing access to better quality health services; (iii) tackling food insecurity and malnutrition;
(iv) enhancing access to better quality education; (v) generating good quality jobs and creating
opportunities for growth by promoting tourism and supporting micro, medium and small enterprises
Public Disclosure Copy
(MSMEs); (vi) improving citizen security; and (vii) increasing resilience and adaptation to the
changing environment\.
Sectoral and institutional Context
Guatemala has one of the lowest levels of tax collection in the LAC region and the world\. Modest
gains in revenue mobilization that had been achieved in 2013 were lost amidst high-level corruption
in customs administration\. After reaching 11 percent in 2013, the tax-to-GDP ratio fell to 10\.8
percent in 2014 and to 10\.2 percent by the end of 2015, below the 13 percent target foreseen in the
tax reform of 2012 and significantly below the LAC average of 16\.9 percent\. In addition,
Guatemala's tax effort is the lowest in the Region and the lowest among its lower-middle income
peers\. Low levels of revenues are due to narrow bases and low rates of certain taxes, but also to
widespread tax evasion, lack of transparency, weak monitoring and controls, Value Added Tax
(VAT) revenue leakages due to fraudulent invoicing, and high levels of informality\. While it is
critical to expand the tax base and raise certain tax rates to increase the tax-to-GDP ratio, a
prerequisite for building political and public support for such fiscal reforms is to strengthen the
regulatory framework to enhance tax collection, and re-build trust in SAT\.
Modest tax collection is due to low tax rates and persistent low levels of tax compliance\.
Low tax compliance is mainly caused by institutional weakness in the tax administration and a
Page 2 of 7
chronic low tax culture in the country\. The former is a result of structural problems linked to the
weak internal governance framework in SAT, the outdated core business and support processes in
the tax administration, and the weak controls and enforcement procedures in both internal revenues
Public Disclosure Copy
and customs\. Low tax culture, in turn, is a consequence of the perception of weakness and lack of
transparency of public institutions in general and in SAT in particular\.
The tax policy framework depends heavily on indirect taxation, accounting for over a half
of total government revenues, with around 50 percent of these coming from VAT\. Despite the
relative importance of VAT in revenue collection, VAT rates are among the lowest in Latin
America, with numerous exemptions and loopholes\. A decrease in VAT revenues from 3 percent of
GDP in 2013 to 2\.6 percent in 2015 was the main contributor to the persistent decline in the tax-to-
GDP ratio during this same period\. Direct taxation comprises 30\.9 percent of total revenue, of
which only 2\.9 percent is from personal income tax\. Direct taxation remains hampered by a small
tax base, excessive exemptions, extensive evasion and widespread informality in the economy\.
Furthermore, the current framework is regressive: a fiscal incidence analysis based on the
2009-2010 National Survey of Family Income and Expenditures has revealed that the current tax
system and transfers do little to reduce inequality and poverty overall or along ethnic and rural-
urban lines\.
Weak taxpayer compliance stems from a lack of trust in institutions and inefficiencies in
revenue administration\. The prevailing public perception that compliance is costly, tax
administration is inefficient and has poor governance and that the tax structure is regressive, limits
the scope for voluntary compliance and grind down the tax culture in the country\. In 2015,
Guatemala ranked 123 out of 168 countries on public sector corruption perception index\. High
levels of tax evasion erode the tax base, and continue to undermine both vertical and horizontal
equity in the tax system\. An estimated 74\.5 percent of the economically active population is part of
the informal economy, and informalities relating to contraband and fraudulent customs activities are
estimated to cause a loss of revenue in the order of 2\.8 percent and 4\.4 percent of GDP,
Public Disclosure Copy
respectively\.
The 2015 political and institutional crisis exposed the extent and importance of the
underlying structural problems in SAT\. The Government's revenue administration capacity
deteriorated significantly in recent years as the SAT fell behind in keeping up with the institutional
and technological requirements needed to maintain its operations at international standards\. Several
diagnostic assessments performed by international development partners including the World Bank,
United States Treasury, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB) in recent years, have found that SAT suffers from (i) disintegrated and inefficient tax
administration processes; (ii) a dysfunctional governance structure that lacks transparency and is
characterized by weak internal controls and ineffective information sharing between units; (iii)
fragmented and vulnerable information systems; and (iv) lack of a human resource strategy\.
Particularly, customs operations processes in Guatemala are characterized for being inefficient
and ineffective\. Customs operations in Guatemala have been characterized by limited transparency,
lack of cross-control mechanisms, and costly and inefficient clearance procedures\. Even though in
recent years Guatemala made some progress aligning its trade facilitation practices with current
international standards, a large number of physical inspections are still conducted at the border
which has not reduced the time for cargo to be released by Customs\. In addition, efforts to mitigate
contraband have failed repeatedly due to high levels of discretion by customs officers, lack of
Page 3 of 7
infrastructure and supporting equipment for controlling merchandise transit in customs field offices,
and a weak and fragmented risk management model\.
Public Disclosure Copy
The new administration has given priority to mobilizing tax revenues through strengthening
SATâ¢â¨ s core operations and its governance framework\. The Government has recognized the
present context as an opportunity to reverse the trend of SATâ¢â¨ s poor performance through the
implementation of a comprehensive reform\. The reform plan includes critical modifications in the
institutional and legal framework along with short, medium and long-term actions for improving
SATâ¢â¨ s operations and its transparency\.
As a first step, the Government succeeded in reforming the SATâ¢â¨ s legal and institutional
framework with the approval of the amendments to the Organic Law for SAT (Ley Orgánica de la
SAT-Decree 1-98)\. The amendments address critical governance issues in the existing organization
of the tax administration\. Among the most important aspects included in the reform are: (i) the
separation of functions related to administrative tax appeals with the creation of TRIBUTA, an
administrative tribunal within SAT, that eliminates the risks of conflict of interest and
incompatibilities when the role was exercised by members of the Board of Directors; (ii) limiting
political influence in SAT nominations through the modification of appointments procedures for the
SAT Superintendent, the members of the Board of Directors and the members of TRIBUTA; (iii)
the revision of roles and responsibilities for the Board of Directors and the administrative instances
in SAT; (iv) the creation of a specialized internal investigation unit with the capacity to detect and
investigate corruption and conflict of interest practices in SAT; and (v) the regulation of financial
confidentiality provisions granting SAT the authority to access taxpayersâ¢â¨ bank information for
auditing and investigation purposes\.
In addition, the authorities have already implemented a number of short-term measures aimed at
improving collection\. Short term activities implemented by SAT include, among other: (i) the
hiring and training of new staff; (ii) the authorization and closure of gates in Puerto Quetzal (EPQ
Public Disclosure Copy
access) to reinforce security and merchandise controls in one of the main import and export points;
(iii) implementation of a monitoring system in ports (CCTV); (iv) improvement of containers
controls from arrival to release in customs; (v) the strengthening of controls of ramps in customs;
(vi) the establishment of an internal investigations unit, its protocols and training; (vii) the
acquisition of hardware infrastructure needed to avoid disruptions in the availability of existing
information systems in SAT, and (viii) the completion of the definition and development of a data
warehouse to support initial tax intelligence initiatives in SAT\. All these measures are expected to
gradually contribute to increase tax revenue collection\. They will be followed and complemented
by structural institutional changes in SAT and by medium and long-term reforms to restore the
institution's credibility and capability to perform its role in an effective and sustainable way\.
The Government has successfully mobilized and coordinated efforts from development partners to
support the implementation of SATââªÃ´s integrated reform plan\. Several international
organizations and donors including the IMF, IDB, World Bank (WB), US Treasury (OTA), and the
GIZ have agreed to align their technical assistance and support programs around a common reform
plan\. The Government has established the areas of priority where each of the organizations is now
providing support in a coordinated manner\. A summary of the areas is presented in Table 1\. As part
of these efforts, an IMF led mission took place in May 2016 and produced a comprehensive report
covering the various aspects of the tax administration\. The report includes recommendations
Page 4 of 7
containing both measures geared towards restoring levels of collection in the short-term, as well as
indications for medium-term strategies to reinstate full control and credibility in the tax
administration\.
Public Disclosure Copy
In particular, the Government has requested the WB to support medium and long-term reforms
related to SAT\. The proposed Project draws on recommendations from the IMF report as well as
previous analysis and diagnostics\. It will focus on providing support to both governance and
operational aspects of the tax administration in the medium-term\. It will primarily address the
structural problems causing the tax administration operational inefficiency and would also address
governance related aspects in the SAT in order to realign incentives for a more effective tax
administration and to restore the credibility of the tax administration to help rebuild taxpayer
confidence and thus strengthen the tax culture in the country as a whole\. Issues and shortcoming
related to the existing tax policy framework and elements linked to quality of transparency in the
expenditure side of the fiscal management are beyond the scope of the proposed Project\.
The proposed Project is part of a broader package of lending and analytical instruments to support
the country's reforms on governance of public resources\. It complements policy and institutional
actions that are being supported through the First Improved Governance of Public Resources and
Nutrition (US$250 million; P160667) Development Policy Financing\. The objective of the
development policy financing series is to support the Government's efforts to strengthen the
regulatory and institutional framework to improve governance of public resources and
accountability\. These efforts will be accompanied by analytical instruments, including technical
assistance on using behavioral insights to motivate citizens to pay taxes, technical assistance related
to improving transparency and anti-money laundering systems, and an analysis to better understand
the challenges related to high levels of informality\.
II\. Proposed Development Objectives
The project development objective is to increase levels of compliance with tax and customs
Public Disclosure Copy
obligations\.
III\. Project Description
Component Name
Component 1\. Transparency, Integrity and Institutional Development in SAT
Comments (optional)
The objective of this component is to support implementation of the new SATâ¢â¨ s governance
model by supporting the implementation of the recently approved amendments to the Organic Law
of SAT and by strengthening its internal capacities in areas related to strategic planning, human
resource management, institutional integrity, information governance, and information and
communication technology (ICT) services\. It will also support implementation of a change
management strategy and communications initiatives to ensure successful implementation of the
proposed reforms\.
Component Name
Component 2\. Strengthening of Tax Collection Functions in Internal Revenues and Customs
Comments (optional)
The purpose objective of this component is to strengthen the core processes of the primary tax
collection and controls functions in both Internal Revenues and Customs with a view to enhancing
taxpayer voluntary compliance, taxpayer satisfaction and SATâ¢â¨ s efficiency\. This component will
Page 5 of 7
support: (i) review and redefinition of core processes and management instruments for revenue
collection; (ii) the upgrade, replacement and development of information systems; and (iii) the
implementation of electronic services for taxpayers\.
Public Disclosure Copy
Component Name
Component 3\. Strengthening of Integrated Tax Intelligence and Tax Enforcement
Comments (optional)
The objective of this component is to strengthen tax intelligence and tax enforcement capabilities of
SAT\. The component will promote an efficient use of tax information sources to support the
auditing, control and enforcement functions through the adoption of an integrated compliance risk
management model, the promotion of a culture of information analysis within SAT, and the
strengthening of tax auditing and legal services for a more effective detection of evasion and tax
fraud practices and the effective collection of disputed taxes\. The proposed model will cover both
internal revenues and customs in order to deter existing silo-based practices and to increase
effectiveness of the tax intelligence function through the effective access and use of all available
information\.
IV\. Financing (in USD Million)
Total Project Cost: 55\.00 Total Bank Financing: 55\.00
Financing Gap: 0\.00
For Loans/Credits/Others Amount
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 55\.00
Total 55\.00
V\. Implementation
Public Disclosure Copy
VI\. Safeguard Policies (including public consultation)
Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project Yes No
Environmental Assessment OP/BP 4\.01 â
Natural Habitats OP/BP 4\.04 â
Forests OP/BP 4\.36 â
Pest Management OP 4\.09 â
Physical Cultural Resources OP/BP 4\.11 â
Indigenous Peoples OP/BP 4\.10 â
Involuntary Resettlement OP/BP 4\.12 â
Safety of Dams OP/BP 4\.37 â
Projects on International Waterways OP/BP 7\.50 â
Projects in Disputed Areas OP/BP 7\.60 â
Comments (optional)
VII\. Contact point
World Bank
Page 6 of 7
Contact: Alberto Leyton
Title: Lead Public Sector Specialist
Tel: 473-9396
Public Disclosure Copy
Email: aleyton@worldbank\.org
Contact: David Santos Ruano
Title: Public Sector Specialist
Tel: 202-473-0200
Email: dsantosruano@worldbank\.org
Borrower/Client/Recipient
Name: Ministry of Public Finance
Contact: Mynor Argueta
Title: Head, Management and Negotiation of International Cooperatio
Tel: 5022322-8888
Email:
Implementing Agencies
Name: Superintendencia de Administracion Tributaria
Contact: Ernesto Ramirez
Title: PMO
Tel: 502-2362-7111
Email: jeramire@sat\.gob\.gt
VIII\. For more information contact:
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 473-1000
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/projects
Public Disclosure Copy
Page 7 of 7 | APPROVAL |
P079657 | Page 1
PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
APPRAISAL STAGE
Report No\.: AB1532
Project Name
Tonga Education Support Project
Region
EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC
Sector
General education sector (100%)
Project ID
P079657
Borrower(s)
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
Implementing Agency
Ministry of Finance
Box 87
Vuna Rd\.
Tonga
Tel: 676 23066
Fax: 676 26011
Ministry of Education
PO Box 61
Vuna Road
Tonga
Tel: 676 23903
Fax: 676 23866
Environment Category
[
]
A
[
]
B
[X] C [ ] FI [ ] TBD (to be determined)
Date PID Prepared
April 11, 2005
Date of Appraisal
Authorization
May 2, 2005
Date of Board Approval
June 16, 2005
1\. Country and Sector Background
Tongas human development outcomes, including under-five mortality rate, life expectancy and
literacy, are among the best in the Pacific, and on a par with its Middle Income Country status\.
The country has a long standing tradition of providing virtually universal access to six years of
compulsory, free primary education\. Despite its relatively strong human development indicators
and commendable strides in achieving universal primary education, the Government of Tonga
recognizes the need to improve the quality of education it is delivering in order to meet the
challenges of a globalized market economy as well as the aspirations of its large proportion of
unemployed youth (around 30 percent of the population, among the highest in the Pacific)\.
Accordingly, the Government has recently developed, through a two year long consultative
process, an
Education Policy Framework 2004-2019
(EPF) to provide a vision and strategy for
undertaking comprehensive reform and improvement of its education system over the medium to
longer term\.
Available Ministry of Education (MoE) data indicate that the primary net enrollment rate (NER)
is close to 100 percent in Tongaa commendable achievement, especially relative to other
Pacific island countries (PICs)\.
Similarly, unlike in some other PICs, no apparent gender
disparities are evident in enrollments in primary\. While these achievements, as well as the
officially sound adult literacy rates are commendable,
emerging evidence suggests a problem of
Page 2
education quality
in Tonga, especially in terms of readiness of school graduates for productive
employment in a market economy\. The levels of basic numeracy and literacy (particularly
English) of young adults emerging from Tongas education system are questionable\. This is
evidenced by unemployment rates being highest among those with primary and secondary
education (around 15 percent), in comparison to those with no education or tertiary education\. It
is also supported by qualitative data from interviews with village residents and youth who
suggest that English language skills, in particular, are not sufficiently developed-- a situation the
parents report as worsening in recent years\.
Inequities in education
are most apparent in Tonga at the secondary level due to the varied
quality of education provided by government and non-government schools\. Very restricted
access to elite government run secondary schools has resulted in around 70 percent of secondary
school children studying in non-government schools\.
There is a widespread perception within
the country that the quality of education provided in non-government secondary schools is lower
than that provided in the state schools, despite the higher fees charged\. Equity concerns also
emerge when looking closely at accessibility of lower-income families to secondary education\.
For instance, analysis of the 2000/01 Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) data
suggests that the existing system of education finance at the secondary level is regressive, with
students receiving the bigger subsidy coming from more affluent households and lower income
families on average being under-represented in government secondary schools\. Some equity
concerns have also emerged at the primary level where conditions are often difficult in smaller
schools in the poorer outer islands (virtually no materials, deteriorated facilities, lack of qualified
staff etc\.)\. Outer islands also have lower pass rates from primary to secondary school, and the
majority of students receive no education beyond primary\.
The above equity and quality issues are determined to a large degree by weaknesses in the
Governments public expenditure management and policies
\.
Government expenditures on
education in Tonga have been in the range of about 3\.5-4\.5 percent of GDP since the late
1990sa reasonable range by international standards\. However, expenditures on education, as a
percent of total national budget, have declined from almost 18 percent in 1999/00 to just over 14
percent in 2004/05\. While the overall education budget dropped (in real terms) during the last
four years, expenditure on established staff increased by over 15 percent, placing severe pressure
on other expenditure items\. The main weakness in public expenditure management concerns
allocation of resources across expenditure categories\. For instance, government funding for non-
salary recurrent inputs are inadequate at both the primary and secondary levels, with staff costs
consuming 96 percent of the primary and 94 percent of the secondary recurrent budget in recent
years\. This has resulted in a severe squeeze on the resources available for operations and
maintenance (less than one percent of the recurrent budget has been allocated to maintenance in
recent years) as well as learning-related inputs\.
Between 2002 and 2004, the MoE engaged in a broad consultative process to align the education
sector with the demands of the 21st century and meet the objectives of the national Strategic
Development Plan 7 2001-04 (SDP7)\. Restructuring for higher sustainable economic growth,
ensuring financial stability, and investing in people are the key themes of SDP7, with a specific
emphasis on the role of the education sector in promoting the countrys growth\.
An Education
Page 3
Policy Framework 2004- 2019 (EPF)
,
was developed by MoE
1
and approved by Cabinet in
May 2004(see Annex 1 for details and assessment of EPF)\.
The three goals of the EPF are to: (i)
improve equitable access and quality of universal basic education up to Year 8 (primary
education is currently years 1 through 6); (ii) improve access and quality of post-basic education;
and (iii) improve the administration of education and training\. The first three years of this
framework, which has been further developed in the MoEs Corporate Plan 2004-2007, focuses
on transition and capacity building required for Tonga to achieve its long-term objectives\.
The proposed TESP will help the MoE in the first phase of the EPFs implementation\.
2\. Objectives
The objective of the Tonga Education Support Program (TESP) is to successfully implement the
first 5 years of the 15-Year EPF\. The five-year TESP represents the implementation of the first
phase of this program and, in particular, focuses on improving the quality of primary and
secondary education, the equitable delivery of services and resources, and a strengthening of
management, policy making, and monitoring and evaluation within the sector\. While the
institutional responsibility for implementing the EPF program rests with MOE, its success will
be contingent upon considerable support from both government agencies (most notably MoF)
and the numerous providers of education in the non-government sector\.
3\. Rationale for Bank Involvement
The GoT has requested an IDA Credit
from the World Bank to complement NZAID funding to
implement the first phase of EPF\. These donor funds will provide bridge financing until other
bi-lateral donors financing is secured for implementation of the next phases of EPF, and the
Governments longer-term objective of budgetary self-reliance is met\. The EU remains a firmly
committed partner in this joint approach and expects to support future phases\. Other
development partners are expressing interest and if the present approach demonstrates its
effectiveness, they may be expected to come on board in due course\. The Government and
donors recognize and value the Banks global knowledge of reform in this sector\. The
Government has signaled its intention to draw lessons for other line ministries from this
innovative approach which involves collaborative donor support direct to the budget, around an
agreed sector development framework\. Finally, a joint donor program will create a model for
improved donor collaboration thought the Pacific\. It will also give the World Bank an
opportunity to improve its program supervisory capacity, reduce transaction costs and increase
its presence and visibility among international education partners in the Pacific\.
4\. Description
TESP is designed as two clusters of activities\. TESP Cluster 1, financed jointly by the World
Bank and NZAID, focuses on establishing an intervention at the school level to ensure equitable
provision of universal basic education\. This is a major initiative under the Universal Basic
Education reforms of the EPF \. TESP Cluster 2, financed solely by NZAID, includes teacher
education, curriculum development, skills development etc\.
1
Technical assistance to the MOE was funded jointly by the World Bank and NZAID\.
Page 4
Project Components
1\. TESP Cluster 1: The Tonga Schools Grants Program (TSGP)
US$5\.1 million
Component 1
Policy, Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation (USD 1,044,000)\.
Sub-component 1\.1
Policy Development (USD 400,000)
Sub-component 1\.2 Planning, Management and Monitoring and Evaluation (USD
644,000)
Component 2
School Grants (USD 4,056,000)\.
Sub-component 2\.1
TSGP Management (USD 998,000)
Sub-component 2\.2 Grants to Schools (USD 3,058,000)
5\. Financing
Source: ($m\.)
BORROWER/RECIPIENT 0
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION
1
Total
1
6\. Implementation
Institutional arrangements\.
The GoT, through the Director of the MoE, has overall management
responsibility for the implementation of TESP\. An Annual Joint Review (AJR) will be held each
December to link with the annual planning and budget process\. Progress will be assessed against
agreed TESP performance indicators\. In addition, an Education Sector Consultative Committee
(ESCC) - a multi-stakeholder forum - will several times a year\. This Committee will refer
reports and crucial policy recommendations to the Minister of Education for decision making\. It
will receive financial, technical and progress reports from three permanent technical working
groups (TWGs) - Policy, Planning and Budget, and Monitoring and Evaluation TWG\. These
groups will meet monthly and be supported and informed by a comprehensive Educational
Management Information System (EMIS) maintained by the Policy and Planning Unit under the
Deputy Director of Education Administration, MoE\.
Financial management\.
Project funds will flow through the Governments budget and
accounting processes, and once disbursed, development partner funds will be distinguished from
Government funds and tracked to agreed budget lines\. Special accounts will be used to receive
advance funds from the IDA but will not be used for making payments\. Transfers from the
Special Accounts will be made monthly to the Governments main fund for the purposes of
financing project expenditures, and reliance will be placed on the Government Accounting
systems to account for the advances, the systems will be able to track the Credit and the Trust
Fund separately\. There is a risk that the accuracy of the information contained in the accounting
systems will be undermined due to coding errors and measures have been proposed to guard
against this risk, primarily the requirement for regular reconciliation of Ministry Vote Ledgers to
the Treasury Systems\. There is also a need to ensure that adequate accountability mechanisms
are established for School Grants\. It is therefore recommended that no disbursements for School
Grants be made until the Ministry of Education, working with the Ministry of Finance, has put
into place satisfactory arrangements for the monitoring of grants\. Disbursement categories for
the project will be aligned with the Government of Tongas existing budget structure\. This will
Page 5
significantly reduce the burden of reporting for the Government without negatively impacting on
development partners\. The Government of Tonga is enhancing reporting capabilities so as to
allow generation of SoE statements\. Disbursement for the project will be report based\.
Procurement\.
A
Procurement Advisor will be appointed on a full-time basis for at least 12
months (a condition to effectiveness)\. At the present, MoE has decided to create a Procurement
Unit that will comprise three staff\. While the advisor will be responsible for processing
procurement, his/her performance will be measured by success in capacity transfer\. The
adequacy of these arrangements will be carefully monitored during implementation
7\. Sustainability
Recognizing the prevailing pressure on the education budget, the World Bank/NZAID financing
over the next five years is targeted on the highest priorities (as defined by the education
stakeholders) amongst the transformation and reform activities within the EPF\. In the medium-
term, GoT is looking to development partners to bridge the financing gap for the next several
years it is expected to take the Tongan economy, the revenue effort, and allocations to the
education sector to grow to be able to fully self finance all education plans\.
In the longer-term, it
is likely that the Government will be able to sustain this increased financing for the following
reasons\. First, there is a greater realization by the Government of the importance of providing
quality education to its population\. This is evidenced by the Ministry of Finances recent
commitment to ensuring that financial allocations to the existing programs of activity within the
MoE will be no less than their 2004/05 levels an important commitment which will reverse the
prevailing trend of declining allocations to education\. It is expected that government revenues
will increase over time and greater allocations will subsequently be made to education\.
Second,
it can be assumed that resources freed up from efficiency improvements
2
anticipated from the
project will be reallocated to quality related interventions (especially continuing the school
grants program)\. Third, the anticipated benefits from the project in terms of improved learning
outcomes, community participation in delivering services, and other successes associated with
school-based management, will likely
create a very real on-the-ground demand from
communities for a continued grants program\. This stakeholder demand may make it difficult for
the Government to reverse the precedent of providing school grants\.
8\. Lessons Learned from Past Operations in the Country/Sector
The World Banks review of human development in the Pacific (World Bank 2005) reveals
disappointing outcomes of education in several Pacific Islands countries, despite considerable
attention from both donor and governments themselves to the sector\. Factors accounting for this
included: (i) donor activity that was not meshed with national sector plans; (ii) ill-coordinated
donor efforts; and (iii) weak accountability linkages, particularly between school communities
and the education system\. TESP addresses these factors through: (i) its sector wide approach; (ii)
a
strong focus on school and community empowerment for school improvement; (iii)
2
Efficiency gains are anticipated due to better public expenditure management at the central level from improved
policies and institutional strengthening; internal and external efficiencies associated with successful implementation
of the school quality improvement grants; improved student-teacher ratios which would reduce the proportion of the
recurrent budget allocated to salaries/wages\.
Page 6
accountability mechanisms regarding the use
of
resources at all levels; and (iv) constructive
guidance and monitoring programs for the TSGP\.
The private sector can be a good partner in the provision of school services, but experience
shows that it frequently responds to market demands and/or to influences such as religious
affiliations or schools governing bodies\. In some cases, private providers lack a mechanism to
support broader equity concerns\. TESP addresses these issues directly by providing private
providers substantial incentives to focus on the national education agenda, including equity\.
TESPs School Grants Program will actively promote a broad equity agenda while providing the
means for both government and non-government providers to develop their own mechanisms to
cater for the disadvantage in their communities\.
A
combination of School-based management and grants to schools have been shown to foster
better learning environments, better informed and more participatory school management,
increased local responsibility for school development, better motivated teachers, improvements
in the quality of teaching and learning, improved student participation, better planning and more
efficient use of resources, a better response to locally perceived needs, and a setting of more
school-specific, and therefore, usually, more realistic goals\. However, to achieve these
outcomes, experience has taught: (i) that technical support is critical to schools as they work
through the process of engaging in SBM, grants management and setting and meeting realistic
targets; (ii) constructive monitoring assists schools to assess their processes and outcomes; (iii)
where community contributions are required, expectations and demands must be adjusted to the
poverty level of the community; (iv) grant amounts must be adequate to make the difference that
is expected and they must be known in advance to facilitate planning; and (v) that longer term
grant programs are more productive and have a greater long term impact that high amount, one-
off grants\. TESP has taken each of these lessons into consideration and is reflected in the spirit
and intent of the program\.
9\. Safeguard Policies (including public consultation)
There will be no land acquisition or resettlement under the project\. The entire population of
Tonga is a single ethnic group, so the project as a whole will constitute the Indigenous Peoples
Development Plan\. It is expected that there will be no, or only minimal, environmental impacts\.
Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project
Yes
No
Environmental Assessment
(
OP
/
BP
/
GP
4\.01)
[ ]
[ X]
Natural Habitats (
OP
/
BP
4\.04)
[
]
[
X]
Pest Management (
OP 4\.09
)
[
]
[X]
Cultural Property (
OPN 11\.03
,
being revised as OP 4\.11)
[
]
[X]
Involuntary Resettlement (
OP
/
BP
4\.12)
[
]
[X]
Indigenous Peoples (
OD 4\.20
,
being revised as OP 4\.10)
[
]
[X]
Forests (
OP
/
BP
4\.36)
[
]
[X]
Safety of Dams (
OP
/
BP
4\.37)
[
]
[X]
Projects in Disputed Areas (
OP
/
BP
/
GP
7\.60)
*
[
]
[X]
*
By supporting the proposed project, the Bank does not intend to prejudice the final determination of the parties' claims on the
disputed areas
Page 7
Projects on International Waterways (
OP
/
BP
/
GP
7\.50)
[
]
[X]
10\. List of Factual Technical Documents
Tonga Education Policy Framework 2004-2019
Tonga Education Policy Options Paper, November 24, 2003
Tonga Ministry of Education Corporate Plan 2004-2007
Tonga Education Sector Study, March 24, 2003
Hardship and Poverty Status Discussion Paper, Final Report as Presented to
Government of Tonga, Asian Development Bank, November 5, 2003
Government of Tonga Budget Statement for Year Ending 30
th
June, 2005
World Bank (2005), Current Trends, Future Opportunities: Human Development
Outcomes in the Pacific\. Draft\.
World Bank (2004),
World Development Report: Making Services Work for the Poor
\.
World Bank\. World
Development Indicators
\.
11\. Contact point
Contact: Ian R\. Collingwood
Title: Sr Education Spec\.
Tel: 5740+528
Fax:
Email: icollingwood@worldbank\.org
Location: Sydney, Australia (IBRD)
Jerry Strudwick
Senior Education Specialist
Tel: 473-6107
Fax:
Email: jstrudwick@worldbank\.org
Location: Washington DC (IBRD)
12\. For more information contact:
The InfoShop
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 458-5454
Fax: (202) 522-1500
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/infoshop
Page 8 | APPROVAL |
P150288 | PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
APPRAISAL STAGE
Report No\.: PIDA36000
Public Disclosure Copy
Project Name IN: Strengthening Governance and Service Delivery in Karnataka
Panchayats (P150288)
Region SOUTH ASIA
Country India
Sector(s) Sub-national government administration (100%)
Theme(s) Decentralization (100%)
Lending Instrument Investment Project Financing
Project ID P150288
Borrower(s) Department of Economic Affairs, Government of India
Implementing Agency Rural Development & Panchayat Raj
Environmental Category B-Partial Assessment
Date PID Prepared/Updated 16-Dec-2015
Date PID Approved/Disclosed 11-Jan-2016
Estimated Date of Appraisal
Completion
Estimated Date of Board 10-Mar-2016
Approval
Appraisal Review Decision The Decision Review Meeting that took place on December 14,
Public Disclosure Copy
(from Decision Note) 2015 authorized the team to proceed with appraisal\.
I\. Project Context
Country Context
The Government of India launched profound decentralization reforms in 1993 to strengthen public
service delivery and reduce poverty, particularly in rural areas\. The 73rd Constitutional Amendment
created the Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRIs), or the three tiers of rural governments at the district,
block and village (Gram Panchayats) levels, and mandated that states devolve functions and funds
to the local governing bodies\. The aim was to bring government closer to the people, in particular to
the rural poor\.
Karnataka has a long history of local decentralization and strengthening rural local governments,
perhaps longer than any other state in India\. In particular, Karnataka enacted the Karnataka
Panchayat Raj Act in 1993 following the 73rd Amendment which established the PRIs and
envisaged a greater participation of people for more effective implementation of development
programs and schemes\. In 2015, the 14th Finance Commission recommended a significant increase
in the grants to be transferred to Gram Panchayats to improve basic services from 2015-20,
acknowledging their responsibility for delivering public services in rural areas\.
Page 1 of 5
Despite the strong legal framework for devolution, Karnataka is confronted with difficult
challenges of improving the quality of services in rural areas and to expand the role of the poor and
disadvantaged groups in local governance and accountability\. First, the fiscal backing to carry out
Public Disclosure Copy
these functions is largely weak\. Karnatakaâs rural society is largely scattered and dependent on
agriculture and related activities\. Furthermore, regional imbalances over the years have worsened
creating a wedge between the relatively developed and the less-developed regions of Karnataka\.
During the last five decades, Karnataka has made efforts to achieve rapid growth through
investments in agriculture, industry, infrastructure and other sectors\. This growth, however, has not
been inclusive and twenty-five percent of the state's population (16 million) are living below the
poverty line\. Much of these imbalances are a result of the amalgamation of regions at varying levels
of socio-economic development and different political and administrative structures of these
regions on the eve of its reorganization\.
Sectoral and institutional Context
The improvement of public services, due to historic and systemic reasons, has proven to be
especially difficult in the less developed areas of Karnataka\. The marginalization and exclusion of
the backward regions and its people from the mainstream development process is evident by the
stagnant economies of the poorer blocks and the abysmally low standards of living of the
vulnerable sections of society in these areas\. The backward regions of Karnataka are characterized
by a high representation of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, women, marginal and
landless farmers\.
GoK has put in place an overarching goal of shared prosperity in the specific rural interventions that
have been developed for its less developed regions\. In 2001, GoK established a High-Powered
Committee on Redressal of Regional Imbalances to examine regional disparities in the State\. It
produced a report that compared regions, especially at the block level, and laid out a strategy for
ameliorating poverty and regional imbalances in these areas\. The report classified 39 blocks to be
Public Disclosure Copy
"most backward" and 40 to be "more backward" out of a total of 176 blocks\. One of the key
recommendations was the need for additional public investments in the most disadvantaged rural
areas\.
Furthermore, the 14th Finance Commission recognized a significant funding gap for public service
delivery at the Gram Panchayat level\. Increasing the share of untied transfers in the overall
devolution to the Gram Panchayats is critical to execute their service-delivery functions and to
respond to specific local needs\. Despite the sharp rise in the transfers from the center since 2006-7,
the current transfer system in the state is largely tied and scheme based leaving little space for local
planning that reflects community preferences\.
The Bank supported the development of local capacities in rural Karnataka through a series of
projects in Karnataka\. The recent Karnataka Panchayat Strengthening Project (KPSP) focused on
improving effective service delivery in selected backward Gram Panchayats by a mix of untied
grants and capacity-building initiatives to strengthen institutions\. There is a need, however, for
strengthening inclusiveness as well as scaling up and increasing the coverage and the size of
investment\.
The proposed Project builds on the achievements and learnings of KPSP\. It promotes more
inclusive development in Karnataka given its broader geographical focus to include "more" and
Page 2 of 5
"most" backward blocks and its support for mechanisms to address the unique needs of certain
marginal groups in PRI governance\. The proposed Project, along with 14th Finance Commission
grants, will increase Gram Panchayatsâ access to untied discretionary funds helping GoK to expand
Public Disclosure Copy
the share of untied transfers to backward blocks\. It will also invest in technical assistance and
capacity building of Gram Panchayats functionaries/stakeholders\. This will not only improve their
resource management, strategic planning and revenue mobilization capacities, but will lead to an
overall enhancement of the operating efficiency of the Gram Panchayats\.
II\. Proposed Development Objectives
The project development objective is to enhance the ability of Gram Panchayats to manage
resources and deliver services prioritized in their development plans in the least developed areas of
Karnataka\.
III\. Project Description
Component Name
Block Grants to Gram Panchayats
Comments (optional)
This component will provide funding for block grants to 2815 GPs which will strengthen their
capacity to manage resource, deliver services and enhance their accountability towards the
community\. It will finance block grants to GPs and fund activities and services listed in GPâs Five
Year Perspective Plans and budgets prepared on the basis of participatory processes\. The utilization
of the block grant will rest on an institutional framework\. It will be defined on the basis of
âminimum mandatory conditionsâ to be met by the project GPs and would be revised or updated
every two years based on the recent developments and progress made\. Furthermore, in order to
reward well performing GPs, the block grants will be allocated on the basis of a formula driven
basic and incentive grant\.
Component Name
Public Disclosure Copy
Institutional Development
Comments (optional)
This component covers the range of holistic institutional development activities and investments
required to ensure the progress towards the PDO\. The block grants would be accompanied by a suite
of targeted capacity building and technical assistance activities that will strengthen the capacities of
the PRI, strengthen monitoring systems and increase awareness among rural people\. This
component will support the following activities: Capacity Building of Panchayat Raj Institutions;
Community Engagement and Feedback; and Information Systems for Evidence Based Decision
Making and Enhanced Accountability\.
Component Name
Project Management Support
Comments (optional)
This activity would put in place systems at the state level to enable it to oversee, facilitate and
manage the PRI system and the project GPs\. It includes: Strengthening the Project Monitoring Unit
(PMU); Strengthening the Decentralization Analysis Cell (DAC); and Strengthening Abdul Nazeer
Sab State Institute for Rural Development (ANSSIRD)\.
IV\. Financing (in USD Million)
Page 3 of 5
Total Project Cost: 318\.40 Total Bank Financing: 223\.00
Financing Gap: 0\.00
Public Disclosure Copy
For Loans/Credits/Others Amount
Borrower 95\.40
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 223\.00
Total 318\.40
V\. Implementation
The primary agency responsible for overall implementation of the program is the GoK Department
of Rural Development and Panchayat Raj (RDPR), in conjunction with other state institutions\. The
investment program implementation responsibilities in the field are at the Panchayat level, and in
particular, with the Gram Panchayats\. A Project Management Unit (PMU) has been established in
the RDPR and is responsible for day-to-day project management and the overall project
implementation\. It will ensure inter-departmental coordination, financial management,
implementation of environmental guidelines, and adherence to procurement arrangements as per the
Bank and Karnataka Transparency in Public Procurement Act among others\.
- The PMU will be responsible for conducting specific studies and regular assessment of the project
implementation status\.
- Quantitative monitoring will be achieved through the administrative Management Information
System already used by Karnatakaâs Gram Panchayats\.
- The community feedback mechanism will allow citizens to provide their own oversight of project
implementation\.
- The Monitoring will be complemented by an impact evaluation component with support from the
Bankâs Development Impact Evaluation Initiative (DIME)\.
Public Disclosure Copy
VI\. Safeguard Policies (including public consultation)
Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project Yes No
Environmental Assessment OP/BP 4\.01 â
Natural Habitats OP/BP 4\.04 â
Forests OP/BP 4\.36 â
Pest Management OP 4\.09 â
Physical Cultural Resources OP/BP 4\.11 â
Indigenous Peoples OP/BP 4\.10 â
Involuntary Resettlement OP/BP 4\.12 â
Safety of Dams OP/BP 4\.37 â
Projects on International Waterways OP/BP 7\.50 â
Projects in Disputed Areas OP/BP 7\.60 â
Comments (optional)
The social assessment and consultations in the select Gram Panchayats has informed the overall
design of the project and its components\. A Draft Tribal and Disadvantaged Groups Inclusion Plan
(TDGIP) has been prepared based on the social assessment and consultations specifically organized
with the tribal communities and their representatives\. The TDGIP provides the key issues, actions,
M&E mechanism and institutional arrangements for ensuring inclusion of tribals and other
Page 4 of 5
disadvantaged groups\. A social expert has been designated to ensure implementation of TDGIP in
coordination with the Decentralization Analysis Cell, Abdul Nazeer Sab State Institute for Rural
Public Disclosure Copy
Development, Tribal Research Institute and Panchayat level functionaries\. Social mobilizers at the
GP level will help ensure participation of all sections of society in plan preparation and monitoring
at GP level
Similarly, the Government of Karnataka has developed an Environmental Management Framework
(EMF) to manage potentially negative environmental impacts\. Project activities, especially the civil
works financed under the block grants to GPs, will typically be small-scale and have the potential
for generating positive impact on environment (eg: improved sanitation) and human health (eg:
provision of safe drinking water) if they are well designed and managed\. However, some of the
activities could have negative environmental impacts by virtue of their location in ecologically
sensitive areas, poor design, operation and maintenance; but since these will be small-scale in
nature, they can be appropriately managed and mitigated\. The EMF includes mitigation measures
and an institutional strategy, including âenvironmental reviewâ of all GP works, capacity building of
GP functionaries and engineers on environmental management, focused technical support for GPs
in ecologically sensitive areas and monitoring\. An Environment Management Specialist will be
appointed at the PMU to ensure internal due diligence of EMF implementation\. The budget for
EMF implementation has been integrated into the project cost\.
VII\. Contact point
World Bank
Contact: Farah Zahir
Title: Senior Economist
Tel: 5785+79259
Email: fzahir@worldbank\.org
Public Disclosure Copy
Borrower/Client/Recipient
Name: Department of Economic Affairs, Government of India
Contact: Bhaskar Dasgupta
Title: Director
Tel: 91-11-23092883
Email: bhaskar\.dasgupta@nic\.in
Implementing Agencies
Name: Rural Development & Panchayat Raj
Contact: Yalakki Gowda
Title: Director, Panchayat Raj, RD&PR Dept
Tel: 080-22353925
Email: chief-gsp-kabn@kar\.nic\.in
VIII\. For more information contact:
The InfoShop
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 458-4500
Fax: (202) 522-1500
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/infoshop
Page 5 of 5 | APPROVAL |
P004506 | Doeunent of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL ISE ONLY
Report No\. 9609
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PHILIPPINES
* ''TELECOMMIUNICATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT
(LOAN 2495-PH)
MAY 31, 1991
Industry and Energy Operations Division
Country Department II
Industry, Trade and Finance Division
Technical Department
Asia Re ional Office
This document nas a restricted distribution and mav be used by recipients only in the performance of
their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Currency Unit - Peso (P)
US$1\.00 - P 20\.00 (SAR)
P 1\.00 - US$0\.05 (SAR)
US$1\.0 a P 23\.5 (Project Composite)
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FISCAL YEAR
January 1 - December 31
ABBREVIATIONS
DOTC - Department of Transport and Communication
MOTC - Ministry of Transport and Communication
NTC - Na*ional Telecommunication Commission
OECF - Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
PPF - Project Preparation Facility
SAR - Staff Appraisal Report
FOR OmCIAL UE ONLY
THE WORLD SANK
Washington, D\.C 20433
U\.S\.A\.
Omce co DMetfw\.Gc~l
Opeitrmms it '\.alt"1M
May 31, 1991
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Philippines
Telecommunications Technical Assistance Project (Loan 2495-PH)
Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project
Completion Report on Philippines - Telecommunications Technical Assistance
Project (Loan 2495-PH)" prepared by the Asia Regional Office with Part II of t'ne
report contributed by the Borrower\. No audit of this project has been made by
the Operations Evaluation Department at this time\.
'~~
Attachment
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PHILIPPINES
TELECOMMUNICATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (LOAN 2495-PH)
PRCJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Table of Contents
Page No\.
PREFACE \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. i
EVALUATION SUMMARY \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.ii
PART I\. PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.1
Project Identity \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.1
Background \.1\. \. \. \.e\.t: \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.
Project Objective~s end DescriptLon \. # \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 2
Project Design and 0Organization \. \. \. 2
Project Implementattin \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 3
Project Results \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 4
Project Sustainability \. \. \. \. \. 5
Bank Perforaance \.nc\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 5
Borrower's Performance \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 6
Project Relationship\. \. \. \. \. \. 6
Consulting Services \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 6
Project Documents and Data\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 7
Part II of the PCR \. \. \. \. \. 7
PART II\. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWERS PERSPECTIVE \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 8
PART III\. STATISTICAL INFORMATION \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 10
Related Bank Loans \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 10
Project Timetable \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 10
Loan Disbursement \. \. 11
Project Cost and Financing \. \. \. 12
Studies \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 13
Status of Covenants\. \. \. \. \. \. 14
Use of Bank Resources \. \. \. \.15
A\. Staff Input \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 15
B\. Missions \. \. \. \. \. \. 16
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
PHILIPPINES
TELECOMMUNICATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (LOAN 2495-PH)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Preface
This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Telecommunication
Technical AssistanceeProiect in the Philippines for which Loan 2495-PH in the
amount of US$4\.0 million was approved on February 19, 1985\. With the
cancellation of US$45,065\.31, the loan was closed on December 3, 1990\. The
last disbursement was made on November 29, 1990\.
The PCR, excluding Part II was jointly prepared by the Indtustry and
Energy Division of Country Department and the Industry, Trade and Finance
Division of the Technical Department, both of the Asia Regional Office\.
Part II was prepared jointly by the Department of Transportation and the
National Telecommunication Commission\.
Preparation of this PCR was started in March 1990 after return of the
final supervision mission\. The report is based on, inter alia, the
President's Report, the Loan Agreement, Supervision Reports, correspondence
between the Bank and Borrower and internal Bank memoranda\.
- ii -
PHILIPPINES
TELECOMMUNICATION TECHNICAL ASSISTAi\.CE PROJECT (LOAN 2495-PH)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Evaluation Summary
Obiectives
1\. The project's objectives were to: (i) improve the regulatory
framework and strengthen the National Telecommunication Commission's (NTC's)
organizational structure; (ii) lay the groundwork for rationalizing the
telephone tariff structure and levels; (iii) develop procedures and facilities
for the efficient management of radio frequencies; (iv) improve network
planning based on realistic demand forecasts and available technology; and
(v) expand training to ensure the availability of qualified staff (Part I\.
para\. 3\.1)\.
Implementation Experience
2\. Project implementation was well planned, but a gap between the intent
of the terms of reference and the reality of NTC's underlying problems,
coupled with unforeseen difficulties and delays, especially during the early
part of the implementation cycle, reduced the effectiveness of the project\.
The disruption caused by the change in government left the consultants without
adequate support to properly perform their assignments\. This was exacerbated
by somewhat misdirected efforts of the consultants (Part I, para\. 4\.2)\. The
impact of the disruptions was particularly severe on the frequency management
study\. The consulting firm selected for this study was appointed in
accordance with the Bank's guidelines and awarded a contract in December 1985\.
The new tovernment was intent on cancelling the contract, but ultimately let
it stand rather than lose Bank financing of the study\. As a result, the study
was set back by two years\. In time, progress was made in avoiding and
resolving such difficulties, and project implementation improved
correspondingly (Part I, paras\. 5\.1 and 5\.2)\.
3\. The project revealed that NTC needs to improve its project management
performance\. Basically, NTC must assign a well qualified, experienced and
full-time manager given the responsibility for carrying out future projects\.
NTC should also begin training staff to meet its needs in this area which is
of fundamental importance to successful project executions (Part I,
para\. 5\.3)\.
- iii -
Results
4\. Taken as a whole the project can be considered a success\. Two of the
project components were only modestly successful: (i) the recommended
organizational changes to NTC have not been implemented and improved
regulatory legislation is still being prepared; and (ii) the final phases of
the tariff study have not been carried out, but useful results, such as a
tariff manual have been achieved (Part I, para\. 6\.2)\.
5\. The remaining three project components were successfully completed:
ti) NTC now has the essential elements to effectively manage the frequency
spectrum throughout the Philippines; (ii) the Government is implementing the
National Telephone Program with the help of OECF and bilateral support; and
(iii) selected NTC staff received technical and managerial training under the
project, and additional training is to be provided und-r a Japanese grant
administered by the Bank (Part I, para\. 6\.3)\.
Sustainability
6\. NTC's capacity to monitor and manage the radio frequency spectrum in
the Philippines has been enhanced with the help of the computer facilities and
other equipment supplied under the project\. The existence of a well managed
frequency spectrum will bring positive benefits to the users through better
reception, less interference and similar improvements\. For these benefits to
be sustained, NTC must put in operation and properly maintain its new fre-
quency management facilities and keep up a strong interest in the monitcring
and managing of the radio spectrum\. This endeavor is to be supported by a
Japanese technical assistance grant which should help sustain the benefits
(Part I, para\. 7\.1)\.
Findings and Lessons Learned
7\. The project highlights the need for technical assistance operations
to go further than simply identify the major areas of organizational operation
that require strengthening--and then require borrowers to engage consultants
to strengthen those areas\. This project did identify the areas of NTC's
operation that required most development\. However, the consultant's efforts
fell short of realizing the improvements vlsualized at project inception\.
While the change in Government that took place early in the project was
certainly a contributor to loss of project effectiveness, deficiencies in
project design was another\. The consultant's inability to muster full NTC
support for their efforts and recommendations that were unable to be
implemented by NTC are indicators of that deficiency (Part I, para\. 6\.2-6\.3)\.
8\. The lesson is: To achieve meaningful results and begin a change
process that would be a catalyst for continued development, the preparation of
TA projects should consider carefully the local environment, culture,
absorptive capacity and the readiness to change of the organization under
study\. Also, any legal or external administrative impediments to change need
to be known\. The project design, including its implementation strategy, must
then be crafted taking these characteristics into account (Part I, para\. 6\.4)\.
PH:LIPPINES
TELECOMMUNICATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (LOA-N 2495-PH)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PART I
1\. Proiect Identity
Project Name: Telecommunications T\.A\. Project
Loan No: 2495-PH
RVP Unit: Asia
Country: Philippines
Sector: Communications
Subsector: Telecommunications
2\. Background
2\.1 The Philippine telecommunication sector appraised by the Bank in 1984
comprised mostly private companies which had obtained franchises from the
Government and operating permits from the National Telecommunication
Commission (NTC), the sector regulating body within the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC)\.1/ Although some improvements were
starting to be instituted, the sector as a whole was still being badly
administered and regulated\. There was excessive fragmentation with dupli-
cation of services, lack of any economy of scale provisions, low service
standards and virtually no coordination of the facilities furnished by the
private companies\. In addition, little attention was given to the provision
of a nationwide network\. The private companies with the capability con-
centrated their activities in the profitable areas (e\.g\. Metro Manila) and in
providing the more profitable services (long distance and international
telephone and telex)\.
2\.2 MOTC was established in 1979 to carry out improvements in the sector\.
In 1982 it drew up, with the assistance of telecommunication experts, a
National Telecommunication Plan (NTP) covering the period 1983 to 2000\. The
main initial objectives were the intercotmection of all telephone installa-
tions in the country\. a significant increase in the traffic handling capacity
of long distance transmission facilities and the provision of facilities to
meet at least 80 of the demand for telephone connections\. The plan was to be
implemented in staged phases\. Phase I covering the period 1984 to 1988, was
developed with the financial assistance of two US$500,000 Bank project
preparation facilities (eventually included under this loan) and carried an
estimated price tag of US$1\.7 billion\. The deteriorating economy caused the
1/ Prior to the change of Government in 1986 and the subsequent reorganiza-
tion, DOTC was the Ministry of Transportation and Communication (MOTC)\.
- 2 -
plan to be scaled down to US$186 million, but worsening economic conditions
forced the Government to postpone completely all further investments in the
sector\.
2\.3 The project under review evolved out of the preparation of Phase I of
the NTP\. When it became apparent that sector investments had to be completely
curtailed, it was agreed with the Government that the Bank would support a
technical assistance project which would focus on institutional and policy
improvements\. Negotiations for the project were completed on January 14,
1985\.
3\. Project Obiectives and Description
3\.1 The main objective of the project was to strengthen NTC to enable it
to more effectively ,egulate the sector\. In that regard, the project sought
to ti) improve the regulatory framework and strengthen NTC's organizational
structure; (ii) lay the groundwork for rationalizing the telephone tariff
structure and levels; (iii) develop procedures and facilities for the
efficient management of radio frequencies; (iv) improve network planning based
on realistic demand forecasts and available technology; and (v' expand
training to ensure the availability of qualified staff\. It was viewed that
even if no major investment program was undertaken, the project would bring
substantial benefits to the sector through improved regulation resulting in
greater coordination of effort by the various telecommunications operators\.
3\.2 The project provided consulting services and equipment for:
(a) strengthening NTC's ability to promote sound sector development and
regulation;
(b) carrying out a tariff study;
(c) strengthening NTC's ability to manage the radio frequency spectrum;
and
(d) updating MOTC's National Telecommunications Plan (NTP) on the basis
of demand and technology changes\.
Funds were also provided for carrying out a comprehensive training program\.
4\. Project Design and Organization
4\.1 The project was conceived as the best mJnimum cost alternative to the
sector investment program which was abandoned because of the prevailing
economic crisis\. In this context, the project was desigr\.ed to bring about
institutional and policy reforms which would bring maximum benefits to the
sector in the absence of the previously planned sector investment\. The
Government and the Bank were fully agreed on the scope and objectives of the
project\.
4\.2 Project preparation and organization was generally satisfactory,
although it was deficient in one important respect\. The project's scope and
content were incorporated in clearly defined project components\.
Implementation responsibility was assigned to DOTC which appointed a project
manager with terms of reference satisfactory to the Bank\. The role and
responsibilities of consultants were set forth in terms of reference prepared
by Bank staff\. These arrangements should normally have resulted in a
relatively trouble-free project\. However, the project design was deficient in
not having made an adequate assessment of NTC's institutional capacity and
underlying organizational culture or constraints contributing to its poor
performance\. The problem was, of course, exacerbated by the change in
Government which disrupted the project, and this could not reasonably have
been foreseen\.
5\. Project Implementation
5\.1 Project implementation was initially well planned but the unforseen
change in Government disrupted the process and contributed to delays\. This,
plus the effect of superficial terms of reference diluted the anticipated
benefits of some components\. Initially two foreign consultant firms were
selected in a timely manner, in accordance with Bank guidelines, to undertake
the project studies\. The first firm began work on December 15, 1985 but
encountered implementation problems with regard to the institutional
strengthening and tariff components of the project\. The change in Government
and resultant changes in key NTC and DOTC staff left the consultants without
the strong support needed to properly perform their tasks\. Also, without
approval of the Congress, NTC was unable to implement organizational changes
recommended by the consultants, and attempts to obtain that agreement were not
successful\. The tariff study component was adversely affected when earlier
recommendations by local consultants were rejected by the Government and the
industry and resulted in the need to redefine the terms of reference for the
foreign consultants which reduced the intended effectiveness of their work\.
5\.2 The change in Government and subsequent changes in management in NTC
and MOTC also affected the work of the second firm\. This firm was selected in
December 1985 to undertake the frequency management study, but approval to
proceed was deferred for two years while the incoming Government sought to
reverse the previous selection decision\. Finally the Government agreed to
proceed with the originally selected firm which was able to start work in
January 1988\. This delay necessitated an extension of the loan closing date
and was an indirect factor in the breakdown of contract negotiations with a
local consultant counterpart and the subsequent inability of NTC to complete
this project component by loan closing\. A further factor was the poor
communication between NTC and the consultant\.
5\.3 The task of project m4uager was assigned by the Government to MOTC
which in turn assigned this task to NTC, the implementing agc \.y\. Day-to-day
responsibility for project management within NTC varied over he project
period but was usually vested with a Deputy Commissioner, the Commissioner
retaining overall responsibility\. On occasions when a separate coordinator
was appointed, with more time to oversight the project, project management
- 4 -
improved\. In retrospect, the appointment of a project manager whose primary
responsibilities were concerned with management uf the project could have
improved project implementation
6\. ProeLtRe s
6\.1 In general, the project was successful although individual components
achieved mixed results\.
6\.2 The first two project components are unlikely to fully achieve their
intended objectives\. The first component, a study aimed at strengthening NTC's
regulatory capacity, has been completed, but NTC has been unable to implement
the consultant's recommendations on a revised organizational structure because
of the lack of government approval\. However, as legislation to strengthen NTC,
currently under consideration by Congress, requires a review of NTC's organiza-
tional structure, it is likely that changes based on the consultant's recom-
mendations will eventually be implemented\. It is less clear whether the con-
sultant's work under the second component, a rationalization of sector tariffs,
uill manifest in any tangible improvements\. Under this component, foreign
consultants were to participate in Phases III to V of a six phase study being
lead by local consultants\. It was intended that this scudy develop a plan to
rationalize the sector tariff structure\. Phases I and II recommended the
restructuring of the sector structure and implementation of new tariff arrange-
ments, but these recommendations were not accepted by the Government or the
industry; and Phase III, a study on the application of Usage Sensitive Pricing,
intended to be undertaken jointly with the foreign counterparts, was completed
beforehand by the local firm\. In the light of these events the foreign
consultant's efforts were redirected (with Bank agreement) to developing a
tariff manual to provide NTC with the necessary operational tools for the proper
evaluation and formulation of tariffs under the existing structure\. This work
was completed\. Under Phases V and VI local consultants were to conduct a final
review of the tariff process and help \.ITC develop a data base and computerized
tariff evaluation system\. These phases have yet to be completed\.
6\.3 The three other project components were more successful\. The third
component, which was aimed at improving frequency management, has provided NTC
with: (i) a computer system to help streamline the issue of licenses;2/
(ii) the methodology for rationalizing the f-equency spectrum and improving the
efficiency of future frequency allocations; and (iii) equipment and procedures
for monitoring and cleaning up the frequency spectrum in and around Manila\.
Although at loan closing NTC was still working to finalize the computer system
and put it into operation, once this system is working NTC will have the es-
sential elements needed to properly manage the frequency spectrum in Manila, and
the procedures to improve spectrum management throughout the Philippines\. The
fourth component, revision of the NTP, has been completed\. The DOTC has used
the revised plan as the basis of their National Telephone Program which is
designed to provide improved telephone coverage in the areas of Regions III
through XII lacking facilities\. The Government is implementing this plan with
the help of OECF and bilateral support\. The fifth component, the training
program, has provided selected NTC staff with training over a range of
2/ With reference to the borrower's comments in Part II, pera\. 96, the project was designed to
lift the stp dard of NTC's frequency management In Metro Manila through training and
provision of basic facilities\. Apart from not completing the computer system, the project
provided the necessary training and facilities to meet its objectives\. The horrower
correctly points out, however, that far more needs to be done to enable NTC to provide, to
an acceptable standard, frequency management throughout the Philippines\.
-5-
appropriate technical r\. I managerial areas\. One shortcoming of this program
was that courses provicz%g training on regulatory processes appropriate to NTC
staff could not be found\. To overcome this limitation it was proposed that
specialized training, to meet NTZ's specific needs, be developed and presented
through a range of seminars in Marila\. This arrangement had to be postponed,
however, due to late changes in key Commission staff and pending legislation
which promised further management changes\. It is now proposed that training
of this type be provided under technical assistance funded through a separate
Japanese grant administered by the Bank\.
6\.4 Overall, as indicated earlier (pars\. 4\.2), insufficient attention was
given during project preparation to what would in reality be achieved in view
of NTC's institutional constraints and fundamental organizational weaknesses\.
While the consultants' terms of reference focussed on key problem areas, they
did not take adequate account of NTC's underlying problems\. Consequently, the
consultants' expectations if NTC's performance were unrealistically high and
their unfamiliarity with the local culture masked many of the underlying prob-
lems causing a lack of effective communication between the two and further
masking the causes\. Thus, some of the consultant's recommendatioans were not
immediately appropriate, or were not implementable in the short term\.
7\. Project Sustainability
7\.1 NTC's capacity to monitor and manage the radio frequency spectrum in
the Philippines has been enhanced with the help of the computer facilities and
other equipment supplied by the project\. The availabil'\.ty of a well managed
frequency spectrum will bring positive benefits to the users through better
reception, less interference and similar improvements\. For these benefits to
be sustained, NTC will have to put in operation and properly maintain its new
freqtvncy management facilities and keep up a strong interest in the monitor-
ing and managing of the radio spectrum\. This endeavor is to be supported by a
Japanese technical assistance grant which should help sustain the benefits\.
8\. Bank Performance
8\.1 Although the Bank had received earlier requests from the Government
to help develop the country's telecommunication sector, it was 1982 that a
Bank identification mission first visited the PhA\.ilppines\. The Bank then
concluded that the time was appropriate for addressing the telecommunication
sector's technical, institutional and policy issues\. With this objective, the
Bank devoted a considerable effort into shaping an investment program designed
to promote its sector aims\. The Bank's performance during this period was
constructive and to some extent essential to the development of a modern and
efficient telecommunication system\.
8\.2 However, because of severe resource constraints, the investment
program had to be abandoned and a stop-gap technical assistance project
substituted instead\. It can be seen in retrospect that possibly because of an
urgency to salvage some of the institutional and policy aspects of the
investment program, the Bank's preparation of the technical assistance project
lacked thoroughness in defining its content and execution\. This deficiency
was further compounded by ineffective Bank supervision, both in terms of the
number and duration of the missions and their staffing, during the critical
first two years of the project\. In particular, the Bank did not at any time
field an expert on regulation, although such an expert should have played a
key role in supervising the project early on\. From 1987 on Bank supervision
improved in all respects, and this was reflected in the implementation of the
project\. In fact, it was the belated but strong Bank supervision effort which
can take credit for a good share of the project progress during the ensuing
years\.
9\. Borrower's Performance
9\.1 The borrower's performance was affected to a large degree by the
unforseen change in Government and resultant changes in key DOTC and NTC
management and staff\. As the project had been prepared under the previous
government, the new administration lacked ownershii of the project and this
impacted negatively on project management\. Without a strong attachment to the
project and faced with more serious policy problems, the new management was
unable to take timely decisions on many of the consultant's recommendations
and this sometimes reduced the effectiveness of the consultant's ongoing work\.
Also, while staff were appointed to manage the various project components in
the early stages man7 lacked the background and skills needed to address the
complex issues that evolved during day-to-day interactions\. Following changes
in NTC management late in the project, project management improved markedly
thereby enabling urgent actions on the frequency management component to be
taken which significantly advanced that component almost to the stage of
completion by loan closing\.
10\. Proiect Relationships
10\.1 The Bank's current good working relationship with Government and NTC
officials has had a positive impact on the quality and pace of project
implementation\. This relationship was slow in developing, a natural
consequence of the fact that the project was the Bank's first lending
operation in the telecommunication sector and the disruptive policy and
personnel changes which accompanied the change in Government\. NTC's
relationship with consultants appears to have followed the same course as the
Bank's with a similar impact on project implementation\.
11\. Consulting Services
11\.1 Consultants assigned to the project carried out their assignments
satisfactorily within the constraints noted earlier (Part I, paras\. 5 and 6)\.
7-
12\. Proiect Documentation
12\.1 The project's legal documents were definitive and well drawn up\.
There was no Staff Appraisal Report, but the President's Report gave a good
account of the background, evolution and objectives of the project\. As noted
in para\. 8\.2, the Bank could have been more precise in preparing the project,
but this was not a major deficiency; it could have been corrected by a more
active and properly directed supervision effort in the early stages of
implementation\. Draft terms of reference prepared by the Bank were effective
in defining the duties and responsibilities of the consultants assigned to the
project\.
12\.2 The Borrower's quarterly reports were too infrequent to be of much
help in following the project's progress\. On the other hand, the Bank's
supervision reports were generally comprehensive and informative\. However, it
should be noted as a general comment that the format and content of both
supervision and periodic progress reports should be expanded to include the
statistical data required for Part III of the PCR\. A statement defining the
statistical data requirement should be included in the reporting requirement
for all future projects\. Ready access to the pertinent statistical data would
simplify and possibly also improve the quality of PCRs\.
13\. Part II of the CPR
13\.1 Part II of this PCR was prepared jointly by DATC and NTC\. The views
they express in Part II are in general agreement with the Bank's evaluation of
the projects execution\. Some clarification is needed, however, with regard to
the disbursement difficulties noted in para\. C of Part II\. The Borrower's
difficulty in the disbursement of funds amounting to less than US$20,000 was
mainly due to the following:
(a) approval to open a Special Account for the project was initially
withheld pending resolution of differences with the Bank over a
consultant appointment (para\. 5\.2);
(b) su'jsequently, when a Special Account could have been opened, NTC
chose not to do so; and
(c) in accordance with Bank policy, the minimum size of loan withdrawal
applications is US$20,000 equivalent, although a number of
applications less than this amount were processed for the project,
especially final payments to suppliers\.
PHILIPPINES
TELECOMMUNICATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (LOAN 2495-PH)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PART II
(As prepared by NTC, the implementing Agency)
A\. Confirmation of the Adequacy and Accuracy of the Factual Information
contained in Part III of the Project Completion Report\.
Borrower confirms the adequacy and accuracy of the factual information in
Part III of the Project Completion Report (PCR)\.
B\. Comments on the Analysis in Part I
1\. We (Borrower) fully agree with the objectiveness set forth in the PCR
Evaluation Summary\.
2\. Implementation Experience
We fully agree with the content\.
3\. While we fully agree with the analysis made, we want to add that not
only a well-qualified, experienced and full-time manager is needed to
be assigned to carry out future projects, but also one will have a
fixed tenure of service (removable only for cause) and should be
supported by a staff which should also be given a fixed term of
office and most important, a funding support not only from the
foreign source but also from local source as counterpart funCes\.
4\. We would like to consider, as a whole, the project as fairly
successful\. As stated, the recommended organizational change to NTC
have not been implemented, the final phase of the tariff study had
not been carried out and the recommended regulatory legislation to
lstrengthen NTC is still undergoing public hearing in Congress\.
5\. We fully agree to comments (ii) and (iii) (para\. 6\.3 of Part I], but
we want to disagree with (i)\. NTC still lacks some essential
elements to effectively manage the frequency spectrum throughout the
Philippines\. The reasons is that the essential element needed for an
effective Frequency Management such as nationwide Radio Frequency
- 9 -
Monitoring System, technical standards laboratory for type-
acceptance/approval test of radio communication equipment and
computerized systems and procedures for automated frequency
managemeiut analysis are not yet completed\.
6\. Sustainability
While we agree with the observation made hereto, we would like to
stress the need for additional technical assistance grant to bring
into existence a well aged frequency spectrum in the Philippines\.
7\. Findings and Lessons Learned
We fully agree with the analysis made\.
C\. Evaluation of the Bank's Performance during the evolution and
implementation of the project, with special emphasis on lessons learned
that maybe relevant for the future\.
The Borrower encountered difficulties in disbursement of funds costing
less than $20,000\. Furthermore, we cannot provide Philippine counterpart
funds for goods and services to be acquired within the country due to
financial constraints and unavailability of such funds locally\.
D\. Evaluation of the Borrower's Own Performance during the evolution and
implementation of the project, with special emphasis on lessons learned
that may be relevant for the future\.
The Commission's inability to manage various projects are affected by
frequent reshuffling of personnel and the lack of pernanency of the head
of agency\. Timely decisions cannot be fixed due to lack of juris-
dictional authority of working staff for a certain project\. It is
recommended as far as practicable the designation or assignment of full-
time project managers be made for future projects\.
E\. Assessment of the Effectiveness of the Relationship between the Bank and
the Borrower during the evolution and implementation of the Project\.
There existed a good working relationship as both Borrower and the Bank
experts executed all efforts to effectively carry out its goals and
objectives in spite of all the constraints enumerated\.
Aloysius R\. Santos
Project Manager
- 10 -
PHILIPPINES
TELECOMMUNICATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (LOAN 2495-PH)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PART III
1\. Related Bank Loans
(None)
2\. Project Timetable
Item Date Planned Date Actual
Identification May 1982 May 1982
Preparation November 1983 April 1984
Appraisal Mission April 1984
Loan Negotiations December 10, 1989 January 1985
Board Approval January 1985 February 19, 1985
Loan Signature March 1985 April 2, 1985
Loan Effectiveness May 1985 July 1985
Loan Closing June 30, 1989 September 30, 1990
Project Completion June 30, 1989 Sept\. 30, 1991 (est)
- Ul -
3\. Loan Disbursements
Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements
(US$ million)
IBRD fiscal year Actual Appraisal Actual as X
and semester disbursement estimate of av2raisal
1986
December 31, 1985 1\.00 1\.3 8
June 30, 1986 1\.27 1\.6 79
1987
December 31, 1986 1\.38 2\.0 69
June 30, 1988 1\.95 3\.2 65
1988
December 31, 1987 2\.19 2\.8 70
June 30, 1988 2\.19 3\.2 65
1989
December 31, 1988 2\.42 3\.5 69
June 30, 1989 2\.69 3\.8 77
1990
December 30, 1989 3\.15 4\.0 79
June 30, 1990 3\.27 4\.0 82
1991
December 31, 1990 3\.96 4\.0 96
Closing Date: 9/30/90 6/30/89
Final disbursement: November 29, 1990
Cancellation: US$45,065\.31 undisbursed balance on December 3, 1990\.
4\. Project Implementation
See discussion in Part I\.
- 12 _
S\. Pro1ect Cost and Financing
A\. ComDarison of SAR and Final Proiect Cost
(Us$ '000)
-Appraisal Estimate-- -----Final Cost-
Local Foreign Totat Local Foreign Total
Strengthening of NTC 92 432 522 92 432 524
Tariff study 90 216 306 90 216 306
Radio frequency management:
Consultancy 130 576 706 70 752 822
Equipment and services 208 700 908 90 1,115 1,205
Updating of network plan 60 72 132 60 149 209
Training 60 250 310 5 192 197
Subtotal La 638 2,246 2\.884 407 2\.856 3,263
Physical contingencies - 225 225 - - -
Price contingencies 162 529 691 - - -
Refinancing of PPF - 1,000 1\.000 - 1,099 1,099
Total Proiect Cost 80Q gQ "Q 6Q A43
La Local final costs are estimated\.
B\. Project Financing
(US$ '000)
Appraisal Estimate Actual Funds
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
IBRD - 4,000 4\.000 - 3\.955 3,955
Government 800 - 800 407 - 407
Total Ag LAQ jjgg Q 2
- 13 _
6\. Project Results
(See discussion in Part I)\.
Studies
Purpose as Defined
Study at Appraisal Status Impact of Study
1\. Determine appropriate Partly completed\. The Moderate\. When
organizational structure study proposed changes implemented
and recommend legisla- to the staffing and will provide a
tive changes to organizational structure foundation for
strengthen NTC's of NTC\. The recommend- improved NTC
capacity to regulate\. ations have been ac- operation\.
cepted in principle but
not implemented (see
Comment below)\.
2\. Review NTC's tariff set- Four of the six phases Minimal\.
ting principles and of the study have been
their effect on opera- completed\. Consultant
tors and recommend im- recommendations were not
provements\. fully accepted by the
Government or industry\.
3\. Update the National Study completed and used High\. Expected
Telecommunications as the basis for Govern- to result in
Plan\. ment development plans\. provision of
about 128,000
lines of new
telephone ex-
change equip-
ment in poorly
served provin-
cial areas\.
4\. Make Recommendations on, Study completed and Potentially
and assist NTC in, im- recommends methodology high\. Impact
proving the management for improving efficiency will depend on
of the frequency of frequency alloca- NTC's comple-
spectrum\. tions\. NTC has accepted tion of the
most recommendations\. computer system
and implementa-
tion of consul-
tant's recom-
mendations\.
- 14 -
Comment: The consultant's terms of reference did not require their
preparation of draft legislation for improvement of sector regulation as
originally intended by the project\. However, because in the course of the
project various legislative proposals for strengthening the NTC and clarifying
the sector's policies were drafted separately through political initiatives,
the Bank did not push for compliance with covenants on this point\. At loan
closing the legislative proposals were in various stages of review by
Congress\. Specialist regulatory advice in relation to those initiatives was
provided by consultants engaged under an Asian Development Bank Technical
Assistance project implemented on the basis of the World Bank's
recommendations to DOTC\.
7\. Status of Covenants
Loan Agreement
_ Section Covenant Comnliance/Comment
3\.02 (a) The Borrower shall appoint in MOTC not later Complied
than May 31, 1985 a qualified project
manager\.
3\.02 (b) Borrower through appropriate legislation Not complied\. See
ensure (i) that NPC possesses the full Comment under
range of functions and powers to regulate, 'Studies", Section
supervise and administer the telecommunica- 6 of Part III\.
tion sector and (ii) that existing legisla-
tion, decrees and regulations are updated
and incorporated into a comprehensive
telecommunications and broadcasting code\.
3\.04 (a) The Borrower shall ensure that MOTC enters Complied but not
into contracts for consultants' services on as originally
or before September 30, 1985\. scheduled\.
3\.04 (b) The Borrower shall consult with the Bank on Complied\.
the conclusion and recommendations made by
the consultants and shall implement such
recommendations in a manner and in accord-
ance with a timetable satisfactory to the
Bank\.
- 15 -
8\. Use of Bank Resources
A\. Staff Inputs
Task Input (Staffweeks) /a
Project preparation
Project appraisal
Loan negotiation 5\.8
Loan processing 5\.0
Project supervision 53\.0
Project completion report 4\.9
Project administration 4\.5
TOTAL 73\.2
la Excludes staff input prior to FY85\. Data for prior years is unavailable\.
- 16 -
B\. Missions
Stage of
project Month/ No\. of Days in Speciali- Performance Type of
cycle year persons field La zation Lb rating /c problems /d
Through appraisal
05/82 2 8 E,FA - -
02/83 1 15 LO - -
06/83 1 2' E - -
09/83 1 7 E -
11/83 1 12 E - -
04/84 2 7 E,FA - -
Through effectiveness
01/85 1 3 CON - -
Supervision
11/85 1 3 EC - _
05186 1 5 E 1 -
11/86 1 3 EC 3 OS
02/87 3 15 E,FA,EC 2 Os
07/87 3 7 E,FA,EC 2 OS
11/87 3 4 E,EC,EC 2 OS
06/88 2 21 E,FA 2 OS
11/88 2 16 E,FA 2 Os
04/89 1 16 E 2 OS
09/89 1 11 E 2 Os
03/90 1 13 E 2 Os
07/90 1 14 E 2 OS
La Includes time devoted to other operations in the country\.
/b E - Engineer, EC - Economist, FA - Financial Analyst, CON - Consultant,
LO = Loan Officer\.
/c 1 - No or minor problems, 2 - Minor problems, 3 - Major problems being
taken care of\.
It OS - Overall status\. | APPROVAL |
P004117 | Document of
The World Bank
FOR OmCIAL USE ONLY
Report No\. 10761
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KOREA
SECOND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2473-KO)
JUNE 16, 1992
MICROFICHE COPY
Report No\. 10761-KO Type: (PCR)
MASON-ANDE/ X31676 / T9111/ OEDD2
Industry and Energy Operations Division
Country Department II
Asia Region
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their oMcial duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authori?ation\.
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Currency Unit - Korean Won (W)
$ 1 - W 800 (at appraisal)
$ 1 _ W 799 tat completion)
$1 W 700 (as of June 1991)
ABBREVIATIONS
DFC - Development Finance Companies
ITD - Industrial Technology Development
KDIC - Korea Development Investment Company
KIET - Korea Institute of Electronics Technology
KTDC - Korea Technology Development Corporation
KTIC - Korea Technology Investment Corporation
SMI - Small and Medium Industries
SMIPC - Small and Medium Industry Promotion Corporation
R&D - Research and Development
FISCAL YEAR
January - December
FOR OFFCIAL USE ONLY
THE WORLD BANK
Washington\. D\.C\. 20433
U\.S\.A\.
'DI,\.zwcta,C\.eral
\.kv Evalatkn
June 16, 1992
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Korea
Second Technology Development Pro1ect (Loan 2473-KO)
Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project
Completion Report on Korea - Second Technology Development (Loan 2473-KO)"
prepared by the Industry and Energy Operations Division, Country Department II
of the Asia Regional Office, with Part II contributed by the Borrower\. No audit
of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this
time\.
Attachment 2
Thi document has a motrictod distribution and may be used by reciPbents only In tho PCrrnac
of their oMclit dutios\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without Wofld Bank authofiution\.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PROJECT COMPLEIION REPORT
RORE
_RCOND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2473-0O)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE NO\.
Preface \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. * \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. i
Evaluation Summary \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. ii'
PART I PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 1
1\. Project Identity \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 1
2\. Project Background \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 1
3\. Project Objectives and Description \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 2
4\. Project Institution\. 2
5\. Project Implementation \. 3
6\. Project Performance\. 3
Institutional Development \. 3
Technolcgy Innovation \.4
Resource Mobilization \. 4
Expansion of KTDC's Operations \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 5
Expanded Support of SMIs \.5
7\. Bank Performance \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 6
8\. Borrower Performance \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 6
9\. Project Sustainability \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 7
10\. Conclusions \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 7
PART II PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 9
PART III STATISTICAL INPORM&TIOI1 \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 29
Table 1\. Related Bank Loans \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 31
Table 2\. Project Timetable \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 32
Table 3\. Cumulative and Actual Disbursements \. \. 33
Table 4\.1 List of Subprojects Finance Under the Loan \. \. \. \. 34
Table 4\.2 Distribution of Subprojects \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 42
Table 4\.3 Selected Examples of KTDC Supported Subprojects \. 44
Table 4\.4 RTDC Institutional Performance \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 46
Table 4\.5 KTDC Financed R&D Projects Performed by Public
Research Institute \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 48
Table 5\.1 Estimated and Actual Amount of Financial
Support (Currency and Instrument) \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 49
Table 5\.2 Estimated and Actual Amount of Financial Support
(Collateral Conditions) \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 50
Table 5\.3 Estimated and Actual Resource Mobilization
(1984-1989) \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 51
Table 5\.4 Estimated & Actual Financial Indicators 1984-1989 52
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance I
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'D)
Table 5\.5 Estimated and Actual Income Statements 1984-1989 \. 53
Table 5\.6 Estimated and Actual Balance Sheets 1984-1989 \. 54
Table 5\.7 Estimated and Actual Sources and Uses of Funds
1989-1989 \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 55
Table 5\.8 Analysis of Conventional Loans in Arrears
1984-1989 \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 56
Table 6\. KTDC's Shareholding, Ending 1989 \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 57
Table 7\. Status of Covenants \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 59
Table 8\.1 Use of Bank Resources: Staff Inputs \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 62
Table 8\.2 Use of Bank Resourceb: Missions \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 63
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KOREA
SECOND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(Loan 2473-KO)
PREFACE
This report presents an evaluation of the results achieved under the
Second Technology Development Project in Korea, for which Loan 2473-KO was
approved on October 25, 1984\. The US$50\.0 million loan was made to foster
technological development of Korean industry through continued support for
the Government's effort to accelerate the development of industrial
technology\. The loan proceeds were channelled through the Korea Technology
Development Corporation (KTDC) and aimed at assisting KTDC in its
institutional development, technology innovation, resource mobilization,
operational expansion and support for small and medium industries (SMIs)\.
The loan closed on June 30, 1989 with about US$4\.8 million of the loan
amount undisbursed and canceled\. The last disbursement was made on June
28, 1989\.
The PCR was prepared by the Industry and Energy Operations Division,
Country Department II, Asia Region (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Part I and
portions of Part III)\. The PCR draws on the Staff Appraisal Reports for
the Second and the subsequent (approved in 1988) Third Technology
Development Projects (Loan 2913-KO); the Loan and Guarantee Agreements;
supervision reports, correspondence between the Bank and KTDC; internal
Bank memoranda; KTDC's financial reports and project data provided by KTDC\.
It presents a review of the implementation of the project, the extent to
which institutional objectives were achieved and the results of the
investment made\. KTDC have been very helpful in providing useful data for
Part III and submitted their respective Part II as contribution to the PCR
in a timely manner\.
- iii -
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KOREA
SECOND 'iECHNC'LOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(Loan 2473-KO)
EVALUATION SUMMARY
1\. The overall objective of the loan of $50\.0 million was to foster the
technological development of Korean industry through continued support for
the Government's effort to accelerate the development of industrial
technology\. The specific objectives of the project were to: (a) assist
KTDC's institutional development; (b) assist KTDC's catalytic role in
technology innovatio\.i; (c) help establish a resource base for KTDC; (d)
expand KTDC's operations involving risk-sharing financial instruments; and
(e) expand KTDC's support to SMIs\. The project consisted of two
components: (a) a line of credit of $49\.7 million to cover KTDC's foreign
exchange requirements during 1984-86; and (b) a technical assistance fund
of $300,000 for KTDC institutional development (paras\. 3\.1-3\.2)\. The loan
followvd a previous successful loan to KTDC (Loan 2112-KO; First Technology
Development Project; 1982) for which a PPAR was issued on June 13, 1989
(PPAR No\. 7906)
2\. Overall the project components were successfully executed\. KTDC
committed and disbursed about $45\.2 million three months later than the
originally estimated schedule at appraisal and the loan closed in 1989 in
accordance with original appraisal estimate\. Commitments under the loan,
however, were slower than the first loan largely beeause of the high
premium on Bank funds (resulting from the appreciation of the currencies
which dominate the Bank's pool of currencies) and the availability of
foreign exchange from commercial sources at comparable interest rates
without foreign exchange risk (para\. 5\.1)\.
3\. Under the Bank loan KTDC approved 89 stubprojects amounting to W26
billion of which 50X was financed by KTDC\. Funds allocated for
institutional development was reallocated to the line of credit because
KTDC opted to utilize cost-free UNDP funds and other subsidized sources of
financing (paras\. 5\.2-5\.3)\.
4\. Overall the project has been successful and achieved most of its
objectives\. KTDC's staff capabilities and skills in technology financing
were strengthened significantly\. KTDC staff participated in overseas
training covering areas such as managing technology innovation, financing
R&D, venture capital operations and small business management during 1984-
87\. Several KTDC staff participated in UNDP-financed overseas training\.
Some of KTDC's staff also participated in a UNDP sponsored seminar in
project appraisal techniques in Korea\. KTDC established close links with
related local and foreign institutions and concluded bilateral cooperation
agreements with them (paras 6\.1-6\.2)\.
5\. KTDC supported projects at all stages of technology development from
R&D start-up to first commercialization\. Of its total financing through
1989, about 821 -went to in-house R&D activities including process
- iv -
improvement activities; 7% to technology imports; 9% to commercialization;
and 2% to the purchase of research equipment\. KTDC has also prs-evaluated
372 proposals under the "Industrial Technology Support Program" of which 44
have been actually financed by KTDC (paras\. 6\.3-6\.4)\.
6\. During the project period (1984-87), KTDC mobilized resources
amounting to W170 billion which compared favorably with the W167 billion
estimated at appraisal\. COf this amount, 67% was sourced domestically,
albeit largely through the direct and indirect assistance by the
Government: through borrowed furds under the Government's special loan
program, through equity, and through indirect support by way of Government
guarantees of the Bank loan and domestic debentures and by way of tax
incentives to privately-funded KTDC equity (para\. 6\.5)\.
7\. KTDC's objective of expanding operations involving risk-sharing
instruments fell slightly below expectations but continued to improve with
an encouraging trend\. Only 75% of the projected amount at appraisal was
realized\. However, the sha,e of risk-instruments to total instruments
continue to inc;ease from 4% in 1983 to 14% in 1986 (para\. 6\.9)\.
8\. KTDC exceeded original expectations of providing expanded support to
SMIs\. KTDC's support of SMIs increased from 29% in 1983 to 76% in 1986 in
terms of total financing\. However, while SMIs account for 85% of total
local currency funding in 1986 (due in part to the requirement for
utilization of- government-funds), SMIs utilization of foreign currency
funds continue to be low\. Factors which contributed to this low level of
utilization were the reluctance of SMI sub-borrowers to assume the foreign
exchange risk; and the Bank's reporting and approval re4uirements which the
SMI sub-borrowers considered to be too cumbersome (para\. 6\.10)\.
9\. KTDC continued to show satisfactory financial performance during the
period 1984-89, attributed to a significant increase in its lending
portfolio, rapid growth in investment income and governm\.3nt interest rate
subsidies until 1988\. However, Government subsidies dropped from a high of
20% of total income in 1984 to 4% in 1986 and were eliminated completely in
1989\. These reductions reduced KTDC's margins well below the covenanted
spread of 2\.5%\. The quality of KTDC's conventional loan portfolio
continued to be sound throughout the project (paras\. 8\.1-8\.3)\.
10\. Despite the excellent performance to-date, KTDC's future prospects
are still evolving and not exactly clear\. Although it is now a well
established financial institution staffed with qualified professionals,
KIDC needs to adjust itself to a liberalized financial sector environment\.
KTDC's future plan would be followed up in the context of the supervision
of the follow-on Third KTDC loan approved in 1988 (paras\. 9\.1-9\.3)\.
11\. KTDC has maintained a souni financial position reflecting partially,
the quality of credit appraisal of its specialized staff\. While most of
its investments are not start-up ventures in the true sense of the word,
KTDC has certainly pioneered a new business and help develop an environment
and a pool of professionals for later capital venture companies\. An
independent study of KTDC's effectiveness indicate that KTDC has had a
- v -
positivet imp*-"t for technology development in KTDC-financed companies
through its role as technology broker and financier (para 10\.1)\.
12\. Several important lessons emerged from the implementation of the
project: (a) making the financing of industrial technology development
successful requires a favorable policy framework; (b) the significant
private sector participation in KTDC and the corresponding management style
have contributed to its success; and (c) financing technology ventures by
foreign exchange loans, particularly for SMIs, increases the credit risk
during significant foreign exchange fluctuation (para\. 10\.2)\.
PROJECT COMMLETIOM REPORT
KOR-E
SECOND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2473-KC)
PART I: PROJECT REVIEW WOH BANK'S PER-PECTIVE
1\. Proiect Identity
Name Second Technology Development Project
Loan Number 2473-KO
RVP Unit Asia Region
Country Republic of Korea
Sector Industry
Subsector Technology Finance
2\. Proiect Background
2\.1 Korea's industrial development can be described as one of
transition from import substitution to export promotion through policies
which have stimulated high labor productivity and international
competitiveness\. Since the early 1970s, the Government has furthered
industrial technological development to support industrial development\.
Research institutes, industrial standards, testing and educational
facilities for technicians and scientists were set up, providing a solid
infrastructure for industry to move to the next stage of development\. At
the same time, the Government has provided a policy framework which
stimulated both domestic industrial research and development as well as
technological transfer from abroad\.
2\.2 The Bank's direct involvement in assisting the Government's
effort to foster industrial technological development was initiated in
1979 with Bank financing for the Electronics Technology Project (Loan
1676-KO)\. The project sought to develop the capacity of the Korea
Institute of Electronics Technology (KIET) to support the local
electronics industry by providing specialized services, manpower training,
acquisition of foreign technology and %Xy undertaking, jointly with
industry the feasibility of establis\.Ing a Korean-run, advanced
semiconductor processing facility\. The Bank also supported the newly
founded Korea Technology Development Corporation (KTDC) with three loans
totalling US$150 million between 1982-88 (Loans 2112-KO, 2473-KO and 2913-
KO)\. The Bank assisted the Sm-'l and Medium Industry Promotion Corporation
(SMIPC) (Loans 2215-KO and 2515-KO), which complements the activities of
KTDC by providing support to small- and medium-scale (SMI) industries for
expansion of facilities\. In May 1983, IFC invested W750 million in the
newly created Korea Development Investment Company (KDIC), a venture
capital companry whose primary objectives include the provision of equity
finance for commercialization of new technology\. The Bank has also
extended education sector loans (Loans 1800-KO, 2427-KO and 3037-KO) to
improve the quality of higher education in science and engineering, and to
increase the supply of qualified Korean engineers, technicians and
managers\.
-2-
3\. Project Oojectives and DescriRtion
3\.1 The overall objective of the proiect was to foster the
technological development of Kurean industry through continued support for
the Government's effort to accelerate the development of industrial
technology Specifically, the project aimed at: ,a) assisting KTDC's
institutional development through technical assistance, staff development
and training; (b) assisting KTDC's catalytic role in technology
innovation; (c) helping to establish a res\.urce base, for KTDC that would
be sustainable over the long-term; (d) expanding KTDC's operations
involving risk-sharing financial instruments such as conditional loans and
equity investmerts; and (e) expanding KTDC's support to S\."Is\. The loan
followed a previous successful loan to KTDC (Loan 2112-KO; First
Technology Development ProjeLt; 1982) for which a PPAR was issued on -June
13, 1989 (PPAR No\. 7906)\.
3\.2 The project consisted of two components: (a) credit line of
$49\.7 million to cover the estimated foreign exchange requirements of
subprojects financed by KTDC during 1984-86; and (b) $300,000 for
technical assistance to support KTDC's institutional development programs\.
The TA component included: (i) consulting services to support the
operations of KTDC and training of its staff, both to further deepen
KTDC's capacity to identify, appraise, and supervise research and
development (R&D) projects and to enable KTDC to carry out surveys of the
technological needs of Korean industries; and (ii) pur-chase of training
materials for KTDC staff\.
4\. Proiect Institution
4\.1 KTDC was established under the KTDC Act promulgated on December
31, 1980, and the associated Enforcement Decree issued on April 22, 1981\.
It was created with strong support from the Coverrument and the private
industry\. The Bank played an active role in KTDC's conception, and in
designing its ownership, organizational structure, and operational
policies and procedures\. KTDC's principal goals are to promote the
development of industrial technology and to facilitate desirable changes
in industrial structure, so as to strengthen the international
competitiveness of Korean industry\.
4\.4 In November 1986, I-DC established its own venture capital
subsidiary under the auspi :\.s of the "Small and Medium Sized Industries
Inauguration Promotion Act-\. The subsidiary, Korea Technology Investment
Corporation (KTIC) makes equity investments, convertible bonds and bonds
with warrants in its financing of new, small, high-growth potential
companies, principally at their start-up stage\. KTIC started with a paid-
in capital of W20 billion from the Small and Medium Indu\.,try Promotion
Corporation (SMIPC) iz 1986; at the end of 1987, KTIC's paid-in capital
stood at W8\.6 billion of which 43% is KTDC's share of the equity\. KTIC
invested W2\.2 billion in 22 start-up companies with the cooperation of
KTDC in 1987\.
- 3
5\. Project Imilementation
5\.1 Overall, the project components were successfully executed\.
KTDC's utilization of the loan has been satisfactory; although loan
disbursements have fallen short of appraisal estimates necessitating a
revision of the disbursement schedule\. The loan was committed and
disbursed three months later than the estimated schedule at appraisal
About US$ 4\.8 million of the undisbursed amount was canceled on the
scheduled closing date\. Commitments under the loan were considerably
slower than the first loan largely because of the high cost of Bark funds
resulting from the appreciatlon of the currencies which dominate the pool
of currencies for which sub-borrowers were liable\. Another factor causing
the slow race of commitments was the relatively easy availability of
credits in Won for borrowing in foreign currencies at competitive interest
rates, without foreign exchange risk\. On its part, KTDC can be commended
for waking great efforts, under the circumstances, to on-lend Bank funds
and to explain to sub-borrowers the operation and risks of the Bank's
currency pooling system\. The estimated, revised and actual disbursements
during implementation of the project are given in Part III, Annex 3\.
5\.2 Under the loan, KTDC approved 89 subprojects amounting to WB23\.7
billion\. Total suburolect cost amounted to W55\.8 billion (about US$67
million), of which 42Z was financed by KTDC\. loe approved subprojects
wore about equally distributed auoag the major industrial subsectors in
which KTDC concentrates its lending: machinery and metals (29X);
electrical and electronic goods (29X); and chemical and other products
(422)\. All subloans under the Bank loan went for conventional lending and
most went to large sized companies\. About 70X of the sublran amount were
above tbe free limit of US$ 300,000, requiring Bank-approval\. There were
27 subloans above the free limit and 62 below the free limit\. A detailed
distribution of aubprojects is given in Part III, Annexes 4\.1-4\.3\.
5\.3 Under the flrst project, US$650,000 was earmarked for staff
development and training\. Similarly in ths second project, US$300,000 was
allocated for such a purpose\. However, KTDC opted to utilize grant funds
from UNDP and other concessionary sources\. Therefore, funds allocated for
institutional development was reallocated to the line of credit\.
6\. Z=4g't Performance
6\.1 Inj>jtutionMl Develovment\. KTDC's organization has changed
periodically to meet the needs of the rapidly changing indvis\.rial and
venture capital environment\. It is a well-managed company and employs
well-qualified staff\. Presently, KTDC has 65 professional stuff, which
include 22 engineers, seven lawyers, and 32 financial analysts or
economists\. This is in line with the appraisal expectations\. Continued
staff development is important for KTDC in its role of financing
technology development\. Twenty-five staff participated in overseas
training covering areas such as managing technological innovation,
financing R&), venture capital operations and small business management
during 1984-89\. Fifteen KTDC staff participated in the UNDP-financed
overseas training of a Bank-executed program called KTDC Institutional
Development Project" while 19 staff also received the UNDP/Bank-sponsored
Project Appraisal Techniques seminar in Korea\. There were other domestic
-4\.
external end on-the-job training provided during the period and presented
in detail in Part III, Annex 4\.4 of the report\.
6\.2 KTDC has also established close relationships with local and
foreign financial institutions for training and information exchange\. In
1987 it concluded a bilateral cooperation agreement with three local and
five foreign institutions including Japan Associated Finance\. Through
this network, KTDC participated in international seminars in Paris and
London to share experiences and establish coo-kration ties for technology
transfer\.
6\.3 Technology Innovation\. KTDC supported projects at all stages of
technology developr\.ent from R&D start-up to first commercialization\. The
projects financed various activities such as idea generation, feasibility
studies, technical R&D, development of prototypes and pilot plants,
preliminary production and test marketing\. Of its total financing through
1989 about 82% went to in-house R&D activities (including process
improvement); 7% to technology imports; 9% to commercialization; and 2% to
the purchase of research equipment\. Of the Bank-financed 89 projects
under the loan amounting to US$45 million, 49% of the total amount (US$22
million, 49 in number) was for R&D; 31% (US$13\.8 million, 18 in number)
was for technology import; 8% (US$3\.7 million, 8 in number) was for the
purchase of R&D equipment; 7% (US$3 million, 7 in number) was for the
improvement of the manufacturing process; and 6% (US$2\.6 million, 7 in
number) was for the commercialization of new products\.
6\.4 KTDC has been empowered by the Ministry of Science and
Technology to undertake technology pre-evaluation for the "Industrial
Technology Development Support Program" which is partially funded by the
Government in its efforts to promote cooperative research between public
research institutions and induscrial firms\. During the project period,
KTDC, in close consultation with the Technology Review and Advisory
Committee, pre-evaluated 372 proporals of which 44 have been financed by
KTDC amounting to W14 billion (See Part III, Annex 4\.5 for details)\.
6\.5 Resource Mobilization\. During the project period, 1984-87, KTDC
mobilized resources amounting to W170 billion, compared with W167 billion
estimated at appraisal\. Of this amount, 65% was sourced domestically
amounting to Wlll billion\. This effort was accomplished largely through
the direct and indirect assistance by the Government\. Of the W170 billion
mobilized during the period, the Government has provided 6% (W1O billion)
in equity and 22% (W37 billion) in government loans to KTDC from the
government's special loan program with favorable terms and conditions\.
The Government also provided indirect support by: (a) guaranteeing the
Bank-financed loan which contributed 35% (W59 billion) of total resources
and domestic debentures2I which contributed 30% (W51 billion); and (b)
providing tax incentives to private-funded KTDC equity, which contributed
8X (W13 billion) to total resources mobilized for the period\. Foreign
currency resources mobilized amounted to W59 billion sourced solely from
the Bank-financed loan (See Part III, Annex 5\.3)\.
\.1/ During 1983-88, KTDC issued ten series of debentures with various
discounts with the payment of principal plus interest guaranteed by
the Government except for the tenth debenture\.
6\.6 Since January 1987, four established venture capital companies
inuluding KTDC have obtained the sanctions of operating venture investment
partnerships, leasing and factoring operations under the auspices of the
New Technology Business Financial Support Act\. Investment partnership was
a newly introduced vencure financing scheme in the country in 1987 for
facilitating the inflow of domestic speculative capital and for providing
sources of venture capital\. The investment partners solicit venture
capital funds from limited investors including institutional investors
such as pension funds and financial institutions\. KTDC acts as general
partner responsible for managing the fund portfolio\. KTDC created three
partnership funds: KTDC1 amounting to W2 billion in 1987; KTDC2, W3\.5
billion in 1988; and KTDC3, W5 billion in 1989\.
6\.7 Expansion of KTDC's Operations\. Of the total projected amount of
W264 billion for financial instruments for the period, KTDC approved a
total amount of W250 billion\. Of this amount, Conventional Loans totalled
W226 billion (vs\. estimate of W232 billion); Conditional Loans, W5 billion
(vs\. estimate of W7 billion); onvertible Bonds, W9 billion (no estimated
figures); and Equity Shares, W9 billion (vs\. estimate of W26 billion)\.
The share of local currency loans (Conventional Loans, W160 billion and
Conditional Loans, W6 billion) continue to dominate KTDC operation at W166
billion having been approved for the period\. Foreign currency loans,
which are solely Conventional Loans, amounted to W68 billion\.
6\.9 A major goal of KTDC, and supported under the project is to
expand KTDC operations involving risk-sharing instruments, such as
conditional loans and equity investments, including convertible bonds\.
During the project period, KTDC's actual performance in this category of
instruments fell slightly below expectations but continued to improve with
an encouraging trend\. While at appraisal risk-sharing instruments were
expected to amount to W32 billion (on approval basis), the actual results
were W24 billion, representing 75X of the projected amount\. The
encouraging note is the noticeable trend towards expanded risk-sharing
operatioiis\. The share of conditional loans and equity investments
(convertible bonds and equity shares) increased from 4K in 1983 to a high
of 14X in 1986\. The trend continued as the proportion of expanded risk-
sharing operations reached a level of 18K in 1989 The detailed
performance of these operations are provided in Part III, Annexes 5\.1-5\.2\.
6\.10 Exoanded Sugport of SMIs\. KTDC exceeded expectations of
providing expanded support to SMIs through timely promotional activities,
technical/managerial advice and increased financing of SMI R&D projects\.
An indication of these efforts were the gradual shift from the past
dominance of larger corporations in the KTDC portfolio to small- to medium
scale corporations\. KTDC's support of SMIs increased from 29K in 1983 to
76K in 1986 in terms of total amount of financing\. The results are even
more pronounced in terms of number of companies: 174 out of 198 projects
financed in 1986 were SMIs\. KTDC's total financial commitment up to
December 31, 1986 is equally shared between SMIs and large corporations\.
However, while SMIs account for 85K of total local currency funding in
1986 (due in part to the requirement for utilization of government-sourced
funds), SMI's utilization of foreign currency funds, including Bank-funds
continued to be low\. Of the 89 subprojects financed by the loan, only 47K
went to SMIs amounting to W18 billion or 40K of total loan amount\. The
low utilization of Bank loan funds by SMIs is in part a reflection of low
-6
import content of their projects\. But there were two additional
contributing factors: the reluctance of SMI sub-borrowers to assume the
foreign ex:hange risk; and the Bank's reporting and approval requirements
which the SMI sub-borrowers considered to be too cumbersome\. These
constraints have been addressed in the succeeding third project\.
6\.11 Under the government's program of promoting promising SMI's,
KTDC sought to reinforce the competitiveness of technology development
among SMIs by making continuous efforts of selecting and supporting
technology intensive SMIs\. Forty companies have been selected as most
promising by KTDC during the project period\.
7\. Bank Performance
7\.1 Following the successful implementation of the first loan to
KTDC, this operation represented the second phase of the Bank's continued
support of the government's efforts to accelerate the development of
industrial technology\. Bank involvement in the preparation and
supervision of the project has contributed not only to strengthening
KTDC's institutional development, but also to periodic discussions with
Government of its R&D policies especially with regard to establishing
closer links between industry and public research institutes and its
support and promotion of the industry's R&D capability\.
7\.2 Supervision effort on the project was generally adequate\. The
preparation and appraisal missions for the Third Technology Development
Project were de-facto supervision missions for this project\.
8\. Borrower Performance
8\.1 KTDC's financial performance continued to improve significantly
during the period 1984-89\. The net income before tax increased from W38
million in 1984 to W6\.5 billion in 1989\. As a result, KTDC's financial
position continued to be satisfactory with a debt equity ratio of 3\.9 in
1989\. KTDC's good financial performance can be attributed to: (a) a
significant increase in its lending portfolio, averaging annually at 20X
from 1984-89; (b) a rapid growth of its income from equity investments
(which yielded an annual average growth of 69%); and (c) government
interest rate subsidies of about W10\.8 billion from 1984-88\. In 1984 the
share of interest rate subsidies to total income was as much as 20X; by
1988, it dropped to 4% and was non-existent in 1989\. A more detailed
presentation of KTDC's financial operations and condition from 1984-89 can
be found in Part III, Annexes 5\.4-5\.8\.
8\.2 The importance of government subsidies/interest rate support to
KTDC finances cannot be overlooked because without this subsidy for the
first and second Bank loan and for its debentures in 1985 and 1986, KTDC
would have recorded net losses of W1\.8 billion in 1984, W1\.7 billion i\.
1985 and W0\.4 billion in 1986\.
8\.3 Without government support in the future, KTDC's ability to
mobilize resources at competitive terms while maintaining a sound
financial situation is unclear\. In 1986, the Government reduced the
interest rate subsidies to KTDC for the first Bank loan and KTDC
debentures, reducing KTDC's margins well below the covenanted minimum
spread of 2\.5X (Section 2\.10 (c) and (d) of the Loan Agreement)\. The
total spread on average total conventional loans was 2\.20X in 1985; 0\.96X
in 1986; 1\.23X in 1987; 1\.832 in 1988 and 2\.21X in 1989\. (See Part III,
Annex 5\.4 for details\.)
8\.4 KTDC's conventional loan portfolio remains sound with a very low
level of non-performing assets (less than 22)\. Most of the conditional
loans are also of good quality\. However, the quality of equity
investments is mixed\. As of December 31, 1989 KTDC's total equity
investments amounted to W21\.1 billion of which investments in 12 companies
amounting to W2\.9 billion were non-performing\. KTDC did not make any
provisions against these investments in 1989 since Korean regulations
provide for such exemptions\. However, the impact of these non-performing
assets on KTDC's overall financial condition is fairly limited\.
9\. Proiect Sustainabilitv
9\.1 KTDC is now a well established financial institution staffed
with qualified professionals\. The demand for their service is growing as
Korean industry develops rapidly\. More and more would-be entrepreneurs
are aspiring to begin their own business, and more and more enterprises
have become more technologically oriented to cope with increasing
competition in the local and international markets\. Their ardent desire
to succeed in technology venture is the most important factor to ensure
sustained performance of technology financing institutions like KTDC\.
However, KTDC needs to adjust itself to a liberalized financial sector
environment\.
9\.2 The main challenges facing KTDC for the 1990s are two-fold:
first, it needs to develop a sustainable strategy for resource
mobilization with government support, and second, it must compete with
other institutions in a progressively liberalized financial sector
environment\. On both points, KTDC's future prospects are not yet clear\.
The elimination of government's financial support means that KTDC needs to
offer a broader range of financial products and fee-based services\. This
will require a modification of KTDC's Act which constrains it from
diversifying its services\.
9\.3 The Government had intended to fully privatize KTDC by divesting
its 222 shareholdings (the remaining 782 is held by private companies,
Asian Development Bank and Deutsche Entwicklungslandern Gmbh) by 1990\.
However, so far diversification efforts have been unsuccessful because of
stock market conditions\. Furthermore, in order for KTDC to qualify for
stock market listing, it will need to show at least a 152 return on equity
in the year of the listing\. This will require a sharp rebound in KTDC's
future profitability through a product diversification strategy\. Whether
KTDC can manage to continue to have a niche in technology financing and in
being an active promoter of R&D and technology adaption while facing
pressures to increase its project remains to be seen\.
10\. Conclusions
10\.1 The project was clearly successful in achieving most of its
objectives\. First, KTDC has maintained a good quality portfolio with only
2X of its assets considered non-performing\. This reflects, at least
- 8 -
partially, the quality of credit appraisal of specialized staff for
technology oriented ventures and companies\. Second, although most
investments are not true start-up ventures, KTDC certainly pi,neered a new
business and helped develop the environment and a pool of professionals
for later venture capital companies\. Third, a study by KAIST indicated
positive impact for technology development in KTDC-financed companies
through its role as technology broker and financier\. Today, KTDC is
considered a model for technology financing institutions which many
developing countries are trying to establish\.
10\.2 Several important lessons emerged from the implementation of
this project:
(a) Making the financing of ITD successful requires a favotable
policy framework\. During the project preparation and
implementation period, the Government undertook important policy
measures which helped in developing ITD projects\. These
included: (i) encouragement of R&D by industrial firms with
strong incentives; (ii) liberalization of foreign technology
imports; and (iii) encouragement of closer linkage between
industry and non-profit R&D institutions\.
(b) The ownership structure and management responsibility of KTDC
have contributed to its success\. KTDC has strong private sector
participation, which ensures its close ties to the industry\.
Although the Government is the largest shareholder, KTDC's day-
to-day operation has been fully delegated to its management
without bureaucratic interventions\. This is the key which
enables KTDC to respond quickly to its customers's changing
needs\.
(c) Financing technology ventures by foreign exchange loans,
particularly for SMIs, increases the credit risk at a time of
significant foreigr\. exchange fluctuation\. This experience of
KTDC's SMI clients was reported to be the major deterrent to
greater use of the Bank loan\.
- 9 -
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KOREA
SECOND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2473-KO)
PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE
- 11 -
I\. KTDC'S ROLE AND LOAN OBJECTIVES
1\. KTDC'S ROLE
1\.1 The principal role of KTDC is to promote and accelerate the
technological development of Korean industries and to foster local
entrepreneurship among industries in Korea\.
1\.2 To fulfill this role, KTDC performs its functions through the following
instruments :
(a) Long-term R&D Financing : up to 10 years repayment period including a
3-year grace period\.
(b) Venture Capital (or risk-sharing) Financing : KTDC uses venture capital
financing as a means of technology financing\. This includes equity
investment, conditional lending, convertible bonds and bonds with
warrants\.
(c) Brokerage Services : KTDC's extensive networking with local industries,
financial institutions, overseas companies and international
organizations enables it to provide brokerage services in matchmaking
researchers and entrepreneurs both in Korea and abroad\.
(d) Investment Partnership Management : This is a venture capital financing
program to make investment in new or existing small and mediL cized
industrial companies in the form of equity investments, convertible
bonds or bonds with warrants\.
- 12 -
(e) Leasing and Factoring : These financing operations were recently added
for flexible financing and add-on financing to the SMI clients of KTDC\.
(f) Information Services : Because of its intimate knowledge of the status
of technology development and the needs of the industries, KTDC has
been commissioned by the Government to evaluate projects applied to
"Industry-led National Research and Development Project Program"\. The
Program is designed to stimulate private sector's industrial research
works by providing government financial support in part\. KTDC
recomends to the Government the prioritization of the applications\.
2\. LOAN OBJECTIVES
1\.3 The main objective of the loan was to give support of the Government's
effort to facilitate the structural transformation of Korean industry through
acceleration of industrial technology development\. Specifically, the project
was to : (a) assist KTDC's institutional development through technical
assistance, staff development, and training ; (b) assist KTDC's catalytic role
in technology innovation ; (c) establish the foundation for a long-term
resource base for KTDC ; (d) expand KTDC's operations involving risk-sharing
financial instruments : and (e) expand KTDC's support to SRI\.
1\.4 The Loan Consisted of :
Part A : A line of credit to help cover costs of industry-sponsored R&D
subprojects\.
- 13 -
Part B : Institutional development of KTDC, comprising (i) consulting
services to support the operations of KTDC and training of%KTDC
staff, both to further deepen their capacity to identify,
appraise, and supervise R&D projects and to enable KTDC to
carry out surveys of the technological needs of Korean
industries ; and (ii) purchase of training materials for KTDC
staff\.
- 14 -
II\. KTDC PERFORMANCE
1\. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE
Legal Framework and Ownership
2\.1 KTDC was established under the KTDC Act promulgated on December 31,
1980, and the associated Enforcement Decree issu'd on April 22, 1981\. This
special KTDC Act and the associated Presidential Decree enable KTDC to :
(a) operate in an autonomous manner with the efficiency of a private company\.
(b) to have a strong and independent management, and
(c) to have the ability and means to attract an,t retain staff of high caliber
and entrepreneurship\. All these factors are most critical to the success of an
operation of KTDC\. Public interest in KTDC, by way of Government financial
support, such as equity contributions, loans, ioan guarantees, etc\. is
safeguarded principally through Government representation on KTDC's Board of
Directors, exercising the usual rights of a silareholder\. To prevent KTDC from
being dominated by any one private shareholder, the KTDC Act stipulates that
the ownership of any shareholder, with the except4on of the Government and
international development financing institutions, be limited to no more than
7% of the total shares issued, and that in case any such shareholder's shares
should exceed 7% of the total & ares issued, his voting rights would be
limited to 7%\.
2\.2 The ownership of KTDC has undergone gradual changes in the course of the
last 9 years\. With the acceptance of Asian Development Bank in 1988 and German
Finance Company for Investments in Developing Countries in 1989 (DEG) as a
- 15 -
shareholder and the transfer of a sizable portion of the governments' share to
Korea Development Bank in 1987, the ownership structure of KTDC at the end of
1989 stood as shown in Annex 14\.
2\.3 The government has announced its in rion to sell its 15\.1% interest
in KTDC in 1990, the remaining 7% by 1992 to KTDC's existing shareholders who
don't exceed 7% of the total shares issued\.
Operating Policies
2\.4 KTDC's Operating Manual provides broad guidelines for its operations,
including the scope of loan and investment activities, criteria for investment
decisions, diversification of assets, promotion of SMI, relations with clients,
and generation of profits\. Combined with other operational policies (such as
limiting KTDC's equity investments in any single enterprise to not more than
10% of its paid-in capital and reserves), there are adequate safeguards to
protect KTDC from an undue concentration of its assets\.
2\.5 Details of the terms and conditions of KTDC's loan and equity investment
and procedures are given in the Statement of Investment and Operational
Policies\. KTDC has promoted and financed the following types of projects under
the second Bank loan
(a) Loans for in-house R&D costs and/or for the cost of contracts for
technological development with external research organizations ;
- 16 -
(b) Investments and loans for initial efforts for the commercialization of
the results of R&D ;
(c) Loans for technology import or for the adaptation and improvement of
imported technology
(d) Loans for engineering costs associated with the construction of
industrial facilities ;
(e) Technical advisory services to industrial enterprises with respect to
the business activities referred to in (a) through (b) above and/or
technical feasibility surveys for other R&D facilities ; and
(f) Use of foreign specialists and technical advisers, and training of R&D
personnel\.
Project Supervision
2\.6 KTDC has established supervision systems and procedures which are more
efficient and effective than those established during the implementation of the
first Bank Loan\. Projects encountering financial or operational difficulties
are closely monitored by the responsible department\. The systems \.ith which
ongoing projects are classified by the degree of need for supervision have been
developed and being implemented in order to improve performance in this regard\.
- 17 -
Korea Technology Investment Corporation (KTIC)
2\.7 KTIC was established in November 1986 as a cibsidiary of KTDC to
operate in accordance with the Small and Medium Enterprise Inauguration
Assistance Act\. As stipulated by the Act, KTIC specializes in financing newly
established SMI through equity investments and partnership venture fund
operations\.
KTDC benefited from KTIC through ; (i) offering subsequent financing in
various forms to the SMI clients of KTIC, and (ii) accumulating know-how on
venture capital operations (equity investments and partnership venture fund)\.
Organization, Management and Staff
2\.8 The responsibility for the policy and general direction of KTDC's
business rests with the Board of Directors headed by a Chairman, who is the
Chief Executive Officer of one of the large industry groups\. The President,
who reports directly to the Board, is responsible for KTDC's overall
operations\. The Board has fully de,egated authority to approve individual
loans and investments to the Executive Directors' Committee c3nsisting of all
directors that are managers of KTDC\. Such delegation enables KTDC to respond
quickly to private industry's changing R&D needs\.
2\.9 KTDC's organization has ('anged periodically to meet the needs of the
rapidly changing industrial and venture capital environment\. KTDC now has
eight departments aside from three Branches in Pusan, Kwang-Ju, Tae-Gu and one
representative office in U\.S\.A\. In 1990, another domestic branch will be
established in Tae-Cheon to provide support to promising entrepreneurs\. The
- 18 -
three Project Finance Departments, which are divided by major industrial
sectors (machinery and metal, electric and electronics, and chemical and
others), are responsible for project identification and appraisal al,d
supervision\. The Project Promotion Department is responsible for planning and
coordination relevant to appraisal, supervision and investment partnership
management\. The Fund Management Department is responsible for fund raising and
investment of liquidity assets ; and the Planning and Administration
Department is responsible for planning, budgeting, personnel and other support
services\. The International Business Development Department is responsible for
brokerage service and other international business\. The Leasing Department is
responsible for leasing business\.
2\.10 At present, KTDC has 65 professional staff of which 22 are engineers,
7 lawyers, and 32 financial analysts or economists\.
Staff Development and Training
2\.11 As a result of KTDC's major role in financing as technology development,
staff development has special significance\. Despite its recruitment of
qualified staff with some experience, the absence in Korea of persons with
experience in technology financing or venture capital caused KTDC immediately
to develop an extensive program of domestic and overseas training along with
regular staff reassignment, generally after three years\.
2\.12 From 1984-1989, 25 professionals participated in overseas training (for
two weeks to one year)\. The programs have covered such areas as managing
technological innovation, financing R&D, venture capital operations and small
- 19 -
business management\. From 1984 to 1987, under a UNDP-financed and Bank-
executed "KTDC Institutional Development Project", fifteen staff received
overseas training\. The UNDP project also funded the training of week-long
project appraisal techniques seminar in Korea for 19 staff\. KTDC's domestic
training mainly consists of : (a) Master of Business Administration programs at
graduate s-hools ; (b) on-the-job training in KTDC and KTDC's portfolio
companies ; (c) courses at a training center for bankers in Korea ; and (d)
two or three-day in-house training as well as language training\.
2\. OPERATING PERFORMANCE
Overall Operations
2\.13 KTDC approved 1,304 projects between 1984 and 1989, providing seed
money which had a substantial multipliers effect on industries' investments
in R&D\. Total approval amounted to W391\.1 billion during the period\.
2\.14 KTDC supports projects at all stages of the technology development
process from R&D start-up to commercialization stage, 82% going to in-house
research activities, 7% to technology imports, 9% to commercialization, and
2% to purchase of research equipment\. The distribution among industries had
been made fairly even with the proportion of 37% for machinery/metal sector,
30% for electronics/electrical sector, 33% for chemical/others sector\.
- 20 -
Financial Support to SHI
2\.15 KTDC supports all industries including large-scale enterprises, but
special emphasis is placed on small and medium-sized industrial companies\.
The task of KTDC's preferential treatment to SMI was difficult to accomplish
during the initial period of its business operations, given the conditions of
technological development capability and early awareness of technology of the
large-scale enterprises in the industrial sector\. Most of the SHI had limited
in-house technological capability for developing R&D projects, limited
international exposure to identify sources of technologies or ideas for
products/processes, and financial constraints\. KTDC's support to SMI
increased from less than 30% in 1981/82 to over 95% in 1989 in terms of
total amount of financing\. The results are even more highlightpd in terms of
tho number of projects ; 273 out of 278 projects financed in 1989 were SHI's
projects\.
Venture Capital Financing Instruments
2\.16 KTDC employs various types of financial instruments which is one of the
factor that differentiates KTDC from other financial institutions\. KTDC's
commitment by category of risk-sharing financial instruments including equity
investments, convertible bonds, conditional loans amounts to W44\.0 billion\.
or 11\.3% of total approval during the period 1984-1989\.
The number of investment portfolio companies in this category is 125 firms as
of now\. Of the investee companies, 9 companies were brought to the public
stock market giving KTDC hefty returns on its ventur capital investment and
about 10 companies will be taken to public offering in 1990\.
- 21 -
Relationship between KTDC and its clients
2\.17 KTDC maintains a very close and cooperative relationship with its
clients\. KTDC typically receives preliminary inquires from entrepreneurs,
researchers, and inventors with project ideas\. A project idea at that stage
is, sometimes, neither well-conceived nor sufficiently developed to constitute
a bankable project\. Through interviews with potential applicants, KTDC staff
also provide advice and suggestions based on their own expertise\. Once a
formal application is received, the technically-trained and business-trained
project appraisal officers work together in evaluating the applications\. In
case that the project sponsor is in critical need of KTDC's managerial
support, KTDC helps the investee company by dispatching its staff to the
company for a certain period time upon the investee company's request\. A
notable feature of KTDC's assistance to its portfolio companies is that KTDC's
wide network of industry information and professional financial and managerial
expertise may be taken advantage of\. Based on its expertise and wide network,
KTDC provides a comprehensive support for the growth of its portfolio
companies, which encompasses managerial and financial consultation, even
including the groundwork for going public\.
2\.18 As the number of KTDC's client companies reached approximately 470
industrial companies, KTDC has been able to act as an intermediary among them\.
Activities include complementary sourcing of components and parts and
assisting in marketing aspects, providing opportunities for the exchange of
information on technology and business trends\.
- 22 -
Resource Mobilization
2\.19 KTDC mobilized W318\.2 billion during the period 1984-1989 to
accomodate the significant expansion of its financing activities\. KTDC
successfully mobilized resources in the amount of W28 billion as equity,
borrowed from the government W79 billion and floated Technology Development
Debentures in the private capital market totalling W96 billion during the
same period\. For foreign currency resources, KTDC induced three loans from
the Bank equivalent to US$ 150 million and borrowed the foreign currency of
US$ 34\.7 million from the KOREA LONG-TERM CREDIT BANK for the prepayment of
the first bank Loan\.
2\.20 Bisides, investment partnership fund has been introduced as a new
financial resource\. The partnership is formed by soliciting investment funds
from limited investors including institutional investors such as pension funds
and financial institutions for the purpose of equity-type investment in new
start-up companies or existing small and medium-sized companies\. KTDC acts as
a general partner responsible for management and investment operations of the
partnership fund\. Partners are distributed with capital gains or losses from
the investment operations in accordance with the proportion of the partnership
interest\. As this partnership is regarded as a seperate and independent
entity, seperate management and administration is handled by KTDC\. KTDC
formed three partnership funds in the amount of W2\.0 billion in 1987 and
W3\.5 billion in 1988 and W5\.0 billion in 1989\.
- 23 -
Financial Performance
2\.21 Annex iO summarizes KTDC's actual overall financial performance\. KTDC
recorded the first net profit in 1984\.
In 1989, it accomplished a remarkable net profit of W5\.6 billion without the
goverment's interest rate differential subsidies\.
3\. Accomplishments
2\.22 KTDC is now widely considered as a leading technology financing
institution in Korea and many countries are trying to establish a similar
organization\. Venture financing and R&D financing activities draw wide
attention and the promotion of these financing activities constitutes an
important element of Korea's industrial technology development drive\. In
addition to KTDC, three other venture financing corporations namely,
Korea Technology Financing Corporation(KTFC), Korea Development Investment
Corporation(KDIC)\. and Korea Technology Advancement Corporation(KTAC) have
been encouraged under the New Technology Financing Support Act to promote
venture capital business\. Furthermore, 35 other start-up investment companies
in the nature of KTIC have been created up to now\.
2\.23 KTDC's activities in the venture capital field have attracted a number
of new private venture capital companies which benefitted either directly or
indirectly from KTDC's past achievements and contributions in the field of
R&D financing\. In a sense, KTDC has been a pioneer in showing the way and
- 24 -
nurturing the climate in the technology financing area\. Also, it has been an
important institution responsible for the realization of Korea's objectives in
the field of science and technology\.
2\.24 Regarding its operational aspect, KTDC, by and large took a prudent
investment strategy in its initial stage with emphasis on nurturing the
technology development climate in Korea's industries and slowly injected the
venture capital concept for the sound management and financial viability of
technology ventures\. After KTDC earned a well-established position, it
shifted to a more aggressive financing strategy by employing more risk-sharing
instruments\.
- 25 -
III\. THE BANK'S CONTRIBUTION TO KTDC
3\.1 From 1984 to 1989, KTDC approved 1,304 projects amounting to W391\.1
billion, out of which W99\.6 billion was in foreign currency\. For foreign
currency resources, KTDC relied mainly on the three Bank Loans equivalent to
US$ 150 million\.
3\.2 The approval of the Bank Loan t\. KTDC encouraged both the government and
the private sector shareholders to accelerate their subscriptions\.
3\.3 The Bank suggested to KTDC to strengthen its supervision/follow-up
functions of venture financing to increase the weight of venture financing and
to enhance its profitability\. The suggestion helped KTDC to develop more
specific and efficient supervision/follow up systems\.
3\.4 As a result of the above mentioned, the Bank's contribution to KTDC,
KTDC is now maintaining its leading position in the field of R&D financing and
venture capital business in Korea in spite of emergence of many domestic
competitors\. In addition, the Bank's and KTDC's experience gained during the
evolution and implementation of the project would be useful in assisting other
countries planning to establish R&D financing institutions\. KTDC strongly
hopes the bank's cooperation and support will be continued in 1990's\.
- 26 -
IV\. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE PROJECT
Several important lessons have emerged from the evolution and
implementation of the project\.
4\.1 The role of the government and its strategies are crucial to the
success of this project\. To date, the government has initiated an impressive
array of policies and administrative measures to facilitate the development of
industrial technology\. Policies and administrative measures have been to :
(a) encourage R&D investments by industry as much as possible ; (b)
liberalize foreign technology imports : (c) increase the linkage between
industry and non-profit research institutes : and (d) create suitable
financing mechanisms for R&D activities and venture capital business
(including KTDC), particularly for SMI\. Furthermore, to complement these
measures, the government has increased education sector investments to improve
the quality as well as the quantity of technical manpower\.
4\.2 The government is the largest shareholder of KTDC\. But the government
allows KTDC to operate in an autonomous manner and give it the ability and
means to attract and retain human resources of high caliber and
entrepreneurship\. This is a key to the projects' success because KTDC had to
respond quickly to its customer's changing needs and environment\.
4\.3 There has been an increasing number of would-be entrepreneurs who are
aspiring to begin businesses and private innovators who are dreaming of
- 27 -
commercializing their R&D projects\. Existing small and medium-sized
companies are continuously trying to improve their technology capability to
cope with severer competition in the local and international market\. Their
ardent wishes and efforts are decisive to the project's success\. But, it is
true that some of Korean entrepreneurs are concerned with a erosion of
potential profits and dilution of their ownership\.
4\.4 Fluctuation of exchange rate between currencies in the pool of the bank
loan has been passed on to the subborrowers of the Loan\. The fluctuation risk
was reported as a deterrent for the greater use of the Loan\. KTDC hopes the
fluctuation more stable\.
- 29 -
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KOREA
SECOND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2473-O)
PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION
SECOND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2473-KO)
Table It RELATED BANK LOANS
Loan No\. Title Purpose Approval Status Comments
167C Electronics Technology Develop capacity of KIET and 1979 Closed
support local electronics Industry\.
2112 Technology Development Support institutional develop- 1982 Closed
ment of KTDC\.
2215 SMMI Finance SMI subprojects and TA 1952 Closed Loan to IBK, CNB, KLB and SMIPC\.
SMI machinery industry\.
2427 Science & Technology Improve quality of education in 1984 Closed
Education science and engineering\.
2515 SMi Finance SMI subprojects and TA 1985 Closed Loan to CNB and SMIPC\.
to SMIPC\.
w
2913 Technology Develop- Continue institutional support 1988 Supervision Closing date is 12131192
ment IlIl of KTDC\.
3037 Technology Advancement Strengthen industrial develop- 1989 Supervision Loan to KIT\. ITC and KERI
ment In SMis by enhancing
R&D education
3202 Technology Advance- Improve R&D capacities of 1990 Supervision Loan to KAIST, GEC\. KSRI and KIER
ment 11 science, engineering, biotech, etc\.
3203 University Science & Assist selected universities 1990 Supervision Loan to KAIST, GEC\. KSRI and KIER
in basic research programs
in science and technology
KIET - Korea lnslitute of Electronics Technology ITC - Industrial Technology Center
IBK - Industrial Bank of Korea KERI - Korea Electrotechnology Research Institute
CNB - Citizens National Bank KAIST - Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
KLB - Korea Long Term Credit Bank GEC - Genetic Engineering Center
SMIPC - Small & Medium Industry Promotion Corporation KSRI - Korea Standards Research institute
KIT - Korea Institute of Technology KIER - Korea Institute of Energy and Resources
- 32 -
SECOND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2473-KO)
Table 2: PROJECT TUIETABLE
Item Date Planned Date ActUal
Identficaon Mission May 1983 May 1983
Preparabon October 1983 October 1983
Pre-Appraisal Mission
Appraisal Mission January 1984 January 1984
Post-Appraisal Mission
Loan Negotiations July 1984 August 1984
Board Approval September 1984 October 1984
Loan Signature November 1984 November 1984
Loan Effectiveness January 1985 January 1985
Loan Closing June 1989 June 1989
Loan Completion June 1987 June 1987
- 33 -
SECOND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2473-K0)
Table 3: CUMULATIVE AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS
(USS Millikns)
Appraisal lEstimate ?\.S 21\.S 39\.0 4ao S0\.0 S0\.0
Revised Estimate 3\.0 14\.8 28\.5 41\.5 S0\.0 S0\.0
Actual 5\.7 1 6\.6 33\.3 44\.0 45\.2 45\.2
ActuaJ as a %
of Estimate 76\.0 77\.2 85\.4 91\.7 90\.4 90\.4
Date of Finam atsbursement: Jun 2 28,01989
- 34 - Pane l of 8
- '1OND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2473\.KO)
Table 4\.1: UST OF SUBPROJECTS FINANCED UNDER THE LOAN
CATEGORY CCO1PANY NAME PROJETt NItAME DISSE VSS)
2-A-01 DONG BANG OIL Development of the niweat soybean proceasing 580,429\.13
syst"e
2-A-02 HANNAM COIE4CAL 0\. Technology Import of Continuous Mass Polls" I \.0\.418\.80
rxzacion Process of San Resin
2-A-03 YUKONG LTD\. Purchase of Equipments for l&D Center 664\.862\.53
2-A-04 YUCONC LTD\. Development of heavy oil cracklng process 885,810\.33
2-A-05 SAMSUNG PRECISION Development of Die Making Process of Semi- 1\.515\.901\.79
conductor Lead Frames
2-A-06 SAMSUNG PRECISION Development of Plating Process for Sesi- 1,037\.142\.23
conductor Lead Frams
2-A-0t KOREA SH\.PBUILDING Development of Stainless Sceeel Electric 728\.966\.86
Rail Csr
2-A-08 CHIrL SUGAR 6 CO\., LTD\. The Development of -Incerferon 807,725\.42
2-A-10 DAEU`OO EECTRONICS Developmenc of Tentaljus Electrolyt:c Cape- 1\.512\.679\.46
citors
2-A-12 ORIENTAL CHMD IND\. Development of Manufacturing Process of 457\.094\.75
Magnetic Recording Materials and Piezo-
electric Ceramics
2-A-13 HYUNDAI MDTOR CO\. The Developmenc of Middle sized Gasoline 1\.511\.038\.86
Engine
2-A-16 HANKUK GLASS INDUSTR Purchase of R&D Equipments 6-7\.768\.41
2-A-18 DONG AH PRECiSrON CD\. Development of Y-Bar and Z-Plate Crystal 2\.472\.076\.88
Quartz Groving Proceses
2-A-19 HAm-rL E-HWA Co\. The Develootent of the Automobile lIterior 591,987\.42
Trim parts(2)
2-A-20 CIA MOTORS CDRPORATI Import of Technology/Technical Assistance 2\.426,738\.94
for Engineering & Establishmen of Metal
Finishing Plnt
2-A-21 KIA HMTORS CORP\. Import of Technology/Technical Assistance 668,822\.00
for Engineering A Establishment of Autostic
Conveying Syscem in Natal Finishing Plane
2-A-22 CHErL SUGAR 1 CO\. Import of Interferon-Alpha production 785,728\.72
technology by recombinanc dna mcthod
2-A-23 ORDEG CO\., LTD\. Technology import of ceramic monolithic 1\.235,44S\.07
catalysts for the qutomotive emission control
2-A-25 SUNG MOON ELECTRO Localization of thin matllized film for 1\.017\.736\.18
capacitor
2-A-26 SUNKYONG CO\. Technology training for plant design & 550,780\.78
engmneering capability enhancement
2-A-27 CHEIL SUGAR CO\. Import of Inerferon-Gama production 1\.221\.178\.82
technology by recombLnant DNA mthod
2-A-28 CHEIL SUGAR CO\. Import of hepatitis 8 vacClne production 1\.119\.613\.92
technology by recombi\.nnt DNA mthod
2-A-29 tOREA IND MTOR co\. The developwenc of high efficiency induction 764,864\.28
motors
2-A-30 KORSIL CO\. LTD\. The import of wafer anufacturing technology 1\.500\.000\.00
- 35 Pate 2 of 8
CATEGORY COMPANY NAME PROJECT NAME DISBURSEMENT(USS)
2-A-31 DAEWOO AUTOMOTl''E CO\. The Development of start Motor parts for 1\.200,000\.00
Heavy Duty Vehicle
2-A-35 HANKUK ENGEL;ARD Improvement of manufacturing process of 1,391,351\.35
monolithic 3-way catalyst for automocive
emission control
2-A-37 DAEDONG HEAVY INDUST The Localization of Unit forSpecial purpose 1,000,000\.00
Machine
2-B-01 OTTOGI FOODS CO\., LTD\. Development of raw EGG processing technology 150,748\.83
2-B-02 OTrOGI FOODS CO\., LTD\. Development of Food Additives \.-ith Dooestic 305,835\.88
Agricultural Products
2-B-03 SONG WOLN INDUSTRIAL Development of Manufacturing Process of 227,506\.94
Antioxidants Including Finderec Pheno; Group
2-B-04 YOUL CHON PRINTING Development of High Grade Plastic Films 242,164\.02
2k-B-06 DAEWOO ELECTRONIC CO\. Importation of Capacitor Manufacturing 231,308\.11
Technology
2-B-07 DAEh\.0 ELECTRONIC CO\. Localization High Voltage Capacitor for 368,039\.01
Microwave Oven
2-B-08 SUNG MOON ELECTRO Localization of Metalized Film for Capacitor 797,007\.63
2-B-09 HAN IL E-WHA CO\., LTD\. The Development of the Automobile Interior 97,911\.26
Trim parts(l)
2-B-10 KEOHWA COMPANY The Import of R&D Equipments 378,416\.15
2-B-11 GOLD STAR HONEYWELL Localization of Automatic Controls Products 300,588\.93
and Systems
2-B-13 GOLD STAR INSTRUMENT Localization of the SAW Filter 101\.108\.31
2-B-14 SUNG WOUN INDUSTRIAL Development of Polyester Based Polyurethane 80,899\.89
Polymer(Moldable Thermoplastics) Manu-factu-
ring Process
2-3-16 GOLD STAR PRECISION Development of Micro Precision Motors for 55,609\.37
VTR's
2-B-17 HAN IL E-WHA CO\., LTD\. The import of Manufacturing Technology for 50,554\.15
Bus Seat
2-3-18 KOREA HEAVY INDUSTRY The Development of Partial Integral Rotor 452,522\.32
2-8-19 SAMSHIN SPINNING CO\. Development of a Fancy Yarn Spinning Process 325,108\.83
2-B-20 KIRIN SYSTEM CO\., LTD\. The development of Poinc of Sale System and 165,820\.67
Management Information
2-B-22 DOOSAN COMPUTER CORP Development for Localization of Laser Printer 108,962\.43
2-8-23 DOOSAN COMPUTER CORP Development of Chinese Character Processing 62,923\.50
CRT Terminals
2-3-24 HOEHOON TRADING COL The Development of WEATHER STRIPS for the 93,979\.72
Automobiles
2-B-25 KIA MOTORS CORP Technical Assistance for Engineering of 1'16\.416\.39
Paint Circulation SupplF SFstem
2-B-26 KIA MOTORS CORP Technical Assistance for Engineering of 224,976\.40
Electrostatric Automatic Spraying System
2-3-27 SUNG SAN CO\. The Development of Lamp for 470K/T Car 420,390\.56
-B-28 SUNGMI TELECOM ELECT The Equipment Procurement for the R&D 71,152\.14
Activities
=B-29 GOLD STAR MICRONIS The development of shadow masks for new 275\.135\.47
model C-TV's
-36 - Pa,e 3 of 8
CATEGORY COMPANY NAME PROJECT NAME DISBURSEMENT(USS)
2-B-30 A-POINT CO\. LTD\. The development of factory management 69,698\.02
\.P automation aystem
2-B-32 DAE-SUNG ELECTRIC The Development of printer tractor 149,976\.06
assembly and parts
2-5-33 ORIENTAL CHEMICAL Technology Import of Electroless Cipper 402,902\.75
Plating Solution and Solder Resist for
Through-hole Printed Circuit Boards
2-B-34 KOREA HEAVY INDUSTRI The Development of Design Technology for 473,469\.29
Power Plant Equipment
2-B-35 CHANG WON LTD\. The Development of Ferrite powder and 489,905\.7
seramic materials
2-B-36 SAM HWA CAPACITOR CO\. \.he Development of High-Voltage Ceramic 308\.793\.35
Disc Capacitors
2-B-37 SAM HWA CAPACITOR CO\. The Development of Compound for Ceramic 190,190\.00
Disc Capacitors
2-B-38 KOREA BERAL LTD\. The Development of Break Friction Materials 501,781\.41
of Automobile
2-B-39 YOUNG SUH PRECISION The Development of Micro DC Brushless Fan 226,080\.46
Motors
2-B-40 SAMSUNG CHEMICAL IND Manufacturing process improvement of Non- 181,400\.65
Toxic PVC film
2-B-41 DAELIM EKG CD\. Technology Import of Tray and Packing 333,354\.22
2-B-42 CHOKWANG PANT IND\. The Development of Etching Primer for PCB 146,680\.46
2-B-43 KO-SHIN ENERGY MGT Development of Auto-control Equipments for 199,924\.33
the Industrial Boilers
2-B-44 KOREA GREEN CROSS Commercialization of I\.v Catheter 150,000\.00
2-B-45 SAM SUNG WATCH CO Development of Plstic Watch 167,247\.74
2-3-46 KYL'%G NONG CORP Development of New Horticultural Fungicides 659,406\.83
2-3-47 YUYU IND CO\. LTD Development of Ticlopidine 80,021\.34
2-B-50 KOREA DENKI ONKYO The Development of DY\. FBT for new model TV 198,558\.56
2-B-51 KOREA SEAL MASTER CO\. Development of Siliconized Graphite for 100,000\.00
Mechanical Seal
2-B-52 SUNGMI TELECOM ELECT The Technology Import of Digital Microwave 420,000\.00
Radio Telecommulication Equipment
2-B-53 HI SEONG METAL IND Development of molivden parts for the 499,076\.86
magnetron of micro wave oven
2-B-54 GYUNG GI GELATIN CO\. Development of gelatin for hard capsule 140,000\.00
2-B-55 SUNG SAN CO\., LTD\. The Development of Rear Comb\. Lamp for GM 248,198\.20
H-Car
2-B-56 SAE RON BUL INC\. Development of Head Lamp & Combination 80,000\.00
Lamp for Exporting Automobiles
2-8-57 DOING SEON SPECIAL Development of E\.C\.B\.(Ethylene Copolymer 119\.135\.14
Bitumin)
2-B-58 CHOSUN BREWERY CO\. Purcnase of R&D Equipments 29,691\.35
2-B-59 OVAL KOREA CO\., LTD\. Development of tank truck lading system 300,000\.00
2-B-60 YOUNGBO CHEMICAL CO\. Development of Block Type Cross-Linked 121,968\.11
Polyethylene Foam
2-B-61 KOREA MULTISUN CO\. Development of PP-C Pipe Manufacturing 100,000\.00
System
- 37-
- 37 - ~~~~~page 4 of a
CATEGOY OOMPANY Nm PROJZ NME DISBCWSEWCTIUSS1
2-W-62 SAM SUNG WATCH CO\. Development of Movcwnt for Wrist Watch 398,918\.92
2-8-63 ORIENT PR2ISION CO\. Thc Development of Electronic Hemomanometer 500,000\.00
2-B-64 ORIENT PRECISION CO\. The Automation of Hbat-Run Process 500,000\.00
2-B-65 NAE WAE ELECTRIC CO\. The Development of Rminder IC 255,000\.00
2-B-67 SOE RAE IND\. CO\. Development of Doors for Automobiles 496,396\.40
2-B-68 DONGSUNG CHEM IND\. CO\. The Development of Special Oil and Paper 200,000\.00
Additive
2-B-69 [UJE PHARMA IND\. CO\. Improvement of manufacturing process of 200,000\.00
antibiotics
2-B-70 IMNALL PHARM CO\. Development of Cefoxitin "9610\.80
Total 45,040,436\.79
- 38 -
Project Cost A nvl AJmtt
C\.ATEGORY CONPASY NAMIE Iil\.Von(A) Thou\.U$ (B) KiI\.You(C) Tbou\.gS(D)
- - a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
2-A-01 DON6 BANG OIL 613 624 480 6000
2-A-02 KNANNA CHEMICAL Co\. 2,185 388 500 1\.500
2-A-03 YUKONG LTD\. 524 1\.847 500 1\.WO0
2-A-04 YUKGSG LTD\. 612 1,753 500 1\.500
2-A-05 SAMSUNG PRECISION 087 1,589 500 1,500
2-A-OS SAMSUNG PRECISION 455 1,000 0 1,000
2-A-07 KOREA SHIPBUILDING 690 850 500 850
2-A-O8 CHEIL SUGAR & CO\., LTD\. 757 1,031 500 800
2-A-10 DAIVOG ELECTRONICS 625 1\.832 500 1,500
2-A-12 ORIENTAL CEN IND\. 421 800 330 600
2-A-13 MEDAI MOTOR CO\. 13,043 13,038 500 1\.500
2-A-16 AIKL! GLA4SS INDOSTR 70 530 0 630
2-A-18 DOlG AK PRECISION CO\. 591 2,730 500 2,500
2-A-19 H W-IL E-EVA CO\. 350 600 300 000
2-A-20 UA MOTORS CORPORATI 0 2,350 0 2,350
2-A-21 KIA MOTORS CORP\. 0 740 0 740
2-A-22 CHEIL SUUAR & CO\. 0 800 0 800
2-A-23 ORDEG CO\. LTD\. 5,174 2\.813 500 1\.43
2-A-23 SUNG NOON BLECTRO 210 910 0 910
2-A-25 SUNKYONG CO\. 50 '680 0 5o0
2-A-27 CHEIL SUGAR CO\. 0 1,439 0 1,200
- 39 - Ia\." 6 of I
Project Cost Atpio,l Amt
CATEGORY COMPAY ANAI ViI\.Von(A) Thou\.U $(B) mI1\.Vw(C) S M\.US1D)
2-1-28 CHEIL SUGLa CO\. I so7 2,270 471 i,tW
2-A-29 KOREA In NOTOR CO\. 319 1,OO0 los 1l6oo
Z-A-30 10iOIL CO\., LTD\. S E\.l66 0 \.l9,O
2-1-31 DAEWOO AUTOMOTIVE CO\. 1,007 0 S00 l,\.
2-1-35 IUKN IELW 399 1,400 300 10,4
2-A-37 DAIDONG HEAVY IMT 597 514 0 low
2--01 OTTOGI FOODS CO\. LTB\. 311 175 220 175
2-B-02 OTTOGI FOODS CO\., LTD\. 412 325 28 35
2-3-03 SONG VOUN INDUSTRIAL 570 250 450 250
2-B-04 YOUL CAD1 PRINTIEG 1,6839 3612 250 2
2-5-06 DAKYG0 ELECTRONIC CO\. 0 230 0 3
2-1-07 DAMVOG ELECONIC CO\. 113 380 le 2
2-B-08 SUWG 001 ELECTRO 450 500 200 5"
2-3-09 I-IL 1-VA CO\., LTD\. 185 97 100 97
2-1-10 uOIVA COOMY 0 425 0 425
2--11 GOLD STAR HONETLL 39 1,032 30G 4U
2-B-13 GOLD STAR INSTRUNUT 244 220 200 100
2-B-14 SUNG VON INDUSTRIAL 256 80 200 as
2--18 GOLD STAR PRECIsId S 309 170 250 l7
2-3-17 UN-IL 1-NA CO\.s LTD\. 0 so 0
2-3-18 Omu Mif INDUSTRY 374 460 300 40
-1-19 SS151 SPINNING Co\. 120 300 K 2
-B-20 11113 SYSTEM CO\., LTD\. 318 170 28 175
- 40 - IUZ2~
- 40 - ~~~~~Palo 7 of 8
ProJect Cost Approval howt
CATEGORY CO PANY NAME Mil\.Won(A) Tbou\.US (B) Hil\.Won(C) Tbau\.U (D)
2-3-22 DOOSAN COMPUTER CORP 293 110 250 110
2-3-23 DOOSAN COMPUTER CORP 301 60 250 Q0
2-B-24 HOEROON TRADINfG COL 117 200 100 200
2-B-25 KIA MOTORS CORP 0 270 0 270
2-B-26 KIA MOIORS CORP 0 400 0 4W
2-9-27 SUNG SAN CO\. 1,040 420 1,040 420
2-3-28 SUNGMI TELECOM ELECT 27 75 20 75
2-B-29 GOLD STAR MICROMIS 557 270 450 20
2-3-30 A-POINT CO\., LTD\. 90 70 50 70
2-5-32 DAE-SUNG ELECTRIC 227 150 150 150
2-3-33 ORIENTAL CHEMICAL 490 400 0 too
2-B-34 KOREA HEAVY INDUSTRI 0 470 0 470
2-B-35 CHANG WON LTD\. 50 500 500 50C
2-5-36 SAM EVA CAPACITOR CO\. 666 300 490 30C
2-B-37 SAM HWA ,APAL'TOR CO\. 580 200 450 20C
2-3-38 KOREA BERAL LTD\. 1,T25 500 tO0 me
2-B-39 YOUNG SUB PRECISION 846 132 0 280
2-3-40 SAMSUNG CHENICAL IND 435 180 360 1I
2-3-41 DAELIM ENG CO\. 366 335 -300 8
2-B-42 CHOKtyNG PAIN IND\. 747 0 350 160
2-3-43 1O-SHIN ENERGY HGT 425 200 300 t0o
2-B-44 KOREA GREEN CROSS 400 0 200 150
2-3-45 SAM SUNG WATCH CO\. 572 234 450 201
- 41 -
Page 8 of -
Project Cost Approval Auunt
CATEGORY COMPANY MANE Mil\.Voa(A) Thou\.US (B) mil\.von(C) Tbhu\.US(D)
2-8-46 MYUNG NOMG CORP 313 488 250 450
2-8-47 YM IND CO\. 'TD\. 388 0 250 too
2-B-30 KOREA DENKI ONyO 647 Q 485 200
2-B-5I KOREA SEAL MASTER CO\. 279 100 200 100
2-3-52 SbNGMI TELECOM ELECT 425 0 425
2-B-53 1I SEONG METAL IND 0 500 0 Soo
2-B-54 TNG GI GEUIIN Co\. 440 752 370 140
2-1-55 SuEG SX C3o\. LTD\. 536 250 538 250
2-B-56 SAE RON BUL INC\. 519 100 400 100
2-1-57 DONG SEO!I SPECIAL 255 120 200 120
2-B-S8 CEOStUs BREERT CO\. 36 185 30 18
2-B-59 OVAL KOREA CO\., LTD\. 325 300 260 S00
2-B-60 TOuNoBO ClINICAL CO\. 371 200 300 zoo
2-B-61 KOREA NULTISUN CO\. 350 0 200 100
2-B-62 SAN S6'BG ATCH CO\. 812 a 400 400
2-5-63 ORIENT PRECISION CO\. 512 500 430 500
-8-C4 ORIENT PRECISION CO\. 544 500 U40 gO0
4-\.85 - CAE VAEK ELECTRIC-\. ; 355 255 900 2U5
-B-B7 SOE afe IND\. CO\. 830 600 450 g00
a-es BONGSUNG COU IND\. CO\. 828 0 450 200
B-89 KUKJE PHARA IND\. CO\. 842 0 300 200
-9-70 HANALL PEARX CO\. 189 113 I50 100
Grand-Total 55\.792 67\.622 23,691 47\.687
- 42 -
Pacs I d 2
SECOND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENW PROJWr
(LOAN 2473K0)
TaIlm 4± DISTRIBUTION OF SUBPROJECTS
Cl) 1I of hoj}a Aine by tadustry SMr
!amny Sector A*\.offroCc
IJflt7 / H&tLL 24 1\.0M\.563\.0&
fl\.acU I 0 1tieL 28 LJ3\.,35LOZ
cbL / oQr 37 1 520\.n
TocAL 89 45\.0i0\.436\.79
(2) ler of ftojacts g Asat by Projet Tpe
a3&0 Tn 1 so\. of Projects Amount
P7urc a1 a R D equicsa 8 3\.662\.715\.22
a A 0 49 22\.012\.488\.2
ZSz@,C of imscfl pn oen 7 2\.9S3\.821\.91
Cic1a ciamt of now pr tc: 7 2\.6S\.80A\.&7
Tloiogry wort 18 13\.M\.606\.91
ToeAL 89 45\.040\.436\.79
(3) N_be of Projet ad Amont by Comway Stm\.
Cominy Sue Ito\. of Projecft A ____________t __
LiTii 27\. n\.049\.2
S_1 a Kuitls 42 17\.869\.387\.37
Tat"l 89 45\.040\.436\.79
(4) _ii of Project\. an Amoue by fi\.auaslze Inawc
[_ComvinttouL LOW Zne9 &I 314,060\.436\.79 1
S) 1 of Projec md Aom\.t by Subloan Sixe
5\.4mm S_ze No\. of projewt An_
A 5bl\.= 27 29\.n7\.962\.93
a S\.bi\.m 62 l5\.W\.73\.85
Toal 48\.040\.436\.79
- 43 -
Pm 2 of 2\.
(6) fber of Pw\.j\.s aed A\.m by Ragi
3agN Mo\. of Ftoja A
Z,uq4L 31 465\.T,4
It,sw$ 19 16021\.83\.77
Kym4k 3 70\.02
Pm\. S 1\.51S\.Os3\.17
Tas 3 ?U\.M\.76
CIho&4 S3 m1,SO\.32
Total 89 0\.8\.436\.79
Page 1 of 2
- 44 _
SECOND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2473-KO)
Table 4\.3: SELECTED EXAMPLES OF KTDC SUPPORTED SUBPROJECTS
1\. (1) Company Name Nae-Wae Electric Co\., Ltd\.
(2) Project Name : Development of Reminder IC
(3) Type and Amount of KTDC Financing : Conventional Loan (U$255 Thou\.,
W300Nil\.)
(4) Brief Discription of the Project
The project is a kind of ASIC (Application Specific IC) named as
"Reminder IC", which can store sound information and repeat that
information if requested\. This IC which consists of AID, D/A
converters, memory unit and control unit is essential to the
manufacturing of auto-answering telephone set, language training
equipment, cassette recorder and toys, etc\. KTDC provided a
comprehensive s-pport for the growth of the company , which
encompassed managerial and financial consultation even including the
ground work for going public\.
2\. (1) Company Name : Sung Moon Electronics Co\., LTD\.
(2) Project Name : Localization of thin metallized film for capacitor
(3) Type and Amount of KYDC Financing : Conventional Loan(U$ 1,018 Thou\.)
(4) Brief Description of the Project
KTDC financed technology development projects from start-up to
cowercialization stage for the company\. Among them, Metallized fils
45 - Egge 2 of 2
is made through the process of putting a super-thin membranous metal
on the ordinary film under a vacuum condition\. Special know-how in
the operation and treatment is required for this high quality product\.
Metallized film is one of the essential materials for capacitors\.
comprising 35% of the total material costs of these items\. Until
now, metallized film has been imported from Japan or West Germany, and
local capacitor makers faced a difficulty in securing a stable supply
of the product\. Though the localization of metallized film, domestic
capacitor makers can improve their international competitiveness, and
import substitution effect is expected\.
3\. (1) Company Name : Kia Motors Corp\.
(2) Project Name : Import of Technology / Technical assistance for
Engineering & Establishment of Automatic Conveying
System in Hetal Finishing Plant\.
(3) Type and Amount of KTDC Financing : Conventional Loan (U$ 689 Thou\.)
(4) Brief Description of the Project
KTDC has financed KIA MOTORS CORPORATION to build up a new painting
shop(Hetal Finishing Plant)\. Kia has succesfully established
automatic conveying system in metal finishing shop at Sohari Plant by
making all the process-painting, drying, rinsing, colling, test and
assembling\. Continuously, KIA has increased the productivity and the
quality of the product and has enhanced the technology in the field of
conveying system under the technical assistance of NAKANISHI in Japan\.
- 46 -
Pf 1 of 2
SECOND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2473-KO)
Tabie 4\.4: KTDC INSTITUONAL PERFORMANCE
1\. Staff Training
a\. Overseas Training
\., I i r
I 1984 1983 1986 1 1987 1988 1989
o Duration
- Lonq-term i 3 2 3 2 - 1
- Short-term 1 2 1 2 2 6
o Field
Fifncug WDeAcww 3 4 3 3 2 6
C l O~s~
- le 6op u at 1 - 1 1 - 1
SM hsuss _
o Destination
v\. S\. A\. 4 2 2 i _ 2
- Europe _- - - -
-Japan _ - 1 1 1 1
- South-East Asia - 2 1 2 1 4
b\. Domestic Training
-18 j1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
(1)External Courses
(Short-term only)
o Finance & Investment: - - - 1 6 12
o Capital Market _- - S 8
(KSTI)
o Marketing (IMZ) _- - 2 1
o Planning _ _ _ 2 2 2
& Administration
(KPC, FKZ ete)
oM I s _ 2 6
(2)Graduate School - 1 2 2 3 2
(31 OJT in Portpolto - - 2 2 9 6
companiLes
(4)New employed szaffs - - - - 6
Orientation
(S)Group Traininq - 12 52 70
- 47 -
2\. The Use of Consultancy Services
Name of Consultant Country of Institute Field of ODuration
Origin Assigned Activity From To
Frank S\. Bayley U\.S\.A\. Venture Capital The Internation- 84\.10\.11
Invest nal Strategy of - 84\.10\.12
Venture Capital
Arthur C\. Patterson U\.S\.A\. Citicorp Venture
Capital Ltd\.
George Hara U\.S\.A\. |Shotosa interna-
ltional Tokyo&CA
Y\.S\. Chang U\.S\.A\. sian Management The Review of '85\.3
Center Boston Orginization - '85\.12
Univ\. and MIS
Y\.H\. Lee U\.S\.A\. _
K\.N\. Rao U\.S\.A\.
William A\. Ward U\.S\.A\. Ir\.stitute for Appraisal '87\.5\.11
Development Technique -'87\.5\.15
Programs
Paul Toal U\.S\.A\. New Product Dev\.
Industrial Dev\.
Authority of
Ireland
- 48 -
SECOND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2473-KO)
TabIl 4\.5: KTDC FINANCED R&D PROJECTS PERFORMED BY PUBUC RESEARCH INSTITUTE
(Von Million)
Name of the Instituce No\. of Projects Total Budget Amounc of KTDC Financing
KAIST 16 6,324 4\.580
KIMM 17 4,999 4,065
KRICT 6 4,937 4,043
KIER 4 895 720
KGTRI 1 654 280
Total \. _17\.809 13,688
Abbreviations
KAIST Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
KIMN Korea Institute of Machinery and Metals
KRX1T Korea Research Institute of Chemical Technology
KIER Korea Institute oi Energy Resources
KGTRI Korea Ginseng and Tobacco Researcn Insticute
- 49 -
SECONQ TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2473-KO)
Table S\. 1: ESTIMATEO AND ACTUAL AMOUNT OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT (CURRENCY AND INSTRUMENT)
(Won Billion)
1984 1985 1966 1987 1988 1969 Toa84^S9
Est Ae-aL Er\. A=xL Eec A=AL EeC Ae:UaL EeC AcCnL Eec AcG&1 Est c~
\.Aomma bms
CaWaUL L1 35\.1 35\.0 '8\.7 36\.3 11\.6 43\.5 45\.9 44\.9 68\.0 43\.7 52\.0 '\.45 2613 247\.9
rmui LOW 0\.9 0\.6 0\.9 1\.8 1\.5 1\.9 1 7 1\.0 1\.8 1\.6 2\.6 0\.0 9\.4 6\.9
GMW=blA &IhX 0 1\.5 0 1\.2 0 2\.9 0 2\.8 0 1\.4 0 3\. o UJ
EmAit 9=w 3\.9 0\.9 : 4 1\.3 5\.9 3\.9 8\.4 3\.3 10\.2 4'0 10\.4 10\.1 43\.1 n\.'4
S9bCo\. 3\.9 2\.3 L: 2\.5 5\.9 6\.8 8\.4 6\.1 10\.2 3\.4 10\.4 13\.6 43\.1 36\.7
Total 39\.8 37\.9 "\.0 40\.6 '\.9\.0 52\.2 ;\.0 52\.0 60\.0 50\.7 65\.0 38\.1 313\.8 291-'
Canmu± Low 15\.2 18\.7 16\.9 20\.8 18\.4 12\.2 20\.0 I5\.0 19\.9 17\.0 19\.9 15\.5 110\.1 99\.:
Gaiii"uL Lam 0 0\.0 0\.2 0\.0 0\.4 0\.0 0\.4' 0\.0 0\.4 0\.0 0\.6 2\.1 0\.0
1 ^rAreLwa BIhX 0 0\.4 0 0\.00 0\.00 0\.0 0 0\.0 0 0\.0 0 0\.4
eqwcv Sw 0 0\.0 0\.9 0\.0 1\.2 0\.0 1\.3 0\.0 1\.S 0\.0 1\.5 0\.0 6\.9 0\.0
sjbml 0 0\.4 0\.9 0\.0 1\.2 0\.0 1\.5 0\.0 1\.8 0\.0 1\.5 0\.0 6\.9 0\.4
OiUl 1,5\.1 19\.1 18\.0 tO\.8 20\.0 12\.2 21\.9 IS\.0 22\.C 17-0 =2\.0 U5\.5 119\.1 99\.6
\.oCaL
C\.vmmml 1\.n 50\.3 53\.7 :3\.6 57\.1 60\.0 55\.7 65\.9 59\.9 67\.8 60\.7 71\.8 60\. 371\.4 347\.1
GxdiLa 1 0\.9 0\.6 L\.: ;\.S 1\.9 1\.9 2\.!\. 1\.0 2\.2 I\.S 3\.3 0\.0 11\.5 6\.9
ca'web1a amdo 0 1\.9 0 1\.2 0 2\.90 :\.8 0 1\.4 0 3\.5 0 13\.7
E*dcy Slm 3\.9 0\.8 5\.3 1\.3 7\.1 3\.9 9\.9 3\.3 12\.0 6\.0 11\.9 10\.1 D\.0 -2\.4
51\.cmJ 3\.8 2\.7 5\.3 2\.5 7\.1 6\.8 9\.9 6\.1 12\.0 5\.4 11\.9 13\.6 53\.0 37\.1
TOr1\. 53\.0 57\.0 62\.o 61\.- o d 6f\.4 7\.9 67\.3 ,\., 67\.7 87\.0 73\.6 43\.9 39!\.1
%*Aw0m - t - -
rL GSaTvX
GC\.w22 uira La 3D\.5 26\.7 36\.9 38\.8 60\.2 \.8\.4 43\.8 62\.7 47\.0 46\.1 50\.0 48\.6 248\.4 251\.3
Ca,lcaUJ\. L=n 1\.0 0\.4 0\.9 0\.8 1\.2 1\.7 1\.6 1\.S 1\.7, 1\.7 2\.3 0\.1 8\.7 6\.5
B:mvurcLA lknit0 1\.5 0 1\.0 0 2\.7 0 3\.0 0 1\.2 0 3\.-9 0 U\.-3
Ew\.cY S1wi 2\.'\. 0\.4 4\.1 1\.0 5\., 4\.7 7\.1 3\.1 9\.3 5\.2 10\.3 10\.5 33\.3 24\.9
Subr~ 2\.4 1\.9 4\.1 2\.0 5\.1 7\.4 7\.1 6\.1 9\.3 6\.4 10\.3 14\.4 38\.3 38\.2
ToaL 32\.9 29\.0 41\.9 41\.6 66\.5 57\.5 52\.5 50\.6 58\.0 54\.2 62\.6 63\.1 295\.4 196\.0
Fobmp Q
Qwa==im Lan 16\.2 15\.7 18\.5 17\.8 16\.7 14\.6 18\.3 12\.6 19\.3 16\.4 19\.9 16\.6 1W\.9 93\.7
Lam 0\.21 0\.0 0\.1 0\.0 0\.3 0\.0 0\.4 0\.0 0\.4 0\.0 0\.6 0\.0 2\.0 0\.0
8Ca b1*8&\. 0 0\.0 0 0\.0 0 0\.0 0 0\.0 o 0\.0 0 0\.0 0 0\.0
Eqwt Sum 0 0\.0 0\.' 0\.0 1\.0 0\.0 1\.4 0\.0 1\.' 0\.0 1\.6 0\.0 6\.1 0\.0
Subtcsl 0 0\.0 0\.4 0\.0 1\.0 0\.0 1\.4 0\.0 1\., 0\.0 !\.6 0\.0 6\.1 0\.0
TOel 16\.4 '5\.7 19\.0 17\.8 18\.0 14\.6 20\.1 12\.6 21\.4 16\.4 2\.1 16\.6 117\.0 93\.7
CaWCM~MmL IM 46\.7 42\.4 55\.4 56\.6 36\.9 63\.0 62\.1 55\.3 66\.3 62\.5 69\.9 65\.2 357\.3 345\.0
nca\. L 1 1\.' 0\.4 1\.0 0\.8 1\.5 1\.7 2\.0 1\.8 2\.1 -7 2\.9 0\.1 10\.7 6\.5
EquLe
CoQDrMble BMU 0 1\.5 0 1\.0 0 : \.7 0 3\.0 0 1\.2 0 3\.9 0 13\.3
er sw_ '\.4 0\.4 '\.5 1\.0 6\.1 4\.7 8\.5 3\.1 11\.0 5\.2 11\.9 10\.5 44\.t\. 24\.9
1ibtaL 2\.4, 1\.9 4\.5 2\.0 6\.1 7\.4 8\.5 6\.1 11\.0 6\.4 11\.9 14\.4 44\.4 3S\.2
Total 50\.3 44\.7 f7\.9 49\.4 66\.5 72\.1 72\.6 63\.2 \.9\.4 70\.6 84\.7 79\.7 412\.4 389\.7
- 50 -
SECOND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2473-KO)
Table 5\.2: ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL AMOUNT OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT (COLLATERAL COND!TIONS)
(Won Billion)
1984 198S 1986 1987 1988 1989 To\.1(84-89'
(A &: h Est AcaaL Est kumL Est AioaL Eat kIcL Est AcuaL Est Acta Eat kOJ&
4th Cclltem^ n\.a\. 35\.2 n\.a\. 37\.6 n\.a\. 40\.3 n\.a\. 47\.1 n\.a\. 39\.8 n\.a\. 33\.7 n\.a\. M\.7
Widowt CalUatL n\.a\. 18\.5 n\.a\. 19\.5 n\.a\. 15\.4 n\.a\. 12\.8 n\.a\. 20\.9 n\.a\. 26\.3 n\.a\. 113\.4
Subucla± i0\.3 53\.7 55\.6 57\.1 60\.0 55\.7 65\.9 59\.9 67\.8 60\.7 71\.8 60\.0 371\.4 347\.1
CadttLaL LcLro 0\.9 0\.6 1\.1 1\.8 1\.9 1\.9 2\.1 1\.0 2\.2 1\.6 3\.3 0\.0 11\.5 6\.9
Equiqty Intts
QMo &nds
With Colaterg na\. 1\.8 n\.a\. 0\.8 n\.a\. 2\.3 n\.a\. 1\.1 n\.a\. 0\.7 n\.a\. 1\.6 n\.a\. 8\.3
Widot GoUatarai n\.a\. 0\.1 n\.a\. 0\.2 n\.a\. 0\.5 n\.a\. 2\.0 n\.a\. 0\.! n\.a\. 1\.9 n\.a\. 5\.4
SubotL n\.a\. 1\.9 n\.a\. 1\.0 n\.a\. '\.s n\.a\. 3\.1 n\.a\. 1\.4 n\.a\. 3\.5 n\.a\. 13\.7
B*uiq Sww 3\.9 0\.8 5\.3 1\.5 7\.1 4\.0 9\.9 3\.0 12\.0 4\.0 11\.9 10\.1 50\.0 23\.4
Totl 3\.8 2\.7 e\.3 2\.5 7\.1 6\.8 9\.9 6\.1 12\.0 5\.4 11\.9 13\.6 5D\.0 37\.1
Grand-Tota 55\.0 57\.0 62\.0 61\.4 69\.0 64\.4 77\.9 67\.0 82\.0 67\.7 87\.0 73\.6 432\.9 391\.1
No\. of FroJec 150 184 165 188 182 199 '10 210 222 232 278 1,136 1,\.U
Av\. Fin\. Mwjwmif:ct tIbn IgLL\.in) 267 310 276 327 239 290 391 119 290 305 378 265 331 3D
( Prqnt(2) I
G2w0a Lft
withi COllaw*i n\.a\. 61\.8 n\.a\. 61\.2 n\.a\. 62\.6 n\.a\. i0\.3 n\.a\. 58\.8 n\.a\. 45\.8 n\.a\. 59\.8
Wi?huzt CollatrvL n\.a\. 32\.5 n\.a\. 31\.8 n\.a\. 23\.9 n\.a\. 19\.1 n\.a\. 30\.9 na\. 35\.7 n\.a\. 29\.0
Subicg 91\.5 94\.2 89\.7 93\.3 87\.0 86\.5 84\.6 89\.4 82\.7 89\.7 82\.5 81\.5 85\.8 83\.S
Cami±LacnLI aen 1\.6 1\.1 1\.8 2\.9 2\.7 3\.0 2\.7 1\.5 2\.7 2\.4 3\.8 0\.0 2\.7 1\.7
Equity iwavmat
bmomle Bd
WLth CoJatemL n-a\. 3\.2 \.a-8 1\.3 n-a- 3\.6 n-a- 1\.6 n0a\. 1\.0 n0a\. 2\.2 na\. 2\.1
Widowt Cwlateu n\.a\. 0\.2 n\.a\. 0\.3 n\.a\. 0\.8 n\.a\. '3\.0 n\.a\. 1\.0 n\. 2\.6 n a\. 1\.4
Subtcll n\.a\. 3\.3 n\.a\. 1\.6 n\.a\. 4\.3 n\.a\. 4\.6 n\.a\. 2\.0 n0a\. 4\.8 n\.a\. 3\.5
E4q 3m n\.a\. 1\.4 n\.a\. 2\.4 n\.a\. 6\.2 n\.a\. 4\.5 n\.a\. 5\.9 na\. 13\.7 n\.a\. 6\.0
Toal -\.9 4\.7 8\.5 4\.1 10\.3 10\.6 12\.7 9\.1 14\.6 7\.9 13\.7 18\.5 11\.5 9\.5
Grad Total :00\.0 lD\.0 10\.0 10D\.0 IOD\.0 10D\.0 10\.0 1(7\.0 10D\.0 10D\.0 100\.0 103\.0 102\.0 100\.0
With Collatezi n\.a\. 64\.9 n\.a\. 62\.5 n\.a\. 66\.1 n\.a\. 71\.9 n\.a\. 59\.8 n\.a\. 48\.0 n\.a\. 61\.9
Widou Co1laemaL n\.a\. '5\.1 n\.a\. 37\.5 n\.a\. 33\.9 n\.a\. 29\.1 n\.a\. 40\.2 n\.a\. 52\.0 n\.a\. 39\.1
- 51 -
SECOND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2473-KO)
Table 5\.3: ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL RESOURCE MOBIUZATION 1984- 1989L
(Won Million)
Deemb*r 31 1984 1983 1986 198? 1988 1969 Tose(M4-89)
Es\. AceLL Est\. kAml ESt\. A=&L Fat\. Auml Est\. Acml Fa\. &AL Et\. Ac=km
2,000 2\.0D 3\.000 4,OM 4,000 2\., 0 2\.= 0 (3\.699) 0 - 9*= 6,301
Privue 2\.aO 6\.X5 6\.3D 643 5\.CC 6\.4W 5*=0 0 5\.G 6\.0W 3-*M 2,4W 00 30 21\.697
m6betal 4\.D 8\.155 9\.3m 4\.643 9\.M S\.-tM %,OM 2\.= 5\.QD 2\.:W 3\.OC 2,4D 35M0 27\.998
r|_enmm 2\.O 2\.OMD 18\. 5\.C0 laODIO\.OOD 0M\. 0 27\.= 0 35\.M 3o\.0D 79,O
Debmwmm ib 19\.OD 30\.= 9\.3m 11\.m 0 10o\. 0 033\.0 3D\.UD 14\.250 15\.l W9\.7 96\.1
od 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 960 0 678 0 1,6i2
21\.OOD 32\.m 27\.5M 16\.0M 19\.C000\.00 0 \.A 38\.00S7\.950 14\.2S1 30\.678118\.701765\.68
Im [16\.439 15\.996 19\.0;9 18\.60 18\.0B 12\.1M1 W3\.0 12\.432 21\.396 15\.251 22\.110 12445 UW-Wa8L\.53s
B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 027\.2 0 0 027\.o
Grai Toal 41\.439 56\.151 55\.84939\.247 45\.0B40\.SDI 2\.AB 34\.438 64\.396 W2\.63 39\.30 O\.MVI\.iM3i8\.M
'L Di_bzuin b
/b Befcc dilcaftt
- 52' -
SECOND TECHNOLOGY DVLPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2473-K0)
Taft 5\.4: ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL FINANCIAL INDICATORS 196419I
Yeers ending Decmber 31 1984 1905 198 197 1 19_
Ea\. kAuL Ee\. kt=L EW\. ACML Est\. kt Eat\. kCmL\. Fat\. ,C\.L
- at J- JAte
1\. Gr_m1 /\. 11\.76 11\.43 10\.29 13\.97 13\.98 13\.31 16\.66 12 11\.5 U1 12\.0 11\.6
2\. Fim=aL Eq /b 9\.63 9\.13 9\.80 10\.41 9\.7 10\.3 9\.43 9\.67 7\.1 7\.7 8\.6 6\.0
3\. Grm Sp (1-2) 2\.13 2\.30 0\.49 3\.56 4\.27 2\.n 7\.23 3\.17 4\.4 3\.7 3\.4 5\.6
4\. MA \.lsu Eq:am 4\.34 1\.85 3\.34 1\.34 3\.19 1\.3 3\.3 1\.3 1\.3 1\.5 0\.9 1\.7
5\. Pfrm frLo n\. 0\.44 n\.a\. 0\.48 n\.a\. 0\.02 n\.e 0\.10 0\.3 0\.2 0\.1 0\.2
6\. Nt hcons bIo T -2\.78 o\.a5 03\.29 1\.22 0\.72 1\. 3\.72 1\.46 2\.2 2\.1 1\.6 2\.6
Ntt _a Z oSf Avtmp Not kkrth 13-3 0\.20 -17\.07 5\.53 2\.55 4\.64 11\.S7 5\.73 6\.3 8\.7 5\.1 U\.0
-pd 0n Avup IC CrWataL Lam
IaAvq\.LC Cai1um Iau(Z) /e n\. 14\.C6 n\. 14\.34 n\. 13\.5 ne 13\.70 1245 IMP a\.a 11\.6
Fin\. ExpqmWAvgA\.C Lw#-mu Dt(Z) t nD\.e 11\.25 n\.a\. 13\.28 n\.e\. 12\.81 na\. 12\.54 8\.75 10\.49 a\.e 8\.8
*Wd (S) na\. 2\.81 n\.e 1\.06 n\. 1\.04 n\.e 1\.16 3\.3 2\. n\.e 2\.8
Spam: an I mgEC Carwni: amik
WaWAvg\. EC G Imv aui LcmS(Z) na\. 15\.94 n\.s\. 16\.64 n\.e\. 14\.52 n\.e 12\.96 11\.40 10\.49 *w MO
Fftaq ibig\.0 b=*wqs(Z) n\.e 12\.69 n\. 12\.49 na\. 13\.67 ne 11\.68 9\.9D 8\.93 A\.e 8\.
Sju M(Z) n\.e 3\.25 na\. 4\.14 na\. 0\.1 n\. 1\.30 1\.3D 1\. e 0\.74
0a Avg\. Tlbw CaI _ionam 1n
LIau\.tAn- Totl Cm,U\.aS Lm*) I 5\.72 14\.35 15\.67 15\.33 15\.65 14412 154\.5 13\.41 11-V U\.7! 14\.4S 10\.90
FInqmi/bAvg\. local\. Zwe-tim W() 12\.45 11\.69 12\.16 13\.0 12\.80 13416 12\.75 12\.19 9\.22 9\.92 12\.5 8\.69
sir (Z) 3\.27 3\.05 3\.51 2\.20 2\.85 0\.96 2\.91 1\. 2\.53 1\.*3 1\.91 2\.2
PlO 85K W V10 DBM S Q GE:
kvep LC CamaaI KIl) n\.e -0\.67 n\.a\. -2\.51 na\. -1\.53 n\.e -1\.16 2\.32 1\.0 na\. 0\.0
Aviq KE Caa\.L LMI IZ) na\. -o\.n n\. 0\.59 na\. 0\.53 n\. 1\.07 1\.D 1\.49 n\.e\. 0\.0
Avmqa Total CaGm _mL l=SZ) n\. -0\.60 n\.e\. -1\.36 n\.e\. -0\.70 n\.e -0\.25 1\.90 1\.2D n0e 0\.0
T1bcl 1bbc/fuiey hAia(e) 3\.4 4\.2 4\.2 4\.7 4\.1 4\.6 3\.6 4\.1 3\.7 4\.1 3\.7 3\.9
two-am DfmiPd t btums_) 3\.4 4\.0 4\.2 4\.5 3\.8 3\.8 3\.4 2\.3 3\.1 33 3\.5 34
omuc Astio(cusis) n\.a\. 15\.4 n\.e 9\.4 n\.a\. 1\.0 na\. 0\.3 n\.e 2\.9 G\.e 4\.3
PtUNU/T (dSL(z) n\.a\. 1\.0 na\. 1\.0 na\. 0\.7 n\.e 0\.6 n\.e 0\.6 DA\. 0\.4
/a Tocal Jam rarp Er l_ 1g w\.Zani Cam
'lb, FFlE u ti:man d
/C tte Lwm Udiim a mum Umofd aa dr
- 53 -
SECOND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2473-KO)
Table 5\.5: ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL INCOME STATEMENTS 1984-1989
(Won Million)
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Years endin2 December 31
Est Actual Est Actual Est Actual Est Actual Est Actual Est Actu
Income
Income on Conventional Loans
Interesc/commitment fees 8\.332 5\.677 13\.014 10\.749 20\.049 17\.076 22\.154 19\.259 23\.116 18,601 24\.37 18\.601
GOK's interest rate support 0 1\.869 0 3\.293 0 2,279 0 2,394 0 1\.035 0 0
Subtotal 8\.332 \.566 13\.014 14\.042 20\.049 19\.355 2Z\.154 21\.653 23\.116 19,636 24,357 18\.601
Income on Conditional Loans
Royalty 9 16 144 17,4 362 03 647 25 1,129 841 1\.489 869
GOK's support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 C
Subtotal 9 16 144 :,4 362 33 647 285 1\.129 841 1\.489 869
Income on Equity Investment
Intuast == anonv ertble bcmds 55 ' 130 116 S1 ;93 480 27n 831 363 839 457 823
Diviaz an equLty w es 0 0 5 1 30 7 117 43 353 174 781 319
Ctl gin an A csf W,y- I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 392 36 3,302 645
Subtotal 55 13) 121 32 213 487 392 875 1\.t 1,049 4,560 1\.787
Income on Factoring o 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 32 0 1\.069
Inmt 1zm on liquid hoIns 1,536 1\.672 2\.193 3\.M8 4,018 3\.962 4\.351 3\.7,27 3,874 4,36 3\.925 3\.630
Fign eng e n pus 0 63 0 (376) 0 (529) 0 (441) 0 (360) 0 (140
1\. tnet)
Other income (net0 0 92 0 83 0 71 0 10 0 223 0 36C
Total Income 9\.932 9\.519 15\.17i 18\.093 21\.059 23\.554 27\.664 26\.259 25\.848 25\.868 30\.921 26\.176
Expenses
Financial expenses 7,775 ,706 11\.570 12,727 15\.157 18\.173 16\.590 19,391 17,625 16\.80 21,153 14\.876
Depreciation and amortization 943 878 1\.177 1\.181 99) 1,166 1\.044 902 1,032 468 1\.165 381
Administration expenses 1\.35 1,533 1,656 1\.,91 1,821 2,326 2\.044 2,712 2\.3 3,7 2\.624 3\.844
provision for losses 427 364 683 664 397 32 363 209 357 528 371 58Y
Write-off of bad debts 0 0 0 130 362 0 382 0 1\.071 0 163 C
Total Expenses 10\.630 9,481 l4\.S84 16\.473 18\.719 21,697 20\.33 23\.214 22\.39 21\.8 26\.782 19\.6d
Net Income Before Tax \.717j 38 7 1\.63) 2,;60 1\.857 3\.:S1 3\.045 3\.510 4,760 4 6\.4w)
Taxes 0 3 0 26 49 362 1\.313 814 1\.404 937 1\.66 854
Net Income After Tax (717) 35 587 1\.3$0 1\.691 1\.495 1\.969 2\.231 2\.105 3\.8Z3 2\.483 5\.636
- 54 -
SECOND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2473\.KO)
Table 5\.6: ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL BALANCE SHEETS 1984-1989
(Won Millon)
1984 1965 1986W 1987 1966 1989
Years ending December 31
Est\. Actual Est\. Actual Est\. Actual Est\. Actual Est\. Actual Est\. Actual
Assets
Cash ad iUi 1dinp 11,377 32\.621 25\.179 28\.437 41\.786 28\.257 30\.732 18\.252 33,83 33M\.7 31l\.35 27\.1U3
hut ravab1a 1,678 1\.6S7 3,391 2,424 4,875 3,387 7,245 3\.563 9\.3D1 3\.459 11\.855 4\.121
O2wamoawislo o 73\.152 68\.366 111,\.07 114,514 135,837 157,354 152\.831 163\.375 163\.999 164\.752 173\.451 172,238
CadimLa 1a 2\.941 2\.332 3,417 2\.621 4,150 3,923 5,197 4\.727 6,429 5,107 8,235 4,00
fqudty mn
Gvwrule bsmvs 0 1\.748 0 2\.376 0 4,657 0 6,891 0 7\.587 0 11,632
tyi r 2\.555 611 6\.994 1\.698 13,061 6\.377 20,655 8,941 3S\.119 12\.912 38\.516 20,25
Toeal 2\.555 2\.35 6\.994 4,074 13\.061 11,074 20\.655 15\.832 30\.119 20,499 38\.516 31,837
Faraing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 577 0 4,054 0 10\.186
Net fxas 264 98 32 273 298 295 315 276 33M 837 259 1\.70M
Net fnmt-ai fe/defaind duzMR 2\.632 1,06 2,365 963 1,742 710 884 484 2,544 470 2 S44 591
Odrwas 1\.931 9,143 1,931 2\.372 1,931 2\.707 1,931 3,143 1,931 6,1Q2 1\.931 15,444
Total Aes 96,53 110\.66,\. \.54 585 155\.678 203\.337 207,667 219\.792 210,229 248,3S2 239,C07 26830 267\.283
1Jucia aw EauLat,
On JiaMMltl
at p o£ debt 0 0 0 0 0 26,724 0 68,137 0 28,073 0 11,399
Or cozont J4abites 2\.212 2,231 3\.760 3,292 5\.904 4,017 7,789 4,319 10\.230 7,760 13\.012 15,350
Total 2\.212 2\.231 3,760 3\.292 5,904 3D,741 7,789 72\.456 10,Z 35,833 13,012 26,749
- debt
B21-VSw m fz esn * 6\.0M 6,OO 24,Mo 11\.020 41\.680 21\.2OM 41,450 40,8M 40\.950 67,450 40,250 81,250
DDbmacm 42\.915 53\.724 52\.415 65,164 52\.415 75\.756 42\.215 57,323 44,915 50,991 49,165 45,=
Odthe s 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 960 0 1,638
BUT~WW5 fun MM0 28\.724 26,937 47\.773 48\.304 65,811 69,538 83\.675 66\.145 100\.623 63\.861 O1,-7 67,543
Subtal (pwm) 77,639 86\.661 124\.188 124\.468 160,W5 166\.294 167\.50 164\.268 186\.488 183\.262 198\.117 195,431
L earunt potc 0 0 0 0 0 26\.724 0 68\.137 0 26\.073 0 11,399
Subwt&L (r't) 77\.639 86,661 124,188 124\.468 160,026 139,50 167,540 96\.131 186\.486 155,19 198\.117 184=2
Se eI 14bJ 201 233 273 378 351 515 438 620 533 861 633 1\.42
Total Labiti 80\.053 89\.175 12\.2,21 13\.138 166\.281 170\.856 175,767 1669\.37 197,251 191 AD211\.767 212,Z13
luty
Pat-i capital 18,679 22\.84 27\.979 27\.477 36\.979 35\.20 41\.979 37,X2 46\.979 39\.60 49,979 42\.GM
Retained eMrUi (2\.202) (1\.347) (1\.615) 63 77 1\.639 2,045 3,837 4\.151 7,522 6\.635 13\.,08
Total FquY 16\.477 21\.487 26\.364 27\.540 37\.056 36\.841 44\.074 41\.0= 41\.130 47,124 56\.614 55,\.70
Total LiabJcd sn Equty 96\.530 110\.662 154\.585 155\.678 203\.337 237\.667 217\.792 210\.229 248\.382 239\.C07 268\.30 267,28
\.- 55 -
SECOND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2473__0)
Table 5\.7: ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS 1984\.1989
(Won Million)
194 19MS 1986 1967 1968 1969 T\.t(84 89)
Yenar andla; D\.c\.ud\.r 31
tXC\. k aL Et\. AMOL Fsc\. AknaL Eat\. ACaaL EC\. cmmL Fic\. Ama Far\. howuL
Not 1= (f17) 35 587 1\.360 1\.691 1\.495 1\.969 2\.=5 2\.109 3\.823 2,4\.3 5\.636 S\.139 14\.
Qmn am --cumm 943 8;8 1\.177 \.18 950 1\.16 1,054 gm 1\.0e2 893 1\.10 572 6A4M 5\.3\.
Pwvan 6m 427 3% 483 64' 389 32 353 MD 357 SM 371 0 2= 1,7r
Pvmg 6w wp1oa_ w iw\. 65 s 169 7 96 79 iZ 87 267 95 249 1 19'6 SM 1\.51'
mm(m(ew 0 (63) 0 376 0 529 0 141 0 (360) 0 (6B) 0 85
*tm f of bsd inbcm 0 0 0 I3D 362 0 3S2 0 1\.071 0 1\.663 0 3478 13
L ) Qn 1m at8 1! c 0 (12) 0 (1) 0 1 0 2 0 (41) 0 (7) 0 (S
ZIL cam cGwmnm 718 1371 2319 3\.786 3\.511 3,375 3\.915 4,as2 4\.711 5\.092 5\.77 6\.719 MAI 243\.
casvum 2\.= 2\.= 3\.= 4,M 4\.= 2\.= 0 2\.= 0 0 0 0 9\.= 10M
Prime 2\.= 6\.15 6\.m 643 5\.M 5\.725 5\.a0 0 5\.= 2\.40D 3,0 2\.0 26\.m 17,43
Subma 4\.= 8a\.55 9\.m 4\.643 9\.00D 7\.725 5\.2,= 2\.= 5\.= 2AW 3\.= 2\.5 35\.3 27V4X
GouTMc 2\.= 2\.C 18\.= 5\.M 18\.0 WO\.= 0 \.D= 0 27\.0 0 15\.3W MZ= 79\.m
sm /I 194D 2\.91m 9\.D 10\.7 0 W0\.= 0 0 M\.= 30\.= 14\.2D 15\.( 8D\.7 0WAY1
no &a o 16\.4WA 1\.996 19\.0(9 18\.6D M\.= 12\.101 20\.0N 12\.43 21%39 43\.=3 32\.UD MM81 l17\.1M5 W\.12
Subtam\.L 37\.439 47187 46\.549 34\.461 36\.4 32\.1 M\.A 32\.433 59,365 1\.23 36\.A2AZS =5A \.2X
C aim_ uL IC" 5\.8 5\.554 17\.14 12\.M 31\.W 3YOM '\.913 77,11 54\.915 85\.761 60\.o16OD2= \.992 27\.4
ca-Uin1\. lo 276 155 525 465 7 31 952 798 935 1\.109 1\.X 1\.077 4\.496 3\.9
CaiWO\.h1* 0 52 0 213 0 461 0 691 0 1,574 0 1\.,2 o A\.
£qigcvWince 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 I196 229 1\.651 Mg LW6 M
Sub9 6\.035 5\.761 17\.670 12\.931 32J1 35\.230 45\.W5 78\.50 56\.16 a5\.670 63M163\.56 =21\.35
hZimme m CE t iMa14m \.6 1\.187 t\.%8 1\.061 2\.146 725 L\.S 350 2\.441 2\.429 2\.782 616 12U0 6\.4C
TOt&L Sal 5s 49\.510 63\.761 77\.395 56\.57 83\.91 79\.13D 76\.04117\.692 L27\.665 19\.8\.W U10\.8 U6A \.424 632
Ca~~ulUaUlam f6\.63D 42\.353 55\.401 S5\.61 56\.851 62,974 62\.079 SD\.sd 66\.5 93\.491 59\.M 6953557\.1054095=
,catUauL imu 1\.213 414 1\.012 770 1\.54 1\.775 2\.D 1\.638 2\.192 1\.669 2\.552 17 10\.57 63W
CauetLW* bom 0 1\.5m 0 9gm 0 2\.75D 0 3\.263 0 2\.274 0 5\.930 0 16\.657
squr , - 2\.359 413 4\.DD 1,0 6\.190 4\.66 8\.510 2,6 10\.95D 4\.2209 11\.90D 7\.8W 64\.649 2D\.P0
Faccan 0 0 0 0 0 0 056 0 3\.53 0 6\.25 0 1\.3U
cubmA 50\.D2 [A\.690 60\.943 59s360 64\.57 72R35 n2\.9 \.596 7W79,0 109\.193 84A69D OPA 4U\.G N9X7
atmw at Qf0 0 0 0 MD 5,59 12\.574 37, 40\.1\.8 74\.12 24\.731 3X 2 77\.95314*51
F n c-ad fewdefn dIw 1\.4S0 739 863 42 3U 227 125 2 2\.670 6C 1\.05 Sm 6\.S 2\.30
ractumme Ss ftxod assets % 34 65 m 71 161 79 84 81 672 0 1\. 360 2\.243
lztin 21 21 ucmuse 636 665 1\.713 757 1\.D6 975 2=D 18 D 1\.955 147 2\.655 0 1D3 2\.704
Otiw m at fim (n' 0 623 0 295 0 218 0 947 0 2\.P3 014\.7 0 UAI2
Total U1U 523646\.735 63&A461\.066 66\.6S4 79,310 S7,7127\.697U26,57 tuj Slo2lU\.171u n\.6700iJAi 1G31,2
ma tDnwD Ie u (2,S6)lU\.al1 3\.80 (4\.184) 16\.607 (160)X1\.095U10\.5) 3\.098 16\.061 (2\.22!1\.426) U7\.3 127
- 56 -
SECOND TECINOLOGY DEVELOPMEN PROJECT
(LOAN 2473-KO)
Table S\.8: ANALYSIS OF CONVENTIONAL LOANS IN ARREARS 1984-198
(Won Mlillon)
* re# 194 1965 1966 1987 19 1989
_et C L 1 in Ams
1N d oinam snudw6 \.4 6 6 22 8 9
- m I of 3m (l\.a) (1\.22) (1\.01) (3JO) (1\.11) (1\.0)
modf low SRmVW6 4 2 5 5 7 4
- " S of ml la" (1M) (0\.41) (0o) (0\.8) (0\.97) (0\.46)
_i1\.w of3nA a 8 8 11 2 15 13
- m S of ml Iwo (1O) (1\.62) (1\.92) (4\.3) (2\.9) (1\.D)
TomI w of 1mm in pw-om 3B 92 574 55 79 as
f1m1Affma b, kyin
Total, pimips a&m 6s\.= 115\.61 11\.4%6 16"\.3 M9 W\.=
MaOp1 aUMM by w_n sd 6 m 372 233 1\.29 4 1\.116
- _ S of al pr9hd* am q (0\.04) (0\.2) (0\.16) (O\.J) (0\.3) (0\.71)
pkl1p\. dfind by urn w 1 du 735 587 325\.7 62am
- ta of ml iuiaop aaFLt (1\.-0) (0\.51) (0\.21) (0\.3) (1\.44) (O\.M)
T1\. PA1m1 - by Aams 762 99 m 1\.6 3\.2 1\.97
- a1 mL PiUXPL a (\.1) (0\.OM) (0\.X) (1\.01) (s\.6) (1\.51)
n= ww 6 _ 4 46 53 197 67 li
- I of Plad wAw (OM) (0\.0) (OM) (0\.12) (OA) (0\.0)
hus w 6 240 234 176 W 262 10
- a I of pin*" oma, (0\.3) (0M) (0\.U) (0\.U1) (042) (0\.)
TamLe 244 2 D Zs"a 3w as
- a S Pit1 4aim t (0M) (0\.31) (0\.14) (0\.?) (0\.17) (0\.13)
hum m acbqgini at of
-tAdsL 89 243 442 327
- litl 65 96 98 55 OD U
glSL l, 341 _4&=
A-M fbUAq dm iwkq yr
-h PUi 53,7 12\.099 27\.=, 77\.112 49*\.M 46\.6
- inin 5\.101 9\.97 16\.1W6 18\.443 U 4\.4D0 14\.065
Zm L1 AM 43\.416 m\.7
eW- -d w*p
- ftiYL 5\.1 12\.W02 31\.1 76\.8 41\.9\. 48\.7
- hamu 5\.01n 9\.957 9\.137 18\.418 1437 14\.131
Arm at Ad of pm
- k 24:N 2pD 243 662 3Z 2N
98 98 5O eD 13 47
IMi\. Ala la AL
-umm w Lai 96\.9 98\.3 99\.3 99\.5 99\. 99\.6
Ateum a a do : , a rr 1
- 57 -
Pae- 1 of 2
SECOND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 24734K0)
Table 6: KTOC's SHAREHOLDING, ENDING 1989
(Won Millon)
Asounr Porcentae
GovemfAnt 9,301\.3 22\.1
1D3 3\.698\.7 8\.8
Yukonsg 7000\.0 16\.7
Lucky 2,852\.9 6\.8
Hundal 2,842\.9 6\.8
Sasaung 2,842\.9 6\.8
Kia 1,000\.0 2\.4
Coomrctal genk 760\.6 1\.8
Sangu$g 450\.1 1\.0
Dam\.Ao 405\.0 1\.0
Hyosung Sung 284\.7 0\.9
Others (163 sharehdolders) 5,663\.1 13\.5
ADS 2,400\.0 5\.7
DMO 2,400\.0 5\.7
Total 42,002\.3 100\.0
_m
Presen Status of ITDC Privatization
The Governote has announced its intention to sell its 15\. I interest in 1990, the remaining
7S by i992\.
- 58 -
Pase 2 of 2
Others
1\. There is no failed project under the Second Bank Loan\.
2\. A study was carried out by Korea Advanced Institute of Science and
Technology (KAIST) in 1986 to analyze the effect of KTDC's financing
activities from 1981-1985\.
KAIST is analyzing the effect of KTDC's financing activities from
1981-1989\. KTDC will inform the Bank of the result as soon as it is
completed\.
Page 1 of 3
SEC ND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2473-KO)
Table 7: STATUS OF COVENANTS
Section Activity Remarks
Loan Agreement - KTDC:
2\.02 (a) (i) Relend loan proceeds to finance 100l of Complied
the foreign currency cost of imported goods
and services or 601 of domestic items and
that no withdrawal shall be made unless it
complies with provisions of Section 2\.03 of
the Loan Agreement;
(ii) Relend loan proceeds to meet 1001 of Complied
consulting services, training materials and
staff training under Part B of the Project
provided no amounts shall be withdrawn in
excess of $300,000 except as Bank may
otherwise agree\.
2\.02 (b) Maintain a special acco4nt in dollars on terms Complied
and conditions satisfactory to the Bank and in
accordance with Section 3 of the Agreement\.
2\.03 (a) Withdrawals shall be on the basis of subloans Complied
approved by the Bank or if a free-limit subloan
one for which Bank has authorized withdrawals\.
2\.03 (c) No withdrawals shall be tade before the date Complied
of the Agreement, except expenditures not
exceeding $200,000 after 8/1/84 or
for subloans approved 90 days prior to Bank's
receipt of subloan application
2\.03 (d) No subloan shall exceed $1\.5 million and no Complied
subproject shall be eligible to receive more
than $5\.0 million\.
2\.03 (c) Applications shall be presented to the Bank on Complied
or before 6/30/87\.
2\.10 (c) Except otherwise agreed, KTDC shall charge Not Complied
interest on subloans made as Conventional from 1985489
Loans which will provide KTDC with a spread
of at least 2-1/2X\.
3\.06 KTDC shall ensure that maximum outstanding Complied
loans and equity in a single entity shall not
exceed 7X of KTDC's long term portfolio or
W4\.2 billion whichever is higher\.
4\.01 (a) KTDC shall maintain adequate procedures and Complied
- 60 - Page 2 of 3
STATUS OF COVENANTS
Sectlon Activity Remarks
Loan Agreement - KTDC:t(ontinued)
records and reflect operations and financLal
condition, including expenditures under statement
of e\.xpenditures in accordance with sound accounting
practices\.
4\.01 (b) KTDC shall:
(i) Have its accounts and financial statements Complied
audited in accordance with sound auditing
principles by independent auditors acceptable
to the Bank;
(ii) Furnish the Bank, as soon as available Complied
but in any case not later than four months
after the end of each year: certified
copies of the financial statements as
audited; and the report of such audit by
said auditors, of such scope and in such
detail as the Bank shall have reasonably
requested\.
4\.04 KTDC shall take all necessary action to increase Complied
its authorized capital to W37 billion on or
before 12/31/84\.
4\.05 Except as the Bank shall otherwise agree, Not Complied
KTDC shall enter into satisfactory arrange- only W 12\.6B
ments with Borrowers and prospective share- was raised
holders whereby an additional amount on no
less than W13\.3 billion will be paid into
capital on or before 12/31/86\.
4\.06 Except as the Bank shall otherwise agree, KTDC Complied
shall maintain at all times a debt/equity ratio
of no greater than five times the consolidated
capital and surplus of KTDC and its subsidiaries\.
- 61 - Pate 3 of 3
STATUS OF COVENANTS
Section Activity Remarks
Guarantee Agreement - Government:
3\.04 Government and the Bank shall exchange views Complied
on the Government's industrial technology develop-
ment policies to identify major issues or areas
of special study or action\.
3\.05 (a) Government shall permit KTDC to increase its Complied
authorized capital to no less than W37 billion
with amendments to KTDC's Act, Decree and By-laws
on or before 12/31/84\.
3\.05 (b) Government shall make available to KTDC no less Complied
than W3 billion on or before 12/31/85 by way
of further subscription to KTDC's paid-in
capital\.
3\.05 (c) Government shall provide KTDC by way of Not Compliedl/
loans an aggregate amount of up to W20r
billion on or before 12/31/85\.
3\.06 (d) Government shall provide a guarantee for KTDC's Complied
debentures in an aggregate amount of W30 billion
on or before 12/31/85\.
3\.06 (e) Government shall provide KTDC additional funds Complied
to cover losses suffered by KTDC on account of
Conditional Loans made\.
IL/ Actual government loans contributed for the period was only W7
billion\. However, the Government provided an additional W10
billion in 1986 and W20 billion in 1987 for a total of W37
billion for the project period\.
SECOND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 2473-KO)
Table 8\.1: USE OF BANK RESOURCES
STAFF INPUTS
Stage of
Project Cycle FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91 TOTAL
Preparation 5\.3 9\.5 - - - - - - - 14\.8
Appraisal - 25\.6 6\.7 - - - - - - 32\.3
Negotiations - - 5\.7 - - - - - - 5\.7
Lending Operations - 9\.9 5\.9 - - - - - - 15\.8
Supervision - - 3\.5 6\.3 16\.3 5\.8 1\.2 0\.1 - 33\.2
Completion - - - 1\.3 - - - 0\.6 1\.3 3\.2
Administration - - 0\.1 1\.4 0\.9 - - - - 2\.4
TOTAL 5\.3 45\.0 21\.9 9\.0 17\.2 5\.8 1\.2 0\.7 1\.3 107\.4
- 63 -
SECOND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2473-KO)
Table 8\.2: USE OF BANK RESOURCES
MISSIONS
Thmough Appraisal: 5/833 4 I lndustrial Economics, Ilnterest tate spread, I
--ectronlcs 8 Light ICapital structure of KrDC,
Industries IFree limit on subloan
Retrocative financing &
Bank lending\.
9/83 3 16 Industrial Economics
Appraisal through 12183 5 21 Financlal Policy Loan terms, KTDC debt
Board Approval Industrial Economics structure, Interest rate,
Development Banking SMIS, Alternative financla
Instruments & Science & tec
nology studies\.
Supervision:
Mission 1 3/85 1 NA Industrial Economics _
Mission 2 11/85 2 5 Telecommunications& -
Electronics Speciallsts
Mission 3 5/86 2 3 Telecommunications& -
ilectronics Specialists
Industrlal Economist _
Mission 4 10/86 NA I Industrial Economist Loan Implementation, IFC
contribution, new debenture
issues, Future Bank funding
of ETRI
Mission 5 11/86 2 2 Industrlal Economist Inadequate spreads\.
Cost of Bank funds &
iFC Involvement\.
MIsslon 6 5/87 | 1 | 2 |Industrial Economist |I- | APPROVAL |
P043881 | Report No\. PID3281
Project Name ROMANIA-IRRIGATION REHABILITATION (@)
AND REFORM PROJECT
Region Europe and Central Asia Region
Sector Irrigation and drainage (70%); Central
government administration (30%)
Project ID P043881
Borrower(s) GOVERNMENT OF ROMANIA
Implementing Agency
Address MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FOOD, AND FORESTRY
Address: B-dul Carol I nr\. 24, Sector 3,
Cod 70044, Bucharest
Contact Person: Cornel Tusa, Director,
Project Management Unit (PMU)
Tel: 40-21-314 4020
Environment Category B
Date PID Prepared March 10, 2003
Auth Appr/Negs Date January 16, 2003
Bank Approval Date June 12, 2003
1\. Country and Sector Background
A\. Sector Background
Romania's agriculture sector has made significant contributions to its
economy since the demise of the socialist regime\. Throughout the 1990s,
the sector consistently accounted for approximately 20 percent of GDP\.
Today, the agriculture sector, together with the agro-processing industry,
accounts for about a quarter of the country's GDP, and for more than one
third of the country's total employment\. In the rural economy,
agriculture accounts for more than two thirds of employment opportunities
and total income\. Nearly half of Romania's 23 million people still live
in rural areas, making its rural population the sixth largest in the ECA
region, after Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Poland, and Uzbekistan\.
Romania has a total of 15 million hectares of agricultural land, two
thirds of which are arable, giving the agricultural sector considerable
potential to produce a commercially viable and diverse mix of temperate
crop and livestock products\. Yet the agriculture sector today is still in
disarray, due mainly to problems inherited from the socialist regime and
to difficulties in implementing transition policies\. While the Government
has made some significant policy reforms in areas such as land reform and
trade liberalization, small and medium-sized agro-enterprises have been
slow to develop in the ten years since the demise of the socialist regime,
and employment opportunities are severely limited in rural areas\.
During the early 1990s, land reform dismantled about five thousand
collective farms, and restituted the land to the original owners\. As a
result, about 4 million small private farms emerged\. A prosperous
small-holder private farming sector is developing, but still struggles for
a number of reasons, such as the collapse of state-owned agro-industries
and the resulting disappearance of marketing channels, a lack of
experience with private farming practices, and small, fragmented
landholdings (averaging 2\.3 hectares in four to five parcels)\. The
deterioration of irrigation facilities and the absence of on-farm
irrigation management are also critical constraints to developing and
maintaining private commercial farming\.
Irrigation is vital to Romanian agriculture for several reasons\. First,
it offsets rain deficits in the country's semi-arid southern and eastern
regions\. While average annual rainfall for the country is 750 mm, the
average rainfall in the southern and eastern regions is less than 500 mm
(the typical upper bound of semi-aridity), with uneven seasonal
distributions (less than 20% of total rainfall occurs in summer)\. The
water demands of crops during July and August are 300-500 mm, leaving a
crop water deficit of some 200-350 mm\. This makes irrigation necessary
for most summer crops such as maize, vegetables, sugar beet, sunflowers,
potatoes, and alfalfa\. Irrigation also minimizes the climatic risks
affecting agriculture, ensuring the stability in production necessary for
commercial farming\. It can also encourage private farmers in certain
areas to convert to higher value crops such as vegetables\.
Drainage is also important to Romanian agriculture because the low plains
along the Danube River can become waterlogged, especially in the spring
when river flows are at high levels\. The embankment works along 1,200 km
of Romania's riverbanks allow over 450,000 hectares of low-lying land to
be sustainably cultivated\.
B\. Issues
The main issues in the irrigation sector are the legacy of over-investment
in irrigation infrastructure, and the lack of an 'exit strategy' for
defining a subset of the existing irrigation schemes that are uneconomic,
including clear economic incentives and an effective institutional
framework\. Without such an exit strategy for uneconomic schemes,
available resources for irrigation, including US$20-40 million in state
subsidies, are not used optimally and sometimes encourage continued
uneconomic irrigation practices in high pumping areas\.
The Legacy of Over-Investment in Irrigation Infrastructure and Lack of
Exit Strategy
Romania's old socialist regime constructed irrigation and drainage
facilities covering about 3 million hectares (about 30 percent of arable
land), and worth around US$10 billion if converted to current values\.
Most of these facilities were developed during the 1960s and 1970s, when
irrigation was centrally planned and supply-driven, and economic and
environmental implications were often ignored\. Many irrigation schemes
were built on the higher level terraces, the overwhelming majority of
which relied on pumping systems with high pumping heads and operated using
subsidized electricity, with little regard for cost\. In addition, certain
irrigated crops were guaranteed export\.
Economic irrigation depends on a number of factors, such as pumping
height, irrigation intensity (percentage of total area), and cropping
patterns\. When the socialist regime ended, the economics of irrigation
- 2 -
was affected in many ways\. For example, the existing irrigation schemes
had been designed to serve large state farms, and needed to be adapted to
serve a large number of small farms\. However, when the state and
cooperative farms were dismantled, much of the main irrigation equipment
was damaged, vandalized, or simply disappeared\. What little on-farm
equipment that existed was distributed in bits and pieces to a large
number of small farms\. Furthermore, the collapse of state and collective
farms and the subsequent emergence of small private farms resulted in loss
of scale for commodity crops\. Finally, electricity prices were
liberalized, which led to huge increases in pumping costs, particularly
for the schemes on the higher terraces\. As a result of all these factors,
the demand for irrigation declined sharply in the early 1990s\.
Nevertheless, the full extent of main and secondary irrigation systems
(pumps and canals) had to be maintained and operated to meet this greatly
reduced demand for irrigation because the (small) farms that were still
irrigating were scattered over the entire country\. In addition, because
of the high cost of electricity, the Government felt that it had to
provide irrigation subsidies to farmers\. Over the last three years, the
annual allocation for irrigation subsidies ranged from US$20 to 40
million, but only around 300,000-500,000 hectares were actually
irrigated--about 10 to 16 percent of the total area covered by irrigation
facilities\. Furthermore, the subsidies have allowed farmers to continue
using irrigation at the higher terraces, where irrigation is clearly
uneconomic\. And since irrigation is largely supplementary, farmers often
take an opportunistic approach and postpone signing contracts with the
State Land Reclamation (Irrigation) Company (SNIF) until they see a dry
summer\. Under these circumstances, SNIF has no option but to spread its
resources throughout the entire irrigation command area prior to the start
of the irrigation season\. Consequently, SNIF has not been able to
maintain irrigation schemes properly, much less perform other public good
activities to normal technical and environmental standards\.
The main imperative is now very clear--to concentrate irrigation in the
lower terraces where it can be practiced economically, and to provide the
proper incentive framework for the 'exit', or closure, of uneconomic
schemes on the higher terraces\.
Current Pricing and Subsidy Policies
Given the depressed economic situation in rural areas and the weakness of
the agriculture sector, it is unrealistic to consider eliminating the
subsidy for irrigation in the near future\. However, in order to economize
the use of state subsidies and encourage only economic irrigation, it is
vital to reform pricing and subsidy policies, restructure SNIF, and
promote the development of water user associations (WUAs)\.
The current system of pricing for irrigation contains four flaws that
transfer most of the costs and all of the risks to the state budget, and
provide no incentives for developing an economically viable irrigation
sector\.
Uniform tariffs prevent a focus on economic areas\. The irrigation tariff,
which is determined by SNIF, is the same for every judet (district),
regardless of the actual costs, which are determined mainly by the
-3 -
location of farms (i\.e\., terrace level and pumping heights)\. This means
that subsidies have to be used to finance the balance between actual costs
and the tariff, and that less efficient schemes in the higher terraces
require higher subsidies for operation\. This enables farmers to continue
uneconomic irrigation both in the higher terraces, which require more
energy due to higher pumping heads, and in schemes with high water
losses\. It is indeed these areas that absorb the greater part of the
state subsidy, but without return to Romania's economy\.
The costs and risks from uncertain demand are imposed exclusively on SNIF\.
Further difficulties, with their associated cost implications, arise for
SNIF in managing irrigation because there is no guarantee of demand\.
Farmers make no firm commitment to irrigation prior to the start of the
irrigation season, so SNIF can only guess where the demand will be\. And
since irrigation in Romania is supplementary (there being significant
rainfall during the growing season), there is no advance indication of the
level of demand in the irrigated areas\. The consequence is that SNIF has
to take all the financial risk, as well as maintain all irrigation
facilities in order to be able to provide irrigation water that may never
be used\. While SNIF is currently operated as a commercial entity, it has
no authority or incentive to discontinue irrigation services in areas
where the demand is too low to make operations financially or economically
viable\. In exchange, SNIF always has recourse to budgetary support--the
State budget pays the costs of maintaining supply where there is little
demand, or where irrigation is uneconomic\. SNIF's costs are fixed no
matter what the level of demand is or how high the power costs are in a
dry year\. This is a moral hazard situation where there is no incentive
for SNIF to use the subsidies in the most efficient and economic way\.
Farmers do not pay for mitigating the risk of potential droughts\. In
Romania, irrigation is generally supplemental, but it is also needed to
mitigate the risk of drought in dry years\. Irrigation volumes vary
greatly from year to year, depending on the amount of precipitation in the
summertime\. As stated above, farmers are not required to make any
commitment to irrigation prior to the start of the irrigation season, and
the current pricing method, based exclusively on volume, allows farmers to
avoid paying anything towards maintenance costs, which are incurred every
year regardless of water usage so that irrigation facilities can be kept
operational\. Thus, maintenance works are fully subsidized without
contributions from users\.
Allocated subsidies are used fully regardless of the weather and demand\.
Currently, irrigation subsidies are allocated to support the operation of
SNIF\. This is certainly convenient for fiscal purposes, since allocations
can be made at the start of the fiscal year\. However, demand for
irrigation subsidies should vary from year to year depending on the summer
weather, particularly in countries like Romania where irrigation is
supplementary\. In wet years, the amount of the actual subsidy should be
less, and there should be some incentives for achieving this\.
In summary, the current system has many deficiencies, with all the
consequences in terms of cost and risk born by the state\. At the same
time, the current pricing and subsidy policies contain no mechanisms for
rationalizing costs and benefits\. In this context, policy reforms are
needed to move toward a more efficient sharing of costs and risks and to
- 4 -
provide incentives to guide development of the sector in the appropriate
direction\.
Antiquated Management Structure of SNIF and the Absence of On-Farm
Management
Although Romania's public irrigation agency, SNIF, has been restructured
several times over the past 10 years, the restructurings were rather
cosmetic, and made no fundamental changes to its monolithic structure,
which was created to serve large state farms and cooperatives under a
command economy\. Currently, SNIF is comprised of its headquarters, 41
branches, and local units at the irrigation and drainage scheme level\.
Decision-making authorities are centralized at headquarters, and the
branches have very limited responsibilities\. Branches were established in
every judet (district), regardless of the hydraulics of the scheme\.
Because of this, some of the large irrigation/drainage schemes are managed
by more than one branch, making system management more complicated than
necessary\. There is no involvement of users in the management of schemes,
and there is virtually no accountability\.
The absence of on-farm management is also an issue\. Restitution of
collective farm land and the subsequent emergence of a large number of
small farms had two major implications for irrigation\. First, on-farm
irrigation facilities were left without management, since they were
formerly operated and maintained by the collective farms\. Second, the
public irrigation institution was not able to interact efficiently with
the 4 million new private farmers in the day-to-day business of
irrigation--water allocation, billing, and collection\. To address these
issues, the Law on Water User Associations was adopted and WUAs were
established in four irrigation schemes as a pilot\. These WUAs would take
ownership of and responsibility for on-farm irrigation facilities,
including tertiary pumping stations (SPPs) and associated irrigation
infrastructure, and would be in charge of coordinating water allocation at
the farm level, purchasing bulk water from the public institutions, and
collecting water tariffs from individual irrigation water users\. The
results are promising, as many farmers participating in WUAs have
recognized the benefits of WUA management through better coordination and
greater control\.
Physical Deterioration at Off-Farm Level and Lack of Irrigation Equipment
at On-Farm Level
Because SNIF has been spreading its resources among as many irrigation
areas as possible, expenditures on maintenance are currently well below
normal technical and environmental standards\. Consequently, there has
been a corresponding deterioration in the condition of infrastructure and
thus in the quality of service provided to users\.
Most of the irrigation schemes in Romania rely on pressure pumping
stations (off-farm) and pressurized underground pipes and sprinklers
(on-farm)\. Historically, collective farms owned, operated and maintained
underground pipes and sprinkler lines\. However, when the collective farm
land was being restituted, on-farm equipment was disassembled and the
parts were distributed to small private farms; much of it was reportedly
damaged or even sold as scrap metal\. Today, Romania's privately owned
- 5-
on-farm irrigation equipment is so obsolete as to be effectively
inoperable\.
2\. Objectives
A\. Project Development Objective
The primary objectives of the project are to: (i) achieve more economic
use of irrigation though changes in farmers' and the Land Reclamation
Agency's (LRA's) behavior, and (ii) increase agricultural productivity in
the project area\.
B\. Strategy
In order to address the issues described above, the Government has
developed a new irrigation strategy that will encourage economic
irrigation and optimal use of available resources\. In concrete terms, the
strategy aims to maximize the area of economic irrigation given the
current amount of subsidies\.
To achieve these goals, the strategy contains the following objectives:
(i) reform of subsidies and pricing, (ii) development of WUAs, (iii)
restructuring of SNIF, (iv) rehabilitation of deteriorated facilities and
provision of on-farm irrigation equipment\. The strategy would first
economize the use of irrigation subsidies, and help identify uneconomic
irrigation schemes with high pumping height and low demand that could be
closed forever\. It would also restructure irrigation management and
ownership so that (a) users have more decision-making power, (b) the
irrigation agency is streamlined to provide more limited but improved
services, and (c) the irrigation agency is accountable to water users\.
Finally, the new strategy would salvage the country's investment in
irrigation infrastructure, but only where demand is based on real costs
and benefits\.
This strategy is being considered by the Government in the drafting of a
new Law on Land Reclamation\. The law also provides a schedule for
restructuring SNIF, which is to be completed by September 2003\. Because
it will provide a fundamental framework for the irrigation sector,
adoption of the new Law on Land Reclamation is a condition for Board
presentation\.
Objective I: Reform Subsidies and Pricing
It is of utmost importance to implement the following pricing and subsidy
policies in order to (a) introduce economic incentives, (b) discourage
farmers from irrigating in uneconomic areas, and (c) encourage the
concentration of irrigation only in economically viable areas\.
New Pricing Mechanism\. New pricing and subsidy mechanisms should be
introduced in conjunction with transforming SNIF into a new Land
Reclamation Agency (henceforth the irrigation service provider will be
referred to as LRA)\. The new pricing mechanism would have four main
features\.
The actual cost of water delivery would be charged to users\. Under the
- 6 -
new Law, the LRA would be obligated to charge users the actual cost of
delivering irrigation water\. The price would vary from SPP to SPP and
system to system, and would be one of the incentives for concentrating
irrigation in economic areas\. Subsidies would be provided to users, who
would be responsible for payment to the LRA\.
Prices would have fixed and variable components\. Under long-term
contracts, pricing would have two components: (i) an annual fixed charge,
mainly for maintenance and (ii) volumetric charges, mainly for electricity
costs\. In short, farmers (WUAs) would have to pay the fixed charge even
when they do not use irrigation water\.
Long-term service contracts would be required\. WUAs--the sole users after
a transition period--would be required to sign long-term service contracts
with the LRA\. Long-term contracts would enable the LRA to properly plan
its operations so that only contracted SPPs, related facilities and
equipment, and the main systems that supply them are maintained and
repaired\. Contracted WUAs would pay annual charges to cover most of the
LRA's expenses for maintaining the system\. It is proposed that annual
charges be made due in October, when there is a natural break in the
irrigation calendar\. This would re-validate the long-term contracts each
year, giving the LRA confidence that use of the system justifies its
maintenance\.
Incentive for WUA formation\. Pricing would also provide an incentive to
WUA formation\. In the transition period when WUAs are being established
and the LRA is servicing both WUAs and individual farmers, charges to
individuals would fully reflect the additional costs of serving them, and
would therefore be significantly higher than charges to WUAs\. There would
also be individuals who are not members of WUAs, but whose farmland lies
within WUA boundaries\. The Law would prohibit the LRA from servicing
these users and would allow WUAs to charge them a premium\.
New Subsidy Scheme\. The new subsidy scheme would commence in October
2003, after the new Law is effective and the LRA is formed, and would
coincide with the new pricing policy described above to which the scheme
is closely integrated\. The new scheme would be fundamentally different
from the current scheme and would have three key features\.
Subsidies would be switched from budgetary support for SNIF to direct
support to users\. This change would contribute to the main objectives of
the restructuring strategy by empowering users, increasing their awareness
and exposure to economic conditions, and giving LRA (the new SNIF) an
incentive to seek economies and be more transparent and responsive to
users \.
Subsidies would be a flat rate per hectare\. The subsidy might vary from
year to year depending on rainfall and irrigation demand, but would be
capped at a uniform level per hectare across the country\. As the cost of
irrigation significantly increases in the upper elevations, or indeed in
areas of low demand, and the flat subsidy covers a decreasing portion of
that cost, farmers would be discouraged from irrigating in these
uneconomic areas\. This policy would assist in concentrating irrigation in
the economic zone\.
-7-
Subsidies would only be available after users (WUAs) have paid their share
of the costs\. Defining demand as the payment of user contributions would
assist the LRA in identifying and quantifying demand, and would ensure
that irrigation is better and more economically utilized\. The subsidy
would only be paid through WUAs, and only for SPPs for which there is a
valid long-term service contract\. The subsidy would mirror the two-part
(fixed and variable) structure of the service charge, with an element of
subsidy for both components\. This is the main motivation and support for
WUA development\. Two years would be allowed for adjustment, after which
there would be no subsidy for non-WUA users, who would be charged the full
cost of irrigation\.
The proposed new subsidy scheme is also an essential element of reforming
the irrigation sector, and the adoption of detailed procedures on the new
subsidy scheme by the Government would be a dated covenant of the loan (by
October 31, 2003), and any material abrogation or amendment would require
prior approval by the Bank as a condition of the project\.
The twin principles of (a) the full cost of delivery of irrigation water
charged at the point of delivery, and (b) a flat subsidy across the
country, provide the only mechanism that will reliably lead to a
concentration of irrigation in the economic zones, without which the
sector can have no sustainable future\. In assessing options, alternatives
with variations in the level of subsidy, reflecting social or commercial
considerations, therefore had to be rejected\. In particular, allowing
differences in subsidy levels between rehabilitated and non-rehabilitated
areas was rejected because of the administrative complications that would
follow, and because this would open the door for other variations\.
Similarly, allowing lower subsidies for large commercial farmers was
rejected because, with irrigation costs being very largely variable costs,
scale has little impact on irrigation economics\. Furthermore, lower
subsidies for one group would open the door to higher subsidies for
others, which would undermine the main principle of the new mechanism\.
Objective II: Development of WUAs
The Government has already started to implement a policy that allows
farmers to establish WUAs and transfer ownership of on-farm irrigation
distribution networks and pressure pumping stations (SPPs) to water user
associations (WUAs)\. When the first WUAs began to function effectively,
it became apparent that they can manage the on-farm equipment and SPPs
more effectively than the government, and the WUA program was expanded
throughout the country\.
The current law on WUAs, adopted in October 1999 as a Government
Ordinance, has several problematic deficiencies\. For example, the lack of
clear regulations on the separation of decision-making responsibilities
and implementation responsibilities was often abused, allowing members of
the administrative board to also be paid as employees, presidents to have
discretionary authority in managing the WUA, etc\. The law also failed to
clearly define the responsibilities for income and property taxes\. These
deficiencies would be properly addressed in the new Law on Land
Reclamation\.
A technical assistance program for WUAs, financed by USAID, started in
- 8-
2001 to support the consolidation of established WUAs and help farmers
establish new WUAs\. This program focused on establishing and assessing
WUAs in two irrigation schemes, Nicoresti-Tecuci and Sadova Corabia, which
were selected for rehabilitation under the proposed project\. In addition,
the technical assistance program prepared a manual for WUA establishment
and developed several training modules\. To date, 99 WUAs have been
established, covering some 350,000 hectares of command area\. The average
size of a WUA is approximately 3,500 hectares, which is considerably
larger than in most neighboring countries\. This is mainly because WUAs
should have 6 to 8 SPPs per area (typically one SPP covers 650 hectares)
in order to achieve economy of scale on administration costs\. Farmers
often have a number of plots located in more than one SPP, so this
arrangement is also convenient for them, since they can be a member of
only one WUA instead of four or five\.
The proposed project would collaborate with the USAID program, which will
provide continued technical assistance to WUAs until mid-2005\. USAID will
provide technical assistance to WUAs mainly in the project areas, but also
nationwide through its own training program, which covers all aspects of
operation, including administration, financial management, and technical
matters\. The project would then provide qualified WUAs with physical
support, such as equipment and rehabilitation of on-farm irrigation
facilities\. The project would also provide follow-up technical
assistance to WUAs after the completion of the USAID program\.
Objective III: Restructuring SNIF
Under the project, SNIF would be transformed into the Land Reclamation
Agency (LRA), which would be established as a budgetary agency under the
authority of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Forestry (MAFF)\. The
LRA would be primarily responsible for land reclamation activities,
including the operation and maintenance of irrigation, drainage, flood
protection and soil erosion control works\. The LRA would, in principle,
cover its expenses with allocations from the state budget for activities
of public interest (flood protection, soil erosion control and drainage),
and through service tariffs for irrigation collected from beneficiaries,
who would receive irrigation subsidies\. The main objectives of the
planned restructuring are:
decentralization of decision-making authority;
out-sourcing maintenance to the private sector;
strengthened quality control and greater involvement of users;
full separation of the accounting for irrigation services from the
accounting for other core activities that are financed directly from the
state budget\.
Organizational Structure
There would be a major change in the organizational structure of the
irrigation agency\. The proposed restructuring plan recommends that the
LRA have: (a) a headquarters, (b) 12 regional branches, and (c)
integrated scheme management units (ISMUs)\.
-9-
Transition from SNIF to LRA
Overall Mechanism\. SNIF would transfer approximately 5,000 full-time
employees to the LRA upon its establishment\. These employees would be
complemented by seasonal staff as needed\. SNIF would keep approximately
3,600 full-time staff to carry out the activities that are to remain
there, mainly workshops, non-core businesses, and operation and
maintenance of SPPs (on contract with the LRA)\. These workshops and
non-core businesses would have to raise revenues through contracts with
the LRA, WUAs, or other businesses (contracts with LRA would be guaranteed
for the first two years)\.
The restructuring of SNIF would continue during project implementation
through three channels: (a) privatization of the workshops and non-core
businesses, (b) gradual reduction of the staff working for SPPs due to
the transfer of SPPs to WUAs, and (c) retrenchment of redundant staff\.
It is envisaged that the privatization of workshops and non-core
businesses would be carried out by December 31, 2005, and that staff
working for SPPs would either be hired by WUAs (as they take over SPPs and
related inner systems) or retrenched by December 31, 2006\. A SNIF
privatization plan (see below) would be prepared to assist the Government
in implementing the privatization of the workshops and non-core
businesses\. WUAs would have the right to select only the staff whom they
considered essential for the operation and maintenance of the SPPs\.
Preparation of a Global Restructuring Plan for SNIF and Establishment of
the LRA with the above principles is in the final stage at the MAFF\. Upon
approval by the MAFF, the draft plan would be sent to the Government for
approval\. The plan would provide: (a) organigrams and responsibilities
for branches, regional offices, and scheme units; (b) indicative
allocations of staff for headquarters, regional branches, and scheme
units; (c) indicative numbers of staff to be retrenched and costs; (d) a
detailed business plan for two regional branch offices (for illustration
purposes); (e) a plan for assets and non-core businesses to be divested
immediately; and (f) an indicative budget for the entire LRA (to be
prepared with assistance from international consultants)\. As this plan is
fundamental to the reform of the irrigation sector and to project
activities, government adoption of the Global Restructuring Plan for SNIF
in the form of a Letter of Development Policy, would also be a condition
of Board presentation\.
In the process of restructuring SNIF, the moderate retrenchment of staff
is expected to take place through three channels: (a) redundancy
identified in establishing LRA (mainly administration), (b) privatization
of SNIF (mainly staff at workshops), and (c) transfer of SPPs to WUAs
(staff managing SPPs)\. Retrenchment through channel (a) above would take
place as early as December 31, 2003, when the LRA is established\.
Retrenchment through channel (b) would occur during the privatization of
workshops and non-core businesses\. Retrenchment through channel (c) would
occur as SNIF retrenches all staff working for SPPs\. WUAs would make
their own decisions on how many staff they would recruit to manage SPPs\.
Selection criteria must be explicitly documented so the retrenchment
process is completely transparent\. The Privatization Plan for SNIF should
have a section elaborating this process as well as the criteria for
- 10 -
retrenchment\.
The staff to be retrenched from SNIF are considered government employees,
and would be eligible for post-retrenchment support from the on-going,
Bank-financed Social Sector Development (SSD) Project, in addition to the
retrenchment benefits stipulated under their work contracts\. The SSD
Project's post-retrenchment support would include reimbursement for
training costs and/or concessionary loans for starting new businesses\.
The restructuring of SNIF and establishment of the LRA are considered
vital to completing the reform of the irrigation sector\. Therefore, the
following loan conditions are proposed\.
Establishment of the LRA (by January 31, 2004)\.
Government Adoption of the Privatization Plan for SNIF, including a
section on the retrenchment policy (by September 30, 2004)\.
Implementation of the Divestiture and Privatization of SNIF according to
the Privatization Plan (by December 31, 2005)\.
Provision of Retrenchment Benefits that SNIF workers are entitled to under
current law and work contracts\.
Objective IV: Rehabilitation of Deteriorated Irrigation Facilities and
Support for WUA Infrastructure
The Government also intends to start major rehabilitation of deteriorated
infrastructure at priority irrigation schemes where irrigation is found to
be economic and farmers are committed to developing WUAs and intensively
utilizing irrigation facilities\. The rehabilitation works would include
replacement of/repair to damaged canal linings and related structures,
repair to damaged pumping equipment, and replacement of outdated pumps
with more efficient ones\. The Government also intends to provide WUAs
with critical infrastructure support such as rehabilitation of SPPs,
on-farm equipment, office renovations, office equipment, and
transportation facilities\.
3\. Rationale for Bank's Involvement
The Bank has been involved in numerous irrigation projects with similar
aims (increasing sustainability by consolidating the public sector and
transferring irrigation management to users) in countries all over the
world, including Albania, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, and Turkey within the
region\. Since 1992, the Bank has been assisting the Romanian Government's
efforts to assess the viability of the irrigation sector and initiate
institutional reform\. The Bank has closely monitored the progress of the
reform and has provided timely advice on critical policy issues\. This
support is considered to have been highly effective\. Various donors (the
Netherlands, Canada, Japan, and the United States) have participated in
project preparation and have expressed their interest in supporting
rehabilitation and reform in the irrigation sector\. They consider the
Bank project as a leading vehicle for their more active presence in the
sector\.
4\. Description
Component 1\. Rehabilitation of Irrigation Schemes\. This component mainly
- 11 -
aims to restore the original capacity of economic irrigation schemes
through rehabilitation of deteriorated irrigation infrastructure\. This
component would comprise the following three activities or subcomponents\.
(a) Rehabilitation of Main Schemes\. This subcomponent would comprise two
phases\. The first phase subprojects, Sadova-Corabia and Nicoresti-Tecuci,
have been identified, based on the selection criteria below\. One or two
additional irrigation schemes would be selected during the implementation
period for Phase II rehabilitation, using the same selection criteria\.
Approximately US$22\.1 million would be allocated for the civil works for
Phase II subprojects\.
Pumping\. Areas with less than three pumping lifts and with total static
pumping head (exclusive SPP) of highest area not to exceed 70 meters\.
Potential Economic Viability\. Schemes identified as priority schemes in
the 1994 study\.
WUA Development\. WUA coverage exceeds 50 percent of service area\.
Existence of Private Farmers\. Schemes where the presence of private
farmers exceeds 80 percent\.
(b) Rehabilitation of Major Pumping Stations\. Under this component, the
project would rehabilitate about 20 of the most seriously deteriorated
major lift pumping stations serving schemes that are clearly viable\.
Criteria will be established to identify qualifying pumping stations,
including low pumping head and evidence of demand, such as establishment
of WUAs and use of irrigation\.
(c) Water Metering Equipment\. Government policy under the new pricing
system is to make volumetric charges for water supplied to WUAs\. The
project will support this with installation of water meters at the
pressure pumping stations of all WUAs signing a service contract with the
LRA\.
(d) Monitoring and Control Equipment\. It is considered particularly
important to reduce operational losses in rehabilitated schemes, and the
project will fund introduction of the most technically suitable and cost
effective improvements in water management facilities in the rehabilitated
schemes\. The improved technology will be integrated into the
rehabilitation designs, and specialist consultants will be recruited for
this purpose\.
(e) Rehabilitation of On-Farm Irrigation Facilities\. This subcomponent
would mainly aim to respond to WUAs' needs and requests to rehabilitate or
restore on-farm irrigation facilities, and support their initial
functioning\. The subcomponent would finance rehabilitation of SPPs, the
buried distribution system, office renovations for WUAs, office equipment,
on-farm irrigation equipment, transportation, and radio communication\.
(f) Feasibility Studies for the Second Phase\. A standard set of
feasibility studies for the second phase rehabilitation would be carried
out\.
Component 2\. Support for Institutional Reform in Land Reclamation Sector\.
This component mainly aims to support implementation of institutional
reform and the initial development of LRA and WUAs\. The following
- 12 -
activities are proposed under this component\.
(a) Support for SNIF Restructuring and LRA Initial Functioning\. This
subcomponent would have the following activities\.
Preparation of SNIF Restructuring Plan\. The subcomponent would help the
Government prepare a plan to manage and privatize SNIF's non-core
businesses, such as workshops\. A consultant would be recruited to conduct
detailed investigations of each of the identified non-core businesses,
prepare a detailed assessment of their value, identify the high priority
assets to be privatized, and develop an implementation plan for
privatization\.
Support for LRA Initial Functioning\. This subcomponent would mainly
consist of technical assistance and training and equipment to support the
LRA's initial operations\. In particular, the activities would include
development of an MIS system, training in maintenance planning, and
development of service standards and customer charter\.
(b) Support for MAFF\. The project would provide assistance to (i) the
Land Reclamation Directorate of MAFF for developing procedures for
reviewing LRA service charges and performance, and (ii) to the WUA
Monitoring Unit for developing a database and procedures for monitoring
development of WUAs\.
(c) Economic Analysis of the Irrigation Sector, Changes in Response to the
New Price and Subsidy Policy\. The project would recruit consultants to
analyze the effects of the new pricing and subsidy policy on the structure
of the irrigation sector and to prepare a strategic plan for future
development of the sector\. The study would be implemented immediately
after the transition period for introduction of WUAs, and would be a major
input to the Mid-Term Review\.
(e) Strengthening Agriculture Extension Services and Use of
Agro-Chemicals\. The project would assist extension services in raising
awareness of environmental impact of agro-chemicals, and training for
farmers in practices that respect the environment and lessen pollution\.
Under this subcomponent the project would fund an awareness campaign
targeted to WUAs, train extension staff, and design a program of field
workshops to be conducted at WUAs\.
(f) Support for WUAs\. This subcomponent would mainly consist of technical
assistance to provide comprehensive training to WUAs\. The technical
assistance would comprise aspects such as public administration,
accounting and financial management, budgeting, and irrigation and water
management\. Technical assistance for the WUA Regulatory Unit would
provide training on the role of regulatory authorities (facilitating
development of WUAs, supervising their activities), and development of a
WUA database (see (b) above)\. A substantial portion of this subcomponent
is expected to be co-financed by USAID; the project would finance Phase II
WUA support starting in 2005, after the USAID program is completed\.
Component 3\. Exploring Technologies for Reducing Irrigation Energy
Consumption\. The long-term future of irrigated agriculture in Romania
depends on a reduction in energy costs by reducing pumping head wherever
- 13 -
possible\. The current systems are wasteful of pumping head at all
levels\. The project would start to address this problem though price and
subsidy reform which will lead to the eventual elimination of irrigation
at the higher elevations\. However, further reduction of energy
consumption would be beneficial for the remaining economic irrigation
systems\. In this context, this component would support studies and pilots
(introduction of new low head sprinkler equipment and corresponding
modification of pressure pumping stations)\.
Component 4\. Project Administration\. This component would finance
national staff, international and national consultants, vehicles, and
office equipment to support implementation of the project\.
5\. Financing
Total ( US$m)
BORROWER $20\.65
IBRD $80\.00
IDA
LOCAL COMMUNITIES $2\.33
Total Project Cost $102\.98
6\. Implementation
The main stakeholders in the proposed project are: (a) the Government; (b)
the State Land Reclamation Company (SNIF) and the new Land Reclamation
Agency (LRA) (to be established); and (c) various farming entities
including small family farms, large (private) agricultural associations,
and state farms or their private lessors\. The roles of these stakeholders
are summarized as follows\.
(a) The Government\. Water resource policies are the responsibility of the
Ministry of Water and Environment Protection (MWEP), and are implemented
mainly through the National Administration Apele Romane (ANAR)\. MWEP has
overall responsibility for river regulation works, water management in
watersheds, and water allocation for multiple users\. However, irrigation
is administered by the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Forestry (MAFF)\.
The following arrangements are envisaged for implementation of the
proposed project\.
The Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Forestry (MAFF)\. The MAFF is
designated as the executing agency of the project and thus would have
overall authority for project implementation (including procurement,
reporting, and disbursement), and would be responsible for implementing
irrigation policies\.
Project Management Unit (PMU)\. A PMU has been established within the MAFF
to carry out the following day-to-day tasks of project implementation: (i)
procurement of all activities including goods, civil works, and consulting
services; (ii) monitoring of the progress in civil works, goods and
consultants' contracts; (iii) review and approval of consultants' outputs
including designs and engineering studies, and tender documents, (iv)
supervision of civil works contracts; (v) financial management, including
verification and processing of statement of expenditures and applications
for withdrawals from the loan; (vi) preparation of audit arrangements and
- 14 -
reporting; (vii) preparation of periodic progress reports; and (viii)
monitoring of project implementation and evaluation of project impact\.
The PMU must obtain approval from the Project Steering Committee on
certain policy matters that involve high-level decisions, such as
selection of the second phase subprojects, the proposal on WUA support,
and the privatization plan for SNIF\. The PMU will act as secretariat for
the Project Technical Steering Committee (PTSC) and prepare periodic
documents summarizing project progress and making recommendations on
policy matters for PTSC's review and approval\.
Project Technical Steering Committee (PTSC)\. A Project Technical Steering
Committee has been established, and is comprised of directors of key
departments in the MAFF and representatives from the Ministry of Public
Finance and the Ministry of Public Administration\. The Committee is
chaired by a senior representative from the MAFF\. Its main task will be
to periodically review project progress and approve recommendations made
by the PMU on the policy matters mentioned above\. The PTSC will also draft
and review privatization plans and other technical documents submitted by
the PMU\. The PTSC will seek the HLPCC's (see below) approval on very
important policy matters, such as the privatization plan for SNIF and the
new subsidy and pricing mechanism for irrigation\.
High Level Policy Coordination Committee (HLPCC)\. This committee is
comprised of senior officials of other concerned ministries, such as the
Ministry of Public Finance and the Ministry of Public Administration and
is chaired by the Minister of MAFF\. Its main duties are to review and
approve the concepts for key policy and institutional reforms, such as
pricing and subsidy reform and the restructuring of SNIF, and to assist
the MAFF in processing the necessary documents for these reforms, such as
draft Law on Land Reclamation, and the SNIF Global Restructuring Plan\.
The HLPCC would also play a similar role during project implementation to
discuss very important policy matters, such as the privatization plan for
SNIF and the new subsidy and pricing mechanism, and facilitate the
approval of these matters by the Government\.
(b) The National Company of Land Improvement (SNIF)\. SNIF would be a
direct stakeholder in the project\. The project would support the
transformation of SNIF into the LRA (Land Reclamation Agency), as well as
the start-up operations of the LRA and privatization of the workshops and
other non-core activities that remain at SNIF\.
(c) Farming Entities\. State farms and collective farms under the
communist regime were generally transformed into: (a) commercial farms,
(b) agricultural companies (formal associations), (c) family associations
(informal), and (d) small family farms\. All of these farming entities
would participate in the proposed project\.
Small family farms\. Family farms, which account for the majority of
beneficiaries, would be the main target group for establishing WUAs\. WUAs
would be the main vehicles for ensuring beneficiary participation in the
project\. The enabling legislation for the WUAs would be improved
substantially under the new Law on Land Reclamation\. WUAs would be
involved in all project phases, from preparation to implementation to
evaluation, particularly for on-farm irrigation facilities\.
- 15 -
Commercial Farms, Agricultural Associations, and Family Associations\.
These are usually large irrigation customers that do not necessarily need
to join the WUAs\. However, the project would encourage them to
participate in irrigation management where they share facilities with
WUAs, or to form their own WUAs\.
Financial Management
The Project Management Unit (PMU) is currently being created in the
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Forestry, using the existing structure
of the Project Preparation Unit (PPU), which is currently implementing the
PHRD grant for project preparation\. The PMU will be in charge of all the
financial management aspects of the project\. All financial management and
disbursement procedures will be in accordance with the relevant World Bank
guidelines\. The Government, through the PMU, is currently establishing
and a project financial management system in a format acceptable to the
World Bank\.
Flow of Funds\. The PMU will use the loan amounts through (a) the Special
Account, with reimbursements made on the basis of Statements of
Expenditures (SOEs) and full documentation, and (b) direct payments from
the Loan Account\. The PMU will make payments directly to suppliers,
except in the rehabilitation component, which requires a 10\. beneficiary
contribution, and for which WUAs will remit their 10\. to a joint bank
account in the name of both the WUA and the PMU, and from which funds will
flow to the supplier after joint signatures\. The PMU will also use a
treasury account for Government contributions to the Project\.
7\. Sustainability
The project aims to provide an appropriate policy and institutional
framework for technically, environmentally and fiscally sustainable
irrigation management\. The project would:
select the schemes to be rehabilitated where farmers are committed to
irrigated agriculture;
increase the ownership or at least the feeling of ownership of irrigation
facilities among beneficiaries and reduce the risk of vandalism;
aim to establish community-based management of irrigation facilities
through WUAs, and encourage and guide beneficiaries to properly and
legally maintain and operate the transferred irrigation facilities
(including the SPPs), with the goal of full recovery of O&M costs;
ensure that rehabilitation designs are simple and technically sound, and
that construction costs are affordable for farmers and the Government;
restructure the irrigation agency (SNIF) in a way that ensures more
transparency in decision-making and accountability to water users\.
8\. Lessons learned from past operations in the country/sector
In its experience throughout the world, the Bank has learned that (a)
sustainability in irrigation can be achieved only with substantial
beneficiary participation, and (b) such participation is achieved by
transferring operational responsibility for substantial parts of
irrigation schemes to organized irrigation water users\. In addition,
experience from several ECA countries suggests that the prior development
of a supporting legal framework is crucial to successful institutional
reform\. These lessons are fully incorporated into project design\.
- 16 -
The Bank's experience also suggests that rehabilitation of irrigation
schemes should be concentrated in areas where irrigation is economic, and
where farmers have committed to irrigated agriculture\. In the process of
selecting subprojects, particular attention should be paid to identifying
irrigation schemes that satisfy these criteria\. During the 1970s and
early 1980s, the Bank financed several irrigation projects in Romania\.
These projects were often designed with the economic assumptions of cheap
opportunity costs for energy and guaranteed export of agricultural
products, which were relevant under a command economy, but not in today's
economic circumstances\. Two irrigation schemes have been selected as
subprojects, taking into consideration factors like the economic costs of
pumping, rehabilitation needs, current utilization of irrigation, and
farmers' interest in WUAs\. Rehabilitation would be carried out only on
the first terraces of these schemes\. The economic analysis confirmed that
the planned rehabilitation is of adequate economic viability\.
The project design also reflects some lessons drawn from other irrigation
projects in the region\. These lessons include: (a) developing an enabling
legal framework prior to the start of the project, (b) up-front commitment
of the Government on restructuring inefficient public institutions, and
(c) a relatively simple project design with concrete objectives (e\.g\.,
rehabilitation of physical infrastructure and development of WUAs)\.
9\. Environment Aspects (including any public consultation)
Issues
Environmental impact assessments (EIAs) were carried out by international
consultants during project preparation for the two first-phase irrigation
schemes, Terasa Nicoresti-Tecuci and Sadova-Corabia\. The two EIAs were
reviewed and approved by the Ministry of Water and Environmental
Protection, and a confirmation letter was sent to the Bank on October 25,
2002\. Additional EIAs would be carried out during project implementation
for all schemes selected for the second phase of the project\. Inclusion
of any new schemes in the project would be subject to approval by
Romania's environmental authorities and the Bank, based on the EIAs\.
Environmental management plans, including detailed monitoring and
mitigation measures, will be incorporated into the project implementation
plan\.
The two EIAs determined that the project would have mainly positive
impacts on the environment\. The proposed project would focus on the
rehabilitation of deteriorated irrigation and drainage infrastructure,
most of which is 20 to 40 years old\. In addition to infrastructure
rehabilitation, the project would introduce far-reaching institutional
reforms, including pricing and subsidy reforms, the restructuring of SNIF
into the Land Reclamation Agency (LRA), and the associated development of
irrigation water user associations\.
The two EIAs were translated, distributed and presented at site
conferences to which all stakeholders and interested parties were
invited\. These included farmers, representatives from water users
associations, local governments, the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and
Forestry, Ministry of Water and Environmental Protection, and interested
NGOs\. The two site conferences were advertised in the national media, and
were conducted on October 30, 2002 for Sadova-Corabia and November 6, 2002
- 17 -
for Terasa Nicoresti-Tecuci\. At both meetings the stakeholders endorsed
the proposed rehabilitation\. The two EIAs were also sent to the Bank for
review with a report on the stakeholder conferences\.
The positive impacts resulting from physical rehabilitation of select
schemes include:
reduced water losses from rehabilitated canals, reducing the risk of
waterlogging and salinization;
improved on-farm irrigation techniques, reducing water losses and runoff;
improved irrigation efficiency, reducing overall power consumption\.
The positive impacts resulting from institutional reform, and benefiting
the sector as a whole include:
long-term sustainability;
savings in water and power, as well as a more responsible attitude toward
local environmental issues through the development of WUAs and involvement
of users in system management;
through subsidy reforms and moving financial support to the demand side,
empowerment of users and a concentration of irrigation in the more
profitable lower pumping levels, which would also reduce power and water
consumption;
more economic and effective delivery of services with an improved
responsiveness to users and a greater awareness of environmental issues
through the establishment of the new LRA\.
The EIAs for the two first phase schemes indicate that the proposed
project would have relatively few adverse environmental impacts during
construction and over the life of the project, and those that are
anticipated are considered to be low or not significant\. The main adverse
impacts would be:
increases in pollution loads in soils, groundwater and surface drainage
from chemical and organic fertilizers and pesticides; and
some risk of rising groundwater levels in specific locations\.
Increased Pollution from Agro-chemicals
A potential long-term environmental impact would be the possible increase
in traces of agro-chemicals in groundwater, drainage networks, and nearby
streams\. The current situation is that within the perimeter of the
existing irrigation systems, which total about 3\.0 million hectares, only
about 15 to 20t is currently being irrigated, and even in this area the
use of irrigation water is comparatively low\. However, almost all of this
land is cultivated, relying on uncertain rainfall, and resulting in low
productivity\. Consequently, the use of agro-chemicals is now at a much
lower level than during the former regime in the late 1980s\. And although
the project is expected to redevelop irrigation, it would not expand to
previous levels\. The most that could be expected in the years ahead is
about 1\.0 million hectares of irrigation, concentrated on the lower
levels\. And still there would be significant differences in comparison
with a decade ago\. First, with the rationalization of power charges and
farmers paying an increasing share of the costs, the application of
irrigation water would never reach the earlier peaks\. Second, the more
- 18 -
cost conscious and economically aware farmers would not invest in the
levels of agro-chemicals previously used\. So while agro-chemical levels
would rise above current levels in the drains and groundwater, the levels
of the late 1980s would not be repeated\. In no case would it be expected
that agro-chemical usage would approach that of farms in the EU, North
America or Japan\.
In conclusion, some increase in the contamination of soils, groundwater
and surface drainage by chemical and organic fertilizers and pesticides
may result from the project\. This could potentially affect public health
since groundwater is used as a drinking water source in the smaller
villages surrounding the irrigation command area\.
Monitoring and testing of groundwater wells for drinking water would be
implemented as a matter of urgency, to determine the level of
contamination, particularly with regard to microbiological parameters,
nitrates and pesticides\. The project includes funding for this testing\.
If the results exceed Romanian or EC standards for drinking water,
alternative sources of water would have to be provided to the villages\.
The provision of piped potable water for rural communities is a Government
priority, and three programs are currently active with funding by
different donors; one village in the project area is already benefiting
from one of these programs\.
The increased pollution loads in surface drainage from a single scheme are
unlikely to significantly affect water quality in the Danube due to
dilution capacity, and with greatly reduced irrigation areas in the
future, the pollution from irrigation would remain well below earlier
levels\. However, noting the significance of the River Danube and the
international importance and sensitivity of the environment of the lower
marshes, the project would include measures to minimize the runoff of
pollutants\. Measures would include strengthening the agricultural
extension services in rehabilitated schemes to advise and instruct farmers
on two aspects of irrigated agriculture; (a) the proper use of
agro-chemicals to minimize pollution in a sensitive area; and (b) better
on-farm irrigation management which would contribute to a reduction in
agro-chemical runoff\.
Rising Groundwater Levels
In the Nicoresti-Tecuci scheme, there is no evidence of high groundwater,
or that full utilization in the past led to groundwater levels that
damaged or affected crops or caused salinization\. However, with increased
irrigation after rehabilitation and increased system utilization there
would be more infiltration in the future, and it is prudent to monitor
groundwater levels on the Barlad floodplain\. A provision for this is
included in the monitoring program\.
The Sadova-Corabia scheme has a history of rising groundwater\. Some years
after first construction, water tables began to rise on the first terrace,
and were particularly serious in springtime in areas where impermeable
strata intersected the surface\. At its worst some 2,400 hectares became
waterlogged and in about 7,000 hectares the water table had risen to
within 1\.0 meter of the surface\. In response, the Government constructed
a system of surface and buried pipe drains, which were omitted in the
- 19 -
original construction because of the light textured permeable soils in the
area\. These treatments successfully eliminated the waterlogging, and
currently the groundwater table is close to the surface in only one
limited area\.
However, the EIA found that after rehabilitation under the project, the
increase in the irrigation applications could increase the risk of
waterlogging in this area (although it is unlikely that irrigation would
rise to former levels, since farmers would be paying part of the water
costs)\. Therefore, the project would include rehabilitation of the
drainage system to mitigate this risk\. In addition, the project would
repair irrigation canal linings as a part of the rehabilitation program,
which would reduce water losses and infiltration\. Furthermore,
rehabilitation is not planned in the upper half of the scheme, so
irrigation is expected to decline significantly there, which would further
limit future groundwater rises\. In conclusion, it is possible but
unlikely that waterlogging would recur in the Nicoresti-Tecuci scheme\.
Nevertheless, the project would monitor groundwater levels; a provision
for this is included in the monitoring program and funding is included in
the project for additional drainage if the need arises\.
10\. Contact Point:
Task Manager
Toru Konishi
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: 202 473 2351
Fax: 202 522 1164
11\. For information on other project related documents contact:
The InfoShop
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 458-5454
Fax: (202) 522-1500
Web: http:// www\.worldbank\.org/infoshop
Note: This is information on an evolving project\. Certain components may
not be necessarily included in the final project\.
This PID was processed by the InfoShop during the week ending March 14, 2003\.
- 20 - | APPROVAL |
P001269 | Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No\. 10782
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KENYA
RURAL WATER SUPPLY PROJECT
(LOAN 1637-KE)
JUNE 25, 1992
Infrastructure Operations Division
Eastern Africa Department
Africa Region
|This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their offici'al duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.|
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ALDEV African Land Development Organization
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
DANIDA Danish International Development Agency
GOK Government of Kenya
MWD Ministry of Water Development
RWS Rural Water Supply Program
RWSG Regional Water Supply and Sanitation Group
SIDA Swedish International Development Agency
WDD Water Development Department
THE WORLD BANK FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
U\.S\.A\.
Office of Director-General
Opefatkbs Evaluation
June 25, 1992
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT Project Completion Report on Kenya Rural Water Supply Project
(Loan 1637-KE)
Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project
Completion Report on Kenya Rural Water Supply Project (Loan 1637-KE)"
prepared by the Africa Regional Office\. No audit of this project has been
made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time\.
Attachment
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KENYA
RURAL WATER SUPPLY PROJECT
(LOAN 1637-KE)
Table of Contents
Page No\.
Preface
Evaluation Summary \.ii
PART I PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE \.1
A\. Project Identity \.
B\. Background \.
C\. Project Objectives and Description \. 2
D\. Project Design and Organization \. 2
E\. Project Implementation \. 3
F\. Project Results \. 7
G\. Bank and Borrower Performance and Relationship \. 7
H\. Lessons Leaned\. 8
PART II PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE 9
PART III STATISTICAL INFORMATION \. \. \. 10
Related Bank Loans \. 11
Project Timetable \. 11
Loan Disbursements \. 11
Project Cost and Financing \. 12
Status of Loan Covenants \. 13
Use of Bank Resources \. 16
This documen\. has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KENYA
RURAL WATER SUPPLY PROJECT
(LOAN 1637-KE)
PREFACE
This is a Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Rural Water Supply Project in Kenya,
for which Loan No\. 1637-KE of USS 20 million was approved on December 5, 1978\. Because of
insufficient progress, the project was terminated, and the loan was closed on June 30, 1985, on
the original closing date\. The last disbu\.sement was on September 15, 1985, and the undisbursed
amount of USS 18\.2 million was cancelled on the same date\.
The PCR was prepared by the Infrastructure Operations Division of the Eastern Africa
Department (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and I)\. As the loan was closed 7 years prior
to the preparation of this report, Parts I and m were not sent to the Borrower for comments\.
Preparation of this PCR was carried out in April/May 1992, and is based, intr alia, on
the Staff Appraisal Report, the Loan Agreement, supervision reports, correspondence between the
Bank and the Borrower, and internal Bank memoranda\.
- ii -
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KENYA
RURAL WATER SUPPLY PROJECT
(LOAN 1637-KE)
EVALUATION SUMMARY
Background and Objectives
1\. The main objectives of the Project, which was designed as part of Phase IV of the R'iral
Water Supply Development Program (RWS), were (i) to provide safe water to a rural population
of about half a million by implementing 33 new schemes; and (ii) strengthen the organization and
management capability of the Ministry of Water Development (MWD) to plan expansion
programs, and to operate and maintain rural water supply schemes (paras\. 4 and 6)\. The Project
was the fourth Bank loan to Kenya in the water sector: the experience with the implementation of
the First and Second Nairobi Water Supply Projects was satisfactory; the Mombasa and Coastal
Water Supply Project was in progress during the preparation and appraisal of this project\. The
previous phases of RWS, supported by bilateral donor agencies, were partially implemented with
long delays and significant cost overruns (para 7)\.
2\. MWD, the implementing agency for the Project, was established in 1974\. It was a new
organization, institutionally weak, with a very expansive program\. Financially, it depended on
Government budgetary allocation, revenues from its inherited and newly constructed water
schemes and on grants provided by various bilateral donor agencies\. Government's water pricng
polcy, its reluctance to increase tariffs, the lack of a sufficient billing and revenue collection
system (only about 20% of the targeted revenues, aimed to cover operational and maintenance
cost, were actually collected) contributed to MWD's problems (para 8)\.
Implementation Experience
3\. The Project, as appraised, included the preparation of feasibility studies, detailed designs
and construction of 33 rural water supply schemes\. The physical parameters of the selected
schemes were not adequately known at the time of the appraisal and the content of the individual
schemes were constantly changing - growing - during the design period: many of the schemes
actually became complex and extensive regional water supply systems, with much higher cost than
originally expected\.
4\. In order to contain the cost within the original estimate, the number of the schemes was
reduced first to 33 (November 1980, before credit effectiveness), theii to 29 in mid-1981 and to
24 in March 1982\. At this time the project was already 2 1/2 years behind schedule, no
construction had started and the estimated project cost had more than dozabled\. The
reorganization of the Ministry, which was carried out with reluctance, wasa still incomplete\. Some
equipment and vehicles were procured to strengthen the Ministry's direct labor section, but this
made very little or no impact on the operation and maintenance of the exi\.ting schemes\. No
improvement was made on the revenue collection and the strengthening of the district
- iii -
organizations also advanced very slowly\. As there was little prospect for improvement, in
February 1983, the Bank proposed termination of the Project to GOK\. Government was first in
agreement, but in November 1983, requested that tre Project be maintained at a revised, lower
scale (para 13)\.
5\. The Ptoject was restructured in April 1984\. The number of the schemes was reduced to 6
(4 contractor built and 2 by force account)\. The design for another 15 schemes was included in
preparation for a future second project\. The restructured project also provided for further
technical assistance, training and most importantly, for a water sector review to assist GOK and
MWD to set the basis for a coherent sector development program and water pricing policy\. The
total project cost (net of taxes) was reduced from USS 26\.2 m to US$ 17\.8 n (including
previously committed expenditures) (paras\. 14 through 16)\.
6\. The start-up of the restructured project was promising, but short-lived\. By end-1984 the
previous institutional problems resurfaced\. Progress with design wvork slowed and awards of
contracts for the schemes were delayed\. Frequent changes of high- and mid-level officers in
MWD hindered continuity of project execution\. Finally, in February 1985, GOK decided that in
the future only grant aid should be used for rural water supply development, and the Project
should be terminated\. The loan was closed 'on schedule" on J'\.no 30, 1985\. Total amount
disbursed was only 9% of the loan amount (paras\. 18 amd 19) and the undisbursed balance of
$18\.2 m was canceled\.
Results
7\. The Project failed to achieve its objectives\. None of the original 33 schemes or the 6
schemes in the restructured project was completed\. Some of the schemes hough with
substantially-enlarged scope) were implemented later, utilizing bilateral grant funds\. MWD's
direct labor section also benefitted from the support provided under the Project, and contributed
in a small way to MWD's efforts to operate the existing schemes\. Physical assessment of this
impact is not possible\.
8\. The creation of the Project Monitoring Unit as part of MWD's new organizational
structure demonstrated its usefulness in the short period after the project restructuring exercise
and was retained to implement rural water supply schemes after the Proiect was terminated\.
Lessons Learned
9\. TF-e Project was appraised as part of an over-ambitious lending program, much too early
and without ap riate technical preparation\. The consequences of this approach were felt
during the endrety of the "implementation" period and could not be rectified during the
supervision stage\.
10\. Retrospectively, it can be seen, that the capability of MWD to plan, coordinate, design
and implement the Project was overestimated and the lessons learned from the implementation of
the previous phases of RWS were not sufficiently recognized\. In spite of the massive technical
assistance provided by other donors (funding physical projects as well as a large number of
advisors) MWD had shown all signs of the inertia of an institution which grew too large too soon\.
11\. The financial base of MWD was also uncertain\. Budgetary allocation (and budget cuts)
were erratic in a time when MWD significantly expanded (both prior to and during the project
- iv -
period)\. Water pricing policy was unclear, and tariff increases (even covenanted) fell victim to
political considerations\.
12\. In summary the main lessons learned are:
(i) Physical investments should be preceded by engineering designs and reliable cost
estimates; 3rried out preferably under a separate engineering project or a
preceding project in the sector;
(ii) In case of an institutionally and financially weak organization, support for
institutional improvement and capacity building should not only accompany an
investment project, but precede it during the preparatory phase of the physical
project, and it should be ensured that the scope and size of the investment project
is comrnensurate with the institution's implementation capacity;
(iii) Realisuc, well-defined and enforceable financial covenants are essential to ensure
the fiuiancial base of any implementing agency\.
13\. Overall, it should be said that although the failure of this project and the less than
satisfactory implementation (and subsequent operation) of the RWS schemes, has been
disappointing, it led ultimately to the creation of an independent water supply authority in 1989,
and acceptance by the Government of the principle that it should operate on a commercial basis\.
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KENYA
RURAL WATER SUPPLY PROJECT
(LOAN 1637-KE)
PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE
A\. ProQitJ Identity
Name: Rural Water Supply Project
Loan Number: 1637-KE
RVP Unit: Eastern Africa Department
Country: Kenya
Sector: Water Supply and Sanitation
Sub-Sector: Rural Water Supply and Sanitation
B\. Backrund
1\. Kenya's overall economic performance with an average growth of GDP of 6\.6 percent per
annum in the first 15 yeas of independence was remarkable\. The main ttav of the economy was
the agricultural sector which provided employment to about 90% of the inbor force, and
represented about 38% of GDP in 1977\. It has shown good growth in years with favorable
weather conditions, alternating with disappointing performance in years of drought or floods
(specifically in 1974 and 1975)\. In the high and medium agricultural potential areas the
population is mainly scattered on individual farms; villages as such are rare; instead, small centers
constituted by a few shops, a school and dispensary are more frequent\. In the low potential areas
the population is often nomadic and derives its livelihood from cattle breeding\. Government's
efforts in the rural areas stressed the need to increase rural incomes (about half of the country-
wide average) and improve the quality of services (transport, water supply, education and health)\.
It was in this context that Government launched the Rural Water Supply Program (RWS) in 1970
with the stated objective of providing safe and reliable water supply to the population of Kenya by
the year 2000\.
2\. The rural population in 1977 was estimated at 12\.5 million, of which about 1\.5 million
had access to improved water source or piped water supply\. The balance had to rely on other
sources, often polluted, insufficient and unreliable and had to carry water over considerable
distances\. It was also noted that the level of maintenance of water supply schemes has been
generally low causing frequent disruptions of service\.
3\. The responsibility for water supply and sewerage development changed hands often\.
Until 1964, the Ministry of Works was responsible for urban, and the African Land Development
Organization (ALDEV) in the Ministry of Agriculture for rural water supplies; County Councils
also operated rural schemes which had been constructed before the formation of ALDEV in 1946\.
In 1964, both urban water supply and sewerage, and rural water supply development were
combined under the Water Development Department (WDD) in the Ministry of National
Resources\. WDD was transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture in 1968 where it remained until
the creation of the Ministry of Water Development (MWD) in 1974\. MWD had a very expansive
-2
program from its inception, which was unrealistic in view of the scarcity of tiained manpow3r
and underbudgeting\.
C\. Pro\.ect_Obectivrs and Descrition
Proiect Obiectivej
4\. 'lhe main objectives of the Project were to:
(i) contribute to Phase IV of the n1WS, providing water to a rural population of about
h\.lf a million by implementing 33 new schemes;
(ii) strengthen MWD's organization and management capability to plan expaision
programs, and to operate and maintain rural water supply schemes\.
Project Description
5\. The main components of the Project were:
(i) design and construction of 33 new rural watel supply schemes;
(ii) strengthening of MWD's operation and maintenance, and direct labor secdons;
(iii) technical assistance for implementation of the recommendations of the
management study 1/; and
(iv) preparation of Phase V of the RWS\.
D\. ProEect Design and Organization
6\. The Project was designed as part of Phase IV of the Rural Water Supply Development
Program (RWS)\. The project concept, in principle, was justified: assist the Government's efforts
in satisfying the physical needs in the rural areas through the construction of new water supply
schemes, and at the same time, strengthen MWD's institutional capability and financial position\.
7\. However, the project as conceived was overly optimistic regarding tne MWD's ability to
carry it out\. RWS I started in 1970 (under the WDD in the Ministry of Agriculture) and
comprised the construction of 72 schemes\. It was scheduled for completion in 1972\. Only by
mid-1976 %,s it basically completed, with only a few schemes remaining unfinished\. RWS II
started in t972 and consisted of the construction of 29 schemes\. This phase was substantially
completed by the end of 1978\. RWS III started in 1974, consisted of 73 schemes, and was due
for completion by 1980\. However, virtually none of these schemes were completed by 1977
when the Rural Water Supply Project was appraised (as a matter of fact only two schemes were
completed by January 1980), and implementation was still in progress in 1984 (at the time of
termination of the Rural Water Supply Project)\. RWS IV as planned included 65 subprojects,
financed by the Bank (33 schemes) and other donor agencies (CIDA, DANIDA and the
Government of the Netherlands)\.
l/ I For details see para\. 9\.
-3-
8\. The lengthy delays in the physical implementation of the various phases of RWS were due
to lack of sufficient professional staff in MWD, financial cost overruns due to inadequate designs,
and financial constraints due to overall Government budgetary constraints\. Government's
generally inadequate water pricing policy, and its reluctance to increase tariffs contributed to the
problems\. In addition, MWD did not hrve an effective billing and revenue collection system\.
Tariffs should have been adequate to cover operation and mainte\.Aance (O & M) cost; in reality
the collected revenues covered unly about 20% of the 0 & M costs, and many of the schemes
* built under RWS I and II were already in need of rehabilitation by 1979/80\.
9\. 'The appraisal team was aware of these problems and a considerable effort was made to
address the institutionai issues through the inclusion of covenants requiring MWD to carry out a
reorganization of the Ministry as recomnuended by the management study I/\.
10\. The selection of the physical subprojects was completed by MWD as a condition for
appraisal, with a brief description of the anticipated components\. The cost estimates for the
subprojects were made on the basis of the ongoing RWS I and RWS II schemes\.
11\. Retrospectively, it can be said that (a) the selection 3J, design (and con\. !quently the
estimated cost) of the physical subprojects were not adequately determined for an investment
project; (b) the ability of MWD to handle projec processing, planning and design was
overestimated; and (c) the anticipated improvement of MWD's financial position and availability
of counterpart funds (in spite of occasional warnings by Treasury) was too optimistic\.
Nevertheless, the Project went ahead\.
E\. Project Implementation
12\. After a period of 3 years of preparation (including 3 identification, 3 preparation, and 2
pre-appraisal missions, I appraisal mission and 4 post-appraisal missions) the project was
approved in December 1978 and became eff;\.tive in January, 1980\.
13\. Project progress from the start was very slow dnd problem-laden 4/: \.ndividual
subprojects were repeatedly redesigned and their costs escalated; some of the schemes were
substituted by other schemes; in an effort to contain the costs within the original estimate the
number of schemes were first reduced from 33 to 30 in November 1980, (before Credit
Effectiveness) to 29 in June 1981, and to 24 in March 1982\. Some progress was made by this
time regarding the restructuring of MWD but it was still incomplete and overall, the project was
about 2 1/2 years behind schedule\. Projects costs more than doubled, and MWD's request to
2/ Provision for the evaluation of the RWS was included under the Mombasa and Coastal
Water Supply Project\. Instead, this study was financed by SIDA and its results were availabl¢ in
1977/78\. The allocated funds were available for a malagement study, but this was financed by
GOK/MWD\. The management study report was available at the post-appraisal phase of this
project, and it provided the base for determining the covenants regarding institutional issues\.
/ IThe subprojects (as a result of political considerations) were scattered all over the country
which further escalated the difficulties of the whole operation\.
4/ The history of the project can also be followed under Table 7B in Part II of this PCR
(Column: Type of Problem)\.
-4-
Treasury to provide for the escalated cost was unlikely to come through\. Total amount disbursed
was only about 3% of the SAR estimate (and about 6% of loan)\. As there was very little
prospect for improvement, the Bank proposed the terminatioo of the Project to the Government\.
Treasury first supported this proposal, but later changed Its mind and requested the Bank that the
Project be maintied at a revised lower scale\.
14\. In response to this request two visits were made to Kenya for the preparation of a possible
restructuring of the Project, in Novembcr 1983, and February 1984, respectively\. The full
restructuring mission took place in April 1984\.
15\. The content of the restructured project is described in the letter addressed to the
Permanent Se,\.retary, Ministry of Water Development, dated May 10, 1984, and is summarized
below:
(a) PrEQjectScope
(i) Four self-contained rural water supply schemnes EJ; to-be constructed by
contractors selected by ICB procedures\. Design and construction
supervision to be carried out by engineering consultants acceptable to the
Bank;
(ii) Two small rural water supply scheme\. 5/ to be designed, constructed and
supervised by MWD staff on a pilot basis to demonstrate MWD's
capability and capacity to undertake such works by force account;
(iii) Completion of the detailed engineering designs and preparation of tender
documents of fifteen rural water supply schemes E/ for a future Second
Rural Water Supply Project;
(iv) Purchase of vehicles and equipment to assist MWD to undertake the two
schemes in (ii), and the subsequent operation and maintenance of all the
project -financed schemes in (i) and (ii);
(v) Training support for the staff of the recently created districts involved
with the projects; and
(vi) A Kenya Water Sector Review to be undertaken by MWD staff supported
by consultants\.
I/ Mhe schemes were selected jointly by the restructuring mission and MWD\.
-5-
(b) Project Cost and Financing §I
Cost of Restructured Project
US$ (million) KSh (million)
Project Component | Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
(i) Four schemes (contractor built) 8\.5 3\.6 12\.1 112\.0 48\.0 160\.0
(ii) Two schemes (force account) 0\.2 0\.3 0\.5 2\.0 4\.0 6\.0
(iii) Preparation of 15 schemes 1\.5 - 1\.5 20\.0 - 20\.0
(iv) Vehicles and Equipment 0\.1 0\.5 0\.6 t 2\.0 6\.0 8\.0
(v) Training 0\.1 0\.2 0\.3 2\.0 2\.0 4\.0
(vi) Kenya water sector review O0\.2 0 3_ _2\.0 2\.0 4\.0
TOTALS 10\.5 4\.8 15\.3 140\.0 62\.0 202\.0
Restructured Financing Plan
(USS million)
- \. \. Bank Contribution GOK Contribution Total
Revised project 12\.5 2\.8 15\.3
Previously committed 2\.5 -_ _
TOTALS 15\.0 2\.8 17\.8
Original Loan 1637-KE 20 0
Balance to be cancelled A/ 5\.0
A/ Agreement was reached that GOK would send a formal request to the Bank for
cancellation\. This request was never submitted\.
(c) Disbursement
Agreement was reached that to reflect the revised financing arrangements, GOK
would formally request the amendment of Schedule I of the Loan Agreement, as follows:
Including contingencies, but excluding taxes and duties\.
-6 -
Category Amount of Loan Allocated % of Expenditures to be
financed
(1) Pipes, eilpment, tools, $2,000,000 100%
spare parts d vehicles
(2) Civil Worms $9,000,000 80%
(3) Technical Assistance $3,200,000 100%
(4) Unallocated $800\.00Q
TOTAL $15,000,000 - _ - \. _ _ _
16\. The restructured project included the preparation of a water sector stdy with the
objectives of assisting (a) the formulation of future strategy in the water sector: and (b) the
revision of the tariff structure (and levels) taking into account the varying phases of development
and to meet GOK's "district focus" objective of local financial viability\.
17\. The start-up of the restructured project was promising\. Consultants were appointed to
finalize the designs, the construction of one scheme started, some efforts were made to improve
the revenue collection at district levels, and work commenced on the water sector stwdy with
active involvement of the World Bank/UNDP Project Preparation Unit (predecessor to the present
Regional Water Supply and Sanitation Group (RWSG))\.
18\. The revitalized activity under the restructured project was short-lived\. By end 1984, the
previous problems resurfaced again\. Progress with design work slowed and awards of contracts
for the schemes were delayed\. Frequent changes of high- and mid-level executive officers in
MWD also hindered the continuity of project execution\. Because of the implementation delays
and Treasury's v-\.ew that loan funds should not be used for rural water supply development, the
future of the Project became uncertain again\. Finally, in February 1985, GOK decided that in the
future only grant aid would be used for rural water supply development and the Project should be
terminated\. The loan was closed 'on schedule" on June 30, 1985\.
19\. At the end of the project, MWD made an effort to submit reimbursement applications to
the Bank for legitimate expenditures under the project\. The outcome of this exercise was
unsuccessful: due to improper record-keeping, the total value of the submitted requests was less
than expected\. Final disbursement was made on September 25, 1985\. It is to be noted that since
GOK failed to submit formal request for the amendment of Schedule 1, all disbursements were
made on the basis of the original loan agreement\.
20\. As described in the previous paragraphs, out of the originally planned 33 schemes, not a
single one was completed before the closing of the loan\. This could be attributed to the
following:
(i) the engineering designs (and for 14 schemes even a preliminary assessment) were
incomplete before project implementation began\. During the design period, most
of the schemes grew much larger than originally intended and became regional
water supply systems\. These changes in some cases were justifiable from the
engineering point of view, but their cost could not be accommodated under the project;
(ii) the cmst estimate of the individual project components was inaccurate and
genealy too low;
(iii) countinpan funds were not available in a timely manner even for the actually
incurred expenditure due to budgetary constraints;
(iv) the capability of MWD to plan, coordinate, design and implement the Project was
overestimated\. The impact of the implementation of the reorganization of MWD,
which was carried out with reluctance by the Ministry's officials, was much less
than expected and came too late; and
(v) Government may have been reluctant to borrow on IBRD terms for rural water
supplies\.
F\. Eroject ResultA
21\. The project had no immediate physical impact through providing better water supply in
the rural areas\. However, the design efforts were not fully wasted\. Some of the schemes (though
with substantially enlarged scope) were implemented later, utilizing bilateral grant funds\.
22\. MWD's direct labor section also benefitted from the support provided under the project,
and contributed in a small way to MWD's efforts to operate the existing schemes\. Physical
assessment of this impact is not possible\.
23\. The creation of the Project Monitoring Unit in connection with the reorganization of the
MWD was useful and was retained in the Ministry to implement rural water projects after the
Project was terminated\.
24\. The Project was originally exempted from rate of return calculation, and no meaningful
ex-post calculat n could be undertaken for the uncompleted project\.
G\. Bank and Borrower Performance and Relationship
25\. Despite three years of attempts at defining and preparing the project, the project was
appraised too early and without appropriate technical preparation\. The consequences of this
approach were felt throughout the 'implementation" period, and could not be rectified through
Bank supervision\. Significant effort was made to save the project from early extinction through
its restructuration\. This was not only an effort to resuscitate the physical activities, but also to
pave the way for a better designed future project for which the sector study seemed to be the best
vehicle\.
26\. The Borrower (GOK) and the implementing Ministry also made efforts from time to time
to improve and speed up the planning and design activities\. The reorganization of MWD was
substantially completed, albeit late\. The financial aspects (i\.e\. adequate tariffs and improved
revenue collection), fell victim to political considerations, and to the inertia of an institution which
grew too large too fast\.
27\. Tbe Bank-MWD relationship was not satisfactory\. The Bank was looked at with
suspicion, and the pressure from the Bank to implement the agreed institutional changes was
regarded as unwanted intervention into the Ministry's internal affairs and after inidal enthusiasm
to carry out th Water Sector Study, it fell into the same category and has never been completed\.
28\. In summary, the performance of both the Bank (in the initial stages) and the Borrower
(during implementation) was less than satisfactory\. In addition, the failure of this project and the
difficulties experienced in the implementation of the Mombasa and Coastal Water Supply project
undermined the relationship between the Bank and MWD for a long time\.
H\. Lessons Learn
29\. The Project was appraised as part of an over-ambitious lending program, much too early
and withiout aD\.roDriate technical pre2aration\. The consequences of this approach were felt
during the entirety of the "implementation" period and could not be rectified during the
supervision stage\.
30\. Retrospectively, it can be seen, that the capability of MWD to plan, coordinate, design
and implement the Project was overestimated and the lessons learned from the implementation of
the previous phases of RWS were not sufficiently recognized\. In spite of the massive technical
assistance provided by other donors (funding physical projects as well as a large number of
advisors) MWD had shown all signs of the inertia of an institution which grew too large too soon\.
31\. The financial base of MWD was also uncertain\. Budgetary allocadon (and budget cuts)
were erratic in a time when MWD significantly expanded (both prior to and during the project
period)\. Water pricing policy was unclear, and tariff increases (even covenanted) fell victim to
political considerations\.
32\. In summary the main lessons learned are:
(i) Physical investments should be preceded by engineering designs and reliable cost
estimates; carried out preferably under a separate engineering project or a
preceding project in the sector;
(ii) In case of an institutionally and financially weak organization, support for
institutional improvement and capacity building should not only accompany an
investment project, but precede it during the preparatory phase of the physical
project, and it should be ensured that the scope and size of the investment project
is commensurate with the institution's implementation capacity;
(iii) Realistic, well-defined and enforceable financial covenants are essential to ensure
the financial base of any implementing agency\.
33\. Overall, it should be said that although the failure of this project and the less than
satisfactory implementation (and subsequent operation) of the RWS schemes, has been
disappointing, it led ultimately to the creation of an independent water supply authority in 1989,
and acceptance by the Government of the principle that it should operate on a commercial basis\.
- 9 -
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
KENYA
RURAL WATER SUPPLY PROJECT
(LOAN 1637-KE)
PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE
As the loan was closed 7 years prior to the preparation of this report,
Parts I and III were not sent to the Borrower for comments\.
-10-
PROJECT COMPLEXION REPORT
KENYA
RURAL WATER SUPPLY PROJECT
(LOAN 1637-KE)
PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION
A\. Related Bank Loans
Table 1: RELATED BANK LOANS
Title of Credit Purpose Approved Status
Yma Amount
(USS m)
Nairobi Water (A) Increase the water supply to 1970 8\.3 Completed
Supply Project Nairobi by constructing (a) a satisfactorily in
Lo\. 714-KE weir and river intake on the 1979
Chania river; (b) a raw water
pumping stadon and
transmission main; (c) water
treatment plant at Ngethu; (d)
treated water transmission main
from the water treatment plant to
Nairobi and a terminal reservoir;
and (e) extension of the
distribudon system\.
(B) Provision of T\.A\. to the
newly forned Water and
Sewerage Department of the
Nairobi City Council
Mombasa and (A) Increase the water supply to 1975 35\.0 Completed in 1982
Coastal Water Mombasa, expand distribution
Supply Project into new locations along the
Ln\. 1167-KE coast, (B) provide T\.A\. to the
Coast Province Water Branch
and the Ministry of Water
Development, and facilitate the
preparation of a rural water
supply project\.
Second Nairobi 1978 30\.0 Completed
Water Supply (A) Increase the water supply to satisfactorily in
Project Nairobi by (a) modifying the 1984
Ln\. 1520-KE existing Sasumua dam to
regulating reservoir and
construct new raw water intake
on the Chania river (including
gravity main); (b) increasing the
capacity of the Ngethu water
treatment plant and the
transmission main; (c)
improving and expanding the
distribution system; (B) provide
T\.A\. to the Water and Sewerage
Department of the Nairobi City
Council\.
- 11 -
B\. Project Timei4ble
Table2: PLANNED, REVISED AND ACTUAL DATES OF PROJECT TIMETABLE
Item Date Planned Date Revised Date Actual
Identification 07-11/1975 07-11/1975
Preparation 12/1975-02/1976 - 12/1975-03/1976
Preappraisal - 09/1976 09/1976-02/1977
Appraisal Mission 04/1977 - 04/11-05/05/1977
Post-appraisal - 08-10/1977 08/1977-06/1978
Loan Negotiations 03/1978 - 10/10-13/1978
Board Approval 01/19781' 12/05/1978 12/05/1978
Loan Signature 12/20/1978 - 12/20/1978
Loan Effectiveness 03/1979 01/24/1980
Loan Closing 06/30/1985 - 06/30/1985 2'
Project Completion 06/30/1984 06/30/1985 Not completed '
1/ As per Project Brief\.
2/ Because of inadequate progress, and Government's decision not to utilize loan funding for
rural water supply projects, the project was terminated and the loan closed on the original
closing date\.
C\. Loan Disbursements
able 3: CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS (USS MILLION)
FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86
Appraisal Estimate 1\.10 4\.00 9\.70 15\.70 19\.10 20\.00
Actual 0\.11 0\.11 0\.11 0\.45 0\.75 1\.68 1\.80
Actual as % of Estimate 10\.0 2\.8 1\.1 2\.9 3\.9 8\.4 9\.0
Date of Last Disbursement 1/ September 25, 1985
1/ The loan was closed on June 30, 1985\. The undisbursed balance of US$18,204,421\.52
was cancelled on the date of the last disbursement\.
- 12 -
D\. Project Cgsts and Einancing
I&klA: PROJECT COm (USS million)
A22rAijaaLEstiMiZ Acm 1/
Descripion Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
1\. Materials and 6\.6 6\.4 17\.0 0\.3 0\.1 0\.4
Construction
2\. Engineering 1\.3 1\.1 2\.4 1\.5 - 1\.5
3\. Strengthening MWD 0\.6 1\.6 2\.2 0\.4 0\.1 0\.5
4\. T\.A\. 0\.4 Q Q _ QJ
5\. Total base cost 8\.7 13\.5 22\.2
6\. Contingencies I U 8
(Physical & Price)
7\. Total project cost
(i) net of taxes 8\.1 18\.7 26\.8 2\.5 0\.2 2\.7
(ii) incl\. taxes 11\.8 18\.7 30\.5 2\.7 0\.2 2\.9
i/ Including contingencies\.
IAI:: PROJECT FINANCING (US$ millions)
Appraisal Estimat Actua
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
IBRD Loan 1\.3 18\.7 20\.0 1\.6 0\.2 1\.8
Government of Kenya i - 1 lo Li Z_ I1
Total Financing (incl\. taxes) 11\.8 18\.7 30\.5 2\.7 0\.2 2\.9
- 13 -
E\. Status of Loan Covenangs
Table 6: COMPLIANCE WITH LOAN COVENANTS
Section Status Description of Covenants Comments
3\.01 Not met The Borrower shall carry out the Project\. in More details below
accordance with Schedule 2 to this Agreement\. under Schedule 2 (A
to D)\.
3\.02 OK In any case in which consultants are required\.
their qualifications, experience and terms and
conditions of employment, including their terms
of reference, shall be satisfactory to the
Borrower and the Bank\.
3\.03 (a) OK The Borrower \. to insure \. imported goods
against hazards incident to\. \.delivery thereof\.
3\.03 (b) OK \. all goods and services financed out of the Complied with until
proceeds of the Loan shall be used exclusively termination of the
for the Project until its completion\. Project\.
3\.04 (a) Partially The Borrower shall furnish to the Bank \. plans, Documents, reports,
mat specifications, \.ports, contract documents and etc\. were submitted
construction and procurement schedules\. with delays\.
3\.04 (b)
(i) Partially The Borrower shall maintain records Record keeping and
met to\. monitor progress of the Project\. project monitoring
was maintained in
poor quality\.
(ii) OK shall enable the Bank's representatives to vi-
sit\. \.construction sites \.and to examine
goods\., financed out of the proceeds of the
Loan\.
(iii) Partially shall furnish to the Bank \. information\. Only partially met,
met concerning the Project, its cost\. benefits, the due to poor record
expenditure of the proceeds of the Loan\. keeping\.
3\.04 (c) Not met Promptly after completion \. Borrower shall This condition under
prepare report \. on the Project\. the circumstances can
be regarded as not
applicable\.
3\.05 OK \. The Borrower shall \. acquire \. land \. and water
rights, and shall furnish evidence to the Bank\.
- 14 _
Talel 6: COMPLIANCE W1TH LOAN COVENANTS (con't\.)
Section Status Description of Covenants Comments
4\.02 (a) Partally The Borrower shall maintain \. records\. in Record kIewing was
met respect oA the Project, of the departments or poor\.
agenr\.ies\. \.responsib!e for carrying out the
Project or any part thertof\.
4\.02 (b) N/A The Borrower shall retain, until one year after Not determined\.
the Closing Date\. \.records\.
4\.02 (c) Partially The Borrower shall cause MWD to (i) have its Auditing was carried
met\. accounts and financial statements audited by out by the Controller
independent auditors acceptable to the Bank; (ii) and Auditor General
furnish to the Bank\. \.not later tan 6 months after in accordance with
the end of each year\. GOK regulations\.
Audit reports were
submitted 2 to 3
years late\.
4\.03 Not met \. Borrower shall ensure that the rural water 0 & M of the
supply systems\. \.ar operated and maintained\. existing schemes
acceptable to the Bank \. and provide \. funds, were below
facilities, services and resources required for standards, mainly due
such purposes\. to (a) lack of funds
(inadequate budgetary
allocation, low tariffs
and poor revenue
collection perform-
ance; and (b) lack of
trained personnel\.
4\.04 (a) Not met Borrower shall set and maintain tariffs\., to New tariffs
recover 0 & M costs\. acceptable to the
Bank were
implemented on July
1, 1979\. However,
no required further
tariff increases were
introduced until the
termination of the
Project in 1985\. (See
comments under
Clause 6\.04 (c))\.
4\.04 (b) Not met Borrower shall ensure revenue collection in Targets were not met\.
accordance with Schedule 5 to the Credit
Agreement\.
- 15 -
Table 6: COMPLIANCE WITH LOAN COVENANTS (con't\.)
Section Status Description of Covenants Comments
4\.04 (c) Not met Borrower shall adjust tariffs on December No tariff adjustments
31, 1991 and periodically thereafter to permit were made\.
recovery of 0 & M costs\.
4\.04 (d) Not met Borrower shall maintain records of billing Record keeping was
and revenue collection\. generally poor, and after
the transfer of revenue
raising responsibilities to
the districts (July 1983)
billing and collection
further deteriorated\.
4\.05 OK Borrower shall ensure-\. adequate financial No-additional project
resources and personnel for\. axy project not was carried out during
included in the Program\. the Project implementa
tion period\.
4\.06 Not met Bor;ower, by end-1983 shall furnish \. long Preparation of Phase V
range program\. Rural Water Supply Pro-
ject started, but no
formal information was
submitted to the Bank\.
At the time of restruc-
turing, it was expected
that the water sector
study (WSS) would
rectify this deficiency\.
WSS was not completed
by the time of termina-
tion of the Project\.
Schedule Not met Construction of Rural Water Supply Systems\. Some of the provisions
2, P?it A regarding the preparation
of feasibility studies and
designs were complied
with\. However, even
though the number of
schemes was reduced
from 33 (SAR) to 4
(Restructured Project)
none of the schemes
were completed by the
time of termination of
the Project\.
_ 16 -
lable 6: COMPLIANCE WriH LOAN COVENANTS (con't\.)
Section Status Description of Covenants Comments
Schedule NIA Operation and Maintenance of Rural Water Some vehicles and
2, Part B Supply Systems\. equipment were
procured, but its impact
on operations was not
measurable\.
Schedule Partially Management and Operations of MWD\. Consultancy Study for
2, Part C met MWD reorganization
was completed in May
1978, followed by
implementation of the
agreed recommenda-
tions\. This was partially
completed by October
1979\. However,
MWD's operations did
not improve to the extent
anticipated\.
Schedule Partially Project Monitoring ar\.d Planning for Rural Project Monitoring Unit
2, Part D met Water Supply, Phase V\. was established 2 years
late\. Preparation of
Phase V Schemes
commenced but was not
filly completed by the
time of termination of
the Project (partly due to
the failure of Phase IV)\.
F\. 1Us of Bnk Reources
Staff ntvgaal\.
Data not available\.
- 17 -
Table 7: MISSION (IN STAFF DAYS)
-Slage of Month/ No\. of Days in Spec:alization Perfonasom Type of
Project Cycle Year Pau= Field Represented Rating Stats Problem
Identification 07n5 2 4 Legal Counsel
Financial Analyst
10175 2 4 Loan Officer
Sanitary Engineer
11/75 2 12 Sanitary Engineers (2)
Preparation 12/75 1 I Sanitary Engineer
02/76 3 10 Sanitary Engineer
Financial Analyst
Training Specialist
03/76 1 1 Loan Officer
Pre-Appraisal 09/76 /, 60 Sanitary Engineers (2)
Financial Analysts
Training Specialist
Pre-Appraisal 02/77 1 4 Sanitary Engineer
follow-up
Appraisal 04/77- \.4 106 Sanitary Engineer
Financial Analyst
Economist
Training Specialist
Post-Appraisal 08/77 1 6 Financial Analyst
10/77 1 4 Sanitary Engineer
02/78 2 10 Sanitary Engineers (2)
06/78 2 30 Sanitary Engineer
Financial Analyst
Supervision 05/79 2 10 Sanitary Engineer 3 TIchnial: Proption of feasibility studies
Financial Analyst and detailed designs 8 months overdue\.
Mansgrjal: Poor coordination - Program
Monitoring Unit not established
- 18 _
MTlo : MISSION (IN STAFF DAYS) (con'l\.)
Stage * f Mouth/ No\. of Days iA Speciaton Peformnc Type of
Project cycle Yen Pemt Fidl Reprsted Rating StUs Problem
05/80 1 9 Sanitary Engineer 2 Techcasl: Prepaion of feasbility studies
aad deta,id designs ar 12 months late; many
of the schemes under prepartion are expected
to be significantly lger than envuaged at
appraisal, and estidma cos ar now US$ 68
m (veu SAR USS 30\.5)\.
EinangQi: MWD requested additional fumding
from Tresury\.
11/80 2 20 Sanitay Engineer 2 Tehnig: Frequent revisions of the program:
Finacial Analyst to contan the coat within orig esuma the
number of scheme ws rhced from 33 to
30, of which MWD would desig 17, and
consultants 13\.
06/81 1 4 Sanitary Engineer 3 Technical: Repeated revisiou of the
progm= as 2 schemes would be joined total
numbr of schemes was reduced to 29, of
which 1S would be dsigned by consultas\.
Managonal: Inductioa of new organizaton
stucture of MWD progeins slowly, PPU
still not in place\.
EjMagji: Revenue collection perform
uot adequate (below 0 & M cost)\.
03/82 1 4 Sanitary Engineer (BTO report Tecnial: To contain the cost within estimate
only) and in view that none of the feasibility stulies
and design of the schemes wero completed,
the number of schom was roduced to 24\.
k4anagerial: Lntoduction of now organizaion
strcture not yet completed\.
06t82 1 10 Sanitary Engineer (BTO report Technical: Substitution of one scheme in the
only) program\.
Einanial: While Govemment budgetary
allocation covers about 92% of ounterpart
costs, it is not concreely located\. among the
schemes\. Review of revenue collection and
sdequacy of taiffs by MWD overdue\.
Sd jI: Introductiou of MWD's
roorganizaton is only partialy completed
Ofej: Project implemetao 2 yers late\.
12/82 2 6 Sanitay Engine (2) (BTO rport 1b: Powect implementation more tha
only) 2 yeatn late\. Due to the enlargem of
individual scheans, estiated project cost 2 to
3 tims higher than SAR estim
- 19 -
Table 2: MISSION (IN STAFF DAYS) (con't\.)
_ Stage of Month/ No\. of Days in Specialization Perfonnmace Type of
Project Cycle Year Pins Field Represted Rating Status Problem
Fiancial: Availbility of counterpart funds is
doubtful\. Revenues cover only about 20% of
0 & M cost\.
Managrial: Completion of MWD's
reorniation still incomplete\.
02/83 3 20 Financial Analyst, 3 TeIbncal: Fesibility studies and design are
Sanitary Engineer, completed only for 8 studies (by consultants)\.
Maagement The remaining 16 schemes arm in various
Consultant stg of prepation\. Estimated cost about
USS 72 million (vcrsus USS 30\.5 in SAR),
maly duo to enlarged scope of the
subprojects and prices increas Overall the
project about 2 1/2 years behind schedule\.
Financial: Counteprt funds ar not available
for the escalated costs\. Revenues cover odly
about 20% of 0 & M cosa, due to low taiffs
and iadequate collection Audited accounts 2
yeas overdue\.
Mamgerial: The reorgani=Aon is
substantially completed, but MWD's officics
favor irum to the previous sym\.
Over1: Project program is unsatsfactory\.
Bank proposed to Government the termination
of the project\.
Project 11/83 2 6 Division Chief N/A Government requested that the Project be
Restructuring Sanitary Engieer maintained at a revised, lower scale\.
(Identification)
Preparation 02/84 1 3 Finmcial Analyst N/A
Restructuring 04/84 4 40 Financial Analyst 2 Technical: Restructured Project reflects
Sanitary Engineems (2) Treasury and MWD physical and financial
Procurement constraints components: (a) Completion of
Specialist design (by consultants) and construction (by
contractors selected under ICB) of 4 schemes;
(b) Completion of design (by MWD) and
construction of 2 schemes (by MWD-force
account); (s) Completion of design of 15
schemes (for a fiuture projet); (d) Vehicles
and equipmt to facili prepartion of
MWD schemes and 0 & Mof project
schemes; (e) Traiing (mainly at district
level); (f) Water Sector Review (carried out
by MWD and Conslltants)\. Total Project
Cost: USS 15\.1 m equivalent\.
- 20 -
Table MISSION (IN STAFF DAYS) (con't\.)
-Stage of Month/ No\. of Days ian Specialization Psformce Type of
Project Cycle Yenr Persons Field Reprnted Rating Status Problem
Ficial: Avaability of counterpart funding
of USS 2\.5 million (and budgeting for the
total cost USS 15\.1 Im equivalent) is a risl\.
Impmovement of revenue collection (covering
only 20% of 0 & M cost) by the closing date
is unlikely\.
Suporvision 10/84 1 IS Training Specialist N/A ITnina: Training facilities inadequate to
cope with needs in the sector in general\. and
for the project in particular\. Key manpower
and taining issu have not been addressed
since the 1982 Manpower Developmeat and
Training Program (MDTT)\. Sector Review
should addtr this problem area\.
11/84 2 26 Fincial Analyst 3 Man:g-ij: (jovemment indecidive whether
Saaitary Enginmer to continue with the Project using loan femds\.
Frequet hnges in high- and mid-lovel
executive officers in MWD hinder coatinuity
of project execution\. Trasury's clearance of
contracts delayed\.
T\.2jica: Award of contacts delayed\.
Construction started on 1 scheme only\.
0vem: Because of implementation delays
and Treasury's view that loan funds should
not be used for rural W/S developmet, future
of the project is uncetin\. Goverment's
position was requested\.
02/85 1 3 Sanitary Engineer (BTO report Ovemal: Government decided that in fture
only) only rant aid would be used for mual W/S
development and Ln\. 1637-KE shoule be
terminated\.
03/85 1 7 Sanitary Engineer (BTO report Ovemil: No further progress on any of the
only) project components\. Decision was made that
the Project be terminate and the loan closed
on original date of 06/30/85\.
Fiancial: MWD expected to prepar and
submit disbusement requs regarding
legitimate expeaditure under the project,
estimated totalling USS 3\.7 million\. Outcome
of this exercise was doubtful as MWD did not
keep proper documentation on project
expenditure\. (Final disbursment was actually
made on 09/25/85 and USS 18\.2 millio-n
undisbursed balance was cancloed)\. | APPROVAL |
P008314 | Document of
The World Bank
Report No: ICR0000864
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IBRD 47030, 47040)
ON A
LOAN
IN THE AMOUNT OF US$34\.2 MILLION
TO
TOPLOFIKACIA SOFIA AND
TOPLOFIKACIA PERNIK
FOR THE BULGARIA
DISTRICT HEATING PROJECT
December 30, 2008
Sustainable Development Department
Central Europe and the Baltic Countries
Europe and Central Asia Region
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Currency Unit = Bulgarian Leva (BGN)
Exchange Rates
January 6, 2003 November 7, 2008
(appraisal)
EUR 1\.00 = US$1\.05 EUR 1\.00 = US$1\.28
EUR 1\.00 = BGN 1\.96 EUR 1\.00 = BGN 1\.96
US$1\.00 = BGN 1\.87 US$1\.00 = BGN 1\.52
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 -- December 31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
CAS Country Assistance Strategy KIDSF Kozloduy International Decommissioning
Support Fund (EU grant)
CHP Combined Heat and Power MEE Ministry of Economy and Energy
DH District Heating MTR Mid Term Review
DHC District Heating Company MW Megawatt
DSM Demand Side Management MWh Megawatt hour
EBP Energy Benefit Program NPV Net Present Value
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and PAL Programmatic Adjustment Loan
Development
ENPV Economic Net Present Value PCF Prototype Carbon Fund
ERPA Emission Reduction Purchase Agreement PIU Project Implementation Unit
ERR Economic Rate of Return PSP Private Sector Participation
ESP Electrostatic Precipitator SEWRC State Energy and Water Regulatory
Commission
EU European Union TA Technical Assistance
FNPV Financial Net Present Value TS Toplofikacia Sofia
FRR Financial Rate of Return TP Toplofikacia Pernik
FRP Financial Recovery Plan USAID United States Agency for International
Development
HAC Heat Accounting Companies VAT Value Added Tax
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (World Bank)
Vice President: Shigeo Katsu
Country Director: Orsalia Kalantzopoulos
Sector Director: Peter Thomson
Project Team Leader: Sudipto Sarkar
ICR Team Leader: Sudipto Sarkar
2
DISTRICT HEATING PROJECT
CONTENTS
Data Sheet
A\. Basic Information\. i
B\. Key Dates\. i
C\. Ratings Summary\. i
D\. Sector and Theme Codes \.ii
E\. Bank Staff\.ii
F\. Results Framework Analysis\.iii
G\. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs \. v
H\. Restructuring (if any)\. v
I\. Disbursement Profile\. vi
1\. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design\. 1
2\. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes \. 6
3\. Assessment of Outcomes\. 12
4\. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome\. 16
5\. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance \. 16
6\. Lessons Learned \. 19
7\. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners \. 19
Annex 1\. Project Costs and Financing\. 21
Annex 2\. Outputs by Component \. 24
Annex 3\. Economic and Financial Analysis\. 31
Annex 4\. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes \. 35
Annex 5\. Beneficiary Survey Results\. 37
Annex 5\. Beneficiary Survey Results\. 37
Annex 6\. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results\. 40
Annex 7\. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR\. 41
Annex 8\. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders\. 47
Annex 9\. List of Supporting Documents \. 48
MAP
3
A\. BASIC INFORMATION
Country: Bulgaria Project Name: District Heating Project
IBRD-47030,IBRD-
Project ID: P008314 L/C/TF Number(s):
47040
ICR Date: 12/22/2008 ICR Type: Core ICR
TOPLOFIKACIA
SOFIA &
Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower:
TOPLOFIKACIA
PERNIK
Original Total
USD 34\.2M Disbursed Amount: USD 40\.7M
Commitment:
Environmental Category: B
Implementing Agencies:
Toplofikacia Sofia
Toplofikacia Pernik
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
B\. KEY DATES
Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual
Date(s)
Concept Review: 10/27/1994 Effectiveness: 10/31/2003 10/31/2003
Appraisal: 01/07/2003 Restructuring(s):
Approval: 06/17/2003 Mid-term Review: 10/31/2005 11/21/2005
Closing: 06/30/2008 06/30/2008
C\. RATINGS SUMMARY
C\.1 Performance Rating by ICR
Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome: Low or Negligible
Bank Performance: Satisfactory
Borrower Performance: Satisfactory
C\.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)
Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings
Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory
Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing Satisfactory
i
Agency/Agencies:
Overall Bank Overall Borrower
Performance: Satisfactory Performance: Satisfactory
C\.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators
Implementation QAG Assessments
Performance Indicators (if any) Rating
Potential Problem Project No Quality at Entry
None
at any time (Yes/No): (QEA):
Problem Project at any Quality of
No None
time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA):
DO rating before
Satisfactory
Closing/Inactive status:
D\. SECTOR AND THEME CODES
Original Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)
District heating and energy efficiency services 100 100
Theme Code (Primary/Secondary)
Other urban development Primary Primary
E\. BANK STAFF
Positions At ICR At Approval
Vice President: Shigeo Katsu Johannes F\. Linn
Country Director: Orsalia Kalantzopoulos Andrew N\. Vorkink
Sector Manager: Peter Thomson (Sector Director) Hinderikus Busz
Project Team Leader: Sudipto Sarkar Sudipto Sarkar
ICR Team Leader: Sudipto Sarkar
ICR Primary Author: Sudipto Sarkar
Pekka Kalevi Salminen
Kishore Nadkarni
Evgeny Iliev Evgeniev
Sati Achath
ii
F\. RESULTS FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS
Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)
The project development objectives are to assist the Sofia District Heating Company (or
Sofia Toplofikacia, TS) and Pernik District Heating Company (or Pernik Toplofikacia,
TP) to: (i) improve the quality of their services; (ii) improve their financial viability; and
(iii) increase environmentally friendly operations through energy conservation and
pollution reduction measures\.
Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)
The project development objectives were not revised\.
(a) PDO Indicator(s)
Original Target Formally Actual Value
Indicator Baseline Value Values (from Revised Achieved at
approval Target Completion or
documents) Values Target Years
Indicator 1 : Increase in connection percentage
Value
quantitative orTS: 85% TS: 90% TS: 96%
Qualitative) TP: 63% TP: 69% TP: 85%
Date achieved 12/31/2002 12/31/2007 12/31/2007
Comments
(incl\. % Targets exceeded\.
achievement)
Indicator 2 : Positive fiscal effect - phase-out of operating subsidy
Value
quantitative orTS: BGN 4\.5 mln TS: 0 TS: 0
Qualitative) TP: BGN 1\.1 mln TP: 0 TP: 0
Date achieved 12/31/2002 12/31/2007 12/31/2007
Comments
(incl\. % Target met as operating subsidies were phased out, starting in 2005
achievement)
Indicator 3 : Improvement in working ratio
Value
quantitative orTS: 1\.15 TS: 0\.88 TS: 1\.14
Qualitative) TP: 1\.15 TP: 0\.89 TP: 1\.15
Date achieved 12/31/2002 12/31/2007 12/31/2007
Comments Target partially met\. Situation improved until 2006 due to increase in tariffs\.
(incl\. % However, the situation was reverted in 2007 as tariff increases did not keep pace
achievement) with increasing operating costs due to rapid increase in fuel prices
Indicator 4 : Increased domestic bill collection rate
Value TS: 80% TS: 85% TS: overall
quantitative or collection 86%,
Qualitative) TP: 50% TP: 84% domestic collection
iii
79%
TP: overall
collection 85%,
domestic collection
68%
Date achieved 12/31/2002 12/31/2007 12/31/2007
Comments
(incl\. % Target partially met\. The domestic bill collection was lower than expected\.
achievement) However, the overall bill collection due to electricity sales were close to targets
Indicator 5 : Reduction in network heat losses
Value
quantitative or TS: 16\.7% TS: 15\.6% TS: 17\.5%
Qualitative) TP: 31\.9% TP: 25\.5% TP: 24\.4%
Date achieved 12/31/2002 12/31/2007 12/31/2007
Comments In TS, actual losses were lower compared to appraisal but targets not met if
(incl\. % expressed in percentage terms as the denominator (heat production) reduced
achievement) significantly\. In TP, target met in percentage terms\.
Indicator 6 : Decrease in energy heat consumption\. The indicator used is heat consumption
(MWh/household/year)
Value
quantitative or TS: 12\.7 MWh TS: 10\.6 MWh TS: 9\.1 MWh
Qualitative) TP: 14\.9 MWh TP: 10\.6 MWh TP: 9\.9 MWh
Date achieved 12/31/2002 12/31/2007 12/31/2007
Comments
(incl\. % Target exceeded
achievement)
Indicator 7 : Decrease in carbon dioxide emissions - tons of Emission Reductions (ER)
TS: 1,084,000 tons
(PCF); and 2\.7
Value TS: 0 tons million tons total
quantitative or TS: 925,462 tons
Qualitative) TP: 0 tons TP: 157,000 tons TP: 197,091 tons
(PCF) and 186,000
tons total
Date achieved 12/31/2003 12/31/2012 12/31/2007
In TS, the PCF target will be met in 2008 and the company on track to meet total
Comments target
(incl\. % In TP, the PCF and total targets have been met - 157\.000 tons were sold to PCF
achievement) and 40,091 to the Bank (under a program for the Bank to reduce its carbon
footprint)
Indicator 8 : Decrease in particulate emissions in TP
Value
quantitative or 1,600 mg/m3 100 mg/m3 50 mg/m3
Qualitative)
Date achieved 12/31/2003 12/31/2007 12/31/2007
Comments Target will be met in early 2009 when the electrostatic precipitator will be
(incl\. % operational\. It has been installed and is designed to reduce particulate emissions
achievement) to 50 mg/m3
iv
Indicator 9 : Decrease in network water losses
Value
quantitative orTS: 3,085,000m3 TS: 1,650,000m3 TS: 2,300,000m3
Qualitative) TP: 420,000m3 TP: 280,000 m3 TP: 212,000m3
Date achieved 12/31/2002 12/31/2007 12/31/2007
Comments In TS, target partially met as water losses less than that at appraisal; loss reduced
(incl\. % to 1\.8 million m3/year (2006) but increased to 2\.3 mln\. m3 (2007) due to
achievement) deterioration of network not covered under the project\.
TP: Target met
(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)
Original Target Formally Actual Value
Indicator Baseline Value Values (from Achieved at
approval Revised Completion or
documents) Target Values Target Years
G\. RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRS
Actual
No\. Date ISR
Archived DO IP Disbursements
(USD millions)
1 06/27/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0\.00
2 12/01/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0\.37
3 06/15/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5\.41
4 12/03/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 17\.33
5 12/17/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 17\.69
6 05/19/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 21\.20
7 01/24/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 26\.05
8 12/15/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 31\.95
9 12/21/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 38\.72
10 06/24/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 40\.52
H\. RESTRUCTURING (IF ANY)
Not Applicable
v
I\. DISBURSEMENT PROFILE
Note: The actual disbursements are in US $ equivalent and due to the exchange rate fluctuations they are
more than the original disbursement estimates\.
vi
1\. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design
1\.1 Context at Appraisal
Country and Sector Background: The project was implemented during Bulgaria's
transition from a European Union (EU) accession country to an EU member country\. At
appraisal, the sector was generating approximately 11 GWh of heat energy and 1\.8 GWh
of electricity (in the Combined Heat and Power plants) and represented about 25% of
energy consumption in the country\. About 80% of this energy came from natural gas with
other sources being coal (12%) and mazut (8%)\. The gas is imported and subject to
international prices\. Within Bulgaria, gas transmission and distribution is managed by
Bulgargas, a state-owned company formed in 1990\. Bulgaria has deposits of coal and
annual production is around 30 million tons\. The largest mine is in Maritsa, and there are
other smaller mines including one in Pernik which produces about 1\.5 million tons
annually\. Toplofikacia Sofia (TS) uses gas for its energy source\. Toplofikacia Pernik
(TP) uses coal, from the Pernik mine, as its energy source\.
District Heating (DH) is the most economic form of providing heat in urban areas where
DH networks exist\. However, starting from the early 1990s, before Bulgaria's accession
to the EU, the district heating sector in Bulgaria went through difficult times\. Some of the
difficulties faced were:
Switch to uneconomic forms of heating: Declining incomes did not allow
consumers to afford district heating (DH) and about 30% of the consumers
disconnected themselves from this service\. These consumers moved to other
forms of heating mainly electricity\. Heat delivered through electricity typically
consumes more fuel compared to DH\. Thus, the switch by consumers to use
electricity for heating purposes was not economical for Bulgaria\.
Lack of demand-side management (DSM): Consumers could not control their heat
consumption because heat radiators lacked regulators\. Bills were not based on
actual heat consumption but on apartment size\. Further, the heat entering a block
of apartments through a sub-station was not measured because there were no
meters in substations\. These factors did not encourage energy conservation\. In
addition, because consumers could not control heat consumption room
temperatures were adjusted by opening or closing windows, which wasted energy\.
Inadequate tariffs leading to the need for operating subsidies\. Because tariffs did
not cover operating costs the DH companies became dependent on State operating
subsidies, for example, in 2002, US$70 million in subsidies was provided to the
DH companies\. Insufficient tariffs also prevented the DH companies from making
investments to rehabilitate the DH networks\. Since Bulgaria lacked a clear policy
to increase tariffs and costs were rising, the DH companies' financial situation
grew worse each year\.
1
Depletion of assets\. The financial constraints of the DH companies made network
rehabilitation unaffordable, which increased heat and water losses\. Routine
maintenance was deferred and parts were not replaced, which in turn led to
increased heat and water losses affecting the financial position of the DH
companies\.
To address these issues, the Government prepared a District Heating Strategy (August
2000) that was eventually adopted by Parliament (July 2002)\. The strategy identified the
issues in detail and proposed policy measures, including some that led to the revival of
the sector--related to regulating tariffs, promoting DSM, and privatizing DH companies\.
Rationale for Bank Assistance\. The Bank's Country Assistance Strategy1 (CAS) was
designed to help Bulgaria with reforms to meet its EU Accession requirements such as
improving the business climate and accelerating private-sector led growth, especially in
the provision of infrastructure services\. The CAS explicitly outlined the preparation of
this project to improve the service quality and financial performance of District Heating
(DH) companies, promote energy efficiency, and provide targeted assistance to the poor\.
In addition, the CAS Country Program Framework had an environmental development
objective to support Bulgaria in maintaining headroom for tradable carbon under the
Kyoto Protocol\. This objective was met with the Bank assisting TS and TP to sell the
reduction in carbon emissions to the Prototype Carbon Fund\. Furthermore, the Bank had
assisted in the preparation of the Government's District Heating Strategy and the master
plans for the investments in TS and TP\. These activities, prior to the project, established
the partnership between the Bank and Government that helped with the preparation and
implementation of the project\.
1\.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators
The three project development objectives were to assist the Sofia District Heating
Company (TS) and Pernik District Heating Company (TP) to:
Improve the quality of their services, measured through increased connection
rates2 from 85 to 90% in Sofia and from 63 to 69% in Pernik\.
Improve their financial viability, measured through:
(i) Positive fiscal impact: improvements supported under the project were
projected to decrease State assistance to TS and TP to zero after 2005;
(ii) Improvement in working ratio: the 2002 working ratios were 1\.15 in TS and
1\.22 in TP; these were expected to decline to 0\.88 and 0\.89 at end-2007; and
(iii) Increased bill collection rate: domestic bill collection rate (with arrears) was
80% in TS and 50% in TP, and these were expected to increase to at least 85% in
Sofia and 84% in Pernik by end-2007\.
1Document number: 283927-BUL; May 31, 2002\.
2The ratio of households connected to the network relative to all households with network access\.
2
Increase environmentally friendly operations through energy conservation and
pollution reduction, measured through:
(i) Reduced network heat losses: in 2002, network heat losses (total heat loss
divided by production) were 16\.7% for TS and 31\.8% for TP\. Over the life of the
project, heat losses were expected to decrease to 10\.4% in Sofia and 22\.0% in
Pernik;
(ii) Decreased energy consumption: prevailing heat consumption of 12\.7
MWh/year/household in TS and 14\.9 in TP were expected to drop by 2007 to a
minimum of 10\.6 and 12\.1, respectively; and
(iii) Other environmental benefits: (a) carbon dioxide emissions from
improvements to energy efficiency would be reduced by 2\.7 million tons in TS
and 186,000 tons in TP during 2003-12; (b) particulate emissions at Pernik for
Boiler No\. 5 would be reduced from 1,600 mg/m3 to 100 mg/m3; and (c) network
water losses would decrease by 45% for TS (from 3 million m3/year) and by 30%
for TP (from 400,000 m3/year)\.
1\.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators,
and reasons/justifications\.
The objectives were not revised\.
1\.4 Main Beneficiaries
Primary project beneficiaries were district heating consumers\. TS and TP benefitted from
the project through the rehabilitation that was carried out leading to energy savings, water
savings, reduced carbon emissions, and reduced air pollution, all of which created
economic and environmental benefits\. At project start-up, Sofia and Pernik consumers
were moving to other forms of heating and disconnection rates from the DH system were
climbing but the project reversed this trend, resulting in significant savings for the
economy\. In the absence of the project and a switch to other forms of heating, new forms
of heating (electricity and gas) would have had to be introduced, requiring new
infrastructure investments for gas distribution pipelines, and additional generation and
transmission capacity\.
The project facilitated DSM so that consumers could control and measure their heat
consumption\. Through project activities, average heat consumption per household
decreased as the use of cost allocators, regulators, and new substations became more
widespread\. Project activities also created a direct fiscal benefit by helping to eliminate
operating subsidies from the central government budget\.
1\.5 Original Components (as approved)
The project was mainly focused on rehabilitation of the networks in TS and TP and
financed by the Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the two
district heating companies (TS and TP) and Kozloduy International Decommissioning
Support Fund (KIDSF), managed by EBRD\.
3
The Bank portion of the project had two components, described below, one each for TS
and TP\. The Bank portion was co-financed by the DH companies\.
Component 1 (Total Cost: US$ 44\.22 million equivalent) in TS which included:
(a) Network Rehabilitation - Replacement and/or installation of transmission
pipelines (about 30 km) and replacement of thermal insulation on over-ground
pipelines\. Replacement of valves and compensators in the transmission and
distribution network\. Installation of variable speed pumping systems at the main
heat sources;
(b) Substation Rehabilitation - Replacement of 1,097 DH substations; and
(c) Technical Assistance: (i) to manage and implement the project, including audit
services and a public awareness campaign to promote energy conservation; (ii) to
introduce the private sector for heat production and distribution\.
Component 2 (Total Cost: US$ 13\.67 million equivalent) in TP which included:
(a) Substation Rehabilitation Replacement of 700 DH substations;
(b) Network Rehabilitation - Replacement of transmission pipelines (about 10
km), valves and compensators in transmission and distribution network, and
network monitoring system; installation of variable-speed pumping system at
main heat source;
(c) Generation Plant Rehabilitation - Replacement of outdated electrostatic
precipitator (ESP) for a boiler in the coal fired combined heat and power plant\.
Rehabilitation of chemical water treatment plant, and rehabilitation of automation
and control equipment for coal conveyor system; and
(d) Technical Assistance - for project management and implementation, audit
services, and a public awareness campaign to promote energy conservation\.
The total cost of the Sofia project was US$119\.1 million equivalent3 and was financed by
the Bank (US$27\.2 million equivalent), TS (US$27\.5 million equivalent), EBRD
(US$31\.4 million equivalent), KIDSF (US$31\.4 million equivalent), and EU Phare grant
for project implementation (US$ 1\.6 million equivalent)\. The total cost of the project in
Pernik was US$13\.6 million and was financed by the Bank (US$7\.0 million) and TP
(US$6\.6 million)\. In addition the following sources of financing supported the project:
The Bank's Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) agreed to purchase carbon emission
reductions from TS and TP due to activities related to the project; and
3The figures are expressed in equivalent as the Bank and EBRD loans and the EU KIDSF and Phare grants
to TS were denominated in Euros\. The Bank loan to TP was denominated in US Dollars\.
4
A United States Agency for International Development (USAID) grant of around
US$1\.0 million was made available for consultants to assist with transactions
related to private sector participation (PSP) in TS\.
1\.6 Revised Components
There were no major revisions to the components\. However, due to competitive prices,
additional works, fully in line with the project objectives, were possible\. For instance in
TS: (i) the original plan was to replace about 8,030 substations, including 1,097 financed
by the Bank\. However, after the KIDSF financing is completed (June 30, 2009) about
10,320 substations would be replaced; and (ii) the original plan was to replace about 60
km of transmission network (30 each financed by the Bank and EBRD/KIDSF) but to
date about 92 km of the network has been replaced\. These additional investments were
needed to rehabilitate the DH systems and these efforts to upgrade the network should
continue in the future to reduce energy and water losses\. Other minor changes are
mentioned in Annex 2 and include: procurement of a billing system in TS to modernize
the bill collection process; and financing a coal crusher and a calorimeter in TP, instead
of investments in the coal conveyer system and water filtration plant as these were
financed by TP\.
In TP, at appraisal, KIDSF financing was not envisaged\. However, during project
implementation, a grant of 10\.4 million was provided by KIDSF and managed by
EBRD\. This grant financed rehabilitation of about 8 km of transmission network and the
purchase and installation of a new boiler (Boiler No\. 5) which is physically connected to
the electrostatic precipitator (Bank financed) to reduce particulate emissions\.
1\.7 Other significant changes
No significant changes were made to project design, scope, implementation arrangements,
or financing\. The schedule of activities was not revised as TS and TP completed their
activities in a timely manner; the project closed June 30, 2008, as planned at appraisal\.
The 2007 target indicator on reduction in heat losses in percentage terms was revised in
2005 for both TS and TP\. This was necessary as the production of heat (the denominator
to calculate the indicator) was decreasing at a rate that was not expected at appraisal\. In
TS, the target network heat losses were reduced from 10\.4% to 15\.6%; and a similar
adjustment from 22\.0% to 25\.0% was made in TP\.
Due to the inclusion of the KIDSF grant in TP, the overall project cost increased from
12\.99 to 18\.04 million equivalent, with TP reducing its share of financing from 6\.31 to
2\.04 million equivalent\. In TS, the EBRD loan ( 30 million) was divided into two equal
tranches of 15 million each\. The second tranche was not released as its release was
conditional upon TS entering into a management contract which did not take place\.
However, the project covered more than what it had expected to cover due to costs that
were lower than anticipated\.
5
2\. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2\.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry
Careful consideration was given to the policy environment to ensure that it could sustain
project-supported physical investments that were first appraised in June 1999 when the
objective was to rehabilitate the district heating networks\. However, progress in the
policy environment in 1999 was deemed insufficient to support the investments\. As a
result, the Government of Bulgaria and the World Bank agreed that it would be prudent
to first complete upfront reforms to revive the DH sector and create conditions conducive
for the project to succeed\. At appraisal, TS was owned partially by the central
Government (represented by the Ministry of Economy and Energy - MEE) and the
Municipality of Sofia\. TP was fully owned by the central Government, represented by
MEE\. Thus, as shareholders in both companies and having a thorough understanding of
the sector needs, the Government deemed the underlying sector economics in 1999 were
too risky to provide a sovereign guarantee required for a World Bank loan\. After
appraisal in June 1999, Government and the Bank put the project on hold and pursued
sectoral development\. The Bank helped prepare a District Heating Strategy (August
2000) as part of the overall Energy Strategy approved by the Council of Ministers (May
11, 2002) and eventually, the Parliament (July 17, 2002)\.
Implementation of the District Heating Strategy formed part of the three-year series of
Bank Programmatic Adjustment Loan (PAL,4 FY03-05) and Government committed to
reforming the sector through a Letter of Development Policy dated December 20, 2002\.
Following are some major achievements in sector reform that led to the project being
reappraised in 2003\.
During 1998-02, domestic tariffs were increased by 94% (nominal terms);
inflation during the same period was around 30%;
In November 2001, the Energy Law was amended to make cost allocators and
heat regulators mandatory in apartment buildings, making it possible for DH
companies to bill against actual consumption, and for consumers to control their
consumption\. This policy change significantly reduced household energy
consumption;
Government promoted the introduction of private Heat Accounting Companies
(HACs) to install cost allocators and heat regulators in radiators\. This had a
significant impact on DSM as consumption per radiator could be controlled and
heat usage measured\. The HACs provided a fee-based service to measure heat
consumption and report the bill to the consumer and the DH companies; and
Government started to replace old substations (typically one per block of
apartments), supported through the Bank's Water Companies' Modernization and
Restructuring project, which helped accurately measure heat supplied to a
4The actions by the Government under the three year PAL program are outlined in the Project Appraisal
Document (pages 11 and 12)
6
building so costs could be allocated among apartments\. Replacement of these old
substations was a key step in introducing DSM\. Further, the replacement program
significantly reduced the old substations' high heat losses\.
Progress on the policy front due to implementation of the DH Strategy led to the project
being re-appraised in January 2003\. The objectives were realistic and the proposed
investments under the project were intended to complement the policy measures\. Two
separate Bank loans were made to TS and TP, guaranteed by the Government of
Bulgaria\. During the January 2003 appraisal, the institutional strength of TS and TP was
assessed and their capacity was deemed sufficient to make them the Borrowers and give
them direct responsibilities for implementing the project and meeting the objectives\. The
accountability and responsibilities in implementing the project were clear within TS and
TP\. Further, the implementation was not complex and the objective of the project was
fully in line with goals of Government, TS, and TP\. Government also required TS and TP
to prepare Financial Recovery Plans to demonstrate financial positions that were
improving sufficiently to justify a sovereign guarantee\.
Also, the project was prepared in close coordination with the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), a co-financer\. The World Bank and the
EBRD appraised the project in the same time period and both institutions had a similar
covenant related to the introduction of the private sector for the provision of heat in TS\.
The project design took into account lessons learned from Bank-assisted energy sector
projects in Bulgaria and other countries, and adopted appropriate measures to mitigate all
major risks identified at appraisal\.
Lessons of earlier operations taken into account\.
Willingness to reform should be demonstrated\. Issues related to DH can be
complicated since they involve matters related to the State budget, energy policy,
and social benefits\. Thus, the project was re-appraised in January 2003 after
reforms were taken by the Government which allowed a proper policy
environment to be in place for the investment operation to be successful\. Other
upfront actions were taken to support the project to meet its objective: TS
restructured its payables to Bulgargas (effectiveness condition) and TP separated
its operations from a mine that was making a loss (appraisal condition; supported
by the Government through a decision on September 13, 2002)\.
Location of Project Implementation Unit (PIU)\. Project ownership is diminished
and project implementation suffers if the PIU is located outside the district
heating company or staffed entirely with external consultants\. Instead, project
activities were integrated with regular operations in both TS and TP because PIU
staff were drawn from the companies' technical, financial, and commercial
departments and still carried out their other regular functions\.
Need for demand-side management (DSM)\. District heating project sustainability
is more secure if consumers receive good quality service at affordable prices\.
7
Consequently, prior policy actions were taken to strengthen the sector and
improve the financial positions of DH companies\. The policy changes included
raising tariffs and mandatory installation of heat cost allocators and radiator heat
regulators, which provided consumers with incentives and mechanisms to limit
their consumption\. Thus, DSM led to a drop in household heat consumption and
supported the comeback of DH as a clean source of apartment heating\.
Risks and Risk Mitigation Measures\. A detailed analysis of the risks and mitigation
measures was carried out at appraisal which covered issues such as: overall risk, tariffs
would be unaffordable, private sector participation (PSP) in TS may not be timely,
financial recovery plans may not be followed, possible delays in policy reforms, possible
delays in project implementation, and fuel prices may fluctuate\. Mitigation measures for
these risks and how they were addressed are included in Annex 2\. The overall risk rating
was high but the following mitigation measures helped for the satisfactory
implementation of the project: upfront policy measures, effective implementation teams
in TS and TP, DSM program through which energy was conserved at household levels,
and tariff increases although they did not keep pace with rapid increases in fuel prices\.
Adequacy of participatory processes\. In 1999, a survey was carried out both for Sofia
and Pernik to determine consumer's willingness and ability to pay for district heating
services\. A follow up survey was done in 2002 that also sought opinion from the public
about the quality of service\. The findings of these two surveys, especially the desire of
the consumers to have DSM, were taken into account while designing the project\. Further,
surveys were carried out during project implementation to determine the perception of the
consumers about the DH service (Annex 5)\.
2\.2 Implementation
The project was not restructured, no major changes were made to the design, and the
implementation was never at risk\. The implementation teams in TS and TP were effective,
gave the Bank regular updates, and sought clarifications when needed\. All planned
project investments have been completed\.
The Bank conducted regular missions and held a Midterm Review (MTR) in November
2005\. A project launch workshop was held and a Project Implementation Plan was
prepared that helped with project implementation\. Issues raised during the mission were
addressed by the two DH companies\. Overall implementation was effective, but
expectations were not fully met in the following three areas:
Tariff Increases: Tariffs are not controlled by TS and TP\. Under Bulgarian
regulations, DH utilities prepare an annual tariff proposal based on their costs\.
The State Energy and Water Regulatory Commission (SEWRC)--an independent
body reporting to the Council of Ministers--reviews the proposal and approves a
tariff to be implemented\. Rising prices for gas (TS) and coal (TP) required tariff
increases for both companies\. SEWRC allowed the tariffs to increase but the
levels were lower than the utilities proposed and there was a time lag between the
8
increase in fuel prices and adjustments in tariffs\. If higher tariff levels had been
approved, both companies may have had additional revenues\.
Bill collection: Collection rates in TS and TP fell slightly below estimated targets,
despite company efforts to increase collections\. They initiated court cases to
recover arrears from non-paying consumers, offered to forego interest payments
on past due district heating bills as an incentive, and sold the receivables to a
collection agency (TP)\. However, district heating is often perceived as an
entitlement or social service, making it difficult to terminate services to non-
paying consumers which may have affected the bill collection rate\.
Management contract in TS: The company had full intentions of meeting the
stipulations of the Loan Agreement to complete the bidding process and secure a
private operator by December 30, 2003, in line with a December 18, 2002
Decision of the Municipality to introduce the private sector for the provision of
heat\. EBRD's loan was in two phases and the second tranche ( 15 million)
required TS to enter into a contract with an operator\. As can be seen from the
chronology of events below, a good faith effort to meet this condition was made
but ultimately, at project closing a private sector service provider was not in place
and consequently, the second tranche of EBRD's loan was not released\.
- During the early part of the implementation period, the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) funded a consultant to provide
options for PSP and assist with the selection of an operator;
- The shareholders decided to proceed with a management contract, a form of
PSP\. Based on this decision, bidders were pre-qualified, bidding documents
were prepared, a management contract was drafted, and a pre-bid meeting was
held with the pre-qualified bidders (September 24, 2004);
- The final bidding to select an operator did not take place as the shareholders
of TS started to consider a higher form of private sector participation, such as
privatization or concession (the Sofia water company is under a concession)\.
Also, due to central and local government elections, a decision on PSP was
delayed;
- A Memorandum of Understanding between the Minister of Economy and
Energy and the Mayor of Sofia Municipality was signed where by the two
shareholders agreed to privatize the company and begin selecting a consultant
for the privatization of TS (July 2006)\. The advisor selection process stalled
due to increases in gas prices resulting in increasing payables of TS to
Bulgargas\. It was felt that the issue of payables had to be addressed first
before the company could be privatized; and
- In a recent development (November 2008), the Sofia Municipality agreed to
transfer all its shares (58%) to the Ministry of Economy and Energy\. The
central Government will now be the only shareholder of TS and options are
being considered to reduce the payable to Bulgargas\.
2\.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization
M&E design: Project monitoring was based on indicators that were suitable to assess
how project objectives were being met, were readily available, and quantifiable\. Most of
9
the indicators were included in the regular business planning process of the company and
as a result, the project did not create an additional burden of tracking indicators outside of
regular operations\. At appraisal, annual target values were established for each indicator
to chart a path of improvement for both companies; these annual monitoring targets are
available in the project files\.
M&E implementation: The indicators used were mostly used by TS and TP for their own
business planning purposes and they did not have difficulty in collecting and reporting
the information\. Both DH companies also submitted timely technical and financial data
to the Bank, including preparing summary information during a Bank supervision
mission\. Indicators were reviewed against the annual targets established at appraisal
M&E utilization: The indicators were linked to expected outcomes, which in turn were
linked to project objectives, which made it easy to establish progress\. Each company paid
attention to meeting annual targets for each indicator and if a target was missed, a
discussion of why that had happened and how to make improvements ensued between the
Bank and the companies\.
2\.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance
Financial Management\. Throughout the project life, a satisfactory financial management
system was maintained by TS and TP and the companies regularly submitted quarterly
financial monitoring reports and annual audit reports to the Bank\. Project audit opinions
have all been unqualified and no significant internal control issues have been mentioned\.
Counterpart financing was satisfactory during the project life\. The Bank's Financial
Management Specialist (FMS) regularly reviewed project financial management
arrangements to ensure that they were in line with the requirements of the Loan
Agreement\. Audit reports for FY07 and final quarterly reports for Q2 of 2008 have been
received by the Bank and they are satisfactory\. The final audit reports for FY08 will be
received by the Bank before June 30, 2009\.
In TS, the 2007 entity audit was qualified as the valuation of fixed assets, accounts
receivable, and provisions for tax liabilities were not appropriate\. The auditors also noted
that the rising price of gas may cause the production costs to exceed tariffs approved by
SEWRC and such a situation would affect the financial position of the company and
could lead to restructuring and/or support from its shareholders (Sofia Municipality and
MEE)\. For TP, in 2007, the auditors expressed an unqualified audit opinion on the
entity's financial statements\. However, they drew attention to the fact that TP's short
term liabilities exceeded short term assets, and that the company was a defendant under a
law suit for unpaid liabilities\. These issues raised some doubt as to the company's ability
to continue as a going concern\. The MEE as the shareholder of both companies is aware
of the issues and is taking measures to keep the companies operational\. In TS, the capital
is expected to be increased so that its dues to Bulgargas are paid\. In TP, the preparation
for privatization has started (Fall 2008) and prior to the company being privatized, the
liabilities of the company arising from lawsuits would have to be settled\.
10
Procurement\. The project was implemented according to Bank procurement guidelines
and no major procurement-related problems occurred during project implementation\. The
PIUs in both district heating companies were supported by an international consultant
(financed by EU Phare and KIDSF grants) and they managed the procurement process
well and according to the planned schedules\. The Procurement Specialist for this project
is based in the Bank's office in Sofia which greatly facilitated in addressing any
procurement matters that came up during the implementation\.
Environment\. The project was subject to Bank's OP 4\.01 on Environmental Assessment
and it was rated as a category B project\. Project environmental impacts were due to
construction activities and limited to noise, dust, minor traffic disruptions, and handling
of construction waste\. During implementation there were no environmental issues raised
and the Environmental Management Plan was followed by TS and TP\. Project
environmental benefits were significant due to reduced energy and water losses and lower
carbon emissions\.
2\.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
Transition Arrangement: TS and TP are established utilities providing an important
service\. The companies have adequate capacity to operate effectively after the project
and the demand for their services would not decline\. Both companies have effective
management and a supervisory structure that would ensure proper operations of these
utilities\. However, both companies need to rehabilitate the aging distribution network as
the project replaced only a small portion of the networks in Sofia and Pernik (around
10%)\. Although, this type of rehabilitation is economically and financially sound due to
the savings created by reducing energy and water losses, the challenge is to have
sufficient internal resources to mobilize the financing required for the rehabilitation\. The
following two factors, outside the control of the companies, will largely determine how
much resources could be generated for investments: the prices of gas and coal, which
account for about 70% and 60% of operating costs, in TS and TP; and whether tariffs
would be adjusted to meet increasing investment and operating costs\.
Performance Indicators: Key Performance Indicators were part of regular company
operations and this information would be available for company managers and
shareholders\. However, if a more limited set of indicators were to be used from Key
Performance Indicators, the following might be considered: working ratio, bill collection
rate, network heat losses, and average household energy consumption\.
Follow-up Actions: At this stage, no Bank follow-up action is planned\. The Government
has started institutional changes in both companies\. For TS, the Sofia Municipality share
will be transferred over to the State which will be the sole owner of the company\.
Regarding TP, the preparation for privatization has started under the Government's
Privatization Agency\. Prior to the privatization transaction, a pending lawsuit
(mentioned in the Project Appraisal Document) against TP would need to be addressed\.
Under this lawsuit, claims have been made for TP to pay another company for services
11
rendered in the past\. During the implementation period of the project, the Bank did not
receive any information stating that the matter has been resolved\.
3\. Assessment of Outcomes
3\.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation
Bulgaria, as an EU member country, has committed to conserve energy\. The tremendous
gains in energy conservation at the household level--decline of heat consumption in TS
by 28% and in TP by 34% --will contribute to Bulgaria's efforts to conserve energy, as
will reduced network heat losses that were supported under the project\. The current
energy crisis and fuel cost increases make these energy conservation efforts highly
relevant\.
At appraisal, Bulgaria was an EU accession country carrying out and implementing
policy reforms in various sectors including those in energy\. The Bank's Country
Assistance Strategy at that time was to support Bulgaria's EU Accession objective\.
Today, Bulgaria is an EU member country and the activities carried out under the project
will continue to make project outcomes sustainable\. Notably, Government, TS, and TP,
will continue to pursue: DSM to control household energy consumption; efficient
SEWRC functioning so that tariffs will meet costs; network rehabilitation; and selling
carbon emission reductions in TS and TP due to measures taken by the companies
3\.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives
The project intended to improve quality of services, improve financial viability, and
increase environmentally friendly operations\. The goals to improve services and increase
environmentally friendly operations were met and in some cases, exceeded\. On financial
viability, although the situation improved in both companies compared to their financial
position at appraisal, the results were mixed\. Details are presented below and in Annex 2\.
Improve Quality of Service: Project investments improved the quality of heating
service\. Consumers can now regulate their consumption based on apartment-level
needs\. Consumption-based billing means consumers now pay only for the heat
they use\. The Key Indicator for this was that the connection rates would be 90%
and 69% in TS and TP, respectively\. At the end of 2007, the connection rates
were 96% and 85% in TS and TP, respectively, indicating that consumers are
satisfied with the services\. The outcome indicator for this objective was defined
as `consumers express satisfaction about DH services'\. Surveys carried out show
that a large majority of subscribers, in both Sofia (75% in 2005) and Pernik (80%
in 2004) prefer DH to all other sources of heating\.
Improve the Financial Viability of DH companies: This objective was not
consistently achieved\. There were progressive improvements during 2003-05,
including elimination of Government operating subsidies by 2005\. During this
period, increases in electricity and heat tariffs were adequate to compensate for
increases to fuel prices and other operating expenses\. However, after this period,
12
the adjustments in tariffs did not keep pace with increases in fuel costs and other
expenses\.
Key Financial Unit 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Parameters
Toplofikacia Sofia
Average heat tariff BGN/MWh 41\.3 42\.9 47\.2 51\.4 59\.6 60\.4
Average electricity tariff BGN/MWh 76\.0 80\.0 80\.0 80\.0 82\.0 95\.0
Natural gas purchase price BGN/000 m3 243 235 223 245 302 325
Average household heat MWh/year 15\.0 11\.3 10\.2 10\.9 9\.9 9\.9
consumption
Working ratio number 1\.14 1\.00 0\.93 0\.91 1\.08 1\.14
Collection ratio percentage 80% 87% 90% 87% 80% 79%
Annual net profit/loss BGN million -55\.2 3\.7 76\.1 2\.6 -10\.5 -27\.8
Toplofikacia Pernik
Average heat tariff BGN/MWh 42\.3 42\.9 45\.3 46\.7 55\.2 56\.2
Average electricity tariff BGN/MWh 63\.8 69\.7 68\.2 67\.6 69\.0 79\.3
Coal purchase price BGN/tce 72\.4 75\.0 70\.0 73\.5 80\.0 88\.7
Average household heat MWh/year 12\.7 11\.6 10\.2 10\.4 10\.1 9\.1
consumption
Working ratio number 1\.22 1\.09 1\.02 1\.12 0\.97 1\.15
Collection ratio percentage 50% 55% 83% 80% n/a 68%
Annual net profit loss BGN million -1\.1 0\.6 1\.4 -1\.5 0\.2 -2\.5
Improvement was to be measured through the following key indicators:
(i) positive net fiscal impact: this target was met as both TS and TP were able
to phase out their operating subsidies by the end of 2005, as planned;
(ii) improvement in the working ratio: there were improvements in the initial
years but tariffs did not keep pace with costs and the positive trend was
reverted; and
(iii) increase in the domestic bill collection rate: although both companies
made serious efforts to increase collection, the results were mixed and fell
short of targets\. In TS, the collection rate increased from 80% (2002) to
90% (2004) but thereafter the company's public image was affected due to
alleged misuse of funds by the company's management (not connected
with the project)\. This may have affected collection rate and the rate in
2007 was 79%\. For TP, the collection rate is higher compared to appraisal
it improved from 50% (2002) to 68% (2007)\.
Increase environmentally friendly operations\. This objective was met and there
was progress in all the indicators\. While water and heat losses were reduced, they
continue to increase in areas not covered under the project due to the aging
network, and this needs to be addressed through an ongoing rehabilitation
program in both companies:
(i) reduced network heat losses: compared to appraisal, heat losses in network
were reduced\. In TS, heat losses decreased from 935 GWh (2002) to 899
13
GWh (2007)\. Similarly, in TP, heat losses decreased from 116 GWh
(2002) to 74 (2007)\.
(ii) reduced energy consumption: the DSM measures resulted in significant
savings in heat consumption in apartments, exceeding targets\. Household
energy consumption decreased by 28% and 34% in TS and TP,
respectively, leading to significant economic benefits\.
(iii) demonstrated environmental benefits:
a\. reduced carbon emissions: carbon emissions have been reduced and
both companies have sold the emission reductions to the PCF on an
annual basis\. In TS, the contracted amount with PCF is expected to be
delivered in 2008, before the 2012 deadline\. In TP, the contract for the
sale of carbon with the PCF was met in 2007, before the 2012 deadline\.
In addition, to reduce its carbon footprint, the Bank purchased 40,091
tons of Emission Reductions in 2008 from TP\.
b\. reduced network water losses: compared to appraisal, water losses in
network were reduced\. In TS, the water losses in 2006 reduced by
40% (target was 45% by project end)\. However, losses have started to
increase as large parts of the network areas not covered under the
project - continue to deteriorate\. In TP, the target met and losses were
reduced by about 50%\.
c\. reduced particulate emissions: The electrostatic precipitator (ESP) is in
place in TP and has been connected to the new boiler financed by
KIDSF\. The boiler and the ESP are expected to be operational in
December 2008 and the target of particulate emission (100 mg/m3) will
be exceeded, given the technical specification of the ESP\.
3\.3 Efficiency
At appraisal, both economic and financial rates of return and net present values had been
estimated\. Utilizing the same methodology, they were re-estimated at project completion\.
The results are summarized in the table below and details are provided in Annex 3\.
Indicator Sofia Pernik
Appraisal Current Appraisal Current
ERR 23\.5% 49\.0% 18\.3% 25\.3%
ENPV million BGN 146 BGN 214 BGN 9\.5 BGN 12
FRR 18% 17% 11% 13%
FNPV million BGN 65 BGN 53 BGN 0\.5 BGN 3\.5
The economic rate of return (ERR) in both cities after the project is higher than at
appraisal mainly due to the large energy savings due to DSM and improvements of the
network (variable flow pumping and replacement of sections of the network)\. Further,
there were savings to the economy as consumers switched from electricity to DH which
is the most economical way to provide heat\. This high economic rate of return is an
important factor in rating the overall project outcome as satisfactory\.
14
The financial rate of return (FRR) and financial net present value (FNPV) have been re-
estimated by adjusting costs and benefits under the economic analysis to include only
those effects that have a direct financial impact (cost or benefit) for the two companies\.
Thus, as compared to the ERR and economic net present value (ENPV), taxes (excluding
VAT) and duties have been included where applicable; and for fuel costs, the actual
financial prices paid by TS and TP for gas and coal, respectively, have been utilized\.
3\.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
The overall rating of the project is moderately satisfactory given that the project met two
of its objectives fully and the third objective was met partially\. The project had three
objectives: improve quality of service, improve financial viability, and improve
environmentally friendly operations\. The quality of service improved as seen through an
increased connection rate\. The achievements to improve environmentally friendly
services were also significant resulting in higher than expected economic rates of return:
heat and water losses in the networks reduced, household heat consumption decreased,
carbon emission reductions were sold to the PCF and the Bank, and particulate emissions
in Pernik will decrease when the electrostatic precipitator is operational\. On improving
the financial viability, the results were mixed\. Phasing out of the operating subsidy was a
positive development\. Tariffs also increased throughout the duration of the project but
these increases could not keep pace with the steep increases in fuel prices which affected
the financial position of both companies\. However, as DH is an important and basic
service, the Government is currently taking measures to ensure that the financial viability
of TS and TP continues to improve so that these companies are able to provide services in
a sustainable manner (Section 5\.2(a))\.
3\.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts
(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development
The reduction in household energy consumption due to DSM measures benefitted all
consumers, especially the vulnerable groups\. As tariffs increased, without a decline in
household energy consumption, it would have been difficult for the poor and the
vulnerable groups to pay for their heating bills\. The revival of the DH sector benefits the
society as heat now can be provided in a safe and economic manner\.
b) Institutional Change/Strengthening
Institutional strengthening was not included in the project as TS and TP had adequate
capacity at appraisal\. Since then, with the implementation of the project and overall focus
on institutions with Bulgaria joining the EU, the capacity in TS and TP has increased
further to carry out DH operations and investments\.
(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)
None\.
15
3\.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops
As part of the project, surveys were carried out to determine the level of customer
satisfaction\. In TS the surveys were carried out in 2002, 2004, and 2005 and in the last
survey 75% of the consumers reported being satisfied with services provided\. Similar
surveys were carried out in TP in 2002 and 2004; in the 2004 survey, 80% of the
population reported satisfaction with the services provided (Annex 5)\. Given this high
level of customer satisfaction and as consumers were reconnecting to the DH system (a
proxy indicator on the level of satisfaction), additional surveys after 2005 were not
carried out\.
4\. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome
Rating: Low
Considering overall developments in Bulgaria, which is now an EU member country, the
risk is low that there would be back-tracking in the development outcomes for the
following reasons:
Bulgaria's EU accession has spurred growth and rising income levels, which will
increase the financial viability of DH companies as tariffs increase\. This in turn
will allow the DH companies to rehabilitate networks\. TS and TP have adequate
technical, financial, and commercial capacity to carry out works\. Other
rehabilitation needs have already been identified and the two companies will
continue to upgrade the network to reduce energy and water losses\.
Bulgaria, as an EU member country, will continue to focus on addressing
environmental issues\. Therefore, environmental gains achieved during project
implementation are likely to be maintained through: household energy
conservation, reduced heat and water losses in the DH networks, and reduced
carbon emissions\.
5\. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance
5\.1 Bank Performance
(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry
(i\.e\., performance through lending phase)
Rating: Satisfactory
Bank performance in project identification, preparation, and appraisal was satisfactory\.
To ensure quality at entry and create an environment conducive for project success, the
project was re-appraised in January 2003, which allowed policy measures to be
implemented\. Furthermore, to ensure quality, the project was supported by actions under
the Bank's three year PAL program\. At appraisal, detailed reviews were conducted of the
project's technical economic, financial, and institutional issues to ensure that project
design supported the development objectives\.
16
(b) Quality of Supervision
(including of fiduciary and safeguards policies)
Rating: Satisfactory
The Bank project supervision team focused on development objectives and provided
guidance to TS and TP to meet the Key Indicators\. As needed, the Bank team also met
with the shareholders of the two companies - the MEE and the Sofia Municipality on
matters that need their support\. The Bank team included technical, financial, financial
management, and procurement specialists who conducted regular project supervision and
helped prepare post-mission Aide Memoires that outlined findings and areas for
Toplofikacia and World Bank follow-up actions\.
On safeguard matters, the team regularly followed up on financial management issues,
including review of quarterly financial monitoring reports and annual audit reports\. The
pending lawsuit issue in Pernik, where a company had made a claim against TP, was
monitored to determine the liability of the company\. Audit reports in both companies
were used to determine the financial indicators of the project\. Procurement supervision
was regular and there were no major issues on this matter\. On environment safeguards,
an Environmental Management Plan was developed and followed by both companies\.
A Mid Term Review was held in November 2005 to ensure that project implementation
was progressing as planned\. During the early supervision phase, a project launch
workshop was held (July 18, 2003) and a Project Implementation Plan (June 2003) was
prepared to familiarize TS and TP with Bank's procedures, including procurement and
financial management\. The Bank team kept Bank management informed about the
project and filed necessary memos and documents, including ten Implementation Status
Reports (ISRs)\. The ECA region carried out an audit of an ISR (dated December 21,
2007), which received an overall positive rating of 1\.4 (with a score of 1 being Highly
Satisfactory and 2 being Satisfactory)\.
The Bank maintained regular contact with the co-financer of the project, EBRD, which
was implementing its own component and managing the EU KIDSF grant\. For example,
for the private sector participation in TS, the Bank and EBRD were in regular contact
because they had similar covenants in the legal agreements\. In TP, the Bank had close
contact with EBRD on implementing the Bank-financed electrostatic precipitator because
it was attached to the EU KIDSF grant-financed boiler\. The Bank was also in contact
with USAID regarding the private sector participation efforts in TS\. Further, the Bank
was in regular contact with PCF to facilitate the annual sale of emission reductions by TS
and TP\.
Close supervision was made possible by a highly decentralized Bank team, which was
based in the Region in a nearby time zone, easing communication and reducing travel
costs\. The Task Team Leader (TTL) was in Zagreb (three years); the Operations Officer
was in Sofia; the Procurement specialist was based in Sofia; the Financial Management
specialist was based in Bucharest; and Washington-based Bank staff provided specialized
technical and financial support\.
17
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance
Rating: Satisfactory\. Based on the satisfactory rating for project preparation and
supervision, the overall rating is also satisfactory\.
5\.2 Borrower Performance
(a) Government Performance
Rating: Satisfactory
During project preparation and implementation, Government undertook several policy
measures that helped to revive the DH sector\. Measures included preparing and
implementing the DH Strategy; phasing out operating subsidies; continuously adjusting
the Energy Benefit Program to cover vulnerable groups; legislating mandatory DSM
equipment (heat cost allocators and regulators) that led to a dramatic drop in household
energy consumption\. Finally, the Government supported sales of carbon emission
reductions to the Prototype Carbon Fund\. On the issue of tariffs, the Government did not
interfere in the operations of SEWRC which is an independent regulatory body\.
However, to ensure that both companies function in a sustainable manner, the
Government is currently taking measures\. For TS, the Government will soon be the sole
owner and increase the capital of the company so that the payables to Bulgargas are
reduced\. Through a letter dated November 25, 2008, the Ministry of Economy and
Energy informed the Bank that the Government action is a short-term emergency
measure to facilitate uninterrupted DH services\. In the longer run, the Government will
ensure that company continues to operate in an efficient manner, in accordance with
applicable EU legislation\. For TP, the plans to privatize the company are being
implemented\. There are other smaller DH companies in the country that are private and
the expectation is that TP will also be able to be fully sustainable as a private entity\.
(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance
Rating: Satisfactory
Implementation was satisfactory and timely because shareholders and management of TS
and TP fully supported activities of the project\. Both companies had dedicated officials
to plan and execute the investments, including preparing quality bidding documents,
interacting with the Bank to quickly address issues, making counterpart funds available,
and reporting progress to the Bank on meeting project objectives and Key Indicators\.
The PIU staff in TS and TP were adequate in number, well-qualified, and quickly learned
Bank procedures\. The staff was in place for most of project duration, making project
implementation effective\.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance
Rating: Satisfactory\. Based on the satisfactory rating of Government and the TS and TP,
as mentioned above, the overall rating is also satisfactory\.
18
6\. Lessons Learned
(both project-specific and of wide general application)
Policy setting is conducive to project success\. Before the project started and in the
early years of implementation, a number of policy measures were taken that
supported the project\. Also, a tariff regulatory system exists and tariffs were
regularly increased\. However, the tariff adjustments could not keep pace with
increasing costs, especially those related to fuel\. For the future, it would be useful
to review: the tariff regulatory system to allow tariffs to meet costs; and the
Energy Benefit Program so that the vulnerable groups are not affected by steep
tariff increases\.
Investments should be affordable\. To avoid raising tariffs, the investments were
chosen in a manner that would be affordable and result in savings for the
companies\. Thus, the project focused on DSM to conserve energy and critical
network rehabilitation that would result in reducing heat and water losses\.
Further, a large part of the investments were funded by grants from KIDSF which
reduced the financial burden in TS and TP to raise counterpart funds\. The
benefits of the reduction in heat and water losses are now apparent and both
companies plan to continue with the rehabilitation programs with investments that
are affordable and yield savings\.
The PIUs should be integrated with operations\. Project implementation was
effective because TS and TP PIU staff were drawn from the companies, bringing
necessary technical and financial skills\. As needed, the PIUs were supported by
specialized consultants\. The PIU members maintained their other work functions,
which meant that they were well-integrated in various TS and TP operations,
easing project planning and implementation\. Also project investments were
carried out as part of the companies' regular investment programs\. As the PIU
members will continue to work in TS and TP, they can support improvements in
the companies through the experience gained under the project\.
A decentralized Bank team increases supervision effectiveness\. The Bank team
was highly decentralized as mentioned above\. This increased contact and eased
communication among the Bank and project entities, made travel cost-effective,
and boosted implementation effectiveness\. Thus, when possible, the Bank should
consider decentralized staff to supervise projects\.
7\. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners
(a) Borrower/implementing agencies
The Ministry of Economy and Energy, TS, and TP commented on the project and their
full comments are included in Annex 7\. Some highlights of their comments are:
19
MEE: the project yielded positive results in improving efficiency and quality of
service\. The ministry also noted that rehabilitation of the network is a cost
effective way to improve efficiency and quality of operations\.
TS: the company considered the project to be "exceptionally successful" and felt
that the project was necessary, well-designed, and important for the company,
Sofia city and Bulgaria\. The company mentioned how the project increased
environmentally friendly operations but also noted the difficulties in meeting
costs due to high fuel costs and the regulatory framework, including the time lag
between increases in gas prices (quarterly) and tariff adjustments (annual)\.
Finally, the company mentioned that large parts of the network are more than 30
years old and need to be replaced and for which appropriate policies to finance the
investments need to be in place\.
TP: the company considered that the project was "successful" and mentioned the
progress made in reducing heat losses and meeting environmental targets\. On the
financial side, it recognized that while subsidies were eliminated, achievements
fell short of expectations because of tariff regulations\. The company mentioned
the efforts made to improve the financial position of the company through sale of
old receivables from consumers, court cases against non-paying consumers, and
sale of assets\. The company mentioned the need to maintain a network
rehabilitation program and indicated that improvements could be supported by the
private sector which is expected to be in place within 2 years as the privatization
process is underway in TP, since Fall 2008\.
(b) Co-financiers
EBRD reported the implementation progress made during the project and the energy
savings that resulted from the investments\. It also mentioned that its second tranche of
loan ( 15 million) was not disbursed as TS could not enter into a management contract,
as planned\. EBRD also briefly mentioned the progress of the project in TS, funded by
KIDSF\. Details are in Annex 8\.
(c) Other partners and stakeholders
(e\.g\. NGOs/private sector/civil society)
Not applicable\.
20
ANNEX 1\. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING
The costs below refer only to the Bank portion of the project in TS and TP\. The actual
costs are reported in the currencies used to denominate the Bank loansEuros for TS and
US$ for TP\.
SOFIA PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT
Appraisal Appraisal Actual Percentage
COMPONENTS Estimate
(US$ million Estimate Cost of
equivalent) ( million) ( million) Appraisal
1A Network Rehabilitation 25\.32 24\.19 27\.31 113
Pipeline replacement 12\.44 11\.89 12\.81 108
Compensators and valves 4\.92 4\.70 5\.66 120
Thermal insulation of over ground pipes 2\.09 2\.00 1\.42 71
Variable flow pumping 5\.86 5\.60 7\.41 132
1B Substation Rehabilitation 1\.99 1\.90 2\.39 126
Insulation of regulators 1\.99 1\.90 2\.19 115
Installation of water meters 0\.00 0\.00 0\.20 -
1C Billing System 0\.00 0\.00 0\.91 -
Billing hardware and software 0\.00 0\.00 0\.91 -
1 D Technical Assistance 3\.20 3\.06 2\.62 86
Incremental operating cost for PIU 0\.21 0\.20 0\.10 50
Financial management system 0\.03 0\.03 0\.01 35
Financial audits 0\.11 0\.11 0\.23 219
Consultancy for private sector
participation (funded by USAID) 0\.52 0\.50 0\.00 0
Public awareness campaign (funded by
TS) 0\.42 0\.40 0\.00 0
Design/supervision 1\.93 1\.84 2\.27 123
Total Baseline Cost 30\.51 29\.15 33\.22 114
Physical and Price Contingencies5 6\.23 5\.95 -
Total Project Costs 36\.75 35\.11 33\.22 95
Front-end fee IBRD 0\.27 0\.26 0\.26 101
VAT and import duties 7\.21 6\.89 6\.47 94
Total Financing Required 44\.22 42\.25 39\.96 95
5The contingencies of 5\.95 million have been partly used during the project\. The actual costs were
33\.22 million (without VAT and Front end Fee of Bank loan) against an estimate of 35\.11 million\.
21
PERNIK PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT
Appraisal Actual
Cost Percentage
COMPONENTS Estimate
(US$ (US$ of
million) million Appraisal
equivalent)
2A Substation Rehabilitation 0\.75 0\.80 107
Installation of substation equipment 0\.75 0\.80 107
2B Network Rehabilitation 4\.74 5\.27 111
Pre-insulated pipes 2\.95 3\.34 113
Compensators 0\.19 0\.19 100
Modernization of pumping 1\.10 1\.74 158
Monitoring of DH system 0\.50 0\.00 0
2C Rehabilitation of Generation Plant 3\.42 4\.22 123
Electrostatic precipitator 3\.10 3\.81 123
Water treatment 0\.18 0\.00 0
Automation and control 0\.14 0\.00 0
Coal crusher 0\.00 0\.35 -
Adiabatic Calorimeter 0\.00 0\.06 -
2D Technical Assistance 0\.56 0\.60 107
Total Baseline Cost 9\.47 10\.89 115
Physical and Price Contingencies6 1\.52 - -
Total Project Costs 10\.99 10\.89 99
Front-end fee IBRD 0\.07 0\.07 100
VAT and import duties 2\.61 2\.60 100
Total Financing Required 13\.67 14\.19 104
6The contingencies of US$ 1\.52 million have been partly used during the project\. The actual costs were
US$ 10\.89 million (without VAT and Front end Fee of Bank loan) against an estimate of US$ 10\.99
million\.
22
FINANCING FOR THE PROJECT
The overall financing for the project is shown below\. The Bank loans to TS and TP were
fully disbursed\. As bulk of the actual expenditures was in Euros and the financing from
the Bank (for TS), EBRD and KIDSF were in Euros, the appraisal estimate in Euro
equivalent is compared to the actual expenditures in Euros\.
Appraisal Appraisal Actual
Fund Source Type of Estimate Estimate Expenditure Percentage of
Financing (US$ million ( million ( million Appraisal
equivalent) equivalent) equivalent)
Toplofikacia Sofia
Toplofikacia Sofia Own source 27\.50 26\.27 18\.80 72
Bank Loan 27\.20 26\.00 26\.00 100
EBRD Loan 31\.407 30\.00 14\.30 48
KIDSF Grant 31\.40 30\.00 30\.00 100
EU Phare Grant 1\.60 1\.56 1\.56 100
Sub-total 119\.10 113\.83 90\.66 80
Toplofikacia Pernik
Toplofikacia Pernik Own source 6\.60 6\.31 2\.04 32
Bank Loan 7\.00 6\.69 5\.60 848
KIDSF Grant - - 10\.40
Sub-total 13\.60 12\.99 18\.04 1399
TOTAL 132\.70 126\.83 108\.70 86
7EBRD's loan of 30 million was in two equal tranches\. The second tranche of 15 million was not
disbursed as it was linked to TS signing a management contract\.
8 The Bank loan of US $ 7 million in TP was fully disbursed\. However due to the exchange rate
differences, a 84% disbursement is shown in Euro terms\.
9In TP, the overall cost of the project increased due to the high cost of the boiler # 5 which is being
financed by KIDSF\.
23
ANNEX 2\. OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT
The achievements for each indicator, the description of works, and how the project risks
were addressed are summarized below\.
PROGRESS IN MEETING KEY INDICATORS
Indicator Targets Improvement Achievement
since
appraisal?
SOFIA
Increased Connect 90% of Yes The indicator has been met\. Currently there
percentage of consumers by end 2007 are 362,578 households connected
connection to DH compared to 299,012 in 2002\. Connection
rate was 96% in end 2007
Demonstrated Company operates Yes There are no operating subsidies\. Estimated
positive fiscal without subsidies as of net fiscal benefit was BGN65 million
impact 2005 during 2002-07
Improved working Improve working ratio Partial Achieved improvements over base levels
ratio from 1\.15 to 0\.88 during during 2002-03; reverted to 1\.14 in 2007
2002-06
Increased Increase collection rate Partial Increased rate to 87% during 2003-05;
domestic bill from 80 to 85% during reverted to 79% during 2006-07\. Overall
collection rate 2002-07 bill collection with arrears is at 86% (2007)
Reduced network Reduce losses from Yes Heat loss in absolute terms reduced: 935
heat losses 16\.7% to 15\.6%10 during GWh (2002) and 1,017 GWh (2003) to 899
2002-07 (see footnote GWh (2007)\. Network losses in 2007 were
on using GWh as an unit 17\.5%11
to measure heat loss)
Decreased energy Decrease from 12\.7 to Yes In 2007, annual household energy
consumption 10\.6 MWh/y/household consumption was 9\.1 MWh, representing a
in 2007 28% reduction in energy consumption at
the household level
Demonstrated Reduce carbon Yes and on Carbon reductions are being sold\. TS has
environmental emissions by 2\.7 million track already sold 925,462 tons to PCF (2004 -
benefits tons during 2003-12; 2007) and the contract value is expected to
Contract with PCF to be met by year end 2008
reduce emissions by
1\.08 million tons (2004
and 2012)
Reduce network water Partial Water losses were reduced to 1\.8 million
losses by 45% from m3/year (2006), a reduction of 40%\. But
3 million m3/year by water losses increased in 2007 to 2\.3
2007\. million\. Water losses reduced in the
\. beginning of the project but they have
started to increase which shows that there
is further need to rehabilitate the aging DH
network
10The target was revised in 2005 from 10\.4% to 15\.6%\.
11Note: heat loss is better represented in GWh in this case as the heat production reduced (6,048 GWh in 2003 to 5,135
GWh) due to significant energy conservation in apartments\. Such high levels of reduction in heat production affecting
the denominator in calculating the percentage reduction in heat - were not expected at appraisal\.
24
PERNIK
Increased Connect 69% of Yes\. The indicator has been met\. Currently there
percentage of consumers by end-2007 are 16,768 households connected compared
connection to DH to 12,410 in 2002\. Connection rate was
85% in end 2007
Demonstrated Company operates Yes There are no operating subsidies\. Estimated
positive fiscal without subsidies as of net fiscal benefit was BGN65 million
impact 2005 during 2002-07
Improved working Improve working ratio Partial Achieved improvements over base levels
ratio from 1\.22 to 0\.89 during during 2002-03; reverted to 1\.15 in 2007
2002-06
Increased Increase collection rate Partial Increased rate to 80% during 2004-05;
domestic bill from 50 to 84% during reverted to 68% during 2007\. Overall bill
collection rate 2002-07 collection with arrears is at 85% (2007)
Reduced network Reduce losses from 31\.8 Yes Network losses in 2007 were 24\.4%\. Heat
heat losses to 25\.0%12 during 2002- losses in 2002 and 2003 were 116 and 112
07 GWh; these were reduced to 74 GWh
(2007)
Decreased energy Decrease from 14\.9 to Yes In 2007, annual household energy
consumption 12\.1 MWh/ y/household consumption was 9\.9 MWh, representing a
in 2007 34% reduction in energy consumption at
the household level
Demonstrated Reduce particulate On track; to be The ESP is not yet operational as the boiler
environmental matter from 1600 to 100 met by end # 5 has not yet been commissioned\.
benefits mg/m3 during 2002-07 2008 when the However, the specification for the
for boiler #5 boiler will be particulate emission from the ESP is 50
operational mg/m3\. Thus, this indicator will be met
when boiler is operational
Reduce network water Yes Water losses were reduced to 212,000
losses by 30% from m3/year (2007), a reduction of 50%
400,000 m3 per year
Reduce carbon Yes TP has already met this target\. It already
emissions by 186,000 sold 157,000 tons to PCF (2004 to 2007)
tons during 2003-12 and met its contractual obligations to PCF\.
TP sold an additional 40,091 tons to the
Bank for the Bank to reduce its carbon
footprint\.
DESCRIPTION OF WORKS
In general, the rehabilitation works completed under the project were more than what was
planned, mainly because of competitive prices and in spite of the second tranche of
EBRD's loan in TS ( 15 million) not being released\. A summary of the main
rehabilitation activities are presented below\.
12The target was revised in 2005 from 22\.0% to 25\.0%
25
A\. Network Rehabilitation:
The pipe rehabilitation component was a main project component and the project
exceeded targets under this component as described below:
(i) Installation of pre-insulated pipes: a main project component aimed to replace
worn out district heating pipes based on foam concrete technology, which was
used in 1960s and 1970s and had most of the leakages and breakdowns\. There is a
total of about 920 km of district heating channels in Sofia and the plan was to
replace about 60 km of the network under the whole project, and about 30 km
under Bank loan financing\. Under the Bank-financed project, about 54 km of old
foam concrete district heating channels were replaced with pre-insulated pipes
and a new transmission pipe of 2 km\. was constructed\. Under the whole project
(Bank, EBRD, KIDSF Grant, and TS own funds) about 92 km of pipes were
installed instead of the planned 60 km due to a lower-than-expected cost for pipes
and installation works;
(ii) New thermal insulation of over-ground pipelines: installed for about 16\.5 km,
which is higher than the planned amount of 15 km;
(iii) Replacement of valves and compensators: about 2,200 valves and 1,300
compensators were procured and installed in the district heating network; and
(iv) Installation of variable flow pumping systems: installed at main heat sources and
these were a main project component as it helped to reduce electricity
consumption and supply of heat was adjusted based on demand\. The Bank loan
financed installation of variable flow pumping systems for three main heat
sources; CHP Sofia, heating plants Liulin and Zemliane\. Variable-flow pumping
was also installed in two smaller heating plants and two booster pumping stations\.
In CHP Sofia East, pumping systems were replaced using KIDSF project
financing\. All heat sources in Sofia now have the modern district heating
pumping systems that were planned during project preparation\.
B\. Substation Rehabilitation:
Rehabilitating heating substations located in basements of buildings with district heating
was another main project component\. The plan was to rehabilitate about 8,030 out of the
15,000 heating substations in Sofia\. The Bank loan was to be used to finance the
installation of 1,097 heating substations and EBRD/KIDSF would finance the rest (6,933
units)\. The Bank loan financed the rehabilitation of 1,097 substations as planned and the
EBRD/KIDSF financed 9,233 substations, more than originally planned\.
C\. Technical Assistance (TA)
The activities under the TA sub-components are presented below:
(i) Incremental costs of PIU: this was financed by TS, as planned;
(ii) Financial management system: this was financed by TS, as planned;
(iii) Financial audits: this was financed by TS, as planned;
26
(iv) Consultancy services for private sector participation: this was supposed to be
financed by the Bank (estimated cost of US$380,000)\. However, this was
eventually financed through an USAID grant and the cost was higher than
estimated;
(v) Design and supervision: this was financed by TS, as planned\. In addition, TS was
supported by an international consulting company financed through EU Phare
and KIDSF grants on matters related to engineering, procurement, and
supervision services for the whole project; and
(vi) Consultancy services for public awareness campaign: this was to be financed by
the Bank to promote energy savings\. TS financed this fully as it was an ongoing
campaign the savings in household heat consumption were significant, as
mentioned earlier\.
D\. Other
During project implementation, TS made extra efforts to improve its billing system in
line with its objective to increase the financial viability of the company\. Although not in
the original procurement plan, the Bank and TS agreed to use loan funds to purchase
hardware for Toplofikacia's billing system, including computers and computer networks
between bill payment offices and the main office of Toplofikacia (cost of about
$ 700,000)\. While the Bank financed the hardware, TS financed the software (around
$ 200,000) needed for the system\.
Pernik
A\. Network Rehabilitation:
The network rehabilitation component included the following sub-components:
(i) Installation of pre-insulated pipes: The Bank financed the procurement of 7 km of
pipes which were installed with funds from TP and KIDSF\. The plan was to
rehabilitate 10 km of pipes and the remaining portion of the network will be
financed through TP's own funds;
(ii) Replacement of compensators: as planned, TP replaced all 226 old leaking
compensators with bellow compensators; and
(iii) Variable speed district heating pumps\. The plan was to replace old, oversized, and
inefficient pumps at the main heat source and the booster pumping station with
modern and automated variable-speed pumps\. This was realized as planned, both
pumping stations now have modern variable-flow pumps in operation since 2004,
reducing electricity consumption by about 50%\.
B\. Substation Rehabilitation:
The component included the assembly costs for 700 heating substations\. All substations
with modern equipment, automation, and heat meters were installed as planned before the
2003-04 heating season\. Installing heat substations enabled customers to regulate heat
27
consumption and make full use of heat cost allocators and thermostatic radiator valves
installed in apartments\.
C\. Heat Source Improvements:
This sub-component included the following:
(i) Replacement of ESP for Boiler # 5: as per plan, the ESP (financed by the Bank)
was installed for Boiler # 5 which will reduce particulate emissions from about
1,600 mg/m3 to about 50 mg/m3\. Although the ESP is installed, it is not
operational as the boiler (financed by TP and KIDSF) is not yet functional;
(ii) Improvement of automation and control system of coal conveyer: this component
was financed by Toplofikacia's own funds (cost around $ 200,000) and not
financed by the Bank as originally planned\. In lieu of this financing, the Bank
financed a coal crusher for boiler # 5 which is connected to the ESP, financed by
the Bank\.
(iii) Rehabilitation of chemical water treatment plant: this water filtration system
(cost: US$ 290,000) was not financed by the Bank, as planned, but financed by
TP\. In lieu of this financing, the Bank financed an adiabatic calorimeter to
analyze lignite quality\.
D\. Technical Assistance:
There were no plans for the Bank to finance TA in the company\. As planned, TP
completed the following TA: (i) public awareness campaign to highlight the plans of the
company to provide better service and the need to conserve energy; (ii) design and
supervision; (iii) annual financial audits; (iv) incremental operating costs of the PIU's;
and (v) project financial management system\. In addition, TP was supported by EU
Phare and KIDSF grants to secure an international consultant that helped on matters of
engineering, procurement, and supervision services\.
E\. Other
At appraisal, TP had agreed to carry out the following tasks but these tasks were financed
by KIDSF which provided grant funds ( 10\.4 million) to TP during project
implementation: installation works for the ESP; rehabilitation of the steam boiler # 5;
installation of DH pipelines; and installation of a power transformer\.
RISKS
The table below shows the risks and mitigation measures identified in the Project
Appraisal Document (PAD) and a brief commentary on how the risks evolved during
implementation\.
28
Risks and Mitigation Measures
Risk Risk
Rating Mitigation Measures Comments
Defined at Appraisal
Overall Risk High Overall project risk rating is high Government took upfront policy
Rating because it requires sustained measures; TS and TP project
political will to reform the sector implementation was effective,
and raise tariffs\. But Bulgaria's helping the project meet its
overall reform agenda and energy objectives, despite the high overall
sector reforms are on track; risk rating\. Also, the project was
income levels are expected to rise implemented during Bulgaria's
and household energy transition to EU membership,
consumption, to decline\. DH which helped support growth and
company management will be rising household incomes that
encouraged to transform their permitted tariff increases\. Demand
performance based on conditions Side Measures implemented during
outlined in the Financial the project were maintained in line
Recovery Plan, and an adjusted with energy conservation measures
Energy Benefit Program, which in other EU member countries, and
will be in place each year\. These the Energy Benefit Program was in
factors will lower the project risk place throughout project duration to
rating provide assistance to the poor for
heating services
Tariffs will be High Since income levels were linked Outside the control of TS and TP,
unaffordable and to general economic conditions, tariff increases did not keep pace
social assistance this risk was largely outside with increasing fuel costs which
programs will be project control\. However, the account for a large portion of
inadequate social assessment revealed that operating costs for both companies\.
district heating was affordable for Thus, while tariffs were not
most consumers and that the unaffordable to most of the
Government had plans to population, it affected the financial
continuously update the Energy position of TS and TP\. The Energy
Benefit Program to assist poor Benefit Program was in place
people with DH services throughout the project, albeit
modified, to protect the vulnerable
group by allowing them to receive
DH services
Private sector Substantial To avoid this risk, the Bank loan This risk materialized\. Both the
participation in included a dated covenant Bank and EBRD followed up
Sofia DH requiring Sofia DH company to regularly with TS and shareholders
company complete the bidding process to to introduce the private sector\. The
for the provision select a private operator by Dec\. selection process was in an
of heat may not 30, 2003 advanced stage --management
be timely contract was prepared, bidders were
pre-qualified, and a pre-bid meeting
held--but the management
contractor was not in place as
planned\. Now a higher form of
privatization (concession or
privatization) is being considered
Financial Substantial FRPs prepared in consultation The FRPs were generally followed,
recovery plans with officials were realistic and although there were limitations on
are not followed had wide support from State and the tariff increases TS and TP were
local authorities\. Satisfactory allowed to implement\.
29
implementation of the FRPs was Nevertheless, TS and TP have
a condition for the Bank loan better financial position compared
to the situation at appraisal and they
have benefitted from the policy
measures taken by the Government
to revive the DH sector
Delays in policy Modest Without policy reform, project The upfront policy reforms taken
reforms sustainability could falter so the by Government and supported
project emphasized several through the Bank's 3-year PAL
crucial steps for Government to created an environment conducive
take under the Guarantee to project success
Agreement and the Bank PAL
Delay in project Substantial This risk was mitigated through: Mitigation measures were adequate:
implementation (i) establishing a competent PIU (i) the PIU comprised qualified
and training the staff; (ii) staff who undertook training and
ensuring counterpart funds were sought guidance from Bank
available at the beginning of each procurement staff to rapidly
year; (iii) preparing all bidding familiarize themselves with Bank
documents by end-2003; and (iv) procurement procedures; (ii)
establishing a financial counterpart funds were available as
management system that not only both companies factored project
monitored project progress but activities into their annual
also triggered corrective actions investment program; (iii) bidding
when necessary documents were prepared on time
because both PIUs were efficient
and planned their activities; and (iv)
the financial management system
and auditing procedures identified
areas for management attention in
TS and TP, and corrective actions
were taken
Fuel prices may Modest In Pernik, this risk was modest Fuel prices did fluctuate more than
fluctuate since coal prices were expected expected and the State Energy and
to remain stable\. In Sofia, the risk Water Regulatory Commission
was classified as mid-range in (SEWRC) did allow increases in
line with an Energy Environment tariffs\. However, these increases
Review (Bank report, 2001)\. The were not adequate or timely which
risk would be best addressed by led to financial difficulties for TS
promoting energy conservation and TP\. However, the decline in
and reducing heat losses through household energy consumption was
project-proposed measures This a positive trend as it reduced the
risk would also be addressed by burden of the heating bill to the
financial covenants in the loan consumer as tariff increased
that stipulate tariffs must be
increased to meet costs
30
ANNEX 3\. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
(including assumptions in the analysis)
At appraisal, both economic and financial rates of return and net present values were
estimated\. Using the same methodology, they were re-estimated at project completion
and are discussed below\.
Indicator Sofia Pernik
Appraisal Current Appraisal Current
ERR 23\.5% 49\.0% 18\.3% 25\.3%
ENPV BGN 146 million BGN 214 million BGN 9\.5 million BGN 12 million
FRR 18% 17% 11% 13%
FNPV BGN 65 million BGN 53 million BGN 0\.5 million BGN 3\.5 million
Project Economic Analysis
The project includes rehabilitation of Sofia and Pernik district heating systems\.
Concomitantly district heating customers had to equip their apartments with demand-side
energy efficiency measures--heat cost allocators and thermostatic radiator valves, which
supported the rehabilitation project and produced good economic results\. Cost-benefit
was analyzed for the whole investment program, taking into account the World Bank,
EBRD, KIDSF grant, and Toplofikacia's own funds\. The economic rate of return is
estimated to be 49\.0% for Sofia and 25\.3% for Pernik\.
Net benefits were calculated after the project using the same principles and data
measurements as the project appraisal report\.
(i) Additional energy sold due to retention and reconnection of consumers through
improvements supported under the project, which took into account reduced
energy consumption due to demand side management;
(ii) Savings on substitution costs assumed that consumers who were disconnected
from the district heating system would use electricity with a tariff of 80
BGN/MWh\. A conservative estimate of 7\.5 MWh/year/household of substitute
energy consumption was assumed, which is lower than district heating
consumption (TS 9\.1 MWh/household; and TP 9\.9 MWh/household); and
(iii) Savings in operational costs which comprise: savings in pumping costs which
reduced to 90% of pre-project levels in Sofia and to 40% in Pernik; savings due to
reduction of water losses which reduced to 75% from pre-project levels in Sofia
and 50% in Pernik; reduction in operations and maintenance (O&M) costs due to
less breakdown of pipes; and savings in fuel consumption due to reduction of heat
losses and household energy consumption\.
Project Financial Analysis
The financial rate of return (FRR) and financial net present value (FNPV) have been re-
estimated by adjusting costs and benefits under the economic analysis to include only
those effects that have a direct financial impact (cost or benefit) for the two companies\.
31
Thus, as compared to the ERR and economic net present value (ENPV), taxes (excluding
VAT) and duties have been included where applicable; and for fuel costs, the actual
financial prices paid by TS and TP for gas and coal, respectively, have been utilized\.
For TS, the re-estimated FRR is 17%, close to the PAD estimate of 18%\. For Pernik, the
re-estimated FRR is 13%, slightly higher than the PAD estimate of 11%\. The higher FRR
is due mainly to greater cost savings on coal expenditures, since coal prices were higher
than projected\.
Financial Viability of TS and TP
Prior to 2002, the two DH companies faced serious financial problems as a result of low
heat and electricity tariffs, lower than potential operating efficiency due to deteriorating
facilities and equipment, and low revenue collection rates, which increased net financial
losses, and accumulated arrears to fuel suppliers\. These financial problems were a drain
on the State budget, which provided large operating subsidies to DH companies\. As part
of project preparation, Financial Recovery Plans (FRP) were prepared for TS and TP
which were approved by Government\. The FRPs, which covered 2002-06, included
obligatory targets for operational and financial performance for both companies\. The
FRPs provided for operating subsidies to be phased out by 2005, and the two DH
companies prepared detailed annual business plans that specified operational and
financial targets and analyzed expected revenues and expenditures, including tariff levels
required for heat and electricity\. The FRPs and business plans provided a good basis for
monitoring progress in performance during project supervision\. Selected indicators for
financial performance of the two DH companies are given below\.
The key financial viability indicators that were adopted in the PAD for each DH company
were based on their FRPs\. These indicators and the financial performance of the DH
companies are shown in the following table\.
Indicators Toplofikacia Sofia Toplofikacia Pernik
Year FRP/PAD Achievement FRP/PAD Achievement
Positive fiscal impact 2005 Phase out Phase out Phase out Phase out
operating operating operating operating
subsidy subsidy subsidy subsidy
Improvement in working ratio 2002 1\.14 1\.14 1\.22 1\.22
2003 0\.98 1\.00 1\.11 1\.09
2004 0\.96 0\.93 1\.01 1\.02
2005 0\.91 0\.91 0\.93 1\.12
2006 0\.88 1\.08 0\.89 0\.97
2007 0\.88 1\.14 0\.89 1\.15
Percentage increase in domestic 2002 80 80 50 50
collection rate (including 2003 87 55
collection of arrears) 2004 90 83
2005 87 80
2006 80 _
2007 85 79 84 68
32
Positive fiscal impact: Operating subsidies were phased out both in TS and TP, as
planned in 2005\. Fiscal impact, measured by net fiscal transfers from Government
budget, was positive for both companies, although amounts are now estimated to be
lower than projected [Plan BGN 91 million in TS, and BGN 10 million in TP; Actual
BGN 60 million in TS, and BGN 5 million in TP]\. The shortfall is due mainly to lower-
than-projected net contributions (sales receipts minus purchase refunds) from VAT since
sales revenues were lower due to lower-than-projected heat and sales tariffs (which were
subject to regulatory approval); and purchase expenses were higher due to higher
investment costs and higher fuel purchase prices (natural gas and coal)\.
Improvement in the working ratio: As can be seen in the attached tables, working ratios
improved from 2003 to 2005, but declined thereafter\. The tariffs increased but were
inadequate to compensate for the steep increase in fuel prices (natural gas and coal)\.
Relative movements in tariffs and fuel prices since 2002 can be seen in the table below\.
For the two companies, the overall financial performance improved during 2003-05\.
However, after 2005, the sharp rise in fuel prices was not matched by increases in heat
and electricity tariffs\. Gas and fuel expenses ranged from 65 to 71% of TS' total expenses,
and coal and fuel expenses ranged from 58 to 67% of TP's total expenses\. Given that
such a large portion of the operational cost is for fuel, TS and TP faced financial
difficulties as adjustments in tariffs did not keep pace with increases in fuel prices\.
Parameters Unit 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Sofia DH company
Average heat tariff BGN/MWh 41\.3 42\.9 47\.2 51\.4 59\.6 60\.4
Annual % increase % 3\.9 10 8\.9 16 1\.3
Average electricity tariff BGN/MWh 76\.0 80\.0 80\.0 80\.0 82\.0 95\.0
Annual % increase % 5\.3 0 0 2\.5 15\.8
Natural gas purchase price BGN/000 m3 243 235 223 245 302 325
Annual % increase % (3\.2) (5\.1%) 9\.9 23\.3 7\.6
% share of gas and fuel expenses % 65\.6 70\.7 63\.8 65\.2 70\.7 69\.3
in total expenses
Annual net profit/loss BGN million -55\.2 3\.7 76\.1 2\.6 -10\.5 -27\.8
Pernik DH company
Average heat tariff BGN/MWh 42\.3 42\.9 45\.3 46\.7 55\.2 56\.2
Annual % increase % 1\.4 5\.6 3\.1 18\.2 1\.8
Average electricity tariff BGN/MWh 63\.8 69\.7 68\.2 67\.6 69\.0 79\.3
Annual % increase 9\.2 (2\.2) (0\.9) 2 14\.9
Coal purchase price BGN/tce 72\.4 75\.0 70\.0 73\.5 80\.0 88\.7
Annual % increase % 3\.6 (6\.7) 5 8\.8 10\.9
% share of coal and fuel expenses % 66\.9 60 65\.2 61\.8 61\.6 57\.7
in total expenses
Annual net profit loss BGN million -1\.1 0\.6 1\.4 -1\.5 0\.2 -2\.5
Note: For TS, the exceptionally high net profit of BGN 76\.1 million in 2004 includes accounting adjustments of
about BGN 70 million due to reclassification of doubtful receivables that did not, however, contribute to cash flow\.
Increase in domestic collection rates: Both companies sell heat and electricity\. However,
the relative proportions of revenues differ significantly\. For TS, heat contributes to about
75% of the total revenues and the remaining revenues are derived from electricity sales\.
For TP, heat and electricity account for about 40% and 60% of the revenues, respectively\.
33
Electricity is sold to the national grid and all invoiced amounts are collected\. Heat is sold
to residential and non-residential consumers, but collections have been more problematic,
particularly for residential consumers\. Domestic collection performance for the two TS
has been summarized in the table\. Although the domestic heat collection was lower than
expected, the overall collection in both companies was higher (TS 86% and TP 85%)
at project closing due to the sale of electricity\.
34
ANNEX 4\. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION PROCESSES
(a) Task Team members
Names Title Unit Responsibility/
Specialty
Lending
Supervision/ICR
Adelina Boyanova Dotzinska Program Assistant ECCBG Program Assistant
Blaga Djourdjin Procurement Analyst ECSPS Procurement Specialist
Bogdan Constantinescu Sr\. Financial Management Specialist ECSPS Financial Management
Specialist
Bonita Brindley Consultant ECSSD ICR Editor
Doncho Petrov Barbalov Operations Officer ECSSD Operations Officer
Evgeny Evgeniev Extended Term Consultant ECSPF Private Sector
Development Specialist
Hana Huzjak Operations Analyst ECSSD Operations Analyst
Kishore Nadkarni Consultant, Financial Analyst ECSSD Financial Specialist
Marina Lysiakova Language Program Assistant ECSSD Program Assistant
Mirela Mart Consultant, Financial Management ECSPS Financial Management
Specialist
Orlin M\. Dikov Operations Officer ECSSD Operations Officer
Pekka Kalevi Salminen Sr\. Energy Spec\. ECSSD Technical Specialist
Poonam Rohatgi Program Assistant SASDO Program Assistant
Sati Achath Consultant (ICR) ECSSD ICR Consultant
Sudipto Sarkar Lead Specialist ECSSD/
EASUR Task Team Leader
Yukari Tsuchiya Program Assistant ECSSD Program Assistant
(b) Staff Time and Cost
Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)
Stage of Project Cycle
No\. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel
and consultant costs)
Lending
FY94 14\.90
FY95 38\.01
FY96 42\.24
FY97 32\.47
FY98 11\.46
FY99 62\.68
FY00 60 85\.32
FY01 11 6\.88
FY02 28 109\.78
FY03 42 96\.51
FY04 2 0\.95
FY05 0\.00
FY06 0\.00
35
Total: 143 501\.2013
Supervision/ICR
FY94 0\.00
FY95 0\.00
FY96 0\.00
FY97 0\.00
FY98 2\.79
FY99 0\.00
FY00 0\.00
FY01 0\.00
FY02 0\.00
FY03 1 1\.74
FY04 40 90\.33
FY05 40 97\.84
FY06 36 93\.36
FY07 26 100\.09
FY08 15 75\.18
FY07 0\.00
FY08 0\.00
Total: 158 461\.33
13The preparation was suspended in FY00 and the resources used in FY01 were mainly to support the policy measures
to be undertaken by the Government\. The funds used in FY02 and FY03 should be attributed to the preparation of this
revised project\. The team composition of the revised project (including the TTL) was largely different compared to the
original team\.
36
ANNEX 5\. BENEFICIARY SURVEY RESULTS
The National Center for Study of Public Opinion launched three survey campaigns in
Sofia (2002, 2004, 2005) and two in Pernik (2002, 2004) to study consumer satisfaction
with services offered by TS and TP\. Key findings are summarized below\.
QUALITY OF SERVICE
In Sofia and Pernik, throughout the years, DH has scored very high (91% in TS and TP)
on being a safe form of heating\. Perceptions of the population are summarized below
based on the question "In your opinion, the central heating provided by Toplofikacia in
your home is\.")\. In terms of whether the heat the provided was adequate, there was an
improvement in TS where 65% (2005) of consumers said that their homes were
sufficiently warm, compared to 42% in 2002\. In TP, the level of satisfaction regarding
the adequacy of heat did not change very much 39% (2002) to 43% (2004)\.
A large majority of subscribers, in both Sofia and Pernik prefer DH to all other sources of
heating\. For instance, the share of those in Sofia that prefer DH has increased from 70%
in 2002, reaching 80% in 2004, and 75% in 2005\. In Pernik, in 2002, 80% of subscribers
said that they would prefer DH and in 2004, this percentage remained high at 70%\.
Toplofikacia Sofia % Toplofikacia Pernik %
2002 2004 2005 2002 2004
The safest 86 95 91 80 91
The cheapest 30 49 48 42 45
The cleanest 57 64 62 76 66
The most popular 49 49 50 67 52
The most effective 48 64 58 60 52
Source: National Center for the Study of Public Opinion (2002-2005)\.
The increase in the number of household connections during the project is an indicator
about the increased level of satisfaction with the services\. The increase is shown in the
table below\. The 2004 Sofia survey also reported that the use of private Heat Accounting
Companies (HACs) to measure heat consumption was successful and only 2\.5% of
respondents reported that they did not have home devices for heat measurement\.
Similarly, in Pernik heat accounting was completed by 2004, and only about 2% of
respondents had not installed devices for measuring and accounting for home heating
energy\. In the 2004 Pernik survey, however, the respondents were not satisfied with the
HACs\.
Increase in Connections
Year Toplofikacia Sofia Toplofikacia Pernik
Total number Connection rate* Total number Connection rate
of Connections of Connections
2002 299,012 85% 12,410 63%
2007 362,578 96% 16,768 85%
* Total number of connections divided by total number of households
37
Finally, in the 2005 survey, 76% of subscribers interviewed said they would not cancel
their subscription to TS services, higher than the 69% in 2002, but lower than 82% of the
2004 survey\. Similarly, during the 2004 survey a high percentage of Pernik subscribers
(70%) said they would not discontinue the service from TP\.
About 70 % of the Sofia subscribers reported that they have been informed about the
network rehabilitation program, activities supported under the project\. About 54% of
those informed, believe that this modernization program will improve the quality of
services and 30 % believe that it will contribute to decreasing heating costs\. In TP, 83%
of the respondents (2004 survey) were aware of the network rehabilitation program\.
COST OF SERVICE
Price is an important factor that shapes consumer's assumptions on the choice of DH
services and the table below indicates the ability to pay for the services\. The surveys
showed that about 49% (2005) and 83% (2004) of consumers in Sofia and Pernik,
respectively, would not be able to pay heat bills more than BGN 60\. More respondents in
Pernik were benefitting from the Energy Benefit Program and this may explain why a
greater percentage of the population was able to pay for heat bills less than BGN 60,
compared to the population in Sofia\. The inability to pay bills on time was also revealed
in the survey when 14% (2005) and 38% (2004) of the respondents in Sofia and Pernik,
respectively, mentioned that they had overdue payments to the DH companies\.
What is the maximum (in BGN) you can spend for winter heating?
Payment range Sofia Pernik
(in BGN) % %
2002 2004 2005 2002 2004
0-30 27 12 14 30 35
31-60 37 37 35 45 48
61-90 15 19 18 12 9
90-120 16 24 24 9 7
Over 120 5 8 9 4 1
Source: National Center for the Study of Public Opinion (2002-2005)\.
The DSM measures introduced during the project which reduced household energy
consumption played a significant role in sustaining the DH services\. At appraisal, the
average household income was compared to district heating costs, and this ICR takes a
similar approach\. Even though tariffs increased, the average annual household cost for
district heating decreased, in percentage terms, in both Sofia and Pernik\. This was due to
the rising incomes and declining energy consumption (see table below)\. In Sofia, the
percentage of average income spent on heat (based on average consumption) dropped
from 12\.3% to 7\.3%\. In Pernik, the drop was similar from 14\.3% to 8\.6%\.
38
Declining Cost of Heat as Percentage of Household Income
Year Average Household Average Household Average Heat Tariff Percentage of
Income (BGN)* Heat Consumption including VAT Average Income
(MWh) (BGN/MWh) Spent on Heat
Sofia Pernik Sofia Pernik Sofia Pernik Sofia Pernik
2002 5137 5319 12\.7 15 49\.56 50\.76 12\.3 14\.3
2003 5521 5107 11\.6 11\.3 51\.48 51\.48 10\.8 11\.4
2004 6366 5546 10\.2 10\.2 56\.64 54\.36 9\.1 10\.0
2005 7549 5893 10\.4 10\.9 61\.68 56\.04 8\.5 10\.4
2006 7242 6370 10\.1 9\.9 69\.24 66\.24 9\.7 10\.3
2007 9099 7747 9\.1 9\.9 72\.60 67\.44 7\.3 8\.6
* Source: National Statistical Institution
39
ANNEX 6\. STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP REPORT AND RESULTS
Not applicable
40
ANNEX 7\. SUMMARY OF BORROWER'S ICR AND/OR COMMENTS ON DRAFT ICR
Comments from Ministry of Economy and Energy (MEE), TS, and TP are presented
below\.
MINISTRY OF ECONOMY AND ENERGY
A representative of Ministry of Economy and Energy conveyed this message through an
E-mail dated December 2, 2008:
"The Rehabilitation of the Heat Conveyance Networks in Sofia and Pernik Project is one
of the technical activities within the Central Heating Companies Restructuring Plan,
which was developed and adopted in 2000\.
The technological upgrading of the central heating network is yielding its expected
positive results and proves that the rehabilitation is the cheapest option for improving the
efficiency and the quality of operation\.
The elimination of the main disadvantages of the obsolete heating energy conveyance
systems - high losses, lack of flexibility and low quality of the services - is being
achieved by means of significantly lower investment costs; it allows the limitation of
costs at an acceptable level for a sufficiently long period of time until the state of the
economy and the prosperity of the consumers justify larger investment outlays\."
TOPLOFIKACIA SOFIA
Through a letter dated December 4, 2008, Toplofikacia Sofia provided the following
comments\.
"(i) Assessment of the operation's objective, design, implementation and operational
experience;
The Project objectives were to: (i) improve the quality of the provided services; (ii)
improve the company financial viability; and (iii) increase environmentally friendly
operations through energy conservation and pollution reduction measures\.
Their importance for Toplofikacia Sofia AD (TS) and Bulgaria is proved by the
participation in the project financing of several financing institutions\. District heating is
an essential service in Sofia\. TS considers the Sofia district heating rehabilitation Project
as very needed, well designed and important operation for the whole country, Sofia city
and the company\.
41
(ii) Assessment of the outcome of the operation against the agreed objectives;
The implementation of the Toplofikacia Sofia District Heating Project has been assessed
as exceptionally successful for the company\. Major achievements have been made in
respect of all three objectives\. We would like to stress the following major achievements:
Improvement of the quality of the provided services\. The growth of TS residential
customers during the time of Project implementation was 9%\. The Project' contribution to
this growth are the new automated DH substations, which allow to improve the service
quality by providing the possibility of supplying the exactly desired quantity of heat and
decreasing of the heat losses and electric power costs, resulting in lower energy costs for
consumers\.
Improvement of the company financial viability\. The major indicators met are as
follows:
a\. Ceasing the state operating subsidies to TS since 2005\.
b\. Improvement of the working ratio\. With the present regulations, the
company has limited resources to influence this indicator\. The Project
contributed to minimize the losses due to reduced electricity costs,
reduced heat losses and reduced consumption of heat from the customers'
side However, fuel cost forms the major cost item in overall production
costs\. The tariff regulation as implemented since 2005 prescribes
regulation of both fuel and energy prices\. The tariff regulation is not fully
based on cost bases, but often considers social impacts of the heat price
increases\. Further, as the natural gas price is regulated on quarterly bases,
whereas heat price is regulated on yearly bases, the heat price increases
lag much behind fuel price increases\. As a consequence of this regulatory
framework the heat price has not been able to cover production costs, even
after implementing the cost saving actions by the company\.
c\. Improvement of collection ratio\. Events in 2006, related to the company's
former manager harshly influenced the consumer's attitude with regards to
paying their bills to the company\. The efforts made by to increase the
collection still have not yet given the desired result\. To support these
efforts, there must be implemented changes in the regulatory acts in view
of equal rights and respect in the relations service provider-customer\. At
the same time the company is aware of the necessity of wide public
awareness campaign among the customers to help them understand the
way of formation of the bills, content of the invoices, heat accounting etc\.
Increase of environmentally friendly operations through energy conservation and
pollution reduction measures\. The Project has achieved significant improvements:
d\. Reduction of heat losses and water losses in the system as a result of
pipeline improvements and replacements and replacement of the old DH
substations with new ones\.
42
e\. Reduction of consumed electricity resulting from implementation of
frequency converters for the network pumps and installation of the new
DH substations\.
f\. Reduction of carbon emissions\. The projected amount of reduced carbon
oxide emissions for the period from 2003 to 2012 TS managed to achieve
for the period 2003 - 2008\.
(iii) Evaluation of the borrower's own performance during the preparation and
implementation of the operation, with special emphasis on lessons learned that may
be helpful in the future;
The Project was financed by different financing institutions, each one with its own rules
and conditions and Project components, which required good management for a
successful implementation\.
The PIU established in TS for the purposes of the Project succeeded in organizing and
managing the Project to ensure its implementation within the planned time period,
planned budget, planned volumes keeping the provisions set forth in the agreements\.
The PIU was formed from the employees of TS, who together with their main obligations
worked on the Project implementation\. For working in the PIU additional knowledge and
skills were required\. They were learnt in progress of the work with the active assistance
of the consultant under the Project the Finnish company Poyry Energy Oy\. The PIU was
only the governing body, which for every particular task and different components
worked with the other employees of the company\.
As a result significant experience was gained in procurement of goods and works through
international biddings and management of contracts with foreign contractors\. Using
company employees for the management of the Project has its positive effect as well after
completion of the Project -- TS has at its disposal an experienced team for managing
contracts, which is able to participate in the performance of the regular investment
programs\.
During the Project implementation totally 36 international competitive biddings and one
national competitive bid were carried out and 88 contracts were implemented\. The
management of the company and PIU made all the relevant efforts and all contract were
completed successfully\. The company managed to achieve significant progress in
achieving of the objectives of the Project, which were within the management control and
authority\. Non-reaching of particular indicators related to the financial stability of the
company to their greater extend were beyond the control of the company\.
(iv) Evaluation of the performance of the Bank, any cofinanciers, or of other
partners during the preparation and implementation of the operation, including the
effectiveness of their relationships, with special emphasis on lessons learned;
43
During Project implementation TS had useful cooperation with the World Bank\. All
project documents were timely reviewed and approved\. Any encountered problems were
constructively discussed and timely solved\. The terms of Project implementation were
followed due to this successful cooperation\. TS highly appreciates the flexibility and the
responsiveness of the Bank during Project implementation while solving all the aroused
problems\.
The co-operation of TS was successfully also with the other Project co-financiers\.
(v) Description of the proposed arrangements for future operation of the project\.
Taking into consideration the overall condition of the DH network, we should note that
the Project proved not only its expedience with the implementation of Project
arrangements but as well the necessity of these arrangements to be continued in the time\.
The results achieved for the DH system with the automated substations and the network
pump frequency converters allowing heat supply quantity and quality regulation could be
even more effective when all of the substations become automated\. The network losses
can be lowered drastically only with replacement of at least 20 km pipelines every year\.
In the course of the Project pipelines installed in concrete channels were replaced but still
major part of the network, with total length is 920 km, are pipelines laid in channels and
30 years of age\. The network aging is quicker than company's financial possibilities for
rehabilitation, based on the present tariff setting\. Overturn of this tendency could be made
with a considerable financial resource which the company does not have now after
completion of the Project\."
TOPLOFIKACIA PERNIK
Though a signed statement, sent via E-mail on December 12, 2008, Toplofikacia Pernik
had the following comments:
(i) "Assessment of the operation's objective, design, implementation and
operational experience
The objectives of the operation were to improve quality of the DH service, increase
environmentally friendly operations and improve financial viability of Toplofikacia
Pernik EAD (TP)\. There objectives as well as the operations design are considered by
TP adequate to the actual situation\. The objectives and design are based on the master
plan, carried out prior to the operation start\.
(ii) Assessment of the outcome of the operation against the agreed objectives
TP estimates that the operation has been carried out successfully and that the
objectives have been achieved\. This can be concluded based on the data on the
results of the operation as provided in the present ICR: increase of the connection
rate, decrease of the specific energy consumption, reduction of the network losses
and achieved environmental benefits\. In relation to the financial performance the
objectives were achieved partly\. So, operational subsidies were phased out from
44
heating season 2004/05, but some of the financial targets like improvement of the
working ratio and collections were not achieved in full extent\. This was strongly
influenced by some reasons, which arc outside of TP control, namely: a) tariff setting
by SWERC, which does not always follow fuel and other outside cost increases; b)
legislation, which makes it impossible to disconnect consumers, who do not pay for
heat; c) lacking of legislation of household owners associations; and d) many
problems in the inefficient work of the heat allocator companies\. It shall be stressed
however, that despite the financial targets were not fully met, both collections rate
and working ratio were improved during the course of the operation\.
(iii) Evaluation of the borrower's own performance during the preparation
and implementation of the operation, with special emphasis on lessons learned that
may be helpful in the future;
The procurement was carried out according to the operation's plans\. TP together with the
consultant Ptiyry Energy managed to carry out the procurement according to the
procurement plan arid without any delays\.
Management of the project was carried out by the Pill established in the company
based on TP's existing and experienced staff\. We consider that PIU inside the company
is one of the preconditions of efficient and timely procurement\.
In order to achieve the financial targets, TP carried out several actions to improve the
financial efficiency\. These measures include: a) numerous court cases against the
debtors, (for instance, totally 10\.400 court eases have started up to 2008); b) sales of
the had debts; c) arrangement of few campaigns of "no penalty heat overdue payments"
(during Xmas etc)\. These actions have had a positive impact on the financial position
of TP\. The company has also achieved savings in the everyday operations and has sold
several old and unused physical assets\. However, the control over energy tariff
regulation is outside of company's control, and the tariff limitations, which did not fully
follow the coal price increases had negative outside influence on the financial
performance\. Unemployment levels in Pernik are high and incomes of some population
groups are low\. However, DH business shall not be considered as asocial support
program and the support to low income DH consumers shall be addressed by separate
means and not through DH tariff\.
(iv) Evaluation of the performance of the Bank, any cofinanciers, or of other
partners during the preparation and implementation of the operation, including
the effectiveness of their relationships, with special emphasis on lessons learned
The project was financed by several donors\. The co-operation with the donors during the
operation course was very efficient\. Another major partner in the implementation was an
outside consultant Poyry Energy, who efficiently co-operated with TP as well as with
the project\.
Ministry of Energy and Economy (MEE) as the provider of the Guarantee Agreement of
the operation has committed to assure the fair energy tariff setting for IT\. The Bank
has influenced the MEE during thc course of the operations to assure fair tariff setting\.
45
(v) Description of the proposed arrangements for future operation of the
project\.
There is an continuing need to increase the efficiency of DH system in Pernik\. It refers
especially for the need of the pipeline rehabilitation\. The company has signed the
Privatization Memorandum in fall of 2008 and the privatization is expected to be carried
out in 1-2 years\. It is assumed that combining of the TP's experience from the project
with the financing available from the potential investor will allow further
improvement of the DH system in Pernik\."
46
ANNEX 8\. COMMENTS OF CO-FINANCIERS AND OTHER PARTNERS/STAKEHOLDERS
Comments from EBRD, through an E-mail dated December 16, 2008 follow:
"The rehabilitation of parts of the transmission and distribution network of Sofia District
Heating Company, financed through the EBRD loan, helped improve district heating
services and reduce energy losses\. According to the company's reports, heat consumption
in buildings with new substations has reduced by 20%\. Heat losses in new pipes are
estimated to be 3-4 times lower, and in new substations - 9 times lower\.
The EBRD loan was divided in two equal tranches of EUR 15 m\. Only the first tranche
was disbursed while the availability date of the loan expired on 15-Jan-2007\. The reason
for non-disbursing the second tranche was a condition in the loan agreement which
required the Company to enter into a Management Contract\. This was not implemented
due to disagreements among the shareholders of the company\. While the loan availability
date can be retroactively extended this is subject to progress with the privatization of the
company\.
Procurement of all contracts under the Tranche 1 of the loan was successful and the work
was completed by the end of 2006\. It included supply and installation of pre-insulated
pipes and District Heating substations\.
In addition to the loan the Bank administered grants from the Kozloduy International
Decommissioning Support Fund ("KIDS Fund") supporting investments program of
Sofia District Heating Company\. The first grant component of EUR 20m was approved at
KIDSF Assembly in 2002\. Second grant was EUR 10 m was approved in 2004\.
Support from the KIDS fund was provided also for Pernik District Heating Company\. A
EUR 10\.4 m grant is being used for the rehabilitation of steam generator No 5, the
installation of electrostatic precipitator to this steam generator and rehabilitation of 8 km
heating pipes in Pernik\. The renewed steam generator which is expected to become
operational in early 2009 will allow to make full use of the electrostatic precipitator
delivered under the WB loan\."
47
ANNEX 9\. LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
Government's District Heating Strategy (June 2000)
Project Appraisal Document (May 2003)
10 Implementation Status and Results Reports (ranging from June 2003 to June
2008)
Quarterly Financial Monitoring Reports
Annual audits of the financial statements of the Project and the entities of TS and
TP
48 | APPROVAL |
P007205 | Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
(LOAN 30020; 3002A; 3002S)
ON A Report No: 20141
LOAN
IN THE AMOUNT OF US$ 31\.5 MILLION
TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUATEMALA
FOR A SECONDARY AND REGIONAL ROAD
REHABILITATION PROJECT
June 29, 2000
Finance, Private Sector and Infrastructure Sector Management Unit
Central America Country Management Unit
Latin America and the Caribbean Region
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their
official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective 06/12/2000)
Currency Unit = Quetzal
GTQ 7\.68 =US$ 1\.00
US$ 0\.13 =GTQ 1\.00
FISCAL YEAR
January I to December 31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ADT Average Daily Traffic
CABEI Central American Bank for Economic Integration
CAS Country Assistance Strategy
COVIAL Road Maintenance Unit (Unidad de Conservaci6n Vial)
DGC General Roads Directorate (Direcci6n General de Caminos)
EA Environmental Assessment
FEGUA Guatemalan Railways (Ferrocarriles de Guatemala)
FY IBRD's Fiscal Year (July I to June 30)
GOG Government of Guatemala
HDM Highway Design and Maintenance Model
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICB International Competitive Bidding
ICR Implementation Completion Report
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
IRR Internal Rate of Return
MICIVI Ministry of Communications, Infrastructure, and Housing (Ministerio de
Comunicaciones, Infraestructuray Vivienda)
NCB National Competitive Bidding
NPV Net Present Value
NTP National Transport Plan
OPS Office of Project Services
PCU Project Coordination Unit
QAG Quality Assurance Group
TA Technical Assistance
UCD Concessioning Unit (Unidad de Concesiones y Desincorporaci6n)
UNDP United Nations Development Program
VOC Vehicle Operating Costs
Vice President: David de Ferranti
Country Unit Director: Donna Dowsett-Coirolo
Sector Director: Danny Leipziger
Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Guillermo Ruan
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CONTENTS
Page No
1\. Project Data 1
2\. Principal Performance Ratings 1
3\. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2
4\. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 5
5\. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 9
6\. Sustainability 10
7\. Bank and Borrower Performance 10
8\. Lessons Leamed 12
9\. Partner Comments 13
Annex 1 Key Performance Indicators 20
Annex 2 Project Costs and Financing 23
Annex 3 Economic Costs and Benefits 26
Annex 4 Bank Inputs 27
Annex 5 Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 29
Annex 6 Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 30
Annex 7 List of Supporting Documents 31
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the
performance of their official duties\. Its contents may not be otherwise disclosed without
World Bank authorization\.
I
Project ID: P007205 Project Name: SCNDRY® RD RHB
Team Leader: Guillermo Ruan TL Unit: LCSFT
ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: June 29, 2000
1\. Project Data
Name: SECONDARY & REGIONAL L/C Number: 30020; 3002A; 3002S
ROADS REHABILITATION
Country/Department: GUATEMALA Region: Latin America and
Caribbean Region
Sector/subsector: TR - Rural Roads
KEY DATES
Original Revised/Actual
PCD: 03/25/87 Effective: 11/17/93
Appraisal: 09/25/87 MTR:
Approval: 12/06/88 Closing: 06/30/98 12/30/99
Borrower/Implementing REP\. OF GUATEMALA (MIN\. OF FIN\.)/MICIVI/DGC
Agency:
STAFF Current At Appraisal
Vice President: David de Ferranti S\. Shahid Husain
Country Manager: D-M Dowsett-Coirolo George Park
Sector Manager: Jeffrey Gutman Ricardo Halperin (Div\. Chief)
Team Leader at ICR: Guillermo Ruan Pedro Giraldes
ICR Primary Author: Mahendra Lal (Consultant)
2\. Principal Performance Ratings
(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely,
HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)
Outcome: S
Sustainability: HL
Institutional Development Impact: H
Bank Performance: S
Borrower Performance: S
QAG (if available) ICR
Quality at Entry: S
Project at Risk at Any Time: No
I
3\. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry
3\.1 Original Objective\.
The main objectives of the project were: (a) to preserve and strengthen the administrative and
operational capabilities of the General Roads Directorate (DGC) initiated under the previous Bank
Loan, 1846-GU; (b) to rehabilitate and maintain damaged secondary and regional roads of key
economic importance; (c) to promote the role of the private sector in the execution of public works;
and (d) to enhance the capabilities of the Ministry of Communications, Infrastructure and Housing
(MICIVI) for transport planning and policy-making\.
The Project Objectives were consistent with the Government's broad macro-economic objectives and
were supportive of the significant changes and improvements the Government of Guatemala was
implementing at the time of Appraisal and Reformulation of the project\.
3\.2 Revised Objective:
Although the Loan was appraised in September 1987, and approved by the Board in December 1988,
there was a lag of nearly five years between appraisal and the start of project implementation and it
was only signed on May 21, 1993 due to an overall suspension of disbursements to Guatemala\. Upon
resumption of Bank activities in Guatemala, the project was reformulated and substantial changes
were made to the project scope to reflect revised priorities that had emerged in the intervening period\.
However the concept and objectives of the project remained unchanged\.
3\.3 Original Components:
The project was estimated to cost a total of US$49\.1 million (July 1988 prices) including contingency
allowances\. The Loan of US$31\.5 million would finance 95% of the foreign exchange component of
the project (67% of the total project cost) and government counterpart funding would provide for the
balance amounting to US$17\.6 million, comprising US$16\.1 million of local costs and US$1\.5 million
of mostly indirect foreign exchange costs\.
The project comprised the following original components:
Component Total Cost Bank Loan
(US$million) (US$million)
Secondary Road Rehabilitation and Improvement\. This covered Civil 13\.8 8\.3
Works for 389 km of earth roads, construction supervision for these
works and detailed engineering for 590 km of earth roads\.
Regional Road Rehabilitation and Strengthening Comprising civil 17\.4 10\.4
works for 183 km of paved roads, construction supervision for these
works, and detailed engineering for 200 km of paved roads\.
Construction of Bridges for Secondary Roads (500 m)\. This was to 1\.8 1\.1
replace old wooden bridges\.
2
Road Maintenance and Miscellaneous Equipment\. Covering earth 6\.1 5\.8
moving machinery, transport vehicles, computers and, laboratory
equipment, etc\.
Training Program\. Training of, managers, professionals and 1\.0 0\.2
technicians through seminars and study visits\. The component
included training material and equipment\.
Technical Assistance and Studies\. Including setting up the HDM-III 1\.8 1\.1
Highway Model and the development of the National Transport Plan\.
Contingencies 7\.2 4\.6
TOTAL COST 49\.1 31\.5
3\.4 Revised Components:
Upon resumption of Bank activities in Guatemala, UNDP consultants were retained to work with the
Government and the Bank in the reformulation of the original project\. The Government indicated that
it wished to maintain the project objectives and the loan amount unchanged to avoid reconsideration
by the Guatemalan Congress and further implementation delays\. The Government also wanted to
change the original design concept of the secondary road component to make it consistent with the
government's new policy of upgrading the design standard for key secondary roads, and also to take
into account a severe deterioration of some of the secondary roads during the five years since initial
Board approval in 1988\.
In line with that, the Government's approach was that rather than limiting the works to be performed
on these roads to an average investment per km of US$30,000 (1988 prices) to cover the cost of the
reconditioning of the existing 5\.5 meter road bed with minor modifications to the horizontal and
vertical alignment, and the surfacing of the roads with a 20 cm layer of granular material, these roads
were to be upgraded by the provision of wider lanes, the addition of shoulders, the provision of
drainage, the construction/rehabilitation of bridges, and the improvement to both the vertical and
horizontal alignment and of the pavement structure including asphalt surfacing\. These improvements,
which involved a substantial change in the scope of secondary road rehabilitation and directed works
at paved rather than unpaved roads, made the project more effective and were expected to translate
into costs ranging from US$250,000 to US$300,000 per km (1993 prices)\. The proposed design
concept was reviewed by the UNDP consultants and the Bank and found acceptable\.
The nature of the remaining components of the original project was left unchanged\. Only the length of
road to be rehabilitated under the Regional Road Rehabilitation and Strengthening component was
reduced to account for the additional road deterioration and natural price increase since the project was
appraised in 1987\.
The reformulation of the project with the help of the UNDP consultants was completed in May 1993
and the corresponding Loan agreement was signed on May 21, 1993\. The project became effective on
November 17, 1993\.
3
The revised project and component costs were estimated as follows:
Component Total Cost Bank Loan
(US$ million) (US$ million)
Secondary Road Rehabilitation and Improvement\. This covered 14\.1 8\.5
Civil Works for 38 km of paved secondary roads, construction
supervision for same, and detailed engineering for 387 km\.
Regional Road Rehabilitation and Strengthening\. Comprising 22\.0 13\.2
civil works for 97 km of paved roads, construction supervision
for these works, and detailed engineering for 125 km\.
Construction of Steel Bridges for Secondary Roads (415 m)\. To 1\.5 0\.9
replace worn out wooden bridges
Road Maintenance and Miscellaneous Equipment\. Covering 4\.0 3\.9
earth moving equipment, transport vehicles, laboratory
equipment, etc\.
Training Program\. Covering equipment, training courses for 1\.0 0\.2
professionals, instructors and study visits\.
Technical Assistance and Studies\. Including the HDM-III 2\.0 1\.8
Highway Model and the development of the National Transport
Plan\.
Contingencies 4\.5 3\.0
TOTAL COST 49\.1 31\.5
An amount of approximately US$5\.9 million was canceled from the Bank Loan in March 1995, due to
misprocurement and subproject deletion arising from the cancellation, reducing the Bank Loan to
US$25\.6 million and the project cost to US$38\.9 million (see Para\. 5\.2)\. The Loan was closed on
December 31, 1999 and a balance of US$365,114\.24 was canceled on June 2, 2000\.
3\.5 Quality at Entry:
Satisfactory\. The quality of the project at entry after the reformulation was satisfactory\. The principal
components of the project were developed jointly by the Borrower and the Bank with the assistance of
the UNDP, and the project was updated and reformulated after the lending and disbursement hiatus of
the 1988-93 period, also with the participation of UNDP consultants\. The quality at entry was
considerably enhanced by the assistance of INDP and the GOG's commitment to the project\.
4
4\. Achievement of Objective and Outputs
4\.1 Outcome/achievement of objectives\.
Satisfactory\. The project was to a large extent adequately carried out and merits a rating of satisfactory
according to standards prevailing at the time of Appraisal\. These standards were not changed when
reformulation of the project took place in 1993 (Para\. 3\.2)\. The full implementation of the investments
and the Plan of Action (Para\. 4\.2) helped in the achievement of the project objectives\. Considering the
four objectives one by one, the following is noted:
(a) Institutional Efficiency of the General Roads Directorate (Direcci6n General de Caminos - DGC):
To implement the project, a Program Coordination Unit (PCU) was set up in the DGC, and later
integrated in the DGC, as the coordinating unit for external financing\. It is currently in charge of the
development administration and implementation of all projects that have an element of external
funding\. The training program of the project was adequately implemented (Para\. 4\.2 ) and the
Technical Assistance program produced good results in as much as it enabled DGC to improve its
work of design, studies and execution and supervision of works\. Likewise, the introduction of the
World Bank Highway Design and Maintenance Model (HDM) helped greatly in the formulation of the
pluriannual investment programs\. The development and implementation of a project monitoring and
financial administration systems, and the strengthening of supervision procedures enhanced DGC's
capacity in project administration\.
(b) The Rehabilitation of the Secondary and Regional Roads is dealt with in greater detail in Para 4\.2
below\. The program outlined in parts A, B, and C of the project in regard to the rehabilitation of the
roads was fully implemented and the necessary road maintenance equipment acquired and put into
commission, greatly improving the number of roads in good condition (see sub-para (c) )\.
(c) Promotion of Private Sector in the Execution of Public Works: The project provided for the
outsourcing of road maintenance activities, for which the Government launched a country-wide effort
to involve the private sector\. In 1997, a road fund was started, with money received from the fuel
taxes, to pay for maintenance activities and later COVIAL (Unidad de Conservacion Vial) was created
to manage the fund\. One hundred percent of the paved road network and 60% of the unpaved network
is now maintained by the private sector\. As a result, 89% of the paved highway network is now in
good condition as compared to 20% at appraisal\. Also, following the recommendations of the National
Transport Plan that was prepared under the loan, the Unidad de Concesiones y Desincorporacion
(UCD) was created in MICIVI for the concession of highways to the private sector, and the first
contract assigned to the private sector for a new highway was for the Palin - Escuintla - Puerto Quetzal
section\. Thus, both in maintenance and new works considerable progress has been made in the
incorporation of the private sector\.
(d) Enhancement of MICIVI's Capabilities for Transport Planning and Policy-making: The
implementation of this project took place during a period of economic reforms and modernization of
the state aimed principally at reducing government activity and increasing the role of the private
sector\. This resulted in the gradual redefinition of the ministry's principal functions\. As far as the
transport sector is concerned, and particularly the highways, the MICIVI remained, through the DGC,
5
responsible for the maintenance, rehabilitation and new construction of highways, albeit through
implementation by private contractors\.
In the transport sector, in general, action under the project was concentrated on: (i) preparation of the
National Transport Plan including development of appropriate methodologies for analysis and
planning and policy-making; (ii) development of private sector participation in road maintenance
activities; (iii) institutional development to strengthen sector coordination in a multimodal framework;
and (iv) environmental assessment of transport programs\.
4\.2 Outputs by components:
When the project was initially appraised, Guatemala had a well developed primary and secondary road
network which, however, as a result of aging, inadequate control of axle loads and deferred
maintenance, had reached an advanced stage of deterioration\. At the time only about 20% of the
network was in good condition\. The Secondary and Regional Road Rehabilitation project aimed at
improvement of the condition of the road network\.
Component A - Secondary Road Rehabilitation and Improvement
The work included engineering designs and economic/environmental studies for about 342 km as
against 387 km foreseen after reformulation and the rehabilitation of approximately 54 km as against
38 km foreseen after reformulation\. The 54 km included the rehabilitation of San Juan Ostuncalco
section of National Road 01 (RNO1) and the improvement of some sections of other roads within the
area of influence of RNO 1\. Details of the works planned and the works actually executed are given in
Annex 1\. The major change here was the deletion of the Escuintla-Antigua section of the RN14 due to
resettlement and right-of-way problems, and the inclusion in the program of the San Juan Ostuncalco-
San Marcos\.
Component B - Regional Road Rehabilitation and Strengthening
Engineering designs and economic evaluation were completed for nearly 750 km, i\.e\. about 625 km in
excess of the 125 km planned after reformulation, whereas the rehabilitation of the highways was done
for 78 km against 97 km planned after reformulation\. The reduction in the rehabilitation work came
about due to the cancellation of the rehabilitation of the Los Encuentros - Cuatro Caminos because of
misprocurement (Para\. 5\.2)\. No other change was introduced to this component except for the
improvement of small road sections within the area of influence of the main rehabilitation works
financed under this component; i\.e\. the section Popoya-Nahualate of the main road corridor (CA2W)
that connects Guatemala with Mexico and El Salvador\.
Component C - Bridge Construction
This component covered the replacement of old and worn out wooden bridges whereby 420 meters of
bridges were installed against 415 meters planned after reformulation\. The new bridges were
constructed by private contractors and supervised by the construction division of the DGC\.
6
Component D - Road Maintenance and Miscellaneous Equipment
The planned procurement of road maintenance equipment was executed in its entirety with the
exception of the laboratory equipment and some miscellaneous equipment which was not procured
because the related activities were transferred to the private sector\. Instead, some reallocation of funds
was done to procure spare parts and handling equipment necessitated by the damage caused by
Hurricane Mitch\. The road maintenance equipment needs were analyzed by Gitec of Germany and
these were procured by International Competitive Bidding\.
Component E - Training Program
This component which included training of professionals, seminars, postgraduate courses abroad, etc\.
was adequately implemented although only about US$0\.4 million out of US$1\.0 million set aside for
the purpose was spent\. This happened because too large a proportion of the funds were to come from
the Government (80%) and there was a shortage of Government funds\. Furthermore, other agencies,
particularly IDB, stepped in to provide training programs which were fully financed by its loan
reducing the immediate need for Government funding\.
Component F - Technical Assistance and Studies
In preparing the reformulated project, DGC developed, in collaboration with the UNDP consultants
and the Bank, a revised Action Plan to be implemented during project execution, covering a series of
measures for transport sector management\. The Technical Assistance and Studies component was
designed to support the revised Action Plan (Annex IA)\. For the administration of the consultant
services, DGC used the UNDP's Office of Project Services (OPS) to serve as an administrative agent,
for the selection, contracting, and payment of consultants, while the Bank carried out the technical
supervision\. Under this component, consultant services were engaged in two main groups:
(a) Improvement of Highway Management and Road Planning capabilities;
(b) Preparation of the National Transport Plan (NTP) to improve transport sector
management capabilities\.
Under (a), the main actions envisaged under improvement of institutional efficiency were targeted at:
(i) increasing the effectiveness of road sub-sector entities to manage investment programs;
(ii) increasing the efficiency of road maintenance; and (iii) personnel training\. The following actions
helped the achievement of these objectives: setting up of the Program Coordination Unit (PCU) in the
DGC; conducting studies for road rehabilitation, bridges, etc\.; setting up the HDM; moving from road
maintenance by force account to maintenance by contract for 100% and 40% of the paved and
unpaved networks, respectively; setting up a road fund for maintenance financing; and implementing a
project monitoring system and a financial administration system within DGC\.
Under (b), the main actions under transport sector management covered the preparation of the
National Transport Plan including recommendations for the medium term (1996-2000) and for the
long term (2000-2015)\. Side by side, the introduction of the HDM improved the formulation of the
pluriannual investment programs and monitoring procedures (see also Para\. 4\.5)\.
7
The project, originally scheduled (after reformulation) for completion on June 30, 1997, was extended
by two years to June 1999, and finally, because of Hurricane Mitch, to December 31, 1999\.
4\.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:
An ex-post evaluation of the two main road sections financed under the Loan (i\.e\. Popoya Nahualate
and San Juan Ostuncalco-San Marcos) was carried out following the completion of the works and the
results of this evaluation were compared with the forecast included in the project refornulation
document\. The results of this evaluation are presented in the table below\.
NPV NPV
Road Sections IRR IRR Forecast Actual
Forecast Actual US$M US$M
Regional Roads Rehabilitation and Strengthening 33\.1 67\.5 10\.6 46\.4
CA2W - Popoya-Nahualate
Secondary Road Rehabilitation and Improvement 12\.7 31\.9 0\.2 8\.0
RNO1 - San Juan Ostuncalco-San Marcos
Traffic in both roads increased at rates higher than forecasted at the time of project reformulation\. The
average daily traffic (ADT) on Popoya-Nahualate reached 5500 at project completion which translates
in an annual increase of 7% over the 1992 traffic volume\. In the case of San Juan Ostuncalco-San
Marcos the annual increase was 10 % and the 1999 ADT reached 1800 vehicles\. In addition to the
specific road improvements, three other factors have contributed to the high traffic increase on these
roads: the overall improvement of the road network (additional trips were generated); the signing of
the Peace Accords (road travel became safer); and the signing of trade agreements with Mexico\. A
recalculation of the IRR with updated traffic volumes and costs, gives a revised figure estimated at
67\.5% (NPV at 12% US$46\.38 million) for CA2W Road Rehabilitation Section Popoya-Nauhalate,
and 31\.9% (NPV at 12% 7\.99 US$ million) for the Road Rehabilitation Section San Juan-Ostuncalco-
San Marcos\. This compares very favorably with the forecasted figures shown in the above table\.
The economic benefits considered in both projects included mainly the reduction of vehicular
operating costs\. The significant benefits related to future maintenance costs were taken into account\.
Traffic volumes were based on actual counts taken after project completion\. The costs considered for
the economic evaluation were based on the final contracting costs for each project, which included
direct costs, work supervision costs, and environmental mitigation costs\.
4\.4 Financial rate of return:
N/A
4\.5 Institutional development impact:
Highly Satisfactory\. The institutional development in this project, reviewed earlier in Para\. 4\.1
(achievement of objective) in greater detail, was two-fold: First the DGC was strengthened by the
creation of the Project Coordination Unit, which was later integrated in the DGC as the Coordinating
8
Unit for external financing\. The DGC also introduced a system of financial administration and cost
accounting which improved and streamlined cost control procedures with the aid of computers\.
Secondly, the introduction of the HDM and the preparation and implementation of the National
Transport Plan helped the institutional development of the MICIVI in as much as transport planning in
general was placed on a sound footing, while at the same time encouraging private sector participation
road rehabilitation and maintenance works\. The National Transport Plan covers the period up to the
year 2015 and includes, in addition to the road subsector, aspects related to the privatization of the
Guatemalan Railways (FEGUA) and the ports of Quetzal and Puerto Barrios\. Overall, the institutional
development effect of this project was substantial and the results, highly satisfactory\.
5\. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome
Three major factors affected the implementation of this project\. The first was the inordinate delay in
the implementation of the project following the appraisal (see Para\. 5\.1)\. The second was the
cancellation of part of the loan due to misprocurement (Para\. 5\.2)\. The third factor which was outside
the control of the Government or the implementing agency, and which influenced the project towards
the later stages of its execution, was Hurricane Mitch, which occurred in late October/early November
1998 and necessitated substantial changes in the project (see Para\. 5\.3)\.
S\. ] Factors generally subject to government control:
The delay in implementing the project following the appraisal was caused initially by the excessive
time taken in obtaining the Government's (Congress) approval to the Bank Project; but in effect the
most important cause of the delay was the fact that overall disbursements to Guatemala were
suspended following the Government's failure to service its debt obligations\. This situation was
rectified after a delay of almost five years, during which period the condition of the roads further
deteriorated, necessitating a reformulation of the project with the aid of UTNDP consultants (Paras\. 3\.3
and 3\.4)\.
5\.2 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:
In July 1994 the Bank, on the request of the implementing agency MICIVI issued a no objection to the
latter's recommendation for the award of the contract for rehabilitation of the highway section Los
Encuentros - Cuatro Caminos to the lowest bidder\. About three months later, MICIVI notified the
Bank of its revised decision to award the contract to the third ranked bidder for a larger amount\. The
Bank was neither consulted nor informed of the decision to revise the original award\. The Bank
reviewed the reasons and documentation presented by MICIVI and concluded that the alleged reasons
were not justified, and indicated that this was an avoidable case of misprocurement and the
corresponding amount of US$5\.9 million in the loan would be canceled\. The loan amount was
therefore reduced to US$25\.6 million and the relevant subproject deleted from the project\.
5\.3 Factors outside the control of Government or implementing agency:
Hurricane Mitch damaged substantially the highway system of Guatemala and created the need for
additional expert works and repairs to machinery and equipment, requiring re-allocation of loan funds
and the final postponement of the loan closing date to December 31, 1999 (Para\. 4\.2)\.
9
5\.4 Costs andfinancing:
Project cost details are given in Annex 2a (Project Costs by Component), Annex 2b (Project Costs by
Procurement) and Annex 2c (Project Financing by Component)\. The final cost of the project is
US$38\.97 million against US$49\.1 million estimated at appraisal (and reformulation)\. The Bank loan
contributed to US$25\.35 million of the project cost against US$31\.5 million estimated at appraisal
(and reformulation)\. As for the project cost split in respect of method of procurement, the major
portion remained International Competitive Bidding (US$32\.48 million or 83%), the remaining being
National Competitive Bidding which accounted for the remaining cost of US$6\.5 million (17%)\. The
major reason for the reduction in project cost was the elimination of the Los Encuentros - Cuatro
Caminos component from the project (Para\. 5\.2)\.
6\. Sustainability
6\.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:
Highly likely\. The objectives of the project were achieved in a large measure (Para\. 4\.1), and the
project had a sustainable effect on transport investment planning\. The DGC was strengthened in the
field of planning and in addition to the highways rehabilitated, engineering designs were completed
for over 580 km in addition to the targets foreseen in the reformulated project\. The utilization of the
private sector has been firmly established, and at the time of completion of the project, 100% of the
major road works are executed by the private sector as well as almost 75% of the road maintenance
works\. The capacity for planning and policy making of the MICIVI was improved with the
development of the National Transport Plan for the period 1995-2015 and with the implementation of
the HDM-III model\.
6\.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:
Transition arrangements to regular operation are well in place with the (i) the development of the
planning capacities of DGC for the road sub-sector and the MICIVI for the Transport sector, and (ii)
the effective utilization of the private sector in public works and maintenance works\. It is however,
essential that the process of institutional strengthening of the DGC and MICIVI be maintained and
continued, as also the effectiveness of the Fondo Vial, for highway maintenance\.
7\. Bank and Borrower Performance
Bank
7\.1 Lending\.
Satisfactory\. The project originated from the lessons learned from the previous project (Loan 1846-
GU) pointing to the principal objectives being strengthening of the capability of DGC and MICIVI as
well as the implementation of a rehabilitation program for the road network consistent with the
economic changes facing the country\. The Bank collaborated with the Government of Guatemala in
the preparation of the project together with the UNDP consultants, and this work included: (i) the
10
evaluation of the technical, economic and environmental effects of the various sub-projects and the
development of the Action Plan to maximize the impact of the project; and (ii) the Bank
encouragement to the personnel of DGC and MICIVI to partake in training courses in procurement,
disbursement and administrative work to strengthen the abilities of the staff and managers\.
7\.2 Supervision:
Satisfactory\. With over 150 staff weeks (see Annex 4b) spent on supervision, the Bank appears to have
spent adequate manpower on supervision, and supervision reports indicate considerable attention to
detail during field missions\. Bank staff maintained the integrity of the project through the initial delays
and its reformulation\. Moreover, the Bank particularly helped the Governnent of Guatemala after
Hurricane Mitch in reallocation of funds to rehabilitate damaged machinery and to deepen some of the
ongoing contracts to take care of the damages sustained during the hurricane\. In addition, the Bank
made 3 amendments to the Action Plan on the basis of the recommendations of the technical
assistance for the institutional strengthening of the DGC\. The Bank also assisted actively in the
preparation of information for the Implementation Completion Report\.
Borrower
7\.3 Preparation
Satisfactory\. The participation of the Borrower during the preparation of the project was substantial,
and the assistance of consultants was liberally utilized in analyzing projects\. The Borrower's
contribution in project preparation was satisfactory\. During the later stages of project implementation
there is evidence of even deeper participation by the DGC and the various agencies of the
Government\.
7\.4 Government Implementation Performance
Satisfactory\. The Government pushed for the achievement of the objectives of the project and put its
weight behind the implementation of the institutional changes and privatization of works and
maintenance of roads\. Government procedures in approval of the project and loan however proved
dilatory and resulted in delays in the approval of the project and in the need for project reformulation
after a hiatus of nearly five years (Para\. 5\.1)
7\.5 Government Implementation Performance
Satisfactory\. The Government pushed for the achievement of the objectives of the project and put its
weight behind the implementation of the institutional changes and the privatization of works and
maintaining of roads\.
7\.6 Implementing Agency
Satisfactory\. Generally, the project was well executed by the Borrower, and competently reported,
with detailed reports\. The misprocurement case (Para\. 5\.2) is attributed by the Borrower to
unfamiliarity with Bank International Competitive Bidding (ICB) procedures\. The seriousness of
11
changing an award unilaterally by the Government, however, after a No Objection from the Bank to
award the contract to a different bidder represented institutional weaknesses and warranted a
declaration of misprocurement\. The cancellation of the relevant portion of the loan and the deletion of
the sub-project concerned from the project were, therefore, well justified\.
7\. 7 Overall Borrower Performance
Satisfactory\. Participation of the Borrower in the implementation of the project progressively
strengthened as project progressed, through: (i) the experience gained by working with consultants;
(ii) some of the training courses imparted by the Bank; (iii) the institutional strengthening of the
DGC; (iv) the development of the National Transport Plan; and (v) progression in private sector
participation\. Overall, therefore, the Borrower's performance can be regarded as satisfactory\.
8\. Lessons Learned
The lessons learned as a result of the implementation of the project can be summarized as follows:
Timing of Impacts of Institutional Reforms vs\. Physical Investments
The results of the investments were visible almost immediately following the completion of the works\.
Traffic volumes increased at rates significantly higher than those forecasted during project
reformulation\. On the other hand, the results of the institutional reforms, as expected, have taken
longer to appear, as the proposed changes had to go through a process of acceptance and
understanding by project managers so that they could be applied properly\. However the impact of the
institutional changes, although slow in taking effect, has been increasingly positive (Para\. 4\.2)\.
Level of Management Support Required for Effective Institutional Change
The time required to implement institutional reforms under the project confirms the need for total
support from the upper level management and the govemment to the institutional strengthening
process\. Although the support provided by the MICIVI and the DGC is considered adequate, it was
evident during project implementation that any attempt to improve or modify current processes and
practices requires the total support of the authorities in order to facilitate the implementation of new
standards, to identify strategies and adequate policies for action, and above all, to minimize the
negative effects of the changes in procedures and practices\.
Private Sector Participation
The outsourcing of road maintenance work to the private sector was eminently successful in this
project\. This, together with the improvements in the administration of the road network achieved
under the project, resulted in a rapid increase in the percentage of the paved network in good
condition, from 20% to 89%\. A significant feature of the outsourcing of road maintenance activities
(Para\. 4\.1) is that this change was accomplished directly, without any tentative experimentation, in a
positive manner that brought about quick results\.
12
9\. Partner Comments
(a) Borrower/implementing agency:
SUMMARY OF BORROWER'S REPORT
The Spanish text below is followed by an extract in English\.
PROGRAMA DE REHABILITACION DE CAMINOS SECUNDARIOS Y REGIONALES
(Prestamo BIRF 3002-GU)
Introducci6n
La ejecuci6n del proyecto tuvo lugar en un periodo de reformas economicas y modernizaci6n del
Estado, en el que la principal actividad del Gobierno estuvo dirigida a la reducci6n del tamafno del
Estado, concretandose a realizar inversiones publicas, dejando las areas financieras y productivas al
sector privado de la economia, privatizando, la Empresa Nacional de Aviaci6n -AVIATECA-, la
empresa de Ferrocarriles de Guatemala -FEGUA-, la Empresa Electrica Guatemalteca -EGGSA- y la
Empresa Guatemalteca de Telecomunicaciones -GUATEL-, que por sus caracteristicas de ser
empresas estatales altamente rentables eran demandadas urgentemente por el sector privado\.
De igual forma, la tendencia del Estado de reducir el gasto puiblico, motiv6 a que el entonces
Ministerio de Comunicaciones, Transporte y Obras Puiblicas, redefiniera sus funciones y actividades
principales, siendo en la actualidad el Ministerio responsable del sector Comunicaciones,
Infraestructura y Vivienda\.
Con relaci6n al sector Transporte, particularmente el sector Transporte por Carretera, el Ministerio de
Comunicaciones, Infraestructura y Vivienda (MICIVI), a traves de la Direcci6n General de Caminos
(DGC), es el responsable del mantenimiento, construcci6n, mejoramiento y rehabilitaci6n de la red de
carreteras en el pais, formulando estrategias y politicas de desarrollo, pudiendose mencionar que
durante el iltimo quinquenio la politica de desarrollo estuvo dirigida a motivar la participaci6n del
sector privado en la ejecuci6n de las actividades de mantenimiento rutinario, ampliaci6n y
rehabilitaci6n de la red vial\.
Objetivos del Programa
En el entorno indicado, los principales objetivos del Programa estaban dirigidos a: (a) fortalecer la
capacidad operativa y de gesti6n de la DGC; (b) rehabilitar y mejorar caminos secundarios y
regionales deteriorados; (c) promover el papel del sector privado en la ejecuci6n de obras ptblicas; y
(d) asistir al MICIVI para mejorar su capacidad de planificaci6n y formulaci6n de politicas en materia
de transporte\.
Es importante indicar que los objetivos del Programa fueron alcanzados en gran porcentaje,
pudiendose mencionar que a) se fortaleci6 la capacidad operativa y de gesti6n de la DGC,
particularmente en las areas de planificaci6n (se obtuvo un banco de proyectos y estudios que fueron
sometidos a diferentes instituciones financieras para su ejecuci6n; 580 Km\. de disefio de ingenieria
13
fueron obtenidos por encima de la meta original), b) se rehabilit6 la meta en kilometros propuesta
originalmente en materia de caminos secundarios y regionales, c) el sector privado ejecuta el 100% de
las actividades de obra puiblica y casi el 75% de las actividades de mantenimiento; d) Se mejor6 la
capacidad de planificaci6n y formulacion de politicas del MICIVI (Se cuenta con un Plan Maestro
Nacional de Transporte para el periodo 1996-2015 y su actualizaci6n con un Plan de Desarrollo Vial
2000 - 2010)\.
Principales experiencias y resultados obtenidos durante la implantaci6n del Programa
El Programa facilit6 la rehabilitaci6n y mejoramiento de aproximadamente 130 Km\. de carreteras
regionales y secundarias, asi como la construcci6n de mas de 400 metros de puentes en caminos
secundarios y terciarios, provocando un impacto econ6mico positivo, representado principalmente en
la reducci6n de los costos de operaci6n vehicular y la provisi6n de una permanente transitabilidad en
regiones de extrema pobreza, facilitando el ingreso de los principales servicios bAsicos como
educaci6n y salud, e incrementado las posibilidades de un desarrollo integral y sostenido de las
poblaciones beneficiadas\. El Programa puede calificarse como "satisfactorio", habiendose alcanzado
la mayoria de los objetivos propuestos originalmente, pudiendose resumir los principales resultados
obtenidos, de la manera siguiente:
a) Precio de combustibles y sostenibilidad del mantenimiento: Con base en los resultados
propuestos por la Asistencia Tecnica dirigida a la implantaci6n de un sistema de administraci6n del
mantenimiento vial y de equipos, incluida en la presente operaci6n\., el Gobiemo implement6 un fondo
privativo para el mantenimiento vial financiado con recursos permanentes provenientes del impuesto a
los combustibles, asi como la Unidad de Conservaci6n Vial (COVIAL), encargada de administrar
dichos recursos, lo cual permiti6 elevar el mantenimiento de la red vial a niveles que superan los
objetivos fijados en el Programa en ejecuci6n\. COVIAL cuenta con un presupuesto anual asignado al
mantenimiento vial que alcanz6 en 1998 los US$80 Millones\. Estos recursos permitieron que, en
1998, el estado de la condici6n superficial presentara que s6lo el 11% de la red vial pavimentada este
en mala condici6n mientras que el restante 89% se presenta en 6ptimas condiciones\. Por aparte, la
creaci6n de COVIAL ha coadyuvado a la generaci6n de nuevas fuentes de empleo\. Para 1999 se han
contratado mas de trescientas empresas privadas de mantenimiento, generando en el afio un total de
mas de 6,000 empleos directos y 30,000 empleos indirectos\. El total de empleos por el Fondo Vial
desde su inicio es de 80,000 empleos generados\.
b) Incorporacion del sector privado: La totalidad del presupuesto asignado a COVIAL es utilizado
por contrataci6n con el sector privado, como resultado de lo cual el 88% del total de egresos por
mantenimiento en 1998 fue realizado mediante contratos con el sector privado\.
Por otra parte, es importante indicar que con base en las recomendaciones del Plan Maestro Nacional
de Transporte formulado en 1996 en el marco del Programa, se cre6 la Unidad de Concesiones y
Desincorporaci6n (UCD) del MICIVI, que tiene a su cargo el programa de concesiones para la
incorporaci6n del sector privado en la construcci6n de carreteras\. A la fecha, se ha otorgado la
concesi6n de la autopista Palin-Escuintla y se ha propuesto iniciar una segunda fase del Programa\.
c) Planeaci6n y programaci6n de Carreteras: Como resultado de la implementaci6n del modelo
HDM para asistir en la formulaci6n de programas de inversi6n vial plurianuales bajo restricciones
presupuestarias, la DGC ha desarrollado una buena capacidad en la evaluaci6n economica de
proyectos de carreteras, asi como en la formulaci6n de programas de mantenimiento\. El trabajo de
14
planificaci6n ha sido expandido y fortalecido en las areas de formulaci6n de programas plurianuales
de desembolso, acompafiados por el desarrollo de sistemas de programaci6n y seguimiento en soporte
al mejor uso de los recursos\. Los estudios de ingenieria preparados con fondos del Prestamo han sido
ejecutados en un 90% con financiamiento de Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo y del Banco
Centroamericano de Integraci6n Econ6mica\.
d) Sistema de Seguimiento de Proyectos: Es importante indicar que gracias a la implementaci6n de
un sistema adecuado de seguimiento de proyectos, asi como a las diferentes politicas y estrategias
propuestas durante el uiltimo quinquenio, la DGC ha implantado en mas de un 80% los diferentes
planes de inversi6n propuestos por el Plan Maestro Nacional de Transporte para el periodo 1995-2015,
por lo que en julio de 1999 se formul6 un nuevo Plan de Desarrollo Vial para el periodo 2,000 - 2,010,
mismo que contempla una actualizaci6n de los planes de inversi6n previstos, al tiempo de dirigir la
politica y estrategia de inversi6n en materia vial, el apoyo a la consolidaci6n de los diferentes
compromisos adquiridos con la firma de la paz (diciembre 1996) y el combate a la pobreza\.
e) Eficiencia Institucional de la DGC: Con el prop6sito de dar cumplimiento a lo expuesto en el
Convenio de Prestamo BIRE 3002-GU, relacionado con la administracion del Programa, en 1993 se
crea dentro de la estructura organica de la Instituci6n, una Unidad Coordinadora de Programas que
mas tarde vendria a ser la Coordinadora General de Financiamiento Externo, misma que en la
actualidad tiene a su cargo la gesti6n, administraci6n y ejecuci6n de los diferentes proyectos que
contemplen una porci6n de financiamiento extemo\.
Por aparte, los diferentes eventos de capacitaci6n y fortalecimiento institucional desarrollados en el
marco de la Categoria E: Capacitaci6n del presente Programa permitieron una definici6n mas estrecha
de las relaciones entre las diferentes unidades tecnicas y administrativas, definiendo responsabilidades
y procesos para coordinaci6n y seguimiento de los programas de inversiones\.
De igual forma, como resultado de la implantaci6n de las recomendaciones emanadas de la Asistencia
Tecnica para reforzar los procedimientos de la DGC para la supervisi6n de obras, la Instituci6n ha
desarrollado una adecuada capacidad para controlar la calidad de diseflo, supervisi6n y ejecuci6n de la
obra civil, con personal de la DGC Ilevando a cabo las actividades de direcci6n y supervisi6n
indirecta, mientras que se otorgan a contrataci6n la mayoria de trabajos de disefno, formulaci6n de
estudios, ejecuci6n de obras y supervisi6n\. Con la expansi6n de su programa de inversi6n y como
resultado de la exitosa gesti6n de financiamiento extemo, la DGC ha utilizado firmas consultoras y
contratistas privadas a nivel nacional e intemacional, para la preparaci6n de disefios y supervisi6n de
contratos de construcci6n en la mayoria de sus proyectos, especialmente aquellos financiados por las
instituciones financieras internacionales, habiendo adquirido vasta experiencia en la utilizaci6n de
modelos para la formulaci6n de documentos de licitaci6n y contratos\.
Con relaci6n a las actividades de administraci6n financiera, en complemento a la implementaci6n del
Sistema de Informaci6n y Administraci6n Financiera (SIAF) propuesto por el Banco Mundial a nivel
nacional, durante 1999 la DGC implement6 un sistema de administraci6n general financiera, mismo
que permite llevar adecuada y satisfactoriamente una contabilidad de costos por proyecto, programa de
inversi6n y por tipo de actividad, generando la informaci6n requerida para alimentar el Programa
SIAF\. En la actualidad la Divisi6n Financiera utiliza metodos modemos para el control de costos y ha
15
sido reforzada, en el marco de ejecuci6n del Prestamo BIRF 3002-GU, con equipo de c6mputo y
miscelaneo, asi como manuales de operaci6n\.
En consideraci6n a la condici6n de la red vial, es importante indicar que la DGC cuenta con un
sistema de evaluaci6n de pavimentos desde 1997, mismo que provee de insumos para la alimentaci6n
del modelo HDM para la generaci6n de programnas de inversi6n y programas de mantenimiento
rutinario y peri6dico\.
Papel del Banco
La identificaci6n del Programa se fundament6 en las lecciones aprendidas en la anterior operaci6n del
Banco en Guatemala (Prestamo BIRF 1846-GU), habiendo dirigido los principales objetivos hacia el
fortalecimiento de la capacidad ejecutora del MICIVI y de la DGC y la implantaci6n de un Programa
de Rehabilitaci6n de la Red Vial, que tuvo como fundamento principal, la formulaci6n de un Plan
Maestro Nacional de Transporte, que permitiera determinar las principales estrategias de inversi6n de
conformidad con los cambios econ6micos que el pais estaba enfrentando\.
El Banco colabor6 con el Gobiemo de Guatemala en la preparacion del Prestamo contratando en 1992
a consultores internacionales para la reformulaci6n del Programa original\. Estos consultores apoyaron
a la DGC en la definici6n de proyectos y componentes a ser incluidos, asi como a la evaluaci6n
t6cnica, econ6mica y ambiental del Programa\. Ademas, el Banco mantuvo constante comunicaci6n
con el Prestatario, con el objeto de monitorear las acciones realizadas y actualizar el Plan de Acci6n
previsto al inicio del Programa, reorientando las actividades correspondientes, con el fin de lograr el
mayor impacto del Programa\.
En la fase inicial de la etapa de implantaci6n, el Banco promovi6 la participaci6n del personal de la
DGC y del MICIVI en diferentes cursos de entrenamiento en materia de adquisiciones, desembolsos,
procedimientos administrativos, etc\., con el objeto de fortalecer las habilidades administrativas del
personal\.
AdemAs de las diferentes misiones de seguimiento, misiones anuales de evaluaci6n y medio termino
del Programa, el Banco proporcion6 apoyo al Gobiemo de Guatemala durante la emergencia
provocada por el Huracan Mitch en octubre/noviembre de 1998, permitiendo la reorientaci6n de
fondos remanentes en las operaciones existentes, asi como la posibilidad de ampliar los contratos de
obra existentes, con el objeto de dar respuesta inmediata a los desastres provocados en la red vial\.
Para el caso del Prestamo BIRF 3002-GU, la reasignaci6n de fondos permiti6 iniciar un programa de
rehabilitaci6n del parque de maquinaria de la DGC, principalmente aquella que resultare averiada
durante la emergencia del Huracan Mitch\.
Con relacion al Plan de Acci6n, El Banco aprob6 3 enriendas al Programa, mismas que fueron
originadas con base en las recomendaciones formuladas como resultado de las diferentes asistencias
tecnicas desarrolladas para el fortalecimiento institucional de la DGC\. Finalmente, durante 1999
nuevamente se enmend6 el Programa, con el objeto de reasignar los remanentes existentes en el
Prestamo, asi como plasmar las modificaciones efectuadas en las categorias de inversi6n, como
resultado de la excepci6n aprobada por el Banco durante la emergencia de 1998 provocada por el
huracan Mitch\.
16
Papel del Prestatario
El papel del Prestatario durante la fase de preparaci6n del Programa se puede clasificar como
"satisfactoria" en virtud de que si bien es cierto hubo participaci6n de un grupo consultor que apoy6 al
Gobierno en la preparaci6n del Plan de Implantaci6n, tambien se asign6 al proyecto personal de
contraparte que particip6 conjuntamente con el grupo consultor y el Banco en la formulaci6n el
Programa, particularmente en el establecimiento de objetivos, metas y definici6n de proyectos\.
A partir de la entrada en vigencia del Prestamo y con la capacitaci6n proporcionada por el Banco, el
organismo ejecutor desarroll6 una mejor capacidad de ejecuci6n\. No obstante, se pudo observar
algunas dificultades durante la etapa de implantaci6n de los procesos de gesti6n previa a la
contrataci6n de la obra civil, representados generalmente en la inexperiencia en el manejo de los
modelos estandar del Banco para la preparaci6n de documentos de licitaci6n y contrataci6n, asi como
en el conocimiento de los procedimientos de evaluaci6n y adjudicaci6n de obras, situaci6n que motiv6
al Banco, posterior a diferentes comunicaciones indicando la no conveniencia en la aplicaci6n de
procedimientos locales para la evaluaci6n de concursos intemacionales, a desobligar una porci6n del
prestarno dirigida a la rehabilitaci6n de obra civil sobre la ruta Centroamericana 1, en el tramo: Los
Encuentros - 4 Caminos\.
Con la experiencia anterior, el Prestatario dirigi6 sus esfuerzos a la especializaci6n del personal que
tendria bajo su responsabilidad la administraci6n e implantaci6n del Programa, habiendose obtenido
en los posteriores procesos de adquisici6n mejores resultados en la contrataci6n de bienes y servicios,
representados en la reducci6n de tiempos de a) preparaci6n de documentos de licitaci6n, b) evaluaci6n
y adjudicaci6n de ofertas, c) contrataci6n de proyectos\. De igual forma, la experiencia ganada con las
operaciones anteriores, permiti6 elevar el nivel en la formulaci6n de Terminos de Referencia para
contrataci6n de servicios de consultoria y preparaci6n de especificaciones tecnicas para la adquisici6n
de equipo\.
Resumen de resultados
El Prestamo 3002 apoy6 el desarrollo de nuevas politicas en el sector transporte por carretera,
asistiendo al MICIVI y a la DGC en la formulacion de planes de inversi6n a corto, mediano y largo
plazo, integrando las actividades de planeaci6n, gesti6n y contrataci6n de bienes y servicios y
fortaleciendo los procesos de supervisi6n de obra civil y evaluaci6n, monitoreo y mitigaci6n del
impacto ambiental\.
En general, los objetivos propuestos en el Informe de Evaluaci6n de Proyecto (Staff Appraisal Report)
de octubre 1988, fueron alcanzados\. La obra civil ejecutada contribuy6 a la expansi6n y rehabilitaci6n
de la red vial nacional\. Un analisis econ6mico de los proyectos de obra civil ejecutados han mostrado
un impacto positivo, con tasas internas de retorno por encima de las estimadas originalmente\.
Operaciones futuras
Con el objeto de asegurar la sostenibilidad del proyecto, se requiere proporcionar un seguimiento a las
acciones emprendidas, pudiendose observar las recomendaciones siguientes: a) continuar con el
17
fortalecimiento institucional del MICIVI y de la DGC, b) establecer a nivel nacional la rectoria del
MICIVI con relaci6n al sector Transporte por Carretera, c) Institucionalizaci6n del Fondo de
Conservaci6n Vial para asegurar el mantenimiento de la obra civil rehabilitada, d) Incrementar la
calidad de los diseinos de ingenieria y asegurar la viabilidad econ6mica y ambiental de los proyectos
ENGLISH EXTRACT
Objectives
The objectives of the project were to: (a) strengthen the operating capacity of DGC, (b) rehabilitate
and improve the deteriorated secondary and regional roads, (c) promote the role of the private sector in
the execution of public works, and (d) assist MICIVI to improve its capacity for planning and
formulation of policies in transport\.
The objectives proposed for the project were in general achieved\. The DGC and MICIVI were both
strengthened and the personnel of the institutions were trained and introduced to new and modem
techniques of work\.
Project Execution
As far as the project execution is concerned, the following was accomplished:
Secondary Roads: Engineering designs for 342km against 386km planned\. In civil works,
rehabilitation of 54km against 38km planned\.
Regional Roads: Engineering designs for 750km against 125km programmed\. In civil works,78km
against 96km programmed\. The project for CAIW, Los Encuentros - Cuatro Caminos was disallowed
from the project (misprocurement) and only the branch CA2W Papoya - Nahualate plus some other
minor roads within the area of influence of this road were executed\.
Bridges: 420m bridges constructed as against 41 5m proposed earlier\.
Equipment: All the machinery and plant planned for procurement was bought, taking into account the
additional requirements imposed by Hurricane Mitch\.
Training: Originally US$1 million was allotted for training in 1994-1999 but due to shortage of funds
the amount was reduced and the work executed with IDB funds to achieve the desired results\.
Technical Assistance: The program was executed satisfactorily although with some delays caused by
the association of UNDP\. The following components were included:
* A National Transport Plan was made together with a strategy for implementation for the years
1996-2015, which is under implementation;
* Model HDM-III was implemented for pluriannual plans\.
* A system of follow up projects was implemented\.
* A satisfactory system of supervision of works and contracts was introduced in the DGC\.
* COVIAL (Unit for Conservation of Highways) was set up with funds from fuel taxes\.
18
* COVIAL funds were utilized for promoting contracts through the private sector, utilizing
almost 88% of the funds for maintenance through the private sector\.
Role of the Bank
The Bank cooperated with the Government of Guatemala in the preparation of the project financed by
the Bank Loan and this was done with assistance from international consultants (UNDP)\. The project
helped strengthen the DGC and MICIVI and enabled to make a program for the rehabilitation of the
highways, and helped formulate a National Transport Plan\.
Role of the Borrower
The Borrower's role can be classified as "satisfactory"\. The Borrower's contribution to the project was
substantial and the participation of the Borrower in the implementation of the project gradually
strengthened as the project progressed\. There was some difficulty in implementing international
bidding procedures resulting in cancellation of part of the loan\.
Future Operations
To maintain the improvements generated by the project it is necessary to: (a) continue the
strengthening of MICIVI and DGC; (b) establish the authority of MICIVI over the Highway Transport
at the national level; (c) institutionalize the COVIAL; (d) continue the improvement in the engineering
designs of the highways and ensure their economic and environmental viability\.
Lessons Learned
The reforrns initiated do not produce imnmediate results\.
The Government needs to support the changes proposed\.
There is a need to learn the World Bank procurement procedures\.
19
Annex 1\. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix
Projected in Actual/Latest
Indicator Reformulation Document Estimate
Component A
Engineering Designs (km) 386\.70 341\.06
RN7W, Chiantla - Sacapulas 58\.00
RN7E, San Julian - Panzos 89\.10 89\.10
RN1 8, San Jose Pinlua - Metaquescuintla 55\.60
RN7E, Panzos - el Estor 44\.70 44\.70
RN9, Desvio Todos Santos - Santa Eulalia 61\.30
RN9, Chiantla - Desvio Todos Santos 21\.00
RN 14, Escuintla - Antigua Guatemala 38\.00 38\.00
RN 14, Antigua Guatemala - Chimaltenango 19\.00 29\.00
RD SM 2, San Sebastian - Tejutla (9km) 9\.00
RN12, San Sebastian - Tacana(51\.36) 51\.36
RN 1, San Juan Ostuncalco - San Marcos (32\.28) 32\.20
OITO 180, Quetzalt\. - Las Rosas-Ent\.; CA2, Occidente 47\.70
Rehabilitation/Improvement (km)
Escuintla - Antigua Guatemala 38\.00
RN I, San Juan Ostancalco - San Marcos 53\.78
Component B
Engineering Designs (km) 125\.45 737\.00
CA2W, Retalhuleo=- Coatepeque 51\.10 39\.60
CA I W, Tecpan - Chupol 21\.00 22\.70
CA 1W, Chupol - Los Encuentros 18\.50 16\.80
RNI, San Juan Osuncalco - San Marcos (32\.28km) 34\.85
CA2W, Escuintla - Popoya 43\.57
CA2W, Nahualate - Desvio a Ratalnules 35\.79
CA9S, Guatemala - Palin 54\.00
CA2W, Coatepeque - Tecun Limon 33\.00
RN 1, Cuatro Caminos - Totonicapan 12\.00
CA 1W, San Lucas - Chimaltenango - Tecpan 70\.50
CAI W, Cuatro Caminos - Huehuetenango 69\.42
CAIW, Huehuetenango - La Mesilla (84\.36km) 84\.36
CA 14, El Rancho - Coban 131\.13
CA 13, La Ruidosa - Modesto Mendez 72\.43
CA 1 E, Juiapa - San Cristobal Frontera 51\.70
20
Rehabilitation/Improvement (km) 96\.65 77\.70
Los Encuentros - 4 Caminos 61\.80
Popoya - Nahualate 34\.85 77\.70
Component C
Bridges (linear meters) 415\.00 421\.10
Component D
Maintenance Equipment (units) 46\.00 49\.00
Tipplers 14\.00 14\.00
Crawler Tractor 8\.00 8\.00
Front Loaders 8\.00 8\.00
2,000 gal\. Oil Tanks 3\.00 3\.00
Pick-up 4x4 I ton 8\.00 9\.00
Minivan 4x4 5 passengers 1\.00 3\.00
Elevator Trucks 4\.00 4\.00
Miscellaneous Equipment (US$'000) 790\.00 235\.00
Rehabilitation of Machinery (US$'000) 1520\.00
21
Annex 1A\. Implementation of Action Plan
Step Subject Original Revised Final
No\. Date Date Date
I Submit to the Bank a Transport Plan including a
program for implementation of policies for the period 06/01/95 02/96 02/96
1996-2000\.
2 Implementation of the programs of the National
Transport Plan (dates as detailed in the plan 01/01/96- 01/01/96- 07/01/96-
programs) 12/31/00 12/31/00 12/31/00
3 Contract consultants
(a) for parts F\.1 and F\.2 of project, covering bridge 01/01/94 11/96 12/96
evaluation, HDM model, and monitoring 08/01/94 04/99 04/97
investments\.
(b) to implement the recommendations of the
consultants\.
4 Incorporate the PCU into the permanent structure of
the DGC with functions and personnel satisfactory to 01/01/96 06/96 06/96
the Bank\.
5 Adoption of cost accounting systems and
computerized systems in DGC 02/01/95 02/97 07/99
6 Implementation of the recommendations of the study
in part F\.3 of project, covering DGC's procedures for 06/01/95 07/97 07/97
works supervision\.
7 Acquire equipment for the purpose of Section 3\.12 of
the Loan Agreement, covering vehicle dimensions 04/01/94 07/97 N/A 2
and axle-load limitations\.
8 Implementation of the recommendations of
evaluation of pavements\. 04/95 07/97 08/98
9 Strengthen the training department of DGC with
functions and resources including personnel 01/01/96 07/97 N/A 3
acceptable to the Bank\.
'' Consultants engaged in 1/94 and work completed in 12/96\.
2/ Not implemented because of change in policy, resulting in concessioning of services and contracting of private sector\.
3/ Not implemented because of change in policy, resulting in reduction of staff and engagement of private sector for
training purposes\.
22
Annex 2\. Project Costs and Financing
Table 1: Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent)
Reformulation Actual/Latest Percentage of
Estimate Estimate Reformulation
Project Cost By Component US$ million US$ million
Secondary Road Rehabilitation and 14\.14 12\.20 86\.3
Improvement
Regional Road Rehabilitation and 22\.03 15\.23 69\.1
Strengthening
Construction of Bridges and Secondary 1\.50 4\.17 278
Roads
Maintenance and Miscellaneous Equipment 4\.00 4\.48 112
Training Program 1\.00 0\.38 38
Technical Assistance and Studies 1\.98 2\.51 127
Total Baseline Cost 44\.65 38\.97
Physical Contingencies 2\.30
Price Contingencies 2\.16
Total Project Costs 49\.11 38\.97
Table 2: Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Reformulation Estimate)
(US$ million equivalent)
Expenditure Category ICB NCB Total Cost
1\. Works 35\.86 1\.50 37\.36
(24\.66) (0\.90) (25\.56)
2\. Goods 3\.19 0\.81 4\.00
(2\.38) (0\.81) (3\.19)
3\. Services 6\.95 0\.80 7\.75
(1\.95) (0\.80) (2\.75)
Total 46\.00 3\.11 49\.11
(28\.99) (2\.51) (31\.50)
23
Annex 2\. Project Costs and Financing
Table 3: Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate)
(US$ million equivalent)
Expenditure Category ICB NCB Total Cost
1\. Works 18\.94 4\.17 23\.11
(18\.94) (0\.00) (18\.94)
2\. Goods 2\.78 1\.70 4\.48
(2\.78) (0\.00) (2\.78)
3\. Services 10\.76 0\.63 11\.39
\._________________________________ (3\.63) (0\.00) (3\.63)
Total 32\.48 6\.50 38\.98
______________________________________ (25\.35) - (0\.00) - (25\.35)
1/ Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan\. All costs include contingencies
2/ Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of
contracted staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental
operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government
units\.
24
Annex 2\. Project Costs and Financing
Table 4: Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent)
Component Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage of
Estimate Estimate Appraisal
Bank Govt\. Bank Govt\. Bank Govt\.
Secondary Roads Rehabilitation and 8\.48 5\.66 7\.32 4\.88 86\.3 86\.2
Improvement
Altiplano Road Rehabilitation and 13\.22 8\.81 9\.14 6\.09 69\.1 69\.1
Strengthening l
Construction of Bridges 0\.90 0\.60 2\.50 1\.67 277\.8 278\.3
Maintenance and Miscellaneous 3\.96 0\.04 3\.90 0\.58 98\.5 1450
Equipment
Training Program 0\.20 0\.80 0\.35 0\.04 175\.0 5\.0
Technical Assistance and Studies 1\.78 0\.20 2\.14 0\.37 120\.2 185\.0
Physical Contingencies 1\.38 0\.91
Price Contingencies 1\.58 0\.58
TOTAL 31\.50 17\.60 25\.34 13\.63 80\.4 77\.4
25
Annex 3\. Economic Costs and Benefits
Cost Benefit Analysis Present Value of Flows
Economic Analysis
Latest
IRR/NPV (in US$ millions) Appraisal Estimates
a\. Secondary Roads Rehabilitation and Improvement 12\.70/0\.2 31\.90/7\.9
b\. Regional Roads Rehabilitation and Strengthening 33\.10/10\.60 67\.50/46\.40
26
Annex 4\. Bank Inputs
(a) Missions:
Stage of Project Cycle Count No\. of Persons and Implementation Development
Month/Year Specialty Progress Objective
(e\.g\. 2 Economists, I FMS, Performance
etc\.) Rating
Identification/Preparation 2 1 Eng, 1 E
July 1985
January 1986 2 l Eng, I E
May 1986 1 1 Eng _
February 1987 2 1 Eng, 1 E
June/July 1987 4 1 Eng, 1 E, 1 TP, 1 TS
Appraisal/Negotiation
September 1987 5 1 Eng, 1 E, 1 Fin, 1
\. TP, I Con
April 1988 1 1 E
Supervision
January 1989 2 2 E
May 1989 2 2 E
October 1989 1 1 E
June 1992 1 1 Eng
October 1992 1 Eng _
December 1992 1 1 Eng
January 1993 4 1 Eng, 1 L, 2 Con
(Reformulation of Project)
July 1993 __1 Eng
November 1993 4 1 Eng, 1 E, 1 F, 1 Con S S
February 1994 4 1 Eng, 1 E, 1 F, 1 Con S S
May 1994 3 1 Eng, 1 E, I Con S
October 1994 1 Eng _ S S
May 1995 2 1 Eng, I Con S S
August 1995 2 1 Eng, I Con S S
March 1996 2 1 Eng, I E S S
June 1996 2 1 Eng, I E S S
August 1996 2 1 Eng, 1 E HS S
May 1997 1 Eng S
July 1997 3 1 Eng, I E, I Con S S
February 1998 2 1 Eng, I Con S S
July 1998 _ 1 1 Eng S S
27
ICR
October 1998 1 1 Eng S S
March 1999 2 1 Eng, I Con S S
December 1999 2 1 Eng, 1 Con S S
January 2000 1 1 Con S S
Eng = Engineer, E = Economist, TP = Transport Planner, TS = Transport Specialist, Fin = Financial Expert, Con
Consultant, L = Legal, F = Financial Analyst\.
(b) Staff:
Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate
No\. Staff weeks US$ (,000)
Identification/Preparation 36\.6 60\.2
Appraisal/Negotiation 34\.8 135\.0
Supervision 150\.4 401\.0
ICR 10\.0 15\.0
Total 231\.8 611\.2
28
Annex 5\. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components
(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)
Sector Policies SU
Physical SU
Financial NA
Institutional Development H
Environmental M
Social NA
Private sector development H
Public sector management SU
29
Annex 6\. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance
(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)
6\.1 Bankperformance Rating
Lending S
Supervision S
Overall S
62 Borrower performance Rating
Preparation S
Government implementation performance S
Implementation agency performance S
Overall S
30
Annex 7\. List of Supporting Documents
Staff Appraisal Report No\. 7133-GU\. October 31, 1998\.
Report on Reformulation of the Project\. May 17, 1993\.
Loan Agreement: Loan 3002-GU\. May 21, 1993\.
Amendment I to Loan Agreement\. October 31, 1994\.
Amendment 2 to Loan Agreement\. December 4, 1996\.
Amendment 3 to Loan Agreement\. September 9, 1997\.
Ex-Post Economic Evaluation: Popoya-Nahualate
Ex-Post Economic Evaluation: San Juan Ostuncalco-San Marcos
Borrower's Report (Full Text)
31
MAP SECTION
IBRD 30951
92\. 60~ P\.p,1n~
M E X I C BELIZE \. =, tb
16- j
,\., / o 26~ 0i' i -_
j ~~~Sun Mol- -1ato WM\.n\. \LvrSS
T\. T-la i e4-4 0lSs\, , ;,>
t / t osM Eulabg Bridge Program \ \.JE PUERTO BARRIOS
(23 bridges consEructed) So T0\. 6
Os\. h C\.] C,
i \ E 1 9 Papoli66 _6 -~ J f ' ocs HONDURAS
\ lFchldoon o a Teluda q \ ~~~0- \. i % /
°li"CuucOSALAM DE ICH _-p
MA COS PA J O / So 6911 ZACA 8 SECONDARY AND REGIONAL
Ta Tap c h\. E R\. d o t2 San~ C r itbl TTNIAN / Aog=sln
C_ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-ROAD REHABILITATION PROJECT
T\. TopoIoS\. J1
ToTopachala ( ; g ->Cbicoo f ) \7 Jilatepaque (SanRotunda a n0 CH(QUIM /J PROJECTSROADS/RIDGES
0161CC 1 CdINTE pla vs _tdsal }PaptI\)Tep oomlm ', kREGIONAILROADS
Cd T\.~~~~~, 'N~~~~~pA, S LVA DO _ _ _ _ _ _
|t ANGA < \ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~SECONDAIWAHRY ROADS
1 TEER~LA, uooo, 066 -' 1 I ISmpBqcg 2 30 40, A MAA CIT EXISATINGTERATURLIES O
_ s66 i SI56J f9 0/b; I I< / I u m l >Jrz /h a vdr,*\. ERE
E 1 6 PAVED5 5 R 6OADSI
td 0Q' e-g/ 0 n",b'E SA LV-O o B7o 3 0 iimtr
EA(OF{ c \.6 c PA CIlFIC ;C:EATN - :\.nS tti\.t; Ri RAau/ Ths-\.Ps 6,d^lnQP Xduo,\. 0h,66166
O L\.gAf0# 0, >; -eASA~~NhfA,:,:2\. ,do sb _rh Qldbn
OC: A N0Iyt 660600,, oop \ o , Wod 60E r N CAPITAL
JUTAP INTERNATIONALAIRPOR | APPROVAL |
P113218 | Page 1
INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS DATASHEET
APPRAISAL STAGE
I\. Basic Information
Date prepared/updated: 08/08/2008
Report No\.: AC3802
1\. Basic Project Data
Country: Somalia
Project ID: P113218
Project Name: Rapid Response Rehab of Rural Livel Proj
Task Team Leader: Berhane Manna
Estimated Appraisal Date: July 31, 2008
Estimated Board Date: September 5, 2008
Managing Unit: AFTAR
Lending Instrument: Emergency Recovery
Loan
Sector: General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector (100%)
Theme: Global food crisis response (P)
IBRD Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
IDA Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
GEF Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
PCF Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
Other financing amounts by source:
Borrower
0\.00
Special
Financing
7\.00
7\.00
Environmental Category: B - Partial Assessment
Simplified Processing
Simple []
Repeater []
Is this project processed under OP 8\.50 (Emergency Recovery)
or OP 8\.00 (Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies)
Yes [X]
No [ ]
2\. Project Objectives
The project development objective is to address the food crisis in Somalia by removing
the production constraints and improve food security, rural incomes, and community
assets\.
3\. Project Description
The project has three interrelated components which build on ongoing projects (FAO,
UNDP, UNHCR and others) in Somalia to assist in addressing the crisis\. Implementation
of these components is dependent on improved security in South Central Somalia and
signed peace agreement among the different factions\. The components cover the major
productive areas: (i) crops (component one); and (ii) livestock (component two)\. Both of
these components pay attention to mainstreaming nutrition and gender concerns in the
interventions\. In addition, the project stresses community and local institution
strengthening (component three), aimed at effective implementation of the project\. The
project is being implemented in administrative locations where the need is greatest (the
Shabelle valley in South/Central Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland)\.
Component I: Improving Agricultural and Food Production Capacity
Page 2
Sub-component 1\.1: Increased food availability through decreased post harvest losses
by introduction of improved storage systems
Post-harvest and storage grain losses are estimated at 20-30 percent of the total
production\. These losses are mainly due to lack of proper handling of the crop soon after
harvest and the use of the traditional storage structures\. Experience has shown that grain
stored in metal drums, particularly in humid and flood prone areas where ground pits are
at risk, can last up to 5 years without affecting its quality and therefore add considerable
value in terms of both incomes and food availability\.
The specific activities under this sub-component are to:
train and support artisans on/for metal silos production
work with established
blacksmiths/metalworkers to assist their production\.
facilitate production of metal silos of different sizes and promote awareness/market
demand and production response for use of the storage technology\.
train farmers on proper installation and use of the new technology, mainly through on
farm demonstrations and farm visits\.
train of farmers and community households on post harvest techniques especially
drying grain at optimum moisture\.
Sub-component 1\.2: Increased food production system productivity through distribution
of improved inputs
The key feature of the project proposal is the inclusion of a sub-component to support
resumption of agricultural production and increased household food security by removing
the main production constraints\. The project will support provision of seeds of maize and
sorghum which have proved to be highly productive in similar environmental conditions\.
Seeds will be procured from the local market and distributed through existing NGOs or
NGO-initiated community organizations\. Complementary inputs such as
tools/implements and fertilizer (mainly urea) will also be made available\.
This sub-component will be concentrated in the South/Central areas of Somalia and the
specific activities under this sub-component are:
Distribution of technology packages (seeds, fertilizer and farm implements) to farmers
in Shebelle valley (maize) and in the Sorghum belt (sorghum)\.
Training of farmers, mainly women growing food crops, in improved agronomic and
nutritional practices\. This will include training in using the new technology, including
seed quality management, and nutritional utilization of the increased food grains and
livestock products\.
Evaluation of use and impact of technology packages\. This will include post distribution
review evaluation exercises carried out to inform/improve future assistance\.
Sub-component 1\.3: Increased food production through rehabilitation and improvement
of crop production infrastructure
Page 3
The long absence of stability and consequent lack of institutions has led to the collapse
of basic infrastructure serving the agricultural sector in the most productive areas of
Somalia\. The project will support rehabilitation of canals; river embankments; sluice
gates; water catchments; and feeder roads\. This sub-component will be concentrated in
the South/Central areas of Somalia and the specific activities under this sub-component
are:
Appraisal of infrastructure needs\. This includes the assessment of crop irrigation needs
and capacities of rivers and canals by evaluating the demand/use of water\.
Carrying out of profile surveys for all canals, embankment and roads that need to be
rehabilitated and establish the required excavation cut and fill\.
Implementation through a combination of private sector contracts, labor sourced from
the community (with explicit commitment to employment of women), project
management and local administration collaboration\.
Component II: Enhancement of Food Security and Incomes of Pastoral Livestock
Producers and Livestock Service Providers
Sub-component 2\.1: Improved livestock production through more effective and efficient
feeding systems
Food is a scarce resource in most parts of Somalia almost every year\. In some locations
where feed is occasionally adequate in quantity it is almost always deficient in quality,
mainly low levels of protein and energy\. This situation seriously limits livestock growth
and production\. In the drier pastoral areas, the quality and amount (quantity) of forage
available is almost always insufficient for the number of animals attempting to feed off it\.
In the mixed farming areas along dry river beds and flood plains natural pastures are
being taken over for subsistence cropping and production of fodder\. In the mixed
production systems, crop residues and by-products are important in the livestock diet but
are usually low in nutrients and often wasted or used inefficiently due to inadequate
knowledge and the capacity to process and conserve them as livestock feed\.
This sub-component will increase feed and fodder availability, promote more efficient
livestock feeding systems and increase producer incomes\. It will be implemented in
Somaliland and Puntland\. The specific activities under this sub-component are:
Support the development of seed and planting materials at selected sites for improved
feed production activities\.
Promote improved feed production systems through provision of farms/areas selected
for fodder production with (i) seeds of selected perennial grasses; (ii) farm equipment and
tools; and (iii) assistance to prepare the land for fodder production, including water
storage and irrigation\.
Train farmers in fodder production and preparation of silage\. Where necessary this
training will be adapted, for example, pastoralists will be trained in appropriate range
rehabilitation techniques\.
Sub-component 2\.2: Protecting livestock herd and increased meat production through
improved livestock disease management systems
Page 4
Livestock production is greatly constrained by Transboundary Animal Diseases (TADs)\.
On the other hand, demand for quality livestock products, both in national and
international trade, is increasing rapidly\. This sub-component is directed at assisting in
this area\. It will be implemented mainly in Central/South and Puntland and the specific
activities under this sub-component are:
Improvement through training and technical assistance to monitor, evaluate risk and
report on livestock diseases\.
Support to implementation of emergency preparedness for livestock diseases of trade
concern\.
Sub-component 2\.3: Increased food quality, safety and use through rehabilitation and
construction of low cost slaughter houses/processing units
In Somalia, meat and meat products, slaughterhouses and related infrastructure,
including butcheries, meat transport and delivery practices, and retail businesses (meat
markets), are undeveloped and the associated human health risks is enormous\. This calls
for an integrated income generation and food safety, quality, and use of approaches that
address domestic livestock and meat marketing chains\. This sub-component will be
implemented in Somaliland and Puntland and the specific activities under this sub-
component are:
Rehabilitation/construction of local slaughter house/meat processing facilities\. This will
include upgrading of the physical structure to ensure that local slaughter facilities and
meat markets attain minimum standards
Training of slaughter house/meat processing operators and workers (mainly women) in
more efficient and hygienic slaughtering and meat handling methods\. This will include
identifying and maximizing of quality cuts, protecting products through clean and
sanitary methods, and minimizing damage to by- products\.
Promotion of by-product use for improved nutrition and increased incomes\. Including
both consumption of what might be considered inferior products and use of waste for
agricultural (manure)\.
Making provisions for safe waste disposal at slaughter house/meat processing facilities\.
Component III: Increased capacity and performance of community- based organizations,
local NGOs, and community groups
One of the major results of the conflict in Somalia over the past two decades has been
the collapse of community and civic based institutions\. Thus, there is a great need to
establish a critical pool of capable stakeholders, including beneficiaries that will
contribute the roles required to facilitate immediate efforts at rehabilitation\.
This component will complement and further support a number of ongoing projects and
will be implemented in all three regions of Somalia\. More specifically, it will focus on
food-crises related activities by providing skill training in basic production systems,
including markets and income earning opportunities to enhance income\.
Page 5
4\. Project Location and salient physical characteristics relevant to the safeguard
analysis
The project location will be in the Shabelle valley in south-central Somalia, Somaliland
and Puntland\.
5\. Environmental and Social Safeguards Specialists
Ms Edeltraut Gilgan-Hunt (AFTEN)
Mr Ronald P\. Isaacson (AFTCS)
6\. Safeguard Policies Triggered
Yes No
Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4\.01)
X
Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4\.04)
X
Forests (OP/BP 4\.36)
X
Pest Management (OP 4\.09)
X
Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4\.11)
X
Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4\.10)
X
Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4\.12)
X
Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4\.37)
X
Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP
7\.50)
X
Projects in Disputed Areas (OP/BP 7\.60)
X
II\. Key Safeguard Policy Issues and Their Management
A\. Summary of Key Safeguard Issues
1\. Describe any safeguard issues and impacts associated with the proposed project\.
Identify and describe any potential large scale, significant and/or irreversible impacts:
While the project's potential adverse environmental impacts will not be significant or
irreversible, attention will need to be paid to the (i) safe management of pesticides and
veterinary drugs; and (ii) efficient use of rehabilitated water and transportation
infrastructure; and (iii) safe waste disposal at the slaughter house/meat processing
facilities\.
2\. Describe any potential indirect and/or long term impacts due to anticipated future
activities in the project area:
Potential indirect and/or long term impacts due to future project activities are not
anticipated\.
3\. Describe any project alternatives (if relevant) considered to help avoid or minimize
adverse impacts\.
In light of Somalia's food crisis, alternatives to the proposed project were not discussed\.
4\. Describe measures taken by the borrower to address safeguard policy issues\. Provide
an assessment of borrower capacity to plan and implement the measures described\.
To ensure environmentally and socially sustainable implementation of the planned
investments, the Borrower, with assistance from the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) is preparing (i) an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF)
Page 6
which outlines the environmental and social screening process for future investments;
and (ii) a Pest Management Plan (PMP) to ensure safe management of pesticides and
veterinary drugs\. These documents will take into account experience to-date on the
ground\. The ESMF - with the PMP as an attachment - will be disclosed in Somalia and at
the Bank's Infoshop by September 5, 2008\.
5\. Identify the key stakeholders and describe the mechanisms for consultation and
disclosure on safeguard policies, with an emphasis on potentially affected people\.
The key stakeholders include representatives from NGOs, local government
organizations, and FAO as well as project beneficiaries\. The ESMF includes a
consultation requirement for relevant stakeholders and potentially affected persons; the
results of these consultations are to be accessible to the public\.
B\. Disclosure Requirements Date
Environmental Assessment/Audit/Management Plan/Other:
Was the document disclosed
prior to appraisal?
No
Date of receipt by the Bank
11/15/2008
Date of "in-country" disclosure
11/30/2008
Date of submission to InfoShop
11/30/2008
For category A projects, date of distributing the Executive
Summary of the EA to the Executive Directors
Resettlement Action Plan/Framework/Policy Process:
Was the document disclosed
prior to appraisal?
Date of receipt by the Bank
Date of "in-country" disclosure
Date of submission to InfoShop
Indigenous Peoples Plan/Planning Framework:
Was the document disclosed
prior to appraisal?
Date of receipt by the Bank
Date of "in-country" disclosure
Date of submission to InfoShop
Pest Management Plan:
Was the document disclosed
prior to appraisal?
No
Date of receipt by the Bank
11/15/2008
Date of "in-country" disclosure
11/30/2008
Date of submission to InfoShop
11/30/2008
*
If the project triggers the Pest Management and/or Physical Cultural Resources,
the respective issues are to be addressed and disclosed as part of the Environmental
Assessment/Audit/or EMP\.
If in-country disclosure of any of the above documents is not expected, please
explain why:
Page 7
C\. Compliance Monitoring Indicators at the Corporate Level (to be filled in when the
ISDS is finalized by the project decision meeting)
OP/BP/GP 4\.01 - Environment Assessment
Does the project require a stand-alone EA (including EMP) report?
Yes
If yes, then did the Regional Environment Unit or Sector Manager (SM)
review and approve the EA report?
No
Are the cost and the accountabilities for the EMP incorporated in the
credit/loan?
No
OP 4\.09 - Pest Management
Does the EA adequately address the pest management issues?
Yes
Is a separate PMP required?
No
If yes, has the PMP been reviewed and approved by a safeguards specialist or
SM? Are PMP requirements included in project design? If yes, does the
project team include a Pest Management Specialist?
No
OP 7\.50 - Projects on International Waterways
Have the other riparians been notified of the project?
N/A
If the project falls under one of the exceptions to the notification
requirement, has this been cleared with the Legal Department, and the memo
to the RVP prepared and sent?
Yes
Has the RVP approved such an exception?
Yes
The World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information
Have relevant safeguard policies documents been sent to the World Bank's
Infoshop?
No
Have relevant documents been disclosed in-country in a public place in a
form and language that are understandable and accessible to project-affected
groups and local NGOs?
No
All Safeguard Policies
Have satisfactory calendar, budget and clear institutional responsibilities
been prepared for the implementation of measures related to safeguard
policies?
No
Have costs related to safeguard policy measures been included in the project
cost?
No
Does the Monitoring and Evaluation system of the project include the
monitoring of safeguard impacts and measures related to safeguard policies?
No
Have satisfactory implementation arrangements been agreed with the
borrower and the same been adequately reflected in the project legal
documents?
No
Page 8
D\. Approvals
Signed and submitted by:
Name
Date
Task Team Leader:
Mr Berhane Manna
08/07/2008
Environmental Specialist:
Ms Edeltraut Gilgan-Hunt
08/07/2008
Social Development Specialist
Mr Ronald P\. Isaacson
08/07/2008
Additional Environmental and/or
Social Development Specialist(s):
Approved by:
Regional Safeguards Coordinator:
Mr Warren Waters
08/07/2008
Comments:
Sector Manager:
Mr Francois G\. Le Gall
08/07/2008
Comments: | APPROVAL |
P003756 | The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No\. 6316
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
INDONESIA
NATIONAL RESOURCE SURVEY AND MAPPING PROJECT
(LOAN 1197-IND)
June 27, 1986
Operations Evaluation Department
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
hei official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
Metric System
1 ton m 1,000 kg = 2,200 pounds
1 hectare = 10,000 m2 = 2\.47 acres
ABBREVIATIONS
ADB - Asian Development Bank
APR - Airborne Profile Recording
BAKOSURTANAL - National Coordinating Agency forSurveys and Mapping
CIDA - Canadian International Developmert Agency
FAO - Food and Agriculture organization
GOI - Government of Indonesia
INDOFOTA - Information and Documentation System for Aerial
Photos and Maps
ITC - International Training Center for Aerial Surveys
JANTOP - Indonesian Army Topographic Service
LAPAN - National Institute for Aeronautics and Space
PELITA - Five-Year National Development Plan
REAP - Canadian-Assisted Resource Evaluation and Air
Photo Project
POR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
THE WORLD BANK
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
U\.S\.A\.
Office of Dkrctar-CAerl
Operatams Evalfaton
June 30, 1986
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Performance Audit Report: Indonesia
National Resource Survey and Mapping Project
(Loan 1197-IND)
Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled
"Project Performance Audit Report: Indonesia National Resource Survey
and Mapping Project (Loan 1197-IND)" prepared by the Operations
Evaluation Department\.
Attachment
4
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
INDONESIA
NATIONAL RESOURCE SURVEY AND MAPPING PROJECT
(LOAN 1197-IND)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No\.
Preface \. i
Basic Data Sheet \. ii
Evaluation Summary \. 111
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDTT MEMORANDUM
I\. SUMMARY\. 1
Formulation and Design \. 1
Implementation \. 2
Impact \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.3
II\. MAIN ISSUES \.************* 4
Risks of Parallel Financing \. 4
Annex 1: Borrower Comments \. 6
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
I\. Background \.9\.************************* '
II\. The Project *\.*********************\. 10
III\. Project Evaluation \. 12
IV\. Implementation Problems \. 16
V\. Assessment of Bank Performance and Lessons Learned \. 20
Annexes
Map IBRD No\. 11038R1
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
INDONESIA
NATIONAL RESOURCE SURVEY AND MAPPING PROJECT
(LOAN 1197-IND)
PREFACE
This is a performance audit of the National Resource Survey and
Mapping Project in Indonesia, for which Loan 1197-IND in the amount of
US$13\.0 million was approved by the Board in January 1976\. The loan helped
to finance Part I of the project and became effective in April 1976\. The
original Closing Date was extended by two years to December 31, 1983\. After
the final disbursement in June 1984, an undlsbursed amount of US$0\.14 million
was cancelled\. The Canadian International Development Agency assisted the
Government of Indonesia by providing parallel finance of C$21 million
(US$18\.4 million equivalent) for Part II of the project\. Their loan agree-
ment was signed on April 5, 1978\.
The audit report comprises: an audit memorandum, prepared by the
Operations Evaluation Department; and a Project Completion Report (PCR),
prepared by the Bank's East Asia and Pacific Regional Office\. It is based on
a review of the Staff Appraisal Report (No\. 689-a-IND) of January 15, 1976,
the President's Report (No\. P-1742-IND) of January 15, 1976, the loan Agree-
ment of February 5, 1976, a comprehensive Project Completion Report of June
1984 prepared by the implementing agency, BAKOSURTANAL, and correspondence
with the Borrower and internal Bank memoranda on project issues as contained
in relevant Bank files\. Bank staff associated with the project have also
been interviewed\.
An OED mission visited Indonesia in October 1985\. It held discus-
sions with officials in BAKOSURTANAL, the National Planning Agency
(BAPPENAS), the Ministry of Transmigration, the Directorate-General of
Forestry, and the Directorate-General of Estates\. It visited BAKGSURTANAL's
headquarters complex at Cibinong and inspected the building and equipment
provided under the project\. The information obtained during the mission was
used to test the conclusions of the PCR and to elaborate on a number of
issues in the audit memorandum\.
The audit finds the PCR comprehensive and accurate with respect to
the project's principal achievements\.
The draft report was sent to the Borrower for comments on April 9,
1986\. Comments received from BAKOSURTANAL are attached as Annex 1 of the
PPAM\.
The valuable assistance provided by Government staff, and by the
other individuals interviewed is gratefully acknowledged\.
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
INDONESIA
NATIONAL RKSOUKCK St'KVEY AND HAVPIN; oRo\.:r
(LOAN 1197-1ND)
BASIC DATA SHEET
KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal letnal a\. ot
Estimate Actual APprais4 l Entimate
Component Cost (US$ million) 4n\.0 45\.6 9'1
Loan Amount (tlS! million) 13\.0 12\.9 4%9
Amount Cotinanced (CIDA) (US$ million) 18\.4
Date Board Approval - U1/1a --
Date Effectiveness 05/05/7h 04/02/ 171
Date Physical Components Completed 12/31/80 12/31183 tl
Proportion then completed (1) 100 bO at
Closing Date 12/31/81 12/31/8 I
Economic Performance (ROR Z) None calculated None calcntate4
Institutional Performance --0d
STAFF INPUTS a FY75 FY76 FY77 FY6 FY79 FY8U VY81 FY82 FYS3 VY84 FYA5
Appraisal 16\.9 1\.1
Regotiationi 2\.6 15\.8
Supervision 4\.1 9\.1 0\.8 9\.4 7\.9 5\.% 9\.8 5\.2 3\.4 4\.n
CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENTS
Appraisal Estimate (US$milliton)\. (1\.3 1\.2 7\.9 10\.8 12\.9 13,o - -
Actual (US$ million) 0\.2 2\.3 4\.8 b\.0 7\.5 8\.7 tt\.0 12\.9
Actual as Z of Appraisal Estimate n7 38 hl 56 58 7 8 99
Date of Final Disbursement July 31, 1984
Principal repaid to April 1985 Us$1\.7 million
MISSION DATA MISSION
Date No\. of Staff/Days Speci\.iLtzations Performance Types of
Miseion (Mo\./Yr\.) Persons in field Represented /b Rating /c Trend /d Problems /e
Prepardion t9/74 6 60 E,R,A - -
Appraisal 01/!74 \. 72 E,R,C,A - - -
SUBTOTAL 132
Supervision 1 W2/7t 1 a E 1 I -
Supervision II 05/7b 2 12 E,R 1 2 P
Supervision III 10/lb 3 6 C,R I 1 -
Supervision IV 04/77 2 b E,R 1 1
Supervision V 11/77 1 b R I I -
Supervision VI 04/78 1 3 E I 2 T,M
Supervision VII 11/78 3 ) E,R,C 1 2 4
Supervision Vili 03/79 2 6 E,A I MP,
Supervision IX 05/80 2 12 E,K,l 2 M\.,P
Supervision X 05/81 3 9 E,R,I 2 2 M\.P
Supervision Xl 04/82 2 12 C,I 2 1 M
Supervision XII 03/83 2 I I\.E 2 1 M
Supervision XItI 10/83 2 6 E,l 2 1 M
SUBTOTAL 102
Completion 03/85 1 - A
TOTAL 234
OTHER PROJECT DATA
Borrover Government of Indonesia
Executing Agency Coordinating Agency for Surveys and Mapping (SAKOSURTANAL)
Fiscal Year April 1 to March 31
Name of Curency (abbreviation) Rupiah (RP) Follow-on Project Transmigration V I
Currency Exchange Rates: Loan Number: 2578-1*40
Appraisal Year Average US$1\.00 - RP415 Loan Amount: US$160\.1 million
Intervening Years Average US$1\.00 - RP 545 Date of board Approval: June 1485
Completicn Year Average US$1\.00 - RP909
/a Source: Planning and Budgeting, in staffweeks\.
T A Agriculturalist; E - Economist; I - Irrigation Engineer; C - Civil Engineer; R - Resource Planner\.
1 1 Problem-free or minor problems; 2 * Moderate problems; and 3 * Major problems\.
& I Improving; 2 - Stationary; 3 - Deteriorating\.
M Managerial; T - Technical; P - Political\.
Financing of a four-year tranche of a naitonal mapping program, including small-scale aerial photography,
is being provided under the Transmigration V project\.
- iii -
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
INDONESIA
NATIONAL RESOURCE SURVEY AND MAPPING PROJECT
(LOAN 1197-IND)
EVALUATION SUMMARY
A\. Introduction
In 1976 the Bank made a loan to Indonesia for a National Resource
Survey and Mapping Project (Loan 1197-IND)\. This was the Bank Group's first
loan to support resource survey and base mapping for the entire country
through a newly established National Coordinating Agency for Surveys and
Mapping (BAKOSURTANAL)\. The project assistance covered financing for: civil
works; procurement of equipment for cartography, printing imagery interpre-
tation, and resource evaluation; large-scale aerial photography and remote
sensor imagery to support detAiled mapping of specific areas; technical
services for geodetic control, photo processing and reproduction; technical
assistance and overseas and local training\. The total cost of the project
was estimated at US$46\.0 million and a Bank loan of US$13\.0 million covered
100% of the foreign costs of the Bank-assisted Part I of the project or 40%
of total foreign exchange costs\. An additional contribution for Part II of
the project, covering small-scale aerial photography and ground control, was
expected from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)\.
B\. Objectives
Both the Bank and Government had already experienced the high costs
of planning and executing transmigration and other projects in the absence of
reliable base maps, and CIDA's interest in a national forest resource evalu-
ation project was similarly contingent on first obtaining good base maps\.
The Bank's portion of the project was mainly to support Government in build-
ing up BAKOSURTANAL with facilities, equipment, material and training for
base mapping\. CIDA's portion was to provide the small scale aerial photo-
graphy and related services from which base maps could be derived\.
C\. Implementation Experience
The project had mixed achievements\. The procurement of civil
works, equipment, material, and staff training was accomplished with minor
delays in construction and minor difficulties in the installation and opera-
tion of some of the equipment\. The output of base maps, however, was
significantly lt\.ss than estimated at appraisal, due primarily to substantial
delays: first, in the loan agreement between GOI and CIDA; and second, on
the CIDA-financed aerial photography contract\. The Bank-assisted portion of
the project had no control over these delays, but they resulted in a two year
extension of the project closing date from December 1981 to December 1983\.
- iv -
D\. Results
The project gave BAKOSURTANAL an enhanced capability to produce the
cartographic :-nd thematic base maps required for many of the development plan
programs, i - tuding those in agriculture, transmigration, and public works\.
But the output of base maps was only 19% of the expected target (see PPAM,
para\. 8)\.
E\. Sustainability
To support BAKOSURTANAL further, the bank financed a major program
of base-mapping in the Traremigration V project (Loan 2578-IND) *hich was
approved in June 1985\. Together with the successful institution-building
accomplishments of the pro,ect, this provides good assurance of sustain-
ability of project achievements\.
F\. Findings and Lessons
The main lesson learned from this project is that the Bank took a
calculated risk with project performance when it broke step with CIDA to
finance its own part of the project before arrangements for the other part
were secure\. Financing a project in parallel with another donor poses
certain risks, which the Bank clearly foresaw in this case, but then chose to
minimize when it considered the prospect of further delay\. When considering
parallel financing, the Bank should also consider appraising what amendments
to a project might be required in the contingency that the parallel
components face serious delay (PPAM, paras\. 11-14)\. (Since this project was
approved, the Bank has issued internal guidelines on official co-financing
that would normally require the Bank's loan agreements to co7ntain a cross
default clause and effectiveness of any co-finanting to be a condition of
effectiveness of the Bank's loan\.)
Other findings of interest are that targets for the expected output
of this type of project should have been identified more carefully during
appraisal and monitored throughout project implementation (PCR, para\. 3\.01);
early attention to, and involvement of, the user agencies in the planning of
support for a new agency like BAKOSURTANAL would have reduced problems of
inter-agency coordination (PCR, para\. 4\.16); and Bank supervision should have
examinied more carefully the reallocation of loan proceeds for buying
equipment, when the continued delays of Part II of the project dictated that
other categories of expenditure, such as technical services, had greater
priority (PPAM, para\. 16)\.
- 1 -
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM
INDONESIA
NATIONAL RESOURCE SURVEY AND MAPPING PROJECT
(LOAN 1197-IND)
1\. PROJECT SJMMARY
Project Formulation and Design
1\. In 1973, the Government of Indonesia (GOI) requested Bank assis-
tance in designing and implementing a project that would provide the institu-
tional and physical capability for it to accelerate a national program of
resource inventory and evaluation\. Simultaneously, GOI also requested assis-
tance from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) for a
national forest resource evaluation project\. Preliminary preparation work by
both agencies indicated the need for a base-mapping program of similar scale
before either a general resource inventory or a forestry evaluation program
could be carried out effectively\. At that point it was agreed to carry out
further preparation work on a parallel basis, with CIDA assuming responsi-
bility for the small-scale aerial photography, geodetic control work, and
aerial triangulation required for base-mapping, and the Bank for provision of
facilities, equipment, technical assistance, remote sensor im'gery, and
large-scale aerial photography required to complete base-map production and
to undertake systematic resource inventory and evaluation\.
2\. The entity selected to receive both Bank and CIDA assistance was
the National Coordinating Agency for Surveys and Mapping (BAKOSURTANAL) which
was a civilian agency created in 1969\. Its mandate was to carry out a
national program for production of base maps and to provide the basic
cartographic materials for an inventory of the country's national resources\.
It was also charged with coordination of various existing mapping agencies\.
3\. The Bank provided assistance to GOI's preparation activities and
also participated in, or liaised with, CIDA's appraisal mission in June
1974\. Its own appraisal followed in October/November 1974\. Responding to
delays experienced in finalizing CIDA's proposed assistance, the Bank delayed
its own preparation activitie3, because the Bank assistance for base mapping
(on the scale of 1:50,000) provided under Part I of the project depended for
its effectiveness on CIDA's assistance for the small-scale aerial photo-
graphy, geodetic control work, and aerial triangulation provided under Part
II\. To this end, presentation of the project to the Bank's Loan Committee in
April 1975 was accompanied by a proposal that Board presentation not proceed
before signature of a loan agreement between the Government and CIDA\. The
proposed circulation of notice of intention to negotiate was also linked to
further clarification of CIDA's participation\.
- 2 -
4\. Eventually, however, the Bank broke step with CIDA and proceeded
with negotiations (October 1975) and Board presentation (January 1976) for
its Part I of the project, in the expectation that Part 11 would be imple-
mented by 1978 at the latest\. The Bank's loan agreement included assurances
that GOI would assume full responsibility for the financing of Part II, with
Canadian assistance if the then current negotiations proved successful, with
other bilateral assistance if possible, or with its own funds\. The Bank's
reasons for proceeding with Part I at that time, as presented in the SAR
(para\. 1\.02), were: first, its execution would require a longer lead time
than would the execution of Part II; and, second, an ongoing Australian
bilateral assistance program was expected to produce, between 1976 and 1978,
aerial photography and geodetic data covering 20% of the country, much of
which would otherwise remain unprocessed\.
5\. The project assistance (for Part I) covered financing for procure-
ment of cartographic and reproduction equipment and provided support in
building up BAKOSURTANAL through technical assistance and overseas and local
training\. The project components also included civil works, such as
construction of a headquarters complex for the new agency, suitable facili-
ties for printing, storage and cartographic shops, and photographic labora-
tories; large-scale aerial photography to support detailed mapping of spe-
cific areas, as well as remote sensor imagery, including earth satellite
output; and technical services for geodetic control, photo processing and
reproduction\. The total cost of the project (Parts I and II combined) was
estimated at US$46\.0 million, and a Bank loan of US$13\.0 million covered 100%
of the foreign costs of the Bank-assisted potion of the project or 40% of
total foreign exchange costs\.
6\. Subsequently, in April 1978, well into implementation of Part I,
GOI and CIDA signed their loan agreement\.
Implementetion
7\. A brief visit to BAKOSURTANAL's headquarters in Cibinong gives
ready confirmation that the project provided acceptable buildings, impressive
modern equipment and helpful training to staff\. As detailed in the PCR, the
civil works were completed on schedule; the equipment was procured and
installed, albeit with some difficulties; technical assistance and training
were procured more or less as planned; but major problems developed with
base-map production, with adverse effect on charting and resource surveys,
largely as a result of delays in small-scale aerial photography and related
elements of CIDA's Part II of the project\.
8\. Although signature of the CIDA loan agreement took place in April
1978, commencement of small scale aerial photography did not commence until
mid-1981, well after the scheduled completion date for Part I of the project;
-3-
it was completed in December 1983\.1/ These successive delays in Part II of
the project were a major reason why the closing date for the Bank's loan was
extended by two years (PCR, para\. 4\.04), and why base-map production reached
only 19% of expected output (PCR, paras\. 4\.10-4\.12 and Annex A, Table 1)\.2/
In turn, this distortion to the primary physical output of the project--base
maps--was a major reason why the loan proceeds were reallocated in consid-
erable favor of equipment and remote sensor imagery (PCR, Annex A, Table 3);
another reabon was the Bank's compliance with a government preference that
loan proceeds be used primarily for foreign purchases (PCR, para\. 4\.07)\.
Instead of approximately 35% of loan proceeds being used for equipment and
remote sensor imagery as originally planned (allowing for a Ro rata use of
the unallocated category), actual allocations were 66%\. Instead of 38% of
proceeds being used for (large-scale) aerial photography and technical
services, actual allocations were only 3%\.
Impact
9\. The project assisted greatly the development of BAKOSURTANAL as an
institution\. It is disappointing, though, that this accomplishment was not
matched with a similarly successful accomplishment in base-map production\.
10\. The principal constraint to sustainability of project achievements
at completion was the incomplete coverage of small-sca e aerial photography\.
To support BAKOSURTANAL further, the Bank financed a major program of base
mapping and small-scale aerial photography in the Transmigration V project
(Loan 2578-IND), which was approved in June 1985\. These additional measures
provide good assur&ace of sustainability of project achievements\.
1/ The Borrower's comments in Appendix 1 explain that the delays in aerial
photography stemmed from Government's need to renegotiate the terms
under which aircraft services were procured\.
2/ The Borrower has commented as follows in Appendix 1\. "However, with the
completion of the aerial photography of at least 85% of the target area,
BAKOSURTANAL could now provide photomaps as planimetric base maps for
other government agencies when requested, particularly for land resource
inventory to support the transmigration projects\. The 19% of the
expected target base maps are in the forms of printed 5-coloured line
maps, which for the printing itself takes time and absorbed budget,
while in fact not all maps are urgently needed\. The priority was given
to support field surveys as to collect basic data, such as field
completion, names collection, etc\. since the budget was limited\."
II\. MAIN ISSUES
RisKs of Parallel Financing
11\. The two main lessons of this project arise principally out of the
uncertainties and risks of two donor agencies arranging parallel financing
for a single project: in this case, the Part I interest of the World Bank
and the Part II interest 3f CIDA\. First, despite the Bank's clear intent at
the beginning not to lend independently of CIDA, the project experience
reveals a disinclination of the Bank to wait for things to happen\. Given
that there were good reasons for getting started on BAKOSURTANAL staff train-
ing and other aspects of institution building, this impatience of the Bank to
lend should have been acknowledged overtly during project preparation\. That
is, some attention should have been given to preparing an alternative design
of Part I of the project against the contingency that it would have to
proceed independently of Part II\. Second, in the clear absence of this
contingency planning, Bank supervision efforts should have helped to achieve
a reallocation of the loan proceeds that was more favorable to meeting the
base mapping objectives\.
12\. The Bank's appraisal mission emphasized the importance of the tech-
nical linkage between Part I of the project as designed and Part II\. It
recommended that the Bank finance Part II itself if the negotiations between
CIDA and GOI failed\. The internal Decision Meeting following appraisal sup-
ported that recommendation; the Bank's management rejected it\. Had it not
been rejected, the implied promise to GOI of a Bank safety net would have
undermined CIDA's negotiating position considerably\. Hence, the issue of how
to deal with parallel financing risks arose as soon as the two donors became
interested in closely related activities; the rules of good donoring forbade
that one agency should undercut the other\.
13\. As reported in paras\. 4-5, the Bank's (initial) determination to
keep Parts I and II locked together tightly, by waiting for agreement between
GOI and CIDA on Part II before seeking Board approval of finance for Part I,
lasted no more than six months\. The Bank proceeded with financing of Part I
before any agreement on financing for Part II on the plea that it would avoid
delay in the overall Indonesian resource survey and mapping efforts\. It gave
two supporting arguments: first, this provided a longer lead time required by
institution building components included in Part I compared with components
included in Part II; and second, it permitted BAKOSURTANAL to initially
handle some workload created by mapping then being produced through joint
Australian/Indonesian operations in Sumatra and Irian Jaya\. Finally, the
Bank relied on assurances that GOI would itself finance Part II by 1978\. In
the audit's view, the implementation experience of delays in small-scale
photography and of restricted base-map production shows that the early under-
standing of the Bank was correct\. Given the project design and the need for
parallel financing, the Bank should have insisted on a simultaneous cofinanc-
ing agreement or on making the cofinancing agreement a condition of Bank loan
disbursement\.
- 5 -
14\. The Bank's internal instructions on official co-financing, issued
in August 1977, require that the Bank's loan agreement should normally
contain a cross default clause and that effectiveness of the co-financing
should usually be a condition of effectiveness of the Bank's loan\. That is,
had the Bank delayed its lending operation until April 1978, consistent with
its initial determination not to present its proposals for Part I of the
project to the Board before Government and CIDA had signed their loan agree-
ment for Part II, the Bank's operational guidelines would have demanded yet
further guarantees that Parts I and II of the project be executed in close
harmony\. At the time of Board approval of the proposals for Part I (in
January 1976), the only legal guarantees that had been negotiated in respect
of Part II were that GOI would make definitive financing arrangements within
two years of Loan signing (para\. 4)\.
15\. But would it have been reasonable to delay all of Part I for
another two years? The SAR obviously thought it was not (PPAM, para\. 4), and
the audit agrees with the SAR's main concern; namely, that project components
like staff training and institution building efforts generally did not depend
so directly on Part II\. But the audit disagrees that the Bank's change in
posture overall was reasonable\. No apparent efforts were made or had been
made, either to redesign the other components of Part I as a contingency
against Part II being more seriously delayed, or to make progress on Part II
a condition of disbursement for these most affected elements of Part I\. Such
options must have seemed unnecessary at Bank appraisal--CIDA's appraisal had
already taken place--but the risks of parallel financing dictated that Bank
appraisals and the Loan Committee consider such contingencies\. If such
project eventualities are not planned for in situations involving parallel
financing, the Bank will surely face again the reed for choosing between
decidedly second-best courses of action\.
16\. In the audit's view, Bank supervision should have responded more
aggressively to the delays of Part II by identifying jointly with GOI the
emerging key constraints to the effectiveness of Part I and reallocating loan
proceeds accordingly\. For instance, more expenditures on technical services
such as aerial triangulation would have allowed more use to be made of
Australian aerial photography in Sumatra (PCR, paras\. 3\.09 and 4\.07)\.
-6 - Annex 1
NATIONAL COORDINATION AGENCY FOR SURVEYS AND MAPPING
(BAKOSURTANAL)
JI\. Dr\. Wahidin 1/11, Telepon: 359768 -- Jdkarta Pusat
JI\. Rays Jakarta - Boger i(M\. 46 Cibinong
P\.O\. BOX\. ses JAKARTA Telepon (0219) 82082\.82063\.82064-82066\.82068-82007 CAsU AooRs:
P\.O\. OX\. "MC1111NONG I N D 0 N E S I A SAKOSUArANAL JAKARTA PUSAT
TELEXt 44805 BAKOST\. [A SAKOSURTANAL CISINONG
Jakarta, Juny 2, 1986
No\. : 508/IE/VI/1986
International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development ( IBRD)
1818 H Street, N\.W\.
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
U\.S\.A\.
Attn : Mr\. Otto Maiss
Acting Director
Operations Evaluation Departnant
Ref\. : Project Performance Audit Report :
Indonesia National Resource Survey and Mapping
Project ( Loan 1197 - IND )\.
Dear Sir,
I would like to make the following comments on the draft of the Project
Performance Audit Report ( loan 1197 - IND ), as follows:
Para 8, page 4 :
*Although signature of the CIDA loan agreenant took place in April 1978,
conznennaint of small scale aerial photography did not cnuence until
mid-1981 etc\. \.
A conment in this paragraph should be added that the delay is due to a
significance change in the inpletentation of the CIDA/REAP project by
purchasing two dual-canera aircraft\. The original plan was to contract
aerial photography work with hiring two single camera aircraft by the
contractor\. When the acceptable bid received, the GOI found that the
cost figure for hiring aircraft (including standby rate) will at the
end be as much as the price of the aircraft itself\. Hence, why the GOI
proposed to CIDA to purchase two aircraft with a dual-camera ports which
will be the property of the 001 at the end of the project\.
Subsequent discussions with CIDA and the nodification of the aircraft
into a dual camera systen caused the delay until mid-1981\.
- 7 - Annex 1
The decision above seems now advantageous for the GOI since the aircraft
could now be used for other governant s aerial photography projects,
such as in the start-up activity for tranmigration V project\.
Evaluation SguMary, vage v, para D:
Last line : But the output of base maps was only 19% of the expected
target\. *
It sbould be added the following statement : "however, with the ouple-
tion of the aerial photograpsy of at least 85% of the target area ,
<*KOSRTANAL could provide photonaps as planinetric base naps for
other government agencies when requested, particularly for land resource
inventory to support the transmigration projects\. The 19% of the expected
target base naps are in the forus of printed 5-coloured line naps, which
for the printing itself takes tie and absorbed budget, while in fact
not all maps are urgently needed\. The priority was given to support field
surveys as to collect basic data, such as field rmwpletion, names colleo-
tion, etc\. since the budget was limited\.
I highly apreciate your consideration to insert the above ownents or
statenants, so that the Peport will show a true picture of the state*of -
the-art\.
Trusting to have the pleasure of hearing from you, I renain\.
Y s inoerely,
--Prof\. Jacub Rais
Chaitman\.
Cc\. : - The Director
Bank of Indonesia
Desk Bantuan Proyek
31\. M\.H\. Thatrin 8
Jakarta\.
- Menteri Negara Riset & Teknologi
J1\. M\.H\. Thamrin
Jakarta\.
- Mrs\. Buly 0\. Surjaatmadja
Direktur Dana Luar Negeri
Dep\. Keuangan
Jl\. Lapangan Banteng Timur 4
- Mr\. Muchtarudin siregar
Deputy Ketua Bappenas Bidang Ekonomi
Jl\. Tanan Surapati No\. 2
Jakarta\.
- De-I/De-II/Seketaris/apusbinta BARoSURANAL
-8-
THE WORLD BANK
INDONESIA
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
NATIONAL RESOURCE SURVEY AND MAPPING PROJECT
(Loan 1197-IND)
March 12, 1986
Projects Department
East Asia and Pacific Regional Office
- 9 -
INDONESIA
' NATIONAL RESOURCE SURVEY AND MAPPINGPROJECT
(LOAN 1197-IND)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
I\. BACKGROUND
Project Objectives
1\.01 In view of an accelerated development program, in 1973 the Govern-
ment of Indonesia (OI) felt the need to rationalize management of its natural
resources and the relevant environment\. GOI requested Bank assistance in the
design and implementation of a project which would provide the institutional
and physical capabilities to establish and operate an accelerated program of
resource inventory and evaluation\. Simultaneously, a request was made to the
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) for assistance to a national
forest resource evaluation project\.
1\.02 Responsibility for resource mapping had been spread over various
government institutions while topographic mapping was the sole responsibility
of the Army Topographic Service (JANTOP), the survey and mapping division of
the Ministry of Defense\. During the implementation of the First Development
Plan (Pelita I) the need for resource and topographic maps at various scales
was sharply felt\. Because of the scarce systematic map coverage at the time,
various projects had to undertake their own mapping to fulfill their require-
ments\. To reduce the increasing fragmentation of mapping activities and the
resulting low efficiency and inconsistency, a civilian development-oriented
mapping agency was created\. The new agency was made responsible to carry out
a national program for systematic production of base maps and to provide the
base cartographic materials for an inventory of the country's natural
resources\. This National Coordinating Agency for Surveys and Mapping
(BAKOSURTANAL) was entrusted with the effective coordination of various
existing mapping agencies\. To achieve this coordination, the agency would be
provided with equipment to enhance the national capacity for producing base
maps and for supporting resource mapping agencies with specialized services\.
1\.03 GOI's request to the Bank included assistance in (a) the establish-
ment of the new survey and mapping agency; (b) the completion of an accurate
series of geodetically controlled base maps for the country; (c) the produc-
tion of improved aeronautical and navigational charts; and (d) the initiation
of a nationwide resource inventory and evaluation\. The request to CIDA was to
provide the small-scale photography, mapping control and aerotriangulation
services necessary for completion of the base mapping of Indonesia\.
1\.04 The Bank's participation in the project was labelled Part I while
CIDA's contribution constituted Part II\. The preparation for Part I preceded
Part II because of delays in the formulation of the proposed CIDA forestry
studies\. Moreover, Part I input needed the longer lead time required for
- 10 -
construction, procurement of equipment and institution-building components
financed under the proposed Bank-assisted project\. COI also made a firm
commitment to finance Part II, either with Canadian assistance, with other
bilateral assistance if feasible, or with its own funds\.
Project Identification, Preparation and Appraisal
1\.05 Project preparation reports were compiled by GOI with assistance
from Bank missions in July and November of 1973 and in March and May of 1974\.
In addition, a Bank staff member participated in a CIDA mission in June 1974
to coordinate the assistance of both agencies\. The project was appraised in
October/November 1974 and approved by the Board in January 1976\.
1\.06 The project was the first Bank Group project primarily directed to
supporting a national resource survey and evaluation program although similar
activities had been financed on a smaller scale as parts of other Bank-
assisted projects\. The only major issue arising at the time of appraisal was
the uncertainty of CIDA participation\. However, a Decision Meeting held on
December 5, 1975 agreed that, if CIDA dropped out of the project and no other
timely bilateral arrangement for parallel financing could be made, the Bank
would be prepared to finance the full foreign exchange component to allow the
project to proceed as scheduled\. However, the Bank management did not support
the recommendation of the Decision Meeting and Loan Agreement included as
assurance that within two years of loan signing the GOI would make definitive
arrangements satisfactory to the Bank for financing Part II of the project
components\. A Loan Agreement was finally signed by OI and CIDA in April 1978
covering aerial photography of five areas of Indonesia; horizontal control by
Doppler techniques in three areas, and provision of height control by Airborne
Profile Recording (APR) and Aerotriangulation for the other two areas\.
II\. THE PROJECT
Project Components
The project consisted of the following elements:
2\.01 Civil Works\. Contruction of headquarters for BAKOSURTANAL,
including suitable facilities for cartographic and printing shops and for
photographic laboratories\.
2\.02 Equipment\. Procurement of cartographic, printing, imagery
interpretation, and other equipment required for both map production and
reconnaissance resource evaluation\.
2\.03 Aerial Photography\. Production of aerial photography at scales of
1:50,000 and larger covering about 300,000 square kilometers, and about
950,000 square kilometers at zicale 1:100,000\.
2\.04 Remote Sensing\. Procuremnt of remote sensor imagery, including
earth satellite output covering the national territory\.
- 11 -
2\.05 Cartographic Control\. Extension throughout the country of the
primary, secondary and tertiary geodetic control network and aerial
trangulation of all areas flown\.
2\.06 Technical Services\. Contracting of qualified firms for geodetic
control, photo processing and reproduction, and for map production of
delineated areas\.
2\.07 Technical Assistance\. Engagement of individual experts to provide
technical assistance to BAKOSURTANAL in geodesy, aerial photography, carto-
graphy, printing processes and resource evaluation for a total of about 12
man-years\.
2\.08 Training\. Provision of 49 man-years of overseas training for senior
technical and professional staff of BAKOSURTANAL, and 111 man-years of
training in the country for staff technicians\.
Mapping and Resource Survey Operations
2\.09 The expected output of the provision to BAKOSURTANAL of the above
listed civil works, equipment, materials, technical services and assistance,
and staff training could be divided into the following three categories:
(a) Base-Map Production\. Planimetric base maps were expected to be
produced at 1:50,000 scale for the Islands of Java, Bali, Nusa
Tenggara, the Moluccas, Sulawesi and the unmapped portions of
Kalimantan\. Maps covering Irian Jaya and the unmapped portions of
Sumatra at the same scale were expected to be produced for
BAKOSURTANAL using qualified survey firms\. The equipment to be
provided was expected to enable BAKOSURTANAL to add topographic
contours to the base maps of specific areas to be studied
intensively\.
(b) Charting Operations\. The projet provided for the production of
urgently needed aeronautical and maritime navigational charts keyed
to the new base maps and the geodetic data\. Charting work prior-
ities were to be established by the Department of Communications\.
Use of satellite imagery was envisaged to assist in the preparation
of navigational guides and bulletins and in updating of existing
charts\.
(c) Regional Resource Surveys\. Small-scale mapping, photography and
satellite imagery were to be used as a base for resource and
environmental analysis at the reconnaissance level\. Field surveys
were to be conducted by various field teams, including staff from
the line agencies and universities, under the planning and direction
of BAKOSURTANAL\.
- 12 -
2\.10 the mapping and resource survey operations were planned for a five-
year period with base map production beginning in 1977, chart production in
1978, and regional resource surveys as early as 1976\. The appraisal report
did not attempt to establish clearly defined targets for each of these
activities\. However, there is an implied expectation throughout the project
description that most if not all of the coverage would be completed by the end
of the fifth program year\.
Organization and Management
2\.11 BAKOSURTANAL was responsible for implementation of the project\. The
Agency is administered by a Chairman, who is responsible for overall project
administration and coordination of the various components, assisted by four
deputies, responsible for base mapping, special maps and char:s, resource
evaluation and systems management\.
2\.12 The Base Mapping Deputy is responsible for base mapping operations,
including photogrammetric compilation and map production and reproduction, as
well as for topographic plotting of specific areas\. Most of the aerial photo-
graphy, geodesy, and aerial triangulation work was expected to be performed by
contract with suitable firms\. The Deputy for Special Maps and Charts is
responsible for the program of aeronautical and navigational charting in close
cooperation with the Department of Communications\. The Deputy for Resource
Evaluation is responsible for compilation of existing resource-related
materials; analysis of satellite imagery and aerial photography; design and
coordination of field surveys of regional resource potential; thematic
mapping, and desk studies to synthesize information from these various sources
and present it on the new national base-map series\.
2\.13 The staff of BAKOSURTANAL at the time of appraisal incuded 21
professionals, 13 technicians and 11 administrative clerks\. These numbers
were expected to grow to a total of 90 professionals, 130 technicians and the
proportionate number of administrative staff by June 1980\. The emphasis on
staff strengthening and institution building was through the technical
assistance and training components of the project\. This assistance was sup-
plemented further through several bilateral programs sponsoring training in
project related fields to staff recruited from the ranks of university
graduates and of military officers retiring from the technical mapping
services\. To ensure the efficient use of the training facilities available, a
Training Officer was to be appointed by BAKOSURTANAL\.
III\. PROJECT EVALUATION
General Assessment
3\.01 Overview\. The nature of the project and the fact of this being the
Bank's first experience in supporting the establishment of a resource survey
and mapping agency create a special situation in terms of evaluating the
project's impact\. It is difficult to measure progress of various components
during implementation as no key indicators or measurable target dates were
provided in the appraisal and supervision reports\. However, the project
achieved its major objective of assisting the GOI in establishing and
- 13 -
strengthening a national agency capable of producing the base maps and if
coordinating the resource surveys required to efficiently implement the
Government's ambitious development plans\.
3\.02 It is apparent that Appraisal expectations of the time required to
achieve the desirable coverage in both base mapping and resource survey may
have been too optimistic, but to what degree cannot be ascertained since there
is no clear indication of what the expected output of each activity was to
be\. The completion of the full task in both areas is dependent on a number of
isolated contributions from different sources, which required close coordina-
tion and full cooperation of various agencies outside BAKOSURTANAL\. Given a
short period of a few years it is too much to expect that a new agency would
build a viable institution of national repute, achieve difficult coordination
and produce base maps for the entire country\.
3\.03 Changes were introduced during project implementation, particularly
in terms of equipment to be procured and technologies to be applied\. This was
to be expected in a field where improvements in technology often occur at a
faster rate than the programs it is intended to serve\. An attempt has been
made to select a number of key indicators (Annex A, Table 1) to provide a
measure of comparist between appraisal expectations and actual achievements\.
3\.04 As a gener 1 assessment, the project contributed positively to the
establishment of a L linating mapping and survey agency and provided highly
suitable installations -i equipment to carry out its professional responsi-
bilities\. These achievements outweigh any shortfalls in the expected targets
for mapping and resource survey operations\. These positive results also
include a wider coverage of aerial photography than originally envisioned,
largely through the inputs of the CIDA-assisted Resource Evaluation and Aerial
Photography Project (REAP) and the Australian bilateral assistance; production
of topographic base maps covering about 20% of the total land area, and a
number of special maps and studies carried out to assist programs in commun-
ications, transmigration, and other users\. The operational capacity of
BAKOSURTANAL was strengthened through the technical assistance component\. The
training component has contributed not only to supply the required quality of
staff for the executing agency but to strengthen other governmental institu-
tions, universities and some private companies\. In addition, this component
contributed to the strengthening of an existing training center and to the
establishment of a new one\. Among the many indirect impacts is the establish-
ment by BAKOSURTANAL and the National Institute for Aeronautics and Space
(LAPAN) of a national remote sensing program\.
3\.05 As in the case of base-map production, charting operations and
regional resource surveys have lagged behind appraisal expectations\. But in a
complex and interrelated operation, some activities could not advance without
the input of other activities\. The aerial photography, therefore, became a
serious constraint to the progress of charting, base mapping, and resource
survey\. Special maps and charts could only be prepared when the required
basic data was available\. BAKOSURTANAL has recently reviewed the situation
and proposed a program to complete the basic topographic map coverage of the
country in a period of seven years\. This program is based on the use of the
new completed aerial photography covering about 80% of the country, 90% of
- 14 -
which has ground control\. A four year tranche of this program is being
proposed as one of the main components under the Transmigration V project\. In
addition, ADB has recently approved financing of US$23\.4 million to support a
Land Resources Evaluation and Planning Project to strengthen BAKOSURTANAL in
the areas of reso,;rce survey and evaluation and in establishing a resource
data center and information network\.
3\.06 The limited capacity of BAKOSURTANAL still remains an issue in
relation to the ambitious GOI national development plan\. This plan places
increasingly higher demands on the mapping agency to deliver the base mADs and
resource data needed by the line agencies for their specific work\. The major
difficulty lies in the inter-agency coordination and commonly known inter-
departmental jealousy, which do not make this task any simpler\. This raises a
question on the original concept of a central and independent mapping agency
capable of servicing the country's needs\. The answer to this question can
only be given in the dynamics of the established trend\. At the date of
project completion, BAKOSURTANAL had not reached the full level of capacity
that would allow it to respond to all the requirements for mapping and
resource data if this demand came at once\. But this capacity has been slowly
increasing and it is reasonable to expect that it will develop with the
developing demand\. Problems of inter-agency coordination still persist, but
with the period of installation and familiarization with the new technologies
practically over, there has been in recent years a noticeable emphasis by the
agency on its role as a service institution\.
3\.07 In judging the effectiveness of the original concept, one must
consider two alternatives: (a) placing the mapping facilities in one of the
line agencies or (b) creating a multiplicity of such facilities in the user
agencies\. The first approach may have benefitted from an already organized
managerial staff, but would have made the coordinating role much more diffi-
cult\. The second alternative could have satisfied the demand at a shorter
term, but at the expense of cartographic consistency and quality and at a much
higher cost\.
Project Costs and Benefits
3\.08 Project Costs\. An attempt has been made (Annex A, Table 2) to
quantify project costs based on reported expenditures from BAKOSURTANAL's own
budget and on actual disbursements from loan proceeds\. The result is a total
cost of US$45\.6 million, practically the same as the appraisal estimate of
US$46 million\. These costs, however, represent substantial reallocation of
funds from aerial photography, training and technical services categories
mainly to equipment and civil works\. They do not include contributions from
other sources such as the C$21 million for aerial photography and triangu-
lation provided by Canadian assistance, nor the contribution of the Australian
Government to JANTOP's mapping efforts or the training and technical
assistance received through bilateral assistance\.
3\.09 Frequent reallocation of loan proceeds (Annex A, Table 3) was the
consequence of some project components, such as large scale photography and
training, being provided using either OI budgetary allocations or bilateral
assistance such as CIDA, the Netherlands and Australia\. BAKOSURTANAL also
- 15 -
preferred to use loan funds for expansion of mapping, data processing and
imagery interpretation equipment, thus rendering most of the technical
services unnecessary\.
3\.10 The costs, however, were generally within the range estimated at
appraisal and are consistent, except for quantity of base map production, with
appraisal expectations\.
Project Benefits
3\.11 It is difficult to quantify the benefits of the project, which
explains why no attempt was made to estimate an economic rate of return during
appraisal\. Benefits deriving from more accurate mapping and resource infor-
mation to such nationally important programs as communications, both maritime
and aerial transport, transmigration, agriculture, forestry, public works,
etc\. can only be inferred from some of the work achieved during the project
implementation period\. These include aerial photographic coverage of 80% of
the country; topographic base maps for about 20% of the same area; compilation
of resource maps from data already available with some central government
agencies or at the provincial level, or through the use of remote sensing
techniques, and resource evaluation studies for specific areas at request of
various agencies, such as the Ministry of Transmigration, the Directorate
General of Estates, and others\.
3\.12 The capacities envisioned for BAKOSURTANAL at appraisal have been
expanded to include the establishment of a resources data base using the
COMARC System\. The system is used to digitize, georeference, edit and store
computerized data for national and regional planning and resource management
use\. The installation of digital mono compilation techniques (DIPIX) facili-
tates interpretation of satellite imagery and aerial photography without
having to wait for the final base map\. At present some of the facilities
provided and equipment installed are not used to their full potential, these
capabilities and facilities may soon prove insufficient if the most recent
trend and wish of BAKOSURTANAL to increase the service to line agencies
continues\.
3\.13 Some of the benefits that can be foreseen in the near future include
the use of BAKOSURTANAL facilities in support of the agroecological mapping to
be carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture with ADB assistance\. A program
support plan is being discussed between the mapping agency and the transmigra-
tion authorities and some initial activities have already commenced\. Terms of
reference have been formulated by Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) for
a national, crop specific, climato-ecological zone mapping based on the use of
BAKOSURTANAL systems and maps\.
3\.14 Coordination efforts have improved which can be observed in the
request to BAKOSURTANAL from the Ministry for Demography and Environment to
coordinate the mapping aspects of an interdepartmental effort\. The objective
of such effort is to reach a consensus between the Ministry of Forestry, the
Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of Transmigration, and the Directorate
General of Agraria, on forest area zoning and to achieve compatibility between
the maps produced by the various agencies\. To this effect, a formal agreement
- 16 -
of cooperation was recently signed with the Directorate General of Air Commu-
nications and similar agreements are expected shortly with the Directorates
General of Transmigration Planning, Forest Inventory and Forest Land use\.
3\.15 Finally, the training and technical assistance components of the
project have had a significant beneficial impact not only on BAKOSURTANAL but
also on other agencies and universities, and on some private mapping com-
panies\. The fact that some of the trained personnel both professional and
technicians were absorbed by private firms with better remuneration is proof
of the success of the training program and of the widespread need for training
in the project-related disciplines\. At the same time, such staff losses have
not impeded the development of BAKOSURTANAL\. In view of the professional
development and beneficial impact expressed above, the primary objective of
institution building was attained\.
IV\. IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS
4\.01 The creation of a new agency, particularly when its expected respon-
sibilities coincide or overlap with existing agencies, cannot be expected to
be problem-free\. The Indonesian Army Topographic Service (JANTOP) has worked
closely and in full collaboration with BAKOSURTANAL which can be cited as
clear evidence of the soundness of the original concept of a new civilian
mapping agency\. To the normal establishment problems one has to add the
introduction of new technologies, the lack of trained staff to handle a wide
variety of instruments without experience in their operation or maintenance,
and the pressure created by the increasing demand for mapping output\. When
all these are taken into consideration, the problems of implementation,
exasperating as they must have been at the time of occurrence, appear to have
been surprisingly few\.
Civil Works
4\.02 After some initial delays in construction of headquarters facilities
at Cibinong, the work acquired momentum and was completed on schedule\.
Additional construction for mapping and storage facilities were required, but
these constituted only a minor increase of the programmed civil works\. It is
felt that housing provided under the project was insufficient and may have
contributed to the loss of some trained and competent staff\. This is
confirmed by the agency's statement in its own Project Completion Report that
additional housing for staff is needed\.
Equipment
4\.03 Procurement of equipment tended to lag initially, a not uncommon
occurrence in Indonesia\. However, most of the basic equipment delivery was
timely in relation to the completion of the civil works facilities\. Some
delay in the use of procured equipment has been reported due to inefficient
and at times inadequate air conditioning, insufficient dehumidification and
voltage fluctuations\. Numerous revisions were made to the equipment as a
consequence of perceived needs or the recommendation by experts\. Of these,
the procurement of a COMARC Resources Information System and a DIPIX Image
Analysis System seem to have been the most debated\. Installation of the
- 17 -
COMRAC system encountered numerous difficulties due to inadequate electric
voltage, unavailability of spare parts, and lack of staff experienced with
this system in the agency and in the Indonesian branch of the supplier\.
However, by early 1982 the system was operational and only then was it evident
that the resource data needed to use it beneficially and to its full potential
was not available\. Comparatively the DIPIX system installed one year later,
was put into use more rapidly because by then a number of satellite images and
the aerial photography for the relevant area were available\.
Aeral Photography
4\.04 Obtaining aerial photography, possibly the least complex of the
original components, not only encountered serious delays but, what is most
important, became the bottleneck to mapping and other operations\. The causes
for the serious delay in this component are multiple and need only be
summarized here in general terms\. At the time of appraisal, it was clearly
understood that CIDA would assist BAKOSURTANAL with the aerial photography
but, in case that agreement had not been reached by 1978 Government of
Indonesia would arrange other financing\. The agreement was signed on
April 5, 1978 for C$21\.0 million to cover the geodetic survey and aerial
photography of Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Java, Bali and Nusa Tenggara\. However,
because of lengthy discussions between the two parties on the terms of the
contract for the aerial photography, work was not commenced until mid-1981 and
completed in December 1983 when coveeage reached about 80% of the country
(Annex B, Table 1)\. This delay had an adverse impact on mapping and resource
survey operations and was the primary reason to extend the loan closing date
to December 31, 1983\. CIDA assistance was later extended to complete the
aerial triangulation of the areas flown\.
Remote Sensing
4\.05 In the field of remote sensing no major problems were encountered,
although the technique is not as yet been used widely by BAKOSURTANAL\. A
multi-stage remote-sensing technique was developed under the project\. An
experiment of its use was carried out in Lombok which served as a model for
similar exercises during regional resource surveys in the Other Islands\. The
installation of the DIPIX imagery analyris system increased the capacity of
the agency to utilize satellite images and aerial photographs\.
Cartographic Control
4\.06 The extension of the geodetic control network and of aerial
triangulation has lagged behind appraisal expectations\. The factors contri-
buting to these delays were the late start of aerial photography (para\. 4\.04),
the use of satellite radar altimeter data to substitute for the originally
planned Airborne Profile Recording System (APR) to obtain height information,
and the gaps in photography for the areas which remain under cloud cover all
year-round\. Radar mapping has been suggested as an alternative for these
areas but there is at present no expertise in BAKOSURTANAL with this technol-
ogy\. The introduction of the Doppler satellite positioning techniques
facilitated the establishment of horizontal control and the system will be
used in a survey and demarcation of the international boundary between
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea\.
- 18 -
Technical Services
4\.07 The original allocation for technical services was intended to speed
up the work of geodetic control by Doppler techniques and for map production
from source materials other than those obtained from the Bank or CIDA assist-
ance\. However, in compliance with a Government guidance that loan proceeds
are to be primarily used for acquisition of goods or services not available in
the country, only a minor portion of the allocation (US$26,265\.70) was spent
under this category\. The rest was reallocated to the purchase of map produc-
tion materials\.
Technical Assistance
4\.08 No significant problem has been reported on this component which
made a substantial contribution to the success of the project\. Long- and
short-term technical assistance provided to BAKOSURTANAL is shown in Annex B,
Table 2)\.
Training
4\.09 The training component did not encounter any difficulty and achieved
a total of 52\.5 man-years of overseas training, a slight increase over the
appraisal plan, and 448 man-years of in-country training, four times the
originally estimated number (Annex 8, Table 3)\. This training, however, was
largely financed from sources other than the Bank loan and part of the alloca-
ted funds for training were used instead for technical assistance and other
purposes\.
Base-map Production
4\.10 Base-map production, the very core of the project's output, faced
more difficulties and delays during implementation\. This delay had adverse
effect on other dependent outputs such as charts and resource surveys\.
Because BAKOSURTANAL realized the need to make progress in map production, an
early decision was taken to extend the appraisal date for hiring a resource
survey expert in order to advance the contract of a cartographic printing
specialist\. As soon as the agency's headquarters were completed and the
equipment avilable, BAKSOURTANAL proceeded to prepare base topographic maps
using the aerial photography then available from JANTOP with Australian
assistance\.
4\.11 The delay in map production was further aggravated by unexpected
delays in the Australian inputs to plotting and printing, as well as to the
aerial triangulation for Irian Jaya maps\. The early suspension of the
Australian assistance and the delay in initiation of the CIDA aerial photo-
graphy left a period of several months when no further photographic material
was obtained from which to produce base maps\. By end of Pelita III, in April
1984, the total coverage of basic topographic mapping had reached about 20% of
the country\. However, mapping of Irian Jaya, which represents 9% of the total
coverage achieved, is only provisional, without field checking (Annex B,
Table 4)\.
- 19 -
4\.12 BAKSOURTANAL reassessed its program as a result of this substantial
lag in base-map production and repeated requests by the Bank supervision
mission\. The revised program calls for the production of photomaps in a
period of three years and line maps in seven years\. Assistance for a four-
year tranche of the proposed program has been incorporated as a component in
the proposed Transmigration V project which was appraised in November 1984\.
ChartingOperations
4\.13 The hydrographic charting and aeromagnetic operations are being
carried out under a bilateral agreement betwein Indonesia and the United
States\. Survey work is expected by the Indonesian Army Topographic Service
(JANTOP), Naval Hydrographic office, the US Defense Mapping Agency and the US
Navy Oceanographic Office\. BAKOSURTANAL's role is largely one of budgetary
support and reproduction of the resulting charts\. In the context of this
program, three bathymetric maps have been produced at scale 1:250,000 as well
as reproducible mats of nine maps of other areas\. Five sheets of the aero-
magnetic survey have been printed and seven additional sheets are in final
cartographic stage\.
4\.14 Lack of a clear designation of responsibility was one cause of delay
in the production of aeronautical charts\. Since this was assigned to
BAKOSURTANAL in cooperation with the Directorate General of Air Communication,
a progr4m has been initiated to update information on all airfields\. Aerial
photography of a total of 36 airfields has been taken and aeromosaics and
flight books of 29 airfields were completed (Annex B, Table 5)\.
Regional Resource Surveys
4\.15 This component has suffered delays due to lack of the basic photo-
graphic material and the complexity of the field teams for thematic data\.
Nevertheless, some progress has been made, representing a coverage of about
30% of the national territory for nine disciplines including soils, geology,
groundwater hydrology, climatology, drainage, administration, population, land
cover and road network (Annex B, Table 6)\. BAKOSURTANAL has also provided
special services to such agencies as the Directorates of Archeology and the
Directorate General of Estates\. These services included studies related to
landuse changes in the provinces of Jambi, South Sumatra and East and West
Kalimantan And the mapping of about 179,000 ha of sago in Irian Jaya,
200,000 a of smallholder rubber in Jambi, and extensive areas of coconut in
South Sulawesi\.
4\.16 The major problem encountered during resource survey is that of
coordination among the many agencies involved in resource-related mapping and
the recognition of BAKOSURTANAL as the coordinator for these activities and
the repository for resource information\. During the initial period of
implementation the problem was more pronounced but has gradually reduced and a
marked difference in attitude both on the part of BAKOSURTANAL and of some of
the user agencies has taken place in the last two or three years\. This change
became noticeable as soon as BAKOSURTANAL started paying more attention to its
role as a service institution and signed increasing number of agreements of
cooperation with line agencies of the Government\. The establishment of an
- 20 -
automated mapping system in BAKOSURTANAL will increase the coordination
between the agency and the map users, because map data and information stored
with the topographic data bank can be made available on request\. The computer-
ized Information and Documentation System for Aerial Photos and Maps
(INDOFOTA) is also a recent introduction to provide service to the agencies
and the public in general\.
4\.17 The problem of inter-agency coordination is not fully resolved but
the trend of improvement is encouraging as with many other aspects of the
project\. The forthcoming Transmigration project, with its map-production
component, provides an opportunity for increased contact between BAKOSURTANAL
and the Ministry of Transmigration\. Only when BAKOSURTANAL has been able to
convince the other mapping agencies of its role of support rather than
competition, will the desired coordination be achieved\. This objective will
be further supported by the approved Land Resource Evaluation and Planning
Project, with ADB assistance\.
Procurement and Disbursement
4\.18 Problems related to procurement of project equipment were minor and
delivery of the equipment was timely\. After a slow disbursement period in
1977-81 when only 58% of the loan had been disbursed, the disbursement pace
improved in the last two years of project completion bringing it to a total of
992 at loan closing date (Annex A, table 4)\. An undisbursed balance of
US$137,565\.31 of the loan amount was cancelled\.
V\. ASSESSMENT OF BANK PERFORMANCE AND LESSONS LEARNED
5\.01 The project was well appraised and the creation of an independent
resource survey and mapping agency as proposed by GOI was justified\. Project
implementation was strongly assisted by Bank supervision missions\. In the
early stages, when installation of facilities and new technologies was taking
place, project supervision from Bank headquarters supplied much needed
experience in the technical aspects of project implementation\. Once the
agency became functional, supervision was carried out from the Resident Staff
in Indonesia (RSI) thus allowing for a closer contact with operations and
providing opportunities to influence closer coordination between BAKOSURTANAL
and the user line agencies\. The latter stages of supervision contributed to
the agency's increased emphasis on its service role\. Appraisal expectations
to complete mapping and survey work for the entire country within five years
were unrealistic, but they were not reflected as targets indicating the
mission's understanding of the many factors influencing project output during
the project implementation period\. The main objectives of institution
building, however, were achieved as planned at appraisal\.
5\.02 The main lessons learned under the project are as follows:
(a) in appraising a project of this type, some level of targets and key
indicators for expected project output should be established to
provide a reference base for supervision and completion efforts
(para\. 3\.01);
- 21 -
(b) problems of inter-agency coordination could be reduced in cases
where a new agency is being established and a possible overlap of
responsibilities is perceived, by involving the user agencies in the
early stages of project implementation (para\. 4\.16); and
(c) Bank support to establish resource survey and mappirtg agencies is
justified, particularly in terms of its positive impact on the
country's development plan, but require substantial amounts of
specialized supervision (para 5\.01)\.
5\.03 In retrospect, the project was well conceived, allowing for changes
in equipment which were difficult to have been foreseen, and successfully
implemented in terms of its institution building objectiver\. The long-term
benefits to be derived from the services provided by BAKOSURTANAL to the
Government's development plan will depend on the sustained and increasing
capacity of the mapping agency to deliver the required services and in the
willingness of the user agencies to accept its coordinating role\. The Bank
can contribute substantially to achieve these objectives even after project
completion, through implementation of new projects requiring inputs of base
mapping and/or resource survey and evaluation\.
22-
ANNEX A
Table 1
- 23 -
INDONESIA
NATIONAL RESOURCE SURVEY AND MAPPING PROJECT (LOAN 1197-IND)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Key Indicators
Actual
as % of
Unit SAR Actual SAR
Aerial Photography km2 11250,000 1,580,500 126
Large-scale (1:50,000) km 300,000 205,900 68
Small-scale (1:100,000) km2 950,000 1,374,600 144
Aerial Trian&!lation /a km2 1,250,000 n\.a\. n\.a\.
Level lines network 7b km 32,000 -\.a\. n\.a\.
Technical Assistance m/M 204 244 120
Training /c
Overseas m/yr 49 52\.5 107
Local m/yr 111 488 439
Mapping and Resource Survey Operations
Base-map Production sheet/d 3,652/L 725 19
Charting Operations /a - - -
Regional Resource Surveys sheet/f 4,600/ 1,374 30
/a Aerial triangulation has not started pending covering of existing gaps\.
7T Considerable work was done but no information is available on length of level
lines achieved\.
/c Actual includes training funded by Bank loan and from other sources\.
7- Topographic sheets\.
7W No quantifiable information available\.
7-f Thematic sheets\.
7 The SAR does not quantify the expected coverage of these operations\. Actual
coverage is an estimated percentage of SAR expectations\.
INDONESIA
NATIONAL RESOURCE SURVEY AND MAPPING PROJECT (LOAN 1197-IND)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Project Cost Summary
Appraisal Estimate Actual Actual as
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total of Appraisal
(US$ million) (US$ million) estimates
Civil Works /b 1\.5 1\.1 2\.6 3\.6 1\.8 5\.4 208
Surveys and Mapping
Base mapping 0\.6 17\.8 18\.4 12\.4 - 12\.4 67
Inventory of natural resources 3\.5 0\.6 4\.1 7\.5 - 7\.5 183
Hydrographic surveys - - - 3\.4 - 3\.4 340
Equipment and remote sensing imagery 1\.6 4\.5 6\.1 0\.4 8\.6 9\.0 148
Technical Services 1\.8 1\.7 3\.5 0\.1 0\.1 0\.2 6
Large-scale aerial photography 2\.2 2\.5 4\.7 0\.1 0\.2 0\.3 6
Subtotal 9\.7 27\.1 36\.8 3\.9 8\.9 32\.8 89
Consultants and Training /c 0\.7 3\.7 4\.4 1\.8 2\.2 4\.0 91
Administrative and Overhead 1\.9 0\.3 2\.2 3\.4 - 3\.4 155
GRAND TOTAL 13\.8 32\.2 46\.0 32\.7 12\.9 45\.6 99
/a Local costs have been converted to US dollars using yearly average exchange rates (Annex B, Table 7)\.
71T Includes civil works under the loan and infrastructure financed directly by GOI\.
7c- Includes both overseas and local training\.
ANNEX A
-25 - Table 3
INDONESIA
NATIONAL RESOURCE SURVEY AND MAPPING OROJECT (LOAN 1197-IND)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Allocation of Loan Proceeds
(US$ million)
Original
allocation Actual use
US$ % US$ %
Civil works 1\.0 8 1\.8 13
Equipment and remote sensor imagery 3\.9 30 8\.6 66
Aerial photography 2\.6 20 0\.2 2
Consultants and overseas training 2\.0 15 2\.3 18
Technical services 1\.5 12 0\.1 1
Unallocated 2\.0 15 - -
Total 13\.0 100 12\.9 99 /a
/a After Loan Closing Date, an undisbursed amount of US$137,565\.31 was
cancelled\.
- ANNEX A
Table 4
INDONESIA
NATIONAL RESOURCE SURVEY AND MAPPING PROJECT (LOAN 1197-IND)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Disbursement Schedule
(US$ million)
Appraisal estimate Actual
Bank Cummu- % of Cummu- % of
FY Annual lative total loan Annual lative total loan
1977 0\.3 0\.3 3 0\.2 0\.2 2
1978 2\.9 3\.2 25 1\.0 1\.2 9
1979 4\.7 7\.9 61 3\.6 4\.8 37
1980 2\.9 10\.8 83 1\.2 6\.0 46
1981 2\.1 12\.9 99 1\.5 7\.5 58
1982 0\.1 13\.0 100 1\.2 8\.7 67
1983 - - - 2\.3 11\.0 85
1984 /a - - - 1\.9 12\.9 99/b
/a The extended loan closing date of December 31, 1983 was not changed\. How-
ever, withdrawal applications were accepted until June 30, 1984\.
/b An undisbursed balance of US$137,565\.31 was cancelled after expiration of
the loan closing date, on August 1, 1984\.
ANNEX B
- 27 - Table 1
INDONESIA
NATIONAL RESOURCE SURVEY AND MAPPING PROJECT (LOAN 1197-IND)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Aerial Photography
Total Area Area
agae coered covered
(km 000) (km"'00) (%)
Scale 1:50,000
Jawa and Bali 137\.8 137\.8 100
Nusa Tenggara 68\.1 68\.1 100
(Barat and Timur)
Timor Timur 14\.6 - -
Subtotal 220\.5 205\.9 93
Scale 1:100,000
Sumatera 473\.7 426\.3 94
Kalimantan 539\.5 323\.7 60
Sulawesi 189\.2 170\.3 90
Maluku 74\.5 74\.5 100
Irian Jaya 422\.0 379\.8 90
Subtotal 1,698\.9 1,374\.6 81
GRAND TOTAL 1,919\.4 1,580\.5 82
/a Area of aerial photographic coverage has been calculated from BAKOSURTANAL
percentages of coverage for each island or group of islands\.
ANNEX B
- 28 - Table 2
INDONESIA
NATIONAL RESOURCE SURVEY AND MAPPING PROJECT (LOAN 1197-IND)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Technical Assistance
Year Special- Dura-
ists tion m/m
(months)
Long Term /a
Resource survey and mapping 1976/79 1 36 36
Remote sensing 1976/78 1 24 24
Cartography and map reproduction 1976/79 1 36 36
Orthophoto production (/b) 1 12 12
Regional surveys 1977780 1 36 36
Supervision and management of
photogrammetric, orthophoto
and triangulation equipment 1978/81 1 36 36
Information systems network 1979/80 2 3 6
COMARC system 1980/81 2 9 18
Urban mapping 1982 1 6 6
Subtotal 210
Short Term
Aerial triangulation, automated 1979 4 1 4
cartography, aerial photography
Aerial triangulation, procurement (/b) (/b) (/b) 24
and design of training programs
Readjustment and leveling of 1979 2 1 2
geodetic networks
DIPIX Digital Analysis System 1983 2 2 4
Subtotal 34
GRAND TOTAL 244
/a Assistance of six months or longer is considered long-term,
7b- Information not available\.
ANNEX
- 29 -
INDONESIA
NATIONAL RESOURCE SURVEY AND MAPPING PROJECT (LOAN 1197-IND)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Training
BAKOSURTANAL Non-BAKOSURTANAL
staff staff Total
P T m/yr P T m/yr P T m/yr
Overseas Training
Aerial Photography - 1 0\.5 1 - 1\.0 1 1 1\.
Aerial/Engineering 4 3 3\.5 ~ - - 4 3- 3\.
Aerial Survey Navigation - - - 3 - 0\.3 3 - 0\.
Cartography and Map Reproduction 4 3 3\.5 5 - 5\.0 9 3 8\.
Cargography/Thematic 4 4 4\.0 - - - 4 4 4\.
Computer Science 7 2 4\.5 2 - 0\.6 9 2 5\.
Doppler Satellite Surveys - - - 2 - 0\.2 2 - 0\.
Earth and Social Sciences 3 - 1\.5 - - - 3 - 1\.
Geodesy 11 - 5\.5 - - - 11 - 5\.
Geography 1 - 1\.0 - - - 1 - 1\.
Geomorphology 1 - 1\.0 - - - 1 - 1\.
Photogrammetry 3 6 4\.5 11 - 12\.0 14 6 16\.
Remote sensing 7 - 3\.5 - - - 7 - 3\.
Remote/Application - - - 3 - 0\.4 3 - 0\.
Subtotal 45 19 33\.0/b 27 - 19\.5/c 72 19 52\.
Local Training
School for Photogrammetric and - 102 276 - 276 102 350\.
Cartographic Operators
Training Center for Remote Sensing
Image Interpretation and
Integrated Surveys 15 - 133 - 148 - 138\.
Subtotal 15 102 409 - 424 102 488\.
GRAND TOTAL 60 121 436 - 496 121 540\.
/a Includes staff from University of Indonesia, University of Gadjah Mada, Army Topographic
Service, Bandung Institute of Technology and State Aerial Photography Enterprise\.
/b Includes 33 professionals and 12 technicians for 22\.5 man/yr funded under the Bank loan,
7 Includes five professionals and 0\.5 man'yr funded under the Bank loan\.
7T Includes staff from 12 government agencies and private companies\.
Te Includes staff from 16 government agencies and private companies\.
INDONESIA
NATIONAL RESOURCE SURVEY AND MAPPING PROJECT (LOAN 1197-IND)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Base-Map Production
Region I /a Region II /b Region III /c Total
No\. of Completed No\. of Completed No\. of Completed No\. of Completed
sheets Sheets % sheets Sheets % sheets Sheets 7 sheets Sheets %
Scale 1:25,000
Jawa and Balit - - - 877 - - - - - 877 - -
Scale 1:50,000
Sumatera 835 524 62 - - - - 835 524 62
Kalimantan 804 137 17 - - - - - - 804 137 17
Nusa Tenggara - - - 192 - - - - - 192 - -
Sulawesi - - - - - - 436 - - 436 - -
Timor Timur - - - 25 - - - - - 25 - -
Maluku - - - - - - 276 - - 276 - -
Subtotal 1,639 661 40 217 712 - 2,568 661 25
Scale 1:100,000
Irian Jaya - - - - - - 207 64/d 30 207 64 30
Total 1,639 661 40 1,094 - - 919 64 6 3,652 725 19
/a Includes Sumatra and Kalimantan\.
lb Includes Java, Bali, Nusa Tenggara Barat and Timur, and Timor Timur\.
7c Includes Sulawesi, Maluku and Irian Jaya\.
7W Provisional maps without field checking\.
ANNEX B
- 31 - Table 5
INDONESIA
NATIONAL RESOURCE SURVEY AND MAPPING PROJECT (LOAN 1197-IND)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
-Charting Operations
Area
Units Scale Completed\. surveyed Total completed
Hydrographic Charting
Bathymetric Maps 1:250,000 3 7 16/a 18
Repromats Sheets - 4 - --
Navigational charts Sheets - 11 (updated) - -
Aeromagnetic survey Sheets 1:250,000 12 5 5
Aeronautical Charting
Aerophotos Airfields 1:20,000 36 1
Mosaics Airfields - 29
Airfields - 29
/a In addition, 19 areas are being charted by the U\.S\. Defense Mapping Agency and the
U\.S\. Navy Oceanographic Office\.
INDONESIA
NATIONAL RESOURCE SURVEY AND MAPPING PROJECT (LOAN 1197-IND)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Regional Resource Survey
Region I /a Region II /b Region III /c Total
No\. of Completed No\. of Completed No\. of Completed No\. of Completed
sheets Sheets % sheets Sheets % sheets Sheets % sheets Sheets %
Soils 100 17 17 40 8 20 110 - - 250 25 10
Geology /d 500 127 25 200 - - 550 - - 1,250 127 10
Groundwater /e 200 33 16 80 - - 220 - - 500 33 6 t>
Climatology 7T 300 101 33 120 20 16 330 40 12 750 161 32
Drainage 100 100 100 40 40 100 110 110 100 250 250 100
Administration 100 100 100 40 40 100 110 110 100 250 250 100
Population Li 400 228 57 120 6 5 330 - - 850 234 27
Land cover 100 14 14 40 - - 110 30 27 250 44 17
Road network 100 100 100 40 40 100 110 110 100 250 - 100
Total 1,900 820 43 720 154 21 1,980 400 20 4,600 1,374 30
/a Includes Sumatera and Kalimantan\.
lb Includes Java, Bali, Nusa Tenggara Timur, Nusa Tenggara Barat and Timor Timur\.
7c- Includes Sulawesi, Maluku and Irian Jaya\.
7-d Includes geological, minerals, engineering geology, hydrogeological and geothermal maps\.
7e Includes ground water area and potential maps\.
7T Includes wet and dry months, mean annual and mean monthly rainfall maps\.
Includes population density, age group 7-12 and status of education,-distribution, age group\.
33 -ANNEX 8
INDONESIA
NATIONAL RESOURCE SURVEY AND MAPPING PROJECT (LOAN 1197-IND)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Yearly Average Exchange Rates
Year US$1 * Rp
1975 415\.0
1976 415\.0
1977 415\.0
1978 442\.0
1979 623\.1
1980 627\.0
1981 631\.8
1982 661\.4
1983 990\.3
1984 1,000\.0
-THAILAND ti'lir
MAL AYSIA aBRUNE1a
o MO-
2 MALAYSIA
SINGAPORE-
6PI~an 23
- 4 26- KA iANJA
5 f
7 25
- *s
v~v
1 MAAAtSMA~
13
12 --
 Oa T Mguu\.a Pi7ou
12 i7
h4X~#CES T*~aip
~T____> ,JJTN
27 ~ T~« '
aSaJMATWAUT tom
5JAlir
IBRD 11038R1
PHILIPPINES 1 NDONESIA
o Cities or Towns
Rivers
Province Boundaries
- - International Boundaries
7-o% o r7
HA LMAHERA
20O
JSULAWEs>¼WS
5~ ~ ~ uA s AAý l>1
} SESAM
Nbtre 17 Enorotoi
2~~~~ 21BR o
IRIAN° JA YA\
-Kokonou
- Agats
\.SQ~ d6
16 1_ n 1
PÃ¥o ioo 200 300 a0o
< 4O 27 MILES
nu a las anenssby ri O ewe ite ace esor oawl\.u\. u t 9 i > i
asend e rax~kr #sWtomneww~ of 9he ea nefn- KnOMETER$
Falnc Corpæon~ rae dmeom~h fd rd ke b~ ed w om me op do not
"oÂn D a« n u en f a* a ymmamnf Fan\. Cotpovn\. Manet
oneI\.tlgd iMO* otaya mtoy or ar\.w endeetera <o eia a 1 ns
1 2f ~ 13o f 1 36
MAY 1986 | APPROVAL |
P105329 | Page 1
1
39775
PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
APPRAISAL STAGE
Project Name
GREATER MEKONG SUBREGION (GMS) POWER
TRADE PROJECT: CAMBODIA
Region
EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC
Sector
Power (100%)
Project ID
P105329
Borrower(s) CAMBODIA
Implementing Agency
Electrici
té du Cambodge
Street 19, Wat Phnom, Daun Penh District
Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Tel: (855-23) 72 47 71 Fax: (855-23) 42 60 18
Environment Category
[] A [X] B [ ] C [ ] FI [ ]
Safeguard Classification
[] S
1
[
]
S
2
[
]
S
3
[
]
S
F
[
]
Date PID Prepared
February 22, 2007
Estimated Date of
Appraisal Authorization
March 1, 2007
Estimated Date of Board
Approval
May 31, 2007
1\.
Key development issues and rationale for Bank involvement
The GMS region, comprising of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and
Yunnan province of China, spread over 2\.3 million square kilometers, houses a population of
about 260 million\. While growing rapidly, the region exhibits acute disparity among the
countries in terms of economic and human development\. Despite large endowment of energy
resources, the regions per capita consumption of electricity is low ranging from about only 63
kWh per annum in Cambodia to about 1,900 kWh per annum in Thailand\. The six GMS member
countries are largely characterized by national electricity demands that do not match with
national electricity producing resources\. The economic rationale for this electricity integration
lies in the striking diversity in - electrification ratios, electricity demand and demand growth,
electricity tariffs, generation mix, the current state of development of power infrastructure and
above all in the endowment of electricity generation resources vis-à-vis electricity demand - in
the six countries\. High electricity demand growth in the region over the next fifteen years would
require capacity addition of almost 100 GW more than twice its present capacity and
matching investments in transmission and distribution systems\. Over the next decade, financing
needs in the electricity sectors of Thailand and Vietnam alone are estimated to be about US$3
billion / annum, and US$2billion / annum respectively\.
Momentum for regional economic integration and, in particular, integration of electricity systems
among the countries in the GMS region has been growing steadily\. The ADB, WB, and other
development partners are actively engaged in fostering a coordinated approach towards
Page 2
2
development of the GMS countries resources, and their activities currently touch upon the
following sectors - agriculture, environment, human resource development, investment, energy
(electricity), telecommunications, tourism, trade and transport\. The WBs strategy is now
articulated in the April 2006 Strategy Note on Economic Cooperation across the Mekong Sub-
Region\. The Bank supports the development of frameworks for joint action; their
implementation through AAA, TA, capacity building, dialogue, and investment; and helps
ensure that what is being proposed and implemented at the regional level complements and
reinforces country level activities and programs\. The Banks GMS regional assistance strategy
focuses on two main areas (i) continued support to the development of power trade, and (ii)
enhancing collaboration on Mekong water resource management\. The Bank is also ready to
provide assistance in other areas, upon discussion with the GMS governments and the ADB\.
Two areas where work has already been identified and is in the initial stages are support to trade
and transport facilitation and analytical work on labor migration in the GMS region\.
Country commitment and ownership of relevant policies and strategies for developing a regional
power trade market is strong\. The member countries first established the GMS Power Forum in
1992\. Support from the ADB and the Bank culminated in the Intergovernmental Agreement on
Regional Power Trade (IGA) signed by all countries in November 2002\. Key objectives of the
IGA are: (i) cost minimization in planning and operation of power provision; (ii) full cost
recovery and equitable sharing of benefits of investments; (iii) provision of reliable and
economic electricity to all parties\. There is also concerted endorsement of private sector
participation in sector development in all six countries\.
Analytical work to demonstrate the benefits of strengthening regional transmission
interconnections, and options for market design were prepared with donor assistance\. A
Regional Power Trade Coordination Committee (RPTCC) was established as the high level body
responsible for actively coordinating and guiding the markets development
\.
Since its
establishment, five RPTCC meetings have been held in China (2004), Thailand, Laos, Myanmar
(2005), and Cambodia (2006)\. RPTCC has so far reviewed the GMS energy cooperation
activities; began implementing the RPTCC Work-plan; and most recently, agreed to conduct a
study on an integrated regional master plan for power development in the GMS\. Technical
working groups have been established recently to assist in implementation\. At present, detailed
design of future market, action plans for implementation, and alignment of regional and national
investment priorities are in the process of being discussed among the participants and analytical
work is in progress\.
The Bank has the unique experience of helping develop power markets in other regions (South
East Europe and sub-Saharan Africa), and is, therefore, well positioned in bringing that
experience to the GMS\. The Bank has been an active participant in all five RPTCC meetings,
and working closely with ADB, has helped shape the RPTCCs agenda and work-plan for
implementing the IGA\. With support from PHRD, the Bank has contributed to analytical work
such as developing a power import-export strategy for Lao PDR, and an Energy Sector Strategy
Study and a power development plan for Cambodia; developing principles for ownership and
benefit-sharing of cross-border investment projects; good practice guidelines for bilateral power
trade; defining the scope of work for an integrated regional power master plan which will
inculcate a regional integrated planning culture in the development of national power plans;
and is going to finance a feasibility study for EHV interconnections between South China and
Vietnam\. The Bank presented a workshop on international experiences in the August 2006
RPTCC meeting, which was greatly appreciated by the participants\.
Page 3
3
A
draft strategy note outlining the Banks strategy for its support for the GMS regional
electricity market has been recently prepared\. The following key principles govern Bank
strategy:
Overcoming obstacles facing the development of an economically, technically,
institutionally, environmentally and socially sustainable regional electricity market;
Fostering a regional integrated planning culture based on consensus, that ensures (i)
optimal development of the regions resources; and (ii) consistency of bilateral national
transactions with ultimate market goals;
Ensuring the application of sound principles in the development of the market
infrastructure, its institutions and its operating rules and regulations; and
Supporting, in the early years, initiatives and investments in bilateral trade through: (i)
large power transfers between countries (such as China-Thailand, China-Vietnam, Laos-
Thailand, Laos-Vietnam); and (ii) more modest power transfers between the contiguous
borders (such as Laos-Cambodia, Vietnam-Cambodia) which would bring in tremendous
benefits of economical electricity in the recipient border areas\.
The Banks strategy is comprised of a two-pronged approach, combining institutional/policy
support and investment support to help achieve the above objectives\. Investment support would
assist with the construction of cross border connections and the preparation of investments in
physical infrastructure generation and transmission, while the institutional component would aim
at strengthening the institutional capacity at the regional and individual country levels to
facilitate power transactions reflecting market principles of power trading\.
2\. Proposed objective(s)
The ultimate development objective of the GMS regional power trade program is to lead to the
realization of an integrated GMS Power Grid and a Power Market\. The attainment of this
objective and removal of barriers is expected to take several years\. These barriers are being and
would continue to be addressed through concerted and sustained efforts, over the next several
years, on the part of IDA, ADB and other development partners, and the GMS countries
themselves through the RPTCC\. A regional APL for supporting the regional power trade would
be developed within the next two years on: (i) successful completion and adoption of the
Regional Power Master Plan followed by consensus on its implementation; and (ii) agreement
among the GMS countries on the road map for a phased implementation of the long-term
program\.
Nested within the aforementioned long-term GMS framework, two proposed Projects- GMS
Power Trade (Cambodia) and GMS Power Trade (Lao PDR) being prepared simultaneously-
have the following three immediate development objectives: (i) to bring affordable grid-based
electricity to Cambodias provinces of Kampong Cham and Stung Treng, through import of
power from Lao PDR and Vietnam; (ii) to supply affordable grid based electricity to the
province of Saravan in Lao PDR in the near term while establishing a portion of a transmission
link that would in the medium-term help interconnect Cambodia and Thailand through southern
Lao PDR to increase power trade among them; and (iii) to help establish load dispatching
facilities and capabilities in Lao PDR, that would enable it to optimize its system operation and
facilitate its participation in regional trade\.
Page 4
4
In a broader sense, the proposed project would also contribute
towards promoting regional power
trade through demonstrating the establishment of mechanisms for common design, financing,
and construction of cross-border links and commercial agreement underpinning such
transactions\.
3\. Preliminary
description
This Project has the following key components:
(a)
Component C-1: 115 kV Transmission System: Vietnam border to Kampong Cham:
This component would facilitate import of power
1
from the south of Vietnam to the Province
of Kampong Cham in Cambodia\. It would help displace the current costly and sparse diesel-
fuel-based generation by reasonably priced electricity, fostering demand growth and
economic development in one of Cambodias important provinces\. It would involve
construction of: (i) a 115 kV double-circuit (240 sq mm ACSR conductor and Optical Fiber
Earth Wire), 64 km long, predominantly pole-mounted transmission line, having a firm
capacity of about 90 MVA, constructed from the supply point at the Vietnam border (Veun
Kham located in Vietnam); (ii) a 115/22 kV, 2x20 MVA Substation in Kampong Cham; (iii)
a
115/22 kV, 2x15 MVA Substation, en route, at Suong - to supply the rapidly growing
demand of the district of Suong; and (iv) a 115/22 kV, 2x10 MVA Substation, also en route,
at Kraek - to supply the rapidly growing demand of the district of Kraek\. This Component is
supported by detailed technical, economic, environmental and social impact studies carried
out by Consultants under an IDA-managed PHRD Grant (PHRD Grant Number TF055041)\.
A
Draft PPA between Cambodia and Vietnam is under finalization\.
(b)
Component C-2: 115 kV Transmission System: Lao PDR border to Stung Treng:
This
component would facilitate import of power from southern Lao PDR to the Province of
Stung Treng in Cambodia
2
\.
It would help displace the current costly and sparse diesel-fuel-
based generation by reasonably priced electricity, fostering demand growth and economic
development in Stung Treng, which is one of the regional hub-areas earmarked by the RGC
for rapid development\. It would involve construction of: (i) a 115 kV double-circuit (240 sq
mm ACSR conductor and Optical Fiber Earth Wire), 56 km-long, predominantly pole-
mounted transmission line, having a firm capacity of about 90 MVA, from the Lao PDR
border (at Veun Kham); and (ii) a 115/22 kV, 2x10 MVA Substation in Stung Treng\. This
Component is supported by detailed technical, economic, environmental and social impact
studies carried out by Consultants under the aforementioned PHRD Grant (TF055041)\. A
Draft PPA between Cambodia and Lao PDR is under finalization\.
(c)
Component C-3: Activities to Facilitate Implementation of C-1 and C-2
:
This
component would provide consulting services and support for project design and
management for facilitating implementation of components C-1 and C-2; for mitigation of
social and environmental impacts related to components C-1 and C-2; and a provision for an
1
While initially used for power import, the line would, in the outer years, help transfer surplus hydropower from
Cambodia to Vietnam\.
2
In the first couple of years of the Project, and till Lao Hydro plants under implementation come on line, some
power in the dry months may be obtained from Thailand and routed to Cambodia, via Lao PDR\.
Page 5
5
independent Procurement Agent, which will be hired by the MEF for IDA projects, including
GMS-PT (Cambodia) project\.
(d)
Component C-4: Institutional Development of EDC
:
This component would comprise: (i)
Strengthening the internal auditing capacity of EDC; (ii) Engaging the services of experts
for design of high voltage transmission systems (including lines and substations) and
National/Regional Load Dispatching systems; (iii) Overseas training of EDC staff in the
aforementioned fields; and (iv) Procurement of relevant hardware and software\.
4\.
Safeguard policies that might apply
Safeguard Policies Triggered
Yes No
Environmental Assessment
(
OP
/
BP
/
GP
4\.01) [X]
[
]
Natural Habitats
(
OP
/
BP
4\.04) [X]
[]
Pest Management
(
OP 4\.09
)
[
]
[X]
Cultural Property
(draft OP 4\.11 -
OPN
11\.03
-)
[X] []
Involuntary Resettlement
(
OP
/
BP
4\.12) [X]
[
]
Indigenous Peoples
(
OD 4\.20
)
[] [X]
Forests
(
OP
/
BP
4\.36) []
[X]
Safety of Dams
(
OP
/
BP
4\.37) [
]
[X]
Projects in Disputed Areas
(
OP
/
BP
/
GP
7\.60)
*
[
]
[X]
Projects on International Waterways
(
OP
/
BP
/
GP
7\.50)
[X] []
5\. Tentative financing
Source:
Cambodia
BORROWER/RECIPIENT
(US$ million)
1\.697
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION
18\.500
Total
20\.197
6\. Contact points
Contact:
Mohinder Gulati (TTL)
Apurva Sanghi (co-TTL)
Title:
Lead Energy Specialist (EASTE)
Senior Economist (EASOP)
Tel:
(202) 473-3211
(202) 458-8974
Fax:
(202) 522-1648
(202) 522-1787
Email:
Mgulati@worldbank\.org asanghi@worldbank\.org
wb149486
*
By supporting the proposed project, the Bank does not intend to prejudice the final determination of the parties' claims on the
disputed areas
Page 6
6
C:\Documents and Settings\WB149486\My Documents\Apurva Sanghi - EAP\GMS - Power\World Bank Documents\PID - Cambodia - April 02,
2007\.doc
04/02/2007 10:11:00 PM | APPROVAL |
P172497 |  The World Bank
Sustainable Multiple use Landscape Consortia in Brazil (P172497)
Project Information Document (PID)
Concept Stage | Date Prepared/Updated: 26-Mar-2020 | Report No: PIDC27985
Mar 17, 2020 Page 1 of 11
The World Bank
Sustainable Multiple use Landscape Consortia in Brazil (P172497)
BASIC INFORMATION
A\. Basic Project Data OPS TABLE
Country Project ID Parent Project ID (if any) Project Name
Brazil P172497 Sustainable Multiple
use Landscape
Consortia in Brazil
(P172497)
Region Estimated Appraisal Date Estimated Board Date Practice Area (Lead)
LATIN AMERICA AND Aug 20, 2020 Mar 10, 2021 Agriculture and Food
CARIBBEAN
Financing Instrument Borrower(s) Implementing Agency GEF Focal Area
Investment Project Financing Serviço Nacional de Ministry of Agriculture, Multi-focal area
Aprendizagem Rural Livestock, and Food Supply,
Ministry of Environment
Proposed Development Objective(s)
To strengthen the adoption of low-carbon emission agricultural and environmental conservation and restoration
practices, and sustainable policies for livestock-soybean value chains, in selected landscapes in Brazil\.
PROJECT FINANCING DATA (US$, Millions)
SUMMARY-NewFin1
Total Project Cost 24\.58
Total Financing 24\.58
of which IBRD/IDA 0\.00
Financing Gap 0\.00
DETAILS -NewFinEnh1
Non-World Bank Group Financing
Trust Funds 24\.58
Global Environment Facility (GEF) 24\.58
Environmental and Social Risk Classification Concept Review Decision
Mar 17, 2020 Page 2 of 11
The World Bank
Sustainable Multiple use Landscape Consortia in Brazil (P172497)
Moderate Track II-The review did authorize the preparation to
continue
Other Decision (as needed)
B\. Introduction and Context
Country Context
1\. After rapid growth and social progress between 2001 and 2010, Brazilâs economy first stumbled and then fell
into deep recession\. Sound macro policies and a favorable external environment contributed to fast economic
and social progress between 2001 and 2010\. However, the deterioration in both factors led to a steady decline in
growth after 2010\. Growth declined from an average of 3\.7 percent per year between 2001 and 2010 to 2\.4
percent between 2011 and 2014, followed by contractions of 3\.5 percent in 2015 and 3\.3 percent 2016\. While
external factors triggered the slowdown, an expansionary policy response led to rapidly rising fiscal disequilibria
and, with rising domestic political uncertainty, to a loss of confidence and a sharp drop in investment\. The
economic recovery remains weak with 1\.1 percent growth in 2017 and 2018, with 1\.1 percent growth projected
in 2019 and 2\.0 percent in 2020\. Nevertheless, given population growth of about 0\.8%, growth remains relatively
low in per capita terms\.
2\. Agriculture (including livestock production) is crucial component of Brazil´s economic growth and generates a
large share of Brazil´s exports\. The sector contributes to eight percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), account
for 30 percent of the country's exports and for 19 percent of its employment\. Brazil ranks third among the world's
major agricultural exporters, fourth for food production and second for bio-ethanol production\. It has the second
largest cattle herd and is the world's largest exporter of poultry, sugar cane and ethanol\. Much of that agricultural
growth has taken place in the Cerrado biome, the savanna-forest mosaic located in central Brazil, south and east
of the Amazon region, covering almost one quarter, or 2\.04 million km2, of the country\. The Cerrado has been the
stage for an expansion of agricultural production, primarily through cattle ranching since the 1940s, and, since the
1970s, through mechanized commercial production of soybean, maize and cotton\. Presently, the Cerrado is
responsible for 70 percent of Brazilâs agricultural production\. It accounts for 95 percent of the total cotton, 54
percent of soybean, 55 percent of beef, and 43 percent of sugarcane produced in Brazil\.
3\. The expansion of agriculture production has reshaped the Cerrado landscapes with environmental costs,
including significant land degradation and agriculture productivity loss\. Cerrado forests are important due to the
substantial amount of carbon stored in its biomass and soils\. Brazilian Cerrado has lost 88Mha (46%) of its native
vegetation cover and accounts for 26 percent of Brazilian emissions from land-use change1, mainly to agricultural
activities\. Agricultural expansion in the Cerrado has increased the area of severe erosion, occasioning agricultural
productivity decrease and soil nutrient depletion\. The annual soil loss rate increased from 10\.4 (2000) to 12\.0 Mg
haâ1 yrâ1 (2012)\. Agricultural productivity loss occurred in more than 3 million hectares of crops and silviculture
in 2000 and in more than 5\.5 million hectares in 2012\. Severely eroded areas lost between 13\.1 and 25\.9 times
1
Rajão, R\. & Soares-Filho, B\.S\. (2015)\. Science 350, 519â519\.
Mar 17, 2020 Page 3 of 11
The World Bank
Sustainable Multiple use Landscape Consortia in Brazil (P172497)
more nutrients than areas with low and moderate soil loss rates2\. On those anthropized areas, the prolonged use
of grasslands for conventional beef cattle production diminishes the soil productivity capacity for agriculture and
vegetation regeneration\. In this context, the main development challenge for Brazil is to find the best way to
sustainably manage those natural and productive landscapes, increasing food production while restoring
degraded land and conserving natural characteristics of the Cerrado for its biodiversity and ecosystem services\.
4\. Brazil has made progress to curb deforestation and land degradation impacts in the Cerrado, however to
achieve its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) sustainable agriculture and environmental policies
must be coordinated and scaled-up\. Brazil has committed, under the Paris Agreement, to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions by 37% below 2005 levels by 2025 and 43% below 2005 levels by 2030\. Deforestation in the Cerrado is
about 20 percent of the 2001-2004 levels but has maintained a constant trend in the last 3-4 years\. Sustainable
agriculture and forest-protection policies, such as the National Forest Code and the Sector Plan for Low Carbon
Emission Agriculture (ABC Plan), have helped to advance with those targets, however at a low pace
implementation\. Moreover, the current economic crisis is rekindling conflicts over land and natural resources,
especially in Brazilâs Amazon and Cerrado biomes, highlighting the challenges the country faces in meeting its NDC
commitments\.
Sectoral and Institutional Context
5\. The agricultural sector plays a crucial role in achieving Brazilâs climate commitment in a 10 -year timeframe\. As
one of the larger emitters, the sector is expected under the NCDs to restore 15 million hectares of degraded
pasture areas and 5 million hectares of crop-livestock-forest integration system\. The "Sector Plan for Mitigation
and Adaptation to Climate Change for the Consolidation of a Low Carbon Emissions Agriculture Economy"3, also
known as the ABC Plan and the Forest Code4 are important policy instruments to promote a behavior change of
rural producers conciliate a sustainable agricultural growth with natural resources conservation\.
6\. The ABC Plan is expected to reduce pressure on forests by increasing agricultural productivity and promoting
sustainable management practices\. To achieve its objectives the ABC plan promotes six technologies that have a
proven effect on the reduction of GHG emissions and increase of carbon sequestration by the agriculture sector:
as no-till agriculture; restoration of degraded pasture; integration of crops, livestock and forest; planting of
commercial forests; biological nitrogen fixation; and treatment of animal wastes\. The ABC Plan offers a credit
initiative called the ABC Program, which provides low-interest loans for the adoption of sustainable agricultural
practices\. Originally, the GoB estimated that nearly US$ 40 billion (via credit lines or producersâ own resources)
would be required between 2011 and 2020 to finance low-carbon investments to achieve NDC targets\. Since its
launch in 2011, GoB provided US$ 5 billion under ABC Program to stimulate the adoption of low-carbon practices
and has disbursed US$ 3\.4 billion, most of it was used to restoration of degraded pasture and no-till agriculture\.
There remain a few other hurdles for ABC technology adoption\. Most importantly, there is a lack of knowledge
and understanding among farmers of the technologies promoted\. Second, some technologies require strong farm
management skills, and adequate training and technical assistance for farmers and ranchers\.
7\. The Forest Code, on the other hand, provides a unique opportunity for Brazil to protect its remaining forests
and also accelerate the modernization of agriculture\. The Forest Code requires rural landowners both to maintain
2
Gomes, L\., Simões, S\. J\., Dalla Nora, E\. L\., de Sousa-Neto, E\. R\., Forti, M\. C\., & Ometto, J\. P\. H\. (2019)\. Agricultural expansion in the
Brazilian Cerrado: increased soil and nutrient losses and decreased agricultural productivity\. Land, 8(1), 12\.
3
Decree No\.9,578/2018
4
Law No\. 12,651/2012
Mar 17, 2020 Page 4 of 11
The World Bank
Sustainable Multiple use Landscape Consortia in Brazil (P172497)
the most fragile areas (Permanent Preservation Areas â APP), and to ensure the preservation of part of the original
native vegetation (Legal Reserve â RL) in their properties\. requires rural property owners both to maintain the
most fragile areas (Permanent Preservation Areas â APP), and to ensure the preservation of part of the original
native vegetation (Legal Reserve â RL) in their properties\. The amendments made in 2012 to the Forest Code
include the creation of the Rural Environmental Cadaster (CAR), which requires landholders to register APPs and
RLs on their farms, and to submit proposals for restoring their degraded areas if they are not compliant\. A large
number of producers in the Cerrado are registered in the CAR, however, the tool has been underused for land-
use planning and environmental restoration given the complexity of its process and for depending on federal and
state-levels to implement it\.
8\. Along with the implementation constraints, the policies fell short in prioritize areas and coordinate actions to
revert highly degraded land, maximize agriculture productivity gains and environment benefits in order to
accelerate the achievement of NDCâs targets by 2030\. To tackle those systemic challenges, the proposed project
will support MMA and MAPA to identify those degraded areas and introduce the Integrated Landscape
Management (ILM) approach to mobilize key stakeholders to establish a multi-disciplinary coalition of actors
(consortiums) to catalyze investments and collectively enable an integrated and transformative business
environment\. The added value of the project is to build the synergy of the already installed actors, policies and
initiatives to achieve proposed goals\. The project design aims to integrate, complement and amplify the
implementation of key sustainable policies as the ABC Plan and CAR\.
Relationship to CPF
9\. The proposed project is fully aligned with the World Bank Group's Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for
Brazil FY18-FY23 (Report #113259-BR, discussed by the Executive Directors on July 13, 2017)\. Under the CPF Focus
Area 2: Private sector investment and productivity growth, the project aims to induce beef and soybean producers
to adopt low-carbon practices and link to private actors who are committed in pursuing sustainability, reducing
reputational risk, and creating the transformational market conditions towards environmental benefits beyond
business as usual\. Under the CPF Focus Area 3: Inclusive and Sustainable Development, the proposed project aims
to support the achievement of Brazilâs NDC focusing particularly on land use and promotio n of socioeconomic
development of small and medium rural producers\.
C\. Proposed Development Objective(s)
10\. To strengthen the adoption of low-carbon emission agricultural and environmental conservation and restoration
practices, and sustainable policies for livestock-soybean value chains, in selected landscapes in Brazil\.
Key Results (From PCN)
11\. The achievement of the project development objective would be measured through the following proposed
indicators:
(a) Land area under sustainable landscape management practices (CRI)
(b) Farmers adopting improved agricultural technology in selected value chains (CRI)
(c) Off-farm investments executed (to be detailed during preparation);
(d) Sustainable market linkages enhanced\.
Mar 17, 2020 Page 5 of 11
The World Bank
Sustainable Multiple use Landscape Consortia in Brazil (P172497)
D\. Concept Description
12\. Strategic Approach\. The proposed US$24\.57 million grant will support the Ministry of Environment (MMA) and
the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply (MAPA), to jointly promote an Integrated Landscape
Management (ILM) approach to scale-up the adoption of low-carbon emission agricultural and environmental
conservation and restoration practices on areas with highly intensified agriculture and pasture lands associated
with erosion that have negative impacts on environmental assets with national and global relevance, such as
major freshwater-producing basins and important endemic species\. Those anthropized/consolidated productive
areas have historically applied, mainly for beef cattle production and in a lesser extent for agriculture,
conventional practices with low rates of technological adoption, resulting in environmental degradation processes
and productivity losses\. To tackle those systemic challenges, the project will mobilize key stakeholders (farmers
and their representative organizations, state and municipal governments, local financial and technical assistance
agencies, NGOs, buyers and investors) and build on existing policies (i\.e\.: Forest Code) and programs (i\.e\.: ABC
Program) at the landscape level that are currently being implemented in an uncoordinated and fragmented
fashion to establish a multi-disciplinary coalition of actors (consortiums) to catalyze investments and collectively
enable an integrated and transformative business environment\.
13\. At the landscape level, synergies and capacities among relevant stakeholders will be enhanced allowing the
formulation of a comprehensive land-use planning and governance for the implementation of on- and off-farm
investments\. To escalate innovation and increase farmsâ beef cattle productivity, the project will be built from
tested and successful on-farm interventions applied and under implementation through the Brazilian Investment
Plan, supported by the CIF/FIP5 program (Sustainable Agriculture Production - P143184 and Integrated Landscape
Management in the Cerrado - P164602)\. These approaches include knowledge and technical assistance provision
of sustainable low-carbon emission agriculture practices (soil and water conservation practices; integrated crop,
livestock and forest systems; recovery of degraded pasture land; cultivated commercial forests, etc\.); forest
protection and restoration practices (environmental compliance, soil and water conservation, etc\.); associated
with technical assistance to access credit for adoption of those practices\.
14\. The projectâs strategy for off-farm investments would combine actions to build the capacity and awareness of the
rural population about integrated natural resources management, strengthening public support services and
infrastructure (research and innovation, land regularization, and rural roads rehabilitation and maintenance), and
support for sustainable business initiatives of groups of small producers to foster their greater integration with
remunerative value-chains\. Despite not directly financing the off-farm infrastructure, the project will mobilize
national, state and municipal governments to include those investments in the landscape planning and promote
their implementation\.
15\. Supported by leading Government agencies, the engagement with the private sector will play a key role in
implementing and consolidating a socio-environmental business model conducive to environmental traceability
and mainstream sustainable efforts made by farmers in their production systems, such as applying standards
enabling them to meet the EMBRAPAâs meat carbon neutral protocol\. The project will identify the main local
5
http://fip\.mma\.gov\.br/plano-de-investimento-do-brasil-para-o-fip/
Mar 17, 2020 Page 6 of 11
The World Bank
Sustainable Multiple use Landscape Consortia in Brazil (P172497)
buyers, slaughterhouses, and traders to create a forum of discussion to understand the demand side and market
needs, risks and harness their commitment to promote productive alliances with local farmers\. When suitable,
traceability will be an important tool to engage with key value-chain players\. The project aims to assess, at the
landscape level, production base configuration and whether buyers (traders and slaughterhouses) would be
interested in partnering in sustainable commercial arrangements\. Traceability needs and costs will be assessed
and how they can be offset by market access and premiums\. During preparation the team will engage with IFC to
learn from their portfolio experiences, working in these sectors and areas\.
16\. Priority areas\. Overall, the project would focus on three areas (Annex 2) covering approximately 28\.2 million ha\.
The selected landscapes are important for soybean and beef cattle production and located in major freshwater
producing basins, featuring Cerrado phytophysiognomies, including elements of the Pantanal, Caatinga and
Atlantic Forest biomes\. The three macro areas encompass important biodiversity hot spots, being a strong center
of evolution and speciation of both flora and fauna\. Since in these consolidated production areas there is minimum
room for further legal vegetation suppression, the proposed intervention conduces to improved productivity at
commodity areas, and consequent improvement of the local economy, increasing environmental perception and
value, and contributing to these hot spotsâ viability\. Moreover, those areas are characterized by arid climate
spectrum and ecological transition hotspots, ecotones and occurrence of important endemic species, some
already threatened\.
17\. Within the land area covering the selected 3 landscapes (28\.2 million ha), the project aims to be implemented in
1,700,000 ha\. The project will need to be very selective in the choice of States and the target population\. The
project will be carried out in States and Municipalities where the farmers and agribusiness are judged to be most
ready for adoption of climate smart technologies (areas known for innovation and early adoption of technologies)\.
During project preparation a number of criteria to measure âILM readinessâ? will be developed\. The criteria will
take into consideration areas with: high occurrence of land degradation processes, importance of local
environmental features, high incidence of endemic species, presence of farmer organizations, enterprises and
leaders with a vision for a more sustainable agriculture and livestock as well as the capacity of the implementing
agency to carry out the capacity building programs\.
18\. Main beneficiaries\. The main project beneficiaries are rural producers and local communities who benefit from
the selected landscape's natural resources\. These farmers and ranchers are targeted because their production
units form the bulk of total agricultural land use in the Cerrado\. By increasing the sustainability and productivity
of their agricultural systems, indirect project benefits would be reflected in increased levels of employment and
food security (through improved supply and resilience)\. It is expected that support about 10,000 rural producers,
of which 2,000 women, will be benefit from technical assistance activities\. The estimation is conservative and
based on the proportion of landholdings owned by women in the three selected areas (around 15 percent
according to the latest data available through the 2017 Agrarian and Livestock Census)\. The project will
incorporate lessons learned with the implementation of the FIP/WB financed Sustainable Agriculture Production
Project â Projeto ABC Cerrado (P143184) with regards to participation of women on capacity building / technical
assistance activities, which have been incorporated on FIP Landscapes Gender Action Plan\.
19\. Other direct beneficiaries include national and local institutions\. At the national level, the project will strengthen
and help sustain cross-sectoral collaboration among the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Empresa
Mar 17, 2020 Page 7 of 11
The World Bank
Sustainable Multiple use Landscape Consortia in Brazil (P172497)
Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária, EMBRAPA); the National Rural Learning Service (Serviço Nacional de
Aprendizagem Rural, SENAR); and other to be identified during project preparation\.
20\. The project will be structured within 4 components:
21\. Component 1\. Development of Integrated Landscape Management (ILM) Systems: The application of the ILM
approach requires thorough and careful knowledge of the actionâs focus area\. An understanding of land use, trade
market and local production are essential for having a strategic vision and creating scenarios for the future of the
agriculture and the conservation\. The component will build the necessary capacity and knowledge to support the
planning, governance and main investments and develop ILM action plans at the pre-selected productive
landscape areas\. To this end, the component interventions will: (i) carry out communication campaign to inform
stakeholders about the projectâs goals, scope and rules; (ii) strengthen key stakeholdersâ ILM capacities and
governance to actively participate in the consortiums; (iii) harmonize existing policies, programs and land-use
planning in the intervention area; (iv) identify potential on and off-farm investment needs; (v) identify market
players and opportunities; and (vi) environmental risk assessments\.
22\. Main outcome: Sustainable landscape management plans formulated using ILM approach and adopted to guide
interventions
23\. Component 2\. Promotion of sustainable food production practices and responsible value chains: This
component will finance the implementation of: (i) training and technical assistance to farmers on sustainable
agriculture practices and technologies; (ii) mobilize key stakeholders to catalyze off-farm investments; (iii)
mobilize local financial agents to assist farmers in preparing on-farm investments proposals in order to access
credit resources; and (iv) mobilize local private sector to participate and develop a socio-environmental business
model conducive to environmental sustainability (jointly design traceability tools and productive linkages with
benefited farmers)\.
24\. Main outcomes: Area of degraded grassland restored; Area of landscapes under sustainable land management in
production systems; Off-farm investments executed (to be detailed during preparation); Sustainable market
linkages enhanced
25\. Component 3\. Conservation and restoration of natural habitats: This component will finance activities to support
the steps for environmental compliance of Forest Code requirements of rural landholdings through the Rural
Environmental Cadaster (CAR6, in Portuguese) to promote reforestation, restoration and protection of natural
habitats within private landholdings (Permanent Preservation Areas - APPs, Legal Reserve - RLs), aiming to re-
establishment of biological and hydrological flows; reconnection of fragmented habitats; and restoration of
multiple ecological processes\.
26\. Main outcomes: Area of forest and forest land restored; Area of landscapes under improved management to
benefit biodiversity
6
The Rural Environmental Cadaster (CAR) sets a deadline for farmers to electronically register fragile areas (Permanent Preservation
Areas â APP) and part of the original native vegetation (Legal Reserve â RL) in their properties, and to submit proposals for restoring
their degraded areas if they are not compliant\.
Mar 17, 2020 Page 8 of 11
The World Bank
Sustainable Multiple use Landscape Consortia in Brazil (P172497)
27\. Component 4\. Project Management and M&E: This component will focus on coordination, cooperation, and
monitoring and evaluation (M&E), including knowledge generation and dissemination nationally and
internationally\.
28\. Main outcome: Integrated knowledge management, coordination and collaboration to capture lessons learns for
replication in other areas\.
Other Design Aspects
29\. Stakeholder Engagement and Gender Integration\. The proposed Project will elaborate a strong communication
strategy to reach out to key stakeholders to facilitate a common understanding of the vision, values and landscape
needs through a neutral, nonthreatening and constructive forum\. Also, the project will conduct a gender
assessment and design a gender strategy to encourage the equitable gender participation in the activities and
eventual generation of income and work resulting from the interventions\. The assessment of social impacts and
benefits will incorporate a gender-sensitive lens and would propose specific actions to close identified gender
gaps as well as indicators to monitor actions designed to address or narrow these gaps, such as communication
strategy, specific training, facilitated participation in formal and informal decision-making structures and
governance processes related to the equitable provision of inputs for restoration\.
30\. Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM)\. SENAR has already in place several channels for receiving and redressing
complaints\. These channels include a website, and telephone lines\. On top of this, SENAR, MMA and MAPA have
an Ombudsman Office (with a dedicated free phone line, website, and e-mail address)\. The projectâs GRM would
rely as much as possible on these structures, processes, and procedures that are already in place in the
implementing agency\. The institutional capacity assessment will consider the adequacy and efficiency of SENARâs
GRM\. Measures may be proposed to improve it and would be described in the projectâs Environmental and Social
Framework (ESF)\. The RPF may also define specific processes, procedures, and channels to be locally operated to
attend to the demands of project-affected persons\.
31\. Environmental and Social Impact Analysis (ESIA) and a Stakeholder Engagement Plan (SEP)\. During project
preparation an Environmental and Social Impact Analysis (ESIA) and a Stakeholder Engagement Plan (SEP) will be
prepared as required by the World Bankâs Environmental and Social Standards (ESSs) 1 and 10\. The ESIA will assess
the presence or not of Indigenous Peoples within the selected areas\. It is worth mentioning that (i) a preliminary
assessment pointed out that there are no Indigenous Lands within the selected areas (this information will be
checked during the preparation of the ESIA) and (ii) the project is targeted at private farmers and landholders as
they are the main responsible for commercial agricultural production as well as land degradation and
deforestation\. If Indigenous Peoples are present in the area, the ESIA will assess the potential indirect impacts and
benefits that project activities may have on them as well as propose measures to promote their participation and
the opportunities to increase their access to benefits\.
32\. Screening for climate change and disaster risks\. The Project will be screened for climate change and disaster risks
once the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) is ready for the Decision Meeting\. As climate change may increase the
frequency and severity of adverse hydrometeorological events, the proposed project, by supporting the rural
producers and communities to deal with these impacts, will have significant climate adaption benefits\. The Task
Mar 17, 2020 Page 9 of 11
The World Bank
Sustainable Multiple use Landscape Consortia in Brazil (P172497)
Team and Client have engaged in the design of a project in which overall objective and investments will contribute
from both a mitigation and adaptation perspectives\.
Legal Operational Policies Triggered?
Projects on International Waterways OP 7\.50 No
Projects in Disputed Areas OP 7\.60 No
Summary of Screening of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts
\.
\.
CONTACT POINT
World Bank
Barbara Cristina Noronha Farinelli, Maria Bernadete Ribas Lange
Agric\. Economist
Borrower/Client/Recipient
Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Rural
Daniel Carrara
General Director
senar@senar\.org\.br
Implementing Agencies
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Food Supply
Sidney Medeiros
Agronomist
sidney\.medeiros@agricultura\.gov\.br
Ministry of Environment
Thiago Barros
Director
thiago\.barros@mma\.gov\.br
Mar 17, 2020 Page 10 of 11
The World Bank
Sustainable Multiple use Landscape Consortia in Brazil (P172497)
FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 473-1000
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/projects
APPROVAL
Task Team Leader(s): Barbara Cristina Noronha Farinelli, Maria Bernadete Ribas Lange
Approved By
APPROVALTBL
Environmental and Social Standards
Barbara Cristina Noronha Farinelli 26-Mar-2020
Advisor:
Practice Manager/Manager: Preeti S\. Ahuja 26-Mar-2020
Country Director: Paloma Anos Casero 10-Apr-2020
Mar 17, 2020 Page 11 of 11 | APPROVAL |
P128082 |  PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
CONCEPT STAGE
Public Disclosure Copy
Report No\.: PIDC579
Project Name DZ-Improved Desert Ecosystems and Climate Resilient Oases (P128082)
Region MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
Country Algeria
Sector(s) Irrigation and drainage (70%), General water, sanitation and flood
protection sector (30%)
Theme(s) Land administration and management (60%), Environmental policies and
institutions (20%), Water resource management (20%)
Lending Instrument Specific Investment Loan
Project ID P128082
GEF Focal Area Land degradation
Borrower(s) Ministère de l'Aménagement du Territoire et de l'Environnement (MATE)
Implementing Agency Ministere de lâAgriculture et du Developpement Rural (MADR)
Environmental B-Partial Assessment
Category
Date PID Prepared/ 12-Oct-2012
Updated
Date PID Approved/ 21-Aug-2013
Disclosed
Public Disclosure Copy
Estimated Date of
Appraisal Completion
Estimated Date of 20-May-2014
Board Approval
Concept Review Track II - The review did authorize the preparation to continue
Decision
I\. Introduction and Context
Country Context
1\. Algeria is the largest country in Africa in terms of land mass\. The Sahara Desert covers
87% of that land mass, but is home to just 9% of the national population\. While the majority of the
population, who are Arab or mixed Arab and Berber, identify with the common Algerian culture,
the Berber tribes, particularly in the more isolated southern mountainous and desert regions of the
Sahara, retain more of the traditional Berber culture\. The mountainous desert areas of the Saharaâ
known collectively as âthe Southâ? â are less developed than the coastal areas and are the object of a
major government sustainable development policy thrust\. This initiative aims to spread
development to all regions of the country equally, and to stop migration from marginal lands in the
South to the larger urban areas of the country\.
Page 1 of 7
2\. Algeria is a middle income country and is close to eradicating extreme poverty\. In 2008,
the number of rural poor was estimated at around 10\.5% of the population\. The highest incidence of
poverty is among people in the South Saharan region\. These poorer areas also have unique cultures
Public Disclosure Copy
and social structures, based on survival in the harsh conditions of the Saharan desert\.
3\. There exists a long-established traditional production system and social organization highly
adapted to the extreme conditions of the Algerian South\. Central to life in the harsh conditions of
the Sahara desert are the oases â unique ecosystems that provide for the vital needs of the
communities that inhabit them\. They include productive systems (including ksours, palm groves,
agroforestry, livestock production, et al\.) and social organizations developed over centuries that
allow human habitation of this area\. But there are also opportunities in many oases for: i) more
intensive development which could include a longer and more diverse value chain leading to job
creation; ii) stronger support to preserve important biodiversity (e\.g\. date varieties, drought-resistant
plants, wildlife); iii) support of culturally important links to natural resources developed over
centuries of survival in a harsh environment (e\.g\. ksours, foggaras, artisanal products and
handicrafts); and iv) development of tourism based on the exceptional natural beauty in the South\.
4\. Despite this economic potential, Algeria as a whole, and the South in particular, faces
serious degradation of the environment and deterioration of natural resource value\. National
environmental degradation is estimated at 3\.6 percent of GDP\. And continued deterioration of
natural resources is affecting the countryâs development potential, particularly in the desert where
ecosystems are more fragile\. This results from environmental, social and economic pressures
including: (i) excessive water use and excessive water pumping leading to depletion of the water
table, saline intrusion, and drying of the foggaras (traditional irrigation systems in use for the past
seven to eight centuries); (ii) inadequate agricultural practices; (iii) abandonment of traditional
villages (ksour); and (iv) loss of traditional know-how brought about by emigration of younger
workers to urban areas\. Moreover, climate change - changed rain pattern which produce a climate
that is becoming dryer and hotter, is likely to exacerbate these pressures\.
Public Disclosure Copy
5\. Poverty in the South is more directly linked to resource degradation and social impacts of a
rapidly growing national economy on more traditional and isolated regions of a country than in
almost any other part of the world\. Reduction of groundwater and the gradual loss of traditional
knowledge of how to harvest this scarce and irreplaceable resource are impacting the agricultural
base of the economy in the Algerian South\. The need to urgently address regional economic
stagnation, and emigration of younger workers which results in an inability to transfer traditional
knowledge, coupled with deteriorating agricultural infrastructure and likely accelerated loss of
natural resources driven by climate change is recognized by the GoA\.
Sectoral and Institutional Context
6\. It is in this context that the Algerian Government has adopted a series of policies centered
on developing the potential of desert ecosystem services by conserving desert resources in the
Sahara\. The most relevant economic planning and development document is the National Territorial
Planning Scheme also known as Schéma National dâAménagement du Territoire (SNAT) to 2030
which was adopted by the Government's Council in 2010\. SNAT contains three Territorial
Programmes of Action that focus primarily on integrated desert management, namely: i) n°8
(Option Développement du Sud); ii) n°3 (Ecosystèmes); and iii) n°19 (Ouverture à lâinternational)\.
The National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP)is also relevant, and was adopted with the Bankâs
assistance in 2002\. It remains the basis for policy making in the field of environment and
Page 2 of 7
sustainable development\. A more recent Environment Strategy for the period of 2001 to 2011,
identified two major challenges: i) the promotion of sustainable development; and ii) poverty
reduction\.
Public Disclosure Copy
7\. The Policy of Agricultural and Rural Renewal (Politique de Renouveau Agricole et Rural)
is the Algerian national policy in the agriculture sector, launched in 2009\. In the Saharan context,
rural renewal refers to an innovative approach to rural development and led to projects to rejuvenate
palm oases, rehabilitate foggaras and ksours, and to provide support to women for handicrafts\. In
contrast, agricultural renewal focuses on improving food self-sufficiency by modernizing traditional
oases, intensifying horticultural production in greenhouses and modernizing agroforestry practices
in the oases\. The Five Year Agricultural Plan (FYAP) that the Algerian Government adopted (the
current period is for 2010-2014 and is automatically renewable) aims to implement the Policy of
Agricultural and Rural Renewal by addressing basic needs and to create jobs for rural communities,
including vulnerable desert communities\. The substantive financial resources for the FYAP
implementation will serve as major co-financing for the ALG-DELP project\.
8\. Better coordination among different sectors with stronger local focus is needed\. Sectoral
government strategies which are conducive to sustainable development of desert regions exist, but
they are not well coordinated and their individual effectiveness is low\. They tend to be developed at
the central level and are implemented in a top-down fashion which has difficulty delivering strong
results at the local level\. Institutional incentives within government tend to be aligned towards
serving the interests of the centre rather than those of the regions\. This top-down approach to
economic development is mirrored in the environmental and social protection sectors\. And because
development planning is largely sector-based, visions for environmental and social sustainability
can vary\. The situation is similar in the private sector as little formal development planning in most
of the relevant sectors is currently directed at leveraging and supporting âinternalâ? (i\.e\. national and
local-level entrepreneurs) private sector investment in the South\.
Relationship to CAS
Public Disclosure Copy
9\. The proposed project is fully aligned with the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for
FY11-14\. The CPSâ second area of intervention - Promoting Sustainable Development and
Reducing Spatial Disparities - is based on two pillars: (i) Strengthening sustainable development
through environmental protection, and (ii) Spatial development and tourism\. The proposed project
directly supports the first pillar by providing institutional training and capacity building to reduce
environmental degradation in selected desert areas; and to the second pillar, by improving spatial
integration and ecotourism prospects in the Algerian Sahara\. Moreover, the project also contributes
to the third area of intervention â Strengthening Growth through Diversification of the Economy â
by supporting income diversification through crafts and ecotourism\. Project investment includes
development of pilot âspatial development plansâ? that use local stakeholder input to decide which of
the available options for use of an area (for example as identified in the agriculture sectorâs 5 year
development plans) is appropriate given the need to protect: i) critical aquifers that support
irrigation, culturally and socially important sites; ii) areas harboring important biodiversity; and iii)
areas having valuable touristic values\. Project investment will also provide an incentive to
undertake and marry bottom-up spatial planning with the existing Government investment planning
processes by supporting pilot projects that sustainably use the natural resources of areas identified
through spatial planning as appropriate for the activities\.
10\. Finally, the project supports and benefits from several World Bank ongoing Reimbursable
Page 3 of 7
Technical Assistance (RTAs) activities: (i) Assistance to the Ministry of Land Planning and
Environment and Villes (MATEV) to strengthen the institutional capacity in integrated desert
management (AGID); (ii) Assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
Public Disclosure Copy
(MADR) for Agricultural Statistics, Information and Monitoring-Evaluation Systems (SASISE),
and (iii) Assistance to MADR for the Support Program to Rural Renewal (PSRR)\.
II\. Proposed Development Objective(s)
Proposed Global Environmental Objective(s) (From PCN)
The projectâs PDO is to pilot, in selected and representative oases, the integrated management of
desert ecosystems (IMDE), thereby reinforcing the resilience of those communities to climatic and
social changes, with the intent of replicating successful initiatives across major Government
investments in agriculture and rural development\.
Key Results (From PCN)
12\. The Project will lay the groundwork for IMDE, an integrated, bottom-up, development
process which seeks to improve environmentally and socially sustainable use of limited natural
resources (see definition in Section III: Project Context, below)\. Tctivities will enhance existing
Government programs in the targeted communities, will explicitly promote new private sector
investment through support of pilot investments that make use of local traditional knowledge, and
create jobs through expansion and diversification of value chains associated with dry-land
agriculture and eco/socio tourism\.
13\. The following physical outputs expected to support these short to medium term
development goals are:
(i) Area of palm groves restored and expanded, including replanting of âretiredâ? palm plants;
(ii) Selected traditional irrigation systems (foggara) rehabilitated that would also result in
improved and more sustainable agriculture, and buffering against the observed climate change that
has resulted in a hotter and dryer climate in the pilot areas;
Public Disclosure Copy
(iii) Number of local people benefiting, both directly through participation in pilots and
indirectly through more focused Government interventions resulting from adoption of the successful
methods piloted under the Project\.
III\. Preliminary Description
Concept Description
13\. There is a clear need to improve the livelihoods of people living in rural (desert) areas to
help them utilize scarce natural resources in a more sustainable and profitable manner and to
facilitate adaptation to both climate and social changes likely to put even great demands for resource
use efficiency into play in the future\. This is expected to result from leverage of successful pilot
participatory development activities that support environmentally and socially sustainable livelihood
improvement in a small number of communities that represent different types of oases in the
Algerian desert\.
14\. A powerful tool for the sustainable and fruitful management of the sensitive ecosystems of
desert regions is called âintegrated management of desert ecosystemsâ?, or IMDE\. For the purposes
of this project, IMDE is defined as an integrated approach to management focusing on enabling
economic opportunities specific to deserts that integrate the health and diversity of the desert biome
with the vast potential for innovative livelihood opportunities that also sustain valuable repository
Page 4 of 7
knowledge linked to adaptive practices\. It is intended that such an approach ultimately enhance
desert livelihood opportunities and increase the resilience and adaptation responses of desert
communities and ecosystems to projected pressures, in particular climate change impacts\.
Public Disclosure Copy
15\. IMDE provides a methodology in which all relevant government sectors work together, in a
transparent and decentralized way, and in close cooperation with desert residents and stakeholders\.
The objective of this locally based management is to ensure that any development that occurs in this
sensitive area does so in an environmentally and socially sustainable fashion\. It is an approach
which links development to sustainable management of ecologically sensitive and protected/
conservation areas, promotes co-management of resources between government and local
stakeholders, and integrates management by government through cooperation of sectors\. Because
of the fragility of desert ecosystems generally, IMDE requires that all development sectors (e\.g\.
agriculture, tourism, public works, local government, etc\.) plan and integrate their annual work
programs to be complementary and to recognize the very real possibility of unintended
consequences across sectors\.
16\. Presently, the existing 5 year plan of the Ministry of Agriculture, SNAT, and other sector
plans follow basically traditional processes requiring little local participation in development\. The
process appears to have limited impacts of Government investment in the South\. As such,
âBusiness as usualâ? will not be sufficient to deliver what is needed to address environmental, social
and development issues in the South over the long run, and the current system is deeply engrained
in the Government and will not be easy to change\. What the project can do to leverage a change to
this top-down approach to development planning is to present real examples of the potential benefits
of combining environmental and social protection into the agriculture and rural development sector
planning model\. It can also introduce an element of local stakeholder participation in the
prioritization of sector development investment in their localities\. Existing government and
community systems necessary to support a program of integrated desert management are in place,
but there is a strong need for capacity building, particularly in support of spatial planning at the
Public Disclosure Copy
local level and on specific management methodologies\.
17\. Project financing will complement existing government programs in the pilot areas, making
them more environmentally and socially sustainable\. The project will be supported by an US$8
million grant, comprising US$5 million from GEF and US$ 3 million from the Special Climate
Change Fund\. It will finance activities that complement existing Government programs that reduce
environmental degradation and improve rural livelihoods in the countryâs South\. The Project
concentrations on two broad agendas\. These are: (i) capacity building (training, legislative support,
equipment) in the integrated management of desert ecosystems (IMDE) for all concerned
stakeholders (e\.g\. central governments, wilayas, managers, development agents, researchers, local
beneficiaries, associations); and (ii) pilot investments to the IMDE in selected demonstration areas\.
18\. Selected project sites represent different types of oases in the South\. Four sites were
selected as particularly representative of arid zones in Algerian Sahara, based on rigorous criteria:
Taghit (wilaya of Bechar, MADR sub-project), Tamentit (wilaya of Adrar, MADR sub-project),
Tinerkouk (wilaya of Adrar, MATEV sub-project) and In Guezzam (wilaya of Tamanrasset, MADR
sub-project)\. The sites are located in wilayas that host important biodiversity (date varieties, plants
with high level of endemism, endangered wildlife), traditional values (ksour, artisanat), and an
exceptional endowment with renewable energy (solar, wind)\. They are representative of different
irrigation sources (surface water, and groundwater) and methods (foggaras, wells) used in the South\.
Page 5 of 7
Based on the above, the project includes the following components:
19\. Component 1\. Strengthening capacity for integrated management of desert ecosystems
Public Disclosure Copy
(IMDE)\.
20\. Component 2\. Piloting the IMDE approach in investment\. This component will pilot the
IMDE approach focusing on restoring and conserving the traditional oases system and protect its
biodiversity in Taghit, Tamentit, In Guezzam and Tinerkouk\.
21\. Component 3\. Project management\.
22\. The selected project sites represent different types of oases in the South\. Four sites were
selected as particularly representative of arid zones in the Algerian Sahara:
- Taghit (wilaya of Bechar),
- Tamentit (wilaya of Adrar),
- Tinerkouk (wilaya of Adrar) and
- In Guezzam (wilaya of Tamanrasset)\.
23\. The sites are located in wilayas that host important biodiversity (date varieties, plants with
high level of endemism, endangered wildlife), traditional values (ksour, artisanat), and an
exceptional endowment with renewable energy (solar, wind)\. They are representative for different
irrigation sources (surface water, groundwater) and methods (foggaras, wells) used in the South\.
IV\. Safeguard Policies that might apply
Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project Yes No TBD
Environmental Assessment OP/BP 4\.01 â
Natural Habitats OP/BP 4\.04 â
Forests OP/BP 4\.36 â
Public Disclosure Copy
Pest Management OP 4\.09 â
Physical Cultural Resources OP/BP 4\.11 â
Indigenous Peoples OP/BP 4\.10 â
Involuntary Resettlement OP/BP 4\.12 â
Safety of Dams OP/BP 4\.37 â
Projects on International Waterways OP/BP 7\.50 â
Projects in Disputed Areas OP/BP 7\.60 â
V\. Financing (in USD Million)
Total Project Cost: 31\.40 Total Bank Financing: 0\.00
Total Cofinancing: Financing Gap: 0\.00
Financing Source Amount
BORROWER/RECIPIENT 24\.00
Global Environment Facility (GEF) 7\.40
Total 31\.40
Page 6 of 7
VI\. Contact point
World Bank
Public Disclosure Copy
Contact: Li Song
Title: Senior Environmental Specialist
Tel: 473-3488
Email: sli@worldbank\.org
Borrower/Client/Recipient
Name: Ministère de l'Aménagement du Territoire et de l'Environnement (MATE)
Contact: Nadia Chenouf
Title: Deputy Director
Tel: 21321432884
Email: Chenoufnadia@yahoo\.fr
Implementing Agencies
Name: Ministere de lâAgriculture et du Developpement Rural (MADR)
Contact:
Title:
Tel:
Email:
VII\. For more information contact:
The InfoShop
The World Bank
Public Disclosure Copy
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 458-4500
Fax: (202) 522-1500
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/infoshop
Page 7 of 7 | APPROVAL |
P146463 | PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
ADDITIONAL FINANCING
Report No\.: PIDA3619
Project Name Additional Financing for St\. Petersburg Economic Development
Project (P146463)
Parent Project Name St\. Petersburg Economic Development Project (P069063)
Region EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA
Country Russian Federation
Sector(s) General industry and trade sector (50%), Housing construction
(50%)
Theme(s) Cultural Heritage (80%), Other urban development (20%)
Lending Instrument Investment Project Financing
Project ID P146463
Parent Project ID P069063
Borrower(s) Ministry of Finance
Implementing Agency Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation
Environmental Category B-Partial Assessment
Date PID Prepared/Updated 27-Mar-2014
Date PID Approved/Disclosed 27-Mar-2014
Estimated Date of Appraisal 30-Apr-2014
Completion
Estimated Date of Board 23-Sep-2014
Approval
Decision Appraisal started
I\. Project Context
Country Context
In 2012, Russiaâs economy appeared strong and expanded, at 3\.4 percent, faster than in Brazil,
South Korea and Turkey\. Poverty also fell markedly\. High oil prices accounted for a fair share of
the 2012 achievements translating into strong export receipts, buoyant fiscal revenues, and rapid
increases in public wages and transfers\. Strong labor markets and price stability reduced poverty:
the number of poor people in Russia declined to 15\.6 million in 2012 â a drop of more than two
million in less than a year\.
Since then, the growth momentum in the Russian economy has slowed\. Real GDP grew around 1\.3
percent in the first three quarters of 2013 year-to-year, the lowest rate since 2009\. In the third
quarter of 2013, industrial performance measured by aggregate industrial production fell by 0\.1
percent compared to a 2\.5 percent growth in the third quarter of 2012\. Economic activity in major
services sub-sectors also slowed: retail trade reported growth of 3\.6 percent in the third quarter of
2013 compared to 5\.6 percent in third quarter of 2012; transportation services grew by only 0\.7
Page 1 of 7
percent in the third quarter of 2013 compared to 4 percent in third quarter of 2012\. Fixed capital
investment decreased by 1\.4 percent in the first nine months of 2013 compared to 9\.6 percent
growth in the same period of the previous year\. Consumption, the main growth driver in the past,
expanded at a much slower pace than a year ago, despite low unemployment levels and increases in
wages and credit\. In early November 2013 the Russian Ministry of Economic Development sharply
revised downwards its projection for the medium-term growth rate, indicating that the current
slowdown is unlikely to be short-lived\.
The Russian Governmentâs own strategy outlined in Medium-Term Program (2008, updated in
2011) and Long-Term (2020) Concept for Social and Economic Development places priority on
diversifying economy and sharing the growth and development more widely across Russiaâs
regions and population\. Russian cultural heritage can play an important role in this diversification
and growth sharing\. In particular, the Concept for the Long-Term Social and Economic
Development of the Russian Federation to 2020 indicates that culture is a strategic resource that can
be used to promote economic diversification and economic development\. The Concept Note
stresses the importance of building on Russian regionsâ cultural potential and advocating actively
preserving and conserving Russiaâs cultural and historical heritage; integrating cultural heritage into
tourism development strategies; developing capacity to manage cultural sites; supporting integrated
local development; promoting Russian cultural heritage abroad; increasing the amount of users of
cultural services in Russia; and ensuring the dynamic development of public/private partnerships to
support the development of cultural activities\.
The May 2012 Presidential Executive Order âOn Measures to Implement State Social Policyâ aims,
among other things, at supporting preservation and development of Russiaâs culture\. In December
2012 the Government approved the state program âCulture and Tourism Development, 2013â2020â
led by the Ministry of Culture (MoC) and the Federal Tourism Agency (which is now subordinate
of the MoC)\. This state program integrates the Federal Targeted Programs âCulture of Russia
(2012-2018)â and âDeveloping Domestic and Inbound Tourism in Russia (2011-2018)â and is
aimed at preserving and making accessible Russiaâs cultural and historical heritage, improving the
quality and availability of domestic and international tourism services, and creating a favorable
environment for the sustainable development of culture and tourism, providing equal access to
cultural heritage and art education for citizens\.
Sectoral and institutional Context
By 2000, the City of St\. Petersburg was one of the few Russian regions (along with Moscow, St\.
Petersburg is not just a municipality, but has a status of a Russian Federationâs subject (Region))
that already possessed a detailed roadmap for the future development\. Namely, in 1997 the Cityâs
Government prepared and adopted the Strategic Plan that identified support for new businesses,
privatization of City-owned state enterprises, improved land use, and tourism development as the
main pillars for the future economic growth of the city\. The cultural heritage is one of the key eco-
systemic components of the urban development strategy of St\. Petersburg\. St\. Petersburg
Government regards the performance of cultural heritage development projects as a tool for urban
economic development expanded in various sectors of economics, such as tourism, recreation, the
arts, entertainment and the media, on the one hand, and as the cityâs identity and cultural image, on
the other hand\. In order to sustain the reform efforts of St\. Petersburg, the Russian Federal
Government approached the Bank with the request to provide a loan to support the implementation
of the St\. Petersburgâs Strategic Plan and finance rehabilitation of key federal cultural heritage
Page 2 of 7
monuments located in the City\.
The SPEDP loan (original amount US$161\.1 million, revised amount US$101\.1 million) was
approved by the World Bank Board of Executive Directors on May 15, 2003, signed on August 4,
2004 and became effective on January 24, 2005\. The Project was designed as an innovative hybrid
loan, consisting of two Components including a Development Policy loan (DPL) (City) Component
for US$100\.0 million and an Investment (Federal) Component for US$61\.1 million\.
The DPL (City) component was to provide budget support to St\. Petersburg for a set of agreed
policy reforms implemented by the City and envisaged two disbursement tranches of US$40\.00
million and US$60\.00 million respectively\. The cityâs reform program under the DPL component
was successfully completed in 2007\. While St\. Petersburg met all DPL conditions of the 1st tranche
(US$ 40 million) in 2006 and of the 2nd tranche (US$60 million) in 2007, the Government of St\.
Petersburg decided not to draw down the money due to the significant city budget surplus not
forecasted at the projectâs preparation/approval stage\. Per request of the Borrower, the 1st tranche
was reallocated to the Investment component to support the scale up of its activities, while the 2nd
tranche was canceled\.
The Investment (Federal) Component financed: A: Rehabilitation of Cultural Assets in St\.
Petersburg; B: Cultural Investment Facility which provided competitive, demand-driven grants to
the cultural institutions located in St\. Petersburg and its vicinity to support small-scale priority
investments; C: Institutional Strengthening which supports provision of technical assistance and
training to the St\. Petersburg Cultural Committee and cultural institutions located in St\. Petersburg
and its vicinity, with a view to strengthening their institutional capacity and management skills,
broadening network coordination between cultural institutions and improving interaction between
the Committee and its subordinate entities; and D: Project Implementation\. All activities under CIF
and Institutional Strengthening programs have been successfully completed\. Under Subcomponent
on Rehabilitation of Cultural Sites, eight out of the nine sub-projects has been completed\. Stage 1
of the remaining subproject on the State Hermitage East Wing reconstruction was completed in
December 2010\. Stage 2 of the State Hermitage East Wing reconstruction is expected to be
completed with formal hand-over of the building to the Hermitage museum by July 2014 which fits
within the SPEDP closing date (December 31, 2014)\. The technical quality of works at all
rehabilitated sites meets the Project requirements and is of high standard\.
The reconstruction and restoration of the historic building of the Mariinsky Theater and two inner
Courtyards of the Mikahilovsky Palace (the Russian Museum) were originally appraised under
SPEDP and included in the list of cultural sites to be restored under Sub-component on
Rehabilitation of Cultural Assets\. The design documentation for both sites was prepared in 2006
(Mariinsky theater) and 2005 (Russian Museum)\. However, both sub-projects had to be
subsequently dropped at the request of the Borrower due to the inability of the administrations of
these sites to vacate the premises for the works\. As of now the impeding issues described above
have since been resolved\. The physical condition of both sites have deteriorated since the original
project was prepared, which makes the importance of restoration and rehabilitation even more
critical for the Borrower\.
The Russian Federation requested the Bank to provide Additional Financing (AF) loan in the
amount of US$ 200 million for SPEDP to scale up the project activities and finance the costs
associated with the reconstruction and restoration of the historic building of the State Academic
Page 3 of 7
Mariinsky Theater and the rehabilitation of two inner Courtyards of the Mikhailovsky Palace of the
State Russian Museum to allow their use and accessibility and create conditions for their
sustainable functioning in the long term\. The Russian Federation will provide counterpart funding
in the amount of US$50 million\. The implementation of the AF project is estimated at 5 years\.
II\. Proposed Development Objectives
A\. Current Project Development Objectives â Parent
1) Policy and regulatory environment is conducive to the expansion of private sector enterprises; 2)
Larger and more efficient private market for land and real estate; 3) Improved City fiscal
management capacity; 4) City to preserve its comparative advantage in culture and the arts\.
B\. Proposed Project Development Objectives â Additional Financing (AF)
The Project Development Objectives (PDO) are to support St\. Petersburg in (i) promoting conducive
policy and regulatory environment to the expansion of private sector enterprises, (ii) facilitating
larger and more efficient private market for land and real estate; (iii) strengthening City fiscal
management capacity; and (iv) preserving and enhancing cultural assets in St\. Petersburg\.
III\. Project Description
Component Name
Rehabilitation of Cultural Assets in St\. Petersburg
Comments (optional)
Cost of the component include the AF loan funds to finance reconstruction and restoration of the
Mariinsky Theater historic building and rehabilitation of 2 inner Courtyards of the Russian Museum
Component Name
Cultural Investment Facility (CIF)
Comments (optional)
All activities under CIF component have been successfully completed with full utilization of the
funds allocated for this component
Component Name
Institutional Strengthening
Comments (optional)
All activities under the Institutional Strenthening component have been successfully completed with
full utilization of the funds allocated for this component
Component Name
Project Implementation
Comments (optional)
The project implementation costs include operating costs of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU)
for day-to-day management and implementation of the AF operation
IV\. Financing (in USD Million)
Total Project Cost: 250\.00 Total Bank Financing: 200\.00
Financing Gap: 0\.00
For Loans/Credits/Others Amount
Borrower 50\.00
Page 4 of 7
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 200\.00
Total 250\.00
V\. Implementation
Progress towards the achievement of the Project Development Objective (PDO) for St\. Petersburg
Economic Development Project (SPEDP) has been satisfactory since the Project effectiveness, and
the PDO remained unchanged\. There are no outstanding audits for this Project and all audit reports
were received on time and were acceptable to the Bank\.
The AF will cover two main activities: restoration of the historic building of the Mariinsky theater
and inner Courtyards of the Russian museum\. The designs for both sites are being revised to reflect
present realities and comply with recent Russian legislation on safety and fire protection, and are
expected to be ready by the project effectiveness\. For the Mariinsky Theater, the update of designs
is financed from the SPEDP\. The updated design of the inner Courtyards is being financed by the
Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation\.
Financing will be provided for the restoration works on these sites as well as for the preparation of
the technical parts of pre-qualification and tender documents, working documents, for technical,
scientific and architectural supervision\. Besides that, the loan proceeds will be used for conducting
monitoring, evaluation and auditing of the above activities\. Procurement for the AF SPEDP will be
carried out in accordance with the World Bankâs "Guidelines: Procurement of Goods, Works and
Non-Consulting Services under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits & Grants by World Bank Borrowers"
dated January 2011 (Procurement Guidelines) and "Guidelines: Selection and Employment of
Consultants under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits & Grants by World Bank Borrowers" dated
January 2011 (Consultant Guidelines) and the provisions stipulated in the Loan Agreement\. To
select contractors and consultants for the above contracts the Borrower will use the following
procurement methods identified in the tentative procurement plan: ICB for works and QCBS, LCS
and SSS for consultants\. However, during implementation of the project the need in other
procurement and selection mat arise, therefore, it is suggested to include NCB, shopping and direct
contracting for procurement of goods and works and CQS and hiring of individual specialists under
Consultancy category\.
The proposed AF would not require changes in the financial management arrangements\.Financial
Management (FM) functions under the proposed AF, including flow of funds, staffing, accounting,
reporting and auditing will remain the responsibility of FISP, as under the original Project\. Audit
arrangements similar to the audit arrangements under the original Project would be adopted for the
proposed AF\. The audit will be conducted by an independent private auditor in accordance with
terms of reference acceptable to the World Bank, and procured by FISP\.
The proposed AF would follow the flow of funds and disbursement arrangements established under
the original Project, i\.e\., reimbursement, direct payment, advances, and special commitments
including the use of Statement of Expenditure procedures\.
Given these factors, and taking into account that the implementation arrangements have proven
effective during the parent project implementation, the overall implementation readiness is high\.
VI\. Safeguard Policies (including public consultation)
Page 5 of 7
Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project Yes No
Environmental Assessment OP/BP 4\.01 â
Natural Habitats OP/BP 4\.04 â
Forests OP/BP 4\.36 â
Pest Management OP 4\.09 â
Physical Cultural Resources OP/BP 4\.11 â
Indigenous Peoples OP/BP 4\.10 â
Involuntary Resettlement OP/BP 4\.12 â
Safety of Dams OP/BP 4\.37 â
Projects on International Waterways OP/BP 7\.50 â
Projects in Disputed Areas OP/BP 7\.60 â
Comments (optional)
As in case of the SPEDP Investment component, the AF is assigned Environmental Category B\.
Expected negative impacts are standard for reconstruction and restoration activities\. The
Environmental Management Plan (EMP) prepared for SPEDP was updated and will be used for AF
activities\.
The project client is the Russian Ministry of Culture and the substance of the interventions under
AF was developed with strong focus on protection/preservation of cultural and historic assets\. As
the AF operation focuses exclusively on preservation of existing cultural heritage assets, the project
does not raise any issues in the sense of OP 4\.11 "Physical cultural resources"\. As in case of the
SPEDP, the AF supported activities are aimed to protect some of the highest priority cultural
heritage from further deterioration, increase the exhibition and activities capacity of the respective
cultural institutions, improve the operational safety and efficiency of the facilities for both visitors
and personnel; and ensure a high safety of artworks on display and other cultural assets from
physical damages, theft or other hazards\. The rehabilitation and restoration works will mainly
include primarily repair and upgrading of buildings and will also cover some interior utility
networks (electricity, water, heating, a/c, etc)\. Each site will be developed and managed in
accordance with principles of good practice in the cultural heritage field\. As the project aims on the
cultural heritage protection itself, there is no need to prepare a separate cultural management plan\.
From the technical perspective, the rehabilitation and conservation works will follow the
conservation and rehabilitation guidelines established by the Russian Legislation\. The guidelines are
in line with the International Conservation Standards established in the BURRA charter provided by
ICOMOS (International Council on Monuments and Sites) that is an advisory body to the 1972
UNESCO World Heritage Convention, of which Russia is a signatory, and are in line with the
requirements of the OP/BP 4\.11\. The Bank task team includes specialists knowledgeable in all
aspects of heritage preservation and heritage site management\.
VII\. Contact point
World Bank
Contact: Tatyana Shadrunova
Title: Senior Operations Officer
Tel: 5762+2064
Email: tshadrunova@worldbank\.org
Borrower/Client/Recipient
Page 6 of 7
Name: Ministry of Finance
Contact: Mr\. Viktor Mizin
Title: Lead Specialist, International Relations Finance Department
Tel: 7-495-9833964
Email: victor\.mizin@minfin\.ru
Implementing Agencies
Name: Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation
Contact: Mr\. Artem Novikov
Title: Deputy Director of Estate and Investment Policy Department
Tel: 7-495-6238444
Email: novikov@mkrf\.ru
VIII\. For more information contact:
The InfoShop
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 458-4500
Fax: (202) 522-1500
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/infoshop
Page 7 of 7 | APPROVAL |
P088719 |  Document of
The World Bank
Report No: ICR2163
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-39680)
ON A
CREDIT
IN THE AMOUNT OF
SDR 3\.5 MILLION
(US$5\.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
FOR THE
AFGHANISTAN INVESTMENT GUARANTEE FACILITY
April 5, 2012
Finance and Private Sector Development
Afghanistan
South Asia Region
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective September 2011)
Currency Unit = Afghani (AFN)
US$ 1\.00 = AFN 48\.39
FISCAL YEAR
March 21 â March 20
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ADB Asian Development Bank
AIGF Afghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility
AISA Afghanistan Investment Support Agency
BHF Business Humanitarian Forum Association
BOAD West African Development Bank
BMZ Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CAFEF Conflict Affected and Fragile Economies Facility
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
DFID Department for International Development
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
GoA Government of Afghanistan
GTZ German Organization for Technical Cooperation
IDA International Development Association
IFC International Finance Corporation
IHFD International Home Finance and Development LLC
MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
NAPCOD New Afghanistan Project for Cotton and Oil Development
NDF National Development Framework
PAD Project Appraisal Document
PDO Project Development Objective
PPD Project Preparation Document
QALP Quality Assessment of Lending Portfolio
SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
TSS Transitional Support Strategy
Vice President: Isabel Guerrero
Country Director: Josephine Bassinette
Sector Manager: Ivan Rossignol
Project Team Leader: Guillemette Sidonie Jaffrin
ICR Team Leader: Guillemette Sidonie Jaffrin
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
Investment Guarantee Facility
CONTENTS
Data Sheet
A\. Basic Information
B\. Key Dates
C\. Ratings Summary
D\. Sector and ThemeCodes
E\. Bank Staff
F\. Results Framework Analysis
G\. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
H\. Restructuring
I\. Disbursement Graph
1\. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design \. 1
2\. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes \. 4
3\. Assessment of Outcomes \. 8
4\. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome\. 11
5\. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance \. 11
6\. Lessons Learned \. 12
7\. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners \. 13
Annex 1\. Project Costs and Financing \. 15
Annex 2\. Outputs by Component \. 16
Annex 3\. Economic and Financial Analysis \. 17
Annex 4\. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes \. 18
Annex 5\. Beneficiary Survey Results \. 20
Annex 6\. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results\. 20
Annex 7\. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR \. 21
Annex 8\. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders \. 22
Annex 9\. List of Supporting Documents \. 24
Annex 10\. Details of Guarantees â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦\.25
MAP
A\. Basic Information
Afghanistan Investment
Country: Afghanistan Project Name:
Guarantee Facility
Project ID: P088719 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-39680
ICR Date: 04/11/2012 ICR Type: Core ICR
GOVERNMENT OF
Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower:
AFGHANISTAN
Original Total
XDR 3\.50M Disbursed Amount: XDR 3\.28M
Commitment:
Revised Amount: XDR 3\.28M
Environmental Category: C
Implementing Agencies:
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:
Department for International Development UK (DFID)
Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)
Asian Development Bank (ADB)
B\. Key Dates
Revised / Actual
Process Date Process Original Date
Date(s)
Concept Review: 05/13/2004 Effectiveness: 12/17/2004 12/17/2004
Appraisal: 06/29/2004 Restructuring(s):
Approval: 07/29/2004 Mid-term Review:
Closing: 09/30/2009 09/30/2011
C\. Ratings Summary
C\.1 Performance Rating by ICR
Outcomes: Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial
Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory
Borrower Performance: Satisfactory
C\.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)
Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings
Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory
Implementing
Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory
Agency/Agencies:
Overall Bank Overall Borrower
Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory
Performance: Performance:
i
C\.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators
Implementation QAG Assessments
Indicators Rating
Performance (if any)
Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry
No Moderately Satisfactory
at any time (Yes/No): (QEA):
Problem Project at any Quality of Moderately
No
time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): Unsatisfactory
DO rating before
Satisfactory
Closing/Inactive status:
D\. Sector and Theme Codes
Original Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Non-compulsory pensions and insurance 100 100
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction 50 50
Other financial and private sector development 50 50
E\. Bank Staff
Positions At ICR At Approval
Vice President: Isabel M\. Guerrero Praful C\. Patel
Country Director: Josephine M\. Bassinette Alastair J\. McKechnie
Sector Manager: Ivan Rossignol Simon C\. Bell
Project Team Leader: Guillemette Sidonie Jaffrin Samuel Munzele Maimbo
ICR Team Leader: Guillemette Sidonie Jaffrin
ICR Primary Author: Shiori Onishi
Caroline J\. Lambert
F\. Results Framework Analysis
Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)
The Investment Guarantee Facility was intended to assist Afghanistan in its
reconstruction efforts by stimulating foreign direct investment through a program of
political risk insurance in an environment where the perception of political risk by
foreign investors was very high\. The project was designed to provide a first-loss
mechanism in order to leverage additional political risk cover from the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which managed the Facility, and other insurers\.
ii
By providing political risk insurance, the project intended to stimulate private business
activity and attract foreign private investment in a variety of sectors, including but not
limited to manufacturing, agribusiness, banking, and smaller scale infrastructure projects\.
It aimed to stimulate the local economy, generate employment, create tax revenues, and
assist in the transfer of modern technologies and business practices from abroad to
Afghanistan\.
Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)
Not Applicable\.
(a) PDO Indicator(s)
Original Target Formally Actual Value
Values (from Revised Achieved at
Indicator Baseline Value
approval Target Completion or
documents) Values Target Years
Indicator 1 : Amount of foreign direct investment stimulated by AIGF
No foreign direct
Value
investment stimulated by
quantitative or US$80 million US$201\.5 million
AIGF at the time of board
Qualitative)
approval
Date achieved 07/01/2004 12/15/2010 09/30/2011
Comments
(incl\. %
achievement)
Indicator 2 : Number of jobs created through investments supported by AIGF
No jobs generated
Value
through investments
quantitative or 700 jobs 725 jobs
supported by AIGF at the
Qualitative)
time of board approval
Date achieved 07/01/2004 12/15/2010 09/30/2011
Comments
(incl\. %
achievement)
(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)
Original Target Actual Value
Formally
Values (from Achieved at
Indicator Baseline Value Revised
approval Completion or
Target Values
documents) Target Years
Indicator 1 : Total face value of guarantee issued
Value No guarantee Issued at
(quantitative the time of board US$72 million US$159 million
or Qualitative) approval
Date achieved 07/01/2004 12/15/2010 09/30/2011
Comments
(incl\. %
iii
achievement)
Indicator 2 : Total face value of pipeline
Value Face value of
No pipeline at the time of
(quantitative pipeline: US$284 US$836 million
board approval
or Qualitative) million
Date achieved 07/01/2004 12/15/2010 09/30/2011
Comments
(incl\. %
achievement)
G\. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
Actual
Date ISR
No\. DO IP Disbursements
Archived
(USD millions)
1 12/08/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0\.00
2 05/17/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0\.00
3 11/17/2005 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 1\.25
4 05/16/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 1\.25
5 11/27/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1\.25
6 06/07/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1\.25
7 12/09/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1\.25
8 06/06/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1\.25
9 12/12/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1\.25
10 06/26/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2\.50
11 12/18/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2\.50
12 02/13/2011 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2\.50
H\. Restructuring (if any)
Not Applicable
iv
I\. Disbursement Profile
v
1\. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design
1\.1 Context at Appraisal
Country and sector background: The events of September 11, 2001 resulted in
international military intervention in Afghanistan, which in turn heralded the fall of the
Taliban regime\. The Bonn Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan,
signed in December 2001, subsequently laid out a transition process towards a new
constitution and an elected government\. The new constitution was adopted in January
2004, and presidential elections took place later in the year\.
Following more than two decades of conflict, Afghanistan suffered from food insecurity,
derelict infrastructure, a narrow economic base, depleted human capital and endemic
poverty\. The countryâs private sector was weak and largely informal, and unemployment
and underemployment remained major issues for the country\. One of the poorest
countries in the world, Afghanistanâwhich was estimated to require up to US$27 billion
for its reconstruction over the following seven yearsâdepended heavily on foreign
assistance and capital\.
Rationale for Bank assistance: Early in 2002, the National Development Framework
(NDF) of the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) identified three priorities: (i)
humanitarian assistance, human and social capital, (ii) physical reconstruction and natural
resources, and (iii) private sector development\. The scale of the countryâs funding needs,
as well as the dearth of employment opportunities and the largely informal economy,
highlighted the need for private sector investment\. In March 2003, the World Bank Board
approved the Transitional Support Strategy (TSS), formulated to support the NDF\.
Although Afghanistan and its reconstruction offered substantial investment opportunities
for foreign investors, political risk remained a significant hurdle\. At the same time,
political risk insurance for projects in Afghanistan was scarce\. The country was eligible
for Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)âs guarantees, but MIGAâs ability
to share risks with other insurers was very limited, as most insurers were unwilling to
operate in the country\. The Afghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility (AIGF) was
created to provide first loss political risk insurance and therefore leverage additional
cover from MIGA, Asian Development Bank (ADB), as well as public and private
insurers\. The International Development Association (IDA) credit financed the GoAâs
contribution to the Facility, representing an important initiative in the promotion of
private sector development in Afghanistan\.
1\.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)
The Afghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility was intended to assist Afghanistan in its
reconstruction efforts by stimulating foreign direct investment through a program of
political risk insurance in an environment where the perception of political risk by
foreign investors is very high\. The Facility hoped to attract foreign private investment in
a variety of sectors, including but not limited to manufacturing, agribusiness, banking,
1
and smaller scale infrastructure projects, thereby generating employment, creating tax
revenues, and assisting in the transfer of modern technologies and business practices
from abroad to Afghanistan\.
When the project was approved in July 2004, outcome indicators were not included in the
Project Preparation Document (PPD) and in the Memorandum and Recommendations of
the President\.
Initial indicators were developed in May 2005 and included: (i) disbursements equivalent
to 25% of the value of the IDA contribution towards the issuance of guarantees in
FY2006, and (ii) a pipeline of definitive applications from at least four firms in FY2006\.
Key indicators were revised in November 2006 in order to better align with the PDO,
which remained unchanged\. New indicators are: (i) amount of foreign direct investment
stimulated by the AIGF, (ii) number of jobs created through investments supported by the
AIGF, (iii) total face value of guarantee issued, and (iv) total face value of pipeline with
definitive application\.
1\.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and
reasons/justification
The PDO was not revised\.
1\.4 Main Beneficiaries
The PPD did not identify specific beneficiaries\.
1\.5 Original Components (as approved)
The creation of the Investment Guarantee Facility was the projectâs single component\.
The objective of the Facility was to create a leveraging mechanism that would generate
additional political risk cover\. Additional insurance was to be provided by MIGA as well
as other public and private insurers mobilized through MIGAâs reinsurance program\. In
order to maximize the leverage, the Facility was structured to provide a âfirst-lossâ layer:
the AIGF would cover any claims first, before co-insurers would become liable for
additional amounts not covered by the Facility\. This was considered as a critical element
for the project in view of Afghanistanâs high risk environment\.
The GoA funded the Facility through credits from IDA and ADB, which each committed
US$5 million, and a grant of GBP 1 million from the UKâs Department for International
Development (DFID)\. Contributions were disbursed in tranches into an interest-bearing
trust fund\. The US$11\.9 million extended to the GoA by IDA, ADB and DFID as GoAâs
contributions to the Facility was expected to translate into a total guarantee amount of
US$71\.4 million\.
MIGA administered and managed the Facility\. As administrator, MIGA was to assess
proposed investments and associated risks, issue contracts of guarantee, collect premiums
and manage the portfolio of contracts on behalf of the Facility\. In addition, MIGA was
2
expected to market the Facility and mobilize additional political risk cover from public
and private insurers\. Afghan Investment Support Agency (AISA) agreed to work with
MIGA to promote the Facility to potential foreign investors\. Modalities were detailed in a
Framework Agreement between the GoA and MIGA\.
Guarantees provided by the Facility were to be underwritten following MIGAâs regular
procedures, eligibility criteria and methodologies, and covered the risks of (i) Currency
Transfer Restrictions and Inconvertibility, (ii) Expropriation, (iii) War and Civil
Disturbance, and (iv) Breach of Contract\. To tailor the project to Afghanistanâs post-
conflict environment, however, some flexibility was incorporated into the Facility, which
was authorized to support transactions not eligible under MIGAâs regular policies:
(a) Foreign loans financing either local equity investments or imports of critical
capital goods for reconstruction\.
(b) Local loans provided in a freely convertible currency by foreign financial
institutions in Afghanistan\. The objective was to encourage local lending, which
was non-existent\.
For the Facility to support as many projects as possible, the exposure of AIGF under any
guarantee contract was capped at US$2 million per individual project\. AIGFâs exposure
for transactions ineligible under MIGAâs regular policies was capped at US$1 million per
project and 30 percent of the capital of the Facility on an aggregate basis\. Exemptions to
these rules could be granted if agreed by the GoA, MIGA and the Facilityâs participants\.
Guarantees were to be priced to risk, in accordance with MIGAâs pricing methodology\.
In order to limit the risk of the Facility, guarantee contracts were to have a maximum
duration of seven years\.
1\.6 Revised Components
Not Applicable\.
1\.7 Other significant changes
In order to maximize the leverage of the Facility, the ratio between the cover provided by
AIGF and by co-insurers had initially been set at a minimum of 1:5\. In other words, for
every dollar of cover provided under the Facility, MIGA was to arrange at least US$5 of
additional insurance for the same investment\. Yet, by November 2007, much of the
Facilityâs capital remained uncommitted\. In order to increase the level of capital
commitment, the Facility was then authorized to cover investments following a 1:1 ratio
if necessary, up to AIGFâs maximum amount of liability set for each project\. MIGA,
however, was still committed to generating higher leverage for larger investments that
required additional insurance\.
In February 2009âseven months before the project was scheduled to closeâthe GoA
formally requested that the Facility be extended for another two years\. In July 2009, the
Bank agreed to extend the closing date of the credit until September 30, 2011,
3
considering the pipeline of potential projects as well as AIGFâs and MIGAâs performance
and action plan to strengthen marketing\.
DFID also agreed to extend the project closing date, and the Amendment of
Memorandum of Understanding was signed between MIGA and DFID in December 2009\.
However, ADB declined, taking the view that (i) funds in the Facility were enough to
cover the current and expected guarantees, (ii) the investment pipeline did not justify it,
and (iii) its special funds resources were needed elsewhere\. The Facility continued
operating until September 2011 with a reduced capital of US$9\.4 million, as the
undisbursed portion of the ADB credit (US$2\.5 million) was cancelled in May 2010\.
2\. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2\.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry
The project was prepared as an emergency operation, given Afghanistanâs political and
economic situation, and was delivered within a short period of time\. In line with
Operational Policy 8\.50 Emergency Recovery Assistance, there was no Project Appraisal
Document (PAD) for this project\. Project design was informed by IDAâs and MIGAâs
previous experience with guarantee facilities, most notably in Africa (Regional Trade
Facilitation Project) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (European Union Investment Guarantee
Trust Fund)\. These projects provided valuable lessons related to the importance of local
market knowledge and private sector contacts, the âfirst lossâ mechanism, the value of
maintaining a local presence particularly during the start-up phase, and the need for
flexibility to support a wider range of investments\.
To assess interest in Afghanistan and shape the services offered by the Facility, extensive
consultations were held with private investorsâparticularly from the Afghan Diasporaâ
the financial sector, and political risk insurers\. Project design strived to balance what
MIGA could offer and the need for some flexibility based on Afghanistanâs post-conflict
environment and feedback from consultations\.
General risks related to the security situation, as well as the investment and lending
environment, were well identified\. Implementation risks such as the Afghan authoritiesâ
ability to promote the Facility, on the other hand, were not highlighted\.
As noted in section 1\.2, key project outcome indicators were not defined at the project
design stage\.
2\.2 Implementation
Investment Environment: Project implementation suffered from a deteriorating business
environment\. The deterioration of security, the weight of the informal economy, poor
governance and the slow pace of reforms, combined with the global financial crisis, led to
a severe decline in foreign investment into Afghanistan\. This resulted in declining
interest in the Facility from foreign investors, as reflected in the number of applications\.
4
In addition, as further explained below, the difficult business environment weighed on
projects underwritten by the Facility, which contributed to decisions to cancel coverage\.
The hopes that foreign investment could flourish in a variety of sectors were not realized\.
As in many other post-conflict environments, the telecommunication sector did well,
while other sectors struggled, as illustrated in the AIGFâs portfolio\.
Marketing: The Facility also faced marketing challenges\. Although promotion alone
cannot create demand from investors, knowledge about the Facilityâs services is essential
to facilitate such demand\. The project became effective in December 2004, but
implementation was initially slow\. A German grant of US$0\.6 million through the
German Organization for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) covered the MIGAâs costs of
hiring a consultant based in Kabul to market the Facility and support its operation\. The
consultant was recruited by MIGA in May 2005, and started operating in Afghanistan in
September 2005, after initial training in Washington D\.C\. A lack of clear and commonly
agreed marketing strategy for the Facility and poor supervision of the consultant by
MIGA headquarters who was new to political risk insurance and to Afghanistan,
hampered implementation during the first year\. Misunderstandings about the role of the
consultant and his position vis-Ã -vis AISA affected his ability to interact with the Afghan
authorities\.
By September 2006, initial shortcomings were rectified: the consultantâs responsibilities
were clarified, he received further training (by MIGA), and his performance was more
closely supervised\. However, GTZ declined to provide further funding to extend the
consultantâs contract\. MIGA financed the consultant until October 2007 to focus on
training AISA staff to market the Facility\. The Facilityâs sponsors explored alternative
sources of funding and debated whether a full-time local representative was necessary\.
All the donors agreed that a local representative could improve in-country marketing, but
funding remained a constraint\. In May 2009, HARAKAT, a DFID-funded facility to
promote private sector development in Afghanistan, indicated an interest in financing the
position\. Terms of Reference were drafted by MIGA and a formal application for
HARAKAT funding was prepared\. However, in October 2010, as the project closing date
was approaching, the Facility sponsors decided that marketing would be best conducted
from MIGAâs headquarters as well as by AISAâs staff on the ground in Kabul\.
AISA, as the national Investment Promotion Agency and the official registrar for every
local and foreign investor wishing to conduct business in the country, had direct contact
with investors and thus was expected to take over the local promotion efforts and refer
interested companies to MIGA\. The AIGF was an additional tool for AISA to attract
foreign direct investments (FDI) into Afghanistan by informing investors of the
availability of political risk insurance\. Although AISA introduced AIGF in meetings with
investors and during investment promotion events, the Agencyâs marketing performance
was not consistent\. AISA failed to develop a good understanding of the Facility, in part
due to high staff turnover, and in time active local marketing activities virtually ceased\.
In late 2009, MIGA appointed a former AISA staff as a local marketing agent\. This,
however, also failed to translate into new business opportunities for the AIGF\. It should
5
be noted that political risk insurance is a very specialized and complex product, which is
more difficult to market when brokered by local marketing agents\. Similar lessons were
learned when MIGA set up the West African Development Bank (BOAD) guarantee
facility in Togo or the facility for Bosnia and Herzegovina\. In the Afghan context, MIGA
could have adapted better to the change of market conditions, and be more proactive in
supporting the marketing of its own product\.
As noted above, the Facility was designed to guarantee transactions not typically covered
by MIGA\. Yet the flexibility incorporated in the project design never became applicable
in practice in Afghanistan where formal project finance and trade credit have largely
failed to develop\.
Guarantee Issuance: In spite of increasingly difficult circumstances, the Facility provided
political risk insurance to five projects, two of which obtained further cover for
expansions\. Yet two projects (NAPCOD and BHF) ran into difficulty, and insurance was
later cancelled\. Another project (Geo Building Technologies) failed to secure debt
financing and reduced the amount of cover initially obtained to reflect the declining value
of the investment\. The details of guarantees are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 below\. See
Annex 10 for the details of specific transactions\.
Table 1: AIGF and MIGA Exposure as of September 30, 2011
Projects Guarantee AIGF MIGA Total FDI Jobs Issue Date Expiry Date
Exposure Exposure
July 7, July 6,
MTN $156,750,005 $6,000,000 $150,750,005 $193,000,000 600
2011 2017
BRAC Afghan Sept\. 29, Sept\. 28,
$1,800,000 $300,000 $1,500,000
Bank I 2006 2013
$6,500,000 120
BRAC Afghan Mar\. 31, Mar\. 30,
$225,000 $112,500 $112,500
Bank II 2008 2014
Geo Building Mar\. 31, Mar\. 30,
$180,000 $90,000 $90,000 $2,000,000 5
Technologies 2008 2015
Total $158,955,005 $6,502,500 $152,452,505 $201,500,000 725
6
Table 2: Cancelled AIGF and MIGA Exposure
Projects Guarantee AIGF MIGA Total FDI Jobs Issue Date Expiry Date
Exposure Exposure
Feb\. 24,
NAPCOD $1,269,135 $211,522 $1,057,613 $14,100,000 180 Cancelled
2006
Cancelled to
June 29,
MTN $76,500,000 $2,000,000 $74,500,000 $85,000,000 500 issue a new
2007
guarantee
Geo Building Mar\. 31, Reduced
$1,560,000 $780,000 $780,000 $2,000,000 5
Technologies 2008 cover
Sept\. 25,
BHF $429,840 $64,476 $365,364 $1,000,000 20 Cancelled
2006
Total
$ 79,758,975 $3,055,998 $76,702,977
Cancellations
In April 2011, the AIGF compensated a claim of US$572\.95 under the War and Civil
Disturbance cover to the BRAC Afghanistan Bank for physical damage, following an
explosion at the Safi Hotel and shopping center in January 2010\. This is so far the only
claim filed under this project\.
2\.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization
As previously mentioned, project outcome indicators were developed after the project
was approved, and were subsequently modified\. Intermediate indicators measured the
amount of guarantee issued and the face value of the project pipeline, while project
outcomes were measured by the amount of FDI supported by the Facility and the number
of jobs created\.
Although these indicators were appropriate, the projectâs outcomes also included
generating taxes for the Afghan authorities and promoting technology transfer, which
were not measured\. Given that the Facility together with MIGA issued a guarantee of
US$ 156\.75 million for a foreign investment in telecom, the benefits in terms of tax
revenues to the government and technology transfer are substantial\.
2\.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance
Safeguards: Under the Bankâs Operational Policy 4\.01 Environmental Assessment, this
project was categorized as C: the project was likely to have minimal or no adverse
environmental impacts\. The Framework Agreement states that the Facility applies
MIGA's Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies, MIGA's Environmental
Guidelines, and MIGA's Environmental and Social Review Procedures\. Each project was
reviewed by MIGA for its social and environment impacts during underwriting due
diligence, and each contract of guarantee in the project carried covenants regarding social
and environmental safeguards\.
Fiduciary Compliance: MIGA was chosen as the implementing agency with the sole
authority to issue guarantees from the Facility, and responsible for the fiduciary aspects
7
of the Facilityâs operation\. The Development Credit Agreement requires MIGA to submit
annual audit reports to IDA on the operations, resources and expenditures related to the
project\. The Bank waived the submission of audit reports from year to year, because there
were no guarantee claims until April 2011\. Only one independent audit was undertaken in
December 2009, covering the period from August 4, 2004 to December 31, 2009\. Semi-
annual unaudited financial monitoring reports were submitted by MIGA regularly, and
were reviewed by the Bank\.
2\.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
MIGA continues to administer ongoing operations after the closing date\. As of January
30, 2012, four guarantees remain active, and the total exposure of the Facility stands at
US$6\.5 million, as presented in Table 1 above\.
To support FDI in conflict-affected and fragile countries, MIGA is considering a new
program called Conflict Affected and Fragile Economies Facility (CAFEF) to be
financed by development partners\. Afghanistan will have access to the new Facility\. In
the design of CAFEF, MIGA incorporated lessons drawn from previous operations,
especially AIGF\. CAFEF is structured similarly to the AIGF, i\.e\. the facility will take a
first loss cover on a covered transaction\. The intent of the CAFEF is, like in the AIGF, to
use the first loss layer as catalyst to increase underwriting of political risk insurance from
MIGA and other insurers for a particular investment in a conflict-affected country or
fragile state\. A number of development partners have expressed an interest to finance the
Facility (DFID, CIDA, SIDA, AusAID, and BMZ), but CAFEF has not yet been formally
approved by MIGAâs Board of Directors\.
3\. Assessment of Outcomes
3\.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation
Objectives: Provision of political risk insurance remains critical for foreign investors in
todayâs context, as Afghanistan acutely needs FDI for private sector development and
economic growth\. Yet, as Table 3 shows, FDI into Afghanistan has plummeted since
2008\. As of 2010, it was less than half of the FDI in 2004 when the project started, and
one fourth of its peak in 2008\.
Table 3: Foreign Direct Investment Flow to Afghanistan (US$ million)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
186 271 238 243 300 185 76
Source: Inward and outward foreign direct investment flows, UNCTADStat
The project objective remains relevant, but the deteriorating security situation has
significantly reduced investorsâ confidence and critically affected FDI inflows in
Afghanistan\. Foreign transactions today are mainly short term and trade related\.
8
Design: According to the Quality Assessment of Lending Portfolio (QALP) conducted in
May 2010, the project was well prepared and designed, following MIGAâs established
procedures\. Given the financial management concerns and capacity constraints within the
government ministries, the selection of MIGA as the implementing agency was a creative
and pragmatic approach, as well as an effective measure to mitigate financial
management risk\.
In terms of guarantee products, some of the Facilityâs sponsors argued that the Facilityâs
services should have been extended to cover local equity investments, and local investors
actually expressed interest in political risk insurance\. It is however unclear how MIGA
could have properly assessed the associated risks and managed the legal as well as
logistical implications of covering local investments\.
Allowing the Facility to guarantee transactions not covered under MIGAâs regular
policies was premised on expectations that Afghanistanâs financial sector would develop\.
Yet, the flexibility of the Facility design by offering cover for local loans and export
credit proved ill suited to the Afghan environment, where formal project finance and
trade credit have remained embryonic\.
The time and efforts spent processing the claim for BRAC Afghanistan Bank were
disproportionate compared to the small amount that was paid out\. The claim was only the
sixth claim payment that MIGA had made since its inception in 1988\. As the AIGF was
administered under MIGAâs Operational Regulations, MIGAâs Executive Vice President
was responsible for decisions on claims\. However, given the relative infrequency of such
events, MIGA sought concurrence from the President of the Bank\. A deductible or
similar system to filter small claims could have been developed for the Facility\.
Implementation: MIGA was the implementing agency of the Facility\. Due to the
Facilityâs slow start-up, opportunities for guarantee transactions in 2005 might have been
missed\. The lack of local representative and the limited ability of AISA to market the
Facility hampered the promotion of AIGF in country\. The project sponsors also
expressed some frustration with MIGAâs marketing of the Facility\. Yet, MIGAâs efforts
to promote services in Afghanistan were remarkable relative to its resources and efforts
deployed in other member countries\. MIGA has 18 underwriters who also act as the
Agencyâs business development officers covering 175 countries\.
3\.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives
Despite declining FDI flow and Afghanistanâs deteriorating investment climate, the
AIGF met its key outcome targets of stimulating foreign investment and creating
employment opportunities\.
As Table 1 shows, the total amount of FDI facilitated by the Facility and MIGA exceeded
the target of US$80 million by a wide margin, reaching US$201\.5 million as of
September 2011\. The Facility also exceeded its job target\. Total face value of guarantees
issued by AIGF and MIGA excluding cancellations was US$159 million, compared with
the target of US$72 million\.
9
The target for the total face value of project pipeline at U$284 million was met and
surpassed\. The face value of projects in the pipeline based on submission of preliminary
applications reached US$836 million by September 2011\. However, most of the
applications did not translate into guarantees, and it is difficult to estimate how many of
these applications are for active investment projects\. This is comparable to MIGAâs
business in other countries, as few applications ever turn into guarantee contracts\. In
addition, although investors initially showed interest in AIGF, the Facilityâs services
were deemed expensive, particularly when compared to national insurers, which can
subsidize premiums\. The deteriorating security situation, compounded by the 2008 global
financial crisis, also significantly reduced investorsâ appetite in Afghanistan\.
Key indicators and results are summarized in Annex 2\.
Although the project met its key outcome targets, some of the project sponsors appeared
disappointed by the fact that a single guarantee contract for a foreign investor in telecom
dominates the AIGF/MIGA portfolio for Afghanistan\. This may be due to unrealistic
expectations about the role of political risk insurance, which supports but does not
generate foreign investment, particularly in a context of deteriorating security and
business uncertainty\. As the business environment deteriorated, the type of foreign
investors still interested in Afghanistan were more likely to have high risk tolerance and
therefore unlikely to have any interest in political risk insurance\. In addition, investors
from Afghanistan neighboring countriesâa significant source of FDIâare not traditional
buyers of political risk insurance\. This investor profile, together with the prevailing
political and security trajectory, increased the challenges of promoting political risk
insurance in Afghanistan, unlike in other countries recovering from conflict, such as
Bosnia and Herzegovina\. Yet AIGF and MIGA have underwritten more political risk
cover for investments in Afghanistan than any other national insurer\.
3\.3 Efficiency
As of June 30, 2011, the project generated US$953,000 as premium and interest income,
while expenses accrued under this Facility were US$131,000, which were paid to MIGA
as administrative and audit fees\. In addition, the Facility reimbursed US$572\.94 for the
guarantee claim by BRAC\.
As discussed in Section 3\.2, the project met all the PDO indicators\. Thus, the project
achieved its objective efficiently\.
3\.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating
Rating: Satisfactory\. As discussed above, all the key outcome indicators have been
achieved, thus the projectâs overall outcome rating is Satisfactory\.
3\.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts
(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development
10
Not Applicable\.
(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening
As MIGA was the implementing agency, the project did not directly lead to institutional
change and strengthening in the country\. However, AISA committed to providing
dedicated staff to market the facility in the country\. The MIGA consultant provided
training to AISA personnel in marketing, but they were unable to focus on the Facility
due to other assignments\. Moreover, the various AISA operational staff that were trained
and tasked with the marketing efforts in the country later left AISA, and they were never
replaced\. This resulted in limited capacity building relating to political risk insurance\.
(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)
Not Applicable\.
3\.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops
No beneficiary survey was conducted\.
4\. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome
Rating: Substantial\. QALP2 assessment of the project pointed out that one of the
significant risks in this project is potential claims on existing contracts due to the
deteriorating security situation and political uncertainty\. Four guarantees remain active as
of January 2012, and the AIGFs total exposure amounts to US$6\.5 million\. Although the
project was closed, the risk of potential claim remains until the expiry of the last
guarantee in July 2017\.
5\. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance
5\.1 Bank Performance
(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory\. As this project was an emergency operation, the PPD
was prepared within a very short period of time\. A joint IDA/MIGA team carried out
project preparation and the project design was informed by MIGAâs previous experience
with guarantee facilities, most notably in Africa (Regional Trade Facilitation Project) and
Bosnia and Herzegovina (European Union Investment Guarantee Trust Fund)\. These
projects provided valuable lessons related to the importance of local market knowledge
and private sector contacts, the âfirst lossâ mechanism, the value of maintaining a local
presence particularly during the start-up phase, and the need for flexibility to support a
wider range of investments\.
(b) Quality of Supervision
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory\. With MIGA being the implementing agency for the
Facility, the World Bank project team in Kabul supported MIGAâs work by monitoring
11
progress toward achieving project outcome targets, as well as coordinating with the GoA
and other Kabul-based donors\. The supervision mission was conducted and project status
reported regularly every half year throughout the project implementation period\.
However, coordination between the Kabul-based Bank team and MIGA was inadequate
in terms of securing MIGAâs inputs to project supervision and undertaking timely actions
to address the challenges encountered by the project\.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory\. Based on the above, overall Bank Performance is
moderately satisfactory\.
5\.2 Borrower Performance
(a) Government Performance
Rating: Satisfactory\. The GoA explicitly requested this operation to attract FDI and
enhance private sector development and readily accepted MIGA being the implementing
agency under a Framework Agreement with MIGA\. The GoA maintained its commitment
to the project throughout the project period and was supportive to MIGAâs underwriting
operations in Afghanistan\. When MIGA requested the increase of AIGF insurance
coverage for MTN in July 2011, the GoA readily agreed\.
(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance
Rating: Satisfactory\. Overall, MIGAâs performance as the implementing agency for the
Facility is rated Satisfactory despite shortcomings in marketing the Facility\.
The marketing activities of the AIGF in the first three years yielded good results under a
better investment and security outlook, creating a number of pipeline projects and
guarantees\. Nonetheless, after the AIGFâs consultant left in October 2007, there was no
physical presence in Afghanistan, and MIGA headquarters mainly took care of operation
and marketing\. This, added to AISAâs inability to effectively market the Facility, led to
the very limited marketing activities in Afghanistan\. Nevertheless, MIGA continued
promoting the Facility by attending and/or participating in Afghanistan investment
forums, as well as marketing it through its website, printed material, and presentations on
business development missions and at various forums aimed at attracting private sector
investments in conflict, post-conflict, and fragile states\.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance
Rating: Satisfactory\.
6\. Lessons Learned
Three main lessons emerge from the project: (i) country risk, (ii) flexibility in insurance
products, and (iii) field representation for marketing\.
Country Risk: Afghanistanâs environment is challenging for FDI, in particular the
worsening security environment and governance\. Availability of political risk guarantee
is not enough to mitigate the concerns of foreign investors\. Without minimum peace and
security, long-term investments are difficult to attract\.
12
Flexibility in Insurance Products: Political risk is a major constraint for foreign investors
who are interested in the country; thus providing political risk guarantee is highly
relevant for promoting FDI and enhancing private sector development\. However, the
Facility only focused on cross-border political risk insurance and local loans by foreign
financial institutions\. It could not cover local investments and short-term operations,
which might have had more demand\. According to the Insurance Need Assessment
Survey conducted by AISA in June 2009, 76% of investors suggested that insurance be
extended to local investors as well\.
Field Representation for Marketing: The AIGF marketing activities would have been
further improved by hiring a local marketing representative, familiar with local
investment and business environment as well as political risk insurance products\. The
previous operation of MIGA in Bosnia and Herzegovina highlighted the importance of
having a full-time representative working on the ground to increase awareness and liaise
with investors on a continuing basis; once a special representative was placed in-country,
there was a steady flow of inquiries from foreign investors for guarantees\. In addition,
local representative can help MIGA staff in headquarters to better understand the risks
involved in the country since more detailed information can be provided\. This greatly
helps in the management of risks in a high-risk environment\.
MIGA has incorporated some of these lessons in the proposed CAFEF, in particular: (i)
locating a field marketing staff focused on the program in Africa, and a coordinator
dedicated to CAFEF management and donor relations, and (ii) forming partnerships with
donors, export credit agencies, and private insurance companies and banks as well as
with the World Bank and International Finance Corporation (IFC)\.
7\. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners
(a) Borrower/implementing agencies
None
(b) Cofinanciers
The ADB published its Completion Report on the AIGF in December 2011\. The ADB
has indicated that the achievement of the projectâs outcome was successful, by
stimulating FDI and creating jobs through political risk guarantees despite the
deteriorating security situation and the global financial crisis\. Implementation
arrangements were partly satisfactory; although the ADBâs active involvement was
sought in the later stage, coordination between the ADB and MIGA was intermittent
during the initial phase of implementation mainly due to staff changes\.
DFID also issued its Project Closure Report in December 2011\. The report mentioned
that, although the overall outcomes of the project were positive, the first phase of the
Facility (2004-2009) was more successful than the second phase (2009-2011)\. It has also
indicated that, while the project achieved the initial target in stimulating FDI through
political risk guarantees, FDI in Afghanistan fell significantly over the life of the project\.
13
Therefore, a link between underwriting political risk guarantees and increasing FDI
appears to be weak, particularly in terms of investment risk in conflict-affected countries\.
The details are provided in Annex 8\.
(c) Other partners and stakeholders
None
14
Annex 1\. Project Costs and Financing
(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)
Actual/Latest
Appraisal Estimate Percentage of
Components Estimate (USD
(USD millions) Appraisal
millions)
Investment Guarantee Facility 11\.9 9\.4 75%
Consulting related to marketing of
0\.6 0\.6 100%
Facility and Training AISA
Total Project Costs 12\.5 10\.0 80%
(b) Financing
Appraisal Actual/Latest
Percentage of
Source of Funds Estimate Estimate
Appraisal
(USD millions) (USD millions)
Asian Development Bank 5\.00 2\.50 50%
Department for International
1\.90 1\.90 100%
Development
German Organization for Technical
0\.60 0\.60 100%
Cooperation
International Development
5\.00 5\.00 100%
Association (IDA)
15
Annex 2\. Outputs by Component
Table: Project Outcomes and Key Performance Indicators
Baseline
End-of-
Value Value Achieved
Project Outcome Indicators Project Target
(Project (September 2011)
Value
inception)
1\. Amount of foreign direct investment No foreign US$80 million US$201\.5 million
stimulated by AIGF direct
investment
stimulated by
AIGF at the
time of board
approval
2\. Number of jobs created through No jobs 700 jobs 725 jobs
investments supported by AIGF generated
through
investments
supported by
AIGF at the
time of board
approval
Intermediate Outcome Indicators
1\. Total face value of guarantee issued No guarantee US$72 million US$159 million
Issued at the
time of board
approval
2\. Total face value of pipeline No pipeline at Face value of US$836 million
the time of pipeline:
board US$284
approval million
16
Annex 3\. Economic and Financial Analysis
(Not Applicable)
17
Annex 4\. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes
(a) Task Team members
Names Title Unit
Lending
Manoj Agrawal Consultant SARFM
Anton Dobronogov Senior Economist AFTP2
Emily Harwit Whewell Consultant CAFAF
Shawkat M\.Q\. Hasan Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPC
Monique Koning Operations Team Manager - MIGA MIGOP
Samuel Munzele Maimbo Lead Financial Sector Speciali AFTFE
Vikram Raghavan Senior Counsel LEGES
Supervision/ICR
Manoj Agrawal Consultant SARFM
Nazir Ahmad Research Analyst SASFP
Anton Dobronogov Senior Economist AFTP2
Nabil Fawaz Sector Leader MIGOP
Shawkat M\.Q\. Hasan Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPC
Monique Koning Operations Team Manager - MIGA MIGOP
Sheila Braka Musiime Senior Counsel LEGOP
Asha Narayan Financial Management Specialis SARFM
Richard George Andrew Nash Counsel LEGJR
Kyoo-Won Oh Underwriter MIGOP
Kenneth O\. Okpara Sr Financial Management Specia SARFM
Srilal Mohan Perera Chief Counsel MIGLC
Vikram Raghavan Senior Counsel LEGES
Mustafizul Hye Shakir Consultant SASFP
Michael R\. Silverman Consultant INTSC
Paul Edwin Sisk Lead Financial Management Spec SARFM
Thomas A\. Vis Senior Risk Management Officer AFTFW
18
(b) Staff Time and Cost
Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)
Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including
No\. of staff weeks
travel and consultant costs)
Lending
FY04 5 16\.82
FY05 6 28\.56
FY06 0\.00
FY07 0\.00
FY08 0\.00
Total: 11 45\.38
Supervision/ICR
FY04 0\.00
FY05 3 17\.08
FY06 4 23\.27
FY07 1 13\.29
FY08 11 48\.14
FY09 20 0\.00
Total: 39 101\.78
19
Annex 5\. Beneficiary Survey Results
(Not Applicable)
Annex 6\. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results
(Not Applicable)
20
Annex 7\. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR
Clause D of Schedule 3 in Development Credit Agreement requires MIGA, as the
administrator and operator of the Facility, to provide a comprehensive evaluation report
after the project close\. However, it has been agreed between MIGA and the Bank to
merge MIGA's evaluation with the Bankâs ICR\. MIGA has provided the Bank with the
project information and insights on the AIGF during the process of writing the ICR\.
21
Annex 8\. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders
1\. ADB Completion Report
(i) Project Design
At appraisal, project design and formulation were highly relevant to the development
objectives of Afghanistan as well as the ADBâs country strategy and program (2002-
2004) that supported capacity building, policy and institutional frameworks, and
infrastructure for private sector development\.
In September 2009, when the ADB completed the project, the project design was relevant,
because the Facility offered political risk guarantee cover for noncommercial risks, and it
could not address issues such as deteriorating security situation, and international and
regional banks withdrawing from Afghanistan due to growing aversion to risk after the
global financial crisis\. In addition, the project could not address AISAâs inability to
enhance FDI or promote political risk guarantee, MIGAâs limited marketing to investors
outside of Washington D\.C\., and local investorsâ lack of interest in political risk
guarantee\.
(ii) Project Outcome
The achievement of the projectâs outcome was successful, by stimulating FDI and
creating jobs through political risk guarantees despite the deteriorating security situation
and the global financial crisis\. Substantial leverage was made for the AIGF, as MIGA
provided second loss cover, particularly for the MTNâs investment\.
(iii)Disbursements
The first disbursement from the ADB was made in May 2009, which is 50 months after
loan became effective\. The delay was caused by lack of coordination between the ADB
and MIGA, and the lack of investment projects that needed political risk guarantees\.
(iv) Implementation
Implementation arrangements were partly satisfactory\. Although the ADBâs active
involvement was sought in the later stage, coordination between the ADB and MIGA was
intermittent during the initial phase of implementation mainly due to staff changes\.
(v) Sustainability
The project sustainability is less likely\. On the contrary to what had hoped at appraisal,
instability in Afghanistan has caused a decreased amount of FDI inflow and the
withdrawal of international banks to support FDI; thus, there are weaker prospects in
terms of further investments supported\.
(vi) Overall Assessment
Overall, the project is rated successful\.
22
2\. DFID Completion Report
Although the overall outcomes of the project were positive, the first phase of the Facility
(2004-2009) was more successful than the second phase (2009-2011)\. At the first stage of
the project, the AIGF played an important role in attracting investors through political
risk insurance\. However, in the second phase, the MIGA/AIGF did not adapt its
marketing under less conductive market, and the huge pipeline was not materialized
except the last guarantee underwritten for MTN in 2011\.
The project achieved the initial target in stimulating FDI through political risk guarantees\.
However, FDI in Afghanistan fell significantly over the life of the project\. Therefore, a
link between underwriting political risk guarantees and increasing FDI appears to be
weak, particularly in terms of investment risk in conflict-affected countries\.
Lack of country presence limited the partnerâs responsiveness to the Afghan context and
to DFID\. Marketing strategy, suitability of the products to a conflict-affected country like
Afghanistan, and on-the-ground staff dedicated to the country should be particularly
addressed in any similar facility\.
23
Annex 9\. List of Supporting Documents
1\. âProject Preparation Document for a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 3\.5
Million (US$5\.0 Million Equivalent) to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for an
Investment Guarantee Facility Established as a Trust Fund between the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency as
Administrator of the Trust Fundâ, July 29,2004\.
2\. âMemorandum and Recommendation of the President of the International
Development Association and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency to The
Executive Directors of the International Development Association and Directors of
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency on a Proposed Credit of SDR 3\.5
Million (US$5\.0 Million Equivalent) to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for an
Investment Guarantee Facility Established as a Trust Fund and Proposed Framework
Agreement Between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency as Administrator of the Trust Fundâ, July 29, 2004\.
3\. âAfghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility: Framework Agreement between the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency, as Administrator of the Afghanistan Investment Guarantee
Facilityâ, August 4, 2004\.
4\. âDevelopment Credit Agreement between Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and
International Development Associationâ, August 4, 2004\.
5\. âDescriptive Analysis of Insurance Need Assessment Survey in Afghanistanâ, AISA,
June 2009\.
6\. âAfghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility Trust Fund Administered by Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency, Financial Statement and Independent Auditorsâ
Reportâ, December 31, 2009\.
7\. âThe Second Quality Assessment of Lending Portfolio (QALP-2)â, May 2010\.
8\. Supervision missionsâ aide-memoires, back-to-office reports and Implementation
Status and Results reports\.
9\. âCompletion Report: Afghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility Projectâ, Asian
Development Bank, December 2011\.
10\. âProject Closure Report for the Afghanistan Investment Guarantee Facilityâ,
Department for International Development, December 2011\.
24
Annex 10\. Details of Guarantees
In February 2006, or 14 months after the project became effective, a first guarantee was
issued to Dagris (majority-owned by the French government) for its equity investment
into a cotton ginning and cottonseed oil production project\. By the end of that year,
another two guarantees totaling US$2\.23 million were covering equity investments in
BRAC Afghanistan Bankâa financial institution focusing on loans to small and medium
companiesâand Baz International Pharmaceutical Company Ltd (BIPC)\. In addition, a
guarantee of US$76\.5 million was issued to MTN (Areeba) Afghanistan in June 2007 for
its investment in a mobile phone network\. The US$2 million underwritten by AIGF for
the MTN project provided substantial leverage, as MIGA, besides providing significant
extra cover, also reinsured a portion of its exposure in the project with four additional
insurers that would otherwise not have provided seven-year tenors in Afghanistan\.
Subsequently, two more guarantees were issued in 2008 for an additional investment in
BRAC Afghanistan Bank and for a project sponsored by International Home Finance and
Development LLC (IHFD) to manufacture âgreenâ bricks and lease brick-making
machines\.
From 2007 onwards, however, the security situation in Afghanistan worsened
significantly\. Foreign investment plummeted, which resulted in diminished interest in the
Facility, and fewer applications were submitted to MIGA\. In addition, some of the
investments covered by the Facility struggled because of the deteriorating security
situation and difficult business environment\. Business Humanitarian Forum Association
(BHP), investor of BIPC, cancelled its guarantee in 2007, as it failed to find a technical
partner to manufacture pharmaceutical products in Afghanistan\. In addition, NAPCOD
struggled to enforce its contracts with local farmers, who sold their harvest to other
buyers, and competed with another cotton ginning factory that operated illegally in the
region, which brought its operations to a standstill\. Dagrisâ new shareholders cancelled
the guarantee in 2008\. Having failed to obtain loans to finance its project, IHFD
cancelled a part of its guarantee for Geo Building Technologies in 2009\. Technical
difficulties further hampered the project, and the outstanding cover was reduced to reflect
the diminishing value of the equity investment\. BRAC Bank, which struggled with bad
loans and increasing minimum capital requirements, was in the process of being sold as
the AIGF project closed\.
In July 2011, a new guarantee of US$156\.75 million was issued to MTN to cover the
expansion of its mobile network, replacing the earlier guarantee of US$76\.5 million\.
AIGF underwrote US$6 million of the guarantee after it obtained an approval from the
GoA and DFID to exceed the limit of US$2 million per project, and significant leverage
was obtained through MIGAâs additional cover and reinsurance with other providers\. As
a result, the AIGF committed most of its capital, with the near full drawdown of IDA
resources\.
25
60°E 65°E 70°E 75°E
To
U Z B E K I STA N Dushanbe hob
Am
uD
ar y Murg
a
TA J I K I STAN
To
Chardzhev To TAJ IK IS TA N
To Ë
Kulob To Shazud
Dushanbe To
Ë
Qurghonteppa
AFGHANISTAN TUR KM E N I S TA N
Faisabad
h
¯
¯
JAWZJAN ndz
Pya
BALKH ¯
KUNDUZ mi
r
Taloqan
¯ ¯ Pa
Kunduz
Kondoz
¯ h
Sheberghan
¯ Mazar-e
¯
Sharıf
¯ TAKHAR ¯
s
BADAKHSHAN
Saripul u
Tirich Mir
(7690 m)
To
Samangan
¯ Baghlan
¯ K
Meymaneh
Mary ¯
SAMANGAN ¯
BAGHLAN
¯ ¯
F A R YA B u
ndu
z
I R d To
SH
¯o
eQ J Chitral
To
SAR IP
SARIP UL y n
35°N
Mashad
Mor
gh¯ Da
¯ ry
a- Bazarak
H PAiN ¯ ¯¯
NURISTAN
ab
P
¯
B A D G H ¯S
I ¸ ¯
Mahmud-e Raqı
¯¯
¯ ¯ ¯
KAPISA Nuristan
¯ ¯ ¯
35°N
a Bamyan
¯ ¯¯ ¯
PARWAN Asadabad
¯ ¯
r o Qalâeh-ye Now ¯ Charıkar LAGHMAN
¯¯ ¯
KUNAR To
p a e ¯
R a n g ¯ ¯
m i s u s Mehtarlam Mardan
Chaghcharan
¯ B A M YA N KABUL KABUL
¯ ¯
Herat
¯
ır¯d
Har¯
u
Jalalabad
¯¯ ¯
PAK IS TAN
WA R D A K Meydan Shahr
¯
INDIA
¯ Khyber Pass
¯ LOGAR NANGARHAR
H E R AT GHOR To Peshawar
DAY KUNDI Pol-e âAlam
Nili PAKTIA
Ghaznı
¯ Gardız
¯
us
d
an
G H A Z N¯
Ind
ISLAMIC He
lm I KOWST To
Kowst Kohat 0 50 100 150 Kilometers
REPUBLIC Sharan
rah
¯
¯
OF IRAN Fa
¯ URUZGAN 0 50 100 Miles
FA R A H Tarın Kowt
¯
ut
¯r
Ha
¯
Farah
¯
I ¯
P A K T¯K A
¯
ZABUL
Qalat
¯
h
Kh¯ s
a
ak
rn¯
Ta
Hamun-e
¯ ¯
Saberı
˯ ¯
Lashkar Gah
¯ Arghandab
Kandahar
¯
To
AFG H ANISTAN
Zhob
Dasht-I Margo PROVINCE CAPITALS
Zaranj
NATIONAL CAPITAL
N ¯M R O Z
I ¯ HILMAND ¯
KANDAHAR
RIVERS
Helm To
and Quetta MAIN ROADS
30°N
Gowd-e RAILROADS
Zereh
IBRD 33358R1
30°N
OCTOBER 2011
This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank\. PROVINCE BOUNDARIES
The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information
shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank
Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
60°E PA KI S TA N 65°E
endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries\.
70°E | APPROVAL |
P004463 | Dotmmt of
The World Bank
FbR OFFICLAL USE ONLY
MICROFICHE COPY Repot No\. 10349
Report No\. 10349-PH Type: (PCR)
RICE, E\.B\./ X31755 / T9-059/ OEDD1
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PHILIPPINES
SMALL FARMER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 1646-PH)
FEBRUARY 21, 1992
Agriculture Operations Division
Country Department I
East Asia and Pacific Regional Office
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
Cur\.rncy Unit - Prno (P)
Rat\. of Exchanae (Average for Year)
Appraisal May/JunLe 1978 - US$1\.00 - P 7\.25
1979 - US$1\.00 - P 7\.38
1980 - US$1\.00 - P 7\.51
1981 - US$1\.00 - P 7\.90
1982 - US$1\.00 - P 8\.54
1983 - US$1\.00 - P 11\.11
1984 - US$1\.00 - P 16\.70
1985 - US$1\.00 - P 18\.61
ABBREVIATIONS
CB - Central Bank of the Philippines
CIDARE - Comiittee on Infrastructure
Development in Agrarian Reform Areas
EDCs - Estate Development Coordinators
EMO1 - Estate Management Groups
IEDP - Integrated Estate Development Program
LBP - Land Bank of the Philippines
MAR - Ministry of Agrarian Reform
MCC - Multi-Agency Coordinating Committee
MOA - Ministry of Agriculture
PCR - Project Completion Report
PICs - Provincial Infrastructure Committees
SFDP - Small Farmer Development Project
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FISCAL YEAR
January 1 - December 31
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
ha - hectare (2\.47 acres)
mt - metric ton (2,204 pounds)
THE WORLD BANK FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
U\.S\.A\.
Offce of ODirVo@CIOGIIWAl
Opuiatim\. E'aiualuir
February 21, 1992
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Compietion Report on PHILIPPINES - Small
Farmer Development Prolect (Loan 1646-PH)
Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled
"Project Completion Report on the Philippines: Small Farmer
Development Project (Loan 1646-PH)" prepared by the East Asia and
Pacific Regional Office\. No audit of this project has been made by
the Operations Evaluation Department at this time\.
Attachment
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\.' Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bankt authorization\.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PHILIPPINES
SMALL FA MER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 1646-PH)
Table of Contents
Page No\.
Preface \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.i
Evaluation Summary \. \. \. \. \. \. iii
PART I PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.1
1\. Project Identity \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.
2\. Background \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.1
3\. Project Objective and Description \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 2
4\. Project Design and Organization \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 3
5\. Project Implementation \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 3
6\. Project Results \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 5
7\. Project Sustainability \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 9
\. Bank Performance \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 9
9\. Borrower's Performance \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 9
10\. Project Relationships\. 10
11\. Consulting Services \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 10
12\. Project Documentation and Data \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 10
PART II PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 11
PART III STATISTICAL INFORMATION \. \.13
1\. Related Bank L oans \.13
2\. Project Timetable \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 14
3\. Loan Disbursements \.15
4\. Project Implementation \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 16
5\. Project Costs and Financing \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 17
A\. Project Costs \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 17
B\. Project Financing \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 19
6\. Project Results \. 20
A\. Direct Benefits \.20
B\. Economic Impact \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 21
C\. Financial Impact \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 21
D\. Studies \. \. 24
7\. Status of Covenants\. \. 25
8\. Use of Bank Resources \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 26
A\. Staff Inputs \.26
B\. Missions \.27
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
Page No\.
Annexes
1\. Conversion Factors Used in Estimation of Economic
Rates of Return \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. I \. \. 29
2\. Credit Sub-projects - Financial and Economic Results \. 30
3\. Performance of Credit Component - Tables 1-3 \. \. \. \. \. 31
4\. Cash Flows - Tables 1-10 (available in Regional Files)
Map - IBRD No\. 22431
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PHILIPPINES
SMALL FARMER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 1646-PH)
PREFACE
This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Small Farmer
Development Project in the Philippines, for which Loan 1646-PH in the amount of
US$16\.5 million was approved on December 21, 1978\. The loan was closed on
June 30, 1985 after two extensions of one year each\. An undisbursed balance of
US$835,244\.49 was canceled\.
Parts I and III of the PCR were prepared by the East Asia and Pacific
Regional Office; Part II includes comments on Parts I and III provided by the
Land Bank of the Philippines, the main executing agency for the project\. The PCR
is based, inter alia, on the findings of an FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program
completion mission which visited the Philippines in late 1988; the Staff
Appraisal Report; the Loan and Project Agreements; Supervision Reports;
correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower or LBP; and internal Bank
memoranda\. The Bank wishes to thank the FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program, the
Land Bank of the Philippines and other agencies of the Philippines Government for
their assistance in preparing this PCR\.
- iii -
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PHILIPPINES
SMALL FARMER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 1646-PH)
EVALUATION SUMMARY
Obiectives
1\. The main objective of the Small Farmer Development Project was to
increase rural incomes by enhancing agricultural productivity and expanding rural
employment opportunities among smallscale farmers, most of whom were
beneficiaries of Government's agrarian reform program\. This was to be achieved
through the coordinated delivery of technical assistance, improved infrastructure
and the provision of credit by che Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to
beneficiaries in land reform areas\. Assistance was also to be provided to LBP
to improve the performance of its field support services\. Total project costs
were estimated at US$37 million, against which a Bank loan of US$16\.5 million was
provided\. It was expected that the three-year project would be completed by
June 30, 1982, and the loan would be closed on June 30, 1983\.
Implementation Experience
2\. A number of problems became apparent soon after project start-up\. LBP
began to face a series of issues which had their origin in the inherent conflict
between its mandate to operate as a banking institution and its social
responsibilities as an agent of the Government's agrarian reform program\.
Management of th_ Integrated Estate Development Programs (IEDPs) was not entirely
successful, mainly due to limited technical expertise\. Although a national
Committee on Infrastructure Development in Agrarian Reform Areas (CIDARE) was
formed, coordination and monitoring of infrastructure works remained poor\. The
project was completed in June 1985, about three years behind schedule\.
3\. Credit Component\. Bank loan disbursements were slower than expected
for term credit, with only about 70 parcent of the targeted amount disbursed by
the end of the original three year implementation period\. The main constraints
were the poor credit standing of the agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs) and
slow progress in expanding LBP's field services\. However, by the end of the
project, total term credit disbursement (F367 million) was broadly in line with
appraisal expectations (F360 million in 1985 prices), and seasonal credit (not
included for Bank reimbursement at appraisal) of P135 million in 1985 exceeded
the appraisal target of P124 million (in 1985 prices)\. At project completion,
term credit was only 38 percent of total project costs (54 percent expected at
appraisal) and seasonal credit 46 percent (24 percent expected at appraisal)\.
- iv -
Only 7,000 'n- s (or 5\.5 percent of the total 127,000 loans made under the
project) wer- r term credit\.
4\. Init\.-ally, LBP concentrated on providing credit to priority target
groups, that is, ARBs, but to overcome slow credit delivery LBP increasingly
promoted lending to second priority borrowers, including farmer groups, for
integrated livestock projects, fish farwing and sugarcane development\. These
sub-projects were not generally successful and many were discontinued when the
anticipated benefits did not materiali2e\.
5\. LBP's collection performance on term loans was poor at 43 percent; the
arrears ratio (past due loans to amount due) was as high as 60 percent\. Although
precise figures were not available, it was estimated that about 70 percent of the
loans granted by LBP's field offices were more than three years overdue\. Short
term credit collection was comparatively better at 62 percent\. Collection
performance problems reflected the cumulative impact of inadequste professional
field staff, poor supervision and appraisal standard, and the deteriorating
economic conditions prevailing during the early 1980\. The latter was probably
a substantial reason for the poor collection rate\. The sub-borrowers' perception
that land amortization loans were Government grants also carried over, affecting
attitudes towards repayment of other categories of LBP's loans\. A limiting
factor was the inability (by law) of LBP to impose sanctions against the security
of the land for recovery of loans\. LBP's net losses under the project were
approximately 15 percent of the outstanding loans during 1985\. These losses were
covered by LBP's profits from its commercial credit and other banking activities\.
6\. Minor Infrastructure\. To improve production in IEDP areas, the project
was to support minor and scattered infrastructure works such as feeder roads,
irrigation canals, and flood control dikes\. To oversee implementation, CIDARE
was set up at the national level, with counterpart executing committees (PICs)
at provincial level\. The main constraints were the lack of authority given to
the CIDARE/PICs to control counterpart funds, poor inter-agency cooperation, and
lack of technical competence\. Poor sub-component definition in the SAR caused
considerable confusion in the selection of sub-projects for Bank reimbursement\.
This was resolved in 1981 when, by amendment to the project documents, it was
agreed that all sub-projects completed after January 1979 on landed estates could
be reimbursed\. At project completion, 64 minor infrastructure projects had been
carried out\. Some of these were of poor construction standard, raising doubts
about the extent and sustainability of the benefits of this project component\.
7\. Field Support Services\. The requirements for LBP field support
services to facilitate the coordinated delivery of technical assistance to ARBs
were seriously underestimated at appraisal\. A total of about 50 Estate
Development Coordinations (EDCs) and a similar number of subordinate field staff
were to have been employed by the end of project implementation, with an EDC:
farmer ratio of 1:300\. By the end of 1985, however, about 70 EDCs and 510 other
field staff had been employed with an EDC: farmer ratio of about 1:700\. Only
about 64,000 farmers (50\.4 percent of the 127,000 farmer borrowers) were visited
during 1985\. Cooperation with and technical assistance provided by the staff of
the Ministry of Agriculture was below expectations, partly because of budgetary
- v -
constrainta\. The increase in LBE's field staff and the extended project
implementation period raised the costs of projbct serv\.ces about five tim -s above
those expected at appraisal\.
Proiect Re-sults
8\. Overall, the projoct was unsatisfactory\. Although most quantitative
targ te were met and some exceeded, due to a much longer implementation period
than envisaged at appraisal, the project impact in terms of production and farm
incomes has been much lower than expected\. Available data are insufficient to
allow calculation of a project economic rate of return but they show that
investments in farm mechanization, post-harvest facilities, farm support and
development, and poultry (200 layers) yield very low or negative rates of return\.
These investments accounted for over 50% of the term credit provided under the
p\.oject\. Data relating to the impact of the short-term credit on beneficiaries'
income are not available\. The impact of the project on LBP's profitability was
negative\. LBP's loan collection performance was unsatisfactory\. The interest
rate of 12% on term loans was, on the average, negative in real terms due to
unexpectedly high inflation rates in 1984 and 1985\. The results of the
infrastructure component are also not very satisfactory (para\. 6)\. However, the
project made a partial contribution to LBP's institutional strengthening\. This
was the first Bank loan to LBP and it assisted LBP in strengthening its rural
banking operations\.
Sustainabilitv
9\. Overall, the sustainability of the project, particularly that of the
term credit and support services for agrarian reform beneficiaries provided under
the project, is, at best, uncertain\. However, the project has facilitated a
sustainable LBP presence in the land reform areas which should be of increasing
value in the future\. LBP's performance, particularly in agricultural lending,
has improved significantly during the late 1980s/early 1990s\.
Findin2s and Lesson Learned
10\. The following are the main lessons to be drawn from implementing this
project:
(a) specific criteria for selecting, evaluating, and supervising sub-
projects should be laid down to ensure the financing of viable
activities (PCR, para\. 9\.1);
(b) continuous training of field staff covering sub-project
appraisal, borrowers' repayment capacity and cash-flow, loan
administration and collections is required (PCR, para 9\.1);
(c) a stronger market research on agricultural investment and an
improved management information system are important elements for
ensuring project success (PCR para 9\.1); and
- vi -
(d) interest rate for agricultural lending should be adjusted to
better reflect market rates and to fully cover costs and margins
(PCR, para 9\.1)\.
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PHILIPPINES
SMALL FARMER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 1646-PH)
PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE
1\. Project Identity
Project Name : Small Farmer Development Project
Loan No\. : 1646-PH
RVP Unit : East Asia and Pacific Region
Country : Philippines
Sector : Agriculture
Subsector : Agrarian Reform/Rural Credit
Borrower : Republic of the Philippines
2\. Background
2\.1 General\. In 1977, at the time of project appraisal, agriculture
accounted for about half of total employment and over 50 percent of foreign
exchange earnings in the Philippines\. Three-qurters of the land under
cultivation was devoted to grain production, mainly rice and corn\. About 70
percent of the population (total 42\.5 million in 1977) lived in rural areas, with
60 percent depending directly on agriculture\. Structurally, Philippine
agriculture was dominated by small-scale farmers with a national average land
holding of about 3\.6 ha\. Prior to the land reform initiated in the early 1970s,
a large proportion of rice and corn farmers had worked as sharecroppers on
privately owned estates\. Most arable lands had already been brought under
cultivation, making the Government's declared policy of sustained self-
sufficiency in food grains critically dependent on increased productivity of
already occupied lands\. Improved technology for irrigated rice cultivation did
exist and was belng successfully introduced, but there was no comparable
technical base fo' pland crops, amongst which corn was the most important\.
2\.2 Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform\. About 30 percent of all farms were
operated by tenants, with a further 12 percent being lands under Government
ownership (1971 Agricultural census)\. Landlords with cash rental or share-
cropping arrangements were the main providers of credit, inputs and, in certain
cases, marketing assistance\. In 1972, aiming to promote family-owned
smallholdings as the foundation of Philippine agriculture, GOP declared all
tenanted rice and corn farms as land reform areas, under Presidential Decree No\.
27\. Operation Land Transfer (OLT) was applicable to all farms ("Estates") above
7 ha and a Leasehold Enforcement Program applied to all those below 7 ha\. The
Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) was responsible for overall administration of
the program, and the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) was to handle the
financing of land acquiaition under OLT\. After some initial progress, problems
associated with poor survey standards and an inadequate institutional framework
greatly slowed implementation of the agrarian reform\. Nonetheless, by March
1978, some 227,000 farmers, cultivating about 445,000 ha, had been issued
Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) and a smaller number (37,000) had already
signed Farmers' Undertakings, committing them to repay LBP the value of the lands
they had received\. It was recognized that these farmers would require assistance
to enable them to become self-sufficient after severance from their former
landlords, upon whom they had depended for financing and a wide range of
services\.
2\.3 The Small Farmer Development Project (SFDP) was designed to address the
needs of low-income small farmers, particularly those participating under the
agrarian reform program\. It was complementary to several other Bank efforts in
the Philippines in the mid-1970s, aimed at addressing the development needs of
small farmers\. The project was appraised in 1;-06, and an agreement for a loan
of US$16\.5 million was signed in January 1979\. With a total estimated cost of
US$37 million, the project was to be implemented in three years, with project
completion planned for June 1982 and loan closing in June 1983\. The loan became
effective in April 1979 and was actually closed in June 1985, after two
extensions of one year each\.
3\. Proiect Obiective and Description
3\.1 The main objective of the project was to increase the incomes of
agrarian reform beneficiaries by improving farm productivity and generating of f-
farm employment activitiee\. This was to be achieved through the coordinated
delivery of technical assistance, improved infrastructure and the provision of
seasonal and term credit by LBP to beneficiaries in land reform areas\.
Assistance was also to be provided to LBP to improve the performance of its field
support services\. The project was national in scope, with a main concentration
in the rice growing lowlands of Central Luzo:\. where proximity to existing or
proposed LBP offices in declared agrarian reform areas was an important
consideration in selecting beneficiaries\.
3\.2 Short-term credit was to be provided to meet the seasonal costs of
production, mainly for rice, corn and vegetables, and the marketing requirements
of Samahang Nayons (SN) and area marketing cooperatives\. Medium-term credit was
to be provided for livestock and poultry, farm mechanization and post-harvest
facilities, as well as for the development of cottage industries\. The World Bank
loan financed only medium-term credit, leaving the seasonal credit entirely to
the Government\. A second major component for infrastructure im2rovement in
selected project areas included construction of feeder roads, flood control and
communal irrigation\. Sub-components were to be executed by appropriate line
agencies, following approval of development plans by the national Committee on
Infrastructure Development in Agrarian Reform Areas (CIDARE), set up specifically
for the project\. Funds were also to be provided for the strengthening of LBP
field offices and for socio-economic studies, including reviews of delivery
mechanisms and means of promoting farmer participation\. Of the total project
cost, 21 percent was allocated to seasonal credit, 49 percent to term credit, 15
-3
percent to infrastructure, 4 percent to LBP field support services and studies,
and the rest to physicel and price contingencies\.
4\. Prolect Detign -nd Organization
4\.1 The project concept was based on the perceived needs of small farmers
who hLad entered into Farmers' Undertakings to repay loans to LBP for the purchase
of the lands they had previously tenanted\. It was designed to promote their
independence and to support the Government's policy of creating family-owned
smallholdings\. The implementation arrangements for the project appeared to
include all necessary institutions, with the proposed interaction of LBP, MAR and
CIDARE\.
4\.2 Due credit must be given to LBP for having developed a number of
innovative approaches to dealing with its agrarian reform mandate, including the
implementation of Integrated Estate Development Programs (IEDPs) and the setting
up of a subsidiary called Masaganang Sakaha Inc\. (MSI) to finance and provide
support services to small farmers\. Unfortunately, results were less than
satisfactory because of an overestimation of the capacity of LBP to expand field
operations quickly and simultaneously throughout the country and still maintain
adequate loan appraisal and collection standards; an unrealistically short
implementation period; and some technical assumptions which proved to be over-
optimistic in the absence of adequate extension services and replicable
technologies\. Another innovative effort was the financing of a warehousing
scheme to assist in crop marketing, whereby storage facilities were to be
provided against payment-in-kind (mainly palay) to amortize construction, with
organized farmer groups taking over and managing these warehouses\. However,
apart from providing facilities for LBP field staff and drying floors for local
farmers, the scheme was not successful because farmers did not use the storage
facilities for fear of seizure against past due loans\.
5\. Proiect Implementation
5\.1 General\. Soon after the initiation of project implementation, LBP
began to face a series of issues which had their origin in the inherent conflict
between its mandate to operate as a banking institution and its social
responsibilities as an agent of the Covernment's agrarian reform program\.
Management of the IEDPs was not entirely successful, mainly due to limited
technical expertise\. To help strengthen LBP, a number of local consultant groups
were employed to train its staff, carry out studies, develop community
organizations, and improve accounting procedures, with varying degrees of
success\. Although CIDARE was formed, coordination and monitoring of
infrastructure works remained poor\.
5\.2 Two priority categories of borrowers were serviced under the project\.
The first included agrarian reform beneficiaries and the second was other
farmers, including voluntary groupings involved mainly with integrated small
livestock projects, and medium-scale commercial entrepreneurs\.
- 4 -
5\.3 Credit Component\. Initial Bank loan disbursements for term credit,
which was the main component, were slow, with only about 70 percent of the
targeted amount disbursed by the end of the original three-year implementation
period, although final disbursements for term credit were broadly in line with
appraisal targets\. The main difficulties were the poor credit standing of the
agrarian reform beneficiaries and slow progress in expanding LBP's field
services\. The total amount of short-term credit advanced by the end of the
project period substantially exceeded appraisal targets\. For both seasonal and
term credit, there were significant deviations from the distribution envisaged
at appraisal (Table 1):
Table 1: SEASONAL AND TERM CREDIT PERFORMANCE
(P million)
SAR Tarzet /a Achievement /b
Category (in 1978 (in 1985 (in 1985 Current
l________________________ prices) prices) prices) Prices
Short-Term Credit
Production credit 27\.0 95\.2 69\.5 69\.5
Marketing credit 8\.1 28\.6 65\.5 65\.5
Subtotal 35\.1 123\.8 135\.0 135\.0
Medium-Term Credit
Livestock poultry 61\.80 170\.60 141\.60 63\.54
Farm mechanization 26\.60 73\.40 48\.20 21\.56
Post-harvest faci- 21\.60 59\.60 92\.60 46\.29
lities
Cottage/agro- 20\.30 56\.10 50\.10 24\.42
industry
Farm support and _ - 34\.90 18\.63
development
Subtotal 130\.30 359\.70 367\.40 174\.44
/a Estimated at Year 3 in SAR\.
Lk Over 7 years' actual project implementation\.
Source: LBP\.
5\.4 Interest Rate\. Under the project, loans to individual borrowers
carried an interest rate of 12% p\.a\. This rate was, at the time of appraisal,
comparable to rates charged on similar loans by other institutions in the
country\. The loan proceeds were onlent to LBP at Bank's rate of 7\.35% leaving
a spread of 4\.65% to cover operating costs and expected loan losses\. Foreign
exchange risk was assumed by the Government and no fee was charged against it\.
Inflation rate at appraisal was expected to be 6\.0 to 7\.5% p\.a\. for various cost
items during the original project implementation period (1979-82), which made the
lending rate of 12% positive in real terms\. However, project implementation was
extended for another three years, closing in mid 1985\. The average inflation
rate over this period (1979-85) was 18% p\.a\., resulting in a neg4tive real
interest rate\.
5\.5 Minor Infrastructure\. This component addressed minor infrastructure
needs to improve production in IEDP areas\. To oversee implementation, a policy
making inter-agency Committee (CIDARE) was set up at the national level, with
counterpart executing committees at provincial level (Provincial Infrastructure
Committees, PICs)\. Estate Development Coordinators (EDCs) identified
infrastructure needs in IEDP areas and line agency field officers undertook
feasibility studies\. Works carried out included barangay roads and bridges, and
communal irrigation projects\. Flood control measures planned at appraisal were
not undertaken\. The main constraints were the lack of authority given to the
CIDARE/PICs to control counterpart funds, poor inter-agency cooperation and lack
of technical competence\. Poor subcomponent definition in the SAR caused
considerable confusion in the selection of subprojects for Bank reimbursement\.
This was resolved in 1981 when, by amendment to the project documents, it was
agreed that all subprojects completed after January 1979 on landed estates could
be presented for reimbursement\.
5\.6 Field Support Services\. The coordinated delivery of technical
assistance to beneficiaries of the agrarian reform program was to be a key
feature of project design\. In 1981, through a "Memorandum of Agreement", the LBP
entered into an arrangement with the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and MAR to
create a Multi-Agency Coordinating Committee (MCC) to assist with implementation
of the IEDPs\. The national MCC formulated policies and guidelines for provincial
MCCs, which supervised execution through Estate Management Groups (EMGs)\. These
groups included senior MOA representatives, the EDC (LBP), MOA technical
personnel and representatives of infrastructure agencies working in the agrarian
reform areas\. After initial success, commitment waned and linkages weakened,
creating a heavy workload for the EDCs, particularly as cooperation between the
MOA technical bureaus and the EDCs was not successfully developed\. LBP field
operations were improved by the recruitment of about 580 EDCs and other field
staff by 1985, but with an EDC to farmer ratio of about 1:660, this proved to be
inadequate to service loans and provide the necessary technical assistance\.
6\. Prolect Results
6\.1 Credit\. Short-term credit was provided for farm inputs such as
fertilizer, crop protection chemicals, seed and hired labor, and to finance the
marketing needs of Samahang Nayons (SN) and cooperatives\. Term credit was
provided for individual and group activities, including backyard livestock
development (poultry and duck raising, cattle fattening/breeding and pig
raising), farm mechanization (hand tractors and power tillers), draft animals,
irrigation pumps, rice threshers and other post-harvest facilities\. The total
number of loans made under the project is reported by LBP at about 127,000, of
-6-
which some 7,000 were for term credit\. Of the latter, agrarian reform
beneficiaries accounted for 93 percent (6,522), but received only P 87\.6 million
or 50 percent of the total volume of term lending\."' A large amount of term
credit (P86\.7 million) was distributed to some 300 second priority borrowers, the
average size of their loan being about 20 times larger than that provided to
agrarian reform beneficiaries and other small-scale farmers\.21 The distribution
of first and second priority borrowers is not available for seasonal credit,
which was not included for reimbursement by the Bank at appraisal\.
6\.2 Initially, LBP concentrated on providing credit to priority target
groups\. However, at the end of the original three-year implementation period,
to boost credit delivery, which had been constrained by sizeable arrearages in
loans to agrarian reform farmers, LBP increasingly promoted lending to second
priority borrowers, including farmer groups, for integrated livestock projects,
fish farming and sugarcane development\. These subprojects were not generally
successful, and many were discontinued when the anticipated benefits did not
materialize\.
6\.3 LBP's collection performance on term loans was poor at 43 percent (end-
1985); the past due and arrear ratios were as high as 40 percent and 60 percent
respectively (Table 2)\. Although precise figures were not available, it was
estimated that about 70 percent of loans granted by LBP's field offices were more
than three years overdue\. Short-term credit collection performance was
comparatively better at 62 percent\. Collection performance problems reflected
the cumulative impact of inadequate field staff, weak collection strategies, poor
supervisior\. and appraisal standards, and the deteriorating economic conditions
prevailing during the early 1980s\. The last was probably a substantial reason
for the poor collection rate\. The subborrowers' perception that land
amortization loans were Government grants also carried over, affecting attitudes
towards repayment of other categories of LBP loans\. LBP could not proceed
against the security of land for the recovery of loans as, under Presidential
Decree No\. 27, lands allotted to agrarian reform beneficiaries were not
alienable\. LBP's net losses under the project were approximately 15 percent of
the outstanding loans during 1985\. These losses were covered by LBP's profits
from its commercial credit and other banking business\.
±1 No specific target was given in the SAR regarding the number of agrarian reform farmers who
were to benefit from the project - a total of 9,900 borrowers/subprojects were to be financed,
including "second priority" beneficiaries\.
2/ This figure, however, includes farmer groups involving individual members, whose numbers are
not known\.
Table 2: LBP COLLECTION PERFORMANCE
Shcrt-Term
Term Loans Loen_
1985 1986 (During 19i9-1985)
\. \. (P million)\.
1\. Total loans granted under 164\.67 La 164\.67 La 478\.08
the project
2\. Amount due and collectable 110\.28 116\.72 409\.87
(as at the end of year)
3\. Cumulative collections 47\.30 56\.29 254\.15
4\. Past due (as at the end of 66\.27 60\.42 n\.a\.
the year)
5\. Percentage of collections 42\.9 48\.9 62\.01
(1 of (3) to (2))
6\. Past due ratio 40\.2 36\.7
(Z of (4) to (1))
7\. Arrears ratio 60\.0 51\.8 n\.a\.
(Z of (4) to (2))
/a Excludes IEDP warehousing finance\.
6\.4 Minor Infrastructure Develoipment\. Sixty-four minor infrastructure
subprojects were carried out at an actual cost of P 54\.6 million, against SAR
estimates of t 38\.9 million (1978 prices)\. The physical targets and achievements
are shown in Table 3 below:
Table 3: INFRASTRUCTURE TARGETS AND ACHIEVEMENTS
Category SAR Target Achievement Percentage
Feeder roads (km) 120 120\.0 100
Br\.dges (1 m) _ 203\.0 _
Flood control (ha) 2,700 0
Irrigation (ha) 4,100 8,442\.0 206
Cumbersome procedures and Government budgetary problems, the latter particularly
acute during the early 1980s, created considerable difficulty in identifying and
implementing appropriate subprojects\. Post-project review of some of the works
revealed poor construction standards, raising doubts about the extent and
sustainability of benefits attained\.
-8-
6\.5 Field Support Services\. The requirements for LBP field support
services were seriously underestimated at appraisal\. A total of about 50 EDCs
for the IEDPs, and a similar number of subordinate field staff, were to hsve been
employed by the end of the three-year credit disbursement period\. EDC:farmer
ratios were to be about 1:300 - 500\. By the end of 1985 (Year 7), however, about
70 EDCs and 510 other field staff had been employed to service some 127,000
farmer borrowers with an EDC:farmer ratio in the IEDPs of about 1:660\. This was
mainly because of the larger than expected volume of seasonal Credit, and smaller
average loan sizes, which translated into a significantly larger number of
borrowers\. Only some 64,000 borrowers (50\.4 percent) were visited during 1985,
by which time LBP staff preoccupation with loan collections had resulted in
limited attention being given to their technical assistance functions\.
Cooperation with, and technical assistance provided by the staff of MOA, was
below expectations, also partly due to budgetary constraints\. The eventually
increased levels of LBP staff and the extended project implementation period
raised the costs of project services about five times above those foreseen in the
SAR\.
6\.6 By the end of 1985, LBP had established 67 IEDP areas and 3,867
farmer groups, involving about 47,000 farmers, or 37 percent of the tot_l farmer
borrower coverage\. Fourteen warehouses had also been constructed for their
benefit\. There is no appropriate data to measure the impact of these
interventions on farmer incomes and productivity\.
6\.7 To the extent that the project was seen by both the Bank and LBP as a
useful learning process for the latter, through which its institutional
objectives in land reform and rural development, financial policies and
organizational arrangements could be tested, it was relatively successful\.
However, the viability of the credit program was an issue from the start, given
the nature and poor financial status of the intended project beneficiaries - a
problem which could never be fully overcome by LBP\. The risks recognized at
appraisal - in particular LBP's limited experience in agricultural credit
generally and small farmer credit in particular - were expected to be overcome
by organizational measures, especially field level technical assistance\. In
retrospect, these were not sufficient and did not fully recognize the training
needs of LBP staff in agricultural loan appraisal and supervision, LBP's weak
information system, or the administrative environment and cumbersome budgetary
procedures\.
6\.£ Overall, the proJ4ct was unsatisfactory\. Although most quantitative
targets were met and some exceeded, due to the much longer period of
implementation than envisaged at appraisal, the project impact in terms of
production and farm incomes has been much lower than expected\. The data base is
incomplete and, to a certain extent, not reliable, but the overall impression as
far as the term credit is concerned, which was the major project component at
appraisal, is clearly one of a large number of uneconomic activities financed
without adequate appraisal of obtainable yields, market prospects, technical and
other constraints (diseases, "sourcing" of animals for cattle development,
importation of poultry feed, and energy and fuel shortages during the economic
crisis faced by the country in 1984-85)\. Many of these activities were
-9-
eventually discontinued by borrowers unable to repay their loans\. Based on the
data collected and analysed by LBP (Part III, Section 6, and Annexes 2-4),
investments in farm mechanisation, post-harvest facilities, farm development and
support, and poultry (200 layers) yield very low or negative rates of return\.
These investments accounted for over 50% of term credit provided under the
project\. On the other hand, the number of beneficiaries (41,000 farmers,
cumulative) reported by LBP in the IEDP areas exceeds the appraisal estimates\.
No estimate has been made of the impact of the very significant volume of short-
term credit on these beneficiaries' incomes or living standards\.
7\. Project Sustainabilitv
7\.1 Overall, the sustainability of the project, particularly that of
medium-term credit and support services for agrarian reform beneficiaries
provided under the project is, at best, uncertain\. However, a major long-term
project aim was the institutional strengthening of LBP, particularly the
development of its field operations (involving, inter alia, the separation of
commercial operations at branch offices from small farmer activities related to
agrarian reform, the setting up of area offices, the employment of estate
development coordinators (EDC) and the expansion of the field office program)\.
These actions have laid the basis for a sustainable LBP presence in land reform
areas and should be of increasing value in the future\. The results of these and
other efforts to strengthen LBP can clearly be observed, as LBP's performance,
particularly in agricultural lending, has improved significantly during the late
1980s/early 1990s\.
8\. Bank Performance
8\.1 The project was prepared by LBP with the assistance of two Bank
missions in July/August 1977 and in February/March 1978, and an SAR was prepared
after a final Bank mission in May/June 1978\. In spite of the considerable inputs
by both the Bank and LBP during project preparation, a number of design
w\.aknesses became apparent during implementation\. In retrospect, an
insufficiently rigorous assessment of the institutional and staffing implications
of the project led to the adoption of an implementation period which was too
short to allow for the required growth in LBP's operations and staffing\.
Continuity was maintained during supervision, with an experienced credit
specialist reviewing project implementation through 1984\. A close working
relationship was developed with LBP and discussions on perceived inadequacies in
project execution, loan arrearages and staffing shortages were frank and
constructive\.
9\. Borrower's Performance
9\.1 This was the first Bank loan to the Philippines for LBP and its
borrowers, and it gave LBP the impetus to strengthen its internal organization,
procedures and staffing\. It was also perceived by LBP as a vehicle for improving
the productivity of small farmers in agrarian reform areas, while at the same
time providing the necessary resources to assist in the reorientation of its
lending away from commercial clients\. However, field staff build-up was slower
- 10 -
than projected, and LBP did not lay down clear and specific criteria for
selecting, evaluating and supervising sub-loans, which led to the financing of
non-viable activities\. Staffing problems also contributed to unsatisfactory loan
collection performance\. A further weakness was the inability of LBP's management
information system to provide up-to-date and detailed analysis of project
activities, as required for effective monitoring\. LBP remained financially sound
throughout the project period, although the impact of project lending on its
profitability was negative\. The main lessons that LBP can draw from its
experience with the project include the need for better market research on
agricultural investments and an improved management information system; for
adjustment of agricultural interest rates to better reflect market rates and to
fully cover costs and margins; for continuous training of field staff, covering
loan administration and collections; and for better extension services at farm
level\.
10\. Project Relationships
10\.1 LBP drew up memoranda of agreement with cooperating ministries and line
agencies to form two multi-agency coordinating bodies to oversee the two main
areas of project implementation outside of its own credit operations\. These were
the MCC for estate development and CIDARE for infrastructure improvement in IEDP
areas\. Neither agreement achieved its full objective, and the participating
agencies were unwilling to fully commit staff and resources during a period when
the national budget was constrained and when each agency was faced with other
demands on its resources\. The Bank and LBP maintained continued and good working
relations throughout, and after, the project period\.
11\. Consultin, Services
11\.1 A number of staff training and socio-economic research initiatives were
undertaken by LBP using national university and local consultant groups, with
varying degrees of success\. These were mainly concentrated on community
development and LBP institutional development\. They were short-term measures,
however, and underscored the need for all agencies involved in agrarian reform
to enter into longer-term commitments to community development and staff
training\.
12\. Proiect Documentation and Data
12\.1 No serious problems were encountered in complying with the project
legal agreements, although some difficulties did arise in two specific areas\.
Monitoring of the loan portfolio was problematic due to the lack of an efficient
reporting system; and difficulties arose over the slow pace of staff deployment
which led to unsatisfactory sub-loan appraisal and collection performance\. A
draft PCR was prepared by LBP staff but it concentrated on the Bank loan and not
on the project as a whole (thereby excluding analysis of seasonal credit
activities)\. With the long period between loan closure and PCR preparation, some
gaps were inevitable, but for the most part the data required for a project
completion report were available\.
- 11 -
PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE
On Interest Rate
1\. The interest rate charged by the LBP on the credit component of the
World Bank loan was based on prevailing market rates at that time\. When the LBP
contracted the World Bank loan, it used the credit component to augment the
loanable funds under its existing lending program\. Thus, it did not market the
World Bank loan as a special credit window with a special interest rate\.
Instead, the proceeds of the World Bank loan were combined with the domestic
credit funds of the LBP\. In fact, LBP had reimbursed from World Bank the actual
loan releases that it made under its regular lending program\. Therefore, LBP
simply adopted the in;erest rate that it charged to its First Priority and Second
Priority clients as defined in its lending policy at that time\.
2\. First Priority clients consisted of: (i) agrarian reform beneficiaries
who were holders of Emancipation Patents, Certificates of Land Transfer, etc\. and
potential holders of any of the aforementioned certificates of ownership, each
of whom was to be a member of a Samahang Nayon (SN); (ii) small farmers who owned
not more than seven hectares of arable land; (iii) farmers' associations, SNs and
Cooperatives composed of a majority of members qualified under (i) and (ii) above
and registered with the appropriate regulatory agencies; and (iv) landowners/LBP
bondholders whose sub-projects would directly benefit individuals qualified under
the first two categories above\.
3\. Second Priority clients were other borrowers whose sub-projects would
directly benefit individuals qualified under (i) and (ii) above\.
4\. Before actual implementation of the project, LBP decided to exclude the
Short-Term (ST) production loans because it appeared that local fund sources were
cheaper than the World Bank loan\. LBP could rediscount its ST credit with the
Central Bank (CB) at 1 percent p\.a\. (later increased to 3 percent p\.a\.) compared
to the 7\.35 percent p\.a\. that it had to pay the World Bank\. Therefore, it had
reimbursed from the World Bank only the medium term credit on which it charged
12 percent p\.a\. to First Priority clients and 13 - 15 percent p\.a\. to second
priority clients\. An additional 2 percent p\.a\. service charge was added to the
loan\. Such rates were in line with market rates at that time\. Since LBP
loanable funds were sourced mainly from National Government equity and other
internally generated profits, these rates were considered reasonable with an
adequate margin for LBP\. Besides, under the terms of the World Bank loan, LBP
was protected from foreign exchange risk since this was borne by the Government\.
Assensment of Sub-proiects
5\. A complete manual of operations was prepared and approved by the LBP
management for the implementation of the World Bank loan\. In fact, LBP adopted
- 12 -
the same procedures that it used for its regular First and Second Priority loans\.
Factors consliered in the assessment of the sub-projects were:
(a) actual needs of the project;
(b) viability and cash flow of the project;
(c) creditworthiness of the borrowers;
(d) managerial competence of the borrower in undertaking the project;
and
(e) borrowers' excess of assets over liabilities (net worth)\.
6\. An equity participation of not less than 10 percent of the project cost
was required from the borrowers, either in cash or in kind\. Appropriate
requirements for collateral and insurance and guarantee coverage were also
imposed\.
Capacity of LBP to APRraise the Sub-projects
7\. Definitely, LBP had the capability to appraise the sub-projects\. Even
before the World Bank loan, LBP had an existing term credit\. The World Bank loan
simply augmented the existing loanable funds of LBP\. The LBP staff had
appropriate and adequate training and work experience in loan appraisal and over-
all project management\.
8\. The performance of the term credit component of the World Bank loan
should be seen in the context of the economic and political conditions prevailing
at the time\. Cooperatives were fledgling and nascent and, therefore, LBP had to
retail its term credit to individual farmers\. Also, deteriorating economic
conditions during the early 1980s were a major factor in the slow down of the
rural economy and poor collection'rate rather than just the lack of capability
of LBP to appraise, disburse and supervise the loan\.
9\. LBP's ability to expand its network of field offices and branches was
constrained not by its weakness but by external factors, particularly stringent
requirements and restrictions of the Central Bank\. LBP had a complete plan for
its expansion but was hampered by the CB policies\.
- 13 -
PART III: STATISTICAL INFORNATION
1\. Related Bank Loans
Project Title
L/C Number Purpose (US$M) FY Status/Cotments
1\. Rural CrediE Hedium- and long-term cedit to )\. 0 1'966 Completed
I (Lu\. 432-PH) improve farm machinery and to Loan was fully
develop small private irrigation disbursed\.
aystems\.
2\. Rural Credit II Hedium- and long-term loans for 12\.5 1969 Completed\. Loan was
(Ln\. 607-PH) modernization of farm machinery fully disbursed\.
and irrigation equipment\.
including fisheries equipment
and small boats
3\. Rice Processing Development and modernization of 14\.3 1971 Loan was fully
(Ln\. 720-PH) the rice and corn processing disbursed\. PCR issued
industry through long-term 10/19/82\.
credit\.
4\. Livestock Livestock development program 7\.5 1972 Loan was fully
(Ln\. 823-PH) through agricultural credit disbursed\. PCR issued
administered by DBP\. 09/29/77\.
5\. F'sheries Credit Improve national fish production 11\.6 1973 Loan was fully
(Ln\. 891-PH) through improvement of capture disbursed\. PCR issued
and culture fisheries\. 07/22/80\.
6\. Rural Credit III Continuation and expansion of 22\.0 1974 Loan was fully
(Ln\. 1010-PH Ln\. 607-PH\. including disbursed\. PCR issued
development of fisheries\. 01/23/78\.
livestock, cottage and agro-
industries\.
7\. Livestock II Increase domestic production of 20\.5 1976 Loan was fully
(Ln\. 1225-PH) livestock products\. disbursed\. PCR issued
02/17/83\.
8\. Grain Processing To assist in modernizing and 11\.5 1976 Loan vas fully
II (Ln\. 1269-PH) expanding Philippine grain disbursed\. PCR issued
processing industry through C1/14/85\.
providing long-term credit\.
9\. Fisheries II Same as Fisheries I above\. 12\.0 1976 Loan was fully
(Ln\. 1269-PB) disbursed\. PCR issued
10/12/82\.
10\. Rural Credit IV Medium- and long-term credit 36\.5 1977 US$3,500 was cancelled\.
(Ln\. 1399-PH) through participating banks to PCR issued 12/19/85\.
finance farmers and local
enterpreneurs for farm mechan-
ization, livestock, fisheries,
and cottage and agro-industries\.
11\. Rural Develop- Support to GOP's integrated 15\.0 1977 Project constrained by
ment II (Land development programs in the institutional and
Settlement) three settlement areas of Agusan political problems\. PCR
Project del Sur and Bukidnon (Mindanao) issued 6/25/91\.
(Lu\. 1421-PH) and Capiz (Visayas)
12\. Smallholder Tree Continuation of Ln\. 998-PH with 8\.0 1978 US$3\.8 M was cancelled\.
Farming (La\. additional components in large- PCR issued 04/28/87\.
1506-PB) scale plantations, forestry
research and planning\.
13\. Small Farmer To increase agricultural 16\.5 1979 US$0\.83 M was cancelled\.
Development productivity and excpand rural PCR issued 12/31/91\.
(Lni\. 1646-PB) employment opportunities among
small-scale farmers\.
14\. Third Livestock Same as in Lns\. 891-PH and 1270- 45\.0 1981 US$21\.48 M was
/Fisheries PH\. and increase in meat cancelled\. PCR issued
(Ln\. 1894-PH) production 09/26/88\.
15\. Agricultural Short-term seasonal credit and 100 1985 Completed\. Loan was
Credit medium- and long-term credit for fully disbursed\. PCR
(Ln\. 2570-PB) agricultural investments issued 06/25/91\.
- 14 -
2\. Prolet Timetable
Item Date Planned Date Actual
Identification/Preparation aL n\.a\. July/August 1977
Project Brief n\.a, October 18, 1977
Preappraisal n\.a\. February/March 1978
Appraisal Mission n\.a\. May/June 1978
Loan Negotiations November 13, 1978 November 16, 1978
Board Approval December 21, 1978 December 21, 1978
Loan Signature January 26, 1979 January 26, 1979 b/
Loan Effectiveness April 26, 1979 April 25, 1979
Loan Closing June 30, 1983 June 30, 1985
Project Completion June 30, 1982 June 30, 1985
al By LBP assisted by World Bank\.
bl Both Loan Agreement between IBRD and the Republic of Philippines and
Project Agreement between IBRD and LBP\.
Comments:
Issues Raised following Field Appraisal
(a) Institutional\. The status of the Land Bank as a major agricultural
lending institution was questioned\. Of its total lending, only 24% went
to agriculture and 762 to commerce and industry\. There was also some
concern about the importance of government deposits (962 of the total)
relative to private savings\.
(b) Financial\. The ability of small farmers to repay land amortization
loans was also raised since, given LBP's inability to foreclose on bad
debtors, borrowers tended to regard these and other government loans as
grants\.
(c) Term Credit\. Assumptions for livestock models were queried\.
(d) Infrastructure development\. Concern was expressed regarding the
adequacy of preparation of the infrastructure component\. In the event,
suitable specifications were not agreed until the third year of the
project, requiring amendment of the project documents\.
- 15 -
3\. Loan Disbursements
A\. Loan Allocation and Disbursements by Cateaorv
Original Loan Total Disbursement
Category Allocation Actual
\._________\.________\. ________ _ (Us$) (US$)
1\. Credits under Part A\.3 11,500,000 12,163,854\.34
of the Project
2\. Equipment and materials 100,000 112,352\.68
under Part C of the
Project
3\. Civil works under Part B 3,500,000 3,173,803\.76
of the Project
4\. Consultants' services 200,000 214,744\.73
and training
5\. Unallocated 1,200,000 ____ l
Total 16\.500\.000 15\.664,755\.51
Cancelled 835,244\.49
Notes: (a) Figures are based on the Bank's official
disbursement data\.
(b) No reallocation of Loan proceeds was made under
this project\.
(c) Undisbursed balance was cancelled as of January 8,
1986\.
B\. Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
~~ (USS million) - ---- -------------
Appraisal Estimate a/ 0\.1 2\.8 7\.8 14\.3 16\.5 - - -
Actual - 1\.2 5\.6 6\.6 11\.1 13\.5 14\.2 15\.7 b/
Actual as S of Estimate - 43 72 46 67 82 86 95
Date of Final Disbursements January 23, 1986\.
aZ Disbursement schedule not included in SAR; this schedule was described as the appraisal
estimate, in the first supervision mission report\.
b/ Undisbursed balance nf US$835,244\.49 was cancelled at loan closing date\.
4\. Proect iwleuentation
I of Actua t
Key Indic tors La appraisal Estimte PCi Estimate Anraisal tstimate
of Decber 31\. 1985) Sub-Loanm Reimbrsed by the Bank
(No\. of accounts) (P million) b (go\. of accounts) (P llion) /b (go\. of ccounts) (P millio) /b
Term credit released
- Agrarian reform beneficiaries ) Drekdou sot given 6\.522 87\.6 _
- Other beanficiaries c ) In SAR 1d 316 86\.7 -
Total 9 14 d 1 6\.838 La 174\.3 La 69 149
Field Staff
- zstat developsat coordinators 55 66 120
(IEDP area)
- Overall _upwer ccale_nt at
area/field collectian officees 463 582 126
Area Coverd bh DIDP
- go\. of ICDP project ares 55 67 122
- Area (bh) 27\.5w0 53\.145 193
- no\. of frm beneficiaries (camulative) 13\.500 40,792 302
Infrretracture Iorova eants ff
- Road (in) 120 120 1O0
- Jridgee alinar meters) - 203
- Irri= ton (ha) 4\.100 8,442 206
- Flood control (ha) 2\.700
/a Short-term credit\. excluded from the ISBD loan\. was not recorded as a project indicator by Bank supervision missios\.
/b Io current terms\.
1C Includes LIP's second-priority borrowers\. e\.g\. integrators and medium-scale commercial entrepreneurs\.
/d The actual number of agrarian reform benefictaries Ls about 69 percent of the appraisal estimae (reconstructed by the Bank supervision mission
since the breakdown was not specified in the SAR)\.
a Figures reported by LUP are somewhat different\.
ff Data on physical achievemente were provided by the implementing agencies (DPWS and ALA) te LBP but could Dot be checked by the latter\.
- 17 -
5\. Project Costs and Financing
A\. Proiect Costs
(US$ million)
Appraisal Estimate Actual
Item
Foreign
Local Exchange
Costs Costs Total a/ Total b/c/
Seasonal credit 4\.6 4\.1 8\.7 30\.4 41
Term credit 15\.1 4\.8 19\.9 24\.7 e/L
LBP field support
services 1\.4 0\.1 1\.5 7\.6 f/
Minor infrastructure 3\.7 3\.2 6\.9 3\.1
Total 24\.8 12\.2 37\.0 65\.8
a/ Including physical contingencies (152 of infrastructure costs) and price contingencies
(6 to 7\.5S p\.a\.) for livestock and poultry, machinery and equipment, civil works\.
hL LBP could not provide the specific foreign exchange and local cost breakdown for each
-omponent\.
c/ a\.L cost figures in Pesos were converted to US$ using yearly average exchange rates as
given in International Financial Statistics\.
d/ Mission estimate based on LBP's data on production and marketing credit, and assuming an
average yearly collection rate of 602 (rate provided by LBP as at end 1985 was 622)\. Of
the total of US$30\.4 million, US$11\.4 million were expended over the first 3 years\.
e/ Of which US$15\.1 million were distributed in the first 3 years\.
f/ Of which US$3\.3 million were spent in the first three years, thus already exceeding by
far the appraisal estimates for that period\.
Comments
Total project costs, as provided by LBP,11 exceeded original
estimates by about 78%, essentially due to the following factors:
(a) the much longer disbursement period (7 years), i\.e\. 4 years more than
anticipated at appraisal;
Adjusted by the mission for seasonal credit, taking only incremental requirements for
each year with a recovery rate assumed at 602\.
- 18 -
(b) the higher costs of investments and inputs financed under the credit
component, resulting from considerable price escalation (much more so
than contingencies aeopted at appraisal), especially in 1984 and 1985
when domestic inflation rates shot up to 50\.32 and 23\.1% respectively,
which were not entirely compensated by the devaluation of the Peso
vis-a-vis the US$\. While this affected only marginally the total
amount distributed under term credit, constrained by slow demand and
delivery, it increased considerably seasonal credit, which accounted
for 46% of total cost estimates, but was not financed by the Bank
loan; and
(c) the substantially higher costs to LBP of its field support services
(including studies and consultancies), stretched over a period which
was more than twice that originally planned\. In retrospect, it
appears that the cost of this component was largely underestimated at
appraisal, particularly as there was no provision in contingencies
except for equipment expenditures\.
The huge increase in short-term credit, in current terms, differed
significantly from appraisal estimates, as shown below:
Z of Total Cost
Appraisal PCR
Estimate Estimate
Seasonal credit 24 46
Term credit 54 38
LBP field support 4 11
services
18 5
Minor infrastructure
Total Proiect 100 100
- 19 _
B\. Project Financina
Planned (Loan
Agreement) Revised/Final
Source (US$ M) (Z) (US$ M) (X) Comments
IBRD 16\.5 45 15\.7 24 Relative IBRD
contribution declined
mainly due to
substantially higher
project costs\.
GOP 2\.8 7 - 0 Cancellation of GOP
contribution agreed by
IBRD\.
LBP 15\.9 43 45\.7 69 LBP contribution much
higher than expected
mostly because of
considerable increase
in short-term credit
relative to appraisal
estimate and of higher
staff/consultancies
and facilities costs
(including replacement
vehicles and
equipment)\.
Sub-borrowers a/ 1\.8 5 4\.4 7
Total 37\.0 100 65\.8 100
a/ Average sub-borrowers' contribution to term-credit component was taken
at 102 and 25Z of investment costs, respectively, for loans
distributed by: (i) LBP's field operations group (FOG); and (ii) their
Banking Branch offices\.
- 20 -
6\. Proiect Results
A\. Direct Benefits a/
Estimated % of
Appraisal at Closing Apprai-
Indicators Estimate Date sal
1\. No\. of beneficiaries 9,900 6,838 69
2\. No\. of jobs created 11,900 (yr\. 6) 10,700 (yr\.6) 90
3\. Incremental production in b/ k\.
value (t million)
- Livestock & poultry:
- pork 11\.3 9\.8 87
- beef 25\.6 2\.1 8
- ducks and eggs 2\.6 9\.9 381
- broilers and eggs 1\.5 1\.2 80
- Cottage industries 21\.7 18\.0 83
- Services 11\.0 10\.5 95
a/ Refers to term credit only; benefits of seasonal credit were not
estimated because, although included in total project costs, it was not
financed by the Bank loan\.
b/ Appraisal estimates were given only in value, not in quantity terms\.
c/ Figures were provided by LBP on the basis of individual model results
and the number of subprojects in each category\. However, no value
was estimated for fish production - one of the major project outputs
because it was not anticipated at appraisal\.
- 21 -
B\. Economic Impact
Appraisal PCR
Estimates Estimates
*4v\. ** \. * \. * \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.
Economic Rates of Return a/ From 142 b/ From negative d/
for Term-Credit Models to over 1002 cL to over 842 e/
a/ See assumptions and cash flows in Appendix\.
b/ For cattle model\.
c/ For most other subproject categories\.
d/ For poultry model and power tillers\.
e/ For fishpond model\.
C\. Financial Impact
Appraisal PCR
Estimates Estimates
*\.0*\. \.-\.-@+ \. \.e #\.%# \.
1\. Financial Rates of Return From 8\.52 a/ From negative cL
for Term-Credit Models to lOO0 bl to 932 AL
2\. Financial Impact on LBP eL
- Net income - Year 7 (P million) 2\.0 (46\.7)
- Net cash flow - Year 7 (P million) 12\.9 (93\.2)
3\. Public Revenues Impact
- Net public revenue - Year 6 (P million) 9\.8 6\.3
a/ For power tillers\.
b/ Most other subproject categories (chicken and duck raising, rice
threshers, cottage industries)\.
c/ For most post-havest facilities and farm mechanization items (rice mills,
power tillers, irrigation pumps) as well as poultry and draft animal
models\.
AL Fishpond model\.
e/ See Annex 3\.
- 22 -
Comments
Basis for Analysis\. Of the types of investments financed through
term credit under the project, LBP gathered data for about 10 models, derived
from a survey conducted in 1985 of the reported actual yields obtained and
costs incurred of representative farmer borrowers\. On that basis, cash flows
were prepared by LBP staff in current terms, using actual input and output
prices during the period 1980-1985\. Some of the assumptions appear to be
unrealistic (particularly the cattle fattening model, which was left out by
the mission) or should be treated with caution\. However, in the absence of
any better information, the financial analysis and rate of return calculations
for the investment models were carried out using the technical data provided
(attached to each cash flow; available in Regional Files)\. Since not all the
investments induced by the project are represented by these models, no
aggregate rate of return was calculated\.
Assumptions\. Individual cash flows and rates of return have been
estimated over a period representing the life of the investment - in general
five years, except for the rice mill (10 years)\. In the financial analysis,
debt service is included, according to LBP's terms and conditions for
agricultural loans\. While figures on incomes and costs were kept in current
terms, the rates of return were calculated by bringing the LBP data to
constant prices of the final year (generally 1985), using input/output prices
of that year and/or annual domestic inflation rates as estimated by the
National Statistics Office\.
The economic analysis was carried out by applying a Standard
Conversion Factor (SCF) of 0\.86 and a series of specific conversion factors
estimated by the World Bank in 1985, as well as other conversion factors
estimated by the mission for some items such as paddy and fertilizers (Annex
1)\.
Results\. The financial and economic results are generally much lower
than those obtained at appraisal (see Annex 2; detailed tables for each model
are available in Regional Files)\. Of the models analyzed, only four were
clearly profitable: pig breeding, fishpond, duck raising to a lesser extent,
and the tricyle model\. In these activities, where relatively low-cost
investments have induced fairly quick and substantial returns, the impact made
by the project on borrower (farmer or entrepreneur) income appears to have
been good\. On the other hand, the remaining models representing, in
particular, investments in farm mechanisation and post-harvest facilities,
yield very low or negative rates of return\. The large discrepancies with
original estimates may be explained by the over-optimistic assumptions adopted
at appraisal, the more so when compared with actual results - in particular:
a "with project" yield of 75 to 80 cavans (3\.7 to 4 t) of irrigated paddy per
ha when LBP survey figures consistently show a full development yield (after 5
years) of 60\.8 (3 t) per ha, i\.e\. 20 to 252 less than alLticipated; a milling
capacity of 30,600 cavans per year when only about 12Z (3,750 cavans) of that
was actually achieved by the LBP client, with a mill of similar
specifications; likewise, 9,600 cavans assumed threshed per year in the rice
- 23 -
thresher model when only 3,700 cavans (less than 40%) were reported in the LBP
data; rental incomes expected from the power tiller and irrigation pump
models, which did not materialize, as well as warehousing charges in addition
to milling revenues in the rice mill model; and investment costs which are
considerably lower (e\.g\. by two-thirds, in constant terms, in the poultry
model) than those which were eventually incurred by LBP borrowers\. Low
productivity resulted mainly from inefficient technical support from both the
Agricultural Department and 'BP field staff\.
Conclusions\. In retrospect, it is not surprising that there was slow
delivery of term credit in the initial years and that some of the sub-projects
which were eventually financed stopped being operational after a certain time,
as reported by LBP itself\. However, if much lower adoption rates were
realized for uneconomic items like irrigation pumps (about a third of original
targets), loan data provided by LBP indicate that, despite the obvious
unprofitability of farm mechanization equipment (power tillers, threshers and
rice mills), the numbers of these items which were actually financed exceeded
original estimates (e\.g\. 1,100 power tillers as against 900 targeted, 650
threshers as against 120 originally anticipated)\.
- 24 -
D\. Studies
Purpose as
Studies/ Defined at
Training Appraisal Status Impact of Study
1\. Agricultural credit Theoretical Lacked
prospects & delivery approach actionable
mechanisms\. provided only\. recommendations\.
2\. Marketing of rice, pigs Recommended Too general and
and poultry\. improved did not provide
marketing system guidelines on
for Central storage, proces-
Luzon without sing, grading &
benefit of pilot advice on taking
study\. advantage of
support prices\.
3\. Appropriate role of local No studies Funding and
institutions\. carried out, but bureaucratic
institutional difficulties
arrangements underscored need
created at for greater
national & cooperation
provincial between LBP &
levels to line agencies
improve agency involved in
coordination\. agrarian reform\.
4\. Design & organization of Only LBP EDCs Training impact
training courses for LBP trained\. No good but
staff and farmer groups\. farmer group concentrating
training\. only on loan &
collection
procedures\.
Nothing on
development and
no follow-up\.
Comments:
Other training involved setting up farmer group joint ventures with
varying degrees of success\. In summary most study and training approaches
were over-theoretical and lacked vigorous follow-up\.
- 25 -
7\. Status of Covenants
Loan/Project Appraisal
Agreement Report
(ref\. no\.) (ref\.para) Coveneant Status
Loan Agreement
Section 3\.03 8\.01(b) Adequate and timely Partial compliance
budgetary provision in
accordance with recom-
mendations made by
CIDARE\.
Section 3\.03(a) 4\.09 & Submission to the Bank Partial
5\.11 of plans and rel4ted compliance\.
documents for infra-
structure works\.
Project Agreement
Section 3\.03(b) 4\.20 Maintenance of separate In compliance\.
records, etc\., to
monitor the progress of
Part B of the Project\.
Schedule 4 Procurement arrange- In compliance\.
ments\.
Section 2\.05 4\.20 Submission of progress Partial
reports, maintenance of compliance\.
separate accounts\.
Section 2\.09 5\.14 Monitoring & evaluation Generally complied
of project-supported with\.
activities\.
Section 3\.02 8\.02(d) Terms and conditions of In compliance\.
sub-loans\.
Section 3\.03 8\.02(b) LBP to staff adequately Partial com-
its field offices\. pliance\. Although
LBP reorganized,
in 1982, its Head
Office & field
organization deal-
ing with agrarian
reform sector and
project implemen-
tation, there was
a considerable
backlog in deploy-
ment of additional
staff which was
then remedied by
LBP in phases\.
26 -
Loan/Project Appraisal
Agreement Report
(reference no\.) (ref\.para) Covenant Status
Section 4\.01 4\.20 Separate records for Partial
project activities\. compliance\.
Section 4\.02 4\.20 Audit of LBP accounts\. In compliance\.
8\. Use of Bank Resources
A\. Staff Inputs
Stage of Planned * Total
Project Cycle Actual
-_____ -(Staffweeks) ------
Through Appraisal 164\.3
Appraisal through 26\.4
Board Approval
Supervision 58\.6
Completion 39\.9
TOTAL STAFP INPUTS 289\.2
Total FY76/77 FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY89 FY91
Ident\./Preparatlon 164\.3 104\.6 59\.7
Appraisal 23\.8 12\.2 11\.6
Negotiations/Board 2\.6 2\.6
Supervision 58\.6 0\.8 12\.8 12\.0 16\.3 4\.1 6\.8 3\.2 2\.1 0\.5
Completion 39\.9 37\.9 2\.0
Total 269\.2 104\.6 71\.9 15\.0 12\.8 12\.0 16\.3 4\.1 6\.8 3\.2 2\.1 0 37\.9 2\.0
* Planned data not available\.
- 27 -
B\. Hieeions
Stage of
project Month/ No\. of Days in Specialization Performance Rating Type of
cycle year persons field Represented /a Statue/Trend /b problems /c
Through appraisal
Appraisal through )
Board Approval ) not available - ----------
Board Approval )
through Effectiveness
Superviaion Missions
1\. 11/1979 2 10 E + AE 2/1 F/T/O
II\. 05/1980 1 5 AE 2/1 F/T/O
III\. (Partial) 10/1990 2 10 AE + C 2/1 F/O
IV\. (Partial) 03/1981 2 11 AE + C 2/2 F/O
V\. 09/1981 1 8 C 2/2 F/O
VI\. (Partial) 03/1982 2 15 C + AZ 2/2 F/O
VII\. (Partial) 11/1982 1 10 C 2/1 F/O
VIII\. (combined
with appraisal
of follow-up
project) 06/1983 1 3 C 2/1 F/O
IX\. (Partial) 01/1984 1 10 C 2/2 F/M/O
X\. (Partial) 10/1984 1 3 C 2/2 F/M/O
XI\. 06/07/1985 1 n\.a\. FA 2/2/1/2
XII\. (Also to
review very
first draft
of PCR by LBP) Mid-1986 I n\.a\. FA n\.a\.
/a Specialization: E - Economist, AE - Agricultural Economist; C - Credit Specialist; FA - Financial
Analyst\.
/b (i) Before 19853
Performance Retina Status: 1\. Probiem-free or minor problems
2\. Moderate problems
3\. Major problems
Trend: 1\. Improving
2\. Stationary
3\. Deteriorating
(ii) After 1985: Ratings apply to: - Available Funds
- Project Management
- Development Impact
- Overall Status
Ls\. Before 1985: F - Financial
M - Managerial
T - Technical
P - Political
0 - Other
2d OS - overall status\.
- 29 -
ANNEX I
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PHILIPPINES
SMALL FARMER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 1646-PH)
Conversion Factors Used in Estimation
of Economic Rates of Return
CF
- Standard Conversion Factor ja 0\.86
- Capital Goods /a 0\.86
- Electricity, Gas and Water /a 0\.80
- Construction /a 0\.66
- Paddy (grains and seeds) /b 0\.83
- Fertilizers LA 0\.76
- Pesticides /d 0\.76
- Fuel - oil and lubricants /e 0\.80
L World Bank estimates for 1985\.
lb Estimated by the mission on the basis of current world
prices\.
/c Average CF based on mission's estimates of specific
conversion factors for urea and NPK\.
/d Taken as equal to that of fertilizers\.
le Taken as equal to electricity and gas\.
PROJECT COPLETION REPORT
PWILIPPIEES
SHILL F*11ER DEELOPENT PRDJECT
(WAI 1646-PR)
Credit Sub-Prolects - Financial and Economic Results
Inveat_ent Mbdel Met Farm Income FRR (12) La ERR (2) /a lnvestment
(2n current prices) Cost Life LoaD Repay-
before Project With Project 2 Change (P) (years) ment Period
(in constant (years) it
terms)
Livestock and Foultry
Pig breeding (Combined 2-so,\. - 13\.600 (1984) - 25\.9 43\.8 26,000 (1980) 5 5
14-fattener model) (73\.6) lb (\.100) j
Ducks (200 layers) - 25,0O0 (1985) - 13\.1 22\.6 17\.400 (1981) 5 5
(\.100) IC (\.10D)
Poultry (200 layers) - 5\.700 (19851 - <0 '0 16\.000 (1981) 5 5
(\.100) (1IOD)
Fiahoond - 21\.000 (1985) - 83\.9 92\.7 27\.300 (1981) 5 5 1
(n\.j\.) (n\.i\.)
Post-harvest Facilities *
Thresher - 8\.100 (1983) - 0\.5 5\.1 23\.000 (1980) 5 5
(>100) ('100)
Ricel ill - 31\.450 (1989) - c0 1\.4 65,000 (1980) 10 10
(32\.2) d (na-)
Pam\. echanization
Power tiller 2\.300 (1979) 7\.700 (1984) 17 <0 '0 15\.000 (1980) 5 5
(8\.5) (u\.s\.)
Farm Develosment and Support
Draft animle (carabao) 1\.400 (1979) 4\.500 (1984) 2 10\.5 \.0 5\.000 (1980) 5 4
(n\.1\.) (D\.i\.)
Irrigation pump
(for 2-ha farm) 1\.600 (1979) 12\.800 (1985) 78 2\.1 <0 15\.100 (1980) 6 5
(45) (a\.&\.)
Light Transport
Tricycle - 8,200 (1984) - 49\.0 71\.2 13\.000 (1980) 5 4
(n-'-) (n\.i\.)
L Figures in brackets indicate RORs estimated at appraisal and presented in the SAR, sometimes differing from those found in the
detailed analysis at pre-appraisal (Annex 5\. project files)\.
b Model at appraisal included 15 fattener swines\.
L SAR model based on 180 layers\.
Ld SAR model included warehouse\.
/e Grace period (I year) only for power tillers\.
Note: n\.i\. - not iacluded; n\.a\. * not available\.
PROJEC CCFUIC EW
SMALL FARMI DIYELOHEUT PROJICT
(LOU 1646-WE)
TerMoCredlt Provided Under the Proiect Durina 1979-85
(In million Pesos)
Economic Activity -Appraisal Estilatea- --- Achievementsa- - Variations-
No\. of Amount No\. of Amount No\. of Amount
sub-projects sub-projects sub-projects
Livestock and Poultry 5\.650 61\.80 3,282 63\.54 - 2\.368 - 1\.74
Farm Mechanization 2,000 26\.60 1,490 21\.56 - S10 - 5\.04
Post Harvest Facilities 520 21\.60 1\.078 46\.29 + 558 + 24\.69
Cottage Ind/Agro-Industries 1\.510 20\.30 300 24\.42 - 1\.210 + 4\.12
Farm Support and Development - - 689 18\.63 * 689 + 18\.63
Total 4,680 130\.30 6\.838 /a 174\.34 La - 2\.841 + 44\.14
ja First priority borrovera numbered 6,522 and received assistance to the extent of P 87\.61 million\.
Source: Land Bank of the Philippines\.
- 32 -
ANNEX 3
Table 2
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PHILIPPINES
SMALL FARMER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 1646-PH)
Financial Impact on LBP
Income Statement
(In million Pesos)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Income La 0\.85 1\.57 4\.35 7\.36 27\.69 32\.52 16\.52
Expenses
Operating Expenses 8\.69 7\.69 13\.69 14\.14 21\.05 30\.81 33\.39
Operating NI -7\.84 -6\.12 -9\.34 -6\.78 6\.64 1\.71 -16\.87
Financial
IBRD Funds La 1\.30 2\.95 4\.62 8\.57 14\.59 17\.33
LBP Funds Jb 1\.36 3\.49 2\.63 3\.38 5\.28 9\.37 7\.35
Net Before -9\.20 -10\.91 -14\.92 -14\.78 -7\.21 -22\.25 -41\.55
Bad Debts
Bad Debts le 0\.97 2\.76 2\.22 3\.34 4\.14 3\.75 5\.12
Net Income -10\.17 -13\.67 -17\.14 -18\.12 -11\.35 -26\.0 -46\.67
Cumulative -10\.17 -23\.84 -40\.98 -59\.10 -70\.45 -96\.45 -143\.12
L See Table 3\.
/b At 6 percent of loans granted; lending for short-term period assumed to
have an effective cost period of 10 months/year\.
/c At 3 percent of total loans granted and expected income\.
Source: Land Bank of the Philippines\.
3 -
ANNEX 3
TetDle 3
Impact of Project on LBP's Cash Position
(In million Pesos)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Cash If\.ow
- IBRD Lc\.ans
Term credit 4\.54 23\.81 18\.14 37\.41 7\.94 12\.46 9\.07
Seasonal - - - - - -
Total 4\.54 23\.81 18\.14 37\.41 7\.94 12\.46 9\.07
Field staff 1\.07 - 0\.64 - - - -
Research 0\.99 0\.31 - - 0\.12 0\.91 0\.34
Total 6\.6 24\.12 18\.78 37\.41 8\.06 13\.37 9\.41
- Income
Seasonal credit 0\.85 1\.07 3\.5 4\.18 23\.83 23\.4 10\.19
Term credit - 0\.5 0\.85 3\.18 3\.86 9\.12 6\.33
Total 0\.85 1\.57 4\.35 7\.36 27\.69 32\.52 16\.52
- Sub-loan Repayment
Seasonal credit 4\.14 4\.55 14\.9 17\.8 62\.41 86\.06 62\.29
Term credit - 2\.84 5\.68 6\.62 9\.46 13\.24 9\.46
Total 4\.14 7\.39 20\.58 24\.42 71\.87 99\.3 73\.75
Total Cash Inflow 11\.59 33\.08 43\.71 69\.19 107\.61 145\.19 99\.68
Cash Outflow
- Sub-lending
Seasonal credit 25\.64 50\.22 46\.75 62\.75 86\.29 71\.45 134\.98
Term credit 5\.93 40\.08 22\.93 41\.35 23\.93 21\.08 19\.12
Total 31\.57 90\.3 69\.68 104\.1 110\.22 92\.53 154\.1
-Expenditures
Financial - - - - - - -
IBRD loan - 1\.3 2\.95 4\.62 8\.57 14\.59 17\.33
Other
Field staff 5\.93 4\.04 8\.38 6\.32 8\.2 10\.11 10\.24
Research 0\.99 0\.31 - - 0\.12 0\.91 0\.34
Overheads 1\.77 2\.04 2\.36 3\.2 4\.16 5\.2 5\.48
Total 8\.69 7\.69 13\.69 14\.14 21\.05 30\.81 33\.39
Total Cash Outflow 40\.26 97\.99 83\.37 118\.24 131\.27 123\.34 187\.49
Net Cash Flow -28\.67 -39\.6 -23\.01 -25\.25 -45\.61 5\.6 -93\.19
Cumulative -28\.67 -68\.27 -91\.28 -116-53 -1656\.54 -249\.73
LBP Contribution 46\.43 83\.56 70\.93 91\.83 115\.18 93\.16 152\.03
Overall Cash Positions
Annual 17\.76 43\.96 47\.92 66\.58 69\.57 98\.76 58\.84
Cumulative 17\.76 61\.72 108\.64 176\.22 245\.79 344\.55 403\.35
Source: Land Bank of the Philippines\.
IBRD 22431
116 120 * 14 le
CLASSIFICATION OF PROVINCES
BY GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS
I [LOCOS VI WESTERN VISAYAS PHILIPPI0ES
20° Iloco: Nor\.u ;#I Aklan 10 20
2 liocos Sur 34J Capiz
a L\. Unlon 40 Antique BATANES
4 Pangaslnan 41 llIllo
COROILLERA ADMINISTRATIVE 42 Negros Occldental
REGION (CAR) 43 GulmrIa
Abra Vl CENTRAL VISAVAS Province Capitalls
iWlin\.APayao 44 Cebu
7 Mountain ProvInCe 44 Negros Orlentd) National Capital
H) lfugo 4 6B olhol
9s Senjust 47 Slquijor Province Boundaries
II CAGAYAN VALLEY Vill EASTERN VISAYAS 1 -
1o B,ttnes 4t1 Northern Sitmar 1 I \. Region Boundaries
1 a egytn 44 Western Samar a OT o
2 1eabtle Si( Eustem Samar R I BoundaSies
I Nueva Vlzicaya 5i1 Leyte Internatlonal 0oundaries
14 Quirlng 52 Southern Leyte I\. I I1
gyg CENTRAL LUZON 5\.1 Suliran i 2 ° lagri
I1 Nueva Eclja IX WESTERN MINDANAO /_ 12
1iI TarlIC 54 Zamboanga del Norte -§ r 12
I I Zambklars S Zanmboanga del Sur San rewnngo ')' ; barr a I(KLOMETCRS O 1, O 1 21* 3100
Hi PaMnp"a 56 Basillan 0 ___yo__bo, , I I I I_
9oBn 57 Sulu 1 3 1 4 MILES I I
16, 2oBlaa 511 Twltawi LI,)\.!,1 1 IESt) 50 10 15 0
NATIONAL CAPITAL X NORTHERN MIN0AN4AO Y
REGION (NCR) -i, Su,ig*o tdel Norte C~
IV SOUTHERN TAGALOG o Cam iguir
2 IAurora 61 Agusaiw del Norte 1 i\ i 2 C
22 Quezon 62 Mljinis Orientd l b 0 V
2 1 Riza) 63- Mlsaminl Occidental ~ 1
2 4 Cavite 64 S rukidnon O P0/ 1 0 014\.
2 - Laguna \. i AgusW del Sur I ' /I // VL SEA
2\. ( atang$" XI SOUTHERN MINDANAO 2 i0 4
2 7 Merlnduque 66 Surlgao del Sur uk¶10 j~C~
21;\. Mindoro Oriental ~ 7 Dava\.o Oriental 2 N" 2DItV
29 Mlndoro Occidental ,ru Davan del Norte 26 0
so Romblon r \. Oaviro d Sur 1\.Lc\.na - CATANDUANES
ii Palarwan 70 South Cotabalo aetng -Pill / 14
V BICOL X)( CENTRAL MINDANAO \.,Pl °r
f - Cainarlnes Norte 71 Lanao del Norte I < \
1 CainaSrlnen SUr 72 Lanso del Sur 0iambea* an asp'
1i, Cantanduanes 7,3 North Cotal2ato :abs I\. o" I S as son
\.s Albay 74 Mtgulndanao IV 2 1-
- Sorsogon 75 Sultan Kudairt MINDORC1 °o\. ti- - -
12Mabhaster0l',a
> | lo ~~~~~~"bi g6V~l!IIIta
/ Xoi ib *ee;s i 2 E <t oronal
4(~ ~ ~~~~~41
'ANAY~I ao0
PALAWAN
bp,to Velnc-"-~~~V S Ay |' H p
\ ° Q114q/r60e°M iP Ed
o5o o4 rqu\.l\.t 0 , es c a
t1" al/-l 0 a 69wfnS, ,,, &ybalaYtay
CHINA OA
_ vp|§8 Z, i o*arnboxnsa |COta^°O7 4J o ° 7
; b v \. \. /\. , oim 0 a g C o a A t IX | 7nM (n i l
i i {/ s PHILIPPINES
I //vst; Joocn7->O
v71T aa\.*M
wt \. > ~~~~~~SULU' '
Balo ,WI 01 \.ite ,4It'Whfl?~W ,R 0OS PMfMS Oet,;=
I N 0 N T\.& I A
JUNE 1990 | APPROVAL |
P009407 | Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No\. 8188
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
BANGLADESH
FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REHABILITATION PROJECT
(CREDIT 1023-BD)
NOVEMBER 20, 1989
Industry, Trade and Finance Division
Technical Department
Asia Region
i
This document has a restricted distfibution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Currency Unit Bangladesh taka (Tk)
Appraisal Year US$1 = Tk 15\.5
Investment Period US$l - Tk 15\.5-30\.3
Project Completion Year US$1 - Tk 30\.3
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
BADC - Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation
BCIC - Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation
Bresler - Bresler and Associates, Inc\.
Mscft - Thousand standard cubic feet
MT - Metric Ton
NGFF - Natural Gas Fertilize- Factory Ltd\.
TEC - Toyo Engineering Corporation
tpd - Tons per day
tpy - Tons per year
TSP - Triple superphosphate
TSP Complex - Triple Superphosphate Complex Ltd\.
UFFL - Urea Fertilizer Factory Ltd\.
USAID - US Agency for International Development
FISCAL YEAR
July 1 - June 30
FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY
THE WORLD BANK
Washington\. D\.C 20433
U\.S\.A\.
01ke i Owft"vensfhi
Opsatomn 11vakatumn
November 20, 1989
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Bangladesh
Fertilizer Industry Rehabilitation Proiect (Cr\. 1023-BD)
Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project
Completion Report on Bangladesh - Fertilizer Industry Rehabilitation
Project (Cr\. 1023-BD)l prepared by the Asia Regional Office\. No audit of
this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this
time\.
Yves Rovani
by Ram K\. Chopra
Attachment
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their oMcial duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Back authofiction\.
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
BANGLADESH
FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REHABILITATION PROJECT
(CREDIT 1023-BD)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No\.
PREFACE \. i
BASIC DATA SHEET \. iii
EVALUATION SUMMARY \. v
I\. INTRODUCTION \. 1
II\. PROJECT BACKGROUND \. 1
A\. Project Identification, Preparation, Appraisal and
Credit Effectiveness \. 1
B\. Project Objectives and Description \. 4
Plant Rehabilitation Component \. \. \. 4
Training Component \. \. \. 4
Spares, Catalysts and Chemical Component \. \. \. 5
III\. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND MANAGEMENT \. \. 5
A\. Overall Project \. \. \. 5
Capital Costs, Financing Plan and Disbursements \. 5
B\. Ghorasal Urea Plant \. 8
Operating Performance \. \. \. 10
C\. Chittagong TSP Plant \. 11
Project Implementation, Management and Performance \. 11
Project Implementation Schedule \. \. \. 13
Operating Performance \. \. \. \. 13
Capital Costs \. 14
D\. Fenchuganj Urea Plant \. 15
Project Implementation, Management and Operating
Performance \.5\. i
Plant Implementation Schedule \. \. \. 15
Capital Costs \. 16
E\. Training Center \. \. \. 17
IV\. PRICING POLICY \. \. 17
V\. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE \. 19
A\. Financial Rate of Return \. \. 19
B\. Financial Results and Covenants \. 19
TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd\.)
Page No\.
VI\. ECONOMIC PERFORHANCE \. \. 22
A\. Economic Rate of Return \. 22
B\. Foreign Exchange Savinge \. \. \. \. 25
C\. Technology Transfer \. 25
D\. Environmental Aspect \. \. 25
VII\. SUSTAINABILITY \. 25
Vill\. IDA'S ROLE \. \. *\.*\.so# 26
IX\. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED \. \. 27
Lessons Learned \. \. \. \. \. 27
ANNEXES
1-1 Plant Improvement Component - Capital Cost Estimate \. \. 29
1-2 Estimated Capital Cost by Project Component \. 30
1-3 Financing Plan - Appraisal and Revised Estimates \. 31
1-4 Actual Financing Plan \. \. \. \. 32
2 IDA Credit (1023-BD) Disbursement Schedule \. 33
3 Project Implementation Schedule \. \. 34
4-1 Assumptions for Economic and Financial Rate of Return \. \. 35
4-2 Cost and Benefit Stream for Financial Rate of Return \. 37
5-1 Urea Fertilizer Factory Ltd\. (UFFL): Income Statement
and Balance Sheet \. \. \. \. \. \. \.0*\. \. 39
5-2 Natural Gas Fertilizer Factory Ltd\. (NGFF)s Income
Statement and Balance Sheet \. \. * 41
5-3 Triple Phosphate Complex Ltd\. (TSP Complex): Income
Statement and Balance Sheet \. \. \. 43
5-4 Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation (BCIC):
Income Statement and Balance Sheet 45\. \. 45
6-1 Cost and Benefit Stream for Economic Rate of Return \. 47
6-2 Foreign Exchange Benefit \. 49
7-1 Fertilizer Consumption \. \. \. \.O\. 50
7-2 Fertilizer Imports \. ** \. \. 51
7-3 Fertilizer Production \. 52
7-4 Fertilizer Factory Production Performance \. O\.*\.#\. \. \. 53
8 UFFL (Ghorasal) Project Management Organization \. 54
9 IDA-Financed Procurement of Foreign Goods and Services \. 55
ATTACHMENT
Comments Received from the Government \. 57
- i \.
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
BANGLADESH
FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REHABILITATION PROJECT
(CREDIT 1023-BD)
PREFACE
1\. On May 20, 1980, IDA approved a credit of US$29\.0 million equivalent
to assist in rehabilitating several existing fertilizer plants 'n
Bangladesh\. The Credit became effective on September 8, 1980\. The Credit
closed on June 30, 1986, 30 months after the original schedule\. US$5\.6
million equivalent was cancelled\.
2\. The Fertilizer Industry Rehabilitation Project was developed in
response to the high cost of new fertilizer investments in Bangladesh, when
at the same time existing capacity was greatly underutilized\. The project
was designed to correct the major constraints facing the fertilizer
industry, concentrating on technical rehabilitation and modernization of
existing facilities\.
3\. The Project Completion Report (PCR) was prepared by ASTIF based on a
mission to Bangladesh in October/November 1988\. Information prepared by the
Borrower was used in the preparation of the PCR but did not institute a
formal Borrower PCR\. The draft PCR was sent to the Government for comments,
and they are reproduced as an Attachment\.
4\. The project has been reviewed by OED but will not be subject to a
full audit at this stage\.
- $$$ -
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
BANGLADESH
FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REHABILITATION PROJECT
(CREDIT 1023-BD)
BASIC DATA SHEET
LOAN POSITION
(Amounts In USf Millon)
As of Sept\. 80\. 1989
Original Disbursed Canc lled Res4id Outstanding
Credit 102840 29\.0 28\.4 6\.6 0\.0 23\.4
KEY PROJECT DATA
Appraisal
Estimate Actual Variance
Project Coats (USIM)
Total Installed cost 84\.5 41\.8 e20
Interest during construction 2\.7 5\.8 +96
Total financing required 87\.8 46\.7 +25
Economic Rates of Return (S)
(1) Ohorasal plant rehab\. program 91\.7 22\.9 -75
(Tl) Ch1ttagong plant rehab\. program 18\.2 8\.5 -53
(iii) Fenchuganj (not calculated)
Financial Rates of Return (U)
(i) Qhoraoal plant rehab\. program 80\.0 7\.0 -77
(ii) Chittagong plant rehab\. program 22\.0 6\.0 -64
(1ii) FenchuganJ (not calculated)
COMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS
(Amounts In USS Million)
1980 1981 1962 1988 1984 19865 196
Appraisal Etimtoe 0\.7 17\.9 28\.4 29\.0 29\.0 29\.0 29\.0
Reappraisal Estimat (1/84) - - 2\.6 0\.4 24\.9 29\.0 29\.0
Actual - - 2\.6 6\.1 14\.0 21\.4 23\.4
Actual as X of Reappraisal (X) - - 100 78 so 74 01
Date of Final Disbursements December 24, 1986
- iv -
PROJECT DATES
Apo\. Estimae Actual
Negotlition\. R\.o\. 04/12/60
Board Approvel n\.m\. 01/20/60
Signing n\.o\. 06/04/80
Ett\.cotiv n n\. 09/06/60
Complotion Date, Including:
(1) Plant improvemnnt compnont
(a) Chorasal plant rehab\. program 08/82 12/66
(b) Chittagong plant rehab\. puogram 08/82 06/87
(c) Fenchuganj plant r*hab\. progr a 06/98 06/86
(11) Training component 03/62 cancelled
Loan Closing 12/68 06/30/86
STAFF DNUTS
(staff wees)
Pr_-
Task fY70 fY78 FY79 FY60 FY61 FY82 FY63 Fy64 \.tY8S FY66 FY87 FY68 FY69 Total
LOP 1\.8 2\.0 - 4\.6 - - - - - - - - - 7\.8
LENP 6\.7 19\.3 - 6\.4 - - - - - - - - - 81\.4
LENA - - - 26\.0 - - - - - - - - - 28\.0
LENN - - - 5\.7 - - - - - - - - - 5\.7
SPN - - - 0\.8 4\.0 16\.0 6\.6 11\.2 9\.7 10\.4 6\.4 0\.1 0\.5 87\.0
PCR - - - - - - - 0\.1 - - - 2\.5 21\.6 24\.;
PAD - - 0\.8 0\.8 0\.9 6\.1 0\.2 0\.4
Total 8\.0 21\.8 - 44\.8 4\.9 15\.6 8\.6 11\.4 9\.7 10\.6 6\.8 2\.6 22\.8 166\.6
MISSION DATA
No\. of No\. of Staff Date of
MonthYl*a rs P ons Weeks Regrt
Appraisal 10/79 2 2 4 04/28/00
Supervision I 12/80 1 1 1 01/81/61
Supervislon TI 12/61 1 2 2 01/22/62
Supervision III 09/62 1 1 1 11/01/82
Supervision IV 06/68 2 2 4 11/14/68
Supervision V 05/86 2 8 6 07/09/86
OTHER PROJECT DATA
Borrower s People's Republic of Bangladesh
Beneficlaries: Urea Fertilizer Factory Ltd\. (UFFL)
Trirle Superphosphate Coplesx Ltd\. (TSP Couplex)
Nmtur\.l Gas Frt lI Izr Factory Ltd\. (NOFF)
v
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
BANGLADESH
FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REhABILITATION PROJECT
(CREDIT 1023-BD)
EVALUATION SUMMARY
Introduction
1\. The expansion and modernization of the fertilizer industry in
Bangladesh ?as high priority given the country's comparative advantage in
low-cost gas supply and the predominance of agriculture in the economy\.
Overall fertilizer supply has improved, in part due to the project, and
Bangiadesh is now exporting urea\.
Obiective
2\. The main objective of the project was to rehabilitate and improve
the performance of existing fertilizer plants in Bangladesh\. The project
was identified in the course of technical assistance provided from previous
IDA credits, and focussed on technical rehabilitation (paras\. 2\.1, 2\.3 and
2\.6)\. The project apprais I identified further quality of management and
pricing policy as add!tionil major constraints facing the sector (para\.
2\.7)\. The creation of a training center vas subsequently dropped, and is
being implemented through bilateral assistance (paras\. 2\.12, 3\.28)\.
Xalementation E-rperience
3\. The project experienced difficulties in preparing adequate
specifications and in firming up the project scope (para\. 3\.25)\. Also, the
project suffered from poor coordination among project teams at various
levels and slow decision taking between government authorities and the
project entities\. A more clearly defined project implementation plan and
larger use of external, experienced consultants would likely have improved
implementation performance\.
4\. A management reorganization was agreed by the Government, and the
fertilizer compaies were organized under a holding company, the Bangladesh
Chemical Industry Corporation (BCIC, para\. 2\.7)\. However, the holding
company is not legally established and, as a result, enterprise autonomy
and, by extension, managerial performance, are adversely affected (paras\.
3\.8, 3\.16, 7\.3)\. On the other hand, the senior management of BCIC has
proved to be relatively effective\.
5\. Actual project costs (251 overrun) and implementation period
(about 55 months overrun) were well in excess of appraisal estimates\. Cost
and time overruns were due to changes in project scopo, impact of project
delays, and increased cost of engineering and management following the
expanded scope of work and price escalation (paras\. 3\.2, 3\.3, 3\.12, 3\.14,
- vi -
3\.20, 3\.23, 3\.26)\. Cost underrune in the Fenchunganj plant (24Z) were due
to lower bid prices of foreign equipment than original estimates and lower
local currency capital costs in terms of US Dollars (para\. 3\.27)\.
Results
6\. The rehabilitation program vas well-defined, albeit following
significant changes in scope (paras\. 2\.9-2\.11)\. The economic benefits of
the project were not as high as originally anticipated\. The realized
economic return for Ghorasal and Chittagong components were 232 and 92,
respectively, compared to the appraisal estimates of 922 and 182,
respectively, due to lower world fertilizer prices, higher economic costs
of inputs (natural gas and imported raw materials), higher capital costs
(change in scope), and delays in project implementation (para\. 6\.2)\. Rates
of return were not calculated for Fenchunganj since its rehabilitation was
more in the form of extensive maintenance than modernization\.
7\. Financial returns were also below the levels anticipated at
appraisal, for essentially the same reasons as cited above\. Realized
financial returns for Ghorasal and Chittagong were 72 and 82, respectively,
compared to appraisal estimates of 302 and 222, respectively (para\. 5\.2)\.
'While economic rates of return are acceptable, financial rates of return
are not satisfactory\. The poor financial performance was due, in part, to
the inefficient system of adjusting ex-factory prices in the face of rising
costs of inputs (paras\. 4\.1-4\.3)\.
Overall Asseesmeut and Lessons
8\. The project has succeeded in improving the overall performance of
the three plants through replacement of obsolete equipment, correcting
problems in plant utilities and instrumentation, and provision of foreign
exchange for the importation of parts and consumables for operation and
maintenance\. Production at the Ghorasal plant exceeded 902 of rated
capacity in 1985-88, average energy consumption per urea/ton dropped 152,
and estimated production costs fell 212 per ton (paras\. 3\.6, 3\.13)\.
Capacity utilization rose from 402 to 902 in the Chittagong plant (para\.
3\.21), while in the Fenchunganj plant from 702 to over 902 (para\. 3\.25)\.
Nevertheless, even if it can be assured that the facilities will be well-
maintained and that the quality of management will continue to improve, the
projects show poor prospects of long-run financial viability (para\. 7\.1)\.
Finally, although an organizational restructuring took place, it is still
not fully effective, thereby affecting enterprise autonomy and quality of
management (paras\. 3\.1, 7\.3) -- a more general and deep-rooted issue 'which
is part of on-going public enterprise reforms that are being implemented
very slowly\. All in all, the project was a partial success\.
9\. IDA has been instrumental in impressing on the Government the
expediency of improving the capacity utilization of the existing plants
through a rehabilitation program before venturing on to large investments
in new production facilities, and played a major role in mustering all-
round support for the project and in its preparation\. At IDA's suggestion,
the Government agreed to spin off the individual plants as separate
- vii -
corporate entities to improve the decision-making process -- an experiment
which has been partially successful\. Furthermore, IDA has been urging the
Government to base ex-factory pricing on a direct link to border prices and
drop the cost-plus formula (paras\. 8\.1-8\.3)\.
10\. The experience with this rehabilitation effort suggests that:
rehabilitation projects require detailed preparatory work, organization and
scheduling; successful implementation depends on efficient decision-making
processes; and external technical assistance requirements should be
identified early on and be made available without restrictions (para\. 9\.2)\.
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
BANGLADESH
FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REHABILITATION PROJECT
(CREDIT 1023-BD)
I\. INTRODUCTION
1\.1 Agriculture has remained the mainstay of Bangladesh's economy,
accounting for about 50% of the gross domestic product and providing
employment to about 60% of the work force\. The Government of Bangladesh (GOB)
gives high priority to increasing agricultural production to achieve food-
grain self-sufficiency\. Fertilizer use began to increase significantly in the
middle of the 1970s, and since then total use has increased at an annual
growth rate of over 9%\. In 1987/88, total use reached 1\.5 million tons, with
urea constituting 68% of total products, triple superphosphate (TSP)
accounting for 26%, and muriate of potash amounting to 6%\. With the
successful discovery of natural gas supplies, domestic fertilizer production
was begun in 1961 with the Fenchuganj Urea Factory, followed by Ghorasal
(1970), Ashunganj (1984), Polash (1986), and, just recently, the Chittagong
Urea (1988)\. In addition, Chittagong TSP came into production in 1974\. These
factories, owned by the Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation (BCIC),
have a combined production capacity of about 1\.8 million tons\. Domestic
production has doubled in the last five years, mainly through additional urea
capacities at Ashunganj and Polash and through improvements in output from
existing factories attributable to the completion of the rehabitation project
financed by IDA (Credit 1023-BD)\. Total production of fertilizers in 1987/88
was about 1\.4 million tons, with 1\.3 million tons of urea and 0\.1 million tons
of TSP\. Bangladesh has historically had a fertilizer supply gap and has had
to rely on imports for a substantial share of total fertilizer consumption\.
When the Chittagong urea facility is fully operational, domestic urea
production will be expected to exceed 1\.32 million tons\. Since this increase
has resulted in urea produciton in excess of demand, Bangladesh has the
capacity for substantial urea exports\. In 1987/88, urea exports were 223,000
metric tons (MT) (17% of production) and earned about US$24 million in foreign
exchange\.
II\. PROJECT BACKGROUND
A\. Project Identification\. PreRaration\. ADpraisal and Credit Effectiveness
2\.1 The Fertilizer Industry Rehabilitation Project (the Rehabilitation
Project) was first identified in July 1979 to solve two of the main problems
of the fertilizer sector in Bangladesh, namely, the low capacity utilization
of the operating fertilizer plants (55% of rated capacity on average in 1979)
and the inadequacy of the transportation system for the timely movement of the
fertilizers from the plants, ports and warehouses to the farmers\. During
appraisal in October 1979, it was found that two components, plant
rehabilitation and transport improvement, would require greater than expected
investments, therefore it was decided to proceed with them as separate
operations\. The Rehabilitation Project was designed for the rehabilitation of
BCIC's three fertilizer plants and the Fertilizer Transport Project was
intended to assist the Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation (BADC)
- 2-
in improvement of transportation to facilitate fertilizer movements\. In view
of the increasing demand of fertilizers, then projected at 15% annually for
1980-85, and saving foreign exchange by improving output of fertilizers, the
Rehabilitation Project was given a high priority by GOB\. During this time,
USAID was concentrating on improving the fertilizer marketing system, and a
fertilizer transport project, as such, did not proceed\.
2\.2 At the time of appraisal Bangladesh had two operating urea plants,
Fenchuganj and Ghorasal, and one operating TSP plant at Chittagong\. The
Fenchuganj plant was built in 1961 as the first fertilizer plant in Bangladesh
with a design capacity of ln6,000 tons per year (tpy) of urea and 13,000 tpy
of ammonium sulphate\. Following satisfactory operation of the first nine
years, the plant operated much below rated capacity since 1971\. Major plant
overhauls took place in 1975, and in 1978 and afterwards the plant ran at a
satisfactory level\. The Ghorasal plant was built by a Japanese engineering
company, Toyo Engineering Corporation (TEC) in 1970 with a design capacity of
about 340,000 tpy of urea\. The plant encountered mechanical and safety-
related problems in carly stage of operation and operated at well below its
rated capacity\. Major overhauling was implemented in 1979 by TEC\. The
production improved only to 70* of the rated capacity, but that was the
highest annual production achieved at the Ghorasal plant\.
2\.3 In order to meet the growing needs of phosphate fertilizers in
Bangladesh and to save the foreign-exchange costs of imports of TSP, the
Chittagong TSP plant (based on imported raw materials, rock phosphate and
sulfur) was completed in 1970\. The Chittagong TSP plant consists of two
separate TSP units with total design capacity of 152,000 tons of TSP per year\.
TSP-1 unit was built by Pan American Consultants of US\. It consists of a
100 ton per day (tpd) sulfuric acid plant, a 31 tpd phosphoric acid plant and
a 100 tpd TSP plant\. The TSP-2 unit was constructed by Hitachi Zosen of
Japan\. It consists of a 400 tpd sulfuric acid plant, a 135 phosphoric acid
plant and a 450 tpd TSP plant\. The TSP plant could not start trial runs until
1975 due to mechanical problems and initial raw material shortages\. Since the
start of production the plant continued to suffer from equipment and
maintenance problems which caused the plant to operate well below capacity
(40% of the rated capacity in 1979)\. While the Rehabilitation Project was
being prepared the issue of continuing TSP production at Chittagong was
raised\. A study by Soros Associates Consulting Engineers of the US (which was
not accepted by GOB), recommended to close of the factory with a new
investment for bagging of imported bulk fertilizers instead of rehabilitation
of the existing plant\.
2\.4 The three fertilizer plants employ a total of about 3,600 staff,
about half of them with technical skills\. The limited availability of
experienced plant operators and technicians together with the absence of an
adequate program and facilities for training was a constraint for improving
production\. The problem was further aggravated in the late 1970s and early
1980s by the exodus of skilled workers to much higher paying jobs in the
Middle East\. To meet the increasing needs of training, UNDP financed a
training project to provide technical management assistance and training for
skilled technical and operating staff at Ghorasal and Chittagong plants\. In
addition, the IDA Credit for Ashuganj Fertilizer (Credit 527-BD) provided
funds for import of training equipment\. Since the UNDP project did not
- 3 -
finance the setting up of the training center, the training component was
included in the Rehabilitation Project\.
2\.5 As in the case of Chittagong TSP plant and other fertilizer plants,
the inadequate availability of foreign exchange for the import of raw
materials as well as spares and components often hampered better utilization
of capacity\. To address these problems, IDA provided a series of program
credits to finance the import of fertilizer raw materials, spares and
components\. A part of the Imports Program VIII (Credit 980-BD) was provided
for this purpose\. In addition to the Import Program Credit to assure adequate
availability of spare parts, catalysts and chemicals for maintaining
operations at three plants, foreign exchange of US$8\.3 million to finance two-
year import requirements was identified and included in the Rehabilitation
Project\.
2\.6 In assisting the planning of rehabilitation of the existing plants,
IDA financed under the First and Second Technical Assistance Credits (Credits
409-BD and 622-BD) a Fertilizer Factory Improvement Study designed to identify
equipment and spares for debottlenecking of plant operation\. Based on the
result of the above study prepared by Bresler and Associates, Inc\. of USA
(Bresler) and a preliminary proposal on rehabilitation of Ghorasal urea plant
by TEC, BCIC prepared the plan for the rehabilitation of the three fertilizer
plants and formally presented to GOB as the Fertilizer Industry Rehabilitation
Project\.
2\.7 During the IDA appraisal of the Rehabilitation Project, issues of
restructuring BCIC and the ex-factory prices of fertilizers were also
identified as significant factors that would affect the performance of all the
fertilizer plants\. BCIC operates 30 units in 10 different major product areas
in the chemical industry\. In view of the limited management capabilities and
with the objective of improving the operating efficiency at the unit level,
GOB decided to form each subsectoral set of companies into independent
companies with BCIC in charge of overall coordination\. The individual
companies were to be structured financially based on 60/40 debt/equity ratio
with unit Boards of Directors to be empowered adequately for the management of
the companies\. The establishment of the three fertilizer companies including
Urea Fertilizer Factory Limited (UFFL), Natural Gas Fertilizer Factory Limited
(NGFF) and TSP Complex Ltd\. (TSP Complex) was agreed as a condition of credit
effectiveness\. The ex-factory prices of fertilizers were to be set by GOB on
the basis of BCIC's cost estimates\. The basis for pricing was not clearly
defined especially for determining the capital base and return criteria\.
Moreover, in practice price adjustments often lagged considerably behind
changes in costs of inputs\. With the formation of the three units into
independent companies, it was agreed to establish specific standards for
fertilizer pricing as a pricing covenant under the proposed credit to ensure
the financial viability of three units\.
2\.8 Following agreement on the Project's scope, an IDA appraisal mission
visited Bangladesh in October 1979\. On May 20, 1980, IDA approved a credit of
US$29 million equivalent to GOB, to be on-lent to the new fertilizer companies
at a rate of interest of 10% p\.a\. for 10 years, including 3 years of grace
with the exchange risk to be borne by the new fertilizer companies\. The
Credit Agreement was signed on June 4, 1980, and it became effective or,
September 4, 1980\.
P\. Prolect Obiectives and DescriDtion
Plant Rehabilitation Component
2\.9 Ghorosal Plant Rehabilitation Program\. The main objectives of the
plant rehabilitation program were to increase annual output to the rated level
and to improve production efficiency\. Factors affecting excessive plant
downtime were the lack of appropriate preventive maintenance, spare parts and
poor physical conditions of some equipment\. The scope of the rehabilitation
requirements were identified by the Bresler and TEC studies and then reviewed
by BCIC and IDA\. The program covered the following categories of
rehabilitation: (a) modifications to remove equipment inadequacies;
(b) replacement of equipment having difficult maintenance problems;
(c) improvements in the water and steam supply systems; (d) improvements in
the power generation system; and (e) revamping instrumentation\.
2\.10 Chittagong TSP Plant Rehabilitation Program\. The program aimed at
removing production bottlenecks of the plant and thereby improving production
and operation efficiency so that continued TSP production at Chittagong would
be economically advantageous\. Since one consultant had already recommended
closing the TSP unit, its viability was critically reviewed during the
appraisal process\. The Chittagong plant was reviewed by Jacob Engineering
Group, Inc\. of the US and also by Cremer and Warner, Ltd\. of the UK\. Factors
affecting the poor operation were summarized as: (a) equipment failure and
maintenance problem; (b) shortage of raw materials; (c) power supply
interruptions; and (d) marketing constraint partly due to powder TSP produced
at Chittagong\. The requirements of the Chittagong plant rehabilitation were
identified by the above studies as follows: (a) provisions for replacement of
obsolete equipment and stand-by equipment; (b) improving plant utilities
including steam, power and treated water facilities; (c) addition of TSP
granulation facilities; and (d) improvement in instrumentation\.
2\.11 Fenchuzanj Plant Rehabilitation Program\. Since Fenchuganj plant had
been fully renovated in 1978, the objectives of the program were to maintain
production at a high level level and to prolong plant life\. The program was
limited to: (a) improvement of the instrumentation for better process
control; (b) replacement of heat exchangers; and (c) other preventive
maintenance\.
Training ComDonent
2\.12 Under UNDP financing, technical assistance had been provided to BCIC
for training plans at Ghorasal, but without financing for setting up the
training facilities\. In order to supplement the training plans, the training
component was to finance setting up a training center at Ghorasal together
with trainees' hostel\.
- 5 -
Snares\. Catalysts and Chemical Component
2\.13 The three fertilizer plants required annually about US$4\.0 million of
imported spares, catalysts and chemicals for operation and maintenance\. The
component was to provide US$8\.3 million to finance the import of essential
spares, catalysts and chemicals for two years (from fiscal year 1981 to 1983)\.
III\. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND MANAGEMENT
A\. Overall Project
3\.1 BCIC, a fully government-owned company, owns and operates six
subsidiary fertilizer factories of which five (except for the TSP facilities
at Chittagong) produce ammonia/urea based on domestic natural gas\. Each of
these plants, as an independent fertilizer company, is managed by a
government-appointed Board of Directors and a Managing Director\. Management
powers have been delegated from BCIC to the Board of Directors of each
company\. But in practice each company is responsible only for day-to-day
operation\. BCIC, through its functional directors still has considerable
control powers in the management of the individual companies\. In addition,
the Ministry of Industry continues to exercise considerable influence over the
management of BCIC\.
Capital Costs\. Financing Plan and Disbursements
3\.2 The capital cost estimates were reappraised twice, in February 1982
and January 1984, due to changes in project scope and project time overrun\.
The capital cost breakdown for the total plant rehabilitation component is
summarized in the table below and presented in more detail for each plant in
Annex 1-1\.
- 6 -
PLANT REHABILITATION COMPONENT: SUMMARY OF CAPITAL COST
(US$ million) La
Aporaisal Estimate Actual Costs Chanze
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total %
Equipment and Supplies - 15\.9 15\.9 0\.2 28\.9 29\.1 +83
Freight Insurance and
Inland Handling 0\.8 1\.6 2\.4 0\.7 0\.8 1\.6 -33
Taxes and Duties 3\.5 - 3\.5 3\.6 - 3\.6 +3
Foundation & Structures 1\.4 - 1\.4 2\.2 - 2\.2 +5
Erection 1\.1 - 1\.1 1\.7 - 1\.7 +5
Eng\. & Ngmt\. Assistance 0\.9 1\.1 2\.0 0\.4 3\.0 3\.3 +60
Base Cost 7\.7 18\.6 26\.3 8\.7 32\.7 41\.3 +20
Physical Contingency 1\.2 2\.8 4\.0 - - -
Price Escalation 1\.3 3\.0 4\.3 - - -
Installed Cost 10\.2 24\.4 34\.5 8\.7 32\.7 1\.3_ +20
Interest During
Construction 2\.7 - 2\.7 5\.3 - 5\.3 +96
Total Financing
Reguired 12\.9 24\.4 37\.3 14\.0 \.2J2 46\.7 +25
JA Average taka/US$ exchange rates: 1980-81: 15\.0; 1981-82: 26; 1982-83:
24\.5; 1983-84: 25\.3; 1984-85: 25\.6; 1985-86: 28\.7; 1986-87: 30\.3\.
- 7 -
3\.3 Capital Costs Breakdown by Project ComRonent\. The capital cost
breakdown by project component is presented in Annex 1-2 and shown in the
table below\.
FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REHABILITATION PROJECT
CAPITAL COST BREAKDOWN
(In US$ million)
Appraisal February 1982 January 1984 Actual
Project Component Estimate Reappraisal Reappraisal Costs
I\. Plant Improvement
Component
Ghorasal 17\.8 (11\.7) 22\.8 (15\.9) 23\.5 (17\.5) 22\.1 (15\.8)
Chittagong 15\.0 (9\.7) 15\.2 (9\.5) 15\.6 (10\.2) 21\.3 (14\.5)
Fenchuganj 4\.5 (3\.0) 4\.0 (3\.0) 3\.9 (3\.1) 3\.4 (2\.4)
Subtotal 37\.3 (24\.4) 42\.0 (28\.4) 43\.0 (30\.8) 46\.7 (32\.7)
II\. Training Component 1\.0 (0\.1) 4\.9 (2\.3) 9\.4 (3\.4) 0\.6 (-)
III\. Spares, Catalysts
and Chemicals
Component 8\.3 (8\.3) 8\.3 (8\.3) 8\.3 (8\.3) 4\.2 (4\.2)
Total Financing
Reguired 46\.6 (32\.8) 55\.2 (39\.0) 60\.7 (42\.5) 51\.5 (36\.9)
Note: Foreign cost is shown in parenthesis\.
3\.4 Financing Plan\. The actual project financing plan compared with the
original appraisal plan, the 1982 revised plan and 1984 revised plan are shown
in Annex 1-3\. The major changes between the original and the actual plan are
the use of funds from IDA's Supplemental Assistance Credit (1504-BD)
(US$3\.3 million) for financing the project and use of funds from UK Commodity
Grant (US$4\.7 million equivalent) for financing the procurement of a turbine
generator for the Chittagong TSP plant\. Financing was satisfactory and did
not contribute to project delay\.
3\.5 Disbursements\. The disbursement foj the IDA credit as estimated at
the time of appraisal and reappraisal (January 1984) and the actual pattern,
is given in Annex 2 and is summarized in the following table\.
CUMULATIVE IDA CREDIT DISBURSEMENTS
(US$ million)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Appraisal 0\.7 17\.9 28\.4 29\.0 - - -
Reappraisal - - 2\.6 8\.4 24\.9 29\.0 -
Actual - - 2\.6 6\.1 14\.0 21\.4 23\.4 /a
Actual as % of
Reappraisal
Estimate - - 100 73 56 74 80
La Balance of credit was cancelled\.
B\. Ghorasal Urea Plant
3\.6 Achievement of Prolect Objectives\. Since its commissioning in 1970
with an installed capacity of 340,000 tpy of urea, the Ghorasal urea facili-
ties 1/ could not achieve more than 240,000 tpy of production\. During
1975-79, the plant achieved only an average of 61% of capacity utilization\.
As a result, the energy consumption was high, exceeding 48 Mscf/ton of urea,
compared with the design consumption of 34 Mscf/ton of urea\. Ghorasal, there-
fore, had a high urea production cost compared with the international price
levels\. The rehabilitation project aimed to improve the production levels and
efficiency, through removing inadequacies in the utility systems and through
necessary plant modifications\. With the completion of the major components of
the rehabilitation program by May 1985, the plant performance has improved
significantly and daily production exceeded the rated capacity for the first
time on August 20, 1985\. During 1985-88, annual production exceeded 90% of
rated capacity, reaching over 318,000 tons in 1986-87\. The average energy
consumption has come down to about 41 Mscf per ton of urea and further
improvements are expected when plant operations are further stabilized\. The
cost of production of Ghorasal urea in 1986-87 was Tk 2,566 per ton as
compared with the estimated likely cost of Tk 3,252 per ton had the
rehabilitation program not been implemented\. The BCIC and UFFL management are
now confident that the Ghorasal urea facilities are capable of operation at a
daily rated capacity of 1,137 tpd and with a stream efficiency which will
enable the annual production to be maintained at not below 300 thousand tons
of urea\.
3\.7 Encouraged by the performance of the Rehabilitation Program,
UFFL/BCIC, with the assistance of TEC, studied the scope for further plant
modifications and a project has been taken up for implementation with Japanese
financial assistance\. This project, estimated to cost about US$65 million
equivalent, is expected to increase urea production to about 1,424 tpd through
plant modifications\. At the same time, energy consumption is exp&cted to be
/ Official company name of Ghorasal is Urea Fertilizer Factory, Limited
(UFFL)\.
-9-
reduced to 30 Mscf per ton of urea, and plant effluents will be reduced\. The
project will also include investments on replac~ements to extend plant working
life\.
3\.8 Project Management and Execution\. The project was based on studies
by Bresler and TEC followed by discussions with UFFL/BCIC technical managers\.
TEC provided all the necessary overall plant engineering services and the
proprietary supplies\. In view of the importance of coordinating the project
activities with plant operation, the project was implemented by a UFFL project
team headed by an experienced UFFL manager reporting to the UFFL managing
director\. The implementation of the different project components was
coordinated by a BCIC project team, headed by an experienced BCIC executive
director\. This arrangement was adequate, but results were mixed\. The project
team had difficulties preparing acceptable bid specifications and as a result
there were delays in procurement\. Project management was through two groups,
one located at the plant site and and the other at Dhaka\. This split resulted
in some coordination problems and delays\. Overall, however, the projects were
completed and the main objective of high capacity utilization was achieved\.
3\.9 HanMower Develolment and Training\. When work on the project was
initiated, UFFL/BCIC were facing difficulties in maintaining their trained
manpower due to excessive loss of personnel to the private sector and to the
Middle East\. An in-house training program and the subsequent slackening
industrial activity in the Middle East has reduced the staffing problems\. The
project has made a major contribution to staff morale, boosting their
confidence in operating the facilities at good operating levels on a sustained
basis\. As further explained in a subsequent section, the training center
component was dropped from the project and is now being implemented with other
funding\.
3\.10 Performance of Consultants and Engineering Contractors\. The initial
project preparation work was carried out by Bresler under an IDA Technical
Assistance Program (Credits 409-BD, 622-BD)\. The consultants carried out
their tasks satisfactorily, working closely with the UFFL/BCIC technical
managers\. Further work on project preparation was carried out by TEC, who
were the original contractors for the facilities and who could, therefore,
more easily develop an implementable project than a new contractor\. TEC
provided UFFL/BCIC with all the needed support and technical help\. TEC also
provided all the necessary system engineering services\. The design and
engineering of the individual systems were provided by the system suppliers\.
All the engineering contractors performed satisfactorily\.
3\.11 Procurement and Performance of Suppliers\. All the system engineering
services and proprietary supplies were obtained under a single contract with
TEC\. All the other supplies were procured following ICB contracting and
procurement procedures\. Among the foreign suppliers to \.he project, Japan
accounted for the largest share of IDA financed contracts (84%)\. Denmark
(12%), Korea (3%), and the Netherlands (1%) were the other supplying
countries\. There were some delays in the delivery of the ammonia converter
since the supplier needed several technical clarifications during its
manufacture\. On the overall, the performance of the suppliers was
satisfactory\.
- 10 -
3\.12 Project Implementation Schedule\. A Project Implementation Schedule
is shown in Annex 3, and the actual completion date is compared below with
appraisal estimates:
Completion Schedule (Months)
Appraisal Actual Appraisal Actual
August 1982 December 1986 22 78
(May 1985) La (55) La
La Excluding installation of ammonia converter\.
All items of the rehabilitation project except Ammonia Converter were com-
pleted by May 1985 and with installation of the Ammonia Converter the project
was finally completed in December 1986\. Major factors which caused consider-
able delay in project completion, more than four years in comparison with the
appraisal schedule, are:
(i) protracted contract negotiation (over 18 months) with the engin-
eering contractor, TEC;
(ii) changes in scope during the implementation of the project
including installation of ammonia converter and turbine genera-
tor; and
(iii) delay in procurement and shipment particularly for proprietary
items\.
ODerating Performance
3\.13 A major part of the plant modifications were carried out during the
13 weeks starting from February 1, 1985\. Commissioning of the modified
facilities started by end of April 1985 and urea production was achieved in
May 1985\. Full production could not, however, be achieved due to power supply
constraints\. The new gas turbine generator was commissioned in August 1985
and the plant achieved rated capacity in August 1985\. Due to delays in
delivery and overhauling schedule, the ammonia converter could be installed
only at the end of 1986\. In 1985-86, urea production reached 307,000 tons\.
As plant operations stabilized, production improved in 1986-87 to 318,000
tons, the highest achieved so far, exceeding 93% of the rated capacity\.
Production in 1987-88 was only slightly less, reaching 312,000 tons\. Domestic
urea production is now in excess of requirements\. As a result, while most of
the UFFL output was marketed locally through BADC, significant amounts of urea
has been exported to neighboring countries--Nepal and Sri Lanka\. The urea
export in 1987-88 was 39,000 tons, corresponding to about 13% of the UFFL
production\.
- 11 -
3\.14 Capital Costs for Ghorasal Plant Rehabilitation\. Flnancing required
for the Chorasal plant rehabilitation in comparison with the appraisal esti-
mate is presented in Annex 1-1 and summarized below:
GHORASAL PLANT REHABILITATION: CAPITAL COSTS
(In US$ million equivalent)
Appraisal Estimate Actual Change
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total t
Total Installation
Cost 4\.8 11\.7 16\.5 3\.6 15\.8 19\.4 +18
Interest During
Construction 1\.3 - 1\.3 2\.7 - 2\.7 +108
Total Financing
Reguired 6\.1 11\.7 17\.8 1\.8 22 +24
Financing required for the Ghorasal plant improvement was US$22\.1 million, 24%
higher than the appraisal estimate of US$17\.8 million\. The increase in cap-
ital cost was mainly due to:
(i) change in project scope resulting in additional installation of
equipment and construction work of 22 items including gas
turbine generator and ammonia converter;
(ii) impact of project delays causing more price escalation of equip-
ment and services than estimated at appraisal and increase in
interest during construction; and
(iii) increased cost of engineering and management due to expanded
scope of work and price escalation\.
C\. Chittagong TSP Plant
Prolect Imnlementation\. Management and Performance
3\.15 Achievement of Project Objectives\. The plant modifications were
originally proposed to be carried out by the TSP Complex based on the findings
of the Bresler and other studies aind the company's own findings\. However,
faced with difficulties in spe\.:ifying and procuring the needed supplies, the
company decided to engage the services of Hitachi Zosen, the original TSP-2
plant contractor, to assist in identifying and implementing the project\.
Contracting with Hitachi Zosen was concluded only in February 1984\. Further
thinking within BCIC also resulted in two major scope changes\. BCIC decided
to setup phosphoric acid import facilities to enable TSP capacity to be
increased to 150,000 tpy\. Also, to ensure reliable power supplies to the
- 12 -
complex, the company decided to set up gas based captive power generation
facilities\. The project was substantially completed in June 1987 except for
the captive power unit which was commissioned at the end of 1988\. With the
implementation of the various components of the project, the complex now
produces granulated TSP which finds acceptance with the Bangladeshi farmers\.
The dust effluent from the plant has also been substantially reduced with
increased TSP efficiency\. The complex has greater flexibility enabling TSP
production based on either rock phosphate and sulfur or intermediate
phosphoric acid depending on relative international prices\. The availability
of facilities for importing phosphoric acid enables the complex to operate at
a much higher level of production\.
3\.16 Project Management and Execution\. As with all the other components,
the project was planned to be implemented by an adequate TSP Complex project
team reporting to the BCIC project coordination group, based on the various
consultant studies that were already available to BCIC\. However, even
initially, there were difficulties in specifyine and procuring the needed
supplies\. BCIC, therefore, decided to request Hitachi Zosen, the original
TSP-2 contractors, to study the facilities and prepare a proposal for plant
modifications\. Hitchi Zosen was contracted to assist the TSP complex with the
system engineering services and supply of proprietary supplies\. In the imple-
mentation of the granulation facilities, the company was assisted by a Dutch
grant financed consultant\. The project has been completed adequately,
although with significant delays\.
3\.17 Manpower Development and Training\. The TSP complex carries out a
variety of training programs, both within the country and abroad, for upgrad-
ing and maintaining staff skills\. The opportunities that were available to
the complex staff to work with the various consultants engaged for the project
has also provided them with additional skills\. The complex is now being
operated and maintained efficiently\.
3\.18 Performance of Consultants and Contractors\. The project was
originally identified in the Bresler study\. However, in view of the
continuing poor performance, the TSP complex has been studied by a large
number of consultants, whose suggestions and proposals have gone into
preparing the final project\. All the consultants performed satisfactorily
especially towards transfer of skills and technology to the TSP complex staff\.
In retrospect, there were far too many consultant studies, and the combination
of the several (often conflicting) studies and the lack of decisive management
within the Bangladesh public sector system contributed greatly to the delay in
implementing hte TSP modernization component\. Hitachi Zosen also served as
overall engineering contractor and performed satisfactorily\.
3\.19 Procurement and Performance of the SuDDliers\. Hitachi Zosen provided
proprietary supplies\. All the other IDA-financed supplies and services were
obtained following acceptable contracting and procurement procedures\. Among
foreign suppliers contracted for the execution of the project, Japan won the
largest share (71%)\. The rest of the contracts were won by USA, France,
W\. Geimany, Italy, UK and Netherlands\. Overall, the suppliers performed
satisfactorily both in terms of delivery and in providing follow-up service\.
- 13 -
ProIect Implementation Schedule
3\.20 The actual completion date in comparison with the appraisal estimate
is shown below:
Completion Schedule (Months)
Appraisal Actual Appraisal Actual
August 1982 June 1987 Lg 22 80
La Does not include the captive power unit, which was com-
missioned at the end of 1988\.
Installation of the TSP granulation plant, a major part of the project was
carried out successfully almost within the envisaged project period under
turnkey contract with a Dutch contractor\. Rehabilitation of the sulfuric acid
plant and other facilities, including phosphoric acid import facilities, was
completed in June 1987 resulting in substantial time overrun of more than four
years\. Delays in project completion were mainly due to the following:
(i) change in the manner of implementing the rehabilitation of TSP-2
plant due to needs of assistance from Hitachi Zosen, the
original contractor (para\. 3\.16);
(ii) change in project scopo including installation of phosphoric
acid import facilities to increase TSP capacity to 150,000 tpy
and set-up of gas based captive power generation facilities to
ensure reliable power supplies to the complex (para\. 3\.15);
(iii) overall poor coordination within BCIC and slow decision making
when changes in scope emerged; and
(iv) delay in government approval for contracts and budget resulting
from change in project scope\.
Operating Performance
3\.21 Commissioning and Production\. The project was completed in June 1987
except for the captive power plant\. However, since most of the modifications
were carried out during different plant shut-downs, the effect of the
rehabilitation project was felt even earlier\. TSP production exceeded 100,000
tpy for the first time during 1985-86\. With the commissioning of the
phosphoric acid import facilities TSP production reached 136,500 tons in
1986-87, with about 34% of the output coming from imported acid\. The 1987-88
TSP production was only 117,000 tons due to the difficulties generally faced
by Bangladesh in obtaining supplies of rock phosphate and phosphoric acid\.
The company expects to produce about 140,000 tons of TSP in 1988-89\. The
- 14 -
entire TSP production is now from the TSP-2 facilities\. The TSP-1 phosphoric
acid plant was shut down since it is uneconomical to operate this small plant\.
The TSP-1 sulfuric acid and TSP plants are now being operated to produce
single superphosphate, which could provide part of the badly needed sulfur
requirements of the Bangladeshi soil\.
3\.22 Marketing\. Since the total TSP output of the complex is well below
the country's TSP requirements, the entire output is easily marketed through
BADC\. The plant TSP inventory level is reasonable\. Also, with the
commissioning of the granulation facilities the entire output is available in
an acceptable form similar to granulated urea\. The earlier reluctance of the
Bangladeshi farmer to buy TSP is, therefore, no longer there\. With better
recognition of its usefulness, there has been an increasing demand for gypsum
for use both as a soil conditioner and as a source of secondary nutrient
sulfur\.
Capital Costs
3\.23 Financing required for the Chittagong plart rehabilitation in compar-
ison with the appraisal estimate is presented in Annex 1\.1 and summarized
below:
CHITTAGONG PLANT REHABILITATION: CAPITAL COSTS
(In US$ million equivalent)
ADpraisal Estimate Actual Change
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
Total Installation
Cost 4\.2 9\.7 13\.9 4\.6 14\.5 19\.1 +37
Interest During
Construction 1\.1 - 1\.1 2\.2 - 2\.2 +100
Total Financing
Required 5\.3 9\.7 15\.0 68 14\.5 Z1\.3 +42
Financing required for the Chittagong plant rehabilitation was US$21\.3 mil-
lion, 42% higher than the appraisal estimate of US$15\.0 million equivalent\.
The increase in capital costs was mainly due to:
(i) change in project scope involving additional installation of
equipment and construction work including facilities for
imported acid and a turbine generator of 5 MW which accounted
for 44% of capital costs increase; and
(ii) impact of project delays causing higher costs of equipment and
services and also increase in interest during construction
- 15 -
These types of changes in costs are typical for such modernization work and in
themselves did not affect project viability\.
3\.24 The Rehabilitation Project had envisaged at its preparation stage
that the disposal of gypsum cons crained the TSP production and thus GOB was
required to prepare an evaluation study for gypsum disposal and utilization
(Section 4\.06, Development Credit Agreement)\. In the last few years gypsum is
being widely used by farmers as a fertilizer supplement to correct sulfur
deficiency in the soil\. Sales volume of gypsum has increased drastically from
5,000 MT in 1981/82 to 57,000 MT in 1987/88 and in 1988/89 85,000 MT of gypsum
is expected to be sold at the price of Tk 1,000 per ton\. With full production
of TSP at Chittagong factory 80,000-90,000 MT per year of gypsum will be
produced as by-product\. Thus, under the emerging demand for gypsum, disposal
of gypsum is no longer a constraint to TSP production and this study is no
longer required\.
D\. Fenchuganj Urea Plant
Project Implementation\. Management and Operating Performance
3\.25 The Fenchuganj facilities,/ commissioned in early 1962, had an
initial period of satisfactory operation but production started declining and
reached a low of 37% of capacity in 1973\. The plant was rehabilitated with
Japanese assistance in 1978-79 based on needs identified during the early
1970s\. Further investments were, therefore, required to strengthen the
facilities and stabilize continued operation\. As with the other components,
there were implementation delays due to difficulties in preparing adequate
specifications and in firming up the project scope\. The project was completed
in May 1986\. The results of the project were immediately evident with urea
production reaching 111,500 tons in 1986-87, corresponding to 105% of rated
capacity\. Production in 1987-88 was slightly lower, about 104,000 tons,
corresponding to 98% of rated capacity\. It is expected that the facilities
can produce satisfactorily on a sustained basis of at least 90% of rated
capacity\. Natural gas feedstock consumption has decreased from about 68 Nscf
per ton before rehabilitation to about 59 Mscf per ton after rehabilitation\.
hiie project was, essentially, implemented by the NGFF staff with minimum
external assistance\. Japanese contractors provided the largest share of
supplies and services to the project (55%)\. Switzerland, Austria and Belgium
were the other important suppliers\. The consultants, contractors and
suppliers to the project generally performed satisfactorily\.
Plant Implementation Schedule
3\.26 Actual completion date in comparison with appraisal estimate is shown
below:
2/ The official company name is Natural Gas Fertilizer Factory (NGFF)\.
16
Completion Schedule (Months)
Appraisal Actual Appraisal Actual
June 1983 May 1986 15 50
With considerable delay in bid preparation and procurement, most of the items
for the plant rehabilitation were installed during scheduled shut down in
March-April 1986 and the plant started its operation in May 1986\. Major
factors causing the three-year delay are:
(i) delay in definition of project scope and in preparation of
technical specifications and bid documents due to shortage of
technical manpower;
(ii) delay in procurement of some equipment items due to obsolescence
of the existing model of the equipment/machinery at the plant;
and
(iii) lack of engineering experience and poor decision making within
the BCIC implementation team and management\.
CaRital Costs
3\.27 Financing required for the Fenchuganj plant rehabilitation in compar-
ison with the appraisal estimate is presented in Annex 1-1 and summarized
below:
FENCHUGANJ PLANT REHABILITATION: CAPITAL COSTS
(In US$ million equivalent)
ARRraisal Estimate Actual Change
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total (%)
Total Installed Cost 1\.1 3\.0 4\.2 0\.4 2\.4 2\.9 -31
Interest During
Construction 0\.3 - 0\.3 0\.5 - 0\.5 +67
Total Financing
Reguire 1\.5 3\.0 4\.5 0\.9\. LA 3\. -24
- 17 -
Financing required for the Fenchuganj plant rehabilitation was US$3\.4 million,
24% 1'ower than the appraisal estimate of US$4\.5 million\. The decrease in
capital costs was mainly due to (a) lower bid prices of foreign equipment than
the original estimate for procuring most of items on international tender; and
(b) lower local currency capital costs in terms of US dollars which resulted
from change in exchange rate fi'r Bangladesh taka from Tk 15\.5/US$, at
appraisal, to the actual weighted average rate of Tk 26\.6/US$ over the main
execution period of 1982-86\. There were no problems related to availability
of financing\.
E\. Training Center
3\.28 The setting up of the national training facilities at Ghorasal has
been substantially delayed\. The changes in project scope after negotiation
and the resultant substantially larger financing required resulted in a delay
of the training center\. Subsequently, this component was dropped from the IDA
project and is being implemented with financing of all the foreign costs with
Dutch grant funds\. As envisaged now, this component is expected to cost
Tk 82\.5 million including foreign component of Tk 46\.7 million\. This cost
excludes facilities to be provided by BCIC\. The present scheme envisages
training facilities for 128 apprentices over a period of two years and for
this purpose provides about 47,000 ft2 of covered training facilities and
15,000 ft2 of hostel facilities\. The training areas will include process
engineering, instrument and control engineering, mechanical engineering,
electrical engineering and chemical control\. The faculty will include 27
trainers with appropriate management and support staff\. It is expected that
the facilities will be made ready in a phased manner, with the first batch of
trainees starting in early 1989, and the full scheme scheduled to be in
operation by early 1991\. The overall scheme has been prepared and is being
implemented in cooperation with Stamicarbon of Holland\.
IV\. PRICING POLICY
4\.1 Retail prices of fertilizer have been deregulated progressively since
April 1983 under GOB's price reform to eliminate subsidy\. Although progress
has been slow and erratic, and full decontrol has not yet been reached, prices
paid by farmers are linked to average international prices and are formulated
in principle under market forces\. Ex-factory prices received by BCIC and
wholesale prices charged by BADC are still administered by GOB\. Wholesale
prices are set at the level of ex-factory price plus marketing cost and BADC's
margin which are currently Tk 4,575 (US$145) per ton for urea and Tk 4,725
(US$150) per ton for TSP\. Ex-factory price of urea has been decided based on
production costs of each factory while the ex-factory price of TSP has been
based on its landed (imported) cost\. In the past, due to the Government's
policy to maintain fertilizer price relatively low, adjustments of ex-factory
prices have lagged behind considerably in spite of the increased cost of
natural gas, power and other inputs\. The ex-factory price of urea was raised
to Tk 4,025 (US$127) in Nay 1988 after three year price freeze and ex-factory
price of TSP (Tk 6,619) remained unchanged\. BCIC's proposed price for TSP of
Tk 7,460 is being reviewed by the GOB for adjustment\. In accordance with a
proposal by the Technical Committee on Pricing Policy for Public Enterprise
- 18 -
new pricing for the ex-factory price of urea was established by GOB in May
1988\. Outline of the pricing policy is summarized as follows:
(a) Uniform ex-factory price (Tk 4,025/ton) is established for all urea
delivered to BADC from factories\. The uniform price is decided based
on estimated production costs including return on equity of each
factory\. Ex-factory prices reflecting production costs of each fac-
tory are now introduced within BCIC for its accounting and monitoring
purposes\.
(b) Capital restructuring is to be made to ensure 60/40 debt/equity \.atio
excent for Chittagong Urea Factory which is not yet decided\. BCIC
shall maintain 4\.75% of return on equity on average among various
factories (see separate PCR on Chittagong Urea Fertilizer Project)\.
(c) Production cost estimates will be based on the following:
(i) operating rate: 80%; (ii) natural gas cost in Tk 25/Mscft; and
(iii) depreciation: 20 years for plants and equipment\.
4\.2 BADC lifts locally produced fertilizers from factories and together
with imported fertilizers distributes products to wholesalers and dealers\.
Under the Fertilizer Distribution Improvement Project I of USAID a free market
system of fertilizer wholesalers and dealers has been established nationwide\.
As a result wholesalers and dealers now are able to sell at any price they
wish anywhere in the country\. The private marketing system is now being
expanded through direct lifting by wholesalers from ports and BCIC factories\.
Since September, 1988 the GOB has, on a trial basis, authorized the Chittagong
Urea Factory to sell directly to private wholesalers at prices administered
by GOB\.
4\.3 During the implementation of the Rehabilitation Program, GOB failed
to meet the pricing covenant which was to review and establish ex-factory
prices to cover all production costs and agreed rate of return (10%) on equity
(Section 4\.01, Development Credit Agreement)\. BCIC thus had difficulty to
meet financial covenants to maintain debt/equity ratio (60/40) and current
ratio (1\.3:1\.0) particularly for Chittagong TSP factory (Section 3\.03, Project
Agreement)\. However, more recent events have demonstrated the willingness of
GOB to move toward free-market pricing\. In line with this change of policy,
IDA has recently made a recommendation to GOB on pricing of fertilizers under
Bangladesh Fertilizer Sector Review (Report No\. 7145-BD) dated August 31,
1988, that would be based on a direct link to border prices and drop the
present cost-plus policy\. Combined with the GOB's continuous efforts to
liberalize fertilizer marketing, IDA's pricing recommendation proposed
adjusting the ex-factory price of urea to the level of the international price
and capital restructuring as required for economically viable units\. GOB's
recent decision to set uniform ex-factory prices for all units (except
Chittagong) is a step in the right direction, but there is a need for further
changes to reflect international prices\. With these developments, it would be
counterproductive for IDA to pursue its original pricing covenant objectives\.
I
- 19 -
V\. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
A\. Financial Rate of Return (FRR)
5\.1 The assumptions used in the calculation of the financial rate of
return (FRR) as well as the economic rate of return (ERR) are given in
Annex 4-1\. The financial rate of return has been calculated using prices
adjusted to 1988 constant basis\. The operating costs and revenues are given
in Annex 4-2\. Since the project was rehabilitation of existing operating
plants, only the increments in cost and revenue as a result of the
rehabilitation program are considered in the financial and economic analysis\.
Since the plant improvement expenditure for Fenchuganj forms only a small
portion (less than 10%) of the total project cost, finar\.- Lal and economic
calculations have not been undertaken for Fenchuganj\.
5\.2 The FRR for the Chorasal subproject is now recalculated at 7%
compared to the appraisal estimate of 30%\. The considerably lower FRR is
mainly due to (a) higher capital cest, (b) increased cost of natural gas than
projected at appraisal, (c) relatively insufficient adjustment of ex-factory
price to cover increasing production costs, and (d) the long delay in project
implementation\. The Chittagong TSP subproject also shows a lower rate of
return at about 8% compared to the original estimate of 22%\. The difference
is also due to (a) higher capital costs, (b) increased relative prices of
imported sulfur and phsophate rock, (c) introduction of a part of production
of TSP by using high-cost imported acid, land (d) implementation delays\.
B\. Financial Results and Covenants
5\.3 Income statements and balance sheets for the project beneficiary
companies, UFFL, NGFF and TSP Complex as well as BCIC, are shown in
Annexes 5-1, 5-2, 5-3 and 5-4\. The following table shows selected data for
UFFL, NGFF and TSP Complex\.
- 20 -
SELECTED FINANCIAL DATA
(Tk million)
1985/8i 1986/87 1987/88
(est\.)
UFFL (Ghorasal)
Sales revenue 758 918 982
Net income 167 91 46
Depreciation 151 172 230
Cash generation 318 263 276
Current assets 2,224 2,459 2,596
Current liabilities 772 937 1,049
Long-term debt 2,267 2,589 2,58?
Equity 1,123 1,162 1,149
NGFF (Fenchunganj)
Sales revenue 371 422 473
Net income 36 26 9
Depreciation 62 69 75
Cash generation 98 95 84
Current assets 1,025 1,167 1,335
Current liabilities 425 516 619
Long-term debt 743 838 834
Equity 467 476 479
TSP ComDlex
Sales revenue 655 922 959
Net income (10) 23 24
Depreciation 39 53 57
Cash generation 29 76 81
Current assets 833 1,233 936
Current liabilities 719 1,165 805
Long-term debt 537 627 630
Equity 2 24 48
Ratios
Current ratio
UFFL 2\.8:1 2\.6:1 2\.5:1
NGFF 2\.4:1 2\.3:1 2\.2:1
TSP Complex 1\.2:1 1\.1:1 1\.2:1
Debt/equity ratio
UFFL 67:33 69:31 69:31
NGFF 61:39 64:36 64:36
TSP Complex 100:0 96:4 93:7
- 21 -
While the operating rates of these companies have improved substantially after
the Rehabilitation Project, the level of profits has been well below those
projected at appraisal\. Profit at UFFL and NGFF in 1987/88 remained at 6% and
9%, respectively, of operating margin compared to projected ratios of 32% and
20%, respectively\. TSP Complex showed only 4% in 1987/88 compared to an
expected 32%\. These low levels of profits largely result from the slow
adjustment to ex-factory prices\. Price increases in late 1988 should
substantially increase profit levels of these companies to acceptable levels\.
5\.4 Two companies, UFFL and NGFF, are basically in compliance with
financial covenants as listed in para\. 8\.07 of the SAR\. Although debt/equity
ratio of UFFL shows higher than required ratio of 60:40, it would be
acceptable based on the accounting procedures to record the outstanding long-
term foreign exchange loans converted at exchange rate prevailing at the end
of the financial year while the share capital, expressed in taka terms,
continues to be shown at its face value\. If the urea price covenant had been
maintained, the financial condition of the two companies would have been much
better than indicated in the table\. The TSP Complex has been a consistent
loser and has had difficulty in maintaining both debt/equity ratio and current
ratio\. Particularly as to debt/equity ratio the company has lost nearly its
entire equity\. The poor financial condition of the companies is mainly
explained by:
(a) the unwillingness of GOB to timely increases in the ex-factory prices
to reflect production cost increases;
(b) unsatisfactory operation and financial performance of these plants
during the implementation of the Rehabilitation Project\.
During 1988, the GOB decided to raise fertilizer prices to cover production
costs and also to start capital restructuring of fertilizer companies\. It is
expected that the financial situation of the three companies will improve
progressively to a satisfactory level\. However, some financial restructuring
may be required, particularly for the TSP Complex\. To adjust the debt:equity
ratio to 60:40 would require converting about Tk 220 million from debt to
equity\. This restructuring would also adjust the other financial ratios to
acceptable levels\.
5\.5 During project implementation, UFFL and NGFF met their obligations
under the subsidiary loan agreements regarding terms and conditions of the on-
lending of the IDA credit (10% p\.a\. interest for 13 years inclusive of 3 years
grace)\. However, the TSP Complex could not fulfill its repayment obligations
due to its financial difficulties\.
5\.6 With respect to reporting obligations as outlined in para\. 8\.08 of
the SAR, all reports, particularly financial reports, were submitted with
substantial delay\. However, quality was generally adequate to determine
progress and/or identify problem areas\.
- 22 -
VI\. ECONOMIC PERFORMANE
A\. Economic Rate of Return
6\.1 For the economic analysis, tradeable items have been priced on the
basis of projected international prices adjusted for transportation and
handling charges\. The economic price of natural gas is valued at its long-
term marginal cost (Tk 35/Kscft)\. The price of urea based on international
price and TSP based on its landed cost are projected to increase at 1988 real
terms as follows:
ECONOMIC PRICES OF UREA AND TSP
(in US$ in 1988 real terms)
1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1994/95
Urea La 143 164 208 193
TSP (landed cost of
imported TSP) 217 213 232 254
/a Export price minus inland transportation cost of $5/ton\.
6\.2 The project cost and benefit streams for the ERR are shown in
Annex 6-1\. The ERR for the Ghorasal subproject and the Chittagong subproject
are now calculated at 23% and 9%, respectively, which are considerably lower
than the appraisal estimate of 92% and 18%\. The difference is mainly due to
(i) lower world fertilizer prices than projected at appraisal, particularly
for price of urea; (ii) higher economic costs of inputs, natural gas or
imported raw materials than projected; (iii) higher capital costs as discussed
in paras\. 3\.15 and 3\.27; and (iv) delays in project implementation\.
6\.3 The following table shows estimated economic costs of production of
urea at Ghorasal plant and Fenchuganj plant on "sunk capital cost" basis\.
- 23 -
ESTIMATED ECONOMIC COSTS OF PRODUCTION OF UREA
(In taka per ton of urea based on 1988/89 prices)
Ghorasal Fenchuganj
Annual capacity (Mtpy) 340 106
Annual production (Mtpy) 310 95
Variable costs
Natural gas 1,295 2,100
Other variable costs 761 863
Subtotal 2\.056 2,963
Fixed cash costs d 479 1,114
Economic Production Costs 2\.535 4\.077
(US$) (80) (129)
Export price of urea 5,166 5,166
(US$) A (164) (164)
La Does not include depreciation and interest charges\.
/b Export price (US$169/ton) minus inland transportation of $5/ton\.
6\.4 The economic production costs of urea at Ghorasal and Fenchuganj are
below the export price of urea at Tk 5,166 per ton (US$164 per ton at the
prevailing exchange rate), thus the production of urea a: both plants are
economically viable and should continite to operate\. The Ghorasal plant in
particular with the economic production costs of about half of the export
price is very competitive for export to the international market\. The ability
of both plants to continue sustained, viable operation will depend on how well
the facilities are maintained, access to foreign exchange for needed inputs
and ultimately the quality of the management\. Present indications are that
both these factors are satisfactory\.
6\.5 Estimated economic costs of production of TSP at Chittagong are
summarized in the following table\.
- 24 -
ESTIMATED ECONOMIC COSTS OF PRODUCTION OF TSP
(In taka per ton of TSP based on 1988/89 prices)
Local acid Imported acid Overall
Annual capacity (Mtpy) 152
Annual production (Mtpy) 70 70 140
Variable costs
Sulfur 1,372 686
Rock phosphate 2,948 869 1,909
Phosphoric acid 4,974 2,487
Other variable costs 919 473 696
Total Variable Costs 5\.239 6\.316 5\.778
Fixed cash costs LA 576 576 576
Economic Production Cost 5\.815 6\.892 6\.354
(US$) 185 219 202
Landed cost of TSP 6,710 6,710 6,710
(US$) 213 213 213
/a Does not include depreciation and interest charges\.
6\.6 The economic viability of domestic TSP production has been volatile
depending upon relative prices of imported sulfur and phosphate rock, interme-
diate phosphoric acid and finished product TSP\. Production of TSP based
either on locally produced or imported phosphoric acid was not economically
viable in 1986/87 when prices of TSP were internationally depressed at around
US$144 per ton (Tk 4,440 per ton at the then prevailing exchange rate)\. With
changes in relative prices favorable for domestic production since late 1987,
with TSP prices at more than US$200 per ton, economic production costs of TSP
at present indicate that continued operation of the existing TSP facilities
should be economically viable\.
6\.7 The above economics of production are based on continuous production
at around 140,000 tons per year which has been made possible as a result of
the Rehabilitation Project\. Among the investments, installation of facilities
for imported acid has increased the production capacity of TSP to that level
and also provided some flexibility in managing production costs when relative
prices of imported, sulfur and rock phosphate, phosphoric acid and TSP
fluctuate\. This fluctuation is expected to continue and at times it will be
profitable to product TSP locally as is the case now based on phosphoric acid
imports or phosphate rock imports\. When TSP prices decline, there can be
periods when it would be more economical to import than to produce it locally\.
In that event, the company should temporarily cease production until prices
recover\. The company now has the flexibility to change its production profile
- 25 -
to adjust to changing international prices\. Given the history of the TSP
Complex, its very narrow economic margin, it is difficult to predict the long-
term sustainability of the operations\.
B\. Foreign Exchange Savings
6\.8 The foreign exchange savings (Annex 6-2) over the 10-year life of the
project at Ghorasal and Chittagong before debt service on the foreign loens is
estimated at about US$136 million with annual savings of US$14 million in
constant 1988 dollars, which is about 54% of the appraisal estimate, due to
reasons explained in para\. 6\.2\. While most of the materials used for
production of TSP are imported, production of urea at Ghorasal is almost
entirely based on locally obtained materials, earning 73% of total foreign
exchange savings\. In the last three years (1985/86-1987/88) Gborasal plant
has actually exported about 28,000 tons of urea per year on average, realizing
about US$3 million of annual foreign exchange earnings\.
C\. Technology Transfer
6\.9 The Project was managed and implemented by local management and staff
involving a large number of middle-level officers and workers\. Working with
foreign process licensors and engineering contractors during the entire period
of the implementation, the project staff were able to absorb technology in the
various fields\. Although considerable time was required for completion of the
project, positive results of the projeet have a significant effect on the
morale and confidence of plant managers and workers\. The further development
of the fertilizer industry of Bangladesh should gain considerably from the
experience of the Rehabilitation Project\.
D\. Environmental AsDect
6\.10 Major environmental problems at the Chittagong TSP plant including
(i) dust emission, (ii) sulfur oxide emissions and (iii) disposal of gypsum
have been solved through the Rehabilitation Project\. The problem of dust
emission has been removed by installation of granulation facilities and
improved power supply and better equipment conditions solved sulfur oxide
emission problem\. The disposal of gypsum is no longer a problem as discussed
earlier\.
VII\. SUSTAINABILITY
7\.1 Data are not available for a full cost analysis necessary for a clear
assessment of the three projects' long-term sustainability\. But from a
financial point of view, both Chorasal and TSP Chittagong show poor prospects
as their re-estimated incremental IRRs are only 7% and 8%, respectively\.
Based on economic analysis, where the price of urea is based on international
export price and TSP price on landed cost (para\. 6\.1), the Ghorasal project
may be sustainable in the long run, but the TSP complex's long-term viability
is questionable at this stage\. Calculated on a sunk cost basis, the ERRs of
Ghorasal and TSP Chittagong are 23% and 9%, respectively\.
- 26 -
7\.2 lhe IRR and ERR are not calculated for Fenchuganj as the improvement
expenditures for this plant were only a small portion (less than 10%) of the
total project cost and represented primarily maintenance expenditures\. The
long-term sustainability of this rehabilitated plant will depend on its
ability to produce urea at the export equivalent value\. To achieve this
performance, Fenchuganj will have to be well maintained\. At present, the
projection of ammonium sulfate at Fenchuganj is not viable and has been
recommended to be stopped\.2/
7\.3 In the final analysis, the long-term sustainability of Ghorasal,
Fenchuganj and particularly Chittagong TSP will depend very much on the
management quality which in turn would depend on the ongoing restructuring of
BCIC and its individual fertilizer units\. That restructuring is still not
fully effective\.
VIII\. IDA'S ROLE
8\.1 From the time of its first involvement in the Bangladesh fertilizer
sector, IDA's major objective has been to stress to the GOB and the industry
managers the importance of priority for investments on the existing plants
that wouled maximize their output and improve their efficiency\. IDA believed
that it is important for Bangladesh to stabilize production in existing
fertilizer plants in Fenchuganj, Ghorasal and Chittagong (TSP) through
appropriate investments before venturing on too large investments in new
production facilities\. Possibly due to their uncertain confidence on the
benefits of such additional investments in these plants and the inherent
difficulties in adequately preparing such projects, there has been hesitation
in supporting a substantial rehabilitation program in the fertilizer
production sector\. IDA played a major role in the preparation of the project
and in getting all-round support for it\. The benefits of such a project to
the Bangladesh economy have already been established through improved
performance and confidence among the sector managers\. It is believed that
this additional confidence will go a long way to achieve quicker commissioning
and improved performance with the newer projects\.
8\.2 As part of the preparation for this project, the GOB and IDA agreed
that it would be advantageous to improve the decision making powers of the
individual plants by spinning them off as individual companies with BCIC still
retaining overall coordination\. This experiment has been partially successful
with the individual plants operating autonomously within agreed targets and
budgets\. However, much more needs to be done to improve corporate management
and decision making\.
8\.3 The Government had agreed to a product pricing arrangement which
would require the Government periodically to review and set individual ex-
factory prices based on costs of production plus an appropriate return on
capital\. Under a USAID project, it was agreed that ex-factory fertilizer
pricing would be based on average costs plus 4\.75% return on capital employed\.
a/ See Bangladesh, Fertilizer Paper Review, IBRD Report No\. 7145-BD,
August 31, 1988, para\. 4\.22\.
- 27 -
Based on subsequent rethinking and discussions, the Government is now moving
ex-factory fertilizer prices to border prices and carrying out restructuring
of the capital base as appropriate\. However, actual movement in this
direction has been slower than desirable\. IDA has endorsed this move toward
nonsubsidized, market-oriented pricing in the recent Fertilizer Sector Report
on Bangladesh\.
8\.4 Sharing the concern for providing the sector with well-trained and
experienced staff, the Government is implementing a program for setting up a
large national training center to cater to the needs of the entire chemical
and related industries\. However, this component was dropped from the IDA
project due to excessive delays and is now being implemented through Dutch
aid\.
IX\. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED
9\.1 The economic benefits are considerably less than envisaged at the
time of appraisal\. The project experienced considerable implementation
delays, and there were significant changes in project scope\. But the project
has succeeded in achieving the objective of improving the overall performance
and efficiency of the plants at Fenchuganj, Chorasal and TSP Complex\. There
was a longer delay in the implementation of the training component mainly due
to the desire of the Government to have a larger center and the wish to
finance it with grant funds\. The compan%/BCIC staff gained considerable
confidence by undertaking direct responsibility for project execution using
consultant support where appropriate\. They also became conversant with
international practices in design, engineering, procurement and project
management\.
Lessons Learned
9\.2 Major lessons learned during the implementation of the Fertilizer
Industry Rehabilitation Project are:
(a) For successful implementation, such a project requires efficient
decision making by both the Government and the project entity so
that there are minimum delays in the required approvals\.
(b) The difficulties in preparing and implementing a rehabilitation
project should be fully recognized, and appropriate consultants
should be in place before the commencement of each component\.
(c) The extent of such external help to be used for successful
project implementation should be identified during project
preparation and this help should be available to the project
without further constraints\.
(d) Substantial delays between project identification and
implementation could result in significant scope changes since
the actual rehabilitation needs can change over time due to
changing prices and technology\. Both the project entities and
the financing institutions should recognize this situation and
28 -
allow much more flexibility in scope and implementation schedule
in their plans and procedures\.
(e) Since the projects are best implemented during scheduled
shutdowns so as to minimize losses in production, the
implementation schedules are likely to be somewhat stretched out
and there is need for more careful scheduling\.
(f) There could be delays in the implementation of such
rehabilitation projects if the senior company managers are busy
with other larger projects--as in this case with the Ashuganj
and Chittagong Urea projects\. This workload should be provided
for in structuring the project implementation organization\.
BANGALDESH
FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REHABILITATION PROJECT
Plant Improvement Component - Capital Cost Estimate
(in million US Dollars)
Ghorasal ChittagonR FenchuRani Project
zocai roreigzi iota± 0OcaiL=oreign rotar LrocaL roreign TotaL \.ocaJ coreign Wotaja
A\. SAR Cost Estimate
Equipment ana suppiies - 7\.31 7\.31 - 6\.46 6\.46 - 2\.10 2\.10 - 15\.87 15\.87
Freight and Insurance 0\.07 0\.73 0\.80 0\.06 0\.65 0\.71 0\.02 0\.21 0\.23 0\.15 1\.59 1\.74
Taxes and Duties 1\.62 - 1\.62 1\.43 - 1\.43 0\.47 - 0\.47 3\.52 - 3\.52
Inland Handling 0\.41 - 0\.41 0\.04 - 0\.04 0\.10 - 0\.10 0\.55 - 0\.55
Foundation and Structures 0\.39 - 0\.39 1\.00 - 1\.00 0\.05 - 0\.05 1\.44 - 1\.44
Erection 0\.52 - 0\.52 0\.45 - 0\.45 0\.16 - 0\.16 1\.13 - 1\.13
Engineering and Management 0\.64 0\.82 1\.46 0\.20 0\.30 0\.50 0\.05 - 0\.05 0\.89 1\.12 2\.01
Base Cost Estimate (BCE) 3\.65 8\.86 12\.51 3\.18 7\.41 10\.59 0\.85 2\.31 3\.16 7\.68 18\.58 26\.26
Physical Contingenc 0\.55 1\.33 1\.88 0\.47 1\.11 1\.58 0\.13 0\.35 0\.46 1\.15 2\.79 3\.94
Price Ecalation 0\.60 1\.46 2\.06 0\.52 1\.21 1\.73 0\.14 0\.38 0\.52 1\.26 3\.05 4\.31
(14\.32 of BCE + PC)
Total Proiect Cost 4\.80 11\.65 16\.46 4\.17 9\.73 13\.90 1\.12 3\.04 4\.16 10\.09 24\.42 34\.51
Interest during Construction 1\.30 - 1\.30 1\.11 - 1\.11 0\.33 - 0\.33 2\.74 - 2\.74
Financing Required 6\.10 11\.65 17\.75 5\.28 9\.73 15\.01 1\.45 3\.04 4\.49 12\.83 24\.42 37\.25
B\. Actual Cmletion Cost
Equipment ana suppLies 0\.16 13\.22 13\.38 0\.03 13\.57 13\.60 - 2\.12 2\.12 0\.19 28\.91 29\.10
Freiaht and Insurance 0\.42 - 0\.42 0\.19 0\.56 0\.75 0\.13 0\.25 0\.38 00\.24 0\.81 1\.55
an inland handling
Taxes and Duties 1\.12 - 1\.12 2\.13 - 2\.13 0\.30 - 0\.30 3\.55 - 3\.55
Foundation and Structures 0\.70 - 0\.70 1\.49 - 1\.49 - - - 2\.19 - 2\.19
Erection 0\.87 - 0\.87 0\.76 - 0\.76 0\.02 - 0\.02 1\.65 - 1\.65
Engineering and Management 0\.36 2\.54 2\.90 - 0\.38 0\.38 - 0\.04 0\.04 0\.35 2\.96 3\.32
Total Project Cost 3\.62 15\.76 19\.38 4\.61 14\.50 19\.11 0\.44 2\.41 2\.86 8\.67 32\.67 41\.34
Interest during Construction 2\.68 - 2\.68 2\.15 - 2\.15 0\.49 - 0\.49 5\.32 - 5\.32
Financing Required 6\.30 15\.76 22\.06 6\.75 14\.50 21\.25 0\.93 2\.41 3\.35 13\.98 32\.67 46\.65
a-
BANCLADES8
FERTILIZER IRDUSTRY RERADILITATION PRJECT
Estimated Capital Cost by Project Component
(in USS million)
Revised eatlmte Revised estimate
Anpraisal estimate tFebruary 1982) tJanuarv 1984) Actual
Project component Local Foreitn Total Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Local Forelgn Total
Plant improvement
Ghorasal 6\.1 11\.7 17\.9 6\.9 15\.9 22\.8 6\.0 17\.5 23\.5 6\.3 15\.8 22\.1
Chittagong 5\.3 9\.7 15\.0 5\.7 9\.5 15\.2 5\.4 10\.2 15\.6 6\.8 14\.5 21\.3
Fenchuganj 1\.5 3\.0 4\.5 1\.0 3\.0 4\.0 0\.8 3\.1 3\.9 0\.9 2\.4 3\.4
Subtotal 12\.9 24\.4 37\.3 13\.6 28\.4 42\.0 12\.2 30\.8 43\.0 14\.0 32\.7 46\.7
Training 0\.9 0\.1 1\.0 2\.6 2\.3 4\.9 6\.0 3\.4 9\.4 0\.6 - 0\.6
Spares, catalysts,
4 chemlcals - 8\.3 8\.3 - 8\.3 8\.3 - 8\.3 8\.3 - 4\.2 4\.2
Total Financins
Reauired 13\.8 32\.8 46\.1616\.2 39\.0 5\.2 182 42\.5 60\.7 14\.6 36\.9 51\.5
BANGLADuESH
FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REURBILITATIOE PROJECS
Flnaneikit-Plan
(in US$ million)
Revised estimate Revised estimate
Aooraisal estimate tlebruarv 1982) Januarv 1984) Actual
Project component Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Local Forelgn Total
Plant Imrovement
GOB 12\.9 - 12\.9 11\.2 - 11\.2 12\.2 - 12\.2 11\.6 - 11\.6
Dutch assistance
to GOB - 4\.7 4\.7 - 6\.1 6\.1 - 6\.1 6\.1 - 5\.6 5\.6
IDA-FIRP - 19\.7 19\.7 2\.4 22\.3 24\.7 - 24\.7 24\.7 - 22\.1 22\.1
Other sources - - - - - - - - - 2\.1 5\.3 /_ 7\.4
Subtotal 12\.9 24\.4 37\.3 13\.6 28\.4 4240 12\.2 30\.8 43\.0 13\.7 33\.0 46\.7
Trainina
IDA-FIR? - 1\.0 1\.0 - 1\.0 1\.0 - 1\.0 1\.0 - 0\.6 0\.6
Other sources - - - 2\.6 1\.3 3\.9 6\.0 2\.4 8\.4 - - -
Subtotal 1\.0 1\.0 2\.6 &2 4\.9 6\.0 \.4 \.4 0\.6 0\.6
Spares\. Catalysts\.
and Chemicals
IDA-FIRP - 8\.3 8\.3 - 3\.3 3\.3 - 3\.3 3\.3 - 0\.8 0\.8
IDA-lOth Import
Credit - - - - 5\.0 5\.0 - 5\.0 5\.0 - 3\.3 3\.3
Subtotal - 8\.3 8\. 8\.3 8\.3 _ 8\.3 8\.3 _ 4\.2 4\.2
Total Financinst
Reauired 12\.9 33\.7 46\.6 16\.2 39\.0 55\.2 18\.2 42\.5 60\.7 13\.7 37\.8 51\.
La Includes funds from UK Commodity Grant (US$4\.7 million equivalent)\.
BMANLADESEl
FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REHABILITATION PROJECT
Actual Pinncina Plan
(In million US Dollars)
Ghorasal Chittagong Fenchucani Proiect
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
I\. Plant Improvement Component
Eauitv
Government of Bangladesh 4\.8 - 4\.8 5\.7 - 5\.7 1\.1 - 1\.1 11\.6 - 11\.6
Other 1\.0 - 1\.0 0\.4 4\.7 5\.1 - - - 1\.4 4\.7 6\.1
Subtotal 6\.1 7 10\.8 L_1 1\.1 13\.0 47 17\.7
Debt
Dutch Assistance to Government - - - - 5\.6 5\.6 - - - - 5\.6 5\.6
IDA Credit to Government la - 16\.3 16\.3 - 4\.2 4\.2 - 1\.7 1\.7 - 22\.1 22\.1
Other - - - 0\.7 - 0\.7 - 0\.6 0\.6 0\.7 0\.6 1\.3
Subtotal _ 16\.3 16\.3 0\.7 9\.8 10\.5 _ 2,3 2\.3 0\.7 28\.3 29\.0
Total Financins 5\.8 16\.3 22\.1 6\.8 14\.5 21\.3 1\.1 2 3\.4 13\.7 33\.0 46\.7
II\. Training Component
IDA Credit to Government /La - 0\.6 0\.6 - - - - - - - 0\.6 0\.6
III\. Spares, Catalyst and Chemical
Component
IDA Credit to Government a - 1\.9 1\.9 - 1\.5 1\.5 - 0\.8 0\.8 - 4\.2 4\.2
Total Financint 5\.8 18\.8 24\.6 6\.8 16\.0 22\.8 1\.1 31_ 4\. 13\.7 37\.8 51\.5
La Includes supplemental financing of Tenth Import Credit (Ln 1540-1BD) of US$3\.3 million\.
- 33 -
ANNEX 2
BANGLADESH
FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REHABILITATION PROJECT
IDA Credit (1023-BD) Disbursement Schedule
Cumulative
disbursement (USS millior\.) Ratios\. as gercent
Calendar Appraisal Reappraisal Actual/ Actual/
year Quarter estimate (January 1984) Actual reappraisal credit
1980 3 0\.3
4 0\.7
1981 1 4\.3
2 8\.1
3 12\.6
4 17\.9
1982 1 22\.4 0\.2 0\.2 100 1
2 26\.6 1\.8 1\.8 100 6
3 27\.6 2\.2 2\.2 100 8
4 28\.4 2\.6 2\.6 100 9
1983 1 28\.9 2\.9 2\.9 100 10
2 29\.0 5\.4 5\.4 100 19
3 5\.9 5\.9 100 20
4 8\.4 6\.1 73 21
1984 1 12\.9 6\.6 51 23
2 18\.4 7\.8 42 27
3 22\.4 11\.4 51 39
4 24\.9 14\.0 56 48
1985 1 26\.7 17\.1 64 59
2 28\.2 20\.4 72 70
3 28\.7 20\.7 72 71
4 29\.0 21\.4 74 74
1986 1 22\.6 78 78
2 23\.1 80 80
3 23\.3 80 80
4 23\.4 81 81
SANGLADESN
FEtTILIZER INDUSTRY REEABILITAIT0O_ PROJECT
Pro iect Imolementation Schedule
(Schedule: S8R Actual____
198 1981 193 198 1984 1985 1986 1987 198
Subproject Implementation Stage 1 23 4 12 34 12 3 4123 4 123 4 12 34 1 234 12 3 41 23 4
Engineering ------
Ghorasal Procurement ----___________________________
Urea Plant Erection --------________________
Completion--
Training Center-----------
Engineering -----
Chittagong Procurement------
TSP Plant Erection------
Completion --
Engineering_________ _____
Fenchuganj Procurement ------------__________________
Urea Plant Erection _________________
Completion
- 35 - ANNEX 4-1
Page 1 of 2
BANGLADESH
FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REHABILITATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1023-BD)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Assumptions for Economic and Financial Rate of Return
1\. The financial price of natural gas is Tk 28\.5 per Mscft, and the economic
price of natural gas is assumed to be Tk 35 per Mscft as the long-run
marginal cost in Bangladesh\.
2\. Local variable costs are converted to September 1988 prices and assumed
to remain constant in 1988 terms\.
3\. The plant facilities are assumed to operate for seven years after 1988\.
Estimated production rate is 140,000 tons per year (tpy) for Chittagong
TSP plant and 310,000 tpy for Ghorasal plant\. Production of TSP at
Chittagong is assumed to be 50? by own phosphoric acid and 50? by
imported acid\.
4\. Economic costs of imported raw materials for TSP, sulfur, phosphate rock
and phosphoric acid (542 P205) are assumed as US$130/ton, US$60/ton and
US$232/ton, respectively\.
5\. Economic prices of urea and TSP are based on the Bank's projected inter-
national urea prices and TSP prices\. FOB price of urea (bagged Europe in
constant 1988 USS) is projected to change from the 1988 level of US$148/
ton to US$169/ton in 1989, US$213/ton in 1990 and US$198/ton in 1995\.
- 36 -
ANNEX 4-1
Page 2 of 2
Deducted from FOB prices an inland transportation costs (US$5/ton), thus
the economic prices of urea in 1988 terms is US$143 in 1988\. US$164 in
1989, US$208 in 1990 and US$193 in 1995\. FOB prices of TSP (bulk, US
gulf in constant 1988 US$) is projected to change from the 1988 level of
US$157/ton to US$153/ton in 1989, US$172/ton in 1990 and US$194/ton in
1995\. Added to the FOB price are sea freight (US$35/ton), bagging costs
(US$15/ton) and port handling and unloading charges (US$10/ton)\. The
economic price of TSP thus calculated at 1988 terms is US$217/ton in
1988, US$213 in 1989, US$232 in 1990 and US$254 in 1995\.
37 - ANNEX 4-2
Page 1 of 2
BANGLADESH - FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REHABILITATION PROJECT
Ghorasal Rehabilitation Project
Cost & Benefit Stream for Financial Rate of Return
(In constant 1988 US$ million)
Years Capital Output Variable Net
Cost Value Costs Benefits
1981/82 0\.13 -0\.13
1982/83 3\.39 -3\.39
1983/84 1\.54 -1\.54
1984/85 9\.52 -9\.52
1985/86 3\.45 5\.86 2\.89 -0\.95
1986/87 1\.38 6\.45 3\.65 1\.21
1987/88 5\.34 2\.86 2\.48
1988/89 6\.43 3\.53 2\.9
1989/90 6\.43 3\.53 2\.9
1990/91 6\.43 3\.53 2\.9
1991/92 6\.43 3\.53 2\.9
1992/93 6\.43 3\.53 2\.9
1993/94 6\.43 3\.53 2\.9
1994/95 6\.43 3\.53 2\.9
Financial Rate of Return 6\.7%
- 38 - ANNEX 4-2
Page 2 of 2
BANGLADESH - FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REHABILITATION PROJECT
Chittagong TSP Rehabilitation Project
Cost & Benefit Stream for Financial Rate of Return
(In constant 1988 US$ million)
Years Capital Output Variable Net
Cost Value Costs Benefits
1981/82 1\.57 -1\.57
1982/83 2\.47 -2\.47
1983/84 0\.54 -0\.54
1984/85 2\.78 -2\.78
1985/86 3\.74 2\.58 1\.91 -3\.07
1986/87 2\.59 10\.61 8\.22 -0\.2
1987/88 5\.42 6\.18 4\.55 -3\.79
1988/89 12\.33 8\.82 3\.51
1989/90 12\.33 8\.82 3\.51
1990/91 12\.33 8\.82 3\.51
1991/92 12\.33 8\.82 3\.51
1992/93 12\.33 8\.82 3\.51
1993/94 12\.33 8\.82 3\.51
1994/95 12\.33 8\.82 3\.51
Financial Rate of Return 8\.37%
-39 - ANNEX 5-1
Page 1 of 2
BMGLADESH
FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REHABILITATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1023-BD)
PROJECT COMPLETION MEPOMT
Urea Fertilizer Factors Ltd\. (UPPL):
Income Statement and Balance Sheet
(Tk million)
Year ending 6/30 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88
(est\.)
Sales revenue 757\.8 719\.8 981\.8
CosL of goods sold 539\.3 743\.6 853\.4
Gross profit 218\.5 174\.2 128\.3
Operating expenses 71\.5 68\.1 71\.5
Operating profit 147\.0 106\.1 56\.8
Other income 43\.8 42\.2 61\.0
Nonoperating expenses 16\.0 52\.7 69\.5
Net profit before tax 166\.5 91\.0 46\.1
Taxes 21\.9 22\.4 33\.5
Not profit 144\.6 68\.6 12\.5
Current Assets
Cash and bank 11 13 3
Accounts receivable 1,054 1,289 1,289
Stocks 542 510 440
Advances and deposits 617 647 664
Subtotal 2\.224 2\.459 2\.596
Net fixed assets 1,781 2,208 2,104
Deferred expenses 100 14 59
Investments 58 8 29
total assets 4\.162 4\.688 4\.788
- 40-
ANNEX 5-1
Page 2 of 2
Year ending 6/30 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88
(est\.)
Current Liabilities
Accounts payable 150 168 216
Short-term loans 42 162 196
Other 580 606 637
Subtotal 72 937 1\.049
Long-term liabilities
Long-term loans 2,212 2,549 2,549
Other 55 40 40
Subtotal 2\.267 2\.589 2\.589
Equity
Share capital 414 414 414
Reserves and surplus 709 748 736
Subtotal 1\.123 1\.162 1\.149
Total Liabilities 4\.162 4\.688 \.4788
Current ratio 2\.8:1 2\.6:1 2\.5:1
Debt/equity 67:33 69:31 69:31
- 41
ANNEX 5-2
Page 1 -of 2-
BANGIADE$H
FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REHAIBILITATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1023-BD)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Natural Gas Fertilizer Factory Ltd\. (NGFF)s
Income Statement and Balance Sheet
(Tk million)
Year ending 6/30 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88
Sales revenue 371\.4 422\.1 472\.8
Cost of goods sold 269\.0 310\.4 397\.9
Gross profit 102\.4 111\.7 74\.9
Operating expenses 35\.5 42\.9 32\.8
Operating profit 66\.9 688 42\.1
Other income 26\.4 26\.5 33\.0
Nonoperating expenses 55\.8 67\.6 66\.0
Net profit before tax \. 28 8\.
Tax 6\.9 2\.6 2\.8
Net gro,fit 28\.8 23\.8 6\.0
Current Assets
Cash and bank accounts 6 8 8
Accounts receivable 679 764 974
Stocks 234 284 235
Advances and deposits 106 111 118
Subtotal 1\.025 1\.167 1\.335
Net fixed assets 578 635 576
Deferred expenses 18 9 6
Investments 14 18 14
Total Assets 1\.635 1\.829 1\.931
- 42 -
ANNEX 5-2
Page 2 o- 2
Year ending 6/30 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88
Current Liabilities
Accounts payable 61 337 516
Short-term loans 290 102 23
Other 75 77 80
Subtotal 425 516 619
Long-term Liabilities
Lonb-term loans 711 826 825
Other 32 121 9
Subtotal 743 838 f834
Eguity
Share capital 152 253 253
Reserves and surplus 315 223 227
Subtotal 467 476 479
Total liabilities 1\.635 1\.829 1\.931
Current ratio 2\.4:1 2\.3:1 2\.2:1
Debt/equity 61:39 64:36 64:36
-43- ANNEX 5-3
Page 1 of 2
BANGLADRSH
FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REHABILITATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1023-BD)
PROJEGT COMPLETION REPORT
Triple Phosphate Complex Ltd\. (TSP Complex)s
Income Statement and Balance Sheet
(Tk million)
Year ending 6/30 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88
(est\.)
Sales income 655\.4 921\.9 959\.2
Cost of goods sold 596\.5 793\.5 877\.1
Gross profit 58\.9 128\.5 A2\.
Operating expenses 43\.5 55\.8 47\.3
Operating profit 15\.4 72\.7 34\.8
Other income 2\.7 5\.5 54\.7
Nonoperating expenses 28\.6 54\.6 64\.3
Net profit before tax &10\.4) 22\.5 24\.0
Tax - --
Net profit (10\.4) 22\.5 24\.0
Current Assets
Cash and bank accounts 15 17 11
Accounts receivable 352 771 549
Stocks 461 441 371
Advances and deposits 5 4 5
Subtotal 833 1\.233 936
Net fixed assets 335 444 409
Deferred expenses 26 5 --
Total assets 1,257 1\.816 1\.483
- 44 - ANNEX 5-3
Page 2 of 2
Year ending 6/30 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88
(est\.)
Current Liabilities
Accounts payable 672 815 627
Short-term loans 47 350 178
Other
Subtotal 719 1\.165 805
Long-term Liabilities
Long-term loans \.:97 586 580
Other 40 41 50
Subtotal 537 627 630
Equity
Share capital 100 100 100
Reserves and surplus (98) (76) (52)
Subtotal 2 24 48
Total liabilities 1\.257 1\.816 1\.483
Current ratio 1\.2:1 1\.1:1 1\.2:1
Debt/equity 100:0 96:4 93:7
- 45 -
ANNEX 5-4
Page 1 of 2
BANGLADES
FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REHABILITATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1023-BD)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation (BCIC):
Income Statement and Balance Sheet
(Tk million)
Year ending 6/30 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87
Sales income 6,649 7,465 8,331
Cost of goods sold 5,585 6,355 7,326
Gross profit 1\.065 1\.110 1\.006
Operating expenses 382 497 550
Operating profit 682 613 455
Other income 200 353 403
Nonoperating expenses 701 784 893
Net profit before tax 1 155 (55)
Tax 26 50 32
Net profit after tax 135 105 (86)
Current Assets
Cash and bank 2,141 2,267 3,135
Accounts receivable 3,237 3,690 4,845
Stocks 3,705 4,483 4,851
Advances and deposits 1,233 1,265 1,295
Subtotal 13\.316 11\.705 14\.126
Net fixed assets 13,182 14,737 17,824
Deferred expenses 290 321 60
Investments 486 701 350
Total Assets 24\.274 273464 32\.360
- 46 - ANNEX 5-4
Page 2 of 2
Year ending 6/30 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87
Current Liabilities
Accounts payable 3,339 3,428 4,363
Short-term loans 2,851 3,137 4,093
Other 828 867 882
Subtotal 7\.081 7I432 9\.338
Long-term Liabilities
Long-term loans 11,485 14,173 16,331
Other 864 947 1,234
Subtotal 12\.349 15\.120 17\.565
Share capital 4,311 4,816 5,529
Reserves and surplus 597 96 (72)
Subtotal 4\.908 4\.912 5\.457
Total Liabilities 24\.274 27\.464 32\.360
- 47 -
ANNEX 6-1
Page 1 of 2
Ghorasal Rehabilitation Project
Cost & Benefit Stream for Economic Rate of Return
(In constant 1988 US$ million)
Years Capital Output Variable Net
Cost Value Costs Benefits
1981/82 0\.13 -0\.13
1982/83 3\.39 -3\.39
1983/84 1\.33 -1\.33
1984/85 9\.24 -9\.24
1985/86 3\.14 4\.93 2\.43 -0\.64
1986/87 1\.24 5\.96 3\.37 1\.35
1987/88 7\.01 3\.2 3\.81
1988/89 9\.56 3\.85 5\.71
1989/90 12\.27 3\.85 8\.42
1990/91 12\.27 3\.85 8\.42
1991/92 12\.27 3\.85 8\.42
1992/91 12\.27 3\.85 8\.42
1993/94 12\.27 3\.85 8\.42
1994/95 1L39 3\.85 7\.54
Economic Rate of Return 22\.9%
- 48 -
ANNEX 6-1
Page 2 of 2
BANGLADESH - FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REHABILITATION PROJECT
Chittagong TSP Rehabilitation Project
Cost & Benefit Stream for Economic Rate of Return
(In constant 1988 US$ million)
Years Capital Output Variable Net
Cost Value Costs Benefits
1981/82 1\.4 -1\.4
1982/83 2\.2 -2\.2
1983/84 0\.48 -0\.48
1984/85 2\.47 -2\.47
1985/86 3\.32 2\.58 1\.91 -2\.65
1986/87 2\.3 10\.61 8\.22 0\.09
1987/88 4\.82 6\.34 4\.55 -3\.03
1988/89 11\.15 8\.99 2\.16
1989/90 12\.09 9 3\.09
1990/91 12\.09 9 3\.09
1991/92 12\.09 9 3\.09
1992/93 12\.09 9 3\.09
1993/94 12\.09 9 3\.09
1994/95 13\.17 9\.2 3\.97
Economic Rate of Return 8\.5%
- 49 - ~~~~~ANNE 6-2
BANGLADESH
FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REHABILITATION PROJECT
Foreign Exchange Benefit
(In constant 1988 US$ million)
Gross foreign Materials & other Savings before
exchange saved direct costs debt service
1985/86 8\.93 2\.19 6\.74
1986/87 17\.93 6\.30 11\.63
1987/88 13\.35 3\.36 9\.99
1988/89 20\.71 8\.54 12\.17
1989/90 24\.36 8\.64 15\.72
1990/91 24\.36 8\.64 15\.72
1991/92 24\.36 8\.64 15\.72
1992/93 24\.36 8\.64 15\.72
1993/94 24\.36 8\.64 15\.72
1994/95 25\.44 8\.84 16\.60
(135\.73)
- 50 -
ANNEX 7-1
BANGLADESH
FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REHABILITATION PROJECT
Fertilizer Consumption
('000 MT)
Urea TSP Potash Other Total
1979/80 542 209 47 101 852
1980/81 560 215 45 100 875
1981/82 519 208 45 58 830
1982/83 629 206 50 83 968
1983/84 708 261 63 97 1,129
1984/85 832 346 69 12 1,259
1985/86 795 297 60 4 1,156
1986/87 915 336 66 4 1,321
1987/88 1,029 390 86 9 1,514
Source: BADC\.
- 51 -
ANNEX 7-2
BANGLADSH
FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REHABILITATION PROJECT
Fertilizer Imports
('000 MT)
Urea TSP Potash Other Total
1979/80 287 173 60 - 573
1980/81 64 194 42 - 356
1981/82 254 147 26 - 464
1982/83 43 135 44 - 303
1983/84 94 124 60 - 357
1984/85 171 408 73 - 667
1985/86 196 351 87 - 635
1986/87 - 93 47 - 152
1987/88 - 191 83 - 276
Source: BADC\.
-52 -
ANNE 7-3
BANGLSESH
FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REHaBILITATION PROJECT
Fertilizgr Production
('000 MT)
Ammonium
Urea TSP sulfate Total
1979/80 355 66 9 430
1980/81 336 70 9 415
1981/82 409 58 11 478
1982/83 508 69 12 589
1983/84 724 81 11 816
1984/85 742 55 10 807
198\./86 841 101 10 952
1986/87 846 138 9 992
1987/88 1,286 117 6 1,409
Source: BCIC\.
- 53 -
ANNEX 7-4
BANGLAESH
FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REHABILITATION\.PROJECT
Fertilizer Factory Production Performance
('000 MT)
- Production -----------------------
Plant Capacity 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88
Fenchuganj 106 88 95 80 112 104
Chorasal 340 257 232 307 318 312
Ashuganj 528 379 415 425 337 493
Polash 95 - - 29 80 95
Chittagong Urea 561 - - - - 281
Chittagong TSP 152 81 55 101 136 117
- 54 -
ANNEX 8
BANGLADESH
PERTLIZER INDUSTRY REHABILITATION PROJECT
UFFL (Ghorasal) Project Manaaement Organization
rExecutive Director|
Manager Manager Manager Nanager Manager
Production Engr\. Engr\. Admin\. Account
Machinery &Power &
Construction Maintenance
NGFF (Fenchugani) Project Management Organization
TGeneral Managerc
Chief Admin\.l |Controller| |Chief Operator | he Chief Mech\.|
-M-anager M lanager E8ner Engineer
TSP Completer (Chittagong) Project ManaRtement Organization
Managing Director
Chief Admin\. Chief | Chiief Chief Operation| Che
Manager Accountantl Engineer Manager l Chemls
- 55 -
ANNEX 9
hANGLADESH
FERTILIZER INDUSTRY REHABILITATION PROJECT
IDA Financed Procurement of Foreign Goods and Services
Amount Percentage
(US$ million)
Equipment, Materials, Spar Parts
Engineering & Consultants' Services 23\.40 100\.0
Japan 18\.06 77\.2
Denmark 1\.92 8\.2
Netherlands 0\.66 2\.8
Korea 0\.54 2\.3
Switzerland 0\.43 1\.8
U\.K\. 0\.37 1\.6
Austria 0\.34 1\.4
France 0\.32 1\.3
West Germany 0\.31 1\.3
USA 0\.22 0\.9
Belgium 0\.16 0\.7
Singapore 0\.05 0\.2
Italy 0\.02 0\.1
_ _ _~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
0r or too ATTACHMENT
57 - ~~~~Page 1 o-f 4
Froms- £\. Kamaludding btrunA ResoufSS 4WOU
Deputy Secretary inishty of PXlamning
Shw-w9angla Nagw
Dhaka
Comments Received from the Government
D\.4z\.IDA-I;I/Ind-7/86(Vol IV)/id3 Dab\.October 4 ! 989\.
DO\. No\. \.Iv)/id?, ~~~~~~~~,\.1989\.
Dear Mr\. van Gigch,
Fertilizer Industry Rehabilitation Project
(Credit No\.1023-BD)\.
Chittagong Urea Fertilizer Projeot(Cr,No\.1204-BD)
Project Completion Report\.
In continution of our letter of September 14, 1989
on the above mentioned credits$ I am pleased to forward
herewith a copy of comments of Ministry of Industries and
Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation on the above
mentioned project completion reports\.
You are kindly requested to despatch the comments to
IDA's Head Quarter's\.Vashingtont at your earliest convenience\.
With best regards,
Yours since
( £4\. Kszaatdin
Mr\. Francis van Gigch, / _
Chief of Mitsion,
World Bank Resident Mission
in Bangladechs
3/A, Paribagh,
Dhakae
59 ATTACHMENT
Page 2 of 4
Govt\. of the P ople's Republic of Bangladesh
juinltry of Industries
Bhilp Bhbab
SubjectsProject Completion Report ( POR ) on Fortiliser Industry
Rebabilitatlon Project (Or\. 1023-3D )
And
Chittagong Urea Pertiliser Project (Cr\. 1204)\.
Mhe Projeot Completion Report prepared by the World Bank
on the above projects were examed by the Minietry of Induat*ies\.!be
comments of the Ministry of Industries on the relevant pwtlon of
POR a are given below s-
A\. Pertiliser Industry Rehabilitation Project OPP)\.
(C) trice of Urea Pertiliser
2he uniform ex-feotory price of urea has been fixed for all
factories at fT\. 4025/ MYton ewcept for ohittagong urea f6rtiliser
faotory\. A proposal for upward revision of price of urea fertiliser
covering coat of production is under Consideration of the government
of Bangladesh\.
(ii) Debt-equity ratio 14
(a) Urea Pertilizer Company ltd\. Ghorasal\.
A proposal has been submitted to the Mnistry of Finanoe for
converting foreign loan amounting to fk\. 713\.60 million iAto equity
so that the debt-equity ratio of the Company beooome 60:40\. hibs
Proposal li under oansideration cia the Ministry of ltnAdmsio
(b) Naturl gas fertiliser fectorytPenohagonj\.
2he ZnLstry of Planoe has given conourrenee to a proposal
submitted by the Ministry of Industries to oonvertf foreign loan
amonting Tl\. 255,70 Million lA to equity\. low the debt equity ratio
of the factory Is 60:40
cOoAtG\.P/2
- 60 - ATTACHMENT
Page 3 of 4
(o) !SP Compwa Ltd\. Chititaong
A Proposal has been made to the Minitrzy of PFnan e to
convert\. \. foreLgn loan amounting Tk\. 602\.10 million into equity
so that the debt equity ratio of the ooapany becomes 60s40\.!hio
proposal is under e mimtion of the Mlidntry of Pionaen
B3 Chittagong Urea Pertiliser ( CUlL )
Government has approved debt equity ratio at 50:50 and
relending rate of interest on foreign loan at 10% instead of usual
debt-equity ratio of 60O40 and prevailing relending rate of 11\.5%
on foreign loan in order to minimioe the lose of the Ooupany\. AB
mentioned above a proposal for upward revision of ex-factory prioe
of urea covering cost of production In under oonsideration of the
#overnment \. The Govembt in also considering other alternatives
to avold recurring loss of the oompany and to meke It a viable one\.
A proposal to oonvert foreign loan amounting Tk\. 3900\.70
Million into equity to make the debt equity ratio 60:40 is under
consideration of the Ministry of Yinanoe \.
ATTACHNT
- 61 - Page 4 of 4
Coments on Urnft Project Completion Report on Fertilzer
Industry i(ehabiliatiozt Project ( Credit 1023 - OD )\.
The draft Project Completion Report on FIRP (CredJit No\. 1023-3D)
prepared by World Bank has been revicaed and our comments aro given helow s
1\. Financial and Economic Rate of Return s
In calculating tile FIPR & EIRR in the draft PCB of the World Dank
the assumptions made were realistic\. The cumulative licremental production
was, however considered from 1988 to 1995, which resulted tn poor finan-
cil and economic rate of returns\. It should be from 1983 to 1995 since
DCIC started acruing the benefits of FlRP from 1983\.
2\. Sustainability of Rehabilitated Project :
Sustainability predicted in the draft PCR of World Daik may not
r6flect the actual situation, as the prgdiction was made on the basis of
low FIRR & EIRR calculated for 1988-1995 productive years instead of
1983 to 1995 production-years as mentioned earlier\.
Furtler, taking Into account the present trend of development
towards more economic and efficient management of various enterprises
under BCIC and based on custilative experiences of operating sophisticated
fertilizer industries In this part of the world, there are definite
reasons to be optimistic In sustaining economic operation of the plant
under discussion\.
3\. GENERAL COMlIENTS s
a) Fencbuganj Fertilizer Factory experienced difficulty in procuring
equipment which ore at present more or less obsolete in natuie\.
This bad appreciable Impact on project completion time\.
b) The objectives,nof all the three improvement projects were
fulfilled after lmplementntion and the benefits derived have been
discussed in details in tle PaR of respective project\.
c) It is worth mentioning here that the problems or plant deffiie-n-
cies, Identified by the in-plant personnel were realistic and as
a result, the achievement after implementation was up to the
desired level\.
4\. CONCLUSION :
We have no other comments to make in the draft PCR\.
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | APPROVAL |
P150351 | Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No: PAD1214
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION
PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT
ON A
PROPOSED CREDIT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 50\.8 MILLION
(US$70 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL
FOR AN
URBAN WATER AND SANITATION PROJECT
May 22, 2015
Water Global Practice
Africa Region
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the
performance of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without
World Bank authorization\.
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective March 31, 2015)
Currency Unit = CFAF
CFAF 580 = US$1
US$1\.3795 = SDR 1
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 â December 31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AFD French Development Agency (Agence Française de Développement)
AfDB African Development Bank
ARMP Procurement Regulatory Authority (Autorité de Régulation des Marchés
Publics)
CCS Steering Committee (Comité de coordination et de suivi)
CESMP Contractor Environmental and Social Management Plan
CFAF CFA Franc
CPS Country Partnership Strategy
DCI Ductile Cast Iron
DEEC Directorate of Environment (Direction de lâEnvironnement et des
Ãtablissements Classés)
DGPRE Directorate of Water Resources Management and Planning (Direction de la
Gestion et de la Planification des Ressources en Eau)
DI Directorate of Investment
DN Diameter
EIB European Investment Bank
EIRR Economique Internal Rate of Return
EMP Environmental Management Plan
ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework
ESMP Environmental and Social Management Plan
ESP Emerging Senegal Plan
FM Financial Management
GoS Government of Senegal
GRS Grievance Redress Service
IDA International Development Agency
IEC Information, Education and Communication
KMS Keur Momar Sarr
LTMC Long-Term Marginal Cost
LTWSP Long-Term Water Sector Project
MDG Millennium Development Goal
MEFP Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning (Ministère de lâÃconomie, des
Finances et du Plan)
ii
MHA Ministry of Water and Sanitation (Ministère de lâHydraulique et de
lâAssainissement)
N/A Not Applicable
NGO Non- Governmental Organization
NPV Net Present Value
OFOR Rural Boreholes Agency (Office des forages ruraux)
ONAS National Sanitation Agency of Senegal (Office National de lâAssainissement du
Sénégal)
ONEA National Water and Sanitation Agency (Office National de lâEau et de
lâAssainissement)
PCU Project Coordination Unit
PDO Project Development Objectives
Pe Lease Contractor Rate (Prix exploitant)
PEPAM Water and Sanitation Millenium Program (Programme dâEau Potable et
dâAssainissement du Millénaire)
PIM Project Implementation Manual
Pp SONES Fee (Prix patrimoine)
PPP Public-Private Partnership
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RAP Resettlement Action Plan
RPF Resettlement Plan Framework
SdE Senegalese Water Utility (Sénégalaise des Eaux)
SDR Special Drawing Rights
SEEN Niger Water Operating Company (Société d'Exploitation des Eaux du Niger)
SOMAGEP Malian Water Operating Company (Société Malienne de Gestion de lâEau
Potable)
SOMAPEP Malian Water Assets Holding Company (Société Malienne de Patrimoine de
lâEau Potable)
SONES National Water Company of Senegal (Société Nationale des Eaux du Sénégal)
SPEN Niger Water Assets Holding Company (Société de Patrimoine des Eaux du
Niger)
WAEMU West Africa Economic and Monetary Union
Regional Vice President: Makhtar Diop
Country Director: Vera Songwe
Sector Global Practice Director: Junaid Kamal Ahmad
Practice Manager: Alexander E\. Bakalian
Task Team Leader: Matar Fall
iii
SENEGAL
SENEGAL: URBAN WATER AND SANITATION PROJECT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PAD DATA SHEET\. vi
A\. Country Context \. 1
II\. STRATEGIC CONTEXT \.1
A\. Sectoral and Institutional Context\. 1
B\. Higher Level Objectives to which the Project Contributes \. 6
III\. PROJECT DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES \.6
A\. PDO\. 6
B\. Project Beneficiaries \. 6
C\. PDO Level Results Indicators \. 7
IV\. PROJECT DESCRIPTION \.7
A\. Project Components \. 7
B\. Project Financing \. 9
C\. Project Cost and Financing \. 9
D\. Lessons Learned and Reflected in the Project Design \. 9
V\. IMPLEMENTATION \.10
A\. Institutional and Implementation Arrangements \. 10
B\. Results Monitoring and Evaluation \. 10
C\. Sustainability\. 11
VI\. KEY RISKS AND MITIGATION MEASURES \.11
A\. Overall Risk Rating and Explanation of Key Risks\. 11
VII\. APPRAISAL SUMMARY \.12
A\. Economic and Financial Analyses \. 12
B\. Technical \. 14
C\. Financial Management \. 14
D\. Procurement \. 15
iv
E\. Social (including Safeguards) \. 16
F\. Environment (including Safeguards) \. 16
G\. Other Safeguards Policies Triggered \. 17
H\. World Bank Grievance Redress \. 17
Annex 1: Results Framework and Monitoring \.18
Annex 2: Detailed Project Description \.23
Annex 3: Implementation Arrangements \.30
Annex 4: Implementation Support Plan \.45
Annex 5: Economic and Financial Analyses\.47
Annex 6: Map IBRD 41643 \.57
v
\.
PAD DATA SHEET
Senegal
Urban Water and Sanitation Project (P150351)
PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT
\.
AFRICA
GWADR
Report No\.: PAD1214
\.
Basic Information
Project ID EA Category Team Leader
P150351 B - Partial Assessment Matar Fall
Lending Instrument Fragile and/or Capacity Constraints [ ]
Investment Project Financing Financial Intermediaries [ ]
Series of Projects [ ]
Project Implementation Start Date Project Implementation End Date
15-June-2015 30-June-2020
Expected Effectiveness Date Expected Closing Date
15-Sept-2015 30-Jun-2020
Joint IFC
No
Practice Senior Global Practice
Country Director Regional Vice President
Manager/Manager Director
Alexander Bakalian Junaid Kamal Ahmad Vera Songwe Makhtar Diop
\.
Borrower: Republic of Senegal
Responsible Agency: Programme Eau Potable et Assainissement pour le Millénaire (PEPAM)
Contact: Amadou Diallo Title: Coordinator
Telephone No\.: 221338590499 Email: projeau@gmail\.com
Responsible Agency: Office National de lâAssainissement du Sénégal (ONAS)
Contact: Alioune Badara Diop Title: General Manager
Telephone No\.: 221338593535 Email: abdiop@onas\.sn
Responsible Agency: Société Nationale des Eaux du Sénégal (SONES)
Contact: Charles Fall Title: General Manager
vi
Telephone No\.: 221338397800 Email: charles\.fall@sones\.sn
\.
Project Financing Data(in USD Million)
[ ] Loan [ ] IDA Grant [ ] Guarantee
[X] Credit [ ] Grant [ ] Other
Total Project Cost: 70\.00 Total Bank Financing: 70\.00
Financing Gap: 0\.00
\.
Financing Source Amount
BORROWER/RECIPIENT 0\.00
International Development Association (IDA) 70\.00
Total 70\.00
\.
Expected Disbursements (in USD Million)
Fiscal 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Year
Annual 0\.00 3\.50 7\.00 14\.00 22\.00 23\.50
Cumulati 0\.00 3\.50 10\.50 24\.50 46\.50 70\.00
ve
\.
Institutional Data
Practice Area / Cross Cutting Solution Area
Water
Cross Cutting Areas
[ ] Climate Change
[ ] Fragile, Conflict & Violence
[ ] Gender
[ ] Jobs
[X ] Public Private Partnership
Sectors / Climate Change
Sector (Maximum 5 and total % must equal 100)
Major Sector Sector % Adaptation Mitigation Co-
Co-benefits % benefits %
Water, sanitation and flood protection Water Supply 75
Water, sanitation and flood protection Sanitation 25
Total 100
I certify that there is no Adaptation and Mitigation Climate Change Co-benefits information applicable
to this project\.
vii
\.
Themes
Theme (Maximum 5 and total % must equal 100)
Major theme Theme %
Urban development Urban services and housing for the poor 100
Total 100
\.
Proposed Development Objective(s)
The proposed Project Development Objective (PDO) is to improve access to water and sanitation services
in selected urban areas in a financially sustainable manner\.
\.
Components
Component Name Cost (USD Millions)
1\. Water Supply 48\.9
2\. Sanitation 16\.8
3\. Institutional Strengthening and Project Management 4\.3
Total 70\.0
\.
Systematic Operations Risk- Rating Tool (SORT)
Risk Category Rating
1\. Political and Governance Low
2\. Macroeconomic Low
3\. Sector Strategies and Policies Moderate
4\. Technical Design of Project or Program Low
5\. Institutional Capacity for Implementation and Sustainability Low
6\. Fiduciary Moderate
7\. Environment and Social Low
8\. Stakeholders Low
9\. Other
OVERALL Moderate
\.
Compliance
Policy
Does the project depart from the CAS in content or in other significant respects? Yes [ ] No [X]
\.
Does the project require any waivers of Bank policies? Yes [ ] No [X]
Have these been approved by Bank management? Yes [ ] No [ ]
Is approval for any policy waiver sought from the Board? Yes [ ] No [ ]
Does the project meet the Regional criteria for readiness for implementation? Yes [X] No [ ]
\.
viii
Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project Yes No
Environmental Assessment OP/BP 4\.01 X
Natural Habitats OP/BP 4\.04 X
Forests OP/BP 4\.36 X
Pest Management OP 4\.09 X
Physical Cultural Resources OP/BP 4\.11 X
Indigenous Peoples OP/BP 4\.10 X
Involuntary Resettlement OP/BP 4\.12 X
Safety of Dams OP/BP 4\.37 X
Projects on International Waterways OP/BP 7\.50 X
Projects in Disputed Areas OP/BP 7\.60 X
\.
Legal Covenants
Name Recurrent Due Date Frequency
1\. Project Implementation Manual October 15, 2015
Description of Covenant:
The Recipient shall, no later than one (1) month after the Effective Date, prepare, in accordance with terms
of reference acceptable to the Association, and furnish to the Association, a proposed implementation
manual for the Project containing detailed: (a) technical (b) administrative, (c) procurement, (d) financial
and accounting; and (e) monitoring and evaluation procedures and arrangements, for the Project\. Said
manual to further include, inter alia, elaboration of the procedures for developing and implementing
Safeguard Documents\.
2\. Appointment of External Financial January 15, 2016
Auditor for the Project
Description of Covenant:
The Recipient shall, not later than four (4) month after the Effective Date, appoint an external auditor,
whose qualifications and experience and terms of reference shall be acceptable to the Association\.
3\. Financial Equilibrium of the Urban Yes Yearly
Water Supply Sub-Sector
Description of Covenant:
In order to ensure the financial sustainability and maintain the Financial Equilibrium of SONES,
throughout Project implementation, the Recipient shall implement all necessary measures, including, inter
alia, any adjustments in water tariffs in accordance with the Water and Sanitation Law\.
4\. Financial Sustainability of ONAS December 31, 2019
Description of Covenant:
No later than December 31, 2019, the Recipient shall ensure that all measures, including any required
sanitation surcharge revisions in accordance with the Water and Sanitation Law are in place to allow
ONAS to achieve financial sustainability including covering at least 90 percent of its cash operating
expenditures related to sewerage activities\.
\.
ix
Conditions
Source Of Fund Name Type
Description of Condition
Team Composition
Bank Staff
Name Title Specialization Unit
Matar Fall Lead Water and Team Lead GWADR
Sanitation Specialist
Pierre Francois-Xavier E T Consultant E T Consultant GWADR
Boulenger
Charles Delfieux Water Supply and Peer Reviewer GWADR
Sanitation Specialist
Oumar Diallo Senior Water and Senior Water and GWASA
Sanitation Specialist Sanitation Specialist
Aissatou Diallo Senior Finance Officer Disbursement WFALA
Madio Fall Senior Water and Senior Water and GWADR
Sanitation Specialist Sanitation Specialist
Maman-Sani Issa Senior Environmental Senior Environmental GENDR
Specialist Specialist
Pier Francesco Lead Water and Peer Reviewer GWADR
Mantovani Sanitation Specialist
Mouhamed Fadel Ndaw Senior Water and Senior Water and GWASA
Sanitation Specialist Sanitation Specialist
Boury Ndiaye Program Assistant Program Assistant AFCF1
Mountaga Ndiaye Consultant Consultant GGODR
Fatou Fall Samba Financial Management Financial Management GGODR
Officer Officer
Sudipto Sarkar Lead Specialist Peer Reviewer GWADR
Yacouba Konaté Social Development Social Development GSURR
Specialist
Maya Abi Karam Senior Counsel Legal LEGAM
Astou Diaw Ba Senior Program Program Assistant AFCF1
Assistant
Richard Verspyck Consultant Consultant GWADR
Non Bank Staff
Name Title City
x
\.
Locations
Country First Location Planned Actual Comments
Administrative
Division
Senegal Dakar Region Dakar Department X
Senegal Thiès Region Thiès Department X
Mbour Department
Senegal All X Countrywide Social
Connections Program
xi
A\. Country Context
1\. Senegal is a Sub-Saharan African country with a population of 13\.5 million inhabitants, 45
percent of whom live in urban areas\. Senegal aspires to become an emerging middle income
country by 2035\. However, it has been stuck in low-growth equilibrium since 2006, and has not
shared the rapid growth experienced by many other Sub-Saharan African countries over the last
decade\. Compared to the average growth rate of 6 percent for the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa,
growth in Senegal has averaged only 3\.3 percent since 2006\. The countryâs Gross Domestic
Product growth in 2013 was approximately 3 percent due in part to poor cereal harvests and low
production rates in mining and industry\. Currently, construction and the services sectors are the
main drivers of economic growth\. The most recent estimate of the country's poverty index is 46\.7
percent\. Poverty declined slightly over the last five years, but achievement of the first Millennium
Development Goal (MDG) on halving poverty by 2015 is fast becoming a distant prospect\.
2\. Following the implementation of two generations of Poverty Reduction Strategies between
2003 and 2010, Senegal adopted a National Economic and Social Development Strategy in
November 2012 that serves as the consensual coordination framework for public action\. This
strategy is rooted in the vision of the Emerging Senegal Plan (ESP) to achieve economic
emergence by 2035\. Apart from economic growth and governance framework improvements, the
ESP's key focus areas are to achieve a quantum leap in the living conditions of the people,
minimize social inequalities while preserving the resource base and fostering the emergence of
viable regions\. Achieving this vision will require the implementation of a major investment
program with high added value that can trigger a cycle of strong and steady growth\. Economic
performance is expected to improve in 2014 with a growth rate of 4\.5 percent and Senegalese
authorities have high expectations for growth in the coming years, predicting rates of 6\.7 percent
in 2015 and 8 percent by 2017\.
II\. STRATEGIC CONTEXT
A\. Sectoral and Institutional Context
Institutional and Legal Setting
3\. The provision of water supply and sanitation services in Senegal is governed by a
comprehensive legal and contractual framework\. The Water and Sanitation Law (Loi portant
organisation du service public dâeau potable et dâassainissement des eaux usées domestiques) of
September 24, 2008, defines the responsibilities for managing urban and rural water and sanitation
services as well as the principles for delivering services, delegating responsibilities (including to
private entities), monitoring and controlling the delivery of services and cost recovery of services\.
4\. The urban water and sanitation sector reform launched in 1996 helped establish a well
performing institutional framework with: (i) the creation of the National Water Company of
Senegal (SONES), a public holding company in charge of managing the urban water assets and
developing urban water services under a concession agreement with the Government of Senegal
(GoS); (ii) the recruitment of a private operator, the Senegalese Water Utility (SdE), to operate the
urban water facilities and deliver water services under a performance-based lease agreement; and
(iii) the establishment of the National Sanitation Agency of Senegal (Office National de
1
lâAssainissement du Sénégal, ONAS), a parastatal in charge of managing urban sanitation\. SONES
and ONAS have also entered into performance contracts with the GoS represented by the Ministry
of Water and Sanitation (Ministère de lâHydraulique et de lâAssainissement, MHA) and the
Ministry in charge of Finance (Ministère de lâÃconomie, des Finances et du Plan, MEFP)\.
5\. In 2005, the Government adopted a Water and Sanitation Sector Policy Letter which set out
the strategy to achieve the water and sanitation MDGs by 2015, and established the unified
framework of the Water and Sanitation Millenium Program (Programme dâEau potable et
dâAssainissement du Millénaire, PEPAM) as the steering and coordination instrument for all
activities in the sector\.
6\. IDA's support through the ongoing Water and Sanitation Millennium Project (PEPAM-
IDA, P109986) helped in implementing significant reforms in rural water supply, marked by
greater involvement of the private sector in the management of rural water facilities, and the
creation of the Rural Boreholes Agency (Office des forages ruraux, OFOR), a public holding
company playing a similar role in rural areas as that of SONES in urban areas\. One public-private
partnership (PPP) for the management of two regional water systems serving more than 350,000
people has been signed already\.
Situation of Water and Sanitation Services
Senegalâs Pro-Poor Policies for Equitable Access 7\. Access to Services\.
SONES has developed and implemented commercial and tariff policies to With an aggressive policy to
meet the needs of the ever-increasing urban population and particularly those promote subsidized household
of its poorest strata in the expansion areas of the cities\. These policies aim at water connections (see Box)
providing the same access and quality of services to the poor and ensuring
and a large investment
that they will be able to afford access costs as well as the cost of water
consumption\. program underpinning the
Since 1996, SONES has been promoting social water connections at a price reforms over the last two
(CFAF 18,000 or US$31) that is subsidized by the water rates, and is much decades, near-universal access
lower than the actual cost (CFAF 84,000 or US$145)\. Subsidizing to safe water in urban areas (98
connections enables beneficiaries to benefit from a higher quality and
percent) has been achieved,
quantity of water services, thus maximizing the health impact\. The social
connections policy targets the peri-urban neighborhoods, which are likely to thereby exceeding the initial
accommodate the poor\. With program support from most of the sector donors target of 96 percent set for the
(IDA, AFD, EIB), 205,000 social connections have been built and the MDGs\. The urban sanitation
countrywide connection rate increased from 48 percent in 1996 to the current sub-sector did not witness the
rate of 89 percent\.
same progress as in the water
The water tariff structure is designed to enable the small consumers to benefit
from affordable rates\. A rate of CFAF 202 per m3 (US$0\.35 per m3) is sector and the MDGs will
applicable to the first block (monthly consumption lower than 10 m3 per definitely not be achieved\.
month) and to standposts, whereas the average tariff amounts to CFAF 598 Despite significant
per m3 (US$1\.03 per m3)\. investments, the development
Starting in 2006, ONAS developed a menu of technical options, ranging from
of urban sanitation has been
sewerage to condominial sewerage and on-site sanitation facilities to provide
access to improved sanitation in peri-urban areas of Dakar at a subsidized unable to keep up with the
cost\. Albeit less developed than SONES programs, ONAS programs are now high demand of the growing
being extended to secondary cities\. To date, ONAS programs have benefited urban population, particularly
more than 600,000 people\. outside of Dakar\. The access
rate to urban sanitation
2
services reached only 61\.7 percent in 2013, compared to the MDG target of 78 percent\.
8\. In rural areas, steady investment programs in water supply have resulted in an access rate
to safe drinking water of 84\.1 percent in 2013, exceeding the initial target of 82 percent set out for
the MDGs\. The access rate to improved sanitation was estimated at 38\.7 percent in 2013, far below
the 63 percent target set out for the MDGs\. The high cost of infrastructure hampers the
development of sanitation facilities, whereas the population continues to express their preference
for a higher service level than the basic sanitation options proposed to them\.
9\. Operating Performances\. The Senegal urban water sector now ranks among the top
performers in the business by international standards as illustrated by the following selected
indicators, which compare Senegalâs performances with the best-managed utilities of the sub-
region: Burkina Faso (ONEA, public operator), Mali (SOMAPEP/SOMAGEP-public operator)
and Niger (SPEN/SEEN-private operator)\.
Table 1: Benchmarking of Operating Performance Indicators (2013)
Burkina
Indicator Senegal Mali Niger
Faso
Access to piped water 98% 68% 84% 74%
Household connections ratio 89% 47% 61% 46%
Unaccounted-for Water (UFW) (%) 20% 28% 18% 15%
Bill collection ratio, private sector (%) 97% 93% 97% 96%
No\. of staff per 1,000 connections 2\.1 5\.1 3\.6 4\.8
Staff costs/Total revenues (%) 20% 22% 21% 21%
Compliance with bacteriological
99% 99% 100% 99%
standards (% of samples)
Sources: SONES/SdE, SOMAPEP/SOMAGEP, ONEA and SPEN/SEEN
Key Sector Challenges
10\. Emergence of Water Shortages\. Half of the urban water sector activity is concentrated in
the Dakar region\. With a rapid population growth in the capital area and the development of a new
economic hub next to the future airport of Ndiass and the Diamniadio area, water demand has been
growing faster than expected\. This has led to a current peak hour water supply deficit in the Dakar
region of 20,000 m3 per day that is likely to worsen to 60,000 m3 per day by 2020 if nothing is
done\. Water deficits are also increasing in Petite Côte, a prime tourist area close to the Dakar
region, and will amount to about 35,000 m3 per day by 2020\. In addition, there is a degree of
vulnerability in the Dakar supply system, as evidenced by the September 2013 breakage of a Y-
shaped connection pipe in the transmission line from the water treatment plant located on the
Guiers Lake at Keur Momar Sarr (KMS) to Thiès, which resulted in depriving the city of Dakar
of 40 percent of its supply for three weeks\.
11\. The expansion of the KMS water production system (KMS 3 Project), supported by donors
including the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the French Development Agency (AFD), is
expected to increase the production capacity by 100,000 m3 per day by 2020\. However, meeting
the demand in the 2015-2020 period is looking extremely tight, and actions aimed at providing a
quick response to the water shortages are needed in order to avoid deterioration in service
reliability in the Dakar region\. Without a timely expansion of the water infrastructure, a significant
3
portion of the urban poor and influx of new arrivals to the region would be excluded from basic
services\. Parallel impacts would be severe constraints on the development of the tourism industry\.
12\. Gap between Water and Sanitation Services\. The access gap between water and sanitation
services is particularly wide outside of the Dakar area\. The access rate to improved sanitation
amounts to 78 percent in Dakar and 44 percent in other urban centers\. While the creation of
sewerage networks may not be justified everywhere, sewerage services were available in seven
urban centers 1 when ONAS was created (as compared to 56 urban centers within SONES
perimeter)\. Only ten additional urban centers 2 have been provided with sewerage services since
that date\.
13\. Tariff Policy Shortcomings and Financial Viability\. From 1996 to 2003, water tariffs were
adjusted from time to time to maintain the sectorâs financial equilibrium\. Tariffs were revised by
reference to SONESâ financial model, which provides the value of the needed average tariff
increase\. Another tariff revision was required in 2007\. The GoS decided to freeze the rates for
households and other private users, and to shift the entire burden of the revision onto the rate for
administrative consumers, which had to be increased by about 70 percent, and was further
increased by 90 percent in 2009\. These political decisions, which may be construed as a hidden
subsidy to the sector, made SONES heavily dependent on revenues from public users\. Not
surprisingly, it also led to the accumulation of arrears on public water bills, which have been settled
with significant delays or through compensation with the arrears accumulated by SONES on the
service of the debt on-lent by the GoS\.
14\. Need for a Second-Generation Reform\. The urban water PPP was initially concluded for a
ten-year period\. It was re-negotiated twice in accordance with the contractual procedures, extended
for twelve additional years and cannot be further extended (the expiration date is December 30,
2018)\. All sector stakeholders agree that the contract has to be re-bid and should be improved,
particularly by shifting additional investment responsibilities to the private operator, while keeping
responsibilities for bulky investment programs within SONES\. At the same time, the results
achieved by a performing and autonomous urban water supply sector contrast with the lagging
urban sanitation sector that is hampered by interferences in investment and management decisions
and by unfunded mandates, particularly in flood control and drainage\.
Strategies and Actions to Address Sector Challenges
15\. Elimination of Water Shortages\. Among the water resources next to the Dakar region
consumption areas, the Tassette zone south-east of Thiès, has been identified by SONES and the
Directorate of Water Resources Management and Planning (Direction Générale de la Planification
et de la Gestion des Ressources en Eau, DGPRE) of the MHA as a potentially appropriate (and
least-cost) groundwater resource for the construction of a series of boreholes that may deliver an
average daily discharge of 20,000 m3\. The strategic location of the site will allow groundwater to
be pumped towards the water tanks in Thiès, which supply most of the Dakar region, and also
towards Petite Côte\. In the meantime, SONES is implementing a self-financed emergency program
to produce an additional 40,000 m3 per day from other groundwater sources by June 2015\.
1
Dakar, Rufisque, Thiès, Louga, Kaolack, Saly and Saint-Louis
2
Dagana, Diourbel, Fatick, Matam, Mbacké, Mbour, Podor, Richard-Toll, Tivaouane and Ziguinchor
4
16\. In addition, to diversify the water supply resources for the Dakar region and to strengthen
the reliability of supply, the Government intends to turn to desalination of sea water as an
additional resource to groundwater from boreholes and surface water purification plants\. In fact,
the most recent desalination technologies, especially with regard to energy consumption, enable
desalination to be viewed as a credible and viable complement to the transfer of water from the
Guiers Lake, which is located more than 250 kilometers from Dakar\.
17\. Revision of Water Tariffs\. SONES and the GoS initiated in 2014 a revision of the water
tariff structure to make the sector less dependent on public users\. A tariff revision, including a 4
percent increase of the social block tariff (applicable to standposts and to the first 20 m3 consumed
by domestic users in a two-month period) and a 9 percent increase of the rates applicable to other
private users, was agreed\. The revision was then postponed in view of a likely negative response
from the Dakar population, which was experiencing water shortages\. Once the impact of the Dakar
emergency program started to alleviate water shortages, the GoS eventually approved the tariff
increase, which applies to the March 2015 water consumption 3\.
18\. Governmentâs Vision of the Second-Generation Reforms\. The GoS formulated its vision
of the next round of reforms in December 2014 in a Framework Note (Note de Cadrage)\. The
Framework Note sets the following objectives for the reform: (i) increase access to services,
maintain the current performances of water services and reduce the development gap between
urban water and sanitation; (ii) consolidate the financial equilibrium of the urban water sector and
enable the urban sanitation sub-sector to cover its operational costs; and (iii) finance the
development of the sector at conditions consistent with socially acceptable tariffs, excluding de
facto private concession contracts\. The Note further sets the following guiding principles for the
options to be explored: (i) the confirmation of the PPP for urban water supply and strengthening
the private sector contribution to investments (renewal of the infrastructure and reinforcement of
the water production); (ii) the need for a greater private sector role in the delivery of urban
sanitation services and to clarify the management and financing of flood control and drainage; (iii)
the pursuit of synergies between the water supply and sanitation sub-sectors; and (iv) the need to
reinforce the sectoral regulation\. And finally, the Note defines a roadmap and a time schedule to
ensure that the future operator would be selected and the contract signed by June 30, 2018\.
Rationale for IDAâs Involvement
19\. The proposed project is essential for improving the quality of water services in Dakar and
Petite Côte areas\. Failure to do so would undermine the social acceptability of the sectorâs cost
recovery policies and of the PPP arrangements\. The Government has no other external financing
options to provide a quick response to water shortages\. The proposed project also creates an
opportunity to replicate the experience acquired in Dakar sanitation under the IDA-financed Long-
Term Water Sector Project (LTWSP, P041528) to smaller urban centers\.
20\. By supporting the GoS strategy to diversify the water sources of the Dakar region, the
proposed project will also help strengthen the reliability of supply\. In parallel, the GoS requested
3
The new tariff structure is provided in the Appendix to Annex 5\.
5
the IFCâs assistance in preparing a PPP for a seawater desalination plant, for which a feasibility
study is being carried out under the ongoing PEPAM-IDA\.
21\. As importantly, IDAâs presence in the water and sanitation sector at a critical time for
deepening sectoral reforms will maintain the long-term partnership established with the GoS and
water and sanitation stakeholders\. IDA will thus continue to play a catalytic role in facilitating the
reform process, rather than seeking to push for off-the-shelf solutions\.
B\. Higher Level Objectives to which the Project Contributes
22\. The proposed project will contribute to achieving the goals of the Country Partnership
Strategy (CPS FY2013-2017), discussed by the Board on February 19, 2013, whose second pillar
aims to improve access to basic services, including water and sanitation\. The project is fully
aligned with the new development vision for Senegal, as set out in the ESP, whose second focus
area seeks to meet basic social needs which will require improving access to water and sanitation
services\.
23\. The project will contribute directly to the World Bank twin goals of eradicating poverty and
sharing prosperity more equally to the benefit of the poor\. Access to clean water and sanitation is
a key health determinant\. It is also the basis for many types of livelihoods that can turn the poor
into local entrepreneurs, for example, home-based manufacturing and services\.
III\. PROJECT DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES
A\. PDO
24\. The objective of the Project is to improve access to water and sanitation services in selected
urban areas in a financially sustainable manner\.
B\. Project Beneficiaries
25\. About 590,000 people will benefit from the proposed project: (i) 180,000 additional people,
mostly from poor urban and peri-urban families, will gain access to safe drinking water through
social household connections; (ii) 80,000 additional people will have access to improved sanitation
services; and (iii) 330,000 people currently impacted by water shortages will benefit from
enhanced services through the increased water production\. The latter beneficiaries will be located
in Dakar metropolitan area (from the commissioning of project until the commissioning of KMS
3 scheme), and in the urban and tourist centers of Petite Côte\.
26\. Reduction of Gender Inequalities\. The proposed project will help reduce gender
inequalities\. First, the social connections program will eliminate the burden of water hauling, a
time consuming and physically stressful task, which mostly falls on female members of
households; the other water components will also help reduce the stress associated with water
shortages\. Second, a lack in access to safe sanitation facilities places women and girls at a greater
disadvantage relative to men and boys, perpetuating already existing gender inequalities\. The
sanitation component will provide safe household sanitation facilities, as well as adequate and
6
convenient solutions to wastewater disposal, another task falling exclusively on women 4\. Women
will also play a prominent role in the hygiene education and information programs and be involved
in the selection of the location of public sanitation facilities\.
C\. PDO Level Results Indicators
27\. The following key performance indicators will measure success in achieving the PDO:
(a) Number of people in urban areas provided with access to âimproved water sourcesâ under
the project (core);
(b) Number of people in urban areas provided with access to âimproved sanitation facilitiesâ
under the project (core);
(c) Number of people with access to enhanced water supply services under the project;
(d) Direct project beneficiaries, of which female beneficiaries (core);
(e) Financial equilibrium 5 of the urban water supply sub-sector (yes/no);
(f) Coverage of cash operating expenditures of sewerage activities of ONAS; and
(g) Beneficiary feedback (core)
IV\. PROJECT DESCRIPTION
A\. Project Components
28\. Selection of Project Activities\. Given the immediate and medium-term Borrower priorities
in the water and sanitation sector, and taking into account the scheduled interventions of other
donors of the sector, it is proposed that the project focus on the following areas: (i) help finance
an interim investment program to quickly address difficulties arising from water shortages in the
Dakar region, improve water services in Petite Côte and increase access to services throughout the
country; (ii) help increase access to urban sanitation services outside of Dakar; and (iii) support
sector institutions and reforms\.
29\. The proposed project will consist of three components, which are summarized below\.
30\. Component 1\. Water Supply (US$48\.9 million equivalent)\. This component aims at
improving water services and expanding access through the following sub-components:
1\.1 Development of groundwater resources to increase water availability and quality, in
selected areas through, inter alia, expanding (a) water production capacity by drilling and
equipping new boreholes with connection pipes to collect ground water; (b) water
transmission by providing and installing feeder pipes, booster pumping stations and
constructing a ground storage tank; (c) water storage by constructing storage tanks; and (d)
provision of goods for the purpose\.
This sub-component will: (i) through the development of groundwater resources in the
Tassette area, improve the quantity of water available to existing customers in Dakar until
the commissioning of the KMS 3 scheme and will afterwards supply the urban centers of
4
The public consultation carried out under the Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) included
womenâs associations in Joal-Fadiouth that acknowledged the potential benefits of the sanitation facilities to be
proposed under the project\.
5
The definition of âFinancial Equilibriumâ is given in paragraph 51 of Annex 3\.
7
Petite Côte; and (ii) through the development of groundwater resources in Mbour, improve
the quantity of water available to existing customers in Petite Côte\.
1\.2 Rehabilitating water infrastructure in the urban center of Nguekhokh to improve water
production, storage capacity and distribution through, inter alia, (a) drilling and equipping
boreholes; (b) constructing a water storage tank and distribution pipes; (c) rehabilitating
stand-posts and household water connections; and (d) provision of goods for the purpose\.
This sub-component will rehabilitate and improve water infrastructure in this urban center,
before incorporating the system within SONES perimeter\.
1\.3 Increasing access to safe water in selected urban centers through the provision and
installation of water distribution pipes and household water service connections\.
This sub-component will: (i) enable the water services to reach currently unserved
neighborhoods; and (ii) help connect mostly poor households under affordable conditions\.
1\.4 Carrying out technical studies for water supply systems for selected urban centers\.
Component 2\. Sanitation (US$16\.8 million equivalent)\. This component aims at increasing
access to improved sanitation outside of Dakar through the following sub-components:
2\.1 Provision of sanitation facilities in the urban center of Joal-Fadiouth, including, (a)
provision and installation of sanitation pipes, pumping stations and household sewerage
service connections; (b) construction of a wastewater treatment plant and a sludge
treatment plant; and (c) installation of in-site household sanitation facilities and public
toilets\.
This sub-component will provide a full range of options of sanitation services, including
adequate excreta and wastewater disposal\.
2\.2 Increasing access to sewerage services in selected urban centers where sewerage networks
already exist through the expansion of sewers, construction of a pumping station and
installation of household sewerage service connections\.
This sub-component will: (i) enable the sanitation services to reach currently unserved
neighborhoods; and (ii) help connect mostly poor households under affordable conditions\.
2\.3 Support to the Recipient in the areas of: (a) supervision; (b) communication, information
and education, related to the activities under Components 2\.1 and 2\.2\.
2\.4 Carrying out detailed technical studies for the development of a sanitation system for the
Dakar East Zone
Component 3\. Institutional Strengthening and Project Management (US$4\.3 million
equivalent)\. This component aims at supporting sector institutions and the sector reforms, and
enabling the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) to deliver its responsibilities through the following
sub-components:
3\.1 Strengthening the Recipientâs capacity in groundwater monitoring and knowledge of
groundwater resources through (a) construction of ground water monitoring boreholes
(piezometers); (b) provision and installation of remote monitoring equipment; and (c)
carrying out hydrogeological studies for the region of Horst Ndiass\.
3\.2 Support to the Recipient in the reforms of the water and sanitation sector\.
8
3\.3 Support to the Recipient in the areas of Project coordination, supervision, financial
management, communication and outreach, procurement, monitoring and evaluation,
supervision of implementation of the Safeguards Instruments, including through the
provision of technical assistance, Training, Operating Costs, goods and services for the
purpose\.
B\. Project Financing
31\. The financing instrument is Investment Project Financing (IPF), consisting of an IDA credit
equivalent to US$70\.0 million, over five years\. The selection of the IPF instrument is based on its
flexibility and suitability to finance a range of activities, including works, equipment and capacity
building\.
32\. The portion of the IDA credit to the Recipient that will finance Component 1 will be made
available to SONES at conditions similar to the ones of the IDA credit\.
C\. Project Cost and Financing
33\. Total project financing requirements are estimated at US$70 million, inclusive of price,
physical contingencies and taxes, which will be entirely funded by the IDA Credit\. Detailed
information on costs and financing sources is provided in Table 2 below\.
Table 2: Project Costs by Component and Source of Financing (US$ million)
Project Components Project cost IDA Financing % Financing
1\. Water Supply 48\.9 48\.9 100%
2\. Sanitation 16\.8 16\.8 100%
3\. Institutional Strengthening and 4\.3 4\.3 100%
Project Management
Total Costs 70\.0 70\.0 100%
Total Financing Required 70\.0 70\.0 100%
D\. Lessons Learned and Reflected in the Project Design
34\. Most of the lessons incorporated in the proposed project design derive from the previous
IDA operations in Senegal, and also from the experience accumulated in West Africa in developing
access to water and sanitation services through social connection programs and sanitation
programs\. The experience with urban sanitation in Latin America and the Caribbean is also
particularly relevant for Senegal\.
⢠Accountability is essential to build and maintain trust with customers\. Whereas
customers and the public in general do not expect much from non-performing utilities, their
demands in terms of quality and costs of services increase quickly in the presence of
efficient operators, private or public\.
⢠Subsidizing access is economically and socially more efficient than subsidizing tariffs\.
The policy of freezing water rates applicable to private consumers and raising public rates
well beyond the economic value of water is a clearly inefficient subsidization policy\. In
contrast, the social connections programs are well-targeted and produce substantial
economic benefits that accrue to the new customers, while maximizing the quality of the
water service and the health impact of piped water particularly for the poor\.
9
⢠The generalization of access to piped water through household connections requires
specific attention to wastewater disposal\. The increased household water consumption
resulting from the shift from standposts or informal supply sources to service connections
translates into additional volumes of wastewater\. Basic sanitation options focusing on
excreta disposal thus need to be complemented by technical solutions for adequate
wastewater disposal, which substantially increases the cost of on-site facilities\. The
experience of the previous LTWSP, as well as sanitation programs implemented in Burkina
Faso, show that the development of conventional sewerage may emerge as an economic
option, particularly if local conditions (soil conditions or high population density) are not
favorable to on-site sanitation\.
⢠Lessons from the Brazilian experience on metropolitan and integrated urban water
management will be made available to Senegal to help inform innovative solutions to
sanitation, flood control and drainage issues and can be used to design sanitation sector
reforms\.
V\. IMPLEMENTATION
A\. Institutional and Implementation Arrangements
35\. The proposed project will replicate the implementation arrangements of previous IDA-
financed projects in the water and sanitation sector\. The urban water component of the project will
be implemented by SONES, and the urban sanitation component by ONAS\. The overall
coordination of the project will be carried out by the existing PEPAM's PCU\. The PCU will also
manage the implementation of the institutional support component in cooperation with the
technical departments of the Ministry of Water and Sanitation\. Project oversight will be the
responsibility of a Steering Committee (Comité de coordination et de suivi, CCS) regrouping
representatives of the MHA, sector institutions, and the MEFP\.
36\. The project implementing agencies are adequately staffed with experienced specialists in
procurement, contract management and financial management\. IDAâs implementation support
missions of the ongoing PEPAM-IDA project have consistently rated the procurement and
financial management of the project as "Highly Satisfactory"\. Recent reviews of the ongoing
project concluded that the implementation of the environmental and social protection measures
was âSatisfactoryâ\. There are no overdue audits under projects implemented by the proposed PCU\.
Updated assessments of the capacities of the implementation agencies were carried out during
project pre-appraisal in December 2014 and concluded that the Financial Management risk and the
Procurement risk are âModerateâ\. The assessments identified capacity strengthening actions,
particularly to adapt procedures to the specific activities of the proposed project, which are listed
in Annex 3\. These actions have been completed\.
B\. Results Monitoring and Evaluation
37\. Project outcome indicators will be calculated using intermediate results and African
harmonized ratios in the water and sanitation sector\. The contractual framework of the urban water
and sanitation sector, and particularly the performance contracts of SONES, SdE and ONAS,
provides for an adequate gathering of key indicators of project outcomes, e\.g\. access data and
information on the financial equilibrium of the sector\. Information on the population benefitting
10
from improved services will be collected by SdE\. The progress reports produced by the supervising
engineers of the water and sanitation works will provide an adequate reporting of indicators of the
projectâs intermediate results\.
38\. The PCU will compile the data, produce progress and monitoring reports, and initiate
specific evaluation studies by independent consultants as needed\.
C\. Sustainability
39\. The Government and the stakeholdersâ ownership of the sectoral reforms and policies and
of the long-term objectives of the water and sanitation sector are key ingredients of sustainability\.
They have been demonstrated by the satisfactory execution of the previous projects and the
successful implementation of the sector reforms\. They will be reinforced under the proposed
project by: (i) eliminating current water shortages that could eventually undermine the social
acceptability of the urban water PPP and of the cost recovery policies; and (ii) the commitment of
GoS to proceed with the next round of sector reforms, as demonstrated by the formulation of the
Framework Note (see paragraph 18)\.
40\. An additional element of social sustainability is the continuation of pro-poor policies for
access to services\. The eligibility criteria of the programs developed for social water connections
will be based on the characteristics of the diverse urban neighborhoods, particularly in low-income
peri-urban areas, which are currently not served or only partly served by the distribution networks\.
Social water connections will be at no cost to the beneficiary households, who will have to make
a small refundable deposit of US$31, whereas the average price of a standard connection is
US$145\. Similar rules will apply to social connections to sewers\. Building on previous lessons,
the project will target, engage and distinguish the experience of the lowest socio-economic
quintiles in the urban population\. The baseline will record and monitor the experiences of the most
disadvantaged with respect to time taken for getting services, perception of water quality security,
reliability, cost, participation and feedback communication processes before and after the project\.
With public sanitation and Information, Education, and Communication (IEC) for hygiene
promotion, attention will be given to promoting womenâs entrepreneurship through the project as
well as access to opportunities for training, business and leadership where feasible\.
41\. Other features of the project design that will reinforce sustainability include: (i) the effective
system of monitoring and evaluation; and (ii) the proven record of performance of the utilitiesâ
staff and of the PCU staff\.
VI\. KEY RISKS AND MITIGATION MEASURES
A\. Overall Risk Rating and Explanation of Key Risks
42\. The overall risk is considered as âModerateâ\. The project implementation agencies are
experienced and well-versed in the implementation of this type of operation and the technologies
to be deployed are fully mastered by all actors\. The project is an integral part of a comprehensive
water supply program for Dakar and Petite Côte to meet the water demand by 2035, and therefore
falls in line with a long-term planning process\. Donor actions are properly coordinated via the
Unified Activity Framework set up by the Government under the PEPAM\. The proposed project
follows a series of similar operations funded by IDA in a continuous cycle over two decades, with
11
successful reforms implemented within a framework of a permanent sector dialogue with all
stakeholders and a stable country context\.
43\. The key residual risk is associated with the effective adoption and implementation of the
sector reforms\. Given the GoSâ commitment to reform expressed in the above-mentioned Note de
Cadrage (see paragraph 18), and the support provided under component 3 of the proposed project,
the Sector Strategies and Policies risk is rated as âModerateâ\.
VII\. APPRAISAL SUMMARY
A\. Economic and Financial Analyses
44\. The main outcome expected from the Project is to enable more than 590,000 persons to get
access to improved water and sanitation services at an affordable cost\. The Project will also
facilitate the transfer of future water production from the KMS 3 scheme\. The additional number
of beneficiaries of services will consolidate the financial autonomy of the sector to continue
investments\. Increased access to water and sanitation services will improve the health and hygienic
conditions for the population and the environment\.
45\. Rationale for public sector provision/financing\. The Senegalese urban water sector has
developed a successful PPP, which has been operating since 1996\. The sector autonomously covers
all its costs, including the debt service, from income generated by water sales\. However,
considering the social character of the water service, the sector still needs to get on-lent
concessional funds to develop the infrastructure and maintain water tariffs at a socially affordable
level\. The involvement of the private sector through a lease contract has helped to generate
productivity gains and reduce operating costs\. The sanitation sector is yet to achieve its financial
autonomy and partly covers its operating expenditures with the proceeds of the sanitation
surcharge applied to water consumption in the sewered cities, the balance being funded by
operating subsidies from the national budget\. As regards capital costs, the externalities associated
with sanitation justify the continued subsidy of infrastructure development investments while
promoting more private sector participation in managing services\.
46\. Added Value of the Bank's support\. This project will be a continuation of the Bankâs support
to the water and sanitation sector in Senegal provided over two decades\. The Senegalese model
developed with the Bankâs support as lead partner in the policy dialogue and the reform design,
has achieved highly commendable results as the sector stands out as one of the most efficient in
Africa\. With Bankâs support, this model has been successfully replicated and adapted in other
countries in the sub-region (Niger, Cameroon, Burkina Faso and Mali)\. The Bankâs involvement
in preparing the second generation reforms will be decisive in creating confidence and visibility
for other donors to engage in the long term investment programs of the sector\. The Bankâs added
value will also be high during the project implementation phase, which will need constant support
provided by a seasoned decentralized team working in the water sector in Senegal for a long time\.
47\. Methodology/scope and next steps\. The economic analysis consists of a cost-benefit
analysis to assess the economic impact of the projectâs urban water component\. The economic
analysis encompasses about 71 percent of the total project costs\. For urban sanitation, where the
benefits are obvious but difficult to quantify, a cost-effectiveness analysis has been conducted\. The
12
financial analysis assesses: (i) the financial impact of water activities from the perspective of the
urban water supply sector and from SONES; and (ii) the impact of project activities on the financial
equilibrium of SONES and ONAS\.
48\. Results of the economic analysis\. The Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) of the
water-related activities is estimated at 14\.4 percent and their Net Present Value (NPV) using a
discount rate of 10 percent is estimated at U$14\.6 million\. The calculations have been also
conducted separately for the sub-components\. The social connections sub-component, which
generates a substantial consumer surplus, yields the highest EIRR (36\.2 percent)\. The sub-
component devoted to the development of groundwater resources in Tassette and Mbour, yields a
10\.8 percent EIRR\. The Nguekhokh upgrading yields a 15\.2 percent EIRR\.
49\. Sensitivity Analysis\. The overall results are particularly sensitive to the variation of the water
demand (the switching value of this variable amounts to 23\.1 percent)\. However, a weak demand
response to the project activities is unlikely, given the current water deficits in the project area\.
50\. Sanitation\. The expansion of sewerage services through social connections programs in
urban centers already equipped with a sewerage system is competitive, in terms of investment cost
per capita (US$159), with on-site sanitation solutions (US$141)\. The unit costs per capita of a new
system (US$232) are 60 percent higher\. In the case of Joal-Fadiouth, the technical criteria (water
table level and population density) eventually dictate the sanitation options\. This is confirmed by
the potential cost savings that may accrue to the beneficiaries of the project investments in Joal-
Fadiouth, where the costs of emptying conventional latrines are prohibitive and lead to unsafe and
environmentally harmful disposal practices (see paragraph 17 of Annex 5)\.
51\. Financial analysis\. The financial impact of project activities on the urban water supply
sector is assessed by the Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) derived from the cost-benefit
analysis\. Financial calculations take into account the financial revenues and costs in the
with/without project situations, including taxes and excluding non-cash generating benefits
(consumer surplus)\. The FIRR is estimated at 8\.3 percent\. If the analysis is carried out from the
sole perspective of SONES 6, the financial cash-flows are positive during the 6-year grace period
of the credit\.
52\. Financial perspectives of SONES and ONAS\. Financial forecasts have been prepared using
the updated financial model of SONES, which takes into account a medium-term investment
program enabling SONES to meet the urban water demand until 2030\. The preliminary results of
the financial model show that the March 2015 tariff revision will substantially increase SONESâ
remuneration (Pp should rise to CFAF 140/m3) and that limited and socially-acceptable tariff
revisions after 2017 will enable SONES to maintain its financial equilibrium and to cover cash
operating expenditures and debt service requirements until 2025, and to reduce its dependency on
the revenues billed to administrative users\.
53\. The March 2015 tariff revision also includes a 35 percent increase of the sanitation
surcharge\. Financial forecasts prepared for the new Performance Contract between ONAS and the
6
In this case, the flow of capital expenditures is replaced by the flow of interests and repayments of the on-lent debt,
and the contractual remuneration of SdE has to be deducted from incremental water sales\.
13
Government show that the sanitation surcharge will cover 80 percent of ONASâ cash operating
expenditures until 2020\.
B\. Technical
54\. Groundwater resources to be mobilized in Tassette and Mbour have been reviewed by
DGPRE, using a model of the aquifer developed by international consultants, and confirmed that
the proposed abstraction levels were sustainable\. Additional piezometers will be drilled and
equipped with remote sensing under Component 3 to provide continuous monitoring of the aquifer\.
55\. The design studies of the sub-components were reviewed and found to be sound\. The
transmission and storage facilities of the Tassette sub-component have been designed to facilitate
interconnections in the Dakar regional scheme and to optimize energy costs\. They represent the
least-cost option for addressing water shortages in the short to medium-term\.
56\. ONAS is already familiar with the sanitation options (sewerage and on-site facilities) and
treatment technologies to be used under the proposed project and similar works have been
satisfactorily executed in the recent years, particularly for sludge treatment\.
57\. Readiness\. All relevant assessments have been completed and their findings have been
incorporated in the project design\. The projectâs Steering Committee has been established\. The
implementation teams are in place within SONES, ONAS and the PCU with adequate capacities,
and participated in project preparation\. Specialized staff has been trained in Bank procurement\.
The Project Implementation Manual (PIM) is being updated and the project accounting software
has been updated by the PCU\. Safeguard documents (Environmental and Social Impact
Assessment (ESIA) of the Joal-Fadiouth wastewater treatment plant, Environmental and Social
Management Framework (ESMF) and Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF)) have been
reviewed by the Bank, and were disclosed in-country on March 27, 2015, and at the Infoshop on
April 13, 2015\. Detailed design studies of the water facilities are being financed under the PEPAM-
IDA and will be completed by June 2015\. The bidding documents of the Joal-Fadiouth sanitation
works are available\.
C\. Financial Management
58\. A financial management (FM) assessment of the PCU of PEPAM, which will be in charge
of the financial management of the proposed Project, was conducted in December 2014\. The
objective of the assessment was to determine whether: (a) the PCU has adequate FM arrangements
in place to ensure the funds will be used for the intended purposes in an efficient and economical
manner and the entity is capable of correctly and completely recording all project related
transactions and balances; (b) the Projectâs financial reports will be prepared in an accurate,
reliable and timely manner; (c) the entityâs assets will be safeguarded; and (d) the Project will be
subject to auditing arrangements acceptable to the Bank\. The assessment complied with the
Financial Management Manual for World Bank-Financed Investment Operations effective on
March 1, 2010\.
59\. The assessment found that the PCUâs existing financial management system can adequately
handle FM tasks of this project\. FM capacity built under the ongoing PEPAM-IDA will be
strengthened to manage the activities of the project\. The overall financial management
14
performance based on the last supervision mission was Highly Satisfactory, and the auditorâs
opinion of last yearâs financial statements was unqualified\. Moreover, in order to take into account
specific activities to be implemented by other entities such as ONAS and SONES, the existing
PIM is being updated\. The conclusion of the assessment is that the financial management
arrangements meet the Bankâs minimum requirements under OP/BP10\.00\. The overall residual
risk rating is âModerateâ\. Details on the Financial Management arrangements for this project are
included under Annex 3\.
D\. Procurement
60\. A formal assessment of the capacity of the proposed projectâs executing agencies (SONES,
ONAS and the PCU) to implement procurement actions was carried out in December 2014 to
ensure that IDA standards are adequately met\. The detailed procurement responsibilities and
activities of these entities with respect to the project components that they execute are provided in
paragraphs 20 and 21 of Annex 3\. The assessment found that SONES, ONAS, and the PCU, which
implemented the Water Sector Project (P002346), the LTWSP, and the PEPAM-IDA, have
satisfactory capacities\. The PCU staff (unit coordinator and the part-time procurement specialist)
is fully experienced in Bank procurement procedures\. However, the turnover of technical experts
at ONAS must be taken into account, as well as the diverse experience of the staff of procurement
units and committees in the parent ministry, the MHA, some of whom have extensive experience
in the procurement of other donor-financed projects and have participated in the Bankâs and Public
procurement training activities during the implementation of the previous water projects\. Overall,
the capacity to execute the procurement function is average and the risk has been assessed to be
âModerateâ\.
61\. The risk mitigation measures include the following: (i) having all requests for no-objection
from SONES and ONAS reviewed by the PCU to ensure quality control before sending them to
IDA, (ii) using the support of the PCUâs procurement specialist to ensure the quality of
procurement processes managed by the other agencies, particularly at ONAS, and (iii) organizing
training/refresher courses in Bank procurement procedures for the procurement officers (in
procurement units and procurement committees) of executing agencies\.
62\. Procurement under the project will be carried out in accordance with : The Guidelines on
Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption in Projects Financed by IBRD Loans and IDA
Credits and Grantsâ, dated October 15, 2006, and revised in January 2011; the World Bankâs
âGuidelines: Procurement of Goods, Works, and Non-Consulting Services under IBRD Loans and
IDA Credits & Grants by World Bank Borrowersâ dated January 2011 and revised July 2014 and
âGuidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants by World Bank Borrowersâ dated January
2011 and revised July 2014; and the provisions stipulated in the Financing Agreement\. The Bankâs
standard bidding documents shall be used for procurement of works and goods under International
Competitive Bidding (ICB), and the Bankâs standard Request for Proposal shall be used for large
value contracts involving selection of international consultants\.
63\. Annex 3 provides the thresholds for prior review and procurement methods applicable under
the proposed project, as well as a summary of the initial procurement plan\.
15
E\. Social (including Safeguards)
64\. The project will include rights of way for the water distribution networks, and minimal land
acquisition for water production, storage and distribution and sanitation facilities\. Therefore, the
Borrower prepared a RPF that has been consulted upon and disclosed as a free-standing document
along with the ESMF\. During project implementation, the screening process will determine
whether land would be acquired and whether a sub-project specific Resettlement Action Plan
(RAP) is required\.
65\. The RPF outlines the principles and procedures to be followed in the event of land
acquisition, impact on assets and/or loss of livelihoods\. Any specific RAP prepared in accordance
with the screening result will be negotiated and approved in consultation with all the stakeholders
then fully executed before the concerned activity starts\.
F\. Environment (including Safeguards)
66\. The project is classified as B because of the expected moderate magnitude of the negative
impacts and risks that would result from its activities\. Instead, and apart from risks during
exploitation, the overall impact of the project is substantially positive due to improvement of
sanitation and living conditions in the intervention areas\. The potential sites of the civil works in
Joal-Fadiouth are known but those of the investments in the other cities are not\. Four safeguard
policies have been triggered: Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4\.01); Natural Habitat (OP/BP
4\.04); Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4\.11) and Involuntary Resettlement (OB/BP 4\.12)\. The
World Bank Group Environment Health and Safety guidelines for water and sanitation also apply,
especially when it comes to finalizing and incorporating the environmental clauses in the
enterprises and plant operatorsâ contracts\. To comply with the Bankâs policies and the Senegalese
environmental regulation, the ESMF and the RPF of the whole project, and the ESIA of the Joal-
Fadiouth sanitation (component 2) have been prepared, consulted upon and disclosed in-country
on March 27, 2015, and at the Bank Infoshop on April 13, 2015\.
67\. The ESMF provides a screening mechanism for mainstreaming environmental and social
sustainability aspects from identification of subprojects/activities to their implementation phase\.
As soon as the implementation site is identified, investment subprojects or activities will be
processed through the environmental and social screening procedure and then, if eligible, be
subject to the preparation and approval of an ESIA/Environmental and Social Management Plan
(ESMP) and/or RAP prior implementation\. The screening is executed by the PCUâs environmental
and social safeguard specialist\. This process will result in the environmental classification of the
subprojects into categories B or C; Category A subproject will not be eligible for financing\. The
results of the screening are processed according to the national regulations under the control of the
Directorate of Environment (Direction de lâEnvironnement et des Etablissements Classés, DEEC)\.
68\. The relevant bodies have been adequately informed of the Project\. Communities concerns
and some details of consultations have been provided as Annexes in the ESIA, ESMF and RPF\.
The key concerns raised during the consultation process included: (i) the Mama Gueth oyster
farming area should not be threatened; (ii) stormwater drainage should be integrated in the
infrastructure designs; (iii) preferential recruitment should be given to qualified local candidates
16
for jobs and; (iv) the municipality must have the responsibility of operating the public sanitation
facilities\. These concerns have been addressed in the alternatives proposed through the ESMP\.
69\. One of the key principles of this project from the outset was to foster participation by all
relevant stakeholders\. This approach will be sustained throughout project implementation\. The
environmental and social assessment studies, namely the ESMF and RPF, were also carried out
according to the same principle, using a broad-based public consultation approach, involving the
above stakeholder groups\. The objective was to raise awareness of project activities and impacts
and to foster ownership on the part of the community and stakeholders\.
70\. The Borrower has reasonable capacity in implementing environmental and social safeguard
measures in water and sanitation projects\. It has successfully implemented the ESMP and RAP of
the PEPAM-IDA project including activities that are similar to those of the proposed project\. The
last supervision missions of the PEPAM-IDA project concluded that the implementation of the
Environmental Management Plan (EMP) was appropriate and the safeguard rating was
âSatisfactoryâ\. The same institutional framework used for PEPAM-IDA will be adopted for the
proposed project e\.g\. the PCU will monitor the overall implementation of the EMP, implementing
agencies are responsible for their applicable portions of the EMP, and a full time Safeguard
Specialist has been recruited to strengthen the safeguard function of the PCU\. An amount of
US$0\.34 million is earmarked in the project budget to ensure the implementation of the safeguard
measures\.
G\. Other Safeguards Policies Triggered
Not applicable
H\. World Bank Grievance Redress
71\. Communities and individuals who believe that they are adversely affected by a World Bank
supported project may submit complaints to the responsible country authorities, appropriate
local/national grievance redress mechanisms, or the Bank's Grievance Redress Service (GRS)\. The
GRS ensures that complaints received are promptly reviewed in order to address pertinent
concerns\. Affected communities and individuals may submit their complaint to the Bank's
independent Inspection Panel which determines whether harm occurred, or could occur, as a result
of Bank non-compliance with its policies and procedures\. Complaints may be submitted at any
time after concerns have been brought directly to the World Bank's attention, and Bank
Management has been given an opportunity to respond\. For information on how to submit
complaints to the World Bank's corporate GRS, please visit http://www\.worldbank\.org/GRS\. For
information on how to submit complaints to the World Bank Inspection Panel, please visit
http://www\.inspectionpanel\.org\.
17
Annex 1: Results Framework and Monitoring
SENEGAL: URBAN WATER AND SANITATION PROJECT
Results Framework
\.
Project Development Objectives
\.
PDO Statement
The objective of the project is to improve access to water and sanitation services in selected urban areas in a financially sustainable manner\.
These results are at Project Level
\.
Project Development Objective Indicators
Cumulative Target Values Data Source/ Responsibility for
Unit of Methodology Data Collection
Indicator Name Core Baseline FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 Frequency
Measure
Number of people in
urban areas provided
Progress
with access to
Number 0 0 45 ,000 135 ,000 180 ,000 180 ,000 Annual reports from SONES/SdE
âimproved water
PCU
sourcesâ under the
Project
Number of people in
urban areas provided
Progress
with access to
Number 0 0 0 26 ,000 60 ,000 80 ,000 Annual reports from ONAS
âimproved sanitation
PCU
facilitiesâ under the
Project
Number of people with
Progress
access to enhanced
Number 0 0 0 220 ,000 330 ,000 330 ,000 Annual reports from SONES/SdE
water supply services
PCU
under the Project
18
Progress
Direct Project
Number 0 0 45 ,000 381 ,000 570 ,000 590 ,000 Annual reports from PCU
beneficiaries
PCU
Percentage Progress
Female beneficiaries Sub-Type NA 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% Annual reports from PCU
Supplemental PCU
Financial equilibrium Annual review
of the urban water Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Annual of financial SONES
supply sub-sector model
Coverage of cash
operating expenditures
% 69% 73% 77% 81% 85% 90% Annual ONAS ONAS
of sewerage activities
of ONAS
Beneficiary feedback Percentage 0 0 0 0 0 80 Annual Survey PCU
\.
Intermediate Results Indicators
Component 1: Water Supply
Intermediate Result: Increase and improve access to water services
Additional water Progress
production capacity reports from
m3/day 0 0 0 23 ,100 35 ,500 35 ,500 Annual SONES
constructed under the supervising
Project engineers
New piped household
Activity
water connections that
Number 0 0 5 ,000 15 ,000 20 ,000 20 ,000 Annual reports from SONES/SdE
are resulting from
SdE
Project interventions
Progress
Water storage capacity
3 reports from
constructed under the m 0 0 0 4 ,600 24 ,600 24 ,600 Annual SONES
supervising
Project
engineers
Progress
Length of feeder pipes
reports from
constructed under the Km 0 0 0 10 30 45 Annual SONES
supervising
Project
engineers
19
Component 2: Sanitation
Intermediate Result: Increase access to sanitation services
New household sewer Activity
connections constructed Number 0 0 0 1 ,500 4 ,500 6 ,000 Annual reports from ONAS
under the Project ONAS
On-site sanitation Activity
facilities constructed Number 0 0 0 0 150 320 Annual reports from ONAS
under the Project ONAS
Progress
Length of sewers
reports from
constructed under the Km 0 0 0 30 60 100 Annual ONAS
supervising
Project
engineers
Component 3: Institutional Strengthening and Project Management
Intermediate Result:
Adoption of a new
institutional framework
Yes/No No No No No Yes Yes Annual MHA PCU
for urban water and
sanitation
20
Appendix 1 to Annex 1: Results Framework and Monitoring
SENEGAL: URBAN WATER AND SANITATION PROJECT
\.
Results Framework
\.
Project Development Objective Indicators
Indicator Name Description
Number of people in urban areas provided with access to This indicator measures the number of people in urban areas who benefited from âimproved
âimproved water sourcesâ under the Project water sourcesâ under the Project\. Improved water sources include piped household connections
(house or yard connections), public standpipes, public kiosks, boreholes, protected dug wells,
protected springs and rainwater collection\. Hence, âimproved water sourcesâ do not include, inter
alia, water provided through tanker truck or vendor, unprotected wells, unprotected springs,
surface water (river, pond, dam, lake, stream, irrigation channel), or bottled water\. The definition
of what is considered an âimproved water sourceâ follows the UNICEF-WHO Joint Monitoring
Program definition\. Note that âimproved water sourcesâ does not refer to the question of new
versus rehabilitated water sources, but is the standard definition used to track progress on the
Millennium Development Goals\.
= Number of new social connections x [9 7 people]
Number of people in urban areas provided with access to This indicator measures the cumulative number of people in urban areas who benefited from
âimproved sanitationâ under the Project improved sanitation facilities that have been constructed under the Project\. âImproved sanitation
facilitiesâ include flush/pour-flush into a piped sewer system, septic tank or pit latrine, VIP
latrine, pit latrine with slab, composting toilet\. Hence, âimproved sanitation facilitiesâ do not
include, inter alia, flush/pour-flush toilets to elsewhere (i\.e\., not to a sewer network, septic tank
or pit latrine), bucket, hanging toilet/latrine, public facility, a shared improved facility, or no
facilities, bush or field (i\.e\. open defecation)\.The definition of what is considered an âimproved
sanitation facilityâ follows the UNICEF-WHO Joint Monitoring Program definition\. Note that
âimproved sanitation facilitiesâ do not refer to the question of new versus rehabilitated sanitation
facilities, but is the standard definition used to track progress on the Millennium Development
Goals\.
7
The average number of people per water connection is lower than the average number of people per sewerage connection because there is only one sewerage
connection per compound/housing unit, while there may be multiple water connections per compound/housing unit\.
21
= Number of new sewer connections x [137 people] + Number of on-site sanitation facilities x
[13 people]
Number of people with access to enhanced water supply services This indicator measures the cumulative number of people in urban areas currently having
under the Project access to water services who received piped water from production facilities constructed under
the Project\.
= Daily production of new facilities (m3/day) x 1,000 x 0\.8 (network efficiency) / (1\.3 (peak
factor) x 65 lpcd (average daily consumption per capita))
Direct Project beneficiaries, of which female beneficiaries Direct beneficiaries from water supply and sanitation interventions under the Project, the
percentage of whom are female\.
= Sum of above target values; percentage of female beneficiaries = 50 %
SONESâ net cash balance (previous year plus net cash flow from operations minus debt service
Financial equilibrium of the urban water supply sub-sector
and variation of working capital requirements) positive or equal to zero
Coverage of cash operating expenditures of sewerage activities of / Annual revenues from sewerage surcharges/Annual cash operating expenditures of ONASâ
ONAS sewerage activities
Beneficiary feedback Beneficiaries that feel project investments reflected their needs (percentage)
\.
Intermediate Results Indicators
Indicator Name Description
Daily water production capacity of the facilities constructed under the Project in Tassette,
Additional production capacity constructed under the Project
Mbour and Nguekhokh\.
New piped household water connections that are resulting from Number of new social water connections installed by SdE\.
Project interventions
Water storage capacity constructed under the Project Capacity of water storage tanks constructed under the Project
Length of feeder pipes constructed under the Project Length of water pipes with diameter greater or equal to 500 mm constructed under the Project
New household sewer connections constructed under the Number of new sewer connections installed by ONAS\. This includes household connections to
Project a condominial system\.
On-site sanitation facilities constructed under the Project Number of on-site sanitation facilities constructed under the Project\.
Length of sewers constructed under the Project Length of sewer pipes with diameter greater or equal to 200 mm constructed under the Project
New institutional framework for urban water and sanitation Adoption of a new institutional and contractual framework for urban water and sanitation\.
22
Annex 2: Detailed Project Description
SENEGAL: URBAN WATER AND SANITATION PROJECT
1\. This Annex reviews how the existing challenges facing urban water and sanitation services
and the project development objective are addressed by the project components and provides a
detailed description of activities financed under the project\.
Relationship between Project Components and PDO
2\. The overall objective of the proposed project is to improve access to water and sanitation
services in selected urban areas in a financially sustainable manner\.
3\. The PDO will be achieved through: (i) expanding water transmission, storage and
distribution capacities and constructing sanitation infrastructure; (ii) facilitating access to services
through programs for constructing social water and sewerage connections; and (iii) supporting the
reforms of the water and sanitation sector to strengthen capacities to deliver and manage services\.
4\. The first water sub-components of the proposed project will improve the quality of water
services by eliminating current water shortages through the development of groundwater
resources\. The development of the Tassette groundwater resources will make water volumes
equivalent to 23,100 m3 per day available first to Dakar consumers, pending the completion of
long-term supply schemes in 2021, then to Petite Côte consumers\. The development of
groundwater resources in Mbour will provide an additional volume equivalent to 7,700 m3 per day
to existing water customers in Petite Côte\. The second water sub-component will help restore an
adequate level of services in Nguekhokh through the upgrading of water facilities, including an
additional production capacity of 4,700 m3 per day\.
5\. The third water sub-component and the sanitation sub-component will help improve access
to safe water and improved sanitation outside of Dakar\. The development of access to water
services will be prioritized through the construction of 20,000 social connections for the population
in low-income neighborhoods, as household connections allow for providing more water at a
reasonable cost\. The construction of sanitation facilities in Joal-Fadiouth and the implementation
of social connections in selected sewered cities will enable more than 6,300 households to obtain
access to improved sanitation\. Joal-Fadiouth was selected as a priority for establishing a sewerage
system, since the city experiences severe sanitation and environmental problems stemming from
its location on the coast, compounded by a high water table and the population density\.
6\. The third component of the proposed project will support the GoS in preparing and
implementing the next round of reforms in the urban water and sanitation sector, in view of the
end of the current PPP contract with SdE by 2018 and the need for more private sector participation
in delivering urban sanitation services and financing rehabilitation programs\. On rural water, the
proposed project will continue to support reforms initiated under the PEPAM-IDA project, which
led to a higher involvement of private operators in managing rural water facilities\. The component
will also finance the development and implementation of the Environmental and Social
Management Plan of the project, and the operating costs of the Project Coordination Unit\.
23
Detailed Project Activities
7\. Detailed project activities, together with their costs (including contingencies and excluding
taxes) are listed below\.
Component 1 - Water Supply (US$48\.9 million equivalent): The following activities are planned
under this component:
1\.1 Development of groundwater resources, including:
1\.1\.1 Development of groundwater resources in the Tassette area (US$20\.01 million)\.
This sub-component will help increase the availability of water and improve the
quality of water services in Dakar and Petite Côte by:
(i) expanding the water production capacity by approximately 23,100 m3 per day
by drilling and equipping seven new boreholes in Tassette, installing a booster
pumping station and constructing ground storage tanks (500 m3), and supplying and
laying connection pipes to collect groundwater;
(ii) expanding the water transmission capacity by supplying and laying:
⢠a 17-kilometer feeder pipe (ductile cast iron (DCI), diameter (DN) 600 mm)
linking the Tassette well field to the new storage tanks in the South of Thiès;
and
⢠a 5-kilometer feeder pipe (DCI, DN 700 mm) linking existing storage tanks
in the North of Thiès to the new ones\.
(iii) expanding the storage capacity by approximately 20,000 m3 through the
construction of two 10,000 m3 ground storage tanks in the South of Thiès; and
(iv) financing consulting services for the supervision and technical control of the
above works\.
1\.1\.2 Development of groundwater resources in the Mbour area (US$20\.18 million)\.
This sub-component will help increase the availability of water and improve the
quality of water services in the petite Côte by:
(i) expanding the water production capacity by approximately 7,700 m3 per day by
drilling and equipping two new boreholes in Mbour and Somone and supplying and
laying connection pipes to collect groundwater;
(ii) expanding the water transmission capacity by:
⢠installing a booster pumping station in Mbour; and
⢠supplying and laying a 24-kilometer feeder pipe (DCI, DN 700 mm) linking
the Mbour pumping station to the new water storage tanks in Mbodiène and
Pointe Sarène\.
(iii) expanding the storage capacity by approximately 3,500 m3 through the
construction of two elevated storage tanks in Mbodiène and Pointe Sarène; and
(iv) financing consulting services for the supervision and technical control of the
above works and the Nguekhokh works\.
1\.2 Upgrading Nguekhokh water system (US$3\.17 million)\. This sub-component will help
rehabilitate and improve water infrastructure in Nguekhokh by:
(i) Expanding the water production capacity by approximately 4,700 m3 per day by drilling
and equipping two new boreholes in Nguekhokh;
24
(ii) expanding the storage capacity by approximately 1,100 m3 through the construction of
one elevated storage tank in Nguekhokh and the rehabilitation of a technical building; and
(iii) improving the water distribution by rehabilitating and constructing approximately 42
kilometers of distribution pipes and rehabilitating standposts and approximately 1,500
water service connections\.
1\.3 Social connections program (US$4\.83 million)\. This sub-component will help increase
access to safe water in selected urban centers by:
(i) supplying and laying approximately 160 kilometers of water distribution pipes; and
(ii) installing approximately 20,000 social connections\.
1\.4 Technical studies (US$0\.69 million)\. This sub-component will help finance consulting
services for the detailed design of the expansion of transmission and distribution networks
in Dakar poles and Petite Côte\.
Component 2 â Sanitation (US$16\.8 million equivalent): The following activities are planned
under this component:
2\.1 Sanitation facilities in Joal-Fadiouth (US$9\.53 million)\. This sub-component will help
provide a full range of sanitation options to the population by:
(i) establishing a sewerage network, including:
⢠supplying and laying approximately 44 kilometers of sewers;
⢠supplying and installing five sewage pumping stations; and
⢠supplying and installing approximately 3,000 house connections
(ii) constructing treatment facilities, including:
⢠a wastewater treatment plant (lagoons) with a capacity of 2,000 m3 per day; and
⢠a sludge treatment plant with a capacity of 60 m3 per day
(iii) constructing approximately 320 in-site household sanitation facilities (septic tanks,
soakaway pits and washing basins) and eight public toilets\.
2\.2 Sanitation in selected urban centers (US$5\.89 million)\. This sub-component will help
increase access to sewerage services through social connections programs in the following
urban centers, in which sewerage networks already exist:
(i) Diourbel: Expansion of the sewers by approximately 15 kilometers and provision and
installation of approximately 760 social connections;
(ii) Mbour: Expansion of the sewers by approximately 25 kilometers and provision and
installation of approximately 1,270 social connections;
(iii) Richard Toll: Expansion of the sewers by approximately 15 kilometers and provision
and installation of one sewage pumping station and approximately 985 social connections\.
2\.3 Financing consulting services (US$0\.94 million) for:
(i) supervision and control of the above activities; and
(ii) information, education and communication for Joal-Fadiouth activities and the social
connections programs;
2\.4 Financing consulting services (US$0\.43 million) for design studies associated with the
Dakar Sanitation Master Plan\.
25
Component 3 â Institutional Strengthening and Project Management (US$4\.3 million
equivalent): The following activities are planned under this component:
3\.1 Support to DGPRE (US$0\.74 million)\. This sub-component will help strengthen
groundwater monitoring and improve knowledge of groundwater resources, by:
(i) constructing four piezometers of the Paleocene aquifer and two piezometers of the
Maastrichtian aquifer;
(ii) supplying and installing remote monitoring equipment; and
(iii) financing additional hydrogeological studies of the Ndiass Horst system\.
3\.2 Technical and institutional studies (US$1\.12 million)\. This sub-component will support
sector reforms through the provision of consulting services to:
(i) assist the GoS task force in charge of formulating the next round of urban water and
sanitation sector reforms;
(ii) help OFOR implement the rural water supply sector reform; and
(iii) assist ONAS and GoS update the performance contract\.
3\.3 Support to project management (US$2\.47 million) through the provision of:
(i) one vehicle and equipment (office technology) for the PCU;
(ii) consulting services and operating costs for the PCU during two years (FY19 and
FY20);
(iii) financial audits of the project;
(iv) beneficiaries âsurveys; and
(v) support to implementation of the ESMP\.
8\. The detailed costs of the project activities are provided in the attached Appendix
26
Detailed Costs of Project Activities
Unit Price Cost Cost
Activities Unit Quantity
(CFAFâ000) (CFAF M) (US$ M)
Component 1 (Water Supply) 28,349 48\.88
1\.1 Development of groundwater resources 23,309 40\.19
1\.1\.1 Tassette 11,607 20\.01
Boreholes
Drilling No\. 7 100,000 700 1\.21
Boreholes equipment and connection pipes No\. 7 70,000 490 0\.84
Connection pipes DCI DN150 m 3,850 54 208 0\.36
Pumping station and ground water storage tank (500
Lump Sum 1 1,410,100 1,410, 2\.43
m3)
Pipes
Transmission pipes DCI DN600 m 16,555 268 4,438 7\.65
Transmission pipes DCI DN800 m 4,691 280 1,312 2\.26
Water Storage
Thiès storage tanks (2 x 10\.000 m3) No\. 1 2,500,000 2,500 4\.31
Control and supervision
Supervision Lump Sum 1 500,000 500 0\.86
Technical control (10-year warranty) Lump Sum 1 50,000 50 0\.09
1\.1\.2\. Mbour-Mbodiène 11,702 20\.18
Boreholes
Drilling (F11 Mbour, F4 Somone) No\. 2 90,000 180 0\.31
Boreholes equipment No\. 1 200,000 200 0\.34
Boreholes equipment (F11 Mbour) No\. 1 255,000 255 0\.44
Boreholes re-equipment (F4 Somone) No\. 1 80,000 80 0\.14
Supply and laying connection pipes DN200 m 7,150 65 465 0\.80
Pumping station, civil engineering and equipment (R2
Lump Sum 1 675,000 675 1\.16
Mbour)
Pipes
Transmission pipes Mbour-Mbodiène DCI DN700 m 24,400 280 6,822 11\.76
Water Storage
Mbodiène water storage tank 2,000 m3 No\. 1 1,000,000 1,000 1\.72
3
Pointe Sarène water storage tank 1,500 m Lump Sum 1 1,500,000 1,500 2\.59
Supervision
Supervision (Mbour-Mbodiène and Nguekhokh) Lump Sum 1 500,000 500 0\.86
Technical control (Mbour-Mbodiène and Nguekhokh) Lump Sum 1 25,000 25 0\.04
1\.2 Nguekhokh System Upgrading 1,840 3\.17
27
Unit Price Cost Cost
Activities Unit Quantity
(CFAFâ000) (CFAF M) (US$ M)
Boreholes
Drilling (F3 and F4 Nguekhokh) No\. 2 100,000 200 0\.34
Borehole equipment (F3 Nguekhokh) No\. 1 210,000 210 0\.36
Borehole equipment (F4 Nguekhokh) No\. 1 210,000 210 0\.36
Water Storage
Elevated storage tank 1,100 m3 in Nguekhokh and
No\. 1 650,000 650 1\.12
building rehabilitation
Pipes
Rehabilitation and expansion networks and standposts m 42,000 10 420 0\.72
Renewal of connections No\. 1,500 100 150 0\.26
1\.3 Social Connections 2,800 4\.83
Social Connections No\. 20,000 100 2,000 3\.45
Network expansion for social connections m 160,000 5 800 1\.38
1\.4 Technical Studies 400 0\.69
Detailed design for expansion of transmission and
Lump Sum 1 400,000 400 0\.69
distribution networks Dakar poles and Petite Côte
Component 2 (Sanitation) 9,734 16\.78
2\.1 Joal-Fadiouth 5,526 9\.53
Lot 1:
Sewerage networks (with manholes) m 44,510 44 1,976 3\.41
House connections No\. 2,967 250 742 1\.28
Pumping stations No\. 5 150,000 750 1\.29
Lot 2:
Wastewater treatment plant m3/day 1,978 750 1,484 2\.56
Sludge treatment plant m3/day 60 5,500 330 0\.57
Lot 3:
Septic tanks, soakaway pits and washing basins No\. 321 631 202 0\.35
Public latrines No\. 8 5,200 42 0\.07
2\.2 Social Connections in Sewered Cities 3,416 5\.89
Diourbel
Sewerage networks (with manholes) m 15,200 44 675 1\.16
House connections No\. 760 250 190 0\.33
Mbour
Sewerage networks (with manholes) m 25,460 44 1,131 1\.95
House connections No\. 1,273 250 318 0\.55
Richard Toll
Sewerage networks (with manholes) m 14,775 44 656 1\.13
28
Unit Price Cost Cost
Activities Unit Quantity
(CFAFâ000) (CFAF M) (US$ M)
House connections No\. 985 250 246 0\.42
Pumping stations No\. 1 200,000 200 0\.34
2\.3 Control and supervision and IEC 542 0\.94
Supervision Joal-Fadiouth Lump Sum 1 248,662 249 0\.43
Supervision Social connections Lump Sum 1 153,727 154 0\.27
IEC Joal-Fadiouth Lump Sum 1 90,000 90 0\.16
IEC social connections Lump Sum 1 50,000 50 0\.09
2\.4 Studies 250 0\.43
Detailed design and bidding docs Sanitation Master
Lump Sum 1 250,000 250 0\.43
Plan of Dakar East
Component 3 (Institutional Strengthening and
2,515 4\.34
Project Management)
3\.1 Support to DGPRE 430 0\.74
Piezometers
Paléocène aquifer No\. 4 30,000 120 0\.21
Maastrichtian aquifer No\. 2 50,000 100 0\.17
Supply of Equipment
Remote metering and control Lump Sum 1 30,000 30 0\.05
Additional Groundwater Studies Ndiass Horst
Lump Sum 1 180,000 180 0\.31
System
3\.2 Technical and Institutional Studies 650 1\.12
TA to ONAS Lump Sum 1 100,000 100 0\.17
2nd generation institutional studies Lump Sum 1 300,000 300 0\.52
Support to rural water supply reform Lump Sum 1 250,000 250 0\.43
3\.3 PCU\. Support 1,435 2\.47
Financial audits Lump Sum 1 25,000 25 0\.04
Project Coordination and Management Lump Sum 1 1,110,000 1,110 1\.91
Beneficiaries Surveys No\. 2 50,000 100 0\.17
Support to implementation of ESMP Lump Sum 1 200,000 200 0\.34
TOTAL 40,598 70\.00
29
Annex 3: Implementation Arrangements
SENEGAL: URBAN WATER AND SANITATION PROJECT
Project Institutional and Implementation Arrangements
1\. The institutional implementation arrangements are similar to those used in previous IDA-
financed projects in the urban water and sanitation sector, which proved to be efficient and ensured
a satisfactory execution of activities\.
Project administration mechanisms
2\. Oversight\. A Steering Committee (Comité de coordination et de suivi, CCS) was established
by Ministerial Decision no\. MHA/5317 on April 8, 2015 to oversee the implementation of the
proposed project\. It regroups representatives of MHA, MEFP (represented by the Directorate of
Economic and Financial Cooperation and the Directorate of Investment (DI), DEEC, SONES,
ONAS and OFOR and the PCU as the CCS secretary\.
3\. Project Management and Coordination\. The existing PEPAM's PCU will ensure the
financial management and overall coordination of the proposed project\. It will (i) carry out
financial management; (ii) prepare annual work plans and budgets, to be approved by the CCS and
the Association; and (iii) ensure monitoring and evaluation and reporting (including safeguards
and financial reporting)\.
4\. Implementation Responsibilities\. The urban water component of the project will be
implemented by SONES, and the urban sanitation component by ONAS\. The PCU will manage
implementation of the institutional support and project management component in cooperation
with the technical departments of the MHA\.
Financial Management, Disbursements and Procurement
Financial Management Assessment
5\. The assessment found the PCUâs existing financial management system to be adequate to
handle the FM tasks of this project\. The FM capacity built under the ongoing PEPAM-IDA will
be strengthened to manage the activities of the project\. The overall financial management
performance based on the last supervision mission was Highly Satisfactory, and the auditorâs
opinion of the last yearâs financial statements was unqualified\. However, the actions needed to be
taken to enhance the financial management arrangements for the Project, particularly in order to
account for the specific activities of the proposed project, were agreed at pre-appraisal\. Table 3-1
below provides their current status\. The assessment concluded that the financial management
arrangements meet the Bankâs minimum requirements under OP/BP10\.00\. The overall residual
risk rating is Moderate\.
30
Table 3-1: FM Action Plan
Action Date due Responsible
1 Prepare and agree with the Bank on the format of
Done PCU
the IFRs\.
2 Update the existing FM manual to take into
Not later than one month
account the financial management arrangements PCU
after effectiveness
of this project
3 Not later than four months
Extension of the PCU auditorâ s contract PCU
after effectiveness
Financial Management Arrangements
6\. Budgeting\. The budgeting process and monitoring will be clearly defined in the
administrative, financial and accounting procedures incorporated in the Project Implementation
Manual (PIM) and the budget will be adopted by the Project Steering Committee before the
beginning of the year\. Annual draft budgets will be submitted for the Bankâs no-objection before
adoption and implementation\. Reports of budget monitoring and recommendations will be
prepared by the FM team every quarter and included in the Interim Financial Reports (IFR)\.
7\. Accounting\. The current accounting standards in use in Senegal for on-going Bank-financed
projects will be applicable\. SYSCOA is the assigned accounting system in the West Africa
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries\. Project accounts will be maintained on an
accrual basis, supported with appropriate records and procedures to track commitments and to
safeguard assets\. Annual financial statements will be prepared by the PCU in accordance with the
SYSCOA\. Accounting and control procedures will be documented in the updated PIM\.
8\. Internal control\. The existing PIM of the PCU is being updated in order to: (i) clearly define
FM procedures; (ii) give a clear description of operations documentation; (iii) provide a clear
description of the internal control systems that will be used by the project; (iv) maintain an
appropriate safeguard of the assets and funds; (v) clarify roles and responsibilities of all
stakeholders particularly for ONAS and SONES; and (vi) give a clear description of the budget
monitoring and reporting process\.
9\. Financial Reporting\. The PCU will produce quarterly unaudited IFRs, which will include
sources and uses of funds by project expenditures classification and a comparison of budgeted and
actual project expenditures (commitment and disbursement) to date and for the quarter\. The IFRs
are to be submitted to the Bank within 45 days after the end of the calendar quarter\. The PCU has
already prepared and agreed with the Bank on the format of the IFRs\. The PCU will produce
Annual Financial Statements, and these statements will comply with SYSCOA and World Bank
requirements\. These Financial Statements 8 will comprise of:
⢠A Statement of Sources and Uses of Funds
⢠A Statement of Commitments
⢠Accounting Policies Adopted and Explanatory Notes
⢠Reconciliation of the Designated Account
8
It should be noted that the project financial statements should be all inclusive and cover all sources and uses of funds and not only those provided
through IDA funding\. It thus reflects all program activities, financing, and expenditures, including funds from other development partners\.
31
⢠A Management Assertion that project funds have been expended for the intended
purposes as specified in the relevant financing agreements\.
10\. External Auditing\. The Financing Agreement will require the submission of Audited
Financial Statements for the project to IDA within six months after year-end\. An external auditor
with qualification and experience satisfactory to the World Bank will be appointed to conduct an
annual audit of the projectâs financial statements\. The contract for the existing auditor of the PCU
will be extended to take into account the audit of the proposed project\.
11\. The Audit Report and Due Date table below summarizes the auditing requirements:
Audit Report Due Date
Annual audited financial statements and Management Letter (including
End of June
reconciliation of the Designated Accounts with appropriate notes and disclosures)\.
12\. Financial Covenants\. The Borrower shall establish and maintain a financial management
system including records, accounts and preparation of related financial statements in accordance
with accounting standards acceptable to the Bank\. The Financial Statements will be audited in
accordance with international auditing standards\. The Audited Financial Statements for each
period shall be furnished to the Association not later than six (6) months after the end of the project
fiscal year\. The Borrower shall prepare and furnish to the Association not later than 45 days after
the end of each calendar quarter, interim un-audited financial reports for the Project, in form and
substance satisfactory to the Association\. The Borrower shall comply with all the rules and
procedures required for withdrawals from the Designated Accounts of the project\.
Disbursements
13\. Disbursement Methods, The following disbursement methods may be used under the
project: reimbursement, advance, direct payment and special commitment as specified in the
Disbursement Letter and in accordance with the World Bank Disbursement Guidelines for
Projects, dated May 1, 2006\. Disbursements will be transactions-based where withdrawal
applications will be supported with Statements of Expenditures (SOE)\. A segregated Designated
Account (DA) will be opened in a commercial bank acceptable to the Association to facilitate
payment for eligible expenditures\. The DA will be managed according to the disbursement
procedures described in the administrative and financial procedures manual in compliance with
the Disbursement Letter\. The DA will be managed by the Directorate of Investment (DI) of MEFP,
in coordination with the PCU\. The ceiling of the DA will be set to CFAF 2\.3 billion and will cover
approximately four months of expenditures\. The DA will be replenished through the submission
of withdrawal applications on a monthly basis by the PCU through the DI and will include SOEs
and documents as may be required\.
32
14\. Funds Flow Arrangements\. Funds flow arrangements for the project are as follows:
Funds Flow Chart
IDA
Designated
Account Government PCU
(DI)
Suppliers
Consultants
Transfer of funds
Direct payment
Transmission of documents
15\. The allocation of IDA financing across categories of expenditures is outlined in the table
below\.
Table 3-2: Allocation of IDA Financing (USD million)
Percentage of
Amount of the Credit Expenditures to be
Category
expressed in USD Financed (inclusive of
taxes)
(1) Goods, works,
non-consulting
services, and
consultantsâ 70,000,000 100%
services, Training
and Operating
Costs for the
Project
TOTAL AMOUNT 70,000,000
Procurement
16\. National procurement system and ongoing reforms\. Senegal adopted a Public Procurement
Law in June 2006 and a new Public Procurement Code (decree NË 2014-1212, dated September
22, 2014), as part of the action plan of the Country Procurement Assessment Review for Senegal
carried out in FY03\. The new Public Procurement Code increased the procurement thresholds and
introduced a new concept of unsolicited bids\. The legal framework is in line with the international
33
standards and WAEMUâs guidelines\. The independent Procurement Regulatory Authority
(Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics, ARMP) responsible for policy and handling
complaints from bidders and the National Procurement Department (DCMP) responsible for
controls of procurement transactions are fully operational and appropriately carry out their
respective missions\. Controls within most key contracting authorities are effective through their
respective Procurement Commission and Procurement Units\. A system (SIGMAP) for collecting,
disseminating, and managing procurement information and monitoring procurement statistics has
been developed and is operational at the level of the DCMP and some line ministries\. The
Government intends to apply the SIGMAP to all contracting authorities, including municipalities,
in order to improve efficiency, information gathering, and monitoring of procurement transactions\.
Most of the key decisions as regard sanctions, contract awards, sole source justifications, and
complaints are posted on the Public Procurement Website (www\.marchespublics\.sn)\. National
Standard Bidding Documents have been drafted and are being used by contracting authorities\.
However, there is a need to ensure regular external and internal procurement compliance reviews
from the ARMP and to strengthen the capacity of its new Procurement Investigation Unit\. In
general, Senegalâs procurement laws and regulations do not conflict with IDA guidelines\.
However, provisions restricting the eligibility of bidders to those coming from WAEMU countries
only will not be applied\. No special exceptions, permits, or licenses need to be specified in credit
documents since IDA procedures take precedence over those laws and regulations
Capacity Assessment and Remedial Actions
17\. An assessment of the executing agenciesâ capacity to implement procurement was carried
out by the Bankâs procurement specialist in November 2009\. This assessment was revised and
updated in December 2014\. The assessment reviewed the organizational structure for
implementing the project and the interaction between the different agencies involved in the project\.
The assessment found that SONES, ONAS, and the PCU possessed satisfactory know-how,
technical expertise, and experience in Bank procurement procedures during the implementation of
the past and ongoing IDA-financed projects\. Their procurement capacities include: (i) having
acceptable experience in applying the Bankâs procurement procedures (from planning to contract
awards), (ii) having demonstrated proficiency in managing contracts (scheduling and quality
control of delivery), and (iii) having staff with acceptable knowledge in procurement procedures\.
In addition, the PCU has recruited an experienced procurement specialist under AfDB financing\.
18\. As regards MHA, the Ministryâs procurement organizational structure and conformity with
the national procurement law is satisfactory\. A procurement unit exists and is responsible mainly
for (i) controlling quality and application of the rules, and (ii) advising all the decision-makers on
procurement matters\. A ministerial committee in charge of bid opening, evaluation, and contract
award is operational\. The various entities have diverse procurement experiences\. Several staff
members of these entities were trained in World Bank and National procurement procedures during
the implementation of previous IDAâfinanced projects\.
19\. An agreement has been reached on the following corrective measures:
(a) The existing PIM is being updated to be in accordance with Bankâs procurement
procedures and to clarify the role of staff involved in the procurement process and
in the review and approval system\.
34
(b) Training sessions and workshops will be organized for beneficiaries and financed
by the project (workshop for staff involved in procurement, key staff in the
agencies, and members of Procurement Units and Procurement committees of
MHA) at project launch; training sessions in procurement will be organized by the
Bank and agreed-upon local institutes\.
(c) All procurement documents from the MHA will be transmitted for no-objection
through the PCU, to ensure quality control\.
(d) The procurement specialist based in the PCU will support procurement processes
within the executing agencies\.
(e) An adequate electronic filing system was set up for the project records\.
(f) An assessment will be conducted internally to evaluate the performance of contract
holders in order to draw lessons from the past project (PEPAM-IDA)\.
The overall project risk for procurement is âModerateâ\.
Procurement Arrangements
20\. Procurement responsibilities\. Specific procurement responsibilities of SONES and ONAS
include the following:
(a) Managing the overall planning of activities and the implementation of procurement
processes and monitoring activities and/or components for which each entity is directly
responsible on a day-to-day basis, in line with the PIM and the Bank Guidelines; and
(b) Preparing draft bidding documents, draft requests for proposals, evaluation reports, and
contracts in close collaboration with the PCU\.
21\. The PCU will have overall fiduciary responsibility and will carry out the following activities
to mitigate the procurement risk: (i) overall coordination and quality control and assurance of all
draft procurement documents (bidding documents, requests for proposals, evaluation reports,
terms of reference, contracts, etc\.) prepared by the executing agencies; (ii) preparation and
updating of the Procurement Plan in close collaboration with the executing agencies; and (iii)
seeking and obtaining approval of DCMP and then IDA on all procurement documents, if
necessary\.
22\. Applicable Guidelines\. Procurement for the proposed project will be carried out in
accordance with the World Bankâs âGuidelines:âThe Guidelines on Preventing and Combating
Fraud and Corruption in Projects Financed by IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and Grantsâ, dated
October 15, 2006, and revised in January 2011, the World Bankâs âGuidelines:Procurement of
Goods, Works, and Non-Consulting Services under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits & Grants by
World Bank Borrowersâ dated January 2011 and revised July 2014 and âGuidelines: Selection and
Employment of Consultants by World Bank Borrowersâ dated January 2011 and revised July
2014, and the provisions stipulated in the Financing Agreement\. The various items under different
expenditure categories are described in general in the following paragraphs\.
23\. Fraud, coercion, and corruption\. All procuring entities, as well as bidders, suppliers, and
contractors, shall observe the highest standard of ethics during the procurement and execution of
contracts financed under the project in accordance with paragraph 1\.16 and 1\.17 of the
Procurement Guidelines and paragraphs 1\.23 and 1\.24 of the Consultants Guidelines\.
35
24\. Procurement documents\. Procurement will be carried out using the Bankâs Standard
Bidding Documents (SBDs) or Standard Request for Proposals, respectively for all International
Competitive Bidding (ICB) for goods and works and recruitment of consultants\. For National
Competition Bidding (NCB), while waiting for the Government and the Bank to respectively
validate and give the no-objection on the national bidding documents in preparation, the Recipient
will use the SBD for ICB for goods and works, and the Bankâs Standard Request for Proposals for
recruitment of consultants\. In the same vein, the Sample Form of Evaluation Reports developed
by the Bank will be used until the new national samples are reviewed and found satisfactory to the
Bank\.
25\. Advertising procedure\. The General Procurement Notice (GPN), Specific Procurement
Notices, Requests for Expression of Interest, and results of the evaluation and contracts award
should be published in accordance with advertising provisions in the following guidelines:
âGuidelines:Procurement of Goods, Works, and Non-Consulting Services under IBRD Loans and
IDA Credits & Grants by World Bank Borrowersâ dated January 2011 and revised July 2014 and
âGuidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants by World Bank Borrowersâ dated January
2011 and revised July 2014,
26\. Procurement of works\. Works procured under this project will include but are not limited
to (i) construction of social connections, including expansion of distribution networks; (ii)
construction and rehabilitation of water supply systems; (iii) construction of water storage tanks;
(iv) construction of boreholes; (v) installation of piezometers; (vi) construction of sewerage
networks; (vii) construction of sanitation social connection; and (viii) a wastewater treatment plant
and sewage pumping stations\.
27\. Direct contracting may be used where necessary if agreed in the procurement plan in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3\.7 of the Procurement Guidelines\. Given the need
for rapid results on the ground and in compliance with Article 2 of the Decree on Water Services
Regulations and Article 59\.6 of the lease contract between the Government, SONES and SdE,
which provides the latter with exclusive rights to implement water service connections and
extension works of secondary and tertiary distributions networks), the following contract will be
awarded to SdE under the Direct Contracting method: construction of 20,000 social connections
and extension works of secondary and tertiary distribution networks to support the installation of
the social connections\.
28\. Procurement of goods: Goods procured under this project will include the supply of
vehicles, computer equipment and office equipment, water meters, and so forth\.
29\. Selection of consultants\. Consulting services procured under this project will include:
supervision of civil works, financial audit, contract management, and studies\.
30\. Short lists of consultants for services estimated to cost less than US$300,000 equivalent per
contract may be composed entirely of national consultants in accordance with the provisions of
paragraphs 2\.7 through 2\.8 of the Consultant Guidelines\.
36
31\. Single source selection (SSS)\. In exceptional cases, this method would be used in
accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 3\.9 to 3\.11 of the Guidelines, with IDAâs prior no
objection\.
32\. Procurement of non-consulting services\. The description, estimated cost and the
procurement methods will be defined in the Procurement Plan\.
33\. Training, workshops, seminars, and conferences\. âTrainingâ means the reasonable costs,
included in the Annual Work Plans, of provision of training to persons under the Project, including
seminars, workshops, knowledge sharing activities and study tours, consisting of the following:
travel and subsistence costs for training participants, costs associated with securing the services of
trainers, rental of training facilities, preparation and reproduction of training materials, and other
costs directly related to training preparation and implementation\. All training and workshop
activities will be carried out on the basis of approved annual programs that will identify the general
framework of training activities for the year, including (i) the type of training or workshop; (ii)
personnel to be trained; (iii) institutions that will conduct the training; and (iv) duration of the
proposed training as well as the outcome and impact of the training\.
34\. Operating costs\. The operating costs will include: (i) staff salaries; (ii) travel expenditures
and other travel-related allowances with prior clearance from IDA; (iii) equipment rental and
maintenance; (iv) vehicle maintenance and repair; and (v) utilities and communication expenses\.
Operating costs financed by the project will be procured using the administrative procedures
described in the PIM that were reviewed and found acceptable to the Association\.
35\. Implementation readiness\. The following actions were conducted during the preparation of
this project:
(a) A detailed Procurement Plan for the first 18 months of the project has been prepared and
agreed upon on March 31, 2015\.
(b) The GPN was prepared and reviewed by the Bank and will be advertised locally and in
the United Nations Development Business online\.
Procurement plan
36\. The Recipient developed a draft Procurement Plan for project implementation that provides
the basis for the procurement methods\. This plan was agreed between the Recipient and the
Association on March 31, 2015\. Upon approval of the credit, and with the Recipientâs agreement,
the plan will be published on the Bankâs public website and will be available in the national
procurement website (www\.marchespublics\.sn) and PEPAMâs website maintained by the PCU\.
The Procurement Plan will be updated, at least annually, in agreement with the Bank team or as
required to reflect the actual project implementation needs and improvements in institutional
capacity\.
37\. For each contract to be financed by the credit, the following are agreed between the
Recipient and the Bank in the Procurement Plan: the different procurement methods or consultant
selection methods, the need for prequalification, estimated costs, prior review requirements, and
37
time frame\. The prior review and procurement method thresholds indicated in Table 3-3 below are
intended for the initial procurement plan\.
Table 3-3: Thresholds for Procurement Methods and Prior Review
Contract Value
Expenditure Procurement Contract Subject to
(Threshold,
Category Method Prior Review
US$)
1\. Works ⥠10,000,000 ICB All
< 10,000,000 (*) NCB
<100,000 At least 3 Quotations
No threshold Direct contracting All
2\. Goods ⥠1,000,000 ICB All
< 1,000,000 (*) NCB
< 50,000 Shopping No
No threshold Direct contracting All
3\.Consultants
Firms QCBS
> 300,000 FBS All
QBS
QCBS
< 300,000 CQ
LCS
Individuals > 100,000 IC (at least 3 CVs) All
< 100,000 IC (at least 3 CVs) No
Single Source
No threshold Selection (Firms & All
Individuals)
All ToRs regardless of the value of the contract are subject to prior review\.
(*) In specific circumstances, for example, when there is no sufficient number of qualified firms to ensure competition
in the local context, ICB will apply even if the estimated amount is below the thresholds\.
ICB: International competitive QCBS: Quality and Cost-based CQ: Selection based on Consultantsâ
bidding Selection Qualifications
NCB: National competitive bidding FBS: Fixed Budget Selection LCS: Least-Cost Selection
QBS: Quality-Based Selection IC: Individual Consultants
(a) All contract amendments raising the initial contract value by more than 15 percent
of the original amount or above the prior review thresholds will be subject to prior
review by the Bank as determined mandatory in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Annex 1 of
the Bankâs Procurement Guidelines\.
(b) Post review: For each contract for goods and public works not submitted to prior
review, the procurement documents will be submitted to IDA post review in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of Annex 1 of the Bankâs
Procurement Guidelines\. The post review will be based on a ratio of at least 1 of 5
contracts\. The prior review thresholds and other measures to be taken to mitigate
the procurement risk should be reevaluated once a year with a view toward
adjusting them to reflect changes in the procurement risk that may have taken place
in the meantime and to adapt them to specific situations\. In case of failure to comply
with the agreed mitigation measures or Bank guidelines, a reevaluation of both
types of thresholds, ICB and prior review, may be required by IDA\.
38
(c) The Association shall determine by notice to the Recipient the revision of
procurement prior review thresholds\.
38\. A summary of the procurement packages and of the consultancy assignments is presented
below in Tables 3-4 and 3-5\.
Table 3-4: List of Contract Packages to Be Procured Following ICB, NCB, and Direct Contracting
Estimated Procure-
Ref\. Review Expected Bid Com-
Contract (Description) Cost ment P-Q
No\. by Bank Opening ments
(US$) Method
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Component A: Water Supply
Drilling of seven boreholes in
the Tassette area and four October 27,
1 1,865,000 NCB NO POST SONES
boreholes in Mbour, Somone et 2015
Nguekhokh
Equipment of seven boreholes
October 27,
2 and one pumping station in 3,630,000 NCB NO POST SONES
2015
Tassette
Equipment of five boreholes
December 2,
3 and one pumping station in 3,610,000 NCB NO POST SONES
2015
Mbour, Somone et Nguekhokh
Construction of one 20,000 m3 November 11,
4 4,310,000 NCB NO POST SONES
water tank in Thiès 2015
Construction of three elevated
water storage tanks in Mbodiene
November 11,
5 (2,000 m3), Pointe Sarène 5,430,000 NCB NO POST SONES
2015
(1,500 m3) and Nguekhokh
(1,100 m3)
Supply and laying of 600 to 700
mm ductile iron pipes between
Tassette and Thiès water tanks November 11,
6 21,670,000 ICB NO PRIOR SONES
and of 700 mm ductile iron 2015
pipes between Mbour and
Mbodiene
Upgrading of water network and November 17,
7 980,000 NCB NO POST SONES
equipment in Nguekhokh 2015
Construction of 20,000 water
SONES
8 service connections and of 160 4,830,000 DC NO PRIOR N/A
/ SdE
km of distribution networks
Component B: Sanitation
Sanitation works in Joal- August 30, ONAS
1 9,110,000 NCB NO PRIOR
Fadiouth 2015
2 On-site sanitation facilities 420,000 NCB NO POST July 31, 2015 ONAS
Construction of sewerage
October 30,
3 connections in selected urban 5,890,000 NCB NO POST ONAS
2015
centers
Component C: Institutional Strengthening and Project Management
Installation of six piezometers September 18,
1 380,000 NCB NO POST PCU
for DGPRE 2015
39
Estimated Procure-
Ref\. Review Expected Bid Com-
Contract (Description) Cost ment P-Q
No\. by Bank Opening ments
(US$) Method
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Supply and installation of
September 3,
2 remote monitoring equipment 50,000 NCB NO POST PCU
2015
for DGPRE
August 15,
3 Supply of vehicles 114,000 NCB NO POST PCU
2015
39\. International competitive bidding\. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph 40 below,
works and goods shall be procured under contracts awarded on the basis of ICB\.
40\. Other methods of procurement of goods and works\. The table below specifies the methods
of procurement, other than international competitive bidding, that may be used for goods and
works\. The Procurement plan shall specify the circumstances under which such methods may be
used:
Other Procurement Methods
Limited international bidding
National competitive bidding
Shopping procedures
Direct contracting
Procurement under Framework Agreements
Table 3-5: Consultancy Assignments with Selection Methods and Time Schedule
Estimated Review Expected
Ref\. Selection Com-
Description of Assignment Cost by Proposal
No\. Method ments
(US$) Bank Submission
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Component A: Water Supply
Control and supervision of works in
1 860,000 QCBS PRIOR August 24, 2015 SONES
Thiès - Tassette
Control and supervision of works in
2 860,000 QCBS PRIOR August 31, 2015 SONES
Mbour â Mbodiene - Nguekhokh
Technical control in Tassette and
3 130,000 QCBS POST October 5, 2015 SONES
Mbour â Mbodiene - Nguekhokh
Master Plan (Water Transmission and
4 Distribution) for the new Dakar urban 690,000 QCBS PRIOR August 24, 2015 SONES
poles and Petite Côte
Component B: Sanitation
Detailed design studies of the
5 430,000 QCBS PRIOR August 15, 2015 ONAS
Sanitation Master Plan for East Dakar
Control and supervision of works in
6 430,000 QCBS PRIOR August 15, 2015 ONAS
Joal-Fadiouth
Control and supervision of works of
7 270,000 QCBS PRIOR August 15, 2015 ONAS
the Social Connections Program
8 IEC in Joal-Fadiouth 160,000 QCBS POST July 31, 2015 ONAS
9 IEC for social connections 90,000 QCBS POST July 31, 2015 ONAS
40
Estimated Review Expected
Ref\. Selection Com-
Description of Assignment Cost by Proposal
No\. Method ments
(US$) Bank Submission
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Component C: Institutional Strengthening and Project Management
Hydrogeological study of the Horst de October 31,
1 310,000 QCBS PRIOR PCU
Ndiass System 2015
Technical assistance to ONAS for
2 85,000 CQ POST August 15, 2015 PCU
expanding the GIS to Joal-Fadiouth
Technical assistance to ONAS for
updating the contractual framework
3 (Performance contract between GoS 85,000 CQ POST August 15, 2015 PCU
and ONAS and performance contracts
of the private operators)
Institutional studies and support to 2nd
4 520,000 QCBS PRIOR June 15, 2015 PCU
generation reforms
Strategic studies for support to OFOR
5 in implementing the rural water sector 430,000 QCBS PRIOR July 15, 2015 PCU
reform
Support to implementation of the
7 340,000 IC PRIOR June 15, 2015 PCU
ESMP
8 Financial Audits 40,000 QCBS POST June 15, 2015 PCU
QCBS = Quality- and cost-based selection
CQ = Selection based on consultantsâ qualifications
IC = Individual Consultant
41\. Quality- and cost-based selection\. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph 42 below,
consultant services shall be procured under contracts awarded on the basis of quality- and cost-
based selection\.
42\. Other methods of procurement of consultant services\. The table below specifies methods of
procurement, other than Quality and Cost-based Selection, which may be used for consultantsâ
services\. The Procurement Plan shall specify the circumstances under which such methods may
be used\.
Other Procurement Methods
Least Cost Selection
Selection based on Consultantsâ qualifications
Selection under a fixed budget
Quality Based Selection
Single Source Selection
Individual Consultants
41
Frequency of procurement supervision
43\. In addition to the prior review supervision to be carried out from Bank offices, the capacity
assessment of the implementing agency has recommended (i) supervision missions every six
months to visit the field, and (ii) at least one annual post procurement review\.
44\. Procurement and technical audit\. A procurement and technical audit will be carried out at
least every two years during project implementation and a report will be prepared on the
procurement process, contract management, fiduciary compliance, and so forth\.
Environmental and Social (including safeguards)
45\. The GoS prepared and disclosed the required safeguard documentation on time\. These
instruments provide specific mitigation measures along with their comprehensive implementation
mechanisms\. the main responsibilities are distributed as follows:
⢠The DEEC is the national institution, along with its decentralized units, in charge of
enforcement of the environmental assessment procedure\. It has the primary mandate to
ensure that the PCU complies with the safeguard issues throughout the preparation and the
construction phases\. Furthermore, a memorandum has been agreed with the PCU for
collaborative supervision of the contractors on the ground during the civil works\. Though
the DEEC will report to the PCU in the framework of this memorandum, the DEEC will
be receiving all the final safeguards implementation supervision and audit reports\.
⢠The PCU will be responsible for implementing the safeguard instruments and measures,
on behalf of the Government\. To this end, the PCU will collaborate with: (i) the DEEC for
follow up on execution of mitigation measures by the enterprises; (ii) the institution in
charge of the monitoring of water and air quality in the project influence zone; and (iii) the
national entity in charge of heritage conservation for execution of the chance find
procedure, should a case arise\. The PCU will ensure regular reporting as well as mid-term
and final audits of the environment and social measures and recommendations\. These
reports are shared with the ministry in charge of environment in compliance with national
rules\.
⢠The Enterprises (Contractors) will be responsible for executing a large part of the
environmental and social measures of the construction phase, which has been integrated in
the bidding documents\. To this end, the enterprises will prepare their own ESMP (the
Contractor Environmental and Social Management Plan â CESMP), excerpted from the
global ESMPs approved through the ESIA reports\. The draft CESMPs will be cleared by
the PCU in collaboration with DEEC prior to commencement of the civil works, and the
approved version will be integrated into the Enterprisesâ detailed work plan\. To carry out
proper implementation of its environmental and social compliance obligations, any
contractor working for the project will recruit environmental and social safeguard
specialists who will work closely with the principal engineer of the team\. The
implementation reports must detail progress in the execution of the CESMP, and be shared
with the DEEC and the national entity in charge of heritage conservation\.
⢠The Works Supervisor (Firm or Engineer): the Supervising Engineer will be in charge of
the technical control tasks, as well as ensuring the day-to-day oversight of CESMP
compliance by the contractor\. An environmental safeguard specialist will be recruited as
42
part of the team to help ensure compliance\. A separate CESMP survey report will be
periodically provided to the PCU\.
⢠Other key stakeholders: nature, role and responsibilities (general and specific to the
project), and specific tasks to execute; collaboration with (professional groups, the local
authorities, specialists, etc\.)\. Reports will be sent to the PCU, DEEC, and the World Bank
etc\. for records, compliance and dissemination purposes\.
Follow up and reporting of the mitigation measures
46\. The environmental and social mitigation measures will be executed, monitored and reported
in: (i) a specific Safeguard Monitoring Report; and (ii) the Environmental and Social Safeguards
section of the overall project periodic report\. The responsibility of the follow up is with the PCU
in collaboration with DEEC\. Following are the overall implementation indicators to be monitored:
⢠environmental baseline (air, water, noise) study completed;
⢠number of mitigation measures executed on time;
⢠number of safeguard implementation reports\.
⢠completion of the RAPs execution before the commencement of civil works (%);
⢠number of complaints received/resolved after compensation/relocation;
⢠existence of safeguard specialists in the team of enterprises and supervising engineers (#);
47\. Summary of the critical safeguard implementation measures:
No\. Actions Responsible
Inclusion of appropriate environmental and social mitigation activities and
1 measures in the bidding documents and the contracts of the enterprises and PCU
civil works supervisors
2 Strengthening the managing and technical capacity of the PCUâs safeguard PCU
unit
4 Existence of sound protocol (staff, equipment and baseline studies) for the
follow through on the residual impacts of the waste water and sludge SONES
treatment plants in Joal
5 Relocation/compensation of all the affected populations as approved in the PCU
RAPs
Finalization of the baseline/reference study on air and water resources SONES
6 quality parameters in the new airport influence areas
8 Approval of the CESMPs and their integration in the contractorsâ work plan PCU (DEEC)
10 Reporting periodically to the ministry in charge of environment to comply PCU
with the national rules
Monitoring & Evaluation
48\. Project outcome indicators will be calculated using intermediate results and African
harmonized ratios in the water and sanitation sector\. The contractual framework of the urban water
sub-sector, and particularly the performance contracts of SONES, SdE and ONAS provides for an
adequate gathering of key project outcome indicators, e\.g\. access data and information on the
financial equilibrium of the sector\. Information on the population benefitting from improved
services will be collected by SdE\. Progress reports produced by the consultants in charge of control
43
and supervision of the water and sanitation works will provide an adequate reporting of indicators
of the projectâs intermediate results\.
49\. The PCU will compile the data, produce progress and monitoring reports, and initiate
specific evaluation studies by independent consultants as needed\.
Financial Conditions and Covenants
50\. A sound institutional and contractual framework and financial viability are essential to
project sustainability\. The following covenants have been agreed upon at negotiations:
⢠In order to ensure the financial sustainability and maintain the Financial Equilibrium of
SONES, throughout Project implementation, the Recipient shall implement all necessary
measures, including, inter alia, any adjustments in water tariffs in accordance with the
Water and Sanitation Law\.
⢠No later than December 31, 2019, the Recipient shall ensure that all measures, including
any required sanitation surcharge revisions in accordance with the Water and Sanitation
Law are in place to allow ONAS to achieve financial sustainability including covering at
least 90 percent of its cash operating expenditures related to sewerage activities\.
âFinancial Equilibriumâ means the situation where the Net Cash Balance at the end of year
n is positive or equal to zero\. For the purpose of this definition, âNet Cash Balanceâ at the
end of year n means the net cash balance at the beginning of year n, plus the Net Cash Flow
(positive or negative) for year n; and âNet Cash Flowâ for year n means the sum of the net
operating cash flow, plus any additional external financing (grants, subsidies, increases in
equity capital and drawings under loans of more than one year) received during year n, less
the Variation in Net Working Capital Requirements, the repayments of loans of more than
one year, and the investments for that year; and âVariation in Net Working Capital
Requirementsâ means the variation of current assets excluding cash minus the variation in
current liabilities for year n\.
44
Annex 4: Implementation Support Plan
SENEGAL: URBAN WATER AND SANITATION PROJECT
Strategy and Approach for Implementation Support
1\. The strategy for implementation support has been developed based on the nature of the
project and its risk profile\. Special attention will be given to help address risks linked to the reform
of the water and sanitation sector and its financial viability, which will include: (i) assessing
progress in designing the sector reform; and (ii) reviewing the results of the periodic updates of
the sectorâs financial model; and (iii) helping to bring consensus on measures designed to maintain
the financial equilibrium\.
Implementation Support Plan
2\. Financial Management\. Based on the outcome of the FM risk assessment, the following
implementation support plan is proposed\. The objective of the implementation support plan is to
ensure the project maintains a satisfactory financial management system throughout the projectâs
life\.
FM Activity Frequency
Desk reviews
Interim financial reports review Quarterly
Audit report review of the program Annually
Review of other relevant information such as interim internal Continuous as they become
control systems reports\. available
On site visits
Review of overall operation of the FM system Annual (Implementation Support
Mission)
Monitoring of actions taken on issues highlighted in audit As needed
reports, auditorsâ management letters, internal audit and other
reports
Transaction reviews (if needed) As needed
Capacity building support
FM training sessions During implementation and as and
when needed\.
45
3\. The main focus of implementation support to implementation during the course of the
project includes:
Partner
Time Focus Resource Estimate
Role
First 12 Technical and procurement review of the N/A
months Water and sanitation specialists 7 SWs
bidding documents
Procurement training Procurement specialist(s) 3 SWs
FM supervision and training FM specialist 4 SWs
Social impact and land acquisition Social specialist 2 SWs
Environmental supervision and training Environmental specialist(s) 4 SWs
Financial analyst/Private sector
Financial and institutional aspects 2 SWs
specialist
Team leadership Task Team Leader 8 SWs
12-48 10 SWs N/A
Project construction Water and sanitation specialists
months
Procurement specialist(s)
10 SWs
8 SWs
Environment and social monitoring & Environmental specialist(s)
reporting Social specialist
8 SWs
Financial management
FM specialist 8 SWs
disbursement and reporting
Financial analyst/Private sector
Financial and institutional aspects 12 SWs
specialist
Team leadership Task Team Leader 22 SWs
Staff skill mix required is summarized below\.
Number of Staff Number of
Skills Needed Comments
Weeks Trips
Water and Sanitation specialists 17 6 Regional and country office based
Procurement 13 - Country office based
Social specialist 10 - Regional office based
Environment specialist 12 - Regional office based
Financial management specialist 12 - Country office based
Financial analyst/Private sector
14 4
specialist
Task team leader 30 8 Regionally based
46
Annex 5: Economic and Financial Analyses
SENEGAL: URBAN WATER AND SANITATION PROJECT
1\. The Economic Analysis Section aims to assess the economic impact of the components of
the proposed project through a cost-benefit analysis of the water activities and a cost-effectiveness
analysis of the sanitation activities\. The Financial Analysis Section aims to assess: (i) the financial
impact of the projectâs activities on the urban water supply sector and on SONES; and (ii) the
financial viability of SONES and ONAS\.
A\. Economic Analysis
Methodology and Scope
2\. Water Supply\. The economic analysis consists of a cost-benefit analysis of the water supply
activities of the proposed project\. As explained in the project description, these activities help: (i)
address the current water shortages in Dakar and the Petite Côte (through the development of
groundwater resources in Tassette and investments in Mbour-Mbodiène); (ii) restore adequate
water services in Nguekhokh; and (iii) expand access to water services through a social
connections program that will be implemented throughout the country\. The cost-benefit analysis
encompasses 71 percent of total project costs\. It considers an investment program consisting of
the water supply component, an allocated portion of the institutional strengthening and project
management component, and the incremental (with/without project) costs and benefits associated
with these investments\. All calculations are carried out over a 30-year period, using constant 2013
prices and excluding taxes and financing costs\.
3\. Sanitation\. The analysis is based on the comparison of investment costs per capita for each
of the available sanitation options\.
Water Supply
4\. Investment Costs\. The cost estimates are drawn from: (i) preliminary design studies and
outcome of the most recent bids made by SONES for similar production, storage and transmission
facilities; and (ii) cost estimates of distribution facilities (including service connections) provided
by SdE\. Direct investment costs consist of: (i) the costs of activities of Component 1; and (ii) the
cost of activities of Component 3 which may be partially (project management activities) allocated
to water supply\. In addition, given that Tassetteâs production facilities would first be used to
address water shortages in the Dakar region (transferring water to the Thiès storage tanks) until
the KMS 3 scheme is commissioned in 2021, and then to address water shortages in Petite Côte,
project investments have to be adjusted by:
⢠Adding the cost of a 22-kilometer transmission line from the Tassette well field to
Mbour; and
⢠Subtracting the residual value in 2021 of the project investments located in Thiès, which
would be used exclusively to convey water from the KMS 3 scheme\.
5\. Detailed investment costs are given below\.
47
Table 5-1: Investment Costs for Economic Analysis (CFAF Million)
Activities Cost Estimate Adjusted Cost
Development of groundwater resources:
Tassette 11,608 8,858
Mbour-Mbodiène 11,702 11,702
Nguekhokh 1,840 1,840
Social connections 2,800 2,800
Project management (including safeguards) 723 723
Total 28,673 25,923
Source: Design studies, SONES, SdE and Bank estimates
6\. Incremental Costs\. The energy costs of the new facilities are drawn from the design studies;
other operating costs are estimated on the basis of the current SdE expenditures as stated in the
Financial Model and would be as follows:
Table 5-2: Operating Costs
Consumption Unit Cost
Item per m3 Cost (CFAF) (CFAF/m3
produced produced)
Electricity:
⢠From Tassette to Dakar 0\.375 kWh 97 36\.5
⢠From Tassette to Petite Côte 0\.375 kWh 97 36\.5
⢠Mbour boreholes 0\.360 kWh 97 26\.5
⢠Mbour-Mbodiène 0\.250 kWh 97 33\.8
⢠Nguekhokh 0\.335 kWh 106 35\.5
⢠Other regions 0\.490 kWh 106 51\.9
Chlorination
7\.4 g 850/kg 6\.32
⢠Dakar and Petite Côte (chlorine)
⢠Other regions (hypochlorite)
24\.5 g 245/kg 5\.99
Commercial costs CFAF 6,000 per connection per year
Maintenance costs 0\.5% of investment costs per year
Source: Design studies, SONES financial model and Bank estimates
7\. Incremental Benefits\. The incremental benefits generated by the project activities are
listed in the table below, which also links activities and the PDO:
Table 5-3: Project Economic Benefits
Development Objective/Activities Incremental Benefits
Improving access to water services The increase of production and transmission
(existing consumers): capacities would be used to eliminate water deficits
in impacted areas and generate additional water
consumption from existing users\.
⢠Development of Tassette Benefits would vary over time and would be as
groundwater resources follows:
48
- From 2018 to 2021, Tassette water would be
distributed in Dakar; benefits would be increased
water revenues from existing water users\.
- After 2021 (and the commissioning of other water
systems), Tassette water would be distributed in
Petite Côte; benefits would be water revenues
from existing water users\.
⢠Mbour-Mbodiène and Water produced by facilities would be distributed in
Nguekhokh: the urban centers of Petite Côte; benefits would be
increased water revenues from existing users\.
Increasing access to safe water (social - Incremental water revenues from new connections
connections) - Consumer surplus accruing to beneficiaries
8\. Incremental Revenues\. The incremental consumption, water prices and revenues are
estimated on the basis of: (i) current data on water consumption and current water rates (the current
water tariff schedule is given in the Appendix to this annex); and (ii) the results of a survey of the
willingness-to-pay of unconnected water users 9\. The average revenue per additional m3 sold is: (i)
for existing consumers, the average revenue observed in the impacted centers, excluding
administrative users, the tariff of which includes a substantial part of subsidies; and (ii) for new
consumers, the average revenue from social connections\. The assumptions for estimating
incremental revenues accruing to the water utilities are summarized in the table below:
Table 5-4: Consumption and Water Rates
Average
No\. of people Consumption
Beneficiaries Revenue
served (lpcd)
(CFAF/m3)
Dakar consumers 219,000 65 477
Petite Côte consumers 291,000 65 465
Nguekhokh consumers 43,000 60 376
HH with social
9 per HH 50 240
connection
Source: SONES/SdE Financial Model and Bank estimates
9\. Consumer Surplus\. The table below shows the variation of daily consumption and prices
paid by a household shifting from standposts or water vendors to a social water connection\.
Table 5-5: Consumption and Water Prices with and without Project
Without Project With Project
Current/ Future source of Average
Consumption Average Price Consumption
supply Price
(lpcd) (CFAF/m3) (lpcd)
(CFAF/m3)
Standposts/ social connection 20 500 50 240
Vendors/standposts 10 1,000 50 240
Source: WTP Study and Bank estimates
9
Study of the willingness-to-pay for water and sanitation services in urban areas (EDE-ICEA, 2010 â PPIAF)
49
The consumer surplus is equal to the increase of water consumption multiplied by the difference
of the water price paid before and after the project and by the price elasticity (0\.5)\.
10\. EIRR and NPV\. The economic internal rate of return (EIRR) is estimated at 14\.4 percent\.
The net present value (NPV) of the projectâs benefits and costs is estimated at US$14\.6 million,
using a discount rate of 10 percent\. With the same discount rate, the long-term marginal cost
(LTMC) is estimated at CFAF 402 per m3\. The LTMC is 20 percent lower than the average revenue
per cubic meter sold (excluding the water sales to the administrations), which demonstrates that
groundwater is the least-cost solution\. The EIRR and NPV associated with the sub-components
are as follows:
Table 5-6: Results by Sub-component
NPV@10%
Sub-component EIRR
(US$ M)
Overall project 14\.4% 14\.6
Development of groundwater resources 10\.8% 2\.2
Nguekhokh 15\.2% 1\.3
Social connections Program 36\.2% 11\.0
11\. Sensitivity Analysis\. A range of scenarios has been developed to test the sensitivity of the
EIRR to the main elements of the economic cash-flows\. The variables tested for the sensitivity
analysis were: (i) investment costs; (ii) operating costs; and (iii) overall water demand\. The
outcome of the scenarios is given in Table 5-7 below, which also provides the switching values of
the variables\. The project is particularly sensitive to the reduction of water demand, which exhibits
the lowest switching value\. However, a weak demand response to the project activities is unlikely,
given the current water shortages in the project areas\.
12\. An additional scenario tested the sensitivity of the project to a reduction of the yield of the
Tassette well field after the first five years of operations\. Not surprisingly, the Tassette/Mbour sub-
component is sensitive to a reduction of the production of the Tassette groundwater resources
(switching value: 14 percent), but this reduction is unlikely in view of the result of the
hydrogeological studies\.
Table 5-7: Results of the Sensitivity Analysis
NPV@10%
Scenario EIRR Switching value
(US$ M)
Base scenario 14\.4% 14\.6
Investment cost increase 20% 11\.8% 7\.1 38\.9%
O&M cost increase 20% 13\.7% 12\.1 115\.5%
Overall demand decrease 20% 10\.6% 2\.0 23\.1%
Tassette production reduced by 20%
13\.6% 11\.4 14\.0%â
after five years
â Switching value of the Tassette/Mbour sub-component only
Sanitation
13\. Proposed Options of Sanitation Services\. The sanitation component of the project proposes
various sanitation options, namely sewerage services and on-site sanitation\. The options yield
50
similar benefits to the households in terms of improvement of disposal of both excreta and
wastewater 10\. The on-site facilities, particularly, would not be limited to latrines, but would include
washing facilities associated with soakaway pits\. The effective use of these facilities would be
encouraged by extensive hygiene education programs, leading to effective behavior changes and
better hygienic practices\.
14\. The Particular Case of Joal-Fadiouth\. The existing conditions in Joal-Fadiouth are
particularly challenging for the adequate disposal of septage and wastewater\. In most of the town,
the high water table forbids infiltration and traditional latrines should be frequently emptied\.
Actually, the emptying costs and the absence of adequate disposal facilities for septage haulers
make the adequate disposal of excreta unaffordable for households, which dump wastewater and
septage in their immediate environment\. The project will address these issues by: (i) providing
sewerage connections to households that are located close to the sea; (ii) providing on-site facilities
(septic tanks or VIP latrines) to households located in areas with a lower water table; and (iii)
providing adequate disposal facilities for septage haulers with the construction of a sludge
treatment plant\.
15\. Cost Comparison\. The economic analysis of the sanitation component is based on the cost-
effectiveness of the proposed options, the feasibility of which is also contingent on other
considerations, such as the soil conditions (permeability), the proximity of existing sewers and
hydraulic conditions\. The table below provides the unit cost per capita of the various options:
Table 5-8: Average investment costs of the various sanitation options
Unit cost per Number of
Type of sanitation service person served Design criteria project
(US$) beneficiaries
Sewerage : Joal Fadiouth
Sewerage connection 35
Sewers and pumping stations 129 High water table, high 38,000
Wastewater treatment 68 population density
Total cost 232
Sewerage: Social connections
Housing located in
program
sewered city with
Sewerage connection 35 39,000
existing wastewater
Sewers and pumping stations 124
treatment plant
Total cost 159
On-site sanitation: Peri-urban area,
On-site facility 111 absence of sewers;
3,000
Sludge treatment plant 30 permeable soil, water
Total cost 141 table<1\.3m
Source: Design studies and ONAS
16\. The above results show that the social connections programs in towns already equipped
with a sewerage system have a per capita cost (US$159) close to on-site sanitation (US$141)\. The
creation of a new sewerage system in Joal-Fadiouth generates costs that are 60 percent higher\.
10
The provision of adequate wastewater disposal is all the more important as the majority of households would be
served through water service connections\.
51
However, the technical design criteria (level of the water table and population density) eventually
dictate the sanitation option\.
17\. Potential Cost Savings in Joal Fadiouth\. The project will generate substantial savings in
emptying costs for the beneficiaries of the sanitation sub-component in Joal-Fadiouth\. Table 5-9
below compares the annual cost of adequate disposal of wastewater and septage for an urban
compound (regrouping on average 13 people) in the with/without project situation:
Table 5-9: Annual Cost Savings in Joal Fadiouth (US$ per compound)
With Project
Without
Costs and Savings Unit Sewered On-Site
Project
Compound Facility
Emptying costs
Frequency No\. per year 4 0 1
Unit cost CFAF 17,000 17,000 17,000
Annual cost per compound CFAF 68,000 0 17,000
Sanitation surcharge
Annual water consumption m3 237 237 237
3
Surcharge per m CFAF 0 34 34
Annual surcharge per compound CFAF 0 8,007 8,007
Annual savings:
Per compound CFAF 0 59,993 42,993
Per compound US$ 0 103 74
Per capita US$ 0 8 6
Source: Design studies, ONAS and Bank estimates
B\. Financial Analysis
Financial Impact of the Project
18\. Sectorâs Perspective\. The financial impact of project activities is assessed by the Financial
Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) derived from the cost-benefit analysis\. Financial calculations take
into account the financial revenues and costs in the with/without project situations, including taxes
and excluding non-cash generating benefits (consumer surplus)\. The FIRR is estimated at 8\.3
percent\. This FIRR reflects the rate of return computed from the perspective of the combined
partners of the sector (Government, SONES and SdE)\.
19\. SONESâ perspective\. The financial cash flow accruing to SONES may be computed by: (i)
replacing the flow of investment costs by the debt service paid by SONES to the Government, in
accordance with sector policies; and (ii) deducting the lease contractor rate (about CFAF 360 per
m3) from the average revenue per cubic meter sold\. The pari passu on-lending at the initial IDA
conditions would result in positive annual cash flows for SONES during the grace period of the
credit (until 2021) followed by constantly negative cash flows\. SONESâ financial equilibrium
would not be impacted over the medium term\.
Financial Viability of SONES and ONAS
20\. Current Financial Situation of SONES\. Table 5-10 below summarizes SONESâ most recent
financial statements\. SONES generated a net income of CFAF 973 million in 2013 and of CFAF
52
698 million during the first semester of 2014\. SONESâ cash amounted to CFAF 3 billion at the
end of 2013 and to CFAF 1\.35 billion at the end of 2014\.
Table 5-10: SONES â Selected Financial Data (CFAF M) and Indicators
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014
SONES Fees 18,001 16,842 15,759 16,492
Operating revenues 18,592 18,674 16,494 17,013
Cash operating expenditures 3,030 4,936 3,692 3,240
Depreciation and allowances 11,039 10,346 10,418 10,441
Operating costs 14,069 15,282 14,110 13,682
Operating income 4,523 3,392 2,384 3,331
Interest 2,685 2,334 2,181 2,349
Net income 1,516 1,705 973 1,561
Net cash generation 14,669 11,908 12,231 13,081
Debt service 29,127 4,476 16,955 10,858
Working capital requirements -16,675 8,090 -5,329 3,606
Investments 10,504 8,061 15,094 16,603
Borrowings 12,551 4,933 11,683 12,919
Grants 2,898 2,693 6,516 2,704
Cash on handâ 2,961 3,009 3,093 1,350
Cash variation 717 48 84 -1,743
Operating ratio 75\.7% 81\.8% 85\.5% 83\.8%
Cash operating
expenditures/m3 (CFAF) 25\.6 40\.1 29\.1 25\.3
â excluding cash earmarked for externally-financed projects
21\. SONES is still in financial equilibrium, but the cash variation became negative during 2014\.
SONESâ share of sector revenues (prix patrimoine, Pp) decreased by 20 percent between 2010 and
2014 (see Table 5-10)\. This was attributable to: (i) the increasing share of the consumption billed
in the social block; (ii) the impact of the (contractual) indexation of SdEâs remuneration (prix
exploitant, Pe); and (iii) in 2013, to the reduction of water sales resulting from the interruption of
supply from KMS\.
Table 5-11: Revenue Sharing (CFAF/m3)
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Average revenue per m3 542\.3 561\.2 551\.4 540\.0 535\.2
Pe (SdE) 350\.0 356\.4 364\.0 364\.0 362\.0
Pp (SONES) 150\.0 147\.9 132\.8 122\.8 120\.2
Sanitation surcharge (ONAS) 42\.3 56\.9 54\.6 53\.2 53\.0
22\. Financial Forecasts\. Financial forecasts have been conducted by using the preliminary
version of SONESâ updated financial model\. The updated version takes into account: (i) a medium-
term investment program designed to meet the water demand, including investments of the
proposed project, as well as the KMS 3 project and one tranche of the desalination plant; (ii) the
March 2015 tariff revision (4 percent for the social block and 9 percent for other consumers, with
the exception of administrative consumers); and (iii) further socially-acceptable tariff revisions (1
percent per year from 2017 to 2021 and 2 percent per year afterwards)\. The March 2015 revision
53
will substantially increase SONESâ remuneration (Pp should rise to CFAF 140/m3)\. Those limited
tariff revisions would ensure SONESâ financial equilibrium over the medium term and enable
SONES revenues to cover its cash operating expenditures as well as the debt service until 2025\.
The tariff revisions are also designed to reinforce SONESâ financial viability by reducing the
dependency of SONES on the revenues billed to administrative users\.
Table 5-12: SONES - Selected Financial Data (CFAF M) and Indicators (2015-2025)
Year 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
SONES Fees 19,260 19,801 19,519 19,770 23,177 23,997 24,558 25,089 26,437 27,789 29,422
Operating revenues 19,492 20,038 19,761 20,016 23,429 24,253 24,819 25,356 26,709 28,067 29,705
Total revenues 22,090 22,535 22,609 23,180 26,824 27,764 28,578 30,839 33,516 35,697 37,634
Cash operating
expenditures 3,816 4,165 4,743 5,095 5,489 5,834 6,138 6,414 6,582 6,729 6,890
Depreciation 11,819 12,273 12,212 13,010 13,476 15,945 17,673 23,418 30,310 32,673 34,276
Operating costs 15,635 16,438 16,955 18,105 18,964 21,779 23,811 29,832 36,893 39,403 41,165
Interest 3,008 3,144 4,050 4,629 5,085 5,431 5,839 6,317 6,955 7,438 7,875
Total costs 19,505 20,320 21,406 22,845 24,743 27,348 29,650 36,150 43,848 46,840 49,041
Operating income 3,857 3,599 2,806 1,912 4,464 2,474 1,008 -4,476 -10,183 -11,336 -11,460
Net income 2,585 2,215 1,203 335 2,081 416 -1,071 -5,310 -10,331 -11,144 -11,407
Net cash generation 12,884 12,698 11,626 11,555 13,739 14,530 14,711 14,719 15,532 16,361 17,353
Borrowings 8,649 48,890 69,937 40,965 42,203 36,694 33,260 34,596 28,867 28,343 30,543
Grants 2,393 0 8,473 8,473 10,201 11,565 11,087 11,532 9,622 9,448 10,181
Investments 12,510 49,194 78,718 49,750 55,351 51,210 47,202 48,988 41,355 40,660 43,598
Debt service 10,548 11,379 12,094 13,714 14,203 15,117 15,203 15,690 19,076 21,697 25,195
Variation of
working capital
requirements 8,722 -439 -856 -504 328 -575 -474 -990 -778 -121 38
Cash variation -4,846 4,598 4,130 2,661 1,345 2,467 2,965 3,477 1,325 -647 -2,880
Cash at year end 9,259 13,857 17,987 20,648 21,993 24,460 27,424 30,901 32,226 31,579 28,699
Ratios and
indicators
Operating ratio 80\.2% 82\.0% 85\.8% 90\.4% 80\.9% 89\.8% 95\.9% 117\.7% 138\.1% 140\.4% 138\.6%
Debt service
coverage (times) 1\.5 1\.4 1\.3 1\.2 1\.3 1\.3 1\.4 1\.3 1\.2 1\.1 1\.0
Pp(CFAF/m3) 139\.7 135\.6 127\.9 124\.5 140\.9 136\.7 134\.5 132\.5 135\.4 138\.9 142\.0
Share of
administrative users
in SONES fees 72% 69% 70% 69% 60% 57% 56% 55% 52% 49% 46%
Source: SONES Financial Model and Bank estimates
23\. Current Financial Situation of ONAS\. ONASâ income statements are summarized in Table
5-13 below\. ONAS registered positive net incomes over 2010-2013\. However, the sanitation
surcharge cannot fully cover the cash operating expenditures of ONASâ sewerage activities\. The
gap is financed by operating subsidies, which also finance the operating expenditures of the flood
control and drainage activities\. These subsidies are irregular and often give rise to additional
governmental requests for unscheduled missions and services\. The second-generation reform
should clarify ONASâ mandate and establish a transparent financing strategy for the sewerage
activities\.
54
Table 5-13: ONAS âIncome Statements (CFAF M)
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013
Sanitation surcharges 5,340 5,837 5,807 5,709
Operating subsidy 1,232 1,337 1,370 3,233
Operating revenues 6,764 7,477 7,907 9,083
Cash operating expenditures 7,253 7,507 8,463 9,604
Depreciation and allowances 4,393 4,353 4,725 4,638
Operating income -4,882 -4,383 -5,281 -5,159
Non-operating income 5,154 4,972 5,361 5,343
Net income 272 589 80 184
Sanitation surcharges/Sewerage
operating expenditures (%) 69\.7% 65\.6% 63\.1%
24\. The March 2015 tariff revision also includes a 35 percent increase of the sanitation
surcharge\. Financial forecasts prepared for the new Performance Contract between ONAS and the
Government show that the sanitation surcharge will cover 80 percent of ONASâ cash operating
expenditures until 2020\.
55
Appendix to Annex 5
Water Tariff Schedule
(Last revision: March 2015)
Water Sanitation Total MH Munici
Category VAT Total
Tariff w/o Tariff w/o w/o A -pal
(18%) incl\. taxes
Taxes Taxesâ Taxes Tax Tax
Domestic customers with 15 mm water meter
0 to 20 m3 /2-month period 186\.55 13\.50 200\.05 0\.00 1\.95 0\.00 202\.00
3
21 to 40 m /2-month period 631\.14 61\.63 692\.77 0\.00 1\.95 3\.25 697\.97
More than 40 m3 /2-month
period 655\.65 84\.31 739\.96 133\.19 1\.95 3\.25 878\.35
Non-domestic customers and domestic customers with meter of diameter greater than 15 mm
Single Tranche 655\.65 84\.31 739\.96 133\.19 1\.95 3\.25 878\.35
Standposts, public WC, markets, hydrants,
not-for-profit religious institutions
Single Tranche 239\.05 66\.73 305\.78 55\.04 1\.95 3\.25 366\.02
Market-gardeners
Consumption from 0 to Qâ¡ 102\.92 0\.00 102\.92 18\.53 1\.95 0\.00 123\.40
Consumption from Q to 2*Q 467\.31 0\.00 467\.31 84\.12 1\.95 0\.00 553\.38
Consumption beyond 2*Q 655\.65 84\.31 739\.96 133\.19 1\.95 3\.25 878\.35
Administrations (central government)
Single Tranche 1,868\.88 295\.00 2,163\.88 389\.50 1\.95 3\.25 2,558\.58
â Applicable to customers of sewered cities only\.
â¡Q: allowance allocated to the market-gardener
56
Annex 6: Map IBRD 41643
SENEGAL: URBAN WATER AND SANITATION PROJECT
57 | APPROVAL |
P173819 | FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No: PAD3935
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION
PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT
ON A
PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION CREDIT
IN THE AMOUNT OF EUR 7\.3 MILLION
(US$7\.9 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
IN CRISIS RESPONSE WINDOW RESOURCES
AND
PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION CREDIT
IN THE AMOUNT OF EUR 38\.7 MILLION
(US$42\.1 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO
FOR
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT
UNDER THE
COVID-19 STRATEGIC PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PROGRAM (SPRP)
USING THE MULTIPHASE PROGRAMMATIC APPROACH (MPA)
WITH A FINANCING ENVELOPE OF
UP TO US$6 BILLION EQUIVALENT
APPROVED BY THE BOARD ON APRIL 2, 2020
Health, Nutrition & Population Global Practice
Europe And Central Asia Region
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective April 30, 2020)
Currency Unit = EUR
US$1\.088 = EUR 1
EUR 0\.919 = US$ 1
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 - December 31
Regional Vice President: Anna M\. Bjerde
Country Director: Linda Van Gelder
Regional Director: Fadia M\. Saadah
Practice Manager: Tania Dmytraczenko
Task Team Leader(s): Lorena Kostallari, Stefanie Koettl-Brodmann
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AIDS Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
BFP Bank-financed procurement
CEB Council of Europe Development Bank
CPF Country Partnership Framework
COVID-19 Coronavirus disease 2019
CPAP Continuous Positive Airway Pressure
CPF Country Partnership Framework
CSW Center for Social Work
DA Designated Account
DFIL Disbursement and Financial Information Letter
DO Development Objective
EARK Employment Agency of the Republic of Kosovo
EKG Electrocardiogram
ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework
ESS Environmental and Social Standards
EU European Union
EUR Euros
EVD-WA West African Ebola Virus Disease
F&C Fraud and corruption
FM Financial management
FTCF Fast Track COVID-19 Facility
GDP Gross domestic product
GRM Grievance redress mechanism
HEIS Hands-on expanded implementation support
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICR Implementation Completion Report
ICU Intensive care unit
IDA International Development Association
IFR Interim Financial Report
IHR International Health Regulations
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPF Investment Project Financing
IPSAS International Public Sector Accounting Standards
IT Information Technology
KAS Kosovo Agency of Statistics
KFMIS Kosovo Financial Mangement Information System
KFW and GIZ Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau and Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
KHP Kosovo Health Project
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
LDK Democratic League of Kosovo
LRIS Last-resort income support
M&E Monitoring and evaluation
MIS Management information system
MLSW Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare
MoFT Ministry of Finance and Transfers
MoH Ministry of Health
MPA Multiphase Programmatic Approach
MTEF Medium-term Expenditure Framework
NCD Noncommunicable disease
NIPH National Institute of Public Health
OP Operational Policy
PAD Project Appraisal Document
PCU Project coordination unit
PDO Project Development Objective
PEFA Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PFM Public financial management
PHC Primary health care
PMT Proxy means test
POM Project Operations Manual
PPE Personal protective equipment
PPSD Project Procurement Strategy for Development
SARS Severe acute respiratory syndrome
SAS Social Assistance Scheme
SDC Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SEP Stakeholder Engagement Plan
SPRP COVID-19 Strategic Preparedness and Response Program
STEP Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement
TAK Tax Administration of Kosovo
UCCK University Clinical Center of Kosovo
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Childrenâs Fund
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services
US$ United States dollar
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WB(G) World Bank (Group)
WHO World Health Organization
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DATASHEET \. 1
I\. PROGRAM CONTEXT \. 8
A\. MPA Program Context \. 8
B\. Updated MPA Program Framework\. 8
C\. Learning Agenda \. 9
II\. CONTEXT AND RELEVANCE \. 9
A\. Country Context \. 9
B\. Sectoral and Institutional Context \. 11
C\. Relevance to Higher-Level Objectives\. 17
III\. PROJECT DESCRIPTION\. 18
A\. Development Objectives \. 18
B\. Project Components \. 19
C\. Project Beneficiaries \. 24
D\. Lessons Learned \. 24
IV\. IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS \. 25
A\. Institutional and Implementation Arrangements \. 25
B\. Results Monitoring and Evaluation Arrangements \. 26
C\. Sustainability \. 27
V\. PROJECT APPRAISAL SUMMARY \. 27
A\. Technical, Economic, and Financial Analysis\. 27
B\. Fiduciary \. 30
C\. Legal Operational Policies \. 35
D\. Environmental and Social Standards \. 35
VI\. GRIEVANCE REDRESS SERVICES \. 36
VII\. KEY RISKS \. 37
VIII\. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND MONITORING \. 38
ANNEX 1\. Project Costs \. 44
ANNEX 2\. Implementation Arrangements and Support Plan \. 45
ANNEX 3\. Development Partnersâ Contribution to COVID-19 Response\. 52
ANNEX 4\. National Preparedness and Response Plan for COVID-19 and Prevention Measures \. 54
ANNEX 5\. Ministry of Health (MoH) Emergency Needs Request \. 60
ANNEX 6\. Social Assistance Scheme\. 63
\.
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
DATASHEET
BASIC INFORMATION
BASIC_INFO_TABLE
Country(ies) Project Name
Kosovo KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT
Project ID Financing Instrument Environmental and Social Risk Classification
Investment Project
P173819 Substantial
Financing
Financing & Implementation Modalities
[â] Multiphase Programmatic Approach (MPA) [ ] Contingent Emergency Response Component (CERC)
[ ] Series of Projects (SOP) [â] Fragile State(s)
[ ] Performance-Based Conditions (PBCs) [ ] Small State(s)
[ ] Financial Intermediaries (FI) [ ] Fragile within a non-fragile Country
[ ] Project-Based Guarantee [ ] Conflict
[ ] Deferred Drawdown [â] Responding to Natural or Man-made Disaster
[ ] Alternate Procurement Arrangements (APA)
Expected Project Approval Expected Project Closing Expected Program Closing Date
Date Date
22-May-2020 30-Jun-2022 31-Mar-2025
Bank/IFC Collaboration
No
MPA Program Development Objective
The Program Development Objective is to prevent, detect and respond to the threat posed by COVID-19 and
strengthen national systems for public health preparedness
MPA Financing Data (US$, Millions) Financing
Page 1 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
MPA Program Financing Envelope 4,706\.35
with a reduction of IDA 5\.00
Proposed Project Development Objective(s)
The project development objective is to prevent, detect, and respond to the threat posed by COVID-19 and
strengthen national systems for public health preparedness in Kosovo
Components
Component Name Cost (US$, millions)
Component 1: Emergency COVID-19 response 17\.60
Component 2: Supporting households to comply with public health containment
31\.40
measures
Component 3: Project management, communications, and community engagement 1\.00
Organizations
Borrower: Republic of Kosovo
Implementing Agency: Ministry of Health
Ministry of Finance and Transfers
MPA FINANCING DETAILS (US$, Millions)
MPA FINA NCI NG DET AILS (US$, Millions) Approve d
Board Approved MPA Financing Envelope: 4,711\.35
MPA Program Financing Envelope: 4,706\.35
of which Bank Financing (IBRD): 2,782\.20
of which Bank Financing (IDA): 1,924\.15
of which other financing sources: 0\.00
PROJECT FINANCING DATA (US$, Millions)
FIN_SUMM_NEW
SUMMARY -NewFin1
Total Project Cost 50\.00
Page 2 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
Total Financing 50\.00
of which IBRD/IDA 50\.00
Financing Gap 0\.00
DETAILS -NewFinEnh1
World Bank Group Financing
International Development Association (IDA) 50\.00
IDA Credit 50\.00
IDA Resources (in US$, Millions)
Credit Amount Grant Amount Guarantee Amount Total Amount
Kosovo 50\.00 0\.00 0\.00 50\.00
National PBA 42\.10 0\.00 0\.00 42\.10
Crisis Response Window
(CRW) 7\.90 0\.00 0\.00 7\.90
Total 50\.00 0\.00 0\.00 50\.00
Expected Disbursements (in US$, Millions)
WB Fiscal
2020 2021 2022
Year
Annual 0\.00 40\.00 10\.00
Cumulative 0\.00 40\.00 50\.00
INSTITUTIONAL DATA
Practice Area (Lead) Contributing Practice Areas
Health, Nutrition & Population Social Protection & Jobs
Climate Change and Disaster Screening
This operation has not been screened for short and long-term climate change and disaster risks
Page 3 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
Explanation
The project is prepared under the COVID-19 Strategic Preparedness and Response Program using the Multiphase
Programmatic Approach, for which the requirement for disaster screening was waived\.
SYSTEMATIC OPERATIONS RISK-RATING TOOL (SORT)
Risk Category Rating
1\. Political and Governance ï¬ High
2\. Macroeconomic ï¬ Substantial
3\. Sector Strategies and Policies ï¬ Moderate
4\. Technical Design of Project or Program ï¬ Moderate
5\. Institutional Capacity for Implementation and Sustainability ï¬ Moderate
6\. Fiduciary ï¬ High
7\. Environment and Social ï¬ Substantial
8\. Stakeholders ï¬ Moderate
9\. Other
10\. Overall ï¬ Substantial
Overall MPA Program Risk ï¬ High
COMPLIANCE
Policy
Does the project depart from the CPF in content or in other significant respects?
[ ] Yes [â] No
Does the project require any waivers of Bank policies?
[â] Yes [ ] No
Page 4 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
Have these been approved by Bank management?
[â] Yes [ ] No
Is approval for any policy waiver sought from the Board?
[ ] Yes [â] No
Environmental and Social Standards Relevance Given its Context at the Time of Appraisal
E & S Standards Relevance
Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts Relevant
Stakeholder Engagement and Information Disclosure Relevant
Labor and Working Conditions Relevant
Resource Efficiency and Pollution Prevention and Management Relevant
Community Health and Safety Relevant
Land Acquisition, Restrictions on Land Use and Involuntary Resettlement Not Currently Relevant
Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Management of Living Natural Resources Not Currently Relevant
Indigenous Peoples/Sub-Saharan African Historically Underserved Traditional Local Not Currently Relevant
Communities
Cultural Heritage Not Currently Relevant
Financial Intermediaries Not Currently Relevant
NOTE: For further information regarding the World Bankâs due diligence assessment of the Projectâs potential
environmental and social risks and impacts, please refer to the Projectâs Appraisal Environmental and Social Review
Summary (ESRS)\.
Legal Covenants
Sections and Description
Schedule 2, Section I\.A\.1 (b)\. The Recipient, through the Ministry of Finance and Transfers (MoFT), shall maintain,
throughout Project implementation, an SAS Division, with functions and responsibilities acceptable to the
Association, for the implementation of Part 2 of the Project, in coordination with the Centers for Social Work\.
Page 5 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
Schedule 2, Section I\.A\.2\. The Recipient, through the Ministry of Health (MoH), shall maintain, throughout Project
implementation, a Project Coordination Unit, with functions and responsibilities acceptable to the Association, to
be responsible for the overall implementation, management, coordination and oversight of Parts 1 and Part 3 of the
Project\.
Schedule 2, Section I\.A\.3\. The Recipient shall maintain, throughout Project implementation, a senior management
committee, with composition acceptable to the Association, to be responsible for the decision-making mechanisms
for, and to coordinate and monitor the progress of, Parts 1 and 3 of the Project, and to inform the MoFT (as the
overall Project coordinator) of the technical decisions taken by the committee concerning the said Parts of the
Project\.
Schedule 2, Section I\.A\.5\. The Recipient, through MoFT, shall issue to each Payment Service Provider, the ACG
Notice, including: (a) a copy of the Anti-Corruption Guidelines (ACGs); and (b) requirement that the Payment
Service Provider complies with the ACGs in the holding, processing, and disbursement of Credit proceeds\.
Schedule 2, Section I\.B\.1\. The Recipient, through MoH, shall by no later than thirty (30) days after the Effective
Date, prepare and adopt a Project Operations Manual containing detailed guidelines and procedures for the
implementation of the Project\.
Schedule 2, Section I\.C\.2\. The Recipient shall ensure that the Project is implemented in accordance with the
Environmental and Social Commitment Plan (ESCP), in a manner acceptable to the Association\.
Schedule 2, Section I\.C\.4 (b)\. The Recipient shall promptly notify the Association of any incident or accident related
to or having an impact on the Project which has, or is likely to have, a significant adverse effect on the environment,
the affected communities, the public or workers\.
Schedule 2, Section I\.C\.6\. The Recipient shall ensure that all bidding documents and contracts for civil works under
the Project include the obligation of contractors, and subcontractors and supervising entities to: (a) comply with the
relevant aspects of ESCP and the environmental and social instruments referred to therein; and (b) adopt and
enforce codes of conduct that should be provided to and signed by all workers, all as applicable to such civil works
commissioned or carried out pursuant to said contracts\.
Schedule 2, Section I\.D (a)\. The Recipient, through the MoFT, shall prepare and furnish to the Association not later
than October 15 of each fiscal year during the implementation of the Project, an Annual Work Plan and Budget
containing all activities proposed to be included in the Project during the following year, and a proposed financing
plan for expenditures required for such activities, and shall afford the Association a reasonable opportunity to
exchange views and thereafter ensure that the Project is implemented with due diligence during said following
Fiscal Year in accordance with such work plan and budget approved by the Association\.
Page 6 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
Schedule 2, Section III\.B\.2 (b)\. The Recipient undertakes that no Credit proceeds or resources may be used for law-
enforcement, security, military, or paramilitary purposes or for any payments made to any law-enforcement,
security, military, or paramilitary forces without the Associationâs express approval\.
Conditions
Page 7 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
I\. PROGRAM CONTEXT
A\. MPA Program Context
1\. This Project Appraisal Document (PAD) describes the emergency response to the Republic of Kosovo
under the COVID-19 Strategic Preparedness and Response Program (SPRP) using the Multiphase Programmatic
Approach (MPA), approved by the World Bankâs Board of Executive Directors on April 2, 2020 (PCBASIC0219761)
with an overall financing envelope of US$6 billion\.
2\. An outbreak of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) caused by the 2019 novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2)
has been spreading rapidly across the world since December 2019 , when the initial cases were diagnosed in
Wuhan, Hubei Province, China\. Since the beginning of March 2020, the number of cases outside China has
increased thirteenfold and the number of affected countries has tripled\. On March 11, 2020, the World Health
Organization (WHO) declared a global pandemic as the coronavirus rapidly spread across the world\. As of April
29, 2020, the outbreak has resulted in an estimated 3,195,019 cases and 226,084 deaths in 214 countries\.
3\. COVID-19 is one of several infectious diseases that in recent decades have emerged from animals that
are in contact with humans, resulting in major outbreaks with significant public health and economic impacts\.
The last moderately severe influenza pandemics were in 1957 and 1968; each killed more than a million people
around the world\. Although countries are now far more prepared than in the past, the world is also far more
interconnected, and many more people today have behavior risk factors such as tobacco use1 and preexisting
chronic health problems that make viral respiratory infections particularly dangerous\.2 With COVID-19, scientists
are still trying to understand the full picture of the disease symptoms and severity\. Reported symptoms in
patients have varied from mild to severe, and can include fever, cough, and shortness of breath\. In general,
studies of hospitalized patients have found that about 83-98 percent of patients develop a fever, 76-82 percent
develop a dry cough, and 11-44 percent develop fatigue or muscle aches\.3 Other symptoms, including headache,
sore throat, abdominal pain, and diarrhea, have been reported, but are less common\. While 6\.9 percent of the
people worldwide confirmed as having been infected have died, WHO has been careful not to describe that as
a mortality rate or death rate, because in an unfolding epidemic it can be misleading to look simply at the
estimate of deaths divided by cases so far\. Hence, given that the actual prevalence of COVID-19 infection
remains unknown in most countries, it poses unparalleled challenges with respect to global containment and
mitigation\. These issues reinforce the need to strengthen the response to COVID-19 across all IDA/IBRD
countries to minimize the global risk and impact posed by this disease\.
B\. Updated MPA Program Framework
4\. This project is prepared under the global framework of the World Bank COVID-19 Response financed
under the Fast Track COVID-19 Facility (FTCF) with additional financing from Kosovoâs IDA allocation \. Table 1
provides an updated overall MPA Program framework, including the proposed project for Kosovo\. All projects
under SPRP are assessed for an Environmental and Social Framework risk classification following the Bankâs
1 Marquez, P\. V\. 2020\. âDoes Tobacco Smoking Increase the Risk of Coronavirus Disease (Covid-19) Severity? The Case of China\.â
http://www\.pvmarquez\.com/Covid-19\.
2 Fauci, A S\., Lane, C\., and Redfield, R\. R\. 2020\. âCovid-19 â Navigating the Uncharted\.â New Eng J of Medicine, DOI:
10\.1056/NEJMe2002387\.
3 Del Rio, C\., and Malani, P\. N\. 2020\. âCOVID-19âNew Insights on a Rapidly Changing Epidemic\.â JAMA, DOI:10\.1001/jama\.2020\.3072\.
Page 8 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
procedures and using the flexibility provided for COVID-19 operations\.
Table 1\. MPA Program Framework
Estimated
IPF, Estimated Estimated
Estimated Estimated Environme
Phase Sequential or Phaseâs DPF IBRD IDA
Project ID Other Amount Approval ntal &
# Simultaneous Proposed DO* or Amount Amount
($ million) Date Social Risk
PforR ($ million) ($ million)
Rating
US$42\.1
Please see
(reallocated from May 15,
1 P173819 Simultaneous relevant section IPF 0\.00 US$50 Substantial
regular country 2020
of the PAD
IDA18 allocation)
C\. Learning Agenda
5\. This project, under the MPA Program, will support adaptive learning throughout implementation and
will draw on lessons from international organizations, including WHO, the United Sates Centers for Disease
Control, United Nations Childrenâs Fund (UNICEF), and others\. The areas for learning during project
implementation are described in the technical, social, and economic appraisal sections of the PAD, as applicable\.
In Kosovo, the following topics will be targeted for learning:
ï Forecasting: Modeling the progression of the pandemic, in terms of both new cases and deaths\.
ï Supply chain approaches: Assessment of options for timely distribution of medicines and other medical
supplies\.
ï Social behaviors: Assessments on compliance with and the impact of social distancing measures in
different contexts\.
ï Strengthening the emergency response: Rapid learning cycles, summative assessment upon project
completion, and comparative analysis of other countriesâ approaches to the COVID-19 pandemic across
the Western Balkans and across Europe more broadly, to build Kosovoâs capacity to respond effectively
to national emergencies\.
II\. CONTEXT AND RELEVANCE
A\. Country Context
6\. Since its independence in 2008, Kosovo has maintained a good track record of macroeconomic and
fiscal policy, but with significant dependence on diaspora inflows and high trade deficits\. With policies
anchored in its overarching political objective of joining the European Union (EU), Kosovo has made progress in
transitioning to a market-based system and has maintained relatively stable economic growth\. Kosovo has
maintained an average growth rate of 3\.6 percent over the last decade, albeit from a lower base compared to
the rest of the Western Balkans, and has maintained a stable headline fiscal policy, with low deficit and public
debt levels\. However, its economy is largely consumption-based, with significant dependence on diaspora-
driven remittances, exports of services, and foreign direct investment in residential construction\. Almost 50
percent of value-added is generated by service activities, dominated by wholesale and retail trade\. Against this
background, the countryâs merchandise trade deficit has averaged about 40 percent of GDP over the last decade,
sustained predominantly through diaspora financing flows\.
Page 9 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
7\. Despite this progress, Kosovoâs economic growth has not been sufficient to significantly reduce its
high rates of unemployment and create formal jobs, particularly for women and youth\. According to the 2019
Labor Force Survey, the labor force participation rate is only 40\.5 percent, with significant variation among
women (21\.1%) and men (59\.7%)\. Similarly, womenâs employment rate is low (13\.9%) compared with menâs
(46\.2%), and their unemployment rate is high (34\.3%) compared with menâs (22\.6%)\.4 From a regional
perspective, Kosovo has the lowest employment rates and the highest unemployment rates among Western
Balkan countries\.5 Almost half of the young population that is active in the labor market is unemployed, and
more than one in four young people is not in employment, education, or training\. On the labor supply side, lack
of job opportunities is cited as the main concern for not being in employment, while firms raise concerns about
finding qualified workers despite high unemployment\.6 Notably, Kosovoâs informality is among the highest in
Europe: about 35 percent of workers are employed in the informal sector\.7
8\. At the same time, Kosovoâs economic performance has not yet resulted in strong poverty reduction\.
Poverty fell by more than 1 percentage point per year between 2012 and 2017 but remains high, with 18 percent
of the population living under the moderate poverty line (under Euro 1\.85 per person per day)\. Importantly,
most of the reduction in national poverty was driven by welfare improvements in rural areas, and thus the gap
between rural and urban poverty narrowed from 7\.1 percent in 2012 to 3\.4 percent in 2017\. Consistently
overrepresented among the poor are women and children, households in which the head has not completed
secondary education, households with three or more children, and larger households (especially those with six
or more members)\. Poverty is related to labor market attachment and labor income; in 2017, poverty was
highest among persons with disabilities, followed by those who were unemployed and occasionally employed\.
There is also a clear relationship between education and poverty incidence: the poverty headcount rate in
Kosovo is four times higher among individuals with primary and incomplete primary education than among
individuals with tertiary education\.
9\. Despite some progress over the last decade, Kosovoâs health outcomes remain modest and lag
significantly behind those of other countries in the region\. Life expectancy is 4 years lower than in neighboring
countries and 10 years lower than the European average\. Kosovo is faced with a double burden of disease: the
persistent prevalence of some important communicable diseases and the increasing incidence of
noncommunicable conditions\. The incidence of tuberculosis in 2017 was 43 per 100,000 people, more than
twice the rate in neighboring Albania and nearly four times higher than in Serbia\. In 2014, more than three in
five deaths were attributable to circulatory system diseases, the most frequent cause of death\. 8
Noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) affect a large share of the population: about 21\.6 percent of adults (18 years
and above) reported having a chronic disease in 2017\. As expected, the prevalence of NCDs increases with age:
almost 7 in 10 individuals aged 70 and above report having a chronic disease, as opposed to about one in two
among 60- to 69-year-olds and about one in three among 50- to 59-year-olds\. More than one in three individuals
aged 50 and above report suffering from high blood pressure and about 8 percent from diabetes, the two most
frequently reported conditions\.9 The global evidence is that groups with NCDs and elderly people are among
the most vulnerable populations and at higher risk for severe illness\.
4 Kosovo Agency of Statistics\. Labor Force Survey in Kosovo, 2019\.
5 World Bank and wiiw\. 2020\. Western Balkans Labor Market Trends 2020\.
6 World Bank\. 2018\. Kosovo Country Report: Findings from the Skills Towards Employment and Productivity Survey\.
7 World Bank\. 2017\. Kosovo Jobs Diagnostic\.
8 World Bank\. 2019\. Kosovo Health Financing Policy Note\. August 31, 2019\.
9 Ibid\.
Page 10 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
10\. The COVID-19 pandemic poses a serious social and economic challenge to the country\. The impact of
the COVID-19 outbreak will be transmitted through both external channels and lower domestic demand\. Before
the pandemic, Kosovoâs economy was projected to grow by 4 percent in 2020\. However, because of the
pandemic and the associated public health containment measures, economic activity is now expected to
contract by 4\.5 percent\.10 Revenues have declined significantly since the Government announced the public
health containment measures, and declining consumer demand, disruptions in local and global value chains,
and the need for physical distancing may lead to further adverse effects on businesses\.11 Importantly, 70 percent
of Kosovoâs working-age population enters the COVID-19 crisis without a job and, among those who are
employed, many work for a median wage that is very close to the minimum wage, suggesting that many of these
households have limited savings to draw upon during this crisis\.
11\. The dismissal of the Government during the pandemic heightens the challenges of addressing the
crisis in the current political context\. Following the resignation of the former Prime Minister, early elections
were held in Kosovo on October 6, 2019\. The two (until then) opposition parties, Vetevendosje (Self-
Determination Movement) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) won the majority of votes\. It took four
months from the elections for the new Government to be formed, on February 3, 2020\. The new coalition
Government consisted of Vetevendosje, LDK, and the constitutionally required representation of minorities\.
Less than two months after taking office, on March 25, 2020, following disagreement among the two main
coalition partners on how to handle the resumption of internationally mediated talks on the normalization of
bilateral relations between Kosovo and Serbia, a vote of no-confidence was initiated in Parliament by LDK and
supported by the opposition parties\. Since then, the current Government operates in a caretaker mode until a
new Government is in place\.
B\. Sectoral and Institutional Context
12\. Kosovo was hit with the global pandemic of COVID-19 in mid-March, with 630 confirmed cases and
18 deaths as of April 22, 2020\. The first case reported in Kosovo was imported from Italy on March 13, 2020\. 12
Since then, Kosovoâs epidemic curve showed increasing numbers of new cases confirmed, with the peak during
the early weeks of April (Figure 1)\. Today confirmed cases are spread across more than 20 municipalities in
Kosovo, with the greatest concentrations in Malisheva, Prishtina, and Ferizaj\. More than 500 people are under
mandatory quarantine, and more than 6,300 others are under public health surveillance\. Around 5,400 tests
have been carried out\. Most cases are among people 30-39 years of age, followed by those who are 20-29, 40-
49, and 50-59 years of age\.
10 World Bank\. 2020\. Western Balkans Regular Economic Report: Spring 2020, The Economic and Social Impact of COVID-19 \. These
estimates assume that the outbreak affects only the second quarter and economic activity picks up in the second half of 2020\. If the
epidemic and the corresponding containment measures are prolonged into the third quarter, Kosovo could fall into a deeper recession
associated with a contraction of above 10 percent in 2020\.
11 In Kosovo, more than 90 percent of the firms have fewer than 10 employees and were disproportionately affected through the
shutdown measures that were introduced to contain the spread of the outbreak\.
12 Institute of Public Health in Kosovo\. http://www\.niph-rks\.org/\.
Page 11 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
Figure 1\. Kosovoâs epidemic curve of confirmed COVID-19 cases
Source: National Institute of Public Health data, April 22, 2020\.
13\. The Government of Kosovo acted quickly, declaring a public health emergency for the entire country
on March 15, 2020\. The Government immediately established a National Committee for COVID-19 Coordination
and Monitoring, which has been working with health institutions, the United Nations Agencies, local security
authorities, and international donors to set up quarantine arrangements, border controls, and medical
evacuation of returning citizens\. The Ministry of Health (MoH), the lead agency for the COVID-19 national
planning and response, has put in place action plans to respond to the epidemic, including a National
Preparedness and Response Plan for COVID-19, which was initiated in January 2020\. Decisions and activities for
managing the public health emergency are based on the Health Law 2004/4, the Law on Public Health 02/L-78,
and the Law for Prevention and Control of Communicable Diseases 02/L-109, and following the protocols from
WHO and the European Center for Disease Control\.13 The national plan initially involved conducting awareness
activities among health professionals and the public while building potential scenarios for epidemic
management, foreseeing the need to respond to different levels of country risk posed by the number of cases\.
The plan also established procedures for case detection, isolation, and case management, as well as national
protocols for testing, case treatment, and case tracing\. According to the National Institute of Public Health
(NIPH), Kosovoâs approach to testing is in line with WHO recommendations\. All suspected cases (those who
show clinical symptoms and all close contacts of confirmed cases) are mandatorily tested\.14 Suspected cases are
asked to self-isolate for two weeks and are regularly monitored by the NIPH\. A more advanced version of the
plan includes a communication flow diagram between MoH and other levels of care and other agencies, clear
sets of responsibilities for each stakeholder, and an assessment of stocks of personal protective equipment
(PPE), disinfection, and disposable materials, and of the isolation capacities of health facilities\.
14\. The country is currently at level 4 of the emergency situation, with clusters of localized transmission
of COVID-19\. Kosovo does not currently have any Law on Emergencies\. The MoH and the NIPH have established
a modus-operandi within the National Strategy for COVID-19, with five stages of emergency\. Kosovo is currently
at the fourth level, considering the number of cases as well as fatalities\. Under emergency level 4, all primary
health care (PHC) centers are expected to conduct screening for symptoms at the community level and at
borders, referring suspected cases to the Infectious Disease Clinic at the University Clinical Center of Kosovo
(UCCK)\. Mobile health centers have been set up at all of Kosovoâs borders\. Hospitals were asked to set up
separate areas for routine cases and cancel all non-urgent procedures\. One main quarantine area has been set
13 National Preparedness and Response Plan for COVID-19\. February 2020\.
14 All PHCs, the other clinics at UCCK, Infectious Disease Clinic, and regional hospitals must report suspected cases to the NIPH, which
initiates aggressive contact tracing of the suspected case for the past 3 weeks to identify patient zero\.
Page 12 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
up in Prishtina student campus, mandatorily accommodating all returning citizens and suspected cases for two
weeks\.
15\. The public health response to the pandemic is led by the countryâs health system, which has limited
capacity to surge as demand rises\. Although the role of the primary levels is preventive care, PHC centers in
Kosovo are not acting as gatekeepers of care, and are therefore missing an opportunity to positively affect the
health outcomes of the poor population\. With existing public funds and resources, it is difficult for Kosovo to
incentivize any quality improvement and also respond to the surging demand for health care services arising
from COVID-19\. Kosovoâs health expenditure, both in total and as a share of the Governmentâs health budget,
is low relative to both regional and GDP per capita comparators\. In addition, the Kosovo health system is
predominantly tax-funded (97% of public spending on health comes from the general budget), but a significant
share of contributions comes from private out-of-pocket payments\.15 The implementation of the recently
initiated health insurance reform has been delayed, leaving Kosovoâs health system under the direct-provision
model\. Currently, the financing, risk pooling, and provision of health care are integrated and managed by the
central Government\. Public health facilities are owned by the state, and all health care personnel are salaried
state employees, governed by civil service law and budget rigidities\.
16\. The health systemâs weak delivery systems further undermine the countryâs ability to respond to
COVID-19\. The number of physicians and nurses per patient, and the number of beds, among other things, are
among the lowest in Europe\. The country has a severe shortage of qualified medical staff (Figure 2); over the
last five years, the number of physicians has decreased by more than one-third\. The situation is especially
concerning in PHC: the Government has set target ratios of one physician and two nurses per 1,000 inhabitants
for PHC, and out of 32 municipalities for which data are available, only 3 meet the requirement for doctors and
16 meet the requirement for nurses\. The number of inpatient beds per 100,000 inhabitants (219 in 2017) is
significantly lower than in neighboring countries and than the EU average (Figure 3)\. While low bed capacity
could be a positive efficiency indicator in many countries, the fact that it is exceptionally low in Kosovo more
likely indicates input constraints rather than efficiency\. There are also reports of unavailable drugs and services,
long waiting times, lack of diagnostics and lab services, and absence of specialists\. 16 The existing public health
emergency staff is under-resourced, and their working hours have been doubled to meet the surging demand
for public health services, contact tracing, and diagnosing and treating COVID-19 cases\.
Figure 2\. Health sector staff composition, 2017 Figure 3\. Inpatient beds per 100,000, 2017 or latest
Mental Public
552 642
health health 524
391 443
services program MoH and its 289 349
Pharma 2% 219
market 3% departments
regulation 8%
0%
KHUCS
48% PHC
facilities
39%
Source: Kosovo Health Financing Note\. Authorâs calculations\. Source: Data from KAS (Kosovo) and WHO (other countries)\.
Data source: KAS\.
15 The World Bank Kosovo Policy Notes 2020\. February 2020\.
16 Ibid\.
Page 13 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
17\. Weaknesses in the health system, together with the countryâs demographic and social characteristics,
make Kosovo highly vulnerable to the rapid spread of COVID-19\. Kosovo is a young country: only 7 percent of
the total population is 65 years of age and above\. However, older people in Kosovo largely reside with their
children and grandchildren in multigenerational households\. Of all households, 30\.5 percent are
multigenerational (i\.e\., households with at least one prime-age and one elderly adult), with 61 percent of all
older people living in multigenerational households where children are present\.17 This fact, coupled with the
high burden of NCDs in Kosovo, means that the population is vulnerable to the rapid spread of the coronavirus\.
18\. Given these factors, mitigation measures such as social distancing are key in the response to the
pandemic, as they will limit the pressure on the health system\. The health system needs to prepare to face an
increased demand for medical services, hospitalization, and critical care for COVID-19 patients, while continuing
to provide at least basic services for non-COVID-19 patients\. However, to âflatten the curveâ and not overwhelm
the health system all at once, evidence from other countries shows that mitigation measures, including social
distancing, are essential to reduce community transmission and therefore the number of people infected (see
economic appraisal section below)\. Although uncertainty remains and most predictions are based on evolving
modeling, epidemiologists are warning that countries should expect to see population infection rates of 25-80
percent over the course of the epidemic18 unless mitigation measures are taken\.
19\. Therefore, early on the Government of Kosovo adopted a set of public health measures to contain
the spread of the virus and âflatten the curve\.â Schools, shops, bars, restaurants, public gatherings, and
nonessential businesses have been closed and suspended as of March 11, 2020, except for supermarkets,
pharmacies, and emergency medical providers\. International air travel was suspended and the borders closed
as of March 16, 2020, with permits allowing the return of citizens, who are mandatorily placed in the main
quarantine area in Prishtina University student campus for two weeks\. Following an initial curfew for all citizens
between different hours of the day,19 as of April 15, the MoH has introduced new movement restrictions
prescribing 1\.5-hour periods in which citizensâgrouped according to the penultimate digit of their personal ID
numberâmay purchase food and medicine, attend to financial matters, and practice physical activities\. The use
of vehicles is permitted only if the nearest market/pharmacy/bank is more than 2 km from the home\. Persons
in movement are not permitted to be accompanied by any other person, with exceptions, and are required to
wear a mask or a scarf and keep a minimum of 2 metersâ distance from others\. Persons over 65 years old are
recommended not to leave their homes, except for emergencies\. No other travel or traffic is allowed\. Licensed
pharmacies operate after 5 p\.m\. with rotational on-duty shifts\. All other emergency and core Government
functions continue to operate, albeit with reduced capacity\. Respecting the measures to restrict movement is
the most effective means to prevent a sharp increase of new COVID-19 infections: stay at home, self-isolate,
keep social distance, and wash hands frequently\. These measures were adopted by the country and
progressively introduced with the goal of slowing the spread of the virus\. (Annex 4 lists all measures introduced
by the Government since March 11, 2020\.)
20\. The economic downturn arising from the measures to contain the outbreak will not only affect the
17 World Bank analysis based on the Household Budget Survey 2017\.
18 See, for example, Ferguson N\. et al\. https://www\.imperial\.ac\.uk/media/imperial-college/medicine/sph/ide/gida-
fellowships/Imperial-College-COVID19-NPI-modelling-16-03-2020\.pdf\.
19 The constitutional court ruled that the curfew imposed under the Government decision of March 23, 2020, was unconstitutional,
demanding that it be lifted after April 13\.
Page 14 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
poor but may also propel large numbers of people into poverty \. Experience suggests that unemployment rates
can rise sharply during such a global crisis\. In Kosovo, the supply and demand shocks to the economy arising
from the containment measures adopted by the Government are expected to reduce household earnings\.20 Jobs
in the informal sector, which account for 35 percent of all employment, are especially sensitive to economic
conditions\. An analysis of sectors that will be particularly affected by the consequences of measures to contain
the pandemic shows that close to 90 percent of workers in the most affected sectors are men (reflecting both
the higher rates of employment among men than women and the types of work men carry out compared with
women) who have levels of education up to secondary degrees, work informally, and work in small firms with
up to 10 employees\.21 Many such workers have no access to social insurance\. Although job losses are expected
to be geater for men, the expectation that women will care for children, older people, and ill family members
will likely mean that women, too, will lose jobs or receive salary cuts\.22 Further, a decline in remittances (which
are an important source of income for many households23) and an increase in out-of-pocket health expenditures
are likely to affect a broader range of households, resulting in an increase in the prevalence and depth of
poverty\. Therefore, strategies to ensure that people and families are not pushed further into poverty and
marginalized by social distancing policies should be part of the full response to the crisis\.
21\. Enforcing social distancing measures thus requires clear and consistent communication with the
public and social and financial mechanisms to support people in complying\. Recognizing the need to
communicate clearly with the public, the Government is making regular public statements with updates and
general recommendations for the population\.24 The MoH has created a special website with up-to-date official
Kosovo statistics and measures to be taken to prevent further transmission of the disease\. 25 An emergency
phone line has been established for a 24/7 communication with citizens\.26 To help ensure that the population
is able to comply with the public health containment measures, the Government has announced emergency
measures to provide direct financial support to households through a range of programs (see Annex 4), and has
stated that these immediate measures â detailed in the Operational Plan on Emergency Fiscal Package - will be
complemented by a longer-term recovery package, which will contain a broader set of measures\.27 The cost of
the Emergency Fiscal Package is estimated at about 2\.8 percent of GDP; however, if the outbreak is prolonged,
an extension of the emergency stimulus package may be necessary\. The crisis has also precipitated a sharp fall
in Government revenues (by 11% as compared to last year), leaving limited fiscal space to finance these
programs\. The Government will therefore require external support to provide much-needed financial assistance
to poor and vulnerable households over the coming months to respond to the direct economic consequences
20 World Bank\. 2020\. Fighting COVID-19: ECA Economic Update Spring 2020\.
21 World Bank staff estimates\. Analysis of sectors anticipated to be most affected by the crisis using Kosovo 2018 Labor Force Survey\.
22 National Council for Economic Development\. 2020\. Potential measures proposed for the Government of Kosovo â immediate and
mid-term\. March 2020\.
23 Remittances account for around 12 percent of Kosovoâs annual GDP; last year, Kosovo received Euro 852 million in remittances
according to Kosovo Central Bank data and Kosovo Agency of Statistics data 2019\.
24 Regular communication is established between the MoH, the Institute of Public Health, and international donors, as well as with the
general public\.
25 Also, visitors at the website can do an interactive self-evaluation to verify COVID-19 symptoms, or may register for volunteering\.
26 Citizens have been advised to call this number if they have symptoms of COVID-19 instead of accessing care directly from health
facilities\. The Ministry of Health in Kosovo\.
27 The Emergency Fiscal Package was adopted through a Decision of the Government on March 30, 2020\. The Operational Plan was
issued on April 3, 2020\. Through the media the Government began announcing its intention to provide longer-term support from mid-
April 2020\. It is expected that the new Government, once announced, will announce a second special fiscal package to support
economic recovery\.
Page 15 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
of the pandemic and the containment measures\.
22\. Kosovoâs Social Assistance Scheme (SAS) is well positioned to provide emergency financial assistance
to poor households to help them comply with public health measures\. Kosovoâs social protection system is
dominated by old-age pensions and war-related benefits; spending on the countryâs only poverty-targeted
program, the SAS, decreased to 0\.45 percent of GDP in 2018, which is much lower than the regional average of
2\.2 percent of GDP and the average of 1\.6 percent in developing and transition economies\.28 In terms of
performance, the SAS is well targeted: 70 percent of beneficiaries are in the bottom quintile and receive 68
percent of the benefits\. SAS benefits represent a significant share of beneficiary householdsâ consumption\. 29 At
the same time, because of categorical and exclusionary filters in the beneficiary selection process, the SAS
suffers from high errors of exclusion, reaching only 10 percent of all households and excluding nearly two-thirds
of households in the bottom quintile\. Overall, the ability of Kosovoâs social protection system to respond rapidly
to shocks is undermined by the lack of any unemployment insurance, the rigid and narrow targeting criteria for
social assistance, and a lack of a registry of potential beneficiaries, which could help the Government to rapidly
expand emergency cash transfer support\. As a result, despite its shortcomings, the SAS remains the only
instrument in Kosovoâs social protection system that is capable of rapidly reaching a significant share of the poor
and vulnerable population with cash transfer support\. Under the SAS, a system is already in place to identify,
process, and make payments to eligible households (see Annex 6)\. This system includes a registry of program
beneficiaries, the necessary IT infrastructure to cross-check household eligibility and process payments, and
service agreements to make payments through regulated providers\. While the Government is seeking to reform
the SAS to improve its poverty impacts (see paragraph 245), these systems can be leveraged to increase
payments to existing beneficiaries and expand eligibility to quickly provide financial support to households that
are adversely affected by the COVID-19 crisis and fall into poverty\.
23\. Kosovoâs institutional landscape is changing\. The Government that came into power at the beginning
of February 2020 has reformed the ministries\. Among other changes, it split the Ministry of Labor and Social
Welfare (MLSW) by delegating part of its mandate to the MoH and part to the Ministry of Finance and Transfers
(MoFT)\. Until this point, the MLSW was responsible for setting the policy objectives for and rules of the SAS, and
for implementing this scheme and the range of other social assistance support to pensioners, war veterans,
persons with disabilities, and others\. With this split, the former Department for Social Policies and Family, which
is responsible for social policy and social care services, has been moved to the MoH, while the Division of the
Social Assistance Scheme (called the SAS Division), which had previously sat within the Department, has been
moved to the MoFT\. Within this reorganization, the SAS Divisionâs organization, staffing, and resourcing have
remained unchanged, as has its responsibility for the SAS\.
24\. The Governmentâs response to COVID-19 is closely coordinated with the international community,
which is providing technical assistance and financial support\. WHO is the lead agency for health-related
coordination with MoH and is in daily contact with the MoH and the NIPH in supporting an effective response\.
WHO and a few other UN Agencies, including the World Bank, are members of the interinstitutional crisis
management group\. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is procuring ventilators with financial
support from Norway, Switzerland, and possibly Luxembourg\. UNICEF donated a large amount of PPE to the
MoH\. EU has signed a Euro 5 million contract with the Government of Kosovo for the procurement of emergency
supplies through the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)âsupplies such as respirators, infusion
pumps, syringe pumps, ambulance vehicles, and other equipment\. The United States Agency for International
28 World Bank\. 2017\. Closing the Gap: The State of Social Safety Nets 2017\.
29 World Bank\. 2019\. Kosovo Social Assistance Scheme Study: Assessment and Reform Options\.
Page 16 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
Development (USAID) has announced aid in the amount of US$1\.1 million aimed at providing operational
support to mitigate disease impact\. The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) is assisting the
MoH in preparing, designing, and disseminating awareness-raising messages to the population on the COVID-
19 pandemics and has provided Euro 430,000 to the UNDP for the procurement of mobile ventilators\. The EU
has announced financial support to the Government for immediate needs, including the response to the
socioeconomic impact, and is considering support to strengthen the provision of social care services\. In addition,
the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) has announced the approval of a loan of EUR 35 million to the
GoKâs earmarked budgetary support as part of the Emergency Fiscal Package measures 1\.6 and 1\.7 (bonuses for
front-line healthcare workers and pharmacists), medical equipment complementary to the Project list of
medical equipment, and possible support for additional medical staff\. Last, the IMF has already approved and
disbursed US$56\.6 million under the Rapid Financing Instrument to help mitigate the wider economic impact of
the pandemic\.
25\. As part of this coordinated support to Kosovo, the World Bank is well positioned to effectively support
the Governmentâs rapid response to COVID-19\. Under the current World Bank-financed Kosovo Health Project
(P147402) (KHP), two major components focus on strengthening primary care and developing the key building
blocks for social health insurance\. Recently, under the ongoing project, the Government has used Euro 1 million
to purchase PPE and medical supplies to respond to the immediate COVID-19 emergency\. In addition, the KHP
is being restructured to accommodate the Governmentâs request to use Euro 4 million to further respond to the
needs arising from COVID-19\. The Bank has actively supported the country in capacity-building and analytical
work while introducing social health insurance reform and technical support to improve targeting mechanisms
for health insurance subsidies\.30 The World Bank is thus well positioned to support the Government in
strengthening its surge capacity for COVID-19\. In parallel, the World Bank has a sustained engagement in the
social protection sector\. Based on a thorough review of the SAS, the World Bank has been supporting the
Government in developing a proposal to reform the targeting mechanism, with the objective of replacing the
current inexact proxies of poverty and the powerful exclusion filters with a combination of a means test and a
proxy means test (PMT)\. As a first step in the reform process, with World Bank support the former MLSW
prepared a Concept Document for a new law on the SAS\. The document was submitted for public consultations
on August 30, 2019\. Next steps include the Governmentâs review of the SAS reform Concept Document and
approval by the new cabinet, followed by drafting the new SAS law\. Through this work, the World Bank has
established itself as a leading donor in the sector; it is the only development partner providing technical
assistance to the Governmentâs SAS and the only partner supporting the Governmentâs efforts to provide
financial support to poor and vulnerable households in response to COVID-19\.
C\. Relevance to Higher-Level Objectives
26\. The project is aligned with the World Bank Groupâs (WBGâs) strategic priorities, particularly its mission
to end extreme poverty and boost shared prosperity\. The project is focused on preparedness, which is also
critical to achieving Universal Health Coverage\. It is also aligned with the World Bankâs support for national plans
and global commitments to strengthen pandemic preparedness through three key actions: improving national
preparedness plans, including the organizational structure of the Government; promoting adherence to the
International Health Regulations (IHR); and using the international framework for monitoring and evaluation of
IHR\. The economic rationale for investing in the MPA interventions is strong, given that success can reduce the
economic burden suffered by countries and, in particular, by individuals\.
30 This is coordinated with the broader social assistance reform discussed in this paragraph\.
Page 17 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
27\. The project complements both WBG and development partner investments in health systems
strengthening, disease control and surveillance, attention to changing individual and institutional behavior,
and citizen engagement\. Further, as part of the proposed IDA-19 commitments, the World Bank is committed
to âsupport at least 25 IDA countries to implement pandemic preparedness plans through interventions
(including strengthening institutional capacity, technical assistance, lending and investment)\.â The project
contributes to the implementation of IHR (2005), Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response, the World
Organization for Animal Health international standards, the Global Health Security Agenda, the Paris Climate
Agreement, the attainment of Universal Health Coverage and of the Sustainable Development Goals, and the
promotion of a One Health approach\.
28\. The WBG remains committed to providing a fast and flexible response to the COVID-19 epidemic ,
making use of all WBG operational and policy instruments and working in close partnership with governments
and other agencies\. Grounded in One-Health, which provides for an integrated approach across sectors and
disciplines, the proposed WBG response to COVID-19 will include emergency financing, policy advice, and
technical assistance, building on existing instruments to support IDA-/IBRD-eligible countries in addressing the
health sector and broader development impacts of COVID-19\. The WBG COVID-19 response will be anchored in
WHOâs COVID-19 global SPRP, which outlines the public health measures through which all countries can
prepare for and respond to COVID-19 and sustain their efforts to prevent future outbreaks of emerging
infectious diseases\.
29\. Besides being a program priority in Kosovoâs strategic documents and the Governmentâs
programmatic agenda, health system strengthening is also a priority for support by the World Bank\. The
World Bankâs Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for 2017-2021 envisages supporting Kosovo in broadening
the coverage and improving the equity of health services\. Under Focus area 2 (Strengthening Public Service
Delivery and Macro-Fiscal Management), the CPF sets out the aim of supporting targeted interventions to
strengthen the public health delivery system\. The CPF recognizes that broadened coverage and improved equity
in health care are essential inputs to strengthen human capital, reduce poverty, and enhance social inclusion\.
The CPF also recognizes that improving social protection programming to build human capital and providing
equal opportunities are key priorities in the Systematic Country Diagnostic\.
III\. PROJECT DESCRIPTION
A\. Development Objectives
30\. The project objectives are aligned to the results chain of the COVID-19 SPRP\.
31\. Project DO statement\. The project development objective is to prevent, detect, and respond to the
threat posed by COVID-19 and strengthen national systems for public health preparedness in Kosovo\.
32\. PDO-level indicators\. The PDO will be monitored through the following PDO-level outcome indicators:
ï Number of suspected cases of COVID-19 reported and investigated per approved protocol\.
ï Number of diagnosed cases treated per approved protocol\.
ï Number of beneficiaries receiving financial support to enable social distancing\.
33\. The results chain is detailed in Figure 4\.
Page 18 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
Figure 4\. Results chain
Key project Contribution to
Outputs Outcomes Impact
PDO
activities
Refurbishment
Essential Increased
of ICU units
resources to utilization of
treat COVID-19 treatment for
Essential patients COVID-19
supplies (test patients
kits, PPE) for
ICUs Essential
resources to test
COVID-19
Equip public patients
health
laboratories
to prevent,
Trained human Increased testing detect and Lowered COVID-
Training of resources for and contact respond to the 19 related
medical staff and health tracing threat posed by morbidity and
communication the COVID-19 mortality in
materials and and strengthen Kosovo
workshops national systems
Population at risk
Information better informed of for public health
disseminated prevention and preparedness in
Communication across the Kosovo
treatment
and outreach populations at measures
risk
Social distancing
Vulnerable
Targeted social enabled for
households
assistance compliancance
receive cash
with public health
assistance
containment
measures
B\. Project Components
34\. This project was selected for COVID-19 financing at the request of the Government of Kosovo, on the
basis of the countryâs financing gap and technical capacity constraints\. The objectives, scope, and components
of this project are aligned with the FTCF\. Activities in each component are limited to those for which the
Government requested urgent assistance to complement its own pandemic response (Annexes 4 and 5) and
support from other development partners (Annex 3), while remaining consistent with the list of eligible activities
outlined in the COVID-19 Board Paper and the designs of other COVID-19 projects\. This project design takes into
consideration the CEB loan of EUR 35 milion to the GoK, which plans to finance the procurement of medical
equipment and medical supplies and which are complementary to the list of medical equipment supplies to be
financed under Component 1, as well as bonuses for front-line healthcare workers and pharmacists and possibly
salaries for extra medical staff for a defined period of time\. The components described below, in combination
with the Governmentâs own pandemic response and support from other development partners, are expected
to provide a comprehensive immediate response to the COVID-19 emergency\.
35\. The proposed project will comprise three components aimed at rapidly achieving the PDO\. They are
Page 19 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
designed to disburse quickly, providing much-needed support to the Governmentâs public health response to
COVID-19 by strengthening the health system and supporting poor and vulnerable people in complying with the
containment measures\. To this end, these components directly support those elements of the Governmentâs
Emergency Fiscal Package that are implemented through existing Government programs and provide an
immediate response to poor and vulnerable households\. (Annex 1 provides the project cost by component\.)
Component 1: Emergency COVID-19 Response (Euro 16\.2 million, US$17\.6 million equivalent)
36\. This component provides immediate support to help the Government prevent new cases of COVID-19,
limit local transmission through contact tracing and containment strategies, and treat established cases,
including the most severe\. It supports the enhancement of disease detection capacities by providing technical
expertise, laboratory equipment, and systems to ensure prompt case finding and contact tracing\. It will also
contribute to strengthening the preparedness of the health system and the quality of medical care provided to
COVID-19 patients, while minimizing the risks for health personnel and patients, by providing PPE and infection
control materials in Kosovoâs regional hospitals and PHC facilities\. It will also enable the Government to mobilize
surge response capacity through trained and well-equipped front-line health workers\.
37\. Component 1 builds upon Kosovoâs existing health care network and established hierarchy of specialized
facilities\. Investments will seek to strengthen the hierarchy of health care facilities in Kosovo, which is well
established and works well, rather than to upgrade all health care facilities irrespective of specialization\. The
Infectious Disease Clinic within UCCK is the only hospital that currently provides intensive care services for
COVID-19 patients; it has 59 rooms with a 120-bed capacity\. Of the available rooms, only 19 have an oxygen
system and only 4 are equipped for intensive care (Annex 5)\. Under Kosovoâs COVID-19 response plan, the UCCK
will remain the only hospital that will receive severe COVID-cases requiring ventilatory support\. Accordingly,
Component 1 will finance equipment and supplies to enable the expansion of the UCCKâs intensive care unit
(ICU) to 60 beds, with the medium-term strategy of redistributing the beds to regular ICU units in UCCK and
regional hospitals (the calculations used to determine this number are shown in the âTechnical, Economic, and
Financial Analysisâ in Section V)\. Equipment will include mechanical ventilators, cardiac defibrillators, mobile X-
rays, oxygen concentrators, and other equipment essential to the provision of critical care to patients with
severe acute respiratory infection\. The component will also finance the rehabilitation of the Infectious Disease
Clinicâs wards to enable the isolation of more patients in single-occupancy rooms\. As necessary, it will also
finance the rehabilitation of the UCCKâs dermatology, pulmonology, and sports clinics to increase bed capacity\.
(Annex 5 provides a preliminary list of equipment needed\.) The activities, identified in consultation with the
MoFT, MoH, and NIPH, are outlined below; they are limited to those that require immediate and urgent
implementation\. Some of the equipment purchased under this component will be delivered at the PHC level
throughout all municipalities in the country\.
38\. Subcomponent 1\.1: Strengthening capacity for early case detection, confirmation, contact tracing,
reporting, and monitoring (Euro 1\.3 million, US$1\.4 million equivalent)\.
ï Strengthen disease surveillance systems and public health laboratories, adequately equipping public
health laboratories with diagnostic kits, reagents, and other consumables\.
ï Support detection of new cases by training 6-10 public health workers per regional hospital (50-70
health workers in total) to undertake contact tracing, and strengthen collaboration between central
authorities, regional hospitals, and municipality services\. The trainings are ongoing, organized by the
MoH and the NIPH and using existing local certified trainers\. The project will support these trainings for
additional health care workers\.
39\. Subcomponent 1\.2: Health capacity strengthening (Euro 14\.9 million, US$16\.2 million equivalent)\.
Page 20 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
ï Provide tailored training and guidelines for approximately 800 health care workers on identifying and
treating COVID-19, on the appropriate use of PPE,and on disease surveillance and prevention of the
spread of respiratory infections within health care facilities\. The trainings are ongoing, organized by the
MoH and the NIPH, using local certified trainers\. The project will support these trainings for additional
health care workers\.
ï Develop and distribute training modules or presentations, slide sets, etc\., for health care professionals\.
ï Provide and distribute PPE in accordance with WHO guidelines, including for social workers, who are
essential front-line staff under Component 2\.
ï Provide medical equipment and supplies, including diagnostic kits for coronavirus (Annex 5)\.
ï Rehabilitate and expand (within the existing physical footprint) the Infectious Disease Clinic in the UCCK
by up to 60 beds, to meet the expected surge in demand for hospital care in general, and intensive care
in particular\.
ï Mobilize approximately 400 medically qualified professionals who are not currently working in the
publicly funded health care system and final year medical students to offer clinical services during the
peak of the pandemic, for up to six months\.
ï Conduct workshops and symposia on COVID-19 surveillance, treatment, and prophylaxis for the wider
community (businesses, employers, media, politicians, etc\.); the workshops could be carried out
virtually during the social distancing period\. The engagement under this component will be coordinated
with WHO and the NIPH, which are already leading trainings\.
Component 2: Supporting households to comply with public health containment measures (Euro 28\.9 million,
US$31\.4 million equivalent)
40\. This component will support the Government in providing income support to poor and vulnerable
households in Kosovo to enable them to comply with the social distancing measures that have been introduced
to contain the COVID-19 pandemic\. This measure is particularly important to Kosovo, given the high rates of
poverty and large numbers of people at risk of falling into poverty and into deeper poverty, as described in the
sectoral context and economic appraisal sections\. This component will fund the SAS to (a) ensure that existing
social assistance payments are delivered on time, given the fiscal constraints the country faces; (b) finance an
increase in the value of the benefits provided to SAS beneficiaries to assist them in meeting their basic needs in
the face of rising health care costs and loss of other income sources; and (c) expand the coverage of the SAS to
additional households that have lost their sources of income as result of the pandemic and that do not receive
support from other Government programs\. 31 Each of these aims is elaborated below\. While the Government
has, in its Emergency Plan, established a clear timeline for this financial support to households, given the
evolving nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, this component will use flexibility in allocating resources across the
three subcomponents to respond to emergency needs, as elaborated under subcomponent 2\.3\. Given that SAS
and Measure 15 provide support to particularly vulnerable groups, efforts will be made to coordinate closely
with MoH to ensure that communication messaging around COVID-19 and public health measures reaches this
group\.
41\. Subcomponent 2\.1: Maintenance of social assistance payments (Euro 10\.3 million, US$11\.2 million
equivalent)\. Ensuring predictable cash transfer support to households has proven to be an effective way to
protect households from the worst effects of crises\. This subcomponent will finance the SAS to ensure that
payments continue to be predictable as the coronavirus pandemic unfolds in Kosovo\. Currently, 98,096 people
31SAS payments are issued by Kosovo Treasury based on a payroll approved by the MoFT\. No funding for SAS payments is channeled
through municipalities\.
Page 21 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
(in 24,169 households) are enrolled in the SAS and receive monthly transfers\. Payments will continue to be
made following SAS procedures, with some adaptations to comply with the social distancing measures that are
in effect in Kosovo (see Annex 6 for more details on the SAS and its adaptations)\. These regulations are
communicated regularly by MoFT and MoH to the population through the conventional and social media, with
additional communication by the Centers for Social Work (CSWs) through their own channels\. Normally, the
eligibility of beneficiaries for SAS payments is reassessed periodically (see Annex 6)\. To comply with the public
health measures introduced in response to COVID-19, the Government has waived the requirements that
beneficiaries reapply and that they present the documentation required to confirm their continued eligibility
for the SAS from March 2020 until further notice\. This waiver also applies to the requirement that beneficiary
households include a child under the age of 5 years\.32 As a result, current beneficiaries will automatically
continue to receive support as long as the public health emergency is in effect\.
42\. Households that apply to the SAS for the first time as of March 2020 are similarly not required to
produce any documentation to support their application\. However, applicants are still required to fill out the
necessary paperwork in person at the CSWs and to declare that the household meets the eligibility criteria for
the SAS\. Discussions are ongoing to build a web-based platform that would enable people to apply online, rather
than in person\. Given the likely effects of the pandemic on household income and employments status, it is
expected that the number of people applying for the SAS will increase over the coming months\.
43\. To ensure predictable cash transfer support to enable households to comply with public health
containment measures, this subcomponent will fund ongoing SAS payments for an estimated four months,
starting from March 11, 2020, when the pandemic hit Kosovo and a public health emergency was declared, both
for existing beneficiaries and for new beneficiaries who enroll in the SAS\.
44\. Subcomponent 2\.2: Increase in value of social assistance payments (Euro 7\.8 million, US$8\.5 million
equivalent)\. As part of the Emergency Fiscal Package, the Government has doubled the value of the payments
to SAS beneficiaries for the months of March, April, and May 2020 (this change is set out in Measure 1 of the
Emergency Package)\. The SAS benefit is a flat rate that slowly increases with family size and covers a lower share
of the consumption needs of larger families than of smaller ones\.33 Indexation of the benefit has been ad hoc
and discretionary, despite existing legal rules (see Annex 6)\. As a result, the SASâs benefit adequacy is average
by regional standards and declining\. Given the emergency nature of this support, and the fact that there is no
scope to reform the SAS benefit in the current political context, doubling the payment is an effective way of
improving the adequacy of the benefit as poor households experience declining incomes from informal sources,
particularly remittances, and rising costs, such as those related to health care\. This subcomponent will fund the
double payment to SAS beneficiaries and any associated fees charged by the payment service provider
(commercial bank and post office)\. The temporary nature of this support has been clearly communicated to the
public\. This payment will be generated through the SAS management information system (MIS), which includes
the functionality to support such a double payment\. It is anticipated that 98,096 beneficiaries will benefit from
this subcomponent for an estimated three months, starting in March 2020\. This subcomponent includes the
possibility of retroactive financing for SAS payments made prior to the signing of the Financing Agreement, but
made on or after March 11, 2020\.34
32 This requirement applies specifically to Category II\. See Annex 6\.
33 Beyond the second family member, the incremental benefit amount is only Euro 7\.5 per month for adults and Euro 12\.5 for children\.
As a result, the incremental benefit amount in response to an additional family member is smaller than that envisaged by the most
common equivalence scales and does not reflect adult-equivalent family size\.
34 The Government paid the double payment in March and April 2020 by advancing funds already allocated to SAS\. The subcomponent
will reimburse this financing so that the remaining regular SAS payments can be made throughout 2020\.
Page 22 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
45\. Subcomponent 2\.3: Expansion of social assistance payments (Euro 10\.8 million, US$11\.7 million
equivalent)\. This subcomponent will support the Government in expanding the SAS to provide much-needed
social assistance to poor households that are negatively affected by the pandemic and are not supported
through other public measures announced by the Government (this aim is set out in Measure 15 of the
Operational Plan for the Emergency Fiscal Package)\. Because, as discussed above, the SAS is targeted to
households that fall into a set of narrowly defined categories, the number of exclusion errors is high and is
expected to rise further as households lose their jobs and other income sources as a result of the public health
measures to contain COVID-19\. While the Government recognizes the need to reform the eligibility criteria for
the SAS,35 in the current political context the emergency situation demands a pragmatic response that will
provide immediate support to households in need\.
46\. According to the Operational Plan, households are eligible for support when the applicant household
member is unemployed, no member of the household receives any other regular assistance from the
Government, and the household has no source of formal income\. Eligible households will receive support for a
three months (April, May, and June 2020), amounting to Euro 130 per month per household\. To deliver this
support, the Government will use the systems and procedures that have been established for the SAS, with
modifications to the application, enrollment, and targeting system to comply with the broader eligibility criteria
and the social distancing measures that are in place\. The project will provide technical assistance to adapt the
SAS MIS to support the emergency payments, specifically the development of the web-based enrollment
capability, and to explore the possibility of communication through mobile phones\. Once household data are
entered into the SAS MIS, the system has the functionality to assess eligibility and generate payrolls\. The MoFT
is communicating the eligibility criteria and application method to the public, with support from UNDP, which is
also covering the operational costs to MoFT and the CSWs associated with this measure\. Initially, the threshold
for the means test in the SAS MIS will be set such that eligible households will have no source of formal income\.
However, analysis shows that a considerable share of households in the top 60 percent have no formal sources
of income, and many households in Kosovo rely on informal sources of income, including remittances, which
are expected to fall as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic\. For this reason, efforts are under way to introduce a
second tier in targeting criteria based on a PMT to better assess householdsâ poverty status\. If this emergency
measure is extended, it is expected that this second targeting method will be introduced\.
47\. The Government has allocated Euro 3 million to this emergency measure\. However, because the
economic effects of the pandemic are just beginning to unfold in Kosovo, estimates suggest that the budget
required to provide support to all eligible households is considerably higher than this amount (see the economic
appraisal section for an assessment of potentially eligible houseohlds)\. Therefore, the Government has agreed
to Euro 10\.8 million for this subcomponent, which includes the possibility of retroactive financing for payments
made to eligible households under Measure 15 through the SAS from May 1, 2020 36\. This will allow the
Government to expand the duration of this emergency assistance to the same households or enroll new
households based on the revised targeting criteria\. If support is not required under this subcomponent, these
funds will be reallocated to subcomponent 2\.1 or 2\.2, as may be required\.
35See the Governmentâs Concept Document for the Reform of the SAS, which was submitted for public consultation in August 2019\.
36Under Measure 15 eligible households will receive payments for April, May, and June 2020\. The payment for the month of April will
be made in May\.
Page 23 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
Component 3: Project management, communications, and community engagement (Euro 0\.9 million, US$1\.0
million equivalent)
48\. This component will support the overall administration of the project (including project management
and financial management functions), as well as regular monitoring and reporting of implementation\. It will
finance operating costs, equipment, and training needed for overall project management in MoH and MoFT\.
Existing Government structures and capacities will be used to the extent possible for project management and
implementation, and they may be strengthened by the appointment or recruitment of additional
staff/consultants who will be responsible for overall project implementation, including activities related to the
Environmental and Social Framework, communications and outreach, procurement, financial management
(FM), and other technical areas\. In addition, the component will support the consultancies and purchase of
equipment required to operationalize the new measures outlined under Component 2 and to support the
Government in longer-term reforms to enable its social protection system to respond to shocks\.
49\. This component will also support (a) the development and distribution of basic communication
materials on COVID-19 for the general public (e\.g\., fact sheets or âdos and donâtsâ, TV ads, awareness videos
etc\.) in Albanian and Serbian; (b) the development and implementation of outreach and awareness-building
materials and activities designed to reach the vulnerable, including the elderly, in coordination with ongoing
communication by the Government, including with support from development partners such as UNDP; and
(c) the establishment of mechanisms to receive inputs and feedback from communities and social assistance
beneficiaries, including monitoring by the Government of the effectiveness of these interventions\. To simplify
outreach and build on existing Government systems, the component will support the strengthening (and as
needed, the development) of digital platforms and social media campaigns that are mobile-friendly and able to
reach vulnerable groups\. It will also fund a rapid assessment of the emergency support provided through SAS
to inform real-time decision-making by the Government\.37
C\. Project Beneficiaries
50\. The expected beneficiaries of Component 1 will be the population at large (given the nature of the
disease), including infected people, at-risk populations, the elderly, and people with chronic conditions; medical
and emergency personnel; medical and testing facilities; and public health agencies engaged in the response in
participating countries\.
51\. The expected beneficiaries of Component 2 will be poor individuals who have lost income as a result of
the pandemic because of increased unemployment or loss of access to informal income sources, and those who
are already enrolled in the Governmentâs poverty-targeted social assistance scheme\.
D\. Lessons Learned
52\. The FTCF and the proposed operation draw on lessons learned from previous World Bank responses
to global crises and outbreaks, including the various Ebola outbreaks, the global food and avian influenza crises
in 2007-08, and the 2017 food crisis response\. Swift detection of an outbreak, assessment of its epidemic
potential, and rapid emergency response can reduce both mortality and morbidity and the economic, social,
and security impacts\. Failure to rapidly mobilize financing and coordinate responses results in unnecessary
casualties and significant socioeconomic consequences\. As the SARS and the West African Ebola Virus Disease
(EVD-WA) outbreaks showed, the cost of outbreak control and socioeconomic losses rises exponentially with
delayed detection, reporting, and action, and close technical coordination is needed across countries to prevent
37One tool that has often been used is the Interactive Beneficiary Monitoring survey, a rapid phone instrument that can be carried out
quickly every 2-4 weeks to ensure that processes are working as intended\. The intention is to adopt this methodology for this project\.
Page 24 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
and control the transboundary spread of disease\. Although delayed by several months from the onset of cases,
the global response to EVD-WA was eventually effective in stopping the outbreakâbut only after some 11,000
deaths, and economic and social costs on the order of US$53 billion\.
53\. The proposed operation also draws on lessons learned from recent health and social protection
projects in Kosovo\. The Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) for the Kosovo Avian Influenza
Control and Human Pandemic Preparedness and Response Project38 emphasized that in emergency projects the
PDO can be defined too narrowly, limiting project flexibility as needs evolve\. Accordingly, the PDO in this project
has been defined clearly but flexibly\. The ICR also noted that close coordination with specialized UN Agencies
can enhance the quality of technical assistance, extend the impact of the Bankâs investment, and produce cost
savings\. This project will work closely with development partners, as described in Annex 3\. Because this is the
first emergency project in Kosovo, emergency projects in neighboring countries have been examined to identify
lessons to shape project design\. The ICR for the Bosnia and Herzegovina Floods Emergency Recovery 39 project
noted that ârapid project preparation with the use of streamlined procedures does not compromise projectâs
implementation if a strong task team with experience in the country and in similar projects is mobilized and
implementation issues are anticipated and addressed\.â That ICR also noted that a good monitoring and
evaluation (M&E) framework and, in particular, strong accountability at the local level was an important
contributor to the projectâs success\. Hence, lack of capacity at local level needs to be quickly identified and
addressed in emergency operations\.
54\. The design of the proposed project similarly draws upon the World Bankâs Kosovo Social Assistance
Scheme Study Assessment and Reform Options report40 and the lessons that have been learned across the globe
on how to harness social assistance programs to respond to emergencies\.41 As a result of the World Bankâs
technical assistance on social protection in Kosovo, the Government has a sound understanding of the strengths
and weaknesses of the SAS and is committed to its reform\.42 Therefore, the Governmentâs Emergency Plan
proposed immediate measures that would relax a number of the features of the SAS that undermine its
effectiveness, particularly those related to the targeting criteria, the periodicity of recertification, and the value
of the payments\. This change was complemented by the recognition that scaling up the existing SAS is an
effective emergency response: expanding the SAS in a way that ensures that an adequate benefit quickly reaches
households in need can effectively protect households from economic crises (see economic appraisal section
below)\.
IV\. IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS
A\. Institutional and Implementation Arrangements
55\. The MoFT will be responsible for the overall coordination of the proposed project and for the
implementation of Component 2\. The MoH will be responsible for the implementation of Component 1\. The
MoFT and MoH will use existing systems and structures, with support from an already established project
coordination unit (PCU) under the MoH for the ongoing KHP (P147402)\. A senior staff from the Department of
38 Report No\. ICR00001857; December 15, 2011\.
39 P151157; closed June 30, 2019\.
40 Report No: AUS0000628, March 2019\.
41 See, for example, Bowen T\. et al\. (forthcoming), Adaptive Social Protection, Washington DC: World Bank; and O'Brien C\. et al\. (2018)\.
Shock-Responsive Social Protection Systems Research: Synthesis Report, Oxford Policy Management\.
42 See the Governmentâs Concept Document for the Reform of the SAS, which was submitted for public consultation in August 2019\.
Page 25 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
International Financial Cooperation in the MoFT is expected to be appointed as the main coordinator for the
project\.
56\. Project management\. The PCU will be accountable for the implementation of Component 1\. The
composition of the PCU already includes a project coordinator, a procurement specialist, an FM specialist, and
an administrative assistant, and it will be strengthened with an M&E specialist and an environmental and social
specialist\. The directors of relevant departments of the MoH (Human Resources Division, Infrastructure Division,
and the Department of Health Services) will be responsible for the technical implementation of project activities\.
The PCU will produce semiannual progress reports and will consolidate an annual work plan that will be shared
widely with the MoFT and MoH and key stakeholders\. The reports will be submitted to the World Bank\.
Technical support will be provided during project implementation, aiming at further strengthening the capacity
of the MoH\. Details on the projectâs institutional and implementation arrangements will be set out in a Project
Operations Manual (POM), to be prepared within 30 days after project effectiveness\. The POM will clearly
describe the roles, responsibilities, and processes during project implementation\. The supervision arrangements
outlined in the Global MPA will be followed for this project\.
57\. The Senior Management Committee of the KHPâchaired by the Minister of Health or his designee and
including the deputy ministers, directors of relevant MoH departments/divisions, director of the Kosovo
Hospital and University Clinical Center, and the director of the NIPHâwill continue to be responsible for
decision-making to prevent and address implementation bottlenecks\. The committee will coordinate and
monitor the progress of Component 1\.
58\. The MoFT will implement Component 2 through its SAS Division\. The SAS Division is responsible for
assessing the eligibility of beneficiaries for SAS and Emergency Measure 15 through the SAS MIS and for
approving the monthly payroll\. It is also responsible for the grievance redress mechanism (GRM) and internal
audits\. The Head of the SAS Division will be responsible for Component 2, with the support of existing staff in
the SAS Division\. The PCU in the MoH will provide support to the SAS Division on FM and procurement\.
59\. The Department for Social Policies and Family in the MoH will support the implementation of
Component 2 through its oversight of the CSWs\. The CSWs will accept applications to the SAS, perform data
entry, and carry out communication activities\. They will continue to be the first instance body for complaints
and grievances regarding SAS or Measure 15 and, as required, will elevate complaints to the SAS Division\. (The
complaint mechanism and GRM are described in more detail in Annex 6\.)
60\. Project timeline\. Most activities, including the financial support to households through SAS, will be
financed and completed in the first 9-12 months of project implementation\. However, because of the
complexity of the project, including measures to strengthen the health capacity to respond to future health
emergencies, a two-year project timeline is proposed\.
B\. Results Monitoring and Evaluation Arrangements
61\. The PCU/MoH and the SAS Division/MoFT will be responsible for M&E activities, overseeing progress
related to project activities, outcomes, and results for Component 1 and Component 2, respectively\. For each
component, the responsible ministry will (a) collect and consolidate all data related to the component
indicators; (b) evaluate results; (c) provide the relevant performance information to the Senior Management
Committee for Components 1 and 3; (d) provide relevant performance information to the project coordinator
at the MoFT for all project Components; and (e) report results to the World Bank before each semiannual
implementation support visit (to be carried out virtually during the COVID-19 pandemic)\.
Page 26 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
C\. Sustainability
62\. The sustainability of the project will largely arise from the successful containment of the virus in
Kosovo\. The World Bank will continue to work with the relevant ministries to assess the need for additional
financing that may arise from the evolving situation in Kosovo\. The investments in the health systemâs capacity
to identify, test, and treat cases of COVID-19 are expected to strengthen the capacity of the system for future
health crises\. In terms of financial support to households, COVID-19-related emergency cash assistance (SAS
double payment and Measure 15 payments) will be time-bound to enable beneficiaries to comply with the
public health containment measures\. The provision of rapid financial support to households is designed to
protect their assets and human capital, thereby protecting them from long-term negative effects\. As households
lose their sources of income as a result of COVID-19 and fall into poverty, they may become eligible for SAS,
which is fully Government-funded and is designed to expand to provide support to all eligible households\.
However, the Government recognizes that the current eligibility criteria for SAS significantly restrict the scope
to support poor households through this vehicle, and therefore it had initiated a reform of the program\. It is
expected that once the current political situation stabilizes, the Government will again pursue this reform, with
possible World Bank support\.
V\. PROJECT APPRAISAL SUMMARY
A\. Technical, Economic, and Financial Analysis
63\. The burden of disease in Kosovo and the large share of the population affected by NCDs suggest that
the population infection rate could be high\. COVID-19 case fatality rates are much higher among high-risk
groups\.43 In Kosovo about 21\.6 percent of adults (18 years and above) have reported having a chronic disease,
and three in five deaths in the country are attributable to circulatory system diseases\.44 More than one in three
individuals aged 50 years and above report suffering from high blood pressure, and about 8 percent from
diabetes\. NCDs are relevant co-morbidities, and Kosovo is experiencing an increase in people with NCDs\.
64\. Modeling by the National Response Plan of the MoH shows that even under the most optimistic
scenario, Kosovo should expect that hundreds of citizens will need medical support (with an incidence rate at
0\.1 percent, around 1,876 cases are projected)\. Nonetheless, considering the recent rapid increase in the
number of new cases, in coordination with the MoH, a pessimistic scenario of a higher incidence rate has been
modeled\. Assuming the worst-case scenario of 5,000-6,000 cases (i\.e\., an incidence rate of 300 per 100,000
population, similar to Italy and Spain), then significantly more health care resources would be needed (Table
2)\.45
43 Centers for Disease Control, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), People Who Need Extra Precautions, April 19, 2020\.
44 Kosovo Health Financing Policy Note\. World Bank\. August 31, 2019\.
45 Note: WB team back-of-the-envelope calculations\. The numbers needing ICU and ventilators come from
https://oto\.med\.upenn\.edu/2020/03/31/covid-19-hospital-impact-model-for-epidemics-chime /\.
Page 27 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
Table 2\. Modeling of the most pessimistic scenario on the number of cases at a higher incidence rate
All 80% of cases 15% moderate 5% severe, Around half of Around a quarter of
cases are mild or (no admission needing to hospitalized hospitalized cases
asymptomatic needed) be cases (i\.e\., 2% of (i\.e\., 1% of all cases)
hospitalized all cases) need need to be admitted
to be admitted to ICU and ventilated
to ICU
Total 6000 4800 900 300 120 60
Each month, 2000 1600 300 100 40 20
if spread over
3 months
65\. These estimates justify the planned expansion, outlined in the description of Component 1, of UCCKâs
Infectious Disease ward\. Up to 60 new intensive care beds will be financed by the project â a number that is
sufficient to meet the expected numbers of admissions requiring intensive care, with spare capacity to avoid
100 percent occupancy and allow for unexpected surges in demand\. This is particularly important for the COVID
pandemic, since lengths of stay can be prolonged (median 19 days, with an interquartile range of 14-23 days in
one study46), meaning that hospital beds can quickly become occupied\.
66\. The projected numbers of cases could be reduced through appropriate measures to limit the spread of
the disease in the population, some of which are already in place in Kosovo\. Managing the increased demand
for services and treating critically ill patients will require rapid testing, hospital and human resource capacity,
and adherence to appropriate protocols, thus justifying the investments in equipment, refurbishment,
temporary additional health care workers, and trainings proposed by the project\.
67\. The interventions and investments supported by this project reflect the outcome of a rapid technical
assessment, carried out by the MoH and WHO in Kosovo, taking into account what is known about the disease
and the capacities of Kosovoâs health care system\. In particular, the proposed interventions are informed by
previous assessments and surveys of the health resource capacity and delivery system undertaken by the MoH,
WHO, and the World Bank, by limited modeling, and by careful review of the Governmentâs request and its
detailed equipment list\. Nonetheless, considering the unpredictability of the current and future prevalence of
COVID-19 and the scarce research on the impact of the disease itself, it is challenging to design a technically
appropriate project\. Therefore, the design of the proposed project is flexible to accommodate the changing
needs of a rapidly changing pandemic and the evolving knowledge about the disease\.
68\. There is a strong economic rationale for the projectâs investment to strengthen the Governmentâs
public health response to the COVID-19 pandemic\. Although there are significant gaps in knowledge about the
scope and features of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is apparent that one main set of economic effects will derive
from increased sickness and death among humans and the impact this will have on the potential output of the
domestic and global economy\. The most direct impact would be on the size and productivity of the world labor
force\. The loss of productivity as a result of illness which, even in normal influenza episodes, is estimated to be
10 times as large as all other costs combined, will be quite significant\. Another significant set of economic
impacts will result from the uncoordinated efforts of private individuals to avoid becoming infected or to survive
the results of infection\. The SARS outbreak of 2003 provides a good example\. The number of deaths due to SARS
46Survival analysis of length of hospital stay of novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pneumonia patients in Sichuan, China; Zhuo Wang et al\.
doi: https://doi\.org/10\.1101/2020\.04\.07\.20057299\.
Page 28 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
was estimated at âonlyâ 800 deaths, and it resulted in economic losses of about 0\.5 percent of annual GDP for
the entire East Asia region, concentrated in the second quarter\. The measures that people took resulted in a
severe demand shock for the service sectorsâtourism, mass transportation, retail salesâand increased
business costs due to workplace absenteeism, disruption of production processes, and shifts to more costly
procedures\. A policy of providing prompt and transparent public information can reduce these economic losses\.
The economic impact of this project will be mainly through the first pathway: with investments in prevention
through case detection and the provision of care to patients, the project can reduce the levels of morbidity and
mortality from what they might otherwise have been\.
69\. There is a similarly strong economic rationale to invest in the Governmentâs efforts to mitigate the
economic impacts of the pandemic\. Another set of economic impacts are those associated with governmentsâ
policy efforts to contain the epidemic\. An assessment of social distancing measures from China found that
nonpharmaceutical interventions such as community social distancing and lockdowns reduced the transmission
of COVID-19\. Because of aggressive nonpharmaceutical interventions, the case fatality rate outside Hubei was
nearly five times lower than that in Hubei, and was correlated with the reduction in mobility\. 47 Modeling
revealed that relaxing the social distancing when the epidemic size was still small would have pushed COVID-19
prevalence back to baseline\. Evidence from 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic in the US also shows that
nonpharmaceutical interventions, when imposed early in the course of the epidemic, resulted in lower peaks
and fewer total cases of pandemic influenza than instances in which authorities did not impose or delayed
imposing such measures\.48
70\. Initial analysis suggests that the impacts of COVID-19 on household incomes and broader welfare
status are likely to be substantial in general, and disproportionate for specific poor and vulnerable groups\. In
addition to the direct health impact, the COVID-19 crisis will likely affect household welfare through increased
health expenses, reduced labor incomes, and declining remittances\. It is expected that a significant number of
individuals will lose their jobs, especially people who are engaged in the informal economy\. Simulations of
income shocks during the next 3-6 months, based on the sectors most affected by the containment measures,
suggest that 70,000 to 170,000 people could become poor, while the middle class could shrink by as much as
100,000 people\. More than half the people who are likely to fall into poverty do not benefit from an existing
social protection program (about 40% receive pensions)\. In addition, many poor and vulnerable households that
are not eligible for the SAS because of its restrictive eligibility criteria will be hit hard\.
71\. Expanding the coverage and size of cash transfers could mitigate the financial damage caused by the
virus outbreak on the less well-off\. A growing body of evidence from around the world shows that scaling up
cash transfers can be an effective way to protect households from the negative effects of shocks\.49 As of April
17, 2020, 133 countries have reported making changes to their social protection systems in response to the
CODIV-19 pandemic; most are scaling up cash transfer schemes by increasing either benefit levels or coverage,
or both\.50 Scaling up cash transfers can be a vertical (increasing the value or frequency of payments) or
47 Leung, K\., Wu, J\. T\., Liu, D\., and Leung, G\. M\. (2020)\. First-wave COVID-19 transmissibility and severity in China outside Hubei after
control measures, and second-wave scenario planning: a modelling impact assessment\. The Lancet\.
48 Correia, S\., Luck, S\., and Verner, E\. (1918)\. Pandemics Depress the Economy, Public Health Interventions Do Not: Evidence from the
1918 Flu\.
49 World Bank (forthcoming)\. Adaptive Social Protection\. Washington DC: World Bank
50 Gentilini, U\., Almenfi\., Orton I\., Dale, P\. (2020)\. Social Protection and Jobs Responses to COVID-19: A Real-Time Review of Country
Measures\. âLiving paperâ version 5 (April 17, 2020)\.
Page 29 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
horizontal (increasing the number of beneficiaries) expansion\.51 Through Component 2, the project will invest
in both strategies\. First, doubling the benefit amount to existing SAS beneficiaries (Component 2\.2) will increase
the adequacy of payments from 63 to 126 percent of the consumption expenditure for households in the bottom
quintile,52 mitigating the combined effects of lack of savings, loss of remittances, and more difficult access to
basic goods and food during the crisis\. Second, the funds allocated by the Government allow expanding the SAS
to 35,000 new individuals or 7,600 new households (Component 2\.3), but it has been estimated that many more
households will fall into poverty and comply with the selection criteria\.53 Therefore, the project allocates over
US$11\.7 million for the expansion of SAS to new beneficiaries, equivalent to at least 23,000 households\. To allow
for a quick expansion of the SAS that adheres to the requirements of social distancing, only the means test that
is already used for the regular SAS will be applied, but not the additional poverty screening that requires the
applicant to visit the CSW and the social worker to visit the applicantâs home\. Analysis suggests that using the
means test only will result in about half the beneficiaries being in the bottom 40 percent\.
72\. Large volumes of personal data, personally identifiable information\. and sensitive data are likely to
be collected and used in connection with the management of the COVID-19 outbreak under circumstances in
which measures to ensure the legitimate, appropriate, and proportionate use and processing of those data may
not feature in national law or data governance regulations\. To guard against abuse of those data, the project
will incorporate best international practices for dealing with themâfor example, data minimization (collecting
only data that are necessary for the purpose), data accuracy (correct or erase data that are not necessary or are
inaccurate), use limitations (data are only used for legitimate and related purposes), data retention (retain data
for only as long as they are necessary), informing data subjects of the use and processing of data, and allowing
data subjects the opportunity to correct information about them\. In practical terms, to ensure that these
principles apply, operations will assess existing or develop new data governance mechanisms and data
standards for emergency and routine health care, data-sharing protocols, and rules or regulations; revise
relevant regulations; provide training; share global experience; establish unique identifiers for health system
clients; strengthen health information systems; and so on\.
B\. Fiduciary
Financial Management and Disbursement
73\. Responsibility for the projectâs FM will remain with MoH and MoFT, which will maintain an adequate
project FM system, capable of tracking all project operations, resources, and expenditures and generating
regular financial reports\. The project will rely extensively on the various elements of Kosovoâs public financial
management (PFM) systems and architecture that are applicable to the health sector and the SAS program\. The
Bankâs fiduciary assessment54 confirms that the existing arrangements implemented in the identified units and
departments (i\.e\., the SAS unit, Treasury in the MoFT, PCU and Budget and Finance Division in the MoH),
including budget classification and program structure, reporting and expenditure monitoring systems, Treasury
function, internal control framework, and external audit, are suitable for the proposed operation\.
74\. Overall FM arrangements are adequate and meet the minimum requirements of the Bankâs Policy and
Directive on Investment Project Financing\. The assessment has concluded that the current systems and process
in place for managing and implementing SAS can, with reasonable assurance, provide accurate and timely
51 World Bank\. (2019)\. Sahel adaptive social protection program annual report 2018\. Washington, D\.C\.
52 Calculated based on the Household Budget Survey 2017\.
53 An analysis of the Household Budget Survey 2017 reveals that 39,000 households (215,000 individuals) report no formal income\.
54 An FM assessment was conducted in accordance with the Financial Management Manual for World Bank Investment Project
Financing Operations (2010, revised 2017)\.
Page 30 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
information on the status of the proposed operation\. The MoFT has agreed that the same control framework
and funds flow arrangement will be applied for the new SAS measures proposed\. It appears that the
reorganization (merger) of the former MoLSW with MoFT is temporarily suspended while attention has shifted
to the COVID-19 emergency response\. This may have a negative impact on the retention of existing capacities
in the FM and internal audit functions relevant for the SAS program, if not steered adequately\. The existing FM
arrangements established in the MoH for the implementation of the ongoing KHP project are adequate\. 55 The
same arrangements will be used for Components 1 and 3 of the present project\. The risk pertaining to
insufficient or untimely budgetary allocations is substantial, especially given the current political context\. While
it appears that in the short term, both MoFT and MoH would be able to direct available resources to the
emergency response within the current budgetary limits, a review of the annual budget law during the second
semester would be necessary\. For both parts, additional measures have been agreed to strengthen the FM
systems for the proposed operation\.
(a) Update the FM section of the existing KHP POM, covering all project operations, including internal
controls and division of roles and responsibilities between institutions involved\.
(b) Develop and endorse procedures, acceptable to the Bank, for the implementation of the new SAS
measure\.
(c) Develop and endorse human resource and payroll management procedures, acceptable to the Bank, for
the surge medical and support staff\.
(d) Maintain at least one qualified FM specialist as part of the PCU to support the MoH Budget and Finance
Division for the implementation of both the proposed operation and KHP\.
(e) Formally assign an FM focal point at the Treasury for reporting and disbursement of cash transfers under
Component 2\.
(f) Conduct periodic and on-the-job FM and disbursement training of the FM staff (MoH, MoFT)\.
The World Bank team will monitor these arrangements continuously throughout implementation and will advise
if gaps are identified, indicating the need for additional staff resources or control activities\.
75\. Standard disbursement requirements will be applicable to the project\. All project eligible expenditures will
be entirely financed by the IDA financing proceeds\. The funds will be disbursed following standard Investment
Project Financing (IPF) disbursement procedures, including advances, reimbursements, special commitments,
and direct payments\. The advance method and designated accounts (one for Components 1 and 3, and one for
Component 2) will be used only if required by the Kosovo Treasury\. In that case, one or two segregated
designated accounts (DAs) denominated in Euro will be opened at the Central Bank of Kosovo, as subaccounts
linked to the Single Treasury Account\. The advanced funds will be earmarked for the proposed operation\.
Project eligible expenditures will be documented through Statements of Expenditures and records\. The project
disbursement arrangements will be managed by the MoH/PCU and MoFT/Treasury for their respective project
parts\. Detailed disbursement arrangements are set out in the Disbursement and Financial information Letter
(DFIL)\.
76\. The project have the flexibility of using retroactive financing\. Retroactive financing for an amount not to
exceed EUR 18,400,000 may be made for payments for eligible expenditures under Component 2 made prior to
the date of the Financing Agreement but on or after March 11, 2020\. The prefinanced funds will be provided by
55 The assessment covers KHP, apart from pilot CBPP, considering that a similar scheme is not included under the proposed operation\.
Page 31 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
MoFT and reimbursed after the project becomes effective\.
77\. Financial reporting and audits\. With regard to the FM requirements to be included in the DFIL: (a) quarterly
consolidated interim unaudited financial reports (IFRs), in the agreed form and substance, will be submitted to
the Bank no later than 45 days after the end of each quarter; and (b) two sets of annual project financial
statements, one for each implementing entity, will be audited by independent auditors under terms of reference
acceptable to the Bank, and the audited financial statements will be presented to the Bank no later than nine
months after the end of the fiscal year and made publicly available in a manner acceptable to the Bank\. The
National Audit Office is currently conducting the audits for Bank-financed projects\.
78\. The FM risk after mitigation measures is Substantial for several reasons: (a) overall weak technical
capacities and gaps in implementing the public FM regulations; (b) complex implementation and funds flow
arrangements require effective coordination, monitoring, and oversight; the new SAS measures and
management of additional medical staff should at least follow existing arrangements; (c) social distancing and
travel limitations may disrupt the control and audit processes; (d) the reorganization may cause fragmentation
of processes and lost capacity; and (e) risks associated with the budget and inability to review the budget law
given the current political context\. The measures described above are designed to mitigate the FM risks\.
Procurement
79\. Procurement under the project will be carried out in accordance with the World Bankâs Procurement
Regulations for IPF Borrowers for Goods, Works, Non-Consulting and Consulting Services, dated July 1, 2016
(revised in November 2017 and August 2018)\. The Project will be subject to the World Bankâs Anti-Corruption
Guidelines, dated October 15, 2006, and revised in January 2011 and as of July 1, 2016\.
80\. Use of Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement (STEP)\. The project will use STEP to plan,
record, and track procurement transactions\. All procurement transactions for post and prior contract review
under the project must be recorded in or processed through the Bankâs STEP platform\. This ensures that
comprehensive information on the procurement and implementation of all contracts for goods, works, non-
consulting services, and consulting services awarded under the whole project are automatically available\. This
tool will be used to manage the exchange of information (such as bidding documents, bid evaluation reports,
and no-objections) between the implementing agencies and the Bank\. The PCU is using STEP in another ongoing
project (Swiss Grant) and is familiar with the system\.
81\. The major planned procurement includes the following\. For the health sector: (a) medical equipment
and supplies, including PPE, respirators, test kits for COVID-19 detection, laboratory equipment/supplies,
portable and stationary ventilators, patient monitoring equipment, mobile X-rays, multipurpose devices,
ultrasound portable and stationary devices, extracorporeal membrane oxygenation device, oxygen
concentrators and suction pumps, and intensive care beds; (b) works to upgrade/expand the
infrastructure/capacity of the Infectious Disease Clinic, and installation of ICU beds; (c) support for the
additionally hired 450 volunteers (for an additional 3-5 months of service), and training for health care providers
on risk mitigation measures, identification/treatment of COVID-19, etc\.; and (d) strengthening of public health
laboratories and epidemiological capacity for early detection, confirmation, and reporting of cases (including
lab equipment and disease surveillance equipment)\. For the social protection sector: hiring of consultants to
support the SAS Division and CSWs, and IT and office equipment for MoFT/CSW staff involved in implementing
this component, as needed\. For both sectors: staffing and consultants associated with project implementation,
coordination and management, procurement, FM, environmental and social safeguards, outreach activities,
communication campaigns, M&E, reporting and stakeholder engagement; and performance audits focusing on
key project activities\.
Page 32 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
82\. Project Procurement Strategy for Development (PPSD)\. With support from the Bank, the PCU of MoH
is preparing a streamlined PPSD\. The PPSD will include a Procurement Plan for the first three months of the
Project that will be finalized during implementation\. All the selection methods defined in the Procurement
Regulations can be used; however, priority will be given to streamlined and simple procedures and to those that
ensure expedited delivery, such as Direct Selection, Request for Quotations with no threshold limit as
appropriate, Framework Agreements (including tapping into existing ones), Procurement from UN Agencies
following Direct Selection using existing standard agreements, Engagement of UN Agencies to provide technical
assistance or outputs (combination of technical assistance and inputs), and Consultantâs Qualifications-based
Selection\. Procurement will follow either an international or national approach in accordance with the
procurement thresholds indicated in the PPSD\.
83\. Fast-track procurement for the emergency goods, works, and consulting and non-consulting services
needed\. Key measures to fast-track procurement include the following: (a) use of simple and fast procurement
and selection methods fit for an emergency situation, including direct contracting, as appropriate;
(b) streamlined competitive procedures with shorter bidding time; (c) use of framework agreements, including
existing ones; (d) procurement from UN Agencies enabled and expedited by Bank procedures and templates;
(e) use of procurement agents; (f) force account, as needed; and (g) increased thresholds for Requests For
Quotations and national procurement, among others, as well as minimal or no prior review for emergency
procurement\. If requested by the borrower, the Bank may consider providing hands-on expanded
implementation support (HEIS) to help expedite all stages of procurement â from help with supplier
identification, to support for bidding/selection and/or negotiations, to contract signing and monitoring of
implementation\. In addition, a bid-securing declaration may be asked in lieu of a bid security; performance
security may not be required for small contracts; advance payment may be increased to 40 percent when
secured with an advance payment guarantee; the time for submission of bids/proposal can be shortened to 15
business days in competitive national and international procedures, and to 5 business days for the Request for
Quotations, depending on the value and complexity of the requested scope of bid and the capacity of firms
(local and international) to prepare responsive bids in the proposed periods; and the standstill period will not
apply in any procurement under the project\.
84\. Retroactive financing and advanced procurement\. Partial waivers relating to the application of the
Anti-Corruption Guidelines to unsuccessful bidders in the context of retroactive financing and existing
Framework Agreements in place between the borrower and suppliers and financed under retroactive financing
or advanced procurement have been considered under the project, subject to the conditions defined in 5\.1 and
5\.2 of the Procurement Regulations for Borrowers\. In accordance with the Procurement Regulations, the Bank
requires the application of, and compliance with, the Bankâs Anti-Corruption Guidelines, including without
limitation the Bankâs right to sanction and the Bankâs inspection and audit rights\. To ensure compliance with
these provisions in the bidding processes that have already been conducted for which the awarded/signed
contracts did not include the relevant fraud and corruption (F&C) provisions, the MoH has agreed to require
such suppliers/consultants and contractors to sign the Letter of Acceptance of the World Bankâs Anticorruption
Guidelines and Sanctions Framework so that these contracts can be eligible for financing under this project\. The
Bank will not finance any contracts that do not include the Bankâs F&C-related clauses\. The MoH will also present
to the Bank the list of contractors/suppliers and subcontractors/sub-suppliers under these contracts so that the
Bank can ensure that the selected firms are not, and were not at the time of award or contract signing, on the
Page 33 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
Bankâs list of debarred firms\. Contracts awarded to firms debarred or suspended by the Bank (or those that
include debarred or suspended subcontractors/sub-suppliers) will not be eligible for Bank financing\.
85\. Procurement of secondhand goods may be considered under the project where justified and needed
to respond to emergency\. A procurement process for goods should not mix secondhand goods with new goods;
the technical requirements/specifications should describe the minimum characteristics of the items that could
be offered secondhandâthat is, age and condition (e\.g\., refurbished, like new, or acceptable if showing normal
wear and tear); and the warranty and defect liability provisions in the contract should be written or adapted to
apply to secondhand goods\. Any risk mitigation measures that may be necessary in relation to the procurement
and use of secondhand goods will be reflected in the PPSD\.
86\. Hands-on expanded implementation support (HEIS) may be considered in the procurement of the
initial needs of the medical equipment and supplies, if requested by the Borrower\. This will include expanded
implementation support to help expedite all stages of procurement â from help with supplier identification, to
support for bidding/selection and/or negotiations to contract signing and monitoring of implementation\.
87\. Bank-facilitated procurement (BFP)\. Upon the MoHâs request, the Bank may provide BFP to assist in
accessing existing supply chains\. Once the suppliers are identified, the Bank could proactively support the
borrower with negotiating prices and other contract conditions\. The borrower will remain fully responsible for
signing and entering into contracts and implementation, including assuring relevant logistics with suppliers such
as arranging the necessary freight/shipment of the goods to their destination, receiving and inspecting the
goods, and paying the suppliers, with the option of using the World Bankâs system of making direct payment to
the contractors or suppliers or consultants on behalf of the client from the proceeds of the financing, in
accordance with the terms of the Financing Agreement\. The BFP would constitute additional support to the
borrower over and above the usual HEIS, which will remain available\. If needed, the Bank could also provide
hands-on support to the borrower in contracting to outsource logistics\. BFP to access available supplies may
include aggregating demand across participating countries, whenever possible, or extensive market
engagement to identify suppliers from the private sector and UN Agencies\. The Bank is coordinating closely with
WHO and other UN Agencies (specifically UNICEF) that have established systems for procuring medical supplies
and charge a fee that varies across agencies and type of service and can be negotiated (around 5 percent on
average)\. In addition, the Bank may help the borrower access governmentsâ available stock\. In providing BFP
the Bank will remain within its operational boundaries and mandate, which already includes HEIS to help the
borrower achieve the projectâs development objectives\. Procurement for goods/works and services will follow
the Bankâs standard procurement arrangements, with the borrower responsible for all procurement steps (or
with normal HEIS, as applicable)\.
88\. Procurement implementation arrangements\. The PCU in the MoH has gained experience in the
implementation of the ongoing KHP (including the implementation of the Swiss Development Cooperation
Grant); therefore, the same PCU will undertake procurement implementation\. The internal processes
established under the ongoing operation will be replicated under the proposed project to avoid delays in
implementation and initial set-up\. The PCU employs a part-time procurement specialist who will also work on
the proposed project\. The procurement specialist is experienced with Bank procurement guidelines and has
solid knowledge and experience with the Procurement Regulations\. To increase its technical expertise, the MoH
may need to hire additional technical staff\.
89\. The procurement risk is High\. The major risks to procurement are as follows: (a) slow procurement
processing and decision-making, with potential implementation delays; (b) a poor contract management system
with potential time and cost overruns and poor-quality deliverables; (c) lack of familiarity in dealing with such a
Page 34 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
novel epidemic; and (d) increased risk of F&C (abuse of simplified procurement procedures, false delivery
certification, inflated invoices)\. These risks are elevated by the global extent of the COVID-19 outbreak, which
creates shortages of supplies and necessary services, thus raising prices and cost\. Moreover, the fact that various
industries are feeling the impact of COVID-19 affects the procurement process and the implementation of
contracts\. To deal with potential procurement delays because of the spread of COVID-19, the Bank will support
the MoH in applying any procedural flexibilities (e\.g\., extension of bid submission deadlines, advising on the
applicability of force majeure, electronic bid submission)\. The Bank team will also monitor and support
implementation to agree with the MoH on the reasonableness of the procurement approaches and obtained
outcomes, considering the available market response and needs\.
90\. To mitigate the identified risks, the following actions are recommended in addition to those mentioned
above: (a) maintaining accountability for following the expedited approval processes for an emergency;
(b) assigning staff with responsibility for managing each contract; (c) ensuring oversight by the Bank teams in
close coordination with the borrowerâs oversight; and (d) having the Government of Kosovo consider the BFP
option of using the World Bankâs system of making direct payment to the contractors or suppliers or consultants
on behalf of the client from the proceeds of the financing, in accordance with the terms of the Financing
Agreement\. The procurement risk remains High after mitigation measures\. The Bank will not carry out prior
review\. The Bank will conduct post-review missions using the STEP information (besides the normal post-review
missions, should the situation in the country improve)\.
C\. Legal Operational Policies
\. \.
Triggered?
Projects on International Waterways OP 7\.50 No
Projects in Disputed Areas OP 7\.60 No
\.
D\. Environmental and Social Standards
91\. Overall, the risk is assessed as Substantial for both environmental and social risks\. Paragraph 22 of the
IPF policyârelating to the requirement to seek the approval of the Board before signing the legal agreements for
individual projects under the global emergency MPA Program for projects classified as High or Substantial Risk
(pursuant to the Environmental and Social Policy)âis waived, given the similarity of environmental and social risks
across COVID-19 operations and the commonality of approaches to their mitigation across all such projects,
embedded in the project design and environmental and social requirements that apply to each project (as set out
in the MPA PAD)\.
92\. The project will have long-term positive impacts as it should improve COVID-19 surveillance, monitoring,
and containment\. It can also cause substantial environmental, health, and safety risks due to the dangerous nature
of the pathogen (COVID-19) and reagents and other materials to be used in the project-supported ICUs and
participating laboratories\. The main environmental risks are as follows: (a) environmental and community health-
related risks from inadequate storage, transportation, and disposal of infected medical waste; (b) occupational
health and safety issues related to the availability and supply of PPE for health care workers and the logistical
challenges in transporting PPE across the country in a timely manner; and (c) community health and safety risks
given close social contact and the limited sanitary and hygiene services (clean water, soap, disinfectants) and
isolation capabilities across the country\. Infections due to inadequate adherence to occupational health and safety
Page 35 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
standards can cause the virus to spread to medical staff, laboratory staff, and the population at large during the
detection, transportation of patients/tests/chemicals and reagents, and treatment stages\. This can lead to illness
and death among health workers\. Furthermore, the ICUs and laboratories involved in COVID-19 diagnostic testing
and treatment will generate medical waste and other hazardous byproducts, which, if they are inadequately
managed during their collection, transportation, and disposal, may cause additional health risks\. While risks to the
safety of workers and the community are relevant and significant, they are considered temporary, predictable, and
readily managed through project design features and mitigation measures\. No major civil works are expected under
this project\. Small works are expected under Component 1, rehabilitation and expansion (within the existing
physical footprint) of the Infectious Disease Clinicâs wards to enable more patients to be isolated in single-
occupancy rooms, and rehabilitation of UCCKâs other dermatology, pulmonology, and sports clinics to provide
space for additional beds as necessary\. Since the works will be within existing Government facilities/grounds, no
new land will be acquired or accessed\. The key social risk is the potential for inequitable access to project-supported
facilities and services and exclusion from the social protection measures, particularly for vulnerable and high-risk
social groups (poor, disabled, elderly) and for workers on the site during the rehabilitation of health care facilities\.
This is partly mitigated by the fact that the project will be implemented by an experienced PCU\. All environmental
and social risks are covered by the WBâs Environmental and Social Standards (ESSs): ESS 1, ESS 2, ESS 3, ESS 4, and
ESS 10\.
93\. To manage the risks specified above, the MoFT, in cooperation with MoH, will prepare an Environmental
and Social Management Framework (ESMF) to identify risks and potential environmental and social impacts and
outline appropriate mitigation measures based largely on adopting WHO guidance, World Bank Group
Environment, Health, and Safety Guidelines, and other good international industry practices\. The ESMF will include
a Code of Environmental Practice for minor works associated with the installation of isolation units (e\.g\., utility
connections), and Environmental and Social Management Plans and Infection Prevention and Control and Waste
Management Plans for all facilities, including laboratories and isolation centers\. The ESMF will also include Labor
Management Procedures for PCU and contracted workers to ensure proper working conditions and management
of worker relationships and occupational health and safety, and to prevent potential sexual harassment\. The ESMF
will be prepared to a standard acceptable to the Bank and disclosed no later than 30 days after project
effectiveness\. Until the ESMF has been approved, the project will strictly follow current WHO guidance and avoid
activities such as establishing isolation units and treatment facilities at scale\. The MoFT and MoH will also prepare
a Stakeholder Engagement Plan (SEP) and GRM, establishing a structured approach for community outreach and
two-way engagement with stakeholders, including vulnerable and disadvantaged groups (poor, disabled, elderly,
isolated communities), that is based on meaningful consultation and disclosure of appropriate information, in
appropriate languages, and takes into account the specific challenges associated with public meetings during the
COVID-19 pandemic\. A preliminary SEP, including a GRM, has been prepared and will be updated by the PCU and
disclosed within 30 days after project effectiveness\.
VI\. GRIEVANCE REDRESS SERVICES
94\. Communities and individuals that believe that they are adversely affected by a World Bank-supported
project may submit complaints to project-level grievance redress mechanisms or to the Bankâs Grievance Redress
Service, which ensures that complaints received are promptly reviewed and project-related concerns addressed\.
Project-affected communities and individuals may submit a complaint to the Bankâs independent Inspection Panel,
which determines whether harm occurred, or could occur, as a result of the Bankâs noncompliance with its policies
and procedures\. Complaints may be submitted at any time after concerns have been brought directly to the World
Page 36 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT (P173819)
Bank's attention and Bank Management has been given an opportunity to respond\. For information on how to
submit complaints to the Bankâs corporate Grievance Redress Service, please visit
http://www\.worldbank\.org/en/projects-operations/products-and-services/grievance-redress-service\. For
information on how to submit complaints to the World Bank Inspection Panel, please visit
www\.inspectionpanel\.org\.
VII\. KEY RISKS
95\. The overall project risk is rated as Substantial, reflecting the following risks\.
96\. Political and governance risk is High\. Kosovo has a dynamic political landscape that branches into the civil
service\. There is a risk of political instability triggered by political cycles and historical sensitivities among different
ethnic groups, or by the current discussions with the Republic of Serbia\. The risk is amplified by the current political
situation, with a caretaker Government that has restricted decision-making authority\. There is also a risk that when
a new Government comes into power, it could shift priorities or reorganize the ministries\. Currently, there is strong
political support for the Governmentâs Emergency Plan, which mitigates some of these risks, as does the proposed
coordination of the project by the MoFT\. The support that the proposed project will provide will help ensure the
provision of health services and social assistance during the pandemic and will also help mitigate this risk, as the
response will help build citizensâ trust in the institutions of Kosovo\. Corruption risks in Kosovo are also high; this
risk will be mitigated by using the established FM systems\.
97\. Macroeconomic risk is Substantial, given the economic crisis arising from the negative health impacts of
COVID-19 and the public health measures adopted by the Government, which restrict movement and require
home-based work\. The projected decline in economic growth could undermine Government revenue\.
98\. The fiduciary (both procurement and FM) risk is High\. These risks are detailed in the relevant sections of
the appraisal section above\. For procurement, the High risk largely arises from weaknesses in the procurement
systems and the rapidly evolving and global extent of the epidemic, which has created shortages of supplies and
necessary services\. To mitigate these risks, the World Bank will support the implementing agencies in applying any
procedural flexibilities and will provide timely implementation support\. For FM, Substantial risks largely arise from
weaknesses and gaps in the implementation of the public financial regulations, risks inherent in the SAS
architecture, complexities and gaps arising from the recent ministerial reorganization, and the implications of social
distancing measures and travel restrictions\. An additional key risk is the inability to review the budget law given
the current political context\. These risks will be mitigated through the adoption of clear FM procedures, assigning
of responsible staff to the implementing agencies, and close monitoring by the World Bank\.
99\. Environmental and social risks are rated Substantial\. The four major areas of risk for the project are
related to (a) the rehabilitation of existing health care facilities; (b); medical waste management and disposal;
(c) COVID-19 affecting health care workers; and (iv) the spread of COVID-19 among the population at large\. These
risks are covered by ESS 1, ESS 2, ESS 3, ESS 4, and ESS 10\. To mitigate these risks, the MoFT in cooperation with
MoH will prepare an ESMF that will contain provisions for storing, transporting, and disposing of contaminated
medical waste and will outline guidanceâin line with international good practice and WHO standards on COVID-
19 responseâon limiting viral contagion in health care facilities\. In addition to the ESMF, the client will implement
the activities listed in the Environmental and Social Commitment Plan\.
\.
Page 37 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
VIII\. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND MONITORING
Results Framework
COUNTRY: Kosovo
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT
Project Development Objective(s)
The project development objective is to prevent, detect, and respond to the threat posed by COVID-19 and strengthen national systems for public health
preparedness in Kosovo
Project Development Objective Indicators
RESULT_FRAME_TBL_ PD O
Indicator Name PBC Baseline End Target
To prevent, detect, and respond to the threat posed by COVID-19 and strengthen national systems
Number of suspected cases of COVID19 reported and
6,351\.00 356,000\.00
investigated per approved protocol (Number)
Number of diagnosed cases treated per approved protocol
80\.00 14,000\.00
(Number)
Number of beneficiaries receiving financial support to enable
98,096\.00 234,192\.00
social distancing (Number)
PDO Table SPACE
Page 38 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
Intermediate Results Indicators by Components
RESULT_FRAME_TBL_ IO
Indicator Name PBC Baseline Intermediate Targets End Target
1
Health care delivery and health capacity strengthening
Number of designated laboratories with COVID-19
diagnostic equipment, consumables, and reagents 0\.00 6\.00
per MoH guidelines (Number)
Number of medical staff in public health
laboratories, trained to undertake contact tracing 0\.00 50\.00
(Number)
Number of healthcare workers trained on
appropriate use of PPE, disease surveillance and
0\.00 800\.00
prevention of the spread of respiratory infections
within healthcare facilities (Number)
Upgraded infrastructure of the Infectious Disease
No Yes
Clinic in UCCK completed (Text)
Number of ICU beds equipped and functional in
the Infectious Disease Clinic (Number) 0\.00 60\.00
Number of volunteer healthcare staff covered
0\.00 400\.00
with salaries for at least 3 months (Number)
Number of public events (workshops and
symposia on COVID-19 surveillance, treatment, 0\.00 2\.00
and prophylaxis) (Number)
Supporting households to comply with public health containment measures
Adoption of Government Decision to waive SAS SAS beneficiaries continue to be paid during
Not adopted Adopted
exclusion criteria (Text) public health emergency
Project management, communication and citizen engagement
Beneficiaries reporting satisfaction with
Governmentâs response to COVID-19 through its 0\.00 70\.00
health system and SAS (Percentage)
Page 39 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
IO Table SPACE
UL Table SPACE
Monitoring & Evaluation Plan: PDO Indicators
Methodology for Data Responsibility for Data
Indicator Name Definition/Description Frequency Datasource
Collection Collection
This indicator tracks the
number of suspected
Number of suspected cases of COVID19 Every 6 Administrative data,
COVID-19 cases reported MoH and PCU MoH and PCU
reported and investigated per approved months audit reports
and investigated based on
protocol
guidelines in the whole
country\.
Numerator: Total number
of diagnosed cases that are
treated at the appropriate
level according to MoH-
approved protocols (as Every 6 Administrative data,
Number of diagnosed cases treated per MoH and PCU MoH and PCU
defined in the Project months audit reports
approved protocol
Operations Manual)
Denominator: Total
number of diagnosed cases
in the country in a given
period\.
This indicator measures the Progress SAS management
number of individuals to be towards SAS information system,
Number of beneficiaries receiving supported through the SAS, this management administrative data on Ministry of Finance and
financial support to enable social the SAS double payment indicator information number of beneficiaries Transfers, SAS Division
distancing and Measure 15\. will be system paid during the
Individuals in households reported reporting period\.
receiving each of these upon every
Page 40 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
three forms of support are six months
counted once\. by the
Ministry of
Finance
and
Transfers\.
ME PDO Table SPACE
Monitoring & Evaluation Plan: Intermediate Results Indicators
Methodology for Data Responsibility for Data
Indicator Name Definition/Description Frequency Datasource
Collection Collection
Number of designated
laboratories supported
under the project with
COVID-19 diagnostic
equipment, test kits, and
Number of designated laboratories with reagents per MoH
Every 6
COVID-19 diagnostic equipment, guidelines\. The technical MoH and PCU Laboratory Audit MoH and PCU
months
consumables, and reagents per MoH specifications of the tests
guidelines will be defined in the
Project Operations Manual
based on the
international/national
norms and standards for
COVID-19 response\.
Total number of public
Administrative Data and
Number of medical staff in public health health workers who Every 6
MoH and PCU record from training MoH and PCU
laboratories, trained to undertake contact participated in training on months
institutions
tracing contact tracing according
to MoH protocols\.
Page 41 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
Total number of health
workers who participated
Number of healthcare workers trained on
in training on appropriate Administrative Data and
appropriate use of PPE, disease Every 6
use of PPE, disease MoH and PCU record from training MoH and PCU
surveillance and prevention of the spread months
surveillance and institutions
of respiratory infections within healthcare
prevention of the spread of
facilities
respiratory infections
within healthcare facilities\.
Refers to the application of
infrastructure plan to
expand and/or private the Administrative data and
Upgraded infrastructure of the Infectious One time MoH and PCU MoH and PCU
room capacity of the clinic audit reports
Disease Clinic in UCCK completed
to accommodate high
number of patients seeking
treatment\.
Cumulative number of ICU
beds purchased and fully
Every 6 Administrative data and
Number of ICU beds equipped and operational for COVID-19 MoH and PCU MoH and PCU
months audit reports
functional in the Infectious Disease Clinic patients, as defined by the
Project Operational
Manual\.
Cumulative number of
temporary healthcare staff Every 6 Administrative data and
Number of volunteer healthcare staff MoH and PCU MoH and PCU
hired and paid to provide months audit reports
covered with salaries for at least 3 months
medical services for surging
patient needs\.
Number of public events (workshops and The total number of public Every 6 Administrative data and
MoH and PCU MoH and PCU
symposia on COVID-19 surveillance, events on COVID-19 hosted months audit reports
treatment, and prophylaxis) by the MoH\.
This indicator measures the This Government Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Finance and
Adoption of Government Decision to
formalization of the indicator Directive or Transfers\. Transfers\.
waive SAS exclusion criteria
Government's intent to will be administrative
Page 42 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
waive the reapplication reported instruction,
process for SAS upon every followed by a
beneficiaries during the six report from
COVID-19 pandemic and months\. the SAS
then its application for the Division based
duration of the public on the
health emergency\. monthly
beneficiary
list\.
This indicator aims to This will be
measure the satisfaction of measured
beneficiaries and non- once in
Beneficiaries reporting satisfaction with beneficiaries with the mid-2021, MoFT and
MoFT and MoH
Governmentâs response to COVID-19 Government's response to with MoH
through its health system and SAS COVID-19 through its reporting
health system and through by June 30,
the SAS (including Measure 2022\.
15)
ME IO Table SPACE
\.
Page 43 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
ANNEX 1\. Project Costs
COUNTRY: Kosovo
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT
COSTS AND FINANCING OF THE PROJECT
Project Cost IDA financing
EUR USD Equivalent EUR USD Equivalent
Project Cost by Component/Sub-component
Emergency COVID-19 Response 16\.2 17\.6 16\.2 17\.6
Strengthening capacity for early detection, confirmation,
1\.3 1\.4 1\.3 1\.4
contact tracing, reporting and monitoring
Health capacity strengthening 14\.9 16\.2 14\.9 16\.2
Supporting households to comply with public health
28\.9 31\.4 28\.9 31\.4
contrainement measures
Maintenance of social assistance payments 10\.3 11\.2 10\.3 11\.2
Increase in value of social assistance payments 7\.8 8\.5 7\.8 8\.5
Expansion of social assistance payments 10\.8 11\.7 10\.8 11\.7
Project management, Communications, and Community
0\.9 1\.0 0\.9 1\.0
Engagement
Total Costs 46\.0 50\.0 46\.0 50\.0
Total Financing Required 46\.0 50\.0 46\.0 50\.0
Note: Totals may differ slightly due to rounding errors\.
Page 44 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
ANNEX 2\. Implementation Arrangements and Support Plan
COUNTRY: Kosovo
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 RESPONSE PROJECT
1\. To ensure timely project implementation, the Bankâs support will focus on strengthening the technical
capacity and quality of implementation in MoH and MoFT\. The implementation support will be adjusted as
needed, in response to the evolution of the situation globally and in Kosovo\. Thus the task team structure responds
to the travel restrictions that are in place to mitigate the spread of COVID-19: much of the task team is based in
the Region, with the task team leader in Albania and the co-task team leader in Austria, and local staff in Kosovo\.
This proximity to Kosovo will facilitate day-to day operational support\. Implementation support will be provided
in real time, through telephone and videoconferencing facilities, so that issues are identified and addressed
proactively\.
2\. The main focus of the implementation support will be on the proper coordination of the pandemic
response in both health and social assistance\. Overall, technical assistance support will be needed to ensure
proper compliance:
(a) To strengthen the capacity of the MoH/PCU in procurement and FM, the PCU staff will be trained on any
new development related to the WB procurement framework and the use of STEP\.
(b) FM support will be provided according to the findings of the FM supervision and according to the
procedures described in the FM section below\.
(c) The environmental and social safeguards will be monitored by the MoH/PCU staff, through required
regular reporting\. In addition, technical assistance and training will be tailored to the needs of the MoFT,
focusing on the SAS Division and CSWs\.
3\. During implementation, the WB team will coordinate closely with CEB, WHO, other UN Agencies, and
development partners in the country that are involved in pandemic response, aiming at avoiding duplication and
creating synergies\. In particular, the WB team will regularly coordinate with CEB task team leaders on
procurement of medical equipment and supplies by double-checking the requested list to CEB, providing technical
support to MoH to develop a common work plan for complementary activities, and agreeing on fiduciary risk
mitigation procedure\. This process will be layed out in the POM with a view to prevent double-dipping and
duplication of activities\.
Financial Management
4\. The project will rely extensively on the various elements of Kosovoâs PFM systems: planning and
budgeting, internal control, flow of funds and payments, accounting and reporting, and external audit\. Various
reviews56 have plotted the significant progress Kosovo has made in improving its PFM\. The key strengths of the
system are the sound legal framework, the integrated central treasury system, and an increasingly effective
external audit office\. However, the strengths are offset by limited professional and technical capacities and gaps
in implementation\. There is considerable scope for improving the quality of budget planning and preparation,
internal financial control, audits, debt management, and capital investment management\. The authorities are
aware of these limitations, and progress is supported by international bodies\. Lagging areas include the following:
56Kosovo has participated in a number of detailed reviews of its PFM systems, such as several central government and municipal PEFA
assessments, a country fiduciary review (2012), annual EU-SIGMA reviews, and other analyses by the World Bank and IMF\.
Page 45 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
(a) limited coordination of budgets, the medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF), sector plans, and budget
ceilings; (b) budget preparation is not fully linked with treasury systems; and (c) FM control and audits are not
fully effective\.
5\. The Public Financial Management and Accountability Law provides the FM and accountability
framework for public administration in Kosovo\. The MTEF and the Annual Budget Law are the two main
documents presented for assembly review and approval\. PFM in Kosovo is highly centralized in relation to budget
policy and institutional control\. Budgetary organizations, such as the MoH, and its subordinated agencies
(hospitals), the MoFT, and municipalities do not maintain separate budget, treasury, and accounting systems\. The
process for planning and budgeting is enabled through the Budget Development Management System and the
Project Implementation Pipeline\. The process of managing and executing the budget and accounting and financial
reporting throughout budget organizations is enabled through the Kosovo Financial Management Information
System (KFMIS)\. Budget execution is controlled through the setting of allocation limits, which are based on
forecasts of available resources and the individual needs of the spending institution, with due regard to seasonality
of revenues and expenditures\. Treasury manages allocations throughout the year, and controls budget execution
and cash management, based on the cash plan submitted by the budget organizations themselves\. In general,
internal control procedures are well understood\. The Treasury is serviced through the Single Treasury Account
with the Central Bank of Kosovo, through which all Government revenues and expenditures are recorded\. The
budget organizations enter financial records and information into the KFMIS, which produces reports\. Records
and information are produced, maintained, and disseminated to meet decision-making control, management, and
reporting purposes, as needed\. Budget execution reports are structured according to the budget, and present
fund balance commitments on a monthly and quarterly basis for each economic category\. Detailed books and
records are maintained by each budget organization\.
6\. All core FM functions within MoFT and MoH are appropriately staffed\. FM capacity in the MoH is
complemented by a qualified FM specialist, part of the PCU\. The FM performance of the ongoing KHP is adequate\.
There are no outstanding IFRs or audit reports under the current project\.
7\. The SAS program is currently implemented by staff in SAS Division under the MoFT (formerly located
under MoLSW) and by local governments (municipalities and CSW/SAS units)\. Officials at the MoFT are primarily
responsible for policy, planning, statistics, development of the legal framework and minimum service standards,
budget appropriation, budget allocation and authorization of transfers, monitoring, operational oversight and
inspection, and internal audit\. The SAS unit is also responsible for coordinating the operations between
stakeholders, and for maintaining the electronic database for SAS\. The Local governments (through the Health
and Social welfare directorate, and CSWs/SAS units) are responsible for administration of the SAS, including
managing and planning staff and resources of CSWs, implementing the legal requirements and minimum
standards for the provision of the SAS, assisting the SAS audits and inspections, and compiling periodic reports on
the SAS\.
8\. In general, the mechanisms for budgeting and release of funds in the MoH and SAS program are
considered adequate for the needs of the proposed project\. The Governmentâs MTEF and annual budget
formulation process are followed\. In the MoH, the projectâs budget and planning will be managed by the PCU,
under the guidance of the MoH Finance and Budget Division\. The project budgets and forecasts should be credible
and realistic, and underpinned by realistic procurement and implementation plans\. These budgets will form the
basis for allocating funds to project activities and, after expenditures are paid, for requesting funds from the Bank\.
To facilitate reporting and planning activities, a unique project code will be assigned, which will capture all project
activities\. SAS budget and planning is managed centrally and led by the Department of the Social Policy and Family
(under the former MoLSW)\. It appears that the budget request is compiled largely on the basis of historical
Page 46 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
information collected by SAS MIS and CSWs\. The aggregated SAS subprogram is a consolidated budget submission
of the ministry, which is then negotiated with the MoFT budget department\. The budget structure is rigid and
managed at the level of subprograms and line items\. Once the budget is approved, the ministry does not have the
flexibility to reallocate resources between different departments/programs in accordance with priorities as they
arise\. This constraint is especially critical in the current political context\. While it appears that in the short term,
both MoFT and MoH would be able to direct available resources to emergency response within their current
budgetary limits, a review of the annual budget law during the second semester would be necessary\.
9\. Disbursement of the funds will be managed centrally throughout the year on the basis of the monthly
allocations and funds availability, and in compliance with standard procedures\. For the SAS, the Treasury
executes the payments through an arrangement established with the Banka per Biznes and the Post Office\. The
payment is done using post offices located near the final beneficiaries\. Beneficiaries are supposed to collect SAS
payments within 20 days; funds not collected are returned to the Treasury\. The Banka per Biznes and Post Office
have the collective role to reconcile and verify the data for the beneficiaries and total payments executed and
remit any unused funds to the Treasury\. The same arrangement will be used for the new measure\. The Treasury
prioritizes social assistance payments, including for the SAS, so there has not been a problem with inadequate
cash flow in the past\. Similarly, payments to contractors/vendors/others are centrally managed by the Treasury,
upon the MoHâs request, depending on cash availability\. Considering the emergency context, health emergency
expenditure is prioritized over other public expenditure; therefore, no problems are expected with regard to
inadequate cash flow\. The funds flow process for project is illustrated in Figure 2-1\.
Page 47 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
Figure 2-1\. Project funds flow
10\. The MoH and MoFT/Treasury has a comprehensive accounting and reporting framework based on IPSAS
(International Public Sector Accounting Standards) cash basis\. The KFMIS is used for Government accounting and
reporting and will be used for the project\. The Treasury system was assessed by the WB team as sound, with
reliable reporting and ex-ante controls\. The SAS payments are accounted under economic account 22240 (PNS-
KATEG\.I-(PÃR ANÃT\.FAMILJ)) and 22250 PNS-KATEG\.II-(PÃR ANÃT\.FAMILJ), under the subprogram 00500 âSocial
Assistance\.â For the new SAS measures, it will be possible to add separate economic accounts under the same
subprogram, to capture these expenditures separately\. Similarly, the project financial records (budget
appropriations, allocations, commitments, and actual expenditure) for the MoH part will be maintained in the
KFMIS and accounted separately through a unique project code\. KFMIS can generate project reports by nature of
expenditure, institution, source of funds, and program\. However, the existing chart of accounts does not allow
recording project expenditures by activity\. The PCU FM specialist would be required to maintain parallel contract
monitoring financial data, which would be cross-checked periodically against KFMIS-generated statements\.
Page 48 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
11\. For the proposed operation, the MoH is committed to maintain an effective internal control system
similar to the one established for the implementation of the ongoing KHP, which will be strengthened for the
new measures introduced\. The existing system ensures that project expenditures are properly verified and
authorized; supporting documents are maintained; accounts are reconciled periodically; and project assets,
including cash, are safeguarded\. The existing POM will be updated to account for the implementation of the new
measures, such as human resources management and processing of the payroll of the additional medical and
support staff\.
12\. The design of this operation relies on different dimensions of the existing SAS control framework: the
central level to monitor the correct application of eligibility criteria and overall compliance with the legislation;
the central SAS MIS for the central disbursement arrangements; the Treasury to ensure that payment information
(including amounts) is correct and that benefits are distributed only to approved households; the Control and
Oversight Unit to execute a system of inspections and reviews (central inspection of CSWs); and internal audit,
which performs risk-based operational audits on the selected CSWs\. The Bank team has reviewed the different
layers of checks and controls and found these arrangements to be satisfactory\. The MoFT has agreed that the
same control framework will be applied for the new measures\. Social distancing measures and travel limitations
may disrupt control and audit processes\. There is a need to review the work program of these units, relying more
on desk reviews and resuming regular visits once the limitations are lifted\.
13\. IFRs will be submitted to the Bank within 45 days after the end of each quarter\. The PCU will be
responsible for preparing the consolidated and separate financial reports for the project for activities
implemented by MoFT and those implemented by MoH\. The financial reports will be prepared on the basis of the
financial information registered in the KFMIS\. The financial information on the SAS program will be provided by
MoFT\. The IFRs will contain at least the following: (a) statement of sources and uses of funds (with expenditure
classified by disbursement category); (b) statements of sources and uses of funds (with expenditure classified by
component); (c) contract monitoring; and (d) KFMIS budget execution reports\. Two sets of annual project financial
statements will be prepared for the project using the IPSAS cash basisâone for the activities implemented by
MoFT, and one for those implemented by MoH\. The financial statements will cover the Governmentâs fiscal year,
which coincides with the calendar year\. The functional and reporting currency is Euro\. The PCU FM specialist will
support the preparation of IFRs and annual project financial statements\.
14\. The National Audit Office (Kosovoâs supreme audit institution) will carry out the annual financial audit
of the two sets of project financial statements\. The audits will be executed in accordance with terms of reference
developed jointly between the Bank and the National Audit Office\. The annual audited project financial
statements, together with the audit opinion and the Management Letter, will be submitted to the Bank no later
than nine months after the end of each fiscal (calendar) year; the first audit will be due by September 30, 2021\.
Page 49 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
Table 2-1\. Financial audit reports and due dates
Financial audits Deadline
Financial audit of the project financial statements for Within nine months after the close of each fiscal year
Component 2, including SAS and technical assistance, (January-December); first report due in 2021\.
implemented by MoFT, conducted by the National
Audit Office\.
Financial audit of project financial statements for Within nine months after the close of each fiscal year
Component 1 and subcomponent 2\.4, implemented by (January-December); first report due in 2021
MoH, conducted by the National Audit Office\.
Disbursement Arrangements
15\. Disbursements will follow the transaction-based methodâthat is, traditional Bank procedures:
advance, reimbursement, special commitments, and direct payments\. The Government of Kosovoâs preferred
method of disbursement is reimbursement of funds prefinanced from the Government budget to finance project
expenditures\. Advance and designated accounts may be used for the proposed operation, in case of a cash crunch\.
In that case, one or two DAs (one for Components 1 and 3, and one for Component 2) denominated in Euro will
be opened in the Central Bank of Kosovo, as a subaccount linked to the Single Treasury Account\. The disbursed
funds will be earmarked for the proposed operation only\. All project eligible expenditures will be completely
financed by the IDA financing proceeds\. The project will have the flexibility of using retroactive financing as
discussed in the PAD\.
16\. MoH and MoFT will initiate requests for disbursements from the IDA financing account for their
respective project parts\. The disbursement procedures, including paths for authorization of withdrawals, will be
described in detail in the updated FM section of the POM\. Authorized signatories will be assigned by both entities\.
A detailed DFIL explaining all arrangements will be issued and will include the minimum application size for
withdrawal applications, the ceiling of the DA balance, the issuance of special commitments, documentation
requirements, and the frequency of application\. The DA ceiling and minimum amount for direct payments will be
flexible enough to allow for quick emergency payments\. In case of indirect engagement of UN agencies, the UN
agencies may submit withdrawal applications, if specified in standard agreement between UN agency and the
Recepient\. In addition, the agreement will specify the UN agency financial reporting requirements\.
17\. Eligible expenditures will be documented by Statements of Expenditures for advance, reimbursement
and special commitments, and by invoices for direct payments\. The Statements of Expenditure will follow the
templates provided in the DFIL\. A special Statement of Expenditure will be prepared for cash transfers, in which
the aggregated amount of the monthly transfers for each type of transfer will be documented\. If the DA will be
used, the bank statement will be required to document the account balance\. For direct payments, the Bank will
require copies of the original documents evidencing eligible expenditures in the form and substance specified in
the DFIL\. Records include documents such as invoices and receipts\. The MoH and MoFT are required to maintain
original documents evidencing eligible expenditures, making them available for audit or inspection\. These
documents should be maintained for at least two years after the Bank receives the audit report and for the period
required by local legislation\.
Implementation Support and Supervision Plan
18\. During project implementation, the Bank will supervise the projectâs FM arrangements in two main ways:
(a) reviewing the projectâs IFRs and the annual audited financial statements and auditorâs management
Page 50 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
recommendation letters; and (b) performing on-site supervision at a frequency based on the projectâs risk and
performance (upon the lifting of the restrictions due to COVID-19) and reviewing the projectâs FM and
disbursement arrangements to ensure compliance with the World Bank's minimum requirements\.
19\. For both technical and fiduciary oversight and support, the Bank will provide intense support at two points
during project implementation: during the first 12 months (from approval to effectiveness and through early
implementation) and at midterm\. On-site supervision will take place upon the lifting of travel restrictions due to
COVID-19; in the meantime, virtual review will be conducted\.
Page 51 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
ANNEX 3\. Development Partnersâ Contribution to COVID-19 Response
1\. This table summarizes the contribution of development partners, based on informal discussions and
communications with partners:57
Table 3-1\. Donors Contributions for COVID-19 Response in Kosovo
Organization Description of activities and support Approximate
value
Donated / disbursed or under implementation:
WHO WHO is the lead agency for health-related coordination with the MoH\. Not available
Overall coordination of the UN system is led by the UN RC\.
UNDP UNDP has already provided protective items (masks, gloves, sanitizers) to 8 Euro 880,000\.00
Regional Police Directorates and 3 Regional Border Police Directorates and
has provided gloves and sanitizers for the Emergency Management Agency
and the Employment Agency\. It has also mobilized Euro 880,000 from
Norway and SDC, to procure up to 50 mobile ventilators\. Ventilators will be
delivered in two batches (due to the exceptionally high demand), with the
first batch expected to arrive on May 15, 2020\.
UNICEF UNICEF is supplying PPE to meet immediate stock out\. They are coordinating Not available
with UN Kosovo/WHO and MoH\. In addition, Kosovoâs Global Funds from
UNICEF (initially reserved for tuberculosis, AIDS, etc\.) can be used to purchase
COVID supplies\.
UNHCR UNHCR, through local procurement, supported the Asylum Centre with Euro 29,010\.00
provision of Euro 3,860 in PPE (1000 protective masks, 2000 protective gloves,
and 400 pcs hand disinfectants (500 ml bottle))\. UNHCR conducted quick
needs assessment for the most vulnerable categories and identified that the
current greatest need is for food and hygienic items, considering that PoCs are
unable to secure these goods during this period\. UNHCR assisted 66
families/266 individuals (minority returnees) with the provision of 1 month of
basic food items and hygienic kits\. UNHCR will additionally assist 870
individuals (IDPs in collective shelters) and gender-based violence shelters
with the provision of one-time hygienic kits\. This assistance totals Euro
25,150\.00\.
European EU signed a contract with UNOPS to support Kosovo response with the supply Euro 5\.0 million
Union of equipment\. The needs have been identified by the MoH, and the delivery
of goods will be at the University Clinical Centre in Prishtina\. The priority list
of supplies includes respirators/ventilators, infusion pumps and syringe
infusion pumps, ambulance vehicles, finger pulse oximeters and pulse
57Informal discussions took place between March 13 and April 16, 2020, through video conferences and exchange of emails, aid
coordination workplans, and updates\.
Page 52 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
Organization Description of activities and support Approximate
value
oximeters, patient monitors, defibrillators, electrocardiographs, hospital
beds\. If some of these items are unavailable, supplies of other necessary items
such as tests, tubes, masks, gloves, and disinfectants will be procured\.
Germany The support for the health sector is being channeled through WHO\. KFW and Not available
(KFW + GIZ) GIZ are working on a support scheme for small and medium enterprises
and/or helping publicly owned companies in the waste sector to deal with the
crisis\. In the education sector, KFW and GIZ are looking at possibilities to
provide innovative digital schemes to support the vocational education
sector\.
USAID U\.S\. Government has announced a first tranche of aid in the amount of US$1\.1 US$ 1\.1 million
million to provide operational support and increase Kosovoâs capability to
stop further transmission and mitigate COVID-19âs impact\. Agreements for
the implementation of this support have been signed with UNICEF and WHO\.
In addition, USAID is discussing emergency funding and further assistance for
second wave impact\.
Swiss Through an ongoing health support project, SDC is assisting the MoH and the Euro 430,000\.00
Development National Institute of Public Health in preparing, designing, and disseminating
Cooperation awareness-raising messages to the population on the COVID-19 pandemic\.
(SDC) This includes posters, infographics, and video animations on particular aspects
related to prevention, as prioritized by the MoH and the NIPH\. While some
messages are addressed to the general population of Kosovo, others will be
tailored to specific vulnerable and ethnic communities (with the materials
expected to be made available in Albanian, Serbian, Roma, and Turkish)\.
SDC will also contribute 500,000\.00 Swiss francs (Euro 430,000\.00) to the
UNDPâs procurement of mobile ventilators for the MoH\.
IMF IMF has already approved and disbursed US$56\.6 million under the Rapid Not available
Financing Instrument\.
CEB CEB has announced the approval of a EUR 35 milion loan to the Government EUR 35 million
of Kosovo to support ongoing efforts to provide health care to those affected
by the COVID-19 pandemic\. The CEB loan will cover emergency medical
equipment and supplies, bonuses for healthcare workers and pharamcists
under measures 1\.6 and 1\.7 of the Governmentâs Emergency Fiscal Package\.
This loan is an earmarked budgetary support for the health care sector and is
yet to be negotiated with the GoK\. The proposed activities will be
complementary to the Project interventions under Component 1 and will be
monitored by an overall technical coordinator at the MoH, verified against a
complementary work plan, and oversaw by regular coordination between task
team leaders of CEB and the WB of the respective loan\.
Page 53 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
ANNEX 4\. National Preparedness and Response Plan for COVID-19 and Prevention Measures
1\. The Kosovo Government has acted quickly to respond to the pandemic situation\. A National Committee
for COVID-19 Coordination and Monitoring was established in early March 2020, involving the following key
institutions and agencies:
ï Ministry of Health (MoH)
ï National Institute of Public Health of Kosovo (NIPH)
ï University Clinical Center (UCCK) - Infectious Diseases Clinic and Emergency Center
ï Regional hospitals
ï Emergency Management Agency
ï Kosovo Medicinal Products Agency
ï Kosovo Veterinary and Food Agency
ï Kosovo Security Force - Ministry of Defense
ï Kosovo Police
ï Health Inspectorate and Sanitary Inspectorate
ï Municipal Health Directorates
ï Main Center for Family Medicine
ï Sentinel centers for cases of influenza and of the novel coronavirus COVID-19
2\. An Emergency Action Plan in Public Health has been prepared in accordance with the national principles
of response\. It includes the following:
ï Functional supervision system / early case detection
ï Monitoring the dynamics of the disease
ï Confirmation of reported data
ï Definition of disease cases
ï Laboratory confirmation of reported cases
ï Activation of epidemiological research teams
ï Epidemiological research
ï Identification of counter-epidemic health measures pharmaceutical and non-health - non-
pharmaceutical
3\. The Emergency Action Plan includes the following scenarios:
Possible Scenarios of Cases
Scenario Attack rate Number of cases Mortality rate Number of
deaths
Low 0\.1% 1\.876 0\.5% 9
High 0\.1% 1\.876 2\.2% 39
Page 54 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
Percentage and number of cases, among those with symptoms
Likely to require medical help 50% 900
May require medical help at the hospital 5% 90
May require intensive care 0\.9% 18
May require respiratory assistance 0\.45% 9
4\. Administrative controls and policies to prevent and control the spread of COVID-19 infections within
health institutions include the following components: establishing sustainable infrastructure and activities;
educating patient caregivers; developing policies on the early identification of acute respiratory infection
potentially caused by COVID-19; providing access to rapid laboratory diagnosis for the identification of the
etiological agent; prevention of human disorder, especially in the emergency department; providing dedicated
waiting areas for symptomatic patients; proper isolation of hospitalized patients; ensuring adequate supply of
PPE; and ensuring the implementation of infection prevention and control policies and procedures for all aspects
of health care\.
Preventive Measures
5\. Preventive measures are aimed at reducing the risk of exposure and occurrence of COVID-19 cases\. The
preferred measures are nonpharmaceutical measures\. Because previous experiences show the effectiveness of
these measures, they are preferable and necessary to apply, especially in the initial stage of pandemics when no
vaccine has been developed and there is still no knowledge of specific antiviral preparations\. The essence of
nonpharmaceutical measures consists in:
ï Delaying the massive spread of the virus and peak of the epidemic
ï Reducing the burden on health care infrastructures
ï Reducing the number of cases
ï Providing the opportunity to assess capacity and needs
6\. Among the nonpharmaceutical measures, the following are considered to be efficient and preferable:
ï Isolation: separation or limited movement of persons with suspected coronavirus or even with
clear signs of disease\.
ï Quarantine: restriction of movement of persons who are not ill but are exposed to the
infections\. The quarantine can be improvised at home or in places designed for this purpose\.
ï Social distancing: measures to increase the space between people and reduce the frequency
of contacts between people\.
ï Infection control: hygienic and personal measures that reduce the risk of spreading the virus
from an infected person to a healthy one: clean hands, clean environment, good manners
during coughing, use of personal protective clothing\.
ï Communication with the population: to reduce the impact of the spread of the coronavirus in
the community\.
ï Enhanced supervision system: enables early detection of disease cases in the geographical
Page 55 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
region or population\.
ï Enhanced laboratory quality: enables the laboratory confirmation of suspected cases, and at
minimum, a confirmed case in the laboratory which also has epidemiological links\.
ï Application of disinfection measures: to reduce the number of cases in the external environment and
minimize the risk of spreading the infection\.
Kosovo Government Measures on COVID-19
(March 11 â April 18, 2020)
Date Government Measures
Decision
March 11 First preventive
1\. Closure of schools (public and private), all levels, until March 27, 2020\.
measures against
COVID-19 2\. Temporary suspension of air and land travel from COVID-19 high- and medium-risk
countries (until further notice)\.
3\. Mandatory health examination of travelers at borders, with support of police\.
4\. Mandatory self-quarantine for all citizens entering the Republic of Kosovo from
COVID-19 high- and medium-risk countries, in accordance with WHO instructions\. If
no self-quarantine possible, option of joint quarantines designated by the
Government of the Republic of Kosovo\.
5\. No audience allowed at activities in closed spaces, such as sports events, concerts,
conferences, round tables\.
6\. Restaurants, nightclubs, gyms, swimming pools required to be closed by 23:00\.
7\. No export of medical equipment, materials, and medicines, except by Government
Decision\.
8\. Measures for protection and disinfection required for Government institutions, public
enterprises, and private companies, according to instructions and reinforced hygienic
measures issued by the Ministry of Health\.
9\. Regular disinfection of transportation vehicles required for public enterprises and
private companies providing public transportation services\.
10\. Prohibition of organized international transport (by bus, etc\.) to COVID-19 high-risk
countries\.
March 13 Restrictive measures
1\. Citizens prohibited from entering/ leaving the municipalities of Klina and Viti\.
adopted after first
confirmed cases of 2\. Termination of interurban transport and organized international transport\.
COVID-19 in 2
municipalities 3\. Closure of land borders for travelers entering Kosovo, except for Kosovan citizens\. All
Kosovan citizens entering the country through these borders to undergo additional
medical checks and self-quarantine for 14 days\.
4\. From midnight on March 16, 2020, all flights are suspended temporarily, except for
military flights and medical emergency/evacuation flights\. Exceptions include arrivals
of crew-only-operated air flights and departure of passengers from Kosovo\.
5\. Closure of café-bars, pubs and restaurants, and shopping centers, except pharmacies
and grocery stores\.
6\. Suspension of all cultural and sports activities\.
7\. Closure of livestock and car markets\.
Page 56 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
Date Government Measures
Decision
8\. Reduction of essential activities and essential staff in public institutions, except in the
health and security sectors\.
9\. Work from home where possible for private company employees\.
March 14 Two additional
1\. Citizens prohibited from entering/leaving the municipality of Malisheva\.
measures adopted
March 15 Public health
1\. MoH mandated to manage the National Emergency Response Plan\.
emergency
declaration
March 18 University Student
1\. Quarantine ordered for any person confirmed or suspected to have been in direct
Center in Prishtina
contact with persons infected or suspected to be infected with COVID-19\.
designated as a
quarantine center 2\. The Student Center in Prishtina placed under direct management of the MoH until
termination of the state of emergency\.
March 23 Adoption of additional
1\. The movement of citizens and private vehicles is prohibited from March 24, 2020,
measures to prevent
between 10:00 and 16:00 and from 20:00 to 06:00, except for medical needs, for
the spread of COVID-
services and activities related to pandemic management, and for other essential
19
services\.
2\. Restriction of road mobility to two people, keeping two meters distance\.
3\. Prohibition of all gatherings, except when necessary to perform pandemic work on
prevention and fighting tasks, and when two meters distance is possible\.
March 26 Amendment of earlier
1\. School closures will continue until further notice\.
decisions on schools
2\. Recommendation to release one parent from work, not applicable for health and
security workers\.
March 27 Adoption of other sets
1\. Prohibition of the movement of citizens and private vehicles from 17:00 to 06:00
of measures
except for medical; production, supply, and sale of essential goods (food and
medicine for humans and animals/poultry); and services and activities related to the
management of the pandemic\.
2\. Prohibition of the movement of citizens in open areas (e\.g\., squares), except the
inhabitants of these areas and persons authorized by the relevant bodies\.
3\. Operation of licensed pharmacies allowed from 06:00-17:00\. After 17:00, their
activity will be organized on duty shifts\.
March 28 Decision to extend
1\. MoH to review the preventive measures by April 3\.
preventive measures
until April 6
March 30 Approval of
1\. Measure 1 - Double payment to beneficiaries of the SAS for the months of March,
Emergency Fiscal
April, and May, amounting to â¬7,650,000\.
Package
2\. Measure 2 - Payment of an additional sum of 30 Euros per month to all beneficiaries
of social assistance and pension schemes that receive a monthly payment lower than
100 Euros, for the months of April, May, and June, provided that they are
beneficiaries of only one social assistance scheme; and reinstatement in the list of
beneficiaries of all persons who, as a result of a failure to appear or lack of
assessment for the period January-March 2020, have not had their entitlements
renewed\. This measure amounts to â¬13,000,000\.
3\. Measure 3- Financial support for companies that are in financial difficulties as a result
Page 57 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
Date Government Measures
Decision
of the emergency situation, namely:
(a) Coverage of employees' monthly salary expenses in the amount of 170 Euros
(2 months);
(b) Subsidy of up to 50 percent of the rental value for small and medium
enterprises;
(c) Coverage of the value of pension contributions for wages in relation to the
measures provided for in this Decision\.
4\. Measure 4- Ensuring interest-free lending to public enterprises (return is made by the
end of 2020)\.
5\. Measure 5 - Provision of additional financial support for municipalities of the
Republic of Kosovo affected by the pandemic, if required, due to the eventual
extension of the public health emergency situation, amounting to â¬10,000,000\.
6\. Measure 6- Provision of a salary top-up in the amount of 300 Euros for field workers
and those exposed directly to the risk of infection in their work environment for the
months of April and May, amounting to â¬15,000,000\.
7\. Measure 7 - Additional payment in the amount of 100 Euros to employees of grocery
stores, bakeries, and pharmacies for April and May, amounting to â¬3,000,000\.
8\. Measure 8- Payment of monthly assistance in the amount of 130 Euros to citizens
who lose their jobs due to the public health emergency situation, for April, May, and
June, amounting to â¬4,000,000\.
9\. Measure 9- Supporting initiatives and projects aimed at improving the lives of non-
majority communities in the Republic of Kosovo, which have been severely affected
by the public health emergency situation, worth up to â¬2,000,000\.
10\. Measure 10- Ensuring financial liquidity for:
(a) Micro-enterprises and self-employed through certain programs of the Kosovo
Credit Guarantee Fund, in the amount of up to â¬10,000 for a period of 2 years, in
the amount of up to ⬠15,000,000\.
(b) Commercial Companies / Authorized Companies that provide basic services
(similar to those of public enterprises) with returns up to 31\.12\.2020, within the
specified value of point 1\.4 of the decision on the Emergency Fiscal Package\.
11\. Measure 11 - Increase the budget for grants and subsidies for the Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development for increase of agricultural production,
in the amount of â¬5,000,000\.
12\. Measure 12 - Increase the budget for grants and subsidies for the Ministry of Culture,
Youth and Sports, in the amount of â¬5,000,000\.
13\. Measure 13 - Support for exporters in the Republic of Kosovo after the end of the
emergency public health situation, in the amount of up to â¬10,000\.000\.
14\. Measure 14 - Financial support for companies that register employees with
employment contracts of at least one (1) year during the period of emergency public
health situation, from 130 euros for the next two months after registration, worth up
to â¬6,000,000\.
15\. Measure 15 - Payment of monthly assistance in the amount of 130 Euros to citizens
living under poor social conditions, declared as unemployed in the competent
institution and who are not beneficiaries of any monthly income from the Kosovo
Page 58 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
Date Government Measures
Decision
budget, for April, May, and June, amounting up to â¬3,000,000\.
April 13 MoH announcement
1\. As of April 15, curfew after 17:00, with exceptions announced\.
of new sets of
measures 2\. Shopping only allowed alone, with exceptions for persons with disabilities and
minors\.
3\. Senior citizens over the age of 65 are recommended not to leave their home /
apartment, except in urgent and necessary cases\.
4\. All citizens are required to wear a mask, scarf, or other cover over mouth and nose;
maintain a distance of two meters between two persons\.
5\. Noncompliance is punishable by a fine of 1,000 Euro to 2,000 Euros for individual and
from 3,000 Euros to 8,000 Euros for legal entities\. The owner of the legal entity is
responsible for paying the fine from Euro 500 to Euro 1,500\.
April 17 Amendments and
1\. Payment of an additional sum of 30 Euros per month to all beneficiaries of social
supplement of the
assistance and pension schemes that receive a monthly payment up to 100 Euros\.
Emergency Fiscal
Package 2\. Beneficiaries of the financial assistance are both medical staff and the support staff
(doctors, nurses, and other personnel exposed to risk)\.
Page 59 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
ANNEX 5\. Ministry of Health (MoH) Emergency Needs Request
MoH List of Activities â New Project:
Received April 10, 2020
Revised May 12, 2020
Component 1: COVID-19 Emergency Response 58
1\.1\. Medical equipment and supplies â see Table 1 below (US$13\.6 million)
1\.2: Infrastructure capacity of the Clinic for Infectious Diseases* (US$1\.5 million)
a\. Upgrade and expand the existing infrastructure/capacity (read rooms) of the Clinic of Infectious
Diseases within the same building in the University Clinical Center of Kosovo (UCCK) (US$1\.0 million)
b\. Installations to accommodate new ICU beds (US$0\.5 million)
1\.3: Mobilize additional health personnel and training (US$1\.3 million)
a\. Support for the additionally hired 450 volunteers for 3-5 more months at Eur 400/month
(~US$0\.8 million)
b\. Provide tailored trainings for 1000 health care providers on risk-mitigation measures, identifying
and treating COVID-19, appropriate use of PPE, and prevention of the spread of respiratory
infections within health care facilities (US$0\.5 million)
1\.4: Strengthening of public health laboratories and epidemiological capacity for early detection, confirmation,
and reporting of cases (US$1\.2 million)
a\. Strengthening disease surveillance systems and public health laboratories: diagnostic kits,
reagents, consumables (~US$200,000; 50,000 tests requested from the excel list for a total of Eur
120k + an additional cost of Eur 80,000 for other consumables, reagents etc\.)\. Increase of physical
and professional capacities of the laboratories by purchasing additional public health laboratory
equipment and training around 50-70 public health providers (6-10 providers for each regional
hospital) (US$1\.0 million)
Total component cost: US$17\.6 million
58Data from the Director of Infectious Disease Clinic, as of April 19, 2020: 59 rooms available, of which 19 are equipped with central
oxygen system\. Under ICU there are 4 beds (with current infrastructure only 2 more can be accommodated)\. Equipment in possession:
ultrasonography 1, EKG devices 7, respirators 7, defibrilators 1, syringe pumps 15, laryngoscope 2, infuomat 3, aspirators 6, monitors 25,
pulse oximeters 20\.
Page 60 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
Table 5-1\. Overview of medical equipment needs list
NO\. Lot Description Unit Unit Total
1 Equipment Single-use protective suit pcs
900,000
2 Equipment Medical face mask pcs
900,000
3 Equipment Medical gloves pcs
900,000
4 Equipment Respirator of 3rd class pcs
100,000
5 Equipment Protective glasses pcs
20,000
6 Equipment Respirator of 2nd class pcs
20,000
7 Equipment Medical test kit for COVID-19 detection pcs
200,000
8 Equipment Pulse oximetry device pcs
900
9 Equipment Acid-base balance analyzer pcs
20
10 Equipment Syringe dosing device pcs
800
11 Equipment Portable medical ventilator pcs
25
12 Equipment Oxygen-supplying nasal cannulas pcs
9,000
13 Equipment Oxygen inhaler pcs
700
14 Equipment Aspiration catheter with vacuum control pcs
200,000
15 Equipment Closed suction system pcs
5,000
16 Equipment Noninvasive ventilation mask pcs
600
17 Equipment High-concentration oxygen therapy mask pcs
2,000
18 Equipment Oxygen concentrator of â¥5 l capacity pcs
400
19 Equipment Video laryngoscopes pcs
100
20 Equipment Adult CPAP high-flow therapy device pcs
completed with cannulas set 120
21 Equipment Isolated stretcher pcs
60
Page 61 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
22 Equipment Bronchoscope pcs
35
23 Equipment Crash cart pcs
200
24 Equipment Patient monitor pcs
200
25 Equipment Medical ventilator of HFlow, CIPAP high-tech pcs
feature 32
26 Equipment Medical ventilator of enhanced options pcs
20
27 Equipment Ultrasound portable device pcs
12
28 Equipment Multipurpose device for renal replacement pcs
therapy 5
29 Equipment Mobile X-ray unit pcs
4
30 Equipment Extracorporeal membrane oxygenation device pcs
completed with expendables (15 sets) 5
31 Equipment Portable medical ventilator of high class of pcs 30
oxygen inhalation and capnography options
32 Equipment Oxygen concentrator pcs 30
33 Equipment Electrical suction pump pcs 50
34 Equipment Ultrasound device of expert grade pcs 10
35 Equipment High-tech intensive care beds pcs 60
Page 62 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
ANNEX 6\. Social Assistance Scheme
1\. The SAS is a last-resort income support (LRIS) scheme that provides temporary financial assistance to
families in poverty\.59 Kosovoâs only direct program for poverty reduction, the SAS is aimed at families that do not
have sufficient income from employment or other sources\. It focuses its resources on poor families with young
children and on families in which all or most members are dependent and/or not able to work\. The SAS aims at
protecting against falling into poverty but also against other risks like disability, unemployment, and caregiving
responsibilities, including for children\.
2\. The SAS is financed through taxes, and its budget allocation is determined at the central Government
level\. SAS financing is determined in the annual consolidated national budget, based on the availability of funds
and in accordance with the Law No\. 03/L-048 on Public Financial Management and Accountability\. According to
Article 15a of Law No\. 4/L-096, fiscal constraints can lead to reducing or eliminating the SAS benefits even when
financing has already been allocated in the national budget\. While this has yet to occur, it undermines the standing
of SAS as a poverty reduction instrument\. Explicit conditioning of LRIS programs on budget availability and legal
provisions for their reduction or elimination in the case of fiscal constraints is not a common practice in the EU
Member States and other Western Balkan countries\.
3\. The SAS was originally introduced in 2000 with a Regulation of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo,
legislated in 2003 with Law No\. 2003/15, and reformed in 2012 with Law No\. 04/L-096 on Amending and
Supplementing the Law No\. 2003/15\. The main amendments included (a) a change in benefit base60 and
introduction of a flat-rate benefit;61 (b) introduction of a child allowance / supplement of Euro 5 per month for
each child under the age of 18; (c) further tightening of eligibility criteria by restricting the number of able-to-work
members in an SAS recipient family to only one for Category II; and (d) abolishment of the ceiling on the number
of family members counted in determining the benefit level\. The amended law introduced the possibility of
gradually increasing the age of the child in Category II, depending on budget availability\. It clarified that family
members who have reached the age of 18 and have completed mandatory upper secondary education should be
considered able to work even if they are enrolled in university or other training program\.
Eligibility and Targeting
4\. Since 2012, eligibility for the SAS consists of two steps: The provision of categorical criteria that filter
applicants, followed by a poverty test\. This two-step procedure identifies first the need for assistance, proxied by
59 Law No\.04/L-096 on Amending and Supplementing the Law 2003/15 on the Social Assistance Scheme, Art\. 1\.
60 According to Law 2003/15, Section 9 (9\.1), the SAS benefit base was set in Euro as the monthly Gross Standard Rate of social assistance,
which is adjusted according to family size and CPI\. Law No\.04/L-096 on Amending and Supplementing the Law 2003/15 on the Social
Assistance Scheme, Art\. 8 stipulates that the SAS monthly amounts should be set based on the number of family members and the cost of
the food basket; that SAS benefit levels are regulated with a sub-legal act; and that the Ministry of Finance (previously in collaboration
with the MLSW) issues decision on the SAS monthly amounts\. The referenced sub-legal act is Administrative Instruction No\.15/2012 on
the Calculation of Monthly Social Assistance Amounts\. It introduced a point system for the purposes of SAS calculation where each point
equals Euro 1, and the points vary with family size, starting at 40 points for a one-member family\.
61 According to Law 2003/15, Section 9 (9\.2), the benefit amount is determined with a formula where it is the difference between the
monthly Gross Standard Rate for a family of certain size and its total reckonable income\. This formula has never been applied in practice\.
Law No\.04/L-096 on Amending and Supplementing the Law 2003/15 on the Social Assistance Scheme, Art\. 8 abolished this formula while
Administrative Instruction No\.15/2012 on the calculation of monthly social assistance amounts introduced flat rates of SAS which are
determined by family size and should be adjusted to the cost of the minimum food consumption basket\.
Page 63 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
household characteristics, and then the householdâs ability to generate sufficient income and assets to meet its
needs\.
5\. The first step of determining eligibility through categorical criteria defines two categories of
beneficiaries\. Eligibility for SAS requires that all family members habitually reside in Kosovo, and that the family
fall into one of two narrowly defined categories\. Category I â all family members are dependent62 and none is
employed\. Families applying because one or more family members are permanently and severely disabled and
thus dependent are required to have such membersâ health status reviewed by a Medical Commission\. Category
II - families can have one family member who is able to work but is registered as unemployed with the Employment
Office\. All other family members must be dependent\. In addition, the family must be parenting at least one child
under the age of 5 or providing permanent care for an orphan under the age of 15\.
6\. As a second step, the SAS evaluates eligible applicants using a poverty test that assigns scores based on
sources of income, household composition, ownership of certain type of assets, and observable living/housing
characteristics (see Box 6-1)\. The reckonable income module considers all types of formal income above Euro 80
per month recorded in the Tax Administration of Kosovo (TAK) system and income from most other benefit
schemes\. The PMT component assesses the household based on ownership of certain types of assets and
characteristics of the householdâs dwelling\. Households with a score between 1 and 130 points are eligible to
receive social assistance, whereas households with a score of 150 or more points are not eligible to benefit from
the SAS\.63
62 Family members are considered dependent if they belong to one of the following groups: (a) persons over 18 years of age with
permanent and severe disabilities rendering them unable to work, (b) persons 65 years of age and older, (c) full-time caregivers of
person(s)or of children under the age of five, (d) persons up to 14 years of age, (e) persons aged 15 to 18 (inclusive) who are in full-time
education, and (f) single parents with at least one child under the age of 15\.
63 For households scoring between 131 and 149 points the CSW SAS Unit Head has the discretion to decide on eligibility status based on
assessment of collected evidence\.
Page 64 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
Box 6-1\. The SAS Poverty Test
The SAS poverty test assesses the eligibility of households by assigning scores to each item across the following
modules in Form A3, which is filled out during the verification visit to households: (1) Ownership of dwelling;
(2) Ownership/rent of land and its surface size; (3) Type of the dwelling; (4) Surface size of the dwelling; (5) Type of
construction material; (6) Type of insulation; (7) Type of doors and windows; (8) Type of floor; (9) Water and
sanitation; (10) Type of sewerage system; (11) Type of heating; (12/13) Basic furniture; (14) Household appliances;
(15) Information devices; (16) Additional dwelling units (e\.g\., summer kitchen); (17) Personal property ownership
(e\.g\., vehicle); (18) Production assets and tools (agriculture, construction, others); (19) Livestock; (21) Nonreckonable
income from social schemes; (22) Reckonable income from other social schemes; and (23) 64 Income from other
sources (e\.g\., formal work, rent, remittances, etc\.)\.
Most of the items in Form A3 are binary variables, even though in a few cases there may be more than two categories,
such as number of livestock, type of floor, and type of doors and windows\.
In the means test component:
ï The following sources of income are assigned 150 points and have exclusionary power: (1) benefit for blind
persons and their caregivers; (2) early retirement Trepça pension, (3) Kosovo Protection Force pension;
(4) Kosovo Security Force pension; (5) benefits for war veterans and their close family members, and families
of war veterans after their death; (6) pensions for different war-related categories (families of war martyrs,
civilian war invalids, war invalids, families of missing civilians, families of civilian invalids of war after their death,
families of civilian victims, caregivers of civilian invalids, families of war invalids after their death, caregivers of
war invalids, families of missing Kosovo Liberation Army members); (7) pensions from abroad; (8) pensions for
persons with paraplegia and quadriplegia; (9) ex-contributory pensions; and (10) monthly formal income above
Euro 80 from any source captured by the TAK system;
ï Income from (1) old-age pensions, (2) scheme of material support for families of children with permanent
disability (age 1-18 years), (3) scheme of material support for foster families, (4) family pension, and (5) work
invalidity pension, as well as monthly formal income below Euro 80 from any source captured by the TAK
system, is considered nonreckonable income\. Each applicable category is assigned 5 points, and the individual
recipients of the benefit(s) are excluded from family size when calculating the benefit level (if the family is
found eligible);
ï For single-member households, income from (1) old-age pensions, (2) ex-contributory pensions, (3) family
pension, and (4) work invalidity pensions is considered reckonable, is assigned 150 points, and has exclusionary
power\.
In the PMT component of the poverty test, the following are assigned 150 points and have exclusionary power:
(1) possession or rent of more than 0\.5 hectares of land; and (2) ownership of a vehicle 65\. The points for most of the
other assets, housing conditions, productive assets, livestock, etc\., range between 0 and 20\.
Source: Administrative Instruction No\. 06/2013 to Calculate Material and Non-Material Goods and Calculated Revenue and
Non-Accountable, meeting with the SAS Database Administrator and developer, and observation of the SAS system \.
64 Because of issues with data verification, in module (23) only formal income can be verified, typically what is captured/recorded by the
TAK\. Verification of inheritance is circumstantial during the field verification visit\.
65 Excluding vehicles used to transport persons with disability\.
Page 65 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
7\. To comply with the public health measures introduced in response to COVID-19, the Government has
waived the requirement that beneficiaries reapply and present any of the documentation required to confirm
their continued eligibility for the SAS from March 2020 until further notice\. This waiver also applies to the
requirement that beneficiary households include a child under the age of 5 years\.66 As a result, current
beneficiaries will automatically continue to receive support as long as the public health emergency is in effect,
currently for three months\. This change dramatically reduces the demands on CSWs to engage face-to-face with
beneficiaries of the SAS\. However, the SAS management information system (MIS) will continue to carry out cross-
checks with the Tax Administration each month, and any household identified as having formal income above the
cut-off for eligibility will be exited from the SAS for the following month\.
8\. Households that apply to the SAS for the first time since March 2020 are similarly not required to
produce any documentation to support their application\. However, at present these households are still required
to visit the CSW in person to fill out the necessary paperwork and to declare that they meet the eligibility criteria
for the SAS\. Discussions are ongoing to build a web-based platform that would enable people to apply on-line,
obviating the need for in-person visits\. Given the expected effects of the pandemic on household income and
employment status, it is likely that the number of people applying to the SAS will increase over the coming months\.
Benefit Formula, Rates, and Duration
9\. The SAS provides a flat-rate benefit\. Unlike many other LRIS schemes, SAS is not a guaranteed minimum
income scheme\. It does not complement other public transfers or incomes of applicants with the objective of
bringing recipients to a defined guaranteed minimum income standard\. Instead, it is a fixed-amount flat-rate
benefit\.67 Law No\.4/L-096 stipulates that the monthly amount of SAS is set on the basis of the number of family
members and the cost of the minimum food basket\.
10\. Since the introduction of the SAS, there have been several reforms to the calculation of the benefit
amount\. Until 2012, a ceiling/cap was applied to the benefit amount for households with more than seven
members (Table 1)\. With the amendments of 2012, the benefit formula points range from 40 for a one-member
family to 120 for a family/household of 15 members, with each point corresponding to one Euro of benefit\. In
addition, these amendments expanded the scope of the benefit: (a) the ceiling for households with more than
seven members was lifted, and the benefit amount adjusted for household size by adding 5 Euros to the monthly
amount for each additional person for households with three or more members; and (b) a monthly child allowance
of an additional 5 Euros for each child under 18 years was introduced\.
11\. Although the SAS benefit has not been formally indexed to inflation, discretionary increases of the
benefit amount have more than offset benefit erosion and have led to an increase in the real value of SAS\.
Because Kosovo uses the Euro as its currency, the cumulative inflation of the prices of food and nonalcoholic
beverages between 2002 and 2017 has been only 41 percent\. During the same period, the Government increased
the amount of the SAS benefit four times (Table 6-1)\. Depending on household size, the cumulative increase of
the benefit amount totaled 60-140 percent, far outweighing inflation\.
66 This requirement applies specifically to Category II (defined above)\.
67 AI No\.15/2012 on the Calculation of Monthly Social Assistance Amounts\.
Page 66 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
Table 6-1\. Trends in social assistance monthly benefits by household size (nominal values)
Household size 2003 2009 2012* November 2015* January 2018*
1 member ⬠35 ⬠40 ⬠40 ⬠50\.0 ⬠60\.0
2 members ⬠50 ⬠55 ⬠55 ⬠68\.8 ⬠82\.5
3 members ⬠55 ⬠60 ⬠60 ⬠75\.0 ⬠90\.0
4 members ⬠60 ⬠65 ⬠65 ⬠81\.3 ⬠97\.5
5 members ⬠65 ⬠70 ⬠70 ⬠87\.5 ⬠105\.0
6 members ⬠70 ⬠75 ⬠75 ⬠93\.8 ⬠112\.5
7 members ⬠75 ⬠80 ⬠80 ⬠100\.0 ⬠120\.0
8 members ⬠75 ⬠80 ⬠85 ⬠106\.3 ⬠127\.5
9 members ⬠75 ⬠80 ⬠90 ⬠112\.5 ⬠135\.0
10 members ⬠75 ⬠80 ⬠95 ⬠118\.8 ⬠142\.5
11 members ⬠75 ⬠80 ⬠100 ⬠125\.0 ⬠150\.0
12 members ⬠75 ⬠80 ⬠105 ⬠131\.3 ⬠157\.5
13 members ⬠75 ⬠80 ⬠110 ⬠137\.5 ⬠165\.0
14 members ⬠75 ⬠80 ⬠115 ⬠143\.8 ⬠172\.5
15 members ⬠75 ⬠80 ⬠120 ⬠150\.0 ⬠180\.0
Source: MLSW administrative data and SAS legislation\.
*Note: Monthly amounts do not include child allowance\.
12\. The duration of the SAS benefit is short by international standards, especially for Category II
beneficiaries\. Category I beneficiaries receive benefits for 12 months, and Category II SAS beneficiaries receive
benefits for only 6 months\. After benefit expiry, the beneficiary status may be renewed (revalidated) for the next
6 or 12 months\. There is no limit on the number of applications, and the benefit can be renewed indefinitely if the
household keeps fulfilling the eligibility criteria\. However, having to reapply for the SAS every 6 months places an
undue burden on households and creates unnecessary workload for the administrative system\. In most EU
countries, the LRIS benefit requires recertification after at least 12 months, similar to the requirements in the
other Western Balkan countries\. Any change in the circumstances of the SAS recipient family (such as family size
and composition, incomes, assets, etc\.) that takes place during the period of benefit receipt must be reported to
the CSW\.
13\. As part of the Emergency Plan, the Government has doubled the value of the payments to SAS
beneficiaries for the months of March, April, and May 2020\. The SAS benefit is a flat rate that slowly increases
with family size and covers a lower share of the consumption needs of larger families than of smaller ones\. 68
Indexation of the benefit has been ad hoc and discretionary, despite existing legal rules\. As a result, the SASâs
benefit adequacy is average by regional standards, and declining\. Given the emergency nature of this support,
and the fact that there is no scope to reform the SAS benefit in the current political context, doubling the payment
is an effective way to improve the adequacy of the benefit as poor households experience declining incomes from
informal sources, particularly remittances, and rising costs, such as those related to health care\.
14\. These double payments will be made automatically to all existing SAS beneficiaries\. To this end, the
payroll will be prepared for the double payment, with the increased amount being paid to beneficiaries with their
regular support through a single payment\. Subcomponent 2\.2 will fund the double payment to SAS beneficiaries
and any associated fees charged by the payment service provider (commercial bank and post office)\. It is expected
68 Beyond the second family member, the incremental benefit amount is only Euro 7\.5 per month for adults and Euro 12\.5 for children\. As
a result, the incremental benefit amount in response to an additional family member is smaller than that envisaged by the most common
equivalence scales and does not reflect adult-equivalent family size\.
Page 67 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
that the full 98,096 beneficiaries will benefit from this subcomponent for the months of March, April, and May
2020\.
Relation to Other Benefits
15\. The SAS is the gateway for other in-kind benefits and associated rights for its recipients\. The SAS benefit
package includes69 (a) coverage of a portion of the electricity bill, (b) exemption from paying for primary and
secondary health care services, (c) free books for primary and secondary school pupils, 70 (d) coverage of student
tuition fees, (e) exemption from paying for other utilities, and (f) exemptions from municipal administration tax
payment (because these fees/taxes vary by municipality, the size of benefits is unequal)\.
16\. There are no explicit legal regulations for integrated social service provision or for complementing the
SAS cash assistance with social care services\. As a result, the links between SAS and other social care services are
weak\. SAS and social services are delivered by separate units of the CSWs, and cases are not managed in an
integrated manner\.
17\. Social and family services in Kosovo were introduced in 2005 with Law No\.02/L-17 on Social and Family
Services\. They are targeted to persons and families in need, such as children who are without parental care, are
neglected, and/or exhibit delinquent behavior; elderly people in need of care; persons who have physical and
mental disabilities or are exposed to risks of exploitation, abuse, domestic violence, and/or human trafficking; and
people affected by natural disasters\. There are three main types of services: direct social care, counseling, and
cash or in-kind assistance for people in need\. The direct care involves help with domestic duties, personal care,
and help for mobility and communication\. It can be provided in a personâs own home, in a day-care center, or in
a residential institution\. Counselling involves providing information, advice, and guidance aimed at helping an
individual or a family to improve their social circumstances\. The assistance includes support in cash, temporary
shelter, food, clothing, payment of medical fees, or other support in case of urgent need\.
18\. Regarding employment services, Category II SAS recipients are rarely treated with activation measures,
and even more rarely sanctioned for refusing to take part in activation programs\. The sole formal linkage with
SAS is the requirement for able-bodied SAS Category II family members to register as unemployed\. There are no
legal provisions for specifically targeted employment measures, even public work programs, which could â
according to their definition71 - combine public and social objectives\.
Emergency Measure 15
19\. Expanding the SAS to new households: Measure 15\. According to the Governmentâs Emergency Plan,72
households are eligible for support under Measure 15 when the applicant household member is unemployed, no
member of the household receives any other regular assistance from the Government, and the household has no
source of formal income\. Eligible households will receive support for three months (planned for April, May, and
June 2020), amounting to Euro 130 per month per household\. To deliver this support, the Government will use
the systems and procedures that have been established for the SAS, including payment procedures, with
modifications to the enrollment and targeting system\. More specifically, one member of the household will apply
to MoFT, on behalf of his or her household, to receive this emergency support\. Given the need to start quickly,
69 AI No\. 15/2012 on the calculation of monthly social assistance amounts\.
70 The Ministry of Education, Science and Technology provides free books to all schoolchildren in Kosovo\.
71 Regulation (MLSW) no\.01/2018 on Active Labor Market Measures, Article 33\.
72 Under Measure 15 of the Emergency Fiscal Package that was announced by the Government\.
Page 68 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
this application process will initially be in the form of an email to a dedicated email account staffed by the SAS
Division\. Through this application, the individual will provide the list of household members and ID numbers\.
Alternatively, for households without the necessary Internet access, there is also an option to apply for this
emergency support in person at the CSWs\. Efforts are under way to build a web-based enrollment system that
would enable people to apply for support by entering their national ID number, name, and a few key variables\. 73
20\. This application form will be reviewed by the SAS Division for completeness and then sent to the
appropriate CSW, where the staff will enter it into the SAS MIS\. The SAS MIS targeting module will cross-reference
the national ID number with Government databases in the Tax Administration and MoFT to determine whether
the household has sources of formal income or receives monthly support from other Government programs\. All
households that receive regular public benefits and social security payments will be excluded\. There will also be a
cross-reference with the Employment Agency of Kosovo (EARK) to confirm that the applicant is registered as
unemployed\.74
21\. Initially, the threshold for the means test is set such that eligible households will have no source of
formal income\. However, analysis shows that even a considerable share of households in the top 60 percent have
no formal sources of income\. Many households in Kosovo rely on informal sources of income, including
remittances\. The effects of the crisis are likely to be wide and deep, with reductions in sources of informal income,
including remittances from abroad\. For this reason, efforts are under way to introduce a second targeting criterion
based on a PMT to better assess the poverty status of households\. If this emergency measure is extended and this
second targeting method introduced, the enrollment form will be adapted to include questions that are necessary
for the PMT\.
22\. The proposed project will invest in adapting the SAS MIS to enable it to support the emergency
payments, specifically the development of the web-based enrollment capability, and to explore the possibility
of communication through mobile phones\. The aim is to support the MoFT in further strengthening the systems
of the SAS to enable it to better respond to future emergencies\. This is expected to include adopting a poverty-
targeting system that includes the flexibility to respond to crisis, and the design of the architecture for a social
registry, which would support the rapid scaling-up of the SAS to meet any future shock\.
SAS Grievance and Redress Mechanism
23\. The main objective of a GRM is to help resolve complaints and grievances in a timely, effective, and
efficient manner that satisfies all parties involved\. Specifically, a GRM provides a transparent and credible
process for fair, effective, and lasting outcomes\. It also builds trust and cooperation as an integral component of
broader community consultation that facilitates corrective actions\. Specifically, the GRM:
ï Provides affected people with avenues for making a complaint or resolving any dispute that may arise
during the course of the implementation of projects;
ï Ensures that appropriate and mutually acceptable redress actions are identified and implemented to the
satisfaction of complainants; and
73 93\.2 percent of households have access to the Internet from home, according to the statistical yearbook (https://ask\.rks-
gov\.net/media/5082/vjetari-2019_ang-final\.pdf), and 78\.9 percent have access to the Internet through their phone, according to the
Survey on Use of Information and Communication Technology 2019 (https://ask\.rks-gov\.net/media/5271/tik-2019-ang\.pdf)\.
74 To facilitate this process, EARK (a) has âreactivatedâ all people who had previously registered with the Agency as unemployed so that
they do not need to re-register; (b) has created an electronic form that may be emailed to EARK offices; and (c) continues to operate
EARK offices so that people may enroll in person\.
Page 69 of 70
The World Bank
KOSOVO EMERGENCY COVID-19 PROJECT (P173819)
ï Reduces the scope of complaint cases that are brought to court to be resolved through judicial
proceedings\.
24\. The decision-making responsibility for approval or rejection of applications for the SAS benefit rests
with the Head of the SAS Unit in the relevant CSW (Law No\.04/L-096, Art\. 3\.5)\. The decision is based on the
information on the case that is provided by the applicant, collected through a field visit, and fed into the SAS MIS
by CSW SAS Unit employees (case managers and IT administrators)\. Each month the MIS cross-checks data on the
eligibility of each case, confirms or rejects eligibility, and communicates back to the CSW the identified reasons
for rejection\. All applicants for SAS who are not satisfied with the decision of the CSW not to honor their
applications have the right to appeal the decision for rejection\.
25\. The grievance procedure is organized in two stages, which could be followed by a third stage - court
appeal\.
ï First-instance grievance procedure\. The first-instance body is the CSW that processed the application\.
The grievance procedure is initiated by the applicant whose application has been rejected or by his/her
legal representative\. The appeal should be filed no later than 5 days after the applicant has been notified
about the decision (Law No\.04/L-096, Art\. 11\.1); however, missing this deadline does not mean losing the
right to appeal/register a complaint at second instance\. To start the grievance/appeal at first instance, the
applicant submits a written complaint to the Head of the SAS Unit and authorizes a review of the case\.
Within 10 days after receiving the complaint, the CSW SAS Unit Head is obliged to review it or to transfer
it for resolution to the second-instance body\. The CSW SAS Unit Head must report the status of the
disputed decision to the applicant in writing\. The CSWs also report annually to the relevant ministry on
the number of appeals that were resolved at first instance, along with the reasons for appeals\. The SAS
Division monitors the number of appeals by CSW and the reasons for them\.
ï Second-instance grievance procedure\. The SAS Division is the second instance body for a grievance
procedure\. If the first-instance decision is not satisfactory to the applicant, he/she files the second-
instance grievance/appeal in writing, not later than 15 days after receiving the decision from the first-
instance body\. The staff of the CSW supports the applicant in preparing the file with documents needed
to submit the appeal\. The SAS Division appoints a Complaint Commission, which reviews complaints and
informs complainants in writing, not later than 21 days after receiving the complaint\.
ï Court appeal\. If the applicant is not satisfied with the outcome of the Complaint Commissionâs decision
at the second instances, he/she or legal representative can file an appeal with the competent court within
30 days after receiving the decision of the second-instance appeal body\.
26\. During project implementation, the typology of appeals and appellants will be monitored closely to
ensure efficient GRM management\. Efforts will be made to (a) identify specific barriers for certain types of
applicants to exercise their right to appeal and redress; (b) increase the benefit uptake by reducing the
bureaucracy associated with grievance and appeal procedures at different instances; (c) limit, and possibly
eliminate, the physical presence of appellants in the GRM procedure; and (d) provide through the CSWs more
detailed and informative data on the reasons for rejection of applications so that an increasing share of appeals
can be resolved by the first instance body\.
27\. The CSWs are responsible for disseminating information about the available GRM procedures and about
the rights and responsibilities of applicants/beneficiaries and benefit administrators, contact details, and
deadlines\.
Page 70 of 70 | APPROVAL |
P117407 | 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
ï¼
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
-
-
28
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
29
-
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
-
-
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
20
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
â«âªï§â¬â¬
â«âª 22â¬Ø¨Ø¯Ø£Øª Ùزارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© Ù?٠اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙسابÙØ© Ù?Ù Ùذا اÙÙ
جÙÙد بÙÙاÙØ© ⪠\.1122â¬ÙÙاÙت اÙÙتÙجة Ù٠زÙادة تعرÙÙ?Ø© اÙÙÙرباء ÙÙصÙاعات ÙØ«ÙÙ?Ø© ااÙستخداÙ
ÙÙØاÙØ©â¬
â«Ù?Ù ÙÙاÙرâª/â¬ÙاÙÙ٠اÙثاÙ٠⪠Ø1122â¬Ù
ع اÙتخÙ?Ùض ÙØد ÙبÙر Ù
Ù Ù
ÙازÙØ© دعÙ
اÙØاÙØ© Ù?٠اÙعاÙ
اÙÙ
اÙ٠⪠\.1122â¬ÙاستÙ
رت اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© Ù?٠إصاÙØ Ø§ÙØاÙØ© ÙاÙدعÙ
â¬
â«Ù Ø£Ùسع ÙتØسÙ٠ااÙستداÙ
Ø© اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙØاعات اÙÙÙرباء ÙاÙÙÙÙدâª\.â¬â¬â«Ø¹ÙÙ ÙØ Ù?â¬
â«âª76â¬â¬
ï§
ï§
77
â«âªï§â¬â¬
â«âª 23â¬ÙØ«ÙÙØ© تÙÙÙÙ
Ù
شرÙع تÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙØاÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙدة Ù
٠اÙرÙاØ⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠21 Øâ¬Ù
اÙÙâª/â¬Ø£Ùار âª( 1121â¬ØªÙرÙر رÙÙ
âª)54267-EGâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ بخصÙص تعزÙز اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© Ù?Ù ÙØاع اÙØاÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ Ù
ÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ رئÙس٠Ù⬠â«âª 24â¬ØسبÙ
ا Ùرد ÙصÙ?Ù Ù?٠اÙÙ?Ùرة بâª(-â¬Ø£ÙاÙ)⪠Øâ¬ÙØ´Ù
٠اÙصÙدÙ٠ااÙÙتÙاÙ٠أÙض Ùâ¬
â«âª 25â¬Ùذ٠اÙÙ
ساعدة Ù
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ù
٠أج٠دعÙ
اتÙ?اÙÙØ© اÙشراÙØ© ( ⪠) Association Agreementâ¬Ù
ع ااÙتØاد اأÙÙرÙب٠ÙسÙاسة اأÙØÙاء اأÙÙرÙبÙØ© ( âªØ)ENPâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ Ù
٠اÙد عÙ
Ø¥Ù٠برÙاÙ
ج اتÙ?اÙÙØ© اÙشرÙØ© بÙÙ Ù
صر ÙااÙتØاد اأÙÙرÙبÙ⪠\.â¬Ø§Ø£ÙÙداÙ? اأÙÙسع ÙÙ (Ø£) اÙÙ
ساعدة Ù?٠تØÙÙÙ Ù
ÙاءÙ
Ø© ÙظاÙ
⬠â«ÙØ£Ùضا بÙصÙ?٠جزءÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙرباء Ù?Ù Ù
صر Ù
ع ÙÙاعد اÙÙ
Ù?ÙضÙØ© اأÙÙرÙبÙØ© ÙتÙجÙÙاتÙا بشأ٠اÙسÙ٠اÙتÙاÙ?سÙØ© Ù?٠إÙتاج اÙÙÙرباء Ùتجارة اÙتجزئة Ù?٠إÙ
داداتÙØ§Ø Ù (ب) تÙسÙرâ¬
â«ØªØÙÙ٠اÙÙصد ا Ø¥ÙستراتÙج٠ÙÙÙ
Ù?ÙضÙØ© اأÙÙرÙبÙØ© Ù
٠اÙØ±Ø¨Ø Ø¨Ù٠اÙÙÙرباء ÙاÙغاز بÙ٠اÙØدÙد اÙغربÙØ© ÙاÙشرÙÙØ© ÙاÙتØاد اأÙÙرÙب٠Ù
٠خاÙ٠دÙ٠جÙÙبâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبØر اأÙبÙض اÙÙ
تÙسØâª\.â¬â¬
â«âª78â¬â¬
ï§
79
â«Ù?Ùزع عÙ٠سÙتÙÙ Ù?٠ثاÙث⬠â«âª 26â¬ÙÙدÙ
برÙاÙ
ج دعÙ
سÙاسة ÙØاع اÙØاÙØ© Ù
ساعدة بÙÙÙ
Ø© ⪠21â¬Ù
ÙÙÙÙ ÙÙر٠Ù
ÙÙا ⪠12â¬Ù
ÙÙÙÙ ÙÙر٠ÙدعÙ
اÙØاÙة⪠Øâ¬Ùذا اÙÙ
بÙغ Ù
â¬
â«Ø¯Ù?عات ØبÙا ÙØ£ÙÙداÙ? اÙÙ
رØÙÙØ© اÙÙ
تعÙÙØ© باÙظرÙÙ? ااÙÙتصادÙØ© اÙÙÙÙØ© ÙسÙاسة ÙØاع اÙØاÙØ© Ùإدارة اÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙعاÙ
⪠\.â¬Ø£Ù
ا اأÙربعة Ù
اÙÙÙÙ ÙÙر٠اÙباÙÙØ© Ù?ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
خصصة ÙÙÙ
ساعدة اÙÙ?ÙÙØ© ÙتدعÙÙ
Ø£ÙداÙ? برÙاÙ
ج دعÙ
سÙاسة ÙØاع اÙØاÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«âª80â¬â¬
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùرد⪠/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
ÙاÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙدÙ
اÙÙ?اتÙرةâ¬
â«Ø£Ù Ø´Ùادة اÙسدادâ¬
â«Ù
دÙر اÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«ÙااÙستشار٠ÙÙÙ
راجعةâ¬
â«ÙااÙعتÙ
ادâ¬
â«Ù
راجعات ÙØاع Ù
شرÙعات شرÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙج٠اÙÙبÙ٠إÙÙتاج اÙÙÙرباءâ¬
â«Ø¥Ø°Ø§ Ùا٠اÙسداد Ù
Ù Ùرض اÙبÙ٠إذا Ùا٠اÙسداد Ù
٠اÙÙ
ساÙÙ
Ø© اÙÙ
ØÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙ ÙØ¥ÙÙشاء ÙاÙتعÙ
Ùرâ¬
â«Ù
راجعة Ù
٠إدارة⬠â«Ù
راجعة Ù
٠إدارةâ¬
â«Ù?Øص ااÙستثÙ
ار⬠â«Ù?Øص ااÙستثÙ
ارâ¬
â«Ù
راجعة Ù
٠إدارة⬠â«ØªØ¹Ø¯ ÙØدة اإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© âªW/Aâ¬â¬
â«âªFOREXâ¬â¬ â«ÙÙسداد اÙÙ
باشر أ٠إعداد اÙØ´ÙÙâª/â¬â¬
â«Ø¥Ø°Ø§ Ùا٠اÙسداد⬠â«Ø§ÙتØÙÙ٠اÙÙ
صرÙ?Ù ÙÙØساب اÙÙ
خصصâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ÙعÙ
ÙØ© اأÙجÙبÙØ©â¬
â«Ø¥Ø¯Ø§Ø±Ø© اÙخزÙÙØ© تصدرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ´Ù٠⪠/â¬Ø§ÙØÙاÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
صرÙ?ÙØ© ÙترسÙ⬠â«ÙØدة اإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙØسابات اÙعاÙ
Ø©â¬
â«ØªØ³Ø¬Ù اÙÙ
عاÙ
ÙØ© ÙتØÙ?ظâ¬
â«ØªØ³Ø¬Ù اÙÙ
عاÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«ØµÙرة Ø¥ÙÙ ÙØدة اإÙدارة⬠â«Ø§Ø£Ùص٠Ùترس٠صÙرةâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£Ùص٠إÙ٠اÙØسابات⬠â«ÙتØÙ?ظ اÙصÙرةâ¬
â«Ø¥Ù٠اÙØسابات اÙعاÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ø§ÙعاÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«ØªØ³Ø¬ÙÙ ÙØÙ?ظ⬠â«ØªØ³Ø¬ÙÙ ÙØÙ?ظâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙصÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙصÙرةâ¬
â«âª95â¬â¬
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
https://clientconnection\.worldbank\.org :â« ÙÙ
Ù٠اÙدخÙ٠عÙÙ Ùذا اÙعÙÙاÙâ¬27
105
ï
ï
106
107
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
108
ï
ï
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
ï
ï
ï
ï
145
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
146
ï
ï
ï
ï
ï
147
148
149
â«âª 28â¬Ø§ÙØ®Ù?ضت ÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙجÙÙ٠اÙÙ
صر٠بÙسبة ⪠21â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
ائة تÙرÙبا Ù
٠بداÙØ© Ø´Ùر ÙÙÙÙÙâª/â¬ØªÙ
Ùز ⪠1121â¬Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
ÙتصÙ? Ù
ارسâª/â¬Ø¢Ø°Ø§Ø± ⪠Ø1122â¬Ù
٠⪠7,5â¬Ø¬ÙÙÙ Ù
ÙابÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙدÙاÙر Ø¥Ù٠⪠2,51â¬Ù
Ùاب٠اÙدÙاÙر اأÙÙ
رÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«âª150â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙستثÙ
ارات اÙÙ
Øددة Ù?Ù Ù
ÙازÙØ© شرÙØ© Ø¥Ùجاس تتضÙ
٠تÙ٠اÙت٠ÙÙ?ذتÙا شرÙØ© جاسÙÙ (اÙÙ
صدر⪠:â¬Ø¥Ùجاس)âª\.â¬â¬ â«âª29â¬â¬
â«âª151â¬â¬
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
â«âª 30â¬ØªÙدر Ùسب اÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙذات٠بÙاء عÙ٠صاÙ?٠تدÙ?Ù ÙÙد اÙتشغÙ٠بعد ØØ±Ø Ø³Ø¯Ø§Ø¯ اÙدÙÙ ØÙÙ٠اأÙج٠اÙÙ
Ùدرâª\.â¬â¬
â«âª160â¬â¬
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
â«âª 31â¬Ø§ÙسÙØ© اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙسÙØ© اÙتخØÙØ ÙÙشرÙØ© اÙÙابضة ÙÙÙرباء Ù
صر تÙ
تد Ù
Ù Ø´Ùر ÙÙÙÙÙâª/â¬ØªÙ
Ùز Øت٠ÙÙÙÙÙâª/â¬ØزÙراÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«âª180â¬â¬
181
â«âª 32â¬Ùذ٠اÙÙÙÙ
Ø© تÙÙÙ
عÙ٠تÙدÙرات اÙتÙÙÙ?Ø© ااÙÙتصادÙØ© ÙÙ
صر Ù?Ù ØاÙØ© استÙاÙ٠غازÙا اÙØبÙع٠اÙت٠تظÙر Ù?٠اÙتÙرÙر اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ "Ù
صرâª:â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙÙÙ?Ø© ااÙÙتصادÙØ© ÙÙغاز اÙØبÙعÙ⪠-â¬Ø§ÙتÙرÙر اÙÙÙائÙ⪠-â¬Ù?براÙرâª/â¬Ø´Ø¨Ø§Ø ⪠Ø1115â¬Ù
شارÙ٠ااÙستشارات ااÙÙتصادÙØ©"â¬
â«âª182â¬â¬
â«Ù
تÙØ³Ø ØªÙÙÙ?Ø© تÙÙÙد اÙÙÙرباء(دÙاÙرâª/â¬Ù
Ùجا Ùات)â¬
â«Ù
ØØØ© بخارÙØ©â¬
â«ØªÙربÙ٠غازÙâ¬
â«Ø¯Ùرة غاز اÙتÙربÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
تÙاÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙستخداÙ
اÙسÙÙÙ ÙÙدرات اÙÙ
ØØاتâ¬
â«Ù
ØØØ© بخارÙة⬠â«ØªÙربÙ٠غازÙ⬠â«Ø¯Ùرة غاز اÙتÙربÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
تÙاÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«âª183â¬â¬
â«âªïâ¬â¬
â«âªïâ¬â¬
â«âª 33â¬ÙستÙ?Ùد Ùذا اÙتØÙÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات اÙÙاردة Ù?٠اÙتÙارÙر اÙسÙÙÙØ© ÙÙشرÙØ© اÙÙابضة ÙÙÙرباء Ù
صر⪠Øâ¬ÙاأÙÙØ´ØØ© ااÙستشارÙØ© اÙÙ
ستÙ
رةâ¬
â«Ø¥Ùدارة اÙتخØÙØ Ù?٠اÙشرÙØ© اÙÙابضة ÙÙÙرباء Ù
صر⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
ÙاÙشات Ù
ع اإÙدارات ذات اÙصÙØ© Ù?Ù Ù
رÙز اÙسÙØرة اÙÙÙÙ
Ùâª\.â¬â¬
â«âª 34â¬Ùدرات تÙÙÙد اÙÙÙرباء اÙÙ
تاØØ© Ù?٠اÙسÙØ© اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ⪠1121â¬ÙاÙت ⪠11572â¬Ù
Ùجا Ùات (Ù
٠أص٠⪠17211â¬Ù
Ùجا Ùات Ù
٠اÙÙدراتâ¬
â«Ù?رÙبة باÙÙ?عÙ) Ù
ÙارÙØ© بØÙ
٠ذرÙØ© Ùدر٠⪠11571â¬Ù
Ùجا Ùات⪠\.â¬Ùا٠ÙاÙ
Ø´ ااÙØتÙاØÙ Ùد خرج Ù
٠اÙÙØا٠اÙسÙب٠Ù?٠اÙعاÙ
اÙÙ
اÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
â¬
â«âª 1111â¬ÙÙÙÙ٠استÙر عÙد ⪠%1â¬ÙÙÙ Ù
ا ÙØ´Ùر Ø¥ÙÙ ÙجÙد Ù
ÙÙÙ? Øرج باÙÙسبة ÙتشغÙ٠اÙÙظاÙ
âª\.â¬â¬
â«âª 35â¬ØªØ®Ù?Ùض تصÙÙÙ? ØاÙØ© اÙتÙÙÙد اÙÙ
رÙبة ÙÙتÙربÙÙات اÙغازÙØ© ذات اÙدÙرة اÙÙ
شترÙØ© ÙاÙتÙربÙÙات اÙغازÙØ© بÙسبة ⪠%8â¬Ø®Ø§ÙÙ ØÙ
٠اÙذرÙØ©â¬
â«Ø¨Ø³Ø¨Ø¨ درجة اÙØرارة اÙÙ
ØÙØØ© ا٠عاÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙذا تعتÙ
د اÙشرÙØ© اÙÙابضة ÙÙÙرباء Ù
صر عÙ٠اÙØاÙØ© اÙÙÙرÙÙ
ائÙØ© ÙÙتغÙب عÙ٠اÙÙÙص Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ùدرات اÙتÙÙÙد ÙتÙبÙØ© ااÙØتÙاجات Ù
٠اÙØÙ
٠اÙÙ
تÙØ³Ø ÙØÙ
٠اÙذرÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«âª184â¬â¬
â«âªïâ¬â¬
â«Ù? Ù
ثاÙ٠بÙ٠تÙÙÙÙÙجÙا اÙغاز ÙتÙÙÙÙÙجÙا اÙبخار Ù
Ùâ¬â«âª 36â¬ØªØ¬Ø¯Ø± Ù
اÙØظة أ٠اÙشرÙØ© اÙÙابضة ÙÙÙرباء Ù
صر تØاÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙازÙØ© عÙÙ ÙØÙâ¬
â«Ø£Ø¬Ù اÙÙ
ØاÙ?ظة عÙ٠ساÙÙ
Ø© اÙÙظاÙ
ÙÙ
ÙØ«ÙÙÙت٠ÙاأÙداء ااÙÙتصادÙ⪠\.â¬ÙاÙتÙربÙÙات اÙغازÙØ© ذات اÙدÙرة اÙÙ
Ù?تÙØØ© Ù?Ù Øا٠استخداÙ
Ùاâ¬
â«Ø¨Ù
Ù?ردÙا أ٠بااÙشترا٠Ù
ع اÙتÙربÙÙات اÙغازÙØ© ذات اÙدÙرة اÙÙ
شترÙØ© ÙÙا بعض اÙÙ
Ùزات باÙÙسبة ÙاÙستثÙ
ار ÙتÙÙÙ?Ø© اÙتشغÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙÙ ÙÙاâ¬
â«Ø§ عÙ٠استÙرار اÙÙظاÙ
(ÙصÙر ذات٠Ù
ÙÙاÙÙÙ٠أÙÙ)⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙÙد اØتÙاØ٠غاÙ٠اÙØ«Ù
Ù (دÙز٠خÙ?ÙÙ?)⪠Øâ¬ÙتÙاÙÙÙ? صÙاÙØ© أعÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ا⬠â«ØªØ£Ø«Ùر اâ¬
â«Ù سÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙا ا٠تستØÙع اÙعÙ
٠بÙاÙ
Ù ÙÙتÙا خاÙ٠أÙاÙ
اÙصÙÙ? اÙØارة (Ù
Ù
ا Ùؤد٠إÙ٠⪠%22-2â¬Ø§ÙØ®Ù?اض Ù?٠صاÙ?٠اÙØاÙØ© اÙÙ
Ùتجة)⪠\.â¬ÙاأÙÙÙ
Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ØªØ®ØØ Ø§ÙشرÙØ© اÙÙا بضة ÙÙÙرباء Ù
صر ÙتشغÙÙ Ù
ØØØ© جÙÙب ØÙÙا٠عÙدÙ
ا ÙÙØ®Ù?ض Ø¶ØºØ Ø§Ùغاز Ù?٠اÙØ®ØÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
غذÙØ© ÙÙÙ
ØØØ© عÙâ¬
â«âª 11â¬Ø¨Ø§Ø± أ٠عÙد اÙØÙ
٠اÙÙاÙ
Ù Ù
ع استخداÙ
زÙت اÙÙÙÙد اÙØ«ÙÙÙ Ù?Ù ØاÙØ© عدÙ
تÙÙ?ر اÙغاز اÙØبÙعÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙتÙ
إخراج اÙتÙربÙÙات اÙغازÙØ© ذاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙدÙرة اÙÙ
شترÙØ© Ù
٠اÙخدÙ
Ø© عÙد ذات اÙÙ
ستÙÙ Ù
Ù Ø¶ØºØ Ø§Ùغاز⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ٠غÙر Ù
اÙئÙ
Ø© ÙزÙت اÙÙÙÙد اÙØ«ÙÙÙ ØÙØ« إ٠اÙÙضاÙا اÙÙ
تعÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ غÙر عÙ
ÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ùستظ٠Ù
ØØØ© جÙÙب ØÙÙا٠أÙثر Ù?اعÙÙØ© Ù
٠اÙÙ
ØØات اÙبخارÙة⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙÙ
ÙØ«ÙÙÙØ© ÙاÙصÙاÙØ© ÙاÙتÙاÙÙÙ? ذات اÙصÙØ© تجعÙÙا اختÙارÙâ¬
â«Ø§ Ù
عâ¬â«Ø§ÙعاÙ
ÙØ© عÙ٠اÙرغÙ
Ù
٠أ٠ترتÙبÙا Ù?٠سÙÙ
اÙÙ
زاÙا باÙÙسبة ÙÙسÙØرة عÙ٠تÙÙÙد اÙÙÙرباء بÙ
ا ÙÙائÙ
اÙعرض ÙاÙØÙب سÙÙØ®Ù?ض تدرÙجÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¯Ø®Ù٠اÙÙ
ØØات اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© Ù
رØÙØ© اÙتÙاعد⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ Ù
ا سÙØدث خاÙÙ Ù
دة تÙ
تد بÙ٠⪠27â¬Ù ⪠11â¬Ø³Ùة⪠Øâ¬ÙخاÙÙÙا سÙتÙ
Ø¥ÙاÙ٠اÙتÙÙÙ?Ø© اÙرأسÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«ÙÙÙ
ØØة⪠\.â¬ÙÙد Ø£Ùدت اÙشرÙØ© اÙÙابضة ÙÙÙرباء Ù
صر أ٠⪠%27 -21â¬Ù
Ù Ù
ÙÙÙات اÙÙ
ØØات اÙبخارÙØ© ÙتÙ
تصÙÙعÙا Ù
ØÙÙا Ù
ÙارÙØ© ب٠âª%21â¬â¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ÙÙسبة ÙÙتÙربÙÙات اÙغازÙØ© ذات اÙدÙرة اÙÙ
شترÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ Ù
ا ÙبÙ٠أÙÙ
ÙØ© تÙÙÙÙÙجÙا اÙبخار Ù?٠دعÙ
اÙتÙظÙÙ? اÙÙ
ØÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«âª185â¬â¬
â«âª 37â¬Ø§ÙتÙرÙر اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ " اÙشرÙØ© اÙÙابضة ÙÙÙرباء Ù
صر⪠:â¬Ø¯Ø±Ø§Ø³Ø© ÙتØÙÙر Ø®ØØ© رئÙسÙØ© ÙشبÙØ© ÙÙÙ ÙÙرباء Ù
صر⪠\.1121 -1118 Øâ¬Ø§ÙتÙرÙرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙائÙ" اÙصادر Ù?٠أغسØسâª/â¬Ø¢Ø¨ ⪠1111â¬Ù
Ù Ùب٠استشارÙ٠⪠CESI/Tractebel Engineering Suezâ¬ÙتضÙ
Ù Ø®ØØ© تÙÙÙد اÙÙÙرباءâ¬
â«ØÙÙÙØ© اأÙج٠(⪠)1117 -1112â¬ÙÙشرÙØ© اÙÙابضة ÙÙÙرباء Ù
صر ⪠\.â¬ÙÙد ØÙر اÙÙ?رÙ٠استثÙ
ارات اÙتÙÙÙد Øت٠سÙØ© ⪠1111â¬Ø¨Ùاء٠عÙÙâ¬
â«Ù Ø¥Ù٠جÙب Ù
ع Ø®ØØ© ااÙستثÙ
ار Ù?٠دراسة اÙجدÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
شرÙع Ø´Ù
ا٠اÙجÙزة Ù
ع اÙشرÙة⬠â«ØªÙÙÙØات Ø®ØØ© تÙÙÙد اÙÙÙرباء ØÙÙÙØ© اأÙج٠جÙباâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙابضة ÙÙÙرباء Ù
صر⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا أخذ اÙÙ?رÙÙ Ù?٠اÙØسبا٠أÙضا اÙبرÙاÙ
ج اÙسرÙع ÙتÙÙÙد اÙÙÙرباء⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùذ٠سÙضÙÙ? ⪠2711â¬Ù
Ùجا Ùات (âª711â¬â¬
â«Ù
Ùجا Ùات Ù?٠دÙ
ÙØ§Ø Ù âª 2111â¬Ù
Ùجا Ùات Ù?٠اÙشباب) Ù?٠⪠1122â¬Ù Ø£ÙÙ? Ù
Ùجا Ùات Ù?٠سÙØ© âª\.1121â¬â¬
â«âª186â¬â¬
â«âª 38â¬ÙÙ?Ùا ÙÙتÙرÙر اÙسÙÙÙ ÙÙشرÙØ© اÙÙابضة ÙÙÙرباء Ù
صر ÙسÙØ© ⪠Ø1121 /1111â¬Ù
٠اÙÙ
تÙÙع أ٠تضÙÙ? اÙØ®ØØ© اÙØ®Ù
سÙØ© اÙسابعة (âª-1121â¬â¬
â«âª 521 )1125â¬Ù
Ùجا Ùات Ù
٠تÙÙÙد اÙÙÙرباء باÙبخار Ù?Ù Ù
ØØات ÙÙرباء اÙسÙÙس ÙجÙÙب ØÙÙا٠ÙÙÙا ÙسÙ?اجا ÙاÙعÙاØâª\.â¬â¬
â«âª187â¬â¬
â«âª 39â¬ØªØ´Ù
Ù Ùدرات تÙÙÙد اÙÙÙرباء Ù?٠تÙبÙØ© ØÙ
٠اÙذرÙØ© عÙÙ ÙظاÙ
اÙشرÙØ© اÙÙابضة ÙÙÙرباء Ù
صر ÙاÙ?Ø© Ùدرات اÙتÙربÙÙات اÙغازÙØ© ذاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙدÙرة اÙÙ
Ù?تÙØة⪠Øâ¬Ù ⪠%27â¬ÙÙدرات اÙØاÙØ© اÙÙÙرÙÙ
ائÙØ© اÙÙ
رÙبة باÙÙ?عÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù ⪠%11â¬Ù
Ù Ùدرة ØاÙØ© اÙرÙØ§Ø Ø§ÙÙ
رÙبة باÙÙ?عÙ⪠\.â¬ÙباÙÙسبة ÙØÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ Ù
Ù ÙØدات اÙتÙربÙÙات اÙغازÙØ© ذات اÙدÙرة اÙÙ
شترÙØ© اÙÙ
رÙبة Ù?٠⪠1111 /1118â¬ÙاÙت٠ستزÙد⬠â«Ø§ÙذرÙØ© اÙÙسÙØ⪠Øâ¬Ù?ÙÙ ÙتÙÙ٠أساسÙâ¬
â«Ù Ø¥Ù٠⪠%87â¬Ù?٠⪠Ø1111 /1121â¬ÙÙسبة Ù
ÙدارÙا ⪠%27â¬Ù
٠اÙØاÙØ© اÙÙÙرÙÙ
ائÙØ© اÙت٠ستظ٠ثابتةâª\.â¬â¬ â«ØªØ¯Ø±ÙجÙاâ¬
â«âª188â¬â¬
â«âª%211â¬â¬
â«âª%21â¬â¬
â«âª%81â¬â¬
â«Ù?٠⪠1122-1122â¬ÙÙدرâ¬
â«âª%21â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙØÙ
٠اأÙساس٠اÙجدÙدâ¬
â«ÙÙدرات اÙتÙÙÙد بØÙاÙÙâ¬
â«Ùسبة ذرÙØ© اÙتØÙ
ÙÙâ¬
â«âª 0011â¬Ù
Ùجا Ùات⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ
Ø«Ùâ¬
â«âª%01â¬â¬
â«Ø°Ù٠زÙادة Ù?٠اÙØÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ
٠اÙØÙ
٠اأÙساس٠Ù
٠⪠%60â¬Ø§Ù٠⪠%01â¬Ù?Ù âª-1112â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø£Ùساس٠Ù
٠⪠%01â¬Ø§ÙÙâ¬
â«âª%01â¬â¬
â«âª1112â¬â¬ â«âª %00â¬Ù
Ù ØÙ
٠اÙÙظاÙ
â¬
â«ÙÙÙ Ù
ا ÙÙ
Ø«Ù Ù
تØÙباتâ¬
â«âª%61â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ùعرض Ù?Ù Ù?ترة اÙتØÙ
ÙÙâ¬
â«âª%21â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙØÙ
٠اأÙساسÙâ¬
â«âª%11â¬â¬
â«âª%21â¬â¬
â«âª%1â¬â¬
â«âª%22â¬â¬
â«âª%26â¬â¬
â«âª%22â¬â¬
â«âª%11â¬â¬
â«âª%11â¬â¬
â«âª%10â¬â¬
â«âª%18â¬â¬
â«âª%22â¬â¬
â«âª%22â¬â¬
â«âª%20â¬â¬
â«âª%22â¬â¬
â«âª%61â¬â¬
â«âª%60â¬â¬
â«âª%62â¬â¬
â«âª%01â¬â¬
â«âª%02â¬â¬
â«âª%00â¬â¬
â«âª%02â¬â¬
â«âª%02â¬â¬
â«âª%06â¬â¬
â«âª%02â¬â¬
â«âª%1â¬â¬
â«âª%2â¬â¬
â«âª%0â¬â¬
â«âª%8â¬â¬
â«Ùسبة اÙساعات اÙسÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«âª189â¬â¬
â«âª 40â¬Ø¨Ø³Ø¨Ø¨ اÙتأخر اÙØاص٠باÙÙ?ع٠Ù?٠اÙشراء اÙÙ
سب٠ÙØزÙ
اÙتÙربÙÙ ÙاÙغاÙÙØ© اÙخاصة بÙ
ØØØ© جÙÙب ØÙÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ØªØ¯Ø®Ù اÙÙ
ØØØ© تجاربâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتشغÙÙ Ù?٠⪠1125â¬Ùستبدأ اÙتشغÙ٠اÙÙاÙ
Ù Ù?Ù âª\.1128â¬â¬
â«âª 41â¬ÙÙÙ
ا زاد اÙÙصÙر اÙذات٠ÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙÙرباء⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙØ®Ù?ضت اÙتغÙرات Ù?٠تردد اÙÙظاÙ
عÙدÙ
ا تØدث اختاÙاÙت Ù?٠اÙتÙاز٠بÙ٠اÙعرضâ¬
â«ÙاÙØب ÙÙÙÙرباء بسب تذبذبات Ù?٠اإÙÙ
داد Ù
Ù Ù
ÙÙدات اÙÙÙرباء اÙت٠تعÙ
٠بØاÙØ© اÙرÙاØâ¬
â«âª190â¬â¬
â«ÙاÙ
Ø´ ااÙØتÙاØÙâ¬
â«Ù
Ùجا Ùاتâ¬
â«Ø°Ø±ÙØ©â¬
â«Ø¥Ø¬Ù
اÙ٠اØتÙاØ٠اÙÙظاÙ
⪠%11 -â¬Ø±ÙاØ⬠â«âª-â¬Ù
ØØØ© إجÙ
اÙ٠اØتÙاØ٠اÙÙظاÙ
⪠%11 -â¬Ø±ÙاØâ¬
â«âªSTâ¬Ø¯âª\.â¬â¬ â«âªCCâ¬â¬ â«Ù
ائÙة⬠â«Ø±ÙاØ⬠â«Ø´Ù
سÙة⬠â«Ø§ÙتØÙ
ÙÙâ¬
â«âªGTâ¬â¬ â«Ø¬ÙÙب ØÙÙاÙâ¬
â«âª191â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ùسعرâ¬
â«Ù
ÙØÙ٠اÙØÙب Ù?٠اÙسÙØ© "âª"nâ¬â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙ?عة اÙÙ
شرÙع (بÙ٠اÙØ®ØÙØ)â¬
â«Ø§ÙتعرÙ?Ø© âªP21/ P2nâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«âª 42â¬Ø¨Ø§ÙÙسبة ÙÙ٠سÙØ© Ù
٠اÙعÙ
ر ااÙÙتصاد٠ÙÙÙ
شرÙع⪠Øâ¬ÙتÙ
Øساب ÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙÙÙرباء اÙÙ
ستÙÙÙØ© Ù
Ù Ù
ØØØ© جÙÙب ØÙÙا٠Ù
Ù ÙÙÙ
Ø© إجÙ
اÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙزÙادة Ù?٠استÙاÙ٠اÙÙÙرباء Ù?٠تÙ٠اÙسÙØ© Ù
Ù ÙÙت دخÙÙ Ù
ØØØ© جÙÙب ØÙÙا٠اÙتشغÙ٠اÙÙاÙ
Ù Ù
ضرÙباâ¬
â«Ù Ù?Ù Ùسبة اÙØاÙØ© اÙÙ
ستÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù
Ù Ùذ٠اÙÙ
ØØØ© Ø¥Ù٠إجÙ
اÙ٠اÙزÙادة Ù?٠استÙاÙ٠اÙÙÙرباءâª\.â¬â¬
â«âª192â¬â¬
â«Ø§ Ù
ÙارÙØ© بتعرÙÙ?ات اÙÙÙرباء Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØÙØ© اÙبØر اÙÙ
تÙسØ⪠\.â¬Ø§Ùظر اÙÙ?ص٠اÙرابع بعÙÙا٠"ااÙستÙ?ادة Ù
Ù Ù
Ùردâ¬â«âª 43â¬Ùذا اÙÙ
ستÙÙ Ù
ÙØ®Ù?ض جدÙâ¬
â«Ø®Ù?Ù⪠:â¬ÙÙ?اءة استخداÙ
اÙØاÙØ© Ù?٠اÙشر٠اأÙÙØ³Ø ÙØ´Ù
ا٠أÙ?رÙÙÙا"⪠\.â¬ØªÙرÙر اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠رÙÙ
⪠Ø48329-MNAâ¬Ù?براÙرâª/â¬Ø´Ø¨Ø§Ø âª\.1111â¬â¬
â«âª 44â¬ØªÙ
اختÙار ÙÙ
Ùذج شب٠ÙÙغارÙتÙ
Ù ÙÙ
ÙØÙ٠اÙØÙب Ù
Ø«Ù Ø°Ù٠اÙÙ
ستخدÙ
Ù?٠اÙتÙÙÙÙ
ااÙÙتصاد٠ÙÙذا اÙÙ
شرÙع (جدÙ٠⪠)2â¬Ø£ÙÙÙ ÙÙدÙ
تÙاÙ?Ùاâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ù ÙتÙدÙÙ
ÙÙ
Ùذجâ¬â«Ø§Ù بÙ٠خاصتÙÙ ÙاÙ
تÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ø£ÙÙÙÙ ÙÙ Ø´ÙÙÙا اÙÙ
ÙØÙ٠اأÙضاÙع اÙØ°Ù ÙختÙÙ? بدرجة ÙاÙ?ÙØ© Ù
٠عاÙÙØ© Ø®ØÙØ© تÙ
اÙ
ا⬠â«Ù
عÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ù
عÙÙÙ ÙÙتÙÙع Ù?٠استعداد اÙÙ
ستÙÙÙÙÙ ÙÙدÙ?ع Ù
Ùاب٠استÙاÙ٠اÙÙÙرباء Ù
ع اÙتغÙرات Ù?٠سعر اÙÙÙرباء Ù?Ù ØدÙد Ù
جÙ
Ù ÙÙÙد اÙÙ
ÙازÙØ©â¬
â«Ù بدرجة Ù
Ù?رØØ© ÙÙÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙÙ
ختارة Ùسعر اÙØÙب عÙ٠اÙÙÙرباء⬠â«Ùد٠اÙÙ
ستÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ø£Ù
ا اÙخاصÙØ© اأÙخر٠Ù?تتÙ
Ø«Ù Ù?٠أ٠Ùذا اÙÙÙ
Ùذج ÙÙس Øساساâ¬
â«( ⪠Ø) price demand for elasticityâ¬ÙÙ٠باراÙ
تر رئÙس٠Ùجب استÙØ¨Ø§Ø ÙÙÙ
ت٠Ù
٠اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات اÙتجرÙبÙØ© اÙÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ
تاØØ© ع٠تجاÙبâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³ØªÙاÙ٠اÙÙ
ستÙÙÙ Ù
ع اÙتغÙرات Ù?٠اÙسعر⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
Ù Ø«Ù
Ù?إ٠ب٠Ùسبة ÙبÙرة Ù
٠اÙظÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«âª 45â¬Ù
تÙØ³Ø ØºÙØ© تعرÙ?Ø© اÙشرÙØ© اÙÙابضة ÙÙÙرباء Ù
صر باÙجÙÙ٠اÙÙ
صر٠ÙÙÙ ÙÙÙÙ Ùات صادر عÙÙ Ù?ÙاتÙر Ù
ØسÙب Ù
Ù Ùذا اÙÙ
عدÙâ¬
â«(إجÙ
اÙÙ ÙÙÙ
Ø© Ù
بÙعات اÙÙÙرباء باÙÙ
ÙÙÙ٠جÙÙÙ Ù
صر٠Ù
ÙسÙÙ
Ø© عÙ٠إجÙ
اÙÙ ÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù
بÙعات اÙÙÙرباء باÙجÙجا Ùات)âª\.â¬â¬
â«âª193â¬â¬
194
195
196
197
â«Ø§Ùسعرâ¬
â«Ù
ÙØÙ٠اÙØÙب Ù?٠اÙسÙØ© "âª"nâ¬â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙ?عة اÙÙ
شرÙع (بÙ٠اÙØ®ØÙØ)â¬
â«Ø§ÙتعرÙ?Ø© âªP21/ P2nâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«âªï?¥â¬â¬ â«âªï?¥â¬â¬
â«âªï?¥â¬â¬
â«âª198â¬â¬
ï?¥
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210 | APPROVAL |
P073322 | Document of
The World Bank
Report No: ICR2768
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(TF-91191)
ON A
GRANT
IN THE AMOUNT OF
(US$6\.0 MILLION)
TO THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
FOR THE
RENEWABLE ENERGY MARKET TRANSFORMATION PROJECT
MARCH 27, 2014
Energy Practice 1
Sustainable Development Department
Country Department AFCS1
Africa Region
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective 2013)
Currency Unit = ZAR
1\.00ZAR = US$0\.10
US$1\.00 = 9\.87ZAR
FISCAL YEAR
2013â2014
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
BEE Black Economic Empowerment
CEF Group Central Energy Fund Group
CO2 carbon dioxide
CSP Concentrating Solar Power
CSWH Commercial Solar Water Heating
DANIDA Danish International Development Agency
DBSA Development Bank of Southern Africa
DFI Development Finance Institution
DME Department of Minerals and Energy (part of which was later renamed DoE)
DoE Department of Energy
DSM demand-side management
DTI Department of Trade and Industry
ESMAP Energy Sector Management Assisted Program
FMU Financial Management Unit
G5 Group of Five
GEF Global Environment Facility
GEO Global Environmental Objective
GHG greenhouse gas
GWh gigawatt-hour
HP high pressure
ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report
IDC Industrial Development Corporation
IEG Independent Evaluation Group
IPP Independent Power Producer
IRP Integrated Resource Plan
IRR internal rate of return
ISMO independent system and market operator
ISR Implementation Status Report
ISU Implementation Support Unit
kg kilogram
kWh kilowatt-hour
LP SWH Low-pressure Solar Water Heating
MG Matching Grants
ii
MTR Mid-Term Review
MW megawatt
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
NERSA National Energy Regulator of South Africa
NSWHF National Solar Water Heating Framework
NT National Treasury
PAD Project Appraisal Document
PDO Project Development Objective
PG Performance Grants
PPA Power Purchase Agreement
PPP Public Private Partnership
PSC Project Steering Committee
RE renewable energy
REFIT Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff
RE IPP renewable energy independent power producer
REIPPPP Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Program
REMT Renewable Energy Market Transformation
REPG renewable energy power generation
REWP Renewable Energy White Paper
SABS South African Bureau of Standards
SASTELA Southern African Solar Thermal and Electricity Association
SWH Solar Water Heating
TA technical assistance
ToRs Terms of Reference
USD United States dollar
ZAR South African rand
Vice President: Mahktar Diop
Country Director: Asad Alam
Sector Manager: Lucio Monari
Project Team Leader: Karan Capoor
ICR Lead Author: Moeketsi Enos Thobela
iii
Â
SOUTH AFRICA
CONTENTS
DATA SHEET
A\. Basic Information
B\. Key Dates
C\. Ratings Summary
D\. Sector and Theme Codes
E\. Bank Staff
F\. Results Framework Analysis
G\. Ratings of Project Performance in Implementation Status Reports (ISRs)
H\. Restructuring
I\. Disbursement Profile
1\. Project Context and Design \.1
2\. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes \.4
3\. Assessment of Outcomes\.13
4\. Assessment of Risk to the GEO \.18
5\. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance \.20
6\. Lessons Learned \.25
7\. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners \.27
Annex 1: Project Costs and Financing \.28
Annex 2: Outputs and Outcomes by Component \.29
Annex 3: Economic and Financial Analyses \.36
Annex 4: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes \.40
Annex 5: Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR \.41
Annex 6: List of Supporting Documents \.44
Annex 7: MAP\.45
iv
Â
A\. Basic Information
Renewable Energy Market
Country: South Africa Project Name:
Transformation
Project ID: P073322 L/C/TF Number(s): TF-91191
ICR Date: 01/16/2014 ICR Type: Core ICR
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
Lending Instrument: TA Borrower:
AFRICA
Original Total
USD 6\.00M Disbursed Amount: USD 4\.65M
Commitment:
Revised Amount: USD 6\.00M
Environmental Category: N/A Global Focal Area: Climate Change
Implementing Agencies:
Development Bank of Southern Africa
Co-financiers and Other External Partners: Government of South Africa
B\. Key Dates
Revised/Actual
Process Date Process Original Date
Date(s)
Concept Review: 06/14/2004 Effectiveness: 09/26/2008
12/14/2009
Appraisal: 08/30/2005 Restructuring(s): 09/26/2011
12/12/2012
Approval: 06/28/2007 Mid-term Review: 06/30/2011 05/23/2011
12/31/2012
Closing: 09/30/2011
09/30/2013
C\. Ratings Summary
C\.1 Performance Rating by ICR
Outcomes: Satisfactory
Risk to Global Environment Outcome: Moderate
Bank Performance: Satisfactory
Borrower Performance: Satisfactory
C\.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance
Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings
Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Highly Satisfactory
Implementing
Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory
Agency/Agencies:
Overall Bank Overall Borrower
Satisfactory Satisfactory
Performance: Performance:
v
C\.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance (IP) Indicators
Implementation QAG Assessments (if
Indicators Rating
Performance any)
Potential problem project at
No Quality at Entry: N/A
any time
Problem project at any time Yes Quality of Supervision: N/A
Project Development
Objective (PDO)/Global
Satisfactory
environmental objective
(GEO) rating before closing
D\. Sector and Theme Codes
Original Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Central government administration 48 48
General finance sector 3 3
Other renewable energy 49 49
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Climate change 33 33
Environmental policies and institutions 33 33
Micro, small, and medium enterprise support 17 17
Regulation and competition policy 17 17
E\. Bank Staff
Positions At ICR At Approval
Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili
Country Director: Asad Alam Ritva S\. Reinikka
Sector Manager: Lucio Monari S\. Vijay Iyer
Project Team Leader: Karan Capoor Xiaodong Wang
ICR Team Leader: Karan Capoor
ICR Primary Author: Moeketsi Enos Thobela
vi
F\. Results Framework Analysis
Project Development Objective (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)
The PDO was to establish policy and regulatory frameworks and build institutional capacity
for renewable energy (RE) development in South Africa\. In line with Global Environment
Facility Operational Program 6, the global environmental objective is to remove the barriers to, and
reduce the implementation costs of, RE technologies to help mitigate greenhouse gas emissions\.
The specific priority is CC-3 power sector regulatory frameworks and policies for grid-based RE\.
PDO/GEO Indicator(s)
Original Target Actual Value
Formally
Values (from Achieved at
Indicator Baseline Value Revised Target
approval Completion or
Values
documents) Target Years
Support the government and the electricity regulator to develop a legal, policy, and
Indicator 1:
regulatory framework for grid-based renewable energy\.
Policy and
Value Policy and regulatory
No frameworks in place regulatory
frameworks effective
frameworks effective
Date achieved 06/30/2007 09/30/2009 09/30/2011
Target achieved\. Indicator was amended to include implementation support for renewable
energy (RE) frameworks being developed\.
The National Energy Act of 2008 set the stage for approval by the regulator of the
Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff (REFIT) framework in 2009 , which included a draft
Comments standardized power purchase agreement, for which the REMT Project supported a review
by a specialist law firm and comments by project developers\. The power planning process
was revamped based on key inputs from REMT and was finalized in March 2011 with
large allocations for RE\. Regulations for the procurement of RE were announced in May
2011, setting the stage for large-scale implementation of the governmentâs flagship
Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Program (REIPPPP)
announced in August 2011\.
Indicator 2: Develop and make a renewable energy resource database available\.
RE resource
RE resource database
Value No information on solar, database developed
made available to
biomass, hydro available and available to
private developers
private developers
Date achieved 06/30/2007 09/30/2010 11/30/2010
Target achieved\. The REMT Web site made available maps with high-level information
Comments on solar, wind, and biomass resources\. In addition, the REMT Web site provided a link to
the wind resource database that was developed by the South African Wind Energy
Program, a Department of EnergyâUnited Nations Development Programme project\.
Assist 10â14 potential RE power generation developers, and prepare 4â6 pre-feasibility
Indicator 3:
studies through REMTâs Matching Grants (MG) program\.
10â14 firms assisted 14 firms and 33 pre-
Value Very few RE projects by
and 4â6 pre- feasibility/pre-
private developers
feasibility studies investment studies
vii
conducted supported
Date achieved 06/30/2007 09/30/2011 09/30/2013
Target achieved\. This indicator was amended in 2009 to include support for pre-
investment studies for eligible project developers\. Support from the REMTâs Matching
Grant (MG) program was provided to 14 beneficiaries to develop projects with a
combined generation capacity of 275 MW\. MGs sometimes supported multiple pre-
investment studies for projects and sometimes supported more than one project being
developed by an applicant firm\. REMT support contributed to at least 5 of these projects
with a generation capacity of 85 MW being selected as preferred bidders and accepted for
Comments implementation under the first round of the governmentâs flagship Renewable Energy
Independent Power Producer Procurement Program (REIPPPP\. As of December 2013, 1
of these projects had been commissioned, while the remaining 4 had achieved financial
close and were in an advanced stage of construction\.
Another 6 REMT-supported projects with a generation capacity of 190 MW have been
notified that they have met the requirements of the oversubscribed third round of
independent power producer procurement, and are on the reserve list as the government
considers increasing the financial allocation for the round\.
Increased knowledge about renewable energy in relevant official agencies and private-
Indicator 4:
sector financial institutions\.
Value Training, workshops Training, workshops
Lack of RE experience
conducted conducted
Date achieved 06/30/2007 09/30/2011 09/30/2013
Target achieved\. The government has supported the establishment of a strong RE market
with well-established knowledge, experience, and capacity among public- and private-
sector institutions\.
Comments In addition to the conferences, training and workshops supported by the REMT Project,
the promotion of legal, policy, and regulatory frameworks, developed by the government
with support from the project and other development partners, added knowledge and
capacity among the relevant official agencies and private-sector financial institutions, as
well as hundreds of global and local project developers, suppliers, commercial banks, and
development finance institutions\.
Indicator 5: Formulate industry standards and codes for solar water heating (SWH)\.
Value Standards and codes Standards and codes
Limited standards in place
adopted adopted
Date achieved 06/30/2007 09/30/2011 09/30/2013
Target achieved\. The project focused on SWH promotion, implementation, and training as
appraised, and also provided limited support testing of SWH systems through a
performance grant\.
Industry standards and codes for SWH had already been developed by the South African
Comments Bureau of Standards by 2009\. These included SANS 1307:2009 (âDomestic solar water
heatersâ), SANS 10106 (âThe installation, maintenance, repair, and replacement of
domestic solar water heating systems,â 3rd edition), SANS 6210 (âMechanical
qualification testsâ), and SANS 6211 (âThermal performance of solar water heatersâ)\.
The project supported the government to develop a training program to accredit SWH
installers\. The certification program, implemented through accredited vocational training
institutions, includes the plumbing elective course Unit Standard ID 244499 and core
viii
course Unit Standard ID 262784\. Installers are expected to possess a Further Education
Training (FET) Certificate in Plumbing at National Qualification Framework (NQF) Level
4 (Qualification ID 58782)\.
Indicator 6: Install 200 commercial solar water heating (CSWH) systems\.
> 312,350 residential
Value
40 systems in place 200 systems installed SWH systems
installed
Date achieved 06/30/2007 09/30/2011 09/30/2013
Target exceeded\. As a technical assistance facility, the project did not directly finance the
installation of SWH systems, except by providing early limited grant support to develop,
demonstrate and document an innovative design for speedy SWH installation, resulting in
several hundred SWH installations annually\.
The 2009 project restructuring redefined and expanded CSWH to include support for
Comments implementation of all SWH, recognizing the need for urgent scale-up of demand-side
management measures\. The target values of indicators were not changed during
restructuring\.
Supported by the government and financed through the energy rebate from the regulator
and utilizing carbon finance incentives, the SWH program was implemented aggressively
by Eskom, the state-owned utility, resulting in 156,000 installations by September 2011
and more than 312,000 installations by September 2013\.
Indicator 7: Avoid power generation (gigawatt-hours [GWh])\.
Value At least 422 GWh
15 GWh avoided 85 GWh avoided
avoided
Date achieved 06/30/2007 06/30/2012 09/30/2013
Target exceeded\. See comments for Indicator 6, above\.
Avoided power generation is computed based on data from installation of 214,444 low-
Comments pressure (LP) and 67,906 high-pressure (HP) systems by Eskom by September 2013\. It
assumes an average savings of 1,250 kilowatt-hours (kWh)/year and 2,050 kWh/year for
LP and HP systems, respectively\. Eskomâs implementation of more than 30,000
government-funded residential SWH installations is excluded from this computation,
which is deemed conservative\.
Indicator 8: Invest in SWH systems\.
Value
$1\.8 million invested $9\.0 million invested $148 million invested
Date achieved 06/30/2007 09/30/2012 09/30/2013
Target exceeded\. See comments for Indicator 6, above\.
Comments
Eskomâs implementation of more than 30,000 government-funded SWH installations is
(including %
excluded from this computation, which is deemed conservative\. In addition, the
achievement)
government allocated ZAR4\.7 billion (US$480 million) for SWH installations over a 3-
year period starting 2012â13\.
Indicator 9: Avoid carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (cumulative) with SWH\.
0\.75 million tons 0\.75 million tons CO2
Value
Negligible CO2 avoided avoided (est\.
(cumulative) cumulative)
Date achieved 06/30/2007 09/30/2012 09/30/2013
ix
Target achieved\. See comments for Indicator 6, above\. The cumulative CO2- avoided
target appears to have been overstated at appraisal\.
Cumulative emissions avoided is computed from the result for power generation avoided
Comments
(Indicator 7, above) and the emission factor of 1\.07 kilograms (kg)/kWh from the Project
(including %
Appraisal Document (PAD) at annualized CO2 emissions avoided of 0\.44 million tons as
achievement)
of September 2013, and estimated cumulative emissions avoided of more than 0\.75
million tons\. Additional CO2 emissions avoided can be expected through ongoing
implementation of the national SWH roll-out program, as well as the REPG projects under
the REIPPPP\.
G\. Ratings of Project Performance in Implementation Status Reports (ISRs)
Date ISR Actual Disbursements
No\. GEO IP
Archived (USD millions)
1 12/13/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0\.00
2 06/02/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0\.00
3 06/16/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 0\.00
4 12/24/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0\.00
5 06/24/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0\.26
6 12/15/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 0\.26
7 06/22/2010 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2\.53
8 03/28/2011 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2\.53
9 01/11/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2\.53
10 11/14/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4\.65
11 06/08/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4\.65
x
H\. Restructuring
ISR Ratings at Amount
Board- Restructuring Disbursed at
Restructuring Reason for Restructuring &
Approved Restructuring
Date(s) Key Changes Made
PDO Change DO IP (in
US$ millions)
Extension of closing date to
12/12/2012 S S
September 30, 2013
Extension of closing date to
December 31, 2012; re-
allocation to reflect rapidly
changing market priorities,
09/26/2011 S MS including additional resources
for implementation of MGs and
additional resources to provide
real-time policy support to the
Department of Energy\.
Addition of new category to
cover operational costs for the
Implementation Support Unit;
expand definition of support to
the Department of Minerals and
Energy and the National Energy
Regulator of South Africa to
develop âand implementâ a
legal, policy, and regulatory
framework for RE; replace
CSWH with SWH to include
12/14/2009 MS MS
residential, commercial, and
industrial installations; re-
allocate additional resources to
the MG component and expand
eligibility beyond private-
sector beneficiaries; facilitate
investment and support for pre-
feasibility studies to include
âpre-investment activitiesâ;
increase allocation for training
and workshops\.
xi
I\. Disbursement Profile
xii
1\. Project Context and Design
1\.1 Context and Appraisal
1\. South Africaâs economic performance from 1994 to 2004 was impressive\. The average
annual growth rate in gross domestic product was 3 percent during this period, before reaching 4\.9
percent and 4\.6 percent in 2005 and 2006, respectively\. In 2004, South Africa had a well-developed
power sector, with a total installed capacity of 42 gigawatts (GW) and total electricity production of
244,607 gigawatt-hours (GWh)\. Power production was predominantly coal-fired (92 percent), and
South Africa has historically had high levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions\. The generation
and transmission of power were concentrated in Eskom, the vertically integrated state-owned utility,
which was also the largest single distributor in terms of energy sales for final consumption and
number of customers\. From around 2006, the country started to experience power supply shortages,
with potentially serious consequences for the economy\. In response, Eskom was planning to build
1,500 megawatts (MW) of generation capacity per year over five years\.
2\. In early 2000, the Minister of Minerals and Energy had requested the Bankâs
assistance on utilization of renewable energy (RE) resources and stimulation of productive
uses of electricity in rural areas\. In response, the Bank took on a number of discrete activities,
including helping to draft the Renewable Energy White Paper (REWP), which was approved in
2003\. A key element of the REWP was a target of 10,000 GWh of final energy consumption from
renewable sources in 2013, which was expected to account for about 4 percent of the estimated
overall electricity demand\. The Renewable Energy Market Transformation (REMT) Project, to be
supported through a grant from the Global Environment Facility (GEF), was aimed at supporting
the government to jump-start the implementation of the REWP goals\.
3\. Despite South Africaâs strong industrial and financial sectors, the country faced
significant barriers to RE development\. The long period of isolation due to the countryâs racial
segregation policies (or apartheid) and historical reliance on cheap coal-fired power generation
made it difficult to develop the RE sector without targeted assistance\. Barriers to renewable energy
power generation (REPG) included average tariff levels well below the long-run costs of expansion
and of most RE technologies; the lack of an adequate policy and institutional framework for the sale
of power into the main grid; the unfamiliarity of potential project developers with the governmentâs
approach to promoting RE; as well as inadequate knowledge about RE in government agencies, the
private sector, and financial institutions\. The barriers to the strong uptake of solar water heating
(SWH) included the lack of recognized industry best practices, standards, and codes, as well as low
levels of market acceptance\. At the time of project appraisal, the government (1) adopted a plan to
develop a Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff (REFIT) Program as the main way to stimulate
investments in RE generation; and (2) was considering a program of SWH installation\.
4\. The Bank was well positioned to support the South African government in RE
development\. The Bank had a comparative advantage in both providing high-level technical
support, as it demonstrated in finalizing the governmentâs REWP, and mobilizing a significant
amount of carbon funds and other private resources for RE development\. Further to the South
African Department of Minerals and Energyâs (DMEâs) request for the Bankâs assistance envisaged
1
that the Bank involvement would (1) introduce international best practices and cutting-edge
knowledge of RE development, in particular RE policy frameworks; (2) link the REMT Project to
the Bankâs overall power sector and climate change policy dialogues in South Africa; (3) build
local capacities; and (4) leverage public-private financing instruments, such as carbon credit
financing\. The project was consistent with the 2007 Country Partnership Strategy, which focused
on âfostering social and environmental sustainability,â and with the Bankâs mandate from the 2005
Gleneagles G8 summit to undertake a Climate Change Initiative in Group of Five (G5) countries,
including South Africa\.
1\.2 Original PDO/GEO and Key Indicators (as approved)
5\. The REMTâs Project Development Objective (PDO) was to establish policy and
regulatory frameworks and build institutional capacity for RE development in South Africa\.
The technical assistance (TA) facility, along with existing support from the Danish International
Development Agency, was expected to help South Africa to put into place a structure to support RE
development by focusing on new policy and regulatory frameworks, as well as improve the
institutional capacity of the DME and various stakeholders, including the private sector\. In line with
GEF Operational Program No\. 6, the projectâs global environmental objective (GEO) was intended
to remove the barriers to RE technologies to help mitigate GHG emissions\. The specific strategic
priority under GEF Climate Change Priority No\. 4 was to promote on-grid electricity from
renewable sources\. The principal outcomes of the project were expected to be establishment of (1)
the policy and regulatory frameworks and institutional capacity required to meet the governmentâs
RE target, and (2) an SWH industry\.
6\. The REMT Projectâs output indicators, grouped according to the project component
to which they related, were as follows:
Renewable Energy Power Generation (REPG) component:
- Indicator 1: Legal, policy, and regulatory frameworks for grid-based RE power
prepared by the government and electricity regulator
- Indicator 2: Database for RE resource made available
- Indicator 3: Number of potential RE power project developers assisted and number
of pre-feasibility studies prepared
- Indicator 4: Knowledge about RE increased in relevant government agencies, private
sector, and financial institutions
Commercial Solar Water Heating (CSWH) component:
- Indicator 5: Industry standards and codes formulated
- Indicator 6: Number of commercial solar water heaters installed
- Indicator 7: Fossil fuel-based power generation avoided
- Indicator 8: Investments in CSWH systems
- Indicator 9: Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions avoided (cumulative)
7\. The PDO/GEO was not revised\.
8\. The definition of some key indicators was amended, as information about the countryâs
energy demand-supply balance and the emergence of severe power and coal shortages called for an
2
urgent need to implement both supply-side investments in generation as well as energy efficiency
and demand-side management (DSM) measures to address base-load and peak-load management\.
Indicator 1 (above) was amended through a 2009 project restructuring that included support for
implementation of the legal, policy and regulatory frameworks developed\. At the same time,
Indicators 6â9 were amended to include all SWH to reflect the urgent need to scale up
implementation of the countryâs DSM efforts as well as to expand energy services for all South
Africans, especially those in poorer communities with limited or no energy access\. A subsequent
2011 restructuring expanded the definition of investment facilitation activities to include support for
pre-investment studies (Indicator 3) under the projectâs matching grants (MG) window to help
prepare RE generation projects to be technically and commercially viable and bankable\. Target
values for the indicators were not changed through the restructurings\.
1\.3 Primary Beneficiaries
9\. The projectâs primary beneficiaries were the government, (primarily the DME, which later
became the Department of Energy [DoE]), National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA),
other state-owned and municipal entities, as well as emerging private enterprises that were involved
or interested in RE market development\.
1\.4 Original Components
10\. The REMT Project provided financing from the GEF for TA and capacity building,
not investments, with the exception of limited support for the CSWH industryâs capacity-building
and demonstration subprojects\. The projectâs original components were:
Component 1 - REPG (US$4\.05 million): This component included technical assistance TA) and
capacity building to eliminate barriers to RE-based power generation in South Africa\. It was
designed both to support the development of policy and regulatory frameworks for grid-connected
RE generation, and to conduct capacity-building activities to strengthen relevant public- and
private-sector institutions and enable them to meet the RE generation target under the REWP\. The
TA was expected to help facilitate RE investments by providing Matching Grants (MG) for project
developers to conduct pre-feasibility studies for RE investments\. According to the Project
Appraisal Document (PAD), the total renewable generation capacity with GEF support was
anticipated to be âabout 100-135 MW with a capital cost of US$ 90-120 million\.â
Component 2 - CSWH (US$1\.40 million): This component included support for TA and capacity-
building measures to address market and business barriers to developing a market for large-scale
CSWH South Africa\. TA activities under this component were intended to support the development
of the SWH industry to international best practice by assisting with developing standards and codes,
promotion campaigns, and training\. In addition, the component was intended to provide business
development support for small and medium private enterprises and demonstrate best practice for
improved design, testing, and installation through MG and performance grants (PG)\. According to
the PAD, since SWH transactions were not linked to transmitting power over the main grid, at
appraisal there was âno need to involve the grid operator (Eskom) in promoting the resource\.â
11\. The components were not revised\.
3
1\.5 Other Significant Changes
12\. Three restructurings extended the project completion date from September 30, 2011,
to December 31, 2012, and subsequently to September 30, 2013, and amended certain definitions
and the focus of some activities to reflect the changes in the environment, although the original
targets and indicators were not amended\. These changes did not require Board approval, and are
described below:
- The first restructuring of December 2009 recognized that several policy and regulatory
activities were already underway in the wake of the countryâs urgent power shortages, and
amended the grant to emphasize stronger implementation support, including for the DoE
and NERSA to develop âand implementâ a legal, policy and regulatory framework\. The
amendment added âfacilitating pre-investment activitiesâ under MGs for RE project
developers, and expanded eligible beneficiaries to include entities outside the private sector
(e\.g\. municipalities and state-owned enterprises)\. It also expanded the definition of the
CSWH component to include implementation support for all SWH\. Finally, it increased
resources for training and workshops, and created a new category for operational expenses
related to the Implementation Support Unit (ISU)\.
- The second restructuring of September 2011 followed the projectâs Mid-Term Review
(MTR) and extended the project to December 31, 2012\. As the government combined
elements of the REFIT design into a competitive public tender process known as the
Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Program (REIPPPP), the
amendment included a specialized consultant to provide âreal-timeâ support to the DoE,
reflecting the rapid changes in the RE landscape in South Africa, as well as the dramatic
decline in prices of global RE technology and equipment\. Streamlining of the MG program
application and approval processes, and earmarking of additional resources through re-
allocation, enabled the project to tap into and serve renewed demand from developers
seeking pre-investment support for the preparation of projects, some of which were slated to
participate in the REIPPPP\. The amendment reduced the allocation under performance
grants (PG), reflecting rapid implementation of SWH, and added more resources to training
and workshops\. Recognizing the REMT Project as an efficient means of supporting and
promoting market development nationally, the DoE released the governmentâs counterpart
funding, which was allocated in part toward supporting the projectâs operational expenses\.
- The third restructuring of December 2012 extended the closing date to September 30, 2013\.
2\. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2\.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry
13\. GEF Grant resources were to be mobilized to overcome barriers to jump-start
progress in achieving South Africaâs long-term goals for RE development\. The barriers noted
at appraisal included the challenges of projects achieving financial closure and being commissioned,
availability of supportive international finance, ease of accessing the grid, private investment in RE,
feasibility and affordability of projects, and market uptake of renewable energy technologies\. The
appraisal noted that that the TA, including external funds and GEF grant resources, would provide
the incremental costs âto jump-start significant progress towards meeting its long-term target,
4
which will be met many years after the project is over\.â The PAD noted that with GEF support
âperhaps two or three of the [pilot RE projects] will reach financial closure in the next few years
with official or international funds\.â
14\. South Africaâs financial sector was assessed as being prepared to provide financing to
well-structured projects supported by an appropriate legal, policy, and regulatory framework\.
Based on discussions with three of the four largest commercial banking groups in South Africa at
that time, as well as with specialized public-sector development finance institutions (DFIs), the
appraisal recognized that South Africa had the financial capability to raise significant resources in
the domestic and international financial markets to finance RE projects\. The assessment recognized
that financial institutions would âcarefully scrutinize the quality of the power off -take agreementsâ
and that long-term price predictability through long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs), with
transparent and adequate pricing, was the most important factor in making projects bankable to
attract commercial RE financing\.
15\. The REMT Project design took into account the lessons from other countries that had
introduced programs to develop RE\.1 The PAD expressed the governmentâs clear preference for
âproductionâ or âoutput-basedâ incentives, such as the NERSA-approved feed-in tariffs, which the
project was expected to review\. The appraisal identified gaps in the development of the RE
marketâe\.g\., the development of an appropriate legal, policy, and regulatory landscape to enable
investment into the RE sector, as well as policy, standards, and codes to scale up installation of
SWH systems\. The importance of supporting the government with high-level technical support was
recognized in this regard\. Capacity-building interventions were also designed to help increase
awareness and knowledge about RE\. The technical feasibility of achieving the REWP target was
assessed on the basis of a âcost curveâ of RE\. In addition, the project was designed to provide
grants for project developers to access incentives and prepare projects for commercial financing\.
16\. South Africa is a vibrant democracy and a major emerging economy, with a strongly
participatory process of policy development and implementation\. The process of preparing and
obtaining approvals for the project was highly participatory, and included the National Treasury, as
well as the then DME, now the DoE, NERSA, the Central Energy Fund (CEF) Group and Eskom\.
The DoE, as the main counterpart, took the lead in outlining the governmentâs requirements for the
development of the RE market, and for the REMT Projectâs supportive and value-added role\.
Risk Identification and Mitigation Options
17\. At appraisal, the main risks were identified and appraised as low\. The Development Bank
of Southern Africa (DBSA) was designated by the DoE as the projectâs implementing agency to
allow the project to benefit from the DBSAâs infrastructure focus and its financial management and
procurement systems and processes\. As a result, implementation risks were considered to be
1
Examples reviewed included the limitations of investment-based incentives as compared with output-based incentives
(India); the effect of supportive regulatory frameworks (China and Sri Lanka); the effect of a combination of supportive
regulatory frameworks and capacity building (Costa Rica and Mauritius); and the effect of the use of feed-in tariffs
(Spain and France), RE portfolio standards (Denmark, Italy, and the United States), and public tendering systems
(California and Ireland)\.
5
minimal\. However, several months elapsed before a suitable Project Coordinator could be
appointed, thus delaying the effectiveness date of the project\. Another project implementation risk
that was not fully considered at appraisal related to procurement processes\. The governmentâs
consideration of black economic empowerment (BEE) as an evaluation criterion in procurement
processes differed from the Bankâs requirement for selection processes, which are based on
technical and financial grounds only\. As a result, it took time before the matter was resolved,
resulting in early implementation delays\.2
2\.2 Implementation
18\. Any policy or project implementation success occurs within a context and necessarily
rests on invaluable contributions from several numerous domestic stakeholders and external
partners that can rightfully claim to have played a role in supporting the government in the
development of the market, thereby potentially creating an issue of attribution\. This challenge is
addressed in this report by showing a tight linkage between specified REMT project outputs that
supported and contributed to the accelerated achievement of certain key outcomes and milestones in
the development of the overall market, or of development of specific market segments\.
19\. Starting in 2006-07, South Africaâs electricity sector experienced a tightening in the
supply-demand balance, and power shortages, which were first experienced in the Western Cape
and eventually affected the entire country\. These shortages turned out to significantly greater and
more persistent than had been anticipated, while Eskomâs supply remained under development and
coal supply issues emerged\. Recognition of the seriousness of the challenges ahead spurred an
unprecedented level of urgency in the response by a wide variety of institutions, agencies and other
stakeholders, who advocated for a diverse set of relevant and complementary concerns included for
urgent new supply-side generation, energy efficiency and DSM measures, climate change response
strategy, emphasis on job creation efforts, and fiscal moderation and cost-effectiveness\. The nature
and persistence of the power shortages over time placed constraints on base-load power, which was
a strong incentive on implementing SWH, not only as an aggressive DSM measure for peak
demand management, but also as an energy efficiency measure to enhance energy security\. South
Africaâs hosting of major international events such the 2010 World Cup soccer tournament and the
2011 Durban Climate Change Conference of the Parties added an international context to the
internal urgency to show strong results on SWH and on REPG development\.
20\. REMT support, along with other development partners, played an important and
value-added role in preparing the ground for the government to enable private sector
participation in renewable energy\. By supporting the government, and, in particular the DoE and
NERSA, REMT contributed to key targeted interventions required for the implementation of urgent
energy demand- and supply-side measures in the country\. The projectâs efforts were in the form of
capacity-building activities, including for private-sector project developers, as well as legal, policy,
and regulatory framework reviews undertaken by the ISU from the beginning of 2009\. Sponsored
activities included convening of public workshops and conferences in cooperation with the
2
To address this issue, the Bank and the DoE agreed to include local consultants as an evaluation criterion, without
reference to BEE\. They also allocated 17 percent of the projectâs budget categories, excluding capacity building, to
local consultants, based on the understanding that such expenditures would be funded from the DoEâs contribution\.
6
government that brought together key stakeholders, and facilitated informed and participatory
decision making in response to some of the key energy-sector issues\. Project implementation
focused on filling gapsâe\.g\. building early market confidence in the process and comfort in key
project documentation, creating an analytical and planning framework for greater share of
renewables, and further developing market segments, such as SWH for residential and low income
communities nationally\. Implementation accelerated after the first and second project restructurings\.
Renewable Energy Power Generation Component
21\. REMT procured the services of a specialist energy project finance law firm for review
of the draft standardized PPA published by NERSA in July 2009\. REMT played a value-added
role by contracting with a specialist project finance law firm to assist local project developers to
comment on NERSAâs draft standardized PPA developed under the REFIT program\.
Recommendations based on global best practice in project finance on such issues as risk allocation
built early market confidence by not only enhancing the commercial viability and bankability of the
proposed PPA, but also by reducing initial apprehensions of project developers in the governmentâs
process to procure RE\. The specialist review laid the foundation for the standardized PPA that was
used later as the basis for bankable independent power producer (IPP) transactions\.
22\. REMTâs review of the 2003 REWP included a modelling of RE technology learning
curves which proved instrumental to expanding allocations for RE in the Integrated
Resource Plan (IRP)\. A key output of the review process was the modeling of RE technology
learning curves, which coincided with the national electricity planning process of South Africaâs
IRP\. 3 The DoE recognized the relevance of the technology learning curves emerging from the
REMT review, and facilitated their incorporation into the IRP process\. This resulted in a cost-
optimized IRP model that allocated greater capacity for RE, thereby providing a sound analytical
basis for planning the implementation of the DoEâs policy of substantially increasing the share of
RE in the projected energy mix\. According to the resulting IRP, with a projected capacity of 17,800
MW of generation from wind, solar photovoltaic (PV) and concentrated solar power (CSP) by 2030,
RE was projected to account for approximately 20 percent of generation capacity\.
23\. The resulting higher IRP allocation for RE coincided with the dramatic decline of
global prices for RE technologies starting in 2010â11\. Consistent with the constitutional
requirement for competitive and cost-effective procurement, the IRP provided South Africa with an
opportunity to pivot quickly from the REFIT platform toward implementation of the Renewable
Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Program (REIPPPP), South Africaâs flagship
program for RE, which was announced in 2011\. The first two bidding windows (rounds) of the
REIPPPP resulted in estimated investments of US$7\.45 billion4 for the addition of about 2,445 MW
of newly installed grid-connected RE capacity, including nearly 1,200 MW of new wind power,
more than 1,000 MW of solar PV, and 200 MW of CSP\.
3
The IRP is the instrument used for planning the introduction of new generation capacity\.
4
US$ 2\.31 billion of this investment amount was slated to be spent on the procurement of local goods and services in
support of the Governmentâs re-industrialization and job-creation drive\.
7
24\. Each of the three REIPPPP rounds conducted so far has seen a sustained drop in
average bid prices\. The second round saw average bid prices of approximately US 9\.09
cents/kilowatt-hour (kWh) for wind power, down from an average bid price of US 11\.58 cents/kWh
from the first bidding window and a 40 per cent average bid reduction for solar PV\. In late 2013,
the DoE announced that an additional estimated capacity of 1,400 MW of renewable generation
capacity was procured through the third round of IPP procurement\. Over time, the wind tariffs are
expected to converge with Eskomâs average tariff, which has been escalating annually\.
Table 1: Aggregated Results of first two rounds of the REIPPPP
Rounds Capacity (MW) Average price Investment (USD
(US cents/kWh) billions)
Wind Solar CSP Wind Solar CSP Wind Solar CSP
PV PV PV
Bid 634 631\.5 150 11\.58 27\.95 27\.22 1\.29 2\.22 1\.16
window 1
Bid 562\.5 417\.1 50 9\.09 16\.67 25\.46 1\.10 1\.22 0\.46
window 2
Total 1,196\.5 1,048\.6 200 2\.39 3\.44 1\.62
25\. Accelerated implementation of the REMT MG program following the first and second
restructurings helped provide timely preparation support to several project developers \.
REMT provided pre-investment support to the development of 14 RE projects for a generation
capacity of 275 MW\. Five of the REMT-supported solar PV projects with a combined generation
capacity of 85 MW are shareholders in project Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) that have been
selected as preferred bidders in the first round of the REIPPPP, together representing an estimated
combined estimated investment of XYZ\. These projects include Momentous Energy (RustMo1 - 7
MW), SunEdison Southern Africa (Witkop and Soutpan Solar Parks, 30 MW and 28 MW,
respectively) and Aurora Power Solutions (Konkoonsies and Aries, 10 MW each)\. The 7-MW grid-
connected RustMol PV plantâhad been commissioned by the end of 2013, while the other four
were at an advanced stage of construction in preparation for commercial operation in 2014\. Two of
the successful REMT-supported IPPs, currently under construction are in South Africaâs Limpopo
Province, a region with high socioeconomic development needs\. Under the third window of
REIPPPP, an additional four (4) solar PV projects with combined generation capacity of 190 MW
were notified that they had âmet requirementsâ for the over-subscribed third round of the REIPPPP\.
These projects, which include Ample Solarâs projects (75 MW and 50 MW) and BNM Fruil
Energy's projects (10 MW and 55 MW) are currently on the âreserve list,â with the expectation that
they would be informed by the government around the end of March 2014 of any possibility of
increasing the maximum financial allocation to the round in order to accommodate bidders that met
program requirements\.
26\. REMT supported a CSP workshop in September 2009\. One of the outcomes was the
formation of the Southern Africa Solar Thermal and Electricity Association (SASTELA),
which has since played a crucial role in the development of the CSP industry in South Africa by
making inputs to the IRP and positioning CSP as a viable peaking-power option\. SASTELAâs
members have also participated in the REIPPPP\. REMT also supported the Upington Solar Park
Investorsâ Conference, which highlighted the trade-off between fixed REFIT rates and a large scale-
8
up of the REIPPPP\. Some of these considerations were reflected in the governmentâs
implementation of the REIPPPP\. Finally, REMT supported the government in collaboration with
the DBSA and the Biogas Industry Association of Southern Africa to convene a biogas energy
conference in 2013, in order to encourage interest by project developers to demonstrate interest in
developing small IPPs using biogas, which had seen very limited interest from project developers in
the first two REIPPPP rounds\.
27\. REMT procured an expert consultant to provide specialized âreal-timeâ support
directly to the DoE\. The project facilitated an expert review of public comments on legislation to
facilitate easier access to the grid by IPPs\. Inputs by the legal advisory specialist resulted in a timely
contribution to the development of legislation to restructure the transmission system as a way of
further facilitating the entry of IPPs\. The draft legislation, known as the Independent System and
Market Operator (ISMO) Bill, is currently undergoing processing by the South African parliament\.
Solar Water Heating Component
28\. REMT supported South Africaâs SWH industry through targeted studies, reports,
grants, and capacity building\. As of September 2013, more than 312,000 residential SWH
systems had been installed nationally, representing an overall investment of US$148 million\.5 SWH
implementation in South Africa was scaled up in the wake of the urgent need for energy efficiency
and DSM, and the marketâs interest shifted to accessing capital for the installation of SWH systems,
largely through the Eskom-administered electricity tariff-based rebate program\. To receive the
rebates, installers had to be certified under SWH industry standards and codes that had been
developed by the South African Bureau of Standards (SABS) in 2009\. 6 As a TA facility, the
project did not directly finance the installation of SWH systems, except by limited performance
grant support to develop, demonstrate, document, and patent an innovative ladder design for SWH
installation, as well as to test SWH systems on a pass/fail basis\. Another REMT grant-supported
SWH beneficiary, Digital Energy Solutions, has reported over four thousand SWH installations\.
The project scaled back the SWH grant program based on accelerated implementation of SWH
installations from ongoing assessment of market development and focused on the most urgent
market gaps and needs identified\.
29\. The REMT-sponsored National Solar Water Heating Framework (NSWHF)
contributed to the development of a national rollout program, involving the DoE and Eskom, as
well as the CEF Group, DBSA and Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), among other
institutions\. Recognizing the importance of expanding access to SWH to lower-income
communities across the nation, REMT supported the development of an SWH Business Plan for the
Free State province of South Africa in 2010\. The study provided a detailed outline of the key
practical challenges and considerations for the rollout of SWH systems as key design elements of
the framework, which, in turn, recommended key elements of the national rollout program,
5
These amounts include the effect of Eskomâs rollout program for its own account (since 2008), as well as the initial
tranche of the substantial US$480 million fiscal allocation for SWH\.
6
These included SANS 1307:2009 (Domestic solar water heaters), SANS 10106 (The installation, maintenance, repair,
and replacement of domestic solar water heating systems, 3 rd edition), SANS 6210 (Mechanical qualification tests), and
SANS 6211 (Thermal performance of solar water heaters)\.
9
including centralized purchasing of SWH products and services\. The DoEâs designation of Eskom
as the entity that would purchase SWH systems from various manufacturers was based on a
recommendation of elements of a âbulk buyerâ or âSuper-Escoâ concept, thereby helping to create
the economies of scale necessary to build a sustainable SWH industry, including job creation
through the local manufacture of SWH components and training of installers\.
30\. REMT supported the government to develop a training program to accredit SWH
installers under the NSWHP\. The certification program was developed with REMT support to
train and certify installers across the country, especially those in smaller towns and provinces\. The
program, which offers the plumbing elective course Unit Standard ID 244499 and core course Unit
Standard ID 262784, is to be implemented with DoE resources through accredited vocational
training institutions across South Africa\.7
2\.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation, and Utilization
31\. REMT provided targeted, strategic assistance in support of developing a market that
had been effectively nonexistent at appraisal\. The project sought to support the development and
subsequent implementation of legal, policy, and regulatory frameworks; to make available a
database of RE resources for project developers in support of feasibility studies; and to build
capacity among key public-sector institutions and private-sector participants in support of the
governmentâs significant efforts to promote RE investment\. Between 10 and 14 enterprises were to
be supported in the development of RE generation projects, with a corresponding target of 4 to 6
feasibility studies\. It was envisaged that increasing knowledge would primarily be in the form of
workshops and training interventions, as well as through a âhelp-deskâ supporting the MG program\.
32\. While the project design selected adequate indicators to measure progress toward the
PDO/GEO, some target values within the results framework were not aligned\. CO2 emissions
avoided (tons/CO2) from SWH were computed as the product of power generation avoided (GWh)
and the grid emission factor\. However, the target values indicated for CO2 avoided in the PAD were
not proportionate to the power generation avoided, suggesting an error in calculating the target
value for CO2 avoided\. As a result, although the project far exceeded the target for avoided power
generation, it achieved, but did not exceed, the PADâs cumulative target for avoided CO2 emissions\.
33\. The results framework for the TA operation logically included several indicators that
were outside the direct scope of project activities\. As a TA operation, it was logical that REMT
would support and catalyze actions and investments that were outside of the projectâs direct scope
of activities\. It was expected that if successful, the role of the project, in cooperation with
development partners, was to support the government in the development and implementation of
the legal policy and regulatory frameworks, in order to catalyze an RE market that would leverage
7
Installers are also expected to possess a Further Education Training (FET) Certificate in Plumbing at National
Qualification Framework (NQF) Level 4 (Qualification ID 58782)\.
10
significant investments from the private-sector\. The project design logically anticipated this
potential leverage of external resources, and several of the outcome indicators reflect this role\.
34\. REMT was proactively restructured three times during its implementation to
proactively respond to market conditions\. By the time the project became effective, South
Africaâs institutions had already started to respond urgently to system-wide power shortages with a
range of measures, including aggressive implementation of DSM measures\. Eskom, which began to
implement a SWH program as a DSM measure in November 2008, started to develop SWH
standards and codes, along with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) for consideration by
the SABS\. Rather than duplicate efforts, the project focused on providing support for
implementation of all SWH, including development of training for installers, and development of a
national SWH program, including among low-income household segments\. The target values of
relevant indicators were not updated during implementation\.
Data Collection and Use of Data
35\. Project data were used as an input to make strategic decisions on a national level, as
well as for project-level re-allocation of resources through restructurings and revised
procurement plans\. South Africa has a multitude of institutions that have a role in the
development of an RE market, including institutions concerned about rapidity of implementation,
while also balancing important elements, such as project cost, project financing, job creation,
environmental sustainability, availability of transmission networks, access to government
guarantees and fiscal policy\. The extent to which M&E data were collected in the project depended
on the indicator and institution concerned, as described below:
- Legal, policy, and regulatory frameworks for grid-based studies: The DoE facilitated the
application of the concept of RE technology learning curves in the IRP modeling process,
based on the preliminary data and analysis from the modeling of technology curves
undertaken as part of the REMT-supported review of the REWP\. This resulted in an
increased share for RE in planned generation capacity in the period to 2030, and formed the
basis of the REIPPPP targets\.
- Number and quality of project developer applications supported: Data on the low
percentage of successful applications in the first round of the MG program provided the basis
for improving the quality of subsequent MG applications and the projectâs ability to support
them\. The information was used to organize multiple promotional workshops across the
country to tap market demand from project developers to prepare for the REIPPPP; to
implement a multi-round MG procurement process; to increase the resources allocated for
MG for renewable power generation; and to increase the maximum MG amount per
beneficiary\. These interventions resulted in significant increases in the quantity and quality
of applications received by the MG program from project developers\.
- Number of SWH systems installed: Although this indicator was amended from CSWH and
expanded to include all SWH in 2009, the corresponding target was not revised\. Market
feedback was used to reduce the allocation for SWH grants following the 2011 MTR, and the
project focused on defining various SWH market segments, which included low-income
households\. Data from the SWH Business Plan for the Free State province of South Africa
(first half of 2010) provided a detailed outline of the key practical considerations for the
rollout of SWH systems, especially in low-income communities\. Historical investment
11
patterns were used to develop the national SWH program and to re-allocate SWH spending
across South Africaâs provinces\. Eskom and NERSA used program data to assess SWH as a
demand-side measure and to determine the extent to which electricity tariffs could be used to
fund the installation of SWH systems\.
2\.4 Safeguards and Fiduciary Compliance
36\. Gaps identified between the World Bankâs procurement and financial management
processes and the DBSAâs procedures were proactively resolved\. The ISU developed an
Operations Manual as a way of clarifying the interfaces between REMTâs procurement processes
and the DBSAâs procedures\. The World Bank team scheduled procurement training sessions on
applicable World Bank procedures, and input from the Post Procurement Review helped strengthen
the ISUâs capacity to execute its fiduciary responsibilities\. The DBSA also made available a
procurement specialist, who provided valuable support to the ISU\. The World Bank provided
support to the ISU and the DBSAâs Financial Management Unit (FMU), and the ISU addressed
early gaps identified as part of preparing for the projectâs first external audit\. These adjustments
were made in time for the commencement of the MG program in 2010, and following the MTR
when the number and average value of transactions increased\.
2\.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
37\. The policy and regulatory reforms initiated by REMT are on track to be sustained
through implementation of national programs for both renewable power generation and SWH\.
Well-balanced PPAs, among other interventions, underlined RE investments and are a continuing
legacy of the project, which made important contributions to their development\.
38\. Institutional capacity was enhanced at institutional, enterprise, and industry levels\.
South Africaâs thriving RE market is a legacy to which the project made timely and important
supporting contributions\. The formation and support of industry associations resulting from national
conferences are a sustaining benefit of the project\. SASTELAâs advocacy is expected to continue as
the South African RE market evolves\. The SASTELA model set the stage at a 2013 conference for
the establishment of a fledgling industry association of biogas producers that is expected to play a
key role in the evolution of the DoEâs proposed small RE IPP program\.
39\. Key recommendations and decisions will provide local job creation opportunities\. The
DoE has developed a national training program for installers and has designated Eskom as the
centralized entity to purchase SWH systems from various manufacturers as part of the REMT-
sponsored NSWHF and the national rollout of the SWH program\. Eskomâs access to the substantial
ZAR4\.7 billion (US$480 million) fiscal allocation for this purpose would help create the economies
of scale necessary to build a sustainable SWH industry, including for local manufacture of SWH
components and training of installers, with opportunities for job creation as an important step for
the establishment of a âgreen economyâ in South Africa\.
12
3\. Assessment of Outcomes
3\.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design, and Implementation
Rating: High
40\. The PDO/GEO remains relevant, especially in light of the rapid changes that took
place in the South African energy policy environment while the project was underway\. South
Africa continues to address a number of ongoing policy issues related to climate change mitigation,
including diversifying the countryâs energy mix and strengthening its institutional capacity\. Given
the continued relevance of the objectives, design, and implementation, a key question for the DoE is
how it would continue to systematically support a number of ongoing initiatives started with REMT
support\. In particular, in light of the DoEâs announcement of a procurement program for small RE
IPPs in mid-2013, it is recognized that emerging project developers could benefit from an MG
program similar to that supported by REMT\.
41\. The projectâs legal, policy, and regulatory outcomes remain relevant to future
evolution of the market for RE power generation\. Given the importance of the IRP as a planning
and policy decision-making tool, REMTâs review of the socioeconomic impact of various planning
scenarios remains relevant, especially as it could support the governmentâs intention to develop a
green economy\. The IRP model, which incorporates technology curves, will continue to enhance
system planning, including proper modeling of the competitiveness of grid-connected RE relative to
fossil fuel-based power generation\. National legislation for the ISMO Bill is under consideration by
the South African parliament\.
42\. Provision for development of training and certification services has reinforced the
continuing relevance of the PDO/GEO\. The successful rollout of the national SWH program is
dependent on reliable equipment and skilled installers\. The use of a standards-based testing process
for quality assurance is relevant, especially for the promotion of locally manufactured SWH
systems, and is also as a model for new initiatives, such as the small RE IPP program\.
3\.2 Achievement of PDO/GEO
Rating: Satisfactory
43\. REMT played a supportive, catalyzing role providing targeted, strategic assistance
toward the achievement of the PDO/GEO\. In the context of South Africaâs rapidly changing
policy and planning environment,8 the projectâs legacy includes its timely support to the DoE in
particular, and through its contributions to the development of the RE market, as outlined in this
report\. According to the IRP developed with key insights from an REMT-supported study, with a
projected capacity of 16,800 MW of generation from wind and solar PV by 2030, RE is projected to
account for approximately 20 percent of generation capacity, far surpassing expectations at the time
of appraisal\. Through the NSWHF, the project has provided the basis for a collaborative effort
8
A detailed account of the achievement of the PDO/GEO is presented in Annex 2\. The Results Framework outlined in
the PAD provides a basis for assessing achievement, the focus being the associated outcome indicators and targets\.
Wherever applicable, causal linkages between the projectâs outputs and outcomes are highlighted\.
13
between the DoE and Eskom in broadening the SWH program to low-income households, as well
as facilitating the development of a local SWH industry\.
44\. The achievements from successful implementation of the first two bidding windows of
the REIPPPP, including for local job creation, are likely to continue\. Of the more than US$7
billion in investments from the first two rounds of the REIPPPP, US$2\.31 billion was slated to be
spent on the procurement of local goods and services in support of the governmentâs re-
industrialization and job-creation drive\. As has been publicly reported, at least two solar PV
projects had been connected to the grid at the time of compiling this ICR, including the 75-MW
Scatec plant and the 7-MW RustMo1 plant (the second project benefited from REMT MG support)\.
Other projects from the first two rounds are at various stages of construction\. Toward the end of
2013, the DoE announced the preferred bidders from the third bidding window\. Of 93 bidders, 17
projects were selected\. The preferred bidders in the third round were expected to provide an
additional 1,472 MW of RE generation capacity\. Four (4) projects supported by REMT were
notified that they had met the requirements of the third window, and were placed on a âreserve listâ,
pending further budgetary allocation for the window\. Further bidding windows are envisaged,
especially taking into account the interest generated by the REIPPPP and the governmentâs re -
industrialization and job-creation drives\.
45\. REMT facilitated national multi-stakeholder workshops for discussions on REPG
(including CSP) and SWH\. REMT supported the DoE with the planning and organization of five
major national events, including the 2009 National SWH Workshop, the 2009 Renewable Energy
Summit, the 2009 CSP Industrial Potential Workshop, the 2009 National SWH Conference and the
2010 Solar Park Investors Conference\. One of the outcomes at the CSP event was the establishment
of a CSP industry association, SASTELA, which continues to play a constructive role in the
development of the CSP sector in South Africa\. Further outcomes of the events were increased
interest and action on implementation of SWH in the public and private sectors, and significant
fiscal allocations for future installations\. Finally, REMT supported the government in collaboration
with the DBSA and the Biogas Industry Association of Southern Africa to convene a biogas energy
conference in 2013, in order to encourage interest by project developers to demonstrate interest in
developing small IPPs using biogas, which was an area with very little interest shown in the first
two rounds of the REIPPPP\. A thriving market for RE power development exists today in South
Africa, having developed over a few short years, during which the project, along with other
development partners, provided timely targeted support to the government and stakeholders\.
3\.3 Efficiency
Rating: Satisfactory
46\. Efficiency has been assessed using different approaches and methods, including
quantitative assessment of the performance of the project itself\. In addition, given the projectâs
catalytic role as a TA operation, this report also quantitatively assesses the projected performance of
the national SWH rollout program, and qualitatively assesses the projectâs contribution to the
REIPPPP\.
47\. The quantitative assessment for SWH (Component 2) uses as its basis the national SWH
rollout program, which has received considerable financial support from the Government of South
14
Africa\. A summary of the assessment, including a similar assessment that was undertaken at project
appraisal, is included in Table for comparison\. Taking into account steep increases in electricity
tariffs, a weakened local currency, and the governmentâs policy thrust to broaden access to SWH in
favor of low-income households, the estimated internal rate of return (IRR) (without accounting for
CO2 emission reductions) is 15 percent\. This compares with an IRR of 14 percent at project
appraisal, which was based on a projection of a much smaller number of demonstration SWH
systems\. Taking into account the effect of CO2 emission reductions at the same price used at project
appraisal (i\.e\., US$4 per ton) results in an estimated IRR of 16 percent, compared with 17 percent at
project appraisal\. The IRR taking into account the effect of CO2 emissions would be higher if
higher carbon prices are assumedâe\.g\., approximately US$12 per ton under the proposed South
Africa carbon tax\. The details of the analysis are included in Annex 3\.
Table 2: Assessment of efficiency: Solar water heating (SWH)
Environme
reductions
Projected
economic
economic
electricity
benefits
benefits
systems
Capital
Projected
SWH
CO2
ntal
cost
and
Net
Net
savings
USD
Projected USD USD USD (million USD
units (million) GWh (million) (million) kT ) (million)
Project 105 0\.03 1\. 73 0\.063 0\.032 1\.850 0\.0074 0\.04
appraisal
IRR (over 15 years) 14% 17%
468,870 391 3,840 896 505 4,109 16 522
ICR
IRR (over 15 years) 15% 16%
48\. The GEFâs leverage of additional resources in support of RE power generation
(Component 1) and SWH installations (Component 2) is demonstrated by the projectâs
contribution to the REIPPPP and by the number of SWH installations\. This TA, through small, but
well-directed support, along with other support from development partners, leveraged multibillion-
dollar private investment support for RE generation\. The multi-billion dollar investment value
generated by the REIPPPP provides a qualitative indication of the efficiency with which the
relevant aspects of the projectâs PDO/GEO were catalyzed, in part, through TA activities supported
by the project, but outside of its direct scope\. Similarly, the GEFâs leverage of additional resources
in support of SWH installations (Component 2) is reflected in the implementation to date of well
over 316,000 SWH systems, far above what had been anticipated at appraisal\. Table 3 shows the
private sectorâs contribution to the MG program, as outlined in detail in Annex 3\. The MG program
performed the best among the various project activities from the perspective of the outcomes that
were in the projectâs direct scope of activities supported, taking into account the disbursement
profile and implementation of planned activities (i\.e\., grant funding and technical support)\. The
total direct financial amount advanced by both the Project and the private-sector entities to the MG
program was ZAR27\.02 million (US$2\.74 million)\.
15
Table 3: Private sector Contributions to Matching Grants
Expenditure Amount Including private-sector
Category (ZAR) contribution to MG (ZAR)
Total consultant services 10,114,442\.66 10,114,442\.66
Total goods and services 663,529\.35 663,529\.35
Total MG 13,513,741\.73 27,027,483\.46
Total PG - -
Total training and workshops 433,110\.57 433,110\.57
Total disbursements 19,783,233\.59 38,238,566\.04
Total operational expenditure (Opex) 2,022,588\.80 2,022,588\.80
49\. Ex-post incremental cost analysis of GEF funding shows that the projectâs global
benefits exceed what was anticipated at the time of appraisal\. At project close, it is noted that
the market has indeed been jump started in its long-term goal to develop 10,000 GWh, and many of
the barriers noted (e\.g\., challenges to financial closure) have been addressed; the cost differential
between RE and fossil fuels has been reduced; and the market has seen development of wind, solar
PV, and CSP projects at a large scale\. Project development has been promoted, and the results have
been seen through the implementation of the first two rounds of the REIPPPP, which combined
elements of incentive systems with typical features of bidding/tendering mechanisms, and resulted
in leveraging billions of dollars for RE project development in South Africa\.
3\.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating
Rating: Satisfactory
50\. The project is rated overall as Satisfactory, as a result of considering the rating of its
relevance, achievements, and efficiency, each of which is rated as Satisfactory\.
51\. The project made strategic choices to support activities related to legal, policy, and
regulatory frameworks and capacity building, which addressed critical issues related to both RE
power development and SWH\. The effect, in close coordination with the government, was to
leverage other resources in the development of these sectors in South Africa, especially noting that
these had been nonexistent at project appraisal\. The data sheet of this paper identifies the achieved
results and outcomes in detail, including those within the scope of the project, as well as results
leveraged outside the scope of the project through well-directed TA and capacity building activities\.
52\. With respect to RE power generation, the key outcome is the REIPPPP, whose
establishment and implementation the project supported through contributions to a bankable PPA
leading to early market confidence in the process; to a greater share of RE in the IRP; and to
development of the CSP sector in South Africa\. Further bidding windows are envisaged, especially
taking into account the interest generated by the REIPPPP and the governmentâs re-industrialization
drive\. The Project supported several project developers to prepare for this process through MG,
with some notable successes reported\.
53\. With respect to SWH, the main strategic contribution was through project
contributions to the framework that led to the development of the national SWH rollout
16
program\. The key outcomes relate to the segmentation of the SWH market in a way that also
included low-income households, which contributed to the national roll-out of the SWH program;
and the establishment of a central SWH purchasing agency as a way of reducing costs and creating
scale\. The central SWH purchasing agency contributed to prospects for the development of local
SWH manufacturing capacity, as this enabled bulk procurement and the large-scale application of
approved standards\. As of September 2013, 316,000 SWH systems were installed, representing an
overall investment of US$148\.4 million\.9 Project support through a PG to an innovative installation
process has resulted in several hundred installations annually by the beneficiary\. REMT support for
development of an installer training program will continue with DoE support, and will help extend
the scope of SWH installations to less represented provinces and a broader socio-economic group of
beneficiaries\.
3\.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes, and Impacts
(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development
54\. Development policy in South Africa, in part because of the pernicious effects of
apartheid, is focused on job creation and economic development\. The scope and design of the
project did not entail reporting specifically on poverty impacts, gender-related aspects, and social
development\. Nevertheless, two of the RE projects that were supported through REMTâs MG
program and were successful in the first round of the REIPPPP are located in two relatively
underdeveloped provinces in South Africa (i\.e\., Limpopo and Northern Cape)\. The requirement of
the REIPPPP for project developers to provide for local development means that all RE IPP
projects must make a positive contribution to the social welfare of the communities within which
they plan to operate\. Finally, a key outcome of REMTâs support for market segmentation of SWH
implementation resulted in the development the national rollout of the SWH program to encourage
implementation among lower-income households\.
(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening
55\. The South African RE sector at project close was markedly different from where it
was at appraisal\. Institutionally, the RE marketâcomprising regulators; governmental institutions;
and the private sector, including project developers, commercial lenders, and service providersâ
had demonstrated remarkable progress in their knowledge, experience and capacity and have
produced concrete results over a relatively short period\. The REIPPPP experience, in combining
elements of a feed-in tariff within a tendering procurement process, is a RE model for other
countries seeking to initiate and scale-up RE investments in a sustainable and cost-effective manner\.
9
This amount includes the effect of Eskomâs rollout program for its own account (since 2008), as well as the initial
tranche of the substantial US$0\.48 billion fiscal allocation from the DoE\.
17
3\.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops
56\. As part of the project close-out process, the ISU requested feedback from MG beneficiaries\.
The comments received from beneficiaries are summarized below:
- The project had a beneficial impact on the ability of project developers to conduct
their feasibility studies\. The project was well structured and implemented in a targeted way
that made a materially positive difference to project developers\. The outreach activities
across the country undertaken by the Project Coordinator during the fourth round of the MG
program played a critical role in marketing the program to potential beneficiaries\.
- The ISU was sufficiently flexible to accommodate external changes in implementation
schedules\. The governmentâs original intention of organizing four REIPPPP bidding
windows annually could not be realized\. The resulting changes in the REIPPPP
implementation schedule meant that it was a challenge for some of the MG beneficiaries to
adhere to the timelines agreed for grant funding purposes\. However, ISU team members
showed flexibility in responding to changing requirements of project developers to meet
these needs\. Certain delays in implementation of the MG program from the second half of
2012 could have been mitigated by better communication from the ISU, in particular,
regarding the lack of continuity of a Project Coordinator in 2013, resulting in delays to
contracting with the beneficiaries approved in the final round of the MG program\.
- A project similar to REMT, with transaction support and an MG process, could be
helpful to support the small RE IPP program\. Should further financing opportunities be
available, it was noted that it would be helpful if a REMT-like project could support
processes related to the small RE IPP program, announced by the DoE in 2013, which
targets development of RE projects with capacity not exceeding 5 MW\. This program could
benefit from the establishment of a small central coordinating body to facilitate project
developersâ and policymakersâ access to transaction and technical specialists\. Some of this
assistance could be directed to interactions with municipalities, noting that the smaller
projects would more likely connect to municipal-owned grids\. Other areas of potential
support indicated included the development of a capital financing instrument and legal
support services for small projects, taking into account the high costs of professional fees\.
4\. Assessment of Risk to the GEO
57\. Putting into place a sound regulatory system for development of RE markets has
created a basis for attracting and sustaining private investment\. The country has developed a
track record of attracting and supporting both public and private investment to developing RE for
power generation and SWH\. Taking into account the outcomes of both project components, the
financial risks to the continued sustainability of the GEO are considered Moderate\.
58\. Lower average prices bid in the three successive rounds of the competitive REIPPPP
are widely viewed as a positive development\. However, it is unclear whether expectations of a
continued reduction in bid prices can be sustained in subsequent rounds\. An important question is
whether prices in subsequent bidding rounds would fall further, and what effect this could have on
the IRRs of project developers\. A related question is whether the South African financial
institutions that supported developers in earlier bidding rounds would have adequate financial
18
capacity to participate in later rounds\. As the fall in REIPPPP prices also reflects the current global
overcapacity in wind and solar power generation systems, the extent to which these prices reflect
the long-run generation capacity constraints in South Africa is limited\. Increasing grid-based
electricity tariffs in South Africa could be conducive to the financial viability of distributed
generation options, such as rooftop solar PV, which could prosper in an environment of increasing
prices paid by end consumers for grid-based electricity\. In addition, new financing models should
be explored to attract long-term âyieldâ institutional investors to refinance projects as they get
commissioned and enter regular operations\. Finally, it not clear to what extent the establishment of
a credit-worthy single buyer over time would have on the market\.
59\. The limited number of trained SWH installers across the country presents a moderate
risk to national implementation of the SWH rollout program\. The majority of SWH
installations have been in and around the major metropolitan areas of Gauteng and Kwa Zulu-Natal,
and, to a lesser extent the Western and Eastern Cape, respectively, which enjoy a large
concentration of trained installers and plumbers\. With national implementation of SWH, there is a
risk of an insufficient number of trained installers in other locations across the country in the
remaining provinces of Limpopo, Northern Cape, Mpumulanga, Northwest, and Free State\. South
Africa intends to implement appropriately developed installation training and certification programs,
coupled with targeted market awareness campaigns to attract young people to serve these markets\.
60\. High up-front costs of SWH systems remain a barrier to attract end consumers\.
Despite steep increases in electricity prices from 2009 onward, SWH had not attracted the attention
of end customers as a financially viable alternative energy source without continued rebates or
subsidies\. Under the Eskom SWH rebate scheme, an SWH installer receives payment (or rebate) for
each accredited SWH system installed\. 10 This risk could be mitigated by the development of
revenue models that are based on the value of the savings in power generation and reductions in
CO2 emissions; however, low global carbon prices and the high cost of SWH systems remain
barriers\. The proposed introduction of a carbon tax, and the ability to offset it, could provide
additional incentives to mitigate this risk\. In addition, local production of SWH components could
offer an opportunity for lower-cost systems\.
61\. Lower energy consumption resulting from the installation of SWH systems could have
adverse financial effects on municipalities\. Municipalities derive an important part of their
revenue base from reselling electricity to end consumers\. Obtaining the expected level of support
for the SWH rollout program would require consideration of this issue, especially where middle- to
high-income households contribute a significant share of municipal finances\.
62\. The government has shown strong commitment to the projectâs PDO/GEOs\. The DoEâs
support, in the form of co-financing and participating in oversight functions, illustrated a very high
level of government ownership\. This strong commitment was illustrated by the substantial fiscal
10
The funds for the rebates were initially derived from NERSA-approved tariffs, and later from fiscal transfers\.
19
allocation of ZAR4\.7 billion to the national SWH rollout program, and by the focus placed on
ensuring that the appropriate institutional arrangements were in place to support the SWH rollout
program, including the designation of an implementing agency that would be accountable to the
DoE\. The use of a public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements, in the form of envisaged
concessions to approved SWH suppliers, supported by the implementation of a training program for
SWH installation, also contributes to creating the necessary implementation capacity\.
63\. More broadly, the government has made a range of related commitments that seek to
strengthen the PDO/GEO\. On July 1, 2009, the government started to implement an
environmental levy on the production of electricity from coal, with the intention of complementing
DSM efforts\. The levy was also seen as a first step toward developing a carbon tax to achieve long-
term climate change objectives, which the government proposed would be designed to minimize
potential adverse impacts on low-income households and industry competitiveness\. An energy
efficiency tax incentive in the form of a tax deduction of 45 Rand-cents/kWh to address
improvement in energy use is in place, and is expected to run until January 2020\. It is designed as a
complementary mechanism (carrot) in anticipation of the implementation of the proposed carbon
tax, with some of the proposed carbon tax revenue being recycled through the tax deduction\.
5\. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance
5\.1 World Bank
(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
64\. The World Bankâs performance during identification, preparation, and appraisal of the
project is rated Moderately Satisfactory, reflecting some minor shortcomings in Quality at Entry\.
65\. The project design was highly strategic at a time when the South African RE sector
was virtually nonexistent\. The appraisal recognized South Africaâs sound fiscal and monetary
policies, including a strong financial sector\. These policies stood the country in good stead to attract
RE investments within the legal, policy, and regulatory frameworks to be developed\. The projectâs
approach was informed by the Bankâs correct assessment at entry that without appropriate support
mechanisms, the development of RE power generation and SWH would be limited, since prevailing
electricity prices at that time were substantially lower than the costs of long-run marginal capacity
expansion, primarily in relation to coal-based electricity generation\.
66\. While the 2003 REWP created a policy goal, there was no legislation enabling the
purchase of power from RE IPPs\. In the context of the lack of market development at the time of
appraisal, it was logically correct to provide for TA support for a number of legislative, regulatory,
and statutory frameworks required to facilitate the implementation of the REWP\. These frameworks
included the development of enabling legislation that would provide for the purchase of RE
(realized in the form of the passage of the 2008 Energy Act), the detailed design of the REFIT
mechanism, and the formulation of SWH standards\. The project design also correctly identified the
need for a robust grid-access framework for RE IPPs, and noted that it was imperative that the
private sector, policymakers and regulators develop adequate knowledge about RE\.
20
67\. The governance arrangements related to the project reflected a good mix between the
policymaker (DoE), the regulator (NERSA), and an energy-sector implementing agency (CEF
Group)\. The location of the ISU at the DBSA, one of South Africaâs premier development finance
institutions, was also logically expected to contribute to the coordinated removal of RE barriers\. In
addition, considering the nascent state of industry development at that time, the project design also
sought to increase the capacity of project developers to ensure the project remained relevant\.
68\. The project risk assessment appropriately focused on the factors that could negatively
affect outcomes, but some implementation arrangements were not fully addressed at entry\.
The motivation for the risk assessment and ratings at entry were premised on the expectation that
the DBSA, as host of the ISU, was well placed to address implementation risks\. The motivation to
use the DBSAâs financial management and procurement expertise was essentially sound; however,
the adequacy of these implementation arrangements and the provision of adequate human resource
capacity were not addressed properly until project implementation began and restructurings were
needed to ensure continued progress and relevance\. Another shortcoming was that administrative
and operating costs should have been included in the Grant Agreement budget, as they had been in
the PAD\.
69\. The PAD results framework provided adequate indicators for M&E, although some
indicators could have been better aligned\. Indicators selected for M&E of the projectâs
implementation, as well as progress toward the implementation of SWH and REPG projects and
toward the governmentâs REWP target were mostly adequate\. Although some of the outcome
indicators were not quantitatively defined (e\.g\., industry codes and standards adopted), it could be
argued that such a qualitative design lends itself well to flexible implementation of a TA project in
a quickly changing environment\. The indicators for power generation and CO2 emissions avoided
were not proportionate to each other, suggesting a possible error in alignment\.
(b) Quality of Supervision
Rating: Satisfactory
70\. The World Bankâs quality of supervision of project implementation is rated as Satisfactory\.
Despite limited resources for implementation support of GEF stand-alone operations and the hands-
on role required to support implementation of TA activities, the Bank team focused closely on the
projectâs development impact throughout the implementation period\. The team regularly and
consistently engaged with the government on its priorities (e\.g\., expanding the projectâs focus from
commercial SWH systems to all SWH systems, including those installed in the residential sector);
by fostering resilience in the face of a fast-changing policy environment (e\.g\., re-allocating the
budget to provide more support for MG beneficiaries and providing for âreal-timeâ specialist
support to the DoE); and by facilitating flexibility (e\.g\., extending the project closing date to allow
for the completion of contracted MG activities)\.
71\. The World Bank exercised its fiduciary duties in a timely manner, and regularly
communicated with and provided strong client-focused implementation support for the DoE
and the DBSA\. The Bankâs inputs were primarily in the form of regular implementation support
missions, Aide Memoires, âno objectionâ processes, post-procurement reviews, and financial
management oversight\. These inputs focused on maintaining the projectâs relevance, procurement
planning, and implementation, as well as improving the disbursement profile and financial reporting\.
21
The World Bank team provided procurement training for ISU team members, and consistently
achieved short turn-around times for âno objectionâ requests related to the MG program\. This
approach contributed greatly to the MG programâs success, while maintaining compliance with
fiduciary requirements\.
72\. Members of the World Bank team also led and/or participated in other similar-themed
engagements in the country, providing synergies in implementation and resources\. Examples
of these other operations included the Eskom investment projects; the Energy Sector Management
Assisted Program (ESMAP)-supported Low Carbon Growth Strategy Study with the then
Department of Environment, Agriculture and Tourism; ESMAP-supported TA for the South
African Cities Network on Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency; carbon finance cooperation
with the DBSA; and regular interactions with Eskom, CEF, the IDC, and private companies\. The
Bank also provided advisory support to South African institutions (e\.g\., to Eskom on such issues as
the bulk-buying of SWH systems), and supported such initiatives as reviewing the governmentâs
long-term mitigation scenarios for climate change; developing standard offer incentives for energy
efficiency; advising on managing power shortages; assisting municipalities on RE and energy
efficiency and various carbon credit initiatives, including through the DBSA; and helping the DoEâs
prepare for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Changeâs 7th Conference of the
Parties in Durban\. Feedback from these interactions and the Bankâs coordination with the National
Treasury on these issues provided opportunities for synergies in implementation that proved
beneficial to the project\.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance
Rating: Satisfactory
73\. The ICR rates the Bankâs overall performance as Satisfactory\. Gaps in the projectâs
preparation were mitigated by active engagement during implementation\. The project focus was on
maintaining relevance, being flexible in the context of a fast-changing policy environment, and
continually focusing on the PDO/GEO and execution of fiduciary duties\. After a slow start, the
project would have most likely disbursed its entire amount had it not been for the final year delay in
appointing a team for ISU coordination at the DBSA, despite several proactive efforts by the
government and the Bank teams to accelerate these processes\.
5\.2 Borrower
(a) Government Performance
Rating: Highly Satisfactory
74\. The Government of South Africa, represented in the project by the DoE and the Project
Steering Committee (PSC), was engaged and proactive\. The Governmentâs performance is rated as
Highly Satisfactory\.
75\. The DoEâs Clean Energy Chief Directorate and New and Renewable Energy
Directorate played a key role in the projectâs implementation\. The DoE complied with project-
related covenants, including for the transfer of co-funding resources to the project\. The government
was highly committed to REMT and achievement of the GEOs, including strong involvement of
22
DoE officials during implementation (e\.g\., evaluations and undertaking site visits); policy and
regulatory framework development (e\.g\., involvement in the processes related to the REWP review,
ISMO Bill development, and socioeconomic assessment of the IRP); and regular communication of
priorities and exchanges with the Bank as the policy environment changed\. The DoE played a key
coordination role between ongoing national initiatives and the project\. The DoEâs active
engagement in the project enabled it to receive first-hand information on progress, and to provide
informed guidance and inputs to the overall South African policy and regulatory process\. This led
to opportunities for value creation, such as the DoEâs decision to apply the modeling of technology
cost curves to the ongoing IRP process, and its facilitation of the projectâs participation in the
formulation of strategies to support the national SWH rollout program\.
76\. The DoE chaired the PSC, which was a platform for stakeholders to participate in the
projectâs oversight functions\. The DoEâs role on the REMT Grant Approval Committee ensured
that first-level oversight was in place, thus facilitating the granting of âno objectionsâ by the Bank
for proposed procurement\. As PSC Chair, the DoE was able to access information on project
implementation, including potential bottlenecks, and participated actively in the 2011 MTR Report,
which allowed for accelerated implementation of the MG program\. The DoE supported the
projectâs outreach activities by participating in workshops, making its Web site available as an
additional channel for the dissemination of project-related information, and facilitating linkages
with regional investment promotion agencies for workshops that helped increase the quality and
quantity of MG applications\. When required, the DoE helped to remove hurdles to project
implementation and focused on transition arrangements at the projectâs close\. The DoE was
proactively involved on a number of occasions in addressing human-resource constraints at the ISU
that affected the project, including through discussions with DBSA senior management\.
(b) Implementing Agencyâs or Agenciesâ Performance
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
77\. Due to some moderate challenges to implementation that were ultimately resolved, the
ISUâs performance is rated as Moderately Satisfactory\.
78\. The ISU coordinated interactions with external stakeholders and partners, hosted
conferences and workshops, generated reports, and disseminated information\. The ISU held
regular discussions with the IDC, Eskom, CEF Group, United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP), Danish International Development Agency, GIZ, and other partners to coordinate the
activities related to the RE power generation and SWH programs being implemented or planned by
these institutions at the time, and as part of the projectâs MTR in early 2011\. The ISU organized
several conferences, including the Renewable Energy Summit and SWH conference, which
facilitated engagement on strategic issues related to the development of South Africaâs RE sector\.
In addition, the ISU organized workshops on CSP, SWH, and biogas, and published informative
documents about various aspects of the RE sector, including conference and workshop proceedings\.
As part of the MG program, the ISU convened workshops across the country to reach and engage
prospective project developers with the MG application procedures\. These workshops significantly
improved the quality of MG applications and, in turn, project disbursements\. The larger benefit was
that developers were able to access project pre-investment resources in a timely manner to prepare
their REIPPPP project applications\.
23
79\. Although there were several strengths in the ISUâs performance, certain
implementation shortcomings affected REMT implementation\. The DBSA, as the DoEâs
implementing agency, established the ISU reporting internally to its Agencies Unit, to manage the
projectâs daily operations\. This allowed for the provision of dedicated resources toward the
achievement of the PDO/GEO\. With support from the World Bank team, the ISU developed
capacity in following applicable World Bank procurement guidelines, and also worked closely with
the DBSAâs FMU in the compilation of quarterly financial reports\. The DBSAâs financial
management and reporting arrangements served the project well, and also facilitated the conduct of
annual financial audits in an effective and timely manner\. The ISUâs M&E arrangements were
adequate and informed decision making and resource allocation\. However, implementation
challenges encountered included delays in the recruitment and departure of ISU team members at
critical stages, including in the final year of project implementation\. Whenever new ISU team
members were appointed, they did their best to get the project on track, and where implementation
issues required attention, the Bank and the DoE actively worked with the DBSA in their resolution\.
Despite these efforts, the delay in re-appointing and the subsequent departure of the ISU
coordinator in the final year of the project impacted the full disbursement of the Project and its
high-impact MG program\.
80\. The ISU coordinated with the DoE and the World Bank in planning for
implementation following the closing of the GEF project\. One of the transitional issues under
discussion was the implementation of the training program for SWH installers following the close
of the GEF project in September 2013\. In support of the implementation process of the national
SWH program, and working jointly with the Bank and the DoE, the ISU procured the services of a
consultant to design and deliver training to SWH installers\. The first part of this process was the
production of training materials in 2013, which would be followed by the actual training of
installers during 2014\. As a way of managing the transition to the post-implementation phase, the
training materials were procured using the Bankâs portion of the co-funding, while the actual
training would be funded from the DoEâs portion after the GEF project closed\.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance
Rating: Satisfactory
81\. The ICR rates the overall performance of the Borrower as Satisfactory\.
82\. The DoEâs leadership in the project is rated as Highly Satisfactory\. Given the many heavy
demands and requirements placed on the availability of the DoE officials who participated in the
project, the DoEâs active involvement, including in operational matters, was exemplary\. The DoE
counterpart was responsive and always assisted in the timely resolution of issues\. The provision of
budgetary resources illustrated the DoEâs commitment to the project, and senior officials, including
the DoE Director General, were engaged in the project\. The ISUâs expeditious implementation of
the MG program, coordination of capacity-building activities, and facilitation of policy and
regulatory frameworks played a major role in advancing the projectâs objectives\. The DBSAâs role
in financial management and reporting contributed to good governance\. Moderate shortcomings
included the initial challenges to aligning procurement processes, which were overcome, and final-
year challenges related to ensuring the ISU had the necessary human resource capacity, which were
overcome but limited the full disbursement of funds\.
24
6\. Lessons Learned
83\. When REMT was first conceptualized in the early 2000s, there was very little activity
related to RE in South Africa\. This changed rapidly as the country grappled with generation
capacity constraints and rising concerns about its economyâs carbon intensity, and as the
government balanced its interest in addressing urgent power shortages through new generation and
supply and through DSM, while meeting South Africaâs climate change mitigation goals and
expanding access and services to low-income and unserved populations\. The governmentâs efforts
in this regard were supported by the REMT Project, as well as by several other development
partners\. The main overall lessons are:ï
- Well-targeted TA activities, although time consuming, can support the enabling
conditions for scale-up of RE markets\. The project focused its TA activities to
complement ongoing efforts to support the removal of key legal, policy, regulatory, and
information barriers to implementation\. Improving and extending the capacity of relevant
state-owned institutions helped provide strong leadership in the sector, including support for
high-impact analytical work, such as the modeling of technology curves, which led to
favorable allocation for RE in the IRP\. ï
- Well-designed pre-financing and financing mechanisms for RE projects are key
elements of scale-up of RE investments\. In the context of South Africaâs well-developed
financial markets, the governmentâs preparation of key legal, policy, and regulatory
frameworks, including well-structured PPAs, was a key success factor\. Recommendations
for fair allocation of risks and a bankable standardized PPA in the early development phase
of the market provided a basis for the introduction of project financing in the South African
RE sector\. The governmentâs early preparation was invaluable, and included considerations
of resource data for site identification (including integration with the grid), identifying the
importance of identifying potential projects and making pre-investment resources available
to make potential projects bankable\. Targeted TA was a necessary success factor to unlock
the liquidity in the countryâs financial markets to support RE investment\.ï
- Market-driven development of RE generation is an effective strategy\. Rather than
prescribing financing of only one type of RE technology, REMT focused on the policy,
regulatory, and commercial conditions required for the overall development of the RE
market\. When the global RE technology marketplace changed in 2009â10, South Africa was
able to build on the regulatory frameworks developed and adopt a tender mechanism to
attract investment in RE, although the technologies featured, and the process for procuring
and financing RE capacity were different from those that were favored at project appraisal\.ï
- South Africa combined elements of both feed-in-tariffs and competitive tendering in
the implementation of the REIPPPP, creating a replicable model of RE development
for other countries\. FiTs can be important in initiating (or âkick-startingâ) RE investments,
while competition through tendering mechanisms can be an effective strategy to attract such
investments in a sustainable and cost-effective manner\. As the global market changed and
prices of RE equipment and technology fell, and in line with the constitutional requirement
for cost-effective procurement, the Government pivoted to a tendering process and the FiTs
were set as the maximum amount (ceiling) that could be bid through the competitive process\.
The resulting competition put pricing pressure on the submitted bids, which came in below
the ceiling price\. ï
25
- Flexible project design allows clients to move quickly to adjust to changing global
market conditions\. The projectâs support proved timely and relevant, when South Africa
decided to evolve the regulatory approach developed under REFIT to a tendering process to
procure new capacity from private-sector entities\. This allowed South Africa to benefit from
extremely favorable market conditions and pricing of RE technology on the global markets\.
In general, governments need flexibility to respond to market conditions\.ï
- Effective project implementation seeks to harmonize with the countryâs broader and
urgent goals\. While Eskomâs SWH implementation was designed primarily as an energy
DSM initiative, the DoE identified opportunities to scale up energy access through the
development of the national SWH rollout program\. Recognizing the value of having one
centralized agency to procure and install SWH, the government designated Eskom to install
SWH systems on its account\. This had scale implications for the cost of procuring and
installing SWH systems, including for local production and job creation as well as for
expanding access to low-income households\. Overall, the project was well harmonized with
broader national goals, such as securing energy capacity, increasing energy security,
mitigating climate change, and creating jobs\.ï
ï
6\.1 Lessons Learned Relevant to Project Preparation
- Creating dedicated in-house project management capacity by locating the ISU at the
DoE could have been considered as an option\. This option would have required
establishing appropriate procurement, recruitment, and financial management arrangements\.
Although the provision for the DoE to outsource the project to an implementing agency was
sensible, it did not guarantee the necessary implementation capacity would be available\. The
choice of an external ISU also meant that project implementation capacity on fiduciary
issues was not built within the DoE\.
- Attracting and retaining qualified personnel on the basis of fixed-term employment
contracts can be a challenge for project implementation\. As an alternative, the services
of ISU team members could have been procured through consulting contracts, as was the
case with at least one of the Project Coordinators\. Besides minimizing the disruptions to
implementation caused by the turnover of personnel experienced during the projectâs
implementation, this approach could have been augmented by the use of market-related
remuneration structures\. The ISUâs organizational design could have provided for at least
one additional team member (e\.g\., a second Business Support Manager) to match the ISUâs
capacity to meet the projectâs administrative requirements\.
6\.2 Lessons Learned Relevant to Project Implementation
- The engaged and flexible approach demonstrated by the ISU, the DoE, and the World
Bank during implementation was critical in maintaining the projectâs relevance during
a period of considerable policy change\. A significant amount of progress in the project
was enabled because of the strong cooperation and relationship between the government and
World Bank counterparts, who communicated regularly and frankly about market evolution
and needs\. Since procurement of consultants was not undertaken directly by the DoE, more
effort was required to ensure that the resulting policies and frameworks remained aligned
with the PDO/GEO and national imperatives\. Therefore, it was imperative for the ISU to go
beyond mere contract and project management, and to also have insight into the
26
implications of the various policy options being explored\. The relative positioning and
status of the ISU within the host organization is also an important factor to consider\.
- Reducing turnaround time for procurement of consultants would have helped the
project become even more responsive in a fast-moving policy and regulatory
environment\. One way to reduce turnaround time with limited implementation capacity
would be to procure panels of consultants who could be prequalified to bid for specific
interventions as required based on generic terms of reference (ToRs), or who are already
prequalified by the DoE or the DBSA for similar assignments\. The contractual assignment
of consultants would be undertaken on the basis of specific ToRs and proposals from the
prequalified consultants\. This approach could help reduce the turnaround time for consultant
appointments, without deviating from the principles of competitiveness, efficiency, and
transparency\.
- Engaging small RE enterprises to participate in the REMT MG program is a time- and
resource-intensive activity and requires a significant level of ISU support\. The high-
level ISU support required for the MG program and other REMT elements had a
disproportionate impact on the projectâs administrative and operational costs, and placed
heavy burdens on human resource capacity\. Greater allowance for operational support in
GEF projects that envisage intense engagement with sub-grantees would be helpful\.
- Successful projects require close oversight and engaged supervision with sufficient
budgets\. As a stand-alone operation, the task team was able to provide implementation
support by leveraging budgets from numerous smaller operations for combined missions etc\.
With limited implementation support resources available for stand-alone GEF operations, it
is important to consider having one team assigned for related tasks sustained over time\.
7\. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners
84\. The DoEâs comments on the first draft of this ICR are attached in Annex 5 of this report,
and relevant points have been incorporated in this report\.
85\. The ISU expressed the view that the âModerately Satisfactoryâ rating of its performance
does not adequately reflect the successes achieved\. The ISU also requested clarity on a reference to
the performance of new ISU team members\. It was clarified that the reference related to all
instances in which new members were appointed throughout the project implementation period, and
was not directed only at the ISU team appointed in the final year of project implementation\.
27
Annex 1: Project Costs and Financing11
Project Cost by Components12
Appraisal Estimate Estimate (USD
Components Percentage of Appraisal
(USD millions) millions)
Total Baseline Cost
REPG 5\.75 3\.64 tbc
(C)SWH 10\.70 0\.24 tbc
Project Management 0\.85 0\.20 tbc
Total Project Costs 17\.30 4\.08 tbc
Financing
Appraisal Estimate of
Type of Co- Estimate direct co- Percentage of
Source of Funds
financing (USD financing Appraisal
millions) (USD millions)13
Borrower Direct 2\.30 0\.51 tbc
Global Environment Facility (GEF) Direct 6\.00 2\.20 tbc
Private sector14 Direct/Indirect 9\.00 1\.37/14715 tbc
Total Financing Required Direct/Indirect 17\.30 4\.08/152\.8 tbc
11
The numbers presented in this Annex are estimates based on unaudited financial reports prior to financial close, and
are not deemed reliable\. The data presented in the table await confirmation based on review of final audited statements\.
12
The âProject Cost by Componentâ table reflects unaudited estimates of direct costs borne by the REMT project\. It
does not include amounts leveraged indirectly through the Government or indirectly from the market\.
13
These numbers are estimates based on unaudited financial reports prior to financial close, and are not deemed reliable\.
The data presented in the table awaits confirmation based on review of final audited statements\.
14
The PAD (Table 2) states that the project was expected to leverage US$ 9 million from the private sector under this
project\. The PAD clearly stated that the funds so leveraged could not be committed in the same manner as Government
or donor funds\. Amounts leveraged by the private sector include the over $7 billion leveraged for REPG under the
REIPPPP under the first two bidding windows; over $148 million invested in SWH installations; and the $390 fiscal
allocation for the national roll-out of the SWH program\.
15
The PAD (Table 3) also states that the $9 million from the private sector reflects the estimated cost of equipment
installed by the SWH companies under this project\. Grants for SWH under the project were curtailed based on the
uptake in the SWH market and resources were focused on MG for REPG\. The $1\.37 million financing amount cited
above includes only the direct private sector matching contribution through the REMT Matching Grants program\. The
$148 million cited in the Financing table above refers to the confirmed investment leveraged for SWH installations\.
The numbers above do not reflect the $390 million allocated for implementation of the national rollout of the SWH
program\.
28
Annex 2: Outputs and Outcomes by Component
Table 1: Assessment of Outputs and OutcomesâRenewable Energy Power Generation
(REPG)
Baseline Outputs Outcomes
Outcome indicator 1: Government and electricity regulator prepared the legal, policy, and
regulatory frameworks for grid-based renewable energy power, and submitted them for
government approval by December 31, 2009\.
No Received comments on the draft The comments on the draft standardized
frameworks in standardized REFIT PPA\. REFIT PPA, which were drawn up by a law
place firm in 2009, created early market
confidence by private sector project
developers and commercial lenders, and
informed the use of a similar concept for the
governmentâs flagship RE programâthe
REIPPPP\.
NSWHF provided input to The NSWHF provided input toward the
national rollout of SWH implementation of the ZAR4\.7-billion SWH
program\. rollout program as undertaken by Eskom on
behalf of the DoE\. Examples of such input
include the concept of a single âbulk-buyingâ
agency for SWHs, as well as the expansion
of the rollout program to low-income
households by introducing market
segmentation\.
Revised the REWP report with The concept of technology learning curves
significant contribution to that was applied in the modeling scenarios
expanding the role of RE in the for the REWP review was incorporated in
IRP for the countryâs energy the IRP modeling\. The result was a lowering
development plan of the cost of RE technologies over time,
thus increasing their share of projected new
generation capacity in the countryâs energy
development plan\.
Reviewed and provided Comments received during the ISMO Bill
comments on the draft ISMO parliamentary public consultations were
Bill\. reviewed and considered for incorporation
into the bill\. The bill was in the
parliamentary process at the time of
compiling this ICR\.
29
Baseline Outputs Outcomes
No Made available high-level solar As a result of the REFIT program that was
information resource information via the announced by NERSA in 2009, and
on solar, projectâs Web site\. increased investor interest in the South
biomass, Created a link on the projectâs African REIPP sector, individual project
hydro Web site to the interactive wind developers undertook the prospecting of
available resource map through the solar and wind power generation sites for
UNDPâGEF-sponsored South their own proprietary use\. Commercially
African Wind Energy Program\. available satellite data were used for solar
resources, while on-site wind masts were
installed to gather wind energy-related
resource information\. In some cases, the
project supported these prospecting activities
through the MG program\. As a result, the
project only had to make available high-level
resource information via its Web site\.
Outcome indicator 3: Assist 10â14 potential renewable energy power generation
developers, and prepare 4â6 pre-feasibility studies\.
Very few Approved MG guidelines (June Assisted 14 new REPG enterprises\.
renewable 2010)\. Conducted 33 pre-feasibility and feasibility
energy Updated MG selection criteria studies, as some of the firms had portfolios
projects by (May 2011)\. with more than one project\.
private
developers Conducted 5 procurement At least 5 of the projects supported via the
rounds for MG applications\. MG program were selected as preferred
bidders at the start of the governmentâs
Organized a series of back-to- flagship REIPPPP in 2011 (i\.e\., Bidding
back workshops held nationally Window 1)\. As of December 2013, one of
to engage prospective MG the projects had been successfully
applicants during the 4th round, commissioned\. The other 4 projects had
which attracted the most market achieved financial closure and were in
response and applications ahead construction\. An additional 4 projects had
of the first round of the been notified that they met the requirements
REIPPPP\. under Bidding Window 3 of the program\.
30
Baseline Outputs Outcomes
Outcome indicator 4: Increase knowledge about renewable energy in relevant official
agencies and private-sector financial institutions\.
Lack of Organized CSP workshop and A key outcome of the RE summit was a
renewable RE summit held in 2009\. resolution for REMT to facilitate the review
energy of South Africaâs 2003 REWP\. The CSP
experience workshop led to the establishment of
SASTELA, an industry association that went
on to contribute to the development of the
CSP sector in South Africa\.
REMT hosted SWH workshop, The SWH workshop, national conference,
conference, and launch event in and launch event were instrumental in
2009 and 2010\. building capacity, as well as allowing
stakeholders to engage on the rollout of
SWH systems\. The NSWHF, which evolved
from this engagement, provided more
information on different market segments,
resulting in the expansion of the SWH
rollout program to low-income households
Project Web site launched The project Web site played the role of the
during the last half of 2010\. âhelp-deskâ envisaged in the PAD\. This was
Project Web site used both to an efficient way to increase knowledge about
make available reports about RE in general, and the MG program in
REPG and SWH, and as a particular\. The MG guidelines and detailed
channel for distributing MG application forms played a significant role in
program material (e\.g\., increasing the quality of applications\.
publishing guidelines and
application forms)\.
31
Table 2: Assessment of Outputs and OutcomesâSolar Water Heating (SWH)
Baseline Outputs Outcomes
Outcome indicator 5: Formulate industry standards and codes\.
Limited standards Supported the testing of SWH Eskomâs implementation of the SWH
in place systems\. rebate scheme began in late 2008, and it
facilitated the development of standards in
conjunction with the DTI\.
Rather than duplicate efforts, the
REMT Project focused on the
implementation of the standards\.
Implementation support came in the form
of assisting SWH suppliers with the
testing of their systems, which was
required for participation in the Eskom
rebate scheme (and later the national
rollout program)\.
Supported a patent One company was supported in testing a
application for an innovative number of SWH systems\. The same
SWH installation system company was also assisted in applying for
through a Performance Grant the patenting of an innovative âsolar
(PG)\. ladder,â which had been designed to
increase the rate at which SWH systems
could be installed\. Several hundred SWH
systems are being installed annually using
this innovation\.
The DoE with REMT The SWH training program was expected
supported the design and to make available accredited SWH
commissioning of a training installers in support of the implementation
program for installers\. of the ZAR4\.7-billion national SWH
rollout program\.
32
Baseline Outputs Outcomes
Outcome indicator 6: Install 200 CSWH systems by Year 4\.16
40 systems The DoE designated Eskom By September 20, 2013, Eskomâs
installed as an implementer of its SWH implementation of the SWH program had
program, with DoE-funded resulted in the installation of 282,350
installations in such areas as SWH systems, comprising 214,444 low-
Tshwane and Sol Plaatjie\. pressure (LP) and 67,906 high-pressure
The DoE, jointly with REMT, (HP) SWH systems\. An additional
supported the segmentation of 30,000â 40,000 SWH systems were
the SWH market (as part of installed under contract by Eskom, but
the NSWHF)\. funded by the DoE, by the end of
September 2013\. The DoE-funded Eskom
SWH installations are not included in the
results reported above\.
In addition, based on the allocation of
ZAR4\.7 billion over 3 years by the
National Treasury toward the national
SWH rollout program, an estimated
additional 107,000 systems (88,000 LP
and 19,000 HP systems) would be
installed in the first year of the rollout
program alone\. Allocation of substantial
fiscal resources, supported by the
designation of Eskom as a âbulk-buyingâ
agency for SWH systems, contributed to
the attractiveness of investing in local
SWH manufacturing\.
Outcome indicator 7: Avoid 85 GWh of power generation by Year 4\.
15 GWh avoided Same as the outputs for By September 2011, the Eskom
Outcome Indicator 6 (i\.e\., implementation of the SWH program,
segmentation of the SWH which started as a pilot in 2008, was
market, designation of a avoiding 60 GWh per year nationally,
âbulk-buyingâ agency, and according to Eskom estimates\. This figure
commissioning of a training of power generation avoided is over and
program for installers)\. above the baseline of 15 GWh of power
Related to the NSWHF\. noted in the PAD, which when
considered, would have brought the
cumulative power generation avoided to
16
It should be noted that although the original indicator baseline was on the basis of commercial SWH systems, this
was amended to include both residential and commercial systems\. The actual implementation of South Africaâs SWH
program focused primarily on the residential sector\.
33
Baseline Outputs Outcomes
75 GWh by 2011 (Year 3 of the GEF
project)\.
The pace of installations rapidly increased
in the two subsequent years, and Eskom
reports that by the end of September 2013,
assuming average savings of 1,250
kWh/year for LP and 2,050 kWh/year for
HP systems, at least 407 GWh is
calculated to have been avoided on an
annualized basis\. When considered along
with the baseline, this would have brought
the cumulative power generation avoided
to 422 GWh by 2013\. The calculation
excludes the power generation avoided
from the installations funded by the DoE\.
Outcome indicator 8: Invest $9 million in CSWH systems by Year 4\.
$1\.8 million Same as the outputs for At least US$138 million, comprising
invested Outcome Indicator 6 (i\.e\., ZAR962 million (US$97\.5 million) and
segmentation of the SWH ZAR404 million (US$40\.9 million), had
market, designation of a been invested in LP and HP systems,
âbulk-buyingâ agency, and respectively, by September 2013\.This
commissioning of a training estimate is conservative and is based on
program for installers)\. Eskomâs installations on its own account;
Related to the NSWHF\. it does not count DoE installations under
contract\.
In addition, the South African National
Treasury Africa has allocated ZAR4\.7
billion (US$480 million) over 3 years
(starting from 2012â13) toward the rollout
of SWH systems\.
Outcome indicator 9: Through (C)SWH, avoid 0\.75 million tons of CO2 emissions by Year
4\.
Negligible Same as the outputs for The cumulative target of 0\.75 million
Outcome Indicator 6 (i\.e\., tons avoided was achieved by project
segmentation of the SWH close\.
market, designation of a Based on an emission factor of 0\.99
âbulk-buyingâ agency, and kg/kWh, Eskom reported 60,000 (0\.060
commissioning of a training million) CO2 emissions avoided annually
program for installers)\. by September 2011\. Using the 1\.07
kg/kWh used in the PAD, this would
translate to just over 65,000 tons (0\.065
million tons) annually\. By the end of
September 2013, the Eskom SWH
program had ramped up implementation
with just over 435,000 (0\.44 million) tons
34
Baseline Outputs Outcomes
avoided using the 1\.07 kg/kWh emission
factor from the PAD\. (This number does
not include the additional tons from the
DoE-funded Eskom installations or the
SWH implemented in the first-year rollout
of the national SWH program\.)
Considering the accelerated pace of
installations in 2012 and 2013, on a
cumulative basis, the 0\.75-million-ton
target was highly likely to have been
achieved by the end of 2013\.17
17
Given that the scale of installations and the quantum of GWh avoided are several times higher than the target values,
the corresponding CO2 target of 0\.75 million tons avoided by Year 4 appears to have been overstated in the original
PAD\.
35
Annex 3: Economic and Financial Analyses
Economic Analysis
Project Appraisal Stage
As outlined in the PAD, an economic analysis of installing demonstration CSWH systems was
conducted\. The Eskom tariff applicable at the time was used to indicate the costs that would be
saved by switching to SWH, and therefore was used as a proxy for benefits\. The tariff used was
a combination of the âdemand chargeâ and âenergy charge ,â resulting in a value of 3\.62 US
cents per kWh\. To estimate the effect of environmental benefits, in the form of CO2 emission
reductions, the carbon price used was US$4 per ton\. This conservative approach indicates the
lower end of the quantum of benefits from CO 2 emission reductions\. Naturally, using a higher
carbon price, for instance, the level of the carbon tax proposed by the South African National
Treasury of US$12 per ton, would result in a higher IRR\.
The analysis showed an IRR of 14 percent, taking into account only the electricity savings\.
With CO2 reductions, the IRR was calculated at 17 percent\. A key conclusion was that
reductions in the cost of SWH systems were required to improve their attractiveness\. Table 1
provides an outline of the analysis, including the key assumptions\.
Table 1: Economic analysis at project appraisal: solar water heating
South Africa REMT Project
Economic Analysis of Commercial Solar Water Heating
Net Economic +
Net Economic Environmental
Capital Cost Annual Electricity Savings Benefits Annual CO2 Reductions Benefits
Year ZAR US$ kWh ZAR US$ ZAR US$ tons ZAR US$ ZAR US$
1 200,000 28,986 115,264 28,816 4,176 (171,184) (24,809) 123 3,401 493 (167,783) (24,316)
2 - - 115,264 28,816 4,176 28,816 4,176 123 3,401 493 32,217 4,669
3 - - 115,264 28,816 4,176 28,816 4,176 123 3,401 493 32,217 4,669
4 - - 115,264 28,816 4,176 28,816 4,176 123 3,401 493 32,217 4,669
5 5,000 725 115,264 28,816 4,176 23,816 3,452 123 3,401 493 27,217 3,944
6 - - 115,264 28,816 4,176 28,816 4,176 123 3,401 493 32,217 4,669
7 - - 115,264 28,816 4,176 28,816 4,176 123 3,401 493 32,217 4,669
8 - - 115,264 28,816 4,176 28,816 4,176 123 3,401 493 32,217 4,669
9 - - 115,264 28,816 4,176 28,816 4,176 123 3,401 493 32,217 4,669
10 5,000 725 115,264 28,816 4,176 23,816 3,452 123 3,401 493 27,217 3,944
11 - - 115,264 28,816 4,176 28,816 4,176 123 3,401 493 32,217 4,669
12 - - 115,264 28,816 4,176 28,816 4,176 123 3,401 493 32,217 4,669
13 - - 115,264 28,816 4,176 28,816 4,176 123 3,401 493 32,217 4,669
14 - - 115,264 28,816 4,176 28,816 4,176 123 3,401 493 32,217 4,669
15 - - 115,264 28,816 4,176 28,816 4,176 123 3,401 493 32,217 4,669
IRR 14% 14% 17% 17%
Notes and Assumptions
System size (liters) 10,000
Solar panel need (liters/square meter) 100
Cost (installed) per panel 2,000
Exchange rate (Rand/$) 6\.90
Electricity cost savings: (US cents/kWh) 3\.62
CO2 emissions (kg per kWh) 1\.07
Value CO2 ($/ton) 4\.00
36
Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Stage
The same approach followed at project appraisal was used in the analysis, using updated
information\. The governmentâs ZAR4\.7-billion (USD0\.48-billion) national SWH rollout
program was used as a basis of analysis\. This included the introduction of low-pressure (LP)
and high-pressure (HP) SWH systems, to be installed in low-income and middle- to high-
income households, respectively\.
Based on a planned LP/HP system split of 80/20, the number of envisaged LP and HP
installations in the first year was 88,000 and 19,000 systems, respectively\. With the support
toward the cost of each LP and HP specified at ZAR7,500-00 and ZAR8,500-00, respectively,
the amount expected to be committed was 82 percent of the ZAR1 billion budgeted for the first
year, respectively\. This LP/HP split and level of budget commitment was assumed to apply over
the remaining two years of fiscal transfers\. The projected capital expenditure was restricted to
the initial 3-year period, although the projection of electricity savings was calculated over a 15-
year period\.
The effect of electricity savings was calculated on the basis of a typical municipal residential
electricity tariff in the city of Johannesburg for the year 2012 â13, which was 154\.06 SA cents
per kWh (15\.61 US cents per kWh)\. This was considered more appropriate than the average
Eskom tariff of 58\.49 SA cents per kWh (5\.93 US cents per kWh), which included the effect of
the tariffs related to other customer groups (e\.g\., commercial and industrial customers)\. The
2012â13 average Eskom electricity price was escalated by the NERSA-approved 8 percent per
year over five years to 2017 â18, while the average municipal tariffs were escalated by a lower
annual factor (5 percent) during the same period\. Thereafter, the averages prices were escalated
by the governmentâs target annual inflation rate of 6 percent\.
Electricity savings per SWH system were calculated on the basis of informat ion sourced from
Eskom\.18 According to this information, each HP SWH system was expected to save 1,600â
2,500 kWh, while the corresponding range for an LP SWH system was 1,100â1,400 kWh\. For
the purpose of this analysis, these ranges of values were used to calculate average savings per
SWH system type\.
To estimate environmental benefits, a carbon price of US$4 per ton was used\. This is the same
as the price used at project appraisal, and takes into account prevailing carbon market
conditions (e\.g\., oversupply of carbon credits due to a drop in global economic activity)\.
In US dollar terms, the IRR resulting from electricity savings only was 15 percent\. The inclusion of
environmental benefits, in the form of the value of CO2 emission reductions, resulted in an IRR of
16 percent\. The inclusion of environmental benefits would have resulted in a higher IRR had a
higher carbon price been used\.
18
Eskom Solar Water Heating Rebate Program, November 2010\.
37
Despite the steep increases in electricity prices that South Africa has experienced, an improvement
in the IRR level was still contingent on a reduction of the cost of the SWH systems\. The further
evolution of the national SWH rollout program in support of meeting the governmentâs target of 1
million units, including possible future fiscal allocations, was expected to contribute to the desired
cost reduction\.
Table 2 provides an outline of the analysis\. The key assumptions are detailed below the table\.
Table 2: Economic analysisâICR stage: solar water heating
Net economic and
New HP New LP Capital Annual electricity Net economic Annual CO2 Environmental
FY systems systems cost savings benefits reductions benefits
ZAR m USD m GWh ZAR m USD m ZAR m USD m kT ZAR m USD m ZAR m USD m
2013 19329 87627 822 83 149 229\.80 23\.29 -592 -60 159\.60 6 0\.64 -585 -59
2014 31000 140533 1397 142 239 386\.24 39\.14 -1 010 -102 255\.96 10 1\.02 -1 000 -101
2015 34406 155975 1643 166 266 449\.25 45\.53 -1 194 -121 284\.09 11 1\.14 -1 183 -120
2016 - - 266 470\.81 47\.71 471 48 284\.09 11 1\.14 482 49
2017 - - 266 493\.41 50\.00 493 50 284\.09 11 1\.14 505 51
2018 - - 266 517\.09 52\.40 517 52 284\.09 11 1\.14 528 54
2019 - - 266 548\.13 55\.54 548 56 284\.09 11 1\.14 559 57
2020 - - 266 581\.02 58\.88 581 59 284\.09 11 1\.14 592 60
2021 - - 266 615\.88 62\.41 616 62 284\.09 11 1\.14 627 64
2022 - - 266 652\.84 66\.16 653 66 284\.09 11 1\.14 664 67
2023 - - 266 692\.00 70\.12 692 70 284\.09 11 1\.14 703 71
2024 - - 266 733\.53 74\.33 734 74 284\.09 11 1\.14 745 75
2025 - - 266 777\.55 78\.79 778 79 284\.09 11 1\.14 789 80
2026 - - 266 824\.20 83\.52 824 84 284\.09 11 1\.14 835 85
2027 - - 266 873\.66 88\.53 874 89 284\.09 11 1\.14 885 90
IRR 15% 15% 16% 16%
Key assumptions
The years used in the model are based on the envisaged fiscal allocation of the amount of ZAR4\.7
billion from over three years\. However, the actual disbursement profile would depend on the pace at
which the program was implemented\.
38
Cost (installed) per LP system - ZAR 7500
Cost (installed) per HP system - ZAR 8500
Ave annual savings per LP system (kWh) 1250
Ave annual savings per HP system (kWh) 2050
Number of LP systems (planned) 2012-2013 88000
Number of HP systems (planned) 2012-2013 19000
Allocated budget: LP systems (2012-2013) - ZAR m 660
Allocated budget: HP systems (2012-2013) - ZAR m 161\.5
Total allocated budget (2012-2013) - ZAR m 821\.5
Proportion of allocation (2012-2013) - % 82%
Share of budget (2012-2013) - LP systems 80%
Share of budget (2012-2013) - HP systems 20%
Average annual CPI (%) 6%
Ave weekly exchange rate (ZAR/USD): 2013 -2014 9\.8683
CO2 factor (kg/kWh) 1\.07
Value of CO2 (USD/ton) 4
Ave price - Eskom* Ave price - municipality**
Electricity cost savings (SA cents/kWh): 2012/2013 58\.49 154\.06
Electricity cost savings (SA cents/kWh): 2013/2014 63\.17 161\.46
Electricity cost savings (SA cents/kWh): 2014/2015 68\.22 169\.21
Electricity cost savings (SA cents/kWh): 2015/2016 73\.68 177\.33
Electricity cost savings (SA cents/kWh): 2016/2017 79\.57 185\.84
Electricity cost savings (SA cents/kWh): 2017/2018 85\.94 194\.76
Electricity cost savings (SA cents/kWh): 2018/2019 91\.1 206\.45
Electricity cost savings (SA cents/kWh): 2019/2020 96\.57 218\.84
Electricity cost savings (SA cents/kWh): 2020/2021 102\.36 231\.97
Electricity cost savings (SA cents/kWh): 2021/2022 108\.5 245\.89
Electricity cost savings (SA cents/kWh): 2022/2023 115\.01 260\.64
Electricity cost savings (SA cents/kWh): 2023/2024 121\.91 276\.28
Electricity cost savings (SA cents/kWh): 2024/2025 129\.22 292\.86
Electricity cost savings (SA cents/kWh): 2025/2026 136\.97 310\.43
Electricity cost savings (SA cents/kWh): 2026/2027 145\.19 329\.06
* Escalated by 8% per annum for first 5 years, thereafter by annual CPI (6%)
** Escalated by 5% per annum for first 5 years, thereafter by annual CPI (6%)
39
Annex 4: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes
(a) Task team members
Names Title Unit
Lending
Arun Sanghvi Now Retired
Xiaodong Wang Senior Energy Specialist (TTL) EASCS
Luiz Maurer Lead Industry Specialist CBDSB
Supervision/ICR
Senior Energy Specialist (TTL from
Karan Capoor AFTG1
September 2009)
Senior Energy Specialist (TTL until
Xiaodong Wang EASCS
August 2009)
Edith Ruguru Mwenda Senior Counsel LEGAM
Tandile Gugu Zizile Msiwa Financial Management Specialist AFTME
Chitambala John Sikazwe Procurement Specialist AFTPE
Jose C\. Janeiro Senior Finance Officer CTRLA
Christiaan Johannes Nieuwoudt Finance Officer CTRLA
George Ferreira Da Silva Finance Analyst CTRLA
Moeketsi Enos Thobela Consultant AFTG1
David Vilar Ferrenbach Energy Specialist AFTG2
Maria Meer Program Assistant AFTG2
(b) Staff time and cost
Fiscal years USD thousands (including
No\. of staff weeks
travel and consultant costs)
Lending
FY01 4\.85 20\.28
FY02 1\.45 68\.95
FY03 9\.31 71\.97
FY04 4\.95 71\.92
FY05 6\.18 75\.31
FY06 7\.52 61\.53
FY07 7\.58 41\.01
Total: 41\.84 410\.97
Supervision/ICR
FY08 5\.22 62\.35
FY09 3\.51 15\.50
FY10 4\.76 33\.17
FY11 15\.99 80\.12
FY12 11\.54 43\.45
FY13 8\.36 41\.80
FY14 3\.37 22\.24
Total 52\.75 298\.63
40
Annex 5: Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR
After the compilation of the first draft of the ICR, the lead ICR author met with the DoE Director of
New and Renewable Energy to discuss the ICR in detail\. The resulting comments are summarized
in this annex\. The comments are categorized according to the corresponding sections of the main
body of this ICR\.
Section 2\.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry
Adequacy of participatory processes
As part of resolving the inclusion of black economic empowerment as an evaluation criterion in
procurement processes, the Bank and the DoE agreed that 17 percent of project costs would be
allocated to the procurement of local services and goods\. This provision excluded the capacity-
building and implementation support activities, which were funded fully by the Bank\. (During 2011,
a decision was made for the DoE to fully fund the implementation support activities in the period
remaining before the projectâs closing date\.)
Section 2\.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation, and Utilization
Utilization
In addition to streamlining the MG selection criteria and frequent calls for applications, the
workshops on the MG application process that were facilitated by the Project Coordinator also
contributed to increasing the quality and quantity of MG applications\.
The substantial interest in the capacity-building workshops convened by the projectâas evidenced
by high attendance figuresâindicated the extent to which the project contributed to the
dissemination of knowledge about RE\.
Section 2\.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
Transitional arrangements to post-completion
The process of determining how the DoE funds remaining after the projectâs closing date could be
applied in supporting outstanding activities was underway\. It was confirmed that these activities
included the implementation of a training program for SWH installers, the procurement of a solar
energy specialist to provide support directly to the DoE, and possibly, support toward the
implementation of the RE small projects program launched by the DoE in the second half of 2013\.
Section 2\.5 Achievement of PDO and GEO
Outcome Indicator 1: Government and electricity regulators prepared the legal, policy, and
regulatory frameworks for grid-based renewable energy power, and submitted them for
government approval by December 31, 2009\.
41
The ICR should highlight the market segmentation concept that was presented as part of the
National Solar Water Heating Framework (NSWHF)\. This was due to the enabling role it played in
broadening the SWH rollout program, such as the inclusion of low-income households\.
The ICR should highlight that the REMT Project had contributed its share to the development of the
ISMO Bill, and that further progress was dependent on the parliamentary process\.
Outcome Indicator 2: Renewable energy resource database is available\.
The ICR should also highlight that a solar resource map could have been created to support the
development of the nascent rooftop solar PV the market\. This would be in addition to facilitating
the rollout of SWH systems nationally\. This also could have assisted with government planning, for
instance, in support of the implementation of a management system for environment impact
assessments\.
Outcome Indicator 4: Knowledge about renewable energy increases in relevant official
agencies and private-sector financial institutions\.
Although not documented in the applicable workshop report, the contribution of the project-
sponsored CSP Industrial Potential Workshop to the establishment of the CSP industry association
(SASTELA) should be highlighted, because SASTELA subsequently played a key role in
developing the CSP sector in South Africa\.
Outcome Indicator 8: US$9 million is invested in CSWH systems\.
The project contributed indirectly to SWH investments by sponsoring the development of the
NSWHF\. The NSWHF provided the basis for the national rollout of SWH systems, which received
ZAR4\.7 billion from the National Treasury\.
Outcome Indicator 9: CO2 emissions avoided through CSWH systems\.
The project contributed indirectly to the CO2 emission reductions related to SWH investments by
sponsoring the development of the NSWHF\. The NSWHF provided the basis for the national
rollout of SWH systems, which received ZAR4\.7 billion from the National Treasury\.
Section 4 Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome
Government ownership/commitment
The ICR should also highlight the DoEâs commitment by ensuring that the institutional
arrangements required to support the national SWH rollout program are in place\. These included
the designation of an implementing agency, the envisaged use of PPP instruments, such as
concessions to secure SWH investments, as well as the rollout of a training program for SWH
installers\.
42
Section 5\.2\.a Government performance
Adequacy of beneficiary/stakeholder consultations and involvement
The ICR should mention the role played by the DoE in facilitating linkages with regional
investment promotion agencies in support of the MG program\. These were helpful in convening the
workshops that the Project Coordinator used as a platform to share detailed information on the MG
application process with prospective beneficiaries\.
Relationships and coordination with donors/partners/stakeholders
Same as above
Adequacy of transition arrangements for regular operation of supported activities
The implementation arrangements were in the process of being finalized\.
Section 5\.2\.b Implementing Agencyâs or Agenciesâ Performance
Adequacy of transition arrangements for regular operation of supported activities
The transition arrangements were in the process of being finalized\.
43
Annex 6: List of Supporting Documents
Project Appraisal Document
Grant Agreement between the Bank and the DoE
Memorandum of Understanding between the DBSA and the DoE
Midterm Review Report (2011)
Restructuring letters exchanged between the Bank and the DoE
The Bankâs Aide Mémoires
Implementation Supervision Reports
Interim Financial Reports
Audited Annual Financial Statements of the Project
Presentation on the Eskom Solar Water Heating Rebate Scheme
DoEâEskom Revised SWH Contract Model
DoEâEskom SWH Rollout Dashboard
44
IBRD 35553
20 ° 25 °
ZIMBABWE
SOUTH AFRICA NP341
RENEWABLE ENERGY MARKET
NP342
DC34 MOZAMBIQUE
TRANSFORMATION PROJECT
NP343
NP351 NP344
CBDMA4
BOTSWANA DC35 NP331
NP362
NORTHERNNP352
NP353 NP332
DC33
NP367
PROVINCE CAPITALS PROVINCE PolokwaneNP333
(Pietersburg)
NP334
NATIONAL CAPITALS DC36 NP354
NP355 CBDC4
NCDMA08 DISTRICT MANAGEMENT NP361
NP365
NP03A3
NP04A1
AREAS NP364
CBLC5
NP03A2
CBDMA3
LOCAL MUNICIPALITIES CBDC3
CBLC6
NP366 CBDMA4
NW375 CBLC3
DISTRICT COUNCILS NW385 NW371 MP316 MPDMA32
CBLC4 25 °
CROSS-BOUNDARY NWDMA37
MPDMA31
MP321
DC32
DISTRICT COUNCIL
NW372 DC37
GT02b1 MP315 MP322
NW373 Tshwane Nelspruit
Durban METROPOLITAN DISTRICT NW395
Mmabatho NW374
Pretoria MP313
MP314
MPDMA32 MP324
GTDMA41 CBDC2
COUNCIL
NW381
NW383
GT411 GAUTENG
CBLC2 MPUMALANGA MP323
PROVINCE BOUNDARIES NW384DC38 GT412
City of
Johannesburg MP312 DC31 MP301
MPDMA32
Johannesburg East Rand MP311
INTERNATIONAL NW401 CBDC8 Ekurhuleni
NORTH WEST
GT414
BOUNDARIES NW391 GT423
DC39 CBLC8
DC40
GT421
MP307
DC42 MP302
NW382
NC081
NW392 NW403
NW402 GT422
DC30 SWAZILAND
NCDMACB1 MP306
0 50 100 150 200 250 FS204 MP305
NW1a1
MP303
CBDC1
KILOMETERS NW393 NW404
DC20 FS205
MP304
KZDMA27
KZ271
NCDMA08 FS203
NW394
NC01B1 CBLC1
NW396 FS185 KZ261 KZ262 DC27
FS201 KZ253 KZ272
CBLC7
FS193
FS195
KZ252 DC25 DC26 KZDMA27
NC086 FS184 KZ263 KZ265
DC8
NAMIBIA
FS183 KZ273
NCDMA09 NC093 DC19 KZ254
NC085 DC9 DC18 FS194
KZ241
FREE STATE
KZ242 KZ266 KZ274
NC092
FS182
FS192
FSDMA19
KZ232
DC24 Ulundi KZDMA27
NC082
NC083
Kimberley FS181
Bloemfontein
FS191
KWAZULU-NATAL
KZ233 KZ285 KZ281
KZ275
NC091 KZ235 KZ286 KZ283
NCDMA07 KZ244
NC061
NC084 DC23 KZ234 DC28 KZ282
KZ284
NC078 FS173 KZ236 KZ245
NCDMA06 FS172 KZDMA23
KZ223
NC067
DC17 KZ294 KZ291
NC077 FS161 KZDMA22
KZ221 DC29
NC062 NORTHERN CAPE NC076
FS171
LESOTHO KZ224
KZ222
DC22 KZ293 KZ292
DC16 KZDMA43 DC21 KZ225
NCDMA06 FS162
KZ5a2
KZ5a1 KZ227
KZ226
Durban
NCDMA06
NC075 FS163 ECDMA44 KZ5a4
30 ° KZ5a5 30 °
DC6 DC7 KZ5a3 DC44 KZ211
NC064 EC05b1 KZ212
NC074 KZ213
NC073 ECDMA14
DC44 KZ214 DC21
EC05b2
NC072
EC144
DC14 EC142
KZ215
EC141 EC152 KZ216
EC151
WCDMA01 EC143
NC065 EC156
EC153
NC071 EC138
DC15
EC133
EC136 EC155 EC154
EC137
AT L A N T I C WC011
NC066 EC132 DC13 EC157
WCDMA05 EC131 EC135
EC134
OCEAN DC1 WCDMA02 EC101
ECDMA13
EC121
EASTERN CAPE
WCDMA01
EC122
WC012
WC053 EC128 EC124 INDIAN OCEAN
DC12 EC123
ECDMA10 EC102 EC127
WC013 Bisho
WCDMA02 DC5 WC052
EC103
EC125
WC014 WC051
DC10 EC104 EC126
WC022 DC2 EC106
WCDMA01 WC015 EC107
WESTERN CAPE
WC041
WC045
WCDMA04
ECDMA10 EC105
This map was produced by the
Cape Town WC023 WC025
WC026
DC4 EC109 Nelson Map Design Unit of The World Bank\.
WC044 WC048 WC047 EC108
WC024 WC043 Mandela The boundaries, colors, denominations
Cape WC042
Town WC031 WC034 and any other information shown on
DC3 this map do not imply, on the part of
WC032
WC033
WCDMA03 The World Bank Group, any judgment
on the legal status of any territory, or
any endorsement or acceptance of
15 ° 20 ° 25 ° 30 ° such boundaries\.
JUNE 2007 | APPROVAL |
P159115 | COMBINED PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENTS / INTEGRATED
SAFEGUARDS DATA SHEET (PID/ISDS)
ADDITIONAL FINANCING
Report No\.: PIDISDSA17320
Date Prepared/Updated: 27-May-2016
I\. BASIC INFORMATION
A\. Basic Project Data
Country: Montenegro Project ID: P159115
Parent P107473
Project ID
(if any):
Project Name: Additional Financing to MIDAS (P159115)
Parent Project Montenegro Institutional Development and Agriculture Strengthening (MIDAS)
Name: (P107473)
Region: EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA
Estimated 16-May-2016 Estimated 20-Jul-2016
Appraisal Date: Board Date:
Practice Area Agriculture Lending Investment Project Financing
(Lead): Instrument:
Sector(s): Public administration- Agriculture, fishing and forestry (40%), General
agriculture, fishing and forestry sector (30%), Animal produ ction (30%)
Theme(s): Rural policies and institutions (40%), Rural non-farm income generation (40%),
Managing for development results (20%)
Borrower(s): Ministry of Finance
Implementing Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
Agency:
Financing (in USD Million)
Financing Source Amount
Borrower 0\.50
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 3\.28
Total Project Cost 3\.78
Environmental B - Partial Assessment
Category:
Appraisal The review did authorize the team to appraise and negotiate
Review
Decision (from
Decision Note):
Other Decision:
Is this a No
Page 1 of 12
Repeater
project?
B\. Introduction and Context
Country Context
Montenegroâ¢â¨ s agricultural development is held back by constraints similar to those witnessed
elsewhere in the region of Southeast Europe: (i) low levels of information among farmers and a
reluctance and/or inability to adopt modern technologies; (ii) small average farm size and a
limited or sub-optimal land rental market; (iii) slow uptake in development of intermediaries or of
agricultural cooperatives that could improve collecting, storage, packaging and marketing of
produce; (iv) the effects of climate change, especially increased risks of weather-related natural
disasters such as floods, and to a lesser extent droughts, the former often resulting in damaging
land erosion once torrential rains occur after these dry periods\.
Montenegro was officially granted candidate status on December 17, 2010\. After obtaining the
EU candidate country status, Montenegro has worked intensively to prepare its institutions to
meet negotiations requirements\. To this end the Montenegro Institutional Development and
Agriculture Strengthening (MIDAS) project was designed to improve compliance with EU
agricultural standards and strengthen institutional capacity to provide agro-environmental
advisory services to Montenegrin farmers, thus enabling them to access EU grant funds to
enhance their operations\. Thus far the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD)
supported by the MIDAS Project has taken a number of steps including setting up the required
Operating Structure for managing IPARD funds, namely establishment of a Directorate for
IPARD Payments and a Directorate for Rural Development which will evolve to become the
future Paying Agency and Managing Authority respectively\.
MIDAS among other activities supported on one side, the strengthening of the institutional
structures in terms of capacity and technical needs, and on the other side designing and piloting
the support program approximating IPARD requirements in a gradual manner\. The Project
provided IPARD-like grants to eligible agricultural holdings, gradually introducing the IPARD
requirements in subsequent rounds, while involving the relevant institution and introducing
required procedures with a learning-by-doing approach\. The MIDAS step wise approach has built
both supply and demand capacity while continuing to support investment in agricultural holdings
until Montenegro will receive conferral of management, and IPARD funds will become available\.
In this regard MARD completed the preparation of its IPARD II Program for 2014 â¢â¨ 2020 that
has been adopted by the EU in July 2015 and by Montenegro in September 2015, while the
IPARD II Accreditation Package has been submitted by Montenegro to the EU in August 2015\.
Sectoral and institutional Context
The importance of agriculture to Montenegroâ¢â¨ s rural economy remains significant, as it
represents a key source of employment, income generation, and food security for a large segment
of the population including some of its most vulnerable members\. According to official statistics,
agricultural primary production represents around 10% of GDP, yet official data likely
underestimate the contribution of agriculture to the economy because a large share of agricultural
production is carried out informally\. Historically, the region of Southeast Europe has had a
tradition of growing food at home and many families still grow fruits and vegetables and
sometimes raise animals (even urban dwellers often have rural second houses called vikendica)\.
Page 2 of 12
This production is not accounted for in most national statistics, as is the case with the related
agricultural employment\. For instance, according to the official statistics provided by the
Statistical Office of Montenegro (MONSTAT), the number of persons formally employed in
agriculture was 2,347 in 2010\. However, the 2010 Agricultural Census reported the equivalent of
46,473 Annual Work Units for agriculture, suggesting that only 5% of agricultural employment is
formal\. This implies that 95% of agricultural employment is not reported in official statistics\. In
turn, this also means that a large share of this production may not be reported, neither as
production nor as consumption\.
The importance of agriculture is also expressed through the growing demand for agricultural
products that contributes to a large and increasing trade deficit\. Agricultural exports have been
increasing by around 4% annually during the last 8 years, while agricultural imports have been
increasing much faster, around 16% annually\. This divergence has resulted in a worsening
agricultural trade deficit that increased from US$166 million in 2005 to US$473 million in 2012\.
Agricultureâ¢â¨ s share within the goods trade deficit increased from 21% to 27% over the same
period\. The role of tourism should not be neglected in understanding these figures which drives a
surge in demand in summer to a multiple fold of what the average monthly figures show\. But
there is potential to supply a substantial share of this surging demand from a better organized
local production base for fresh produce and niche products\.
C\. Proposed Development Objective(s)
Original Project Development Objective(s) - Parent
The Project Development Objective is to improve delivery of government assistance for
sustainable agriculture and rural development in a manner consistent with the EU's pre-accession
requirements\.
Current Project Development Objective(s) - Parent
The new objectives of the Project are: (i) to improve delivery of government assistance for
sustainable agriculture and rural development in a manner consistent with the EU's pre-accession
requirements; (ii) to increase the experience of Montenegrin authorities in administering rural
development grants in accordance with EU-IPARD core rules, and (iii) to support a selected
number of agricultural holdings and food establishments in upgrading towards EU standards\.
Key Results
The main expected outcomes are therefore the following: (i) design of a functional system
supporting the disbursement of direct payments, (ii) design one or two measures to be piloted
with the new system, and (iii) pilot the direct payments\.
D\. Project Description
The proposed AF will provide additional resources to strengthen the capacity of all the
implementing entities and structures involved in the management of the IPARD measures\. It
would furthermore introduce systems, processes and applications necessary for the management
of direct payments which along with the farm register, the livestock registration and identification
system and the eventual Land Parcel Identification System (LPIS) will form the backbone of the
emerging Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS)\.
Component Name
Page 3 of 12
Component 1: Strengthening MARD's rural development program
Comments (optional)
Continues support MARD in the implementation of EU-compatible rural development measures
including: (i) provision of funds for piloting of direct payment scheme; (ii) implementation of a
monitoring support system to measure results achieved by the scheme; (iii) enhancement of
knowledge and capacity in implementing the tasks foreseen under the future full-fledged Paying
Agency in particular through financing TA (including training, study tours, etc\.) and equipment;
(iv) further strengthening the extension and advisory serivces; and (v) carry-out baseline
beneficiary satisfaction/socioeconomic surveys and public awareness campaign including
dissemination of promotional material to illustrate the features of the program and dedicated
presentations and workshops country-wide\.
Component Name
Component 2: Strengthening MARD's administrative and management capacity in accordance
with EU pre-accession requirements
Comments (optional)
Further supports MARD in building key elements of an emerging IACS as required for
implementation, management and control of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP)
implementation \.To this end the AF will finance technical assistance, training; IT and office
equipment as well as software applications; refurbishment of an estimated 3 or 4 regional offices;
workshops for local stakeholders; and logistical support in order to develop such system\. The
rudimentary IACS system developed under the project will be tested during the piloting and
processing of direct payments\.
Component Name
Component 3: Project Management, Administration and Monitoring
Comments (optional)
Continues to support MARD in managing the day-to-day implementation of the project as well as
monitor and evaluate its impact\. In addition to the required consultant services, the AF would
finance: (i) training expenditures, (ii) IT and office equipment, (iii) financial audits, and (iv)
incremental operating costs including the TSU and its fiduciary functions\.
E\. Project location and salient physical characteristics relevant to the safeguard
analysis (if known)
The project would operate country-wide\.
F\. Environmental and Social Safeguards Specialists
Esma Kreso (GEN03)
Vera Dugandzic (GSU03)
II\. Implementation
Institutional and Implementation Arrangements
The Implementing Agency of the Project is the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
(MARD), supported by a small Project Management Team (PMT) established under the Montenegro
Institutional Development and Agriculture Strengthening (MIDAS) that will continue to operate
Page 4 of 12
under the direction of the Project Coordinator/General Director of Directorate for IPARD Payments
of the MARD\. The PMT is composed by a Project Manager, a Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E)
Specialist, and a part-time Environment Specialist\. Additional local consultants with specific
expertise required during the implementation of the AF may be hired\. During the implementation of
MIDAS MARD has worked toward mainstreaming of Monitoring & Evaluation activities into the
ministry structure\. As such, M&E of project activities will be also supported both by the Directorate
for Rural Development, tasked with the monitoring and evaluation of the MARD rural development
program, and by the Directorate for IPARD Payments that will provide data on the implementation
of the support piloted through the direct payments system to be established under the project\. With
regard to the required fiduciary requirements, procurement and financial management aspects of the
Project will be carried out under the Technical Service Unit (TSU) established under the Ministry of
Finance (MOF) to provide procurement and financial management services to the line ministries as
defined in the Memorandum of Understanding signed by MARD and MOF\.
III\.Safeguard Policies that might apply
Safeguard Policies Triggered? Explanation (Optional)
Environmental Assessment Yes An Environmental management framework has been
OP/BP 4\.01 prepared under the original project and included in
each of the Grant Operational Manuals, as applied to
each of the grant cycles\. The purpose of the EMF is
to determine activities that cannot be financed and
screen them out, which include activities that
correspond to World Bank category A projects or
activities requiring a Profound EIA as per the
Montenegrin Law on EIA; activities that may impact
quality or quantity of an international waterway or
activities where proof of land ownership is not
available\. The EMF sets forth guidance on
developing site specific Environmental Management
Plans that are to be disclosed with public
consultations in the project area\. No issues have been
noted with the EMF screening process or
implementation of EMP measures on sites\.
All reconstruction/refurbishment activities under the
AF shall be subject to a simple EMP or Checklist
EMP, as was the case for the Paying Agency and BIP
Bar works under the original project\.
Natural Habitats OP/BP 4\.04 Yes The original project triggers this policy mostly due to
the broad scope of the project that was envisaged
during the preparation of the original project and the
potential for degradation of natural habitats\. The AF
shall not finance any activities that would have an
impact on natural habitats of any kind or type and all
financed activities will be on existing agricultural
land\.
Forests OP/BP 4\.36 Yes The original project triggers the policy on forestry,
Page 5 of 12
due to the potential loss of forested areas and
conversion of forested areas into agricultural land,
which has not happened under the original project\.
The AF does not foresee any activities that would
impact forests and all financed activities will be on
existing agricultural land\.
Pest Management OP 4\.09 Yes The original project triggers this policy due to the
risk of increased pest management with increasing
agricultural production\. The support to agricultural
activities may also lead to an increased use of pest
management products, which would need to be
controlled by the Integrated Pest Management Plan,
as part of the original EMF\.
Physical Cultural Resources Yes The original project included works on the
OP/BP 4\.11 reconstruction of the Institute for Marine Biology in
Kotor which is a building under the protection
regime\. No such works are anticipated under the AF\.
Indigenous Peoples OP/BP No
4\.10
Involuntary Resettlement OP/ Yes The original project triggered the Bankâs Policy OP
BP 4\.12 4\.12 on Involuntary Resettlement\. It was expected
that the project would finance the construction of the
Paying Agency building and that land may be
required to be expropriated for that purpose\.
Therefore, as a guiding resettlement instrument, the
Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) document
was developed, approved and disclosed in November
2008\. However, it is to be noted that no land
acquisition took place under the original project as
the implementing Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development decided not to construct a new building
but rather to use the existing state-owned building\.
Moreover, the eligibility criteria for the existing
grant scheme spelled out in the Grant Operational
Manual (GOM) clearly state that only activities that
do not trigger the application of Bankâs OP 4\.12
policy on Involuntary Resettlement are eligible for
grant funding\.
The AF new support program of piloting direct
payments to farmers will follow the same eligibility
criteria which also state that the activities that may
result in displacement of any third party formally or
informally occupying or using the land on which the
activity is to be implemented will be excluded from
financing\. Only activities that are located on the
farmerâs own land or on land for which the grant
Page 6 of 12
applicant has written consent from the owner to use
the land will be eligible for funding\.
Safety of Dams OP/BP 4\.37 No No activities related to dams are envisaged to be
financed\.
Projects on International Yes An exemption from notification based on Para 7(a)
Waterways OP/BP 7\.50 of the policy was approved by the ECA VP on
9/24/2008, based on the assessment that water
requirements for water-related infrastructure to be
rehabilitated under the project will not adversely
affect the quantity or quality of water flow to other
riparians, and will not be adversely affected by the
other ripariansâ possible water use\. In addition, the
Loan and Grant Agreements for the original project
specify that âthe Borrower shall ensure that no Loan
proceeds are used to finance: (a) any new irrigation
systems or extension of existing irrigation systems;
or (b) any agri-processing or other activities which
could result in increased contamination of
international water bodies\.â The AF does not
envisage activities that could impact international
waterways beyond the existing exemption, while the
Trust Fund aimed at supporting agro-processing has
conducted a notification of the riparians (namely the
International Commission for the Protection of the
Danube River - ICPDR and the Mediterranean
Action Plan - Barcelona Convention MAP/RCU) was
sent out by MARD on March 06, 2015\. No
objections or comments have been received to date
Projects in Disputed Areas OP/ No
BP 7\.60
IV\. Key Safeguard Policy Issues and Their Management
A\. Summary of Key Safeguard Issues
1\. Describe any safeguard issues and impacts associated with the proposed project\. Identify
and describe any potential large scale, significant and/or irreversible impacts:
The project will maintain the current ongoing monitoring systems to ensure the environmental and
social safeguards under the project are adequately tracked and managed\.
The scale-up of already existing project activities will not trigger any additional safeguards
policies\. The original project, as prepared in 2009 had triggered OP 4\.01 on Environmental
Assessment, OP 4\.04 on Natural Habitats, OP 4\.36 on Forests, OP 4\.09 on Pest Management, OP
4\.11 on Physical Cultural Resources, OP 4\.12 on Involuntary Resettlement and OP 7\.50 on
International Waterways\. The triggering of this number of policies was mostly due to the fact that
the size, location and type of investments to be financed under the grants was unknown at the time,
and that the activities beyond the grants included works on a cultural heritage building (Marine
Biology Laboratory in Kotor), and the potential for irrigation development, for which an
Exception to Notify Memo had been prepared in line with OP 7\.50\. The most relevant of the
Page 7 of 12
policies, OP 4\.01 was reflected in the Environmental Management Framework prepared for the
project, and applied in each of the grant cycle through its provision in the GOM\. Sound
environmental practices have been integrated into each of the grant applications for which an
Environmental Management Plan was necessary\. A relatively small number of activities that could
have an impact on international waterways were screened out\.
In preparation of each of the subsequent grant cycles, the MIDAS team had worked closely with
the World Bank team to streamline the process and to integrate lessons learned into the new grant
cycle\. The revisions have been minor, but have helped improve the overall process\. In addition,
the safeguards specialist that is on board the Project Management Team has played a crucial role
in educating the applicants and reviewing all of the grant applications with respect to potential risk
to the environment, land ownership issues and assigning adequate due diligence\. As a result, each
of the applications has been screened with respect to environmental and social impact, and
adequate measures were provided through EMPs prepared for each activity that required one\. The
screening procedure was also in place for the two TF-funded activities under the project\. Each of
the Environmental Management Plans called for public consultations and disclosure and this has
been carried out for each of the activities\. There have been no issues noted during the select site
visits, and there were no cases reported on any environmental or social safeguards non-compliance
All reconstruction/refurbishment activities under the AF shall be subject to a simple EMP or
Checklist EMP, as was the case for the Paying Agency and BIP Bar works under the original
project\.
2\. Describe any potential indirect and/or long term impacts due to anticipated future activities
in the project area:
There are no negative long-term or indirect impacts associated with the AF\. The potential long-
term impacts may only be indirectly reflected in the increased environmental awareness of the
participating farmers\. The AF will carry out a baseline beneficiary satisfaction surveys as well as
public awareness to familiarize farmers with the application process and required minimum
documentation\.
3\. Describe any project alternatives (if relevant) considered to help avoid or minimize adverse
impacts\.
There are no alternatives that were considered, as each application is screened for individually
upon submission\. The grant applications are screened upon receipt to ensure no Category A
activities or any activities that would require any land acquisition are financed\. The grants are then
awarded on a competitive basis following criteria defined in the GOM\.
4\. Describe measures taken by the borrower to address safeguard policy issues\. Provide an
assessment of borrower capacity to plan and implement the measures described\.
The proposed AF would provide additional resources to strengthen the capacity of all the
implementing entities and structures involved in the implementation of IPARD measures,
processing direct payments and an emerging IACS system as defined above and in line with EU
approximation requirements\. Implementation arrangements, beneficiary institutions and existing
mechanisms would be substantially retained as designed under the original MIDAS project\. The
MIDAS project has included an environmental and social specialist that has conducted regular
environmental and social screening, education and training of applicants and site supervision\. The
borrower is therefore very knowledgeable of the World Bank procedures and has a solid track
record of implementing them\. in addition, there is a good track record of complaints handling
mechanism with adequate registering, monitoring and reporting established\. The GOM lays out in
detail the guidelines to be followed for handling rejections and complaints; the composition and
role of the evaluation and complaints commissions (CC); and disclosure requirements stating that
Page 8 of 12
all complaints handling procedures and information are to be posted on the MIDAS website:
www\.midas\.co\.me to ensure transparency of the whole process\.
5\. Identify the key stakeholders and describe the mechanisms for consultation and disclosure
on safeguard policies, with an emphasis on potentially affected people\.
The original Environmental Assessment and Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) have been
disclosed in country with public consultations held in 2008 that solicited reviews and comments
from a group of varied stakeholders, including NGOs, academia and the agencies and ministries
that deal with environmental protection\. For each of the grant cycles, the Grant Operational
Manual has included a section on environmental and social screening and compliance, which have
also been disclosed to the public prior to the start of the application submissions\. Each of the
EMPs that has been developed following the guidelines in the GOM was subject to disclosure and
public consultations\. The two linked Trust Funds have also required a revised EMF (or
environmental and social screening procedure) that was disclosed on the MIDAS project website
on June 24, 2014, and also through the World Bank Infoshop and continues to be applicable for
this Additional Financing as well\.
B\. Disclosure Requirements
Environmental Assessment/Audit/Management Plan/Other
Date of receipt by the Bank 16-Jun-2008
Date of submission to InfoShop 30-Jul-2008
For category A projects, date of distributing the Executive
Summary of the EA to the Executive Directors
"In country" Disclosure
Montenegro 24-Jun-2014
Comments: The EMF was re-disclosed for the Trust Fund activities\.
Resettlement Action Plan/Framework/Policy Process
Date of receipt by the Bank 16-Jun-2008
Date of submission to InfoShop 28-Nov-2008
"In country" Disclosure
Comments:
Pest Management Plan
Was the document disclosed prior to appraisal? NA
Date of receipt by the Bank NA
Date of submission to InfoShop NA
"In country" Disclosure
Comments:
If the project triggers the Pest Management and/or Physical Cultural Resources policies, the
Page 9 of 12
respective issues are to be addressed and disclosed as part of the Environmental Assessment/
Audit/or EMP\.
If in-country disclosure of any of the above documents is not expected, please explain why:
C\. Compliance Monitoring Indicators at the Corporate Level
OP/BP/GP 4\.01 - Environment Assessment
Does the project require a stand-alone EA (including EMP) Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
report?
If yes, then did the Regional Environment Unit or Practice Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
Manager (PM) review and approve the EA report?
Are the cost and the accountabilities for the EMP incorporated Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
in the credit/loan?
OP/BP 4\.04 - Natural Habitats
Would the project result in any significant conversion or Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
degradation of critical natural habitats?
If the project would result in significant conversion or Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
degradation of other (non-critical) natural habitats, does the
project include mitigation measures acceptable to the Bank?
OP 4\.09 - Pest Management
Does the EA adequately address the pest management issues? Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
Is a separate PMP required? Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
If yes, has the PMP been reviewed and approved by a Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
safeguards specialist or PM? Are PMP requirements included
in project design?If yes, does the project team include a Pest
Management Specialist?
OP/BP 4\.11 - Physical Cultural Resources
Does the EA include adequate measures related to cultural Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
property?
Does the credit/loan incorporate mechanisms to mitigate the Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
potential adverse impacts on cultural property?
OP/BP 4\.12 - Involuntary Resettlement
Has a resettlement plan/abbreviated plan/policy framework/ Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
process framework (as appropriate) been prepared?
If yes, then did the Regional unit responsible for safeguards or Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
Practice Manager review the plan?
Is physical displacement/relocation expected? Yes [ ] No [ ] TBD [ ]
Provided estimated number of people to be affected
Is economic displacement expected? (loss of assets or access to Yes [ ] No [ ] TBD [ ]
assets that leads to loss of income sources or other means of
livelihoods)
Page 10 of 12
Provided estimated number of people to be affected
OP/BP 4\.36 - Forests
Has the sector-wide analysis of policy and institutional issues Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
and constraints been carried out?
Does the project design include satisfactory measures to Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
overcome these constraints?
Does the project finance commercial harvesting, and if so, Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
does it include provisions for certification system?
OP 7\.50 - Projects on International Waterways
Have the other riparians been notified of the project? Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
If the project falls under one of the exceptions to the Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
notification requirement, has this been cleared with the Legal
Department, and the memo to the RVP prepared and sent?
Has the RVP approved such an exception? Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
The World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information
Have relevant safeguard policies documents been sent to the Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
World Bank's Infoshop?
Have relevant documents been disclosed in-country in a public Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
place in a form and language that are understandable and
accessible to project-affected groups and local NGOs?
All Safeguard Policies
Have satisfactory calendar, budget and clear institutional Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
responsibilities been prepared for the implementation of
measures related to safeguard policies?
Have costs related to safeguard policy measures been included Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
in the project cost?
Does the Monitoring and Evaluation system of the project Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
include the monitoring of safeguard impacts and measures
related to safeguard policies?
Have satisfactory implementation arrangements been agreed Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
with the borrower and the same been adequately reflected in
the project legal documents?
V\. Contact point
World Bank
Contact: Daniel P\. Gerber
Title: Sr Agricultural Spec\.
Borrower/Client/Recipient
Name: Ministry of Finance
Contact: Radoje Zugic
Title: Minister of Finance
Email: radoje\.zugic@mif\.gov\.me
Implementing Agencies
Page 11 of 12
Name: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
Contact: Blagota Radulovic
Title: General Director of IPARD Payments
Email: blagota\.radulovic@mpr\.gov\.me
VI\. For more information contact:
The InfoShop
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 458-4500
Fax: (202) 522-1500
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/infoshop
VII\. Approval
Task Team Leader(s): Name: Daniel P\. Gerber
Approved By
Safeguards Advisor: Name: Agnes I\. Kiss (SA) Date: 24-May-2016
Practice Manager/ Name: Steven N\. Schonberger (PMGR) Date: 24-May-2016
Manager:
Country Director: Name: Tatiana A\. Proskuryakova (CD) Date: 27-May-2016
Page 12 of 12 | APPROVAL |
P098583 | Page 1
Updated Project Information Document
35152
Project Name
MALDIVES
INTEGRATED HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
ADDITIONAL FINANCING
Region
South Asia
Sector
Other services (40%); General education sector 30%); Health (20%); Sub-
national government administration (10%)
Theme
Social risk reduction (P); Education for all (S); Public expenditure, financial
management and procurement (S)
Project
P098583
Borrower(s)
REPUBLIC OF MALDIVES
Implementing Agency(ies)
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
Address: Ameenee Magu, Male, Republic of Maldives
Contact Person: Riluwan Shareef
Tel: 960-31-7586 Fax: 960-32-4432
E-mail: rshareef@finance\.gov\.mv
Environment Category
B
(partial assessment)
Date PID Prepared
January 30
,
2006
Auth Appr/Negs Date
February 6, 2006
Bank Approval Date
March 14, 2006
1\. Country and Sector Background
The Maldives is a chain of Indian Ocean islands spread over a distance of 900 kilometers, and located
between northern latitude 4 to slightly south of the equator\. The land area, which covers about 26 geographic
atolls, is grouped into 20 administrative atolls\. The population of the Maldives is about 300,000\. The
country faces two main geographic challenges: (a) the absence of a significant land mass, which has resulted
in a highly dispersed population, and (b) the low altitude of the existing islands\. The country has 1,190
islands, of which 198 are inhabited\. Of these islands, only 33 have a land area greater than one square
kilometer\. One third of the inhabited islands have a population of less than 500 and 70% of the inhabited
islands have a population of less than 1,000\. This extremely low population density makes the Maldives
unique, even among small island archipelagic states\. It also raises the cost of delivering social services and
of public administration, as there is hardly any scope to generate economies of scale\. The altitude of most of
the islands in the Maldives is very low, just above sea level\. As a result, rising sea levels cause many islands
to disappear\. This has rendered some inhabited islands ecologically vulnerable, while other islands have
become too densely populated to sustain their communities\. The greater Male area, already home to 70,000
people or almost a quarter of the population, is of specific concern, with increasing strain on social and
public services caused by continuing in-migration from other parts of the archipelago\.
The Maldives has enjoyed rapid economic growth over the past 25 years or so, based on the highly
successful development of a tourism industry aimed at the upper-end of the global tourism market, a
prosperous fishing industry and an expanding service sector\. GDP growth in the past two decades has
averaged over 9 percent per year, resulting in a tripling of per capita income since 1980 to US$2,280 in
2002\. The literacy rate among females aged 15 and above has reached 97 percent and the net primary school
enrolment rate has risen rapidly, from 38 percent to 93 percent, over the last three decades\. The health status
of the population has also improved considerably\. The average life expectancy at birth increased from 50
years in 1970 to 69 years in 2002\. The infant mortality rate declined from 159 per thousand live births in
1970 to 55 per thousand live births in 2002\. The crude death rate fell from a high 38 per thousand to 4 over
the same period\. Finally, the population growth rate declined from over 3 percent around 1990 to 1\.9 percent
Page 2
2
in 2002, reflecting decreases in fertility that can be attributed, to a considerable extent, to the improved
education status of women\.
Economic growth and improvements in human development indicators have substantially reduced income
and non-income dimensions of poverty in the Maldives\. Destitution and extreme hunger are rare phenomena
in Maldives, and it is entirely plausible that Maldives will meet most if not all of the MDG targets, with
child malnutrition the only MDG target which is still a problem\. While the Maldives does not yet have an
official or widely accepted poverty line, preliminary analysis based on the Household and Income Survey
(HIES 2002/03) and using a range of plausible poverty lines suggests that poverty is substantially higher in
the outer atolls than in Male\. Most income poverty is concentrated in the outer atolls, especially in the more
remote islands\. Non-income dimensions of poverty and deprivation, such as health, nutrition, education and
access to local government services, also consistently reveal worse conditions in the atolls in comparison to
the capital M
ale region\.
The government has developed a two pronged strategy to distribute the benefits of economic growth to all
parts of the country\. The first element of the strategy is to develop two regional centers, one in Addu Atoll in
the far south and the second in Haa Dhalu Atoll in the far north\. These centers are designed to have airports,
good ports and other social and infrastructure facilities\. The regional centers are to be complemented by
focus islands on different atolls to act as atoll service hubs and growth centers\. The government expects
these strategies to reduce regional differentials and promote growth and employment opportunities outside
of Male\. The government also plans to address poverty among the most vulnerable groups, who may not be
able to benefit from the growth strategy, by developing special targeted income support programs\.
In response to the Governments request for support to the above strategy, an IDA funded Integrated Human
Development Project was approved in July 2004 and became effective on December 9, 2004\. On December
26, 2005, a Tsunami traveling at over 700 kilometers per hour hit the Maldives\. Tidal waves ranging from 4-
14 feet were reported in all parts of the country\. More than 100 persons were reported dead, 1,300 persons
injured, 12,000 persons displaced from their islands and 8,500 persons relocated to other places on their own
island\. There was widespread destruction of infrastructure including electricity and water supply\. Direct
damages to physical assets were estimated to be about US$ 300 million\. The impact of the tsunami on the
economy was severe and widespread\.
To respond to the crisis situation, and due to the lack of IDA funds till the approval of IDA 14 in July 2005,
the Government of the Maldives requested the World Bank to cancel SDR 6\.598 million (about US$10
million)from the IHDP, with the understanding that additional financing will be sought from IDA once
funds became available under the IDA 14 allocations\. It is now proposed to provide restore part of the
cancelled funds through the mechanism of additional financing
for IHDP of US $ 5\.7 million from the
available IDA 14 allocation for the Maldives\. The European Union has agreed to financing education
activities under IHDP on two islands, leaving an estimated shortfall of less than US$1 million from the
original financing of IHDP\.
2\. Major Sector Issues
The High Cost of Delivering Social Services
\.
The provision of social services in the Maldives poses special
challenges given the dispersed population\. The countrys public expenditure is high, at 40% of GDP, though
comparable with other small island economies with dispersed populations\. The Governments previous
strategy of expanding access to services across the archipelago consisted of creating facilities and providing
services on all islands, including those with small populations\. In the education and health sectors, this
approach has led to the establishment of a primary school and a primary health post on each inhabited island\.
Establishing and maintaining secondary schools and more advanced health facilities on each island would,
however, be extremely expensive\. Even the current high level of public expenditure can only support a basic
Page 3
3
level of local government services to the atolls, with advanced services concentrated
in the central Male
region\. Widening access to high quality local government services to the atolls is likely to be unaffordable\.
Hence, the government needs to maximize cost effectiveness in developing strategies to improve access and
the quality of education, health care and local government services in the outer atolls\.
Education Services
\.
While primary education is virtually universal, secondary school enrolment varies in
from about 131% (gross enrolment ration) in Male to only 53% in the outer atolls\. This is mainly due to the
physical inaccessibility of secondary schools from the outer atolls\. However, establishing a secondary
school network on all inhabited islands would be prohibitively expensive, requiring massive investment in
school infrastructure and high recurrent expenditures, with an implied student-teacher ratio of about 5:1 if all
inhabited islands were to have secondary schools\. The Government strategy is therefore to concentrate
secondary education in the focus islands\.
Further, the quality of secondary education in the outer atolls is unsatisfactory as exemplified in much lower
pass rates at the GCE O/L and GCE A/L for students in the outer atolls than for students in Male\.
Opportunities for training are limited for teachers and school administrators in the outer atolls\. The
availability of teaching material and learning resources is also limited\. The Government strategy is to
enhance quality through initiatives such as professional development of academic and administrative staff in
the outer atolls and greater investment in teaching material and learning resources\. Due to the geography of
the Maldives, students seeking secondary education often have to travel to other islands, including Male, to
attend secondary schools\. The problem of commuting to school is particularly acute for girl students and
children from poor families\. According to the recently completed beneficiary assessment, female students
attending school away from home tend to be obliged to carry out domestic chores within host households,
which reduces their time for academic study\. This deters many girls from enrolling in secondary schools
away from their home islands\. In addition, pass rates for girls are about 18% lower than for boys in the GCE
O-level examinations in the outer atolls\. The poor test results for girls relative to boys run contrary to the
usual pattern experienced in most other countries and even in Male, where girls perform better\. This
emphasizes the need to address the constraints faced by girls studying outside their home islands\. In
addition, students from poor families are at a disadvantage in accessing education opportunities outside their
home islands due to cost constraints\. The Government strategy is to establish residential learning centers on
the focus islands to enable students from primary islands to live on the focus islands and attend secondary
school\.
Health and Nutrition Services
\.
The rapid expansion of the Maldivian population over the past 25 years,
combined with higher life expectancy, has created a need for regional health services to combat a range of
non-communicable and degenerative diseases\. Past investments have created a basic health network across
the atolls, capable of dealing with basic communicable diseases\. However, establishing advanced health
services on all islands is prohibitively expensive, given the small populations on the large majority of
islands\. Upgrading a regional health center on each atoll for diagnosis and treatment of non-communicable
and degenerative diseases provides a rational strategy for improving the quality of health care available in
the atolls\. A key constraint to the development of such regional health centers is the difficulty of providing
off-site training to health personnel on a regular basis, because the small numbers of health staff at each
center precludes the release of staff from the island for long periods\. The Government proposes to use
telemedicine to expand the range of health services available in atoll health centers cost-effectively\.
Similarly, training programs based on distance learning methodologies will be used to upgrade the skills and
knowledge of medical personnel while they remain on the islands\.
The extensive use of foreign health personnel on the outer atolls causes variations in treatment, including the
use of medicines and drugs\. To reduce regional imbalances in the quality of care offered, the Government
proposes to develop standard treatment protocols for non-communicable diseases (these already exist for
communicable diseases)\. There are also sporadic shortages of essential drugs on the atolls, and even the
Page 4
4
focus islands, as private pharmacies tend to stock medicines which are most profitable in preference to
essential drugs\. Some island development committees have expressed an interest in community pharmacies
to address this problem, and the Government proposes to assist communities to establish pharmacies to sell
essential drugs in the outer atolls\.
Despite its high level of per capita income and relatively good health infrastructure, the Maldives suffers
from unexpectedly high rates of malnutrition and micronutrient deficiencies as well as a disease burden
caused by perinatal mortality, and a slow decline in maternal mortality\. According to the 2001 Multiple
Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS 2001), over 30% of children under 5 are two standard deviations below
their expected weight for age\. Malnutrition (weight for age) rises sharply after the first twelve months,
probably due to inadequate weaning practices and foods\. These problems can usually be addressed through
nutrition education\. According to MICS 2001, micronutrient malnutrition including vitiamin A, iodine and
iron deficiency is high with 51% of women suffering some form of anemia, and over 20% of school children
having iodine deficiency\. Globally, iodine deficiency has been addressed by salt iodization, but although
iodized salt is available in the Maldives, the MICS 2001 survey found that only 44% households actually
used iodized salt\. The Government proposes to implement a nutrition education program to improve dietary
and food preparation habits\. The high perinatal mortality and slow decline in maternal mortality is largely
the result of poor access of women to skilled birth attendants\. Currently more than a third (36%) of the
deliveries is still conducted by untrained birth attendants\. In geographic conditions that limit access to
obstetric services, the concept of maternity waiting homes has been successfully used\. The Government is
considering transporting women residing in islands without skilled delivery care services to the focus island
a
fortnight before their expected date of delivery and arranging for their stay at the multi-purpose building
to be constructed under the community services component project until delivery\. This opportunity can be
used to educate women in child caring practices with emphasis on exclusive breast feeding and
demonstration of weaning foods\.
In a beneficiary assessment carried out in 2003, the issue of transportation was cited as a major constraint to
accessing health care by 89% of those interviewed on primary islands in Baa Atoll and by 79% in Lamu
Atoll\. The focus island residents, on the other hand, reported that they had access to health services on their
own islands and were generally satisfied with the quality of the services\. Therefore the Government strategy
to address the transportation problem is to provide facilities on focus islands for patients from primary
islands where they can reside during the period they need treatment\.
Employment Services\.
The Maldives is beginning to face a problem of youth unemployment as a result of
working age population expansion and rising education levels\. The countrys unique geography and
population distribution places sharp constraints on worker mobility\. According to the poverty and
vulnerability survey in 1998, the unemployment rate for the whole country was 10% (22% for females)\.
However the average masks large differences between employment rates in Male and the Atolls\. The
unemployment rate in Make was 6% (27% for females) and in the four focus atolls the unemployment rate
was 13% (28% for female)\. On the labor demand side, job-growth is concentrated in service jobs in the hotel
/tourism sector mainly in the central region around Male\. Thus, employment opportunities in the outer atolls
for young educated people (outside of the traditional fisheries sector) are limited\. School leavers in the outer
atolls might be willing to accept jobs in the Male region, but have limited information about these jobs\.
High transport costs also restrict the ability of people to search for jobs\. As a result, most new jobs in the
service sector use foreign labor\. On the supply side, the skills mismatch between graduates in outer islands
and service sector jobs requirements may also contribute to high unemployment levels\.
The Government plans to strengthen measures to improve the flow of information about labor market
opportunities within the Maldives to reduce job search periods for young people and match job seekers with
potential employers\. As noted above, the Government also proposes to address the skills mismatch by
improving the access and quality of secondary school education in outer atolls\. Finally, the Government
Page 5
5
plans to spread the benefits of growth to the outer atolls by facilitating the development of resorts in these
regions\. The evidence from atolls with resorts suggests that not only do the resorts create jobs directly but
they also enhance the scope for self-employment and income generating activities on neighboring islands by
increasing the demand for local handicrafts and souvenirs, thereby having a positive impact on poverty
reduction\. In particular, women who are not allowed to work on resorts due to cultural factors benefit as
income generating activities are developed in their home islands in the neighborhoods of resorts\.
Community Services\.
Community organizations traditionally play an important role in the life of the
Maldives, a country of many small, island communities\. Most of the public or collective services available
on distant islands are provided by community groups\. The demand for good quality local government
services, such as public administration, law courts, police, water, electricity, posts and communications have
been rising with population expansion, higher incomes and improved education\. Providing such facilities
and services to each inhabited island is prohibitively expensive, given the small population sizes on the
islands\. To address this issue, the government plans to develop focus islands to serve as local government
hubs for the atolls\. In addition, the government desires to promote community participation in the delivery
of public services to empower atoll communities, and increase accountability and ownership of the
communities in delivering services\. Further, wherever possible, the government plans to concentrate the
delivery of local public services in one location, to improve access and convenience of use, and increase the
efficiency of land utilization on space scarce focus islands\.
The development of a national broad band network to provide access to internet based public services within
atolls is also an important element of the governments strategy to improve the coverage and quality of local
government\. Currently, the cost of intra-atoll and inter-atoll communication and information transmission is
severely constrained by the high cost of telecommunications and the absence of adequate transmission
capacity\. The Government strategy is to develop a broad band network would enable focus island hubs to
supply services to the primary islands within their atolls more cheaply and effectively\. In addition, a broad
band network would facilitate inter-atoll communications by substantially reducing costs and increasing the
volume of information that can be transmitted\.
2\. Objectives
The development objective of this project is to assist the Borrower in improving the delivery of social
services and promoting economic opportunities on Focus Islands, so as to offer viable alternatives to Male\.
3\. Rationale for Bank's Involvement
The World Banks support in the implementation of this project will bring together the unique combination
of the Bank's macroeconomic and sectoral expertise, and its international experience in island economies\.
The Banks financial support will help the GOM in moving forward to implement its innovative strategy
during its critical, inception phase\. The Bank will also technically support the implementation of this
national strategy, which, if successful could become a central element of the future economic and social
development policy framework of the Maldives\.
4\. Description
The project has four components that strengthen the delivery of (1) education services; (2) health services;
(3) employment services; and (4) community services\. These components will be supported by a monitoring
and evaluation component\.
Component1\. Education Services
\.
This component will (a)expand access to and improve the quality of
secondary education through the establishment and equipping of facilities on the Focus Islands; (b) provide
Page 6
6
training to teachers and administrative staff in the school system through internet based and classroom
training and provide teaching materials; (c) construct, furnish and equip residential learning centers on focus
islands for the benefit of students attending secondary school away from their home islands; and (d) carry
out research studies and evaluations on student and school performance\.
Component 2\. Health Services\.
This component will improve the quality of health services through (a) the
development of standard treatment protocols for the management of non-communicable diseases; and (b)
improving access to specialist services for focus island residents through telemedicine; (c) carry out a
program of nutrition education in the Focus Islands; and (d) support the establishment, equipping and
stocking of community pharmacies on the Focus Islands and train community based organizations in the
operation of the pharmacies\.
Component 3\. Employment Services\.
This component will enhance employment prospects of individuals,
particularly those residing in remote atolls by (a) establishing job-centers on the Focus Islands for the
provision of career counseling, entrepreneurship development and business services; and (b)expanding
micro-finance access to support income generating activities on the Focus Islands through the intermediation
of community based organizations\.
Component 4\. Community Services\.
This component will (a) strengthen the capacity of community based
organizations for managing public assets and service provision on the Focus Islands through the provision of
training and technical advisory services; (b construct multi-purpose buildings for the provision of social
services; (c) support community based organizations in the design, implementation and supervision of
micro-finance projects; and (d) develop a broadband network on each focus island\.
Component 5\. Monitoring and Evaluation
\.
Design and implement a monitoring and evaluation system for
the project to ensure better planning, optimal use of resources and timely feedback on project performance\.
5\. Financing
Source (Total: US 6\.20$m))
BORROWER ($0\.50m)
IDA ($5\.70)
Total Project Cost: $6\.20
6\. Implementation
The Ministry of Education shall have overall responsibility for coordinating the implementation of the
project, under the oversight of the Project Steering Committee, and with the support of a Project
Implementation Unit (PIU)\. The Line Ministries are responsible for implementing their components:
specifically, the Ministry of Education for education services, the Ministry of Health for health services, the
Ministry of Employment and Labor for employment services and the Ministry of Atoll Development and the
Ministry of Communications, Science and Technology for community services\. The Ministry of Planning
and Development and the Ministry of Finance will support the line ministries in project implementation and
will be responsible for the monitoring and evaluation component\.
7\. Sustainability
The project, which aims to consolidate the provision of social services in selected focus islands, is more
sustainable than the current approach of trying to provide all services on all the islands\. By creating regional
growth poles, the economy may strengthen and create more tax revenues to finance services\.
It should also be noted that, despite the countrys overall very low population density, some islands have
become overcrowded and unsustainable\. It is therefore crucial to develop ecologically viable communities
Page 7
7
on the focus islands\. Since the project interventions minimize investment costs (these would be much higher
in the absence of the focused interventions proposed under the project), and have negligible recurrent costs,
the long term fiscal sustainability of the project is assured\.
8\. Lessons learned from past operations in the country/sector
The following lessons from World Bank experience globally and on small island economies have been built
into the project: (a) the importance of local coordination and management of services: experience in island
economies shows that the most effective way to improve the quality of social services is to build on island
solidarity and develop ownership and accountability at the community level\. For technically complicated
services which the beneficiaries cannot lead, they should be given an opportunity to provide continuous
feedback to the service providers through appropriate feedback mechanisms (which have been included
under the M&E framework for this project); (b) the need to reduce overhead and unit costs of providing
services to scattered populations by use of ICT and by consolidating higher level services (e\.g\. secondary
schools and tertiary health care) on a single island in each atoll; (c) the high cost and non-sustainability of
providing direct fiscal incentives for individuals to relocate: the current strategy therefore is to create
attractive alternatives to Male in the outer atolls; (e) poor coordination among different Ministries in
intersectoral projects: a high powered inter-ministerial committee has been set up to take policy decisions as
necessary, and to resolve operational issues as they arise\.
9\. Environment Aspects
In accordance with the Maldives policy to protect its environmental resources and the projects
development objective to improve social service provision and economic opportunities in a selected
ecologically viable focus island in each of four identified atolls, the project will have a beneficial impact on
the environment in the long term\. Any environmental impacts that can be identified during the
implementation of project activities are reversible and can be easily mitigated\. Considering that specific
activities and exact locations cannot be identified due to the demand driven nature of the project, an
Environmental Report detailing the prevailing environmental conditions in the Maldives and an
Environmental Assessment and Management Framework (the Framework) has been prepared\. This
Framework will serve as a template to conduct activity specific environmental assessments and/or
environmental management plans (EMP) prior to implementation of sub-projects\. Public consultations were
held during the preparation of the Framework\. There will be no land acquisition or resettlement under this
project\. All land identified for potential construction work is unencumbered state owned land\.
The Education Services component may include construction associated with expanding educational
facilities such as IT centers, science labs, multipurpose rooms, library resource centers and residential
learning centers on the focus islands\. Construction in fragile ecosystems as in the Maldives demands close
attention to the potential environmental impacts\. In this regard, proper site selection for construction
activities is essential\. The Framework stipulates site selection criteria that ensures that environmentally
sensitive sites will be not be eligible for funding under the project\. The Framework also describes how
construction material, debris disposal, sewage and solid waste arising from civil works proposed under the
project should be addressed through sub-project specific EMPs\.
The Health Services component proposes to improve the quality of health services of the focus islands by
nutrition promotion, community operated pharmacies, training of health service personnel, accessing
telemedicine and development and implementation of standard treatment protocols\. None of these activities
will impact the environment\. However, an integral aspect of improving health care services is to ensure
proper systems are in place to manage health care waste in an environmentally acceptable manner\. As there
is no proper health care waste management in the Maldives at the present time, the project will assist the
Page 8
8
Ministry of Home Affairs and Environment (MHAE) to develop a National Health Care Waste Management
Policy and Guidelines that can be implemented at the hospital level\.
The Employment Services component will support entrepreneurship, promote small businesses and
economic growth on the focus islands\. The sub-projects to be financed under this component are not yet
defined\. The Framework has outlined a procedure to be followed to identify sub-project specific
environmental impacts and developed guidelines for preparation of EMPs to mitigate any potential
environmental issues, prior to any fund disbursements\. Considering that the funding of these projects is very
small, it is not anticipated that there will be any significant environmental issues that will arise from this
component\.
The Community Services Component proposes to increase the effectiveness with which resources are used
in focus islands through community leadership and management\. Potential environmental issues may arise if
communities plan to manage sanitation systems, solid waste management, water supply systems and
public transport systems\. Since these are small scale community based systems, it is most unlikely that there
will be any significant and/or irreversible environmental impacts\. Community organizations will be provided
with training programs to increase environmental awareness and to effectively manage community services
with minimal adverse environmental impacts\. The Framework already prepared has guidelines on how sub-
activity specific EMPs should be prepared, as well as already sample environmental codes of practice for
such community services\. MHAE will assist communities with addressing potential environmental issues
either directly or through the Atoll Offices, if required\.
10\. List of factual technical documents
1\. Beneficiary impact assessment with gender dimension
2\. The following Consultant reports:
Telemedicine
Job-Centers as part of a National Job-Information Network
Residential community learning centers on Focus Islands
Education Quality Study
Environmental report and management plan
Nutrition
Capacity building for coordinating and managing community services
3\. Project Appraisal Document: Report No\. 27710-MAL
4\. Project Supervision Reports, June 2005, December 2005\.
11\. Contact Point
Task Manager
Qaiser M\. Khan
The World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW
Washington D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: 202-473-2523; Fax: 202-522-3408
12\. For information on other project related documents contact:
The InfoShop
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW; Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 458-5454; Fax: (202) 522-1500
Page 9
9
Web: http:// www\.worldbank\.org/infoshop
wb12009
C:\Documents and Settings\WB12009\My Documents\IHDP Addl Financing Updated PID\.doc
02/03/2006 4:09:00 PM | APPROVAL |
P115318 | Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No: 53782-ZR
PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT
ON A
PROPOSED GRANT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 6\.6 MILLION
(US$lO MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
FOR A
STREET CHILDREN PROJECT
May 4,2010
Human Development Department
Social Protection Unit
Africa Region
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the
performance of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World
Bank authorization\.
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Exchange Rate Effective March 3 1,20 10
Currency Unit = Congolese Franc
894\.997 = US$l
US$1,51824 = SDRl
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 - December31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
BCC Behavior Change Communication
BICE Bureau International Catholique de l'enfance
BISPE Child Protection Office (Bureau des Interventions Sociales pour la Protection
de 1'Enfant)
CAS Country Assistance Strategy
CAFES National Centre for Training of Social Workers (Centre Apicain de Formation
Supe'rieure des Educateurs sociam)
CATSR Support Committee for Street Social Work (Comite' d 'Appui am Travailleurs
Sociam de la Rue)
CCT Conditional Cash Transfer
CFAA Country Financial Accountability Assessment
COGES School Management Committee (Comite' de Gestion des Etablissements
Scolaires)
COPERF Coordination of International Organizations for the Protection of Children
without Family Care (Collectifdes Organisations Internationales pour la
Protection des Enfants en Rupture Familiale)
CPAR Country Procurement Assessment Review
CPS Social Promotion Center (Centre de Promotion Sociale)
DEP MINAS's Studies and Planning Department
DISPE Department of Child Protection (Direction des Interventions Sociales pour la
Protection de 1'Enfant)
DIVAS Division of Social Affairs (Division Provinciale des Affaires Sociales)
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
FBO Faith-Based Organization
FM Financial Management
FSRDC The Social Fund of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Fonds Social de la
Re'publique De'mocratique du Congo)
HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
IDA International Development Association
IFMIS Integrated Financial Management Information System\.
IFR Interim Financial Report
ILO International Labor Organization
2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
IMF International Monetary Fund
JSDF Japan Social Development Fund
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG Millennium Development Goal
MDM MCdicins du Monde
MDRI Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
MINAS Ministry of Social Affairs, Humanitarian Action and National Solidarity
(Ministire des Affaires Sociales, Action Humanitaire et Solidarite` Nationale)
MIS Management Information System
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
NCB National Competitive Bidding
NGO Non Governmental Organization
ovc Orphans and other Vulnerable Children
PAD Project Appraisal Document
PASU World Bank-funded Emergency Social Action Project
PDO Project Development Objective
PEFA Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PIM Project Implementation Manual
PIU Project Implementation Unit
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RAAP Rapid Assessment, Analysis and Action Planning
REJEER Network of Street Children and Youth Educators (Riseau des Educateurs des
Enfants et Jeunes de la Rue)
RENACERAS National Network of Centers for Remedial Schooling (Re`seauNational des
Centres de Rattrappage Scolaire)
SBFB Selection Based on Fixed Budget
SPF State and Peace Building Fund
TFESSD Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development
ucw Understanding Children's Work
UNFPA United Nations Fund for Population Activities
USAID United States Agency for International Development
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
WB World Bank
Vice President: Obiageli K\. Ezekwesili
Country Director: Marie Frangoise Marie-Nelly
Acting Sector Director: Tawid Nawaz
Sector Manager: Lynne Sherburne-Bern
Task Team Leader: Anne Mossige
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their official duties\. Its contents may not be otherwise disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
3
CONGO\. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
STREET CHILDREN PROJECT
CONTENTS
Page
I \. STRATEGIC CONTEXT AND RATIONALE \. 9
A \. Country and sector issues \. 9
B \. Rationale for Bank involvement \. 12
C \. Higher level objectives to which the project contributes \. 13
I1 \. PROJECT DESCRIPTION\. \. \.e\. \. 14
A \. Lending instrument \. 14
B \. Project development objective and key indicators \. 14
C \. Project components \. 15
D \. Lessons learned and reflected in the project design \. 19
E \. Alternatives considered and reasons for rejection \. 20
I11 \. IMPLEMENTATION \. \.
\. 21
A \. Partnership arrangements\. \. 21
B \. Institutional and implementation arrangements\. 21
\.
C \. Sustainability\.
*
26
D \. Critical risks and possible controversial aspects\. 26
E \. Loadcredit conditions and covenants\. 29
IV \. APPRAISAL SUMMARY \. 30
A \. Economic and financial analyses \. 30
B \. Technical \. 31
C \. Fiduciary \. 32
D \. Social\. 33
E\. Environment\., \. 33
\. F\. Safeguard policies \. 33
G\. Policy Exceptions and Readiness\. 34
Annex 1: Country and Sector or Program Background \. 35
Annex 2: Major Related Projects Financed by the Bank and/or other Agencies \.41
4
Annex 3: Results Monitoring Framework \. 42
Annex 4: Detailed Project Description \. 51
Annex 5: Project Costs \. 61
Annex 6: Implementation Arrangements \. 62
Annex 7: Financial Management and Disbursement Arrangements \. 68
Annex 8: Procurement Arrangements \. 81
Annex 9: Economic and Financial Analysis \. 89
Annex 10: Safeguard Policy Issues \. 91
Annex 11: Project Preparation and Supervision \. 92
Annex 12: Documents in the Project File \. 93
Annex 13: Statement of Loans and Credits \. 94
Annex 14: Country at a Glance \. 95
Annex 15: Map \. 97
5
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
Street Children Project
Date: May 5,2010 Team Leader: Anne Mossige
Country Director: Marie Francoise Marie- Sectors: Other social services (100%)
Nelly Themes: Social safety nets (50%); Gender
Sector Manager: Lynne Sherburne-Benz (25%); Vulnerability assessment and
Acting Sector Director: Tawhid Nawaz monitoring (25%)
Project ID: P115318 Environmental screening category: C
Lending instrument: Specific Investment Safeguard screening category: NIA
Lending
Source Local Foreign Total
BorrowerRecipient 0 0 0
IDA Grant 6\.68 3\.32 ? 10
Others 0 0 0
Total 6\.68 3\.32 10
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Estimated disbursements (Bank FY/US$m)
FY 201 1 2012 2013 2014 2015
Annual 1\.1 2\.0 3\.0 3 \.O 0\.9
Cumulative 1\.1 3\.1 6\.1 9\.1 10
Does the project depart from the CAS in [ 3 Yes [XI No
content or other significant respects? Re$ PAD
I\.C
Does the project require any exceptions from [ ]Yes [XI No
Bank policies? Re$ PAD IKG71
Have these been approved by Bank [ ]Yes [ 1 No
management?
Is approval for any policy exception sought [ ]Yes [X ] No
from the Board?
Does the project include any critical risks rated [ X]Yes [ 3 No
?substantial? or ?high??
Re$ PAD III\. 0 5 2
6
Does the project meet the Regional criteria for [XIYes [ 3 No
readiness for implementation?
Ref: PAD IV G72
Covenants applicable to project implementation: The following financial management covenants
apply:
(a) The Recipient shall establish not later than three months following the effectiveness Date
and thereafter maintain or cause to be maintained a financial management system
(including related staff, software and an internal auditor) in accordance with the
provisions of Section 4\.09 of the General Conditions\.
(b) The Recipient shall prepare and furnish to the Association as part of the Project Report
7
not later than forty-five (45)days after the end of each calendar quarter, interim unaudited
financial reports for the Project covering the quarter, in form and substance satisfactory to
the Association\.
(c) The Recipient shall have its Financial Statements audited in accordance with the
provisions of Section 4\.09 (b) of the General Conditions\. Each audit of the Financial
Statements shall cover the period of one fiscal year of the Recipient, commencing with
the fiscal year in which the first withdrawal was made under the Project\. The audited
Financial Statements for each such period shall be furnished to the Association not later
than six months after the end of such period\.
(d) The Recipient shall by not later than three months following the effectiveness date, or any
other later date agreed with the Association, contract an external auditor under terms and
conditions and with qualifications and experience satisfactory to the Association\.
8
I\. STRATEGIC CONTEXT AND RATIONALE
A\. Country and sector issues
1\. Following years of the most devastating conflict in Africa, the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) has experienced important political and economic gains\. Since 2007, a
broad coalition government has implemented policies following the five priorities underpinning
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)\. These included good governance and peace
consolidation, consolidation of macro-economic stability and growth, access to social services,
fight against HIVIAIDS, and the promotion of community dynamics\. In the last nine years and
prior to the financial crisis, the economy was growing at an average rate of 6\.7 percent per
annum\.
2\. The country's social situation, however, remains fragile and poverty is widespread\.
DRC is ranked 176 out of 182 countries in the 2009 Human Development Index and income
poverty is widespread\. In 2007, statistics indicated that about 70-80 percent of the population
lived under the poverty line and the financial crisis as well as the food crisis have aggravated the
situation\. For example, in the Katanga province alone, 300,000 workers have lost their jobs\.
Impoverishment, violence, human rights abuses and large-scale displacements have caused
untold suffering and a deep deterioration of the social fabric, overburdening or breaking up
families and traditional social safety nets\. Perhaps the most heart-rending manifestation of this
social disruption is the growing number of street children in the country's urban centers\.
3\. There are an estimated 40,000 street children in DRC, including about 14,000 in
Kinshasa,' though many development actors believe this is an underestimate\. Of this total,
an estimated 26 percent are girls\. Because of the violence to which they are exposed on a daily
basis and the lack of adult guidance, street children tend to live on the margins of society and
engage in antisocial behavior, including substance abuse, crime, vandalism, prostitution and
unsafe sex\. For example, studies in Kinshasa report that nine out of ten street girls were
involved in prostitution, and seven out of ten had been raped\. These behaviors may have highly
negative consequences for the children themselves (drug addiction, sexually transmitted diseases,
unwanted early pregnancies, imprisonment) but also for society as a whole\. In addition to the
obvious security problem posed by street children, and the consequent loss of business or
diminished quality of life for the general population, street children are unlikely to grow up into
well adjusted and productive adults and may instead become easy prey for recruitment by urban
gangs and militias\. This can result in significant costs and large scale social capital erosion,
including aggravating problems of insecurity and instability in many urban areas\.
4\. Children are in the street for a multitude of reasons\. According to a study
commissioned by the World Bank in 2009, some reasons are related to acute poverty, as parents
and other caretakers who are unable to provide for their children may encourage them to leave
the household and fend for themselves, or simply eject them\. Other reasons are social or
cultural, such as family break-ups or step-parents' refusal to accept children from their spouse's
previous marriage\. A most disturbing and frequent phenomenon has to do with children's
rejection from their parental or caretakers' households after accusations of witchcraft\.
' UNICEF, 2006: Recensement des enfants de la rue de la villeprovince de Kinshasa\.
9
5\. Most street children actors are nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and faith-
based organizations (FBOs), while limited capacity and lack of resources make public
support minimal\. USAID is the most important donor targeting orphans and other vulnerable
children (OVC) and funds an important part of UNICEF's and Save the Children's (UK)
activities in different urban areas of the country\. UNICEF has a national OVC program,
including support to the establishment of a legal framework for child protection, advocacy,
government capacity building, and service delivery (health, education)\. The most important
international NGOs/FBOs supporting street children in Kinshasa are Save the Children, Africare,
MCdecins du Monde (MDM), and the International Catholic Office for Children (BICE)\. Most of
the international NGOs involved with street children are members of a network called COPERF\.
They implement their projects with or through local NGO and FBO partners, whose capacity
they try to strengthen\. Congolese NGOs and FBOs working with street children are grouped in
the network of street educators known as REJEER, which has over 100 member organizations
(of significantly varied sizes and degrees of professionalism) and a total of 2,370 social workers\.
6\. Both the political will and institutional framework required to address the issue of
street children are in place\. Since 2004, the Ministry of Social Affairs, Humanitarian Action
and National Solidarity (MINAS) has produced a national social protection strategy for
vulnerable groups\. MINAS has also developed a National Action Plan for OVC in 2009\. The
recent promulgation of the Child Protection Law, which has been developed with considerable
support from UNICEF, illustrates the political will to respect and promote children rights in
accordance with international law\. Other Ministries such as the Ministry of Gender, Family, and
Children, the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Ministry of
Education, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Security, the Ministry of Labor and Social
Protection, as well as the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights have various degrees of
responsibility in dealing with the issue\. Numerous coordination bodies are in place, including a
UNICEF-supported OVC coordination committee (locally known as Commission mixte) that
comprises several ministries, donors as well as national and international NGOs and FBOs
involved in child protection\.
7\. Despite these systemic arrangements, major challenges pertaining to prevention and
protection of DRC's street children persist, including:
Insufficient coverage o services\. While there is an active network of private organizations
f
(NGOs and FBOs) trying to provide services for street children, their resources - both
technical and financial - fall considerably short of need\. A 2006 UNICEF survey in
Kinshasa found that 55 percent of the street children had not benefitted fiom any of the
services available for street children, thus the majority of street children in Kinshasa makes
a living from the street and does not benefit from support from either private or public
actors\. Moreover, most development actors only provide one or two services and rarely have
a holistic approach\.2
Main activities include accommodation (45 percent) followed by family reintegration, social assistance, vocational
training and education\.
10
Limited focus on preventive measures, disrespect of children's rights and impunity o f
perpetrators\. Although several laws and codes related to child protection and fundamental
rights have recently been adopted by the Government, the application of these laws is still
minimal\. For example, the great majority of perpetrators of sexual violence or accusers of
witchcraft are not punished, although the Child Protection Law (2009) forbids sexual
violence and accusations of witchcraft\. Strongly held cultural beliefs, ignorance of the law,
unwillingness to go after influential members of the community, unclear mandates and
responsibilities, and a chronically under-resourced judiciary system militate against the
application of the existing laws\. Although some actors support local community-based
prevention activities in Kinshasa, the approaches vary considerably between actors and the
activities are often thinly spread (e\.g\., one child protection committee covering a commune
of over 500,000 people), and they have often not been evaluated\.
Inadequate skills and training o most private and public actors\. At present DRC has
f
identified norms but has yet to develop and apply standards for social work (case
management) and workers\. The only national centre for training of social workers (African
Center for the Higher Education of Social Workers or CAFES) is private and has very
limited capacity\. While CAFES is funded by the Belgian development cooperation,
UNICEF recently started supporting the development of provincial pools of trainers in
social work\.
Very few good practice interventions and very limited expertise in the provision of
psychosocial assistance\. Several studies, including the 2009 World Bank assessment of
actors and interventions concerned with street children in Kinshasa found that the support
provided is generally limited to one or two activities, primarily accommodation (in closed or
open centers) and a minimum of social assistance\. Very few organizations are able to offer
comprehensive services and major gaps have been found in the provision of psychosocial
assistance and vocational training\. Moreover, to date very few good practice interventions
have been documented\.
Weak national leadership, poor quality control, and lack of standards\. At present MINAS is
unable to play its role as a national focal point concerning social protection of OVC\.
MINAS is a weak capacity ministry and suffers from extremely limited financial and human
resources\. E\.g\., in 2008, MINAS's proposed budget of US$ 30 million for social protection
was approved by the Parliament but the funds for the budget were never allocated\. During
the same year, the operating budget of MINAS's Studies and Planning Department (DEP)
was only US$ 50\. The capacity of its staff - both at national and provincial level - is often
weak due to high turn-over, high average age, limited practical experience and few training
opportunities, all issues that are intrinsically linked with the challenges that a post-conflict
DRC faces with its civil service and therefore not specific to MINAS\. Between 35 to 40
percent of MINAS' staff do not receive a regular Government salary as they do not have the
required employment status (they are not "m6canis6sYy)\. Moreover, the Ministry's physical
infrastructure related to social protection of OVC is often in bad repair and poorly managed\.
11
B\. Rationale for Bank involvement
8\. Progress toward peace and recovery is taking place within the context of an acute
social crisis, which constitutes a major risk for the country's recovery\. While political
progress, economic reforms, and the return of growth have produced some visible results, the
social situation remains appalling\. The conflict in the DRC has had indirect but devastating
impact on the social fabric of the country: large-scale displacements, violence and human rights
abuses, as well as impoverishment, have caused tremendous psychological suffering breaking up
families and other solidarity networks\. Many traditional safety nets are no longer functioning
effectively, and some of the social networks that are key for economic recovery have been
severely disrupted\.
9\. Recognizing this challenge, the 2008-2011 CAS sets out to focus assistance on
improved social services as one of the three pillars of the Bank assistance program\. The
proposed project fits in a portfolio that, as of February, 2010, included 17 active investment
projects amounting to US$2\.4 billion\. The portfolio reflects the priorities of a country emerging
from a protracted conflict, with an emphasis on emergency infrastructure rehabilitation balanced
by support to strengthen governance and prevent further deterioration in the delivery of social
services\. Given the widespread needs and poverty, only three operations target a specific
vulnerable group: the demobilization and reintegration project for ex-combatants, the State and
Peace Building Fund (SPF) grant for women victims of sexual violence, and the SPF grant for
ex-miners in the Katanga province (ex-miners will also be supported by the IDA-financed Social
Fund)\. The proposed project will focus on another critically vulnerable group whose numbers
have increased as a result of the prolonged crisis\. It will, therefore, help fill a gap\. At the same
time, it will complement ongoing and planned operations in education\. In fact, drop-out children
have been found to have a higher risk of becoming street children and once children are in the
street, their chances to finish elementary school are minimal, thus making the education MDG all
the more elusive\.
10\. The recent promulgation of a Child Protection Law creates a momentum around
the issue of street children in DRC\. The Bank is strategically placed to finance an intervention
that will stimulate learning on the most effective approaches to the issue at this critical time\.
Such an engagement is even more critical given the plethora of actors that have demonstrated
interest in the question through different interventions (e\.g\., UNICEF, UNFPA, USAID and
other bilateral donors, international NGOs and FBOs, and private foundations)\.
11\. The street children project is an important element of Bank assistance to DRC in its
transition from emergency to development\. Street children are one of the most vulnerable
groups in society and also one of the poorest\. The cost of inaction on society as a whole is
disproportionate to the cost of dealing effectively with the problem\. The quality of urban living
is greatly affected by street children, who are not only a sad reminder of society's ills but also
contribute to spread a sense of insecurity because of their frequent association with petty crimes
and various forms of violence\. The experience of metropolises in Latin America and other parts
of the world makes it clear that unless action is taken at an early stage, street children may
evolve into a (dysfunctional) society within society, with a considerable cost in terms of damage
to property, loss of business, judiciary actions and health care\. In addition, the delivery of
12
quality, cost-effective and financially sustainable services to OVC is critical to the attainment of
many of the MDGs (see below)\.
12\. The proposed project activities address the recommendations of the Bank's 2009
assessment of the street children actors and interventions in Kinshasa\. These include: (a) the
importance of focusing on prevention activities as they represent the only long-term sustainable
answer for ending the street children plight; (b) the need to improve the quality and coverage of
assistance services, including those adapted to the special circumstances of street girls as they are
a particularly vulnerable group; and (c) the need to strengthen the capacity of MINAS, so that it
can become a more dynamic national focal point for child protection and mobilize more donor
funds in the future\.
C\. Higher level objectives to which the project contributes
13\. The proposed project is fully consistent with the objectives of the PRSP, particularly
two of its pillars: (i) improving access to social services and reducing vulnerability, and (ii)
promoting community dynamics\. It is also consistent with the World Bank's priorities for Sub-
Saharan Africa\. The Bank's Social Protection Sector Strategy stresses that "OVC constitute the
first-order priority target group for social protection in Africa"\.
14\. As indicated above, the 2008-2011 CAS for DRC, prioritizes shared and sustainable
growth, as well as improved social services\. Projects and activities to be designed within the
scope of the last two pillars, including the proposed street children project, will reduce
vulnerability of marginalized populations, thus supporting the social development priorities
highlighted in the PRSP\.
15\. The project would also contribute towards four of the five specific objectives of
DRC's National Social Protection Strategy for Vulnerable Groups, including: (i) promoting
the rights and the dignity of vulnerable groups (through prevention and sensitization); (ii)
increasing access to basic social services; (iii) promoting and facilitating the economic and socio
professional reintegration of vulnerable groups; and (iv) building the capacity of key
stakeholders, including MINAS\. In addition, the project would contribute to building more
cohesive communities and stronger solidarity (and therefore greater social capital), a better
organized and more competent Ministry in charge of social affairs, and progress toward
achieving a number of MDG --MDG no\. 1 (eradicate extreme poverty and hunger), as assistance
to street children, and especially street girls, will help break the inter-generational cycle of
poverty; MGD no\. 2 (achieve universal primary education), as street children will be given a
chance to attend school; MDG no\. 4 and 5 (reduce child mortality and improve maternal health),
as street girls will receive peri-natal assistance\.
13
11\. PROJECT DESCRIPTION
A\. Lending instrument
16\. A Sector Investment Lending is proposed as the most suitable instrument\. As DRC has
not yet a long term strategy related to the street children issue it is not appropriate to use any
programmatic approach\.
B\. Project development objective and key indicators
17\. The project development objective (PDO) is to improve the delivery mechanisms of
prevention and support services for street children, primarily in Kinshasa\. Though the project
will benefit street children in Kinshasa, some of its prevention and capacity building activities
will have a national coverage\. For example, radio programs on children rights will be
broadcasted in all the provinces, and training for MINAS staff will also be provided to personnel
based outside the capital\.
18\. The PDO will be pursued through (i) piloting alternative approaches, (ii) improving the
delivery capacity of service providers, and (iii) improving the institutional capacity of MINAS in
coordination, supervision and strategic planning\.
19\. Performance will be measured by the following outcome indicators (for a complete list of
monitoring indicators see Annex 3):
0 Increased availability of information related to child protection law and children rights
(75% of households targeted through the project are active3 and 70% of households
targeted recall correctly key messages about children rights fiom the campaigns financed
by the project)
0 Increased support services available to street children (by the end of the project, 2,500
children at risks provided with education or remedial education opportunities; 5500
children are offered access to comprehensive support services; and 800 children have
restored relationships with their families)
0 Strengthened capacity of the Ministry of Social Affairs and other key actors to coordinate
and monitor services provided (national standards for service delivery to street children
are developed and validated; a national multisectoral coordination committee for the
protection of OVC is established and operational; a database established and managed by
MINAS's Department of Child Protection (DISPE) with the support of MINAS's Studies
and Planning Department (DEP) to monitor and coordinate ongoing children rights
interventions as well as to capture the number of beneficiaries per category of service is
established; annual evaluation of the effectiveness and costs of different prevention and
support services is conducted)\.
Active is defined relatively to the mandate of the child protection committees based on: (i) the number of technical
meetings held per month; (ii) the percentage of child protection cases that are successfully addressed per month; and
(iii) the understanding of laws pertaining to child protection\.
14
0 A total number of 8,000 children are offered access to basic services; 800 community
leaders and authorities are sensitized; and 650 NGOs and government workers are trained
C\. Project components
20\. Project components were determined on the basis of lessons drawn from international
experience, research recently conducted in DRC (see Annex 12) and extensive consultation with
local stakeholders including the NGO network of street children and youth educators (REJEER),
key international NGOs (e\.g\., MCdecins du Monde, Save the Children, Africare), government
and UNICEF\. UNICEF, who is the lead technical expert and main child protection actor in DRC,
participated actively in project preparation\. Two studies were carried out during the preparation:
(i) a 2009 assessment of street children actors and interventions in Kinshasa, and (ii) a qualitative
survey of street children in Kinshasa involving the participation of REJEER\.
21\. A priori considerations and some sparse but impressive empirical evidence support the
view held by most local stakeholders that only preventive approaches offer realistic hope of
overcoming the street-children problem in countries such as DRC where it has reached
formidable levels\. On the other hand, there are also sound reasons to invest in activities targeting
directly the many children now living and working in the streets\. Their miserable lives do not fit
with the principles of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and their suffering
calls for efforts to afford them protection and help to a better future\.
22\. Of the three components proposed below, there was general agreement among the
different stakeholders that prevention is the most important\. However, in light of the higher per
capita cost of providing services to children already in the street, of the humanitarian imperative
to offer immediate assistance to the target group and of the complementarity of other IDA-
financed operations with prevention activities (especially the education project), a larger portion
of the budget will be allocated to "remedial" actions\.
23\. Component A: Prevention ($3\.1 million)\. The approach adopted by this component
will aim at tackling the most common proximate causes of " streetism": (a) family break-up and
the subsequent abandonment, mistreatment or severe neglect of orphans and step-children; (b)
accusations of child witchcraft; and (c) lack of parental responsibility or simply ignorance of
children's needs and rights as stipulated in national legislation^\.^ In addition, as dropping out of
school is often a precursor of family abandonment or expulsion, efforts to keep children in
school will be supported\. Activities will be concentrated on the four communes of the greater
Kinshasa metropolitan area (out of 24) that are most often the point of origin for street children
(the so-called "supplying zones"): Masina, Kimbanseke, Limete and Bumbu\. In 2004 the total
population of these communes was estimated at about 2\.1 million\. Such a seemingly narrow
focus is justified by the labor-intensive nature of the most promising approach, which requires
face-to-face communication with community leaders and at-risk households\. When activities
Poverty also plays a significant role in parents' decision to push their children out or in children's decision to leave
their home in search of a better life (or just of food), but it appears to be less important than the other factors
mentioned\.
15
may cover also other areas at relatively low cost (e\.g\., radio programs), coverage will be
expanded to the rest of the capital and beyond\.
24\. In line with common practice in prevention work that relies primarily on behavior change
communication (BCC), such as it is done with HIV/AIDS prevention, a variety of mutually
reinforcing activities will be financed, including:
Community mobilization: Informal community-based networks of volunteers, including
Child Protection Committees and "family helpers", will be the backbone of preventive
efforts as well as the primary link of the community to child protection services offered
by specialized NGOs/FBOs and the Government\. They will be strengthened (if they
already exist) or established, organized and supported by community organizers and
social workers hired by the NGOs/FBOs contracted for project implernentati~n\.~ A
particular effort will be made to set up and support community warning systems aimed at
identifying children at risk such as run-aways or abuse victims (who are likely to be
future run-aways)\. It is expected that the networks will concentrate on individuals whose
standing in the community places them in a privileged position to influence behavior\. In
particular, given the considerable outreach capacity of churches and mosques and,
especially, their important role in shaping beliefs and behaviors, they will constitute a
primary ally for preventive activities\. The experience of local NGOs and the active
involvement of FBOs in the provision of humanitarian assistance bode well\.
0 Community awareness campaigns: The actions of community networks will be
complemented and reinforced by a variety of community events that will use social
marketing principles to deliver basic messages on topics such as child protection, parental
responsibility, child development, children rights and duties (as per the African Chart on
the Rights of Children), HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention, human rights, and the
challenges of witchcraft\. Interactive theater has already been used with good results and
will be supported\. A particular emphasis will be put on the dissemination of the Child
Protection Law\. The law was approved in 2009 and it contains a comprehensive set of
provisions that, if applied, should significantly reduce the number of children living in
the streets\. While a number of decrees have to be issued to make the law fully
applicable, one of the main obstacles to its effectiveness is that it is simply not known\. So
far, limited efforts have gone into disseminating it, primarily by UNICEF and Save the
Children targeting magistrates and lawyers, and the NGO BICE targeting police officers\.
It is believed that increased awareness of the law would contribute to prevention (e\.g\., the
existence of penalties for those accusing children of witchcraft)\. Those in charge of
ensuring that the law is applied will be particularly targeted and trained, including social
workers, police officers, magistrates and lawyers\.
0 Media outreach: Radio has proved to be a very influential tool for promoting positive
changes of attitudes and behaviours, as it reaches large population groups, including
illiterate or under-educated people\. NGOs specialized in the use of mass media for BCC
will be contracted to produce a variety of radio formats, including sketches, mini-dramas,
'NGOsRBOs and MINAS social inspectors will supervise the activities of community networks to ensure that no
harm results to children as a result of volunteers' actions (whether well-intentioned or malicious)\.
16
interactive call-in programs, and feature programs\. Topics covered in such programs will
be similar to those covered by community awareness campaigns\.
25\. The project will also finance efforts to keep children in school, liaising with the Ministry
of Education to ensure coordination and an efficient use of available resources (including the
IDA-financed education project)\. As experience shows that dropping out of school is often the
first step toward life in the streets, many local actors support school attendance for at-risk
children as a preventive measure\. This is generally done in one of two ways, depending on the
particular predicament of the children and their families, as well as on the specific context:
One approach is to work closely with neighborhood schools, helping them with
repairs, maintenance and supplies\. Teachers and School Management Committees
(which include parents) are sensitized and trained to engage their help in identifying
children at risk and keeping them in school\. It is typical for schools to then agree to
accept a percentage of children (10-15 percent) free of charge, which will include
children at risk\.
0 The other approach is to set up remedial education centers that provide an accelerated
primary cycle or collaborate with existing ones\. These centers provide an accelerated
primary cycle (three years instead of six) that has been approved by UNESCO and
they have been shown to have better success rates than formal primary schools\. After
graduation, children can (reljoin the formal education system and enroll in secondary
education\.
26\. Component B: Assistance ($4\.3 million)\. This component will finance a set of activities
aimed at improving coverage and quality of services for street children, with special attention to
street girls\.6Theparticular focus on street girls is justified by the following considerations:
(a) Street girls often become pregnant and have babies, who will likely grow up in the street
and become themselves street children\. Assisting street girls, therefore, could help break
the intergenerational cycle of "streetism" and, hopefully, also the intergenerational cycle
of poverty\.
(b) Street girls are often victims of sexual violence at the hand of various predators,
including, in some cases, reportedly by police officers or random men in the city who
take advantage of them in exchange for protection or a place to sleep\.
27\. Given the limited funding available, activities will be geographically targeted to eight of
the 24 communes of the Kinshasa larger metropolitan area, selected for their high concentration
of street children: Gombe,' Kinshasa, Masina, Matete, Kasa-vubu, Kalamu, Kitambo and
Selembao\.
6
Street children are defined as boys and girls under the age of 18, loitering and living in the street, who are no
longer under the authority and responsibility of an adult, and who make a living on the street using all means
necessary (see Annex 4 for a more detailed defmition)\.
' 0nly"Listening Centers" are likly to be supported in Gombe, as children are generally chased away from this very
central area and prefer to sleep elsewhere\.
17
28\. The component will support a wide range of services going from immediate protection
from imminent danger (shelter, medical care, food, trauma counseling) to long-term living
solutions (family reunification, group housing)\. While permanent removal from the streets
would be the ultimate goal of interventions, it would be unrealistic to expect high rates of
success\. Experience worldwide suggests that family reunification - in principle the ideal
outcome - is a long, costly and often unsuccessful process\. Some factors that are present in DRC
further increase the likelihood of failure in family reintegration efforts: (i) in cases where
children have fled family abuse, it is not in the best interest of the children to be reunited with
their families; (ii) levels of stigma associated with girls having children outside of wedlock (a
category within which 20% of street girls in Kinshasa fall) are extremely high, further
complicating the family reintegration process when at all possible\. For these reasons, a variety
of intermediate and alternative arrangements will be explored\. Street educators and informal
Listening Centers will offer a first contact for children with the "regular" world and caring
adults, thus representing the entry point for other services\. Transit Centers will provide, in
addition to immediate protection, access to a number of services with longer-term objectives
such as psycho-social counseling and remedial classes\. Particular emphasis will be put on
functional literacy and vocational training, including business skills training, as these are crucial
to equip children who cannot (or do not want to) rejoin their families with the skills needed to
become productive citizens\. In addition, experience in DRC suggests that family reunification
may be easier when the child possesses skills that make himher an economic asset to the
household\.
29\. Component C: Capacity building, coordination and project management ($2\.6
million)\. This component would provide for technical assistance and training to strengthen
MINAS' capacity to: (i) develop standards for activities targeting street children; (ii) coordinate
the interventions of different stakeholders (NGOs, FBOs, donors, government institutions); and
(iii) monitor and evaluate ongoing interventions\. When relevant, capacity building would also
include staff of other ministries (e\.g\., Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Gender, Family and
Children)\. In addition, the project will provide the opportunity to reinforce the capacity of
entities with a direct role in the implementation of components A and Bybecause of their
mandate because they have been contracted as service providers (e\.g\., NGOs and FBOs), or
because of their strategic position (e\.g\., the umbrella NGO for street educators)\.
30\. As part of this component, an institutional assessment will be conducted focusing on
MINAS' capacity to achieve results in the field of child protection, so as to help the Ministry
identify weaknesses and devise measures to make a more effective use of available resources\.
The 2004 National Social Protection Strategy for Vulnerable Groups identified a number of
obstacles to MINAS' effectiveness that are still valid, including: high staff turn-over, a
disproportionate number of staff beyond retirement age, difficult physical working environment,
and staff who are often insufficiently or inappropriately trained and who lack relevant field
experience\. Some of these constraints are a result of the protracted crisis and not unique to
MINAS, thus a solution would entail a much larger effort than possible under the limited scope
of this project (e\.g\., a large number of staff beyond retirement age)\. Others, on the other hand,
can be tackled with the available funding (e\.g\., insufficient or inappropriate training)\. It should
be noted that capacity building activities targeting MINAS will have a national coverage,
18
enabling its provincial representations to benefit from the project as well\. In this sense, it is
hoped that the activities financed under this component will help re-energize the Ministry and
enable it to play its role of national focal point for vulnerable children, including mobilizing
funds from other donors\.
3 1\. Training activities will target key actors, in particular relevant staff of MINAS and local
NGOs/FBOs and will include training in: child protection and children rights; planning and
monitoring and evaluation, accounting and fund raising; norms, standards, policy development,
and the development of legal provisions; and thematic training on specific topics such as social
reintegration (e\.g\., listening skills, mediation techniques, family reunification), economic
reintegration (e\.g\., how to provide assistance for self-employment, motivational skills), and
gender-based violence (prevention, case management, trauma counseling)\.
32\. A tentative breakdown of costs for this component is as follows:
Capacity building for MINAS, local NGOs and FBOs and other relevant actors, including
coordination: US$900,000
Monitoring and evaluation: US$ 600,000
Project management: US$ 1\.1 million
D\. Lessons learned and reflected in the project design
33\. As the second and largest Bank operation designed to tackle the issue of street children in
the Africa Region, this grant provides various opportunities for learning\. On the other hand,
considering that the other operation (a $2 million JSDF grant in Senegal) has just started
implementation, it is impossible at this stage to reflect on past performance of similar Bank
projects in the region\. Similarly, lessons have yet to be drawn from the only other comparable
project funded by the institution in recent years, the Bangladesh Disability and Children at Risk
Project, which started implementation in January 2009 and has not yet undergone any formal
evaluation process\. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the plight of institutionalized children in
the ex-Soviet bloc resulted in two projects that addressed street children issues to a certain
extent: the Child Welfare Reform projects in Bulgaria and Romania\. While the context is
considerably different from DRC, the following lessons apply:
(i) Sustainability: It is important to secure buy-in from the Ministry of Finance early on, so
as to motivate it to develop a financing formula for child protection services that can be
adopted to ensure sustainability\.
(ii) Prevention activities: Collaboration with strategic partners (including the media, UN
agencies, and private organizations) is essential to the success of public awareness
campaigns, especially when the project budget is limited\. In addition, activities geared
towards disseminating information on children rights and promoting law enforcement for
child protection (including training for law enforcement officers) create an enabling
environment for meeting project objectives\.
19
34\. Lessons from non-Bank operations targeting street children in other countries come
primarily from Latin America, where formal efforts to deal with the problem date back to the
1980s with the active involvement of the Inter-American Development Bank, but also from a
number of African and Asian countries where NGOs have generally been at the forefront of
efforts\. Lessons include:
(i) the imperative of prevention for a long-term solution, with the most effective interventions
often targeting not children at risk of ending up in the street, but children from
underprivileged backgrounds in general (e\.g\., early childhood development, conditional
cash transfers, after school programs, etc\.);
(ii) the need to focus "remedial" actions on mainstreaming children, thus avoiding
institutional solutions and facilitating reintegration within the community;
(iii) caveats about family reunification, which is generally the preferred outcome but is an
expensive and long endeavor with low success rates, especially with girls (recidivism is
common and the longer the child has been in the street, the least likely the success);
(iv) the importance of vocational training, which organizations working with street children
are seldom equipped to deliver in a competent way, that is, in a way that actually results in
the children being able to earn a living, with the skills learned, once the children reach the
legal age to work;
(v) the value of rigorous monitoring and evaluation, including follow-up of "graduated"
children (either reunified with their family or otherwise reintegrated into mainstream
society); and
(vi) the importance of encouraging innovation and of making space for innovative projects
with high potential benefits --but not weak implementing partner NGOs\.
35\. Lessons learned from operations in DRC include the need to (i) have clearly defined
selection criteria for NGOs working in Bank projects, (ii) have strong financial management and
procurement capacity underpinning project activities, and (iii) establish clear monitoring and
reporting requirements prior to project effectiveness\.
E\. Alternatives considered and reasons for rejection
36\. Several alternatives to the proposed project design were considered during project
preparation\. Initially, and in recognition of the needs, the team wanted to implement the project
at the national level\. Given the budget available, it became quickly evident that less ambitious
objectives were more appropriate and the larger metropolitan area of Kinshasa was selected in
light of its large population of street children as well as the presence of all major stakeholders\.
The project team also considered financing the delivery of support services without addressing
prevention\. However, lessons learned from experiences elsewhere as well as stakeholders'
insistence on the need to address the "supply" side of the equation, made it clear that prevention
had to be included\.
20
37\. In terms of implementation arrangements, the team considered whether MINAS should
have been given the responsibility to actually implement the project\. While the Ministry has the
official mandate to provide for vulnerable children, it was agreed that MINAS's lack of
familiarity with donor project execution and weak human resources would have called for a
disproportionate investment to beef up its implementation capacity, and probably also implied a
very slow start\. In light of the limited project budget, a decision was made to rely on the proven
capacity of the Social Fund agency (known as FSRDC), whose fiduciary set-up is well adapted
to the needs of the project (see below for details on implementation arrangements)\. The project's
component C focus on building MINAS' capacity to develop standards, coordinate and monitor
and evaluate interventions related to street children\.
111\. IMPLEMENTATION
A\. Partnership arrangements
38\. The project is being prepared in close collaboration with the key street children
stakeholders\. UNICEF in particular has been closely involved in all phases of project
preparation, and will continue its involvement by being a member of the Steering Committee
(see below) and acting as an advisor throughout the implementation period\. USAID (the most
important bilateral donor for OVC), and the international NGOs Save the Children, Africare,
MDM and BICE have been regularly consulted\. Members of the local NGO network REJEER
participated actively both in the qualitative survey of street children and in the review of street
children actors and interventions\. Although the World Bank to date is the only institution
funding the proposed project, the intention is to use this operation to leverage other donor funds
for street children and child protection interventions in Kinshasa and throughout the country\.
B\. Institutional and implementation arrangements
39\. MINAS will be the implementing agency, but will rely on a Project Implementation
Unit (PIU) placed within the Social Fund of the DRC (FSRDC)\. As the government body
with the mandate for children protection, the Ministry bears ultimate responsibility for activities
dealing with "streetism"\. However, in light of its weaknesses and of the limited resources and
time for project implementation, day-to-day project management activities will be delegated to
the FSRDC (see below), through an ad hoc PIU (see organigram in Annex 6)\. A MOU will
clearly spell out duties and responsibilities of the two parties\. A Steering Committee comprising
representatives of government (especially MINAS), donors and civil society will act as the
oversight body\. Activities under Component A and B, as well as part of the activities under
Component C, will be contracted to private actors (NGOs, FBOs, consulting firms) and, when
appropriate, to government entities\. Selection will be done in line with Bank procedures,
primarily on the basis of competitive bidding\. The roles of the main institutions involved in
project implementation are summarized below\.
0 Role of MINAS: The Ministry will be responsible for: (i) ensuring that project activities
are consistent with national policies and laws; (ii) liaising with other governmental
stakeholders including the Ministries of Justice, Gender, Health, Education as well as the
21
national police; and (iii) coordinating with relevant stakeholders to tackle strategic issues
that will emerge during project implementation as well as providing technical support\.
MINAS will also be responsible for sharing lessons learned during project
implementation regarding good practices and lessons learned\. The activities financed
under component C will help MINAS facilitate these tasks\.
Role of the PIU/FSRDC: The PIU will be hosted at the FSRDC\. As explained above,
this arrangement was chosen: (i) because MINAS has limited project implementation
capacity; and (ii) to take advantage of FSRDC's established reputation for quality
implementation while realizing economies of scale through the use of its fiduciary staff
and instruments\. The PIU will have a very small staff including a coordinator, two child
protection specialists, and a monitoring & evaluation (M&E) specialist\. FSRDC
fiduciary staff will manage fiduciary aspects of the project\. At least one of the two child
protection specialists will be seconded by MINAS to facilitate a partnership with the
Ministry and stimulate project ownership\.
0 Role of the Steering Committee: This committee will act like a board of directors\. It
will be chaired by the Minister in charge of social affairs and comprise a total of seven
members representing various departments of MINAS (three), civil society, the Ministry
of Education and the Ministry of Gender, Family and Children; the PIU Coordinator will
assist without voting rights\. From the donor community, UNICEF will participate as an
observer and provide advice\. The Steering Committee will be responsible for (i)
approving the annual budget and work program, (ii) approving the selection of entities for
the implementation of component A and B (for contracts above a certain threshold), (iii)
approving any other expenditure above a certain threshold; and (iv) revising the
implementation reports produced by the PIU\. In addition, it will serve as a last resort to
resolve litigations\. Modes of operations of the Steering Committee will be further
detailed in the Project Implementation Manual (PIM)\.
Role of other government actors: The issue of street children is complex, and finding
sustainable and effective responses to the problem requires the involvement of a host of
government actors whose mandates give them a role to play with child protection and
child\. rights\. These include the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Human Rights, the
Ministry of Gender, Family and Children, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of
Health, and the Ministry of Interior (the police in particular)\. These actors will therefore
be associated in project implementation, and, when needed, be involved in the capacity
building activities\.
0 Role of Partner Implementing Organizations: Implementation of Components A
(prevention) and B (assistance) will be contracted primarily to NGOs and FBOs\.
Specialized government entities, consulting firms and individual consultants will be the
main implementing partners for Component C (capacity building)\. Implementing
partners will be recruited following Bank procurement procedures and be responsible for
service delivery in accordance with a work plan, budget and targets clearly spelled out in
a contract as well as in the PIM (see Annex 6 for further details on the recruitment
process of partner NGOs/FBOs and implementation arrangements)\. They will be required
22
to provide regular progress reports, be available for supervision by the PIU, submit audits
and conform to the arrangements laid out in the PIM\.
Fiduciary management
40\. The findings of CFAA and PEFA exercises as well as the financial management (FM)
capacity assessment of MINAS conducted during the project preparation revealed some capacity
shortages in the fields of financial management and procurement within the Ministry\. Thus, the
Bank cannot, at this time, rely on the public expenditure framework for the purpose of this
project\. It was agreed, therefore, to outsource the fiduciary aspect of the project to the FSRDC\.
FSRDC is very familiar with the Bank requirements and procedures for FM and procurement,
and it will be the Bank and other donors' main counterpart and focal point for all the fiduciary
aspects of the project\.
41\. Project FM will follow the same approach as the FM arrangements in place for the World
Bank's projects that are currently being managed by the FSRDC (the Emergency Social Action
Fund Project and an SPF grant for labor-intensive public works in the Katanga region), and the
residual FM risk has been rated "moderate"\. FSRDC has been regularly submitting Interim
Financial Reports (IFR) within 45 days of the end of the quarter, in form and substance that
comply with IDA FM requirements, and it is expected that it will continue to do so\. Appropriate
additional FM arrangements have been discussed and agreed with the government to mitigate
risks associated with the increase of workload that FSRDC will experience in the coming
months\. Due to FSRDC's satisfactory FM performance, project accounts will be audited on an
annual basis and the external audit reports will be submitted to IDA within six months after the
end of each year\.
42\. Upon Grant effectiveness, transaction-based disbursements will be used during the first
months of project implementation\. Thereafter, the option to disburse against submission of IFR
(also known as the report-based disbursements) will be considered subject to the quality and
timeliness of IFR submitted to the Bank and the overall financial management arrangement as
assessed in due course\. A Designated Account (DA) denominated in US Dollars will be opened
in a commercial bank on terms and conditions acceptable to IDA\. An initial advance up to the
ceiling of the DA and equivalent to six months expenditures forecast will be disbursed by IDA
upon effectiveness at the request of the project\. Subsequent advances will be made once the
FSRDC has reported on the use of the initial/previous advance\. Funds will be disbursed to
Partner Implementing Organizations (e\.g\., NGOs) in accordance with the payment modalities
specified in the respective contractdagreements\. In addition to these supporting documents,
FSRDC will consider the findings of the internal audit unit while approving the payments\.
FSRDC, with the support of its Internal Audit Unit, will reserve the right to verify the
expenditures ex-post, and refunds might be requested for non respect of contractual clauses\.
Misappropriated activities could result in the suspension of financing for a given entity\. An
implementation support mission will be carried before effectiveness to ensure the project
readiness\. To the extent possible, mixed on-site supervision missions will be undertaken with
procurement, monitoring and evaluation, and disbursement colleagues\. Detailed FM and
Disbursement Arrangements are discussed in Annex 7\.
23
43\. Procurement activities will be carried out in accordance with Bank's guidelines --
Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans, and IDA Credits dated May 2004, revised October
2006; and Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants by the World Bank Borrowers
dated May 2004, revised October 2006- as well as the provisions stipulated in the Financial
Agreement\. The project shall apply the Guidelines on Preventing and Combating Fraud and
Corruption in Projects Financed by IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and Grants, dated October 15,
2006 and the project's Anti-Comption Plan\. Additional details are available in Annex 8\.
Monitoring and evaluation of outcomeshesults
44\. Monitoring and evaluation will be of special significance\. In light of the limited size of
the budget compared to the needs, it is important to be able to document costs and outputs, and
assess results\. This will make it possible for the project to offer an important contribution in
terms of guidance for future scaled-up operatiws as well as for other donor contributions, and
more in general, for social policy both in DRC and in the many other countries faced by similar
situations\. Given the lack of evaluations of preventive efforts and the central role they should
play in any program for street children, particular attention will go into the monitoring and
assessment of this component, with matching funds being provided by outside sources\.*
45\. Monitoring\. Day-to-day monitoring of project activities will be carried out by the PIU,
in collaboration with MINAS decentralized representations including the Child Protection
Offices (Bureaux d 'Interventions Sociales pour la Protection de 1'Enfance or BISPE) and the
Provincial Divisions for Social Affairs (Divisions Provinciales des Affaires Sociales or DIVAS)
in the targeted districts of Kinshasa\. The PIU (with help from external consultants as needed)
will set up a database to manage relationships with contracted suppliers of goods and services
(including partner NGOs), and to keep track of activity implementation\. This database should
eventually be managed by the local representations of MINAS (DIVAS), who will therefore be
associated during its development so as to ensure that data requirements are realistic\. This will
also allow MINAS staff to start familiarizing themselves with the discipline required for
effective monitoring and with the system itself\.
46\. Three levels of monitoring will take place: (i) inputs will be regularly recorded by PIU
staff in the project database and used to produce monthly reports; (ii) information on outputs
(e\.g\., number of community meetings held, number of meals provided) and intermediate
outcomes (e\.g\., number of girls assisted at Transit Centers or number of neighborhood Child
Protection Committees set up) will be provided on a quarterly basis by the entities contracted and
entered into the database by PIU staff (eventually by MINAS staff), but also checked through
regular field visits and random rapid assessments of the performance of service providers; and
(iii) beneficiary assessments and other research tools will be employed primarily by consultants
to gauge the level of satisfaction of intended beneficiaries\.
47\. When data collection instruments and processes are sufficiently tested, MINAS' staff will
be trained in their use and will begin to take over monitoring responsibilities in an incremental
'At present, contributions from the Understanding Children's Work Project (a UNICEF/ILO/WB effort fmanced by
several bilateral donors) have been secured and funding from the Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially
Sustainable Development (TFESSD) has ben provisionally approved\.
24
manner\. It is expected that progress will be uneven among different MINAS subdivisions and
that refreshers and assistance will be needed from time to time\. This will be the responsibility of
the M&E Specialist of the PIU, who may be supported by consultants as the needs arise\.
Regular meetings will be held with MINAS staff and service providers to discuss progress and
obstacles, exchange experiences and useful tips, and identify solutions to common problems\.
The PIM will contain precise instructions on the processes to follow for data reporting and
dissemination, including standard data recording forms\. It is expected that the National Statistics
Institute will be involved in the design and implementation of an M&E system, as well as the
Ministry of Plan (Directorate for the Social Sector) and NGO networks\.
48\. Evaluation\. At the Concept Note review, the project team was instructed to look for
outside sources to finance project evaluation, because the small size of the available budget
could not support the cost of a rigorous exercise\. The project team, therefore, submitted an
application for a complementary TFESSD grant to develop a sound evaluation system that would
accompany the project, so as to be able to draw lessons for scaling up activities beyond this
initial effort and inform social policy both in DRC and in countries facing similar situations\. The
TFESSD proposal has been tentatively approved for $200,000\. The entity identified to help set
up and carry out evaluation functions is the tri-agency (UNICEF/ILO/WB) Understanding
Children's Work (UCW) Project\. UCW has accepted to co-finance the effort\.
Prevention: Evaluation efforts will focus on activities to prevent children from ending in
the street, as this has been identified as the most crucial element to address "streetism"
and also as a major gap in the current literature\. While the evaluation design and strategy
have not yet been finalized, it is expected that a pre- and post-test design will be used,
sampling households in neighborhoods where prevention activities will behave been
taking place and comparing them to similar households in neighborhoods where these
activities will not behave not been taking place\. lo A baseline survey will allow collection
of information on variables that are considered predictors of risk to "streetism" and also
measurement of knowledge and attitudes about children's rights and available assistance
services to families or children under stress\. Subsequent surveys will make it possible to
determine the incremental impact of prevention activities\. This evaluation design is
expected to use not only a pre- and post-survey but also a combination of other methods
(mixed method approach)\. Therefore, if any significant change will occur within the
treatment group as a result of the project, specific components of the intervention that
generate behavior change will be evaluated using qualitative process evaluation data\.
0 Assistance: Evaluation of the assistance component is also expected to rely on a pre-test
and post-test survey, which will be administered to street children identified through a
chain-referral sample\. Due to the high mobility of street children over time, the pre-test
and post-test sample will be independent\. Children will be asked in both the treatment
and control neighborhoods if they utilize any social service provided by local NGOs,
ILO, UNICEF and the World Bank initiated this inter-agency research project in December 2000\. The Oslo
Agenda for Action, Adopted at the 1997 International Conference on Child Labor, lays out global priorities in the
fight against child labor, and guides the work of the UCW Project\. Improved data and information and stronger
international cooperation are among these priorities\.
lo It is recognized that it will not be possible to separate neighborhoods in terms of their exposure to radio programs\.
25
FBOs or community-based organizations and, if yes, from which type of activity they
specifically benefit (e\.g\., health care, education, training, family reunification, socio-
economic integration, psychosocial support)\. A cost-benefit analysis of a sample of
NGOs will also be conducted to determine which among the different service provision
approaches are the most efficient and effective\.
Capacity building: It will be relatively straightforward to measure to extent to which
MINAS's capacity to carry out its role as focal point for OVC has actually improved\.
The existence and actual regular use of a database by Ministry staff will be the main
indicator\.
C\. Sustainability
49\. Project design will contribute to sustainability, in that it will (i) address the knowledge
gap currently impeding effectiveness in service delivery to children; (ii) generate lessons learned
for successful prevention activities; (iii) promote community ownership of the various
interventions; (iv) build MINAS' capacity to coordinate, supervise and monitor street children
interventions more effectively and also to leverage funds from other donors; and (v) help
establish and apply norms and standards for the sector\. A large number of donors are involved in
DRC and willing to invest resources towards addressing the street children problem\. A body of
knowledge about what works would greatly encourage contributions, and the involvement of the
World Bank would act as a catalyst\.
D\. Critical risks and possible controversial aspects
50\. The major risks to the project would be: (i) the selection of partner implementing
organizations is not transparent; (ii) partner implementing organizations have insufficient
capacity; (iii) prevention messages prove unacceptable to the intended audience; (iv) target
groups may not want to use the services made available to them; (v) deterioration of the
economy makes family reunification and sustainable economic reintegration close to unfeasible ;
(vi) training of MINAS does not result in long-term capacity building because of staff turn-over
and insufficient public resources\.
51\. The financial management risk, which is a combination of inherent and control risks, is
essentially fiduciary, that is, the risk of misuse of Bank funds\. To mitigate this risk, which is
modest, a robust financial management system is proposed in Annex 7\. To ensure this system
continues to operate well during the project life, and based on the current FM risk rating, one on-
site supervision mission will be carried out every year in addition to the desk review of IFRs,
annual work program and budget, audit reports as well as timely advice to the Task Team on all
FM issues\. Hands-on support will also be provided to the project team as needed\.
26
52\. The Bank will work closely with members of the Social Protection Thematic Sub-
group11,and particularly UNICEF, to limit reputational risks that may arise during the course of
project implementation\. The following table presents the project?s risks at the macro, sectoral
and project specific levels\.
Risks Risk Mitigation Measures Risk Rating
with Mitigation
I\. Country Specific i s h
The Bank will continue to work closely with the UN
Political instability and
conflict resurgence
and other bilateral partners to monitor the political H
situation and adjust its program accordingly\.
The authorities have negotiated a new IMF PRGF
program that was approved by the IMF?sBoard in
December 2009\. The program aims to enhance
macroeconomic stability, fiscal space for priority
spending\. In close coordination with the IMF, the
program will pursue its monitoring of the country?s
Macroeconomic instability S
adherence to the PRGF, including the
macroeconomic stability and the fulfillment of other
HIPC Completion triggers\. Adherence to this
program is a key trigger to release of about US$ 10
billion HlPC debt relief and possible additional
MDRI\.
Deterioration of economic
conditions resulting in
reduced fiscal space and a See above S
contraction of social spending
11\. Sector Level Risks
The Project will provide technical assistance and
training to strengthen MINAS? capacity to effectively
play its role as the national focal point for child
protection\. Three Ministries (MINAS, Gender, and
Insufficient coordination Education) will have representatives in the project
Steering Committee\. The national OVC coordination
between relevant Ministries
committee is already operational and will be further
S
Weak governance and
accountability, including MINAS will delegate project implementation
MINAS? weak capacity and responsibilities to FSRDC, which has demonstrated
lack of experience in capacity to effectively manage WB-supported
L
managing Bank-supported projects
projects
?I The thematic group was established to improve aid effectiveness by enhancing coordination and collaboration in
achieving agreed objectives and outputs\. More specifically, the thematic group provides a consultation framework
on sector strategies and operations, and contributes to the elaboration of the poverty reduction strategy\.
27
The political will and institutional framework
required to address OVC issues are in place\. The
Limited client engagement -
national social protection strategy identified OVC,
OVC and child protection
including street children, as one of the most
issues have received S
vulnerable groups\. In 2009, The Child Protection
inadequate attention for a
Law was promulgated and MINAS adopted the
long time
National Action Plan for OVC\. A national OVC
coordination committee meets regularly
1 \. Operation Specific Risks
1
To project development objective
Relationship between I An MOU will be signed by both parties clarifying \. -
strained
I
MINAS and FSRDC becomes respective roles andresponsibilities I M
MINAS is unable to provide The project has a specific component on building
needed guidance to the PIU MINAS capacity, including an institutional M
and partner NGOs assessment\. The development of norms and standards
will facilitate MINAS' role
Limited capacity of partner Partner implementing organizations will be selected
implementing organizations competitively and only those with demonstrated
(NGOs and FBOs) capacity to provide good quality services will be
retained\. However, capacity building opportunities M
will be provided to others based on criteria to be
articulated in the PIM
Procurement procedures are An anti-corruption plan has been elaborated and will
not respected, including be reflected in the,PIM\. In particular, transparent
contract awards to partner processes and eligibility criteria for all sub-grants,
implementing organizations defined in the PIM, are a pre-condition for this M
being marred by operation\. A two-tier decision process (PIU and
irregularities, Steering Committee) will increase transparency and
objectivity\.
To component results
The project does not achieve Key development partners and leaders in the field of
results due to technical flaws child protection, including UNICEF, were consulted
in design during project preparation\. UNICEF will be an
observer in the project Steering Committee and is L
expected to provide technical advice throughout
project implementation\.
Many of the community- Partner FBONGO will be supervised closely\. The
based volunteer networks PIM will have a comprehensive list of criteria for
supported will not be selecting volunteers and detailed TORS for the
operational due to poor community mobilization work\. MINAS field-based L
selection of volunteers and staff will also be involved\.
insufficient support of
NGOFBO implementing
partners
Communities react negatively Communities will be involved in the design of social
to social marketing messages marketing messages through the participation of L
partner NGOs
28
Street children are not Activities will be designed and implemented by
interested in using services experienced and competent NGOs and FBOs whose
made available by the project services are already in high demand among street
children\. Ongoing monitoring of activities should L
enable feedback on the relevance and quality of the
activities, and allow corrections in annual plans\.
High turn-over of MINAS The institutional assessment will provide a sound
staff hinders capacity basis to calibrate capacity building\. The involvement
building efforts of MINAS' top hierarchy in project implementation,
including regular feed-back on progress, will M
encourage their collaboration in targeting capacity-
building\.
FSRDC fiduciary staff A dedicated accountant will be hired\. In addition,
becomes overwhelmed and is FSRDC is purchasing more sophisticated software to
unable to provide high quality facilitate financial management\. M
performance I
Overall Risk Rating S
E\. Loadcredit conditions and covenants
53\. In addition to the standard effectiveness conditions, the following four conditions apply:
(a) The Recipient, through MINAS, has adopted a Project Implementation Manual,
including a Project Financial and Accounting Manual and an Anti-corruption Plan, in
a form and substance satisfactory to the Association;
(b) The Recipient has established the Project Steering Committee under terms of
reference and composition satisfactory to the Association;
(c) The Recipient, through MINAS, has caused the Social Fund of the Democratic
Republic of DRC, to establish a Project Implementation Unit within the FSRDC as
the entity in charge of the day-to-day management of the Project, under terms of
reference satisfactory to the Association, and has appointed the following staff of the
PIU under terms of reference and with qualifications satisfactory to the Association:
a Project coordinator, an accountant, a procurement specialist, two child protection
specialists, and a monitoring and evaluation specialist;
(d) The Memorandum of Understanding between the Recipient, through the MINAS and
the FSRDC has been executed and delivered under terms satisfactory to the
Association\.
54\. The following FM covenants apply:
(a) The Recipient shall establish not later than three months following the effectiveness Date
and thereafter maintain or cause to be maintained a financial management system
(including related staff, software and an internal auditor) in accordance with the
provisions of Section 4\.09 of the General Conditions\.
29
(b) The Recipient shall prepare and furnish to the Association as part of the Project Report
not later than forty-five (45) days after the end of each calendar quarter, interim
unaudited financial reports for the Project covering the quarter, in form and substance
satisfactory to the Association\.
(c) The Recipient shall have its Financial Statements audited in accordance with the
provisions of Section 4\.09 (b) of the General Conditions\. Each audit of the Financial
Statements shall cover the period of one fiscal year of the Recipient, commencing with
the fiscal year in which the first withdrawal was made under the Project\. The audited
Financial Statements for each such period shall be furnished to the Association not later
than six months after the end of such period\.
(d) The Recipient shall by not later than three months following the effectiveness date, or
any other later date agreed with the Association, contract an external auditor under terms
and conditions and with qualifications and experience satisfactory to the Association\.
IV\. APPRAISAL SUMMARY
A\. Economic and financial analyses
55\. Economic analysis is extremely difficult in the present context because of lack of data in
DRC and difficult comparisons with the few countries for which data are available\. This is
especially the case for preventive activities, as a cost-benefit analysis would require data
(detailed below) that are normally not available even in countries with far more developed
statistical systems\.
0 On the benefit side one would need to consider: (a) increase in lifetime earnings due to
increased education of (former) street children; (b) value of improved health status both
in terms ofincreased productivity and in terms of reduction of cost of care; (c) reduced
cost of police and judiciary activity involving street children (arrests, jailing, trials,
imprisonment); (d) reduced property loss due to street children's activities (theft,
vandalism); (e) reduction in health costs borne by the children themselves (e\.g\., as
consequence of beatings, sexual violence, pregnancies, HIV/AIDS) and by those
aggressed by the children; (0 reduction in profit losses incurred by businesses as
customers stay away if street children are around; and (g) reduction in the spread of
HIV/AIDS\.
0 On the cost side, beside the cost of the program, one should add the earnings by street
children (e\.g\., most street girls engage in prostitution and would therefore lose those
earnings if they got off the streets)\.
56\. Lack of data does not even allow computing returns to education, and reliable estimates
of the other costs would require substantial investment\. Moreover, the project aims at reducing or
eliminating conditions of extreme abuse and of substantive violation of human rights whose
30
monetary quantification would obviously be arbitrary to the extreme\. Therefore, a least-cost
approach will be used, supported by the establishment of benchmarks for the unit costs of
complex services and the use of competitive bidding procedures\.
57\. It is worth noting that projects of this kind have proved to offer very high rates of returns
elsewhere\. For example, a cost-benefit analysis for a comprehensive prevention project in the
USA found the program to be a hugely profitable social investment, returning US$7 of benefit
for each dollar invested over a 20 year period\.12
B\. Technical
58\. Project design is based on international best practice and has been adapted to DRC
conditions to make it technically sound\. The following features are worth pointing out\.
59\. Comprehensive approach to the street children problem: Because of the emotional
response to the sight of street children, interventions to deal with the problem tend to focus on
providing assistance to children already in the street\. This has been the case worldwide, and
DRC is no exception\. The proposed project makes a concerted effort to include prevention,
which is considerably cheaper than assistance and obviously results in much less suffering for
the children\. It is also the only sustainable approach, and has the advantage of putting families
and communities in the center stage, encouraging them to take greater responsibility for the well-
being of their children\. Overall, the project adopts a comprehensive approach that seeks to stem
the flow of children to the streets while easing the suffering of those already in the street and
helping them reintegrate into mainstream society\.
60\. Synergy with other operations: The proposed project aims at finding cost-effective
approaches to deal with the problem in ways that foster the respect of children's rights, but are
also realistic and sustainable\. By focusing on prevention, the number of children ending up in
the street should diminish\. At the same time, prevention requires sensitization to the rights of
children\. For example, field experience suggests that children who are not in school have a
greater risk of ending up in the streets, so prevention will stress the importance of keeping
children in school\. This will contribute to the achievement of the education MDG and
complement efforts undertaken in the context of the IDA-financed education project\. In the
same vein, street children will be given the opportunit to enroll in fast-track elementary classes
with a diploma delivered in three years instead of six\. IT
61\. Strengthening of civil society and public-private partnership\. The project will rely
heavily on private entities to deliver services\. This is in line with trends throughout the
continent, where the Bank has been encouraging ministries in charge of social protection to limit
their role to guidance, coordination and monitoring, leaving service delivery to NGOs and FBOs
that are generally better equipped to provide needed services\. When they present a clear
comparative advance, government agencies will be recruited to deliver services\. Component C
l2 The program evaluated is the Perry Preschool Project in Ypsilanti, Michigan\. See: Moran, Ricardo, and Claudio
de Moura Castro, 1997\.
l 3 Evidence suggests that success rates at the end of fast-track courses are better than those at the end of the regular
classes\.
31
will finance activities to help the Ministry acquire the instruments and competences required to
carry out its key role, but also provide capacity building opportunities for service providers\. In
addition, Component A will include the organization, training and support of community-based
organizations, thus further contributing to strengthening civil society\.
C\. Fiduciary
62\. Financial Management\. The financial management (FM) arrangements for the project
have been designed with consideration for the country's post-conflict situation while taking into
account also OPBP 10\.02, which covers overall FM Bank policies and procedures\. The findings
of the Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA) and the Public Expenditure and
Financial Accountability (PEFA) exercises as well as the FM capacity assessment of MINAS
conducted during project preparation revealed some weaknesses in financial management and
procurement\. As a result, at the time of appraisal the Bank could not rely on the public
expenditure framework for the purpose of this project\. It was therefore agreed to outsource the
fiduciary aspects of the project to FSRDC, which is very familiar with the Bank FM
requirements and procedures\. FSRDC will be the main counterpart of the Bank and focal point
for all project fiduciary aspects\. Financial management will follow the same approach as the
implementation arrangements in place for the other projects managed by FSRDC, Le\., the
Additional Financing to the Emergency Social Action Project (known as PASU) and the SPF
grant for labor-intensive works in the Katanga province\. These are considered appropriate by
IDA, having been improved through the implementation of the action plans prepared by the
government following the midterm review of PASU and various FM implementation support
missions\. The residual FM risk after mitigation measures has been rated Moderate taking into
account the current FM arrangements of the FSRDC\.
63\. Implementation of three additional projects - the Additional Financing of PASU, the SPF
Grant and the present project-- will translate into an increased workload for FSRDC, which in
turn will require more sophisticated control systems and adequate staff, an effective internal
audit function, an updated PIM, an integrated information system, and a multi-project software\.
Appropriate additional FM arrangements (e\.g\., acquisition of a multi-project and multi-site
accounting software, and recruitment of an additional accountant and an additional internal
have
a ~ d i t o r ' ~ ) been agreed with the government and FSRDC\.
64\. Interim Financial Reports (IFR) will be prepared every quarter in a format and content
agreed with IDA and submitted to the Bank 45 days after the end of the quarter\. The General
Auditor (Cow des Comptes), having been assessed as weak, a qualified, experienced, and
independent external auditor will be recruited on approved terms of reference\. The audit period
will be on annual basis and reports will be submitted to IDA and to the Cow des Comptes six
months after the end of each fiscal year\.
65\. Upon Grant effectiveness, transaction-based disbursements (replenishment and
reimbursement) will be used during the first months of project implementation\. Thereafter, the
option to disburse against submission of IFR will be considered subject to the quality and
l4 The FM team of FSRDC at the central level is presently composed of a qualified Financial Director, a
management accountant, a treasurer and two accountants\.
32
timeliness of IFR submitted to the Bank and the overall financial management arrangement as
assessed in due course\. The other options of disbursing the funds will also be available\. A
Designated Account denominated in US Dollars will be opened in a commercial bank on terms
and conditions acceptable to IDA\. An initial deposit equivalent to six-month expenditures
forecast will be released by IDA at the request of the project (FRSDC) upon effectiveness\.
Payments to partner implementing organizations, services providers and suppliers will be made
as specified in the respective contracts and MOUs\.
66\. FM supervision will focus on the status of financial management system to assess
whether the system continues to operate well and provide support as needed\.
67\. Procurement\. Given its satisfactory performance to date, the FSRDC will be the
procurement agent for the Street Children Project until the new institutions recommended by the
new national procurement law are in place; at this time, a decision will be taken on the most
appropriate approach to be used\.
D\. Social
68\. Especially when they group together, street children tend to be perceived as threats to
property, to physical integrity, or to strongly held values of other members of the community\.
Their mere presence has a demoralizing effect on the population, both because of the risks they
represent and because they symbolize society's failure\. Through its activities, the project will
not only contribute to better social outcomes for children-at-risk and street children, but also to
improved living conditions for the Kinshasa population at large\. Overall, the project is expected
to have only positive social outcomes\.
E\. Environment
69\. The project has been rated as a Category C as no environmental impacts are expected
from the implementation of project activities\.
F\. Safeguard policies
70\. This project does not trigger any Bank safeguards as detailed below\.
Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project Yes No
Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4\.0 1) [I [XI
Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4\.04) [I [XI
Pest Management (OP 4\.09) [I [XI
Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4\.1 1) [I [XI
Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4\.12) [I [XI
Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4\.10) [I [XI
Forests (OP/BP 4\.36) [I [XI
Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4\.37) [I [XI
Projects in Disputed Areas (OP/BP 7\.60) [I [XI
Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP 7\.50) [I [XI
33
G\. Policy Exceptions and Readiness
7 1\. No policy exceptions are sought\.
72\. The Government counterpart, UNICEF and other important street children stakeholders
have been actively involved in the preparation of the project\. The Ministry has agreed to the
principle of delegating project implementation responsibility to FSRDC, given the agency's
experience and good track record in implementing World Bank-supported projects\. The status of
the project's non-standard effectiveness conditions are as follows: The Project Implementation
Manual has been drafted and the manual is expected to be finalized and adopted by MINAS and
FSRDC before, or shortly after, the Board date\. FSRDC's recently updated Project Financial and
Accounting Manual will be modified slightly to integrate this project\. It is expected that this
work will be completed and approved satisfactory by IDA before the Board date\. The Anti-
corruption Plan has already been drafted and is expected to be approved by IDA before the
Board date\. As MINAS is highly committed to set up the Project Steering Committee, it is
anticipated that the PSC will be established shortly after the Board date\. There should not be any
delays in the recruitment of project staff\. The expenditures linked to the recruitment process will
be eligible for retroactive disbursement and the PIM includes the TORS of all the professional
staff\. The preparation of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Recipient through
MINAS and FSRDC will start soon and is expected to be finalized and signed shortly after the
Board date\.
34
Annex 1: Country and Sector or Program Background
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: Street Children
Country Background
1\. Following a decade of conflict, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has
experienced important political and economic gains in the past nine years\. Since 2007, a broad
coalition government has implemented policies following the five priorities underpinning the
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)\. These include good governance and peace
consolidation, continued macro-economic stability and growth, access to social services, fight
against HIV/AIDS, and the promotion of community dynamics\. The result was a net
improvement in the economy growth rate, assessed at 6\.7% per annum between 2003 and 2008\.
2\. On the other hand, the country's social situation remains fragile\. In 2007, 70 to 80
percent of the population lived below the poverty line\. DRC is ranked 176 out of 182 countries in
the 2009 Human Development Index, and the 2008 financial crisis has undoubtedly aggravated
the situation\. In addition to impoverishment, large-scale displacements, violence and human
rights abuses have caused tremendous suffering and deterioration of the social fabric,
overburdening or breaking up families and traditional social safety nets\. Perhaps the most heart-
rending manifestation of this social disruption is the growing number of street children in the
country's urban centers\.
DRC's and Kinshasa's Street Children
3\. In 2006, there were an estimated 40,000 street children in DRC, including about 14,000
in Kinshasa," though many development actors believe this is an underestimate\. About 26
percent of the street children are girls\. Some organizations report that there are more than 500
new cases of street children per month in Kinshasa\.
4\. The causes of "streetism" are multiple\. Some are related to poverty: the incapacity of
parents and other caretakers to adequately feed their children and to pay for school fees or health
care may push some parents to send their children on the street, or may be an incentive for the
children themselves to try their luck somewhere else\. Many children also grow up in adverse
home situations, without nurturing, guidance and support from parents or caretakers, and in some
cases with outright abuse and neglect, so that they leave the household in self-defense\. Many of
the street children have been rejected from their parental or caretakers' households after
accusations of witchcraft\. Orphans appear to be particularly at risk, as formal adoption is rare
and step-parents are generally not keen on caring for someone else's child, which may lead to
rejecting the orphans, often after witchcraft accusations\.
5\. Characteristics\. Concerning Kinshasa's street children, findings from a World Bank
qualitative survey (2009) and a UNICEF study (2006) include:
''UNICEF, 2006: Recensement des enfants de la rue de la villeprovince de Kinshasa\.
35
0 Age: Most street children were between 12 and 18 years old (69 percent), 26 percent
were between 6 and 11 years old, and five percent younger than six\.
Duration in the street: The majority had lived more than one year in the street (62
percent out of which 15 percent had lived in the streets for four years, 19 percent for three
years, and 19 percent for two years), 21 percent for about one year, and only 17 percent
for less than one year\.
Family status: Eighty percent were orphans or came from broken families and only 13
percent had parents who were still married to each other\. In particular, almost 26 percent
were double orphans, 17 percent were paternal orphans and 14 percent maternal orphans\.
Reported reasonsfor being in the street: The main reasons for the child breaking with
the family were relational problems with a parent or a step-parent (29 percent), followed
by the death of a parent (20 percent) and parental financial problems (19 percents)\.
Poverty appeared to be the main reason for leaving the household especially for children
whose parents were still married\.
0 Family background: Most of the street children in Kinshasa came from poor families
living in Kinshasa Almost 40 percent of the fathers worked in the formal sector
(government, international organizations, public or private enterprises)\. Only one in five
fathers was jobless or retired\. On the other hand, one third of the mothers were self-
employed traders, 30 percent were jobless and 16 percent worked as domestic workers\.
Many families needed assistance from the extended family or others\. The family of a
street child had on average seven members, and the street child was often the second or
third oldest of the children\.
0 School attendance: 73 percent of the street children had attended primary school, but
many had not graduated, and only 13 percent had attended secondary school\. The
majority (58 percent) reported that the main reason for abandoning school was their
family's inability to pay school fees\. Almost 20 percent of the street children attended
school at the time of the survey, most of them (64 percent) in closed centers\. As for
parents, most of them had only limited education, and one out of three mothers was
illiterate\.
Family contact and reunijkation: 42 percent of the children interviewed kept some
contact, albeit very limited, with their families\. The great majority (77 percent) of the
children wanted to leave the street and return to their families, but only one fourth had
ever received help for family reunification\. The remaining 23 percent had tried, some
several times, but had returned back to the street\.
0 Childparents: Among children older than eleven, 16 percent had their own children, and
59 percent of these were girls\. Over one third of the child parents (35 percent) were
bringing up their children in the street, and only four percent had entrusted them to an
institution\. The rest were relying primarily on their families to take care of their children\.
36
Child work: Only 3 percent of the children interviewed in Kinshasa had benefited from
vocational training, while 26 percent were involved in various types of work (e\.g\.,
begging, carrying loads, petty trading)\. Nine out of ten girls were involved in
prostitution\.
Police arrests and abuse: 30 percent of the sampled children had been arrested by the
police, less than half (42 percent) due to a crime or misdemeanor and the others during
police raids\. More than half (54 percent) had been reportedly badly treated by the police\.
Only four percent of the arrested children had been referred to a judge\.
6\. Street girls' lives\. A 2008 survey of street girls in Kinshasa by MDM found that 90
percent of were selling sex\.16 Almost half of the girls reported to be forced to work as prostitutes,
and this since they were around 12 years old\. Seven out of ten girls had been raped, 76 percent
of them in the form of gang rapes\. By undergoing a very violent ritual, the girls were initiated
("baptized") into to the street\. Three fourths had already had a sexual relation before they
entered the streets, often in the form of a rape (40 percent of the cases)\. There was often a mix
of reasons why the girls lived in the street, including: abuse (65 percent), persuaded by friends
(45 percent), poverty (44 percent), and witchcraft accusations (4 1 percent)\.
Support provided to street children
7\. The majority of street children in Kinshasa makes a living from the street and does
not benefit from support from either private or public actors\. According to the 2006
UNICEF survey, 55 percent of the street children in Kinshasa had never been to any open or
closed child center\.
8\. Most of the entities offering services for street children are FBOs and NGOs\. DRC's
public agencies provide minimal support\." USAID is the most important donor for interventions
targeting orphans and other vulnerable children (OVC) and funds an important part of UNICEF's
and Save the Children's (Save) support to street children in different urban areas\. UNICEF has a
national OVC program, including support to establish a legal framework for child protection,
advocacy, government capacity building, and service delivery (health, education)\. The majority
of the international NGOs involved with street children interventions are members of a network
called COPERF\. The most important actors in Kinshasa are Save the Children, Africare, MDM,
and the International Catholic Office for Children (BICE)\. They implement their projects
through their local NGO partners, which are mostly members of the local NGO network known
as REJEER\.'* REJEER has more than 100 partner members -whose size and professionalism
l6 Mddecins du Monde, 2009 : "La rue, c'est la chance? )) - Enqugte sur I'exploitation et les violences sexuelles des
jeunesjlles des rues de Kinshasa, mimeo\.
that
" This was confirmed by UNICEF's 2009 Rapid Assessment, Analysis and Action Planning (W) found that in 2007,
320 OVC actors in DRC supported only about 287,000 out of the estimated 8\.2 million OVCs, including street children\. The vast
majority (94 percent) of the organizations providing support to OVC are civil society actors\. FBOs are very active; although they
comprise only 19 percent of the OVC actors, they support almost one third of the beneficiaries\. Many of the NGOs are very small
organizations and support only a small number of children (e\.g\., two thirds of the actors support only six percent of the
beneficiaries)
'*REJEER: Rkseau des Educateurs des Enfants et Jeunes de la Rue (Network of street children and youth educators)\.
37
vary significantly- and a total of 2,370 social workers\. A third umbrella organization (known as
CATSR) regroups about 70 NGOs, the majority of which are active outside the capital\.
9\. Most social workers of local NGOs and public actors have inadequate skills and
training\. At present DRC has identified norms but has still to develop and apply standards for
social work (case management) and workers\. The only national centre for training social workers
(Centre afiicain de formation supkrieure des e`ducateurs sociaux or CAFES) is private and has
very limited capacity, but receives support from the Belgian cooperation\. Recently UNICEF
started to support the development of provincial pools of trainers in social work\.
10\. Relatively little attention has been given to preventive measures, allowing violations
of children's rights and impunity of perpetrators to continue\. Although several laws and
codes related to children's protection and fundamental rights have been adopted by the
Government, their application, or even just their dissemination, is still minimal\. The great
majority of perpetrators of sexual violence or of accusations of witchcraft are not punished
although the recently adopted Child Protection Law (2009) forbids sexual violence and
accusations of witchcraft\. Though some actors support local community-based prevention
activities in Kinshasa, approaches vary considerably between actors and activities tend to be
thinly spread (e\.g\., one child protection committee covering a commune of over 500,000 people)\.
A lack of rigorous evaluations makes it difficult to draw lessons from these experiences\.
11\. There are few good practice interventions and very limited expertise in the
provision of psychosocial assistance\. Several studies, including the 2009 World Bank
assessment of street children actors and interventions in Kinshasa, found that the support
provided is generally limited to one or two activities, such as accommodation (in closed or open
centers), family reintegration or social assistance\. Few actors have adopted a holistic approach
and certain services appear to be particularly under-resourced (e\.g\., psychosocial assistance)\.
Moreover, to date very few good practice interventions have been identified in Kinshasa\. A
particular gap concerns vocational training\.
12\. Limited support to pregnant street girls, young street mothers and their children\.
In Kinshasa, MDM is the only international NGO that concentrates on improving health services
to street children, including reproductive health, and that focuses on street girls in particular,
including pregnant girls and young mothers\. On the other hand, some centers are known for
expelling girls who are visibly pregnant as they are considered a bad example\. To make things
worse, family reunification for girls who have become mothers is reported to be particularly
difficult given the extra burden represented by the girls' children\.
13\. Experiences in remedial education are promising\. Children from the centers of the
newly developed remedial education system in DRC have achieved better results in the national
tests for a primary school certificate than children from the "regular" primary school^\.'^ In
2008, there were 91 active remedial education centers in Kinshasa (80 run by NGOs and FBOs,
l9 The system has been developed by several stakeholders including the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of
Primary and Secondary Education, UNICEF, the Belgian Development Cooperation and some international NGOs\.
The centers accept children between nine and 14 years old who are school drop-outs or who have never been to
school\.
38
and 11 by MINAS)\. The children who pass the national test for primary education2' obtain a
certificate that allows them to continue with secondary education, vocational training or
technical and professional education, so passing the test is important for the future of the child\.
Given the large number of school drop-outs, and of children who never make it to school to
begin with, there is widespread agreement that the remedial education system now active in
Kinshasa should be strengthened and expanded throughout the country\.
14\. There is limited support to children in conflict with the law\. The recent World Bank
assessment found that very few of the children and youth who are in conflict with the law have
access to legal and other services\. When children and youth are being arrested, there is very little
follow-up by relevant authorities\. The police, judges and lawyers are only partially aware of
children's rights, and children are often put in prison cells together with adults - or in special
centers that lack qualified staff as well as a minimum of services, such as education and health,
and often even food\.
Government support
15\. Both the political will and institutional framework required to address the issue of
street children are in place\. In 2004, MINAS adopted a national social protection strategy for
vulnerable groups that identified OVC, including street children, as one of the country's most
vulnerable groups and highlighted several key challenges to the protection of street children\. In
2009, MINAS adopted the National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children\. The
recent promulgation of a Child Protection Law illustrates the political will to respect and
promote children's rights in accordance with international law\. Other Ministries such as the
Ministry of Gender, Family and Children, the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Youth
and Sports, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Security, the
Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, as well as the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights
have various degrees of responsibility in dealing with the issue\. Numerous coordination bodies
are in place, including a UNICEF-supported OVC coordination committee (locally known as
Commission mixte)\. In addition, a national multisectoral coordination committee for the
protection of OVC, that will comprise relevant Ministries, bi- and multilateral organizations, and
other relevant public and private actors, is currently being set up\.
16\. The national leadership needs to be strengthened\. Due to its limited resources, present
MINAS is at present unable to play its role as a national focal point for the protection of OVC,
including street children\. MINAS is also unable to guide and coordinate OVC interventions
carried out by other Ministries (in particular Justice; Gender, Family and Children; Public
Health; Primary and Secondary Education; and Youth and Sports) and other public and private
actors\. The establishment of the National Multisectoral Coordination Committee for the
Protection of OVC (see above), chaired by MINAS (DISPE), will represent an important step
toward improving MINAS coordination capacity\.
17\. MINAS is one of the least supported Ministries and suffers from extremely limited
financial and human resources\. In 2008, for example, MINAS proposed budget of US$ 30
million was approved by the Parliament but the funds were never allocated\. During the same
2o Test national defin d'e`tudesprimaires or TENAPEF\.
39
year, the operating budget for MINAS' Studies and Planning Department was only US$ 50\.
MINAS' staff, both at national and provincial level, is often beyond retirement age, not
specialized in social work and with limited practical experience\. Between 35 to 40 percent of
MINAS' staff do not receive a regular Government salary as they do not have the required
employment status (they are not "mCcanisCs")\. Many of its services at the local level have
overlapping activities and are overstaffed (but with inappropriate staff profiles)\. These factors, as
well as high staff turn-over, contribute to increase the challenges of institutional development\.
Moreover, the Ministry's important physical infrastructure related to child protection is often
poorly managed and in bad repair\. *'
18\. Progress has been made in developing national policies and actions plans related to
OVC and street children but their implementation has yet to start in earnest\. The national
social protection strategy for vulnerable groups was developed in 2004 and should be updated\.
In the meantime, a National Action Plan for OVC was produced in 2009 and a draft decree was
prepared in December 2009 on Guidelines for the Protection of Children without Family Care
(Lignes directrices pour la protection des enfants en rupture familiale)\. These guidelines are the
result of a highly participatory work carried out with UNICEF support\. Although the decree has
identified norms, standards consistent with the guidelines need to be developed, disseminated
and applied\. In addition, a comprehensive system to track, monitor and evaluate different OVC
interventions and actors has not been established\. So far, the only cartography of OVC
interventions in DRC concerns exclusively children affected by HIV/AID S\.
*'MINAS's infrastructure for service delivery includes 28Social Promotion Centers and a number of specialized centers\.
40
Annex 2: Major Related Projects Financed by the Bank and/or other Agencies
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: Street Children
Implementation Development
Financier Project Progress (IP) Objective
(DO)
World Bank Education Sector Project\. The overall project development
objective is to prevent further deterioration in the delivery of
essential services for primary education and prepare the Mu Mu
ground for a sustainable development and financing of the
sector that will facilitate donor coordination and future
transition to a sector wide program\.
World Bank Health Sector Rehabilitation Support Project\. The project
development objective is to ensure that the target population MS MS
of selected health zones has access to, and use, a well-defined
package of quality essential health services\.
World Bank Emergency Social Action Project\. The objective of the project
is to improve access of the poor to social and economic
services and increase the availability and management of S S
development resources at the community level\.
UNICEF - Orphans and Vulnerable Children Program\. The program
supports the establishment of a legal framework for child n\.a\. n\.a\.
protection; advocacy; government capacity building; and
service delivery (health, education) for OVCs\.
Save the Street Children Project\. Social and legal child protection,
Children UK including support to: (i) education; (ii) children in conflict
with the law: training of judges, magistrates and staff of the
Ministry of Justice and visits to children who are under arrest; n\.a\. n\.a\.
(iii) community-based protection network; (iv) training of
local evangelic pastors to advocate against accusations of
witchcraft; and capacity building of local partners\.
Africare Street Children in Kinshasa Project\. Services for street
children include: informallremedial education, vocational
training, and local community forums for child protection n\.a\. n\.a,
(activities were reduced after the end of the two-year support
from the Gates Foundation in 2009)\.
MDM Health Improvement for Street Children Project\. Focuses on
improving health services to street children, including
reproductive health\. Project has street girls, including
pregnant girls and young mothers, as its particular focus n\.a\. n\.a\.
group\. Supports a semi-open centre for street girls in Kinshasa
providing health services, psychosocial assistance, some
literacy training, as well as shelter to a small number of girls\.
Also supports a mobile night team\.
BICE Children in Conflict with the Law Project\. Specialized in
supporting children and youth in conflict with the law in
Kinshasa, including: follow-up of arrested children and
training of police, lawyers and judges; has built children cells n\.a\. n\.a\.
in the Kinshasa prison and in some police stations; has a small
centre in Kinshasa that focuses on family reintegration and
accommodates children and youth for up to six months\.
41
Annex 3: Results Monitoring Framework
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: Street Children
I PDO Project Outcome Indicators Use of Project Outcome
Information
To improve the delivery Prevention To evaluate the performance of
mechanisms of 1 \. Child Protection Committees that the project in increasing access to
prevention and support are active (%)22 basic services for the targeted
services for street 2\. Target households who recall group
children, primarily in correctly key messages about
children rights from the campaigns To advocate for more finding to
Kinshasa\. financed under the project (%) replicate the project at the
3 , Children at-risk provided with national level
education or remedial education
opportunities financed under the
project (number per year,
disaggregated by sex)
SUDDOI~ Services
4\. Street children offered access to
comprehensive support services23
(number, disaggregated by sex)
5 \. Street children having restored24
relationships with their families
(number, disaggregated by sex)
6 \. Direct Project Beneficiaries
(number) - % female (CORE)
broken down by (i) children
supportedper type o services, (ii)
f
Community leaders and authorities
sensitized', (iii) NGOs and
government workers trained
I Intermediate Results Intermediate Results Indicators Use of Intermediate Results
Monitoring
Component A: Track implementation progress
7\. Radio broadcasts on child
Prevention of prevention services
protection (number per year)
8\. Child Protection Committees (i)
Increased availability of established (number) (ii) and/or
information related to strengthened (number)
child protection law and 9\. Community events on children's
rights and parental responsibility
22 Active is defined relatively to the mandate of the child protection committees based on: (i) the number of
technical meetings held per month; (ii) the percentage of child protection cases that are successfully addressed per
month; and (iii) the understanding of laws pertaining to child protection\.
23 Comprehensivesupport services are defined as education, health, shelter (may be temporary), psychosocial
support, vocational training and family reunification\.
24 Defined as having given or received at least two visits to/fiom relatives per year\.
25 These may include neighborhood chiefs, religious authorities (pastors, priests), school principals, presidents of
women associations and other community-based organizations, and government representatives\.
42
~
:hildren rights (e\.g\., interactive theatre) (number
per year)
Component B: Support 10\. Street children using at least one
to street children To take appropriate corrective
service offered by transit centers
measures during project
financed under the project
[ncreased support implementation
(number, disaggregated by sex)
services available to 11\. Street children benefitting from (i)
street children skills training courses; and (ii)
formal education (number per year,
disaggregated by sex)
12\. NGOsFBOs supported by the
project achieving at least 90% of
the agreed performance indicators
(%I
Component C: 13, National standards for service
Capacity building To use for fundraising efforts to
delivery to street children
secure additional financing to
developed and validated (yesho)
Strengthened capacity of replicate or expand the project
14\. A national multisectoral
the Ministry and other coordination committee for the The strengthening of the national
key actors to coordinate protection of OVC is established leadership of the protection of
and monitor services and operational OVC is an asset for an effective
provided 15\. A database established and coordination of OVC
managed by DISPE with the
interventions\.
support of DEP to monitor and
coordinate ongoing children rights
interventions as well as to capture
the number of beneficiaries per
category of service is established
(yesho) To compare and share different
16\. Annual evaluation of the approaches to prevention and
effectiveness and costs of different support and document best
prevention and support services practices and lessons learned
(yesho)
43
3
3
3 JI
> N
3
3
3 3
> N
:I
3
2
3
3 n
r 3
n
9
3
3 3
9 n
Q)
5;
8 \.3
SR
zcd
m
0
0 3
n
I 3
vl x)
0
0 3
*
vl
?
0
0
vl
c\1
m
4
9
0\.
\. n
3 N
a
8
rw
0
3
0 0
P
\o
v, 3
$1 3 W
3
0 0
P
v,
n
$1 $1 v
-3
3
P
2
3
d-
n
\.rl
W
3
0
P
2 0 72
W
\.d
o\
3
P
N
0
l-
3
3
P
3
0 n
v, W
\.d
4
s
b
)s:
\.3
W
\.3 ?
s
b
v,
3
W
\.r( ? 8
00
d
?
? 8
? E
d
00
b
3
n
\.r(
w
\.3
E
M
w
M
w
2 E
m
3
1\. Addressing challenges asso'ciated with data collection: The project will face two
critical challenges associated with data collection: (i) the paucity of streamlined baseline data
available in DRC; and (ii) the difficulties associated with documenting project impact on a group
as mobile and heterogeneous as street children\.
2\. In recognition of this challenge, monitoring and evaluation will be of special significance
as detailed on pages 24 to 25 of this document\. More specifically:
(i) Day-to-day monitoring of project activities will be carried out by the PIU, in
collaboration with MINAS decentralized representations including the Child Protection
Offices (Bureaux d'Interventions Sociales pour la Protection de 1'Enfance or BISPE) and
the Provincial Divisions for Social Affairs (Divisions Provinciales des Affaires Sociales
or DIVAS) in the targeted districts of Kinshasa\. The PIU (with help from external
consultants as needed) will set up a database to manage relationships with contracted
suppliers of goods and services (including partner NGOs), and to keep track of activity
implementation\. This database should eventually be managed by the local
representations of MINAS (DIVAS), who will therefore be associated during its
development so as to ensure that data requirements are realistic\. This will also allow
MINAS staff to start familiarizing themselves with the discipline required for effective
monitoring and with the system itself\. The database will be established within year one
of the project, and will be used throughout project implementation\.
(ii) Three levels of monitoring will take place: (i) inputs will be regularly recorded by PIU
staff in the project database and used to produce monthly reports; (ii) information on
outputs (e\.g\., number of community meetings held, number of meals provided) and
intermediate outcomes (e\.g\., number of girls assisted at Transit Centers or number of
neighborhood Child Protection Committees set up) will be provided on a quarterly basis
by the entities contracted and entered into the database by PIU staff (eventually by
MINAS staff), but also checked through regular field visits and random rapid
assessments of the performance of service providers; and (iii) beneficiary assessments
and other research tools will be employed primarily by consultants to gauge the level of
satisfaction of intended beneficiaries\.
(iii)Regular meetings will be held with MINAS staff and service providers to discuss
progress and obstacles, exchange experiences and usehl tips, and identify solutions to
common problems\. The PIM will contain precise instructions on the processes to follow
for data reporting and dissemination, including standard data recording forms\. It is
expected that the National Statistics Institute will be involved in the design and
implementation of a M&E system, as well as the Ministry of Plan (Directorate for the
Social Sector) and NGO networks\.
50
Annex 4: Detailed Project Description
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: Street Children
Definition of Target Population
1\. For the purpose of this project, street children will be defined as: children who are under
the age of 18, loitering and living in the street, who are no longer under the authority and
responsibility of an adult, and who make a living on the street using all means ne~essary\.~' In
particular, the children eligible for services provided under component B (see below) will fall
within one of the categories below:
0 Children of the street, having no home but the street\. The family may have abandoned
them or they may have no family members left alive\. Such children have to struggle for
survival and might move from friend to friend, or live in shelters such as abandoned
buildings\.
Children on the street, visiting their family with some regularity\. They might even return
most nights to sleep at home, but spend most days and some nights on the street because
of poverty, overcrowding, and sexual, physical or verbal abuse at home\.
Children in a Transit Center\. They may have come to the Transit Center after having
spent time in the street, or come to it directly upon abandoning home or being ejected
from it\.
2\. Concerning Component A, on prevention, the ultimate beneficiary of project activities
will be children at risk of ending up in the streets\. Direct beneficiaries will be their families and
their communities\. While it is impossible to identify with certainty the children at risk, recent
research suggests that street children come disproportionally from households where there is a
step-parent (because or death or divorce) or where there is only one parent (because of death,
abandonment or divorce), with poverty often increasing the risks\. Therefore, it is expected that
these categories of families will be specifically targeted\.
3\. As to Component C, capacity building will benefit directly MINAS personnel, but will
also include other government actors (e\.g\., teachers, police) and agencies (e\.g\., Ministry of
Gender) as well as NGOs and FBOs\.
Components
4\. Project components were determined on the basis of lessons drawn from international
experience, research recently conducted in DRC (see Annex 12) and extensive consultation with
local stakeholders including the NGO network of street children and youth educators (REJEER),
key international NGOs (e\.g\., MCdecins du Monde, Save the Children, Africare), government
30 It should be noted that a number of Congolese stakeholders prefer referring to "children without family
bonds"(enfants en rupture familiale) or "children considered street children" (enfants dits de la rue) as the
expression "street children" is considered to have a bad connotation\.
51
and UNICEF\. UNICEF, who is the lead technical expert and main child protection actor in DRC,
participated actively in project preparation\. Two studies were carried out during the preparation:
(i) a 2009 assessment of street children actors and interventions in Kinshasa, and (ii) a qualitative
survey of street children in Kinshasa involving the participation of REJEER\.
5\. A priori considerations and some sparse but impressive empirical evidence support the
view held by most local stakeholders that only preventive approaches offer realistic hope of
overcoming the street-children problem in countries such as DRC where it has reached
formidable levels\. On the other hand, there are also sound reasons to invest in activities targeting
directly the many children now living and working in the streets\. Their miserable lives make a
mockery of the fine ideals of the 1989 UN-Convention on the Rights of the Child, and their
suffering calls for efforts to afford them protection and help to a better future\.
6\. Of the three components proposed below, there was general agreement among the
different stakeholders that prevention is the most important\. However, in light of the higher per
capita cost of providing services to children already in the street, of the humanitarian imperative
to offer immediate assistance to the target group and of the complementarity of other IDA-
financed operations with prevention activities (especially the education project), a larger portion
of the budget will be allocated to "remedial" actions\.
Component A: Prevention ($3\.1 million)
7\. The approach adopted by this component will aim at tackling the most common
proximate causes of children being in the streets - family break-up and the subsequent
abandonment, mistreatment or severe neglect of orphans and step-children; children's
accusations of witchcraft; lack of parental responsibility or simply ignorance of children's needs
and rights\. Efforts will be concentrated on the four communes of the greater Kinshasa
metropolitan area (out of 24) that are most often the point of origin for street children (the so-
called "supplying zones"): Masina, Kimbanseke, Limete and Bumbu\. These communes are
characterized by a strong population density, insufficient access to public schools and other basic
social services, high levels of unemployment and sub-employment (Le\., low-paying occasional
work), high crime rates, and relatively easy access to the better-off city center either because of
proximity (Bumbu) or because of the railway\. In 2004, their total population was estimated at
about 2\.1 million by the National Institute of Statistics\. Such a seemingly narrow focus is
justified by the labor-intensive nature of the most promising approach, which requires face-to-
face communication with community leaders and at-risk households\. When activities may cover
also other areas at relatively low cost (e\.g\., radio programs), coverage will be expanded to the
rest of the capital and beyond\.
8\. Prevention activities will be primarily predicated on social marketing principles and draw
on lessons from experience with "behavior change communication" (BCC)\. Such an approach
has been used to effect desirable behavioral changes primarily related to hygiene (e\.g\., hand
washing), environment (e\.g\., recycling) and health (e\.g\., healthy eating habits, condom use)\.
Experiences with BCC to alter deviant behavior (e\.g\., domestic and sexual violence, youth
violence) are far more limited and have generally been poorly documented, but hold promise\. In
addition, several stakeholders have noticed that dropping out of school is often the precursor of
52
ending up in the street, and many carry out activities aimed at keeping children in school as part
of their prevention strategy\. The project will therefore support these efforts (see below)\.
9\. In line with common practice in prevention work with a strong emphasis on BCC, such as
it is done with HIV/AIDS prevention, a variety of mutually reinforcing activities will be used to
familiarize the target population and the community at large with topics such as child rights and
protection, parental responsibility, HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention, human rights and
~~
women's rights in p a r t i c ~ l a r ,and the challenges of witchcraft\. Dissemination of the Child
Protection Law, approved in 2009, will also be supported as it contains a comprehensive set of
provisions that, if applied, should result in a greatly diminished number of children living in the
streets\.32 While a number of decrees have to be taken to make the law fully applicable, one of
the main obstacles to its effectiveness is that it is simply not known\. So far, limited efforts have
gone into dissemination, primarily by UNICEF and Save the Children targeting magistrates and
lawyers, and by BICE that also targets police officers\. It is believed that increased awareness of
the law would contribute to prevention (e\.g\., the existence of penalties for those accusing
children of witchcraft)\. Those in charge of ensuring that the law is applied will be particularly
targeted and trained, including social workers, police officers, magistrates and lawyers\.
10\. Community mobilization\. Community-based networks, such as Child Protection
Committees and volunteer "family helpers", will be the backbone of preventive efforts\. They
will be strengthened (if they already exist) or established, organized and supported by NGO/FBO
community organizers\. A particular effort will be made to set up and support community
warning systems aimed at identifying children at risk such as run-aways or abuse victims (who
are likely to be future run-aways)\. It is expected that the networks will concentrate on two main
target groups\. On the one hand, there will be the specific groups within the community whose
behavior tends to be directly connected with children leaving or being ejected from the
household, such as recently divorcedwidowedremarried parents (whose children have a higher
probability of ending up in the street than other children)\. On the other hand, there will be
individuals whose standing in the community places them in a privileged position to influence
behavior\. In particular, given the considerable outreach capacity of churches and mosques and,
especially, their important role in shaping beliefs and behaviors, they will constitute a primary
ally for preventive activities\. A number of NGOs have already adopted a similar approach (e\.g\.,
Afiicare, Save, BICE in Kinshasa, PACT in Lurnumbashi) and their achievements and
challenges will be taken into account\.
11\. Community awareness campaigns\. The actions of community networks will be
complemented and reinforced by a variety of community events that will use social marketing
principles to deliver basic messages on topics such as child protection, parental responsibility,
child development, children rights and duties (as per the African Chart on the Rights of
Children), HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention, human rights, and the challenges of witchcraft\.
These events may include interactive theater, interactive film projections and all sorts of "fun"
events (e\.g\., singing or dancing competitions)\. In this sense, partner implementing organizations
~
3 1 A widow and her children tend to be very vulnerable in DRC, as a widow will often lose family assets to family
members of her deceased husband\. This is most frequent in urban areas\.
32 Administrative and legal measures needed for the full application of the law will be supported under Component
C\.
53
and neighborhood networks will be encouraged to use their creativity and to learn from each
other\. In particular, community drama outreach using local amateur theatre groups has already
been used by some NGOs with encouraging results\. Theatre can be a tool for creating
opportunities to improve the problem-solving skills of communities\. In interactive drama
performances, the actors become facilitators and the audience becomes the actors\. The drama
usually highlights critical and sensitive issues and concerns, and creates the space for community
members to identify possible local solutions\. A particular emphasis will be put on the
dissemination of the Child Protection Law\. The law was approved in 2009 and it contains a
comprehensive set of provisions that, if applied, should significantly reduce the number of
children living in the streets\. While a number of decrees have to be issued to make the law fully
applicable, one of the main obstacles to its effectiveness is that it is simply not known\. So far,
limited efforts have gone into disseminating it, primarily by UNICEF and Save the Children
targeting magistrates and lawyers, and the NGO BICE targeting police officers\. It is believed
that increased awareness of the law would support prevention efforts (e\.g\., the existence of
penalties for those accusing children of witchcraft)\.
12\. Media outreach\. Radio has proved to be a very influential tool for promoting positive
changes of attitudes and behaviours, as it reaches large population groups, including illiterate or
under-educated people\. NGOs or firms specialized in the use of mass media for BCC will be
contracted to produce a variety of radio formats on topics similar to those covered by community
awareness campaigns\. Radio programs, therefore, will complement and reinforce the work
carried out by community networks\. Formats may include the following:
radio drama series: 10-15 minutes stories to address a few specific themes at a time,
generally featuring the same key characters (e\.g\., the adventures of a child);
0 sketches: short stories of two to five minutes to communicate specific messages in an
attractive format for the communities;
feature programs: to address particular issues and concerns related to specific groups
(e\.g\., single mothers or recent widowers);
0 call-in programs: to allow all stakeholders to have their voice heard and bring out
their concerns, thus facilitating social dialogue and cooperation by creating a common
space of interaction;
jingles: to announce and frame the different programs in an appealing and message-
bearing way\.
13\. As there are no Congolese actors with the required experience and competence, it is
expected that this type of activities will be initially contracted to international entities, which will
be asked to develop and produce the radio programs, negotiate broadcasting times with
community and national radios, and provide taped broadcasts\. Training of local media actors
(journalists, radio producers, technicians) will also be part of the contract package to ensure that
competences are transferred\. It is hoped that during the last two years of implementation it will
be possible to finance radio programs created and produced by local actors\.
14\. Schooling opportunities\. As experience shows that dropping out of school is often the
first step toward life in the streets, many local stakeholders support school attendance for at-risk
children as a preventive measure\. This is generally done in one of two ways, depending on the
54
specific predicament of the children and their families, as well as on the specific context\. One
approach is for NGOs/FBOs to work closely with neighborhood schools, helping them with
repairs, maintenance and supplies, but also training and sensitizing teachers and School
Management Committees (they include parents and are locally known as COGES) to engage
their help in identifying children at risk and keeping them in school\. It is typical for schools
receiving support to agree to accept a percentage of children (10-15 percent) free of charge\.33
These non-paying children will generally be children at risk, identified either by the NGORBO
or by the teachers and COGES\. Support to public schools will be carried out in coordination
with the Ministry in charge of education to avoid overlapping with other support efforts
(including the IDA-financed education project)\.
15\. The other approach to keep children in school and away from the street is to set up or
collaborate with existing remedial education centers (centres de ratrappage scolaire)\. These
centers provide an accelerated primary cycle (three years instead of six) that has been approved
by UNESCO and they have been shown to have better success rates than formal primary schools\.
After graduation, children can (reljoin the formal education system and enroll in secondary
education\. The Directorate for Non Formal Education of MINAS runs some of these centers and
coordinates the whole effort, with support from UNICEF\. Most actors agree that remedial
education has a very important role to play for children who are too old for regular classes
(because of late enrolment, repetitions or missed years) or at risk of dropping out prematurely
from the education system\. For these reasons, children rescued from the street are more likely to
be directed toward these centers than toward formal education\. In this sense, support to remedial
education serves both preventive and assistance purposes\.
Component B: Assistance ($4\.3 million)
16\. This component will finance a set of activities aimed at improving coverage and quality
of services for children already in the street\. Particular attention will be given to services adapted
to the special circumstances of street girls who are arguably even more vulnerable than street
boys, as they are often victims of sexual violence\. For example, a 2008 study in Kinshasa
reports that 70 percent of them had been raped and three fourth of those rapes were gang rapes\.
In addition, field evidence indicates that street girls are also more difficult to reunite with their
families, especially after they have children\. In addition, street girls often become pregnant and
have babies, who will likely grow up in the street and become themselves street children\.
Assisting street girls, therefore, could help break the intergenerational cycle of "streetism" and,
hopefully, also the intergenerational cycle of poverty\.
17\. Given the limited funding available, activities will be geographically targeted to eight of
the 24 communes of the Kinshasa larger metropolitan area, selected for their high concentration
of street children: Gombe, Kinshasa, Masina, Matete, Kasa-vubu, Kalamu, Kitambo and
33 This approach can be considered an adaptation of conditional cash transfers to Congolese reality\. Rather than
paying targeted parents to keep children in school, schools are paid (in kind) to keep targeted children enrolled,
which in turn results in savings for the parents\. The conditionality is built in the system because the only way to
benefit is to attend school (thus doing away with cumbersome controls on compliance), and the distribution of
benefits is greatly simplified because they are concentrated on schools (rather than dispersed among caretakers) and
they are in kind (hence preventing misuse)\.
55
\. ~
S e l e m b a ~In~2004, the total population of the eight communes was about 1\.8 million\. All of
these communes attract street children because of the opportunities they offer to earn (or steal)
money at markets, car parks, bus and train stations, and other locations where people with money
tend to gather (e\.g\., restaurants, shops, offices)\. Gombe, which hosts the most prestigious
economic and political actors (ministries, donor offices, commercial banks, elegant restaurants),
is a top attraction for street children, but they are generally chased away by police and security
services, and therefore few street children sleep in Gombe's streets\. For this reason, support
services offered in Gombe will be limited to Listening Centers (see below)\.
18\. The component will support a wide range of services to be provided primarily by NGOs
and FBOs, but also, when appropriate, by specialized institutions of MINAS (e\.g\., Social
Promotion Centers)\. Services provided can be grouped in the following categories:
Short-term services: These would include temporary shelter (whether for the day or for
the night), emergency medical care, food, entertainmentjplay, and, to the extent possible,
trauma counseling\. Service providers will be encouraged to use creative approaches and
build on their experiences to offer services that are cost-effective and adapted to the
target population\. Street educators and informal Listening Centers will offer a first
contact for children with the "regular" world and caring adults, thus representing the
entry point for other efforts\. On the other hand, moving health centers (i\.e\., vans with
health personnel and supplies for basic medical care) may be used to bring health services
to children where they congregate (usually these vans circulate at night and go where
children gather to sleep)\. Transit Centers may also provide short-term services in an
open environment where children are free to come and leave\.
Medium-term services: These would be services with longer-term objectives such as
psycho-social counseling, remedial classes, functional literacy, and vocational training\.
In general these services would be available through Transit Centers, but it is not
expected that all Transit Centers be able to offer all services\. Partner implementing
organizations will be encouraged to set up collaboration agreements with other
organizations, or even with individuals (e\.g\., a psychologist who may accept to provide
counseling to street children at reduced rates) so as to offer children more comprehensive
services\. A number of organizations are already engaged in these activities, albeit with
varying degrees of quality and comprehensiveness\. Particular emphasis will be put on
vocational training and functional literacy, as these are crucial to equip children who
cannot (or do not want to) rejoin their families with the skills needed to become
productive citizens\. In addition, experience in DRC suggests that family reunification
may be easier when the child possesses skills that make himher an economic asset to the
household\.
Long-term living solutions: Ideally, all street children should be given the opportunity to
live in a caring household, better if with their own family\. But while permanent removal
from the streets should be the ultimate goal of interventions, it would be unrealistic to
expect high rates of family reunifications\. Experience worldwide suggests that
34 It should be noted that Masina is also part of the communes to be targeted for prevention\.
56
reunification is a long, costly and often unsuccessful process\. "Recidivism" is the norm,
and several attempts have to be made, with patient mediation offered by trained personnel
and careful follow-up even when the reunification appears to have been successful\. Both
local actors and existing literature suggest that street girls are a particularly difficult
group to reintegrate, especially when they have become mothers\. In addition, in cases
where children have fled family abuse, reunification may not be in the best interest of the
child\. Therefore, alternative long-term living arrangements have to be envisaged\. Group
houses, where a small group of children live together under the supervision of a pool of
adults, and foster houses, would be the preferred solutions\. There is little experience with
these two types of arrangements in DRC, and the little experience there is has provided
mixed results, so they will be tried on a pilot basis\.
Component C: Capacity building, coordination and project management ($2\.6 million)
19\. This component would provide technical assistance and training to strengthen MINAS'
capacity to effectively carry out its mandate as the government agency responsible for child
protection, but also support NGOs and FBOs directly involved in service delivery as well as
other stakeholders with a role to play in child protection\. Project-funded activities will focus on
Ministry personnel at the central level and on field personnel operating in the communes targeted
by Components A and B\. It should be noted that capacity building activities targeting MINAS
will have a national coverage, enabling its provincial representations to benefit from the project
as well\. In this sense, it is hoped that the activities financed under this component will help re-
energize the Ministry and enable it to play its role of national focal point for vulnerable children,
including mobilizing funds from other donors\.
20\. When relevant, capacity building would also cover staff of other government bodies\.
These will include: Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Gender, Family and Children, Ministry of
Primary and Secondary Education, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Interior (police), National
Statistics Institute, Ministry of Youth and Sports\. In addition, the project will provide the
opportunity to reinforce the capacity of entities with a direct role in the implementation of
Components A and Byeither because they have been contracted or could be contracted as service
providers (NGOs, FBOs) or because of their strategic position (e\.g\., opinion leaders, journalists,
umbrella NGOs)\.
21\. The National Social Protection Strategy for Vulnerable Groups (2004) identified a
number of obstacles to MINAS effectiveness that are still valid , including: high staff turn-over,
a disproportionate number of staff beyond retirement age, difficult physical working
environment (e\.g\., poorly maintained buildings, unreliable access to water and electricity,
overcrowded offices, insufficient or broken furniture, lack of internet access), and staff who are
often insufficiently or inappropriately trained and who lack relevant field experience\. In
addition, a study financed by UNICEF in 2006 had also pointed to a series of weaknesses at the
institutional level\. Therefore, while the national institutional assessment to be financed through
the component should provide a comprehensive view of the capacity building needs of MINAS,
a number of areas that warrant attention could already be identified, as well as the actors most
likely to benefit fiom the trainings\.
57
Child protectiodchild rights: All actors with a possible role in prevention or assistance
should be familiar with these basic concepts, including government stakeholders,
NGOs/FBOs, as well as media representatives (through their networks) and theater
people (as they will be called upon in the context of community-based prevention)\.
Particular emphasis will be put on those who are in a position to create a multiplier effect,
such as the associations of local NGOs involved with street children (REJEER and
CATSR)\. When relevant, expert assistance will be recruited to assist MINAS draft legal
provisions needed to enact the Child Protection Law\.
Planning, monitoring and evaluation: MINAS will be helped improve the capacity of its
various directorates and divisions involved in child protection to plan, monitor and
evaluate activities\. This will include setting up a monitoring system to be piloted initially
in the targeted communes, as well as an MIS\. It is expected that the National Statistics
Institute will be involved, as well as the Ministry of Plan (Directorate for the Social
Sector) and NGO networks\. It should be pointed out that the project team has requested
funding from sources other than IDA to support the rigorous monitoring and evaluation
(M&E) of the project\. Activities financed by this component will not focus specifically
on the project, but rather aim at equipping stakeholders with the skills necessary to
establish and operate M&E systems for activities beyond the life of the project\. Of
course, the project will provide the opportunity to test the skills and the systems\.
Norms, standards and policy development: Guidelines for the Protection of Children
without Family Care (Lignes directrices pour la protection des enfants en rupture
familiale) were developed in a highly participatory way with UNICEF support and
officially adopted in December 2009\. Project funding will support the development of
standards consistent with the guidelines, and the training of MINAS' provincial
representations for disseminating the guidelines and standards to field actors (Social
Promotion Centers, NGOs, FBOs) and for monitoring their application\.
Thematic training on specijc topics: Actors with direct and regular contact with street
children, whether with public or private organizations, will be offered both training in
topics such as social reintegration (e\.g\., listening skills, mediation techniques, family
reunification), economic reintegration (e\.g\., how to provide assistance for self-
employment, motivational skills), and gender-based violence (prevention, case
management, trauma counseling), as well as training in how they can function effectively
(e\.g\. in accounting and fund raising)\.
22\. Coordination\. Much effort has already gone into coordinating the work of the numerous
organizations with the mandate -or sometimes just the desire-to help solve the street children
problem\. There exists four umbrella organizations for NGOs actively involved with street
children that already make efforts to disseminate information to their members and offer a forum
to exchange experiences: REJEER, CATSR, RENACERAS and COPERF (see Annex 6 for more
details)\. The inter-agency body, the National Council for Children, which was established in
2001 and which comprises six ministries, several donors and international and local NGOs and
FBOs, has not been very effective so far, in part because it has not been decided which agency
should take the lead\. Currently a UNICEF supported OVC Coordination Committee (known as
58
Commission Mjxte), which was established in 2004 and is chaired by the Child Protection
Department of MINAS, is currently quite active at the national level h d there are plans to set up
similar committees at the provincial MINAS' active involvement and leadership in the
Committee is currently hampered by its very limited logistical means (e\.g\., lack of access to
internet) and the uneven quality and high turn-over of its staff, especially in the provinces\. At
present, a national multisectoral coordination committee for the protection of OVC, that will be
chaired by MINAS and comprise relevant Ministries, bi- and multilateral organizations, and
other relevant public and private actors, is currently being set up\. This new Committee will
replace the existing OVC Coordination Committee\. The support to MINAS described above
should help palliate the different shortcomings\.
23\. Monitoring and evaluation\. The phenomenon of street children tends to elicit an
immediate moral response and therefore the urge to "do something", with monitoring and
evaluation being often considered a distraction from the most important task of providing
assistance --or at least trying to prevent the need for assistance\. As a result, data on costs,
service standards, outputs and outcomes are generally hard to come by and rigorous evaluations
are very few, especially on prevention efforts\. Hence the importance of setting up a sound
monitoring and evaluation system for the project, as this will provide crucial information not
only for the implementation of this project but also for future scaled-up activities and for social
policy decisions in DRC as well as in the many countries faced by similar circumstances\. It is
expected that the National Statistics Institute will be involved in the design and implementation
of an M&E system, as well as the Ministry of Plan (Directorate for the Social Sector) and NGO
networks\. In addition, the collaboration of the UCW Project, jointly implemented by
UNICEF/ILO/WB, has been secured to provide guidance and technical assistance particularly for
evaluation purposes\.
24\. Three levels of monitoring will take place: (i) inputs will be regularly recorded by PIU
staff in the project database and used to produce monthly reports; (ii) information on outputs
(e\.g\., number of community meetings held, number of meals provided) and intermediate
outcomes (e\.g\., number of girls assisted at Transit Centers or number of neighborhood Child
Protection Committees set up) will be provided on a quarterly basis by the entities contracted and
entered into the database by PIU staff (eventually by MINAS staff), but also checked through
regular field visits and random rapid assessments of the performance of service providers; and
(iii) beneficiary assessments and other research methods will be employed to gauge the level of
satisfaction of intended, beneficiaries\. When data collection instruments and processes are
sufficiently tested, MINAS' staff will be trained in their use and will begin to take over
monitoring responsibilities in an incremental manner\. It is expected that progress will be uneven
among different MINAS subdivisions and that refreshers and assistance will be needed from
time to time\. The PIM will contain precise instructions on the processes to follow for data
reporting and dissemination, including standard data recording forms\.
25\. Evaluation is expected to adopt a pre- and post-test design\. This will start with the
collection of baseline data for components A and Bythe first focusing on households and the
second on street children\. In the case of prevention, households in neighborhoods where
prevention activities will behave been taking place will be compared to households in
35 The committee comprises relevant Ministries, some donors and other public and private OVC actors\.
59
neighborhoods where prevention activities will not have not been taking place\. In the case of
assistance, street children in targeted communes will be compared to street children in non
targeted communes (keeping in mind that street children are highly mobile)\. Given the need for
a rigorous approach, evaluation will be contracted to specialists, but MINAS and the National
Statistics Institute will be associated at all stages to facilitate competence transfer\.
26\. 'Project Management\. Funding will cover the establishment and operating costs of the
PIU (see Annex 6 for details)\.
27\. A tentative breakdown of costs for this component is as follows:
Capacity building for MINAS, local NGOs and FBOs and other relevant actors, including
coordination: US$900,000
Monitoring and evaluation: US$600,000
Project management: US$ 1\.1 million
60
Annex 5: Project Costs
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: Street Children
Local Foreign Total
Project Cost By Component andor Activity
US $million US $million US $million
Component A: Prevention 3\.1
Community mobilization and awareness 0\.90 1\.oo
Schooling opportunities 0\.80
Radio programs 0\.40
Component B: Assistance 2\.00 2\.20 4\.3
Component C: Capacity Building 2\.6
Capacity building (including coordination) 0\.90
Monitoring and evaluation 0\.60
Project management 1\.00 0\.10
Total Project Costs' 6\.68 3\.32 10\.0
Of which (Le\. included in the above costs):
Physical Contingencies 0\.04 0\.01 0\.05
Price Contingencies 0\.04 0\.01 0\.05
'Taxes and duties are included as the country financing parameters allow for 100%
reimbursement\.
61
Annex 6: Implementation Arrangements
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: Street Children
Overview
1\. The Ministry of Social Affairs, Humanitarian Action and National Solidarity (MINAS)
will be the implementing agency, but will delegate implementation to a Project Implementation
Unit (PIU) placed within the Social Fund of the DRC (FSRDC)\. As the government body with
the mandate for child protection, the Ministry bears ultimate responsibility for activities dealing
with the phenomenon of street children\. However, in light of its weaknesses and of the limited
resources and time for project implementation, day-to-day project management activities will be
delegated to the FSRDC (see below), through an ad hoc PIU\. A MOU (Protocol d'accord) will
spell out duties and responsibilities of the two parties\. A Steering Committee will act as the
oversight body\. Activities under Component A and Byas well as some of the activities under
Component Cywill be contracted to private actors (NGOs, FBOs, consulting firms) and, when
appropriate, to government entities (see graph at the end of the Annex)\. Selection of partner
implementing organizations will be done in line with Bank procedures, primarily on the basis of
competitive bidding\.
Main Actors and their Role
2\. MINAS\. The Ministry has the primary responsibility for initiating and coordinating
policy action for vulnerable groups in general and for orphans and other vulnerable children
(OVC) in particular, but its limited means seriously handicap its efforts to carry out its mandate\.
Within the Ministry, the Department for Child Protection (Direction des Interventions Sociales
pour la Protection de 1'Enfant or DISPE) is to lead OVC policy formulation, and coordinate and
monitor interventions (including chairing the OVC Coordination Commission)\. In 2009, DISPE
had a total of 57 staff at the national level and about eight staff in each of the provincial Offices
for Child Protection (Bureaux des Interventions Sociales pour la Protection de 1'Enfant or
BISPE) that are located under the Provincial Social Affairs Divisions (known as DIVAS)\. In
each province, activities related to child protection are carried out not only by the Office for
Child Protection, but also by the Social Affairs Bureaus, which are part of provincial or
municipal services, and to a limited extent by the Social Promotion Centers\.
3\. In Kinshasa there are 24 Social Affairs Bureaus (one per commune), but their staffing is
far from complete,36and 28 Social Promotion Centers, but most of them are either completely
run down or no longer functioning\. The limited activities targeting OVCs at the Social
Promotion Centers are financed by UNICEF\. The Ministry is experiencing serious staffing
problems: several employees are beyond retirement ageY3'while many others either lack
appropriate training or relevant experience (e\.g\., according to DISPE, only about 60 percent of
their staff is qualified)\. In addition, about 35% to 40% of MINAS' staff does not receive any
regular salary as they do not have the required status as civil servants\. Offices, logistical and
theory there should be three social workers and a Bureau chief, covering up to a million people\.
36 In
37Because public resources are insufficient to pay for pensions, the number of overage civil servants has been
growing throughout the public sector\.
62
communication means are also grossly inadequate, with frequent overcrowding and insecure
access to water, electricity and internet\. Moreover, the operating budget is extremely low (e\.g\., in
2008 the operating budget for the Studies and Planning Department was US$50)\. Although some
donors, including UNICEF, USAID and the African Development Bank, have provided some
support to strengthen the Ministry's capacity, the needs remain enormous\.
Role ofMINAS: The Ministry will be responsible for: (i) ensuring that project activities
are consistent with national policies and laws; (ii) liaising with other governmental
agencies including the Ministries of Justice, Gender, Health, Education and Youth as well
as the national police; and (iii) coordinating with relevant actors to tackle strategic issues
that will emerge during project implementation as well as providing technical support\.
Although the daily activities of the project will be facilitated by the PIU, MINAS will be
involved in project oversight and critical decision making through its presence in the
Steering Committee (see below)\. It is also expected that staff from Kinshasa's Social
Affairs Division, including its Child Protection Office, and the municipality's Social
Affairs Bureaus will be called to play a progressively more important role in monitoring
and facilitating project implementation\. As the capacity building provided under
Component C gets underway, they will become better equipped to support and coordinate
NGO work\. At the same time, their familiarity with project activities, and in particular
with the work of high performing NGOs, will contribute to strengthen their capacity\.
MINAS will also be responsible for sharing lessons learned during project
implementation regarding good practices and lessons learned\. Coordinating bodies, such
as the Inter-agency Committee that MINAS chairs, will provide an ideal forum for
informal exchanges\. The activities financed under Component C will help MINAS
successfully facilitate these tasks\.
4\. Project Implementation Unit: The PIU will be a light structure under FSRDC, which is
currently implementing an IDA-financed CDD project and an SPF grant for labor-intensive
public works in the Katanga province\. FSRDC was chosen as the agency to host the PIU in light
of its reputation for quality implementation and satisfactory fiduciary management\. The PIU
will be staffed with: a Coordinator, two child protection specialists, and a monitoring and
evaluation (M&E) specialist, supported by a secretary\. In addition, the FSRDC financial
management team may be strengthened by an accountant if the workload for existing staff proves
excessive; new accounting software, multi-project and multi-site, should be in place by the time
project implementation starts (it is financed by an Additional Financing for the CDD project)\.
Personnel will be selected on a competitive basis according to Bank rules, but at least one
technical specialist will be on loan from MINAS\. This arrangement should facilitate
collaboration with the Ministry and stimulate project ownership\.
0 Role ofthe PIU: By delegating implementation to FSRDC, MINAS will benefit from
FSRDC expertise in the Bank's fiduciary guidelines and requirements, and will greatly
limit additional costs associated with establishing a separate implementation unit and/or
building the Ministry's capacity to effectively run the project\. Financial management and
procurement will be carried out by FSRDC specialized personnel, an arrangement that
should allow implementation to start quickly\. All other day-to-day management
63
activities needed for project implementation will be carried out the PIU\. These will
include:
preparing yearly work plans and budgets and submitting them to the Steering
Committee (see below),
preparing terms of reference for all consultants and obtaining related non objections
fiom the World Bank,
preparing requests for manifestation of interest and for proposals in collaboration
with FSRDC procurement staff and selecting consultants,
submitting consultant selections to the Steering Committee in accordance with
requirements set in the PIM (only for contracts above a certain threshold),
supervising the work of implementation partners, in collaboration with MINAS
staff as appropriate,
f) maintaining a monitoring and evaluation system (consultant expertise and technical
assistance will be provided to design and set up the system),
disseminating project-related information,
preparing regular monitoring reports to the attention of MINAS, the Steering
Committee et the World Bank in accordance with requirements set in the PIM\.
5\. The roles and responsibilities of FSRDC, the PIU and MINAS in terms of project
implementation will be clearly determined, defined and documented in the PIM\. In addition, an
MOU (Protocol d'accord) will be established between MINAS and FSRDC and is a condition of
effectiveness\.
6\. Steering Committee: This committee, to be set up prior to project effectiveness, will be
chaired by the Minister in charge of social affairs and consist of representatives of the following
entities (one per entity): the Studies and Planning Department of MINAS, Child Protection
Department of MINAS, the Provincial Division for Social Affairs (Kinshasa) of MINAS, civil
society (one of the umbrella NGO organizations), the Ministry of Primary, Secondary and
Professional Education, and the Ministry of Gender, Family and Children\. UNICEF and the PIU
Coordinator will participate to the Committee meetings as resource persons and observers,
without the right to vote\.
0 Role o the Steering Committee: The committee will be the oversight body for the
f
project\. In this capacity it will have three main functions: (a) approve yearly work plans
and budgets; (b) approve proposed contracts with selected partner implementing
organizations above a certain threshold; and (c) revise implementation reports as well as
specific monitoring and evaluation reports\. In addition, it will be the last resort in case of
disagreements involving the PIU (e\.g\., with partner implementing organizations or
among PIU staff)\. On occasion, Committee members may also request to participate to
project supervision activities planned by the PIU\.
7\. Other government actors: The issue of street children is complex, and finding
sustainable and effective responses to the issue requires the involvement of a host of government
actors, including: the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Gender, Family and Children, the
Ministry of Primary, Secondary and Professional Education, the Ministry of Interior (the police
64
in particular), the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the National
Statistics Institute and the training institute for social workers (known as CAFES)\. It is therefore
critical that these actors be associated in project implementation, and, if needed, be involved in
the capacity building activities\.
Role of other government actors: The specific role of each actor will obviously depend
on its mandate and comparative advantage\. Some actors will be involved as partners in
project activities, such as the ministry in charge of education, the National Statistics
Institute, or CAFES\. Others may be targeted for prevention activities, such as members
of the police inspectorates of Kinshasa\. Others still may benefit from capacity building
activities\. It is envisaged that a focal point for the project will be identified in each of the
agencies above\.
8\. Partner Implementing Organizations: Project-funded activities under Component A
and B will be primarily implemented by NGOs and FBOs\. There are some 300 NGOs, FBOs
)~~
and children centers (centres d ' a c ~ u e i lrecorded as members of at least one of the umbrella
NGOs, although many of them do not have a legal personality and many others may be involved
in activities that are not within their legally approved mandate (e\.g\., orphanages hosting
malnourished children)\. Churches (protestant, catholic and kimbanguist) have a long tradition of
social assistance and resource mobilization (human and financial), and their outreach and
visibility give their actions great legitimacy in the eyes of the population\. While a great number
of organizations carry out heroic work in helping vulnerable children and strengthening
community capacity to protect children's rights, local NGOs tend to suffer from grossly
inadequate resources, insufficiently trained staff, and poor management\.
9\. Private organizations involved with street children are grouped in four umbrella
organizations (with some overlapping):
a) the Network o Educators o Street Children and Youth (REJEER): it is the largest
f f
umbrella organization, with about 150 members and it is increasingly receiving funding
from bilateral and foreign NGOs to organize workshops and other capacity building
activities for its members;
b) the Support Committeefor Street Social Work (CATSR): it has 70 members, the majority
of whom operate outside Kinshasa, and is focused on coordination and advocacy;
c) the National Network o Centers for Remedial Schooling (RENACERAS): created in
f
2004 to offer schooling opportunities to vulnerable children who are drop-outs or never
went to school, includes 100 centers in Kinshasa (250 in total);
38 Children centers cover a wide variety of arrangements and services\. They include: day centers offering little more
than a sympathetic ear; temporary shelters, which are open institutions where children are free to come and go,
offering a variety of services; and closed residential institutions like orphanages\. Their quality varies enormously,
but in most cases it tends to be rather modest\.
65
d) the Coordination o Organization for the Protection o Children without Family Care
f f
(COPERF): it comprises nine international NGOs3' that meet regularly to exchange
information and experiences, coordinate their activities, and agree on a common
advocacy strategy; these NGOs generally work in partnership with local NGOs\.
Role of partner implementing Organizations: Implementation of Components A
(prevention) and B (assistance) will be contracted primarily to NGOs and FBOs\.
Specialized government entities, consulting firms and individual consultants will be the
main implementing partners for Component C (capacity building)\. Implementing
partners will be recruited in a competitive way and be responsible for service delivery in
accordance with a work plan, budget and targets clearly spelled out in a contract and the
project implementation manual\. They will be required to provide regular progress reports,
to be available for supervision by the PIU, to submit to audits and, more in general, to
conform to the arrangements laid out in the PIM\.
Implementation Activities
10\. The process to select partner implementing organizations will follow standard Bank
procurement procedures\. Requests for manifestation of interest will be issued by the PIU to
identify organizations to be short-listed for preventive or assistance services (the same
organization could be short-listed for both services)\. On the basis of the short list, organizations
will be invited to submit proposals for one of the communes targeted (the same organization
could submit proposals for more than one commune)\. To simplify project management, it is
expected that, at least initially, organizations will be invited to offer comprehensive services and,
therefore, that there would be only a few partner implementing organizations with fairly large
programs\. Prospective partner implementing organizations will be encouraged to form
partnerships with other entities (e\.g\., NGOs, FBOs, CBOs, children centers, theater groups,
health centers), as it is often the case already, so as to be able to offer a variety of integrated
services and to take advantage of the proximity of smaller partners to the grassroots\.
11\. Partner implementing organizations will be selected based on criteria including
demonstrated capacity to implement and manage complex and large scale activities\. Concerning
Component A, it is expected that the production of radio programs or other mass communication
instruments will be contracted separately to specialized entities, while prevention activities
relying on face-to-face interaction will be part of a comprehensive package including community
mobilization and community awareness\. Concerning component B, the exact cost will be
determined based on the services to be provided, the fees of the NGOs and the estimated costs
for the services and expected amount of children that can benefit from the project partner
implementing organizations will need to have two separate bank accounts, one to receive their
own fees, and one to receive the delegated funds that are to be used to provide specific services
or goods according to need and demand from beneficiaries\.
12\. It should be noted that the number of partner implementing organizations will be quite
limited, as it is expected that only one organization will be selected per commune and per type of
service (prevention or assistance) for the duration of the project\. On the other hand, partner
39 Africare, MDM, Save the Children, CIS, BICE, War Child, CESVI, Red Cross, and Amici dei Bambini\.
66
implementing organizations will be encouraged to form partnerships with other NGOs/FBOs or
individual consultants so as to provide more comprehensive services and/or better coverage\.
Performance indicators will be specified in the contracts between FSRDC and the organizations,
and the continuation of contracts will be contingent on an acceptable performance in terms of
process (e\.g\., timely submission of monitoring reports, unqualified annual financial audits),
outputs and outcomes\. Hence the importance of a sound monitoring and evaluation system for
the project\.
Flow of Funds
13\. An initial deposit equivalent to six months expenditures forecast will be released by IDA
upon effectiveness at the request of FSRDC\. Funds will be disbursed to partner implementing
organizations on the basis of a three-month budget as per an agreed Work Plan\. The submission
of supporting documents of expenditures for previous advances will not be a condition for
paying subsequent requests for replenishment\. However, two documents will be required for
replenishment: (i) a statement of expenditures; and (ii) a summary showing the total amount
received, and the expenditures made\.
Box 1: Project organigram
Guidance
Final responsibility
Day-to-day
Management
Field
Implementa
NGOs,FBOs, Specializedgovernment services, Consultants
~-r
Final
beneficiari
PREVENTION:
-at risk families
-neighborhoods
-schools and remedialcenters
I -1-tTC\.
\.
Annex 7: Financial Management and Disbursement Arrangements
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: Street Children
1\. The financial management (FM) arrangements for the project have been designed with
consideration for the country's post-conflict situation while taking into account also OPBP
10\.02, which covers overall FM Bank policies and procedures\. The findings of the Country
Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA) and Public Expenditure and Financial
Accountability (PEFA) exercises as well as the FM capacity assessment of MINAS conducted
during project preparation revealed some weaknesses in financial management and procurement\.
As a result, at the time of appraisal the Bank could not rely on the public expenditure framework
for the purpose of this project\. It was therefore agreed to locate the project implementation unit
under the FSRDC, including the responsibilities for the project's fiduciary aspects\. FSRDC is
very familiar with the Bank FM and procurement requirements and procedures\. FSRDC will be
the main counterpart of the Bank and focal point for all project fiduciary aspects\. Financial
management will follow the same approach as the implementation arrangements in place for the
other projects managed by FSRDC, Le\., the Additional Financing to the Emergency Social
Action Project (known as PASU) and the State and Peace Building Fund (SPF) grant for labor-
intensive works in the Katanga province\. These are considered appropriate by IDA, having been
improved through the implementation of the action plans prepared by the government following
the midterm review of PASU and various FM implementation support missions\. The residual
FM risk after mitigation measures has been rated Moderate taking into account the current FM
arrangements of the FSRDC\.
2\. Implementation of three additional projects -the Additional Financing of the PASU
project, the SPF Grant and the present project-- will translate into an increased workload for
FSRDC, which in turn will require more sophisticated control systems and adequate staff, an
effective internal audit function, an updated PIM, an integrated information system, and a multi-
project software\. Appropriate additional FM arrangements (e\.g\., acquisition of a multi-project
and multi-site accounting software, and recruitment of an additional accountant and an internal
auditor4') have been agreed with the government and FSRDC\.
3\. Interim Financial Reports (IFR) will be prepared every quarter in a format and content
agreed with IDA and submitted to the Bank 45 days after the end of the quarter\. The General
Auditor (Cow des Comptes), having been assessed as weak, a qualified, experienced, and
independent external auditor will be recruited on approved terms of reference\. The audit period
will be on annual basis and reports will be submitted to IDA and to the Cow des Comptes six
months after the end of each fiscal year\.
4\. Upon Grant effectiveness, transaction-based disbursements will be used during the first
months of project implementation\. Thereafter, the option to disburse against submission of IFR
will be considered subject to the quality and timeliness of IFR submitted to the Bank and the
overall financial management arrangement as assessed in due course\. The other options of
disbursing the funds will also be available\. A Designated Account (DA) denominated in US
40The FM team of team of FSRDC at the central level is presently composed of a qualified Financial Director, a
management accountant, a treasurer and two accountants\.
68
Dollars will be opened in a commercial bank on terms and conditions acceptable to IDA\. An
initial advance up to the ceiling of the DA and equivalent to six-month expenditures forecast will
be released by IDA at the request of the project (FRSDC) upon effectiveness\. Subsequent
advances will be made against submission of Statements of Expenditures or records reporting on
the use of initial/previous advance\. Payments to partner implementing organizations, services
providers and suppliers will be made as specified in the respective contracts and MOUs\.
5\. FM supervision will focus on the status of financial management system to assess
whether the system continues to operate well and provide support as needed
Summary Project Description
6\. The development objective of the project is to improve the delivery mechanisms of
prevention and support services for street children in Kinshasa\. Though the project will benefit
street children in Kinshasa, some of its prevention and capacity building activities will have a
national coverage\. For example, radio programs on children rights will be broadcasted in all the
provinces, and training for MINAS staff will also be provided to personnel based outside the
capital\.
Component A: Prevention- US$3\.1 million;
0 Component B: Assistance- US$4\.3 million;
0 Component C: Capacity Building, Coordination and Project Management : US$2\.6
million\.
7\. The description of the components is detailed in Annex 4\.
Country Issues
8\. Assessments by the World Bank and other donors, notably, the CFAA, PER (Public
Expenditures Review), and PEFA completed between 2002 and 2007 portray an unsatisfactory
economic and financial control environment including weak budgeting preparation and control,
financial reporting, external audit and human resources\. In-depth structural reforms have been
launched in the areas of economic governance, public expenditure management, financial sector
and public enterprises to strengthen capacity in the public administration\. With the support of
the international community, the Government of DRC is undertaking a series of Public Financial
Management (PFM) reforms in budget preparation and execution, compliance with Treasury
forecasts, preparation of regular budget execution reports, and simplification of the national
budget classification system\. By the HIPC completion point, expected in June 2010, the reforms
and actions put in place will impact the quality of the PFM system\. Although there is reason for
cautious optimism, it will take time for these reforms to yield substantial improvements in the
management of public funds\. As a result, the overall country fiduciary risk is still considered
high and the Bank cannot, at this point in time, rely on the public expenditure framework for the
purpose of this project\.
Institutional arrangements for financial management
69
Financial management capacity assessment of MINAS and the justgcation for using FSRDC
9\. Project implementation arrangements will be based on a delegation of implementation
responsibilities to government administrative and technical entities as well as to private entities
such as NGOs, FBOs, enterprises and consulting firms\.
10\. Assessments by the World Bank and other donors, notably the CFAA (Country Financial
Accountability Assessment), PER (Public Expenditures Review), and PEFA (Public Expenditure
and Financial Accountability) completed between 2002 and 2007, portray an unsatisfactory
economic and financial control environment including weak budgeting preparation and control,
financial reporting, external audit and human resources\. As a result, the overall country fiduciary
risk is still considered high\. The findings of CFAA and PEFA exercises as well as the FM
capacity assessment of MINAS conducted during project preparation revealed some capacity
shortages in financial management and procurement\. In particular, the weaknesses of the FM
Department of the Ministry include (i) insufficiently qualified staff in financial management at
all levels of the Ministry's system, (ii) insufficient familiarity with IDA and other donor-financed
procedures for project reporting, disbursement arrangements, and auditing; (iii) absence of a
proper accounting system to record and prepare financial reports ; (iv) lack of computerized and
modern accounting tools at central and provincial levels; and (iv) weak internal control systems\.
The scope and responsibilities of the FM Department of the Ministry are limited to the
preparation and execution of the Ministry budget\.
11\. As the Bank cannot rely on the existing public expenditure framework for the purpose of
this project, it was agreed to locate the project implementation unit under the FSRDC, including
the responsibilities for the project's fiduciary aspects\. FSRDC is very familiar with World Bank
FM procedures\. The FM arrangements for the Street Children Project will follow the same
approach as the FM arrangements in place for the ongoing Bank operations managed by FSRDC\.
These are considered acceptable to IDA, having been improved through the implementation of
the action plans prepared by the team following various FM implementation support missions\. In
particular, the Aide Memoire of the last implementation support mission carried out in July 2009
revealed some improvements in the FSRDC FM performance leading to an overall Satisfactory
FM rating\. The last audit report of project financial statements for the period ended December
31, 2008 was unqualified (clean)\. There is no overdue audit report and IFR at the time of
preparation of this project\.
Risk assessment and mitigation
12\. The Bank's principal concern is to ensure that project funds are used economically and
efficiently for the intended purpose\. Assessment of the risks that the project funds will not be so
used is an important part of the financial management assessment work\. The risk features are
determined over two elements: (i) the risk associated to the project as a whole (inherent risk),
and (ii) the risk linked to a weak control environment of the project implementation (control
risk)\. The content of these risks is described below\.
70
Risk Risk Mitigating Measures
Incorporated into Project Design
Inherent risk H M
Country level H The government is committed to a
The CFAA, PER and the PEFA reform program that includes the
reports outlined PFM weaknesses strengthening of the budget
at central and decentralized classification and implementation of
government levels as well as an interim IFMIS\. A new legal
sector ministries level in term of framework is being prepared\. N H
governance and public finds However there are still weaknesses in
management\. capacity and in audits of a first set of
accounts\. Efforts are being continued
to strengthen the accounting and
audit capacity\. Use of IDA FM
procedures is required for this
project\.
Entity level The FSRDC is very familiar with
Implementation of the Additional IDA FM procedures\. The FM
Financing, the SPF grant for procedures manual will be updated;
Katanga and the Street Children additional staff will be recruited; the
Project will translate into an S internal audit team will be
increase of activities for FSRDC, strengthened (this will be financed by Y M
which in turn will require more the PASU Additional Financing); a
sophisticated control systems and multi-project and multi-site
adequate staff, an effective accounting software will be installed
internal audit function, upgrading (this will be financed by the PASU
the project implementation manual Additional Financing)\.
(PIM), an integrated information
system and a multi-project
software\.
Project level M The current FM arrangements are
The resources of the project may appropriate to manage the project\.
not be used for the intended However, for efficiency purposes, the
purposes\. Delays in the reporting FSRDC will strengthen ex-ante and
system and auditing due to the ex-post control of funds allocated to
additional workload of FM team partner implementing organizations
are expected\. including NGOs and FBOs\. The M
scope of audit will include review of N
expenditures incurred by partner
implementing organizations\.
Additional FM staff (an accountant)
will be recruited on TORSacceptable
to IDA, and training and hands-on
advice will be provided to new staff
~~
Control Risk
~
S M
M Annual work plans and budgets are
Budgeting: required and will be disseminated to
(i) Weak capacity at central and the project stakeholders\. The project
decentralized entities to prepare PIM (Financial Procedures part)
and submit accurate annual work defines the arrangements for
programs and budgets; (ii) weak budgeting, budgetary control and the N M
consolidation of decentralized requirements for budgeting revisions\.
budgets; and (iii) weak budgetary [FR will provide information on
71
I execution and control\. budgetary control and analysis of
variances between actual and
estimated expenditures\.
Accounting: L The PIU will be located under
Poor policies and procedures, lack FSRDC, that will also be responsible
of qualified additional accountant for the project's fiduciary aspects: (i)
staff at MINAS\. the project will adopt the Congolese
accounting system\.; accounting
procedures will be documented in the N L
PIM; (ii) the FM team headed by a
qualified and experienced Finance
Director will be strengthened by an
individual consultant recruited on a
competitive basis; (iii) training on
IDA FM procedures will be provided
to the new staff as needed\.
Internal Control: H (i) Update of the FM portion of the
Internal control system may be PIM and training on the use of the
weak due to weak FM capacity of manual; (ii) recruitment of an
IA; or the current FM procedures additional internal auditor (to be
may not be sufficient for this fmanced under the Additional
project\. Financing) who will scrutinize posted Y M
accounts, as well as financial and
operational procedures\. The internal
auditors team will report to FSRDC's
Coordinator, who will in turn report
to the Steering Committee\.
Funds Flow: S (i) Payment requests will be
Risk of misused of funds and approved by the Finance Director
delays in disbursements of funds and the Management Accountant
to IA and beneficiaries\. prior to disbursement of funds to
contractors or consultants and
decentralized entities; N S
(ii) The TORSof the Internal Auditor
as well as the External Auditors
include regular field visits (physical
controls of goods, services acquired);
(iii) A ceiling for expenditures that
can be handled /paid in cash will be
set up in the FM portion of the PIM;
(iv) Replenishment of bank accounts
of IAs will be made via a simplified
IFR (summary report) and supporting
documents will be kept in their
premises;
(v) New FM staff capacity will be
strengthened prior and during the
project implementation period\.
72
Risk Risk Mitigating Measures
Incorporated into Project Design
Financial Reporting: M (i) A computerized accounting
Inaccurate and/or delayed system will be used (multi-project
submission of IFR at central level and multi site);
due to delays from IAs and the (ii) IFR and financial statements
increase in the FSRDC activities\. formats will be similar the IFR N M
prepared by the FSRDC and agreed
during negotiations (iii) A Finance
Director will support the FM team of
the FSRDC and additional FM staff
will be recruited
Auditing: M (i) The project's institutional N M
Delays in the recruitment of the arrangements allow for the
external auditor, recruitment of appointment of adequate external
unqualified auditing f m s ; delays auditors and the Tom will include
in submission of audit report and field visits and specific reports on
the scope of the mission may not findings of physical controls of
cover expenditures incurred by all goods, services and works acquired
IAs\. by partner implementing
organizations and beneficiaries;
(ii) Annual auditing arrangements
will be carried out during the project
implementation period; (iii) Close
monitoring of audits due dates by the
Bank FM team\.
Fraud and Corruption: S (i) The TOR of the internal and
Possibility of circumventing the external auditors will comprise a
internal control system with specific chapter on corruption
colluding practices as bribes, auditing; (ii) the internal auditors will
abuse of administrative positions, report to the Coordinator of the
misprocurement etc, is a critical FSRDC and the Project director\. The
issue\. project director, in turn will report
directly to the Board of Directors;
(iii) one sample of his reports will be
submitted to the Bank on a quarterly Y M
basis; (iv) revised FM procedures
manual approved three months after
project effectiveness; (v) robust FM
arrangements (qualified FM staff
recruited under TORS acceptable to
IDA, quarterly IFR including budget
execution and monitoring; (vi)
technical auditing; (vii) measures to
improve transparency such as
providing information on the project
status to the public, and to encourage
participation of civil society and
other stakeholder are built into the
oroiect design\.
OVERALL FM RISK
73
Strengths and Weaknesses
13\. The FSRDC is very familiar with Bank FM procedures (e\.g\., financial reporting, auditing
and disbursement) and has significant experience in implementing and managing CDD
operations (e\.g\., IDA H120-DRC)\. Project accounting will be managed and supervised by the
Kinshasa-based Finance Director with a team of internal auditors, budget controller and
accountants\. An additional Accountant will be recruited and will be mainly assigned to the FM
aspects of the present project\. The Budget Controller and the internal audit unit have acceptable
experience in working with IDA-financed projects\.
14\. No significant FM capacity weaknesses impeding the implementation of the project have
been identified\. However, the implementation of the Street Children Project in addition to the
existing operations managed (or to be managed) by FSRDC will translate into an increased
workload, which in t r will require more sophisticated control systems, an effective internal
un
audit function and multi-sites and multi-projects accounting software\.
Financial Management Action Plan
15\. The Financial Management Action Plan described below has been developed to mitigate
the overall financial management risks\.
Issue Remedial action recommended Responsible Completion
bodyfperson date
Staffing Appointment of an additional accountant FSRDC 3 months after
effectiveness
Information Acquisition and installation of FSRDC and 3 months after
system accounting software for the project and the software effectiveness
accounting training of the users (financed under the providers\.
software Additional Financing)
Administrative
Financial
Update of the current FM procedures
Accounting, and manual ( part of the PIM)
Manual
Internal auditing Strengthening of FSRDC Internal Audit
Unit by recruiting an additional internal
FSRDC
FSRDC
BY
effectiveness
3 months after
effectiveness
1
consultant (financed under the
Additional Financing)
External Appointment of the external auditor FSRDC and 3 months after
auditing completed and contract signed the Auditor effectiveness
General (Cow
des Comptes)
I I I I I
Note: The actions required within 3 months after effectiveness are part of the Financing Agreement (Ref\. Schedule
74
Description of the Implementing Entity
16\. FSRDC will be the Bank's main counterpart and focal point for fiduciary aspects\. It will
oversee fiduciary management for the whole project, including management of the funds and the
Designated Account, and will primarily be responsible for: (i) financial and administrative
management, (ii) disbursement, (iii) procurement, and (iv) auditing\. The FM team of the FSRDC
is composed of one Finance Director, two Accountants and one Treasurer at central level; and
one Accountant in each of the 11 provinces; they have all been selected on a competitive basis
under term of reference acceptable to the Bank\. The Finance Director has the overall oversight of
the project FM system\. For the purpose of this project, an additional accountant will be recruited\.
Budgeting Arrangements
17\. The FM team of the FSRDC will contribute to the preparation of an annual work plan and
budget for project implementation, identifying the activities to be undertaken and the role of
various stakeholders\. Annual work plans and budgets will be consolidated into a single
document, which will be submitted for approval first to the Steering Committee and then to IDA,
with latter submission no later than December 31 of the year prior to that for which the work
plan has been prepared\.
Key Accounting Policies and Procedures
18\. An integrated financial and accounting system will be put in place and used by FSRDC\.
The Project code and chart of accounts will be developed to meet the specific needs of the
project and documented in the PIM\. The prevailing accounting policies and procedures in line
with the national accounting standards - Plan Comptable Congolais - will apply\. The accounting
systems and policies and financial procedures used by the project will be documented in the
administrative, accounting, and financial portion of the PIM, which will be used (a) by the
project staff as a reference manual; (b) by IDA to assess the acceptability of the project
accounting, reporting, and control systems; and (c) by the auditors to assess the project's
accounting systems and controls and to design project audit procedures\. Specific procedures will
be documented for each significant accounting function\. They will be written to illustrate
document and transaction flows and they will cover the flow of funds, record keeping and
maintenance, the chart of accounts, formats of records and books of account, authorization
procedures for transactions, planning and budgeting, financial reports (including formats,
linkages with chart of accounts and procedures for reviewing them)\.
19\. For the project to deliver on its objectives, a computerized financial management system
will be developed based on a multi-site software being acquired by FSRDC\. The system should
integrate budgeting, operating and cost accounting systems to facilitate monitoring, evaluation
and reporting\.
75
Internal Control and Internal Auditing
20\. The internal control system is aimed to ensure (i) the effectiveness and efficiency of
operations, (ii) the reliability of financial reporting, and (iii) the compliance with applicable laws
and regulations\. FSRDC has already established FM procedures that are described in the PIM\.
For the purpose of this project, the current Accounting, Financial and Administrative Procedures
Manual, being an integral part of the PIM, will be updated to document, explain and describe
work processes, information flow, authorization and delegation of authority, timing, job
segregations, auto and sequential controls, compliance with project objectives, micro and macro
rules and regulations\. Application of the procedures set up in the manual will be mandatory for
all staff at all levels\. In addition to the procedures manual, all rules of MINAS that will not
conflict with the PIM will also apply to the project\.
2 1\. In the specific component related to ensuring the reliability of financial reporting, the
following staffing arrangement should be sufficient to maintain accounting records relating to the
project financial transactions, and to prepare the project's consolidated financial reports and
submit the same to IDA\. The financial management function will be carried out by the FSRDC
FM team headed by a Finance Director with acceptable Bank FM procedures experiences\.
22\. The internal audit function of the project will be handled by the Internal Audit Unit of the
FSRDC, The project will provide support for strengthening this function and the internal audit
team through the recruitment of an additional experienced and qualified internal auditor under
terms and conditions acceptable to the Bank\. The internal audit arrangements for the Street
Children Project will follow the same arrangements and approach as the arrangements in place
for the ongoing projects managed by the FSRDC\. The Internal Audit Unit will report directly to
the FSRDC Coordinator and the Steering Committee of this project\. All deficiencies or
circumvented practices identified will be communicated in a timely manner to the overall senior
management of the project, mainly the Steering Committee and the Coordinator for immediate
corrective action as appropriate\. One of each such report will also be communicated to the Bank\.
The internal audit unit will provide training and hands on support to the project staff\. The team
will also prepare relevant manuals and guidelines\.
Funds Flow and Disbursement Arrangements
Disbursement methods
23\. Upon Grant effectiveness, transaction-based disbursements will be used during the first
months of project implementation\. At effectiveness, an initial advance up to the ceiling of the
Designated Account will be made into the Designated Account and subsequent disbursements
will be made against submission of Statements of Expenditures or records\. Thereafter, the
option to disburse against submission of quarterly unaudited Interim Financial Report (also
known as report-based disbursement) could be considered subject to the quality of financial
management arrangements as assessed in due course\. If and when report-based disbursement is
adopted, the Designated Account ceiling will be equal to the cash forecast for two quarters as
provided in the quarterly Interim Financial Report\.
76
24\. The option of disbursing the funds through direct payments to third party on contracts
above a pre-determined threshold for eligible expenditures will also be available\. Another
acceptable method of withdrawing proceeds from the IDA grant, if applicable in the project, is
the special commitment method whereby IDA may pay amounts to a third party for eligible
expenditures to be paid by the Recipient under an irrevocable Letter of Credit\.
Designated Account
25\. A Designated Account denominated in US Dollars will be opened in a commercial bank
on terms and conditions acceptable to IDA\. An initial advance of US$600,000 equivalent to six
months expenditures forecast will be released by IDA at the request of the project upon
effectiveness\. The Designated Account will be used for all payments less than 20 % of the
ceiling amount\. Disbursements to the Designated Account or on account of direct payments will
be made based on eligible expenditures to be financed\. Additional advances to the Designated
Account will be made on a monthly basis against withdrawal applications supported by
Statements of Expenditures or records and other documents as specified in the Disbursement
Letter\. \.
Disbursement of funds to Partner Implementing Organizations and services providers and
suppliers
26\. FSRDC will make payments to partner implementing organizations as well as service
providers and suppliers in regard to the specified activities in the three components of the
project\. Payments will be made in accordance with the payment modalities specified in the
respective contractdagreements\. In addition to these supporting documents, FSRDC will
consider the findings of the internal audit unit while approving the payments\. FSRDC, with the
support of its Internal Audit Unit, will reserve the right to verify the expenditures ex-post, and
refunds might be requested for non respect of contractual clauses\. Misappropriated activities
could result in the suspension of financing for a given entity\.
27\. Overall funds flow is described in the chart below:
I Service providers, suppliers\. \. 1
I
77
Taxes
28\. Funds will be disbursed in accordance with project categories of expenditures, as shown
in the Financing Agreement\. Financing of each category of expenditure will be authorized at
100 percent inclusive of taxes as per the current Country Financing Parameters approved for
DRC \.
Financial Reporting
29\. Financial reports will be designed to provide quality and timely information on project
performance to project management, IDA and other relevant stakeholders\. Formats of the
financial reports were developed and agreed during project negotiations\. The quarterly IFR
includes the following financial statements: (i) statement of sources of funds and project
revenues and uses of funds; (ii) statement of expenditures classified by project components and
or disbursement category (with additional information on expenditure types and implementing
agencies as appropriate), showing comparisons with budgets for the reporting quarter and
cumulatively for the project life; (iii) cash forecast; (iv) explanatory notes; (v) Designated
Account activity statements\. The quarterly IFR will be prepared and submitted to IDA within
45 days after the end of each calendar quarter\.
30\. In compliance with International Accounting Standards and IDA requirements, the
project will produce annual financial statements\. These include: (i) a Balance Sheet that shows
Assets and Liabilities ; (ii) a Statement of Sources and Uses of Funds showing all the sources of
Project funds, expenditures analyzed by project component and or category; (iii) a Designated
Account Activity Statement; (iv) a Summary of Withdrawals using Statements of Expenditures,
listing individual withdrawal applications by reference number, date and amount; and (v) Notes
related to significant accounting policies and accounting standards adopted by management and
underlying the preparation of financial statements\. The financial statements will constitute the
entry point of the external auditor's annual diligences\.
Auditing
31\. Due to the weak capacity of the General Auditor (Cour des Comptes), an external
qualified audit firm will be recruited under Terms of References and procedures acceptable to
IDA\. This firm will audit the financial statements of the project annually\. FSRDC with
participation of the General Auditor will prepare the terms of reference for the audit\. The scope
of the audit will cover the activities performed by FSRDC at central level and any partner
implementing organizations\.
32\. The annual audited financial statements together with the auditor's report and
management letter covering identified internal control weaknesses will be submitted to IDA no
later than six months after the end of each fiscal year\. A single audit opinion will be issued with
respect to project income and expenditures, Designated Accounts, and the IFR, The report will
also include specific controls such as compliance with procurement procedures and financial
reporting requirements and consistency between financial statements and management reports
78
and field visits (e\.g\., physical control)\. The audit report will thus refer to any incidence of non-
compliance and ineligible expenditures identified during the audit mission\.
Audit Report Due Date
(i) Not later than June 30 (2000 + N) if
effectiveness has occurred before June 30
The Project audit reports (Audit report and (2000 + N-1)\.
Management letter) (ii) Not later than June 30 (2000 + N+1) if
effectiveness has occurred after June 30,
(2000 + N- 1)
Financial covenants
33\. The following financial covenants apply:
(a) The Recipient shall establish not later than three months following the effectiveness Date
and thereafter maintain or cause to be maintained a financial management system
(including related staff, software and an internal auditor) in accordance with the
provisions of Section 4\.09 of the General Conditions\.
(b) The Recipient shall prepare and furnish to the Association as part of the Project Report
not later than forty-five (45) days after the end of each calendar quarter, interim
unaudited financial reports for the Project covering the quarter, in form and substance
satisfactory to the Association\.
(c) The Recipient shall have its Financial Statements audited in accordance with the
provisions of Section 4\.09 (b) of the General Conditions\. Each audit of the Financial
Statements shall cover the period of one fiscal year of the Recipient, commencing with
the fiscal year in which the first withdrawal was made under the Project\. The audited
Financial Statements for each such period shall be furnished to the Association not later
than six months after the end of such period\.
(d) The Recipient shall by not later than three months following the effectiveness Date, or
any other later date agreed with the Association, contract an external auditor under terms
and conditions and with qualifications and experience satisfactory to the Association\.
Fraud and corruption
34\. The risk of fraud and corruption within the project activities is high given the country
context and the nature and implementation arrangements of the project activities\. A strong
fiduciary arrangement has been designed and put in place to mitigate these risks\. To mitigate the
risk of fraud and corruption, Guidelines on Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption in
Projects Financed by IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and Grants, dated October 15, 2006 shall
apply to the project\. Moreover, FSRDC will implement an Anti-Corruption Plan, which will
include measures to improve transparency such as providing information on the project status to
the public, and encouraging the participation of civil society and other stakeholders\.
79
List of conditionalities
35\. Following is the effectiveness condition related to FM:
The Recipient, through MINAS, has adopted a Project Implementation Manual,
including a Project Financial and Accounting Manual and an Anti-corruption Plan, in
a form and substance satisfactory to the Association
Supervision plan
36\. FM supervisions will be conducted over the project's lifetime\. The project will be
supervised on a risk-based approach\. Supervision will focus on the status of financial
management system to verify whether the system continues to operate well throughout the
project's lifetime and to ensure that expenditures incurred by the project remain eligible for IDA
funding\. It will comprise inter alia, the review of audit reports and IFRs, advice to task team on
all FM issues\. Based on the current risk assessment which is Modest, we envisage one FM
supervision mission per year\. The ISR will include a FM rating of the project\. An
implementation support mission will be carried before effectiveness to ensure the project
readiness\. To the extent possible, mixed on-site supervision missions will be undertaken with
procurement monitoring and evaluation and disbursement colleagues\.
80
Annex 8: Procurement Arrangements
CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: Street Children
A\. General
1\. Procurement for the proposed project would be carried out in accordance with the World
Bank's "Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits" dated May 2004, revised
October 2006; and "Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants by World Bank
Borrowers'' dated May 2004, revised October 2006, and the provisions stipulated in the Legal
Agreement\. The various items under different expenditure categories are described in general
below\. For each contract to be financed by the Grant, the different procurement methods or
consultant selection methods, estimated costs, prior review requirements, and time frame are
agreed between the Borrower and the Bank in the Procurement Plan\.
2\. The World Bank's standard bidding documents (SBDs) will be used for all contracts
involving international competition, including International Competitive Bidding (ICB) for
works, goods and non-consultant services and the World Bank Standard Request For Proposals
(SRFP) for all consulting firms estimated to cost the equivalent value of US$ 100,000 or more\.
Until such time that a national procurement system has been developed and its use for Bank-
financed projects approved by the Bank, the World Bank's SBDs will also be used for contracts
involving national competition, including NCB, and National SBD agreed with or satisfactory to
the Bank, as specified in the PIM\. The preparation of a PIM, satisfactory to the Bank, is a
condition of effectiveness\.
B\. Conditions to use the upcoming national procurement system
3\. The main recommendations of the 2004 CPAR were to (i) prepare and approve a public
procurement code, (ii) do a survey of the existing capacity on procurement, (iii) make a needs
assessment of the institutional and human capacity requirements for public procurement in the
country, and (iv) prepare and implement a plan of action for the procurement system reform\.
4\. Hence the Government is currently working on a new procurement code and progress in
implementing the action plan for this reform is very encouraging\. It is expected that the new
code will be approved and implemented by mid-May, 2010\. The most important steps achieved
to date include the following: (i) the draft national procurement code has been completed and
submitted to the National Assembly for final review and approval; (ii) the highest authorities of
DRC have demonstrated that they are very committed to the reform agenda (e\.g\. the National
Assembly will have a special session to discuss the proposed new national procurement code);
and (iii) funds will be available to put in place the new institutions (contract committees within
the line ministries, prior reviewing entity and regulatory body), train staff and conduct the first
audit of the system\.
5\. Therefore, once the new procurement code is adopted by the Government and has been
reviewed and found satisfactory by the Bank, it will be applicable to all contracts that are not
advertised internationally\. For this purpose, the Bank procurement team will identify and clarify
clauses of the said code that are not entirely or partially applicable to a Bank-financed project,
81
and propose appropriate modifications\. These modifications would be set out in an agreement
between the Government and the Bank\.
C\. Procurement methods
6\. Procurement of Works: Works to be procured under this project would consist of small
works only, such as the expansion of the FSRDC office space to accommodate staff from the
project PIU\. The procurement will be done using the Bank's Standard Bidding Documents
(SBD) for all ICB and National SBD agreed with or satisfactory to the Bank\. Small simple works
may be procured by requesting at least three written quotations from qualified contractors\.
7\. Procurement of Goods: Goods to be procured under this project would include: office
equipment for the PIU (furniture, computers, photocopy machine, etc\.) and vehicles for the PIU\.
The procurement will be done using the Bank's SBD for all ICB and National SBD agreed with
or satisfactory to the Bank\. Small value goods may be procured under shopping procedures\.
United Nations Agencies and Direct Contracting may also be considered with the Bank prior
review and approval\.
8\. Procurement of Services (other than consultants' services): Services (other than
consultants' services) to be procured under the project will include services for the maintenance
of office equipment\. The procurement will be done using the Bank's SBD for procurement of
services for all ICB and National SBD agreed with or satisfactory to the Bank\. Some of these
services may be contracted under simplified procurement methods and procedures as defined in
the implementation manual\.
9\. Selection of Consultants: Consultants' services required would cover consultancies for,
among others: (a) the provision of comprehensive support services to street girls (e\.g\., shelter,
medical, including peri-natal care, psychosocial counseling, family reunification); (b) social
marketing campaigns aimed at preventing children from ending up in the streets; (c) community
mobilization; (d) radio production; (e) training; (d) monitoring and evaluation, including the
establishment of computerized MIS\.
10\. Service providers, including NGOs, CBOs, and public sector services, may be employed,
in partnership with smaller local organizations at field level, to provide facilitation and
community capacity development services across the project area\. The procurement methods and
procedures to be used by these entities will be defined and described in the PIM\. It is expected
that for the implementation of Component A and B, calls for proposals will be issued at the
beginning of the project to select one NGO per commune and per service (either prevention or
assistance)\. NGOs will be encouraged to partner with other, probably smaller, NGOs or FBOs
so as to ensure a greater range of services and a better coverage of the commune\. Contracts with
the NGOs will specify performance indicators that will have to be upheld for the continuation of
the contract for the project life\. While this approach will limit the number of NGOs that will
benefit from the project, it will also facilitate continuity and consistency\.
82
11\. Least-Cost Selection (LCS) may be used for selecting consultants for assignments of a
standard or routine nature (audit services) where well-established practices and standards exist
estimated to cost less than US$200,000\.00\.
12\. All services of individual consultants (IC) will be procured under individual contracts in
accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 5\.1 to 5\.4 of the Guidelines\.
13\. Short lists of consultants for services estimated to cost less than US$ 100,000 equivalent
per contract may be composed entirely of national consultants in accordance with the provisions
of paragraph 2\.7 of the Consultant Guidelines\.
14\. Training: This category would cover all costs related to the carrying out of training
program for public sector services staff, NGOs, CBOs for sustainability purposes\. Training
programs would be part of the Annual Work Plan and Budget and will be included in the
procurement plan\. Prior review of training plans, including proposed budget, agenda,
participants, location of training and other relevant details, will be required only on annual basis
unless otherwise agreed during routine supervision\.
15\. Operating Costs: Operating costs shall consist of operation and maintenance costs for
vehicles, computers and equipment; insurance, travel costs, and travel allowances to staff and
Steering Committee members involved in the project implementation and supervision, electricity
and telephone, among others\. Operating costs, made within one year prior to the effectiveness
and on or after April 15, 2010, up to an aggregate amount not to exceed $100,000 will be
financed on a retroactive financing basis\.
16\. The procurement procedures and SBDs to be used for each procurement method, as well
as model contracts for works and goods procured, will be included in the Implementation
Manual to be prepared by the Borrower\.
D\. Institutional arrangement for procurement and capacity of the executive unit to handle
procurement
17\. Institutional arrangementsfor procurement\. Given its satisfactory performance to date,
the project coordination unit of the Emergency Social Action Project, FSRDC, will be the
procurement agent for the Street Children Project until the new institutions recommended by the
new national procurement law are in place; at this time, a decision will be taken on the most
appropriate approach to be used depending on the conclusion and recommendations of a
procurement audit of contracts funded by the national budget\.
18\. Assessment o the agency's capacity to implement procurement\. This is an existing
f
implementing agency that capacity on procurement has been found acceptable for the Bank; the
unit has shown qualification and experience in handling procurement activities of the social
sector project and it is envisaged the do the same thing for the additional financing of the same
project\.
83
E\. Assessment of the risks and measures to mitigate
19\. The risk factors for procurement performance include those posed by the country context
and those due to the low procurement capacity of the Ministry of Social Affairs\. This ministry
may be in charge of procurement activities of the project implementation when the new
procurement law is enforced\. In that sense, a risk assessment is needed\. Indeed, in terms of the
country context, the Country Procurement Assessment Review (CPAR) and experience of other
IDA- and International Financing Institutions (1FIs)-funded projects indicate that procurement on
the project is likely to involve the following risks (if procurement is transferred to the Ministry):
0 a weak governance environment, weaknesses in accountability arrangements, and an
overall lack of transparency in conducting procurement processes creates significant risks
of corruption, collusion and fraud;
0 the administrative system as it operates in practice creates opportunities for informal
interference in the procurement process by senior officials - creating opportunities for
waste, mismanagement, nepotism, corruption, collusion and fraud;
government officials likely to be involved in project procurement through tender
committees may not be familiar with procurement procedures;
0 there is neither a national control system ensuring that the rules are respected nor a
regulatory body to handle complaints from bidders and
Overall project risk for procurement is currently rated low but would become high if transferred
to MINAS\.
Measures to mitigate the identified risks
20\. The following strategy has been devised in the project to mitigate the procurement risks:
0 To mitigate the risks of collusion, fraud, corruption, waste and mismanagement,
implementation arrangements will be geared to achieve a high level of transparency in
project implementation\.
0 To mitigate risks related to the low level of capacity both at the PIU and MINAS, all
proposed procurement decisions above a given threshold (to be determined at project
effectiveness) will be subject to mandatory review by a contract committee composed of
representatives from Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Budget, Ministry of Social Affairs,
excluded staff involved in evaluation and contract award processes\.
All ICB contracts for goods and works and all consulting contracts costing US$ 200,000
and above, will be published in the UNDB and DgMarket, in accordance with World
Bank Guidelines;
0 The PIU will apply a "one-strike" policy to all contractors and consultants - any case of
complicity in corruption, collusion, nepotism andor fraud will lead to dismissal,
disqualification from all further project activities, and prosecution;
84
A project launch workshop will be carried out for all project's stakeholders including
MINAS staff, relevant staff of all other entities involved in project implementation,
NGOs, religious organizations, and civil society;
For all procurement, the Project Implementation Manual, to be adopted by effectiveness,
will include procurement methods to be used in the project along with their step-by-step
explanation as well as the standard and sample documents to be used for each method\.
F\. Frequency of Procurement Supervision
21\. In addition to the prior review supervision to be carried out by the Bank staff, the
capacity assessment of the Implementing Agency has recommended quarterly supervision
missions during the first 18 months\. These will include field visits to carry out the post-review of
procurement actions\. Therefore, missions in the first 18 months shall include a Bank
Procurement Specialist or Consultant\.
G\. Procurement Plan
22\. A procurement plan for the implementation of the Project was agreed between the
Recipient and the Project team during the negotiations\. This plan covers the first 18 months of
the Project and indicates the procurement methods to be used for each activity\. This plan will be
available at the recipient web site and the Bank external website\. The Procurement Plan will be
updated, with the prior approval of the Bank, on an annual basis or as required by the Bank to
reflect the project implementation needs and improvements in institutional capacity\.
23\. The thresholds for the use of the various procurement and selections methods regardless
of the procuring entity are summarized below:
(a) Contractsfor w o r k and goods
Procurement Method Threshold for the method in 1000 Bank review in 1000
us%
(a) International CompetitiveUS$ 3,000 or more for works, US$ All contracts
Bidding (ICB) 500 or more for goods other than
drugs and US$300 for drugs and
textbooks
(b) National Competitive All contracts estimated below the The first two contracts
Bidding ICB threshold and above the
shopping ceiling
(c) Shopping Below US$ 100 for works and US$ Post review
50 for goods
( d) UN procurement agencies NIA
(e) Community participation Implementation manual to Post review
in procurement determine the process
(f) Direct contracting NIA All contracts
85
(b) Contracts for consultant services
Selection Bank review in 1000 US$
methods in 1000
Procurement Method \. US%
(a) Selection based on quality NIA All contracts estimated above
and cost (QCBS) US$ 100
(b) Least Cost Selection NIA All contracts estimated above
(LCS) US$ 100
(c) Selection Based on Fixed 100 All contracts estimated above
Budget (SBFB) US$ 100
(c) Selection Based on 100 All contracts estimated above
Consultant Qualifications US$ 100
(SCQ)
(d) Individual Consultants NIA All contracts estimated above
(IC) US$50
(f) Single Source Selection NIA All contracts
In addition:
0 Consultant services estimated to cost above US$ 100,000 equivalent per contract for
firms and US$ 50,000 for individuals and all contracts awarded on a single source basis
(SSS) will be subject to prior review by the Bank
0 Short lists composed entirely of national consultants: Short lists of consultants for
services estimated to cost less than US$ 100,000 equivalent per contract may be
composed entirely of national consultants in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
2\.7 of the Consultant Guidelines\.
26\. Procurement would be carried out in accordance with the World Bank's
"Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits" dated May 2004, revised
October 2006; and "Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants by Worid Bank
Borrowers'' dated May 2004, revised October 2006\. Guidelines on Preventing and Combating
Fraud and Corruption in Projects Financed by IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and Grants", dated
October 15,2006 shall apply to the project\.
E\. Details of the Procurement Planning Involving International Competition for Goods,
Works, and Services (other than Consultants' Service):
No transactions in the Project's procurement plan are foreseen to involve international
competitive bidding\.
86
F\. Project's Procurement Plan for the first 18 months of project period (September 1,
2010 to March 31,2011)
I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Ref\. Contract Estimated Procurement Pre- Domestic Review by Expected Comments
Yo\. Description Cost Method Qualification Preference WB Bid
(US$) (yeslno) Prior/ Opening
Post Date
5 Alterations of 37 200 Shopping N/A Yes Post 06/06/10
containers for
the project
office
Total 37 200
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ref, Name of the assignment Estimated Selection Review by Expected Comments
No\. Cost (US$) method the WB proposal
Priori/ post submission
date
1 Project coordinator 86 400 IC Prior 09/01/10 Expected date of
contract start
2 Specialists in Child protection (2) 80 640 IC Prior 09/01/10 Expected date of
I contract start
3 I Specialist in M & E I 40320 I IC I Post I 09/01 1/10 I Expected date of
contract start
4 Accountant 40 320 IC Post 09/0 1/10 Expected date of
contract start
5 Prevention Services 1 000 000 SBFB Prior 10/15/10
(4firms)
6 Assistance Services (8 firms) 2000000 QCBS Prior 10/15/10
7 Broadcast production 400 000 QCBS Prior 11/10/10
8 Legal Training 40 000 IC Post 11/01/10 Expected date of
contract start
9 Development of child protection 50 000 IC Prior 12/01/10 Expected date of
standards contract start
10 Baseline Survey 100 000 CQ Prior 10/3O/10
11 Financial audit for the first 3 years 300 000 LCS Prior 11/10/10
of the project
12 Organizational audit of the Ministry 150 000 LCS Prior 11/10/10
TOTAL 4 287 680
General Total 4 410 485
87
24\. It should be noted that:
(a) Consultancy services estimated to cost above US$lOO,OOO per contract for firms and
single source selection of consultants will be subject to prior review by the Bank\.
(b) Short lists composed entirely of national consultants: Short lists of consultants for
services estimated to cost less than US$lOO,OOO equivalent per contract may be
composed entirely of national consultants in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
2\.7 of the Consultant Guidelines\.
25\. The agreed and approved procurement plan will determine procurement methods and the
contracts to be submitted to Bank prior review and no objection\.
88
Annex 9: Economic and Financial Analysis
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: Street Children
1\. A precise economic analysis is difficult to present due to the lack of data on DRC and the
dissimilarity of the few countries for which data are available\. However, both the assistance and
the preventive components of the project aim to decelerate the development of a phenomenon
with considerable and rising costs to society\. Given data availability, a comprehensive estimate
of these costs would involve the calculation of at least the following factors\.
2\. First, a child lost to the streets is unlikely to provide anything beyond a marginal
productive contribution to society, normally derived from petty activities like occasionally
washing car windows, recycling garbage or transporting goods\. The lifetime earnings of an
educated and protected citizen are thus a loss to the economy\. Second, street children incur a
range of direct costs\. These are:
a) property loss due to street children's activities (theft, vandalism, littering),
b) considerable cost of police and judiciary activity responding to street children and
especially gang activities (general patrolling, guarding of property, direct
confrontations, arrests, jailing, trials, imprisonment),
c) profit losses incurred by reduced public security limiting the activity and mobility of
business people and potential customers,
d) public health costs related to the spread of contagious diseases (e\.g\., related to the
lack of toilet facilities), as well as the imputed costs of the (often voluntary) services
offered by constrained health professionals to the street children themselves and their
often equally marginalized victims (violence, rape, pregnancies, complications related
to illegal abortions, drug-related illnesses, HIV/AIDS and other STDs),
e) spill-over effects of the spread of drugs to other marginalized groups, and
f ) Intergenerational costs as street children give birth to children who will be
disadvantaged from the very beginning of their lives\.
3\. In addition to this, the demoralization and disillusion their daily presence represents to
society around them is likely to severely affect social capital\.
4\. The phenomenon of street children worldwide develops along a predictable path towards
gradually more violent gangs, eventually representing a counter society at permanent war with
adult society, its' police and authorities\. A spontaneous reversion of this development is yet to be
documented, and the costs of a broader preventive effort providing safety nets and protection to
marginalized groups must be seen against the backdrop of this scenario\.
5\. The success rate of interventions for children already in the street is low, as mentioned,
and largely depends on the projects' ability to motivate the children themselves into wanting to
change their lives\. Project reviews have shown that when street girls become pregnant they more
often than other street children are able to mobilize such a motivation\. This may be decisive to
the success of efforts to get them (and their babies) out of their situation\. The targeting of the
"assistance" component of the project should thus have a better possibility to succeed than
similar interventions targeting more broadly\.
89
6\. While a direct comparison is impossible, a preventive program aiming to reduce the
likelihood of marginalized children in the US drifting into anti-social behavior was found to be a
hugely profitable social i n v e ~ t m e n tMore than 20 years of evaluation shows a return of US$7
\.~~
for each dollar invested, the main share of savings being in the judicial sector\. Children taking
part in this type of preventive programs also report lower use of ERs and social benefits, fewer
teenage pregnancies, stronger commitment to their education, more stable jobs and more stable
and lasting relationships\.
41The program evaluated is the Peny Preschool Project i Ypsilanti, Michigan\. See: Moran, Ricardo, and Claudio
n
de Moura Castro, 1997\.
90
Annex 10: Safeguard Policy Issues
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: Street Children
The project does not trigger any safeguard policies\.
91
Annex 11: Project Preparation and Supervision
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: Street Children
Planned Actual
PCN review 05/15/2009 12/08/2009
Initial PID to PIC n\.a\. 02/19/2010
Initial ISDS to PIC n\.a 03/05/2010
Appraisal 03/18/20 10 03/19/2010
Negotiations 04/13/20 10 04/2 1/20 10
BoardRVP approval 05/27/20 10
Planned date of effectiveness 08/3 1/2010
Planned date of mid-term review 02/28/2013
Planned closing date 08/3 1/20 15
Key institutions responsible for preparation of the project:
Ministry of Social Affairs, Humanitarian Action and National Solidarity
Anne Mossige Senior Social Protection Specialist, TTL AFTSP
Maurizia Tovo Lead Technical Specialist AFTSP
John Elder Lead Social Protection Specialist HDNSP
Fanta Toure Operations Analyst AFRVP
Astania Kamau Language Program Assistant AFTSP
Lucie Bobola Team Assistant AFCC2
Yvette Kandi Shungu Team Assistant AFCC2
Jean Charles Kra Senior Financial Management Specialist AFTFM
Bourama Diaite Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPC
LCa Allaba Salmon Consultant AFTSP
Gilberte Kedote Consultant AFTSP
Lompole Bayaki Boss'uki Consultant HDNSP
Irene Diata Esambo Consultant AFTSP
Aissatou Diallo Finance Officer CTRFC
Daria Goldstein Sr\. Counsel LEGAF
Bank funds expended to date on project preparation:
1\. Bank resources: $275,000
2\. Trust funds: 0
3\. Total: $275,000
Estimated Approval and Supervision costs:
1\. Remaining costs to approval: $60,000
2\. Estimated annual supervision cost: $150,000
92
Annex 12: Documents in the Project File
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: Street Children
Hounsounou, Gilberte, et al, 2009: "Etat des lieux des interventions et intervenants ciblant les
enfants de la rue A Kinshasa", mimeo\.
MCdecins du Monde, 2009: "La rue, c'est la chance? EnquCtes sur l'exploitation et les violences
sexuelles des jeunes filles des rues de Kinshasa", mimeo\.
Ministbres des Affaires Sociales, Action Humanitaire et SolidaritC Nationale, dCcembre 2009 :
Project de dCcret portant rbglementation de 1'Action Sociale\. ,
Ministbres des Affaires Sociales, Action Humanitaire et SolidaritC Nationale, octobre 2009 : Plan
d'Action Nationale en faveur des orphelins et enfants vulndrables vivant en RDC (201 1-2014
PAN OEV)\.
Ministbres des Affaires Sociales, Action Humanitaire et SolidaritC Nationale, 2009: Rapport
synthbse du processus RAAP (Rapid Assessment, Analysis and Action Planning)-RDC (draft)\.
Ministhres des Affaires Sociales, Action Humanitaire et SolidaritC Nationale, 2004: StratCgie
nationale de protection sociales des groupes vulnCrables\.
Ministbre du Genre, Famille et Enfant, 2009 : Loi no\. 09/001 du 10janvier 2009portant
protection de 1'enfant\.
Moran, Ricardo, and Claudio de Moura Castro, 1997: "Street-children and the Inter-American
Development Bank: Lessons from Brazil", Discussion Paper, Social development Division,
Sustainable Development Department, Inter-American Development Bank\.
Mossige, et al, 2003 : "Etude pilote de risques et de la vulnCrabilitC en RCpublique DCmocratique
du Congo\. Rapport final\.
Salmon, Lea, et al\. 2009: (( Les enfants de la rue h Kinshasa D, mimeo\.
UNDP, 2008: Statistical Update, UNDP Human Development Report 2007/8
UNICEF, 2006: Recensement des enfants de la rue de la ville province de Kinshasa\.
93
Annex 13: Statement of Loans and Credits
CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF: ProjectName
Difference between
expected and actual
Original Amount in US$ Millions disbursements
ProjectID FY Purpose IBRD IDA SF GEF Cancel\. Undisb\. Orig\. Frm\. Rev'd
PO92724 2010 DRC Ag Rehab & Recovery SIL (FYlO) 0\.00 120\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 117\.46 0\.00 0\.00
P115642 2009 rj
DRC:Emerg P o to Mitig Impact Fin Cris 0\.00 100\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 7\.76 6\.58 0\.00
PI00620 2009 DRC- Forest and Nature Conservation SIL 0\.00 64\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 , 62\.86 -5\.30 0\.00
PO91092 2009 DRC Urban Water Supply Project (FY09) 0\.00 190\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 193\.45 23\.53 0\.00
I
P 01745 2008 DRC- Pro-Routes (FY08) 0\.00 50\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 42\.80 10\.48 0\.00
P104041 2008 DRC-Enhancing Governance Capacity 0\.00 50\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 36\.78 4\.38 0\.00
(FY08)
P104497 2007 DRC Em\. Urban & Social Rehab ERL 0\.00 180\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 79\.64 60\.11 0\.00
(FY07)
PO86294 2007 DRC-Education Sector Project (FY07) 0\.00 150\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 126\.24 113\.57 0\.00
PO88751 2006 ZR-Health Sec Rehab Supt (FY06) 0\.00 150\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 70\.53 68\.02 0\.28
PO88619 2005 DRC-Emergen Living Condtion Impr 0\.00 82\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 30\.99 29\.25 0\.00
(FYW
PO86874 2005 DRC Emerg Soc Action (FYO5) 0\.00 95\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 40\.03 2\.35 0\.00
PO78658 2004 DRC-Emerg Demob Reintegr ERL (FY04) 0\.00 150\.00 0\.00 0\.00 3\.26 26\.82 -17\.33 28\.92
PO81850 2004 DRC-Emerg Econ & Soc Reunif ERL 0\.00 214\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 10\.83 -4\.70 6\.59
(FY04)
PO825I6 2004 ZR-Multisectoral HIV/AIDS (FY04) 0\.00 102\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 27\.01 9\.93 0\.00
PO71144 2004 DRC Priv Sec Dev Competitiveness 0\.00 180\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 75\.07 6\.55 38\.80
(FY04)
\. I
Total: 0\.00 1,877\.00 0\.00 0\.00 3\.26 948\.27 307\.42 74\.59
CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
STATEMENT OF IFC's
Held and Disbursed Portfolio
In Millions of US Dollars
Committed Disbursed
, IFC IFC
FY Approval Company Loan Equity Quasi Partic\. Loan Equity Quasi Partic\.
Adastra Miner\. 0\.00 0\.09 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 \.1
00 0\.00 0\.00
2003 Celtel DROC 8\.57 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 8\.57 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
2005 Kolwezi 0\.00 4\.80 0\.47 0\.00 0\.00 4\.46 0\.47 0\.00
2005 PCB Congo 0\.00 0\.45 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.45 0\.00 0\.00
Total portfolio: 8\.57 5\.34 0\.47 0\.00 8\.57 4\.92 0\.47 0\.00
Approvals Pending Commitment
FY Approval Company Loan Equity Quasi Partic\.
Total pending commihnent: 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
Annex 14: Country at a Glance
CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF: Street Children
Congo, Dem\. Rep\. at a glance W9IO9
Sub-
P O V E R T Y and S O C I A L C o n g o , Saharan Low-
Dem\. Rep\. Developmntdtmonb
Afrlca Income
2008
Population, mid-year (miliions) 84\.3 88 973
GNIpercapita (Atiasmefhod, US$) 150
Life expectancy
1082 524
GNI (Atlas mefhod, US$ billions) 9\.8 885 50
Average annual growth, 2 0 0 2 - 0 8 T
Population (%) 2\.9 2\.5 2\.1
Laborforce(%) 3\.3 2\.8 2\.7
M o a t recent e s t l m a t e (latest year available, 2 0 0 2 - 0 8 ) enrollment
Poverty (%ofpopuiafio n beb w nafio nal po verty line)
Urban pa puiatio n (% o F total popuiafio n) 32 36 29
Life expectancy at birth (pars) 48 52 59 L
\.
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) 126 89 78
Childmalnutrition (%of children under5) 28 27 26 Access to improved water source
Access to animproved watersource(%ofpopulation) 46 58 67
Literacy (%ofpopulation age T y 62 84
Gross primary enrollment (%of school-age population) 90 98 96
M ale 99 03 02
Female 82 93 95
KEY E C O N O M I C R A T I O S and L O N G - T E R M T R E N D S
1988 1998 2007 2008
Economlcratlo3
GDP (US$billions) 8\.9 6\.2 0\.0 ns
Gross capital formatiorVGDP 14\.4 2\.1 8\.5 23\.9
Exports of goods and sewicesiGDP 25\.5 29\.8 27\.2 23\.3 Trade
Gross domestic savingsiGDP 12\.1 -10 8\.8 8\.6
Gross national savingslGDP 3\.5 6\.8 121 19 T
Current account baiancelGDP -6\.7 a\.7 -7\.0 -15\.4
Interest paymentslGDP 2\.0 0\.3 2\.8 2\.5
Total debtiGDP 96\.6 212\.3 123\.9 05\.3
Total debt sewicelexports 14\.4 15 8\.1 20\.4
Present value of debtlGDP 87\.5 80\.3
Present value of debtlexports 2914 295\.8
Indebtedness
1988-98 1998-08 2007 ZOO8 2008-12
(average annualgrowth)
GDP
GDP percapita
-5\.9
-9\.2
3\.2
0\.3
6\.3
3\.3
6\.2
3\.3
5\.3
13
-
- C-
, Dan\. Rep
L o w - i m srwp
Exports of goods and sewices -6\.4 7\.4 9\.9 4\.9 -4\.9
' '
(%of GDP)
Agriculture
Industry
Manufacturing
Services
Household final consumption expenditure
1988
29\.8
30\.2
113
40\.0
75\.2
47\.5
20\.9
6\.1
316
92\.9
2007
42\.5
28\.4
6\.4
29\.1
60\.9
40\.2
26\.0
5\.5
318
80\.4
y---
GrowthofcapltciandGDP(%)
'
0
03 04 05 OB 07 08
General gov't final consumption ex$mditure 12\.7 8\.1 0\.4 no -0cF - C O O P
Imports of goods and sewices 27\.6 32\.9 37\.9 38\.6
1988-98 1998-08 2007 ' 2008
Growth of exports and Imports (%)
(average annualgrowth)
Agriculture 2\.5 0\.0 3\.0 3\.0
industry -0\.0 7\.1 no 7\.1
Manufacturing -119 3\.5 8\.0
Services -P\.6 9,0 ns 0\.0
Household final consumption expenditure -5 7
I
-
-15 7 -lo 03 04 05 OB 07
General gov't final consumption expenditure
Gross capital formation -0 3 Exporls -Clmwrtr
Imports of goods and sewices -144 209 92 157
~ o t 2008 data are prelimlnaryestimates
e
This table was produced from the Development Economics LDB database
*Thediamonds showfourkeylndicators inthecountry(inbold)comperedmth its income-groupaverage ndataaremissing,thediamondmll
be incomplete
95
Congo, Dem\. Rep\.
P R I C E S and GOVERNMENT F I N A N C E
Domestic prices
1988 1998 2007 2008
Inflation (a)
35
I
(%change) 30
Consumer prices 29\.1 25
Implicit GDP deflator 916 26\.9 211 8\.4 20
15
G o v e r n m e n t finance 10
5
(%of GDP, includes cunent grants) 0
Current revenue 5\.9 22\.7 212
Current budget balance
Overall surplusldeficit
-62
-6\.2
P\.5
54
3\.4
-15 I 03
-
04 05
GDP denator
06
-C- CPI
07
I
TRADE
I
1988 1998 2007 ZOO8
Exportandimport levels (USmill\.)
(US$millions)
Totaleworts (fob) 181 228 2,335 3,500 T
Copper 1241 130 3\.000
Coffee 2\.500
Manufactures 2\.000
Total imports (cif) 775 2,864 3,053 1,500
Food 1,000
Fuel and energy 500
Capital goods 0
Ewort price index(2000=WO) 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
Import price index(2000=WO) #Expoiis llrnportr
Terms of trade (2OW=WO)
BALANCE of PAYM EATS
(US$ millions)
Exports of goods and services
1988
2,702
1998
1284
2007
2,846
2008
7,a7
Currentaccwnt balance toGDP(%)
0
I
Imports o f goods and services 2,532 1340 3,767 8,857 3
Resource balance 80 -56 -921 -1749
6
Net income -750 -391 -356 -1263 v
Net current transfers -n 32 583 1231
-12
Current account balance -591 -415 -694 -1,781
5
-I
Financing items (net) 628 402 642 1792 -18
Changes in net reserves -37 0 52 -11
Memo:
Reserves includinggold (US$ milfons) 60 522 68
Conversion rate (DEC, loca!AJS$) 6\.23E-13 16 58\.0 5632
E X T E R N A L D E B T and RESOURCE FLOWS
I
r I988 1998 2007 2008
Compositionof 2008debt(US$mill\.)
(US$ millions)
Total debt outstanding and disbursed 8,562 8203 P\.359 P,B9
IBRD 37 84 0 0
IDA 837 1261 2,402 2,437
Total debt service 392 B 543 641
IBRD 22 0 0 0
IDA 9 0 56 60
Composition o f net resourceflows
Official grants P8 97 107 1522
Official creditors 346 0 -74 -136
Private creditors -8 0 -4 -7
Foreign direct investment (net inflows) 9 33 720 1000
Portfolio equity(net inflows) 0 0 0 0
M r l d Bank program
Commitments 84 0 0 0
Disbursements 05 0 99 92
Principal repayments 8 0 36 42 E-IDA D-OUwrndblateral F-private
Net flows 161 0 61 51
Interest payments P 0 16 $3
Net transfers 134 0 43 32
~~~
Note This table was producedfrom the Development Economics LDB database w9/09
10°E 15°E 25°E 30°E
CENT RA L A FRICA N REPUBLIC SUDAN
To
5°N Ubang To Bangasso 5°N
To i Kembe
Bangui To
Zongo Gbadolite BAS-UELE Juba
Bondo Faradje
NORD-UBANGI Uele
Libenge
Gemena Businga HAUT-UELE
Titule
DEM\. REP\. Buta Isiro Watsa Kiba
li
OF CONGO SUD-
Aketi To
Imese UBANGI Akula
Lisala Pakwach
Bumba ORIENTALE Wamba
MONGALA C Mongbwalu
Bunia UGAN DA
angui
Aruwimi ITURI
on
Banalia
ng
nga Lake
o
o
\.
Bongandanga
Oub
Lulo
Mts
Basankusu TSHOPO Bafwasende Albert
EQUATEUR Yangambi Beni
ba
É Q U AT E U R Kisangani Butembo
Margherita Peak
tum
Wanie Rakula (5,110 m)
0° Mbandaka Boende 0°
Mi
C ON G O Tshu
a pa NORD Lake
G AB ON Lubutu Edward Lake
L
Lo m
KIVU
Lua
u l
Bikoro TS H U APAL Ikela mi
a
aba
om NORD-
b
uil ela Victoria
L
ak Lowa
a
Ul KIVU Goma To Ruhengeri
Inongo i
Lake Kivu
nd
Betamba
di
Congo
Yumbi To
MAI-NDOMBE Kalima Bukavu Kibuye RWANDA
Kutu
Kindu SUD
Buna KIVU
KINSHASA Bandundu Lukenie Lodja
Uvira To
KI N S HA S A CI T Y Kasa
i MANIEMA SUD- Bujumbura
uru SANKURU Kama BURUNDI
BANDUNDU Mangai Sank MANIEMA KIVU
Ilebo
KINSHASA Bulungu KASAI Malela
Lusambo Kasongo
Kenge KWILU K AS AÏ Lulimba
5°S
CABINDA BAS-CONGO ORIENTAL 5°S
Kikwit Idiofa
(ANGOLA) To KO N GO CEN T R A L
Mbanza-Ngungu
Luebo
L OM AM I
Kongolo
TAN ZAN I A
Pointe- Boma KASAI Kananga ga
Kw
K
Noire Mbuji- Luku Kalemie Lake
KASAÏ- Mayi
ilu
ATLANTIC Matadi Feshi OCCIDENTAL
u
To Kabinda Kabalo Tanganyika
OCEAN Damba
Tshikapa Ka
sa
ORIENTAL
TANGANYIKA
LULUA
Kw
K
KWANGO i
Moba
ang
a
Mwene-Ditu
i
Manono
am
o
o
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
Lom
KATANGA Luv
ua
OF CONGO Kapanga
H A U T- L O M A M I
s\. Pweto
t
Kamina
Lueo
M
SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS
ba
Lulua Lu
PROVINCE CAPITALS* ANGOLA L Lake
m
Kilwa
a Lu
Mweru
itu
uff
ira
l ua
NATIONAL CAPITAL Sandoa
M
Lubudi HAUT- 10°S
RIVERS LUALABA KATANGA
MAIN ROADS Kolwezi To
0 100 200 300 400 Kilometers Dilolo Likasi Luwingu
ZAMBIA
RAILROADS To
Lu
Lake
lab
ua
Lucano a Malawi
PROVINCE BOUNDARIES** 0 100 200 Miles Lubumbashi
I
IBRD 33391R1
M A L AW
NOVEMBER 2007
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank\.
*The creation of 26 new Provinces was approved by the ratification of the 2005 Constitution, to take effect by February,
2009\. The existing 11 Province Capitals, shown with green circles, will retain their status, with the exception of Bandundu\.
The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information
shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank ZA MBI A To Sakania
Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any Kitwe
Future Province Capitals are shown with white circles\.
endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries\.
**The existing 11 Province boundaries and names are shown in dark green; future in light green\. 25°E 30°E | APPROVAL |
P004731 | Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No\. 9016
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
THAILAND
PROVINCIAL POWER DISTRIBUTION PROJECT
(LOAN 2312-TH)
SEPTEMBER 19, 1990
nd Energy Operations Division
partment 1I
nal Office
a restricted distribution and nPay be used by recipients only in the performance of
a\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
CURRENCY EQITIVALENTS
Currency Unit = Baht (B)
US$1\.00 = B 23\.0 (SAR)
= B 25\.0 (Project composite)
FISCAL YEAR
October 1 to September 30
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
km - Kilometer
kV - Kilovolt (1,000 volts)
kVA - Kilo Volt-Ampere
cct-km - Circuit Kilometer
kW - Kilowatt (1,000 watts)
MW - Megawatt (1,000 kilowatts)
GW - Gigawatt (million kilowatts)
kWh - Kilowatt hour (1,000 watt-hours)
GWh - Gigawatt hour (million kilowatt-hours)
ABBREVIATIONS
ADB - Asian Development Bank
ADAB - Australian Development Assistance Bureau
EGAT - Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand
MEA - Metropolitan Electricity Authority
NREP - Normal Rural Electrification Program
OECF - Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (Japan)
PEA - Provincial Electricity Authority
RVP - Regional Vice President
SAR - Staff Appraisal Report
TF1E WORLD SlANK FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY
Washington\. D C 20433
U\.S A
OUtce d D"qeC1u-C~1a
0owa e twwtatrn
September 19, 1990
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Thailand
Provincial Power Distribution Project (Loan 2312-TH)
Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project
Completion Report on Thailand - Provincial Power Distribution Project (Loan
2312-TH)n prepared by the Asia Regional Office with Part II of the report
contributed by the Borrower No audit of this project has been made by the
Operations Evaluation Department at this time\.
Attachment
Th's document has resmcted distribution and MAy be used by recipients only in the perfornmnce
of \.helt official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclsed without World lank authoartion\.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
THAILAND
PROVINCIAL POWER DISTRIBUTION PROJECT (LOAN 2312-TH)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Table of Contents
Page No\.
Preface \. i
Evaluation Summary \.ii
Part I - Project Review from Bank Perspective
Project Identity\. 1
Background\. 1
Project Objectives and Description\. 2
Project Design and Organization\. 2
Project Implementation\. 3
Project Results\. 3
Project Sustainability\. 4
Bank Performance\. 5
Borrower's Performance\. 5
Project Relationships\. 6
Consulting Services\. 6
Project Documentation and Data\. 6
Findings and Lessons Learned \. 7
Part II - Project Review from Borrower's Perspective
Project Background \. 8
Project Results\. 9
Overall Summary (Project Performance) \.10
Evaluation and Assessment \.13
Part III - Statistical Information
Related Bank Loans \.17
Project Timetable \.17
Loan Disbursement \.18
Project Implementation \.19
Project Cost and Finance \.20
Project Results \.21
Economic Impact \.21
Financial Impact \.24
Studies \.24
Status of Covenants \.26
Use of Bank Resources \.27
Staff Inputs \.27
Missions \.27
Annexes
1\. Implementation Progress Chart
2\. Economic Rate of Return Calculation
3\. Financial Statements
| This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization
THAILAND
PROVINCIAL POWER DISTRIBUTION PROJECT (LOAN 2312-TH)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Preface
This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Provincial Power
Distribution Project in Thailand, for which Loan 2312-TH in the amount of
US$30\.6 million was approved on June 9, 1983\. The loan was closed on June 30,
1988, one year behind schedule\. It was fully disbursed and the last
disbursement was on June 26, 1988\.
The PCR was prepared by the Industry and Energy Operations Division,
Department II of the Asia Regional Office (Preface, Evaluation Summary,
Parts I and III)\. The Borrower, the Provincial Electricity Authority,
prepared Part 'iI which has been included in the PCR without editing or other
alterations; its contents are the sole responsibility of the Borrower\.
Preparation of this PCR started in August 1989 after a PCR mission to
Thailand and is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report, the Loan and
Guarantee Agreements, supervision reports and correspondence between the Bank
and the Borrower\.
- ii -
THAILAND
PROVINCIAL POWER DISTRIBUTION PROJECT (LOAN 2312-TH)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPuRT
Evaluation S"mmary
Obiectives
1\. The project comprised two parts: Part A assisted the Government to
finance a portion of the first phase of its Normal Rural Electrification
Program scheduled for implementation over the 1983-86 period, and Part B
included measures to strengthen and modernize PEA's operations\. The chief
objective of Part A was to electrify 1,500 villages with no previous access to
electricity and to extend electric service to another 1,500 villages already
partially electrified\. Altogether 127,500 households were expected to be
supplied with electricity\. Part B's objectives were to: (i) improve corpo-
rate planning, materials management and project planning and implementation;
(ii) modernize and extend electronic data processing; (iii) prepare a training
program; and (iv) improve the distribution network (Part I, paras\. 3\.1 and
3\.2)\.
Implementation Experience
2\. Project implementation was well planned, organized and supervised\.
During project appraisal it was estimated that construction could get underway
by June 1983; however, construction work started only in January 1984 when the
Bank loan became effective\. This six-month delay was reflected in a corres-
ponding delay in completing, during June 1987, about 99g of what was origi-
nally defined to be the project\. At this point US$12\.7 million, 42Z of the
loan amount, had not been disbursed or committed\. On July 21, 1987, the Bank
formally amended the Loan Agreement by extending the closing date to June 30,
1988 and increasing the electrification targets from 1,500 to 2,100 villages
and extending electric service in 4,500 instead of 1,500 partially electri-
fied villages\. Project implementation continued until June 1988 when the loan
was fully disbursed and even the revised electrification goals were exceeded
(Part I, para\. 5\.1 and 5\.2)\.
Results
3\. Part A: As a result of the loan extension the project overachieved
the original electrification targets by the following wide margins (project
appraisal targets are in parenthesis): 2,330 (1,500) new villages were
electrified; service was extended to 10,021 (1,500) villages partially
electrified villages; and 224,741 (127,500) households were supplied with
electricity\. All this was accomplished at an increase in project cost of
about 25Z\. The larger volume of work was possible within the loan amount
because of the substitution of locally available materials for imports\.
Part B: The institutional development study was carried out in accordance
with terms of reference prepared by PEA and the Bank\. Implementation of its
findings and recommendations to strengthen and modernize PEA's operations has
produced good results (Part I, paras\. 6\.1 anA 6\.2)\.
- iii -
Sustainability
4\. Barring unanticipated adverse developments the project benefits
should be sustainable over the foreseeable future because: (i) PL'4 is
competent to successfully maintain and operate its facilities; (ii) its
facilities have been installed in accordance with strict design and con-
struction standards following international practices; (iii) the Government
has a long-standing power sector policy to supply adequate electricity to all
segments of the population; and (iv) villagers prefer, and are willing to pay
more for electricity than any substitute energy (part I, para\. 7\.1)\.
Findings and Lessons Learned
5\. The foreign exchange requirements for the original scope of the
project were greatly overestimated; however, no proceeds of the loan had to be
cancelled because disbursements could be channelled to eligible expenditures
for an increased project scope\. This illustrates the importance of providing
such flexibility in the content and scope of a project where the volume of
work required for planned electrification targets cannot be accurately gauged
at the initial plaining stage (Part I, para\. 13\.1)\.
THAILAND
PROVINCIAL POWER DISTRIBUTION PROJECT (LOAN 2312-TH)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Part I
1\. Proiect Identity
Project Name: Provincial Power Distribution
Loan No\.: 2312-TH
RVP Unit: Asia
Countrys Thailand
Sectors Energy
Subsector: Electric Power
2\. Background
2\.1 Three government-owned utilities generate and distribute all the
electricity consumed in Thailand except for a relatively insignificant amount
bought and distributed by one franchise operated by the Thai Navy and captive
power generated by a number of industries for their own use\. The three
utilities are the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), the
Metropolitan Electricity Authority (MEA)> and the Provincial Electricity
Authority (PEA)\. EGAT is responsible for the generation and high voltage
transmission of electricity to MEA, PEA and a number of large industrial
consumers; MEA is responsible for electricity distribution in the greater
Bangkok metropolitan area; and PEA distributes electricity throughout the rest
of Thailand not served by MEA\. In addition, PEA generates a small amount of
electricity in certain isolated areas\.
2\.2 Distr3bitLior of power to the provinces began on a planned basis in
1963 with the formation of PEA\. In 1964 PEA introduced a scheme known as the
Normal Rural Electrif\.caticn Program (NREP), whereby villages requesting
electrificatLon had to provide some materials (e\.g\. wooden poles and cross
arms) and half of the labor needed\. In later years this practice was dis-
continued to facil\.itate compliance with stricter technical requirements and
specifications, and ill its place a monetary contribution amounting to about
25-30Z of the cost of village electrification was substituted\. The balance
was first funded from government budget allocations and subsequently from
subsidized local loans to PEA by the Krung Thai Bank and the Ministry of
Finance\.
2\.3 The NREP is open to villages from all over Thailand and complements
other rural electrification projects,l/ The program was such a success that by
1982 there was a backlog of around 7,600 villages which had applied and were
still awaiting electrification\. The lucal loans available to PEA could not
cope with the strong demand for electrification\. Consequently, PEA structured
a five-year program (1983-86) which would facilitate access to foreign sources
of finsnce\. Following the advice os the National Economic and Social Devel-
opment Board, the program was divided into two phases\. The first phase was to
be implemented during 1983-87 and covered 3,000 unelectrified villages and
extension of electricity in another 3,000 partially electrified villages\. The
second phase was to be implemented during 1985-87 and covered electrifying
2,000 villages and expanding electrical services in an additional 2,000
villages\. PEA divided the first phase into two identical projects: one
financed by the Bank under this project and the second financed by OECF of
Japan\.
3\. Project Objectives and Description
3\.1 The objectives of the project were to assist PEA's ongoing rural
electrification program for providing electricity to rural consumers and to
strengthen PEA's operations\.
3\.2 The project consisted of two parts\. Under Part A, the project was to
help finance a portion of the first phase of the NREP five-year program to be
implemented from 1983 to 1986\. It provided for the electrification of 1,500
villages which had no access to electric services and the extension of
electric services in another 1,500 partially electrified villages\. Altogether
about 130,000 households were expected to receive electricity under the
proJect\. Part B of the project included the implementation of measures to
strengtnen and modernize PEA's operations\. It provided for the retention of
consultants to assist PEA in four main areas of its activities: (i) the
improvement of corporate planning, materials management and project planning
and implementation; (ii) the modernization and extended application of
electronic data processing; (iii) the preparation of a training program; and
(iv) the improvement of the reliability, safety and economy of the
distribution network\.
4\. Project Design and Organization
4\.1 The project was well conceived, designed and organized\. Part A gave
financial support to a program which supplied electricity to rural area where
it was in much demand and where villagers were willing to pay a part of the
installation cost\. While rural electrification was fully in accord with the
1/ The regional accelerated rural electrification (ARE) projects partly
financed by the Bank under Loans 1527-TH and 1871-TH and the Tambon
program aimed at electrifying all Tambons (Thailand's lowest
administrative unit consisting of a group of villages) headquarters and
the surrounding villages which can be connected at reasonable cost\.
Bank's lending policy of helping the rural poor, it rightly required villages
to meet minimum economic connection crit"r\.e to qualify for electrification
under the project\. This measure was meant to prevent excessively remote low
revenue installations from overburdening PEA's financial position\.
4\.2 Part B of the project was an important complement to Part A\. It
provided consui ing services to assist PEA improve and modernize its
operations and undertake institutional reforms needed for PEA's transition
from a construction oriented organization to a service utility\.
4\.3 Planning, engineering and construction activities were coordinated by
PEA's Project and Planning bivision, and the electrification subprojects were
implemented by PEA's regional offices\. These arrangements were satisfactory\.
PEA avoided land easement problems by routing its distribution lines along
mair\. roads and by keeping encroachment on farm land to an absolute minimum\.
5\. P-oiect implementation
5\.1 Project implementation was well planned, organized and supervised\.
During project appraisal it was estimated that construction would get under
way by June 1983; however, construction work only started in January 1984 when
the Bank loan became effective\. As can be seen from Annex 1 progress chart,
this six-month delay was reflected in a corresponding delay in completing
about 992 of what was originally defined to be the project\. At this point
US$12\.7 million (422 of the loan amount) had not been disbursed, nor
committed\.
5\.2 On July 21, 1987 the Bank approved PEA's request to utilize the
remaining US$12\.7 million amount to finance additional village electri-
fication\. Accordingly, the loan agreement was amended to include the
electrification of about 2,100 (was 1,500) villages and the extension of
electrical services in 4,500 (was 1,500) partially electrified villages over
the 1984-88 (was 1984-86) period\. When the loan was fully disbursed in June
1988, even the revised electrification targets were exceeded by a significant
margin\.
6\. Proiect Results
6\.1 Part A: Project objectives were fully achieved\. As a result of the
loan extension enabling the full utilization of uncommitted loan proceeds, the
project exceeded the original electrification targets as follows (project
appraisal targets are in parenthesis): 2,330 (1,500) villages were elec',i-
fied; service was extended in 10,021 (1,500) partially electrified villages;
and 224,741 (127,500) households were supplied with electricity\. This much
greater thar\. estimated volume of work at an increase in project cost of only
about 252 was possible because of an overestimate of the quantity of material
and labor, as well as unit costs\. The increased work could be accomplished
within the loan amount due to the substitution of locally available material
for imports\.
6\.2 The villagers who have been supplied with electricity will share such
benefits as cost and labor savings and increased productivity through the use
of electric lighting, tools and machinery\. In time, there should follow
social and other benefits such as, to name a few, a better standard of living,
new employment ar\.d business opportunities and more opportunities for education
and personal advancement\.
6\.3 Part B: The institutional development study included (i) strategic
planning; (ii) project planning and implementation, (iii) materials manage-
ment; (iv) distribution system planning; (v) electronic data processing and
(vi) manpower development\. Findings and recommendations of the study have
been implemented with good results\. A noteworthy example is PEA's corporate
planning system which has developed into an effective tool for articulating
corporate responsibilities and objectives and managing corporate activities\.
6\.4 As detailed in Part III, Section 6 and Annex 2 of this report, the
reevaluated internal economic rate of return (IERR) from the project is about
12X, essentially the same as the opportunity cost of capital in Thailand\. The
reevaluation takes into account the quantification of benefits similar to the
methodology used in the SAR except for the use of updated socio-economic data
obtained from PEA's surveys\. An IERR of 142 was estimated in the SAR for the
entire NREP progra\.r\. comprising this project, the OECF funded project and all
of Phase II\. The PCR calculated a reevaluated IERR for only the project, for
which data on costs and benefits could be compiled with a good degree of
accuracy\. The slightly lower rate of return is mainly due to lower actual and
fo\.ecast consumer density compared to assumptions in the SAR\.
6\.5 PEA's financial performance improved steadily over the project
period\. All financial covenants were complied with except for the debt to
debt plus equity ratio which by FY88 was reduced to 60\.5X only marginally
higher than the 602 maximum required by the Loan Agreement\. PEA's financial
performance should continue to be satisfactory in the foreseeable future
barring any adverse developments\.
7\. Project Sustainability
7\.1 The project's benefits should be sustainable in the foreseeable
future for the following reasons:
(a) PEA has amply demonstrated that it has the technical and
administrative capability to continue to competently maintain and
operate its facilities;
(b) PEA's facilities have been installed in accordance with strict design
and construction standards follcwing international practices;
(c) The Government's energy sector policies have in the past and continue
to emphasize the objective of extending an adequate electricity
supply to all segments of its population; and
-5 -
(d) Villagers have shown their definite p:eference for and readiness to
pay for electric services in lieu of such energy substitutes as LPG
and kerosene\.
8\. Bank Performance
8\.1 For many years, the Bank has played an important role in assisting
the Government's programs on behalf of the poorer segment of its population\.
r \.e project exemplifies the Bank's ongoing efforts to improve the lot of the
rural poor\. The Bank's associations with PEA goes back to the first rural
electrification pruject (Loan 1527-TH) approved in February 1978\. In the
ensuing yea-s, the Bank supported PEA's growth into a full-fledged electric
power distribution utility by providing funds and advice\. The Bank's
insistonce on institutional development was responsible for including in the
project the ADAB financed study which was influential in strengthening PEA's
operations\.
8\.2 A cooperative workirg relationship was maintained by Bank staff with
PEA and Government officials throughout the project cycle\. Since the project
was the third of its kind with an experienced borrower, project preparation
and appraisal were relatively straightforward tasks\. Eight supervision
missions were fieldec during the implementation period\. These missions along
with well-prepared progress reports submitted quarterly by PEA were adequate
for effective supervision of the project\. The Bank's performance in all these
aspects of the prcject can be rated as completely satisfactory\.
9\. Borrower's Performance
9\.1 Making allowance for the expansion of the project in order to be able
to fu_y disburse the Bank loan, PEA implemented the project according to
plan, on schedule and within the budget\. At least some credit for this
relatively faultless performance must be due to the experience gained in
carrying out the previous two rvral electrification projects\. This shows that
PEA's project implementation skills are increasing with the increasing skills
gained by its employees through training and on-the-job experience\.
9\.2 Regarding project implementation, it must also be mentioned that PEA
effectively employed local and expatriate consultants to assist with desigi,
engineering and construction supervision of various components of the project\.
The selection and assignment of consultants fully qualified for the tasks at
hand is considered an essential element in the successful implementation of
the project\. This fact can be applied as a general lesson to illustrate the
importance of recognizing the need for and taking advantage of outside
expertise in project implementation whenever necessary\.
9\.3 PEA's operating efficiency and productivity has benefited from the
introduction of modern technology and computer-assisted techniques\. During
the 1980-88 period customers per personnel almost doubled and revenues per
personnel more than doubled by a substantial margin\. Despite these favorable
-6-
statistics, however, PEA must still address two basic issues in its
distribution network: (i) maintaining a voltage drop which does not exceed
10X; and (ii) reducing power outages to more acceptable levels\. As PEA moves
toward supplying ever increasing loads, especially on the outskirts of the
Bangkok metropolitan area, it will have to:
(a) gear up to a higher distribution voltage;
(b) work to improved standards of service quality and reliability, and
(c) further strengthen its institutional capabilities to meet the
challenge imposed by the currently anticipated rapid growth in aemand
in Thailand\.
10\. Project Relationships
10\.1 In the course of the Bank's extensive lending operations in
Thailand's electric power sector, Bank staff have established especially
cordial working relationships with sector entities including PEA, and the
government officials concerned with the sector\. The atmosphere of mutual
respect and trust which has been engendered has made it possible to amicably
settle the various issues which arise during a lending operation, including
such sensitive issues as electricity tariffs and financial performances\.
Neither the Bank nor the Borrower have any adverse comments regarding their
relationship throughoutt the project cycle\.
10\.2 Bank staff also maintained good relationships with ADAB, its
consultants on institutional development and other participants in the
project\. As far as could be observed, PEA remained on equally good terms with
ADAB, consultants and contractors\.
11\. Consulting Services
11\.1 PEA engaged consultants to carry out the institutional development
study financed by ADAB and to assist in the different phases of project
implementation\. The study was successfully executed and laid the groundwork
for the development of an effective corporate planning system for PEA
(para\. 6\.3)\. The project assistance consultants contributed to the expe-
ditious completion of the electrification project through their design,
engineeritlg and construction supervision efforts (para\. 9\.2)\. PEA reports
that all consulting services performed on the project were satisfactory\.
12\. Proiect Documentation and Data
12\.1 The staff appraisal report was comprehensive and well prepared\. It
gave an excellent account of all aspects of the rural electrification program
and the project's rcle in the program\. Moreover, it precisely defined the
project, its objectives and execution, all of which were accurately reflected
in the legal agreements\. The legal agreements provided sufficient flexibility
in the definition and scope of the project to allow an expansion of eligible
disbursements within the intent of the loan\. This feature is important when
the volume of work required for planned electrification targets cannot be
accurately gauged at the initial planning stage\.
12\.2 Both the supervision reports and the Borrower's quarterly progress
reports were informative and useful\. However, for both there is room for
improvement in format and content to make them more suited for the purpose of
preparing PCRs\. In general, it can be observed that too much emphasis and
effort goes into details which are necessary but not entirely relevant to an
analytic approach to project evaluation\. This is particularly true of the
quarterly progress reports which contain many pages of procurement and
contracting details which are important for record purposes but have
practically no value to the person preparing the PCR\. It should be a standard
requirement that the quarterly reports include the statistical data required
for Part III of the PCR\.
13\. Findings and Lessons Learned
13\.1 The project, the third of its kind with the same borrower, proceeded
fairly smoothly except for the large overestimate of the foreign exchange
cost\. It would not be fair to be overly critical of the appraisal estimate
because the villages to be electrified were not identified (there was only a
maximum investment per connection eligibility criterion) and it was difficult
to judge beforehand which of the project's imported equipment and goods could
be substituted from local sources\. However, it was not necessary to cancel
about 402 of the loan because of the framing of provisions in the project and
legal documents which permitted disbursement of uncommitted proceeds of the
loan to other eligible expenditures\. This illustrates the importance of
providing such flexibility in the content and scope of a project when the
volume of work required for planned electrification targets cannot be
accurately gauged at the initial planning stage\.
THAILAND
PROVINCIAL POWER DISTRIBUTION PROJECT (LOAN 2312-TE)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Part II
1\. PROJRCT BACKGROUND
The original Normal Rural Electrification
Project (NREP) was identified and formulated during
1981-1982\. Th- scope of works of the project aims at
electrifying a total number of 5,000 unelectrified
villages and 5,000 extension jobs in partly electrified
villages throughout the country\. The project is splitted
into 2 phases as follows:
I Scope of Works
Phase I--------------------------
I Villages I Extension jobs
----------------_-------------+
_-----------------_______
NREP Phase I QiRZP I) I 3,000 1 3,000
NREP Phase Ir (NREP II) I 2,000 1 2,000
Total I 5,000 I 5,000
On December 14, 1982, the implementation of NRBP
I was approved by the Cabinet while NREP II was postponed
for another years\. In 1983, the World Bank and the OECF
agreed to finance US$ 30\.6 million and Y 6,580 million
for NREP I\. The NREP I was then divided into two (2)
identical projects to be implemented in parallel
accordingly\. The NREP I part 1 which is called
"Provincial Power Distribution Project (PPD)" was so
formulated on condition that its foreign currency
components are to be financed by the afore-mentioned loan
of USS 30\.6 million and its scope of works is aimed at
- 9 -
electrifying 1,500 unelectrified villages and 1,500
extension jobs in partly electrified villages tiroughout
the country\. The rest is to be implemented under the
NREP I part 2 which is concentrated in the northern and
northeastern parts of Thailand and its foreign currency
components are financed by the OECP of Japan\.
After the World Bank Appraisal Mission had
conducted the Project study and appraisal, it was agreed
that PEA prepare a Plan of Action to introduce
improvements in PEA's operation and submit such a Plan
for the Bank's comments\.
Under ADAB assistance, the institutional
development plan was organised aiming at strengthening
and modernizing PEA's operations subject to the World
Bank Appraisal Mission's recommendations\.
Consequently, the Provincial Power Distribution
Project (PPD) contains two components which are;
Part A - Village Electrification
Part B - The institutional development (as details
shown in Part I Para\. 3\.2)
2\. PROJECT RESULTS
The project was well planned, organized,
supervised and cooperated between PEA, the Bank and
consultants\. Therefore, the project implementation and
construction were wholly accomplished as desired\.
Details of its successful results are shown in the
following Summary Sheet for Project Review and Completion
Report\.
- 10 -
SUMMARY SHEET FOR PROJECT REVIEW
AND COMPLETION REPORT
Project Title : Provincial Power Distribution Project (PPD)
(Loan 2312-TH)
Executing and Implementing Agency : Provincial Electricity
Authority (PEA)
------------------------------------------------------------
Loan Agency : IBRD
------------------------------------------------------------
I Investment Cost (USS million)
Funding Sources '-----------------------------------
I Original Planned I Actual
IBRD I 30\.53 1 30\.60
ADAB I 1\.00 1 2\.35
Local I 20\.06 1 31\.55
Total I 51\.59 1 64\.50
Project Commencement I Project Completion
Planned I Actual I Original I Actual
Jun\.1983 I Jan\.1984 i June 1987 1 June 1988
A\. OVERALL SUMMARY (PROJECT PERFORMANCE)
1\. Prolect PurDose and Goals
The goal of the project was initially the
expansion of rural electrification for 1,500
unelectrified villages and the extension of electric
- 11 -
service to another 1,500 villages partially
electrified\. The project implementation period
covered 5 year span in the PEA's entire service area\.
2\. Accomplishment
Attainment of the goals was done through, the
following construction activities:
Planned Actual %Difference
Primary lines (cct-km\.) 3,300 2,963 -10
Secondary lines (cct-km\.) 5,250 6,648 +27
Distribution
Transformers (kVA\.) 63,000 85,600 +36
Service Meters (set) 127,500 224,741 +76
Construction labor (*) 100 116 +16
and overachieved the originally planned electrification
target as follows
Planned Actual %Achievement
Villages to be electrified 1,500 2,330 155
Extension service works 1,500 10,021 668
3\. Finarrcial Svendina
The project was both cost-efficient and cost-
effective in respect of accomplishment it made to
cover the greater than planned volume of work within
the approved loan amount\. The comparison of the final
project cost was summarized in Part III Table A\.
4\. Lesson Learned
Summary of lessons learned during and after
the project implementation :
- 12 -
1\. Flexibility in the provision and allowance
for loan extension to be fully utilized in line with
sensibly increased project scope enabled the project
to overachieve its originally planned electrification
target\.
2\. The key factor in the success of the
project is administration\. The project received
overwhelmingly strong support from all level from both
the Government and IBRD\. A close collaboration and
consultation made the project proceed easier and able
to overachieve the target resulting in the larger
benefits derived by the rural people than expected\.
3\. The technical advisor, consultant staff,
also worked well in contributing to strenghthening
PEA's operations\.
4\. The project benefits has gone to 225,741
households under the project\. Effects and impact of
the project were reported to be very satisfactorily
constructive as it provided rural people access to
power utility, opportunity for local socio and
economic development and increased standard of living\.
5\. Conclusion
The project was implemented smoothly and
successfully\. Eventhough there existed a delay at
the early stage of project implementation, it was
manageable and had no major negative or adverse
impact\.
Overall conclusion is that the project was
very successful in terms of project performance,
input, output and project environment\.
- 13 -
B\. EVkLUATION AND ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE\. OF THE BORROWER
AND THE BANK AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP
i Evaluation and Assessment
Analysis I------------------------------------------------
lInadequateOAdequatel not ItimelylGoodlExcellent
I I Itimely' I I
--------------+------------ - +----------+------
l\.Project Design and I I I O I I
Implementation I I ' I I
-Project activities I I x
commensurate with I I I I
inputs I O
-Project output commen- I I I x
surate with activities\.l I I I I
-Design of the project O I I I I x I
logical,impact-orientedl I I I
-Timeliness of project I I x I
implementation I I I
-Compliance of project O I I x I
implementation with I
plan I I I I
-Collaboration between I I O I x
institution involved in! I I I
the project implementa-I I
tion I I
2\.Staff Inputs I I O
-Sufficient PEA staff x I I 1 1 x
involved I I I I
-Sufficient IBRD staff O x I I I x
involved I t I I I
-Collaboration between I x I I I x
project staff and staffl O I I
of IBRD I I I
-Timeliness of availabi-I I x I I I I x
lity of IBRD assistancel t I I I
I I I I Il
- 14 -
I Evaluation and Assessment
Analysis I-----------------------------------------------
llnadequatelAdequatel not itimelylGoodlExcellent
I I Itimelyl I I
3\.Consultancy Service I I I I i I
-Sufficient consultant I xI I I x
input J I I I
-Adequacy of job I I x I i i x
description performed I I I I I I
-Consultant technically I I x I I x
qualified for task I I I
-Quality and quantity ofI x I I I x I
work of consultant
-Collaboration between a I I x
project staff and I a I I '
consultant I I a a a I
I I I a I
4\.Financing I I I I
-Availability of loan atl I x I I x I I x
schedule I I I I I I
-Timeliness of loan I I I I x I I x
disbursed to the I I I I I I
project I I I I I I
-Flexibility of loan I I x I I I I x
given to the project I I a I I I
a I a I I I
5\.Materials and Equipment I I I I I
-Materials requirement x I x I x I
planned I I I I I I
-Quality of project I I i I I I x
materials and equipment! I I I I I
-Availability of projectl I x I I I x I
materials and equipmentl I I I I i
acquired I I I I I I
l ~ ~~~~~ I
- 15 -
I Evaluation and Assessment
Analysis I-------------------- --------------------------
!InadequatelAdequatel not itimelylGoodlExcellent
I I I~~~~timely!
------------------------+--_______+________+______--+----+-------+_________
-Timeliness of delivery I I x I I x I I
of project materials I I I t I
and equipment I I
-Timeliness of use of I I x I x x I
project materials and I I
equipment I I I I
I I I I I
6\.Project Relationship I I I I I
-Collaborative relation-l I I I x I ,
ship between the IBRD I , I I
and the PEA I I I I I I
-Collaborative relation-I I I x
ship between the PEA I I I I I i
and the assigned I I I I I I
consultants ' I i a I
-Cooperation in techni- \. a a x
cal aspect resolution/ I I I t I
solving I I I I t I
I \. I , I
7\.Project Environment I I I I a I
-Policy support from thel I I I I x
Government I I II I
-Implementational I I I a a a x
support and assistance I I t I I I
from IBRD and the ' It a I I
assigned consultants i It a a a
-Co-ordination with I I i I I a x
related government I I I I I I
programs I I I I I I
-Rural people recep- I I I x
tiveness to the projectl I I
I a I I I I
- 16 -
II Evaluation and Assessment
Analysis I-
lInadequatelAdequatel not ItimelylGoodtExcellent
I I Itimelyt ' I
---------------------------
----
--------+
----
-Integration in I t I t I x
economic/social policy I I t t t I
I t I I I I
8\.Project Outputs I I I I t I
-Timeliness of outputs I I I I x I
produced II I I
-Availability of and I I x I t x I I
accessibility to the 1 I I I I
outputs produced I I I I
-Project objectives I I I I x
achieved as compared tol t I I I I
the outputs I I I I I
-Commensurativeness of I t I I t I x
planned project target I \. I I
with outputs produced I I I
I ~ ~I I I t
9\.Project Sustainability I I I I
-Adequacy of technical I I x I I I t
and administrative I I I t I I
capability to continue I I t I I I
maintaining the projectl t I
-Government's aontinued I x I I I I x
power expansion and I I I
development policies t i I I I
-Beneficiaries I II I I I x
receptiveness to the I I I
project I I I
I I I ~~~~~~~~I t I
- 17 -
THAILAND
PROVINCIAL POWER DISTRIBUTION PROJECT (LOAN 2312-TH)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Part III
1\. Related Bank Loans
1\.1 The Provincial Power Distribution Project under Loan 2312-TH was the
third Bank lending operation in support of Thailand's rural electrification
program\. The two preceding loans are described below:
Loan No\. 1527-TH 1871-TH
Title Accelerated Rural Second Accelerated Rural
Electrification Project Electrification Project
Purpose Electrification of Electrification of
rural communities rural communities
Year of Appraisal November 1976 March 1979
Status Successfully completed Electrification of all
in March 1985 project villages is to
be completed by Sept\.
1989
Comment Project was audited by OED\. Project Completion
See F\.rformance Audit Report Report issued in
No\. 6269 dated 6/13/86\. May 1989
2\. Project Timetable
Item Date Planned Date Actual
First presented to the Bank March 1982
Preparation March 1982
Appraisal Mission June 1982 June 1982
Negotiations January 1983 April 1983
Board approval March 1983 June 9, 1983
Loan Signature September 28, 1983
Loan effectiveness September 1983 January 12, 1984
Loan closing June 30, 1987 June 30, 1988
Loan completion June 30, 1987 June 26, 1989 /a
/a With payment of US$102,504\.21 equivalent on January 26, 1989 disbursement
under this loan was complete\.
- 18 -
3\. Loan Disbursements
CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS
(US$ million)
IBRD Fiscal Year Actual Appraisal Actual as
and Semester Disbursements Estimate Z of Appraisal
1984
December 31, 1983 0\.0 0\.1 0
June 30, 1984 0\.1 0\.2 50
1985
December 31, 1984 0\.4 1\.5 27
June 30, 1985 6\.9 5\.8 119
1986
December 31, 1985 9\.8 14\.8 66
June 30, 1986 12\.0 22\.5 53
1987
December 31, 1986 13\.8 28\.9 48
June 30, 1987 17\.0 30\.6 56
1988
December 31, 1987 21\.5 - 70
June 30, 1988 27\.2 - 88
1989
December 31, 1988 30\.3 - 99
January 26, 1989 30\.6 - 100
Closing Date: 6/30/88 06/30/87
Comment: The project was essentially completed by end-1987; the one year loan
closing extension was required to allow time to complete disbursement against
the additional purchases required for the expanded project content, discussed
in the following section\.
- 19 -
4\. Proiect Implementation
4\.1 Part A: A comparison of the actual project implementation progress
with the original plan is shown in Annex 1\. It shows that completion of the
project as originally defined was delayed by six months and that it took an
addltional six months to complete the extended work program financed under the
project\. The following Table 4\.1 compares the planned and actual content of
the project\.
Table 4\.1: PART A - PROJECT CONTENT COMPARISON
Appraisal z
Component Plan Actual Difference
Electrification:
Number of new villages 1,500 2,330 +55
Number of partly electrified
villages 1,500 10,021 +568
Primary lines (cct-km) /a 3,300 2,963 -10
Secondary lines (cct-km) 5,250 6,648 +27
Distribution transformers (XVA) lb 63,000 85,600 +36
Service meters (sets) 127,500 224,741 +76
Construction labor (Z) 100 116 +16
/a Circuit kUlometers\.
/b Kilo Volt-Amperes\.
4\.2 Part B - Institutional Development: Consultants financed by the
Australian Development Assistance Bureau commenced the institutional
development studies on April 28, 1984\. A copy of their final report was
forwarded to the Bank on December 11, 1987\. The studies covered the following
subjects:
(a) strategic planning;
(b) project planning and implementation;
(c) materials management;
(d) distribution system planning;
(e) electronic data processing; and
(f) manpower development (training)\.
- 20 -
5\. Project Cost and Finance
A\. COMPARISON OF SAR AND FINAL PROJECT COST
(US$ million)
Appraisal estimate Final Cost
Foreign Local Total Foreign Local Total
Part A - Village Electrification
Material
Concrete poles and accessories 5\.88 6\.65 12\.53 9\.33 13\.05 22\.38
Conductors 8\.77 0\.81 9\.58 6\.57 3\.80 12\.37
Transformers 1\.81 0\.16 1\.97 3\.26 0\.74 \.00
Protection equipment 0\.57 0\.24 0\.81 0\.79 0\.57 1\.36
Meters 1\.59 0\.66 2\.25 3\.98 1\.43 5\.41
Accessories 2\.88 0\.38 3\.26 3\.87 1\.12 4\.99
Subtotal 21\.50 8\.90 30\.40 27\.80 22\.71 50\.51
Equipment, tools & vehicles 1\.95 0\.92 2\.87 2\.72 0\.55 3\.27
Labor cost - 4\.05 4\.05 - 4\.58 4\.58
Transportation - 0\.66 0\.66 - 1\.02 1\.02
Engineering & supervision - 1\.22 1\.22 - 1\.45 1\.45
Base Cost 23\.45 15\.75 39\.20 30\.52 30\.31 60\.83
Contingencies
Physical 1\.87 1\.11 2\.98 - 1\.24 1\.24
Price 5\.13 3\.2C 8\.33 - - -
Total Village Electrification 30\.45 20\.06 50\.51 30\.52 31\.55 62\.07
Part B - Institutional Development
Consultancy services 1\.00 - 1\.00 2\.35 - 2\.35
Tiotal Project 31\.45 20\.06 51\.51 32\.87 31\.55 64\.42
Front-end fee on Bank loan 0\.08 - 0\.08 0\.08 - 0\.08/a
Total Financing Required 31\.53 20\.06 51\.59 32\.95 31\.55 64\.50
La Full amount = US$76,309\.
Comment: The project cost comparison above shows that the actual electrification
costs exceeded the appraisal estimates by 25Z\. The additional cost covers the
greater than planned volume of work which could be accomplished within the loan
amount by the substitution of locally available material for imports\.
-21 -
B\. PROJECT FINANCING
(US$ mill4an)
SAR Plan Actual Funds
Source Foreign Local Total Foreign Local Total
IBRD 30\.6 - 30\.6 30\.60 - 30\.60
ADAB 1\.0 - 1\.0 2\.35 - 2\.35
Consumers - 12\.6 12\.6 - 13\.84 13\.84
PEA - 7\.4 7\.4 - 17\.71 17\.71
Total 31\.6 20\.0 51\.6 32\.95 31\.55 64\.50
6\. Project Results
A\. ECONOMIC IMPACT
6\.1 The PCR reevaluated the internal economic rate of return (IERR) as
the discount rate which equates the economic costs and benefits of the project
over its 30 year life\. The IERR thus calculated in Annex 2, Table 1 is 12Z\.
Annex 2, Table 2 shows the number of the different category of consumers,
actually developed upto 1989 and forecast to develop upto 2,013, on which the
reevaluated IERR is based\. The associated costs and benefits are discussed
below\.
Cost
6\.2 The economic costs comprised the following:
(a) the capital investments in the project and in primary lines,
transformers, secondary lines and services to new consumers upto the
30th year of the project's life; and
(b) the operating and maintenance costs over the project's 30 year life\.
All cost are net of taxes and duties, and local expenditure on equipment,
goods and labor are shadow priced at 0\.92 times their actual costs\. The cost
of electric energy was assumed at the long run marginal cost (LRMC) of
B 1\.92/kWh\.
- 22 -
Benefits
6\.3 Table 6\.1 summarizes the benefits which are quantified as follows:
(a) Households
- Savings in lighting\. This saving was evaluated as the
difference between (i) annual capital recovery costs of
kerosene/battery lightning plus annual fuel cost before
electrification and (ii) annual capital recovery cost plus the
cost of electricity (LRMC) after electrification\.
- Agricultural labor serving\. An additional 1\.5 hours labor made
possible by electric lighting during 30 days per year of the
peak agricultural labor season; based on 73\.5? of village
households whose major occupation is in agriculture and a
marginal value of labor of B 57\.7 per 8 hour day\.
- Increased productivity of cottage industries\. The weighted
annual benefit from a longer working day in basket making, cloth
weaving and mat and pillow making; based on the percentage of
households having people engaged in cottage industry activities
for 120 days in the year\.
(b) Shops: the weighted annual benefits realized by, tailor, food and
composite shops due to the availability of electricity based on the
average percentage of shops in villages\.
tc) Agricultural pumps: the capital, operating and maintenance cost
saving from the use of a 3 hp electrified pump compared to a diesel
engine drive 5\.0 hp unit, both operating 300 hours per year\.
(d) Rice mill: the capital, operating and maintenance cost saving from
the use of 7\.5 hp electrified mill operating 869 hours per year
compared to a diesel engine driven 15\.0 hp unit operating 1,159 hours
per year\.
(e) Potable water pump: the capital, operating and maintenance cost
savings from the use of a 3\.0 hp electrified pump compared to a
5\.0 hp diesel driven unit, both operating 300 hours per year\.
(f) Power tools: the labor saving from the use of a 1\.0 hp electrified
wood planner used for 3\.6 hours per day for 50 days per year compared
to accomplishing this work manually\.
- 23 -
Table 6\.1: ECONOMIC BENEFIT PER CONSUMER
(Baht per year)
Item
Households
Saving in lighting 243
Agricultural labor savings 219
Cottage industry activity 103
Total 565
Typical shop 2,217
Agricultural pump 3,500
Rice Mill 8,745
Potable pumps 1,939
Power tools 3,040
Social facilities (lighting) 243
6\.4 In calculating the IERR for the project, cost and benefits were
converted to constant 1988 bahts using the following deflators:
Fiscal year Deflator
1984 0\.7815
1985 0\.8190
1986 0\.8491
1987 0\.9078
1988 1\.0000
6\.5 The economic profile of the project villages is summarized in the
following table\.
- 24 -
Table 6\.2: ECONOMIC PROFILE OF PROJECT VILLAGES
(Units per Village)
Latest
Item survey la
Population 651
Households 108
Number of persons per household 6\.01
Schools 0\.7
Health Centers 0\.07
Shops 3\.9
Rice mills 1\.9
Water pumps 4\.2
Potable 1\.2
Agricultural 3\.0
/a 3,000 Village survey in 1986\.
B\. FINANCIAL IMPACT
6\.6 PEA's financial performance, comparing actual results with project
appraisal forecasts for the period FY82 to FY88 is given in Annex 3 and
summarized in the following Table 6\.3\. Financial performance improved
steadily over the past few years, and in this context, FY88 was an
exceptionally good year\. In that year, the rate of return on revalued net
fixed assets reached 10? (substantially exceeding the 8? required for the
sector as a whol\.e); there was no operating loss since FY84; and the shock
produced on TK4-s capital structure by the 1985 devaluation of the Baht was
overcome as the debt to debt plus equity ratio was reduced to 60\.5X, only
marginally higher than the 60? covenanted in the Loan Agreement\. PEA's
financial performance should continue to be satisfactory over the foreseeable
future barring any adverse development\.
C\. STUDIES
6\.7 The project included ^ne study which had the objective of
strengthening PEA's operations\. It has already been noted (para\. 6\.2) that
the ADAB study played an important role in PEA's development of effective
corporate planning methods and procedures\. The consultants' contribution
comprised the development and implementation of the following basic
components:
- 25 -
(a) acquisition and distribution of electricity;
(b) customer service;
(c) operations and maintenance;
(d) finance and accounts;
(e) personnel management and development;
(f) resource utilization;
(g) management and administration;
(h) MIS and data processing;
(i) social responsibility; and
(j) technology and technical development\.
Table 8\.3: FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF PEA
(Bnht million except whore noted)
Fiscal year ending September 30 1982 1988 1984 1986 1986 1987 1988
Sales increase (X) 12\.10 14\.40 11\.80 16\.10 8\.70 17\.60 16\.00
Sales (CWH) 6,840 6,680 7,433 8,657 9,806 10,944 12,591
Average price (Baht per kWh) 1\.80 1\.74 1\.70 1\.69 1\.67 1\.64 1\.62
Operating revenue 10,982 12,052 13,029 14,946 15,997 18,890 21,061
Operating costs 9,642 10,388 11,226 12,946 18,784 15,658 17,099
Operating Income 580 784 764 691 746 1,058 2,064
Net income 56 153 108 (218) (296) (162) 744
Rate base 7,882 9,168 11,241 18,658 15,770 17,505 19,918
Rate of return (X) 7\.86 8\.66 6\.80 6\.08 4\.78 6\.02 10\.81
Operating ratio (X) 87\.80 86\.16 86\.16 86\.61 85\.86 86\.14 81\.28
Debt service coverage (times)) 1\.61 0\.78 1\.49 1\.17 0\.67 1\.08 1\.42
Increase In gross Plant (X) 19\.10 17\.66 22\.18 17\.69 16\.18 11\.19 17\.79
Debt as X of debt pluo Equity 44 48 48 67 el 88 60\.5
Current ratio 1\.72 1\.76 1\.47 1\.86 1\.28 1\.46 1\.46
- 26 _
7\. Status of Covenants
Project
Agreement
Section Covenants Compliance/Comments
5\.01 Village Records
Maintain appropriate record of In compliance
villages electrified\.
5\.02 Audit
(a) Have accounts and financial In compliance
statements audited each fiscal
year by an independent auditor\.
(b) Furnish audited financial In compliance\. The FY86
statements to the Bank within six audited financial
months at the end of each fiscal statements were the last
year\. received and were
satisfactory\.
5\.04 (a) Rate of Return (ROR)
Shall be such as to permit a rate of In compliance\. The sector
return on net fixed assets of not less earned a ROR of greater
than 82 for the power subsector as a than 8Z in each year since
whole\. the project started\.
5\.04 (c) Tariffs
(a) Review adequacy of tariffs every In compliance
year to produce the covenanted
ROR\.
5\.04 (d) (b) Maintain a provision for fuel Although tariffs have been
surcharge in the tariff\. reduced with fuel price
reductions, they have
fallen more slowly than
have fuel prices\. This is
acceptable because neither
PEA nor the subsector is
earning excessive ROR's\.
5\.05 Debt
(a) Shall not incur new debt without During FY88 PEA's debt to
Bank approval if existing debt is debt plus equity ratio was
greater than 1\.5 times the reduced to 60\.5% only
capital and surplus\. marginally higher than the
required 60X\. Financial
projections indicate that
PEA will be in compliance
with this covenant from
FY89 onwards\.
5\.06 (b) Shall not incur short or medium PEA presently has no short
term debt exceeding 10? of all and medium term debt\.
debt\.
- 27-
8\. Uses of Bank Resources
A\. Staff Inputs
8\.1 Staff inputs in carrying out the various tasks through the project
cycle from preparation in 1982 to completion in 1988:
Task Input (Staffweeks)
Project preparation 12\.3
Project appraisal 30\.8
Loan negotiations 14\.7
Loan processing 6\.9
Project supervision 28\.0
Project completion report 8\.6
Project administration 1\.2
Total 102\.5
B\. Missions
Stage of Days
Project Month/ Number in Speciali- Performance Type of
Cycle Year Persons Field zation /a Rating Lb Problems /c
Through Appraisal
1\. 03/82 3 21 E,EC,FA - -
2\. 06/82 3 21 E,EC,FA
Through Effectiveness
1\. 12182 1 10 FA
Supervision Id
1\. 11/83 2 17 E, FA 2 D
2\. 03/84 1 7 PA 2 PR
3\. 11/84 2 19 E,FA 2 D,PR
4\. 11/85 3 19 E,C,FA 1 Os
5\. 03/87 3 19 E,C,FA 1 Os
6\. 12/87 2 8 E,C 1 OS
7\. 01/88 2 8 E,FA 1 OS
8\. 05/88 1 20 E 1 Os
9\. /e 06/89 1 7 E - -
/a E Engineer; EC Economist; FA = Financial Analyst; PA = Procurement
Adviser; and C = Consultant\.
/b 1 = No or minor problems; 2 Moderate problems\.
/c D = Disbursement; PR = Procurement; and OS = Overall Status\.
/d Supervision missions were generally combined with other business in the
country\.
/e Project Completion Report mission\.
THAILAND
PROVINCIAL POWER DISTRIBUTION PROJECT
(LOAN 2312 - TH)
9% IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS CHART
150
140
130-
110
, X;00Tttl '~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~&0
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 Period
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Year rxtw4ss74
ANNEX 2
- 29 - Table 1
THAILAND
PROVINCIAL POWER DISTRIBUTION PROJECT (LOAN 2312-TH)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Internal Economic Rate of Return
(Baht million)
Fiscal Total Investment O&M Net
Year Benefits Cost Cost Benefits
1984 18\.8 241\.5 2\.9 -225\.6
1985 57\.0 370\.5 9\.0 -322\.5
1986 112\.5 628\.7 18\.5 -534\.7
1987 171\.8 398\.3 27\.8 -254\.2
1988 178\.8 101\.5 29\.0 48\.3
1989 193\.4 16\.8 30\.4 146\.2
1990 207\.2 17\.4 31\.4 158\.4
1991 220\.2 17\.9 32\.3 170\.1
1992 232\.7 18\.5 33\.1 181\.2
1993 244\.9 17\.5 33\.9 193\.6
1994 256\.7 17\.3 35\.4 204\.0
1995 268\.2 16\.9 36\.9 214\.5
1996 279\.3 15\.6 38\.3 225\.4
1997 290\.1 14\.6 39\.7 235\.8
1998 300\.5 12\.6 41\.1 246\.8
1999 310\.6 11\.4 42\.4 256\.8
2000 320\.1 63\.2 44\.1 212\.9
2001 329\.3 90\.8 46\.2 192\.3
2002 338\.2 143\.2 49\.1 145\.9
2003 346\.6 79\.7 51\.9 215\.0
2004 354\.8 30\.2 52\.8 271\.7
2005 362\.5 15\.1 53\.3 294\.1
2006 369\.8 14\.6 53\.6 301\.6
2007 376\.9 14\.7 53\.9 308\.4
2008 383\.5 13\.6 54\.1 315\.8
2009 389\.3 12\.6 54\.3 322\.5
2010 395\.0 11\.1 54\.4 329\.5
2011 400\.7 9\.3 54\.5 336\.9
2012 406\.1 7\.6 54\.6 343\.9
2013 411\.4 6\.6 54\.6 350\.2
IERR = 12Z\.
ANNEX 2
- 30 - Table 2
THAILAND
PROVINCIAL POWER DISTRIBUTION PROJECT (LOAN 2312-TH)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Number of Electricity Consumers
Fiscal Resi- Rice Agri\. Social Power* Pot\.*
Year dential Shop Mill Pump Fac\. Tool Pump
1984 21,978 333 24 38 248 158 319
1985 66,780 1,637 105 176 787 480 956
1986 134,517 3,372 237 403 1,613 967 1,902
1987 220,013 5,377 415 722 2,608 1,583 3,113
1988 248,358 7,167 562 1,002 2,927 1,787 3,534
1989 266,365 7,409 696 1,209 3,044 1,916 3,809
1990 286,849 7,649 829 1,413 3,159 2,064 4,165
1991 306,335 7,889 962 1,618 3,275 2,204 4,505
1992 324,839 8,125 1,093 1,819 3,388 2,337 4,825
1993 342,365 8,356 1,221 2,016 3,499 2,463 5,124
1994 358,928 8,581 1,346 2,208 3,607 2,582 5,400
1995 374,550 8,801 1,468 2,395 3,713 2,695 5,655
1996 389,260 9,012 1,585 2,574 3,814 2,800 5,886
1997 403,076 9,220 1,700 2,751 3,914 2,900 6,098
1998 416,058 9,425 1,814 2,926 4,013 2,993 6,292
1999 428,266 9,627 1,926 3,099 4,110 3,081 6,470
2000 439,760 9,828 2,037 3,270 4,207 3,163 6,634
2001 450,607 10,027 2,147 3,440 4,303 3,241 6,786
2002 460,868 10,223 2,256 3,607 4,397 3,316 6,924
2003 470,593 10,415 2,362 3,771 4,489 3,385 7,055
2004 479,826 10,603 2,466 3,931 4,579 3,451 7,176
2005 488,608 10,787 2,568 4,088 4,668 3,515 7,293
2006 496,975 10,972 2,670 4,246 4,757 3,575 7,403
2007 504,991 11,151 2,769 4,398 4,843 3,633 7,507
2008 512,668 11,324 2,865 4,545 4,926 3,688 7,607
2009 520,014 11,494 2,959 4,690 5,008 3,740 7,708
2010 526,497 11,662 3,052 4,833 5,089 3,787 7,787
2011 532,489 11,827 3,143 4,973 5,168 3,830 7,851
2012 538,366 11,986 3,231 5,109 5,245 3,873 7,914
2013 543,069 12,142 3,317 5,242 5,320 3,906 7,944
Included with residential consumers\.
THAILAND
PROVINCIAL POWER DISTRIBUTION PROJECT (LOAN 2312-TH)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PEA Income Statement
(Baht million)
Fiscal Yar 1982 1983 1984 1986 1988 1987 1988
SAR Actual SAR Actual SAR Actual SAR Actual SAR Actual SAR Actual Actual
Electricity Salos (GWh) 6,842 5,840 6,553 6,680 7,478 7,433 8,321 8,557 9,364 9,305 10,330 10,944 12,691
Average tariff (8/KWh) 1\.8 1\.8 1\.94 1\.74 2\.06 1\.7 2\.11 1\.69 2\.23 1\.67 2\.38 1\.84 1\.62
Energy revenues 10,519 10,519 12,713 11,648 15,418 12,630 17,571 14,489 20,851 1G,513 24,626 17,959 20,433
Other Op\. revenues 468 463 550 404 603 399 637 467 575 484 435 431 618
Tot l Op\. revenues 10,985 10,982 13,263 12,052 15,921 13,029 18,108 14,946 21,426 15,997 25,061 18,390 21,051
Purchased power 8,193 8,193 9,752 8,837 12,112 9,529 13,838 10,962 16,482 11,679 19,578 13,056 14,308
Fuel 88 88 62 84 11 63 12 49 13 45 15 44 29
Operating expenses 1\.332 1\.381 1\.749 1\.462 1\.825 1\.633 2\.032 1\.934 2\.2e2 2\.010 2\.488 2\.658 2\.762
Total operating cost 9,613 9,642 11,583 10,383 13,948 11,226 16,880 12,946 18,767 13,734 22,081 15,668 17,099
Income before depreciation 1,372 1,340 1,700 1,669 1,973 1,804 2,228 2,001 2,668 2,263 2,980 2,732 3,952
Depreciation 896 780 845 885 1\.032 1\.040 1\.280 1\.310 1\.542 1\.517 1\.800 1\.679 1\.898
Op"rating income 676 580 856 784 941 764 968 691 1,126 746 1,isO 1,063 2,054
Operatinal interest 530 525 e68 631 786 681 803 909 90s 1,041 920 1\.216 1,310
Net income 146 S5 189 153 155 103 166 (218) 221 (295) 260 (162) 744
Average rate bass 9,306 7,882 11,318 9,168 13,891 11,241 17,104 13,663 21,331 15,770 24,756 17,606 19,913
X Working ratio 87\.6 87\.8 87\.2 86\.2 87\.6 86\.2 87\.7 86\.6 87\.6 85\.9 88\.1 85\.1 81\.2
X Rate of return 7\.3 7\.4 7\.6 8\.6 6\.8 6\.8 6\.7 6\.1 6\.3 4\.7 4\.8 6\.0 10\.3
DX z
5- Z
fD X
THAILAND
PROVINCIAL POWER DISTRIBUTION PROJECT (LOAN 2312-TH)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PEA Flow of Funds
(Baht million)
Fiscal Year 1982 1983 1984 1986 1986 1987 1988
SAR Actual SAR Actual SAR Actuai SAR Actual SAR Actual SAR Actual Actual
Source of Funds
Internal generation 1,372 1,340 1,700 1,669 1,973 1,804 2,276 2,001 2,e68 2,263 2,980 2,732 3,952
Other contribution 231 231 240 376 273 369 201 491 133 378 20 381 587
Customer deposits 5SS 1SS 359 184 222 188 177 183 284 208 310 237 263
Increase other liabilities (113) (468) 97 148 (7) (114) (7) 1,787 2 2,884 0\.0 474 731
Equity increase 83 83 312 119 264 53 207 1 200 8 113 10 94
Borrowing 1,846 2\.116 3\.028 3\.415 974 1\.736 2\.576 2\.485 3,053 3\.132 1\.008 3\.808 2\.693 1
Total sources 3,674 3,469 6,734 5,910 3,672 4,026 6,382 8,948 8,325 8,673 4,318 7,622 8,300
Application of Funds
Capital investments 2,981 2,981 3,126 3,015 3,672 3,584 4,504 3,680 3,901 3,809 1,592 3,472 3,817
Debt service 880 830 1,028 2,142 1,253 1,214 1,671 1,709 2,040 3,353 2,226 2,662 2,776
Inc\. in work capital 93 17 1,388 671 (1,218) (601) (653) (102) 419 (1,033) 544 1,413 1,018
Other assets (380) (369) 213 82 (35) (171) (40) 1\.681 (35) 2\.544 (45) 75 690
Total application 3,574 3,459 5,734 6,910 3,672 4,026 5,382 6,948 6,325 8,673 4,318 7,622 8,300
Debt service ratio 1\.60 1\.61 1\.65 0\.78 1\.67 1\.49 1\.42 1\.17 1\.31 0\.67 1\.34 1\.03 1\.42
I contribution to investment 16\.9 - 20\.8 - 19\.1 - 16\.3 - 18\.9 - 27\.9 - -
fD X
" Li
THAILAND
PROVINCIAL POWER DISTRIBUTION PROJECT (LOAN 2312-TH)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PEA Balance Sheot
(Baht mill;on)
Fiscal Year 1982 1983 1984 1986 1988 1987 1988
SAR Actual SAR Actu*' SAR Actual SAR Actual SAR Actual SAR Actual Actual
Assets
Fixed assets in operation 18,983 18,293 21,255 19,164 25,439 23,392 31,549 27,530 38,220 31,896 43,213 35,243 41,511
Accumulated depreciation 65169 4,950 6,401 5,948 7,897 7\.061 9\.709 8\.482 11,834 1L0087 14,343 21,915 14,022
Net fixed assets 11,794 11,343 14,854 13,206 17,541 16,331 21,840 19,048 26,388 21,809 28,870 23,328 27,489
Work in progre 2,998 2,997 3,103 3,802 4,133 3,231 4,307 3,534 3,430 3,912 2,322 4,513 2,883
Cash in banks 368 386 296 1,045 396 754 399 448 1,279 322 1,248 1,752 3,460
Accounts receivable 1,899 1,619 1,755 1,879 2,026 1,902 2,247 1,930 2,596 1,992 2,984 2,297 2,4L2
Inventories 3,760 3,760 4 495 3,853 3\.144 4\.095 2,290 4,288 1,730 3,715 2,383 4,101 3\.368
Total current assets 5,825 5,745 6,54s 8,777 6,568 6,761 4,936 6,868 5,605 8,029 6,815 8,160 9,250
Other assets 132 212 345 294 310 123 270 208 235 2,876 190 3,080 3,911
Total assets 20,749 20,297 24,849 23,879 27,550 26,438 31,353 29,456 35,865 34,428 37,997 39,071 43,513
Equity and Liabilities
Equity 1,116 1,117 1,428 1,238 1,692 1,289 1,899 1,290 2,099 1,298 2,099 1,308 1\.402
Contribution and grants 1,904 1,904 2,144 2,279 2,417 2,837 2,818 3,129 2,761 3,607 2,771 3,868 4,435
Reevaluation surplus 4,266 3,227 5,150 3,287 6,227 3,212 7,465 3,515 8,765 3,757 10,349 3,875 4,020
Operational surplus 2,009 2,882 2\.198 3,114 2,364 3\.603 2,619 3\.651 2,740 j,8 3,001 4,008 6\.199
Total equity 9,296 8,930 10,920 9,916 12,690 10,641 14,491 9,989 18,366 10,861 18,220 11,716 13,854
Long term debt 7,241 7,133 9,799 9,108 9,978 9,894 11,421 13,207 13,16e 17,240 12,687 19,983 ?1,257
Accounts payable 1,768 1,768 1,699 2,161 1,986 2,548 2,2e8 2,587 2,702 2,908 3,210 3,328 3,413
Customer advances 1,191 1,189 713 1,157 se5 1,348 305 1,322 121 1,398 78 1,686 1,883
Curront maturities 382 385 468 s53 768 707 1,135 997 1,306 469 1,507 558 1,248
Total current liabilities 3,321 3,342 2,780 3,871 3,319 4,599 3,708 4,908 4,129 4,775 4,795 5,572 6,342
Customer deposits 683 877 1,043 881 1,2e4 1,049 1,441 1,232 1,710 1,440 2,019 1,677 1,940
Other liabilities 209 215 308 123 299 253 292 122 294 120 298 123 120
Total liabilities 11,464 11,387 13,928 13,963 14,380 15,795 16,882 19\.467 19,300 23,575 19,777 27,355 29\.659
Total equity A liabilities 20,749 20,297 24,848 23,879 27,550 28,436 31,353 29,458 35,S58 34,428 37,997 39,071 43,513
No\. days accts\. receivable 41 44 40 48 40 39 40 38 40 41 40 41 38
% Debt/(Net assets + WIP) 48\.95 49\.74 54\.57 54\.19 48\.04 50\.68 43\.68 58\.48 44\.18 67\.55 40\.61 71\.78 70\.03
Working capital 2,888 2,788 4,234 3,459 3,018 2,859 2,363 2,757 2,782 1,723 3,227 3,138 4,154
Current ratio 1\.75 1\.72 2\.35 1\.75 1\.68 1\.47 1\.33 1\.36 1\.36 1\.26 1\.38 1\.46 1\.48
% Debt/(debt * equity) 43\.8 44\.4 47\.3 47\.9 44\.0 48\.2 44\.1 65\.9 44\.6 81\.4 41\.0 83\.0 60\.5 | APPROVAL |
P173830 |  The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
Project Information Document (PID)
Appraisal Stage | Date Prepared/Updated: 15-Apr-2021 | Report No: PIDISDSA31960
Apr 15, 2021 Page 1 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
BASIC INFORMATION
OPS_TABLE_BASIC_DATA
A\. Basic Project Data
Country Project ID Project Name Parent Project ID (if any)
Western Africa P173830 Community-Based
Recovery and Stabilization
Project for the Sahel
Region Estimated Appraisal Date Estimated Board Date Practice Area (Lead)
AFRICA WEST 12-Apr-2021 15-Jun-2021 Social Sustainabilty &
Inclusion
Financing Instrument Borrower(s) Implementing Agency
Investment Project Financing Republic of Niger - Ministry Burkina Faso PIU (under
of Planning, Burkina Faso - DGDT), Executive
Ministry of Economy, Secretariat for the SDS
Finance and Development, Sahel Niger (SE/SDS Sahel-
Mali - Ministry of Economy Niger), The Authority for
and Finance the Integrated
Development of the
Liptako-Gourma Region
Proposed Development Objective(s)
The development objective of this project is to contribute to the recovery and resilience of communities in target
areas of the Liptako-Gourma Region of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger through a regional approach supporting (i)
integrated socio-economic services and infrastructure, (ii) livelihoods and territorial development, and (iii) regional
data and coordination\.
Components
Component 1: Resilient and inclusive recovery of conflict-affected communities
Component 2: Transitional support towards stabilization and territorial development of communities
Component 3: Regional dialogue, coordination and data and capacity building
Component 4: Project Management
Component 5: CERC
PROJECT FINANCING DATA (US$, Millions)
SUMMARY -NewFin1
Total Project Cost 352\.50
Total Financing 352\.50
Apr 15, 2021 Page 2 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
of which IBRD/IDA 352\.50
Financing Gap 0\.00
DETAILS -NewFinEnh1
World Bank Group Financing
International Development Association (IDA) 352\.50
IDA Credit 352\.50
Environmental and Social Risk Classification
High
Decision
The review did authorize the team to appraise and negotiate
B\. Introduction and Context
Country Context
1\. The Liptako Gourma Region, a tri-border area in the Sahel spanning Burkina Faso, Mali and
Niger, is among the worldâs poorest and most climate vulnerable and marginalized places \.1 More than
80 percent of the over 17 million people in Liptako Gourma live in rural areas, where access to basic
services and economic opportunities is lacking, and livelihoods are concentrated around farming and
herding\.2 Poverty rates throughout Liptako Gourma significantly exceed the national averages for all three
countries, with rates significantly higher in rural areas than in urban areas\. 3 Maliâs Mopti, Meneka, and
Gao regions had poverty rates ranging from 49 to 62 percent in 2018, while the national average stood at
40 percent\.4 Similarly, the poverty rate in Nigerâs Tillaberi region in 2011 and Burkina Fasoâs Sahel and
Northern region in 2014 were more than 8 percent and 20 percent higher, respectively, than the national
averages of 48\.2 percent in Niger and 40 percent in Burkina Faso\. Of concern, Liptako Gourma also lags in
1 Based on the LiptakoâGourma Authority (LGA), the Liptako-Gourma region covers administratively the following regions: In
Burkina Faso, it covers eight regions, including the Centre (Ouagadougou), Centre-East (Tenkodogo), Centre-South (Manga),
Centre-North (Kaya), East (Fada N'Gourma), Central Plateau (Ziniaré), North (Ouahigouya) and Sahel (Dori) regions\. In Mali, it
covers four regions: 5th Region (Mopti), 6th Region (Timbuktu), 7th Region (Gao) and 8th Region (Kidal)\. In Niger, it covers two
regions and one urban community: Region of Tillabéri (Tillabéri), Region of Dosso (Dosso)\. Within this Liptako-Gourma region,
the project will focus on the following regions: Gao, Meneka, Mopti and Tombouctou in Mali, Sahel, Centre-Nord and Nord in
Burkina Faso, and Tillaberi in Niger\.
2 Autorité de développement intégré des états du Liptako-Gourma (LGA) presentation (08/03/2019) in ACAPS (22 March 2019)
Briefing note â Conflict and displacement in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso\.
3 Rapport dâenquête multisectorielle continue, Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie du Burkina Faso, 2015\.
4 Mali: Cartographie Nexus humanitaire et développement, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(UNOCHA), 2018\.
Apr 15, 2021 Page 3 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
human development, with all three countriesâ scores in the bottom 5 percent of the human development
index globally\.5
Map 1\. Regions of the Liptako-Gourma Region of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger which are the projectâs target
areas
2\. The region shares several common characteristics which inextricably link communities across
national borders\. Common features include strong cultural, linguistic, and familial linkages; highly mobile
populations across porous borders with closely-knit trade relations; shared dependency on climate-
sensitive natural resources; a fragile socio-ecological system with a high degree of water scarcity and high
vulnerability to climate change impacts; and a transnational insecurity crisis with significant cross-border
spill-over effects\. Despite commonalities, vulnerabilities and risks are also anchored in local dynamics and
vary across communes, regions, and national boundaries, pointing to the need for any regional responses
to be informed by local contexts\. Investing in border areas can bring significant advantages, whichmay
include: (a) the capacity to trade across borders and identify markets and better prices for goods; (b) the
ability to secure employment or access labor across borders; and (c) the ongoing capacity of traditional
and community-based organizations that cut across the borders to effectively manage conflict and
regulate economic activity\.6 In addition to cross-border trade, livelihoods, movement and institutions as
sources of resilience; regional and international cooperation mechanisms (including the G5 Sahel,
international military support and the role played by the diaspora), and coordinated management of
shared regional assets, are elements of stability that can be capitalized upon to produce lasting effects\.
3\. The Liptako Gourma Region faces multi-dimensional and interrelated risks, leading to a vicious
cycle of fragility that has proven difficult to overcome\. The joint World Bank Group (WBG)7 and United
5UNDP\. 2019\. Human Development Report 2019\. Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today: Inequalities in human
development in the 21st century\. New York\.
6
World Bank\. 2020\. From Isolation to Integration: The Borderlands of the Horn of Africa\. Washington, DC: World
Bank\. https://openknowledge\.worldbank\.org/handle/10986/33513 License: CC BY 3\.0 IGO\.
7 United Nations; World Bank\. 2018\. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict\. Washington, DC:
Apr 15, 2021 Page 4 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
Nations (UN) Pathways for Peace report identifies four âarenas of contestationâ?, around which conflict
takes place: (i) power and governance, (ii) service delivery, (iii) land and natural resources, and (iv) justice
and security\. For communities in Liptako Gourma, power and governance challenges include the absence
of state institutions, incomplete decentralization processes, and unequal representation and voice in
government for some groups, such as youth, women, people with disabilities, nomadic populations, and
ethnic and religious minorities\. Poor access and low-quality public services, as well as a lack of positive
state presence, all aggravate governance challenges by reinforcing feelings of exclusion and
marginalization\. Inequitable territorial distribution of basic services, while not directly linked to violence,
generates frustration and affects state legitimacy and its ability to mediate conflict\. Lastly, a receding state
presence in the border areas, the stateâs difficulty in protecting citizens and poor access to justice services
(that is perceived as favoring elites) have eroded public trust of the state\. This has also created an enabling
environment for non-state actors (e\.g\. self-defense militias) to fill security gaps left by the lack of State
security, contributing to a further rise in violence\.
4\. Limited access to basic services also constrains communitiesâ ability to effectively manage
shocks and stresses of all kinds\. This includes the impacts of climate variability and change on land and
natural resources, which are highly climate sensitive and form the basis of key sectors and livelihoods in
the region\. Temperatures have increased in recent years, as has variability in precipitation patterns,
increasing the incidence of floods and droughts\. These changes have lowered soil productivity and water
availability, severely affecting agriculture and livestock\. The impact of climate variability on the natural
resource base has been further exacerbated by scarce employment or income-generating opportunities,
which has intensified environmental degradation and competition over the regionâs dwindling natural
resources, which are also highly sensitive to weather-related hazards and shifting climatic conditions\. This
has meant that farmers and pastoralists are often at odds, competing over land and water for their
livelihoods, which has in turn compounded conflicts and fragility risks, affecting agriculture through lower
soil productivity and water access\. Thus, fragility drivers and vulnerability to climate-related risks have
reinforced and amplified each other in recent years, undermining the resilience of communities to
manage risks associated with the FCV-climate nexus, resulting in negative coping strategies and
maladaptation, particularly in areas with limited access to basic services and safety nets\.
5\. Climate risks - such as extreme temperature, extreme precipitation and flooding, and drought -
are projected to increase in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger and in particular in the Liptako Gourma Region\.
Climate change and hazard events will increasingly affect key socioeconomic and development sectors,
especially agriculture and livestock â but also infrastructure\. Mean annual temperature is projected to
increase by 1°C in the Sahel over the next 20 years and 4°C by the end of the century\. Heat waves are
expected to be more frequent, intense and longer lasting, likely increasing by 8â28 days\. While rainfall is
currently low, projected high rainfall variation is likely to exacerbate both drought and flood risk,
particularly in the short term\. By the 2050s, it is anticipated that there will be increased frequency (+1 to
43 percent) and intensity (+1 to 12 percent) of heavy rainfall events in much of the Sahara, including
Burkina Faso and Mali\. In Niger, estimates are increased in frequency by +16 to 75 percent and uncertain
trends for intensity ranging from -4 to +21 percent\. Almost 100,000 additional people are also estimated
World Bank\. World Bank\. https://openknowledge\.worldbank\.org/handle/10986/28337 License: CC BY 3\.0 IGO\.
Apr 15, 2021 Page 5 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
to be exposed to the risk of flooding in Liptako-Gourma annually\. \. Climate change induced migration and
variations in pastoralistâs migration patterns would also intensify competition and create new tensions
and conflict over natural resources, particularly amongst farmers and pastoralists\. Impacts from climate
variability and change on water resource availability, agriculture and livestock, together with increased
climate-induced displacement will exacerbate existing food security challenges\. Marginalized groups,
including women, youth, and people with disabilities will be disproportionately vulnerable to climate
change impacts due to their relatively higher rates of poverty and limited access to productive resources,
basic services and safety nets, and exclusion from decision-making process\. In the absence of support,
Sahelian states face challenges in managing these climate change impacts related to existing political,
economic, and social instability, poverty, historical grievances, poor governance, and weak institutions\.8
6\. In recent years, Liptako Gourma has seen an escalation of violence and conflict, which threatens
to destabilize the entire region and undermine development gains\. Violence in Sahel was initially
triggered by exogenous factors related to regional dynamics, including the difficulties of the state in
controlling cross-border movement of arms, people, and goods, thereby creating the possibility of violent
spillover\. However, current conflict risks are not only the result of the rise in regional violent extremism,
but also deep-rooted structural causes and frustrations over the lack of positive state presence - that is
perceived as exclusionary, contested and absent (particularly relating to protection and justice)\. The
growing unrest, which first emerged in Northern and Central Mali, has metastasized throughout Liptako
Gourma, particularly in vulnerable border areas that are isolated with weak state presence and
overexposed to security threats\. Since 2015 in particular, the boundaries between violent extremism,
rebellions and insurrections, community self-defense and banditry have blurred\.9 Between 2016-2020,
the recorded number of violent events (battles, explosions, and violence against civilians) in the tri-border
area increased tenfold and the conflict is estimated to have led to the death of about 6,250 people\. 10
Demographics and climate change (including environmental degradation) also serve as âthreat
multipliersâ? that amplify the fragilities and even the dynamics of conflict, in particular with regard to
access to natural resources and basic services\.11 These dynamics often reinforce one another and are both
the byproduct and a leading cause of fragility, as they have resulted in a weakened social contract
between citizens and the state\. Growing social unrest and discontent has also led to political upheaval\.
7\. Growing violence has led to an acute humanitarian, food insecurity and forced displacement
crisis, which has been exacerbated by climate change and COVID-19\. As many as 2\.1 million people in
Liptako Gourma were estimated to be in a situation of severe food insecurity between June and August
2020\. Armed conflict and violence, together with the adverse effects of climate change, led to a significant
displacement of 1\.66 million individuals in Liptako-Gourma as of December 2020\. This includes around
1\.49 million internally displaced people (IDPs) (90 percent of the displaced population) and 0\.17 million
8
United Nations; World Bank\. 2018\. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict\.
Washington, DC: World Bank\. World Bank\. https://openknowledge\.worldbank\.org/handle/10986/28337 License:
CC BY 3\.0 IGO\.
9
World Bank, 2020\. Sahel Risk and Resilience Assessment (RRA)\.
10ACLED\. Ten Conflicts to Worry About in 2021\. February, 2021, https://acleddata\.com/2021/02/02/ten-conflicts-to-worry-
about-in-2021/#1612195879250-fd67dc25-cc2c
11
World Bank, 2020\. Sahel Risk and Resilience Assessment (RRA)\.
Apr 15, 2021 Page 6 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
refugees (10 percent)\. Burkina Faso accounts for 64 percent of the displaced and is now the worldâs
fastest-growing displacement crisis with a 20-fold increase from 50,000 in January 2018 to over 1 million
by October 2020\. Mali and Niger hold 20 percent and 12 percent, respectively, of the regionâs IDPs\.12 A
growing number of IDPs live in host communities in these climate hotspots, most of which are poor and
vulnerable, and typically lack the resources to adapt to an increasingly hostile environment characterized
by multi-hazard risks\. Governments are also under increased pressure to deliver basic social services at a
time when there are competing calls to increase security spending\. More recently, the COVID-19
pandemic has led to significant and potentially long-lasting public health and economic impacts\. COVID-
19-related movement restrictions across the three countries, including border closures, have also
substantially impacted cross-border dynamics, migration and food security\. The impacts of the global
COVID-19 outbreak, compounded by security and climate risks, are worsening the short-term economic
outlook for these countries, with further decline expected in the medium term, aggravating poverty and
social challenges\.
8\. Children, youth, women and people with disabilities are among the most affected by the crisis\.13
Children and youth have been severely impacted by school closures\. In Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso,
about 10,000 teachers are displaced, with as many as 400,000 children estimated to be without access to
education in 2019, which is a two-fold increase from 2017\.14 Youth not in employment, education, or
training are increasingly targeted for recruitment by extremists or armed groups, which exploit existing
grievances and use egalitarian narratives to attempt to bestow a sense of purpose to marginalized youth,
providing a reaffirmation of self-worth, as well as income\. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have one of the
worldâs youngest populations, with median age of less than 18 years old, making the need to integrate
youth into the social and economic fabric even more pressing\.15 While the regionâs youth dividend could
be a potential driver for economic growth, lack of economic opportunities for youth can translate into
growing fragility risks and out-migration\. Additionally, conflict and weather-related disasters are not only
are major causes of disability, but also have a greater impact on people with disabilities\. Failure to address
hidden disabilities (such as mental and psycho-social health problems) also inhibit efforts to rebuild social
capital and economic development\.
9\. Women face stark inequalities that can enhance their vulnerability in an FCV and climate
vulnerable context\. All three countries rank very low on the Gender Inequality Index which measures
three important aspects of human developmentâreproductive health, empowerment, and economic
status\.16 Niger ranks last (189), Mali ranks 184 and Burkina Faso 182 out of 189 countries\. Women have a
58 percent labor force participation rate in Burkina Faso; 52 percent in Mali; and 15 percent in Niger\.17 In
the Sahelian agricultural system, women and men work together to produce food, but they typically
12 Central Sahel and Liptako-Gourma Crisis Monthly Dashboard #12, International Organization for Migration (IOM), 4 January
2021\.
13 UNHCR, Sahel Emergency, February 2021, https://www\.unhcr\.org/en-us/sahel-emergency\.html\.
14 ACAPS, Conflict and Displacement in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, Briefing Note, 22 March 2019\.
15 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division\. https://esa\.un\.org/unpd/wpp/\. (Medium-
fertility variant)\.
16 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Gender Inequality Index, UNDP 2020\.
http://hdr\.undp\.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii\.
17 https://data\.worldbank\.org/indicator/SL\.TLF\.CACT\.FE\.NE\.ZS?locations=BF-ML-NE
Apr 15, 2021 Page 7 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
cultivate separate crops or care for different livestock\.18 For food processing, women are often associated
with the primary and secondary processing of grains and the processing of poultry and small livestock\. For
food distribution, women typically hold a monopoly on street-food vending\.19 In Burkina Faso and Mali,
the majority of womenâs economic participation consists of roles in agriculture and the share of female
employment in agriculture is 87 percent in Burkina Faso, 64 percent in Mali, and 38 percent in Niger\. 20
However, the share of female agricultural land holders is less than 10 percent in Burkina Faso and under
5 percent in Mali\.21 Furthermore, discriminatory family code in the form of early and forced marriage, lack
of parental authority, and unequal inheritance rights limit womenâs decision-making power and
participation in local institutions in Liptako-Gourma\. As they are more likely to experience poverty and
have less socio-economic power than men, women are disproportionately vulnerable to the impacts of
climate change and face greater difficulty recovering from disasters and adapting to shifting climatic
conditions\. Women are disproportionately vulnerable to the impacts of climate change as they are more
likely to experience poverty and their income sources are often more dependent on climate-sensitive
natural resources or exposed to shocks\. Women also face greater difficulty recovering from disasters and
adapting to shifting climatic conditions, often as a result of patriarchal gender norms that limit their
ownership of land and access to resources that support coping and adaptation
10\. Gender-based violence (GBV) is highly prevalent in all three countries\. Women and girls,
especially those with disabilities, are highly vulnerable to GBV\. Evidence from Mopti in Mali, for example,
points to growing incidence of early marriage, rape, and survival sex\. Conflict, militarization and insecurity
in some areas of the countries have further exacerbated pre-existing risks of GBV in multiple ways: the
collapse of social safety nets and protective relationships; the growing challenges in accessing life-saving
services, leaving survivors isolated and unable to seek care; the weakened rule of law and state presence
failing to provide protection; the increased severity of gender inequality and different manifestations of
GBV\. Climate change and COVID-19 also exacerbate vulnerability to GBV, for example, through increased
challenges in sourcing food, water and other critical livelihood resources (often the responsibility of
women), as well as lockdown measures that can make it difficult for women to escape domestic violence\.
In addition, it is estimated that Niger has the highest prevalence rate of child marriage globally, with 77
percent of girls married before the age of 18 and 28 percent before the age of 15\.22 Burkina Faso and Mali
also have a high prevalence rate of child marriage\. For example, in Mali, 53 percent of girls are married
before the age of 18;23 and 36 percent of women gave birth before the age of 18\.24 This may be
18 Gnisci, D\., "Women's Roles in the West African Food System: Implications and Prospects for Food Security and Resilience",
West African Papers, No\. 3, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2016\. https://doi\.org/10\.1787/5jlpl4mh1hxn-en\.
19 Gnisci, D\. 2016\. Women's Roles in the West African Food System: Implications and Prospects for Food Security and Resilience,
West African Papers, No\. 3, OECD Publishing, Paris\.
20 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)\. "FAO statistical yearbook 2014, Asia and the Pacific, Food and Agriculture\." (2014)\.
21 Bouchama, N\., G\. Ferrant, L\. Fuiret, A\. Meneses and A\. Thim\. 2018\. Gender Inequality in West African Social Institutions, West
African Papers, No\. 13, OECD Publishing, Paris\.
22 Girls Not Bride, Child Marriage Rates in Niger, accessed at https://www\.girlsnotbrides\.org/child-marriage/niger\.
23 Institut National de la Statistique - INSTAT, Cellule de Planification et de Statistique Secteur Santé-Développement, and ICF\.
2019\. Mali Demographic and Health Survey 2018\. Bamako, Mali: INSTAT/CPS/SS-DS-PF and ICF\.
http://dhsprogram\.com/pubs/pdf/FR358/FR358\.pdf
24 Institut National de la Statistique - INSTAT, Cellule de Planification et de Statistique Secteur Santé-Développement, and ICF\.
2019\. Mali Demographic and Health Survey 2018\. Bamako, Mali: INSTAT/CPS/SS-DS-PF\.
http://dhsprogram\.com/pubs/pdf/FR358/FR358\.pdf\.
Apr 15, 2021 Page 8 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
exacerbated in situations of high insecurity as families may see marrying their young daughters to older
men as a way to protect them and to improve access to natural and financial resources\. Furthermore,
sexual violence against girls in schools is of particular concern, notably in Burkina Faso25\.
11\. The international and regional response to the crisis has focused on security and humanitarian
challenges, yet there is growing recognition to prioritize the humanitarian to development transition \.
Also, there is a need to reinforce regional mechanisms to respond to the main FCV drivers\. In September
2013, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for an integrated strategy for the Sahel,
emphasizing that humanitarian needs cannot be addressed in isolation from security considerations and
development efforts, including considerations of climate and disaster risks\. On the security front, Burkina
Faso, Mali and Niger, together with Mauritania and Chad, as part of the G5 Sahel, have launched a Joint
Force in 2017, stepping up their military presence in the region\. Other international military responses
include the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the
French Force Barkhane\. However, there are concerns that security expenditures are crowding-out
development investments, including for improved governance, engaging communities, and fostering
social cohesion, and thereby undermining a sustainable recovery\. An ambitious response, the âSahel
Allianceâ? - established in 2017 by Germany, France, and the European Union (EU) and subsequently joined
by the WBG, the African Development Bank, the UN Development Program (UNDP) and other
development partners - is working in partnership with G5-Sahel countries to support targeted
development interventions in the Sahel\. Its members have developed a core operating framework\. This
includes a pipeline of 800 projects to be implemented by 2022 totaling about EUR 11\.6 billion (including
USD 8\.5 billion from IDA) and 12 flagship programs that showcase how the Sahel Alliance is charting new
ways for partners to engage in FCV environments,26in line with G5âs Sahel Integrated Priority Action
Framework (CAPI)\. Targeting vulnerable populations, these flagship programs use an integrated spatial
and multi-sectorial approach, aimed at achieving rapid results to stabilize regions where security has been
recently restored\. Their âprototypeâ? has been designed by WBG in Konna (Central Mali)\. The members
recently agreed on implementing this integrated multisectoral approach in a systematic way, prioritizing
areas through close field coordination\. The proposed project is one such intervention\.
Sectoral and Institutional Context
12\. Liptako Gourmaâs complex multi-sectoral challenges with cross-border spillovers call for an
integrated and holistic regional response\. A regional approach offers four distinct advantages\. First, it
avoids âpublic badsâ? from undermining national development efforts\. Lack of investments in basic
services, climate adaptive resilience, and livelihood opportunities can result in out-migration, adding
pressure to poor host communities and governmentâs capacity to respond\. Second, a common framework
for stabilization and cohesion, in the context of highly mobile populations across country borders, can
reinforce targeted investments\. Third, given the small and fragmented markets in remote areas, an
25 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner\. 2017\. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women reviews the report of Burkina Faso\.
https://www\.ohchr\.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews\.aspx?NewsID=22292&LangID=E\.
26 Sahel Alliance, https://www\.alliance-sahel\.org/en/sahel-alliance/; The World Bank Group, Press Release, December 15, 2020,
The World Bank Boosts Support to the Sahel for a Resilient Recovery from the Security and Economic Crisis,
https://www\.worldbank\.org/en/news/press-release/2020/12/15/the-world-bank-boosts-support-to-the-sahel-for-a-resilient-
recovery-from-the-security-and-economic-crisis\.
Apr 15, 2021 Page 9 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
integrated regional response can leverage larger economies of scale by supporting livelihood and
infrastructure investments that enable small-scale regional trade to continue\. Fourth, stronger regional
coordination can spur learning, leading to improved public policies through enhanced data sharing and
regional knowledge\. Failing to intervene at the regional level can lead to self-defeating national programs,
as improvements on one side of the border can be disrupted and undermined by neighboring instability\.
Lastly, a regional approach can support the management of assets that are shared by bordering countries
in an integrated way\.
13\. An urgent shared challenge is the need to provide immediate assistance and targeted support
to prevent negative coping strategies among climate-vulnerable, conflict-affected, displaced and host
community households\. In the absence of income generating opportunities, and with poor road access
and security constraints affecting access to fields or markets, many households are drawing on their
existing assets to survive through selling livestock or consuming their crops\. Non-displaced households in
conflict-affected communities have seen local agricultural systems affected by the destruction of farming
and irrigations facilities and attacks or thefts of cattle\. Many displaced households have been forced to
leave behind their cattle or tools and are therefore dependent on host populations for their survival\.
Needs assessment in host communities have found most displaced households to be either unemployed
or have precarious and climate-sensitive livelihoods working as day laborers and farm workers\. Food
security is overwhelmingly cited as the main priority for the displaced\. In addition to man-made
disruptions, frequent floods and droughts episodes negatively impact farming and herding\. Supporting
livelihood restoration and climate adaptive income generating opportunities among the displaced is
therefore critical for a sustainable recovery\.
14\. Access to water and sanitation is a growing concern for both conflict-affected and host
communities in Liptako Gourma, and the challenge is compounded by the impacts of climate variability
and change\. The destruction of water points has been a common tactic in the regionâs conflict, forcing
vulnerable groups (particularly women and girls) to travel long distances, often at great personal risks (e\.g\.
of GBV), to collect drinking water\. For host communities, many of which faced prior water shortages
(exacerbated by climate change), coping with rising demand from displaced populations has proved
exceedingly difficult\. The use of non-protected water sources, such as open wells, rivers, and lakes, is
common among IDPs\. Recent needs assessments in Tillaberi and Sakoira municipalities in Niger found that
households travel about 8 kilometers to source water, while about 24 percent of the population in Soum
province in Burkina Faso had to travel over 30 minutes to the nearest water point\.27 Overcrowded
conditions further strain access to limited sanitation facilities\. Assessments have also found open
defection to be widespread across IDP communities in all three countries, increasing the risk of disease
transmission\. The lack of safe and accessible sanitation facilities also places women and girls at greater
risk of sexual violence\.
15\. Despite urgent needs, local governments in the Liptako Gourma Region lack sufficient fiscal
resources, instruments, and capacity to effectively respond to the crisis and restore public confidence\.
27 Conflict and displacement in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, Briefing note â 22 March 2019\.
https://reliefweb\.int/sites/reliefweb\.int/files/resources/20190322_acaps_regional_briefing_note_mali_-_niger_-
_burkina_faso\.pdf\.
Apr 15, 2021 Page 10 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
For the most part, local governments rely on budget support from donors to finance investment, since
government transfers and own source revenues are used for operating expenses\. A review of local
development planning across communes in the three countries found that local development plans (LDPs)
are not inclusive, lack conflict sensitivity, fail to adequately integrate climate change considerations, and
are disconnected from budgeting process\.28 LDPs are prepared for 5-year windows, and therefore did not
account for the growing number of displaced or destruction of community infrastructure from the
escalating conflict\. Varying levels of access across the commune prevent all villages from being included
in the process\. Consultations are often âthinâ?, involving some discussions with community leaders, yet
not building on village development plans or diagnostics\. While annual investment plans, linked to LDPs,
are meant to guide yearly investments, unclear budget allocation results in a long list of aspirations and
needs without prioritization\. Consequently, decisions are determined by the municipal council, often
resulting in misalignments between the selected investments and community priorities, leading to
frustrated expectations\.
16\. Development partner financed projects in the Sahel, including Liptako Gourma, focus primarily
on sectoral investments\. Many partners are working in the region\. The EU supports regional stabilization
through a program that promotes social cohesion and rehabilitating basic infrastructure\. The UN has three
main programs focusing on border management for stability and human security\. The United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) is financing a resilience and economic growth project,
which focuses on boosting short-term income and training opportunities\. And the French Development
Agencyâs (AFD) âThree Bordersâ? project contributes to Liptako-Gourmaâs stabilization by supporting socio-
economic investments and social cohesion activities in the border areas of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger\.
17\. The proposed project responds to a need for both bottom-up and regional approaches to
simultaneously address emergency and climate change needs, heightened pressures from forced
displacement, competition over natural resources (including land and water resources), and regional
data monitoring gaps\. Existing WBG projects in Liptako-Gourma primarily focus on sectoral approaches
linked to infrastructure, food security, livestock, and human development\. This includes providing a wide
range of support services, like cash transfers, livelihood, labor-intensive public works (LIPWs), etc\. An
initial mapping undertaken during project preparation, shows the total estimated amount of active WBG
activities in Liptako-Gourma to be over USD 3 billion\. However, WBGâs response to a regional crisis has
been predominantly national\. Thus, the types of intervention and level of implementation across different
countries have been uncoordinated, posing limits on curbing the transnational dimensions of FCV driving
factors\. There is also a deficit of cross-border dialogues and regional harmonization\. Hence, given the
regionâs investment needs and the regional dimension of the crisis, there is considerable scope for WBG
to scale up development support to Liptako-Gourma - through a regionally coordinated approach to tap
on potential regional synergies\.
18\. The proposed projectâs regionality, conflict-sensitive design, and integrated territorial approach
complements the existing WBG portfolio in Liptako Gourma\. The planned regional engagement
complements national-level programs by providing a common framework for regional, national, and local
28This is one of the findings of a Citizen Engagement and Local Development Plan review in the Liptako-Gourma Region that was
undertaken by the task team as part of the project preparation process\.
Apr 15, 2021 Page 11 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
stakeholders to strengthen resilience and support the humanitarian to development transition\. In Burkina
Faso, the Local Government Support Project (P162742) supports administrative and fiscal decentralization
by strengthening communeâs institutional capacity and citizen participation in local governance\. The
proposed project will build on existing citizen engagement modalities and leverage commune capacity
improvements by supporting investments linked to LDPs\. It is also a sister operation to the Emergency
Local Development and Resilience Project (P175382), as it would be implemented by the same Project
Implementation Unit (PIU), follow similar institutional arrangements, and target different communes to
ensure comprehensive coverage\. In Mali, the project will establish strong linkages with the Project
Coordination Unit (PCU) and regional implementation units within the Ministry of Economy and Finance
that are implementing the Mali Reconstruction and Economic Recovery (P144442) and the implementing
agencies of the Emergency Safety Net Project in Mali (P127328 and P173321) that have satellite offices in
Mopti and Gao\. In Niger, the project is well aligned with, amongst others, the Niger Refugees and Host
Communities Support Project (P164563) and the Kandadji Project (P130174) and its Additional Financings
and the Niger Integrated Water Security Platform Project (P174414) which is currently under preparation\.
At a regional level, the proposed projectâs coordinated approach for small-scale community investment,
trust-building activities, and knowledge sharing for improved policy making will benefit from the West
Africa Food System Resilience Programâs (P172769) regional operation designed to support agro -sylvo-
pastoral systems nutritional needs and generate surplus incomes\. The proposed project also
complements sector specific investments, some of which have had to temporarily stop operations in
Liptako Gourma due to security risk, by using a conflict-sensitive approach that enables tailored
engagement in different localities, thereby restoring access to basic services and building the foundations
to resume operations\.
19\. The proposed project contributes to a Regional and Community-Centered Approach to Lagging
Regions in West Africa advanced by the Social Sustainability and Inclusion (SSI) global practice\. This
approach follows a development model predicated on âThinking Regionally while Acting Locally\.â? It
consists of two intervention pillars: (i) regional development diplomacy, and (ii) regionally-informed
community-centered platforms\. The first pillar recognizes the need for regional dialog among key
government, humanitarian, and development actors to underpin a common policy response to shared
drivers of FCV and climate vulnerability\. It will support access to timely and quality data, targeted regional
analytics, and the innovative use of technology (such as data and knowledge platforms) to promote cross-
border learning and build a common understanding of regional best practices to inform community-
centered development processes\. The second pillar refers to the deployment of multi-country
community-centered development platforms, designed to localize implementation while drawing on
lessons from the regional dialogue\. The community-centric model aims to restore the social contract
between local governments and communities by ensuring local investments respond to communitiesâ
most pressing needs and by promoting local economic development\. Specifically, communities will be
engaged to support (i) participatory needs assessments, (ii) the prioritization and identification of
investments feeding into local development plans, (ii) monitoring and evaluation activities, and (iv) local
grievance redress committees\. The menu of investments, implementation modalities, security measures,
and targeting approach will be harmonized drawing on regional lessons while reflecting and strengthening
existing country systems\. This overall regional approach is being implemented in the Lake Chad Region
Recovery and Development Project (PROLAC, P161706) and is under preparation for another regional
Apr 15, 2021 Page 12 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
project targeting the lagging regions of the Gulf of Guinea - Cote dâIvoire, Ghana, Togo and Benin
(P175043)\.
C\. Proposed Development Objective(s)
Development Objective(s) (From PAD)
The development objective of this project is to contribute to the recovery and resilience of communities in target areas
of the Liptako-Gourma Region of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger through a regional approach supporting (i) integrated
socio-economic services and infrastructure, (ii) livelihoods and territorial development, and (iii) regional data and
coordination\.
Key Results
PDO Level Indicators
20\. The following PDO-level indicators will measure progress toward achievement of the PDO:
⢠Number of beneficiaries with improved access to socio-economic services and infrastructure (broken
down by females, youth and forcibly displaced)
⢠Number of people provided with access to improved water sources
⢠Number of beneficiaries that report an increase in annual income (in %) as a result of project activities
(broken down by females, youth and forcibly displaced)
⢠Hectares of land area where sustainable agricultural, land and water management practices, suited
to local and regional agro-ecological conditions, have been adopted as a result of the project
⢠Joint statement and action plan agreed during an annual coordination meeting with participation of
the three countries (Number)
D\. Project Description
This project is seen as a part of a larger regional program and long-term commitment to support the
recovery of and build resilience in the Liptako Gourma region\. The proposed operation aims to
contribute to a larger regional program by building the foundation for the sustained engagement required
to systematically deepen regional coordination, harmonize policies, and create regional public goods\. A
long-term vision is necessary to sustain a joint response to the regionâs shared FCV and climate risks, in
strengthening the recovery-stabilization-climate resilient development nexus\. While the first phase (i\.e\.
this project) will focus on integrated socio-economic services and infrastructure, livelihoods and territorial
development, and regional data and coordination (as explained above); subsequent phases/ projects will
aim to focus on deepening this engagement and extending it in thematic and geographical terms\. Given
the volatile security, political, and climate vulnerable situation in the region, the exact scope of future
engagement is not yet know and will be kept flexible to allow task teams to reassess and better
accommodate to the fluid specific circumstances\.
Apr 15, 2021 Page 13 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
21\. A three-pronged territorial development lens\. The project follows a three-pronged territorial
development approach, comprised of âconcentric circlesâ?, to tailor investments to different target areas
and support the regionâs recovery and resilience\. The concentric circles correspond to the different project
components:
⢠The first circle, under Component 1, focuses on the immediate crisis response by targeting the source
of displacement to capitalize on security gains and provide a peace dividend in conflict-affected
communities\. It will finance livelihood restoring and climate-resilient income generating activities,
delivery of household supplies and goods, and small-scale basic infrastructure in response to
communitiesâ most pressing needs\.
⢠The second circle, under Component 2, targets secured communes and communities, mostly in
secondary cities and their surroundings, that host a large share of the forcibly displaced\. The
component aims to (i) mitigate mutually reinforcing FCV and climate risks related to increased
competition for scarce social services, economic opportunities, and natural resources, and (ii) create
the foundations for a more sustainable regional recovery through stronger links to LDPs and a
renewed social contract with greater opportunities for community decision-making on local
investments\. It will support multi-sectoral investments, including access to socio-economic
infrastructure and services (particularly water and sanitation), local economic development
interventions, and environmental and natural resource management\.
⢠Finally, Component 3 will pave the way for future regional programming and larger-scale investments
by building capacity for regional dialogue and implementation of harmonized local approaches\. This
includes supporting national and regional data and monitoring, as well as regional coordination and
collaboration\. The sharing of best practices (e\.g\. on tackling FCV and climate risks) across the three
countries is expected to accelerate communitiesâ recovery and open opportunities for future cross-
border activities as security improves\. This component will also strengthen local level capacity-
building, citizen engagement and social cohesion\.
22\. Restoring the interface between local government and citizens by supporting greater
community engagement in local development planning\. The project proposes to work simultaneously
with local government and communities to ensure a better match between investments and needs,
improve social inclusion and accountability and restore trust between government and citizens\.
Underpinning this approach are four key elements : (i) participatory planning and budgeting; (ii)
participatory monitoring and supervision; (iii) feedback and grievance mechanisms and (iv) adequate
representation and participation of women, youth and systematically excluded people including persons
with disabilities, at every step of the process\. First, the selection of project investments will be
mainstreamed through the yearly process of updating local development plans; the project will provide
assistance to local governments to ensure adequate community engagement and social inclusion in the
process, and reinforce the capacity of communities to participate effectively and meaningfully\. Second,
beneficiary communities will take part in the monitoring of activities, notably via a digital platform
facilitating interaction between communitiy committees, facilitators and local government througout the
project cycle\. Third, strong complaints handling mechanisms will reinforce community voice and ensure
accountability\. Communities will also directly take part in the implementation of investments involving
Labor Intensive Public Works\. Finally, facilitating partners will ensure that the voice of women, youth and
Apr 15, 2021 Page 14 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
systematically excluded people including persons with disabilities, is taken into account when identifying
needs and planning and monitoring activities\. The approach will be initiated in the first year of project
implementation and will apply to the investments for both Components 1 and 2 in years 2-5 of the
projects\. In Year 1, a more centralized rapid prioritization exercise will be carried out with a community
and municipal validation to ensure activities reflect community priorities and investments commence
rapidly\.
23\. To address stark gender inequalities, the project has integrated gender-sensitive interventions
into the various project components to promote women and girlsâ economic opportunities and foster
their agency and resilience\. These activities will be adapted to the specific countriesâ contexts and
identified gender gaps\. In response to gender-based disparities in economic opportunities, the project will
target women through a multi-faceted approach of livelihood, agribusiness, and labour intensive activities
under project components 1 and 2\. Activities that aim specifically at women will be prioritized and women
participation will be encouraged and ensured in all activities of these components\. Increasing womenâs
roles in public life and decision-making will be supported by womenâs participation in local development
committees, as well as in the regional KMP and data work under project components 1 and 3 respectively\.
A female quota will be established for local development committees to ensure that a significant amount
of women participate in the local development planning decision making process\. Finally, gender gaps in
womenâs agency will be addressed through the promotion of GBV prevention and mitigation measures
and response mechanisms\.
24\. Considering elevated security risks and their operational/reputational implications, the WBG
together with the PIUs have adopted a ârisk mitigation by designâ? strategy\. Security risks are factored
into all elements of project design, supervision, and implementation\. Security risks play an important role
in both the selection of sub-project sites, and in the sequencing of activities depending on the level of
complexity allowed by ground conditions\. Subject to changes in security, additional target communes and
communities can be added within the projectâs target regions\. The initial selection of target communes
was informed by security considerations, yet a regular assessment is required given rapid changes in
security conditions both within and across communes\. Given the regional character of the project and
multiplicity of sub-project locations and activities, it is impossible to determine a priori a numeric baseline
for insecurity that applies universally across all project sites\. For this reason, several criteria are used to
classify yellow, orange, and red/black zones\. These criteria include (i) levels of insecurity - estimated
according to the number of publicly available reported security incidents, open-source analyses of conflict
intensity, degree of militarization, and number of forcefully displaced persons; as well as (ii) the degree of
access for technical PIU staff, implementing partners, contractors and NGOs\. While the projectâs risks are
high, the project is expected to have significantly positive economic, social, and cultural impacts in all
three countries as well as contribute toward reducing the overall vulnerability of the local populations\.
These potential project results as compared to a situation of non-intervention therefore outweigh the
projectâs risks\.
Apr 15, 2021 Page 15 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
Figure 1: Project Activities According to Security Zones
25\. Component Overview\. The project has five components\. Each of these components is described
in more detail below\. The breakdown of the financing amounts by component and country is shown in
the table 1\.
Table 1: Breakdown of the financing amounts by component and country
Components Burkina Faso Mali Niger LGA Total
Component 1: Resilient and inclusive recovery of
34 23 20 - 77
conflict-affected communities
Sub-Component 1a: Basic livelihood support and
12 8 16 - 36
income generating activities
Sub-Component 1b: Delivery of household goods
and small-scale infrastructure works in crisis- 22 15 4 - 41
affected regions
Component 2: Transitional support towards
stabilization and territorial development of 76 47 55 - 178
communities
Sub-Component 2a: Access to Resilience Social
and Economic Services, Infrastructure and 56 32 40 - 128
Resilience
Sub-Component 2b: Resilient livelihoods and
20 15 15 - 50
territorial development Interventions
Component 3: Regional dialogue, coordination
20 15 15 2\.5 52\.5
and data and capacity building
Sub-Component 3a: Strengthening Regional
- - - 2\.5 2\.5
Collaboration for Recovery and Stabilization
Sub-component 3b: National Capacity Building for
5 5 5 15
Regional Collaboration
Apr 15, 2021 Page 16 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
Sub-Component 3c: Local level capacity-building,
15 10 10 - 35
citizen engagement and social inclusion
Component 4: Project Management 20 15 10 - 47
Component 5: CERC 0 0 0 - 0
Total 150 100 100 2\.5 352\.5
Of which PPA (included in the country totals) - - 3 - 3
C\. Description of Project Components
Component 1: Resilient and inclusive recovery of conflict-affected communities (US$ 77 million equivalent)
26\. This component will focus on supporting recovery in partially insecure communes and
communities in so-called âorange zonesâ?\. It will mitigate further displacement by addressing the
immediate needs of affected communities through the provision of goods, livelihood support and the
rehabilitation of small-scale productive infrastructure\. Eligible communities will be able to select from a
closed menu of investments under this component to address emergency needs\. It will generate income
through LIPWs involving target communities\. It is anticipated that this component will represent 30
percent of total project investments\. As stated above, the project operates in a context that is highly
vulnerable to the effects of climate change\. Activities that directly and demonstrably contribute to greater
climate resilience will be prioritized in the participatory selection of project investments, with the goal of
reaching a share of 65 percent of Component 1 activities contributing to climate mitigation or adaptation
and/or improved management of natural resources\. Security in target areas will be monitored
continuously in order to adjust or suspend activities when required by circumstances\.29 The activities
under this component will generate useful field-level data and information that will feed into regional
data collection and dialogue supported by Component 3\. The regional data and dialogue on development
issues in Liptako-Gourma will in turn inform adjustments to field activities\. The component has two sub-
components:
Sub-Component 1a: Basic livelihood support and income generating activities (US$ 36 million equivalent)
27\. This sub-component will focus on the short-term restoration of basic livelihood in conflict-
affected areas and address the needs of target communities for economic resources\. Activities under this
sub-component include:
⢠Provision of agricultural inputs such as seeds for local staple crops (maize, sorghum, beans and peas),
fertilizer (such as nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium, and urea) and manual tools, with an emphasis on
climate-smart agricultural practices (for example, prioritizing drought-resistant crops);
⢠Provision of livestock kits and animal feed to farmers/herders (i\.e\. sheep, goat and cattle);
⢠Extension services such as short training courses (e\.g\. on climate resilient practices), including e-
extension services where feasible;
29Such as, for example, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Food Program (WFP), the United Nations Office for
Project Services (UNOPS), the ICRC and others\.
Apr 15, 2021 Page 17 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
⢠Provision of livestock kits and extension services for poultry farming, aquaculture and fishing to
promote livelihood diversification (away from climate vulnerable livelihoods) and improve food
security (including food insecurity affected by droughts)
⢠Targeted LIPW activities related to soil preservation to improve soil fertility and climate-resilient small
water and sanitation infrastructure, as well as restoration works and regeneration of pasture lands to
improve carbon stocks and to increase environmental protection and climate resilience\.
28\. LIPW activities will generate well-needed income for target communities\. Participants in LIPW
activities will be selected through a public lottery selection system\. Recruitment will be widely advertised\.
Eligible persons who would like to participate in the lottery for LIPW activities can register, subject to
certain limits like distance to sub-project sites, previous unemployment, one individual per household etc\.
Names drawn will then be written on two lists by gender, to ensure 50% of beneficiaries are female\. Limits
and/or prerequisites which will be described in more detail in the project implementation manual (PIM)
will ensure that the most vulnerable (such as youth and females) are prioritized in the selection process
for participating in LIPW activities\. These activities will be accompanied by menâs sensitization and
engagement interventions to encourage womenâs participation\. Selection mechanisms will also support
prioritization of youths, displaced persons and people with disabilities\. The proposed method promotes a
transparent, fair, and equal chance for all community members to benefit from the project, which is
important in a context where trust in the government is low and social capital has been weakened\. In
addition to generating income, the LIPW method can contribute to social inclusion and cohesion by (i)
demonstrating that a large variety of works can be done by the community (even unskilled community
members) and (ii) allowing workers from different backgrounds and genders to work together\. Keeping
LIPW opportunities within target communities also mitigates potential risks of conflict with external
laborers, which might be perceived as competing for limited new local income generating opportunities\.
29\. To promote climate resilience, livelihood activities financed under this component will support
stress tolerant crop varieties and climate-smart cultivation practices, as well as soil preservation and the
restoration and regeneration of pasture lands\. Proposed activities will be screened for their contribution
to improved natural resource management and climate change mitigation or adaptation, and investments
with a positive contribution will be prioritized in the participatory selection of project investments\. The
project aims to ensure that 65 percent of activities across Component 1a and 1b will contribute
demonstrably to climate mitigation or adaptation and/or improved management of natural resources\.
Sub-Component 1b: Delivery of household goods and small-scale infrastructure works in crisis-affected regions
(US$ 41 million equivalent)
30\. This sub-component will provide much-needed supplies to conflict-affected communities with
moderate to substantial accessibility constraints\. It will also support the rehabilitation of small-scale
infrastructure\. The activities financed under this sub-component will include:
⢠Provision of basic necessity kits, consisting of household supplies like solar lightening, rainwater
harvesting kits, kitchen sets, mosquito nets, plastic mats, blankets, and hygiene kits etc\.;
⢠Rehabilitation and construction of climate-resilient water and sanitation structures; and
⢠Rehabilitation of small-scale socio-economic infrastructure, via LIPW when applicable\.
Apr 15, 2021 Page 18 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
31\. To improve community resilience to climate change, kits will include supplies that favor the
adoption of positive coping strategies, including rainwater harvesting kits (that can reduce land-
degradation)\. The component will also promote small-scale infrastructure that integrates climate change
considerations\. For instance, buildings will be designed to cope with seasonal flooding or landslides and
rehabilitated with options for greater natural light and therefore greater energy efficiency\. Proposed
activities will be systematically screened for their contribution to improved natural resource management
and climate change mitigation or adaptation, and investments with a positive contribution will be
prioritized\. For rehabilitation works, it is estimated that 65 percent of financing will contribute
demonstrably to climate mitigation and adaptation measures\.
Component 2: Transitional support towards stabilization and territorial development of communities (US$ 178
million equivalent)
32\. This component will contribute to territorial development and stabilization in comparatively safer
and more accessible communities in âyellow zonesâ? (mostly in secondary cities and their surroundings),
that host a large share of the forcibly displaced population\. Investments will support communitiesâ access
to socio-economic infrastructure and services, climate-resilient livelihoods, and environmental and
natural resource management\. Therefore, they will contribute to mitigating risks of increased competition
for scarce resources driven by the compounding impacts of climate change and FCV\. The project will
support host communities and forcibly displaced alike, as well as the communesâ local institutions\. The
component will deploy a community-centered approach by ensuring the representation and active
participation of local communities in local development planning processes, the identification and
prioritization of their needs, and the implementation and monitoring of project activities\. These
community-centered platforms will strengthen the social contract by providing mechanisms for
communities to work with local governments to drive local investments\. They will foster social resilience
and support a territorial development approach where investments are tailored to the realities of local
development challenges (including degree of community isolation, violence, and climate risks)\.
33\. Sub-project selection will emphasize investments that leverage synergies across complementary
sectors to maximize impact\. This could include, for example, developing the neighborhood surrounding a
public space or a market by improving access to basic services (such as water and sanitation) and
community infrastructure, while supporting livelihood opportunities with increased market accessibility
(access roads to main arteries of transport, etc\.)\. Investments will be complementary to national programs
and activities of humanitarian and development partners\. The project will also facilitate linkages between
target areas both nationally and regionally (e\.g\. through spatial connective infrastructure)\. The regional
spillover effect of community-centered investments will be maximized through (i) input from regional
dialogue activities supported by Component 3; and (ii) the prioritization of activities with both local and
regional relevance, and/or with high potential for regional impact in the future (taking into account
findings from the West African Economic and Monetary Union / Swiss cooperation cross border project
Programme de Cooperation Transfrontaliere Locale (PCTL))\. Additionally, prioritization of investment for
Component 2 will also favor geographical clustering of interventions to develop larger scale catalytic
interventions, alongside the other key criteria of cross border linkages and benefiting IDP and host
communities\.
Apr 15, 2021 Page 19 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
34\. Sub-project selection will also prioritize investments that support climate resilience\. Proposed
activities will be systematically screened for their contribution to improved natural resource management
and climate change mitigation or adaptation\. The project aims to ensure that 65 percent of Component 2
financing will directly contribute to climate mitigation or adaptation\.
35\. Activities are organized into two sub-components, described below\. Both community-level and
municipal level investments will be supported, with implementation modalities adjusted according to the
size of sub-projects and the area context\. Both sub-components will use an open menu approach to
ensure investments are responsive to local needs\. This will also enable municipalities, communes and
communities to pull resources together for larger inter-sector investments\.
Sub-Component 2a: Access to Resilient Socioeconomic Infrastructure and Services (US$ 128 million equivalent)
36\. This sub-component will finance local investments to (i) expand and improve local service
delivery; and (ii) build integrated infrastructure for local development and support regional integration
and positive spillover impacts\. The target communities and local governments will work together to
identify and prioritize the specific social services and economic infrastructure to be funded through the
yearly updating of LDPs\. To ensure sustainability, only those subprojects that can have their operating
costs covered, and can be maintained and staffed will be financed\. An illustrative list of possible
investments under this sub-component includes:
⢠Rehabilitation of secondary and tertiary roads and construction or rehabilitation of footpaths,
culverts, and small bridges (this will include the improvement of pedestrian mobility);
⢠Rehabilitation and cleaning of drainage canals;
⢠Rehabilitation of local electricity facilities (including the promotion of solar power);
⢠Rehabilitation and equipment of primary and secondary schools;
⢠Rehabilitation and equipment of health centers and provision of essential medicines;
⢠Construction, upgrading, rehabilitation, or expansion of small-scale water supply systems (boreholes
with manual or solar pumping, standpipes) and sanitation systems (household latrines - ventilated
improved pit or flush toilet types, sanitation cabins); and
⢠Activities focused on soil and water conservation (e\.g\. establishment and management of tree
nurseries)\.
37\. These activities will improve access to basic services that are critical for coping and building
resilience to climate and other shocks\. The sub-component will also ensure that the construction and
rehabilitation of community infrastructure will integrate climate-resilient design practices, including the
ability to cope with climate extremes (such as flooding and extreme heat)\. In addition, roads and electricity
works will be supplied by renewable energy to the extent possible\. Rehabilitated water supply systems
and drainage canals will also help address water scarcity in the region and support flood risk management,
thereby contributing towards mitigating climate change risks and preventing potential conflicts over
water resources\. Proposed activities will be systematically screened for their contribution to improved
natural resource management and climate change mitigation or adaptation\. The project aims to ensure
Apr 15, 2021 Page 20 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
that 65 percent of Component 2 activities contribute to climate mitigation or adaptation and/or improved
management of natural resources\.
38\. The following infrastructure sub-projects are not eligible: religious buildings, construction of new
schools or new health centers; construction or rehabilitation of individual dwellings; construction of new
asphalted roads; and private goods to individuals\. To the extent possible, the constructed/ rehabilitated
infrastructure will incorporate a universal design to allow for accessibility for all\.
Sub-Component 2b: Resilient livelihoods and local economic development interventions (US$ 50 million
equivalent)
39\. This sub-component will support existing and newly established livelihood and producer groups
through small infrastructure investments and skills development\. It will support groups or beneficiary
households in agriculture, livestock, fisheries, and agro-processing â concentrating investments in a few
selected locations to maximize impact\. While adopting a demand-driven approach, the project will
prioritize investments with strategic value from the perspective of local economic development and
territorial plans\. A particular emphasis will also be put on using innovative climate-smart agricultural
techniques, including targeted support to agriculture production, (pre- and post-harvest) and marketing
for selected products as well as promoting Zaï or integrated agro-sylvo-pastoral systems and ecological
land rehabilitation\.
40\. An illustrative list of possible investment packages under this sub-component includes:
⢠Construction and rehabilitation of community storage facilities, veterinary clinics, livestock markets
and vaccination facilities;
⢠Upgrading and/or rehabilitation of community buildings, stalls and markets, especially markets with
regional linkages;
⢠Enterprise and skills development training to producer groups including women groups, based on
community cluster level territorial development plans\.
41\. Activities of this sub-component will complement the activities of other humanitarian and
development partners, especially the UNDP and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN\.
Community-centered sub-project selection will be facilitated to ensure an adequate inclusion and
prioritization of the economic needs of women, youth, displaced persons and people with disabilities\.
42\. As in previous sub-components, activities will emphasize and promote climate resilience in the
choice of livelihood activities and infrastructure to be supported\. High-value agriculture and value chain
development activities under this sub-component will also incorporates climate risk considerations and
focus, where possible, on the adoption or inclusion of climate smart agricultural technologies including
the use of drought resistant seeds and irrigation\. Project activities will, for example, upscale innovative
climate-smart agricultural techniques such as Zaï and integrated soil fertility management approaches in
collaboration with deconcentrated extension services where available, NGOs and other stakeholders\.
Proposed activities will be systematically screened for their contribution to improved natural resource
management and climate change mitigation or adaptation\. The project aims to ensure that 65 percent of
Apr 15, 2021 Page 21 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
Component 2 activities contribute to climate mitigation or adaptation and/or improved management of
natural resources\.
Component 3: Regional dialogue, coordination and data and capacity building (US$ 52\.5 million equivalent)
43\. This component aims to strengthen regional collaboration and build local capacity to support a
harmonized regional response to existing FCV drivers through a community-centered approach\. This will
be done via three sub-components focused on the regional, national, and local levels\. At the regional level,
the project will facilitate the establishment of a Knowledge Management Platform (KMP) to address gaps
across three pillars - (i) data collection, (ii) analytics, and (iii) dialogue building activities that will support
the establishment and implementation of a common regional vision in Liptako Gourma\. The
implementation of KMP activities will require the engagement of a range of stakeholders, including (i)
universities and think tanks (particularly those from the Liptako-Gourma Region); (ii) international actors
(e\.g\. G5, Sahel Alliance) and diplomats; (iii) humanitarian, human rights and development organizations
working in the region (e\.g\. AFD); (iv) local, regional, national and technical government officials and policy
makers (from the three countries); (v) local NGOs and Community Based Organizations (CBOs); and (vi)
development and human rights practitioners\. At the national level, the component will finance the bulk
of activities by national actors that directly contribute to the three pillars of the platform\. Lastly, at the
local level, and drawing on common approaches supported by the platform, the project will reinforce
institutional capacity for inclusive investment planning, citizen engagement, and social cohesion activities\.
These activities will also include dialogue and planning for climate change and resilience\. Activities that
will be financed by the project will not include the collection of personal data\.
Sub-component 3a: Strengthening Regional Collaboration for Recovery and Stabilization (US$2\.5 million
equivalent)
44\. Sub-component 3a will finance activities related to the KMP implemented by the Liptako Gourma
Authority (LGA)\. The LGA, as the sole regional organization comprising only of the three national parties,
is well-positioned to support the coordination of KMP activities\. To support implementation, the project
will finance the establishment of a PIU within the LGA, staffed with both consultants and LGA-seconded
staff\. The LGA-managed activities will be gradually phased to progressively strengthen implementation
capacity, and specialized agencies will be contracted to support implementation of core activities\. The
activities to be financed include complementary investments of a regional nature across the three pillars
of data collection, analysis, and dialogue (see table 2)\.
Table 2: Illustrative list of activities to be financed under sub-component 3a
Pillar 1: Building an integrated and publicly available multi-layered database for Liptako Gourma drawing on
Data Collection geospatial data, satellite imagery, and raster data, and linked to national data centers\. Data activities
will also pay particular attention to climate data that informs climate change risks and response (such
as temperature and rainfall measurements)\.
Financing relevant Information and Communication Technology (ICT) hardware, software,
connectivity, datasets, access to expertise, and training to support the integrated data center\.
Supporting the harmonization of data collection and analysis methodology for perceptions surveys
through workshops with participating countries\.
Pillar 2: Development of a regional catalogue existing national and regional research and report on the Liptako
Analytics Gourma via a dedicated catalogue (this will include research on climate change and climate financing)\.
Apr 15, 2021 Page 22 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
Commissioning selective regional research focused on cross-border issues and specific security
challenges that undermine regional development gains (including studies on the climate vulnerability
context of the region)\.
Assisting national parties to ensure complementarity of national scholarship programs\.
Standardizing relevant regional KMP trainings through training of trainers activities\.
Pillar 3: Supporting the organization of the annual regional workshops\.
Dialogue Building Hosting regional discussions to discuss key policy recommendations stemming from KMP reports\.
Support regional workshops with subnational actors in bordering local governments to cover pressing
cross-border issues such as social cohesion, climate change, conflict prevention and management, and
access to justice\.
45\. The sub-component will also finance the development and hosting of a novel digital KMP, drawing
on inputs from the national parties and other KMP stakeholders\. To ensure that the digital KMP reflects
the needs and preferences of all KMP stakeholders, the LGA will commission a firm experienced in human-
centered design to support a co-creation process in the development of the software\. The digital KMP
functions will mirror the KMP investments by providing digital visualization of its core activities and
supporting actionable diagnostics to inform policymaking\. Some examples of potential functions include:
(i) eCatalog, creating a digital library of research and reports in the region, (ii) map composer and sector
diagnostics, providing system-generated diagnostics drawing on integrated data center to display
information on key trends, gaps, and alerts to guide local investments, and (iii) a project tracker to identify
the types of investments across the region\. In addition, the digital KMP will be linked to a Community-
Driven Development (CDD) application (see sub-component 3c) to disseminate key regional lessons to
target communities\. The KMP will complement existing and future initiatives such as AFDâs knowledge
platform (Plateforme dâanalyse, de suivi et dâapprentissage au Sahel, PASAS) and G5âs Sahelian Center for
Early Warning\. LGA will also coordinate with the G5 Sahel, WAEMU and ECOWAS to support their
involvement in the KMP\.
46\. The KMP will have a section on research and mobilization of climate financing (such as
international performance-based financing in sequestering greenhouse gases and more specifically
carbon ââ with the Bio Carbon Fund and the Private Sector)\. These funds could then enable them to scale
up investments and ensure sustainability of the projectâs activities in the area\.
Sub-Component 3b: National Capacity Building for Regional Collaboration (US$15 million equivalent)
47\. This sub-component will finance activities by national parties related to the KMP to support their
contributions and fruitful engagement in the regional dialogue through the platform\. As with sub-
component 3a, investments are structured around three pillars: (i) data collection, (ii) analytics, and (iii)
dialogue building activities\. In terms of data collection, the sub-component will finance capacity building
of institutions at the national and local level in data and monitoring, as well as investments in new data
collection and consolidation\. These investments will underpin regional diagnostics and new knowledge
products\. Analytics supported by the KMP will build on regional data to generate evidenced-based analysis
for the development of regional and cross-border policy and programming\. This is expected to influence
the preparation of future cross-border activities, on trade, digital/energy services, etc\. Lastly, the
subcomponent will finance dialogue building activities, drawing on improved regional analysis, to support
a common and sustainable regional response to the crisis\. Across these three pillars, linkages will be
Apr 15, 2021 Page 23 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
established to support multi-level stakeholder engagement involving community groups, local
governments institutions, national government and development partners to promote synergies with
humanitarian and development investments in the region\. Special emphasis will be given to the
engagement of local governments in regional activities through a series of workshops and visits that foster
peer to peer learning and strengthen cross-border collaboration\. Climate change risks and impacts in the
region will be an integral part of the activities of this sub-component\. An illustrative list of activities is
below in table 3\.
Table 3: Illustrative list of activities to be financed under sub-component 3b
Pillar 1: National integrated data centers and hardware and software solutions required for data collection
Data Collection and management (a particular focus will be given on climate change data)\.
Development and monitoring of Liptako Gouma indicators, covering multi-dimensional indicators
used to monitor and compare developments on several axes, including governance, socio-economic
development, security and social cohesion, climate change vulnerabilities, etc\. collected through
surveys\.
Conducting community panel perception surveys in selected localities using a mix-methods approach
designed to take stock of community needs, aspirations, and intra and inter-community dynamics\.
Build and update project registries to map investments by sector, partner, and coverage\.
Pillar 2: Finance national research capacity through partnerships with local universities and think tanks to
Analytics strengthen the platformâs sustainability\. This includes commissioning new research based on regional
development priorities grants to partner universities to finance scholarships for selected Doctor of
Philosophy (PhD) students\. A focus will be given to study that focus on climate change risks and
impacts in the region\.
Support university-sponsored regular knowledge sharing events, conferences, forums, field research
or development of specific courses related to regional challenges (including climate change
challenges)\.
Targeted learning programs for PIU staff, civil servants from the three member states, research
partners, local governments, and CSOs covering data analysis, the use of the KMP and related digital
applications, and monitoring multi-dimensional
Pillar 3: Collaboration events, such as workshops and forums, involving international, regional, and local
Dialog Building government actors to coordinate on and promote a common vision for the peaceful and successful
development of the Liptako-Gourma Region\.
An annual Liptako Gourma international forum which will be hosted on a rotational basis by each
participating country, and with support from the LGA\. This will serve as a high-visibility event to discuss
regional development issues, existing national and regional initiatives, and possible collaboration to
strengthen the impact of stabilization programs\.
Field visits and studies to document best practices in community-driven activities, sharing lessons
across the different project target areas\. Lessons learned, key insights, and agreed policy changes will
also be communicated back to local governments and communities leveraging project-supported
digital tools to enhance a fluid dialogue across all levels of government and improve two-way
exchange with communities\.
Sub-Component 3c: Local level capacity-building, citizen engagement and social inclusion (US$ 35 million
equivalent)
48\. This sub-component aims to build national, subnational, and local institutional capacity to
mobilize and empower communities and implement investments responsive to local needs\. It will
strengthen the capacity of local stakeholders to engage in inclusive and conflict- and climate-sensitive
decision making to support the investment of funds under Components 1 and 2\. Specifically, the sub-
Apr 15, 2021 Page 24 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
component will finance three interrelated sets of activities, covering (i) sub-project cycle implementation
support, (ii) citizen engagement and social accountability, and (iii) youth mobilization, social inclusion and
social cohesion activities\. The activities will be implemented by Facilitating Partners (FPs), which are
organizations specialized in community mobilization and capacity building support, contracted by national
PIUs to cover specific geographic areas\. The sub-component will cover the cost of community meetings;
community and commune level workshop trainings; inter-community exchanges and learning events;
capacity building activities for community institutions and commune governments; social accountability
activities; technical assistance throughout annual investment cycles; and youth engagement and soft skills
activities\.
49\. The FPs will be assigned specific communes to build capacity and provide technical assistance to
local governments and community institutions throughout the annual investment cycle, which includes
(i) community mobilization and orientation; (ii) participatory needs assessments and prioritization of
investments; (iii) sub-project proposal developments to be included in Annual Investment Plans and Local
Development Plan, (iv) implementation support; (v) participatory monitoring; and (vi) participatory
operations and maintenance\. Communities will be represented by Community Development Committees
(CDCs), which can either consist of existing or newly establish groups based on local conditions\. These
CDCs will benefit from training and capacity building activities, including support for the elaboration or
updating of LDPs or community emergency plans\. Training will include strengthening capacities for
disability inclusion, local level planning on climate adaptation and mitigation, and the development of
climate change communication and sensitization strategies\.
50\. The sub-component will support community monitoring and citizen engagement activities, to
enable meaningful participation of citizens in the project\. The project will establish a two-pronged
grievance redress mechanism (GRM) at the local and national levels to allow affected stakeholders to raise
grievances and seek redress if and when they perceive that a negative impact has arisen from the project
interventions\. The grievance redress mechanism (GRM) will be designed in consultation with relevant
government and non-government stakeholders\. It will establish accessible processes including an IT
platform to submit complaints as well as clear procedures from investigation to resolution and feedback\.
The GRM will include the provision for appeal if aggrieved parties are dissatisfied with the outcome\.
Community-level GRM committees will be established to allow for real-time feedback from project
beneficiaries and will be composed of at least one female member and a youth\. A communication
campaign will be implemented aiming at informing beneficiaries and stakeholders on how to use the GRM
and stipulating the investigation and resolution sequential process, timeline and procedures\. A range of
communication channels will be adopted to reach people with disabilities\. To address Sexual Exploitation
and Abuse and Sexual Harassment (SEA/SH)-related complaints safely and ethically, specific procedures
will be developed integrating SEA/SH channels into the project general GRM to allow for the safe and
confidential management of SEA/SH grievances\.
51\. A simple and innovative CDD application will also be introduced to support community
committees, facilitators, and local government engagement throughout the sub-project cycle\. The CDD
application will be customized to reflect the institutional arrangements and processes for each country
and enhance two-way communication between communities and government\. The digital tools will be
gradually rolled out to ensure a simple user experience and any needed modifications will be made prior
Apr 15, 2021 Page 25 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
to their scale-up\. The use of simple digital solutions is expected to strengthen the projectâs community -
centered approach by ensuring a regular flow of information, providing guidance throughout different
stages of the sub-project, as well as enhancing transparency on sub-project approvals, available funding
allocations, community needs, and financed investments\. The CDD application will advance social
inclusion objectives by tracking the needs and aspirations of different groups as recorded through focus
group discussions, highlighting when their preferences are matched with actual investments\.30 Collected
data will also feed into the KMP, to inform regional dialogue\. The sub-component will finance servers,
training activities, and smartphones for community committees and facilitators\.
52\. Youth mobilization, social inclusion and social cohesion activities will be supported and embedded
in the projectâs community outreach and mobilization activities\. To ensure the priorities of youth, women
and disadvantaged groups are adequately considered, the project will engage these groups in identifying
their needs and potential investment opportunities to be listed as part of the local development plans\. An
illustrative list of activities includes:
⢠Community-based psychosocial support activities, including support for survivors of GBV (particularly
for those with disabilities);
⢠SEA/SH prevention sensitization trainings;
⢠Inclusive and accessible sensitization sessions (e\.g\. on disability inclusion) and formation/training
campaigns on non-violent methods of resolving conflicts, violence prevention, and de-stigmatization
(and including also on climate action);
⢠Cultural and sports events to promote collaboration, team spirit, and a positive identity of the people
living in the Liptako-Gourma Region;
⢠Comprehensive sport and art curricula to help youth (including those with disabilities) develop life
skills and social-emotional learning and enhance their voice and constructive engagement with the
community elders; as well as to help prevent gender-based violence\.
Component 4: Project Management (US$47 million equivalent)
53\. Project management and implementation will follow a decentralized approach using, as much as
possible, the existing government structures at the national, subnational, and local levels, as well as local-
level community institutions (to be established or strengthened)\. The component will finance the three
national-level PIUs to carry out day-to-day project management responsibilities for Components 1 and 2,
and sub-components 3b and 3c, namely (i) the planning, implementation, and technical oversight of
program activities; (ii) effective social and environmental risks management; and (iii) financial
30
The CDD applications core functions include: (i) e-capacity building, including instructional material with concrete
guidance for community committees, facilitators, and local governments on their role at different stages of the
annual investment cycles, (ii) community diagnostics, designed to support the mapping of available infrastructure
and services and document prioritized needs by different groups, (iii) sub-project cycle, which allows communities
to submit agreed investment proposal, track approvals, and monitor implementation, (iv) community pulse surveys,
consisting of high-frequency or on demand surveys to gain regular community insights to help project
implementation, (v) community scorecards to allow citizens to assess sub-projects, and (vi) a GRM through multiple
channels (analogue, feature phones, smartphones, web form) for citizens to voice complaints, concerns or provide
feedback on project activities\.
Apr 15, 2021 Page 26 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
management and procurement\. The arrangements for project coordination will be determined at
preparation stage\. Relevant government agencies at the regional, national, sub-national and local levels
will be involved in the implementation process with adequate capacity building support\. Activities will
include: (i) communication support; (ii) monitoring and evaluation (M&E) arrangements, including the set-
up of a Management Information System (MIS); and (iii) measures for enhanced transparency and
accountability\. Data produced under Component 3 will feed directly into project supervision and
oversight\. The component will also strengthen the PIUsâ capacities to monitor project activities, while
supporting an improved understanding of greenhouse gas (GHG) sources and trends, design mitigation
strategies, and policy actions in the face of climate change\.
54\. The complicated security situation in each of the three countries will require a layered approach
to project management and supervision as the WBG staff and consultants are unable to travel to many of
the subproject sites\. This layered approach will include a third-party monitoring (TPM) agency in each
country, which may be a local NGO, as well as the creation of digital project monitoring and mapping
platform for subprojects through the Geo-Enabled Monitoring and Supervision (GEMS) initiative\.31 Both
angles of this approach are outlined in more detail below:
⢠TPM: Each of the PIU will recruit a TPM that may be a local NGO, civil society organization (CSO) or
firm and which will be tasked with monitoring (i) specific crucial activities under each component; (ii)
social and environmental risk management; and (iii) the local context and evolving security situation\.
The TPM will be reinforced by continuous community engagement and feedback which will also be
regularly monitored\. The TPM will be expected to undertake at least two field missions per year, if the
security conditions allow for it and to use innovative technology as well as perception surveys to
better understand the situation and project implementation results on the ground\. TMP is not
intended to substitute existing country monitoring and security assessment systems, but rather to
serve as an additional source of information to support project implementation\. The work of the TPM
and the issues that they raise will be discussed during implementation support missions\. The actors
that will be implementing the TPM is also expected to cooperate closely with the communities and
communitiesâ monitoring system of project activities, where established\. In addition to this TPM
which will be financed and implemented by the clients themselves, the World Bank will also seek for
funding (possibly with external partnership) to complement the work of the client TPM with a World
Bank financed and managed TPM\.
⢠GEMS: To systematically implement the GEMS method, a capacity-building training will be organized
for local project coordinators, M&E specialists, TPM32 and WBG staff supervising the project\. In
addition, it will be ensured that contracts for works under this project will include an adequate budget
for security costs as part of the contracts\. The GEMS will also be integrated into the CDD application
financed under sub-component 3c to strengthen community monitoring mechanisms and ensure that
investments can be easily monitored in real-time\.
31
The PIM will outline specific links in the flow of information and complementarities with state security
structures\.
32The project will explore if the TPM can use the GEMS methodology for (part of) their work on monitoring the situation on the
ground; due to this, TPM staff would be included in the local capacity building training, or that a separate training will be organized
for just them\.
Apr 15, 2021 Page 27 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
55\. Project management will be undertaken in close coordination with security and justice forces\.
Social risks, including human security, will be monitored on a continuous basis by the PIUs using a system
that includes monitoring and mitigation mechanisms at the community, project, and national level as well
as ICT and other innovations for remote monitoring\. Furthermore, a security protocol for the PIU staff and
beneficiaries who participate in project activities will be detailed in the PIM\.
Component 5: Contingent Emergency Response Component (CERC) (US$0 million equivalent)
56\. This zero-budget component will establish a contingency fund that could be triggered in the event
of a man-made crises or disasters, through formal declaration of a national emergency, or upon a formal
request from one of the Governments\. This can include a response to communicable diseases, such as the
COVID-19 pandemic\. In the event of such a man-made crises or disasters, funds from the unallocated
expenditure category or from other project components could be reallocated to finance emergency
response expenditures to meet emergency needs\. This component will therefore support Burkina Fasoâs,
Maliâs and Nigerâs emergency preparedness and response capacity\. This also includes the financing of
post-crisis and/or disaster critical emergency goods, or emergency recovery and associated services, as
well as targeted provision of post-crisis and/or disaster support to affected households and individuals\.
Implementation arrangements for the immediate response mechanism will be outlined in the PIM that
the Borrower will prepare\.
\.
\.
Legal Operational Policies
Triggered?
Projects on International Waterways OP 7\.50 Yes
Projects in Disputed Areas OP 7\.60 No
Summary of Assessment of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts
\.
57\. While the activities that will be financed by this project are expected to have limited
environmental and social impacts, they will be implemented in a fragile and highly volatile environment
that is facing extreme insecurity and violence\. As a result, the contextual risks related to insecurity and
conflict far outweigh the direct environmental and social risks that are likely to be generated by the
implementation of project activities\. These contextual risks are serious and are likely to increase (or
change) during the life of the project\. During preparation, all environmental and social risks have been
carefully screened\.
58\. The following environmental and social standards (ESSs) are applicable in this project: ESS1, ESS2,
ESS3, ESS4, ESS5, ESS6, ESS8 and ESS10\. The following instruments have been prepared and disclosed as
follows:
Apr 15, 2021 Page 28 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
⢠The Environmental and Social Management Frameworks have been disclosed in-country and on the
World Bank site on April 13 (Burkina Faso)33, April 14 (Niger)34 and April 15 (Mali)35\.
⢠The Resettlement Policy Frameworks have been disclosed in-country and on the World Bank site
on April 13 (Burkina Faso)36, April 14 (Niger)37 and April 15 (Mali)38\.
⢠The Labor Management Plans have been disclosed in-country and on the World Bank site on April
13 (Burkina Faso)39, April 14 (Niger)40 and April 15 (Mali)41\.
⢠The Stakeholder Engagement Plans have been disclosed in-country and on the World Bank site on
April 13 (Burkina Faso)42, April 14 (Niger)43 and April 15 (Mali)44\.
59\. The Environmental and Social Commitment Plans with be finalized and disclosed at negotiations\.
The Pest Management Plans and Security Management Plans (together with summaries of the already
finalized Security Risk Analyses) will be finalized and disclosed before project effectiveness\.
E\. Implementation
Institutional and Implementation Arrangements
60\. A designated ministry will be the project implementing entity responsible for overall
implementation of the project in each country\. The implementing entities will set up PIUs to support
implementation and undertake fiduciary responsibility\. The national PIUs in each country will be
responsible for managing the project at the national level and producing national progress reports on the
33
Link for disclosure of instrument in-country: https://dgdt-bf\.org/2021/04/13/cadre-de-gestion-
environnementale-et-sociale-du-projet-pcrss/ and
https://www\.finances\.gov\.bf/fileadmin/user_upload/storage/Cadre_de_gestion_environnementale_et_sociale_du
_projet_PCRSS\.pdf
34
Link for disclosure of instrument in-country: https://sds-sahelniger\.org/avis-de-publication/
35
Link for disclosure of instrument in-country: https://www\.finances\.gouv\.ml/
36
Link for disclosure of instrument in-country: https://dgdt-bf\.org/2021/04/12/cadre-politique-de-reinstallation-
du-projet-pcrss/ and
https://www\.finances\.gov\.bf/fileadmin/user_upload/storage/Cadre_politique_de_r__R_installation_du_projet_PC
RRSS\.pdf
37
Link for disclosure of instrument in-country: https://sds-sahelniger\.org/avis-de-publication/
38
Link for disclosure of instrument in-country: https://www\.finances\.gouv\.ml/
39
Link for disclosure of instrument in-country: https://dgdt-bf\.org/2021/04/12/procedures-de-gestion-de-la-main-
doeuvre-du-projet-communautaire-de-relance-de-stabilisation-du-sahel-pcrss/ and
https://www\.finances\.gov\.bf/fileadmin/user_upload/storage/Proc__R_dure_de_gestion_de_la_main_d_oeuvre_d
u_projet_PCRSS\.pdf
40
Link for disclosure of instrument in-country: https://sds-sahelniger\.org/avis-de-publication/
41
Link for disclosure of instrument in-country: https://www\.finances\.gouv\.ml/
42
Link for disclosure of instrument in-country: https://dgdt-bf\.org/2021/04/12/plan-de-mobilisation-des-parties-
prenantes-du-projet-pcrss/ and
https://www\.finances\.gov\.bf/fileadmin/user_upload/storage/Plan_de_mobilisation_des_parties__prenantes_du_
projet_PCRSS\.pdf
43
Link for disclosure of instrument in-country: https://sds-sahelniger\.org/avis-de-publication/
44
Link for disclosure of instrument in-country: https://www\.finances\.gouv\.ml/
Apr 15, 2021 Page 29 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
project\. This includes financial, procurement, environmental and social risk management and M&E, in
accordance with WBG guidelines and procedures\. The national PIUs will be responsible for the
implementation of the Components 1, 2, 3b and 3c and 4 (and 5, when triggered)\. The respective
implementing entities and PIUs are shown in table 4\.
Table 4: National-level Ministries and Executing Agencies Responsible for the Project Country
Country Implementing Entity Project Implementation Unit Local level institutions
Burkina Ministry of Economy, A PIU will be established under the General Local government (communes),
Faso Finance, and Directorate of Territorial Development of in rural areas: Village
Development (MINEFID) MINEFID (Direction Générale du Développement Development Councils; in urban
Territorial, DGDT) with regional antennas in areas: Community-based
Sahel, Nord, and Centre Nord under the Regional organizations
Directorate of Economy and Planning (DREP)\.
Mali Ministry of Economy and A Project Coordination Unit (PCU) will be Local governments, Comité
Finance established under the Ministry of Finance with dâOrientation, de Coordination
regional antennas in Gao, Mopti and Ménaka\. et de Suivi des Actions de
Développement (COCSAD), and
local development committees
Niger Cabinet of the Prime A PIU will be established under the Executive Local governments (communes)
Minister Secretariat for the Development and Security of and local development
Sahelian-Saharan Areas of Niger (SE/SDS Sahel- committees
Niger)\.
61\. The PIUs will be headed by project coordinators, supported by a core team of specialists in
procurement, financial management (FM), environmental and social (E&S) risk management, and M&E\.
They will also be supported by a team of technical specialists (e\.g\. in community mobilization, conflict
prevention, livelihoods, territorial development, infrastructure and natural resource management) that
will be financed by IDA, and seconded staff as relevant from different ministries\. Additional specialists will
be contracted based on individual country requirements under IDA financing\. While the community and
local governments will play a role in identifying and prioritizing the investments (under Components 1 and
2), the PIUs will be overall responsible for project implementation, including through delegating execution
to MODs (in the case of Mali); or contracting implementing partners like NGOs, national agencies, private/
local contractors, CSOs and UN agencies (such as UNOPs), etc\. The PIU will also partner with local
authorities to implement project activities, with arrangements tailored to each component, as needed\.
The PIUs will rely on regional implementation units (regional antennas, RAs) for coordinating project
activities, working closely with government entities at the regional and local government (commune)
levels\. In addition, given security related access restrictions, a TPM agency will be recruited by the PIUs to
ensure compliance to the implementation guidelines to be specified in the PIMs\.
62\. At the regional level, the LGA will establish a unit for the implementation of sub-component 3a\.
The team will be headed by a project coordinator, along with a core team of specialists\. The core team of
specialists will consist of a procurement specialist, a FM specialist, and an additional specialist to support
activities related to the KMP\. A Regional Coordinating Committee (RCC) will be set up to coordinate
strategies, establish a common vision, and coordinate investments in the region\. The RCC will organize
Apr 15, 2021 Page 30 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
regional forums each year and rely on the KMP for the monitoring, sharing, and collating information,
which will be supported by LGA\. Regional coordination sessions are expected to be held every six months\.
Development partners, donors and key regional partners may be invited as observers for these sessions\.
The RCC will rotate presidencies amongst Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger\. The country presiding will also
have their national PIU serve as the secretariat for the Regional Coordinating Committee (that is, if Burkina
Faso is presiding, then the Burkina Faso PIU will be responsible for the secretariat function)\. Table 5 details
the roles and responsibilities of the RCC and the National Steering Committees (NSCs) / National Review
Committee\.
63\. An existing National Review Committee for Burkina Faso and new NSCs to be established in Mali
and Niger at the national level will guide and oversee the implementation of the project\. These NSCs will
coordinate closely with the committee at the regional level\.
Table 5: Key Project-related Institutions and their Roles and Responsibilities
Membership Roles and Responsibilities
Regional Around three representatives of each ⢠Provide implementation oversight of the
Coordination country (including representatives of the regional program\.
Committee respective project line ministries, the
(RCC) respective project coordinators, one ⢠Guide, advise, and support knowledge
representative of the local authorities by generation and learning as well as regional
country), one representative of the LGA and policy dialogue and harmonization\.
representatives of key donors and regional ⢠Conduct regular discussions and a review of (i)
organizations (such as the G5 Sahel and the project activities (at a general level); and (ii) a
Sahel Alliance, etc\.)\. common action plan for the project\.
⢠The RCC will be responsible for preparing the
draft statement/ action plan to be agreed
during the annual forum/ planned
collaboration events\.
NSC/ National Chaired by a high-level representative of the ⢠Strategic guidance and oversight of project
Review responsible lead ministry in charge of the management;
Committee project or his/her designee\. Members may ⢠coordination; and
include: (i) relevant sectoral ministries, (ii) ⢠implementation, including approving the
the associations of local authorities and (iii) annual work plans and budgets of the relevant
civil society, and (iv) relevant implementing implementation levels\.
agencies\. Other relevant stakeholders,
including development and humanitarian
agencies and organizations may be invited
to sessions of the committee on an as-
needed basis\.
64\. Detailed PIMs will be prepared for the three participating countries and for the LGA before project
effectiveness\. They will detail roles and responsibilities at the regional, national, subnational, and local levels and
implementation arrangements for the project components, the technical activities, E&S safeguard management,
M&E, FM, and procurement procedures\. For each participating country, dated legal covenants include the
\. appointment of an internal and an external auditor\.
Apr 15, 2021 Page 31 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
CONTACT POINT
World Bank
Nicolas Perrin
Lead Social Development Specialist
Gertrude Marie Mathilda Coulibaly Zombre
Senior Social Development Specialist
Johanna Damboeck
Social Development Specialist
Richard Abdulnour
Senior Water Specialist
Borrower/Client/Recipient
Republic of Niger - Ministry of Planning
Moussa Mai Moussa Mai Moussa
Department Lead
maimoussa05@gmail\.com
Burkina Faso - Ministry of Economy, Finance and Development
Martial Bassole
Directeur Général de Développement du Territoire
mbassole@gmail\.com
Mali - Ministry of Economy and Finance
Diakaridia DEMBELE
Conseiller Technique
diak28@yahoo\.fr
Implementing Agencies
Burkina Faso PIU (under DGDT)
Martial Bassole
Directeur Général de Développement du Territoire
mbassole@gmail\.com
Executive Secretariat for the SDS Sahel Niger (SE/SDS Sahel-Niger)
Laoualy Ada
Secrétaire Exécutif
ada\.laoualy@yahoo\.fr
Apr 15, 2021 Page 32 of 33
The World Bank
Community-Based Recovery and Stabilization Project for the Sahel (P173830)
The Authority for the Integrated Development of the Liptako-Gourma Region
Saïdou OUA
Secrétaire Exécutif
ouasaidou@liptakogourma\.org
FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 473-1000
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/projects
APPROVAL
Nicolas Perrin
Gertrude Marie Mathilda Coulibaly Zombre
Task Team Leader(s):
Johanna Damboeck
Richard Abdulnour
Approved By
Practice Manager/Manager:
Country Director: Claire Kfouri 15-Apr-2021
Apr 15, 2021 Page 33 of 33 | APPROVAL |
P083851 |  Document of
The World Bank
Report No: ICR00001838
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-39390 TF-54176 TF-56792 TF-91447)
ON A
CREDIT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 5\.6 MILLION
(US$8\.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
REPUBLIC OF HONDURAS
FOR A
POVERTY REDUCTION SUPPORT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT
September 22, 2011
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management
Central America Country Management Unit
Latin America and the Caribbean Region
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective September 22, 2011)
Currency Unit = Lempira
1\.00 = US$0\.052 US$ 1\.00 = 18\.88
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 â December 31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
CFAA Country Financial Accountability Assessment
CONASA National Planning Board for Water and Sanitation
CPAR Country Procurement Assessment Report
DGSC Civil Service Office
EFMTAC Economic and Financial Management Technical Assistance Credit
ENEE National Electricity Enterprise
ERSAPS National Regulatory Agency for Water and Sanitation
HONDUTEL Honduran Telecommunications Enterprise
IADB Inter-American Development Bank
IDA International Development Association
IGR Institutional and Governance Review
ISN Interim Strategy Note
ISR Implementation Status Reports
ONCAE National Procurement Agency
PAD Project Appraisal Document
PCU Project Coordination Unit
PEU Project Execution Unit
PDO Project Development Objective
PRS(P) Poverty Reduction Strategy (Paper)
PRSTAC Poverty Reduction Support Technical Assistance Project
SIAFI Integrated Financial Management System
SIARH Integrated Human Resources Management System
SINACORP Integrated National Control System for Public Resources
SWAp Sector-Wide Approach
TF Trust Fund
TSC Supreme Audit Institution
UAP-SDP Project Implementation Unit in the Secretary of the Presidency
UATP/UNAT Technical Assistance Unit (Secretary of the Presidency)
Vice President: Pamela Cox
Country Director: Carlos Felipe Jaramillo
Sector Manager: Alberto Herrera
Project Team Leader: Carolina Rendon
ICR Team Leader: Carolina Rendon
ICR Primary Author: Fanny Weiner
ii
HONDURAS
Poverty Reduction Support Technical Assistance Project
CONTENTS
Data Sheet
A\. Basic Information
B\. Key Dates
C\. Ratings Summary
D\. Sector and Theme Codes
E\. Bank Staff
F\. Results Framework Analysis
G\. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
H\. Restructuring
I\. Disbursement Graph
Contents
1\. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design \. 1
2\. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes \. 8
3\. Assessment of Outcomes \. 13
4\. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome\. 19
5\. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance \. 20
6\. Lessons Learned \. 23
7\. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners \. 24
Annex 1\. Project Costs and Financing \. 25
Annex 2\. Outputs by Component \. 26
Annex 3\. Economic and Financial Analysis \. 31
Annex 4\. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes \. 32
Annex 5\. Beneficiary Survey Results \. 33
Annex 6\. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results\. 33
Annex 7\. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR \. 34
Annex 8\. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders \. 40
Annex 9\. List of Supporting Documents/People interviewed \. 41
MAP \. 42
i
A\. Basic Information
Poverty Reduction
Country: Honduras Project Name: Support Technical
Assistance
IDA-39390,TF-
Project ID: P083851 L/C/TF Number(s): 54176,TF-56792,TF-
91447,TF-93440
ICR Date: 09/26/2011 ICR Type: Core ICR
GOVERNMENT OF
Lending Instrument: TAL Borrower:
HONDURAS
Original Total
USD 8\.00M Disbursed Amount: USD 7\.93M*
Commitment:
Revised Amount: USD 7\.37M* *Discrepancy due to exchange fluctuation of SDR during project time
Environmental Category: C
Implementing Agencies:
Unidad Administradora de Proyectos - UAP
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:
Department for International Development UK (DFID)
Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)
B\. Key Dates
Revised / Actual
Process Date Process Original Date
Date(s)
Concept Review: 09/23/2003 Effectiveness: 04/07/2005 04/07/2005
01/31/2008
04/24/2009
Appraisal: 05/05/2004 Restructuring(s):
12/08/2009
02/19/2010
Approval: 06/24/2004 Mid-term Review: 03/19/2007 11/15/2007
Closing: 06/15/2008 12/31/2010
C\. Ratings Summary
C\.1 Performance Rating by ICR
Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial
Bank Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory
Borrower Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory
ii
C\.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)
Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings
Moderately
Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government:
Unsatisfactory
Moderately Implementing Moderately
Quality of Supervision:
Unsatisfactory Agency/Agencies: Unsatisfactory
Overall Bank Moderately Overall Borrower Moderately
Performance: Unsatisfactory Performance: Unsatisfactory
C\.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators
Implementation QAG Assessments
Indicators Rating
Performance (if any)
Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry
Yes None
at any time (Yes/No): (QEA):
Problem Project at any Quality of
No None
time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA):
DO rating before
Satisfactory
Closing/Inactive status:
D\. Sector and Theme Codes
Original Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Central government administration 100 100
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Administrative and civil service reform 33 25
International financial standards and systems 17 40
Legal institutions for a market economy 33 5
Participation and civic engagement 17 30
E\. Bank Staff
Positions At ICR At Approval
Vice President: Pamela Cox David de Ferranti
Country Director: Carlos Felipe Jaramillo Jane Armitage
Sector Manager: Arturo Herrera Gutierrez Ronald E\. Myers
Project Team Leader: Carolina Rendon Alberto Leyton
ICR Team Leader: Carolina Rendon
ICR Primary Author: Fanny Weiner
iii
F\. Results Framework Analysis
Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)
The objective of PRSTAC is to assist the Government of Honduras in improving its
institutional capacity in the areas of participatory planning and monitoring, public
expenditure management, accountability, public administration and public service
delivery thereby facilitating the implementation of the country's Poverty Reduction
Strategy\.
Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)
N/A
(a) PDO Indicator(s)
Original Target Formally Actual Value
Values (from Revised Achieved at
Indicator Baseline Value
approval Target Completion or
documents) Values Target Years
Enhanced capacity to monitor and improve the Poverty Reduction Strategy in a
Indicator 1 : participatory manner, in order to use it as an effective instrument to align public
sector resources
9\.4 % o f public
Value expenditure
quantitative or 7\.8% allocated to 9\.1%
Qualitative) poverty reduction
related programs
Date achieved 06/03/2004 12/31/2004 09/30/2007
Comments
Partially achieved\. Indicator could not be continued to be measured after 2007, as
(incl\. %
the country discontinued its PRS process\.
achievement)
Creation of a more qualified and streamlined public sector and administrative
Indicator 2 :
career path under implementation in the Central Government
Central
Government
Value
expenditures on
quantitative or 11\.4% 11\.1%
wages and salaries
Qualitative)
reduced to 10\.4%
of GDP
Date achieved 06/03/2004 12/31/2004 12/31/2009
Comments
Not achieved\. Instead of a new civil service law, a professionalization bylaw was
(incl\. %
passed\. However, not much advances were made to modernize the civil service\.
achievement)
Competent fiscal and financial management institutions promoting efficient and
Indicator 3 : transparent use of public resources with credible and independent accountability
systems in place
Value Promotion of a 100% coverage of
quantitative or N/A financial Central
Qualitative) management Government\.
iv
system covering
100% of Central
Government
expenditures
& Decentralized
Agencies with
effective fiduciary
instruments
Date achieved 06/03/2004 12/31/2004 12/31/2010
Comments
Partially achieved\. 100% coverage of Central Government, but only one
(incl\. %
decentralized agency (ENEE)\.
achievement)
Indicator 4 : Timely and effective public services delivery in key sectors of the PRS
Strategic reform
Some advance has
Value processes under
been achieved in
quantitative or N/A implementation in
the education and
Qualitative) at least four key
water sector\.
sectors of the PRS
Date achieved 06/03/2004 12/31/2004 12/31/2010
Comments Partially achieved\. Teacher allocation post audit was conducted and results
(incl\. % disseminated\. Broad support was given to the decentralization of the water
achievement) sector\.
(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)
Original Target Actual Value
Formally
Values (from Achieved at
Indicator Baseline Value Revised
approval Completion or
Target Values
documents) Target Years
Component 1: Percentage of foreign assistance channeled through sector-wide
Indicator 1 :
programs (SWAPs) according to PRS priorities\.
Value
No target value
(quantitative No baseline\. Not measurable\.
established\.
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 06/03/2004 12/31/2004 12/31/2010
Comments
(incl\. %
achievement)
Component 1: Number of progress reports and Poverty and Social Impact
Indicator 2 :
Analysis (PSIAs) produced using the PRS Evaluation & Monitoring system
4 progress reports 11 progress reports
Value 1 progress report and 1
and 6 Poverty and and 5 Poverty and
(quantitative Poverty and Social
Social Impact Social Impact
or Qualitative) Impact Analysis (PSIAs)
Analysis (PSIAs) Analysis (PSIAs)
Date achieved 06/03/2004 12/31/2004 10/30/2007
Comments
(incl\. % Achieved (at mid-term review)\.
achievement)
v
Component 1: Number of social audit programs conducted at the community
Indicator 3 :
level
Value
47 social audits at
(quantitative Not established\. 9 pilots
community level
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 06/03/2004 12/31/2004 10/30/2007
Comments
(incl\. % Achieved (at mid-term review)\. However, contribution from project is unclear\.
achievement)
Component 2: Number of staff positions reduced in the Central Government as a
Indicator 4 :
result of reengineering processes\.
Value
6,191 positions Positions have
(quantitative 1,513 positions reduced
reduced increased\.
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 06/03/2004 12/31/2004 12/31/2010
Comments
(incl\. % Not achieved\. Reengineering process did not take place\.
achievement)
Component 2: Number of civil servants recruited through competitive processes
Indicator 5 :
or confirmed under the new Civil Service legislation\.
Value
(quantitative N/A 3,150 Not measurable\.
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 06/03/2004 12/31/2004 12/31/2010
Comments
(incl\. % Not achieved\. New civil service law was not approved\.
achievement)
Component 2: Development of modules and coverage of upgraded web-based
Indicator 6 :
SIAFI
Budget, Treasury,
and Accounting
modules operating
in both Central and Budget, Treasury,
Decentralized Accounting, HR,
Value
Agencies; and Asset
(quantitative N/A
Procurement, HR, Management
or Qualitative)
and Asset operating at the
Management central government
modules operating
in the Central
Government\.
Date achieved 06/03/2004 12/31/2004 12/31/2010
Comments Partially achieved\. The modules are operating in the central government only; the
(incl\. % procurement module has been developed by ONCAE and not yet fully
achievement) functional\.
Component 2: Percentage of public expenditure managed through a Single
Indicator 7 :
Treasury Account
Value 90% of Public 100% of central
N/A
(quantitative Expenditure government
vi
or Qualitative) expenditure\.
Date achieved 06/03/2004 12/31/2004 12/31/2010
Comments
(incl\. % Partially achieved\.
achievement)
Component 2: Percentage of operational Internal Audit Units in the Central
Indicator 8 :
Government under regulations established by the TSC
Value
(quantitative 10% 100% 100%
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 06/03/2004 12/31/2004 12/31/2010
Comments
(incl\. % Achieved\.
achievement)
Component 3: Number of new public telephone lines available as a result of
Indicator 9 :
Telecommunications Sector Reform
Value 387,314 land lines 669,541 land lines
100,000 additional
(quantitative 70,201 mobile phone 8,807,272 mobile
new lines
or Qualitative) lines phone lines
Date achieved 06/03/2004 12/31/2004 12/31/2010
Comments
Achieved\. More than 8 million additional phone lines, but without direct
(incl\. %
contribution of the project\.
achievement)
Indicator 10 : Increase percentage of average ship loading/unloading turn-around in ports
Value
2,268 ships 2,162 ships
(quantitative 40% increase
592,460 TEUs 484,148 TEUs
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 06/03/2004 12/31/2004 12/31/2010
Comments Not Achieved\. Both the total number of ships, as well as the TEU decreased
(incl\. % slightly\. (TEU = twenty-foot equivalent unit, measure used for capacity in
achievement) container transportation)
Indicator 11 : Component 3: Increase coverage of rural electrification\.
Rural coverage: not
Value
Rural coverage 39\.35% available
(quantitative 30% increase
Total coverage: 64\.64% Total coverage:
or Qualitative)
81\.27%
Date achieved 06/03/2004 12/31/2004 12/31/2010
Comments
Not completely measurable\. Data on rural coverage was not available\.
(incl\. %
(www\.enee\.gob\.hn)
achievement)
Indicator 12 : Total number of teacher posts audited\.
Value
22,000 posts
(quantitative N/A 19,168 posts
audited
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 06/03/2004 12/31/2004 10/30/2007
Comments
Achieved\. 19,168 posts were audited at time of mid-term review and results
(incl\. %
published in the PETS report in November 2010\.
achievement)
vii
G\. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
Actual
Date ISR
No\. DO IP Disbursements
Archived
(USD millions)
1 12/10/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0\.00
2 04/23/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0\.00
3 11/11/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0\.75
4 07/14/2006 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1\.61
5 12/27/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2\.20
6 06/25/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 3\.06
7 12/21/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 3\.92
8 04/22/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4\.59
9 10/17/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5\.01
10 04/03/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5\.86
11 04/23/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5\.86
12 07/24/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 6\.61
13 04/23/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 7\.55
14 05/05/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 7\.55
15 01/13/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 8\.28
H\. Restructuring (if any)
ISR Ratings at Amount
Board Restructuring Disbursed at
Restructuring Reason for Restructuring &
Approved Restructuring
Date(s) Key Changes Made
PDO Change DO IP in USD
millions
Extension of closing date of one
01/31/2008 MS MS 4\.17 year due to delays in project
effectiveness\.
Extension of project closing
04/24/2009 N S S 5\.86 date, due to slow
implementation\.
Unilateral extension due to
12/08/2009 N S S 7\.39 pause of Bank operations in
Honduras
Extension of project closing
date, to complete project
02/19/2010 N S S 7\.55
activities interrupted by political
crisis\.
viii
I\. Disbursement Profile
ix
1\. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design
1\.1 Context at Appraisal
1\. Honduras has historically been one of the poorest countries in Latin America\. At
time of appraisal, the country had a population of about 7 million people, and an annual
per capita income estimated at US$920; an estimated 63 percent of the population lived
below the poverty line, most of them in rural areas\. The countryâs record of poor
economic growth, recurrent macroeconomic imbalances, vulnerability to natural disasters,
and a decade-long legacy of periodic fiscal mismanagement were key factors contributing
to Hondurasâ high poverty rate and weak social indicators\. The country initiated a series
of ambitious economic and structural reform programs throughout the 1990s to stabilize
the economy, promote faster economic growth, and improve social conditions\.
2\. In October 1998, Hurricane Mitch caused major damage, and defeated much of
the countryâs development progress from the past decade\. Following this natural disaster,
the Government presented the Plan for National Reconstruction and Transformation,
aimed at long-term sustainable poverty reduction and economic recovery\. In this context,
the Government prepared a Poverty Reduction Strategy, also a requirement to qualify for
the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Debt Relief Initiative (HIPC), and presented a
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) (Report No\. 22661-HO), to the IMFâs and
World Bankâs Board of Executive Directors in June and July 2001, respectively, and an
associated first Progress Report (Report No\. 27648-HO) in February 2004\.
3\. The main objective of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) was to reduce
poverty by 24 percent over the period 2001-15 by meeting the Millennium Development
Goals\. The strategy was founded on six pillars: (i) accelerating equitable and sustainable
growth to levels consistent with income poverty reduction targets, (ii) reducing rural
poverty, (iii) reducing urban poverty, (iv) enhancing investment in human capital, (v)
strengthening social protection for vulnerable groups, and (vi) ensuring the strategyâs
sustainability through governance and institutional reforms and enhanced environmental
sustainability\.
4\. Despite the presence of a coherent and focused strategy and Government
commitment to the reforms proposed in the PRSP, initial implementation made little
advancements\. The two main challenges to assure effective implementation of the PRS
arose from shortcomings in the operationalization of the strategy and the public sectorâs
weak institutional capacity to implement the necessary reforms\.
5\. The Honduras Country Assistance Strategy 2003-2006 (Report No\. 25873-HO),
was based on the objectives and priorities expressed in the PRSP\. The Bankâs strategy
explicitly contemplated a technical assistance project to support PRS implementation,
acknowledging the shortcomings in PRS operationalization and weak institutional
capacity\. These weaknesses were also identified in the 2004 Country Financial
Accountability Assessment â CFAA (Report No\. 28418-HO) and the 2004 Country
Procurement Assessment Report - CPAR (Report No\. 32791-HO)\. The Poverty Reduction
Support Technical Assistance Project (PRSTAC) (P083851, approved on July 24, 2004),
1
evaluated in this ICR, followed the purpose to assist Honduras in moving forward with its
PRS by strengthening the public sectorâs institutional capacity with the final goal to
alleviate poverty and meet the Millennium Development Goals\. Giving support to a
number of promising reform initiatives initiated by the Maduro Administration, Bank
support was concentrated through a series of programmatic PRSCs, complemented by the
PRSTAC, which was specifically designed to implement the measures under the PRSCs
and with the final objective to meet the PRS targets\. Although linking the project results
directly to the PRS posed many risks, the Bank took advantage of this window of
opportunity to support potentially far-reaching reforms\. As support areas were expected
to change during the implementation of the PRSCs, the PRSTAC design consequently
reflected those expectations through a broad project development objective\.
6\. Previous to the PRSTAC and the PRSCs, the World Bank had supported the
reform program through a series of Public Sector Modernization Projects, which aimed at
restoring fiscal sustainability and increasing private sector participation in the provision
of public goods\. The PRSTAC followed and built on progress achieved under the
Economic and Financial Management Project (EFMTAC) (P060785), which was
approved on September 12, 2000 and closed on September 30, 2006\.
1\.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators
7\. The objective of PRSTAC as stated in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD)
was to assist the Government of Honduras in improving its institutional capacity in the
areas of planning, participatory monitoring, public expenditure management,
accountability, public administration, and public service delivery thereby facilitating
implementation of the PRS\.
8\. The key outcome indicators of the PDO were aligned with the Governmentâs PRS
and described in detail in the Results Framework (Annex 3 of the PAD) as followed:
(i) Enhanced capacity to monitor and improve the Poverty Reduction Strategy in a
participatory manner, in order to use it as an effective instrument to align public
sector resources
(ii) Creation of a more qualified and streamlined public sector and administrative
career path under implementation in the Central Government
(iii) Competent fiscal and financial management institutions promoting efficient and
transparent use of public resources with credible and independent accountability
systems in place
(iv) Timely and effective public services delivery in key sectors of the PRS
2
1\.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators,
and reasons/justification
9\. The PDO and key indicators remained unchanged during the project\. However,
during the mid-term review, the Government and the Bank agreed to the adaption of
activities under Component 2\. As a consequence, one indicator under Component 2 was
not achievable, as it directly referred to the passing of the new Civil Service Law\. The
change is a result of an agreement between the Bank and the Government to approve a
Regulatory Decree instead of passing a new law\. In addition, due to the lack of fiscal
space, the Bank agreed in 2006 to drop the target for public expenditure allocated to
poverty reduction programs\.
1\.4 Main Beneficiaries
10\. The PAD does not identify specific project beneficiaries\. However, based on
characteristics of the project, the main direct beneficiaries are central government staff
and citizens\. Hereby, citizens would benefit from (i) improved poverty reduction
programs, (ii) enhanced public service delivery, (iii) more transparency in the allocation
of public funds, and (iv) better investment climate\. Government staff would benefit from
gaining additional skills through training, and improved working conditions\.
1\.5 Original Components
11\. The total amount of the project was US$12\.85 million, which were financed by an
IDA credit (US$8 million), with co-financing from the Government of Sweden (US$3\.8
million) through the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA),
the Government of the United Kingdom (US$0\.3 million) through the UK Department
for International Development (DFID), and a counterpart financing from the Government
of Honduras in the amount of US$0\.8 million\. The distribution of financing sources by
component is shown in the table below\.
Cost Financing
Component
(US$ thousands) Source
1\. Develop the Institutional Capacity to manage, 800\.5 IDA credit
monitor, evaluate and improve PRS implementation 300\.0 Co-financing
2\. Improve the implementation of public sector 1,864\.7 IDA credit
management 3,100\.0 Co-financing
3\. Support for sectoral activities within the framework 4,734\.8 IDA credit
of the PRS 500\.0 Co-financing
600\.0 IDA credit
4\. Project Management
150\.0 Co-financing
Counterpart Contribution 800\.0 Counterpart
Total Project Cost 12,850\.0
3
Project Component 1: Develop the Capacity to Manage, Monitor, Evaluate and
Improve PRS Implementation\.
12\. The objective of this component was to strengthen the Governmentâs capacity to
monitor, evaluate, and open the process of consultation for the PRSP and subsequent
progress reports\. The following sub-components were supported by this operation:
ï Sub-Component 1\.1: Develop UNATâs Analytical Capacity\. This sub-component
was to strengthen UNATâs (Unidad de Apoyo Técnico) capacity to analyze and
disseminate the results of public programs associated with the Governmentâs poverty
reduction strategy\. Activities included: (i) the recruitment of specialized staff for
UNAT; (ii) the carrying-out of impact analyses and assessments of PRS-related
programs; and (iii) the dissemination of such studies\.
ï Sub-Component 1\.2: Strengthen the Governmentâs Capacity to Coordinate Foreign
Assistance\. Government and stakeholders were committed to the creation and
implementation of sector programs SWAps around PRS priorities\. Activities
included: (i) the design and implementation of SWAps in selected sectors; and (ii) the
development and dissemination of adequate guidelines on SWAps\.
ï Sub-Component 1\.3: Enhance the PRS Consultative Process\. This sub-component
systematized the PRSP participatory process through regular consultations with
communities to identify priorities, complemented by stakeholder involvement in
designing and implementing the Strategyâs programs\. Activities under this sub-
component were geared to strengthen work undertaken by the PRS Consultative
Council (CCERP) in PSR monitoring and evaluation\.
Project Component 2: Improve the Implementation of Public Sector Management\.
13\. The objective of this component was to support the implementation of the new
Civil Service legislation, thereby ensuring a more equitable working environment with
better performance incentives and improved quality of civil servants\. It also strengthened
the Governmentâs budgetary, financial, and fiduciary management to produce a more
accurate, timely, relevant, and transparent public sector\. The following sub-components
were supported by this operation:
ï Sub-Component 2\.1: Implement the New Civil Service Law and Continue with
Efforts to Reengineer the Public Sector\. This sub-component would help the
Government implement a new Civil Service Law being discussed\. This legislation
included renewed provisions for the establishment of transparent and less politically
influenced procedures for hiring, evaluation, and dismissal of public servants\.
Activities under this sub-component included: (i) the expansion of the Human
Resource Management System (SIARH) and its integration with SIAFI; (ii) the
conceptualization of the structure and functions of the new Civil Service Regulatory
Office and equipping the latter for its day-to-day operations; (iii) training of civil
servants in topics related to HR management; (iv) carrying out of studies on the fiscal
impact of the redefined wage policy and a strategy to ensure its fiscal sustainability;
(v) support to Government efforts to reengineer the public administration in a number
of additional public entities; and (vi) the contracting of a specialized firm to conduct
4
independent personnel evaluation activities in pilot agencies and to develop the
capacity of those entities to apply the new HR policies regarding posts classifications,
recruitment and selection, performance evaluations, and professional development\.
ï Sub-Component 2\.2: Upgrading and expanding the Capacity of SIAFI\. This sub-
component helped to develop a set of norms, methodologies, and computer-based
systems to allow the Government to prepare an effective and transparent budget
compatible with the PRS\. Activities under this sub-component included: (i)
acquisition of software, communications and computer equipment, and data links and
licenses to use servers for the upgrading and expansion of web based e-SIAFI, as well
as preparation of an âe-SIAFI users manualâ?; and (ii) a review of the Central
Governmentâs financial accounts\.
ï Sub-Component 2\.3: Strengthening the Institutional Capacity to Ensure
Accountability through Internal and External Control\. This sub-component was
geared to assist the Supreme Audit Institution (Tribunal Superior de Cuentas - TSC)
to establish stronger financial controls, thereby instituting greater transparency in
public financial management\. Activities under this sub-component included: (i)
training of personnel of internal control units from all public sector entities in various
skills related to new regulations and control abilities; and (ii) the acquisition of
equipment (such as computers and communications) for each area of the TSC\.
Project Component 3: Support for Sectoral Activities within the Framework of the PRS
14\. The objective of this component was to support sectoral activities that require
technical assistance to fulfill the actions and conditions specified in the PRSC (three year
program)\. In this context, technical assistance was to be provided to specific sectors
identified by a Project Steering Committee during Project implementation\. To begin, the
following activities in the areas of public infrastructure and service provision were
identified in principle as activities to be supported, but were pending ratification by the
Steering Committee:
ï For the telecommunications sector, financial and legal advisors were to be hired to
assist the Government in restructuring and modernizing HONDUTEL\. These advisors,
together with other consultants, were to help the Government of Honduras to prepare
new telecommunications legislation and to strengthen the newly established
telecommunications coordinating unit\.
ï For the power sector, consultants were to be hired to assist the Government in
improving the efficiency of the national electricity enterprise (Empresa Nacional de
EnergÃa Eléctrica - ENEE) including its restructuring\. Other activities in this sector
that could be supported by the fund included: the design of institutional and
regulatory reforms necessary to improve the performance of the sector; a
comprehensive study of power tariffs, as well as of various regulatory aspects of the
power sector, and of mechanisms to stimulate private sector participation\. Activities
could also be undertaken to strengthen the National Commission of Energy (the entity
in charge of regulating this sector)\. Finally, technical assistance was to be provided to
identify and implement viable approaches for providing modern energy services to
consumers in rural and semi-urban areas\.
5
ï For the ports sector, activities included technical assistance geared to help the
Government restructure the National Ports Company\. In addition, consultants were to
be hired to strengthen the organizational capacity of the regulatory entity in line with
the new Ley General de Puertos, and supporting efforts of attracting private
investment for other ports\.
ï For the water sector, activities included supporting the National Planning Board for
Water and Sanitation (CONASA) as well as strengthening the Water Sector Regulator
for Water and Sanitation (ERSAPS)\. To support CONASA, a technical manager, a
planning expert, a decentralization expert, an economist, and an information systems
specialist were to be contracted\. In ERSAPS, an economist, two engineers, and a
lawyer were to be contracted\. Other activities in this sector that could be supported
included: support for an information campaign aimed at the general public, NGOs,
Municipalities and Government in general on the reforms introduced by the 2003
Water Law\. Finally, the project was to provide technical equipment (computers and
software) to allow both agencies to operate efficiently\.
ï For the environmental sector, consultants were to be hired to improve the quality and
accuracy of information\. Using this improved data, consultants were to review the
sectorâs policies and regulatory framework\. Other activities in this sector that could
be supported included: workshops to strengthen capacity to conduct environmental
risk assessments, and a comprehensive diagnosis of key areas to determine necessary
institutional reforms in the sector\.
ï For the social sectors, consultants were to be hired to produce a feasibility study to
expand the role of local education development associations with special attention to
basic infrastructure, transportation networks, and health; and a comprehensive teacher
allocation post review (auditorÃa de puestos) was to be carried out in the departments
of Francisco Morazán and Cortés\. Teacher allocation post review could later be
extended to cover other departments\.
15\. A Steering Committee was responsible for identifying and approving sectoral
activities within the context of the PRSC that were supported under this sub-component\.
Detailed procedures governing the identification and approval of sectoral activities were
outlined in the project Operational Manual\.
Project Component 4: Manage PRSTAC Implementation
16\. This component financed the provision of technical assistance, equipment,
training and operating costs, as necessary, to establish, operate and strengthen the Project
Coordination Unit and Project Execution Units to enable these units to effectively
coordinate, monitor and evaluate (including periodic audits) the implementation of the
project activities\.
1\.6 Revised Components
17\. The components were not formally revised during project implementation\.
However, as mentioned in section 1\.3, activities of Component 2 were adapted to reflect
the Government decision to approve a Regulatory Decree instead of passing a new Civil
6
Service Law as initially laid out in the PAD\. In 2009, as part of donor cooperation and
joint preparation of a follow-up operation, a sub-component under Component 2 was
added to support the Oficina Normativa de Contratación y Adquisiciones del Estado
(ONCAE)\. The objectives of this sub-component were (i) to set-up a national
procurement platform, (ii) to implement a regulatory framework on public procurement,
and (iii) to conduct training on the framework and the preparation of procurement plans\.
These incorporations were not formally processed through an amendment of the credit
agreement, but agreed upon in a number of aide memoires\.
1\.7 Other significant changes
18\. There were a number of significant changes during the project:
ï Additional Trust Funds\. In 2008, additional funds (TF091447) in the amount of
US$4\.63 million for the professionalization of the civil service and the
implementation of SINACORP were received from the Government of Sweden\.
Furthermore, the Government of Japan granted funds (TF056792) in the amount of
US$471,000 to strengthen the assistance for capacity building in Honduras\. This
grant was executed by the Ministry of Finance\.
ï Changes in implementation arrangement\. In April 2010, as a result of organizational
changes by the new administration, a new project implementation unit (PIU) at the
Secretary of the Presidency, the Unidad Administradora de Proyectos de la
SecretarÃa del Estado en el Despacho Presidencial (UAP-SDP) and a new technical
assistance unit Unidad de Apoyo Técnico Presidencial (UATP) were established\. The
UAP-SDP assumed the implementation responsibilities formerly carried out by the
Comisión Presidencial de Modernización del Estado (CPME), and the UATP
assumed the responsibilities of the former Unidad de Apoyo Técnico (UNAT)\. Key
personnel for the implementation of the project remained the same despite this change\.
ï Extensions of the credit and the associated TFs\. The closing date of the credit was
extended four times\. The first two extensions mainly reflected the one-year delay in
effectiveness and slow progress in implementation\. In December 2009, as a
consequence of paused operations in the country, the Bank approved a 2-months
unilateral extension\. With the new Government in place in January 2010, the fourth
extension provided the time needed to complete remaining implementation activities\.
The closing dates of the TFs, in accordance with the donors and the Bank, were
adjusted accordingly\.
ï Reallocation of funds\. In 2008 and 2009, funds were reallocated among expenditure
categories, in particular to increase funds for consultant and communication services,
and to finance the additional sub-component on ONCAE\.
ï Changes in Bankâs monitoring and results framework\. During the projectâs life time,
the Bankâs operational procedures and focus on results underwent several changes
and the design and use of indicators became more sophisticated and integral to
reporting on development effectiveness\. Most notably are the changes in the
implementation summary and results reporting (ISR) that are filed twice-a-year to
inform management of progress in Bank-supported operations\. Initially, the report
7
format in 2004 did not require reporting on results indicators\. The following format,
starting in 2005, required reporting of at least one outcome-level and one intermediate
level indicator\. Since 2010, the ISR measures all indicators described in the PAD, and
puts emphasis on distinguishing outcome level and intermediate outcome level
indicators\. Hence, the Project is being evaluated at closing under a different logic
than the one applicable during its design\. The resulting inconsistency of reporting
during the projectâs lifetime makes the evaluation of the achievement of its results
indicators more challenging\.
2\. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2\.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry
19\. The quality at entry was moderately satisfactory\. Objectives responded to the
Government priorities in the implementation of the PRS, as laid out in the PRSP and the
First PRSP Annual Progress Report 2004\. The PRSTAC did not only support the
Government in the implementation of the PRS, which was a condition for the HIPC debt
relief initiative; it also served as a framework for the general modernization process of
the country\.
20\. The project design reflected the objectives of the 2003 CAS which were based on
supporting the implementation of the PRS process\. The CAS explicitly contemplated a
PRSTAC as a cross-cutting support vehicle for the policy-based PRS Credits, with the
objective to consolidate reforms in the education sector, assisting the Government to
address civil service reform issues, improving public resource management and
increasing transparency and promoting greater civil society participation in the
formulation, implementation and monitoring of the poverty reduction strategy\. The
project furthermore drew on recommendations from the CFAA 2004 and the CPAR 2004
and built upon the previous EFMTAC, integrating lessons learned and continuing most of
the reforms initiated under this project\.
21\. As continuation of the EFMTAC project and technical assistance for the planned
PRSCs, the project enjoyed strong Government commitment and could count on an
existing implementation structure\. Two external donors (Sweden and the UK) provided
co-financing, not only adding financial resources and flexibility, but also contributing to
donor alignment and dialogue\. The components were in line with the development
objectives, and in particular to support the countryâs PRS process\. However, the
corresponding indicators were not as flexible and measured specific outcomes; for some
of the indicators a baseline or even a target value was not established\. Furthermore, the
delay in project implementation, mainly caused by deficiencies in sequencing the closing
of EFMTAC and initiation of the PRSTAC, suggest shortcomings in implementation
readiness at entry\.
22\. The Project´s objective as defined in the project appraisal document was too
broad and overambitious for a project of its nature; for the reasons discussed above, the
objectives reflected more the desired outcomes of the PRS process than those that could
be reasonably achieved through the PRSTAC\. However, such broad and ambitious
objectives provided the Bank enough flexibility to adapt and respond to changing
8
circumstances throughout project duration\. As a result the PRSTAC was converted into
the main vehicle of dialogue between the Bank and the Government, not only in public
sector modernization issues but also in relation to sectoral activities\. At the same time, by
responding to the evolving operation environment the project switched its focus;
activities were adjusted in several components making it difficult to monitor the
achievement of indicators and to adequately evaluate the project outcomes\.
23\. The potential risks in meeting the development objectives were correctly
identified and corresponding mitigation measures put into place\. The political context
was relatively stable during project preparation, and although the risk of change of
administration with the resulting change of direction and lack of ownership of the
reforms proposed by the project was flagged, the risks of it actually happening were
considered to be low\. This suggests that the initial risk rating of âmoderateâ? was mainly
based on the probability of the risk materializing, but did not consider its impact in case it
did materialize\. From the ex-post perspective of this evaluation, the risks should have
been rated higher and the proposed mitigation measures integrated more effectively into
the project to enable the team to react to the materialization of those risks\. Hence, future
projects should carefully assess the likelihood and the impact of potential risks especially
taking into consideration the political environment\.
2\.2 Implementation
24\. The project became effective nine months after Board approval and then started
off slowly, because remaining funds under the EFMTAC were used to complete activities,
and the set-up of the multi-donor trust fund was delayed\. Yet, activities accompanying
the reforms under the first PRSC were initiated\.
25\. Another setback was the 2005 presidential elections that resulted in the change of
the administration and, consequently, of policy priorities\. While the Government of
President Zelaya (2006-2009) initially was committed to continuing the PRS process,
policy priorities gradually moved away from the PRS agenda\. Country dialogue and the
continuation of the Bank´s involvement in the country was challenged by the significant
changes brought on by the new government and by the favorable macroeconomic
environment Honduras enjoyed during the first years of the Zelaya administration\.
During this period, and given the reversal of many critical aspects of the PRS, the PRSC
operations were interrupted while the implementation of the PRSTAC was continued as a
means to maintaining the dialogue in areas of coinciding interest but with lesser
possibilities to support big policy changes (i\.e\. the civil service law or specific sector
reforms)\.
26\. As noted in the CAS Progress Report (Report No\. 42344-HN, May 8, 2008),
progress had been made in some areas, but favorable macroeconomic conditions and
delays in the completion of measures related to key structural reforms led to the dropping
of the PRSC operations scheduled for FY08 and FY09\.
27\. These developments undermined several of the objectives originally supported
under the PRSC/PRSTAC, notably in the area of civil service reform\. Support provided
under the PRSTAC was adjusted, with the result that several important reform measures
9
were eventually carried out with PRSTAC support, even though the PRSC series did not
progress beyond the first loan\.
28\. The mid-term review conducted in November 2007 recognized these changes, and
it was agreed with the Government to re-allocate funds and to extend the project closing
date\. In 2008, a Learning QAG report underlined implementation issues and
recommended maintaining a close and intensive supervision and dialogue with the
government and other stakeholders\. These actions then showed positive impact as
consensus with the government on activities was reached and improved implementation
led to rising disbursement rates during 2009\.
29\. The removal of President Zelaya from power, followed by a 6-month pause of
Bank operations in the country, interrupted all operations\. Its resumption by the newly
elected Government under President Lobo presented further challenges with an
institutional and political framework weakened by the global financial crisis\. Yet, the
PRSTAC kept its relevance and was the vehicle to facilitate re-engagement in the country
policy dialogue\. Project implementation, however, progressed slowly and concentrated
on a few new policy priorities\. Additionally, institutional changes, including the creation
of a new implementation unit, the loss of key personnel in PIUs, and of institutional
memory, further delayed project processes\.
30\. In sum, a project that was originally intended to accompany implementation of
the PRS as only one of several instruments in the Bank program served as one of the
most effective means to keep policy dialogue open with the authorities in moments of
dramatic changes in the country context and facilitated the reengagement process
following the political crisis in 2009\. Although it is true that original objectives were
different from what was accomplished, it is also fair to provide a critical account of the
situation and explicitly recognize the value of these unintended outcomes of the project,
and the fact that it became one of the few operations the government requested to be
extended through a follow-up operation\.
31\. Implementation arrangements were an issue throughout the entire project\. The
presence of four executing agencies demanded a major effort in organization and
technical assistance from the implementing agency and the Bank team\. These complex
institutional arrangements resulted in delays, lack of coordination and administrative
bottlenecks\. Attempts to centralize communications with the Bank resulted in a big
backlog in the implementing agency, which was later reversed, but due to a high
workload in the implementing agency could never fully be resolved\.
32\. The fact that the project was never formally restructured drastically reduced the
possibilities of achieving the PDO and indicators, and made it difficult to adequately
record progress made through modified activities\. Restructuring the project would have
had allowed to adapt the PDO and indicators to reflect changing circumstances and to
measure and assess the new activities\. There have been important advances and
achievements attributable to the project that have not been properly reflected by the
original indicators, such as, the progress made in the public procurement system and
achievements of the Supreme Audit Institution, including the audit of teacher positions\.
10
However, when formal restructuring was being considered, the project was near its
closing date, which could have undermined the value-added of the restructuring\.
2\.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization
33\. The M&E of the project is rated unsatisfactory, mainly because monitoring and
evaluation arrangements as agreed in the PAD were not put into practice and baseline and
end-of-project targets were not established\.
34\. The Results Framework distinguished between four outcome indicators to
measure the PDO, one intermediate result indicator per component (two in the case for
component 2), and three to four result indicators for each component\. The 16 result
indicators were generally closely linked to their respective component, sub-components
and activities\. This did not reflect the otherwise rather broad description of the
components and activities\. Furthermore, more than half of the indicators had no baseline
at project appraisal; one indicator had no yearly and end target\.
35\. Monitoring was also challenging as the ISR format on indicators changed several
times during project implementation\. The earliest format did not report on indicators at
all\. The second format, starting in 2005, reported on four indicators: one âoverallâ?
indicator (taken from one of the indicators measuring the PDO achievement) and three
intermediate outcome indicators\. Out of these three intermediate outcome indicators
chosen to be tracked in the ISR, only one was in the set of indicators measuring the PDO
outcome as described in the PAD\. The other two were among the results indicators\. In
2009, the original PDO indicator was added to the ISR, but could not be measured, as it
depended on four only partially tracked indicators\. The final ISR (archived on January 13,
2011) was prepared with the newest ISR structure, which includes all indicators as
described in the PAD, and noted the PDO as moderately satisfactory accordingly\.
36\. Consequently, during most of the project implementation, only four of 16 results
indicators were monitored with the ISR\. With changes in government priorities and
adjustments of the projectâs activities, the relevance of indicators decreased: one indicator
became obsolete, and two indicators could only be measured once, as the basis or data
source changed or became irrelevant\. Only one indicator could successfully be measured
throughout implementation\.
37\. During the mid-term review in 2007, the Bank team undertook the effort of
establishing missing baseline data and to collect data on the current status of all 16
indicators, even though many of them had become irrelevant for the project, or their
achievements could not be attributed to the project\. Neither the failure on measuring the
existing indicators, nor the absence of indicators that could actually measure project
progress brought up the need to formally restructure the project at that time to improve
the M&E framework and align it with the changed priorities and changed project
activities\.
11
38\. The Bank team instead concentrated and channeled its M&E efforts through ISRs,
aide memoires and the mid-term review, where it properly reported on project progress,
reorientation and issues\.
2\.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance
39\. As a category C project, there were no safeguards issues in the PRSTAC\.
40\. The FM performance of the project was either âModerately Satisfactoryâ? or
âSatisfactoryâ? throughout most of the project life, up to 2009 when the rating was
downgraded to âModerately Unsatisfactoryâ?, which was maintained up to the closing of
the project\. The reasons for the downgrade were related to: (i) non conciliated differences
in the balances of the different designated accounts (credit and associated TFs), (ii)
transfers of funds between the IDA credit and other sources of funds (the co-financed TFs
and counterpart funding), (iii) delays in the presentation of audit reports and Financial
Management Reports and (iv) internal control issues\. Except for the first audit report (FY
2005) and the final audit report, audit opinions throughout the project were qualified due
to the above-mentioned reasons\.
41\. Due to the high turnover of FM staff in addition to the institutional changes in the
Implementation Agency (with the elimination of the CPME and the creation of the UAP),
the follow-up of the FM issues was delayed\. The auditors confirmed in the final report
that no significant FM issues remained at project closing\.
42\. The procurement under the project is rated Moderately Satisfactory\. Throughout
the project, the preparation of the Annual Operation and Procurement Plans was delayed\.
The selection of individual consultants did not always involve procurement staff, and
consultant contracts used varied by institutions; furthermore, some did not include
clauses on fraud and corruption, and conflict of interest\. Insufficiencies were also present
in the conduct of shopping processes, and the use of Honducompras to publish
procurement processes\.
2\.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
43\. Advances made in the modernization of the Honduran public sector will be
continued and consolidated under the US$15 million follow-up operation Improving
Public Sector Performance Project â IPSP (P110050), scheduled to be presented to the
Board jointly with the new Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) and the first operation in
a series of Development Programmatic Credits in FY12\.
44\. The IPSP project is part of a coordinated public sector program among the
German Development Cooperation KfW, Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
and World Bank\. While the IADB operation Honduras Fiscal and Municipal
Management Consolidation Program was approved in October 2008 and started
implementation in 2010, the IPSP project is intended to be implemented in parallel with a
12
â¬10 million KfW operation, which will focus on activities with the Supreme Audit
Institution\.
45\. The IPSP intends to continue the reform efforts made under the PRSTAC in the
areas of financial management systems and monitoring of public policies\. A strong focus
of the project will be on the public procurement system and the operationalization of the
Honducompras platform\. The IPSP will further give technical assistance in areas
supported by the First Programmatic Development Policy Credit (P127331) in the area
of human resources management\.
46\. The project design will incorporate the lessons learned under the PRSTAC, which
will be reflected through a simpler project design, realistic and achievable objectives, and
in institutional arrangements adjusted to the countryâs circumstances (see table below)\.
Lesson learned from PRSTAC Integration into IPSP
Relative to project design
ï Public sector performance improvement as an
overarching topic with limited but interrelated
components
Keep project design simple and
ï Clearly defined objectives and indicators
goals realistic
ï Monitoring based on easily collectible data with
baseline values determined upfront
ïï Reduced number of agencies involved in the project
implementation
ïï Introduction of a Project Coordinator, exclusively
Simple but well structured
dedicated to the Project
implementation arrangements
ï Introduction of transition arrangements to avoid loss
of institutional memory and ensure uninterrupted
implementation
Relative to project implementationï
ïï Use of easily accessible, collectible or existing data
for indicators
ïï Integrate section on indicators in Aide Memoires to
Adjust implementation share and be transparent on advancement with
arrangements to country-specific counterparts
circumstances ï Enhanced communication arrangements among
participating agencies (to be defined in the
operational manual, e\.g\. regular meetings, sharing of
reports, etc)
3\. Assessment of Outcomes
3\.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation
47\. The project objectives were mainly consistent during project implementation, and
throughout implementation the operation remained important for achieving country, Bank
and global development objectives\.
13
48\. The CAS 2007-2010 (Report No\. 37280-HN, November 30, 2006) built on the
PRS strategy, representing a continuation of the previous CAS 2003-2006, and
incorporated priorities of the Zelaya Government\. Good governance through state
modernization and civic participation represented one of the CAS pillars; transparency,
accountability and the demand for good governance were addressed as cross-cutting
issues\. However, the CAS Progress Report (Report No 42344-HN, May 8, 2008) notes
that the originally programmed PRSCs were dropped due to macroeconomic conditions
and delays in the completion of measures related to key structural reforms\.
49\. The Institutional and Governance Review (IGR) (Report No\. 53517-HO)
concluded that there is a need to strengthen the countryâs accountability framework and
to focus the policy discussion on performance\. To address weaknesses in the
implementation of public policies, it suggested adopting a new approach towards the
professionalization of the public administration in order to ensure that reforms take into
consideration the country context and become an integral part of public sector
management reforms\.
50\. The Interim Strategy Note (ISN) (Report No\. 56405-HN, September 29, 2010)
identified intensified support for efforts to improve governance and fight corruption as
one of its four basic principles\. Civil service reform and the strengthening of public
financial management and transparency form part of the support for macro stability and
growth\.
3\.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives
51\. Despite slow and interrupted implementation, change in political priorities, and
the broad and ambitious reform agenda, the project made advances towards several
project development objectives\. Even though the majority of indicators were not fully
met, progress was made in many areas and achievements from former projects were
consolidated\.
52\. As noted in the CAS Progress Report and the ISN, advances had been made in the
area of governance in Honduras, as well as in building stronger relationships with civil
society\. Other advances have been reached through the Governance and Anti-Corruption
(GAC) agenda and in fostering transparency, in particular through social audits and the
introduction of an Access to Information Law\. However, as noted in the IGR, the country
still faces a lack of transparency and information in the decision-making process, and the
organizational capacity of groups representing public interest remains weak\.
PDO 1 (Component 1): Develop government capacity to manage, monitor, evaluate
and improve PRS implementation by giving all stakeholders access to effective
mechanisms for the design and control of the governmentâs poverty reduction
programs\.
53\. Overall project activities contributed to the strengthening of the implementation
and monitoring capacity of the Central Government\. A results-based management system
was established, which tracked progress of PRS and Government goals and indicators,
and which introduced a result-oriented mind set in the public sector in Honduras\.
14
Analytical capacity was built up in earlier stages of the project through training and
technical assistance; planning methodologies and systems were developed and integrated
in administrative processes\. As a result, public expenditure allocated to poverty reduction
programs increased during project implementation\. As a result of the turnover of key staff
and the re-structuring of the implementation unit, capacity was lost, but many of the staff
that benefited from the project remain in (or have been called back to work in) the
Central Government\.
54\. Significant progress has been made in donor coordination, initiated during the
PRS process\. The preparation of strategic plans, engagement with civil society, and the
set-up of sector specific round tables has established a culture of cooperation and
communication among donors, the Government and, to certain extend, civil society\.
During, and in particular after the political crisis in Honduras, the donor community
played a crucial role in maintaining the dialogue with the country\.
55\. The dialogue with the civil society, initiated under the PRS Consultative Process,
has led to a now established participation of civil society in the areas of transparency and
anti-corruption, in particular through social audits and monitoring initiatives\.
56\. Due to the fact that during the project cycle, the PRS process lost its momentum
and, consequently, its importance in the Governmentâs development agenda, some key
indicators that depended on the PRS process were not met
PDO 2 (Component 2): Improve public sector management by ensuring a more
equitable working environment with better performance incentives and improved civil
service quality, as well as strengthening the Governmentâs fiscal, financial and
fiduciary management\.
57\. A major achievement of this component was the set-up of the integrated human
resource system (SIARH) and its linkage to SIAFI\. As a result, today several Central
Government agencies are using SIARH, facilitating automated payments of salaries and
pensions\.
58\. Steps towards strengthening the Governmentâs fiscal, financial and fiduciary
management have been achieved by upgrading SIAFI to a web-based system, and
extending its functions with modules for budget, treasury, accountancy, HR and
administration of goods\. As a result, 100 percent of the central government expenditures
are now processed using a single treasury account, constituting a significant improvement
in the financial and fiduciary management\. Further advances are needed to connect
decentralized agencies and the public procurement information platform (Honducompras)
to the SIAFI\.
59\. The Integrated National Control System for Public Resources (SINACORP)
substantially contributed to the strengthening of the management of public resources\.
Implemented by the Supreme Audit Institution (TSC) it supports the countryâs external
audit function\. The internal control function has been enhanced through the set-up of a
National Office for the Development of Internal Control in Public Institutions
(ONADICI)\. The TSC managed to link the follow-up of social monitoring outcomes into
15
its processes, to establish guiding frameworks and manuals for internal and external
control and audit, and to train over 2000 public servants\. It is also worth mentioning that
the TSC conducted the audit of the teacher posts\.
60\. The improvement of the public sector management and the civil service was
mainly dependent on the passing of the new civil service law\. But due to lack of political
consensus the law was never presented to Congress; instead, a bylaw on
professionalization of the civil service was passed\. Revisions of nearly all public servant
positions and the definition of strategically important positions throughout all secretaries
of the Government, follow-up activities and implementation were never undertaken\. As a
result, the envisioned re-engineering process of the public service, the reduction of
Central Government staff and the recruitment through a merit-based system was not
achieved\. Similarly, the target to reduce government spending on salaries was not
accomplished\.
PDO 3 (Component 3): Support sector specific activities within the framework of the
PRSC for improving public service management and delivery in key economic and
social sectors\.
61\. Successful support was given to the decentralization efforts in the water sector to
the municipal level, benefiting over 50 municipalities, nine water associations, and other
stakeholders, inter alia, through situation analysis of the water and sanitation structure,
studies on water price structures and the corresponding operating costs in 15
municipalities, and training and dissemination of the water decentralization law,
administration, operation and maintenance of drainage system, and other water and
sanitation related topics\.
62\. Another successful sector support was the conduct of the teacher posts audit,
which was carried out by the TSC upon request by SEFIN\. The main finding of the audit
was that the database on teachers is incomplete, unreliable and hence not a proper and
functioning instrument for planning purposes\. âPhantomâ? teachers, duplicate posts, and
unrecorded absenteeism are rampant\. Conducting the audit required major political will
and constituted a significant effort on the part of Government\. Even further, the findings
provided a platform from which to discuss needed reforms to the sector\. The country has
initiated a policy reform dialogue in the education sector, which also involved civil
society through parentsâ associations\.
63\. Due to changed government priorities, only one of the three initially planned
PRSCs materialized; as a result this component lost its overarching policy reform
framework\. Nevertheless, efforts were undertaken to support other sector-specific lending
and technical assistance activities, which resulted in improved inter-sector dialogue\.
64\. As for the telecommunication sector, attempts to liberalize the national
telecommunication company (HONDUTEL) failed\. Notwithstanding, the tele-
communication sector is much more liberalized today (with four companies vs\. two
companies at Project appraisal, and approximately 8 million additional new telephone
lines in the country, mainly mobile phone lines)\. However, main attribution of this
achievement belongs to the advances in mobile phone technologies, and not the Project\.
16
65\. Similarly, the project gave no or minimal support to the power, ports and
environmental sectors\. While studies for the restructuring of the national electricity
enterprise (Empresa Nacional de EnergÃa Eléctrica - ENEE) and the national ports
company were conducted, no further actions were taken or significant impact was
achieved\. Consequently, ship loading/unloading was not increased\.
3\.3 Efficiency
66\. As an institutions-building and technical assistance project, computations of rates
of return are difficult to quantify\. Nevertheless, as expected in the PAD, economic and
fiscal savings resulting from project activities are likely to have occurred\. I\.e\., the
introduction of a more efficient financial management system paired with increased civil
society involvement has permitted a more transparent and efficient budget process, which
has possibly contributed to financial savings\. The improved internal and external control
through the TSC has led to greater accountability and more effective monitoring and
control of financial flows\.
67\. Several activities that were part of the PRS process are likely to have had positive
fiscal impacts during the project, but due to the discontinuation of the process these
savings were probably not maintained throughout the end\. Examples are a more efficient
alignment of resources through a monitoring system for PRS advances, and an increased
rate of return for public investments through enhanced assessment and analysis capacities\.
68\. Considering the small progress made towards the achievement of the PDOs and
the result indicators during the slow and lengthy implementation, the overall efficiency of
the project can be considered as rather low\.
3\.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
69\. The most notable achievements of the project are the upgrading of SIAFI to a
web-based system with additional modules, and the consolidation of the independent
Supreme Audit Institution; both have played a crucial role in the improvement of the
Governmentâs fiscal, financial and fiduciary management\. As well, the teacher posts
audit, and the decentralization of the water sector constitute important steps towards
sector reforms\. The country had also established a state-of-the-art results-based
management system, which tracked progress of PRS and Government goals and
indicators\. Unfortunately, this system was discontinued when the Government decided to
phase out the PRS process\.
70\. Through the discontinuation of the PRS many indicators and part of the PDO
became irrelevant, as they were directly linked to the PRS process\. The project missed an
opportunity to restructure and to reflect those changes in priorities and activities\. As a
result, the PDO was only partially achieved and indicators were not monitored and
measured\. As mentioned above, later attempts to restructure the project were deemed
impracticable and unjustified as the remaining project life was only of another year\.
17
71\. However, it must be mentioned that the projectâs relevance, even in times of
political changes and instability, remained high throughout its implementation\. The
PRSTAC became the vehicle for a continuous dialogue with the Government on its
public sector and governance reform agenda, and a flexible instrument to quickly respond
to the clientâs needs and priorities\. The request for the preparation of a follow-up
operation with mainly the same stakeholders reflects the continuous need for Bank
support in public sector modernization in Honduras\. The rating also takes into
consideration the overall rating of the PRSCs as the project has significantly contributed
to the PRS process\.
3\.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts
(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development
72\. The project contributed to the implementation of the countryâs Poverty Reduction
Strategy, in particular by strengthening planning and monitoring processes\. Furthermore,
it supported the PRS consultative process with civil society, as well as stakeholder
dissemination and consultation workshops for the OECD survey on the accomplishment
of the Paris Declaration indicators\.
(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening
73\. Institutional strengthening was a cross-cutting desired impact of this project\. The
main institutional change happened at the Supreme Audit Institution, which consolidated
its role as the national independent audit function\. However, the reliance in external
consultantsâ contributions remains an institutional challenge ahead\. Analytical and
implementation capacity was created at the central government level, at the project
implementation unit and the executing agencies\. Furthermore, public sector staff and
other stakeholders benefited from training in project-related areas, such as (i) use of the
SIAFI, (ii) internal and external control, (iii) public procurement, and (iv) water
management\. It must be noted, that high turnover of staff with the change in
administration could potentially undermine these results\.
(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)
74\. As mentioned earlier, the PRSTAC unexpectedly evolved from a small technical
assistance loan to the major vehicle for country dialogue and engagement during several
administrations and critical political circumstances\. This enabled the Bank to respond to
specific client demands and to continuously engage, even if marginally, in critical aspects
of the public sector reform agenda in Honduras\.
75\. The sector dialogue initiated under the PRSC and the PRSTAC gave the impulse
for operations in the energy (Power Sector Efficiency Enhancement Project
(PROMEF) P104034), water (Honduras Water and Sanitation Sector Modernization
Project- P103881) and the education sectors (Honduras Education Quality, Governance,
& Institutional Strengthening P101218)\.
18
76\. As noted in the CAS progress report, the approval of the Transparency Law
represented a significant advance in the governance reform agenda in Honduras\. The
Transparency and Access to Information Law came into force in January 2008, followed
by the creation of the Access to Information Institute, and the appointment of public
information officers and information offices in most public institutions\. The project
supported the GAC dialogue around the approval of the law, and gave operational
support to the IDF which contributed to finance the creation of the Access to Information
Institute\.
3\.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops
12\. No beneficiary surveys or stakeholder workshops were undertaken for the
preparation of this ICR\.
4\. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome
77\. The risk to Development Outcome is rated as Substantial as institutional capacity
remains weak and the sustainability of the achievements continue to depend on the
political will and commitment to sustain and advance governance reforms\. The follow-up
operation builds on achievements made and intends to consolidate the PRSTAC
outcomes\.
78\. The SIAFI and its related modules, including SIARH, enjoyed strong ownership
for a period of time and were well established within the public administration\. Even
throughout changing administrations, the SIAFI remained a priority\. However, the
maintenance and further development of SIAFI will depend on the availability of
continued financing and uninterrupted political support\.
79\. The continuation of the support and development of the national control system
SINACORP is restrained by dependence on external finance\. With the closing of the
PRSTAC, the TSC is working with minimum capacity and resources, and had to a
discontinue support given by specialists (mostly consultants)\. The institution will receive
further donor support and financing by the KfW, which intends to focus its involvement
in Honduras on the TSC\.
80\. Continuous the communication among the donor community will act as a
platform for constant donor coordination and aid harmonization\. It will also maintain and
further develop the coordination and implementation capacity of development programs\.
However, much of this human capital depends on external financing, and is not formally
integrated into the governmentâs capacity\.
81\. Civil society involvement and increased transparency has started to anchor in
society and the government, and informed, conscious and organized civil society groups
are continuing advances in social monitoring and civil participation\. However, there is an
increasing risk that these civil society groups are being captured by power groups to
advance their political agendas\.
19
5\. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance
5\.1 Bank Performance
(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
82\. The Bank, together with the donor community, strongly supported Hondurasâ
PRS process and its public sector modernization agenda\. The PRSTAC together with a
series of PRSCs were designed to support the countryâs PRSP and its implementation
process, in particular in the technical aspects of control mechanisms, monitoring,
implementation, and analytical capacity, and the involvement of civil participation in the
PRS process\. Reform was supported not only in the public administration, but also to
important public service sectors, such as water and sanitation, electricity and education\.
Analytical work, such as the CFAA and the CPAR, as well as CAS objectives were taken
into consideration and integrated into the project design\. The PRS process enjoyed high
Government commitment at the time of the appraisal, and the project responded to the
demands and needs of the client\.
83\. The PRSTAC continued achievements made under the EFMTAC project, and was
able to build on an existing structure of project implementation capacity\. However, the
countryâs history of slow implementation should have been considered while designing
the implementation arrangements\. In fact, implementation of the PRSTAC was delayed,
as remaining funds under the EFMTAC were used to complete activities, and the set-up
of the multi-donor trust fund was delayed\. During implementation the presence of five
implementing units, coordinated by one coordination unit proved to be a bottleneck for
timely implementation and fiduciary aspects in a setting with low coordination and weak
institutional capacities\.
84\. The results framework was well aligned with the expected outcomes of the PRS
process and the project components\. However, lacking baseline data at project initiation,
weak monitoring and shortcomings of communicating the state of indicators to the client,
resulted in irregular reporting on the framework\.
(b) Quality of Supervision
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
85\. As in the early stages of the project, most of the supervision team was based in
Washington, in the later years the fiduciary teams (Financial Management and
Procurement Specialists) were based in the country office, allowing just-in-time support
to the counterpart\. Support from other country office staff, including the country manager,
contributed to the good working relationship and continuous involvement with the
changing administrations\. The PRSTAC had four task team leaders, and transition
processes might have slightly slowed down implementation\. Only in one case was the
incoming team leader already a team member and familiar with the project and the
country, hence facilitating the transition process\.
20
86\. Shortcomings in the quality of supervision are the missed opportunities to
restructure the project and to adjust the PDO and/or the results framework according to
new government priorities\. Opportunities to reconsider the relevance and achievability of
the PDO were, for example, the agreement with the government on passing the bylaw on
the professionalization of the civil service instead of a new civil service law; the
agreement in 2006 not to meet the target for public expenditure for poverty reduction
programs, and the mid-term review, which showed that many of the initial components
and the results framework did not reflect the actual reality of the project\. As a result, most
ISR ratings reflect a satisfactory or moderately satisfactory progress, which in
retrospective seem to have been overoptimistic\. It must be noted that the Learning QAG
report carried out in 2008 stated the need to maintain the close and intensive supervision
of the project, but provided no rating or further recommendation on project supervision
and implementation, nor did it flag the need to restructure\.
87\. The difficult and changing country and political context interrupted
implementation and supervision per se several times\. Nevertheless, the task team
maintained a continuous dialogue using the PRSTAC as the platform and as a tool to
react to upcoming needs and Government demands\. The flexible design of the project and
in particular the flexible use of the Swedish TFs allowed adjusting activities without
formal restructuring\.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
88\. Despite the quality of the project at appraisal, which correctly identified and
captured the Governmentâs development program and the Bank´s proposed strategy for
the country; supervision had several shortcomings with task teams failing to restructure
the project (even though as mentioned before, project was adapted to changing
circumstances) and to monitor its progress\. Yet, the task team´s effort to maintain an
open dialogue and to respond to the Government´s request for assistance under
challenging circumstances should be acknowledged as it permitted the Bank to maintain
engagement with the country and advance on important reforms\.
5\.2 Borrower Performance
(a) Government Performance
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
89\. As the project was directly linked to the countryâs PRSP and the PRS process,
Government ownership and commitment during preparation was high\. The PRS process
and the PRSTAC enjoyed government support, and the cooperation with the Bank and
other donors was effective\. Unfortunately, consensus for passing the new civil service
law was not reached before the change in administration\. While the following
government was initially committed to the PRS process, the focus of priorities shifted and
political commitment for the implementation of various components (and the
achievement of the PDO) decreased significantly\. This affected especially the civil
21
service reform and the support for sector activities\. After the political crisis in 2009 and
the 6-months pause of Bank operations, the newly elected government re-engaged in
policy dialogue with the Bank, with the project and its activities serving as a platform and
means for addressing the new Governmentâs priorities\. However, changing Government
priorities and a volatile political environment paired with a lack of political will and
country ownership during most of the projectâs life significantly contributed to the low
performance of the project\.
(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
90\. This project was implemented by up to five implementing agencies and one
coordination unit, which was in charge of the fiduciary aspects and reported directly to
the Secretary of the Presidency\. The implementing agencies generally showed
commitment for the implementation of their respective components and the
corresponding objectives\. Nevertheless, they were dependent on political decisions, and
often had to struggle with lack of political support, as well as insufficient personal and
technical capacity\. This directly influenced fiduciary aspects of the implementation, with
continuous delays and unsatisfactory performance in procurement and financial
management processes\.
91\. The coordination unit was responsible for handling a broad portfolio of
development projects, resulting in work overload which hindered smooth project
implementation\. The existing number of staff and technical capacities were insufficient
and made it difficult to efficiently handle the portfolio, which in turn negatively
influenced the fiduciary performance\. Considering these circumstances, the unit, and in
particular a core team, dedicated considerable efforts and time to the project\.
92\. Insufficient transition arrangements between governments slowed down
implementation progress, as project knowledge and information was not sufficiently
handed over to the incoming staff\. The combination of the general lack of capacity and
technical skills in the administrative body and the country in general, and the major part
of staff appointments being politically motivated, led not only to high turn-over rates, but,
in many cases, also to weak staffing of (key) positions\.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
93\. This rating is based on the difficulties in implementation and achievement of the
development objective described above\.
22
6\. Lessons Learned
94\. The main lesson learned is that the project and its implementation arrangements
need to be carefully designed and adapted to respond to the countryâs circumstances\.
Firstly, the political context is volatile, political will is not constant and country
ownership is generally low\. Secondly, implementing capacity is weak and technical skills
limited, resulting in a slow implementation pace\. Recruiting and sustaining technically
skilled staff is difficult, time-consuming and often undermined by political appointments
without the matching professional profiles\. Furthermore, the number of externally-
financed projects has led to a heavy workload of the UAP at the Secretary of the
Presidency, causing bottlenecks through a lack of communication, planning and technical
assistance to the executing agencies\. The following provides recommendations for the
preparation of the follow-up project:
ï Keep project design simple and realistic with results indicators specifically
calibrated and linked to the activities financed by the project\. In addition, design
the M&E arrangement around available data and existing systems in Government or
relevant external and reliable monitors\.
ï Avoid fragmented implementation arrangements that can slow down the project\.
Involvement of several executing agencies, which are coordinated by one
implementing agency, causes fragmentation and makes communication difficult\.
While complex public sector reforms might require the involvement of several
agencies, these might actually interfere with the achievement of the project objective\.
ï Make sure that there is enough staff dedicated to the project
ï Consider the introduction of the figure of a Project Coordinator
ï Involve technical agencies/staff and enhance communication
ï Prepare operational plans on a longer-term basis
ï Consider to concentrate on a few specific public sector reforms instead of
trying to cover a wide range of reforms
ï Employ available Bank tools to improve prospects for achieving project
development objectives at exit\. Restructuring should be seen as a helpful instrument
to adjust the project, especially in an environment like Honduras
ï Project flexibility enhances client responsiveness\. Implementation took place
during three elected Governments and a pause in Bank operations\. Flexibility in
financing activities and categories through a Swedish Trust fund gave the PRSTAC
the opportunity to respond to the changing needs of the country, and to act as a
vehicle of dialogue for the Government and the Bank\. However, flexibility should not
go beyond the core focus of the project, but assure that the final goal is the
achievement of the PDO\.
23
7\. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners
(a) Borrower/implementing agencies
95\. The Borrower provided the Bank with their project completion report and
comments on this ICR (see Annex 7)\. The main issues raised were related to performance
and their corresponding ratings of the implementing and executing units and the project
M&E\.
96\. While the Borrowerâs completion report considers the performance of the
implementing and executing units âsatisfactoryâ?, the Bankâs rating is âmoderately
unsatisfactoryâ?\. This rating derives from the fact that the ICR considers the project design
characteristic of having four executing and one coordinating agency as being too complex\.
Delays in the implementation process are therefore attributed to this complexity as well
as the high workload of the UAP, as the unit was in charge of a large number of projects\.
Furthermore, during implementation and during the preparation of the ICR, this issue had
been raised several times by the UAP itself\.
97\. Borrower comments on the Bankâs assessment and rating of M&E and
achievement of PDO state that the described shortcomings should be mainly attributed to
the changed project focus\. While this ICR describes the circumstances and reasons of the
difficulties to monitor project progress, the actual outcomes and outputs of the project are
compared and rated against the formally agreed results framework\. Unfortunately, the
significant changes of the project have not been reflected through an update of this
framework, leaving the original, even though outdated one, as the only base against
which to measure results\. The ratings and its explanations specifically and the ICR in
general tries to objectively illustrate the facts\.
98\. Other comments raised by the Borrower have been duly noted by the Bank team\.
All comments raised have been carefully taken into consideration during the preparation
of the follow-up operation and most have been included in the lessons learned sections\.
(b) Cofinanciers
99\. Annex 8 presents the comments received by the Swedish Development Agency
SIDA\. The main issues raised were donor coordination and the significance of the
staffing choices to achieve progress on the government side\.
100\. While the ICR recognizes the excellent donor coordination in the policy dialogue
with the country, SIDA has pointed out shortcomings in the administrative coordination
and communication among donors\. This has been reflected in the lessons learned within
the general need of improving communication within project participants\.
(c) Other partners and stakeholders
101\. No comments\.
24
Annex 1\. Project Costs and Financing
(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)
Actual/Latest
Appraisal Estimate Percentage of
Components Estimate (USD
(USD millions)* Appraisal
millions)
Develop capacity to manage, monitor,
evaluate and improve the Poverty 1\.10 1\.97 179
Reduction Strategy (PRS)
Improve implementation of public sector
4\.96 2\.80 56
management
Support for sectoral activities within the
5\.23 2\.65 51
framework of the PRS
Project Management 0\.75 2\.69 359
Total Baseline Cost 12\.05 10\.11 84
Contingencies
0\.80 0\.00
Total Project Costs 12\.85 10\.11
Front-end fee PPF 0\.00 0\.00
Front-end fee IBRD 0\.00 0\.00
Total Financing Required 12\.85 10\.11
*Based on information from the PAD
(b) Financing
Appraisal Actual/Latest
Percentage
Type of Estimate Estimate
Source of Funds of
Co-financing (USD (USD
Appraisal
millions) millions)
Borrower Counterpart 0\.80 0\.69 86
UK: British Department for
International Development (DFID) Multi-Donor
4\.05 1\.56 39
SWEDEN: Swedish Intl\. Dev\. Trust Fund
Cooperation Agency (SIDA)
International Development
8\.00 8\.36 105
Association (IDA)
Other* 0\.06
Sub-Total 12\.85 10\.73 83
Additional Trust Funds
SWEDEN: Swedish Intl\. Dev\.
Trust Fund 4\.62** 4\.21 91
Cooperation Agency (SIDA)
JAPAN: Ministry of Finance Trust Fund 0\.471** 0\.462 98
Total 17\.95 15\.40 86
*This amount results from incorrect classification of project funds by the Honduran Treasury
**As per grant agreement
25
Annex 2\. Outputs by Component
Project Component 1: Develop the Governmentâs Capacity to Manage, Monitor,
Evaluate and Improve PRS Implementation\.
Output anticipated at Appraisal
9\.4 percent of public expenditure allocated to poverty Partially achieved\.
reduction related programs (9\.1 percent in 2007)
Percentage of foreign assistance channeled through sector- Not achieved\. No SWAps were
wide programs (SWAPs) according to PRS priorities done in Honduras
4 progress reports and 6 Poverty and Social Impact Analysis Achieved\.
(PSIAs) produced using the PRS Evaluation & Monitoring
system
9 pilots social audit programs conducted at the community Achieved\. However,
level contribution from project is
unclear\.
1\.1 Develop UNATâs Analytical Capacity: Coordinator, research staff and consultants
were hired and supported the planning process through the preparation of annual progress
reports on the PRS process\. This also included the preparation of Poverty and Social
Impact Analysis (PSIAs) until 2007\. The UNAT furthermore supported Government
officials and Planning and Evaluation Units with training and technical assistance in areas
of strategic planning, results-based management, and institutional and sectoral goals and
their linkage to the PRS global indicators\. A results-based management system was
developed, which tracked progress of PRS and Government goals and indicators\.
However, planning methodologies and systems established by the UNAT in the
beginning of the project, such as the PSIAs, decreased to be used during the projectâs life
cycle and work was focused on monitoring\. Eventually, in early 2010, the UNAT was
dissolved and its responsibilities were distributed among the newly formed Secretary of
Planning (SEPLAN) and the UATP\. The indicators measuring the percentage of public
expenditure allocated to poverty reduction related programs were last measured in 2007
(9\.1percent)\. The Bank team was informed that due to a lack of fiscal space, the
Government, in accordance with the Bank had agreed in 2006, to not meet this indicator\.
1\.2 Strengthen the Governmentâs Capacity to Coordinate Foreign Assistance: this
component supported three main activities: (i) a strategic plan on alignment and
harmonization of foreign assistance, (ii) dissemination workshops and consultative
process on the OECD survey on the accomplishment of the Paris Declaration indicators,
and (iii) sector specific round tables\. The preparation of sector-wide programs, as planned
in the PAD, was never realized, however, the Millennium Development Goals Report for
Honduras 2010 states that in 2008, 38\.7 percent (US$218\.8 million) of the official
development aid is channeled towards social sectors; of which 26 percent benefit the
education and 14 percent the health sector\. The biggest part with 36 percent supports
governance and civil society\.
1\.3 Enhance the PRS Consultative Process: The work of the PRS Consultative Council
was supported through technical assistance and the purchase of office equipment\.
Furthermore, information workshops and consultative processes with communities to
26
update the PRS process were conducted, but not continued after 2007\. The ultimate
objective of this sub-component was to create a viable system of social audits as part of
the national poverty monitoring system, and to support the PRS Consultative Council to
implement decentralized regional strategies\. By 2007, 47 social audits at community
level were conducted by the National Commission for Human Rights (CONADEH), and
today, social audits and monitoring have been widely established in the Honduras civil
society landscape\. However, it is not clear, to what extend the project and Consultative
Council has contributed to this progress\.
Project Component 2: Improve the Implementation of Public Sector Management
Output anticipated at Appraisal
Central Government expenditures on wages and Not achieved\. The expenditure was
salaries reduced to 10\.4 percent of GDP 11\.1 percent of GDP in 2009\.
6,191 staff positions reduced in the Central Not achieved\. Reengineering
Government as a result of reengineering processes\. process did not take place\.
3,150 civil servants recruited through competitive Not achieved\. New civil service law
processes or confirmed under the new Civil Service was not approved\.
legislation
100 percent coverage of upgraded web-based SIAFI Partially achieved\. 100 percent
Budget Modules in the Central Government and coverage of Central Government, but
Decentralized Agencies only 1 decentralized agency\.
Development of Budget, Treasury, and Accounting Partially achieved\. The modules are
modules operating in both Central and Decentralized operating in the central government
Agencies; Procurement, HR, and Asset Management only; the procurement module is
modules operating in the Central Government being developed by ONCAE\.
90 percent of public expenditure managed through a Partially achieved\. 100 percent of
Single Treasury Account central government expenditure is
managed through STA, which
constitutes about 83 percent of
public expenditure\.
100 percent of operational Internal Audit Units in the Achieved\.
Central Government under regulations established by
the TSC
2\.1 Implement the new civil service legislation and continue efforts to reengineer the
public sector: The main achievement of the civil service component is the successful set-
up of the integrated human resource system (SIARH) and its linkage to SIAFI\. Today, the
entire Central Government and two decentralized agencies are using SIARH; it also
incorporated pension and scholarship payments\. Due to lack of political consensus, the
new Civil Service Law, as envisioned during project preparation, was never submitted to
Congress\. Instead, a bylaw to the existing civil service law was passed, backing-up the
professionalization plan for the public service\. In this regard, the DGSC undertook an
extensive exercise reviewing and preparing descriptions of nearly all public servant
positions\. The unit also reviewed and defined strategically important positions similar
throughout all secretaries of the Government in the areas of public administration,
financial management, planning, procurement, HR and internal audit\. The objective was
to identify those positions to protect them from politically-motivated personnel
replacements, which take place with each newly elected government\. However, actions to
27
follow these studies and reports did not occur\. As the objective and outcomes, as
proposed in the PAD, were mainly based on and linked to support the implementation of
a new civil service law, many of the planned activities could not be carried-out and
expected results could not be met\. Similarly, the targets to reduce government spending
on salaries, the reduction of positions and introduction of a competitive recruitment
process were not achieved\.
2\.2 Upgrading and expanding the capacity of SIAFI: The upgrading of the SIAFI is
one of the success stories of the project\. The country operates today an integrated
financial management system with all central government agencies using the real time
information produced by the web-based SIAFI\. During the project life, modules for
budget, treasury, accountancy, HR and administration of goods were added, and more
than 8,000 users were trained in their use\. Consequently, 100 percent of the central
government expenditures are processed using the single treasury account (STA)\. SIAFI
also features public access, although there is room to make public consultation easier to
access, allowing citizens to request and download information on budget execution has
been a notable step forward in Honduras\. On the other side, of the decentralized agencies,
only the national electricity enterprise (ENEE) is connected to SIAFI and none to the
STA, mainly because the law does not mandate the integration of the agencies into SIAFI\.
The public procurement system (Honducompras) has been developed by the National
Procurement Agency, and efforts will be conducted to link it to SIAFI\.
2\.3 Strengthening institutional capacity to ensure accountability through internal
and external control: The support to the Supreme Audit Institution (Tribunal Superior
de Cuentas â TSC) was a follow-up component on the EFMTAC project, which
supported the constitution of the TSC\. Today, the institution has assumed all its
responsibilities and is operating as a fully independent institution\. While the PAD
foresaw mainly office equipment for the TSC, and training for the TSC and the internal
audit offices, the completed activities exceeded this initial objective\. Early in the project,
priority was given to the implementation of an Integrated National Control System for
Public Resources (SINACORP), and the connection of social audits through civil society
organizations to the external auditing process of the TSC\. Activities related to the internal
audit units were intended to be executed under the Project to Strengthen Control of Public
Resources - PAFICORP (part of SINACORP) through the set-up of a National Office for
the Development of Internal Control in Public Institutions (ONADICI)\. Main
achievements under this component were: (i) follow-up of social audits outcomes into the
processes of the TSC, (ii) development and implementation of SINACORP, (iii) set-up of
ONADICI, (iv) guiding frameworks for internal and external control and audit, (v)
manuals in topics related to internal and external control, and (vi) training of over 2000
public servants in areas of internal and external control\. It is also worth mentioning, that
the TSC conducted the audit of the teachers post described in subcomponent 3\.6\.
Additional activities: Supporting ONCAE (Oficina Normativa de Contratación y
Adquisiciones del Estado): With support of the IADB, ONCAE had started to develop
and set-up HONDUCOMRPAS, a platform to publish and manage government purchases
and contracts\. In 2009, parts of the projects funds were allocated to continue the on-going
work of the national procurement agency ONCAE\. The objectives of this sub-component
28
were (i) to set-up a national procurement platform, (ii) to implement a regulatory
framework on public procurement, and (iii) to conduct training on the framework and the
preparation of procurement plans\.
Honducompras has been developed by the National Procurement Agency (ONCAE), but
still faces major development needs\. The current platform only allows for: (i) the
publication of all business opportunities and associated results, but to date compliance is
very low, (ii) publication of agency procurement plans, and (iii) partial registration of
suppliers\. ONCAE delivered a large number of training sessions on the national
procurement framework and the preparation of procurement plans to government
agencies, including hospitals and entities on the departmental level\. This training has
proven to be an advance but has been clearly insufficient to generate a change in culture
as to the way governmental entities procure goods and services\. In November 2010,
ONCAE opened an office for transparency and client service\.
Project Component 3: Support for Sectoral Activities within the Framework of the
PRS
Output anticipated at Appraisal
100,000 new public telephone lines available as a result of Achieved\. But without direct
Telecommunications Sector Reform contribution of the project\.
40 percent increase percentage of average ship Not Achieved\. Both the total
loading/unloading turn-around in ports number of ships, as well as the
TEU decreased slightly\.
30 percent increase coverage of rural electrification Not measurable\. Data on rural
coverage was not available\.
22,000 teacher posts audited Achieved\.
3\.1 Telecommunications Sector: A draft bill for the restructuring of HONDUTEL was
prepared and submitted to Congress, but never approved\. Independently from the project,
the telecommunication sector underwent liberalization and as a result there are now four
companies offering landline and mobile phone services (vs\. two companies at Project
appraisal)\. Mainly due to the extreme progress in mobile technology, the country counts a
total of approximately 8 million additional new telephone lines (mainly mobile phone
lines) since appraisal (www\.conatel\.gob\.hn)\.
3\.2 Power Sector: A consultancy for the restructuring of the national power company
ENEE was carried out\. As for the indicators, no data on the current coverage of rural
electrification was available\. However, the total coverage has increased to 81\.27 percent
in 2010, compared to 64\.64 percent at project appraisal (www\.enee\.gob\.hn)\.
3\.3 Ports Sector: A couple of consultancies on restructuring of the National Ports
Company, as well as privatization possibilities were undertaken, but after a change of
Government, their recommendations were not implemented and partial results were not
followed up\. In the last year of the Project, a study on PPP possibilities for the Port of
Castilla was prepared, but no further actions have been taken\. In regard to the indicators,
29
the number of ships that were loaded/unloaded in Honduran ports in 2010, decreased
slightly from 2269 ships in 2004 to 2162 ships in 2010 with no major discrepancies
during this time period\. Likewise, the TEUs 1 handled in the ports decreased from
592,460 TEUs in 2004 to 484,148 TEUs in 2010, after having reached lows of 507 TEUs
in 2005 and 484 TEUs in 2009 and peaking at 572 TEUs in 2008\. (Empresa Nacional
Portuaria, www\.enp\.hn)
3\.4 Water and Sanitation: Successful support was given to the decentralization efforts
of the water sector to the municipal level, benefiting over 50 municipalities, nine water
associations, 70 staff of water and sanitation entities, and individual water consultants\.
Main activities included: (i) situation analysis of the water and sanitation structure in 12
municipalities, facilitating the assumption of responsibilities by municipalities, (ii)
studies on water price structures and the corresponding operating costs in 15
municipalities, (iii) training and dissemination of the water decentralization law,
administration, operation and maintenance of drainage system, and other water and
sanitation related topics, (iv) preparation of an investment plan, identifying the water
access gaps and financial requirements for infrastructure upgrading, (v) support of the
National Water and Sanitation Council (CONASA) in the form of office equipment and
studies on the situation of water services in over 30 municipalities, and (vi) support of the
water sector regulating entity (ERSAPS) through diagnostics of the status of the water
structure in 33 municipalities\.
No indicator was designed to measure this subcomponent\. The PAD states the
strengthening of CONASA and ERSAPS as the main objectives\. With the completed
activities exceeding this initial objective and having given substantive support to the
decentralization process, the objective of this subcomponent is considered achieved\.
3\.5 Environmental Sector: No activities were undertaken\.
3\.6 Social Sector: An audit on the teacher allocation post was conducted by the TSC,
verifying the existence of teachers and posts as described in the Governmentâs database\.
Results were never published by the government, but as part of the PETS (Public
Expenditure Tracking Survey) and in cooperation with the Community-based Education
Project (P007397) and the IADB, successfully sample survey was conducted and
presented to the Government in November 2010\. The main finding was that the database
on teachers is incomplete, unreliable and hence not a proper and functioning instrument
for planning purposes\. âPhantomâ?-teachers and unrecorded absenteeism is high; the study
estimates that up to US$19 million are lost on phantom teachers each year\.
1
Twenty-foot equivalent unit, measure used for capacity in container transportation
30
Annex 3\. Economic and Financial Analysis
As an institutions-building and technical assistance project, quantitative computations of
rates of return are difficult to quantify\. Nevertheless, as expected in the PAD, economic
and fiscal savings resulting from project activities are likely to have occurred\. i\.e\., the
introduction of a more efficient financial management system paired with increased civil
society involvement has permitted a more transparent and efficient budget process, which
has possibly contributed to financial savings\. The improved internal and external control
through the TSC has lead to greater accountability and more effective monitoring and
control of financial flows\.
Several activities that were part of the PRS process are likely to have had positive fiscal
impacts during the project, but due to the discontinuation of the process these savings
were probably not maintained throughout the end\. Examples are a more efficient
alignment of resources through a monitoring system for PRS advances, increased rate of
return for public investments through enhanced assessment and analysis capacities\.
Considering the small progress made towards the achievement of the PDOs and the result
indicators during the slow and lengthy implementation, the overall efficiency of the
project can be considered as rather low\.
31
Annex 4\. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes
(a) Task Team members
Names Title Unit
Alberto Leyton Representative LCCSV
Amparo Ballivian Lead Public Sector Specialist LCCNI
Ana Bellver Vazquez-Dodero Senior Public Sector Management Specialist LCSPS
Carolina Rendon Public Sector Specialist LCSPS
Etel Patricia Bereslawski Aberboj Senior Procurement Specialist LCSPT
Florencia T\. Castro-Leal Senior Economist LCSPP
Christian Yves-Gonzalez Country Economist LCSPE
Blanche M\. Cotlear Consultant LCSSO
Jose Eduardo Gutierrez Ossio E T Consultant LCSPS
Dante Ariel Mossi Reyes Senior Country Officer AFCW1
Fabienne Mroczka Financial Management Specialist LCSFM
Beate Gisela Mueller Procurement Specialist LCSPT
Maria Poli E T Consultant LCSSO
Jose Simon Rezk Financial Management Specialist LCSFM
Rebeca P\. Santos Operations Officer LCSHS-DPT
Silvio V\. Solarte Leiton Consultant LCSPS
Javier Armando Soriano Arce Consultant LCCGT
Rajeev Kumar Swami Senior Financial Management Specialist ECSO3
Maria Guadalupe Toscano Nicolas Public Sector Management Specialist LCSPS
Josef S\. Trommer Senior Operations Officer FPDID
Rosa G\. Valencia De Estrada Consultant LCSPT
Joao N\. Vian Lanceiro da Veiga Malta Senior Procurement Specialist LCSPT
Fanny Weiner E T Consultant LCSPS
Valerie Hermann Team Assistant LCSPS
(b) Staff Time and Cost
Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)
Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including
No\. of staff weeks
travel and consultant costs)
Lending
FY04 43 135\.77
FY05 16 21\.90
FY06 1 1\.46
Total: 60 159\.13
Supervision/ICR
FY05 14 55\.53
FY06 28 103\.99
FY07 30 107\.70
FY08 29 152\.20
FY09 27 12\.65
FY10 25 8\.23
FY11 14 16\.08
Total: 167 456\.39
32
Annex 5\. Beneficiary Survey Results
Not applicable\.
Annex 6\. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results
Not applicable\.
33
Annex 7\. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR
7\.1 Summary of the Borrower Completion Report2
During the first semester of 2011, the Government of Honduras produced a completion
report of the credit and its associated trust funds\. The document contains a description of
the projectâs background, and its objectives and components as stated in the PAD and the
legal agreement, as well as performance rating for the Borrower and the Bank, and
recommendations on the sustainability of the project\.
The report the points out the main achievements of the project as follow:
ï Update and implementation of the PRS consultation process, strengthening of
capacity and analytical skills of the PRS Consultative Council\.
ï Strengthening of the implementation units, and linkage of institutional and
sectoral goals with the global PRS indicators\.
ï Expansion and integration of the integrated HR system in SIAFI\.
ï Conceptualization of the new civil service regulatorâs structure and functions\.
ï Purchase of furniture and other equipment for the civil service regulator\.
ï Training in classification of positions, recruitment selection and performance
evaluation delivered to HR staff\.
ï Studies and consulting services on the evaluation of fiscal impact and implication
on salaries in the public sector were conducted\.
ï Training in topics of public debt, integrity and ethics, financial auditing,
evaluation of the chart of accounts, public procurement and other delivered to the
staff of the Supreme Audit Institution\.
ï Development of SIARH, including norms, methodologies and computer systems\.
These achievements are then described in more detail and by implementing institution:
Ministry of Finance (SEFIN)
Component 2: Improve the Implementation of Public Sector Management
a) Sub-component 2\.1: Implement the New Civil Service Law and Continue with Efforts
to Reengineer the Public Sector, activities under this sub-component included:
ï SIARH was expanded and integrated with SIAFI, staff was trained and
infrastructure to operate the updated system was installed\.
ï Conceptualization of the new civil service regulatorâs structure and functions
(which will replace the DGSC with additional supervision and regulating
functions in accordance with the new normative framework); purchase of
furniture and other equipment for the operations of the new civil service regulator\.
ï Public sector staff received training in classification of positions, recruitment
selection, performance evaluation, career development and staff motivation\.
2
Full original version in Spanish is filed in the project files\.
34
ï Studies and consulting services on the evaluation of fiscal impact and implication
on salaries in the public sector were conducted to assure fiscal sustainability of
the borrower\.
ï Organizational structures of selected pilot organizations were re-engineered, and
an analysis of HR missing to effectively implement civil service reforms in those
institutions was conducted\. Also, e-government strategies were implemented\.
ï Current staff and new recruitments in the pilot institutions were evaluated to
initiate the implementation of the new legislation\. Capacity was developed in the
pilot institutions to apply the new HR policies with regard to classification of
positions, recruitment selection, performance evaluation and career development\.
b) Sub-component 2\.2: Upgrading and expanding the Capacity of SIAFI\.
The main achievements of this sub-component were:
ï Launch of the new SIAFI portal, including access by citizens to real time
information on budget execution\.
ï Central administration is operating with the SIAFI production modules, including
real time information\.
ï Issue of technical norms for each subsystem and integration of the norms and user
manuals in each module\.
ï During 2005 and 2010, more than 8,000 SIAFI users were trained in 500 training
courses\.
ï 172 executing agencies and 1,175 work stations were connected to SIAFI via
intranet\. The remaining 103 institutions are using SIAFI via web-based access\.
ï A virtual training platform was designed and launched in April 2010\. It contains
42 courses on SIAFI usage and competencies\. Up to date, 208 users are
subscribed\.
ï All payments to staff and suppliers are made through bank transfers\.
Supreme Audit Institution (TSC)
a) Implementation of SINACORP
ï SINACORP organized and implemented, including normative framework\.
ï Information session on SINACORP and ONADICI and its objectives delivered to
authorities of TSC, Presidency, Council of Ministers\.
ï Institutional capacity strengthened\.
ï Information sessions delivered to approximately 1,800 public servants of 80
entities\.
ï Issue of several guiding frameworks on internal and external control\.
ï Preparation and launch of ONADICI, including regulating framework\.
b) Strengthening of Internal Control
ï Policies on Institutional Internal Control signed by the President and disseminated
to the Council of Ministers and Institutions of the International Cooperation\.
ï In 15 workshops, more than 500 public servants of 85 entities have received
training on the use of the manuals to implement the five components of internal
control\.
35
ï Strengthening of the internal audit function\.
ï Preparation of manuals on internal control and computer-supported internal audits\.
ï Approximately 160 internal auditors of 69 entities received training on the use of
the internal audit manual and framework\.
c) Strengthening of External Control
ï Guidelines for the use of computer-supported audits\.
ï Manual on a Quality Control System in the Public External Audit\.
ï More than 40 supervisors within TSC received training on the Quality Control
System in the Public External Audit manual\.
Civil Service Office (DGSC)
Main activities and achievements included the following:
ï Audit on allocation posts was conducted\.
ï Preparation, approval and publication of the new regulatory framework of the
Civil Service of the Civil Service Law\.
ï Definition and analysis of positions with horizontal strategic importance for the
public sector\. The objective was to guarantee the stability of these civil servants
and to ensure sustainability with changes of the administration\.
ï Manuals with description of position\.
ï Elaboration of recommendation to improve the professionalization program;
implementation of the SIARH in all central government institutions\.
ï Purchase of IT equipment\.
ï Administrative unit of SIARH was strengthened with technical staff, which
participated in the pilots and gives technical support to all the State Secretaries\.
Following, the report features a section on the design and implementation of the project,
which describes the main activities, objectives and achievements for each component (by
implementing agency)\. In addition to the achievements and activities mentioned above,
the report states the achievements made by the National Procurement Agency ONCAE:
ï Preparation and launch of module for a simplified registration of suppliers, and
the registration of annual procurement plans on the platform Honducompras (33
institutions have published their procurement plans)\.
ï More than 3,000 purchase processes have been published, and the website
receives an average of 500 visits daily\.
ï All public institutions have a unified tool for the preparation of tender documents\.
ï Training has been delivered to a total of 91 public institutions, including hospitals\.
ï Opening of a transparency center for the public \.
Borrower Performance
The performance of the coordinating unit and the executing agencies is rated satisfactory,
even though not all of the funds could be executed nor all activities completed due to the
âpauseâ? of Bank operations as a reaction to the political events from June 2009\.
The CPME and the UAP-SDP as coordinating units complied with administrative and
financial responsibilities by assuring the availability of funds for the executing agencies\.
36
Those agencies complied by preparing financial reports using the established accounting
procedures\. Each executing unit keeps a proper archive on all the supporting documents
which justify the use of assigned resources for each component\.
The procurement processes were conducted in a transparent way, following the
recommendations received from the Bank and applying the corresponding guidelines and
rules\. This is reflected in the evaluation and audit reports\.
Bank Performance
The resident Bank mission played a key role and maintained communication with the
important entities\.
The technical and administrative team in Washington gave continued constant support to
the project and responded to all requests made by the executing agencies\. The team
visited the project in numerous occasions, and delivered training in the procurement and
financial management which contributed to professional development of the executing
agencyâs staff\.
Sustainability of the Project
SEFIN has developed an action plan to convert the technical personnel into permanent
staff to avoid high turn-over rates as a result of instable contract situations\. Since May
2010, the Government of Honduras is financing all staff with national funds and it is
planned to convert them into permanent staff in 2011\. To assure technical sustainability,
a sustainability component has been included in a new loan by the IADB (Loan 2032),
which included activities to improve the server capacity, a back-up site and the
certification of SIAFI\.
The Supreme Audit Institution (TSC) prepares its annual budget based in the needs to
continue the implementation of the developed mechanisms with the objective to comply
efficiently with its function\. The advances made under the project and through the
Swedish TF are not enough to fully achieve the general objective of SINACORP, but
need immediate support to assure continuity, completion and consolidation of the results
achieved by the end of the project in December 2010\. The next phase will be financed by
the KfW, and the TSC is working closely on the documents that will be the base for this
future cooperation\.
The DGSC considers the following activities necessary to assure the sustainability of its
component: i) editing of the new civil service law and its regulatory framework, ii)
complete auditing the positions in the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Transport,
iii) complete the update of the positions manual, iv) strengthening the technical units of
DGSC through additional staff, extended physical space, purchase of equipment, training,
and other, v) continue the recruitment of HR specialists for the sustainability of the
SIARH, and vi) logistical support for the implementation of new SIARH modules\.
The reforms in the water sector need further consolidation of the regulatory bodies and
the implementation of the Strategic Modernization Plan for the Water and Sanitation
Sector (PEMAPS)\. This would support to achieve the objectives of the framework law
37
and guarantee the delivery of efficient quality services\. As part of the PROMOSAS
project these reforms are continued and expect to achieve the following objectives: i)
improve sustainability, efficiency and responsibility of the water and sanitation services
in eligible municipalities, ii) improve the performance of the national institutions and the
compliance with the law\.
The PROMEF project is continuing the achievements made in the energy sector\. It
mainly concentrates on the improvement of the financial and operational performance of
the energy company ENEE, as well as upgrading the distribution network and
strengthening the institutional capacity and corporate governance of ENEE\.
7\.2 Summary of Comments from Implementing Agency on the Draft ICR
The task team received the following comments on the draft ICR:
1) On section 1\.7 âOther significant changesâ?: With the change of the projectâs
implementing agency only part of the key personnel transferred from the former CPME
to the newly created UAP-SDP\.
2) Section 2\.2 âImplementationâ? refers in paragraph 8 to the issues resulting from having
four executing agencies\. The implementing agency (UAP) carried out its tasks of quality
control and consolidation of operational plans according to the implementation
arrangements of the Project\. Furthermore, the coordination was undertaken involving all
concerned parties and communication with the Bank was never centralized\.
3) Regarding the âunsatisfactoryâ? rating of the M&E (Section 2\.3), both the Bank and the
Government should be hold accountable, based on the paragraph from the ICR reading:
At the same time, by responding to changing requests the project switched its focus;
activities were adjusted in several components making it difficult to monitor indicators
achievements and to evaluate the project\. (Section 2\.1)
4) As for the Section 2\.4 on âSafeguards and Fiduciary Complianceâ?, as per
recommendation of the Bank, procurement personnel did not take part in evaluation
committees, and that the format used for contracts was approved by the Bank, while it
was agreed to change the format under a new loan\. Furthermore, comments state that the
CPME always published its contracts in Honducompras, as they were a pilot of this
system\. To avoid generalizing it would be useful to specify the executing agencies to
which the insufficiencies in the processes refer to\.
5) In Section 3\.2 âAchievement of Project Development Objectivesâ?, the description
under PDO 3 refers to a study on the restructuring of the electricity ENEE\. This
consultancy was not carried out under the PRSTAC\.
6) The conclusion of the Section 3\.3 on âEfficiencyâ? reads the following: âConsidering
the small progress made towards the achievement of the PDOs and the result indicators
during the slow and lengthy implementation, the overall efficiency of the project can be
considered as rather low\.â? This statement seems contradictory\. During several missions,
38
the Bank stated that no evaluation of indicators would be done as they were obsolete, so
it is not clear why they are being considered in the ICR\.
7) Section 3\.4 âJustification of Overall Outcome Ratingâ? states that the results-based
system introduced by the Government was discontinued when the Government decided to
phase out the PRS process\. This system was actually interrupted during the âpauseâ? and
is currently being re-installed\.
8) In Section 5\.1 (a) âBank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entryâ? states that
âDuring implementation the presence of five implementing units, coordinated by one
coordination unit proved to be a bottleneck for timely implementation and fiduciary
aspects in a setting with low coordination and weak institutional capacities\.â? This
statement seems inappropriate and incorrect\. The coordinating unit did at no point delay
the activities of the executing agencies, as they did not depend on the coordinating unit,
as this unit only consolidated POAs, PACs, and managed funds\.
9) In Section 5\.2 âBorrower Performanceâ?, the justification for the Implementing Agency
or Agencies Performance, the text states that âthe combination of the general lack of
capacity and technical skills in the administrative body and the country in general, and
the major part of staff appointments being politically motivated, led not only to high turn-
over rates, but, in many cases, also to weak staffing of (key) positions\.â? It should be made
clear that this statement refers to the Government as a whole and not specifically to the
UAP\.
10) In Section 6 âLessons Learnedâ? the ICR states that âthe number of externally-
financed projects has led to a high workload of the UAP at the Secretary of the
Presidency, causing bottlenecks through a lack of communication, planning and
technical assistance to the executing agencies\.â? Similarly to the previous comment 8, this
statement seems inappropriate as the UAP despite the high workload responded to the
demands of the project\. As mentioned earlier, each executing agency was in charge of
procurement and payment, and therefore the UAP has had no influence on the delays\.
11) In Annex 2 âOutput by Componentâ?, in Component 3\.4 the following additional
achievements in the water and sanitation sector should be mentioned: 45 situation
diagnostics of urban aqueducts, 15 studies on water tariffs, training of 70 technicians,
certification of 25 consultants in the area of water and sanitation regulation certification,
and 22 diagnostics on service delivery institutions\.
39
Annex 8\. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders
1) Comments from the Swedish Development Agency (SIDA)
Relevance of development objectives: The objectives were relevant for Honduras, but
some were in particular relevant to the World Bank, such as the strong efforts paid at the
beginning of the implementation of the project to pass a new Civil Service Law and other
legislation processes within the PRSTAC\. Such policy processes often have little impact
on institutional strengthening and the Bank should take earlier experiences as lessons-
learned\.
Bank performance and cooperation: Bank performance assuring quality at entry and
technical capability during implementation as good\. However, coordination with the co-
financier was poor, information was not shared on a regular basis and follow-up had to be
made on financial and audit reports\.
Government Performance: Government performance has been satisfactory, especially
during the Maduro Administration\. The more technocratic approach that characterized
the Maduro administration suited well the implementation of the PRSTAC\.
Implementing Agency Performance: The performance of the implementing agency was
good, but very much linked to the person in the management position\.
2) Comments from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
Compartimos las conclusiones sobre el avance del proyecto, especÃficamente sobre el
componente para la implementación del sistema SIAFI que cofinanciaron ambos Bancos\.
Sobre las recomendaciones del informe nos gustarÃa puntualizar lo siguiente:
1\. En el diseño de la nueva operación, serÃa conveniente precisar las diferencias de esta
nueva figura â Coordinador de Proyecto - respecto a la figura de Asesor Técnico
Principal (ATP) establecida por los préstamos PRSTAC y 1546/SF-HO\. En el caso
del SIAFI, el ATP fue seleccionado por el GHO y ambos Bancos de una terna de
consultores internacionales\. Sus TDRs fueron acordados por todas las partes y el
consultor seleccionado permaneció desde el arranque del proyecto hasta junio de
2009\. Este consultor tuvo la responsabilidad de coordinar, en forma exclusiva y desde
el punto de vista técnico, la ejecución de las dos operaciones que financiaban el
proyecto SIAFI\. En nuestra opinión, esta figura de ATP fue clave en los logros del
componente\. Sin embargo, no creemos que es suficiente\. Otros componente tuvieron
ATPS y los resultados no fueron similares\.
2\. Creo que es importante resaltar la importancia de los estudios previos âejemplo el
CFAA- que apoyaron el diseño de la operación y facilitaron el arranque\.
3\. Es necesario resaltar, también, el apoyo que recibió el proyecto por parte de las
autoridades de SEFIN, especialmente durante el periodo de crisis, que le dio
sostenibilidad a los resultados alcanzados hasta la fecha\.
40
Annex 9\. List of Supporting Documents/People interviewed
Secretaria en el Despacho Presidencial (2011), Project Completion Reports of UAP and
implementing agencies for the PRSTAC project, Tegucigalpa (unpublished files)
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (2010), Millennium Development Goals,
Honduras 2010, Third Country Report, Overview, United Nations System in
Honduras, September 2010, Tegucigalpa
World Bank (2010), Interim Strategy Note for the Republic of Honduras, Report No\.
56405-HN, September 29, 2010, Washington, D\.C\.
World Bank (2009), Institutional Governance Review: âStrengthening Performance
Accountability in Hondurasâ? (in two volumes), Report No\. 53517-HN, March 9,
2009, Washington, D\.C\.
World Bank (2008), Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report, Report No\. 43244-HN,
May 8, 2008, Washington, D\.C\.
World Bank (2008), Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Honduras, Report
No\. 37280-HN, November 30, 2007, Washington, D\.C\.
World Bank (2004 -2010), Ayuda Memorias of supervision missions and Implementation
Status Reports (ISR), Washington, D\.C\. and Tegucigalpa (internal files)
World Bank (2004), Project Appraisal Document on a Poverty Reduction Support
Technical Assistance Project, Report No\. 29065-HN, June 3, 2004, Washington,
D\.C\.
People interviewed for this ICR:
Government of Honduras
Elena Calidonio Coordinator of UAP
Belinda Zepeda Procurement Manager
Rocio Tabora Director of UATP
Conrado Gomez and team Tribunal Superior de Cuentas
Alejandro Aplicano and team UAP-SEFIN
Luis Cosenza Secretario del Despacho Presidencial (2002-2004)
Renan Sagastume Ex-official of Tribunal Superior de Cuentas
World Bank
Alberto Leyton TTL (2003-2007)
Joseph Stig Trommer Co-TTL (2003â2007)
Amparo Ballivian TTL (2007-2008)
Ana Bellver TTL (2008 â2010)
Carolina Rendon TTL (2010-2011)
Dante Mossi Country Officer Honduras (2004-2010)
Jose Rezk Sr Financial Officer
41
89°W 88°W 87°W 86°W 85°W
17°N 17°N
B ELI Z E Caribbean Sea HONDURAS
Roatán A
BAHI
LA
DE
Gulf of S
Honduras LA
16°N IS 16°N
Trujillo Iriona
Puerto Cortés
za Barra Patuca
Tela La Ceiba
Balfate
Corocito
r an Brus
C O L Ã N Es pe
G U AT E M ALA A T L Ã? N T I D A bre de Dios La
Laguna
ya
CORTES Tocoa La
ula
Nom Sonaguera
a M
Pa
Lago de San Pedro ll e r a u an Ag
rr o s Ahuas
Izabal Sula Cordi Olanchito
e q
El Progreso Si
GRACIAS u i t
Quimistan Las Vegas El Carbón Puerto
Sico
Morazán
YORO ia Lempira
Higuerito A DIOS
Ulú San Esteban
a
Nuevo
Arcadia
S A N TA Embalse General
Francisco Morazán Dulce Nombre
Sirsirtara
Yoro
BÃ?RBARA de CulmÃ
Su
ula
15°N n 15°N
OLANCHO ló
co
c
COPÃ?N Santa
a
Co
uc
Bárbara Lago de Catacamas
Salamá
de
at
CO
Copán Ruinas Santa Rosa Yojoa P
Hu
San Luis Guaya
l s
ca
pe tu Awasbila
m
de Copán de Pa ña
uya
Jaitique
M
M
To a To
Mon as nt Puerto
AY
Chiquimula Juticalpa
de C taña añ
Gracias o Cabezas
o m a y Cedros t M
on
AG
AG
O C O T E - Cerro Comayagua agua Guaimaca M
re
Las Minas
mb
Nueva P E Q U E (2,870 m) La
CÃ?
UA
aa
AZ SCO
Ocotepeque Esperanza
y
La Paz
A
Gu
LEMPIRA n
BU
AN
á
Valle de Jal
To
o
San Salvador Angeles
TI
oc
OR CI
Marcala EL PARAÃ?SO C
IN
Mapulaca L A PA Z
M AN
14°N
Camasca
TEGUCIGALPA Danlà 14°N
Yuscarán
H ONDURAS
FR
To Sabana
Las Manos
E L S ALVAD OR San Miguel Grande
SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS
VALLE To
NICA RAGUA
Estelà DEPARTMENT CAPITALS
To Nacaome San Marcos
San Salvador de Colón NATIONAL CAPITAL
San Lorenzo
Choluteca ECA RIVERS
LUT
0 20 40 60 80 100 Kilometers
O
nsec
a CH PAN AMERICAN HIGHWAY
e Fo Triunf
El Triunfo 0 20 40 60 Miles
13°N o lfo d 13°N
MAIN ROADS
IBRD 33418R1
G This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank\.
FEBRUARY 2008
To RAILROADS
PAC IF IC OC EAN Managua
The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information
shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank
Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any DEPARTMENT BOUNDARIES
endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries\.
89°W 88°W 87°W 86°W 85°W INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES | APPROVAL |
P071264 | Report No\. PID10011
Project Name Kosovo-Third Economic Assistance Grant to\.
Support Private Sector Development
Region Europe and Central Asia Region
Sector Private Sector Development
Project ID XKSF71264
Borrower NA
Implementing Agency United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo,
UNMIK
Pristina, Kosovo
Environment Category C
Date This PID Prepared December 20, 2000
Date Initial PID Prepared December 20, 2000
Projected Appraisal Date February 12, 2001
Projected Board Date NA
1\. Country and Sector Background
In general terms, economic activity in Kosovo has been centered on extractive
industries, production of raw materials, and semi-finished products (lead,
coal, zinc and textiles), as well as agriculture\. The economic policy and
regulatory environment was shaped by Yugoslav-style socialism\. Industry was
largely directly held or controlled by the state or socially-owned
enterprises (SOEs)\. In contrast, agriculture was almost totally privately
held\. Significantly, more than 60 percent of the pre-conflict population
lived in rural areas\.
Kosovo's economy consists of two basic components: publicly owned enterprises
and privately owned enterprises\. Publicly owned enterprises are mainly
SOEs \. They have formerly been engaged in all sectors of the economy but
predominately in the industrial sector, and they are generally in very poor
condition\. As a result of the events of the last ten years and the 1999
conflict in particular, comprehensive and up-to-date information on the SOEs
is not yet available\. UNMIK, assisted by some donors, has started to assess
these enterprises, checking primarily on their workforce, condition of their
equipment and status of production activities\. According to the latest
survey there are some 400 SOEs with a reported total workforce of about
57,000 persons\. However, these employment figures are not very reliable\.
Many enterprises report the number of workers that were on their official
payroll but may not have actually worked for quite some time as actual plant
operations have been substantially reduced or stopped altogether\. The degree
of actual capacity utilization of the SOEs varies considerably from
enterprise to enterprise, but very few reported capacity utilization
exceeding 50 percent in 1999\. Conflict related damages to SOEs' equipment
and infrastructure also vary considerably but are on average much less
significant than could have been expected\. The SOE sector still controls a
large inventory of facilities and equipment, much of which is obsolete or
very close to obsolescence\. On the whole, however, the SOE sector can still
be considered as having some value, with a small number of selected
enterprises likely to attract investors' interest\.
The population of privately owned enterprises - much larger in number and in
collective output - is engaged mostly in trade and services activities\. A
substantial segment of the private enterprise sector consists of gray market
activities in trade and services on a small to medium scale\. Nevertheless,
it should be noted that the dividing line between the formal and informal
sector has been an obscure one, given the absence of an adequate legal and
regulatory framework, the incompleteness of registration of companies
(although a provisional business registration for fiscal purposes has been
recently implemented ), and the strong incentives during the pre-conflict
decade on the part of ethnic Albanians to distance their activities from the
formal sector\. All sectors currently operate in institutionally and
economically unfriendly conditions with limited industrial production,
limited access to banking services, and an outdated and incomplete regulatory
framework\.
The sharp decline in Kosovo's GDP over the past decade can be attributed to a
dramatic falloff in industrial output\. The enterprises in this sector were
mainly socially owned\. While virtually all enterprises had suffered damage
during this decade of disinvestment and neglect, their condition deteriorated
even further during the 1999 conflict, leaving many in a an extremely poor
physical condition\. Most enterprises now need significant restart capital to
resume production\. Enterprises also suffer from the far more serious problem
of having lost their markets\. This is because the rest of the Balkan region
moved on economically after 1989, with FRY no longer a viable market for most
products previously manufactured in Kosovo\. Furthermore, as a result of the
exclusion of the ethnic Albanians from management and skilled worker
positions, the skills of the ethnic Albanian workforce are out of date\.
Throughout the past decade, the private sector, both formal and informal, was
a major pillar of Kosovo's economy\. This was unusual relative to other non-
Balkan, Eastern European countries, but mirrored the contribution of the
private sector in the rest of the SFRY\. In fact, the output levels of the
privately owned sector have remained more or less stable since 1987\. As of
1996, privately owned enterprises contributed to almost half of total GDP
and, in 1998, the contribution of the private sector to the overall economy
rose to about 80 percent\. In the meantime, the publicly owned sector became
stagnant just before the conflict\.
As the formal economy collapsed, ethnic Albanians were dismissed from their
positions at public companies\. While the official unemployment rate over the
decade was significant - some pre-war estimates running as high as 70 percent
- this was ameliorated by ethnic Albanian participation in the gray (legal)
and black (illegal) economy\.
In theory, SFRY's legal and regulatory regime applies today to publicly and
privately owned enterprises as well as to the parallel economic segment\.
With the repeal of Regulation 1, Section 3, and the adoption of Regulation
24, in December 1999, UNMIK adopted the SFRY commercial legal framework of
March 22, 1989, modified and expanded by other more recently issued UNMIK
regulations\. In practice few, if any, of these SFRY laws have been
enforceable, nor are they suited to the type of market-oriented economy UNMIK
wants to establish\.
2\. Description and Objectives:
The objective of the proposed grant is to support Kosovo's private sector
development program\. The operation was envisaged in the Transitional Support
Strategy for Kosovo (Progress Report) discussed in the Board on July 25,
2000\. The reform actions being undertaken by UNMIK center on the creation of
a policy framework for encouraging the growth of private, small and medium
- 2 -
enterprises\.
More specifically, the reform program being supported by this proposed grant
is the enactment of four regulations: (i) the Regulation on Business
Organizations, (ii) the Regulation on Contract for Sale of Goods, (iii) the
Regulation on Pledges and, (iv) the Regulation on Foreign Investment\.
While the above four regulations are critical to the development of a viable
private sector, many more measures will need to be adopted\. Work is already
well advanced on a new bankruptcy regime, on a law on mortgages over
immovable property and on legislation for the introduction of appropriate
accounting standards\.
Special attention has been placed in the design of these regulations to
ensure continuance and sustainability when UNMIK withdraws and local
representative authorities take its place\. Local Kosovar experts and
political leaders have been extensively consulted in the formulation of these
laws\. An ancillary technical assistance operation is being prepared in
parallel to this grant to support the implementation and dissemination of the
newly proposed commercial legal framework\.
3\. Financing
The proposed grant operation in the amount of US$5 million will be made
available to UNMIK out of the Trust Fund set up for the benefit of Kosovo in
FY2000\. It will be disbursed as a single tranche\. The grant will be
disbursed against the standard Bank negative list for imports\.
4\. Benefits
The main benefits of the grant relate to the establishment of an adequate
commercial legal framework to support the development of the private sector\.
More specifically, an improved business enabling environment should provide
the necessary conditions under which: investor's confidence can begin to be
restored, creditor and property rights can be protected, contracts can be
executed and secured lending transactions can be performed\.
5\. Risks
Prevailing political and social risks in the region remain a major threat to
the implementation of the reconstruction and reform program in Kosovo\. The
recent political developments in FRY have caused donors to shift attention
away from Kosovo and there is a risk that some donor's funding would also be
diverted away\. Major constitutional and political uncertainties remain
despite favorable developments in the FRY\.
There are substantial risks associated with the implementation of the private
sector reform effort itself\. The long period of exclusion from civic life of
the ethnic Albanian population and the legacy of the conflict has led to a
severe erosion of skills, lack of sense of civic responsibility, and
disrespect for the rule of law\. Thus there is also some degree of
uncertainty as to whether the Kosovar business community will readily adapt
their informal and unstructured methods of operation to the formal
requirements of an organized economy\. While one might expect that Kosovars
who were previously excluded would welcome the chance to live and work with
the recognized system, that enthusiasm may fade as persons realize it comes
with a cost in the form of rules and regulation to be obeyed, taxes to be
paid, etc\.
Associated to the risk presented above, the interim nature of UNMIK and the
uncertainty regarding ongoing implementation and enforcement of the laws also
have implications for sustainability\. Related to this is also the prevailing
low capacity and incipient state of affairs of the judiciary, and their
-3 -
ability to quickly absorb numerous new concepts and the required legal
practice embedded in the new commercial legal framework\.
Finally, the completion of a full-fledged commercial framework will take
considerable additional time and effort, not to mention the even longer time
needed to create the institutional capacity to support it\. A prolonged,
inefficient or half-hearted effort to complete a full-fledged commercial
framework will also undermine its credibility and enforceability\. In
essence, weak local capacity remains a threat to the medium-term feasibility
of the private sector reform agenda\.
6\. Poverty Category
No significant social risks identified at this stage\.
7\. Environmental Aspects
Not Applicable
8\. Contact Point:
Gerardo M\. Corrochano, ECSPF
The World Bank
1818 H Street N\.W\.
Washington, DC 20433
Telephone No\.: (202) 473-3568
Fax No\.: (202) 522-0005
Note: This is information on an evolving project\. Certain components may
not necessarily be included in the final project\.
This PID was processed by the InfoShop during the week ending March 2, 2001\.
These publicly-owned enterprises are socially-owned except for a
limited number, mainly the utilities, the electric power company (KEK),
the telecommunication company and the water supply companies which are
under state ownership\. Excluding the large mining and metallurgical
complex of Trepca\. Current data from the provisional registry show
almost 28,000 registered economic units\.
- 4- | APPROVAL |
P078991 | Documentof
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIALUSEONLY
Report No: 31740-NI
PROJECTAPPRAISALDOCUMENT
ONA
PROPOSEDCREDIT
INTHEAMOUNT OFSDR7\.2 MILLION
(US$ 11MILLIONEQUIVALENT)
TO THE
REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA
FORA
HEALTH SERVICESEXTENSIONAND MODERNIZATION PROJECT
INSUPPORTOFTHE SECONDPHASEOFTHE
HEALTH SERVICESEXTENSIONAND MODERNIZATION PROGRAM
March4,2005
HumanDevelopmentUnit
LatinAmerica and the CaribbeanRegion
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the
performanceof their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwisebe disclosed without World
Bank authorization\.
CURRENCYEQUIVALENTS
(ExchangeRateEffectiveFebruary 28,2005)
CurrencyUnit = C6rdoba
16\.18 C6rdobas = US$1
US$1\.52 = SDR 1
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 - December31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
APL Adjustable Programmatic Loan
BSG Budget Support Group
CAS Country Assistance Strategy
cc Code of Conduct
CD Compact Disk
CFP Country Financing Parameters
CHFS Community HealthFinancing Scheme
C M Casa Materna (Matemity Waiting Home)
CP Capitation Payment
CUT Cuenta Unica del Tesoro (Single Treasury Account)
DGPD Direcci6n General de Planeaci6n v Desarrollo
DHS Demonraohic and Health Survev
EA Environmental Assessment
EHP Elderly Health Program (of INSS)
EMP Empresas MCdicas Provisionales (Previsional Medical Firms)
ENDESA Encuesta Nicaraguense de Demografia y Salud (Nicaraguan Demographic and Health
Survey)
FM Financial Management
FONMAT Fondo para laMaternidad e Infancia Seguras (Safe Malernity and Infancy Fund)
FOROFFICIAL USEONLY
FONSALUD NicaraguanHealthSector Support Fund
FYIP Five Year Implementation Plan
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GON Government of Nicaragua
HCW Health Care Waste
HCWM Health Care Waste Management
HCWMP Health Care Waste Management Plan
HIPC Heavily IndebtedPoor Countries
ICB International Competitive Bidding
IDA International Development Association
IDB Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank
IEC Information, Education and Communication
INEC Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos
INSS Instituto Nicaraguense de Seguro Social (Nicaraguan Social Security Institute)
IPDP IndigenousPeoples' Development Plan
IPP Indigenous Peoples' Plan
IRR Internal Rate of Return
LAC Latin America and the Caribbean
MAIS Modelo de Atenci6n Integralde Salud (Integrated Health Care Model)
MCH Maternal-Child Health
MDG MillenniumDevelopment Goals
MINSA Ministerio de Salud (Ministry of Health, MOM
MTEF Mid-Term Economic Framework
MOF Ministry of Finance and Public Credit
,MOH Ministry of Health
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MS Mesa Sectorial de Salud (HealthSector Council)
NCB National Competitive Bidding
NDF Nordic Development Fund
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NHP National Health Plan
NORAD Norwegian Development Agency
NPV Net Present Value
PACC Plan Anual de Compras (Annual Procurement Plan)
PBHS Paquete Bisico de Servicios de Salud (Basic Package of Health Services)
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in
the performance of their official duties\. I t s contents may not be otherwise disclosed
/withoutWorld Bank authorization\.
PHC Primary Health Care
PMSS Proyecto de Modernizacihdel Sector Salud (HealthSector Modernization Project,
World Bank)
PREM Poverty Reductionand Economic Management
PROCOSAN ProgramaComunitaria de Salud y Nutrici6n
PRSC Poverty ReductionSupport Credit
PRSP Poverty ReductionSupportProgram
SIGFA Sistemade GerenciaFiscalAdministrativo (Adminiftrative Fiscal Management System)
SILAIS SistemaLocalde Atencih Integralde Salud (Local Integrated Health Care System)
SIMINSA SistemaInformhticadelMinisterio de Salud (MOH Information System)
SIPLA Sistemade Planificacih (Planning System)
SWAP Sector Wide Approach
TOR Terms of Reference
USAID United States Agency for InternationalDevelopment
Vice President: Pamela Cox
Country ManagerDirector: Jane Arrnitage
Sector Leader: Laura Rawlings
Sector Manager: Cristian Baeza, Acting
Task Team Leader: Jesus Maria Fernandez Diaz
NICARAGUA
Health Services Extensionand Modernization(2nd APL)
CONTENTS
Page
A\. STRATEGICCONTEXT AND RATIONALE\. 7
1\. Country and sector issues \. 7
2\. Rationale for Bank involvement\. 10
3\. Higher level objectives to which the project contributes\. 11
B\. PROJECTDESCRIPTION\. 11
1\. Lending ipstrument\. \. 11
2\. Project development objective and key indicators \. 14
3\. Project components\. 15
4\. Lessons learned and reflected in the project design \. 19
5\. Alternatives considered and reasons for rejection\. 20
C\. IMPLEMENTATION \. 21
1\. Partnership arrangements\. 21
2\. Institutional and implementation arrangements\. 21
3\. Monitoring and evaluation of outcomes/results \. 22
4\. Sustainability \. 23
5\. Critical risks and possible controversial aspects \. 24
6\. Loadcredit conditions and covenants \. 25
D\. APPRAISAL SUMMARY \. 25
1\. Economic and financial analyses \. 25
2\. Technical\. 26
3\. Fiduciary\. 27
4\. Social \. 28
5\. Environment \. 28
6\. Safeguard policies\.
\. \. 30
7\. Policy Exceptions and Readiness \. 30
Annex 1:Country and Sector or ProgramBackground\. 31
Annex 2: Major RelatedProjects Financedby the Bank and/or other Agencies\. 41
Annex 3: ResultsFramework and Monitoring \.
Annex 4: DetailedProject Description\. \. \.
Annex 5: Project Costs\. 63
Annex 6: ImplementationArrangements \. 64
Annex 7: FinancialManagementand DisbursementArrangements\. 69
Annex 8: ProcurementArrangements\. 76
Annex 9: Economic and FinancialAnalysis\. 81
Annex 10: SafeguardPolicyIssues\. 91
Annex 11: Project Preparationand Supervision\. 103
Annex 12:Documentsin the ProjectFile\. 104
Annex 13: Statementof Loans and Credits\. 105
Annex 14: Country at a Glance\. 106
Annex 15:Map IBRD 33456 \. 108
NICARAGUA
HEALTH SERVICES EXTENSIONAND MODERNIZATION (2ND APL)
PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT
LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN
LCSHH
Date: March 8, 2005 Team Leader: Jesus Maria FernandezDia
Country Director: Jane Armitage Sectors: Health (100%)
Sector ManagedDirector: Evangeline Javier Themes: Health systemperformance (P)
Project ID: PO78991 Environmental screening category: Partial
Assessment
Lending Instrument: Adaptable Program Loan Safeguard screening category:
Project Financing Data
[ ] Loan [XI Credit [ ] Grant [ ] Guarantee [ ] Other:
Source Local Foreign Total
BORROWEFURECIPIENT 4\.10 0\.00 4\.10
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 11-00 0\.00 11\.oo
IASSOCIATION
FINLAND:MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN 1 7\.10 1 0\.00 1 7\.10 1
AFFAIRS
SWEDEN, GOV\. OF 20\.00 0\.00 20\.00
INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT 30\.00 0\.00 30\.00
BANK
NETHERLANDS: MIN\.OF FOREIGN 10\.00 0\.00 10\.00
AFFAIRS / MIN\.OF DEV\.COOP\.
Total: 82\.20 0\.00 82\.20
Republic ofNicaragua
Nicaragua
ResponsibleAgency:
Ministry of Health
Nicaragua
FY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Annual 2\.20 2\.20 2\.20 2\.20 2\.20 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
Cumulative 2\.20 4\.40 6\.60 8\.80 11\.00 11\.00 11\.00 11\.00 11\.00
Project implementationperiod: Start July 5, 2005 End: May 31,2009
Expectedeffectiveness date: July 5, 2005
Does the project depart from the CAS incontent or other significant respects?
Re$ PADA\.3 [ ]Yes [XINO
Does the project require any exceptions from Bank policies?
Re$ PAD0\.7 [ ]Yes [XINO
Have these beenapprovedby Bank management? [ ]Yes [XINO
I s approval for any policy exception sought from the Board? [ ]Yes [XINO
Does the project include any critical risks rated "substantial" or "high"?
Re$ PAD C\.5 [ ]Yes [XINO
Does the project meet the Regional criteria for readiness for implementation?
Re$ PAD D\.7 [XIYes [ ] N o
Project development objective Re$ PAD B\.2, TechnicalAnnex 3
The overall APL program development objective, as approved by the IDA Boardin 1998, is to
improve health outcomes inNicaragua, particularly among the poor, by raising the efficiency,
effectiveness, equity and sustainability o f the Nicaraguanhealth system\. Inthis second phase o f
the APL, IDA financing will contribute, alongside funds from the M O H and other SWAP
partners, to improve maternal and child health inthe poorest municipalities o fNicaragua,
concentrating roughly half of the Nicaragua's poor\. By improving the health status o f this
population, health inequities should reduce, as shown by disparities inmaternal and infant
mortality indicators across geographical areas and income groups\. These goals will be achieved
through the operationalization o f three strategic objectives, as set up inthe sector Five-Year
ImplementationPlan, namely: (i) the extension o f coverage o f a package o f basic health and
nutritionservices to the poorest areas ofthe country, via the new integrated model ofhealth care;
(ii) physicalandfunctionalstrengtheningofthehealthservicefacilitiesnetwork,focusingon
the
maternal-infant care, so as to provide a seamless path of essential services inthe target areas; and
(iii) institutional strengtheningand capacity-building, concentrated specifically on developing
the purchasing, monitoring and evaluation capacities o fthe MOH, its leadership role to
enhancing donors? alignment and harmonization, and the management capacity of M O H
decentralized units and Autonomous Governments o f the Atlantic Coast\.
Project description [one-sentence summary of each component] Re$ PAD B\.3\.a, Technical
Annex 4
Strategic Objective 1: Extension o f health care coverage to the poorest population (US$36\.5
million\. Extension o f the Basic Package of Health Services to vulnerable rural populations at the
community-level\.
Strategic Objective 2: Strengtheningthe network o f services intargeted areas to support the
implementation o f the BPHS (US$27,8 million)\. This component of the SWAPi s designedto
support the extension o f coverage, andto complement its MCH-related activities\. It includes
physical rehabilitation o f health centers and hospitals, expansion o f the Women Center Network
and strengthening management o f public providers\.
Strategic Objective 3: Improving Stewardship, Institutional Strengthening and Decentralization
(US$17,8 million)\. The M O Hrecognizes that to fulfilthe vision set forthintheNHP and
effectively leadthe SWAp, it will need to undertake a variety o f institutional reforms\. These
include: (i)strengthening the Ministry?smanagement capacity necessary for planning,
contracting and supervising the expansion o f the BPHS (e\.g\., programming and planning,
information and reporting) and the rest o f institutional fiduciary systems (financial accounting,
procurement, auditing) so the SWAP can progressively adopt these national systems instead o f
donors? procedures; (ii) strengthening the GON?s capacity to monitor and evaluate health sector
performance, efficiency and equity; (iii) supporting the MOH?s coordination role as executor
and overseer o f the GON?s population policy; and (iv) developing a strong purchasing function
at the MOH, including the identification o f beneficiaries for the expansion o f essential services,
adjusting payment mechanisms, overseeing service quality, contract design and monitoring\.
Which safeguard policies are triggered, if any? Re$ PAD 0\.6, TechnicalAnnex 10
Environmental Assessment (OP/BP/GP 4\.0 1)
Indigenous Peoples (OD 4\.20, beingrevised as OP 4\.10)
Significant, nonstandard conditions, if any, for:
Re$ PAD C\.7
Board presentation:
Loan/credit effectiveness:
Effectiveness conditions:
? Operational Manual for the extension o f the PBHS, including calculation o f the capitation
transfer, estimation o f beneficiary population, operation o f the community health financing
scheme, contractual arrangements and performance-based mechanisms for public and private
providers satisfactory to the Bank and other partners\.
Covenants applicable to project implementation:
A\. STRATEGIC CONTEXT AND RATIONALE
1\. Country andsector issues
Nicaragua's health profile reflects the country's highprevalence of poverty-in particular, its
highrate of absolute poverty\. Despiteprogress inreducingpoverty over the past decade, with a
per capita income of US$710 Nicaraguaremains one of the poorest countries in Latin America\.
Although from 1993 to 2001, poverty declined from 50 to 46 percent, and extreme poverty fell
from 19 to 15 percent, the gains were characterized by significant geographic differences\. In
2002, 44 percent o f the population still lived in rural areas where the prevalence of extreme
poverty was 25 percent, more than four times the rate of urban areas\. On average, poorer
households have higher fertility rates and larger families, as well as higher maternal, infant and
child mortality\. Inaddition, tuberculosis, which remains a persistent public health problem, has
become largely a disease of the poor\.
Nicaragua has made considerable progress in improving the health status of its people over the
last decade\. Life expectancy has reached 69 years, and since 1990, infant and child maternal
mortality rates have fallen by 29 and 32 percent, respectively\.2 A recent study of 165 countries
that predicted life expectancy and infant mortality based on gross domestic product (GDP),
found that health status of Nicaraguans exceeds what one would anticipate, given the country's
per capita income\. While Central America as a whole didbetter than predicted on both o f these
two key health indicators, among the Central American republics, Nicaragua had the largest
positive deviations between its actual and predicted life expectancy and inthe case of infant
mortality was second only to Costa Rica\.
Life Expectancy and Infant Mortality in Central America:
ctual and Predicted Levels Based on WorldwideAnalysis
Percent
Actual Predicted Difference
Source\. Todd & Hicks, 2003
World Bank, Nicaragua Poverly Assessment-Raising Welfare and Reducing Vulnerability,December2003, p\. i
The 2002 Joint IDMMFAnnual ProgressReport of the NicaraguaPRSPrecordedmajor gains in 12of 13 of the
intermediate health indicators, and resultsrangingbetween 85 and 130percent of the planned targets\. The only
healthindicator that did not improvewas the prevalence of diarrhea incidence among childrenunder 5 years\.
7
These recent advances hide, nevertheless, the fact that the poor have benefited much less than the
wealthiest, as the table inAnnex 1shows\. Notwithstanding its relatively good recent record of
improving health, Nicaragua continues to confront many of its traditional health challenges\. The
disease profile o f Nicaraguai s one of a country inthe early phases of the epidemiological
transition\. Infectious diseases remain major health concerns, and perinatal illnesses together with
the illnesses of early childhood-malnutrition, acute respiratory diseases and diarrhea in
particular-continue to dominate the public health agenda\. Moreover, unless current trends are
accelerated, it i s unlikely that Nicaragua will achieve the MillenniumDevelopment Goals
(MDG)of reducingmaternal mortality and the prevalence of chronic malnutrition\. Maternaland
child health care, therefore, remain at the top of Nicaragua's human development agenda\. In
addition, the overall fertility rate-one o f the highest inL A C at 3\.2-is a particularly pressing
social problem, and the adolescent pregnancy rate i s second to none in the r e g i ~ n \. ~
Maternal mortality 125 129 Yes 40 Unlikely
Chronic Malnutrition 17\.8 16 Yes 7 Unlikely
Source PRSP, LSMS 2001, PRSP First Progress Report, Poverty Assessment 2003
With respect to healthfinancing, the level, stability and composition of M O Hfinancing are
causes of concern\. From 1999 to 2003, Ministry of Health (MOH) expenditures constituted 14
percent o f total national budget expenditures (i\.e\., national funds plus external financing)\. While
the,leveland sources of M O H financing were erratic over this period, inreal, absolute terms, its
2002-2003 total financing was 8 percent less than its 1999-2000 total\.
The M O H i s heavily dependent upon external financing (both grants and loans)\. From 1999 to
2003, external financing grew inreal terms from US$22\.9 million to US$30\.8 million\. Although
the level of external financing has fluctuated annually, it has generally grown -from 18 percent
of total M O H expenditures 1999 to 24 percent in 2003- at the same time that the level of real
financing provided by national funds has fallen (by an annual average of 7 percent since 1999)\.
Ineffect, the Government of Nicaragua (GON) has substitutedexternal funds for national funds
to finance M O H expenditures\. The composition of M O H resources i s also a cause of concern as
the allocation of public expenditures by department i s generally inversely related to the severity
and level of poverty (SANIGEST 2004: 90)\. A critical challenge for Nicaragua and the
international community i s to modify existing patterns of public health expenditures so that they
no longer reinforce, but instead help to address Nicaragua's unequal health and poverty profiles\.
Although the coverage of the health program of the NicaraguanSocial Security Institute (INSS)
has expanded by one-third over the past five years, it still provides coverage for only 9 percent of
the population, the lowest proportion of any Central American country\. Moreover, 70 percent of
its beneficiaries are from the wealthiest 40 percent of the population\. With private health
insurance covering a mere 1percent of Nicaraguans, the poor are forced to rely overwhelmingly
A 2001 national survey found that 25 percent of women aged 15-19 had already beenpregnant at least once\.
8
on a combination of Ministry of Health services and self-treatment\. Out-of-pocket purchases of
medicines have grown steadily inrecent years and now constitute 49 percent of all health
expenditures\.
Insummary, highfertility rates, childmalnutrition, poor health anda low level of financial
protection against illness still prevail for significant groups o f the population\. Moreover, these
same factors are important determinants of poverty and together they constitute apoverty trap
from which today's and tomorrow's Nicaraguanpoor will find it difficult to escape\. \.With
existing patterns of public expenditure mirroring these inequalities, a critical challenge for public
policy will be to reverse these inequities as a principal tool for combating poverty and fostering
human development\.
The GON i s well aware of many of the shortcomings of the health sector, and over the course of
the last five years has accelerated the pace of reform\. A few years ago it passed the General
Health Law (20021 and the Law's companion piece, the Regulation Decree'(2003), both \.
important steps in the modernization and institutional capacity-building of the MOH\. These legal
instruments set up: (i) the organization of a national health system based on two financial
regimes, contributory and non-contributory, their respective benefit plans, institutional
responsibilities and financing mechanisms; (ii) the principle o f separation o f functions,
reinforcing the M O H stewardship role and the instrumentsto do so (i\.e\., national health plan,
quality assurance mechanisms and sector planning mechanisms), (iii) a decentralized model of
governance and management; (iv) the basis for devolution of power to the Autonomous
Governments of the Atlantic Coast; and (iv) the consideration of the special needs andconditions
of the indigenous and afro-descendant population\. The Ministry i s now implementing these
reforms and developing its institutional capacity to address the sector challenges, with the
financial support of an IDB loan and the IDA'SAdjustable Programmatic Loan (APL) first-phase
credit (NI-3084)\.
The other key health care organization in the country, the Nicaraguan Social Security Institute
(INSS), has also made notable advances since 2000\. In2002, it separated financing from the
management of its health and pension regimes\. Between 2000 and 2004, it expanded the number
of beneficiaries of its health program by 32 percent, and introduced a new Elderly Health
Program (EHP) for its retired affiliates\. The INSS, which buys all medical services for its
affiliates from private providers (EMPs), has also devised and implemented a provider
certification system, and has reviewed and formalized the methodology for fixing the capitation
payment paid to the EMPs, with active participation from the EMPs and their trade association\.
Looking ahead, the G O N has agreed with a group of significant donors, including IDA, to
increase their effort to coordinate and harmonize official development aid by sponsoring a series
of Sector Wide Approaches (SWAp) in a number o f sectors, including health\. Nicaragua has
done a substantial amount of work in health policy reform that serves as a strong foundation for
the proposed SWAp: in October 2004, the GON (Government o f Nicaragua) released an
Operational National Development Plan to update the 2001 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
(PRSP); in mid-2004 the M O H released the ten-year National Health Policies and its
accompanying 2004-2015 National Health Plan (NHP), outlining how it plans to achieve the
health goals set out in its PRSP; inNovember 2004 the MOHreleased a draft Five-Year
9
Implementation Plan (FYIP) detailing how it would operationalize the aforementioned NHP\.The
fundamental goal set up by the FYIP i s increased access of the poor people of Nicaraguato
effective maternal and child healthcare\. This would be achieved by expanding access to a
package of basic health services (PBHS) in the most deprived and rural municipalities of the
country through a combination of performance-based incentives to public providers and
purchasing of services from private providers\. InDecember 2004, the M O H convoked an
extraordinary session of the Local Health Care System (SILAIS) and local area health networks
(municipios)to present to them the NHP and national priorities for the FYIP, and to assist each
of them in establishing their own annual operating goals for each year inthe FYIP, and thereby
produce a detailed, bottom-up plan for programming and budgetingthe FYIP\.
These national plans have also receivedthe backing of the international financial community\. All
of the cooperating partners inthe SWAP have agreed that the FYIPwill serve as the operational
framework for the SWAp, thereby ensuring that the SWAP will be a single unifiedpolicy that
'will be fully aligned with government policy\. By its beirlgbased on the product of the still
nascent local annual programming system, it i s hopedthat the SWAPwill help to nurture the
further development of local level planning andprogramming capability, and thereby help to
institutionalize this new approach and with it, the effective decentralization of the MOH\.
2\. Rationale for Bank involvement
The primaryrationale of the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) i s to support the GON's
development goals as outlined inthe PRSP\. The Adaptable Program Credit (APL) for the health
sector modernizationproject, approved by the Board in 1998,supports three of the four 2001
PRSP pillars: (i) greater and better investment in the human capital of the poor, (ii) better
protection for vulnerable populations, and (iii) good governance\. The most significant IDA
support to Nicaragua consists of the poverty reduction support credits (PSAC and PRSCs)\. These
credits contain health conditionalities that are fully aligned with the PRSP\. This proposed new
SWAPwould buildupon the work accomplished under the first phase of the adjustable
programmatic loan (APL), concluded inDecember 2004, and would contribute directly and
synergistically to the goals established inthe PRSP with the PRSCs\.
The Bank's involvement in the SWAPbuilds upon its previous work inNicaragua by broadening
the policy dialogue on poverty reduction and promoting further reforms in the modernization of
the Nicaraguan health sector\. Since September 2003, the Bank has been working closely with
M O H to develop the NHP and the FYIP\. The first phase o f the Bank's APL health sector credit
achieved its development objectives satisfactorily\. The MOH-with the support of the World
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) through the health modernization
project-has developed sound institutional tools and regulations to improve the Ministry's
regulatory and management roles, as described in the previous section\. Extensive evaluations of
most of the first phase interventions supported by the APL, together with cross-evaluations with
other donors' programs and past national health policies, have been carried out over the past two
years\. The results of these evaluations have been used to inform new sector policies and have
assistedthe M O H in makingstrategic decisions about how best to harmonize donor contributions
and design the SWAP\.^ The vast majority o f the SWAp's planned activities consists of efforts to
A summary table of the evaluation results i s presented in Annex 1-A\.
10
scale-up activities that were pilot-tested, evaluated, deemed successful, and (generally with some
modifications) worthy of replication and expansion\.
While health modernization efforts, have made significant advances, much work still needs to be
done to improve the health status of the population and the country's health system\. Inequity
persists and the health reform and decentralization agenda is not yet completed\. Inaddition,
there i s a dire need to improve accountability, transparency and governance throughout the
sector\.
The Bank's expertise in SWAps, as well as its extensive experience with designing effective pro-
poor health strategies, complements the contribution of the other stakeholders in the SWAp\.
Moreover, the Bank has accrued important experience inthe Nicaragua's health sector working
closely with other donors and financiers\. The Bank has played a pivotal role encouraging the
M O H to develop a more cohesive sector policy and institutional structure, thereby promoting the
Ministry's institutional effectiveness and enhancing its leadership role in coordinating donors'
aid\. The Bank i s also part of the Budget Support Group (BSG) inNicaragua\. The BSGand all of
the bilateral donors financing the health SWAp, have agreed to a harmonized set of policy
actions and results (including health) that will serve as key inputs to the SWAp\.
3\. Higher levelobjectives to which the project contributes
The Government of Nicaragua's 2001 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which i s the
basis of the World Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Nicaragua, emphasizes the
need to improve public sector management and the coordination of foreign aid\. The health
SWAP supports three of the PRSP's four pillars by targeting vulnerable populations, focusing on
institutional strengthening and capacity-building and encouraging greater and better human
capital investment in the poor\. Inparticular, the SWAPwill primarily seek to improve the
maternal and child health of a significant proportion of the Nicaraguan poor and, thereby, help to
reduce the rural-urban health inequities\. More easily accessible and more affordable access to
health, nutrition and family planning counseling and services will, in turn, contribute to reducing
child malnutrition, protecting household income and facilitate women's empowerment\. The
SWAPwill also improve the Nicaragua health sector effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability
by improving the MOH's stewardship role, fostering alliances with private (NGOs and others)
and official institutions (TNSS), broadening the capacity of decentralized units to manage
resources and evaluate performance, and improve the targeted use o f external assistance, while
reducing the administrative burden that has historically been associated with it\. Each of these
highlevel development objectives are fully aligned with the NHPand its FYIP, as well as IDA'S
APL program development objectives\.
B\. PROJECTDESCRIPTION
1\. Lendinginstrument
APL program: In 1998 the Bank approved a ten-year Health Modernization Program (APL)
consisting of two phases, the first one for an amount o f US$32 million to be implemented
between 1999 and 2003\. This first project was co-financed (joint-financing) by the Norwegian
11
Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD)\. for an amount of US$3 million equivalent,
and The Nordic Development Fund (NDF),for an amount equivalent to US$3\.5 million of
parallel co-financing\. The program seeks to improve the efficiency, effectiveness and equity of
the Nicaraguahealth system\. The first phase was completed on December 31St,2004 and the
second phase i s expected to commence in the second half of 2005\.
The first phase focused on: (i) extension of primary health care (PHC) by strengthening the
the
physical condition and management o f public PHC providers\. implementing a community
nutrition and growth program, developing a network of Women's Centers (CasusMuternus) and
piloting the contracting of PHC from NGOs; (ii) hospital reform, including physical
rehabilitation and equipment and management demonstration projects; (iii) modernization of
specific MOH capabilities-most notably reforming the sector regulatory and organizational
framework, strategic planning\. financial management, information systems, human resources,
Information, Education and Communication, and procurement of pharmaceuticals and medical
supplies; (iv) modernization of the Social Security Institute and 'expansion of health insurance\.
The borrower met or surpassed the triggers established for moving to phase 11\.Compliance with
specific triggers i s as follows:
12
Trigger indicators Status of compliance
Policv indicators
1, New roles and responsibilitiesdefined This goal was accomplishedby the 1999Law onOrganization, Competenceand
for MOH, and new organizational and Proceduresof the Executive\. This law establishedmoreclear specialization of
functional structure established\. functions within the MOH\. The MOH is devisingand implementinga second step
2\. Adequate legal framework supporting re-structuringexercisesince early 2004\.
the developmentof MOHorganization, The Law on Pharmaceuticalsand Pharmacy, in 1998,the GeneralHealthLaw, in
pharmaceuticals,social security, and 2002, andtheir regulations(Reglamenros), in 1999 and 2003 respectively, have been
privateprovision of health services in passedand enacted\.
place\.
3\. Major changes introducedin resource A bottom-up, activity-basedbudgeting exercise has beenimplementedby MOH
allocation, with activity and since 2003, breakingupthe old historicalbudget\. This system has beenformalizedin
performance-basedmanagement the budgetstructure and has beenapprovedby the MOF\. As apartial consequenceof
agreements signed with SILAIS and this, budget execution of the MOH has gone up from 77% in 1999to 99% in2003\.
hospitaldirectors\. Management agreementshave beensigned in 2004 with all 17 SILAIS, 152
4\. Separationof core business in INSS municipalitiesand 32 public hospitals for setting performancegoals and identifying
(including accountsand management), fundingresources
and numberof policy holders increased INSS has effectively separatedthe administrationand accounting of the three plans\.
by 20% (comparedto 1998) Affiliation has also accomplishedthe target since INSS beneficiaries have increased
from 259,506 in 1998to 353,035 in2004 (+36%)\.
Implementation indicators
5\. IntegratedMaternal and Child care The IntegratedMaternalandChild Care Model (Modelo de Gesti6fi)has been
Modeland nutritioninterventions implementedin the 6 pilot SILAIS, under support of the APL\. All 17 SILAIS now
operational in 17 SILAIS\. enter into annualmanagement agreementswith MOHto deliver the PHC services\.
The nutrition programhas beenimplementedin 442 communities, morethan
doublingthe number planned,andhas beentaken up by other donors in 1,413
additionalones\.
6\. Nationalprogramto reducematernal The programwas designedin 2002 and implementedinthe 11beneficiarySILAIS of
andperinatal mortality designed (based the APL\. Maternaldeathswent down in 13 pilot municipalitiesfrom 21 in 2001to 7
on results from pilots) in 2004, and infant deathsfrom 213 in2001to 115 in2004\.
7\. Managementstrengthenedin five Fourpilot hospitals have fully implementedthe following management tools, under
hospitals\. APL support:strategic plans,management agreements, intemal management
agreements,managementtable-boards, quality improvement programs, nursing
standardpractices, and waste management plans\. Some of thesetools havebeen also
replicatedin four other "tutored" hospitals\. Two other nationalhospitals have
implementedsimilar tools under IDB support\.
8\. At least 30 hospitals rehabilitation Intotal, 31 rehabilitationprojects have beenundertakenin the four pilot hospitals
projects implemented\. andthe other four "tutored" hospitals\. Most of them concentrated on upgradingthe
critical path(emergency,operating rooms, obstetric and neonritology wards),
bringing them to compliancewith MOH minimumstandards (habiliracidn)\.
9\. ManagementInformation System links Managementinformation systems (managementtable-boards)are operational in
to center operational from 8 SILAIS\. MOHhospitals and are beingreviewedmonthly by the MOHhospitaldirectorate\.
SILAIS also operate with areducedmanagement table-board for supervisingtheir
10\. Collectiveaffiliation substitutes PHC local providers\.
individual affiliation in INSS and new INSS has fully implemented an integrated FMsystem\.As a result all financial
financial management system in place\. transactions(payroll, accounting, inventory,budget, treasury, humanresources) are
now interlinked and INSS has access to on time financial statements\. Regardingthe
modeof affiliation, individual affiliation substitutedcollective affiliation startingin
1996and was completedby 1998\.
The second phase of the APL will continue the same program's objectives, although its
implementation will further focus on the achievement o f maternal and child health results\. It will
scale up the first project's activities for expansion of services, learn from lessons accrued and
benefit tremendously from the institutional ownership and capacity gained duringthe first phase\.
However, the Bank, together with the rest o f the development community inNicaragua, has
made a commitment to the GON that it will foster broader coordination of foreign aid\. To that
end, the Bank has worked with GON and the many donors inthe health sector to develop a
Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp), both to ensure coordination among the many donors in the
health sector and to reduce the transaction costs of managing external assistance for the GON\.
The APL second phase will be an integralpart of the SWAp\.
13
The massive amount of foreign aid Nicaragua received after natural disasters (inparticular,
Hurricane Mitch in 1998) resulted in a proliferation of projects inthe health ~ e c t o rThe lack of \. ~
adequate coordination of these projects has bred inefficiencies in the health sector while foisting
excessive demands on the M O H for project supervision and monitoring\. The desire to reduce the
administrative burdenof external assistance has been a major factor motivating the MOH's
efforts to promote a health SWAp\. The timing of the SWAP i s particularly propitious given that
IDA, IDB,Finlandand Sweden (two major bilateral donors inthe health sector inNicaragua) are
all in similar phases of the traditional project cycle and need to define their activities inthe
health sector for the next four to five years\. This constellation of circumstances provides a
compelling need for, and a unique opportunity to develop, a health SWAPunder the leadership
of the MOH\.
IDA will contribute US$11 million to the health SWAP though this proposed secondphaseAPL\.
This amount has been reduced from the US$15 million allocated inthe NicaraguaCAS for this
project, due to current restrictions of IDA-13 funds\. '
2\. Project development objective and key indicators
As approved by the IDA Boardin 1998, the overall APL program development objective is to
improve health outcomes inNicaragua, particularly among the poor, by raising the efficiency,
effectiveness, equity and sustainability of the Nicaraguan health system\. Inthis second phase of
the APL, IDA financing will contribute, along with funds from the M O H and other SWAP
partners, to improving maternal and child health inthe poorest municipalities of Nicaragua,
where roughly half of Nicaragua's poor reside\. Improving the health status of this population,
should reduce health inequities, inparticular, the disparities in maternal and infant mortality
indicators across geographical areas and income groups\. These goals will be achieved through
the operationalization of three strategic objectives, as set forth in the sector Five-Year
Implementation Plan, namely: (i) extension of coverage of a package o f basic health services
the
to the poorest areas of the country, via the new integrated model of health care; (ii) the physical
and functional strengthening of the health service facilities network, focusing on maternal-infant
care, so as to provide a seamless path of essential services in the target areas; and (iii)
institutional strengthening and capacity-building, concentrated specifically on developing the
purchasing, monitoring and evaluation capacities of the MOH, its leadership role to enhance
donors' alignment and harmonization, and the management capacity of M O H decentralized units
and Autonomous Governments of the Atlantic Coast\.
A common set of results indicators accompanies the FYIP and will be closely monitoredby the
MOHand the SWAP partners\. These indicators, along with its corresponding targets, are fully
described inAnnex 3 and include the following:
IResults related to improved access to matemal and child essential services in targeted areas:
1\. The number o f beneficiaries of the expansion of essential health services
2\. Institutional delivery rate
3\. Child immunization rates
4\. Coverage o f early prenatal care
'In 2003, there were 36 internationally funded projects in the health sector and 14 distinct primary health care
models\.
14
~ ~~ ~ ~
5\. Coverage of complete prenatalcare
6\. Utilization rates of safe family planningmethods
IResults relatedto strengtheningthe health services network in targeted areas:
7\. Number of pregnant women admitted to Women's Centers (Casus Matenas)
8\. Hospital discharge rate
9\. Number of hospitals with critical path services certified by MOH
10\. Percentageof providers satisfying targets set intheir service agreements
1 11\. Percentageof maternal deaths audited
Results relatedto improved sector stewardship and institutional strengthening
12\. Percentageof MOH budget transferred to local systems as purchase of services
13\. Percentageof MOH budget directly administeredby the MOH executing units of the Autonomous Atlantic Regions
14\. Per-capitapublic health expenditure in the targeted areas
3\. Project components
The Five-Year Implementation Plan (2005-2009) provides the strategic framework for all SWAP
partnkrs to join efforts to achieve the stated results\. While the'FYIP has a national scope and
incorporates all M O H activities, it has been agreed with the M O H that the FYIP, and its
consecutive annual action plans, will clearly identify a subprogram of activities aimed
specifically at achieving the targets and strategic initiatives set out hereafter\. The two first
strategic objectives within this program are targeted to the 79 municipalities with the greatest
health needs\. If new funds become available or new donor partners join the SWAp, this list of
municipalities andor the identified priority activities may be increased accordingly\. The FYIP
sets up the strategic actions to achieve the following three strategic objectives:
Strategic Obiective 1: Extension of health care coverage to the poorest population (US$36\.5
million)
Extension of the Basic Package of Health Services to vulnerable rural populations at the
community-level
A package of basic health care services (PBHS), focusing on maternal and child health, will be
offered to the most deprived population of Nicaragua\. Vulnerable populations and localities for
the extension of coverage have been identified based on the following criteria: current access to
health services, level of poverty, and health status\. A multiple-tiered targeting process has been
used\. First, the 12 most vulnerable departments have been identified, usingthe targeting criteria
explained inAnnex 4\. Second, 79 municipalities within the 12 most vulnerable departments have
been selected usingthe same criteria\. Intotal, these localities account for 47 percent of the
poorest Nicaraguans\. Third, within these 79 municipalities, the rural and indigenous
communities (comarucas) will be prioritized\. The content o f the PBHS further focuses this
interventionby targeting specific diseases and health problems, maternal and child health along
with a few other adult-prevalent diseases that have their greatest impact on the poor\. I t i s
estimated that the PBHS will be extended over the next five years to 470,000 inhabitants living
inthe most deprived municipalities of the North andAtlantic Coast of Nicaragua\.
The expansion of the PBHS will be based on the implementation o f a new integrated health care
model (MAIS), developed by the MOH to integrate the multiple, diverse models of health care
delivery and management that have been implemented over the past years\. The M A I S has
15
already been drafted b y the M O H and includes all the necessary technical instruments to
implement this strategy\. It establishes the delivery model (including consideration of different
delivery modalities according to social and geographical characteristics of the population to
cover), the benefits plan, targeting mechanism, contracting and payment instruments, social
participation strategies and supervision and monitoring arrangements)\. Itinerant health service
delivery teams will be organized for reaching the poor living inthe most remote areas of the
country\. The PBHS will be tailored, incontent and delivery modalities, to the special conditions
of the indigenous and afro-descendant population\. These accommodations are currently being
worked out between the M O H and the Autonomous Governments of the Atlantic Coast, where
most o f these groups live\.
The delivery of the PBHS will be achieved through a capitation transfer to SILAIS which, in
turn, will purchase services from public, local providers (municipios)and/or qualified, private
providers (mainly NGOs)\. These capitation transfers constitute a community health financing
scheme\. The community health financing scheme will provide uni'versal coverage within targeted
communities of the 79 prioritized municipios\. The community health financing scheme will
entitle all persons residing inthe targeted communities (comarcas) to the services included inthe
PBHS\. The amount to be transferred to each SILAIS will be determinedby an adjusted
capitation payment\. The total value of funds transferred to each SILAIS will be calculated as the
product of the population of the community and a region-specific, average per capita cost of the
PBHS (i\.e\., the number o f residents inthe community will be multipliedby the region-specific,
average per capita cost)\. The transfers to the SILAIS will be made monthly and prospectively\.
The beneficiary population will be estimated prospectively\. The initial population estimates of
the targeted communities will be based on the official 2005 national census that i s currently
being conducted b y the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC)\. Each year, the
capitation transfers made to the SILAIS on behalf of the targeted communities will be adjusted to
take into account changes inpopulation\. These adjustments will be based on the annual,
community-specific, population estimates that INEC routinely prepares duringinter-censal years,
and that constitute the official GON population estimates Additionally, there will be a review,
and (if deemed appropriate) an adjustment of the regionally differentiated capitation rates\.
The M O H will enter into management agreements with the SILAIS (Convenios de Gestidn)\.
These Convenios will be the basis for the capitation transfers o f the community health financing
scheme to the SILAIS\. The capitation transfers will finance the delivery of services (mainly
maternal and child care) included in the PBHS, including outreach strategies, necessary
transportation, essential drugs, nutrition advice, IEC activities, reproductive and sexual health
services and limited essential health services for adults\. The actual delivery of services and the
expected outcomes of such services will be monitored and verified through a two-pronged
strategy:
- social audit mechanisms will be devised, by which: (1) the community will certify that the
local providers render the services included inthe PBHS, and (2) periodic community
surveys will be carried out to investigate the quality and timeliness of services and members
of community's general level of satisfaction with the arrangement\.
- Intermediate results linked to the delivery of the PBHS will be closely monitored by the
SILAIS and the MOH\. These intermediate results, as described inthe results framework
16
(Annex 3), are: institutional deliveries, child immunization, early prenatal care, full prenatal
care and discharges from Women Centers\. The achievement and verification of these results
will also be subject to an independent assessment, as agreed in the MOU\.
Inthe event that any beneficiary isjudged (by the MOH) to have beendeniedcare for services
included in the PBHS, the M O H will deduct the capitation payment made for that patient and
apply penalties as described in the Operational Manual\.
Strengthening planning, accountability and social participationfor the delivery of the PBHS
The SWAp's resources will fund technical assistance necessary to develop institutional capacity
at the SILAIS and local provider levels (municipios)for implementing the expansion of the
PBHS\. While local providers will progressively take up broader management responsibilitiesfor
the delivery of services and management of resources, SILAIS will develop a supporting role to
the MOHcentral purchasing unit, helping out in the planning, formulation, m6nitoring and
supervision of annual health plans, service contracts with private providers and performance
agreements with public local providers\. This capacity buildingsupport activities will entail
capacity assessment, training, development and implementation of contractual, management and
clinical instruments, and information technology necessary to effectively plan for the expansion
of services, improve and control quality, manage resources at local level, and monitor results\.
Both public and private health care providers will work closely with the communities, jointly
identifying the community's health needs, and programming community and health sector
actions to address their health problems\. This work will constitute the MOH-community
interface portion of the Ministry's ongoing decentralization efforts\. To date, MOH's
decentralization has been exclusively an intra-institutional process\. A key element of the process
has been the recent development of local M O H networks' (municipios) annual programming and
budgeting exercise, whereby they develop annual operating plans, which then aggregate up to the
SILAIS level to become the heart o f the SILAIS annual plan\. The SWAP will help taking this
process to the next step, and will incorporateprivate sector itinerant health teams and local health
counciles (as well as the MOH's hospitals) into the planning, monitoring and
evaluatiodfeedback cycle\. The civil society will play an active role on auditing the actual
delivery and quality of services to the community\. A community committee will advise and
ultimately endorse the provider annual working plan and periodically (e\.g\., quarterly) provide
monitoring feedback to the provider and the supervisory SILAIS\.
Strategic Obiective 2: Strengthening the network o f services in targeted areas to support the
implementationof the PBHS (US$27\.8 million)
This component of the SWAP is designed to supportthe extension of coverage, and to
complement its MCH-related activities\. Activities in this area are aimed at creating an effectively
structured and functioning referral system that will provide a more complete continuum of M C H
care to rural communities, while increasing their access to secondary care and improving the
overall quality of health care\.6 Bringingsuch a system to fruition will require improving three
I t is expected that the extension of primary care through the PBHS will increase the demand for and referrals to
secondary care\.
17
different types of facilities that comprise the M C H delivery system located in the same
geographical areas selected for the expansion of essential services:
WomenHomes (CasusMaternas)
CasusMaternas (CMs) are low cost, assisted-living arrangements that usually have around 10
beds and are located next to a hospital\. The physical facilities are usually contributed by the
community\. Communities get also involved inco-financing and managing these homes\. The
CMs are designed to lodge pregnant women living in remote villages inthe last few days of their
pregnancy, to ensure that the women have ready access to an institutional facility when labor
work starts\. Women usually stay in these facilities for a few days after delivering\. Services
provided inthese Casus also expand to provide family planning and child nutrition counseling,
as well as other education activities for empowering women\. Selected communities will be
trained and supported to manage and maintain their CMs\. It i s envisaged that 30 additional units
will be added to the existing network of CMs\. Fundingwillbe provided for the rehabilitation of
existing premises or (on an exceptional basis) the construction of new homes, the acquisition of
basic equipment and furnishings for the homes, time bound (and declining) recurrent costs,
activities aimed at empowering women staying in the homes, and the promotion of family
planning\.
Primary Health Care Centers
This part of the program is aimed at improving the infrastructure and renovating existing primary
health care centers in the targeted geographical areas and ensuring they are sufficiently equipped\.
The centers will also be stocked with the medical supplies required b y the basic package of
health and nutrition services (PBHS)\. A needs assessment of physical rehabilitation and
equipment of health centers inthe targeted areas will be prepared as part of the pre-investment
phase of the SWAp\.
Hospitals
The 12district hospitals inthe areas targeted for extension of coverage will be rehabilitated and
equipped with medical and industrial equipment necessary to improve the quality and safety of
the maternal and child care critical path\. Specifically, investments will revamp emergency
rooms, operating rooms, obstetric and pediatric wards and related ambulatory facilities, as well
as support clinical services (image and lab departments)\. Other essential general hospital
facilities, including laundry, steam and water, catering and waste management, will also be
improved\. It i s expected that although the investment will prioritize the maternal and child care
critical path, it will also have a positive spill over impact on hospital services rendered to other
patients by upgrading these general and support hospital facilities\.
Investments inphysical infrastructure (remodeling only) and equipment will be accompanied by
investments to improve the management of those facilities\. The SWAP will buildupon the
experiences of the health modernization project (APL first phase) and will extend and replicate
the support given to the first phase pilot hospitals inorder to improve the management capacity
and systems inthe 12targeted hospitals\. The management support strategy includes direct
18
technical support to the hospital directors by itinerant management support teams, under the
supervision of the M O H central Hospital Directorate, training, information technology and
implementation o f institutional management systems (i\.e\., M O H information, procurement and
financial management systems)\. Special support will be given to the preparation and
implementation of hospital waste management plans, complying with applicable national
standards and policies acceptable to IDA, control of hospital infectious diseases and
implementation of quality improvement strategies\.
Strategic Obiective 3: Improving Stewardship, Institutional Strengthening and Decentralization
(US$17\.8 million)
The M O H recognizes that to fulfill the vision set forth in the NHP and effectively lead the
SWAp, it will need to undertake a variety o f institutional reforms\. These include: (i)
strengthening the Ministry's management capacity necessary for planning, contracting and
super`vising the expansion of the PBHS (e\.g\., programming arld planning, information and
reporting) and the rest of institutional fiduciary systems (financial accounting, procurement,
auditing) so the SWAP can progressively adopt these national systems instead of donors'
procedures; (ii) strengthening the GON's capacity to monitor andevaluate health sector
performance, efficiency and equity; (iii) supporting the MOH's coordination role as executor and
overseer of the GON's population policy; and (iv) developing a strong purchasing function at the
MOH, including the identification of beneficiaries for the expansion of essential services,
adjusting payment mechanisms, overseeing service quality, contract design and monitoring\.
The FYIPalso includes under this objective activities to advance the decentralization policy
established by the National Health Policies\. Inparticular, the SWAPwill support
decentralization by: (i) providing advocacy and technical assistance to municipal government to
undertakepublic healthresponsibilities7; (ii) supporting the devolution of responsibilities to the
two Autonomous Governments of the Atlantic Coast over the organization and management of
their regional health systems; (iii) offering technical support to MOHdepartment offices
(SILAIS) to carry out their annual planning and contracting functions; (iii) decentralizing
management of the M O H human resources function to the SILAIS and hospitals\. The over-riding
goal will be to improve the performance of MOH-increasing its effectiveness, efficiency and
the degree of equity in access to and expenditures on health care-by improving incentives and
accountability\.
4\. Lessons learned and reflected in the project design
The FYIP supported b y the SWAP scales up the successful programs piloted under the APL first
phase, based on feedback obtained from evaluations of its components\. This is particularly
evident in three elements of the strategy\. First, the development o f a unified, institutionally
endorsed delivery and management model for primary health care was prompted by the existence
of at least 14different donor-sponsored primary health care programs\. The Integrated Healthcare
A recently passedLaw by the National Assembly requires the central Government to transfer an increasing
proportion of the GON's budget to municipal governments\. It is expected that municipal governments will take up
some public health responsibilities nowadays delivered by the MOH\. But this assumption of functions requires
raising awarenessand capacity in these institutions to execute those responsibilities\.
19
Model (MAIS) developed by the M O H integrates already piloted successful programs, like the
community nutrition and growth program (PROCOSAN), sexual and reproductive health
services programs and the contracting out of essential services from NGOs for remote
communities\. The MAIS has been designed after the results of an evaluation of the mentioned 14
PHC projects and an evaluation of the health modernizationproject's components\.
Second, in view of the fact that evaluations of the Casus Muternus show that these facilities have
made a substantial contribution to reducing maternal mortality and improving other reproductive
health indicators', the FYIP seeks to expand the existing network of CMs\. Based on findings
from evaluation reports, collaboration between the CMs and local community service
organizations and the integration of the C M network with the formal health care system, which
were found to be successful elements of the strategy, will be pursued\.
Third, lessons from the operation of the Safe Maternity and Infancy Fund(FONMAT) highlight
the positive results of usingperformance-based payments to public' providers to increase the
production o f services\. Experience inexpanding services inNicaragua, and elsewhere, show that
supply and demand interventions are equally and simultaneously needed\. The Nicaragua SWAP
will apply specific incentivesto public and private providers for increasing performance and at
the same time will improve the health services network and community infrastructure, and
mobilize health professionals to work in underserved communities\. The key results identified
regarding the implementation of the Health Sector Modernization Program's first phase, as well
as lessons drawn from other relevant evaluation studies undertaken recently are presented in
Annex 1-A\.
Furthermore, the SWAP collects the knowledge and expertise of several key bilateral and
multilateral donors with substantial historical experience inthe Nicaraguanhealth sector and
different comparative advantage and expertise\. It also builds upon the relationships established
duringIDA'Sprevious collaboration with the IDB,NORAD and NDFinthe supervision and
evaluation of the Health Sector Modernization Project\.
5\. Alternatives considered and reasonsfor rejection
Possible alternatives to the SWAP would have been first, carrying out a second phase of the APL
credit as a standalone project, outside the SWAPcontext\. However, as noted above, this would
have been inefficient as it would have promulgatedthe disjointed nature of project-based funding
inthe health sector, without allowing for a coordinatedmulti-donor approach supporting sectoral
priorities\. In addition, another reason for selecting the SWAPmodality i s that with limited
resources the Bank i s able to influence a much larger set of policy issues\.
A second possibility would have been providing additional IDA fundingto the second PRSC,
attached to additional healthand nutrition priority actions\. While the SWAPcomplements and
supports the PRSC's current health and nutritional policies and goals, an investment sector loan
forges stronger M O H ownership, provides earmarked funds to carry out the sector plans, and
offers an excellent avenue to convey the Bank's technical expertise to the MOH\.
* TheNicaragua CasusMatemas initiative has been showcased and recognized as best practice by the World Bank
Gender Network in 2004\.
20
C\. IMPLEMENTATION
1\. Partnershiparrangements
Partners in the SWAP are Sweden, The Netherlands, Finland, and the IDB\.Some bilateral donors
(Finland, Sweden and The Netherlands) will provide unrestrictedbudget support to the MOH\.
Sweden will be contributing US$20 million over the next five years\. Netherlands will contribute
US$2 million in 2005 and continue inputtingat least similar amounts on an annual basis\. Finland
estimates its contribution will be US$6\.5 million between 2005 and 2009\. The IDB has approved
inDecember 2004 a $30 millionperformance-based credit to be disbursed over five years\. The
IDB credit, althoughusingIDBprocurementprocedures, resources the same five-year action
plan, disburses against a subgroup of the SWAp's result targets, relies on the M O H institutional
structure to execute the project, and will bejointly supervised with the rest of the SWAP
partners\. USAID, another big player in Nicaragua's health sector, has been pafticipating in all
the SWAP preparation missions and although unable to pool funds with the rest of the donors,
has committed to also support the FYIP, and particularly those activities aimed at institutional
strengthening and sector governance\. The total SWAP envelope for the five-year timeframe
amounts to US$ 82\.2 million, including (1) IDB and IDA credit proceeds, (2) funds from
Finland, Sweden and The Netherlands and (3) M O H counterpart funds for the IDB and IDA
credits\.
2\. Institutionaland implementationarrangements
The principles of the SWAp planning, executing, monitoring and coordination mechanisms are
contained in a Code of Conduct that has been agreed between the MOH and the SWAPpartners\.
Those principles will be further detailed in a Memorandum of Understanding that the MOH will
agree with the SWAP partners before credit effectiveness\. As outlined inthat Code o f Conduct
(already signed by all SWAP partners), and the drafted MOU, the M O H will lead the
implementation and execution of the SWAp\. The Mesa Sectorial de Salud (MS), comprised of
all cooperating agencies inthe health sector and all the health-related government agencies, will
be the principal forum for cooperation, information exchange and dialogue for the overall health
sector development\. The M O H and all the SWAP partners will constitute a Coordinating
Committee incharge of overseeing the planning and execution of the FYIP and its annual action
plans, and reviewing periodically (at least biannually) the attainment of its targets\. Technical
support and internal coordination within the M O H will be provided by a SWAP Technical
Secretariat directly reporting to the Minister o f Health\. The director of the Technical Secretariat
will be appointed by the Health Minister, under TORS,employment conditions and appointment
subject to approval by all the SWAP partners\.
Initially-until the M O H sets up a dedicated purchasing unit within its formal structure-the
Health Planning and Development General Directorate (DGPD) will be the purchasing entity for
the SWAP-funded expansion of services\. This office will purchase the PBHS through the
management agreements with SILAIS on a per capita basis\. It i s also the MOH's intent that the
purchasingunit to be created will gradually take over the purchasing of health services
throughout the country usingMOHresources through the annual management agreement signed
21
with all SILAIS\. The DGPDwill also be responsible for the annual planning and budgetingof
the FYP\. The Financial Administration General Directoratewill be responsible for budgeting,
accounting and reconciliation matters and providing support to the DGPD on mid- and short-
term financial planning of the SWAp\. The DGPD will inturn provide technical support to the
SWAP Technical Secretariat on other SWAPexecution matters\.
Flow of Funds
All donors of the Nicaragua health SWAP will contribute their funds to a Health Sector Support
Fund, FONSALUD\. Basedon MOF's preference, eachdonor funding FONSALUD will have its
own special deposit account\. The M O F (through the Treasurer General) will open and maintain
inthe NicaraguaCentralBank (BCN) a special deposit account for IDA'Scontribution to
FONSALUD,which will be co-managed by M O H and MOF, to be used exclusively for deposits
and withdrawals o f credit proceeds for eligible expenditures\. After the conditions of
effectiveness have been met, and the special deposit account has been opened, M O H will submit
the first disbursement request to IDA, together with the credit expenditure forecast for the next
six months\. Subsequent to the first disbursement, credit proceeds will be withdrawn on a
quarterly basis under the report-based disbursement method (described in Annex 7)\.
Program disbursements will be made utilizing MOH's general disbursement procedures\. For
major expenditures, upon receipt of a request from MOH, M O F will execute payments out of the
national Single Treasury Account (CUT)\. For minor expenditures, M O H will execute payments
usingthe revolving fund mechanism\.
Payments under Component 1will be made in accordance with the provisions of the
management agreements with the targeted SILAIS (such provisions to be consistent with the
Operational Manual that has to be reviewed and approved b y the SWAPpartners)\. Every month
the M O H will transfer to each SILAIS a portion of the amount calculated by multiplying the
estimated beneficiary population in the SILAIS by the adjusted capitation payment for that
SILAIS (as explainedinsection B\.3)\.Advance payments could be made to provide working
capital at the beginning of each year, as defined in the Operational Manual, and then
proportionally deducted from the monthly capitation transfers throughout the remainder of the
one-year contract\. At the end o f the program, or in the interim inthe event of significant
underperformance, SILAIS will refund any unused balance\. The costing mechanism will be
documented in the Operational Manual and reviewed on an annual basis\.
Certain minor expenditures under Component 2 will be paid for by the SILAIS under short-term
advances from M O H subject to reconciliation\. Other payments will be managed centrally by the
MOH's Finance Department\.
3\. Monitoringand evaluation of outcomedresults
A common set of results and indicators, as mentionedin section B\.2and detailedinAnnex 3, has
been set up by the M O H and agreed by the SWAP partners\. Results will be monitored on a
regular basis by M O H at the central, SILAIS and local levels\. The SWAP specific results are
consistent with those nationwide results established between the GON and the Budget Support
22
Group of donors, and both sets of indicators will bejointly monitored at the SWAP supervision
missions\. The SWAPCoordinating Committee will meet at least twice a year as specified inthe
Code of Conduct, to monitor progress made on the implementation of the Five-Year
Implementation Plan and the consecutive Annual Operational Plans\. Duringthe preparatory
stages of the SWAp, the M O H has demonstrated sufficient capacity for information collection as
well as the flexibility to be able to devise innovative and technically sound approaches that will
contribute to the long term development of institutional capacity to not only monitor the SWAp,
but to better fulfill its role as the rector of the health sector\. This capacity will be further
enhanced inthe process of implementing and monitoring the SWAp, including the strengthening
of the M O H Information System (SIMINSA), which i s the main instrument for planning,
managing, reporting and supervising the FYIP\.
The Memorandum of Understanding, to be signed by the M O H and the SWAP partners, also
calls for an annual, independent audit of the SWAp's targets fulfillment, that will be carried out
undef TOR'Sacceptable to all the partners\. A mid-term evaluhtion will be carried out after two
years of implementation\. This mid-term evaluation will seek to take stock o f the accumulated
experience for refining the SWAPtargets, strategies and operational instruments\.
4\. Sustainability
The M O H has demonstrated its commitment to health sector reform and modernization through
its performance in the first phase of the APL credit and throughout the preparatory phase of the
SWAp\.Duringthese stages, the M O Hhas adopted a new regulatory framework, organizational
and functional structure through an incremental process of institutional modernization\.
The layout of the health sector strategy for the next ten years has been released and endorsed by
the GON and the SWAP partners, after thorough consultation\. Most of the FYIP strategies have
proven successful, though will be continuously adjusted and improved according to experience
accrued with the implementation of the SWAp\. In summary, the essential groundwork for the
implementationof the SWAPhas already been completed\.
The sustainability of the SWAP relies mainly on the financial capacity o f the M O H to keep up
with the running cost of delivering extended services once the FYIP i s over\. This seems feasible,
though, because: first, no major new infrastructure will be undertaken inthe five-year
implementation plan; second, it i s expected that the GON's fiscal situation will improve through
HlPC debt relief, forecasted economic growth, and increased external budget support, making
more likely the GON's injecting o f new funds into the M O H budget\. To that end, one o f the
SWAPtarget results requires from the GONat least maintaining the per capita M O H
expenditure, inreal terms, over the SWAP life cycle\. Third, through improved M O H purchasing
and stewardship capacity over the health sector, it is expected that allocative efficiency of GON
and external funds for health will improve, therefore makingthe sustainability of increased
access to essential services more affordable for the GON\. Finally, there i s an implicit agreement
among external donors that support to the Nicaraguan health sector will continue as long as its
poverty rates remain highand the health sector performance improves over time\.
23
5\. Critical risksand possiblecontroversialaspects
There are no controversial aspects inthe SWAP and no major opposition i s envisaged to its
broad goals and objectives\. The NHP 2004-2015 has been extensively consulted\. However, the
political situation inNicaragua i s currently very polarized, and consequently the approval of the
SWAPby the National Assembly, and the execution of the SWAP could be affected\.
Risks RISK MITIGATION MEASURES Risk
Rating
with
Mitigation
Lack of National Health Policies 2004-2015 and National Health Plan L
continuity of 2005-2009 are fully endorsed by GON and not only by MOH\.
GON They are extensively consulted with society and principal
commitment stakeholders\.
with the Moreover, the National Health Plan goals and strategies are
project's fully aligned with PRSP-11\.
policies and
strategies
Lack of capacity Institutional strengthening has been extensively done in first M
of the MOHto phase (particularly for financial administration systems) both
manage the at central and local (SILAIS) levels\. It will continue under the
complexity of a SWAp, particularly for procurement capacity\.
SWAP Continue support to decentralization and strengthening of
management to hospitals and SILAIS under new regulations\.
Increased role of SILAIS for managingthe SWAp\.
Synergies with PSTAC strengthening GON public
management capacities\.
Fiduciary capacity assessment (both at locai and central
levels) prepared before project implementation and action
plans implemented\.
Mismanagement Harmonization of procedures M
and corruption Close joint supervision of achievements and administrative
issues procedures\.
Availability of a tested financial administration system
(SIGFA and SIAF) standardized for the entire Government\.
Increased social control, particularly for the extension of
services component\.
Full involvement of independent official control bodies
(Contraloria, Oficina de Etica Pdblica)
Lack of Memorandum of Understanding previously agreed among L
understanding MOH and donors setting decision making mechanisms, M&E
and agreement systems and dispute settlement arrangements\.
among donor National Health Policies and 5-year health action plans
agencies and elaborated under MOH leadership\.
GON in Accrued experience of IDA working under a co-financing
planning, operation with NDF and Norway and a parallel financing with
monitoring and IDB infirst phase of the APL
evaluating the
SWAP
Insufficient Elaboration of a mid-term sectoral economic and financial L
funds framework consistent with the overall Nicaragua's MTEF\.
24
Fiscal spending ceilings are fully assessed before project
implementation\.
6\. Loadcredit conditions and covenants
There are no non-standard conditions for Board presentation\. Readiness for Board presentation i s
demonstrated by Nicaragua's satisfactory portfolio performance\.
Loan conditions and Covenants
Effectiveness conditions:
0 Operational Manual for the extension of the PBHS, including calculation of the capitation
transfer, estimation of beneficiary population, operation of the community health
financing scherns, contractual arrangements andperformance-based mechanisms for
public and private providers satisfactory to the Bank and other partners\.
Disbursement condition (beginning in January 2006 and applying only to the project's first
component):
0 Formal re-structuring of M O H central offices, establishing a purchasing branch within
the MOHwith clearly defined responsibilities on formulation and evaluation of
management agreements by January 2006\.
Legal Covenants:
Annual Working plan prepared b y the M O H and agreed with SWAPdonors before each
calendar year
0 Audit and expenditure reconciliation reports furnished to IDA\.
Progress reports submitted b y MOH to the SWAP Coordinating Committee prior to each
annual review meeting, including an independent assessment o f targets accomplishment\.
Annual review of the per capita cost of the PBHS and payment mechanism to providers
with a methodology satisfactory to IDA\.
D\. APPRAISAL SUMMARY
1\. Economic and financial analyses
NPV of Net Benefits =US$66\.7 million; R R = 54 percent
The economic evaluation considers the SWAp's costs and the direct and indirect economic
benefits expected from the successful implementation of the SWAp\. The benefits from the
SWAPare expected to be reaped for many years beyond the 5-year life of the SWAp\. A 10-year
planning horizon i s employed in this analysis, together with a 12percent discount rate\.
The SWAPwould produce four distinct types of direct benefits: (1) reductions in hospital
discharges for malnutrition, perinatal complications, intestinal infections and acute respiratory
25
infections; (2) a reduction in hospital bed-days owing to an increase inthe number of ambulatory
surgeries; (3) a reduction inhospital bed-days due to reduction inthe nosocomial infection rate;
and (4) improvements in the efficiency of the M O H owing to advances inthe process of
decentralization\. The net present value o f these direct benefits over the 10-year planninghorizon
i s estimated to be US$17\.6 million\.
The SWAPwould also produce indirect benefits, inthe form of potential years of life that would
be saved as a result of the SWAp's nutrition interventions, together with the lives saved from
reducing child and maternal mortality rates\. The valuation of the potential years of life saved i s
calculated as the product of the number of additional years of economically active life per
individual saved, weighted by the real average per capita Nicaraguan GDP\. The net present
value of these indirect benefits over the 10-year planning horizon i s US$118\.4 million\.
The total cost of the SWAP is US$82\.2 million\. Over the 10-year planning horizon, the net
pres'entvalue o f the net benefits of the SWAPi s US$66\.7 million\. The internal rate of returnof
the SWAP i s 54 percent\. A substantially more than proportionate share of the benefits of the
SWAPwould accrue to the poorest and most vulnerable groups inNicaraguan society\.
FiscalAnalysis
Most SWAP activities are investments designed to improve the effectiveness of the functioning
of the health network and to strengthen the management and stewardship of the Ministry\. These
activities will generate increased recurrent costs for the M O H inthe form of increased annual
maintenance costs\. The SWAPwill also increase the MOH's recurrent costs because the Ministry
will eventually need to pay the annual costs of maintaining the purchasing of NGO services
related to extending the coverage o f the Basic Package of\.Health Services\. It i s estimated that
these two sources of additional recurrent costs will be roughly equal in size and that upon
completion of the SWAPthey will together total US$5\.6 million, 3 percent of the projected total
expenditures of the M O H and roughly 4\.5 percent of the Ministry's total recurrent costs\.' The
total cost of the SWAP over the entire 10-year planning horizon averages 8 percent of total M O H
expenditures and about 15 percent of its total recurrent costs\. As a percent of GDP, the total cost
of the SWAPrepresent a relatively small number, never reaching even 0\.5 percent over the 10-
year period\. Insummary, based on the analysis of the costs, benefits, and return on investment,
the SWAP i s a viable economic undertaking\.
2\. Technical
M O Hhas developed the Integrated Health Care Model (MAIS) which will be the framework for
delivering the PBHS\.This model i s based on a variety of institutional experiences andjoint
projects, and draws lessons from a 2004 evaluation of these experiences implementedin
Nicaragua over the past five years\. The PBHS used to extend coverage o f health services under
the SWAP contains those health prevention, promotion and treatment practices that the
internationalexperience and research support as the more efficient health care interventions\. The
As part of preparation for the SWAp, annual projections of anticipated MOHallocations for the 2005-2009 period
were prepared working with officials from the Ministry of the Treasury, the Central Bank and the Ministry of the
Presidency's Strategic Planning Unit\.
26
criteria used to identify and target departments are sound and reliable measures of where poverty
and health needs tend to concentrate inNicaragua\. Component 11will ensure that the existing
health facilities in the targeted departments are upgraded in order to provide the appropriate
quality and safety services necessary to fulfill the health care path of the maternal and child
illnesses included in the PBHS\. The project includes the necessary provisions to secure
community and user involvement inthe planning and monitoring o f the delivery of health
services\. It also provides for the tailoring of the delivery model to the special needs and wants of
the indigenous people, significant recipients of the SWAP interventions\. Finally, Component I11
will support and buildup the M O H institutional strengthening necessary for continuously
evaluating the results of the SWAP and the Nicaraguahealth system as a whole, as well as the
fiduciary systems requiredto jointly operate M O H and external funds\.
3\. Fiduciary
The basic premise of the NicaraguaHealth financial management (FM) arrangements i s that they
will be based on the Government's public financial management systems and procedures, with
additional safeguards when needed\. The FMassessment reviewed MOH's financial
management structure, its experience inmanaging donor-funded projects and its internal
operating performance and procedures (budgeting, accounting, internal control, auditing and
reporting)\. The assessment concluded that MOH's financial management system meets the
Bank's minimumfinancial management requirements\. The FM action plan, supervisionplan and
scope of the audit are designed to manage the risks identified\. These provisions are detailed in
Annex 7\.
The three main components of the program will require procurement of small civil works,
consulting services and goods\. The issues/risks concerning the procurement component for
implementation of the project have been identified and include:
Inconsistencies between Law 323 and World Bank Guidelines on (i) registration
requirements; (ii) evaluation systems; and (iii)consulting services;
Inconsistencies between IDB and World Bank Guidelines on: (i) eligibility; (ii)
thresholds for prior review; and (iii)consulting services;
Weaknesses inthe internal and external auditing system;
Weaknesses in technical specifications, terms of reference, and contract management;
and
Need for additional qualified staff to manage project procurement\.
The corrective measures agreed upon will be included in a fiduciary memorandum of
understanding and include:
Review by Pool FundPartners of the annual procurement plan and quarterly updates;
Outline for the use of ICB and NCP systems;
A capacity plan funded by the Pool Fundto strengthen procurement procedures, reporting
and audit, and staff skills; and
Addition of qualified staff\.
27
With these measuresinplace, the overall project risk for procurement i s average\.
4\. Social
A social assessmentthat includes consultations, focus groups and interviews with local
communities, NGOs, health services users, traditional authorities, etc\. was carried out (October
2004-January 2005) by a local independent firm\. The assessment includes indigenous, non-
indigenous and Afro-Nicaraguan population living inhighly vulnerable areas with limited access
(geographic, linguistic or cultural) to health services\. The assessedareas include the Northern
and Southern Autonomous Atlantic Regions (RAAN, RAAS),Jinotega, Rio San Juan, and
selected municipalities of Nueva Segovia, Matagalpa and Madriz\. The objectives o f the
assessment were: (a) to assess the social feasibility of creation of new Women's Centers in 15
remote communities, and to evaluate the utilization of 4 existing Centers (El Rama, Bilwi,
Bluefields, Matagalpa); (b) to assess utilization of public health services (including 4 hospitals:
Bluefields, Bilwi, Juicalpa and Matagalpa) in 15 municipalities; (c) t6 assess the relationship
among the primary, secondary and tertiary levels of health care; and (d) to identify and
systematize the mechanisms of social control and health care surveillance presently in operation
by Councils, Committees, Associations and organized groups or civil society\.
Given that 11percent of the population is indigenous peoples, an Indigenous Peoples Plan (IPP)
has been incorporatedin the project design to ensure the indigenous andAfro-Nicaraguan
peoples benefit from the project in a culturally adequate manner\. The IPPderives from
consultations with the Central and Regional Autonomous Government of RAAN and RAAS, and
i s consistent with the National and Regional Health Plans\. Some of the activities included by the
IPPunder Component 1are: (a) A consultancy to determine the PBHS for RAANand RAAS;
(b) Contracting of private health care providers servingremote areas; (c) training and equipment
of itinerant health care units serving remote areas; (d) Installation of at least 15 new community-
managed Women's Centers inRAAN, RAAS, Rio San Juan, Jinotega, Madriz, Nueva Segovia
and Chontales; (e) Strengthening the services of 10existing Subsedes and creationof 8 new ones
inselected municipalities; (f)The creation of Municipal HealthDelegation inPrinzapolka\.
Under Component 2: (a) Training of 900 midwives and 500 traditional healers; (b) Equipping
midwives and healthpromoters; (c) Workshops with traditional health providers at the Institute
of Traditional Medicine of URACCANto share experiences, and disseminate best practices in
intercultural medicine\. Under Component 3: (a) Strengthening technical skills of Regional
Health Councils and Regional Government to administrate health; (b) Strengthening the capacity
of the Coordinating Commission to manage the decentralizationprocess; (c) Strengthening the
social auditing mechanisms by financing workshops, training, with the Regional, Municipal and
Communal Health Commissions\.
5\. Environment
This operation aims at improving the conditions of the Health Sector inNicaragua, throughout its
expansion and modernization\. This operation will lead to an increase of the production of Health
Care Waste (HCW), and a reversible and moderate environmental impact inthe areas where
remodeling activities will take place\. This operation i s category B\. In order to meet the
requirements of the Bank and, enhance the quality of the operation, the Government of
28
Nicaragua (GON) has prepared a stand alone Environmental Assessment which at least includes:
a summaryo f the report, a Health Care Waste Management Plan (HCWMP), its implementation
strategy, and a set of rules for constructors\.
The Health Care Waste ManagementPlan (HCWMP)
The EA presented by the GON contains a general objective, a methodology, a legal framework
and the HCWMP\. This plan includes an institutional framework for its implementation, an
overview of the current practices on handling HCW, a strategy and an action plan to improve the
management of H C W on selected facilities, indicators, training materials, environmental
mitigation measures, lessons learned, conclusions, schedule, budget and bibliography\.
As reported by the GON, HCW production inNicaragua was estimated in 1,43
kilograms/bed/day and an aggregate of National Daily ProductionLevel 9\.6 tons o f which 2\.4
tons are biologicalhazardous waste\. The legal framework comprehends a series df laws and
decrees, of which the most relevant are: Ley de Municipios N o 40 , 1988,Law 217, Ley General
del Medio ambiente y 10s recursos naturales, and the Ley General de Salud, on its articles 55, 56,
64, 65,66, 67,68, and 69, all addresses the framework for HCWM\. Based on the assessment
above the GON, expects to support through this operation on the following institutions: Hospital
Victoria Motta, Jinotega; Hospital Asuncibn, Juigalpa; Hospital Espaiia, Chinandega; Hospital
Dr\.Juan A\. Brenes, Somoto; HospitalLuis Alfonso MoncadaGuillCn,Ocotal; HospitalNuevo
Amanecer, RAAN; Hospital Gaspar Garcia Laviana, Rivas; Hospital Regional Ernest0 Sequeira,
RAAS;Hospital LuisFelipe Moncada, de San Carlos, Rio San Juan, Hospital Cesar Amador
Molina, Matagalpa; Hospital Escuela Oscar Danilo Gonzalez, Le6n; Hospital San Juan de Dios,
Esteli; and Hospital JosC Nebrowski, Boaco\.
The Ministry of Health (MOH) will implement the guidelines developed in the course of a
Technical Cooperation with the European Union\. These guidelines include the following
materials: guidelines for training and management of Health Care Waste (7 modules); a training
video on best practices on HCWM; a manual for technicians and supervisors; manual for
doctors and nurses; manual for General Services Personnel; and a C D which includes all of the
above\. A H C W M committee will be established on every health institution\. The strategy to be
implemented by M O H focuses on the inclusion in each fiscal year's budget of the required
resources to support the implementation o f H C W M plans, specifically allocate particular funds
to handle HCW; implement a recycling strategy for non-biomedical waste; sign technical
cooperation agreements with the major's offices to manipulate and dispose treated HCW in
specific sites, agreed in advance and under safety conditions, at the sanitary landfills; include
standards for accomplishments o f H C W M plans within the accreditation and certification plans;
all these activities supported by a series o f indicators in order to measure the effectiveness of the
plan\. The main indicators are as follows: Health Care Waste Management Committee
implemented, Health Care Waste Management Plan inPlace, Implementation of the HCWMP,
Efficiency on the Segregation Process, Treatment for Biomedical Waste, Training of Hospital
Personnel, Coordination with Municipal Authorities, Consejos Consultivos support the
Implementationof the Plan, Inclusion o f Budget for HCWM every Fiscal Year\.
29
Environmental rules for contractors :
The GONhas presented a report which addresses the needs of the minor construction works
supported by this operation\. The guidelines include the following: site selection criteria, heating
needs, ventilation, natural and artificial light energy efficiency, historical and cultural
considerations, and security and handicapped access\. Also, floor space (ft2) per bed/ward,
requirements for x-ray rooms, and adequacy of corridors for wheel chairbed access\. Also, waste
management, maintenance, stockpiles and borrow pits; site cleanup; safety duringconstruction;
nuisance and dust control; community relations; chance find procedures for culturally significant
artifacts; and Environmental SupervisionDuringConstruction\.
6\. Safeguard policies
Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project Yes N o
Environmental Assessment (OP/BP/GP 4\.01) [XI [I
Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4\.04) [I [I
Pest Management (OP 4\.09) [I [I
Cultural Property (OPN 11\.03, being revised as OP 4\.11) [I [I
Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4\.12) [I [I
Indigenous Peoples (OD 4\.20, being revised as OP 4\.10) [XI [I
Forests (OPBP 4\.36) [I [I
Safety o f Dams (OPBP 4\.37) [I [I
Projects inDisputed Areas (OP/BP/GP 7\.60)* [I 11
Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP/GP 7\.50) [I [I
7\. Policy Exceptions and Readiness
N o policy exceptions are implied by the program\.
* By supporting theproposed project, the Bank does not intend toprejudice thefinal determination of theparties' claims on the
disputed areas\.
30
Annex 1:Country and Sector or ProgramBackground
NICARAGUA: HealthServicesExtension and Modernization(2nd APL)
Health is a major priority inNicaragua\. From 1999 to 2002, Nicaragua spent an annual average
of 7\.1% of its GDP on health, and the percent of Central Government expenditures devoted to
the Ministry of Health (MOH) exceeded 14%\. These are relatively highproportions compared to
neighboring Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador\. Still, due primarily to its poverty, the
absolute level of health expenditures i s relatively low\. In2003, the per capita expenditure level
of the MOH--the primary provider of health care in Nicaragua--was US$24\.
I
MOH ExpenditiureTrends MOH and Total Health Sector Expenditure Trends
(Millionsof US$ of December 2003)
Total Central
Year MOH Central Government GDP
1999 127\.1 923\.6 4,031\.1
2000 132\.6 894\.2 4,098\.0
2001 116\.9 815\.1 3,890\.9 1999 2 0 0 0 2001 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3
2002 115\.1 812\.8 3,965\.5
2003 130\.6 960\.9 4,016\.2 -tCentralGovt%ofGDP ~ M I N S A % oCentralGovt
f
Health%of GDP
II
In2003, the Ministry of Healthprovided 7\.2 million outpatient consultations (an average of 1\.3
per capita), 280,000 hospital discharges (52 per 1,000) and accounted for 34% of total health
expenditures\. The MOHprovides care through its network of more than 1,000 facilities-
including 32 hospitals, 177 health centers and 872 health posts\. It administers this system
through 18 departmental offices (SILAIS)\.
The Nicaraguan Social Security Institute (INSS) i s the second most important actor in the health
sector\. It purchases a defined package of services from 48 health maintenance organization-like
entities (EMPs), and provides coverage for 19 percent o f the labor force and 9 percent o f the
national population\. In 2003, it provided 2\.4 million ambulatory visits (an average o f 4\.9 per
beneficiary) and 43,000 hospitalizations (90 per 1,000 beneficiaries), and accounted for 14
percent of total health expenditures\. lo
Over the last decade, Nicaragua's health systemhas been undergoing a transition from a socialist
system that was implementedinthe 1980s, to one that i s more pluralistic\. The private sector has
grown steadily from the early 1990s, when it accounted for less than 5 percent of outpatient care
and an even smaller share of hospitalizations\. According to the 2001 DHS, the private sector
now accounts for 32 percent outpatient visits and 15 percent o f hospitalizations\. This growth has
been spawned by the INSS system of purchasing care, but also manifests the process o f
economic development; namely, increasing householdincomes and changing consumer
preferences\.
loMost of the organizations from which INSS purchases care are private agents, but they also include 10MOH
facilities acting as either prime contractors providing the full package of services or as sub-contractors providing
hospital services exclusively\.
31
Sourcesof HealthSector Financing, Nicaragua's health system provides a relatively
Nicaraaua Ilow level of financial protection from the direct
costs of health\. From 1997through 2002, nearly
half of the annual average of 7\.0 percent of GDP
that Nicaragua spent on health was paid out-of-
pocket by households\. The high proportion of out-
of-pocket financing reflects a combination of
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 factors, including: the common perception among
0MOH 0INSS 0HouseholdsON1Other Nicaraguans that the quality of care provided by
the major care provider-MOH-is unacceptably
low, a long tradition of self-treatment, the relatively highprice of medicines in Nicaragua, and
the lack of access to care of a substantial proportion of the population\. Nearly one-fifth (18
percent) of Nicaraguans devote at least 10percent of their total household expenditures to health\.
This is the hi'ghest proportion of the population spending at least this amount on health
expenditures in all of Central America, and i s more than double the combined average of
Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador\.
Key Challenges
MOH's WeakInstitutional Capacity
The weak institutional capacity of the Nicaraguan Health Ministry (MOH) is most conspicuously
manifested by: (1) the widely held belief that the quality of care provided i s relatively poor, (2)
M O H weak managerial capacity, and (3) its dependence on external assistance\.
MOH's efforts to improve its managerialcapacity-which began inearnest more than a decade
ago-are just startingto reach fruition and need to be deepened and institutionalized\. One of the
MOH's pivotal institutional weaknesses has been the way in which M O H has traditionally
allocated its resources\. Budgetary allocations have been made on a historical basis, based on past
allocation patterns without taking into account variations or changes inhealth needs, health
priorities of local populations, the recurrent costs of providing care, or the performance of system
administrators and managers\.'
The M O H initiated a process of devolving managerial responsibility to the SILAIS inthe early
1990s\. The decentralization initiative, however, remains only partially implementedbecause the
SILAIS have never been granted adequate autonomy\. Most importantly, their financial
autonomy i s limited to about 30 percent of their operating expenditures, as control over the
selection, placement and pay of personnel has remained centralized\.
Another impedimentto MOH's effective management of its financial resources i s the Ministry of
Finance (MOF) requirement that the revenues that M O H facilities generate from user fees or
from providing services to social security beneficiaries be transferred to the MOF\. The M O F
thendetermines how much of these funds will be returnedto the facilities generating them,
takinginto account the consolidatedfiscal position of M O H and the central government\. This
l1Jack, p196\.
32
process usually involves a time-lag of one to two months, creating a trade-off of local autonomy
for macro-economic control\.
MOHhas traditionally focused on service provision and the management of the hospital and
primarycare network\. It has yet to develop adequate institutional capacity to effectively manage
areas for which it has more recently assumed responsibility (as part o f the GON's efforts to
reform the sector), including regulatory, quality control, supervisory and monitoring functions\.
Substantial Inequities by Residenceand Region
Nicaragua's national statistics mask substantial inequities in health status and the utilization o f
health care\. Both poverty and health indicators vary significantly by place o f residence (rural
versus urban) and by department\. Whereas in rural areas, more than two-thirds of the population
i s poor, in urban areas the proportion i s less than one-third\. Similarly, more than 25 percent of
those in rural areas are ex`tremely poor versus 6 percent among urban dwellers\. Th'ese differences
are reflected in a variety o f health indicators, inpart because they condition access to and use of
health services\.
The prevalence of poverty and the absolute number of poor are found disproportionately in the
rural areas of the North and Atlantic Coast\. As health problems have become increasingly
concentrated among the poor, they have become increasingly concentrated in these geographic
areas of the country\. As a result, the 5 (of 17) departments that have the highest maternal
mortality rates (Jinotega, Chontales, Rio San Juan, RAAN and RAAS), are the same 5
departments with the highest fertility rates, the same 5 with the lowest percentage of births
attended in a medical facility, and they include the 3 departments with the lowest contraceptive
prevalence rates, the 4 departments with the lowest coverage o f prenatal care, the 4 with lowest
proportion of prenatal care initiated duringthe first trimester o f pregnancy, and the 3
departmentswith the highest levels of unmet need for family planning services (DHS 2001)\.
Among these populations access to services i s hampered by geographical, financial and cultural
barriers\.
Inequity and ineflicient allocation of health expenditures
A critical challenge for Nicaragua and the international community is to modify existing patterns
of public health expenditures so that they no longer reinforce, but help address Nicaragua's
unequal health and poverty profiles\. When recent advances inhealth are disaggregated b y
household income quintiles, it reveals that the poor have benefited less than proportionately from
the progress\. As may be seen in the graph below, there i s a direct relationship between the
amount of improvement that was made between 1998 and 2001 inhousehold income quintile
and the rate of reduction inthe (a) infant mortality rate, (b) the under-5 mortality rate, and (c) the
prevalence of chronic malnutrition among children 12-59 months old\. The poorest benefited the
least from the improvement of health indicators, the wealthiest benefited the most\. As a result,
these healthproblems have become increasingly concentrated among the poor and the
geographic areas where the poor are concentrated, mainly rural areas o f the North and the
Atlantic Coast\.
33
Rates of Reduction in Nicaragua'sKey Health MDG Indicators
Between 1998 and 2001 by Household Income Quintile
Ql-Lowest Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5-Highest
Household Income Quintiles
' 0Infant Mortalitv Rate 0Under 5 Mortalitv Rate NChronic Malnutrition 1
Another facet of the inequities inexisting public expenditures i s the highproportion of higher
income households that obtain their care (largely free-of-charge) from the MOH\. In2001, an
estimated 52 percent of the ambulatory care and 77 percent of the inpatient care consumed by the
two highest household income quintiles was provided by M O H (Rathe & Lora, 2003)\. M O H
should improve targeting of its resources to the poor\.
Imbalances in Doctor-Nurse ratio
Lack of trained health personnel, specifically the scarcity of nurses relative to doctors (although
doctors are also in short supply) i s another significant area of concern\. This imbalance became
worse after M O H divested nurses' education to universities\. Latest estimates show the ratio of
physicians was 6\.2 per 10,000 inhabitants whereas the corresponding estimate of nurses was 3\.3\.
Developingcountry studies have shown that the density of nursing staff i s positively correlated
to reduced infant mortality rates\. Conversely, since under-5 mortality rates in Nicaragua (though
declining) are still the second-highest in Central America, it i s possible that lack of sufficient
nursingpersonnel mightbe a factor accounting for the relatively slow rate of progress\.
Lack of afordable pharmaceuticals
Whereas the list of drugs available inNicaragua has expanded from 2,061 to 10,585 between
1993 and 2000, prices of non-generic drugs are prohibitively highmakingthem unaffordable for
the poor\. A recent study found the average price of a list of 35 generic medicines inNicaragua
was 10times higher than the price paid by a World Bank project in Argentina (Meerhoff, 2004)\.
According to M O H estimates, only 45 percent o f the population inneed has access to subsidized
or free drugs provided by CIPS, the public drug and medical supply agency\. The average per
capita expenditure on pharmaceuticals amounts to $2 annually, which i s equivalent to roughly
half the total per capita annual expenditure on health\.
34
GovernmentResponse
Over the past four years, the GON has accelerated the pace at which it has been reforming the
health sector\. Passage of the General Health Law and its Regulation Decree marked important
steps inthe modernization and institutional capacity-building of MOH, and both are now being
implemented\. M O H i s also makingprogress on developing institutional capacity and further
decentralizing health planning and management to the local health systems (SILAIS)\. It i s
implementing a new financial information system (SIAFI), which will provide the MOH with a
system that i s compatible with the MOF's system (SIGFA) but provides the Ministry with a
more institution-specific and powerful management tool that will support effective
decentralization\. This system has enabled a budget management reform that has decentralized
control of all inputs with the exception o f personnel, down to the health department level
(SILAIS)\. That system, inturn, interfaces with a local programming and budgeting tool (SIPLA)
which the Ministry has developed to structure a bottom-up approach to the development o f
annual opzrating plans by local level public health networks (municipios)and SILAIS\. The
M O H has used this tool (in combination with its new initiatives and health priorities, and
estimates of available financing) to begin helping the municipios to identify the specific types
and levels services that they will produce ineach of the next five years\. The sum of these plans
will constitute the MOH's Five-Year Implementation Plan 2005-2009 for the Ministry's primary
health care system, and will concurrently provide the wherewithal of management agreements
with the SILAIS directors, and thereby enhance accountability\.
At the same time, new procurement mechanisms havebeen first piloted and then
institutionalized, new management models have been introduced in a group o f public hospitals
and service agreements are now entered into with all SILAIS, local primary care providers
(municipalities) and hospitals\. New outreach strategies, like Women's Centers (Casus
Maternas), contracting of NGOs for the delivery of essential health services in remote areas and
the community nutrition and growth program, have been successfully implemented, bringing
effective accessible health care to poor communities\.
The other key health care organization in the country, the Nicaraguan Social Security Institute
(INSS), has also made notable advances since 2000\. In2002, it separated financing from the
management of its health and pension regimes\. Between 2000 and 2004, it expandedthe number
of its health program's beneficiaries by 32 percent from 389,100 to 515,400, and reduced its
administrative expenditures from 18 to 9 percent o f total expenditures\. In 2003 it introduced a
new Elderly Health Program (EHP) which has already been extended to 32,077 elderly people
(86 percent of the EHPtarget population), and in 2004 it added new services to the EHP's
defined benefit package\. In2002, it implemented a new provider certification system for the 51
private companies (EMPs) that INSS pays to provide health care to its affiliates\. In2004 it
evaluated this system with the active participation of the EMPs\. Forty-eight of the EMPs have
now been certified and the three that were unable to meet the new standards have had their
contracts cancelled\. Finally, in 2004, INSS, with the participation of the EMPs, developed a
methodology for fixing and periodically updating the capitation payment paid to the EMPs\.
The GON's National Development Plan 2005-2009 which supplements MOH's Five-Year Plan,
sets the following areas as priorities for health and nutrition: (i)
increasing coverage and quality
of services to vulnerable populations; (ii) intensifying the institutional reforms already
35
commenced by MOH; (iii) preventingchronic malnutrition inchildren under 2 years, improving
nutrition and hygiene practices at the household and community level and; (iv) enhancing inter-
institutional coordination to improve nutritional programs\. The table below illustrates the
GON's targets for the reduction of maternal and infant mortality rates and chronic malnutrition\.
2003
Indicator (Base- 2005 2006 2009 2015
Year)
Maternal mortality rate per 96" 93 86 60 22
100000 births
Infant mortality rate per 1000 live 31 \. 30 27 20
births DHS
(2001)
Under-5 mortality rate per 1000 40 \. 39 33 24
live births\. DHS
(2001)
Percentageof the population with 17\.8 15\.5 \. 12\.8 7
chronic malnutrition\. LSMS
(2001)
* Preliminary estimates\.
Source: MOH
36
ANNEX 1-A
SUMMARY OFEVALUATIONSAND LESSONSLEARNEDFROMTHE HEALTH
SECTOR MODERNIZATION PROJECT
ProgradComponent Key Conclusions
Evaluated
0 Primary Health There is a vast array of sponsor-driven programs with different strategies and
Care Programs kinds of support\. In many cases they coincide and compete in the same
centers\. Integration, mainstreaming and better focalization of all these
programs on the most vulnerable population i s urgent\.
All PHC programs show that availability of essential drugs inone of the
principal bottlenecks for providing effective care (only an average of 5 1% o f
the population had access to the required drugs inthe 14 PHC programs
evaluated)\.
Most programs have increased coverage but measures of technical and
perceived quality have not (63% of intervention centers comply with quality
standards against 65% of control centers)\.
Availability of reliable and easy-to-accessclinical and management
information i s one of the most critical instruments to improve results (as
perceived by health professionals and managers)\.
Most programs take at least 2 to 3 years before showing any improvement o f
results\. The institutional delivery rate shows particularly difficult to improve,
suggesting most likely the influence of other social, cultural and economic
factors\.
Unreliable and outdated population data (for constructing denominators) and
small number rates have made difficult to evaluate the results of these
interventions\. Also disease incidence and service production reporting are
still not reliable\.
Per capita-based payments combined with some kind of performance and
very specific activity-based incentives have shown the most powerful
- -
mechanism for purchasing PHC services and allocating fiscal resources\.
0 FONMAT This program has achieved significant increases incoverage rates of
institutional delivery, prenatal care and child care\.
FONMAT has developed an innovative model for contracting out services\.
Contracting processes within FONMAT and the extension of coverage are
well developed with goals and objectives clearly linked to the flow of
economic resources\.
Providing incentives to the demand (performance-based payments) together
with incentives to the supply o f services (strengthening infrastructure,
equipment, basic supplies) has demonstrated most effective in order to
achieve results (all the coverage indicators have improved and data also
suggest that early neonatal mortality has reduced where FONMAThas been
implemented)\.
Local autonomy to use the performance-based payments have been
considered instrumental to achieve better results\.
The direct purchasing of certain hospital services (Le\. deliveries) by PHC
providers has shown positive results in terms o f hospital responsiveness and
continuity of care\.
The FONMATinformation and reporting system is considered simple and
very useful\.
Also, the differential payments according to zone characteristics implemented
by FONMAT have been effective\.
37
- The program was captured by the public providers, and the planned private
provision was never implemented\.
PHC - Together with FONMAT, the new model has assisted MOH in its reforms,
Management chiefly by enabling the separation of its financing and providing functions,
Model Project and developing its capacity to contract by introducing new contractual
- arrangements, payment systems and negotiation processes\.
Key clinical and management instruments (protocols, patient records, patient
satisfaction surveys, management table boards and information systems, etc\.)
have been successfully implemented and are worth-valued by local health
professionals\.
- A more direct intervention i s needed at the local health centers and posts in
terms of organization ,quality assurance, etc\. rather than assistance at the
- central and SILAIS level\.
The role of SILAIS in supporting the contracting, M&Eprocesses needs to be
further clarified and strengthened\. Contracts are not sufficiently followed-up
- and evaluated\.
The lack of sufficient progress in the MOHdecentralization and the reformof
- M O H resource allocation has hampered tfie impact of this model\.
Unexpected budget cuts, lack of M O H compliance with the financial and
supplies commitments established in management agreements, and lack of
direct incentives to health staff have also been identified as problematic\.
NGOs - Excellent results for increasing coverage in remote areas\. All the target
contracting - coverage rates were surpassed\.
Discontinuation of the experience and financial sustainability are its main
weaknesses\.
Women's - 3,000 mothers gave birthbetween 2001 and 2003 using CMs, 80% of them
Centers (Casus were poor or extreme poor, and 30% younger than 19 years\. Average travel
Maternas - time from their homes to the C M was between 3 and 8 hours on foot or by
boat\.
CM) - Preliminary data suggests sharply reduced maternal mortality since CMs
- became operational\.
Coordinated action by CMs and community health networks has increased
family planning (intwo CMs located in very poor localities, utilization of
- family planning more than doubled)\.
Areas for improvement identified are: (i) harmonizing reproductive health
training programs ran by different government agencies, donors and NGOs;
(ii) servicestandardsandcratingaFederationofCMs;(iii)building
setting
capacity to operate CMs properly in more communities, particularly where no
I solid social base exists\.
PROCOSAN - PROCOSAN and other community-based programs have demonstrated
important positive impact, but its relationshipand coordination with the
- mainstream health services network requires further effort\.
The nine services provided by PROCOSAN are generally of superior quality
to similar services provided in more institutional clinics\. As a result however,
PROCOSAN appearsto be diverting demand for these services from these
- clinics, thereby entrenching inefficiencies in mainstream facilities\.
PROCOSAN has been institutionalized and generally adopted by most NGOs
and donors in Nicaragua as the best nutrition and growth development
program\.
A more in-depth evaluation of PROCOSANis currently underway\.
Hospital -- The methodology usedto establish the management capacity baseline was to
Modernization complicate and could not be replicated at completion\. Simpler but more
rigorous capacity assessment instruments are neededto follow-up hospital
modernization\.
- The same caveat mentioned for PHC regarding the effect of small numbers
and unreliability of information has been detected when trying to evaluate
38
hospital performance improvement\.
Hospitals have, in general, successfully implemented key management
instruments,like management agreements with MOH, internal service
agreements, quality programs, information systems, strategic and business
plans, consultative councils, etc\. Its impact is more difficult to ascertain\. In
fact, hospital performance ratios are quite unstable and do not show
significant improvements\. However, hospital maternal and perinatal mortality
rates have decreased in most intervention hospitals\. Patient satisfaction rates
have also improved in all hospitals\.
Low hospital occupation rates are pervasive and suggest problems on the
demand as well as on the supply side, including lack of operational funds\.
Physical strengthening projects on hospitals are considered positive and
necessary, but they have also been evaluated as somehow patchy and non-
responding to a coordinated plan\.
The hiring o f the change agents by the program has been considered
instrumental for supporting the implementation o f the new management
model\. However, a more sustainable strategy would require strengthening the
M O H Hospital Directorate with qualified st`aff\. On the same realm, hospital
directors discontinuity is perceived as excessive and negative for the hospital
improvement process\.
Sustainability of improvements is a major issue given the scarcity of non-
personnel operational budgets\. Supply of drugs, maintenance of equipment,
and running waste management programs are all examples of programs that
cannot be continued with the current level of expenditures\.
"Differentiated services" to private patients in public hospitals and cross-
subsidies across patients have remained untouchedby the program\.
Historical budget allocation pervades and requires urgent reform\. Similarly,
the decentralization process of management power to hospitals i s considered
slow by most hospital managers\.
Insummary, the reformof hospital management is still incipient and requires
-
further institutionalization\.
0Institutional The goals and objectives set for this component have been fully complied
Strengthening with19 1% of the-key performance targets have been fulfilled)\.~Specifically,
the new regulatory framework has been set out, management agreements have
been concluded with the 17 existing SILAIS, 32 hospitals and 152 municipal
health centers\. The new policy framework has also been set out after
extensive consultation\.
M O H has successfully developed and institutionalized a new bottom-up
budgeting and planning cycle based on local needs and performance\. This has
been a major capacity-building exercise for the MOH and a critical tool for
planning and implementing the FYIP\.
Budget execution and intra-unit resource allocation have both improved, but
sector-wide resource allocation and territorial financial equity still need to be
addressed\.
M O H has also restructured its financial management system which allows for
managing the budget more transparently and effectively, with greater
decentralization\. However the MOHfinancial system (SIAFI) and the GON's
(SIGFA) do not communicate yet\.
Whereas financial administration functions have been decentralized to a
certain extent, there still needs to be greater decentralization of other
functions to the executing units (Le\. human resources)\. There is also a need
for risk-transfer mechanisms to be strengthened so that local management
assumes greater responsibility for the results of their actions\.
The new MOH information system (SIMINSA) has been devised and
partially implemented\. However the evaluations show that it needsto be
further adjusted, quality of information needs to be assessed, its modules need
39
to be better integrated (SIPLA, SIAFI, production)and accessibility to the
system locally needs to be extended\. It is particularly hospitalmanagers who
complain the most about the usefulness of this tool\.
- Similarly, the new planningand management mechanismsset out by the
MOH(annualplans and budgets, management agreements, management table
boards)needto be articulated and integrated\.
- Although the legal framework, the contractinginstruments and the
institutionalculture have been established,the institutionalizationof a
purchasingunit within the MOH is still required to consolidate and take full
responsibilityover the development and strengthening of this function\.
- Ownership of the HealthSector ModernizationProgram and Coordination
betweenthe program and the MOHline Directorateshas increased
progressively over the years and it is consideredessential for the program's
success\.
- Institutionalmodernization activitieswere dispersed in too many areas and
coordinationwith the other components was not always evident\.
Evaluation Studies from which these conclusions are drawn:
Evaluation of 14 Programs Supporting Primary Health Care inNicaragua (Bitran y
Asociados, 2004)
Evaluation of the Institutional Strengthening Component of the Health Sector
Modernization Program (Fernando Marin, 2004)
Evaluation of the Hospital Modernization Component of the Health Sector Modernization
Program (Carlos Martin,2004)
Evaluation of the Primary Health Care Strategies supported by the Health Sector
Modernization Program (Roser Vicente, 2004)
Evaluation of the Women's Centers inthe Health Sector Modernization Program (Maria
Elena Ruiz Abril, Gender and Civil Society Group, World Bank-PREM, 2003)
Evaluation of the Nicaragua 1997-2002 Health Policy (Sanigest, 2003)
40
Annex 2: Major Related Projects Financed by the Bank and/or other Agencies
NICARAGUA: Health Services Extensionand Modernization (2nd APL)
Sector and description Project PSR Rating
WB Projects IP DO
Public Sector Modernization including Economic Management S S
financial and public investment Technical Assistance Project
management, institutional development, (EMTAC)
civil service reform and strategic planning\. (IDA US$20\.9M)
Support for the GON's efforts to reduce Poverty Reduction Support
poverty, increase economic growth and Credit (PRSC)
promote better coordination across GON , (IDA US$70M)
including a series of reforms inbasic
education, health, population, social
protection and water and sanitation\.
Implementation of poverty reduction Poverty reduction and local S S
strategy, and improve access to small-scale development project (IDA
social and economic infrastructure to the US$60 million)
poor\.
Health Sector Modernization Project Adaptable Program Loan (first S S
phase)
(IDA/NORAD/NDF US$24 M)
Non-WBProjects
This project has been financing inparallel Hospital Modernization
the Health Modernization Project, Program (IDB)
including hospital modernization,
extension of PHC through the FONMAT,
severance payments for M O H retired staff
and institutional modernization\.
This loan, approved inDecember 2004, Maternal and child care
will resource the M O H five-year action improvement performance-
plan\. Although usingIDB procurement based loan (IDB US$30
procedures, it will be part of the SWAP million)
technical and administration framework\.
Thisjointly financed program resources Sexual and Reproductive health
partially the M O H sexual and reproductive program (Canada, Finland, UK)
health strategy\. It i s currently administered
by UNFPA but the M O H i s willing to
integrate this program under the SWAP
framework inthe near future\.
41
USAID has a new five-year strategy to USAID
support Nicaraguahealth sector that still
needs detailed programming\. Main areas
of support are: family planning, sector
governance and civil society involvement\.
USAID has agreed to program its sector
governance component taking on many of
the institutional modernization activities
under the five-year action plan\.
Sweden will define its financing strategy in Sweden (US$20 million over
early 2005 but has committed to pool its the next 5 years)
funds for the SWAp\. It will also execute an
obstetric nurses training project\.
The Netherlands will devote most of its The Netherlands (Euros 1
financikl aid to the SWAP pool\. It will million per year, i t least, over
however continue some of its current the next 5 years)
projects on a declining basis\.
Finland i s also currently definingits Finland (US$7\.5 million for the
support strategy to the Nicaragua health next 5 years)
sector but has committed to finance the
SWAP pool, besides continuing its support
to the SRH program\.
This project has three components focusing Commitment and Action
on reducing HIV/AIDS, malaria and Against HIVIAIDS, Malaria
tuberculosis transmission among and Tuberculosis
vulnerable populations\. (Global Fundagainst
HIV/AIDS,Tuberculosis and
Ma1aria)
(US$18,865,903 over 5 years)
This project aims to improve the health Project for Strengthening of the
status of the people in the Department of Local System o f Integrated
Granada by buildingcapacity in the Healthcare (SILAIS) in
SILAIS servicingthis area\. Granada (2000-2004)
(JICA)
(465 million ven)
42
Annex 3: Results Framework and Monitoring
NICARAGUA: HealthServicesExtension and Modernization (2nd APL)
Results Framework
Project
Development Results Indicators Use of Results Information
Objective (Higher
level development
objectives)
1\.To improve the Maternal Mortality rate They gauge the long-term program
efficiency, Infant mortality rate impact on the MDGs, though no
effectiveness and Under-5 mortality rate direct attribution to project activities
equity of,the Childhood malnutrition rate can be established\. They will be
Nicaraguanhealth Neonatal mortality rate in measured as part of the PRSP and
system targeted populations National Development Plan
monitoring\.
Intermediate Results Indicators12 Use of results information
ResuIts
Stratepic Number of beneficiaries to In2005-09: To monitor progress in
Obiective 1: whom the PBHS has been the implementation of the extension
Improved extended\. o f health services coverage\.
coverage and Percentage of institutional In2005-08: To monitor program
access to priority births results and make any necessary
health services for adjustments in the event the target i s
targeted not being met\. In2009: To evaluate
population\. the program and decide whether to
maintain and expand it in successive
years\.
Percentage of immunization In2005-08: To monitor program
coverage (pentavalent results and refine the program
vaccine) in infants under 1 design\.
In2009: To evaluate the program
and decide whether to maintain and
expand it in successive years\.
Percentage of pregnancies to In2005-08:To monitor
whom pre-natal control program results and refine the
starts in the first trimester program design\.
In2009: To evaluate the program
and decide whether to maintain and
expand it in successive years\.
'*All theseindicators have precise methodological definitions in a technical paper provided by the MOH to the
SWAP partners\.
43
Percentage of pregnancies In2005-08: To monitor program
with full (four controls) pre- results and refine the program
natal control\. design\.
Number of pregnant women In2005-09: To gauge the expansion
attended inWomen Centers and utilization of these facilities\.
Utilization rate of safe In2006: To evaluate the program
family planning methods and decide whether to maintain and
among fertile women (as expand it in successive years\.
measuredby DHS)\.
Strategic 0 Hospital discharge rate i n In2005-09: To monitor
Obiective 2: the targeted regions\. improvement in accessibility across
Strengthening the geographic, cultural and
network of socioeconomic groups\. Low rates
services could indidate demand-side
Improved access problems\.
to priority hospital
services\.
More effective Percentage of hospitals In2005-09:Tomeasureprogressin
healthcare offering certified critical SWAP implementation\.
networks with path services included inthe
enhanced capacity PBHS
to deliver critical
services\.
Healthcare Percentage of health In2005-08: To monitor the capacity
networks with the providers which comply of the M O H to evaluate the sector
capacity to satisfactorily with targets set and make decisions inthe medium
measure their intheir management term about the objectives that have
results and agreements\. not been achieved\.
improve their In2009: To evaluate programresults
performance\. related to health sector performance
inPriority areas\.
Healthcare Percentage of maternal In2005-09: To measure the progress
networks provide deaths audited\. inimplementing quality enhancing
better quality measures in the delivery of critical
programs\. maternal and child care services\.
Strategic Percentage of MOH's In2005-09: To measure the extent to
Objective 3: expenditures transferred to which resources are allocatedbased
Institutional health care service providers on results obtained\. To measure the
Strengthening and through purchase o f extent of decentralization o f
Leadership services, instead o f historical resources\.
M O H budget allocations\.
progressively
transfers funds to
local providers
based on actual
44
demand and
provider
performance\.
Managerial
autonomy of local
providers
increased\.
The M O Hbudget Percentage of GON funds In2005-08: To measure the extent of
executing units in for health care services in decentralization of resources\.
the Autonomous these regions administered In2009: To assess whether the
North and South by the MOHbudget decentralization policy inthese
Atlantic Regions executing units of the regions has been fully implemented\.
manage their own RAANand RAAS\.
health services\.
Equitable ' 0 Per capita M O Hexpenditure In2005-08: To monitor the
reallocation of allocated to the targeted implementation of the FYIP\.
health areas\. In2009: To evaluate ifresources are
expenditures being distributed more equitably
towards than before\.
vulnerable
populations\.
45
0
0
8 m m
M ?
b 8 z1
b M 2
m
*a,
0 W m
L
2 9 0 09 2
00
c\1*
M m 3 v)
m P
v,
9 c?
b
m d-
m
a
r?
m
00
Q\ 00
a* M 3 v,
m d 3
$1 2 m ch
c\1
00
b a
(" 00
b cc, b
P J
e,
Y
e
C
0
2
a) \.r(
Y
Y cd
N
\.3
c
E
U
$1
Be,
0
\.3
3 cd
0d
\.3
U
5
\.3
Y
iim
c
H
PI
vi 0 v,
00, 9m 0 c?
3
m vi 3 ln
00
c\.l 9
-, c\.l
3 s E:
m vi
3
c\.l
2 9 co
m
r3 ?
d
c\.l
0
2
82 3
3
82 00
8
00
8 M
rl
0
\.3
Y
\.*cd,a
N
4
Yk
50
a" 0
W s
M
rl
s8M
r 3
h
0
2
3;
3cd
rl
0
a
1 3
Y
\.3
Y
2
U
9d
2
3;
z\.
cc)
e,
>
\.3
u
0
b"
e,
0
0
3
\.3
ze
E Y
m
a
t':
v
0
Monitoringarrangements
Results will be monitored on a regular basis by the M O H at the central and SILAIS levels\. The
SWAP Coordinating Committee will meet at least twice a year to monitor progress made on the
implementation of the Five-Year Implementation Plan and the Annual Operational Plan for the
health sector\. The Directorate General of Health Planning and Development (DGPD) will have
overall responsibility for monitoring and evaluation at the central level\. The DGPDwill
collaborate with the SILAIS to develop a standardized monthly report that will track M&E actual
versus plannedperformance indicators\.
At the local level, municipalities will collate information on programoutputs generated by health
clinics and health centers\. At the SILAIS level, it will be necessary to develop M&E teams\.
These M&Eteams will be headed by the deputy manager of the SILAIS, and will be trained and
supported to carry out the routine oversight of the public and private providers' performance on
an on-'going basis\. These teams will be responsible for coordinating and compiling information,
including information generated by hospitals, using the Health Management Information System
(SIMINSA)\.14 The SIMINSA, through its different modules, will be the main instrument for
formulating the annual action plans and budgets, and for monitoring the SWAp's final and
intermediate targets\.
The SILAIS M&Eteams will submit monthly reports to the DGPD that will use them as input to
produce quarterly monitoring reports of the SWAp, as well as SILAIS-specific quarterly
management reports\. These quarterly reports will provide timely input for improving M O H
results-based management decision-making by focusing attention and requiring explanations
about variations in actual versus planned levels of a specific set of performance indicators\. The
review and discussion of these reports will serve as the agenda for quarterly, national M&E
meetings of all of the SILAIS\. At these quarterly meetings, the DGPDwill present a report of
the overall performance of the MOH, and each SILAIS director will present and explain hisher
SILAIS's performance\. These presentations will be based on a standardized format (based on the
annual operating plan) which the DGPD will develop and which each SILAIS will use in
reporting its performance\. These meetings will provide the basis for fine-tuning individual
SILAIS and MOH's annual action plans, as well as the FYP\.
The first quarter M&Emeetingof each year will incorporate a review of the previous year's
performance, that will assess that performance within both the framework of the annual action
plan and the framework of the Five-Year Plan-and, as deemed appropriate, will modify the
subsequent national, annual action plan and/or the Five-Year Plan\. The goal i s to construct the
M&Esystem as an action-based tool for fostering the development of a more on-going, proactive
and strategic system of M O H management at both the national, SILAIS and local levels\." This
l4 SIMINSAhasbeenassessedaspartoftheSWAPpreparation\. Anenhancementplanwillbedevisedand
The
implementedin the first two years of the SWAp\. As mentionedabove, the SWAPwill also finance the expansion,
integrationand implementation of the key institutional informationmanagement systems, includingthe SIGFA,
FinancialAdministrationInformation System (SIAFI), SIPLA together with the SIMINSA\. The developmentof
this M&E systemwill require ongoing coordination with the NationalStatistics Institute (INE)\.
l5The public forum nature of the quarterly performancereview meetingsis intendedto provide:(1) a learning forum
for SILAIS directors in which they will share experiencesand strategies, and (2) non-material,management
50
system will also be used as input into monitoring the fulfillment of contracts of those private
service providers with whom the MOHenters into agreement\.
Inaddition to on-going M&E, an annual, independent audit of the SWAp's targets fulfillment
will be carried out under TORSacceptable to all the partners\. A mid-term evaluation will be
carried out after two years of implementation\. This mid-term evaluation will take stock of the
accumulated experience and provide a feedback mechanism for refiningthe SWAP targets,
strategies and operations\.
~
performance incentives (in the form of (a) personal pride in beinga knowledgeable, hands-on manager, together
with (b) the knowledge that they are an active, on-going participant in the development and implementation of
Nicaragua's national health policy)\.
51
Annex 4: Detailed Project Description
NICARAGUA: Health Services Extension and Modernization (2nd APL)
ProgramOutreach
The second phase of the Health Sector Modernization APL will support, along with the M O H
and four other donors, a sector-wide approach supporting the Nicaragua National Health Plan
2004-2015 (NHP), with priority given to the achievement of the health-related MDGtargets\. The
NHPhas been operationalized into afive-year implementationplan 2005-2009 (FYIP)that sets
up the planning framework for the SWAp\. The APL programmatic objectives are fully
compatible with those of the FYIP,therefore makingthe participation of IDA inthe SWAPfully
viable and recommendable\. In accordance with the NHP, the FYIP prioritizes the extension of
coverage to the poorest segments of the population, particularly the Afro-Nicaraguan, indigenous
and rural popuJations in the most socio-economically deprived regions of the country\. The FYIP
has a national and overall scope, and contains a well-defined subprogram centered inthree
specific objectives\. The first two are, in turn, focalized for the 12most deprived departments
(SILAIS) of Nicaragua\. These specific strategic objectives within the FYIP are as follows:
(i) extension of coverage of a basic health and nutrition services package to the poorest
areas o f the country, via the new integrated model of health care;
(ii) physical and functional strengthening o f the health service facilities network, focusing on
maternal-infant care, so as to provide a seamless path of essential services inthe target
areas;
(iii) institutional strengthening and capacity-building, concentrated specifically on developing
the purchasing, monitoring and evaluation capacities of the MOH, its leadership role to
enhancing donors' alignment and harmonization, and the management capacity of M O H
decentralized units and Autonomous Governments of the Atlantic Coast\.
The financial resources allocated to the SWAP will supplement the portion of the national budget
dedicated to health, and its annual work plans will be programmed and budgeted simultaneously
and incoordination with those of the health budget as a whole\. The FYIP will include activities
under the M O H responsibility mainly\.
ProgramFocus
The FYIP targets 12departments and their 12 corresponding health care systems (SILAIS) out o f
the 17 systems that currently exist\. Seventy -nine municipalities included inthose 12 SILAIS
have been prioritized\. Since there are 115 municipalities nationwide, this implies the SWAP will
cover 75 percent of all the municipalities or 36 percent o f the total population\. However, a much
larger proportion, 47 percent, of the poor and extreme poor live inthese municipalities\.
Priority SILAIS and the respective municipalities were selected on the basis of the following
criteria defined by the MOH in the preparatory phases of the SWAp: (i) of poverty, as
level
measuredby the percentage of people inthe lowest household income quintile as measured by
the DHS (2001); (ii) to health services, as measuredby the percentage of peoplethat live
access
52
more than an hour away from a health care center and the percentage o f institutional birthsin
that municipality; (iii) status, as measured by infant mortality and maternal mortality rates,
health
and morbidity rates for acute diarrhea and respiratory infections; and (iv) the needfor continuing
projects aimed at extending coverage o f health services already initiated insome areas\. The
following table lists the departments (SILAIS)and municipalities selected on the basis o f the
above criteria:
SWAP Targeted Departments(SILAIS) and Municipalities
SILAIS Municipalities SILAIS Municipalities
BOACO San Jose de 10s Remates MADRIZ Palacaguina
SantaLucia Las Sabanas
Teustepe San Jose de Cusmapa
San Juan de Rio Coco
San Lucas
Somoto
Totogalpa
Telpaneca
Yalaguina
CHINANDEGA CincoPinos MATAGALPA San Ram6n
San Francisco del Norte
Somotillo
San Pedro del Norte
Santo Tomhs del Norte
El Viejo
Villanueva
CHONTALES Acoyapa NUEVA Jalapa
Comalapa SEGOVIA El Jicaro
El Ayote Macuelizo
La Libertad Murra
Muelle de 10s Bueyes Quilali
Nueva Guinea Wiwili (Nueva Segovia)
ElRama
Santo Doming0
San Pedro de L6vago
ESTEL~ Condega RAAN
Esteli
Pueblo Nuevo
San Juan de Limay
San Nicolhs
La Trinidad
JINOTEGA La Concordia RAAS Bluefields
El Cua-Bocay Corn IslandLa cruz de Rio Grande
SantaMaria de Pantasma El Tortuguero
San Rafael del Norte Kukra Hill
San Sebastian de Yali Karawala
Wiwili (Jinotega) Laguna de Perlas
LEON Achuapa
ElJicaral
eA6n
53
Furthermore, within these selected regions, additional criteria will be usedfor selecting priority
populations:
a) Women o f childbearing age between 15 and 49 years and children under 5 will gain
access to maternal and infant care services under the essential basic health services
package (PBHS), including non-medical interventions aimed at reducing morbidity and
mortality inthese target groups;
b) Rural communities classifiedas poor or extremely poor withinthese targeted
municipalities;
c) Dispersedextremely poor populations without access to health services will receive
services included inthe PBHS through mobile units, supported by health centers;
d) Indigenous and Afro-descendant populations, especially those living inthe RAANand
M A S regionswill receive priority attention\.
Ineachyear ofthe SWAp, the M O Htogether with INEC will conduct a beneficiary assessment
inthe 12 selected departments (3\.3 million inhabitants live inthose 12Departments, ofwhich 2
million live inthe 79 targeted municipalities)\. This assessment will constitute a census o f the
participating communities\. In2005, this assessment will be one and the same as the national
census which i s being conducted this year\. It i s estimated that this survey will classify
approximately 470,000 people as potential beneficiaries for the extension o f coverage o f health
care services, applying the abovementioned criteria\. Ofthis population, 235,000 will be women
o f childbearing age, 188,000 will be children under 5 years and 47,000 will be young people and
adults with diseases targeted by the PBHS\.
ProjectComponents
Strategic objective 1:Extension of access to the Basic Package of Health Services (PBHS)for
thepoorest and most vulnerablepopulations US$36\.5million (IDA US$ 7\.5 million)
- -
The primary objective o fthis component is to extend access to the PBHS to populations inthe 12
targeted departments (SILAIS), which have the worst health and poverty indicators\. This
objective will be achievedthrough the financing o f a community health financing scheme\. The
M O H will allocate the capitation transfers that will finance the community health financing
scheme to these select SILAIS\. The capitation transfers will be calculated on a per capita basis,
based on the estimated cost o f providing the PBHS to the eligible population\. The amount o f
funds to be transferred to each SILAIS each year will be calculated by multiplyingthe adjusted
average capitation payment by the number o f persons residing inthe eligible communities\. The
total annual capitation payments will be transferred on a prorated monthly basis to the SILAIS\.
At the beginningofeach annual contract, an advance equal to one quarter of the annual total
transfer will be distributedto the SILAIS\. Subsequentmonthly payments o f the capitation
transfers will be adjusted downward to ensure that this advance i s offset duringthe course o f the
year\. Every year the number o f beneficiaries ineach community and the adjusted average
capitationpayment will be reviewed and updated\. The SILAIS would inturncontract services
for the PBHS with local public providers and/or private providers\.
54
The IntegratedHealth Care Model (MAIS)
The M O H has developed the Integrated Health Care Model (MAIS) based on previous
experiences and projects implemented in the country\. The MAIS delivery model i s based on a
recent cross-cutting evaluation of the 14 primary health care projects implemented nationwide\.
This model will serve as the technical framework for the delivery and management of the PBHS
and contains key instrumentsfor the organization and delivery of quality health services (health
team's organization and functions, clinical protocols and service standards, contracting
mechanisms and performance-based payments)\. The MAIS will evolve as the PBHS i s extended
and new experience i s gained by the M O H on the implementation of these instruments\.
Services of the PBHS would be contracted by SILAIS inthree different modalities, according to
the social and geographical characteristics of the population:
(i) Zones B (rural concentrated): Mostly public providers, if existing in that area, will
mobilize itinerant teams of health practitioners to provide the PBHS in close co-
ordination with their corresponding institutional settings\.
(ii) Zones A (urban): The local health center and its catchment network o f health posts
(municipios)will provide the PBHS to people working inthose urban areas\.
(iii) Zones C (rural dispersed): Most likely NGOs or other private health service providers
will be contracted to provide outreach services comprising the PBHS to the communities\.
These itinerant teams will coordinate their service delivery with the nearest health center\.
A working referral system will be implementedto ensure that patients who require higher
level care have access to it, particularly institutional deliveries and perinatal care\.
Mobile public and private units will be comprisedo f health personnel (namely doctors and
nurses) and community health workers\. They will provide ambulatory health services defined in
the PBHS to remote areas (zones B and C)\. Mobile teams will be complemented by the role of
paid health practitioners (promotoresde salud) who, although being part o f the delivery team,
will reside in the community, identify at-risk population, promote healthy practices and
environments, provide basic health care and contribute to close follow-up o f patients, pregnant
women and children\. The role of community midwives will also be enhanced b y offering
appropriate training, basic equipment, implementing a sort of certification process, and
improving coordination and integration of these community workers' function with the local
health centers, NGOs and mobile teams operating in the area\. The role o f health volunteers
(brigadism)will also be promoted and integrated inthe model, particularly to provide nutrition
advice, as the current community nutrition and growth program does (PROCOSAN)\. This
successful program will be expanded to the targeted communities without it yet, and developed
with new modules (Le\. morbidity module) adding to the existing ones\. PROCOSAN services
have been included as part of the PBHS\. Where it does not exist, the contractedproviders of the
PBHS will provide it\. Where it already exists, its current providers will progressively get
incorporated into the delivery of the PBHS model\.
Inthe case of the indigenous and afro-descendant communities, the delivery model will be
adjusted in accordance with their specific needs, expectations and traditional customs and values\.
55
The MOH, along with the Autonomous Governments of the Atlantic Coast (RAAN and RAAS),
i s currently working out a specific delivery model for these two regions that will be used for the
extension of the PBHS in those areas\.
The Package of Basic Health Services (PBHS)
The PBHS has been formulated, in accordance with the corresponding specifications set up in
the 2002 General Health Law\. This law stipulates an ample list of health care services that
should be offered b y the M O H to the entire population without means or without any health
insurance coverage (the non-contributory regime)\. However, the M O H cannot offer the entitled
package to all the eligible population under the law due to financial restriction\. It has therefore
decided to adopt an incremental approach, commencing by offering an affordable package of
health services, based on the cost-effectiveness o f interventions and health and population
priorities established in the NHP, to the population groups that cluster the highest poverty and
disease burden inthe country\. Consequently, the PBHS prioritizes the folldwing areas for
intervention: (i) maternal care; (ii) and reproductive health, including family planning and
sexual
the prevention and control of sexually-transmitted diseases; (iii) health (for childrenunder
infant
5 years), child nutrition and development; and (iv) health education, detection and treatment for
the control of the most prevalent communicable and non-communicable diseases inadults\.
The PBHS consists of the services outlined in the following table:
1\. Monitoring andPromotionof GrowthandDevelopment, for childrenunder 5 years\.
~
a) Promotional and Preventive Actions
Promotion of healthy diet, personal hygiene, oral health, breastfeeding, distribution of information and
education material\.
Monitoring of infant andperinatalmortality\.
Training, early evaluationandclassificationof newbominfantsbasedon their level of risk\.
Parentaleducation about basic care of newborninfants, andinfant and adolescent growth anddevelopment\.
Periodic care and monitoringof infant growth anddevelopment, includingevaluationof vision and hearing,
monitoringof heightand weight and developmentof psychometric and motorskills\.
Promotionof a completeimmunizationplanduring the first year of the infant's life\.
Implementationof the compulsory immunizationprogram\.
Supply of vitamin A, iron, iodine, fluoride, folic acid and ferrous sulphate\.
b) Early detection and care
HealthCare of newbornsandtreatment of complications\.
Outpatientcare for infant healthand children under 5 years
Referralsandcross-referrals for complicatedpatients\.
Treatment of communicablediseases\.
Detectionof high-risk cases (suchas victims of childhoodabuse, mistreatmentand violence)\.
c) Development of community health and nutrition interventions
Educationand development of healthy diet for children, personal, family and householdhygiene\.
Distribution of IEC material\.
Prevention,early diagnosis andtreatment of malnutrition\.
Supply of vitamin A, iron, iodine, fluoride, folic acidand ferrous sulphate\.
Implementationof the Community Programof Health and Nutrition\.
Treatmentof nutritional problems and associateddiseases\.
Case referral\.
2\. Integrated care for women of reproductive age
a) Pre, post nataland obstetric care
56
Promotion of healthy diet, oral health, newborn hygiene and care, breastfeeding, institutional births, family
planning, distributionof IEC material\.
Care of normal low-risk pregnancies and deliveries\.
Referral and follow-up of high-risk cases\.
Early detection and care of pregnancies\.
Prenatal care\.
Evaluation of nutritional status of pregnant women\.
Provisionof nutritional supplements to pregnant and post-natalwomen\.
Anti-tetanus immunizationof pregnant women\.
Family planning education\.
Diagnosis, treatment and counselingfor sexual and reproductive diseases\.
Emergency care for pre and post natal complications and complications during delivery\.
Diagnosis and treatment of diseases in pre and post natal women\.
Incentives for referral to Casas Matemas\.
b)Early detection of cervical and breast cancer
Promotion of self-examination and PAP smears\.
Distribution of IECmaterial\.
PAP smears\.
Breast examination and self-examination
Case diagnosis and referral\.
c) Sexual education andfamily planning
Sexual health and educationwith emphasis on abstinence in adolescence\.
Training and care of adolescents with risk factors\.
Detection, care and referral of cases of violence\.
Promotion of spacing betweenbirths\.
Promotion of correct usage of traditional and modern methods\.
Distribution of IEC material\.
Training and delivery of family planning methods\.
Distribution of contraceptives in the community\.
8\.Care of prevalent diseases
Treatment of sexually transmittedinfections (including HIVIAIDS)\.
Early detection, control and treatment of malaria, dengue andtuberculosis\.
Early detection and treatment of hypertensionand diabetes mellitus\.
Two complementary activities necessary to ensure appropriate utilization of the PBHSby the
targeted population will be supported within this strategic objective o f the FYIP, namely:
a) The incorporation o f traditional medicine, community structures and practitioners into the
health services delivery and management model for the indigenous and Afro-Nicaraguan
populations\.
b) Information and communication activities aimed at: (i) generating community awareness
and marketing the extension of health services; (ii) raising social and individual
responsibility over healthy practices and better nutritional habits inthe target populations\.
The actual delivery of services and the expected outcomes of such services will be monitored
and verified through a two-pronged strategy:
- A social audit mechanismwill be devised, by which the community will certify quarterly that
the local providers render the services included inthe PBHS\. Annual community surveys will
also be carried out to investigate the quality and timeliness o f services\.
57
- Intermediateresults linkedto the delivery of the PBHS will be closely monitored by the
SILAIS and the MOH\. These intermediate results, as described inthe results framework
(Annex 3), are: institutional deliveries, child immunization, early prenatal care, full prenatal
care and discharges from Women Centers\. The achievement and verification of these results
will also be subject to an independent annual assessment, as agreed in the MOU\.
Financingand payingfor the PBHS
The cost of the per capita premium of delivering the PBHS has been calculated for the 79
municipalities by geographical region, taking into consideration the differential cost of providing
services by the three different delivery models (rural-dispersed; rural-concentrated; urban) and
the amount of potential beneficiaries in each municipality living in those areas\. According to that
calculation, the average cost per capita inthe most expensive region, RAAN, i s US$12\.2, in
contrast to the more densely populated Pacific region where the average per capita cost i s
US$16\.3\. These costs have been developed through analysis of actual costs of each component
parts, accountingfor actual prices that prevail inthe markets for medical goods and services,
technology improvements, efficiency standards and expected economies of scale\. The cost has
been brought to per capita average basis, taking into account the size of the beneficiary pool\.
These costs are considered to be reliable, proxies, on average, for actual costs o f delivering the
PBHS\.
To ensure that SILAIS will enforce the delivery of services by contracted public and private
providers, the management agreements between SILAIS and M O H will include the obligation of
SILAIS to spell out intheir contracts with providers: (i) the rights and obligations of the parties;
(ii) contentofthePBHS;(iii) annualobjectives,follow-upindicators,andverification
the the
mechanisms; (iv) budgetary allocation (inthe case of public providers), and the mechanisms for
payment and incentives; (v) information to be provided for supervision and evaluation purposes\.
The following annexes to the contract will also be added: (a) the operational annual plan; (b)
training and development activities for strengthening clinical and management capacities; (c)
investment plan to strengthen the services network and the management plan for the
corresponding catchment network\.
The management agreements (Convenios) will also define the result targets for each SILAIS,
usingthe FYIPresult indicators framework, establish the responsibilitiesof SILAIS and MOH
for following-up providers' performance, and specific mutual commitments for that area\.
The OperationalManual for the extension of services that the M O H will furnish to IDA, and the
rest of the SWAP partners, before effectiveness o f the IDA credit, will describe inmore detail the
benefit plans, delivery modalities, focalization criteria and identification of beneficiary
mechanisms, payment mechanisms, contract instruments, management responsibilities of public
local providers, supervision arrangements, and procurement procedures\.
Strengthening planning, accountability and social participationfor the delivery of the PBHS
The FYIPcalls for the development o f a strong health services purchasing function at the MOH
(the capacity of the M O H to prepare, negotiate, monitor and enforce the management
agreements)\. This function becomes crucial for the successful implementation of the expansion
58
o f the PBHS strategy and the accomplishment o f the FYIP targets\. The M O H will produce by
January 2006 a restructuring o f M O H central offices so as to define and implement an
operational purchasing body sufficiently staffed, with clearly separated responsibilities from the
direct management o f units, and utilizing an integrated information system providing timely and
reliable data necessary for the formulation and evaluation o f management agreements usedfor
the implementation ofthe SWAp\. This capacity buildingwill entail: (i) capacity assessment and
training activities inthe 12 SILAIS; (ii) technical assistanceand limited logistics (vehicles,
workshops) necessary to support the implementation and improvement o f the planning and
supervising roles; (iii) technical assistance and information technology required for the
implementation o f the SIMINSA modules (SIPLA, SIAFI and others) inthese 12 SILAIS; (iv)
identification o f beneficiaries o f the PBHS; (v) studies, workshops and development o f
instrumentsaimed at involvinglocal communities inthe governance and supervision ofthe
expansion o f health care\.
StrategicObiective2: Strenptheningthe networkof serviceswith emphasis on maternal
and infanthealthcare - US$27\.8 million (IDA US$2\.8 million)
-
I t s central objective i s aimed at increasing and improving the capacity o f public providers to
deliver the services included inthe PBHS, especially inthe area o fmaternal and infant care, by
reinforcing physically and functionally the primary and secondary care facilities\. The reason for
this component i s that successful infant and maternal care can only be achieved ifadequate
institutional, both ambulatory and hospital, care i s available and accessible to the population\. In
fact, the lesser maternal and infant mortality rates get anywhere, the more complicatedthe causes
o f those deaths become\. Perinatal diseases are currently responsible for some more than one third
o f total infant deaths inNicaragua\. This illustrates the need for relying on good quality and
accessible institutional care for appropriately tackling maternal and infant mortality in
Nicaragua\. Reducing maternal and perinatal mortality requires also an operational referral
system, transportation, and good coordinationofthe entire health care process\.
The M O Hwill support the expansionof the CasasMaternas network with 30 more o fthese
facilities, since the existingones have proven instrumental inincreasing the rates o f institutional
deliveries for pregnant women living inremote areas\. Although not a health center, CMs are
frequently cross-supported by staff from the community's affiliated hospital\. Services provided
inthese Casaswill expand over simply lodging pregnant women, to provide family planning and
child nutrition counseling, as well as other education activities (Le\., simple vocational training)
for empowering resident women\. A feasibility study will be conducted to identify communities
with difficult access to institutional delivery and expressed community support to maintaining
these centers\. Fundingwill be provided for the rehabilitation o f existing premises or (on an
exceptional basis) the construction o f new homes, the acquisition o f basic equipment and
furnishings for the homes, time bound (and declining) recurrent costs, activities aimed at
empowering women staying inthe homes, and the promotion o f family planning\.
Activities fundedunder this strategic objective o f the SWAPwill include:
(i) Physical rehabilitation, medical equipment and basic furnishing o f health centers and health
posts inthe targeted areas necessary to provide the PBHS;
59
(ii)Physical rehabilitation, medical and industrial equipmentnecessary to upgrade the maternal
and infant critical care path o fthe twelve existing hospitals inthe 12targeted SILAIS\.At least
the obstetric, neonataland pediatric services ofthese 12hospitals will improve as to comply with
the quality standards set forth bythe M O Hcertificationprocess (habilitacidn)\. The critical path
consists o f emergency rooms, operating theaters, obstetric and pediatric wards and the necessary
diagnostic (image, laboratory) and supporting services (water, steam and sanitation, catering,
laundry, maintenance and waste management);
iii)ExpansionoftheCasasMaternas(CMs)networkincluding:(a)rehabilitationofavailable
homes inthe communities for that purpose; (b) basic furniture and supplies, (c) operational costs
on a declining basis, (d) outreach activities for the target population, and (e) technical assistance
and training of the communities for the management and financial sustainability o f these homes;
iv) Strengtheningmanagement capacities o f hospitals and local public primary care providers
(municipios), including: (a) general management (strategic and business planning, monitoring
and internal control, performance management); (b) financial and administrative management
(financial accounting and control, humanresources, procurement o f supplies, general support
services - catering, maintenance, cleaning, hospital waste management and disposal); (c) clinical
and patient management (user identification and billing, clinical records, control o f hospital
infections, clinical protocols)\. These interventions will entail technical assistance for systems
development and implementation, training and information technology\. Direct technical
assistance to local and hospital management teams will be provided by itinerant teams o f long
term consultants working under direct supervision o f the M O H Hospital and Primary Care
Directorates\. Investmentinhospital infrastructure and equipmentwill be necessarily tied and
simultaneous to investment inmanagement and quality improvement o f those facilities\.
Decentralizationof the healthsector - US$17\.8 million(IDA
StrategicObjective3: ImprovingStewardship,StrengtheningInstitutionsand
- US$0\.7 million)
This strategic objective is aimed at strengtheningMOH's leadership capacity and accountability
inorder to better enable achievingthe goals ofthe National HealthPlan(2004-15) and its
operational five-year plan (2005-2009)\. The FYIP goals relatedto this strategic objective are: (i)
improving the efficiency and equity o f health expenditures; (ii) advancing the decentralization of
the healthsector and developing capacity ofthe Autonomous Governments ofthe Atlantic Coast
to take over management o f their regional health systems; (iii) alignment and harmonizationof
foreign cooperation with M O H policies and systems; and (iv) developing the M O H capacity for
purchasing services\.
3\.1 Stewardship
The objective ofthis component is to further develop the M O H institutional leadership ofthe
sector, particularly by: (a) monitoring and adjusting, ifneeded, the sectoral policy and strategy;
(b) developing the institutional capacity to evaluate the performance o fthe nationalhealth
system; (c) conducting and coordinating the implementation o f the GON's population policy; (d)
promoting and facilitating the assumption o f public healthresponsibilities (health protection,
60
promotion and environmental health) by municipal governments\. These objectives will be
achieved through the following means:
i)EnhancingtheMOHcapacitytoevaluatetheperformanceofthenationalhealthsystem\.
Resources will be allocated to support preparation of the national health accounts, perform a
mid-term evaluation of the five-year implementation health plan, as well as financial assistance
to carry out the 2006 demographic and health survey (DHS)\.
ii)TechnicalassistanceprovidedtotheMOH,astheGONdelegatedagencyforcoordinatingthe
Nicaragua multi-sectoral population policy, to help it manage, coordinate and monitor the
implementation o f the populationpolicy and its associated action plan\.
iii)Capacity-buildingandawareness-raisingactivitieswillbeconductedwithmunicipal
governments to take on municipal responsibilities on public health\. This activity will support the
GON effort to scale up municipal government responsibilities attached to the municipal fiscal
transfer law recently approved by the National Assembly\.
iv) Coordination and progressive harmonization of foreign aid inthe sector\. Technical assistance,
study tours and workshops will be supported inorder to facilitate progress in the harmonization
of external support\. The SWAPfund will also contribute to the operational costs, including
salaries of consultants, of a reduced SWAPTechnical Secretariat\.
3\.2 Institutional strengthening to improve health service delivery and equity\.
This will involve the following:
i)DevelopmentofMOH'spurchasingfunctionbythefollowingmeans:
a) establishing the M O H purchasingbody\. It will start as a branch o f the General
Directorate of Health Planning and Development, managing the day to day relationship
with SILAIS for the implementation of the community health financing scheme,
including the use of funds provided by the external agencies and MOH for the SWAp\.
SWAP funds may be used for the contracting of time-limited consultant services that
bringknow-how and support the operational functions of the purchasingunit;
b) supporting the MOHannual planning andbudgeting process, facilitating its operation
and implementing new instrumentsfor rendering the planning and budgeting process
more needs-based and performance driven (namely, implementation of the new resource
allocation formula, development of planning guidelines, identification of unit costs,
development of hospital payment mechanisms)\.
ii)StrengtheningMOHfiduciarycapacitybyprovidingtrainingandtechnicalassistancefor:a)
deploying the institutional financial management system (SIGFA) in local units; b)
implementation of costing and invoicing systems; c) strengthening the M O H procurement
function\. These activities will implement the strengthening plans prepared b y the fiduciary
assessments carried out by the SWAP partners in the preparation stage and all other necessary
61
measures that may be identifiedduringthe SWAP execution\. The M O Hwill enlarge the staff of
its procurement unit as defined in the fiduciary strengthening plan\. Consultants may be also
needed to enlarge its technical capability\.
iii)AdjustingtheMOHinformationsystem(SIMINSA)tomakeitresponsivetotheneedsofits
different end users (central MOH, SILAIS, hospitals and municipalities)\. This will involve
software development and the information technology and communication equipment required at
central and decentralized levels\.
iv) Establishing a system of identifying social security beneficiaries at selected national
hospitals, aimed at reducing cross-subsidies between M O H and INSS\. Also, funds will be
provided to develop the identification system o f the non-contributory regime system, starting by
the targeted municipalities for the expansion of coverage\.
v) Supporting the technical development of the community health arid nutrition program
(PROCOSAN) in order to formulate and fine-tune the new components and support their
implementation\.
3\.3 Decentralization
The FYIP seeks to advance the technical and administrative decentralization of the MOH and
facilitate the transfer of human and financial resources to the SILAIS and local providers\. The
M O H decentralization agendathat will be specifically supported by the SWAP include the
following:
i)Implementationofadecentralizedhumanresourcemanagementsystem,involvingthe
decentralization of payroll management, personnel planning and budgetingat local level, and
piloting of a performance payment mechanism\.
ii)BuildcapacityintheGovernmentsoftheAutonomousRegionsoftheAtlanticCoast(RAAN
and RAAS) so that they become prepared to take on their legal responsibility to design, organize
and manage their regional health services\. The FYIP will support the working plans that are
being prepared between the M O H and the Autonomous Secretariats of Health\.
62
Annex 5: Project Costs
NICARAGUA: Health Services ExtensionandModernization (2nd APL)
COST TABLE BY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE (US$)
Five Year
Total
1\. STRATEGICOBJECTIVE
1\. Extensionof Health Services 36,564,306
Extensionof the PBHSwith institutionalproviders 22,200,238
IExtension of the PBHSwith private providers 9,514,388
Strengtheningof health planning, evaluationand social I
participationfor the extensionof health services\. 4,849,680
Strengtheningof the Health Network 27,817,446
Women Centers (Casas Maternas) 1,476,198
Health Centers and Posts 9,103,780
Equipment 8,593,338
Hospitals 8,644,130
Stewardship, Institutional Developmentand
Decentralization 17,820,390
Stewardship,and Coordination 147,843
InstitutionalStrengthening 11,775,646
Decentralization 5,882,502
Support to INSSfor expansion of coverage and improvementof
health service quality 16,000
TOTAL 82\.202\.143
SOURCES OF FUNDS\.FIVE YEAR PLAN\.US$
Partner I ExtemalFunds I Counterpart I Total
Funds
IDB 30 3 33
I Sweden I 20 I I 20 I
IDA 11 1\.1 12\.1
The Netherlands 10\.6 10\.6
Finland 6\.5 6\.5
TOTAL 78\.1 4\.1 82\.2
63
Annex 6: Implementation Arrangements
NICARAGUA: Health Services Extension and Modernization (2nd APL)
The Code o f Conduct, which has been signed by all SWAP partners on January 28,2004, sets out
the basic principles guidingthe implementation of the SWAp\. These include the following:
Coordination: The M O H and other SWAPpartners will cooperate with each other inestablishing
mechanisms o f collaboration necessary to prevent duplication and facilitate complementarities in
policies, agendas and activities\.
Alignment: The MOH and other SWAPpartners will align their actions in accordance with the
National Health Policy and Plan (2004-2015) and the Five-Year ImplementationPlan (2005-
2009)\. They will also make sure these actions are coherent with the Reinforced Strategy for
Growth and Poverty Reduction (ERCERP), the National Development Plan and other GON
policies\.
Harmonization: The GON and all SWAP partners will simplify and integrate their policies,
procedures and operational practices in accordance with the GON legal, regulatory and
institutional structures, procedures and fiduciary systems\.
A Memorandum of Understanding(MOU), which has been drafted and furnished to the SWAP
partners by the MOH, sets out the institutional arrangements for the implementationof the
SWAPinmuch more detail\. The MOU stipulates the FYIP as the operative instrumentfor the
SWAP inthe medium-term and the consolidation of all the common initiatives inthe SWAp\. The
FYIP contains a subprogram along the priorities and geographical focalization set out inthis
credit proposal\. This subprogram, for a total amount of US$82\.2 million, focalizes the first two
objectives aimed at expanding the coverage o f the PBHS andthe strengthening of the health
service network on 79 municipalities with the worst poverty and ill-health'levels\. The FYIPi s
accompanied by a mid-term financial plan for the health sector, setting out the expected total
funding of the health sector each year, by source of funds (fiscal, external and others), as well as
the allocation of those funds across functions, territories and expenditure category\. The M O H
and the SWAP partners will create a special fund, FONSALUD, which will resource the
abovementioned subprogram within the FYIP\. Initially this fund will collect funds committed by
IDA, IDB, Sweden, Finland andthe Netherlands\. However, the fund may enlarge as new
financing from current SWAP donors i s available or new donors join in\. FONSALUD will pool
funds from those donors, allowing for specific tracking of expenditures by donor source if
necessary\.
The FYIPwill be, inturn, operationalizedevery year in annual action plans, compiling annual
plans and budgets prepared by SILAIS under MOH guidelines\. The SWAP annual programming
will be performed within the same context and process of the M O H regular budgeting and
planning cycle\. All SWAP participating agencies will meet with the M O H at least twice a year in
springand autumn\. The springmeeting will evaluate the progress of the sectoral strategy inthe
past year and will establish common guidelines for the next year's plans\. Inautumn, the SWAP
parties will review and agree with the M O H the next year action plan\.
Other implementation and institutional arrangements for the management of the SWAP will
consist of the following:
64
The M O H Board o f Directors, composed of the Minister, Vice-Minister and Directors
Generals will have overall responsibility over the planning and direction of the SWAp, as
part of the overall overseeing o f the M O H responsibilities\. The M O H will constitute a
Technical Secretariat for the SWAp\. The Technical Secretariat will report directly to the
Minister or Viceminister of Health and will be managed by an official appointed by
himher\. The appointed official's TORs and conditions of employment will require
approval b y all SWAP participating agencies\.
The General Directorate of Health Planning and Development will assist, technically and
administratively, the SWAPTechnical Secretariat\. The Technical Secretariat will be
staffed with a small number of officials for coordination and liaison with the MOH
central divisions and SILAIS purposes\. All SWAP partners will agree upon the number of
officials, their TORs and the selection process\.
The M O H Purchasing unit: This virtual entity will initially reside under the responsibility
of the General Directorate'of Health Planning and Development and will be supported by
the General Directorate of Financial Administration\. It will have the responsibility on the
operation and supervision of the community health financing scheme\. It will
progressively take on the purchasingfunction of the M O H in the rest of the country (non-
targeted SILAIS)\. Its operating cost will be partially financed by the SWAP funds in a
phased-out manner\.
SILAIS in the targeted departments will have the responsibility to formulate and monitor
service contracts and performance agreements with private and public providers for the
delivery of the PBHS\.
Corporate management agreements (convenios de gestidn): These are the purchasing
instruments between the M O H and SILAIS inthe targeted areas, by which the capitation
transfers o f the community health financing scheme are allocated\. They will also include
the investment and capacity-building plans necessary to implement the SWAP at local
level\.
Performance agreements: These are administrative tools, already implemented by the
MOHnation-wide, signedby SILAIS and the institutional providers (municipios and
hospitals)\. They will contain provisions related to the implementation of the PBHS in
those localities, as indicated in Annex 4\.
Service contracts: These contracts will be similar in content to the management
agreements but will be entered into with private providers and be legally binding\.The
tendering procedures will be in accordance with the administrative requirements for
third-party purchases of services under the GON laws\.
The following table summarizes the different mechanisms and institutional arrangements
described above:
65
Planning the overall strategy 0 Five-year health plan
Determining needs Information systems
Central Level: 0 Formulating nationaI health plans National Health Plan
(Planningand 0 Defining the procurement strategy 0 Management agreements
Purchasing) and overseeing the negotiation and Decentralizedbudget
management of management Quality Certification
agreements Instrument (habilitucidn)
* F o l l o w 2 a n d evaluation
-_m--**_u_IIII ---
, , a-
0 Qualifying providers (hubilitucidn) 0 SILAIS Health Plan and
0 (Modulator) Contracting of ,purchasingplans
services and the negotiation and Quality certification
3
i SILAIS management of contracts Instrument
(Monitoring and 0 Supervising contracts (habilitacidn)
Evaluation) Providingassistance to the central Information systems /
level inmonitoring and evaluating Providers Registry
contracts Corporate management
agreements, service
contracts and
performance agreements
Monitoring and
--* -Im"_lm
evaluation instruments
_y_ -__I_-- __uI
0 Complying with the management Performance agreements
commitments and contracts and service contracts
I Health promotion and prevention Local health analyses
i 0 Providinghealth services and plans
II Providers Local health needs analysis 0 Local health information
(Local provision) 0 Formulatinglocal health plans systems
Local financial
4 0 Compiling, processing and 0
1 management and
i supplying information for planning
and purchasing purposes administration systems
m--lp--wIIp I-*w- -I--* ----\.--
_u- - w * I _ I ' %
Capacity Constraints
The main capacity issues concern: (i) MOH's financial management capacity to oversee the
the
disbursement of SWAPfunds; and (ii) capacity of the SILAIS and governments of the
the
Autonomous Atlantic Regions to efficiently absorb, administer and monitor SWAP funds\. The
MOHhas made substantial progress inenhancing its capacity inthis regard through the
development of the Financial Administration Information System (SIGFA)\.A financial
management and procurement capacity assessment of the MOHcentral offices and the involved
SILAIS has been done as part of the preparation stage\. Strengthening plans have been outlined
and will be devised inmore detail and implemented accordingly\.
66
Organizational structure and Implementationarrangements for the SWAP
Line divisions within Division of Planning
the MOH and Development ---jL1 SWAPTechnical
Secretariat
i Managementagreements
(Convenim)
I
Performance agreements j 1 Service contracts
Providers Providers
Administrative links
------- Technical collaboration and administrative coordination links
\. Provision links
67
MOHAnnual Budget and planning cycle
t
GON's M O H Local Consolidation
budget budget planning at SILAIS budget
economic planning + and + level sent to
guidelines guidelines budgeting
A
I
M O F adiusts Assembly's M O H Local final Consolidation
and drafts discussion and prepares adjustment of final M O H
GON's approvalof + new budget -+ of budgets budget at
---+
budget final budget SILAIS and
local level
68
Annex 7: FinancialManagement and DisbursementArrangements
NICARAGUA: Health Services Extensionand Modernization (2nd APL)
Introduction
The financial management(FM)arrangementsand action plancontained here take into account the
findings of the Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA), the results of a preparation
missionto the Ministry of Health (MOH), the results of the financial management assessment, and
discussions with Government officials from MOH, the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (MOF), the
Secretariat of Strategy and Coordination of the Presidency (SECEP), and representatives of various donor
agencies\.
The basic premise of the Nicaragua Health FMarrangementsis that these will be based on the GON's
public financial management systems and procedures, with additional safeguards where needed\.
Accordingly, the sectorial arrangementspresented here fall under the umbrella of the overarching GOY'S
public financial management modernization plans (i\.e\., the Plan de Accio'n Gubemamental "PA,") and
the correlated policy dialogue with the donor community (e\.g\., the Performance Assessment Matrix under
discussion with the Budget Support Group)\.
FromJanuary 20 to 28,2004, a mission visited Nicaragua to perform the assessment of the financial
managementcapacity of the executing agency in relation to the proposed Health Services Extensionand
Modernization SWAP\. The proposed project is to be implementedby the Ministry of Health (Ministerio
de Salud -MOH) in Nicaragua\. The financial management assessment was designed to ensure that the
executing agency has in place an adequatefinancial management structure, keeps adequate automated
accounting records, has the requiredcapacity and strong internal controls in place in order to ensurethat
they will manage the funds appropriately and efficiently\.
On the basis of the assessment performed, the following broad conclusions were reached:
(i) Overall, M O H has considerably improved its financial management with a reorganization of
the administration and finance unit and the implementation of the Government's integrated
financial management system\.
(ii) Therefore, assuming that M O H carries out the proposed action planpresented inthis
assessment, especially with regards to staffing, it would have in place adequatefinancial
managementarrangementsthat meet the Bank's minimumfiduciary requirements to manage
the specific financial activities of the proposed SWAP\.
Commonfiduciary framework
The MOHhas agreed with a group of Donors on a health sector-wide approach where external assistance
would be provided through a virtual Health Sector Support Fund(FONSALUD)\. Inconnection with the
FONSALUD, a common fiduciary framework (CFF) is being developed\.
A CFF may significantly reduce transaction costs of meetingthe diverse requirements of donors;
however, CFF procedures can impose transaction costs of their own, which raises the need for a simple
and gradual approach\. In a first stage, it i s likely (and recommended) that the CFF will be adopted by a
limitednumberof Donors\. With their focus on country systems, the FMarrangements for the use of IDA
proceedshave been designed as a basis for a CFF\.
69
ImplementingEntity
As outlined inthe Code of Conduct, andthe already drafted MOU, the executing entity for the proposed
health SWAP will be M O H (Ministerio de Salud) with oversight by the Office of the Minister of Health\.
The Mesa Sectorial de Salud (MS)comprised of all cooperating agencies in the health sector and all the
health-related government agencies will be the principal forum for cooperation, information exchange and
dialogue for the overall health sector development\. MOH and all the SWAP partners will constitute a
Coordinating Committee in charge of overseeing the planning and execution of the FYP and its annual
action plans, and reviewing periodically (at least biannually) the attainment of its targets\. Technical
support and internal coordination within M O H will be provided by a SWAP Technical Secretariat
attachedto the MOH's Department of Planningand Development\. The director of the technical secretariat
will be appointed by the Health Minister, under TORS,employment conditions and appointment subject
to approval by all the SWAP partners\.
M O H is responsible for formulating policies relating to the health sector in Nicaragua, and coordinating,
executing and evaluatingprograms related to the protection, prevention and improvement of the health
status of the Nicaraguan population\. M O H is divided into 53 executing units, including 17 SILAIS
(SistemasLocales de Atencidn Integral en Salud) and 33 hospitals\. Inaddition, M O H is divided into 9
divisions, includingthe General Administration and Finance Division (Direccidn General Administrutiva
Financiera or DGAF) and the PlanningDivision (Direccidn General de Panijkacidn y Desarrollo)\. The
PlanningDivision will be responsible for overall technical execution of the program, and the
Administration and Finance Division will be responsible for the financial and administrative
management\.
Therefore, MOH, through the DGAF,will have overall financial and accounting responsibility for the
proposed SWAp, including (i) maintenance of accounting records, (ii) preparation of project financial
statements in accordancewith national and World Bank guidelines, (iii) management of bank accounts,
(iv) preparation and submission of quarterly FinancialMonitoringReports (FMRs) produced by the
SIGFA, and (v) preparation and submission of withdrawal applications\.
Staffing
As described above, the proposed programwill be implementedby MOH, and responsibilities for
financial management will be assignedto DGAF\. Therefore, existing staff members within DGAFwill
play a role inthe financial management of the proposed program\. The credit will finance qualified
incremental technical assistanceas requiredby the DGAF, such technical assistanceto be absorbed
gradually by MOH\.
The Ministry has proposed to create aunit, within the DGAF,to manageexpenditures andbudget
execution of the SWAP(FONSALUD)\. This unit would include a Coordinator two Analysts and a team
of financial officers who will supervise financial management at the SILAI level and report directly to the
Manager of the Accounting Office\. This unit would be responsible for reviewing expenditures of
FONSALUD, coordinating with MOF for disbursement purposes from FONSALUD,providingfollow-up
on budget execution, preparingperiodic financial reports and withdrawal applications for donors\.
70
i Oficina de
Seguimientode
RecursosExternos
Analisis\. Registroy Registro Contable Contabilidadpara
Patrimonial FONSALUD
Accounting Policies and Procedures
The main FMnormative framework for the FONSALUD will consist o f (i)the Budget Regime Law,
which establishes procedures for the formulation, approval, and execution of the budget; (ii) the Annual
Law of the General Budget of the Republic, which specifies the Revenue and Expenditure Budgets and
expands on the general rules laiddown inthe Budget RegimeLaw; (iii) the annual Norms and Procedures
for Budget Execution and Control issuedby the MOF; and (iv) the manuals and rules developed under the
Integrated Financial Management System (SIGFA)program\.
FMarrangementsspecific to FONSALUD that are not contemplated inthe regulations cited above will be
documented in a concise FMsection of the Operational Manual\.
Budgeting
Duringthe second quarter of each year MOH, under the overall budget policy framework provided by the
MOF, will prepareFONSALUD's Investment Program for the next year\. At the overall MOH's level of
investments, IDA funds should add to, rather than substitute for, domestic resources\.
The Investment Programwill be presentedto the SECEP for its incorporation in the National Public
Investment Plan (PIP)\. The latter is subject to two levels of approval: (i) the inter-ministerial Investments
Technical Committee (CTI); and (ii) the GON's Economic Cabinet\.
The approved Investment Programwill be incorporated into MOH's annual budget proposal\.
FONSALUD expenditure items will be tagged\.16 The healthbudget will be incorporated by the MOF into
the national budget for the President's submittal to the National Assembly in October\. The Assembly
would approve the budget by December\.
On the basis of the approved budget, MOH will adjust its annual work plan (POA/MOH), which includes
the annual work and procurement plan financed under FONSALUD (POA/FONSALUD)\. The latter will
be reviewedby IDA\.
l6The GON's integratedfinancial management system (SIGFA) allows tagging of expenditures ("marcaje de
seguimiento de proyecto especifico") at different levels of expenditure classification\.
71
Management agreements with Public Providers and Contracts with Private Providers (NGOs)
FONSALUD will support the transfer of community health financing scheme to SILAIS for the
expansion of coverage of the PBHS\. A managementagreement will be established between M O H and
the SILAIS, with a specified list of activities andpayment amounts\. A monitoring system will be
established to ensure contract compliance by programparticipants\.
Information Technology (IT)Systems
Project funds will be captured in the Government's integratedfinancial management system(SIGFA),
utilized by MOH\. There will, however, be a need for further cooperation with MOF for the purposes of
aggregating information from SIGFA on a component and category basis (for financial monitoringto the
Bank) and preparing withdrawal applications\.
Safeguard over assets
Assets acquired usingproject funds will be inthe custody of the respective organizations\. The accounting
system allows for tracking of assets purchased\. Therefore, the asset register will be kept within MOH's
accounting system (SIMINSA)\. The amounts inthe register will be reconciledmonthly against the
respective account balances\. And, at least one annual physical inspection of the assets will be undertaken
by M O H staff, preferable with the participation of external auditors\.
Reporting and Monitoring
On a quarterly basis, MOHwill prepare and submit to IDA a FinancialMonitoringReport (FMR) for
FONSALUD containing: (i) Statement of Sources and Uses of Funds (with expenditures classified by
subcomponent) and Cash Balances; (ii) Statement of Budget Execution per subcomponent (with
expenditures classified by the Government's budgetary economic lines); (iii) PhysicalProgressReport;
and (iv) Procurement MonitoringReport\. The format for the FMR will be flexible enough to satisfy needs
of the Government, IDA and other Donors\. An annex to the FMR would contain data specific to IDA
disbursements: (i) Special Account Activity Statement (including a copy of the bank statement); (ii)
Summary Statement of Special Account Expenditures for Contracts subject to Prior Review; and (iii)
Summary Statementof Special Account Expenditures for Contracts Not subject to Prior Review\. The
FMRs will be submitted to IDA no later than 45 days after the endof eachquarter\.
On an annual basis, M O H will prepare Financial Statements for FONSALUD that will includecumulative
figures, for the year and as of the end of that year, of the financial statements cited inthe previous
paragraph, with the corresponding explanatory notes in accordancewith the Cash Basis Intemational
Public Sector Accounting Standard (IPSAS), and MOH's assertion that credit funds were used in
accordancewith the intendedpurposes as specified in the Credit Agreement\. These financial statements,
once audited, will be submitted to IDA no later than six months after the end of the Government's fiscal
year (which coincides with the calendar year)\.
The supporting documentation of the quarterly and annual financial statements will be maintained in
MOH's premises and made easily accessible to IDA supervision missions and external auditors\.
FundsFlow
IDA Disbursement method
Credit proceedswill be withdrawn on a quarterly basis under the report-based disbursement method\.
Duringimplementation, MOHwill (a) sustain satisfactory FMarrangementsto be verified through
supervision missions, (b) submit FMRs consistent with the agreedform, content and due date, and (c)
submit acceptable audited financial statements by their due date\. IfM O Hdoes not continue to meet these
criteria, the method will be changed to transaction-based disbursements only (provided the World Bank
72
does not suspenddisbursements because of non-compliance with the obligation to maintain an adequate
FMsystem)\. Underthe transaction-based disbursement method, the SOEthresholds would be consistent
with the procurement prior review thresholds\.
IDA Special Account
Basedon MOF's preference, each donor fundingFONSALUD will have its own special deposit account\.
Therefore, the MOF (through the Treasurer General) will open and maintain inthe Central Bank (BCN) a
special deposit account for IDA'Scontribution to FONSALUD, which will be co-managed by M O Hand
MOF, to be usedexclusively for deposits and withdrawals of credit proceeds for eligible expenditures\.
After the conditions of effectiveness have beenmet, andthe special deposit account has been opened,
M O H will submit the first disbursement request (form 1903B) to IDA, together with the credit
expenditure forecast for the next six months\. For subsequentwithdrawals, M O H will submit form 1903B
to IDA, along with the FMR for the quarterjust ended and the expenditure forecast for the subsequent six
months\.
Flow of Funds (program disbursements),
Program disbursementswill be madeutilizingMOH's general disbursement procedures\. Therefore,
programdisbursements will be made either through direct payment from MOF, or through MOH's
revolving fund\. For major expenditures, upon receipt of a request from MOH, MOF will execute
payments out of the national Treasury Single Account (CUT)\. For minor expenditures, M O H will
execute payments out of its revolving fund mechanism\.
On a weekly basis, MOF will verify the amounts spent under the FONSALUD budget lines, which i s
possible as SIGFA produces real-time data on budget execution\. On the basis of expenditures incurred
during the period and the percentage applicable to IDA financing of FONSALUD, MOF will reimburse
the CUT from the Special Account\. Inother words, withdrawals from the Special Account will be to
cover expenditures pre-financed out of the CUT\.
Paymentsunder Component 1will be made in accordance with the provisions of the management
agreementsbetween M O H and SILAIS (such provisions to be consistent with the Operational Manual
that has to be reviewed and approved by the Bank)\. Montly pro-rated payments to SILAIS will be made
inaccordance with the agreednumber of beneficiaries times the average adjusted per capita premiumin
that SILAIS\. Inthe event of significant underperformance, any unusedbalance will be deducted from the
subsequent payment, or, if it occurs at the end of a contract period, it will be refunded\. The costing
mechanism will be documented in the Operational Manual and reviewed on an annual basis\.
Certain minor expenditures under Component 2 will be paid for by the SILAIS under short-term advances
from M O H subject to reconciliation\. Other payments will be managed centrally by MOH's Finance
Department\.
Payments to foreign providers in foreign currency can be made directly out of the Special Account\.
DisbursementSchedule (USD)
Expenditure US$ SDR
Category Equivalent
(1) Works, Goods, ConsultingServicesand 4\.25 2\.78
Trainingfor Component A2 and B
(2) Works, Goods, ConsultingServices and 1\.80 1\.18
Trainingfor Component C
( 3 ) Catitation Transfers 4\.20 2\.14
73
(4) Operating Costs and Audits \.65 \.42
(5) Unallocated \.10 \.08
Total 11\.0 7\.2
A new disbursement category (``convenios for SILAIS") has been created above as it does not fit any
traditional disbursement categoriesof the Bank (i\.e\. civil works, consultants, goods, training)\.
RetroactiveFinancing
The Bank would finance up to a maximum of US$ 1\.0 million for eligible expenditures incurred after
March 1, 2005, but no more than one year from signing\.
Audit
Internal Audit
Inthe course of its regular internalaudit activities vis-8-vis the institutional budget, MOH's Internal
Auditor may include FONSALUD activities in its annual work plan\. M O H will provide IDA with copies
of internal audit reports covering FONSALUD activities and financial transactions\. However, since
MOH's internal audit department's work plan i s limited, for this program, the use of external independent
operational audits (as described below) will contribute to ensure that the resourcesare usedfor the
purpose intended\.
External Audit
The annual FONSALUD Financial Statements will be audited in accordancewith InternationalStandards
on Auditing(ISA), by an independent firm and in accordance with terms of reference (TORS)both
acceptableto IDA and the participatingDonors\. New audit policy of the World Bank, documented in
"Guidelines: Annual financial reportingand auditing for World bank-financed projects" will be applicable
to the project, as it is appraised after July 1,2003\. This means that interms of audit opinion on project
accounting records maintainedby the project, a single audit opinion covering: (i)program financial
statements, (ii)special account statement, and (iii) adequacy of supporting documentation maintainedby
M O H in respect of expenditures claimed for reimbursement via report-based proceduresand eligibility of
suchexpenditures for financing under the respective Credit Agreement will be required\.
In addition to the audit opinion, the auditors will have to present the managementletter, covering: (i)
weaknesses noted by the auditors in the internal control systems of the project, (ii) of application of
cases
inappropriate accounting policies and practices, (iii) issues regardinggeneral compliance with broad
covenants, and (iv) any other matters that the auditors consider should be brought to the attention of the
borrower\.
In addition, operational audit reports (under ISRS 4400 "Engagements to perform agreed-upon
procedures regarding financial information") on the procedures followed in execution of FONSALUD
expenditures would be produced annually duringimplementation\.
While the audit reports are to be issuedannually, the external auditors are expectedto perform at least one
review visit per quarter during the first two years of implementation, producing memoranda on internal
controls ("management letters") accordingly\.
The audit work will be co-financed with credit proceeds\.MOHwill appoint the external auditors within
three months after credit effectiveness\. Each audit contract i s expected to cover at least two reporting
periods\.
74
ANNUALREPORTINGSUMMARY
Document Due Date
I
Annual FONSALUD Investment Program June 30, previous year
I
~~Annual Budget ProDosal
~ IINov\. 1\. Drevious vear
Approved budget, annual work and procurement
plan (POAFONSALUD) I Jan\.
Annual review of the costing mechanism for Jan\. 15
Component 1
Quarterly Financial Monitoring Reports (FMRs) 45 days after the end of each quarter
Annual financial audit report 6 months after the end of the year
Annual oDerationa1audit reDort 6 months after the end of the vear
FMActionPlan '
No\. Responsible Deadline
1 II Action
Finalize the Financial Monitoring- Report
- 1IMOWIDA Before negotiations
(FMR) format
2 Finalize and sign agreement on common MOH/IDA/Donors Before effectiveness
fiduciary framework (CFF) for the
3 II FONSALUD
Coordinate with MOF to enable the production I MOH IBefore effectiveness
o f necessary financial reports from SIGFA or
the implementation o f a system to generate
necessary reports
4 Identify and incorporate new staff and technical MOH Before effectiveness
assistance required in DGAF (FONSALUD
unit)
5 Finalize audit terms of reference and short list MOWIDAIDonors Before effectiveness
6 Finalize FMsection o f the operational manual MOH Before effectiveness
7 Contract external auditors MOH 3 months after
effectiveness
8 Provide applicable reports MOH Throughout
implementation
IDA FMSupervisionPlan\.An IDA FMSpecialist should perform a supervision missionprior to
effectiveness\. After effectiveness, the FMSpecialist must review the annual audit reports, shouldreview
the financial sections of the quarterly FMRs, and should perform at least one supervision mission per
year\.
Guidelines
The financial management and disbursement provisions of the Credit Agreement, the Operational
Manual, and the arrangementsdescribed above would be complemented where neededby the following
World Bank documents:
l+ Financial Monitoring Reports: Guidelines to Borrowers
l+ Guidelines: Annual Financial Reporting and Auditingfor World Bank-FinancedActivities
P Disbursements Handbook
75
Annex 8: Procurement Arrangements
NICARAGUA: Health Services Extensionand Modernization(2nd APL)
1\. SUMMARY
An assessment of the capacity of the Ministry of Health (MOH) to implement procurement actionsfor the
proposed secondphase of the Nicaragua Health ModernizationProject (APL) was carried out between
January 24-28, 2005\. The assessment reviewedthe organizational structure for implementing the project
and the interaction between the project's staff responsible for procurement and MOH's Department for
Administration and Finance\. The assessment reviewed the four main components of the program, plus
operational costs\.These components will require procurement of small civil works, consulting services
and goods\.
Most of the issues/risks concerning the procurement component for implementation of the project have
been identified and include:
0 Inconsistencies between Law 323 and World Bank policies on (i) registrationrequirements; (ii)
evaluation systems; and (iii) consulting services;
0 Inconsistencies between IDB and World Bank policies on: (i) eligibility; (ii)
thresholds for prior
review; and (iii) consulting services;
Weaknessesin the internal and external auditing system;
0 Weaknessesin technical specifications, terms of reference, and contract management; and
0 Needfor additional qualified staff to manage project procurement\.
The corrective measures agreedupon will be includedin a fiduciary memorandumof understanding, and
include:
0 Review by SWAP Partners of the annual procurement plan and quarterly updates;
0 Outline for the use of ICB and NCP systems;
0 A capacity plan funded by the Pool Fundto strengthenprocurement procedures, reporting and audit,
and staff skills; and
0 Addition of qualified staff\.
With these measuresin place, the overall project riskfor procurement i s average\.
2\. PROCUREMENT CAPACITY
The HealthPlanningand Development General Directorate (DGPD) will be the starting purchasingentity
for the SWAPfunded expansion of services, until the MOH sets up a devoted purchasing unit within its
formal structure\. This office will purchase services from public and private providersto achieve the
expansion of services objectives with the SWAPdefinedfunds\. It i s also the MOH's intentthat the
purchasingunit to be created will gradually take over the purchasing of heath services throughout the
country using MOH resourcesthrough the annual management agreement signed with all SILAIS, local
providers and national hospitals\.
Within MOH's General Directorate for Management and Finance, the Procurement Unit (Divisi6n de
Adquisiciones de Bienes y Servicios, PU) i s responsible for the acquisition of goods, services and works
for the Ministry and its depending administrative entities\. The PUis responsible for managing, using
national procedures, all procurement of goods, services and works\. Of the total purchases, approximately
76
50 percent is financed from the national budget\. Untilrecently, procurement for World Bank and IDB-
funded projects was managedby Project ImplementationUnits (PIUs) under each MDB's Guidelines,
procedures and SBDs\.Thereafter, a recently approved IDBLoan NI-Ll001 (Improving Maternal and
Child Health) charged the PU with the responsibility to manage procurement albeit usingIDB's
procurement guidelines\. These transactions are also captured in the annual procurement plan\.
The PUcurrently has a staff group of 1Director and 5 procurement officers\. The current PUstaffing level
i s insufficient to managethe workload identified in the program\. To meet the demands of the proposed
SWAp, it is estimated the PUwill needa complement of 5 to 9 additional procurement officers\. The PU
i s in a process of restructuringits organization\. Organization, functions and accountabilities of the PU's
staff needto be defined in an organizational/operational manual with individualjob profiles and
description for each of the required positions\.
3\. RISK ASSESSMENT AND MEASURES
A numberof efficiencies can be achievedthrough the proposed pooled fundmechanism\. The pooledfund
will reduce the number of differing procurement procedures demandedby donors and, in so doing, will
enable the P Uto better plan and consolidate procurement to achieve economies of scale\. The review of
the annual Procurement Plan and quarterly updates, coupled with provisions for prior review of proposed
high riskhaluetransactions, a capacity plan procurement to strengthen procedures, and reporting and
audit, to be included in the Fiduciary MOU, will reduce the risk for the PooledFundPartners to support
the proposed SWAp\.
The SWAPPartners and GONauthorities agreed on the following to organize procurement processes and
transactions under the SWAp:
1\. All the purchasesand procurement processes, except those expressly delegatedto the SILAIS,
will be centralized and conducted by the MOH's PU\.
2\. Purchases of goods, works and consulting services financed with resourcesprovided by donor
agencies will be procuredeither following IDB-WBGuidelines or Law 323, depending upon the
economies of scale and the threshold levels of the specific transactions\.
3\. Law 323 permits exceptions when procurement i s subject to an agreement with a foreign
government or internationalorganization\. The Fiduciary M O U would constitute such an
agreement\.
4\. Weaknessesin the application of the regulatory and operational framework, including human
resources, management systems, and audits, will be addressedin the Fiduciary M O U between
the SWAP Partners as follows:
Weakness Identified Mitigation Measures
Legal and Regulatory Framework\. MOU will require that procurement be conducted by the PUas
follows:
For ICB
For goods and works, the procurement processes will
be conducted using the recently approved and
harmonized WB-IDB procurement guidelines, and the
corresponding harmonized SBDs, to allow for inter
alia eligibility o f foreign supplierdproviders as per
Bank policies\. This will require to iron out a few
differences in the current master SBDs, and to review
77
Weakness Identified Mitigation Measures
and agree with the partners the thresholds outlined in
IDBLoan NI-L1001(Improving Maternal and Child
Health) as follows: (i) lower the threshold for goods
from 350K (too high for Nicaragua) to a level to be
definedafter a quick review of the market and recent
bids (the current WB threshold is presently set for all
projects at 150K), (ii)set a threshold for shopping
procedures (the current threshold for Nicaragua is set
in the Bank at 25K\. IDB'sproject does not mention
it)\.
For consulting services, the selection processes will
be conducted usingWB Consultants Guidelines for
all contracts\. Prior review of procedures will take
place for all contracts above 200K\. Below a 200K
threshold, the use of short-lists made up of local
consultants only may be authorized, add prior review
will only take place for the first three contracts\. Prior
review of individual consultant procedures will take
place for contracts above 50K\.
NCB, quotations and shopping:
For goods and works, the procurement processes will
be conducted using nationalprocedures, and the
corresponding SBDs issuedby the Ministry of
Finance, which have been reviewed and assessedto
be consistent with Bank guidelines\.
Deletion of references to NCB for consultants, but
agreement that national procedures could be used
under a 200K threshold\. This should be agreed in the
MOUand the procedures well defined --they have
still to be consistent with the guidelines if not exactly
those contemplated in the guidelines\.
Exclusion o f consulting services contracts,
irrespective of source of funding (agreed with
Nicaraguan authorities during mission)\.
Post review of a sample of contracts following WB
guidelines\.
MOUwill provide for SWAP Partner review of any future
legislative and procedural change which may have the
effect of weakening the openness, transparency and
efficiency of procurement\.
hternal Policy and Procedures 1 M O H will require the issuanceof a comprehensive
operational manual, which includes both organizational
and operational functions\.
?lanning 1 MOUwill require M O Hto prepare, in a form satisfactory
to the SWAP Partners, an Annual Procurement Plan
(PACC) covering goods, services and works\.
1 Progress against the PACC, including amendments to the
plan, will be tracked in quarterly reports following the
Procurement Informationand Follow-Up System
78
Weakness Identified MitigationMeasures
(SIPROSEC) developedby the Louis Berger Group\.
PFP's will approve annualfunds on the basis of the
PACC\.
___
Standard Bidding Documents MOU will requireMOHto amend SBDs to address
specifically:
The mandatory requirementthat all bidders, including
foreign bidders, be registered in the Registro de
Proveedores prior to bid opening and replacing it witk
a requirementthat the successfulbidder be registered
at the time of contract signature;
The exclusion of price adjustmentsfor inflation in
consultant contracts;
The exclusion of bidders with pending litigation with
aprocuremententity;
Subjecting all procurementfor goods, woFks and
consulting services above the value threshold set for
Public Bid, to international advertisement(e\.g\.,
development business);
Publishing all bids subject to Bid by Registry and
Public Bidprocedureson the website of the Ministry
of Financein addition to the notification requirement:
of current legislation;
Consolidating the procurement, to the extent possible
of like requirementsto achieve economies in
transactioncosts and bulk purchasing; and
The use of apoint system in bid evaluation for
standard goods and works, instead of the discretion tc
set aside the lowest compliant bid in favor of the mos
convenient or favorable bid in the general interest\.
Audit and Review MOU will require that an annualreview of PU
procurementoperations be carried out by an independent
agent appointedby MOHand satisfactory to the SWAP
Partners\.In addition, when a particular risk has been
identified, any PFP may undertake a special procurement
audit\.
MOU will require MOHto prepare quarterly reports
which include performance information relating to
selection method, processingtimes, transaction costs and
the resolution of bid and contractual disputes\.
MOU will allow the SWAP Partnersto carry out semi-
annual supervision missions to conduct post review of
procurement actions\.
Human Resourcesand Training MOU will address:
The need for additional staff to increasingly use the PUto
manage project procurement\.
Inclusionof the costs of PUsupport in program budgeting
The current gap betweenMOHPUand PIU salary scales\.
Infrastructure needs such as equipment, enlarging office
space and facilities such as the archives\.
Expertise and training in areas such as preparation of
79
WeaknessIdentified MitigationMeasures
technical specifications and terms of reference,design and
application of more sophisticatedbid evaluation
methodologies, and contract management\.
Monitoring and evaluation of procurementperformance\.
4\. PROCUREMENTARRANGEMENTS
Expenditure ContractValue ProcurementMethod Contractssubjectto
Category Threshold Prior Review
(US$ thousands)
1\.Works >= 1,000 ICB All contracts
<1,000 NCB None
40,000 Price Quotations None
2\. Goods >= 150 ICB All contracts
15040 NCB None
' 4 0 Shopping None '
3\.ConsultingServices >=200 firms QCBS All contracts
>100<200 firms QCBS (use of short list All contracts
of local consultants
only)
All values individual Individual All contracts >50
Community healthfinancing schemefunds transferred to SILAIS for the expansion of the PBHS
will not be subject to procurement rules\.
80
Annex 9: Economicand FinancialAnalysis
NICARAGUA: Health Services Extensionand Modernization(2nd APL)
A\. Introduction
Inorder to improve healthresults inNicaragua, particularly among the poorest, The World Bank
and the Government o f Nicaragua are inthe process of preparing the second phase of the Health
Reform Program\. The strategy for attaining better health results for the target population will be
based on the achievement of higher levels of efficiency, effectiveness, equity and sustainability
by the Nicaraguan institutions that provide health services\.
Financing for this new phase has also undergone changes, evidenced by the set up of a common
fund and the adoption of a common strategic approach-known as a SWAp, or SWAP-with six
different donors from the international &operation partners\. Duringthe period 2005-2009, this '
fundwill provide the necessaryresources, along with those provided by the Ministry of Health,
to pursue the above mentioned objectives\.
The intervention strategies for this second phase are divided inthree main themes: (i) the
extension of coverage of basic health and nutrition services in the poorest areas of the country,
through the establishment and strengthening o f the new service provision model, (ii) integration
and strengthening of the healthservices network, with special emphasis on maternal-child health,
through the provision of a basic healthservices package in selected geographic areas of the
country and, (iii)strengthening the Ministry o f Health's institutional capacity inthe following
areas: purchasingof services, monitoring and evaluation, governing and administration capacity
of the ministry's decentralized units and supporting the growing independence of the
autonomous governments of the Atlantic coast\.
The intervention strategies set forth in the SWAp, are consistent with the goals established in the
2004-2015 National Health Policy and the Five-Year Health Plan established by the Ministry of
Health (MOH)\. As such, the starting point at the health reform program has been identified as
the need to establish coordinating mechanisms within institutions as well as across the different
international cooperation funds in order to effectively confront structural health problems in the
most vulnerable population\.
This document contains the economic and fiscal analysis results for the second phase of the
Health Reform Project\. The analysis examines the investment return and fiscal impact that such
disbursements will have over the public finances o f the Government of Nicaragua\.
B\. Assumptions of the Analysis
The economic analysis starts with the adoption o f a series of assumptions, about the strategies,
interventions and goals established in the SWAp\. The analysis' most important assumptions are
described below:
81
1\.Population covered:Theproposed interventionswill focus onthe highriskSILAIS and
municipalities that were identified in a socio-demographic analysis conductedby MOH, in
combination with analysis that was carried out as part of the evaluation of the 1997-2002
National Health Policy\. The targeting was based on vulnerability criteria using several
indicators: three health status measures, average per capita household income and geographical
access\. Combining this analysis with estimates of the resources expected to be available to M O H
from both national and international sources, resulted inthe identification of 12 SILAIS and 79
municipalities, presented in the table below, that will be prioritized in the interventions\.
Table 1\.SILAIS and Priority Municipalities inthe Health Sector Strategy
1\.BOACO San Jose de 10s Remates 7\. MADRIZ Palacagiiina
Santa Lucia Las Sabanas
Teustepe San Jose de Cusmapa
San Juan de Rfo Coco
SanLucaS
Somoto
Totogalpa
Telpaneca
Yalagiiina
2\. C H m m E G A Cinco Pinos 8\. MATAGALPA San Ram6n
SanFranciscodel None Waslala
Somotillo Esquipulas
San Pedrodel Norte Matiguiis
Santo Tomiisdel Norte Bocanade Paiwas
ElViejo RanchoGrande
Villanueva RioBlanco
San Dionisio
3\. CHONTALES Acoyapa 9\. NUEVASEGOVIA Jalapa
Comalapa El Jicaro
ElAyote Macuelizo
La Libertad Murra
Muelle de 10s Bueyes Quilali
NuevaGuinea Wiwili (NuevaSegovia)
El Rama
Santo Doming0
San Pedro de L6vago
4\. ESTEL~ Condega 10\.M A N Bonanza
Esteli Rosita
Pueblo Nuevo PuertoCabezas
SanJuande Limay Siuna
San Nicolas Waspin
La Trinidad Muculucu
PrinZaplka
5\. JINOTEGA L a Concordia 11\.RAAS Bluefields
ElCua-Bocay Corn IslandLa cmz de Rfo
SantaMan'a de Pantasma Grande
San Rafaeldel Norte El Tortuguero
San Sebastifinde Yali KukraHill
Wiwili (Jinotega) Karawala
Lagunade Perlas
-
6\. LEON Achuapa 122\. RfOSANJUAN ElAlmendro
ElJicaral ElCastillo
Quezalguaque Momto
El Sauce SanCarlos
Santa\. Rosadel Peii6n San Juandel Norte
San Xliguelito
82
According to official 2005 statistics, there are 3\.3 million inhabitants inthe 12target
departments, 2 million of whom live in the 79 prioritized municipalities\. It i s estimated that the
SWAP will extend coverage to 470,000 beneficiaries, including 235,000 women of reproductive
age, 188,000 children under 5 years of age and 47,000 youth and adults who are regarded as
particularly vulnerable to the area's prevailing diseases which are included inthe Basic Health
Services Package (PBS)\.
2\. Temporal horizon: While SWAP interventions cover a total of 5 years, the impact of project
interventions will be for considerably longer\. So as to be consistent with the economic analysis
of similar health projects the time horizon of the analysis will be 10years\.
3\. Discount rate: A discount rate of 12percent i s used for discount of total benefits generated by
the project\. Two alternative scenarios are considered with 10 and 8 percent rates\. A 10percent
rate i s normally used inWorld Bank-evaluated projects, which represents the investment
opportunity cost o f project resources\. Lower discount rates of course mean that the income
flows from future earnings will be greater\. For example, a 3 percent rate has been proposedby
the World Health Organization to discount future income flows received by people whose lives
have been saved, (Murray and Lbpez, 1994)\.
4\. Direct benefits: The analysis considers four types of direct benefits associated with project
interventions: (i)reduction in patient-days as a result o f primaryhealth levels' effective
a
functioning, (ii) an increase in outpatient surgery for certain causes that can be treated under
these procedures, (iii) a reduction inintra-hospital infections and, (iv) the savings generated as a
result of improved efficiency of the M O H resulting from decentralization\.
(i)Reductioninpatient-days\. Oneofthemajorexpectedbenefitsofestablishing theIntegral
Health Treatment Model (MAIS) i s the reduction of certain diseases currently treated in hospitals
because of the ineffectiveness o f reference and counter-reference systems\. Treatment o f diseases
inhospitals causes an unnecessary increase incost, which canbe averted by strengthening and
improving the efficiency of primary health care\. The most important diseases that can be treated
at the primary level and that will produce the majority o f such savings are: intestinal infections,
acute respiratory infections, malnutrition and perinatal causes\.
(ii)Increaseinoutpatientsurgery\. Someofthesurgicalproceduresthat arecurrently
performed on an inpatient basis can be safely and more efficiently conducted on an ambulatory
basis\. This will generate cost savings in the health system\. The most important conditions that
will be targeted for being transformed into ambulatory care cases are: tonsillitis, surgical
contraceptive treatment, detached retina, palm fibrosis, renal arteriovenous fistula, hallux valgus,
hemorrhoids, hernia, slipped disk, knee instability, meniscus, joint stiffness, vocal chords tumor,
bladder tumor and peripheral venous bypass\.
(iii)Reductioninhospitalinfections\.Promotingbetterhospitalhealthcaremanagement-in
particular, improving hygienic conditions and the quality o f hospital services-will allow a
reduction of intra-hospital (nosocomial) infections inNicaraguan hospitals\.
83
(iv) Savings due to improvements in the decentralization process\. Efficiency in the use of
resources will allow the Ministry of Health to save costs\. Development of contracting capacity,
improvement of supplies system, improvement in equity of resources, etc\. arejust a few of the
proposed actions\.
5\. Indirectbenefits: Two types of indirect benefits are considered: (i) producedby the
those
proposed nutrition interventions and, (ii) the estimated number of lives saved by the Project\.
Persons who are undernourished earn lower incomes throughout their economically active life\.
When fewer persons suffer from global and severe malnutrition, their income earning capacity i s
increased\. This increased income-earning capacity of the persons whose nutrition status i s
improved by the project can be estimated as the of future income flow, valued on the basis of
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita projected throughout the individual's work life and
translated inpresent value\.
The reduction inmaternal and children under 5 mortality rates will reduce the number of deaths
inthese population groups\. Savedlives will create an economic benefit that may be quantified
usingthe human capital method; an economic assessment of future income flow receivedby
these individuals, who willjoin or will continue to be part of the economically active population,
i s carried out\.
6\. Percentage of goal completion: Inthe case of benefits generated through the reduction inthe
rate of malnutrition and through direct benefits, it i s expected that benefits will accumulate
progressively according to the schedule presented in the table below\.
Table 2\. ExpectedValues of Project Benefits
Year Nutrition Xrect Benefit!
1 10% 0%
2 10% 30%
3 25% 60%
4 25% 90%
5 30% 100%
6 30% 100%
7 30% 100%
a 30% 100%
9 30% 100%
10 30% 100%
7\. Project investments and recurrent costs: The total financing of the SWAP is US$82\.2
million, which will be disbursed over a period of 5 years inthe pattern shown inTable 3\.
It is estimate that recurrent costs equal to roughly 20 percent of the investment in(only) the
infrastructure and equipment component and that these will be absorbed by the MOHonce
project investments are completed in 2009\.
84
Coiiiponente hieines externas Total
2005 1 2006 I 2007 I 2008 I 2009 riuttiqiienio
Extension de Servictos(le Saliitl 3,132,026 5,035,938 9,240,803 9\.567\.391 9,588,148 36,564,306
Entensiondel PBSS con proveedores institucionales 59,634 73,866 89,931 103,040 115,891 442,361
Entensibn del CBEC a traves de terceros 2,334\.581 3,978,398 8,135,586 8 3 18,392 8,505,307 31,272,265
Fortalecimiento de la ulanificaci6n\. evaluacionYDarticioaci6n social uara la
extension de cobettura 737,811 983,674 1,015,286 1,I45,959 966,950 4,849,680
Fortalecitiiieirto(le la Redde SeMcios 7,058,901 5,767,468 4,478,903 6\.530\.297 3\.981\.878 27,817,447
casas Maternas 328,320 293,166 301,266 295,920 257,526 1,476,298
Centros y Puestos de Salud 2,653,780 1,950,000 1,500,000 1,500,000 1,500,000 9,103,780
Equipamiento 1,747,338 1,579,200 1,737,750 1,755,600 1,773,450 8,593,338
Hospitales 2,329,462 1,945,102 939\.887 2,978,777 450,902 8\.644\.1 30
Rectoria,DesarrolloFortaleclnilentoInstttiictoiiuly Desceidralizacioii 1,378,489 3,154\.207 5,253384 5\.365\.390 2\.069,020 17\.820\.390
Rectoria Q Coordinaci6n 43,635 31,167 21,680 25,680 25,680 147,843
Divulgaci6n, capacitationy coord intersectorial 31,355 17,607 0 0 0 48,963
Promover un enfoque intersectorial en 10s ss 12,280 13,560 21,680 25,680 25,680 98,880
Fottalecimiento lnstitucional para melorar la entrega de sewicios 1,030,823 3,172,105 3,495,379 3,032,111 1,045,228 11,775,646
Redisefio,reorganizacion y OtrOS 32,542 2,116,165 2,721,402 2\.1 40,960 103,644 7\.114\.711
lmplementar la reorganizaclon institucional 115,689 94,230 16,605 0 0 226,524
Caiidad, promoci6ny prevencion en salud ' 397,536 154,428 112,186 110\.212 109,210 883,572
Desarrollar el talento human0 215,287 363,074 431,954 497,034 561,720 2,069,069
Melorar el sistema de sumlnistros 269,770 444,209 213,232 283,904 270,654 1,481,770
Descentralizacion 295,030 545,535 1,736,226 2,307,599 998,112 5,882,502
Desarrollarfunci6nde contratacl6n de sew salud 209,850 113,739 128,911 104,952 116,655 674,108
Profundizar la desconcentraci6n 62,550 129,803 129,803 0 0 322,155
Mejorar la equidad en la asignaci6n de recursos 22,630 301,994 1,477\.51 2 2,202,647 881,456 4,886,238
Apoyo al INSS para la extension de Cobettura y meiora de la calidad en
salud 9,000 5,400 0 0 0 16,000
TOTAL 11\.569\.416 14557,613 18,972\.990 21,163,078 15,639,046 82,202,134
8\. Use of real (as opposed to nominal) figures: All figures are inreal currency units (US$
dollars of 2004); therefore, the results presented here will not be effected by inflation\.
9\. Establishment of "without project" and "with project" scenarios: Two scenarios are
analyzed inestimating direct and indirect benefits: without project and with project\. Inthe \.
"without project" scenario the performance variables of interest are analyzed assuming rates of
improved experienced during the five-year period 1997-2002\. Inthe "with project" scenario
estimates of changes are based on rates of change that will be needed to achieve the goals
presented inthe MOH's Five-Year Plan\. The difference between these rates may be interpreted
as the savings generated by the project\.
10\. Conservativeestimate of benefits: Due to the difficulties inquantifying some of the
expected benefits, this analysis produces what should be regarded as minimumbenefit estimates
does not take into account all possible benefits (inparticular, it excludes any benefit attributable
to positive externalities the SWAP may produce)\. The economic analyses o f project's feasibility
should, therefore, be regarded as conservative, low-end estimates\.
C\. Methodologyfor estimating indicators
c\.1DIRECTBENEFITS
(i)Reductioninnumberofhospitaldischargesfor four selectcauses\. Theintroductionofthe
new health care model, MAIS, will improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the referral and
counter-referral systems, thereby better ensuring that ony cases requiring hospital care will be
85
treated at the hospital level\. At the same time, the preventive character of many PBSS-proposed
interventions will allow a reduction in the number of patients who need to be treated at more
complex health levels\.
The number o f discharges and average length of stay for intestinal infections, acute respiratory
disease, malnutrition and certain perinatal causes was estimated based on MOH's hospital
discharge databases\.
Savings generated are estimated based on the reduction percentage of each cause, which
generates a reduction inhospital patient's length of stay, valued in monetary terms by the cost of
an inpatient day\. Estimates indicate that the cost of one patient day i s US$35\. It i s estimated
that the rates of reduction are: 40 percent for intestinal infections and acute respiratory and 30
percent for malnutrition and perinatal causes\. It i s expected that benefits will be generated
gradually throughout the life of the project\.
(ii)Increaseinoutpatientsurgery\. Basedonthenumberofdischargesforeacheachofthese
procedures, it is estimated number of procedures that are currently conducted in hospitals but
that could be and that are expected to be performed after implementationof the MAIS on an
outpatient basis was identified\. These include treatment o f tonsillitis, surgical contraceptive
treatment, detached retina, palm fibrosis, renal arteriovenous fistula, hallux valgus, hemorrhoids,
hernia, slipped disk, knee instability, meniscus, joint stiffness, vocal chords tumor, bladder tumor
and peripheral venous bypass\.
The savings that are expected to be generated by providing these procedures on an ambulatory
basis i s calculated as the difference between total patient-days currently generated versus the
final number of patient-days as a result of the project's actions, and assuming that conducting
these surgeries on an ambulatory basis would require exactly a one day stay\.
(iii)Reductioninhospitalinfections\. Infectionsacquiredduringhospitalizationresultina
significant increase inpatients' length of stay\. Reducing the intra-hospital infection rate results in
averting the costs of unnecessary additional days of inpatient care\. In estimatingthe SWAp's
economic benefits, these averted additional inpatient days are valued at their average actual cost
per day\.
(iv) Savings due to improvements in the decentralization process\. Many local facility level
problems can be resolved by investingin strengthening decentralization\. Presently, many
resources are lost or are inefficiently useddue to a lack of local capacity to administer them
properly\. Proposed intervention through the project includes areas such as: improvements inthe
management and coordination processes, institutional strengthening to improve service delivery
and support of local level planning and budgeting processes thar are at the heart of the
decentralization process\. Savings equivalent to 1percent o f MOH's current budget are expected
as a result of these reforms\.
86
c\.2 INDIRECTBENEFITS
The project's indirect benefits are related to the potential life years saved by the project and the
economic and financial value of highest productivity reached\. The economic assessment of
additional lives i s calculated as the potential number of life years for each child and mother
saved, multiplied by the real Nicaraguan GDP and accumulated over the expected duration of the
economically active life of those individuals\.
After defining the key elements of the methodology employed, the primaryquantitative results
obtained in the economic analysis are presented\.
D\. Mainresults
The health project's proposed interventions generate a net economic benefit o f US$67 million, in
present value terms, throughout the project's 10-yeartemporal horizon\. Out o f total generated
benefits, 87 percent represent indirect benefits interms of maternal and child lives saved and 13
percent direct benefits\. Main results attributable to the project are presented in the following
table\.
Table 4\. Cost Benefit of the NicaraguaHealthProject
N e t benefits
Year Total cost Direct benefits Indirect benefits Total benefits (Benefit-cost)
1 2005 11,569,416 0 3,258,228 3,258,228 4 3 11,188
2 2006 14,557,613 1,372,513 7,881,721 9,254,234 -5,303,379
3 2007 18,972,990 2,745,026 14,923,007 17,668,033 -1,304,958
4 2008 21,463,078 4,117,538 19,231,636 23,349,174 1,886,096
5 2009 15,639,046 4,575,043 24,206,352 28,781,395 13,142,349
6 2010 5,563,489 4,575,043 28,338,889 32,913,931 27,350,442
7 2011 5,563,489 4,575,043 32,427,575 37,002,618 31,439,128
8 2012 5,563,489 4,575,043 36,476,110 41,051,153 35,487,663
9 2013 5,563,489 4,575,043 40,488,108 45,063,151 39,499,661
10 2014 5,563,489 4,575,043 44,467,102 49,042,144 43,478,655
Total 110,019,590 35,685,332 251,698,728 287,384,060 177,364,469
\.Net- \.Present\.- Value-
\.- \.---\. \.- -
(12%) $~~,333,w\.a7, $i7,618,m\.s $118,447,354\.73 S136,066,1&\.62 $66,73&46Q\.S5
(lo%) $74,268,844\.77 $19,618,408\.97 $132,821,741\.68 ~$152,\.140,148\.85 $7@,17%,=88
(8%) $79,792,342\.30 $21,928,098\.3!5 $149,568\.209\.52 %171,498,30?&7' $91,7@3$@5\.57
09
k'?
The internalrate of return of the SWAPis 54 percent, which exceeds the 12percent discount
rate\. Inother words, other possible alternative uses of the project's investments would obtain 12
percent versus 54 percent generated by investing in the proposedhealth interventions\.
When alternative discount rates are employed, the project generates even higher net benefits,
reaching a maximum of US$92 million when using an 8 percent discount rate\. This project's
87
cost benefit ratio i s approximately 2, which implies US$2 inbenefits per dollar investedinthe
project\.
Previous results provide ample evidence to declare the project economically feasible, by virtue of
its high return\. However, the following section presents an analysis of alternative scenarios, in
order to evaluate the sensitivity of the rate of return to changes in some of the Project's critical
assumptions\.
E\. Sensitivityanalysis
Sensitivity analysis allows investigating the robustness of the results by introducing changes in
some of the assumptions underlying the estimates, such as possible delays inproject execution or
reductions in the estimated level of benefits\. Parameters examined in the sensitivity analysis are:
(1) a two- and three-year dela) in execution, (2) 20 and 40 percent reductions in the eipected
level of benefits, and (3) a combination of scenarios with a proposed 20 percent benefit reduction
and two- and three-year delay inproject implementation\. The main results generated in net
present value (NPV) and internal rate of return (IRR) are presented in the following tables\.
Table 5\. Project Sensitivity in the Face of Potential Implementation Delays
Base 2-year delay 3-year delay
NPV 66,732,461 24,609,917 15,151,345
IRR 54% 31?'n 28%
Table 6\. Project Sensitivity in the Face of Benefit Reductions
Base 20% reduction 40% reduction
NPV $66,732,461 $39,519,231 $12,306,002
IRR 54% 36% 20%
Table 7\. Project Sensitivity inthe Face of Potential Implementation Delays and Benefit Reductions
20% reductionand 20% reductionand
Base 2-year delay 3-year delay
NPV $66,732,461 $8,024,192 $2,702,907
IRR 54% 19% 15%
The project would bejustified in any of the proposed scenarios, but with significant reductions in
the internal rate of return and the present value of benefits\.
Inthe case of a 2 or 3-year maximumdelay inproject implementation, the internal rate of return
would go from 54 percent to a minimumof 28 percent, and the present value o f net benefits
would fall from US$67 million to US$15 million\.
Ifreductions inthe amount of benefits attributableto the project take place, the IRRwould be
reduced to 20 percent, which would still exceed the 12 percent discount rate used\. The net
88
present value of expected net benefits would be US$12 million, which implies a more than 80
percent reduction in such category\.
A combination of previously considered scenarios constitutes the most extreme case in terms of
project sensitivity\. If 20 percent reduction inbenefit flow takes place and project
a
implementation i s delayedby 3 years, the internal rate of return would be 15 percent, slightly
higher than the one used to discount economic flows and the NPV of net benefits would be
substantially reducedbut would still total US$2\.7 million\.
F\. Fiscalimpact and sustainability
Inaccordance with conductedestimates and established disbursement flows, the fiscal impact of
this project would be quite mild\.Recurringproject costs, to be assumedby M O H after the
SWAPdisbursements are completed, represknt an average of 3 percent of the Ministry's
projectedexpenditures\.
89
Table 8\. Fiscal Sustainability of the Nicaragua Health Project
]Year O(2004)I Year1 Year 2IYear3 1Year 4 IYear 5IYear 6I Year7 IYear8IYear9 Year10
General Financial kformation II
Recurrent Expenddures I I I I I I I I I
The costs represent nearly 4\.5 percent o f the MOH's current recurrent expenditures\. Total
project cost througliout the project's 10-year temporal horizon remains less than 10percent of
MOH's projectedtotal expenditures, and 15percent of the Ministry's recurrent expenditures\. As
a percentage of GDP, project costs represent a relatively small amount that does not exceed 1
percent of GDP, which, together with cost flow analyses, benefits and profitability, make the
Project not only viable, but an attractive option, from an economic perspective\.
90
Annex 10: Safeguard Policy Issues
NICARAGUA: Health Services Extension and Modernization (2nd APL)
The World Bank i s supporting the Government of Nicaragua (GON) on the preparation of the "Health
Services Extension and Modernization 2"dAPL -SWAP"\. The operation aims at improving the
efficiency, effectiveness and equity of the Nicaragua health system\. These objectives will be supported
through activities concerning the strengthening of the first level of care, modemization of the hospital
network, developing institutional capacity and supporting the social security reforms\.
This project is expected to lead Nicaragua to an improvement of current conditions of the health sector,
through its expansion and modernization, which will lead to an increment inthe production of health care
waste, and the generation of environmental impact in areas where remodeling activities will take place\.
This operation is a category B with minor and reversible environmentalimpact\. In order to fulfill the
requirements of the Bank and better support the preparation of this operation, the GON has prepared a
standaloneEnvironmental AsSessment which addresses:a general objective; a methodology, for the
assessment; existing legal framework and legislation in NicaraguaregardingHealth Care Waste
Management (HCWM); an institutional framework; current practices to handle HWC; a baseline
assessment on the existing facilities and their practices on HCWM; and a proposalto improve the
managementof HCW, indicators, strategiesfor implementingthe HCWM plan, didactic materials,
environmental mitigation measures, conclusions, schedule, budget and bibliography\.
According to the LCSES- QAT review, this operation triggers the following safeguard policies:
Environmental Assessment and Indigenous People\. In order to comply with the requirements of these
polices, the GON has preparedthe Standalone Environmental Assessment and an Indigenous People Plan\.
ENVIRONMENTALASSESSMENT(EA)
As described above, the EA contains several chapters which address all aspects of HCWM and a set of
activities and procedures to manage the environmental impact generatedby the construction, renovation
or expansion of existing facilities\.
The objective of this EA is to perform an assessment of current HCWM environmental conditions inthe
hospitals and centers participatingin this project\. The HCWM plans would be applicable where the Bank
i s supporting any of the activities mentioned in the project design\. Once the sites and the projects are
identified,the guidelines proposed in the EA will be implemented\. A summary of the EA report will be
part of the Operational Manual\.
The Health Care Waste Management Plan
The proposed HCWMplan includes a general backgroundwith information on HCWproduction, which,
according to latest estimates, is about 1\.43 kilograms/bed/day\.
Currently, the comprehensive legal framework to address HWC includes:
Decree No\. 35, 1979, Ley del sistema Nacional de Salud; Decree No\. 70, 1979, Ley sobre exportacidn de
produccidn farmace`uticos y medicinales; Decree 432, 1989, Regulacio'n e Inspeccidn Sanitaria; Law 156,
1993, Ley sobre radiaciones ionizantes; Law 1168, 1994, Ley que prohibe el trdfico de desechos
peligrosos y sustancias tdxicas; Law 202, 1994, Ley de Prevencidn, Rehabilitacidn y Equiparacidn de
oportunidades para las personas con discapacidad\.
91
Along with the above mentioned legislation, the GON has reported that the Ley de Municipios No 40,
1988, Ley 217, Ley General del Medio Ambiente y 10s Recursos Naturales, and the Ley General de Salud,
on its articles 55, 56,64, 65,66, 67, 68, and 69, all address the framework for Health Care Waste
Management inthe country\. It was noticed on the analysis the relation of this regulatory framework with
the existing framework regarding solid waste managementat the municipal level, which contributes to
activities related to final disposal\.
Current Situation of HealthCare Waste Management in Nicaragua
The Ministry of Health of Nicaragua has been working on the issue of Health Care Waste Management
since 1994, through technical cooperation and projects with the European Union, the IDBand the World
Bank\. Results of this cooperation have been mixed\. The plans were applied in 10out of a total of 33
hospitals\. The main constraints faced by these institutions were with regards to maintenance and budget
allocation\. Most of the hospitals acquired technically advancedtreatment facilities such as incinerators,
but due to the circumstances above stated, some of them are not operative\.
The current operation is expectedto focus on improving the current HCWM systems and extending -but
not limiting- its coverage to up to 9 new institutions as follows: Hospital Victoria Motta, Jinotega;
Hospital Asuncih, Juigalpa; HOSPITAL Espaiia, Chinandega; Hospital Dr\.Juan A\. Brenes, Somoto;
Hospital LuisAlfonso MoncadaGuillCn, Ocotal; H\.Nuevo Amanecer, RAAN; Hospital RegionalErnest0
Sequeira, RAAS; Hospital Luis Felipe Moncada, de San Carlos, Rio San Juan; Hospital Cesar Amador
Molina, Matagalpa; Hospital Escuela Oscar Danilo Gonzalez, Le6n; Hospital SanJuan de Dios, Esteli;
and Hospital JosC Nebrowski, Boaco\.
The EA presentedby the GONfocused on HCWM and construction activity on the hospitals listedabove,
which will be part of the Bank's project, and will be disclosed according to Bank policy\.
On the EA presentedby the GON, a site visit to the followinginstitutions i s reported:
92
NOC - Not in operating condition
As seen inthe previous analysis, the issuesconcerning HCWM are focused more on tools for the Plan's
implementation rather than on willingness from the hospital management to implement it\. With this
operation, the GON expects to support the strengthening of current practices inorder to fulfill the
sector's needs\.
The Health Care Waste Management Guidelines
The Ministry of Health (MOH) expects to implement the guidelines developed through technical
cooperation with the European Union\. These guidelines include the following material: guidelines for
training and management of Health Care Waste (7 modules); a training video on H C W M best practices;
a manual for technicians and supervisors; a manual for doctors and nurses; a manual for General Services
Personnel; and a CD which includes all of the above\.
The guidelines are basedon a survey conducted in 1996, followed by a second phase which contemplated
the following activities: development of a training program, definition of a management system, and
purchase of necessary equipment to be distributedwithin the participatinginstitutions\. In2000, four
additional hospitals (Victoria Mota, Jinotega; Cesar Amador, Matagalpa; Luis Felipe Moncada, Rio San
Juan; Nuevo Amanecer, Puerto Cabezas) were included in the HCWM program\.
The guidelines currently beingused by M O H address doctors, nurses, technical staff and MOH
supervisors\. The document also contains guidelines to develop tailor-made plans for each institution
where the plans will be applied\. The processto be supported by M O H i s the following:
Definition of General Objective and implementation of a working group: there should be an intemal
group at the hospital level to develop and implement the HCWMplans\. This committee should account
for the organizational and structural definitions of responsibilities at every level of attention, should be
multidisciplinary, and the coordinator must have technical capacity to handle HCW\. Responsibilities also
includecoordination between infirmaries, medical support, cleaning, maintenance and an epidemiologist\.
93
The first activity of the committee is to perform a diagnostic of the current situation\. The HCWM plan
will be designed based on thediagnostic, the guidelines and the existing legal framework inNicaragua\.
The plan contains at least the following elements: determination of intemal responsibilities, definition of
the flow of operations andregulations regarding health care waste, coordinationof provision of human
and technical resources (procurement of equipment and supplies, personnel protection, etc)\. Also, the
committee has the responsibility to implement and coordinate the plan and control and monitor its results\.
There are other technical responsibilities regarding segregation, final disposal, informationto
communities and patients, risk assessment and management, which are part of the committee's
responsibilities\. Also, the committee is responsible for maintaining the reports and files of HCWM\.
As this project covers most of the Republic of Nicaragua, a strategy was specifically designedfor the
implementation of Health Care Waste Management Plans\. This strategy calls for progressively including
in the fiscal year budgetthe resourcesrequired to support the implementationof HCWM plans,
specifically: allocate own funds to handle HCW; sign technical cooperation agreementswith the major's
offices to manipulate and di8posetreated HCW in specific sites -previously agreed and under safety
conditions- at the sanitary landfills; include standardsfor accomplishments of HCWMplans inthe
accreditation and certification plans\. Also, pursingsustainability of the system, explore the possibility, in
hospitals where the incinerator is in operating condition, to offer treatment services to other similar
facilities intown\. As supporting documentation, it was noticedthat the following documents also contain
some steps to enhance HCWMpractices in Nicaragua: Esta'ndarespara la Habilitacidn de
Establecimientos de Salud; Esta'ndares de Habilitacidn de ClinicasMe'dicasProvisionales; Esta'ndares
de Habilitacidn de Hospitales en Nicaragua; and Esta'ndares de Habilitacidn de Centros de Salud en
Nicaragua\.
Inorder to ensurethe quality of implementation of this component, the GONhasproposed a set of
indicators which will measurethe performance of M O H and the beneficiary hospitals with regardsto
HCWM\. Also, these indicators will be the basis for reviewing the compliance of this operation with the
Bank Environmental Assessment Policy\. These indicators were proposed by the GON and will be
supervised duringthe life of the project:
Indicator Verification
Heath Care Waste Management Committee Report to MOHby beneficiary hospital of
implemented its conformation
Heath Care Waste Management Plan in Document presented to M O H for review
place land approval
Implementationo f the HCWMP Report by MOH of its implementation
Efficiency of the Segregation Process Report by MOH of its implementation
Treatment for Biomedical Waste Monthly report by the beneficiary hospitals
Training of Hospital Personnel Annual Report to M O H by beneficiary
hospital
Coordination with MunicipalAuthorities Annual Report to MOH by beneficiary
hospital
Consejos Consultivos support the Annual Report to M O H by beneficiary
Implementation of the Plan hostital
Inclusion of Budget for H C W M every Annual Report to M O H by beneficiary
Fiscal Year hospital
Environmental rules for contractors
The guidelines developed by the GON address all the needs of the minor works requiredand supported by
this operation\. These guidelines include the following general aspects:
Consideration of aspects such as ventilation, natural and artificial light energy efficiency, historical and
cultural considerations, and security and handicapped access\. Also, floor space (ft2)per bedward,
requirements for x-ray rooms, and adequacy of corridors for wheelchairbed access\. Moreover, waste
management, maintenance, stockpiles and borrow pits, site cleanup, safety during construction, nuisance
and dust control, community relations, chance find procedures for culturally significant artifacts, and
environmental supervision duringconstruction\. More details can be found inthe EA presented by the
GON\.
95
SOCIALAND INDIGENOUSPEOPLEPLAN(OD4\.20)
As part of project preparation, the project team visited several municipalities throughout the
country, including the Regional Governments of RAANand RAAS, and interviewed with
SILAIS, hospital staff and other health care providers and users\. The team also interviewed
Health Councils to discuss their Health Plans in the context of the National Health Plans and the
National Health Law\.
The social assessment reviewed the evaluations and studies carried out to assess the 14programs
under the Health Modernization Programof the Ministry of Health (PMSS) since 2001\. It
reviewed the evaluation results of the Women's Centers created under the Indigenous Peoples
Development Plan (IPDP) for the PMSS, and corroborated the widely- recognizedpositive
results\. Moreover, a Social Feasibility study was carried out b y a local independent firm (ALVA
Consultants) in a selected sample o f 15 municipalities in 7 departments: Jinotega, RAAN,
RAAS, Rio San Juan, Madriz, Chontales and Nueva Segovia\. The sample municipalities &e
among the 90 municipalities selected by M O H for installation of Women's Centers; they are
among the poorest and more isolated municipalities inthe country; they have highmaternal-
infant mortality rates; and they have access to a health care provider with surgical facilities (Le\.
hospital, clinic, health center with beds present or future recipient of the FONMAT program)\.
The study included four parts: first, 15 Social Feasibility workshops were carried out in selected
municipalities with the purpose o f introducing, discussing, and seeking agreements for the
creation of 15 new Women's Centers to be managed by their own communities\. Cooperation was
sought and agreed with the SILAIS, hospital or healthcenter, or health organization supported by
FONMAT, the Municipal Government, local NGOs, public institutions, private organizations,
Women's Groups, etc\. and with the support of the local networks of midwives and health
promoters\. Second, an assessment o f users' satisfaction of existing Women's Centers was also
conducted inBilwi, Bluefields, Matagalpa and El Rama\. Third, an assessment of perceptions of
satisfaction among health care service users was carried out through a survey of 720 users and
non-users of public primary health care services\. Fourth, a similar survey was applied to 150
hospital patients to assess their satisfaction with hospital services, their knowledgehse of social
controls installedby M O H andtheir recommendations towards the promotion of social auditing
mechanisms\. Finally, interviews were carried out to assess the coordination among the three
levels in 15 municipalities: PHC, hospitals and Women's Centers\.
The results of the Assessment and Feasibility Study were presented to the Regional Governments
of M A N and RAAS in December 2004\.
1\.Resultsof 1998IndigenousPeoplesPlanfor theHealthModernizationProject(APLI)
96
The 1998 IPDPfor the Health Modernization Project called for the creation of Women's Centers
in 10municipalities serving IndigenousandAfro-Nicaraguan population mostly on the Atlantic
Coast, Jinotega and Central region of Nicaragua\. The present assessment evaluated users'
satisfaction infour Women's Centers with positive results\. Several evaluations of Women's
Centers carried out between 2001-2003 corroborate the reduction of maternal and child mortality
rates and highcost-effectiveness\. The creation o f 90 new Women's Centers i s part of the
National Health Plan for Nicaragua\.
2\. Demographic profileof Nicaragua
Eleven percent o f the Nicaraguanpopulation (out of a total of 5\.6 million inhabitants) self-
identify as indigenous and conserve their native languages\. The majority of indigenous peoples
belong to five Atlantic Coast groups: Miskito, Mayangna, Garifuna, Creole (Afro-descendants)
and Rama who live in 300 communities of the Atlantic Coast and 15 communities of the
Department of Jinotega and the Central Plateau of Matagalpa\. Nearly half of the inhabitants of
the Atlantic Coast at present are `mestizos'\. The indigenous peoples inthe mentioned regions
live in extreme poverty conditions with scarce basic health, education, water and sanitation
services\. Their living conditions have deteriorated inthe past decade due to the invasion of
colonos, degradation of natural resources in an unsustainable way, open-air miningand over
exploitation of marine resources\. On the Pacific Coast, the largest indigenous group i s the
Sutiaba in the Departments o f Le6n and Chinandega\. Other groups include the Nahuas, Nicaraos
and Chorotegas who live along the coastal departments of Madriz, Nueva Segovia and
Chinandega\.
3\. Main recommendationsof the SocialFeasibility Study and Assessment of perceptionsof
satisfactionamong usersof public health care services
(1) Attention should be paid to traditional and intercultural medicine since people are
combining both on a daily basis\. This subject i s of highpriority inthe Regional Health
Plans\.
(2) Strengthen local networks o f midwives, MOH and traditional health promoters\. Educate
themto identify, refer, accompany and monitor women inneed of pre and post-natal care;
small children suffering from URI and diarrheic infections; and men, women and youths
at risk of HIV/AIDS\. Equipthem with gear and access to transportation, to be efficient\.
(3) Although the topic of social control in the health sector i s a concern to the central level of
the M O H and the Regional Health Councils, at present, the communities and health staff
interviewed in the field are not aware o f or engaged in any plans for social
auditingkontrol in the sector\.
4\. The Situation of the Autonomous Atlantic Regions and their Health Plans
Extensive consultations with civil society and other sectors at the community, municipal and
departmental levels were carried out inthe past two years in order to discuss the Regional Health
Plans for RAAN and RAAS\. As part of the Plan, a Health Decentralization Commission that
97
includes the M O H and Regional health authorities was formed to oversee the decentralization
process\. Likewise, Regional Health Commissions and Regional Municipal Commissions have
been formed\. The Regional Communal Commissions are inthe process of formation\.
A number of workshops and forums have been heldbetween the Regional Governments of
RAAN and the present Minister of Health for the definition of decentralization of political,
financial, administrative and operational power to the Regional Government and its Councils\.
The Health Plans for RAANand RAAS are consistent with the National Health Plans for
Nicaragua\. At present, the definition of the Health Planfor RAANi s more advanced than that of
RAAS\. As part of project preparation, the M O H will finance the Diagnostic Study of Health in
RAAS and a definition of the main elements of a regional health policy\.
The most important issuesrelated to the Autonomous Atlantic Regionhealth plans are:
(a) Legal Framework '
The Health Law (Title 11, Chapter lV)warrants the Autonomous Regions of the Atlantic Coast
the right to define their own health model according to their traditions, culture and costumes,
within the framework of policies, plans, projects and programs of the Ministry of Health\. Under
the Health Law, the M O H will coordinate with the Regional Councils the management and
institutional models, as well as those requiredto promote decentralization, de-concentration and
delegation of responsibilities to those regions\. The RegionalAutonomous Councils, on the other
hand, will be able to create their own health institutions for service administration and delivery,
within the framework o f autonomy and consistent with the national health policies, norms and
procedures\.
Law No\. 28 warrants the Autonomy of the Northern and Southern Atlantic Coast Regions
(RAANand RAAS)\. This law was approved by Congress inOctober 1987 but its Operational
Guidelinesbecame effective in 2003\. Under Law No\. 28, Decentralization of Administrative
responsibility i s transferred from the Central Government to the Regional Government of the
Atlantic Coast\. The law requires that the Regional Governments be involved inthe preparation,
design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of projects implementedon the Atlantic
Coast of Nicaragua\. The Law also requires that individuals integrating the Regional
Governments and Commissions have a pertinent profile and be trained in the necessary skills\.
Other important legislationpertaining to autonomy are: Law No\. 445 of Land Tenure and
Legalization and Law No\. 162on the Protection and Preservation of native languages and the
teaching of Intercultural Bilingual Education\.
(b) Administrationof Health Care
Prinzapolka i s the poorest municipality inthe country and 95 percent of its population
corresponds to Miskito Indians\. It i s the only municipality, however, without a Municipal Health
Delegation on the Atlantic coast\. At present it depends administratively on both Puerto Cabezas
and Siuna\. The Regional Health Plans recommend the creation of a Municipal Health Delegation
and Council to attend the needs o f Prinzapolka\.
98
The re-incorporation to the Atlantic Region of seven municipalities presently administered b y
Pacific Regions (Waslala and Mulukukuin MAN; and Paiwas, Nueva Guinea, El Rama, Muelle
de Bueyes and ElAyote in M A S ) i s high in the agenda of regional governments as fiscal
distribution of revenues to municipalities i s done on a per capita basis\. The re-incorporation of
municipalities has already been done for the education sector, but the decision i s still pending for
the health sector\. The total number of municipalities on the Atlantic coast i s 19\. After the re-
incorporation i s implemented, the creatiodconstruction and equipment o f Municipal Delegations
will be needed, as well as training of its members\.
(c) Financial Autonomy
Decentralization entails that the decisions concerning financial planning and implementationbe
made by the autonomous regions, rather than by the central government\.
(d)Participation
Participation of the civil society through the Communal, Municipal and Regional Commissions
i s a salient principle of decentralization and autonomy\. The councils represent the peoples for
makingdecisions regarding policy, planning and sharing of responsibilities\.
(e) HumanResources
It is widely recognizedthat there are two major problems regarding human resources:
(i) Health professionals from the Pacific don't usually choose isolated regions\.to live;
however, they are often assigned there for medical residency, resulting in a high
turnover of health staff;
(ii) Local health staff o f isolated regions who would like to work/live in those areas have
a hardtime becoming M O H staff\.
It i s therefore recommended that health workers graduating inURACCANor other universities
be given priority for M O H staffing inthe isolated areas o f their choice, which may contribute to
keep hospitals and health units staffed\.
(f)Expansion Strategy of Primary Health Care servicesfor vulnerable groups
One of the strategies of the Health Plans i s the expansion of basic primary health services for
vulnerable populations through the creatiodimprovement of `subsedes' ,which were created to
strengthen nuclei of health posts serving indigenous and isolated communities\. They don't exist
inthe present nomenclature of MOH\. They are strategicallylocated to cover areas of difficult
access\. Staff includes medical staff, nurses, information systems for monitoring diseases, lab
staff\. They operate with energy from solar panels\. Subsedes have basic equipment (stethoscope,
tension meter) for child delivery and minor surgery, 5 or 6 beds for patient recuperation,
transportation (boat or car) and communications\. They assist a nucleus o f communities with
itinerant teams for vaccinations, and refer patients to bigger units and hospitals\.
99
Ten subsedes have been created inthe past with the support of different foreign donors, to serve
Indigenous and Afro-Caribbean population\. The two best-equipped subsedes are Bilwaskarma
and Santa Martha which act as independent service providers\. They have a Cooperation
Agreement with M O H where the latter contributes with medical and nursing staff, information
systems and transportation, medicines, extension services and vaccination campaigns\. Although
they have yielded successful results, they continue to have a low profile due to lack of financing\.
The regional governments seek financial resources to strengthen their operation\. At present, most
subsedes have medical staff but lack recuperation facilities, and means o f transportation and
communication\.
(g) Strengthening of the traditional health care networks
Given the isolation and low density of population on the Atlantic Coast Region, access to public
health services i s much lower than in'the rest of the country\. To compensate for the supply '
deficit, traditional networks of traditional health agents such as midwives, health leaders
(promoters) and volunteer health workers, `sukias' and `curanderos' (traditional healers), play a
very important historical role inthe surveillance, promotion and supply of health care\. They are
the pillars that support the health system inthe regions inhabited by Indigenous and Afro-
descendants\. Studies find that more than 40 percent of child deliveries are done by traditional
midwives\. Also, the Regional Health Councils calculate that over 20,000 health consultations are
made to traditional leaders by patients seeking health care\. Moreover, the `Sukias' and
`curanderos' together with the Institute of Traditional Medicine of the University of URACCAN
(RAAN) are the healers responsible for providing health care to patients sufferingfrom what is
called "krisi siknis" and defined as a cultural-based psycho-somatic disease\. According to the
Council, over 5,000 people were treated with that disease inthe past two years\. Inmany cases,
activities of the traditional networks are coordinated with local M O H institutions, NGOs, the
coastal universities of URACCAN and BICU (RAAS) and international as well as national
donors (European Union, Doctors without Borders, Acci6n MCdica Cristiana, KEPA
(Norwegian), etc\.)\.
Traditional healers and health volunteer workers are respected prestigious leaders who are held
responsible for the health of the community\. They may do their work for free or charge a very
small fee mostly to cover transportation and nourishment\. An important item in the Regional
Health Plans o f RAAN and RAAS i s the strengthening o f these traditional healers and volunteers
with training in safe health practices at the Institute of Traditional Medicine of URACCAN,
equipment, and a fee for transportation to deliver reports\.
(h) Onthe Definition of the Basic Health Care Package for isolatedareas (PBHS)
A Diagnostic Study of the organization of health care services as prescribedby the Regional
Health Plan i s beingimplemented with the financial support of the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB)\.The study should be completed inMarch 2005\. Financing i s sought for a
consultancy to determine the elements of the Basic Health Care Package for the Autonomous
Regions (to include Intercultural Health Care)\.
100
(i)ContractingofHealthCareServicesDeliverytotheprivatesector
Given past experience of extension of health care services to isolatedindigenous and Afro-
Caribbean communities, the Regional Health Care Plans contemplate strengthening of NGOs
which currently deliver said services\.
5\. Indigenous and Afro-Nicaraguan Peoples and Gender Plan
Given the presence of Indigenous and Afro-Nicaraguan Peoples in the project area, the proposed
project includes an Indigenous and Afro-descendant Peoples and Gender Plan intended to
include all those living in the regions inhabited by ethnic population\. The planbelow results
from the joint consultations of M O H and World Bank with the Central and Regional
Governments, and seeks to respond in part to the Regional Health Plans being formulated\. The
interventions included in the Plan below are suggestions made by the Regional Governments and
should be further discussed with the project team, ind the MOH\.
The objectives of the Indigenous and Afro-Nicaraguan Peoples and Gender Plan are:
1\. To ensure that the Indigenous andAfro-Nicaraguan Peoples within the project area
benefit from the project in an equitable and culturally-adequate manner;
2\. To promote full and active participation of the indigenous and Afro-Nicaraguan peoples,
their Regional Governments, Regional Health Councils, leaders and authorities inthe
project design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the proposed project\.
Recommendations
Given that the bulk of the Indigenous and Afro-Nicaraguan population live inthe Atlantic Coast,
the following recommendations derive from the assessments and discussions with the Regional
Health Councils, and are suggested to be incorporated in the project design:
Component 1: Extensionof Access to the Basic Package of Health Services (PBHS) by the
poorestand most vulnerable populations
(a) Consultancy to determine the PBHS for the RAAN and RAAS (US$30,000)
(b) Contracting of private health care providers, particularly NGOs and mobilization of private
and public itinerant health care units, appropriately trained and equipped, to reach out to people
living in remote areas\.
(c) Installationof 15 new community-managed Women's Centers in selected municipalities of
RAAN,RAAS, Rio San Juan, Jinotega, Madriz, Nueva Segovia and Chontales\.
(d) Promotion of Women's Centers in 15 new communities on the Atlantic Coast\.
101
(e) Strengthening and improving 10existing subsedes of SILAIS operating inremote areas on
the Atlantic Coast and serving Indigenous, Afro-Nicaraguans and mixedpopulation\.
(US$200,000)
(f)Construction andEquipmentof eight new subsedesinselected municipalities\. (US$620,000)
(h)Creationof aMunicipal Delegation inPrinzapolka\.
Component2: Strengtheningthe Networkof Services inTargetedAreasto Supportthe
Implementationof the PBHS
(a) Training of 900 midwives and 500 traditional healers\. (US$200,000)
(b) Equippingmidwives and healthpromoters (boots, backpack, rain poncho) and provision
of supplies (gauze, umbilical clamp, scissors, etc)\. (US$200,000)
(c) Workshops with traditional health providers at the Institute of Traditional Medicine of
URACCANwith the purpose of sharing experiences\.
(d) Dissemination of best practices of healthcare provision and implementation of PBHSin
isolated rural areas\.
Component3: ImprovingStewardship,InstitutionalStrengtheningandDecentralization
(a) Strengthening the technical skills of the Regional Health Councils to administrate health
(b) Strengthening the technical skills of the Regional Government
(c) Strengthening the operations of the Coordinating Commission to continue to manage the
decentralization process (workshops, assemblies, mobilization, monitoring)
(d) Strengthening the social auditing mechanisms by financing workshops, training, with the
Regional, Municipal and Communal Health Commissions\.
102
Annex 11:Project Preparation and Supervision
NICARAGUA: Health Services Extensionand Modernization (2nd APL)
___ _____~ ~ _____~ _ _ _ ~
Planned Actual ~
PCN review 6/28/04 6/28/04
InitialPID to PIC 8112/04 8112/04
Initial ISDS to PIC 8112/04 8112/04
Appraisal 2114/05 2114/05
Negotiations 3/01/05 3/2/05
BoardlRVP approval 4/05/05
Planned date of effectiveness
Planned date of mid-term review
Planned closing date
Key institutions responsible for preparation of the project: Ministry of Health
Bank staff and consultants who worked on the project included:
Name Title Unit
Jesds Maria Fernandez Task Manager LCSHD
Jack Fiedler Sr\. Health Economist LCSHD
Christina Alquinta Program Assistant LCSHD ,
Manuel Vargas Sr\. FM Specialist LCOAA
LuisTineo Sr\. Procurement Specialist LCOPR
JosC Ram6n G6mez Environmental Specialist LCSEN
Andrea Guedes Operations Officer LCSHD
Morag Van Praag Sr\. Finance Officer L O A G l
Ximena Traa-Valarezo Social Evaluation Specialist LCSHD
Selpha Nyairo Legal Associate LEGLA
Solange Alliali Sr\. Counsel LEGLA
Fernando Lavadenz Health Specialist LCSHD
LuisPCrez Sr\. Public Health Specialist LCSHD
Bank funds expended to date on project preparation:
1\. Bank resources: US$62,555\.22
2\. Trust funds: US$170,825\.00
3\. Total: US$233,380\.22
EstimatedApproval and Supervision costs:
1\. Remainingcosts to approval: US$134,136\.61
2\. Estimatedannual supervisioncost: US$95,000\.00
103
Annex 12: Documents inthe Project File
NICARAGUA: Health Services Extension and Modernization (2nd APL)
Program Background Documents
1,Project Status Report, Nicaragua Health Sector Modernization Project, December 22, 2004\.
2\. Aide-memoire: Nicaragua HealthServices Extensionand Modernization SWAP- Supervision
Mission, November 22-24, 2004\.
3\. Aide-memoire: Nicaragua Health Services Extensionand Modernization SWAP -Pre-Appraisal
Mission, January 24-28,2005\.
Country Documents producedkommissioned bv the World Bank:
1\. Nicaragua- Country Assistance Strategy Volume 1, December 18, 2002\.
2\. Social Assessment, January 18,2005\.
3\. EnvironmentalAssessment, October 14,2004\.
4\. Fiduciary Assessment, January 2005\.
5\. Financial Analysis of the Nicaragua Health Sector, Ricardo Meerhoff, 2004
6\. Evaluation of Primary Health Care Projects and Programs, Bitran and Associates, 2004\.
7\. Evaluation of the Institutional Strengthening Component of the APL, FirstPhase, Fernando Marin,
2004\.
8\. Evaluation of Casas Maternas, Doming0 Sanchez Ortega, 2003
9\. Evaluation of Casas Maternas, MariaElena Ruiz Abril
10\. Evaluationof National Health Policies, Sanigest,
11\. Costing of the Five-Year ImplementationPlan, Fabio Duran, 2004
12\. Evaluationof the Primary Health Care Component of the HealthModernization Program, Roser
Fernandez, 2004\.
13\. Public ExpenditureReview, 2001
14\. Definition of the Basic Packageof Health Services, Fabio Duran, 2004
Countrv Documents produced by the Government
1\. National Health Policies 2004-2015
2\. National Health Plan 2004-2015
3\. Five-Year ImplementationPlan
4\. Modelo de Atenci6n Integral de Salud (MAIS)
5\. Code of Conduct (latest draft)
6\. Analysis of the Health Sector, Avendaiio, 2004
7\. Nicaragua- Health and Equity, Magdalene Rathe, DayanaLora, Fundacion Plenitud, 2003
Documents on the Sector produced by other donors
1\.NicaraguaStrategy Document: Health sector Development ,Royal Netherlands'Embassy, 2003\.
2\. Loan proposal for Strengthening Maternal and Child health in Nicaragua\. A Performance-based loan,
IDB,December 2004\.
104
Annex 13: Statementof Loansand Credits
NICARAGUA: HealthServices ExtensionandModernization(2ndAPL)
Differencebetween
expectedand actual
Original Amount in US$Millions disbursements
Project ID FY Purpose IBRD IDA SF GEF Cancel\. Undisb\. Orig\. Frm\. Rev'd
PO78990 2005 NI- EDUCATION 0\.00 15\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 15\.96 0\.00 0\.00
PO77826 2004 NIBroad-BasedAccess to FinanServices 0\.00 7\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 7\.36 0\.46 0\.00
PO78891 2004 NIPUBLIC SECTOR TA 0\.00 23\.50 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 21\.19 3\.05 0\.00
PO82885 2004 NICARAGUA PRSC I 0\.00 70\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 36\.03 -1\.03 0\.00
PO73246 2003 NIOffgrid RuralElectrification (PERZA) 0\.00 12\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 10\.97 4\.13 0\.00
PO75194 2003 NIOff-Grid RuralElectrification 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 4\.02 0\.00 3\.74 1\.90 0\.00
PO56018 2002 NILAND ADMINISTRATION PROJECT 0\.00 32\.60 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 32\.28 3\.39 0\.00
PO64906 2001 NIPoverty Red\.&Local Dev\.FISE 0\.00 6&00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 15\.90 8\.24 -12\.76
PO70016 2001 NICompetitivenessLIL 0\.00 5\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 2\.62 1\.80 0\.52
PO55823 2001 NISECOND RURALMUNICIPAL DEV\. 0\.00 28\.70 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 9\.57 15\.89 0\.00
PROJECT
PO64916 2001 NINaturalDisasterVulnerability Reduc 0\.00 13\.50 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 10\.51 8\.51 0\.00
PO68673 2001 NIRoadRehab\.andMaintenance111 0\.00 75\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 13\.43 -1\.11 0\.00
PO64915 2000 NIAG TECHN & RURALEDU(APL) 0\.00 23\.63 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 5\.65 0\.00
PO56087 2000 NIPensionand Financ\. MarketReformTA 0\.00 8\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.80 -6\.18 0\.99
PO55853 2000 NI- TELECOMMUNICATION REFORM 0\.00 15\.90 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.59 1\.21 0\.00
PO50613 2000 NISECOND BASICEDUCATION 0\.00 52\.50 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.99 1\.92 0\.00
PROJECT
PO41790 1997 GEFNIAtlantic Biological Conidor 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 7\.10 0\.00 0\.51 7\.16 6\.32
Total: 0\.00 ,442\.33 0\.00 11\.12 0\.00 182\.45 54\.99 - 4\.93
NICARAGUA
STATEMENT OF IFC's
Held and DisbursedPortfolio
InMillions of US Dollars
Committed Disbursed
IFC IFC
FY Approval Company Loan Equity Quasi Partic\. Loan Equity Quasi Partic\.
2004 Contia 5\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 5\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
1998 Frutan 0\.36 0\.36 0\.00 0\.00 0\.36 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
1998 La Colonia I\.00 0\.00 0\.50 0\.00 1\.00 0\.00 0\.50 0\.00
1999 SEF Dicegsa 0\.33 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.33 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
Total portfolio: 6\.69 0\.36 0\.50 0\.00 6\.69 0\.00 0\.50 0\.00
ADDrOVak Pendine Commitment
FY Approval Company Loan Equity Quasi Panic
Total pending commitment: 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
105
Annex 14: Country at a Glance
NICARAGUA: Health Services Extensionand Modernization (2nd APL)
Latin
POVERTY and SOCIAL America Low-
Nicaragua & Carib\. income >evelopment diamond'
2003
Population, mid-year(millions) 5\.5 534 2 3 a Lifeexpectancy
GNIpercaptta (Atlasmethod, US$) 730 3 260 450
GNI(Atlas method, US$ billions) 4\.0 1,741 1038 -
Average annual growth, 1997-03
Population (77) 2\.6 15 19
Laborforce (%) 3\.8 2 1 2 3 >NI Gross
M o s t recent estimate (latest year available, 1997-03) )er primary
:apita nrollment
Poverty ("7of populationbelownational POvertyline) 48
Urbanpopulation (%of totalpopulation) 57 77 30
Lifeexpectancyat birth (years) 69 71 58 I
Infant mortality(per/OOOlive births) 32 28 82
Childmalnutntton (%ofchildrenunder5) a 44 Access to improved water source
Access to an improvedwatersource (%ofpopulation), 77 86 75
Uliteracy(%of populationage 54 23 n 39
Gross pnmaryenrollment ("of school-age population) x)5 P 9 92 -Nicaragua
Male a 4 t31 99 Low-income group
Female a 5 P 6 85
KEY ECONOMIC RATIOS and LONG-TERM TRENDS
1983 1993 2002 2003
GDP (US$ billions) 2 8 18 4 0 4 1
Gross domestic investmentiGDP 225 195 32 1 312
Exports of goods and sewtcesiGDP 8 4 204 22 9 228
Gross domestic savingsiGDP 119 -80 6 0 6 0
Gross national savingsiGDP 5 5 -292 P 8 t36
Current account balanceiGDP -213 -515 -86 -17 6
InterestpaynentsiGDP 14 3 2 11 13
Total debtiGDP 1489 6435 1620 )66 6
Total debt serviceiexports 212 341 x)9 e 3
Presentvalueof debtiGDP 715
Presentvalueof debtiexports 205 9
1983-93 1993-03 2002 2003 2003-07
(averageannualgrowth)
GDP -26 5 3 10 2\.3 4\.0
GDP oercaoita -5 1 2 5 -16 -0\.3 17
STRUCTURE of the ECONOMY
1983 1993 2002
(%of GDP)
Agriculture 23\.1 29\.7 18\.0
I
Industry 30\.7 21\.8 25\.0 24\.9
Manufacturing 242 175 145
Services 462 484 570 zi ~`:
-
Privateconsumption 567 904 780 783 -20 1 98 99 00 01 02 03
Generalgovernmentconsumption 314 176 159 157
Imports of goods and sewices 300 479 49 0 48 1 -GDI -GDP
1983-93 lgg3-03 2o02
(averageannualgrowth) Growth of exports and imports (Yo)
Agriculture -2\.4 1\.8 -0\.4 02 4 0 T
Industry -3\.5 3\.0 -0\.4 0\.5
Manufacturing -4\.4 2\.1 2\.1 -0\.3 20
Services -22 8\.3 2\.2 3\.9 0
Private consumption 1\.9 5\.2 4\.1 2\.4 -201
Generalgovernmentconsumption -92 -1\.0 - B O 1\.3 ~ - 4 0 1
Gross domestic investment -8\.1 t3\.6
Imports of goods andservices -12 5\.6 -0\.5
11 -5 5
-7\.1 --Exports -Imports
106
Nicarama
PRICES and GOVERNMENT FINANCE
1983 1993 2002 2003 Inflation (%)
Domestic prices 1
(%change) 80
Consumer prices 31\.0 20\.4 4\.0 7\.3
Implicit GDP deflator 11\.0 20\.4 5\.3 6\.1
Government finance
(%of GDP\.includes currentgrants)
Current revenue 20\.1 14\.9 8\.7 98 99 00 01 02 0
Current budgetbalance -1\.1 -1\.9 0\.8
Overall surplusideficit -7\.6 -8\.7 -6\.9 -GDPdeflator -CPI
TRADE
1983 1993 2002 2003
(US$ millions) Export and import levels (USS mill\.)
Total exports (fob) 452 270 596 596 I, 000 II
T
Coffee 153 32 73
Shrimp andlobster T7 27 76 1500
Manufactures 64 91 191 214
Total imports (cif) 806 744 1,796 1\.624 1000
Food a 1 , T79
Fueland energy 148 d 4 5M)
I I
Capital goods 204 184 401 0
Export price index(W95=WO) 67 70 73 79 97 98 99 00 01 02
Import price index(W95=WO) 59 96 116 P 9 Exports Imports
Terms of trade (895=WO) It3 73 63 61 O3
BALANCE of PAYMENTS
1983 1993 2002 2003
(US$ millions) Current account balance to GDP (%)
Exports of goods andsewices 498 364 918 936 0
Imports of goods andservices 873 882 1,974 1,971
Resource balance -375 -498 -1,057 -1,035 \.15
Net income -212 -432 -193 -735
Net current transfers 0 25 484 507 -30
Current account balance -587 -905 -785 -723
-45
Financingitems (net) 549 804 834 708
Changes innet reselves 38 dl -49 15 -60
Memo:
Reselves includinggold (US$ millions) 221 88 454 447
Conversion rate (DEC,local/US$) 2\.39E-9 6\.1 14\.3 15\.1
EXTERNAL DEBT and RESOURCE FLOWS I
1983 1993 2002 2003
(US$ millions) Composition of 2003 debt (USS mill\.)
Total debt outstanding and disbursed 4,098 11,303 6,485 6\.829
IBRD 148 87 0 0
IDA 57 736 811 998 G 569 B 998
Total debt sefvice d 7 *35 151 7 8
IBRD a 29 0 0
IDA 1 3 2 3
Composition of net resource flows
Officialgrants 49 207 218
Official creditors 260 42 155 162
Private creditors 28 -5 32 -26
Foreign direct investment 0 39 v 4
Portfolio equity 0 0 0
World Bank program
Commitments 0 93 33 27
Disbursements 24 A - IBRD E- Bilateral
15 72 1P 0 - IDA D Other multilateral
- F - Private
Principal repayments 6 21 0 0 C - I M F G- Short-ter
107
Annex 15: Map IBRD33456
NICARAGUA: Health Services Extensionand Modernization(2nd APL)
108
MAP SECTION | APPROVAL |
P130015 |  PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
CONCEPT STAGE
Report No\.:75640
(The report # is automatically generated by IDU and should not be changed)
Project Name Enhancing Resilience of Endangered Species to Climate
Change
Region South Asia
Country Nepal
Sector Environment
Lending Instrument Specific Investment Loan
Project ID P130015
Borrower(s) Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation
Implementing Agency (i) Department of Forests and (ii) Department of National Parks
and Wildlife Conservation
Environmental Screening [ ]A [ X ]B [ ]C [ ]FI [ ]TBD (to be determined)
Category
Date PID Prepared February 19, 2013
Estimated Date of Appraisal June 7, 2013
Completion
Estimated Date of Board October 3, 2013 (First grant funding request approval)
Approval
Concept Review Decision Following the review of the concept, the decision was taken
to proceed with the preparation of the operation
Introduction and Context
A\. Country Context
Nepal is a small land-locked country in the heart of the Himalayas, with China on its northern border
and India to the south\. The country is about 850 km across along its east-west axis, and about 200 km
north to south\. It can be divided into three ecological regions that run like horizontal strips dividing the
country into three roughly equal areas: (i) the high mountains (35% of total area), (ii) the middle hills
(42% of total area), and (iii) the lower altitude Terai (23% of total area)\. Each region has distinct
altitude and climatic characteristics, varying from alpine to sub-tropical conditions\. Altitudes range
from over 8800 meters in the north at the peak of Mount Everest, to just 60 meters above sea level in
the southern plains\. Although Nepal only comprises about 0\.1% of Earthâs terrestrial area, it harb ors a
high share of the worldâs biodiversity, confirming its unique geographic nature\. A total of 118
ecosystems have been identified, with 75 vegetation types and 35 forest types\. Both its floral and
faunal diversity is unique\.
In 2006, Nepal emerged from a prolonged internal conflict with the signing of the Comprehensive
Peace Accord laying out a roadmap to a lasting peace and the construction of a new governance
structure\. In 2008, a constituent assembly (CA) was voted into power, the monarchy was abolished,
and a president and a prime minister were formally elected\. A series of coalition governments have
been formed and the process of writing a new constitution remains underway\. The CA was dismissed
in May 2012 without completing the constitution\. New elections are yet to be announced\.
1
Nepal attained the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG), to halve extreme poverty, ahead of
time\. The percentage of people living below the international line for extreme poverty (people earning
less than US$1\.25 per day) has halved in only seven years\. At this measure of poverty, the percentage
of poor people declined from 53\.1 percent in 2003/2004 to 24\.8 percent in 2010/2011\. Despite the
progress in poverty reduction, Gross National Income per capita remains low at US$540 (2011) and
Nepal remains among the poorest countries in the world\.
B\. Sectoral and Institutional Context
In 2011, the global risk analysis firm Maplecroft ranked Nepal the 4th most climate-vulnerable country
in the world\. Nepalâs extremely varied and challenging geography, its poor resource dependent
population and its weak institutional capacity all combine to create this vulnerability\.
There is growing evidence that climate change is one of the most serious threats to global biodiversity,
environmental services and livelihoods of natural resource dependent communities\. According to the
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, climate change is likely to become one of the most significant
drivers of biodiversity loss and ecosystems change by the end of the century\.
Nepalâs unique geographic position and variations in altitude and climate are reflected in its rich
biodiversity\. The dense tropical forests of the Terai, the deciduous and coniferous forests of the
subtropical and temperate, and the sub-alpine and alpine pastures and snow-covered Himalayan peaks
are all habitat to a wide variety of flora and fauna\. Several internationally important flagship species of
which several are critically endangered, including the Snow Leopard, Asian One-horned Rhinoceros,
Bengal Tiger, Red Panda, and Crocodile are found in Nepal\. Important flora is birch, rhododendron,
Jatamansi (Nardostachys grandiflora), Kutki Neopicrorhiza scrophulariiflora and Paanch-Aunle
(Dactylorhiza hatagirea)\.
Faunal biodiversity is a key tourism asset which is important to Nepalâs sustained economic growth\.
Floral biodiversity is also critically important for the livelihoods of rural people across Nepal\. For
example, high value medicinal and aromatic plants are an important source of household income for
people in the Himalayas/high Mountains\. They are in fact important instruments for addressing
poverty issues for the marginalized, forest dependent communities as they contribute to livelihoods,
including food security, income and health\.
The impact of climate change on the health of ecosystems is a key risk to Nepal\. Climate change
threatens ecosystems, biodiversity and peopleâs livelihoods in a number of ways\. With the increase in
temperatures, vegetation is expected to shift upward, water cycles will change, encroachment of
invasive species is expected to increase, flowering patterns will change, and prevalence of disease and
pests is expected to increase\. The prolonged winter dry spells have increased and more frequent forest
fires have destroyed large forest areas and forest biomass, thereby hastening the emission of carbon
dioxide into the atmosphere\. Many observations suggest that recent climate change has already
influenced animal and plant populations in a number of ways\. The influence can be seen in the timing
of seasonal events (e\.g\. flowering, migration), in rates of growth and reproduction, and in the
distribution of species\. Because species react differently to climate change, climate change is also
influencing species interactions (e\.g\. predation, parasitism, competition, symbiosis)\. This results in
serious vulnerability to biodiversity and is a threat to the people who depend on biodiversity for their
livelihoods\. It is expected to have a disproportionate effect on vulnerable communities\. Women,
whose daily activities are largely associated with natural resources such as fetching water, collecting
firewood and grasses etc\., are particularly vulnerable\.
2
Mountain ecosystems especially are highly sensitive to climate change\. These same ecosystems
provide up to 85% of the water humans depend on as well as a host of other ecosystem services such
as timber, unique flora and fauna, and critical habitat for rare and endangered species\. Climate change
poses special problems for mountain protected areas, such as national parks and wilderness areas,
because most of the land area within their boundaries is at higher elevations\. The above provides a
clear overview of the vulnerability of Nepalâs mountain ecosystems to climate change and the impacts
on livelihoods\.
C\. Relationship to CAS
The proposed project is fully consistent with the FY 12 - 13 Interim Strategy Note (ISN)\. The ISN is
organized around three main pillars, namely: (i) Enhancing Connectivity and Productivity for Growth,
(ii) Reducing Vulnerabilities and Improving Resilience, and (iii) Promoting Access to Better Quality
Services\. The proposed project contributes to the second ISN pillar on reducing vulnerabilities and
improving resilience\. As the ISN recognizes, Nepal is highly susceptible to climate change risks\. The
proposed project also aligns with the new Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Nepal, which is
currently under preparation\.
The proposed project also aligns with the World Bank's (WB) commitment as an implementing agency
of the Climate Investment Fund's Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR)\. The proposed project
is one of the 5 projects identified in Nepal's Strategic Program for Climate Resilience (SPCR) that was
developed by the Government with support from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), International
Finance Corporation (IFC), and World Bank through an extensive consultative process with
development partners, civil society, and private sector\. Other PPCR projects are: (i) Building
Resilience of Watersheds in Mountain Eco-Regions (to be implemented by ADB), (ii) Building
Resilience to Climate Related Hazards (to be implemented by WB), and (iii) Mainstreaming Climate
Risk Management in Development (to be implemented by ADB), and (iv) Building Climate Resilient
Communities through Private Sector Participation (to be implemented by IFC)\. It also aligns with
Nepalâs National Adaptation Programme of Action to Climate Change that identifies ecosystem health
as a key priority area\.
Proposed Development Objective(s)
II\. Proposed PDO/Results
A\. Proposed Development Objective(s)
The development objective of the proposed project is to assist the Government of Nepal (GoN) to
develop and implement climate-resilient biodiversity plans for selected protected areas and to improve
the livelihoods of communities in the buffer zones
The project will be implemented in the habitats of endangered species in the mountain regions\. Key
faunal and floral species which are considered to be critically endangered and vulnerable to climate
change in high altitude mountain regions have been identified as target species under the proposed
project\. The potential project sites have been selected on the basis of physiographic representativeness
of mountain ecosystems, elevation zones, high vulnerability to climate change, eco-regional diversity,
species diversity, presence of endangered and charismatic species and cultural diversity\. This is in line
with Nepalâs selection as one of the PPCR pilot countries because of its unique and vulnerable
mountain ecosystems which are more impacted by climate change than the ecosystems in lower
altitudes\. Climatologists believe that the changes occurring in mountain ecosystems provide an early
3
glimpse of what may come to pass in lowland environments\. Information on the health of mountain
environments will undoubtedly assist governments and international organizations as they develop
management strategies and mount strong campaigns to reverse current global warming trends\. The
lessons learnt from this project will be of tremendous importance in enhancing global knowledge and
experience on climate change resilience measures in mountain ecosystems\.
B\. Key Results
Progress towards the development and implementation of climate-resilient biodiversity plans for
selected protected areas and the improvement of livelihoods of communities in the buffer zones would
be indicated through proposed indicators (to be refined and developed) such as:
ï Climate sensitive management plans prepared and key priorities implemented in the priority
Protected Areas (PA) and the surrounding landscapes;
ï Conservation strategies to enhance climate resilience of endangered focal species prepared and
implemented;
ï The livelihood of natural resource dependent communities improved while reducing the
decline in biodiversity\.
ï Area brought under enhanced biodiversity protection
ï New areas outside PAs managed as biodiversityâ?friendly
Preliminary Description
A\. Concept
1\. Description
The proposed project would be designed to assist the GoN to develop and implement climate-resilient
biodiversity plans for selected protected areas and to improve the livelihoods of communities in the
buffer zones in two pilot protected areas and its surrounding landscape\.
The proposed project would be implemented in two mountain protected areas and the surrounding
landscapes\. The PAs are Shey-Phoksundo National Park (SPNP) and Dhorpatan Hunting Reserve
(DHR)\. The PAs were identified based on specific criteria (II A above)\. They have high vulnerability
to climate change, contain habitats of endangered species, such as snow leopard and red panda and
habitats of high value and threatened medicinal plants, such as yarcha gunbu and kutki (both have a
high livelihood relevance)\. The selected PAs include areas affected by human activities and also
contain wilderness areas\. Despite the ecological importance, the harsh conditions and increasing
threats to conservation, these PAs have received little conservation attention\. Therefore, these are PAs
with limited information and data and low funding allocated for conservation and adaptation to climate
change, not due to the lack of importance, but due to constrained resources\.
SPNP, established in 1984 is an International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN)
Management Category II (National Park) located in the Mid-Western development region of Nepal\.
The park supports the prime habitat for the highest number of the snow leopard in Nepal\. In addition
to climate vulnerability, SPNP is threatened by habitat destruction, over grazing, poaching of snow
leopard and musk deer, hunting of blue sheep and over harvesting of medicinal plants\. The buffer
zone is jointly managed by the park and local communities\. DHR is an IUCN Management Category
VIII (Game Production/Multiple Use Management Area) located in the Dhaulagiri Himal range in
4
West Nepal\. DHR was established in 1983 under the National Parks and Wildlife Act of Nepal\.
Hunting of blue sheep, himalayan tahr, barking deer, wild boar and some other common bird species is
permitted in the reserve, based on a formal hunting license issued by the Department of National Parks
and Wildlife Conservation (DNPWC)\. The reserve contains the prime habitat for blue sheep, which are
the main prey species of the snow leopard and has sizable populations of red panda and snow leopard\.
The Red Panda are found in three hunting blocks in DHR and have a declining population in Nepal\.
Component 1: Climate resilient biodiversity management plan development
A better understanding of climate change impacts on ecosystems and species is key in terms of
responding to adverse impacts of climate change on ecosystems and species\. Instrumental for this are
knowledge building and adaptation as well as development of institutional and human resources\. The
proposed project would provide technical assistance for improved information, knowledge and
capacity regarding climate change and resilience measures on the natural habitats of endangered
species by supporting the following indicative activities:
ï Climate vulnerability assessments for SPNP, DHR and surrounding conservation landscapes
focusing on climate vulnerability of terrestrial biodiversity and the communities living in the
surrounding landscapes;
ï Preparation and/or updating of Protected Area Management Plans for SPNP and DHR to be
climate sensitive;
ï Development of a framework for wildlife conservation and ecologically responsible livelihood
development for communities in the landscape outside SPNP and DHR;
ï Preparation of conservation strategies to enhance climate resilience of the focal species;
ï Capacity assessment of conservation agencies (DNPWC and Department of Forests), local
government bodies and buffer zone communities for participatory management of
conservation landscapes;
ï Institutional and human resource capacity building, conservation education and community
awareness programs\.
Component 2: Management plan implementation
New approaches to the management of ecosystems and biodiversity are required to respond to the
emerging threats of climate change\. In response to the anticipated effects of climate change adaptation,
strategies to facilitate the adjustment of human society and ecological systems to altered climate
regimes would be identified during the climate vulnerability assessments of the pilot PAs\. Adaptation
measures would involve a landscape level approach to wildlife conservation since wildlife populations
are not restricted to protected areas\. Since conservation landscapes susceptible to climate change
would require targeted support for conservation and recovery programs of endangered species,
implementation of conservation strategies developed for the focal species becomes important\.
Management of endangered species, natural habitats and improvements in eco system health will be
supported through the following indicative activities:
ï Implementation of priority actions of the climate sensitive protected area management plans;
ï Investments for key actions of the conservation strategies developed for enhancing climate
resilience of the focal species;
ï Support for habitat improvement activities in the conservation landscapes outside the focal
PAs as identified in the climate vulnerability assessment;
5
Component 3: Livelihood enhancement
The rich ecological landscape surrounding the pilot PAs has been integral to the lives, well-being and
livelihoods of the local community in the buffer zones\. Community livelihoods are derived in large
part from forestry, fishery, and tourism and the services performed by its ecosystems support life
(through soil formation, nutrient cycling, primary production, oxygen production, and habitats) and
regulate processes crucial to well-being (air quality, climate, water flow, soil retention, water
purification, and biological and disease control)\. The ability to adapt to changes in the environment is
also determined in great part by the variation and resilience of species and ecosystems\. Appropriate
management of natural systems can therefore play a critical role in contributing to cost effective
adaptation\. Since the natural habitats of endangered species are changing as a result of climate change,
the livelihoods of the dependent communities are also affected\. It is therefore important to enhance the
livelihoods of communities by providing alternative livelihood options\. Improving the well-being of
natural habitat dependent communities would be supported through the following indicative activities:
ï Based on the findings of the climate vulnerability assessment, support would be provided for
activities such as community based eco-tourism, diversification of local products, marketing
high value products such as fruits, Non-timber forest products, medicinal plants, animal breeds
and on-farm fodder and forage support;
ï Due to the changing habitats there may be an increased incidence of human wildlife conflict\.
Support for specific activities that could be initiated to reduce such incidence, includes
introducing or strengthening insurance or compensation schemes towards crops and livestock
loss, fencing, and awareness/education would be provided;
Component 4: Project coordination and management
This component would support project management/coordination activities such as the day-to-day
coordination and supporting the implementation of the project components, including technical,
fiduciary, and monitoring and evaluation responsibilities\.
2\. Key Risks and Issues
The overall risk rating is assessed at substantial at this stage\. The more significant risk is related to the
project design as there is currently a significant amount of work ongoing on biodiversity related issues
throughout most parts of Nepal\. Most of the approaches focus very much on business as usual
interventions whereas the PPCR calls for transformational change and what this means in terms of
climate resilience biodiversity is yet not clearly defined\. The design of the project shall therefore be
made flexible enough to incorporate new approaches, build on best practices and use techniques of
adaptive management\. In order to reduce stakeholder risks broad based stakeholder consultations will
be held throughout the preparation and implementation of the project\.
B\. Implementing Agency Assessment
While the ministry responsible for the sector and the project is the Ministry of Forests and Soil
Conservation (MoFSC), the project will be implemented by the Department of National Parks and
Wildlife Conservation (DNPWC) and the Department of Forest\. The implementation of the proposed
project would be coordinated through a Project Coordination Unit (PCU) already in existence for
coordination of the Strengthening Regional Cooperation for Wildlife Protection Project\. The PCU
function has been delegated to the National Trust for Nature Conservation (NTNC) under the
6
Strengthening Regional Cooperation for Wildlife Protection Project\. The PCU will be responsible for
the day-to-day coordination and supporting the implementation of the project components\. The PCU is
led by a Project Chief and supported by a team of professional staff, including technical specialists and
a finance/disbursement officer and a procurement officer to handle the fiduciary responsibilities
together with a few support staff\. Overall project oversight would be provided by a project specific
steering committee, chaired by the Secretary, MoFSC\.
The overall coordination of the PPCR program (with all 5 PPCR sub-projects) would be managed by
the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment (MoSTE)\. A Climate Change Coordination
Committee, chaired by the Honorable Minister for MoSTE and the National Planning Commission
(NPC) member responsible for Environment, to provide oversight and guidance for all climate related
projects in Nepal is being established\. The PCU will work closely together with the Mainstreaming
Climate Risk Management in Development Project (the third sub-project of PPCR) to ensure
knowledge and results management across the 5 PPCR sub-projects\.
Safeguard Policies that might apply
Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project Yes No TBD
Piloting the Use of Borrower Systems to Address Environmental X
and Social Issues in the Bank-Supported Projects (OP/BP 4\.00)
Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4\.01) X
Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4\.04) X
Pest Management (OP 4\.09) X
Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4\.11) X
Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4\.12) X
Indigenous Peoples ( OP/BP 4\.10) X
Forests (OP/BP 4\.36) X
Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4\.37) X
Projects in Disputed Areas (OP/BP 7\.60)* Not applicable
Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP 7\.50) Not applicable
Tentative financing
Source: US$ million
Borrower/Recipient 0\.00
Strategic Climate Fund Grant 5\.00
Total 5\.00
Contact point
World Bank
Contact: Sumith Pilapitiya
Title: Lead Environmental Specialist
Tel: 94-11-5561302
Email: spilapitiya@worldbank\.org
*
By supporting the proposed project, the Bank does not intend to prejudice the final determination of the parties' claims on the
disputed areas
7
Borrower/Client/Recipient
Contact: Braj Kishor Yadav
Title: Director General, Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation
Tel: 977-1-4220303
Email: brajkishoryadav@yahoo\.com
Implementing Agencies
Contact: Megh Bahadur Pandey
Title: Director General, Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation
Tel: 977-1-4220912
Email: pandey\.megh@gmail\.com
For more information contact:
The InfoShop
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 458-4500
Fax: (202) 522-1500
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/infoshop
8 | APPROVAL |
P006346 | Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ReportNo\. 10710
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
BRAZIL
NATIONAL LAND ADMINISTRATION PROGRAM
NORTHEAST REGION LAND TENURE IMPROVEMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2593-BR)
JUNE 8, 1992
MI CROFTC,HE CoPY
Report No\. 1071C--BR Type: (PCR)
MACKIE, T / X31752 / T9053/ C)EDD'
Environment and Agriculture Operations Division
Country Department I
Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
CuRRENCY EgIVXALENTs
Currency Unit - Brazilian Cruzeiro (CrS)V1
Aappraisal Commletion
US$1\.00 - Cr$2,562 (October 31, 1984) US$1\.00 - Cr$ 1,630 (Feb\. 28, 1992)
Cr$ 1\.00 US$0\.00039 Cr$ 1\.00 US$O\.00061
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS
CAE Comisslo Agraria Estadual (State Land Commission)
CDRU Concessao de Direito Real de Uso (Usufruct Right)
CE Commiss&o Especial (Land Adjudication Commission)
COCAR (INCRA's Cartography Department)
CRDR Commissao Regional Desenvolvimento Rural
(Regional Rural Development Commission)
DI Diretoria de In\.egracao com Estados e Territorios (INCRA)
(Directorate of Integration with States and Territories of INCRA)
EMFA Estado Maior das Forcas Armadas (Joint Staff of Armed Forces)
FETAGs Federag8es dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura
(Agricultural Workers Federations)
IDB Interamerican Development Bank
INCRA Instituto Nacional de Colonizag&o e Reforma Agrhria
(National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform)
LCB Local Competitive Bidding
MINAGRI Ministry of Agriculture
HINTER Ministry of Interior
MIRAD* Minist6rio da Reforma e Desenvolvimento Agrario
NRDP Northeast Rural Development Program
(Ministry of Agrarian Reform and Development)
OET Organo Estudual de Terras
(State Land Institute)
PAPP Programa de Apoio ao Pequeno Produtor
(Support Program for Small Rural Producers of the Northeast Region
Rural Development Program, NRDP)
PDSFN Programa de Desenvolvimento do Sistema Fundiario Nacional
(National Land Administration Development Program)
PF Projeto Fundiario (Land Adjudication Project)
SERPRO (Data Processing Agency)
SUDENE Superintendencia de Desenvolvimento do Nordeste
(Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast)
TDA Titulos da Divida Agraria (Agrarian Debt Bonds)
TOR Terms of Reference
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UTrNE Unidade Tecnica do Projeto Nordeste
(State CoordirLating Units of the Northeast Program)
* Extinct\.
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 - December 31
1/ The Cruzeiro was reintroduced on March 15, 1990, replacing at a one-to-one ratio the new cruzado
(NCz$), which replaced the cruzado (CzS) on 'anuary 16, 1989, at a one-to-one thousand ratio\. The
cruzado substituted the old cruzeiro in February 1986 at a one-to-one thousand ratio\.
FOR OFmFCIL USE ONLY
THE WORLD BANK
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
U\.S\.A\.
Ofhce of Difecttv-GCwetal
OpeAthm Evalwtli<n
June 8, 1992
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on BRAZIL
National Land Administration Program
Northeast Region Land Tenure Improvement Proiect (Loan 2593-BR)
Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project
Completion Report on Brazil - National Land Administration Program -
Northeast Region Land Tenure Improvement Project (Loan 2593-BR))" prepared
by the Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office with Part II of the
report contributed by the Borrower\. This project has not been audited by
the Operations Evaluation Department at this time\.
Attachment
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
BRAZIL
NATIONAL LAND ADMINISTRATION PROORAM
NORTHEAST REGION LAND TENURE IMPROVEMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2593-BR)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pace No\.
PREFACE \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.
XVALUATION SUMMARY \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. iii
PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE
A\. Project Identity \. \.
B\. Project Background \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.
C\. Project Objectives and r3scription \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 2
D\. Project Design and Organization \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 4
E\. Project Implementation \. \. \. \. \. 5
F\. Project Risks \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 11
G\. Project Results \.iy,::::: \. \. \. \.12
H\. Project Sustainaoility \. \. \.12
I\. Bank's Performance, Borrower's Performance and
Project Relationship \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.13
J\. Conclusions and Lessons Learned \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 14
K\. Project Documentation and Data \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 15
PART Ili PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPEaXIVE \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 17
A\. Comments on Part I\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 17
B\. Project Impact and Lessons Learned \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 19
PART XII: STATISTICAL INFORMATION \. M \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 21
Table 1: Related Bank Loans Relevant to the Project \. \. \. \. \. 21
Table 2: Project Timetable \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 22
Table 3: Cumulative, Estimated and Actual Disbursements \. \. \. 23
Tables 4A and 4B:
Project Key Performance Indicators \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 24
Table S: Project Costs \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 28
Table 6A: Project Financing \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.29
Table 6B: Allocation of Loan Proceeds \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 30
This doLument has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perfiormance
Of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
Table of Contents (Cont'd) Page No\.
Table 7A: Project Results - Dtrect Benefits \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 3i
Table 7Bs Project Results - Institutional Strengthening,
Technical Assistance and Training \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 32
Table 8: Compliance with Loan Covenants \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 33
Table 9: Bank Staff Inputs \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 36
Table 10: Bank Missions \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 37
ANNEXES
Annex 1 - Institutiona4/Aeministrative Changes During
Project Implementation \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 38
Annex 2 - Project Costs - Breakdown per State \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 39
Annex 3 - Comparative Performance in Land Expropriation of
the Project and the PNRA \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 40
MAPS - IBRD No\. 18685: Yearly Photogrammetric Operations
- IBRD No\. 18686:R Yearly Land Adjudication Operations
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
BRAZIL
NATIONAL -m)yADINISTRATION PROGRA4
NORTHEAST REGION LAND TENURE IMT'ROVEEEN PROJECT
(LOAN 2593-BR)
PREFACE
This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Northeast
Region Land Tenure Improvement Project, first phase of the National Land
Administration Program in Brazil\. Loan 2593-BR, in the amount of US$100
million, was approved sn June 25, 1985, to finance the implementation of the
project whose total cost was estimated at US$250\.5 million\. The loan was
closed on February 29, 1992, after three one-year extensions of the original
closing date of September 30, 1988, followed by a five-month extension limited
to an ongoing contract for aerophotogrammetric services\. On March 1, 1992 an
initial US$42 million was canceled\. Final disbursement of loan proceeds is
expected to take place before the closing of the loan account (June 30, 1992)\.
By then, some US$53\.7 million is expected to be disbursed, and the final
balance estimated at US$4\.3 million will then be canceled\.
The PCR was prepared by the Environment and Agriculture Operations
Division of the Country Department I of the Latin America and the Caribbean
Region (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III)\. On February 18, 1992,
the Bank sent the Borrower Parts I and III with the request to prepare Part II
which was received on March 20, 1992\.
Preparation of this PCR was started during the Bank final super-
vision mission of the project in mid-November 1991, and is based, inter alia,
on a desk review of the Staff Appraisal Report, the President's Report, the
Loan and Project Agreements, INCRA's quarterly progress reports until
September 30, 1991, Bank supervision reports, project correspondence, and
internal Bank memoranda\.
- i$L -
_PRJECT COMPLETION PEPORT
BRAZIL
NATICNAL LAND ADMINISTRATION PROGRAM
NORTHEAST REG'ON LAND TErnRE IMPROVEMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2593-BR)
EVALUATION SUMMARY
Obiectives
1\. The main objectives of the project were to (a) extend the benefits of
secure landownership to a large number of small farmers in the ten states of
the Northeast, and (b; improve the Government's ability at both federal and
state levels to formulate land policies and administer the country's land
resources\. The first objective was to be achieved by identifying and delimit-
ing, through the land identification and adjudication process, all private and
public properties within the project areal regularizing the tenure of all eli-
gible occupants; selecting, planning the use of and redistributing to present-
ly landless farmers lands acquired by the Government: and confirming landown-
ership rights through the issuance of appropriate titles\. The second objec-
tive was to be accomplished through the establishment of state-level cadastral
data banks and their gradual integration with the National Institute for Colo-
nization and Agrarian Reform's (INCRA) fiscal cadastre, the strengthening of
federal and state land institutions, and the completion of various institu-
tional, legal and socioeconomic studies\.
Prolect Imolementation
2\. At appraisal, project costs were estimated at US$250\.5 million, and it
was expected that a Bank loan of US$100 million and an IDB loan of US$40
million would finance, on average, 58 1\.arcent of these costs net of taxes for
seven and three states, respectively\. Since cofinancing arrangements did not
materialize, the legal agreements were amended a first time, upon loan effec-
tiveness in March 1986, to exterd, without any further change at this stage,
Bank disbursements and related conditions of the loan to the three additional
states\. As a result, the Bank loan financed only 41 percent of project costs
net of taxes for ten states\. In a second amendment agreed in May 1987, a
revised project implementation schedule, based on a five-year period instead
of the original three-year period, was added to the Loan Agreement, and the
closing date was extended by zne year to September 30, 1988\. Under a fourth
amendment to the legal agreements, the Bank agreed to double from 50 percent
to 100 pVrcent the financing of the Government's share in the cost of a UNDP-
executed training contract, and to use US$1\.2 million of the proceeds of the
loan to finance 100 percent of the cost of imported data processing equipment\.
After two other one-year extensions of the closing date to September 30, 1991,
continuing delays in the execution of a 13-month action plan agreed in August
1990 forced the Bank to exercise the remedies at its disposal under the Loan
Agreement and General Conditions\. Loan disbursements were suapanded in July
19911 the suspension was lifted only in late September 1991\. Based on the
consiste\.itly unsatisfactory performance of the project and the fact that
project completion would have required at least another two years, the Bank
- iv -
declined a Government request for a fourth one-year extension of the closing
date but agreed to postpone the closing date to February 29, 1992, to complete
disbursement of ongoing ICB contracts (No\. 01/8/) for aerophotogrammetric
works\. By loan closing, the Bank is expected to have disbursed US$53\.7
million equivalent or 54 percent of the c:iginal loan\. An initial US$42
million was cz-aceled on Mar-h 1, 1992, and another US$4\.3 million is expected
to be canceled on closin7 mlf' the loan account\. Final project costs, excluding
administration costs, are cxpected to amount to US$110\.1 million equivalent,
or 46 percent of the corresponding original estimate, with the Bank loan
financing 49 percent of these costs\.
Results
3\. At loan rlosing, the numbers of direct beneficiaries of the land adjudi-
cation and land redistribution components were 25 percent and 20 percent of
appraisal estimates, respectively\. About 171,000 properties, compared wLt); an
original estimate cf 695,000 were adjudicated, and about 25,000 landlesa
farmers, compared with an original estimate of 130,000, got access to land\.
In spite of these modest quantitative achievements, the project helped to
improve land tenure in the Northeast states through expanded use of modern
low-cost aerophotogrammetric techniques in identification and redistribution
of unproductive public or private land to farmers with little or no land\.
However, the establishment of state data banks, without which the project's
longer-term impact would be substantially reduced, has not been accomplished
and requires appropriate measures and financial resources which will be
partially provided by the ongoing Bank-financed Northeast Rural Development
Program (NRDP) state projects\. Finally, with the exception of some positive
standardizatioa effort among the states' land laws and regulations, the
project fell short in its objective of improving land legislation and court
procedures for the judicial resolution of land conflicts\.
Sustainabilitv
4\. In spite of the modest implementation record, project's objectives have
been met for a reduced number of beneficiaries\. It is expected thac the ex-
post evaluations of the ten NRDP state projects will confirm and quantify the
benefits that were derived from the project\. Sustainability of the modest
achievements of the land adjudication and redistribution activities will
largely depend on the farm maiaagement capacity of the settlers and the avail--
ability of efficient production support services provided under the NRDP state
projects\.
Findinas and Lessons Learned
5 The following were the main lessons learned in implementing the project:
(a) It is essential to predict correctly the Government's political
will to implement ambitious programs to extend the benefits of secure landown-
ership to a large number of small farmers and improve land policies and admi-
nistration\. Although this project tried to develop efficient methodologies
for doing so, the ultimate impact was undermined by a lack of political will
to regulate the land-related articles of the 1988 Constitution and to chal-
lenge vested interests\. This missina official commitment\. which translated
into chronic counterpart fundina shortfalls and institutional problems\. would
have been secured more easily had the controversial land redistrib4tion compo-
nent been eliminated from the prolect: on the other hand\. this elimination
could have rendered already difficult farmer participation and popular oupnort
even more problematical\.
(b) It is clear that the proposed time frame of three and a half years
for vroiect implementation was overly optimistic given the political sensitiv-
ity of the project actions and the emerging macroeconomic problems\. Also,
events which occurred during project implementation, such as the new interpre-
tation of the 1964 Land Law ("Estatuto da Terra") in,the related articles of
the new Constitution, wade it difficult for the project to be executed within
the original time frame\.
(c) The new methodology to be introduced and develoved under '\.he
proiect for the establishment of a multiRurpose state cadastre needed to be
thoroughly_discussed, understood and agreed with INCRA before the start,of
implementation\. The protracted delay in the procurement of the urgently
needed data processing equipment, both locally manufactured and imported,
stemmed mainly from reservations and/or lack of experience of INCRA and the
Data Processing Agency (SERPRO) technical staff regarding the type of joint
alpha-numeric and spatial data base required for the project\.
(d) When the success of a project is dependent on close cooperation
among many implementing agencies, ;he coordinating entity should be able to
attract and retain competent techrical, financial and managerial staff and
should be delegated sufficient au\.hority to er\.ore efficient implementation\.
The various structural changes w,ich took place within INCRA and the Minietry
of Agrarian Reform and Development (MIRAD), after the extinction of the Direc-
torate of Integration with States and Territories (DI) in 1986, never vested
the Coordinating Unit with the level of authority needed to deal with the
other INCRA directorates and, in particular, the regional directorates\. In
future\. the Bank should be more forthcomina in exercisina its remedies when
institutional/organizational weaknesses threaten to undermine imolementation\.
(e) A well Planned monitorina and evaluation system should be desianed
at appraisal and is indispensable to provide timely feedback on the pace and
gualitv of implementation, to identify chanaes in strateav or scope recruired\.
and to measure Proiect impact\. Evaluation arrangements were not well designed
at appraisal; the external evaluation, by independent consultants to be hired
by INCRA, of the performance and progress of the land tenure system did not
take place as planned; and the impact of land activities on the target popu-
lation and on rural development activities is still to be evaluated in each
state by the Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast (SUDENE)
under the respective NRDP state projects\. Such impact evaluation is needed to
help the Gove=nment prepare any follow-up land tenure project in Brazil\.
(f) In the Brazilian administrative and political setup, efficient
project implementation and beneficiary participation are sianificantlv
comoromised for reaional Projects because of the implicit built-in split
between financial responsibilitv and control (INCRA/MI"PDi and manaaerial
responsibilities (State Land Institutes WOETs) and because of the existence of
a complicated and ineffective three-tier channel of funds (Federal Treasury,
Ministry of Interior (MINTER), INCRA) between the federal agencies themselves\.
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
BRAZIL
NATIONAL LAND ADMINISTRATION PROGRAM
NORTREAST REGION LAND TENURE IMPROVEMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2593-BR)
PART I - PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE
A\. Proiect Identity
- Project Name: National Land Administration Program - Northeast
Region Land Tenure Improvement Project
- Loan No\.: 2593-BR
- RVP Unit: Latin America and the Caribbean Region
Country Department I
- Country: Brazil
- Sector: Agriculture
B\. Proiect Backaround
1\. Land Situation\. Based on the concept of the social role of
property, the "Estatuto da Terra" (Law No\. 4504 of November 30, 1964) is
considered the centerpiece of Brazilian agrarian legislation\. Its objective
is to promote agriculture development through the elimination of unproductive
holdings (through the expropriation of land in the social interest) and uneco-
nomic small farms\. However, by the early 1980s, little progress had been made
in this respect\. The extent of landlessness among Brazil's small farmers, and
the uneconomic size of many farms continued to be of serious social and econo-
mic concern; in the Northeast region, the geographic focus of this projec%,
only 30 percent of farmer families owned land, and 68 percent of the farms
were less than 10 ha, with an ave -age size of 2\.7 ha\. The already highly
skewed distribution of farm owneSship had in fact worsened over the last two
decades, and on the fringes of the Amazon region the land tenure situation was
fraught with problems arising from multiple titling of the same plot, occupa-
tion by squatters, fraudulent land sales and social tensions\. Moreover, the
land taxation system in Brazil, which did distinguish between farms according
to size and efficiency of use, was based on tax estimates established exclu-
sively on the basis of declarations provided by the supposed owners to the
National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA)\. As demons-
trated by recent surveys, the cadastral information stored by INCRA lacked the
proper geodetic references or a precise delimitation of boundaries, and the
-2-
sum of the areas declared to be privately owned in a given municipality often
exceeded the municipality's total area\.
2\. New Land Policies and Proara q\. In August 1982, the Government
instituted a National Land Policy Program to unify the implementatiun of land
adjudication 1/ and regularization projects and ensure the effective appli-
cation of the "Estatuto da Terra\." Within the framework of the land program,
a 15-year National Land Administration Development Program (PDSFN) was fo:\.nu-
lated to: (a) strengthen the federal and state land institutions; (b) clarify
the existing land situation; (c) propose legal and administrative measures to
improve conditions of landownership and use; and (d) improve access to land
for small farmers\.
3\. Prior Bank and IDB Asei tance for Land Ac6ivities\. Previous Bank
experience in land tenure operations in Brazil had been limited mainly to
relatively small land titling and redistribution componen\.:;\. in a few rural
development projects of the first generation (POLONORDESTE) in thcf: Northeast
(Loan No\. 1589-BR in Paraguagu, Bahia; Loan No\. 2015-BR in Piaui)\. Expe-
rience in both projects pointed to a substantial potential for improvements in
adjudication and redistribution of public and private lands, and the last two
POLONORDESTE rural development projects in the States of Maranhao (Loan No\.
2177-BR), and Bahia (Loan No\. 2269-BR) had relatively large land components
which relied on modern aerophotogrammetric techniques\. Experience in larger-
scale land surveying and titling had been generated by an IDB-financed project
which was implemented in 1982-85, under INCRA coordination, in five states of
the Northeast and wnich utilized aerial photography and cartographic reiti-
tution in three states and traditional topography in the other two\. Overall,
past IDB and Bank assistance for land activities effectively helped in devel-
oping the land policies of the states concerned, introducing modern, cost-
effective land survey technologies and achieving various institutional
improvements\. In August 1984, INCRA organized, with Bank and IDB assistance,
an International Symposium on Land Administration to help disseminate among
Brazilian land institutions the modern cadastral techniques which were to be
used in the project\.
C\. Proiect Obiectives and Description
4\. Obiectives\. In line with the objective of the PDSFN, the project
sought to: (a) extend the benefits of secure landownership to a larger number
of small 1' farmers; and (b) improve the Government's ability at both federal
and state levels to formulate land policies and administer the country's land
resources\. The first objective was to be achieved by identifying and delimit-
ing, through the process of land identification and adjudication, all private
and public properties wita\.n the project area, reoularizing the tenure of all
eligible occupants, selec-Lng, planning the use of and redistributing to land-
less farmers lands acquired by the Government, and confirming landownership
rights through the issuance of appropriate titles\. The second objective W!'s
1/ "Dtscriminatoria Administrativa" in Portuguese\.
2/ Var,\.able holding size, generally less than 50 ha\.
-3 -
to be accomplished through the establishment of state-le-el cadastral data
banks and their gradual integration with INCRA's fiscal cadastre, the
strengthening of federal and state land institutions, and the completion of
various institutional, legal and socioeconomic studies\. As the initial phase
of the PDSFN, it was concentrated on priority areas of the Northeast (which
legally encompasses the nine states of Alagoas, Bahia, Ceara, Maranhao,
Paraiba, Pernambuco, Piaui, Rio Grande do Norte and Sergipe, plus the northean
part of the State of Minas Gerais) involving 564 municipalities and covering
about one-fifth of the region\. It was to be implemented over three and a half
years\. It was to support improvements in land tenure necessary to enable a
greater number of small farmers to benefit more fully from irrigation, invest-
ment credit and other activities under the ten state-specific projects of the
Support Program for Small Rural Producers (PAPP), within the second-generation
Northeast Rural Development Program (NRDP)\.
b\. Description\. The project, therefore, comprised the following
components:
(a) Aerial Dhor0orammetrv operations, including the aerial
photography, ground control, aerial triangul eion and the
production of orthophotomaps or line-maps for some 72 blocks
covering about 56 million ha;
(b) Identification of land tenure conditions in mapped areas totalling
about 31 million ha, including production of microfilms of all
land registry documents, widespread notification of the Govern-
ment's intention to review and regularize ownership rights, physi-
cal identiification of the properties, legal evaluation of all
tenants and occupants' claims and preliminary estimates of land
potentials and values;
(c) Cadastre implementation and titlina, including the digitalization
of all geographical and literal data generated by the preceding
components for computerized storage and processing, and the
production of about 830,000 title documents;
(d) Sup2ort for land restructurin , including assessments of land
capability and potential use for the selection of some 3 million
ha to be redistributed to some 130,000 beneficiaries, physical
planning of infrastructure needs, and demarcation and titling of
the resulting plots;
(e) Institutional strengthening of the existing ten State Land
Institutes (OETs), by providing technical (including data bank
management) and management training, construction of office
buildings for nine OET headquarters and the acquisition of
vehicles, topographical and data processing equipment for
cadastral and titling operations;
(f) Proiect administration, including incremental administrative costs
of the OETs, and the salaries and travel costs of the project
coordinating unit within INCRA; and
-4-
tg) Institutional\. lecal and socioeconomic studies to help INCRA and
the OETs gradually imprc\. the efficiency of land operations and
land tenure conditions, inc'\.uding the following topics: (i) pos-
sible improvements in OET management structures, procedures and
regulations; (ii) means of integrating the multipurpose cadastre
to be produced by the project with the traditional INCRA fiscal
cadastre; (iii) review of legislation on land adjudication and
cadastral operations, and court procedures to accelerate the
judicial resolution of land conflicts; (iv) impact of Brazilian
tenancy Laws on current tenure conditions; (v) land taxation
principles and procedures and the impact of various Government
fiscal incentives on land tenure structures\.
D\. Project Design and Organization
6\. Proiect Strategy\. In contrast to the piecemeal approach which had
characterized the Bank's past assistance for land activities in Brazil, the
project reflected the political objective and priority attached by the Govern-
ment (beginninq in 1982) to land administration and tenure issues, and repre-
sented a more comprehensive effort to assist the Government to (a) unify land
policies, legislation, and technological and institutional requirements;
(b) mobilize and enhance support from different political and social levels;
and (c) achieve economies of scale, especially in aerial photogrammetry and
surveying operations\. The geographical spread of the ten NRDP Bank-assisted
state projects which the project aimed to support, and the need to develop the
institutions of each state, were factors which contributed to the decision to
distribute project activities among all the states of the region\.
7\. Project Design\. In retrospect, project design was based on some
important assumptions that proved to be overly optimistic\. Among these were
that: (a) the Federal Goverrnent and in particular, INCRA, would maintain the
political will to implement and/or cause the State governments to implement an
ambitious land identification/adjudication and titling program, and to comple-
ment it with a significant land redistribution program; (b) the OETs' institu-
tional capacity could be strengthened to the point of being able to implement
a complex project with innovative techniques, in an uncertain political envi-
ronment; and (c) cLunterpart funds would be available in adequate amounts and
in a timely manner, despite the worsening fiscal situation in Brazil\. As it
turned out, during a twenty-month period crucial to project implementation,
the extinction of INCRA, the abolition of its lead ministry, the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform and Development (MIRAD), and finally INCRA's reinstatement
under its original lead ministry, the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI), put
repeatedly in question the consistency of the Government's political support
and commitment to the project\. Given the precarious political support at the
federal level and weakened federal land institutions, the OETs' institutional
capacity improvement became directly subordinate to the fluctuations of the
state governments' political support\.
8\. Proiect Organization\. Direct responsibility for project adminis-
tration and supervision at the federal level was to rest with INCRA's Direc-
torate of Integration with States and Territories (DI) which was to receive
full assistance and coo,eration from the other INCRA directorates involved in
- 5 -
project implementation, and, in particular, from the Regional Directorates\.
INCRA was to: (a) establish operational norms and provide technical assis-
tance to the OETs; (b) contract out and supervise all aerial photogrammetric
operations and studies; (c ) produce microfilms of all land registry archives;
(d) acquire land with federal funds; and (e) later, establish and maintain a
central cadastral data bank\. At the state level, the ten OETs were to plan
and implement the various project activities\. These included: land identifi-
cation and adjudication operations; establishing and maintaining computer-
based data banks; producing title documents for all recognized landowners;
selecting and appraising properties to be acquired by the Government; and
planning and supervising land redistribution and related infrastructure
investments with assistance from the State Coordinating Units of the NRDP
(UTPNE)\. Small farmer involvement was to be secured through the provision of
legal assistance to the state agricultural workers federations (FETAGs) to
promote farmer participation in the land adjudication activities and provide
legal assistance to small farmers through channels independent from the land
administration\. Project implementation procedures and the respective obli-
gations of the implementing institutions, as well as the annual programs and
budgets, were satisfactorily defined in subsidiary operational agreements
entered into by INCRA, the Superintendency for the Development of the North-
east (SUDENE) and each of the ten project states, and updated yearly\. Al-
though carefully conceived and prepared, these administrative arrangements
were often ineffective throughout the project implementation period, essen-
tially because of the total lack of "institutional memory" in the implementing
institutions\. Repeated changes in policies, structures and key parsonnel at
the federal level deprived INCRA of the necessary continuity in its adminis-
trative and supervisory responsibilities\. In the absence of a strong central
monitoring system, the original arrangements set up at the state level loosen-
ed and project implementation became much more sensitive to local political/
electoral trends\. Finally, recurrent acute shortages in federal counterpart
funds contributed in tempering the commitment of even the most supportive
state governments\.
E\. Prolect Implementation
9\. Chronological Events\. The Northeast Region Land Tenure Improvement
Project was approved by the Bank's Board of Directors in June 1985, sigi\.ed in
October 1985, and was faced at a very early stage with implementation
problems\. Up until Board presentation, US$40 million cofinancing from the
Interamerican Development Bank (IDB) was expected for three of the ten North-
east states\. However, cofinancing arrangements did not materialize, and at
INCRA's request, the legal agreements were amended upon loan effectiveness on
March 25, 1986, to extend Bank loan financing and related conditions of the
loan to the three additional states\. During the first two years, implemen-
tation did not progress as anticipated, mainly becauoe of changes of adminis-
tration in MIRAD and INCRA, and restructuring of INCRA; problems in procuring
and acquiring aerial photography, orthophotomaps, and data processing equip-
ment; political debate regarding the role ^f this project in the National
Agrarian Reform Plan and the relative importance of land regularization and
titling (an increase of land redistribution targets was requested in 1986 by
INCRA) and reservations or dissent, within INCRA, on the objectives, scope and
- 6 -
technl\.cal features of the state-level cadastre to be established under the
project\.
10\. In a second amendment agreed on May 15, 1987, after broad discus-
sions held at the Bank in late January 1987 with a Brazilian delegation, a
revised project implementation schedule, based on a five-year period instead
of the original three-year period, was added to the Loan Agreement, and a
first one-year extension of the loan closing date from September 30, 1988, to
September 30, 1989 was approved\. A second one-year extensie\.i was left contin-
gent upon the project's achieving a satisfactory rate of implementation\. In
spite of INCRA's abolition in late 1987 and further changes in MIRAD's admi-
nistration, reasonable progress was made in 1987-1988 at both the state and
federal levels: 80 percent of the aerial coverage of the project area was
completed; land identification/adjudication and redistribution activities
gained momentum as well as the preparation, with Bank assistance, of the
International Competitive Bidding (ICB) documents for the first contracts (No\.
01/87) of aerophotogrammetric works\. This progress was unfortunately inter-
rupted by the Government's various fiscal and administrative reforms\. Project
implementation slowed down again during the fourth quarter of 1988 2' as a
result of the late release of federal counterpart funds and ground to a halt
in early 1989 with the extinction of MIRAD\. After a period of uncertainty,
INCRA was finally reinstated in June 1989 under its original lead ministry,
the Ministry of Agriculture\. Upon confirmation by the Government of its
commitment to the project's original targets, the Bank agreed to the planned
second one-year extension of the closing date until September 30, 1990\. Howe-
ver, project implementation continued to suffer from new changes in INCRA
leadership and project key personnel, and acute counterpart funding shortages
as a result of late releases compounded by skyrocketing monthly inflation
rates\. The lack of orthophotomaps resulting from the protracted delays in the
signing of the first ICB contracts (No\. 01/87), twice postponed until October
1990, kept the land identification/adjudication procese at a near standstill\.
11\. Following the change in Government in 1990, the new administration
indicated renewed interest in the project and requested a third one-year
extension of the closing date until September 30, 1991, to resolve, in accor-
dance with a satisfactory 13-month action plan presented by INCRA's new
President in August 1990, pending issues concerning delayed procurement of
locally manufactured and imported data processing equipment, audits of project
accounts, and reduced land identification/adjudication and redistribution tar-
gets based on a proposed six-year implementation period\. A fourth amendment
to the loan documents incorporated the new administrative and structural
changes introduced after June 1989 and adjusted financing shares and loan
allocations for a UNDP-executed training contract and imported data processing
equipment\. However, the freezing by the Government of project funds budgeted
for 1991, the cancellation at the final stage in January 1991 of the bidding
process for the procurement of locally manufactured data processing equipment,
subsequent non-compliance with the proposed rebidding timetable, and the
overall continuing delays in the execution of the agreed action plan, forced
the Bank to exercise its remedies under the Loan Agreement and General
3/ Set of administrative reforms called "01Derac&o Desmonte\."
Conditions\. Accordingly, loan disbursements were suspended on July 5, 1991\.
The suspension was lifted only on September 27, 1991, after certain measures
related to resumption of project funding and procurement of data processing
equipment had been taken to bring the project into compliance with related
legal covenants\. As a result of these financial, administrative and mana-
gerial constraints, land identification/adjudication and redistribution
activities remained at a virtual standstill during the first nine months of
1991\. Although some progress was made in the planned procurement of aero-
photogrammetric works (ICB documents No\. 01/90) and imported data processing
equipment (ICB documents No\. 01/91), the completion of the first contracts
(No\. 01/87) and the delivery of about 7,160 urgently needed orthophotomaps
were also delayed by about four months to February 1992\. Finally, the audit
report for the period 1988-1989, received in late September 1991, e\.g\., four-
teen months after the due date, was heavily qualified\.
12\. Based on the fact that project performance had been consistently
unsatisfactory and that completion of the project would have required at least
another two years, the Bank declined a further twelve-month extension of the
loan closing date as requested by the Government only on September 27, 1991\.
Instead, it agreed to postpone the closing date to February 29, 1992, to allow
additional time to complete disbursements for the ongoing ICB contracts\. An
initial amount of US$42 million was canceled, effective March 1, 1992\. Final
disbursement of loan proceeds will be made before June 30, 1992, when the loan
account will be closed\. Total disbursements are expected to be about US$53\.7
million equivalent, or about 54 percent of the appraisal estimate of US$100
million, and an additional US$4\.3 million equivalent are expected to be
canceled at that time\.
13\. The aerialshotoarammetrv operations, consisting of aerial photo-
graphy and ground control, aerial triangulation and mapping activities, aimed
to support, through the production of orthophotomaps or line-maps, the on-the-
ground identification of land tenure conditions\. The target of some 56 mil-
lion ha was intended to cover the project's requirements and pave the way for
uninterrupted land surveys to be carried out during the first year of a pos-
sible second phase of the PDSFN\. Photogrammetric operations, which had
previously been procured through Local Competitive Bidding (LCB) during
project preparation, were incorporated into project costs based on the actual
contracts signed by INCRA\. Those were completed by mid-June 1986\. Subsequent
photogrammetric operations were to be procured through ICB\. The corresponding
aerial photography component was to be procured through LCB from local firms
exclusively at the request of the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces (EMFA), on
security grounds and, therefore, was not eligible for Bank financing\.
14\. The aerial photography target of 558,000 km2 (including 93,000 km2
completed at the end of project preparation) was achieved in early 1989 at a
unit cost of US$19 per km2- e\.g\., 95 percent of appraisal estimate\. However,
because of continuing institutional and financial uncertainties at the federal
level, the bidding process for the production of the first 218,000 km2 of
orthophotomaps (following the 88,000 km2 contracted at the end of project
preparation) took 26 months from the prequalification review to contract sign-
ing in October 1990\. This protracted delay translated into the unavailability
until August 1991 of orthophotomaps other than those produced in 1985-86, and
- 8 -
considerably hampered land identification/adjudication operations\. The momen-
tum gained in 1987-88 in field surveys came to a quasi standstill in 1989 with
the exhaustion of available cartographic material\. However, by the time of
loan closing, about 306,000 km2 of orthophotomaps (including 88,000 km2
contracted at the end of project preparation) had been satisfactorily produced
(55 percent of the appraisal target) under the technical supervision of
INCRA's Cartography Department (COCAR) at a unit cost of US$126 per km2, e\.g\.,
88 percent of appraisal estimate\.
15\. Identification of land tenure conditions under the project aimed at
confirming the titles of all legitimate land owners, regularizing the tenure
of all rightful occupants, including where necessary the reallocation of
excessively small properties, and providing definitive titles to some 700,000
beneficiaries occupying some 31 million hectaros of mapped rural land distri-
buted among the ten Northeast states\. Microfilms of all land registry docu-
ments in 368 municipalities were to be produced by INCRA\. The OETs were to
carry out the combined physical identification and adjudication operations up
to the conclusion of work by the special commissions g and the completion of
the team work (Proieto Fundiario, PF) and provide definitive titles to bene-
ficiaries\. Foreseen risks of judicial delays and injunctions 1" from unsa-
tisfied claimants and the relatively low efficiency of OET staff were to be
mitigated by improved staff training and studies of possible legislative and
administrative improvements\.
16\. By the time of loan closing, a mapped area of about 9\.8 million ha
(including available orthophotomaps, line maps and enlarged photographs),
representing about 213,000 farms, had been physically identified and surveyed\.
Of these, only 8\.2 million ha, covering 171,000 farms, had been adjudicated
(25 percent of the appraisal targets of 31 million ha and 700,000 benefi-
ciaries) at a unit cost of US$400 per km2, e\.g\., 158 percent of appraisal
estimate\. Very slow judicial processes explained an important part of the
difference in progress reported between the physical identification and the
adjudication operations\. Adjudication processes which stalled because of lack
of available land in the vicinity to reallocate excessively small properties,
or reluctance from the small farmers themselves to have their properties
reallocated, represented other factors of delay\. The issuance of usufruct
rights (CDRUs) to farms below one rural module V was not used as temporary
solution as was originally planned: by loan closing, only some 5,000 CDRUs had
been delivered\. Moreover, the effective use of these rights as collateral by
the beneficiaries in order to receive official investment credit is still to
be demonstrated\.
4/ Special commissions were vested by INCRA or the OETs with powers to conduct
an adjudication process (discriminatoria administrativa)\.
5/ "Discriminatoria Judicial" in Portuguese\.
6/ The minimal area is defin\.ed for each region as one being capable to support
and facilitate the social ard economic progress of the owner and his family\.
-9-
17\. Cadastre Implementation and Titling\. Each of the ten project
states was to establish a data bank, or cadastre, to process and store graphic
and literal data generated by the preceding stages\. The initial processing
and further updating were planned to be done by the OETs in view of their
legal responsibility for the land titles they produced\. INCRA was to define
minimum capacity, basic inputs and outputs, formats, and corresponding hard-
ware and software for these state data banks\. Tenure improvements achieved
under the identification/adjudication operations were to be complemented by
regular monitoring of future changes in land ownership, occupation and use\.
The production of computerized titling documents was also expected to help
simplify and improve registration procedures\.
18\. This component was by far the poorest achiever of the project\.
Digitalization of the first literal data collected through field surveys was
initiated by contractors in several states during a transitory period in 1987
while awaiting the definition by INCRA of the data processing equipment at the
state and central levels\. It took INCRA/MIRAD, and its advisory data process-
ing agency (SERPRO), more than two years after 1987 to reach the conclusion
that complementary highly specialized data processing equipment, not produced
in Brazil, was required, and to prepare the specifications for such equipment\.
It took INCRA another two and a half years, and a three-month suspersion of
Bank loan disbursements, to complete the procurement process of the 12 sets of
urgently needed locally manufactured data processing equipment, and the ICB
documents for the complementary imported equipment\. The reason for this
protracted delay laid in largi part with the lack of experience of INCRA's and
SERPRO's cadastral experts in the type of joint alpha-numeric and spatial
database required for the project\. By loan closing, some 162,500 titles, or
12 percent of appraisal target, were reportedly issued at a unit cost of US$43
per title, e\.g\., 253 percent of appraisal estimate\.
19\. Project activities in Support of Land Restructuring were to be
carried out by the OETs with the support of INCRA to meet a redistribution
target of 3 million ha benefitting some 130,000 landless farmers in the
selected priority areas of the ten states\. In retrospect, the concept and the
scope of this politically sensitive component appear to have been consistently
controversial from project inception on among federal and state land institu-
tions\. Apart from including some public land to be recovered by the OETs
through the adjudication process, land to be redistributed was to be mainly
private land acquired through expropriation or purchase\. Emphasis was placed
at an early stage by INCRA leadership on the expropriation of unproductive
large estates as the principal source of land for redistribution\. This ended
up shifting towards purchase el land when restrictions were introduced in the
existing expropriation regulation by Decree-Law No\. 2363 of October 21, 1987,
which also abolished INCRA aid transferred its functions to MIRAD\. The
FETAGs, which were until then actively participating through State Land
Commissions (CAEs) in the selection and submission to INCRA of proposals for
expropriation, withdrew from the CAEs\. From then on, very few new expro-
priation files were opened by INCRA, and the processing of the ongoing ones
slowed down considerably because of the legal recourse allowed by the new law\.
At the same time, purchase of land proceeded very slowly because of funding
shortages\.
- 10 -
20\. The methodology recommended by INCRA for the settlement of landless
families in redistributed areas, comprised three phases spread over a five-
year period before reaching the emancipation vJ of the settlers with the
issue of definitive titles\. A preliminary phase of six months, including a
series of temporary measures, preceded an active settlement phase of three
years used to delineate the individual plots, plan and organize various types
of assistance, and supervise infrastructure works in the settlement area\. The
last eighteen months aimed essentially at consolidating the previous phase and
issuing the definitive titles\. At the time of loan closing, about 95,000 km2
(or 32 percent of appraisal estimate) had been redistributed to over 25,000
lundless families (20 percent of appraisal estimate) at a unit cost of
US$1,112 per km2 (151 percent of appraisal estimate)\.
21\. The project aimed to strengthen the institutional canabilities of
the OETs by providing staff training and technical assistance, as well as
office buildings and equipment\. Because of budgetary constraints, construc-
tion of new office buildings was prohibited in early 1989 by a decision of the
Regional Rural Development Commission (CRDR) created to oversee NRDP planning
and implementation\. Consequently, only three state office buildings were
constructed and another two rehabilitated under the project, at a cost repre-
senting 25 percent of the appraisal estimate\. Similar economy measures were
adopted for the purchase of vehicles, topographic and office equipment and
furniture\. Only 217 of the 530 vehicles planned at appraisal were procured,
and the total cost of equipment and furniture, excluding all data processing
equipment, amounted to only 22 percent of the appraisal estimate\. Staff
training, carried out mostly under the INCRA/UNDP contract No\. BRA 87/022,
represented, with the aerial photogrammetry, the project's major achievements\.
Unfortunately, because of rivalries within INCRA/MIRAD, the project Coordinat-
ing Unit did not have the direct responsibility for monitoring and evaluating
the UNDP contract\. Therefore, most of the information regarding UNDP project
activities came from either the Bank supervisions or UNDP's own final evalua-
tion report\. In addition to the courses and seminars directly organized by
INCRA and the OETs during the project implementation period, the UNDP contract
itself, from June 1987 to August 1991, involved 55 training events and 1,115
trainees, or 64 percent of total appraisal target\. Finally, the legal assis-
tance provided under the project to the FETAGs turned out to be generally
ineffective\. The total cost of staff training and technical assistance ended
up exceeding appraisal estimates by 80 percent\.
22\. Proiect Administration\. Project administration and supervision
suffered heavily from: (a) repeated changes in structures and key personnel
of the Coordinating Unit (Part III, Annex 1); (b) insufficient authority
delegated by INCRA's Presidency or MIRAD's General Secretariat to deal with
the agency's other directorates and, in particular, the Regional Directorates;
(c) severe shortages or delayed releases of counterpart funds which hindered
field supervision; and (d) lack of adequate per innel policies to maintain the
skill mix required within the Coordinating Unit\. The lack of project consoli-
dated accounts at the central level and the reliance on INCRA's Regional
Directorates for the control of the OET accounts also made it impossible for
2/ "EmancipacRo" in Portuguese\.
the Coordinating Unit's financial controller to maintain accurate accounts\.
The heavily qualified consolidated audit report for the period 1988-1989 bore
witness to these weaknesses\. Finally, since these expenditures were not
eligible for 3ank financing, the OETs did not maintain separate accounts for
the incremental administration costs financed by the state budgets\. There-
fore, the project Coordinating Unit was unable to provide the Bank with the
corresponding actual costs\.
23\. The various institutional\. legal and socioeconomic studies aimed at
helping INCRA/MIRAD and the OETs identify possible improvements in the effi-
ciency of land operations, including the means of integrating the multi-
purpose cadastre to be produced with the traditional INCRA/MIRAD fiscal
cadastre, unfortunately never went beyond the stage of the TOR preparation\.
This protracted delay was the result of the reservations and/or dissent which
accompanied, within INCRA, the difficult gestation of the new multipurpose
cadastre\.
24\. Total Proiect Cost\. The total project cost, excluding project
administration costs, mainly borne by the states and not eligible for Bank
financing, is expected to be US$!10\.l million, or 46 percent of the appraisal
estimate of US$240\.4 million\. This was mainly the result of the extreme
shortage of counterpart funds from the Federal Government throughout the life
of the project but especially in 1989, 1990 and 1991\. Expected aggregate
disbursement of US$53\.7 million will represent about 54 percent of the Bank
loan amount and 49 percent of the total project costs\. The increased Bank
participation, from the original 42 percent, was partly due to the agreement
to finance 100 percent (US$3\.4 million) of the Government's share of the
INCRA/UNDP training contract\. When excluding tnis incremental funding, the
Bank financed 47 percent of total project costs\. The Federal Government
contributed only 40 percent of the counterpart funds originally agreed,
excluding land acquisition funds\.
F\. Proiect Risks
25\. Most project risks were identified at appraisal, but optimistically
considered manageable\. The political risks associated with the support to the
land restructuring component were not fully appreciated; nor was the impact of
Brazil's deteriorating fiscal situation, compounded by the impact of the low
priority assigned to the project by the Federal Government, on counterpart
funding\. The technical risks associated with the introduction of a new
sophisticated technology for the establishment and updating of state data
banks were not appreciated\. Finally, the proper evaluation of the risks of
(a) adverse political reactions from farmer associations, (b) judicial
obstruction from locally powerful unsatisfied claimants to land ownership,
(c) delay in institutional development and poor collaboration between agen-
cies, (d) low staff efficiency, and (e) delay in the implementation of aerial
photography because of unfavorable weather conditions, should have translated
into a more realistic project timeframe\.
- 12 -
G\. Proiect Results
26\. General\. The numbers of direct beneficiaries of the land adjudica-
tion and land redistribution components were 25 percent and 20 percent of
appraisal estimates, respectively (about 171,000 properties adjudicated
against 695,000, and about 25,000 redistributed, as against 130,000)\. In
spite of these modest quantitative achievements, the project helped the North-
east states to achieve greater security of land tenure through expanded use of
modern low-cost aerophotogrammetric techniques in the process of land identi-
fication and improved redistribution procedures for unproductive public or
private land to farmers with little or no land\. However, unless appropriate
arrangements are made and financial resources are provided to proceed with the
procurement of imported specialized data processing equipment and the setting
up of the pl:\.aned state data banks, now proposed under the ongoing Bank-
financed NRDP state projects, the project has to be considered ineffective in
introducing the proposed new technology for the establishment of a multi-
purpose rural cadastre\. Finally, with the exception of some positive stan-
dardization efforts among the states' land laws and regulations, the project
fell short in improving land legislation and court procedures for the judicial
resolution of land conflicts\.
27\. Even though project achievements in acquiring and redistributing
land did not exceed 30 percent of appraisal targets, the land area actually
acquired by INCRA through expropriation, represented 75 percent of the
achievements of the National Land Reform Program (NRPA) in the Northeast, and
the area of land redistributed about 50 percent of the NRPA results for the
entire country\. However, there is as yet no specific evidence that greater
security of tenure has provided small farmers with better access to on-farm
credit or has had a direct effect on farmers' willingness to invest in
productivity improvements\. Such linkages may exist, but will become evident
only through specialized studies in the future after the "emancipation" of
the settlers\.
28\. With regard to other expected benefits, related to the reduction in
frequency and level of violence of land conflicts and the decrease in rural/
urban migration and its attendant economic and social costs, available sta-
tistics tended to indicate that the project did not succeed in reversing the
existing trends\. Finally, the expected reductions in the administrative costs
to the government of land administration and taxation remain a long-term
prospect\. However, the extensive and accurate land surveys carried out under
the land identification component should facilitate the introduction in the
future of a more objective land tax based on the productive potential of the
land rather than on its actual use\.
H\. Proiect Sustainability
29\. In spite of the modest implementation record, project's objectives
have been met for the reduced number of beneficiaries\. It is expected that
the ex-post evaluations of the ten NRDP state projects will confirm and
quantify the benefits that have derived from the project\. Sustainability of
the modest achievements of the land adjudication and redistribution activities
- 13 -
will largely depend on the availability of efficient production support
services provided under the NRDP state projects\.
I\. Bank's Performance\. Borrower's Performance and Prolect Relationship
30\. Bank's Performance\. The Bank's involvement in project preparation
and appraisal was consistent with average Bans inputs for agricultural
projects in Brazil, absorbing a total of 147 staff weeks from identification
through Board presentation\. A supervision input, with an above-Pank-average
ye'rly figure of 27 staff weeks (177 staff weeks distributed over a period of
six and a half years), demonstrated the Bank's special efforts to follow up on
the implementation of this politically sensitive and technically ambitioua
project\. A total of 29 supervision missions were fielded, of which 20 were
partial missions, staffed with one land specialist who visited one to threc
states at a time\. The yearly input peaked during the first three years, at an
average of 44 staff weeks per year, due to the high frequency of state visits
fielded by Recife office staff during this period\. Substantial assistance in
technology, ICB procurement and audit was also provided by headquarters staff\.
However, this combined effort was not sufficient to resolve the problems
encountered in project implementation\.
31\. It is an open question as to whether the time chosen by the Bank to
finally exercise its remedies and suspend loan disbursements three months
before the expiration of the third exten3ion of the loan closing date, and
shortly after INCRA leadership and project coordination underwent a new set of
changes, was the right one\. The use of these remedies six months earlier,
when the first signs of non-compliance with the timetable of the 13-month
action plan were detected, could have resulted in earlier corrective measures,
and, possibly, better overall performance in the execution of the action plan\.
This could have provided the Bank with a reasonable justification for a fourth
one-year extension of the loan closing date to try 6o achieve the proposed
reduced targets\. Instead, the actual timing of the sanction precluded the
possibility of any further extension other than an exceptional and restricted
one\.
32\. Borrower's Performance\. The Borrower cooperated closely and
efficiently with Bank missions during the preparation, appraisal and post-
appraisal of the project, and was generallv supportive of supervision missions
and open to suggestions for improvement\. However, the Borrower did not
provide the required timely counterpart funding, because of fiscal constraints
stemming from the protracted economic crisis, but also because of the low
priority given to the project as a result of the lack of political commitment
from the Federal and, often, the State Governments\. This low priority,
compounded by repeated structural changes and administrative reshufflings,
resulted in considerable delays in decision-making, important shortfalls in
project implementation, weak interagency coordination and ineffective project
monitoring and evaluation\. However, within these constraints, OETs' staff
resources were reasonably deployed and trained\.
33\. Proiect Relationship\. The relationship between the Bank and the
Borrower remained good throughout the implementation period in spite of the
severe financial and institutional constraints imposed on the project\.
- 14 -
However, the Bank's refusal to respond favorably to the Borrower's late
request for a fourth one-year extension of the loan closing date strained to
some degree this relationship, until the possibility of continued Bank
assistance for the establishment of state data banks through the ongoing NRDP
state projects was identified\.
J\. Conclusions and Lessons Learned
34\. The following were the main lessons learned in implementing this
project:
(a) It is essential to predict correctly the Government's pclitical
will to implement ambitious programs to extend the benefits of secure land-
ownership to a large number of small farmers and improve land policies and
administration\. Although this project tried to develop efficient metho-
dologies for doing so, the ultimate impact was undermined by a lack of poli-
tical will to regulate the land-related articles of the 1988 Constitution and
to challenge vested interests\. This missina official commitment\. which trans-
lated into chronic counterpart fundina shortfalls and institutional problems\.
would have been secured more easily had the controversial land redistribution
component been eliminated from the Droiect: on the other hand\. this elimina-
tion could have rendered a'\.readv difficult farmer participation and 1poiular
support even more iproblematicel\.
(b) It is clear that the proposed time frame of three and a half years
for proiect implementation was overly oiptimistic given the political sensiti-
vity of the project actions and the emerging macroeconomic problema\. Also,
events which occurred during project implementation, such as the new interpre-
tation of the 1964 Land Law ("Estatuto da Terra") in the related articles of
the new Constitution made it difficult for the project to be executed within
the original time frame\.
(c) The new methodoloav to be introduced and developed under the
proiect for the establishment of a multipurpose state cadastre needed to be
thorouahlv discussed\. understood and agreed with INCRA before the start of
implementation\. The protracted delay in the procurement of the urgently
needed data processing equipment, both locally manufactured and imported,
stemmed mainly from reservations and/or lack of experience of INCRA and the
Data Processing Agency (SERPRO) technical staff regarding the type of joint
alpha-numeric and spatial data base required for the project\.
(d) When the success of a project is dependent on close cooperation
among many implementing agencies, the coordinating entity should be able to
attract and retain competent technical, financial and managerial staff and
should be delegated sufficient authority to ensure efficient implementation\.
The various structural changes which took place within INCRA and the Ministry
of Agrarian Reform and Development (MIRAD) after the extinction of the Direc-
torate of Integration with States and Territories (DI) in 1986, never vested
the Coordinating Unit with the level of authority needed to deal with the
other INCRA directorates and, in particular, the regional directorates\. In
future, the Bank should be more forthcomina in exercisina its remedies when
Institutional/organizational weaknesses threaten to undermine implementation\.
- 15 -
(e) A well-planned monitoring and evaluation system should be designed
at appraisal and is indispensable to provide timely feedback on the pace and
cuality of implementation, to identify changes in strateay or scope recruired,
and to measure project impact\. Evaluation arrangements were not well designed
at appraisal; the external evaluation, by independent consultants to be hired
by INCRA, of the performance and progress of the land tenure system did not
take place as planned; and the impact of land activities on the target popu-
lation and on rural development activities is still to be evaluated in each
state by Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast (SUDENE) under
the respective NRDP state projects\. Such impact evaluatior\. is needed to help
the Government prepare any follow-up land tenure project in Brazil\.
(f) In the Brazilian administrative and political setup\. efficient
proiect implementation and beneficiary participation are significantly
compromised for regional Droiects because of the implicit built-in split
between financial responsibility and control (INCRA/MIRAD) and managerial
responsibilities (State Land Institutes (OETs) and because of the existence of
a complicated and ineffective three-tier channel of funds (Federal Treasury,
Ministry of Interior (MINTER), INCRA) between the federal agencies themselves\.
K\. Proiect Documentation and Data
35\. The Staff Appraisal Report and accompanying Working Papers would
have provided the necessary framework for the Borrower and the Bank to
implement the project, had the Borrower demonstrated its sustained, full
commitment to the objectives of the project in making available adequate
counterpart funding\. The detailed quarterly progress reports regularly
prepared since mid-1987 by the project Coordinating Unit within INCRA provided
most of physical and financial data relevant to the preparation of the Part
III of the PCR\. However, state level data were often not properly maintained
by the OETs, and various discrepancies were spotted by supervision missions
during the implementation period\.
- 17 -
PART II - PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE
A\. Comments on Part I
1\. Introduction\. The description and analysis of the project from the
Bank's viewpoint is almost exactly the same as that of the Borrower, with the
exception of several observations regarding management and political support
for the project\. Thus, for example, with the advent of the so-called "New
Republic" which occurred with the swearing-in of the new Federal Government in
March of 1985, and despite the signing of Project and Loan Agreements in
October of 1985, the lack of institutional support for the project became
evident with the preparation of the New Republic's first National Agrarian
Reform Plan (PNRA)\. In the view of some former directors of the National
Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA), the Project was reac-
tionary and anti-reformist in that, through the adjudication process, it could
consolidate and grant title to large rural properties which were not legally
occupied\. In the same way, these authorities understood that the mobilization
of financial and human resources simply for land \.enure regularization consti-
tuted a scattering of efforts and scarce resources, when the proposed agrarian
reform--with its oversized goals, it might incidentally be said--was the admi-
nistration's main objective\.
2\. Only during the middle of the referred administration, when the
non-feasibility of the first National Agrarian Reform Program became evident
and public opinion became saturated with the emotional treatment of the agra-
rian reform issues, did federal and state actions regarding the land tenure
sector begin to lose their original thrust\. Coincidentally, during this
period the Federal Government's financial condition began to worsen, making
national counterpart funding steadily more difficult\. The economic and
financial crisis that affected the country made it difficult to finance the
project, which was not a priority either for the Federal Government or the new
state governments then in power, due to the saturation caused by the land
question and exacerbated by the way that the issue was treated during the
first years of the "New Republic\."
3\. Along these lines, although we are almost in complete agreement
with the evaluation contained in Part I of this Report, we raise several
issues for the purpose of assisting in the final evaluation of the project and
of directing possible future actions in this area\.
4\. Proiect Concept and ImDlementation\. The National Land Administra-
tion Program was created with a view to seeking to take advantage of expe-
rience accumulated by INCRA in adjudicating unoccupied federal lands in the
AmAzon and the frontier regions which took place on an intensive basis from
1976 to 1985, as well as under the Land Tenure Regularizatic\.1 Project,
financed by the Interamerican Development Bank and carried out, with relative
success, in five Northeastern states\. The purpose of the Project was to
consolidate the State Land Agencies (OETs) created by the States, with INCRA's
encouragement, to manage unoccupied state lands and cooperate in the agrarian
reform process in their respective areas\.
- 18 -
5\. When the Bank entered into the process, the project underwent tech-
nical modifications, broadened its objectives, ard consequently its management
became more complex\. There was something of a reciprocal complicity in the
formation of a complex tec;inical and institutional model whose operational
oostacles were underestimated and their solutions outlined with excessive
optimism\. The corporative state of mind of the staff of the institutions
involved, for example, was a silent obstacle to project development, and the
weight of the bureaucracy in setting up deadlines for the channelling of funds
was ignored, as if a federal or state administration could be transformed by
simpiy' signing a contractual arrangement (convenio)\.
6\. Project planning lacked a greater involvement in activities by
INCRA's Regional Superintendencies\. In this case, two issues should be
underlined: first, since INCRA is an agency with a systematic organizational
structure, with each central agency represented at the regional level, the
closing of the Directorate of Integration (DI) created serious operational
difficulties for project activities at the superintendency level, since the
Project Coordination Unit was precarious and non-institutional; second, the
Project Coordination Unit, in dealing directly with the OETs, preparing and
strengthening them for more efficient action in the states, in certain cases
gave rise to resentment by INCRA's Regional Superintendencies, absent from the
Project, especially in later years when, in spite of everything, OETs' finan-
cial resources released for the project turned out to be greater than those
availabl' for the Regional Superintendencies\.
7\. Another issue which was either not considered or was poorly evalu-
ated during project preparation was the capacity of certain sectors of the
country's cartography industry to obstruct or avoid international bidding,
which caused considerable delay in the project's timetable due to obstacles
that had to be overcome\. Also, the phenomenon of resistance to change, which
was very evident in the behavior of some former INCRA Directors of Cadastre;
this phenomenon was sometimes disguised beneath ideology with the backing of
the data processing services agency's staff (SERPRO) which at that time had no
technical background in graphic processing and data-banks, in the modern sense
of the term\.
8\. It also seems important to state that the constant delays, lack of
continuity, insufficiency, and at times even the freezing of counterpart
funds, not only made it difficult to carry out operational plans, but also
made it impossible to monitor technical and administrative activities of the
OETs as well as the training of their personnel, which caused a gradual loss
of quality in work in the technical and administrative areas, due to the
turnover of their respective staff\.
9\. Another fact that should be stated, since it directly affected the
project, is the great number of times that the land institution's management
staff and its own structural organization were changed, making it impossible,
even for those who came to understand the project, to give it more effective
support and especially to ensure necessary continuity in actions\. Since it
did not belong to INCRA's formal structure, the Project Coordination Unit
underwent situations both of prestige and isolation with respect to INCRA as a
whole, which created difficulties in dealing with the agency's day-to-day
- 19 -
technical, administrative and financial problems\. The final result was in
fact a gradual and progressive dismantling of the Project Coordination Unit,
with growing difficulties in keeping its staff and giving technical and
administrative support the OETs\.
B\. Prolect Impact and Lessons Learned
10\. In spite of the fact that about 50 percent of the external financ-
ing will end up being canceled and the percentages of achievement for some
project targets have been relatively low, the project's impact has been one of
modernity in land administration both at INCRA's and OETs' levels\. In a
certain w2', the project, in relation to the Bank's viewpoint, ended up in the
way it shc ld have begun had the original design been respected\. Graphic
processing and data banks are now considered by the OETs as necessary and
naturally required for their land administration activities, and at INCRA's
level, the technical cadastre or "multipurpose cadastre," is now viewed as
necessary and feasible, particularly with the availability of orthophotomaps
and the use of the central data processing equipment to be procured\. These
psychological changes are going to allow the future use, through the govern-
ment's own resources, of the aerophotogrammetric products already available as
well as of satellite imagery\.
11\. As far as the Bank is concerned, its decision to exercise its
contractual remedies by suspending loan disbursements should have taken into
consideration the situation of the Borrower in its broader aspects and, in
particular, the ongoing ICB contracts and the implications of the sanction on
all the parties involved\. It should be mentioned that the Borrower found this
decision inopportune, since it deprived the project of the possibility of a
new extension of the Loan Closing Date at a time when project issues were
being tackled\. The lack of proper monitoring of the sector policies and
economies deprived the Bank from becoming, through the PDSFN, an important
participant in the Land Reform Program recently launched by the Federal
Government\.
21 -
PART IU - STATISTXCAL !NFORP t
Table 1: IELATED BANK LOANS RELEVANT TO TRE PROJECT
Localization Loan Land Component Closing PCR Achievements I\.L
Loan Number Signature Content and Size Date Issue
Project ritle Date (% of Loan Amount) Date
State of BAHIA
Loan 1580 BR 06178 Land titling services and land 08/86 06/87 Land titling: 50% of A\.T\.
Babia P \.ral Development Project acquisition Land Acquisition: disappointing
-Paraguacu (7% of L\.A\.) Component Cost: 31%e of A\.E
-an 2269-BR 05183 Land regularization and 12189 03/91 Land Regularization: 52% of A\.T\.
\.-d Babia Rural Development redistribution Land Redistribution: 8% of A\.T\.
roject (24% of L\.A\.) Component Cost: 15% of A\.E\.
State of CEARA
Loan 1924-BR 01/81 Cadastre survey, land tiding and 12/87 03/90 Cadastral Survey: 59% of A\.T\.
Ceara Second Rural Development purcmase Land ritling: 180% of A\.T\.
Project (33% of L\.A\.) Component Cost: 56% of A\.E\.
State of IMtARNHAO
an 2177-BR 06/82 Land regularization and 12/89 06/91 Land Regularization: 65% A\.T\.
saranhao Rural Development redistribution Land Titling: 25% of A\.T\.
roject (33% of L\.A\.) Component Cost: 64% of A\.E\.
State of MINAS GERAIS
an 1877-BR 09t80 Land titling services 12/87 03/90 Land ratling: 82% of A\.T\.
nac Gerais Second Rural (less than \.5% of L\.A\.) Component Cost 140% of A\.E\.
evelopment Project
State of PIAUT
Loan 2015-BR 08/81 Land development 12/86 06/89 Land Adjudication: 45% A\.T\.
Piaui Rural Development Project (20% of L\.A\.) Land Purchase: 70% of A\.T\.
Component Cost: 60% of A\.E\.
Includes: O % of Appr2isal Tagot (A\.T\.); and (II actual cost as % of Appraisal Esdmates (A\.E\.)
- 22 -
Table 2: PROJECT TIMETABLE
Item Planned Date Revised Date Actual Date
Identification 1/ June 1983 June 1983
Preparation I 2/ October 1983 October 1983
it April 1984 April 1984
Appraisal June 1984 June 1984
Post Appraisat October-November 1984 October-November 1984
Loan Negotiations January 1985 January 1985
Board Approval May 7, 1985 3/ June 25, 1985 3/
Loan Signature October 15, 1985 October 15, 1985
Loan Effectiveness January 13, 1986 4/ March 25\. 1986 4/
Project Completion March 31, 1988 not completed
Suspension of Disbursments July 5, September 27, 1991
Loan Closing september 30, 1988 September 30, 1989,
September 30, 1990,
September 30, 1991 February 29, 1992 S/
1/ Project identification made by TBRD staff\.
2/ Preparation carried out by INCRA with assistance from IBRO staff\.
3/ Delay in compLying with condition of Board presentation involving the m6dification of existing aerial
photogrammetry regulations so as to permit ICS procurement\.
4/ In spite of compLiance with the specific conditions for loan effectiveness, the non-compliance with
dated covenants initially set for January 1986 entailed two months, deLay in loan effectiveness\.
Retroactive financing of expenditures incurred prior to January 1, 1985, was made subject to the
signing of the Subsidiary Project Agreements States/INCRA/SUDENE\.
5/ For ICB contracts No\. 01/87 only\.
- 23 -
Table 3: CUMULATIVE \. ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS
(US$ million)
Bank FY 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Appraisal 33\.0 68\.0 96\.00 100\.00 -- -- --
Estimate 21
Actual -- 14\.37 22\.50 28\.30 32\.03 41\.21 53\.7 V
Actual as Z
Appraisal 0 21\.1 23\.4 28\.3 32\.0 41\.2 53\.7
Estimate
1/ Including all or part of the original deposit of US$8\.0 million into the
Special Account\.
2/ An estimated initial amount of US$42\.0 million was canceled, effective
March 1, 1992\. Final disbursement against the loan is expected to be made
before June 30, 1992, and the final balance, currently estimated at US$4\.3
million, will be canceled after the closing of the loan account\.
TABLE 4A - PROJECT KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (AS OF 02/28/92)
AS COMPARED WITH APPRAISAL TARGETS
STATES ALAGOAS BAHIA CEARA MARANHAO MINAS GERAIS PARAIBA PERNAMBUCO
AEROPHOT\. UNIT PLANNED I/ ACTUAL PLANNED ACTUAL PLANNED ACTUAL PLANNED ACTUAL PLANNED ACTUAL PLANNED ACTUAL PLANNED ACTUAL
Aerial Coverage km2 27,653 21,686 141,698 128,708 64,783 62,477 66,326 80,913 40,801 54,872 25,855 21,742 54,925 52,966
Products:
Enlargements km2 - 15,000 - 1,700 3,200 7,050 - -- -
Yr 0 Orthoph/line maps km2 6,066 10,380 10\.043 (8,2u0) 2/ 6,764 11,748 15,882
New Orthophoto maps km2 27,653 - 141,698 44,697 64,783 16,453 66,326 38\.909 40,801 28,611 25,855 5,819 54,925 26,782
Totat km2 27,653 6,066 141,698 70,077 64,783 28,196 66,326 42,109 40,801 42,425 25,855 17,567 54,925 42,664
CAOASTRE\.
Phys\.ldent\.
Area km2 11,486 4,314 83,872 24,525 43,470 11,689 16,630 3,073 27,038 13,565 15,137 10,873 32,182 8,690
Nr\.Tenure unit 57,000 31,511 167,000 40,246 97,000 26\.139 30\.000 2,611 18,000 14,786 38,000 30,5S8 119,000 32\.496
Legal Ident\.
Area km2 11,486 3,562 83,872 22,051 43,470 5,438 16,630 8,111 5/ 27,038 6,540 15,137 8,856 32,182 B,364
Nr\.Tenure unit 57,000 29,701 167,000 35,595 97,000 6,936 30,000 9,349 -18000 7,923 38,000 22,586 119,000 30,871
LAND RECOVERY ha 67,300 5,244 804,200 247,785 631,700 120,610 600,000 491,728 182,000 73,495 102,400 6,664 143,000 25,619
by INCRA/MIRAD ha 3,310 247,785 109,875 322,414 44,073 3,919 9,846
Exprop\. 3/ ha 1,408 247,785 109,875 322,414 44,073 3,919 9,114
Purch\./Other ha 1,902 0 0 0 0 0 732
By OET: ha 1,934 0 10,735 169,314 29,422 2,745 15,773
Legal Ident\. ha 0 0 3,334 161,492 0 0 0
Purch\./Other ha 1,934 7,401 7,822 29,422 2,745 15, m7
LAND REDIST\.
Total:
Area ha 67,300 6,520 804,200 190,060 631,700 137,529 600,000 370,895 182,000 45,540 102,400 10,757 143,000 33,219
Nr\.Benefic\. unit 4,700 344 29,100 3,562 20,600 4,443 20,000 9,780 5,700 1,139 12,800 1,009 11,400 1,633
fy INCRA:
Area ha 4,701 190,060 130,611 204,081 21,549 7,587 17,918
mr\.0enefic\. uiCt 308 3,625 4,100 6,091 254 596 787
By OfT:
Area ha 1,819 0 6,918 166,814 29,422 3,170 15,751
Nr\. Benefle\. unit 61 0 311 3,689 985 413 944
TITLYNG:
Total unit 61,700 1,983 196,100 5,114 117,600 1,592 50,000 11,591 23,700 0 50,800 29,478 130,400 2,898
Titles Regul\. unit 1,983 8,019 0 23,071 1,892
Titles Redist\. unit 5,114 100 0 6,243 1,006
CDRU Deliv\. unit - 1,492 3,572 0 164 0
EXPRO\.IN PROCESS: 4/
u\.P\.D\.w/o O\.R\. ha 0 19,046 41,999 208,153 28,327 533
w/o/P\.D\. ha 3,460 76,918 84,797 452,784 52,696 10,816 17 812
Total 3,460 95,964 126,796 660,937 81,023 11,349 17:812
I/ Planned figures are appraisal targets or adjusted targets (as amended in May 1987)\.
2/ Orthophotomaps produced under the PDRI (Ln\. 2177-BR) not included in the total\.
3/ Land recovered through expropriation (with INCRA's ownership recognition) after 03/15/85\. At that time INCRA's land stock amounted to 52,695 ha\.
4/ P\.O\. means Presidential Decree; O\.R\. means ownership recognition (emissao da posse)\.
5/\.Physical IdentIfIcation carried out under the PORI (Loan 2177-BR)\.
TABLE 4A, CONT\. - PROJECT KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (AS OF 02/28/92)
W RPREIr APAISAL IN
X APPRAISAL
STATES UNIT PIAJI RCN SERGIPE TOTAL TARGETS
AEROPHOT\. PLANNED ACTUAL PLANNED ACTUAL PLANNED ACTUAL PLANNED ACTUAL
Aerial Coverage 1c2 94,439 100,031 19,536 23\.817 21,994 11,863 558,010 559,075 0OO
Products:
Enlargements km2 - 26,950 -
Yr 0 Orthoph/line maps kW2 16,274 6,098 4\.997 88:252
Noe Orthophoto maps kW2 94,439 46,587 19,536 10,268 21,994 - 558,010 218,126 55
Totat kW2 94,439 62,861 19,536 16,366 21,994 4,997 558,010 333,328 60
CADASTRE\.
Phys\.ldent\.
Area km2 64,107 12,891 13\.070 5 687 6,017 2,436 313,009 97,743 32
Nr\.Tenure unit 104,000 3,725 28,000 6,524 37,000 23,953 695,000 212,549 31
Legal Ident\.
Area km2 64,107 11 635 13,070 4 821 6,01\. 2,099 313,009 81,477 26
Nr\.Tenure unit 104,000 1,839 28,000 5,765 37,000 20,648 695\.000 171,213 25
LAND RECOVERY ha 276,100 101,946 198,800 49,228 51,400 13,438 3,056,900 1,135,757 38
by INCRA/HIRAD ha 10,729 44,612 10,928 807,491
Exprop\. 3/ ha 10,729 44,612 10,928 804,857
Purch\./Other he 0 0 0 2,634
By 0ET: ha 91\.2176/ 4,616 2,510 328,266
Legal Ident\. ha 0 0 0 164,826 un
Purch\./Other ha 91,217 4,616 2,510 163,440
LAND REDIST\.
Total:
Area ha 276,100 100 946 198,800 45,129 51\.400 12,434 3,056,900 953,029 32
Hr\.Benefic\. unit 14,800 1,060 6,500 1,520 3,900 818 129,500 25,308 20
By INCRA:
Area ha 9,729 40,513 9,924 636,673
Nr\.Benefic\. unit 281 1,212 433 17,687
By OET:
Area ha 91,217 6/ 4,616 2,001 321,728
Nr\. Benefic\. unit 779 308 385 7,875
TITIlNG:
Total unit 118,800 254 34,500 1\.100 40,900 49,4577/ 824,500 103,467 12
Titles Regul\. unit 254 1,100 39,549- 75,868
Titles Redist\. unit - 0 9,908 22,371
CDRU Deliv\. unit 0 5,228
EXPRO\.IN PROCESS: 4/ ha
w\.P\.D\.v/o O\.R\. ha 3,820 400 302,278
u/ojP\.D\. ha 83,958 7,043 830,223
Total 87,778 7,443 1,132,501
6/ Land purchased urder the POLONORDESTE Program\.
7/ Likely, including titles issued outside the area of the POSfN\.
TABLE 4B - PROJECT KEY PERFORMANCE INDICRT9RM (AS OF 02/28/92)
AS COMPARED UIIH REVISED TARGETS PROPOSFO IN AtGliCST 1092f l_Tmnij DP
STATES ALAGOAS BAHIA CEARA MARANHAO MINAS GERAIS PARAIBA PERNAMBUCO
AERDPHOP \. UNIT PLANNED ACTUAL PLANNED ACTUAL PLANNED ACTUAL PLANNED ACTUAL PLANNED ACTUAL PLANNED ACTUAL PLANNED ACTUAL
Aerial Coverage km2 27,653 21,686 141,698 128,708 64,783 62,477 66,326 80,913 40,801 54,872 25,855 21,742 54,925 52,966
Products:
Enlargements km2 - 15,000 - 1,700 - 3,200 - 7,050 -
Yr 0 Orthoph/line maps km2 6,066 10,380 10,043 (8,200) 2 6,764 11,748 15,882
New Orthophoto maps km2 27,653 - 141,698 44,697 64,783 16,453 66,326 38,909 40,801 28,611 25,855 5,819 54,925 26,782
Total km2 27,653 6,066 141,698 70,077 64,783 28,196 66,326 42,109 40,801 42,425 25,855 17,567 54,925 42,664
CADASTRE\.
Phys\.ldent\.
Area km2 5,110 4,314 29,116 24,525 15,272 11,689 24,413 3,073 16,369 13,565 11,948 10,873 13,003 8,690
Nr\.Terure unit 41,088 31,511 46,089 40,246 15,926 26,139 23,753 2,611 19,759 14\.786 31,893 30,558 45,275 32,496
Legal Ident\.
Area km2 5,110 3,562 29,116 22,051 15,272 5,438 24,413 8,1115/ 16,369 6,540 11,948 8,856 13,003 8,364
Nr\.lenure unit 41,088 29,701 46,089 35,595 15,926 6,936 23,753 9,349 19,759 7,923 31,893 22,586 45,275 30,871
LAND RECOVERY ha 14,900 5,244 353,600 247,785 226,000 120,610 487,500 491,728 106,900 73,495 13,900 6,664 45,200 25,619
by INCRA/MIRAD ha 3,310 247,785 109,875 322,414 44,073 3,919 9,846
Exprop\. 3/ ha 1,408 247,785 109,875 322,414 44,073 3,919 9,114
Purch\.JOther ha 1,902 0 0 0 0 0 732
By OET: ha 1,934 0 10,735 169,314 \.?,422 2,745 15,773
Legal Ident\. ha 0 0 3,334 161,492 0 0 0
Purch\./Other he 1,934 7,401 7\.822 29,422 2,745 15,77M
LAND REDIST\.
Total:
Area ha 14,900 6\.520 353,600 190,060 226,000 137,529 487,500 370,895 106,900 45,540 13,900 10,757 45,200 33,219 I
Ur\.Benefic\. unit 742 344 6,687 3,562 7,054 4,443 13,195 9,780 2,669 1,139 939 1,009 2,118 1,633
By INCRA:
Area ha 4,701 190,060 130,611 204,081 21,549 7,587 17,918
Nr\.Benefic\. unit 308 3,625 4,100 6,091 254 596 787
By OET:
Area ha 1,819 0 6,918 166,814 29,422 3,170 15,751
Nr\. Benefic\. unit 61 0 311 3,689 985 413 944
TITLING:
Total unit 41,830 1,983 52,776 5,114 22,980 1,592 36,948 11,591 22,428 0 32,832 29,478 47,393 2,898
Titles Regul\. unit 1,983 - 8,019 0 23,071 1,892
Titles Redist\. unit - 5,114 100 - 0 6,243 1,006
CDRU Deliv\. unit - - 1,492 3,572 0 164 0
EXPRO\.IN PROCESS: 4/
W\.P\.D\.u/o O\.R\. ha 0 19,046 41,999 208,153 28,327 533
w/o/P\.D\. ha 3,460 76,918 84,797 452,784 5,696 10,816 17\.812
Total ha 3,460 95,964 126,796 660,937 81,023 11,349 17,812
1/ Plamed figures are appraisal targets for aerophotogranmetric services and revised targets (proposed in 13-month Action Plan of July-August, 1990) for land regularization
and land redistribution activities\.
2/ Orthophotomaps produced under the PORI (Ln\. 2177-BR) not included in the total\.
3/ Land recovered through expropriation (with INCRA's ownership recognition) after 03/15/85\. At that time INCRA's land stock amounted to 52,695 ha\.
4/ P\.D\. means Presidentiat Decree; O\.R\. means ownership recognition (emissao da posse)\.
5/ Physical identification carried out under the PORI (Loan 2177-OR)\.
TABLE 4B, CONT\. - \.ERCTELTKFY P BWRF ATJCEINftCAIQRS\.IAS OF 02/28/92)
AS COMPARED WITH REVIS 0 TARGETS PROPOSEO IN AUGUST 1990 ACTION PLAN
X REVISED
STATES PIAUI RGN SERCIPE TOTAL TARGETS
AEROPHOT\. UNIT PLANNED ACTUAL PLANNED ACTUAL PLANNED ACTUAL PLANNED ACTUAL
Aerial Coverage km2 94,439 100,031 19,536 23,817 21,994 11,863 558,010 559,075 100
Products:
Enlargements km? - - - - 26,950
ir 0 orthoph/line maps km? 16,274 6,098 4,997 88,252 -
New Orthophoto maps kim2 94,439 46,587 19,536 10,268 21,994 - 558,010 218,126 -
Total km2 94,439 62,861 19,536 16,366 21,994 4,997 558,010 333,328 55
CADASTRE\.
Phys\.Ident\.
Area km2 17,504 12,891 9,428 5,687 3,974 2,436 1',6,137 97,743 67
Nr\.Tenure unit 2,766 3,725 11,381 t,524 30,894 23,953 268,u24 i\.2,549 79
Legal Ident\.
Area km2 17,504 11,635 9,4\.3 4,1:21 3,974 2,099 146,137 81,477 56
Nr\.Tenure unit 2,766 1,839 11,3e, ;Z 30,894 20,648 268,824 171,213 64
LAND RECOVERY ha 122,400 101,946 71,300 49,228 21,400 13,438 1,463,100 1,135,757 78
by INCRA/HIRAD ha 10,729 44,612 10,928 807,491
Exprop\. 3/ ha 10,729 44,612 10,928 804,857
Purch\./Other ha 0 0 0 2,634
By OET: ha 91,217\._ 4,616 2,510 328,266
Legal Ident\. ha 0 0 0 164,826
Purch\./Other ha 91,217 6/ 4,616 2,510 163,440
LAND REDIST\.
Total:
Area ha 122\.400 100,946 71,300 45,129 21,400 12,434 1,463,100 953,029 66
Nr\.Beneflc\. unit 1,285 1,060 2,264 1,520 1,181 1l3 30,134 25,308 67
By INCRA:
Area ha 9,729 40,513 9,924 636,673
Nr\.eenefic\. unit 281 1,212 433 17,687
By OET:
Area ha 91,217 4,616 2,001 321,728
Nr\. Benefic\. unit 779 308 385 7,875
TITLING:
Total unit 4,051 254 13,645 1,100 32,075 49,4577/306,958 103,467 33
Titles Regul\. unit 254 1,100 39,549- 75,868
Titles Redist\. unit - 0 9,908 22,371
CORU Deliv\. unit - 0 - 5,228
EXPRO\.1N PROCESS: 4/
w\.P\.D\.w/o O\.R\. ha 3,820 \. 0 400 302,278
w/o/P\.D\. ha 83,958 39,939 7,043 830,223
Total 87,778 39,939 7,443 1,132,501
6/ Land purchased under the POLONORDESTE Program\.
7/ Likely, including titles issued outside the area of the PDSFN\.
- 28 -
Table 5: PROJECT COSTS (CONSOLIDATED)
(USS mi\.lion)
Item/No\. SAR Estimates Actual
Total Distrib\. Total X of
$SAR Estim\.
1\. Aerial Photoaramnetry 91\.2 36\.4 49\.4 54\.2
a) Aerial Photography 11\.3 10\.7
b) ICS and LCB Photogramwnetrlc 79\.9 38\.7 /
Services (Ground Control, Aerial
Triangulation and photomapping)
2\. Land Tenure Identification 79\.2 31\.6 32\.6 41\.2
3\. Cadastre and Titlin2 14\.2 5\.6 4\.4 31\.2
4\. Suogrt for Land Restructuring 22\.5 9\.0 10\.6 47\.1
5\. Institutfonal Strengthening 31\.8 12\.7 13\.1 41\.2
a) BuiLdings 5\.9 1\.3
b) Data Processing Equipment
Locally Manufactured 7\.1 \.4 I/
Iiported -
c) Other Equipment 14\.2 3\.1
d) Staff Training and Technical Asst\. 4\.6 8\.3 V
6\.Prolect Administration 10\.1 4\.1 n\.av\. n\.av\.
7\.Studies 1\.6 \.6 -- 0\.0
TOTAL 250\.5 J1 100\.0 110\.1 5L 45\.8 J
Land Fund -- 5\.0
1/ Twelve sets of locally manufactured data processing equipment procured in October 1991\.
2/ Includes INCRA/UNOP training contract No\. BRA 87/022 for US$3\.76 million, including USS\.3 million UNDP
grant\.
3/ Includes about US$7\.5 million of local taxes\.
4/ Relates to SAR estimates minus administration costs\.
5/ Estimated as of 02/29/92\.
- 29 -
Table 6A: PROJECT FINANCING
(USS miltion)
Expected in SAR As Amended at Final Y
Effectiveness
Source of Funds
Total CX) Total CX) Total (X)
ISRD Loan 100\.0 39\.9 100\.0 39\.9 53\.7 53\.7
Co-financing Foreifn Institutions
IDS Loan 40\.0 16\.0 - - - -
UNDP Grant - - \.3 Y --
Government
rederal 100\.5 40\.1 140\.5 56\.1 56\.1 39\.9
State 10\.0 4\.0 10\.0 -4\.0 n\.av\. n\.av\.
TOTAL 250\.5 100\.0 250\.5 100\.0 110\.1 45\.8
J Estimated values, to be confirmed after the closing of loan account\.
) UNOP grant uider the INCRA/UNDP training contract No\. BRA/87/022\.
- 30 -
Table 6B: ALLOCATION OF LOAN PROCEEDS
(USS million)
Actual Disbursement
Category Original Revised 1/ Total X of Revised
ALlocation Allocation Allocations
(1) ICB Photogramnmetric Services 38\.0 38\.0 21\.7 V 57\.1
(other than aerial
photography)
(2) Goods and Services for:
-Land Tenure Identification 27\.0) 27\.0) 16\.4)
-Cadastre and Titling 4\.5) 4\.5) 2\.2)
-Support for Land Restructuring 7\.4) 47\.8 7\.4) 47\.8 5\.3) 32\.0 66\.9
-Institutional Strengthening 9\.1) 9\.1) 8\.1)
-imported Data Processing
Equipment -- 1\.2 -- 0\.0
(3) Consultants' Services 1\.5 1\.5 - 0\.0
(4) Initial Deposit in S\.A\. 8\.0 8\.0 -- 0\.0
(5) Unallocated A 3- -
100\.0 100\.0 53\.7 V 53\.7
\./ As amended on 12/11/90\.
2/ Estimated as of 02/29/92\.
Comments on Allocation of Loan Proceeds\.
The unused allocation of USS1\.2 million for the financing at 100X of inported highly specialized data
processing equipment is expected to be provided for urder Loan 2523-BR\.
-31-
Table 7A: PROJECT RESULTS - DIRECT BENEFITS
Physical Taraets 1/ Cost Per Unit
(US$)
Estimated Actual Z of Est\. Act\. % of
Indicators Unit (SAR) of SAR SAR (SAR) (PCR) SAR
Pre-Cadastral Ooerations
-Aerial Photography Knj 558,000 559,075 100 20 19 95
-Photogrammetric Services Km2 558,000 306,378 55 143 126 88
-Microfilm\. of Land Reg\. No\.of 368 2/ 193 52 n\.av\. n\.av\. \.
Munic
-Physical Identification
-Area KmS 313,000 97,744 31
-No\. of Tenures Unit 695,000 212,549 31
-Legal Identification
-Area KW2 313,000 81,477 26 253 400 158
-No\. of Tenures Unit 6\.5,000 171,213 25 114 190 167
Land Redistribution
-Total Land Recovered Ka? 30,600 11,357 37
Through
-Expropriation KmS 21,400 8,048 8,048
-Legal Identification Kin ) 1,648 1,648
-Purchase & other means Kaf ) 9,200 1,661 1,661
-Land Redistributed
-Area Kb 30,600 9,530 3/ 31 735 1,112 151
-Beneficiaries No\. 129,500 25,308 2I 20 174 419 241
Data Banks Titig
(Literal & Graphic)
-Titles No\. 824,500 102,467 §/ 12 17 43 253
i! Legal Documents as amended on May 15, 1987 (Schedule 5 of the Loan Agreement)\.
I/ Complementing the microfilms already existing for 196 municipalities\.
3I 6\.367 Kin' by INCRA for 17,687 beneficiaries and 3,127 KW by OETs for 7,875 beneficiaries\.
4/ Of which 5,228 CORUs\.
- 22 -
Table 7B: PROJECT RESULTS - INST1UTIONAL STRENGTHEhiNG\. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TRASING
Indicators Unit Estimated Actual
(SAR) (PCR)
OETs' Headguarters 1/
-Built, equipped No\. 9 3 (PI,RN,PB)
-Rehabilitated, equipped No\. I (MG) 2 (MA,CE)
OETs' Vehicles
Leaal Assistance to FETAGs
-Municipalities attended No\. 564 399 2/
-Legal advsers appointed No\. 81 54 2V
StaffTrainin&g
-2\.5 month courses for topographers, No\. of Trainees 700
agonomists and field technicians
-Courses for data processing and ^ 60
mapping specialists
-Courses for managers 180
-Various seminars ' 800
Total 1,740
INCRA/UNDP Training Contract
No\. BRA 87/022 3/
-2-month courses in agro-economic No\. of Courses/ - 5/149
planning (Agronomists arnd field No\. of Trainees
technicians involved in land
redistribution)
-2-month courses in photo interpretation r 2/51
and mapping
-3-month courses in land redistibution/ - 6/159
settlement (Agronomists, field technicians,
and farmer leaders)
-15-day courses for instructors in land - 4/75
restructuring
-1-month courses in monitoring of - 2/62
aerophotogrammetric services
-1\.5-month courses in preparing settlement - 4/74
projects
-Various seninars and recycElng courses - 32/545
Total ' 55/1115
1/ Construction and rehabilitation works suspended since 1989 because of lack of resources\.
2/ As of September 30, 1991\.
3/ From June 1987 to August 1991\.
- 33 -
Table 8: COMPLIANCE WITH LOAN COVENANTS
ARTICLE/ COVENANT STATUS OF COMPLIANCE
SECTION
Loan Agreement tas amended on 03/25/86, 05/15/87\. 03/01/88 and 12/11/90)
ARIL ES
3\.01 (a) The Borrower declares its commitment to the Although agreements were reached in March
objectives of the Project as set forth in 1987 on project objectives, the Government's
Schedule 2-\. and shall: (1) cause INCRA, commitment to the project has been ambivalent
SUDENE and the Northeast States to perform (extinction of INCRA in October, 1987, then of
with the provision of the Project Agreement; MIRAD in January 1989, and late reinstatement
(ii) take all action necessary to enoble INCRA, of INCRA in June 1989)\.
SUDENE and the Northeast States to performn
such obiigation; and (iii) not take any action
which would prevent such performance\.
3\.01 (c) The Borrower shall: (i) take all action \. so as to Chronic counterpart funding shortages and late
ensure that INCRA and the Northeast States releases have hindered project implementation
shall have funds required for carrying out their and pre pted suspension of Bank
respective parts of the Project available to them disbursements under this Loan from July 5 to
in a timely basis\. September 27, 1991\.
_ARTICLE lV
4\.02 (a) The Borrower shall take all action necessary to As of 02/28/92, only 26% of the adjusted
acquire land in a timely manner to enable each appraisal targets for land regularization and
northeast state to meet the land regularizadon 32% for land redistribution have been reached\.
00, tand redistribution targets set forth in Schedule Meeting the revised targets proposed in the
5 to this agreement\. August 1990 Action Plan would have increased
these percentages to 51% and 63 %,
respectively\.
4\.02 (b) The Borrower shall, not later than August 31, Complied with (Central Bank Resolution No\.
1987, apply l-nding policies for the provision 1329 of 06/03/87 complemented by Decree
of agricultural credit to farmers which are Laws No\. 2363 of 10/21/87 and No\. 2375 of
granted usufruct rights in accordance with the 11/25/87)\.
provisions of Decree Law 271\.
4\.03 The B3orrower shall take aU reasonable action Considerable delays in: (i) signing (October
necessar to enable the timely procurement of 1990) the first ICB ;ontracts (No\. 01/87) for
the goods and services required for purposes of acrophotogrammetric works; and (ii) initiating
the Project\. (September 1990) and completing (October
1991) the LCB process for the acquisition of 12
sen of locally manufactured data processing
equipment\.
- 34 -
Project Aereement (as amended on 03/25/86\. 05/15/87\. 03/01/88 and 12/11/90)\.
2\.01 (a) INCRA declares its commitment to the Although agreements were reached in March
objectives of the Project as set forth in 1987 on project objectives, the Government's
Schedule 2 to the Loan Agreement \. and shall commitment to the project has been ambivalent
carry out the Project with due diligence and -(extinction of INCRA in October, 1987, then of
efficiency\. MIRAD in January 1989, and late reinstatement
of INCRA in June 1989)\.
2\.01 (b) For purposes of ensuring the assistance of the Amended Subsidiary Project Agreements were
Northeast States and SUDENE in carrying out signed in November 1987 and updated every
the Project, INCRA shall: (i) not later than year henceforth\.
06/15/87, amend the subsidiary Project
Agreements\.
2\.01 (d) INCRA shaU ensure that the planning, Complied with\.
supervision and monitoring and evaluation
procedures are fuUy consistent with those
established for the NRDP\.
2\.02 (a) and INCRA shaU (a) take aU action to ensure that Not complied with\. The price charged to
(b) beneficiaries of the land redistribution activities beneficiaries of the land redistribution activities
included under the Project be charged a price reflected only a smaU part of the fuU value of
that reflects the fuU value of the land; (b) make the land\.
available to beneficiaries terms of payment for
land\.
2\.03 (a) INCRA shaU furnish to the Bank, not later than Complied with only in October 1991\.
09/15/87, a proposal on the technical and Technical specifications for the data processing
institutional issues related to the establishment equipment were approved by the Bank in early
of the data banks, including the specifications 1989, but the procurement process was initiated
of the equipment, and not later than 12/31/87, after considerable delays in Scptember 1990
to complete the proposal referred to and finaUy completed in October 1991\.
2\.04 INCRA shall: (a) carry out aU studies included The Bank approved terms of reference for some
in Part e in accordance with terms of reference of the studies but they were not carried out\.
satisfactory to the Bank; (b) employ the
consultant required; and (c) promptly upon the
completion of the respective studies, furnish to
the Bank, the conclusions and recommendations
cf such studies\.
3\.01 (b) INCRA shall: (i) maintain at aU times a project Partially complied with\. The project
unit within its Presidency; and (ii take aU coordinating unit has suffered from three major
actions necessary to ensure that such project institutional changes and five reorganizations\.
unit shall have the full assistance and
cooperation of the other departmnents and
directorates\.
- 35 -
4\.02 (a) and INCRA shall (a) cause the project accounts for Because of institutional changes and protracted
(b) each fiscal year audited by independent auditors delays in the release of counterpart funds to
acceptable to the Bank; and (b) furnish to the contract independent auditors, audits were
Bank not later than six months after the end of generally late (combined Audit Report for fiscal
each fiscal year: (i) certified copies of the years 1988 and 1989 received on 09/20190 and
project accounts for such year as so audited; audits of fiscal year 1990 accounts not yet
and (ii) the report of such audit by said undertaken\.)
auditors\.
_ 36 -
Table 9: BANK STAFF INPUTS
Loan/Credit
Project ID Nutber Project Name Stages Staff Weeks
6BRAPA133 L25930
NE LAND TENURE IMPRO Preappralsal 65\.0
AppraIsal 61\.9
NegotIatIon 16\.6
Supervision 194\.5
Others 24\.1
Total for Project Id 6BRAPA133 362\.0
Grand Total For All the Project Ids 362\.0
m Excludes tIme spent by Young ProfessIonaIs
- 37 -
Table 10: BANKCMSSIONS
Perfomrance Ruing Sau
Mo/Yr\. Persons Field Specilization G DO M F P
~mahr h\.ADDnl*
Identfication 06/83 4 14 ae,b/
Preparation 1 09/83 2 16 *I,cl
n 11/83 3 24 a/,cl,b
m 04/84 5 80 a/,c/,fI,h/
Appraisl 061I4 3 45 a,Ie/,/h
Post-Appraisal 11/84 3 45 A/,c/,b
Sugervision lyne/State)
F (BSB) 12/85 1 10 g/ 2 2 1 2
P (AL, CE, MA, PE, PB, AL) 03/86 1 10 a
P (AL, BA, MG, PB, BSB) 7-8/86 1 IS d
F (BSB) 9-10/S6 2 32 gl/ 4 4 4 3 4
P (CE\.PI,SE,PR) 1-2/87 1 22 c/
F (Was) 02/87 5 - a/,b/,d/,f,i/ 4 3 2 4
U 04/87 - - - 4 2 2 4
P (BSB\.BA) 05/87 1 7 cl
P (BSB) 05/87 1 2 a/
P (BA, PE) 6-7/87 2 20 cl,rl
F (BsB, PI) 07/87 2 26 bl,c/ 3 3 2 3
P (MG, RGN) 0S/87 1 13 c/
P (BSB) 10/87 2 6 c/,dl
P (PE) 10/87 1 2 c
F (8S8, MA) 10-11/87 2 14 b/,c/ 3 3 2 2
P (CE, BA) 11/87 3 26 e/,e/,e
P (AL) 12/87 2 1S c/,a/
F (BSB\. PE,PI) 03/S8 2 30 b/,cl 2 3 2 2
P (BSB) 03/88 1 7 d/
P (RGN) 03/88 1 4 c/
P (SE) 4-5/88 1 12 c/
P (PI) 7-4/88 1 6 c/
P (BSB) 01/89 1 2 cl
P(CE, AL) 1-2/89 1 8 cl
P (BA, MA, P4 4-5/S9 1 24 el
U 09/89 - - 3 3 3 3 3
F (BSB) 11/89 2 16 blc/ \.3 2 3 2 2
P (CE, MA, PB, P4 03/90 1 20 c/
P (AL) 05/90 1 7 el
U 06190 - - 3 4 4 3 4
F (BSB) 11190 2 6 b/,c/ 3 2 3 2 2
P (BSB) 02/91 1 3 e
C (BSB Il/SI 2 5 b/,el
TOTAL 597
Supervision: P - Patial; F - Full; C - Completion; U - Update of Form 590
States:
AL - Alasoas; BA - Bahia; CE - C"na; MA - Mamrnho; MG - MiDma Germ!; PBS Psiba; PE -Pernambuco; PI Pisui; RN - Rio Orande do
None; SE - Sergipe; BSB - BrasiliN TCRAYM D bcadquasn
ecaization:
a/Economlsc b/Agdculturis; e/and Speci liht; d/Raources Planner, c/Financial Analyxt; siusaionsl Expen; g/Eavikonmeo Specialist; b/Management
Specilst; ILeal Advisr
Performance Ratng Status;
I - problem-fie; 2 - modertc prblem; 3 - major problem;
4 a mjor problem not being adequately addreued\.
OveU State
- DevelopnatObjective\.
, MnagamPcformsne
* Availability of Funds
- Ptocum Prorm
INSTITUTIONAL/ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES DURING PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
Nature and Calendar of Changes Occurred
INCRA's President MIRAD#s General Secretary
No\. of Months No\. of Months No\. of changes
Month/Year Executing Agency Name in Function Name in Function (cum\.)
04/85 INCRA/DI Jose Gomes da Silva 6 1
10/85 INCRA/DI Nelson de F\. Ribeiro 7 -
05/86 INCRA/DP Pedro do Carmo Dantas 1 2
(Decr\. No\. 92627)
06/86 Guitherme Frederico M\. I
Muller
07/86 Ruben ltgenfritz da 12
Silva
05/87 INCRA 3
(Decr\. No\. 94331)
06/87 Jose Eduardo Viera 3
Raduan
10/87 Extinction of INCRA --
(Decr\. No\. 2363/87) 4
MIRAD/SG
(Decr\. No\. 95074)
09/88 MIRAD/SG -- Delite Guerra de Macedo 6
Mario Ramos Vilela 3
01/89 Extinction of MIRAD
(Med\. Prov\. No\. 29)
HINAGRI
06/89 Reinstatement of --
INCRA
(Decr\. No\. 97886)
HINAGRI
07/89 INCRA Mario Luiz Pegoraro 10
05/90 INCRA Jose Reynaldo da C\.S\.A\. 10 5
Vieira da Silva 6
03/91 INCRA Joao Mendonca A Filho 10 7
PROJFCT COSlS (BREAKDOWN PER STATE)
Exp ditum (in USS mnitio rnad % of A\.F) nd Physical Targets Adcieved (in% of A\.E) per tan No\.
STATE/INSITIUTION (1) Aora hotogrmmatry/ (2) Lad TtnuRc (3) Caast and (4) Suott for (5) Institutioa Sle -ing Total
Idcatfnto_ Titig jLand Restructuing (2) to (5)
Aerial photoVgrSmet&ic Buildiagp Zquipm Staff Tr\. OA: TA
Pn,ot phy Savice
Total %AE Totbl %AE TOWl %AE Total %AB Total %AE Toal SAE Totrl %Ae Total %AE Total %Ae
AIAGOAS -Cost \.41 29\.3 \.76 6\.1 3\.65 61\.5 \.39 24\.5 \.35 28\.7 0 0 \.43 23\.2 \.37 112\.1 5\.19 45\.7
-Achievnt 78 22 31 3 10 0 _ - _
RABA -Cod 2\.47 132\.9 6\.96 47\.2 t\.12 59\.0 1\.40 53\.4 \.93 13\.5 0 0 \.82 19\.6 \.5S 55\.3 HA\.dS 42\.3
-Ad6kymait 91 39 26 3 24 0 - -
CEARA -coot 1\.19 113\.6 3\.3S 40\.2 1\.97 16\.2 \.02 1\.3 \.38 35\.1 \.07 10\.4 \.41 20\.8 \.23 S2\.3 3\.53 1\.9
-Achlewmct 96 41 13 1 22 _
MARANHAO -Cot I\.SS ISS4\. 4\.91 62\.3 2\.49 53\.3 \.21 24\.7 4\.41 216\.2 \.07 9\.5 \.23 7\.8 \.05 6\.S 7\.46 62\.1
-A&Leva_ent 122 59 49 23 62
MINAS GERAIS -Cost 1\.05 161\.2 4\.47 U4\.2 2\.50 73\.3 \.32 43\.2 \.79 43\.9 0 0 \.35 40\.2 \.05 54\.4 4\.01 0\.00
\.Achkvum=* 134 87 24 0 25 0
PARAIA -Cmd \.42 103\.8 2\.22 71\.3 4\.02 76\.1 \.59 34\.5 \.39 41\.2 \.45 73\.7 \.08 5\.6 \.45 2i4\.5 6\.43 0\.00
;Adveu U4 61 59 53 II 100
PERNAMBUCO -Coae 1\.01 91\.9 5\.39 65\.6 4\.03 34\.9 \.77 23\.8 \.63 31\.8 0 0 \.04 1\.4 \.43 65\.2 S\.90 28\.8
-AdaievW 96 78 26 2 23 0
PIA -Cost 1\.92 127\.4 7\.94 64\.4 1\.38 12\.3 \.08 S\.0 \.83 23\.4 \.33 69\.1 \.31 11\.4 \.52 36\.7 4\.00 16\.9
-A _deleminm 106 67 I1 0 37 100
R1OGRANDEN\. -Cost \.45 130\.0 2\.07 73\.3 1\.73 41\.3 \.17 42\.5 \.56 31\.1 \.36 33\.7 \.35 33\.3 \.13 81\.2 3\.30 41\.3
-Achiuvemt 122 84 37 40 23 100
SERGIPE -Cost \.23 23\.1 \.63 10\.0 2\.22 61\.5 \.44 55\.7 \.34 32\.4 0 0 \.39 27\.5 \.09 33\.3 3\.43 46\.7
\.A _cyinaud S4 23 35 121 24 0
TNCRAJMIRD (HQ _-Cost - - -- \.07 - 5\.36 - 5\.43 -
-Achievemen_t\.
TOTAL -Cost 10\.70 94\.7 38\.70 48\.4 32\.61 41\.2 4\.39 31\.3 10\.61 47\.2 1\.33 22\.5 3\.43 16\.3 8\.27 179\.80 60\.68 41\.1
-Achivcc 100 55 26 12 32 50 -\. -\.
aJ Breakdown per itate calculated from dbe overll avere cosb of US$19\.1 per 100 ha for serial photography nd edtimated US$126\.3 for photograiummetc service\. (LCB and ICB conrat)\.
- 40 -
ANNEX 3
COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE IN LAND EXPROPRIATION OF THE PROJECT
AND OF THE NATIONAL LAND REFORM PROGRAM (PNRA)
IN THE NORTHEAST (AS OF 09/30/91)
PNRA PROJECT
STATES Area Expropriated Area Expropriated a/ Z of
(ha\.) (ha\.) PNRA
ALAGOAS 3,310 3,310 100
BAHIA 392,057 266,831 68
CEARA 156,705 151,874 97
MARANHAO 639,430 530,567 83
MINAS GERAIS 184,993 72,400 39
PARAIBA 7,698 4,452 58
PERNAMBUCO 13,063 9,846 75
PIAUI 14,549 14,549 100
RIO G\. DO NORTE 49,664 44,612 90
SERGIPE 17,337 11,328 65
TOTAL 1,478\.806 1,109\.769 75
a/Includes:
-areas acquired by INCRA prior to March 1985 (52,695 ha\.);
-area expropriated up to the recognition of INCRA ownership (emissao da
posse);
-areas expropriated (presidential decree signed) but still under process; and
-areas acquired through private deal\.
BRAZILt 5 '-
NATIONAL LAND ADMINISTRATION PROGRAM )
'/ ~~~~~~~NORTHEAST REGION LAND TENURE N_H
g& ~~~~~~~~~~IMPROVEMENT PROJECT IBRAZI L RcNORN
PARA b I'9YEARLY PHOTOGRAMMiETRIC OPERATIONS - ,
M^r >>9 > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~South America
| 'tQ ~~~ \ < A NORTE~
f ;~~~~~~~~~~~~6 0f-wUA
oPpelww~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
,<) \.' ' " ~~~~" " '' z;% tO
: l_cSbF-°e<hd
9 f- 5 W i PRNAVBCO~v °tM
Y { i i -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 59 \ < ALAGOA~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~PSSO
\-tr Xo'°"e g ( D \. ,\., \. : \.0 0 ' -
5\.r- 1w,;\. m;' ERIAUE
PERNSAMBUCO r
G O l A S 9 Sf RW SSN o 2o Maps to t e produced~1,
> Oa \ ~-- -----project
\.D td \. \.w0$^1 > t (~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
De r\. S OF ars Cbros 5 _ _ Sto~~~~~~~~~~~~~Piete boundarye
f~~~~r,, ~~~\. \. \. Ye r 0
, <s\.,,,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Ya I \.
,,, j \. EsptRlr~~~~~~~~~~~~co" C0- Year 2 0IE
,~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Ya 3\./ SAT
o3~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Mp F-due under 6 ;
|____~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ohrpoet
BRAZIL S'-
NATIONAL LAND ADMINISTRATION PROGRAM J'
R ~~~~~NORTHEAST REGION LAND TENURE
ff ~~~~~~~~~~~~IMPROVEMENT PROJECT B RA Z I L'
PA RA ° YEARLY LAND ADJUDICATION OPERATIONS \.
(/ :)/*' ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~South CAmerica
j ' |' +) 5 9 +! </ \.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Or g IL X/ 3Vn19eo 0l°t /_ ,\ Ys °eCPt9 (/
>S Xd-,,,:oW;_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
i} X aoolw^O 0 oT 0 § C
y t'$v ? t5\.-r <r IPAAB>'ffpA53
\> osO,\.O, P | A 2 i SFt 8<s t/ t 71+b;MdsrFECIFE b~~~~~~J\. co_
( > <, / W * t t° -- e ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0
x ~' J c nu / IARWF' O
f \.- \ r- - J O X b\.Sd - w 3 SERGIPE~~~~~~~~~~~~
J ~~~~" 'V'°X t,\.:
HtAgA'gf; AlOMB\. B
J~~~~o o v<
GC)liC (> sa\.a5~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- X OvO~~~~~~ Project Boundary
\ ° obrumado ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Year I
A,, X > < OVter:doConqslstltwOoOllb!us ~~~~~~~Year 2
S ,^ o' \~~~~~ other projects
nF\. D \.n'0o+> 4dM Nuclei Centers
j IPRASS %/ ,? > 13~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ State Capitals
* °s c\.,,\. ~~~~~Rivers
*s uS b_ nt~ye X < OMonles Cbros r I State Boundasries
R g MINAS GERAIS x oAILD+o ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~International Boundo\.s
> 0 100 ~~~~~~~~200 300 KILOMETERS
ws w S 0 ~~~~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~ESPIRITO '0 100 200 MILES
SANTO 3 | APPROVAL |
P008952 | Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ReportNo\. 11514
PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
TURKEY
INDUSTRIAL TRAINING PROJECT
(LOAN 2399-TU)
DECEMBER 30, 1992
Operations Evaluation Department
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
CURRENCY EQUIVALElTS
Currency Unit = Turkish Lira (TL)
at Appraisal 1984
TL 100\.00 = US$ \.34
TL 291\.50 = US$1\.00 (February 13, 1984)
End of Period
ExchangE Rate
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Lira 366\.7 522\.0 647\.5 857\.2 1,422\.3 2,121\.7 2,608\.6
FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER
January 1 - December 31
ABBREVIATIONS
AC Advisory Committee (at each TTC)
FTE Faculty of Technical Education (under YOK)
FTVE Faculties of Technical and Vocational Education (collective reference to FTEs and
FVEs)
FVE Faculty of Vocational Education (under YOK)
ITU Industrial Training Unit (Y6K)
KOSGEB Small- and Medium Industry Development Organization (under the MIT; see also
SMIDO)
KOSEM Small- and Medium Industry Training Center (under KOSGEB)
KOSGET Small Industry Development Organization
MIT Ministry of Industry and Trade
MOE Ministry of Education
MOL Ministry of Labor
OED Operations Evaluation Department (World Bank)
PAR Performance Audit Report (World Bank), replaced PPAR, July 1992
PCR Project Completion Report (World Bank)
PIU Project Implementation Unit
PPAR Project Performance Audit Report (World Bank), replaced by PAR, July 1992
SAR Staff Appraisal Report (World Bank)
SEE State Economic Enterprise
SEGEM Industrial Training and Development Center, under the MIT, replaced in 1989 by
KOSGEB
SIS State Institute of Statistics
SMIDO Small- and Medium Industry Training Center (see also KOSGEB)
SMITC Ankara Small and Medium Scale Industry Training Center
SPO State Planning Organization
TA Technical Assistance
TTC Technician Training Center (upgraded from VJHE)
TTU Technician Training Unit
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization
VSHE Vocational Schools of Higher Education
YOK Council for Higher Education
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
THE WORLD BANK
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
U\.S\.A\.
Office of Director-General
Operatione Evaluation
December 30, 1992
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Performance Audit Report on Turkey
Industrial Training Project (Loan 2399-TU)
Attached is a copy of the report entitled "Performance Audit Report on Turkey
Industrial Training Project (Loan 2399-TU)" prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department\.
Attachment
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
TURKEY
INDUSTRIAL TRAINING PROJECT (LOAN 2399-TU)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No\.
PREFACE \.i
BASIC DATA\.iii
EVALUATION SUMMARY \. vii
I\. PROJECT BACKGROUND \. 1
Introduction 1\. 1
Main Sectoral Issues \. 1
Government Industrial Training Policy \. 1
Project Objectives and Scope \. 2
Project Components \. 2
A\. Under YOK 2\. 2
B\. Under SEGEM \.3
C\. Under SIS \.3
Project Cost and Financing \. 4
Expected Benefits \.4
II\. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION\. 4
Project Management and Implementation Experience \. 4
Project Changes\. 4
Implementation of the Main Project Components\. 5
A\. Activities under Y6K\.5
B\. Activities under SEGEM\.12
C\. Activities under SIS\. 15
III\. FINDINGS AND ISSUES\. 15
Overview\.4\.15
Findings and Lessons\. 15
Issues\. 19
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
APPENDIX 1 - Outputs from Project Training Programs
APPENDIX 2: Fellowships Training for YOK Personnel
APPENDIX 3: Retention and Loss of Instructional Personnel Trained
under the Industrial Training Project
APPENDIX 4: TTC Curricula Documentation Inventory
APPENDIX 5: Weekly Utilization of Laboratory and Workshop Facilities
APPENDIX 6: Fellowship Training for SEGEM Personnel
Attachment A - Comments from the Head of Department Undersecretariat of Treasury and
Foreign Trade of the Prime Ministry
Attachment B - Comments from the Vice President of the Small and Medium Industry
Development Organization
Attachment C - Comments from the Acting President of the State Institute of Statistics
-1-
PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
TURKEY
INDUSTRIAL TRAINING PROJECT (LOAN 2399-TU)
PREFACE
This is a Performance Audit Report (PAR) on the Industrial Training Project in Turkey\. For
the Project, a Loan of US$36\.8 million equivalent was approved on March 27, 1984, and closed on
December 31, 1990, one year behind schedule\. Actual disbursements amounted to US$36\.37 million,
and the undisbursed balance of US$432,584\.15 was cancelled\.
The PAR is based on the Project Completion Report (PCR) prepared by the Population and
Human Resources Division of Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office and the
Borrower, issued on August 23, 1991;1/ the Staff Appraisal and President's Reports; the Loan
Agreement with the Borrower and the Project Agreement with the Council for Higher Education
(YOK - the major implementing agency); a study of the project files; minutes of the Board meeting;
and discussions with Bank and Borrower staff\. An OED mission was in Turkey in June 1992 to visit
selected project sites and discuss implementation experience and project outcomes with Borrower
staff\. Their cooperation and assistance in the preparation of this report is gratefully acknowledged\.
The PAR validates and supplements the PCR's succinct and incisive record of project
experience\. The PAR elaborates on the conflict of interest problem, highlights other aspects of
implementation experience and project achievements, and discusses findings, lessons, and issues
concerning project design, management and supervision; the retention of teaching staff; monitoring
and evaluation; cost-recovery and cost-sharing, and formalizing of the status of technicians\.
The draft PAR was sent to the Borrower for comments\. The comments received from the
Head of Department, Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade of the Prime Ministry; the
Vice President of the Small and Medium Industry Development Organization; and the Acting
President of the State Institute of Statistics are reproduced as Attachments A, B and C\.
y Project Completion Report, Turkey: Industrial Training Project (Loan 2399-TU), Report 9835, August 23, 1991\.

PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
TURKEY
INDUSTRIAL TRAINING PROJECT (LOAN 2399-TU)
BASIC DATA
KEY PROJECT DATA
Item Appraisal Estimate Actua
Total Project Cost (US$ million) 44\.42 52\.44
Overrun (%) 18\.08
Loan Amount (US$ million) 36\.80 36\.80
Disbursed: US$ 36\.37
Cancelled 0\.43
Repaid (05/31/92)
Outstanding (as of 05/31/92)
Date Physical Components Completed gt 12/31/1989 12/31/1990
No\. of months since Loan Signature 68 80
Proportion Completed by Above Date (%) 90 100
Time Overrun (%) 18
Date of Overall Project Completion 12/31/1989 12/31/1990
No\. of months since Loan Signature 68 80
Proportion Completed by Above Date (%) 90 100
Time Overrun (%) 18
Institutional Performance Satisfactory
CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS
(US$ millions)
FY 1985 1966 1967 1988 1969 1990 1991
(i) Appraisal Estimate 1\.40 4\.90 13\.50 22\.60 31\.20 36\.80 36\.80
(ii) Actual 2\.04 3\.47 5\.98 17\.73 33\.01 33\.89 36\.37
(iii) as % of (i) 146 71 44 78 106 92 99
Z/ The project had no civil works, only provision of equipment where physical facilities were concerned\.
- iv -
STAFF IMPUTS
(staff weeks)
FT 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 Total
PreappraisaL - 30\.1 - - - - - - - - - 30\.1
Appraisal - 23\.2 30\.3 - - - - - - - - 53\.5
Negotiations - - 9\.3 - - - - - - - - 9\.3
Supervision - - 3\.9 7\.6 6\.4 8\.4 9\.1 7\.9 12\.0 15\.1 1\.1 71\.2
Other 0\.1 0\.7 19\.5 - - - - - - - - 20\.3
Total 0\.1 54\.0 63\.0 7\.6 6\.4 8\.4 9\.1 7\.6 12\.0 15\.1 1\.1 184\.4
PROJECT DATES
Iten Planned Date Actual Date
First Mention in Files September 14, 1982
Negotiations December 15, 1983 February 14-16, 1984
Board Approval March 27, 1984
Loan signature April 16, 1984
Loan Effectiveness July 16, 1984 September 18, 1984
Project Completion December 31, 1989 December 31, 1990
Closing Date June 31, 1990 December 31, 1990
OTHER PROJECT DATA
Borrower: Republic of Turkey
Executing Agencies: Council for Higher Education (Y6K)
Industrial Training and Development Center (SEGEM) 1/
State Institute of Statistics
Follow-on Projects
Name: Second Industrial Training Project
Loan No\.: 2922-TU
Amount of Loan (USS m): 115\.8
Loan Agreement (Date): 04/08/88
3/ Subsequently reconstructed as KOSGEB (Small and Medium Industry Development Organization)\.
V -
NISSION DATA
Type of No\. of Days in
Mission Date Persons Fietd SpeciaLization 4/
Identification 11/82 3 12 E, TE, STS, DC
Preparation 02/83 3 19 E, TE, STS
Appraisal 05/83 5 17 E, TE, STS, FP, ITS
FolLow-up 08/83 1 4 STS
Pre-Negotiations 10/83 1 3 E
Supervision 1 05/84 2 20 TE, GE
Progress Review (Combined) 10/84 3 9 E, FP, TS
Supervision 2 12/84 3 9 E, A, TE
Supervision 3 11/85 3 16 E, A, TE
Supervision 4 04/86 2 30 E
Supervision 5 11/86 2 12 TE, PS
Supervision 6 02/87 3 21 'TVE, A, TE
Supervision 7 01/88 2 17 TE, OA
Supervision 8 06/88 1 34 TE
Supervision 9 02/89 2 18 E, TVE
Supervision 10 11/89 2 19 TM, TEE
Combined SPN 11/89 2 9 SA, 00
Supervision 11 05/90 2 3 TM, TVE, A
Completion 10/90 2 16 TM, TVS
4/ A = Architect; D = Division Chief; E = Economist; FP = Facilities Planner; GE = General Educator; ITS = Industrial
Training Specialist; OA = Operations Assistant; 00 = Operations Officer, PS = Procurement Specialist; SA = Systems
Analyst; STS = Science & Technology Specialist; TE = Technical Educator; TEE = Training & Employment Expert; TM =
Task Manager, TP = Training Planner; TS = Training Specialist; TVE = Technical & Vocational Educator\.
Vi-
ALLOCATION OF LOWM PROCEEDS
(USS)
cat oraisal Estimte ActuaL
Part
1\. Equipment and materials
(excluding furniture) 23,988,229 22,661,273\.97
2\. Consultant's services
(a) Under Part A\.4 200,000
(b) Others 3,600,000 5,335,347\.03
3\. Overseas fellowships 4,600,000 3,790,690\.36
Part B
4\. Equipment and materials
(excluding furniture) 1,000,000 2,117,699\.74
5\. Consultant's services
(a) Under Part A\.4 200,000 0\.00
(b) Others 2,100,000 1,475,258\.99
6\. Overseas fellowships 320,000 0\.00
Part C
7\. Overseas felLowships 700,000 701,552\.48
Other
8\. Fee 91,771 91,771\.00
Total 36,800,000 36,367,415\.85
Undisbursed Balance (cancelled) 432,584\.15
36,800,000\.00
-Vii -
PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
TURKEY
INDUSTRIAL TRAINING PROJECT (LOAN 2399-TU)
EVALUATION SUMMARY
Introduction
ty of the Council for Higher Education (YOK)
1\. The project was identified, prepared and and the Industrial Training and Development
appraised by the Bank between November 1982 Center (SEGEM) to monitor pre-service and in-
and May 1983\. Following negotiations in Febru- service industrial training programs, and to
ary 1984, the project was approved by the Board alleviate scarcities of skilled labor through
in March 1984\. The project cost, estimated at expansion and improvement of their technical
US$44\.4 million equivalent (including a front- education and training programs\. Support was
end fee of US$92,000 equivalent), was to be also provided to the State Institute of Statistics
financed by a Bank loan of US$36\.8 million (SIS) in order to increase its institutional capaci-
equivalent while the balance of US$7\.6 million ty to provide economic and labor market statis-
equivalent was to be financed by the Govern- tics\. At the very end of the project, SEGEM
ment\. The original Closing Date was postponed was replaced by the Small and Medium Industry
by six months to December 1990, which was also Development Organization (KOSGEB)\.
the date when the project was completed, a year
later than planned\. Ninety-nine percent of the Implementation EWgrience
Loan was disbursed\. The actual project cost was
US$52\.44 million equivalent, 18 percent higher 3\. Overall, project implementation was
than expected\. satisfactorily carried out by the three imple-
menting agencies\. Although completed a year
Objectives and Project Content later than planned, the project generally had
positive results and met its objectives, except
2\. The main sector objective was to support those concerning institutional development,
the Government in improving and expanding which the project failed to reach satisfactorily\.
services in industrial training\. The project was Most procurement and technical assistance
designed to respond to industry's need for targets were reached, and enrollment targets
skilled labor to maintain and increase the rates were exceeded\. Three problems affected imple-
of growth of manufactured exports\. Moderniz- mentation: first, the chronic shortage of local
ing Turkish industry was critical to the introduc- counterpart staff to work with foreign consul-
tion and spread of modern production and tants resulted in lack of institution-building;
marketing techniques\. Specific rotect obJec- second, the shortage of qualified candidates for
tives were to strengthen the institutional capaci- overseas fellowships delayed implementation;
-vii -
and finally, an in-service teacher training compo- Sustainability
nent was deleted from the beginning because it
was found to be redundant\. 6\. Although the sustainability of the project
is not in question, the Government nevertheless
Results has been advised to take certain measures to
strengthen project sustainability: (a) YOK should
4\. The overall project objective, to shift the establish an in-service training program for TTC
orientation of technical education and training teachers to improve knowledge on the use of
from a formal academic process to one con- equipment, provide more training materials in
cerned with producing skilled technical manpow- Turkish, and assist in organizing laboratory
er demanded by the manufacturing industry, sessions; (b) KOSGEB and YOK's Industrial
seems to have been generally met, and a link is Training Unit should carefully monitor the
developing between the education and training provisions for an adequate budget for their
sector and industry\. The eight Technician respective training centers; and (c) staffing
Training Centers (TICs, under Y6K jurisdic- requirements of YOK and KOSGEB should be
tion), and the Ankara Small and Medium Scale carefully monitored and assessed to ensure that
Industry Training Center are now fully equipped the institutions will continue to function effec-
and operational\. The apparent quality of the tively\.
facilities, equipment, staff, and training has
attracted the attention of both students and Findines and Lessons
industry\. Initial problems concerning installation
and utilization of equipment seem to have been 7\. There appeared to be a conflict of inter-
largely solved, although facility utilization rates est in regard to equipment procurement for
for TTCs are still low\. Teachers have learned to YOK A local affiliate of an international firm
use the equipment, and have prepared many alleged that an equipment contract (valued at
manuals for students\. US$2\.5 million equivalent) was awarded to
another international firm whose local counter-
5\. The institutional development objectives part was fully owned by foundations established
for YOK and SEGEM were less than fully and directed by the head of YOK, the main
achieved\. By the end of the project, these project beneficiary\. Although the matter was
agencies had limited capacity to plan, administer, closed where the project being audited is con-
and manage the training for which they were cerned, the conflict of interest issue appears to
responsible\. With the establishment of affect also the two on-going education projects\.
KOSGEB, however, it would appear that a
strong foundation has been laid for institutional 8\. The audit emphasizes that the Bank takes
development: it is left to be seen whether it will a serious view of any conflict of interest in the
achieve its original project objective\. With procurement of goods and services\. The Bank
YOK, however, problems continue\. The ex- is responsible for ensuring that procurement
pected transfer of knowledge and experience procedures are observed in accordance with the
from the substantial technical assistance finan- Guidelines which, quoting the Articles of Agree-
ced by the Loan was limited by a shortage of ment, state that, among other things, the Bank
counterpart staff\. should ensure that the proceeds of a loan be
used with due attention to economy and effi-
ciency in the execution of the project and
without regard to political considerations\.
ix -
Arising from these principles are three basic 11\. The development of KOSGEB is a major
considerations: first, the Borrower shall carry success of the project\. If it fulfills its mandate,
out the execution of the project, including the it will have a major impact on the development
procurement of goods and works involved, with of Turkish small and medium scale industry\.
economy and efficiency, i\.e\. the Borrower "gets With its legal status established, KOSGEB is
the best value for its money"; second, all eligible now responsible for a wide range of training and
bidders from developed and developing coun- consultancy services for small and medium scale
tries have the opportunity to compete in provid- industry\. It has an impressive performance
ing the goods and works financed by the Bank; record in training, and other services are getting
and finally, the Bank is interested in encourag- under way, even though it has lost a number of
ing the development of local contractors and experienced trainers to the private sector\. The
manufacturers in the borrowing country\. Every experience of KOSGEB suggests that, in a
effort, therefore, should be made by the Bank situation of acute shortage of industrial skills, an
and the Borrower to maintain these principles in internal brain-drain may be unavoidable\. To
Bank-financed procurement\. minimize the loss to the institution, a program
should be in place, with the appropriate finan-
9\. Enrollments in all the project TICs have cial incentives, for the returnees from overseas
apparently met or exceeded their targets, but training to train others locally\.
the statistical information is beset by interpreta-
tional difficulties which cannot be resolved 12\. The overall experience of YOK and
because of inadequacies in reporting routines\. KOSGEB suggests that technical and vocational
Data gathering and processing should be refined training programs are more effective if there is
so that planners and managers may have accu- a strong and positive link with industry, and the
rate and meaningful statistical information on link, once established, should be nurtured to
which to base their policy and operational ensure continuing support and to advance the
decisions\. sustainability of the TTCs\.
10\. Despite its failure to achieve its institu-
tional development objectives, YOK appears to
have made an important contribution to middle-
level manpower development in Turkey\. In
addition to meeting manpower supply targets,
YOK was able to draw the attention of industry
and students to the existence of quality training
institutions\. Teaching staff who benefitted from
overseas fellowships, are highly motivated and
self-confident\. The experience suggested that a
quality-improvement strategy should combine
the provision of better facilities and equipment
with systematic staff training to acquaint staff
with new approaches to the use of those facili-
ties and equipment, because a well-equipped
and adequately staffed and efficiently managed
training institution could have a demonstration
effect far beyond its immediate environment\.
t
PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
TURKEY
INDUSTRIAL TRAINING PROJECT (LOAN 2399-TU)
L PROJECT BACKGROUND
Introduction
1\.1 The main objective of Bank lending for the education and training sector in Turkey was
to support the Government's policy to improve industrial productivity which had been declining in
the late 1970s\. The causes of low industrial productivity included: (a) the lack of an appropriate
industrial framework for training programs, resulting in poor coverage and quality of training; (b) little
or no financial incentive for employers to provide training; and (c) low wages and salaries because
of state control, resulting in a shortage of industrial training instructors\.
Main Sectoral Issues
1\.2 Bank findings confirmed industry reports that Turkey was short of well-trained
technicians, particularly in export industries which required high standards of quality control, modern
production techniques and specialized machinery\. Bank estimates for 1985-95 showed that manpower
demands would exceed supply of engineers, technicians, skilled and semi-skilled workers\.
1\.3 There were three main reasons for the expected manpower shortages: (a) predisposition
of the majority of secondary school graduates of the academic orientation of the education system
towards university education; (b) limited opportunities for pre-service industrial training of semi-
skilled and skilled workers; and (c) inadequate technician training prograM both quantitatively and
qualitatively\. These problems were compounded by labor migration, mainly to Western Europe\. In
1982, an estimated one million Turks, representing 5 percent of the labor force, were working abroad\.
Government Industrial Training Policy
1\.4 The Government had a three-pronged policy, which was considered "reasonable" by the
Bank: (a) to improve the effectiveness of existing programs by linking them directly to the needs of
industry through cooperative programs with local industry; (b) to increase the provision of industrial
training through a national system for training services to assist small-scale enterprises; and (c) to
establish an appropriate institutional framework for industrial training and a legal basis for training
levies on all industrial employers to ensure financial support and to encourage the private sector to
carry out more training (SAR, para\. 1\.15)\.
-2-
Project Objectives and Scope
1\.5 The Industrial Training Project was designed in accordance with the Government strategy
to improve productivity and maintain high growth rates for manufactured exports\. The main
objectives of the project were (SAR, paras\. 2\.01-2\.02):
(a) To strengthen the institutional capacity of YOK and SEGEM to provide industrial
training programs;
(b) To alleviate technician scarcity in industry by assisting the development of pre-service
technician training programs;
(c) To improve industrial productivity by developing and expanding SEGEM's in-service, on-
the-job, industrial training programs, and to establish a national industrial training
system; and
(d) To improve the quality of staff responsible for economic and social statistics, with the
long-term purpose of facilitating the management of the economy\. jJ
Project Components
1\.6 The project was to be implemented by three agencies: YOK, SEGEM (which was
subsequently given an upscaled legal status and became KOSGEB), and SIS\. The project
components under each of these agencies are summarized as follows:
A\. Under Y("K
(a) Eight pilot TTCs were to be established, with equipment, furniture and minor
refurbishing, by converting eight existing Vocational Schools of Higher Education
(VSHE)\. These TTCs, to be responsible for pre-service training, would provide 2,600
training places by 1990/91 and graduate 1,200 trainees annually by 1991/92 (SAR, para\.
2\.06)\.
(b) Curriculum development in 12 fields of specialization was to be undertaken at the TTCs
in Izmir and Istanbul with technical assistance (SAR, paras\. 2\.07-2\.09)\.
(c) Staff development would be carried out to meet short- and long-term needs\. Short-term
needs of the TTCs would be met by the existing 16 core and specialist subject
instructors, and 156 new instructors would be trained under a fellowship program\. To
meet long-term needs, an in-service program would be carried out at Izmir to upgrade
new and existing staff teaching in the TTCs\. This program would cater to the additional
/ The SAR included objective (d) as part of (c), but it is the view of this Audit that objective (d), which is a small but
important component to facilitate the management of the economy, should not be combined with (c)\.
-3-
staff requirements of the eight TECs in the project and the other TTCs as the program
developed (SAR, paras\. 2\.10-2\.12)\.
(d) Strengthening the TTC management system\. a major objective of YOK, would be
achieved with expert services (including a technical education planner, an equipment
procurement and facilities planner, and a specialist in monitoring, evaluation and
educational management), and short-term overseas fellowships for 18 YOK and senior
TTC management staff\. To ensure the appropriate expansion of YOK technician
training facilities, expert services would be used to carry out feasibility and pre-
investment studies (SAR, para\. 2\.13)\.
B\. Under SEGEM
(e) A framework for a National Industrial Training System would be developed through
SEGEM which would be provided with overseas fellowship training, and teaching
materials and equipment, and expert services in planning of industrial training systems,
manpower economics, industrial training, training standards and accreditation, and
finance, management, and information systems (SAR, para\. 2\.16)\.
(f) Program development\. expansion\. and extension would be assisted by the provision of
expert services and fellowship training to enable SEGEM to expand its coverage,
improve the quality of the training programs, and increase the number of participants
in the program in management, technology, and production techniques from 2,500 in
1982 to about 4,450 by 1988\. The number of participants in the program for technician
and supervisory level staff would increase from about 400 annually in 1982 to about
2,000 by 1988\. The capacity of SEGEM to develop in-service and pre-service training
programs for instructors in public sector and private sector training institutions would
be increased by doubling its staff from 50 to 100 (SAR, paras\. 2\.17 and 2\.21)\.
(g) SEGEM would initiate a cost recovery system, aimed at recouping not less than 20
percent of direct costs by the end of 1986, increasing each year thereafter by a
reasonable percentage in consultation with the Bank (Loan Agreement, dated April 16,
1984, Article III, Section 3\.03)\. SEGEM would also maintain its monitoring and
evaluation system, involving both follow-up visits in industry to monitor on-the-job
performance of course participants and surveys of industrial enterprises (Loan
Agreement, Article IV, Section 4\.02)\.
C\. Under SIS
(h) The project would strengthen SIS with the provision of overseas training to 55 staff
members in economic statistics, research methods, and technical operations\.
-4-
Project Cost and Financing
1\.7 Total project costs were estimated at TL 12\.9 billion, or US$44\.3 million equivalent,
including contingencies\. Local costs were estimated at TL 2\.225 billion (US$7\.63 million equivalent),
and foreign costs at TL 10\.724 billion (US$36\.79 million equivalent)\. The Bank loan of US$36\.8
million equivalent was to finance the foreign exchange component and the front-end fee of US$0\.7
million, and the Government, the balance of project costs (SAR, para\. 3\.09, Table 3\.1)\.
Expctd Benefits
1\.8 The main project benefits were expected to include the following: (a) enhancement of
the manufacturing and exporting industries; (b) the institutional development of the two key industrial
training agencies, YOK and SEGEM; (c) improvement of industrial productivity; and (d) more
effective management of the economy\. The quantifiable indicators would be the projected annual
output of TTC graduates from 940 in 1989 to 1,230 from 1992 onward, representing about 10 per
cent of annual demand at that time\. About 164 technician instructors for the TTCs were expected
to be trained through fellowships\. The quality of industrial training would be raised through the
development of curricula and training materials, the establishment of an in-service staff development
program, and strengthening of the management of the new TTCs (SAR, paras\. 4\.01-4\.03)\.
1\.9 All the above would depend on the most important benefit of all: the establishment of
a local capability through YOK and SEGEM to develop and sustain a national industrial training
system, including SEGEM's capacity to provide effective consultancy services to local industries on
new technologies to increase productivity, and to maintain a sustainable level of cost recovery\.
IL PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
Project Management and Implementation Experience
2\.1 Overall, project implementation was delayed by about six months\. Project start-up was
two months behind schedule while waiting for a Ministerial Decree to ratify the Loan Agreement
with the Government and the Project Agreement with Y6K The project activities under Y6K
started almost immediately, but those under SEGEM suffered protracted delays due basically to the
uncertainty of its legal status, which was finally upgraded in April 1990, and SEGEM became
KOSGEB (Small and Medium Industry Development Organization)\. The fellowship program under
SIS was delayed by the shortage of qualified candidates for overseas training\. Further details on
implementation experience are presented below and by the PCR (paras\. 8-10)\.
Project Changes
2\.2 Of the eight TEC sites, Antalya, a small city on the Mediterranean coast, was replaced
in mid-1986 by Malatya, an industrial city in east-central Turkey\. There were two main reasons for
-5-
the change: there was more industry in Malatya than in Antalya, and the buildings in Antalya were
not yet finished\.
2\.3 Soon after loan effectiveness, it was decided not to proceed with the establishment of
the in-service staff development program at Izmir because it proved difficult to implement\. It was
also decided that the Second Industrial Training Project would develop the in-service teacher training
through the three existing Faculties of Technical Education (FTEs) and one Faculty of Vocational
Education (FVE), collectively referred to as Faculties of Technical and Vocational Education
(FTVEs)\.
Implementation of the Main Project Components
A\. Activities under YOK
2\.4 The eight pilot TICs were duly established\. They are listed in Table 2\.1, which indicates
the notation used in the loan documentation, the proper name, and the name of the associated
university\.
Table 2\.1: Technician Training Centers and Associated Universities
Notation Proper Name Univ\. Campus Associated University
V,ankiri Cankiri TTC No Ankara University
Diizce Dfizce TTC No Istanbul University
Iskenderun Iskenderun TIC No Cukurova University
Istanbul Teknik Bilimler TTC Same campus Istanbul University
Izmir Izmir TTC Same campus Dokuz Eylul University
Kirikkale Kirikkale TTC No Ankara University
Konya Teknik Bilimler TTC Same campus Selcuk University
Malatya Malatya TTC Same town Inonu University
2\.5 Enrollments\. The total number of applicants for places in the post-secondary education
system is substantially higher than the number of places\. Each year, some 900,000 school leavers
apply for a total of some 200,000 places\. The highest achievers typically apply for and are accepted
into the academic programs\. Nevertheless, the large number of applicants in total assures a sizable
pool of qualified and talented candidates for the TTCs to select from\. Enrollments in the 8 pilot
TTCs during the period 1986/87-1990/91, by program, are shown in Table 2\.2, and more detailed
figures are shown in Appendix 1\. By 1990/91, total annual enrollment in the pilot TTCs had reached
6,750, more than twice the level envisaged in the SAR (para\. 2\.06)\. The annual number of graduates
had reached 1,346, slightly exceeding the level envisaged\. About 90 percent of students in the TICs
come from industrial high schools\. There are 172 teachers to meet the instructional needs of these
students\.
-6-
Table 2\.2: Total Output of All Programs, 1990/91, by Program
Enrollments Failed Exams
Drop
TTC Year Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Grads\. Outs
Electrical Engin\. 488 718 1,206 56 128 184 231 84
Industrial Elec\. 232 332 564 27 32 59 135 53
Instrum\. & Control 278 329 607 53 61 114 69 33
Telecommunications 248 354 602 36 62 98 98 43
Mechanical Engin\. 750 1,007 1,757 87 106 193 396 126
Agriculture Mech\. 100 120 220 19 11 30 31 10
Air Con\. & Refrig\. 285 325 610 41 55 96 134 32
Foundry 51 103 154 0 0 0 29 13
Civil Engineering 261 409 670 46 72 118 130 49
Computer Programming 90 117 207 0 27 27 59 9
Petrochemical Program 61 92 153 0 0 0 34 14
Grand Total 2,844 3,906 6,750 365 554 919 1,346 466
2\.6 Some explanation is necessary to understand the above enrollment figures\. First, they
include a petrochemical program not included in the original project, but that explains only 153
students and 14 graduates\. Second, the pressure of both social demand and industry demand has led
to the use of many cases of double-shifting\. Third, there is the problem of non-attending enrollees\.
These are students who are enrolled, perhaps have attended one or two years, but have not passed
the examination\. Students have the right to remain registered for 4 years even though the programs
are designed as 2-year courses\. Apparently this practice is to delay the military draft\. In the
published statistics, the attending students are not separated from the non-attending students, thus
inflating the enrollment figures\. Estimates of the number of non-attending students vary from a few
percentage points to upward of 30 percent\. Fourth, the published statistics do not include repeating
students\. The evidence supplied for drop-outs does not allow for a separation of data for Year 1 and
Year 2\.
2\.7 Gender Distribution\. The published enrollment statistics do not provide information on
gender distribution, but data provided by Cankiri TTC suggests wide dispersion between programs,
as shown in Table 2\.3\. Women make up one fifth of the enrollment at large, but their proportion
by program ranges from a low of one percent for mechanical engineering to a high of 60 percent for
administration and management\. Konya TTC reported that an estimated 10 percent of the student
body were women, but no detailed statistics are available\.
-7-
Table 2\.3: Distribution of Male and Female Students at Vankiri TTC,
199192, by Program
Year 1 Year 2 Total
N % N % N %
Program F M F F M F F M F
Accounting 25 22 53 27 41 40 52 63 45
Administration & Management 39 18 68 28 26 52 67 44 60
Air con\. and refrigeration 16 26 38 15 46 25 31 72 30
Civil engineering 6 38 14 10 66 13 16 104 13
Electrical engineering 6 60 9 3 58 5 9 118 7
Industrial electronics 6 43 12 11 70 14 17 113 13
Instrumentation & control 3 31 9 8 36 18 11 67 14
Mechanical engineering 0 80 0 1 109 1 1 189 1
Telecommunications 7 35 17 7 39 15 14 74 16
Total 108 353 23 110 491 18 218 844 21
Source: Cankiri TTC, 1992
2\.8 Fellowship Program\. In the overseas fellowship program, 195 TTC teachers received a
total of 1,335 months of training abroad\. During the academic year 1991/92, YOK conducted a study
of the retention and loss of trained instructional personnel in the project TTCs\. Almost all the
instructional personnel at the pilot TTCs during the project -- both those employed at the start of
the project and those recruited during the project -- received training overseas, financed through the
project\. Some fellowships included training in equipment maintenance at the manufacturing plant
for one of the major suppliers of laboratory equipment\. Additional information is given in Appendix
2\.
2\.9 Retention of Trained Teachers\. Of the teachers trained abroad, 132 (68 percent)
remained and 63 had left, the former having used 797 staff months, the latter 537 staff months of
overseas training\. Those who remained had used an average of 6 staff months, and those who left,
8\.5 staff months, for their overseas training\. It may not be a coincidence that those who received
more training appeared more likely to leave than those who received less training\. There is
significant variation among the TTCs and among programs in the relative loss of personnel who had
received overseas fellowships\. For example, more than half of the teachers in computer technology
and control and instrumentation had left, while less than a fifth of the teachers of air conditioning
and refrigeration and the common core subjects had left\. Malatya TTC is still functioning under
capacity due to lack of qualified teachers\. Further details are provided in Appendix 3\.
-8-
2\.10 Access to qualified technical teachers is a general problem facing technical training
institutions\. Part-time teachers are used extensively in some TTCs\. These teachers are drawn from
industry, the universities, or wherever else they can be found\. This practice is common, especially
where school enrollments are expanding\. Although this can have disadvantages from a pedagogical
point of view, it can have the advantage of bringing into the TTCs both industrial experience and
high levels of expertise, in addition to budgetary advantages since there are no social overheads\.
2\.11 YOK is aiming at a teacher/student ratio of approximately 1/12, but it is nowhere near
that target now\. Current enrollments, adjusted for non-attending enrollees, suggest a student teacher
ratio of approximately 22\. Z/ Most teachers who leave do so reportedly to obtain a higher salary\.
TTC teachers recently received a significant pay increase when they were moved onto the university
pay scale\. Still, salaries are lower than in industry, especially in some fields, including electronics,
computer technology, and English\.
2\.12 Curriculum Development\. A substantial amount of curriculum development work was
completed\. Programs were developed in 11 fields:
(a) The Electronics Group, comprising Electrical Technology, Industrial Electronics
Technology, Telecommunications Technology, Process Control & Instrumentation
Technology;
(b) Mechanical Technology Group, including Mechanical Technology, Air Conditioning &
Refrigeration Technology, Foundry Technology, Agricultural Mechanization Technology;
(c) Civil Engineering, including Construction Technology;
(d) Computer Technology; and
(e) Petro-chemical Technology;
2\.13 As can be seen in Appendix 4, these new curricula have now been spread more widely
than the original pilot TTCs\.
2\.14 Laboratory Equipment Utilization\. Teachers interviewed by the audit mission generally
feel that the laboratory equipment provided under the project is appropriate in terms of quality and
quantity\. Initially, equipment utilization rates were low because: (f) the local agent representing the
supplier did not know how to install the equipment; (ii) many operating manuals were in English; (iii)
some instructors did not know how to use some of the equipment in classroom demonstrations or
experiments; and (iv) lesson guides for students were lacking\.
2/ Assuming the 1,346 graduates in 1991 represent 80 percent of the year 2 attending students, which in turn represents 80 per-
cent of the year 1 attending students suggests 2,103 year 1 students + 1,682 year 2 students actually attending, for a total of
3,785 attending students\. This figure, compared with 172 teachers, indicates a ratio of approximately 22\.
-9-
2\.15 All project TTCs have equipment installed, and most equipment is reported to be well-
utilized\. Many manuals have now been translated, at least in part, and translation work is continuing
slowly, on the initiative of individual teachers\. Teachers have learned to use the equipment in
teaching\. Large numbers of lesson guides are already prepared, and work is continuing\. In the
Malatya TTC, equipment and laboratory facilities are under-utilized because of teacher shortages\.
Problems that have occurred have generally been dealt with either by the supplier or by the teaching
staff\. There have been few cases of difficulty in obtaining spare parts\. The highway construction
program has not materialized, so that equipment is not yet in use\.
2\.16 In some cases, there have been disagreements concerning the proper mix of pieces of
equipment\. For example, teachers in telecommunications at one TTC complained that although they
had an adequate supply of analogue transmitters, they had only one spectrum analyzer\. Teachers
claimed that many of the exercises they wanted to do (mainly in the second year of the program)
required the use of a spectrum analyzer, and that the presence of only a single unit limited their
ability to carry out laboratory exercises\. A curriculum adviser from the university, however,
maintained that most of the exercises in fact required only a transmitter\. Transmitters are relatively
cheap, while spectrum analyzers are relatively expensive\. With proper planning, it should be possible
to accommodate all students\.
2\.17 Laboratory Facilities Utilization\. Utilization rates for individual pieces of equipment are
difficult to estimate and interpret\. Utilization rates for laboratory facilities, however, can be estimated
by the number of hours per week the facilities are in use\. The YOK Industrial Training Unit (ITU)
has carried out two laboratory facilities surveys of the TECs, in 1989 and 1991\. The results of these
surveys suggest lower than optimal utilization rates on average\. They also suggest that utilization
rates were actually lower in 1991 than 1989, as shown in Table 2\.4\. In 1989, laboratory and workshop
facilities were utilized 25 hours per week on average\. Taking 40 hours per week as a benchmark for
full utilization, this would represent 63 percent utilization\. In 1991, they were utilized 22 hours per
week on average which would represent 54 percent utilization, or a decline of approximately one
tenth\. Further details are given in Appendix 5\. Laboratory facilities are sometimes used by local
industry\. In university towns, the laboratories are sometimes used by researchers from the university\.
Table 2\.4: Weekly Utilization of Laboratory and Workshop Facilities
Mean Per Cent
Survey Hours/Week Utilization
1 25 63
2 22 54
1 & 2 Combined 24 60
Source: YOK, 1992
- 10 -
2\.18 Translation of textbooks\. Although teachers have translated many manuals for laboratory
equipment and have prepared lecture notes and other learning materials, the availability of technical
textbooks in Turkish has been a serious problem\. A translation commission has been appointed and
is ready for operation, and funds are available for covering copyright fees and printing costs\. No
funds are available for covering translation fees, however, and so the major task of translation is at
a standstill\. Meanwhile, instructors can and do write textbooks and laboratory manuals, financed by
the instructor without support or with support from the school or a publisher\.
2\.19 Institutional Development\. The project fell short of achieving institutional development
at YOK, because at project completion it had only limited capability to plan, administer, and manage
technical pre-service training\. This was due in part to the lack of Turkish staff to work with the
foreign experts under the technical assistance programs\. The statistical reporting is inadequate for
managing a technical and vocational education and training system, since even basic internal efficiency
indicators cannot be calculated\. For purposes of reporting to the Bank, statistical reports with
English captions and sufficient text in English to allow for basic interpretation would be required\.
Such reports should also provide information on gender distribution of enrollments\.3/
2\.20 However, although the project fell short of achieving institutional development at the
central level, it did succeed at the level of the individual TTCs where facilities are in use, teachers
are in place, enrollments are high, and students appear to be learning\. The successful institutional
development at this level is due in large measure to the overseas training, under the project, of TTC
teachers and senior management personnel\.
2\.21 Cost Recovery Cost Sharing Today, TTCs sometimes sell short-cycle courses to
industry, and this practice is being encouraged by YOK\. Industry shows some sign of interest\. There
is a central revolving fund intended to cover the costs of training courses sold to industry\. A TTC
may draw upon this fund in order to provide training services or training consultancies to a firm, and
the firms then pay into the fund\. The degree of cost recovery varies\. The notion of sglng training
services is not widely accepted, since it is even written into the constitution that education is to be
free\.
2\.22 Large firms are interested in training\. Often they provide their own training but also
want services from training institutions\. Medium-size firms look for support in training needs
assessment as well as in training\. Small-size firms generally have low demand for training services,
although they often accept apprentices\. Institutions sometimes share training facilities with industry
during evenings or weekends\.
2\.23 Some TTCs are authorized to give quality certificates for civil engineering tasks on behalf
of the Turkish Standards Institute\. For these services they charge market rates\. Some TTCs sell
materials testing, particle testing, or other testing services to industry\. TTCs may engage in
production for sale\. Revenues from such activities accrue partly to teachers, partly to the schools,
and partly to the revolving fund\. Students may not be remunerated\. Incentives to engage in
3/ See Borrower comments in Attachment A on "Institution Building" and "Statistical Reports"\.
- 11 -
production are not strong, and thus most TTCs do little or no production work\. For example, in
Diizce there has been no production work; in Izmir some; in Iskenderun, some training services have
been provided together with the steel mill\.
2\.24 Student fees are currently 50,000 TL (about US$8\.00) per year for tuition, which can
be compared with university tuition fees of 120,000 TL (about US$18\.00) per semester\. For students
living on-campus there is a fee of 76,500 TL (about US$11\.00) per quarter for dormitory housing\.
Private housing alternatives are usually available, but at a considerably higher cost\. Tuition fees are
symbolic only, as there is no attempt at cost recovery\. An example may be given from Konya TTC,
as shown in Table 2\.5\.
2\.25 Advisory Committees\. As of 1990, all TTCs have Advisory Committees, which meet at
least once per year\. YOK requests the names of members and the minutes of the meetings\. A series
of workshops was held for managers and assistant managers on how Advisory Committees should be
constituted and should work\. These committees are gradually beginning to think in managerial terms\.
In addition to Advisory Committees, some TTCs also have subject committees\.
Table 2\.5: Approximate Cost Recovery Estimate for Konya TIC Annual
Budget, 1991/92 (Million TL)
Source of Revenue Amount Percent
Medical & Dental Faculties: Machine repair 3\.5 1\.3
Machine rental 1\.0 0\.4
Production work 0\.5 0\.2
Student tuition 5\.0 1\.9
Total cost recovery 10\.0 3\.7
Government grant, excluding salaries 30\.0 11\.1
Government grant, salaries 230\.0 85\.2
Total grant 260\.0 96\.3
Total budget 270\.0 100\.0
Source: Konya TTC, 1992
- 12 -
2\.26 Monitoring and Evaluation\. Within Y6K there is a Planning and Development Unit
responsible for follow-up monitoring and evaluation\. 4/ This unit does follow-up evaluations of
students' industrial attachment period but does not do regular tracer studies\. The individual TTCs,
which are required to conduct follow-up evaluation, also do not carry out regular tracer studies\.
Statistical information collected is wanting in reliability (paras\. 3\.23 - 3\.24)\.
B\. Activities under SEGEM
2\.27 ILO Consultants\. The consulting agency for this component of the Project was the LO\./
The major objectives of the project were to: (i) design the framework of a national industrial training
system; (ii) strengthen SEGEM's program; and (iii) establish an industrial training consultancy facility\.
Ultimately these objectives were realized when SEGEM was accorded an upscaled status and became
KOSGEB\.
2\.28 In total, 24 international consultants served 99\.5 months, and 12 national consultants
served 54\.8 months\. In the designing of the framework of a national industrial training system, the
15 consultants assigned to the project produced 14 reports\. The 6 consultants assigned to program
development assisted in developing curricula and training materials in training methodology, training
aids, export marketing, and industrial engineering\. Ten consultants assigned to the task of developing
the industrial training consultancy worked with their counterparts to develop training curricula and
learning materials in the various technological areas and either to develop or to review equipment
for procurement by SEGEM under the project\. They produced 12 reports, including suggestions for
an industrial training consultancy facility\.
2\.29 A total of 49 short-term fellowships for training and study tours abroad were provided,
amounting to 1,210 fellowship days or 40\.3 fellowship months\. Further details of these fellowships
can be found in Appendix 6\.
2\.30 Organization\. It was originally expected that legislation forming KOSGEB would be
passed in 1983, but after a long delay it was established by Law No\. 3624, passed April 12, 1990, as
the Small and Medium Industry Development Organization (SMIDO in English, KOSGEB in
Turkish) under the Ministry of Industry and Trade\. This legislation incorporated the Small Industry
Development Organization (KOSGET) and the Industrial Training and Development Center
(SEGEM)\. Its aim is the upgrading of the effectiveness and expanding the share of small and
medium scale industrial enterprises in meeting the social and economic needs of the country, of
enhancing their competitive capacity, and ensuring industrial integration in conformity with economic
4/ See most recent publication: "The Council of Higher Education & World Bank, I\. Industrial Training Project Schools: Follow-
up and Evaluation\." Ankara: YOK, June 1992\.
5/ Project Findings and Recommendations\. IBRB Industrial Training Project\. Geneva: ILO, International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development\. 1990\.
- 13 -
development\. Small firms typically have 50 br fewer employebs, while medium firms typically have
between 50 and 150 employees\.
2\.31 KOSGEB in turn will establish a host of centers and other institutions in order to carry
out its mandate: development centers specialized in specific fields of technology, quality improvement
centers, physical testing and analysis laboratories, common facilities workshops, consultancy centers,
technology centers or "technoparks", marketing centers, information centers, investment guidance
centers, and training centers\.
2\.32 By the time of the establishment of KOSGEB, there were three training centers of
excellence (KOSEM), and a fourth is to be established soon\. In total there are currently 28 centers
country-wide, with a total staff of 340, of whom 55 deal with planning, coordination, and management\.
It is planned that, by 1993, the total number of centers will increase to 38\.
2\.33 The Ankara Small and Medium Scale Industry Training Center (SMITC in English),
equipped with project funds, became operational only in 1991\. It has a guest house with 25 (soon
50) private rooms for participants\. Its library facilities are used mostly by students and trainers from
industry\.
2\.34 Cooperation with YOK and MOE is informal, on a case-by-case, person-to-person basis,
and does not go through YOK or MOE centrally\. This has the advantage of keeping the
organization lean and flexible\.
2\.35 Training and Other Activities\. Courses offered range typically from half a day to fifteen
days, usually half-days or 20-30 hours per week\. Courses are usually offered for 10 or more
participants\. More training is done outside the training centers than at the centers\. Courses are
offered on the basis of demand, as measured through experience, personal contacts, coordination with
trade unions and industry associations, and training needs surveys\. The most useful source is face-to-
face contact\.
2\.36 During the calendar year 1991, KOSGEB held 225 seminars or courses with some 5,225
participants for a total duration of 1,950 instructor-hours and 42,745 participant-hours\. 6/ In the
first two quarters of 1992, 127 seminars with 2,650 participants have been held\. In the past, tailor-
made courses were developed, but currently packaged programs are being prepared\. Many courses
give no certificates\. Some give certificates from the Middle East Technical University, others from
the Turkish Standards Institute\. In addition to training activities, consultancies and physical testing
and analysis services are also carried out\.
2\.37 Equipment and Materials\. Procurement of audiovisual and laboratory equipment was
handled through the ILO contract\. Most of the equipment procured under the project has been
&/ Atilla S60t\. "The Role of SMIDO in Technology Development, Management, and Technical Training in Turkey"\.
Prepared for the Eureka Seminar on Small and Medium Industry\. SMIDO: 1992\.
- 14 -
distributed to the new centers, and there are plans to equip a mobile training unit\. Extensive use is
made of the ILO instructional materials for small and medium scale industry\.
2\.38 Supply of Instructors\. After the period abroad, the instructors receiving short-term
fellowships returned, wrote specifications for procurement, and set up the laboratories\. After the
project, many of the fellows left for industry\. Today instructors are typically hired on a course-by-
course basis as needed\. At the Ankara training center, 1/3 of the instructional personnel are regularly
employed instructors, and 2/3 are brought in from outside on a course-by-course basis\. Instructors
often come from industry, including some former SEGEM instructors who had received overseas
fellowships under the project and who later left for industry\. The departure of trained instructors
represents a loss to the organization, although not necessarily a loss for the country from a
macroeconomic perspective\. Management regards hiring instructors on a course-by-course basis as
economically efficient Aside from short promotional courses and package courses given frequently,
course offerings are given irregularly on the basis of demand\. Only by recruiting instructors on a
course-by-course basis can the organization remain lean and at the same time offer highly qualified
specialist instructors\. The practice also yields the benefit of promoting close linkages with industry
and a knowledge of current practices in industry\.
2\.39 Cost Recovery\. By early 1986, the level of cost recovery had reached 20 percent, and
by the final year of SEGEM, the level of subsidy had fallen to approximately 50 percent\. Now, under
KOSGEB, the subsidy has started at 80 percent\. This may seem like a retrogression, but it is a
reflection of deeper changes in the organization\.
2\.40 In principle, SEGEM served both state and private industry, but in practice it provided
training mainly for large industry, especially for state economic enterprises (SEEs)\. KOSGEB aims
at providing training services to private industry, with industry paying a high proportion of the costs\.
The high level of subsidy currently provided is viewed as a way of promoting the concept of state
agency providing training services for small- and medium scale private industry on a cost-sharing basis\.
The subsidy will gradually be reduced to 45-50 percent, which the Government regards as appropriate
for their purpose\.
2\.41 The management of KOSGEB and KOSEM are committed to increasing levels of cost-
recovery and to making cost-recovery a part of the organizational culture\. Consultancy services carry
lower levels of subsidies than pure training services\. Laboratory tests are carried out at market rates\.
Short courses (half-day) are seen as promotional and are provided at no charge\. They are often
followed by requests for longer courses\. Longer courses are provided at the currently subsidized
rates\. Courses provided at the enterprise premises are charged at a lower rate than courses provided
at the training center\.
2\.42 As in the case of YOK, SEGEM fell short of achieving its institutional development
objective, having at project completion only limited capability to plan, administer, and manage
technical in-service and industry-based training\. This was due in part to the lack of Turkish staff to
work with the foreign experts under the technical assistance programs\. On the other hand,
KOSGEB, established in April 1990 and operational since 1991, offers good promise of developing
institutional capability along the lines envisaged at appraisal\.
- 15 -
C\. Activities under SIS
2\.43 Fellowships were provided to 41 members of SIS for 207 staff-months of training in
statistics at the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the International
Statistical Program Center in the USA\. Language training had been provided in advance to maximize
the benefit to be derived from the training\. Of the 41 staff members who received fellowships, only
5 had left the SIS by project completion\.
IL FINDINGS AND ISSUES
Overview
3\.1 Implementation was generally satisfactory, although having YOK, SEGEM, and SIS
separately carry out their respective project components, without any agency entrusted with project
oversight responsibilities, resulted in a lack of coordination in financial reporting\. While YOK started
implementation quickly with contracted technical assistance, SEGEM experienced long delays caused
in part by its uncertain legal status, in part by internal disputes over the technical assistance work
program\.
3\.2 The project was implemented as planned, with the exception of TTC instructor in-service
training\. Total project cost was US$52\.44 million equivalent, 18 percent higher than expected, and
99 percent of the Loan was disbursed\. The Closing Date was December 31, 1990, six months later
than originally planned\.
Fmdings and Lssons
3\.3 Conflict of Interest in Procurement YOK awarded one contract to supply 25 computer
systems, valued at US$2\.5 million equivalent, to Data General Corporation (a U\.S\. firm), which was
affiliated to a local firm BILTEK Co\. Ltd\.; and another for technical assistance, valued at US$2\.7
million equivalent, to a consortium comprising TEKSIS Co\. Ltd\., a local firm, the British Council, and
General Electric\. In October 1988, Honeywell Bull, an international firm, through its local affiliate
ELTEK Co\. Ltd\., addressed a letter to the Bank, alleging a "misuse of the loans" under Loan 2399-
TU and Loan 2922-TU (the Second Industrial Training Project), on grounds that the local
representative of Data General, BILTEK Co\. Ltd\., as well as TEKSIS Co\. Ltd\., were fully owned by
the Hacettepe University and Hospital foundations, which were founded and directed by the head
of YOK, the main beneficiary of the two projects\.
3\.4 The Bank responded in November 1988 to the Honeywell Bull complaint, stating that
it was satisfied that, on the basis of information supplied by YOK, ICB procedures were "correctly
followed" and that "there was no evidence of any violation of ICB rules\." This explanation was not
accepted by Honeywell Bull, which pursued the matter with a formal complaint to the Treasury of
- 16 -
the Government of Turkey\. The crux of Honeywell Bull's concern was the inter-locking
arrangements between YOK and BILTEK The allegation was that the ICB bidding for the supply
of the computer systems was in fact local procurement procedures, and some of the "approved"
bidders were other companies wholly owned by the same two foundations, or were in partnership with
a third also directed by the head of YOK\.
3\.5 The Bank in April 1989 sought Government clarification on the matter, particularly the
allegation that "local shopping procedures" had been used to procure the 25 computer systems\.
Evidently there was no official response until March 1990, when YOK informed the Bank that it had
"carefully reviewed" its procurement process and found "no sign of contravention" of Bank
procurement guidelines, citing the Bank's earlier statement that "there was no evidence of violation
of ICB rules\." YOK, however, admitted that TEKSIS and BILTEK were indeed companies
established by the above-mentioned foundations, but denied that TEKSIS received any contract award
from the project\. Technically, this may have been correct, but as TEKSIS was a major partner of the
consortium that administered the TA component, it was clear that BILTEK was a beneficiary of the
contract\.
3\.6 In August 1990, the Bank resolved that, under the First Industrial Training Project, the
contract between YOK and TEKSIS contained nothing to prevent BILTEK from being awarded a
contract downstream\. However, as Loan 2399-TU was closed, no further action was called for\.
Nevertheless, the conflict of interest problem has also affected the Second Industrial Training Project
(Loan 2399-TU, approved in 1988) and the National Education Project (Loan 3192-TU, approved
in 1990)\. The Bank has excluded TEKSIS, in the case of Loan 2399-TU, and the subsidiary firms
of Bilkent University Holding Company, in the case of Loan 3192-TU, from bidding for goods, civil
works, or services in any Bank-financed projects implemented by YOK
3\.7 The audit should point out that the Bank views with serious concern any hint or overt
allegation of conflict of interest in the procurement of goods and services\. This concern springs from
the provisions of the Procurement Guidelines which, quoting the Bank's Articles of Agreement, state
that, among other things, the Bank should ensure that the proceeds of a loan be used with due
attention to economy and efficiency in the execution of the project and without regard to political
considerations\. Arising from these principles are three basic considerations\. First, the need for
economy and efficiency means ensuring that the Borrower "gets the best value for the money" by
obtaining the lowest evaluated bid from truly competitive bidding\. Second, it is in the interest of the
Bank, as a cooperative international institution, to give all eligible bidders from developed and
developing countries an opportunity to compete fairly in providing the goods and works financed by
the Bank\. Finally, as a development institution, the Bank is interested in encouraging the
development of local contractors and manufacturers in the borrowing country (Operational Directive,
March 1989, paras\. 2-5)\.
3\.8 Lessons\. It should be recalled that, during project start-up, the Bank had, in fact,
objected to TEKSIS being on the shortlist of eligible bidders, but conceded reluctantly at the
insistence of the Borrower to maintain TEKSIS on the short-list and approve its contracting when
it was declared a winner\. The lesson is that, to ensure an atmosphere of mutual trust, confidence
and cooperation, any perceived conflict of interest in procurement matters should be taken seriously\.
- 17 -
At the first sign or explicit allegation of any impropriety, the Bank would be prudent to investigate
thoroughly before making an announcement on the matter\. The Borrower, on its part, should ensure
that the letter and the spirit of the Bank's Procurement Guidelines and Articles of Agreement are
strictly observed to facilitate trouble-free implementation\.
3\.9 Enrollments\. At the time of planning the project, there were 53 post-secondary
vocational training institutes, of which 8 were selected for upgrading into pilot Technician Training
Centers\. By 1992 there were 94 such upgraded institutions, and a Second Industrial Training Project
for upgrading an additional 20 TTCs (Loan No\. 2922-TU)\. Actual greatly exceeded planned
enrollments in the project TTCs, although the statistical information is beset by interpretational
difficulties which cannot be resolved because of inadequacies in the reporting routines\. Iesson: Data
gathering, collation and interpretation should be improved so that planners and managers may have
accurate and meaningful statistical information on which to base their policy and operational
decisions\.
3\.10 Instructional Materials\. The availability of Turkish language teaching and learning
materials has been and still is a serious problem in the TTCs\. Although the development of curricula
and training materials is an important component, the project did not provide funds for the
procurement or production of those materials\. Since such costs would be eminently fundable, this
would appear to have been an oversight at appraisal\. Lesson: In projects involving the development
of instructional materials, the costs should be included as part of the project, the necessary funding
provided, and a cost recovery scheme put in place to assure a sustainable program of up-to-date
instructional materials for the TTCs\.
3\.11 Y6K Despite the problems, difficulties, and delays, the project appears to have had
an important impact on middle-level manpower development in Turkey\. In addition to meeting the
original manpower supply targets (enrollment and graduates), the project appears to have achieved
something more difficult to quantify, viz\., visibility and recognition, drawing the attention of industry
and students to the existence of quality training institutions\. Firms willingly opened their doors to
TTC students for industrial attachment\. They came to the TTC open-house days and were impressed
with the quality of the equipment and the student work they saw\. They became interested in the
students, and they regarded TTC students as a priority pool of middle-level manpower\.
3\.12 Students too became aware of the existence of a kind of school that stood out from the
rest in terms of quality and opportunity\. They apply to these schools in preference to other post-
secondary technical institutions\. The TTCs can thus be very selective in their intake\.
3\.13 The staff also, with their overseas fellowships and modern facilities and equipment, are
highly motivated and self-confident\. As one teacher expressed it: "In the beginning, there were empty
rooms, no equipment, and forgotten teachers\. This project has made great improvements\."
3\.14 The overseas fellowships were also highly appreciated for what they gave in terms of
insights, examples, and ideas\. As one teacher, who had been sent to England to study technical
education, put it: "When I went to England on fellowship and made a tour of technical education
institutions, at first I was disappointed\. I thought, 'What is so special about this? We could do this
- 18 -
in Turkey too\.' Then I realized that was the whole point\. I returned and implemented in my school
much of what I had seen on the study tour\."
3\.15 Lessons\. A quality-improvement strategy should combine the provision of better facilities
and equipment with staff training to acquaint them with new approaches to the use of those facilities
and equipment\. A well-equipped, adequately staffed and efficiently managed training institution could
have a demonstration effect far beyond its immediate environment\. Furthermore, although
institutional development failed to materialize centrally, it did take place in individual TTCs as a
result of the overseas training of teachers and senior management staff and the influx of modern
machines and equipment for training\. This combination of physical and human capital yielded a
synergy, attracting the attention and interest of students and employers alike\.
3\.16 KOSGEB\. Although there were considerable delays in implementing the technical
assistance and establishing the organization which has become KOSGEB (para\. 2\.31), it would appear
that the full impact of the project is now beginning to be experienced\. A wide range of training and
consultancy services for small and medium scale industry are placed under a single, modern, semi-
autonomous organization\. KOSGEB already has an impressive performance record in training, and
other services are now getting under way\. Although a number of trainers have left the organization
and gone into industry, this does not necessarily mean a total loss\. It may represent an economically
efficient solution to the problem of finding highly specialized and qualified instructors with industrial
expenence\.
3\.17 Lessons\. The experience with KOSGEB suggests that, in a situation where there is an
acute shortage of industrial skills, an internal brain-drain appears unavoidable\. To minimize the loss
to the institution concerned, a program should be in place, with the appropriate financial incentives,
for the returnees from overseas training to train others locally\. The overall experience of KOSGEB
and YOK suggests that technical and vocational training programs are more effective if there is a
strong and positive link with industry, to expose students to the possibilities of alternative careers
from good quality post-secondary education and training outside the traditional universities, and to
acquaint private firms with the quality of training provided by publicly funded institutions such as the
TTCs\. The link, once established, should be nurtured to ensure continuing support and to advance
the sustainability of the TTCs\.
3\.18 In-Service Staff Development In-service staff development was to have been carried
out at Izmir, initially to upgrade new and existing staff teaching in the pilot TTCs, and later the other
Vocational Schools of Higher Education (VSHE) which eventually were to be upgraded as TTCs\.
Since the Faculties of Technical and Vocational Education,which provide pre-service training for
technical teachers, do not offer in-service training, the deletion of the in-service staff development
component has left the country without the capacity to conduct the in-service training needed for
upgrading the remaining VSHEs, at least until the facilities are established under the on-going Second
Industrial Training Project\. Lesson: When a new layer of training institutions is created, it is
important at an early stage to provide cost-effective means of staffing the institutions with teachers
who have the required qualifications\.
- 19 -
Issues
3\.19 Project Design\. Management, and Supervision\. Risks in project management were to
have been minimized by mounting more frequent supervision missions during the first 18 months of
implementation (SAR, para\. 4\.07)\. A project progress review was carried out a month after loan
effectiveness, followed by a supervision mission two months later, but the next three supervision
missions took place at intervals of 10, 6 and 7 months, which could hardly be characterized as "more
frequent" than the prevailing practice\. Closer supervision might have helped to resolve or mitigate
some of the management problems that occured\. Leson: More attention should be given to the
assessment of risks a project is likely to face and to appropriate follow-up measures in supervision\.
3\.20 The experience of both YOK and SEGEM demonstrates that placing effective
responsibility for TA on the consultant firms denied the implementing agencies the opportunities to
learn from doing, which is an important process that contributes to institution building\. For that
reason, relevant institutional development -- the capability of YOK and SEGEM in coordinating
technical and vocational training, in carrying out monitoring and evaluation, and advancing policy
development -- did not take place to any appreciable degree\. Moreover, the problem persisted
through the Second Industrial Training Project\. Evidently the provision of technical assistance to aid
Y6K paradoxically undermined the achievement of the institutional development, in that Y6K
became extremely dependent on the consultants\. The audit confirms the observation of the PCR
(para\. 6) that institutional building requires the host institution to have the necessary number and
quality of counterpart staff to interact with the foreign consultants to maximize the benefits of such
technical assistance\.
3\.21 The audit also supports the recommendation of the PCR (para\. 14) that the Government
should consider appointing a Task Force to assess the role of YOK, and to evaluate the effectiveness
of the use of Bank funds for financing technical assistance in such cases\.
3\.22 The technical teacher in-service training program, to be carried out at the Izmir TTC,
was a strategic component which was cancelled to the detriment of the project\. According to the
PCR (para\. 17), one reason for the cancellation was that the teachers and the facilities would have
been overburdened if they undertook the task of in-service training in addition to the regular
functions\. The result of this cancellation was the lack of appropriate teacher training and of teaching
materials, diminishing the quality and amount of education provided by the TrCs\. This issue is being
addressed under the Second Industrial Training Project which supports a system of high-quality
technical and vocational teacher education in the four existing Faculties of Technical and Vocational
Education\.
3\.23 Retention of Teaching Staf There is a risk that training programs at the TECs might
be compromised by excessively academic orientation due to attachment of TTCs to universities\. This
risk, however, is diminished by the strong commitment of YOK and the instructional staff of the
TTCs to make TTC training relevant to the needs of industry and by cooperative arrangements for
training with industry\. The other side of the coin is the problem of recruiting qualified teaching staff\.
Many FTVE graduates prefer to work in industry, which leads to the risk that YOK may not be able
to attract sufficient numbers to teach in TTCs\.
- 20 -
3\.24 Consideration should be given to the problem of loss of qualified and experienced TTC
teachers to industry\. Paradoxical as it may seem, there could be benefits from this loss, as some of
the teachers may be engaged in training in industry\. They may also be favorably disposed to training
and to promoting training in industry\. However, in a formal technical education institution, the costs
may outweigh the benefits\. Some solution might be found to the problem of losing teachers to
industry, by increasing teacher salaries or other benefits in order to be competitive with industry\.
This is another reason why cost recovery is needed\. More than 37 percent of the teachers recruited
under the project (54 out of 145) left for industry\. Alternatively, continuous in-service training would
be necessary to provide training to recent graduates\.
3\.25 Teacher in-service training is needed in order to protect the investment already made\.
Human capital must be updated if it is not to fall rapidly into obsolescence as technology and markets
change\. This is true not only of the technical specializations but also in language, especially in this
age of European integration\. Increasingly, technology will have international dimensions, as
machines, equipment, and processes, as well as the know-how to go with them, are either imported
or exported\.
3\.26 Monitoring and Evaluation\. The TTCs should be carrying out regular tracer studies as
a way of evaluating the outcomes of their training\. To do this for all programs each year would be
unnecessarily expensive, but regular conduct of tracer studies on a sample survey basis, rotating over
programs, would provide invaluable information for program evaluation\.
3\.27 The statistical reporting of YOK is comprehensive and looks good on the face of it\.
However, it needs further refinement - non-attending students are mixed with attending students,
which inflates enrollment figures and leads to under-estimation of graduation rates and makes a
calculation of unit costs impossible\. Attending students and non-attending students should be
separated\. Dropouts and repeaters by year should also be reported\. Information about gender
distribution should also be made available\.
3\.28 Cost Recovery and Cost Sharing& Tuition fees at TTCs currently cover around two
percent, while government grants absorb over 95 percent, of total recurrent costs\. There is reason
to consider whether it is possible and desirable to raise fees to correspond somewhat more closely
to actual costs\. There must be some parity between fees at universities and TTCs\. TTCs face high
unit costs due to the cost of machines and equipment\. In future, given rapid expansion of the system
and increases in the quantity and quality of machines and equipment, these costs will increase
dramatically if educational quality levels are to be maintained\.
3\.29 The development of KOSGEB is a major success of the Project\. If it fulfills its mandate,
it will have a major impact on the development of Turkish small and medium industry\. In the long
run, however, the viability and sustainability of its training activities are dependent on its ability to
mobilize private sector resources for training\. At its current high levels of subsidy for training
activities, its success in training will be limited by what the public purse can bear\.
3\.30 In order to avoid being completely dependent on government grants, KOSGEB will need
independent sources of funding\. If industry benefits from KOSGEB's training activities, it should also
- 21 -
bear a major portion of the costs\. Then the total amount of resources mobilized for training will rise,
the cost of training will correctly enter corporate accounting as a cost of production, and overall
efficiency will rise\. The argument that the high rate of subsidy will stimulate the interest of industry
may be valid, but its validity has a short lifetime\. Soon industry must see the value of training and
begin to bear a major proportion of training costs, or else the project will have been a failure in a
crucial aspect\. If industry does not soon see sufficient value in the training KOSGEB provides, then
it must not be relevant to their needs and should not continue\. There should be a clear timetable
for reduction of the level of subsidy\.
3\.31 Formalizing the Status of Technicians\. The concept of "technician" in Turkey can cover
a wide spectrum of meaning\. It can refer to semi-skilled or skilled technical workers\. It can also
refer to bona-fide technicians with formal, certificate- or diploma-level post-secondary technical
education, such as the ITCs provide\. These latter are called "tekniker" in Turkish\. A formal legal
clarification of the status of a "tekniker", indicating what a "tekniker" can do and what they are not
qualified to do, is needed\. This applies both in civilian life as well as in the military, in the latter
case determining who is qualified to become an officer or not\. This would in itself help to raise its
status by reducing the uncertainty as to the meaning of an investment in "tekniker" training\.
1
1
- 23 -
APPENDIX 1
OUTPUTS FROM PROJECT TRAINING PROGRAMS
Table 1: Outputs from Electrical Engineering Program
Enrollments Falled Exams
Drop
TTC Year Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Grads\. Outs
Cankiri 1986/87 31 76 107 11 2 13 33 13
1987/88 90 63 153 7 2 9 34 7
1988/89 30 53 83 1 5 6 18 6
1989/90 76 55 131 6 1 7 21 7
1990/91 61 97 158 28 1 29 35 29
Dfzce 1986/87 29 106 135 2 3 5 55 4
1987/88 18 74 92 0 0 0 51 0
1988/89 25 40 65 1 1 2 27 0
1989/90 69 36 105 0 1 1 20 6
1990/91 57 81 138 0 1 1 33 10
Iskenderun 1986/87 64 69 133 0 0 0 12 7
1987/88 90 114 204 0 0 0 54 50
1988/89 28 100 128 0 0 0 19 32
1989/90 64 77 141 0 0 0 17 10
1990/91 55 114 169 0 0 0 18 24
Istanbul 1986/87 - - - - - - - -
1987/88 - - - -
1988/89 27 - 27 - - - - 9
1989/90 60 18 78 - 8 8 10 13
1990/91 61 47 108 - 37 37 10 4
Izmir 1986/87 57 111 168 4 5 9 47 8
1987/88 96 104 200 0 2 2 61 6
1988/89 29 131 160 0 4 4 70 6
1989/90 67 80 147 11 1 12 26 6
1990/91 61 103 164 0 2 2 26 2
Kirikkale 1986/87 60 125 185 6 5 11 52 6
1987/88 31 117 148 12 3 15 52 5
1988/89 30 76 106 9 1 10 36 1
1989/90 54 59 113 3 0 3 21 0
1990/91 62 89 151 9 1 10 30 5
Konya 1986/87 - - - - - - - -
1987/88 27 - 27 8 - 8 - 5
1988/89 35 17 52 8 1 9 12 6
1989/90 66 42 108 11 0 11 12 6
1990/91 67 81 148 19 12 31 47 8
Malatya 1986/87 35 43 78 4 13 17 23 0
1987/88 61 44 105 14 21 35 15 7
1988/89 55 68 123 1 32 33 28 8
1989/90 61 86 147 5 50 55 34 8
1990/91 64 106 170 0 74 74 32 2
Total 1,953 2,702 4,655 180 289 469 1,091 326
Source: YoK, June 1992
- 24 -
APPENDIX 1
Table 2: Output from Industrial Electronics Program
Enrollments Failed Exams
Drop
TTC Year Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Grads\. Outs
Cankiri 1986/87 - - - - - - - -
1987/88 - - - - - - - -
1988/89 26 24 50 3 0 3 11 3
1989/90 50 34 84 4 1 5 14 5
1990/91 59 65 124 12 9 21 27 21
Duzce 1986/87 - - - - - - - -
1987/88 29 - 29 - - - - 5
1988/89 25 24 49 1 0 1 12 2
1989/90 39 35 74 0 1 1 28 3
1990/91 26 42 68 0 0 0 17 8
Iskenderun 1986/87 - - - - - - - -
1987/88 - - - - - - - -
1988/89 26 - 26 0 - - - 1
1989/90 32 43 75 0 0 0 11 7
1990/91 29 57 86 0 0 0 9 7
Istanbul 1986/87 - - - - - - - -
1987/88 62 - 62 0 - - - 21
1988/89 32 41 73 0 9 9 32 9
1989/90 28 23 51 0 4 4 19 2
1990/91 25 26 51 0 12 12 14 3
Izmir 1986/87 - - - - - - - -
1987/88 - -
1988/89 24 - 24 0 - - - 1
1989/90 40 23 63 0 0 0 18 2
1990/91 29 58 87 0 0 0 34 4
Kirikkale 1986/87 - - - - - - -
1987/88 26 - 26 0 - - - -
1988/89 21 26 47 5 0 5 17 1
1989/90 34 24 58 1 0 1 18 4
1990/91 29 35 64 5 0 5 9 3
Konya 1986/87 - - - - -
1987/88 28 - 28 10 - 10 - 1
1988/89 27 27 54 8 5 13 12 5
1989/90 35 38 73 7 3 10 20 3
1990/91 35 49 84 10 11 21 25 7
Total 816 694 1,510 66 55 121 347 128
Source: YoK, June 1992
Notes:
1\. Malatya has no program in industrial electronics\.
2\. In some cases, programs began with Year 1 and Year 2 students
simultaneously by transferring students from other institutions\.
- 25 -
APPENDIX 1
Table 3: Output from Instrumetation and Control Program
Enrollments Failed Exams
Drop
TTC Year Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Grads\. Outs
Cankiri 1987/88 - - - - - - -
1988/89 28 - 28 2 - 2 3 2
1989/90 37 24 61 1 0 1 19 19
1990/91 50 48 98 18 1 19 0 0
Duzce 1987/88 25 - 25 1 - 1 - 10
1988/89 28 14 42 1 0 1 5 2
1989/90 28 34 62 0 0 0 13 1
1990/91 31 48 79 2 0 2 14 3
Iskenderun 1987/88 - - - - - - - -
1988/89 29 - 29 0 - 0 - 3
1989/90 32 26 58 0 0 0 2 1
1990/91 28 55 83 0 0 0 7 12
Istanbul 1987/88 - - - - - - - -
1988/89 30 - 30 0 - 0 - 10
1989/90 29 20 49 0 8 8 12 6
1990/91 32 23 55 0 18 18 5 0
Izmir 1987/88 - - - - - - - -
1988/89 31 - 31 3 - 3 - 3
1989/90 30 25 55 2 1 3 5 3
1990/91 32 44 76 3 2 5 14 4
Kirikkale 1987/88 17 - 17 0 - 0 - 0
1988/89 27 17 44 2 0 2 7 5
1989/90 29 30 59 3 1 4 13 7
1990/91 38 36 74 5 0 5 10 4
Konya 1987/88 - - - - - - - -
1988/89 25 - 25 11 - 11 - 1
1989/90 31 22 53 15 6 21 9 0
1990/91 36 38 74 20 13 33 11 8
Malatya 1987/88 - - - - - - - -
1988/89 28 - 28 7 - 7 - 3
1989/90 36 18 54 2 3 5 12 3
1990/91 31 37 68 5 27 32 8 2
Total 798 559 1,357 103 80 183 169 112
Source: Y6K, June 1992
Note: In some cases, programs began with Year 1 and Year 2 students
simultaneously by transferring students from other institutions\.
-26-
APPENDIX 1
Table 4: Output from Telecommunicallons Program
Enrollments Failed Exams
Drop
TTC Year Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Grads\. Outs
Cankirl 1987/88 - - - - - - - -
1988/89 21 24 45 3 0 3 10 3
1989/90 45 31 76 1 7 8 9 8
1990/91 50 59 109 17 0 17 16 17
Duzce 1987/88 26 - 26 0 - 0 - 5
1988/89 24 20 44 1 0 1 6 2
1989/90 29 35 64 0 0 0 15 4
1990/91 31 45 76 0 0 0 20 5
Iskenderun 1987/88 - - - - - - - -
1988/89 29 - 29 0 - 0 - 1
1989/90 28 28 56 0 0 0 3 3
1990/91 27 50 77 0 0 0 8 3
Istanbul 1987/88 - - - - - - - -
1988/89 33 - 33 0 - 0 - 5
1989/90 26 28 54 0 10 10 18 4
1990/91 31 22 53 0 16 16 6 3
Izmir 1987/88 - - - - - - - -
1988/89 29 - 29 0 0 0 - 0
1989/90 27 29 56 0 0 0 7 7
1990/91 30 46 76 0 0 0 16 1
Kirikkale 1987/88 23 - 23 0 - 0 - 0
1988/89 25 23 48 3 1 4 13 5
1989/90 37 26 63 3 1 4 18 3
1990/91 22 39 61 7 0 7 14 7
Konya 1987/88 32 - 32 11 - 11 - 1
1988/89 26 30 56 11 7 18 8 4
1989/90 36 43 79 14 6 20 26 2
1990/91 27 49 76 12 13 25 23 7
Malatya 1987/88 - - - - - - - -
1988/89 28 - 28 3 - 3 - 0
1989/90 32 25 57 3 15 18 10 0
1990/91 30 44 74 0 33 33 11 0
Total 804 696 1,500 89 109 198 257 100
Source: YoK, June 1992
Note: In some cases, programs began wth Year 1 and Year 2 students
simultaneously by transferring students from other institutions\.
-27-
APPENDIX 1
Table 5: Output of the Mechanical Engineering Program
Enrollments Failed Exams
Drop
TTC Year Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Grads\. Outs
CankIrl 1986/87 31 71 102 3 7 10 23 10
1987/88 60 69 129 9 6 15 39 15
1988/89 56 70 126 15 1 16 24 16
1989/90 111 77 188 14 0 14 33 14
1990/91 96 135 231 26 3 29 64 29
Duzce 1986/87 - - - - - - - -
1987/88 49 - 49 1 - 1 - 8
1988/89 65 40 105 2 0 2 15 2
1989/90 105 86 191 0 1 1 57 6
1990/91 80 127 207 0 0 0\. 42 7
Iskenderun 1986/87 - - - - - - - -
1987/88 40 - 40 0 - 0 - 0
1988/89 67 39 106 0 0 0 5 15
1989/90 100 86 186 0 0 0 10 20
1990/91 89 156 245 0 0 0 34 39
Istanbul 1986/87 - - - - - - - -
1987/88 53 - 53 0 - 0 - 27
1988/89 63 26 89 0 11 11 15 9
1989/90 96 54 150 0 31 31 23 15
1990/91 98 81 179 0 49 49 32 2
Izmir 1986/87 73 - 73 5 - 5 - 4
1987/88 68 64 132 2 4 6 21 5
1988/89 55 100 155 0 6 6 43 6
1989/90 90 101 191 0 3 3 38 10
1990/91 95 140 235 0 3 3 43 5
Kirikkale 1986/87 62 92 154 9 0 9 45 3
1987/88 60 97 157 5 0 5 40 7
1988/89 62 105 167 8 3 11 53 5
1989/90 92 98 190 7 2 9 36 9
1990/91 93 136 229 16 0 116 45 16
Konya 1986/87 - - - - - - - -
1987/88 51 - 51 9 - 9 - 2
1988/89 64 46 110 18 2 20 24 4
1989/90 110 71 181 24 7 31 44 7
1990/91 105 122 227 38 13 51 71 21
Malatya 1986/87 - - - - -
1987/88 45 - 45 9 - 9 - 6
1988/89 73 30 103 10 7 17 17 6
1989/90 104 70 174 7 13 20 48 9
1990/91 94 110 204 7 38 45 65 7
Total 2,655 2,499 5,154 244 210 454 1,049 366
Source: YoK, June 1992
-28-
APPENDIX 1
TAe 6: OutptA of the Agriculhe Mechanical Program
Enrollments Failed Exams
Drop
TTC Year Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Grads\. Outs
Duzce 1986/87 -
1987/88 - - - -
1988/89 24 - 24 2 - 2 - 3
1989/90 33 19 52 0 1 1 14 2
1990/91 34 35 69 2 0 2 12 9
Iskenderun 1986/87 - - - - - - - -
1987/88 - - - - - - - -
1988/89 25 - 25 0 0 - 7
1989/90 35 18 53 0 0 0 0 5
1990/91 31 48 79 0 5 5 2 1
Konya 1986/87 - - - - - - - -
1987/88 25 - 25 3 - 3 - 1
1988/89 32 21 53 5 0 5 22 5
1989/90 43 22 65 15 0 15 12 10
1990/91 35 37 72 17 6 23 17 8
Total 317 200 517 44 12 56 79 51
Source: Y6K, June 1992
Notes:
1\. Only Duzce, Iskenderun, and Konya offer an Agriculture Mechanics
program\.
2\. In some cases, programs began with Year 1 and Year 2 students
simultaneously by transferring students from other Institutions\.
-29-
APPENDIX 1
Table 7: Outpt of Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Program
Enrollments Failed Exams
Drop
TTC Year Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Grads\. Outs
;ankiri 1987/88 - - - -
1988/89 25 - 25 5 - 5 - 5
1989/90 37 20 57 4 4 8 4 8
1990/91 59 37 96 11 1 12 27 12
Dazce 1987/88 - - - - - - - -
1988/89 24 - 24 0 - 0 - 1
1989/90 29 21 50 0 1 1 8 2
1990/91 26 39 65 0 0 0 16 3
Iskenderun 1987/88 - - - - - -
1988/89 24 - 24 0 - 0 - 2
1989/90 29 22 51 0 0 0 1 6
1990/91 35 44 79 0 0 0 5 4
Istanbul 1987/88 - - - - -
1988/89 27 - 27 0 - 0 - 10
1989/90 32 17 49 0 10 10 7 4
1990/91 34 28 62 0 10 10 18 2
Izmir 1987/88 27 - 27 1 - 1 - 3
1988/89 30 23 53 0 2 2 13 3
1989/90 37 38 75 0 4 4 15 1
1990/91 30 55 85 1 1 2 22 1
Kirikkale 1987/88 - - - - -
1988/89 27 - 27 0 - 0 - 5
1989/90 26 22 48 1 0 1 10 0
1990/91 33 37 70 5 0 5 15 1
Konya 1987/88 - - - - - - - -
1988/89 28 - 28 10 - 10 - 3
1989/90 33 22 55 11 4 15 7 2
1990/91 36 43 79 16 15 31 20 6
Malatya 1987/88 - - - - - - -
1988/89 30 - 30 2 - 2 - 1
1989/90 35 27 62 3 10 13 16 1
1990/91 32 42 74 8 28 36 11 3
Total 785 537 1,322 78 90 168 215 89
Source: Y6K, June 1992
Note: In some cases, programs began with Year 1 and Year 2 students
simultaneously by transferring students from other Institutions\.
-30-
APPENDIX 1
Table 8: Output of Foundry Technology Program
Enrollments Failed Exams
Drop
TTC Year Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Grads\. Outs
Iskenderun 1988/89 27 - 27 0 - 0 - 1
1989/90 31 26 57 0 0 0 3 1
1990/91 21 53 74 0 0 0 7 8
Izmir 1988/89 29 - 29 0 - 0 - 2
1989/90 31 27 58 0 2 2 3 3
1990/91 30 50 80 0 0 0 22 5
Total 169 156 325 0 2 2 35 20
Source: YdK, June 1992
Notes:
1\. Only Iskenderun and Izmir offer foundry technology programs\.
2\. In some cases, programs began with Year 1 and Year 2 students
simultaneously by transferring students from other Institutions\.
- 31 -
APPENDIX 1
Table 9: Output of Civil Engineering Program
Enrollments Failed Exams
Drop
TTC Year Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Grads\. Outs
Cankiri 1986/87 28 135 163 6 4 10 71 10
1987/88 35 77 112 9 5 14 45 14
1988/89 32 50 82 2 2 4 28 4
1989/90 63 48 111 7 0 7 24 7
1990/91 69 74 143 17 0 17 27 17
Duzce 1986/87 23 109 132 3 0 3 48 8
1987/88 28 74 102 2 0 2 45 5
1988/89 28 49 77 4 0 4 34 5
1989/90 26 35 61 1 2 3 13 11
1990/91 31 36 67 0 1 1 16 0
Iskenderun 1986/87 - - - - - - -
1987/88 - - - -
1988/89 28 - 28 0 - 0 - 8
1989/90 35 20 55 0 0 0 2 6
1990/91 30 47 77 0 0 0 9 4
Izmir 1986/87 65 95 160 0 4 4 55 13
1987/88 30 94 124 0 0 0 39 4
1988/89 26 94 120 2 1 3 40 3
1989/90 34 74 108 2 3 5 30 4
1990/91 26 59 85 0 3 3 19 4
Kirikkale 1986/87 - - - - - - - -
1987/88 27 - 27 0 - 0 - 3
1988/89 26 24 50 2 1 3 5 3
1989/90 31 39 70 1 0 1 12 2
1990/91 35 55 90 7 1 8 14 5
Konya 1986/87 - - - - - - - -
1987/88 30 - 30 7 - 7 - 1
1988/89 31 28 59 15 6 21 9 4
1989/90 38 59 97 13 12 25 27 8
1990/91 36 58 94 17 13 30 26 12
Malatya 1986/87 39 44 83 7 11 18 22 11
1987/88 47 43 90 4 28 32 15 0
1988/89 40 71 111 3 31 34 32 8
1989/90 35 68 103 4 49 53 15 4
1990/91 34 80 114 5 54 59 19 7
Total 1,086 1,739 2,825 140 231 371 741 195
Source: YoK, June 1992
Notes:
1\. Istanbul does not offer a civil engineering program\.
2\. In some cases, programs began with Year 1 and Year 2 students
simultaneously by transferring students from other institutions\.
- 32-
APPENDDI 1
Table 10: Output of Computer Programming
Enrollments Failed Exams
Drop
TTC Year Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Grads\. Outs
Istanbul 1986/87 33 - 33 0 2 2 - 2
1987/88 41 31 72 0 3 3 28 6
1988/89 33 33 66 0 10 10 23 12
1989/90 31 21 52 0 3 3 18 5
1990/91 26 26 52 0 9 9 17 2
Izmlr 1986/87 39 60 99 0 2 2 20 6
1987/88 28 74 102 0 1 1 24 2
1988/89 34 85 119 0 4 4 25 3
1989/90 28 87 115 5 2 7 45 5
1990/91 31 58 89 0 2 2 25 7
Malatya 1986/87 - - - - - - - -
1987/88 - - - -
1988/89 25 - 25 5 - 5 - 0
1989/90 35 20 55 3 1 4 16 3
1990/91 33 33 66 0 16 16 17 0
Total 417 528 945 13 55 68 258 53
Source: YoK, June 1992
Notes:
1\. Only Istanbul, Izmir, and Malatya offer Computer Programming\.
2\. In some cases, programs began with Year 1 and Year 2 students
simultaneously by transferring students from other InstItutions\.
-33-
APPENDIX 1
Table 11: Output of Petrochemical Program
Enrollments Failed Exams
Drop
TTC Year Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Grads\. Outs
Izmir 1986/87 -
1987/88 - - - -
1988/89 26 - 26 0 - 0 - 2
1989/90 34 24 58 0 0 0 7 0
1990/91 32 49 81 0 0 0 20 5
Kirikkale 1986/87 - - - - - - - -
1987/88 - - -
1988/89 26 - 26 0 - 0 -
1989/90 35 26 61 2 0 2 11 5
1990/91 29 43 72 0 0 0 14 9
Total 182 142 324 2 0 2 52 21
Source: Y6K, June 1992
Notes:
1\. Only Izmir and Kirikkale offer a Petrochemical Program\.
2\. In some cases, programs began with Year 1 and Year 2 students
simultaneously by transferring students from other Institutions\.
APPENDIX 1
Table 12: Total Output of Al Programs, 1986/87-1990/91
by Field of Training
Enrollments Failed Exams
Drop
TTC Year Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Grads\. Outs
Electrical Engin\. 1,953 2,702 4,655 180 289 1469 1,091 326
Industrial Elec\. 816 694 1,510 66 55 121 347 128
Instrum\. & Control 798 559 1,357 103 80 183 169 112
Telecommunications 804 696 1,500 89 109 198 257 100
Mechanical Engin\. 2,655 2,499 5,154 244 210 454 1,049 366
Agriculture Mech\. 317 200 517 44 12 56 79 51
Air Con\. & Refrig\. 785 537 1,322 78 90 168 215 89
Foundry 169 156 325 0 2 2 35 20
Civil Engineering 1,086 1,739 2,825 140 231 371 741 195
Computer Programming 417 528 945 13 55 68 258 53
Petrochemical Program 182 142 324 2 0 2 52 21
Grand Total 9,982 10,452 20,434 959 1,133 2,092 4,293 1,461
-34-
APPENDIX 1
Table 13: Oulputs from AI Program 1990/91\.
by Field of Training and TTC
Enrollments Failed Exams
Drop
TTC Year Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Grads, Outs
Cankid EI\. Eng\. 61 97 158 28 1 29 35 29
Duzce EI\. Eng\. 57 81 138 0 1 1 33 10
Iskenderun El\. Eng\. 55 114 169 0 0 0 18 24
Istanbul El\. Eng\. 61 47 108 - 37 37 10 4
Izmir El\. Eng\. 61 103 164 0 2 2 26 2
Kirikkale El\. Eng\. 62 89 151 9 1 10 30 5
Konya El\. Eng\. 67 81 148 19 12 31 47 8
Malatya El\. Eng\. 64 106 170 0 74 74 32 2
Total 488 718 1,206 56 128 184 231 84
Cankirl Ind\. El\. 59 65 124 12 9 21 27 21
Dazce Ind\. El\. 26 42 68 0 0 - 17 8
Iskenderun Ind\. El\. 29 57 86 - 0 - 9 7
Istanbul Ind\. El\. 25 26 51 0 12 12 14 3
Izmir Ind\. El\. 29 58 87 0 0 - 34 4
Kirikkale Ind\. El\. 29 35 64 5 0 5 9 3
Konya Ind\. El\. 35 49 84 10 11 21 25 7
Total 232 332 564 27 32 59 135 53
Cankiri Inst\. Con 50 48 98 18 1 19 0 0
Duzce Inst\. Con 31 48 79 2 0 2 14 3
Iskenderun Inst\. Con 28 55 83 0 0 0 7 12
Istanbul Inst\. Con 32 23 55 0 18 18 5 0
Izmir Inst\. Con 32 44 76 3 2 5 14 4
Kirlkkale Inst\. Con 38 36 74 5 0 5 10 4
Konya Inst\. Con 36 38 74 20 13 33 11 8
Malatya Inst\. Con 31 37 68 5 27 32 8 2
Total 278 329 607 53 61 114 69 33
Cankiri Tel\. Com\. 50 59 109 17 0 17 16 17
Duzce Tel\. Com\. 31 45 76 0 0 0 20 5
Iskenderun Tel\. Com\. 27 50 77 0 0 0 8 3
Istanbul Tel\. Com\. 31 22 53 0 16 16 6 3
Izmir Tel\. Com\. 30 46 76 0 0 0 16 1
Kirikkale Tel\. Com\. 22 39 61 7 0 7 14 7
Konya Tel\. Com\. 27 49 76 12 13 25 23 7
Malatya Tel\. Com\. 30 44 74 0 33 33 11 0
Total 248 354 602 36 62 98 114 43
(Continued)
-35-
APPENDD( 1
Table 13 (continued): Outputs from Al Programs 1990/91,
by Field of Training and TTC
Enrollments Failed Exams
Drop
TTC Year Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Grads\. Outs
Cankiri El\. Eng\. 96 135 231 26 3 29 64 29
Dozce Mec\. Eng\. 80 127 207 0 0 0 42 7
Iskenderun Mec\. Eng\. 89 156 245 0 0 0 34 39
Istanbul Mec\. Eng\. 98 81 179 0 49 49 32 2
Izmir Mec\. Eng\. 95 140 235 0 3 3 43 5
Kirikkale Mec\. Eng\. 93 136 229 16 0 16 45 16
Konya Mec\. Eng\. 105 122 227 38 13 51 71 21
Malatya Mec\. Eng\. 94 110 204 7 38 45 65 7
Total 750 1,007 1,757 87 106 193 396 126
Duzce Ag\. Mech\. 34 35 69 2 0 2 12 9
Iskenderun Ag\. Mech\. 31 48 79 0 5 5 2 1
Konya Ag\. Mech\. 35 37 72 17 6 23 17 8
Total 100 120 220 19 11 30 31 18
Cankirl Air Con\. 59 37 96 11 1 12 27 12
Dozce Air Con\. 26 39 65 0 0 0 16 3
Iskenderun Air Con\. 35 44 79 0 0 0 5 4
Istanbul Air Con\. 34 28 62 0 10 10 18 2
Izmir Air Con\. 30 55 85 1 1 ' 2 22 1
Kirikkale Air Con\. 33 37 70 5 0 5 15 1
Konya Air Con\. 36 43 79 16 15 31 20 6
Malatya Air Con\. 32 42 74 8 28 36 11 3
Total 285 325 610 41 55 96 134 32
Iskenderun Foundry 21 53 74 0 0 0 7 8
Izmir Foundry 30 50 80 0 0 0 22 5
Total 51 103 154 0 0 0 29 13
Cankiri Civ\. Eng\. 69 74 143 17 0 17 27 17
Dizce Civ\. Eng\. 31 36 67 0 1 1 16 0
Iskenderun Civ\. Eng\. 30 47 77 0 0 0 9 4
Izmir Civ\. Eng\. 26 59 85 0 3 3 19 4
Kirikkale Civ\. Eng\. 35 55 90 7 1 8 14 5
Konya Civ\. Eng\. 36 58 94 17 13 30 26 12
Malatya Civ\. Eng\. 34 80 114 5 54 59 19 7
Total 261 409 670 46 72 118 130 49
Istanbul Comput\. 26 26 52 0 9 9 17 2
Izmir Comput\. 31 58 89 0 2 2 25 7
Malatya Comput\. 33 33 66 0 16 16 17 0
Total 90 117 207 0 27 27 59 9
(Continued)
-36-
APPENDIX 1
Table 13 (cominued): Outpis from M Progmams 1990191,
by Field of Traitng and TTC
Enrollments Failed Exams
Drop
TTC Year Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Yr 1 Yr 2 Total Grads\. Outs
Izmir Petrochem 32 49 81 0 0 0 20 5
Kirlkkale Petrochem 29 43 72 0 0 0 14 9
Total 61 92 153 0 0 0 34 14
Grand Total 2,844 3,906 6,750 365 554 919 1,362 474
Source: Y6K, June 1992
- 37 -
APPENDD( 2
Table 1: Fellowships Training for YiK Personnel
No\. of Fellowships Total Total
Fellow- Staff
Specialization 3 mo\. 9 mo\. Ships Months
Ag\. machine technician 1 7 8 66
Air con\., refrigeration 0 12 12 108
Assistant Manager 10 0 10 30
Business Applications 0 2 2 18
Chemistry 1 0 1 3
Civil engineering 14 10 24 132
Computer technology 8 7 15 87
Control, Instrumentation 0 10 10 90
Electricity 14 17 31 195
English Language 10 0 10 30
Foundry technology 0 2 2 18
Industrial Electronics 2 14 16 132
Mechanical engineering 16 30 46 318
Petrochemical technology 0 3 3 27
Petroleum 0 1 1 9
Telecommunications 0 8 8 72
Total 76 123 199 1,335
Source: Y6K, 1992

-39-
APPENDIX 3
Retention and Loss of Instructional Personnel
Trained under the Industrial Training Project
Table 1: Retention and Lass of Instructional Personnel:
Staff Situation as of 1991/92
Trained Staff Retained Trained Staff Lost
Institution/ No\. of Staff- No\. of Staff-
& Department Persons months Persons months
Electrical engineering 3 15 2 18
Electronics 2 24 0 0
Communications 1 9 0 0
Mechanical engineering 3 15 3 27
Civil engineering 4 24 0 0
Common core 1 3 0 0
Dace
Electrical engineering 3 15 2 18
Electronics 3 21 1 9
Communications 2 18 0 0
Control & Instrumentation 0 0 1 9
Mechanical engineering 2 18 4 36
Air con\., refrigeration 1 9 0 0
Civil engineering 4 12 2 12
Ag\. machine technician 0 0 2 18
Computer technology 0 0 1 9
Commercial studies 0 0 1 9
Common core 3 9 1 3
Iskenderun
Electrical engineering 1 3 0 0
Electronics 3 27 0 0
Communications 1 9 0 0
Control & Instrumentation 0 0 1 9
Mechanical engineering 5 27 0 0
Air con\., refrigeration 1 9 0 0
Ag\. machine technician 1 9 1 9
Foundry technology 2 18 0 0
Computer technology 2 12 0 0
Common core 4 12 0 0
istanbul
Electrical engineering 1 9 1 9
Mechanical engineering 3 27 4 36
Air con\., refrigeration 1 9 0 0
Computer technology 4 18 1 3
Common core 3 9 0 0
(Continued)
-40-
APPENDIX 3
Table 1 (continued): Reterion and Loss of Instructional Personnel:
Staff SItuation as of 1991/92
Trained Staff Retained Trained Staff Lost
Institution/ No\. of Staff- No\. of Staff-
& Department Persons months Persons months
Izmir
Electrical engineering 4 24 0 0
Electronics 2 18 2 18
Communications 1 9 0 0
Control & Instrumentation 0 0 1 9
Mechanical engineering 6 24 0 0
Air con\., refrigeration 2 18 0 0
Foundry technology 0 0 1 9
Civil engineering 2 6 2 18
Petrochemical technology 2 18 1 9
Computer technology 0 0 4 36
Common core 2 6 0 0
Kirikkale
Electrical engineering 3 15 0 0
Electronics 2 12 0 0
Communications 2 12 0 0
Control & Instrumentation 2 18 1 9
Mechanical engineering 5 33 1 9
Air con\., refrigeration 1 9 0 0
Civil engineering 1 9 3 27
Petrochemical technology 1 9 0 0
Common core 1 3 0 0
Electrical engineering 1 9 2 18
Electronics 2 6 1 9
Communications 0 0 2 18
Control & Instrumentation 1 9 0 0
Mechanical engineering 4 18 2 18
Air con\., refrigeration 0 0 1 9
Civil engineering 3 15 1 9
Ag\. machine technician 1 9 2 18
Cartography 0 0 1 9
Common core 3 8 0 0
(Continued)
- 41 -
APPENDIX 3
Table 1 (continued): Retention and Loss of Instructional Personnel:
Staff Stuation as of 1991/92
Trained Staff Retained Trained Staff Lost
Institution/ No\. of Staff- No\. of Staff-
& Department Persons months Persons months
Electrical engineering 1 9 1 9
Electronics 2 18 1 9
Communications 1 9 0 0
Mechanical engineering 4 24 3 27
Air con\., refrigeration 1 9 0 0
Civil engineering 2 6 0 0
Computer technology 1 9 0 0
Mining 0 0 1 3
Common core 2 6 1 3
Total 132 797 63 537
Ratio to total trained (%) 68 60 32 40
Source: YOK, 1992
Note: Data refer to academic year 1991/92\. Only courses in which staff have received training are reported here\.
- 42 -
APPENDIX 3
Table 2\. Retention and Las of Intructional Personnel:
Staff Situalon as of 1991/82 by Inhtitution
Retained Lost Ratio Lost/Total
No\. of Staff- No\. of Staff- No\. of Staff-
Institution Persons months Persons months Persons months
cankirl 14 90 5 45 26 33
Konya 15 74 12 108 44 59
Iskenderun 20 126 2 18 9 13
Kirikkale 18 120 5 45 22 27
Istanbul 12 72 6 48 33 40
Izmir 21 123 11 99 34 45
Dzce 18 102 15 123 45 55
Malatya 14 90 7 51 33 36
Total 132 797 63 537 32 40
Source: Y6K, 1992
Table 3: Retention and Loss of Instructional Personnel:
Current Staff SItuation as of 1991/92, by Program
Retained Lost Ratio Lost/Total
No\. of Staff- No\. of Staff- No\. of Staff-
Department Persons months Persons months Persons months
Air con\., refrigeration 7 63 1 9 13 13
Civil engIneering 16 72 8 66 33 48
Common core 19 56 2 6 10 10
Communications 8 66 2 18 20 21
Computer technology 7 39 6 48 46 55
Control, instrumentation 3 27 4 36 57 57
Electrical engineering 17 99 8 72 32 42
Electronics 16 126 5 45 24 26
Mechanical engineering 32 186 17 153 35 45
Total 132 797 63 537 32 40
Source: Y6K, 1992
Note: Only courses offered at five or more institutions are represented\.
-43-
APPENDD( 4
Table 1: TTC Curricula Documentation Inventory
industrial Number of
Training Schools In
Subject Project Program
Electronics Group
Electrical Technology I 28
Industrial Electronics Technology I 24
Communications Technology 1 24
Process Control & Instrumentation Technology I 24
Biomedical Technology II 2
Computer Maintenance and Repair II 2
Mechanical Technology Group
Mechanical Technology I 24
Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Technology 19
Foundry Technology 4
Agricultural Mechanization Technology I 8
Civil Engineering
Construction Technology 24
Computer Technology
Computer Technology I 7
Chemical Engineering Group
Petro-chemical Technology I 5
Chemical Technology II 4
Textile Technology 11 4
Food Technology II 5
Commercial & Business Group
Tourism II 5
Business Administration II 9
Secretarial II 8
Source: YdK, June 1992

\.45\.
APPENDIX 5
Table 1: Weely Utiliaion of Laborsaor and Workshop Facilities:
Average Hours UtIlizallon Per WeekI
Laboratory & Workshop Survey Cankirl Istanbul Iskenderun Izmir Kirikkale Malatya Mean
Dazce Konya
Electrical Lab & Workshop 1 65 33 39 38 24 60 na 33 42
2 34 22 35 52 18 18 36 24 30
Electrical Machine & Power 1 14 25 40 24 12 35 n a 17 24
Systems 2 24 22 25 60 10 16 34 10 25
Telecommunications 1 15 22 14 24 21 60 n a 16 25
2 30 20 20 16 10 18 26 8 19
Process Control & 1 12 19 25 20 20 20 na 4 17
Instrumentation 2 36 20 30 11 5 23 22 na 21
Technical Drawing & 1 26 12 20 48 6 40 10 13 22
CAD/CAM I
2 24 20 13 48 na 32 40 8 26
Materials Testing & Heat 1 12 16 6 28 24 60 6 4 20
Treatment 2 na 12 8 16 12 30 24 4 15
Measurement, Quality Control 1 na 2 14 20 18 40 4 6 15
2 34 6 12 16 8 na 18 8 15
General Industrial Machines 1 16 20 38 26 20 50 24 32 28
2 32 5 16 40 32 30 34 16 26
Air Conditioning & 1 na 20 20 20 20 35 18 17 21
Refrigeration 2 21 13 8 34 10 34 18 16 19
Foundry 1 na na na 22 22 na na na 22
2 na na na 24 na na na na 24
Agricultural Machines 1 na 24 na 20 na na 15 na 20
2 na 24 na 16 na na 12 na 17
Building Workshop & 1 10 7 na 12 18 42 4 7 14
Materials Laboratory 2 16 6 na 18 3 27 8 4 12
-46-
Soil Mechanics & Hydraulic 1 5 2 n a 8 10 25 4 10 9
Drainage Laboratory 2 8 6 na 10 4 7 6 2 6
Technical Drawing 1 46 11 20 10 40 40 48 26 30
2 18 40 40 48 4 10 68 4 29
Computer & Data Processing 1 43 36 36 8 40 60 62 36 40
2 16 32 44 100 37 4 na 51 41
General Science Laboratory 1 59 2 12 8 2 60 8 n a 22
2 16 24 28 na 5 6 4 40 18
Language Laboratory 1 66 35 44 8 40 60 110 40 50
2 16 40 8 na 5 8 64 2 20
Computer Applications Rooms 1 n a 40 40 6 30 60 38 35 36
2 1 40 80 na 2 4 40 1 26
Mean, Both Surveys 26 20 26 26 17 33 28 16 23
Per Cent of 40 Hours 65 50 66 65 42 82 69 41 59
Source: YoK, June 1992\.
Note: There were two questionnaires, referred to as Survey 1 (1989) and Survey 2 (1991)\.
- 47 -
APPENDIX 6
Table 1: Fellowship Training for SEGEM Personnel
Days
Number of
Field of Study Fellows Minimum Maximum Total
Accounting 1 87 87 87
Air conditioning & heating 1 5 5 5
Air conditioning & refrigeration 1 12 12 12
CEDEFOP 1 9 9 9
Electrical & electronics 1 63 63 63
Finance 1 87 87 87
Fire security systems 1 11 11 11
Food technology 1 35 35 35
Graphics 1 13 13 13
Hydraulics & pneumatics 2 11 94 105
Industrial hydraulics 2 15 76 91
Laboratory testing 1 29 29 29
Library 1 21 21 21
Maintenance 3 5 84 97
Management 1 20 20 20
Metallurgy 1 63 63 63
Non-destructtve testing 2 8 14 22
Process design 1 31 31 31
Project management 7 7 22 77
Steel work, corrugated 2 5 5 10
Training 1 41 41 41
Training support services 1 15 15 15
Training systems 11 8 22 171
Visual aids 3 7 21 39
Welding 1 56 1 56
Total 49 - - 1,210
Source: ILO & IBRD: Turkey, IBRD Industrial Training Project: Project Findings and Recommendations\.
Geneva: ILO, IBRD, 1990\. Annex VI, pp\. 105-107\.
Note: There seems to have been an error in the tabulation of the total fellowship days and months\. The
table in Annex VI Is spread over three pages and is divided into five sub-tables\. Two sums, 250 and
77 fellowship days, respectively, appear to be missing in the calculation of the total\. Thus the total
number of fellowship days Is 1,210, or 40\.3 fellowship months\.
s
- 49 - Attachment A
Page 1
THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
PRIME MINISTRY
THE UNDERSECRETARIAT OF TREASURY AND FOREIGN TRADE
Ref: DEi-IV-5-70 Ankara,
Mr\. Graham DONALDSON
Agriculture and Human
Development Division Chief
Operations Evaluation Department
Ref: Your message dated October 30,1992\.
Dear Mr\. DONALDSON,
We have examined the draft Performance Audit Report very carefully and asked
for the comments of the relevant agencies\.
On the outcome of Mr\. Noonen's audit, we are pleased to learn the Project has
been carried out satisfactorily by the relevant agencies and the Project mostly reached
to its aims\.
Although the most of the statements are thorough, YOK has raised couple of
more points to be corrected as enclosed by\.
Best regards\.
Encl\.
F\. Ers VK N
- 50 - Attachment A
Page 2
1\. Industrial Training project (Loan 2399-TU) was completed on November 1988\.
Draft Performance Audit Report regarding this project, dated October 30,1992, has
carefully been examined\. No doubt that the report reflects some keen observations and
in general, sound conclusions\.
The following are the suggestions that should be considered before finalizing the report\.
1) Institution Building: Functions of the Council of Higher Education (YOK) is laid down
by the Higher Education Law, No: 2547\. According to the law, YOK is responsible for
the planning, coordination and inspection of the higher education system of Turkey\.
Execution function lies on Universities\. Industrial Training Unit provides counterparts
mainly for the planning and coordination of activities\. In technical areas, staff of the
faculties and TTCs has got the necessary knowledge and expertise, which can be
resorted to whenever needed\.
Over emphasizing the institution building objective of the project may be misleading if
requirements of legal structure are not taken into consideration\.
2) Some Corrections:
a) There must be a misunderstanding about equipment installation (Para\. 2\.15) All
equipment of the first project schools is fully installed\.
b) The word TEKSIS should be BILTEK (Para 3\.5, line 9),
c) The sentence should be "more than 37 percent of the teachers recruited under the
Project (54 out of 145) left for industry "(Para 3,2 line 9)
3) Statistical Reports: YOK prepares detailed statistics annually in Turkish and in English,
through Student Selection and Placement Center and publishes it\. ITU carries out a
follow up study covering only the project schools every other year for the propose of
office use\. The document mentioned in the Report is the project follow up study, not
"The Higher Education Statistics' which covers whole higher education system\.
Y6K believes that considering size and complexity of the project the outcome is not only
satisfactory but also rather succcis'ul,
- 51 - Attachment B
TURKISH REPUBLIC
MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE
S MI D
SMALL AND MEDIUM INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION
Ref
B 14 KSG 0 08 00 00/622A9
Subject Project No\. 2399 TU 2 t 192
Cear Mr\. Donaldson,
We acknowledge receipt of your letter dated October 30,1992 and
we appreciate your evaluations\.
We are pleased to hear about the World Bank's conclusion that
SEGEM has duly performed the project obligations and
establishment of KOSGEB is a major success of the project\.
KOSGEB continues to fulfill its mandate and has achieved a
noteworthy performance record in training\. The number of training
programs implemented in 1992 is 450 and a total number of 7700
participants have been trained in these programs\.
Regards,
VICE PRESIDENT
cc\. Mr\. BOlent OzgUn
Treasury

- 53 - Attachment C
Page 1
T*\.C\.
STATE INSTTUTE OF STATISTICS 6 A $ 8 A K A N L I K INSTITUT NATIONAL DR STATISTIQU
PRIME MINISTRY DEVLET ISTATISTIK ENSTITO0S PRESIDENCE DU CONSEIL
REPUBLIC OF TUREY BASKANL1Q1 REPUBLUQUE D TURUIR
OurRef\. B\.02\.1\.DtE\.O\.76\.00\.02/908/c'3- N*catbey CwMesl No\. 114
06100-ANKARA
Your Ref\.
\.A\.--1/ 19 \.92
Mr\.Graham Donaldson
Chief
World Bank
Agriculture and Human Development Division
Operations Evaluation Department
1818 H Street, N\.W\.
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
U\.S\.A\.
Dear Mr\.Donaldson,
Industrial Training Project 2399-TU Part C which was allocated for the State
Institute of Statistics was succesfully completed at the end of 1990\.
This component covered only overseas fellowship training in statistics for
SIS staff\. The project achieved its objective of providing fellowship
training to a number of our staff, improved quality of our national
statistics; in particular, various fields of economic statistics and
computer usage\.
SIS completed the fellowship program through the US Census Bureau Contract\.
A total of 41 SIS staff received 207 man/months of training in the USA at
the Bureau of Labour Statistics, Bureau of Economic Analysis and
International Statistical Programmes Center\.
All candidates participated in refresher training in English at the Turkish
American Association in Ankara before going-to the USA\.
We have found the fellowship program highly useful because our returning
staff have greatly contributed to the work of our Institute, the training
has assisted in their professional development, and allowed many of them to
be promoted to more senior managerial posts\.
i : 417 64 40 (Switchboard) Telefax : 425 338 7 Telex : 46 347 DIE TR
- 54 - Attachment C
Page 2
The SIS component in this project was $ 700,000\. A total of $ 693,184\.42 has
been disbursed by four withdrawal forms at different times\. The project
account was closed with a negligible residual in 1990\.
The SIS has evaluated Performance Audit Report of October 30, 1992 and our
Institute is totally in agreement with the project\. In view of this we feel
that no further comment is necessary\.
I would like to express my sincere thanks to the World Bank staff who
assisted us in managing the project successfully\.
Since ely yours,
Enis YDEMIR
Acting President | APPROVAL |
P176811 |  The World Bank
Madagascar Road Sector Sustainability Project (P176811)
Note to Task Teams: The following sections are system generated and can only be edited online in the Portal\. Please
delete this note when finalizing the document\.
Project Information Document (PID)
Appraisal Stage | Date Prepared/Updated: 25-May-2021 | Report No: PIDA32043
May 19, 2021 Page 1 of 8
The World Bank
Madagascar Road Sector Sustainability Project (P176811)
BASIC INFORMATION
OPS_TABLE_BASIC_DATA
A\. Basic Project Data
Country Project ID Project Name Parent Project ID (if any)
Madagascar P176811 Madagascar Road Sector
Sustainability Project
Region Estimated Appraisal Date Estimated Board Date Practice Area (Lead)
AFRICA EAST 27-May-2021 29-Jun-2021 Transport
Financing Instrument Borrower(s) Implementing Agency
Investment Project Financing Republic of Madagascar Road Agency
Proposed Development Objective(s)
To improve the longevity, safety and climate resiliency of selected paved primary roads in Madagascar\.
Components
Improving Road Condition and Resilience
Technical Assistance and Support to Roads and Transport Sectors Reforms
Contingency Emergency Response Component
PROJECT FINANCING DATA (US$, Millions)
SUMMARY -NewFin1
Total Project Cost 200\.00
Total Financing 200\.00
of which IBRD/IDA 200\.00
Financing Gap 0\.00
DETAILS -NewFinEnh1
World Bank Group Financing
International Development Association (IDA) 200\.00
IDA Credit 200\.00
May 19, 2021 Page 2 of 8
The World Bank
Madagascar Road Sector Sustainability Project (P176811)
Environmental and Social Risk Classification
Substantial
Decision
The review did authorize the team to appraise and negotiate
Note to Task Teams: End of system generated content, document is editable from here\. Please delete this note when
finalizing the document\.
Other Decision (as needed)
B\. Introduction and Context
Country Context
1\. Madagascarâs economic performance prior to the COVID-19 pandemic had been generally
robust thanks to overall political stability and careful macroeconomic management\. Madagascar is the
fourth largest island in the world, with a total population of over 26 million\. The country has various
economic potentials, such as tourism, agrobusiness, fishery, light manufacturing and mining\. After the
political and economic crisis in 2009, the Malagasy economy has been recovering steadily, with an average
growth rate of over 4 percent in the last 5 years, led by strong investment in transport infrastructure,
textile and apparel, agrobusiness and mining industries (Figure 1)\.1 In 2019, Madagascar attracted about
375,000 international tourists, earning nearly US$900 million in foreign currency, which accounts for
about 20 percent of the countryâs total exports\.2
2\. The adverse economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis is substantial in 2020 and 2021\. Global trade
and travel disruptions as well as domestic containment measures resulted in a recession in 2020
comparable to that associated with the constitutional crisis in 2009, with gross domestic product (GDP)
contracting by an estimated 4\.2 percent in 2020\. Economic conditions are expected to gradually stabilize
in 2021 and accelerate in 2022, with export sectors recovering against the backdrop of a modest pickup
in global demand and domestic activity driven by public investment, notably in infrastructure, and a
modest pickup in private consumption and investment\.
3\. Transport connectivity is a critical enabler for key economic activities of Madagascarâs
economy\. The agriculture sector still plays a key role in the Malagasy economy and Madagascarâs
productive sectors, hampered by poor transport connectivity, suffers from low access to local and
international markets\. The agriculture sector currently employs 75 percent of the countryâs total labor
force, generating 25 percent of GDP and earning 30 percent of foreign currency\. Agricultural productivity
remains low and most rural farmers are engaged in subsistence production with limited access to markets
1 IMF\. (2020)\. IMF Country Report 20/60\.
2 According to World Development Indicators\.
May 19, 2021 Page 3 of 8
The World Bank
Madagascar Road Sector Sustainability Project (P176811)
and only 11 percent of the population has access to good road network in rural Madagascar\. Firms,
particularly agribusiness, do not operate in rural areas due to poor connectivity and some high value
export crops, such as lychee and coffee, are at least 3 days away from the main port in Toamasina\. Limited
transport connectivity has long been a constraint on the countryâs agricultural growth as well as stable
food security, which could become an important challenge given the current rapid urbanization of the
country\. Poor transport connectivity, including on main transport links and primary roads such as the RN2
linking the main port of Tomasina to the Capital Antanarivo, is hindering firmsâ productivity and raising
costs\. Meanwhile, tourism sites in the north and west of the country, such as Nosy Be and Morondava,
are difficult to access by road from Antananarivo the primary entry point for many international tourists\.
4\. The transport sector is a key driver for the overall development of Madagascarâs economy and
services, and to ensure local and international connectivity to markets\. Yet it is also costly due to
Madagascarâs geography (very large island), difficult topography (central mountains and dense coastal
forests), climate & other shocks, and the generally scattered population with low concentration of
volumes (both goods and passengers) outside the Capital\. This results in transport unit costs being high,
and the attractiveness of transport sector to private investments â outside few key transport modes â
generally low\. It is therefore necessary to mobilize large resources to âjump-startâ? the economy and break
the isolation of markets and the pockets, which will then trigger more economic activity and investments,
followed by increased financial and fiscal revenues\. The mobilization of such large resources should be
coupled with important measures to also ensure the financial and socio-economic sustainability of such
investments\.
Sectoral and Institutional Context
5\. The road sector is the backbone of the transport network in Madagascar yet remains one of the
most underdeveloped in the world\. The road sector moves around 90% of total goods and passenger
volumes, yet road density is 5\.4 km per 100 km2 of land, among the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa and the
world\. Among the 32,000km of roads in Madagascar, there are 11,000 km of national roads (the rest are
regional and local roads) and only 6,000 km are paved\. Most of the paved network are national roads\.
About 40% of the paved national roads are in fair to poor condition requiring periodic maintenance, while
most of the unpaved national roads require heavy rehabilitation\. Meanwhile, over 70% of feeder regional
and local roads are in poor condition, hampering peopleâs access to markets and social facilities in rural
areas (Figure 8)\. The Rural Access Index â measured by the share of rural population who live within 2 km
of an all-season road â is only 11\.4 percent and among lowest globally, leaving 17 million of rural residents
unconnected\.
6\. Madagascar has among the highest road fatality rates globally\. Madagascar road safety
performance is quite poor and ranks 152 among 175 countries assessed for road safety\. In 2016, the road
crash fatalities in Madagascar were estimated by WHO at 7,108 (or 28\.6 per 100,000 people, higher than
the 26\.8 average for all of Africa)3 and serious injuries at 106,620, costing the economy about US$949
million\. Averagely, road traffic crashes are estimated to cost about 1 to 5 percent of GDP in developing
countries\. As the economy of Madagascar grows and the traffic picks up, road crashes would likely
increase if proper measures are not put in place\. There are little efforts to systematically address road
safety challenges, and no concrete plans or coordination between the various agencies to tackle this
3 World Health Organization (WHO)\. Global Status Report on Road Safety 2018\. Geneva\. WHO\.
May 19, 2021 Page 4 of 8
The World Bank
Madagascar Road Sector Sustainability Project (P176811)
important challenge\.
7\. The Government of Madagascar is cognizant of the importance of the road and transport
sectors which are a key part of its national and sectoral plans\. The Plan Emergence Madagascar (PEM),
a key national document setting an ambitious vision for the countryâs development, highlight the roads
and transport sectors as key sectors for the development and modernization of Madagascar, which
ambitious targets for the upgrade and expansion of all transport modes\. The PEM is also being developed
in parallel to another long-term infrastructure development plan, the Marshall Plan, which would further
detail the large infrastructure investments needs and priorities\. The Ministry of Public Works is also
developing a new road sector strategy that identifies the key priorities and vision for the sector, especially
for the national roads network\. The new draft strategy, âStrategies et Programmation des Activities 2020-
2024â? prioritizes the upgrade of the existing trunk road network of national roads which carries the bulk
of traffic volumes and assures the connectivity between the various parts of the country, and which
despite its relatively small size remains in an overall bad condition\. The strategy aims to upgrade most of
the 11,000 km of the national roads from earth roads to paved roads to ensure year-long accessibility,
while also increasing expenditures on periodic and routine maintenance to ensure the sustainability of
these investments\. Select feeder roads in the vicinity of the national/primary roads will also be improved
in parallel to major upgrades to ensure last mile connectivity for rural communities in proximity to the
trunk network\.
Relationship to CPF
8\. The project is fully aligned with the World Bankâs Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for
FY17â21 which aims to build on the current relative political stability to help address structural
fragilities that hamper the sustainable development in Madagascar\. The project supports the two focus
areas of the CPF which are: (a) promoting inclusive growth and (b) increased resilience and reduced
fragility\. The CPFâs focus areas support the priorities of Governmentâs National Development of generating
a higher, inclusive and sustainable growth path to reduce poverty\. The CPF recognizes the constraints
poor transport connectivity have on limiting access to economic activities and markets\. The CPF also cites
access to wellâ?performing transport infrastructure as one of the most serious impediments to the
countryâs competitiveness and inclusive growth in urban and rural areas\. The CPF references the Global
Competitiveness Index, where on a scale of 1 to 7, the quality of roads in Madagascar is 2\.2\. The
constraints within the roads and transport sectors affect other productive sectors of the economy such as
agriculture and tourism where the condition of supporting transport infrastructure plays an important
role in the economic and financial returns realized in these sectors\. By seeking to improve and sustain
road connectivity in Madagascar, the project echoes the CPFâs proposal for increased focus on measures
that will unlock constraints and promote investments\.
C\. Proposed Development Objective(s)
Development Objective(s) (From PAD)
The Project Development Objective (PDO) is to improve the longevity, safety and climate resiliency of selected paved
primary roads in Madagascar\.
May 19, 2021 Page 5 of 8
The World Bank
Madagascar Road Sector Sustainability Project (P176811)
Key Results
The PDO-level indicators and targets of the project include:
⢠Additional paved roads in good or excellent condition (percentage);
⢠Paved roads with safe and more climate-resilient features (percentage)\.
D\. Project Description
The design of the proposed Madagascar Road Sector Sustainability Project (MRSSP) started in early 2020
under the then proposed, Infrastructure Governance and Lifeline Connectivity Program for Results -
P173932 (the PforR)\. The PforR was being prepared with an aim to support the Government of
Madagascar to advance reforms and investments to improve infrastructure connectivity in both the
electricity and the transport sectors, anchored on the Plan Emergence Madagascar\. The transport
activities of the PforR focused on enhancing the sustainability (financial, institutional, environmental) and
safety of the road sector in the country\. Following the need by the Government for more time to advance
proposed reforms in the electricity sector, in April 2021 it was agreed to proceed with the transport
elements of the PforR through an Investment Project Finance (IPF) instrument\.
The proposed MRSSP project components are based on the transport sector activities that, in essence,
had been under preparation in the PforR, and emphasize the need to preserve the existing assets and
improve resilience of the network through periodic and routine maintenance works while supporting the
consolidation of institutional reforms including for better road safety management\. The activities under
the MRSSP are limited to the road sector and are largely about periodic and routine maintenance works,
which are well suited for an IPF instrument\.
\.
\.
Legal Operational Policies
Triggered?
Projects on International Waterways OP 7\.50 No
Projects in Disputed Areas OP 7\.60 No
Summary of Assessment of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts
\.
E\. Implementation
Institutional and Implementation Arrangements
The project will be implemented by the Road Agency (RA) in line with the ongoing sector reforms to empower
May 19, 2021 Page 6 of 8
The World Bank
Madagascar Road Sector Sustainability Project (P176811)
the RA as the implementing agency on all national roads\. A dedicated Project Implementing Unit (PIU), financed
by the proposed project, will be created at the RA to implement the project\. The RA will also be supported by the
Road Fund and the Ministry of Public Works given the close working relationship between these agencies\. The
creation of a dedicated PIU at the RA will also support the efforts of strengthening the capacity of the RA and
preparing it to execute larger works\. Having an existing road sector PIU at the Ministry, and creating a new PIU
at the RA will also significantly increase the absorption capacity in the sector, which is essential given the
upcoming large investments including those financed by the World Bank and other donors\.
\.
CONTACT POINT
World Bank
Ziad Salim EL Nakat
Senior Transport Specialist
Borrower/Client/Recipient
Republic of Madagascar
Implementing Agencies
Road Agency
Christophe Rakotomavo
Director General
cnrakotomavo@gmail\.com
FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 473-1000
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/projects
May 19, 2021 Page 7 of 8
The World Bank
Madagascar Road Sector Sustainability Project (P176811)
APPROVAL
Task Team Leader(s): Ziad Salim EL Nakat
Approved By
Practice Manager/Manager:
Country Director: Idah Z\. Pswarayi-Riddihough 27-May-2021
Note to Task Teams: End of system generated content, document is editable from here\. Please delete this note when
finalizing the document\.
May 19, 2021 Page 8 of 8 | APPROVAL |
P102316 | Page 1
INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS DATASHEET
APPRAISAL STAGE
I\. Basic Information
Date prepared/updated: 12/13/2006
Report No\.: AC2664
1\. Basic Project Data
Country: Argentina
Project ID: P102316
Project Name: Additional Financing Argentina Provincial Agricultural Development
Project I
Task Team Leader: Alvaro J\. Soler
Estimated Appraisal Date: December 11,
2006
Estimated Board Date: January 30, 2007
Managing Unit: LCSER
Lending Instrument: Specific Investment
Loan
Sector: Animal production (50%);Irrigation and drainage (15%);Roads and highways
(15%);Agricultural marketing and trade (14%);Health (6%)
Theme: Rural policies and institutions (P);Rural services and infrastructure (P);Other
rural development (P)
IBRD Amount (US$m\.):
37\.00
IDA Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
GEF Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
PCF Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
Other financing amounts by source:
BORROWER
7\.80
7\.80
Environmental Category: A - Full Assessment
Simplified Processing
Simple [X]
Repeater []
Is this project processed under OP 8\.50 (Emergency Recovery)
Yes [ ]
No [X]
2\. Project Objectives
The project development objectives would remain unchanged\. The additional financing
would continue supporting the key development objectives of the project, including the
improvement of the effectiveness of basic agricultural support services to increase the
international competitiveness of agricultural products\. The project would do so by
introducing new and more productive technologies, increasing quality and improving
sanitary conditions of products, eradicating diseases that limit access to international
markets, and improving rural productive infrastructure to reduce production and
marketing costs\.
The AF would fund activities that with the exception of Avian Flu efforts are ongoing
and were processed under PROSAP's safeguard procedures\. Those procedures are set
forth in detail in an Environmental Manual (EM) and summarized in an Environmental
Management Framework (EMF), which explain how subprojects are screened and
evaluated to identify and mitigate potential safeguards issues\. For the purposes of this
AF, the project's Environmental Assessment (EA) has been updated to reflect the
Page 2
safeguards screening and evaluation results for each proposed subproject (including
Avian Flu efforts)\.
Like the ongoing phase of PROSAP, while the majority of activities supported are
Category B-type investments, the AF is a Category A as it includes one Category A
subproject (Chaco - L?nea Tapeng? Drainageand Agricultural Production Development
subproject)\. That subproject, the works for which are already completed, was closely
supervised by Bank safeguard specialists\. The resulting Environmental Impact
Assessment and Management Plan (EIA-EMP) and Indigenous Peoples Development
Plan (IPDP) are summarized in the project's updated Environmental Management
Framework, and have been consulted and disclosed both in-country and through the
Bank?s InfoShop on December 5, 2006\. None of the activities to be financed have
caused, or will cause, any resettlement\.
3\. Project Description
The proposed additional loan would finance completion of original activities under the
above mentioned project, which faced an unanticipated financing gap and cost overrun\.
In addition, a small portion of the additional financing (4\.7 percent) would finance a
minor scale-up in support of the prevention of an avian flu pandemic, which nevertheless
fall within the project?s original development objectives and is specifically linked to one
of nine project intervention areas, that of animal health\. With the additional financing,
the project is expected to achieve its full original objectives\. There are two underlying
causes for the financing gap\. First was the transfer out in 2002 of $20 million for an
Emergency Human Health component, driven by Argentina's economic and social crisis
(but unrelated to the project's original objectives)\. This transfer out was agreed by the
Ministry of Economy and the Bank in face of the crisis and characterized as a cost
savings, nevertheless required a reduction in scope of the activities planned and a re-
setting of targets\. Second are the subsequent cost overruns resulting from higher-than
anticipated increases in construction costs following the rebound in economic activity
after the crisis, affecting 18 of 22 of subprojects under implementation\.
Over half of the additional financing would be devoted to animal health activities of
large economic importance, aimed at (a) restoring and completing project activities
designed to eradicate Foot and Mouth disease (FMD), and (b) introducing new activities
being supported by the Bank at a global scale related to the prevention of an Avian Flu
pandemic\. These new activities involve monitoring and capacity-builidng efforts related
to pandemic prevention but would not include control activities if an outbreak were to
occurr\. These complementary new activities fall under the original objectives of the
project and imply a minor a scale up of the project\. The remaining balance (slightly less
than half) of the additional financing would be used to restore and complete ongoing
project activities under other types of subprojects\.
Page 3
4\. Project Location and salient physical characteristics relevant to the safeguard
analysis
As in the Original Project, the project area includes 9 provinces throughout Argentina:
Catamarca, Chaco, Chubut, C?rdoba, Entre R?os, Mendoza, Misiones, Neuqu?n and
Tucum?n\.
5\. Environmental and Social Safeguards Specialists
6\. Safeguard Policies Triggered
Yes No
Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4\.01)
X
Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4\.04)
X
Forests (OP/BP 4\.36)
X
Pest Management (OP 4\.09)
X
Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4\.11)
X
Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4\.10)
X
Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4\.12)
X
Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4\.37)
X
Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP
7\.50)
X
Projects in Disputed Areas (OP/BP 7\.60)
X
II\. Key Safeguard Policy Issues and Their Management
A\. Summary of Key Safeguard Issues
1\. Describe any safeguard issues and impacts associated with the proposed project\.
Identify and describe any potential large scale, significant and/or irreversible impacts:
The AF would fund activities that ?with the exception of Avian Flu efforts?are ongoing
and already processed under PROSAP?s existing safeguard procedures\. Those procedures
are set forth in an Environmental Management Framework (EMF), which explains how
subprojects are screened and evaluated to identify and mitigate potential safeguards
issues\. While the majority of activities supported are Category B-type investments, the
AF is a Category A as it includes one Category A subproject (L?nea Tapeng? Drainage)\.
That subproject has been closely supervised by Bank safeguard specialists\. The resulting
EIA-EMP and IPDP, along with the general safeguards screening procedures that will
accommodate all the activities to be financed (including Avian Flu efforts) are
summarized in the project?s updated Environmental Management Framework, and have
been consulted and disclosed both in-country and through the Bank?s InfoShop\.
2\. Describe any potential indirect and/or long term impacts due to anticipated future
activities in the project area:
The project is not expected to result in significant negative environmental impacts\. The
majority of project activities are low-impact activities, including rehabilitation or
improvement of existing infrastructure (such as rural roads or most irrigation
subprojects), or limited new construction in low-sensitivity areas (such as the sanitary
barriers or lab construction)\. Potential negative environmental impacts include soil
erosion or nutrient loss, water quality effects, and increased use of pesticides and/or
Page 4
chemicals for animal health control (with resulting environmental and worker health
implications), and increased use\. These impacts are more thoroughly described in the
project EA\.
Rather, the project is expected to result in positive environmental outcomes, through
attempts to improve the efficiency of agricultural productivity in Argentina?s provinces\.
Improvements in water allocation and efficiency, coupled with technical assistance to
encourage IPM, and modern production methods, are likely to result in improved
environmental management in the rural sector\. Cumulative impacts are not expected to be
significant, as the project is nationwide (but limited) in scope, and all activities are being
implemented in areas already under agricultural production\.
3\. Describe any project alternatives (if relevant) considered to help avoid or minimize
adverse impacts\.
The EIA-EMP that was done for the L?nea Tapenag? subproject ? which is the only
Category A subproject ? includes an analysis of alternative designs to achieve the
subproject?s goal of reducing frequent flooding in the upper portion of the R?o Tapenag?
Watershed\. The alternative that was chosen is the most environmentally benign\.
4\. Describe measures taken by the borrower to address safeguard policy issues\. Provide
an assessment of borrower capacity to plan and implement the measures described\.
An EMP was developed as part of the EIA setting forth the specific measures to mitigate
all identified impacts\. The EMP includes a construction management plan, which
addresses traffic, impacts to minor infrastructure (livestock-related), waste management,
worker and road safety, impacts to public services and infrastructure (roads, railroads),
environmental protection measures (soil, air, water and landscape), and public
information\. Likewise, the EMP includes measures to be implemented over a four-year
period following completion of the works, including installation of a monitoring and alert
system for water, soil and vegetation, and technical assistance to farmers for natural
resource management (including IPM training, soil and water management, etc\.)\. The
EMP?s construction management plan was implemented by the contractor, under the
supervision of the Provincial Water Administration (APA) and the UEC\. The activities
are to be implemented by the APA and the local Water and Soil Management
Commissions (COMAS)\. The total EMP budget is US$ 28,100\.
IPDP: A site specific IPDP was developed and implemented to ensure culturally
compatible benefits were provided to those indigenous peoples affected by the L?nea
Tapeng? Drainage subproject\. The IPDP, reviewed, approved and supervised by the Bank
project team?s social specialist, includes an analysis of flood-related problems in the
community, as well as an evaluation of other key issues important to the community?s
economic development\. Through the IPDP, the community identified and prioritized a
number of actions, which were in turn funded by the L?nea Tapeng? subproject\. These
activities were successfully completed to the community?s satisfaction, and included: (1)
rerouting and treating sewage discharge from a neighboring city (Quitilipi) outside of the
Tapeng? Watershed; (2) construction of a school and health center; (3) improvement of
existing roads; (4) expansion of the drinking water well network; (5) expansion of the
Page 5
watering trough system for cattle; (6) rehabilitation of the community center; (7)
technical assistance for productive activities; and (8) support for improved
communication both within the community and with neighboring communities\.
The IPDP, which had a budget of US$ 567,000, was successfully implemented under
the initial PROSAP project phase\.
Both the EIA-EMP and IPDP were made publicly available at the project WEB site
(http://www\.sagpya\.mecon\.gov\.ar/) after the documents were approved\. Likewise, these
documents are available through the Bank?s InfoShop\.
5\. Identify the key stakeholders and describe the mechanisms for consultation and
disclosure on safeguard policies, with an emphasis on potentially affected people\.
Consultation: Public consultations were held for both the EIA-EMP and IPDP\.
Consultations for the EIA-EMP?s Terms of Reference were held in Roque Saenz Pe?a on
December 1, 2003\. Additionally, consultations on the draft EIA were held in Brasail and
Roque Saenz Pe?a on January 30, 2004\.
Likewise, the IPDP is the product of multiple consultations involving the affected
indigenous community prior to finalizing the TORs for the plan, as well as the final plan\.
Those events were held at the Colonia Abor?gen on January 30, 2004 with approximately
100 people in attendance and on March 27, 2004 with an approximate attendance of 200
people\.
B\. Disclosure Requirements Date
Environmental Assessment/Audit/Management Plan/Other:
Date of receipt by the Bank
11/16/2006
Date of "in-country" disclosure
12/05/2006
Date of submission to InfoShop
12/05/2006
For category A projects, date of distributing the Executive
Summary of the EA to the Executive Directors
12/21/1995
Indigenous Peoples Plan/Planning Framework:
Date of receipt by the Bank
04/30/2004
Date of "in-country" disclosure
12/05/2006
Date of submission to InfoShop
12/05/2006
Pest Management Process:
Date of receipt by the Bank
N/A
Date of "in-country" disclosure
N/A
Date of submission to InfoShop
N/A
*
If the project triggers the Pest Management and/or Physical Cultural Resources,
the respective issues are to be addressed and disclosed as part of the Environmental
Assessment/Audit/or EMP\.
Page 6
If in-country disclosure of any of the above documents is not expected, please
explain why:
C\. Compliance Monitoring Indicators at the Corporate Level (to be filled in when the
ISDS is finalized by the project decision meeting)
OP/BP/GP 4\.01 - Environment Assessment
Does the project require a stand-alone EA (including EMP) report?
Yes
If yes, then did the Regional Environment Unit or Sector Manager (SM)
review and approve the EA report?
Yes
Are the cost and the accountabilities for the EMP incorporated in the
credit/loan?
Yes
OP/BP 4\.04 - Natural Habitats
Would the project result in any significant conversion or degradation of
critical natural habitats?
No
If the project would result in significant conversion or degradation of other
(non-critical) natural habitats, does the project include mitigation measures
acceptable to the Bank?
N/A
OP 4\.09 - Pest Management
Does the EA adequately address the pest management issues?
Yes
Is a separate PMP required?
No
If yes, has the PMP been reviewed and approved by a safeguards specialist or
SM? Are PMP requirements included in project design? If yes, does the
project team include a Pest Management Specialist?
N/A
OP/BP 4\.11 - Physical Cultural Resources
Does the EA include adequate measures related to cultural property?
Yes
Does the credit/loan incorporate mechanisms to mitigate the potential
adverse impacts on cultural property?
Yes
OP/BP 4\.10 - Indigenous Peoples
Has a separate Indigenous Peoples Plan/Planning Framework (as
appropriate) been prepared in consultation with affected Indigenous Peoples?
Yes
If yes, then did the Regional unit responsible for safeguards or Sector
Manager review the plan?
Yes
If the whole project is designed to benefit IP, has the design been reviewed
and approved by the Regional Social Development Unit or Sector Manager?
N/A
The World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information
Have relevant safeguard policies documents been sent to the World Bank's
Infoshop?
Yes
Have relevant documents been disclosed in-country in a public place in a
form and language that are understandable and accessible to project-affected
groups and local NGOs?
Yes
All Safeguard Policies
Have satisfactory calendar, budget and clear institutional responsibilities
been prepared for the implementation of measures related to safeguard
Yes
Page 7
policies?
Have costs related to safeguard policy measures been included in the project
cost?
Yes
Does the Monitoring and Evaluation system of the project include the
monitoring of safeguard impacts and measures related to safeguard policies?
No
Have satisfactory implementation arrangements been agreed with the
borrower and the same been adequately reflected in the project legal
documents?
Yes
D\. Approvals
Signed and submitted by:
Name
Date
Task Team Leader:
Mr Alvaro J\. Soler
12/13/2006
Environmental Specialist:
Ms Ann Jeannette Glauber
12/13/2006
Social Development Specialist
Ms Judith M\. Lisansky
12/13/2006
Additional Environmental and/or
Social Development Specialist(s):
Approved by:
Regional Safeguards Coordinator:
Mr Reidar Kvam
12/13/2006
Comments:
Sector Manager:
Mr Mark E\. Cackler
Comments: | APPROVAL |
P073458 | Document of
The World Bank
Report No: ICR2850
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-H3070)
ON A
GRANT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 5\.3 MILLION
(US$ 8\.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
KINGDOM OF BHUTAN
FOR A
PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
December 31, 2013
Finance and Private Sector Development Unit
South Asia Region
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective June 30, 2013)
Currency Unit = Ngultrums (Nu)
1\.00 = US$ [0\.017]
US$ 1\.00 = [59\.7]
FISCAL YEAR
July 1 â June 30
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AS Analytical Skills
ATM Automated Teller Machines
ATS Automated Trading System
BBO Brokerâs Back Office
BBS Bhutan Business Solutions
BCCI Bhutan Chamber of Commerce & Industry
BICMA Bhutan InfoComm and Media Authority
BICTTA Bhutan ICT & Training Association
BITC Bhutan Innovation and Technology Center
BOB Bank of Bhutan
BPC Bhutan Power Corporation
BPO Business Process Outsourcing
BT Bhutan
CAS Country Assistance Strategy
CBS Core Banking Solution
CPS Country Partnership Strategy
CSS Clearing and Settlement System
DBFOOT Design, Build, Finance, Own, Operate and Transfer
DHI Druk Holding and Investments
DITT Department of Information Technology & Telecom
DO Development Objective
DPA Department of Public Accounts
EA Environmental Assessment
EDS Electronic Depository System
EFT Electronic Fund Transfer
EFTCS Electronic Fund Transfer Clearing System
EMP Environment Management Plan
ETP Employment Training Program
FA Financing Agreement
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FLP Financial Literacy Program
FIs Financial Institutions
FIP Financial Inclusion Policy
FRSD Financial Regulation and Supervision Department
FM Financial Management
FY Fiscal Year
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GDM Green Dragon Media
GSE Global Skills Enhancement
GTP Graduate Training Program
HV High Voltage
IA Implementation Agency
ICT Information and Communication Technology
IDA International Development Association
IPO Initial Public Offering
IFC International Finance Corporation
IMF International Monetary Fund
IO Intermediate Outcome
IP Implementation Progress
IPO Initial Public Offering
IRR Internal Rate of Return
ISR Implementation Status and Results Report
IT Information Technology
ITES Information Technology Enabled Services
LE Language Enhancement
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
LEED Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
MFI Microfinance Institution
MOEA Ministry of Economic Affairs
MOF Ministry of Finance
MOIC Ministry of Information and Communications
MOLHR Ministry of Labor and Human Resources
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MSS Market Surveillance System
MTR Midterm Review
NPV Net Present Value
PAD Project Appraisal Document
PPP Private Public Partnership
PIA Project Implementation Agency
PDO Project Development Objective
PSC Program Steering Committee
PSD Private Sector Development
RBI Reserve Bank of India
RGOB Royal Government of Bhutan
RMA Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan
RSEBL Royal Securities Exchange of Bhutan Limited
RUB Royal University of Bhutan
SEDF South Asia Enterprise Development Facility
SEIA Socio Economic Impact Assessment
TTPL Thimphu Tech Park Pvt Ltd
VC Video Conferencing
VLE/CMS Virtual Learning Environment/Course Management System
WB World Bank
Vice President: Philippe H\. Le Houerou
Country Director: Robert Saum
Sector Manager: Henry K\. Bagazonzya
Project Team Leader: Cecile Thioro Niang
ICR Team Leader: Suhail Kassim
ICR Primary Author: Mihasonirina Andrianaivo
BHUTAN
Private Sector Development Project
CONTENTS
Data Sheet
A\. Basic Information
B\. Key Dates
C\. Ratings Summary
D\. Sector and Theme Codes
E\. Bank Staff
F\. Results Framework Analysis
G\. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
H\. Restructuring
I\. Disbursement Graph
1\. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design \. 1
2\. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes \. 4
3\. Assessment of Outcomes \. 9
4\. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome \. 15
5\. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance \. 16
6\. Lessons Learned \. 18
7\. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners \. 20
Annex 1\. Project Costs and Financing \. 21
Annex 2\. Outputs by Component \. 22
Annex 3\. Economic and Financial Analysis\. 32
Annex 4\. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes \. 36
Annex 5\. Beneficiary Survey Results \. 38
Annex 6\. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results \. 47
Annex 7\. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR \. 49
Annex 8\. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders \. 54
Annex 9\. List of Supporting Documents \. 55
MAP \. 56
A\. Basic Information
Bhutan Private Sector
Country: Bhutan Project Name:
Development
Project ID: P073458 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-H3070
ICR Date: 12/24/2013 ICR Type: Core ICR
KINGDOM OF
Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower:
BHUTAN
Original Total
XDR 5\.30M Disbursed Amount: XDR 5\.25M
Commitment:
Revised Amount: XDR 5\.25M
Environmental Category: B
Implementing Agencies:
Ministry of Information and Communications
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:
B\. Key Dates
Revised / Actual
Process Date Process Original Date
Date(s)
Concept Review: 12/14/2006 Effectiveness: 06/22/2007 06/22/2007
12/21/2010
Appraisal: 04/02/2007 Restructuring(s):
06/21/2012
Approval: 06/20/2007 Mid-term Review: 06/10/2010 10/20/2010
Closing: 06/30/2012 06/30/2013
C\. Ratings Summary
C\.1 Performance Rating by ICR
Outcomes: Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate
Bank Performance: Satisfactory
Borrower Performance: Satisfactory
C\.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)
Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings
Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory
Implementing
Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Satisfactory
Agency/Agencies:
Overall Bank Overall Borrower
Satisfactory Satisfactory
Performance: Performance:
C\.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators
Implementation QAG Assessments (if
Indicators Rating
Performance any)
Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry
No None
at any time (Yes/No): (QEA):
Problem Project at any time Quality of Supervision
No None
(Yes/No): (QSA):
DO rating before
Satisfactory
Closing/Inactive status:
D\. Sector and Theme Codes
Original Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Central government administration 13 13
General education sector 25 25
General finance sector 12 12
General industry and trade sector 15 15
Information technology 35 35
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Education for the knowledge economy 20 20
Improving labor markets 20 20
Infrastructure services for private sector development 40 40
Other Private Sector Development 20 20
E\. Bank Staff
Positions At ICR At Approval
Vice President: Philippe H\. Le Houerou Praful C\. Patel
Country Director: Robert J\. Saum Alastair J\. McKechnie
Sector Manager: Henry K Bagazonzya Simon C\. Bell
Project Team Leader: Cecile Thioro Niang Asya Akhlaque
ICR Team Leader: Suhail Kassim
ICR Primary Author: Mihasonirina Andrianaivo
F\. Results Framework Analysis
Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)
The objective of the project is to increase productive employment in Bhutan through promotion
of enterprise development in the IT/ITES sector, enhanced IT skills, and improved access to
finance\.
Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)
No change
(a) PDO Indicator(s)
Original Target Actual Value
Formally
Values (from Achieved at
Indicator Baseline Value Revised
approval Completion or
Target Values
documents) Target Years
Indicator 1 : Cumulative job creation in the IT/ITES sector supported by the project\.
PDO outcome
indicator
revised to
âCumulative
job creation in
Value
the IT/ITES
quantitative or 0 700 1015
Sector in the IT
Qualitative)
Park and related
activitiesâ â
Target
remained
unchanged
Date achieved 06/30/2007 06/30/2012 06/30/2013 09/30/2013
Comments
(incl\. % Target value exceeded by 45 percent\.
achievement)
(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)
Original Target Actual Value
Formally
Values (from Achieved at
Indicator Baseline Value Revised Target
approval Completion or
Values
documents) Target Years
Indicator 1 : Cumulative leads generated for new investments in the IT Park
Value
(quantitative 0 200 200 255
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 06/30/2007 06/30/2012 06/30/2012 06/30/2012
Comments
(incl\. % Target value exceeded by 27\.5 percent
achievement)
Indicator 2 : Number of companies successfully incubated in the IT Park
Value
(quantitative 0 5 5 13
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 06/30/2007 06/30/2012 06/30/2012 06/30/2013
Comments
(incl\. % Target value exceeded by 160 percent
achievement)
Indicator 3 : Percentage of lettable space leased out
Value
(quantitative 0 100% 100% 25%
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 06/30/2007 06/30/2012 06/30/2012 06/30/2013
Comments
(incl\. % 25 percent of target value met
achievement)
Percent of students clearing ITES industry competency assessment that is widely
Indicator 4 :
recognized
Value
(quantitative 0% 35% 35% 56%
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 06/30/2007 06/30/2012 06/30/2012 09/30/2013
Comments
(incl\. % Target value exceeded by 60%
achievement)
Indicator 5 : Percentage of students trained are successfully employed by the private sector
Value
(quantitative 0% 50% 50% 63\.63%
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 06/30/2007 06/30/2012 06/30/2012 09/30/2013
Comments
(incl\. % Target value exceeded by 27\.26%
achievement)
Indicator 6 : Number of financial transactions by using ATMs per year
IO indicator
revised to
âNumber of
ATM financial
transactions at
Bank of Bhutan
Value
per year,
(quantitative 40,000 50,000 1,418,494
following the
or Qualitative)
2010
restructuring of
the projectâ-
Target value
was revised to
900,000
Date achieved 06/30/2007 06/30/2012 06/30/2013 06/30/2013
Comments
Between July 2012 and June 2013, the number of ATM financial transactions at Bank
(incl\. %
of Bhutan were 1,418,494\.The revised target value was exceeded by 57\.6 %\.
achievement)
Indicator 7 : Value of financial transactions by using ATMs per year
IO indicator
was removed
Value
following the
(quantitative Nu 150m Nu 188m Nu\. 1,644\.24m
2010
or Qualitative)
restructuring of
the projec
Date achieved 06/30/2007 06/30/2012 06/30/2012 06/30/2010
Comments
(incl\. % Target exceeded by more than 774 percent as of June 2010
achievement)
Volume of fund transfer transactions among banks channeled through the EFTCS
Indicator 8 :
system
IO indicator
was removed
Value
following the
(quantitative 0 40,000 0
2010
or Qualitative)
restructuring of
the project
Date achieved 12/31/2010 06/30/2012 06/30/2012 06/30/2010
Comments
The IO indicator was removed in 2010 because the implementation of a national
(incl\. %
payment system (EFTCS system) was henceforth conducted outside the project
achievement)
Indicator 9 : Per cent of district coverage for financial literacy campaign
IO indicator
with target
value of 100%
Value
was added
(quantitative 0% N/A 100%
following the
or Qualitative)
2010
restructuring of
the project
Date achieved 06/30/2010 06/30/2012 06/30/2012 06/30/2013
Comments
(incl\. % Target was achieved by September 2012\.
achievement)
Percentage automation of stock exchange trading, settlement, and delivery with straight
Indicator 10 :
through processing
IO indicator
with target
Value value of 100%
(quantitative 0% N/A was added 100%
or Qualitative) following the
2010
restructuring of
the project
Date achieved 06/30/2010 06/30/2012 06/30/2012 06/30/2012
Comments
(incl\. % Target was achieved by April 2012
achievement)
G\. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
Date ISR Actual Disbursements
No\. DO IP
Archived (USD millions)
1 11/16/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0\.15
2 06/06/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0\.15
3 12/23/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1\.24
4 06/26/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1\.24
5 02/05/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2\.03
6 12/11/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2\.54
7 07/09/2011 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 3\.88
8 01/08/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 7\.34
9 11/20/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 7\.79
10 06/26/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 8\.09
H\. Restructuring (if any)
ISR Ratings at Amount
Board
Restructuring Restructuring Disbursed at Reason for Restructuring & Key
Approved PDO
Date(s) Restructuring Changes Made
Change DO IP
in USD millions
Level 2 restructuring\. The main
reason was to accommodate the
financial inclusion agenda under
the project\. In addition, bilateral
assistance from the Reserve Bank
of India (RBI) was secured for the
establishment of an inter-bank
electronic fund transfer clearing
system (EFTCS - component 3)
and therefore was being
12/21/2010 N S S 2\.54
implemented separately from the
project\. The initial Nu 29\.8m
(US$500,000) funds earmarked for
the EFTCS was reallocated to
financial inclusion and upgrading
of the IT infrastructure of the
Royal Security Exchange of
Bhutan\. IO indicators were also
changed accordingly\. To fund the
Nu\. 26\.9m (US$450,000)
ISR Ratings at Amount
Board
Restructuring Restructuring Disbursed at Reason for Restructuring & Key
Approved PDO
Date(s) Restructuring Changes Made
Change DO IP
in USD millions
undergrounding of a high voltage
transmission line over the IT Park,
Nu\. 17\.9m (US$300,000) of
component 3âs funds was
reallocated to component 1
(Development of the IT/ITES
Sector), while leaving the overall
Grant Allocation unchanged (the
difference in funds was matched
within component 1)\. In addition,
the Project Development Objective
(PDO) outcome indicator was
revised to take into account value-
added jobs created in all sectors of
the economy\.
One year closing date extension\.
Even though the project had
achieved its PDO in March 2012
exceeding its final target regarding
the outcome indicator (the number
of Bhutanese graduates hired
under the project was 778 as of
June 2012), the main reason for
closing date extension was to
complete the undergrounding of a
high voltage transmission line in
the IT Park\. Technical and
coordination challenges led to
several delays and the
undergrounding was not completed
06/21/2012 N S S 7\.75 by end May 2012 as initially
planned\. The implementation of
some activities also benefited from
the closing date extension (such as
the activities in the Financial
Literacy Program âFLP- including
comic book advance version
drawing and the TV soap operas)\.
In addition, using project savings
and savings from exchange rate
differentials, RGOB expanded its
incentive programs to include
potential tenants with an
employment incentive program
covering a fixed amount of the
training costs of the tenants'
ISR Ratings at Amount
Board
Restructuring Restructuring Disbursed at Reason for Restructuring & Key
Approved PDO
Date(s) Restructuring Changes Made
Change DO IP
in USD millions
employees and a matching grant
program for commercial tenancy
of the IT Park\. Cofunding support
for Private Sector Development
(PSD)-related activities of the
National ICT Master Plan also
benefitted from the extension and
savings
I\. Disbursement Profile
1\. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design
1\.1 Context at Appraisal
Country and sector background
1\.1\.1\. Bhutan is a small landlocked economy with growth driven by hydropower and donor support\.
Annual per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was Nu 42, 983\.6 (US$720) in 2004\.
1\.1\.2\. The public sector (the preferred employer in Bhutan) could not absorb the increasing number of
graduates and school dropouts entering the labor market every year\. Private sector, considered the âengine
for growthâ, played a limited role in the economy with nascent entrepreneurship and several constraints
faced by private investors\. The Royal Government of Bhutan (RGOB) embarked on a two-pronged
strategy for private sector development (PSD): (i) improving the investment climate through policy and
institutional reform (ii) encouraging ânicheâ sectors as sources of growth and employment generation\.
1\.1\.3\. Information and communications technology (ICT) was considered one such ânicheâ sector\. ICT
could provide areas of new business and employment opportunities for all Bhutanese through a multiplier
effect on employment generation\. Bhutan was also considered as a potential Information
Technology/Information Technology Enabled Services (IT/ITES) location considering (i) Bhutanâs close
ties with India â one of the biggest country players in the offshoring of IT/ITES globally, (ii) Bhutanâs
attractiveness (stability, security, scenery) and (iii) anticipated growth of local businesses\.
1\.1\.4\. Weak financial sector was also identified as a constraint to PSD\. Bhutanâs financial sector was
highly liquid with limited private investment and high interest rate spread\. The payment system was
characterized by heavy use of cash and paper-based instruments which decoupled transaction costs in a
mountainous country with limited transportation infrastructure\. Underdeveloped IT infrastructure and
unbalanced IT development in financial institutions constrained commercial and financial transactions\.
The financial sector was at a rudimentary stage of electronic-payment services\.
Rationale for Bank assistance
1\.1\.5\. RGOB approached the World Bank to assist its strategy of private sector-led economic growth\. One
pillar of the Bankâs Country Assistance Strategy (CAS 2006-2009) was âpromoting private sector
development and employmentâ\. The Bankâs value-added in the proposed project was based on:
(i) its global experience in the ICT sector, including in development of IT Parks, and in financial sector
development, which allowed the Bank to share best practices from other countries and projects
(ii) its ability to catalyze interest from international players through its involvement in the project, which
could facilitate the development of the proposed IT Park
(iii) its complementary operations in supporting Bhutanâs private sector such as the Development Policy
Grant dialogue in the area of investment climate and PSD growth\.
1\.1\.6\. The project responded to the priorities highlighted in the RGOBâs Ninth Five-Year Development
Plan (2002-2008), and the Bhutan CAS: âcreating employment opportunities through PSDâ\.
1\.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators
1
1\.2\.1\. The objective of the project was to increase productive employment in Bhutan through the
following intermediate results: promotion of enterprise development in the IT and ITES sector, enhanced
IT skills, and improved access to finance\.
Key indicators
1\.2\.2\. The PDO outcome indicator as stated in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) was âCumulative
job creation in the IT/ITES Sector supported by the projectâ with an end target of 700\.
1\.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators
1\.3\.1\. The PDO remained unchanged throughout the project\. The scope of the PDO outcome indicator
was revised to âCumulative job creation in the IT/ITES Sector in the IT Park and related activitiesâ
following a Level 2 restructuring of the project in December 2010\. This was because the Mid-Term
Review (MTR) mission showed that the project had generated jobs across sectors directly as a result of
training supported through the project\. The target values remained unchanged\.
1\.4 Main Beneficiaries
1\.4\.1 The PAD did not explicitly define the beneficiaries\. Based on the outcome indicators, it is
inferred that the main beneficiaries include: firms, especially tenants and incubatees of the IT Park;
IT/ITES sector employees; IT/ITES students; banks; and users of ATMs\. Also the overall economy would
benefit from financial infrastructure development and policy reforms\.
1\.5 Original Components (as approved)
1\.5\.1 The project had three components: (i) Development of IT/ITES Sector; (ii) Development of
IT/ITES Skills Program; (iii) Strengthening the Financial Sector through IT use\.
1\.5\.2 Table 1 provides a descriptive summary of the original components and activities, intermediate
outcome (IO) indicators, and a breakdown of the costs\. See Table 2 in Annex 2 for further details\.
Table 1 â Original components, intermediate outcome indicators and breakdown of costs
Costs
Count % of
IDA erpart Total Original Intermediate outcome
Activities by component total
US Funds US indicators
costs
$000 US $ 000
$ 000
Component 1- Development of IT/ITES Sector
(i) Carrying out of infrastructure for an (i) Cumulative leads generated
4,000 4,000 for new investments in the IT
IT Park
Park, (ii) Number of companies
(ii) IT Promotional activities 1,000 1,000 successfully incubated in the IT
Park, (iii) Per cent of lettable
SUB TOTAL Component 1 5,000 5,000 48% space leased out
Component 2 - Development of IT Skills Program
(i) General preparatory work including (i) Per cent of students clearing
technical assistance , M&E and 50 50 ITES industry competency
Advocacy assessment that is widely
2
(ii) Generic skills training for the recognized, (ii) Per cent of
980 980 students trained are successfully
IT/ITES sector
employed by the private sector
(iii) Distance learning facilities and
course management systems for IT 325 325
skills development
(iv) IT Entrepreneurship
645 645
Development program
SUB TOTAL Component 2 2,000 2,000 19%
Component 3 - Strengthening Financial Development through IT use
(i) Modernization of Bank of Bhutan 1,800 (i) Number of financial
200 2,000 transactions by using ATMs per
through IT system upgrade (BOB)
year, (ii) Value of financial
100
(ii) Developing âFinancial sector IT transactions by using ATMs per
50 (IFC/SE 150
development strategic planâ year, (iii) Volume of fund
DF)
transfer transactions among
(iii) Establishing an Inter-bank
450 banks channeled through the
Electronic Fund Transfer Clearing 750 1,200
(RMA) EFT system per year
System (EFTCS)
SUB TOTAL Component 3 1,000 2,430 3,430 33%
TOTAL 8,000 2,430 10,430 100%
in % 77% 23% 100%
Note: currency Exchange Rate: 1US=Nu\.44\.45 as of November 3, 2010\. Except where mentioned otherwise, the rest
of the document uses the exchange rate at closing date1US$=Nu\. 59\.7 (Source: International Monetary Fund)\.
1\.6 Revised Components
2010 Restructuring:
1\.6\.1\. Following a restructuring request by RGOB in December 2010 (after the MTR mission),
component 3 was restructured to accommodate the financial inclusion agenda under the project\. Nu
29\.8m (US$ 500,000) of available component 3 funds was reallocated to fund two new activities:
(i) Upgrading of the IT infrastructure of the Royal Securities Exchange of Bhutan Limited (RSEBL);
(ii) Financial inclusion to support the Royal Monetary Authority (RMA) in providing an enabling
regulatory framework and promoting financial literacy (see Table 2 in Annex 2)\.
1\.6\.2\. The following activities were implemented outside the project: (i) technical assistance to develop a
financial sector IT development strategic plan, co-funded by the International Finance Corporation (IFC),
was completed in January 2009; (ii) inter-bank electronic fund transfer clearing system (EFTCS), was
implemented separately with bilateral assistance from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI)\.
1\.6\.3\. Though the overall grant allocation remained unchanged, Nu\. 17\.9m (US$300,000) was reallocated
from component 3 to component 1 to contribute to funding the Nu 26\.9m (US$450,000) undergrounding
of one kilometer of a high voltage (HV) overhead transmission line over the IT Park\. The power line was
identified as a hazard\. Also, rerouting was necessary as the power line passed by the edge of the IT
building, and rerouting helped comply with Bhutanese regulations that do not allow residential or
commercial buildings in an 18-meter wide right of way below the lines\.
1\.6\.4\. IO indicators of component 3 were revised as follows: (i) âNumber of financial transactions by
using ATMs per yearâ was changed to âNumber of financial transactions by using ATMs at Bank of
Bhutan per yearâ; (ii) âValue of financial transactions by using ATMs per yearâ and âVolume of fund
transfer transactions among banks channeled through the EFT system per yearâ were removed because
3
national payment system was implemented outside the project with RBI ; (iii) Two new IO indicators
were introduced: âPercentage of district coverage for financial literacy campaignâ and âPercentage
automation of stock exchange trading, settlement, and delivery with straight through processingâ\.
2012 Closing Date Extension:
1\.6\.5\. In June 2012, the project extended its closing date to complete the undergrounding of the HV
transmission line\. Initially planned to be completed by May 2012, it suffered delays due to technical and
coordination challenges\.1 The implementation of some activities (e\.g\. Financial Literacy Program)
benefited from closing date extension\. In addition, using project and foreign exchange savings, 2 RGOB
expanded its incentive programs to first mover tenants of the IT Park\. Cofunding support for PSD-related
activities of the National ICT Master Plan also benefitted from the extension\.
1\.7 Other significant changes
1\.7\.1\. Changes in component 3 and a request from RGOB to simplify implementation arrangements led to
the following institutional modifications: (i) Removal of three covenants of the Financing Agreement
related to the financial sector IT task force, the IT technical working group, and the IT task force on IT
skills development; (ii) Change in the staff composition of the implementation agency of component 3\.
2\. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2\.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry
2\.1\.1\. At design, the Bank team drew lessons from the CAS evaluation report of 2005\. IFC-SEDF (South
Asia Enterprise Development Facility) also contributed to design by financing two feasibility studies: (i)
Industrial Estates and (ii) IT Park and Distance Learning Centers\.
2\.1\.2\. Project components were designed to facilitate the achievement of the development objective of
increasing productive employment\. The proposed interventions were complementary and maximized
synergies\. Component 2 focused on development of skills (in collaboration with international and private
organizations) to ensure availability of a stream of trained IT manpower as a pre-requisite for the success
and sustainability of the proposed IT Park\. The design team proposed the development of the IT Park
under component 1 (despite cautionary assessments in the IT Park and Distance Learning Centersâ
feasibility study) because it was aligned with national priorities, emerged from stakeholder consultations,
took into account international experiences with IT Parks, and aimed at approaching IT/ITES sector
development in a dynamic and flexible manner thereby leading to increased efficiencies in other domestic
industries\. Also component 3 was designed to solve the operational inefficiencies that hampered PSD in
the country through ICT development in the financial sector\. In a nutshell, project activities targeted both
the supply side (through components 2 and 3) and the demand side (through component 1)\.
2\.1\.3\. The design team undertook a thorough risk assessment\. The PAD rated risks to project success as
substantial\. Skills gap was identified as a moderate risk at design stage\. During implementation, the
Ministry of Labor and Human Resources (MOLHR) stepped in to provide employees with the specialized
training required by private firms (including tenants)\.3 Another risk identified in the PAD was internet
1
This was the first undergrounding undertaken by Bhutan Power Corporation (BPC)\. BPC faced challenges in meeting
international safety and safeguard measures\. In addition an unforeseen landslide in early 2012 required the construction of a
retaining wall and adversely impacted the timelines\. Parallel road expansion works financed by RGOB also impacted the works\.
2
In June 2012, projectâs savings were about Nu\. 26m (US$ 437,865)\. Savings from exchange rate differentials were about Nu\.
17m (US$284,322)\.
3
Initial industry assessments (with Genpact and Infosys) revealed that few students had the skills needed in the IT/ITES sector\.
The first occupant of the IT Park stopped its operations in November 2012 due to factors that included skills gaps of employees\.
4
connectivity infrastructure not being up to international standards\. Domestic and international competition
was expected to bring down connectivity costs and RGOB committed to bearing the differential cost
between the leased line rates for IT Park tenants and prevailing regional rates through the âLetter of
Sector Policyâ in April 2007\. Though this demonstrated RGOBâs commitment to the success of the
project, it did not solve the underlying issue\. Internet connectivity to date remains a risk to the long term
success of the project\. Today RGOB is providing subsidies to the IT Park occupants (see Annex 2, Box
3), for an initial period of 3 years, and concerted efforts to reduce connectivity costs continue\. 4
2\.1\.4\. Apart from the connectivity issue, mitigating measures identified at design stage helped overcome
most challenges faced during implementation:
(i) The potential failure to attract reputable IT infrastructure developers to Bhutan (evaluated as high risk)\.
Indeed, during implementation, only one eligible bid from a private developer (Thimphu Tech Park Ltd â
TTPL) was received for the IT Park\. Mitigating actions proposed at design stage, such as IT promotion
activities led by RGOB and allotment of appropriate land, helped seal the deal with the private developer;
(ii) The cross sectorial nature of the project, and the unsatisfactory IT system upgrade and usage leading
to operational inefficiency in financial institutions, were considered as moderate risks though they did not
materialize\. The various task forces, coordination committees and investment promotion activities that
involved several government agencies and stakeholders mitigated these risks\. They helped attract
stakeholdersâ interests and obtain their commitment to project success\.
2\.2 Implementation
2\.2\.1\. Project implementation was rated satisfactory since effectiveness, except for a one time downgrade
to moderately satisfactory due to a disbursement lag in June 2011\. Components did not progress at the
same speed due to (largely unanticipated) implementation and institutional challenges\.
The global financial crisis affected the outlook for component 1
2\.2\.2\. The 2008 financial crisis adversely affected private participation in infrastructure and enclave
projects globally\. Several potential investors became reluctant to participate in the tender for the IT Park\.
Nonetheless, the IT/ITES investment promotion activities led to successful contract signing with TTPL\.
2\.2\.3\. Despite signing MOUs to locate in Bhutan in 2009 and 2011, as a second wave of global economic
slowdown affected IT firms in 2011, Genpact and Wipro put in abeyance their plans to locate in Bhutan\.
They were losing voice based business to the Philippines and existing clients were reducing their IT
spending\. This led to inventory of unutilized spaces in these firmsâ offshore facilities and their employees
were being laid off\. In this scenario, they became less enthusiastic to expand into Bhutan\.
Internet connectivity adversely impacted results of component 1
2\.2\.4\. Internet connectivity issues (lack of redundancy of the communications networks and high
bandwidth prices) led a large foreign investor to decide against starting operations in Bhutan\. RGOB
deployed efforts throughout the project to reduce connectivity prices and increase quality (see Annex 2,
Box 2)\. But even after start of operations in 2012, quality of connectivity has continued to affect
occupants of the IT Park\. Shaun Communication (the first occupant) temporarily stopped its operations in
the IT Park and later changed its telecom operator due to quality issues\. By projectâs closing date, prices
have reduced significantly in 2013 but are still not at par with the region\. RGOB pays the price difference
to IT Park occupants\.
4
Telecom subsidy was provided for an initial 3 years in 2011 but this timeline commenced when IT park occupants started
operations in 2012-13\. According to RGOB, the draft telecom and broadband policy could lead to further liberalization of the
sector; and the third international gateway (currently underway) will improve telecom infrastructure and provide redundancy\.
5
Innovative skills development partnerships for component 2
2\.2\.5\. Component 2 accelerated after a program manager was appointed in August 2008\. Implementation
revealed that Royal University of Bhutan (RUB) alone might not be the natural champion for the
employment program, especially since MOLHR had been given this mandate following the 2008
elections\. After an agreement signed in October 2009 between RUB and MOLHR, implementation of the
employment programs under the project - Graduate Training Program (GTP) and Employment Training
Program (ETP) - progressed well\. The inclusion of MOLHR as an implementation agency proved
judicious, as the pool of Class X and Class XII (high school graduates) unemployed Bhutanese turned out
to be even bigger than tertiary educated graduates\.
MTR triggered a level-2 restructuring with change in scope of component 3
2\.2\.6\. The Level 2 restructuring proved instrumental to projectâs successes\. The beneficiaries of the
training were absorbed by various sectors of the economy and by ITES companies outside Bhutan\. 5 The
supply side was built up while the demand side was affected by the delayed construction of the IT Park\.
The restructuring ensured that the project achieved its development objective by appropriately capturing
all jobs generated through the project whether in the IT/ITES sector or in other sectors\.
Closing date extension
2\.2\.7\. Completion of the IT Park took more time than expected mainly because of:
(i) Delays in the undergrounding of the HV (66kV) power lines (see paragraph 1\.6\.5)\. As a result some
advances earmarked for this activity remained unused and triggered audit qualifications in 2011/2012\.6
(ii) Operational challenges\. Additional infrastructure services (water supply requirements and access road
expansion) were required\. In addition, investment climate challenges (access to construction materials,
labor, specialized skills, construction machinery), force majeure events (exceptionally difficult ground
conditions and inclement weather) and project management challenges 7 led the private developer to
request an extension for the completion of construction from September 2011 to April 2012\.
2\.2\.8\. Due to these implementation delays, the projectâs closing date was extended from June 2012 to
June 2013\. Several activities benefitted from this change in closing date (see paragraph 1\.6\.5)\.
2\.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization
2\.3\.1\. The PDO Outcome Indicator aimed to measure evidence of employment generation in the
IT/ITES sector through the project and was clearly linked to the PDO\. 8 After MTR, it was appropriately
revised to include jobs across sectors, which were created directly as a result of the projectâs training
5
There were some clear linkages that worked well between project components, e\.g\. the investment promotion activities of
component 1 generated the industry linkage programs with Infosys, Genpact and Wipro of component 2\. Towards the end of the
project, employment incentive program of component 2 was offered as an incentive for future IT Park tenants (see Annex 2)\.
6
All related outstanding payments were eventually settled before June 2013\.
7
Because of the need to import all material, actual costs of construction were higher than India by about 50 percent\. Labor issues
included difficulty to obtain labor permits, labor unrest, thefts, vandalism, delays of transportation of material due to road
conditions, weather and strikes, delays in clearance of material and equipment for imports, vendor refusals to supply equipment\.
Difficult terrain, inclement weather conditions, unfavorable geological conditions, led to midway redesign of construction\. All
these challenges reportedly created cost overruns for the private partner of 25 percent against initial budget\.
8
The initial PDO Outcome Indicator had two definitions in the PAD: (i) the key performance indicator and results framework
defined the job creation in the IT/ITES sector supported by the project without restriction to the IT Park; (ii) the arrangements for
results monitoring in PAD Annex 3 restricted the measure to cumulative job creation in the IT/ITES sector in the IT Park\. The
task team clarified that the latter was an oversight, and the task team and the Government always used the former definition\.
6
programs: âCumulative job creation in the IT/ITES Sector in the IT Park and related activitiesâ\. 9 Despite
the broadened scope of the PDO outcome indicator, the end-target of 700 jobs remained unchanged (see
paragraph 1\.3\.1)\. The revised PDO outcome indicator was achieved before the IT Park was completed\.
2\.3\.2\. All three components were interrelated to achieve the PDO (see paragraph 2\.1\.2) and had
defined outputs with a set of specific IO indicators related to each component\. Each IO indicator had
baseline values and quantitative targets established\. Most IO indicators were clearly defined\.10
2\.3\.3\. Most IO indicators were directly linked to the achievement of the PDO outcome indicator of
employment generation\. The three IO indicators of component 1 stimulated the demand side through
investment leads; firm incubation; and IT park occupancy\. The IO indicators of component 2 and
component 3 promoted the supply side\. In component 2, competency assessments and conversion rate
from training to employment monitored the efficiency of the training provided and adequacy of skills
developed for employment\. The IO indicators of component 3 were less directly linked to employment
generation; nonetheless increased ATM transactions and automation of the stock exchange indicated
improved efficiency of financial infrastructure for private sector operations; while higher financial
literacy captured improved awareness and capability to efficiently use the financial sector for PSD\.
2\.3\.4\. The Project Implementation Agency (PIA) had dedicated full-time staff responsible for M&E\.
Data was regularly collected from the various Implementation Agencies (IAs) including RUB, MOLHR
and RMA\. All IAs coordinated well on M&E\. The implementation support missions conducted regular
M&E of the results and intermediate indicators\.
2\.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance
Social and Environment
2\.4\.1\. The project was classified as a Category B project at appraisal\. The safeguard policy on
Environmental Assessment (OP/BP/GP 4\.01) was triggered\. Nonetheless, unlike the typical process
followed in OP 4\.01, the Environmental Assessment (EA) and Environmental Management Plan (EMP)
for the IT Park was expected to be completed after Board approval of the project when the private
developer would be selected and the layout and design of the IT Park infrastructure would be completed\.
2\.4\.2\. In compliance with this exceptional decision relating to the application of OP/BP/GP 4\.01, a
comprehensive EA and EMP was prepared by the private developer and approved by the National
Environment Commission of Bhutan and the Bank in late 2009\. The EA confirmed that negative
environmental and social impacts of the IT facility were to be very small, and such impacts would
largely be limited to the construction phase of the IT Park\. The EMP defined measures to reduce and
manage potential construction and operational phase related impacts through noise and traffic
management, labor management, solid waste and soil erosion management, management of occupation
health and safety related impacts\. Implementation of EMP was adequately monitored during the project\.
2\.4\.3\. At MTR, with the undergrounding of the 66kV HV transmission line, the projectâs safeguards
category remained Category B\. New enabling works were not expected to cause significant
9
The PDO indicator was measured by counting all new jobs created as a result of projectâs activities and which would not have
been created otherwise\. For jobs created through the training programs and recruitment drives, employment was tracked within 6
months post-training and changes such as attrition/mobility in employment were not tracked\.
10
The IO indicator on âNumber of companies successfully incubated in the IT Parkâ was initially misinterpreted to represent the
number of incubatees graduating from the IT Parkâs incubation center\. The IO indicator actually represented the number of
incubatees in the incubation center of the IT Park and this clarification was provided during implementation support missions\.
7
environmental or social impacts\. The EMP for the undergrounding specified actions for management of
environmental impacts\. Its implementation was adequately monitored during the construction period by
the National Environment Commission and Bank missions\.
2\.4\.4\. The project performance on environmental and social safeguards is rated Satisfactory\. The project
adequately complied with OP/BP/GP 4\.01 and safeguard policies of RGOB\. RGOBâs EA policies were
compatible with OP/BP/GP 4\.0 and satisfactorily applied international standards\.
Procurement
2\.4\.5\. Most of the issues and risks concerning the procurement component for implementation of the
project were assessed at the time of appraisal and the complex procurement issues covering the IT Park,
under a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model, was planned to be closely monitored during
implementation\. The procurement capacity assessment at appraisal concluded that the knowledge gap of
the dedicated project staff responsible for procurement was small and could be bridged by training\.
2\.4\.6\. The procurement procedure complied with Bankâs Procurement and Consultant Guidelines\. No
major procurement issues occurred during project implementation\. Procurement post reviews did not
highlight any major deviations from agreed procedures for the project\. Procurements were conducted in a
timely manner except for undergrounding of HV transmission line, which was slightly delayed by BPC\.
2\.4\.7\. The procurement capacity and PIA performance was Satisfactory throughout the project\. Record
Keeping/Filing of procurement records was identified as an area that needed to be strengthened\.
Financial management
2\.4\.8\. The Financial Management (FM) performance was Satisfactory throughout the project\.
2\.4\.9\. Designated Account advances based on six months expenditure forecast provided required funds
for the project\. The funds from the Designated Account were distributed to various implementing
agencies to incur expenditure for their respective activities\.
2\.4\.10\. The involvement of several IAs occasionally posed challenge in obtaining project information and
resolving open items\. The PIA ultimately satisfactorily resolved all FM issues\. The submission of the
quarterly IUFRs was mostly on time\. Currently there are no overdue audit reports under the project\. The
next audit report for the financial year 2012-13 will become due on December 31, 2013\.
2\.4\.11\. Use of country financial management systems worked well\. As the countryâs public FM systems
are being strengthened (through Bank support and others), the FM capacity is also improving\.
2\.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
2\.5\.1\. RGOB set up several continuity arrangements for each component of the project to ensure
sustainability of project activities: (i) the PIA was embedded in Ministry of Information and
Communications (MOIC) as the PSD Section under Department of Information Technology & Telecom
(DITT); (ii) new courses developed under the project (academic skills, analytical skills, entrepreneurship)
were mainstreamed and institutionalized by RUB within the college system; (iii) the Human Resource
Development Division of MOLHR took forward the skills development initiatives under the project as a
part of MOLHRâs skills development program 11 in sectors such as ICT, health, arts and craft, and
11
The programs are now âplacement orientedâ rather than âtraining orientedâ\.
8
hospitality; (iv) recruitment drives under the project were carried out by the Department of Employment
of MOLHR; (v) Financial Inclusion Policy and financial literacy implementation were assigned to three
RMA staff under the Financial Regulation and Supervision Department; (vi) automation of RSEBL and
of Bank of Bhutan (BOB) operations is mainstreamed within RSEBL and BOB respectively\.
3\. Assessment of Outcomes
3\.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation
3\.1\.1\. With the economy still reliant on the hydropower sector and donor grants, PSD remains a priority
in Bhutanâs Eleventh Five Year Plan (11FYP) for 2013-2018\. As part of its focus on green accelerated
economic development, the 11FYP aims to diversify the economy to non-hydro sectors for import-
substitution and export promotion, and create employment opportunities in particular for the youth\.
3\.1\.2\. The projectâs objectives were relevant at inception and remain relevant today\. The 11FYP
highlights RGOBâs focus on resolving underemployment and quality of employment\. Youth
unemployment was estimated as 7\.3 percent in 2012 and RGOBâs target is to reduce it to 2\.5 percent in
2018\. The PDO is also well related to the current (FY 2011-14) Country Partnership Strategy (CPS)\. The
PSD project responds to the countryâs development objectives of (i) leveraging private sector
participation for strategic infrastructure and (ii) improved efficiency of and access to financial services\.
Hence the relevance of objectives, design, and implementation is High\.
3\.1\.3\. The components of the project remain relevant to the countryâs development priorities today\.
Availability of a stream of trained IT manpower is critical to develop communication infrastructure in
Bhutan\. Use of IT for enhanced financial sector efficiency and financial inclusion are important
considering RGOBâs concern to provide access to finance to some sectors through priority sector lending\.
The newly elected Prime Minister appears committed to the IT Park\. His first business visit was to
Hyderabad where he met officials of Infosys and Microsoft to discuss possibilities of collaboration and
where he emphasized the value that Bhutan offers to global IT companiesâ critical operations\.12
Choice of ICT sector:
3\.1\.4\. At design stage, ICT and more particularly the ITES sector was selected as focus area due to its
potential for employment, innovations, higher learning elasticities, and positive externalities\. This was a
joint decision made by RGOB, the Bank and other stakeholders, and took into account feasibility studies\.
3\.1\.5\. The projectâs focus on PSD and ITES sector was in hindsight a step in the right direction with
RGOBâs commitment to enhance the use of ICT, including mobile technology, to reduce bureaucratic
processes and turn-around-time for public service delivery\. The project also piloted innovations relevant
to non-ICT sectors (e\.g\. PPPs, private sector-led training and employment, incubation center)\.
3\.1\.6\. Today the ICT sector is prominently mentioned in the 11FYP in developing the communications
infrastructure, including fiber optic network, national data center, and government intranet system\. The
Economic Development Policy (2010) identified ICT as a priority: âThe transformation of the traditional
Bhutanese society into a knowledge based society and the development of high end service industry shall
be enabled by ICT\. In so doing, the Royal Government shall endeavor to make Bhutan an attractive
destination for FDI in R&D, data processing and high end BPOs through a highly skilled talent pool\.â
12
See media coverage at: http://www\.kuenselonline\.com/bhutan-is-open-to-business-pm/
9
3\.1\.7\. To achieve its full job creation potential, the ICT sector requires good internet connectivity and
availability of a critical mass of technically qualified talent pool, which remain two areas for
improvement as evidenced during project implementation\.
Inclusion of Financial Sector Component:
3\.1\.8\. The financial sector activities under component 3 were included in a project titled âPrivate Sector
Developmentâ whose objective is productive employment\. A strong financial sector is essential to
improve the âhorizontalâ investment climate, which benefits all private sector firms, and in turn supports
productive employment\. Also, it is common in small land-locked country projects (and small IDA
envelopes) to combine private sector and financial sector activities into one project, thus reducing the
transaction cost to the country\. Given these aspects, inclusion of financial sector component in the project
is deemed appropriate\. Through this component, the financial sector payment infrastructure was
modernized to service increased number of transactions, stock market efficiency increased, and draft
regulations on access to finance provided regulatory framework to fund private sector investments\.
3\.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives
3\.2\.1\. The PDO was to increase productive employment in Bhutan through the following intermediate
results: promotion of enterprise development in the IT and ITES sector, enhanced IT skills, and improved
access to finance\. The PDO was largely achieved and its efficacy rating is High\. Through the training and
infrastructure provided under the project, 1,015 value added jobs (exceeding the target of 700) were
created for young Bhutanese, of which 205 (20 percent) were located in the IT Park as of September
2013\. On a national scale, this represents almost 15 percent of the total unemployed in Bhutan in 2012,
and almost 21 percent of the unemployed who attended a school or institute in 2007 (at the start of the
project)\. 13 Most of those employed were between 19 to 24 years old, with equal representation between
young men and women from across Bhutanâs 20 districts, and the jobs created by the project represent 29
percent of total youth unemployment\. 14
3\.2\.2\. Expectation mismatch: There was some negative press about the project in the media during the
latter stages of project implementation; 15 even though the projectâs outcome indicator and all intermediate
outcome targets (except one related to IT Park occupancy) were met or exceeded\. IT promotional
activities (roadshows) carried out under the project set high expectations of IT Park, which (being the
visible infrastructure part of the project) was incorrectly equated to being the whole project\. The
roadshows highlighted Bhutan as an emerging ICT destination and MOUs were signed between global IT
companies and RGOB; however, external factors (including the global economic slowdown) made these
IT companies revisit their plans to locate in the IT Park as (anchor) tenants\. This created unmet
expectations reflected in the press\.
3\.2\.3\. The achievements of the intermediate outcomes directly affected the PDO as they were designed
to lead to creation of productive employment (see paragraph 2\.3\.3)\. They were as follows:
(i) Development of the IT/ITES sector in Bhutan through attracting IT/ITES firms in the IT Park, and
increase in the private investment in the IT/ITES sector\. This intermediate objective was partially
achieved as of closing date\. The IT Park is the first economic zone in Bhutan built with public/private
investments and fully operated by the private sector\. As of September 2013, it hosts one international
tenant occupying 25 percent of the commercial space of the Park and employing 170 young Bhutanese of
whom 57 percent are women\. 75 percent of the space of the Park remains empty though advanced
13
Data sources: Ministry of Labor and Human Resources, 2012 Labor Force Survey and 2007 Labor Force Survey\.
14
Total jobs facilitated through the project represents 59 percent of unemployed youth (age 15 to 24) in urban areas in 2012\.
15
For instance, there were occasional media references to the IT Park as being a âwhite elephantâ\.
10
discussions are ongoing with potential tenants\. Among them is Shaun Communication, currently renting
out space in the BITC for its 27 employees, which has committed to occupy 25 percent of the commercial
space through signature of a tenancy contract in early 2013\. The IT Park also hosts the first incubation
center in Bhutan to promote micro and small enterprise development/innovation through the Bhutan
Innovation and Technology Center (BITC)\. Three ventures out of thirteen (five physical, eight virtual)
have graduated from BITC; not all are in the IT/ITES sector as BITC targets a larger set of entrepreneurs\.
BITC also has a shared technology center and a datacenter currently hosting three local clients\.
(ii) Availability of a stream of trained IT manpower to support the development of the IT/ITES Sector\.
This intermediate objective was achieved\. The project pioneered private sector-relevant skills
development programs leading to the creation of new jobs\. These training and employment programs
directly undertaken by potential investors who paid part of the training costs, decreased the cost to RGOB
of employment generation and allowed skills development customized to industry needs\. 873 new jobs
(of whom 428 male and 445 female) were created following the training of 1372 Bhutanese under the
programs and this cost RGOB around Nu 65\.7k (US$1,100) per job, which is reportedly four times below
regional averages (see Annex 2)\. This successful model is now being replicated by MOLHR to implement
training programs in other sectors\. In addition, the investment promotion activities of the project
generated interest from global IT/ITES industry players beyond the IT Park\. The industry linkage
program and recruitment drives pioneered with Infosys, Genpact and Wipro led to the employment of
more than 100 Bhutanese, and was initiated as a result of the promotional activities aimed at attracting
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) into Bhutan\. RUB also embedded three core curriculum courses
(analytical and technical skills, language enhancement, and entrepreneurship development) at all its 10
colleges, which were provided under the project and designed in consultation with global ITES firms\. In
addition, distance learning facilities were provided with the establishment of the Virtual Learning
Environment (VLE) at RUB colleges, providing a richer learning environment for students and also
benefitting lecturers\. The set-up of the projectâs video conferencing (VC) centers in 5 locations saved
costs and time for staff who would otherwise travel for a week to attend a dayâs meeting in Thimphu\.
(iii) Gradual growth in IT use by the financial sector to achieve greater efficiency\. This intermediate
objective was achieved\. The co-financing of financial infrastructure under the Project, combined with the
liberalization of the financial sector, led to an increase in ATM transactions at BOB - which holds about
46 percent of banks âassets in 2013 - from 200,000 ATM transactions in 2009 to about 1,360,000 ATM
transactions in 2012\. With the IT system upgrade of BOB, BOBâs procedures were modernized and
positioned BOB to fully benefit from the EFTCS\. The installation of the Core Banking Solution (CBS) by
the BOB reduced the maximum waiting time for BOBâs clients by 90 percent\.16 A next step for further
modernization of the financial infrastructure in Bhutan is to increase the efficiency of the Bhutan financial
switch (launched after the EFTCS) and improve its integration with the global system\.
(iv) Upgrading of the IT infrastructure of the stock exchange RSEBL\. This intermediate objective was
achieved\. RSEBL IT system was launched in April 2012\. It has completely integrated six systems which
helped significantly reduce time to process shares, benefiting brokers and investors\. Automation led to a
marked increase in transactions in the secondary market for all listed companies (currently numbering 21)
within a month\. Automation of the stock exchange improved risk management, market surveillance,
transparency, system robustness, interest from brokers and number of trading days\.
(v) Financial inclusion: This intermediate objective was achieved\. Increasing awareness, promoting
financial literacy and providing an enabling regulatory framework are building blocks to improve access
to finance and ultimately support entrepreneurship and PSD\. The project supported the drafting of the
Financial Inclusion Policy (FIP), and of accompanying regulations (microfinance, e-money) which were
16
Sources: Royal Monetary Authority (June 2013) and Socio Economic Impact Assessment report of the project (July 2013)\.
11
enriched by two outreach missions to Philippines and Kenya in 2012\. It contributed to a national financial
literacy campaign using innovative channels (radio and TV) (see Annex 2)\.
3\.3 Efficiency
3\.3\.1\. The PAD included a financial and economic analysis which identified the projectâs money inflows
and outflows to and from RGOB (not the private sector developer) for component 1 (IT Park) only\. This
analysis indicated that though the project was not financially viable, it was economically viable to
generate employment and increase net exports, yielding an economic net present value (NPV) of US$30\.6
million with an economic internal rate of return (IRR) of 125\.2% for a period spanning 20 years\.
3\.3\.2\. The economic and financial analysis done at design stage has been updated\. The analysis was
carried out for the IT Park from the perspective of RGOB + TTPL combined\. To facilitate a like-to-like
comparison with the PAD, the updated analysis also looks at just RGOB\.
3\.3\.3\. The updated financial analysis based on a discount rate of 10% over 20 years indicates that the IT
Park generates a financial IRR of -0\.60% for RGOB + TTPL (and -8\.28% for just RGOB) (original PAD
estimated +6\.76%)\. The updated economic analysis indicates that the IT Park yields an economic NPV of
$39\.7 million with an economic IRR of 35\.20% for RGOB + TTPL (and an economic NPV of US$16\.8
million with an economic IRR of 32\.43% for just RGOB)\. This reinforces the conclusion that the project
is economically viable to generate employment and increase net exports\.
3\.3\.4\. In conclusion, while the IT Park is marginally financially unattractive at present capacity utilization
rates, it has upside potential should tenancy improve\. Also, the project is economically viable as
confirmed by positive economic cost benefit analysis (see Annex 3)\. Hence the efficacy rating is High\.
3\.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating
Rating: Satisfactory
3\.4\.1\. The project has achieved its intended outcomes and exceeded most of its targets\. Over 1,000 jobs
were created, new infrastructure for the IT/ITES sector was built, IT skills corresponding to business
needs were developed, financial infrastructure was modernized, and financial inclusion was promoted
through the development of the regulatory environment\.
3\.4\.2\. The remaining challenges beyond closing date relate to the IT Park which represents one part of
component 1\. This component was hit by implementation challenges including external factors (see
section 2\.2)\. Key remaining issues include weak internet connectivity and occupancy in the recently
completed IT Park\. There is also a lack of critical mass of technically qualified talent pool due to limited
scale up potential, small size of workforce, skills mismatches, and high labor costs in Bhutan\. Several of
these were identified as potential risks at design stage\.
3\.4\.3\. In balance, the overall project is rated Satisfactory\. This is based on the following:
On the demand side of the PDO
(i) The efforts and progress towards reaching full occupancy of the IT Park, the only IO indicator not met
by closing date\. Contractually, the timeline for TTPL to fill up the IT Park is within three years of start of
operations, which is in line with industry standards in economic zones globally\. Because of unexpected
delays in the construction of the IT Park, this timeline extends until 2015 (i\.e\. beyond projectâs closing
date)\. At present occupancy rate (25 percent), the IT Park may still be able to achieve 100 percent
occupancy in line with the contract\. Higher IT Park occupancy will increase projectâs viability as
12
demonstrated in the economic analysis\. In addition the socio economic impact assessment (SEIA)
estimates several anticipated positive impacts for the community (see Annex 5)\. The efforts to fill the IT
Park are continuing, targeting also medium-sized ITES firms\. Tenancy deals with domestic firms are also
under discussion and if they materialize they would provide a more sustainable mix of tenants to the IT
Park - since domestic firms are expected to be less exposed to global turmoil in the industry\.
(ii) The commitment and support from RGOB and several stakeholders: RGOB remains committed to the
project as evidenced consistently throughout the project and even after its closing date\. RGOBâs financial
contribution leveraged significant investment from the private sector, notably for the IT Park, with Nu
300m (US$5m) investment from TTPL\. The IT association has also expressed full support to the IT Park\.
(iii) The efforts and progress in resolving connectivity issues: RGOB continues efforts to provide
connectivity at par with the region, while providing subsidies to IT Park occupants in the meantime\. As of
June 2013, prices of international bandwidth have fallen by 70 percent, due to negotiations (largely
triggered by the project) between Bhutanese and Indian telecom operators\. The second international
connectivity gateway at the Indian border, in Gelephu, was completed in April 2011\.
(iv) The success of BITC and its potential for further growth: BITC has considerable growth potential in a
country where 57 percent of industries were classified as cottage in 2011\. 17 Following the considerable
interest generated by the microwork workshop provided under the project, BITC expects to incubate a
number of future microwork entrepreneurs in its premises or virtually\. Over time, BITC intends to
become a hub of entrepreneurship and innovation in Bhutan (see Annex 2)\.
On the supply side of the PDO
(v) The skills developed under the project that would be useful for an IT/ITES firm but also for any
business in Bhutan (local or foreign): Even though scale remains a challenge in Bhutan, the majority of
youth that benefitted from the projectâs trainings expressed that they gained significant professional skills
- beyond IT skills - with the trainings\. These included communication, analytical and presentation skills;
and their confidence and self-esteem have also considerably improved (see Annex 5)\.These youth trained
through public private partnerships included tertiary as well as class X and XII graduates\.
On the overarching outcomes of the project and its positive spillovers
(vi) The project generated several positive spillovers as detailed in the next section\.
3\.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts
(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development
3\.5\.1\. As noted in the PAD, the impact of the ICT sector is gender-sensitive\. As of September 2013, 1372
secondary education (class X and class XII) graduates were trained, of whom 52 percent were female\. 873
candidates â of whom 50 percent were female â obtained a job in ITES companies and in various sectors
of the Bhutanese economy (see Annex 2)\. Most Bhutanese employed with support from the project are
between 19 and 24 years old and come from across Bhutanâs 20 districts\.
3\.5\.2\. A socio economic impact assessment (SEIA) was carried out in two phases during project
implementation, in accordance with the Financing Agreement\. For the impact assessment a survey of a
sample of respondents from each beneficiary category was conducted\. A summary of the social
development impacts of the project is provided in section 3\.6 and in Annex 5\.
17
Cottage industries are firms with an investment of less than Nu\.1 million (US$16,750\.6) and engaging up to 4 people\. Source:
National Statistics Bureau, RGOB Statistical Yearbook of Bhutan, 2012\.
13
(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening
3\.5\.3\. The broader mandate of the project (beyond the PDO) was to develop the countryâs private sector\.18
The project has contributed to this higher level objective in several ways:
(i) Trigger for policy reforms: Several investment climate reforms were triggered by the IT Park tender
process and by the project including: (i) amended FDI policy, (ii) economic development policy, (iii)
draft PPP policy, (iv) draft telecom policy, (v) draft FIP and related regulations on access to finance (such
as e-money issuers regulation, and deposit taking microfinance institutions regulations), (vi) National ICT
masterplan and related regulations on ICT\. The fast-tracking of the clearances and the establishment of
the single window agency for the IT Park also started to instill the one stop shop culture to improve
business environment\. These reforms in business environment would help alleviate some reported
negative perceptions of foreign investors in Bhutan notably on distance, scale, and talent pool\.
(ii) Capacity building in PPPs: As the first PPP in Bhutan, the IT Park helped develop in-country
capacity on PPP arrangements\. It also provided several lessons learned such as on the use of the tendering
documentation and process, which would be useful for similar projects, such as the RGOBâs forthcoming
Education City project\. This first experience has enhanced RGOBâs experience in attracting private
investments (both foreign and local) in serviced land and strategic infrastructure projects in Bhutan\.
(iii) New private sector-led training models: The training provided by MOLHR was the first to directly
link academia and business in Bhutan\. It has changed the strategic direction of vocational training adopted
by RGOB in other sectors (e\.g\. tourism, construction)\.
(iv) Capacity development of local IT private sector (including local IT training firms) (see Annex 2, Box
4): Consultations with local firms and the chamber of commerce throughout the project helped build
private sector capacity\. Domestic firms were encouraged to form joint-ventures with foreign bidders\. 19
Feedback from the IT private sector association (BICTTA) on their non-participation as IT Park tenants
included the high rental costs and their requests to obtain the special incentives which only export-
oriented tenants in the IT Park receive\. BICTTA was however encouraged to evolve to play a similar role
to that played by the Indian IT association in the meteoric development of the Indian IT/ITES industry\.
(v) Coordination mechanism between Government, private sector and academia: The project initiated and
sustained national and international relationships between Government, private sector and academia\.
Bhutanese government agencies and private sector participated in the project with external companies
(such as Infosys and Genpact) and the University of Colombo in Sri Lanka (for the VLE)\. Coordination
between government agencies was seamless during the project (see paragraph 5\.2\.2)\.
(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)
3\.5\.4\. The implementation of the project generated several positive spillovers in the ICT sector\. The
project kick started the âICT mindsetâ among Bhutanese firms and entrepreneurs\. It helped change
Bhutanese mindsets towards FDI, through demonstration\. Investment promotion and skills development
programs highlighted Bhutanâs value proposition as an IT services investment location including its
âgreenâ brand name, reliable/low cost access to power, stable environment, English language skills of
Bhutanese graduates and low attrition rates of Bhutanese manpower\.
18
Although this cannot be attributed solely to the project, the number of industrial establishments in the private sector has
increased in absolute value from 26,261 in 2007 to 34,692 in 2011\. Source: RGOB Statistical Yearbook of Bhutan, 2012
19
Out of 7474 firms, only 22 were joint-ventures between foreigners and Bhutanese (2010 Establishment Census by MOLHR)\.
14
3\.5\.5\. In addition, new concepts in employment creation are being explored through the projectâs
activities\. These include the entrepreneurship training program, BITC, and microwork\. Self-employment
and entrepreneurship are now increasingly considered as viable alternatives to public sector jobs\.
3\.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops
3\.6\.1\. Under the SEIA, a survey using a structured questionnaire to collect mostly quantitative data was
conducted with a sample of respondents from each beneficiary category\. Semi-structured questionnaires
and open-ended discussions with the key stakeholders were also conducted\.
3\.6\.2\. Key results of the beneficiariesâ survey finalized in June 2013 along with a summary of the key
socio economic benefits and impacts of the project are provided in Annex 5\. The SEIA also pointed out
that some impacts will take time to emerge since activities have just been completed\. It anticipated
several positive impacts for the community in the future\.
4\. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome
Rating: Moderate
4\.1\. Risks to the PDO outcome indicator are moderate\. A number of factors are expected to contribute to
consolidating and furthering the gains achieved under the project\. Most notably RGOBâs commitment to
youth employment and its continued support to PSD, communication infrastructure and the IT Park as
highlighted in the 11FYP\. These factors should help maintain and grow the new levels of productive
employment created under the project\.
4\.2\. Because the IT Park accounts for about 48 percent of original projectâs costs and is the visible
infrastructure part of the project, success of the project is frequently linked to success of the IT Park\.
Filling up the remaining empty space and retaining the two occupants of the IT Park would be crucial for
the long term success of the project\. 20 An exit by either would send a negative signal to prospective
tenants and IT/ITES investors, and could also influence the PPP models playing out in Bhutan\.
(i) Scan Café: the first tenant of the IT Park operates in the image editing segment and intends to
progressively move its Bangalore operations to Bhutan\.
(ii) Shaun Communication: operates in the voice Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) segment\. It did
not benefit from support for building its fit outs, and has indicated its difficulty in making the additional
investments needed to move over to the commercial space of the IT Park\. This remains a concern\.
4\.3\. One challenge that continues to affect the IT Park is the internet connectivity issue (see paragraph
2\.2\.4)\. This could jeopardize current tenancy deals in both IT Park commercial space and BITC\.
Negotiations are underway to identify a long term solution for pricing (such as opening the market for
foreign investments and partnerships with an Indian operator at the border)\.
4\.4\. Under the PPP model, TTPL has a contractual obligation to fill the IT Park within three years of IT
parkâs operations (see paragraph 3\.4\.3)\. Some tenancy deals appear to be in the pipeline with domestic
firms\. Attracting more firms to BITC and making it financially viable is another objective\. Nonetheless,
all actorsâ financial positions have weakened due to overruns in cost and time\. An objective of TTPL now
20
Neither occupant agreed to a lock-in period on their lease period in their initial tenancy contracts signed in early 2013\.
Nonetheless, as per the FDI policy, FDI companies are constrained to a lock in period of 3 years\.
15
appears to reach a cash flow breakeven position while also servicing its debt\. A clear risk to avoid is for
RGOB to be left running the IT Park, as this could signal failure of Bhutanâs first PPP experiment\.
Enforcement of the contractual obligations of TTPL could mitigate this risk\.
4\.5\. For component 3 (automation of stock exchange), sustainability might be an issue as this initiative
would need to secure funding in order to operate (see Annex 2)\.
5\. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance
5\.1 Bank Performance
(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry
Rating: Satisfactory
5\.1\.1\. The project was designed after several rounds of discussions with RGOB dating back to the 2002
Private Sector Survey\. The feasibility studies financed by IFC through SEDF, as well as the lessons
learned from earlier operations, were essential for the design of the project\. The design team also held
several consultations with RGOB and other stakeholders (including the private sector) during preparation\.
5\.1\.2\. In line with RGOBâs priority to solve youth unemployment and promote the private sector as the
âengine for growthâ, ICT and in particular IT/ITES emerged as the ânicheâ sector that would generate
maximum employment in landlocked Bhutan\.
5\.1\.3\. Despite the minor shortcomings mentioned elsewhere (see sections 2\.1, 2\.2\.2 and 2\.2\.4), the need
for relevant IT infrastructure, IT skills and modernized financial infrastructure was well established at
design stage\. Hence the âSatisfactoryâ rating for the overall project quality at entry\.
(b) Quality of Supervision
Rating: Satisfactory
5\.1\.4\. The World Bank team included experienced staff with expertise in relevant areas, including in
developing IT Parks in other countries; ICT; PPP; and financial sector development\. There was also
adequate continuity in the World Bank project team, with a core team member being part of the project
from design to closing date\. The TTL changed once, soon after effectiveness\.
5\.1\.5\. The World Bank team conducted regular supervision of the project through: (a) regular supervision
missions from Washington and Delhi; (b) an MTR in 2010; and (c) monthly conference calls between the
PIA, IAs and the World Bank\. These calls, set up early in project implementation, were used to resolve
outstanding issues, monitor and assist implementation\. They have proven an effective project monitoring
tool and their effectiveness was commended by both RGOB and Bank management\.
5\.1\.6\. The World Bank team provided support to the PIA and IAs through the project life\. Based on
feedback from RGOB, the team was very responsive and the quality of support provided by the team was
above RGOBâs expectations\. The team proactively leveraged other parts of the World Bank Group
throughout the project; including (e\.g\.) from Global Information and Communication Technologies
(GICT) unit for ICT regulation issues and from the payment unit and financial literacy experts for
component 3\. The team also ensured that local private firms were involved through the project\.
Implementation support missions always met with the IT association and the chamber of commerce and
also provided advice as solicited which at times went beyond the projectâs scope\.
16
5\.1\.7\. Nonetheless, given the lack of experience of RGOB in areas like IT Parks, PPP projects, and
contracting with global investors and tenants, the team could have explored creative ways to do more in:
(i) encouraging transfer of skills and technology from foreign firms to local firms and staff through
activities like networking and training, and (ii) advising the government on a conservative media strategy
so as to better manage the expectations of the public\. Some of these activities could have been undertaken
through complementary technical assistance or in coordination with other donors (including IFC)\.
5\.1\.8\. The team provided timely responses (with occasional delays) to approval requests, e\.g\. during the
organization of the roadshows and outreach missions which involved several bookings to be made in
advance and required at the same time clearances from several agencies including the Bank\. The Aide-
Memoires and Implementation Status and Results Report (ISRs) provide detailed recommendations on
measures to accelerate and improve project implementation\. Ratings are well substantiated in all ISRs for
all components\. This is endorsed by the IEG âQuality Assessment of ISRsâ published in 2013, which
assessed the project and concluded: âThe Aide Memoire and the ISRs reflect very well organized and
focused supervision, excellent reporting, and above all, a proactive approach towards challenging
aspects of the operation (â¦) Reporting is very candid, showing which are the challenges despite the
excellent performance of the project, and the actions that are being pursued to overcome them\.â
5\.1\.9\. RGOBâs requests for restructuring and project extension were processed on time and largely
contributed to the projectâs successes\. Final disbursement ratio was estimated at 99\.15 percent\. Hence the
âSatisfactoryâ rating for the overall project quality of supervision\.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance
Rating: Satisfactory
5\.1\.10\. The project was well prepared and included a cost benefit analysis for the IT Park\. It responded to
the countryâs request and benefitted from strong commitment from RGOB\. The design was based on
feasibility studies, lessons learnt from earlier operations and active participation from various
stakeholders\. More concrete actions to mitigate the connectivity issue could have been provided at design
stage\. Bank performance in ensuring quality at entry is therefore rated Satisfactory\. The team provided
sound advice and implementation support to the counterparts throughout the life of the project,
performing beyond expectations as expressed in client feedback\. There was proactive identification of
opportunities and issues facilitated by the monthly conference calls between the team and all IAs\.
Reporting was also of excellent quality\. Quality of supervision is therefore rated Satisfactory\. The overall
rating of Bank Performance is rated Satisfactory\.
5\.2 Borrower Performance
(a) Government Performance
Rating: Satisfactory
5\.2\.1\. The performance of RGOB is rated Satisfactory\. Even though the project was the first experience of
RGOB in PPP, clean governance, commitment and enthusiasm compensated for any shortcomings\.
RGOB provided strong support during the project appraisal and design stages, offered incentives to
stimulate demand, and proactively introduced supportive reforms from projectâs effectiveness and
throughout the project cycle (see Annex 2, Box1)\.
5\.2\.2\. The project was given considerable importance by the RGOB ministries and agencies in charge of
its implementation\. Collaboration between ministries during the project was notable\. As a result, several
17
key policy reforms were undertaken and cross-ministerial issues such as land were addressed in a timely
manner\. The Ministry of Finance provided timely support for necessary disbursements under the project\.
5\.2\.3\. As accurately assessed at appraisal stage, the project required a large number of processes to be
expedited\. Committees were formed to ensure rapid processes\. The Empowered Task force (ETF) was
established in 2009 via a Cabinet directive to resolve any road blocks for smooth implementation of the
project\. The ETF was crucial in resolving issues including those on the ancillary facilities such as delayed
provision of power\. Larger issues were raised at the Cabinet and this occurred three times during project
implementation for: decision on land lease duration, tax holiday, and keeping provision for the cost
sharing of training programs\. The Program Steering Committee (PSC), established in 2007, met regularly
with the PIA to give necessary policy guidance, review progress and assess performance\. An Advisory
Council was set up in 2008 and was instrumental in guiding the IT Park PPP as well as other sector PPPs\.
5\.2\.4\. IEG âQuality Assessment of ISRsâ in February 2013 concluded: â(â¦) It also reflects very strong
commitment on the side of the Government, which is evidenced not only by financial resources provided
for the project, but also on proactivity in terms of addressing challenging issues (â¦)â\.
(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance
Rating: Satisfactory
5\.2\.5\. The performance of MOIC/DITT is rated Satisfactory\. Experience with Bank projects was low at
the start of the project\. However, this issue resolved over time\. The PIA actions, including IT promotion
activities and support to IT/ITES firms, were crucial for successful accomplishment of project objectives\.
5\.2\.6\. Coordination of IAs was complex\. The PIA was diligent in providing high quality Quarterly
Progress Reports and organizing the monthly conference calls\.
5\.2\.7\. Some components also suffered from staffing shortages at various periods of implementation\. The
RUB component picked up after the Vice Chancellor appointed a project manager\. The RMA/BOB
component was managed by RMA staff instead of a dedicated project management team\. Nonetheless all
outcomes of component 2 and component 3 were achieved and IO targets were exceeded\.
5\.2\.8\. The PIA suffered from lack of business analysis expertise at the start of the project but later
benefited from the support of the Bank team and the consultants hired by the project\. External
communications to the media could have also been handled more proactively (see paragraph 3\.2\.2)\.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance
Rating: Satisfactory
5\.2\.9\. The overall performance of the Borrower is rated Satisfactory\. This is based on RGOB strong
commitment to the project as evidenced since the beginning of the project and on the considerable efforts
of coordination between ministries and within the IAs for the common goal of project success\.
6\. Lessons Learned
6\.1\. Project Design
6\.1\.1\. Evidence based policy making:
18
- A fine distinction needs to be drawn between âpicking winnersâ by government, and identifying
âpromising strategic betsâ based on extensive input from the private sector and experiences of comparable
countries\. Robust feasibility studies can support such decisions\.
- Equally important is how this decision is implemented: is there room for flexibility and mid-course
corrections? This project âpickedâ the IT/ITES sector\. However, there was flexibility inbuilt in the
design: today, a mix of firms (domestic and international, small and medium-sized, voice and data based)
occupies the IT Park, as well as some non-ICT startups (in the BITC)\. Similarly, many of the graduates of
the training programs have found employment in non-ICT sectors\. Such flexibility has helped create a
more level playing field and has encouraged the participation of larger sections of Bhutanâs private sector\.
Given that IT/ITES remains a priority services sector for RGOB even today, it can be concluded that
flexible implementation played a major role in validating this âchoiceâ of sector\.
- Availability of a strong fact base is important at design stage, both as a baseline and to measure impact\.
For example in component 3, supply-side and demand-side evidence on access to finance across Bhutan
were collected through two surveys (quantitative and qualitative) for the elaboration of the draft FIP\.
6\.1\.2\. Taking âbaby stepsâ first: In a situation of limited experience and training, it could be claimed that
major physical works warrant less focus until the âsoftwareâ (e\.g\. conducive policy frameworks, strong
investment climate, innovation mindset and skills) is more in place\. An interim step could include
creating a virtual center based on training rather than a physical structure\.
6\.1\.3\. âSmall is beautifulâ: Successful achievement of project objectives does not always require
considerable funding\. Simple projects designed with few components requiring adequate amounts of
funding can be as, if not more, successful than larger sized and overly ambitious projects\.
6\.1\.4\. Measuring impacts: As impacts often take time to materialize, a system to track the progress of
medium-term impacts of the projectâs activities should be put in place during the design stage\. For
instance, the SEIA did not benefit from baseline data, which in turn did not allow robust impact
evaluation analysis\. Another example of results that could have been better assessed is regarding the RUB
component; even though employment of RUB university graduates cannot be solely attributed to specific
courses and modules, going forward it would be interesting to explore ways to measure the impacts of
these new curricula in studentsâ overall performance at RUB and their subsequent career success\.
6\.2\. Project Implementation
6\.2\.1\. Effective project coordination is critical: especially when several government agencies are
involved\. High level committees can be helpful to solve roadblocks along implementation while at the
same time a leading agency must take clear ownership for overall progress\.
6\.2\.2\. Marketing efforts and importance of managing expectations: with prospective investors as well as
the media and the public\. While IT promotional activities were useful to showcase Bhutan as an
investment destination, awareness campaigns targeting the public (e\.g\. on the time required for strategic
infrastructure to show impact) are often a good way to build the right expectations\. A coordinated focus
on external relations and communications is important\.
6\.2\.3\. Creating short-term market distortions could sometimes be beneficial in the long term: A good
example of this is provided by RGOBâs incentives and subsidies to the private sector developer and
occupants\. Such actions could be deemed essential to build up a new industry from scratch\. However,
unlike the âinfant industryâ approach of traditional industrial policies, care should be taken to phase out
such market distortions and ensure crowding-in of private sector in a level playing field\.
19
6\.2\.4\. World Bank implementation support: Regular planned communications, through the monthly
conference calls between the Bank team and all IAs, were instrumental for implementation progress\. This
could be considered as âbest practiceâ in implementation support\.
6\.3\. Public Private Partnerships
6\.3\.1\. In order to successfully implement PPP projects, adequate capacity of the government is important
to negotiate PPP arrangements and fully benefit from the PPP\. World Bankâs project preparation
advances can be used to help build borrower capacity even before the project starts\. Going forward, PPP
guidance notes could be provided to borrowers and task teams for both design and implementation\.
6\.3\.2\. Domestic private sector capacity often needs further strengthening to allow local firms to also
participate in PPP deals in lieu of, or in active partnership with, foreign private sector\.
6\.3\.3\. A lesson from the various joint âventures and partnerships between foreign firms and local firms is
the need to ensure full inclusion and active participation of all partners, better commitment and equal risk
sharing, transfer of knowledge and local capacity building, especially in countries where local capacity is
a priori weak and such partnerships are relatively uncommon\.
6\.3\.4\. In countries where domestic private sector capacity is weak, infrastructure is basic, and PPPs are at
a pioneer stage, the governmentâs financial contribution is often higher than planned (for instance in
providing public infrastructure, and offering incentives to investors)\. This is particularly valid in the case
of the IT/ITES sector and international PPPs (including IT Parks), to mitigate new location costs and risks
to investors\. PPP ventures could be economically viable but might be financially unattractive from the
governmentâs point of view\. Based on the experience of other IT Parks and zones globally (e\.g\.
Cyberabad technology hub in Hyderabad), such initial investments at start-up phase are essential for
future success\. On a related note, the government should enter at its own peril if it relies on the private
sector to provide the key missing links (such as major ancillary infrastructure or public works)\.
6\.4\. Skills development and Employment
6\.4\.1\. In countries like Bhutan where skills mismatches and quality of employment-ready manpower are
areas of concern, the shift from government training to private sector-led training might be a sensible
approach\. In addition, considering the number of secondary graduates employed through the project,
governments could target both tertiary graduates and secondary graduates in their employment and
training programs â as the latter can also develop skills that respond to firmsâ needs\.
6\.5\. Building an international country brand
6\.5\.1\. Bhutanâs value proposition as an investment destination includes its âgreenâ brand name, reliable
and low cost access to power, political stability, and low attrition rate\. Bhutan could meet medium-sized
ICT companiesâ needs and in particular creative BPO as Bhutanese relate to western cultures naturally,
which is an essential requirement for IT/ITES and sub-sectors like Creative Process Outsourcing\.
7\. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners
(a) Borrower/implementing agencies
The Borrowerâs ICR has been received by the World Bank and a summary is attached as Annex 7\.
(b) Cofinanciers
None\.
(c) Other partners and stakeholders
None\.
20
Annex 1\. Project Costs and Financing
(a) Project Cost by Component (in US$ Million equivalent)
Actual /Latest
Appraisal Estimate
Estimate Percentage of
Components
Appraisal
(US$ million) (US$ million)
1\. Development of the IT/ITES Sector 5 6\.81 136%
2\. Development of the Skills Development Program
2 1\.76 88%
3\. Strengthening Financial development through IT use
3\.43 4\.15 121%
Total Baseline Cost 10\.43 12\.72 122%
Physical Contingencies
Price Contingencies
Total Project Costs 10\.43 12\.72 122%
Project Preparation Facility (PPF)
Front-end fee (IBRD only)
Other financing sources
ADB 0\.075
IFC/SEDF 0\.14 0\.14 100%
Counter fund from the RMA 0\.45 0\.04 9%
Counter fund from MOIC/RUB 0\.92
Counter fund from BOB 1\.84 3\.17 172%
Total Financing Required 8 8\.38 105%
Note: currency Exchange Rate: 1US$=Nu\.46\.19, which is the average conversion rate used by RGOB for the whole
project duration\.
(b) Financing
Appraisal Actual/Latest
Percentage of
Source of Funds Type of Financing Estimate Estimate
Appraisal
(US$ million) (US$ million)
[Government]
[IBRD/IDA or GEF] 8 8\.38 105%
[Donor A] [WB-administered TF]
[Donor B] [Parallel financing]
21
Annex 2\. Outputs by Component
Table 2 summarizes all the project components and Table 3 analyzes the outputs by components with an emphasis on the sustainability of each
result\.
Table 2 â Summary of project's activities by component
Outputs Activities as agreed in the PAD and Restructuring Papers
Component 1- Development of IT/ITES Sector â Implementing Agency: MOIC/DITT
Development of the IT/ITES (i) Infrastructure - Establishment of the IT Park with four elements:
sector in Bhutan through - plug and play office infrastructure for IT/ITES companies;
attracting IT/ITES firms in the - shared technology center;
IT Park, and increase in the - incubation center;
private investment in the - space for data center\.
IT/ITES sector (ii) IT Promotion- Establishment of an IT/ITES Promotion and Program Implementation Agency (PIA)
Component 2 â Development of IT Skills Program â Implementing Agency: RUB and MOLHR
Availability of a stream of (i) Generic Skills for IT enabled services and support the following activities
trained IT manpower to - introduction and implementation of an âassessment of competencyâ test which assesses candidates on key
support the development of the IT/ITES skills through a standard assessment;
IT/ITES Sector - training of teachers in institutions under the RUB;
- introduction of remedial training for students in government/private institutions;
- conducting Just-in-Time training for potential candidates for employment with identified investors
(ii) Development of skilled IT Professionals through Distance learning facilities/ Course Management System
(CMS)
- setting up of distance learning infrastructure in selected institutions imparting higher-level IT/ITES skills
training;
- adoption of CMS to facilitate a better VLE for students
(iii) IT entrepreneurship development program
- short academic component and - corporate attachment
Component 3 â Strengthening Financial Development through IT use â Implementing Agency: RMA
Gradual growth in IT use by (i) IT system up-gradation in the Bank of Bhutan;
the financial sector to achieve (ii) Financial sector IT development strategic plan (PLAN)
greater efficiency - policy framework for the electronic financial transactions;
- technical framework for development of e-payment system\.
(iii) Inter-Bank Electronic Fund Transfer Clearing System (EFTCS) at the RMA in different phases guided by
the PLAN (removed)
22
Automation of stock exchange (i) Upgrading of the IT infrastructure of the RSEBL
and Financial inclusion (ii) Establishment and drafting of the FIP
(added) (iii) Creation of an enabling regulatory and supervisory framework for MFIs and branchless banking
(iv) Organization of an outreach mission in selected neighboring countries to meet with regulators and
practitioners
(v) Promotion of financial literacy throughout the country through workshops, education, and the media
(vi) Training to RMA supervisors and other stakeholders on microfinance and financial inclusion\.
Table 3 â Outputs by component
Agreed Revised Achieveme Comments and Sustainability
performanc performance nt at end of
e indicator indicator project
at approval date
PDO: increase productive employment in Bhutan through promotion of enterprise development in the IT and ITES sector, enhanced IT skills, and
improved access to finance\.
Cumulative Following Target Through the training and infrastructure provided under the project, 1015 value added jobs were
job creation restructuring in value created for young Bhutanese, most of whom between 19 to 24 years old and from across the 20
in the 2010, IO indicator exceeded by districts\. On a national scale, this represents almost 15 percent of the total unemployed in Bhutan in
IT/ITES was revised to: 45 percent 2012 and almost 21 percent of the unemployed, who attended a school or institute in 2007 (at the start
Sector Cumulative job of the project)\. It represents 29 percent of total youth unemployment (in urban and rural areas) and 59
supported creation in the percent of unemployed youth in urban areas in 2012\. Jobs were created in the ICT/BPO sector but
by the IT/ITES Sector in also in other sectors of the economy such as trade, hospitality and education\. Among those who found
project the IT Park and employments after training in the GTP and ETP programs, 51 percent were female (see charts below)\.
related activities\. Under all training programs, firms were responsible for mobilizing candidates and required to employ
Target value of the trained individuals, while being provided a matching grant for employment rates\. Thanks to the
700 was participation of the private sector, the cost to the Government was estimated at Nu\.65\.67k (US$1,100)
unchanged per job\. This successful model is being replicated by MOLHR to implement training programs in
other sectors\.
Component 1- Development of IT/ITES Sector
Cumulative IO indicator not Target Promotion of ITES and the IT Park by the PIA aimed to attract FDI and large IT/ITES companies to
leads revised value Bhutan\. The PIA reached out to more than 200 such companies, mostly in India, through NASSCOM\.
generated exceeded by MOUs were signed with Wipro (the third largest IT Services company in India ) and Genpact (an
for new 27\.5 percent independent entity of GE for IT/ITES) for locating offshore BPO centers in Bhutan in the IT Park and
investments additionally with Genpact to conduct âTrain the Trainerâ programs creating a pipeline of master
in the IT trainers in Bhutan\. These promotional activities (roadshows) also generated interest from global
Park ITES/BPO industry players beyond the IT Park leading to the industry linkage program pioneered
23
with Infosys, Genpact and Wipro of component 2\. Local IT companies, typically very small (with less
than 10 employees) were also targeted\. A few of them who accompanied the PIA on road shows
reported to have gained exposure and established business linkages with companies outside the
country\. The IT promotional activities also enhanced awareness among the public about the IT and
BPO industry\.
Number of IO indicator not Target The incubation center is part of the BITC which is also composed by the datacenter and a shared
companies revised value technology center (comprising a conference room, CISCO VC facility, training room and cafeteria)\.
successfully exceeded by BITC and its incubation center are considered one of the main successes of the project, though few
incubated in 160 percent resources have been put into the BITC\. Three ventures out of thirteen have graduated out of the
the IT Park incubation center (five located in BITC, eight virtual)\. In the future, the incubation center expects to
attract more small businesses and potentially some entrepreneurs interested in undertaking
microwork\. A tie-up with the Druk Holding and Investments (DHI) BEGIN program (providing a
training program, seed fund and mentoring, for start-ups, existing small businesses and new
subsidiaries of existing companies) is also expected to take place in the near future\. The BITC intends
to become a hub of entrepreneurship and innovation in Bhutan, coordinating existing efforts to
promote entrepreneurship in Bhutan (including a number of donor-led efforts to fund and develop
small businesses in Bhutan) and serve as a strong platform for lobbying to bring a more friendly
business environment for enterprises in Bhutan\.
Percentage IO indicator not 25 percent Talks with two local BPO firms (Green Dragon Media, GDM and Bhutan Business Solutions, BBS)
of lettable revised of target to locate in the IT park were at an advanced stage during implementation, until the firms finally opted
space leased value met for an independent space, mainly because of delayed construction of the IT Park\. Two international
out BPOs companies, Scan Café and Shaun Communication, conducted pilot operations from the BITC in
end-2012\. In early 2013, both companies signed tenancy agreements for 10,000sqf with commitment
to move operations to the commercial space of the IT Park as soon as the latter was ready (fit outs and
plug and play) and by May 2013\. Scan Café moved to the commercial space as planned and is, as of
date, renting 25 percent of the lettable space\. However, as of September 2013, Shaun
Communicationâ timelines to move to the commercial space remained unknown, even though the
limited space in BITC premises does not suit their outbound calls activities\. Other potential tenancy
deals appear to be in the pipeline with advanced stage of discussions between TTPL and a domestic
firm while some foreign firms are conducting exploratory visits to Bhutan\.
Component 2 - Development of IT Skills Program
Percent of IO indicator not Target MOLHR carried out two assessments with assistance from AMCAD and Net Ambit\. These
students revised value assessments were carried out to assess the Bhutanese talent pool suitability for the BPO/ITES sector
clearing exceeded by and to help local training providers in designing courses for employment for the BPO/ITES sector\.
ITES 60% The AMCAT Assessment was conducted for graduates class XII and job seekers in April 2011\. The
industry Net Ambit Assessment was conducted online for class XII fresh candidates in June 2011\. 208 out of
competency 375 candidates reportedly cleared these assessments\. With the Employment Incentive Program in
assessment 2013; an additional 170 out of 300 candidates cleared the assessment with Scan Café for subsequent
24
that is employment\. In total 56 percent of students cleared the ITES industry competency assessment\. Note
widely that when Infosys carried out its first recruitment drive in August 2009, only 2 candidates out of 100
recognized cleared their assessment\.
Percentage IO indicator not Target Almost 64 percent of students trained successfully have been employed by private sector\.
of students revised value RGOB provided output based matching grants to private sector (training) firms - subsidy
trained are exceeded by commensurate to the percentage employment of trained candidates: (i) Following the GTP, 65 percent
successfully 27\.26% found employment mostly in the trade sector (25 percent), BPO sector (23 percent) and in education
employed (19 percent)\. 12 percent went into civil service and 6\.7 percent became self-employed; (ii) 67 percent
by the of those trained under the ETP found employment of which 64% worked in BPOs, 12% in the
private hospitality sector, 7\.6 percent in civil service and 7 percent in trade (see charts below)\.
sector Through the Industry Linkage Training and Employment Programs, a total of 194 graduates have
been employed outside Bhutan by BPO giants such as Wipro, Genpact and Infosys\. The graduates
were trained in India at the companiesâ own cost, with financial support to the candidates from the
project\. The companies also conducted recruitment drives in Bhutan leading to the creation of 106
jobs\.
An international training of trainer program was provided to build capacity among the local training
private sector and was conducted at Genpact in Hyderabad\. The program was an important element
for implementation of the GTP as the GTP was implemented by 4 selected local training firms which
were Genpact certified trainers
The Employment Incentive Program (EIP) provided by RGOB covered a fixed amount of the training
costs of the tenantsâ employees and provided employment with Scan Café to more than 50 percent of
candidates\.
The private sector-led training approaches pioneered by the PSD project in Bhutan have been
successful in changing the overall vocational training strategies adopted by the Government in other
sectors (tourism, construction etc\.)\.
RUB also provided training programs and institutionalized the three modules provided under the
project -namely academic skills, analytical skills and entrepreneurship- in the RUB curriculum -in
addition to modernization of training infrastructure through the videoconferences and the VLE\. While
the module on academic skills is mandatory, the other two are optional and used in various colleges as
enrichment learning\. Even though employment of RUB university graduates will never be solely
attributable to specific courses and modules, it would have been interesting to measure the impacts of
these curriculum in studentsâ overall performance and success at RUB (unfortunately RUB does not
track these data nor employment data following university)\.
Component 3 - Strengthening Financial Development through IT use
Number of IO indicator For the The number of ATM financial transactions at BOB steadily increased since 2009 reaching 1,359,944
financial revised to period transactions in 2012 (and a cumulative number of about 4\.2m transactions between 2009 and 2012)\.
transactions Number of ATM covering Between July 2012 to June 2013, 1,418,494 ATM transactions took place in BOB, which exceeded
by using financial July 2012 to the projectâs target by 57\.6 percent\. This contributed to a reduction in waiting time at banks by 90
25
ATMs per transactions at June 2013, percent (see SEIA)\. The IT system upgrade of the BOB was also completed with the roll out of the
year Bank of Bhutan the revised Core Banking Solution at BOB in 12 branches (against a target of 10) and 3 training sessions on the
per year, target value CBS, i\.e\., two programs for the end users, and one for the graduates\.
following the was
2010 exceeded by
restructuring of 57\.6 %\.
the project-
Target value was
revised to
900,000
Value of IO indicator was The target Data prior to the MTR mission and the 2010 restructuring of the project, which removed this IO
financial removed exceeded by indicator, showed that the value of financial transactions by using ATMS per year amounted to Nu\.
transactions following the more than 1,644\.24 m (US$27\.5m), as of June 2010\. The target was exceeded by more than 774 percent\.
by using 2010 145 percent
ATMs per restructuring of as of June
year, the project 2010
Volume of IO indicator was Implementa The project supported the development of a roadmap for the implementation of a national EFTCS\.
fund transfer removed tion of the The Financial sector IT development strategic plan prepared by an international consultancy firm was
transactions following the EFT system finalized in January 2009\. With advice from a South Asia Payments and Securities Settlement
among banks 2010 was Initiative mission, RMA appropriately chose to concentrate on developing an EFTCS with fully
channeled restructuring of henceforth automated settlement system (instead of three payment systems)\. After bilateral assistance from the
through the the project conducted Reserve Bank of India, implementation of the EFTCS was carried out outside the project and the
EFT system outside the interbank EFTCS was inaugurated in June 2010\. As of May 2013, Nu\. 41\.51million (US$ 695\.3k)
per year project worth of transactions were processed monthly through the EFTCS\. Having successfully implemented
National Electronic Clearing System for bulk debit and credit, the RMA on December 2, 2011
launched the Bhutan Financial Switch facilitating the inter-operability of ATMs\. It allows bank
customers to withdraw money from the ATMs of other banks and facilitates bank customersâ use of
the Point of Sales terminals of other banks for payments of goods\.
Per cent of IO indicator was Target was During the first phase of the FLP, the RMA and all financial institutions visited every Dzongkhag
district added following achieved by (district), to raise awareness about various financial services through presentations (public awareness
coverage for the 2010 June 2012 program)\. The target audience was mainly the business community and high school students\. A
financial restructuring of financial literacy strategy was drafted following feedbacks from the first phase and interventions were
literacy the project then designed towards specific targets, using innovative channels: for instance soap operas for the
campaign youth and comic books for children\. Advance and basic versions of the comic books for children were
completed in the first week of June 2012\. One private school in an urban area was visited as part of a
pilot to implement the strategy\. Evaluation of the program included a small quiz undertaken by
children after the visit\. The script for the 12 episodes of the TV drama, one video program on fake
currency and the radio program and music video were completed in May 2012 and aired in Thimphu
26
through local cable networks in 2013\. By end June 2012, 17 out of 26 weekly publications of
Financial Literacy Articles in K2 Magazine of Kuensel were completed\. Prizes (royal wedding note
album) to individuals who took part in the quiz competition after every four weeks were offered\. All
the educational materials developed through the project were officially launched on March 21st 2013\.
Considering limitation of funding, the FLP conducted under the project can be considered only as a
first step of a more important nationwide effort to increase financial education\. Anecdotal evidence
from the SEIA indeed shows limited impact of the FLP suggesting that more needs to be done (such
as for instance the transmission of financial awareness and literacy campaigns over the national
television channel: Bhutan Broadcasting System)\.
Percentage IO indicator was Target was The automation of RSEBL was co-financed by World Bank (70 per cent), ADB (20 per cent) and
automation added following achieved by RMA (10 percent)\. It integrated 6 systems: ATS (Automated Trading System), EDS (Electronic
of stock the 2010 June 2012 Depository System), CSS (Clearing and Settlement System), MSS (Market Surveillance System),
exchange restructuring of BBO (Brokerâs Back Office), and IPO Engine (Initial Public Offering)\.Following automation, the
trading, the project number of trading days increased from 2 to 3 a week\. Investorsâ access to the secondary market was
settlement, facilitated and risk of settlement failure reduced with the CSS\. Risk management improved with the
and delivery EDS\. Availability and access to quick and reliable data from the securities âexchange also facilitated
with straight the supervision of RSEBL by the RMA\. Within a month, transactions for all listed companies
through increased\. In the second half of 2013 a total of 661,756 shares were traded in the secondary market
processing amounting to Nu\.189\.7 m (US$11,326\.8m) compared to a total of 91,939 shares worth Nu\.28\.2 m
(US$ 1,685\.3m) traded during the same period before automation\. In addition market capitalization
reportedly increased by 41\.71 percent\. One challenge for RSEBL is to support the Annual
Maintenance Contract with its own funds (Nu\.3\.6m -US$60,000- per annum for the following 5 years
after the warranty period of 1 year), due the low amount of revenues currently generated by the stock
exchange (with its small size and limited potential to scale up)\. Currently the stock exchange
financially depends on RMA and is looking for ways to increase its revenues\.
Sources: project documents (PAD, Restructuring Papers, ISRs, Aide Memoires, Socio Economic Impact Assessment reports and so forth) and ICR mission consultations\.
27
Training Programs and Employment under the project
The charts below describe the type of jobs facilitated by the projectâs training programs\. 21
The trainings conducted under the project were the GTP, the ETP, the training of three batches of
candidates on IT and BPO in India, with support from Infosys, and the training provided within the EIP\.
The RUB also coordinated a number of trainings such as Global Skills Education on Language
Enhancement and Analytical Skills for faculty, VLE, Training for System Administrators and faculty,
Industry and Academia Workshops on Entrepreneurship for faculty as well as Training for established
entrepreneurs in Business Improvement and Growth\.
Employment by sector after ETP
Employment by sector after GTP
Trading
Trading 7%
Self Civil
Employed 25% Service
7% 7%
Civil hospitality
Service 12% BPO/ICT
12% 64%
BPO/ICT
23%
Education
19%
Trading BPO/ICT
Education Civil Service BPO/ICT hospitality Civil Service
Self Employed Finance Trading Education media
media hospitality corporation Self Employed construction
21
Additional jobs were created through the recruitment drives, Shaun Communication employment figures and the jobs created at
the IT Park but were not included in the charts\.
28
100%
Employment of trained 90%
26\.2%
candidates 80% 32\.8% 35\.6%
49\.7%
70%
60%
50%
40%
73\.8%
36\.4% 30% 67\.2% 64\.4%
50\.3%
20%
10%
63\.6%
0%
BPO Employment Graduate Employment
Training, Training Training Incentive
Infosys Program Program Program
(ETP) (GTP) (EIP)
employed unemployed employed unemployed
Gender distribution of 100%
employment after training 90%
programs 80% 42\.9% 47\.5% 48\.5%
70% 57\.2%
60%
50%
40%
30% 57\.1%
49\.0% 52\.5% 51\.5%
20% 42\.8%
51\.0%
10%
0%
Graduate Employment Employment BPO
Training Incentive Training Training,
Program Program Program Infosys
(GTP) (EIP) (ETP)
Female Male Female Male
29
Snapshots on Implementation of the PSD Project
Box 1- IT Park: the First Public Private Partnership (PPP) in Bhutan
Following continuous efforts post the global financial crisis, the International Competitive Bidding process to secure
a private investor to Design, Build, Finance, Own, Operate and Transfer (DBFOOT) an IT park in Bhutan attracted
one bidder (non-participation of Bhutanese private sector appeared to come from lack of capacity)\. This was a joint
venture between the Singapore subsidiary of Assetz Property Group Pte Ltd, a global Special Economic Zone
developer (74 percent), and Bhutan's national holding company: DHI Ltd, a domestic equity partner (26 percent)\.
The first PPP in Bhutan was signed between the MOIC/DITT and TTPL on 4 September 2009\. Government
contribution leveraged about Nu 300m (US$5m) from TTPL\. RGOB commitment to the IT Park PPP included:
(i) The signing of the âLetter of ICT sector policy for the Bhutan PSD projectâ in 2007 in an attempt to solve the
competitive issue related to connectivity costs
(ii) The approval by the Cabinet in 2008 of the incentives for the IT Park developer and ICT companies registering
in Bhutan including among others: (a) tax holidays of 15 years to the IT Park developer and 10 years to IT/ITES
businesses operating within the IT Park and exporting 80 percent of their products/services; (b) Exemption of
customâs duty on imported capital goods; (c) 100 percent foreign equity participation allowed to the IT Park
developer and IT/ITES companies in the Park
(iii) The Cabinetâs approval in 2008 of the extension of the land lease terms for the IT Park to 30 years with two
automatic renewals (and the complex transfer of the ownership of the land between ministries)\. This decision
provided a total of 90 years lease term, in line with international standards, and was instrumental in attracting FDI in
the IT Park\. It also set a precedent for reforming the Land Act to facilitate FDI in any sector
(iv) The Government contribution of US$2 million for the IT Park, legally committed to the private sector investor
in September 2009 to ensure a fixed annual revenue stream for the private developer\. It was provided as a lease-in
for RGOB of the 10,000sft shared space of the IT Park for 90 years\.
(v) The provision of ancillary facilities, including strategic infrastructure investments into the park (such as roads,
power supply, sewage and water treatment) as per PAD and additional counterpart funding (road expansion)
(vi) Incentive programs for first mover tenants
(vii) Additional contributions to the PPP from outside the project such as the financing of IT park commercial
spaceâs warm shell and subsidies for connectivity costs and training support
(viii) Active participation in the promotion efforts\. On numerous occasions, delegations were led by the Honorable
Minister and Secretary MOIC and on one occasion by the Honorable Prime Minister
(ix) Project management supervision through MOIC, MOLHR, RUB and RMA
Box 2 -Internet connectivity during project implementation
Around the period of the global financial crisis, lack of redundancy of the communications networks and high
bandwidth prices led a large foreign investor to decide against starting operations in Bhutan\. The project team
recommended agreeing on a reasonable cost plus pricing of wholesale tariffs by BPC at par with international
standards\. The project team also liaised with the GICT group of the World Bank to provide technical assistance to
the RGOB for strengthening telecom regulation and competition in these price negotiations\. In June 2009, the ICT
and the Bhutan InfoComm and Media Authority (BICMA) issued a new tariff order placing a price cap on wholesale
bandwidth tariffs\. The tariff order by BICMA had, however, been pending as Bhutan is landlocked and BICMA has
no jurisdiction over the international tariffs charged by Indian operators near the border\. Only high level discussions
between RGOB and the government of India to secure a negotiated price from Indian operators to Bhutanese
operators would allow a revised international tariff order, which would benefit the IT Park, the private sector at large
and the whole country\. RGOB was in discussion with the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India and the
Government of India-owned provider to reduce costing at the international gateway\. On the redundancy issue,
RGOB held negotiations with the parties concerned to pursue a completely independent fiber link through Coxâs
Bazaar in Bangladesh to Gelephu (Bhutan) via Tripura (India)\. In addition, there were expectations that as the
volumes in the IT Park and the rest of the country would increase (when the Park occupancy crosses the 500 seat
mark estimated by RGOB) volume based pricing would also have ultimately a positive effect on bandwidth pricing\.
Success in these negotiations would release the RGOB from its commitment to bear the differential rates with the
region as per the 2007 Letter of ICT Sector Policy\.
30
Box 3- International occupants of the IT Park
Tenancy agreements were signed in late 2012 and early 2013 with two international firms\.
Scan Café is a US based company working on digitizing, editing, repairing photos and videos using software\. Scan
Cafe piloted its operations in Bhutan in the BITC in end- 2012 while the IT Park was being completed (with warm
shell and later on with fit outs)\. Scan Café is now occupying 25 percent of the commercial space of the IT Park and
benefitted from both RGOB additional incentive programs\.
Shaun Communication is a voice-based BPO mainly doing market research and survey for the UK market\. Shaun
communications started their operations in 2012\. It is part of GB Solz, a company into web development
technologies, mobile application development and others\. Shaun Communication was the first firm to start
operations in the IT Park with 90 people in August 2012 before stopping operations in November 2012 and
considerably scaling down\. Among the reasons for scaling down were connectivity issues, lack of talent pool with
the required communication skills and transportation challenges for their night shifts\. Shaun did not meet the criteria
to benefit from the incentive programs of the project but MOLHR is supporting part of the training costs of its
employees through a scheme\. With this additional training support from MOLHR, Shaun resumed operations in
February 2013 with 27 staff and changed its Internet Service Provider\. Even though Shaun Communication signed a
tenancy contract for 10,000 sqf in February 2013 and committed to move to the commercial space of the IT Park by
May 2013, Shaun is still operating from the BITC as of September 2013\.
Box 4 - Impact of the project on local companies
Local companies had complained about the lack of access to markets in the context of a small domestic market\.
Through roadshows, domestic IT firms were taken to India to network and get exposure to Indian entrepreneurs and
to other locations\. Prior to the GTP, Genpact supported part of the training of local IT training firms\. The ETP also
supported five private local firms including Link2Support, Athang, GDM, BBS and Bhutan Center of Excellence
(BCE)\. BBS is currently employing those that were trained by MOLHR program as was expected\. In addition,
Athang and GDM are currently employing full operational production units in animation\. GDM won a national
award on animation which was undertaken by the candidates of ETP\. Athang which became the local partner of the
first tenant (Scan Café), and which was also an active member of BICTTA since 2006, has grown with the training
contract it obtained with MOLHR\. Athang recruited several people that it trained\. Athang is also now participating
in national bids such as the bid for the National Land Commission land registration electronic system\. In fact by the
end of the project the number of local IT companies (including IT training firms) registered in the IT association has
reportedly increased to about 90 companies (from 50 companies in 2011)\. While this increase in number of firms
cannot be solely attributed to the project, the BICTTA believes that the fate of the IT industry is tied to the IT Park\.
Other domestic private sector was also involved during the pre-construction stage of the IT Park\. Evidence from the
SEIA reports that contract works amounting to at least around Nu 20 million (US$355k) were taken up by local
contractors for the IT Park\.
31
Annex 3\. Economic and Financial Analysis
Introduction
1\. The economic analysis in the original PAD has been updated based on the following two principles:
i\. Principle of consistency: where applicable, the same facts and assumptions have been
retained from the original PAD, in order to facilitate a like-to-like comparison;
ii\. Principle of conservatism: where applicable, assumptions have been made to neither over-
report nor under-report the true outcomes\.
2\. The updated analysis has been carried out from the perspective of RGOB + TTPL combined (to
provide a more complete picture of the project)\. Since the original PAD carried out this analysis from
the lens of RGOB only, a second economic analysis is presented here from the point of view of
RGOB only (to facilitate a like-to-like comparison with the PAD)\.
Assumptions
3\. The following assumptions converge with the original PAD:
i\. Component 1 focus: Economic analysis has been undertaken only for the IT Park;
ii\. Exchange rate: is assumed same as the original PAD (US$1 = Nu 43\.01) except for revenue
projections starting 2013 where the exchange rate used is US$1 = Nu 60;
iii\. Financial benefits: remain the same: (i) rental of incubation center; (ii) rental of shared
technology center; (iii) rental of data center; and (iv) tax revenues generated from the IT
Park\. Caveat: both 100% rentals, as well as RGOBâs share of rentals (i\.e\. DHIâs share of
26%) are presented here (original PAD considered full 100%);
iv\. Financial costs: the following categories remain the same: (i) provision of the land as an
equity contribution; (ii) cost of leasing-in space; (iii) ancillary infrastructure including water,
power, internet connectivity; (iv) primary infrastructure including shared technology center;
(v) incubation center; and (vi) labor cost;
v\. Economic benefits: remain the same: (i) employment generation inside the IT Park; (ii)
employment generation outside the IT park; and (iii) net increase in exports;
vi\. Constant prices: All the data in the financial projections are based on constant prices\. Impact
of inflation has not been taken into consideration in the projections;
vii\. Time horizon: The analysis is undertaken for a time horizon of 20 years\. Caveat:
development period and operation period have been changed from original PAD to reflect
actual progress;
viii\. Discount rate: In the analysis, discount rate has been set at 10%, the interest rate at which the
government can borrow from local commercial banks for 20 years;
ix\. Depreciation: Fixed assets are depreciated using the straight-line method over the 40 year
period;
x\. Land: Provision of the land as an equity contribution is also considered a capital expenditure
to be amortized over 40 years;
xi\. Dividend to the government: While the government provides the land for the IT Park as an
equity contribution, the analysis assumes that the government will not receive dividend
income (which is true so far);
xii\. Tax revenues: Tax revenues generated through the IT Park include sales tax, income tax from
labor employed in the IT Park and the supplier industries, and corporate tax on the industries
in the IT Park\. As in the PAD, tax revenues are assumed to be US$0\.04 per US$1\.00 value of
total production;
xiii\. Tax exemption and relief: It is assumed that taxes are exempted for initial 3 years and
reduced by 50% for the following 3 years;
32
xiv\. Revenue generation per person: The original PAD used the NASSCOM-McKinsey Report
(2002) to estimate revenue generation per seat in the business process outsourcing (BPO)
services sector in India at between US$17,000 - US$24,000\. As in the PAD, revenue
generation per person in the IT Park in Bhutan is assumed to be US$17,000;
xv\. Employment generation outside the Park: The original PAD used empirical studies to show
that each new position in the BPO/IT industriesâ generates 3 further jobs in the rest of the
economy\. This multiplier has been used in the ICR as well;
xvi\. Net increase in exports: It is assumed that 80% of the total production will target export
markets\. The value of net increase in export excludes the value of imported materials, labor
cost and other operational expenses;
xvii\. Production capacity: Total value of production at full capacity is maintained;
xviii\. Exports: Ratio of export to total production is maintained;
xix\. Imports: Average ratio of imported material and other expenses is maintained;
4\. The following assumptions diverge from the original PAD:
i\. Financial costs: the following categories are now included under capital investment: (i)
development of ancillary infrastructure including undergrounding of high voltage power line,
sewage treatment plant; and (ii) development of primary infrastructure including data center
and fit-out support to tenants;
ii\. TTPL investment: Following the principle of conservatism, TTPLâs total investment of
US$5\.9 million has been accounted in the first two years of operation (10% in year 1 and
90% in year 2), while in reality this will be spread out over more years;
iii\. Production: Value of production (actual and forecasted) tracks total rentals per year (actual
and forecasted);
iv\. Rentals: Total per year (based on actual numbers) of which 26% share accrues to the RGOB
through DHIâs equity share in the IT Park;
v\. Speed to full capacity: The original PAD assumed that on average the IT Park will have an
average capacity utilization of 25% each year, consequently reaching full capacity in the
fourth year after commencing production\. The ICR documents actual capacity utilization
until the present, and then tracks value of production;
5\. The following numbers are based on actual values and converge with the original PAD:
i\. Equity contribution of the RGOB: in the form of provision of 5 acres of land;
ii\. Total area: of leasing-in space;
iii\. Employment generation inside the Park: An area of approximately 50,000 SFT is developed
for the building spaces with a space for one person being about 50 SFT\. Considering
corridors and common facilities, the IT Park can generate 700 jobs at full capacity;
iv\. Annual salaries: of IT Park jobs (tenants, management and staff) as well as non-IT Park jobs
are maintained since these are in line with actual estimates based on the ICR teamâs field
interviews\.
6\. The following numbers are based on actual values and diverge from the original PAD:
i\. Cost of leasing-in space: this is now incurred upfront in year 3;
ii\. Costs of primary infrastructure: capital investment for shared technology center, data center,
incubation center, fit-out support to tenants;
iii\. Costs of ancillary infrastructure: capital investment for water, power, internet connectivity,
undergrounding of high voltage power line, sewage treatment plant, access road to site;
iv\. Taxes: Actual values till date of 2%, 3% and 5% taxes paid as applicable by the IT Park and
BITC till date have been included in the ICR calculations;
v\. Staffing: Numbers of senior and junior staff are based on actuals till date\.
33
Summary of results
7\. Financial analysis: The analysis, which is based on a discount rate of 10%, indicates that the IT Park
generates a financial IRR of -0\.60% for both RGOB + TTPL, and -8\.28% for just RGOB (original
PAD estimated +6\.76%)\.
Financial benefits and costs
(Unit: US$ Thousand)
Y1 Y2 Y3-Y8 Y9-Y14 Y15-Y20 Total
Cash Inflow
Total rentals per year (% share of RGoB) 1,051,366 2,400,000 2,400,000 5,851,366
Tax Revenue from the business in the IT Park 0 0 1,557 1,086,569 1,446,683 2,534,809
Total 0 0 1,052,923 3,486,569 3,846,683 8,386,175
Cash Outflow
Provision of the land (Equity contribution) 25,000 25,000 150,000 150,000 150,000 500,000
Ancillary infrastructure 182,309 1,640,784 1,823,093
Primary infrastructure (shared technology cente 101,142 910,279 1,011,421
Incubation Center 30,003 270,024 300,027
TTPL Funding 588,006 5,292,055 5,880,061
Leasing-in the space 2,000,000 0 0 2,000,000
Labor Cost 1,500 3,000 0 0 4,500
Total 926,460 8,139,642 2,153,000 150,000 150,000 11,519,102
Net Financial cash flow (926,460) (8,139,642) (1,100,077) 3,336,569 3,696,683
Cumulative Financial cash flow (926,460) (9,066,102) (10,166,179) (6,829,610) (3,132,927)
Present Value (926,460) (7,399,674)
IRR -0\.60%
NPV (7,488,262\.84)
8\. Economic analysis: The economic analysis indicates that the IT Park yields an economic NPV of
US$39\.7 million with an economic IRR of 35\.2% for RGOB + TTPL\. If just RGOB is considered,
economic NPV is US$16\.8 million and economic IRR is 32\.43%\. This reinforces the conclusion that
the project is economically viable to generate employment and increase net exports\.
34
Economic benefits and costs
(Unit: US$ Thousand)
Y1 Y2 Y3-Y8 Y9-Y14 Y15-Y20 Total
Economic Benefits
Financial Benefit 0 0 1,052,923 3,486,569 3,846,683 8,386,175
Employment generation (Inside the zone) 0 0 6,595,960 21,233,941 21,233,941 49,063,842
Employment generation (Outside the zone) 0 0 8,244,951 26,542,426 26,542,426 61,329,802
Net Increase in exports 0 0 4,617,172 14,863,758 14,863,758 34,344,689
0
Total 0 0 20,511,006 66,126,694 66,486,808 153,124,508
0
Economic Costs 0
Capital Expenditure 926,460 8,138,142 150,000 150,000 150,000 9,514,602
Operating Expenses 0 1,500 2,003,000 0 0 2,004,500
Total 926,460 8,139,642 2,153,000 150,000 150,000 11,519,102
Net Economic cash flow (926,460) (8,139,642) 18,358,006 65,976,694 66,336,808
Cumulative Economic cash flow (926,460) (9,066,102) 9,291,904 75,268,598 141,605,406
Present Value (926,460) (7,399,674)
EIRR 35\.20%
ENPV 39,659,540
9\. Comparison with original PAD: The table below demonstrates that, while the IT Park is almost
financially breakeven at present capacity utilization rates, it has upside potential should tenancy
improve\. Also, the project is economically viable as confirmed by positive economic cost benefit
analysis\.
Financial PAD ICR
analysis NPV (â000) IRR NPV (â000) IRR
(612\.0) 6\.76% (7,488\.3) (0\.60%)
Economic PAD ICR
analysis NPV (â000) IRR NPV (â000) IRR
30,599\.1 125\.2% 39,659\.54 35\.20%
35
Annex 4\. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes
(a) Task Team members
Responsibility/
Names Title Unit
Specialty
Lending
Asya Akhlaque Senior Economist, Task Team Leader AFTFE
Philip Beauregard Senior Human Resources Officer HRSCO
Debabrata Chakraborti Senior Procurement Specialist SARPS
Kashmira Daruwalla Senior Procurement Specialist ECSO2
Syed Abul Kamal Md Abdul Hye Senior Program Assistant AFCTZ
Malcolm A\. B\. Jansen Consultant SASDI
Zarafshan H\. Khawaja Lead Social Development Specialist AFTCS
Manvinder Mamak Sr Financial Management Specialist SARFM
Kyoo-Won Oh Underwriter MIGOP
Randeep Sudan Sector Manager TWICT
Bharatha Manju S\. Haththotuwa Senior Private Sector Development Spec SASFP
Afshan H\. Khawaja Senior Social Scientist SASES
Sudhakar G\. Kaveeshwar Manager ISGEA
Tenzin Dolma Norbhu Senior ICT Policy Specialist CITPO
Jose Antonio Garcia Garcia Luna Financial Sector Specialist CGFPS
Karma Senior Financial Markets Specialist IFC/SEDF
Wendy Werner Business Enabling Environment IFC/SEDF
Supervision/ICR
Cecile Thioro Niang Senior Economist, Task Team Leader SASFP
Savinay Grover Financial Management Specialist SARFM
Joseph Shine Consultant SARPS
A\.K\.Kalesh Kumar Senior Procurement Specialist SARPS
Chinam Kali Veeresh Consultant SASFP
Arun Manuja Senior Financial Management Specialist SARFM
Kashmira Daruwalla Senior Procurement Specialist ECSO2
Samantha L\. Forusz Program Manager HRSOP
Bharatha Manju S\. Haththotuwa Senior Private Sector Development Spec SASFP
Syed Abul Kamal Md Abdul Hye Senior Program Assistant AFCTZ
Malcolm A\. B\. Jansen Senior Environmental Specialist, Consultant, SASDI
Karma Karma Operations Officer CSASF
Roch Levesque Senior Counsel LEGAM
Manvinder Mamak Sr Financial Management Specialist SARFM
Zakiullah Sayeed Munshi Operations Officer CSASB
Kyoo-Won Oh Underwriter MIGOP
Thyra A\. Riley Sector Coordinator SASFP SASFP
Kumaraswamy Sankaravadivelu Senior Procurement Specialist SARPS
Varun Singh Senior Social Development Specialist SASDS
John F\. Speakman Lead Private Sector Development Spec AFTFW
Suhail Kassim ICR Team Leader FCDKP
Mihasonirina Andrianaivo ICT Primary Author SASFP
36
(b) Staff Time and Cost
Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)
Stage of Project Cycle US Thousands (including travel
No\. of staff weeks
and consultant costs)
Lending
FY02 0\.00
FY03 5\.53 102\.33
FY04 1\.03 1\.80
FY05 6\.38 30\.91
FY06 10\.19 38\.43
FY07 40\.14 225\.21
FY08 0\.00
Total: 63\.27 398\.68
Supervision/ICR
FY02 0\.00
FY03 0\.00
FY04 0\.00
FY05 0\.00
FY06 0\.00
FY07 0\.00
FY08 41\.11 228\.19
FY09 31\.23 164\.19
FY10 18\.03 87\.47
FY11 24\.49 132\.03
FY12 17\.32 98\.547
FY13 27\.99 139\.22
FY14 10\.86 62\.87
Total: 171\.03 912\.51
37
Annex 5\. Beneficiary Survey Results
In compliance with the Financing Agreement of the project, a SEIA was commissioned\. The objectives
were to identify and measure the socio-economic benefits and impacts of the project\.
The SEIA was done primarily using a structured questionnaire administered on a sample of purposively
selected respondent groups\. The sample for the survey was selected in close consultation and agreement
with the PIA\. Four categories of end-beneficiaries were interviewed: (i) local communities in the vicinity
of the IT Park; (ii) people who were trained under RUB and MOLHR training programs including those
employed, a small sample of unemployed, lecturers and trainers from private training institutes; (iii) Bank
of Bhutan customers; and (iv) general public (business persons, villagers) from 6 districts to assess the
impact of the FLP\. In total, 174 respondents who underwent training responded to the questionnaires
used in the survey in 2012 and 20 respondents in 2013\. In addition, 60 customers of BOB, 50 participants
of the FLP of RMA and from the institutes under RUB, 30 students using VLE, 10 System Administrators
and 28 lecturers involved in the Global Skill Enhancement courses, VLE and EDP were also interviewed
in 2012\.
In a competitive process, RGOB recruited an individual consultant to undertake the SEIA\.
The impact evaluation constructed outcome indicators, and available âimpactâ indicators, that went
beyond the intermediate outcome indicators of the project\. They were suggested to DITT and to
stakeholders and agreed on by all stakeholders before data collection\. They were used as the basis for
formulating questions\. The SEIA of the project was carried out in two phases â in mid-2012 and mid-
2013\.
The Key Socio-economic Benefits and Impacts of the project as reported in the SEIA in June 2013 and a
summary of the results of the SEIA are reported below\. Table 4 summarizes selected results of the
survey finalized in June 2013\. Note that the SEIA figures provided below are as of June 2013 while the
ICR figures are as of the end of the grace period\.
Key Socio-economic Benefits and Impacts
1\. Promotion of enterprise development in the IT/ITES sector
(i) For the first time in Bhutan, with the implementation of the TTP under the project using the PPP and
FDI mechanisms has been executed\. The exercise with many valuable experiences and lessons learned
provides precedence to similar projects in the country\.
(ii) The Bhutan Innovation and Technology Center, a center of excellence for incubation of small
businesses has been instrumental in incubating thirteen new businesses\. The three who have graduated
have started operations and have created further employment\. The shared technology center and data
center is also part of the BITC and Data center is currently hosting 3 local clients\.
(iii) Due to the project, Bhutan is now firmly on the map as an option offering conditions for IT
investments such as its âgreenâ brand, low cost access to power, stable political environment and high
English language skills of its graduates\.
(iv) The project initiated and sustained national and international relationships between Government,
private sector and academia\. This was evident in the coming together of Bhutanese agencies participating
in the project and external companies such as Infosys and Genpact in India and University of Colombo in
Sri Lanka\.
38
2\. Enhanced IT skills
(i) Cumulative job creation in the IT/ITES sector\. As of early June 2012, 1,372 secondary education
(Class XII) graduates and college graduates had been trained and 778 candidates employed (389 male and
389 female) in global ITES companies1 and in various sectors of the Bhutanese economy\. By June 2013,
the numbers employed increased to 964\. Most Bhutanese employed with support from the project are
between 19 and 24 years old, with equal representation between young men and women from across
Bhutanâs 20 districts\. The cost to the government per job created under the Project is estimated in the
range of Nu\.65\.7k\.(US$ 1,100), which is highly satisfactory as per regional and global standards\.
(ii) Of the total 451 trained under the ETP, 303 were employed of which 64% found jobs in BPOs, 12%
in hospitality, 7% each in government and trading and smaller percentages in assorted professions such in
education, media and 7 corporations\. Similarly from among those 320 persons trained under the GTP, 192
were employed of which trading took in 25%, BPOs employed 23%, education employed 19%, the civil
service took in 12% and the rest in professions such as media, hospitality, finance and some were self-
employed\. This shows that the trainings have enhanced employability to the extent that people have found
jobs beyond the IT sector\.
(iii) Given that the number of jobs created by 2013 is 964 for youth in the age range between 18 to 24
years by 2013 and if the total number of unemployed in Bhutan in 2012 was 6,904 and the number of
youth in the age range 19-24 years comprised 3,476, the project has therefore contributed to addressing
14% of the overall unemployed in 2012\. Moreover, the project contributed to reducing youth
unemployment by 28%\.
(iv) Ninety percent of respondents gained more usable knowledge and skills while 66% said that they
gained more self-confidence\. These seem to be the two most important social impacts, besides securing a
job for a livelihood experienced by respondents as a direct effect of the training and the job they have
been able to secure after the training\.
(v) Seventy eight percent of students trained successfully have been employed by private sector\. The
private sector-led skills development programs have been highly successful, both in terms of percentage
of trainees employed (74%) and cost per job created\. Fifty five percent students cleared the ITES industry
competency assessment\.
(vi) For trainees from the business development trainings, they have increased profit margins in their
businesses, reinvested in their business\. As a direct outcome of the training, one person could expand the
current business by investing more money, 3 could expand their business by investing more equipment, 7
introduced a better accounting system, 5 could more effectively market their products and services and 1
could establish new clients and suppliers\. Those trained have been able to effect changes in their
businesses and to grow by improving organizational capacity as well as generating additional incomes for
disposal, reinvestment in businesses and deposits in bank for future investments\. Therefore, the training
has contributed to enhancing the knowledge and skills, which are the important attributes of social capital\.
(vii) Income for local construction contractors/sub-contractors, at least contract works amounting to
around Nu\. 20 m (US$340k) taken up by local contractors\.
39
3\. Improved access to finance
(i) Huge increase in ATM transactions which has led to reduction in visits to banks and waiting time at
banks has been reduced by 90%\. Time save has been used by customers for various productive and social
activities\.
(ii) Enhanced awareness of financial products and processes to access them from the nation-wide
dissemination campaign done last year and the public awareness program through the media currently
being initiated\.
(iii) Owing to automation of the RSEBL there has been a marked increase in transactions for all listed
companies indicating a rapidly growing use of the system even within a month of operation of the new
automated system\.
4\. Other Anticipated Impacts
(i) At least 40% of the employment at TTP will be created for Bhutanese citizens: There will also be
substantial indirect job creation in engineering, gardening, catering and cleaning services\. Owing to the
large number of expatriates working at the TTP, indirect income earning opportunities for the local
community will also proliferate such as transportation, residential rentals, housekeeping, grocery and
other supplies to name a few\. It is expected that the ratio of expatriates to local employees will be around
1:4 in the first five years and 1:6 thereafter\.
(ii) Increased Opportunities for local residents for income generation: Most people living near the TTP
reported that they had either set up small shops, started business, constructed houses for rental\. Many
residents have started constructing buildings in anticipation of an adequate customer base for residential
units\.
(iii) Positive Community Perception: All respondents said they were proud to have the TTP located in
their neighborhood\. The reasons mentioned are: better outlook now where slums used to exist; easy
access to needs due to the town; easy availability of jobs and proximity; easy availability of jobs for
children; better income for the whole community; more products can be sold to the people; rapid
development will take place; students from the near-by schools can be absorbed here and they can now
run a business\. While many of these reasons can be seen as anticipation of economic incentives for the
community, others are convenience to residents from better amenities being available in expectation of
urban development being triggered by the TTP\.
(iv) Changes in community demographics: The number of people living in the neighborhood is bound to
increase from year-to-year\. This is because while some will relocate to live near the TTP for convenience
of working at the Park, others would re-locate with their businesses further increasing the population in
the area\. This could lead to increase in congestion of housing and people in the area\.
Socio-economic impact assessment
It is evident that some impacts will take time to emerge since activities have just been completed, or in a
few cases such as the Financial Literacy through the media is still ongoing\.
Construction of the Tech Park has offset changes in the local economy in Wangchutaba such as increase
in construction of buildings and land prices\.
Among those trained under the project and employed, though people earn less owing to the short duration
in employment, youth still have secured a means of livelihood and possess skills thereby enhancing their
40
confidence and self-esteem\. Business persons and trainers from private training institutes trained have
used the knowledge and skills from the training to improve their business and generate income for their
business units\.
Customers of the Bank of Bhutan using ATMs have cut down visit to banks and now spend much less
time than before on bank transactions\.
Participants in dzongkhags attending the financial outreach programs are much more aware than before
on financial products and services but are yet to produce economic outcomes\.
Many youth trained under the project have secured employment and a means of livelihood\. Integration of
courses in curricula has not only introduced an element of sustainability but students are made ready for
the job market essential to enhance their employability\.
Use of IT for the VLE in colleges has added a new dimension to learning ensuring âanytime, anywhereâ
learning for students and teachers facilitating the courses\.
The financial strengthening component encompassing the upgrading the BOB CBS has had immense
benefits to customers throughout the country providing convenience and saving time for users through
introduction of ATMs and SMS and on-line banking\.
The financial literacy and outreach program has created the necessary awareness but economic outcomes
are anticipated over time\.
The automation of the RSEBL will permit trading of shares from any part of the country with
connectivity and the FIP will have far-reaching impacts for rural Bhutanese in future\.
41
Table 4 â Selected results of the Socio Economic Impact Assessment
Indicator in the SEIA Results as of June 2013
Thimphu Tech Park (TTP) [also called IT park] Infrastructure
Enhanced number of people employed (by As of June 2013, the TTP employed three persons in the office\. Other support staffs employed are a driver,
type) and nationality at the TTP a gardener and one for maintenance\. Security has been outsourced to a company which fields 5 persons on
associated with TTP operations a regular basis and cleaning services has also been outsourced to a company which has assigned two
persons with the TTP\.
Scan Café in the period between October 2012 and June 2013 employed 125 Bhutanese youth and two
Indian nationals while Shaun Communication employed 16 youth and two Indian nationals\.
Enhanced income for local construction Work in developing the TTP was taken up by people from India\. However, the management also
contractors/sub-contractors outsourced some of the work to local contractors\. It is reported that contract works amounting to around
Nu\. 20 m (US$340k) was sub-contracted to local contractors\.
Enhanced income for TTPL and for The TTP earned Nu\. 1,714,755 (US$28,723\.1) from leasing space in BITC in June 2013\.
companies leasing space As of June 2013, Shaun Communication and Scan Café invested approximately Nu\. 9\.8 m and Nu\. 3\.7 m
(US$ 164,2k and US$ 62k) respectively\. On the income side Shaun Communication expects to make Nu\.
0\.6m to Nu 0\.7 m (US$0\.01m) per month after all expenses, Scan Café indicated that this information was
not available\.
Enhanced income for utility service In June 2013, the TTP expenses for a year amounted to Nu\. 5,660,400 (US$94,814\.9)\. A proportion of this
providers (telecom, power, water and was spent on payment for services such as power, telecommunications and water and sewerage\.
sewerage)
Enhanced income for National employees In 2013, employees working at TTP earned between Nu\. 6,000 (US$100\.5) (Scan Café) to Nu\. 8,000
of companies based in TTP (US$134) per month (Shaun Communication) as startup pay\. The salary of some staff in Shaun
Communication however has gone up to Nu\. 14,000 (US$234\.5)\. These companies also indicated that
bonus packages were also offered to staff based on their performance\.
Enhanced income of community members Community members living around the TTP did not earn any income directly from the TTP but it was
living near TTP by source noted in mid-2012 that a few obtained rental income from leasing housing units to people working at the
TTP\. In Bhutan for every direct job created, 1\.2 more indirect jobs will be generated so it is expected that
jobs in the TTP will have multiplier effects\.
IT Promotion (PIA)
Increase in number of local IT/ITES Under the project, the road shows have been useful since even local IT companies participated in these\.
companies implementing new ventures, They gained exposure and few have established linkages with a few companies outside Bhutan but are
products and procedures on return from reported to be in an early stage of business development\.
international events facilitated by PIA
For IT Park neighbors
Enhanced incomes and employment as a Since construction on the TTP commenced many residents have started constructing buildings in
result of TTP anticipation of an adequate customer base for residential units\.
42
The price of land in the locality also escalated\. The median land prices per decimal before the construction
were Nu\. 200,000 (US$3,550\.1) while soon after the TTP construction started, land prices escalated and
now the median price quoted per decimal is Nu\. 475,000 (US$ 7,956\.5)\. This is an increase by 138%\.
TTP has been in operation for a relatively short period of time so impacts are not so obvious yet\. Only a
few expected any employment in the TTP for their children if they could not continue for further studies
after they were trained in IT\.
Reduction in number of interest groups So far there has not been any news or information from any source opposing the TTP\. This implies that
there is general societal acceptance to the facility\. All those interviewed had positive feedback on the TTP\.
Number of views representing community All respondents living near the TTP said they were proud to have the TTP located in their neighborhood\.
attitudes if generally supportive of the Many were anticipating the economic incentives for the community and the better amenities in expectation
kind of development that is being of urban development being triggered by the TTP\. The reasons mentioned were: better outlook now where
proposed, or consistent opposition to slums used to exist; easy access to needs due to the town; easy availability of jobs and proximity; easy
development; availability of jobs for children; better income for the whole community; more products can be sold to the
people; rapid development will take place; students from the near-by schools can be absorbed here and they
can now run a business\.
Development of IT Skills
Enhanced earnings of trained employees Median salary received by trainees now employed was Nu\. 8,000 (US$134) in June 2013\. The median
per month as compared to before training expenditure per month was Nu\. 6,000 (US$100\.5) while the median amount saved was Nu\. 875
and employment\. (US$14\.66)\.
Entry level salaries offered by the tenants were lower and roughly half of civil service salaries in
comparable professions\. In June 2013, the entry pay for youth working at Scan Café at the TTP was fixed
at Nu\. 6,000 (US$100\.5) per month\. and Nu\. 8,000 (US$134) a month at Shaun Communication\. These
companies provided however bonuses based on performance\.
Enhanced employee satisfaction and self- As a result of the training, 90% of a total of 174 respondents gained useful knowledge and skills while 66%
esteem gained more self-confidence\. These seem to be the two most important social impacts\.
The job obtained after training secured their livelihood, by providing them a regular salary, enabled some
of them to contribute to the family income and to pay their rents\. Most mentioned it increased their
financial autonomy\.
Trainers from Bhutanese Private Training Institutes
Enhanced business opportunities after the Trainers have been able to apply the knowledge to their work as 7 out of 8 respondents conducted similar
training courses for their institutes on their return\.
Enhanced employee satisfaction and self- As a direct outcome of the training, all respondents said that they gained more knowledge and skills and
esteem also self-confidence\.
Training of Institutes staff and students under RUB
Number of faculty designing courses on All faculties who attended the Global Skills Training (GST) Program reported conducting the GST
Global Skills Training (GST) modules with students studying in the 1st year\.
Enhanced knowledge and skills of As a result of GST, there was a marked improvement in the studentsâ speaking and writing skills\. They
students taught GST modules by trained were better organized and focused and able to plan and present their work\. Their research skills improved
43
lecturers and they are more confident and are better behaved\.
Students who studied analytical skill modules found the lectures very useful\. They learnt the techniques to
deal with complex problems, became more confident in preparing for interviews and in analyzing
problems\. Students interviewed on academic skills found the module very useful\. They learnt: note taking,
American Psychological Association referencing style, quoting texts, writing essays, and thesis and better
communicate\.
Enhanced performance of System According to the System Administrators, the VLE system established in the Colleges makes it possible for
Administrators (Virtual Learning System students to learn from anywhere by accessing materials uploaded to the system, interacting in the Forum,
(VLE) and Course Management System submitting assignments and exams on-line and getting feedback from Faculty on-line too\. Having VLE
(CMS) along with face-to-face class room teaching occasionally is cost effective for teachers and students\.
Trained lecturers in Virtual Learning Lecturers trained in VLE personally benefited as they post quizzes, announcements, assignments on-line,
System (VLE) and Course Management which can be easily accessed by students\. It has instituted a culture of self-directed learning and
System (CMS) quoting benefits of the independence as students must submit assignments by the deadline\. Students became more time conscious,
training and system improved their computing skills and lecturer-student interaction increased online\. Use of VLE system cut
down paper use and saved a lot of time for assignments, lecturer feedback, group discussions and
evaluation of assignments\. Students also are more active online than they would be in the classroom\. The
use of multi-media has made teaching and learning interesting\.
Enhanced experience of trainees that have Students seem to do well in the anonymity offered by VLE\. Grades are posted by Lecturers on the website
completed the distance course which serves as a notice board for students\. Students share views on studies in the discussion forums\. They
(convenience, learning difficulties, limited communicate among themselves but also with the Lecturer on a real-time basis\. The VLE cut down the
face-to-face contact) risks of cheating as students submit assignments that are tutor-marked\.
Training of businesspersons for improvement of businesses and growth
Cumulative increase in income of Those trained have been able to effect changes in their businesses, grow by improving organizational
businesses employing trainees capacity as well as generating additional incomes for disposal, reinvestment in businesses and deposits in
bank for future investments\. Of 11 respondents, 9 mentioned that their profit margins were higher than
before, 4 of them reinvested in the business, 1 deposited the money in the bank and 4 spent the money\.
Enhanced employee satisfaction and self- Most respondents felt that trainers were competent and that the course was relevant to their business\. Most
esteem also could apply the learning from their course to their business\.
Training of Class XII school leavers and graduates
174 respondents were contacted for interviews of which half were Class XII graduates, 44% with Bachelor
degrees and 6 persons were post-graduate\. Among them, 44% studied commerce, 28% studied Arts and
about 12% studied science and IT\.
Over half of trainees ranked the trainers mostly as âvery goodâ and 60% mentioned that the course was
âhighly relevantâ of which 83% could apply the knowledge and skills in their work\.
More than half of the trainees who found jobs were trained in BPO operations\. Two were trained in
animation and one in IT\. The training played a significant role in securing their jobs according to them\.
They found the training very useful as they acquired communication skills and confidence\. The training
also gave them good exposure, knowledge, new skills\.
44
A small sample of unemployed who were interview mentioned the tough competition in the job market\.
Some also mentioned low salaries or dissatisfaction with their previous jobs\. The number of jobs they
applied for after their training ranged from 2 to a maximum of 16 jobs\. Some of the jobs were in banks,
hydropower projects, newspapers, IT jobs, government, private companies, corporations and travel
agencies\. Some also applied for fieldwork such as household surveys\.
The type of temporary jobs taken up till now by the youth are designing birthday cards, tour guides, cell
phone operation, supervisors, photo editors in IT park and also supervisors of construction projects\.
IT system up-gradation in the Bank of Bhutan
Reduced time against increased money For indicative purposes if a dayâs national wage is Nu\. 160 (US$2\.68) for 8 hours work, the 3\.5 hours wait
value in lieu of bank visit before using CBS is Nu\. 70 (US$1\.17) worth in monetary terms\. Time reduction from 3\.5 hours to 20
minutes wait with the CBS (see above) translates to a reduction from Nu\. 70 (US$ 1\.17) to Nu\. 6 (US$0\.1)\.
So, assuming that 50,000 persons across the country use the services in 1 day, Nu\. 3,170,000
(US$53,099\.3) is saved in a day and in a month of 25 working days, the savings goes up to Nu\. 79,250,000
(US$ 1\.3m)\.
Waiting time at banks before and after â If we take 3\.5 hours as the maximum waiting time before the CBS and 20 minutes after introduction of
money value for time savings CBS and use of services, the waiting time has therefore been reduced by 90%\.
People living in the border areas also mentioned the added advantage of being able to withdraw Indian
currency in the border towns\. People said that they did not have to carry lots of cash, at the risk of theft or
loss, and could conveniently withdraw money from ATMs in the dzongkhags while travelling\. Some
respondents also felt that using ATM forced them to save\.
Creation of awareness on financial aspects (financial literacy)
Enhancement of awareness about bankâs Most participants stated that the presentation of the various loan schemes, interest rates, procedures to
services and products; apply and other terms and conditions was useful\. Many also indicated that government policies vis-Ã -vis
financial lending, policy and regulations on soiled and counterfeit currency were useful\. The various
insurance schemes were also good information for people to understand to insure lives and property for
future security\.
Under the school education program, sensitization was done in a few schools in Thimphu with banks\. This
induced BNB to start the âpiggy-bank saving schemeâ for school children\.
The survey carried out in June 2013 in 6 districts revealed that although radio programs were being aired in
Kuzoo FM in Dzongkha and through the Etho Metho Local TV channel, the survey team which visited the
districts of Trongsa, Wangdue, Punakha, Thimphu, Paro and Chukha could not identify people who had
heard or watched these on radio and TV respectively largely because youth listen to Kuzoo radio and music
is preferred over other programs\. Even those listening to Dzongkha programs on Kuzoo prefer the music
program\. Cable TV operators have only local reach\. The transmission of financial awareness and literacy
over the Bhutan Broadcasting System will have substantial impact in creating awareness\.
Increase in number of persons reacting Several people interviewed applied for group loans and received quick service\. Several other people also
after the awareness sessions applied for loans to build houses or to invest in businesses after the campaign and fulfilled their credit
needs\. Many noted that they can now identify counterfeit notes and this is useful for their businesses\.
45
Participants who attended the meeting sessions in the Dzongkhags could not understand all that was
discussed\. Many forgot what was discussed\. Also, a few mentioned that they didnât speak and understand
the language the presentations were made in\. A few mentioned since they were cramped in the venue,
presentations made were not always audible\.
RSEB automation
Increase in number of shares traded after There was a marked increase in transactions for all listed companies indicating a rapidly growing use of the
automation system even within a month of operation of the new automated system\. Volume of shares traded before
automation was 19,343 and it increased to 741,382 by the end of 2012\. This also represents a 97% increase
from the volume of shares traded in 2011 of 375,652\. The value of the shares traded since automation
increased by 65%\. However, the capacity of the system is still underutilized\. This is mainly because there
are limitations on the supply-side as more companies need to enlist in the stock exchange to divest\.
Nonetheless, market capitalization for the listed 20 companies has also increased by 42% as compared to
the interim period of 2011\.
Reduced time to process shares Time spent to process the shares after automation has been reduced from 2 months to a month\. 39 persons
have been issued on-line terminals for access to trade shares online but only 3 were reported to be active\.
Automation increased the number of technicians and IT staff working at the RSEBL to manage the
systems\. It has also led to higher efficiency in work processes\.
Some emerging preliminary impacts observed on a day-to-day basis were as follows:
(i) The primary effect of the depository system is easy and efficient dissemination of securities reports to
investors\. It keeps track of every trading movement, replacing the previous manual mode
(ii) Brokers are more comfortable with the new brokerage system, which allows them to maintain both
security account and the trading account of an investor\. Access to the online trading facility is facilitated\.
(iii) The Clearing system now provides the edge to carry out settlement within the exact settlement date\.
The system has somehow instigated brokerage firms and the RSEBL to initiate a settlement bank, which
helps the settlement process as per the designated timeline\.
(iv) The RSEBL has also increased the trading day to three times a week and has moved from spot trading
to the continuous trading system\. Investors have now the platform to trade for long duration and also the
facility to determine price in pre-open session\. Trade is now visible throughout Bhutan\.
(v) The IPO system provides an edge to carry out the initial public offering as per international standards\.
The system provides facility of both fixed price and book building methodologies\. Tracking of investors
and subscription is automated and this will increase efficiency and transparency\.
(vi) Investors will now have a dedicated and permanent securities account to record their securities\.
Automation of the RSEB has made share trading easier for citizens and is expected to further develop the
capital market\.
46
Annex 6\. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results
Not Applicable as this is not an intensive learning ICR\. However the Bank ICR team comprising Suhail
Kassim (Senior Private Sector Development Specialist) and Mihasonirina Andrianaivo (Financial Sector
Specialist) conducted an ICR mission from September 12 â 21, 2013 in Thimphu\. During the mission, the
ICR team met with the officials from RGOB, and all major stakeholders including the TTPL, BICTTA,
BCCI, Bhutan Telecom, Tashi InfoComm, local BPO firms and a number of beneficiaries\. A list of
people met in Thimphu during the ICR mission follows:
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND TTPL
COMMUNICATIONS (MOIC) Mr\. Mike Holland, Chief Executive Officer via
teleconference
Dasho Kinley Dorji, Secretary Mr\. Tshering Cigay Dorji, Chief Operating
Mr\. Phuntsho Tobgay, Director, DITT Officer
Mr\. Bhimlal Suberi, CPO, Policy and Planning Ms\. Sonam Choden, Office Manager
Division
Ms\. Dorji Wangmo, DCPO, Policy and Planning BHUTAN TELECOM LTD (BT)
Division Mr\. Nidup Dorji, Chief Executive officer
Mr\. Chencho, Head, Promotion Division, DITT Mr\. Tshering Norbu, General Manager
Ms\. Deepika Rai, Project Coordinator,
PIA/DITT TASHI INFOCOMM (TASHICELL)
Mr\. Tashi Tshering, Managing Director
MINISTRY OF FINANCE (MOF) Mr\. Ganga R\. Sharma, Chief Technical Officer
Mr\. Nim Dorji, Joint Secretary, DPA
Mr\. Choiten Wangchuk, Director General, DPA BITC INCUBATEES
Ms\. Chuni Dorji, Program Officer, DPA Mr\. Varun Singh, Bhutan IT
Mr\. Kinga Sithup, Green Dragon Media
MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND HUMAN Mr\. Sonam Dorji, Mawongpa Water Solutions
RESOURCES (MOLHR) Mr\. Hari Kafley, iTechnologies
Ms\. Norbu Dema, Offtg\. CPO, HRDD
Mr\. Kinga Wangdi, HR Specialist, HRDD BENEFICARIES OF VLE and GSE
Ms\. Tenzin Choden, PSD Project Focal Officer, PROGRAM via videoconferencing, RUB
DHR Mr\. Tsheten Dorji , Head of Department,
College of Science and Technology, VLE
ROYAL MONETARY AUTHORITY (RMA) Mr\. Yeshi Wangchuk (VLE Coordinator) with 9
Mr\. Dorji Phuntsho, CEO, RSEBL CST students
Mr\. Sangay Dorji, Focal Officer for FLP
Ms\. Dechen Choden, Focal Officer for FIP GRADUATES- BENEFICARIES OF
TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT
ROYAL UNIVERSITY OF BHUTAN (RUB) PROGRAM
Mr\. Yangka, Director, Academic Affairs Mr\. Tashi Tobgay, Animation with GDM
Mr\. Sonam Penjor, Manager, Education Ms\. Sonam Deki, Animation with GDM
Technology Mr\. Tharchen (Infosys 2nd batch)
Ms\. Pema Zam, BBS in medical transcription
DRUK HOLDING AND INVESTMENTS Mr\. Puran Pradhan, BBS in medical
(DHI) transcription
Mr\. Karma Yonten, Chief Executive Officer Mr\. Sonam Wangdi , Animation with Athang
Ms\. Karma Sonam Dorji, Sr\. Analyst Ms\. Sangay Wangmo, Animation with Athang
Ms\. Sonam Choki, Woezer Event
47
Ms\. Rinzin Wangmo Mr\. Phub Gyeltshen, Yangkhor IT Solution,
Mr\. Namgay, Druk PNB Bank Executive member of BICTTA
Mr\. Rinchen Wangchuk\. Drasindra Technology,
OTHERS Executive member of BICTTA
Mr\. Prabito Mukherjee, Operation Manager, Mr\. Tashi Wangchuk, Chief Executive officer,
Shaun Communication Bhutan Pvt\. Ltd Dzongkha Language Institute, Executive
Ms\. Susmita Rai, Asst\. Manager, Scan Cafe member of BICTTA
Mr\. Lhendup, Bhutan Business Solution Mr\. Kiran Parajuli, General Secretary, Bhutan
Mr\. Tshoni Tiakar, Bhutan Business Solution ICT and Training Association
Mr\. Bhim Nepal, Bhutan Business Solution Mr\. Tashi Tobgay, Chief Operating Officer,
Mr\. Karma Dhendup, Chief Executive Officer, Data Center Services
Athang Training Academy Mr\. Lungten, Data Center Services
Mr\. Sonam Wangdi, Athang Training Academy Mr\. Santa Bir Gurung, Photo Designer, Scan
Ms\. Sangay Wangmo, Athang Training café employee
Academy Mr\. Dorji Tshering, Photo Editor, Scan Café
Mr\. Ken Dobruskin, CIMAS Bhutan employee
Mr\., Tshering Penjor, CIMAS Bhutan Mr\. Shiraj Dhital, Team Leader, Shaun
Mr\. Basant Raj Chhetri, Bhutan Professional Communication employee
Services, Mr\. Phub Tshering, Team Leader, Shaun
Mr\. Phub Tshering, General Secretary, BCCI Communication employee
Mr\. Tandin Wangdi, President, Bhutan ICT and Capt\. Veeresh, Ex\. Consultant of the PSDP (by
Training Association (BICTTA) audio)
Mr\. Dorji Wangdi, Lorig Enterprise, Executive Mr\. Kezang , Ex\. Consultant of the PSDP
member of BICTTA Mr\. Rinzin Namgay Dorji\. Ex\. Consultant of the
PSDP
48
Annex 7\. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR
The RGOB sent its draft implementation completion results report (31 pages) to the World Bank on
October 11, 2013\. A summary of RGOB ICR was also received from RGOB on November 15, 2013 (18
pages) and is shortened below:
The Royal Government of Bhutan (RGOB) received a grant from the World Bank for implementation of
the Private Sector Development (PSD) Project focused on some of the key enablers that will help enhance
Bhutanâs ICT competitiveness and position the country as a regional ICT hub\. The PSD Project, in
particular, supported development of IT/ITES sector, using an integrated approach that includes:
(i) establishment of the IT Park and related infrastructure and IT promotion services (ii) Development of
IT/ITES skills and (iii) improved access to finance\.
During the preparation of the project, Bhutan was in the process of transitioning into a democratic
constitutional monarchy\. The project took into account the countryâs need and the development and use of
the IT/ITES sector was felt to be an effective tool to enhance good governance; and generate employment
through the growth of private sector and IT/ITES industries\. The Government showed its commitment by
prioritizing ICT and the project was identified as a national flagship project\. The promotion of IT
investment will benefit Bhutanâs industrial development by locating globally experienced IT companies
in Bhutan and setting high industry standards for local companies\.
Component 1
The development of IT Park was undertaken in a PPP model\. The obligation of private partner was to
develop an IT park infrastructure in a DBFOOT model and generate 700 jobs by May 2015\. The
operation of BITC was contracted to TTPL under management contract for 5 years\.
For the successful design and implementation of the project, coordination with different government
agencies and with the private sector is a key imperative\. Towards this end, this sub-component supported
MOIC to establish an IT/ITES Promotion & Program Implementation Agency (PIA)\. The PIA promoted
and facilitated the development of IT/ITES industry in Bhutan and coordinated and supported the
implementing agencies (project components)\.
Through this project, advisory council was formed comprising of CEO of MNCs who advised RGOB on
the ICT development in Bhutan; a private sector focus group where communication line was created
between government and private sector; and an empowered task force who assisted and supported in fast
tracking and resolving issues\.
Component 2
Development of IT-ITES skills program at the following three levels:
i) Generic Skills for the IT/ITES Sector;
Through this component, 1015 Bhutanese has been provided productive employment\. 1372 secondary
and tertiary graduates were trained under the project from all districts of Bhutan\. Due to the delayed
completion of the IT Park, candidates were employed in various sectors of the economy, including
education, trade, hospitality and self-employment\.
The cost to the Government is 4 times below regional averages, thanks to private sector participation\. The
Project supported the launch by MOLHR of several programs described below\. Under the local programs,
firms were responsible for mobilizing candidates and required to employ at least 50% of the trained
individuals, while being provided a larger matching grant for higher employment rates:
49
1) a graduate training program (GTP): A total of 320 graduates have completed training under GTP out
of which 192 (60%) are employed in the private sector\.
2) an employment training program (ETP): A total of 451 candidates have completed a 6 months to 1
year training in animation, medical transcription, graphic design and call center training, out of which 303
(67%) have been employed\.
3) Industry Linkage Training and Employment Programs: A total of 194 graduates have been employed
outside Bhutan by BPO giants Wipro, Genpact and Infosys\.
4) Employment incentive program (EIP): A total of 170 candidates have been employed as of date\.
5) Global skills enhancement program: In collaboration with Infosys, analytical and Academic module
was developed and is introduced in the colleges under RUB\.
ii) Distance learning facilities/CMS for IT Skills development;
With the implementation of VLE, capacities of the colleges were also built through this project for
effective delivery of e-learning\. Beside video conferencing facilities in 4 colleges were also provided for
facilitating distance learning initiatives\.
iii) IT Entrepreneurship Development Program\.
This sub component established entrepreneurship development center in 5 colleges under RUB\. The EDC
coordinators and faculty were trained besides providing capacity building for 26 local entrepreneurs\.
Component 3
Strengthening the financial sector through IT use, comprising the following activities:
i) IT system up-gradation in the Bank of Bhutan (BOB);
Networking for Core Banking Solution (CBS) was the sole activity supported with IDA funding on
implementation of CBS in BOB\. The entire hardware and software component including capacity
building were funded by BOB\. Project funds have contributed to the rapid modernization of BOBâs
procedures and positioned BOB to benefit from the inter-bank Electronic Fund Transfer and Clearing
System (EFTCS)\.
ii) Developing a Financial sector IT development strategic plan
The TA to develop a financial sector IT development strategic plan was implemented by RMA\. Following
the completion of the âFinancial sector IT development strategic planâ commissioned by RMA with
Project and IFC support, RMA started implementation of the EFTCS with support from RBI\.
iii) Establishing the Inter-bank Electronic Fund Transfer Clearing System (EFTCS) at the RMA
iv) Up gradation of the IT infrastructure of the Royal Stock Exchange of Bhutan
The upgradation facilitated the Bhutanese to use the services of the RSEBL in terms of trading, clearing
and depository of securities through the use of friendly IT system which was nonexistent before\. Doing so
not only developed the capital market but also ensured transparency, disclosure and efficient functioning
of the system\.
v) Financial Inclusion Policy and financial literacy program
Under this component financial inclusion policy has been drafted to improve financial services
penetration and inclusive growth\. The Literacy program was conducted in all 20 Dzongkhags\.
Project Restructuring
1\. During the Mid Term Review, it was understood that the Project facilitated jobs creation in IT/IES
sector and other value added sectors of the economy\. The scope of the outcome indicator was expanded to
50
include the cumulative job creation in the IT/ITES sector, as initially planned, as well as jobs created in
other sectors directly as a result of training supported through the Project\.
2\. The component 3 under RMA, âestablishment of an inter-bank electronic fund transfer clearing system
(EFTCS - Component)â was being implemented separately from the project after securing bilateral
assistance from the Reserve Bank of India\. Hence, Component 3c was replaced with two new sub-
components, as below:
i) New Component 3c\. Upgradation of the IT infrastructure of the Royal Security Exchange of Bhutan
ii) Financial Inclusion and Financial Literacy
Results Indicators
The Project Development Objective was to generate âCumulative job creation in the IT/ITES Sector in
the IT Park and related activitiesâ with target as 700\. By the project closure, the target was exceeded and
achieved 1015 job creation in IT/ITES and related activities\.
a\. Component One:
1\. The indicator on âCumulative leads generated for new investments in the IT Park with target as 200â
was achieved and exceeded to create 255 leads\.
2\. The indicator on the ânumber of companies successfully incubated in the IT Parkâ with target of 5 was
measured as number of companies incubating at the IT Park\. Since the Bhutan Innovation and
Technology Center was operational from 1st May 2012, over a short period of time 3 incubatees out of 13
have graduated and are operating successfully in the market\.
3\. The indicator on âPercentage of lettable space leased outâ was achieved to 50% against target of
100%\. Since the 2 international occupants have signed the tenancy agreement\. However one occupant is
yet to move into the commercial space and hence the ICR agreed to reduce the space leased to 25%\.
Prospects for filling the remaining space are promising, as Bhutanese companies as well as international
companies have expressed interest in locating at TTP\. RGOB has mitigated this risk in several ways:
(i) contractually, TTPL has an obligation to host at least 700 employees in the Park by May 2015,
(ii) RGOB has been helping to build a pipeline of prospective domestic and international tenants in the IT
Park, (iii) RGOB has worked on providing an enabling investment climate for tenants\.
b\. Component Two:
1\. Per cent of students clearing ITES industry competency assessment that is widely recognized with
target as 35%
This indicator was based on the competency assessment carried out by Infosys , Wipro and Genpact after
providing the training\. This indicator is based on the number of candidates successfully passed the
assessment and was offered employment by the companies\. By June 2013, the target of 35% was
achieved and exceeded to achieve 56%\.
2\. Per cent of students trained are successfully employed by the private sector with target as 50%
This indicator is related to the number of Bhutanese that were trained under the project and is employed
as of date irrespective of employed in or outside Bhutan and trained by national or international
companies\. The target has been achieved and exceeded to achieve 63\.63%\. A total of 1372 were trained
and as of date a total of 1015 has been employed in IT/ITES sector\.
c\. Component Three:
1\. Number of financial transactions by using ATMs at BOB per year with the target as 900,000
The target of 900,000 was achieved and exceeded to achieve transaction of 1,418,494\.
2\. Percentage of district coverage for financial literacy campaign with target as 100%
The main objective of FLC was to educate the Bhutanese especially the under banked and unbanked on
current and future financial services that will enable them to be financially disciplined\.
51
The target was 100% achieved and in addition RMA is considering programs through better innovative
ideas targeting groups especially the youth and farmers\.
3\. Percentage automation of stock exchange trading, settlement, and delivery with straight through
processing with target as 100%
The integrated system now allows online trading and generates more accurate and real time information -
a leap from the manual system established more than two decades ago\. It was 100 % completed with
users even from USA\. Also the number of shareholders in the RSEBL has increased and as of December
2012 it was 48,077 against 12,852 in 2008 and market capitalization is Nu\. 17\.63 billion\.
Extension of Project Closing Date
The project closing date of 30 June 2012 was extended to 30 June 2013 due to delay in completion of the
undergrounding of high voltage power line at IT Park implemented by Bhutan Power Corporation\. The
delay did not impact any change in the PDO and performance indicators\.
1\.The implementation of the project was kept in line with the Governmentâs priorities and strategy\. The
Project maintained its relevance throughout implementation by expanding the development objective and
the key outcome indicators (restructuring, Dec 2010) in line with the Governmentâs emerging strategies\.
2\.Resources were reallocated in a timely fashion to address the governmentâs emerging priorities like the
support for undergrounding of the High voltage power line , development of the national ICT master plan
that directly contributed towards the ICT industry development beside building the in-house capacity,
implementing matching grant program and employment incentive program for attracting first anchor
tenant and support for implementing microwork that has the potential for huge employment and
contribution to GDP\.
3\.The project implementation triggered investment climate reforms like FDI policy 2010, EDP 2010
including fiscal incentives for the IT Park and ICT industry, revision of Information Communication and
Media Act, formation of Single Window Agency for FDI investment, and trigger for development of
telecom policy\.
4\. High telecom tariff is an issue\. Through the project, the telecom tariff reduction has taken place from as
high as 300% for 50 mbps to almost 80% reduction compared to the region by project closure\.
5\. The successful implementation of PPP model using DBFOOT model had triggered usage of similar
model for other projects, international level collaboration, innovative private sector led skills development
programs leading to jobs, testing Bhutanâs value propositions as an investment destination and new IT
and financial infrastructure like establishment of 2nd international telecom gateway\.
Assessment of Risks
The risk that the developments outcomes will not be sustainable is low for the following reasons:
1) The youths employed through this project are already working and have not only enhanced their
employability skills but has also gained experience that most of them will find jobs or can start their
own business given the environment that has been created\.
2) The risk of losing commercial international tenants is also low since government has prioritized
private sector development and creation of conducive environment\. Hence in the 11th FYP, to further
support private sector development, an ICT industry development roadmap will be implemented , for
the first time e-gov master plan has been developed that will project the domestic market for the
industry that will be implemented in the 11th FYP, an ICT advisory panel has been proposed where
private sector is part of the design and implementation of not only the projects but also guiding the
government in terms of talent pool requirement (addressing the gap between the demand and supply
in the market)
3) Promotion of microwork\. Government is creating this environment for youth to take up microwork
that will provide employment and earnings in foreign currency\.
4) Telecom Policy will be in place to address the telecom tariff issue\.
52
Bank Performance
The preparation of the project had included adequate consultations and analytical work and was done in
the context of the Governmentâs and the Bankâs strategy\. The supervision from the Bank was excellent
hence the project had a smooth implementation\.
Though there has been time when the response has been delayed from the Bank while seeking approvals
to carry out activities but it did not have major impact since the delays has always been useful to complete
all due diligences required from both the side\.
Borrower Performance
1\. RGOB was fully supportive of this project and had prioritized this project as a national flagship
project\. The commitment was there from the highest level of the government\.
2\. All the agencies were very supportive and forthcoming during the implementation\.
3\. PIA and IAs had a very strong dedicated team and unlike the trend of high attrition of civil servants,
this project team from civil service was in the project till the end\.
4\. Sustainability of the project activity has been fully addressed by integrating with the agencies plans
and has not been taken as a onetime project\.
Annex - BHUTAN IT/ITES ADVISORY COUNCIL
1\. HE Lyonpo Nandalal Rai, Minister, Ministry of Information & Communications â Chairperson
2\. Mr\. Pramod Bhasin, Non-Executive Vice Chairman (Past President & CEO), Genpact â Member
3\. Mr\. Som Mittal, President, NASSCOM â Member
4\. Dr\. Ganesh Natarajan, Vice Chairman and CEO, Zensar â Member
5\. Mr\. Kiran Karnik, Past President, NASSCOM â Member
6\. Mr\. S\. (Kris) Gopalakrishnan, CEO and MD, Infosys Technologies â Member
7\. Mr\. Ajai Chowdhry, Chairman & CEO, HCL Infosystems â Member
8\. Mr\. Avinash Vashistha, Chairman & MD, Accenture India â Member
9\. Mr\. Rajendra S\. Pawar, Chairman, NIIT â Member
10\. Mr\. Ravi Venkatesan, Independent Director, Infosys (Past Chairman, Microsoft India) â Member
11\. Mr\. Nadathur S\. Raghavan, Patron/Chairman Advisory Council, NSRCEL-IIMB (co-founder and
former Joint MD, Infosys) â Member
12\. Dasho Kinley Dorji, Secretary, Ministry of Information & Communications â Member Secretary
53
Annex 8\. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders
Not applicable\.
54
Annex 9\. List of Supporting Documents
1\. Project Appraisal Document, June 2007
2\. Restructuring paper, December 2010
3\. Restructuring paper, June 2012
4\. Financing agreement, June 2007
5\. ISR sequence 1 to 10
6\. Aide Memoires of Bhutan Private Sector Development Project (PSDP)- Implementation Support
missions, World Bank documents
7\. PSDP Mid Term Review December 2010- Aide Memoire and Management Letter- World Bank
document
8\. PSDP Quarterly Progress Reports, January 2012 to March 2013
9\. PSDP Report on review of undergrounding of 66kV line at IT Park â Thimphu Thromde- January
2013
10\. PSDP Completion report for undergrounding of 66kV line at IT Park
11\. Nathan Associates (April 2006) âBhutan IT Park and Distance Learning Center Feasibility Studyâ
Executive report
12\. Bhutan Private Sector Survey (2002)
13\. Ministry of Labor and Human Resources, Royal Government of Bhutan, Labor Force Survey 2012
14\. Ministry of Labor and Human Resources, Royal Government of Bhutan, Establishment Census 2010
15\. National Statistics Bureau, Statistical Yearbook of Bhutan 2007 and 2012
16\. Ministry of Finance, Royal Government of Bhutan, Notification August 2008 : Fiscal Incentives for
IT Park developer and IT/ITES companies at Wangchhu Taba
17\. Bhutan\. Investment Climate Assessment Report âVitalizing the Private Sector, Creating Jobs\.
VOLUME II\.â The World Bank, September 2010
18\. Bhutan Country Assistance Strategy 2006-2009
19\. Bhutan Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) evaluation report - 2005 Bhutan Country Partnership
Strategy 2011-2014
20\. Bhutan Country Partnership Strategy progress report of 2012
21\. Bhutan Eleventh Five Year Plan 2013-2018
22\. Economic Development Policy of Bhutan, 2010 Socio Economic Impact Assessment report of the
Bhutan PSD project (July 2013)\.
23\. Thimphu Tech Park Ltd (TTPL), Bhutan Innovation and Technology Center Strategic Plan 2012-
2016
24\. PSDP Generic Skills Development Report (2013)
25\. License Agreement between TTPL and Shaun Communication, August 2012
26\. Leave and License Agreement between TTPL and Shaun Communication, February 2013
27\. Leave and License Agreement between TTPL and Scan Cafe, December 2012\.
55
BH UTAN
89°E 90°E 91°E
SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS
0 10 20 30 40 Kilometers DZONGKHAG (DISTRICT) CAPITALS
NATIONAL CAPITAL
0 10 20 30 Miles
RIVERS
BHUTAN MAIN ROADS
RAILROADS
GEWOG (SUB-DISTRICT) BOUNDARIES
DZONGKHAG (DISTRICT) BOUNDARIES
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
Him
GASA ala 92°E
ya 28°N
28°N
Mo
u
unt To
Ch
ains Cona
o
Ph
Gasa
Thunkar
To
Gamba
LHUENTSE TRASHI
dee
W ANG DUE
gd
'YANGTSE
ng
an
PUNAKHA PH ODRANG
Ma
M
THIMPHU BUMTHANG
Punakha Tang Lhuentse
Shingkarap
Trashi
Tango âYangtse
u
Chari
Kulo
Kuru Ch
PARO Lobesa
gCn
Haa Paro Trongsa Jakar
Chu
hu
Pa
ro
THIMPHU Wangdue
Haa
Ch
Khasadrapchu
TRONGSA
u
TRASHIGANG
San
HAA os
h Lingmithang
Monggar
Trashigang
k
Bumthang
Kisona Zhemgang
Torsa
MONGGAR Wamrong
Tendru Yebilaptsha
DAGANA ZH
nas
Ma
Chhukha Daga EM
Pema Gatshel
G
W
AN
a ng
PEMA
G
Damphu S A M D R UP
27°N S A R PA N G G
27°N
SAMTSE
AN
Chu
GATSHEL
Ton
JO N GKHA R Daifam
gsa
Panka
CHHUKHA
IR
Chu
Samtse Sarpang Panbang Nganglam Samdrup
TS
Pheuntsholing Jongkhar
To
Gorumara
To To To
To
IBRD 33373R2
Goalpare Guahati Guahati
Goalpare To
To
This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank\. Guahati
Alipur Duar
APRIL 2012
The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information
shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank
Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any
endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries\. 90°E 91°E 92°E | APPROVAL |
P001688 | Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No\. 3848
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
MALI FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT
(CREDIT 420-MLI)
March 9, 1982
Operations Evaluation Department
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.

FOR OFFICIAL USE O
GLOSSARY
DNFLA Direction Nationale de 1-Alphabgtisation National Directorate of
Fonctionnelle et de la Linguistique Functional Literacy and
Appliqu4e Applied Linguistics
ECICA Ecole Centrale d'Industrie, de Commerce Central School for
et d'Administration Industry, Commerce and
Administration
ENETF Ecole Normale d-Enseignement Technique Women's Technical
Feminin Teacher Training College
ENS Ecole Normale Superieure Higher Teacher Training
College
IPN Institut Pedagogique National National Pedagogical
Institute
IRFED Institut International de Recherche International Institute
et de Formation pour 1'Education et of Research and Training
le Developpement for Educational
Development
IRNES Institut de Recherches et de Normali- Institute for Research
sations Economiques et scientifiques and Economic and
Scientific Norms
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
MALI FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT
(CREDIT 420-MLI)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No\.
Glossary
Preface \. i
Basic Data Sheet \. \. ii
Highlights \. v
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM
SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT OF THE PROJECT EXPERIENCE \. 1
Project Background and Objectives\.1
Project Design\. 3
Institution-Building and Technical Assistance \. 4
Supervision by IDA \. 5
Covenants \. \. 5
Comments From The Borrower \. 7
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
I\. Conclusions and Recommendations \. 11
II\. Project Background \. 14
III\. Project Description and Credit Agreement \. 16
IV\. Project Administration \. 17
V\. Physical Implementation \. 18
VI\. Implementation of Software Inputs \. 21
VII\. Project Costs and Financing \. 22
VIII\. Project Outcomes \. 24
IX\. IDA Performance \. 30
X\. The Government Role in the Completion Report \. 31
XI\. Main Lessons Learned \. 32
Annexes
1\. Comparison of Originally Estimated and
Actually Provided Gross Construction Areas \. 35
2\. Technical Assistance: Comparison of Estimated and
Actual Schedule of Duration \. 36
3\. Compliance with Credit Agreement Covenants \. 37
4\. Comparison of Originally Estimated Costs and
Actual Costs \. 40
5\. Comparison of Unit Costs for New Institutions \. 41
6\. Costs per Student Place for New Institutions \. 42
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page No\.
Annexes
7\. Comparison Between Number of Beneficiaries
(Schools and Students) of Science/Technology Blocks
at Different Stages of the Project Cycle and the
Present Numbers \. 43
8\. Comparison of Weekly Timetables for Science/Technology
Activities in Second Cycle of Basic Education at
Different Stages of the Project Cycle and at Present 44
9\. Weekly Timetables for a Sample of ECICA Sections
(Courses with Full or Partial Practical Content) \. 45
10\. Expectations at Appraisal of Enrollments in Different
Streams of ECICA for 1977/78, Compared with Reality
in 1977/78 and at Present (1979/80) \.47
11\. Implementation Schedule \. 48
12\. Allocation of Credit Proceeds \.49
13\. Disbursement Schedule \. 50
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
MALI FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT
(CREDIT 420-MLI)
PREFACE
This is a performance audit of the First Education Project in Mali,
for which Credit 420-MLI was approved in June 1973 in the sum of US$5 million\.
Credit disbursements were completed on August 1, 1980\.
The audit report comprises: (a) a Project Performance Audit Memo-
randum (PPAM) prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department and (b) a
Project Completion Report (PCR), dated June 1, 1981, and revised August 18,
1981 and January 11, 1982 following OED and Borrower comment, prepared by
UNESCO on behalf of the Western Africa Regional Office following a mission to
Mali in October 1980\. Borrower staff accompanied the PCR mission on site
visits, provided background material and participated in discussions on the
project experience\. No field visit was undertaken in connection with the
PPAM\. The PPAM is based on a study of the PCR and other material in IDA files
relating to this project, including the Appraisal Report (140a-MLI) and the
President's Report (P-1248a-MLI) both dated June 1, 1973, the record of the
Board discussion on this project on June 19, 1973, the Credit Agreement
(420-MLI) dated July 11, 1973, and the reports of all subsequent supervision
missions\.
As is customary in the preparation of performance audit reports, a
copy of the draft report (in a French translation) was sent to the Borrower
for comment\. An English translation of the Borrower comments, dated Decem-
ber 16, 1981, is reproduced on pages 7 and 8 of this report\. This final
report reflects these Borrower comments\.
The audit finds no reason to disagree with the findings of the com-
prehensive PCR and provides only a highlights section and a brief memorandum
summarizing the project experience in the light of recent developments in
the education sector in Mali and experience with other education projects\.

- ii -
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET
MALI FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT
(CREDIT 420-MLI)
KEY PROJECT DATA
Appraisal Actual or
Estimate Current Estimate
Total Project Cost (US$ million) 5\.5 5\.6/a
Overrun (%) - 2% lb
Credit Amount (US$ million) 5\.0 5\.0
Disbursed - 5\.0
Repaid to June 30, 1981 -
Outstanding - 5\.0
Date Physical Components Completed 12/77 12/80
Months Since Credit Signature 53 89
Proportion Completed by Above Date (%) 30 100
Proportion of Time Overrun (%) 68
Institutional Performance Good Fair
Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements
(US$ million)
FY 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
i\. Appraisal Estimate 0\.06 1\.20 2\.75 4\.59 4\.89 5\.00 5\.00
ii\. Actual - 0\.63 1\.20 1\.90 3\.60 4\.69 5\.00
iii\. Actual as % of
Appraisal Estimate 0 52 44 41 74 94 100
OTHER PROJECT DATA
Original Actual or
Plan Revisions Estimated Actual
First Mention in Files 05/16/69
Government Application Nov\. 72
Negotiationsi\. 05/14-18/73
Board Approval 06/19/73
Date of Credit Agreement 07/11/73
Credit Effectiveness 10/15/73 11/15/73
Closing Date 12/31/79 06/30/80 08/01/80
Borrower Republic of Mali
Executing Agency Ministry of Education, General Directorate
of Administrative and Financial Planning
Fiscal Year of Borrower January 1 - December 31
Follow-on Project Name Second Education Project
Credit No\. 733-MLI
Amount (US$ million) 10\.0
Date of Credit Agreement September 30, 1977
/a Cost of the project as revised and reduced in 1977\.
7-b The PCR (para\. 7\.01) indicates that the real cost overrun of the revised
project is 31%\.
/c Held in Bamako\.
jä¹
- iii -
MISSION DATA
Sent Month/ No\. of No\. of Man- Date of
Mission by Year Weeks Persons* Weeks** Report
Identification UNESCO 02/72 3\.5 4 (B,C,D,E) 13 April 72
Reconnaissance IDA/ 06/72 2 3 (B,D,E) 6 08/03/72
UNESCO
Preparation UNESCO 10-11/72 4\.5 4 (A,B,C,E) 18
Appraisal IDA 11-12/72 4 5 (A,A,B,E,C) 17 06/01/73
Post-appraisal IDA 05/73 1 1 (F) 1 05/24/73
Total 55
Supervision I IDA 09/73 2 4 (A,B,D,D) 7 10/23/73
Supervision II IDA 03/74 1 1 (A) I No record
Supervision III IDA 03/74 1 1 (G) 1 05/08/74
Supervision IV IDA 06/74 1 2 (A,C) 2 06/24/74
Supervision V IDA 12/74 1 1 (A) 1 12/31/74
Supervision VI IDA 05/75 2\.5 4 (A,B,D,H) 9 07/25/75
Supervision VII IDA 10/75 2\.5 6 (A,A,B,B,
D,H) 12 12/09/75
Supervision VIII IDA 03/76 1 2 (B,D) 2 No record
Supervision IX IDA 03/76 1 1 (A) 1 04/01/76
Supervision X IDA 10/76 1 1 (A) 1 12/01/76
Supervision XI IDA 03/77 1 2 (A,B) 2 04/02/77
Supervision XII IDA 07/77 1 2 (A,D) 2 09/20/77
Supervision XIII IDA 02/78 1 2 (A,B) 2 04/04/78
Supervision XIV IDA 07/78 1 1 (A) 1 09/08/78
Supervision XV IDA 12/78 1 1 (B) 1 01/16/79
Supervision XVI IDA 02/79 1 2 (A,B) 1\.5 02/20/79
Supervision XVII IDA 03/79 0\.5 1 (C) 0\.5 03/22/79
Supervision XVIII IDA 10/79 1 2 (A,B) 2 11/27/79
Supervision XIX IDA 03/80 1 1 (D,J) 2 04/16/80
Supervision XX IDA 06/80 1 1 (A) I (Cable of
06/16/80)
Total 52
Completion UNESCO 10/80 2 2 (A,B) 4 06/01/81
CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATES
Name of Currency (Abbreviation) Malian Franc (MF)
Exchange Rates:
Appraisal Year (1972) US$l = MF4\.60
Intervening Years Average US$l = MF4\.50
Completion Year (1980) US$l = MF4\.20
A = Architect; B = General Educator; C = Technical Educator; D = Agricul-
tural Educator; E = Economist; F = Technical Assistance Specialist;
G = Comptroller (staff member); H = Basic Education Specialist;
J = Sociologist\.
Estimated number of man-weeks attributable to this project (including
travel time)\.

- iv -
ALLOCATION OF CREDIT PROCEEDS (US$)
Original Actual
Category Allocation Disbursement
I\. Part A of the Project
(a) Civil Works and Consultant
Architect Services $1,330,000 $2,136,111\.36
(b) Equipment and Furniture 1,290,000 1,011,211\.91
II\. Part B of the Project
Training of Teachers and Directors 40,000 46,159\.09
III\. Part C of the Project
Basic Education Study 440,000 465,519\.16
IV\. Part D of the Project
(a) Specialists Services and
Fellowships 770,000 1,232,515\.43
(b) Project Unit
(i) Project Architect/Engineer 110,000 -
(ii) Equipment, Transport,
Travel, Rent 50,000 108,483\.05
V\. Unallocated 970,000 --
Total $5,000,000 $5,000,000\.00
UNIT COSTS
(From PCR, Annexes 5 and 6)
Science/Technology Blocks
Appraisal Estimate Actual
Construction Costs
- per square meter US$130 - US$160 US$260 - US$380
- per student place US$720 - US$850 US$1,320 - US$2,600
ENETF
Construction Costs
- per square meter US$100 US$270
- per student place US$250 US$970
å
- v -
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
MALI FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT
(CREDIT 420-MLI)
HIGHLIGHTS
A Credit of US$5 million equivalent to help finance an education
project in Mali was signed in July 1973\. The total project costs were esti-
mated at US$5\.5 million\. The Credit financed (a) technical assistance to
improve the planning capabilities of the Ministry of Education; (b) construc-
tion and equipping of 11 groups of multipurpose science laboratories and
workshops for basic technology and domestic science; (c) teacher upgrading
and training of directors for the science/ technology blocks; (d) conversion,
extension and equipping of a middle-level technical training institution and a
women's technical teacher training college and (e) technical assistance -
including expert services and fellowships - to assist in the administration
and planning of education curriculum change, project implementation and a
study of basic education alternatives\. The project was closed on August 1,
1980, seven months after the original Closing Date of December 31, 1979\.
The project has been worthwhile, although not all of its objectives
have been achieved\. The number of science/ technology blocks was reduced to
six in 1977, and the reduced project has been implemented\. The six science/
technology blocks were not yet operating (PPAM, para\. 5), and the study of
alternatives in the field of basic education has not succeeded in indicating
a viable alternative to the present primary school system (PPAM, para\.10)\.
Almost all the implementation difficulties have stemmed from the
country's difficulty in meeting operational expenses and from the shortage of
experienced personnel to initiate, manage and sustain operational programs\.
These constraints led to delays in planning and project implementation, which
in turn resulted in some cost overruns (PPAM, para\. 6)\. In two respects,
the technical assistance programs were not as effective as was originally
intended\. In the first place, the lack of qualified counterparts rendered it
impossible to take full advantage of the technical assistance when it did
become available\. Secondly, as a result of planning and construction delays,
the specialists brought in to organize and conduct training programs were no
longer in the country when the project institutions were preparing to begin
operations (PPAM, para\. 8; PCR, paras\. 4\.03, 5\.03 and 8\.17)\.
The following points are of special interest:
(i) while central science/ technology blocks to serve a number of
schools may in certain circumstances represent a cost-effective
alternative to providing these facilities at individual schools,
- vi -
there are managerial and other difficulties in this kind of inter-
school collaboration which need to be taken into account in the
design stage (PPAM, para\. 5);
(ii) the need to have included more fellowships (PCR, para\. 11\.05);
(iii) the original inclusion of Credit support for some portion of the
operating costs of project institutions over an initial three-year
period (PPAM, para\. 1);
(iv) insufficient involvement of both employers in the design of teaching
programs at the Central School for Industry, Commerce and Admin-
istration and Malian officials in the early stages of curriculum
design (PCR, para\. 11\.08);
(v) the strength of the IDA supervision effort in rural education
(PPAM, para\. 11) and
(vi) the unrealistic nature of many of the covenants included in the
Credit Agreement (PPAM, para\. 12)\.
- 1 -
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM
MALI FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT
(CREDIT 420-MLI)
SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT OF THE PROJECT EXPERIENCE
1\. Project Background and Objectives\. In 1972, the Association
responded to tentative inquiries regarding support for the education sector
from Malian sources through UNESCO and at Bank annual meetings\. A full-scale
UNESCO identification mission was mounted in February 1972 followed by an IDA/
UNESCO reconnaissance mission in June of the same year\. The credit applica-
tion documents were prepared by the Government, with the help of a UNESCO
mission in October/November, and the project was appraised by an IDA mission
in November/December 1972\. The agreed project, at an estimated cost of
US$5\.5 million, comprised: (a) technical assistance - including specialist
services and fellowships - to improve the management and planning capability
of the Ministry of National Education; (b) technical assistance to help carry
out a study of alternatives for extending basic education at low cost to
out-of-school children and illiterate youths and adults; (c) the construction
and equipping of 11 blocks of centrally-located science laboratories and
workshops for basic technology and domestic science in support of a reform
program to re-orient the content and objectives of lower cycle secondary
education, each block to serve a group of neighboring schools; (d) technical
assistance to upgrade/train teachers and directors for the science and techno-
logy blocks and to assist in designing appropriate facilities; (e) the
rehabilitation and extension of a middle-level Industrial and Commercial
Technical School (ECICA) and a Women's Technical Teacher Training School
(ENETF) and related technical assistance - including specialist services and
fellowships - for curriculum development and counterpart training and (f)
assistance to the project implementation unit (PCR, paras\. 3\.01-3\.04)\. In
addition, the Credit included funding for some of the initial operating costs
of project schools over a three-year period\.1/
2\. The project was directed at institution-building and qualitative
improvements, with a small measure of expansion resulting from the facilities
provided\. The objectives were consistent with the national priorities within
an extremely constrained financial framework\. In the shorter term, the
priorities were: (a) reorientation of the education system to provide the
economy with better skilled workers and more readily trainable graduates from
the lower secondary schools and (b) strengthening the administrative capacity
1/ See Appraisal Report para\. 5\.12\. Credit funding to the extent of
US$250,000 was included to cover 75% of the cost of materials and sup-
plies for the practical rooms in the first year, 50% of the cost in the
second and 25% in the third\. In the event, with the delays in physical
implementation and the cost overruns, this provision appears to have been
used to offset cost overruns\.
- 2 -
of the Ministry of National Education in order to improve the efficiency and
productivity of the relatively costly education system, which was absorbing
some 30% of national recurrent expenditures\. Over the long term, it was
considered essential to extend basic education and basic skill opportunities
to increasingly larger segments of the population in a country in which the
illiteracy rate was estimated at 90% while only 19% of children aged 6-13 were
enrolled in the formal primary school system\. Such an extension of basic
education was not feasible within the framework of the existing formal system\.
3\. One of the features included in the project was the Basic Education
Study\. It is of interest to trace the changes in the definition of this
project item through the various stages prior to and following appraisal\.
The initial UNESCO Identification Mission had assigned high priority to
expansion of out-of-school education, mainly of a functional literacy nature
and with special reference to programs within two agricultural development
projects which IDA rural development specialists were studying\. The sub-
sequent IDA/UNESCO mission took no further action for two reasons: (a)
there was insufficient information available on which to base and define the
details of a program which could readily meet IDA appraisal criteria and (b)
the Government had committed itself to expanding its activities in functional
literacy only within the framework of large integrated projects for rural or
industrial development\.!/
4\. The appraisal mission appears to have considered that a major reform
of primary education would not in itself have made any substantial impact
upon the unsatisfactory enrollment participation rate and would probably
have raised unit costs\. Consequently, the mission, adopting a cautious
approach in this difficult and complex area of rural education and universal
education, recommended (and outlined) an extensive in-depth study of alterna-
tive low-cost approaches to extending basic education opportunities outside
the formal education system\. Basic planning studies were felt to be needed
before the country could be advised on cost-effective and technically and
politically viable solutions to its major problems\.V!
1/ The Second Education Project in Mali departs from this approach and
directly supports functional literacy development\.
2/ This search for acceptable alternatives to formal basic education was
pursued with remarkable consistency by the Western Africa Regional
Office especially among the Sahelian countries\. It was reflected in
studies and other components included in Nigeria Education III (Loan
929-UNI), Senegal Education II (Credit 530-SE), Sierra Leone Education II
(Credit 573-SL), as well as Mauritania Education I (Credit 459-MAU),
Benin Education I (Credit 583-BEN) and Upper Volta Education I (Credit
530-UV)\.
- 3 -
5\. Project Design\. The project prepared by UNESCO envisaged that a
science/workshop block be constructed at each of 31 schools\. In the interests
of economy, the IDA appraisal team replaced these individual blocks with 11
central blocks, each to serve a group of schools\. However, the six blocks
which have been constructed following a reduction in project scope are not yet
operating; when they do begin to operate, it is expected that there may be
severe overcrowding in them because of the rapid growth which has taken place
in lower secondary enrollments in the feeder schools (PCR, para\. 8\.04)\.
Whether the idea of central facilities is an improvement over the idea of
providing a block for each of selected larger individual schools is not clear
at this early stage\. The operation of a central block of facilities to be
shared by several schools poses difficult problems of administrative respon-
sibility, synchronized organization of the centers and the feeder schools and
control of stock\.Y In the case of this project the Regional Office has
indicated to OED that training programs for the staff of these science/
workshop blocks will be recommended for inclusion in the forthcoming Third
Education Project\.
6\. The overriding issue has been the non-availability of funds for
capital and recurrent expenditures - a problem which was addressed in the
project design by including Credit funding for some operating costs over an
initial three-year period\. None of the project institutions or extensions was
operational until 1979 because the national contributory funds were not
available at the scheduled times\. None of the central practical facilities
is operating because, inter alia, funds have not been made available for
materials and utility services\. Because of lack of funds, the Ministry of
National Education has not organized additional programs for training and
re-training of the practical subjects teachers for the central science-
technology blocks; consequently, the resources and newly developed curricula
of these facilities are not as yet being fully exploited (PCR, para\. 8\.08)\.
7\. The two technical institutions appear to be in a position to achieve
their intended objectives, except that certain sections of the Central School
for Industry, Commerce and Administration (ECICA) are still without an ade-
quate budget, including electrical power for operation of machinery and
1/ In the Mauritius First Education Project, this concept of a central block
ran into difficulties, because of scheduling problems\. In this case, IDA
financed additional classrooms and thus turned the central science/work-
shop blocks into complete schools\. In the Nigeria Second Education
Project, the idea of "matching" secondary schools, so that they might
share facilities, proved generally unworkable for administrative reasons\.
On the other hand, in the Indonesia First Education Project, where the
secondary Technical Training Centers were administratively autonomous
units serving feeder schools, the concept worked well\. The Regional
Office observes that in the Senegal Second Education Project eleven
central science/technology blocks are expected to be operational soon\.
-4-
equipment (PCR, paras\. 5\.10 and 8\.15)\. It is expected that, in October 1981,
all sciencetechnology blocks will be open and operating, some three years
behind schedule\. However, by mid-1981, no arrangements had been made in
regard to the administration, time-tabling and scheduling of students from t1e
feeder schools\. A new teacher training program was scheduled to be conducted
in the Summer of 1981\. The project has provided 1,380 places, but some 5,500
students can benefit from these science and technology facilities, if the
scheduling is carefully organized and the centers well administered\.
8\. Institution-Building and Technical Assistance\. The institution-
building potential of the project was limited by the concentration of the
consultant specialists within the project management unit; this led to their
isolation from the Malian officials and specialists within the operational
directorates and development agencies of the Ministry of Education\. The
contribution of these expatriate consultants to MOE capabilities was therefore
minimal\. The problem was alleviated by UNDP/UNESCO technical assistance in
reinforcing the Planning Directorate, while the resources of the National
Pedagogical Institute (IPN) and the Malians returning from fellowship programs
supported from bilateral and other multilateral sources considerably strength-
ened the range of Ministry capabilities (PCR, para\. 6\.03)\. The technical
assistance consultant services provided under the project proved unsatisfac-
tory on the whole; the site supervision services of the architectural consul-
tants were also unsatisfactory, although their design work was generally
acceptable (PCR, paras\. 4\.03, 5\.06, 6\.05 and 11\.03)\. In hindsight also, it
appears that the phasing-in of consultants needed more careful planning; the
PCR recommends, for example (para\. 1\.09(c)), that an additional consultant
now be employed to assist in organizing new science/technology programs
because the project specialist left Mali two years before the facilities were
completed\.
9\. Local staff contributed substantially to the Basic Education Study\.
Only one expatriate worked throughout on the Study\. He was assisted by a
number of short-term consultants brought in for special tasks from time to
time, but the Malian working teams which the expatriate was able to organize
made the major contribution\. The experience this national group gained has
made it possible to include in the Second Education Project (Credit 733-MLI) a
second phase of the Study in which certain of the recommended prograas are to
be applied in the field and tested\. A comprehensive Basic Education Study
was completed (PCR, para\. 8\.16), and the Mali Government has established a
Basic Education Task Force (as well as a Rural Education team) to conduct
studies and experiments in these respective fields (PCR, para\. 8\.19)\.
10\. The outcome of the Basic Education Study has been to provide the
justification and design of two more components in the Second Education
Project - assistance to development of functional literacy programs and a
program to provide basic vocational training to newly literate youths within
their village environment\. However, the Study did not satisfactorily address
the cost of various alternatives to formal primary schooling which could
extend basic education to out-of-school children and illiterate youths and
- 5 -
adults\. The reason for this deficiency is not known\. What is clear is that
recurrent unit costs in the existing primary school are already quite low at
US$25 per pupil\. Even at this cost, the extension of primary schooling on any
but a very limited scale would not be financially feasible\. Whatever the
reason, the Study did not respond to its principal task, nor did it cost those
programs it did recommend\. The study has not had the expected impact upon
education and education development thinking throughout the Western Africa
Region which was originally expected\.
11\. Supervision by IDA\. IDA provided frequent supervisory and advisory
services, often from the Abidjan (RMWA) office\. That IDA appreciated the
significance of the low cost rural education study is indicated by the fre-
quent visits of agricultural education staff or consultants with considerable
experience in rural education and development matters\. However, the useful-
ness of the IDA missions was limited in the initial stages when project
progress was dependent, not so much upon covenant agreements, advice or
exhortation, as upon the availability of government funds\. Supervision mis-
sions did not succeed in ensuring that the technical assistance consultant
group was appropriately positioned to be effective and that the timing of
technical assistance was well coordinated with physical implementation, the
timely appointment of counterpart staff or the maintenance of a reasonable
level of continuity in the project management staff, and the adoption of
measures to provide electricity for the ECICA (PCR, paras\. 5\.10, 8\.15, 8\.20,
9\.03 and 11\.04)\.
12\. Covenants\. Certain covenants have not been met or have been only
partially met (see PCR, Annex 3)\. These relate to (a) the allocation of
adequate operational funds to project institutions, (b) the application of
revised curricula in these institutions and (c) the reduction, by one year, of
the four-year programs in the ECICA and the teacher training programs, once
higher standards had been achieved in first cycle secondary education\. It is
as yet too early to ascertain whether the project will result in improved
standards of learning in first cycle secondary education\. In the circum-
stances, it appears that, however desirable these goals or targets might have
been, these were not realistic subjects for such covenants in the Agreement\.
4
-7-
FOR \.788 IBRD LANGUAGE SERVICES DIVISION
CONTROL No\. E-713/82 ATE: December 29, 1981
ORIGINAL LANGUAGEt French (Mali)
DEPT, 0pEvaln S TRANSL\.TOR: TS:cc
COMMENTS FROM THE BORROWER
Ministry of Education
Education Projects Office
Bamako, Mali
No\. 387/BPE Bamako, December 16, 1981
Mr\. Shiv S\. Kapur
Director, Operations Evaluation Department
IBRD, Washington, D\.C\.
Dear Mr\. Kapur:
Thank you for sending me, for comment, the first version of the
evaluation report on the first Mali Education Project\.
After reading the report we have the following comments:
- paragraph (e), page 4: the study of the entire education sector was not
made in the context of execution of this component\. It was performed at
the World Bank's request as an initial stage for the implementation of a
third education project\. The study was carried out by a mixed team of UNESCO
experts and Malian specialists from the following units and agencies:
Education Projects Office, National Directorate of Functional Literacy
and Applied Linguistics, Institut Pedagogique National et Enseignement Normal,
National Directorate of School Planning and Equipment, Human Resources
Division of the Ministry of Planning\.
The planning and management component of the education project
has been included in a UNDP/UNESCO planning program\.
- paragraph 8\.17, page 21: as this paragraph does not reflect the facts,
I would like it to be omitted\.
- paragraph 10\.02, page 24: I suggest that the first part of the third
sentence be dropped and that the sentence start with "The officials responsible
for the project will offer\."
-8-
I trust that these comments will be taken into account\.1/
Yours, etc\.
Is! Hamadoun Sidibe
Director, Education Projects Office
1/ All the comments in this letter have been taken into
account in the revised version of the PCR Section of
the audit report\.
-9-
MALI
FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT
CREDIT 420-MLI
COMPLETION REPORT
June 1, 1981
(rev\. January 11, 1982)
Projects Department
Western Africa Regional Office
Education Division
æ
- 11 -
I\. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Project Description
1\.01 Objectives: The First Education Project in Mali (Cr\. 420-MLI) was
designed to support the Government's efforts to improve educational planning
and management, apply the reform of lower secondary education by introducing
science/technology programs and upgrading the teaching staff, and make middle-
level technician training better adapted to the country's manpower needs\. An
innovative component of the project was a study to evaluate low-cost alterna-
tives for providing basic education to those not served by the formal primary
system\. The project was to be implemented over a period of about 5-1/2 years,
at a total cost estimated at US$5\.5 million\.
1\.02 Components\. The project consisted of the following components:
(a) technical assistance to improve the planning capabilities of the Ministry
of Education; (b) construction and equipping of 11 groups of multipurpose
science laboratories and workshops for basic technology and domestic science
(the number of these science/technology blocks was reduced to six in 1977);
(c) teacher upgrading and training of directors for the science/technology
blocks; (d) conversion, extension and equipping of a middle-level technical
training institution and a women's technical teacher training college; and
(e) technical assistance for a study of basic education alternatives\.
General Results
1\.03 Physical implementation\. Physical implementation of the project
was generally satisfactory, despite initial construction delays resulting from
a need to reduce the project scope because of high cost increases after the
1973/74 oil crisis\. There were additional delays, with subsequent cost
increases in civil works, due to the shortage of qualified technical staff in
the architectural consulting firm, the managerial and financial limitations of
the local contractors, and the difficulty experienced by the Government in
financing its full share of the project costs\.
1\.04 Suitability and use of buildings and equipment\. The buildings and
equipment provided for the project institutions are generally suitable for
their intended purposes and the users have few complaints\. At the time of the
completion mission, the major shortcomings in the physical premises were a
lack of electricity, gas (for the science labs) and water supplies\. These
problems are temporary and provisions have been made for their solution\.
1\.05 Project costs and financing\. The IDA credit of US$5\.0 million was
fully disbursed by August 1, 1980, seven months later than anticipated at apprai-
sal\. In 1977, to compensate for unanticipated cost overruns of 41%, the
project was reduced in scope by deleting five (out of 11) science/technology
blocks\. For those elements in the reduced project, the total cost overrun
from appraisal to completion in 1980 was US$1\.3 million, or 31%\. The 1977
amended Credit Agreement financed a reduced project, then estimated to cost
US$5\.3 million and reduced the Government's contribution from US$0\.5 million
to US$0\.3 million, as Mali was experiencing financial difficulties\. The cost
of the completed project exceeded the 1977 revised cost estimates by US$0\.3
million, or 5%\. During implementation, cost increases were incurred mainly in
- 12 -
civil works, resulting from delays of two to four years and from exchange rate
losses when the value of the US dollar fell from MF 460 to MF 420\. To date,
the Government has paid only US$270,000 of its share of the project cost,
leaving about US$370,000 still owed to contractors\. To reduce this indebted-
ness, the Government has committed the equivalent of US$280,000 in its 1981
budget, leaving about US$90,000 to be financed from its 1982 budget\.
1\.06 Project management\. Despite some turnover of staff during the
seven-year implementation period, the Project Unit performed its functions
adequately and succeeded in organizing numerous entities to carry out the
pedagogical aspects of the project\. IDA monitoring of the project was frequent
during the critical first four years, but could not avert some problems
which arose; e\.g\., weakness in the accounting procedures and in the implemen-
tation of the technical assistance and the science and technology programs\.
The experience gained under the first project has, however, prepared the
Project Unit to manage the more sophisticated activities of the second project\.
1\.07 Component outcomes\.
(a) Central School for Industry, Commerce and Administration (ECICA):
This component aimed at improving the quality of training programs
designed to meet the country's needs for middle-level technicians
and skilled manpower, through more practically oriented programs,
close cooperation with the private sector in developing these
programs and follow-up of ECICA students after they enter the work
force\. As the school has been in operation only since October 1979,
it is too early to assess its results\. However, some improved
programs have been prepared with the assistance of private sector
specialists\. The newly appointed Director of ECICA intends to
enable representatives of the industrial and commercial sectors to
participate further in the improvement of the training programs by
membership in an Upgrading Board ("Conseil de Perfectionnement")\.
(b) Lower secondary science program: The six science/technology blocks
were finished by October 1980, and it is expected that they will
serve 25 schools and about 5,500-6,000 students\. However, most of
these blocks have not functioned during the 1980/81 school year
because of prolonged student unrest\. To ensure the best results
from this experimental program, the use of the facilities and
equipment should be carefully planned and organized, particu-
larly in view of possible overcrowding\. To benefit fully from the
new facilities and equipment, teachers have been trained in the new
science program and teaching aids have been prepared\. As a new
curriculum is being implemented progressively, teachers who underwent
training three years ago are being given refresher training in the
new approach to science and technology instruction\. The new teaching
aids need to be printed and distributed to the lower secondary
schools on a regular basis\. A possible third education project
could help the Government to make the science program more effective\.
- 13 -
(c) Science facilities for ENETF: A science technology block was
also built and equipped for the Women-s Technical Teacher Training
College (ENETF), which previously had no facilities for practical
work\. The training program for domestic science teachers for lower
secondary schools now includes instruction in science and technology,
and consequently they should be better prepared to teach effectively\.
(d) Basic Education Study: The final report, issued in June 1978,
proposed six alternatives for providing basic education\. Three of
these are being tested: an adult literacy program, rural education,
and introduction of local languages as media of instruction\. Two
other possibilities (women-s training and diversified regional
education programs) were not considered because of a lack of manpower
to implement them\. The most interesting of the six proposals is a
system for training newly literate youth, but its generalization
throughout the country would be very expensive\. Programs for adult
literacy, rural education, use of local languages, and rural youth
training are currently being implemented under the Second Education
Project (Cr\. 733-MLI) on a pilot basis\. The main outcome of this
component of the first project is the setting up of a multidisci-
plinary team to undertake field tests of the alternatives proposed
in the final report\. Mali appears to be the only West African
country to have such a well-structured group to evaluate alternative
forms of basic education\. However, the study did not apply itself
to the principal objective of conceptualizing and elaborating
low-cost alternatives\.
(e) Educational planning and management: This component, which could
not be completed within the framework of the project as a result of
budgetary constraints and changes made in the distribution of
technical assistance (para\. 6\.02) was included in the framework of a
UNDP project and implemented by Unesco\. This project provided
financing for a Unesco expert to work in Bamako for approximately
two years and for several training scholarships for Malian spe-
cialists\. These specialists, together with other Malian specialists
from the Project Unit, the National Directorate of Functional
Literacy and Applied Linguistics, the National Pedagogical Institutes
and the Division of Human Resources in the Ministry of Planning, and
with the technical assistance of the Unesco CP, carried out a
comprehensive sector study which has served as a basis for the
preparation of future projects\.
Principal Recommendations
1\.08 Relative to the Bank Group, we make the following observations
and recommendations:
(a) Supervision missions should have included a general educator when
careful monitoring of implementation of the "software" aspects of
the project was needed\.
- 14 -
(b) A technical educator should have participated in some of the super-
vision missions\.
(c) Future missions should occasionally include a consultant to ensure
proper projD\. accounting\.
(d) Changes should have been discussed with the Government as soon as it
became obvious that the technical assistance was not fully adequate\.
(e) IDA should insist on the Project Unit submitting quarterly progress
reports on a regular basis, and these reports should include "soft-
ware' activities\.
(f) In collaboration with the Government, IDA should undertake an
evaluation of the impact of the new practical science/technology
programs within a few years after these programs and the project-
assisted institutions have been fully operational to assist in the
Government's decision-making process\.
1\.09 Relative to the Government of Mali, we make the following recommen-
dations:
(a) Maintenance procedures for the new buildings and equipment should
be established\.
(b) The Ministry of Education should ensure that adequate funds are
budgeted for ECICA-s operational costs and those of the science/
technology blocks\.
(c) As the specialist in science and technology left Mali two years
before the facilities were completed, a consultant should be
employed to assist the lower secondary schools in organizing their
new science/technology programs and refresher training for the
teachers\.
(d) The National Pedagogical Institute (IPN) should assume a more active
leadership role in developing and monitoring innovative educational
programs\. Three different departments presently share responsibility
for these programs\.
II\. PROJECT BACKGROUND
Sectoral Setting
2\.01 In 1972 when the Government sought IDA assistance for educational
development, the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports was responsible for
administering education and training in Mali\. The Government had undertaken
to reform the formal system by establishing a mandatory nine-year basic
- 15 -
education ("enseignement fondamental") for all Malian youth between ages 6 and
15\. This two-cycle system (primary grades 1-6 and lower secondary grades 7-9)
replaced the traditional 10-year system of primary and lower secondary educa-
tion, and was intended to be more democratic and less selective\. Lower
secondary school prepared students for entry into upper secondary general
education and for vocational, agricultural and teacher training at the same
level (grades 10-13)\. Students continuing to higher education (grades 13-16)
were channeled on the basis of results achieved in the Malian baccalau-
reate examination\.
2\.02 Primary education\. With an enrollment of only 20% of the 6-12 age
group, the primary system-s main function was the preparation of a small
minority of students proceeding to further education\. But this function
was undertaken at a relatively high cost because of the system's limited
efficiency, mainly due to the use of a foreign language for instruction, the
poor learning environment, the theoretical nature of the teaching approach to
the curriculum, and the poor educational background and training of the
teachers\. For these reasons, a study of low-cost alternatives for basic
education was included in the project\.
2\.03 Lower secondary education was an extension and reinforcement of the
primary school curriculum, with chemistry, biology, physics and domestic
science added to the already long list of subjects\. Despite their nine or more
years of basic education, lower secondary graduates were still severely
handicapped, whether they sought employment or entered an upper secondary
technical/vocational school, because of the low quality of the education they
had received\. As in the case of the primary level, there were three main
reasons for this situation: the over-emphasis on theory in the lower secondary
science, technology and domestic science programs, the low quality of training
provided to lower secondary school teachers, and the inadequacies of the
school facilities and equipment resources\.
2\.04 Upper secondary education\. At the time of project appraisal, the
curriculum for this level of education still followed the French model\.
Unlike the situation in other African countries, over 50% of the students
followed and graduated from science and technical streams\. All qualified
graduates who continued their studies did so on government scholarships\. The
key middle-level technical training institution, then as now, was the Central
School for Industry, Commerce and Administration (ECICA)\. Its training
programs were insufficiently practical because of inadequate facilities and
equipment\. Remedial measures were urgently required to enable the school to
fulfill its role effectively\.
Project Generation
2\.05 In February 1972 a Unesco mission assisted the Government in iden-
tifying education projects suitable for Bank Group financing\. The Unesco
report was discussed with the Government by a joint IDA/Unesco mission in
June 1972\. The following November the Government requested IDA assistance
for a project, prepared with the help of Unesco\. It was designed to strengthen
educational planning and management, investigate alternative means of expanding
- 16 -
opportunities for basic education, and improve the quality of lower secondary
and middle-level technician education programs\. It was proposed to construct
and equip 31 science laboratories/workshop blocks for lower secondary schools
and to reconstruct and equip science laboratories and provide additional
equipment for the Women's Technical Teacher Training College and the Central
School for Industry, Commerce and Administration\. Staff housing and technical
assistance were included in the proposal\.
2\.06 An IDA appraisal mission visited Mali in November/December 1972
and presented its findings in June 1973\. The appraised project differed
from the project identified by Unesco in terms of the number of science
laboratories (11 instead of 31) and in terms of the amount of technical
assistance (11 man-years instead of 3 to improve education planning and
management) and the resources made available for project management\. An IDA
credit of US$5\.0 million, with a foreign exchange component of US$4\.1 million,
was approved on June 19, 1973, and signed on July 11, 1973\.
III\. PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND CREDIT AGREEMENT
Project Description
3\.01 The agreed project consisted of:
(a) construction and equipping of (i) 11 groups of multipurpose science
laboratories and basic technology and domestic science workshops,
each group serving one to four lower secondary schools in the sur-
rounding area; (ii) a multipurpose science laboratory at the Women's
Technical Teacher Training College (ENETF); and (iii) classrooms,
laboratories, technology rooms and administrative offices at the
Central School for Industry, Commerce and Administration (ECICA);
(b) a program to upgrade teachers and train directors for the practical
science and workshop facilities to be provided under the project;
(c) 7 man-years of specialist services and 1\.5 years of fellowships for
improving lower secondary and middle-level technical education;
11 man-years of specialist services to support the Government-s
efforts to improve educational planning and management and to
develop manpower planning capabilities; 5\.5 man-years of specialist
services to undertake a study of alternatives for providing low-cost
basic education to a greater proportion of the population; and
(d) 2\.5 man-years for an architect or engineer experienced in school
construction to assist the Project Director; furniture, equipment
and accommodations for the Project Unit\.
The Credit Agreement
3\.02 When the Credit Agreement for an IDA credit of US$5\.0 million was
signed on July 11, 1973, it represented the first Bank Group assistance for
educational development in Mali\. Credit effectiveness was expected to be
- 17 -
October 15, 1973; the credit was declared effective November 15, 1973\.
The Closing Date of December 31, 1979 was subsequently postponed to June 30,
1980\.
3\.03 A Unesco mission had assisted the Government during October and
November 1972 in preparing the project proposals and the request for IDA
financing (para\. 2\.05)\. During the early phase of the preparation process,
the responsible Malian officials were not fully aware of the detailed impli-
cations of the proposals because counterpart working groups had not been set
up\. However, by the time the project was appraised the Malian officials and
IDA staff had established a working relationship that permitted successful
negotiations\.
3\.04 During negotiations at Bamako in May 1973, agreement was reached
with the Government on the main issues relating to project implementation and
the sector\. These are set out in Annex 3 and included: consultations with IDA
on the recommendations to be made by the basic education study team; prepara-
tion of new curricula for lower secondary education with emphasis on practical
work; preparation of a plan for rationalization of higher education; improve-
ment of the qualifications of science teachers; appointment of a Malian
Director of Practical Work at ECICA; and introduction of appropriate budgetary,
inventory and procurement procedures\.
IV\. PROJECT ADMINISTRATION
4\.01 In accordance with Section 3\.01(b) and Schedule 4 of the Credit
Agreement, a Project Unit was established within the General Directorate
for Administrative and Financial Planning, with a full-time Project Director
to be responsible for overall management of the project and coordination with
the ministries and other agencies involved in its implemention\. The Project
Director was appointed in July 1973, but the Project Unit became fully opera-
tional only in August 1974 when technical assistance arrived\.
4\.02 Information on the functioning of the Project Unit was difficult
to obtain as quarterly progress reports were not submitted on a regular
basis until 1978\. There was a considerable turnover of staff during the
seven-year implementation period; e\.g\., there were two different Project
Directors, two different architects and four different accountants\. The
mission found the Project Unit bookkeeping to be in a confused state; this may
be attributed to the frequent turnover of accounting personnel and weak
administration\. However, the IDA supervision missions appear to have been
satisfied on the whole with the Project Unit's performance under the difficult
working conditions imposed in the early stages by budgetary problems and
misunderstandings in the technical assistance program\.
4\.03 The major problems encountered by the Project Unit concerned the
availability of Malian counterpart funds for financing project costs, and the
quality of the support services\. Following the Government reassignment of
the Project Unit premises, the first counterpart funds in 1976 were used to
construct new premises and a storeroom for the Project Unit which were not
- 18 -
included in the project\. Furthermore, the Government budgetary and finan-
cial constraints led to a reduction in its contribution to project financing\.
All this explains why, at completion of the project, there were still out-
standing payments to be made by the Government to contractors for work done\.
With respect to suppor- services, the problems encountered were related to the
poor quality of the work performed by the architectural consultants (particu-
larly site supervision), the technical and financial capacity of the building
contractors, the reliability of the soil and reinforced-concrete tests, and
the late involvement of the Power Company of Mali\.
4\.04 Despite these difficulties and the turnover of its staff, the
Project Unit acquired valuable experience during the first project which
has proved beneficial in the implementation of the ongoing Second Education
Project (Cr\. 733-MLI)\.
V\. PHYSICAL IMPLEMENTATION
Civil Works
5\.01 Schedule of accommodations\. As a result of the 70% rise in con-
struction costs identified by the supervision mission of May 1975, certain
modifications, accepted by the Government and IDA in 1977, were made in the
project scope\. The number of science/technology blocks was reduced from 11 to
6 and student sanitary facilities and the guardian's house were deleted from
this science/technology component\. Taking into consideration budgetary
constraints and changes in the target population, the total design capacity
for the blocks was reduced from 2,260 to 1,380 places (-39%) and the gross
areas to be built were reduced from 12,176m2 to 6,274m2 (-49%) between
appraisal i1 1972 and project completion in 1980\. For all project components
(science/technology blocks, ENETF and ECICA) the difference between the gross
areas foreseen at appraisal (13,022m2) and those actually completed (7,532m2)
is 5,490m2 or -42%\. The difference between the gross areas foreseen when
the project was revised (6,647m2) and those actually completed (7,532m2)
is 885m or +13% (Annex 1)\. This increase in gross area is due to the
creation of storage spaces for workshop materials in the science/technology
blocks, the creation of an extra classroom and teachers' room at ECICA, the
addition of seven classrooms in the Mopti science/technology block 1/, and
the creation of a science/technology block for ENETF instead of remodelling an
existing special room into a biology laboratory\.
5\.02 Procurement\. International bidding by prequalified building con-
tractors was opened in April 1975 for the ECICA component and in early 1976
for construction of the science/technology blocks\. For ECICA, the contracts
1/ This resulted from a decision by the authorities in Mopti to establish
the science/technology blocks on the site of an existing school, there-
fore necessitating the relocation of a group of classrooms\.
- 19 -
were awarded on September 18, 1976\. For the science/technology blocks and the
ENETF, both batches of civil works, (a) Sikasso, Segou and ENETF, and (b)
Bamako and Mopti, were awarded in April 1977\. For Mopti, the design studies
had to be taken up again by the Project Unit architect following problems
relating to site selection and soil tests which created difficulties in
foundation design (June 1978)\. Furniture and equipment were offered on the
basis of international competitive bidding advertised in June 1975\. The lists
were reduced after bid opening\. The furniture and equipment were available in
1977, but could not be installed until March 1979 because of construction
delays \.
5\.03 Implementation delays\. On average, construction was completed
with two to four years' delay with reference to the original work plan at
appraisal (Annex 11)\. The principal reasons were: the late start of the
design studies (July 1975 instead of January 1974) because of difficulties in
selecting and appointing the project architect; redefinition of the project,
necessitated by the rise in construction costs from 1975 to 1977; an extended
period of negotiations with the contractors for the ECICA component; and a
construction time far beyond the contract schedule\. Three to five months
passed between award of the contracts and the consultants- approval of the
execution plans established by the contractors--a practice which has been
abandoned in more recent projects, where it is now the consultants' task to
complete the final drawings and specifications before the bidding stage\.
Delivery of construction materials to the sites was a continual problem\.
Long delays 1/, often more than 100 days, between submission of the monthly
statement of works by the contractors and actual payment forced them (with
limited funds) to slow down their work\. In addition, although international
bidding procedures were applied, no foreign contractor was attracted in the
tendering exercise, probably because of the number of relatively small con-
tracts to be implemented at widely dispersed sites and the difficult working
conditions in Mali\. All civil works contracts were therefore awarded to
local contractors, suffering from unavoidable managerial and technical limita-
tions\. The handing over of buildings was effective as from December 1978 for
ECICA, ENETF and the science/technology blocks at Sikasso and Segou\. The
three science/technology blocks at Bamako were also handed over in December
1978\. The one for Mopti, where construction did not begin until June 1978
following foundation and site problems (para\.5\.02), is not yet completed
because the contractor had to slow down the work, due to delays in the Govern-
ment-s payments\. Implementation time for construction work surpassed the
deadlines set in the contracts; e\.g\., nine months for the science/technology
blocks, which was not realistic owing to local constraints\.
1/ Due to (a) the circuit of visas necessary for payment (contractors,
architectural consultants, Project Unit); (b) the practice at one time to
regroup statements of completed work before sending them to IDA; and (c)
the difficulty experienced by the contractors in obtaining payment
corresponding to the Malian counterpart funds\.
- 20 -
Architectural Consultants
5\.04 The architectural consultants- contract was awarded on May 22, 1974,
to a private domestic firm, nine months after the date anticipated at appraisal
because of cumbersome administrative procedures\. The contract included 11
science/technology blocks plus the ECICA and ENETF components, with lump sum
fees (MF 95 million) and a site supervision period not to exceed 18 months\.
At completion, the consultants' fees not only covered the praparation of
construction documents for works that were deleted from the project when the
scope was reduced, but also site supervision that extended oVer an implementa-
tion period more than twice that anticipated\.
5\.05 The architectural design study for the project components, prepared
under the project architect's guidance, was satisfactory as regards space
requirements\. The natural lighting and ventilation are good, The orientation
of the buildings (north-south) is generally correct\.
5\.06 The consultants' performance was disappointing, especially regardins
time management and technical matters\. They did not carry out site supervi-
sion and control of the contractors with the necessary expertise, especially
during the start-up period, because of a shortage of qualified technical
staff\. This caused numerous delays\.
Furniture and Equipment
5\.07 The quality and quantity of equipment delivered to ECICA, ENETF
and the science/technology blocks are satisfactory\. Only certain chemical
products deteriorated during the longer than anticipated storage period,
necessitated by the construction delays\. The furniture was designed and
produced locally\. The steel furniture is of good quality\. But the wooden
furniture has some deficiencies in its design and quality; hence, maintenance
of this furniture may soon become a problem\.
5\.08 The cost of equipment provided ECICA amounted to nearly US$0\.5 mil-
lion, or 60% of the total cost of the equipment included in the project\. No
complete inventory was available, but most of the ECICA equipment has been
installed\. The equipment lists had to be reduced, with the result that the
electricity, automotive and refrigeration workshops need further strengthening
in terms of equipment\. In the commercial/secretarial/administration wing, the
installation of equipment was expected to be completed shortly\. The account-
ing machines were not yet installed as the supplier was keeping them until
electricity was connected and he could brief the teachers on their use\.
Quality and Functional Suitability of the Facilities
5\.09 Apart from ECICA, the project facilities are of a standard type\.
Taking into account the number of student places foreseen for each facility,
the areas can be considered as corresponding to accepted norms in similar
construction financed by the Bank Group\. The deletion of the student sanitary
facilities and the guardian's house in the science/technology blocks, due
to financial constraints, may create serious maintenance problems\.
- 21 -
5\.10 There are still complementary works to be completed: final connec-
tions for utilities (water, gas, electricity) and sewerage at ECICA\. The
delays in these works are due to slow action on the part of the Power Company
of Mali, which has already been paid for the work, and the installation of a
defective transformer for the new ECICA facilities\. The quality of construc-
tion varies depending on the contractor who performed it\. The finishings are
generally of poor quality\.
VI\. IMPLEMENTATION OF SOFTWARE INPUTS
Technical Assistance
6\.01 At appraisal, it was estimated that a total of 26 man-years of
technical assistance and 1\.5 man-years of fellowships were needed for the
project\. A comparison of the estimated and actual man-months of specialist
services and their duration are shown in Annex 2\.
6\.02 Important changes were made in the distribution of technical
assistance in 1975\. At that time the Government and IDA agreed to limit the
number of technical assistants to seven (instead of the existing 12 short-term
specialists) but without significant changes in the total number of man-months\.
Some of the specialists responsibilities were changed\. A general educator
replaced the educational planner and the program specialist, and became
responsible for new programs and teacher training\. The expert in technology,
in addition to having responsibility for programs and teacher training, was
the procurement specialist for the Project Unit\. Instead of being assigned to
prepare a long-term plan for education financing and administration, the
finance and management specialist was appointed as project administrator\.
These changes would have been at the expense of the project support to the
institutional strengthening of the Ministry of Education had not the National
Pedagogical Institute (IPN), supported by FAC, not filled the void; moreover,
the Project Unit became better prepared to implement the Second Education
Project (Cr\. 733-MLI)\.
6\.03 The "software" aspects were not neglected\. To replace the project-
financed educational planner and manpower specialist, a UNDP-financed Unesco
expert was appointed by the Government and worked in the Educational Planning
Unit of the Ministry of Education\. Moreover, Malian specialists, back in the
country from studies abroad, were able to make up for the other posts such as
those concerned with home economics, evaluation, curriculum development, and
organization and methods\. Instead of working within the Project Unit--an
arrangement that would have isolated them from field realities--they were
integrated into newly created teams responsible for basic education and rural
education\. Furthermore, the technical assistance for vocational and technical
training was extended to 45 months to take into account the importance of this
component\. Finally, as can be seen in Annex 2, the total of 321 man-months of
technical assistance came close to the appraisal estimate (312 man-months)\.
- 22 -
6\.04 Except for the technical assistance for the Basic Education Study,
all the other specialists, including the project architects who served
successively, were from a private consulting firm\. They were administratively
attached to the Project Unit\. The Government contract with the consulting
firm was signed in April 1974; there were no delays in recruiting the special-
ists--in fact, although only three were supposed to arrive in 1974 and the
remainder in 1975, almost all of them were at work during 1974\. For the
science, technology and vocational training specialists, it would have been
preferable to postpone their recruitment by two years so that they would
have remained in the country until the new facilities were completed and the
equipment dellvered\.
6\.05 The work performed by the private consulting firm was uneven in
quality\. Programs for science, technology and vocational/technical education
were not completed\. Project management was weak, and quarterly progress
reports were not submitted regularly\. As the Project Director insisted on
regrouping all the technical specialists in the Project Unit, their contacts
with Malian counterparts were minimal\. However, some positive results were
obtained: equipment was adequate and its delivery timely; sophisticated
technical equipment was properly installed at ECICA; a training session for
science and technology teachers was successfully conducted; and the programs
set up for science, technology and technical education, although still
incomplete, are innovative and practically oriented\.
6\.06 The specialist for the basic education study was provided by Unesco,
sub-contracting with the International Institute of Research and Training
for Educational Development (IRFED)\. He was attached administratively to
the National Directorate of Functional Literacy and Applied Linguistics
(DNAFLA)\. He arrived in Mali about six months later than anticipated, and
although to rzsults of his work are somewhat disappointing (see para\. 8\.16)
he was ver7 well accepted by the Malians and quickly contributed to the
creation within DNAFLA of the basic education team\. At different points in
time, short-term consultancy services were provided for the study\. The Malian
inputs were much larger than anticipated at appraisal, with several working
groups established within IPN and DNAFLA\.
Fellowships
6\.07 The project included financing for two fellowships (1\.5 man-years),
but only one was awarded--the one-year fellowship for the ECICA Director
of Practical Work to study vocational training abroad\. The benefit derived
from this study program did not have a direct impact on the component, as the
post has been abolished and in any case the fellowship holder was subsequently
appointed as Head of Cabinet in the Ministry of National Education\.
VII\. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING
7\.01 The estimated and actual total costs of the project are summarized
below and set out in detail in Annex 4\.
- 23 -
Comparative Table of Project Costs
(US$-000)
Estimated Coste Estimated Costs Cost at Appraisal Estimated Costs Final
of Appraised of Appraised Differ- (1973) of After Reduction Expenditure Cost Differ-
Project in Project in ence Components in of Project Scope (June 30, Overrun ence
Ceor 1973 1975 % Education Project (1977) 1980) (5)-(3) z
Civil works 2,023 3,440 70 1,161 2,310 2,441 + 1,280 t 110
Furniture &
Equipment 1,685 2,530 50 1,369 1,150 1,120 - 239 - 17
Technical
Assistance 1,599 1,600 - 1,599 1,655 1,744 + 145 + 9
Professional
Fees 208 208 - 164 225 328 t 164 + 100
5,515 7,780 41 4,293 5,340 5,633 + 1,340 + 31
Between 1973 and 1975 the estimated cost of the complete project increased
by about US$2\.2 million, or 41%, because of higher costs for civil works (70%)
and equipment (50%) than anticipated at appraisal\. Also, it became apparent
that the Government would have difficulty in financing its full contribution
of US$0\.5 million\. To compensate for this cost increase and to relieve the
Government of some of its financial burden, the project scope was reduced by
eliminating construction, furniture and equipment for five of the 11 science/
technology blocks (para\. 5\.01); all the other components remained as appraised\.
In 1977, Schedules 1 and 2 of the Credit Agreement were amended accordingly,
reducing the total project cost from US$5\.5 to 5\.3 million, and the Govern-
ment's share from US$0\.5 to 0\.3 million\. For the reduced project, the total
cost overrun from appraisal to completion in 1980 was US$1\.3 million or 31%\.
The cost of the completed project exceeded the 1977 revised cost estimates by
US$0\.3 million, or 5%\.
7\.02 For civil works, the cost increased by 110% because of a higher than
expected annual price escalation (15% instead of 5%), implementation delays of
two to four years (para\. 5\.03) and a 9% drop in the exchange rate for the US
dollar (from MF 460 to MF 420)\. Moreover, the total area was built or rehabil-
itated exceeded the 1975 revised estimate by 9%, as shown in Annex 1\.
7\.03 The cost of furniture and equipment decreased by 17%, resulting from
lower than expected prices of locally produced furniture and a sharp reduction
in requirements for equipment after bid opening\.
7\.04 The cost for technical assistance increased by 9%, because of the
necessity in 1978 to extend by several months the financing of four special-
ists to be carried over to the Second Education Project (Cr\. 733-MLI) when IDA
replenishment funds were not available\.
7\.05 The cost increase for professional fees (100%) stemmed from a more
than doubled supervision period due to construction delays, and from the
loss incurred when construction documents were prepared for works that later
were deleted from the project\.
- 24 -
7\.06 As shown in the comparison of unit costs at Annex 5, the gross
construction cost per square meter was approximately MF 130,000 (US$310) for
the science/technology blocks, as compared with the appraisal estimate of
MF 65,000 per m2\. The gross area per student place for the science/tech-
nology blocks was the same as the appraisal estimate, while the cost per
student place (including civil works, furniture and equipment) was about 140%
higher than the appraisal estimate, as shown in Annex 6\.
Project Financing
7\.07 The financing plan for the project is shown below\.
Financing Plan (US$'000)
At Appraisal Reduced At Completion
Source (1973) (1977) (1980)
Government 0\.515 0\.340 0\.633
IDA 5\.000 5\.000 5\.000
5\.515 5\.340 5\.633
Because of its difficult financial situation, the Government was never able to
finance its full contribution during the implementation period, and when the
Credit Agreement was amended in 1977 its share was reduced from US$0\.5 million
to US$0\.3 million (para\. 7\.01)\. To date, the Government has paid the equiv-
alent of about US$270,000, leaving about US$370,000 in an outstanding amount
which is owed to contractors\. The Government recently committed the equiv-
alent of US$280,000 in its current budget to reduce this indebtedness, leaving
about US$90,000 to be financed from its 1982 budget\.
7\.08 Recurrent costs\. In 1979/80 the annual recurrent unit cost per
ECICA student was US$600, more than 50% of which was due to the cost of ECICA
scholarships\. With respect to the science/technology blocks, it is too early
to calculate their contribution to the unit cost per student at the lower
secondary schools or at the Women-s Technical Teacher Training College\.
7\.09 Disbursements\. The schedule of disbursements is shown in Annex
13\. The credit proceeds were not disbursed in accordance with Schedule 1 of
the Credit Agreement, as the Closing Date was postponed from December 31,
1979, to June 30, 1980, when the project scope was reduced in April 1977
because of implementation delays and cost overruns\.
VIII\. PROJECT OUTCOMES
Current Expectations
8\.01 Nearly all the project facilities are operational at the various
institutions where they were provided to improve the quality and relevance
of lower secondary and technical education\. With the new facilities and
equipment, these institutions are now able to offer the practical education
- 25 -
and training programs which were not possible heretofore in Mali\. However,
because of the implementation delays, at the time of the completion mission
most of the educational expectations remained to be realized and only the
prospects for success could be assessed\. The science/technology blocks at the
lower secondary schools in Segou and Sikasso have been operational for only a
year, in 1979/80, and the other four are not yet fully operational\. Student
problems, the inadequacy of operational funds and materials, and teacher
limitations have hampered a fully effective start\. In the case of ECICA, the
industrial workshops functioned in 1979/80 and for about three months the
previous school year\. The new facilities provided to ENETF in Banankoro are
not yet fully operational\.
Science/Technology Blocks
8\.02 At the time of appraisal, the lower secondary schools (second
cycle of basic education) were the Government-s main target for reform; hence,
the science/technology blocks to be built for these schools comprised a key
component of the project\. The objective of this component was to help apply
the reform by providing the facilities, equipment and staff training needed to
make the lower secondary science and basic technology programs more practically
oriented\. The new programs were to be applied in a group of specially
equipped science and technology classrooms, supervised by specially trained
teachers and serving several secondary schools\. The improved programs
are expected to better prepare lower secondary school graduates for appro-
priate on-the-job training or for entry into upper secondary schools, particu-
larly the technical/vocational and teacher training institutions\. Another
expected benefit was a reduction of the duration of upper secondary level
programs, with commensurate cost reductions, after it was determined that
there was sufficient improvement in the quality of lower secondary school
graduates\. This objective has been postponed until the effects of quality
improvement in lower secondary schools become noticeable\.
8\.03 Annex 7 shows the number of beneficiaries of the science/technology
component in terms of numbers of schools and students, as estimated at
appraisal, after the 1977 reduction in project scope, and at present\. As can
be seen in this cbmparison between the appraisal estimates and the present
situation, the number of schools to be served by the new facilities has more
than doubled (25 instead of 10), notwithstanding a consolidation program
undertaken a few years ago\. In terms of student potential, in 1979/80 the
number is more than 5,500 1/, whereas at appraisal it was estimated at 3,480,
reduced to 3,170 when the project scope was revised in 1977\. The estimated
total enrollments in the schools served by the central practical facilities
in the regional capitals have increased considerably over the 1977 estimates
(e\.g\., a fourfold increase in Segou), and in the three locations in Bamako the
numbers increased five, six and seven times\.
1/ Assuming a 30-hour week, six hours for each beneficiary per week at
a center and an 80% utilization factor (6,200 beneficiaries if 90%
utilization, or 7,000 if 100% utilization; in the latter instance the
work week could be increased to 33-35 hours)\.
- 26 -
8\.04 Enrollments in lower secondary schools have been growing at a faster
rate than anticipated at appraisal\. Furthermore, the parents of children
who attend the schools served by the science/technology blocks are anxious
for their children to benefit from the practical instruction offered in these
new facilities\. Thus, there is a risk that the severe overcrowding to be
expected in 1980/81 in most of the schools will make it difficult to achieve
the desired results from this experimental approach to the teaching of science
and basic technology\.
8\.05 A comparison of the weekly timetables for science/technology activi-
ties at different stages of the project cycle is shown in Annex 8\. By 1979/80
the total requirement for science/practical subjects was six periods per week,
compared with the previously estimated e ^-'-'- periods (at appraisal and in 1975)\.
The Malian authorities expect the tinrtable for this year to comprise nearly
eight periods per week, with the af:ernoon sessions to include artisanal and/or
agricultural activities and technology for boys and girls\. When this intended
time distribution is implemented, the project objective of enabling the
students to use science and technology materials and equipment will be achieved,
but the number of beneficiaries would need to be reduced unless the facilities
were also used outside the normal school hours\.
8\.06 There have been difficulties in introducing the new programs, mainly
due to the unwillingness of senior IPN personnel to accept an innovative
approach, such as integrated science teaching in place of separate courses in
physics, chemistry and biology\. Also, the technical assistance personnel
concerned with curriculum reform were administratively attached to the Project
Unit insteae of to Ministry of Education directorates and this made them
somewhat isolated from the Ministry and IPN\. Nevertheless, the additional time
allotted for practical subjects in the weekly timetables for grades 7-9, as
well as th5 possibility of using the appropriately equipped science/technology
blocks pruoced by the project, should make it possible for the lower secondary
schools t- offer more practically oriented programs\.
8\.07 The -fiches" (text materials for teachers and students), which are the
responsibility of a special unit of IPN, are presently available in printed
form for grade 7 but exist only in manuscript for grade 8\. IPN's printing
capacity is inadequate and the materials do not always get distributed to the
schools because of logistical problems\. In Sikasso, for example, the mission
was told that the new texts did not arrive on time for the last school year
and the teachers had to go to Bamako to obtain their supply of texts\.
8\.08 In 1979/80 at four locations of the science/technology blocks, 88%
of the staff were qualified\. The three science/technology blocks in Bamako
have retained most of their retrained teachers and Sikasso has retained about
half of its upgraded staff; however, Segou and Mopti have retained only two
and one, respectively\. When the number of retrained teachers still in service
is compared with the total number of science/technology staff, the situation
is less encouraging\. An effort should be made to provide retraining for the
entire teaching staff and the directors of the science/technology blocks, so
that these new facilities can become fully effective\. Positive results can
be expected from this project component if this retraining program is under-
taken and if attention is given to the regular provision of teaching aids,
adequate funding for operating expenses and maintenance, the development of an
effective student rotation system among the schools served by each block, and
a means for evaluating student achievement\.
- 27 -
Women's Technical Teacher Training College (ENETF)
8\.09 The objective of this component, consisting of the construction
and equipping of a laboratory to provide training in biology and nutrition
for domestic science teachers, was to further the integration of family
social education with science and at the same time to ensure maximum utili-
zation of these teachers\. During implementation, it was decided that the
laboratory should be a multipurpose one and the equipment should correspond to
that required for a complete science/technology block serving lower secondary
schools\. This equipment includes items for physics and chemistry as well as
for technology activities related to those courses\.
8\.10 The target for ENETF enrollments in 1977/78 was estimated at 95, or
about 25 students for each of the four sections or grades\. Actual enrollments
in 1979/80 totaled 180, with the first and fourth grades having only one
section, whereas the second and third grades each has two sections\. Internal
efficiency is said to be excellent, with most of last year-s student-teachers
passing the final examination\. It can be expected that this college will
serve its purpose of producing better-qualified teachers for lower secondary
schools if several prerequisites are met: improvement of some of its staff, a
reduction in enrollments, and the provision of expendable supplies and the
IPN-produced texts for instructors and students\.
Central School for Industry, Commerce and Administration (ECICA)
8\.11 By providing additional facilities and equipment to ECICA, the
project aimed at improving the quality of training programs designed to meet
the country's needs for middle-level technicians and skilled manpower\. This
objective was to be achieved through: more practically oriented programs;
close cooperation with the private sector in developing these programs; full
utilization of equipment, including in evening courses; use of ECICA's facil-
ities and equipment by the students of the "Technical Lycee"; and follow-up of
ECICA-s students after they enter the work force\.
8\.12 The rehabilitated school has been in operation only since October
1979, and it is therefore too early to assess its results after one academic
year, which was considerably disrupted by teachers strikes\. However, some new
improved training programs have been prepared by the technical assistance
expert\. For some of the programs, he consulted with private sector employees\.
8\.13 Although in 1979/80 about 600 students from the civil engineering
and industrial technology sections of the "Lycee Technique" attended courses
at ECICA on a half-weekly basis, the laboratories, workshops, other special-
ized facilities and equipment will be under-utilized if the current timetable,
shown in Annex 9, is not changed to increase the time devoted to practical
work\. As the private sector has not yet been involved in curriculum design,
the newly appointed Director of ECICA intends to set up an Upgrading Board
("Conseil de Perfectionnement") to enable representatives of the industrial
and commercial sectors to contribute to the improvement of the training
programs offered by the school\.
- 28 -
8\.14 In 1979/80 there were 1,298 students at ECICA, including 151 from
other African countries, the great majority from neighboring Niger\. This
enrollment comprised nearly 50% of the technical/vocational programs in
Mali\. According to ECICA-s management, the school could well reach an enroll-
ment of over 2,000 in 1985, although the projections based on past trends
indicates a diminishing enrollment in technical/vocational programs reflecting
the students- tendency to prefer general education\. Annex 10 shows the
enrollments projected at appraisal and the actual enrollments in 1977/78 and
1979/80\. As can be seen from this comparison, enrollments are lower in the
industrial/civil engineering streams, higher in commerce/accounting, and more
than four times higher in administration\. The school-s internal efficiency is
generally adequate\. No tracer studies have been undertaken to assess the
school's external efficiency, but it appears that the private sector is not
satisfied with the level of skills acquired by the graduates, the employers
attributing this to ECICA's programs being too theoretical\. loreover, surveys
covering the 1975-79 school years and labor market trends indicate there is an
over-production of graduates from such branches as commerce/distribution,
whereas for accountancy/secretarial work and general/auto-mechanics the output
falls far short of demand\. A reexamination of the courses offered by ECICA is
envisaged to correct this imbalance\.
8\.15 As the country's only middle-level technician training school, it
is essential that ECICA quickly adopt new practically oriented programs and
upgrade its teaching staff, so that the school will be able to meet the
growing demand for qualified technicians\. Tracer studies and methods of
evaluation are needed to follow-up on the graduates after they enter the work
force, and consultative arrangements should be made to increase cooperation
with the private sector and ensure its involvement in the design and implemen-
tation of the new training programs\. Within an overall training policy,
particularly in the technical/vocational field, the progressive replacement of
expatriate staff with Malians should be undertaken with the help of ENS and
the National Engineering School (ENI)\. Adequate operating budgets should be
provided for the laboratories and workshops and all facilities and equipment
should be properly maintained\. "Auto-financing" of some maintenance expenses
and for the replacement of furniture and equipment, as envisaged by ECICA-s
management and endorsed by the Government, would also enhance the school's
operational efficiency\.
Basic Education Study
8\.16 The objective of this study was "to assist the Malian authorities
in the exploration and implementation of alternative systems for extending
some form of basic education to a greater proportion of the populaticn within
the financial constraints likely to obtain in the medium and long term\."
The final report, issued in June 1978 and produced by a Malian team assisted
by a Unesco expert, proposed six alternatives for nonformal education\.
Three were related to ongoing projects--rural education, adult literacy and
use of local languages--two were only mentioned without an in-depth study
(women's education and educational decentralization) and only one proposal,
the training of newly literate rural youth, was new and original\. While this
is the most promising of the six alternatives, its generalization throughout
- 29 -
the country would be very expensive\. The study is somewhat disappointing
because it appears to have been more of an academic exercise than an effort to
produce low-cost practical alternatives\. Many interesting points were not
covered, such as the organization and management of basic education, the use
of low-cost mass media (radio, rural publications) and a detailed study of the
cost of each proposal\. However, at least two positive effects resulted from
this component: (a) a new way, under experimentation in the Second Education
Project, has been identified to provide newly literate young people with a
general and vocational education without their having to leave their villages
or abandon their normal activities; and (b) an autonomous interdisciplinary
team has been established to continue research on new alternatives of basic
education and, more important, to set up practical work in the field and
evaluate the results\.
Critique of Expectations
8\.17 For the most part, the objectives set for the project proved to
be reasonably realistic\. The introduction of science and technology in the
general education curriculum, and of practical subjects in vocational/technical
training, is expected to prove effective although some adjustments and improve-
ments are needed as this practically oriented approach is at a very early
stage of implementation\. The training programs for science and technology
teachers also need improvement, but they are underway and the high motivation
of parents and teaching staff demonstrates that these programs, supported by
the new facilities and equipment, are well received and correspond to a real
need in Mali\. The quality of training programs for middle-level technicians,
skilled workers and domestic science teachers has improved\. Finally, the work
currently being done by the Malians to implement basic education, with some
financing by the Second Education Project (Cr\. 733-MLI), includes experiments
that could lead to possible low-cost alternatives if they are closely monitored\.
8\.18 These positive achievements should be viewed in the light of a number
of difficulties that have arisen during the course of project implementation\.
These difficulties, some unforeseen at appraisal, concern:
(a) the need for a meaningful involvement of the private sector in
technical and vocational training;
(b) the ability of the Government to withstand social pressures that
are causing severe overcrowding of the lower secondary schools,
so that these schools can maintain a reasonable number of students
who will benefit from the new science/technology facilities and
equipment;
(c) adequate funding to cover operating expenses of the schools and
the maintenance of facilities and equipment;
(d) pre- and in-service training of Malian science/technology teaching
staff to replace expatriate teachers, and improve their qualifi-
cations; and
- 30 -
(e) the adoption of realistic policies for basic education, taking
into account the implications of socio-cultural changes in Mali
and resource constraints\.
Retrospective Assessment
8\.19 The project addressed the main issues in education and training,
as agreed by the Government and IDA, and was of an appropriate scale: It
was closed in its reduced form with only a seven-month delay\. A well-
structured Project Unit has been established and is now implementing the
Second Education Project very efficiently\. As far as institution building is
concerned, it is worth noting that a basic education team and a team for rural
education have been set up as a resulz jf the project and they are now working
on experimental programs as alternaives to traditional primary education\. An
evaluation of the efficiency and costs of these programs should be ongoing\.
Few other countries have similar task forces for testing and evaluating
innovative basic education alternatives\.
8\.20 In retrospect, it can be seen that the project could have been more
effective had there been a better distribution and monitoring of technical
assistance, particularly at an early stage, and if more attention had been
given to the technical/vocational training component and the timely allocation
of the Government contributory funding\. In this respect it would have been
preferable to focus more on curriculum development and teacher training and,
in order to do so, to have recruited additional science, technology and voca-
tional training specialists with the necessary expertise in those fields\.
IX\. IDA PERFORMANCE
Supervision
9\.01 There were 20 supervision missions during the seven-year implemen-
tation period, or about one every four months\. Their duration averaged
about six working days\. During the first four years the project was supervised
from Abidjan (RMWA) and as a result the IDA resident agricultural education
specialist provided useful inputs\. Only two of the 20 supervision missions
included a specialist in technical education, although ECICA was a problem
area; however, an ILO vocational education expert in Dakar was consulted from
time to time by supervision missions making special calls to Dakar for this
purpose\. (Similarly, supervision missions called into Paris for discussions
with IRFED and Unesco on the Basic Education Study\.) All but six of the
missions included an architect and eight included a general educator\. The
missions too often were confined to Bamako because of the logistical and time
constraints\.
9\.02 Circumstances may have favored the second project (Cr\. 733-MLI,
effective in January 1978), which has benefited from lessons learned from the
first project\. The more sophisticated second project, in its early stages of
implementation, required considerable attention; with time being a constraint,
this may have been detrimental to the first project\. On the other hand, some
extensions of this project technical assistance were financed by Credit
- 31 -
733-MLI\. Also, a very useful procedure was developed during the supervision
missions from 1977 onward, namely, setting up "technical sheets" for each
project component\. These proved very helpful to the Malian personnel and are
also being used in the second project\.
How IDA Might Have Been More Helpful
9\.03 In assessing how IDA might have been more helpful, it should be
borne in mind that this First Education Project was a learning experience for
all concerned and, in retrospect, the IDA is perceived by the Government
to have become more and more helpful during the course of implementation\. In
particular, the regular supervision during the past two years seems to have
been useful in bringing the project to a successful conclusion, especially in
conjunction with the implementation of the second project\. IDA might have
been more helpful if it had been possible to provide more inputs for the ECICA
component\. Despite the long implementation period, there was considerable
continuity in the composition of the supervision missions\. The benefits of
this were somewhat offset by the lack of continuity on the part of Government
officials over the long implementation period\.
X\. THE GOVERNMENT ROLE IN THE COMPLETION REPORT
10\.01 This completion report was prepared after a Unesco mission visited
Mali in October 1980 to review the project and obtain the Government comments
on the outcomes\. The Government cooperated fully with the mission, and
several officials offered constructive comments\. The Project Unit staff
assisted in gathering information and some of them accompanied the mission on
visits to the various institutions, where discussions were held with directors
of schools and science/technology blocks and the supervisory staff\. In Mopti,
the mission met with the engineer of the consulting firm and the director of
the construction firm\. In Bamako, the mission met with the building contrac-
tors, the architectural consultant and the furniture supplier, and also with
the Secretary-General of the Chamber of Commerce\. The mission was unable to
meet with representatives of the National Federation of Employers of Mali, who
recently expressed some criticism of the quality of ECICA graduates\.
10\.02 Response to the questionnaires handed over about a year ago was
minimal\. 1/ Partial returns were received from only two science/technology
blocks in Bamako\. The responsible officials were very helpful in providing
the mission with data and documents relating to the project components;
1/ It might be useful to develop and transmit in advance of completion
missions a set of forms geared to "software" aspects, to supplement
the forms relating to "hardware" aspects, project costs and quanti-
tative data on technical assistance\.
- 32 -
these included staffing lists and enrollments for the schools; curricula,
course outlines and records of training sessions; and some equipment defi-
ciency lists for ECICA\. Several ECICA staff members assisted the mission
by providing data and answering queries\. The mission was also able to review
the preliminary draft of the sector study and to discuss several main issues
with the officials\. The results of these discussions are incorporated in thic
report, which is also intended to reflect to some extent the Government
views on project issues\.
XI\. MAIN LESSONS LEARNED
Physical Aspects
11\.01 Analysis of the problems encountered in the physical implementation
of the First Education Project in Mali leads one to question whether in
designing and preparing the project sufficient consideration was given to
local constraints and capabilities\. Apart from the reduction in its scope due
to high and unforeseeable increases in construction costs identified in 1975,
there were a number of problems that can be called chronic; these concern the
availability of imported building materials, the competence of cont:rol offices
(soil and reinforced-concrete testing), and the technical and financial
capacity of local construction enterprises\. Such constraints should be taken
into account when designing the physical elements of a project in order to
minimize delays and cost increases and hence a reduction in quality and
benefits, such as forgoing student sanitary facilities in the science/
technology blocks\.
11\.02 Another matter of concern is the choice of contractors for civil
works\. Local firms rarely offer the desirable guarantees concerning their
managerial and financial capacity or the quality of their technical services\.
On the other hand, the volume of work to be performed does not always justify
resorting to international competitive bidding\. Given these limitations of
local firms, they should be allowed more realistic deadlines than were given
to complete the science/technology blocks (nine months for each one)\.
Technical Assistance and Fellowships
11\.03 The Government, with IDA agreement, signed a global contract
with a consulting firm which presented a list of specialists and insisted on
their working all at the same time (para\. 6\.04)\. Some of them were qualified\.
but others did not achieve satisfactory results (para\. 6\.05)\. The relation-
ships and performance may have been more satisfactory if the contractual
arrangements had built-in flexibility, particularly to assure that the
Government would request specialists to be brought in as and when the actual
implementation progress made a particular service necessary\. The question
also arises as to the extent to which IDA missions can intervene and advise on
drastic action when a technical assistance program, in part or in whole, is
unsatisfactory but the Government is reluctant to take remedial action\.
- 33 -
11\.04 The Government and the consulting firm insisted on regrouping the
team members and having them work together\. Consequently, contacts with their
counterparts were infrequent and the training of local specialists suffered
accordingly\. The case of the basic education specialist, who was not recruited
by the consulting firm, is an exception; before leaving Mali, he had trained a
team of 11 Malian specialists who are now working efficiently\. In hindsight,
and for future reference, it would seem that the technical assistance spe-
cialists are much more effective in helping a country when they are placed to
function with counterparts in the directorate or division of a ministry
responsible for that area or sub-sector of the national education effort\.
11\.05 More fellowships or more training provisions should be provided
whenever a project deals with activities for which there are few local spe-
cialists and local training is not available\. This is particularly important
when the use of new science/technology and technically sophisticated equipment
is involved\.
Project Administration and Management
11\.06 The role played by the Project Unit became increasingly important,
and is now essential in the implementation of the second project\. While this
is a positive factor insofar as the Project Unit's efficiency is concerned, it
has reinforced the tendency of the Project Director to feel that he has sole
responsibility for all aspects of project implementation, including "software"
such components should be specifically assigned to the directorates concerned
and the Project Unit role limited to ensuring overall coordination of project
implementation and liaison with the Bank Group\.
11\.07 More efficient means will have to be found to enable the Project
Unit to recruit competent personnel for key posts (accountant, procurement
specialist, architect/engineer, site supervisor, and administrator)\. Project
staff not only have to perform their tasks efficiently, but also need to
keep the Bank Group informed on the progress of implementation throughout
the project period\. When the Project Unit-s tasks are properly performed on
a continuous basis, delays and cost overruns can be minimized\.
The Borrower's Involvement
11\.08 When there are innovative components such as the introduction
of technology in education programs or research on low-cost basic education
alternatives, a strong commitment is required on the part of all the officials,
technicians and users concerned with these components\. This in turn requires
that everyone involved in innovative components should be consulted at the
design stage and thereafter so that they can feel that their ideas are taken
into consideration and they are participants in these components\. For
instance, a more substantive contribution by employers in the design of ECICA
teaching programs might have improved the graduates' employability in the
private sector (para\. 8\.14)\. The same point can be made in respect of the
revised science curricula: a deeper involvement of Malian staff during the
early stages of curriculum design and integration of the technical assistance
curriculum specialists in the Ministry of Education directorates would have
increased the Malian inputs and probably would have facilitated project
implementation (para\. 8\.06)\.

MALI: FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 420-MLI)
PREMIER PROJET EDUCATION (CREDIT 420-MLI)
COMPARISON OF ORIGINALLY ESTIMATED AND ACTUALLY PROVIDED GROSS CONSTRUCTION AREAS M2)
COMPARAISON ENTRE LES SUPERFICIES BRUTES PREVUES ET LES SUPERFICIES BRUTES ACTUELLEMENT CONSTRUITES
Estimated Areas to be Con- Actual Gross
structed/Superficies en m2 Difference/ Construction/ Difference/ Difference/ Remarks/
pr6vues A 9tre construites Difffrence Construction Diff6rence Diff6rence )Observations
Institutions effective(31(/2
Appraisal/ Revision 1975 (2/1) brute ( (3/1) (3/2)
Pr6vues (1) Rvisdes (2)
Hawdallaye 800 736 - 8% 767 - 4% + 4,2%
Badalabougou 800 736 - 8% 795 0 + 8 %
Missira 1,095 1,245 + 14% 1,252 + 14% 0
Segou 1,653 882 - 46% 898 - 45% + 2 %
Sikasso 800 736 - 8% 767 - 4% + 4,2%
Mopti 1,357 1,320 a - 3% 1,795 + 32% + 36 % Includin construe- L
tion of 7 classroom
Mamadou Konatd 800 deleted - - - -
Kayes 800 delayed - - - - Inoluded in Cr\.733-
MLI
Niarela 1,357 deleted - - -
Dar Salam 1,357 deleted - - - -
Gao 1,357 delayed - - - - Included in Cr\.- 733-
MLI
ENETF-Segou 75/ 146 + 95% 141 4 88 - 3 % Construction instead
of conversion
ECICA-New Areas 846 846 0 1,117 + 32% + 32 %
ECICA-Converted Spaces 2,75O1/ 2,75W1 0 2,7501/ 0 0
Total New Areas/Totales
qouvelles surfaces 13,022 6,647 - 49% 7,352 - 42% + 13 %
Total New Areas -
Rehabilitated Spaces/ 15,847 9,397 - 40 10,282 - 35% + 9 %
Totales Nouvellas -iur-
faces - Espaces am6nags
1/ Spaces to be converted or rehabilitated/Espaces A itre construite on am6nag6s\.
- 36 - ANNEX \. 2
AL: CREDIT 420-MLI
FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT/PREMIER PROJET EDUCATION
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCEASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE
Comparison of Estimated and Actual Schedule of Duration/
Comparaison entre calendrier prévu et effectif de durée d'assistance technique
Man-months/ Starting Date/
Number/Nombre Mois-homme Date de démarrage
Specialists or Functions/ Actual/ A / Actual/2
Spécialistes ou Fonctions Est\./Prévu Actual/Effe f Eu Effectif Est/Prévu Effectif
Before Z5 Aftrr 75
Avant Apres "
Science and Domestic
Science/science et 2 2 48 36\.5 7/1974 6/1974
Economie doméstique
Technology/Technologie 118 41 1/1975 9/1974
Technical-Vocational/
Technique-Prof essionnelle 1 1 1 18 45 1/1975 6/1974
Education Planner/Plani- 1 1 24 1/1975 9/1974
fication de l'éducation 13 4
Program Evaluation/Eva- 45
luation de progra 1 1 24 7/1975 9/1974
Manpower Specialint/ 4
Spécialiste en matière 1 1 0 24 9 4/1975 6/1974
de main-d'oeuvre
Education Finance-Bud- 2/1975
geting/Financement et 1/
préparation des budgets 556
pédagogiques
Administration-Management/ 1 1 36 12/1974 2/1975
Administration-Gestion
Architect-Engineer/ 1 1 1 30 49\.5 1/1974 7/1975
Architecte-Inganieur
Sub-total/Sous-totale 246 282
Basic Educ\. Study/Etude sur 66 39 10/1974 4/197Ã
l'éducation de base
Total/Total 312 321
Fellowships - Tech\. & Voc\. 2 1 1 18 12
Educ\./Bourses - Educ\. tech\.
et Formation professionnelle
Sources: 1Appraisal Report Appendix III, page 2 and Credit Agreement, Schedule 2 (III)\.
Rapport d'Evaluation Appendice III, page 2 et Accord de Crédit, Sec\. 2 (III)\.
2IRNES contract (Division Files) and P\.I\.V\. records\.
Contrat IRNES (archives de la Division) et dossiers du Bureau de projets\.
Notes: Education Planner and Program Evaluation Specialists were replaced by a General
Educator in charge of program preparation for science and technology\.
Les spécialistes en planification de l'éducation et en évaluation et recherche
sont remplacés par un Educateur général chargé de préparer les programmes scien-
tifiques et technologiques\.
4After 1975, a UNDP-financed Unesco expert, working in the Planning Unit of the MOE,
was in charge of planning and manpower studies\.
Depuis 1975, un expert de Unesco, financé par le PNUD et travaillant dans le Bureau
de planification du MOE était chargé de diriger les études de planification et
main-d'oeuvre\.
5The main responsibility of the specialist was to manage the project\.
La responsabilité la plus importante du spécialiste est la gesticn du projet\.
Covenant Status: M a Met MALI: FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT
PM = Partially Met (CREDIT 420-MLI)
N = Not Met
P - Pending COMPLIANCE WITH CREDIT AGREEMENT COVENANTS
I\. Major Covenants
Section No\.
of Credit Covenant Status Comments
Agreement
3\.07 and Carry out the basic education study M
Schedule 2, by a specialist acceptable to IDA\.
Part C
3\.08 Appoint counterparts to specialists PM The specialist in charge of renovation of ECICA's cur-
at the beginning of Project Imple- ricula and equipment lists did not have a permanent
mentation\. counterpart\.
4\.03 and Consult IDA on the recommendations M
Schedule 2, of the team carrying out the basic
Part C education study\.
4\.04 (i) Establish new curricula for P New curricula were prepared by the Malian rural edu-
lower secondary education, with cation team (para\. 8\.21), but at the time of apprais-
emphasis on practical work\. al they were still awaiting the Government's decision
on whether the new curricula would be applied in low-
er secondary schools\.
(ii) Improve qualifications of PM A 45-day retraining program was organized in the sum-
science teachers\. mer of 1977, with the help of expatriate experts, for
about 40 science, domestic science and technology
teachers for the schools intended to benefit from the
new science/technology blocks\. This was done mainly
at a Bamako school and with the use of a sample of
equipment for the science/technology blocks, which
were not yet completed\. This retraining program, al-
though undoubtedly very useful and wall organized
(and during which textual materials for pupils and
teachers were designed and later on-printed by IPN)
was premature in light of the delayed opening of the
science/technology blocks\. The need is felt by all
concerned to organize, hopefully at the various loca- Q
tions, new training/refresher type of programs for
the science/home economics/technology staff of the a
beneficiary schools\.
c ediNo\. Covenant Status Comments
Agreement
(iii) Train 35 students at ECICA in N This was abandoned because of a change in the approach
bricklaying, carpentry, electriety to the technology courses in lower secondary education;
and metalwork\. instead of focusing them on the traditional wood and
metalwork type of activity as was initially intended,
it was decided to reorient these courses to illustrate,
in a practical way, the technical concepts/applications
relating to the physics and chemistry courses\.
4\.05 (i) Appoint a Malian Director for PM In 1975 a Director of Practical Works ("Chef des
Practical Works at ECICA\. Travaux") was appointed for ECICA after completing
special studies abroad under the project-financed fel-
lowship\. However, one year later he was appointed
Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Education\.("Chef de
Cabinet") and has not yet been replaced\.
(ii) Reduce by one year the train- P As programs have not changed in lower secondary schools
ing programs at teacher training (see Section 4\.04) this convenant is still pending\.
institutions and ECICA provided
there will be sufficient improve-
ment in the quality of lower sec-
ondary sihool graduates\.
4\.06 (i) Allocate adequate annual bud- N For the science/technology blocks at lower secondary
getary funds to operate each group and ECICA levels,there is no budget for operating the
of laboratories and workshops\. laboratories and workshops\. The ENETF at Banankoro
last year had an operating budget of MF 4 million for
the entire school, covering not only expendable mate-
rial but also various services, stationery and class-
room materials\.
(ii)For the laboratories and work- PM Administration of laboratories and workshops was a
shops, establish inventory, procure- special topic in the 1977 retraining program session
ment and budgetary procedures sat- (see Section 4\.04 11 abovel\. As the trained directors
isfactory to IDA\. of the scienceltechnology blocks are still In office,
they can be expected to apply what they have been
taught,
4\.07 Prepare a program for the coordinat- N This has been a sensitive issue during the past few
ed planning and development of high- years, provoking strikes leading to a Cabinet reshuffle\. 0
er education and exchange views with P The Government is veil aware of the problem and will
IDA on the program\. deal with it when possible\.
II\. Educational Objectives in Side Letter of Government
Government Intentions Status Comments
Strengthen the educational plan- M The Educational Planning Directorate has been considerably strengthened by
ning and managerial capabilities the excellent work done by the Unesco expert provided by a UNDP project (see
of the Ministry of Education\. para\. 8\.18) and physically located there\. A good deal of institution build-
ing has been achieved, and at present the staff comprises 20 professionals\.
Explore alternative approaches M This has been achieved with the work done within the framework of the basic
to basic education for the education study (see para, 8,17)\.
majority of the population\.
Reduce the growth of education N It is premature to expect program improvements at lower secondary level which
costs (reduction of the duration could lead to a reduction of the duration of upper secondary studies in se-
of upper secondary studies, lected institutions\. However\., to facilitate controlled school development,
school consolidatinn, and school the Government recently adopted a decree (July 1978) regulating the creation, u
location planning)\. extension, transfer or closing of public schools at the basic education
level\. The opening of a new school or the extension or transfer of an ex-
isting school would be made in accordance with school mapping, and after a
detailed report of the responsible supervisor the Ministry of Education
would take the final decision\.
Control enrollment growth N Social demand for education has been so strong in Mali during the past decade
at various levels\. that it has not been possible for the Government to control enrollment growth
at the primary and lower secondary levels\. Enrollments at basic education
level are considerably higher than anticipated at appraisal; for example,
there were more than 50,000 students at the second cycle of basic education
in 1977/78, compared with 33,000 forecast for 1978/79\.
Make the education and training PM The reformulation of the programs for lower secondary schools and ECICA has
system more relevant to the been prepared and is expected to improve the practical content of the studies\.
Malian environment\.
0
Country: MALI IBRD/IDA Education Projects
Pays: --
COMPARISON OF ORIGINALLY ESTIMATED COSTS AND ACTUAL COSTS IN 000 of MALIAN FRA~KS Projets Education BIRI/AIO
Projact: First Education Project
Projet: Premier Projet Education Form V
Loan: COMPARAISON ENTRE LES COUTS PREVUS ET EFFECTIFS EN 000 DE FRANCS MALIENS
Læs:COMARASON_____________Fiche
Pr"t: No\. 429-MLL__
Credit:
Crédit:
CONSTRUCTION AND SITE DEVELOPMENT FURNITURE AND EQUIPMENT PROFESSIONAL FrES TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TOTAL
CONSTRUCTION ET VRO?/ MOBIL/ER ET EGUIPEMENT HONORAIRES ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE
PROJECTITEM A- ais\. E\.tIm\.e Appr,isa EstIa\.e\. Appreital E\.tm-t-s Appr'\.I\. E\.tint- App l mat
Pr o A P A P u ion Actuai Prevu\.Iév1luaton Actua Prévu- - évPlu1t\.on A\.a
Dl \.,ni(' -\.c Iýr F1 f \.I Er tf If ý E" ff Dif
ELEMENT DU PROJET E-l Conting lnc, Conng, EfetW\. in\. Exci Conuing ince Conting EffecIf Dif Excl ContIng\. Incl\. ContIng' Effect\.s DII Eral Contin\. \.Jnc Condng EffecifsC Efetf oI?
mp\. non 1"0p V 3/2 Imp non np\. y 3/2 Im nl Imp 3/2 lrnA non Imp 3/2 m imp 3/2
2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 2 3
Science Bloc c/Blocs scientif\.
m 65,340
Kave _____ 43 960 55 615
Mamadnu K n_37,280 47,165
Ni_r______65,340 82,665 __ _ I ¯
Bad\.labougou 12,280 47\. 165 __,42 ±9_5 _32,570 401431 66 505505505 147,928 6
amd 11av _ 3_J _ 47 165 91 _s66 +94
Miss ra 52,260 66 115 154,242
__80_070 304 C 20 ¯ -50 304 0 ' 2012-4
ZiOs so _ __ Ll69Q 96,52 +80 ___I
8' 1430 1 Y16_53 + 6
Banankro __ 2\. 3,49û __11 3,535 4,460
Xr T_\.56 _108,245 213 323\.9 267 370 327,215 253,91 -22 13,860 16_570
Project Unit/Bureau du Pro et 2000 29,010 49 15 +70 50,600 _59_f - - - 73,600 _ 88,680 -4
sic Educ Study/Etude Educ,de- ie ___ -202,400 538,670 209,715 -12 202_400 238_670 209, 715-1
ch- / a\. s sT n\. 354,200 417,67 5,D3 +33 -5_4, -416 5
21,10 20\.146 - 700 0 746
735\. S7 930 65 1PR6 Q34 ±7\. 614\.475 764\.995 505\.2 - 96075 41,928 +54 625,600 731,113 186,544 +6 56,010 29,38 352626 \._
1,599 2023 _ 2 - - 3361 L685 ,144 - 208 328 ------1,356 - -1,59 744 __ 4465 - 5\.,5 _,3 ±2_
TÃ¥l-US$- 000)- - --- - - - - ,34( 5\.633 4
Source: World Bank/Banque Mondiale
Note: 1/ Exchange rate/Taux de change - Original/Origine US$1\.00 460 MF: Current/Actuel US$1\.00 420 MF
Average rate/Taux moyen US$1\.00 445 MF
2/ Deleted or delayed in December 1975/Eliminé ou report5 en décembre 1975\.
-/ Estimate including price revision (source contractor)/Estimation incluant révision des prix (source constructeur)\.
/ Estimate after revision of 1977/Estimation après la révision de 1977\.
MALI - CREDIT 420-MLI
FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT/PREMIER PROJET EDUCATION
COMPARISON OF UNIT COSTS FOR NEW INSTITUTIONS/COMPARAISON DES COOTS UNITAIRES DES NOUVELLES INSTITUTIONS
Gross Construction Areas Construction Costs
(in square meters) (in 000 Malian Francs)1/2 Costs per Square Meter
Surfaces rutes de construc- Coats de construction Coats par m4tre carrg
, Institution tion en m (en 000 Francs maliens)
0 R A 0 R A 0 R A
Hamdallaye 800 736 767 47,165 123,300 91,666 58,956 167,527 119,513
Badalabougou 800 736 795 47,165 123,300 92,342 58,956 167,527 116,153
Missira 1,095 1,245 1,252 66,115 210,900 154,242 60,379 169,397 123,196
Sikasso 800 736 767 53,340 139,330 96,514 66,675 189,307 125,833
Segou 1,653 882 898 109,350 165,000 116,534 66,152 187,075 129,770
Mopti 1,357 1,320 1,795 101,300 257,000 304,000 74,650 194,916 169,359
ENETF 75 146 141 3,490 33,760 17,413 46,533 231,232 123,493
ECICA
%w Areas/Nouvelles surfaces 846 846 1,117 240,000 265,034
Converted3 paces/Espacps 2,750 2,750 2,750
anenagas - 2,750 75 2,750 _ 1______
Source: Project Implementation Unit and World Bank\. Bureau du projet et Banque Mondiale\.
Notes: 1/ Fees not included\. Honoraires non compris\.
2/ Including contingencies\. Impr&vus compris\.
V/ Due to global cost for new and rehabilitated spaces for ECICA it is not possible to produce costs per
square meter for this item\.
A cause des coats globaux pour les fspaces nouveaux et am6nags pour ECICA, il eat impossible d'estimer
lea coIts unitaires par mAtre carrf\.
0 Appraisal/Evaluation
R \. Revision of 1975/ R&vision de 1975
A = Abtual/Effectif
MALI - CREDIT 420-MLI
FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT/PREMIER PROJET EDUCATION
COSTS PER STUDENT PLACE FOR NEW INSTITUTIONS/COUTS DES NOUVELLES INSTITUTIONS PAR ETUDIANT
Gross Area per Cost per Student Place (in Malian Francs)/Co^t par place d'Etudiant (en france maliens)
Student Place/
Institution Surface brute Furniture and Equipment/
par ftudiant Constructions Mobilier et Equipement Total
(m2)
0 R A 0 R A 0 R A 0 R A
Hamdallaye 5\.7 5\.25 5\.47 336,892 880,714 654,757 32,285 122,707 174,180 369,177 1,003,421 828,937
Badalabougou 5\.7 5\.25 5\.67 336,892 880,714 659,585 32,285 122,707 174,180 369,177 1,003,421 833,765
Missira 5\.47 4\.78 4\.8 330,575 811,153 593,238 31,675 116,615 174,180 362,250 927,768 767,418
Sikasso 5\.7 5\.25 5\.47 381,000 995,214 689,385 36,500 138,628 174,180 417,500 1,133,842 863,565
Segou 5\.16 4\.90 4\.98 341,718 916,666 647,411 32,750 134,166 174,180 374,468 1,050,832 821,591
Mopti 5\.2 5\.07 6\.9 389,615 989,577 1,169,230 37,326 136,154 174,180 426,941 1,125,731 1,343,410
ENETF-Segou 2\.5 3\.65 3\.52 116,333 844,000 435,325 22,333 109,000 174,180 138,666 953,000 609,505
Note: Due to different enrolments for new and rehabilitated spaces for ECICA - as well as for furniture and equipment- it is
not possible to produce cost per student place for this item\./Etant donni les taux de friquentation diff6rents pour les
nouveaux locaux et les locaux r6am6nag6s - 6galement pour le mobilier et 1'6quipement - i n'est pas possible de calculer
le coat par place d'6tudiant pour cet 61ment
0 - Appraisal/Evaluation
R = Revision of 1975/R6vision de 1975
A Actual/Actuel
Source: Appraisal, Supervision report and World Bank\./Rapports 6valuation, supervision et la Banque mondiale\.
MALI: CREDIT 420-MLI
COMPARISON BETWEEN N!MBER OF BENEFICIARIES (SCHOOLS AND STUDENTS) OF SCIENCE/TECHNOLOGY BLOCKS
AT DIFFERENT STAGES OF PROJECT CYCLE-I AND THE PRESENT NUMBER/COMPARAISON ENTRE LE NOMBRE DES BENEFICIARES (ECOLES ET ELEVES)
DES BLOCS SCIENTIFIQUES/TECHNOLOGIES AUX DIFFERENTS STADES DU CYCLE DU PROJET!/ ET ACTUELLEMENT
After reduction in Size of Project/ At Completion/
At Appraisal/A 1evaluation Apr s r4duction du projet A l'Ach6vement
Benefi- No\. of No\. of Lab/ Benefi- No\. of No\. of Lab/ &eTiiN1l\. No\. of No\. of Lab/
Capacity/ ciaries/ schools/ Workshops/ Capacity/ ciaries/ schools/ Workshops/ Capacity/ per Week nefi- schools/ Workshops/
Place d'g- B4n6fi- No\. d'4- No\. de lab/ Place d'- Begnefi- No\. d'6- No\. de lab/ Place d'e- g nares - No\. No\. d'e- Ho\. de lab!
(at present/actuelles) tudiants ciares coles ateliers tudiants ciares coles ateliers tudiants seaT Pa/ coles ateliers
1\. Missira (Medine, Bozola 200 520 2 7 260 680 - 9 320 1,300-1,450 8 11
Missira I, Missira II, (520)
Missira III, OPAM I,11,III)
2\. Hamdallaye Plateau 140 400 2 5 140 400 - 5 170 700-800 7 6
(Hamdallaye Marchd I, II
III, Hamdallaye Plateau I
II, Lafia-Bougou I,II)
3\. Badalabougou 140 410 1 5 140 410 - 5 170 700-800 4 6
(Badalabougou I, II,
Soknigo 1, II)
4\. Segou 320 990 2 11 180 520 6 200 800-900 3 7
Groupe central, Mission,
Quartier administratif
5\. Sikasso A 140 350 1 5 140 350 - 5 170 700-800' 1 6
6\. Mopti 1 260 810 2 9 260 810 - 9 320 1,300-1,450 2 11
Mopti II
Total 1,200 3,480 10 42 1,120 3,170 - 39 1,350 5,500-6,200 25 47
1/ At the agreement and apprais"& stages the project was to construct and equip 34 multi-purpose laboratortes, 28 technology workshops and 17 practical work
facilities for girls' family and social education, all spread over 11 groups or locations\. One to four schools would be served per group and the groups
would have by 1977/78 2,260 student places (half of which in Bamako) and allow about 6,600 students to use the facilities, or an average of 600 per group\.
During implementation, because of delays in construction and inflation, the numbers were reduced (1977)to,6 groups to offer 1,120 student places and allow
approximately 3,200 students as beneficiaries (roughly 1,330 being in Bamako)\./
An moment de 1'6valuation et de la signature du projet, il itait privu la construction de 34 laboratoires polyvalents, de 28 ateliers de technologie et 17
salles de travaux pratiques minagers, tous r(partis en 11 groupes ou lieux\. Une quatre ecoles auraient 4te desservies par chaque groupe et, en 1977/78
l'ensemble des groupes aurait dispos' de 2\.280 places (dont Is moitie' I Bamako) et auraient permis a 6\.600 6tudiants de lea utiliser, soit 4ne moyenne de
666 par groupe\. Pendant Is construction, a cause des retards et de 1'inflation, ces nombres ont di 8tre reduits (1977) 'a 6 groupes offrant 1\.200 places
I apprbximativement 3\.200 itudiants (dont 1\.330 I Bamako)\.
3/ Assa the equivalent of a 30 hour week, 6 hours at the center for each student, and a utilization factor of 80% to 90%\. On a 100% utilization factor the
beneficiaries would be 7,000/En prenant pour hypothZse 1'equivalent d'unEF semaine de 30 heures, 6 heures de pr6sence au centre pour chaque M1Ive et un facteur
d'utilisation de 80 a 90%\. Sur la base d'un facteur d'utilisation de 100%, le nombre de b6n6ficiaires s'le'verait 1 7\.000\.
MALI CREDIT 420-M11
FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT/PREMIER PROJET EDUCATION
COMPARISON OF WEEKLY TIME-TABLES FOR SCIENCE/TECHNOLOGY ACTIVITIES IN SECOND CYCLE OF BASIC EDUCATION
AT DIFFERENT STAGES OF PROJECT CYCLE AND AT PRESENT/COMPARAISON DES EMPLOIS DU TEMPS HEBDOMADAIRES
POUR LES ACTIVITES DE SCIENCES TECHNOLOGIE DANS LE SECOND CYCLE DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT DE BASE
AUX DIFFERENTS STADES DU CYCLE DU PROJET ET ACTUELLEMENT
Suggested in Suggested in Applied in To be Applied in
Working Documents Supervision 1979/80/ 1980/81
(Appraisal) Reports (1975)/ Mis en A mettre
Proposés dans les Proposés dans place en en place
Activities/ documents de travail les rapports de 1979/80 en
Activités (Evaluation) supervision (1975) 1980/81
Sciences 5 5 (2L (Biology/ ( 2 (Biology/
( Biologie) ( Biologie)
( 2 (Physics/ ( 3 (Physics&Chemistry
( Physique) Physique&Chimie)
Technology (Boys)/
Technologie (garçons) 3
Home Economics and
Social Studies (Girls)/
Enseignement ménager
et sciences sociales
(filles) 3
Home Economics/
Enseignement ménager
Manual Work/
Travaux manuels 1/ (afteroo/
( 3 2- aprns-midi)
Practical Activities/ apè-ii
Travaux pratiques
Total/Week/Grade
Total/semaine/niveau 8 868
l/ In first grade 1-1/2 week\. En 12ème une semaine et demie,
2/ Apparently for boys and girls\. Apparemment pour garçons et filles\.
3/ Does not concern 3rd grade\. Sauf en 9ème,
4/ Includes the concept of "ruralization" (artîia type of activiiesand/or agricultura-l activitieal and technology
for boys and girls\. Y compris la "ruralietlon" ctivités nrtianales et/ou agricolea et la technologie pour
garçono et filles\.
MALI: CREDIT 420-MLI
FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT/PREMIER PROJET EDUCATION
WEEKLY TIME-TABLES FOR A SAMPLE OF ECICA SECTIONS (COURSES WITH FULL OR PARTIAL PRACTICAL CONTENT)/
EMPLOIS DU TEMPS HEBDOMADAIRES POUR UN ECHANTILLON DE SECTIONS ECICA (COURS CONSACRES EN
TOTALITE OU EN PARTIE AUX TRAVAUX PRATIQUES)
I\. Mechanics and Auto-Mechanics
Mécanique et Mécanique automobile
1st and 3rd Year/3e Année 4th Year/4e Année
Subjects/ 2nd Years/ Auto- General Auto- General
Matières lère et Mechanics/ Mechanics/ Mechanics/ Mechanics/
2e Années Mécanique Mécanique Mécanique Mécanique
automobile générale automobile générale
Physics/Physique 8 3 3 2 2
Chemistry/Chimie 1 1 -
Industrial Drawing/
Dessin Industriel
Construction Technology/
Technologie de Construc\. 2 2 2 2
Analysis of Manufac\.
Processes/Analyse des - - 5 - 4
procédés de fabrication
General Technology/ 2
Technologie générale -
Strength of Materials/
Résistance des matériaux - 2
Workshop/Atelier 14 10 10 - 10
Welding Workshop/ 6
Atelier de soudure
Total per weekfor entire
curriculum/Total hebdo\. 40 + 34 36 42 18 31
pour l'ensemble du O ,0
programme
Commerce and Accounting/
Commerce et comptabilité
1st and 3rd Year/3e Année 4th Year/4e Année
Subjets 2nd Years/ Accounting/ Commerce/ Accounting/ Commerce/
2e Années Comptabilité Commerce Comptabilité Commerce
Accounting/Comptabilité il 10 6 10 5
Typewriting/Dactylo- 3
graphie
Total per week for\. entire
curriculum/Total hebdo\. 27 + 30 27 30 17 21
pour l'ensemble du pro-
gramme
III\. Administration
3rd Year/30 Année 4th Year/40 Annie
1st and Labor Adv\. Secre- Adv\. Secte-
Subjects/ 2nd Years Law/ tarial/ Taxes/ tarial/
Matières lère et Adm\. Droit du Secrétariat Fisca- Law/ Labor/ Customs/ Secrétariat Treasury/
2e Années Fin\. travail avancé lité Budget Droit Travail Douane avancé Finances
Commercial Correspondence/ 4 - 2 2 - - - - - 2 -
Correspondance commerciale
Office Organization/Orga- - - - 2 - - - - 5 - -
nisation administrative
Accounting/Comptabilité 4 4 - - 2 4 - - - - 2
Typewriting/Dactylo- 6 - 2 5 - - - - - 7 -
graphie
Shorthand/Sténographie 4 4 - 6 - - - - - 4 - e
Total per week for entire
curriculum/Total hebdo\. 20 27 3 31 33 13 11 11 11 37 18 11
pour l'ensemble du pro-
gramme
MALI - CREDIT 420-MLI
FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT/PREMIER PROJET EDUCATION
EXPECTATIONS AT APPRAISAL OF ENROLMENTS IN DIFFERENT STREAMS OF ECICA FOR 1977/78
AND AT PRESENT (1979/80)/
PREVISIONS AU MOMENT DE L'EVALUATION DES EFFECTIFS DANS LES DIFFERENTES SECTIONS
DE L'ECICA EN 1977/78 PAR RAPPORT A LA REALITE (EN 1977/78)
ET AUX EFFECTIFS ACTUELS (1979/80)
Projected at Real Real
Appraisal Figures Figures
for 1977/78/ in 1977/78/ in 1979/80
Effectifs prévus Chiffres Chiffres
lors de l'évalua- effectifs effectifs
Courses/Cours tion pour 1977f78 en 1977/78 en 1979/80
Industrial and Civil Engineering/
Industriels et génie civil\. 490 3311: 3511/
Commerce 123 156 192
Administration 98 448 435
Total 711 935 978
1/ Not counting geology, chemistry, quantity surveying students and excluding the foreign African students/
Sans compter les élèves des cours de géologie, de chimie et de métrage et non compris les élèves
africains étrangers\.
MALI: CREDIT 420-MLI
FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT/PREMIER PROJET EDUCATION
Forecast at Appraisal/ IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE/
Prévu à l'évaluation CALENDRIER D'EXECUTION
Forecast at Revision (Dec\. 1975)/
L\.------- JPrévu à la révision (Dec\. 1975) IV 19, IV
r Actual/Effectif
f197 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 198k
CIVIL WORKS/GENIE CIVIL
 Prepararation of architectural planning and
bidding documents/Préparation des plans
architecturaux et des documents d'appel d'offres
Pre-qualification of contractors to award of
construction contracts/Présélection des entre-
prises jusqu'à l'attribution des marchés de
travaux \.-
 Construction/Travaux
FURNITURE & EQUIPMENT/MOBILIER & EQUIPEMENT
 Preparation of procurement lists to submission/ 0
Préparation jusqu'à la soumission des listes 1
d'équipement
 Contracts to delivery/Passation des marchés
jusqu'Ã la livraison
Delivery to installation/Livraison jusqu'Ã -----
l'installation -J-
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE/ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE
Basic education study/Etude de l'enseignement r
fondamental
Technical assistance/Assistance technique -
 Project unit/Bureau du projet -
'w Board date/Date de présentation au conseil 6-19-73
-v Date of signing/Date de signature 7-11-73 9 Closing date (original)/Date de cl6ture (originale) 12-31-79
V Effective date/Date d'entrée en vigueur 10-15-73 V Closing date (revised)/Date de clSture (révisée) 6-30-80
MALI - CREDIT 420-MLI
FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT/PREMIER PROJET EDUCATION
ALLOCATION OF CREDIT PROCEEDS (in 000's US$)/AFFECTATION DES FONDS DU CREDIT (en 000's $EU)
Credit Agreement % of Allocation per % of
Allocation/ Expenditures Amendment of March Expenditures Actual
Affectation des to be financed/ 1977/Affectation to be financed/ Disbursements
fends selon % de d6penses des fonds d'apris la % de d6penses D6caissements
catezoy/Categorie l'Accord de Cr6dit financ6es modif\. de mars 1977 financges effectifs-
I\. a) Civil works and services of con-
sultant architect/G6nie civil et
services d'architecte/consultant 1,330 1/ 2,000 2/ 2,136\.1
b) Equipment and furniture/Equipe-
ment et mobilier 1,290 100% 1,000 100% 1,011\.2
II\. Training of teachers and direc-
tors/Formation des enseignants
et des directeurs 40 100% 40 100% 46\.2
III\. Basic education study/Etude de
1'enseignement fondamental 440 100% 440 100% 465\.5 4
IV\. a) Specialist services and fellow-
ships/Services de sp6cialistes
et bourses 770 100% 1,050 100% 1,232\.5
b) Project unit/Bureau du projet
Project architect/Architecte du
projet 110 100% 0 -
Furniture & Equipment/Mobilier
et 6quipement 50 100% 100 100% 108\.5
V\. Unallocated 970 100% 370 100% --
Total 5,000 5,000 5,000
Source: The World Bank/Banque mondiale\.
Notes: 1/ 100% of total expenditure up to September 1975 - 60% thereafter/l00% des d6penses totales jusqu'A septembre 1975 - en-
suite 60Y\.
2/ 100% of total expenditure up to $1,660 - 50% thereafter/100% des d6penses totales jusqu'A concurrence de $1660 - en-
suite 50%\.
Closing Date/Date de clSture: -Credit Agreement - 12/31/79/Accord de cr9dit - 31/12/79\.
-Amendment - 6/30/80/Modification 30/6/80\.
MALI: CREDIT 420-MLI
FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT/PREMIER PROJET EDUCATION
DISBURSEMENT SCHEDULE/CALENDRIER DES DECAISSEMENTS
Fiscal year! 73 74 75 - 76 77 78 79 0 81
Ann6e bgdg6taire
Year/Annge 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
5:POCO
5, 000
I\.
2,000
iI
2\.000
, 000 - -
800
600\. 4
6 oo4
4oo-00 i
400
200
000 \.-
Effective disbursement/D6caissements effectife
Appraised disbursement/Dgcaissements estim6s au moment de l'6valuation
--- Disbursement estimate (December 1975)/Estimation des d6caissements (d&cembre 1975) | APPROVAL |
P158710 | COMBINED PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENTS / INTEGRATED
SAFEGUARDS DATA SHEET (PID/ISDS)
ADDITIONAL FINANCING
Report No\.: PIDISDSA20672
Date Prepared/Updated: 31-Jan-2017
I\. BASIC INFORMATION
A\. Basic Project Data
Country: Kosovo Project ID: P158710
Parent P112526
Project ID
(if any):
Project Name: Kosovo Agriculture and Rural Development Project - Third Additional
Financing (P158710)
Parent Project Agriculture and Rural Development (P112526)
Name:
Region: EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA
Estimated 16-Jan-2017 Estimated 28-Apr-2017
Appraisal Date: Board Date:
Practice Area Agriculture Lending Investment Project Financing
(Lead): Instrument:
Borrower(s): Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development
Implementing Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development
Agency:
Financing (in USD Million)
Financing Source Amount
International Development Association (IDA) 22\.00
LOCAL BENEFICIARIES 5\.84
Total Project Cost 27\.84
Environmental B - Partial Assessment
Category:
Appraisal The review did authorize the team to appraise and negotiate
Review
Decision (from
Decision Note):
Other Decision:
Is this a No
Repeater
project?
Page 1 of 14
B\. Introduction and Context
Country Context
Over the past decade, Kosovoâ¢â¨ s overall economic growth has been generally positive,
averaging about 4-5 percent annually, driven mostly by massive donor-funded reconstruction
efforts as well as remittances from its diaspora\. The economy has demonstrated a considerable
degree of resilience, with principal macro fiscal and financial indicators reflecting that the country
has performed considerably better than any of its neighbors in the Western Balkans over the past
decade\. Kosovo is a potential EU candidate country and economic reforms are largely driven by
the prospect of eventual EU accession\.
Despite the positive trend in growth and relatively stable and resilient economy, Kosovo remains
one of the poorest countries in Europe\. As of 2011, approximately 30 percent of its population of
1\.8 million lived below the national poverty line of â¢âªÂ¬1\.72 a day and about 10\.2 percent were
living in extreme poverty on less than â¢âªÂ¬1\.20 day\. Unemployment is widespread, estimated at
about 30 percent in 2013, the highest in South Eastern Europe\. Unemployment among women is
higher, estimated at 38\.8 percent\. Demographically, Kosovo is Europeâ¢â¨ s youngest country,
where the average age is estimated at 26 years\. Unemployment among the youth is especially
high, estimated at 61\.0 percent in 2014\.
The main driver of Kosovoâ¢â¨ s economic growth has been consumption, fueled by remittances
rather than income earned domestically\. The steady consumption demand has been met mainly by
imports given the countryâ¢â¨ s narrow, undiversified, and uncompetitive production base\. There
is little export-orientation and imports remain large\. The current growth model based on large
financial inflows is unsustainable and the main challenge for the country remains the
establishment of conditions conducive to promoting self-sustained growth founded on increased
domestic productivity and export competitiveness, within the framework of reducing high
unemployment, improving human capital and building physical infrastructure\.
Kosovoâ¢â¨ s location, EU membership prospects and free market access to the EU and Central
European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) countries offer strong opportunities for sustained and
rapid overall development\. The government is committed to instituting reforms to promote
sustainable economic development and is working to put in place the policies, institutions and
investments that will help unleash the countryâ¢â¨ s growth and export potential\. In this context,
the National Development Strategy 2015-2020, adopted in January 2016, emphasizes four priority
pillars: (a) human capital and employment; (b) good governance and rule of law; (c) competitive
industries; and (d) infrastructure development\.
Sectoral and institutional Context
Agriculture plays a significant role in Kosovoâ¢â¨ s economy\. It is an important contributor to
GDP, accounting for about 11\.4 percent of GDP in 2014 (second only after wholesale and retail
trade)\. Over 62 percent of the countryâ¢â¨ s population lives in rural areas and depends, directly or
indirectly, on agriculture for its livelihood\. The sector is the largest private employer, accounting
for about 35 percent of total employment, although primarily on an informal basis\. Poverty in
rural areas is especially high and over 40 percent of the rural population is unemployed\. The lack
of job perspective, especially among the rural young population is putting a strain on social
cohesion and encouraging out-migration\. Often, agriculture serves as a safety net for much of the
population\.
Page 2 of 14
Despite a steady growth in the sector since independence, Kosovo is the largest importer of food
per capita in Europe\. The country is highly dependent on imports to meet its food demands and
the export/import ratio has been steadily increasing over the past decade\. In 2011, the value of
imports of agricultural products was approximately â¢âªÂ¬561\.4 million while the value of exports
was â¢âªÂ¬26\.2 million\. Exports of agricultural products thus generated revenues to pay for only 4\.6
per cent of the cost of importing such products\. Agricultural products account for about 10
percent of all imports; of this, 30 percent comprises food products\.
This is primarily because the sector faces several diverse and inter-related challenges that prevent
it from meeting its productive potential and hinder commercialization\. Before the 1990s, Kosovo
was largely food self-sufficient with large quantities of agricultural products exported to the
region\. However, after the war, this trend was reversed so that today, agriculture is largely
subsistent/semi-subsistent in nature\. The sector is characterized by small, fragmented land
holdings, with average land holding size ranging between 1\.5 and 2\.0 ha, often spread across an
average of seven smaller plots\. Lack of and/or limited access to, inter alia, modern technologies,
good quality inputs, irrigation, post-harvest management and processing infrastructure, credit, and
markets pose serious challenges to the development of the sector\. In its current state, agriculture
attracts limited private investments which effectively inhibit commercialization of the sector and
the realization of socio-economic gains thereof\.
Two areas that offer good opportunities for the development of Kosovoâ¢â¨ s agricultural sector
include the horticulture and livestock subsectors\. Horticulture and livestock farming are
traditional economic activities in Kosovo, representing a rural cultural identity and there is a
strong preference among the farming communities to remain engaged in these subsectors for their
livelihood\. Over the past decade, demand for high value horticulture products has surged more
than any other food category and there is a strong consumer preference for locally grown fruits
and vegetables, both for fresh consumption and processing\. Livestock farming is predominant in
the mountainous and remote areas of Kosovo where it often serves as the primary source of rural
livelihood\. With increased productivity and production there is good potential for: (i) promoting
import substitution; (ii) boosting exports, especially to EU and CEFTA countries; (iii) generating
employment in rural areas; (iv) creating economic opportunities for women in agriculture
production and especially value-added processing activities; and (v) providing opportunities for
young farmers to be gainfully employed in these remunerative value chains\.
To harness the potential of these subsectors, especially the horticulture subsector, there is a
critical need for improving irrigation delivery and services\. Rainfall patterns show high variability
in Kosovo and there is a crucial need for supplementary irrigation, especially during drier spells\.
For fruits and vegetables, irrigation is essential for increasing yields and ensuring quality and
timely production\. It is expected that with irrigation small farmers would move to more high-
value crops and specialized markets, and away from near-subsistence agriculture\.
Ageing irrigation infrastructure and lack of maintenance are reducing the level of irrigation use
and impacting development of agriculture\. Most of the irrigation schemes were built in the 1970s
and are showing signs of ageing\. Moreover, the war of the 1990s damaged or destroyed large
sections of countryâ¢â¨ s irrigation infrastructure\. This coupled with expansion of urban and
industrial areas in recent years has sharply reduced actual irrigable area and jeopardized existing
irrigation investments\. The area equipped for irrigation fell from approximately 71,000 ha before
Page 3 of 14
the war to approximately 43,900 ha in 2014\. The area of irrigation use is also far lower than in
the past\. Between 2006 and 2012, the average area irrigated was only about 12,000 ha - 4,000 ha
in small schemes and 8,000 ha within the areas serviced by the countryâ¢â¨ s three regional
irrigation companies in Kosovo: Iber-Lepenc, Radoniqi-Dukagjini and Drini i Bardhe\.
Recognizing the significant role of agriculture in Kosovoâ¢â¨ s overall economic development, the
government is undertaking critical measures to re-vitalize the sector\. The objectives of the
National Agricultural and Rural Development Plan (NARDP 2014-2020 are to undertake actions
to overcome bottlenecks holding back sustainable rural development in the country and align
Kosovoâ¢â¨ s rural sector with the axes of the EU Instrument for Pre-accession for Rural
Development (IPARD)\. The NARDP lays out several measures for implementation support over
the next five years, including inter alia, investments in the physical assets of agricultural holdings
as well as processing and marketing of agricultural and fishery products; agri-environmental
measures and organic farming; farm diversification and business development; improvements in
training, advisory services and vocational training; land consolidation; and irrigation\. On the
institutional front, the government is building the capacity of important institutional structures,
such as the Managing Authority and Paying Agency, for improved performance of the agriculture
sector as well as to approximate their functioning with EU requirements\. These efforts are being
carried out with assistance from several donors, including EU, DANIDA, Suisse Interco-
operation, USAID, Austrian Development Agency, GIZ and the World Bank (through the
ongoing IDA-financed Agriculture and Rural Development Project)\.
C\. Proposed Development Objective(s)
Original Project Development Objective(s) - Parent
The development objective of the project is to assist the Recipient to promote competitiveness
and growth in the livestock and horticulture sub-sectors over the next decade through
implementation of selected measures of its agricultural strategy and institutionaldevelopment\.
Proposed Project Development Objective(s) - Additional Financing
The development objective of the project is to improve productivity of and access to markets by
project beneficiaries in the horticulture and livestock subsectors of Kosovo and strengthen
institutional capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development\.
Key Results
The PDO-level Results Indicators comprise the following: (i) increased yields of key crops
supported by the project â¢â¨ tons/ha; (ii) increased yields of milk production per animal on
livestock farms supported by the project â¢â¨ liters/cow; (iiiu) increased sale of milk to processing
companies; (iv) increased sales of horticultural products from farmers supported by aggregators;
(v) increased number of farmers adopting improved agricultural technologies; (vi) preparation of
Rural Development Grant Program (RDGP) sub-measures for investment support in line with
EU-IPARD Guidelines
D\. Project Description
The Additional Financing, a US$22\.0 million IDA credit, to be implemented over four years,
would support the following activities:
Component 1: Transferring Knowledge to the Rural Sector\. The AF will continue support for the
Page 4 of 14
following sub-components: (a) Rural Advisory Service (RAS) Contracts under which training
would be provided to potential applicants for the Rural Development Grant Program (RDGP) as
well as to municipal advisors to assist the farming community in the preparation of such grant
proposals as well as to national extension staff on technical topics; (b) Regional Knowledge
Exchange under which the project will support the organization of study tours/visits to countries
in the region to enable farmers and processors in the horticulture and livestock subsectors to learn
and benefit from the knowledge and experiences of other agri-food producers and processors in
the region; and (c) Institutional Strengthening of Rural Advisory Services\. The AF will continue
to support the municipal advisory service centers in delivering effective services to the rural
community through the provision of training, equipment and select operating costs\.
Component 2: Enhancing Investments to Promote Sustainable Rural Development\. The AF will
support the following activities:
(a) Rural Development Grant Program (RDGP)\. RDGP support will be provided to farmers and
processors in the livestock subsector\. As under KARDP, the RDGP will be implemented at the
national level â¢â¨ for potential beneficiaries in all municipalities of Kosovo\. The Call for
Proposals would be open to all farmers and processors residing on the territory of Kosovo\.
Implementation of RDGP would follow the same processes and procedures as under the ongoing
project, including extra points for women applicants and additional co-financing for beneficiaries
(both men and women) under the age of 40 as well as for climate friendly agricultural practices\.
(b) Promoting Development of the Horticulture Subsector\. The objective of this component is to
promote the development of the horticulture subsector by strengthening backward and forward
linkages in the value chain of the subsector\. The aim is to improve productivity, quality, value
addition, and ma rket linkages within the subsector to enhance its competitiveness towards
increased exports and import substitution as well as job creation, improved beneficiary incomes
and increased economic opportunities for women and youth in the rural sector\. It will target
support to small holder farmers that dominate the rural landscape and provide them opportunities
for assured markets and improved livelihoods while assisting the commercial and semi-
commercial agro-enterprises to reach both domestic and export markets, create jobs and improve
incomes\.
The entry point for project support will be the Aggregators, i\.e\. private Collection Centers (CCs)
and Agro-processors, handling or procuring horticultural produce\. The project will provide
matching grants to qualifying Aggregators, who will: (i) promote and strengthen backward
integration strategies through the provision of supply contracts and extension services to small-
holder farmers, thereby guaranteeing farmers markets for their produce as well as enabling them
to enhance their productivity while improving quality (including meeting Global GAP
certification requirements); and (ii) exploit the value addition potential of the sector through
improved postharvest management by increasing their capacity for handling and processing\.
Thus the project will enable Aggregators to increase the intake of fresh produce from farmers
(upstream) and increase their supply of fresh produce and processed products to domestic and
export markets (downstream)\. By introducing upgrades in the value chain - quality checks,
packaging, labeling, etc, the project will reorient firms towards more lucrative export markets\.
Potential aggregators will be invited to prepare business plans and submit applications to enhance
and expand their operations\. Funding for selected subprojects would be allocated through a
competitive bidding process\. The maximum size of the grant would be ââ¢â¨ ì200,000\. The
Page 5 of 14
submitted business plans will be reviewed, evaluated and scored against clearly defined criteria
by an independent Evaluation Committee\. Eligibility criteria and detailed arrangements for
implementation of the matching grants will be elaborated in the Horticulture Development Grant
Manual\.
(s) Institutional Capacity Building\. The AF will continue to support capacity building of the
Managing Authority and Paying Agency through the provision of training, personnel and
equipment as needed\. Project support will assist in approximating their functioning to EU
requirements and contribute to their efforts towards EU accreditation\. The project will also
support capacity building within the Kosovo Institute of Agriculture (KIA) to enhance its ability
to promote food safety and quality standards in the livestock and horticulture subsectors of
Kosovo through the provision of select equipment to strengthen capacity of the food testing
laboratory\.
Component 3: Support for Irrigation\. The AF would support rehabilitation works in the Radoniqi-
Dukagjini Irrigation Scheme, located in an area of high agricultural productivity\. Horticulture is
the dominant economic activity in the region and with improved irrigation delivery and services
there is a high likelihood of improved productivity of high value crops\. Specific rehabilitation
investments in the scheme will focus on, inter alia, lining and repair of main canal sections,
replacement of moving parts; pipes, where necessary, aqueduct crossing on the Drini river, and
the restoration of irrigation delivery in two blocks, namely the Janosh scheme in the upstream part
of the system; as well as the Doblibare scheme which is currently dysfunctional\. Minor dam
safety actions (non-structural), as identified by the dam safety assessments, will be supported as
well\. Modernization will include selective automation of scheme monitoring to increase water and
energy use efficiency\. A technical study is underway to further specify the technical requirements
and prepare bidding documents for scheme construction works as well as identify equipment and
spare part requirements\.
In providing rehabilitation support to the scheme, the project will take a broader modernization
approach and integrate managerial upgrading with the technical rehabilitation to improve both
resource utilization and water delivery service to users, optimizing resource utilization and
ensuring institutional and financial sustainability\. This includes the support for a Management
Information System, SCADA for improved operations, support for maintaining a strategic supply
of spare parts and maintenance equipment; harmonization of planning and budgeting with
municipal plans as well as water usersâ¢â¨ demands\.
Component 4: Project Management, Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation\. The existing
Project Implementation Unit (PIU) within MAFRD will be responsible for the daily management,
administration and coordination of the project's activities in accordance with Bank requirements,
including procurement, financial management, monitoring and evaluation, and audits\. Its
capacity would be enhanced through the hiring of an irrigation specialist who will be responsible
for the implementation of the irrigation activity as well as additional short-term technical
specialists as needed\.
Component Name
Component 1: Transferring Knowledge to the Rural Sector\.
Comments (optional)
Page 6 of 14
Component Name
Component 2: Enhancing Investments to Promote Sustainable Rural Development
Comments (optional)
Component Name
Component 3: Support for Irrigation
Comments (optional)
Component Name
Component 4: Project Management, Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation
Comments (optional)
E\. Project location and salient physical characteristics relevant to the safeguard
analysis (if known)
The project will be undertaken throughout Kosovo\.
F\. Environmental and Social Safeguards Specialists
Bekim Imeri (GSU03)
Esma Kreso (GEN03)
II\. Implementation
Institutional and Implementation Arrangements
The project will be implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development
(MAFRD)\. A dedicated Project Implementation Unit, headed by the General Secretary, has been
established under the ongoing KARDP for overall management of the project, including the fiduciary
(procurement, financial management), monitoring, evaluation, training and administration
requirements as well as coordination with donors and other government units\. The Rural
Development Grant Program (RDGP) will be implemented by the Managing Authority (MA) and
Paying Agency (PA)\. The MA is responsible for identifying the measures for support under the
RDGP and prepares the procedures for implementation of the selected RDGP sub-measures\.
Towards this, it establishes Working Groups with representation from the private sector and civil
society\. The PA is in charge of administering the RDGP, including the selection, awarding,
monitoring and disbursement processes for the sub-projects\.
III\.Safeguard Policies that might apply
Safeguard Policies Triggered? Explanation (Optional)
Environmental Yes Potential environmental impacts are anticipated under
Assessment OP/BP Component 2: Enhancing Investments to Promote Sustainable
4\.01 Rural Development and Component 3: Support for Irrigation\.
The major portion of Component 2 remains the provision of
Page 7 of 14
grants which were also administered under the original project\.
The grants were awarded based on a screening criteria set forth
in the ESMF prepared for the project in October 2010 and
subsequently revised in 2015\. This revision solely dealt with
changes in the Kosovo environmental legislation and did not in
any form alter the overall screening procedure within the
ESMF\. The screening criteria as set forth in the ESMF helps to
screen out project activities corresponding to a category A, and
to provide adequate due diligence on a case-by-case basis for
the rural grants\. The ESMF had undergone a slight revision in
January 2017, where the irrigation activities have also been
added in the project description and small changes were made
to ensure that all activities even beyond grants are covered
through the process in the ESMF\. The screening and due
diligence mechanisms remain the same as within the original
ESMF from 2010\.
The approach outlined in the ESMF from January 2017 will
apply to the rural grants, matching grants, irrigation rehab and
any activity that would be proposed to be financed within the
project or the subsequent AFs\. Furthermore, any strategic and
planning documents to be produced under Component 3(b)
will also incorporate adequate safeguards requirements within
the Terms of Reference for any proposed study or plan\.
The environmental impacts associated with the grants program
and irrigation rehab should be readily mitigated through sound
construction practices (dust and noise, waste management,
material sourcing) while the operational impacts can be
mitigated through environmentally friendly farming
approaches (manure management, waste disposal, emissions
from food processing facilities, improved water resource use)\.
Under Component 3, rehabilitation of the Radoniqi irrigation
scheme is foreseen which would lead to better management of
water resources\. This activity will potentially cause minor
construction related impacts (noise, dust, waste generation)\.
A full and robust ESMP will be prepared to address risks and
impacts of implementation of this scheme, including assessing
impacts to other water users\.
â¢â¨â«
Natural Habitats OP/ No There are no implications on natural habitats foreseen\.
BP 4\.04
Forests OP/BP 4\.36 No There are no implications on forested areas foreseen\.
Pest Management OP Yes Due to the fact that the project would more than likely lead to
4\.09 increased agricultural production, it is safe to assume that there
would be an increased need for pest management\. As such, an
Integrated Pest Management Plan was part of the original
ESMF (2010) andalso the revised ESMF (2015 and 2017)\.
Page 8 of 14
Physical Cultural No There are no activities involving physical / cultural resources
Resources OP/BP foreseen\.
4\.11
Indigenous Peoples No There are no implications for indigenous people\.
OP/BP 4\.10
Involuntary No This safeguards will not be triggered because the potential
Resettlement OP/BP works proposed for the scheme rehabilitation are as follows:
4\.12
(i) Lining and repair of main canal sections, replacement
of parts such as valves, etc\.
(ii) rehabilitation of of irrigation delivery in two secondary
sub-schemes
(iii) minor works related to dam safety and the Drini river
aqueduct
Given the nature of rehabilitation works, there will be no need
for land take although there might be some crop damages for a
temporary period of time while the works are ongoing\. The
protocol defined in the ESMF addresses the crop damage
compensation which will be operationalized with concrete
ESMPs \.
Safety of Dams OP/ Yes Although the project will not build any dams, the Radoniqi
BP 4\.37 Irrigation scheme depends upon the existing Radoniqi Dam for
its effective functioning as the scheme draws its raw water
directly from the Radoniqi reservoir controlled by a 61 meter
high clay-core embankment dam\. Several Dam Safety
Assessments have been carried out in the recent past for
Radoniqi Dam, including in 2000, 2002, and 2006 under the
WB supported Pilot Water Supply Project, and most recently
in 2012 by the Water Task Force as part of a countrywide Dam
Safety Review\. While none of these reviews raise any concerns
on imminent dam safety they make recommendations for
operation and maintenance procedures and safety-related
measures that are required to ensure an acceptable standard of
safety\. More precisely, this includes the need for critical
documentation and information on dam safety, including
geotechnical information, an update on and improvement of
status of control instruments (inclinometers and piezometers
are reported as largely dysfunctional) and electrical
installations\. Also, it is observed that there is no dam safety
(monitoring) plan, although a letter from the dam operator
states that geodetic measurements have been carried out to
some extent over the past years\. Most of the recommendations
have not been fully implemented since\. The project proposes to
adopt a composite of the 2005 and 2012 recommendations, to
be confirmed by a dam safety panel to be established, and to
Page 9 of 14
finance those under the project\. The following activities are
envisaged to be included under the program: updated safety
analysis, including full geodetic survey, rehabilitation of dam
safety instrumentation and an emergency preparedness plan\.
Projects on Yes Component 3 includes works on rehabilitation of the Radoniqi
International irrigation scheme, which is part of the trans-boundary Drini
Waterways OP/BP river basin\. However, considering that the works will focus on
7\.50 better use and management of the existing irrigation scheme
the team does not foresee any issues on water quality or
quantity to downstream users\. As such, an Exception to
Notification was granted on December 16, 2016 by ECA VP\.
Projects in Disputed No The project will not be implemented in any disputed areas\.
Areas OP/BP 7\.60
IV\. Key Safeguard Policy Issues and Their Management
A\. Summary of Key Safeguard Issues
1\. Describe any safeguard issues and impacts associated with the proposed project\. Identify
and describe any potential large scale, significant and/or irreversible impacts:
Potential environmental impacts are anticipated under Component 2: Enhancing Investments to
Promote Sustainable Rural Development and Component 3: Support for Irrigation\. The major
portion of Component 2 remains the provision of grants which were also administered under the
original project\. The grants were awarded based on a screening criteria set forth in the ESMF
prepared for the project in October 2010 and subsequently revised in 2015\. This revision solely
dealt with changes in the Kosovo environmental legislation and did not in any form alter the
overall screening procedure within the ESMF\. The screening criteria as set forth in the ESMF
helps to screen out project activities corresponding to a category A, and to provide adequate due
diligence on a case-by-case basis for the rural grants\. The ESMF had undergone a slight revision
in January 2017, where the irrigation activities have also been added in the project description and
small changes were made to ensure that all activities even beyond grants are covered through the
process in the ESMF\. The screening and due diligence mechanisms remain the same as within the
original ESMF from 2010\.
The approach outlined in the ESMF from January 2017 will apply to the rural grants, matching
grants, irrigation rehab and any activity that would be proposed to be financed within the project
or the subsequent AFs\. Furthermore, any strategic and planning documents to be produced under
Component 3(b) will also incorporate adequate safeguards requirements within the Terms of
Reference for any proposed study or plan\.
The environmental impacts associated with the grants program and irrigation rehab should be
readily mitigated through sound construction practices (dust and noise, waste management,
material sourcing) while the operational impacts can be mitigated through environmentally
friendly farming approaches (manure management, waste disposal, emissions from food
processing facilities, improved water resource use)\.
Under Component 3 rehabilitation of the Radoniqi irrigation scheme is foreseen which would lead
to better management of water resources\. This activity will potentially cause minor construction
related impacts already described above that can be mitigated through a site-specific ESMP, while
additional concerns include dam safety issues and also the potential for impacts on international
waterways as the reservoir and the scheme are located within the Drini river basin\.
The overall project would lead to an increase in agricultural practices therefore having
Page 10 of 14
implications on pest management, which should apply and follow the Integrated Pest Management
Plan as prepared under the original ESMF\. There are no social safeguard related issues\. The
works proposed are rehabilitation of existing schemes\. Rehabilitation of lining of open main canal
and secondary pressurized (piped) schemes where necessary in two sections\. There will be no need
for neither land take nor establishment of right of way\. Crop damages because of the rehabilitation
works will be addressed in ESMFS and related ESMPS
The Terms of Reference for Component 3(b): Strategy and Investment Framework for the
Irrigation Sector, will incorporate safeguards requirements to ensure that there is due diligence of
all potential safeguards aspects under the propsoed Strategy/Investment Framework\.
2\. Describe any potential indirect and/or long term impacts due to anticipated future activities
in the project area:
There are no long term or indirect impacts associated with the project, beyond the potential
increase in agricultural production and therefore implications on pest management, where the
Integrated Pest Management Plan as prepared under the original ESMF should apply\.
3\. Describe any project alternatives (if relevant) considered to help avoid or minimize adverse
impacts\.
There are no project alternatives considered\. The screening mechanism for the grants would allow
to either accept or deny a sub-project based on their associated impacts\.
4\. Describe measures taken by the borrower to address safeguard policy issues\. Provide an
assessment of borrower capacity to plan and implement the measures described\.
The Borrower has applied the ESMF screening in the later grant calls, while some issues remained
in the first call and the due diligence was carried out by an independent consultant retroactively\.
The borrower has also provided educational trainings and seminars on ESMF compliance and
sound environmental practices in 2014\. The Borrower has a dedicated M&E staff that also
provides support to the implementation of the ESMF, and as required can hire an external
consultant to be engaged in the implementation of the ESMF policies\. The site-specific ESMP for
the Radoniqi irrigation scheme will more than likely be carried out by a company or consultant
outside the Borrower's team and will try to streamline the WB requirements and those of the
Kosovo environmental legislation into one process\. As for the grants, one of the requirements is
that no grant is awarded without the environmental and social due diligence in place\. This
requirement is strictly supervised by all of the PIU and also by the World Bank team\.
5\. Identify the key stakeholders and describe the mechanisms for consultation and disclosure
on safeguard policies, with an emphasis on potentially affected people\.
The key stakeholders include representatives of the Project Implementation Unit and the MAFRD,
as well as the members of the local communities where projects will take place\. As such, the
ESMF was subject to public consultations and disclosure in 2010 (as documented in the original
ESMF) while each of the subsequent ESMPs prepared for each specific project was subject to
disclosure and public consultations\. For small scale projects public consultations were replaced by
consent forms signed by all of the neighbors\. The revised ESMF (as of January 2017) will be
disclosed through the MAFRD website and Bank's Infoshop prior to the Appraisal of the AF\.
B\. Disclosure Requirements
Environmental Assessment/Audit/Management Plan/Other
Date of receipt by the Bank 15-Oct-2010
Date of submission to InfoShop 02-Dec-2010
Page 11 of 14
For category A projects, date of distributing the Executive
Summary of the EA to the Executive Directors
"In country" Disclosure
Kosovo 18-Jan-2017
Comments: The revised ESMF that would make it applicable also to the Irrigation scheme was
disclosed on January 18, 2017\.
This revised version was also disclosed in Infoshop on January 19, 2017\.
Pest Management Plan
Was the document disclosed prior to appraisal? Yes
Date of receipt by the Bank 15-Oct-2010
Date of submission to InfoShop 09-Jan-2017
"In country" Disclosure
Kosovo 18-Jan-2017
Comments: The PMP is an integrated part of the ESMF that was revised and re-disclosed on
January 18\. This revised version was also disclosed in Infoshop on January 19, 2017\.
If the project triggers the Pest Management and/or Physical Cultural Resources policies, the
respective issues are to be addressed and disclosed as part of the Environmental Assessment/
Audit/or EMP\.
If in-country disclosure of any of the above documents is not expected, please explain why:
C\. Compliance Monitoring Indicators at the Corporate Level
OP/BP/GP 4\.01 - Environment Assessment
Does the project require a stand-alone EA (including EMP) Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
report?
If yes, then did the Regional Environment Unit or Practice Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
Manager (PM) review and approve the EA report?
Are the cost and the accountabilities for the EMP incorporated Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
in the credit/loan?
OP 4\.09 - Pest Management
Does the EA adequately address the pest management issues? Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
Is a separate PMP required? Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
If yes, has the PMP been reviewed and approved by a Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
safeguards specialist or PM? Are PMP requirements included
in project design?If yes, does the project team include a Pest
Management Specialist?
OP/BP 4\.37 - Safety of Dams
Have dam safety plans been prepared? Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
Have the TORs as well as composition for the independent Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
Panel of Experts (POE) been reviewed and approved by the
Bank?
Page 12 of 14
Has an Emergency Preparedness Plan (EPP) been prepared and Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
arrangements been made for public awareness and training?
OP 7\.50 - Projects on International Waterways
Have the other riparians been notified of the project? Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
If the project falls under one of the exceptions to the Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
notification requirement, has this been cleared with the Legal
Department, and the memo to the RVP prepared and sent?
Has the RVP approved such an exception? Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
The World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information
Have relevant safeguard policies documents been sent to the Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
World Bank's Infoshop?
Have relevant documents been disclosed in-country in a public Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
place in a form and language that are understandable and
accessible to project-affected groups and local NGOs?
All Safeguard Policies
Have satisfactory calendar, budget and clear institutional Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
responsibilities been prepared for the implementation of
measures related to safeguard policies?
Have costs related to safeguard policy measures been included Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
in the project cost?
Does the Monitoring and Evaluation system of the project Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
include the monitoring of safeguard impacts and measures
related to safeguard policies?
Have satisfactory implementation arrangements been agreed Yes [ ] No [ ] NA [ ]
with the borrower and the same been adequately reflected in
the project legal documents?
V\. Contact point
World Bank
Contact: Meeta Sehgal
Title: Sr Agricultural Spec\.
Borrower/Client/Recipient
Name: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development
Contact: Memli Krasniqi
Title: Minister
Email: memli\.krasniqi@rks-gov\.net
Implementing Agencies
Name: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development
Contact: Kapllan Halimi
Title: General Secretary
Email: kapllan\.halimi@rks-gov\.net
Page 13 of 14
VI\. For more information contact:
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 473-1000
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/projects
VII\. Approval
Task Team Leader(s): Name: Meeta Sehgal
Approved By
Safeguards Advisor: Name: Nina Chee (SA) Date: 19-Jan-2017
Practice Manager/ Name: Julian A\. Lampietti (PMGR) Date: 20-Jan-2017
Manager:
Country Director: Name: Marco Mantovanelli (CD) Date: 02-Feb-2017
Page 14 of 14 | APPROVAL |
P102547 | Page 1
INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS DATA SHEET
CONCEPT STAGE
Report No\.: AC2891
Date ISDS Prepared/Updated: 05/04/2007
I\. BASIC INFORMATION
A\. Basic Project Data
Country: India
Project ID: P102547
Project Name: Primary Education (SSA II)
Task Team Leader: Amit Dar
Estimated Appraisal Date:
Estimated Board Date: September 13, 2007
Managing Unit: SASHD
Lending Instrument: Specific Investment
Loan
Sector: Primary education (100%)
Theme: Education for all (P)
IBRD Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
IDA Amount (US$m\.):
500\.00
GEF Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
PCF Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
Other financing amounts by source:
BORROWER/RECIPIENT
0\.00
0\.00
B\. Project Objectives [from section 2 of PCN]
The objective is to support the government in implementing SSA and making progress towards
achieving SSA goals of improvements in quality, while reducing gender and social disparities\.
C\. Project Description [from section 3 of PCN]
The SSA program is a centrally sponsored scheme wherein, based on district elementary
education plans and budgets, the central government contributes 75 percent of the finances and
the states provide a matching 25 percent\. District Annual Work Plan and Budgets (AWPBs) are
developed in consonance with norms and guidelines detailed in the SSA ?Framework for
Implementation\. Among other activities , the program finances innovative state led initiatives to
get children into school, salaries for new teachers, free textbooks for girls and disadvantaged
students, provision of teaching and learning materials, setting up local level institutions to
provide resource support to schools and teachers and strengthening of a monitoring and
evaluation system\. In SSA I the Development Partners supported the program using a SWAp
approach wherein the partners in a harmonized mode, agreed on meeting a slice of the program
expenditures above agreed thresholds and also relied on government?s own rules and procedures
in implementing the program\. The experience with the SWAp has been positive and the
harmonization among development partners has enabled reduction in transaction costs\.
Page 2
As with SSA I, the project will adopt a SWAp approach, with pooled funding\. Under this
modality, DP funds will be provided alongside domestic funds in an agreed ratio, thereby
leveraging domestic contribution\. The harmonized procedures will be continued through an
updated MOU with common formats, updates Results Framework, withdrawal claims and Joint
Review Missions\. The lessons learned under SSA I will be used to discuss potential
improvements in how the system is financed, particularly in the context of diverse capacity
across and within states, with regard to special focus groups and districts, and rural and urban
contexts\. The preparation will explore how financing can move from norm-based allocations, to
gradually build in the share of financing that is based on needs (e\.g\. using the Education
Development Index developed by MHRD to identify educationally backward districts),
achievement of policy/institutional milestones and/or performance\. This presupposes further
strengthening of the M+E systems which will provide this data\. The preparation will also
appraise government?s own proposals for reaching out to the children yet unreached, and for
ensuring regularity of student and teacher attendance and quality improvement in service
delivery, taking into cognizance provision of basic learning conditions in schools And lessons
learned during SSA I implementation\.
Within this framework, the key issues/areas of focus in preparing the support for the next
phase of the program, which coincides with the government?s XIth five year plan, will include:
Quality and Equity:
Teachers: Assess successful innovations that states have used to improve motivation or
accountability of teachers and how these can be scaled up under SSA, including improvement in
teaching learning conditions\. Examine how SSA can support the introduction of a system of
good practices including increasing involvement of local bodies in school management and
putting in place incentives for continuous professional development of teachers\.
?
Classroom Processes and learning levels: Assess how the increasing attention to
classroom processes and interaction, particularly in relation to teacher ?student behavior and
equity issues, can be supported and sustained and agree on the role SSA should play in terms of
bringing about needed changes to pedagogic processes which would promote higher order
learning\. Also examine the extent to which the program will encourage classroom assessment to
become an integral part of the teaching -learning cycle, to promote grade-appropriate learning in
children\.
Enrolment and Retention: Assess the proposed approach to ensure quality with equity, so as to
ensure enrolment, retention and learning for all groups (particularly in respect of girls and special
focus groups)\.
Monitoring and Evaluation:
Monitoring of Learning Outcomes: Understand the various initiatives undertaken at the
national level and by different states in learning assessments at the systemic level\. Assess the
XIth plan recommendation to ?create a set of national testing standards and a chain of
institutions that test and evaluate children according to set norms? and the government?s plans to
move towards a coherent system of quality monitoring that includes good quality and timely
Page 3
large scale national and state-level assessments, as well as more disaggregated quality
monitoring tools\.
Other Monitoring and Evaluation aspects: Assess how the monitoring and evaluation systems
can be strengthened to ensure that relevant, disaggregated, complete, reliable, timely and useful
information is available to policy makers, education service providers and civil society to
influence interventions and decisions\. Can rigorous evaluations of specific interventions be built
into SSA to assess impact, facilitate scaling up of the more successful interventions and to also
inform mid-course and future corrections of less successful ones?
Program Implementation and Planning:
Decentralization: Assess the issues related to program implementation at the decentralized
levels including the role and accountability of PRIs, VECs, PTAs, etc\. to the larger community\.
Use experiences of SSA I to derive lessons for how SSA II can enhance the intended centrality
of PRIs in education service delivery and increase the effectiveness of VECs\.
?
Public-private partnerships: Based on the experience during the first phase,
identify/estimate further possibilities for encouraging partnerships with the private sector and
NGOs within the SSA framework, in support of the objectives of quality with equity, particularly
in respect of meeting the needs of special focus groups, and as initial steps towards developing
an urban strategy\.
Fiduciary Arrangements:
Financial Management and Procurement: Evaluate implementation of the Manual on financial
management and procurement and its effectiveness vis-a-vis the sub-district implementing
entities, since a significant part of SSA expenditures occur at this level\. Agree on actions that
need to be taken by states /GoI to address issues of (a) identification of capacity constraints and
taking appropriate remedial measures; (b) strengthening of internal controls and the external
audit process and (c) simplification of reporting\.
D\. Project location (if known)
India
E\. Borrowers Institutional Capacity for Safeguard Policies [from PCN]
The Borrower's capacity is high
F\. Environmental and Social Safeguards Specialists
Mr Tapas Paul (SASES)
II\. SAFEGUARD POLICIES THAT MIGHT APPLY
Safeguard Policies Triggered
Yes No TBD
Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4\.01)
X
Environmental Assessment to be conducted as part of preparation
Page 4
Safeguard Policies Triggered
Yes No TBD
Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4\.04)
X
Forests (OP/BP 4\.36)
X
Pest Management (OP 4\.09)
X
Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4\.11)
X
Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4\.10)
X
Social Assessment to be conducted as part of preparation
Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4\.12)
X
Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4\.37)
X
Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP
7\.50)
X
Projects in Disputed Areas (OP/BP 7\.60)
X
Environmental Category:
B
-
Partial Assessment
III\. SAFEGUARD PREPARATION PLAN
A\. Target date for the Quality Enhancement Review (QER), at which time the PAD-stage ISDS
would be prepared: 06/20/2007
B\. For simple projects that will not require a QER, the target date for preparing the PAD-stage
ISDS: N/A
C\. Time frame for launching and completing the safeguard-related studies that may be needed\.
The specific studies and their timing
1
should be specified in the PAD-stage ISDS\.
Env\. Assessment - 6/20/2007
Social Assessment - 6/20/2007
IV\. APPROVALS
Signed and submitted by:
Task Team Leader:
Mr Amit Dar
04/03/2007
Approved by:
Regional Safeguards Coordinator:
Ms Michelle Riboud
Comments:
Sector Manager:
Ms Michelle Riboud
Comments:
1
Reminder: The Bank's Disclosure Policy requires that safeguard-related documents be disclosed before appraisal (i) at the
InfoShop and (ii) in-country, at publicly accessible locations and in a form and language that are accessible to potentially affected
persons\.
Page 5 | APPROVAL |
P005929 | Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No\. 4379
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
ARGENTINA FIRST RAILWAY PROJECT
(LOAN 733-AR)
March 1983
Latin America and the Caribbean
Regional Office
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ARGENTINA - LOAN 733-AR
FIRST RAILWAY PROJECT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No\.
PREFACE \.******\.***\. \.
BASIC DATA SHEET \. \.i\. i
HIGHLIGHTS \. v
I\. INTRODUCTION \. \. I
II\. PROJECT PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL \. \. 4
III\. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COST \.6\.6
IV\. TRAFFIC AND OPERATIONS \. \. 11
V\. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE \. 14
VI\. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT \. 17
VII\. ECONOMIC REEVALUATION \. \. 17
VIII\. THE ROLE OF THE BANK \. \. 18
IX\. CONCLUSIONS \. 20
TABLES
1\. Actual and Expected Physical Completion \.
1A\. Major Investments-Physical Units \.
2\. Actual and Appraisal Estimates of Project Costs\.
2A\. Planned and Actual (1971-72] and (1971-1975) in Constant
Dollars and in Physical Units\. \.
3\. Disbursement Schedule\.
3A\. Disbursements by Category \.
4\. Projected and Actual Freight Traffic\.
4A\. Projected and Actual Passenger Traffic \.
5\. Selected Operating Statistics\.
6\. Actual and Projected Income Statement (1970-1975) \.
7\. Actual and Projected Balance Sheets (1970-1975) \.
8\. Actual and Projected Financing of Project\.
9\. Economic Reevaluation \.
MAP
IBRD 13699 - Argentine Railways (1978)
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
PREFACE
This report presents a Project Completion Report of the Argentina
First Railway Project for which Loan 733-AR for US$84\.0 million equivalent
was approved on April 20, 1971\.
The Project Completion Report (PCR) was prepared by the Latin
America and Caribbean Regional Office\. In accordance with the revised
procedures for project performance audit reporting, this PCR was read by the
Operations Evaluation Department (OED) but the project was not audited by
OED staff\. The PCR was sent to the Borrower for comments; however, none were
received\.
- ii -
BASIC DATA SHEET
Key Project Data
Actual or Current
Appraisal Expectation Estimate
Total Project Cost (US$ million) 368\.0 406\.7
Overrun % 11% a/
Loan Amount 84\.0 56\.3
Disbursed 56\.3
Cancelled 27\.7
Date Physical Components Completed 1972 1979
Proportion Completed by Above Date 35%
Proportion Time Overrun 65%
Economic Rate of Return 14\.5% b/ 10%
Financial Performance 26\.50 -
Poor
Institutional Performance - Below expectation
Guarantor's Performance Poor
a/ The project was not fully implemented\. If it had been the cost overruns
would have been higher\.
b/ 14\.5% was the minimum estimate with conservative assumptions and stagnant
traffic, 26\.5% was the most optimistic estimate with the most favorable
assumptions\.
- iii -
OTHER PROJECT DATA
Original Revision Actual
First Mention in Timetable
Government Application
Negotiations 12/16-23/70
Board Approval April 20, 1971
Loan Agreement Date 4/28/71
Closing Date 4/30/74 6/30/79 7/1/80
Borrower Argentine Railways
Executing Agency Argentine Railways
Fiscal Year of Borrower January 1 to December 31
Follow on Project Name Second Railway Project
Loan Credit Number 1677-AR
Amount (US$ million) 96\.00
Loan Credit Agreement Date 11/8/79
- iv -
MISSION DATA
Date of
Item Month/Year No\. of days No\. of Persons Mandays Report
Identification 06/69 15 4 60 07/69
Preparation 11/69 12 4 48 12/69
Preappraisal 11/69 12 4 48 12/69
Appraisal 05/70 26 5 130 03/71
Total 286 (50 Manweeks)
Supervision I 11/72 8 3 24 12/72
Supervision II 05/73 19 5 95 07/73
Supervision III 06/74 4 1 4 06/74
Supervision IV 02/76 5 1 5 05/76
Supervision V 08/76 5 4 20 08/76
Supervision VI 03/77 /a 1 1 1 04/77
Supervision VII 01/81 4 2 8 (for PCR)
Supervision VIII 05/81 3 3 9 (for PCR)
Total 114 652
COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATE
Name of Currency Year: Argentina Peso ($a)
Appraisal Year US$1 = $a 4
Intervening year Average US$ = $a 973
Completion Year Average US$ = $a 1950
a/ Between 1977 and 1981 there were a series of BankMissions first in connection with
the Appraisal and then for Supervision of Second Railway Project\.
- v -
HIGHLIGHTS
1\. The project was the first Bank loan for Argentina's
railways and was aimed at rehabilitation of the railway network\.
However due to factors arising largely from the political and
economic conditions that prevailed in Argentina during the early
70's the investments and actions planned were not implemented
adequately and it was decided to cancel $27\.5 million out of the
loan of $84\.0 million (para\. 1\.03)\. The reduced amount of $56\.5
million was used to finance 59 items which had been contracted up
to the extended project completion date of April 30, 1974\.
2\. The project was based on FA's Investment Plan for the
five year period 1971-75 and comprised the first two years
(1971-72) of the Investment Plan together with a program of action
to improve the operations and financial position of the Argentine
Railways\. Investments of $368 million were proposed during the
project period and the Bank loan of $84 million was to finance 23%
of the project or 49% of the foreign exchange cost\. Subsequent to
the signing of the Loan Agreement, FA agreed, by exchange of
letters, to a time phased program for rationalization of services,
line closures, staff reductions, rehabilitation of diesel locos,
reorganization of workshops, and the introduction of commercial
policies and targets\.
3\. The implementation of the project was adversely affected
from the start as the political and economic problems faced by the
country resulted in grossly inadequate levels of investments and
scant attention to the program of actions agreed with the Bank
(para\. 3\.01)\. Although the completion date of the project was
postponed to April 30, 1974, little progress was achieved and the
Bank offered the Government and FA one of two alternatives: a) to
renegotiate the loan on the basis of new targets and specific
actions to be taken by the Government and FA, or b) to cancel the
balance of the loan\. The Government and FA chose the latter\.
4\. The project was actually completed in 1980 instead of
1972, with a cost overrun of 11% (para\. 3\.03)\. As far as the loan
disbursements are concerned, it is relevant to mention that no
disbursements were made until 1973, and the year of the highest
disbursements was 1974 ($22\.1 million) tapering off, in an
irregular fashion, to $1\.4 million in 1979 (Table 3)\. Hardly any
action was taken by the Government or FA to seriously implement
any of the several action programs (para\. 3\.07), which showed the
direction in which the railway should have been reformed\. On the
other hand substantial increases in the personnel strength of FA
took place which had no relation to the declining volumes of
traffic, and the management of FA was changed 11 times between
1971 and 1975\.
- vi -
5\. The economic rate of return of the project was estimated
during appraisal to be 21%\. The ERR of the delayed and
inadequately implemented project has been recalculated at 10%
(Table 9) which is equivalent to the opportunity cost of capital
and represents a marginal return (para\. 7\.02)\.
6\. Other points of special interest in this project are the
following:
(i) Although progress under the project was poor the
formation and strengthening of the central office of FA
(Oficina Central) was an unintended benefit of the
relationship with the Bank which led finally to the
creation and development of the Planning Office of FA
(para\. 6\.02)\.
(ii) FA's report on the completion of the project concludes
that despite the fact that the project was not
implemented adequately, the Bank's contribution to the
medium term planning of FA was positive, the diagnosis
of the railway situation appropriate and that the
measures proposed were not only necessary but were
possible of implementation had the requisite political
and economic conditions existed at the time (para\.
8\.02)\.
(iii) Bank's involvement with FA in the first railway project
tended to "orient" the railways and particularly the
Government towards judicious investments consistent with
the need for pruning and rationalization of railway
services\. Those two factors in course of time, formed
the basis for the Second Railway Project currently under
implementation\.
INTRODUCTION
1\.01 Argentina has developed a highly diverse and extensive transport
2
network to integrate its 2\.8 million km of territory and to serve the needs
of its population of 28 million\. The network includes 100,800 km of national
and provincial primary roads, 32,200 km of railways; 17,000 km of pipelines
for crude oil, petroleum products and natural gas; over 100 ports and 90
commercial airports\. Following the worldwide trend, highways increasingly
represent the dominant mode\. From 1965 to 1978, road transport's share of
cargo traffic increased from 47% of total inter-urban ton-km to 55%, while
rail's share declined from 18% to 10%\. Similarly, in terms of passenger
service, roads' share rose from 76% of inter-urban passenger-km to 88%, while
rail declined from 22% to 7%, with air transport increasing its share from 2%
to 6%\.
1\.02 During the half century preceding the first World War, the railways
played a crucial role in the economic growth of the country by opening up new
areas to development and providing the only transport link between production
areas and the main ports\. Thereafter, however, their relative importance
declined steadily with the growth in road, river and pipeline transport, and
their financial situation deteriorated\. In 1946, the Government purchased the
12 private railway companies and combined them with the six it already owned
and one owned by the Province of Buenos Aires, to form Ferrocarriles Argentinos
(FA)\. The resulting railway had 44,000 km of lines and was one of the largest
in the world\. Unfortunately, the Government failed to maintain the railway
infrastructure to provide continuity of management, to integrate fully organiza-
tions of the original railway companies, to discontinue services which could
no longer be provided economically, to insulate the railways from political
interference and to maintain adequate tariff levels\. Consequently, financial
losses mounted, maintenance expenditures lagged and service deteriorated;
railway traffic declined from 16\.5 billion ton-km and 32\.8 million tons
in 1951 to 14\.2 billion ton-km and 22\.1 million tons in 1970\.
1\.03 The realization of the changing role of the railway has led to
several attempts at rationalizing the system and the services offered\. One of
these attempts was initiated in 1970 and formed the basis for the Bank's First
Railway Project (Loan 733-AR) which is the subject of this Project Completion
Report (PCR)\. However, due to factors arising largely from the political and
economic conditions that prevailed in Argentina during the early 70's the
investments and actions planned were not implemented and by February 1974,
it was apparent that little or no improvement had been made by FA and that
performance was well below the established targets\. In April 1974, the Bank
offered the Government and FA the alternative of renegotiating the loan on the
basis of new targets and specific actions to be taken by the Government and
FA or cancelling the balance of the loan for items not yet contracted\. The
Government and FA chose the latter alternative and US$27\.5 million of the
US$84\.0 million loan were cancelled\.
1\.04 An analysis of the railways during-the period of 1970's, the time-
frame for this PCR, is complicated by the severe economic and political
crisis which came to a head by the middle of the decade\. A combination of
- 2 -
domestic and international events undermined the country's economy resulting
in rising external debt and falling foreign exchange reserves; inflation
reached over 300% in 1975 and rose to an annual rate of over 800% by early
1976\. The Administration which came to power in 1976 moved to stabilize the
economy\. Nevertheless, in 1981 the situation was still not stable, with infla-
tion continuing at over 100% and a series of substantial devaluations and
other measures being instituted to stop the outflow of capital\.
1\.05 The transport sector was significantly affected by the economic
crisis\. Traffic declined on much of the road and rail network (with the
exception of rail passengers) and public expenditures were drastically reduced
both for maintenance and construction\. From 1976, however, as the road
subsector rebounded, with investment support in critical areas, rail freight
remained stagnant largely due to poor levels of service caused by: (a) govern-
ment apathy over the years; (b) grossly inadequate investments; (c) frequent
changes of management (between 1971 and 1979 the management of the Railway was
changed 13 times); and (d) changing geographic structure of the economy which
favored competing modes\. The Government again instituted plans in 1976 to
rationalize the railways and has reduced the labor force from 157,000 to under
96,000, eliminated 7,600 km of uneconomic branch lines, recommended an addi-
tional 3,000 km for elimination, reduced service on another 13,000 km of line
and is striving to improve operational efficiency\. Some of this work has
overlapped with the preparation and implementation of the Second Railway
Project (see para 1\.06 below)\. However, though some improvements have been
achieved in railway operations, no systematic reorganization nor any significant
efficiency-oriented investments 1/ have yet been made in FA to improve its
operations\. 1980 was a particularly bad year when floods and poor economic
conditions depressed traffic levels and FA's working ratio rose to 208\. The
railway problem thus remains a key issue facing the Argentine Government and
its resolution represents a long term project\.
1\.06 Based on the lessons learned during the First Railway Project and
with the belief that the Government was committed to a substantial ration-
alization of the system, the Bank reentered the subsector with the Second
Railway Project (1677 AR) which was appraised in 1978-79 and became effective
in May, 1980\.
1\.07 The Bank has also been involved in other transport subsectors,
especially during the 1970's\. Highway development has been supported by
the Bank over the last 20 years by four loans totalling US$228\.5 million
(Loan 288-AR, June 1961, US$31 million after cancellation; Loan 619-AR,
June 1969, US$25 million; Loan 734-AR, May 1971, US$67\.5 million, and Loan
1384-AR, May 1977, US$105 million)\. All of these projects experienced
serious delays and in many cases, substantial cost overruns mainly due to
the economic crisis of the mid-1970's\. A port project was appraised in 1979
for which negotiations have not yet been held; a Fifth Highway Sector Project
has been appraised (March 1981) and is currently being processed\.
1/ Such as improved telecommunication facilities, computerized wagon and
yard control systems, etc\., which are producing marked efficiency
improvements on railways over the world\.
- 3 -
In addition, the Bank has been extensively involved in sector planning culmi-
nating in the National Transport Plan (NTP) and the establishment of the
National Directorate for Transport Planning (DNPT) with financial assistance
provided under the Fourth Highway Loan\.
1\.08 This PCR, covering the First Railway Project, has been prepared with
the assistance of the Borrower, who provided a set of reports for the Bank's
review\. These reports, together with data obtained from Bank files were
reviewed with FA by Bank missions which visited Argentina in January and
May 1981\.
II\. PROJECT PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL
Background
2\.01 The first loan to Argentine Railways was preceded by a long series
of contacts between the Bank and Argentina dealing with the problems of
the railways\. Until 1946 the financial results for the railways were reason-
able but, thereafter, increasing road competition, political influences,
frequent changes in railway management, low staff morale, inadequate invest-
ments for the maintenance and renewal of assets and for improvements to meet
changing circumstances led to deterioration of railways services and increasing
financial difficulties\. The deficits also increased the burden on the Govern-
ment budgets\.
2\.02 In 1960 the Argentine Government, the United Nations Special Fund
and the Bank set up a Transport Planning Group to formulate long-term
transportation plans and investment programs\. The recommendations proposed
inter-alia extensive reforms and economies for the railways\. The Government
attempted to implement these in 1962-63 but a drastic reduction of labor
created political and financial problems beside having an adverse effect
upon the morale and efficiency of the railways\. The program was abandoned
and the only permanent result was the retirement of about 50,000 FA staff\.
2\.03 In early 1967, the Government embarked upon measures to stabilize the
economy, including the reorganization of the railways\. The direction of FA
was placed under military control and steps were taken to restore discipline
and the morale of the staff\. Design of a complete recovery program for FA was
started and, at the request of the Government, the progress made and the plans
for the future were reviewed by a Bank mission in September 1968\. The Bank
recommended that the recovery measures be accelerated and that medium-term
investment and financial programs be developed\. A subsequent series of missions
determined that serious efforts were being made to improve the physical and
financial position of FA\. Traffic increased and deficits appeared to be
decreasing\. In June 1969 the Bank sent a Project Identification/Preappraisal
Mission to Argentina which discussed conditions for Bank participation in a
project which was appraised in May 1970\.
Project Description and Goals
2\.04 The project was based on FA's Investment Plan for the five year period
1971-1975 and comprised the first two years (1971-72) of the Investment Plan
together with a program of action to improve the operations and financial
position of the Argentine Railways\. Subsequent to the signing of the loan
agreement, FA agreed by exchange of letters to a time phased program for
rationalization of services and line closures, staff redeployment and reduc-
tions, rehabilitation of diesel locos, reorganization of workshops, and the
introduction of commercial policies and targets\.
2\.05 Investment of the equivalent of US$368 million were proposed during
the project period 1971-72 of which the foreign exchange component was computed
to be about US$172 million equivalent\. The Bank loan of US$84 million was to
finance 23% of the project or 49% of the foreign exchange requirements\. The
- 5 -
major components of the project were (a) track renewals and improvement as
well as procurement of track materials and equipment (25%); (b) signalling and
telecommunications equipment and works (3%); (c) structural civil works (8%);
(d) procurement of new locomotives and freight cars (41%); and (e) maintenance
of locomotives and freightcars (22%)\. The Bank loan of $84 million was
expected to finance procurement of freight cars, workshop equipment, and
components for rehabilitating and renovating locomotives and cars, track
material and track workshop equipment and signalling and telecommunications
equipment\. A small portion of the loan was also expected to finance track
civil works\.
2\.06 Negotiations with FA and the Government were held in December
1970\. The loan and Guarantee Agreements were signed on April 28, 1971 and
became effective on August 5, 1971\.
- 6 -
III\. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COST
3\.01 Implementation of the project ran into trouble almost fror
the start\. The political and economic problems faced by the country from
the initial years of the project resulted in grossly inadequate levels of
investments and scant attention to the plans of action agreed with the Bank\.
As the action taken in implementation of the agreed program was grossly
inadequate, the Bank decided, within a year of the loan becoming effective,
to stop disbursements in July 1972\. In August 1972, the Bank held detailed
discussions with FA and the Argentine Government and approved of some changes
in the Project and investment figures and agreed to postpone the project
completion date to April 30, 1974\. By February 1974, it was apparent that
little or no improvement had been achieved in FA's physical and financial
condition during 1972 and 1973 and that performance was well below established
targets\. In April 1974, the Bank offered the Government and FA one of two
alternatives: (a) to renegotiate the loan on the basis of new targets and
specific actions to be taken by the Government and FA; or (b) to cancel
the balance of the loan\. The Government and FA chose the latter, and it was
decided to cancel $27\.5 million out of the loan of $84 million, agreeing to
maintain an amount of $56\.5 million in the loan to finance 59 items which
had been contracted up to the project completion date of April 30, 1974\.
The loan closing date was extended to December 31, 1976\. Table 1 gives details
of the physical completion of each item of the project in juxtaposition with
the expected completion as foreseen during appraisal\. Table 2 details the
actual costs in comparison with the appraisal cost estimates\. Table 2A
details the investments in the project years 1971-72 and the Investment Plan
years 1971-1975, in physical units as well as in constant dollars\.
Project Cost
3\.02 Analysis of project costs for Argentina is a difficult task not
only because of the high inflation rates but also because the parity between
the dollar and the peso is rather unevenly maintained, with marked fluctuations
in certain years\. However, an attempt has been made to reduce all costs
to constant dollars in terms of the 1970 rate of exchange so that resultant
figures would be comparable to appraisal estimates\.
3\.03 An analysis of Tables 1 and 2 illustrates that the main features of
the project implementation were as follows:
(a) The project was completed in 1980 instead of 1972 as planned\.
(b) The main reason for delay in investments was the lack of
adequate funds as reflected in the government allocations
of funds from year to year\. For the project period 1971-
72 FA investments amounted to $128 million instead of
$368 million and for the 5 Year Investment Plan period
1971-1975 $268 million instead of $839 million\.
(c) The cost of the project at US$406 million was 11% higher
than the appraisal estimate of US$368 million including
contingencies\. Some items of the project were not implemented
as detailed in para\. 3\.04\.
- 7 -
(d) Only 34% of the investments expected to be made by 1972
were actually made by end 1972\.
(e) As far as the 1971-1975 investment program is concerned,
only 31% of the investments expected to be made by 1975 were
actually made by end 1975\.
(f) Though the overall cost overrun for the 1971-72 project
was 11%, the cost overrun for the track works was nearly
25% and for the freightcars over 34% largely because of
the extended period of time over which these were
implemented (see para 3\.04 below)\. For procurement of
electric coaches the cost overrun was 197% chiefly because
more electric coaches were purchased than foreseen
(92 instead of 42)\.
Project Composition
3\.04 The principal changes in project scope and implementation arose from
inadequate authorization of funds for the various works and in particular a slow
rate of execution of track renewal and improvement works\. Though the appraisal
report exhorted (para 5\.07) that the investment plan should be carried out as
early as possible to capture traffic, the government never authorized sufficient
funds to implement the project/plan in a meaningful way\. Table lA shows the
rate at which the principal items of work were executed from the year 1971 to
1975 and this in conjunction with Table 1 gives a fair idea of the tempo of work
and time taken for the various items of work\.
(a) Track Works
Track related works comprised about 25% of the project and of these
the track renewal and improvement works comprised 72% the rest being workshop
and maintenance equipment and machinery\. Although 368 km of track renewal
work were done in 1971 against 450 km planned, the figure fell to 250 km in
1972 against 500 planned, 215 in 1973 against 600 planned and to 81 in 1975
against 800 planned\. The average over the years 1971-1975 was 214 km per year
against 610 km per year planned, i\.e\. about one-third of the original plan\.
It is significant to note that the 5-year program for 1971-1975 for track
renewal (3050 km) and improvement (3800 km) work has not yet been completed
up to the year 1980 but meanwhile the second railway project was appraised in
1978 which fixed new targets from 1979 onwards\. In so far as the workshop and
maintenance equipment is concerned only 4% of the equipment was procured and
installed up to 1972 and 6\.5% up to 1974\. The work was completed in 1980\.
(b) Signalling and Telecommunications
Though Signalling and Telecommunication Works constitute a relatively
small portion of the project, these were vital for improving train operations\.
However no significant work was done in the years 1971-72 and by 1974 only 17%
of the works were completed\. Less than one third of the Bank loan earmarked
for the purpose was utilized\.
-8-
(c) Structures
These comprised various power and water installations, bridge
strengthening works, station buildings, housing and Zarate Brazo Largo Bridge\.
These works were completed 20% up to 1972, 50% up to 1974 and finally completed
in 1976\.
(d) Locomotive and Car Maintenance
This part of the project pertained to the purchase of spare parts and
rehabilitation of locomotives, freight cars and passenger cars\. However, up to
1972 only 1% of the amount foreseen was spent and up to 1974 only 6%\. This was
one of the major reasons for the fall in the availability of locomotives from
63\.8% in 1971 to 55\.8% in 1976, and similar deterioration in the availability
of freight cars and passenger cars\.
(e) Purchase of New Locomotives and Cars
40 Broadgauge locomotives were purchased as planned from GM by 1972\.
However only 40 of the 150 narrow gauge locos to be procured in the 1971-1975
period had been actually purchased by 1975\. As for the standard gauge locos,
the 20 locomotives expected to be purchased in 1972 did not show up until 1977
(18 nos) followed by 22 in 1978\. Taking the 5-year period 1971-1975, FA
purchased only 80 out of 230 locomotives programmed having had to defer the
procurement of the rest of the locomotives to later years\. This was the other
principal cause of drop in locomotive availability 1/ (see 3\.04(d) above)\.
A similar situation arose in respect of the rail tractors which were to be
supplied at the rate of 50 per year for the 4 years 1971-1974 but actually
nothing was delivered until 1979 when 39 were delivered and 1980 when 36 were
delivered, resulting in the continued utilization of obsolete steam/diesel
locos in shunting operations in the railway yards\. As for freight cars of
which 4400 units were to be purchased in 1971-72 largely to replace overaged
stock, only about 2,000 were procured by end 1972\. This was also the pattern
for the 5 year project for 1971-1975 during which period, 5192 freidht cars
were purchased against 10,400 foreseen during appraisal\. As most purchases
were in replacement of overaged and run-down stock, the effect on loading and
handling capacity and train operations in general was negative\.
(f) The case of passenger cars is rather special for here 215 cars
were purchased in 1971-72 against 175 foreseen though over the 5 year period
1971-1975 FA purchased 385 passenger cars against 523 foreseen during appraisal\.
For electric rail cars FA ended up purchasing 92 rail cars against 75 foreseen
over the 5 year period (1971-1975) although for the project years (1971-72) no
purchases were made versus 42 foreseen at appraisal time\. Viewed with hindsight
(intercity passenger services and suburban passenger services in cities other
than Buenos Aires were drastically reduced in 1978/79) this emerged as a parti-
cularly wasteful investment (US$14 million)\.
1/ One of the principal causes of the low availability of the locomotives on
FA has been the multiplicity of types (22 types in 1972) of locomotives
many of which were overaged, for which there have been severe problems in
procuring spare parts\. Hence the accent on procurement of new locomotives
(to reduce the number of types) and to purchase spare parts to improve
availability\.
-9-
Procurement
3\.05 Slow implementation of the project resulted in curtailment of the
loan to $56\.3 million to limit Bank financing to a list of 59 items ordered up
to April 1974\. No disbursements were made until 1973, the year of the highest
disbursement was 1974 ($22\.1 million) with $1\.4 million in 1979\.
3\.06 The disbursement schedule is given in Table 3 which shows the actual
disbursements in comparison with the original schedule\. Table 3A shows the
disbursements by category\. The disbursements that dragged on the longest were
for the wagon bodies of which the last lot was delivered in 1978 and final
payments were made in 1979\. In addition, spare parts for locomotives and cars
were last delivered in 1979 and the deliveries of track materials and equipment,
signalling equipment, etc\. was completed in 1978\. Most of the extended
deliveries were caused by budget limitations, except for small numbers of spare
parts delivered late due to supplier constraints\. At one stage FA requested
the Bank to finance the purchase of locotractors which was postponed due to lack
of funds (para\. 3\.4e), but the Bank did not agree to this, presumably because it
meant financing a contract signed several years earlier\. All procurement
financed by the Bank was done by ICB\.
Action Program
3\.07 The project was accompanied by a program of action agreed between FA
and the Bank inter-alia for:
(a) Rationalization of services and closing of lines aiming
at an examination and possible closure of about
6300 km of lines by 1975\.
(b) Reduction of staff from 145,000 in 1970 to 120,000 in 1975\.
(c) Rehabilitation of diesel locomotives to increase the
number in running condition from 900 in 1971 to 1163 in
1975, and a similar program for diesel rail cars (150
to 281)\.
(d) Centralization of workshops and reduction of the number
of workshops from 24 to 18 and staff strength in
workshops from 19,500 to 14,700 by 1975\.
(e) A program of tariff increases\.
(f) A program of marketing studies and promotion\.
Hardly any action was taken either by the Government or FA to seriously implement
any of the above programs within the time-frame agreed with the Bank except tariff
increases which were carried out to an extent generally close to appraisal
expectation (see para 5\.06)\. The management of FA was changed 11 times between
1971 and 1975\. Staff strength instead of being reduced was increased from
145,000 in 1971 to 175,000 in 1975 by direct government intervention\. The
number of diesel locomotives in running condition steadily deteriorated
instead of improving and locomotive availability fell from 63\.8% in 1971 to an
- 10 -
all time low of 55\.8% in 1976\. Similarly electric coaches availability fell
from 51\.8% in 1971 to 45\.4% in 1975\. No serious rationalization of workshops
was attempted\. This state of affairs continued until the new military govern-
ment took over in 1976\.
3\.08 It is important, however, that the action program prepared for this
project, though not implemented, showed the direction in which the railway
should be reformed, and the management of FA initiated similar measures in
1976 when in collaboration with Bank Mission it started on a program of line
closures, staff reductions, workshop and services rationalization, leading to
the formulation of the Bank's Second Railway Project (see paras\. 1\.05 and 1\.06)\.
- 11 -
IV\. TRAFFIC AND OPERATIONS
Performance of the Economy
4\.01 At the time of appraisal in 1971 data available indicated that the
Argentine economy was recovering from a period of slow and uneven growth
and considerable inflation\. The production potential of the country was rated
as high and the appraisal report projected an annual growth in real GDP of
about 5\.5% over the next five years which was expected to generate a substantially
larger demand for transport of both primary products and manufactured goods\.
In actual fact, it appears from the data available that the economic crisis
during the project period affected national production in general so that no
significant growth occurred in the production of the principal commodities
carried by the railways, although between 1961 and 1970 GDP grew in real terms
at an average rate of 3\.7% per year or just over 2% on a per capita basis\.
Freight Traffic
4\.02 The appraisal forecast assumed that with the implementation of FA's
investment plan and the program of action agreed upon with the Bank to
rationalize the railway system and to improve its operations, the freight
traffic decline which had occurred since 1947 would be arrested and that
traffic would rise steadily between 1970 and 1975 at an annual growth rate of
about 4% from 22 to 27 million tons and from 13\.4 billion ton km to 16\.3 billion
ton-km\. However, due to a combination of factors (see para 4\.03 below), the
expected traffic growth did not materialize\. Freight traffic continued to
decline, and by 1975 it was 21% lower than in 1970\.
4\.03 The disparities between projected and actual freight traffic are
the result of the combination of three factors: (i) the country's economic
decline; (ii) the deteriorating level of service because of the lack of full
implementation of the investment plan and also of the plans for improving
operational efficiency; and (iii) the diversion of commodities which could
be more appropriately handled by other modes\.
4\.04 The economic crisis during the project period affected national
production in general so that no significant growth occurred in the production
of principal railway commodities such as grain, cement, wine and minerals\. At
the same time, substantial delays affected the implementation of both the in-
vestment and action plans\. Less than 1/3 of the investments foreseen for the
1971-1975 period (which were essentially deferred maintenance and replacement
works and equipments) were actually made (Table 2A) and some of the important
investments to be made in 1972 (e\.g\. for replacement of overaged wagons)
have not yet been completed\. The expected actions to improve the efficiency
of operations were not taken and the end result was a continuous decline in
the quality of the service which prevented the railways from increasing their
share in the total transport of the principal railway commodities, although
the railways' share for such commodities did not decline\.
- 12 -
4\.05 Finally, about 70% of the decline in traffic between 1970 and 1975
can be accounted for by the reduction in the traffic of petroleum and "other"
commodities which are not considered "prime" rail traffic and were susceptible
to competition from new pipelines and expanded truck services\. Also, the
average distance per ton carried increased from 637 km to 664 km which indicates
that shorter distance traffic has left the railways, again not a "prime"
target for traffic growth (the average distance for "other" commodities
increased from 600 km to 862 km)\. In economic terms it can be expected that
it would be cheaper to haul many of the short haul commodities by other modes
even under improved rail operating conditions\.
4\.06 The results of the First Railway Project illustrate the great
difficulty economists and railway planners have faced in estimating rail
traffic for projects which are expected to reverse the long term neglect of
the rail system\. A major question which is important in assessing the rail
forecasts and which has implications for future rail forecasts is to what extent
the lack of traffic growth was a phenomenon which because of the changing
geographic structure of trade and the improvement of the highway network would
have occurred despite improvements in the railway, and to what extent it was
a consequence of lack of investment in the railways\. The appraisal forecast
appears to have been based on the latter reasoning and concluded that increased
investment, together with improved operational efficiency, would attract
substantial traffic that had been lost, and increase railways' transport
share\. The data from Argentina suggest that the "with-project" appraisal
assumption may have been over-optimistic\. On the other hand, the conspicuous
difference between the actual and the planned investments and the scant
attention given to implementation of the action program (paras 3\.04 and 3\.07)
are important factors which are of considerable consequence\. The period in
which the First Railway Project was to have been implemented was an era of
unprecedented political and economic turmoil in Argentina and perhaps clearer
answers will emerge when the Second Railway Project started in 1980 near
completion, and is analyzed in the light of the various studies included in
that project\.
Passenger Traffic
4\.07 The appraisal passenger forecast assumed that intercity passenger-km
would increase by 22% between 1970 and 1975 while suburban passenger-km would
remain relatively stable increasing by about 10% (Table 4A)\. Actual intercity
passenger traffic for this period was equivalent to the forecasts and was
apparently insensitive to the economic difficulties reaching 6\.6 billion
passenger-km by 1975\. The declines after 1976 were due to the reduction of
intercity passenger services\. Suburban traffic declined steadily until 1974
when traffic levels rebounded to a level of about 8 billion passenger-km\.
Much of this increase may be due to the rise in fuel prices in March 1974\.
- 13 -
Operations
4\.08 Selected operating statistics for FA for the years 1970-1979 are given
in Table 5\. During the six year period 1970-1975, the total traffic units
(comprising freight ton km and passenger km) remained between 25 and 26 billion
units\. No serious attempt was made to reduce staff which, on the other hand,
was increased from 145,000 in 1970 to 155,000 in 1976\. The mounting arrears
of track renewal and improvement works led to a steady deterioration in the
condition of the track, leading to an increase in speed restrictions and minor
derailments\. As a result the average speeds fell to an all time low of 22\.8 km/hr
in 1976 and the average wagon turn around time increased steadily from 16\.3 days
in 1970 to 20 days in 1976\. Due to inadequate replacements of the overaged
and obsolete motive power and inadequate purchases of spare parts, the avail-
ability of locomotives dropped from 63\.8% in 1971 to 55\.8% in 1976\. If it is
remembered that in a fleet of 1,100 locomotives this drop in itself represents
90 locomotives lost, the effect on FA's potential capacity to capture more
traffic can well be imagined\. Lack of funds led to a wholesale postponement
of the purchase of locotractors to be used for shunting operations in yards
stations and sidings in replacement of the overaged and expensive steam
locomotives\. As a result projected improvements in shunting operations never
materialized and FA continued to maintain unreliable steam locomotives at
exorbitant costs\. Locotractors against the Belgian contract finally started
coming in 1979 at prices several times more than the planned 1971-72 purchases,
Freightcar availability fell from 75\.8% in 1971 to 68\.7% in 1975 due to the
fact that less than half of the wagon replacement program was implemented\.
4\.09 The cumulative effect of the above delays and defaults was a marked
deterioration in the quality of the service provided by the railway and the
result was that instead of capturing more traffic as the project and action
program had foreseen, there was loss of traffic, and further deterioration of
the railway infrastructure\. It is pertinent to note that over the years
1970-1976 manpower productivity measured in the number of annual traffic
units per employee fell from 188,000 to 162,000\.
4\.10 During the 30 year period 1946-1976 thus Argentina witnessed the
systematic erosion of its railway property and potential by what appears
to have been a combination of gross neglect in the period 1946-1970 and some
ill-conceived government actions during the years of political and economic
turmoil from 1970 to 1976\.
- 14 -
V\. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
5\.01 FA's financial Performance during the Project execution period
was very poor and, in fact, became the major factor which led to the Bank's
cancelling a portion of the loan\. At the time of the appraisal the long term
financial objective was for FA to cover all operating expenses, including
depreciation by 1979 ie within ten years\. In this context a set of financial
targets, covering the five years from 1971 to 1975, were established\. The
substantial difference between these original targets and the actual perfor-
mance is shown clearly below:
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Working Ratio
Forecest 126 117 108 101 98
Actual 179 156 168 183 262
Operating Ratio
Forecast 147 136 127 119 115
Actual 199 180 182 193 267
5\.02 The dramatic difference between the appraisal projection and what
actually happened is shown clearly in Table 6\. It can be seen in 1974 1/
(when the loan was cancelled) that revenues were about 83% below the appraisal
projections and total operating costs were 25% above the appraisal estimates\.
These operating cost comparisons are distorted because depreciation is under-
stated in the actual data; comparison of the working expenses (excluding
depreciation) is more meaningful and shows that costs were 40% higher (in
real terms) than the appraisal estimates\.
5\.03 The appraisal had projected that the improvement in financial
performance would be achieved through a steady increase in total revenues
while operating expenses were expected to be held essentially constant\.
Thus, between 1971 and 1975 revenues were expected to increase by 31%,
reflecting traffic increases of 11% (in unit-km) and tariff increases of
nearly 20% in real terms\. Actually total traffic declined by 10% (in unit km)
and the cumulative increase in unit revenues was about 14%\.
5\.04 The main reasons for the difference in the actual versus antici-
pated expenses were the higher actual personnel costs\. The appraisal report
projected a 24% increase in personnel costs between 1970 and 1975 while they
actually increased by 71% (in real terms)\. Other costs in total increased
roughly in line with the appraisal projections but, as personnel costs consti-
tuted over 70% of local expenses, the difference in these dominated the
results\.
1/ 1975 data is not discussed because the extreme inflation of that
year makes the data practically meaningless\.
- 15 -
5\.05 The difference between the projected and actual labor costs reflect
both higher staffing levels and greater salary increases\. It had been
anticipated that staff would be decreased from the 1969 level of 145,000 to
120,000 by 1975 while actual staff was reduce to only 141,000 in 1974 before
increases were commenced (after the balance of the loan was cancelled)\. More
importantly, average personnel costs were increased by about 50% more than
expected by the end of 1974\.
5\.06 The extreme difference between the actual results and the projections
raises a question as to the reasonableness of the Bank original financial
projections\. Obviously, in retrospect, the projections seem to have been far
too optimistic and yet it is clear from the information in the files that a
very serious and thorough attempt was made to present reasonable financial
projections for FA\. The main weaknesses in -the financial projections seem to
have been:
(i) the assumption that the investment program and plan of
action would be carried out with resulting improvements
in operations, reductions in cost and improvement in the
quality of services\. The appraisal mission did not foresee
the chaos which would overtake the political and economic
system which in turn made the execution of the project
impossible\.
(ii) the assumption that steady real tariff increases could be
implemented while at the same time, traffic increases occurred\.
In fact tariff increases seem to have taken marginally short
of the assumed ones but the lower increases seem reasonable in
view of the fact that the traffic declines were so severe\.
More importantly, the Bank seems to have placed great emphasis
on the need for greater tariff increases, during supervision,
in order to achieve the financial targets but it is not clear
from the limited information available on competitive tariffs
for trucks that such increases were possible without losing
significant traffic and, worsening the financial situation;
(iii) the assumption that costs, particularly personnel costs,
would be maintained at their preappraisal levels seem to have
been unreasonable mainly because it was not possible to hold
the salary levels relatively constant\. It is not clear to what
extent this need for greater increases in salaries could
have been foreseen, railway salaries were known to be low but
apparently were only felt to be 20% too low, not 50% too low\.
Balance Sheets
5\.07 A comparison of the appraisal and actual Balance Sheets (in comparable
unit currency) is shown in Table 7\. Because of FA's extreme unprofitability
(and resultant dependence on the government budget) these figures have little
financial importance\. However, it is interesting to note that FA's actual
financial position generally strengthened throughout the 1970-1974 period, in
spite of the large losses\. It is particularly evident that one of the Bank's
main objectives, a strengthening in the working capital position, was achieved
a fact which shows that the government did give good financial support to FA's
operating budget\.
- 16 -
5\.08 With respect to the Balance Sheet, a further objection of the project
was to improve the quality of the data presented in the Balance Sheet through:
(i) determination of a more accurate valuation of FA's asset;
(ii) carrying out of regular audits by private auditors\.
Both steps were carried out, at least partially while the loan was active\. A
firm of private auditors was appointed and produced annual reports until 1973,
when the loan was cancelled, and a major portion of the asset revaluation was
carried out at the end of 1972 but this work was not extended to the rest of
the assets\.
Financial Plan
5\.09 A comparison of actual project financing in comparison with the appraisal
estimate is shown in Table 8\. It can be seen that while the size of the project
was reduced there was still an increase of 11% in the funds required to execute
the project\. The total cost of the project was US$407 million, of which Bank
contributed only US$56\.3 million, or 14%, whereas during appraisal it was
forecast that the Bank loan would contribute 23% of the project cost\.
5\.10 This reduction in Bank contribution meant that other financial sources,
mainly government had to make larger contributions to the financing of the
project, it is estimated that the government contribution increased from an
estimated US$160 million equivalent to US$317 equivalent or about 100% more\.
5\.11 Though over the extended period of the project, government contribution
was higher than anticipated, the inadequate overall provision for investments
year by year (see Tables 2, 2A) was a serious problem that prevented the project
and the investment plan from being implemented and completed as planned\.
- 17 -
VI\. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT
6\.01 The appraisal report reviewed in a general way the organization and
staffing of FA and highlighted the need for (i) improving the administrative
control of the headquarters over the individual railways and (ii) reduction of
surplus staff and the need for government assistance in retraining and re-
employment of such staff\. The formation of an incipient planning office was
touched upon\. The project, per se, however, did not contain any specific
proposals for institutional reforms either within on FA or in FA's relationships
with the government\. Neither did the project contain any proposals for studies
on any institutional aspects of the railway problem\.
6\.02 FA's report on the completion of this project, however, contains a
chapter on institutional development which refers to the strengthening of the
central organization (Organismo Central) of FA in relationship with the
different railways each of which had its own individuality inherited from the
premerger years\. It does appear that during the seventies the central
organization of FA found a role for itself, albeit slowly and flatteringly at
first, and later in a surer manner, with the creation and development of the
Organization for Engineering Administration (Organismo de Ingenieria Adminis-
trativa)\. The latter led to the formation of the planning office which has
in recent years assumed the responsibility for preparation of FA's short-term
(one year), medium term (5 year) and long-term (10 year) investment plans\. It
would appear therefore that though the First Railway Project did not contain
any specific proposals on the institutional front certain developments did
take place, largely on the initiative of the borrower, which have had a
positive effect in defining a role for the headquarters office (Organismo
Central) and in formation of the planning office, which has been playing an
increasingly active role in the making of plans and projections for the
future\.
VII\. ECONOMIC REEVALUATION
7\.01 The economic evaluation carried out at appraisal calculated the
economic rate of return for the investment plan for 1971 to 1975\. Although a
technical assessment was made of individual investments, the investment plan
was economically assessed as a whole rather than by individual components and
the underlying assumption was that such an integrated plan would attract
additional traffic and stop further diversion of traffic to other modes\. The
1980 freight forecasts in the appraisal report for the "with" and "without"
project situation were estimated at 18\.0 billion and 4\.0 billion ton-km
respectively; for passengers, 15\.0 billion and 5\.6 billion pass-km respectively,
The major benefits were the savings in transport costs between rail and road\.
The economic rate of return (ERR) was estimated at 21%\.
7\.02 Although the original plan was not carried out, some investment did
occur and 67% of the loan funds were disbursed though with inordinate delays
(1974-1980)\. Applying a similar methodology, the ERR was recalculated taking
into account the actual traffic for 1971 to 1981 and revised forecasts to
2000; and the reduced investment level from 1971 to 1981\. Investments beyond
1980 were derived from the recent proposals of the National Transport Plan
- 18 -
(NTP)\. No changes were made in the "without" project forecast\. Rail and road
costs were revised based on the appraisal methodology used in the Second
Railway Project and the estimates of the NTP\. Other benefit parameters
applied in the appraisal evaluation could not be included because of the lack
of data in the project file needed to reconstruct them\. Instead an additional
benefit was calculated representing the savings in the maintenance costs from
track rehabilitation which was carried out\. To avoid double counting of benefits
these savings are calculated on the basis of the traffic which would not have
diverted to road in the "without" case\. The recalculated ERR is estimated at
10% (Table 9) which is equivalent to the opportunity costs of capital and
represents a marginal return\. Given the fact that FA did not institute many
of the operational improvements originally agreed as well as the bulk of the
investment plan, and that traffic was below appraisal estimates the ERR
appears to be reasonable\.
7\.03 The main drawback to the evaluation methodology is that it does
not permit an analysis of the marginal impacts on project benefits when the
individual components are substantially changed as happened in Argentina\.
Thus, it is difficult to assess, in economic terms, whether the type of
investment and/or the location of the investments was appropriate\. System-
wide traffic loss estimates are subject to a high level of uncertainty\.
The Second Railway Project was evaluated through an analysis of the marginal
benefits of specific investments and a similar methodology was applied in
developing the NTP investment plan\. The ERR's calculated for types of invest-
ments in the Second Railway Project and the NTP should be indicative of the
returns on investments made in the 1971-1975 period\. Thus rehabilitation
projects on the trunk lines should register ERR's of from 10% to 20%; locomotive
procurement projects from 15% to 25%; and wagon procurement projects from 12%
to 20%\.
VIII\. THE ROLE OF THE BANK
8\.01 This Project Completion Report is being written almost ten years
after appraisal of the project, and though this has meant that retrieval of
project-related data was quite difficult because of the several waves of
changes in the management and staff of FA (and to a lesser extent the Bank),
this does give the Bank and the borrower the advantage of considerable 'hind-
sight' particularly because in the intervening years another appraisal exercise
was undertaken (1978-79) for the ongoing Second Railway Project\.
8\.02 FA's report on the completion of this project concludes that
despite the fact that the project was not implemented adequately, the Bank's
contribution to the medium term (5 year plan) was positive\. In FA's view
the Bank mission's diagnosis of the railway situation was appropriate and
the measures proposed not only necessary but also possible, given the
indications received from the Argentine Government during appraisal\. The
report further comments that the Bank supervision missions were useful and
the information requirements not particularly burdensome\. It is FA's view
that the project was not implemented because of political and economic problems
that "annulled" the optimistic expectations of the appraisal for recuperation
- 19 -
of the railways and maintained the distortions 1/ in the transport sector that
supported the railways' principal competitor, the highways\. It is further
argued that inasmuch as the Bank's appraisal indicated that the principal
economic benefit of the railway program was based on the avoided investments
in and higher cost of highway transport the Bank's support of road construction 2/
and general neglect of road-pricing issues (which helped the railways' principal
competitor), was in conflict with the objectives of the railway project\. FA's
comment is at least partially valid\. It is significant however that the Bank
has since sought to resolve such conflicts by the assignment of transport
economists on a country sector basis to ensure a more balanced approach to
intermodal issues\. The National Transport Plan (financed under the 4th
Highway Project) is also expected to focus attention on the development of
evenhanded transport policies\.
8\.03 In conclusion FA's report states that collaboration with the
Bank was useful because (i) the plans developed for the rehabilitation of
the system (although inadequately implemented) were basically sound and
have retained their validity in as much as they are being implemented now
(with suitable mutations) as part of the ongoing railway project; (ii) the
financial participation of the Bank (although reduced from $84 million to
$56\.3 million) was valuable because of the long term, low interest rates and
above all the procurement of significant volumes of railway materials at
international prices; and (iii) Bank's involvement tended to orient the
railways "and particularly" the Government towards investment plans consistent
with the rationalization and development of FA\. In fact, in retrospect, this
last factor has been particularly important because the influence of the
Bank does appear to have had some effect in developing a positive attitude
towards the railways which emphasizes the need for pruning and rationalizing
the system as well as support for judicious investments in essential maintenance
and efficiency oriented projects\.
8\.04 The principal question that arises in this analysis however is to
what,extent was the Bank's rather precipitate action in cancelling a part of
the loan in 1974 justified\. It is evident from the files that the cancella-
tion of part of the loan followed a series of measures which were deliberated
within the highest levels of the Bank\. Initially, when it was noted that
the financial position of FA was deteriorating instead of improving, the
Loan Committee came to the conclusion in May 1972 that disbursements should
be suspended\. In August 1972 the targets were renegotiated, but in July 1974
a part of the loan ($27\.5 million out of $84 million) was cancelled and the
closing dated extended to December 1976\. It is clear that the Bank loan
was expected to finance purchase of railway equipment by international bidding
and thus to exert a stabilizing influence on the prices of railway equipment
in Argentina which have traditionally been considerably higher than inter-
national prices\. In fact to the extent the Bank loan was disbursed, it did
finance the purchase of various items such as track and workshop machinery,
spare parts and freight cars at competitive prices, and there is evidence
that this did have a salutary effect (although not for long) on the price
1/ We presume reference here is to such factors as low diesel fuel costs,
relatively high investments in highways, etc\.
2/ There were four Bank loans for highways between 1961 and 1977 ($229
million) of which two ($173 million) between 1971 and 1977\.
- 20 -
levels in the indegenous industry\. The cancellation of a significant portion
of the loan (33%) amounted in effect to the Bank abandoning this project, and
the question that naturally arises is whether it would not have been better
for the Bank to continue to disburse and complete the procurements planned
for the loan\.
8\.05 It is easy to understand the reasons that led to the cancellation
of the loan in 1974 - inadequate government funding for investments, little
or no attention to the implementation of the action programs, and above all
a political and economic climate that showed no signs of improving\. As
a matter of fact the year 1975 following the year of cancellation of the
loan was perhaps the worst year of the project period\. It is also clear
that proceeding with (instead of cancelling) the project would have been
inordinately expensive in Bank manpower in view of the general situation in
Argentina, and perhaps helping FA did not have a high enough priority to
warrant the Bank making such an investment of staff effort at the time\. In
retrospect, however, and given the advantage of hindsight and of the knowledge
of somewhat better succeeding years, it does appear that if the loan had not
been cancelled the project would have received the benefit of closer monitoring
(both by FA and the Bank), and incidentally the procurement of some more badly
needed equipment at internationally competitive prices\. Experience with
railway projects has shown that if any significant changes are to be achieved
in railways' operations and financial condition a long term association with
the Bank perhaps covering a series of carefully planned projects and action
plans is required\. As it turned out, the Bank picked up the threads again in
1976 when a mission was sent to evaluate the position under the new government
regime, which lead to the appraisal of the Second Railway Project in 1978-79\.
IX\. CONCLUSIONS
9\.01 It is clear from an examination of the data furnished by FA as well
as the supervision reports and the Bank file on the subject that the project
failed largely because of the political and economic problems which overtook
the country in the most critical years of its implementation viz 1971-1975\.
It also appears that the management of FA tried as far as it could to main-
tain its relations with the Bank and feels that its association with the
Bank was beneficial even though a significant part of the loan was cancelled\.
It does appear in retrospect however that the Bank's response to the poor
performance under the project was overly stern inasmuch as disbursements were
suspended almost within a year of the loan becoming effective\. An attempt at
accommodation was made when targets were revised a few months later but this
was followed within 2 years by cancellation of one third of the loan\. The
cumulative experience of the railway projects in the Bank indicates that
long term association of the Bank covering several projects is necessary in
order to bring about significant improvements in the financial condition and
operations of railways, suggests (with hindsight) that the objectives of the
project would have been better served if the loan had not been curtailed in
1974 but it could also be argued that Bank efforts to help FA in 1975 and 1976
would not have been effective\.
9\.02 One of the reasons for the overoptimistic financial forecasts appears
to have been that though measures aimed at increasing revenues (primarily
through investments for improving railway operations and increasing tariffs)
- 21 -
were included in the project, there does not appear to have been an analysis
of the railway costs or any concrete steps for reducing costs, which clearly
should have been planned concurrently with measures to increase traffic and
revenues\. Although it is doubtful whether in the political conditions then
prevailing any serious consideration would have been given to cost reductions
(as indeed the experience with staff increases suggests), it is clear that the
project would have been improved by the inclusion of an analysis of and some
concrete measures for reduction of costs\. While such a task would have been
difficult to achieve in one project, it seems unfortunate that no studies to
help define the appropriate dimension of the railway were supported by the
project and the Bank loan\.
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
ARGENTINA - LOAN 733-AR
FIRST RAILWAY PROJECT
Actual and Expected Physical Completion
Percentage of Original
Works Completed by
Units Completed Date of Completion
Expected date
Main Works Units Actual Expected Actual Expected 12/31/72 7/1/74
1\. Track
Complete renewal km 1\.104 950 1976 1972 65 95,8
Improvement km 1\.306 1\.200 1975 1972 48 77,1
Maintenance Equipment,
Workshops, etc\. US$ 41,3 53,2 1980 1972 4,1 6,8
2\. Signalling & Telecom-
munications US$ 22,2 8,5 1978 1972 7,2 17,6
3\. Structures US$ 28,1 28,1 1976 1972 20,3 50,0
4\. Locomotive and Car
Maintenance US$ 61,5 75,2 1977 1972 1,0 6,0
5\. New Locomotives & Cars
Diesel Locomotives GB Number 40 40 1972 1972 100 100
NG " 91 60 1979 1972 66,0 66,0
SG " 40 20 1978 1972 - -
Rail Tractors " - 100 - 1972 - -
Electric Railcars 92 42 1973 1972 0 219
Passenger Cars 215 175 1972 1972 122,0 181,5
Freight Cars:
Boxes " 4,837 4,400 1979 1972 46,0 75,0
Bogies " 8,800 8,800 1974 1972 - 80,0
July 5, 1981
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
ARGENTINA - LOAN 733-AR
FIRST RAILWAY PROJECT
Major Investments - Physical Units
Total
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1971-1975 1976-1980 Total
Track Renewal - Programmed 450 500 600 700 800 3050 -
Actual 368 250 215 155 81 1069 10461/ 331311
Track Improvement - Programmed 500 700 800 900 900 3800 - 11
Actual 322 268 241 208 159 1198 -
Locomotives - Programmed 80 40 40 35 35 230 -
Actual - 80 - - - 80 165 245
Rail Tractors - Programmed 50 50 50 50 - 200 - -
Actual - - - - - 75 75
Electric Cars - Programmed 6 36 33 - - 75 -
Actual - - 92 - - 92 36 128
Passenger Cars - Programmed 105 70 105 175 68 523 - -
Actual 100 115 99 7 64 385 96 481
Freight Cars - Programmed 2200 2200 2000 2000 2000 101400 -
Actual 693 1359 668 1146 1091 4977 3505 8482
1/ Renewal and improvement are combined
Source: Appraisal Report and FA
July 1981
- 24 -
TABLE 2
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
ARGENTINA - LOAN 733-AR
FIRST RAILWAY PROJECT
Actual and Appraisal Estimates of Project Costs
Actual Cost as
1/ Percentage of
Actual Costs- Estimated Costs Estimated Costs
Main Works US$ US$ %
1\. Track 104\.3 83\.3 65
2\. Signalling and Telecom-
munications 14\.33 8\.2 270
3\. Structures 37\.84 28\.1 100
4\. Locomotive and Car
Maintenance 76\.7 75\.2 81
5\. New Locomotives and Cars
Diesel Locomotives 44\.5 36\.0 109
Rail Tractors - 5\.0 -
Electric Coaches 14\.0 4\.7 348
Passenger Cars 25\.7 28\.6 73
Freight Cars:
Boxes 85\.9 41\.5 108
Bogies 85\.9 22\.5 64
6\. Miscellaneous 3\.4 2\.7 155
7\. Total
8\. Contingencies - 32\.2 -
9\. Grand Total 406\.67 368 84
The actual cost figures given in this colum are in constant
US dollars (1970) and are based on the units completed as detailed in Table 1\.
July 5, 1981
- 25 -
TABLE 2A
PROJECT COMPLETIN REPORT
ARGENTINA - LOAN 733-AR
FIRST RAILWAY PROJECT
Planned and Actual - Constant Dollars
(Figures in million of dollars)
1971-72 1971-75
Nos\. Title Planned Actual Planned Actual
1\. Track 83\.3 25\.3 245\.7 68\.0
2\. Signalling and Telecom\. 8\.2 2\.0 21\.6 6\.3
3\. Structures 28\.1 6\.9 65\.5 20\.8
4\. Loco and Car Maintenance 75\.2 11\.3 125\.2 36\.0
5\. New Locos Incl\.Locotractor 41\.0 30\.2 79\.0 30\.2
6\. New Freight Cars 64\.0 26\.0 151\.0 52\.0
7\. New Passenger Cars 33\.3 25\.9 70\.1 54\.3
8\. Miscellaneous 2\.7 - 5\.7 \.1
9\. Contingencies 32\.2 - 75\.2 -
TOTAL 368\.0 128\.0 839\.0 267\.7
Planned and Actual - Physical Units
(1971-1975)
1971-72 1971-1975
Planned Actual Planned Actual Remarks (1971-1975)
Track Renewal 950 618 3050 1069 35%
Track Improvement 1200 590 3800 1198 31%
Total Track 6850 2267 33%
Locomotives 120 80 230 80 34\.7%
Rail Tractors 100 0 200 0 0%
Total Locos 430 80 18\.6%
Freight Cars 4400 2052 10400 5192 49\.9%
Passenger Cars 175 215 523 385 73%
Electric Cars 42 0 75 92 122%
Total Passenger
Cars 217 215 598 477 79\.7%
- 26 -
TABLE 3
Page 1 of 2
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
ARGENTINA - LOAN 733-AR
FIRST RAILWAY PROJECT
Disbursement Schedule (in Millions of Dollars)
Quarterly Cumulative
I Fiscal Year 1971-1972 Actual Original Actual Original
September 30, 1971 - 0,3 - 0,3
December 31, 1971 - 3,1 - 3,4
March 31, 1972 - 3,4 - 6,8
June 30, 1972 - 5,6 - 12,4
II Fiscal Year 1972-1973
September 30, 1972 - 10,3 - 22,7
December 31, 1972 - 13,4 - 36,1
March 31, 1973 - 13,3 - 49,4
June 30, 1973 - 10,5 - 59,9
III Fiscal Year 1973-1974
September 30, 1973 5,6 6,5 5,6 66,4
December 31, 1973 4,1 5,9 9,7 72,3
March 31, 1974 6,0 5,2 15,7 77,5
June 30, 1974 5,1 3,2 20,8 80,7
IV Fiscal Year 1974-1975
September 30, 1974 6,0 2,3 26,8 83,0
December 31, 1974 5,0 1,0 31,8 84,0
March 31, 1975 2,7 34,5
June 30, 1975 1,7 36,2
V Fiscal Year 1975-1976
September 30, 1975 0,7 36,9
December 31, 1975 0,5 37,4
March 31, 1976 3,1 40,5
June 30, 1976 1,9 42,4
VI Fiscal Year 1976-1977
September 30, 1976 5,4 47,8
December 31, 1976 1,3 49,1
March 31, 1977 0,6 49,7
June 30, 1977 0,7 50,4
- 27 -
TABLE 3
Page 2 of 2
Quarterly Cumulative
VII Fiscal Year 1977-1978 Actual Original Actual Original
September 30, 1977 - 50,4
December 31, 1977 2,3 52,7
March 31, 1978 1,3 54,0
June 30, 1978 0,6 54,6
VIII Fiscal Year 1978-1979
September 30, 1978 0,1 54,7
December 31, 1978 0,2 54,9
March 31, 1979 - 54,9
June 30, 1979 0,6 55,5
IX Fiscal Year 1979-1980
September 30, 1979 0,1 55,6
December 31, 1979 0,7 56,3
July 5, 1981
- 28 -
TABLE 3A
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
ARGENTINA - Loan 733-AR
FIRST RAILWAY PROJECT
Disbursements by Category
(in millions of dollars)
Category Title Proposed Utilized
1 Track Civil Works 3\.5
2 Track Material and 1o\.4 8\.69
Equipment
3 Signalling and 3\.3 0\.27
Telecommunications
4 Locomotive and Car 16\.5 4\.50
Rehabilitation
5 Freight Car Bodies 15\.8 18\.30
6 Freight Car Bogies 22\.5 17\.10
7 Unallocated 12\.0 7\.401/
TOTAL 84\.0 56\.26
Freight and Insurance, etc\.
- 29 -
TABLE 4
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
ARGENTINA - LOAN 733-AR
FIRST RAILWAY PROJECT
Projected and Actual Freight Traffic
(in billions of ton-km)
Year With Project-- Without Project!- Actual
1970 13\.4 13\.4 13\.6
1971 14\.1 13\.4 13\.7
1972 14\.9 13\.2 12\.5
1973 15\.3 12\.5 12\.5
1974 15\.9 11\.0 12\.3
1975 16\.3 9\.5 10\.7
1976 16\.8 8\.0 10\.9
1977 17\.3 6\.7 11\.6
1978 18\.0 5\.6 9\.8
1979 18\.0 4\.6 10\.9
1980 18\.0 4\.0 9\.3
1/
Appraisal Traffic Estimates
These figures were used by the appraisal mission for the
economic evaluation\.
Source: Appraisal Report and FA
July 1981
- 30 -
TABLE 4A
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
ARGENTINA - LOAN 733-AR
FIRST RAILWAY PROJECT
Projected and Actual Passenger Traffic
(in billion of pass-km)
Appraisal Estimation
Intercity Service With Project Without Project Actual
1970 5\.1 5\.1 4\.7
1971 5\.3 5\.3 5\.0
1972 5\.6 5\.3 5\.0
1973 5\.8 5\.1 5\.5
1974 6\.0 4\.7 6\.2
1975 6\.2 4\.4 6\.6
1976 6\.2 3\.9 6\.0
1/
1977 6\.3 3\.3 4\.4-
1978 6\.3 2\.5 3\.7
1979 6\.4 2\.0 4\.0
1980 6\.4 1\.4 4\.1
Suburban Service
1970 7\.8 7\.8 8\.0
1971 8\.0 8\.0 7\.8
1972 8\.0 8\.0 7\.3
1973 8\.2 7\.9 7\.1
1974 8\.4 7\.7 7\.7
1975 8\.6 7\.5 8\.0
1976 8\.6 6\.9 8\.2
1977 8\.6 6\.4 8\.1
1978 8\.6 5\.7 7\.8
1979 8\.6 5\.2 8\.0
1980 8\.6 4\.4 8\.5
1/ After elimination of uneconomic services\.
Source: Appraisal Report and FA
July 1981
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
ARGENTINA - LOAN 733-AR
FIRST RAILWAY PROJECT
Selected Operating Statistics (1971-79)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
SYSTEM
Length (kms) 39\.300 39\.800 39\.800 39\.800 39\.800 39\.800 39\.800 38\.000 34\.400 34\.300
Staff (thousands) 145 143 140 142 141 149 155 124 111 106
TRAFFIC 6
Number of passengers, total (10 ) 44o 435 406 391 423 437 448 41o 380 377
Passengers, Suburban 106) 413 409 386 363 393 4o5 413 390 367 366
Passengers, Other (100) 6 27 26 20 28 30 32 35 20 13 11
Passengers Kms, total (10 ) 12\.700 12\.800 12\.500 12\.840 14\.110 14\.370 14\.610 13\.000 11\.560 12 028
Passengers, Suburban 19,2 19,1 19,4 20,0 20,0 19,0 19,6 19,5 21,1 21,9
Passengers, General 177,5 192 250 204 214 202 186 270 291 371
Freight 6 616,6 638 683 658 644 656 652 590 577 573
Net Freight Tons (10 ) 6 25,7 21,5 18,3 19,1 19,1 16,3 17,2 20,1 17,1 19,1
Tons kms Commercial (10 ) 13\.640 13\.700 12\.500 12\.500 12\.300 10\.700 10\.900 11\.577 9\.870 10\.947
Average Haul (kms) 6 616 638 683 658 644 656 652 590 577 573
Total Gross Tons km 10 ) 52\.800 51\.600 50\.300 48\.800 47\.100 45\.000 43 900 42\.220 37\.556 39\.318
Wagon kms loaded (10 ) 633 608 570 538 502 448 431 451 372 395 t
Wagon kms empty (10) 364 352 462 337 313 279 286 312 285 310
TRAFFIC DENSITY
Passengers km/Route km (10 ) 318 321 316 323 354 362 367 349 337 351
Freight net tons/route km 342 343 314 314 310 283 273 299 287 319
OPERATIONS 6
Passenger Train kms ( o ) 64,7 61,5 61,2 61,9 62,8 62,2 65,9 53,0 47,2 41,8
Freight Train kms ( 00) 39,0 37,1 38,1 35,6 31,4 38,9 29,8 30,0 38,5 31,4
Total Train kms (10b) 6 112,7 98,6 99,3 97,5 94,2 91,1 95,7 83,0 75,7 73,2
Steam Locomotives, kms (10 )6 35,2 28,4 21,9 18,9 16,4 17,3 14,4 7,3 2,9
Diesel Locomotivies, kms (10 85,1 86,4 87,4 87,6 84,1 82,9 75,4 72,8 76,1
Electric Coaches, kms (lob) 55,1 56,7 60,9 57,9 61,3 64,o 56,3 54,9 53,0
EFFICIENCY OF FREIGHT OPERATIONS
Ton kms/Gross Train kms 1\.354 1\.391 1\.320 1\.371 1\.500 1\.557 1\.473 1\.407 1\.318 1 252
Ton kms/Net Train kms 363 369 328 351 392 370 297 385 346 349
Ton kms/Net loaded wagon kms 22\.949 22\.533 21\.930 23\.234 24\.502 23\.884 25\.290 25\.277 26\.532 27\.714
Wagon Turnaround (days) 16,3 16,8 18,7 19,3 19,4 20,8 20,0 20,0 22,0 23,6
Average Speed (km/h) 24,1 24,0 25,5 25,7 24,7 24,7 22,8 24,3 25,5 26,1
Traffic units per employee (10 ) 188 185 179 178 167 169 162 207 197 220
AVAILABILITY
Steam locomotives (%) 59,7 55,0 53,8 53,1 50,8 47,8 49,1 52,5 65,7 56,7
Diesel locomotives (M) 60,4 63,8 63,8 65,4 59,5 56,4 55,8 62,9 66,4 70,3
Electric coaches (%) 69,7 73,1 68,3 69,6 71,9 70,5 77,2 75,0 71,2 75,7
Freight cars () 75,9 75,8 75,9 76,9 71,0 68,7 71,9 72,5 77,7 74,6 ,
Passenger Coaches (%) 74,8 72,5 70,3 70,0 72,9 71,5 71,4 70,7 68,4 76,9
July 5, 1981
PROJECT OMPLETION REPORT
ARGENTINA: First Rawilway Project (Loan 733-AR)
Actual and Projected Income Statement for 1970-1975
($a millions)
OPERATING REVENUE 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Actual Forecast Actual Forecast Actual Forecast Actual Forecast Actual Forecast Actual
Freight 450 550 519 578 479 609 545 642 558 675 379
Parcels 39 20 - 20 - 20 - 20 - 20 -
Passengers - Suburban 165 216 212 243 190 292 205 300 220 307 180
- General 186 202 210 226 189 252 200 289 211 298 162
Miscellaneous 35 37 69 38 59 40 53 42 60 42 45
Mail 48 35 - 35 - 35 - 35 - 35 -
State Reimbursements 47 18 - 22 - 24 - 28 - 32 -
TOTAL OPERATING REVENUE 970 1,078 1,010 1,167 918 1,272 1,003 1,356 1,049 1,409 766
OPERATING EXPENSES
Personnel 902 1,086 1,377 1,102 1,144 1,117 1,365 1,119 1,546 1,120 1,683
Materials 145 140 217 144 125 149 117 153 116 157 122
Fuel and Power 90 109 111 94 93 89 122 81 148 77 109
Miscellaneoup 42 45 60 45 40 45 45 45 60 45 50
Contractorsj' 26 35 46 38 34 28 35 24 45 20 46
1,205 1,415 1,810 1,417 1,436 1,428 1,684 1,422 1,915 1,419 2,009
Less Investment Overheads - 59 - 59 - 54 - 50 - 46 -
TOTAL WORKING EXPENSES 1,205 1,356 1,810 1,358 1,436 1,374 1,684 1,372 1,915 1,373 2,009
Depreciation 200 225 208 231 215 237 140 243 112 247 36
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES 1,405 1,581 2,018 1,589 1,651 1,611 1,824 1,615 2,027 1,620 2,046
NET RECEIPTS (LOSS) FROM OPERATIONS (235) (278) (800) (191) (518) (102) (680) (16) (867) 36 (1,244)
NET OPERATING LOSS 435 503 (1,008) 122 (733) 339 (820) 259 (979) 211 (1,280)
Interest Charges 24 64 10 85 145 88 84 101 120 111 37
NET DEFICIT 459 567 (1,g18) 507 (878) 427 (904) 360 (1,099) 322 (1,317)
Working Ratio 124 126 179 117 156 108 168 101 183 98 262
Operating Ratio 145 147 199 136 180 127 182 119 193 115 267
Source - FA
I Covers consultants and contractors for cleaning coaches, offices, stations, etc\.
2/
Actual figures are in constant pesos
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
ARGENTINA - First Railway Project (Loan 733-AR)
1/
Actual- and Projected Balance Sheets for 1971-1975
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Factual Actual Factual Actual Factual Actual Factual Actual Factual Actual
Assets
1\. Fixed Assets:
Gross Value 7,000 3,167 7,600 19,282 8,100 12,880 8,600 10,468 9,000 3,596
Less: Accrued Depreciation 4,500 354 4,600 215 4,700 277 4,800 318 4,900 131
Net Fixed Assets 2,500 2,813 3,000 19,067 3,400 12,603 3,800 10,150 4,100 3,465
2\. Current Assets 700 1,327 730 1,239 750 1,196 770 1,680 770 1,182
Total Assets 3,200 4,140 3,730 20,306 4,150 13,799 4,570 11,829 4,870 4,647
Liabilities
1\. Equity 1,905 973 2,190 17,462 2,345 11,389 2,535 8,728 2,655 1,870
2\. Long Term Debt 945 2,819 1,190 2,031 1,455 1,703 1,685 2,147 1,865 1,398
3\. Current Liabilities 350 861 350 813 350 707 350 954 350 1,379
Total Liabilities 3,200 4,140 3,730 20,306 4,150 13,799 4,570 11,829 4,870 4,647
Current Ratio 2\.0 2\.5 1\.5 2\.1 1\.7 2\.2 1\.8 2\.1 1\.2
Debt/Equity Ratio 33/67 35/65 10/90 38/62 9/91 40/60 20/80 41/59 43/57
Source - FA
1 Actual figures are presented in constant pesos\.
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
ARGENTINA: FIRST RAILWAY PROJECT (Loan 733-AR)
Actual and Appraisal Expectation of Project Financing
, ocal Currency Foreign Currency
Actual:-' Anticipated Actual Anticipated
Million Pesos % Million Pesos % Million US$ % Million US$ %
Government 868\.5 100 419\.6 54 100\.1 52 54\.4 32
World Bank - - 56\.3 29 84\.0 48
Other - 362\.8 46 35\.0 18 34\.0 20
TOTAL 868\.5 100 782\.4 100 191\.4 100 172\.4 100
Actual figures are presented in constant 1971 pesos\.
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
ARGENTINA - LOAN 733-AR
FIRST RAILWAY PROJECT
Economic Reevaluation
Traffic (in billion unite) Costs/Benefits (in millions of 1980A$)
Actual/
Year Projected with Without Operating Savings
Project Project Investment Freight Passenger for Non-Diverted Net
Ton-Km Pas\.-km Ton-km Pas\.Km Cost SavingsY1 Savingal/ Traffic Benefits
1971 13\.7 12\.8 13\.7 12\.8 186\.5 - - 3\.2 (183\.3)
1972 12\.5 12\.3 12\.5 12\.3 306\.6 - - 2\.4 (304\.2)
1973 12\.5 12\.6 12\.5 12\.6 244\.9 - - 2\.1 (242\.8)
1974 12\.1 13\.9 11\.0 12\.4 103\.8 46\.2 36\.0 1\.7 ( 19\.9)
1975 10\.5 14\.6 9\.5 11\.9 192\.2 42\.0 64\.8 1\.1 ( 84\.3)
1976 10\.9 14\.2 8\.0 10\.8 266\.8 121\.8 81\.6 2\.2 ( 61\.2)
1977 11\.5 12\.5 6\.7 9\.7 226\.2 201\.6 74\.4 0\.9 50\.7
1978 9\.7 11\.5 5\.6 8\.2 336\.0 172\.2 79\.2 1\.0 ( 83\.6)
1979 10\.7 12\.0 4\.6 7\.2 368\.8 256\.2 115\.2 1\.2 3\.8
1980 9\.3 12\.6 4\.0 5\.8 340\.4 222\.6 163\.2 1\.8 47\.2
1981 10\.0 12\.7 4\.0 5\.8 485\.3 252\.0 165\.6 1\.8 ( 65\.9)
1982 10\.9 13\.2 4\.0 5\.0 485\.3 278\.9 181\.7 3\.0 ( 21\.7)
1983 11\.8 13\.8 4\.0 5\.0 485\.3 308\.6 199\.4 3\.0 25\.7
1984 12\.9 14\.4 4\.0 5\.0 485\.3 341\.6 218\.7 3\.0 78\.0
1985 14\.0 15\.0 4\.0 5\.0 485\.3 378\.0 240\.0 3\.0 135\.7
1986-2000 14\.0 15\.0 4\.0 5\.0 370\.6 462\.0 240\.0 3\.0 334\.4
ECONOMIC RATE OF RETURN = 10%
1/ Average savings per unit of traffic in 1970 US$ is estimated at US$0\.011/ton-km and US$0\.006/pass-km\.
Source; FA and Bank Staff
July 1981\.
----e B R A AZ i L -
B O L I V I A \.- ) ARA AV
-<ceARGENTINA
NARGENTINE RAILWAYS
P\.-
¼ FmLlrrnrjL ''\.lRUUAY
Rc Il
P CARRAIGEUTAEY
JUAJUY
QZo
T--JA\.+ B R A Z l,A
FS B-1bcd\.r
c,C 5-5-
R l p GpAt N-ch, AAP--r- , P7 ih - cis)
\-b\.,al P-SA-0AS , 97
31- S~ANbrd LU ANTRIAGUOY34
--EL- ESTERO FPrro lestoscws
\.20~~G\.d TAgscAasy 0
K- ETR ,, Km10 3
-+S 5, FriesG
hNbEhUK3GTUaEN A Z
16* ~ ~ ~ 64 WV~Z
Cabalar Rereo K 3S1' | APPROVAL |
P003789 | Document of
T, The World Bank
g \ IR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FILE C0OPY
Report No\. 2673ja-IND
INDONESIA
FOURTEENTH IRRIGATION PROJECT
STAFF APPRAISAL REPORT
February 12, 1980
Projects Department
East Asia and Pacific Regional Office
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS /a
US$1\.00 = Rupiahs (Rp) 625
Rp 100 = US$0\.16
Rp 1 million = US$1,600
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES - METRIC SYSTEM
1 millimeter (mm) - 0\.039 inches
1 meter (m) - 39\.37 inches
1 kilometer (km) - 0\.62 miles
1 square kilometer (sq m) - 0\.386 square miles
1 hectare (ha) - 2\.47 acres
I cubic meter (cu m) - 35\.31 cubic feet
1 million cubic meters (MCM) - 811 acre feet
1 liter (1) - 0\.264 gallons (USA)
1 liter/second (1/sec) - 0\.35 cubic feet per second
1 kilogram (kg) - 2\.2 pounds
I metric ton (ton) - 2,205 pounds
CONVERSION FACTORS FOR RICE
1 ton paddy (gabah) = 630 kg milled rice
INDONESIA FISCAL YEAR
April 1 - March 31
PREVIOUS IRRIGATION PROJECTS
Project No\. Ln\./Cr\. No\. Year approved Ln\./Cr\. Amount
US$ million
I Cr\. 127-IND 1968 5\.0
II Cr\. 195-IND 1970 18\.5
III Cr\. 220-IND 1970 14\.5
IV Cr\. 289-IND 1972 12\.5
V Cr\. 514-IND 1974 30\.0
VI Ln\. 1100-IND 1975 65\.0
VII Ln\. 1268-IND 1976 33\.0
VIII Ln\. 1434-IND 1977 63\.0
IX Ln\. 1435-IND 1977 35\.0
X Ln\. 1578-IND 1978 140\.0
XI Ln\. 1579-IND 1978 31\.0
XII Ln\. 1645-IND 1978 77\.0
XIII Ln\. 1691-IND 1979 50\.0
FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY
ABBREVIATIONS
BIMAS - Bimbingan Massal Swa Sembada Bahan Makanan "Mass Guidance
for Self-Sufficiency in Foodstuffs" - a farm input credit
program
BRI - Bank Rakyat Indonesia - People's Bank of Indonesia
BULOG/DOLOG - Badan Urusan Logistik - "National Logistics Body"
- rice procurement agency/Depo Logistik - provincial
branch of BULOG
BUUD/KUD - Badan Usaha Unit Desa - Forerunner of KUD as Village Unit
Cooperative
DGWRD - Directorate-General of Water Resources Development
DGFC - Directorate-General of Food Crops
DIP - Project Implementation Budget
GOI - Government of Indonesia
HYV - High-Yielding Variety
INMAS - Intensifikasi Massal - "Massive Intensification"
- a farm input programs
INPRES - Instruksi Presiden - "Presidential Instruction"
- a complex of rural public works programs
IPEDA - Iuran Pembangunan Daerah - Land Tax
NFCE - National Food Crops Extension Project
O&M - Operation and Maintenance
PIBD - Badan Pelaksana Proyek Induk Irigasi Dengan Bantuan Bank
Dunia, "Executive Body for Major Irrigation Projects Wlith
World Bank Assistance"
PROSIDA - Proyek Irigasi IDA - a special project executive body of
DGWRD created to execute IDA-assisted projects
Paddy - Unhusked Rice
Secondary Crops - Nonrice sta'ple food crops\.
Major ones are maize, soybean, groundnut, vegetables and
tub ers
Ulu-ulu - Water master
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
INDONESIA: APPRAISAL OF THE
FOURTEENTH IRRIGATION PROJECT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No\.
1\. PROJECT AND SECTOR BACKGROUND \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 1
Project Background\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 1
Sector Objectives \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 1
Role and Performance\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 2
Food Crops \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 2
Tree Crops \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 3
Area Development and Transmigration \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 4
Role of Government \. \. \. \. \. \. 4
Bank Lending Strategy \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 5
The Irrigation Subsector \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 6
2\. THE PROJECT AREAS \. \. 9
Location \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 9
Climate \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 9
Soils, Topography and Drainage \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 9
Population, Farm Size and Land Tenure \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 9
Agricultural Support Program \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 10
Existing Works \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 11
Works Completed with Previous Bank Group Assistance \. \. 15
Project Formulation \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 16
3\. THE PROJECT \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 18
Project Description \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 18
Project Works \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 18
Basis for Design of Serang River Drainage and Flood
Protection \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 19
Water Supply, Demand and Quality for Irrigation
Components \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.2\. \. \. \. \. \. 0
Status of Engineering \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 21
Implementation Schedules \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 21
Cost Estimates \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 21
Financing \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 23
Procurement \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 25
Disbursements \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 26
Accounts and Audits \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 26
Environmental Effects \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 26
4\. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 27
Project Management \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 27
Consultants and Training \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 27
Agricultural Support Services \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 29
- ii
Page No\.
Operation and Mainl:enance \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 29
Monitoring \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 30
5\. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 31
Serang River Drainage and Flood Protection \. \. \. \. \. \. 31
Madiun Irrigation Rehabilitation Stage II \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 33
Pemali-Comal and Pekalen-Sampean Tertiary Irrigation
Systems\. \. \. \. 34
Drying, Storage ane Processing \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 34
6\. MARKET PROSPECTS, PRICES, FARM INCOMES AND PROJECT
CHARGES \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 34
Market Prospects \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 34
Prices \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 35
Farm Incomes \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 37
Project Charges \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 37
7\. BENEFITS, JUSTIFICATION AND RISKS \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 43
Main Assumptions Used in Economic Analysis \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 43
Economic Rates of Return\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 45
Sensitivity Analysis\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 45
8\. AGREEMENTS REACHED AND RECOMMENDATION \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 49
LIST OF TABLES IN THE MAIN REPORT
2\.1 Agricultural Land in Serang Subproject \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 14
2\.2 Tertiary Development in Pemali-Comal and Pekalen-Sampean 17
3\.1 Project Cost Summary\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 22
3\.2 Project Financing \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 24
4\.1 Consulting Services \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 28
5\.1 Cropping Patterns, Yields and Production \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 32
6\.1 Price Structure for Food Crops and Fertilizers \. \. \. \. \. 36
6\.2 Input and Output Price Summary \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 38
6\.3 Summary of Farm Incomes \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 39
6\.4 Project Charges Averaged Over Project Areas \.40
6\.5 Cost and Rent Recovery Indices\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 42
7\.1 Economic Costs\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 44
7\.2 Economic Costs and Benefits \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 46
7\.3 Sensitivity Analysis\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 48
- iii -
ANNEXES
1\. Cost Estimate, Expenditures, Disbursements,
Allocation of Loan Proceeds, List of Vehicles and
Equipment, Work Quantities and Unit Prices, Consulting
Services, Breakdown of Cost Estimates by Credit
Category \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 51
2\. Crop and Farm Budgets, Rent Recovery, Crop Production
Costs, Economic Benefits per Hectare \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 59
3\. Schedule of Early Events \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 73
4\. O&M Funds for Bank-Assisted Irrigation Projects\. \. \. \. \. \. 74
5\. Statements of Expenditure \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 75
6\. Related Documents and Data Available in Project File:\. \. \. 76
LIST OF FIGURES
2\.1 Serang River System (Schematic) (14616)
3\.1 Implementation Schedule (20752)
4\.1 DGWRD Organization (18765)
4\.2 PROSIDA Management Organization (16008)
4\.3 PROSIDA Field Organization (8964)
5\.1 Proposed Cropping Calendars (20726)
LIST OF MAPS
IBRD 13783R- Project Areas and Previously Bank-Assisted
Irrigation Project Areas
IBRD 14508 - Serang River Drainage and Flood Protection Subproject
IBRD 14509 - Madiun Irrigation Systems Rehabilitation Subproject
IBRD 14510 - Tertiary Irrigation Systems Subproject - Pemali Comal
IBRD 14511 - Tertiary Irrigation Systems Subproject - Pekalen Sampean
INDONESIA
IRRIGATION PROJECT XIV
1\. PROJECT AND SECTOR BACKGROUND
Project Background
1\.01 The Government of Indonesia has requested Bank assistance for the
construction of drainage and flood protection works to serve about 61,000 ha
of farm lands adjacent to the Serang River in Central Java; for the
rehabilitation of irrigation systems serving some 65,000 ha in the Madiun
Valley in Central Java and for engineering design for rehabilitating four
small dams and for constructing two dams in the Madiun Valley; for the
construction of tertiary irrigation canals and structures serving about
50,000 ha in Pemali-Comal, Central Java, and about 70,000 ha in Pekalen-
Sampean in East Java; for engineering design of about 105,000 ha tertiary
systems in Pemali-Comal and Pekalen-Sampean; for the engineering design for
rehabilitation and upgrading of the 20,000 ha Senkareng-Pemali Atas irriga-
tion area; and for construction of about 1,000 additional O&M houses in
nine major irrigation areas\.
1\.02 The Serang subproject was prepared by the Directorate of Planning
and Programming of the Directorate General of Water Resources Development
(DGWRD) assisted by local consultants (P\.T\. Sangkuriang, P\.T\. Nusa, and
the University of Semarang) and by foreign consultants (NEDECO, Netherlands)
funded by the Netherlands' Government, and SMEC and associates (Australia)
funded by the Bank Group under Irrigation Project VII\./1 Feasibility
studies for the Madiun subproject were completed by PROSIDA, an executive
body of DGWRD, with foreign consultant assistant (Electroconsult, Italy and
Nippon Koei, Japan)\. The Tertiary Systems subproject was prepared by
PROSIDA\. This report is based on the findings of an appraisal mission
composed of Messrs\. R\. Hewson, P\. Momal, T\. Dwyer, A\. Banerjee (Bank) and
P\.G\. Herklots (consultant) which visited Indonesia in June 1979\.
Sector Objectives
1\.03 The Government's major objectives for the agricultural and rural
sector are to: (a) create productive employment to raise the incomes of the
rural poor; (b) increase domestic food supply to keep pace with rising
demand; (c) expand agricultural exports, particularly of smallholder
tree crops; and (d) ensure productive, sustainable use of Indonesia's land,
water and other natural resources\.
/1 A summary of previous Bank Group-assisted irrigation projects appears
in the frontispiece to this report\.
-2
Role and Performance
1\.04 Despite a 4% average annual growth of production, agriculture's
share of GDP has declined from 40% to 30% since 1968, while its share of
exports dropped from 45% to 33% due mainly to the markedly increased value
of oil exports\. Nevertheless, the agricultural and rural sector remains of
overwhelming importance to the great majority of Indonesians; nearly 80% of
the population lives in rural areas, and agriculture is the major source of
income for about two-thirds of rural households and one-tenth of urban
households\. Some 15\.6 million smallholder families produce subsistence and
cash crops on 15\.8 million ha, while 1,800 estates occupying 2\.2 million ha
produce mainly rubber, sugar, tea, palm oil, and tobacco\.
1\.05 Employment\. Agriculture's share of total employment decreased
from 69% in 1961 to 64% in September 1971, while in 1976 it ranged between
66% in March and 60% in October\./l Nevertheless, agriculture remained by
far the largest single source (with 46%) of new employment during 1971-76\.
Outside Java, employment prospects in agriculture appear quite promising,
given the sustained increases in the smallholder area, due to land and
irrigation development, including that under publicly sponsored and
spontaneous transmigration\. In Java, rehabilitation of irrigation systems,
which generated significant employment in the last decade, should continue
to provide additional construction and farm work\.
Food Crops
1\.06 Production Growth\. Given its limited manpower and financial
resources, GOI has concentrated on increasing the production of rice, the
preferred staple food of the great majority of Indonesians\. Rice production
increased rapidly (4\.5% p\.a\.) between 1968 and 1974, chiefly due to irri-
gation rehabilitation and the provision to irrigated rice growers of fer-
tilizer and high-yielding variety seed, financed largely through the BIMAS
credit program\. The growth rate slowed markedly to 1\.7% p\.a\. over 1974-77,
in the wake of severe declines in fertilizer usage (due to restrictions on
private sector fertilizer trade), successive seasons of untimely rainfall,
and unprecedented attacks by pests and diseases, principally the brown plant
hopper and associated viruses\. In 1978, a record rice harvest was achieved,
with better weather, improved and liberalized fertilizer distribution, and
nationwide Government distribution of recently-introduced pest resistant
varieties\. Over the past decade, output of secondary food crops (maize,
cassava, soybeans, peanuts, and sweet potatoes) grew more slowly, at an
average of only 1\.6% p\.a\., composed of a 1\.1% p\.a\. average decline in area
(much of this land shifting to irrigated rice) and a 2\.7% p\.a\. increase in
yield\.
/1 In 1976, shares were 63% in March and 57% in October in Java, and 72%
and 66%, respectively, elsewhere\. The total drop in agricultural
employment from March to October was 6\.7 million\. Precise estimation is
difficult due to the surveys' shifting definitions and seasonal timing\.
- 3 -
1\.07 Demand-Supply Balance\. These gains in food output did not keep
pace with the 3\.5-4\.0% p\.a\. increase in demand due to rising population and
incomes\. Indonesia became the world's largest rice importer, with a record
import of 2\.3 million tons in 1977, and about 1\.3 million tons in 1978\.
Simultaneously, wheat imports rose to 1\.4 million tons in 1978, cassava
exports nearly disappeared, and soybean, maize, and coconut oil imports
began to grow\. The "Indonesia Supply Prospects for Major Food Crops"
(Report No\. 2374-IND of March 3, 1979) concluded that even with expanded
irrigation, and improved technology, extension, credit and marketing, food
production growth would not exceed 3\.5% p\.a\., leaving a basic food deficit
up to at least 1990, with a rice deficit alone of 2-3 million tons\.
1\.08 Future Strategy\. To keep rice imports at some reasonable fraction
of the world rice trade, and to prevent a widening food production-consumption
gap, productivity and area of both rice and secondary food crops must be
increased\. In Java, rice-cropping intensity could be raised through water
storage projects and by exploiting groundwater Rice yields and cropping
intensity can also be increased by constructing tertiary irrigation and
drainage systems, and improving support services\. In the Other Islands
there is potential for new irrigation systems, including tidal and swamp
land development\. Despite the scarcity of high-yielding tropical varieties
of secondary food crops, yields of existing varieties could be increased
substantially by improved husbandry, including use of fertilizer and
insecticides\. GOI is just beginning to give serious attention to marketing,
credit, seeds and research aimed at varietal improvement for secondary
crops\.
Tree Crops
1\.09 Tree crops occupy about a third of total cropped land (coconuts
and rubber account for 80% of this), and generate almost half of total
non-oil export revenue\. Smallholders cultivate 80% of the rubber area and
virtually all coconuts, coffee, cloves and pepper, whereas tea and oil palm
are grown primarily on estates\. Despite recent higher world prices for
Indonesia's major tree crop projects, only oil palm has shown sustained
large increases in production, due to investment programs by Government and
private estates\. With the long immaturity of tree crops, static production
levels are a symptom of past low prices and neglect, especially inadequate
research and extension, and failure to replant with higher-yielding
varieties\.
1\.10 Smallholder Development\. Efforts to revitalize the smallholder
tree crop sector are commencing on several fronts\. One new approach, which
is being supported by three Bank-financed Nucleus Estates and Smallholders
(NES) projects, is for Government estates to plant and maintain rubber and
oil palm on previously undeveloped land for three years, using farmers
selected to be settlers (including local landless families and trans-
migrants) as employees, and thereafter to supply the settlers with inputs,
extension, and processing facilities\. Other new plantings of tree crops are
-4-
being included in transmigration projects\. While the NES approach has been
mainly for new settlers, GOI has also initiated national programs to assist
geographically concentrated groups of existing smallholders to plant rubber
or coconuts themselves, with fairly intensive support from Project Management
Units (FMUs)\. Efforts to design a low-cost system of tree crop planting
with minimal demands on management are also starting\. Given the vast area
of overaged and lowyielding smallholder rubber and coconuts (smallholder
rubber yields are half those in Malaysia), the good market prospects for
these crops, and the Other Islands' land availability and natural comparative
advantage in them, rapid expansion of smallholder tree crops, using all
suitable approaches, is a high priority\. As these programs will place a heavy
demand on technical and managerial personnel, major staff recruitment and
training efforts will be required\.
Area Development and Transmigration
1\.11 Java\. In 1978, about 85 million people lived in Java, at a density
approaching 650/sq km\. The island, with 7% of Indonesia's land area, has
45% of the cropped area and 63% of the population\. Java generally has
higher fertility and better infrastructure than the Other Islands; however,
its cultivable land is almost fully utilized, and in some higher watersheds
cultivation already exceeds ecologically safe limits, contributing to
increasing erosion, downstream flooding, and siltation of ports, dams, and
irrigation canals\. GOI is preparing watershed development and integrated
development projects to address this problem\.
1\.12 Other Islands\. The primary program for new area development in
the Other Islands, as well as for creating employment and settlement nuclei
for Javanese migrants, is transmigration\. An organized transmigration program
is important for regional and natural resource development in the Other
Islands, production of food and export crops, and creation of employment and
decent living conditions for landless Javanese\. Unfortunately, this program
has long been hampered by unrealistic expectations of its potential for
resolving Java's population problems and for stimulating large-scale
regional development, by overly ambitious targets, and by weak, uncoor-
dinated implementation\. Confronted by management problems, GOI reorganized
the program in preparation for Repelita III, by transferring implementation
responsibility from the Directorate General of Transmigration to the line
agencies normally responsible for each sector\. This measure needs to be
complemented by continued attention to technical and policy issues including
(a) the suitability of the land for food crops, (b) the role of tree crops
and livestock, (c) appropriate target incomes and farm sizes, (d) the extent
of Government financial, marketing and other services to settlers, and
(e) the role of spontaneous migration\. The Second Transmigration Project
(Loan 1707-IND and Credit 919-IND) is expected to address these issues\.
Role of Government
1\.13 While the private sector should be encouraged to expand its role
in agricultural input supply, marketing, and processing, Government
-5-
bears the major responsibility for infrastructure, resource conservation,
and other services\. Despite marked improvements over the past decade, overly
centralized procedures, weak regional planning, and technical and managerial
manpower constraints have impeded agricultural and rural development
planning and implementation\. GOIT's concern for area development has also
increased the need to strengthen provincial and local planning capabilities\.
Future programs responsive to GOI's stated objectives will necessarily be
complex, requiring closely coordinated programs of agricultural research,
extension, input supply, credit, land development, transport, pricing policies
and marketing\. GOI must therefore continue to strengthen its key rural
development institutions, particularly through the education, recruitment,
training and retention of technical manpower\.
Bank Lending Strategy
1\.14 GOI and the Bank generally agree on overall objectives and strate-
gies for the rural sector\. While views sometimes differ on the relative
emphasis to be given to different investments, and on the technical design of
some projects, such differences are not impeding Bank Group operations
generally and are usually resolved by further analysis and dialogue\.
1\.15 Projects\. Since the first of 13 irrigation projects was approved
in 1968, the Bank Group's agricultural lending has rapidly expanded to
include estate and smallholder tree crops, fertilizer production and
distribution, sugar, livestock, fisheries, research, extension, training,
seeds, transmigration, and resource survey and mapping\. The Operations
Evaluation Department's Sector Operations Review of Bank Group agricultural
lending in Indonesia (Report No\. 2166, dated August 9, 1978) concluded that
despite deficiencies in some projects, the Bank's portfolio in Indonesian
agriculture was "of overall good quality and likely to contribute
substantially to increased production\." Within the context of GOI's
agricultural strategy, future Bank lending is expected to focus on:
(a) a diversified irrigation, flood protection, drainage and swamp
reclamation program to intensify rice cropping on Java and to
extend water management to the Other Islands;
(b) production of secondary crops, including second phase projects
for agricultural research, extension and seeds;
(c) smallholder tree crop planting programs; and
(d) area development projects aimed at (a) watershed management to
conserve soil and ensure long-term productivity in the densely
populated areas of Java, (b) integrated rural development of poor
areas on Java, and (c) transmigration\.
1\.16 Sector Work\. These projects have been and will continue to be
complemented by extensive sector work\. Analyses of employment and income
distribution, irrigation, agricultural support services, and food crop
production have improved the Bank's understanding of the sector's needs and
of GOI's policies\. Reviews of the rubber subsector, the transmigration
program, secondary food crops\. land tenure systems, and the supply and
requirements of technical and managerial manpower for agriculture are now
underway\.
The Irrigation Subsector\.
1\.17 Although annual rainfall is normally in the range of 1,500 mm to
3,000 mm, its distribution from year to year is unpredictable and even
during the main wet season there are frequently periods when rain is
inadequate for initial stages of plant growth such as post germination,
tillering or flowering\. Excessive rainfall causing flooding is equally
common and crop losses in early growth and at harvesting are significant\.
Irrigation and drainage are essential, therefore, and are equally important
in controlling weeds and facilitating land preparation - both major
drawbacks with rainfed farming\.
1\.18 Rice is the dominant irrigated crop in Indonesia, accounting for
about 60% of the area of all major food crops harvested\. In 1978 there were
some 8\.9 million ha of rice harvested, of which about 7\.7 million ha were
irrigated or grown in rainfed paddy fields which provide almost 95% of total
rice production\. Irrigation systems serve an estimated 5\.0 million hectares
of land, of which only 2\.1 million hectares have technical irrigation\./l
1\.19 Irrigation development is the responsibility of the Directorate
General of Water Resources Development (DGWRD), which is within the Ministry
of Public Works\. The DGWRD uses the facilities of Provincial Public Works
Offices and in addition frequently retains contractors and consultants to
carry out its work\. It is organized along functional lines in six Direct-
orates (e\.g\., the Directorates of Irrigation, Rivers and Swamps) and has
about 1,200 professional engineering staff\.
/1 The four classifications used are "technical", "semi-technical", "simple"
and "village"\. Technical systems have a water supply system separate
from the drainage system and the volume of incoming water can be measured
at several delivery points\. Semi technical systems have fewer permanent
structures, have only one water measuring device (usually at the major
intake) and the supply and drainage systems are not always separate\.
Simple systems have no measurement devices and have common irrigation/
drainage facilities\. All those are controlled by the Ministry of Public
Works\. The remaining "village" systems are constructed, operated and
managed directly by village authorities, usually without professional
engineering advice\.
-7-
1\.20 In addition to the six Directorates which carry out the regular
DGWRD development program, five special executive bodies /1 have been
established to execute specific development tasks which are funded from
GOI's development budget, frequently with foreign assistance\.
1\.21 The Bank Group has now made 13 loans or credits for irrigation,
drainage and flood control in Indonesia (totaling US$574\.5 million), concen-
trating first on the most urgent rehabilitation of existing works and upgrad-
ing of operation and maintenance services and later on improving and expand-
ing irrigation systems and constructing tertiary systems to increase
irrigation efficiency\. The first three projects have been completed, and
a project performance audit has been prepared for the first (PPAR dated
February 13, 1978 on Credit 127-IND)\. Performance audits are under
preparation for the Second and Third Irrigation Projects\. Conclusions of
the PPAR for the First Irrigation Project were that food crop production
increases and economic returns exceeded expectations, and that the
project was an outstanding example of institution building\.
1\.22 The rehabilitation of about half of the major irrigation systems
(which cover 2\.1 million ha in Java) has been completed or is under way, but
poor drainage, inadequate flood protection and rural roads in many of Java's
irrigation systems continue to depress cropping intensities and yields and
hamper the flow of extension services, agricultural products and inputs\.
Recent cultivation and deforestation of the catcbments of rivers serving
irrigation systems is accelerating soil erosion, resulting in serious
downstream sedimentation and siltation problems\. Additional work on the major
irrigation systems is warranted, and the rather limited potential for
reservoirs and groundwater to expand dry season cropping should be developed
as far as practical\. New gravity irrigation systems and swamp and tidal land
development mostly outside Java offer prospects for increasing rice
production, although short-term economic returns on such investments are
likely to be lower than for rehabilitation of irrigation systems or for
tertiary irrigation construction in Java\.
1\.23 When the Bank Group became involved in Indonesia's irrigation
subsector in 1968, the existing institutional capacity could not, unaided,
have supported the very significant accomplishments in irrigation
rehabilitation and construction over the past few years\. In the course of
project work, the Bank Group has played an important supporting role in not
only improving the engineering and management capacity of DGWRD by providing
foreign and local consulting services and training, but also in strength-
ening the capacity of operation and maintenance (O&M) services in the
provinces and in ensuring that increased and timely budgetary support is
directed to O&M\. There have been important advances in the local contract-
ing industry and improvements in local consulting capability also\. The Bank
/1 PROSIDA (Proyek Irigasi IDA), PIBD (Proyek Irigasi Bank Dunia), P4S
(Proyek Pengembangon Persawahan Pasang Surut), Jakarta Flood Control
Project and the Brantas River Basin Development\.
-8-
Group has worked with the Government in introducing multiyear contracts,
with price escalation provisions, where previously work could be contracted
only on an annual budget basis with no guarantee of continuity of work for
contractors\. More attractive mobilization and prompter payment provisions
have been introduced also, and an increasing proportion of work is now
awarded to local contractors and consultants\.
1\.24 A recent Bank review of Indonesia's irrigation program /1 concluded
that, to expand rice production at the same rate as demand (about 4% per
year), the level of annual investment in irrigation should be further
increased by about 20% by the end of the third Five-Year Development Plan in
1983\. The Government recognizes this and during the Third Plan intends to
rehabilitate and improve 1\.0 million ha of existing irrigation systems, to
construct about 0\.7 million ha of new irrigation systems, construct about
2 million ha of tertiary systems in existing irrigation schemes, to reclaim
about 0\.5 million ha of swamps, and to improve flood protection by improving
rivers presently adversely affecting about 0\.7 million ha\. Implementation
of this irrigation investment program demands strengthening of DGWRD, espe-
cially in planning and project formulation, training, and staff development\.
DGWRD lacks sufficient trained engineers, economists and other staff, and
relies heavily on consultant services in project planning and construction
supervision\. For the next few years, DGWRD is expected to continue using
such consultants in order to expand investments in irrigation, drainage and
flood protection\. Training and staff development needs are being studied
with Bank assistance under Irrigation Project XII while strengthening the
planning capacity of DGWRD will be supported under the proposed Irrigation
Project XV\. Further expansion of agricultural support services provided by
other GOI agencies will be necessary for successful implementation of the
irrigation program, and the Bank is planning to assist projects for
extension, research, seeds and fertilizer distribution\.
1\.25 Bank Group lending for Indonesian irrigation for the next few
years is expected to place roughly equal emphasis on Java and the Other
Islands, while paying increasing attention to institutional strengthening\.
The basic problem to expanding irrigation investments is the lack of
sufficient numbers of high caliber DGWRD engineers who are free from
administrative functions to undertake engineering design and construction
supervision; a similar situation exists in project planning and economic
evaluation\. A balanced program of investments in irrigation, drainage and
flood protection and swamp reclamation will be persued while seeking to
strengthen DGWRD in project planning, evaluation, implementation and
monitoring to gradually lessen the Bank's current heavy involvement in these
aspects\. As progress is achieved in these areas, the Bank will also explore
the possibility of eventually moving towards a sector lending approach in
the belief that a broader involvement will permit more effective considera-
tion of the critical problems in this subsector\.
1\.26 The components of the proposed Irrigation Project XIV comprise
works in Central and East Java designed to intensify rice production in the
/1 Irrigation Program Review Report No\. 2027-IND, October 1978\.
-9-
major agricultural areas near the Serang River east of Semarang; and in the
irrigated areas in Madiun; in Pemali-Comal; and Pekalen-Sampean\. Previous
Bank Group assistance, details of which are described in Chapter 2, was
instrumental in completing some of the most urgent rehabilitation works in
these areas\. The proposed works would lead to further increasing irrigation
efficiency and crop production in these areas\.
2\. THE PROJECT AREAS
Location
2\.01 The Serang subproject area is located in a broad coastal plain near
Semarang, on the north coast of Central Java\. The region is well served by
air, rail and highway transport and has port facilities in Semarang\. The
Madiun subproject area lies inland in the broad valleys formed by the Solo and
Madiun rivers in the western part of East Java province\. MIain highways and
railways run through the area and connect to the port cities of Semarang and
Surabaya\. Tertiary development subproject areas are located on the north
coast of Central Java province (Pemali-Comal) and on the south eastern coast
of East Java province (Pekalen-Sampean)\.
Climate
2\.02 The climate in Java is tropical and monsoonal\. Temperatures vary
only slightly from the annual average of 260C in all subproject areas\. The
rainy season extends from October/November to April/May with about 80% of
annual rainfall during these months and a distinct dry season during the
remainder of the year\. Mean annual rainfall is about 2,000 mm in the Serang
subproject area; 1,900 mm in the Madiun subproject area; and 1,700 mm in the
Pemali-Comal and Pekalen-Sampean areas\.
Soils, Topography and Drainage
2\.03 Soils in the Serang subproject area are mostly alluvial clays of
volcanic origin\. Percolation rates are low, and with supplementary nitrogen
and phosphorus, the soils are well suited to intensive rice cultivation and
for dry season secondary food crop production\. Most of the area is flat and
has poor surface drainage, while some parts are inundated each year\. Soils
at Madiun are also of volcanic origin\. They range from clay loams to heavy
clays, all of which are moderately permeable except for the heavier clays\.
The valleys have mostly clay soils which are ideal for rice cultivation,
while secondary crops grow mostly on the better drained soils and on
surrounding foothills\. Drainage is generally good, except in some valley
bottoms\. Tertiary development areas are flat plains typically with clay
soils of volcanic origin, well suited to irrigated rice cultivation and to
dry season secondary food crops\.
Population, Farm Size and Land Tenure
2\.04 The number of farm families which would directly benefit from the
project is estimated to be about 0\.6 million (150,000 in the Serang River
- 10 -
subproject area; 160,000 in Madiun; and 260,000 in the tertiary development
areas)\. In addition, an estimated 0\.3 million landless laborers would
directly benefit from increased farm employment\. Landless laborers comprise
about 40% of the rural population in the subproject areas\. Average farm size
is about 0\.4 ha, except in the Pekalen-Sampean area where it is marginally
higher (0\.5 ha)\. Farm size data are sketchy, but the following from the
Madiun area is believed representative of the subproject areas\.
Farm size Percentage of Percent of total
(ha) all farms cultivated area
Less than 0\.2 57 13
0\.2-0\.4 13 10
0\.4-0\.6 9 12
0\.6-1\.0 12 26
More than 1\.0, 9 39
avg size 1\.7 ha
2\.05 In the Serang, Madiun and Pemali-Comal areas, about 60% of farmers
are owner operators and 40% sharecroppers\. The Pekalen-Sampean area has a
lower proportion of sharecroppers (20%)\. In most share cropping arrange-
ments, the tenant and landlord equally share total production, inputs and
harvesting cost including hired labor; and the tenant and his family provide
their labor\. The landowner pays the land tax\.
Agricultural Support Program
2\.06 Agricultural support services have been strengthened by several
ongoing Bank-assisted programs, such as the National Food Crops Extension
Project (Loan 1267-IND), the Seeds Project (Credit 246-IND) the Rural
Credit Project (Credit 827-IND), and the Agricultural Research Project (Loan
1179-IND)\. Other programs proposed for Bank Group Assistance are second
agricultural research, agricultural extension and seeds projects\. Domestic
fertilizer production presently meets demand as a result of facilities built
with Bank Group assistance under Credit 193-IND and Loan 1089-IND, while
fertilizer distribution from national to district level is being aided under
Loan 1139-IND, and will be strengthened further and expanded down to
village level under a proposed second fertilizer distribution project\.
2\.07 The BIMAS/INMAS program provides farmers with subsidized credit,
fertilizer, agrochemicals, high yielding variety (HYV) seed, cost of living
allowances, and extension advice for crop production\. The Bank Rakyat
Indonesia (BRI) is the source of credit for the BIMAS program; under the INMAS
program, farmers are advised by the extension service, which assists in
arranging for input supplies, but obtain their own credit mostly from the
suppliers\. For irrigated rice production, a farmer can obtain up to
Rp 48,000/ha credit (US$77/ha) for seven months at 1%/month interest rate\.
- 11 -
Similar credits are available for rainfed rice and secondary crops\. Farmer
participation is extensive in the project areas\. In the Serang area,
BIMAS/INMAS programs cover 95% of the wet season rice crop\. At Madiun, 92%
of wet season rice is covered, while farmers use BIMAS/INMAS to grow 66% of
wet season rice at Pemali-Comal and 80% at Pekalen-Sampean\.
2\.08 In all project areas the staff of the Directorate General of Food
Crops (DGFC) within the Ministry of Agriculture provide extension services
to farmers\. The services in all project areas are working well although
often understaffed, with good coverage of training and visit programs and
demonstration plots\. Inputs of seeds, fertilizers, insecticides, and
rodenticides are usually available throughout the project areas from private
traders and the BUUD/KUD cooperatives\. HYVs are widely available and are
used extensively on irrigated lands and less widely on good quality rainfed
lands, but farmers prefer local varieties for badly drained or flood prone
lands\. There has been a rapid swing to the newer HYVs (IR 36, 38) resistant
to brown plant hopper following severe attacks on varieties available in
1977/78 (IR 32, 34)\.
Existing Works
2\.09 Serang Area\. The flood protection works along the Serang River
system consist of a river levee system constructed primarily to protect
irrigated areas to the west and includes provision for diversion of rainy
season flood water into swampland (Juana Valley) to the east\. A second
purpose of the system was to build up the Juana Valley ground level through
deposition of sediment carried by the flood water to make the land suitable
for farming\. The diversion was initially accomplished by spilling water
over the right levee but completion of the Wilalung structure in 1918
provided firmer regulation and resulted in the present practice of allowing
flows up to 350 cu m/sec to pass down the Wulan (Lower Serang) River with
all remaining flood water routed into the Juana Valley\. When the system was
constructed, Juana Valley was sparsely populated, but the valley ground
level has now risen significantly and farmers have moved in to cultivate the
land\. Deliberate annual flooding does not allow full development of farming
in the area\.
2\.10 The Serang River system and adjacent areas are shown schematically
in Figure 2\.1\. Most of the levee system is located downstream from the
junction of the Serang River and its major tributary, the Lusi River\. In
the vicinity of the Serang-Lusi confluence, the levees are fairly low and
are 3 to 4 km apart but converge as they extend about 20 km downstream to
provide a floodway width of about 1,500 m near the Wilalung structure\.
Below the structure, the width of the Wulan River continues to decrease and
in two reaches (about 3 km and 8 km in length) is only 150 m between the
levees\. Over the remainder of the floodway, the width is generally between
500-800 m, except in the delta area where there are several narrow branch
channels\. The levees are 2 to 4 m higher than adjacent land, are generally
narrow with fairly steep side slopes, and have a grass cover except in a few
MURIA
VOLCANOJO
KEDUNG-SEMAT '
AREA-3,300ha
WELAHAN BUM
WEDUNG , h;AREA-4,800 *A
ha\~~~~~) ~~~~ 4 LOWER ~~~~~~~JUANA AREA
3,000 ha
; elIxa ' '' s' v;9S t' \. ''"
PELAYARAN AREA TUNang G-SER
7, AREA 11,100ha / \o UANA ALLEY II DONESIA
y 3, 300S s , IRRIGATION PROJECT XIV
Pondok intake Serang River Drainage and Flood Protection Project
SERANG RIVER SYSTEM
, 1/g Wilalung Cultivated land
X 11 , ~diversion
,c, //f >/R structure Z Major rivers
----\.Minor rivers
i¾ T ) \._ "\._- \.= | Irrigation canals
Ihis n-p has been prep-red by the World ank sstaff exclusively for the cor%0iencr Weir
ot the reodors ot the teport to ohi,h it is attached Tlle denor-nintons itt-d Ind the
boondonet thewe Ott tttis map do not imply\. on the port of the World dook and its~\. -\.;i \.* \._to
h-I II, thi, -PdI 1-t i"Ply, - th,\. Pita 0 tht, Wdd B-k-d it, ~Diversion structure
ffibite\., o-y I'dg-r,it on the legal Ototno of any teritory or any -d-rsement- n r
aoctfttonno of toob boundaries UPPER SE RANG + r1l ~ , Irrigation pumping plant
AREA- 7,400 ha [H i\.
HtAILANID fllt'
E \ -C?\THAILAND tRUNtl i k 00 0 \\.,,,PUlLlPPINES ||S 0 N j 0 s/I A Irrigation intake
\ Q P t A Y 5 / tr {= ; \.,;, S g i; '\. S f -Q?E \.E Proposed project drains
5 \\.,' W='SINGAPORt< \, ,, , ;,,, PAPUa ,1 J - 0 " L dn Proposed pro ject levees
z S(/MAMA, ) KAd/MANTAN ' fj ' ,:'' c , S Nf0 ii
fh: oi lrnlkpineng tst laal rt-at A M m: 50V
N D 0 N D n I A idar,i
: PirPr°t ' tmboi a rAY j
PyrwotoKltJA VATa Seda di Weir
\. { (: ,, \ \. PJeinner' \. o_
110011T ,Kedungombo Dae site O
\.- it ti-I boitndsris / / _ __ /, _ _ - o
- 13 -
areas where recent slumping or erosion has occurred\. The floodway (fore-
land) areas between the main river channel and the levees have been built up
over the past 80 years by sediment deposition so that they are mostly in the
range of 1 to 2 m above the land outside the levees\.
2\.11 From the Wilalung structure to the Java Sea, the Wulan River has
a total length of about 46 km\. Tributaries include the Gelis and Tunggal
Rivers which join the main stream respectively about 12 and 20 km downstream
from the Wilalung structure\. Bridges for the Semarang-Kudus road and
railroad cross the river at Karanganyar, 11 km below the Wilalung structure,
and another road bridge crosses at Mijen about 15 km further downstream\.
Four foot bridges span the river between Mijen and the river mouth and
bridges spanning the gate piers at the Wilalung structure also accommodate
foot traffic\. To the east of the Wulan River, several rivers drain
southwesterly from the slopes of Muria Volcano through the Welahan-Bum area
and flow into the Bum and Serang Lama (Old Serang) Rivers\. Because of
narrow floodways, low levees and constricted channels, flooding occurs
frequently along these rivers\.
2\.12 Excess rainfall is removed from the project land principally by
natural channels but many of the channels have been improved and artificial
drains have been constructed in some areas\. Levees have been constructed
along some of the larger drains\. Drains in the Upper Serang and Tuntang-
Serang areas were rehabilitated under Irrigation Project I but the other
drains generally have insufficient capacity for the timely removal of excess
rainfall\.
2\.13 Flooding caused by drainage deficiencies and operation of the
Serang River; flood control system results in inundation of about 30,000 ha
each year during portions of the wet season\. The Pelayaran, Wedung and
Welahan-Bum areas are affected principally by inadequate drainage but the
Juana valley inundation results from a combination of flood control opera-
tion and poor drainage\. In addition to the routine annual flooding of the
Pelayaran and Wedung areas due to restricted drainage, portions of those
areas and the Tuntang-Serang and Upper Serang areas are periodically flooded
through breaches in the Serang River levee system\. Major floods from
breaching and over-topping of the levees occurred in 1972 and again in 1976,
when about 25,000 ha were inundated, destroying the rice crop on 16,500 ha
and reducing yields on an additional 2,000 ha\.
2\.14 From the viewpoint of drainage, the Kedung-Semat area is separate
from the remainder of the subproject\. About half of the area lies at or
below high tide levels, and has been protected by a coastal levee construc-
ted in the 1930s\. Drainage was provided by tidal gates which are no longer
serviceable, and the area is now adversely affected by flooding, poor
drainage and salinity\.
2\.15 The Sedadi irrigation system begins at the Sedadi Weir on the
Serang River about 10 km upstream from the confluence with the Lusi River
and provides water for the Tuntang-Serang area and portions of the Upper
- 14 -
Serang and Pelayaran areas\. The main canal of the Sedadi system parallels
the Serang and Wulan Rivers for a distance of about 40 km to Karanganyar,
immediately adjacent to the left river levee\. The Pondak intake located
about one kilometer upstream from the Wilalung structure was constructed to
supply additional water but has not been operated for several years due to
sedimentation problems\. About 18,500 ha of land in the Upper Serang and
Tuntang-Serang areas are irrigated during the wet season but only 4,300 ha
receive sufficient water for a dry season rice crop\. The Pelayaran area
receives water during the wet season but little during the dry season\. A
pumping plant located on the Wulan River at Karanganyar supplies irrigation
water for the Wedung area during the wet season but only very limited
amounts are available in the dry season\.
2\.16 Numerous small irrigation systems supply water for small areas
of land in the Juana, Welahan-Bum and Kedung-Semat areas\. The areas and
present condition of agricultural land in the subproject are indicated in
Table 2\.1\.
Table 2\.1: AGRICULTURAL LAND IN SERANG SUBPROJECT
Generally Poorly drained
adequate but infrequently Flooded during
drainage flooded rainy season Total
--
-- - - -- - - - -(ha)
-- - - - - -- - - - - - -
Upper Serang - 7,400 7,400
Tuntang-Serang 11,100 - - 11,100
Pelayaran & Wedung - 9,200 9,200 18,400
Welahan-Bum - 2,100 2,700 4,800
Juana Valley - - 13,300 13,300
Lower Juana - - 3,000 3,000
Kedung-Semat - 1,300 2,000 3,300
Total 11\.100 2000 30\.200 61,300
2\.17 Madiun Area\. About 140,000 ha in the Madiun Valley is supplied
with irrigation water by a complex of 117 irrigation systems that include
about 1,200 canal headworks, 120 km of main canals, 700 km of secondary
canals and 2,500 canal structures\. About 90% of the water supplies for the
systems are obtained from streams and the remaining 10% is from springs and
ground water\. Some of the systems heading on streams include diversion
weirs across the streams but others have "free intakes" where the stream
channels are stable and additional elevation above the channels bottoms is
not required\. Canal structures include turnouts, measuring devices, bridges
and other miscellaneous structures\. The canals are mostly unlined and the
structures mostly masonry\. Tertiary systems vary in size up to 150 hectares
and are maintained by individuals or groups of farmers\.
- 15
2\.18 Many of the systems and structures have fallen into serious dis-
repair, and rehabilitation is now in progress under Bank-assisted Irrigation
Project VIII on 26 of the systems serving 75,000 ha (Stage I)\. Stage I
includes the larger systems which are generally located in the low central
portion of Madiun Valley\. The remaining systems are small and are located
around the periphery of the valley where the slope of the ±Lnd varies from
moderately flat in the low areas to steep in the higher portions of the
adjacent mountain slopes\. In the Stage II area, 59% of the land is under
technical systems, 13% under semitechnical systems and 28% under nontech-
nical systems\.
2\.19 Tertiary Areas\. The Pemali-Comal area is served by eight inter-
connected systems that irrigate some 128,000 ha using water diverted by 41
weirs on 28 rivers\. The Pekalen-Sampean area includes 139 small irrigation
systems serving about 229,000 ha\.
Works Completed With Previous Bank Group Assistance
2\.20 Bank Group assistance has been provided previously for certain
works in all of the subproject areas\.
2\.21 Serang Subprolect\. Bank Group assistance for irrigation and
drainage improvements in the Serang area began under Irrigation Project I\.
The work under that project included rehabilitation of the Sedadi irrigation
system and the rehabilitation of drains in the Upper Serang and Tuntang-
Serang areas\. The project was completed in 1976 but some parts of the area
remain subject to flooding and water shortages limit dry season crop produc-
tion\. (see Project Completion Report of June 1977 and Project Performance
Audit Report of February 1978\.) Bank assistance for preparation of designs
and tender documents for the proposed Serang River drainage and flood pro-
tection was provided under Irrigation Project VII\.
2\.22 Madiun Subproject\. Bank assistance for the investigation and eval-
uation of groundwater resources in the Madiun area has been provided under
Irrigation Project IV\. Irrigation Project VI provided Bank support for
feasibility studies of system rehabilitation, detailed rehabilitation designs
and feasibility studies at four storage sites\./l Activities under Stage I of
the Madiun rehabilitation work for 75,000 ha are supported by Bank assistance
under Irrigation Project VIII\. Where necessary, canals are being repaired,
desilted and in some cases enlarged, while structures are repaired or recon-
structed depending on their present condition\. When practical, semitechnical
and nontechnical systems are being upgraded to technical systems\. The
designs for Stage I will be completed in April 1980 and those for Stage II
in December 1980\. Implementation of Stage I is progressing slightly behind
schedule but the major construction work is expected to be completed early
in 1981\.
/1 Detailed engineering and design for two of these would be performed
under the proposed project\.
- 16 -
2\.23 Tertiary Subproject\. Feasibility studies of the rehabilitation of
irrigation works in the Pemali-Comal area were assisted under Irrigation
Project I, detailed planning and designs for the rehabilitation were
supported under Irrigation Project II, and rehabilitation work was assisted
under Irrigation Project III\. Tertiary development for 21,000 ha in the
area is being assisted under Irrigation Project VII\. Construction is 80% on
schedule and is expected to be completed in early 1980\. Bank Group
assistance on the Pekalen-Sampean area for feasibility studies for
rehabilitation was provided under Irrigation Project I; rehabilitation of
main irrigation works under Irrigation Project IV; and tertiary development
for 30,000 ha under Irrigation VII\. Construction of the tertiary systems is
100% on schedule, and should be completed also in early 1980\.
Project Formulation
2\.24 The components of the project would provide additional infra-
structure for drainage and flood protection, would expand the rehabilitation
of irrigation systems already under way in Madiun, and would construct
tertiary systems in order to achieve more efficient management and
utilization of available water supplies and other agricultural inputs\. The
works are designed to further increase crop production\.
2\.25 Serang River Drainage and Flood Protection Subproject\. With
consultant assistance, the Government formulated development plans for the
Serang River system and other neighboring river basins during the 1971-75
period and made more detailed studies of the Serang area between 1977 and
1979\. The studies for the Serang area considered the need for better flood
protection and drainage of existing irrigated and rainfed farm land, which
would also be necessary prior to any expansion of irrigation\. The studies
propose that in the longer term additional dry season water would be
provided though construction of a multipurpose dam on the Upper Serang River
(the Kedungombo Dam)\.
2\.26 The Government wishes to proceed with the drainage and flood
protection works and has deferred for the present construction of the
Kedungombo Dam because of its high cost and the need to resettle people from
the reservoir area\. The dam would have only a minor effect on peak floods
in the project area mostly because of the large amount of downstream inflow
from the Lusi River\. Additional downstream drainage and flood protection
measures are warranted with or without construction of the dam\.
2\.27 The proposed drainage and flood protection system was selected by
the government following study of seven alternatives by consultants\. The
selected system would avoid deliberate flooding of the Juana River by
increasing the capability of the Serang/Wulan River system to cope with
flood flows\. The conveyance capacity of the Wulan River would be increased
to 1,000 cu m/sec from the Wilalung structure to the mouth of the Gelis
River and 760 cu m/sec from the Gelis River to the Java Sea\. Occasionally
water would be spilled at the Gelis River mouth into the Welahan area for
conveyance to the sea through a separate low level drain\. During occasional
high flow periods some temporary ponding would occur in the Welahan area,
with an estimated 1,500 ha inundated in the rare event of a 100-year
frequency flood\.
- 17 -
2\.28 Madiun Irrigation System Rehabilitation Stage II\. As a continuation
of its overall irrigation rehabilitation program and as a follow up to Madiun
Rehabilitation Stage I, the Government wishes to complete rehabilitation of
the remaining Madiun systems using the presently established organization ane
the desig\. and construction supervision procedures of the first stage project
This will allow efficient utilization of resources and orderly continuation of
the program\.
2\.29 Tertiary Systems Development\. Tertiary systems development is an
ongoing GOI program which has received renewed emphasis in the Government's
Third Five-Year Development Plan during which period 2 million ha are to be
constructed\. The proposed construction would be implemented using the same
design systems, construction supervision and organization of the ongoing
programs, and would serve an additional 50,000 ha at Pemali-Comal and 70,000
ha at Pekalen-Stmpean\. Table 2\.2 summarizes the present situation of
tertiary development in the two areas\. Additional housing would be
constructed for operation and maintenance staff in the two tertiary areas,
,and additionally in Ciujung, Cisedane, Rentang, Cirebon, Sedeku, Madiun and
Sadang\.
Table 2\.2: TERTIARY DEVELOPMENT IN PEMALI-COMAL AND PEKALEN-SAMPEAN
Future Remaining
Total double Tertiaries To be for future
service cropped/a completed constructed construc-
area rice area already /b under project tion/c
------------------------ '000 ha ---
----------------------
Pemali-Comal 128 113 33 50 30
Pekalen-Sampean 229 182 37 70 75
/a Includes about 10% increase over existing double cropped area\.
/b Completed or undergoing construction both independently by GOI and with
Bank Group assistance\.
/c Engineering and design are included in this project\.
- 18 -
3\. THE PROJECT
Project Description
3\.01 The proposed works would consist of the construction and rehabili-
tation of drainage and flood protection works on the Serang River to reduce
flooding and improve drainage of some 61,000 ha of farm land; the rehabilita-
tion of irrigation systems serving about 65,000 ha in the Madiun Valley and
engineering design for improving four small dams and for constructing two
medium dams; the construction of tertiary irrigation canals and structures
serving 120,000 ha in the Pemali-Comal and Pekalan-Sampean irrigation
systems; engineering design for an additional 105,000 ha tertiary systems
in Pemali-Comal and Pekalen-Sampean; engineering design for engineering
design for the rehabilitation and upgrading of the 20,000 ha Senkareng-
Pemali Atas irrigation area; and construction of about 1,000 additional
O&M houses in nine major irrigation areas\.
Project Works
3\.02 Serang River Drainage and Flood Protection\. Works would consist of:
(a) Reconstruction or rehabilitation of about 242 km of drains with
associated bridges, siphons and water control structures in the
Upper Serang and Pelayaran-Wedung areas, including channel
dredging and levee construction;
(b) Reconstruction or rehabilitation of about 63 km of drains in the
Juana valley and construction of about 12 km of levees on the
north side of the main Juana drain;
(c) Construction cf about 9 km of coastal levees in the Kedung-Semat
area, with associated road and gate structures and reconstruction
or rehabilitation of about 17 km of drains;
(d) Raising and strengthening flood protection levees on about 10 km
of the Serang River from Godang to the Wilalung structure;
(e) Raising and strengthening levees along about 42 km of the Wulan
River from the Wilalung structure to the Java Sea, and channel
excavation of about 28 km;
(f) Construction of a spillway on the right bank of the Wulan River
near Karanganyar and a low level drain from the spillway to the
Java sea of about 33 km;
(g) Construction of a Serang Lama-Bum river high level drain of about
24 km to convey discharges of south flowing tributaries of the
Serang River system to the Java sea;
- 19 -
(h) channelization and levee construction (about 18 km) along the
lower reaches of six streams that would be intercepted by the
Serang Lama-Bum drain;
(i) Procurement of vehicles and equipment for constru\.tion supervision;
(j) Training of government staff; and
(k) Consultant services for construction supervision; for preparing an
O&M plan; and for preparing a food prediction and warning system\.
3\.03 Madiun Irrigation System Rehabilitation Stage II\. Works would
consist of:
(a) Rehabilitation or reconstruction of about 707 diversion weirs and
other types of headwork structures;
(b) Rehabilitation of about 350 km of primary and secondary canals and
about 1,048 structures, including turnouts, bridges, and other
structures;
(c) Procurement of vehicles for construction supervision and motor-
cycles and equipment for O&M; and
(d) Consultant services for construction supervision, rehabilitation
designs for four existing small dams and construction designs for
new itedium size dams at Pondok and Sangiran\.
3\.04 Tertiary Systems Development\. Works would comprise:
(a) construction of a tertiary network on about 120,000 ha at Pemali-
Comal and Pekalen-Sampean comprising about 5\.5 m/ha of tertiary
irrigation canals, about 11 m/ha of subtertiary canals, about
50 m/ha of quaternary canals, about 40 m/ha of tertiary and
quaternary drains, and about 0\.1 stuctures/ha;
(b) consultant services for engineering designs for about 105,000 ha
additional tertiary systems in the Pemali-Comal and Pekalen-
Sampean irrigation areas, and for engineering designs for the
rehabilitation and upgrading of the Senkareng-Pemali Atas
irrigation area adjacent to the Pemali-Comal system; and
(c) construction of about 1,000 houses for O&M staff in the Pemali-
Comal, Pekalen-Sampean, Ciujung, Cisedane, Rentang, Cisebon,
Sedeku, Madiun and Sadang irrigation systems\.
Basis for Design of Serang River Drainage and Flood Protection
3\.05 Drainage\. Most of the drainage facilities are designed to remove
within 72 hours excess water resulting from the maximum rainfall expected to
- 20 -
occur at a frequency of five years\. Exceptions are the Juana Valley drains
that are designed to a 3-year frequency, justified from analyses of estimated
crop damages and drainage costs as related to the frequency of flooding\.
Designs of the drainage systems are based on providing primary and secondary
drains for all catchment areas that include more than 400 hectares of
agricultural land\. Other drainage would be the responsibility of individuals
or groups of land owners\. Total three-day depths for five-year frequency
rainfall for various segments of the project area were obtained from a
isohyetal map developed from historical data and this information was
supplemented by estimated rainfall depths expected to occur in two following
three-day periods\. Three-day five-year frequency rainfall over the project
area is in the 175 mm - 300 mm range with 30 to 45 mm occurring in the
following six days\. Required capacities and dimensions for drains were
established for different sizes, slopes and shapes of areas from analyses of
the rainfall data and other factors including estimated evapotranspiration,
percolation, drain storage, land slopes, and crop damage/inundation
depth/duration relationships\. Drain design capacities are generally in the
range between 4\.9 liters/second/ha and 6\.5 liters/second/ha for the
Glapan-Sedadi, Welahan-Bum and Kedung-Semat areas and 3\.3 to 5\.2
liters/second/ha in the Juana valley\.
3\.06 Flood Protection\. The system would be capable of controlling
100-year frequency floods\. Consultants reviewed incremental costs for
providing protection against 100-year frequency floods as compared to a
20-year frequency and concluded that the 100-year level of protection was
the most cost effective\. The flood stage is rather insensitive to the
return period of the flood (i\.e\. water levels of a 100-year flood are
little different to those of a 20-year event)\.
Water Supply, Demand and Quality for Irrigation Components
3\.07 Madiun\. The subproject area, which has been irrigated for several
generations, is supplied primarily from the unregulated flows of the Madiun
river and its tributaries, tributaries of the Solo river, local springs, and
small amounts of groundwater\. The systems make extensive use of return
flows\. Because of the large number of independent systems and catchments,
no analysis has been attempted of water supply and demand for individual
systems\. Historically, water supplies are adequate for 65,000 ha of land
in the wet season, but only for about 23,000 ha in the dry season\. Some
58,000 ha of rice and 7,000 ha of sugarcane are irrigated in the wet season\.
Rehabilitation would lower losses in the system, and permit irrigation of a
slightly larger area in the dry season (25,000 ha)\. Losses would be reduced
at diversion points, in canals, and from spillage, while canals would have
greater conveyance capacity and better water control\. These measures would
permit more timely and equitable water distribution\. Sustained usage and
testing indicate that water quality is suitable for irrigation\. Sediment
loads are high, and the increased desilting efficiency provided by project
works would reduce the problems of sediment deposition in conveyance and
distribution systems\.
K 21 -
3\.08 Pemali-Comal and Pekalen-Sampean\. For many years, water supplies
have been adequate for 100% cropping intensity of the two schemes in the wet
season, and for about 70% of the command areas in the dry season\. The main
impact is expected to be on crop yields with minor area effects\. Better
distribut---n to individual fields would permit more efficient application,
better drainage, and coordinated cultivation within tertiary blocks leading
to lower pest and disease incidence\. The main systems are long established,
and water supplies have been shown to be of good quality for irrigation\.
Status of Engineering
3\.09 Serang River Drainage and Flood Protection\. All detailed designs,
contract drawings, and tender documents will be completed in early 1980\.
3\.10 Madiur Irrigation System Rehabilitation Stage II\. Detailed design
for works in the area being rehabilitated under the Stage I project are
scheduled to be completed by April 1980\. The small size and type of works
to be undertaken are appropriate for a continuing design/construction
program, and consultants are starting to prepare designs for Stage II now
that Stage I designs are nearly complete\.
3\.11 Tertiary Systems\. Detailed designs for the tertiary blocks
constructed under Irrigation Project VII were prepared by local consultants
to satisfactory standards\. The same consultants have prepared 70% of the
designs for the construction now proposed at Pemali-Comal and 90% of those at
Pekalen-Sampean\. The remaining detailed design for the proposed construction
would be available in early 1980\.
Implementation Schedules
3\.12 The project would be implemented over a period of four and a half
years from June 1980 to December 1984, with the first main contracts expected
to be awarded in mid-1980\. Serang drainage and flood protection works
construction would start in June 1980 and be completed by December 1984\. The
Stage II rehabilitation work at Madiun would begin in June 1980 and is
scheduled for completion by July 1983\. Tertiary systems would be construc-
ted over a four-year period from June 1980\. Implementation schedules for
the three subprojects are shown in Figure 3\.1\.
Cost Estimates
3\.13 The total project cost is estimated at US$186\.7 million, of which
US$66\.7 million is the foreign exchange component\. The above costs include
taxes of 5% on civil works contracts\. Civil works quantities for the
Serang subproject were estimated from completed final design drawings (70%)
and from preliminary design drawings (30%); and for the Tertiary subproject
from ongoing construction of tertiary systems in Pemali-Comal and
Pekalen-Sampean under Bank Group assisted projects\. Civil works costs for
the Serang and Tertiary subprojects were estimated by applying to the
estimated quantities the the prevailing unit costs for similar works in the
- 22 -
specific areas (projected to beginning-1980 prices)\. For the Madiun
subproject, civil works costs were estimated by comparison with recent
contract costs for rehabilitation of similar canals and structures in the
Stage I area\. Costs of consulting services are based on recent contracts
for similar services in Indonesia\. The direct costs of foreign consultants
(salaries, overseas allowance, home office overhead and fee) amount to about
US$7,100/man-month\. Reimbursible expenses (travel, housing, field office
overhead, reproduction and printing, and other expenses average about
US$3,400/man-month, for a total cost of about US$10,500/man-month\. Total
costs of local consultants amount to US$1,500/ man-month (Annex 1, Table 7)
for engineers and US$500/man-month for technicians and draftsmen\. The cost
estimates include physical contingencies of 20% for civil works, and 10% for
other cost items\. The cost estimates also include an allowance for expected
price contingencies during project execution (29% of base cost plus physical
contingencies) based on the following annual inflation rates for civil
works, equipment and services projected from recent trends noted in
contracts for irrigation projects in Indonesia:
1980 1981 1982-84
Local component 15 15 10
Foreign component 9 8 7
3\.14 Details of project costs are presented in Annex 1, Tables 1 and 2,
and are summarized below:
Table 3\.1: PROJECT COST SUMMARY
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total %
--- Rp million ---US$ million---- F\.E\.
Serang river drainage
and flood protection 22,500 16,870 39,120 35\.6 27\.0 62\.6 43
Madiun rehabilitation
Stage II 9,000 9,130 18,130 14\.4 14\.6 29\.0 50
Tertiary systems 15,560 3,130 18,690 24\.9 5\.0 29\.9 17
Base cost 46,810 29,130 75,940 74\.9 46\.6 121\.5 38
Physical contingencies 8,690 5,500 14,190 13\.9 8\.8 22\.7 38
Price contingencies 18,500 7,060 25,560 31\.2 11\.3 42\.5 27
Total Project Cost 75,000 41\.690 116,690 120\.0 66\.7 186\.7 36
- 23 -
Financing
3\.15 The proposed Bank loan of US$116 million would finance the
project's foreign exchange cost excepting the foreign exchange cost of
vehicles provided by GOI and US$49\.7 million of local costs\. It would cover
about 65% of total project costs excluding vehicles provided by GOI under
reserve procurement (US$0\.4 million) and taxes on civil works contracts
(US$7\.6 million), and 41% of local costs\. The Government would provide the
remaining Rp 44,200 million (US$70\.7 million) out of annual budget
appropriations\.
- 24 -
Table 3\.2: PROJECT FINANCING
Item Total cost Government Bank
---------------(US$ million)-----------------
Serang Subproject
Civil works 84\.8 30\.3 54\.5
Land acquisition 3\.7 3\.7 -
Consulting services 2\.0 - 2\.0
Equipment 0\.2 - 0\.2
Vehicles 0\.1 0\.1 -
Training 0\.3 - 0\.3
Administration 4\.3 4\.3
Civil works taxes 4\.2 4\.2
Subtotal 99\.6 42\.6 57\.0
Madiun Subproject
Civil works 34\.5 3\.7 30\.8
Consulting services 3\.7 - 3\.7
Equipment 0\.2 - 0\.2
Vehicles 0\.2 0\.2
Administration 1\.7 1\.7
Civil works taxes 1\.7 1\.7
Subtotal 42\.0 7\.3 34\.7
Tertiary Subproject
Civil works 33\.5 17\.1 16\.4
Consulting services 7\.2 - 7\.2
Equipment 0\.2 - 0\.2
Vehicles 0\.1 0\.1 -
Mapping 0\.5 _ 0\.5
Administration 1\.9 1\.9 -
Civil works taxes 1\.7 1\.7 -
Subtotal 45\.1 20\.8 24\.3
Total 186\.7 70\.7 116\.0
- 25 -
Procurement
3\.16 Civil works\. For the Serang subproject, river mouth dredging,
river channel excavation and levee construction, and major drainage
rehabilitation and construction would be packaged into 6 contracts
(US$38\.4 million)/l which would be awarded on the basis of international
competitive bidding in accordance with Bank Group guidelines\. The
remaining 25 civil works contracts (US$14\.4 million) would be for drainage
works which are small, would be carried out almost entirely by hand labor,
and are scattered over many job sites\. These works would be carried out
following local competitive bidding\. The M4adiun (US$23\.4 million) and
tertiary works (US$21\.8 million) are small, scattered, and would be
performed almost entirely by hand labor\. Contracts would be let by systems
or by groups of systems on the basis of local competitive bidding\. For
Madiun civil works a total of up to US$5 million of works would have a
minimum contract size of US$100,000, the others would be grouped into a
number of suitable contracts of minimum size US$500,000\. No minimum
contract sizes would be required for tertiary works, or for works in the
Serang awarded by local competitive bidding\.
3\.17 Vehicles and equipment\. Excepting four vehicles required for
start up operations which would be purchased locally by consultants under
the terms of their contracts, all vehicles and motorcycles (US$0\.4 million)
would be procured locally following Government procedures because the
Government does not permit importation\. Equipment (survey, office and
laboratory equipment - total value US$0\.4 million) would be in small
contract packages required for rapid start up and purchased by the different
subproject offices responsible\. No contract package is expected to be
greater than US$85,000\. Accordingly the equipment would be procured through
normal GOI procurement procedures involving local competitive bidding or at
least three price quotations for small contracts less than Rp 10 million
(US$16,000)\.
3\.18 During negotiations, an understanding was reached with the Govern-
ment on the use and content of standard contract documents for civil works
and equipment to be procured by international competitive bidding\. The
understanding on the use and content of standard contract documents for works
to be awarded under locally advertised competitive bidding is expected to be
reached by September 1, 1980\. Because of this, and PROSIDAs extensive experi-
ence, prior Bank review of bidding documents for individual contracts may be
reduced and cost limits for contracts requiring prior review before tendering
and award would be higher than in earlier projects\. These limits would be
US$1\.5 million and above for civil works and US$0\.2 million and above for
equipment\. The use of standard contract documents should accelerate the
preparation of tenders and reduce the Bank's supervision to review of special
conditions attached to individual tender invitations\.
/1 Costs in this section are base costs not including physical contingen-
cies or expected price increases\.
- 26 -
Disbursements
3419 Disbursements would be made at the rate of 100% against the foreign
exchange cost of directly imported equipment, 95% of the exfactory cost of
locally manufactured equipment, and 65% for locally procured imported
equipment\. Excepting start-up vehicles for consultant services, purchase of
vehicles would be financed totally by GOI\. Disbursements for civil works
would be at the rate of 100% of total expenditures for six major ICB
contracts (para\. 3\.16) in the Serang subproject (equivalent to 70% of total
civil works expenditures in Serang)\. Funds for remaining civil works in the
Serang subproject would be provided fully by Government\. For the Madiun
subproject, disbursements for civil works would be at the rate of 100% of
total expenditures\. For tertiary systems disbursements would be applied
only to structures, at the rate of 100% of costs (equivalent to 48% of total
civil works expenditures in tertiary development)\. Disbursements for
consulting services (including four start-up vehicles) would be at the rate
of 100% of total expenditures\. Disbursements for the Madiun subproject, and
the tertiary subproject would be on the basis of certified quarterly
statements of expenditure (Annex 5)\. The estimated schedule of expenditures
for the project, disbursement schedule, and allocation of loan proceeds are
presented in Annex 1\.
Accounts and Audits
3\.20 In previous Bank Group supported projects PROSIDA has complied with
the need to keep separate audited project accounts, although frequently late
in submitting such reports\. For Irrigation Project XIV, assurances have
been obtained from the Government that PROSIDA would maintain separate
accounts for each subproject; engage auditors acceptable to the Bank to
audit these accounts and statements of expenditures submitted in support of
Loan withdrawal applications; and submit to the Bank, within six months of
the close of each fiscal year, audited statements, together with the
auditor's comments\.
Environmental Effects
3\.21 All project areas have been under intensive cultivation for many
years, and the basic land use patterns would change little following
implementation of the project\. In the Serang area frequent flooding of
living areas, roads and agricultural land would be greatly reduced, and
health problems would be reduced\. The flora and fauna temporarily affected
by construction activities would quickly revert to their present condition\.
Environmental changes at the mouths of the Juana and Wulan Rivers would be
small since minimum flows would be undisturbed\.
- 27 -
4\. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
4\.01 All project components would be implemented by PROSIDA, an executive
body within the DGWRD, which has completed rehabilitation works under the
first three Bank Group irrigation projects and is executing works under six
other Bank Group-assisted projects\. Since its establishment in 1969,
PROSIDA has demonstrated a steadily increasing capacity to execute irriga-
tion, drainage, and flood protection projects, and has maintained its
reputation of being one of the most efficient construction agencies in the
Ministry of Public Works\. PROSIDA would have no difficulty in carrying out
the project with its present staff supported by consulting services\.
4\.02 Day-to-day supervision of the work in the Serang area would be
carried out through PROSIDA's subproject office and staff in Semarang, which
is presently implementing the rehabilitation of the SEDEKU project assisted
by Irrigation Project IX\. The staff in Semarang would be strengthened by
assigning experienced personnel from recently completed Bank Group-assisted
projects and projects nearing completion\. The senior official of the
Provincial Irrigation Service would be the Subproject Manager and would
coordinate the various activities in the project area and later be
responsible for operation and maintenance (O&M)\. Working under him would be
a Deputy Subproject Manager and assistants for supervision of construction
and administration\. This type of field organization is working successfully
under ongoing projects\. The DGWRD organization is shown in Figure 4\.1, the
PROSIDA management organization in Figure 4\.2; and the PROSIDA field
organization in Figure 4\.3\.
4\.03 The day-to-day supervision of the Stage II work and new engineer-
ing design for dams in the Madiun subproject would be carried out by the
PROSIDA field office in Madiun, which is presently implementing the Stage I
work assisted under Irrigation Project VIII\. No changes in organization or
increases in staff from the present are foreseen since the Stage II work
will be phased in as Stage I work is completed\. The field organization of
the PROSIDA Madiun office is similar to that of the Semarang office\.
4\.04 Implementation of tertiary systems construction and additional
tertiary systems engineering and design in the Pemali-Comal and
Pekalen-Sampean areas would be supervised by PROSIDA offices which were
established in each area for construction under previous Bank Group-assisted
projects\. PROSIDA has offices also in the other seven irrigation systems
for supervising O&M housing construction\.
Consultants and Training
4\.05 Local and expatriate consultants would be employed to assist
PROSIDA in finalizing tender documents, bid evaluation, and construction
supervision of the Serang and the Madiun subprojects\. Consultant assistance
- 28 -
would also be provided for dam designs in the Madiun area\. About 422
man months foreign engineers and 2,402 man months local engineers will be
employed\. Numbers of man-months and estimated costs for these services are
presented in Table 4\.1 below\. For the Serang subproject, DGWRD expects to
employ the co\.ultants presently engaged for detailed engineering design,
and for the Madiun subproject, the consultants employed for feasibility
studies, detailed engineering design and construction of the Stage I area
(para\. 1\.02)\. Assurances were obtained during negotiations that by July 1,
1980, GOI would appoint consultants whose qualifications, experience and
conditions of employment would be satisfactory to the Bank\.
Table 4\.1: CONSULTING SERVICES
Man-months Estimated cost
Subproject Foreign Local/a Foreign Local Total
-- (US$'000) ------
Serang construction
supervision 120 60 852\.0 498\.0 1,350\.0
Madiun construction
supervision 80 180 568\.0 542\.0 1,110\.0
Dam design 96 396 681\.6 1,056\.9 1,738\.5
(273)
Tertiary
Tertiary design - 1,070 - 2,505\.0 2,505\.0
(1,800)
Rehabilitation design 126 696 894\.6 1,772\.4 2,664\.0
(600)
Total 422 2,402 2,996\.2 6,374\.3 9\.370\.5
(2,673)
/a Engineers (in brackets technicians and draftsmen)\.
4\.06 The project would provide overseas training for selected PROSIDA
and Serang subproject management, technical and operating personnel\. The
training would include: six months of formal courses covering land drainage
requirements and procedures, embankment and channel design, river
hydraulics, operation and maintenance procedures, and management techniques
for five senior Govrnment offficials; and three months of practical
operation and maintenance training in neighboring countries for ten middle
level government employees\.
- 29 -
Agricultural Support Services
4\.07 Agricultural support services in all project areas are in general
providing good coverage and farmers are availing themselves of the assis-
tance available (paras\. 2\.06-2\.08)\. The major agricultural changes to be
induced by project actions would be increased yields from more timely
planting; less crop damage from flooding; better water supplies; and a shift
from local varieties to HYVs in areas previously poorly drained, seasonally
flooded, or threatened by floods\. Increased quantities of HYV seed and
fertilizers would be provided by present production facilities in Java and by
distribution networks in the subproject areas\.
Operation and Maintenance
4\.08 PROSIDA would be responsible for the operation and maintenance of
all project works during the construction period\. Except for the tertiary
works, PROSIDA would continue to operate and maintain the works of
individual sections for one year following completion to ensure that all
defects are corrected and needed repairs are made before they are formally
turned over to the Provincial Public Works Departments of Central Java and
East Java, which would thereafter assume responsibility for operating and
maintaining them\.
4\.09 Although the O&M funding of main and secondary irrigation systems
and of drainage and flood protection works has always been a provincial
responsibility, the provinces have been unable to meet the full funding
requirements out of their own revenues\. The provincial O&M budget is suf-
ficient only to meet salaries of senior irrigation officials down to
irrigation foreman (pengamat) level\. The amount budgeted by the provinces
is about Rp 1,400/ha, with the balance coming in the form of subsidies from
the Central Government\. Because of these subsidies, there has been consider-
able improvement in O&M services in the completed and ongoing Bank-assisted
irrigation projects\. However, there is further need for trained staff, as
well as an increase in O&M budgetary allocations for the main and secondary
systems\. O&M funds allocated to the various subprojects in FY80/81 are
consistent with standing agreements between the Government and the Bank\.
For FY80/81, the Government increased the O&M allocation for rehabilitated
systems to Rp 5,820/ha (Annex 4)\.
4\.10 Shortly after construction of the tertiary works, responsibility
for O&M of the tertiary systems would shift to the water-user associations
established within the systems\. PROSIDA would, however, closely supervise
the operation of these systems for one year to ensure that all defects are
corrected and needed repairs are made before they are formally turned over
to the water-user associations\. To properly operate and maintain the
systems, each water-user association would appoint a full-time water master
(ulu-ulu) with one or two assistant water masters, who would allocate the
water to the various users on a day-to-day basis and carry out needed
maintenance and repairs\. The water-user associations would establish and
collect contributions from all beneficiaries to defray the salaries of
- 30 -
water masters, as well as the cost of materials needed for maintenance and
repairs\. These practices are presently in effect for completed tertiaries
and are generally satisfactory\. Since the standard of O&M in these systems
would be dependent upon the existence of properly functioning water-user
associations, assurances have been obtained at negotiations tha: the
Government would take the necessary steps to ensure that: (a) before the
start of construction of any tertiary network a water-user association would
be established to assist in obtaining right-of-way for construction, and to
operate and maintain it after completion; and (b) promptly when a tertiary
network is completed each association would establish and collect from its
members contributions adequate to cover sound operation and maintenance of
the system\.
4\.11 Assurances have been obtained also from the Government that (a)
all canals, drains, structures, roads, equipment and oTker facilities of the
irrigation and flood protection systems rehabilitated or constructed with
the financial assistance of the Bank would be adequately operated and main-
tained, in accordance with appropriate agricultural, engineering, financial
and public utility policies, and practices and such action would be taken as
reasonably required to ensure the economic use of the water made available
by such systems for agricultural development and operations; (b) at all
times adequate staff are employed and funds allocated and are made available,
as and when required, for the proper operation and maintenance of all irriga-
tion, flood protection and road systems constructed under Bank Group-assisted
Irrigation Projects; (c) by August 15 in each fiscal year or such other date
as the Bank may agree, GOI would make available to the organizations or
departments charged with maintenance of any such system, an amount of liquid
funds equal to not less than one half budgeted for the O&M of such systems
in each fiscal year, and make the balance available in equal quarterly
installments until all budgeted amounts have been made available; (d) the
number of qualified O&M staff would be progressively increased until
adequate levels agreed with the Bank have been attained; (e) by December 31
of each year GOI would inform the Bank of the proposed cost per hectare for
O&M budgets and staff requirements for all systems assisted by the Bank
Group by June 1 of the following year of the approved budgets, and by
October 1 of each following year the staff provisions; and (f) by
December 31, 1981, the Government would submit to the Bank for its review,
proposals for staffing and funding O&M of drainage, river training and flood
control works constructed tinder the Serang subproject, together with a
maintenance program for these works and a flood warning system; and, by
April 1, 1983, it would begin to implement these proposals and keep the Bank
informed on the progress of their implementation\.
Monitoring
4\.12 Local authorities would continue to keep records of flood occurr-
ences and damages, and provincial agricultural staff would continue recording
agricultural yields and production\. A program to monitor agricultural and
other benefits accruing from earlier Bank-assisted irrigation and drainage
- 31 -
projects was implemented under Irrigation Project VI but is inadequate to
cover new projects\. Monitoring of project progress and use of loan funds is
the responsibility of the Foreign Aid Administration office of DGWRD which
receives regular reports on physical and financial progress from the executing
agencies such as PROSIDA\. Monitoring the impact of the project is the
responsibility of the Evaluation Section, Directorate of Planning and
Programming\. This section is currently responsible for monitoring and
evaluating the USAID supported small-scale irrigation systems (SEDERRANA)
project\. It cooperates with other sources of related data such as the Central
Bureau of Statistics and the Department of Agriculture\. The Evaluation
Section will be strengthened under proposed Irrigation Project XV\.
5\. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
5\.01 The project would increase agriculture production on 0\.25 million
hectares of land in Java by providing drainage and flood protection on some
61,000 ha of land in the Serang area; by improving water control and distribu-
tion on some 65,000 ha of irrigated land in the Madiun area; and by improving
water control, distribution and utilization through the introduction of
tertiary systems serving some 120,000 ha of irrigated land in Pemali-Comal and
Pekalen-Sampean\. Rice and secondary food crops would benefit from better
drainage, water supplies, and flood protection\. Details of cropping patterns,
yields and production, as well as expected changes as a result of the project
are discussed below and are summarized in Table 5\.1 and Figure 5\.1\.
Serang River Drainage and Flood Protection
5\.02 The entire area (61,300 ha) grows rice in the wet season\. Of this
about 18,500 ha is irrigated, the remainder rainfed or with very poor irri-
gation\. About 30,200 ha of rainfed rice is planted late after seasonally
flooded land drains towards the end of the wet season (see Table 2\.1)\. In
the dry season, rice is not planted except under irrigation, for which water
is available for only 4,300 ha\. Dry season crops are maize, soybeans, and on
heavy clay soils sorghum\. In areas not seasonally flooded rice yields average
3\.4 tons/ha in properly drained irrigated areas, and 3\.0 tons/ha where drain-
age has not been improved; 1\.8 tons/ha under rainfed cropping; and 3\.8 tons/ha
under dry season irrigation\. Maize yields average 1\.0 tons/ha; soybean yields
0\.8 tons/ha; and sorghum yields 1\.7 tons/ha\. Present cropping intensities
average 156%\. In the areas presently seasonally flooded, rice yields average
1\.6 tons/ha\. Because the rice is planted late, it suffers from water short-
age, and because the length of flooding is sometimes unpredictable, farmers
use less inputs than on well irrigated and drained land\. Fewer farmers are
able to plant secondary crops, and when they do, yields are lower than in the
non-flooded area\. Cropping intensities are about 138%, and yields of maize are
0\.8 tons/ha; sorghum 1\.7 tons/ha' and soybeans 0\.6 tons/ha\.
- 32 -
Table 5\.1: CROPPING PATTERNS, YIELDS AND PRODUCTION
Future Future
Present without project with project
Pro- Pro- Pro-
Area Yield duction Area Yield duction Area Yield duction
(ha) (t/ha) (tons) (ha) (t/ha) (tons) (ha) (t/ha) (tona)
-------------------------------- Serang River --------------------------------
Nonflooded Area (29,850 ha)
Wet Season
Irrigated rice
well drained 11,100 3\.4 37,740 11,100 3\.6 39,960 11,100 3\.8 42,180
Irrigated rice
badly drained 7,400 3\.0 22,200 7,400 3\.0 22,200 7,400 3\.8 28,120
Mostly rainfed
rice 12,600 1\.8 22,680 12,600 1\.9 23,940 12,600 2\.3 28,980
Dry Season
Irrigated rice 4,300 3\.8 16,340 4,300 4\.0 17,200 4,300 4\.0 17,200
Maize 3,500 1\.0 3,500 3,500 1\.1 3,850 4,000 1\.3 5\.200
Sorghum 8,100 1\.7 13,770 8,100 1\.8 14,580 11,700 2\.0 23,400
Soybeans 1,000 0\.8 800 1,000 0\.9 900 1,300 1\.2 1,560
Cropping intensity 156% 156% 171%
Flooded Area (30,150 ha)
Wet Season
Rainfed rice 30,200 1\.6 48,320 30,200 1\.6 48,320 30,200 2\.3 69,460
Dry Season
Maize 6,700 0\.8 5,360 6,700 0\.8 5,360 6,900 1\.3 8,970
Sorghum 4,500 1\.7 7,650 4,500 1\.7 7,650 10,400 2\.0 20,800
Soybeans 500 0\.6 300 500 0\.6 300 3,900 1\.2 4,680
Cropping intensity 138% 138% 170%
---------------------------------- Madiun -----------------------------------
Wet Season
Irrigated rice 58,000 3\.2 185,600 58,000 3\.0 174,000 58,000 3\.4 197,200
Dry Season
Irrigated rice 23,000 2\.8 64,400 20,000 2\.6 50,000 52,000 3\.0 75,000
Soybeans I 23,000 0\.6 13,800 23,000 0\.5 11,500 24,000 0\.8 19,200
Soybeans II 29,000 0\.4 11,600 29,000 0\.4 11,600 29,000 0\.6 17,400
Total 133\.000 130\.000 136,000
Cropping intensity 229% 224% 234%
------------------------------- Tertiary Areas -------------------------------
Pemali-Comal
Wet Season
Irrigated rice 50,000 3\.2 150,000 50,000 3\.2 150,000 50,000 3\.6 190,000
Dry Season
Irrigated rice 32,500 3\.2 104,000 32,500 3\.2 104,000 32,500 3\.4 110,500
Maize 12,500 1\.2 15,000 12,500 1\.2 15,000 12,500 1\.5 18,750
Soybeans 10,000 0\.7 7,000 10,000 0\.7 7,000 10,000 1\.0 10,000
Total 105\.000 105\.000 105,000
Cropping intensity 210% 210% 210%
Pekalan-Sanean
Wet Season
Irrigated rice 70,000 3\.6 252,000 70,000 3\.6 252\.000 70\.000 b\.0 294\.000
Dry Season
Irrigated rice 49,000 3\.6 186,200 49,000 3\.6 176,400 49,000 3\.8 186,200
Maize 24,500 1\.5 36,750 24,500 1\.5 36,750 24,500 1\.8 44,100
Soybeans 10,500 0\.7 7,350 10,500 0\.7 7,350 10,500 1\.0 10,500
Total 154\.000 154,000 154,000
Cropping intensity 220% 220% 220%
33 -
5\.03 The main impact of project works would be to eliminate seasonal
inundation caused by poor drainage and flood protection, and to permit the
rainfed rice crop to be planted at the start of the main wet season, with more
secondary crops grown in the dry season\. On land not presently subject to
annual flooding, but still prone to periodic flooding from main rivers,
farmers are expected to increasingly use HYV on both irrigated and rainfed
land because of better water control and crop security\. Irrigated rice
yields are expected to increase to about 3\.8 tons/ha in the wet season and
about 4\.0 tons/ha in the dry season\. Rainfed rice yields are projected to
increase to about 2\.3 tons/ha\. On land previously flooded each year, more
secondary crops would be planted in the dry season; planting would be earlier
and would benefit more from rainfall and residual soil moisture\. Maize
yields would increase to about 1\.3 tons/ha; soybeans to about 1\.2 tons/ha;
and sorghum to about 2\.0 tons/ha\. Future cropping intensities would average
170%\. Future average yields and cropping intensities have been projected on
the basis of recent performance on properly drained and irrigated land in
Java\. The projected levels would be obtained 4 years after the completion of
drainage and flood protection works, when rice production would be about
186,000 tons compared to 148,000 tons at present\.
Madiun Irrigation Rehabilitation Stage II
5\.04 Project works would benefit about 58,000 ha of irrigated rice\.
By raising the water levels at the offtakes in some supply rivers and by
rehabilitating headworks and free intakes, the dry season irrigated rice
area would increase from the present 23,000 ha to 25,000 ha\. In the absence
of repair/rehabilitation works, yields of rice would steadily decline as
water intake and distribution deteriorates\. Present irrigated rice
yields averaging 3\.2 tons/ha in the wet season and 2\.8 tons/ ha in the dry
season would decline over the project period to 3\.0 tons/ha and 2\.6 tons/ha
respectively\. As a result of better water control and distribution rice
yields are projected to increase to 3\.4 tons/ha (wet season) and to 3\.0
tons/ha (dry season); and soybean yields from 0\.6 tons/ha in the dry season
and 0\.4 tons/ha for the early wet season crop to 0\.8 tons/ha and 0\.6 tons/ha
respectively\. Cropping intensity would increase marginally from a present
229% to 234% at full development\. These yields and intensities would be
attained four years after the completion of rehabilitation of each system\.
The major agricultural change would be in crop yields; no increases in wet
season irrigated area and only small increases in dry season irrigated area
are projected\. Under Irrigation Projects I-III assisted by the Bank Group,
considerable irrigated area increases were realized, but these large systems
had few sources of water and the breakdown of a small number of structures or
main canals had serious effects on the irrigated area (see PCR's for these
projects)\. In the case of Madiun the individual systems are small with many
distinct water sources, and the main impact of rehabilitation would be to
decrease losses in the systems which use the same water several times\.
Yield projections are based on similar systems in good repair in Central and
East Java; rehabilitation under the Stage I Madiun project is too recent to
show discernable production increases\.
- 34 -
Pemali-Comal and Pekalen-Sampean Tertiary Irrigation Systems
5\.05 The tertiary areas are in well established irrigation systems and
overall water supplies are adequate\. The major impact of project works would
be on crop yields which are expected to increase as a result of better and
more timely water control and distribution, and because farmers would be able
to synchronize planting in water management blocks thus leading to lower pest
and disease damage\. Area increases from better water distribution have been
conservatively ignored in the analysis\. Yields of irrigated rice at
Pemali-Comal of 3\.2 tons/ha are expected to rise to 3\.6 tons/ha (wet season)
and 3\.4 tons/ha (dry season)\. Yields of secondary crops would rise from the
present 1\.2 tons/ha maize and 0\.7 tons/ha soybeans to 1\.5 tons/ha and 1\.0
ton/ha\. At Pekalen-Sampean, present rice yields of 3\.6 tons/ha are expected
to increase to 4\.0 tons/ha in the wet season and 3\.8 tons/ha in the dry
season\. Secondary crop yields at Pekalen-Sampean would also increase through
greater control of field irrigation and better drainage\. Present yields of
1\.5 tons/ha would rise to 1\.8 tons/ha\. Soybean yields would increase from the
present 0\.7 tons/ha to 1\.0 tons/ha\. These yield estimates which would be
obtained four years after the completion of each tertiary system, are based on
actual yield increases recorded under existing tertiary development programs
in the project areas and elsewhere in Java\.
Drying, Storage and Processing
5\.06 Farmers sun-dry paddy on the roadside and in house yards on mats
and store it in their houses\. Drying of the wet season crop is sometimes
difficult, but farm families are adept at drying the small quantities grown
by each farmer (usually 1\.0 to 1\.5 tons)\. The BUUD/KTIDs are increasingly
equipped with concrete drying floors, and private traders distributed
throughout subproject areas invariably have drying facilities\. All
project areas are in established rice growing areas, and adequate rice
milling facilities exist, which can meet future demand without difficulty\.
Most rice is milled to medium grade, around 35% broken\.
6\. MARKET PROSPECTS, PRICES, FARM INCOMES AND PROJECT CHARGES
Market Prospects
6\.01 Indonesian rice production has been unable to satisfy demand for
many decades\. From 1969 to 1976 imports ranged between 0\.5 and 1\.3 million
tons\. In 1977/78 imports rose to about 2\.3 million tons; because of an
excellent 1977/78 harvest, imports during 1978/79 were 1\.3 million tons;
1979/80 imports, however, are expected to be substantially higher\. Rice-
oriented policies have been a major element of the Government's development
strategy in Repelita I and II (1969/70 to 1973/74 and 1978/79) and continue
to receive very high priority\. As a result of the heavy investments aimed
at increasing the domestic supply of rice, production is expected to grow at
between 3% and 3\.5% p\.a\. to 1985; this, however, would still imply an
- 35 -
average annual rice deficit of 2 to 3 million tons in 1985 (10% to 15% of
the total producton)\./1 Continuation of high investment rates over the next
ten years could reduce the average expected annual deficit to 2 million tons
in 1990\./1 Marketing prospects for paddy should therefore remain eminently
favorable in the future\.
6\.02 Most of the incremental rice production in the Serang River area,
Madiun, Pemali-Comal and Pekalen-Sampean would be consumed at the farm level,
while the surplus is expected to be marketed in the Semarang, Surabaya and
Jakarta urban areas\. Secondary crop production would be marketed locally\.
6\.03 The marketing system for rice in Indonesia is well established and
provides for producer price support and consumer protection through interven-
tion of the Government's rice procurement authority (BULOG/DOLOG) both on
producer and consumer markets (para\. 6\.05)\. BULOG/rOTOG maintains a floor
price for paddy and the BUUD/KUDs, acting as purchasing agent in the
villages, buy standard grades of paddy directly from farmers at a fixed
price\. The floor price is currently Rp 95 (US$0\.15)/kg for 14% moist paddy
at the village\. During non-harvest periods open market prices are generally
higher than the floor price\. A large proportion of the trade is handled by
private dealers and millers, and during the wet season harvest, farmers may
sell paddy on the open market at a discount if the BUUD/KUDs exhaust their
credit lines, and farmers are unable to obtain the cash needed immediately
for payment of taxes or debts and for purchase of inputs for the new season\.
Most farmers sell paddy with about 18-20% moisture content and up to 10%
impurities and obtain a lower price of Rp 85/kg\. Practically all farmers
have to sell some paddy immediately after harvest to meet their debts, even
if they have to repurchase rice later for consumption at prices up to Rp
150/kg\. BULOG, through its subsidiary DOLOG, also maintains rice and paddy
storage facilities at the provincial level\. Farmers sell their secondary
crop production in village and subdistrict markets\. Facilities at these
markets are being upgraded where necessary under the INPRES program\. Some
BUUD/KUDs are disseminating information on market prices to their members\.
Prices
6\.04 For farm budgets and economic analysis, farm inputs and outputs
have been valued at early 1980 prices\. For rice, soybeans and fertilizers,
economic prices were derived from the Bank's Commodity Division's forecasts
for world market prices, and adjusted for transportation and other costs;
the calculations are shown in Table 6\.1\. The economic prices of paddy
assumed in the analysis are US$243 per ton in 1980 (Rp 152 per kg) and
/1 "Indonesia: Supply Prospects for Major Food Crops," Report No\. 2374-IND,
March 3, 1979, and "Indonesia: Irrigation Program Review," Report
No\. 2027a-IND, October 16, 1978\. Over the five years in Repelita II
(1974-78), investment in irrigation was about US$2,150 million in 1979
prices\.
- 36 -
Table 6\.1: PRICE STRUCTURE FOR\. FOOD CROPS AND FERTILIZERS
Food crop and 1980 (beginning) 1q90 (mid)
fertiizer prices /a '000 Rp/ton US$/ton '000 Pp/ton USS/ton
Rice
Export price, Thai, 5% broken 255\.6 409 275\.0 440
f\.o\.b Bangkok
Indonesian import prices /b 230\.0 368 247\.5 396
Ocean freight and insurance 12\.5 20 12\.5 20
Port handling and storage 3\.8 6 3\.8 6
Transport to wholesalers /c 5\.n 8 5\.0 8
Handling, transport mill to
wholesaler /d -2\.5 -4 -2\.5 -4
Rice, ex-mill, project area 248\.8 398 266\.3 426
Paddy equivalent /e 156\.7 251 167\.5 768
Hilling costs less value
of by-products 0 0 n 0
Farm operations - 1\.9 -3 -1\.9 -3
Gross farm-gate price 154\.8 248 165\.6 265
Transport losses /f -3\.1 -5 -3\.8 -6
Farm-gate price, net of
transport losses 151\.7 243 161\.9 259
Corn
Export price, f\.o\.b\. 86\.9 139 108\.7 174
U\.S\. Gulf Ports
Ocean freight and insurance 18\.8 30 18\.8 30
Port handling at Semarang 3\.8 6 3\.8 6
Transport, wholesalers to wharf 5\.0 8 5\.0 8
Corn price at wholesalers 114\.5 183 136\.3 218
Transport, farm to wholesalers -2\.5 -4 -2\.5 -4
Farm-gate price 112\.0 179 133\.8 214
Soybean
Export price, U\.S\. c\.i\.f\. 158\.8 254 259\.4 415
Ro tterdam
Ocean freight and insurance 9\.4 15 9\.4 15
Port handling at Semarang 4\.4 7 4\.4 7
Transport, wholesalers to wharf 5\.0 8 5\.0 P
Soybean price at wholesalers 177\.6 284 278\.2 445
Transport, farm to wholesalers -3\.8 -6 -3\.8 -6
Farm-gate price 173\.8 278 274\.4 439
So rghm
Export price, f\.o\.b\. Gulf
Port 78\.1 125 95\.0 152
Ocean freight and insurance 18\.8 30 18\.8 30
Port handling 3\.7 6 3\.7 6
Transport, wholesalers to wharf 5\.0 8 5\.0 8
Sorghum price at wholesalers 105\.6 169 122\.5 196
Transport, farm to wholesalers -2\.5 -4 -2\.5 -4
Farm-gate price 103\.1 165 120\.0 192
Urea
World export price, f\.o\.b\. 99\.4 159 125\.6 201
Europe
Ex-factory price, Palembang /g 108\.8 174 135\.0 216
Handling and distribution to
retail level 18\.8 30 18\.8 30
Transport to farm 1\.2 2 1\.2 2
Farm-gate price 128\.8 706 155\.0 248
Triple super phosphate
World export price, f\.o\.b\. 80\.0 128 115\.6 185
Florida
Ocean freight and insurance 18\.8 30 18\.8 30
Handling and distribution to
retail level 15\.6 25 15\.6 25
Transport BUUD/FUD kiosk to farm 1\.2 2 1\.2 2
Farm-gate price 115\.6 185 151\.2 242
/a Calculated at an exchange rate of IUS$1\.00 - Rp 625\.
lb 90% of export price, Thai, 5% broken, f\.o\.b\. Bangkok\.
/c Weighted average of transportation costs to the wholesalers in the
different project areas\.
/d Based on an average distance of 50 km from the production area to
the wholesalers\.
/e Based on a 63% rice recovery ratio\.
If Based on 2% transportation loss between field and mill\.
g Urea is valued at ex-PUSRI factory, Palembang; IBP\.D world market price
price projections for bagged urea f\.o\.b\. Europe have been adjusted for
South-East Asia markets with a US$15 transport premiun\.
- 37 -
US$288 per ton in 1990 (Rp 180 per kg)\. The remaining inputs not traded on
the international market have been expressed in terms of actual (farmgate)
prices\. All prices used in the analyses are summarized in Table 6\.2\. Rice
produced under the project would substitute for Indonesian imports of 25%
broken quaLity rice\. It has been shown that the world market price for this
quality of rice is about 90% of the standard 5% broken Thai white rice price\.
This has been used to project the future cost savings in Indonesian rice
imports\. The economic price of soybeans has been calculated under the
assumption that Indonesia would remain a net importer of soybeans\. Indonesia
has been a traditional exporter of limited amounts of soybeans until the
last three years; it has since become a net importer under the continued
influences of increasing domestic demand and slackening production\. It is
not expected that production will keep up with demand in the coming years\.
6\.05 Histor\.cally, the Government has followed a policy of maintaining
low food prices by selling imported rice below cost and keeping domestic
floor prices low\. To mitigate the effect of this policy on farm income, the
Government has simultaneously subsidized fertilizer and pesticide\. In 1974
and 1975, however, the Government substantially raised domestic paddy prices
to encourage rice production\. This change in policy, combined with the fall
of world prices from the record levels of 1973-74, brought farm-gate prices
fairly close to world market levels, taking into account the quality
differences\. The current floor price of paddy of Rp 95/kg is expected to
increase to Rp 120/kg in 1980 (in 1980 prices)\. Prices of fertilizers would
rise from a present low of Rp 70/kg to Rp 100/kg, an increase warranted by
rising oil prices and by the effects of the November 15, 1978 devaluation of
the Rupiah\.
Farm Incomes
6\.06 Three typical farm sizes (0\.2, 0\.4 and 0\.7 ha) have been selected
for farm income analysis\. In the analysis, it is assumed that the farm family
performs all the farm tasks and also works off the farm during slack periods\.
The land use and cropping patterns for the present conditions broadly repre-
sent the averages of the aggregate cultivated lands in the project areas\.
Farm budgets include costs for harvest labor but not for farm family labor\.
Sharecropping is extensive in the project areas, and the farm incomes have
been calculated for both owner-operators and sharecroppers\. The details
of the estimated incomes for different farm sizes are presented in Annex 2
and are summarized in Table 6\.3\.
Project Charges
6\.07 The Government has effective mechanisms to recover a significant
measure of project costs through the collection of the IPEDA tax and of a
water charge\.
6\.08 IPEDA\. IPEDA is a land tax collected nationwide by the village head
and turned over to local and provincial administrations for use in public
services\. Allocation of GOI funds under the local infrastructure development
- 38 -
Table 6\.2: INPUT AND OUTPUT PRICE SUMMARY
1980 (beginning) 1990 (mid)
Financial Economic Financial Economic
Crops (Rp/kg)
Paddy 85 152 120 160
Corn 80 112 80 134
Soybeans 220 174 274 274
Sorghum 75 103 75 120
Seeds (Rp/kg)
Rice - local 85 160 100 190
- HYV 200 250 200 250
Corn 80 125 80 150
Soybeans 220 200 300 300
Sorghum 90 110 90 135
Fertilizer (Rp/kg)
Urea 70 129 100 155
TSP 70 116 100 151
Other Inputs
Zinc phosRhide (Rp/kg) 2,300 4,200 2,300 4,200
Agrochemicals (Rp/l) 1,250 6,400 1,250 6,400
Animal labor (Rp/day) 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250
Farm labor (Rp/man-day)
Land preparation 700 350 700 350
Planting 500 250 500 250
Crop management 500 250 500 250
Harvesting 800 400 800 400
INDONESIA
IRRIGATION XIV PROJECT
Summarv of Farm Incomes
Net crop income Off-farm income Total farm income Per capita income
Future w/o Future with Future w/o Future with Future w/o Future with Future w/o Future with
Present project project Present project project Present project project Present project project
--------------------------------------------- Rp'00O ----------------------------------------------- ------------ UsS$ ---------------
----------------------------------------- Serang Drainage and Flood Control --------------------------------------------------
Nonfiooded Area
0\.2 ha Owner-operator 48 71 82 75 75 75 123 146 157 36 42 46
Sharecropper 25 36 42 75 75 75 100 111 117 29 32 34
0\.4 ha Owner-operator 88 132 153 65 65 65 153 197 218 45 57 63
Sharecropper 46 68 80 65 65 65 111 133 145 32 39 42
0\.7 ha Owner-operator 150 226 259 55 55 55 205 281 314 60 82 91
Sharecropper 78 116 135 55 55 55 133 171 190 39 50 55
Flooded Area
0\.2 ha Owner-operator 22 31 60 75 75 75 97 106 135 28 31 39
Sharecropper 12 16 32 75 75 75 87 91 107 25 26 31
0\.4 ha Owner-operator 40 57 111 65 65 65 105 122 176 31 35 51
Sharecropper 21 30 59 65 65 65 86 95 124 25 28 36
0\.7 ha Owner-operator 68 99 195 60 60 60 128 159 255 37 46 74
Sharecropper 37 52 104 60 60 60 97 112 164 28 33 48
------------------------------------------------- Madiun Rehabilitation - Stage II ---------------------------------------------------
0\.2 ha Owner-operator 70 89 117 70 70 70 140 159 187 41 46 54
Sharecropper 36 45 60 70 70 70 106 115 130 31 33 38
0\.4 ha Owner-operator 133 170 221 60 60 60 193 230 281 56 67 82
Sharecropper 68 86 114 60 60 60 128 146 174 37 42 51
0\.7 ha Owner-operator 224 285 374 45 45 45 269 330 419 78 96 122
Sharecropper 115 147 192 45 45 45 160 192 237 47 56 69
-----------------__------------------------------------ Tertiary Development
---------------------------------------------
Pekalen-Sampean
0\.2 ha Owner-operator 93 132 143 70 70 70 163 202 212 47 59 62
Sharecropper 47 67 73 70 70 70 117 1-37 143 34 40 42
0\.4 ha Owner-operator 176 250 269 60 60 60 236 310 329 69 90 96
Sharecropper 89 126 138 60 60 60 149 186 198 43 54 58
0\.7 ha Owner-operator 294 418 450 45 45 45 339 463 495 99 135 144
Sharecropper 150 212 231 45 45 45 195 257 276 57 75 80
Pemali Comal
0\.2 ha Owner-operator 74 107 123 70 70 70 144 177 193 42 51 56
Sharecropper 38 54 63 70 70 70 108 124 133 31 36 39
0\.4 ha Owner-operator 139 200 230 60 60 60 199 260 290 58 76 84
Sharecropper 71 101 118 60 60 60 131 161 178 38 47 52
0\.7 ha Owner-operator 5\.5 233 336 386 45 45 45 278 381 431 68 98 125
Sharecropper 5\.5 119 170 199 45 45 45 164 215 244 35 49 71 5
(D
- 40 -
program (INPRES) are tied to IPEDA collection performance and provide a
constant incentive for good IPEDA collection rates\. The IPEDA land classifi-
cation is based on soil fertility, quality of irrigation and other yield
determining factors and IPEDA levels are based on average production levels
on these clas-s of land; amounts collected would therefore increase as crop
yields rise and IPEDA land classification is modified in the project area in
response to the project\. There is no mechanism relating incremental IPEDA
collection due to irrigation projects to incremental allocations of O&M funds\.
6\.09 Water Charges\. Water charges are collected by water users associa-
tions and are earmarked for O&M of tertiary and quaternary canals and drains\.
The levels of water charges vary according to the level of development of
tertiary units but would average some 25 kg of paddy/ha/season for units
developed to approved GOI standards\. This is sufficient to pay for the
services of the wat0±r-master (ulu-ulu) and, -where applicable, of his assis-
tants; sometimes the water charge is in the form of an area of village rice
land reserved for the water master\.
6\.10 Cost Recovery\. Present and estimated future levels of IPEDA and
water charges are as follows:
Table 6\.4: PROJECT CHARGES AVERAGED OVER PROJECT AREAS
Present /a With project /b Increment
(Rp/ha) /c ----------------------
IPEDA 7,500 12,500 5,000
Water charges - 4,250 4,250
Total 7,500 16,750 9,250
/a Present and "future without project" charges would be the same\.
/b With project refers to full agricultural development\.
/c In constant early 1980 prices\.
At full development, water charges would cover O&M costs at the tertiary
level and incremental IPEDA collection would more than offset incremental
O&M outlays for main and secondary networks\./l Direct cost recovery indices
comparing the present value of direct Government recovery (incremental IPEDA)
discounted at 10% opportunity cost of capital to present value of Government
costs (capital + O&M of main systems) are shown in Table 6\.5\. Further
analysis of the cost recovery issue should take into account lower government
/1 In 1980/81, O&M expenses are fixed at Rp 3,540/ha for nonrehabilitated
systems and Rp 5,820/ha for rehabilitated system (PROSIDA standards)
resulting in Rp 2,280/ha incremental O&M expenses due to rehabilitation
(Annex 4)\.
- 41 -
expenses for international rice procurement due to increased domestic produc-
tion (indirect recovery) and the advantages of Bank borrowing (indirect
cost)\.
6\.11 Rent Recovery\. From the point-of-view of the benefiting farmer,
the project is a windfall opportunity for realizing increased incomes
(Table 6\.3)\. The project rent calculation shown in Annex 2, Table 8,
attempts to separate earned income increases (through increased labor,
management, etc\.) from "nonearned" increases and the rent recovery index
indicates how much of the "nonearned" portion is returned to the Government
over the project life\. Rent recovery indices for project components are
shown in Table 6\.5\. Most project farmers have annual per capita incomes
below the critical consumption level of about US$110\. Rent recovery indices
are consistent with the farmers' capacity to pay and both GOI and the Bank's
income distribution objectives especially since besides IPEDA and water
charges, farmers pay some 10% of gross production in village taxes, and
contribute to the social life of the village through religious taxes,
compulsory feasts and by allowing village members to participate in the
harvest\.
6\.12 O&M Funding\. The amounts provided each year for operation and
maintenance of systems rehabilitated or constructed with Bank Group
assistance have steadily risen, consistent with assurances given by the
Government\. Further increases are still necessary, but to ease the burden
on the Central Government, ways of increasing project charges are being
considered\. Assurances were obtained while negotiating Irrigation Project
XII that by June 30, 1980, the Government would prepare and furnish to the
Bank for comment, a study to: (a) determine the level of funds necessary to
ensure adequate operation and maintenance of irrigation systems financed by
the Bank and the Association; (b) investigate sources of funds and
mechanisms to ensure timely availability of such funds; and (c) recommend
appropriate levels of direct and indirect contributions including, among
others, IPEDA contributions from the beneficiaries of irrigation\. The study
which is being conducted by the University of Gaja Mada (Jogjakarta) covers
as sample areas the Pemali-Comal (Java) and Sadang (South Sulawesi) systems\.
6\.13 Assurances have been obtained at negotiations that following
completion of project irrigation works, the government would collect from
farmers an adjusted IPEDA sufficient to ensure sound O&M practices and to
recover a reasonable portion of the capital costs during the project's
useful life, taking into account farmers' incentives and ability to pay\.
Assurances were obtained also that appropriate water charges would be
collected by water users associations to ensure sound O&M practices at the
tertiary level, and that the IPEDA rates established and collected would be
furnished once every two years for the Bank's comments (para\. 4\.10)\.
- 42 -
Table 6\.5: COST AND RENT RECOVERY INDICES
Serapg_
Non-
flooded Flooded Madiun Pemali-Comal Pekalan-Sampean
Rent Recovery Index /a (%)
0\.2 ha Farm
Owner-operator 40\.4 15\.1 17\.0 27\.5 42\.2
Sharecropper 26\.7 9\.3 12\.1 16\.0 30\.8
0\.4 ha Farm
Owner-operator 43\.0 15\.9 17\.2 29\.8 48\.1
Sharecropper 39\.1 11\.2 13\.2 24\.3 50\.0
0\.7 ha Farm
Owner-operator 43\.9 15\.9 19\.2 31\.1 47\.4
Sharecropper 35\.7 11\.1 6\.2 25\.0 39\.5
Direct Cost Recovery Index /b (%)
5 11 31 31
/a The Rent Recovery Index is the ratio of the present value of incremental
revenue (IPEDA and water charges) to the present value of project tents,
both calculated at 10% discount rate\. Project rent calculations are
detailed in Annex 2 Table 8 and attempt to show the nonearned revenues
accruing to the farmers as a result of the project\. On any farm the rent
is defined as from farm income less farm expenses less taxes less imputed
value of family labor less allowances for management and risk; the project
rent is defined as the incremental revenues of all farms benefiting from
the project\.
/b The Direct Cost Recovery Index is the ratio of the present value of
incremental revenue (IPEDA and water charges) to the present value of
incremental financial costs, both calculated at 10% discount rate\.
- 43 -
7\. BENEFITS, JUSTIFICATION AND RISKS
7\.01 The project would increase crop yields and production on a quarter
of a million hectares of land and directly benefit 0\.6 million farm families
or 2\.6 million people; it would indirectly benefit some 0\.3 million landless
laborers' families, or 1\.7 million people\. The project would permit more
timely planting of the rice crop; allow additional secondary crops to be grown
in the following dry season in presently flooded areas; and by increasing
cultivation inputs and harvesting labor needs, would create a demand for an
additional 8\.1 million man-days of farm labor each yStr, equivalent to 31,500
full-time additional jobs\. The project would create a demand for some 114,000
man-years of construction labor over the construction period\. Expected future
crop yields and production, with and without the project, are discussed in
Chapter 5\.
7\.02 Access and inspection roads along drains and canals improved or
constructed under the project would substantially benefit the Serang and
Madiun areas\. Farm production would be stimulated because of easier market-
ing of produce and travel of extension service staff\. The drainage and flood
protection works would diminish O&M costs and travel interruptions on
presently seasonally flooded roads\. The recurrent threat of flooding and
present household disruption due to flooding would be reduced, and health
would improve especially by reduction of intestinal diseases and parasites\.
The non agricultural benefits of drainage and flood control account for about
10% of benefits on Serang\. They have been estimated on the basis of physical
damage avoided and reduced costs of repairing and maintaining roads, bridges,
levees and structures, and of health care and government subsidies\.
7\.03 At present some 90% of project farmers have per capita incomes below
the estimated absolute poverty level /1 and, therefore, belong to the target
poverty population\. At full project development, this proportion would be
lowered to about 80%\. About 60% of project farm benefits would accrue to the
target group of poor farmers with 25% accruing to sharecroppers and 35% to
owner-operators\. The remainder would go to larger farmers (average farm size
1\.7 ha) a majority of which still earn less than the national average per
capita income (US$360)\. Costs per farm familyL2 to achieve projected benefits
are US$640 in the Serang subproject; US$230 in Madiun; and US$100 for the
Tertiary subproject\.
Main Assumptions Used in Economic Analysis
7\.04 The main assumptions used are:
Foreign Exchange\. Together with the November 1978 devaluation of
the rupiah, a package of measures was enacted to reduce import
duties, quantitative restrictions and export subsidies\. As a
result, the present official exchange rate of US$1\.00 = Rp 625 is
/1 Based on an estimated absolute poverty level (in 1980 prices), of
US$120 per capita per annum\.
12 Including physical and price contingencies\.
- 44 -
estimated to reflect the value to the economy of the foreign
exchange used in carrying out the project and saved through
increased grain production\. A standard conversion factor of 1\.0
has, therefore, been used in replacement of the previous factor of
0\.85^ However, this value has also been considered in the
sensitivity analyses\.
Labor Pricing\. There is considerable population pressure in
the project areas as in most areas of Java\. This is reflected in
the large proportion of landless population (up to 402) and small
average farm sizes (about 0\.4 ha) which compel farm laborers to seek
additional off-farm employment\. As a result, labor supply is
overabundant and wages are low, averaging less than Rp 550 per
man-day; unemployment is considerable and economic wages have
consequently been assessed at about 50% of market values (Rp 275 per
man-day) as for similar Bank-assisted projects in Indonesia\. Given
the low market wages, variations in this percentage would only have
negligible effects on the rate of return\.
Investment Costs\. The construction unit rates are expressed
in early 1980 prices net of taxes and duties\. Because of the
November 1978 devaluation, and post devaluation government controls,
unit rates of local components are artificially low in US$ terms; in
the coming years, local costs are expected to escalate faster than
foreign costs\. Inflation rates have been applied to the local
components therefore to take into acount the difference between
local and international inflation on investment costs at at levels
of 6% for 1981, 7% for 1982 and 3% between 1983 and 1985, consistent
with price increase assumptions in para\. 3\.13\. With shadow pricing
of labor, economic costs are as follows:
Table 7\.1: ECONOMIC COSTS
Serang River Madiun Tertiary
drainage & flood irrigation irrigation
protection rehabilitation systems
Financial Economic Financial Economic Financial Economic
cost /a cost cost /a cost cost La cost
(US$ million)--------------------
Unskilled labor 12\.0 7\.0 3\.3 1\.9 10\.8 6\.2
Other local costs 28\.6 33\.5 11\.6 13\.3 12\.6 14\.4
Foreign component 30\.9 30\.9 16\.2 16\.2 4\.4 4\.4
Total 71\.5 71\.4 31\.1 31\.4 27\.8 25\.0
/a Base cost plus physical contingencies\.
- 45 -
Development Period\. In the Serang subproject the largest contribu-
tion to benefits would be made by farmers planting rice at the start
of the wet season, instead of the end of the wet season, and then
introducing secondary crops in the dry season\. Farmers would change
the present cropping pattern when assured that drainage and flood
protection works are effective\. Similarly, farmers not affected by
annual flooding, would improve cultivation practices markedly after
they feel secure from periodic flooding\. The benefit build up has
been assessed over four years, with only 15% of benefits realized
the year after completion of works and a buildup of 40%, 80%, and
100% thereafter\. No changes in cropping pattern are projected for
the Madiun and Tertiary Development subprojects and in accordance
with results being achieved under earlier projects, a steady benefit
build up over four years has been assessed\. Benefits have been
assumed to increase by 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% of full benefits\.
Other Assumptions\. Economic cost and benefit streams have been
expressed in border prices (conversion factors method)\. The period
of analysis is 30 years\. Shadow pricing of inputs other than labor
has not been found necessary; in particular, the waters used by the
project components have no other use than contributing to the with-
out project agricultural production\.
Economic Rates of Return
7\.05 The economic rates of return are 14% for the Serang River Drainage
and Flood Protection, 29% for Madiun irrigation rehabilitation, and 37% for
tertiary irrigation construction in Pemali-Comal and Pekalen-Sampean\. The
rate of return on the overall project is 25%\. Economic costs and benefits
are summarised in Tables 7\.2 and Annex 2 Table 12\.
Sensitivity Analysis
7\.06 Sensitivity analysis was used to determine which variables would be
most crucial to the success of the project\. To that end, crossover values for
a 10% discount rate were calculated for a number of variables\. The crossover
value is the value of the variable tested for which the project's net present
value, calculated at 10% discount rate, is zero, or, equivalently, the value
beyond which the economic rate of return would be below 10%\. Therefore, the
greater the difference between the crossover value and the value assumed in
the analysis, the less sensitive the economic rate of return is to the tested
variable\.
7\.07 The Serang River drainage and flood protection subproject is not
overly sensitive to individual assumptions, in particular, future world prices
of rice could be lower than present prices by up to 39% (in real terms), and
leave the rate of return above 10% (Table 7\.3)\. Rice yield increases of
about 560 kgs/ha are predicted over a four-year development period, but an
increase of 272 kgs/ha would be sufficient to justify the subproject\. If
- 46 -
Table 7\.2: ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEPITS
(US$ million)
Costs
Capital O&M Total Benefits
Serang Drainage and Flood Control
1980 2\.9 - 2\.9 -
1981 19\.4 0\.1 19\.5 0\.1
1982 24\.8 0\.5 25\.3 0\.8
1983 19\.2 1\.1 20\.3 2\.9
1984 5\.1 1\.6 6\.7 6\.3
1985 1\.7 1-7 10;0
1986 1\.7 1\.7 12\.7
1987 1\.7 1\.7 14\.0
1988 1\.7 1\.7 14\.5
1989-2010 1\.7 1\.7 14\.6
NPV
At 10% discount rate 58\.9 13\.0 71\.9 93\.5
At 20% discount rate 49\.9 5\.9 55\.8 37\.5
Economic rate of return: 14%
Madiun Rehabilitation (Stage II)
1980 4\.1 - 4\.1 -
1981 12\.3 0\.1 12\.4 0\.5
1982 12\.2 0\.4 12\.6 2\.5
1983 2\.8 0\.7 3\.5 2\.8
1984 0\.8 0\.8 9\.6
1985 0\.8 0\.8 12\.6
1986 0\.8 0\.8 14\.3
1987-2010 0\.8 0\.8 14\.6
Present Value
At 10% discount rate 27\.5 6\.5 34\.0 100\.3
At 20% discount rate 24\.4 3\.1 27\.4 42\.3
At 40% discount rate 20\.1 1\.3 21\.4 14\.2
Economic rate of return: 29%
Tertiary Development
Pekalan-Sampean
1980 3\.5 - 3\.8 -
1981 3\.8 0\.3 4\.1 0\.5
1982 3\.8 0\.7 4\.5 1\.7
1983 3\.4 1\.0 4\.8 3\.4
1984 1\.0 1\.0/ 5\.6
1985 1\.0 1\.0 7\.2
1986 1\.0 1\.0 8\.4
1987-2010 1\.0 1\.0 8\.9
Present Value
At 10% discount rate 12\.6 8\.5 21\.1 62\.1
At 20% discount rate 11\.3 4\.2 15\.5 26\.7
At 40% discount rate 9\.4 1\.4 10\.8 9\.3
Economic Rate of Return: 37%
Pemali-Comal
1980 2\.5 - 2\.6 -
1981 2\.8 0\.2 2\.9 0\.4
1982 2\.7 0\.5 3\.2 1\.2
1983 2\.5 0\.7 3\.4 2\.5
1984 0\.7 0\.7 4\.1
1985 0\.7 0\.7 5\.3
1986 0\.7 0\.7 6\.2
1987-2010 0\.7 0\.7 6\.6
Present Value
At 10% discount rate 9\.2 6\.0 15\.2 45\.9
At 20% discount rate 8\.2 2\.9 11\.1 19\.7
At 40% discount rate 6\.8 1\.3 8\.1 6\.9
Economic Rate of Return: 37%
- 47 -
construction costs were to rise 37% above estimated costs and the projected
benefits are realized, the rate of return would stay above 10%\. Delays of
3-1/2 years in realizing projected benefits would reduce the rate of return to
10%\. Nonagricultural benefits are estimated to be about 10% of total
subproject benefits, and failure to realize such benefits would reduce the
rate of return by less than 2%\. Because of the complex interrelation between
drainage and flood protection works in the proposed Serang scheme, no attempt
has been made to analyze these works and their benefits separately\.
7\.08 Crossover values (shown also in Table 7\.3) confirm that rehabilita-
tion of irrigation systems in Madiun and tertiary systems development in
Pemali-Comal and Pekalen-Sampean allows substantial yield increases at rela-
tively low cost; in the analysis, wet season rice yields have been assumed to
increase by 400 kgs/ha in Madiun and 300 kgs/ha in tertiary subproject areas,
but secondary crop benefits alone are sufficient to justify the project in
Madiun and Pemali-Comal while increases in paddy yields of only about 10 kgs/
ha are sufficient in Pekalen-Sampean (yield increases of 200 kgs/ha soybeans
and 300 kgs/ha maize have been assumed)\. Sensitivity to rice prices is
naturally of the same order; assumptions regarding cropping intensities have
minimal bearing on justification of the irrigation subprojects; secondary
crops account for 36% of benefits in Madiun and 29% of benefits in tertiary
areas\. For all subproject components, shadow pricing assumptions are of
secondary importance\.
7\.09 Risks\. No major management or organizational problems are expected
in the implementation of the project\. Rapid inflation over the last several
years led to sizeable cost overruns on projects initiated in the early 1970s\.
Inflation is a continuing problem after last year's devaluation of the Rupiah;
however, the provisions for price increases are greater than in earlier
projects financed by the Bank Group\. Cost estimates for Miadiun rehabilitation
works were extrapolated from actual costs of the Stage I project, taking due
account of inflation and allowing for smaller sized systems\. Actual costs of
Stage II might turn out to be rather different, but the foregoing sensitivity
analysis indicates that the Madiun project's economic viability would be
little affected by sizeable cost increases\.
- 48 -
Table 7\.3: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Appraisal Crossover
value value % Change
Serarig Drainage and Flood Control
Increase in paddy yields /a (kg/ha) 560 272/b -39
World price of rice /c (US$/ton) 490 238/b -39
Total construction cost (US$ million) 71\.5 97\.7 +37
Pure benefit delay n\.a\. 3\.4 yrs\. n\.a\.
Shadow foreign exchange rate /d 625 512 -18
Shadow wage rate (coefficient) 0\.5 2\.8 +460
Madiun Rehabilitation - Stage II
Increase in paddy yields /a (kg/ha) 400 /e /e
World price of rice /c (US$/ton) 490 /e /e
Total construction cost (US$ million) 31\.1 106\.1 +341
Pure benefit delay n\.a\. 11\.4 yrs\. n\.a\.
Shadow foreign exchange rate /d 625 263 -58
Shadow wage rate (coefficient) 0\.5 3\.5 +600
Tertiary Development
Pekalan-Sampean
Increase in paddy yields /a (kg/ha) 318 /e /e
World price of rice /c (US$/ton) 490 /e /e
Total construction cost (US$ million) 16\.3 69\.3 +325
Pure benefit delay n\.a\. 11\.3 yrs\. n\.a\.
Shadow foreign exchange rate /d 625 320 -49
Shadow wage rate (coefficient) 0\.5 2\.4 +380
Pemali-Comal
Increase in paddy yields /a (kg/ha) 321 /e /e
World price of rice /c (US$/ton) 490 /e /e
Total construction cost (US$ million) 11\.5 49\.9 +334
Pure benefit delay n\.a\. 11\.6 yrs\. n\.a\.
Shadow foreign exchange rate /d 625 245 -61
Shadow wage rate (coefficient) 0\.5 2\.4 +380
/a Based on weighted average of yield increases\.
/b 54% of benefits are due to paddy\.
/c Price of Thai, 5% broken, f\.o\.b\. Bangkok\.
Id Rupiah equivalent of US$1\.
/e Although 64% of expected total Madiun benefits and 71% of tertiary benefits
would arise from increased rice production, benefits from secondary crops
alone would be sufficient to justify the project at a 10% discount rate\.
- 49 -
8\. AGREEMENTS REACHED AND RECOMMENDATION
8\.01 During negotiations, agreement was reached with Government
on the following points:
(a) except for a total of up to US$5 million of works
with minimum contract size of US$100,000, civil works at Madiun
would be grouped into a number of suitable contracts with minimum
size US$500,000 (para\. 3\.16)
(b) contracts for civil works exceeding US$1\.5 million and for
equipment exceeding US$200,000 in value would be submitted to the
Bank for review before tendering and award (para\. 3\.18);
(c) PROSIDA would maintain separate accounts for each subproject;
engage auditors acceptable to the Bank to audit these accounts and
\.statements of expenditures submitted in support of loan withdrawal
applications; and submit to the Bank, within six months of the
close of each fiscal year, audited statements, together with the
auditor's comments (para\. 3\.20);
(d) by July 1, 1980, GOI would appoint consultants whose qualifica-
tions, experience and conditions of employment would be satis-
factory to the Bank to assist with construction supervision
(para\. 4\.05);
(e) the Government would take the necessary steps to ensure that:
before the start of construction of any tertiary network a water-
user association would be established to assist in obtaining
right-of-way for construction, and to operate and maintain it
after completion; and promptly when a tertiary network is completed
each association would establish and collect from its members
contributions adequate to cover sound operation and maintenance
of the system (para\. 4\.10);
(f) all canals, drains, structures, roads, equipment and other facil-
ities of the irrigation and flood protection systems rehabilitated
or constructed with the financial assistance of the Bank would be
adequately operated and maintained, in accordance with appropriate
agricultural, engineering, financial and public utility policies
and practices, and such action would be taken as reasonably required
to ensure the economic use of the water made available by such
systems for agricultural development and operations; at all times
adequate staff are employed and funds allocated and would be made
available to the organizations or departments charged with
maintenance of any such system, an amount of liquid funds equal to
not less than one half of the amount budgeted for the O&M of such
systems in each fiscal year, and make the balance available in
equal quarterly installments until all budgeted amounts have been
- 50 -
made available; the number of qualified O&M staff would be progres-
sively increased until adequate levels agreed with the Bank have
been attained; by December 31 of each year GOI would inform the
Bank of the proposed cost per hectare for O&M budgets and staff
requirements for all systems assiste by the Bank Group by June 1
of the following year of the approved budgets, and by October 1 of
each following year the staff provisions; and by December 31,
1981, the Government would submit to the Bank for its review
proposals for staffing and funding O&M of drainage, river training
and flood control works constructed under the Serang subproject,
together with a maintenance program for these works and a flood
warning system; and by April 1, 1983, it would begin to implement
these proposals and keep the Bank informed on the progress of
their implementation (para\. 4\.11); and
(g) following the completion of project irrigation works, the
Government would collect from farmers an adjusted IPEDA sufficient
to ensure sound O&M practices and to recover a reasonable portion
of the capital costs during the projects' useful life, taking into
account farmers' incentives to pay; and that the IPEDA rates
established and collected would be furnished once every two years
for the Bank's comments (para\. 6\.13)\.
8\.02 With the above assurances, the project is suitable for a Bank loan
of US$116 million with a 20-year maturity including a grace period of five
years\. The Borrower would be the Republic of Indonesia\.
- 51 -
INDONESIA ANNEX 1
IRRIGATION PROJECT XIV Table 1
Cost Estimate /a
Foreign Base
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total exchange cost
----- Rp million ----- ----- US$ million
-
-- __- % ------
1\. Serang Drainage & Flood Control
Civil works 17,810 15,190 33,000 28\.5 24\.3 52\.8 46 88
Land acquisition 1,500 - 1,500 2\.4 - 2\.4 - 4
Consulting services lb 250 630 880 0\.4 1\.0 1\.4 71 2
Vehicles & construction equip\. - 190 190 - 0\.3 0\.3 100 1
Training - 120 120 - 0\.2 0\.2 100 -
Administratation & overhead 1,810 - 1,810 2\.9 - 2\.9 - 5
Base Cost 21\.370 16\.130 37,500 34\.2 25\.8 60\.0 43 100
Physical contingencies /c 4,070 3,120 7,190 6\.5 5\.0 11\.5 43 19
Expected price increase 10,500 4,440 14,940 16\.8 7\.1 23\.9 30 40
Subtotal 35\.940 23\.690 59\.630 57\.5 37\.9 95\.4 40 159
Taxes on civil works /e 1,560 1,060 2,620 2\.5 1\.7 4\.2 40 7
Total 37,500 24,750 62,250 60\.0 39\.6 99\.6 40 166
2\. Madiun Rehabilitation - Stage II
Civil works 6,940 7,690 14,630 11\.1 12\.3 23\.4 53 84
Consulting services /b 940 810 1,750 1\.5 1\.3 2\.8 46 10
Vehicles & construction equip\. - 60 60 - 0\.1 0\.1 100 -
O&M equipment - 130 130 - 0\.2 0\.2 100 1
Administration & overhead 810 - 810 1\.3 - 1\.3 - 5
Base Cost 8,690 8\.690 17\.380 13\.9 13\.9 27\.8 49 100
Physical contingencies /c 1,560 1,630 3,190 2\.5 2\.6 5\.1 51 18
Expected price increase 2,940 1,680 4,620 4\.7 2\.7 7\.4 36 27
Subtotal 13\.190 12,000 25,190 21\.1 19\.2 40\.3 48 145
Taxes on civil works /e 500 560 1,060 0\.8 0\.9 1\.7 53 6
Total 13,690 12,560 26,250 21\.9 20\.1 42\.0 48 151
3\. Tertiary Development
Civil works 11,440 2,190 13,630 18\.3 3\.5 21\.8 17 76
Consulting services 2,690 560 3,250 4\.3 0\.9 5\.2 17 18
Vehicles and equipment - 120 120 - 0\.2 0\.2 100 1
Mapping 60 130 190 0\.1 0\.2 0\.3 67 1
Administration & overhead 810 - 810 1\.3 - 1\.3 - 5
Base Cost 15,000 3,000 18,000 24\.0 4\.8 28\.8 17 100
Physical contingencies /c 2,690 560 3,250 4\.3 0\.9 5\.2 17 18
Expected price increase 5,250 630 5,880 8\.4 1\.0 9\.4 11 33
Subtotal 22,940 4,190 27\.130 36\.7 6\.7 43\.4 15 151
Taxes on civil works /e 870 190 1,060 1\.4 0\.3 1\.7 17 6
Total 23\.810 4,380 28\.190 38\.1 7\.0 45\.1 16 157
Project subtotal 72\.070 39\.880 111,950 115\.3 63\.8 179\.1 36 154
Taxes on civil works /e 2,930 1,810 4,740 4\.7 2\.9 7\.6 38 7
PROJECT TOTAL 75,000 41\.690 116\.690 120\.0 66\.7 186\.7 37 160
/a Based on beginning 1980 prices and exchange rate of US$1\.00 = Rp 625\.
/b Based on billing rate of about US$7,100/man-month and reimbursable expenses of about US$3,400/man-
month for foreign consultants and billing rate of about US$1,200/man-month and reimbursable expenses
of about US$300/man-month for local engineers\.
/c About 20% for civil works and 10% for equipment and services\.
/d Includes tertiary and quaternary drains\.
Ie Based on 5% of civil works (base cost plus physical contingencies plus expected price increase
for civil works)\.
-52 - ANN3EX I
Table 2
INDONESIA
IRRIGATION PROJECT XIV
Schedule of Expenditures
(US$ million)
1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 Total expenditures
Incal Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Total
I\. Serang Drainage & Flood Control
Civil works - - 5\.5 5\.1 12\.1 10\.7 8\.6 7\.2 2\.3 1\.3 28\.5 24\.3 52\.8
Equipment & services 0\.5 0\.5 2\.1 0\.3 1\.5 0\.2 1\.4 0\.3 0\.2 0\.2 5\.7 1\.5 7\.2
Base Cost 0\.5 0\.5 7\.6 5\.4 13\.6 10\.9 10\.0 7\.5 2\.5 1\.5 34\.2 25\.8 ti4-0
Physical contingencies 0\.1 0\.1 1\.4 1\.1 2\.6 2\.1 1\.9 1\.5 0\.5 0\.2 6\.5 5\.0 11\.5
Expected price increases 0\.1 - 2\.1 0\.9 6\.3 8\.8 6\.3 2\.7 2\.0 0\.7 16\.8 7\.1 23\.9
Subtotal 0\.7 0\.6 11\.1 7\.4 22\.5 15\.8 18\.2 11\.7 5\.0 2\.4 57\.5 37\.9 95\.4
Taxes on civil works la - - 0\.5 0\.4 1\.0 0\.7 0\.8 0\.5 0\.2 0\.1 2\.5 1\.7 4\.2
Total 0\.7 0\.6 11\.6 7\.8 23\.5 16\.5 19\.0 12\.2 5\.2 2\.5 60\.Q 39\.6 99\.6
II\. Madiun Rehabilitation - Stage IT
Civil works 1\.5 1\.7 4\.3 4\.8 4\.3 4\.7 1\.0 1\.1 - - 11\.1 12\.3 23\.4
Equipment & services 0\.9 0\.6 1\.1 0\.5 0\.6 0\.3 0\.2 0\.2 - - 2\.8 1\.6 4\.4
Base Cost 2\.4 2\.3 5\.4 5\.3 4\.9 5\.n 1\.2 1\.3 - - 13\.9 13\.9 27\.8
Physical contingencies 0\.4 0\.4 1\.0 1\.0 0\.9 1\.0 0\.2 0\.2 - - 2\.5 2\.6 5\.1
Expected price increases 0\.2 0\.1 1\.5 0\.8 2\.3 1\.3 0\.7 0\.5 - - 4\.7 2\.7 7\.4
Subtotal 3\.0 2\.8 7\.9 7\.1 8\.1 7\.3 2\.1 2\.0 - - 21\.1 19\.2 40\.3
Taxes on civil works la 0\.1 0\.1 0\.3 0\.3 0\.3 0\.4 0\.1 0\.1 - - 0\.8 0\.9 1\.7
Total 3\.1 2\.9 8\.2 7\.4 8\.4 7\.7 2\.2 2\.1 - - 21\.9 20\.1 42\.0
III\. Tertiary Development
Civil works 4\.4 0\.8 5\.0 1\.1 4\.8 1\.1 4\.1 0\.5 - - 18\.3 3\.5 21\.8
Equipment & services 1\.1 0\.5 2\.2 0\.4 2\.2 0\.4 0\.2 - - - 5\.7 1\.3 7\.0
Base Cost 5\.5 1\.3 7\.2 1\.5 7\.0 1\.5 4\.3 0\.5 - - 24\.0 4\.8 28\.8
Physical contingencies 1\.0 0\.3 1\.2 0\.3 1\.3 0\.2 0\.8 0\.1 - - 4\.3 0\.9 5\.2
Expected price increases 0\.4 0\.1 2\.1 0\.3 3\.2 0\.4 2\.7 0\.2 - - 8\.4 1\.0 9\.4
Subtotal 6\.9 1\.7 10\.5 2\.1 11\.5 2\.1 7\.8 0\.8 - - 36\.7 6\.7 43\.4
Taxes on civil works /a 0\.3 0\.1 0\.4 0\.1 0\.4 0\.1 0\.3 - - - 1\.4 0\.3 1\.7
Total 7\.2 1\.8 10\.9 2\.2 11\.9 2\.2 8\.1 0\.8 - - 38\.1 7\.0 45\.1
Project subtotal 10\.6 5\.1 29\.5 16\.6 42\.1 25\.2 28\.1 14\.5 5\.0 2\.4 115\.3 63\.8 179\.1
Taxes on civil works /a 0\.4 0\.2 1\.2 0\.8 1\.7 1\.2 1\.2 0\.6 0\.2 0\.1 4\.7 2\.9 7\.6
PROJECT TOTAL 11\.0 5\.3 30\.7 17\.4 43\.8 26\.4 29\.3 15\.1 5\.2 2\.5 120\.0 66\.7 186\.7
/a Based on 5% of civil works costs (base cost plus physical contingencies plus expected price increases)\.
53 ~ ANNEX I
Table 3
INDONESIA
IRRIGATION PROJECT XIV
Estimated Schedule of Disbursements
IBRD fiscal year and semester Cumulative disbursement
(US$ million)
FY80
Second 0\.2
FY81
First 1\.0
Second 6\.2
FY82
First 12\.0
Second 28\.0
FY83
First 43\.8
Second 68\.0
FY84
First 91\.3
Second 103\.7
FY85
First 115\.9
Second 116\.0
- 54 -
INDONESIA, AbEX 1
Table 4
IRRIGATION PROJECT XIV
Proposed Allocation of Proceeds of Loan
Total
Project Loan Disburse-
Category Cost amount ments
1\. Civil Works Under Subparts 3-8 of
Part A of the project (Serang)
Base cost 38\.4
Expected price increases 14\.3
Subtotal 52\.7 52\.7 100
II\. Civil Works Under Part B of the
Project (MAdiumI
Base cost 23\.4
Expected price increases 6\.4
Subtotal 29\.8 29\.8 100
IIT\.(a) Structures for Tertiary Networks
under Part C of the Project
(Tertiary)
Base cost 8\.7
Expected price increases 3\.1
Subtotal 11\.8 11\.8
III\.(b) SiN Housing
Base cost 3\.1
Expected price increases 0\.9
Subtotal 4\.0 4\.0 100
IV\. Equipment
(a) for Serang 0\.2
(b) for Madiun 0\.1
(c) for tertiary development 0\.1
expected price increases 0\.1
Subtotal 0\.5 0\.5 100
V\. Consultant Services & Training
(a) for Serang
Base cost 1\.6
Expected price increases 0\.6
Subtotal 2\.2 2\.2 100
(b) for Mladiun
Base cost 2\.8
Expected price increases 0\.6
Subtotal 3\.4 3\.4
(c) for tertiary design
Penali-Comal and Pekalen
Sampean
Base cost 2\.5
Expected price increases 0\.7
Subtotal 3\.2 3\.2
(d) for design and engineering
additional rehabilitation
Senkareng-Pemali Atas
Base cost 2\.7
Expectcd price increases 0\.8
Subtotal 3\.5 3\.5
Total Consultant Services
& Training 12\.3 12\.3 100
VI\. Mapping
Base cost 0\.3
Expected price increases 0\.1
Subtotal 0\.4 0\.4 100
VII\. Unallocated
Other civil works in Serang 21\.5
Tertiary works except structures 13\.4
Land acquisition 3\.2
Administrative coats 7\.3
Physical contingencies 21\.8
Vehicles provided by Government
under reserve procurement 0\.4
Taxes on civil works contracts 7\.6
Subtotal 75\.2 4\.5
Total 186\.7 116\.0 /a
/a 62Z of total project cost, equivalent to 65% of total cost net of taxes
(US$7\.6 million) and reserve procurement (US$0\.4 million)\.
-55 - ANNEX 1
Table 5
INDONESIA
IRRIGATION PROJECT XIV
List of Vehicles and Equipment
Item Quantity Unit cost Total cost
Item O^uantity ~~-------- US$ -------
Serang
Pickups 4 12,000 48,000
Inspection vehicles /a 10 11,000 110,000
Motorcycles 15 1,000 15,000
Radio, telephone and telemetering
equipment - L\.S\. 40,000
Surveying equipment - L\.S\. 80,000
Electric generator 1 25,000 25,000
Laboratory equipment - L\.S\. 36,000
Office equipment - L\.S\. 16,000
Subtotal 370,000
Madiun Rehabilitation Stage II
Vehicles 4 11,000 44,000
Motorcycles 159 1,000 159,000
Surveying equipment - L\.S\. 40,000
Office equipment - L\.S\. 84,000
Subtotal 327,000
Pemali-Comal and Pekalen-Sampean Tertiary
Development
Vehicles 2 11,000 22,000
Motorcycles 80 1,000 80,000
Bicycles 100 100 10,000
Subtotal 112,000
Pemali-Comal Rehabilitation Design
Surveying equipment - L\.S\. 40,000
Office equipment - L\.S\. 15,000
Subtotal 55,000
Total 8642000
/a Of which four start-up\.
'0 'CCD DC CC
CC CC CCC DCC CC
CC CCCC C-C CC CC' H C0000CC-CC-CCCCOZ 0000CC CCO00CCDCX00CCCCCC CCCCCCCCCCHVC DCCC
DC CoC F' CC C CC 0'0CH4C CCCCCCCCCC C CC 0002 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCOCCCC C
CC COCC 0 CCC C' CCC CC CC DC CCC CCCCCCOOOCOCCCCCCCC<CCCOCCCC,\.CCC C
CC CC CC CCC CO C C CCC COCOCOC OCCICCO CCCC'CC-CC- CCC000CCCCOCCCCCCCCCCCIC1CC CCC
CC0' C CC CC H C CC 0CC- CC CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCO*CCC-CCCCCCCCCCCCCCC0CCCC
C C C -'CCC I C - IC CCC 0C,CC C C CCCCCCCCC C CC CC'OC-CCCC CCC'C0 CCCCDCCCCCC
C I CCCCCCOCCCCCCCCCCCCCOC CC
I CCC -' C C CC CC 000CC 0 CC 00CC CC -' C CCCCCCCCO '0C,C0CCCCOCCC00CC0CCCCC<CC
I I C 00CCCIC
CC C CCC C C C I C C C OCCCC'CC0CCC\. CCCCCDCCC CCC 'CCC
0 C C, 00CC CCC CC C CCC CCC 0000 0CC CC CC CCCCCC-CCCCCCCCCCC-C CCC-CDCCCCCCCCCCCCCC\.CC\.C
I CCCCC C CCCCCCCCCCC CC CCC CC CCCCC'CCCCCCCCCCCC CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC CCCCCCCCC' CCCCCCCCCCCCC I
CCC CCCC-C'CC-C CCC CC CC C CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC0CCC CCC0CC 041)0CC
C COCOC C CC CC CC CC CC00CCCCCCCCCCCC COO
F C, o C F ICOCCCC -
CC CC C, CC COOC CCCCC\. CCCCCCCC\. COCCIC-CO CCCCC-CCC
CO C CC CC C r CCC 0 C CCC CC I COCCOCCO CCOCCCC CCCCCCDCCCCC'OOC 0CC, CC
CC CCCI CCC CC C C- C COCCC CCC0CC 000j CCCCC CCCOCC
- CCC CC CCC CCC C C,CCC'2 CC\.CCCC-CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC CC
B CCC CC C CCCCCCCCCC,CCCCCC0CCCCC00CCC0C C CC CCC L
CO C CC-S 0 0CC
CCCCCCCCCCC 00000CC CCC, CC 00 'C
CCC C C CC CC CCCCC00CC-CCC0C'CC- 0 CCC CC 'CC C
C C OCCOOC' CCC CC CCC 00 C C
C CC 'C CCCCCCCCCC COCCOC CCCOCCCCCOC CC CC
'COCCCCCCCCCC CCC C
C' CCCCCC OC<C,CCCCCC 00CC CCC C
CC CCCCCCCCCCOC C '0 C CCC C
C CC CC CO C C C CC C C\.'C C\. C C C' 0 CC C'
CC CC CCC COBO 0CC CCC' C,
C'00CCCC CCCCCC 'CCC C'
C C\.CC- 0000CC CCCCC C C
CCC C CCC, CC C C
CC CC CC DC 0
C C C CC C C'
C CCC' CCC CC' COCCO OCCO CCC CC C -
15
CCCCCCCCC CCCCC C
CC CC
0 00020000CC CCOOCCCCCCC0CCCW0000 4! C C'
C-CO 0 C CCC C CCCC 0CCC\.CC\.CCC\.0C,CC\.CCCC C I C CC
- 00 00 01CC CCC C C CCC CCC C' CC
riboo00t 0
00CC 00CC CCO CCC C\.'C0 oOOOo C- - C CC C CC CCCCCCCCCCOCCCCCC 1 0
CC CC CCCC CCC COC'CC CCCCO 0 CC CCC
CC C CO CC-CC' CCCC,-'-C CC CCC A OCCCCCCCCCCCC\. 0000C-COCCO\.CO CC, IC
C - \. \.-\. \. C CC,
CC 0 OCCOoC CC\.'COCC 000CCC0CC'0 CCC CC0000000 000000CC000 C' CC
C' CCC' 0 00000 0000 0 OCCOCCO 'COOOOOOOOO0000000CCCC0O C C
" [CD 0 [o
C' CC 0 OOOCCO 0000 C C CO C 0000CC C 00000 000000000000CC000 CC
CC CCO CC CC0 00 00000 0000 CCC
0 000 CO 00 OCCOOO 0000 0 C
CCC'C-"-C000000CC 0000CCCCO 000CC CCC -'-' 00 C
CCCCOOCCOOOOCCOC 000\.CCCCCCC CCOC-'COCCCC' 00 CCOCC0 COO 'C
* \. \.0\.00000\. 0 0OCCCCC4COCCOCCCCCCC'CCCCCCCCO0 000CC CC
0 00000 OCCOCCOOC 00000000000000 C
V CC
CC
CC CC 00 CC CC C CC-CC C CC- 0 0 CC C' CCC
IC' 'C CO C CC 0 - C CCC
\. I \. L ''COO
0 CC CC CCCCCO 00 CCCO Ioo 'C 00CC CC 004CC CCC CC CC0C-JOCCCC-CCCCCOCCCCC0OC-CO 0CC-CC CCCC0 CC COO
C * \. Coo
0 C-\. CC 000 COO 000000 C-C 0000CC 0 CCCOCCCCCC-CCCCCCCC\.CC0CC- 0000-0 0000 000 00 00CC
:pCC lo
0000 0 0 CCC-CCC- 0 '0-4 00 0 CCCC-CCC'C,CCCC-C00OC 0 CC0C-C0CCOCCCCCCCOOCC\.'CCCCCCCCCCOOO OCCOCOCCOOOCC00 0 CCC
CC 0 00 lao 0 0000-CCCCCOCCOO0CCCCCCCCCCCC\.CCO0CCC,C 00000CC\.CCOOO CO CCC
C
C - I
-57 - ANNEX 1
Table 7
INDONESIA
IRRIGATION PROJECT XIV
Consulting Services /a
Expatriates Local consultants
Foreign Local Total Local
Item currency currency cost currency
- - - - - - - - - - - US$/man-month - -
- - - - - - -
Billing rates
Basic salary 2,450 - 2,450 515
Social benefits 675 - 675 115
Home office costs 2,000 - 2,000 430
Overseas allowances /b 610 - 610 115
Net fee 380 - 380 85
Subtotal 6,115 - 6,115 1,260
Reimbursable expenses
Mobilization, travel & related expenses
International travel 530 - 530 _
Mobilization 260 - 260 -
Subsistence allowance 55 - 55 25
Miscellaneous 105 - 105 15
Subtotal 950 - 950 40
Duty station expenses
Local duty travel - 175 175 25
Per diem - 290 290 35
Field office costs - 515 515 35
Housing & utilities - 1,500 1,500 60
Transport /c - 800 800 50
Subtotal 3,280 3,280 205
Total 7,065 3,280 10,345 /d 1,505 /e
/a Based on recent consultants contracts\. Costs have been projected to end-
1979 prices\.
/b Field allowance for local consultants\.
Ic Includes driver, fuel and lubricants, and vehicle depreciation\.
/d May vary between US$8,500 and US$12,000 depending upon nationality and
experience\.
/e Applies to engineers and surveyors; total cost of draftsmen and technicians
is US$500/man-month\.
- 58 - ANNEX I
Table 8
INDONESIA
IRRIGATION PROJECT XIV
Breakdown of Cost Estimates by Credit Category
(US$ million)
Civil
Base Contingencies works
Item cost Physical Price Subtotal taxes Total
Civil Works
Serang
ICB (6 contracts) 38\.4 7\.7 14\.3 60\.4 3\.0 63\.4
Other 14\.4 2\.9 7\.1 24\.4 1\.2 25\.6
Madiun 23\.4 4\.7 6\.4 34\.5 1\.7 36\.2
Tertiary
Structures 8\.7 1\.7 3\.1 13\.5 0\.7 14\.2
Other tertiary canal work 10\.0 2\.0 3\.4 15\.4 0\.8 16\.2
O&M housing 3\.1 0\.6 0\.9 4\.6 0\.2 4\.8
Subtotal 98\.0 19\.6 35\.2 152\.8 7\.6 160\.4
Equipment
Serang 0\.2 - - 0\.2 - 0\.2
Madiun 0\.1 - 0\.1 0\.2 - 0\.2
Tertiary 0\.1 0\.1 - 0\.2 - 0\.2
Subtotal 0\.4 0\.1 0\.1 0\.6 - 0\.6
Consulting Services & Training
Serang 1\.6 0\.1 0\.6 2\.3 - 2\.3
Madiun construction spvn\. 1\.1 0\.1 0\.3 1\.5 - 1\.5
Madiun dam design 1\.7 0\.2 0\.3 2\.2 - 2\.2
Tertiary design 2\.5 0\.2 0\.7 3\.4 - 3\.4
Additional rehab\. design 2\.7 0\.3 0\.8 3\.8 - 3\.8
Subtotal 9\.6 0\.9 2\.7 13\.2 - 13\.2
Mapping
Additional rehab\. design 0\.3 0\.1 0\.1 0\.5 - 0\.5
Unallocated
Land acquisition - Serang 2\.4 0\.5 0\.8 3\.7 - 3\.7
Administrative Costs
Serang 2\.9 0\.3 1\.1 4\.3 - 4\.3
Madiun 1\.3 0\.1 0\.3 1\.7 - 1\.7
Tertiary 1\.3 0\.2 0\.4 1\.9 - 1\.9
Vehicles
Serang 0\.1 - - 0\.1 - 0\.1
Madiun 0\.2 - - 0\.2 - 0\.2
Tertiary 0\.1 - - 0\.1 - 0\.1
Subtotal 8\.3 1\.1 2\.6 12\.0 - 12\.0
Project Total 116\.6 21\.8 40\.7 179\.1 7\.6 186\.7
- 59 -
AN!NFy 2
INDONESIA Table I
IRRIGATION XIV PROJECT
Crop Budgets - Serang Drainage and Flood Control
Nonflooded Areas
Wet season Dry season
Irrigated rice Irrigated rice
(well drained) (poorly drained) Rainfed rice Irrigated rice Maize Soybeans Sorghum
Econ\. Fin\. Econ\. Fin\. Econ\. Fin\. Econ\. Fin\. Econ\. Fin\. Fcon\. Fin\. Econ\. Fin\.
---------------------------------------- ----------- Present --
------------------------------------------------
Yield (ton/ha) 3\.4 3\.0 1\.8 3\.8 1\.0 0\.8 1\.7
Price (Rp'OOOlton) 152\.0 (85\.0) 152\.0 (85\.0) 152\.0 (85\.0) 152\.0 (85\.0) 112\.0 (80\.0) 174\.0 (?20\.0) In3\.0 (75\.n)
Gross Value (Rp'OOO/ha) 516\.8 (289\.0) 456\.0 (255\.0) 273\.6 (153\.0) 577\.6 (323\.0) 112\.0 (8O\.n) 130\.2 (176\.0) 175\.1 (127\.5)
Cultivation 25\.0 (25\.0) 25\.0 (25\.0) 25\.0 (25\.0) 25\.0 (25\.0) 12\.5 (12\.5) - - 12\.5 (12\.S)
Seed 7\.5 (6\.0) 7\.5 (6\.0) 6\.4 (3\.4) 7\.5 (6\.0) 7\.5 (4\.8) 6\.0 (6\.6) 5\.5 (4\.5)
Urea 25\.8 (14\.0) 25\.8 (14\.0) 12\.9 (7\.0) 25\.8 (14\.0) 9\.7 (5\.3) - - 6\.5 (3\.5)
TSP 8\.7 (5\.3) 8\.7 (5\.3) 2\.9 (1\.8) 8\.7 (5\.3) 3\.5 (2\.1) 2\.3 (1\.4) 2\.3 (1\.4)
Agrochemicals 13\.2 (2\.7) 13\.2 (2\.7) 6\.6 (1\.4) 13\.2 (2\.7) - - 3\.2 (0\.6) -
Direct Production
Cost 80\.2 (53\.0) 80\.2 (53\.0) 53\.8 (38\.6) 80\.2 (53\.0) 33\.2 (24\.7) 11\.5 (8\.6) 26\.8 (21\.9)
Gross Margin 436\.6 (236\.0) 375\.8 (202\.0) 219\.8 (114\.4) 497\.4 (270\.0) 78\.8 (55\.3) 127\.7 (167\.4) I1P\.3 (105\.6)
Labor (man-dayslha)
Land preparation 45 45 40 35 10 5 10
Planting 35 35 35 30 10 25 10
Crop management 45 45 35 40 20 30 15
Harvesting 75 75 65 75 30 50 25
Total 200 200 175 180 70 110 60
----------------------------------------- Future without project --------------------------------------------
Yield (ton/ha) 3\.6 3\.0 1\.9 4\.0 1\.1 0\.9 1\.8
Price (Rp'000/ton) 160\.0 (120\.0) 160\.n (120\.0) 160\.0 (120\.0) 160\.0 (120\.0) 134\.0 (80\.0) 274\.0 (274\.0) 1?0\.0 (7S\.0)
Gross Value (Rp'000/ha) 576\.0 (432\.0) 480\.0 (360\.0) 304\.0 (228\.0) 640\.0 (480\.0) 147\.4 (88\.0) 246\.6 (246\.6) 216\.0 (135\.0)
Cultivation 25\.0 (25\.0) 25\.0 (25\.0) 25\.0 (25\.0) 25\.0 (25\.0) 12\.5 (12\.5) - - 12\.5 (12\.5)
Seed 7\.5 (6\.0) 7\.5 (6\.0) 7\.6 (4\.0) 7\.5 (6\.0) 9\.0 (4\.8) 9\.0 (9\.0) 6\.8 (4\.5)
Urea 31\.0 (20\.0) 31\.0 (20\.0) 15\.5 (10\.0) 31\.0 (20\.0) 11\.6 (7\.5) - - 7\.8 (5\.0)
TSP 11\.3 (7\.5) 11\.3 (7\.5) 3\.8 (2\.5) 11\.3 (7\.5) 4\.5 (3\.0) 3\.0 (2\.0) 3\.n (2\.0)
Agrochemicals 13\.2 (2\.7) 13\.2 (2\.7) 6\.6 (1\.4) 13\.2 (2\.7) - - 3\.2 (0\.6) -
Direct Production
Cost 88\.0 (61\.2) 88\.0 (61\.2) 58\.5 (42\.9) 88\.0 (61\.2) 37\.6 (27\.8) 15\.2 (11\.6) 3(\.1 (24\.0)
Gross Margin 488\.0 (370\.8) 392\.0 (298\.8) 245\.5 (185\.1) 552\.0 (418\.8) 109\.8 (6O\.2) 231\.4 (235\.0) 185\.9 (111\.0I
Labor (man-days/ha)
Land preparation 50 50 40 35 10 5 10
Planting 35 35 35 30 i1 25 10
Crop management 50 50 40 40 20 30 15
Harvesting 75 75 65 75 30 50 25
Total 210 210 180 180 70 110 60
-------------------------------------------- Future with project ---------------------------------------------
Yield (ton/ha) 3\.8 3\.8 2\.3 4\.0 1\.3 1\.2 2\.0
Price (Rp'000/ton) 160\.0 (120\.0) 160\.0 (120\.0) 160\.0 (120\.0) 160\.0 (12n\.0) 134\.0 (80\.0) 274\.0 (274\.0) 120\.0 (75\.0)
Gross Value (Rp'000/ha) 608\.0 (456\.0) 608\.0 (456\.0) 368\.0 (276\.0) 640\.0 (480\.0) 174\.2 (l04\.0) 328\.8 (328\.8) 240\.0 (150\.0)
Cultivation 25\.0 (25\.0) 25\.0 (25\.0) 25\.0 (25\.0) 25\.0 (25\.n) 12\.5 (12\.5) - - 12\.5 (12\.5)
Seed 7\.5 (6\.0) 7\.5 (6\.0) 5\.7 (3\.0) 7\.5 (6\.0) 9\.0 (4\.8) 9\.0 (9\.0) 6\.8 (4\.5)
Urea 31\.0 (20\.0) 31\.0 (20\.0) 23\.3 (15\.0) 31\.0 (20\.0) 15\.5 (10\.0) - - 15\.5 (10\.0)
TSP 11\.3 (7\.5) 11\.3 (7\.5) 7\.6 (5\.0) 11\.3 (7\.5) 4\.5 (3\.0) 3\.8 (2\.5) 4\.5 (3\.0)
Agrochemicals 13\.2 (2\.7) 13\.2 (2\.7) 13\.2 (2\.7) 13\.2 (2\.7) 3\.2 (0\.6) 3\.2 (0\.6) -
Direct Production
Cost 88\.0 (61\.2) 88\.0 (61\.2) 74\.8 (50\.7) 88\.0 (61\.2) 44\.7 (30\.9) 16\.0 (12\.1) 39\.3 (30\.0)
Gross Margin 520\.0 (394\.8) 520\.0 (394\.8) 293\.2 (225\.3) 552\.0 (418\.8) 129\.5 (73\.1) 312\.P (316\.7) 200\.7 (120\.0)
Labor (man-days/ha)
Land preparation 50 45 40 35 10 10 10
Planting 40 40 35 30 10 25 In
Crop management 50 55 40 40 20 30 15
Harvesting 80 80 70 75 35 50 30
Total 220 220 185 180 75 115 65
-60 - ANNEX 2
Table 2
INDONESIA
IRRIGATION XIV PROJECT
Crop Budgets - Serane Drainage and Flood Control
Flooded Areas
Wet season Dry season
Rainfed rice Maize Soybeans Sorghum
Econ\. Fin\. Econ\. Fin\. Econ\. Fin\. Econ\. Fin\.
-________--_--_----------- Present ---------------------------
Yield (ton/ha) 1\.6 0\.8 0\.6 1\.7
Price (Rp'000/ton) 152\.0 (85\.0) 112\.0 (80\.0) 174\.0 (220\.0) 103\.0 (75\.0)
Gross Value (Rp'000/ha) 243\.2 (136\.0) 89\.6 (64\.0) 104\.4 (132\.0) 175\.1
Cultivation 25\.0 (25\.0) 12\.5 (12\.5) - - 12\.5 (12\.5)
Seed 6\.4 (3\.4) 7\.5 (4\.8) 6\.0 (6\.6) 5\.5 (4\.5)
Urea 12\.9 (7\.0) 9\.7 (5\.3) - - 6\.5 (3\.5)
TSP 2\.9 (1\.8) 3\.5 (2-1) 2\.3 (1-4) 2\.3 (1\.4)
Agrochemicals 6\.6 (1\.4) - - 3\.2 (0\.6) -
Direct Production
Cost 53\.8 (38\.6) 33\.2 (24\.7) 11\.5 (8\.6) 26\.8 (21\.9)
Gross Margin 189\.4 (97\.4) 56\.4 (39\.3) 92\.9 (123\.4) 148\.3 (105\.6)
Labor (man-days/ha)
Land preparation 40 10 5 10
Planting 35 10 25 10
Crop management 35 20 30 15
Harvesting 65 30 50 25
Total 175 70 110 60
------------------- Future without project -----------------
Yield (ton/ha) 1\.6 0\.8 0\.6 1\.7
Price (Rp'000/ton) 160\.0 (120\.0) 134\.0 (80\.0) 274\.0 (274\.0) 120\.0 (75\.0)
Gross Value (Rp'000/ha) 256\.0 (192\.0) 107\.2 (64\.0) 191\.8 (191\.8) 204\.0 (127\.5)
Cultivation 25\.0 (25\.0) 12\.5 (12\.5) - - 12\.5 (12\.5)
Seed 7\.6 (4\.0) 9\.0 (4\.8) 9\.0 (9\.0) 6\.8 (4\.5)
Urea 15\.5 (10\.0) 11\.6 (7\.5) - - 7\.8 (5\.0)
TSP 3\.8 (2\.5) 4\.5 (3\.0) 3\.0 (2\.0) 3\.0 (2\.0)
Agrochemicals 6\.6 (1\.4) - - 3\.2 (0\.6) -
Direct Production
Cost 58\.5 (42\.9) 37\.6 (27\.8) 15\.2 (11\.6) 30\.1 (24\.0)
Gross Margin 197\.5 (149\.1) 69\.6 (36\.2) 176\.6 (180\.2) 173\.9 (103\.5)
Labor (man-days/ha)
Land preparation 40 10 5 10
Planting 35 10 25 10
Crop management 40 20 30 15
Harvesting 65 30 50 25
Total 180 70 110 60
-------------------- Future with project ----------------
Yield (ton/ha) 2\.3 1\.3 1\.2 2\.0
Price (Rp'000/ton) 160\.0 (120\.0) 134\.0 (80\.0) 274\.0 (274\.0) 120\.0 (75\.0)
Gross Value (Rp'000/ha) 368\.0 (276\.0) 174\.2 (104\.0) 328\.8 (328\.8) 240\.0 (150\.0)
Cultivation 25\.0 (25\.0) 12\.5 (12\.5) - - 12\.5 (12\.5)
Seed 5\.7 (3\.0) 9\.0 (4\.8) 9\.0 (9\.0) 6\.8 (4\.5)
Urea 23\.3 (15\.0) 15\.5 (10\.0) - - 15\.5 (10\.0)
TSP 7\.6 (5\.0) 4\.5 (3\.0) 3\.8 (2\.5) 4\.5 (3\.0)
Agrochemicals 13\.2 (2\.7) 3\.2 (0\.6) 3\.2 (0\.6) -
Direct Production
Cost 74\.8 (50\.7) 44\.7 (30\.9) 16\.0 (_12\.1) 39\.3 (30\.0)
Gross Margin 293\.2 (255\.3) 129\.5 (73\.1) 312\.8 (316\.7) 200\.7 (120\.0)
Labor (man-days/ha)
Land preparation 40 10 10 10
Planting 35 10 25 10
Crop management 40 20 30 15
Harvesting 70 35 50 30
Total 185 75 115 65
AFFEX 2
- 61 - Table 3
INDONESIA
IRBIGATION XIV PROJECT
Crop Budgets - Madiun Rehabilitation Stage TI
Wet season Dry season
Irrigated rice Irrigated rice Soybeans I Sovbeans II
Econ\. Fin\. Econ\. Fin\. Econ\. Fin\. Econ\. Fin\.
Present
Yield (ton/ha) 3\.2 2\.8 0\.6 0\.4
Price (Rp'000/ton) 152\.0 (85\.0) 152\.0 (85\.0) 174\.0 (220\.0) 174\.0 (220\.0)
Gross value (Rp'000/ha) 486\.4 (297\.5) 425\.6 (238\.0) 104\.4 (132\.0) 69\.6 (88\.0)
Cultivation 27\.5 (27\.5) 27\.5 (27\.5) - - _ _
Seed 10\.0 (8\.0) 10\.0 (8\.0) 6\.0 (6\.6) 6\.o (6\.6)
Urea 21\.9 (11\.9) 21\.9 (11\.9) - -
TSP 5\.8 (3\.5) 5\.8 (3\.5) 2\.3 (1\.4) 2\.3 (1\.4)
Agrochemicals 8\.3 (1\.6) 8\.3 (1\.6) 3\.2 (n\.6) 3\.2 (0\.6)
Direct production cost 73\.5 (52\.5) 73\.5 (52\.5) 11\.5 (8\.6) 11\.5 (8\.6)
Gross margin 412\.3 (245\.0) 352\.1 (185\.5) 92\.0 (123\.4) 58\.1 (79\.4)
Labor (man-days/ha)
Land preparation 55 35 10 20
Planting 35 30 25 25
Crop management 35 40 30 30
Harvesting 75 75 35 40
Total 200 180 100 115
Future Without Project
Yield (ton/ha) 3\.0 2\.6 0\.5 0\.4
Price (Rp'000/ton) 160\.0 (120\.0) 160\.0 (120\.0) 274\.0 (274\.0) 274\.0 (274\.0)
Gross value (Rp'O00/ha) 480\.0 (360\.0) 416\.0 (312\.0) 137\.0 (137\.0) 109\.6 (109\.6)
Cultivation 27\.5 (27\.5) 27\.5 (?7\.5) - -
Seed 10\.0 (8\.0) 10\.0 (8\.0) 9\.0 (9\.0) 9\.0 (9-0)
Urea 26\.4 (17\.0) 26\.4 (17\.0) - - - -
TSP 7\.6 (5\.0) 7\.6 (5\.0) 3\.0 (2\.0) 3\.0 (2\.0)
Agrochemicals 9\.8 (2\.0) 9\.8 (2\.0) 3\.2 (0\.6) 3\.2 (0\.6)
Direct production cost 81\.3 (59\.5) 81\.3 (5q\.5) 15\.2 (11\.6) 15\.2 (11\.6)
Gross margin 398\.7 (300\.5) 334\.7 (252\.5) 121\.8 (125\.4) 94\.4 (98\.0)
Labor (man-days/ha)
Land preparation 55 35 10 20
Planting 35 30 25 25
Crop management 35 40 30 30
Harvesting 75 75 35 40
Total 200 180 100 115
Future WTith Project
Yield (ton/ha) 3\.4 3\.0 0\.8 0\.6
Price (Rp'000/ton) 180\.0 (120\.0) 180\.0 (120\.0) 274\.0 (274\.0) 274\.0 (274\.0)
Gross value (Rp'000/ha) 612\.0 (408\.0) 540\.0 (360\.0) 219\.2 (219\.2) 164\.4 (164\.4)
Cultivation 27\.5 (27\.5) 27\.5 (27\.5) - -
Seed 7\.5 (6\.0) 7\.5 (6\.0) 9\.0 (9\.n) 9\.0 (9\.0)
Urea 31\.0 (20\.0) 31\.0 (20\.0) - - -
TSP 9\.8 (6\.5) 9\.9 (6\.5) 4\.5 (3\.0) 4\.5 (3\.0)
Agrochemicals 13\.2 (2\.7) 13\.2 (2\.7) 5\.1 (1\.0) 5\.1 (1\.0)
Direct production cost 89\.0 (62\.7) 89\.0 (62\.7) 18\.6 (13\.0) 18\.6 (13\.0)
Gross margin 455\.0 (345\.3) 391\.0 (297\.3) 200\.6 (206\.2) 145\.8 (151\.4)
Labor (man-days/ha)
Land preparation 55 55 20 25
Planting 35 30 30 25
Crop management 40 40 30 30
Harvesting 80 80 40 40
Total 210 185 120 120
- 62 -
ANNEX 2
INDONESIA Table 4
IRRIGATION )IV PROJECT
Crop Budgets - Tertiary Development Areas
Pemali-Comal
Wet season Dry season Dry season
Irrigated Rice Irrigated Rice Maize Soybeans
Econ\. Fin\. Econ\. Fin\. Econ\. Fin\. Econ\. Fin\.
Present
Yield (t/ha) 3\.2 3\.2 1\.2 0\.7
Price (Rp '000/ton) 152\.0 83\.0) 152\.n ( 85\.0) 112\.0 ( 80\.0) 174\.0 (220\.0)
Gross value (Rp '000/ha) 486\.4 (272\.0) 486\.4 (272\.0) 134\.4 ( 96\.0) 121\.8 (154\.0)
Cultivation 25\.0 ( 25\.0) 25\.0 25\.0) 12\.5 ( 12\.5) 12\.5 ( 12-5)
Seed 10\.0 ( 8\.0) 1-'\.0 ( 8\.0) 7\.5 ( 4\.8) 6\.0 ( 6\.6)
Urea 12 9 ( 7\.0) 12\.9 ( 7\.0) 9\.7 ( S\.3) - -
TSP 2\.9 ( 1\.8) 2\.9 C 1\.8) 3\.5 ( 2 ') 2\.3 ( 1\.4)
Agrochemicals 6\.6 ( 1\.4) 6\.6 ( 1-4) - _ 3\.2 ( 0\.6)
Direct production cost 57\.4 ( 43-2) 57\.4 ( 43-2) 33\.2 ( 24-7) 24\.0 ( 21\.1)
Gross margin 429\.0 (228\.8) 429\.0 (228\.8) 101\.2 ( 71-3) 97\.8 (132\.9)
Labor (man-days/ha)
Land preparation 55 35 10 20
Planting 35 30 in 25
Crop management 35 4n 20 30
Harvesting 75 75 30 40
Total 200 180 70 115
Future Without Project
Yield (t/ha) 3\.2 3\.2 1\.2 0\.7
Price (Rp '000/ton) 160\.0 (120\.0) 160\.0 (120\.0) 134\.0 ( 80\.0) 274\.0 (274\.0)
Gross value (Rp '000/ha) 512\.0 (394\.0) 517\.0 (384-0) 160\.8 ( 96\.0) 191\.8 (191\.8)
Cultivation 25\.0 ( 25\.0) 25\.0 ( 2S\.0) t2\.5 ( 12\.5) 12\.5 ( 12\.5)
Seed 10\.0 ( 8\.0) 10\.0 ( 8\.0) 9\.0 ( 4\.8) 9\.0 ( 0\.0)
Urea 18\.6 ( 12\.0) 18\.6 ( 12\.0) 12\.4 ( 8\.0) - -
TSP 4\.5 ( 3-0) 4\.5 ( 3\.0) 6\.0 ( 4\.0) 3\.8 ( 2\.5)
Agrochemicals 9\.8 ( 2\.0) 9\.8 ( 2\.0) 6\.4 ( 1\.3) 3\.2 ( 0\.6)
Direct production cost 67\.9 ( 50\.0) 67\.9 ( 90\.0) 46\.3 ( 30\.6) 28\.5 ( 24\.6)
Gross margin 441\.1 (334\.0) 444\.1 (334\.0) 114\.5 ( 65\.4) 163\.3 (167\.2)
Labor (man-days/ha)
Land preparation 55 35 10 20
Planting 35 30 1n 25
Crop management 35 40 20 30
Harvesting 75 75 30 40
Total 200 180 70 115
Future With Project
vield (t/ha) 3\.6 3\.4 1\.5 1\.0
Price (Rp '000/ton) 160\.0 (120\.0) 160\.n (120\.0) 134\.0 ( 80\.0) 274\.0 (274\.n)
Gross value (Rp '000/ha) 576\.0 (432\.0) 544\.0 (408\.0) 201\.0 (120\.0) 274\.0 (274\.0)
Cultivation 25\.0 ( 2S\.0) 75\.0 2 25\.0) 12\.5 ( 12\.5) 12\.5 ( 12\.5)
Seed 7\.5 ( 6\.0) 7\.5 ( 6\.0) 9\.0 ( 4\.8) 9\.0 ( 9\.0)
Urea 23\.3 ( 15\.0) 23\.3 ( 15\.0) 15\.5 ( 10\.0) - -
TSP 11\.3 ( 7\.5) t1\.3 ( 7\.5) 7\.6 ( 5\.0) 4\.5 ( 3\.0)
Agrochemicals 13\.2 ( 2\.7) 13\.2 ( 2\.7) 9\.6 ( 1\.9) 5\.1 ( 1\.0)
Direct production cost 90\.3 C 56\.2) 80\.3 ( 56\.2) 54\.2 ( 34\.2) 31\.1 ( 25\.5)
Gross margin 497\.7 (375-8) 463\.7 (351-\.) 146\.8 ( 85\.8) 242\.9 (248\.5)
Labor (man-days/ha)
Land preparation 55 35 15 25
Planting 40 30 10 25
Crop management 45 40 25 30
Harvesting 80 80 30 40
Total 220 185 80 120
- 63 - ANNEX 2
Table 5
INDONESIA
IRRIGATION XIV PROJECT
Crop Budgets - Tertiary Development Areas
Pekalan-Sampean
Wet season Dry season Dry season
Irrigated Rice Irrigated Rice Maize Soybeans
Econ\. Fin\. Econ\. Fin\. Econ\. Fin\. Econ\. Fin\.
Present
Yield (t/ha) 3\.6 3\.6 1\.5 0\.7
Price (Rp '000/ton) 152\.0 ( 85\.0) 152\.0 ( 85\.0) 112\.0 ( 80\.0) 174\.0 (220\.0)
Gross value (Rp '000/ha) 547\.2 (306\.0) 547\.2 (306\.0) 168\.0 (120\.0) 121\.8 (154\.0)
Cultivation 25\.0 ( 25\.0) 25\.0 ( 25\.0) 12\.5 ( 12\.5) 12\.5 ( 12\.5)
Seed 10\.0 ( 8\.0) 10\.0 ( 8\.0) 7\.5 ( 4\.8) 6\.0 ( 6\.6)
Urea 12\.9 ( 7\.0) 12\.9 ( 7\.0) 9\.7 ( 5\.3) - -
TSP 2\.9 ( 1\.8) 2\.9 ( 1\.8) 3\.5 ( 2\.1) 2\.3 ( 1\.4)
Agrochemicals 6\.6 ( 1\.4) 6\.6 ( 1\.4) - - 3\.2 ( 0\.6)
Direct production cost 57\.4 ( 43\.2) 57\.4 ( 43\.2) 33\.2 ( 24\.7) 24\.0 ( 21\.1)
Gross margin 489\.8 (262\.8) 489\.8 (262\.8) 134\.8 ( 95\.3) 97\.8 (132\.9)
Labor (man-days/ha)
Land preparation 55 35 15 20
Planting 35 30 10 25
Crop management 35 40 25 30
Harvesting 75 75 30 40
Total 200 180 115 115
Future Without Project
Yield (t/ha) 3\.6 3\.6 1\.5 0\.7
Price (Rp '000/ton) 160\.0 (120\.0) 160\.0 (120\.0) 134\.0 ( 80\.0) 274\.0 (274\.0)
Gross value (Rp '000/ha) 576\.0 (432\.0) 576\.0 (432\.0) 201\.0 (120\.0) 191\.8 (191\.8)
Cultivation 25\.0 ( 25\.0) 25\.0 ( 25\.0) 12\.5 ( 12\.5) 12\.5 ( 12\.5)
Seed 10\.0 ( 8\.0) 10\.0 ( 8\.0) 9\.0 ( 4\.8) 9\.0 ( 9\.0)
Urea 18\.6 ( 12\.0) 18\.6 ( 12\.0) 12\.4 ( 8\.0) - -
TSP 4\.5 ( 3\.0) 4\.5 ( 3\.0) 6\.0 ( 4\.0) 3\.8 ( 2\.5)
Agrochemicals 9\.8 ( 2\.0) 9\.8 ( 2\.0) 6\.4 ( 1\.3) 3\.2 ( 0\.6)
Direct production cost 67\.9 ( 50\.0) 67\.9 ( 50\.0) 46\.3 ( 30\.6) 28\.5 ( 24\.6)
Gross margin 508\.1 (382\.0) 508\.1 (382\.0) 154\.7 ( 89\.4) 163\.3 (167\.2)
Labor (man-days/ha)
Land preparation 55 35 15 20
Planting 35 30 10 25
Crop management 35 40 25 30
Harvesting 75 75 30 40
Total 200 180 115 115
Future With Project
Yield (t/ha) 4\.0 3\.8 1\.8 1\.8
Price (Rp '000/ton) 160\.0 (120\.0) 160\.0 (120\.0) 134\.0 ( 80\.0) 274\.0 (274\.0)
Gross value (Rp '000/ha) 640\.0 (480\.0) 608\.0 (456\.0) 241\.2 (144\.0) 274\.0 (274\.0)
Cultivation 25\.0 ( 25\.0) 25\.0 ( 25\.0) 12\.5 ( 12\.5) 12\.5 ( 12\.5)
Seed 7\.5 ( 6\.0) 7\.5 ( 6\.0) 9\.0 ( 4\.8) 9\.0 ( 9\.0)
Urea 23\.3 ( 15\.0) 23\.3 ( 15\.0) 15\.0 ( 10\.0) - -
TSP 11\.3 ( 7\.5) 11\.3 ( 7\.5) 7\.6 ( 5\.0) 4\.5 ( 3\.0)
Agrochemicals 13\.2 ( 2\.7) 13\.2 ( 2\.7) 9\.6 ( 1\.9) 5\.1 ( 1\.0)
Direct production cost 80\.3 ( 56\.2) 80\.3 ( 56\.2) 54\.2 ( 34\.2) 31\.1 ( 24\.5)
Gross margin 559\.7 (423\.8) 527\.1 (399\.8) 187\.0 (109\.8) 242\.9 (249\.5)
Labor (man-days/ha)
Land preparation 55 35 20 25
Planting 40 30 10 25
Crop management 45 40 25 30
Harvesting 80 80 35 40
Total 220 185 90 120
- 64 - ANNEX 2
Table 6
INDONESIA
IRRIGATION XIV PROJECT
Farm Budgets - Serant River
0\.2 ha farm 0\.4 ha farm 0\.7 ha farm
Incremental values p WIO W P W/O W P W/o W
------------------- Serang - Nonf looded Areas--------------------
Cropped Area (ha)
Wet Season
Irrigated rice 0\.12 0\.12 0\.12 0\.24 0\.24 0\.24 0\.42 0\.42 0\.42
Rainfed rice 0\.08 0\.08 0\.08 0\.16 0\.16 0\.16 0\.28 0\.28 0\.28
Dry Season
Irrigated rice 0\.04 0\.04 0\.04 0\.06 0\.06 0\.06 0\.09 0\.09 0\.09
Maize 0\.02 0\.02 0\.03 0\.04 0\.04 0\.04 0\.07 0\.07 0\.07
Soybeans 0\.01 0\.01 0\.01 0\.01 0\.01 0\.01 0\.02 0\.02 0\.02
Sorghum 0\.06 0\.06 0\.08 0\.11 0\.11 0\.16 0\.18 0\.18 0\.25
Total Cropped Areas 0\.33 0\.33 0\.36 0\.51 0\.61 0\.66 1\.06 1\.06 L\.13
Cropping intensity (2) 165 165 ISO 153 153 165 151 151 161
Crop Production (kg)
Rice 692 718 800 1,308 1,360 1,520 2,232 2,323 2,600
Maize 20 22 39 40 44 52 70 77 91
Soybeans 8 9 12 8 9 12 16 18 24
Sorghum 102 108 160 187 198 320 306 324 500
Farm Incomes (Rp'000)
Gross value of production 69\.8 98\.5 113\.7 130\.2 184\.0 213\.8 221\.8 314\.2 363\.4
Production costs, excl\. labor 13\.5 15\.3 17\.3 25\.6 29\.1 32\.6 43\.7 49\.7 55\.3
Hired labor (harvesting) ta 7\.1 10\.5 11\.5 13\.3 19\.5 21\.9 22\.8 33\.5 37\.4
Net Value of Production 49\.2 72\.7 84\.9 91\.3 135\.4 159\.1 155\.3 231\.0 270\.7
Taxes lb 1\.5 1\.5 3\.4 3\.0 3\.0 6\.8 5\.3 5\.3 11\.8
Payments to landlord /c 24\.6 36\.4 42\.5 45\.7 67\.7 79\.7 77\.7 115\.5 135\.4
Net Incomes
Owner-operator 47\.7 71\.2 81\.5 88\.3 132\.4 152\.5 150\.0 225\.7 258\.9
Sharecropper 24\.6 36\.3 42\.4 45\.6 67\.7 79\.6 77\.6 115\.5 135\.3
Off-farm income Id 75\.0 75\.0 75\.0 65\.0 65\.0 65\.0 55\.0 55\.0 55\.0
Total Net Incomes
Owner-operator 122\.7 146\.2 156\.5 153\.3 197\.4 217\.5 205\.0 280\.7 313\.9
Sharecropper 99\.6 111\.3 117\.4 110\.6 132\.7 144\.6 132\.6 170\.5 190\.3
Total labor requirements /e
(man-days) 51 53 56 97 101 108 167 173 184
--------------- Serang - Flooded Areas --------------------
Cropped Area (ha)
Wet Season
Rainfed rice 0\.2 0\.2 0\.2 0\.4 0\.4 0\.4 0\.7 0\.7 0\.7
Dry Season
Maize 0\.05 0\.05 0\.05 0\.10 0\.10 0\.10 0\.15 0\.15 0\.15
Soybeans - - 0\.04 - - 0\.06 - - 0\.10
Sorghum 0\.05 0\.05 0\.07 0\.06 0\.06 0\.12 0\.10 0\.10 0\.25
Total Cropped Areas 0\.30 0\.30 0\.35 0\.56 0\.56 0\.68 0\.95 0\.95 1\.20
Cropping intensity (2) 150 150 180 140 140 170 136 136 170
Crop Production (kg)
Rice 320 320 460 640 640 920 1,120 1,120 1,610
Maize 40 40 65 80 80 130 120 120 195
Soybeans - - 48 - - 72 - - 120
Sorghum 85 85 140 102 102 240 170 170 500
Farm Incomes (Rp'000)
Gross value of production 36\.8 48\.0 84\.1 68\.5 90\.9 158\.5 117\.6 156\.8 279\.2
Production costs, excl\. labor 10\.1 11\.2 14\.3 19\.2 21\.4 27\.7 32\.9 36\.6 48\.8
Hired labor (harvesting) Ia 3\.3 4\.6 6\.6 6\.5 9\.2 13\.2 11\.4 16\.1 23\.2
Net Value of Production 23\.4 32\.2 63\.2 42\.8 60\.3 117\.6 73\.3 104\.1 207\.2
Taxes Lb 1\.5 1\.5 3\.4 3\.0 3\.0 6\.8 5\.3 5\.3 11\.8
Payments to landlord /c 11\.7 16\.1 31\.6 21\.4 30\.2 58\.8 36\.7 52\.1 103\.6
Net Incomes
Owner-operator 21\.9 30\.7 59\.8 39\.8 57\.3 110\.8 68\.0 98\.8 L95\.4
Sharecropper 11\.7 16\.1 31\.6 21\.4 30\.1 58\.8 36\.6 52\.0 103\.6
off-farm income /d 75\.0 75\.0 75\.0 65\.0 65\.0 65\.0 60\.0 60\.0 60\.0
Total Net Incomes
Owner-operator 96\.9 105\.7 134\.8 104\.8 122\.3 175\.8 128\.0 158\.8 255\.4
Sharecropper 86\.7 91\.1 106\.6 86\.4 95\.1 123\.8 96\.6 112\.0 163\.6
Total labor requirements /e
(man-days) 42 43 50 81 83 96 139 143 168
- 65 - ANNuX 2
Table 7
IUEGATIOW 13V YJXCT
far ,4dea- - endice ad Tertiar Are\.
0\.2 ha fat\. 0\.4 ha fa\. 0\.7 h\. fare
Oetr_ataaolrio-\. P W/O 0 P W/O W P W/O 0
--------------~~----- ---- M d 3 - -tU -----------------------------
CIroed Area (bh)
WIt Secor
Irrigated rite 0\.2 0\.2 0\.2 0\.4 0\.4 0\.4 0\.7 0\.7 0\.7
DrY Scram
Irrigated rite 0\.09 0\.08 0\.10 0\.16 0\.14 0\.17 D\.26 0\.23 0\.20
Orybete\. 0\.09 0\.09 0\.09 0\.26 7\.16 0\.17 0\.26 0\.26 0\.28
icybaot I0 0\.12 0\.21 0\.11 0\.20 0\.20 0\.20 0\.32 0\.32 0\.52
Total Cro,erd Arets 0\.49 0 48 0\.50 0\.92 0\.90 0\.94 1\.54 1\.51 1\.58
Crorpprig iaci\.ty 27) 245 240 250 230 225 235 220 225 225
Care Prodccilto (kg)
Cibe ego too 9ao 1,720 1,564 1,070 2,966 2\.698 3,220
coytnee \. 56 45 72 96 00 136 156 130 274
Soybear \. 21 04 44 66 s0 80 120 128 128 192
Fate Ootoaa (Qp'006)
Groat ealor or poodoriior 97\.4 221\.4 053\.4 105\.6 231\.5 294\.5 010\.6 394\.4 500\.4
1^ru~~~~~~~~~~-\. In" * 49D
Pr tc-oteio orate, r\.0\.6c\.or 26\.9 19\.0 21 4 32 5 3 3 40\. 5 55\.4 621: 69\.2
Hired labor fhrreetl \. /e 9\.1 10\.6 24\.2 17\.6 22\.5 06\.9 30\.3 38\.0 46\.4
Nta Valce of Prdocttie 71\.4 90\.8 119\.9 235\.5 172\.7 227\.1 229\.1 293\.4 384\.8
TaiaLb 12\.5 1\.5 5\.4 3\.0 3\.0 6\.9 5\.3 5\.3 11\.9
Paysetie it Otedlord /c 35\.7 45\.4 60\.0 97\.8 86\.4 113\.6 114\.5 146\.7 292\.4
P:t t\.I \.dlI / 3\. 4 0
o-r-opert 69\.9 89\.3 116\. 1\.5 132\.5 169\.7 020\.3 223\.8 285\.1 373\.0
Shoreorepp\.r 35\.7 05\.4 59\.9 67\.7 86\.3 113\.5 114\.5 146\.7 192\.4
Off-fare ret- Id 70\.0 70\.0 70\.0 60\.0 6\.0 60\.0 45\.0 45\.0 45\.0
Total Net Octeaea
o \.er-e\.raIor 139\.9 159\.5 186\.5 102\.5 229\.7 280\.3 268\.9 530\.1 418\.0
5httettopreo 105\.7 215\.4 229\.9 127\.7 146\.3 175\.5 2\.5 5 192\.7 237\.4
Total tahoeretqoirteeeeia I
(ear-da\.t) 78 76 04 148 146 160 250 244 271
-
Peen----------------- li-C -tl\. ________
Corr,ed Area (ha)
net Seater
Irrigated rite 0\.2 0\.2 0\.2 0\.4 0\.4 0\.4 0\.7 0\.7 0\.7
irr1iged rot\. 0\.16 0\.16 0\.16 0\.29 0\.26 0\.28 0\.45 0\.45 5\.65
Ileite 0\.06 0\.08 0\.06 0\.21 0\.11 0\.11 0\.27 0\.27 O\.07
ioybe ao 2\.03 0\.03 0\.035 0 0 0\.09 0\.08
Trial CIo-ced Aorta 0\.45 0\.45 0\.45 0\.84 0\.84 0\.84 2\.40 1\.40 1\.40
Crppice i-teraty (X) 225 225 229 210 210 210 200 200 200
C\.oo P-od-tcten i23)
Rite 1,112112 1\.2 1,264 2,096 2,096 2,392 3,540 3,540 4,050
teiaie 72 72 90 232 132 165 204 204 255
Soybe-ea 21 22 30 35 35 50 56 56 S0
Fare IDcn (4t'000)
GrenI ralor of p-od-ctiec 104\.e 245\.0 267\.2 196\.4 271\.7 313\.9 329\.5 456\.5 528\.3
PrId eicor reate, ear\. IObtr 17\.7 6 23\.0 3\.1 38\.6 45\.3 55\.6 60\.7 72\.5
Hl-rrd Inhor b re- cieg) /e 11\.3 16\.0 28\.2 20\.4 30\.2 34\.6 36\.2 51\.0 58\.3
eit VO\.e of peodoctice 75\.9 208\.4 125\.9 241\.9 202\.9 236\.2 237\.8 340\.t 397\.5
Teee- /b 15 'S2\.5 3\.4 3\.0 5\.0 6\.9 5\.3 5\.3 21\.8
Parted to lodlOord Ls 38\.0 54\.2 63\.0 72\.0 101\.5 118\.1 129\.9 270\.4 198\.8
NeWI Ino_
Ner-operoteor 74\.4 206\.9 222\.5 138\.9 l99\.9 229\.4 232\.5 335\.5 385\.7
Sh-e-opp-er 37\.9 54\.2 62\.9 70\.9 202\.9 120\.2 218\.9 170\.6 298\.7
off-f-no I e _ L 70\.0 70\.0 70\.o 60\.0 60\.0 60\.0 45\.0 45\.0 45\.0
Scr-op ien 144\.6 276\.9 9\. 192 198\.9 259\.9 289\.4 270\.5 503\.9 050\.7
Saeo--rpqro 107\.9 I22\.2 232\.9 130\.9 161\.4 279\.1 163\.9 225\.4 263\.7
Teil taboo oar\.qiree\.n /e
(ea-da\.a) 77 77 82 144 144 153 242 242 258
------------------------ ---------------- - ____________
Ceoered Area (he)
WIc Sete
Iroi8aisted rita 0\.20 0\.20 0\.20 0\.4 0\.4 0\.4 0\.7 0\.7 0\.7
cOrv Settee
Irr4ttged rite 0\.15 0\.15 0\.15 0\.27 0\.27 0\.27 0\.43 0\.43 0\.43
eooae 0\.07 0\.07 0\.07 0\.12 0\.12 0\.22 0\.20 0\.00 0\.20
Soybh\.D\. 0\.05 0\.05 0\.05 0\.09 0\.09 0\. 04 0\.14 0\.26
T-i1i Croe-ed Ar-ma 0\.47 0\.47 0\.47 0\.88 0\.88 0\.88 1\.47 1\.47 1\.47
Croppieg i-ee\.ity (X) 235 235 235 220 220 220 210 210 210
Cece Peeoducile 7Ae)
HtC\. 1,290 1,290 1\.370 2,466 2,466 2,626 4,154 4\.254 ,4,34
8\.0cr 205 105 226 100 10O 216 300 300 360
Seyb\.es 35 35 50 63 63 90 98 98 140
Yet\. Ic-ere (4R-OO)
Gmrna nIne of pordortirn 125\.8 272\.8 20\.2 237\.9 527\.6 357\.1 398\.7 549\.3 599\.2
P-o-roi tree\., nti\. labee 17\.9 20\.8 23\.3 35\.8 39\.4 06,2 56\.7 66\.2 73\.9
eloed Otbhr (hoeoaetiic) / 1 23\.2 18\.6 19\.7 25\.2 35\.5 37\.0 42\.6 59\.9 63\.8
Cr8 Value of P-d-ctin 94\.7 133\.3 245\.2 278\.9 252\.7 275\.2 299\.6 423\.4 661\.5
Ta\.re 1! 1\.5 1\.l 3\.0 3\.0 3\.0 6\.8 5\.3 5\.53 2L\.
PayereaI to loid-ord 74 07\.4 69\.7 72\.6 69\.5 226\.0 237\.6 249\.8 212\.7 230\.9
WIt IncIt-
O nce-operator 93\.2 131\.8 141\.c 175\.9 249\.7 062\.0 294\.3 428\.2 469\.7
Sharetroppar 47\.3 66\.6 72\.6 89\.4 126\.3 237\.6 149\.8 211\.7 230\.7
Off-Oars tc\. Id 70\.0 70\.0 0\.0 60\.0 60\.0 60\.0 45\.0 05\.0 45\.0
Trial Nenitoeeeo
creer-oeceacor 163\.2 201\.8 221\.8 235\.9 309\.7 326\.4 339\.3 463\.1 494\.7
Shar-ro-pppeo 17\.3 136\.6 142\.6 249\.6 166\.3 197\.6 194\.0 256\.7 275\.7
Total Inhor rescireroecIs /
_4er-day\.) 81 81 84 153 153 160 257 257 268
14 22 of goot caine of prod-tiio \.
7b eceed or OPtrA trgee ed vetet tne rate\.p rhe otre\.
/c 501 of ret ral\.e of -rod-tilo\.
Id eated or Br1k i-toiee ad euroryt\.
4 Coapored feon Otbhr reqolted pe Clop BOdgete\.
- 66 - ANNEX 2
- 66 - ~~~~~~TableS8
Page I of 2
INDONESIA
IRRIGATION XIV PROJECT
Rent Recovery
0\.2 ha farm 0\.4 ha farm 0\.7 ha far-
Owner- Share- Owner- Share Owner- S \.,re
Incremental values operator cropper operator cropper operator cropper
---------------- Serang - Nonflooded Areas -----------------
Gross value of production 15\.2 7\.6 29\.8 14\.9 49\.2 24\.6
Less: Cash production costs 2\.0 1\.0 3\.5 1\.8 5\.6 2\.8
Harvesting costs 1\.0 0\.5 2\.4 1\.2 3\.9 2\.0
Equals: Net cash income 12\.2 6\.1 23\.9 11\.9 39\.7 19\.8
Less: Imputed value of family labor 1\.7 1\.7 3\.9 3\.9 6\.1 6\.1
Imputed value of management 0\.6 0\.3 1\.2 0\.6 2\.0 1\.0
Allowance for risk 3\.7 1\.8 7\.2 3\.6 11\.9 6\.0
General taxes 1\.5 0\.8 3\.0 1\.5 4\.9 2\.5
Equals: Project rent 4\.7 1\.5 8\.6 2\.3 14\.8 4\.2
Rent as 2 of net cash income 38\.5 24\.6 36\.0 19\.3 37\.3 21\.2
Land tax 1\.0 - 2\.0 - 3\.5 -
Water charge (EMM) 0\.9 0\.4 1\.7 0\.9 3\.0 1\.5
Total Direct Charges 1\.9 0\.4 3\.7 0\.9 6\.5 1\.5
Rent recovery index (%) 40\.4 26\.7 43\.0 39\.1 43\.9 35\.7
Farm income per capita (US$) 45\.5 34\.2 63\.3 42\.1 91\.3 55\.4
----------------- Serang - Flooded Areas-------------------
Gross value of production 36\.1 18\.1 67\.6 33\.8 122\.4 61\.2
Less: Cash production costs 3\.1 1\.6 6\.3 3\.2 12\.2 6\.1
Harvesting costs 2\.0 1\.0 4\.0 2\.0 7\.1 3\.6
Equals: Net cash income 31\.0 15\.5 57\.3 28\.6 103\.1 51\.5
Less: Imputed value of family labor 3\.9 3\.9 7\.2 7\.2 13\.8 13\.8
Imputed value of management 1\.6 0\.8 2\.9 1\.4 5\.2 2\.6
Allowance for risk 9\.3 4\.7 17\.2 8\.6 30\.9 15\.5
General taxes 3\.6 1\.8 6\.8 3\.4 12\.2 6\.1
Equals: Project rent 12\.6 4\.3 23\.2 8\.0 41\.0 13\.5
Rent as 2 of net cash income 40\.6 27\.7 40\.5 28\.0 39\.8 26\.2
Land tax 1\.0 - 2\.0 - 3\.5 -
Water charge CORM) 0\.9 0\.4 1\.7 0\.9 3\.0 1\.5
Total Direct Charges 1\.9 0\.4 3\.7 0\.9 6\.5 1\.5
Rent recovery index CE) 15\.1 9\.3 15\.9 11\.3 15\.9 11\.1
Farm income per capita (US$) 39\.2 31\.0 51\.1 36\.0 74\.3 47\.6
------------------------- Madiun ---------
---___________
Gross value of production 34\.0 17\.0 63\.0 31\.5 106\.0 53\.0
Less: Cash production costs 2\.4 1\.2 4\.2 2\.1 7\.1 3\.6
Harvesting costs 2\.5 1\.3 4\.2 2\.1 7\.5 3\.8
Equals: Net cash income 29\.1 14\.5 54\.6 27\.3 91\.4 45\.6
Less: Imputed value of family labor /a 4\.4 4\.4 7\.7 7\.7 14\.9 14\.9
Imputed value of management /b 1\.4 0\.7 2\.7 1\.4 4\.6 2\.3
Allowance for risk /c 8\.7 4\.4 16\.4 8\.2 27\.4 13\.7
General taxes /d 3\.4 1\.7 6\.3 3\.2 10\.6 5\.3
Equals: Project rent 11\.2 3\.3 21\.5 6\.8 33\.9 24\.3
Rent as Z of net cash income 38\.5 22\.8 39\.4 24\.9 37\.1 53\.3
Land tax /e 1\.0 - 2\.0 - 3\.5 -
Water charge (ORM) /f 0\.9 0\.4 1\.7 0\.9 3\.0 1\.5
Total Direct Charges 1\.9 0\.4 3\.7 0\.9 6\.5 1\.5
Rent recovery index (%) 17\.0 12\.1 17\.2 13\.2 19\.2 6\.2
Farm income per capita (US$) 54\.3 37\.8 81\.7 50\.5 121\.8 69\.1
67 ANNEX 2
Table 8
Page 2 of 2
Rent Recovery (Continued)
0\.2 ha farm 0\.4 ha farm 0\.7 ha farm
Owner- Share- Owner- Share Owner- Share
Incremental values operator cropper operator cropper operator cropper
---------- Tertiary Development - Pekalan-Sampean ----------
Gross value of production 15\.4 7\.7 29\.5 14\.8 49\.9 25\.0
Less: Cash production costs 2\.4 1\.2 4\.7 2\.4 7\.8 3\.9
Harvesting costs 1\.1 0\.6 2\.3 1\.2 4\.0 2\.0
Equals: Net cash income 11\.9 5\.9 22\.5 11\.2 38\.1 19\.1
Less: Imputed value of family labor 1\.7 1\.7 3\.9 3\.9 6\.1 6\.1
Imputed value of management 0\.6 0\.3 1\.1 0\.6 1\.9 1\.0
Allowance for risk 3\.6 1\.8 6\.8 3\.4 11\.4 5\.7
General taxes 1\.5 0\.8 3\.0 1\.5 5\.0 2\.5
Equals: Project rent 4\.5 1\.3 7\.7 1\.8 13\.7 3\.8
Rent as % of net cash income 37\.8 22\.0 34\.2 16\.1 36\.0 19\.9
Land tax 1\.0 - 2\.0 - 3\.5 -
Water charge (O&M) 0\.9 0\.4 1\.7 0\.9 3\.0 1\.5
Total Direct Charges 1\.9 0\.4 3\.7 0\.9 6\.5 1\.5
Rent recovery index (Z) 42\.2 30\.8 48\.1 50\.0 47\.4 39\.5
Farm income per capita (US$) 61\.7 41\.5 95\.7 57\.5 144\.1 80\.2
----------
Tertiary Development - Pemali-Comal ------------
Gross value of production 22\.1 11\.1 42\.2 21\.1 71\.8 35\.9
Less: Cash production costs 2\.4 1\.2 4\.7 2\.4 7\.8 3\.9
Harvesting costs 2\.2 1\.1 4\.2 2\.1 7\.3 3\.7
Equals: Net cash income 17\.5 8\.8 33\.3 16\.6 56\.7 28\.3
Less: Imputed value of family labor 2\.2 2\.2 5\.0 5\.0 8\.8 8\.8
Imputed value of management 0\.9 0\.4 1\.7 0\.8 2\.8 1\.4
Allowance for risk 5\.3 2\.6 10\.0 5\.0 17\.0 8\.5
General taxes 2\.2 1\.1 4\.2 2\.1 7\.2 3\.6
Equals: Project rent 6\.9 2\.5 12\.4 3\.7 20\.9 6\.0
Rent as X of net cash income 39\.4 28\.4 37\.2 22\.2 36\.9 21\.2
Land tax 1\.0 - 2\.0 - 3\.5 -
Water charge (O&M) 0\.9 0\.4 1\.7 0\.9 3\.0 1\.5
Total Direct Charges 1\.9 0\.4 3\.7 0\.9 6\.5 1\.5
Rent recovery index (%) 27\.5 16\.0 29\.8 24\.3 31\.1 25\.0
Farm income per capita (US$) 56\.1 38\.7 84\.3 51\.8 125\.5 70\.9
/a At Rp 550/day based on total labor requirements\.
/b 5% of net cash income\.
/c 30% of net cash income\.
/d 10% of gross value of production
/e Based on Rp 5,000/ha IPEDA charges\.
/f Based on Rp 3,500/ha water charges\.
INDONESIA
IRRIGATION XIV PROJECT
Serang Drainage and Flood Control
Crop Production - Physical Inputs
Present Future without project Future with project
Wet season Drv season Wet season Drv season Wet season Dry season
Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated
rice rice rice Maize Soybeans Sorghum rice rice rice Maize Soybeans Sorghum rice rice rice :aize Soybeans Sorghum
Nonflooded Areas
Cultivation (animal day) 20 20 20 10 - 10 20 20 20 10 - 10 20 20 20 10 - 10
Seed (kg) 30 40 30 60 30 50 30 40 30 60 30 50 30 30 30 60 30 50
Fertilizer (kg)
Urea 200 100 200 75 - 50 200 100 200 75 - 50 200 150 200 100 - 100
TSP 75 25 75 30 20 20 75 25 75 30 20 20 75 50 75 30 25 30
Agrochemicals
Insecticides (l) 2 1 2 - 0\.5 - 2 1 2 - 0\.5 - 2 2 2 0\.5 0\.5 -
Zinc phosphide (gin) 100 50 100 - - - 100 50 100 - - - 100 100 100 - -
Interest (Z month)
Flooded Areas
Cultivation (animal day) - 20 - 10 - 10 - 20 - 10 - 10 - 20 - 10 - 10
Seed (kg) - 40 - 60 30 50 - 40 - 60 30 50 - 30 - 60 30 50
Fertilizer (kg)
Urea - 100 - 75 - 50 - 100 - 75 - 50 - 150 - 100 - 100
TSP - 25 - 30 20 20 - 25 - 30 20 20 - 50 - 30 25 30
Agrochemicals
Insecticides (1) - 1 - - 0\.5 - - I 0\.5 - - 2 - 0\.5 0\.5 -
Zinc phosphide (gm) - 50 - - - - - 50 - - - - - 100 - - - -
Interest (I month)
50>4
-69 - ANNEX 2
Table 10
INDONESIA
IRRIGATION XIV PROJECT
Crop Production Costs - Physical Inputs
(Madiun Stage II)
Future with- Future
Present out project with project
Soy- Soy- Soy-
Paddy beans Paddy beans Paddy beans
Cultivation (animal-day) 22 - 22 - 22 -
Seed (kg) 40 30 40 30 30 30
Fertilizer (kg)
Urea 170 - 170 - 200 -
TSP 50 20 50 20 65 30
Agrochemicals
Insecticides (1) 1\.3 0\.5 1\.5 0\.5 2\.0 0\.8
Zinc phosphide (gm) - - 50 - 100 -
Interest (Z month) 2\.0 2\.0 2\.0 2\.0 1\.0 1\.0
IFT)ONES IA
IRRICATIOD YIV PROJECT
Crop Production Costs - Physical Inputs
(Tertiary Development)
------------- Present -
------- ------ Future without project ------- ------- Future with project -------
Wet season Dry season Wet season Yry season TTet season nry season
Paddy Paddy Corn Soyaheans Paddy Paddy Corn Soyabeans Paddy Paddy Corn Foyabeans
Cultivation 20 20 10 10 20 20 10 1n 20 2n 10 10
(animal-day)
Seed (kg) 40 40 60 30 40 40 60 30 40 4n 60 3n 0
Fertilizer (kg)
Urea 100 100 75 - 120 80 80 - 150 150 100 -
TSP 25 25 30 20 30 30 40 25 74 75 50 30
Agrochemicals
Insecticides (1\.) 1 1 - 0\.5 1\.5 1 1 0\.5 2 2 1\.5 0\.8
Zinc phosphide (gm) 50 50 - - 50 - - - 1o0 100 - -
Interest (% month) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1
X X
I- Ns
- 71 - Tablet?
Page 1 of 2
ECONOMIC BEIEFITS PEP RFCTAPE
Project Area
Fare-gate Cross value/ Production lross margin/ Gross nargin/ Inputed Total farm
Area Yield price ha cost/ha ha ha labor cost income
('000 ha) (ton/ha) (P\.p '00C/ton) ------------ (Rp '0)
_______ ----------- (Rp billion)
Serang Drainage and Flood Control
Fon-Flooded Area
Future Without Project
Wet Season
Irrigated rice (well drained) 11\.1 3\.6 160 576\.0 P8\.0 488\.0 5\.4 n\.8 4\.6
Irrigated rice (poorly drained) 7\.4 3\.0 160 480\.0 68\.0 372\.n 2\.9 0\.5 2\.4
Rainfed rice 12\.6 1\.9 160 304\.0 5R\.5 245\.5 3\.1 0\.8 2\.3
Dry Season
Irrigated rice 4\.3 4\.0 160 720\.0 88\.0 632\.n 2\.7 0\.3 2\.4
Maize 3\.5 1\.1 134 147\.4 37\.6 ioq\.8 n\.4 0\.1 0\.3
Soybeans 1\.0 ' \.9 274 246\.6 15\.2 731\.4 n\.2 - n\.2
Sorghon 8\.1 1\.8 120 216\.0 30\.1 189\.9 1\.5 0\.3 1\.2
Total 46\.7 17\.9 2\.8 13\.1
Cropping Intensity: 156%
Future With Pro1ect
Welt Season
Irrigated rice (well drained) 11\.1 3\.8 160 608\.0 88\.0 c96\.0 6\.6 0\.8 5\.n
Irrigated rice (poorly drained) 7\.4 3\.8 160 608\.0 88\.0 596\.0 4\.4 0\.S 3\.3
Rainfed rice 12\.6 2\.3 160 368\.0 74\.8 339\.2 4\.3 0\.0 2\.8
Dry Season
Irrigated rice 4\.3 4\.0 160 640\.0 88\.0 552\.0 2\. 4 0\.3 2\.1
Maize 4\.0 1\.3 134 174\.2 44\.7 12°\.5 0\.S n\.1 0\.4
Soybeans 1\.3 1\.2 134 328\.8 16\.0 317\.F n\.4 n\.4
Sorgho= 11\.7 2\.0 120 240\.0 3Q\.3 200\.7 2\.3 n\.3 2\.0
Total 59\.1 21\.2 2\.9 16\.0
Cropping Intensity: 1717
Net Benefits 2\.0
Flooded Area
Future Without Project
Wet Season
Painfed rice 30\.2 1\.6 160 256\.0 58\.5 107\.5 6\.0 1\.8 4\.2
Dry Season
Meaize 6\.7 0\.8 134 107\.2 37\.6 69\.6 0\.5 0\.2 0\.3
Soybeans 0\.5 0\.6 274 164\.4 15\.2 149\.2 n\.1 - 0\.1
Sorgh\.ss 4\.5 1\.7 120 204\.0 30\.1 173\.9 0\.8 0\.1 0\.7
Total 41\.9 8\.3 2\.1 6\.2
Cropping Intensity: 138X
Future With Projet
Waet Season
Rainfed rice 30\.2 2\.3 180 414\.0 74\.8 33q\.2 In\.2 1\.0 8\.3
Dry Season
Maize 6\.9 1\.3 134 174\.2 44\.7 129\.5 0\.8 0\.2 0\.7
Soybeans 3\.9 1\.2 274 328\.8 16\.0 312\.8 1\.2 0\.1 1\.1
Sorghon 10\.4 2\.0 120 240\.0 39\.3 2n0\.7 2\.1 0\.2 1\.°
Total 51\.4 14\.4 2\.4 12\.0
Cropping Intensity: 170%
Neot Benrfita 5\.3
Nonagricult\.ral Benefits 0\.F
Total Project Senefits 0\.8
ANNFY 2
Table 12
-72 - Page 2 of 2
ECONOMIC BENEFITS
Farm gate Cross value Production Cross margin Cross margin Imputed Total farm
Area Yield price cost labor cost income
('000 ha) (ton/ha) (Rp '000/ton) ------------ (Rp '000) -------
----_ ---_-------- (Rp billion) -----------
Madiun Rehabilitation - Stage II
Future Without Project
Wet Season
Irrigated rice 58\.0 3\.0 160 480\.0 81\.3 398\.7 23\.1 3\.9 1Q\.2
Dri Season
Irrigated rice 20\.0 2\.6 160 +16\.0 81\.3 234\.1 6\.7 1\.3 5\.4
Soybeans I 23\.0 0\.5 274 137\.0 15\.2 121\.8 2\.8 0\.7 2\.1
Soybeans II 29\.0 0\.4 274 109\.6 15\.2 °44\.1 2\.7 1\.1 1\.6
Totol 130\.0 39\.R 7\.n 20\.3
Cropping Intensity: 224%
Future 11ith Pro\.ect
Wet Season
Irrigated rice 58\.0 3\.4 160 544\.0 69\.0 455\.0 26\.4 4\.0 22\.4
Dry Season
Irrigated rice 25\.0 3\.0 160 480\.0 89\.0 391\.0 9\.8 1\.8 8\.O
Soybeans 1 24\.0 0\.8 274 219\.2 18\.6 20n\.6 4\.8 0\.9 3\.9
Soybeans II 20\.0 0\.6 274 164\.4 18\.6 145\.0 4\.2 1\.1 3\.1
Total 136\.0 50\.6 7\.8 37\.4
Cropping Intensity: 234%
Pro ect Benefits 10\.0
Tertiary Development - Pekalan-SarMean
Future Without Project
Wet Season
Irrigated rice 70\.0 3\.6 160 576\.0 67\.9 508\.1 35\.6 4\.7 30\.9
Dry Season
Irrigated rice 49\.0 3\.6 160 576\.n 67\.9 5n0\.1 24\.9 3\.4 21\.5
Maize 24\.5 1\.5 134 301\.0 46\.3 154\.7 3\.8 0\.6 3\.2
Soybeans 10\.5 0\.7 274 191\.8 28\.5 163\.3 1\.7 0\.4 1\.3
Total 154\.0 74\.5 9\.1 S6\.9
Cropping Intenoity: 220%
Future With Project
Went Se\.aso
Irrigated ri-e 70\.0 4\.0 160 640\.0 80\.3 559\.7 39\.2 S\.1 34\.1
Dry Season
Irrigated rice 49\.0 3\.8 160 608\.0 80\.3 527\.7 25\.9 3\.6 22\.3
Maize 24\.5 1\.8 134 241\.2 54\.2 187\.0 4\.6 0\.7 3\.9
Soybeans 10\.5 1\.0 274 274\.0 31\.1 242\.9 2\.6 0\.4 2\.2
Total 154\.0 61\.4 4\.8 62\.5
Cropping Intenoity: 220%
Project Benefits 5\.6
Tertiary Development - Perali-Coral
Future Without Project
Wet Season
Irrigated rice 50\.0 3\.2 160 572\.0 A7\.9 444\.1 22\.2 3\.3 18\.9
Dry Season
Irrigated rice 32\.5 3\.2 160 512\.0 67\.9 444\.1 14\.4 2\.3 12\.1
MHfee 12\.5 1\.2 134 160\.8 46\.3 114\.5 1\.4 0\.3 1\.1
Soybeans 10\.0 0\.7 274 191\.8 28\.5 163\.3 1\.6 0\.4 1\.2
Total 105\.0 44\.Q 6\.3 23\.3
Cropping Intensity: 210%
Future With Project
Wet Season
Irrigated rice 50\.0 3\.6 160 570\.0 80\.3 495\.7 24\.8 3\.6 71\.2
Dry Season
Irrigated rice 32\.5 3\.4 160 544\.0 80\.3 463\.7 15\.1 2\.4 12\.7
Maize 12\.5 1\.5 134 201\.0 54\.2 146\.8 1\.P 0\.3 1\.5
Soybeans 10\.0 1\.0 274 274\.0 31\.1 242\.9 2\.4 0\.4 2\.0
Total 105\.0 49\.9 6\.7 37\.4
Cropping Intensity: 210%
Project Benefits 4\.1
-73 - ANNEX 3
INDONESIA
IRRIGATION PROJECT XIV
Schedule of Early Events
Activity Target Date
Serang River Drainage and Flood Protection
Issue tender documents for river mouth dredging July 1980
Award consultant contracts for construction
supervison July 1980
Award construction contract for main mouth
dredging November 1980
Issue tender documents for the first construction
contracts for Wulan/Serang flood protection,
Kedung-Semat drainage and Glapan Sedadi drainage October 1981
Award first construction contracts for Wulan/
Serang flood protection, Kedang-Semat drainage
and Glapan-Sedadi drainage April 1981
Madiun Rehabilitation Stage II
Award consultant contracts for construction
supervision July 1980
Issue tender documents for first group of
rehabilitation contracts March 1980
Award first rehabilitation contracts June 1980
Issue tender documents for second group of
rehabilitaton contracts February 1981
Pemali-Comal and Pekalen-Sampean Tertiary Systems
Issue tender documents for first group of
construction contracts February 1980
Award first group of construction contracts June 1980
Issue tender documents for second group of
construction contracts February 1981
INDONESIA
IRRIGATION XIV PROJECT
1980/81 Budget Allocation for O&M IBRD Assisted Projects
Rehabilitated up to 1/4/1979 Rehabilitated in FY 1979/80 Not yet Rehabilitated Total
Area Unit price Budget Area Unit price Budget Area Unit price Budget Area Budget
Province (ha) (Rp/ha) (Rp\.1000) (ha) (Rp/ha) (Rp\.1000) (ha) (Rp/ha) (Rp\.1000) (ha) (Rp\.1000)
Lampung
PROSIDA/PIBD 49,000 6,500 320,000 7,500 2,000 15,000 37,500 4,000 163,000 94,000 498,000
West Java
PROSIJAT 251,000 6,500 1,631,000 22,000 2,000 44,000 31,766 2,500 79,000 304,766 1,754,000
PROSIDA 214,578 5,500 1,180,000 22,768 3,000 66,000 - - - 237,346 1,246,000
Central Java
PROSIDA 186,293 5,500 1,024,000 - - - - - 186,293 1,024,000
Yogyakarta
PIBD 21,844 6,500 153,000 2,000 2,000 4,000 10,806 4,000 42,000 34,650 199,000
East Java
PROSIDA 316,335 5,500 1,740,000 37,262 2,000 75,000 78,937 3,500 279,000 432,534 2,094,000
North Sulawesi
PIBD 11,025 6,000 66,000 - - - - - - 11,025 66,000
Central Sulawesi
PIBD 12,000 6,000 72,000 - - - - - - 12,000 72,000
South Sulawesi
PROSIDA 52,330 5,750 300,000 4,000 2,500 10,000 - - - 56,330 310,000
Total 1,114,405 5,820 6\.486,000 95,530 2,240 214,000 159,009 3,540 563,000 1,368,944 7 263,000
- 75 - ANNEX 5
INDONESIA
IRRIGATION XIV
Statements of Expenditure
1\. Statements of expenditure would be used for disbursement on the
i ol )wing items:
(a) civil works - rehabilitation of Madiun irrigation systems -
Loan Amount US$29\.8 million; and
(b) civil works - tertiary development in Pemali-Comal and
Pekalen-Sampean and gatekeeper housing in nine major irrigation
schemes - Loan Amount US$15\.8 million;
2\. The civil works in NIadiun, tertiary works in Pemali-Comal and
Pekalen-Sampean, and gatekeeper housing would be procured on the basis of
local competitive bidding for a large number of small scattered contracts
because of the nature of the work\. Disbursements would be made on the basis
of quarterly statements of expenditure made under the terms of the contracts
accompanied by certification that the work had been completed and by
evidence of payment\. For tertiary development the certification would cover
earthworks as well as structures\. The contracts and bid evaluation would be
retained by PROSIDA, the executing agency for DGWRD and would be available
for inspection by Bank supervision missions\.
4\. The statements of expenditures for civil works in Madiun, Pemali-
Comal and Pekalen-Sampean would be prepared by the financial divisions of
PROSIDA project units in those areas already established for ongoing works
under previous Bank loans\. For O&M housing the statements would be prepared
by the Finance Division of PROSIDA headquarters in Jakarta, which has
considerable experience under previous Bank loans of processing withdrawal
applications\. All statements of expenditure would be subject to auditing
requirements established for the project\.
-76 - ANNEX
INDONESIA
IRRIGATION XIV
Related Documents and Data Available in the Project File
A\. General reports and studies relating to the agriculture and irrigation
sector\.
A\.1 World Bank, "Comnmodity Price Forecast," May 1979\.
A\.2 World Bank, "Indonesian Growth Patterns," Report No\. 2093-IND,
February 20, 1979\.
A\.3 World Ban>', "Indonesia Irrigation Program Review," Report No\. 2027a-
IND, October 16, 1978\.
A\.4 World Bank, "Indonesia Supply Prospects for Major Food Crops," Report
No\. 2374-IND, March 3, 1979\.
B\. General reports and studies relating to the project\.
Serang River Drainage and Flood Protection
B\.1 Republic of Indonesia, "Serang River Drainage and Flood Protection,
"SMEC, Volume 1, February 1979\.
B\.2 Republic of Indonesia, "Serang River Drainage and Flood Protection,
"SMEC, Downriver Works, September 1978\.
B\.3 Republic of Indonesia, "Serang River Drainage and Flood Protection,
"SMEC, Water Investigations, September 1978\.
B\.4 Project File, AEPIA, August 1979\.
Madiun Rehabilitation Stage II
B\.5 Republ'c Of Indonesia, Electroconsult-Nippon Koei, "Feasibility
Report," November 1976\.
B\.6 Republic Of Indonesia, "Madiun Rehabilitation Stage II," Revised
Cost Estimate, June 10, 1979\.
B\.7 Republic Of Indonesia, "Madiun Rehabilitation Stage II," Revised
Cost Estimate, Supplement No\. 1, June 24, 1979\.
B\.8 Project File, AEPIA, August 1979\.
Tertiary Irrigation Systems
B\.9 Miscellaneous reports by PROSIDA and the Jatiluhur Authority
INDONESIA
IRRIGATION PROJECT XIV
IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE
INDONESIAN FISCAL YEAR
PROJECT ACTIVITY\.
FY 1979/80 FY 1980i81 FY 1981/82 FY 1982/83 FY 1983/84 FY 1984/85
Serang River Drainage and Flood Protection 1 11
Detailed Designs and Construction Drawings
Tender and Award WVO O OAVJ WW !ZJPdPJ W\.O VIO
Constrction
River Mouth Dredging _ _ _ _ _ _
Wulan/Lower Serang Flood Protection _ _ _ - _ ___ _
Welahan-Bum Drainage _
Juana Valley Drainage \. _ _ -
Kedung-Semat Drainage _ _ _ = = _ - _
Upper Serang, Pelayaran and Wedung Drainage = - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Madiun Rehabilitation State II
Detailed Designs and Constrction Drawings
Tender and Award ti! 0' t p #' W MOW _O4
Construction
Pemali-Comal and Pekalen Sampean Tertiary Systems
Detailed Designs and Construction Drawings
Tender and Award sX x _ w _ _
Construction f _{_
g,mar,r Work Performed IntermittentiV
Indonesian Fiscal Year Starts April 1 and Ends March 31 of Following Year World Bank - 20752
xjr
W
l\.a
aq
INDONESIA
IRRIGATION XIV
Organization of the Directorate General of Water Resources Development
I MINISTER OF PUBLICWORKS I
ASSISTANTS TO
MINISTER OF DIRECTOR-GENERALOF
PUBLICWORKS DI WATER RESOURCES
FOR WATER RE- WADEVELOPMENT
SOURCES DEVELOP-
MENT (2)
sECRETARIAT DIVISION OF FOREIGN
LOAN ADMINISTRATION
DIRECTORATE OF DIRECTORATE O DIRECTORATE OF ~ O A EIRGTO
PROGRAMMING OF RIVERS ~SWAMPS OF IRRIGATIONEQIMNEGNERG
|ENERAL MANAGER|
|PROSIDA/PIBDl
World Bank -18765
INDONESIA
IRRIGATION XIV
PROSIDA MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION
DIR\. GENERAL
WATER RESOURCES
DEVELOP\.
ICONSULTANTS L I IADVISORY GROUP
E r 1 P~~~~~ROSIDAJPIB 13
I CH EF I r CHIEF CHIEF PIBD
I ENGINEERING ] I OP\. & MAIN\. ADMINISTR\.
IDEPUTY- CHIEF I IDEPUTY CHIEFI
IENG\./CONSTRUC\. I IENG\./SURV\.-DES\.I
ASST\. TO THE ASST\. FOR [ ASST\. FOR l ASST\. FOR S ASST\. FOR
GEN\. MANAG\. SUPERV\. CONST\. 0URVEO\. &S M\. FINANCE
I ASST\. FOR I I ASST\. FOR I ASST\. FOR ASST\. FOR
m BUILDING/FAC\. ! DESIGN I m HYDROLOG\.] GEN\. AFFAIR
\.1ASST\. FOR I ASST\. FOR I ASST\. FOR I ASST\. FOR I
MECH\. EQUIPM\. | BUDGET/REP\. I AGRICULT\.I LOGISTIC AFFAIRI
'1-
SUB\. PROJECTS SUB\.PROJECTS SUB PROJECTS SUB\. PROJECTS SUB\. PROJECTS
World Bank-16008
INDONESIA
IRRIGATION XIV
PROSIDA FIELD ORGANIZATION
I SUB-PROJECT I\.~PROVINCIAL
MANAGER J ADVISORJ GROUP
_ , 2/
CONSULTING DEPUTY SUB-PROJECT
ENGINEERiS MANAGER
1 DEPUTY - DEPUTY
DEPUTY 0 & M ENGINEERING ADMINISTRATION
r1
2/ 2/ 1 , I1 2/ 2/
DESIGNU| CONSTRUCTION MECHANICAL ADMINISTRATION FINANCE COMPTROLLER
DESIGN ~~~~~~~UNIT
0 & M SECTIONS
1/ PROVINCIAL STAFF
i/ PROSIDA STAFF World Bank-8964
Oq
ID
Figure 5\. 1
IRRIGATION PROJECT XIV
PRESENT AND PROPOSED SCHEMATIC CROPPING PATTERNSl'
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep |
SERANG RIVER AREA _ - -- PRESENT CROPPING PATTERNS - - - - -- - - -
la) Non-flooded Areas
Irrigated _ 1 1l1iil
Rainfed 1 lhllIll 111111111 d!d i A
(bl Flooded Areas liiilIlhlIN
MADIUN VALLEY AND TERTIARY AREAS
Fully Irrigated _hhI lINhhhl 111111 lhlIlhhl 111111111
Wet Season Irrigation Only 111 lflflJfl flfl_J
_ _ - \. - _ _ _ FUTURE CROPPING PATTERNS - - _ _
SERANG RIVER AREA
(a) Non-flooded Areas 111 hhhIhhll mlii tI
Irrigated
Rainfed 1 i iiiiii llll V i
lb) Flooded Areas 111 hhiNIhhhhl 111111111
MADIUN VALLEY AND TERTIARY AREAS
Fully Irrigated 11 Ihhhhhhhhlhi 11I l I 1 1
Wet Season Irrigation Only _niii illIllihIl 1111
Average Rainfall 500 _'5
(mm)
400
300 ' Serang River Areas s
300 _ " \. 293 94 Madiun Valley
200
100 _ 35 i5
too
0! =- \.
Land Preparation and Nurseries
^ - Palawija Crops (Maize, Soybeans etc\.)
Rice
World Bank - 20726
W60 137832
MALAYSIA~~~~~~~~~~~~I
Onno0>00
SLP-40 'I\.,, Sl5NGPdy A-''
0 h"l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ > 'a']0, 0OO
Ij, A- S,/ u~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -
bok\.ot,o00 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 5,00h
50~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ooom ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 500J 0Oo
2 pIer0~~Vp 25po,060re h\. k-> iWloooo 2,0
t 1,250 h~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0 1704 ¶-
\.oo2A,so Jy 0 ~~~" 't\.4 2 2
Ooo20olo 5~~~~~~~~P,j~ 2,000 h\.r 2
INDONE 8'6'0'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Joooooobboo,o
IRRIGAT16N 'PBO ~ ~ 1 po'\.o Llosb &Sd' Pod 0000 ""
ROJECT ARE ~ ~ lopooooo 0000 000 - 00010OtOpAr
mfti~~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ A~~¶0 SootIro~ Sobd tAooo 25 d,00oPspo, ,
V 100,067O00h ~r a
BOO ~ ~ ~ ~ ,~~'roi01dkoron0brio 0 V AS I SoSol¶ 000 5,0 A-0,60o
= IR RI~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Wo C n O obIr s , 12 0 o50Co ¶ 8Og S lop o¶ o 2420Lo\.-0 00 4
Eam Fi~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Soo
ROADS ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~Io ono'o oloooSr-ro0 \.0
D 1?0 200 39~~~~~~~~~~~~~~/'o,004 0
Ssoborg 00orsng Sub-project 92,000 0 0, op 5 0100 /0r¶, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -~NJ~Y
K BIC T O POEIROJ[ T X V Comrk( Sooo0004 --)o IO,nloo-'/ 1S4b1npSbp0o0,
~~~~AILES ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ oprcobr
0 jjfJ1f RIEChBA 201 SF LOOCNRLPOPT2il Sodot: Onnn bA0 K,~<o/ -
IBRD 14508
t_tiCIPPNEa 1 ilt\.55 INDONESIA AUGUST 1979
rjrvsAnra ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~IDOEI
' m'';eE<\.-+SlNGhueCSZ 1 < o ~/ ^ IRRIGATION PROJECT XIV
K5uuA<5 e<e,MAir\.taFaaa apaaa;uNI(rtsf/ j~ t Serong River Drainage & Flood Protection Sub-project
-N D-_ p0 N A ;
Benef t areas
C- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~ ~~~~~Future irrigation area
Main conals
R-wtaaaa a5 -- lapara Secondary canals
s 1 opana 'Exist ng drain in satisfactory coadition
11 0' 30' '/ '- \. _ Existing drra n to be rehabilitated
aTaaewaw'aafrSe ,epaa fa A-QPofPffEdbYrh@got hed N\. S/,la,\.aanoiaaaaaCaSN -- ----\.;#-\.d- New drain to be constructed
b-,-o des,oaa -amp dMI t,piy o- th- e -_e! o t - Waed BN P d t\
aWfJ11-\. ,ar,adaa-m isN rviSat\., - f , f a -4C Rivers
cg,\.,, 'a 50a,\.Naara ~~~~~~~~Semat, Weirs
KILOMETERS 0 5 to to \.- ,a4- Proposed dams/reservoirs
_______________________________ - t ~~~~~~~~~~~~Pumping station
MILES 0 5 10 ,' 3 _ \.-- Power stations
XEDU , ; t Main roads
,,a' \. ~~~~~~~~~~Railways
--- I 5 '7
\ ', / sM4w~~~~~~EM T P-ecangoan a -,
_t , / < S5py , 1 , , ; /a514
jK RJMP STATIOtN
N~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
/00' t/ / 7'0
PUCANGGACING '\~i\
JRAIGUNST r
BARA G W u waEIR' -
WEIR c ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ WI
''_ WEt \.-
t/'/~~~~~~~~~~n v a8 W{<
D eAM SITE AP' A 7AM Si/
JPAOAG'5 -~1'55,juoot 1,0
RF\.5E1?V0)1? K dungia ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ;-5nita-
-\., A5--\.'c-, -' 5-p Oa -SPAN~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ill
7 tO~~~~~~~~3,1 7-0
IBRD 14509
r 111I00' 111\.30' 112 00' AUGUST 1979
IN DON ES IA
IRRIGATION PROJECT XIV
Madiun Irrigation Systems Rehabilitation Sub-project
Project boundary
iI, p'-dLdi 6V Irrigation service units
Previous Bank Project
(Stage I, Irrigation VII)
Not irrigated area
Cerroirxsg ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Roads
------Railways
->- Rivers
[73 Contours in meters7' -
W fcJogiab:rr Ko ongonyor Sorcor Ecc, MADIUN REHABILITATION STAGE IIUN'ITS
L : X i : m 0 a 0 & Atus0 u
S;wAr AcN; KentEng Ats Pirigng
Swrrhor 3-hie P-rcrrg 5 ibi,
S, -'N- At\.s PI-cgkrcrrgcrs Pe-;T
Irn, c\itrAibSJrkarda L\.d wo\. AA\.w\.k AsIE Atc, K--0304
Lodrlol Af\.s G-dsl1 Di-rng
| 991- \. C Bis\.rh Key-g Scs-rr, D-sr
Ngle--ccg At\., K,,y-g At\.s K-rshog At\.,
X ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ KPengok B-1,c EerTrrgc Ke-rb-g B-wrr
%00 &-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Ccrk Mcyocg KoTi Ab\.
200 ~~~~~~~~~~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Ngiy-n B13sc Pelcrs K,,1Lsi
(l 33 Ngiy- Ar,s Mr ic cNsgcc
K_k-'n Dom- Bruswok A1s
f ~~~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Sok\. Rc-sr, Keli sir-s Br-~k 5c,rol
S\.k\. Alts G\.Iok Ales K\. iqed,,
Ponos-ogo ~ ~ ~~~~6\.Kior,pok P-sorg K\.li G-rrlbg
Ked-9c Me,ck 31ege Jot Ketc, Atns
K--se Outrng K-\.iiri J,,t Kesok 5c-1,
Tre-Il SelIrng T-wu
Crc Re,jo G\.rerBtrdrro
G,,b-'g GIocggorrg D-rg S3-d\.
Andcsrg Alas Klepek Y,y-\.rp-cg
___________ __________________________________________________________ TieiI Ales ScSi Ales PoE orre~~~Ti!] At-B\.til t- ph
Ng-rst S-rcc At,cs Ker-SIgcgo-
AlSO 7 ~ PHLPPNES Bringin eegScekOr
A 55 NIH - ~ ~~~~~~~~~I O ~NJ\.bung Mru,wk Je-ker
K 5\. Kelekoss ~~~~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Atc,s J-rk P-r9
4000000 Insist r Gcngging Srcngko Ales KeslerIs Ce erg~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\.ng7q R\.nk\.Af~ Kd- C -
UMATEA ,,A ,ear/Asr NEW Goeggong Cebur Arcs Grrrdo~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-nq\.q \.t,rAt, -d
I ~ ~ ~~O~ ~N E S V -
troor - "IsA ~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~KILOMETERS 0 10 20 30 40t
rrr ,,sad , rnr,srls r Onpi it n , - d -d 0, 0559,5
7Ii rO r-irnrnrss,rrlrni\.rI,nrsrrro MILES 3 50 15 20 2\.5
I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~wf \.rrsr lbs\.rdorw Ill130, Ii 2 -00'
iBRD 14510
DOS s0A iUGUST 935
INRT ONES CA Project areas
IRRIGATION PROJFCT Xf Previous proect areas (Loan 1268 IND)
Tertiary Irrigation Systems Sub-project * Serv,ce areas
PEMALI - COMAL \.r\. a\.ion boundary
Momn canals
Secondary canals
Risers
PLMAILI ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Reservoirs
A: MALAHA IIU B\. VirF \. 1FA SRACGI I Weirs
SERVICE AREA '" 'L SFRVICE AREA H pu\.p
D GULNI Gd
\ - S-Et F \. CACx \. A,fIRVl Ar -F A Raildays
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~, ' RViCf R \.sEhA
% PEiA, APEKALO
( /50 * ty u ou I AK ~\\- ,,3aUTeYnDx K\.P)
\ \F~~~~\ / e \ X Thz, rr, \.rep3recl br z118 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~suosss \.O* d o~I H* - eveurvl *,\.o CD^ wooe,ec
R C, SOKAWATI - ~ / - -
L VE
PI NII -ANGGERO0G
\, i N 5 Pn 5 r n N 0 v5 eM
u~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 0000 V 'rLrlTR 5 10 15 20 25 ®li 000013-ll ,,Trss
-S - S iLOS D 5 ID inrU@ efN >Sdr
\.0AAJ iB 109°30'
113°00' 113°30' 114O00' 114°30'
IN DON ES IA
KILOMETERS 0 10 20 30 40 50
KU\.OMETERS _____________________IRRIGATION PROJECT XV\
MILES 0 1o 2' 0 Tertiary Irrigation Systems Subpro'ject
7his -nphah byee predaredhythe WVrldBankostar -ff--tUetrforrheronoeroence PE PAAI EN I AAADC A 1 1
of the tender oh the repor to wh/ch it s attached\. Thr de,,ontto tioa -d and the PE A E L if"IN _
7° 30' b_ondaoe -hown on -IS tmaIp d0 ot- imp,Iy 0n the p\.rt of the Wond Bank and, ts
alh/iates\. dnY,odgrnt ontheed1,,1ttcs oh anyf tr-tttor anyendo/sementor 7'30
dotrhptadeofscrhnforhhndar,ae> -r v
i Proposed project areas
Primary canals
fI,77fi, Previous project areas
P'-/-// 7Loan 1268-IND (1979/80)
Rice paddy area completed under
CR 289-IND
UM Terrain above 500 m\. altitude
Headworks or weirs
Roads
Railways
Rivers
-*~-Ditrictboundaries
_,P L54AND L 'LIP' NES 8a-3O 8e Xa30r
hdhGINEEI\.
I N A Y N E o~iT S I r
Pa,ePrre Ambon JAYA I
S KNA lrten L( TMR-0f
_ 13'00' 113'30t b 0 _d
L A y P~~~~~~~~~/M At~Ot0
SINGAPORE~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~J
SUMAIRA KAZIMANTAN PAPUA ciganIoCrttiOdISOthdd,o | APPROVAL |
P170236 |  The World Bank
Renewable Energy and Improved Utility Performance Project (P170236)
Project Information Document (PID)
Appraisal Stage | Date Prepared/Updated: 04-Aug-2021 | Report No: PIDA28834
Apr 27, 2021 Page 1 of 23
The World Bank
Cabo Verde Sustainable Electricity Service Project (P170236)
BASIC INFORMATION
OPS_TABLE_BASIC_DATA
A\. Basic Project Data
Country Project ID Project Name Parent Project ID (if any)
Cabo Verde P170236 Cabo Verde Renewable
Energy and Improved
Utility Performance
Project
Region Estimated Appraisal Date Estimated Board Date Practice Area (Lead)
AFRICA WEST 21-Jun-2021 07-Oct-2021 Energy & Extractives
Financing Instrument Borrower(s) Implementing Agency
Investment Project Financing Republic of Cabo Verde Special Project
Management Unit,
Ministry of Finance
Proposed Development Objective(s)
The project development objectives are to (i) increase renewable energy generation; and (ii) improve the
performance of the electricity utility in Cabo Verde by leveraging private finance\.
Components
Renewable and Efficient Electricity Service
Advisory Services for Electricity Sector Restructuring and Privatization
Project Implementation Support and Technical Assistance
PROJECT FINANCING DATA (US$, Millions)
SUMMARY -NewFin1
Total Project Cost 16\.50
Total Financing 16\.50
of which IBRD/IDA 7\.00
Financing Gap 0\.00
DETAILS -NewFinEnh1
World Bank Group Financing
Apr 27, 2021 Page 2 of 23
The World Bank
Cabo Verde Sustainable Electricity Service Project (P170236)
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 3\.50
International Development Association (IDA) 3\.50
IDA Credit 3\.50
Non-World Bank Group Financing
Trust Funds 9\.50
Canada Clean Energy and Forest Climate Facility Trust Fund 7\.50
GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE FACILITY 2\.00
Environmental and Social Risk Classification
Moderate
Decision
The review did authorize the team to appraise and negotiate
Other Decision (as needed)
B\. Introduction and Context
Country Context
1\. Cabo Verde experienced spectacular social and economic progress between 1990 and 2008,
despite being a small island economy with a small population only numbering to about half a
million people\. Indeed, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) went from an annual growth rate of 3\.5
percent in 1990 to 10\.4 percent in 2008\. That growth, driven mainly by the rapid development of
inclusive tourist resorts, allowed the small archipelago of ten volcanic islands (of which nine are
populated) situated in the Atlantic Ocean, about 500 km off the coast of Senegal, to graduate to
middle income status in 2007 (currently classified in the lower middle income group)\.
2\. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, Cabo Verde experienced robust and accelerating economic
growth on the back of a blooming tourism sector and strong structural reforms, which was halted
by the economic crisis triggered by the pandemic\. Following the global financial crisis of 2008,
annual growth accelerated in Cabo Verde, particularly between 2016 and 2019, reaching 4\.7 percent
on average during that period, on the back of a thriving tourism sector and strong structural reforms\.
These included SOEs reform, fiscal restraint, and debt reduction\. The unfolding crisis reversed this
progress\. GDP is estimated to have contracted by 14\.8 percent in 2020 (15\.7 percent in per-capita
terms), the third-largest reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)\. As a result of the substantial
reduction in fiscal revenue, both the fiscal deficit and financing needs increased substantially in 2020\.
Apr 27, 2021 Page 3 of 23
The World Bank
Cabo Verde Sustainable Electricity Service Project (P170236)
The overall deficit (including grants) widened from 1\.8 percent of GDP in 2019 to 9 percent in 2020\.
Tax and non-tax revenue declined from 229\.4 percent of GDP in 2019 to 25\.8 percent in 2020\. Total
expenditures increased from 31 percent of GDP in 2019 to 35 percent in 2020\. Public debt (as a share
of GDP) had been on a declining path since 2017, falling from 128\.4 percent of the GDP in 2016 to
124\.9 percent in 2019\. However, the increase in concessional external borrowing and domestic
lending to cover fiscal financial needs in 2020 (and the contraction of GDP) increased public debt to
140\.9 percent of GDP\. Growth is projected to be 3\.9 percent in 2021 supported by the gradual
resumption of tourism flows\.
3\. Expansionary fiscal policy, including increased support to loss-making SOEs, led to growing fiscal
financing needs and a ballooning in public debt\. Weak central government fiscal performance,
including current transfers to SOEs, was compounded by increasing below-the-line financial support
to loss-making SOEs, notably to the airline and the social housing program\. Growing fiscal financing
needs and the provision of guarantees to SOEs fueled a rapid accumulation of public and publicly
guaranteed debt, which climbed from 57 percent of GDP in 2008 to peak at 128\.4 percent of GDP in
2016\. While progress has been made since 2016, the SOE sector is still the most significant source of
fiscal risks, with most SOEs making losses for the last couple of years, leading to an increase in the
stock of debt\. The total debt stock for the three largest SOEs â the real estate company, Imobiliária
Fundiaria e Habitat (IFH), which manages the social housing project Casa para Todos (CPT), the
electricity and water company Empresa de Electricidade e Ã?gua (ELECTRA) and the national airline
company, Transportes Aéreos de Cabo Verde (TACV) â rebranded Cabo Verde Airlines (CVA) as of
May 2018 â reached 27\.7 percent of GDP in 2019\.
4\. In response to these challenges, the GoCV has embarked on an ambitious program of reforms for
SOEs and, more broadly, of improving the business environment and quality of delivery of key
services such as transport, energy and ICT\. The initial reform efforts have already yielded significant
results in the performance of the SOE sector in Cabo Verde and, in turn, reducing the fiscal risk related
to SOEs\. In 2018, the SOE sector in Cabo Verde reached a positive overall net result of 235,786 million
Escudos (about US$2\.4 million), constituting an increase of 183 percent over 2017\. In 2019, the public
financing1 to SOEs represented 7 percent of GDP, down from 9\.57 and 10\.90 percent of GDP in 2018
and 2017 respectively\. Similarly, annual public revenues from SOEs2 skyrocketed from US$348,772 in
2017 to US$22\.5 million in 2019\.
5\. The COVID-19 pandemic unleashed unprecedent threats to social and economic progress in Cabo
Verde, significantly worsening the economic outlook\. The pandemic poses major threats to the global
economy, which are exacerbated in Small Island Developing States (SIDS) given their high reliance on
international financial and trade flows\. The main transmission channels in Cabo Verde are threefold\.
First, the tourism sector, which represents 25 percent of GDP and drives around 40 percent of overall
economic activity, is affected by worldwide travel restrictions in place since March 2020\. Second, the
delay or cancellation of planned investment projects due to lingering global uncertainty reduce FDI, a
key driver of growth\. Third, with a diaspora outnumbering the resident population, the economic
downturn in the developed world may impact remittances, currently accounting for 9 percent of GDP\.3
1 This includes lending subsidies, capital injections and guarantees for loans\.
2 This includes tax payments, dividends, concession payments and divestment proceeds\.
3 According to the World bank, due to the COVID-19 crisis, remittance flows to SSA are expected to decline by 23\.1 percent to
Apr 27, 2021 Page 4 of 23
The World Bank
Cabo Verde Sustainable Electricity Service Project (P170236)
Recognizing the large economic threat posed by the crisis, and despite very limited policy buffers
available, authorities swiftly took resolute measures to contain and mitigate the impact of the
pandemic, including declaring for the first time the State of Emergency, boosting cash transfers,
providing temporary tax exemptions, deferring taxes, facilitating credit to small business, and
implementing other measures\. The ranking of Cabo Verde on the Doing Business Index has been
eroding for the past years and is currently 137th out of 190 countries, below the average of its structural
peers\.
6\. The COVID-19 crisis halted progress in the fiscal consolidation program the Government
implemented since 2016\. Driven by a substantial increase in revenues and containment in expenditure,
the primary balance improved steadily turning from a deficit of 5\.4 percent of GDP in 2014 to a surplus
of 0\.7 percent in 2019\. The overall fiscal deficit declined from 7\.6 percent of GDP in 2014 to 1\.8 percent
of GDP in 2019\. Furthermore, total fiscal financing needs, including on-lending to SOEs and
recapitalization, almost halved to less than 3\.0 percent of GDP between 2016 and 2018 â before picking
up in 2019 on the back of one-off support to the privatization of CVA\. Since 2017, the GoCV has been
implementing an ambitious plan to gradually disengage the State from SOEs, which included the partial
privatization of CVA and the concession for the provision of inter-island maritime services in 2019\. The
crisis increased fiscal pressures in early 2020 with the overall fiscal deficit accounting for 3\.5 percent
of GDP as of August 2020\.
7\. Overall, electricity services in Cabo Verde are expensive, which makes the economy less competitive,
and calls for actions to reduce the cost of that basic service\. By reducing the cost of power generation
through increased penetration of cheaper renewable energy sources as well as improved commercial
performance of a restructured and privatized electricity utility, this project can contribute to lower the
cost of electricity services, increase energy independence, reduce exposure to volatile petroleum price
fluctuations and reduce Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions\. Sustainable and affordable electricity
service is likely to yield a growth dividend and reduce fiscal risks\.
8\. Cabo Verde is performing relatively well across a range of gender indicators related to human
development, but womenâs economic empowerment is still hampered\. On the Global Gender Gap
Index, Cabo Verde ranks among the worldâs best in the âhealth and survivalâ? and âschool enrollmentâ?
dimensions\. Progress on human development indicators for women have however not translated into
womenâs economic empowerment\. Cabo Verde ranks only 115th out of 149 countries on âeconomic
participation and opportunity for womenâ?\. The difference in engagement in economic activities
between women and men is particularly pronounced in rural areas where only 36 percent of women
is involved in economic activities compared to 56 percent of men\. Nationwide, labor force participation
of women is indeed significantly below that of men\. According to the recent Country Gender Profile
report for Cabo Verde, some of the key issues that contribute to high poverty and low productivity
among women are their lack of time, financing and knowledge\. Lack of financing also hinders growth
and productivity of their business efforts and lack of knowledge is a key challenge, on issues including
options for productive income-producing activities, networking structures to build skills, how to access
markets etc\.
reach US$37 billion in 2020\. The anticipated decline can be attributed to a combination of factors driven by the coronavirus
outbreak in key destinations where African migrants reside including in the EU area, the United States, the Middle East, and
China\.
Apr 27, 2021 Page 5 of 23
The World Bank
Cabo Verde Sustainable Electricity Service Project (P170236)
9\. The archipelago of Cabo Verde is exposed to a wide range of natural hazards including droughts,
tropical storms, landslides and floods\.4 Climate change will worsen these risks5 as the country will
experience higher temperatures 6 showed that by mid-century, sea level rise could vary between 1\.08
m and 1\.66 m, which would present a direct threat for the coastal population\. Cabo Verde accounts
for negligible share of global emissions (0\.0018 percent) but is ranked 101st out of 188 countries in
terms of its vulnerability to climate change impact7\. Climate and disaster risk screening indicates that
Cabo Verde has a high risk of landslides and medium risk of coastal floods8\. The provision of reliable
electricity services is critical for emergency preparedness and response system in case of disaster and
climate-related shocks, as the power sector is highly interconnected with other critical sectors,
including communication services, transportation, and health care facilities\.
10\. Cabo Verde submitted its first NDC in 2015 and has updated it in 2020 by quantifying emission
reductions\. Through its mitigation strategies provided in the NDC, Cabo Verde has made a 2030
commitment to reduce economy-wide greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 18 percent below business-
as-usual (BAU) and to increase this target to 24 percent on the condition of adequate international
support leading to removal of 764 Gg CO2eq GHG emissions by 2030\. The contribution of the energy
sector in the NDC mitigation strategies is based on the Electricity Master Plan adopted in 2018\. Cabo
Verde plans to undertake a major shift towards the low-carbon economy by increasing the share of
renewable energy sources in the electricity supply from 18 percent to 30 percent in 2025 and up to
50percent in 2030\. With adequate support, Cabo Verde has indicated that the target for the share of
renewable energy sources may go up to 100 percent by 2040\. Cabo Verde also plans to secure on-grid
or off-grid electricity supply across nine islands and reach 100 percent access to electricity for all
consumers by 20239\.
Sectoral and Institutional Context
General Overview
11\. The energy sector in Cabo Verde has accomplished tremendous progress in the past 10 years\. Access
has reached approximately 95 percent today (from 47 percent in 2000), among the highest in SSA;
there is enough power generation capacity to meet the countryâs demand for electricity; and
important investments in new transmission and distribution assets have improved the quality of
service\. Cabo Verde performs well on energy intensity compared to neighboring countries; as of 2015
4 As an example, on average, once every 10 years a loss of at least US$10 million in agricultural income is expected to occur in Cabo Verde and
approximately $540 million of building stock and around 150,000 people are exposed to flash flood hazard\. For more details, see World Bank,
Cabo Verde Risk Profile (2019) http://documents1\.worldbank\.org/curated/en/523961573390033686/pdf/Disaster-Risk-Profile-Cabo-Verde\.pdf\.
5 Cabo Verde is already high on the climate risks index: 155th out of 181 countries â see https://www\.climatewatchdata\.org/countries/CPV\.
6 Deltares, 2017\. Cabo Verde -Coastal FloodingHazard Assessment\.
7
https://gain\.nd\.edu/our-work/country-index/rankings/
8 https://thinkhazard\.org/en/report/47-cape-verde
9 https://www4\.unfccc\.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Cabo%20Verde%20First/Cabo%20Verde_NDC%20Update%202021\.pdf
Apr 27, 2021 Page 6 of 23
The World Bank
Cabo Verde Sustainable Electricity Service Project (P170236)
(latest available) it had the lowest energy intensity of all West African countries (2\.773 MJ/US$2011
PPP GDP)10\.
12\. Despite these major achievements, the electricity sector in Cabo Verde is vulnerable and continues
to face challenges that could undermine its ability to be the engine of post COVID-19 economic
growth\. In 2011, the GoCV embarked on a comprehensive recovery and reform plan for the sector
with the support of several development partners, including the Bank with the Recovery and Reform
of the Electricity Sector Project (P115464)\. Key investments to modernize the sector included the
modernization of thermal generation (more efficient and larger plants, substitution of diesel by heavy
fuel oil â HFO), the expansion of renewable generation capacity, the upgrading of the transmission
and distribution networks and the implementation of a revenue protection program (RPP) beginning
in 2016\. Despite these efforts, the sector continues to have persistently high commercial losses,
financial losses, and significant debt (approximately US$ 270 million, or 12\.5 percent of GDP), all of
which could undermine its performance going forward\. ELECTRAâs level of indebtedness is a
significant source of fiscal risk as it holds the largest stock of government guaranteed debt\.
13\. Electricity prices in Cabo Verde are amongst the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa\. Indeed, residential
tariffs have averaged US$0\.28/kWh over the past four years but have fluctuated as high as
US$0\.36/kWh in March 2019 for higher-consuming (>60 kWh/month) residential users\. High
electricity tariffs limit the affordability of electricity for many households, many being hardly hit by
the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and are a contributing factor to the high level of
electricity fraud and theft\. Tariffs allow for full cost recovery of costs (with an allowed level of system
losses of 23\.3 percent set by the regulator) with a compensation mechanism for low-income energy
consumers who benefit from a social tariff discount policy based on their level of consumption -
ELECTRA made losses in the last few years in part because its technical and commercial losses are
above those allowed by the regulator when setting tariffs\.
14\. High electricity service costs are driven by: (i) low economies of scale with small isolated systems
across the archipelago; (ii) dependency on imported fossil fuels for electricity generation; and (iii)
high commercial losses\. Regarding quality of service, it has improved significantly over the past
decade, and the annual duration of blackouts has decreased by 30 percent between 2013 and 2018\.
However, the number of blackouts has increased by 60 percent, and all other monitored indicators
related to system availability have essentially remained constant over the same period\.
15\. Historically, electricity demand growth in Cabo Verde was met exclusively with thermal generation
using imported fossil fuels, while renewable energy penetration has increased significantly in recent
years\. Thermal generation was used to supply most of the electricity generation and to cover the
demand for industry, transportation, and approximately 30 percent of householdsâ energy
consumption\. Traditionally, the population of Cabo Verde use biomass as a primary renewable energy
resource, which still covers a significant proportion of household energy needs (for cooking),
especially in rural areas (55 percent)\. Renewable energy penetration has increased from less than 2
percent of the utilityâs power generation mix in 2010 to about 18 percent in 2019, thanks to major
10 World Bank DataBank\.
Apr 27, 2021 Page 7 of 23
The World Bank
Cabo Verde Sustainable Electricity Service Project (P170236)
investments to expand renewable generation capacity and upgrade the transmission and distribution
network\.
16\. To plan for the necessary infrastructure and related investments to meet the energy goals under
the National Program for Energy Sustainability of 2017 (PNSE), the GoCV has developed a Master
Plan for the Power Sector (2018 - 2030) which concludes that the least-cost plan to meet energy
demand by 2030 includes 54 percent of power generation coming from VRE sources\. The Master
Plan, which was endorsed through Resolution â 39/2019 of the Council of Ministers, provides for the
installation of around 251 MW of VRE capacity (160 MW of solar PV; 91 MW of wind)\. As part of the
preparation of the Master Plan, the GoCV developed a Renewable Energy Atlas in 2010, which
identified the sites for potential solar and wind projects and designated them as Renewable Energy
Development Zones (Zonas de Desenvolvimento de Energia Renovável, or ZDERs) under the Decree
Law â 1/2011\. Since then, GOCV has procured about 13 MW of the 114 MW renewable energy
needed by 2025, and it has launched a competitive procurement of IPPs (5 WM solar in Boa Vista, and
10 MW wind in Santiago) with the support of the Luxemburg Development Agency, which have yet to
reach financial closure11\.
17\. The GoCV also seeks to capitalize on its potential for distributed energy generation, with an
estimated potential of rooftop solar PV of 250 MW, out of which only 4 MW has been installed so
far\. Studies under the Distributed Solar Energy Systems Project (P151979) identified challenges for
scaling up distributed generation, including lack of adequate financing for residential and small and
medium enterprises (SMEs), insufficient local technical capacity and import duties\. The GoCV has
established a tax incentive regime promoting investment in renewable energy for distributed
generation\. In 2019, the GoCV approved regulation for net billing, which allows solar PV system
owners to consume solar energy produced onsite and export any surplus production to the grid at a
pre-defined tariff (approximately US$0\.08/kWh)\. Additionally, the GoCV budgeted US$5\.0 million in
2019 to provide subsidies to commercial banks to reduce lending rates on distributed PV generation
systems, which is expected to support approximately 3 MW of additional distributed solar generation\.
18\. In light of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the impact it is having on the countryâs economy,
the GoCV is committed to accelerate the shift towards least cost variable renewable energy
generation and implement its ambitious reform program to restructure and privatize the electricity
utility\. These actions will support the post COVID-19 economic recovery by reducing the average cost
of electricity supply (and eventual reduction in end user tariffs) as well as a reduction in the fiscal
burden of the energy sector on public finances\. The GoCV is targeting 54 percent power generation
from renewable energy sources by 2030 through public and private investments\. Those investments,
including the ones made under the Project, are expected to lead to lower average cost of power
generation and ultimately lower average cost of electricity supply\. Depending on the fiscal space that
the GoCV will have then, a reduction in end user tariffs could be envisaged\. On the other hand, the
restructuring and privatization of ELECTRA is expected to result in improved performance and
11 For the Boa Vista 5 MW solar project, the concession contract has been signed and a guarantee has been provided by the
Ministry of Finance\. Financial closure is still pending, and construction expected to begin by September 2021\. Negotiations are
still ongoing to reach contractual close for the 10 MW wind plant in Santiago; construction targeted to begin by end 2021\.
Apr 27, 2021 Page 8 of 23
The World Bank
Cabo Verde Sustainable Electricity Service Project (P170236)
efficiency of the utility, mainly through a reduction of commercial losses\. This will strengthen the
financials of the sector and reduce its fiscal burden\. Those interventions will help the GoCV in its
response to the COVID-19 crisis and will support the post-pandemic economic recovery\.
Power Sector Institutional Framework
19\. The power sector in Cabo Verde involves the following key players:
(a) The Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Energy develops policy, establishes the sector
development plan and plays an important role in mobilizing major investments in the sector\.
(b) Agência Reguladora Multissetorial da Economia (ARME), a multi-sector regulatory authority, is
tasked with economic and technical regulation of the electricity sector\.
(c) ELECTRA, the vertically integrated electricity and water utility, has a concession from the State for
electricity service and dominates the market and performs power generation, transmission (very
small and only in one island) and distribution activities\.
(d) Independent Power Producers (IPPs) sell bulk power to ELECTRA\.
(e) Ã?guas e Energia da Boa Vista (AEB), a privately-owned company distributing electricity in Boa Vista,
has a sub-concession from ELECTRA\.
20\. The sectorâs current institutional structure is represented in Figure 1\.
Figure 1: Current Institutional Framework of the Power Sector
Public Utility ELECTRA
21\. Cabo Verdeâs electricity sector is dominated by ELECTRA, the vertically integrated electricity and
water public utility company\. Since 2011, ELECTRA has been organized as a holding company,
ELECTRA SA, with two subsidiaries, ELECTRA NORTE SA and ELECTRA SUL SA, operating in the Northern
and Southern islands of Cabo Verde, respectively\. ELECTRA is responsible for generation,
Apr 27, 2021 Page 9 of 23
The World Bank
Cabo Verde Sustainable Electricity Service Project (P170236)
transmission, distribution and retail supply activities on eight of the nine islands in the archipelago\.
Ã?gua e Energia da Boa Vista (AEB)12 was created in 2007 with the purpose of providing electricity and
water services to support tourism activity in the island of Boa Vista\. AEB operates under a sub-
concession from ELECTRA since 2010 and has an installed capacity of 5 MW (fuel) and 10\.5 MW
(diesel)\. Independent Power Producers (IPPs) sell bulk power to ELECTRA\. In 2019, ELECTRA produced
443\.6 GWh of electricity with an installed capacity of 154 MW (of which 6 MW of solar and 0\.6 MW
of wind)\. In addition to ELECTRAâs own installed capacity, two IPPs are operating in the country:
Cabeólica (25 MW of wind)13, the first IPP in the country, which has been operating successfully since
2012, and Electric Wind, a small wind farm in Santo Antão (1 MW), which has been operating since
April 2011\. There is one transmission line in the country, a 60 kV line located in the island of Santiago,
which connects the islandâs generation center with the north of the island; all other islands use 20 kV
and 6 kV subtransmission and distribution systems\.
22\. While ELECTRA has made progress towards diversification of its energy mix, and investments to
improve the grid infrastructure are underway, its operational performance remains weak and
characterized by high system losses\. Global losses (technical and non-technical) amounted to 24\.8
percent of generation in 2019, reaching 36 percent in the largest island of Santiago, the vast majority
of losses being commercial\. This is above the efficient level of 23\.3 percent losses set by the regulator,
but lower than the 25\.5 percent losses experienced in 2018\. This represents a limited reduction
despite important investments in transmission and distribution network improvements and a loss
reduction program to fight fraud and protect revenues14\. The highest losses are found in urban areas,
particularly the capital city of Praia where ELECTRA SUL operates, where energy theft is rampant\. High
electricity tariffs limit the affordability of energy uses for many households and are a contributing
factor to the high level of electricity fraud and theft\.
23\. The Revenue Protection Program (RPP), financed by the Electricity Sector Project (P115464),
approved in 2012 and closed in 2018, aims at installing smart meters and securing the revenues from
the largest customers to reduce the utilityâs commercial losses\. Its implementation has been delayed
and is still ongoing\. It has been progressing very slowly because of the need to detect and address
fraudulent connections prior to replacing the meters and the lengthy juridical process to implement
the disconnection policy for delinquent customers\.
24\. ELECTRAâs financial performance is weak, mainly due to high commercial losses and non-payment
from public entities\. The 2019 audited financial statements indicate that the utilityâs net result was
at a negative US$3\.7 million (CVE 368\.6 million) 15 and the retained earnings at a negative US$101
million (CVE 9,985 million), resulting in negative equity of US$46 million (CVE 4,521 million)\. However,
12AEB is a partnership between SDTIBM, a state-owned association governing the tourism investments in the island, and two
private entities - Bucan and Promomax\. SDTIBM has 60% of AEBâs equity, while Bucan and Promomax have 30% and 10%,
respectively\.
13
This was the first commercial-scale, privately financed, public private partnership (PPP) wind farm in subâSaharan Africa; The project was
developed by EleQtra, who entered into a long-term PPA with ELECTRA\. The total capital cost was US$84 million\. Today, Cabeólica has an installed
capacity of 25\.5MW and provides sufficient renewable power to satisfy roughly 25 percent of Cabo Verdeâs demand for electricity\. Source:
https://eleqtra\.com/projects/cabeolica-wind/
14
These investments were financed by the last IBRD operation (CAPE VERDE - Recovery and Reform of the Electricity Sector Project (P115464)),
a loan from Government of Portugal and a loan from the European Investment Bank\.
15 1 USD ~ 98 escudos\. Exchange rate as of December 2019, www\.oanda\.com
Apr 27, 2021 Page 10 of 23
The World Bank
Cabo Verde Sustainable Electricity Service Project (P170236)
the financial of the subsidiaries is notable: ELETRA NORTE remained profitable (CVE 385\.6 million)
whereas ELECTRA SUL made a loss (negative CVE 546\.1 million)\. As described above, actual losses are
higher than the regulatory cap, leading to weak financial performance\. To improve its financial
situation, ELECTRA must tackle the issue of high commercial losses, particularly those under the
jurisdiction of ELECTRA SUL\.
25\. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, ELECTRAâs revenues and costs have been affected although
the overall effect on ELECTRAâs financial performance is not entirely clear yet\. As described above,
demand in 2020 was down compared to 2019 resulting in a reduction in ELECTRAâs revenues\.
However, ELECTRAâs costs have also decreased due to the reduction in demand and lower
international oil prices\. A tariff reduction of 2,64 ECV/kWh (approximately equivalent to
US$0\.03/kWh) was announced by the regulator, ARME (Multisectoral regulation agency of the
economy), in the Official Bulletin of Cabo Verde, and was due to take effect from April 1, 2020\.
However, to help mitigate the effect of the pandemic on ELECTRA, this reduction was postponed and
finally implemented only on October 1, 2020\. Similarly, the adjustment of end user tariffs to reflect
fuel costs was also postponed until October 1st, 2020\.
26\. In 2016, the GoCV decided to privatize ELECTRA, as a means to reduce the governmentâs public debt
exposure, contingent liabilities, and fiscal risks\. Although there was an earlier unsuccessful attempt
which resulted in government repurchasing the utitliy in 2006, it is felt that a better allocation of
respective obligations of the parties, among others, could lead to a better outcome today16\. The Bank
is currently supporting the preparation of the power sector reform plan, which involves the
restructuring and privatization of ELECTRA through the provision of transaction advisory services to
the GoCV under the SOE Related Fiscal Management Project (P160796)\. This advisory work is expected
to be completed in July 2021 and will pave the way for the implementation of the power sector reform
supported under Component 2\. The Bank is also preparing the Cabo Verde First Equitable and
Sustainable Recovery Development Policy Financing (DPF; P174754), which will support the
implementation of the power sector reform through the publishing by the Government of the power
sector reform decree law laying the ground for the restructuring and privatization of ELECTRA
(expected in June 2021)\. The DPF is expected to be submitted to the World Bankâs Board in the first
quarter of FY22\.
27\. With the expected improvement in operational efficiency and management of the utility by a
private entity, the restructuring and privatization of ELECTRA should result in substantial reduction
of electricity system losses\. Electricity system losses are expected to reduce by 1\.5 percentage points
per year, reaching 19 percent in 2025, and by 1 percentage point per year thereafter, reaching 14
percent in 2030\. Based on international experience, there may be opportunities for achieving even
higher loss reductions\. In Latin America for instance, countries such as Argentina, Peru, and Colombia,
that introduced widespread power sector reforms in the 1990âs17, including the privatization of
generation and distribution asset similar to the ongoing reform in Cabo Verde, managed to reduce
total losses by an average of 3 percent per year\.
16 ELECTRA was privatized once in 1999/2000 and a majority of its stake sold to the Portuguese utility Consortium EDP/AdP\. In spite of significant
initial gains in efficiency and coverage under EDP/AdP management, privatization was marred by disagreements over the respective obligations
of the parties, particularly regarding tariff adjustments, which were unavoidable given the increase in oil prices\. In 2006, EDP/AdP pulled back
and the government bought back their shares in ELECTRA\.
17 World Bank\. 2009\. Reducing technical and non-technical losses in the power sector (English)\. Washington, DC: World Bank Group\.
Apr 27, 2021 Page 11 of 23
The World Bank
Cabo Verde Sustainable Electricity Service Project (P170236)
28\. Despite ELECTRAâs current poor financial standing and the global financial crisis resulting from the
COVID-19 pandemic, the company holds valuable assets that could incentivize private sector
investment in the power generation and distribution sectors of Cabo Verde\. Indeed, current
electricity service delivery conditions in Cabo Verde, characterized by near universal access and full
cost reflective tariffs are markedly better than at the time of ELECTRAâs first privatization attempt in
1999 and better than in most other SSA countries\. Furthermore, Cabo Verde is a lower middle-income
country, with a well-educated population living in urban or peri-urban areas and a competent
workforce\. In addition, the utilityâs assets are in relatively good condition and do not require
immediate and massive investments\. Therefore, these conditions should make ELECTRA attractive to
qualified investors who are expected to submit responsive bids to take over the privatized generation
and distribution companies, as borne out by the market sounding conducted in the first semester of
2018\. Efficient management by the private operators will result in a reduction in the average cost of
electricity service delivery, which is expected to be reflected in the average end user electricity tariff,
contribute to improvement of the competitiveness of local businesses and boost the economic
development\. Private operators will also be able to expeditiously and efficiently implement
infrastructure investment plans promoted by the GoCV to accelerate economic recovery in the post-
pandemic scenario\.
29\. The restructuring and privatization of ELECTRA is required to improve the operational and financial
viability of the electricity sector and enable the new companies to mobilize, from their own means,
the financing required to upgrade and expand the electrical system, therefore ceasing to be a burden
to the governmentâs budget\. Privatization is expected to lead an improvement in efficiency and a
reduction in commercial and technical losses of ELECTRA, which would lead the utility to fully recover
its costs\. In addition, the ongoing investments to further diversify the systemâs power generation mix
and make it less reliant on imported oil products are expected to reduce average costs of generation\.
30\. The GoCV has started the divestment process of ELECTRA as part of its reform and privatization
agenda\. With advisory service support under the SOE Related Fiscal Management Project (P160796),
the GoCV is developing a comprehensive strategy for the restructuring and privatization of ELECTRA\.
The vertically integrated ELECTRA will be unbundled into three separate public shareholding
companies: (a) a Transmission and System Operator (TSO); (b) a distribution company (Disco); and (c)
a power generation company (Genco)\. While ELECTRA TSO will remain a state-owned enterprise, up
to 75 percent of its distribution and power generation shares are expected to be privatized\. The GoCV
is also considering buying back the private shares in AEB (sub-concession operating on Boa Vista) and
the assets of AEB would also be included along with ELECTRAâs in the privatization of the power sector\.
The regulator ARME is and will continue to benefit from capacity building support, including under
the proposed Project\. This is consistent with the approach recommended by the Bank on liberalizing
the power sector, which also requires a strong regulator18\.
31\. The GoCV has also embarked on reforms to the regulatory framework of the electricity sector to
support the supply of electricity under the most efficient (quality and cost) conditions\. The existence
18 Foster, Vivien; Rana, Anshul\. 2020\. Rethinking Power Sector Reform in the Developing World\. Sustainable Infrastructure\. Washington,
DC: World Bank\.
Apr 27, 2021 Page 12 of 23
The World Bank
Cabo Verde Sustainable Electricity Service Project (P170236)
of an operating and regulatory environment will be critical to attract private capital and expertise to
the sector\. Therefore, in parallel to the divestment process, the GoCV is undertaking important
measures to strengthen the regulatory framework\. In particular, GoCV is focused on the separation
of policy making, regulation and operations19, reflecting international experience in emerging
countries that has demonstrated the importance of proper policy and regulatory frameworks to
ensure successful privatization\. Reform measures being taken include restructuring of the electricity
tariff\. This is designed to encourage energy efficiency, electric mobility and distributed renewable
energy generation, while providing incentives for loss reduction and allowing the recovery of efficient
operational costs and a reasonable rate of return for the electric utilities\.
32\. The predictability and enforcement of applicable regulatory framework is a key enabler of
successful privatization in all segments and is paramount in the case of the distribution company
(DisCo)\. GoCV intends to create and privatize a single national DisCo that will be responsible for
providing distribution and retail services including operating, maintaining and rehabilitating publicly
owned assets under a concession contract\. Allowed tariff revenues (Revenue Requirement) of DisCo
should ensure recovery of its own costs incurred for efficient service delivery, as well as a
remuneration on invested equity consistent with the risk of the business, and the cost of energy
purchases (âpass-throughâ? of project sales and allowed losses)\. In order to maximize predictability
and strengthen enforcement of the applicable regulatory framework, a âregulation by contractâ?
approach will be adopted\. It consists of preparing a ringfenced concession contract prescribing in
detail the main aspects of the applicable regulatory framework20\.
C\. Proposed Development Objective(s)
Development Objective(s) (From PAD)
The project development objectives are to (i) increase renewable energy generation and (ii) improve the performance
of the electricity utility in Cabo Verde by leveraging private finance\.
Key Results
The proposed PDO indicators for this project are:
33\. The proposed PDO indicators for this project are:
(a) Generation capacity of energy constructed or rehabilitated (Megawatt) â Corporate Results
Indicator
o Renewable energy capacity installed as small-scale solar PV plants (Megawatt);
19 The definition of energy policies and sector planning is a function of the Ministry of Industry Trade and Energy (MICE), while electricity
sector regulatory functions will be exercised by ARME\. Measures for the reinforcement of the Electricity Sector Regulatory Commission
and the Central Planning entity, the General Direction of Industry, Trade and Energy, are underway\.
20 This includes, among others: (i) economic regulation: procedures and methodologies for setting and periodically adjusting Revenue
Requirement (own operating and investment cost) and initial tariff structure and rates as well as payment to concessionaire at the end
of the contract of undepreciated investments; (ii) service quality regulation: indicators, target values, procedures for monitoring and
enforcement, penalties for non-compliance; (iii) mechanism to ensure systematic payment of consumption of public entities; (iv) rights
of concessionaire for management of unpaid amounts (service disconnection, switch to prepayment); (v) all relevant contents of the
Distribution Code; (vi) international arbitration for settlement of disputes (before International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes ICSID or equivalent); and (vii) conditions for contract termination\.
Apr 27, 2021 Page 13 of 23
The World Bank
Cabo Verde Sustainable Electricity Service Project (P170236)
o Renewable energy capacity installed as distributed solar PV (Megawatt);
(b) Power system losses reduced (Percentage);
(c) Annual CO2 emissions reduced (Tones/year)\.
Apr 27, 2021 Page 14 of 23
The World Bank
Cabo Verde Sustainable Electricity Service Project (P170236)
D\. Project Description
34\. The project comprises three components: Component 1 will finance investments to integrate additional
Variable Renewable Energy (VRE) into the grid and provide sustainable and resilient electricity services to public health
buildings; Component 2 will provide transaction advisory services for the restructuring and privatization of ELECTRA;
and Component 3 will provide project preparation and implementation support to the PIU, as well as technical
assistance and capacity building to the National Directorate of Industry, Commerce and Industry (Direcão Nacional da
Indústria, Comércio e Energia, DNICE) for improved energy system planning to efficiently meeting the goals under the
Power Sector Master Plan\.
35\. The estimated project cost is US$16\.5 million, which includes the following sources of financing:
⢠US$3\.5 million IBRD loan;
⢠US$3\.5 million IDA credit;
⢠US$7\.0 million concessional loan from the Canada Clean Energy and Forest Climate Facility (CCEFCF);
⢠US$0\.5 million gender grant from the CCEFCF; and,
⢠US$2\.0 million recipient-executed GIF reimbursable grant\.
36\. Component 1: Renewable and Efficient Electricity Service (US$12\.5 million of which US$3\.5 million IBRD,
US$1\.5 million IDA, US$7\.0 million CCEFCF concessional loan, and US$0\.5 million CCEFCF gender grant)\. This
component has two sub-components, as follows:
37\. Sub-component 1\.a: Small-scale variable renewable energy integration (US$10\.5 million â US$3\.5 million
IBRD and US$7\.0 million CCEFCF): Based on the priority needs of the GoCV in the first phase of the power sector Master
Plan, this sub-component will finance the development of the following small-scale solar PV projects: 1\.3 MW on Fogo;
1\.2 MW on Santo Antão; 0\.4 MW on Maio; and 0\.4 MW on São Nicolau islands at an estimated cost of US$4\.75 million\.
Pre-feasibility studies have already been conducted to identify the locations and size of the power plants\. The final
designs will be completed by the Ownerâs Engineer to be hired by the project shortly after Effectiveness\. Market
sounding indicates that these small-scale power plants are unlikely to attract private developers due to their small scale
and geographical dispersion, which is expected to result in limited competition and high transaction costs\. Therefore,
the construction of the plants will therefore be implemented as EPC contracts with public financing\. The GoCV plans to
competitively tender the operation and maintenance (O&M) of these plants to local private operators, who will sell
electricity to the TSO and be renumerated for their services using a portion of these revenues\. This approach is in line
with the GoCVâs strategy to promote and develop local content and expertise to manage, operate and maintain small
scale solar power plants\.
38\. To facilitate integration of the small-scale solar plants into the grid, this sub-component will finance power
transmission lines to connect the plants to the grid, as well as battery energy storage systems to optimize production
of the small-scale power plants and support voltage and frequency regulation in the grid, at an estimated cost of
US$2\.25 million and US$3\.5 million, respectively\. Pre-feasibility studies have already been conducted for the design of
the power evacuation lines, and the final designs will be completed by the Ownerâs Engineer to be hired by the project
shortly after Effectiveness\. The design of the battery energy storage systems will be informed by the results of an
ongoing study financed with an ESMAP grant (US$190,000) to better estimate the technical and financial feasibility of
the storage needs across the archipelago and identify the optimal location of investments\.
Apr 27, 2021 Page 15 of 23
The World Bank
Cabo Verde Sustainable Electricity Service Project (P170236)
39\. A Climate Change and Disaster Risk and Vulnerability Assessment funded by the Africa Climate Resilient
Infrastructure Investment Facility (AFRI-RES) is underway and will provide an assessment of vulnerability of the
projectâs investments to climate and disaster risks\. This study will also provide recommendations for resilience
measures that can be incorporated into the project design (including to include relevant risks in bidding documents for
electrification works)\. Examples of such resilience measures include: provision of appropriate anchorage support; deep
foundation and size of footings to adapt against extreme wind and flooding; elevate control room and critical equipment
to reduce flood hazard potential; use of steel, concrete or composite towers; creation of vegetation buffers etc\.
40\. Sub-component 1\.b: Resilient and Efficient Electricity Services to Public Health Facilities (US$2\.0 million -
US$1\.5 million IDA, US$0\.5 million CCEFCF gender grant): The GoCV seeks to reduce the burden of energy on public
health services, improve the quality of healthcare services, and decrease the use of fossil fuels for the public sector\.
These objectives have become more urgent in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, where the demands on the
healthcare sector have increased dramatically\. This sub-component will finance public investments in rooftop solar PV
systems and energy efficiency on public health buildings, including public hospitals and health centers\. Fourty-one (41)
public health buildings have been identified across the 9 islands21; this will cover all the public health buildings that have
not already benefited from rooftop PV investments under the World Bankâs Distributed Solar Energy Systems project
(P151979)\. This sub-component was prepared in coordination with the Bank-financed project in Cabo Verde: COVID-19
Emergency Response Project (P173857) being implemented by the UGPE and the MoHSS\. The final design of the rooftop
PV systems and energy efficiency investments will be informed by the results of an technical consultancy to be financed
under Component 3 of the project, which will be initiated prior to project Effectiveness, and will also consider resilience
measures identified in the Projectâs climate risk assessment described above\.
41\. Investments in energy efficiency and distributed rooftop solar PV systems in public health buildings will
support the achievement of multiple strategic objectives of the government, including: (i) reduce the burden of
electricity on the fiscal obligations of the public sector by reducing public building energy use and offsetting grid-
supplied electricity with onsite generation from solar; (ii) reduce ELECTRAâs arrears from public sector clients, who tend
to be delayed in paying electricity bills; (iii) increase the resilience of the public health sector by providing back-up power
options in case of power outages due to natural or other disasters; and, (iv) greening of the cold chain for provision of
health services to support the deployment of the COVID-19 vaccine and other routine vaccinations programs22\.
42\. This sub-component will also support of narrowing gender gaps in Cabo Verde, namely the gap in womenâs
employment within the energy sector\. In particular, womenâs labor force participation in Cabo Verde was found to be
almost 15 percentage points below the rate for men, with an even wider gap within the energy sector\. Gender bias in
skills development and skilled labor market as well as low enrolment in technical trainings were also identified, as
described in the Gender Gap Analysis (see Annex 4)\. The Project will provide women with training programs and
subsequent long-term employment opportunities in rooftop PV system operation and maintenance (O&M) services\.
The gender activities will be implemented by UGPE in collaboration with the Center for Renewable Energy and Industrial
Maintenance (Centro de Energias Renováveis e Manutenção Industrial, CERMI), a public corporation that provides
21 19 buildings in Santiago; 3 in Fogo; 2 in São Nicolau; 1 in Boa Vista; 2 in Sal; 1 in Maio; 4 in Santo Antão; 8 in São Vicente; and
1 in Brava\. While public health buildings are being prioritized, other key public service buildings may also be considered if the
budget allows, including buildings within the Ministry of Justice and the National Police Directorate\.
22 In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the GoCV has developed a comprehensive national plan to deploy vaccines that are
being procured by the Ministry of Health and Social Security (MoHSS) through the COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access (COVAX), an
initiative launched by the World Health Organization (WHO) to ensure vaccine access to the world's most vulnerable\. According
to the plan, the GoCV intends to vaccinate a total of 60 percent of the population by 2023 (20 percent in 2021, 20 percent in
2022, and 20 percent in 2023)\. The vaccination shots will be administered in the health centers and hospitals, among others\.
Apr 27, 2021 Page 16 of 23
The World Bank
Cabo Verde Sustainable Electricity Service Project (P170236)
professional and technical trainings, certifications, and a business incubator program\. UGPE will partner with CERMI to
(i) offer technical and business trainings for the provision of solar PV O&M services, (ii) provide business incubation to
these trainees to establish their own solar PV O&M companies, and (iii) contract these incubated businesses to perform
the O&M services for the first two years after the systems are installed23\. CERMI will monitor and support these new
businesses, ensuring quality control and guiding the entrepreneurs through operational, commercial and other
challenges that may arise\. CERMI will ensure at least 35 percent female participation in the training programs (compared
to a current baseline of 20 percent) and at least 30 percent female employees in non-adminstrative positions of the
newly established O&M companies\. Details of the implementation arrangements for the gender activities are provided
in Section III\.
43\. Component 2: Advisory Services for Electricity Sector Restructuring and Privatization (US$2\.0 million GIF)\. As
described above, the main objectives of the privatization is to reduce the fiscal burden of the energy sector on public
sector and reduce system losses through improved management\. In order to ensure these goals will be met, the AP sets
out that the privatization will be executed using a regulation by contract approach, meaning that a self-contained
concession agreement will include all of the key conditions on economic regulation of the concession (methodology
and procedures for setting and periodically adjusting Revenue Requirement of the distribution company under a
performance based multi-year tariff regime, tariff structure and charges in each and all tariff categories, etc\.), service
quality regulations, rights/obligations of the concessionaire and government (including those regarding disconnection
of customers due to commercial debts, management of cases of theft and fraud in electricity consumption, regular
payment of electricity bills of government agencies), provisions for international arbitration, etc\. To incentivize loss
reductions, the concession contract will include starting values of tariff rates and procedures for periodic adjustment
within the initial multi-year period following handover of DisCo management and operations to private owner, and
these values will be set considering a regulatory allowance on total losses\. If the DisCo owner exceeds the loss reduction
targets in the regulatory allowance it will be able to earn additional profits; conversely, if these targets are not met, it
will suffer direct profit loss\.
44\. This component provide additional advisory services and technical assistance to support the GoCV in the
implementation of the AP for the restructuring and privatization of ELECTRA,24 building on the AP prepared under the
the SOE Related Fiscal Management Project (P160796) and supported by the Cabo Verde First Equitable and Sustainable
Recovery Development Policy Financing (DPF; P174754), as described in Section B above\. These additional advisory
services will focus on two key areas: implementation of the privatization AP and technical assistance to ensure
sustainability of the sector restructuring and privatization of ELECTRA\.
45\. Implementation of the privatization AP\. This pillar will include the following scope of work: (i) update of the
AP to include due diligence and asset valuation of AEB, if an agreement is reached between the GoCV and AEB to
repurchase of AEBâs privately held shares; (ii) launch of the bidding processes for the new GenCo and DisCo, and provide
advisory services up to financial closure of a contractual agreements with the successful bidders; and, (iii) design of de-
risking and payment support mechanism(s) to support the privatization of ELECTRA as well as for the ongoing IPP
program under the Power Sector Master Plan, taking into consideration the new institutional arrangements that will be
put in place as part of the privatization AP\. The estimated cost for Phase 2 is US$740,000\.
23 The number of companies required will be based on the optimal aggregation of PV system O&M services, according to the
location of the PV systems across the archipelago\.
24 With the expectation that the GoCV will buy-back private shares in AEB, the assets of AEB will also be included in the scope of
the privatization activities\.
Apr 27, 2021 Page 17 of 23
The World Bank
Cabo Verde Sustainable Electricity Service Project (P170236)
46\. Technical Assistance for sustainability of the restructuring and privatization\. This pillar will provide technical
assistance and capacity building to sector stakeholders to ensure a successful and sustainable implementation of the
AP for restructuring and privatization of the electricity sector at an estimated cost of US$1,260,000\. This activities to be
supported include:
⢠Preparation of implementation arrangements for institutional reforms and organizational restructuring
identified under the AP, and support to implement the new institutional framework\.
⢠Preparation of an incorporation plan for the new generation and distribution companies into joint stock
companies and support in its implementation\.
⢠Technical assistance to the Transmission System Operator (TSO) in its first three years of operation to
ensure smooth and reliable operation of the system under the newly restructured electricity sector,
including with the newly incorporated generation and distribution companies\.
⢠Technical asstiance to the national utility regulator ARME: (a) preparation of a roadmap for phased
implementation and strict enforcement of approved Quality of Service (QoS) regulations; (b) definition and
implementation of regulations for accessing databases for infrastructure assets used for delivery of
regulated services supported by Geographic Information System (GIS), and other Information Technology
(IT) applications; (c) establishment of protocols to collect information needed to carryout oversight duties;
(d) definition of procedures for allocation of revenues from payments of bills made by electricity consumers
to transactions across the electricity supply chain and arrangements for implementation and monitoring;;
and, (e) training on how to access and use operatorâs information systems\.
⢠Technical assistance in the development of a Social Plan to address any future labor-force implications of
the privatization process that may arise after the DisCo concession is signed25\.
47\. Component 3: Project Implementation Support and Technical Assistance (US$2\.0 million IDA): This
component will provide support for the preparation and implementation of the project as well as support to DNICE to
improve power system planning capabilities to supporting the implementation of the Master Plan for the Power Sector
in the context of the restructuring and privatization of ELECTRA\.
48\. Sub-component 3\.a: Project preparation and implementation support (US$1\.5 million IDA): This sub-
component will support incremental expenses related to the projectâs preparation and implementation, including the
hiring of: (i) a consultant to prepare the final environmental and social safeguard studies for the activities under
Component 1; (ii) a consultant to prepare a technical study on the distributed generation component; (iii) dedicated
electrical / power engineer and accountant staff within the UGPE; (iv) an ownerâs engineer to prepare technical
specifications for the investments under Component 1(a), as well as supervise their construction and implementation;
(v) a consultant to undertake a communication campaign to scale-up the distributed generation component; (vi) an
independent auditor for the project; (vii) capacity building to the UGPE and other sector stakeholders, as needed; (viii)
project operating costs\.
25 While this component will provide technical assistance related to potential future retrenchment activities, the project will not
finance costs of any eventual retrenchment activities required as a result of the privatization of ELECTRA\. As set out in the AP,
any costs associated with future retrenchment will be paid for by the GoCV using proceeds from the privatization\.The GoCVâs
privatization road map indicates that staffing decisions will only be made once the new concessionaire has been contracted;
any staff not retained by the new concessionaire would be transferred to the public Single Buyer / TSO, after which any
necessary downsizing decisions would be made\. Where all alternatives have been fully considered and downsizing is deemed
unavoidable, the GoCV shall exercise due diligence to carry out the downsizing in accordance with the provisions of relevant
national laws, applicable collective bargaining and a Social Plan\. Capacity building is provided under this component to ensure
that the GoCV has the capacity to develop and implement such a Social Plan if it is needed\.
Apr 27, 2021 Page 18 of 23
The World Bank
Cabo Verde Sustainable Electricity Service Project (P170236)
49\. Sub-component 3\.b: Technical assistance and capacity building (US$0\.5 million IDA)\. This sub-component
will provide technical assistance to the DNICE, under the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Energy (Ministério da
Indústria, Comércio e Energia, MICE) to support: (i) establishment of a dedicated planning department within the
Ministry; (ii) definition of a roadap for the systematization of the energy planning function, and (iii) supervision of
concessions in the energy sector\. This work is complementary to the transaction advisory services activities under
Component 2 of the project, focusing on the needs of DNICE key stakeholders to supervise and implement the new
electricity sector structure as well as improve planning to support achieved of the Power Sector Master Plan\.
\.
\.
Legal Operational Policies
Triggered?
Projects on International Waterways OP 7\.50 No
Projects in Disputed Areas OP 7\.60 No
Summary of Assessment of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts
\.
The Project will involve the construction of the four power plants, grid reinforcements and battery storage\. The
proposed project is anticipated to have direct and indirect environmental and social benefits, including the decrease
of CO2 emission and other air pollutants through the integration of more clean electricity from renewable sources,
possible reduction in the price of electricity and increase in PUI capacity building\. At the same time, potential negative
environmental impacts and safety risks are also expected\. The main environmental and social risks could be related to
the civil works, environmental disturbances, and land acquisition and resettlement\.
E\. Implementation
Institutional and Implementation Arrangements
50\. The project will be implemented by the Special Projects Management Unit (Unidade de Gestão de
Projetos Especiais, UGPE) within the Ministry of Finance, originally established in 1999 to carry out an
IDA/GEF financed project (Energy and Water Sector Reform and Development Project (P040990)) and
subsequently strengthened and entrusted with the responsibility of implementing projects with
different donors\. UGPE is now responsible for the implementation of several donor-funded projects
(World Bank, African Development Bank, JICA)\. UGPE has a strong track-record for effective
implementation, and has specialized fiduciary staff (financial management specialists, procurement
specialists) with experience with World Bank policies\. As the projectâs lead implementing agency,
UGPE will have the responsibility of managing the process of implementing the Project in line with
World Bank guidelines, financing agreements, procedures and practices for environment and social
risk management (including resettlement, if needed), procurement, disbursement, accounting, and
financial management\.
51\. A dedicated Project Manager (PM) has been appointed for the implementation of this project\. PM will
report to the coordinator of the UGPE\. The PM will be responsible for day-to-day project
Apr 27, 2021 Page 19 of 23
The World Bank
Cabo Verde Sustainable Electricity Service Project (P170236)
implementation\. In addition to the PM, an electrical / power engineer, with strong expertise in
implementing renewable energy projects, and an accountant, will be hired and financed by the project
(under Component 3\.a)\. The project will benefit from the fiduciary, technical and administrative
expertise available within UGPE\. Detailed project arrangements will be described in the Project
Implementation Manual (PIM), including fiduciary and safeguard procedures\. UGPE will prepare and
adopt the PIM before the project effectiveness\.
52\. The PM will work in close collaboration with the National Directorate of Industry, Commerce and
Energy (DNICE), who will provide technical support and strategic guidance to ensure the project
activities are aligned with the national energy sector objectives and policies\. The PM will also
coordinate with other key technical stakeholders, including the regulator ARME for the
implementation of the sector development support (Component 3\.b) and other donors active in the
sector, such as LuxDev\.
53\. The UGPE will have full fiduciary responsibility for implementation of the project\. Having implemented
a complex IDA-financed energy sector project and other IDA-financed projects in other sectors in the
past, the UGPE has a very thorough knowledge of Bank financial management and procurement rules
and procedures, which will facilitate a rapid and smooth implementation of the Project\.
54\. The UGPE will be responsible for implementing the Resilient and Efficient Electricity Services to Public
Facilities sub-component (1\.b), including the gender interventions, in collaboration with CERMI, a
public corporation26, supported by LuxDev\. UGPE will lead the procurement and installation of the
solar PV systems and energy efficiency (EE) equipment\. For the first year after the solar PV systems
are installed, O&M services will be paid by the Project and implemented by UPGE, in collaboration
with CERMI\. The EE equipment is however not expected to require dedicated operation and
maintenance (O&M) service, and any maintenance or repairs will be handled with equipment
warranties and/or by the buildingâs owners\.
55\. CERMI started operating in 2014 and is dedicated to providing professional and technical trainings
(specific trainings on the systems to be installed as well as trainings focused on preventive and on-job
maintenance) and certifications of the quality of the installations\. CERMI also hosts an
entrepreneurship business incubator\. CERMI will be responsible to provide the technical and business
trainings to support establishment of new solar PV O&M businesses\. CERMI has experience
implementing gender-focused initiatives\. In the first years of their training programs, women
comprised approximately 10 percent of the cadre of trainees\. Noting this gender gap, CERMI
implemented targets for female participation and scholarships to incentivize more women to
participate\. As a result of these efforts, female participation has increased to an average of 20 percent
in their technical training programs\.
56\. CERMI will be contracted by UGPE using Project funds to perform the O&M services for the first year
after installation, and CERMI will sub-contract these services to one or more of the companies that
are established as a result of CERMIâs training and incubation program27\. During the first year of O&M
26 http://cermicv\.com/
27 The number of companies required will be based on the optimal aggregation of PV system O&M services, according to the
Apr 27, 2021 Page 20 of 23
The World Bank
Cabo Verde Sustainable Electricity Service Project (P170236)
service provision, one of CERMIâs senior technical experts will closely accompany the start -up
businessâ performance, making regular site visits to evaluate the quality of service\. CERMI will also
provide business support to the companies as needed, for example supporting them in negotiating
service contracts\. Provided adequate quality of service has been provided, which will be ensured
through the capacity building provided under the Project, the same incubated companies will
continue to be contracted by the Ministry of Health and Social Security (MoHSS) going forward\.
57\. Gender-focused measures will be key for these activities: CERMI will ensure at least 35 percent female
participation in the training & incubation programs described above\. Furthermore, only businesses
with at least 30 percent female employees will be eligible to provide O&M services for the solar PV
systems under the Project, with a priority given to firms incubated and women trained by CERMI
under the Project\. To ensure sustainability of the Project impact, the incubated companies will agree
to maintain at least 30 percent female employees even after they stop receiving direct support from
the Project\. These interventions will narrow the gender gap in skills development in the country and
also offer an enhanced opportunity to women to subsequently take up technical jobs in the energy
sector, which can close the gap in womenâs energy sector employment\. The women trained and
employed under this Project will gain valuable knowledge and work experience in the sector, and they
will also be well placed to secure additional and future employment within the growing solar PV
industry if they so choose\.
58\. After a year of O&M service provision by the Project (under CERMIâs supervision), the MoHSS will be
responsible for financing the O&M services for the public health buildings\. This arrangement will build
off CERMIâs experience performing similar roles for other renewable energy projects28\. CERMI has
signed a joint agreement with DNICE confirming their role in the Project, and an agreement will also
be signed with the MoHSS prior to initiation of investments under this sub-component\. Once the PV
systems have been installed, a tripartite contract will be signed between CERMI, the MoHSS and the
selected companies to ensure a smooth transition of O&M services after CERMIâs first year of support\.
59\. The arrangements for the first year of O&M of sub-component 1(d) are illustrated in Figure 2\.
location of the PV systems across the archipelago\.
28 For example, CERMI has a contract with ELECTRA since 2016 to maintain a 4 MW solar PV system\. CERMI outsources the
work to one of the companies established under its incubation program, providing quality control supervision and business
advice\.
Apr 27, 2021 Page 21 of 23
The World Bank
Cabo Verde Sustainable Electricity Service Project (P170236)
Figure 2: Arrangements for the O&M of Sub-component 1\.b
\.
CONTACT POINT
World Bank
Thierno Bah
Senior Energy Specialist
Megan Meyer
Senior Energy Specialist
Borrower/Client/Recipient
Republic of Cabo Verde
Nuno Gomes
Coordinator
Nuno\.Gomes@mf\.gov\.cv
Implementing Agencies
Special Project Management Unit
Nuno Gomes
Coordinator
Nuno\.Gomes@mf\.gov\.cv
Apr 27, 2021 Page 22 of 23
The World Bank
Cabo Verde Sustainable Electricity Service Project (P170236)
Daniel Santos
Project Manager
Daniel\.Santos@mf\.gov\.cv
Ministry of Finance
Nuno Gomes
Coordinator
Nuno\.Gomes@mf\.gov\.cv
FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 473-1000
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/projects
APPROVAL
Thierno Bah
Task Team Leader(s):
Megan Meyer
Approved By
Practice Manager/Manager:
Country Director: Barbara Geiser 06-Aug-2021
Apr 27, 2021 Page 23 of 23 | APPROVAL |
P101418 | Page 1
INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS DATA SHEET
CONCEPT STAGE
Report No\.: AC2519
Date ISDS Prepared/Updated: 11/17/2006
I\. BASIC INFORMATION
A\. Basic Project Data
Country: Brazil
Project ID: P101418
Project Name: Goias State Highway Management Project (APL II)
Task Team Leader: Aymeric-Albin Meyer
Estimated Appraisal Date:
Estimated Board Date: June 19, 2007
Managing Unit: LCSFT
Lending Instrument: Adaptable Program
Loan
Sector: Roads and highways (87%);Sub-national government administration (13%)
Theme: Infrastructure services for private sector development (P);Decentralization
(P);Other environment and natural resources management (S);Rural services and
infrastructure (S)
IBRD Amount (US$m\.):
65\.00
IDA Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
GEF Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
PCF Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
Other financing amounts by source:
BORROWER
65\.00
65\.00
B\. Project Objectives [from section 2 of PCN]
It is proposed that the project development objective of the second APL remains the same as that
of the Program, namely to increase the efficiency of the road transport system within sustainable
environmental and fiscal frameworks\.
C\. Project Description [from section 3 of PCN]
It is proposed that the second APL remains structured with the same five components as included
in the first APL, with added emphasis on the state reform component\. The project cost is
estimated at US$130 million, of which US$65 million would be financed by the Bank\. The
project components would include:
-
a
highway rehabilitation and maintenance component, to:
(a) support the completion of the rehabilitation of the state paved road network (following a
study undertaken by AGETOP of the condition of its network as part of the supervision of the
program Terceira Via, about 1,000 km of road sections remain to be rehabilitated) through the
use of performance-based contracts and economically-optimized technical solutions,
Page 2
(b) structure a state program to ensure all-weather access on the state non-paved network
(essentially by upgrading bridges and drainage structures), an essential program to ensure
movement of goods and people between the municipalities, economic production areas and the
main services centers, job markets and transport corridors; and
(c) the implementation of a first phase of the program, on about 2,000 km of the non-paved
network\.
-
a
highway paving component, to link selected agro-industrial centers to major highway or
multimodal corridors (about 200 km\. of existing state feeder roads would be paved)\.
-
a
highway policy and institutional development component, to:
(a) pursue assistance to the state infrastructure secretariat in developing transport policies,
through the strengthening of the secretariat's transport department, the consolidation of the state's
freight transport plan, and assistance to define policy and management models to be used in the
areas of inter-municipal bus transportation and of provision of rural transport services; and
(b) consolidate AGETOP's capacity, through the strengthening of internal procedures'
performance evaluation capacity, the procedures' modernization, the conclusion of the
modernization of management and operational information systems, the consolidation of
progress made in the planning and project management areas, as well as the definition of a
strategy to ensure the sustainability of the decentralization to the municipalities of maintenance
responsibilities for the municipal networks\.
-
an environmental management component, to:
(a) review the distribution of responsibilities among the relevant state entities, and structure a
proposal for a management contract between SEMARH and AGMA;
(b) pursue progress in consolidating the capacity of SEMARH and AGMA;
(c) pursue progress in developing instruments to foster private sector participation in managing
biodiversity and natural resources (such as the Bolsa Verde, the Clean Development Mechanism,
environmental certification process for producers, and development of alternative methods for
production); and
(d) consolidate the progress realized in the establishment of protected areas, through definition
of incentives to the implementation of established areas and the creation of corridors to connect
such areas\.
-
a
state reform component, which will support:
(a) the finance secretariat in designing and implementing a institutional strengthening program
for the secretariat (including preparation of a strategic plan, restructuring of procedures,
centralization and modernization of information systems, and development of training programs)
and implement a series of measures to increase tax collection efficiency (especially with respect
to the collection of ICMS-related debts, and improvements of ICMS tax bureaus efficiency);
(b) capacity strengthening at the level of the planning secretariat at (i) the planning level,
through the update of the state long-term strategic plan, the elaboration of a regional
development agenda, the consolidation of the monitoring systems for the state programs, (ii) the
administration organization level, through the reduction in superposition of responsibilities
across entities, the detailing of competencies and obligations between entities in charge of
defining policies and those in charge of executing such policies, and the structuring of at least 2
Page 3
management contracts; and (iii) the level of provision of services to the public, through support
to the expansion of the Vapt-Vupt system; and
(c) the consolidation of the state regulatory capacity, through further support to the state
regulatory agency, to improve monitoring of concessionaires' activities, structure a capacity to
monitor hydrological resources use, structure a regulatory framework for provision of inter-
municipal passenger transport services, structure a first PPP project, and develop training
programs for the agency's staff\.
D\. Project location (if known)
The state of Goias is located in the high central plains of Brazil, in the Biome known as the
Cerrado\. The region's natural vegetation consists mainly of savannah, or open fields with brush
vegetation, with riparian forests along the rivers\. The state's economy has traditionally been
based on extensive cattle ranching, but over the past three decades, the region has seen a very
rapid development of agriculture, particularly corn and soybean, and industry\.
The civil works to be financed by the second APL (as was the case for the first APL) will be
located on sections of the existing state road network, within the roads' right-of-way\. No new
road construction will take place\.
The technical assistance activities to be financed under the second APL (as it was the case for
the first APL) will benefit the state as a whole\.
E\. Borrowers Institutional Capacity for Safeguard Policies [from PCN]
With support from the first APL, the state significantly increased its capacity in managing
natural resources and protecting biodiversity, with: (a) the institutional strengthening of the
state's environmental agency, and the consolidation of environmental impact assessment and
mitigation procedures within AGETOP; (b) a significant increase in the proportion of the state's
surface under environmental protection, from 1\. 8% in 1998 to 4\.2% in 2005; and (c) progress
realized in the development of enconomic incentives to enhance the effieciency and effectiveness
of the state's environmental management policy instruments\.
In addition, the civil works component of the first APL was implemented under a safeguard
framework designed during the preparation of the first APL (including a Sector Environmental
Assessment, AGETOP's Environmental Norms and Procedures, a Public Consultation Manual,
and an Involuntary Ressettlement Framework)\. No safeguard-related issue arose during the
implementation of the component, and, during the discussions undertaken in the context of the
ICR preparation, no suggestion was made either by AGMA or AGETOP to modify the
framework\. This confirms the adequacy of such framework as well as of the state's capacity to
implement it\.
It is thus proposed to use the same basic safeguard framework for the second APL; however, an
assessment of the efficieny of its implementation under the first phase, to identify possible
weaknesses and needs for updates, will be carried out, and the framework will be improved in
line with the results of this assessment\. More details are in section II below\.
F\. Environmental and Social Safeguards Specialists
Page 4
Ms Elena Correa (LCSEO)
Ms Juliana Menezes Garrido Pereira (LCSFT)
II\. SAFEGUARD POLICIES THAT MIGHT APPLY
Safeguard Policies Triggered
Yes No TBD
Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4\.01)
X
Environmental impacts resulting from civil works on existing road sections are expected to
be relatively minor, and mostly related to civil works execution\. It is proposed that such impacts
be identified and mitigated in accordance with the provisions of the framework designed during
the preparation of the first APL, which will be reviewed and updated if such need arises from the
assessment of the implementation of the framework under the first APL\. It is also proposed to
update AGETOP's Environmental Norms and Procedures to adapt them to additional technical
solutions for road rehabilitation and improvement\.
Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4\.04)
X
As was the case during the preparation of the first APL, it is not expected that the
implementation of the second APL will have any negative impact on natural habitats\. Specific
Environmental Management Plans (EMPs) will need to be prepared for road rehabilitation
works, and Environmental Impact Assessments and EMPs will be prepared for road paving
works\. These documents will be used by AGMA as the basis to issue the environmental licenses\.
In the case of road paving works, a satisfactory review by the Bank of such documents will be
condition for the emission of the Bank's no-objection to works contract bidding\.
Forests (OP/BP 4\.36)
X
Pest Management (OP 4\.09)
X
Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4\.11)
X
As was the case during the preparation of the first APL, it is not expected that the
implementation of the second APL will have any negative impact on physical cultural resources,
as the project civil works will be located within the existing right-of-ways of road sections\.
However, "chance findings" are possible, and it is proposed that the Sectoral Environment
Assessment includes a section describing the procedures to be followed in such event (the
IPHAN procedures)\.
Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4\.10)
X
As was the case during the preparation of the first APL, it is not expected that the second
APL's implementation will impact indigenous peoples in the state (the implementation of the
first APL did not generate such impact)\. Indeed: (a) the state counts only an estimated 340
indigenous people (on an area as large as that of Italy, mostly located in two areas (around the
municipalities of Nova America and Aruana), as well as a few Quilombos communities in the
northern part of the state; and (b) as stated above, civil works will be located within the right-of-
ways of state roads, usually quite distant from indigenous peoples' areas or Quilombos'
communities\. However, as it is not possible to a priori ensure that all road sections would be
selected as not to affect an indigenous people area, it is proposed to prepare an indigenous people
development framework\.
Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4\.12)
X
As was the case during the preparation of the first APL, it is not expected that involuntary
resettlement will occur as a result of the second APL's implementation (no involuntary
resettlement was undertaken during the implementation of the first APL)\. Indeed, as stated
above, civil works will be located with the roads' right
-
of
-
ways, which are very much free of
Page 5
Safeguard Policies Triggered
Yes No TBD
settlement\. However, as it is not possible to a priori ensure that an involuntary resstlement issue
will not arise during implementation, it is proposed to use the framework prepared during the
preparation of the first APL, which will be reviewed and, if necessary, updated\. In addition, the
project will strengthen the state's capacity in consolidating its protected areas, without supporting
land acquisition or exchange\. In further project preparation, the team will assess whether the
activities under the environmental component might lead to restrictions in access to natural
resources legally designated parks and protected ares, resulting in adverse impacts on the
livelihoods of the displaced people\. In the affirmative case, a process framework will be
prepared\.
Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4\.37)
X
Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP
7\.50)
X
Projects in Disputed Areas (OP/BP 7\.60)
X
Environmental Category:
A
-
Full Assessment
III\. SAFEGUARD PREPARATION PLAN
A\. Target date for the Quality Enhancement Review (QER), at which time the PAD-stage ISDS
would be prepared: 03/26/2007
B\. For simple projects that will not require a QER, the target date for preparing the PAD-stage
ISDS: N/A
C\. Time frame for launching and completing the safeguard-related studies that may be needed\.
The specific studies and their timing
1
should be specified in the PAD-stage ISDS\.
The activities aiming at completing the existing safeguard framework have been launched
following the clearance of the minutes of the PCN review meeting\.
IV\. APPROVALS
Signed and submitted by:
Task Team Leader:
Mr Aymeric-Albin Meyer
11/16/2006
Approved by:
Regional Safeguards Coordinator:
Mr Reidar Kvam
11/16/2006
Comments:
Sector Manager:
Mr Jose Luis Irigoyen
11/16/2006
Comments:
1
Reminder: The Bank's Disclosure Policy requires that safeguard-related documents be disclosed before appraisal (i) at the
InfoShop and (ii) in-country, at publicly accessible locations and in a form and language that are accessible to potentially affected
persons\.
Page 6 | APPROVAL |
P167804 |  The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
Combined Project Information Documents /
Integrated Safeguards Datasheet (PID/ISDS)
Appraisal Stage | Date Prepared/Updated: 16-Oct-2019 | Report No: PIDISDSA25696
Sep 16, 2019 Page 1 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
BASIC INFORMATION
OPS_TABLE_BASIC_DATA
A\. Basic Project Data
Country Project ID Project Name Parent Project ID (if any)
India P167804 Enhancing Coastal and
Ocean Resource Efficiency
Region Estimated Appraisal Date Estimated Board Date Practice Area (Lead)
SOUTH ASIA 14-Oct-2019 17-Dec-2019 Environment, Natural
Resources & the Blue
Economy
Financing Instrument Borrower(s) Implementing Agency
Investment Project Financing Republic of India Society of Integrated
Coastal Management
Proposed Development Objective(s)
To strengthen integrated coastal zone management in selected States and Union Territories
Components
Capacity for Decentralized Coastal Management
Protection and Pollution Abatement in Coastal Areas
Project Management, Monitoring, and Evaluation
PROJECT FINANCING DATA (US$, Millions)
SUMMARY -NewFin1
Total Project Cost 360\.00
Total Financing 360\.00
of which IBRD/IDA 180\.00
Financing Gap 0\.00
DETAILS -NewFinEnh1
World Bank Group Financing
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 180\.00
Non-World Bank Group Financing
Sep 16, 2019 Page 2 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
Counterpart Funding 180\.00
Borrower/Recipient 180\.00
Environmental Assessment Category
A-Full Assessment
Decision
The review did authorize the team to appraise and negotiate
Other Decision (as needed)
B\. Introduction and Context
Country Context
While still high by global standards, Indiaâs growth rate has decelerated in the past two years\. After peaking at 8\.2
percent in FY16/17, economic growth has been lower in FY17/18 (to 7\.2 percent) and FY18/19 (to 6\.8 percent)\.
Estimates for the first quarter of FY19/20 suggest that growth is likely to be soft by Indian standards for the full fiscal
year\. In addition to relatively low levels of private investment over the past several years, the latest data shows a
broadening of the slowdown across all categories of aggregate demand\. On the fiscal side, the general government
deficit is estimated to have widened to 5\.9 percent of GDP in FY18/19 but is expected to consolidate to 5\.7 percent in
FY19/20\.
Since the 2000s, India has made remarkable progress in reducing absolute poverty\. Between FY11/12 and 2015,
poverty declined from 21\.6 percent to an estimated 13\.4 percent at the international poverty line (2011 PPP US$ 1\.90
per person per day), continuing the earlier trend of fast poverty reduction\. Thanks to robust economic growth, more
than 90 million people escaped extreme poverty and improved their living standards during this period\. Despite this
success, poverty remains widespread\. In 2015, 176 million Indians were living in extreme poverty, while 659 million -
half the population- were below the higher poverty line commonly used for lower middle-income countries (2011 PPP
US$ 3\.20 per person per day)\. Implementation challenges of indirect tax reforms, stress in the rural economy and a
high youth unemployment rate in urban areas, may have moderated the pace of poverty reduction since 2015\.
Sep 16, 2019 Page 3 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
Sectoral and Institutional Context
The Indian coast is home to more than 250 million people or 14\.2 percent of the national population\. The countryâs
Blue Economy (BE) estimated at US$ 24 trillion, with an expected annual value addition of US$ 2\.5 trillion, is a major
contributor to the Indiaâs economic growth and poverty reduction\. However, Indian coastal ecosystems are under
increasing pressure from rapid urbanization and development\. Resource overexploitation diminishes the economic
potential of coastal and marine resources, and affects coastal communities dependent for their livelihoods on these
resources\. Anthropogenic pressure on coastal resources is exacerbated by the effects of climate change\.
Indiaâs coastal zone management has evolved through a series of policy, regulatory, and institutional reforms\. The
National Coastal Mission (NCM) of 2017 adopted the principles of Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) into
the development, protection, and conservation of coastal space, and articulates that ICZM is one of Indiaâs climate
adaptation strategies\. Indiaâs vision articulated in the NCM is to transform the countryâs coastal marine sector into
the worldâs best managed productive ecosystem\. India has agreed in its Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions (INDC): (a) to create an additional carbon sink of 2\.5 to 3 billion tons of CO2 equivalent through
additional forest and tree cover by 2030; (b) better adapt to climate change by enhancing investment in sectors
vulnerable to climate change, including coastal regions; and (c) build capacity and invest in cutting edge climate
technology\. While MOEFCC has leveraged different sources of funding in support of achieving the INDCs (Green
Climate Fund and other sources), investment in the coastal regions is marginal\. ENCORE provides a significant
opportunity to support the achievement of the GOIâs goals expressed in INDC by promoting the sound management
of the mangrove forests and seagrass fields\.
The Government of India demarcated ecologically sensitive areas on the coasts and launched differentiated
management regimes under the 1991 Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) and Island Protection Zone (IPZ) Notification and
its subsequent amendments\. The CRZ 2018 defines the Coastal Regulation Zone as the coastal stretches of the
country and the water area up to its territorial water limit, excluding the islands of Andaman and Nicobar and
Lakshadweep and the marine areas surrounding these islands, and provides a detailed classification of ESAs, critically
vulnerable coastal areas (CVCA), No Development Zones (NDZ), and prohibited activities in its various coastal zones\.
India is establishing institutions to align coastal zone functions and functionaries among the Union and State
government, by constituting National and State Level Coastal Zone Management authorities\. To advance coastal zone
management actions, the MoEFCC has also contributed to creating the Society of Integrated Coastal Management
(SICOM) and the National Centre for Sustainable Coastal Management (NCSCM)\.
Within this institutional set up, adequate human resource capacity and technical know-how remain a major challenge
at both the national and the state levels\. The disconnect between Centrally mandated CRZ 2018 rules and Statesâ
institutional capacity to discharge their coastal management responsibilities is further exacerbated by limited
financial resources\. Marine and coastal management remains under the oversight of multiple departments and
agencies operating with little coordination\. These institutional constraints adversely impact coastal zone planning,
zoning, and permitting, which are inherently local functions\. States are facing serious implementation challenges,
including in the development of institutional capacity for preparation and implementation of State-level ICZM plans
and Marine Spatial Plans (MSP)\. In addition to information gaps and technical capacity constraints, the lack of
incentives to tackle complex cross-sectoral issues of the coast has emerged as another challenge\. Recognizing these
challenges, in 2010 the GOI initiated an Integrated Coastal Zone Management Project (ICZM) with the support of the
World Bank to test the approach of moving away from top-down regulation to a science-informed coastal
management in three States with different development trajectories -- Gujarat, Odisha, and West Bengal\. The ICZM
project has helped strengthen institutions and demonstrated scalable and sustainable models for increasing the
Sep 16, 2019 Page 4 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
productivity of coastal and marine ecosystems and improving the livelihood opportunities for coastal communities\.
The proposed Enhancing Ocean and Coastal Resource Efficiency (ENCORE) program builds on the results, experience
and lessons learnt from the ongoing ICZM Project\. The ENCORE program activities will cover 9 coastal States and 4
UTs where coastal resources under significant pressure\. It will help expand the integration of scientific information in
the CZM decision-making, policy design and project development by involving multiple coastal states in capacity
building programs focusing on the fundamentals for understanding the value of Coastal Zone Management (CZM)
regulation and management\.
ENCORE will provide the needed long-term support to the GOI for meeting national coastal and marine spatial
planning needs and building the related institutional capacity of the coastal states/UTs to enable them to carry out
their newly acquired CRZ implementation powers\. ENCORE will help protect and develop more intangible âblueâ
resources such as carbon sequestration, coastal resilience, waste management and coastal tourism in order to help
vulnerable coasts to mitigate the effects of poverty and climate change\. The proposed operation is consistent with
the World Bank Group India Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for 2018-2022 and is aligned with achieving the
objectives of its focus areas on: (i) promoting resource efficient growth; (ii) enhancing competitiveness and creating
jobs; and (iii) investing in human capital\. With reference to Focus Area 1 (Resources and Resource Efficiency), the
project will help unlock new economic potential -- for example, through supporting the goal of establishing 200 Blue
Flag Beaches and enabling sustainable coastal tourism â while empowering State and local governments to pursue a
more effective and climate-resilient development in coastal urban and peri-urban areas\.
C\. Proposed Development Objective(s)
To strengthen integrated coastal zone management in selected States and Union Territories\.
D\. Project Description
Building on the need for long-term partnerships to ensure much needed Centre-state co-ordination and integrated
planning; ENCORE is developed as a two-phase operation using the Multiphase Programmatic Approach (MPA) in
response to GoI request to the Bank to continue the CZM support via phased-based investments to manage, monitor
and motivate capacity building demand from coastal states to execute the National Coastal Mission\. The first phase of
US$180 million will finance State institutional strengthening, technical capacity-building, the development of state-
level Integrated Coastal Zone Management plans (ICZMPs), and concurrent enabling coastal zone investments; the
second phase of $120 million will finance the ICZMPsâ implementation, including investments in climate friendly
economic development projects, conservation and restoration of coastal ecosystems, pollution abatement and risk
reduction investments in/around ecologically sensitive areas, all of which contribute to achieving ICZMPsâ objectives\.
Investments financed under the second phase will be scoped and prioritized on the basis of the ICZMPs supported by
the first phase\. Program aims at improved protection of people in coastal zones against erosion, flooding, storm
surges and/or pollution and improved management of critically vulnerable coastal areas and tourism sites in selected
States and Union Territories\. ENCORE Phase 1 comprises of 3 components as follows:
Component 1: will support capacity for coastal zone management customized to the needs of national and state
organizations, stakeholders and community beneficiaries\. The component will finance applied research and
development, studies and capacity needs assessment, training, exchange programs, good practices pilots
Sep 16, 2019 Page 5 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
demonstrating innovation, flagship programs for strengthening the resilience of coastal and marine natural assets,
decisions support systems for the ICZMP/MSP/BE strategy preparation (under Component 2), and inputs toward
long-term operating models for the NCSCM and SICOM\. Activities will focus on five thematic areas: (a) conservation
management in the mainland, (b) climate change adaptation and mitigation, (c) conservation management for
islands, (d) pollution abatement; and (e) capacity building\. Component 1 activities will be implemented by the NCSCM
and SICOM in collaboration with the participating states/UTs and universities and research centers\.
Component 2: will focus on improved protection and pollution abatement in coastal areas\. This component will
support the states/UTs to develop cost-effective solutions to address the risks to the coastal natural capital assets
through inclusive spatial and marine planning in line with the CRZ 2018 implementation requirements\. Investments in
no-regret/green and grey infrastructure will aim to minimize the anthropogenic and climate risks of people and
economic assets in the participating States/UTs\. Project funding will be available for state investments that will
implement the statesâ ICZMPs (where such plans exist) or will facilitate the preparation of state ICZMPs (where such
plans are yet to be developed)\. Priority will be placed on cross-sectoral investments that will enhance the inter-
agency coordination/harmonization in line with the ENCORE development objective and that can potentially catalyze
private sector participation in sustainable coastal development\. The investments will have to meet criteria for cost-
effectiveness and scalability of coastal development models that protect and augment the value of green and blue
assets and contribute to sustained local economic growth\. Public resources will be used to leverage private funds for
nature-based solutions and infrastructure improvements when these meet the performance criteria for area-based
ecological improvements, with PPPs being the preferred option where applicable\.
Component 2 will further finance expenditures for preparation of feasibility studies, ESIA, engineering designs,
procurement of works and equipment, supervision costs, community development investments, training and
awareness building, and incremental operating costs during project life\. For coastal states/UTs that will be preparing
their first ICZMPs, Phase 1 will also support the preparation of priority implementation investments (for example, in
marine plastics removal, repurposing, and safe disposal) for the implementation of approved ICZMPs/MSPs to be
financed by Phase 2\. State investments for which financing will be provided under ENCORE Phase 1 will be grouped in
the following categories:
⢠Integrated Coastal Zone and Marine Planning,
⢠Conservation and protection of coastal and marine ecosystems;
⢠Coastal pollution management and infrastructure improvement,
⢠Livelihood security of coastal communities; and
⢠Capacity building (for implementation of ICZMPs/ MSPs)\.
Component 3: will focus on Project Management, Evaluation and Monitoring\. This component will finance the
national and statesâ project management costs including staffing and operation of the National Project Management
Unit (NPMU), establishment of financial management and procurement systems, implementation of the
communication plan and the Right to Information (RTI) related activities, governance and accountability actions,
M&E and third-party audits, coordination with states and other stakeholders, and special evaluation studies\.
Support will be provided for MOEFCCâs medium-term capacity-building plan and training of coastal zone managers
from all coastal states and UTs\.
Sep 16, 2019 Page 6 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
E\. Implementation
Institutional and Implementation Arrangements
SICOM (a Society under MOEFCC at the Central level) would implement the project as NPMU\. Program activities under
ENCORE will be overseen by Project Director of NPMU with the support of Assistant Project Director\. At each State/UT
level a SPMU (preferably a Society at the State level) would either be created or nominated to carry out the project\.
The SPMU will implement projects through Project Executing Agencies (PEAs) / line departments with support of
Project Management Consultants\. Project implementation will be further supported by the NCSCM, providing
scientific advice to the State/ Union Territory Governments and other associated stakeholders on policy, and scientific
matters relating to Integrated Coastal Management (ICZM)\.
\.
F\. Project location and Salient physical characteristics relevant to the safeguard analysis (if known)
Location: The ENCORE Program aims to strengthen integrated coastal zone management across Indiaâs
coastal States/UTs\. The general area for project interventions is identified as the east, west and south coasts
of peninsular India and its two island territories\. Subprojects under Phase I of this Multi-phase Program will
cover different locations in eight (8) States and three (3) UTs\. The sub-projects and the proposed
investments are located along the coast and the locations include coastal towns and villages where the
agriculture, fishing and tourism are the main stay\. Physical Characteristics: The Indian subcontinent is a
peninsular projection into the Indian Ocean\. India has 1382 offshore Islands along the mainland coast in
addition to its two island territories viz\., Andaman and Nicobar Groups of Islands and Lakshadweep Islands\.
The East Coast of India is characterized by many deltas built by the rivers flowing into the Bay of Bengal
while the west coast is often rocky with pocket beaches interlaced with fast flowing rivers forming estuaries
flowing into the Arabian Sea\. Coastal region of India has Littoral and Swampy forests (Wet tropical forests),
which include the beach forests and the tidal forests or mangrove forests\. Depending on the
geomorphology and coastal processes, a variety of ecosystems can be identified along the coast\. The coastal
areas in India are subjected to severe anthropogenic pressures leading to degradation of many ecologically
sensitive coastal and marine areas\. The typical environmental issues include destructive fishing techniques,
siltation due to deforestation, sedimentation, marine pollution and contaminants, sewage/solid waste
disposal, and irresponsible tourism\. Life, property and livelihoods of the coast also suffers from climate
change and weather phenomena like cyclone\. In the light of the above issues, the ICZM Project (P097985)
was implemented starting from 2011 to build government of India capacity to manage the coastal space
through systematic ICZMP approach\. As part of the capacity and institutional building, the project has
achieved multiple targets addressing coastal vulnerability issues in addition to protecting and enhancing
marine/ coastal ecological value\. The initiatives taken up under the Project has set the benchmarks for
ensuring effective integration of safeguards into marine/coastal management and the guidance has been
streamlined into regulatory system and coastal management approaches\.
Sep 16, 2019 Page 7 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
G\. Environmental and Social Safeguards Specialists on the Team
Parthapriya Ghosh, Social Specialist
Deepa Balakrishnan, Environmental Specialist
SAFEGUARD POLICIES THAT MIGHT APPLY
Safeguard Policies Triggered? Explanation (Optional)
Subprojects considered for implementation in Eight
(08) States / and Three (03) Union Territories (UTs)
of coastal India relate to improving the coastal
environment leveraging the concepts of resource
efficiency\. In case of Gujarat, Odisha and West
Bengal states, by and large the investments will be
based on ICZM Plans which are already in place\. For
example, the investments specific to coastal/erosion
protection shall necessarily be taken up only in areas
where shore line management plans are place (as
part of ICZM Plans based on cumulative impact
assessments)\. Such an inclusive approach will
minimize safeguards risks\. In addition, investments
for coastal pollution prevention, livelihood support
and coastal resilience identified in the ICZM Plans in
these three project States will be taken up on
Environmental Assessment OP/BP 4\.01 Yes priority\.
In case of new states, the MPA Phase I will primarily
focus on preparing ICZM Plans for the priority
coastal stretches\. Parallely, low to moderate risk
investments which will inform effective coastal
management solutions to guide ICZM Plan
preparation would also be taken up for pilot /
demonstration purposes\. Typical investments under
the project include: a) coastal protection activities
such as mangrove afforestation and shelter belt
plantations, b) habitat conservation activities such as
restoration of seagrass meadows, coral reef
restoration, eco-restoration of sacred groves and
islands, development of hatcheries, rearing / rescue
centers for turtles and other marine animals etc, c)
converting / developing the existing beaches in to
Sep 16, 2019 Page 8 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
âBlue Flagâ? category beaches, derisking the coastal
tourism from EHSS perspective by improving the
infrastructure, restoration and recharge of water
bodies, integrated infrastructure facilities for solid
and liquid waste management in coastal small
towns\.
The Project investments are expected to enhance
and support coastal resources, minimize coastal
pollution and improve the livelihoods of coastal
communities thereby ensuring positive impacts\.
However, temporary and localized environmental
impacts during implementation of different
investments across the coastal areas will arise\. These
impacts would be due to construction and related
activities and the typical impacts include: (i) increase
in noise, dust, impacts on air quality or safety risks
due to poor construction methods and inadequate
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) of facilities; (ii)
temporary water quality impacts resulting from
possible drainage and septage pollution from
facilities created under the project or due to labor
camps; (iii) impacts related to movement of vehicles
including increased congestion, and conflicts with
pedestrian movements; iv) hindered
access/temporary changes in access to, and the use
of, public spaces during construction/excavation
works; and (v) public health risks due to improper
waste/debris, sludge, material storage, excavated
silt/muck management, or lack of attention to labor
camps and facilities for laborers\. Some interventions
may require civil works, and shifting of existing
public utilities (telecommunication, power supply,
water supply, and sewerage lines etc\.), causing
temporary disturbance and restriction of access to
the communities\. Desilting, dewatering and
excavation activities required for water body
improvement and civil works may pose issues
related to storage space for odorous silt / muck,
disturbances to the communities in terms of
temporary blockage of accessways and common
properties, disturbance to livelihood activities, dust
and disturbance during transportation and disposal
of silt, localized flooding, and temporary blockage of
water channels\. There may be temporary impacts
due to migrant laborers in case the contractor
Sep 16, 2019 Page 9 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
decides to use them\. Since the project investments
spread along Indiaâs entire coast, including island
territories, some locations may have indigenous
population and this aspect will ascertained at sub-
project level on a case to case basis\. Hence, there is
a need for systematic safeguards management with
pre-defined framework for risk mitigation,
complying with World Bank and national
requirements\.
The proposed project interventions would not lead
to large scale, significant and/or irreversible impacts
due to the proposed project interventions\. This is
also confirmed from the implementation experience
of ICZM Project\. Further, to ensure that the spread
of project activities all along the coast do not pose a
higher level of cumulative risk, a well designed
institutional mechanism of decentralized state level
management of activities through State Project
Management Units (SPMUs) with sufficient capacity
are proposed to be established under the project\.
The SPMUs are in turn supported by a center of
excellence - National Center for Sustainable Coastal
Management (NCSCM)\. However, considering the
spread of investments in multiple locations along
coastal India, the Safeguards Category for ENCORE
Project is assigned as 'Category A'\.
While the nature of investments and the locations
are broadly known, the exact site details for some
subprojects are being worked out as part of
preparation of Detailed Project Reports (DPRs)\.
Considering this, in order to integrate environmental
and social considerations in multiple subprojects
proposed in different coastal States and effective
safeguards management, in Phase I of MPA
program, the borrower has prepared a Draft
Environmental and Social Management Framework
(ESMF) complying with World Bank requirements\.
ESMF describes screening process to decide the
inclusion of proposed subprojects in the program
and to categorize these based on defined criteria
also following the WB safeguard policies and
national regulations\. ESMF describes the process for
managing and mitigating anticipated impacts by a)
following Strategic Environmental and Social
Sep 16, 2019 Page 10 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
Assessments (SESA approach) process as integral
part of regional / sectoral plan preparation activities
including ICZM Planning, b) Environmental and Social
Impact Assessments (ESIA) and ESMPs for moderate
risk projects; and c) using Generic ESMPs for low risk
projects\. In addition, set of Environmental Codes of
Practice are also included in the ESMF to guide
integration of environmental aspects in planning and
project related activities\.
ESMF directs the use of the World Bank Group
Environmental Health and Safety (EHS) Guidelines
on cross-cutting environmental and social, health,
and safety issues potentially applicable to
construction and other projects\. Further, ESMF
provides guidance on screening, assessing, planning
and implementing mitigation measures, and
supervising / monitoring the impacts to natural
habitats, physical cultural resources and pest
management\.
ESMF also describes the improved institutional
mechanism, capacity building and cross learning at
the National, State and Project levels, supervision
and monitoring mechanisms and budget for ESMF
implementation\.
Since location and design information for conducting
activity-specific ESIAs for some of the project
activities are likely to be available only during
project implementation, the ESMF defines the
detailed process for the consultations, reviews, and
clearances\. ESMF has been prepared after
consultations with stakeholders to explain the need
for impact/risk management framework for
environmental and social aspects of ENCORE
program, and the proposed framework to manage
safeguards\. National, State and site level
consultations on ESMF were conducted to take
feedback of wider stakeholders before finalization of
ESMF\. The consultations will be continued during
the implementation phase of the project\. The draft
ESMF has been disclosed 'in country' in June 2019 as
well as in the Bankâs IDU on Aug 01, 2019\.
Consultations on the draft ESMF were co-ordinated
by the National Project Management Unit (SICOM)\.
Sep 16, 2019 Page 11 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
Consultations with stakeholders and project
beneficiaries / public were held in project States /
UTs as well\. The draft ESMF was reviewed and
approved by the WB safeguards team and disclosed
as Draft in-country prior to appraisal and 120 days
prior to Board date in country and in the World Bank
(IDU) following applicable procedures\. In addition,
ESIAs for the projects which would be implemented
during the first two years are under preparation
along with preparation of DPRs\. These will also be
consulted, reviewed and disclosed in the websites of
NPMU and respective States following applicable
procedures\.
Considering the proposed program and its focus, the
Performance Standards for Private Sector
No Private Sector activities are not envisaged and hence
Activities OP/BP 4\.03
OP/BP 4\.03 is not triggered\.
Program activities will not cause any conversion or
degradation of natural habitats; but support their
conservation and management\. This policy is
triggered as some of the project activities may have
minimal short term implementation stage impacts
which are temporary and reversible on natural
habitats (including rivers, streams, islands, sacred
groves, mangrove forests)\.
ESMF describes specific measures to mitigate
potential impacts on these\. While no significant
conversion/degradation of this natural resource is
Natural Habitats OP/BP 4\.04 Yes expected to occur, screening mechanism in the
ESMF enables early identification of such issues to
exclude them\. Subprojects involving natural habitat
areas will need standalone Environmental
Assessment with expertise to plan such projects and
implement them, review ESMPs, supervise and
monitor through stakeholder participation; so that
they become part of the IMPs/IIMPs for the area
when prepared\. A set of ECoPs including for
activities in CVCAs also have been included in the
ESMF to describe specific considerations to be
incorporated at planning / design stage to ensure
conservation and management of natural habitats\.
Subprojects would not involve conversion or
degradation of critical forest areas or any forest
Forests OP/BP 4\.36 Yes
based commercial activities or logging\.
Sep 16, 2019 Page 12 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
The locations proposed by two States (Odisha and
Kerala) for establishment and sustainable
management of environmentally appropriate,
socially beneficial, coastal mangrove and shelter belt
plantations for coastal protection are in and around
designated coastal forests\. While these activities do
not in any way affect the designated forests, it is
important to take precautionary measures to rule
out any impacts\. In this regard, the screening
mechanism in the ESMF enables early identification
of issues which may affect forests\. ESMF includes
detailed due diligence requirements to exclude the
projects which involve conversion or degradation of
forest areas and to mitigate any identified impacts
to forested areas\. ESMF highlights the need for joint
planning between NPMU, SPMUs, PEAs and Forest
Department of the State and communities while
planning projects in and around natural habitat
areas including coastal forests\. The project ECoPs
provided in the Draft ESMF, for use by contractors to
prepare site specific ESMPs also suggest the use of
only most appropriate native species; in consultation
with the host communities and forest department;
thus avoiding probable risks due to invasive / alien
species\. In case project involves forest restoration,
the project design will incorporate means of
addressing the potential for forest restoration to
improve biodiversity and ecosystem functions\.
In some States, in order to improve the adaptive
capacity of the local communities certain
subprojects are included to revive traditional
agriculture, improved agriculture using salt resistant
species and floating farms/aquaponics have been
proposed on pilot basis for demonstration benefit\.
Such projects /pilots/ demonstration activities are
designed to follow sustainable agricultural practices
excluding the use of synthetic pesticides\. However,
Pest Management OP 4\.09 Yes
the practical aspects may demand use of such
pesticides for controlled experiments with or
without pesticides and hence suggestive of the need
for incorporating pest management strategies;
triggering OP 4\.09 Pest Management\.
ESMF prepared by the borrower describes the need
and process for preparing Integrated Pest
Management Plan for such projects and due
Sep 16, 2019 Page 13 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
diligence on use of certain types of Pesticides\.
ENCORE would support the use of an Integrated Pest
Management Plan for such subprojects\. The project
would disallow procurement of any banned
pesticides\. Management of soil nutrient content
using traditional farming principles would be
considered while planning agriculture / horticulture
related projects\. Such projects would invest in
training of farmers in procurement, storage, use and
disposal of pesticides (which are not banned) and
necessitates use of ESMP with detailed Integrated
Pest Management Plan, prepared based on the
framework presented in the ESMF\. In addition, de-
weeding (weed removal from canals, water bodies)
activities will be performed mechanically, without
the use of weedicides\.
The policy on Physical Cultural Resources (OP 4\.11) is
of relevance as the Indian coastal areas have several
Physical and Cultural Resources, the presence of
such areas in proposed project interventions cannot
be ruled out, especially based on implementation
experience of ICZM Project â for example, \. some
project activities may be adjacent to certain cultural
assets of interest to local communities including
grave yards, places of worship, routes followed for
religious activities commonly encountered in both
urban/rural areas\. Some activities may result in
relocation of cultural assets or temporary access
restrictions\. In some cases traditional religious
pathways through fields / rural areas, festivities etc,
Physical Cultural Resources OP/BP 4\.11 Yes may be affected temporarily during construction
works\. Hence OP/BP 4\.11 has been triggered\.
The ESMF includes criteria for screening locations of
archaeological importance, and specific provisions to
assess the potential impacts on resources
considered to have historical or cultural significance
prior to any activities being undertaken on the
ground\. The ESMF describes the process to be
followed to prepare Physical Cultural Resources
Management Plan including consultations to discuss
associated issues with the communities\. It also lays
out provisions for the treatment of physical cultural
resources that may be discovered during project
implementation (chance finds)\.
Sep 16, 2019 Page 14 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
Since the project investments spread along Indiaâs
entire coast, including island territories, some
locations may have indigenous population and this
aspect will ascertained at sub-project level on a case
to case basis\. The project as part of ESMF has
Indigenous Peoples OP/BP 4\.10 Yes prepared IPPF that will guide preparation of IPP if
required\. For each sub project social screening will
be carried out along with FPIC and IPP will be
prepared\. Indigenous community was not consulted
during the preparation of IPPF but the framework
was consulted with the administrators\.
Since the project interventions will be on public land,
private land acquisition is not envisaged under this
project\. However, there are chances of
encroachment of public land\. Since there are
multiple interrelated interventions across fourteen
States and UTs which are at the planning stage, a
Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) has been
prepared because the extent of resettlement cannot
be known upfront for all interventions at the
Involuntary Resettlement OP/BP 4\.12 Yes appraisal stage\. The RPF provides for any situation
that may arise where need for temporary or
permanent land acquisition or resettlement and
rehabilitation is inevitable\. Resettlement and
compensation activities will be conceived and
executed in a sustainable manner in line with the
RPF\. The RPF is intended for use as a practical tool,
to guide the preparation of the Resettlement Action
Plan (RAP) depending upon the scale and severity of
impacts\.
This project is not envisaged to involve any activity
related to Safety of Dams as per OP/BP 4\.37 and
hence this policy is not triggered\. Any subproject
Safety of Dams OP/BP 4\.37 No which would involve the construction or would
concern the safety of the dams would be excluded
from the project at the screening stage; using the
screening criteria provided in the ESMF\.
Not applicable as the project activities are not
Projects on International Waterways
No expected to have any investments that would attract
OP/BP 7\.50
OP/BP 7\.50
Project activities are not expected to be taken up in
Projects in Disputed Areas OP/BP 7\.60 No disputed territories and hence this policy is not
triggered\.
Sep 16, 2019 Page 15 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
KEY SAFEGUARD POLICY ISSUES AND THEIR MANAGEMENT
A\. Summary of Key Safeguard Issues
1\. Describe any safeguard issues and impacts associated with the proposed project\. Identify and describe any potential
large scale, significant and/or irreversible impacts:
Environmental Safeguard issues and Impacts:
The program investments are expected to enhance and support coastal resources, minimize coastal pollution and
improve the livelihoods of coastal communities\. The activities under the program are not expected to result in long
term or permanent adverse impacts on the environment\. In addition, the program is expected to provide a scientific
basis and an effective management framework (including institutional capacity) for resource efficient and integrated
coastal management\. Rather than adhoc placing and implementation of projects in time and space without adequate
planning considerations, the Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) Plan which would be prepared by each
State / UT for selected coastal stretches as part of the project would set the stage for investments with a scientific
basis; considering the environmental, social and climate related sensitivities among others\. The proposed project
mandate subsumes safeguards management as an integral part of the project objectives and implementation\. Thus,
the proposed project investments pose low to moderate safeguards risks which are manageable\. However, project
investments are spread in multiple locations in coastal India\. To ensure that the spread of project activities all along
the coast do not pose a higher level of cumulative risk, a well designed institutional mechanism of decentralized state
level management of activities through State Project Management Units (SPMUs) with sufficient capacity are
proposed to be established under the project\. Proof of such an arrangement to minimize the risk has been established
under implementation of ICZM Project\. Under ENCORE Project, considering the larger number of investments, an
additional measure is integrated by embedding the knowledge sharing and monitoring role for the Coastal
Environmental Impact Assessment (CIA) division of National Centre for Sustainable Coastal Management (NCSCM)\.
NCSCM as well as CIA have been established under ICZM Project and the ENCORE Preparation is carried out by this
center of excellence\.
The assessment reveals no large scale, significant and/or irreversible impacts due to the proposed project
interventions\. The program will avoid undertaking any activities that will cause significant conversion or negative
impacts on natural habitats and sensitive environmental receptors\. Activities that may have cumulative/regional
impacts or large scale construction / Operation and Maintenance (O&M) stage impacts (such as hard coastal
protection structures) will be taken up for implementation only if its necessity is established and guided by ICZM
Plans\. ICZM plans have been prepared for three coastal states as part of ICZM Project (P097985)\. While the overall
program is environmentally beneficial, some activities like construction and upgradation of infrastructure and facilities
for coastal protection and pollution prevention, and certain livelihood support activities are likely to result in impacts
that can be effectively managed across the detailed design and implementation phases of the investments, as follows:
A\. ICZM Plan Preparation and other Sectoral Plans:
ICZM Plan which would be prepared by each State as part of the project would set the stage for future investments\. It
will be prepared with a scientific basis; considering the environmental, social and climate related sensitivities among
others\. To ensure full integration of environmental, social and climate related sensitivities ICZM plan and other
sectoral plans will be prepared following the process of Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment (SESA)
approach with effective prior-informed consultations (with all stakeholders including communities, private sector, line
departments) and regional/sectoral assessments\. This process would identity impacts on critical environmental
Sep 16, 2019 Page 16 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
resources early on, avoid or minimize such impacts and ensure prevention of further degradation of the environment\.
It thereby ensures that potential impacts are fully included and appropriately addressed at the earliest appropriate
stage of decision-making\. This process will identify opportunities to minimize the range of environmental issues that
will have to be dealt at the project level\. Terms of Reference for ICZM / Other Plans will include this requirement to
avoid or minimize large scale significant or irreversible impacts\.
B\. Upgradation of Database creation (Documentation and Mapping), Monitoring and Research Facilities:
The institutional strengthening activities under these project activities will involve the construction or upgradation of
additional buildings or facilities for the operation of the systems being developed in addition to collection of data and
monitoring\. Construction of buildings may lead to site-specific and temporary impacts associated with construction
work, such as clearing of land, dust, noise, occupational and public health and safety\. Database creation/mapping,
monitoring and Research facilities may have other direct and indirect impacts on community and worker health and
safety owing to storage of chemicals / materials for research purposes, collection and storage of samples, and
management and disposal of minimal amount of waste (including laboratory and packaging wastes) produced in such
facilities\. These impacts are short term, temporary and reversible; manageable with effective supervision and
guidance in the form of codes of practice to be followed for such activities\.
C\. Coastal Protection and Conservation:
Project activities considered for implementation in Eight (8) States / Three (3) UTs of coastal India relate to improving
the coastal environment; leveraging the concepts of resource efficiency\. Three coastal States; Gujarat, Odisha and
West Bengal have already prepared ICZM Plans following wide range of consultations and science based planning, as
part of ICZMP Project (P097985) funded by the World Bank\. In addition to implementing priority projects identified in
these ICZM Plans, those investments which will inform and demonstrate effective coastal management solutions to
guide ICZM Plan preparation in other States/UTs will also be taken up for piloting / demonstration and
implementation during MPA Phase I\. Investments proposed by the States/UTs include a) coastal protection activities
such as mangrove afforestation and shelter belt plantations, b) habitat conservation activities such as restoration of
seagrass meadows, coral reef restoration, eco-restoration of sacred groves, development of hatcheries, rearing /
rescue centers for turtles and other marine animals etc, c) ) converting / developing the existing beaches into âBlue
Flagâ? category beaches, de-risking the coastal tourism from EHSS perspective by improving the infrastructure,
restoration and recharge of water bodies, integrated infrastructure facilities for solid and liquid waste management in
coastal small towns\. In addition, the investments also includes sustainable coastal erosion and protection works\. Such
works will be carried out only in areas where Shore Line Management Plans have already been prepared (after
detailed analysis of coastal processes where cumulative impacts of physical interventions have been studied) under
ICZM Project\.
Environmental impacts, though meager; may include a) land clearing, change in landuse and water courses/drainage
pattern in or near environmentally sensitive coastal areas; b) probable introduction of alien species, and (b)
deterioration of environmental quality due to construction and operation of facilities including: (i) increase in noise,
dust, impacts on air quality or safety risks on habitats due to poor construction methods and inadequate operation
and maintenance (O&M) of facilities; (ii) temporary water quality impacts resulting from material storage areas, and
septage/drainage from facilities and labor camps; (iii) impacts related to movement of vehicles including increased
congestion, and conflicts with movements of flora/fauna; iv) hindered access/temporary changes in access to, and the
use of, premises; and (v) risks due to improper waste/debris, sludge and excavated silt/muck management, or
activities by the laborers / labor camp\. These impacts could be managed by proper guidance for works using
Environmental and Social Management Plans (ESMPs) and monitoring\. Similarly, with project investments expected to
spread along Indiaâs coast, including island territories, it is likely that some locations may have presence of indigenous
Sep 16, 2019 Page 17 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
population\.
Some interventions may require civil works, and shifting of existing public utilities (telecommunication, power supply,
water supply, and sewerage lines etc\.), causing temporary disturbance and restriction of access to the communities\.
Desilting, dewatering and excavation activities required for water body improvement and civil works may pose issues
related to storage space for odorous silt / muck, disturbances to the communities in terms of temporary blockage of
accessways and common properties, disturbance to livelihood activities, dust and disturbance during transportation
and disposal of silt, localized flooding, and temporary blockage of water channels\. There may be temporary impacts
due to migrant laborers in case the contractor decides to use them\. However, these impacts are proposed to be
managed by following labor management framework and well developed ESMP for labor camps\. All temporary
construction stage impacts can be mitigated by preparing and following specific environmental management and
monitoring plans\. Any activities near natural habitats would be guided by standalone Environmental and Social
Assessments or with standalone ESMPs reviewed and supervised by subject experts\.
Waste management subprojects including sewage treatment and disposal and solid waste management for small
coastal towns will be considered in a comprehensive manner\. Such projects are necessary to reduce the impact of
sewage / waste pollution on coastal and marine resources\. These, would entail accumulation of wastes (though small;
of the order of 30 to 50 Tons of solid wastes or around 5 MLD of sewage considering the population in these small
towns) at the proposed location for treatment in contrary to its dispersed condition today, and may have an impact in
case of operational inadequacies\. This will be taken care of by devising proper guidance on institutional mechanism for
sustained O&M, efficient monitoring systems (with community participation) and development of
emergency/contingency plans as part of design and ESMP\.
D\. Livelihood improvement projects:
Livelihood improvement projects near Eco-sensitive areas (ESAs) and Critically Vulnerable Coastal Areas (CVCAs) may
involve activities with small footprint at each location; such as demonstration of climate resilient or salinity resistant
agriculture, water harvesting and recharge/storage, creation of infrastructure and facilities to support ecotourism,
community-based; small-scale mariculture, seaweed cultivation, aquaponics, and value addition to other livelihood
activities\. Such activities may result in temporary impacts if not planned and managed properly; including i) site
clearance, ii) dust, water and noise pollution, iii) impacts due to storage of construction materials, iv) disposal of
wastes, v) temporary access restrictions to communities, vi) occupational and worker health and safety etc\. Any
impacts on natural habitats, can be avoided by following screening criteria, proper siting principles and impacts during
construction stage can be mitigated using specific ESMPs and monitoring plans\. De-weeding of canals and other water
bodies will use mechanical means; avoiding the use of pesticides or weedicides\. Projects related to improvement in
agricultural practices may necessitate pest control\. Specific guidance to avoid using banned pesticides and following
the principles of Integrated Pest and Nutrient Management (IPNM) would support environmental safeguards
management in such projects\.
Social Risks:
Most of the project activities require little or no land\. However, some construction/plantation/restoration and other
interventions might have minimal land requirement for which only public land has been considered\. Mangrove
plantations and small infrastructure in villages will be carried out on public land\. Rehabilitation of assets will be in-situ
and will not require any additional land\. However, there are chances of encroachment of public land\. Structures, such
as street vendor stalls, may need to be moved or relocated for implementation of projects such as restoration of built
heritage or natural coastal resources (such as mangrove)/infrastructure (solid waste management and sewage)/eco-
tourism activities/ beach cleaning/ livelihood activities/ protection of coastal structures or any other activities\.
Sep 16, 2019 Page 18 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
Displacement of vendor stalls/small businesses/ small informal establishments such as fisherman hut/informal fish-
landing sites/ may have adverse impacts with regards to security of the concerned people\. This can especially impact
women vendors/ small business owners/traditional small fisherman or traditional farmers\. Fences may need to be
erected to protect coastal resources (sand-dunes, turtle nesting sites and others), or temporarily be erected for
construction works (coastal protection structures), and they could block access to peopleâs lands or public spaces like a
part of a beach\. There may be negative economic impacts on small businesses/traditional and small-scale fisherman/
farmers/ individuals informally working in the structure/site/area to be rehabilitated\. Vendors or small businesses
removed or displaced from their original locations may be unable to return to these once they have been
rehabilitated, thus facing significant loss of income During the construction phase, influx of large numbers of migrant
workers in the project area is also not envisaged as assets to be created will be small\. At the same time, the Project
will benefit the community in general\. Mangrove plantations and rehabilitation work will be carried out by the local
community thus generating additional employment opportunities\. However, inclusion and equity issues may remain a
concern in accessing the benefits of the project\.
2\. Describe any potential indirect and/or long term impacts due to anticipated future activities in the project area:
Social:
Evidence from prior ICZM experience indicates that multiple coastal zone users with conflicting interests can often
generate strong resistance to coastal management, both from entrenched public institutions and from private-sector
actors, including coastal communities\. This is especially the case when reforms seek to further devolve user rights, for
example having fishing communities taking on partial fisheries management responsibilities\. Lack of tradition of wide
stakeholder input early into the coastal management plan preparation can exacerbate such risks\.
Environmental:
Future activities in the project area would be as per the ICZM Plan which is prepared based on scientific principles and
planning\. To avoid negative direct or indirect long term effects, ICZM Plan would be prepared following a SESA
approach with effective stakeholder consultations\. Hence, indirect and/or long term impacts due to anticipated future
activities in the project area are expected to be positive and beneficial to the coastal environment and the community\.
Certain landuse and developmental changes may be necessary over the long term; especially guided by the shoreline
management plan and ICZM Plan which would suggest a) the management mechanism to be adopted for each
sediment cell/sub-cell, b) most appropriate landuse for the study region, c) additional infrastructure or facilities
essential for the region, and d) any infrastructure which shall be avoided in the region\. This may suggest shifting
facilities and housing over the next 30 years, which when implemented may have impacts on the lives and livelihoods\.
However, ICZM Plans would guide the most appropriate development options and mechanisms / procedures to be
followed, in close consultation with the communities\.
The exact interventions to be financed under Phase II have not been identified at this stage\. However, the investments
identified through ICZM Plans prepared as part of Phase I would be taken up for implementation during Phase II\.
3\. Describe any project alternatives (if relevant) considered to help avoid or minimize adverse impacts\.
ENCORE draws its lessons on sustainable integrated planning and implementation through the experience of ICZMP
Project (P097985)\. This ensures avoiding and minimizing adverse impacts on the coast through thorough science
based planning, and institutional capacity development\. ICZM Plans will be prepared following scientific planning
principles and integrates the SESA approach to avoid or minimize any adverse impacts of project selection, phasing or
Sep 16, 2019 Page 19 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
siting\. During subproject design stage; Environmental and Social Impact Assessment would: a) evaluate a subproject's
potential environmental risks and impacts in it's area of influence, b) examine the alternatives, and c) identify
measures to mitigate and monitor the impacts and ensures positive effects throughout project implementation and
operations\.
Other option of coastal development focusing only on isolated development of coastal infrastructure without planning
would not be sustainable, considering the probable adverse impacts which might result in the absence of long term
regional planning including the science on coastal processes\. The approach adopted by ENCORE program linking
science based planning, pilot / demonstrative of best case examples and capacity building at National, State and
project levels for integrated coastal management is hence the best alternative for coastal zone development\.
The land parcel required for small village assets will be identified and finalized in consultation with the community\.
The land required for activities like mangrove plantations or any public assets will be screened for encroachment and
other encumbrances\. Community consultations will be carried out even at design stage to ensure that no vulnerable
households are impacted by project's intervention\.
4\. Describe measures taken by the borrower to address safeguard policy issues\. Provide an assessment of borrower
capacity to plan and implement the measures described\.
While the nature of investments and the locations are broadly known, the exact site details are being workd out as
part of DPR preparations\. Considering this, in order to integrate environmental and social considerations in multiple
sub projects proposed in different coastal States and effective safeguards management during Phase I of this MPA
program, the borrower has prepared an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF)\. The ESMF
includes: (i) detailed procedures for environmental and social screening and categorization of sub projects based on
defined criteria following the World Bank Safeguard Policies and national regulations, (ii) guidance on assessment of
project activities (iii) guidance on avoidance and mitigation of environmental and social impacts (including sample
ESMPs for various types of project activities, mitigation measures for construction works, generic mitigation measures,
generic labor influx and construction workersâ camp management plan, generic waste management plan, resettlement
action plan, and tribal development plan; (iv) monitoring and evaluation framework, (v) consultation, information
disclosure and grievance redress\. ESMF also describes the institutional mechanism, capacity building and cross
learning needs at the National, State and Project levels, supervision and monitoring mechanisms, and budget for ESMF
implementation\. Since location and design information for conducting activity-specific ESIA for some of the project
activities are likely to be available only during project implementation, the ESMF will define the detailed process for
the consultations, reviews, and clearances\. This complies with World Bank requirements as per the World Bankâs
Safeguards Policy OP 4\.01 Environmental Assessment\. In addition, guidance on procedures to be followed, ESMPs,
Environmental Codes of Practice (ECoPs) and institutional mechanisms to comply with other safeguard policies
triggered by the project; namely OP/BP 4\.04 Natural Habitats, OP/BP 4\.36 Forests, OP 4\.09 Pest Management, OP/BP
4\.11 Physical Cultural Resources, OP/BP 4\.10 Indigenous Peoples and OP/BP 4\.12 involuntary Resettlement have also
been described in the ESMF\. The Draft ESMF has been prepared by National Project Management Unit (SICOM) and
consulted with various stakeholders\. The Draft ESMF has been disclosed 'in-country' as well as on Bankâs IDU\. In
addition, for the projects which would be implemented during the first two years; ESIAs if applicable will also be
prepared and disclosed in respective websites following applicable procedures\. Detailed location specific plans are
under preparation for project interventions in three (03) States where ICZM Plans have been prepared under ICZMP
Project\. In addition, location specific plans and project details are also being prepared for the interventions in other
States which would help them address the priority coastal issues to and make them understand the integrated ICZM
Process\. Safeguard instruments for these projects are also under preparation, following the ESMF procedures\. Review
Sep 16, 2019 Page 20 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
and clearance procedures will be followed for these draft ESIAs and these will be disclosed 'in-country' and in World
Bank IDU\.
Policy and Regulatory Framework:
Policy and regulatory framework in India supports coastal planning and management programs\. Coastal Regulation
Zone Notification 2019 and Environmental Impact Assessment Notification 2006 of the Government of India and
various other policies regarding environment, biodiversity and development provides the policy and regulatory
framework for ENCORE program\. Though, no regulation mandates the strict use of SESA approach for planning or
development in India; there have been attempts to use consultation process extensively for planning / developmental
projects\. Further, cumulative impacts of large scale developments is well recognized in the EIA process; as guided by
the EIA notification 2006\. There are many National, State and local laws including labor laws, building bylaws, laws and
policies for managing various livelihood and pollution related aspects, which would be applicable for various project
activities under ENCORE\. The regulations and consent / clearance requirements would support in avoiding and
mitigating pollution and other impacts which may result from project activities\.
Assessment of Borrowerâs Capacity:
The Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change of the Government of India; is experienced in implementing
the World Bank financed IPF Projects - especially the ongoing Integrated Coastal Zone Management Project (ICZMP);
through its agency Society of Integrated Coastal Management (SICOM), which functions as its National Project
Management Unit (NPMU)\. The same agency act as the NPMU for ENCORE program\. Ever since ICZM Project (2010),
NPMU has established an organizational structure to ensure that the policy obligations and associated procedures
suggested by Environmental ad Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) are implemented\. Program activities under ENCORE
will be overseen by Project Director of NPMU with the support of Assistant Project Director\. In addition to the
professionals including ICZM Planners, Environmental / Civil Engineers, Biodiversity Specialist, Procurement, Financial
Management specialists; Environmental and Social Managers are also deployed at SICOM to co-ordinate with the
States on environmental and social aspects and ensure preparation and implementation of ESMF\. Currently, NPMU
has two Environmental and Social Managers (one Environment and one Social) who would be adequate for the same\.
However, since the potential social and environmental impacts under ENCORE are likely to be more complex
considering the more number of participating States; more stringent due diligence and institutional mechanisms are
required in terms of environmental and social management and supervision during sub project preparation and
implementation\. The implementation experience in coastal management projects confirms the roles of responsibility
to respective State Project Management Units (SPMUs) and Project Executing Agencies (PEAs) to enhance safeguard
arrangements at the implementation level, besides Capacity Building for continued incorporation of environmentally
acceptable measures for all future coastal development activities\.
SPMUs will be formed to oversee the project activities in respective States\. SPMUs will also have ICZM specialists,
subject experts in various fields, procurement, financial management specialists and environmental and social
specialists under the leadership of Assistant Project Director and Project Director\. SPMU will oversee ESMF
implementation by PEAs during all project stages and maintains records on project â wise / implementing agency -
wise report on E&S actions at respective State Levels\. The PEAs shall have dedicated environmental and social experts
with appropriate qualification and experience for coordinating with Local Bodies, line departments and SPMUs\. States
will either hire non-governmental organization (NGO) or social mobilizers within SPMU for community mobilization
and addressing any social safeguard issues at investment level\. SPMUs and NPMU will also be supported by Project
Management Consultants (PMCs), Quality Assurance and E&S Audit consultants for reviewing, implementing,
monitoring and reporting on safeguards management during various project stages\. The NPMU and SPMUs will be
responsible for ensuring sound implementation of all provisions outlined in the ESMF for Phase I and other sub-project
Sep 16, 2019 Page 21 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
specific safeguards management plans throughout all phases of the project\.
As an additional measure for embedding the knowledge sharing and monitoring role, the Coastal Environmental
Impact Assessment (CIA) division of National Center for Sustainable Coastal Management (NCSCM) will provide expert
support for all the SPMUs\. This role would ensure hands on safeguards management as NCSCM as well as CIA have
been established under ICZM Project and the ENCORE Preparation activities are being managed by this center of
excellence\.
5\. Identify the key stakeholders and describe the mechanisms for consultation and disclosure on safeguard policies,
with an emphasis on potentially affected people\.
Stakeholder consultations with a wide cross section of people / communities/ including all categories specifically
vulnerable groups for priority investments in the States will include: (i) process of their inclusion in the decision
making process; (ii) links between communities and their natural resource base, especially adjacent to project
locations; (iii) public awareness and information sharing on the overall project components and priority investments,
alternatives, benefits and entitlements where applicable; and (iv) views on designs and solutions from the
communities\. Outputs from this process were integrated into the design where technically feasible\.
The project will also document inputs from the comprehensive multi level stakeholder consultations, pertaining to the
National components\. Consultations with the identified stakeholders will be carried out during the preparation of ESIA
at the sub project level\. Stakeholder identification and mapping will be carried out during the ESIA for all sub projects
and during ICZMP plan preparation to study the profile of the stakeholders identified and the nature of the stakes;
understand each groupâs specific issues, concerns as well as expectations from the project that each group retains;
and gauge their influence on the project\.
ESMF has been prepared after consultations with stakeholders to explain the need for impact/risk management
framework for environmental and social aspects of ENCORE program, and the proposed framework to manage
safeguards\. National level consultations on ESMF will be conducted to take feedback of wider stakeholders before
finalization of ESMF\. The consultations will be continued during the implementation phase of the project\.
The Draft ESMF has been prepared by National Project Management Unit (SICOM) and consulted with various
stakeholders\. The Draft ESMF has been disclosed 'in-country' as well as on Bankâs IDU\. In addition, for the projects
which would be implemented during the first two years; ESIAs if applicable will also be prepared and disclosed in
respective websites following applicable procedures\. Detailed location specific plans are under preparation for project
interventions in three (03) States where ICZM Plans have been prepared under ICZMP Project\. In addition, location
specific plans and project details are also being prepared for the interventions in other States which would help them
address the priority coastal issues to and make them understand the integrated ICZM Process\. Safeguard instruments
for these projects are also under preparation, following the ESMF procedures\. Review and clearance procedures will
be followed for these draft ESIAs and these will be disclosed 'in-country' and in World Bank IDU\.
Sep 16, 2019 Page 22 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
B\. Disclosure Requirements
OPS_EA_DISCLOSURE_TABLE
Environmental Assessment/Audit/Management Plan/Other
For category A projects, date of
Date of receipt by the Bank Date of submission for disclosure distributing the Executive Summary of
the EA to the Executive Directors
07-Jun-2019 01-Aug-2019
"In country" Disclosure
India
07-Jun-2019
Comments
OPS_RA_D ISCLOSURE_T ABLE
Resettlement Action Plan/Framework/Policy Process
Date of receipt by the Bank Date of submission for disclosure
07-Jun-2019 01-Aug-2019
"In country" Disclosure
India
07-Jun-2019
Comments
OPS_I P_DIS CLOSURE_TAB LE
Indigenous Peoples Development Plan/Framework
Date of receipt by the Bank Date of submission for disclosure
07-Jun-2019 01-Aug-2019
"In country" Disclosure
India
07-Jun-2019
Comments
OPS_ PM_D ISCLOSURE_TAB LE
Pest Management Plan
Was the document disclosed prior to
appraisal? Date of receipt by the Bank Date of submission for disclosure
Sep 16, 2019 Page 23 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
Yes 07-Jun-2019 01-Aug-2019
"In country" Disclosure
India
07-Jun-2019
Comments
OPS_PM_ PCR_TABLE
If the project triggers the Pest Management and/or Physical Cultural Resources policies, the respective issues are to
be addressed and disclosed as part of the Environmental Assessment/Audit/or EMP\.
If in-country disclosure of any of the above documents is not expected, please explain why:
C\. Compliance Monitoring Indicators at the Corporate Level (to be filled in when the ISDS is finalized by the project
decision meeting)
OPS_EA_COMP_TABLE
OP/BP/GP 4\.01 - Environment Assessment
Does the project require a stand-alone EA (including EMP) report?
Yes
If yes, then did the Regional Environment Unit or Practice Manager (PM) review and approve the EA report?
No
Are the cost and the accountabilities for the EMP incorporated in the credit/loan?
No
OPS_ NH_COM P_TABLE
OP/BP 4\.04 - Natural Habitats
Would the project result in any significant conversion or degradation of critical natural habitats?
No
If the project would result in significant conversion or degradation of other (non-critical) natural habitats, does the
project include mitigation measures acceptable to the Bank?
NA
OPS_ PM_COM P_TABLE
OP 4\.09 - Pest Management
Does the EA adequately address the pest management issues?
Yes
Is a separate PMP required?
No
Sep 16, 2019 Page 24 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
If yes, has the PMP been reviewed and approved by a safeguards specialist or PM? Are PMP requirements included in
project design? If yes, does the project team include a Pest Management Specialist?
NA
OPS_ PCR_COM P_TABLE
OP/BP 4\.11 - Physical Cultural Resources
Does the EA include adequate measures related to cultural property?
Yes
Does the credit/loan incorporate mechanisms to mitigate the potential adverse impacts on cultural property?
Yes
OPS_I P_COM P_TABLE
OP/BP 4\.10 - Indigenous Peoples
Has a separate Indigenous Peoples Plan/Planning Framework (as appropriate) been prepared in consultation with
affected Indigenous Peoples?
Yes
If yes, then did the Regional unit responsible for safeguards or Practice Manager review the plan?
Yes
If the whole project is designed to benefit IP, has the design been reviewed and approved by the Regional Social
Development Unit or Practice Manager?
No
OPS_IR_ COMP_TAB LE
OP/BP 4\.12 - Involuntary Resettlement
Has a resettlement plan/abbreviated plan/policy framework/process framework (as appropriate) been prepared?
Yes
If yes, then did the Regional unit responsible for safeguards or Practice Manager review the plan?
Yes
OPS_F O_COM P_TABLE
OP/BP 4\.36 - Forests
Has the sector-wide analysis of policy and institutional issues and constraints been carried out?
Yes
Does the project design include satisfactory measures to overcome these constraints?
Yes
Does the project finance commercial harvesting, and if so, does it include provisions for certification system?
No
OPS_ PDI_ COMP_TAB LE
The World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information
Have relevant safeguard policies documents been sent to the World Bank for disclosure?
Sep 16, 2019 Page 25 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
Have relevant documents been disclosed in-country in a public place in a form and language that are understandable
and accessible to project-affected groups and local NGOs?
All Safeguard Policies
Have satisfactory calendar, budget and clear institutional responsibilities been prepared for the implementation of
measures related to safeguard policies?
Yes
Have costs related to safeguard policy measures been included in the project cost?
No
Does the Monitoring and Evaluation system of the project include the monitoring of safeguard impacts and measures
related to safeguard policies?
Yes
Have satisfactory implementation arrangements been agreed with the borrower and the same been adequately
reflected in the project legal documents?
Yes
CONTACT POINT
World Bank
Milen F\. Dyoulgerov Vollen
Senior Environmental Specialist
Sita Ramakrishna Addepalli
Senior Environmental Specialist
Borrower/Client/Recipient
Republic of India
Sameer Kumar Khare
Joint Secretary
jsmi-dea@nic\.in
Implementing Agencies
Society of Integrated Coastal Management
A K Mehta
Additional Secretary and Natonal Project Director
akmehta@nic\.in
Sep 16, 2019 Page 26 of 27
The World Bank
Enhancing Coastal and Ocean Resource Efficiency Project (P167804)
FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 473-1000
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/projects
APPROVAL
Milen F\. Dyoulgerov Vollen
Task Team Leader(s):
Sita Ramakrishna Addepalli
Approved By
Safeguards Advisor: Charles Ankisiba 02-Oct-2019
Practice Manager/Manager: Magda Lovei 02-Oct-2019
Country Director: Hisham A\. Abdo Kahin 16-Oct-2019
Note to Task Teams: End of system generated content, document is editable from here\. Please delete this note when
finalizing the document\.
Sep 16, 2019 Page 27 of 27 | APPROVAL |
P000169 | Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No\. 4582
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
BURUNDI
FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 467-BU)
June 27, 1983
Eastern Africa Projects Department
Transportation Division I
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
I I
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BURUNDI
FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 467-BU)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No\.
Preface\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.
Key Project Data \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. ii
Highlights \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. iv
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
I\. INTRODUCTION\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 1
II\. PROJECT PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 2
III\. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COST \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 4
IV\. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 12
V\. FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 13
VI\. ECONOMIC REEVALUATION\. 14
VII\. THE ROLE OF IDA\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 15
VIII\. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNT\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 16
Tables
1\. Project Cost Estimates and Financing\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 18
2\. Maintenance Equipment \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 19
3\. Schedule of Disbursements \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 20
4\. Vehicle Operating Cost Estimates\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 22
MAP
| This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
I I A
PREFACE
The First Highway Project for Burundi (Credit 467-BU) for an
amount of US>') million was approved by the Board in March 1974\. The credit
was signed on March 27, 1974, and became effective on August 22, 1974, two
months later than expected\. The physical component of the project was
virtually completed in August 1978, except for the construction of an
office building which was not included in the original project\.
Construction of that building necessitated two, one-year extensions of the
Closing Date before it was completed by a contractor (para\. 3\.02)\.
The major components of the project consisted of (a) a four-year
road maintenance program; (b) consultants' services for technical
assistance to the Departement des Ponts et Chaussees (DPC) and training of
its personnel; and (c) refinancing of an earlier credit for preparatory
studies (Credit S11-BU)\.
Since the Credit Agreement dates from early 1974, it did not
include a covenant requiring the Government to submit a PCR\. This PCR
was prepared by the Eastern Africa Projects Department Highways Division
(since July 1982 Transportation Division I) in September 1981\.
Preparation of this PCR was a desk job, based on supervision
mission reports, appraisal reports of the First, Second and Third Highway
Projects, progress reports and Bank files\. No special mission was arranged
or considered necessary for its preparation\.
In accordance with the revised project performance audit reporting
procedures (1982), this PCR was read by the Operations Evaluation Department
(OED) but the project was not audited by OED staff\. The PCR was sent to the
Borrower for comments; however, none were received\.
I I I
- ii -
KEY PROJECT DATA
Item Appraisal Estimate Actual
Total Project Cost (US$million) 8\.4 8\.8
Overrun (%) - 5 a/
Credit Amount (US$million) 5 5
Disbursed 5
Repaid - -
Closing Date 12/31/78 12/31/80
Date Physical Components completed 09/78 09/80
Proportion completed by above date 85 100
Proportion time overrun (%) - 50
Economic Rate of Return (%) 13 )13 b/
OTHER PROJECT DATA
Item Original Plan Actual
First Mentioned in File 03/06/70 -
Negotiations 04/72 02/74
Board Approval 04/72 02/74
Credit Agreement Date 03/27/74
Effectiveness Date 06/27/74 08/22/74
Closing Date 12/31/78 -
First Revision Closing Date - 12/31/79
Second Revision Closing Date - 12/31/80
Borrower Republic of Burundi
Executing Agency Direction des Ponts et
Chauss6es, DPC
Fiscal Year Borrower January 1 - December 31
Follow-on Project Second Highway Project
03/78
Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements
(US$ million)
FY74 FY75 FY76 FY77 FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81
(i) Estimated 0\.4 1\.4 3\.2 4\.5 4\.9 5\.0 - -
(ii) Actual - 0\.3 0\.7 1\.5 3\.3 4\.0 4\.9 5\.07
% of (ii) to (i) - 21 22 33 67 80 - -
a/ Figure is somewhat misleading because project implemented deviated from
that appraised in that part of the materials, fuel, technical assistance
and training was financed under subsequent projects\.
b/ It was not feasible to calculate a re-evaluated rate of return for the
Project as there is no clear-cut separation of costs and benefits among
this and the two subsequent projects (para\. 6\.ul); however, indications
are that the rate of return is higher than the appraised 13% (para\. 6\.05)\.
I
-iii -
MISSION DATA
Month/ No\. of No\. of Man- Date of
Item Year Weeks Persons Weeks/C Report
Identificstion 03/701/ - - - -
Preparation )
Pre-appraisal) 10/71 3 3 9 04/71
Appraisal 07/73 - 2 -- 01/25/74
Supervision I 08/74 1 1 1 -
Supervision II 12/74 1 1 1 01/14/75
Supervision III 11/75 1 2 2 11/18/75
Supervision IV 01/76 1 2 2 04/08/76
Supervision V 06/76 1 1 1 07/14/76
Supervision VI 02/77 1\.5 2 3 04/06/77
Supervision VII 08/77 1 1 1 09/28/77
Supervision VIII 02/78 1 1 1 04/28/78
Supervision IX 09/78 1\.5 1 1\.5 10/27/782/
Supervision X 02/79 1 1 1 04/06/797/
Supervision XI 10/79 1\.5 2 3 12/20/79S/
Supervision XII 02/80 1\.5 1 3 05/09/80S/
Supervision XIII 07/80 1 1 1 4/
Supervision XIV 10/80 1 1 1
COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATE
Name of Currency Burundi Franc (FBu)
Appraisal Date July 1973 US$1\.00: FBu 78\.50
until March 1976 US$1\.00: FBu 78\.50
after March 1976 US$1\.00: FBu 90\.
l/ In the context of the preparation of engineering Credit
S11-BU dated 6/19/70\.
2/ After this date combined with supervision Credit 773-BU\.
3/ After this date combined with supervision Credit 773-BIT and
preparation Third Highway Project\.
4/ Incorporated in Appraisal Report Third Highway Project\.
I I I
I
- iv -
HIGHLIGHTS
The First Highway Project was intended as a first phase of an
eight-to-ten year program to establish a highway maintenance organization
capable of adequately maintaining Burundi's highway network (2\.02, 4\.01)\.
Nationals with sufficient education to take full advantage of the
training and technical assistance provided to the D6partement des Ponts et
Chauss6es (DPC) are scarce in Burundi\. As a result, appointments of
suitable counterparts to the staff of expatriate consultants was a
continuous problem during the implementation of the project (para\. 3\.09)\.
This made the task of the consultants difficult and often frustrating but
they performed quite satisfactorily (paras\. 3\.23-3\.25)\. Since DPC
recognizes that the shortage of domestic staff will continue for some time,
it readily accepts technical assistance\. As a result, additional technical
assistance was incorporated under the Second and Third Highway Projects and
subsequent progress in staffing and training has been reported (paras\.
4\.01, 4\.02)\. This implies that institution building, which was a major
goal of the First Highway Project, is being followed up\.
Another problem during implementation was the shortage of local
funds due to inadequate budgeting (para\. 3\.10)\. This led IDA to agree to
use funds under the Credit, initially intended for betterment works, for
the purchase of materials and fuel to be used in maintenance works (para\.
3\.10)\. The shortage of local funds was corrected in the follow up projects
when related covenants in the credit agreements for the Second and Third
Highway Projects were made more specific and stringent (para\. 3\.11)\.
An unforeseen problem arose when the Dar es Salaam refinery was
down for repairs and when war conditions in Uganda closed Burundi's major
external supply route via Mombasa, causing frequent shortages of fuel and
materials, particularly cement (para\. 3\.08)\.
Whereas the introduction of labor intensive maintenance
procedures was quite successful, the introduction of mechanized maintenance
brigades was less successful because of delays in deliveries of equipment
(paras\. 3\.03, 3\.07) and in training of operators (para\. 3\.15)\. Further, a
two-year delay resulted from IDA's initial resistance, later withdrawn, to
agree placing an order for trucks with the second lowest bidder which was
preferred by DPC (para\. 3\.16)\.
v -
The Government failed to comply with the Credit Agreement by
pressing DPC into using its organization to repair and maintain city
streets in Bujumbura\. To correct this, a covenant in Credit 773-BU for the
Second Highway Project requires setting up a separate department for
Bujumbura with its own budget, staff and equipment (para\. 3\.12)\.
The studies financed under the project formed the basis not only
for the Second and Third Highway Projects but also for funding of works by
the Kuwait Fund and the African Development Fund\.
The 5% cost overrun for the project was small but this is
somewhat misleading because the project as implemented deviated from that
appraised, in that part of the materials, fuel, technical assistance and
training was financed under the Second and Third Highway Projects (para\.
3\.22)\. As there is no clear-cut separation for costs and benefits among
the three projects, an economic re-evaluation of the First Highway Project
was not feasible (para\. 6\.01)\.
In summary, although implementation of the First Highway Project
met with a number of problems, some of which may have been foreseen (e\.g\.,
shortage of local funds and national counterparts), it constituted a
positive first step to strengthen the DPC\. DPC made serious efforts to
perform well and most problems were outside its control, some even outside
the control of the Government\. The fact that performance is improving
under two follow-on projects may lead to the conclusion that by and large
the teething problems of the initial project have been corrected and that
the project was successful\.
- 1 -
I\. INTRODUCTION
1\.01 The first Bank Group lending operation in Burundi was made in 1957
(Loan 165-BE, US84\.8 million), to the Belgian Trust Territory of Ruanda-TTrundi
for improving to paved standards the BRujumbura-Muramvya road; the project was
completed in 1959\. The second was in 1970 (Credit Sl1-BTJ, TTS8380,000) to assist
in financing detailed engineering of the Bujumbura-Nyanza Lac road plus a study
for the improvement of road maintenance\. This latter credit amount was later
included for refinancing under the First Highway Project (Credit 467-BTT, TTSS5
million, March 1974) which is the subject of this Project Completion Report\. 1/
1\.02 Burundi's topography is rugged, and the cost of road transport,
including that of road construction and maintenance, is high\. Since road
conditions are poor, the Bank Group's lending activities have consistently
focussed on reducing road transport costs through improvements of the country's
3,000 km classified roads and the maintenance thereof\. The total system is
about 5,500 km of which the 3,000 km classified network is administered by the
central Government and the remaining 2,500 km by local administrations and the
users\. The maximum east-west distance within the country is about 150 km and
north-south about 225 km\. In view of the above and the absence of navigable
rivers, road transport is the only internal economic transport mode, and
minimizing its cost is vital for the country's economy\.
1\.03 Volumes of external transport are low and unbalanced, the more so since
the main export is coffee and thus highly seasonal\. In the 1976-1978 period,
foreign trade amounted to about 110,000 tons of imports and 27,000 tons of
exports per annum\. External transport routes are either the most frequently
used southern lake/rail route via Kigoma to Dar es Salaam in Tanzania (1,428 km)
or the northern route via Rwanda through Kampala in Uganda to Mombasa in Kenya
(1,740 km by road or 1,925 km by road/rail)\. Because of the small volume of
traffic it generates, Burundi has virtually no leverage over neighboring
countries to improve transport conditions\.
1\.04 During the implementation period of this First Highway Project,
another credit was granted to Burundi (Credit 773-BIJ, USS14 million, February
1978) for the Second Highway Project\. In April 1981 the Board approved a Third
Highway Project\. Whereas the First Highway Project focussed exclusively on
improvements of maintenance operations and studies, the Second and Third Highway
Projects include also road construction and improvement works in addition to
continuing the maintenance activities begun under the First Highway Project\.
1/ The original title of this project was "Highway Maintenance Project" but
since subsequent road projects which include also a maintenance component,
are called Second and Third Highway Project, the title "Highway Maintenance
Project" was later unofficially changed to First Highway Project\.
- 2 -
II\. PROJECT PRRPARATION AND APPRAISAL
Preparation
2\.01 The preparation of the First Highway Project took a long time and met
with many difficulties\. In 1967-69 the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) financed a feasibility study for improvement of the road from the
country's capital, Bujumbura, to Kigoma in Tanzania, a railhead of the then East
African Railways by which a large share of Burundi's export-import traffic is
transported to and from the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam\. The Rank was the
executing agency for this study which was carried out by a German/French joint
venture of consulting firms\. It demonstrated that the volume of international
Burundi traffic was insufficient to warrant an improved road link in competition
with the established lake transport route between Bujumbura and Kigoma\. The
study did indicate, however, that improvement of Bujumbura-Nyanza Lac (121 km)
would be economically justified\.
Identification
2\.02 In view of that conclusion, the Association followed up the study with
Credit Sll-BU ITS$380,000, 1970) to help finance the detailed engineering of the
above road\. The credit also provided for a study on how to improve the
maintenance of Burundi's highway network, the priority of which was established
during IDA's appraisal of Credit Sll-BU\. The maintenance study was carried out
by the German partner of the above joint venture\.
Preappraisal
2\.03 On the basis of the findings in October 1971 of the above studies, an
IDA mission appraised a project consisting of: (a) construction to bituminous
paved standards of the Bujumbura-Mutambara road section; (b) improvement to
gravel standards of the Mutambara-Nyanza Lac road section; and (c) a four-year
highway maintenance program as a first phase of a longer-term (eight to ten
years) maintenance program\. A US$8\.9 million Credit was negotiated in April
1972 for the above project\. However, in May 1972 political disturbances eruDted
and Board presentation was deferred\.
2\.04 In late 1972 the Government proposed changing the specifications of
the contract for the Bujumbura-Nyanza Lac road to render the work more labor
intensive so as to expedite resettlement of the population in the
Bujumbura-Nyanza Lac region, depopulated during the above disturbances\.
Consultants who were retained to study the feasibility of this concluded in an
April 1973 report that labor, if available, could be substituted for equipment
for some operations\. However, they also concluded that execution of the works
to the original specifications was no longer justified because traffic was about
half the 1971 level as a result of the depopulation of the region\.
2\.05 A subsequent FAO study carried out in April 1973 concluded further
that it would take about five years for production in the abandoned region to
return to the 1971 level\. IDA therefore proposed to the Government to finance
only limited improvement of the Bujumbura-Nyanza Lac road and to defer paving of
the Bujumbura-Mutambara road section until justified by increased traffic
volumes\. However, the Government later decided to seek other financing for the
full reconstruction of the above road and to limit IDA financing to a highway
maintenance project plus preinvestment studies\.
-3-
Appraisal
2\.06 Accordingly, a more modest project was conceived and appraised in July
1973\. The total cost of the project was estimated at UTS$8\.4 million of which
about US$7\.2 million was the foreign currency component (Table 1)\. The project
costs were to be shared by the Association, ITJNT)P, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Belgium and Burundi (for the amounts see para\. 2\.11)\. Negotiations
were held in February 1974 and a US$5 million Credit was signed in March 1974\.
Of the US$5 million IDA credit, UTS$4\.82 million, or 96%, was to be for foreign
costs and the remaining US$180,000 would be local; the Credit included the
refinancing of Credit Sll-BU for preparatory studies (para\. 1\.01)\.
2\.07 Thus, the highway maintenance project for which Credit 467-BIJ was made
in March 1974, was part of an initially larger project, identified some five
years earlier as a result of a 1967-1969 TIJNDP study, and of subsequent
feasibility and detailed engineering studies undertaken in 1970 and updated in
1973\.
The Project
2\.08 The project consisted of the following:
(a) a four-year highway maintenance program, including
(i) technical assistance to the Department of Roads and Bridges
(Departement des Ponts et Chaussees, DPC) including the training
of DPC personnel at all levels;
(ii) procurement of maintenance, workshop and training equipment,
spare parts, fuel and materials; and
(iii) the construction of a mechanical workshop and storeroom at
Bujumbura and a small maintenance depot at Gitega;
(b) consultants' services for:
(i) the preparation of a master plan for road development;
(ii) feasibility study and detailed engineering of the
Ngozi-Muyinga-Kobero road (106 km) and of other roads to be
identified under (i) above; and
(iii) updating the consultants' report financed by Credit Sll-BTU for
preparing the project:
(c) refinancing Credit Sll-BU\.
2\.09 The DPC within the Ministry of Public Works was responsible for
execution of the project, assisted by the experts financed by UNDP, German and
Belgian financial aid and the Credit\.
-4-
Estimated Cost of the Project
2\.10 The estimated cost of the project and IDA's contribution is shown in
Table 1 and summarized below:
IDA
Local Foreign Total Foreign Contribution
---- S-- IT St 000
--___\._
(a) Highway Maintenance
Program, including
technical assistance 966 5,500 6,474 85 3,200
(b) Studies 112 890 1,002 89 890
(c) Contingencies 117 807 924 87 810
1,195 7,205 8,400 $36 5,000
2\.11 The cost sharing referred to in para 2\.06 was to be as follows:
% of
Local Foreign Total Total
-------IJS$ million-----
IDA 0\.18 4\.82 5\.00 60
Federal Republic of Germany 0\.00 1\.33 1\.33 16
UNDP 0\.00 1\.05 1\.05 12
Belgium 0\.40 0\.00 0\.40 5
Burundi 0\.62 0\.00 0\.62 7
1\.20 7\.20 8\.40 100
In addition to the above the Government undertook to allocate in its current
budgets the funds needed for the road maintenance operations\.
Disbursements
2\.12 The Credit became effective two months later than expected, on August
22, allowing immediate disbursement of US$302,000 for the refinancing of funds
actually disbursed under Credit Sll-BTJ\. Disbursements for the four-year program
were scheduled to be completed by September 1978 and the initial Closing Date
was set at December 31, 1978 (Table 3)\.
III\. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COST
General
3\.01 The project was completed in September 1980, 27 months later than
originally scheduled, and the Closing Date was extended twice, first to December
31, 1979 and again to December 31, 1980\. The Credit was fully d[sbursed by the
end of 1980\.
3\.02 The project item that caused 27-month delay was the construction of
an office building which was not included in the original project (para\. 3\.18)\.
Other project components were either completed within the scheduled four years,
or their continuation was incorporated into the Second Highway Project when
funds of the First Highway Project were exhausted\. Other causes for delays in
the course of implementing the project were:
- 5-
(a) delay in procurement of equipment;
(b) shortages of fuel and materials, particularly cement: and
(c) lack of suitable counterparts for the expatriate experts, and frequent
changes of those employed, resulting in loss of continuity and waste
of training efforts\.
3\.03 As to achieving the goal of the project, it was successful in
improving manual road maintenance but less so in introducing mechanized brigades
for betterments and periodic maintenance because of the delay in delivery of
equipment and training of local staff\. This Dart of the project was later
continued by incorporating it into the Second and Third Highway Projects\.
Another factor which adversely affected the success of the project was the use
of scarce physical, human and financial resources on the streets of Bujumbura,
rather than on the inter-urban network which was the primary purpose of the
project\.
Road Maintenance Program
3\.04 This part of the project may be divided into four categories:
(a) technical assistance to DPC and training of its staff;
(b) road maintenance equipment and spare parts;
(c) materials and fuel; and
(d) construction of workshops and depots\.
Technical Assistance
3\.05 The technical assistance and training category consisted of the
following:
(a) four mechanical experts provided under a German technical assistance
arrangement already in force since 1968 and renewed in 1972\.
(b) six road maintenance experts, financed by TJNDP, provided as of October
1974 by a consulting firm under contract with the Association as the
executing agency for TJNDP; and
(c) three training experts for the School of Public Works in Bujumbura and
the DPC training center of Gitega provided by consultants under
contract since October 1978 and financed by the IDA Credit and the
Project Preparation Facility for the Third Highway Project\.
3\.06 The German experts, who operated the central workshop in Bujumbura,
maintained existing equipment and checked and accepted on behalf of the
Government the IDA-financed new equipment when it arrived\.
-6-
3\.07 The six experts to assist in the maintenance operations were: one
engineer-head of mission, advisor to the Director of the Department of Roads and
Bridges; one accountant; one head of stores; two work supervisors and one
mechanical inspector\. The function of mechanical inspector was later eliminated
when it appeared to overlap and interfere with the German technical assistance
team\. That vacancy was filled in 1977 by an expert in maintenai\.ce and repair
of structures\. The team concentrated in the first instance on reorganization
and strengthening the cantonnage system for manual road maintenance operations
focussing first on improving the worst sections of the most important 1,400 km
of the 3,000 km classified network\. These manual maintenance activities were
quite successful in that they contributed to bringing about considerable
improvement of road conditions\.
3\.08 Technical assistance was, however, adversely affected by the following
problems:
(a) lack of suitable counterparts and lack of continuity since several of
those who were trained either left the Government, e\.g\. to continue
their studies abroad, or were transfered to other Government agencies;
(b) continuous shortage of local funds to cover payroll and nurchase of
fuel, parts and materials, since the Government did not (and possibly
could not) live-up to the standard credit covenant that it would
"provide, promptly as needed, the funds\., etc";
(c) lack of fuel, first during the global shortage in 1975, and again in
1977 when the refinery in Dar es Salaam was down for repairs and the
country's alternative supply route from Mombasa via Kampala was cut
off because of the Tanzania-Uganda war;
(d) lack of and slow deliveries of imported materials (cement) and parts;
(e) pressures to get involved in other than project-related activities;
(f) pressure to improve city streets in Bujumbura, rather than inter-urban
roads; and
(g) discipline problems with drivers, operators and foremen who did
not like to work out in the field, away from home and families, under
poor living conditions with respect to lodging and food supply\.
In addition, it was intended that mechanized brigades be used to assist manual
operations by levelling and regravelling road surfaces and improving drainage\.
This part of the maintenance operations was seriously delayed by problems in
procuring 25 tipping trucks, 2 tank trucks and a mobile workshop (paras
3\.15-3\.16)\.
Counterparts Problem
3\.09 This problem is a normal one to be expected in any developing country
that became independent only recently and faces a serious shortage of an
educated middle class\. However, what was not normal was that salaries were
higher not only in private business but also in other Government agencies than
those in DPC\. The Government later introduced a bonding system for staff
-7-
trained through Government financing, but only when the shortage of educated
local staff gradually eased as a result of the training program under the
project, and under the Second Highway Project, did the availability of
counterparts become more stable\.
The Local Funds Problem
3\.10 Unfortunately, at the time of Credit negotiations no specific amounts
for annual recurrent budget allocations were agreed upon\. The problem was
partly solved through:
(a) contributions from Belgian aid;
(b) transfers from the National Road Fund which, although in principle to
be used for investments only, was amended in 1973 to permit its use
for recurrent expenditure if and when needled;
(c) using IDA funds for day-to-day purchases of fuels, spares and
materials for routine maintenance, rather than as was intended, for
betterment works to be carried out by mechanised brigades\.
3\.11 Notwithstanding the routine covenant in Loan/Credit agreements that
the Government will provide promptly the funds needed for the nroject, shortage
of local funds for recurrent expenditures has been the rule rather than the
exception for Bank Group-financed road maintenance projects\. In the case of
Burundi in 1974, only 1\.3% of the national recurrent budget or TTS8O\.65 million
equivalent, was earmarked for road maintenance; in 1975 the amount was even
lower, US$0\.6 million equivalent\. The Ministers of Public Works and Finance
were informed that compared with other countries, this was a very low
percentage\. A covenant in Credit 773-BU for the Second Highway Project requires
the Government to allocate at least $2\.5 million equivalent annually for road
maintenance, to be adjusted annually after consultations with the Association\.
Government's performance in this regard has so far been satisfactory\. During
negotiations for the Third Highway Project, an amount of US$3 million was agreed
upon with the possibility of adjustment\.
Other maintenance Program Problems
3\.12 The use of the experts for other than project-related work was
discontinued after the Association pointed out to the Minister that such
practices reduced the effectiveness of the experts\. Tising the maintenance
program resources for urban street improvements rather than for inter-urban
roads was gradually discontinued as a result of a covenant in Credit 773-WTT made
in 1978 for the Second Highway Project which required that street maintenance in
Bujumbura be made the responsihility of a separate township department with its
own budget, staff and equipment\.
3\.13 Whereas maximizing labor intensive methods for road construction and
maintenance in developing countries looks logical from the point of view of
savings in foreign currencies, it also creates problems\. From a technical point
of view the quality of the works is usually lower since manual construction
methods cannot attain the same compaction of base and subbase materials as heavy
equipment moving over the roadbed during construction\. From an execution and
managerial standpoint, there are the problems of transporting large numbers of
-8-
workers to and from constantly moving work sites and lodging and feeding them\.
These were not encountered in Burundi except in a region, depopulated as a
result of the May 1972 upheavals, which Government wished to repopulate through
maximizing labor-intensive maintenance methods arid, where discipline problems
through excessivr absence were experienced\. Only after introduction of
bonusses, improved lodging and special food arrangements, was the discipline
problem gradually reduced\.
Training
3\.14 This part of the project may be divided into two parts: (a)
on-the-job training provided through technical assistance; and (b) theoretical
training within the Ministry of Public Works\. After a study of training needs
(para\. 3\.20), it was decided that three experts would be needed for training
mid-level and technical local supervisors, foremen, and equipment operators\.
The courses for mid-level technicians were to be given at the School of Public
Works in Bujumbura and the others in the DPC training center in Gitega\.
However, the signing of the training contract was seriously delayed and the
experts did not arrive until October/November 1973, just before the initial
Closing Date of the project\. It was therefore decided to continue the training
program under the Second and Third Highway Projects\.
Procurement of Equipment
3\.15 Table 2 shows the list of equipment intended to be procured at the
time of appraisal and the reduced equipment list eventually procured under the
IDA credit\. The reason for the reduction was threefold: (a) price increases
after the mid-1973 appraisal; (b) some equipment was in the meantime purchased
in the UK with local financing; and (c) it became clear that not all equipment
could be efficiently used because of delays in training supervisors, foremen,
mechanics and operators\.
3\.16 Whereas procurement of the major part of equipment did not pose any
particular problems, completion of this component was delayed two years as a
result of an issue which arose in connection with the bidding procedure for 25
tipper trucks and three utility trucks (two tank trucks and one mobile workshop
truck)\. The original low bid submitted on March 23, 1975 was from Metalusa, the
local representative of Leyland (IJK), with a price about 23% below that of EMC,
the local representative of Mercedes Benz\. After taking account of various
evaluation factors, however, the difference was reduced to 16%\. Recause Leyland
did not have an established after-sale service in Burundi and EMC which offered
Mercedes Benz did, the Government was very much in favor of awarding the
contract to the Mercedes dealer\. But because of the large price difference, IDA
objected\. When another reevaluation of the bids still showed Leyland to have an
advantage of some 7%, the Government decided and the Association agreed to ask
for new bids on the basis of changed bidding documents whereby separate offers
were to be submitted for the imported chassis and for the bodies which could be
manufactured domestically\. In addition, the number was increased to 43 trucks\.
When bids were opened on February 18, 1977, the Leyland offer was again lower,
and the firm guaranteed after-sale service\. Since some 250 Mercedes Benz trucks
were already operating in Burundi, including 10 for the Ministry of Works, and
no Leyland trucks, the Government again asked IDA to approve placing the order
with EMC for Mercedes Benz trucks\. After another review of the many evaluation
factors and on the basis of internal memoranda, IDA staff concluded that the
-9-
price difference was still 2% in favor of Leyland\. However, in view of the
Government's strong preference for Mercedes and the non-quantified advantages of
standardization and after-sale service, IDA finally decided in mid-1977 to
withdraw its objection to the award of contract for Mercedes Benz equipment\. In
the meantime, some twenty-eight months had elapsed since the first bids were
opened in February 1975, resulting in some two years' delay in the delivery of
the trucks which finally took place between May and October 1978\. Ironically,
shortly after the equipment arrived, it could not be used because of a fuel
shortage resulting from the refinery in Dar es Salaam being down for repairs\.
Materials and Fuel
3\.17 While in principle day-to-day expenditures for fuel, supplies and
materials for routine road maintenance are a recurrent cost to be paid from the
country's recurrent budget, in this case an amount of JJS$862,000 (TUS$690,nOO
foreign) was included in the project cost to take account of the fact that part
of heavy maintenance to be carried out by mechanized brigades was in fact
betterment\. Because of local currency shortages in the early years, the IDA
funds earmarked for this project component had been spent at the time the
equipment finally arrived but were included in the Second Highway Project (para
3\.10 [c])\.
Construction of Workshop Annex, Maintenance Depot and Office Building
3\.18 Because of the time that elapsed between reappraisal of the project in
mid-1973 and the signing of the Credit in March 1974, the construction of the
workshop annex and depot in Bujumbura was virtually completed under German
technical assistance\. Therefore, the Association agreed to the Government's
request to use US$120,000 of the US$150,000 allocated for this component for the
foreign cost of the renovation and extension of the DPC building in Bujumbura,
and the remaining US$30,000 for improvements to an old school for the training
center in Gitega\. The Government proposed to carry out the construction by
force account\. Since this would save foreign currency and DPC had successfully
carried out some force account construction work in the past, the Association
agreed\. With hindsight, this was unfortunate since the completion of the office
building, originally not a component of the project was the cause of a two-year
delay in the completion of the project\.
3\.19 Initially, the work was faced with a shortage of cement as a result of
the building boom in Burundi in the earlier years cf project implementation\.
Subsequently progress was adversely affected by the lack of a qualified
supervisor\. Finally, it was decided in July 1979 to have the work completed by
a contractor, selected after local competitive bidding\. Only two bids were
received and with the Association's approval, the contract was awarded to the
low bidder, a local contractor, for an amount of FBu 12,118,640 (UTS$112,400
equivalent)\. Because of a shortage of funds, payment of the contract was spread
over 1979 (FBu 7,103,090) and 1980 (FBu 2,925,550)\. However, the contractor was
also faced with a shortage of cement, and the building was finally
satisfactorily completed in September 1980, about three months behind the
contract schedule\.
-10
Studies
3\.20 The initial three-month study to define the training needs was
completed in February 1975\. After extensive comments from IDA's training
specialist and discussions with Government, the study formed the Basis for a
contract for training courses which did not start until November 1978\. The
delay was caused by slow bureaucratic procedures\.
3\.21 The study by the US-French joint venture for an overall road plan, the
feasibility study for the Ngozi-Muyinga-Kobero road, and the updating of the
feasibility studies for the Bujumbura-Cibitoke-Rugombo and the Bujumbura-
Mutambara roads started in early 1976\. The early results, identifying the road
sections for which further feasibility studies and detailed engineering appeared
justified, were available in mid-1976\. The outcome of the studies formed the
basis for the Second Highway Project financed under Credit 773-BIT, signed in
March 1978\. The study of the Ngozi-Muyinga-Kobero road resulted in its
in,clusion under the Third Highway Project\. The updating of the Bujumbura-
Mutambara road study resulted in its financing by the Kuwait Fund and the
African Development Fund\.
Project Cost
3\.22 The total cost of the project increased from the 1973 appraisal
estimate of US$8\.4 million equivalent to US$8\.8 million equivalent at
completion\. Considering inflation over the 1974-1980 period, such a small
increase would seem quite satisfactory\. However, as shown by Tables I and 2,
the increased amount is not for the same project composition, and the financing
of the technical assistance and training was continued under Credit 773-RTT and a
Project Preparation Facility when the funds of Credit 467-BU were exhausted\.
The main project changes are:
(a) Notwithstanding higher equipment prices which would have increased the
estimated cost by some 70% (Table 2), the total amount for equipment
and spare parts is about the same as the US$2\.4 million (including 12%
price contingency) estimated at appraisal\. This resulted from a
sizeable reduction in the equipment procured, because: (i) some
equipment was procured in the UK and financed from local sources; and
(ii) it was recognized already at an early stage that local funds in
the recurrent budget were insufficient to operate all equipment
originally intended to be procured\.
(b) The amounts allocated for technical assistance services over a
four-year period, financed by a UNDP grant, would have been exhausted
around mid-1977; therefore, UNDP was asked to increase its
contribution by US$1 million, and US$300,000 of InA funds were used to
cover the Government's cost sharing obligation under the UNDP
arrangement\. The continuation of the technical assistance contract is
being financed through Credit 773-BTT under which IDA contributes US$2
million for this contract\.
(c) The training contract financed by IDA did not start until October
1978, 18 months later than intended\. When it became obvious that the
contract would have to be extended by 14 months if it were to achieve
its goal, it was first envisaged to finance the additional cost,
US$300,000, from the unallocated funds of Credit 773-BUT\. However,
-11
when it became clear that costs of the Second Highway Project would be
higher than anticipated and that all unallocated funds of that credit
would be needed for its completion, it was decided that when funds of
Credit 467-BU were exhausted, the additional cost of the training
contract would be paid from a US$1 million Project Preparation
Facility for the preparation of the Third Highway Project\. This
arrangement was approved in March 1980\.
(d) Funds intended for fuel and materials for betterment works were
largely used for routine maintenance (para 3\.17)\.
Performance of Consultants
3\.23 A Belgian consulting firm was responsible for technical assistance to
DPC for the routine and periodic maintenance of the road network\. In
performing this task, the experts carried out on-the-job training of their
counterparts and of local staff for jobs such as overseers and foremen\. The
performance of the firm as a whole was quite satisfactory\. In particular, their
preparation and timely submission of quarterly progress reports was very good\.
3\.24 The consultants' task was often quite frustrating because of the
problems mentioned in para 3\.08\. That both the Government and the Association
were satisfied with their performance is demonstrated by the fact that their
contract has been continued under the Second Highway Project and is expected to
be extended under the Third Highway Project\.
3\.25 A US-French joint venture was responsible for preparation of a
1978-1987 road investment program, of the feasibility study for the
Ngozi-Muyinga-Kobero road and for updating the feasibility study of the
Bujumbura-Mutambara and the Bujumbura-Cibitoke-Rugombo road\. The performance of
this joint venture was satisfactory, and two of their studies mentioned above
formed the basis for the Second and Third Highway Projects\. The
Bujumbura-Mutambara road was financed jointly by the ADF and the Kuwait Fund and
completed in January 1981\.
3\.26 The training consultants started their activities only a few months
before the original closing date of the project, for reasons given in
para 3\.22 [c]\. They were responsible for reorganizing the School of Public
Works in Bujumbura and for teaching there and for training maintenance personnel
through short-term courses at the training center in Gitega\. Training of
qualified local staff was slower than expected because of lack of adequate
applicants\. Their services have been satisfactory, and their contract is
expected to be extended under the Third Highway Project\.
Performance of Contractors
3\.27 Only one local contractor was involved in the project\. He was awarded
the contract to complete renovation and extension of the TPC office building in
Bujumbura (para 3\.19)\. The quality of the work was satisfactory, and the
three-month delay in completion may be blamed on the shortage of cement in
Burundi in late 1979 and early 1980\.
-12
Performance of Suppliers
3\.28 Except for the bidding issue discussed in paras 3\.15 and 3\.16, the
supply of equipment did not give rise to particular problems\. Ironically, when
finally after t'\.> two-year delay the Association gave its no objection to the
award for 40 tippers and three other vehicles to Mercedes Benz, another problem
arose after delivery of the vehicles\. It appeared that the suspension system
failed on many trucks, either because of unusually bad road conditions, poor
driving habits, and/or a structural weakness\. In any event, because by then
some 300 trucks (largely for the military services) had to be serviced and
repaired by the Mercedes dealer, it took a rather long time before the failing
DPC trucks were repaired\.
3\.29 Another supply problem resulted from the long time (up to 18 months)
which elapsed between the order and delivery of parts\. Not only did these
excessive delivery times adversely affect operations; after ordering, prices and
transport costs increased considerably because of inflation necessitating a
re-order\. The delays were partly due to the inefficient operations in the port
of Dar es Salaam and on the Tanzania railway\. Also pilferage on that route was
excessive\.
Disbursements
3\.30 Because of the delay of two years in the overall completion of the
project, disbursements were delayed (Table 3)\. However, the delay resulted from
only a small part of the project\. At the time of the original Closing Date,
December 31, 1978, about 75% of the Credit had been disbursed and all but 7%
committed; at the time of the first extended Closing Date, December 31, 1979,
92% had been disbursed and all funds committed\.
IV\. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
4\.01 It is not possible to separate the contribution to institution
building made by each of the two highway projects financed by IDA in 1974 and
1978, but there is no doubt that the most difficult first step was made under
the First Highway Project financed by Credit 467-BIJ\. Notwithstanding the
problems and delays encountered during the implementation, it succeeded in its
goal of beginning to reorganize and strengthen the DPC which, with continued
use of technical assistance, is responsible for implementation of the Second and
Third Highway Projects\. The fact that the management of DPC and its successor,
DGR (Direction Generale des Routes) have consistently recognized the need for,
and continue to accept expatriate assistance and training from the same
consultants and German expertise during the implementation of the Second and
Third Highway Projects illustrates that for DPC, and subsequently DGR, quality
of performance and institution building are very imnortant\. It also
demonstrates that not only the consultants' experts have performed well but also
the Ministry of Works and the DPC (later DGR) have been taking advantage of the
technical assistance to strengthen their institution and to gradually reduce the
shortage of qualified nationals at all levels\.
4\.02 The above is illustrated by a few quotations from the Appraisal Report
of the Third Highway Project:
-13
The situation for mid-level and technical positions is
improving considerably\.and it is expected that with the
expansion of the training program\.the Public Works School
would eventually be able to provide 10 to 12 graduates per
year\. This should be sufficient to fill estimated staffing
requirements for the next ten years\.
And further,
It is expected that upon completion of the (Third Highway)
Project in 1984 the training center at Gitega will be able
to provide a total of 15 equipment operators, 30 overseers
and 60 foremen per year \. sufficient to fill DGR's
staffing requirements at least during the next ten years\.
V\. FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT TO THE PROJECT
5\.01 Whereas the performance of the Ministry of Works and DPC was
satisfactory with respect to institutional development, the same cannot be said
of the financial performance of the Government during the implementation of the
First Highway Project\. At negotiations, an understanding was reached that at
least US$1 million per year from the current budget would be allocated for road
maintenance\. However, the relevant covenant (section 4\.02) in the Credit
Agreement does not mention a specific figure and is limited to the standard
clause that the Government "will provide, promptly as needed, the funds,
etc\.
5\.02 The financial performance is outside the control of the agency
responsible for the implementation of the project; DPC, which annually submitted
detailed proposals for budget allocations, received only a fraction of what it
needed\. Instead of the US$1 million mentioned above, in 1974 the allocation was
only US$640,000, and in 1975 US$600,000 equivalent\. It was frequently pointed
out to the Government that compared with other African countries, Burundi's
budget allocation for road maintenance was an extremely low percentage of the
national budget (some 1\.3 to 1\.5%) but it was not until the Second Highway
Project was appraised and Credit 773-BU negotiated in 1978 that the annual
allocation was increased to IJS$2\.5 million equivalent, with the understanding
that future allocations would be determined after discussion with the
Association\.
5\.03 The shortfall in local funds was covered by contributions from the
National Road Fund (not intended for routine maintenance but amended to allow
its use for that purpose if needed), from the sub-category in the IDA Credit for
fuels and materials (also not intended for day-to-day operations, see para
3\.17), and from Belgian aid\. THowever, the shortfall would have been greater if
delivery of equipment had not been delayed, postponing the need for funds for
operating the mechanized brigade\.
5\.04 It may be said, however, that the Government eventuallv recognized the
need for larger budget allocations as indicated by allocating at least US$2\.5
million after 1978\. Funds provided under the maintenance budget are now
adequate\. At the time of credit negotiations of the Third Highway Project, the
Government undertook to allocate US$13\.7 million between mid-1981 and mid-1984
to meet the recurrent cost of road maintenance\.
-14
VI\. ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION
6\.01 A highway maintenance project is actually a slice in ti- of a
continuous program\. Therefore, cost overruns and delays in attaining the
expected benefits of the First Highway Project have been partly camouflaged by
the continuation of the maintenance program as part of the subsequent Second
Highway Project which includes, besides construction and betterment of specific
road sections, continuing components of the First HRighway Project\. For example,
the work by the mechanized maintenance brigade and training activities were
eventually financed from subsequent credits when the funds of Credit 467-BIT ran
out\. Therefore, it is virtually impossible to clearly separate and quantify the
benefits resulting from the First THighway Project from those of the same
components continued under the subsequent credit\.
6\.02 By the same token, as mentioned in para 3\.22, the modest 5% increase
in the cost of the project is misleading since a considerable number of delayed
project components were financed from subsequent sources after the funds of
Credit 467-BU had been exhausted\. Moreover, more than half of the cost of the
project is for technical assistance and studies, the benefits of which do not
lend themselves for quantifying\.
6\.03 Finally, whatever traffic counts existed at the time of appraisal in
1973 were very unreliable\. In 1976, more detailed traffic counts were taken as
part of the highway study\. But since then only a few selective traffic counts
have been carried out in the context of feasibility studies for specific roads\.
6\.04 In Table 4, a comparison is shown of the vehicle operating cost
assumed at the time of project appraisal in mid--1973 and those assumed at the
time of the appraisal of the Second and Third Highway Projects in mid-1977 and
mid-1980 respectively\. As may be seen, vehicle operating costs in Burundi
francs in 1977 were some three times and those in 1980 some five to seven times
those assumed in 1973\. Obviously, at the time of appraisal, it could not have
been foreseen that inflation would cause vehicle operating costs to increase
five to seven times by 1980\. Moreover, whereas under the Fist Highway Project
heavy maintenance was to focus on the worst sections of only 1,400 km of the
3,000 km classified network, in subsequent years improvements spread gradually
to a larger share of the road system\.
6\.05 In view of the above it is not feasible to re-calculate the economic
return of the First Highway Project on the same basis and under the same
assumptions as was done at the time of appraisal\. However, there are
indications which show that the economic return must be considerably higher than
the 13% calculated in the 1973 report:
(i) the vehicle fleet grew by an average of 10\.2% per annum between 1974
and 1978; this compares with an average growth of 9% over the years
1968-1973 and an assumed 7% traffic growth used as the basis of the
1973 calculation;and
(ii) the fact that vehicle operating costs in 1980 were some five to seven
times those assumed in 1973 means that also the savings in these
operating costs must be much higher by a similar order of magnitude
than was assumed for the calculation of the ER of 13% in 1973\.
-15
VII\. THE ROLE OF IDA
7\.01 As is the usual practice, goals were set higher and the time schedule
to achieve them was set tighter than could realistically be exDected\. For road
construction projects the design, execution and supervision are usually made the
responsibility of experienced consultants and contractors, causing relatively
little burden on the responsible Government agency\. Highway maintenance
projects, however, are largely carried out by force account which puts a much
heavier burden on the highway agencies even when expert technical asistance is
provided\. They require good organization and managerial skills to run an
operation which involves thousands of employees, and procuring, maintaining and
supplying equipment fleets spread over large areas\. In addition, extensive
practical and theoretical training of large numbers of staff and workers on all
levels is needed\. Experience shows the major problems to be financing and
manpower\.
7\.02 IDA's experience with Burundi's First Highway (Maintenance) Project
confirms the above: not all goals were achieved within the original time
schedule for its completion\. However, the project gave an important initial
push to the strengthening of DPC and its manual maintenance operations which was
continued under the Second Highway Project\. In addlition, the Association helped
make the Government aware of the importance of highway maintenance and the need
to substantially increase the funds allocated to this endeavor\.
7\.03 The 1967-1969 UNDP-financed overall highway survey was not needed as
preparation of the project to identify possible ways of reducing transportation
cost by improved maintenance of the existing road network\. A maintenance
project could have been started much earlier, without waiting for the
identification, feasibility and engineering studies of specific road
construction projects\.
7\.04 With road conditions as poor as those prevailing in Burundi in the
late 1960's, routine maintenance is not feasible without spot improvements such
as raising embankments, improving drainage, fixing bridges, and adding gravel
where needed\. Since pre-engineering for that type of work would be too costly
and too time-consuming, decisions as to what improvements are needed and where
must be taken on the spot by experienced roadwork supervisors as work
progresses\. Such betterment works are most efficiently carried out by
self-contained mechanized brigades, as was intended but hardly begun in the case
of the Burundi First Highway Project\.
7\.05 Procuring equipment, organizing its maintenance and timely supply of
parts, fuels and materials, and of training of staff and workers is a complex
and time consuming task\. In view thereof, consideration should be given to
include in maintenance projects such as that for Burundi a lump sum for
financing of both foreign and local cost of betterment works, under a
construction management-type contract with a foreign firm\. The firm would be
responsible for equipping and managing the operation of the mechanized
brigades\. The lump sum could be a line of credit, to be used in consultation
with supervising consultants and Bank/IDA staff, and based on a cost plus
formula to be negotiated with the management firm\. In case of bilateral donors,
it may be possible to initially carry out betterment works as turn-key projects,
-16
gradually turning over both equipment and responsibilil:ies to the highway
department\. The 100% financing arrangement would make it possible for
contractors to import everything that is not locally available, be it equipment,
parts, supplies, key personnel, and even skilled labor from more advanced
neighboring court ries to the extent needed\. Training of local staff and works
would proceed concurrently\.
7\.06 An issue in which IDA has played an important role but which caused
two years delay is the bidding procedure for tracks described in paras 3\.15 and
3\.16\. This is another example in which IDA is caught between satisfying
its guidelines based on economy, equity and efficiency on one hand and on the
other, accepting understandable preferences of a borrower for standardization by
procuring equipment with which it is familiar and is offered by a dealer which
has long established after-sale service in the country\.
7\.07 Supervision of the project was adequate, with at least two missions
per year\. Except for the last year, these were carried out by the same staff
assuring good continuity\. Moreover, supervision was further supported by the
elaborate quarterly progress reports of the technical assistance consultants\.
With hindsight, it would have been better if IDA had objected to the
construction of the office building by force account\. ITDA's close supervision
has certainly contributed to institution building of the DPC\.
7\.08 Notwithstanding the comments made as to the delays in the preparation
of the project and the procurement of trucks, ITDA's role has been satisfactory,
and quite positive where it resulted in two follow-up IDA credits in amounts
respectively of US$14 and US$25 million for road projects costing respectivelv
US$26\.5 and US$32\.1 million\.
VIII\. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNT
8\.01 On the balance, the project was satisfactorily completed; it provided
the basis for two subsequent highway projects\.
8\.02 The need to extend the Closing Date with two years largely resulted
from one minor construction job for an office building that was not included in
the original project\. At the time of the original Closing Date 75% of the
Credit was disbursed and 93% committed\.
8\.03 The cost overrun cannot be accurately established since (a)
procurement of equipment was for a reduced number of items; and (b) continuation
of technical assistance and training was financed from a subsequent UNOP grant
and IDA credits for the Second and Third Highway Projects\.
8\.04 A large share of the credit was for technical assistance and training
of which economic benefits cannot be quantified\. This, plus the lack of traffic
data makes it impossible to recalculate the economic return of t:he project\.
However, because of the much larger than average increase in vehicle operating
costs after the appraisal of the project, there need be no doubt that vehicle
operating costs savings resulting from better road maintenance will be much
higher than those assumed at the time of appraisal\.
-17
8\.05 Under this project, the most positive achievements were attained in
the field of manual road maintenance and this success can mainly be ascribed to
the following favorable conditions in Burundi:
(i) in general there was no problem of availability of manual labor for
maintenance\. Because of the scattered settlement pattern and a
general lack of job opportunities in the rural areas, laborers could
be found relatively easily;
(ii) because of the size of the country and the limted extent of the
network under maintenance, continuous and close supervision of
operations was possible;
(iii) both the Government and the technical assistance gave the manual
activities the proper recognition and professionalism they
deserved\. This is evidenced by the fact that a training center for
"cantonniers" was established in Gitege\. It can also be noted that
due to the delays in the delivery of the mechanized maintenance
equipment, the technical assistance could, during the start-up phase
of its assignment, concentrate most of its attention on organizing
the manual road maintenance\.
8\.06 Although significant results were achieved in institution building
during the early years of project implementation, continuous difficulties in
recruiting and retaining qualified counterparts, particularly in the
administrative field, were encountered\. This points to the need to address this
problem and to design appropriate solutions before the start-up of the project
which has institution building as one of its main objectives\.
8\.07 During the course of the project, the Government has become much
more aware of the benefits of improved road maintenance\. This is illustrated by
the fact that budget allocations at the end of the project amount to several
times those at the time of project appraisal\. This very encouraging development
is primarily the result of a continuous dialogue with Government on the subject
and the visible achievements attained early on from the maintenance operations\.
September 1981
BU RUNDI
FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 467-BU)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Project Cost Estimates and Financing
Revised Revised Appraisal
Estimates Estimates Estimates Revised
Appraisal Appraisal Revised IDA Estimates1/
Item Estimates Quantities Quantities Contribution May 1980
---------US$ '000 ------ US$ 000
A\. Highway Maintenance Program
(i) German Technical Assistance (GTA) 1,200 1,200 1,200 - -
(ii) UNDP Technical Assistance 1,322 1,700 1,7002/ -
(iii) Training Expert (s) 365 550 570 300 530
(iv) Equipment and Spare parts 2,150 3,600 2,500 2,000 2,353
(v) Materials and fuel 862 1,120 1,245 750 750
(vi) Workshop construction and equipment (GTA) 403 480 480 H
(vii) Workshop annex and depot construction 172 200 200 150 150 X
6,474 8,850 7,895 3,200 4,083
B\. Studies
(i) Planning, feasibility and engineering 610 550 590 500 579
(ii) DIWI review of construction methodology 12 13 13 10 12
(iii) Refinancing of Credit Sl1-BU 380 302 302 380 302
Subtotal 1,002 864 905 890 893
C\. Contingencies on IDA Financed Items 924 - 910 24
TOTAL PROJECT COSTS 8,400 9,714 8,800 5,000 5,000
1/ For final disbursements see Table 3, page 2
2/ Government has made a cost-sharing contribution of US$300,000 to UNDP out of the IDA Credit\. Since May 1978, the
technical assistance is financed from a new UNDP contribution totalling US$900,000 for the years 1978-1982 and from Credit
773-BU (Highways II) in the form of a Government cost-sharing contribution\.
August 1981\.
S \. S
I 4
LURtlNDI
FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 467-BU)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Maintenance Equipment
Appraisal List Appraisal List/Actual Cost Actual List
Unit Cost Total Cost Unit Cost Total Cost Unit Cost Total Cost
No\. to be CIF Bujum CIF Bujum\. No\. to be CIF Buium CIF Bulum No\. to be CIF Bujus CIF Bujum
Type of Equipment Purchased US$'000 US$'o00 Purchased US$'000 11S$'000 Purchased US$'OOO US$'000
Bulidozers (100-145 HP) 3 55 154\.0 3 76 228 Ol/ - -
Loaders (100-145 HP) 4 35 140\.0 4 50 200 1 50 50
Graders (100-145 HP) 7 38 266\.0 7 63 441 21/ 63 126
Tractors (heavy) 1 21 21\.0 1 35 35 o0! - -
Tractors (light) 4 7\.5 30\.0 4 10 40 0 - -
Rubber wheel rollers 3 16 48\.0 3 56 168 4 56 221
Vibrating rollers 2 8 16\.0 2 9 18 1 9 9
Tanker rollers (6-8 tons) 1 12 12\.0 1 35 35 0 - -
Tipping trucks (6-7 tons) 34 12 408\.0 34 29 986 323/ 29 928
Trucks (6-7 tons) 5 12 60\.0 5 29 145 2 29 58
Water tankers (6-8m3) 2 17\.5 35\.0 2 36 72 1 36 36
Low loaders 1 10 10\.0 1 20 20 1 20 20
Fuel tankers (6-8m3) 1 16 16;0 1 36 36 1 36 36
Fuel tank trailers (3-4m3) 4 6 24\.0 4 10 40 04/ - -
Servicing units 1 14 14\.0 1 98 98 1 98 98 'I
Cressing units trailers 2 10 20\.0 2 7 14 2 7 14 1
Compressors (3-Sm3) 1 6 6\.0 1 10 10 2 10 20
Four wheel drive vehicles 6 5 30\.0 6 8 48 5 8 40
Cars 4 4\.5 18\.0 4 5 20 05/ - -
Pick-ups and vans 5 4\.5 22\.5 5 5 25 0 - -
Concrete mixers 3 3 9\.0 3 3 9 3 3 9
Water pumps 7 1\.3 9\.1 7 1 7 2 1 2
Caravan trailers 2 4\.7 9\.4 2 10 20 2 10 20
Heavy tipping trucks - - - - - - 1 90 90
Fuel tanks (3-4m3) - - - - - 4 2 8
Miscellaneous equipment - - 95\.0 - - 95 - - 61
Tools, educational equipment - - 16\.0 - - 30 - - 30
Spare parts - - 500\.0 - - 500 - - 474 I
Total 2,000\.0 3,340 2,353
1/ Four new bulldozers and five graders were purchased out of the Burundi Road Fund in 1974\.
2/ Replaced by heavy truck\.
3/ In addition, Government has purchased 15 tipping trucks out of the Burundi Road Fund (10 In 1974; 5 in 1977)\.
4/ Replaced with simple fuel tanks\.
5/ Already provided for in Research and Development contract\.
August 1981\.
- 20 -
TABLE 3
Page 1
BURUNDI
FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 467-BU)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Schedule of Disbursements1/
(as of December 31, 1981)
Fiscal Year Actual disbursements
respectively Actual Appraisal as % of
Quarter ending Total Estimate Appraisal Estimates
June 30, 1974 - 0\.4 -
June 30, 1975 0\.3 1\.4 21
June 30, 1976 0\.7 3\.2 23
June 30, 1977 1\.5 4\.5 34
June 30, 1978 3\.3 4\.9 67
June 30, 1979 4\.0 5\.0 80
Sept 30, 1979 4\.3 - 86
Dec 31, 1979 4\.6 - 96
March 31, 1980 4\.7 - 94
June 30, 1980 4\.96 - 99
Dec 31, 1980 5\.072/ - 100
Closing Dates: Original 12/31/78
First extension 12/31/79
Sec\. extension 12/31/80
1/ For disbursements by categories see page 2
2/ Credit of US$ million was exceeded as a result of fluctuation in
exchange rate\.
August 1981\.
- 21 -
TABLE 3
Page 2
Amount Schedule 1 of
Category disbursed Credit Agreement
(US$) (US$)
I-a Construction of office
facilities for DPC,
expansion of the store of
DPC, and renovation and
equipping of the School
of Public Works 75,380\.26 150\.000
I-b Fuel and materials 816,590\.80 750\.000
I-c Equipment and spare parts 2,405,792\.08 2,000\.000
II-a Engineering, studies and
supervision of Part I-d of
the Project 11,535\.10 10\.000
II-b Consultants' services for
training including training
equipment 509,451\.81 300\.000
II-c Highway Master Plan and
Preinvestment Studies under
Parts B and C of the Project 579,424\.95 500\.000
II-d Technical Assistance for the
reorganization and strengthe-
ning of road maintenance
operations of the Borrower
under Part Al of the Project 300,000\.00 -
III Refunding of Credit Sll-BU 301,825\.00 380\.000
IV Unallocated - 910\.000
Total disbursed: 5,000,000\.00 5,000\.000
August 1981\.
- 22 -
TABLE 4
Page 1
BURUNDI
FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 467-BU)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Vehicle Operating Cost Estimates
(in FBu pr km; net of taxes)
From Appraisal Report January 1974:
Road Condition 1/
Engineered
Vehicle Type Earth Gravel Bitumen
1 2 3 4 5
Passenger Car 8\.30 6\.15 5\.10 4\.92 3\.69
Van 15\.07 12\.35 10\.37 9\.65 6\.18
Truck2/ 27\.18 22\.28 17\.82 16\.26 10\.44
1! Road condition categories are as follows:
1 - exposed base course of 100-200 mm stone\.
2 - exposed base course of 50-100 mm stone\.
3 - irregular surface; 0-50 mm gravel\.
4 - well graded; 0-25 mm gravel\.
5 - bituminous paved\.
2/ Average vehicle operating cost for 2\.5-ton and 7-ton trucks (petrol and
diesel)\.
Source: Engineering Study - August 1971\.
Mission Estimates - July 1973\.
August 1981\.
- 23 -
"ABLE 4
Page 2
From Appraisal Report February 1978
A\. Level Terrain
Road Type Vehicle Type 1
Private Light Medium Heavy
Car Pick-up Truck Truck Truck
Poor Earth 25\.2 32\.8 51\.8 85\.3 172\.3
Good Earth 20\.3 27\.3 41\.7 67\.9 137\.1
Engineered Gravel (In-situ) 16\.8 22\.2 33\.3 53\.0 107\.8
Engineered Gravel (Realigned) 14\.9 19\.7 27\.3 43\.1 82\.0
Bitumen 12\.9 17\.6 22\.7 36\.2 68\.0
B\. Undulating Terrain
Poor Earth 27\.6 37\.7 66\.9 111\.6 216\.1
Good Earth 22\.0 32\.0 51\.9 85\.6 166\.6
Engineered Gravel (In-situ) 17\.8 24\.3 39\.0 63\.1 124\.5
Engineered Gravel (Realigned) 15\.3 20\.9 29\.7 47\.4 91\.3
Bitumen 13\.1 18\.2 24\.2 39\.0 72\.6
1/ Peugeot 304; Toyota Stout 200; Fiat 2\.5-ton; Mercedes 6\.5-ton;
Fiat 22-ton\.
Source: "Highway Investment Program 1978-1987"
Draft Final Report, February 1977\.
From Appraisal Report February 1981:
Earth Track Low Standard Gravel Road
Flat Mountainous Flat Mountainous
Terrain Terrain Terrain Terrain
Car 43\.05 47\.50 29\.16 30\.84
Pick-up 61\.80 71\.21 43\.44 46\.40
Light Truck 97\.49 197\.03 61\.59 72\.56
Medium Truck 174\.64 228\.35 106\.80 127\.02
Source: Same as previous, updated to mid-July 1980 by IDA staff\.
a V * C I
IBRD 2829R5
BURUND
e take 1 0 0 0 I
\. \. r~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ko~ A\. TEnEI',A AIP
< ~ ~~ ~ ~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~ DStn'oc ~\. J 0 0ETI '> % \ RPJDO 40 5
\ \. DSSANZAAgEIRo,,EondoerffDEoo
| t Xe \;uzinda Mjr LURhM'lYA % ) /t <\vX Xan X
ovira ~ - - ~
B UJUMBaURA - c \fTG
_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~mr s uonga UYIGI
O Y , i s h ub ir zakebuo| ! ;
tJ / | I umuyange 4, [lankae) u
\. 4 \ X t >' g w ~~~~~~~ROAD SYSTEM
/ \ ) t< >- s RjJTAN / PAVED ROADS
- 4 , uabr - aE ROAD :iqFPCl7-RJCT\.ri ;4
g \ MutaCD9 ~~~~~~ > 0 7 Gi hlDri 2 + * e e @~~~~~\. \. RDADS BEINoG SILC r D
} j /\1 > \7\ \ \ (<ular~~~~~~ ~ ~~~~~~~ha / ROADS STUDIED UNDER ENIGINEERIN'CRD crk '1 - r
J ( e \ vL vMakaRlba g ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~EeTTERMEtIT SURVEY
f t j | r \ &-_ _ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ DETAILED ENG-INEFRIG11
> ) t | :6 I r > rikinql ! \. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~HIGHWAY NiAINTENIA:CF PILJL-C
s \./§ | | t \ \ _ u / \. \. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~TO BE v AINTAIWEID
t / { | ~~~~~~ \ \ /M2ban~~P~bda \.Itoo R PRE-INVL iT11ENT 5-UlOY
/ ! ~~~~~Nya nz2, ) NT1\.2 TTICi1L AilRror-
/ l Lac X \. _\._ It:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ TFRN4AT I )rAL L)ulAil
? j ) ttunina~~ ~~ ~~~~ b-1 gudiA - dvcl r c^''' ze\. ° KchEEa
6 \ X -} To \.TiGGrla l) j _~~~~" | APPROVAL |
P037357 | Z-- A/ _ -s / \.r- Ah)
RETURN TO
REPORTS C LN cO F I D E N T I A L
WITHIN t;x?ETuRN TO REp0RTS DESK Report No\. DB-2c
ONE WEK |CIRCULATING COPY Copy No\.
TO BE RETURNED TO REPORTS DESK
IN CENTRAL FILES
This report is available only to those members of the staff to whose work it relates\.
Any further release must be authorized by the department head concerned\.
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION
APPRAISAL OF PROPOSED THIRD BANK LOAN TO
OESTERREICHISCHE INVESTITIONSKREDIT AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
AUSTRIA
June 6, 1962
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
$I\. = 26 schillings
S\. 1\. = $0\.03846
S\. 1, 000, 000 = $38, 460
APPPAISAL OF ?O-''OSED TTPP B/NX L(ANT TO
COPSRTER \.ICtHISCHE INVESTITIONS EREThIT AKTIENGESELISCHAFT
AUSTRIA
Table of Contents
Paragraphs
Summary and Conclusions i x
I\. INTRODUCTION 1-3
II\. ORIGIN M\D PURPOSE
III\. ESTABLISH1fEN 9 - 10
IV\. DEVELOPMIENT 11 - 16
V\. OPERATIONS 17 - 30
VI\. BOARD, N1PATAGEMENT AND STAFF 31 - 37
VII\. FUTURE PROSPECTS 38 -
VIII\. JUSTIFICATION ANM CONCLUSICOiS -
ANNEXES
1\. Shareholders of Oesterreichische Xontrollbankl,\.
2\. Major Shareholders of IVK\.
3\. Portfolio of Bonds\.
\. Repayments to May 22, 1962, and Amortization Schedule of
Principal on Bank Loans 192 and 237-AUA for 1962 through 1966\.
5\. Summary of Operations ex Bank Funds\.
6\. Summary of IVK Schilling Operations ex ERP and other funds\.
7\. Summary of Swiss Franc Gperations\.
8\. Summary of Water Purification Loans\.
9\. Comparative Balance Sheets for Fiscal 1958 through 1961\.
10\. Comparative Income Statements for Fiscal 1957 through 1961\.
11\. Neinbers of IVK Board of Directors\.
12\. Organization - Management and Staff\.
13\. Applications Under Consideration\.
1\. Projected Income Statements for 1962 and 1963\.
APEPAISAL OF TIFE 0ESTLET'P,C\.ISTJS ICTFE STThlTOiN:S KR+DT AAG\.
AUSTRIA
Summary and Conclusion
i\. Oesterreichische Investitionskredit A\.G\. (IVK) has requested a loan
of $5\.0 million equivalent to replenish its resources in order to meet
the continued demand for long-term loans in Austria\. This would be in
addition to two previous Bank loans totaling &aBl8,288,65-\. (Paragraph
1 refers)\.
ii\. IVK was established in 1957 to act as an intermediary between the Bank
and the beneficiary industrial enterprises of the first Bank loan
(192-AUA) in the sum of $10\.7 million, with the intention of expanding
it into a soundly based financial institution\. During 1958, IVK ex-
pandeJ its resources by means of a large share issue and a long-term
loan from ERP counterpart funds, which has the character of equity\.
(Paragraphs 9 and 10 refer)\.
iii\. In September 1959 the Bank made a seconcd loan to IVK (237-AUA) in thle
amount of $,9\.0 million equivalent\. As of Hay 22, 1962, 4564,oC0 of
this loan remained uncommitted\. (Paragraph 15 and Annex 5 refer)\.
iv\. The amount of IVKIs assistance to any one company has ranged from
S\. 1\.0 million to S\. 50\.0 million, with the larger part of its funds
in loans between S\. 20 and S\. 30 million\. IVKts portfo'lio of loans
shows a good balance among industrial categories\. Applications for
assistance received by 1V7 as at December 31, 1961 indicate an increase
in the demand for assistance\. (Annexes 5, 6, 7, 8 and 13 refer)\.
v\. IVY's management and staff work efficiently, and the professional staff
is competent\. IVKYs relations with the financial community are good\.
(Paragraphs 30-36 refer)\.
vi\. As at May 22, 1962 IVK had relent ';17\.7 million equivalent of Bank
funds to 26 sub-borrowers (paragraphs 17, 18 and Annex 5 refer)\. As
at the same date it had financed 26 projects out of ERP counterpart
and other schilling' funds and accumulated' reserves totaling S\. lbO
million\. It has also financed 8 projects totaling S\. 75\.5 million
equivalent oult of Swiss franc funds\. (Paragraphs 20, 21 and Annexes
6, 7 and 8 refer)\.
vii\. IeTew loan applications received by IVK total S\. l44 million\. Ten
projects involving financing of approximately S\. 115 million are
presently under consideration\. it is evident that there is a need
for a source of long-term capital in Austria, which IVK is endeavour-
ing to meet\. (A list of projects under consideration is set forth
in Annex 13)\.
- 2 -
viii\. Judging by its past operations and the applications in hand, the
proposed Bank loan of S\. 130 million equivalent, the proposed second
ERP loan of S\. I!o\.O million, together with repayments from loans out
of proceeds of the first ERP loan plus reserves amounting to
approximately S\. 19\.0 million for 1962 and 1963 and a S\. 10 million
line of credit, all totaling S\. 199\.0 million, should provide suf-
ficient funds until the middle of 1963\.
ix\. IVK will not be able to continue operations without the proposed
Bank and ERP loan funds\. It is therefore believed that the Bank,
taking into consideration that IVK is only just embarking on its
first serious attempt to raise funds from the private market,
should not refuse its assistance at this point\.
x\. IVK i3 a suitable borrower for a third Bank loan of $5\.0 million
equivalent for a term of 15 years with a fixed interest rate and a
fixed amortization schedule\. The proposed arrangements would
provide that IVKts total long-term indebtedness may not exceed an
amcunt equal to 3\.5 times the sum of unimpaired capital, reserves,
and the outstanding amount of MEP counterpart fund loans\. TUnder
the proposed loan the Bankts approval will not be required for loans
bringing the total of IVKts loans to, or investments in, any one
enterprise to less than 1500,000\.
I\. INTRMODUCTION
1\. The Oesterreichische Investitionskredit A\.G\. (I-TK) has requested a
loan from the Bank of j5\.0 million equivalent to replenish its
resources in crder to meet the continued demand for long-term loans
in Austria\.
2\. The proposed loan would be the third Bank loan granted to IVK\. Two
previous Bank loans were made as follows:-
Loan No\. Date of Agreement Amount of Loan
192-AUA April 28, 1958 fi?9,288,654 - net after
cancellations
237-AUA September 25, 1959 it!9,000,000
3\. The following information is based upon data submitted by IVK, and
upon an investigation of its operations and prospects, carried out
in the field by a mission in January 1962\.
II\. ORIGIN ANTD PURPOSE
4\. IVK is an institution similar to a development bank in that its
purpose is to make long-term loans for the expansion and modern-
ization of industry\. The need for such an institution in Austria,
already an industrialized country, arises primarily from the absence
of an adequate capital market to wuhich industry, particularly small
and medium-sized, can turn for funds\.
5\. The Austrian capital market is virtually confined to issues by the
Government, municipalities and public utilities\. Issues by these
institutions offer tax benefits which make possible a net-of-tax
yield of about 15% per annum\. In addition the Austrian authorities,
through capital issues control, restrict private capital issues in
the interest of channeling savings to Government and semi government
paper\. However, the Government is now considering measures which
would put the Government and private bond issues on an equal tax basis\.
6\. The origin of the Bank's association with IVK is unusual in that it
did not stem from a straightforward decision to establish a develop-
ment bank, but originated with a request from the Austrian Government
that the Bank assist private industry in Austria\. It was felt that
large nationalized industries had been receiving the greater portion
of the Governmentfs available capital, including Marshall Plan Aid,
and it was suggested that the Bank assist in financing a number of
medium-sized industrial companies in Austria\.
2-
7\. The difficulty of diverting domestic savings to smaller industries -
hence the need for IVK - was further enhanced when the Soviet Union
announced that it was finally prepared to agree upon a State Treaty
for Austria\. The Austrian Government was immediately confronted
with a further financing problem, since a substantial number of
industrial firms, seized and operated by the Soviet Union would,
under the Treaty, be handed back to Austria\. The Government knew
that these industries would require additiornal capital in order to
adjust to the changed conditions\.
8\. After the ratification of the State Treaty in 1955, a review of the
former Soviet enterprises showed in fact that their immediate need
was for additional norking capital to enable them to maintain
operations, and steps were taken to make short-term money available
for this purpose\. Hovever there remainef& a cyitThuinr need for long-
tern c-\.piti] b-, private industr- which Austrian scurces could not satisfy\.
III\. ESTABLISHYENT OF IVK
9\. In early 1957 the Bank agreed to examine the possibility of a loan
for modernizing and expanding prlvate industrial enterprises in
Austria\. In the course of this examination, it suggested that a
small company be established to act as intermediary between {he Rank and
the beneficiary industrial enterprises\. This company would be set
up with a nominal capital, but with the possibility in mind of
expanding it into a soundly based financial institution, if condi-
tions wzere favorable\. This suggestion was accepted, and IVK was
established in July 1957 with a capital of S\. 1\.0 million, which
was shortly thereafter increased to S\. 10\.0 million, - about
$385,0oo equivalent\.
10\. The original share capital of IVk was subscribed by the Oesterreichische
Kontrollbank A\.G\. The Kontrollbank is a subsidiary of twelve of the
principal Austrian b ' whiC> vep'<t th' 1e>'ing
institutions of the credit community (Annex 1 lists the Kontrollbank
shareholders)\. It performs various functions, which the commercial
banks find useful to carry out through a central organization, such
as the administration of the export credit scheme, performance of
various trustee functions, and the handling of public bond issues\.
In fact all Government and Verbundgesellschaft* issues are handled
through the Kontrollbank\. Yhen IVK was set up, the staff of the
Kontrollbank was made available to administer it\. This was recognized
to be an interim arrangement, the objective being to place IVK in an
independent position\. It was understood that if IVK's capital were
increased, the Kontrollbank would not retain a majority holding\.
* The Verbundgesellschaft is a holding concern formed by the
Austrian Government to administer the power industry program\.
- 3 -
IV\. DEVEOPUENT OF IVK
11\. The first Bank loan (192-AUA) was made on April 28, 1958 for
$10,765,000\.* The Bank had previously appraised all the projects
and the sub-loan agreement terms had been worked out in consulta-
tion with the Bank and the ultimate beneficiaries\. Thus, IVK was
to act merely as a channel for disblursement and repayment of the
loan\. The loan agreement contained a provision that IVK should
not undertake any other operations without the Bank's approval\.
12\. IVK faced the problem of providing an adequate earnings potential
that would attract additional capital despite heavy progressive
corporate income and property taxes and the small spread possible
between the Bank's interest rate (51-2%) and IVK's then lending
rate (7%)\. The proposed IVK financing plan envisaged a loan by
the Austrian Government of ERP counterpart funds in the amount of
S\. 80,0 million (about $3\.1 million equivalent), and an increase
in the share capital to S\. 40o0 million (about $1\.55 million
equivalent)\.
13\. The ERP counterpart fund loan was concluded in August 1958\. This
loan, at an interest rate of l/' for a term of 60 years, is repay-
able over a 40 Year period beginn-ng in 1977\. 'lTheF-Ioanagreement
Oonta a isioff'TE-V53j7he event of liquidation or insolvency,
the rights of the Austrian Government are to be treated on the same
basis as the rights of shareholders in TVK\.
14\. A share issue was made in December 1958\. Although the original plan
had been to increase the share capital to S\. 40\.0 million, the
response was such that the share capital was increased to S\. 42e0
million, and the proportion of the issue which was to have been
taken by the Kontrollbank was reduced from 40% to 33%\. Of the
present share capital, 72% is held by banks (including the Kontroll-
bank), 18\.5% by industrial enterprises, 6% by insurance companies,
2\.5% by credit cooperatives and 1% by private individuals (A list
of major shareholders is set forth in Annex 2)\.
15\. In Septemiber 1959 the Bank made a second loan to IVK (Loan 237-AUA)
of $9\.O million equivalent\. This loan differs from the first Bank
loan in that, after initial evaluation and selection, IVK submits
applications for individual loans to the Bank for final approval,
and each project bears interest at the Bank's current rate at the
time the project is approved\. The loan agreement contains a pro-
vision whereby IVK agreed not to incur additional debt if, ther'eby-,
the total of IVK's long-term debt would exceed 32- times its unim,
paired capital, reserves, and the outstanding amount of the counter-
part fund loan\. The amortization schedule for th-is loan i nn
7rogate of all 11M rcpa7ricrzt schcrlulrs with its sub-borroTcrs
* Subsequently reduced to $9,288,65L as a result of cancellations\.
- 4 -
16\. IVK has not used the proceeds of its share issues for lending\. Instead
it has invested them in readily negotiable securities of high yield so
as to maintain a certain measure of liquidity\. (Annex 3 sets forth IVKts
portfolio of bonds)\.
V\. OPERATIONS
Bank Loans
17\. The first Bank loan covered 11 projects, six of which were in the pulp
and paper industry\. Subsequently, two beneficiary enterprises decided
not to proceed with their investment projects, and el\.39 million was
cancelled from the loan\. In June 1959 a further ~'86,346 was cancelled
as no longer needed for completing one of the projects\. The net amount
of the loan stands at 's9,288,65h, fully disbursed\. Repayment of
principal to the Bank as at April 30, 1962 amounted to ^,1,078,054 re-
ducing the amount due on the loan to M8,210,6oo\. (For details of the
amortization schedule see Annex 4)\.
18\. As at May 22, 1962, 17 projects have been financed out of the second
Bank loan totaling ',8\.b36 million equivalent, and repayments of prin-
cipal amounted to j328,057\. (For the status of Bank loans 192-AUJA and
237-AUA reference is made to Annex 5)\.
ERP Loans
19\. It was agreed between the Bank and IVK that IVK should not make loans
out of ERP funds until its Board of Directors had established a general
statement of policy for future onerations, and had taken measures to
strengthen its procedures for appraising and selecting projects suitable
for investment financing\.
20\. In September 1958, 111K Board of Directors did approve a statement of
general policy, which it submitted to the Bank\. On the basis of this
statement, the Bank agreed that IVTK could make loans from the proceeds
of the ERP counterpart fund loan\. IVK had the responsibility for the
appraisal and selection of projects, and the Bank was to be kept
informed of its loan operations\. As at M-Iay 22, 1962, 26 projects had
been financed totaling S\. 140 million from ERP and other schilling funds\.
As of the same date, capital repayments on these loans amounted to
S\. 8\.3 million\. (For details of IVK loans made out of ERP funds
reference is made to Annex 6)\.
Local MTedium-Term Loan
2Z1\. In June 1961 IV7K obtained a S\. 10\.0 million line of credit from
Zentralsparkasse of Vienna at 6%, per annum\. The loan, without
security, is repayable on or before December 31, 1966\.
Swiss Franc Loan
<T\. A loan ofESw\.F\. 13\.0 million, equivalent to S\. 78\.0 million, with an
effective rate of interest of 6Q, a five-year term and an 18-month
grace period, was obtained in November 1961\. As of Hay 22, 1962 eight
projects totaling S\. 75\.5 million had been financed\. (Annex 7 shows
the status of IVK Swiss franc loans)\.
- 5-
Water Purification Loans
23\. Under Austrian law heavy consumers of water may be required to install
water purification systems\. In 1960 an agreement was reached between
IVK and the IMinistry of Agriculture whereby IVK would be used as an
instrument for providing water purification loans\. After satisfying
itself of the prospective borrowerst creditworthiness, IVK advances out
of its schilling funds the monies required at 712% per annum\. The
Government subsidizes the interest cost by refunding to the borrower
42% of the interest\. By May 22, 1962, IVK had loaned S\. 15\.5 million
to seven companies, which is 3O of its total protfolio (Annex 8 refers)\.
Distribution of IVK Loans
2L7\. IVK7s distribution of assistance by major industrial grouping may be
summarized as follows: (data as of Mlarch 1962)
Approximate
Number of Total Project IVK's Percentage of
Industry Borrowers Cost Portion Total Portfolio
In Million Schillings
Paper 6 579\.1 187\.2 38
Cardboard 2 53\.4 24\.6 5:
Textile 3 151\.6 h8\.6 9
Electrical 1 75\.0 25\.1 5
Graphical 2 5L\.o 23\.0
Food 2 39\.7 16\.5 3
Furniture 1 13\.5 3\.0 1
Building Material 3 92\.3 26\.0 5
Chemicals 8 10\.8 76\.8 15
Clothing 3 90\.1 38\.7 7
Glass and China 2 1t0\.9 10\.0 2
Iron 2 24\.4 11\.0 2
ITlrater Purification 7 15\.5 3
42 1,354\.8 5o6\.o 100
25\. Under the first Bank loan TVK paid the Bank 51-% per annum as against
its own relending rate of' 7/' per annum\.
26\. Under the second Bank loan the Bank rate for the principal amount
allocated to each project is determined at the time when each part of
the loan is credited to the Loan Account\. W,7ith two exceptions,e* the
Bank's interest rate so far has been 5-3/45 per annum which IVK has re-
lent to its beneficiaries at 7-1/45 per annum\. The exchange risk under
the first and second Bank loans is borne by the sub-borrowers\.
* The exceptions are: (i) Semperit - S\. 25\.0 million (Q\.962,000 equivalent)-
Bank interest rate is 61 per annum and I7Kts
lending rate 7% per annum; and,
(ii) Hiag - S\. 25\.0 million (d)962,000 equivalent) -
Bank interest rate 5-3/14 per annum and IVK7s
lending rate 7-3/4% per =nnum\.
-6-
Financial Position
27\. During fiscal 1961 reserves increased by S\. 5\.43 million, and total
reserves stood at S\. 16\.2 million on December 31, 1961\. Net profits
for 1961, amounting to S\. 1\.57 million, are expected to be allocated
to reserves\. IVK has not declared a dividend in its four years of
operation\.
28\. As far as it is known 17K has no bad debts in its portfolio of loans\.
One beneficiary under the first Banlc loan 192-AUA, Glanzstoff, re-
quested postponement of its first two sche\.uled repayments, to which
IVK agreed\. The compan:y has since m-ade re,' ular repayments, and is
expected to continue to do so\. The foregoing did not alter IVKTs
repayments to the Bank, which have been paid on schedule\.
29\. At May 22, 1962, the status of IVX?s financial resources was
approximately as below:
RESOURCES In Million Schillings
IVLK's Own Funds
Share Capital 42\.0 v
Contingency Reserves (12/31/61) 16\.3
Accumulated Profits (12/31/61) 1\.7 60
Austrian Government Loan (ERP) - quasi-equity 80
Borrowed Funds (000)
1st Bank Loan - 192-AUA ' 77777P8 --
Less Repayments 1\.078
8\.210 equiv\. to 213
2nd Bank Loan - 237-AUA <\.1' 8\.436
Less Repayments 328
0 8\.108 equiv\. to 211
Balance available under 2nd
Bank Loan 237-AUDA 8 564 equiv\. to 15
Swiss Loan equivalent to 78
Zentralsparkasse Line of Credit 10
Total Pesources 667
USES
Loans to Induistry
Ex Bank Funds S\. L60 million
Less Repayments 36 424
ERP and other (including repayments revolved) 125
Swiss Francs 76
Services (Irater Purification) 16
Total Loans 641
AVTAILABLE FOR LENDIG (of which S\. 15\.0 million is S\. 26
the balance available under the second Bank Loan)
- 7 -
30\. IVK?s balance sheets and profit and loss statements for the years 1958
through 1961 are given in Annexes 9 and 10\.
VI\. BOARD, 141TAGEATMENT ANI) STAFF
31\. During negotiations leading to the establishment of IVK, the Bank
had clearly indicated the desirability of broadening ownership which
initially was in the hands of the Kontrollbank\. It was intended, as
soon as possible after its formation, that IITK should increase its
share capital by inviting public parbicipaecion\. This has been partly
done inasmuch as VTK share capital has been increased from S\. 1\.0
million to S\. 42\.0 million\. However, the commercial banks remain the
major shareholders\.
32\. IVK Boarc\. of Directors (Aufsichtsrat) consists of ten members, including
the Chairman, Dr\. Walther Kastrier, an attorney and counsellor-at-law,
six mcmbers representing commercial banks, one representing insurance
companies, and two representing industry\. (A list of directors may be
found in Annex 11)\.
33\. The management (Vorstand) of IVK comprises the General Manager, Pkfm\.
Dr\. jur\. Eduard Karlik, Mr\. Eduard Schmidt and Dr\. M^Jilhelm Teufenstein\.
The first two are associatedl with both I7TTK and the Kontrollbank\. Dr\.
'Tilhelm Teufenstein was formerly an official in the Austrian ITinistry
of Finance, an Alternate Governor of the Bank and Chairman of the IVK
Board of Directors\. He resigned from the Board of Directors in December
1959 and was appointed to the management in January 1960\. He is now
solely concerned with IVK affairs\.
34\. All loans of IVK are presented by Management to the Executive Committee
of the Board which meets about six times a year and consists of the
Chairman, Vice Chairman and two other members of the Board\.
35\. On December 31, 1961, IVK had a staff of 17, of whom ten are pro-
fessionals\. On February 1, an additional financial analyst was
engaged\. (A breakdowm of management and staff is given in Annex 12)\.
36\. The IVK1s operating procedures, both lending and project appraisal,
are satisfactory\.
37\. The earlier inadequacy of IVK follow-up procedures was due primarily
to a lack of staff, and over-concentraticn on project appraisals\. With
the now increased professional staff, augmented by four financial
analysts in the past two years, IVK can keep in closer contact with its
borrowers\. Its progress reports are adequate\.
- 8 -
VII\. FUTURE PROSPECTS
37\. On the basis of the experience of the past four years, and of the
number of applications on hand, it is estimated that IVK may be
reasonably expected to lend about S\. 1500 million a year\. Loan
applications presently under consideration by IVK total approximately
S\. 143 million\. (Annex 13 refers)\.
38\. The balance of $357,000 (S\. 14\.7 million equivalent), available under
the second Bank Loan (237-AUA), will probably be committed soon\.
39\. In June 1961 IVK obtained a S\. 10\.0 million line of credit from
Zentralsparkasse of Vienna at 6% per annum\. The loan without
security, is repayable on or before December 31, 1966\.
40\. IVK is presently negotiating a second ERP loan of S\. 40\.0 million\.
As in the case of the first ERP loan, this loan will rank equally
with the share capital in the event of liquidation and hence may be
regarded as equity for the purpose of calculating IVKts long-term
debt/equity ratio\. The exact terms of this loan have yet to be
determined\.
41\. Together with a third Bank loan of $5\.0 million (S\. 130\.0 million),
plus repayments under the first ER? loan, and increased reserves of
approximately S\. 19 million f6r 1962 and 1963, IVK will have in-
creased its lending resources byr S\. 199\.0 million\. These funds
are expected to suffice until 1964\.
42\. On the assumptions indicated in Annex 14, the long-term debt/equity
ratio in 1963 would be about 3\.5:1\.
43\. If IVX is to continue lending operations after 1963 on the estimated
scale of S\. 150 million per annum, it will require additional funds\.
The following possible sources have been examined:
(a) Public Bond Issue in Austria - IVK has so far been unable to
issue bonds in the Austrian capital mark-et for the reason that
it has largely been Dreempted by government, municipal and
electric power issues which are considered to have a prior
claim on available capital funds in Austria\. Moreover, it
would not be possible tnder present market conditions for IVK
to bor~row in the market at an interest cost which would be
consistent with its lending rates\. Tax legislation which
would remove the existing discrimination against MV bonds
is now under discussion\.If it is passed, IVK would hope to go
to the market in 1963\.
- 9 -
(b) Share Capital Increase - IVK, in its 4 years of operation,
has paid no d-vidends\. A possible source for additional
funds may be IVK's existing shareholders (mainly banks and
insurance companies) who might be induced to increase their
investment if, by so doing, IVK could borrow a relatively
large sum on long term\.
(c) ERP Funds - It is possible that IVK will obtain additional
ERP fund loans in the future, but it is not at this time
possible to estimate what the terms and ccn ditions of such
such loans may then be\.
(d) Foreign Loans - The best prospect for IVK is to obtain
funds from abroad where the rate of interest, compared to
Austria, is relatively low\. IVK has recently successfully
concluded its first foreiin loan (Paragraph 21 refers)\.
There is a gentlemen's agreement that after this loan has
been repaid in 1967 further similar credits will be
sympathetically considered\. There is no reason to believe
that IVK will not be able to raise additional funds in
Europe and the United States, but the possibilities of
obtaining long-term, as against medium-term, loans are
doubtful\.
VII\. JUSTIFICATION &c COYCLUSION
44\. In the five years since its establishment, IVK has developed into a
lending institution with a total loan portfolio amounting to about
$ 25 million, It has established its credits sufficiently to enable
it to borrow on its own account in the Swiss market\. IVK has not
yet made an issue in the local Austrian market but there is a
possibility that the factors which have prevented it from so doing
will be removed in 1963\. In short IVK is on the way towards becoming
an established and independent institution able to rely on its own
credit to obtain funds from private sources\.
45\. Unlike many other development banks, IVK does not have the advantage
of being the only source of foreign exchange in a situation of foreign
exchange scarcity and it therefore has to meet considerable competition
from the large commercial banks in Austria\. On the other hand, IVKts
ability to provide long-term loans enables it to fill the gap in the
Austrian capital market as is evidenced by the substantial numbers of
applications which have been submitted to it\. In present circumstances
however, IVK is not yet in a position to obtain sufficient funds from
other sources to maintain an adequate volume of lending\. A further
Bank loan at this time would, therefore, be justified\.
46\. IVK's staff has been augmented by 4 financial analysts in the past
two years, and it has increased its competence in project appraisal\.
- 10 -
470 There is no reason to doubt that it will be in a position to meet
its obligations to the Bank\.
483 IVK would therefore be a suitable borrower for a third Bank loan
of $5\.0 million for a term of 15 years with a fixed interest rate
and a fixed amortization schedule\. The proposed arrangements
provide, inter alia, that:
(a) the loan agreement shall become effective only after TVK
has received the additional ERP counterpart fund loan of
S\. 40\.0 million now being negotiated;
(b) IVKts long-term borrowing be restricted to an amount not
greater than 3\.5 times the sum of paid-in share capital
plus accumulated surplus or minus accumulated deficit,
reserves, and the outstanding amount of ERP counterpart
fund loans not yet repaid by IVK; and,
(c) IVK shall make loans out of the proposed Bank loans in
excess of $500,000 equivalent only with the prior
approval of the Bank,
AINEXr\. 1
Shareholders of Oesterreichischen Kontrollbank
' Creditanstalt-Bankverein S 4L,10\.0000-- 31,5 %
* Oesterreichische Landerbank AG\. " 3,535000\.-- 25,3 %
- Oesterreichisches Credit-Institut, AG\. tt 2,450O000- 17,5 %
Sceloeller & Co\. " 857X000e, 6,1 %
Pinschof & Co\. " 368\.000\.-- 2,6 %
Arbeiterbank AG\. i/en "L 560\.000\.-- hL, %
Genossenschaftliche Zentralbank AG\. " 420\.000\.-- 3,0 %
Bank fur Gberoesterreich und Salzburg 4 h20\.000\.-- 3,0 %
Breisach & Co\. 70\.000\.-- 055 %
Dank fur Karnten AG\. 4 h20\.000\.-- 3,0 %
C\.A\. Steinhausser Bank KG " 70\.000¢-D 0,5 %
Bank fur Tirol und Vorarlberg AG\. " 420\.000\.-- 3,0 %
S 14,000\.000\.- -200\.10 %
* Govcrnment controlled banks
Annex 2
OESTERRETCHISCHT-ILiVFS T TTT0;iS VREDTT AKTIPNGISELLSCHAFT
List of NMajor Sharcholders as at December 31, 1961
Schillin-s Percentage Total
Oesterreichische Kontrollbank 1),000,OOC 33\.33 33\.33
Other Banks
Bank f\. Oberoesterreich u\. Salzburg 2,500,coo 5\.95
Bank f\. Tirol u\. Vorarlberg 1,000,000 2\.38
Bank f\. Karnten AG\. 1,000,000 2\.38
Eisenstadter Bank AG\. 100,000 0\.23
Arbeiterbank: AG\. 2,000,000 L\.76
Breisach e& OD \. 1,000,000 p\.38
Pinschoff & Co\. 900,000 2\.1L\.
C\.A\. Steinhausser 1,000,000 2\.38
Kathrein & Co\. 1,000,000 2\.38
Roessler & Co\. 200,000 0\.48
Berger & Comp\. 100,000 0\.23
Zentralkasse d\. Volksbanken 500,000 1\.19
Schoeller Group 5,000,000 11\.90 38\.78
Private Industry 7,760,000 18\.50 1R\.50
Insurance Companies
Erste Allgemeine Unfall- und
Schadensversicherungs-AG\. 1,LQOO000 3\.33
W,,Tiener Allianz Vers\. AG\. 600,000 1\.L3
WHechselseitige Versicherungsarnstalt Graz 500,000 1\.19 5\.95
Co-operative Institutes 1,000,000 2\.40 2\.h0
Private Individuals 440,000 i,OL 1\.04
b2,000,000 100\.00
I>ITEi, Y\.3
CE\. rLR;REICH ISCIiE VXlT-rITITOAN Kkl\. itT A±hP1 iNG -,LL3CH- AFT
eCrt<ci of EnBonds
os at Dectmber 31, 19-1
( In Austrian Schillings )
Nlarket Value
Nominal Value Cost Price as at 31/12/61
4125 Energieanleihe 1953 4o\.0-- 527\.40 532\.--
5-14%iO t\. 1959 741\.000\.-- 977\.002\.60 1,022\.58Q\.--
7 5 Investitionsanleihe 1958/I/B 550\.000\.-- 533\.500\.-- 530\.750--
7 5 _ t 1958/II 2\.0000\.OCO,\.-- 1,960\.QOO\.-- 1\.925\.00C\.--
7 E Fnergieanleihe 1958 12 000\.000\.-- ll,)465,625\.-- 11\.700\.000\.--
1959 1\.000\.000\.-- 966\.875\.-- 890\.000\.--
7 % Tiroler ETasserkraft 1958/II 750\.000\.-- 735\.000\.-- 735\.000\.--
7 % Vorarlberger Illwerk AG 1958 1,000\.000\.-- 980\.000\.-- 980\.000\.--
574 Republic of Austria
Dxternal Sinking Fund
Dollar Bonds 1958
US&,,$ 400\.000\.-- 10100\.000\.-- 9,901\.504\.30 10,037\.415\.--
7 % Verkehrsanleihe 1957 9)46\.000\.-- 936\.540\.-- 914\. 782\.--
7 , Wohnhaus-Vjiederaufbau-
Fonds-Anleihe 1958 3\.000(0!O\.-- 2,955\.o0o\.- 2,925\.000\.--
7 5 Bundesanleihe 1959 10,000\.000\.-- 9,90g\.C0o\.-- 9,650\.000\.--
7 /O Wohnhaus-Wiederaufbau-
Fonds-Anleihe 1957 1,000\.000\.-- 985\.000\.-- 980\.000\.--
7 5 Bundesanleihe 1961 100\.000\.-- 96\.000\.-- 98\.000\.--
50 Multivalor
- Investmentzertifikat - 25\.000o-- 25\.000\.-- 26\.737\.50
7 5 Hochwasserschaedensfonds-
Anleihe 1961 300\.000\.-- 292\.500\.-- 292\.500\.--
7 5 Energieanleihe 1961 300\.000\.-- 288\.000\.-- 288\.000\.--
44,112\.400\.-- 42,998\.074,30 42,996\.296\.50
Annex h
OESTERREICHISC 0E INVEST ITIO1S,0KREDIT AKT IENGESELLSCHAFT
LOANS 192- and 237-AUA
Repayment of Principal to May 22, 1962 and
Amortization Schedule through 1966
( U\.S% Dollars )
Loan Loan
192-AU;! 237-AAUA Total
Total Amount of Loans 9,288,654 9,000,000 18,288,654
Amount Repaid as at May 22, 1962 1,078,05b 328,057 1,406,111
Amortization Schedule through 1966
October 1, 1962 266\.h 211\.1 477\.5
April 1, 1963 3hh\.0 255\.3 599\.3
October 1, 1963 355\.9 265\.6 621\.5
April 1, 196L 368\.5 372\.1 740\.6
October l, 1964 381\.6 439\.7 821\.3
April 1, 1965 394\.8 451\.5 8h6\.3
October 1, 1965 hW8\.6 470\.5 879\.1
April 1, 1966 388\.8 480\.9 869\.7
October 1, 1966 402\.5 491\.o 893\.5
Total Repaymen tstrough December3l,1966 4,389\.1 3,765\.8 7,569\.1
NMTE: S\. 14\.7 million under 237-AUA remains uncommitted\. When these funds
have been allocated to particular projects, the amortization schedule
for loan 237-AUA will be revised accordingly\.
Annex 5
OESTERBEICHISCHE INVFSTITIONSEREDIT AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
Status of IBRD Loans 192-AUA and 237-AUA as at May 22, 1962
A\.S\. Millions U\.S\.$
Total IVK/IERD Amount Balance
Project Cost Portions Equivalent Disbursed Undisbursed
192-AUA -$9$288,65h
Voslauer - Worsted yarn 36\.343 15\.565 598,654 Fully Nil
Glanzstoff - Rayon yarn 57\.500 20\.020 770,000 I I
Funder - Sawmill, fibreboard 49\.000 25\.090 965,000 I n
mills, mechanical pulp & paper
Kunert - Hosiery, Knitted wear 35\.550 13\.000 500J,000 it i
Mayr-Melnhof - Mech\. pulp & 25\.716 12\.610 485,o000
paperboard
Nettingsdorfer - Sulphate pulp 137\.a58 50\.050 1,925,000 t 11
and paperboard
Brown-Boveri - Electrical equip\. 76\.042 25\.090 965,000
Steyrermue'nl - Mechanical & 188\.995 50\.050 1,925,000 t n
sulphite pulp, paper
Frantschach - Sulphate pulp & 118\.200 30\.030 1,155,000
paper
Total 192-AUA (9 projects) 725\.204 241\.505 9,288,654 9,288,654 -
237-AUA -$9,000,000
Semperit - Rubber products 49\.648 25\.012 962,000 962,000 _
Hiag - Chemicals 39\.321 25\.012 962,000 962,000 _
Triumph - Women's undergarments 56\.500 27\.000 1,038,000 606,319 431,681
Oberglas - Glassware 14\.535 5\.018 193,000 193,000 -
Epple Buxbaum - Farm equipment 23\.360 3\.900 150,000 150,000 -
Leipnik Lundenburger - Sugar 37\.355 15\.000 576,920 576,920 -
Transport-Beton - Stationary 9\.320 4\.004 154,000 154,000 -
concrete plant
Perfekta - Rubber & plastics 27\.900 14\.014 539,000 539,000 -
Colombia Kaffee - Coffee roasting 3\.800 1\.307 50,257 50,257 -
Ergee Textilwerk - Textile 21\.000 9\.022 347,000 347,000 -
Ernst Pollman - Clocks & pre- 2\.850 1\.014 39,000 39,000 -
cision instr\.
Guggenbacher - Paper 25\.000 12\.012 462,000 256,966 205,034
Welser - Paper 73\.000 20\.000 770,000 290,578 479,422
Radio Austria - Equip\. for 13\.000 3\.016 116,000 116,000 -
radio station
Ganahl - Paper 17\.000 4\.000 154,000 - 154,000
Plansee - Special metals & 70\.000 25\.000 961,000 - 961,000
alloys
Interplastic - Plastics 76\.000 25\.000 962,000 574,134 387,866
Total 237-AUA (17 projects) 559\.589 219\.331 8,436,177 5,817,174 2,619yO03
Uncommitted Balance $ 563,823 or AS\. 14\.7 million equivalent
Annex 6
OESTERREICHISCHE INTVESTITIONSKREDIT AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
Status of IVK Schilling Loans ex ERP Counterpart (S\.80\.0 million)
and Other Schilling Funds as at May 22, 1962
(Millions of Austrian SchilLings)
Amount Amounts
Total IVK To Be Repaid
Project Cost Portion Disbursed Disbursed to IVK
Elbemuhl - paper, printing 53\.702 20\.0 20\.0 - 1\.503
-Holzel I + II - printing 13\.633 5\.0 5\.0 _ 0154
Joka - mattresses & padded furniture 14\.619 3\.0 3\.0 - 0\.b48
Oswald - shoes 6\.160 3\.0 3\.0 - 0\.106
Sz'1-warz I & II - coffee 9\.090 3\.0 3\.0 - 0\.261
3anahl - paper 30\.026 12\.0 12\.0 _ 1\.317
Wienerberger - tile 68\.015 20\.0 20\.0 - 2\.963
Beindl - chemicals 2\.950 1\.2 1\.2 - 0\.085
Kwizda - chemicals 3\.480 1\.5 1\.5 - 0\.280
Nordland - concrete slabs 6\.900 2\.0 2\.0 - 0\.619
Oespag - ceramics, china 31\.1h4 8\.0 8\.0 - Oo568
Kargl - brick 12\.470 5\.5 5\.5 -
Hiag II - chemicals 12\.000 10X0 - - -
Perovit - fodder 7\.000 2\.0 - 2\.0 -
Oespag III - ceranics 3\.600 1\.3 1\.8 - -
lietersdorfer - cement 33e000 5\.0 1/ 5\.0 _
Standard - telephone 37\.300 6\.0 1/ - 6\.0 _
Ganahl II - corrugated board 17,000 h\.0 2/ 3\.0 1\.0 _
Perlmooser - cement 25\.600 12\.0 12\.0 *
Total (19 projects) 387\.689 125\.- 106\.- 19\.- 8&304
'/ See also Swiss Franc Loans, Annex 7
2/ See also US-$ Loars, Annex 5
Annex 7
OESTERREICHISCCHE INVESTITIONSKREDIT AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
Status of IVK Swiss Franc Loans
as of May 22, 1962
(Millions of Austrian Schillings)
Amount Amount
Total IVK To Be repaid
Project Cost Portion Disbursed Disbursed to 1I7
Wietersdorfer - cement 33\.0 5\.0 1/ 5\.0 - -
Canal - brick 17\.0 8\.0 8\.0 - -
Plansee - metal 70\.0 10\.0 2/ 10\.0 - -
Lignospan - fibreboard 7h\.0 25\.0 25\.0 _ _
Standard - telephone 37\.3 6\.0 1/ 6\.o - -
Radio Austria II - 15\.3 1\.5 0\.8 0\.7 -
telecommunication
Vossen - textiles 30\.0 15\.0 - 15\.0 -
Oberglas II - glass 15\.0 5\.0 1\.5 3\.5 -
Total (8 projects) 291\.6 75\.5 56\.3 19\.2 -
See also Schilling loans Annex 6 for other I_& portion\.
2/ See also US$ loans Annex 5 for other IVK portion\.
ANNEX 8
GES TiTThEET CVT CT I ?S TI TI ONxT T k FTT TT K:SELL3 CHA!?T
Water Purification Loans as at Januaiy 6
In Austrian Schillings
Gebr\. Grundmann 011G\. 936\.000\.-
Aktiengesellschaft Jungbunzlauer
Dpiritus- und chemische Fabrik 3,000\.000\.--
Leipnik-Lundenburper Zuckerfabriken AG\. 3,000\.000\.--
Zellwolle Tenzing AG\. 5,600\.000\.-
Oesterr\.-Aloine Montangesellschiaft 1,310\.000\.--
"ZIAG" 7iegelindustrie AG\. 750\.000\.--
Schoeller-Bleckmann S'tahlwerke AG\. 906\.000\.-- *
Total (7 projects) 15,502\.00o-
This loan was to become effective early in February 1962,,
MX=% 9
OESTERREICHISCHF ITE\.STIT IONSRREDIT AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
Comparative Balance Sheets as at December 31, 1958, 1959, and 1960
and Estimate for 1961
(Million Austrian Schillings)
Provisional
and Unaudited
Assets 1958 1959 1960 1961
Cash 0\.002 0\.0018 0\.0031 0\.013
Investments callable on short 21\.2 36\.7 15\.0 122\.3
notice 1/
Treasury Bonds of Federal Republic 50\.0 - - -
of Austria
Other Bonds '26\.6 L2\.2 41\.9 h2\.h
Investments 60\.9 177\.1 332\.0 h53\.5
(of which in foreign currencies) (33\.9) (129\.7) (253\.0) (357\.7)
Part of Share Capital not paid-in 2/ 23\.9 - - -
Deferred Accounts 0\.2 0\.5 - -
Miscellaneous - - 2\.2 2\.2
Total Assets 182\.8 256\.5 391\.1 620\.L
Liabilities
Current Liabilities - - - 3\.7
Long-term Debt 3/ 61\.6 129\.7 256\.5 L76\.7
Other Long-term Debt with Equity 80\.0 80\.0 80\.0 80\.0
Character (ERP)
Share Capital 42\.0 42\.0 42\.0 42\.0
Contingency reserves 1\.8 5\.3 10\.6 13\.6
Other Provisions 4/ 0\.1 0\.3 1\.9 \.-2\.7
Deferred Accounts 0\.5 - - -
Carried over from previous year (3\.2) (0\.8) 0\.1 1\.7
(Loss)
Total Liabilities 182\.8 256\.5 391\.1 620\.4
Debt/Equity Ratio 33/67 50/50 66/3L 77/23
0\.5:1 1:1 2:1 3\.h:1
1/ The 1961 figure in the balance sheet includes S\.78\.0 million (equivalent to
the Sw\.F\.13\.0 million loan)
2/ Fully paid up in January 1959
3/ Includes short-term loans from local banks pending reimbursement ex Bank loan
funds\.
h/ Breakdown of "Other Provisions" - 1961\.
Reconstruction reserve 1\.867
Pension fund 0\.260
Legal reserve 0\.581
S\. 2\.705
ANNEX 10
C7ST7:`REICHISCHE INVESTITI011SKR'DIT A1T4-iZGBFTLL:-liFT
Income Statements for Fiscal 1957 through 1961
-(In Million Schillings)-
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 *
Income
Interest on loans - 1\.38 8\.05 17\.17 27\.637
Commitment charges - 0\.94 1\.82 1\.65 1\.119
Other income - investments 0\.005 1\.62 8\.49 5\.88 5\.007
Total Income 0\.005 3\.94 18\.36 24\.70 33\.763
Expenses
Interest - 1\.10 7\.57 11\.76 18\.476
Commitment charges - 0\.94 1\.17 0\.83 0\.527
Salaries - 0\.59 1\.06 1\.87 2\.252
Legal and social expenses - 0\.06 0\.11 0\.19 0\.240
Nlaterial expenses (including
depreciation & consulting fees) 0\.319 1\.83 1\.79 2\.17 1\.765
Taxes - 0\.47 0\.82 1\.62 3\.500
Contingency Reserves - 1\.83 3\.48 5\.28 5\.429
Total Expenses 0\.319 6\.82 16\.00 23\.72 32\.189
Net Profit (Loss) for year (0\.32) (2\.88) 2\.36 0\.98 1\.574 *
Accumulated Profit (Loss)
Brought Forward - (3\.20) (0\.84) 0\.14 1\.71
* The figures for 1961 are provisional and unaudited\.
** As yet unallocated but expected to be transferred to reserves\.
ANIFEX 11
OESTEPREICHISC IE IIIVESTITIONSKREDIT AIrEG,ESELLSCHAT
Board of Directors
"AUFSICHTSRAT"
DrO\. Walther Kastner - Chairman
Attorney and Counsellor-at-Law
Erich Miksch - Vice Chairman
General Manager of Creditanstalt-Bankverein
Robert Eichinger
MVlember of Management of the Bank fur Oberoesterreich und Salzburg
Dr\. Georg Furstenberg
Partner of Breisach & Co, Bankkommanditgesellschaft
Gustav Gluck
Member of Management of the Dresdner Bank Aktiengesellschaft
Friedrich Kurssa (Insurance)
MTember of Management of the Erste Allgemeine Unfall-und
Schadensversicherungs-Gesellschaft
DDr\. Franz Ockermuller
Member of Management of the Oesterreichische Landerbank Aktiengesellschaft
DDr\. Gerhard Rosenberg (Industry)
Member of Management of Veitscher Magnesitawerke Aktiengesellschaft
Dr\. Friedrich Schoeller
Partner of Schoeller & Co\.
Dr\. Franz l'ilhelm (Industry)
ANEX 12
OEB102EB ICH 'SCHE ITMrESTITIOUTSKPZDIT AKTB\.L-G'C;TvSEL,LSCAPFT
Hanagement and Staff
Management - 11VORSTAIT"
* Dkfm\. Dr\. jur Edward Karlik - General Manager
Dr\. jrilhelm Teufenstein
M Ir\. Eduard Schmidt
Secretariat
* Dr\. Helnut Haschek - Executive Officer of Management
* One assistant to Dr\. Haschek (lawyer)
Bookkeeping Department
* 1Ir\. Groiss - Chief Accountant
One assistant accountant
Credit Department
Dr\. F\. Dunkel - Chief
Four financial analysts
One engineer
One lawyer
Consultants
One engineer
One architect
One legal
Tho financial
' Not full tire - associated with both Kontrollbank and TVK\.
Annex 13
OSTERREICHISCHE INVESTITIOISKREDIT AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
I\. Loan Applications Under Consideration
(Millions of Austrian Schillings)
Type of Estimated Total Amount of
Project Business Project Cost Loan Application
Jenbach diesel motors 70\.0 30\.0 1) 2)
Reichert optical 51\.7 30\.0 1) 2)
Frantschach paper 45\.o 20\.0 1) 2)
Danubius plywood 20\.0 7\.0 3)
Wiesner Hager chairs 20\.0 5\.0 1) 2)
Lignospan II fibre board 22\.0 12\.0 1)
Aesca pharmaceutical 5\.L 3\.0 4)
Kwizda II "r 3\.0 1\.5 4)
Steiner textile 6\.o 3\.0 4)
Schmidt steel construction 9\.0 3\.0 4)
Total 10 projects 252\.1 11\.5
II\. Loan Applications To Be Considered
(Hillions of Austrian Schillings)
Andritz machinery 40\.0 18\.2
Martha petrol distribution 62\.0 12\.0
102\.0 30\.2
1) To be financed out of third IBRD loan
2) Project to be submitted to the Bank within short time
3) To be financed out of Swiss Franc Loan (remaining portion) and
Austrian Schillings
4) To be financed out of Austrian Schillings
ANNEX 14 - Page 1
OEETERREICHlSCHE INVESTITI')NEKRED1T AKRIFNGESELLSCHAFT
PROVISIO)NAL INCOME STAPEEENT FOR 1961 AM)
PROJECTED IN0\.1OaE STATEMENTS FOR 1962 AND 1963
-----------------------------------In Million Schi2lings ---------------_-___________________
Amount of Loan Amount of Loan Amount of Loan
Interest Outstanding at In,terest Outstardi ng at Interest Outstanding at
Earned the end of ar Earned the end of year Earned the end of year
NET INCOME before operating Prcvisional & Unadied IWE9 7 Estinated 1962 Estimate 96
expenses and taxes
TVK Investments - (Annex 3 refers) 5\.0 - 50 5\._
First Bank loan 192-AiA $9\.288 million
equivalent to S\. 2415\.05 million (1%
spread - actual) 3\.6 220\.2 3\.1 206\.6 2\.8 188t,
Second Bank loan 237-AU)A
(a) $6\.366 million (committed as at Dec\. 31, 1961)
equivalent to S\. 165\.47 million (1% spread -
actual) 2\.b 161\.1 2\.3 151\.5 2\.1 137\.7
(b) $2\.634 million (available as at Dec\. 31, 1961)
equivalent to S\. 68\.6 million (2% spread -
proposed) -- 1\. 68\.6 1\.4 68\.6
Third Bank loan (proposed) $5\.0 million equivalent
to S\. 130\.0 million (2% spread - proposed) - - - - 2\.6 130\.0
First ERP loan S\. 80\.0 million (5% spread - actual) 4\.0 80\.0 4\.0 80\.0 4hC 80\.0
Second ERP (proposed) loan S\. 40\.0 million
(minimum 3% spread - proposed) - - 1\.2 40\.0 1\.2 40\.0
Swiss loan Sw\.F\. 13\.0 million equivalent to
S\. 78\.0 million (li% spread - proposed) - - 1\.2 78\.0 10 67\.2
15e0 461\.3 18\.2 624\.7 20\.1 711\.9
AiYNX 14 - Page 2
OESTERREICHISCHE ]ESTITIONSKREDIT A-KT:ENGESELLSCPHFT
--- In Million Austrian Sckillings
Provisional &- E\.st\.imated
Unaudited 1961 T962 \.
Net income before operating expenses
and taxes B/F 15\.0 18\.2 20\.1
ILESs
Operating costs including depreciation
and consultants fees -4\.5 4\.9 _54
10\.5 13\.3 14 \.7
Taxes (approximately) 3\.05 40L 49
Profit before reserves and dividends 7\.0 8¢9 9\.8
Provision for dividends of 6% commencing
end 1962 (proposed) - 265 2_5
Available for Reserves 7\.0 6\.h 773
Contingency Reserves including unallocated
profits (cumilative) i7,7 2h4o 314
Total Equity (including ERP) 139\.7 186\.-\. 193\.4
Debt/Equity Ratio 77/23 73/27 75/25
Times Equity 3\.4:l 2\.7:1 3\.1:1
1/ lc% increase each year has been provided\. | APPROVAL |
P001113 | Docment of
The World Bank
FOR oMCAL USE ONLY
Report No\. 5557
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
IVORY COAST - SMALL SCALE ENTERPRISE PROJECT
(LOAN 1162-IVC)
March 26, 1985
Operations Evaluation Department
This docnlment ha a restricted distribeuion and may be used by recipients only in the pefrfwoe of
their oflicial daties\. Its contents my not otherwise be disclosed witheut World Bank authoriastion\.
ABBREVIATIONS
BDI «- - Bureau de Développement Industriel
BCEAD - Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest
CAPEN - Centre d'Assistance et de Promotion de l'Enterprise
Nationale
CCCE - Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique
CCI - Crédit de la Côte d'Ivoire
OPEI - Office for the Promotion of Ivorian Enterprises
PCR - Project Completion Report
PPAM - Project Performance Audit Memorandum
PPAR - Project Performance Audit Report
SAR - Staff Appraisal Report
SSE - Small Scale Enterprise \.
SONAFI - Société Nationale de Financement
COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATES
Name of currency Communauté Financière Africaine Franc (CFAF)
Appraisal Year Average Exchange rate: US$1 = 200
Intervening Years Average US$1 = 245
Completion Year Average US$1 = 315
FOR OFFICIAL USS ONLY
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
IVORY COAST - SMALL SCALE ENTERPRISE PROJECT
(LOAN 1162-IVC)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No\.
Preface \.*\.*\. \.0\. i
Basic Data Sheet\. o\. \. * \. \.
Highlights \. ii
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MENORANDUM
I\. BACKGROUND\. 1
II\. OBJECTIVES AND PROJECT DESIGN \. \. \. 1
III\. EVOLUTION OF CCI AND SUPPORTING INSTITUTIONS\.o\. 3
Technical Assistance to SSE \. 3
The Guarantee and Participation Funds \. 4
Evolution of CCI \. \. 5
IV\. EVALUATION OF LOAN FEATURES AND CONDITIONS \. 6
The Branch and Model Project Approach \. \. 6
Subproject Financing Scheme and Conditions \. \. 7
V\. UTILIZATION OF BANK FUNDS \. \. 8
VI\. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BANK's APPRAISAL AND SUPERVISION \. 9
VII\. CONCLUSIONS \. 10
Attachment A: Comments Received from the Borrover \. 12
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
I\. Introduction \. \. \. 13
II\. The Environment \. \. 13
III\. Cr6dit de la C5te d'Ivoire \. 14
IV\. SSE Promotion Institutions and Instruments \.--\. 16
V\. The Project \. \. 18
VI\. Conclusions\. 21
Annexes:
1\. Loans Outstanding by September 30, 1982 \. 23
2\. Distribution of Subloans According to Size \. \. 24
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
Page No\.
3\. List of Subprojects Financed under Loan 1162-IVC \. 25
4\. Geographical Distribution of Subloans \. 29
5\. Arrears Position of Subloans (in number) \. 30
6\. Arrears Position of Subloans (in CFAF '000) \. 31
7\. Analysis of Arrears as of March 31, 1982 \. 32
8\. Estimates and Actual Performance of 11 Subprojects w\. 33
9\. Cumulative Disbursements 34
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
IVORY COAST - SMALL SCALE ENTERPRISE PROJECT
(LOAN 1162-IvC)
PREFACE
This is the performance audit under Bank Loan 1162-IVC for US$5\.6
million, approved on August 21, 1975, and made to Credit de la Cote d'Ivoire
(CCI) for onlending to small scale enterprises\. During implementation,
US$1\.03 million of the Loan was cancelled because of corresponding cancella-
tions of subloans and the availability of a second Bank Loan for small and
medium enterprises (Loan 1663-IVC approved on March 6, 1979), which was less
expensive and had more flexible eligibility conditions\. CCI has also
received Bank loans for tourism development\. The first SSE loan, reviewed in
this report, was fully disbursed, net of cancellations, in July 1982, three
years after the original closing date\.
The Bank has not extended, beyond the second, any other loans to
CCI for SSE\. Recognizing the limited achievements of these two projects, the
Bank changed its approach to industrial lending in Ivory Coast, moving away
from supporting individual DFCs and into apex operations involving a broader
spectrum of financial institutions including the commercial banks\. Such an
approach places greater emphasis on sectoral and policy issues and involves
the apex institution in bank supervision and institution building\. Also, in
recognition of the fact that CCI's past problems stemmed, to some extent,
from the environment (i\.e\. the financial and banking system) in which it
operated, the Bank in early 1984 carried out a review of the banking sector
in the Ivory Coast which identified a number of problems and made recommenda-
tions for improving the operation of Ivorian banks, including CCI\.
The Project Performance Audit Report (PPAR) consists of a Project
Performance Audit Memorandum (PPAM) prepared by the Operations Evaluation
Department (OED) and a Project Completion Report (PCR) prepared by the
Western Africa Regional Office of the Bank\. The PPAM is based on the
attached PCR, the Staff Appraisal and President's Reports, the loan
documents, sector studies, economic reports, the summary of the Board
discussion, study of the project files and discussions with Bank staff\. An
OED mission visited the Ivory Coast in June/July 1984 and discussed the
effectiveness of the Bank's assistance with CCI, Government agencies, and a
sample of CCI's clients\. Their kind cooperation and valuable assistance in
the preparation of this report is gratefully acknowledged\.
The PCR ably and candidly describes the project experience, high-
lighting particularly the underperformance of the supportive institutions,
the need for follow-up, and the importance of Government commitment to SSE
promotion\. The PPAM elaborates on and updates some aspects of the project
experience and draws lessons for future Bank SSE operations\. CCI's comments
have been taken into account in finalizing the report and are reproduced as
Attachment A\.
PROJECT PERDRMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET
IVORY COAST - SMALL SCALE ENTERPRISE PROJECT
(LOAN 1162-IVC)
KEY PROJECT DATA
(Amounts in us$)
LOAN POSITION
As of 12/31/84
Original Disbursed Cancelled Repaid Outstanding
Loan 1162-IVc 5\.60 4\.57 - 1\.03 2\.10 2\.47
CULMULATIVE LOAN DISBURSEMENTS
FY76 FY77 FY78 FY79 PY80 FY81 Fr82
(i) Planned 0\.68 2\.52 4\.80 5\.60 5\.60 5\.60 5\.60
(ii) Actual - - - 1\.76 3\.23 3\.86 4\.57
(iii) (ii) as Z of (i) - - - 31 58 69 82
OTHER PROJECT DATA
Actual or
Item Original Plan Estimated Actual
First Mention in Files
of timetable 10/02/74
Negotiations 06/23/75 06/23/75
Board Approval 08/21/75 08/21/75
Loan Agreement Date 09/05/75 09/05/75
Effectiveness Date 02/02/76 02/02/76
Closing Date 06/30/79 06/30/82
Borrower Crfdit de la C3te d'Ivoire
Fiscal Year of Borrover 10/1-9/30
MISSION DATA
Month No\. of No\. of Date of
Year Weeks Persons Manweeks Report
Preparation 12/73 n\.a\. n\.a\. n\.a\. 02/27/74
Appraisal 12/74 3\.6 4 14\.4 07/21/75
Total 3\.6 14\.4
Supervision I 06/76 2\.9 2 8\.0 09/20/76
Supervision II 06/77 2\.6 2 7\.2 07/22/77
Supervision III 06/78 2\.4 2 6\.8 02/12/79 *
Supervision IV 05/79 1\.0 2 2\.0 06/01/79
Supervision V 05/80 1\.3 2 2\.6 07/10/80
Supervision VI 12/81 1\.0 1 1\.0 01/27/82
Completion 06/82 1\.0 1 1\.0 04/30/83
Total 12\.2 28\.6
FOLLOW-ON PROJECTS
A second line of credit to CCI (Loan 1663-IvC) in the amount of US$12\.6 million Was
approved on March 6, 1979\.
* Includes appraisal of 1663-IVC\.
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
IVORY COAST - SMALL SCALE ENTERPRISE PROJECT
(LOAN 1162-IVC)
HIGHLIGHTS
With over ninety percent of private sector industrial assets owned
by foreigners, development of small scale enterprises (SSE) had long been
viewed as a means of promoting Ivorian entrepreneurship, employment genera-
tion and a more balanced regional development\. To advance these objectives,
the Government established in 1968 a promotion agency (Office for the Promo-
tion of Ivorian Enterprises -- OPEI) to provide training and technical
assistance to SSE, as well as to help prepare and appraise SSE projects for
financing by Ivorian commercial and development banks\. A Guarantee Fund and
a Participation Fund were also set up in 1963 and 1973, respectively\. The
project under review, made to the Crfdit de la C6te d'Ivolre (CCI) in 1975,
was the first Bank loan in support of SSE development in the Ivory Coast\. In
designing the project, rather than providing funds to the entire Ivorian
banking network, the Bank decided that CCI should be the sole intermediary,
for that would give a better chance for closer cooperation with OPEl whose
participation was viewed as critical to the success of an SSE project, and
would also facilitate institution building within CCI (paras\. 1-5)\.
The project, which was complex, innovative and of a pilot nature,
largely failed to meet its objectives\. CCI's institutional development
remained below expectations, its role in the promotion of SSE was limited,
and the quality of its portfolio has deteriorated\. Technical assistance to
SSE became increasingly ineffective and the cooperation between CCI and OPEl
has not been as effective as hoped\. The performance of the Guarantee and
Participation Funds was equally disappointing\. Subproject performance has
been poor, as a result of the general economic environment, unrealistic
appraisal assumptions, insufficient screening of promoters, OPEI's inadequate
technical assistance, deficiencies in control over disbursements and project
implementation, and lack of follow-up\. Expectations of commercial bank cofi-
nancing also proved unrealistic (paras\. 11-20, 24-26)\.
While CCI has improved somewhat its appraisal capability over the
years, further improvements are still possible\. The deterioration in CCI's
financial position suggests the need for more carefuL project selection,
recruitment of additional professional staff, improvement of accounting and
auditing systems, strengthening of supervision and loan collection
procedures, and capital restructuring\. A review of the financial sector
recently undertaken by the Bank is expected to lead to the development of an
action program for CCI's recovery\. OPEl was reorganized several times, and
finally transformed into a civil service agency\. With its salaries reduced,
it lost many qualified Ivorian staff, and its effectiveness deteriorated\.
Under two structural adjustment loans, the Bank has been attempting to assist
in revitalizing OPEl (paras\. 10, 21)\.
- iv -
The project experience is instructive in many respects\. It sug-
gests (a) the critical importance of sector work and of a circumspect
appraisal effort in order to appreciate better the workings of the financial
system in the country, to identify gaps in the financial structure and
institutional arrangements, and to enhance the Bank's capability to design
purposeful projects; (b) the need for a full understanding and appreciation
of the cultural background, attitudes and, generally, the way business is
conducted in a particular country; (c) that presentation of projects to the
Bank's Board should be advisedly deferred in order to allow time to better
assess the effectiveness and implications of unfolding institutional changes
and late-breaking local developments; (d) that commitment by the financial
intermediary and unswerving support by the Government to institutional
development are extremely important to achieve stated objectives; (e) the
importance of technical assistance for the success of SSE projects, and the
need for suitable cooperative arrangements between a financial institution
and a technical assistance delivery agency; (f) the desirability of inducing
small entrepreneurs to take a significant stake in their own enterprise to
guard against abandoning the project when the first difficulties arise;
(g) that the effectiveness of Guarantee Funds depends on being adequately
funded, well managed, and adapted to the task at hand; (h) the importance of
permitting banks an adequate spread on SSE loans; (i) that greater super-
vision effort is required by the Bank, particularly during the early years of
its association with new DFCs and technical assistance delivery agencies; and
(j) that staff compensation and overall conditions of employment remain a
vexing issue in state controlled financial intermediaries\. Finally, if the
Government's decision is that the DFC should bear the foreign exchange risk,
then it is advisable to institute a satisfactory risk insurance scheme to
effectively limit its exposure (para\. 33)\.
- 1 -
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMDRANDUM
IVORY COAST - SMALL SCALE ENTERPRISE PROJECT
(LOAN 1162-IVC)
I\. BACKGROUND
1\. With over 90% of private sector industrial assets owned by
foreigners, the Government and foreign aid organizations have long seen
support for small scale enterprises (SSE) to be a means of promoting Ivorian
entrepreneurship\. Employment generation and a more balanced regional
development were related objectives for assisting SSE\.
2\. In 1968, the Government established the Office for the Promotion of
Ivorian Enterprises (OPEI), a public sector agency designed to provide
training and technical assistance to Ivorian entrepreneurs, and to help
prepare investment projecta for later financing by local commercial or
development banks\. By 1973, OPEl had reportedly assisted 602 enterprises, of
which 159 had obtained financing\. At the end of 1974, OPEl had 126 staff,
including 39 Ivorian professionals and 33 expatriate technical assistants
from UNIDO, as well as from French, German and U\.S\. bilateral assistance and
volunteer programs\.
3\. To encourage financing of SSE, the Government also established in
1968 a Fund to guarantee up to 80% of each loan provided by local financial
institutions to enterprises with majority Ivorian ownership\. In 1973, a
separate Participation Fund to provide Ivorian-owned enterprises with
subordinated loans (of up to 15% of project costs) was created within SONAFI,
an agency which administered Government participation in industrial and cor
mercial enterprises\.
4\. Aside from commercial banks, financing for SSE had also been
provided by Credit de la Cote d'Ivoire (CCI)\. CCI was established in 1955
with the Government owning 75% of its equity, CCCE holding 17%, and BCEAO the
remaining 8%\. Originally it financed mainly housing, automobiles, and
household equipment, but by 1975 it had expanded its scope of activities to
lending also to artisans, trade, industry and tourism\. It provides short to
long term loans, guarantees and, more recently, a limited number of equity
investments (PCR, para\. 1\.01)\.
II\. OBJECTIVES AND PROJECT DESIGN
5\. A major issue for the project was whether the Bank should provide
its financing through all the commercial and development banks in the Ivory
Coast or through a single institution\. It was decided to use CCI as a sole
intermediary so that efforts in support of SSE would be better focussed and
the necessary coordination with OPEL could be more easily achieved\.
- 2 -
6\. The objectives of the Bank loan were: to provide financial
assistance to small Ivorian entrepreneursl/ through CCI, to improve the
quality and focus of the technical assistance provided by OPE1, to develop
cooperation between OPEl and CCI, to improve the working of the Guarantee and
Participation Funds, and to learn more about effective SSE assistance (SAR,
para\. 5\.01)\. Increased lending by commercial banks to SSE was also an
implied objective (PCR, para\. 5\.02)\.
7\. The bulk of the loan was expected to finance projects in specific
subsectors (branches) identified and studied by OPEl and approved by the
Bank\. Three branches had already been approved at appraisal -- woodworking,
garages, and bakeries\. Garment-making had been studied, but the "branch and
model" approach was rejected there because in that subsector each
project/enterprise had to be designed on the basis of a specified market
demand (SAR, para\. 5\.05)\. Bank subproject reviews were expected to be
limited to the first "model" subproject appraisal in each of the branches,
and to subprojects outside preapproved branches over an individual free limit
of CFAF 10 million (US$50,000 equivalent)\.
8\. Financing of an individual project out of Bank funds was limited to
a maximum of 60% of project costs (CCI's expected maximum level of
participation)\. The minimum contribution of owner's equity was 10% of total
project costs, while the 30% balance of financing required was expected to
come from either the promoter, the Participation Fund, or the commercial
banks\. In fact, the resources of the Participation Fund had been totally
exhausted by the time the Bank loan was appraised, but its replenishment was
not considered necessary because rediscountable term loans could substitute
for the Fund's contributions, especially since BCEAO had recently reduced to
10% of total costs the minimum equity required in projects for such
rediscounting (SAR, para\. 4\.13)\. Some of CCI's subloans were expected to
benefit from guarantees provided by the Guarantee Fund, and during the
negotiation of the Bank loan assurances were received from the Government
that the resources of the Guarantee Fund were being replenished and that this
Fund would charge a fee (1%) for its guarantees (SAR, para\. 5\.13)\.
9\. Concerning the link of financial with technical assistance, the
Bank appraisal mission had concluded that OPEl had "performed poorly due to
poor management, mediocre staff, lack of coordination, inadequate controls
and the absence of well defined priorities;" OPEI's technical assistance
capability suffered from "lack of appropriately experienced technicians and
low motivation of professionals;" and its accounts were "thoroughly confused"
(SAR, paras\. 1\.02, 4\.04, 4\.06)\. Along with Bank suggestions, OPEl was being
reorganized to give priority to certain SSE subsectors, and improved finan-
cial controls were instituted (SAR, paras\. 4\.15-4\.22)\. The Bank assumed
that, as OPEl was being reorganized, it would be in a position to extend
effectively technical assistance to SSEs\.
1/ The definition of SSE eligible for financing under the loa" was enter-
prises with a maximum total assets (including project assets) of CFAF 40
million (US$ 200,000 equivalent), a minimum 51% Ivorian ownership, and
Ivorian management\.
-3-
III\. EVOLUTION OF CCI AND SUPPORTING INSTITUTIONS
Technical Assistance to SSE
10\. While some progress was made in improving OPEI's operations, its
overall performance continued to be unsatisfactory, especially in terms of
the quality of assistance provided to SSE\. The reorganization on branch or
subsector lines earlier advocated by the Bank became diluted as OPEl
decentralized operations to several regional offices\. In 1980, OPEl was
merged with the Bureau de Developpement Industriel (BDI), which had been
providing advisory assistance to larger enterprises\. In 1982, it was
reorganized as the Centre d'Assistance et de Promotion de 1'Entreprise
Nationale (CAPEN), with less financial and operational autonomy\. Civil
service salary scales were imposed (meaning reductions in salaries of up to
50% in some cases), resulting in the loss of many capable Ivorian staff
members\. Its reorganization is now again being studied with a view to
increasing its financial and operational autonomy (PCR, paras\. 4\.08, 4\.10)\.
11\. As regards OPEI's cooperation with CCI, at the inception of the
project, CCI's Director General was appointed to OPEI's Board\. As lending
operations began, regular monthly (later quarterly) meetings between CCI's
and OPEI's Directors General were instituted to review progress under the
project, and a joint technical committee met twice monthly to review
projects\. When Bank loan disbursements began, CCI experimented for one year
with a procedure whereby OPEl would approve disbursements on CCI's SSE
subloans\. Also, the SAR had implied that OPEl would be responsible for
undertaking detailed studies of SSE branches, following which CCI would
perform simplified appraisals of individual subprojects (SAR, para\. 4\.16)\.
12\. However, this was not how the attempted cooperation between the two
institutions worked out in practice\. For a short period, OPEl did prepare
the subproject appraisals, which were then discussed by the joint technical
committee before being finalized for CCI's Board approval\. Subsequently,
however, OPEI's role was confined to identifying and preparing subprojects,
which were then appraised by CCI\. But OPEl was responsible for "technical
assistance follow up", which was all the project supervision that occurred,
since CCI has not established a follow-up capability of its own to this day,
aside from disbursement controls and efforts of its legal department to
recover on problem loans\. At one time, OPEl even argued that it should have
exclusive responsibility for all client contact\. However, OPEl was not
properly equipped to perform such a role, as indicated by the fact that the
experiment of allowing OPEl to approve subloan disbursements was abandoned
after CCI learned that OPEl had begun approving disbursements without
visiting the site of projects\. Because of OPEI's (and later CAPEN's) short-
comings and improvements in CCI's own appraisal capabilities, cooperation
between the two institutions gradually declined over the years\. When CCI
embarked on a major new SSE subsector under the loan (poultry), it did so
without any branch study by OPEI\.
-4-
13\. Despite efforts at reorganisation and the fact that OPEl had a
sizeable complement of expatriate technical staff aside from qualified
Ivorian professionals (para\. 2), OPEI's weaknesses (para\. 9), in particular
poor management, persisted\. As a result, the quality of its project prepara-
tion work remained weak\. The project profiles that it prepared were
considered too abstract and projections too optimistic by the banks,
reflecting poor market analyses\. Follow-up and technical assistance support
also were inadequate\.
The Guarantee and Participation Funds
14\. Following approval of the Bank loan, resources for SONAFI's Parti-
cipation Fund never were sufficiently replenished and SONAFI itself was
disbanded in 1980\. The Guarantee Fund has also since become ineffective
partly because of the lack of resources and partly because banks did not find
its conditions for payment on a guarantee reasonable, as they are first
required to prove that they have taken all possible legal measures to collect
on the loan, including liquidation of the enterprise and sale of its assets
-- steps which are often overly harsh, costly or impossible in the case of
very small borrowers\. Also, the screening process was poor\. It was an over-
sight for the Bank not to have undertaken during appraisal a more thorough
analysis of the modus operandi and effectiveness of the Guarantee Funds\.
15\. Even if these Funds had been operarional, one may question how
effective they might have proved to be\. Tb Participation Fund was designed
to permit a promoter to embark on an ente\.prise while investing as little as
10% of the total project cost\. Despite the absence of the Fund, CCI did use
this minimum for subprojects financed under the loan, and found it too small
- partly because CCI allows promoters to count as part of their contribution
services rendered in kind (e\.g\., supervision or construction work)\. CCI has
learned that when a promoter does not make a sufficient cash contribution to
a project, he is all too ready to abandon the enterprise if difficulties
arise\.
16\. A similar case can be made regarding the Guarantee Fund, which
added to the administrative complexity of approving these very small loans
while it contributed virtually nothing to the quality of projects financed\.
Also, the procedures for guarantee payments were too cumbersome and
exacting\. Before this Fund's resources were exhausted, it did encourage at
least CCI to provide loans with little or no collateral security require-
ments, which again (especially combined with the minimal cash contribution by
sponsors) made it all too easy for promoters to abandon projects if problems
arose\. It might be argued that the existence of these funds permitted a
qualified entrepreneur (perhaps even a technically qualified school graduate)
with little capital to launch an enterprise quickly\. However, it must also
be recognized that pushing such an individual too quickly into management of
a business (when he has had little or no practical management training or
experience, nor even experience of managing personal assets of any size)
entailed higher risks of failure, particularly considering the cultural
context\.
-5-
Evolution of CCI 2/
17\. Institution building within CCI was not a major, explicit goal of
the project; however, it was accorded more importance under the second SSE
loan which included a provision for foreign technical assistance\. CCI's
project appraisals have become more thorough, but further improvements are
still possible, including a more critical assessment of assumptions crucial
for the success of projects (e\.g\., management capability, market prospects
and proposed capacity of operation)\.
18\. CCI's financing approvals during the mid-1970s grew considerably
faster than forecast at appraisal, averaging for example CFAF 16\.5 billion
per annum in the two years ending September 30, 1979 (versus CFAF 9\.7 billion
forecast) \. This was mainly due to faster than expected growth in lending for
housing and vehicles, including small Ivorian trucking firms\. Because of
resource constraints and a decline of new investment opportunities, approvals
have fallen dramatically since 1977/78, and totalled only CFAF 7\.2 billion in
1981/82\. In real terms the decline would be even greater, considering that
inflation has averaged over 10% p\.a\. in recent years\. To improve resource
mobilization, CCI began accepting deposits from the public in 1982, and now
has about 4,000 such accounts with aggregate desposits of CFAF 3\.2 billion
(aside from large deposits from two Government agencies)\. Through 1982, the
bulk of CCT's financing has gone for housing (35%), automobiles (20%), and
consumer loans (16%), with private enterprises representing only 18%,
although recently it has devoted more resources to financing larger scale
private enterprises\.
19\. With the onset of recession in the 1980s, CCI's portfolio quality
has deteriorated significantly\. As of June 1984, 26% of its outstanding
loans were in arrears, or double the percentage as of June 1982\. Loans for
SSE were more severely affected by arrears, with 16% of the SSE portfolio in
arrears and 73% of the portfolio affected by arrears (PCR, Annex VII)\. CCI
has perennially shown a very low level of profitability with net profits of
less than 1% of average equity\. In 1982, its auditors recommended higher
levels of provisions which would have resulted in losses had CCI accepted
their recommendations\. In more recent years, CCI experienced losses due to
the decline in its activities, reduction in the spread as a result of the
rising cost of borrowing, increases in operating costs and write-offs of bad
debts\. A French auditing firm (with CCCE assistance) is undertaking a
special audit of CCI's portfolio as of September 1983\. Lack of timely
arrears information and of rigorously-enforced collection procedures,
difficulties in preparing the 1982/83 accounts (due partly to a transition to
a computer-based system) and in accurately assessing the portfolio quality
indicate weaknesses in CCI's financial and administrative management\.
20\. CCI has also exceeded the BCEAO limit on loans to staff (20% of net
worth), partly because it has financed housing rental ventures by employees\.
It would seem prudent to limit staff loans for housing to principal
residences, so that reimbursement could be guaranteed by deductions from
2/ For details see PCR, paras\. 3\.01-3\.09-
-6-
salaries\. Also, while the Government reportedly agreed informally to accept
the foreign exchange risk on the loan under review, this agreement did not
come in time to be written into the loan documents, and CCI apparently has
received no written confirmation; rather, CCI has recently been informed by
the Government that it will have to bear the exchange risk in this case as
well as on a USAID loan\. Unless this decision is reversed, the exchange
losses could significantly impair CCI's net worth\.
21\. CCI has about 273 staff, of whom 131 are professionals\. With high
turnover, CCI's junior professional staff are relatively inexperienced, while
its senior management has not always been sufficiently attentive to internal
operating problems\. Despite existing foreign technical assistance in opera-
tions, computer systems and commercial banking procedures, there is need for
further strengthening of technical support staff, particularly in financial
management and accounting\. Additional recruitment of qualified Ivorian staff
for appraisal and (especially) follow-up activities is called for\. Given
that administrative expenses increased from about 2\.7% of average total
assets in 1980/81 to a high 3\.2% in 1981/82, efforts should be made to
restrain the number of non-professional support staff\. The deterioration in
CCI's financial position suggests the need for more careful project selec-
tion, restraint on lending to staff and their families, improvement of
accounting and auditing systems, stre'gthening of supervision and loan
collection procedures, and capital restructuring\. CCI's difficulties, and
more generally, the problems facing other specialized banks and the financial
system as a whole, prompted the Bank to undertake in 1984 a review of the
financial sector (presently in draft form)\. The findings and recommendations
of this study, following discussions with the Government, are expected to
lead to the development of an action program for CCI's recovery\.
IV\. EVALUATION OF LOAN FEATURES AND CONDITIONS
The Branch and Model Project Approach
22\. The idea of undertaking detailed studies on specific SSE subsectors
was worthwhile in the sense that most of the loan funds were in fact employed
in the three subsectors identified at the time of appraisal: woodworking,
garages and bakeries\. Identification of these branches assisted OPEl in
organizing itself on subsectoral lines, thereby increasing its ability to
perform in these areas, before further reorganizations rendered the
institution increasingly less effective\. On the other hand, the model
project approach per se was perhaps most useful in the case of bakeries and
poultry projects, but less so for woodworking and garages, where the type of
equipement required varied significantly from project to project depending on
the particular capability of the entrepreneur and the market he intended to
serve\. However, neither OPEl nor CCI seems to have obtained the full benefit
of this approach, for instance, by developing detailed knowledge of types of
ovens used by bakeries and their relative advantages\.
23\. The basic concept behind the branch approach - that OPEl would
continue to carry out thorough subsector studies which would help CCI (and
- 7 -
other banks) to undertake individual project appraisals - was not imple-
mented, however\. In fact, OPEl carried out the individual appraisals without
completing new branch studies or updating those performed in pre-identified
branches\. By the time individual loans were approved in the pre-identified
branches, the original studies related to those branches were of little use,
being far out of date\. In any case, it was apparently difficult to identify
additional branches where a large number of repetitive SSE subloans could be
made\. Finally, the decline of cooperation between OPEl and CCI was evident
in the fact that when CCI began preparing its own appraisals, its staff did
not even know about the branch studies OPEl had previously prepared\. One new
branch with a large number of similar projects was financed under the loan -
poultry - but in this subsector, OPEl was not involved\. CCI did carry out a
detailed -model project- appraisal for the first subloan in this branch, but
that was a far less thorough approach than previously envisioned for branch
studies (including comprehensive surveys of market, existing capacity,
alternative production techniques, etc\.)\.
Subproject Financing Scheme and Conditions
24\. As previously mentioned (para\. 15), the minimum 10% equity contri-
bution by promoters proved to be too low\. Also, the expectation that com-
mercial banks would cofinance up to 30% of the costs of subprojects proved
unrealistic\. Commercial banks were reluctant to cofinance CCI's SSE
projects, in part because SSE was not a priority for them, but also because
initially CCI's appraisals failed to improve on OPEI's poor project prepara-
tion work while later, as CCI's appraisal capabilities developed, it became
more of a competitor of commercial banks (in deposit-taking and short-term
lending)\. Thus, CCI's staff spent considerable time and effort trying to
encourage commercial banks to cofinance, resulting in delays and administra-
tive costs difficult to recoup on such small loans\. For the subborrower,
this meant that he had to fend for himself and no attempt was made to help
establish a firm link and effective coordination between term lending and
working capital available from the commercial banks at the time of subloan
appraisal\. In this regard, the Bank did not try to forge a link between
working capital and term lending\. However, the issue (and cofinancing in
general) became less relevant subsequently with CCI's increasing short-term
lending role - a development however which was not foreseen during loan
appraisal\. Some projects apparently have had working capital problems, but
these were usually symptoms of more fundamental problems (see para\. 26)\.
Finally, the maximum of CFAF 40 million (US$200,000 equivalent) of total
assets for an enterprise to qualify as an SSE proved restrictive, particular-
ly given the delays in implementation of the project, the rate of inflation
and foreign exchange realignments experienced in equipment costs\. Adjustment
of the limit to take account of inflation and exchange rate fluctuations
seems to have been called for\.
-8-
V\. UTILIZATION OF BANK FUNDS 3/
25\. Implementation of the project was considerably delayed because of
new BCEAO interest rate regulations which took effect in July 1975 and
limited to 8\.5% the interest rate that could be charged on SSE loans\. By
contrast, the Bank loan carried an interest rate of 8\.5% and was expected to
be onlent to SSE at 13% (including a 1% fee for the Government's assuming the
foreign exchange risk)\. This issue was not resolved until April 1977, when
the Government agreed to compensate CCI for the difference (PCR, paras\. 5\.14, a
5\.15)\.4/ In part because of the above factors, the loan was only disbursed
by July 1982, three years after the original closing date\. A portion
(US$1\.03 million) was cancelled because of subloan cancellations and
availability of a second, lower cost Bank loan with easier subproject
financing conditions (100% of CCI's subloans for SSE were financed, including
enterprises with assets of up to CFAF 75 million)\.
26\. Net of cancellations, 83 subprojects were financed under the loan,
with an average subloan size of US$54,400, compared with 130 subprojects
estimated at appraisal\. Actual data were available on a sample of only
eleven of these subprojects, seven of which had cost overruns (due in some
cases to underestimates of price increases and in others to a larger capacity
installed than foreseen t appraisal)\. The investment cost per job created
on these projects averaged less than US$10,000\. The two largest subsectors
financed were bakeries and poultry, followed by wood industries, garages, and
printing\. As of March 31, 1984, all but nine of the 83 subprojects were in
arrears, many for periods of two years or more\. Arrears totalled 43% of
installments due, excluding any interest on overdue amounts\. While some
projects are only in temporary difficulty or are making some repayments, and
a few were partially guaranteed by the Guarantee Fund, in most cases CCI has
little security outside of the project assets and thus it stands to incur
substantial losses on these projects\. As indicated in the PCR (paras\. 5\.11-
5\.12), lack of follow-up work by CCI inhibits a full assessment of the
reasons for arrears\. However, poor management appears to be the most signi-
ficant reason for failure of projects, particularly the lack of general
business skills rather than technical qualifications, followed by weak
markets reflecting in part the weakness of the overall economy in recent
years\. Unrealistic appraisal assumptions, insufficient screening of pro-
moters, OPEI's inadequate technical assistance, deficiencies in control over
disbursements and project implementation, and lack of follow-up by CCI all
played a part in the arrears record\. Initially, the bakery sector has had
the most successes; however, it now suffers from overcapacity suggesting poor
market analysis\. In the case of the poultry farms, a basic flaw in the
scheme - no direct marketing by the corporation that assisted and bought the
product from outgrowers -- resulted in inadequate profit margins and many
abandoned farms\.
3/ For details see PCR, paras\. 5\.06-5\.13\.
4/ No compensation has yet been paid to CCI\.
- 9 -
VI\. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BANK'S APPRAISAL AND SUPERVISION WORK
\. 27\. While the Bank recommended some improved methods of operation for
OPEl and the Guarantee Fund during project preparation and appraisal, it had
no venue for close involvement with these institutions during project imple-
* mentation\. In particular, the Bank failed to establish specific arrangements
linking effectively technical asistance (OPEI) with SSE financing (CCI) by
a not including OPEl in the project design in a fashion that would have enabled
the Bank to monitor the delivery of technical assistance (PCR, para\. 6\.03)\.
Similarly, the Bank did not see to it that appropriate mechanisms were set up
for the supervision of SSE subprojects\. At the time of conversion of OPEl to
CAPEN, the Bank urged that, to be meaningful, such reconstitution needed to
be accompanied by extensive institutional reforms\. However, the Bank's sug-
gestions were not heeded\. Subsequently, the Bank has had discussions with
the Government regarding the future reorganization of CAPEN, in part in
connection with two Structural Adjustment Loans (PCR, paras\. 4\.08-4\.10)\. As
a result, a review of the role and operations of CAPEN as well as of other
SSE supporting institutions was undertaken by a working group, with a view to
suggesting reforms of the existing institutional set up\. Their report is
presently under review by the Government and the Bank, and it is expected
that their recommendations will be translated into an action program to be
implemented by mid-1985\.
28\. During appraisal, CCI was judged a competent, well-managed finan-
cial institution that could develop an effective SSE lending capacity\.
Technical assistance provided under the Tourism and second SSE loans has
helped strengthen CCI's appraisal work\. The Bank has recommended that CCI
establish a follow-up role in recent supervision missions, but it should have
insisted on this from the inception of the project\.
29\. One area in which the Bank's supervision work appears to have
suffered is in neglecting the branch or subsector approach that was so
central to the appraisal\. Early on, OPEl was not pressed to update the
branch studies it had previously undertaken, nor to complete studies of new
branches\. CCI itself prepared a detailed model project for the first poultry
subloan, but it was not the thorough subsector study originally envisaged\.
One potential benefit of this approach was to minimize the delay and Bank
* staff time required to approve subloans\. When the branch approach was
abandoned, the Bank reverted to the free limit method of reviewing subloan
appraisals, and 51 of the subprojects were apparently reviewed in this
manner\. This represented a considerable commitment of Bank staff time and
caused considerable delays in implementation of some subprojects, although
reportedly it did not result in significant improvements in the design of
subprojects\. As a means of improving CCI's appraisal work, it was somewhat
redundant and less effective than the on-site technical advice financed by
the Bank through other loans to CCI\.
30\. A final point should be made regarding the timing of the loan,
which appears to have been premature, despite the considerable investment of
Bank staff time in preparation work\. At the time the loan was approved, OPEl
was still undergoing reorgani=ation, and working procedures with CCI had not
- 10 -
yet been fully clarified\. The appraisal's optimism that these matters would
work out satisfactorily was not borne out in practice, and with no ongoing
involvement with OPEI, the Bank did not have the necessary leverage in the
promotion of assistance to SSE (PCR, para\. 6\.03)\. Delaying negotiations
until the reorganization and role of OPEl was clarified might have been
advisable\. A second reason for waiting before approving the loan was BCEAO's
imposition of the 8\.5% ceiling on SSE loans, which delayed implementation for
almost two years\. This ruling was in fact promulgated before loan
negotiations, though it took effect afterwards\. A greater sensitivity on the
part of the Bank to these conditions within the Ivory Coast (as regards
timing of the loan) might have enabled more speedy resolution of the issues
involved\.
VII\. CONCLUSIONS
31\. This was the first loan for SSE development in the Ivory Coast\.
The project was complex, innovative and experimental for the Bank but it
largely failed to meet its objectives\. CCI's institutional development
remained below expectations, its role in the promotion of SSE was limited,
and the quality of its portfolio deteriorated (paras\. 17-21)\. Technical
assistance to SSE became increasingly ineffective and the cooperation between
CCI and OPEl has not been as effective as hoped (paras\. 10-13)\. The perfor-
mance of the Guarantee and Participation Funds was equally disappointing
(paras\. 14-16)\. Subproject performance has been poor, in part because of the
general economic environment, but also because of unrealistic appraisal
assumptions, insufficient screening of promoters, OPEI's inadequate technical
assistance, deficiencies in control over disbursements and project implemen-
tation, delegation of subproject supervision to OPEl which failed to
discharge this function and the lack of follow-up by CCI (paras\. 25, 26)\.
High expectations of commercial bank cofinancing proved unrealistic (para\.
24)\.
32\. While lending to SSE through CCI was conceptually the correct
decision for the Bank at the time, and while CCI has improved its appraisal
capabilities, the overall institutional status of CCI and the SSE technical
assistance agency and the procedures for cooperation between the two are
still far from adequate to sustain a project of this nature today\. CCI needs
considerable strengthening, particularly in financial management and account-
ing, follow-up and collections\. CCI still does not have a follow-up unit in
operation, despite having a portfolio afflicted with heavy arrears (paras\.
12, 13)\. The role of the SSE technical assistance delivery agency must be
stressed and the Government's commitment to make it effective must be
demonstrated\. The extent of the improvements required do not imply a
gradual, evolutionary approach, but a thorough overhaul, particularly of
CAPEN, but also of CCI\. To be sure, even an ideal institutional structure
cannot avoid all problems in SSE lending, particularly when new enterpreneurs
face unforeseen environmental problems\. Yet, major improvements in financial
and technical assistance institutions in the Ivory Coast, while not
sufficient, are certainly necessary for successful SSE lending in the future\.
- 11 -
33\. The project experience is instructive in many respects\. It sug-
gests (a) the critical importance of sector work preceding project
preparation and of a circumspect appraisal effort in order to appreciate
better the workings of the financial system in the country, to identify gaps
in the financial structure and institutional arrangements, and to enhance the
Bank's capability to design purposeful projects (paras\. 12-19); (b) that in
preparing projects with innovative features, there is a special need for a
full understanding and appreciation of the cultural background, attitudes
and, generally, the way business is conducted in a particular country (para\.
20); (c) that presentation of projects to the Bank's Board should be
advisedly deferred in order to allow time to better assess the effectiveness
and implications of on-going institutional reorganizations and late-breaking
local developments (para\. 30); (d) that commitment by the financial
intermediary and unswerving support by the Government to institutional
development are extremely important if stated objectives are to be achieved
(paras\. 17-21, 28, 32); (e) the importance of technical assistance for the
success of SSE projects, and the need for suitable cooperative arrangements
between a financial institution and a technical assistance delivery agency
(paras\. 24, 26, 27, 29); (f) the desirability of inducing small enterpreneurs
to take a significant stake in their owu enterprise to guard against aban-
doning the project when the first difficulties arise (para\. 15); (g) the
limited applicability of the -branch and model- project approach (paras\. 22,
23); (h) that the effectiveness of Guarantee Funds depends on being
adequately funded, well managed, and adapted to the task at hand (paras\.
14-16); (i) the danger of fragmentation of responsibilities among
institutions involved in processing SSE loans (paras\. 11-16); (j) the need
for adjusting SSE subloan limits or asset size for inflation and foreign
exchange rate fluctuations (para\. 24); (k) the ioportance of permitting banks
an adequate spread on SSE loans (para\. 19); (1) that greater supervision
effort is required by the Bank, particularly during the early years of its
association with new DFCs and technical assistance delivery agencies (paras\.
27-29); and (m) that staff compensation and overall conditions of employment
remain a vexing issue in state controlled financial intermediaries (paras\.
10, 21)\. Finally, if the Government's decision is that the DFC should bear
the foreign exchange risk, then it is advisable to institute a satisfactory
risk insurance scheme to effectively limit its exposure (para\. 20)\.
- 12 -
ATTACHMENT A
COM1MENTS RECEIVED FROM THE BORROWER
OFFICIAL TRANSLATION FROM FRENCH ORIGINAL
Credit de la Cote d'Ivoire
Abidjan, Ivory Coast Abidjan, January 28, 1985
s
Mr\. Yukinori Watanabe
Director, Operations Evaluation
Department
World Bank, Washington, D\.C\.
Project Performance Audit Report (Loan 1162-IVC)
Dear Sir:
After careful reading of the above Project Performance Report, we
have no particular comments to make as to its substance\.
This line of credit was in fact an experimental one and was carried
out in an environment largely unprepared to meet the requirements connected
with the problems of small-scale enterprises\.
Some problems still remain unsolved of course, whether the Guarantee
Fund that never functioned or the question of exchange risk coverage that is
still under discussion\.
Would you please make the following corrections to the Project
Completion Report:
Para\. 3\.04 As of September 30, 1982, annual loan approvals under the
general activities of CCI stood at CFAF 13\.2 billion, not
Text CFAF 7\.2 billion\.
amended Para\. 3\.07\. CCI's Board of Directors consists of seven
Government-appointed members, four representatives of BCEAO and one from
CCCE\.
This composition results from the capital increase of July 6, 1979,
which brought CCI's capital to CFAF 4\.8 billion held as follows:
58\.4% by the Ivorian State
33\.3% by BCEAO
8\.3% by CCCE\.
We thank you for this objective and interesting report\.
/s/ R\. Amichia
IVORY COAST
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
SNALL SCALE ENTERPRISE PROJECT
(LOAN 1162-IVC)
I\. INTRODUCTION
1\.01 The Cr4dit de la CSte d'Ivoire (CCI), selected by the Bank to channel
proceeds of the IBRD loan to Small Scale Enterprises (SSEa) is a Multipurpose
development bank established in 1955\. It has a majori -Government
shareholding (75%)\. Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique (CCCE) holds
17% and Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de 1'Ouest (BCEAo) holds the
remaining 8%\. CCI finances housing, industry, trade, artisans, small
household equipment and automobiles\. It provides short-, medium- and long-
term loans, equity participations and guarantees to private or public
corporations and individuals\. CCI has its headquarters in Abidjan and five
branch offices in Bouake, Abengourou, Daloa, Korhogo and Nan\.
II\. THE ENVIRONMENT
A\. The Industrial Sector
2\.01 The industrial development of the Ivory Coast has so far been
oriented toward import substitution and processing of agricultural goods both
for the domestic market and for exports to the CEAO (Commanaut- Economique de
l'Afrique de l'Ouest) regional market (and to a lesser degree, the European
Economic Community)\. Fueled by political stability and generous incentives
which have attracted significant foreign capital, the manufacturing sector has
expanded rapidly and has been one of the most dynamic elements in the
development of the Ivory Coast\. Since the early 1960's manufacturing grew at
an annual rate of 13%, in real terms, and its share in GNP has increased from
4% in 1960 to 13% in 1978\. Between 1970 and 1979 the share of manufactured
goods in the country's total exports rose from 24% to 37% with food
processing, textiles and wood products as the leading sectors\.
2\.02 The industrial sector in the Ivory Coast can be characterized by:
(a) predominance of large scale enterprises, which account for 87% of total
industrial output; (b) limited links between large scale, particularly
foreign, and small-scale local enterprises; (c) high proportion of foreign
ownership and management (42% of industry is foreign-owned; even Ivorian-owned
enterprises have mostly foreign top and middle management) and
(d) concentration of industry in the Abidjan area\.
2\.03 Industrial development has been encouraged by Government efforts to
provide adequate industrial and other infrastructure\. Although these have
been concentrated in the Abidjan area, a recent decision to create industrial
estates in other parts of the country should help promote some
decentralization of industry\. However, little has been done to provide
appropriate training in technical and managerial skills tailored to the needs
of industry\. This is mostly due to the widespread appeal of general studies
- 14 -
and civil service employment\. The shortage of trained manpower combined with
generous social and wage policies contributes to the low productivity and the
high costs of labor in general and in industry in particular\.
2\.04 After two decades of industrial development the industrial sector in
the Ivory Coast is now facing the following limitations: (a) the resource
base of the country is narrow aad the domestic market too small; (b) Ivorian a
manufacturing is not competitive because of low productivity, high labor costs
and high effective protection; (c) prospects for new import substitution
projects are not bright; and (d) institutional support for industry is not
adequate\.
B\. Small and Medium Scale Enterprise (SHE) Promotion
2\.05 There are in the Ivory Coast a number of institutions that were
created by the Government with the specific mandate of providing technical
assistance to SME's\. However, they have so far been ineffective in fulfilling
their promotional role\. This was the result of a lack of clear Government
policy for the development of SHE's, the poor management of these institutions
and a lack of coordination among them\.
III\. CREDIT DE LA COTE D'IVOIRE
A\. Operations 1976-1982
3\.01 CCI's operations until the end of 1974 consisted mostly of loans for
housing, and to consumers and small and medium scale enterprises\. However,
over the years CCI has found it necessary for competitive reasons to become
more involved in financing large scale enterprises and since 1982 it has been
gradually expanding its operations to include commercial banking\.
3\.02 CCI's operations were seriously affected by BCEAO's 1975 reforms
which abolished the distinction between commercial and development banks,
reduced access to rediscount facilities, and prohibited financial institutions
from charging more than 8\.5% interest to Small Scale Enterprises (SSE's) in
member countries of the Union Mon6taire Ouest Africaine (UMOA)\. This new
policy on SSE's had significant implications for the Bank loan, since CCI had
agreed to charge 12% on Bank funds, plus 1% commission to cover the foreign
exchange risk which is borne by the Government\.
3\.03 By the end of September 1982, CCI had invested CFAF 47\.9 billion
(US$141 million), most of which (56%) were in medium term loans\. Long term
and short term loans represented 19% and 8% respectively\. About 17% of its
outstanding portfolio represented doubtful accounts, some of which involved
litigation\. As of September 30, 1982 the largest proportion of CCI's
outstanding portfolio (36%) was in housing/property\. Automobile loans
represented 16% of the portfolio and loans to industrial enterprises, 10%\.
The remaining portfolio included loans to artisans, state institutions,
hotels, consumer durables, etc\. (Annex I)\.
- 15 -
3\.04 CCI has been facing increasing resource constraints including limited
access to deposits from state institutions\. Its arrears have been increasing
steadily, its lending activities have declined and annual loan approvals,
which had reached a high of CPAP 17 billion in FY1978, have progressively
* declined to CFAF 9\.2 billion in 1981 and CFAP13\.2 billion in 1982\.
B\. Financial Performance, 1976-1982
3\.05 CCI has never been a highly profitable institution, although it did
manage to make small profits\. 1976 was a good year for CCI\. However, since
then its financial performance has progressively deteriorated\. The country's
deep recession and tight monetary policies and the downturn in economic
activities contributed significantly to such performance\. CCI's lending,
particularly lucrative automobile credits, declined, cost of borrowings
increased, operating costs grew steadily and CCI's arrears position
worsened\. CCI's profitability has declined since 1979 as demonstrated by the
financial indicators below\. Expressed as a percentage of average equity, net
profit declined from 1% in 1979 to \.4% in 1982\. The decline of net profits as
a percentage of average total assets was not as significant\. Financial
statements for 1981 and 1982 report profits of CPAF 16\.6 million and 20\.9
million respectively\. However, if appropriate provisions for losses are
included in the financial statements, the result would most likely be net
losses for both years\. The debt/equity ratio in 1979 and 1980 were 9\.6 and
10\.2:1, well above the 8 1/3:1 limit stipulated in the Bank's legal
documents\. This was resolved with an increase in share capital which improved
the ratios for 1981 and 1982 to 4\.2 and 4\.5:1 respectively\.
CCI Financial Indicators
1979 1980 1981 1982
Net profits as a % of
average equity 1\.0 1\.3 \.5 \.4
Net Profit as a % of
average total assets \.05 \.06 \.03 \.04
Debt/Equity Ratio 9\.6 10\.2 4\.2 4\.5
3\.06 Arrears (principal and interest) as of August 31, 1981 represented
over 8% of CCI's portfolio, up from 7% in 1980\. Loans affected by arrears of
more than six months accounted for 15% of the portfolio, against 9\.9% in 1980
and 9\.5% in 1979\. As a result, CCI's provisions to cover possible losses on
these loans have been increased to 4\.9% of the portfolio, up from 4\.1% in
1980\.
C\. Organization and Management
3\.07 CCI's Board of Directors consists of seven Government-appointed
members, one representative from CCCE and four from BCEAO\. A Government
commissioner, nominated by the Minister of Economy and Finance, has veto power
over Board decisions but has never exercised it\.
- 16 -
3\.08 The present Director General has been with CCI since its founding in
1955\. The three department heads reporting to him also have been with CCI for
a similar length of time\. The staff number 154, including 19 professionals
and 135 non-professionals\.
3\.09 Since its association with the Bank, CCI's capabilities in project
preparation and appraisal have significantly improved\. However, supervision
and follow-up of projects after disbursement is still defficient and continues
to be an issue raised with CCI management by every Bank supervision mission\.
IV\. SSE PROMOTION INSTITUTIONS
4\.01 Although CCI was the channel for financial assistance to SSE's, under
the Bank project, major participation was also expected from other Government
institutions responsible for SSE promotion such as the Office National de
Promotion de l'Entreprise Ivoirienne (OPEI), the Fonds de Garantie and the
Soci6t' Nationale de Financement (SONAFI) Fonds de Participation\.
A\. OPEl
4\.02 OPEl was established in 1968 as a public enterprise with financial
autonomy and a broad mandate to create, develop and improve the efficiency of
Ivorian small enterprises\. It was supervised by the Ministry of Planning and
the Ministry of Economy and Finance\.
4\.03 At the end of 1974, OPEl had 126 staff of which 39 were Ivorian
professionals and 33 expatriate technical assistants financed by either
bilateral or international aid\. Its resources came from the Government
budget\. OPEI's activities and performance were reviewed during Bank appraisal
mission and the general conclusions were that (a) the quality of its technical
assistance had been poor mainly because of lack of experienced technicians and
low motivation of professionals and (b) its financial management was
inadequate and financial accounts confused\. Nevertheless, OPEl had some
successes, for example in the promotion of bakeries, and bince substantial
reform of OPEl was under way at the time of project appraisal, it seemed like
the logical institution for delivery of technical assistance to SSE's\.
B\. Ponds de Garantie
4\.04 The Fonds de Garantie was establisted in 1968 as an autonomous public
institution with an initial capital grant of CFAF 100 million\. It was
authorized to guarantee up to 80% of loans, irrespective of maturities, to
enterprises with a minimum of 50% Ivorian ownership\. The fund's
administrative expenses were met by Government budget allocation\.
C\. SONAFI
4\.05 SONAFI was established in 1962, as a public institution whose
principal function was to hold and administer Government participations in and
provide special loans to industrial and commercial enterprises and to mobilize
national savings for the promotion of Ivorian investment\.
4\.06 The Government established within SONAFI a special fund, the Fonds de
Participation to provide quasi-equity financing to Ivorian entrepreneurs\. Its
- 17 -
main role was to complete the Ivorian entrepreneur's equity contribution in
order to meet BCEAO's rules for discountable medium-term loans guaranteed by
the Fonda de Garantie\. The Fonds de Participation could extend equity capital
to Ivorian enterprises up to 15% of investment costs, provided total project
costa did not exceed CFAF 50 million and the entrepreneur's contribution was a
minimum of 10%\.
D\. Current Status of SSE Promotion Institutions
a
4\.07 During project implementation, the expectations that these
institutions would provide effective assistance to SSE's did not
materialize\. Although some progress was made in improving OPEI's efficiency
(internal procedures were streamlined, staffing of the operational unit was
strengthened and four regional delegations were established to promote
projects and provide technical assistance in the interior of the country),
OPEI's output in terms of number of projects promoted and assisted remained
insufficient\. The Ponds de Garantie and SONAFI Fonds de Participation have
also not been as instrumental in SSE promotion as was hoped\. Although the
first did guarantee a few loans, SONAFI's resources have not been replenished
for years\.
4\.08 1980-1982 was a period of major reforms for the three institutions\.
In 1980 SONAFI was disbanded and OPEl was merged with the Fonds de Garantie
and the Bureau de D9veloppement Industriel (BDI)\. In 1981 the Fonds de
Garantie was dissolved and a new fund was created under the Caisse Autonome\.
Finally, in 1982, against strong reservations expressed by the Bank, the
Government created a new entity, the Centre d'Assistance et de Promotion de
'Entreprise Nationale (CAPEN), made up of OPEL, BDI and the Chambre des
Mgtiers\. Unlike OPEI, which enjoyed some financial and operational autonomy
and which could offer more attractive salaries than the civil service, CAPEN
had neither advantage and was generally viewed as another civil service
agency\. As a result of its new status, CAPEN lost the best OPEl staff (due to
30% to 50% cut in their salaries) and ended up with 265 staff (compared to
OPEI's 175) of which less than 20 could qualify as professionals\.
4\.09 Extensive discussions between the Bank and the Government followed
these reforms and a Working Group on Industrial Promotion was set up in late
1982 (in connection with the Bank's first Structural Adjustment Loan) to
discuss the status of CAPEN and to make specific proposals for maximizing its
effectiveness and that of other institutions providing assistance to SSE's,
including the Fonds de Garantie and Fonds de Participation\.
4\.10 Following the recommendations of the Working Group, the Government
now appears committed to establishing a workable institutional framework for
assistance to SSE's\. Its commitment is expressed in a recent statement in
which it proposed to (a) totally reorganize CAPEN (statutes and personnel),
making it autonomous yet with some degree of intervention to assure the
success of the country's overall industrial policy promotion and (b) regroup
the different funds, Fonds de Garantie, de Participation and de Bonification,
and provide them with the financial support which is indispensable for the
promotion of SSE's\. In order to assure coordination, CAPEN and the Group of
Funds will have a common Administrative Council with representatives from
Government, and the banking and industrial sectors\. It is expected that CAPEN
and the Group of Funds will be ready for operation by October 1983\.
- 18 -
V\. THE PROJECT
A\. Background
5\.01 In 1968 the Government adopted a policy of giving high priority to
the promotion of Ivorian small and medium scale enterprises as a means for
lessening dependence on foreign ownership and management in the private
sector\. In response, the Bank made two loans to the Ivory Coast in 1975: one
to CCI aimed at assisting SSE's and a second to BIDI for the development of
medium and large scale enterprises\. Although financing to Ivorian enterprises
did increase, the absence of technical assistance, a responsibility of OPEI,
prevented the Government scheme from achieving any significant degree of
success\.
B\. Objectives
5\.02 The basic objectives of the Bank loan to CCI were to (a) provide
financial assistance to small entrepreneurs; (b) improve the quality and focus
of technical assistance provided by OPEI; (c) develop cooperation between OPEl
and CCI and improve the working relationships between other institutions
involved (i\.e\., the Ponds de Garantie and the Fonds de Participation) and (d)
learn more about effective SSE promotion, assistance and financing policies
and procedures\. Another objective of the project, although not clearly stated
as one, was to increase the involvement of commercial banks on lending to
SSEs\. It was hoped that through this involvement SSEs would later be able to
rely on commercial banks for financing their working capital and other
requirements
5\.03 To best achieve these objectives, financial assistance to SSE's had
to be linked to adequate technical assistance\. It was, therefore, proposed
that OPEl would identify and promote enterprises in specific branches, where
repetitive operations were feasible, and where satisfactory training
existed\. Based on OPEI's experience, this approach seemed to have several
advantages\. OPEl would concentrate its manpower resources in specific areas
where it could build up significant competence and best satisfy the technical
assistance needs of entrepreneurs in those branches\.
5\.04 Three branches were identified during appraisal: garages, bakeries
and wood working\. Although the loaL's primary focus was on financing
entrepreneurs in these three branches some funds were available for financing
other miscellaneous enterprises\.
5\.05 The Bank loan was to be onlent to small-scale enterprises in the
secondary or tertiary sector\. These enterprises were to: (a) have assets not
exceeding CFAF 40\.0 million ($200,000 at appraisal); (b) have 51% Ivorian
ownership; and (c) be managed by Ivorian nationals\. Entrepreneurs were
required to contribute from their own funds at least 10% of the total
investment costs\. 60% of the balance would be financed by the Bank loan, and
30% by Ivorian commercial banks\.
- 19 -
C\. Utilization of Loan 1162-IVC
5\.06 The loan financed a total of 84 new small scale enterprises\. Of the
84 subprojects financed, 51 (or 61%) were above the free limit of $50,000 and
accounted for $3\.8 million or 83% of the total amount of the 3oan\. The
balance of $787,106 financed the remaining 33 subprojects below che free
limit\.
5\.07 The sectoraL distribution of the enterprises assisted by the loan is
as follows:
Amount % of
Branch No\. of Projects $ Total Amount
Garages 9 478,619 10
Bakeries 29 2,224,738 49
Woodworking 7 576,969 13
Printing Shops 3 170,278 4
Poultry Farms 33 880,918 19
Miscellaneous 3 239,114 5
Total 84 4,570,636 100
5\.08 Out of the total number of subprojects, 39 were identified by OPEI, 3
by commercial bank5 and the remaining 42 by CCI\. 33 of the subprojects
identified by CCI ;ere for poultry farmers\. Commercial bank financing was
involved in 50% of the total number of subprojects, instead of the 100%
participation foreseen during Bank appraisal\. The Soci&ti Gen:rale de Banque
de la C2te d'Ivoire (SGBCI) led with 22% of the total\.
5\.09 A compar-\.son of Bank appraisal projections with actual data 1/ is
summarized in the following table:
Bank Appraisal
Actual Projections
Bank Loan amount S 4\.57 m\. $ 5\.60 m\.
Number of enterprises assisted 84 130
Total value of p:-ojects S 7\.9 m\. S 9\.4 m\.
Employment created 844 1,600
Investment cost per job created $ 9,371 S 5,700
Financial Rates o2 Return
Bakeries (rang-- 14%-34%) 25% 25%
Woodworking (range 165-37%) 25% * 28%
Garages (range 12%-32e) 26% * 33%
1/ In the followin, \.1e and paragraphs, the term "actual data" is
also used to designate the figures and/or e-timates (for instance,
employment and rates of return) available in -CI's subproject appraisal
reports, or partial information provided by at -borrowers\.
* On the basis of CCI appraisal estimates for a saL -e consisting of
50% of subprojects in each branch\.
- 20 -
5\.10 The differences between actual data and projections are due partly to
the inflation experienced in the country and partly to OPEI' s failure to
thoroughly screen applicants\. Although the final number of subprojects
financed was 84, CCI had actually committed by the end of December 1979 a
total of 135 subprojects\. 51 subprojects were later abandoned for a variety
of reasons including lack of personal funds, lack of guarantees, lack of land\.
Ex-ante financial rates of return calculated on the basis of CCI appraisal
reports are very close to those projected by the Bank appraisal\. However, it
is most likely that ex-post financial rates of return, if calculated, would be
much lower than those in CCI appraisals\. The actual number of jobs created
was lower than estimated during appraisal\. In retrospect, appraisal estimates
were too optimistic\. CCI was not required to include economic rates of return
in its appraisals\.
5\.11 The weaknesses and poor choice of promotors have led to high arrears,
which by mid-1982 represented 33% of payments due\. Although this ratio is
high, it is not too far off the 30% rate that commercial banks in the Ivory
Coast are experiencing on their SSE loans\. An analysis of the entire
subproject portfolio indicates that as of March 1982 73% of subprojects
financed under the Bank loan were affected by arrears\. Out of the 84
subprojects financed, 33 were in arrears of more than one year\. Of the 33, 6
are with CCI lawyers (2 garages, 3 bakeries and 1 wood working)\. This high
level of loans in arrears while reflecting weak SSE performance also is
indicative of CCI's inadequate supervision and collecting efforts\. More
importantly, however, the failure of OPEl to supervise and provide adequate
technical assistance to SSE's and CCI's inability to assume that role, makes
it difficult to determine whether subproject difficulties stem from lack of
working capital, a saturated market, absence of marketing strategy, or just
bad faith of promo* ars unwilling to repay their debts\.
5\.12 As mentioned earlier, CCI does not have the capability to carry out
systematic supervision of its projects\. It was not, therefore, possible to
get information on actual performance of all 84 subprojects\. In response to
our request for such data CCI issued a questionnaire to all the enterprises
assisted but received response with actual data (3 years after start of
operations) for only 11 subprojects\. The sample is very small and it is not
clear to what extent it is representative of all subprojects\. Nevertheless,
since all branches, except printing shops, are represented, it may be
indicative of the overall performance of the 84 subprojects\. The sample which
is given in Annex VII is summarized in the following table:
Actual(9/30/81) CCI Appraisal Estimates
Total Investment Costs (CFAF) 390\.3 278\.5
Employment Created 121 111
Investment cost per job created $9,775 $8,502
Returns on Investment (R01)
Garages (range) 0-12% 58-71%
Bakeries (range) 4-68% 39-66%
Wood Works (range) 13-19% 37-40%
Poultry Farms (range) 30-355% 22%
Misc\. Ice Making 3% 22%
- 21 -
5\.13 Of the 11 subprojects, 7 had actual investment costs higher than
estimated\. Six subprojects created fewer jobs than estimated and four created
more\. One subproject, a garage, had actual investment 2 1/2 times higher than
the estimates but the capacity was also higher\. In most cases, actual Returns
on Investment were lower than estimated, and in some cases significantly
lower\. Only poultry farms registered returns higher than estimated\.
D\. Project Implementation
5\.14 During the first year of implementation the project faced serious
problems which delayed subproject commitments\. These delays were mostly due
to BCEAO's new policy on interest charged to SSE's, discussed earlier in the
report (paragraph 3\.02)\. BCEAO'S new policy was in conflict with IBERD's
objective under this project of onlending to SSE's at interest rates as close
as possible to market rates\. In order to alleviate CCI's difficulty and
expedite the utilization of the IBRD line of credit, the Government
established the Fonds de Bonificatioa to subsidize the differential between
BCEAO's rate of 8\.5% and the Bank's rate of 13%\. In April 1977, an exemption
to the BCEAO rule was obtained for CCI from the Kinistry of Finance permitting
CCI to qualify for this subsidy\. The exemption to the BCEAO rules affected 46
of the 84 subprojects financed, which had assets of less than CPAF 20\.0
million\. Up to this date, however, CCI has received no payment from the Fonds
de Bonification\.
5\.15 By December 1979 the line of credit was fully committed\. In fact CCI
had so many subprojects in its pipeline that in early 1980 it started using
the Bank second line of credit 1663-IYC, which had become effective in
November 1979\. However, during 1980 and 1981 CCI requested cancellation of a
large umber of "dlisbursed subloans\. CCI was, at the time, having
difficulties collecting on subloans and thus decided to tighten credit
approval and disbursement requirements\. It finally decided to cancel the
balance of loan 1162-IVC rather than commit new subprojects\. It preferred to
use the proceeds of the second line of credit because it had less strict
eligibility requirements for subprojects and a lower interest rate: 7%
compared to the 8\.5% interest rate for loan 1162-IVC\.
5\.16 CCI's record of compliance with financial covenants has been good\.
VI\. CONCLUSIONS
6\.01 A comparison of the project's goals with its actual achievements
suggests that the objectives of Loan 1162-IYC were only partially met\.
Although it can be arg-ed that the project's economic and social objectives
were achieved by increasing the number of Ivorian-owned businesses and by
increasing financial assistance to them, the other project objectives were far
from being achieved\. For instance, the project did not improve the quality
and focus of OPEI's technical assistance and did not result in high returns on
investment by indigenous businesses\. It did not develop cooperation between
CCI and the other SSE promotion institutions nor did it contribute to
achieving more balanced regional development (79% of the subprojects were in
the South and Abidjan Region)\.
6\.02 The BCEAO reforms and the country's serious recession did have their
effect on project implementation and on the industrial investment climate in
- 22 -
which the project had to operate\. Nevertheless, the greatest impact on the
outcome of the project was the failure of OPEl and the financial institutions
(paras 4\.04-4\.05) to play the role that was foreseen at the time of Bank
appraisal\. OPEl failed to supervise and provide SSE' s with the technical
assistance which is key to the success of an SSE project\. The ineffectiveness
and eventual dissolution of the Fonds de Garantie and SONAPI meant that there
was neither a credit guarantee scheme nor quasi equity financing available to
Ivorian small entrepreneurs\.
6\.03 The project has demonstrated that financial assistance to SSE' s in
the Ivory Coast will not be effective unless it is accompanied by close
supervision linked with appropriate technical assistance and unless credit
guarantee and quasi equity financing schemes are workable and effective\.
Although these institutions existed at the time of appraisal, what seemed to
be missing was a strong commitment to make them work\. The Bank failed to see
this lack of commitment and consequently did not include these institutions in
the project design, either by providing them with financial or other support
or by requiring that mechanisms be set up for supervision of subprojects\.
Consequently, the Bank did not have any leverage either on the performance of
these institutions or on their effective delivery of technical assistance to
SSE's\. It is possible that the project would have experienced a greater
degree of success if it had included assistance to OPEI, the Fonds de Garantie
and SONAFI\.
6\.04 These institutional shortcomings were extensively discussed by the
Bank with Government in the context of the Government's overall
industrialization policy and these discussions in turn have formed the basis
of the Government's present commitment to the reorganization and establishment
of effective institutions for the promotion of SSE's\.
IVORY COAST
SSE - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
OUTSTANDING PORTFOLIO AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1982 (CFAF MILLION)
Types of Loans Short term Medium term Long term Doubtful Total %
& under liti\.
Housing & property 11 12,184 3,150 3,014 18,359 38\.3
Agriculture - 189 - 73 262 \.5
Commercial and artisans 1" 1,915 14 1,088 3,031 6\.3
Industries - 3,057 516 1,322 4,895 10\.2
Professional - 934 53 104 1,091 2\.3
State Institutions - 2,544 1,480 - 4,024 8\.4
Hotels - 970 3,916 13 4,899 10\.2
Special loans 1 - - 82 83 \.2
Cash advances 6 - - 10 16 -
Automobile 667 5,213 - 1,931 7,811 16\.3
Consumer durables 3,197 - - 268 3,465 7\.2
Total 3,896 27,006 9,129 7,905 47,936
% (rounded) 8\.1 56\.3 19\.0 16\.5 100
IVORY COAST
SSE - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
LOAN t162-IVC
DISTRIBUTION OF SUBLOANS ACCORVING TO SIZE
Leoe than 25 25-50 10-75 75-100 More than 100
TYPE OF INDUSTRY million CFAF million CFAF million CFAF million CFAF million CFAF TOTAL
No\. Amount No\. Amount No\. Amount No\. Amount No\. Amount No\. Amount No\. Amount
GARAGES 1 6,043 3 122,565 4 245,664 - - 1 104,348 9 478,620 11 10
BAKERIES 1 24,653 2 84,382 10 621,472 11 936,411 5 557,819 29 2,224,737 34 49
WOOD WORKING - - - - 4 275,397 1 88,515 2 - 7 576,970 8 13
PRINT 8101S - - 2 85,476 - - 1 84,802 - - 3 170,278 4 4
MISCELLANEOUS INDUSTRIES 1 19,869 - - 1 66,869 - - 1 152,376 3 239,114 4 5
POULTRY FARMS 25 488,478 2 72,803 6 319,622 - Z R 880,920 J 19
TOTAL 28 539,043 9 365,226 25 1,529,041 13 1,109,728 9 1,027,601 84 4,570,639 100 100
IVORY COAST
SSE- PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
LIST OF SUBPROJECTS FINANCED UNDER LOAN 1162-IVC
Name of Subproject Location Total Invest- CCI Subloana Employment
ment Costs us $ Created
(CFAF 1000)
ASSI YAPI BLAISE Yopougon 40,000 104,348 10
GARAGE DU PROGRES Ferkesselougou 25,500 67,391 7
N'DOMA VALENTIN Abidjan 16,260 45,556 8
SANAN MICHEL Abidjan 24,000 55,890 16
GABOU PAUL Abidjan 22,500 58,696 11
IBO DENIS Yopougon 17,800 63,687 14
AKA ESSAN ALBERT Abidjan 14,000 29,709 8
AHIA CHARLES Bouake 22,800 47,299 4
GARAGE LA PRUDENCE 6,043
SUB-TOTAL 182,860 478,619 78
BAKERIES
PA 0A Maffere 24,712 78,527 12
CLUb ')BIN Ferkessedougou 22,387 77,734 12
KOFFI VL:'ANCE Abobo-Gare 25,000 66,095 18
COULIBALY ;\.\I Tafire 27,600 65,358 7
MBACKE CAVALY Tabou 17,850 45,768 10
BOULANGERIE DE S\.'FNSI Sikensi 22,300 66,426 9
TIEBA QUATTARA Dabakala 23,227 66,467 10
DAHI KOFFI THOMAS Abobo-Gare 29,100 76,247 18
KIE AKA VICTOR Yaourt Bouake 24,314 63,443 7
COMOE COLETTE Prikro 28,700 77,591 12
GOUE TIEFFI Logouale 28,076 73,526 6
STE EBURNEENNE GB Lahou 20,000 54,380 10
KOUAKOU AGNINI J\.B\. Bongouanou 24,500 69,455 9
MYLONOYANNIS G\. TAKIS Lakota 31,000 85,633 9
H
KOFFI KOUAKOU ALEX\. Port-Bouet 19,400 54,774 5
CISSE MORIKOUNADI Korhogo 34,981 96,968 9
BOULANGERIE DU LITTORAL Abidjan 22,848 64,472 6
BOULANGERIE DE WILLIAMSVILLE Williamsville 40,000 112,360 22
BEDI KANDIA Dabou 18,000 50\.602 18
FLE BENOIT Bangolo 40,000 105,534 17
MONNEY DESIRE Abidjan 40,000 117,079 15
BOULANGERIE N-ELLE KABADOUGOU Yopougon 39,000 111,205 18
BOULANGERIE SIPAC Cocody 13,500 38,614 24
KOUAME HELENE - LOUISE Bouake 39,100 98,711 17
ZIRIGA GOKPEU Zikisso 33,000 93,423 15
OGOU ACHI JULES Boucherie-Riviera 11,130 24,653 5
ALLA N'GORAN Abobo 39,400 111,641 17
BOULANGERIE MOD\. SUD-OUEST Soubre 28,700 82,754 12
BOULANGERIE D'ATTIECOUBE Attiecoube 37,650 95,297 15
SUB-TOTAL 805,475 2,224,737 364
WOOD WORKING
SCIERIE DE GD LAHOU GD Lahou ,0,000 112,723 22
KONE ISSIAKA Man 26,880 70,125 12
KABI KOUBI Abidjan 29,376 88,515 5
ZADI GBADAHI Abidjan 28,800 69,496 12
OUATTARA DRAMANE Bouake 25,807 65,890 20
KPIN GUEHI Abidjan 24,900 69,886 17
YAO TIEBA Abidjan 35,000 100,335 13
SUB-TOTAL 210,763 576,970 101
PRINTING SHOPS
KABOU PROSPER Abidjan 39,780 84,802 10
BOLI SEPRI GEORGES Abidjan 18,100 48,484 6
ADJOUMANI N'ZI ALPHONSE Abidjan 13,110 36,992 8
70,990 170,278 24
IDM
MISCELLANEOUS INDUSTRIES
YAMO-GLACE (ice making) Yamoussokro 27,200 66,869 6
PIERRE N'DA (tile making) Bonoua 7,000 19,869 5
SIPTOUR (snack bar) Abidjan 1069000 152,376 112
SUB-TOTAL 140,200 239,114 123
POULTRY FARMS
BEDA DE Reg\. Abidjan 6,750 18,703 3
ABRO FREDERIC "t 6,750 18,700 3
STE VOLAP it 19,000 52,648 10
ABLOR YESSOH AUGUSTIN " " 6,750 19,797 3
YAPI ATSAIN 6,750 18,012 3
DJAMAN ESMEL " " 6,750 18,452 3
BOUBAKARI BOLY " , 6,750 19,793 3
ASSI DENIS " 6,750 18,700 3
AIMEL YEDO " 6,750 18,708 3
BEAN ROBERT " " 6,750 19,578 3
SACRE BEGUHE AIME " " 6,750 18,763 3
AKOUSSI KOFFI JOEL " " 6,750 18,663 3
SELLY ESSIS ALPHONSE " " 19,000 53,040 10
DIOMANDE LOU EUGENE " " 19,000 52,640 10
TANOH NOMEL URBAIN " 19,000 47,623 10
OUEGNIN KADJOMOU FRANCOIS " " 6,750 19,545 3
KOUKOUGNON GAHOUA P\. " " 19,000 55,017 10
ALBERT FIRMIN CLAUDE " " 6,750 19,556 3
NANDO AKPA " " 6,750 19,274 3
DIBY KOUAME " " 6,750 19,548 3
DIACO BLAISE " 6,750 19,545 3
AHIZI ELIAM JACQUES " 6,750 19,552 3
KOUASSI KOUADIO " " 6,750 19,554 3
SAGOU BERNARD " 6,750 19,545 3
KOUADA NOBILA " 6,750 19,561 3
BROU KOUAME GABRIEL " " 6,750 21,000 3
YAPO ACHIEYAN CHARLES " 6,750 18,800 3
GOUBO VICTOR " " 6,750 19,874 3
ESMEL DJAMAN DANIEL * 8,558 24,224 5
AKPA ESMEL JOSEPH '' '' 8,558 25,180 5
OLIBO GOGOUA VINCENT '' '' 8,558 21,029 5
KONE ZOUMANA '' 19,000 53,147 10
KONE BINTA '' 19,000 53,147 10
SUB-TOTAL 313,924 880,918 154
TOTAL 1,724,212 4,570,636* 844
Difference is due to rounding
IVORY COAST
SSE - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
UTILIZATION OF LOAN 1162-IvC
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF SUBLOANS
Type of Industry North West Centre South East Abidjan Total
Garages 1 - 1 - - 7 9
Bakeries 3 4 4 6 1 11 29
Wood Working - 1 1 1 - 4 7
Printing Shops - - - - - 3 3
Misc\. Ind\. - - 1 1 - 1 3
Poultry Farms - - - 33 - - 33
Total 4 5 7 41 1 26 84
IVORY COAST
SSE - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
UTILIZATION OF LOAN 1162 - IVC
ARREAR POSITION OF SUBLOANS AS OF MARCH 31, 1982
Total Number PROJECTS IN ARREARS Total Number
of Projects 0-3 3-6 6-12 12-24 More than o rojects
Financed months months months months 24 months in Arrears
Garages 9 2 1 2 2 1 8
Bakeries 29 1 5 4 4 3 17
Woodworking 7 - 2 1 1 2 6
Printing Shops 3 - 1 1 - 1 3
Miscellaneous Industries 3 - 1 - - -1
Poultry Farms 33 1 2 5 7 2 17
Total 84 2 12 13 14 9 52
IVORY COAST
SSE - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
LOAN 1162-IVC
ARREARS POSITION OF SUBLOANS AS OF MARCH 31, 1982
PAYENT OTSTNDIG RRERSARES AS AEZ OF
PAYMENTS OUTSTANDING ARREARS PAYMENTS OUTSTANDING
Nov\. March August March Nov\. March August March Nov\. March August March
1980 1981 1981 1982 1980 1981 1981 1982 1980 1981 1981 1982
GARAGES 15,301 19,637 26,853 36,792 6,589 6,690 9,958 16,785 43\.1 34\.1 37\.1 45\.6
BAKERIES 87,621 114,673 152,255 213,523 23,831 34,659 48,999 68,257 27\.2 30\.2 32\.2 32\.0
WOOD WORKING 27,185 32,963 41,217 53,570 10,132 12,864 17,816 24,491 37\.3 39\.0 43\.2 45\.7 ,,
PRINTING SHOPS 10,313 11,916 16,223 22,911 3,685 1,352 3,980 9,782 35\.7 11\.3 24\.5 42\.7
MISCELLANEOUS INDUSTRIE) 1,284 2,398 4,097 7,121 680 - 323 1\.617 52\.9 - 7\.9 22\.7
POULTRY FARMS 70,350 80,020 116,218 146,495 9,633 18,933 22,149 36,406 13\.7 21\.5 19\.1 24\.9
TOTAL 212,054 269,607 356,863 480,414 54,550 74,498 103,225 157,338 25\.7 27\.6 28\.9 32\.8
IVORY COAST
SSE- PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
LOAN 1162-IVC
ANALYSIS OF ARREARS AS OF MARCH 31, 1982
(US $)
A B C B C
Principal
* Principal Outstanding on
Arrears Affected by Arrears Line of Credit %
Garages 76,995 472,576 478,619 99
Bakeries 313,106 1,557,741 2,224,738 70
Wood 112,344 506,845 576,969 88
Print Shops 44,872 170,278 170,278 100
Misc\. 7,417 66\.869 239,114 28
Poultry 167,000 577,576 880,918 66
Total 721,734 3,351,885 4,570,636 73Z
includes arrears of 3 months to 24 months
IVORY COAST
SSE- PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
UTILIZATION OF LOAN 1162-IVC
ESTIMATES AND ACTUAL PERFORMANCE OF 11 SUBPROJECTS (CFAF \.)
WORKING INCOME BEFORE No\. of JOBS INVEOTMENT RETURN ON
CAPITAL COSTS CAPITAL CAPACITY REVENUES INTEREST 6 TAXES CREATED COST PU JOB INVaSThENT
ACT\. EST\. AC M ST\. ACT\. AST\. AT\.CT\. EST, AUC7ET\. ACT,\. S\. ACT\. ET\. AT\. EST\.
GARAGES
Gabou Paul 46\.50 22\.5 6\.3 2\.0 45m\. 45m\. 16,2 38,9 4\.6 14\.9 9 11 5,2 2\.0 101 662
Ahia Charles 17\.7 22\.8 - 2\.0 35n\. 35m\. 10\.0 28\.4 (\.03) 13,3 10 4 18 5\.7 0 58%
A\. Yapi Blaise 103\.3 40,0 6\.6 3,4 100m, 60m\. 50\.5 52\.9 12\.0 28\.3 20 10 5\.2 4\.0 122 71%
BAKERIES
Houlangerie M\. du Sud 36\.7 28\.7 1\.3 1,3 30m, 30 bg1p/ 22\.6 55\.1 4,1 13,9 10 12 3\.7 2\.4 112 482
of Cl,tb Wobin 26\.4 22\.4 111 1\.5 30 30 " 65\.1 83\.9 1\.1 14\.7 14 12 1\.9 1,9 4% 662 6
of 114ne Louise 39\.3 39\.1 1\.2 1\.2 30 30 " 55\.6 72\.0 26\.8 15\.2 15 17 2\.6 2\.3 68X 39X
WOOD FURNITURE
Quattara Dramane 26,8 25\.8 4\.9 4\.1 50\. 50m\. 30\.0 42\.0 5\.0 10\.3 17 20 1,6 1\.3 192 402
Yao Tieba 51\.8 35\.0 9\.6 4\.7 som\. som\. 32,0 44\.0 6,8 13,1 16 13 3,2 2\.7 132 372
MISCELLANEOUS
Yamo-Glace 27\.2 27\.2 1\.0 1\.0 8 8 tons/day 9\.6 21\.5 \.8 6\.0 5 6 5,4 4\.5 3X 222
POULTRY FARMS
Kouda Nobila 6\.8 7\.5 - 2\.6 2\.3 5550 5260 chicks 18\.7 17\.5 2,4 1\.7 2 3 3\.4 2\.5 35% 22%
Asi Dents 7\.8 7\.5 2\.6 2\.3 5732 5260 01 18e6 17\.5 2\.4 1\.7 3 3 2\.6 2,5' 30Z 22Z
* Actuals as of September 30,1981
- 34 -
Annex IX
IVORY COAST
t
SSE - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Cumlative Dis'jursements
(US$ aillion)
IBRD FISCAL YEAR APPRAISAL ACTUAL ACTUAL AS A Z
ESTIMATES of APPRAISAL ESTINATES
1976 \.68
1977 2\.52
1978 4\.80
1979 5\.60 1\.76 31
1980 - 3\.23 -
1981 3\.86
1982 4\.53
December 31, 1982 - 4\.57 -
$1\.03 million was cancelled | APPROVAL |
P042014 | )ocument of
The World Bank
Report No: 24024 HR
PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT
ONA
PROPOSED GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY GRANT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 4\.100 MILLION (US$5\.07 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
FOR
KARST ECOSYSTEM CONSERVATION PROJECT
April 25, 2002
Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Sector Unit
Croatia Country Unit
Europe and Central Asia Region
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective 05/30/94)
Currency Unit = Kuna
1 Kuna = US$0\.12
US$1 = 8\.31 Kuna
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 -- December 1
ABIBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
BSAP Biodiversity ,\. Actioni Plan MEPP Ministry of Environmental Protection and Physical
Planning
CAS Country Assistance Strategy MPBH Ministry of Physical Planning\. Building and H, ,in 2
CITES Convention on Inte\.iiational Trade in NCB National Competitive Bidding
Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna
DO Development \.>jecu e NBF Not Bank Financed
EA Environmental Assessment NEAP National Environmental Action Plan
ECSSD Environmentally and Socially NGO Non Governmental Organization
Sustainable Sector Urnit
ESR Eastem Slavonia Reconstruction Project NS National Shopping
FMS Financial Management System PCD Project Concept Document
GEF Global Environmental Facility PIP Project Implementation Plan
GIS Geographic Information System PIU Project Implementation Unit
IBRD Intemnational Bank for Reconstuction PMR Project Management Report/Project Management
and Development Reporting
ICB International Competitive Bidding PNP Plitvice National Park
ICR Implementation Completion Report QBS Quality-based Selection
IDA International Development Association QCBS Quality- and Cost-Based Selection
IDF International Development Fund REC Regional Enviromnental Center for Central and
Eastern Europe
IFC International Finance Corporation SA Special Account
IP Implementation Progress SBCQ Selection Based on Consultant's Qualifications
IS Intemational S'rrpri SFB Selection under a Fixed Budget
KECP Karst Ecosystem Conservation Project TA Technical Assistance
LACI Loan Administration Change Initiative TOR Ternis of Reference
LCS Least Cost Selection UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization
M&E Evaluation and Monitoring USAID United States Agency for International Development
METAP Mediterranean Technical Assistance WWF World Wildlife Fund
Program
Vice President: Johannes F\. Linn
C;t\. Manager/Director: Andrew N\. Vorkink
Sector Manager/Director\. Kevin M\. Cleaver
Task Tearn Leader/Task Manager: Rita Klees
CROATIA
KARST ECOSYSTEM CONSERVATION PROJECT
CONTENTS
A\. Project Development Objective Page
1\. Project development objective 2
2\. Key performance indicators 2
B\. Strategic Context
1\. Sector-related Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) goal supported by the project 2
la\. Global Operational Strategy/Program objective addressed by the Project 2
2\. Main sector issues and Government strategy 3
3\. Sector issues to be addressed by the project and strategic choices 8
4\. Description of the Project Region 9
C\. Project Description Sumnary
1\. Project components 12
2\. Key policy and institutional reforms supported by the project 16
3\. Benefits and target population 16
4\. Institutional and implementation arrangements 16
D\. Project Rationale
1\. Project alternatives considered and reasons for rejection 18
2\. Major related projects financed by the Bank and other development agencies 19
3\. Lessons learned and reflected in the project design 21
4\. Indications of borrower and recipient commitment and ownership 22
5\. Value added of Bank and Global support in this project 22
E\. Summary Project Analysis
1\. Econornic 22
2\. Financial 23
3\. Technical 23
4\. Institutional 24
5\. Environmental 25
6\. Social 26
7\. Safeguard Policies 29
F\. Sustainability and Risks
1\. Sustainability 30
2\. Critical risks 31
3\. Possible controversial aspects 32
G\. Main Conditions
1\. Effectiveness Condition 32
2\. Other 32
H\. Readiness for Inplementation 32
I\. Compliance with Bank Policies 33
Annexes
Annex 1: Project Design Summary 34
Annex 2: Detailed Project Description 37
Anmex 3: Estimated Project Costs 48
Annex 4: Incremental Cost and Global Environmental Benefits 49
Annex 5: Financial Summary 56
Annex 6: Procurement and Disbursement Arrangements 57
Annex 7: Project Processing Schedule 66
Annex 8: Documents in the Project File 67
Annex 9: Statement of Loans and Credits 68
Annex 10: Country at a Glance 69
Annex 11: Social Assessment and Participation Approach 71
Annex 12: Financial Management System Assessment 89
MAP(S)
IBRD-3 1890
CROATIA
KARST ECOSYSTEM CONSERVATION PROJECT
Project Appraisal Document
Europe and Central Asia Region
ECSSD
Date: April 25, 2002 Team Leader: Rita Klees
Country Director: Andrew N\. Vorkink Sector Director: Laura Tuck
Project ID: P042014 Sector(s): VM - Natural Resources Management
Theme(s): Environment
Focal Area: B - Biodiversity Poverty Targeted Intervention: N
Project Financing Data
[ - Loan [1 Credit [X] Grant [ I Guarantee [1 Other:
For Loans/CreditslOthers:
Amount (US$m): $5\.07 million
Financing Plan (USSn): Source Local Foreign Total
BORROWER/RECIPIENT 3\.30 0\.00 3\.30
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY 3\.84 1\.24 5\.07
Total: 7\.13 1\.24 8\.37
BorrowerlRecipient: GOVERNMENT OF CROATIA
Responsible agency: MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND PHYSICAL PLANNING
Hvrore Glavac
Estimated Disbursements ( Bank FYIUS$m):
- --FY- _2003 - 200-- _ 2005 0 2007\.
Annual 0\.96 1\.75 1\.26 0\.71 0\.39
Cumulative 0\.96 2\.71 3\.97 4\.68 5\.07
Project implementation period: June 2002-2007
OMS PAD Fam- P- M-h\. MM/O
A\. Project Development Objective
1\. Project development objective: (see Annex 1)
The project development objective is that local residents, tourists and other visitors to participating national
parks and other protected areas in the karst region refrain from practices identified as detrimental to
biodiversity conservation and adopt recommended behaviors that preserve and protect the unique features
of the karst enviromnent\. In support of this objective, the project will assist the Government of Croatia to
strengthen institutional and technical capacity for biodiversity conservation, integrate biodiversity
conservation into physical planning and sectoral strategies, strengthen management of protected areas, and
promote entrepreneurial and tourism activities which support sustainable natural resource use and
conservation of the karst ecosystem within the Dinarid Mountain Range\.
2\. Key performance indicators: (see Annex 1)
The key indicators of project success are:
* Stable or increasing number of 2-3 indicator species in Croatia Karst Ecosystem Conservation
(KEC) project region
* Increased public knowledge of Croatian karst ecosystems, species, and habitats and impacts of
behavior on biodiversity
Decreased number of human behaviors destructive to biodiversity in protected areas
* Users of protected areas in the KEC region increasingly satisfied with park management services
* Increased number of, and income of, entrepreneurs in the KEC project region
B\. Strategic Context
1\. Sector-related Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) goal supported by the project: (see Annex 1)
Document number: 19280HR Date of latest CAS discussion: 05/11/99
The CAS indicates that to encourage private sector development, Croatia needs to develop and maintain its
infrastructure and protect its environment\. The CAS also indicates that since a key sector of Croatia's
economic growth is tourism, most of which is nature based, Croatia's natural resource base needs to be
carefully preserved\. In support of these objectives the CAS recommends that the Bank help the
govermnent obtain a GEF grant for environmental protection in one of the country's major tourist
destinations, Plitvice Lakes National Park (NP)\.
High unemployment (19%) is identified in the CAS as one of Croatia's major economic problems\.
Containing poverty is one of the CAS' four key policy objectives\. Unemployment in the project region is
among the highest in the country at about 40%\. By supporting local level, rural initiatives related to
sustainable natural resource use and tourism, the project aims to increase economic development in the
project region while also supporting biodiversity\.
la\. Global Operational strategy/Program objective addressed by the project:
The project's global objective is to conserve biological diversity and ecological integrity of the karst
ecosystems in Croatia particularly in the Dinarid mountain range which contains an estimated 8000 caves -
among the deepest and most extensive in the world\. Both the Croatian National Biodiversity Strategic
Action Plan (BSAP) and the National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) identify karst ecosystems as the
top priority for biodiversity conservation\.
-2 -
Croatia ratified the convention on Biological Diversity on October 7, 1996\. The Parliament of Croatia
endorsed the BSAP on June 8, 1998\. The project will implement selected priority actions outlined in the
BSAP including: (i) preservation of the biological and landscape diversity of the karst region as an area of
global value; (ii) improved inventory and monitoring of biodiversity; (iii) raising of public awareness; and
(iv) participation in regional efforts to manage biodiversity\.
The project supports the objectives of the GEF Biodiversity Operational Programs for coastal, marine and
freshwater ecosystems (OP2), mountain ecosystems (OP4) and forest ecosystems (OP3)\. Activities will
concentrate on the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources of international import in the karst
region of Croatia\. The project responds to Council of the Parties IJR guidance by: (i) promoting in-situ
conservation of biodiversity in protected areas of biological and ecological interest; (ii) building capacity,
especially for NGOs; and (iii) increasing public awareness of nature protection\.
2\. Main sector issues and Government strategy:
Croatia is endowed with internationally recognized karst ecosystem assets which are in need of
conservation\. The main issue facing Croatia is the challenge of balancing economic development of an
impoverished region with conservation of globally significant natural resources\. Accelerated economic
development, including that of the tourism industry, in the absence of a strong national and local level
capacity to protect natural resources could damage Croatia's ability to safeguard its biodiversity\. The
government must cope with scarce resources and competing interests in dealing with the following
obstacles: (i) insufficient capacity within the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Physical Planning
(MEPP) to conserve biodiversity in the karst region; (ii) lack of collaboration between sectors to
sufficiently incorporate biodiversity conservation into physical planning and sectoral strategies, and (iii) a
general lack of environmental awareness regarding karst ecosystems; and (iv) a tradition of limited public
participation in the decision making process\.
Global Significance of the Croatian Karst Ecosystem Croatia enjoys an unusually rich biodiversity of
global significance due to its geography, between the Mediterranean and Central-European continental
climatic regions, and its geology, which is predominantly karst\. The term "karst" originated in Croatia and
is applied to a specific landscape and morphology characterized by the presence of limestone or other
soluble rocks, where drainage has been largely diverted into subterranean routes\. Croatian karst
ecosystems host 3,500 species of flora (283 endemic), 12 species of amphibians, 36 species of reptiles, 200
species of resident birds, 79 species of mammals, and 64 species of freshwater fish (11 endemic)\. Much of
Croatia is karstic\. The project selected for its focus the karst region located within the Dinarid Mountain
range, which runs through Croatia from Slovenia to Bosnia\. The project region was selected because its
biodiversity is the most globally significant\. The Dinarids include hundreds of sinkholes, chasms,
underground streams, and caves\. Its estimated 8,000 caves are among the deepest and most extensive in
the world and render the region a global hot-spot of subterranean biodiversity\. These subterranean karst
habitats support an ever increasing list of newly discovered endemic troglodytic (eyeless and adapted for an
entirely subterranean existence) species and families\. These include one new species, genus and family of
leech Croatobranchus mestrovi, which was found in a 1300 meter deep cave in the Velebit mountain in
1994\. Additional unique species found in Croatian karst ecosystems are the only known cave sponge, cave
clam, and cave polychaete worm\.
Croatia is famous for its karst freshwater ecosystems which include travertine/tuffa-building communities
of micro-organisms\. The travertine barriers, some estimated to be over 40,000 years old, created by these
communities have led to the spectacular lakes and waterfalls now protected within two national parks, one
of which is included in the KEC project, Plitvice Lakes National Park\.
- 3 -
Large areas of the Dinarids, particularly in the Velebit Mountains, are densely covered by forest
communities of beech, fir, spruce and black pine, a relict alpine sub-species found only in the Velebit area\.
The Karst region contains the largest part of unfragmented forest in Croatia (almost 50% of forests), the
integrity of which is evidenced by the presence of viable populations of large carnivores (wolf, brown bear,
and lynx)\. The global significance of Croatia's karst ecosystem is evidenced by the international
recognition it has received\. Plitvice Lakes National Park is on the UNESCO's World List of Natural and
Cultural Heritage\. The Velebit Mountain Range is part of the UNESCO's Man and the Biosphere
Program, and has been identified by the WWF's Forest Hot-spot Initiative as one of the ten most important
forest areas in the Mediterranean region\.
Threats to Karst Biodiversity\. The impacts of threats to the karst ecosystem's biodiversity, with the
exception of eutrophication in the surface waters of Plitvice Lakes National Park, have not been
scientifically docurnented to date, but are believed to be significant\. The Biodiversity Strategic Action
Plan (BSAP) and Nation Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) note that the lack of systematic inventory and
monitoring of the ecosystem and species status has resulted in an insufficient basis for determining the
exact nature and magnitude of threats to biodiversity\. However, in light of observed habitat changes and
fragmentation; water and air pollution; extensive exploitation of natural resources; and introduction of
foreign species experienced in the project region, all threats to biodiversity, the BSAP assumes that the
karst ecosystem biodiversity is declining\. Both the subterranean and terrestrial karst ecosystems are
fragile, interconnected, and dependent upon the maintenance of a delicate balance between relief,
hydrology, climate and vegetation\. The surface ecosystems of predominantly natural forest and traditional
pastoral land generally serve to buffer the subterranean ecosystems but the effectiveness of this function
can be significantly reduced by subtle changes in land-use and vegetation cover\. For instance, land-use
changes can lead to the rapid influx of water in all parts of a karst cave system, resulting in significant
changes in the subterranean ecosystems\. In recent years, these threats have been partially averted by
reduced economic activity, particularly in tourism and agriculture, during and after the war (1991-95)\.
Today, post-war Croatia is on a fast track of economic development, spurred, in part, by a new government
(February 2000) and the opening of EU accession discussions\. Tourism, once a mainstay of Croatian
economy, has traditionally been carried out on a "mass tourism" basis, as opposed to "nature-based
tourism"\. As the tourism industry rebounds it could have serious implications for biodiversity
conservation\. Other sector development projects which traditionally hurt biodiversity, e\.g\. roads,
hydropower, are also proposed for the project region\.
Obstacles to Biodiversity Conservation
Limited capacity for conservation management\. The primary form of biodiversity conservation in Croatia
is its protected area system\. About 8\.2 % of Croatia's area is under some form of protection\. There are
eight types of protected areas in the country with national parks (8) and nature parks (10) being the highest
level of protection\. National and nature parks are managed by the state; other protected areas are the
responsibility of the counties within which they lie\. Biodiversity conservation is governed by the Law on
Nature Protection, noted by the Croatia Biodiversity Strategic Action Plan (BSAP) to be inadequate for
purposes of biodiversity conservation and now under revision\. Parks are financed by a combination of
self-generated revenues, generally from visitor fees, and a minimal allocation from the MEPP budget\. The
designation of newly protected areas has outpaced the capacity for their management both in terms of
human and financial resources\. Overall, staffing is inadequate particularly on the local level\. The Ministry
of Environmental Protection and Physical Planning (MEPP) faces serious challenges managing the growing
number of protected areas while also dealing with growing economic pressures\. MEPP nature protection
division currently has fourteen staff\. The nature protection inspection department has four staff\. MEPP
- 4 -
has no staff on the county level in the project region and only four in the entire country\. Some counties
have taken the initiative to hire environmental specialists (Primorsko-Goranka), and it is in these counties
where one can see best practice of incorporating biodiversity conservation concerns into physical and
protected area plans\. Capacity for biodiversity conservation is also limited by inadequate quality and
quantity of data, as previously mentioned\. The lack of a systematic inventory and monitoring of the
ecosystem and species status has resulted in an inability to accurately identify trends and pattems in
biodiversity and their impacts\. This also limits MEPP's ability to ensure appropriate conservation
measures\. For the scientific information that does exist, no one institution is responsible for collation,
analysis, processing or dissemination of the karst biodiversity studies that have been conducted by
museums, university faculties, NGOs, and others\. Thus decision making and analysis are often based on
fragmented and unrelated results of specific scientific research\.
Inadequate integration of biodiversitv conservation into physical plans and sectoral stratezies
Physical planning\. Land use plans in Croatia are referred to as "physical plans\." Physical plans are
governed by the "Law of Physical Planning"(1994, amended in 1998)\. Physical plans define: natural,
cultural or other characteristics meriting special consideration; the basic organization of the space;
measures of use; development and protection of the area, with all activities that have priority; measures for
improvements and protection of environment; and if needed, the contents of more detailed, physical
development plans for narrower areas\. Croatia has a national Physical Planning Strategy; county level
physical plans; physical plans for areas with particular features (e\.g\. Velebit Mountain), and protected area
physical plans\. Responsibility for all types of physical planning falls under the MEPP\. On the county
level, the county physical planning offices prepare and implement the county physical plans as well as those
for the protected areas, reporting to the MEPP\. Implementation of physical plans is reviewed every two
years with recommendations for improvements adopted as needed\. The management of national parks and
nature parks is based on physical plans and in some cases specific park, protected area management plans
such as in Paklenica NP\. Land-use of the areas surrounding the national parks is managed via county level
physical plans\.
Lack of coordination between physical management plans and protected area management plans is one of
the problems for biodiversity conservation\. Physical plans are developed independently of protected area
plans and do not incorporate biodiversity conservation\. Protected area physical plans are generally
inadequately integrated with local land-use needs as identified in county physical plans\. Protected areas,
specifically national and nature parks, have no overall management plans that would typically include
business management plans\. As part of Project preparation, a review of existing county physical plans and
protected area physical plans was conducted and the resulting recommendations were incorporated into
project design\. Another problem is that intersectoral coordination in developing physical plans is limited\.
Methods for intersectoral collaboration and guidelines are needed for the integration of biodiversity
concems into county level physical plans, sectoral plans, and protected areas physical and management
plans\.
Sectoral Strategies\. Biodiversity conservation is not incorporated in most sectoral strategies, notably in
those of the tourism, forestry, and agriculture sectors which have potentially great impacts on biodiversity\.
Sectoral strategies are not subject to review by the MEPP\. Tourism\. In the pre-war period, tourism was
an economic pillar for Croatia accounting for nearly 12% of the GDP\. Although much of the country's
attraction to tourists was based on the integrity of its natural resources, in fact there was virtually no
awareness of conservation\. The Govemment's intention is to increase revenues from tourism to bolster the
national economy and, to this end, a national tourism master plan is in preparation\. In the absence of
adequate safeguards, increased tourism could result in negative environmental impacts such as habitat
- 5-
destruction from overuse or pollution\. Nature based tourism should be developed in a manner that
recognizes and limits impacts to vulnerable karst ecosystems and biodiversity\. Forestry\. 70% of the karst
region is forested\. All forested lands that are not protected areas, as well as forests of nature parks, are
managed by Hrvatske Sume (HS), the state-owned national forest authority\. Production in these forests is
carried out according to forest management plans, which are developed on a 10 year cycle and take into
consideration ecological and enviromnental functions of the forest\. However, forest management may not
adequately address biodiversity conservation issues, and production forestry reportedly continues to take
place in some areas that have recently been assigned protected area status\. HS has 15 forest districts and
168 local offices, which do not directly correspond to the administrative units for physical planning or
protected area boundaries\. This organizational structure poses a challenge to a more integrated approach
to multiple land-use planning, yet the harmonization of forest management, physical and protected area
planning processes is a clear need for the project region\. Agriculture\. There is a strong link between
traditional agricultural and grazing practices in the project region and biodiversity\. Grazing on highlands
and hence the enlargement of meadows have been key factors in establishing the existing biodiversity in the
project region\. About 50% of the local flora is adapted to open landscapes rather than forests ecosystems\.
However, significant depopulation of the project region and land mine remnants (about 14% of the forested
area in the KEC region is land-mined) have resulted in the cessation of traditional agricultural and grazing
practices\. The BSAP identified protection of grassland habitats and the revitalization of cattle breeding in
the project region as strategic objectives for biodiversity conservation\. As examples of successful
integration of biodiversity conservation into sectoral programming, the Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry (MOAF), which also considers the karst region as an area of strategic importance for grazing in
open grasslands, now promotes keeping livestock in the project region by providing higher than national
level subsidies for cows, pigs, sheep, horse and milk\. The Croatian Selection Center for Domestic Animals
(HSSC) of MOAF coordinates and finances subsidies that protect autochthonous, endangered breeds of
sheep, cow, horse and goat in Croatia\. Among these breeds is the Lika Pramenka sheep which is important
for the protection of the karst grassland areas\.
Lack of environmental awareness regarding karst ecosystems and limited public participation in the
decision making process\. Participation of the public in decision-making of any kind, including
environmental issues, has traditionally been low\. Mass media show little interest in environmental issues
and protection resulting in a low level of information and education of the general public\. While growing,
the influence and involvement of NGOs has been limited in the past\. Despite the lack of awareness
regarding the need to protect karst ecosystems, there is a strong sense of pride among Croatians in their
natural and cultural landscape and this could easily be tapped if effective mechanisms were put into place\.
Government comritment and strategy\. The new government has demonstrated a commitment to improving
the legal and institutional fiamework for nature protection\. Institutionally the environment sector was
elevated from a directorate to ministerial status\. Environment was also combined with physical planning
to form a Ministry of Environmental Protection and Physical Planning (MEPP) in recognition of the
inter-relationship between environmental protection, land-use, and development, and expanded
opportunities for inter-sectoral coordination\. As a nascent institution, the MEPP suffers from the country's
overall budgetary problems - but it appears to be going in the right direction\. The MEPP has shown
commitment to environmental issues by preparing revisions of the major piece of environmental legislation,
the Law on Nature Protection (82/94), to broaden the mandate of enviromuental protection and to authorize
a more pro-active approach in emphasizing sustainable development and use of natural resources\. In
support of this objective, MEPP has established a Department for Sustainable Use of Natural Resources\.
The draft legislation is expected to pass a second government review in early 2002 and then be submitted to
the government and Parliament for approval (expected in late 2002)\. The new draft includes guidelines,
recommendations and concrete measures from the BSAP, as well as addressing outstanding issues related
- 6-
to international agreements\. The new law integrates EU Directives and harmonizes Croatia's law with
existing laws of neighboring countries (Slovenia and Hungary)\. The Government's significant contribution
of US$3\.2 million to the proposed Karst Ecosystem Conservation Project (KEC) reflects its strong
commitment to biodiversity conservation\.
Regarding the obstacles to effective conservation, the government's strategy is less well formulated\.
Currently, the biodiversity and protected management sectors are faced with the same economic problems
as the rest of the country\. The govermnent, in particular the MEPP, is taking a serious look at economic
instruments for financing environmental protection\. The NEAP recommends new approaches to financing
environmental programs, including biodiversity conservation\. Meanwhile, the protected areas are each
seeking opportunities to increase revenues and capture them for conservation activities\. Protected area
managers and staff are engaging in study tours and exchange programs, funded under project preparation,
to national parks in Italy, Slovenia and the U\.S\. However, the integration of biodiversity conservation into
other sectors' planning, while a strong recommendation of the BSAP, has not taken hold and will be a major
goal of the KEC project\. This will be accomplished by developing guidelines for sectoral strategies,
training, and selected inter-sectoral activities\. The government is particularly concemed to identify
impacts of tourism on environment\. The NEAP recommends a strategy towards tourism that protects
natural resources; balances development with sustainability; strengthens eco-tourism and reduces emphasis
on mass tourism; and educates tourists and local residents\. Several "eco-tourism" conferences have been
held in Croatia in 2000 and 2001 bringing together key stakeholder groups to discuss opportunities and
strategies\. Biodiversity specialists have played key roles in designing and participating in these tourism
conference\. In the forestry sector, the Forestry Law is being updated in a way that would integrate
biodiversity interests and allow other uses of forests e\.g\. recreation, biodiversity protection, nature based
tourism, under certain circumstances\.
-7-
3\. Sector issues to be addressed by the project and strategic choices:
The project will assist the Government to address priorities identified in the BSAP by: (i) building the
national capacity to conserve biodiversity and support natural resource management and (ii) establishing
community based approaches for biodiversity conservation and sustainable resource use in, and among,
selected protected areas and their associated villages in the karst region\. Specifically, the project will assist
the Government to strengthen the legal and regulatory framework for biodiversity conservation through
review of current environment related legislation and strategies (e\.g\. national tourism strategy) and
harmonization of sectoral legislation and policies, to ensure that biodiversity conservation concerns are
adequately addressed and overlapping mandates resolved\. It will produce guidelines, and training in their
use, for incorporating biodiversity conservation into physical and sectoral planning\. The project will
strengthen the capacity of MEPP to regulate and coordinate biodiversity conservation issues at the national
and local levels and to manage protected areas\. It will improve the ability of local staff to manage
protected areas by improving the quality and accessibility of data\. This will include undertaking a
thorough inventory and mapping of biodiversity in the project region; evaluating proposed protected area
sites; conducting a monitoring program for large carnivores; inventorying biodiversity of caves and
sub-terranean ecosystems and their related hydrogeology; developing a karst ecosystem biodiversity GIS
and database; developing a web-site; and establishing monitoring programs at selected sites\. It will
increase the capacity for biodiversity conservation on the protected-area level by providing technical
assistance, goods and equipment\. This will include development of guidelines for protected area
management plans; development of three protected area management plans in selected sites; and ranger
training programs\. Each of the project sites has unique needs in terms of goods and works to improve
biodiversity protection which the project will address, e\.g\. program for the recovery of the Eurasian Vulture
(Paklenica NP), program to protect local breeds of sheep (Velebit NP)\. Additionally, the project will
support: (i) monitoring; (ii) facilities for field, interpretation, recreational and education; (iii) staff skill
development; (iv) research exchange; and (v) support for "people and parks" programs\. The project also
aims to contribute to formulation of transboundary tourism marketing plans, as well as the management
and monitoring of biodiversity research and projects related to biodiversity conservation, e\.g\. develop a
transboundary protected area management plant between Risnjak NP and neighboring national parks in
Slovenia\.
The project help the Government to balance economic development and conservation efforts\. The project
will fund a protected area system market analysis followed by a promotion and marketing plan\. It also
will fund a protected area financing strategy\. It will finance a tourism development strategy for the project
region to identify local-level opportunities in tourism for artisans, craftsmen, business people\. This effort
will be followed by offerings of training in development of business plans and in proposal writing\. A
major ($500,000 of grant funds) activity under the project is the "Conservation and Rural Revitalization
Grants" (CRRG) program\. The CRRG grants program will be available to farmers, foresters,
entrepreneurs, businesses, and NGOs in the project region and is intended to finance activities that
demonstrate linkages between economic development and conservation\. The grants program will encourage
activities which demonstrate inter-sectoral collaboration\.
The project will increase public awareness and public participation in conservation initiatives and decision
making\. It will finance preparation of a "how to" guide for protected area managers that outlines steps for
community and NGO participation in protected area management The project will finance a 'People and
Parks" program in each of the four national parks; local advisory groups; and community outreach and
involvement activities in each protected area\. The project finances a small grants program for NGOs
specifically for educational activities\. The project will prepare biodiversity conservation
promotional/education materials including a traveling, mobile exhibit; field guides; material for the karst
- 8 -
web-site; TV promotional spots; annual biodiversity festivals; and conduct a pilot biodiversity
conservation educational program (designed by NGOs) utilizing the internet, in five schools\.
4\. Description of the Project Region
Proiect Region
The project addresses only some of the issues facing the biodiversity conservation sector in Croatia, and
confines its activities to the general area of the Dinarids, as previously described, and five of its protected
areas, and their associated communities\. The Government and the Bank favored a combination of national
level attention for issues related to institutional strengthening, intersectoral coordination, and public
awareness; and a local level approach to improve protected area management for biodiversity
concentration, rural revitalization, and tourism\. By limiting the project to a local approach in an area
important for biodiversity, the project seeks to increase the possibilities for successful implementation, to
have a visible demonstration effect of the linkages between conservation and development, and to focus
limited resources\.
The project region is a representative karst area of the Dinarids Mountains (see map Annex 2)\. The 9,500
square kilometer area (17% of total land in Croatia) is defined by the Slovenian border to the north, and the
Zrmanja River to the south\. Administratively, the region consists of the Lika-Senj county, which is 80% of
the project region; Primorsko-Goranka county, 15% of the project region; and Zadar County, 5%\. The
region contains inmnense karst aquifers with high quality potable water, large karst springs, and the most
extensive forest areas in the Dinarids\. Approximately 40% of the project region is designated as protected
area\. This includes three long established national parks (NP) (Paklenica, Plitvice Lakes and Risnjak), one
new national park (Northern Velebit), and one nature park (PN) (Velebit)\. Paklenica and Northern Velebit
National Parks are located within the much larger Velebit Nature Park\.
This selection of protected area sites in total provides the project with (i) biodiversity of international value;
(ii) importance for economic development; (iii) presence of direct or potential threats to biodiversity; (iv)
representative sites for the country and the opportunity for replicability of interventions in other karst areas;
(v) importance for overall environmental stability; and (vi) expected sustainability of intervention effects\.
A detailed description of each of the project protected area sites is found in annex 2\.
Protected Area Mana2ement in the Proiect Region
The management of national parks and nature parks is based on physical plans, specific to the site, which,
in the project area, vary from park to park\. Only Paklenica National Park has an adequate physical plan,
well-coordinated with the county physical plan, and thus serves as a best practice to be replicated in the
other project sites\. The new North Velebit National Park has no plan at all\. The protected areas in the
project region also vary considerably in terms of size, staffing, and financing (Table 1)\.
Table 1: Characteristics of the project protected areas - data for 2000
Protected area Year of Size in Number of Employees in Financing:
declaration km2 registered protection National
visitors activities budget/self-f
inancing
9-
NP Risnjak 1953 64 25,000 13 50/50
NP Plitvice Lakes 1949 294 490,000 120 3/97
NP Paklenica 1949 96 70,000 20 30/70
NP Northern Velebit 1999 _ 0 1 100/0
Velebit Nature Park 1981 2,000 0 1 100/0
As can be seen above, there are two significantly different groupings of parks: (i) those that have been in
existence about 50 years, have a relatively large number of visitors, high degree of self-financing, some
level of employees in nature protection, i\.e\. Paklenica, Plitvice and Risnjak; and (ii) relatively new parks,
with no visitor registration, financed largely by the government, few full or part-time staff, i\.e\. NP North
Velebit, and Velebit PN\. The GEF funds are allocated according to the level of development, with the
newer parks receiving more resources\.
Parks are financed by a combination of self-generated revenues, generally from visitor fees, and from the
MEPP budget\. One of the national parks, Plitvice Lakes, is a major tourist attraction in Croatia and
generates considerable revenues from visitor entrance fees\. Risnjak and Paklenica National Parks also
derive revenues from visitor fees\. Currently these revenues are not sufficient to render the parks financially
self-sufficient\. These parks intend to increase visitor revenues by attracting more visitors and offering them
a variety of nature activities\. Velebit Nature Park and Northern Velebit National Park do not currently
earn tourism revenues, although the potential exists\. The Project will include preparation of a general
protected area financing strategy\.
Physical Planning in the Project Region
County physical plans are of relevance to protection of biodiversity in the project region from two
perspectives\. First, for the 60% of the project region that is "unprotected", the inadequacy of the county's
physical plans in incorporating conservation concerns poses a threat to the biodiversity of the region\.
Second, county level land-use, construction activities, and economic development, managed through the
county's physical plans, have impacts on the protected areas within their boundaries\.
Project preparation included a review of county level physical plans for the project region, and protected
area management plans for the project's sites\. The review indicated the stage of completion,
incorporation of biodiversity conservation concems, realism of plans' recommendations, identification of
threats, etc\. County plans were found to differ significantly; all had strengths and weaknesses\. Project
activities have been designed to address the specific shortcomings of each of the three county plans\.
Similarly, protected area plans varied from none (NP Velebit, Velebit PN, Plitvice NP) to relatively good
plans (Paklenica), to good plans that could use some upgrading (Risnjak)\. The KEC project will develop
physical and management plans for those protected areas that don't have them, and update existing
protected area management plans, as needed, to incorporate biodiversity issues\.
Economic Activities and Resource Use in the Project Region
Project preparation included a social and rural development assessment (Annex 11)\. The results
significantly guided project preparation\. The KEC Project area has experienced profound demographic
changes over the past several decades\. In Lika-Senj county, which includes Plitvice National Park,
Velebit Nature Park, North Velebit National Park, and comprises more than 80% of the KEC region, there
has been an extreme and steady depopulation in recent years due primarily to the war and lack of economic
- 10 -
opportunities\. Population density in Lika-Senj is extremely low at 15 person/square kilometer\. The
population that remains is very old, and relies largely on pensions for support\. The other of the two major
counties in the project, Gorski-Kotar District of Primorsko-Goranska county, in which Risnjak National
Park is located, have experienced the same depopulation for similar reasons although less hard-hit by war
impacts\. Similarly, in Zadar county, in the rural region around Paklenica National Park, there are only 120
people living, all elderly\. The exact population of the project region is not known\. No census has been
conducted in the project region since 1990 and due to a number of factors, most significantly the war, and
population data from 1990 is not very useful\. The social assessment undertaken during preparation for the
project attempted to establish population data but could only guess at a figure of about 65,000\. The
project region has a significant "floating" element due to younger people staying with elders on a revolving
temporary basis; people living part-time in rural areas and part-time in larger towns where they work; and
younger Serbs moving back and forth between Belgrade and their homes in Croatia\. While there is a very
rich cultural heritage in Croatia, virtually all of its manifestations in the project region, e\.g\. heritage
buildings, traditional foods and beverages; wood arts and crafts; wool, textiles and clothing production are
disappearing\.
The economic situation in the KEC project region is significantly depressed, even for Croatia\.
Unemployment is estimated at over 40%\. In Lika-Senj, in the 1980s almost everyone had a paying job in
forestry, tourism, or government\. To supplement their income in one of the state-organized industries,
many practiced traditional agriculture on their family farms\. The thiiving Plitvice Lakes National Park
that was attracting 750,000 visitors in the late 1980s was an all-important source of direct employment\. It
also provided large guaranteed markets for all the agricultural products people could produce\.
In the 1990s, the country saw a major decline of all Lika-Senj's productive sectors, loss of jobs, and
out-migration of young people\. The war started and was largely fought in the Plitvice National Park area\.
Even with reconstruction, the area remains depressed and has suffered from the national slump in tourism
and other sector activities\. Forestry jobs in Lika-Senj have declined by at least 60% from some 1,700 to
2,000 jobs in 1991, to between 570 and 700 today as a result of the bankruptcy of several sawmills as land
mines take some forests out of production\. As far as agriculture is concerned, the significant decline of
tourism at Plitvice has undermined demand for produce\. Never a mainstay but a strong supplementary
activity, it continues its decline\. The predominant elderly farm dwellers are unable to maintain pastoral and
crop lands, while the younger people are often unable to farmn effectively due to a lack of resources and a
lack of knowledge about how to market their products\. The year 2000 gave signs that the tourism industry
may be on its way to recovery, increasing demand for related goods and services sectors as well\. A total of
6\.6 million people visited Croatia, and the Plitvice Lakes National Park received about 480,000 visitors\. It
is believed by many that establishment of a sound economic base in this region may be an important factor
in achieving sustainable development\.
In the northern part of the study area around Risnjak National Park, forestry was, and remains, the
overwhelmingly dominant industry, accounting for approximately 1,100 jobs\. This represents about the
same employment level as in 1991, accounting for an estimated 700/o-80% of total employment in the
district\. Unfortunately, a decline in employment by the sector is anticipated, as a result of reorganization
and modernization\. Before the war and independence, municipalities used to own the forests within their
boundaries and were able to generate important revenues from this resource\. HS now manages the forests
providing a very small portion of revenues back to the municipalities\. Before the war, many of the
communities in the Risnjak National Park study area were visited by tourists, mostly Western European,
who were staying in nearby Istria and Kvarner Bay (Opatija, Crikvenica) and attracted to the region by the
natural and cultural features\. Such visitation included day and overnight stays and provided revenues
sufficient to diversify the study area's economy beyond forestry\. Unfortunately, the war and break-up of
- 11 -
Yugoslavia led to a severe decline of the coastal tourism industry, particularly of the Western European
tourists\.
In the southernmost part of the study area, around Paklenica National Park, tourism is the mainstay of the
economy, centered along the coast around Starigrad\. Forestry is not an industry of any importance in this
southern region\. While agriculture was reportedly important to the area in past decades, there are only a
few remaining rural villages\.
Implications of these fndings for project design are presented in section "E\. Summary Project Analysis: 6\.
Social"
C\. Project Description Summary
1\. Project components (see Annex 2 for a detailed description and Annex 3 for a detailed cost
breakdown):
Results of five studies conducted under project preparation were used in designing the project: Social and
Rural Development Assessment; Comprehensive Biodiversity Survey; Legal, Regulatory and Institutional
Review; Land and Natural Resource Management Plan Review; and Public Awareness and Environmental
Education Needs Assessment\. In addition to these studies, results of a technical assistance rmission
sponsored by the U\.S\. Department of Interior/National Parks Service, conducted in September, 2000; and a
study tour of Croatian national park directors to U\.S\. National Parks, May, 2001, were used to guide both
national level and site specific project activities\. Results of the background studies were used to select the
project region boundaries\. The project region encompasses three counties - Primorje-Gorski Kotar,
Lika-Senj, and Zadar\. Within the project region are four national parks and nature parks from North to
South being: Risnjak National Park, Plitvice National Park, and the Velebit Nature Park, which includes in
its territories North Velebit Nature Park and Paklenica National Park\. The project region is defined in
more detail in Annex 2\. The three project components are as follows:
Component 1\. Build national capacity to conserve biodiversity and support sustainable resource use
Activities to strengthen national capacity fall into five sub-components:
(i) Strengthening laws and regulatory framework\. The project will finance a review and/or revision of
biodiversity-related regulations and sectoral strategies to incorporate biodiversity conservation concerns\.
The project will finance training in the use of the guidelines to staff from relevant government agencies,
including the Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture, Ministry of Tourism, Croatia Forests (HS), Croatia
Waters (HV); physical planners; and protected area staff; as well as NGOs and citizens\.
(ii) Strengthening national capacity to ensure biodiversity conservation\. The project will finance
preparation of protected area management and planning guidelines which include biodiversity concerns;
guidelines for community and NGO participation in protected area management; a protected area system
market analysis, promotion and marketing plan; a protected area financing strategy; and a pilot project on
biodiversity information dissemination\. The project will develop and conduct a ranger training program\.
(iii) Expansion of species and taxa under legal protection\. Project preparation studies found that may be
other areas in the project region which could be eligible for protected area status\. For these areas, which
include Ogulin and the Kupa Valley, the project will finance feasibility studies including an analysis of
biodiversity; assessment of water management issues related to biodiversity conservation; equipment for
- 12 -
underwater biodiversity monitoring; and revision of the list of taxa under legal protection\.
(iv) Biodiversity inventory, mapping and monitoring\. The project will finance consultant services and
equipment for inventory and mapping of the biodiversity priority areas (identified by the BSAP and
Comprehensive Biodiversity Survey); a specific inventory of the biodiversity of caves in the project region
and necessary equipment for such; a study of cave hydrology in the project region; and a monitoring
program for large carnivores in the project region\. The project will finance the development of a GIS for
the project region, the database, and training for staff in its use\.
(v) Increasing public awareness and support for biodiversity conservation\. The project will finance
development of a public awareness strategy; development of a WEB site and TV spots on biodiversity
conservation; a guide to karst biodiversity; annual workshops/festivals on biodiversity conservation; and
preparation of a traveling exhibition on biodiversity and the KEC Project\.
Comuonent 2\. Establishing community-based mechanisms for biodiversit, conservation and
sustainable resource use in the karst repion
The project will support measures to preserve the globally significant biodiversity in the Karst region
through community level activities and capacity building for protected area management\. Activities to
meet this objective fall into three sub-components:
(i) Promotion of sustainable nature based tourism\. The project will finance development of a local level
tourism strategy which includes determination of the nature-based tourism potential in the region and
econornic opportunities in tourism; a visitor management plan for selected protected areas; and preparation
and field works on the European-6 (E-6) hiking trail through the project region (E-6) is a branch of a larger
network of hiking trails which spans Europe)\.
(ii) Increasing local public awareness and support for biodiversity conservation\. The project will finance
preparation of national park promotion materials for park visitors, local population, and schools; and
preparation of field guides for the project region\.
(iii) Improved protected area management and services for biodiversity conservation\. In each of the five
protected areas in the project region, the project will finance refurbishing of existing visitor structures,
information kiosks, and research facilities (where they already exist); a "people and parks" program, each
to be designed specific to the protected area and intended to ensure direct, comnunity involvement in the
decision making process; field works, e\.g\. trails, signs; data acquisition, processing and interpretation
equipment including computers, GIS software; field equipment, e\.g\. field telephone, binocular, staff
uniforms, safety equipment; equipment for monitoring programs; and staff development in skills such as
interpretation, education, monitoring, research\. The project will finance distinct investments/activities in
each of the five protected areas, according to their needs as follows:
* Paklenica NP: The project will finance the "Recovery of the Eurasian Vulture (Gypsfulvus) Project"
by providing equipment, education material, and monitoring equipment
* Plitvice NP: The project will finance preparation of a park management plan; laboratory equipment for
the research facility; and mowing equipment\.
* North Velebit NP: The project will finance preparation of a park management plan; and rehabilitation
of a park road\.
* Velebit Nature Park: The project will finance preparation of a park management plan; field vehicles;
mountain shelters, camp sites, and fire control equipment\.
- 13 -
* Risnjak NP: The project will finance rescue equipment, horses and equipment; a traveling exhibit;
camp site facilities\.
(iv) Conservation and Rural Revitalization Grants Program\. The goal of this sub-component is to
demonstrate of linkages between rural development and biodiversity conservation\. The main activity under
this sub-component is the financing of the Conservation and Rural Revitalization Grants program (CRRG)\.
The conservation and rural revitalization grants (CRRG) program is designed to enable groups and
individuals to carry out activities that contribute to achieving the goals and objectives of the project\. The
CRRG program will support entrepreneurial projects which demonstrate linkages between sustainable use
of natural resources, economic development and biodiversity conservation\. $500,000 will be available for
grants to farmers, artisans, entrepreneurs, businesses, and NGOs\. Public-private partners or NGOs in
partnership with others are also eligible\. Grant activities could include support to local communities to
develop small businesses, such as tourism services, crafts, food services; support of demonstration projects
linking conservation and sustainable natural resource use such as traditional agricultural activities, forestry
and water resource related projects; and public education and outreach activities\. The goal of the CRRG
project is to encourage projects in biodiversity conservation and sustainable use of biological resources in
the KEC project region; communiity development and increased civil society participation in biodiversity
conservation; and NGO activity in conservation\. The specific objectives of the CRRG program are to:
* Enhance the objectives and activities of the KEC project by supporting community based initiatives
which address the KEC goal;
* Demonstrate the link between the objectives of conservation and tangible benefits for local
communities;
* Develop replicable approaches to economic development which ensures biodiversity conservation;
* Strengthen new and emerging local civic groups and NGOs in order to promote biodiversity
conservation;
* Test innovative approaches and technologies to biodiversity conservation; and
* Establish partnership between local communities, protected areas administrations, NGOs and PIUs to
promote sustainable development of local communities in the KEC project area
Annex 2 provides more details about the CRRG program\. The Project Implementation Plan includes a
CRRG draft operations manual which details the proposed administrative, procurement, disbursement, and
application arrangements\. The operations manual will be finalized with the involvement of the local
advisory boards during the first year of KEC project implementation\. Completion of the final CRRG
operations manual will be a condition of disbursement of grants\. This sub-component will also finance a
local cattle breeds protection program; and rehabilitation of the Glacka river springs facility which is a
cultural heritage and biodiversity conservation site\. Both of these activities are further demonstrations of
linkages between economic development, tourism, and conservation\.
(v) Regional Cooperation Program for Karst Ecosystem Conservation\. Under this sub-component
financial support for Croatia to encourage partnerships with Croatia's neighbors, particularly Slovenia
(Risnjak and Kupa River Project), will be provided to encourage and support transboundary solutions to
biodiversity conservation\. The project will finance the inventory and monitoring of the biodiversity of
springs, groundwater, caves, meadows, forests and cliffs on the Croatian side of the border region between
Croatia and Slovenia in the Risnjak National Park region\. It will finance the preparation of the Risnjak
National Park Management plan in coordination with Slovenia\. The project will finance a tourism
marketing plan for the Croatian region on the Slovenian border; promotional materials; intemational
workshops; and participation of Croatian protected area staff in karst workshops\. The project will finance
study tours to European countries including France; and participation in international and regional
- 14 -
workshops, training, partnerships, and conferences related to project objectives\.
Component 3\. Proiect Management and Monitoring
The project will finance the establishment and operation of a central PIU located within the MEPP in
Zagreb and composed of a project manager, a procurement specialist, financial management specialist, and
an assistant\. The project will also finance a local PIU that will be located within the county/municipal
physical planning office in Gospic, one of the two county seats included in the project\. The local PIU will
be staffed by a project field coordinator and assistant\.
Donor interest in the KEC project has been strong\. During project preparation the U\.S\.Agency for
International Development (USAID), the U\.S\. Department of the Interior (DOI) and the U\.S\. National Park
Service (NPS) worked together with the KEC project team to help identify KEC project components
directed towards the five protected areas included in the project\. DOI-NPS financed a technical assistance
mission of three protected area management specialists for three weeks to Croatia in September, 2000 , to
assist with KEC project design\. DOI/NPS sponsored a Croatian delegation of protected area managers to
the U\.S\. National Parks in April, 2001\. DOI/NPS worked with the KEC project team and MEPP to design
a program "Practical Training in National Parks" financed, in part, by USAID/Croatia\. This program
was designed to improve visitor interpretation services in two KEC project national parks; and to provide
job-training to local youths thus assisting in the reintegration of war-affected populations in the KEC
project region\. This US$120,000 program was carried out from June 2001-April 2002\. Based on its
success, US DOI/NPS is currently considering a sequel to be conducted in FY03 at approximately the
same funding level\. The KEC project will continue to work closely with US DOI/NPS during KEC
project implementation\. US DOI has offered the services of the project manager of their program to the
MEPP/KEC team\.
The Dutch Partners for Water program is financing a $100,000 Croatian technical assistance project for
FY03\. The goal of the project is to support KEC project activities by providing Dutch expertise in
groundwater, pollution and biodiversity conservation in preparing karst conservation guidelines\. If
successful it is expected that an additional $100,000 will be available for FY04\.
- Comyponent
1\. Strengthening national Institutional 1\.83 21\.9 0\.00 0\.0 1\.04 20\.5
capacity to conserve Development
biodiversity and support
sustainable resource use\.
2\. Community based 4\.88 58\.3 0\.00 0\.0 2\.88 56\.8
mechanisms for biodiversity
conservation and sustainable
resource use in the Karst
region
3\. Project Management and 1\.26 15\.1 0\.00 0\.0 0\.78 15\.4
Monitoring
Unallocated 0\.40 4\.8 0\.00 0\.0 0\.37 7\.3
Total Project Costs 8\.37 100\.0 0\.00 0\.0 5\.07 100\.0
0\.00 0\.0 0\.00 0\.0 0\.00 0\.0
Total Financing Required 8\.37 100\.0 0\.00 0\.0 5\.07 100\.0
2\. Key policy and institutional reforms supported by the project:
The project will address a key environmental policy issue facing the government - how to manage the
country's future growth and development, while protecting the environment, on the national and local level\.
It will strengthen the ability of the newly established MEPP to implement the new (2002) Law on Nature
Protection\. It will integrate biodiversity conservation concems into sector politics and physical planning
and increase sectoral collaboration for conservation\. The project will expand opportunities for nature
based tourism while ensuring the ecological integrity of protected areas\. The project will support rural
revitalization activities and increase the role of civil society in environmental decision-making\.
3\. Benefits and target population:
The project would have environmental, financial, institutional and social benefits\. The primary
environmental benefit would be increased national level capacity to protect globally significant biodiversity
in the Croatian karst ecosystems\. The project would also benefit other regional, transboundary initiatives
to conserve the biodiversity of the Alp/Dinarid/Balkan karst mountain chain\. Financial benefits would
include a more cost-effective approach to protected area management\. Protected areas would develop
management plans which include a business plan with feasible financial targets and adequate allocation of
resources for conservation activities\. Institutional benefits would include strengthening of the newly
established MEPP and its ability to implement the new Law on Nature Protection; increased overall
capacity to manage biodiversity conservation for multiple uses through piloting of participatory,
community based planning and management approaches; improved coordination across sectors at the
national and local level; and sharing of experience of other protected areas and karst regions across the
country\. Social benefits would be realized by the entire Croatian society, local communities, and tourists\.
The project will increase the recreational and existence value of the protected areas for urban and coastal
populations and tourists by conserving their karst ecosystems\. It will improve the social sustainability of
biodiversity conservation by increasing local communities' participation in the decision making process on
protected area management and by supporting them in developing small businesses including nature based
tourism services\. The project will also help local communities realize economic benefits from tourism to
the parks, and will contribute to rural revitalization\.
4\. Institutional and implementation arrangements:
Implementation period: 5 years
Project oversight: The MEPP will have overall responsibility for project implementation and a national
level project implementation unit (PIU) will be established in the MEPP Division of General Environmental
Policy\. The PIU will build on the existence of the KEC project preparation implementation unit\. The PIU
will be responsible for all procurement, disbursement and financial management aspects of the project as
well as oversight of consultants, seminars and training\. The PIU will be responsible for coordinating with
other donors the implementation of components to be supported through parallel and co-financing\. It will
also be responsible for all reporting requirements to the Bank and the Government\. It will be staffed by a
project director, procurement and disbursement specialist, financial specialist and an assistant, funded
under the project\.
The project would also finance a local PIU office in Gospic, the county seat of Lika Senj\. The local PIU
office, provided by the government, will be in the county department office building which houses local
offices for all sectors and for physical planning\. This will facilitate local level inter-sectoral coordination
and planning\. Since Gospic has been identified by county officials as the best location for a proposed
- 16 -
regional development pole, locating a PIU here offers the potential to coordinate the project with county
development plans\. The local PIU will be responsible for day-to-day project implementation and local level
coordination\. The local PIU will be staffed by a project field coordinator and assistant funded by the
project\. The local level PIU will report directly to the national PIU\. Staffing and technical decisions for
the local PIU will be the responsibility of the MEPP Division of Nature Protection\.
The CRRG program will support projects that further the KEC project development objective\. The
beneficiaries would include community based organizations, NGOs, private entrepreneurs, and local
residents\.
The PIU would be assisted by an inter-agency Project Steering Committee established prior to Board
presentation\. The Steering Committee consists of representatives from relevant Ministries and institutions,
including Ministry of Environmental Protection and Physical Planning, Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry, State Directorate for Water, and Croatia Waters\. The Steering Committee would be responsible
for providing project oversight advice, inter-ministerial coordination, and assistance in resolving issues
associated with project implementation\. The Minister for Environmental Protection and Physical Planning
will be chairman for this committee\. The Steering Committee will build on the success of the inter-agency
committee which oversaw KEC project preparation\.
Local advisory groups from each of the three main project regions (Plitvice, Paklenica, and the Velebit),
selected by, and comprised of, representatives of key stakeholder groups, will also assist the PIU\. The
functions of the national and local PIU and the terms of reference of staff are included in Annex I of the
Project Implementation Plan (PIP) as are the functions of the local advisory board and steering committee\.
Financial Management
A review of the Financial Management arrangements for the project was undertaken in December 2001 to
determine whether the financial management anrangements within the PIU are acceptable to the Bank\. It is
concluded that the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) satisfies the Bank's minimum financial management
requirements\. The MEPP and PIU have also agreed to take the following measures:
Action Deadline
1\. Prepare FMRs
First half year after
Effectiveness
2\. The PIU to select auditors acceptable to the Bank, to audit the Grant 09/30/2002
accounts\.
Financial Reporting
The PIU will ensure the preparation and distribution of consolidated periodic progress reports to the
relevant government institutions, including the World Bank, to reflect: (i) sources and uses of funds, by
component and activity; (ii) project progress; and (iii) procurement activities\. In this context, the PIU will
prepare quarterly Financial Monitoring Reports (FMRs), which would be submitted to the Bank within 45
days of the end of each half year\. The first FMRs will be submitted for the first half year after
Effectiveness\. The FMRs formats were discussed during appraisal and was agreed at negotiations\.
Audit Arranigements\. The PIU, would be responsible for ensuring that the Project financial statement,
- 17 -
Special Accounts (SA), and Statement of Expenditures (SOEs) are audited by an independent auditor,
acceptable to the Bank, in accordance with International Auditing Standards (IAS)\. The PIU will maintain
responsibility for the management of project funds and the Special Account\. They will monitor and keep
track of the use of funds\. The audit will cover all funds related to the project, including counterpart funds,
for all project components\. The annual audit will be conducted in accordance with the Guidelines for
Financial Reporting and Auditing of Projects Financed\. The audited financial statements, the special
accounts, and SOEs of the preceding fiscal year will be sent to the Bank within six months of the end of the
fiscal year\.
Disbursements\. Disbursements from the Grant will be made based on traditional disbursement methods
(i\.e\., from the Special Account with reimbursements made based on Statements of Expenditures (SOEs)
and full documentation, and direct payments from the Grant Account)\. The proceeds of the World Bank
Grant will be allocated in accordance with Table C, Annex 6\. To facilitate timely project implementation,
the MEPP will establish, maintain and operate a special account under terms and conditions acceptable to
the Bank\. While, the PIU will prepare all the required documents and keep accounts for the project, all
payments will be made by the accounting department of the MEPP, as required by law\. The option to
move to a FMR based disbursements will not be considered\.
D\. Project Rationale
1\. Project alternatives considered and reasons for rejection:
Alternatives considered were:
* Include only Plitvice Lakes National Park in the project and focus activities on improving
biodiversity conservation in one national park\. Plitvice is the most renowned of Croatia's national parks,
hence this alternative was proposed\. However, since other protected areas in the project region also contain
unique biodiversity and extending the project to several of these additional protected areas would create
synergies among park managers, the scope of the project was broadened to cover five protected areas\.
* Focus only on protected areas and improving their management\. This option was rejected in favor
of including project activities in non-protected areas bordering the protected areas so as to strengthen
linkages between rural development opportunities, biodiversity conservation, and tourism\. The broader
focus also enables the project to have a greater socio-economic impact on the communities adjacent to the
parks; extend the benefits of the project to a wider population; and integrate conservation
activities/considerations into regional planning\. The social assessment fully supports the need to develop
the nature based tourism potential of the region, as well as to identify and support rural development
initiatives that link development with sustainable natural resource use\.
- 18 -
2\. Major related projects financed by the Bank and/or other development agencies (completed,
ongoing and planned)\. The KEC project is linked to the Croatia Municipal Water Pollution Control
Project (MCWPC) which is mapped to ECSIN and is scheduled for appraisal in FY03\. The objective of
the US$100 million MCWPC project is to help the Croatian government combat water pollution and
improve water quality in coastal areas\. The implementing agencies will be Croatia Waters (HV) for the
infrastructure components and the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Physical Planning (MEPP) for
the water quality monitoring component\. HV and MEPP have been co-implementing agencies for the World
Bank Eastern Slavonian Reconstruction Project, also a water infrastructure project, and its associated
GEF project, Kopacki Rit Nature Park Project, since 1999\. This model of the water infrastructure sector
working closely with the environment sector in Croatia, on both the Bank and government side, is thus well
established and has proven to be effective\. Both the borrower and the Bank (environment and
infrastructure departmnents) are committed to continuing this successful approach in the design and
implementation of the MCWPC project and the KEC project\. The MCWPC recognizes that since the most
of the surface and ground-waters supplying the coastal drinking water supply and discharging into the
Adriatic within the project's region, originate in the karst region of the KEC project, protection and
conservation of the sensitive karst ecosystems included in the KEC project are essential for the successful
implementation of the MCWPC Project\. The MCWPC project will use an integrated water management
approach which will include wastewater treatment infrastructure in two selected geographic regions and
in selected "hot-spots\." The MCWPC project will support the KEC project by including financing of a
specific enviromnental project component on water quality monitoring and capacity building of MEPP\.
This component will also finance specialized water quality monitoring equipment, hydrogeological studies
in the KEC region, and training\. The MCWPC Project may also identify and co-finance environmental
infrastructure investments in the KEC project region which would not be eligible for financing by the GEF\.
As the MCWPC is still under preparation the exact amount of co-financing is not yet determined\. The
KEC project task manager is the environmental specialist on the MCWPC project team and this
assignment was made so that the KEC task manager can design the water quality monitoring component of
the MCWPC project in coordination with the KEC project\.
It is expected that the KEC project will be effective about one year before the MCWPC and that this timing
will be beneficial to both\. It will give the MEPP at least one year to build water quality monitoring
capacity through implementation of the monitoring program financed under the KEC project and further
develop the working relationship between HV and MEPP\. In the first year of implementation the KEC
project will review and make recommendations regarding incorporation of biodiversity concems into
sectoral strategies, including the proposed national tourism strategy and the coastal zone development
strategy\. Both of these strategies will influence the MCWPC project, because the driving force for the
MCWPC project is to mitigate existing, and pre-empt future, negative environmental impacts of tourism
and economic development on the coast\. Additional KEC Year one activities which will provide important
information to the final design of the MCWPC project are: (i) biodiversity inventory of caves in the
MCWPC project region to serve as a baseline; (ii) initiation of the KEC water quality monitoring activities
which subsequently can be replicated in the MCWPC project region; (iii) hydrgeological assessment of the
karst region in the upper watershed of the MCWPC region; (iv) development of an ecotourism strategy that
will incorporate considerations of downstream water quality impacts; and (v) development of protected area
management plans which may identify water pollution control investments that would enhance the KEC
project and could be financed under the MCWPC project\.
The KEC project also will build on the results of the Coastal Forest Reconstruction Project (scheduled for
closing in June 2002), through activities targeted to improve intersectoral planning for biodiversity
conservation between MEPP and MoFA; interagency training programs, joint workshops and study tours;
and development of a management plan for the Velebit Nature Park based on guidelines developed under
the KEC project for incorporation of biodiversity conservation into the forest strategy\. The Forestry
- 19 -
project's objective is to restore and protect forest land in the coastal zone of Croatia in order to enhance
landscape and recreation values of the region and thereby contribute to restored tourism\. The Coastal
Forest Reconstruction Project includes reconstruction of coastal forests destroyed by war activities
including the rehabilitation of about 5,800 ha of coastal forests\. It also includes forest fire management
activities such as prevention through raising public awareness, cleaning and reducing the amount of
flammable material, fire detection system and fire fighting roads; as well as equipment e\.g\. seaplane
air-tankers, trucks and fire-fighting equipment\. It has assisted with the development of a GIS; research
activities; and institutional support to Croatian Forests and the Ministry of Interior (MoI)\.
During preparation, the proposed Project was discussed with authorities implementing a Bank financed
"Croatia Emergency Transport/Mine Clearing Project\." The "Mine Clearing" project involves: (i)
clearance of mines in priority areas; (ii) screening and surveys; (iii) quality assurance tests; and (iv)
technical assistance and training\. The location of land mines throughout most of the country, including the
protected areas, and their associated communities, has been mapped and this information was used in
designing the KEC project\. Activities such as trails and camps will not be built in the vicinity of land
mines\. Land mine location information will also be used in assessing the projects proposed under the
KEC's Conservation and Rural Revitalization Grants Program\. While funds could be available from the
World Bank's Social Recovery and Development Project (in preparation) for de-mining, on a case-by-case
basis, it is not expected that there will be any KEC financed activities in areas of land mines\.
The KEC project has generated interest in rural revitalization and a US$1 million grant has been awarded
from the World Bank to Croatia for the "Zadar and Knin-Sibenik Counties: Refugee Return and Regional
Development Project\." This project region is located on the Northern Dalmatian coast of Croatia, and its
objective is to create pre-conditions for refugees to return (including youth and working age people) and a
broader economic development of Dalmatia\. The grant program is under preparation and the team is
working closely with the KEC teamn to coordinate strategies\.
Completed and ongoing related projects are:
Table 1\. Projects financed by the bank
Latest Supervision
Sector Issue Project (PSR) Ratings
(Bank-flnanced projects only)
Implementation Development
Bank-financed Progress (IP) Objective (DO)
Environment IDF Grant: MEPP S S
Environment Capacity Building
Natural Resources Coastal Forest Reconstruction S S
Project
Agriculture Farmer Support Project S S
Infrastructure/Envirornent Eastern Slovania S S
Reconstruction Project/Kopacki
Rit Nature Park (GEF
component)
Biodiversity Biodiversity Strategy and S S
Action Plan - completed
Infrastructure Emergency Transport & Mine S S
- 20 -
Clearing
Social Refugee Return and Regional
Development Project
Other development agencies
IP/DO Ratings: HS (Highly Satisfactory), S (Satisfactory), U (Unsatisfactory), HU (Highly Unsatisfactory)
Add in "other UNDP/GEF - Renewable energy
NA
3\. Lessons learned and reflected in the project design:
Experience from other similar initiatives in Central and Eastern Europe suggests that:
(a) All stakeholders should be involved early in project concept design, specifically local communities
and influential decision makers, by inviting them to workshops or public awareness programs, in order to
instill a feeling of ownership, build lasting commitment and achieve successful project implementation;
(b) Conservation management strategies should establish a link between the objectives of conservation
and tangible benefits for key stakeholders, specifically including local communities (e\.g\., economic and
community development associated with appropriate forms of rural and ecotourism, etc\.);
(c) In order to achieve enviromnental, social and financial sustainability, conservation strategies must
be site-specific and address local needs and issues;
(d) Where consumptive use of natural resources is an issue, (e\.g\., grazing, hunting, fishing, and use of
other forest products), resource users must be substantively involved in the design of sustainable resource
management systems, and effective monitoring and control mechanisms need to be developed and applied;
(e) Applied research and monitoring programs should also be site-specific and targeted to provide
direct support for effective conservation management;
(f) Problems should be solved jointly with clients and not for them; and
(g) Decentralized responsibility for financial and project management builds local ownership and
sustainability of project activities\.
(h) Successful project implementation requires that PIU staff be in place prior to project start-up; the
first year procurement plan is ready by negotiations; and sequencing of project activities is determined prior
to implementation\.
(i) A successful competitive grant program is dependent on several factors: (i) identification of
realistic and focused priorities; (ii) a well trained Board and staff; (iii) an independent and transparent peer
review process; (iv) accountability; (v) efficient and effective fiduciary procedures; and (vi) a well defined
monitoring and evaluation system\.
The project will incorporate these experiences and build on them specifically by: (i) addressing the links
between socio-economic issues and sustainable natural resource use and management through the rural
revitalization grants program, (ii) building both the local and national capacity for conservation
management, (iii) developing mechanisms for local level participation in conservation and land-use
decision-making, e\.g\. a "People and Parks" program in each protected area; (iv) ensuring a participatory
-21 -
and transparent approach to project preparation and implementation (v) ensuring PIU staff are in place, the
first year procurement plan is ready, and project sequencing determined prior to project start-up; and (vi)
preparing a Small grants program operations manual following procedures described in "Good Practices
for Procurement, Disbursement and Financial Management for Competitive Grant Program in ECA
Countries\."
4\. Indications of borrower and recipient commitment and ownership:
The World Bank received a letter of support from the GEF focal point, the Director of the State Directorate
for Nature Protection and Environment, requesting technical assistance and financial support for the
preparation of the Karst Ecosystem Conservation Project (June 1999)\. Subsequent to this, upon the
establishment of a new MEPP, the new minister and new GEF focal point, have supported the request for
the KEC project\. Additional letters of support have been received (December, 2000, and October, 2001)\.
The Minister of MEPP visited World Bank headquarters April 17, 2001, to reiterate his support of the
KEC project, per his letter of support, December 13, 2000\.
The Government agencies responsible for environment have shown a commitment to identifying and
prioritizing environmental problems and finding solutions\. The BSAP was endorsed by the Parliament
(June 1999)\. The KEC project is a national priority under the BSAP, which identifies conservation of
biodiversity in the karst region as a key environmental priority\. A National Environmental Action Plan
(NEAP), produced with support from the World Bank (2001) includes as priority environmental issues,
biodiversity conservation, and within biodiversity, specifies the KEC project as the top priority action\.
MEPP is currently implementing a medium size GEF grant for biodiversity conservation as part of the
Eastern Slavonian Reconstruction\.
5\. Value added of Bank and Global support in this project:
The value added of GEF support for the KEC project comes from providing additional funds to ensure the
long-term protection of biodiversity of global importance\. Without GEF support to coordinate these
activities, Croatia might undertake a series of small activities in different parts of the country, but would
lack a mechanism to coordinate the financing, and approaches and geographical targeting of activities\. The
Bank has assisted Croatia with preparation of the BSAP and NEAP, which both provide a strategic
foundation for this project\. Bank experience with ongoing project in Croatia's forest, agriculture, water,
and biodiversity sectors add value to the KEC project\. Through its role as broker, the Bank has and will
continue to mobilize donor support for biodiversity conservation in Croatia\.
E\. Summary Project Analysis (Detailed assessments are in the project file, see Annex 8)
1\. Economic (see Annex 4):
O Cost benefit NPV=US$ million; ERR = % (see Annex 4)
O Cost effectiveness
* Incremental Cost
O Other (specify)
Incremental costs associated with the provision of global benefits through the project were estimated\. The
global benefits are: (i) increased national capacity to manage protected areas and natural resources
sustainable and to conserve biodiversity of global importance; and (ii) increased local capacity for
enhanced conservation of globally significant biodiversity and sustainable resource use in the karst region\.
The total incremental cost of achieving these benefits is US$8\.37 million\. The Government of Croatia has
committed to financing US$3\.30 million (39%)\. The GEF grant contribution toward the GEF alternative
would be US$5\.07 million (61%)\.
- 22 -
2\. Financial (see Annex 4 and Annex 5):
NPV=US$ million; FRR = % (see Annex 4)
Fiscal Impact:
Total govemment financing for taxes and recurrent costs during the implementation period is estimated to
be USD 1\.3 million which, at an average of USD 0\.26 million/year, is less than 2\.0% of the MEPP annual
budget (USD 15\.5 million for 2001)\.
The Karst Ecosystem Conservation project is designed to address concems of financial sustainability of the
national parks it supports by enhancing their eco-tourism capacity for revenue generation and developing a
financing strategy for the Protected Areas (PA) system\. Croatia has over 50 years experience in attracting
significant number of tourists to its national parks, and deriving revenues from user fees, the Plitvice Lakes
being a prime example\. The rebounding of tourist inflows to the country after a decline in the mid 1990s
caused by the war, provides ample opportunity to derive revenues from tourist visits to build on this
experience in the national parks supported by the project\. The project will fund a PA system market
analysis and the development of a promotion and marketing plan\. Based on these studies, a PA system
financing strategy will develop a visitor fee structure for individual national parks\. Furthermore, the
project will assist these national parks by building and equipping visitor centers, integrating ecotourism
development in park management plans, publishing information material on the parks, and by providing
training to park staff in nature interpretation and visitor management\.
While project national parks will strive for financial sustainability, some of them may not be able to
achieve this at all times for various reasons\. To ensure continued funding of recurrent costs in such cases,
the PA System financing strategy that will be elaborated under the project may entail a mechanism of
cross-subsidization from national parks that have surpluses\.
Early in project preparation, concern was voiced regarding the indebtedness of the Plitvice Lakes National
Park (PLNP)\. The issue was whether the debt, related to the renovation of their hotels, might be diverted,
with revenues from visitor fees used to serve the debt rather than fund conservation activities\. The financial
situation of PLNP was studied in detail during project preparation and discussed with the Government\.
During appraisal, the Government presented the Bank with a letter which stated that "[t]he Government
has sought financial solutions to cover the PLNP hotel debts from its internal resources"\. The letter further
assures the Bank that MEPP has taken measures to separate the accounts of the conservation branch
funded by visitor fees and the hotel and restaurant branch of the PLNP\. The Project Team considers this
assurance as satisfactory\.
On the fiscal side, the project's support to existing and would-be local enterprises in setting up and
expanding environmentally friendly businesses in tourism services, farming and crafts production, will help
expand the Government's tax base\. To the extent employment is enhanced, fiscal expenditures for social
protection may be less than would otherwise be the case\.
3\. Technical:
The project is technically justified on the basis of the urgent need to address growing and potential threats
to the globally significant biodiversity in the karst region of Croatia\. This assessment is based on the
BSAP and Comprehensive Biodiversity Survey conducted as part of project preparation\. The project seeks
to mainstream biodiversity considerations into land-use management plans as well as sectoral management
plans\. The project components are aimed at addressing not just the immediate issues at hand but also to
- 23 -
build capacity to deal with long term priority conservation issues while establishing linkages and technical
partnerships with intemational organizations for regional transboundary conservation\. The project also
aims to strengthen the legislative and regulatory framework for biodiversity conservation and build public
awareness and support for biodiversity conservation\.
4\. Institutional:
4\.1 Executing agencies:
The executing agency would be the Ministry of Environment Protection and Physical Planning (MEPP)\.
The MEPP's Division of General Environmental Policy would have overall responsibility for project
coordination and supervision of progress\. The Division of Nature Protection would have responsibility for
technical issues\. The MEPP has sufficient capacity to implement the project as evidenced by its successful
completion of the GEF financed BSAP and the Bank financed NEAP; as well as its successful ongoing
implementation of three GEF financed projects -- Kopacki Rit -- a biodiversity conservation project, and
two climate change GEF financed projects\.
4\.2 Project management:
The MEPP will have overall responsibility for project implementation and a national level project
implementation unit (PIU) will be established in the MEPP Division of General Environmental Policy\. A
project management unit handling donor funded projects has been operational in the MEPP, and former
State Directorate, since 1998\. It is this unit that has executed the GEF activities and projects mentioned
above; prepared the KEC project; and managed donor programs\. The KEC PIU will extend the existing
management structure to meet the additional management needs\. The PIU will be responsible for all
procurement, disbursement and financial management aspects of the project as well as oversee the work of
consultants, organize seminars and training\. It will also be responsible for all reporting requirements to the
Bank and the Government\. The project would also finance a local PIU office in Gospic\. The local PIU
office will be in the county department office building which houses local offices for all sectors and for
physical planning\. The local PIU will be responsible for day-to-day local project implementation and local
level coordination\.
4\.3 Procurement issues:
An assessment of the existing project management unit's capacity to implement the project's procurement
plan was carried out in December, 2000\. The review addressed legal aspects, procurement cycle
management, organization and functions, support and control systems, and record keeping\. The review
rated procurement under the project in the high-risk category although public procurement in Croatia is an
average risk\. The rating is based on the limited experience the PIU has with procurement\. The following
actions were recommended in the assessment and will be implemented to mitigate the procurement risk: (i)
a procurement book containing the guidelines, templates of tender notices, standard bidding documents,
evaluation forms, etc\. will be prepared and made available to the PIU prior to project launch so that their
procurement staff can familiarize themselves with Bank procurement policies, procedures and documents;
(ii) a project launch workshop will be held for the PIU after effectiveness of the loan with sufficient time
dedicated to procurement issues; (iii) the PIU will hire a local procurement specialist with experience in
Bank projects, upon effectiveness, (in fact MEPP has already done so in September, 2000) with an
international procurement consultant retained for at least six months to train the local counterpart; and (iv)
intensive procurement supervision will be provided during the first three supervision missions\. PIU staff
have attended the Bank's 4 week procurement training course in Turin, Italy (in March, 2001) and the
Bank's Competitive Grants course in Turkey (March 2001)\.
4\.4 Financial management issues:
- 24 -
CFAA for Croatia was carried out in 1999\. The reforms carried out to date in the area of financial
management put Croatia ahead of many other CEE countries\. Croatia has, in fact, set up a modem legal
and regulatory framework, compatible with the needs of a market-driven economy, completely discarded
the old accounting system and opted to introduce a comprehensive new framework based on international
guidelines\. In order to enhance public sector financial management and to achieve a higher level of
accountability, the issues related to the integrity and universal coverage of the budget process need to be
addressed in greater depth, together with the start of the Treasury, the modernization of accounting and
reporting systems and the further development of the institutions in charge of budget compliance through
internal and external audits\. Bank rehabilitation is under way but additional efforts are needed to strengthen
banking supervision and improve credit institutions risk-management\. Financial markets and their
regulatory institutions need further development; this would also make the privatization process more
effective\. Market competition and corporate governance are main areas to be reformed to achieve greater
transparency and financial accountability for the private sector\. A self-regulating and standard-setting
national body, ensuring the application of high standards of ethics and progressively taking on the functions
currently performed by the government, should define the organization of the accounting and auditing
profession\.
To improve the overall public sector accountability, the reform of the institutions (namely, the ZAP and the
relevant Departments of the MoF) currently involved in the accounting, reporting and internal control
functions needs to be addressed\. In conclusion, the establishment of an adequate financial management
framework for the public sector requires the modernization of accounting systems, the harmonization of
reporting formats as well as the introduction of effective internal controls and auditing functions\.
From a financial management perspective, the project however, is considered moderate risk due to the
following reason\. The existing PIU is well versed in Bank procedures with the experience gained form
implementing an IDF Grant and the on-going GEF project\. The same PIU is expected to implement the
KECP\. The PIU is "ring fenced", and will have its own financial management system and will carry out all
procurement functions in line with Bank's procurement guidelines\.
5\. Environmental: Environmental Category: B (Partial Assessment)
5\.1 Summarize the steps undertaken for environrental assessment and EMP preparation (including
consultation and disclosure) and the significant issues and their treatment emerging from this analysis\.
The project addresses national, global and transboundary biodiversity conservation issues\. It is designed to
preempt the negative environmental impacts that could accompany economic development, particularly
tourism, in the karst region\. The project activities which could have negative environmental impacts
include: (i) rehabilitation of existing structures in national parks, such as kiosks, visitor facilities;
rehabilitation of existing roads within parks; refurbishing of the local PIU office in Gospic (government
financed); upgrading of biodiversity research and monitoring facilities in Plitvice National Park; trail
construction in Gorski Kotar; and minor works in fences, small trails, landscaping in the National Park
Northern Velebit and the Park of Nature Velebit; and (ii) possibly some activities financed by the
Conservation and Rural Revitalization Grants program since these will involve small grant awards to
farmers, entrepreneurs, NGOs, on a competitive basis, for projects aimed at increasing economic activity
in the project area whilst ensuring biodiversity conservation and environmental protection\. CRRG
proposals could include activities such as conservation of mountain meadows, organic farming, handicrafts
production, wood processing\.
Mitigation measures to be taken are detailed in the Environmental Management Plan (EMP) and will
ensure that construction procedures mitigate for dust and noise; that trails will be individually assessed and
- 25 -
designed to take into consideration factors which influence the amount of resource damage caused by trail
use; that individual small projects carried out under the small grants program be reviewed under the
existing environmental impact assessment procedure (which is fully compatible with the World Bank OP
4\.01); and that all project activity sites are clear of land mines\. The operation manual for the CRRG
program will include environmental assessment guidelines consistent with those of the MEPP\. Criteria for
selection of CRRG awardees will include compliance with existing Croatian environmental standards\.
5\.2 What are the main features of the EMP and are they adequate?
The EMP provides an assessment of the potential impacts of protected area facilities improvements; and
indicates possible projects to be financed under the small grants program\. The small grants program will
develop an operational manual before negotiations which will include procedures for environmental review
of the small grants projects\. The EMP provides a table of activities, potential impacts/issues, mitigating
measures, costs, institutional responsibility, and comments\.
5\.3 For Category A and B projects, timeline and status of EA:
Date of receipt of final draft: December 30, 2000
5\.4 How have stakeholders been consulted at the stage of (a) environmental screening and (b) draft EA
report on the environmental impacts and proposed environment management plan? Describe mechanisms
of consultation that were used and which groups were consulted?
The environmental assessment was discussed during the project design workshop II (October, 2000)with
over 80 stakeholders, including NGOs\. The EMP is on the MEPP's web-site; and has been made available
for public consultation\.
5\.5 What mechanisms have been established to monitor and evaluate the impact of the project on the
environment? Do the indicators reflect the objectives and results of the EMP?
The EMP has designed a monitoring and evaluation program for the project which reflects the objectives of
the EMP\.
6\. Social:
6\.1 Summarize key social issues relevant to the project objectives, and specify the project's social
development outcomes\.
A social assessment (SA) was conducted as part of project preparation\. At the time the demographics of
the project region had not been examined since 1991, pre-war, and most of the project region was not
included in the recent (2000) Croatia Poverty Assessment\. (Since the SA, a 2001 census has been
conducted but the results are not yet available)\. The SA study area consisted of the communities in and
around the four protected areas that are the focus of the KEC, including: Paklenica National Park (within
north Zadar County, at the south end of the KEC study area); Plitvice Lakes National Park in Lika-Senj
County; Velebit Nature Park, also in Lika Senj County; and Risnjak National Park (in the Gorski-Kotar
District of Primorsko-Goranska County)\.
The main findings of the SA relevant to the KEC project are that the population in the project region has
declined substantially in the past ten years; the area is economically depressed; and traditional rural and
agricultural activities once practiced in the region have largely been abandoned\. From available
information, the SA estimates the population of the total project region is about 65,000\. Since 1991 (the
-26-
date of the census for which data is available, 2001 census data not yet available), the demographics of the
project area have shifted significantly\. It is estimated that in Lika-Senj County, which comprises more than
80% of the project area, the population has decreased over ten years from 64,000 to approximately 44,000
people, most of whom are elderly\. While unemployment was already high before the war, it is now much
higher throughout the project area which includes the poorest county in Croatia (Lika Senj)\. Employment
in the main towns, such as Gospic and Otocac, is largely in the forestry sector, public sector, and in a few
small businesses\. Although agricultural pursuits have long been practiced throughout the area, agriculture
has not been the economic mainstay of most families in the recent past, but rather has usually been carried
out as a supplementary activity\. One of the most vulnerable segments of society in the project area are
those living in the rural villages and undertaking subsistence agriculture\. Most of these people are the
elderly living on pensions and welfare support that often amounts to only 300 - 400 Kunas /month
(US$45)\. Perhaps the most vulnerable and poverty-stricken elements of society observed are the Serbs and
Croats who have returned to the rural villages in the Plitvice area in the aftermath of war\. Both groups
tend to be dominated by the elderly and live in isolated settlements with limited access to resources\.
Civil society participation in enviromnental (or any type of) decision making is weak\. The environmental
NGO movement in Croatia is in its early stages of development\. While there are numerous entities
identifying themselves as environmental NGOs, they are small and fragmented, and have limited resources
and capacity\. There is no tradition of community participation in local decision making\. Some residents
expressed resentment because they could no longer use areas, now protected, for economic activities\. This
sentiment is limited to the Velebit area, as the other national parks have all been in existence for over 50
years\.
The SA identified a broad range of groups and individuals who have a stake in how the Karst ecosystem
resources are managed\. They include: (a) government institutions at the national, regional and local levels
(including MEPP, MOAF, HS, Ministry of Tourism, HV); (b) managers of national and nature parks in the
project area; (c) local residents and resource users (farmers, forest users, HS employees, herders, service
providers to national parks and park visitors); (d) national and local NGOs; (e) the academic community
and research institutes; and (e) tourists\. Annex 11 identifies and evaluates the role of specific stakeholders
that are most able to influence the project, likely to be most affected by the project, and have potential to
contribute knowledge or others support it\. The results of the SA have been used to define activities for the
project as follows:
* The project aims to establish a sound public participation program and to ensure that decision-making
be decentralized to the local level as much as possible\.
* The KEC project includes, at each of the protected area sites, a "people and parks" integration program
to strengthen the links between the national parks, protected areas and the local populations who live in
and around them\. The program will include the development of local, community advisory groups that
include a range of stakeholders (for example, park residents, adjacent communities, park managers,
NGOs)\. These groups will serve as advisors to the PIU\.
* The project includes a tourism initiative to boost the local economy which includes: baseline research
of supply-side/product; market analysis; survey of tour operators' perceptions (intemational and
national operators); "comparable" evaluation (for example, Slovenia); identification of, and
packaging, business opportunities; constraints; and an action strategy\.
* The project is a vehicle for rural revitalization by promoting linkages between biodiversity conservation
and rural development issues\. The small grants program for rural development provide opportunities
in line with stakeholders' interests and the suitability of the resource base\.
* The project includes, under the small grants program, a specific program for environmental education
- 27 -
and public awareness that will draw upon, and build the capacity of, environmental NGOs\.
Specific social outcomes are delineated in Annex 11\.
6\.2 Participatory Approach: How are key stakeholders participating in the project?
The project has been developed with a participatory approach\. Beginning with pre-identification, the
World Bank team met with national, regional, and local level government authorities; NGOs; scientists and
academics; research institutes; and local communities to discuss conservation of biodiversity in the karstic
regions of Croatia\. The BSAP, which guided identification of the KEC project, itself, was developed
through a participatory process with over 100 stakeholders involved in its preparation\. An inter-sectoral
steering committee and counterpart team was established at identification\. National and local level
workshops at milestones in project preparation used a participatory process and involved a wide range of
stakeholders\. Key stakeholders that participated in the project identification and preparation phase
included representatives from relevant Ministries and Institutions, including Ministry of Environmental
Protection and Physical Planning, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of
Culture, Ministry of Economy, State Directorate of Tourism, State Directorate of Water, Chamber of
Commerce, Croatia Forests, Croatia Waters, private sector tourism, Institute 'Hrvoje Pozar', Croatian
Building Institute Ltd\., Geological Research Institute, Natural History Museum, Zagreb University, county
level authorities, local level protected area managers, and representatives of approximately 30 NGOs\.
The SA team met with the full range of stakeholders, including Croat and Serb villagers; town residents;
and representatives of community-based organizations (CBOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
international relief agencies, local businesses, and all levels of government\.
Reports of all preparation workshops, including an evaluation by participants, were produced in English
and Croatian, widely disseminated and posted on the MEPP web-site\. All preparation reports were
produced in Croatian and English and also posted on the web-site\. Results of the preparation reports, as
well as the SA, were discussed in a series of local level meetings\. To pilot an approach for local level
dissemination of information during preparation, the project team prepared a brochure "Karst Ecosystems
Conservation: Information on Project Preparation" in Croatian and English, posted the brochure on the
web, and distributed over 500 copies which were discussed in a series of local level meetings\. Feedback
from the participants indicated that this was an effective tool in disseminating information and, throughout
project implementation, similar pieces will be produced for discussion purposes\. Input from the local and
national level meetings and workshops was incorporated into the final project design which was the topic of
a national workshop (October 2000)\. The workshop report is on the MEPP web-site\. Stakeholders will
participate in the implementation of the project components at all three levels of participation, namely
information sharing, consultation and collaboration as indicated below (also see Annex 11)\.
* National Park management and staff will contribute to, and be recipient of, information in a number of
project components that directly affect national parks and biodiversity management and monitoring in
the Karst region\. This includes: development of policies and guidelines for the system of protected
areas in the karst; provision of support to newly protected areas; development and implementation of
biodiversity information inventory; development of mapping and monitoring system; strengthening
local PA staff capacity; and the development of regional and international vehicles for cooperation\.
Park management will also play an important role in ensuring public awareness of, and subscription to,
the goal of Karst ecosystem conservation, notably through people and parks liaison committees, and
more informally, taking into account local populations' needs in planning park activities\.
* Participation and feedback of local farmers, households, NGOs, and businesses will be integral to the
implementation of demonstration projects on sustainable resource use, to be financed under the CRRG
grants program\. This group of stakeholders will also participate in the rural revitalization program, as
- 28 -
recipients of project support and information, as well as members of decision-making committees,
"people and parks" liaison committees and local small grant administration boards\. Local
communities, businesses and county and municipal governments will also collaborate in the preparation
of the management plans of the Velebit Nature Park and Northern Velebit National Park\.
* The public at the national and local levels will be informed about the importance and values of karst
ecosystems through a variety of media, including TV spots, booklets, annual workshops, traveling
exhibition, and a project newsletter\. NGOs will play an active role in this effort\.
* Current and potential tourism service providers in the region, tour operators nationwide, protected
areas, the Tourism Institute, and the Ministry of Tourism will both be providers and recipients of
information in the context of the supply/demand analysis of feasibility of nature tourism in the Karst
region and on the carrying capacity and revenue break-even targets for the national parks\. The
development of pilot marketing plans and action plans for the nature tourism product in the karst region
will heavily rely on the collaboration of these stakeholders to be most beneficial to sustainable tourism
development in the region\.
6\.3 How does the project involve consultations or collaboration with NGOs or other civil society
organizations?
During project preparation, the SA included NGOs as a key stakeholder group, and a separate study on
public awareness and public participation in biodiversity involved consultations with NGOs\. There are
about 150 NGOs dealing with some aspect of the environment in Croatia\. A meeting was held during
project identification with environmental NGOs to discuss technical issues on karst biodiversity
conservation and the project objectives\. The World Bank and counterpart preparation team has met with
national and local NGOs that are working in the project region to discuss the project and relevant NGO
activities and get input on project design\. The project was discussed in a national level meeting between the
Minister of MEPP and 200 members of NGOs (October 13, 2000)\. NGOs have been included in all
national and local level workshops during project preparation\. Two specific project activities have been
designed to be carried out by NGOs, preparation of gnidelines for community and NGO involvement in
biodiversity conservation, and a public awareness and education activity\. NGOs will be represented on the
KEC working group and local advisory boards\.
6\.4 What institutional arrangements have been provided to ensure the project achieves its social
development outcomes?
The SA identified social development issues, existing structures and mechanisms needed for community
participation in the project and necessary resources, and recommendations on how best to structure and
finance community-based protected area organizations so as to facilitate a partnership with protected area
management, with concerned NGOs, and with county development committees\. The implementation of the
project will include the establishment of a community-level local advisory group for each county (3) in the
KEC region\. These groups will include local residents and other relevant stakeholders and will convene for
the purpose of consultation on various park and protected area management as well as local planning
issues\. The local advisory groups will evaluate CRRG proposals\.
6\.5 How will the project monitor performance in terms of social development outcomes?
The project will finance periodic SAs to monitor social development outcomes identified in the initial SA
carried out during project preparation\. Annex 11 presents a list of social development outcomes and
indicators as well as a plan for social development outcome monitoring and evaluation\.
-29 -
7\. Safeguard Policies:
7\.1 Do any of the following safeguard policies apply to the project?
Policy Appltcablly
Environmental Assessment (OP 4\.01, BP 4\.01, GP 4\.01) * Yes 0 No
Natural Habitats (OP 4\.04, BP 4\.04, GP 4\.04) 0 Yes * No
Forestry (OP 436, GP 4\.36) 0 Yes 0 No
Pest Management (OP 4\.09) 0 Yes * No
Cultural Property (OPN 11\.03) 0 Yes * No
Indigenous Peoples (OD 4\.20) 0 Yes 0 No
Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4\.12) 0 Yes * No
Safety of Dams (OP 4\.37, BP 4\.37) 0 Yes 0 No
Projects in International Waters (OP 7\.50, BP 7\.50, GP 7\.50) 0 Yes * No
Projects in Disputed Areas (OP 7\.60, BP 7\.60, GP 7\.60)* 0 Yes 0 No
7\.2 Describe provisions made by the project to ensure compliance with applicable safeguard policies\.
An environmental assessment was prepared under project preparation and is provided in the EMP\.
F\. Sustainability and Risks
1\. Sustainability:
la\. Institutional sustainability
The national government agencies responsible for biodiversity conservation, municipal governments of the
local projects' areas, and the local protected area management and technical staff are in full support of the
project\. The project preparation counterpart team includes representatives from local level protected areas,
protected area advisory boards, county management; national level government officials and private sector
experts from biodiversity conservation, forestry, water, agriculture, and tourism\.
On the field level, where day-to-day project implementation will occur, the local PIU will work closely with
the directors of the protected areas, as well as the local authorities responsible for physical planning, forest
management, and environmental protection\. The local PIU office is located within the county offices
which manage local level environment, forestry, agriculture and water activities which will contribute to
sustainability\. Through capacity building and institutional strengthening and increased coordination
between various implementing agencies at the local, regional and national level, institutional sustainability
has been addressed\.
lb\. Social sustainability
From its inception the project has tried to involve key stakeholders in project preparation and
implementation, including policy makers, citizens and NGOs, to ensure social sustainability of the project\.
Future initiatives aim to involve the local communities by developing activities that will reduce pressure on
the natural resources through effective management and altematives, increase in public awareness and
support for biodiversity conservation\. These should also contribute to social sustainability\. The inclusion
of a "people and parks" program into each of the five protected areas will ensure community involvement in
decision making\. To demonstrate sustainable economic development, compatible with biodiversity
conservation, the components will be responsive to the needs of the local residents\. Local advisory boards
- 30 -
for each of the KEC region's three counties will be key players in project implementation\.
lc\. Financial Sustainability
The Government's contribution to the project of US$3\.2 million includes taxes (US$1\.3 million); some
investment costs -- facilities and refurbishing costs (US$1\.4 million); and US$0\.5 million to cover recurrent
costs (staff)\. The 39% level of government contribution reflects the extremely strong commitment to the
project\. The Project incorporates measures to ensure financial sustainability of protected area maintenance
and eco-system conservation in the Karst region\. The Government recognizes the importance of
conservation of Karst ecosystems and minimization of the negative impact of protected area visitation for
the sustainability of tourism in the long run\. It is committed to ensuring that protected area operations and
maintenance and conservation activities are financed adequately and in a sustained fashion\. To this end,
MEPP has decided that in the Plitvice Lakes National Park an adequate amount from the visitor revenues
be dedicated to the above activities\. In the Risnjak, Paklenica and Velebit National Parks, where there is
potential for increased at the visitation level, project components, such as demand analysis and marketing
plan development, based on canying capacity assessments, will help improve visitation and hence revenues\.
The recent revitalization of tourism to Croatia will be a complimentary, positive factor in this direction\. At
times when visitor revenues are insufficient to cover necessary operation and maintenance and conservation
costs, the Govermnent is committed to provide complimentary funding\.
2\. Critical Risks (reflecting the failure of critical assumptions found in the fourth column of Annex 1):
Risk Risk Rating Risk Mitigation Measure
From Outputs to Objective
Proposed changes in legislation and policy N The project will support a national public
not adopted awareness program targeted at key audiences,
including politicians and Parliament, to explain
the benefits of biodiversity conservation and
need for changes in legislation\. For the
purposes of EU accession, which Croatia is
discussing, it is mandatory that the
environmental legislation be harmonized with
that of the EU\.
Inter-sectoral conflict among agencies M Stakeholders will be involved throughout
responsible for land-use and natural preparation and implementation of the project to
resource management planning build collaboration and support for the project
objectives, design and activities\.
Lack of support by local communities and M The project will demonstrate the economic
counties for sustainable management and benefits of using sustainable technologies and
use of Karst ecosystems conserving biodiversity\.
From Components to Outputs
Delayed contribution of counterpart M Periodic visits to MoF to share progress of
financing\. Government doesn't allocate project activities
enough resources to protected areas
MEPP does not allocate adequate (full- M Discussions are on-going to ensure that a
time) staff and office facilities for national full-time national and local PIU are established
and local PIU prior to implementation of the project
- 31 -
Steering Committee not functioning M Committee roles and responsibilities clearly
effectively spelled out in PIP\.
Strategies developed under project not M Performance based criteria used at project
implemented milestones to determine if project should
continue
Hotel debt servicing drains resources from M Continue to work with government to ensure
BC in Plitvice Lakes NP that an adequate share of PLNP visitor revenues
are allocated to biodiversity conservation\.
Overall Risk Rating M
Risk Rating - H (High Risk), S (Substantial Risk), M (Modest Risk), N(Negligible or Low Risk)
3\. Possible Controversial Aspects:
The project will seek to ensure that visitation to the Plitvice Lakes National Park be kept at a level that is
sustainable from a biodiversity conservation point of view\. However, due to its large hotel related debt
with annual servicing requirements of US$3-4 million, PLNP management may be inclined to attract more
visitors to the park reaching unsustainable levels\. The project will continue to work with the Government to
ensure that the hotel debt is funded from the Government's intemal resources or privatized and tourism is
kept at sustainable levels\.
G\. Main GrantConditions
1\. Effectiveness Condition
None
2\. Other [classify according to covenant types used in the Legal Agreements\.]
Financial Covenants
(a) The PIU will complete the agreed financial action plan for strengthening the project financial
management systems by December 31, 2002
(b) The Government will cause the PIl to have its records, accounts, and financial statements audited each
year, commencing with the accounts for the year ending December 31, 2002
H\. Readiness for Implementation
0 1\. a) The engineering design documents for the first year's activities are complete and ready for the start
of project implementation\.
0 1\. b) Not applicable\.
1 2\. The procurement documents for the first year's activities are complete and ready for the start of
project implementation\.
Z 3\. The Project Implementation Plan has been appraised and found to be realistic and of satisfactory
quality\.
0 4\. The following items are lacking and are discussed under loan conditions (Section G):
- 32 -
project implementation\.
Z 3\. The Project Implementation Plan has been appraised and found to be realistic and of satisfactory
quality\.
El 4\. The following iteins are lacking and are discussed under loan conditions (Section G):
1\. Compliance with Bank Policies
Z 1\. This project complies with all applicable Bank policies\.
O 2\. The following exceptions to Bank policies are recommended for approval\. The project complies with
all other applicable Bank policies\.
v_ _ _ _ _ _ _ c -wt _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Rita Klees Laura Tuck Andrew N\. Vorkink
Team Leader Sector Director Country Director
- 33 -
Annex 1: Project Design Summary
CROATIA: KARST ECOSYSTEM CONSERVATION PROJECT
Key Perfornance Data Collection Strategy
Hierarchy of Objectives Indicators Critical Assumptions
Sector-related CAS Goal: Sector Indicators: Sector! country reports: (from Goal to Bank Mission)
Protect the environment * Parliamentary gazette Biodiversity protection and
which is crucial for sustainable natural resource
economic growth and * CAS updates management contribute to
private sector development local economic development,
through tourism * Govemment "State of the and poverty alleviation\.
development\. Environment" reports; Political stability and stable
economic development
ESW (occasional)
GEF Operational Program:
To promote conservation of * Baseline level of globally * Biodiversity information Continued Government
biological diversity and important species, habitats, and monitoring system commitment to biodiversity
ecological integrity of and communities maintained\. conservation\.
mountain, forest, freshwater * National biodiversity
ecosystems, and associated inventories Biodiversity conservation
landscapes of karst region * Regional Collaboration and benefits local stakeholders
(OP2, OP3, OP4)\. Coordination Program for * Official gazette
Karst Ecosystem Conservation
established\.
Global Objective: Outcome / Impact Project reports: (from Objective to Goal)
Indicators:
Project Development * Significant reduction in * Park and natural area Continued political support
Objective: destructive practices (list TBD management reports for biodiversity conservation
based upon results of the (quarterly) and sustainable resource use,
Local residents, tourists and baseline survey)\. despite changes in
other visitors to participating * Significant increase in the * Project monitoring reports Government
parks and natural areas adoption of environmentally (quarterly)
refrain from identified responsible practices by local
destructive practices and residents, tourists, and other' * Supervision mission
adopt recommended behaviors visitors within the project area reports;
that preserve and protect the
unique features of the natural (Measurable indicators: Level * Evaluation mission reports
environment\. of visitor satisfaction with PA (MTR & ICR);
services with respect to * Registration of
biodiversity; number of level entrepreneurs
of destructive behavior in the e PA visitor surveys with
PA; level of knowledge of questionnaires filled out
Croatian karst, species, before and after visit
habitats, and impact of human
behavior on biodiversity\.)
* Improvement in livelihood
and employment generation in
- 34 -
selected communities
(Indicator: Number of
entrepreneurs in the project
region)
Global Objective
Conservation of biodiversity * Stable or increasing * Indicator species surveys
and sustainable use of bio numbers of 2-3 indicator (annual);
resources in Croatian Karst species (flora & fauna, to be * Forest cover mapping
areas\. identified during preparation) (annual)
* Gradually improved status
of key forest species within
the project area
Output from each Output Indicators: Project reports: (from Outputs to Objective)
Component:
1\. Biodiversity Conservation Favorable program review by * Project monitoring reports * Legislation and policy
and Resources intemational panel of experts (quarterly) adopted, where necessary\.
Management: (mid-term & final) * Legal protection is enforced
Effectiveness of biodiversity * Supervision mission effectively\.
conservation and resources reports;
management enhanced at
national and local levels\. * Evaluation mission reports
(MTR & ICR);
2\. Conservation and Rural * Verification that the grant As above, +
Revitalization Grants funds were distributed for * Financial audit report
(CRRG): productive purposes and were
Viability of biodiversity used by beneficiaries as
friendly resource use intended\.
demonstrated among local
stakeholders\.
3\. Global Karst Network * Verification that the As above, +
Participation: activities were carried out as Technical audit
Intemational working planned\.
relationships established with
sister institutions to facilitate
information sharing regarding
Karst ecosystems
management approaches\.
4\. Project Management, * Timely submission of As above
Monitoring and Reporting quality reporting, as required\.
Project implementation
successfully completed;
project results adequately
monitored and reported
- 35 -
Key Perfornance I Data-Collection Strategy j
- O S i0-0- t h-f"Indicators Critical Assumptions
Project Components I Inputs: (budget for each Project reports: (from Components to
Sub-components: component) Outputs)
1\. Biodiversity US$ 1\.83 million * Project progress reports * Timely contribution of
Conservation and Resources (of this US$ 1\.04 million GEF counterpart financing\.
Management: grant funded) * Bank supervision reports
* Improve laws & * MoE maintains adequate
regulatory framework; * Disbursement reports (full time) staff and office
* Capacity building for facilities for PIU
biodiversity conservation; * Procurement
* Expanded protection for documents/contracts
species and taxa;
* Biodiversity inventory, * Quarterly Project
mapping & monitoring; Management Reports (PMR)
Public awareness building
with NGOs
2\. Establishment of US$ 4\.88 million
community-based (of this US$2\.89 million GEF
mechanisms for biodiversity grant funded)
conservation and sustainable
resource use in the Karst
region
* Nature based tourism;
* Protected areas
management (NP Plitvice
Lakes, NP Paklenica, NP
Risnjak, NP Northern Velebit,
PN Velebit)\.
* Conservation and Rural
Revitalization Grants (CRRG)
- Demonstration grants
* Increasing local public
awareness and support for
biodiversity conservation with
active role of NGOs
Regional Cooperation
Programme for Karst
Ecosystem Conservation
3\. Project Management, US$ 1\.26 million
Monitoring, & Reporting (of this US$ 0\.78million GEF
grant funded)
- 36 -
Annex 2: Detailed Project Description
CROATIA: KARST ECOSYSTEM CONSERVATION PROJECT
Background
Croatia enjoys unusually rich biodiversity of global significance due to its geography, between the
Mediterranean and Central-European continental climatic regions, and its geology, which is predominantly
karst\. The term "karst" originated in Croatia and is applied to a specific landscape and morphology
characterized by the presence of limestone or other soluble rocks, where drainage has been largely diverted
into subterranean routes\. The globally prominent Croatian karst ecosystems host 3,500 species of flora
(283 endemic), 12 species of amphibians, 36 species of reptiles, 200 species of resident birds, 79 species of
manmmals, and 64 species of freshwater fish, of which eleven are endemic\. Much of Croatia is karstic\. The
project selected for its focus, the karst region located within the Dinarid Mountain range, which runs
through Croatia from Slovenia to Bosnia\. The Dinarids include hundreds of sinkholes, chasms,
underground streams, and caves\. Its estimated 8,000 caves are among the deepest and most extensive in
the world and render the region a global hot-spot of subterranean biodiversity\. These subterranean karst
habitats support an ever increasing list of newly discovered endemic troglodytic (eyeless and adapted for an
entirely subterranean existence) species and families\. These include one new species, genus and family of
leech Croatobranchus mestrovi, which was found in a 1300 meter deep cave in the Velebit mountain in
1994\. Among the unique species found in Croatian karst ecosystems are the only known cave sponge, the
only known cave calm, and the only known cave polychaete worm\.
Croatia is equally famous for its karst freshwater ecosystems which include travertine/tuffa-building
communities of micro-organisms\. The resulting travertine barriers, some estimated to be over 40,000 years
old, have led to the spectacular lakes and waterfalls now protected within two national parks, one of which
is also included in the KEC project, Plitvice Lakes National Park\.
Large areas of the Dinarids, particularly in the Velebit Mountains, are densely covered by forest
communities of beech, fir, spruce and black pine, a relict alpine sub-species found only in the Velebit area\.
The Karst region contains the largest part of unfraginented forest in Croatia (almost 50% of forests), the
integrity of which is evidenced by the presence of viable populations of large carnivores (wolf, brown bear,
and lynx)\. The Dinarids serve as an important trans-European forest mountain corridor between Slovenia
and Bosnia Herzegovina\. The global significance of Croatia's karst ecosystem is evidenced by the
international recognition it has received\. Plitvice Lakes National Park is on the UNESCO's World List of
Natural and Cultural Heritage\. The Velebit Mountain Range is part of the UNESCO's Man and the
Biosphere Program, and has been identified by the WWF's Forest Hot-spot Initiative as one of the ten most
important forest areas in the Mediterranean region\.
The impacts of the threats to the karst ecosystem's biodiversity, with the exception of eutrophication in the
surface waters of Plitvice Lakes National Park, have not been scientifically documented to date, but are
believed by the country's environmentalists to be significant The BSAP and NEAP note that the lack of
systematic inventorying and monitoring of the ecosystem and species status has resulted in an insufficient
basis for determining the exact nature and magnitude of threats to biodiversity\. But in the light of observed
habitat changes and fragmentation; water and air pollution; extensive exploitation of natural resources; and
introduction of foreign species experienced in the project region, the BSAP assumes that the karst
ecosystem biodiversity is declining\. Both the subterranean and terrestrial karst ecosystems are fragile,
interconnected, and dependent upon the maintenance of a delicate balance between relief, hydrology,
climate and vegetation\. The surface ecosystems of predominantly natural forest and traditional pastoral
- 37 -
land generally serve to buffer the subterranean ecosystems but this function can be significantly negatively
impacted by subtle changes in land-use and vegetation cover\. For instance, land-use changes can lead to
the rapid influx of water in all parts of a karst cave system resulting in significant changes in the
subterranean ecosystems\. In recent years, these threats have been somewhat averted by reduced economic
activity, particularly in tourism and agriculture, during and after the war (1991-96)\. Today, post-war
Croatia is on a fast track of economic development, spurred, in part, by a new government (February 2000)
and the opening of EU accession discussions\. Tourism, once a mainstay of Croatian economy, has
traditionally been characterized as "mass tourism" as opposed to "nature-based tourism"\. As the tourism
industry rebounds it could have serious implications for biodiversity conservation\. Other sector
development projects which commonly negatively impact upon biodiversity, e\.g\. roads, hydropower, are
also proposed for the project region\.
The project development objective is to protect the biodiversity of karst ecosystems in Croatia in a way that
is participatory, economically viable, and integrated with the country's socio-economic goals\.
Project Region and Protected Area Sites
The focus of the project region is the Croatian Highlands, which is one of the four major landscape units in
the country and includes the mountain corridor of the Dinarids between Slovenia and Bosnia Herzegovina\.
The project region encompasses three counties, Primorje-Gorski Kotar, Lika-Senj, and Zadar\. The project
area is primarily rural; over 50% is forested, and 65% has few or no inhabitants\. The project area includes
two main municipalities, Gospic and Ogulin, and five small towns and has a total population of
approximately 60,000\. The main economic activities in the region are forestry, animal husbandry and
tourism\. Agricultural and industrial activities are minimal\. In the few areas with tourism, it is the primary
economic activity of the immediate area\. The project region provides resources to the coastal towns, and
there are future plans to establish a triangle of highways, inside the project area, connecting major Croatian
cities\. Annex 11 - the Social Assessment; and PAD section A\.4 give more detailed information about the
socio-eoncomic characteristics of the project region\.
Risnjak National Park (NP) is located in the Gorski-Kotar District of the Primorska-Goranska Country,
at the Slovenian border of Croatia to the north-east of the Istria Peninsula and in close vicinity of the resort
town Rijeka\. The Park was established in 1953 on 3,200 hectares\. In 1997 its area doubled to include the
headwaters and the upper portions of the watershed of the Kupa River\. Although is only 1,528 meters
high, Risnjk represents a very strong climatic barrier between the coastal and inland parts of the country\.
6100 hectares of the Park are covered by forests comprising thirty flora populations\. The Park is a public
company with only 10% of its area being private property\. It comprises two villages, one with 300
residents and another with only eight full time inhabitants\. The average age of the village populations is
high and depopulation is an ongoing process\. The main Rijeka-Zagreb highway is only 15 kilometers
away, which makes Risnjak easily accessible\.
The National Park Administration employs 21 full-time staff (of whom 6 are professionals) and carries out
activities in protection, public education and community relations, visitor management and catering (the
Park operates a small-scale hotel-restaurant and mountain huts) and tourism promotion\. The Park has a
solid research and resources preservation program\. Between 25,000-50,000 people visit the Park annually\.
About 40% of the visitors are local, 15% are foreigners and the rest are Croatians from other parts of the
country\. The park charges a daily entrance fee of about US$2\.00 to adults and US$1\.00 to students\.
Local residents are not charged a fee for entering the Park\. The Park's annual income from visitor fees is
about US$15,000\. The salaries of the Park's 21 employees, making up about 50% of current expenditures,
are covered by a transfer from the state budget\. Just over the border in neighboring Slovenia, the tourism
- 38 -
and recreational markets are thriving with small businesses engaged in river rafting, kayaking, horseback
riding, etc\. Much of this recreation is based upon the Kupa River and begins at the point where the river
flows out of the park at the international boundary\. Presumably, similar income generating recreational
activities could be offered on the Croatia/Risnjak side as well\.
The Park's buffer zone, defined as the area within 500 meters of the Park's borders, is mostly forested\.
The main economic activities are forestry, and to a lesser extent agriculture and tourism services\. Hunting,
though prohibited, is carried out excessively, in the buffer zone\. The buffer zone does not fall under the
jurisdiction of the National Park Administration\.
The main problems facing Risnjak NP in regards to biodiversity conservation are:
* Depopulation of the park area reducing traditional agricultural activities that help maintain existing
biodiversity;
* Trans-boundary acid rain which has impacted the forests and contaminated the soil
* Excessive hunting in the buffer zone
* Insufficient tourism infrastructure and poor roads in the Park
* Insufficient financial resources
c Lack of equipment/facilities for monitoring, interpretation, education, camping, hiking
Plilvice Lakes National Park, founded in 1949, is located in the Lika Senj County between the mountain
massif of Mala Kapela and a spur of Licka Pljesivica\. Administratively, a minor part of the park falls
within the areas of Slunj, Otocac and Ogulin, but most of it comes under Titova Korenica\. The Park's
headquarters is in Plitvice jezera\. The park covers an area of 29,482 hectares with a large forest cover of
22,306 hectares; 6,957 hectares of meadows and pastures; and 217 hectares in surface water features, i\.e\.
lakes, streams, water falls\. The Park is famous for its travertine lakes (a series of 16) and the waterfalls
that connect them\. A unique phenomenon of karst topography, the lakes have nevertheless remained
surface features\. The water largely comes in from the Crna rijeka, Bijela rijeka, and potok Ljiskovac
(black and white rivers, Ljeskovac brook), which flow into the Proscansko jezero (lake)\. This lake lies at
an altitude of 636 meters above sea level, and the water runs from it through the lower lakes down to the
River Korana, racing over many travertine barriers of various morphological forms, creating countless falls
and rapids\. of great beauty\. Plitvice forests provide habitat for diverse flora and fauna, including but not
limited to the brown bear, wolves, otter and 126 bird species, of which 70 breed there\. 25% of the Park
area is privately owned\. The park hosts several small settlements with elderly populations mostly engaged
in basic agricultural activities\.
The Park received an average of 750,000 visitors per year in the 1 980s, 90% of whom were foreign tourists
on their way to or on a day trip from coastal resort areas\. During the war (1991-1996), the Park was not
operational\. In the latter part of the 1990s, visitation recovered to only about 400,000 per year (1999)\.
However, in 2000, in parallel to the overall recovery of tourism to the Adriatic coast, the visitor numbers
reached 700,000\. The park, charges US$5\.00 per day to adults, and US$3\.00 to students\. The Park owns
and operates 3 hotels with a total bed capacity of 722, three restaurants, a motel and a camping facility\. A
total of 620 staff are employed in the Park\. Revenues from their own resources cover about 97% of the
Park's operating costs\. The Govemrnment provides the salaries of three nature protection professionals
which amount to 3% of current expenditures\.
The main problems facing Plitvice NP in regards to biodiversity conservation are:
* Eutrophication of Plitvice Lakes
* Lack of research and data to document the trend of declining biodiversity;
* Lack of scientific information to adequately assess state of biodiversity through the park;
- 39 -
* Lack of an adequate park management plan, including a business management plan;
* Damaged trails, hiking infrastructure, boardwalks;
* Lack of promotional/educational/interpretation materials;
* Low public awareness in local communities of conservation;
* Lack of a center for promotion, presentation and education\.
Velebit Nature Park
The Velebit Nature Park and world bio-sphere reserve was established in 1981\. It covers 200,000 hectares
in the Lika-Senj and Zadar County\. The exact borders of the park have not been established legally\. The
area of the park encompasses the entire Velebit mountain range including the coastal area with villages and
tourist settlements\. The Nature Park also houses the Paklenica National Park, Northern Velebit National
Park, as well as a number of other protected areas: the Hajducki and Rozanski Kukovi Strict Reserve
(1,220 hectares), the Zavizan-Balinovac kosa Special Botanic Reserve (118 hectares), the Velebit Botanic
Garden (50 hectares) and Stirovica Special Forest Reserve (117 hectares)\. The Velebit Nature Park
encompasses the most important parts of the Dinarid Mountains in terms of relief and vegetation\. Forests
occupy nearly 75% of the Nature Park\. 10% of the national park area is private property mainly in the
coastal and southern part of the protected area\.
Although established two decades ago, the Velebit Nature Park is still at the beginning stage of planning
and development which provides the KEC project with a vehicle to demonstrate new protected area
management planning systems and processes\. There is a need to being a process that will integrate the
park with local communities and villages\. At present, the park is staffed with a director, manager, and
three rangers\. Economic activities in the Velebit Nature Park include forest operations which are controlled
by Hrvatske Sume (HS)\. The forest management approach, including timber harvest level, is a
controversial issue between the HS and Velebit NP management the resolution of which can be catalyzed
by the KEC project\. Through the protected area management plan developed by the KEC project for the
Nature Park; NGO support through the project; regional planning and development inclusion of
biodiversity concerns; grant funding for demonstration projects linking activities such as forestry, with
biodiversity conservation, the KEC project will help resolve issues relating to conflicting use of natural
resources in the Velebit\. As in other rural areas in the KEC project, economic opportunities in the region
are extremely limited, and local people are leaving for greater opportunities elsewhere\. support for the park
will increase to the extent that tourism can be generated\.
Tourism is very limited, and undocumented\. The local mountaineering club, based in Gospic, guides
several hundred visitors per year to various sites in the nature park\. Due to lack of an administrative
structure and legal basis, visitors are not charged an entrance fee as yet\.
The most important problems and issues facing the Velebit Nature Park are:
* Lack of an administrative system and visitor management system (administration building, personnel,
management plan);
* Insufficient government budget to hire personnel, acquire monitoring and other equipment and develop
nature tourism facilities;
* Lack of facilities and infrastructure to attract nature tourists;
* Poaching and poisoning of game animals;
* Environmental degradation due to exploitation of minerals, solid waste landfills, and uncontrolled
housing development on the coast;
* Landmine remnants, especially in the southem and south-eastem Velebit area;
-40-
* Lack of an ecologically integrated approach to forest operations;
* Need to define and register the exact NP borders;
* Lack of promotional, education, interpretive information and services in the Park\.
Paklenica National Park is located within the Velebit Nature Park, on the southern, sea-facing side of the
Velebit Range\. Its total size area is 3600 hectares, with about 2/3 of the territory in Zadar County and the
rest in Lika Senj County\. Administratively, it is within the area of the city of Zadar, while the park
headquarters and visitor center are in Starigrad Paklenica, a coastal tourist destination\. Founded in 1949,
this is the second oldest national park in Croatia\. Unlike the slightly older Plitvice NP, it has not suffered
from the consequences of excessive use and hotel waste impacts\. Management of the Park is clearly the
most balanced in Croatia, and the KEC project will foster transfer of this know-how to the other national
parks\. Paklenica is a particularly interesting part of the Velebit by reason of its richness of natural
phenomena\. The Park includes mountain landscapes including the highest peaks of Velebit,
geomorphologically rich rocks, numerous caves, and two deep mountain gorges\. Steep cliffs up to 400
meters high draw technical climbers from around Europe\. Some 300 climbing routes have been identified
and established in one of the two main canyons in the park\. The other canyon, which also contains
appealing routes for climbing, is closed to climbing, for conservation purposes\. Climbing is well managed
however there remains the challenge of rescuing lost/injured climbers\. world\. Most (60%) of the area is
covered by forest\. Because of its geographical position and variations in altitude, there is a great diversity
of vegetation in the park\. There is the stone scrub and maquis of the coastal region; then broad, low woods
that become high forests in the interior\. Above them are beech and juniper forests; and then mountain
meadows stretching up to the highest peaks\. The Park also has richly varied flora ranging from
Mediterranean to high Alpine\. Paklenica National Park provides habitat for a number of animals and
insects, including but not limited to the endangered Griffin vulture, bears, pine and beech marten, wild cat,
wild boar, reptiles and mountain butterflies\. The Park is an active participant in a regional and
international effort to support reestablishment of a stable population of the endangered Griffon Vulture, an
endangered species in Croatia\. Local residents, in attempts to poison wolves, which the vultures feed on,
contribute to their decline\.
The Park employs 20 full time workers and 10 part time (summer) workers\. In addition to protection and
research, park staff are engaged in visitor management, notably climbers and cave visitors\.
In 2000, the Park had about 70,000 visitors which is nearly double the number of visitors in 1999\. Of
these visitors, an estimated 1/3 were rock climbers, another 1/3 visited the Manita Pec Cave, and the rest
were hikers and students\. It is estimated that 50% of the visitors arrived from coastal resorts\. Park
management believes that annually 100,000 and daily 600 visitors could be managed by the Park in an
environmentally sustainable manner\. Currently most visitation occurs in August when the average daily
number of visitors is 1,000\. Management's goal is to reach the annual sustainable visitor level and at the
same time spread visitation more evenly across the months\. The buffer zone of the national park offers
potential for bed and breakfast operations to support increased tourism\.
The Park charges about US$3\.00 entrance fee per person to adult visitors\. It also operates a camping site
by the management building in Starigrad and charges about US$10\.00 per night per tent\. Revenues from
entrance and camping fees make up about 60-70 % of the current expenditures\. A public company, the
Park receives the rest form the Government in the form of a budget transfer\.
The main problems of Paklenica National Park in terms of biodiversity conservation are:
* Hunting of park-protected animals, especially of the endangered griffon vulture;
-41 -
* Poaching of large mammals on high elevations;
* Uncontrolled alpinist behavior and related accidents;
* Lack of biodiversity data, research and mapping;
* Need for rehabilitation and equipment in the visitor/interpretation center;
* Need for rehabilitation and expansion of the trail system\.
Northern Velebit National Park
The North Velebit National Park was established in 1999 and is located in the central part of the Velebit
Nature Park\. It is staffed with a director, manager and one ranger\. Being a very new park, there is no
management plan; no registered visitor system; and the park is fully funded by the state budget\. The main
issues for the Northem Velebit NP are to get the Park up and running\. To do this effectively, the Park
needs:
* A management plan including a financing strategy;
* Basic infrastructure -- remodeling of an existing building to establish a visitor center;
* Construction of Filed works, e\.g\. trails, camp sites;
* visitor center, field, monitoring and office equipment;
* A business/tourism plan;
* Promotional/education/interpretive equipment;
* Mechanisms for community and NGO involvement in park decision making\.
The Project and Its Components
The project's global objective is to protect the biodiversity of karst ecosystems in a way that is
participatory, community-based, economically viable, and integrated with the country's socioeconornic
goals\. The project's development objective is: Local residents, tourists and other visitors to participating
national parks and other protected areas refrain from practices identified as detrimental to biodiversity
conservation and adopt recommended behaviors that preserve and protect the unique features of the karst
environment\. The project will strengthen institutional and technical capacity for biodiversity conservation;
integrate biodiversity conservation into management plans and sectoral strategies; improve management of
protected areas; and promote entrepreneurial and tourism activities to support rural revitalization and
biodiversity conservation; and increase civil participation in decision making processes\. Accordingly, the
three project components and their sub-components are:
By Component:
Project Component 1 - US$1\.83 million
GEF US$1\.04 million; GOC US$0\.79 million)
Building national capacity to conserve biodiversity and support natural resource management\.
(i) Strengthening of laws and regulatory framework (lJS$0\.02m)\. The project will finance a review and/or
revision of biodiversity-related regulations and sectoral strategies to incorporate biodiversity conservation
concems\. The project will finance training in the use of the guidelines to staff from relevant government
agencies, including the Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture, Ministry of Tourism, Croatia Forests (HS),
Croatia Waters (HV); physical planners; and protected area staff; as well as NGOs and citizens\.
(ii) Strengthening national capacity to ensure biodiversity conservation (US$0\.32m)\. The project will
finance preparation of protected area management and planning guidelines which include biodiversity
-42-
concerns; guidelines for community and NGO participation in protected area management; a protected
area system market analysis, promotion and marketing plan; a protected area financing strategy; and a pilot
project on biodiversity information dissemination\. The project will develop and conduct a national ranger
training program\.
(iii) Expansion of species and taxa under legal protection (US$0\.18m)\. Project preparation studies found
that there are two areas in the project region which could be eligible for protected area status; Ogulin and
the Kupa Valley\. The project will finance feasibility studies for these areas including an analysis of
biodiversity in Ogulin and water management issues related to biodiversity conservation; equipment for
underwater biodiversity monitoring; and revision of the list of taxa under legal protection in these two
areas\.
(iv) Biodiversity inventory, mapping and monitoring (US$1\.14m)\. The project will finance consultant
services and equipment for inventory and mapping of the biodiversity priority areas (identified by the
BSAP and Comprehensive Biodiversity Survey); a specific inventory of the biodiversity of caves in the
project region and necessary equipment for such; a study of cave hydrology in the project region; conduct
a monitoring program for large camivores in the project region\. The project will finance the development
of a GIS for the project region, the database, and training for staff in its use\.
(v) Increasing public awareness and support for biodiversity (US$0\.17m)\. The project will finance
development of a public awareness strategy; development of a WEB site and TV spots on biodiversity
conservation; a guide to karst biodiversity; annual workshops/festivals on biodiversity conservation; and
preparation of a traveling exhibition on biodiversity and the KEC Project\.
Project Component 2 - US$4\.88 million
GEF US$2\.88 million; GOC US$1\.99 million
Establish communitybased mechanisms for biodiversity conservation and sustainable resource use in
the karst region
The project will support measures to preserve the globally significant biodiversity in the Karst region
through community level activities and capacity building for protected area management\. Activities to
meet this objective fall into three sub-components:
(i) Promotion of sustainable nature based tourism in karst region (US$0\.21m)\. The project will finance
development of a local level tourism strategy which includes determination of the nature-based tourism
potential in the region and economic opportunities in tourism; a visitor management plan for protected area;
and preparation and field works on the European-6 (E-6) hiking trail through the project region (E-6 is a
branch of a larger network of hiking trails which spans Europe)\.
(ii) Increased localpublic awareness and supportfor biodiversity conservation (US$0\.08m)\. The
project will finance preparation of national park promotion materials for park visitors, local population,
and schools; preparation of field guides for the project region; and fund a small grants program for NGO
sponsored activities related to public awareness\.
(iii) Improving protected area management and services for biodiversity conservation (US$3\.86m)\. The
project will finance activities which are common to all the protected areas, and activities specific to the
individual park's needs and aspirations\. In each of the five protected areas in the project region, the project
will finance refurbishing of existing visitor structures, information kiosks, and research facilities (where
-43 -
they already exist); a "people and parks" program, each to be designed specific to the protected area and
intended to ensure direct, community involvement in the decision making process; field works, e\.g\. trails,
signs; data acquisition, processing and interpretation equipment, e\.g\. computers, GIS software; field
equipment, e\.g\. field telephone, binocular, staff uniforms, safety equipment; essentials for monitoring
programs; and staff development in skills such as interpretation, education, monitoring, research\. The
project will finance distinct investments/activities in each of the five protected areas, as follows:
Plitvice NP (US$0\.45m): The project will fnance preparation of a park management plan; laboratory
equipment for the research facility; and mowing equipment\.
Paklenica NP (US$0\.35m): The project will fiance the "Recovery of the Eurasian Vulture (Gyps
fulvus) Project" by providing equipment, education material, and monitoring equipment\.
Risnjak NP (US$0\.39m): The project will finance rescue equipment, horses and equipment; a traveling
exhibit; camp site facilities\.
North Velabit NP (US$1\. 65m): The project will finance preparation of a park management plan\.
Velebit Nature Park (US$1\.02m): The project will finance preparation of a park management plan;
field vehicles; mountain shelters, camp sites, and fire control equipment\.
(iv) Conservation and Rural Revitalization Grants Program (US$0\.57m)\. The objective of this
sub-component is to demonstrate linkages between rural development, tourism and biodiversity
conservation\. The main activity under this sub-component is the financing of the Conservation and Rural
Revitalization Grants (CRRG) program which is designed to enable groups and individuals to carry out
activities that contribute to achieving the goals and objectives of the KEC project\. The CRRG program
will support entrepreneurial projects demonstrate linkages between sustainable use of natural resources,
economic development and biodiversity conservation\. US$500,000 will be available for grants to farmers,
artisans, entrepreneurs, businesses, NGOs\. Public-private partners or NGOs in partnership with others are
also eligible\.
The goal of the CRRG project is to encourage projects in biodiversity conservation and sustainable use of
biological resources in the KEC project region; community development and increased civil society
participation in biodiversity conservation; and NGO activity in conservation\. The specific objectives of
the CRRG program are to:
* Enhance the objectives and activities of the KEC project by supporting community based initiatives
which address the KEC goal;
Demonstrate the link between the objectives of conservation and tangible benefits for local
communities;
* Develop replicable approaches to economic development which ensures biodiversity conservation;
* Strengthen new and emerging local civic groups and NGOs in order to promote biodiversity
conservation;
* Test innovative approaches and technologies to biodiversity conservation; and
* Establish partnership between local communities, protected areas administrations, NGOs and PlUs
to promote sustainable development of local communities in the KEC project area
The CRRG program is open to any qualifying body operating in, or located within, the defined KEC
project region\. The following types of organizations are eligible to apply:
* Private sector - companies, businesses, and scientific institutions (both foreign, and locally
owned), and individuals
- 44 -
* Governmental sector - companies, local, provincial and national authorities, state scientific
institutions
* Non-Govermmental sector - local and National NGOs, local associations
Grants would support a range of activities that conform to the overarching biodiversity conservation
objectives of the KEC project\. Given the nature of participatory planning which provides the flexibility for
communities to decide their own priorities, the CRRG operations manual does not prescribe a precise range
of sub-projects, but expects that broadly three categories of projects will be proposed: (i) small business
and infrastructure investments, (ii) capacity building and business management, (iii) environmental
education and public awareness\. The projects proposed will be categorized into one of three categories:
* Small grants - up to US$2,000 for the small projects\. These are expected to be used largely by
individuals\. * Medium grants - up to US$ 10,000
* Large grants - up to US$25,000
\. Successful proposals will demonstrate:
* Benefits to biodiversity conservation
* Benefits to the livelihood of local people
* Activities bringing benefits to the project region
* Compatibility with other GEF project activities
* Catalytic role of the project
* Positive environmental effect on the karst ecosystem
* Efficiency in achieving tangible results with verifiable indicators
* An activity that can be replicated on a larger scale
* A realistic plan describing how maintenance and operational expenses (if applicable) will be
financed after the grant period
* A clear time-line describing the implementation of the project
Criteria for rant fundine: Criteria will be determined during the first year of the program, but could
include:
* Investment should relieve pressures on community natural resource base
* Should be beneficial to the majority of community
* Must be financially feasible
* Involve low risk
* Proven technology unless designated as a demonstration or pilot technology
* Developed markets and good access to markets
* Must be environmentally friendly with no significant environmental impacts
* Must not increase unsustainable pressures on natural resource base or utilization of biodiversity
resources from protected areas (e\.g\. increase in livestock numbers, collection of medicinal plants
and wild rare and protected species)
* Must be owned and implemented by commnunity groups, or private and not by the protected areas
* Should be compatible with the protected areas, buffer zone management plans, forest management
plans, and tourism strategy, once they become available
* Funding proposals should focus on target communities or community groups living in the buffer
zones and vicinity of the PA, or make explanation for exception
-45 -
Details of the CRRG program can be found in the draft operations manual attached to the Project
Implementation Plan (PIP)\. Completion of the final CRRG operations manual will be a condition of
disbursement for the grants\. This sub-component will also finance a local cattle breeds protection
program; and rehabilitation of the Gacka river springs facility which is a cultural heritage and biodiversity
conservation site as these two activities are designed to demonstrate linkages between sustainable
development and conservation\.
(v) Regional cooperation programme for karst ecosystem conservation (US$0\.16m)\. Under this
sub-component partnerships with Croatia's neighbors, particularly Slovenia (Risnjak and Kupa River
Project), will be financed to encourage and support transboundary solutions to biodiversity conservation\.
The project will finance the inventory and monitoring of the biodiversity of springs, groundwater, caves,
meadows, forests and cliffs of the border region between Croatia and Slovenia in the Risnjak National Park
region\. It will finance the preparation of the Risnjak National Park Management plan in coordination with
Slovenia\. The project will finance a tourism marketing plan for the Croatia/Slovenia border region;
promotional materials; international workshops; and participation of protected area staff in karst
workshops\. The project will finance study tours to European countries including France; and participation
in international and regional workshops, training, partnership activities, and conferences\.
Project Component 3 - US$ 1\.30 million
GEF US$ 0\.78 million; GOC US$0\.48 million
Project Management and Monitoring
The MEPP will have overall responsibility for implementation of the five year project\. A national level
project implementation unit (PIU) will be established in the MEPP Division of General Environmental
Policy\. The PIU will build on the existence of the KEC project preparation implementation unit\. The PIU
will be responsible for all procurement, disbursement and financial management aspects of the project as
well as oversee the work of consultants, organize seminars and training\. The PIU will be responsible for
coordinating with other donors in the implementation of components which will be supported through
parallel and co-financing\. It will also be responsible for all reporting requirements to the Bank and the
Government\. It will be staffed by a project director, procurement and disbursement specialist, financial
specialist and an assistant, funded under the project\.
The project would also finance a local PIU office in Gospic, the county seat of Lika Senj\. The local PIU
office, provided by the government, will be in the county departnent office building which houses local
offices for all sectors and for physical planning\. This will facilitate local level inter-sectoral coordination
and planning\. Furthermore, since Gospic has been identified by county officials as the best location for a
proposed regional development pole, locating a PIU here offers the potential to coordinate the project with
county development plans\. The local PIU will be responsible for day-to-day project implementation and
local level coordination\. The local PIU will be staffed by a project coordinator and assistant funded by the
project\. The local level PIU will report directly to the national PIU\. Staffing and technical decisions for
the local PIU will be the responsibility of the MEPP Division of Nature Protection\.
The PIU would be assisted by an inter-agency Project Steering Committee established prior to negotiations\.
The Steering Committee consists of representatives from relevant Ministries and institutions, including
Ministry of Environmental Protection and Physical Planning, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, State
Department for Water, and the directors of the protected areas covered by the project\. The Steering
Committee would be responsible for providing project oversight advice, inter-ministerial coordination, and
assistance in resolving issues associated with project implementation\. The Minister for Environmental
Protection and Physical Planning will be chairman for this committee\.
-46 -
Local advisory groups from each of the three main project regions (Plitvice, Paklenica, and the Velebit),
selected by, and comprised of, representatives of key stakeholder groups, will also assist the PIU\. The
functions of the national and local PIU and the terms of reference of staff are included in Annex I of the
Project Implementation Plan (PIP)\.
NOTE: For the project overall, a total of US$0\.41 million of which GEF is financing US$0\.37 million has
been set aside in unallocated funds for contingencies is not reflected in the component costs given in this
Annex\.
-47 -
Annex 3: Estimated Project Costs
CROATIA: KARST ECOSYSTEM CONSERVATION PROJECT
-L\. \. \. For\.i~i Total
Project Cost By Component US Smllon US $~ - US $rnilion
Component I - national capacity building 1\.47 0\.36 1\.83
Component 2 - decentralized conservation 3\.81 1\.07 4\.88
Component 3 - project management 1\.23 0\.03 1\.26
Unallocated 0\.40 0\.00 0\.40
0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
Total Baseline Cost 6\.91 1\.46 8\.37
Physical Contingencies 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
Price Contingencies 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
Total Project Costs' 6\.91 1\.46 8\.37
Total Financing Required 6\.91 1\.46 8\.37
Identifiable taxes and duties are 1\.13 (US$m) and the total project cost, net oftaxes, is 7\.24 (US$m)\. Therefore, the project cost shaing Tatio is 70\.06% of
total project cost net of taxes\.
-48 -
Annex 4
CROATIA: KARST ECOSYSTEM CONSERVATION PROJECT
Incremental Costs and Global Environmental Benefits
Overview
1\. The general objective of the GEF alternative is to protect and conserve karst ecosystems in Croatia\.
The project development objective is to protect the biodiversity of karst ecosystems in Croatia in a way
that is participatory, economically viable, and integrated with the country's socio-economnic needs\. The
GEF alternative will: (a) build national capacity in biodiversity conservation and sustainable resource
use; and (b) establish community-based mechanisms for biodiversity conservation and sustainable
resource use in the Karst region\. This will include: a review and revision of the legal and regulatory
framework to incorporate biodiversity conservation and sustainable natural resource use; strengthening
the national capacity to ensure biodiversity conservation; promoting public awareness and support for
biodiversity conservation with active role of NGOs; incorporating biodiversity conservation in land-use
plans, land development and natural resource use in the Karst region; establishing effective planning
and management systems for protected areas; demonstration of linkages between rural development and
biodiversity conservation; and establishing a Regional Cooperation Programme for Karst Ecosystem
Conservation\. The GEF Alternative intends to achieve these outputs at a total incremental cost of
US$8\.37 million to be financed by the GEF (US$5\.07 million) and the Croatian Government (US$3\.30
million)\. The proposed GEF Alternative should be viewed as complementary to ongoing activities in
the karst Region of Croatia\.
Context and Development Goals
2\. Located between the Mediterranean and central-European continental climatic regions with a
predominantly karst geology, Croatia enjoys unusually rich biodiversity\. Karst is a term applied to
regions characterized by the presence of limestone or other soluble rocks, where drainage has largely
diverted into subterranean routes\. Its existence is dependent upon the maintenance of a balance
between relief, hydrology, climate and vegetation\. The Dinarid Mountain range, which runs through
Croatia from Slovenia to Bosnia, is one of the best known karst regions in the world and the term
"karst" originated there\. The karst features in the Dinarids include hundreds of sinkholes, chasms,
underground streams, cavities and an estimated 8,000 caves\. Croatian cave systems are among the
deepest and most extensive in the world and contain subterranean pools, lakes, streams and rivers\.
Sites included in the project area have received international recognition\. Notably, (i) the Velebit
Mountain range (within the Dinarids) is part of the UNESCO's Man and the Biosphere Program and
has been identified by the WWF's Hot Spot Initiative as one of the ten most important forest areas in
the Mediterranean region; and (ii) Plitvice Lakes National Park is on UNESCO's global list of Natural
and Cultural Heritage\.
3\. The biodiversity of the Croatian karst ecosystem is of global significance and hosts 3,500 species
of flora (283 endemic), 12 species of amphibians, 36 species of reptiles, 200 species of resident birds,
79 species of mammals, and 64 species of freshwater fish (11 endemic)\. Croatia's subterranean karst
habitats support an ever increasing list of newly discovered endemic and troglodytic (eyeless and
adapted for an entirely subterranean existence) species and families, including one new species, genus
and family of leech Croatobranchus mestrovi, found in a 1300 meter deep cave of the Velebit
mountain in 1994\. A great number of relict species and taxa of flora, originating from the tertiary
-49 -
period, survived in Croatia's montane forest and pasture ecosystems because the area was never
glaciated\. This also resulted in a prevalence of a higher diversity of aquatic fish than in other parts of
Europe\. The karst freshwater ecosystems also include travertine/tuffa-building communities of
micro-organisms\. The resulting travertine barriers, some estimated to be over 40,000 years old, have
led to the spectacular lakes and waterfalls now protected within two National Parks\. Large areas of the
Dinarids, particularly in the Velebit are densely covered by forest communities of beech, fir, spruce and
black pine, a relict alpine sub-species found only in the Velebit area\. The karst region contains the
largest part of unfragmented forest in Croatia (almost 50% of forests), the integrity of which is
evidenced by the presence of viable populations of carnivores (wolf, brown bear, and lynx)\. The
Dinarids are also an important trans-European forest mountain corridor between Slovenia and Bosnia
Herzegovina\.
Baseline Scenario
4\. Croatia gained independence from the former Yugoslavia in 1991\. In 1993, the Government
launched a successful stabilization program bringing down inflation and stabilizing the exchange rate\.
However, by 1998, the initially buoyant economy slowed down and in 1999 it contracted (by 0\.3%)\.
There were two main reasons for this\. First, the progress made in public finance reforms, and in the
banking and enterprise sectors was inadequate\. Second, the earlier economic growth was based largely
on reconstruction efforts and domestic consumption, instead of investments that would have enhanced
the country's competitiveness\. This, in turn, contributed to the current account deficit which has been
financed increasingly from extemal borrowing, thereby leading to a rapid build up in extemal debt\. In
early 2000, a newly elected government and a new President came to power promising economic
restructuring and stabilization, and stronger integration with the westem world\. This year has also
brought some positive developments in the economy\. Notably, the GDP started to grow again mainly
thanks to local consumption, exports to the EU and a major increase in tourism, especially to the
Dalmatian coast\. Moreover, arrears in govenmment payments, in particular to farmers, have been
reduced\. Macroeconomic stability has been sustained\. The growth in the rate of inflation has been
contained in the range of 3-40%\. The most important economic challenges facing the Government are
large scale unemployment which now stands at about 20% of the workforce which is even higher in
rural areas and among older sections of the populations is even higher\. Coupled with a troubled
pension system and high levels of relative poverty and inequality, unemployment carries the potential of
social tensions\. Govenmment's fiscal revenues remain low\. Another problem that the Government
needs to address is the very low level of investments and nearly nonexistent financial intermediation
which is largely the cause of the former\. Foreign direct investments remain low as well\.
5\. The key environmental policy issue for the govemrnment is how to manage the country's future
growth and development, while protecting the environment\. Central issues include: the strengthening
of environmental agencies, management and enforcement of environmental protection; and integration
of enviromnental concems into sector policies and plans\. In February 2000, the Government
established the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Physical Planning (MEPP) and included
within it the agency formerly responsible for environmental protection, the State Directorate for the
Protection of Nature and the Environment (SDPN), and the Ministry of Physical Planning\. By virtue
of elevating the main organization in charge of environment from a state directorate to a ministry, the
govenmment has given a strong signal that it is serious about its commitment to the environment\. The
major environmental legislation, the Law on Nature Protection is being revised, broadening the
mandate of environmental protection to a more proactive approach, emphasizing sustainable
development and use of natural resources\. In support of this objective, MEPP has established a
department for Sustainable Use of Natural Resources\. An Institutional Development Fund (IDF) grant
- 50 -
is helping the Government to prepare its National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) designed to
detail environmental priorities and set the basis for future cooperation\. A Bank/GEF Biodiversity
Strategy and Action Plan (BSAP) was prepared in 1999\.
6\. The same karst ecological conditions, which have led to the development of rich subterranean
biodiversity, also render the area extremely susceptible to environmental impacts\. Due to the rapid
influx of water throughout a karst cave system, subtle changes in land-use and vegetation cover on the
surface can result in immediate and sometimes catastrophic changes in the subterranean ecosystems\.
Currently in Croatia, surface land is predominantly natural forest and traditional pastoral land, which
provides a buffer for the subterranean ecosystems\. However, in the absence of mechanisms to ensure
sustainable land-use practice, the buffer provided by these surface ecosystems could easily be
damaged, and the subterranean ecosystems could quickly and negatively be affected\. Consequently, the
threats to the biodiversity of the Karst region relate to the existing and potential changes in land-use
that would remove the buffer that protects the subterranean ecosystem or directly impact the montane
forest and pasture ecosystems and aquatic species of the Adriatic watershed\.
7\. BSAP identifies the principal threats to Croatia's unique biodiversity as habitat transformation,
fragmentation and degradation; and pollution including solid waste and waste water, road construction
and drainage associated with tourism and municipal developments\. These are compounded by a weak
institutional policy and legal framework for the protection and conservation of biodiversity, limited
institutional capacity for conservation management, lack of collaboration between sectors to
sufficiently incorporate biodiversity conservation into physical and land-use and sectoral strategies, and
a general lack of environmental awareness and the importance of Croatian karst biodiversity\.
8\. Under the baseline scenario, it is expected that the Government of Croatia expenditures related to
ecosystems mnanagement biodiversity conservation in the project area over the period of the project will
be approximately US$24\.131 million\. These expenditures are detailed as follows\.
i\. The Directorate for Nature Protection of the Ministry of Environment and Physical Planning
will spend an estimated US$9\.43 1 million on central and protected area level operating costs, nature
protection and sustainable natural resource use programmes, wildlife damage compensation to local
populations\.
ii\. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry considers the karst region as an area of strategic
importance for grazing in open grasslands\. It promotes livestock keeping by proving higher than
national level subsidies for cows, pigs, sheep, horse and milk\. Promotion of grazing on highlands and
hence the enlargemnent of meadows is beneficial to biodiversity conservation as about 50 % of the local
flora is adapted to open landscapes rather than forests ecosystems\. The total cost of these subsidies
over the project period may be estimated as US$12\.981 million\.
iii\. The Croatian Selection Centre for Domestic Animals (HSSC) of MOAF coordinates and
finances a program geared towards protecting autochthonous, endangered breeds of sheep, cow, horse
and goat in Croatia\. Among these breeds is the Lika Pramenka sheep which like other local breeds that
were selected during the last centuries to survive hard conditions are important for the protection of the
karst grassland areas\. Breeders of Lika Pramenka and other domesticated species under protection
receive an annual subsidy\. According to HSSC, in 1999 the total subsidy payments made in the
Licko-Senjska and Primorsko-Goransk counties was equivalent to US$387 thousand\. Assuming that
the same annual outlays will be made by HSSC during the 5 year project period, the total sum may be
estimated as US$1\.720 million\.
-51 -
9\. The National Parks located in the KEC Project area are expected to allocate their own resources
(mainly from visitor fees) to biodiversity protection within their borders\. These expenditures may be
conservatively estimated as US$1\.691 million over the project period\.
10\. A number of natural resource management and biodiversity conservation activities in Croatia are
being financed by other international development agencies, or will be under implementation during
part or all of the proposed GEF project:
i\. The World Bank Coastal Forest Reconstruction and Protection (CFRP) Project has been
under implementation since 1996 and is scheduled to close in June 2002\. Its main objective is to
restore and protect forest lands in the coastal zone of Croatia in order to enhance landscape and
recreation values of the region\. There is partial geographical overlap with the KEC Project\. The
CFRP Project is supporting reforestation activities that are believed to allow for the return of the native
climatic forest communities after one rotation\. The project is spending a total of US$2\.2 million on
this component\. It is estimated that about 20% of this amount, or US$440 thousand, account for
biodiversity conservation in the KEC Project area\. The CFRP Project is also investing US$40 million
in improving the existing fire management system to enhance the capacity of fighting annually
recurrent large scale fires\. Given limited geographical overlap, it is estimated that 10% of this amount,
or US$4 million, may be considered as part of the baseline for the KEC Project\.
ii\. The Government of the Netherlands has provided trust funds in the amount of US$300 thousand
to support the preparation for and introduction of forest product certification in Croatia\. Certification
will contribute significantly to the introduction of sustainable management practices in Croatian forests
which will also ensure due attention to biodiversity conservation\.
iii\. The Ecological Center Large Carnivore Program monitors and protects bears, wolves and lynx
in the Karst region\. The annual funding of this program amounts to approximately US$23 thousand
and is projected to continue over the KEC Project period of 2001-2005\. The total baseline cost is
estimated as US$115 thousand\. Of this amount, about US$64 thousand will be provided from the
Croatian Central budget, US$29 thousand from Swiss grant funds and about US$23 thousand from
German grant funds\.
11\. Despite being completed before the implementation of the KEC Project, the BSAP should be
considered as part the of the baseline scenario since most of its findings provided the basis for the
project\. The KEC Project will implement recommendations made in the BSAP\. The production of
BSAP cost approximately US$ 170 thousand, of which USS102 thousand was a GEF grant and the rest
Government of Croatia contribution\.
12\. The NEAP the Government of Croatia is in the process of preparing and which will have
biodiversity conservation as one of its components is also considered part of the baseline since it will
further strengthen the institutional basis for the attainment of the KEC Project objectives\. Of the
US$273 thousand IDF grant, approximately US$35 thousand will account for biodiversity
conservation related action planning\.
13\. Although not considered part of the baseline sirce thev are not within the KEC project area, the
following projects are noted for their contribution to biodiversity conservation in Croatia:
i\. Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe is carrying out a
- 52 -
transboundary project within the Regional Environmental Reconstruction Program of the Stability
Pact\. The US$1\.45 million project is called Promotion of Networks and Exchanges in the Countries of
South Eastern Europe, financed by the Swiss Agency for Cooperation and Development and
includes biodiversity protection in the Neretva River Area of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina\.
The component will be implemented in 2000-2001 and cost approximately US$98 thousand\.
ii\. The Ministry of Science and Technology will spend US$138 thousand to finance the following
biodiversity-related projects:
* Biological and ecological characteristics of Vransko lake in Cres Island
* Biodiversity protection of the Adriatic Sea
* Characteristic species and coastal ecosystems in South Adriatic
* Research on Adriatic Sea mammals
* Structural and metabolic characteristics of phytoplancton in Adriatic
* Mariculture: biological, genetic and ecological valuation
* Ecology and protection of endangered national ornitofauna
* Creation and transformation processes of organic matter in Adriatic
* Vegetation map of Croatia
* Review of ichtyosystems and fish population dynamics in coastal waters
* Biodiversity of selected areas in Adriatic
* Insects population in coastal area and island of Croatia
* Long-term changes mechanisms in North Adriatic
* Fauna of Croatian Adriatic islands
14\. Costs\. Total expenditures under the Baseline Scenario are estimated at US$30\.88 million
including US$30\.39 million from the Government of Croatia, US$0\.44 million through international
cooperation and US$0\.05 million from national and international NGOs\.
15\. Benefits\. Implementation of the Baseline Scenario will result in improvements in the legal and
institutional framework for biodiversity conservation\. Furthermore, in the Karst region important
measures will be taken to enhance resource management, through: on-going MEPP support to
protected areas and sustainable resource use; incentives for the protection of autochthonous livestock
breeds; protected areas recurrent expenditures on the resource conservation; improvement in the
capacity to prevent recurrent large scale fires that have negative impacts on forest eco-systems; and the
protection of large carnivores\. However, additional resources are needed to enhance the information
base, monitoring and management planning for and public participation in the conservation of globally
significant Karst ecosystems\. The GEF grant will address these issues at the local and national levels\.
Global Environmental Objective
16\. The GoC ratified the Convention of Biological Diversity in 1996\. The World Bank/GEF
Biodiversity Strategic Action Plan (BSAP), completed in 1999, identifies "the preservation of the
existing values of the biological and landscape diversity of the Karst region as an area of global value
and ensuring the coordinated management of all natural resources in this area" as a strategic objective\.
17\. Scope\. The GEF Alternative would build on the baseline scenario and make possible activities and
programs that would not be undertaken under the Baseline Scenario\. This would include strengthening
capacity at the field and national levels for planning and managing land-use for conservation and
- 53 -
sustainable use of biodiversity; establishing effective inter-sectoral participatory planning and
sustainable management of natural ecosystems and associated landscapes at selected project sites and
thus protecting key freshwater, forest mountain and coastal ecosystems; supporting participatory
approaches to sustainable natural resources conservation in key protected areas; supporting
environmental education and awareness programs; developing mechanisms to reduce non-sustainable
resource use; and promoting ecotourism development\.
18\. Costs\. The total costs of the GEF alternative is estimated at US$39\.25 million, detailed as follows:
[Note: A total of US$0\.41 million - of which GEF financing US$ 0\.37 million - has been set aside in
unallocated funds for contingencies and is not reflected in the component costs given in this Annex\.]
i\. Building national capacity to conserve biodiversity and support sustainable resource use:
Legal and regulatory framework review and subsequent revisions to incorporate biodiversity
conservation and sustainable use of natural resources (Law on Nature Conservation and other sectoral
laws); strengthening the national capacity to ensure biodiversity conservation; increasing public
awareness and support for biodiversity conservation with active role of NGOs - US$2\.34 million (GEF
financing: US$1\.04 million);
ii\. Establishment of community-based mechanisms for biodiversity conservation and sustainable
resource use in the Karst region: Incorporating biodiversity conservation in land-use plans, land
development and natural resource use in the Karst region; effective planning and management systems
for protected areas; demonstration of linkages between rural development and biodiversity conservation
mainly through a Conservation and Rural Revitalization Grants; establishing a Regional Cooperation
Program for Karst Ecosystem Conservation (exchange of information, tourism promotion and
partnerships with other Karst regions) - US$35\.25 million (GEF financing: US$2\.89 million);
iii\. Project Management: Support for operating costs of national level and local level Project
Implementation Units (PIU) - US$1\.26 million (GEF financing: US$0\.78 million)
19\. Benefits\. The Project will increase national level capacity to protect globally significant
biodiversity in the Croatian karst ecosystems\. This will include a review and revision of Croatia's
legal and regulatory framework as well as sectoral and land-use plans to incorporate biodiversity
conservation; devising a tourism strategy that will strive to achieve the dual goal of financial resources
for conversation activities and minimizing tourism's harm to the ecosystems; the expansion of species
and areas under legal protection; development of a biodiversity information inventory, mapping and
monitoring system; and raising public awareness about the significance of the Karst ecosystems as a
national and global heritage\. The project will also improve local capacity for enhanced conservation of
globally significant biodiversity and sustainable resource use in the karst region\. Specifically, the
project will develop effective planning and management systems for protected areas; provide
monitoring equipment; and train rangers\. The project will also improve social sustainability of
biodiversity conservation by increasing local communities' participation in the decision-making process
on protected areas management; supporting them in developing small businesses, such as tourism
services; and in reviving biodiversity friendly traditional land-use practices\.
Incremental Costs
The difference between the cost of the Baseline Scenario US$30\.88 million and the cost of the GEF
Alternative US$39\.25 million, US$8\.37 million represents the incremental cost of achieving sustainable
global environmental benefits\. Of this amount, the Government of Croatia has committed to financing
- 54 -
US$3\.30 million and US$5\.07 million is requested from GEF\.
Incremental Cost Matrix
Component Sector Cost Category Cost Domestic Benefits Global Benefits
(US$ Million)
1\. Building capacity to Baseline 0\.51
conserve biodiversity
and support
sustainable resource
use
With GEF 2\.34 Increased national
Alternative capacity to manage
protected areas and
natural resources
sustainable and to
conserve biodiversity o
global importance\.
Increment 1\.83
2\. Baseline 0\.30 Enhanced biodiversit
Establish protection and
community-based sustainable resource
mechanisms for management in the
biodiversity karst region\.
conservation and
sustainable resource use
in the Karst region
With GEF 35\.25 Increased local
Altemative capacity for
enhanced
conservation of
globally significant
biodiversity and
sustainable resource
use in the karst
region\.
Increment 4\.88
3\.Project Baseline 0 Not applicable
Management
With GEF 1\.26 Not applicable
Altemative
Increment 1\.26
Unallocated 0\.41
Totals Baseline 30\.88
With GEF 39\.25
Altemative
Increment 8\.38
- 55 -
Annex 5: Financial Summary
CROATIA: KARST ECOSYSTEM CONSERVATION PROJECT
Years Ending
| Year1 I Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 1 Year 5 | Year 6 Year 7
Total Financing
Required
Project Costs
Investrnent Costs 1\.6 2\.7 1\.9 1\.1 0\.6
Recurrent Costs 0\.1 0\.2 0\.1 0\.1 0\.0
Total Project Costs 1\.7 2\.9 2\.0 1\.2 0\.6 0\.0 0\.0
,Total Financing 1\.7 2\.9 2\.0 1\.2 0\.6 0\.0 0\.0
Financing
IBRD/IDA 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0
Govemment 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0
Central 0\.6 1\.1 0\.8 0\.5 0\.3 0\.0 0\.0
Provincial 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0
Co-financiersUSAID 0\.1 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0
User Fees/Beneficiaries 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0
Other 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0
Total Project Financing 0\.1 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0
Main assumptions:
-56 -
Annex 6: Procurement and Disbursement Arrangements
CROATIA: KARST ECOSYSTEM CONSERVATION PROJECT
Procurement
Summary of Procurement Procedures\.
Proposed procurement arrangements are summarized in Tables A and Al\. All other procurement
information, including capability of the implementing agency, and the Bank's review process is
presented in Tables B and B 1\.
Project Implementation Unit\. The Ministry of Environmental Protection and Physical Planning (
MEPP) will have overall responsibility for project implementation\. A national level project
implementation unit (PIU) will be established at the MEPP Division of General Environmental Policy,
built on the existence of the current KEC project preparation implementation unit and will be
responsible for all procurement, disbursement and financial management aspects of the project as well
as for overseeing the work of consultants, and organization of seminars and training\. It will coordinate
with other donors in the implementation of components which will be supported through parallel
financing and co-financing and will also be responsible for all reporting requirements to the Bank and
the Government\.
The project will also finance a local PIU office in Gospic, the county seat of Lika Senj\. The local PIU
will be responsible for day-to-day local project implementation and local level coordination, but the
procurement responsibility will lie with the Central PIU\. Staffing and technical decisions for the local
PIU will be the responsibility of the MEPP Division of Nature Protection\.
The PITJ would be assisted by an inter-agency Project Steering Committee established during project
preparation\. The Steering Committee consists of representatives from relevant Ministries and
institutions, including Ministry of Environmental Protection and Physical Planning, Ministry of
Agriculture and Forestry, State Department for Water, and the directors of the protected areas covered
by the project\. The Steering Committee would be responsible for providing project oversight advice,
inter-ministerial coordination, and assistance in resolving issues associated with project
imnplementation\. The Minister for Environmental Protection and Physical Planning will be chainnan
for this committee\. Local advisory groups from each of the three main project regions (Plitvice,
Paklenica, and the Velebit), selected by, and comprised of, representatives of key stakeholder groups,
will also assist the PIU\.
Summary of the Procurement Capacity Assessment\. An assessment of the PIU's capacity to
implement the project's procurement plan was carried out in November 2000, and revisited during
appraisal mission on November/December of 2001\. The review addressed legal aspects, procurement
cycle management, organizations and functions, support and control systems, record keeping, staffing,
general procurement environment and made a general risk assessment of the PIU\. The review rated the
project's risk with regard to procurement as "average\." On the other hand, while the PIU has
accumulated experience and is well staffed for this project, still it has no experience in complex
procurement such as ICB, NCB and procurement of large consulting assignments and there is no staff
dedicated to procurement activities\. Because of that, thresholds for NCB are kept on the lower side\.
The following actions are recommended to mitigate this risk: (i) before board submission, PI1 should
- 57 -
hire a procurement specialist; (ii) PIU should send staff working on procurement activities to an
advanced procurement training course; (iii) the project launch workshop should include a
comprehensive seminar on procurement and financial management, including preparation of bidding
documents for each type of procurement method proposed in the Grant agreement (this seminar needs
not to coincide in time with the project launch); (iv) an updated library including all the standard
bidding documents for relevant procurement methods should be in place in the PIU prior to project
launch; and (v) supervision missions every six months should include accredited procurement
specialist to provide consultation and advice, conduct post review of contracts not subject to Bank
Prior Review, and resolve pending procurement-related issues\.
Participation of Government Owned Enterprises (GOEs) in procurement of goods and works\.
GOEs willing to participate in procurement of works and goods financed by the Bank in this project
should meet the Bank's eligibility criteria: they should be financially and legally autonomous and
operate under commercial law in Croatia\. Their status has to be properly clarified by interested GOEs
before participating in any bid under this project and screened by the PIU\.
Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)\. Nongovernmental Organizations
(NGOs) can compete in the selection process under the provisions of Bank Guidelines, provided that
they have expressed their interest in doing so, and that their qualifications are satisfactory to both the
Government and the Bank\. NGOs as eligible voluntary nonprofit organizations may be uniquely
qualified to assist in the preparation, management, and implementation of projects, essentially because
of their involvement and knowledge of local issues, community needs, and/or participatory
approaches\. For assignments that emphasize participation and considerable local knowledge, the short
list may comprise entirely NGOs\. Selection of Consultants and their contracts will be based on the
standard documents issued by the Bank for the procurement of such services with the minimal
necessary modifications as agreed by the Bank\.
Procurement of Goods and Works
Goods and works financed by the Bank will be procured in accordance with the provisions of the
"Guidelines for Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits" published by the Bank in January
1995 and revised in January and August 1996, September 1997, and January 1999\. The appropriate
standard and regional procurement documents issued by the Bank will be used with the minimum
changes acceptable to, and agreed with, the Bank\.
Procurement of Civil Works (US$O\.945 million - Bank: US$0\.766 million)\. Civil works are
intended for building trails, rehabilitation of park roads, rehabilitation of buildings, and rehabilitation
of facilities in four national parks\. The following procurement methods would be used:
International Competitive Bidding or ICB\. ICB procedures will be applied to works contracts
estimated to cost US$0\.5 million and above\.
National Competitive Bidding or NCB (US$0\.945 million - Bank: US$0\.756 million)\. NCB
procedures will be applied for works contracts estimated to cost below US$0\.5 million\. All efforts
should be made to ensure proper advertisement nationally, so that a wide range of contractors,
including foreign contractors, if interested, can have the opportunity to bid\.
Procurement of Goods (US$1\.424 million - Bank: US$\.992 million)\. Vehicles, specialized
underwater gear; monitoring equipment; GIS equipment; computers; audio/visual equipment and
- 58 -
office furniture and other equipment will be grouped to the extent practical to encourage competitive
bidding\. The following procurement methods will be used:
International Competitive Bidding or ICB (US$0\.911 million - Bank: US$0\.634 miUlion)\. Goods
contracts for procurement estimated to cost US$100,000 or more will be procured through ICB
procedures\.
National Competitive Bidding or NCB (US$0\.082 mDllion - Bank: US$0\.057 million)\. NCB
procedures for goods, using the ECA standard document, will be applied for contracts for supply of
furniture and equipment for National Park Paklenica estimated to cost US$0\.06 million
International Shopping or IS (US$0\.116 miHlion)\. Contracts for the procurement of GIS equipment,
estimated to cost less than US$100,000 each, may be procured under IS procedures by obtaining
competitive price quotations from at least three suppliers in two different countries\. Award through
IAPSO would be acceptable as an alternative to IS, and IAPSO could be invited as a supplier under
the said IS procedures\.
National Shopping or NS (US$0\.182 milion)\. Goods contracts for computers, office equipment;
furniture, equipment for national parks, vehicles, and miscellaneous equipment for park functioning
estimated at less than $50,000 each may be procured through using NS procedures\.
Procurement of Consultants' Services (US$230 million)\. Contracts for consultants' services will
be awarded in accordance with the provisions of the "Guidelines for the Selection and Employment of
Consultants by World Bank Borrowers" published by the Bank in January of 1997 and revised in
September 1997 and January, 1999\. The services financed or co-financed under the grant are:
(describe generically)\. Selection of Consultants and their contracts will be based on the standard
documents issued by the Bank for the procurement of such services with the minimal necessary
modifications as agreed by the Bank\.
Selection of firms (US$1\.76 million)
Quality-and Cost-Based Selection (QCBS) will be the preferred method for selection of firms in
contracts with estimated values starting US$200,000 equivalent and above\.
Least Cost Selection Method will be applied to procurement of contracts estimated to cost less than
$100,000 for services such as knowledge dissemination, production of media materials and brochures
and financial audit services\.
Consultants Qualifications (CQ)\. Contracts estimated to cost less than US$100,000 may be
procured using CQ for the procurement of consulting services in the field of preparation of guidelines
for NGO participation in biodiversity conservation activities\.
Selection of Individuals (US$0\.54 million)\. Individual consultants to provide a wide variety of
services will be mostly selected on the basis of their qualifications for the assignment preferably by
comparing at least 3 CVs from potential eligible candidates\.
Small Grant Program\.
- 59 -
Small Grants (US$0\.500 million financed by the Bank)\. The Small Grants program (Conservation
and Rural Revitalization Grants Program [CRRG]) will support projects that further the KEC project
development objective such as financing the development of a "people and parks" strategy and
programs for each of the four national parks\. Under this objective, the project will also finance
activities for increased public awareness on the local level, including preparation of park promotional
materials for visitors and local population; preparation of educational material for regional schools;
preparation of field guides for Velebit and Plitvice national parks;\. The beneficiaries would include
conmmunity based organizations, NGOs, private entrepreneurs, and local residents\. Procurement will
be conducted according to the procedures laid out in the Manual for Conducting Very Small-Value
Procurement Under World Bank/IDA Small Grants, Loans and Credits, approved in ECA (single
purchases of goods, works and services estimated to cost less than $5,000 equivalent may be
conducted on the basis of local commercial practices screened with anticipation by the PIU and
acceptable to the Bank, including sole sourcing when appropriate)\. Main criteria for project eligibility
will include biodiversity "friendliness", technical feasibility, sustainability cost effectiveness, poverty
reduction impact, environmental impact, and potential to yield short term benefits\. A draft operations
manual for the CRRG Grants Program will be completed by project negotiations\. Completion of a
final CRRG operations manual will be a condition of disbursement for the grants\.
Review by the Bank of Procurement Decisions\.
Goods and Works: The following contracts are subject to Bank's prior review as set forth in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Appendix I to the Guidelines: (i) all ICB contracts; (ii) the first contract for
works and goods to be procured through NCB; (iii) each contract for goods estimated to cost the
equivalent of $100,000 or more and works contracts estimated to cost each the equivalent of $200,000
or more; (iv) the first contract procured under IS procedures, the first contract procured under NS
procedures\.
Consultants: With respect to consulting services, prior Bank review will be required for all terms of
reference for consultants\. Contracts for services estimated to cost the equivalent of $100,000 or more
for firms and $50,000 or more for individuals are subject to Bank's prior review as set forth in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Appendix 1 to the Guidelines\. For all consultants, terms of reference will be
prior reviewed\. All other contracts are subject to post review (one in 5 contracts)\. With respect to the
selection of individuals, most consultancy positions will be advertised\.
Procurement methods (Table A)
Table A: Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements
(US$ million equivalent)
* Proturement MAe d \.
expeNdRtre- Category [CB N£B- N\.BX\. -- Toti\.Cost
1\. Works 0\.00 0\.94 0\.00 0\.00 0\.94
(0\.00) (0\.77) (0\.00) (0\.00) (0\.77)
2\. Goods 0\.91 0\.08 0\.43 0\.00 1\.42
(0\.63) (0\.06) (0\.30) (0\.00) (0\.99)
3\. Services 0\.00 0\.00 2\.43 0\.00 2\.43
(0\.00) (0\.00) (2\.30) (0\.00) (2\.30)
-60 -
4\. Small Grants 0\.00 0\.00 0\.50 0\.00 0\.50
(0\.00) (0\.00) (0\.50) (0\.00) (0\.50)
5\. Incremental Operating Cost 0\.00 0\.00 0\.35 0\.00 0\.35
(0\.00) (0\.00) (0\.14) (0\.00) (0\.14)
6\. Unallocated 0\.00 0\.00 0\.37 0\.00 0\.37
(0\.00) (0\.00) (0\.37) (0\.00) (0\.37)
Total 0\.91 1\.02 4\.08 0\.00 6\.01
(0\.63) (0\.83) (3\.61) (0\.00) (5\.07)
"Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Grant\. All costs include contingencies\.
2'Includes civi] works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of
contracted staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental
operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government
units\.
3/ A total of US$0\.37 million has been set aside in unallocated funds for contingencies\.
4/ Please note that the total costs does not include contingencies for Tables A and Al\.
-61 -
Table Al: Consultant Selection Arrangements (optional)
(US$ million equivalent)
- v - Seleqtton \.tto _ --s
Consultant Services-\.
Expenditure Calpq QCBS 4BS \.P9 LCS -Q- Other l\.S\.F\. TOtl Coilt
A\. Firms 1\.51 0\.00 0\.00 0\.21 0\.04 0\.00 0\.00 1\.76
(1\.51) (0\.00) (0\.00) (0\.21) (0\.04) (0\.00) (0\.00) (1\.76)
B\. Individuals 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.54 0\.00 0\.54
(0\.00) (0\.00) (0\.00) (0\.00) (0\.00) (0\.54) (0\.00) (0\.54)
Total 1\.51 0\.00 0\.00 0\.21 0\.04 0\.54 0\.00 2\.30
(1\.51) (0\.00) (0\.00) (0\.21) (0\.04) (0\.54) (0\.00) (2\.30)
1\ Including contingencies
Note: QCBS = Quality- and Cost-Based Selection
QBS = Quality-based Selection
SFB = Selection under a Fixed Budget
LCS = Least-Cost Selection
CQ = Selection Based on Consultants' Qualifications
Other = Selection of individual consultants (per Section V of Consultants Guidelines),
Commercial Practices, etc\.
N\.B\.F\. = Not Bank-financed
Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Grant\.
-62 -
Prior review thresholds (Table B)
Table B: Thresholds for Procurement Methods and Prior Review
Contract Value Contracts Subject to
Threshold Procurement PriorPReview
\.cpenditure Category (US$ thousands) Method (Ut$ millions)
1\. Works >500,000 ICB 0\.77
<500,000 NCB
2\. Goods >100,000 ICB 0\.76
<100,000 NCB (furniture, park
equipment)
<100,000 Is
< 50,000 NS
3\. Services QCBS, LCS 2\.10
CQ, IND
4\. Miscellaneous
5\. Miscellaneous
6\. Miscellaneous
Total value of contracts subject to prior review: 3\.63
Overall Procurement Risk Assessment
High
Frequency of procurement supervision missions proposed: One every 6 months (includes special
procurement supervision for post-review/audits)
Frequency of procurement supervision missions proposed: One every 6 months (includes special
procurement supervision for post-review/audits) during the first year of implementation; then, once a year\.
Ex-Post review procurement will be part of the supervision missions and will be carried out by a PAS\.
It is expected that, by the time of effectiveness, a year of procurement documentation will be ready\. The
project launch workshop is estimated to be taking place in 2002\.
Thresholds generally differ by country and project\. Consult OD 11\.04 "Review of Procurement
Documentation" and contact the Regional Procurement Adviser for guidance\.
- 63 -
Disbursement
Allocation of grant proceeds (Table C)
Table C: Allocation of Grant Proceeds
Expenditure Category Amount in USSmillion Financig Pperuent
Works 0\.77 85%
Goods 0\.99 100% of foreign expenditures, 100% of
local expenditures (ex-factory cost) and
85% of local expenditures for other items
procured locally
Services 2\.30 100%
Small Grants 0\.50 100%
Incremental Operating Cost 0\.14 80% until October 2004; 50% thereafter
Unallocated 0\.37
Total Project Costs 5\.07
Total 5\.07
Disbursements
Disbursements from the Grant would be made by the Bank initially on receipt of full documentation for all
project expenditures except those submitted as SOE\. Replenishment applications should be submitted on a
monthly basis and must be fully documented and supported by bank statements and reconciliation
statements\. This documentation will be made available for the required audit as well as to Bank
supervision missions and will be retained by the PIU for at least one year after receipt by the Bank of the
audit report for the year in which disbursement was made\. The proceeds of the World Bank Grant will be
allocated in accordance with Table C, Annex 6\. To facilitate timely project implementation, the MEPP will
establish, maintain and operate a special account under terms and conditions acceptable to the Bank\. The
option to move to a FMR based disbursements will not be considered\.
Use of statement of expenditures:
Statement of Expenditure (SOE) would be used for:
(a) goods estimated to cost less than US$100,000 per contract
(b) works less than US$200,000
(c) consultant contracts with firms less than US$100,000
(d) individual consultant contracts costing less than US$50,000
(e) incremnental recurrent costs
(f) sub-grants referred to in Table C, category "sub-grants"
Special account:
To facilitate timely project implementation, the MEPP would establish, maintain and operate, under
conditions acceptable to the bank, a special accounts in Euros in a commercial bank for the GEF grant\.
The selection process and criteria for selection of the commercial bank will follow the Bank's
- 64 -
Disbursement Handbook procedures\. The bank would, upon request, make a deposit of US$350,000 for
the GEF special account\. Applications for the replenishment of the account will be submitted monthly or
when 20 percent of the initial deposit has been utilized, which ever occurs earlier\. The necessary
documentation, the special account bank statement, and a reconciliation of this bank statement will support
the replenishment application
Please see Annex 12 for Financial Management Assessment Report
- 65 -
Annex 7: Project Processing Schedule
CROATIA: KARST ECOSYSTEM CONSERVATION PROJECT
Project Schedule Planned Actual
Time taken to prepare the project (months) 21
First Bank mission (identification) 03/18/2000 03/18/2000
Appraisal mission departure 01/04/2002 11/26/2001
Negotiations 03/05/2002
Planned Date of Effectiveness 01/04/2002
Prepared by:
Re: project schedule, note the project was "on hold" (for 14 months) due to a shortfall in GEF funds from
the completion of the pre-appraisal mission, October, 2000, until the GEF Council Meeting 12/6/01, when
the project was approved for the work plan, and appraisal was conducted\.
Preparation assistance:
Bank staff who worked on the project included:
Name Speciality
Rita Klees Task Manager, Senior Environmental Specialist
John Fraser Stewart Senior Biodiversity Specialist
Tijen Arin Consultant - Natural Resource Economist
Valencia Copeland Program Assistant/Project Cost
Karin Shepardson Senior Environmental Economist - GEF Regional Coordinator
Gonzalo Castro Senior Biodiversity Specialist - ENV
Jan Post Principal Biodiversity Specialist
Anthony Whitten Senior Biodiversity Specialist
Jane Holt Sector Leader - Environment
Marjorie Ann Bromhead Sector Leader - Natural Resources
Jose Martinez Procurement Specialist
Gurdev Singh Consultant - Procurement Specialist
Hiran Herat Financial Management
Janis Bernstein Senior Environmental Specialist - Social Team
Vladimir Skendrovic Senior Operations Officer
Anamarija Frankic Consultant - Ecologist
Martin Schneider-Jacoby Consultant - Biologist
Voltaire Andres Consultant - Leadership Development Center
Riunma Dankova Consultant - Economist
- 66 -
Annex 8: Documents in the Project File*
CROATIA: KARST ECOSYSTEM CONSERVATION PROJECT
A\. Project Implementation Plan
B\. Bank Staff Assessments
C\. Other
Social and Rural Development Assessment
Comprehensive Biodiversity Survey
Legal, Regulatory and Institutional Review
Land and Nature Resource Management Plan Review
Public Awareness and Environmental Needs Assessment
Environmental Management Plan
Letter from MEPP regarding Plitvice Lakes National Park Finances
*Including electronic files
-67-
Annex 9: Statement of Loans and Credits
CROATIA: KARST ECOSYSTEM CONSERVATION PROJECT
01-Mar-2002
Difference between expected
and actual
Orginal Amount In US$ Millions disbursements
Project ID FY Purpose IBRD IDA GEF Cancel\. Undisb\. Orig Frm Rev'd
P067223 2002 SAL 202\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 100\.00 -34\.00 0\.00
P065466 2001 COURT & BANKRUPTCY ADM (UL) 5\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 5\.00 0\.00 0\.00
P070088 2001 TRADE & TRANS FACIL IN SE EUR 13\.93 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 12\.60 7\.61 0\.00
P051273 2000 HEALTH SYSTEM 29\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 24\.36 -4\.62 0\.00
P039161 1999 RAILWAY MOD\. & REST\. 101\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 56\.06 61\.78 0\.00
P057767 1999 TA INST REG REF PSD 7\.30 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 5\.42 2\.79 0\.00
P043444 1998 MUN ENV INFRA 36\.30 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 21\.43 11\.02 0\.00
P040139 1998 INVESTMENT RECOVERY 30\.00 0\.00 0\.00 7\.70 1\.43 10\.11 0\.00
P048983 1998 EAST SLAVONIA REC 40\.60 0\.00 0\.80 0\.00 24\.76 26\.40 0\.00
P008334 1997 COASTAL FOREST RECON - HR 42\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 6\.54 6\.54 0\.00
P008335 1996 FARMER SUPPORT SERV 17\.00 0\.00 0\.00 2\.00 2\.35 4\.35 0\.02
Total: 524\.13 0\.00 0\.80 9\.70 259\.95 91\.97 0\.02
CROATIA
STATEMENT OF IFC's
Held and Disbursed Portfolio
Jan - 2002
In Millions US Dollars
Committed Disbursed
IFC IFC
FY Approval Company Loan Equity Quasi Partic Loan Equity Quasi Partic
1998 Alpe Jadran 2\.23 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 2\.23 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
1973/81/98 Belisce 9\.65 6\.01 0\.00 6\.00 9\.65 6\.01 0\.00 6\.00
1999 Croatia Capital 0\.00 5\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 2\.69 0\.00 0\.00
1999 E&S Bank 12\.81 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 12\.81 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
2001 Pliva 25\.00 0\.00 10\.00 12\.50 20\.00 0\.00 10\.00 10\.00
T\.S\. Banka D\.D\. 0\.00 1\.24 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 1\.24 0\.00 0\.00
1996/99 Viktor Lenac 6\.00 1\.90 4\.20 9\.00 6\.00 1\.90 3\.70 9\.00
2000
Total Portfolio: 55\.69 14\.15 14\.20 27\.50 50\.69 11\.84 13\.70 25\.00
Approvals Pending Commitment
FY Approval Company Loan Equity Quasi Partic
2001 Local Leasing CR 5\.00 0\.00 1\.20 0\.00
2000 RZB Pension 0\.00 0\.00 3\.00 0\.00
Total Pending Commitment: 5\.00 0\.00 4\.20 0\.00
-68 -
Annex 10: Country at a Glance
CROATIA: KARST ECOSYSTEM CONSERVATION PROJECT
Europe & Upper-
POVERTY and SOCIAL Central middle-
Croatia Asia Income Development dlamond
2000
Population, mid-year (millions) 4\.4 475 647 Life expectancy
GNI per capita (Atlas method, US$) 4,840 2,010 4\.620
GNI (Atlas method, USS billions) 21\.2 956 2\.986
Average annual growth, 1994-00
Population (%) -0\.9 0\.1 1\.3 N G
Labor force (%) -3\.1 0\.6 2\.0 GNPI pGross
Most recent estimate (latest year available, 1994-00) capita enrollment
Poverty (% of pooDulation below national poverty line) 8
Urban population (% of total population) 58 67 76
Life expectancy at birth (Veers) 73 69 69
Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 8 21 28
Child malnutrition {% of children under 5) \., \. \. Access to improved water source
Access to an improved water source (% of population) 96 90 87
Illiteracy (% of population age 15+) 3 10 Croati
Gross primary enrollment (%of school-ape population) 99 100 107 Croatia
Male 101 106 Upper-middle-income group
Female 99 105
KEY ECONOMIC RATIOS and LONG-TERM TRENDS
1980 1990 1999 2000
Economnic ratios'
GDP (USS billions) \. \. 20\.3 22\.4
Gross domestic investment/GDP 23\.4 22\.0
Exvorts of uoods and services/GDP 40\.6 45\.0 Trade
Gross domestic savings/GDP 15:1 16\.4
Gross national savings/GDP 16\.5 18\.7
Current account balance/GDP \. -6\.8 -1\.8 Domestic Investment
Interest Payments/GDP 2\.1 2\.1 sU VI
Total debt/GDP 46\.0 46\.6 savngs
Total debt service/exports 17\.2 20\.9
Present value of debVGDP 46\.1
Present value of debtUexports 101\.2
Indebtedness
1980-90 199040 1999 2000 2000-04
(average annual growth)
GDP 0\.6 -0\.4 3\.7 4\.4 Croatia
GOP per capita 1\.2 0\.5 4\.4 3\.2 Upper-middle-income group
Exports of goods and services 5\.5 0\.7 8\.7 3\.7
STRUCTURE of the ECONOMY
1980 1990 1999 2000 Growth of Investment end GDP (%)
(% of GDP)
Agriculture 10\.3 9\.7 9\.5
Industry 33\.8 33\.1 32\.8 20
Manufaclurina 27\.7 22\.4 23\.2
Services 6\.9 57\.2 57 7 o _ = _ o = 0 -
Private consumption 57\.1 57\.2 20 I
General government consumption 27\.8 26\.5 -GDI C GDP
Imports of goods and services 48\.9 50\.6
1980-90 1990-00 1999 2000 Growth of exports and Imports (%)
(average annual growth)
Agriculture -2\.0 -2\.0 1\.3 30
Industry -2\.5 0\.1 1\.5 20 A
Manufacturlng -3\.3 4\.1 4\.1 10
Services 2\.2 -0\.3 5\.0 10
Private consumption 2\.6 -2\.7 4\.1 o ss 9 97
General government consumption 1\.1 0\.8 -0\.7 \.10
Gross domestic investment 8\.4 -2\.6 -0\.1 Exports IlImports
Imports of goods and services 4\.8 -2\.7 4\.2
Note: 2000 data are preliminary estimates\.
The diamonds show four key indicators in the countrv (in bold) comoared with its income-group average\. If data are missing, the diamond wiil
be incomplete\.
- 69 -
Croatia
PRICES and GOVERNMENT FINANCE
1980 1990 1999 2000 Inflatton (%)
Domstfic prkes
(% change) 150-
Consumer prices 4\.2 6\.2 100
lmplicft GDP deflator 4\.1 6\.5
Govsermmnt finance 50
(% of GDP, includes current grants) o
Current revenue 47\.7 45\.2 9f 96 97 98 99
Current budget balance 1\.1 -1\.4 - GOP deflator e PI
Overall surplus/deflict -2\.2 -5\.2
TRADE
(USS rniFonsJ 1980 1990 1999 2000 Export and Import levels (USS mill\.)
Total exports (fob) 4,395 4,567 10\.000
Capital goods 243 251
Chemicals 338 486 7\.soo
Manufactures 2\.800 2,751
Total Imports (cmf) 7,693 7,805 5,00
Food 560 538 2\. __ _
Fuel and energy 804 1,094
Capital goods 2,732 2,606
Export price index (1995=100) 94 ss 9s 97 9\. 99 oo
Import price index (1995=100) * Exports Mimports
Terms of trade (1995=100)
BALANCE of PAYMENTS
(US$ 1980 1990 1999 2000 Current account balance to GDP (%)
(US$ mtNbns)
Exports of goods and services 6,819 8,118 8,651 10
Imports of goods and services 7,115 9,791 9,598
Resource balance -296 -1,673 -946 s
Net income -192 -350 -310 0_
Net current transfers 1,541 632 858 s94
Curent account balance 1,053 -1,391 -399 1 -
Financing Items (net) -1,053 1,769 981 10
Changes Innet reserves 0 -379 -582 -15
Memo:
Reserves including gold (USS milions) \. \. 3,025 3,525
Conversion rate (DEC\. tocalIUS$) \. \. 7\.0 7\.0
EXTERNAL DEBT and RESOURCE FLOWS
1980 1990 1999 2000
(US$ miions) Composition of 2000 debt (US$ mill\.)
Total debt outstanding and disbursed 9,335 10,448
IBRD 387 395 G k95 C 3959
IDAO 0 G: 795 C: 159
IDA 0 0 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- - D\. 488
Total debt service 1\.596 2,085
IBRD 40 411,116
IDA 0 0
Composftion of net resource flows \. = - a -
Official grants\
Ofllcal creditors 83 154 -
Private creditors 979 1\.004 /'i
Foreign direct investment 1,445 898
Portfolio equity 574 733 F: 7\.495
World Bank program
Comnmitments 108 29 A-IBRD E 2-EIaeral
Disbursements 85 55 B - IDA D - Oier murDlateral F - Private
Principal repayments 18 22 C - IMF G - Short-tefm
Netflows 67 34
Interest payments 22 19
Net transfers 46 14
Development Economics 9121101
- 70 -
Additional
Annex 11
CROATIA KARST ECOSYSTEM CONSERVATION PROJECT
SOCIAL ASSESSMENT AND PARTICIPATORY APPROACH
As part of the preparation of the Croatia Karst Ecosystem Conservation (KEC) Project, the World
Bank commissioned Blackstone Corporation Resource Management & Tourism Consultants, a Canadian
consultant firm, to carry out a social assessment (SA)\. The results of the SA and consultations with a wide
range of stakeholders were incorporated into the project to improve the effectiveness of the project design\.
The following sunmmarizes the SA objectives and methodology, socioeconomic conditions, especially
principal economic activities as well as demographic and economic changes in the project areas since 1991,
social development issues, framework for public participation, and social development indicators for
project monitoring and evaluation during implementation\.
Social Assessment Objectives and Methodology
The main objectives of an SA are to identify and address key social issues associated with a proposed
investment; identify main stakeholders, their interests capacities, conflicts, and likely effects on the
protected areas and levels of support/participation in project implementation; evaluate potential social
impacts on individuals and social groups; and identify desirable social development outcomes and the social
and institutional arrangements to achieve them\. The specific SA objectives for the KEC project are to:
* Characterize the local population in the proposed project area in terms of who is currently living in
the study area, their economic activities and use of natural resources, and the changes that have occurred
since 1991\.
* Characterize the extent to which the refugees, most of whom fled in 1995, are returning to the
study area and the social impacts of this development\.
* Identify specific measures that can be incorporated into the project to contribute to poverty
alleviation, as well as strengthening social capital and ensuring equity\.
* Identify socio-economic activities, issues and needs, and their relationships to sustainable
development and conservation goals (e\.g\., activities that demonstrate linkages between conservation and
development, such as rural tourism, traditional agriculture, handicrafts, etc\., as well as those that may pose
a threat to biodiversity conservation)\.
* Identify economic development/income-generating activities for the study area communities that
can contribute positively to conservation goals, and assessment of possible financial mechanisms, and other
vehicles, to support such development\.
* Identify the current involvement of the population in tourism and opportunities for
community-based initiatives in the tourism sector\.
* Assess current level of public awareness of need for biodiversity conservation, current level of
- 71 -
participation of communities in decision-making related to biodiversity conservation, existing structures for
participation\., and appropriate mechanisms for increasing community participation\.
* Identify social development outcomes and indicators as well as mechanisms for monitoring and
evaluating them during project implementation\.
The SA methodology involved qualitative techniques, particularly formal and semi-formal in-depth
interviews with key stakeholders supplemented by a series of focus groups to bring people together to
discuss a specific set of questions about socio-economic conditions and social issues relating to the project\.
The SA team interviewed over 225 individuals, representing the full range of stakeholders, including Croat
and Serb villagers; town residents; and representatives of community-based organizations (CBOs),
non-govermnental organizations (NGOs), international relief agencies, local businesses, and all levels of
government\. The SA study area consisted of the communities in and around the four protected areas that
are the focus of the KEC\.
Social and Economic Conditions
Demographic Changes Since 1991\. The KEC study area has experienced profound demographic changes
over the past several decades\. In Lika-Senj County, which comprises more than 80% of the KEC study
area, there has been an extreme and steady depopulation for many decades, declining by 65% between 1900
and 1991\. In 1991, the last year that census results are available (2001 census data not yet available), only
64,000 people were recorded as living in the inland\. The county's inland population has decreased a
further 32% over the past decade, to approximately 43,450 people\. This depopulation is the result of the
war (including the fleeing of the Serbs), and the disastrous privatization process, which led to the closure of
factories, massive unemployment, and out-migration of people in search ofjobs\.
At the time of the 1991 census, the study area's population consisted largely of the elderly, with people
over 60 years of age comprising 23% of the population\. Since 1991, many more youth have left, causing
the proportion of elderly to increase significantly, particularly in the rural areas\. Many young people have
moved to cities such as Zagreb and Rijeka to obtain advanced degrees, often because they are unable to
find employment Rural depopulation has implications for the biodiversity aims of the KEC, because much
of the farmland meadows that were important contributors to the karst system's biodiversity have been
abandoned and overtaken by the forests\.
The north part of the study area around Risnjak National Park, generally coinciding with the District of
Gorski-Kotar, has also experienced rural depopulation in the order of 20% since 1991, largely as a result of
the loss of employment and an exodus of people in search of jobs\. Some of the mayors in the towns near
the park note that the loss of youth has reached the point where schools are being closed, and there is a fear
that some settlements will no longer be able to retain their status as municipalities\.
The southem part of the study area, around Paklenica National Park, has reportedly succeeded in holding
its 1,200-1,500 population over the past 10 years due to the availability of employment in tourism along
the coast\. Today, there are only about 120, mostly elderly people, living in rural areas around the national
park\.
Little is known about land-ownership in this area\. Forests comprise much of the area and they are mainly
state-owned\. There is an on-going process of decentralization and divesting of parcels (for example,
church land is being returned)\. Reportedly there are no conflicts among users\.
-72 -
The ratio of men to women was relatively stable throughout the region according to the 1991 census\. The
SA investigations, however, identified a very interesting and important factor related to gender balance in
post-war times\. It was noted by several of the younger men that a major impediment to them staying in the
study area is the fact that there are so few young women\.
Economic Activities and Resource Use in the Study Area\. With Croatia's independence in 1990 came
the decision to make the transition to a market economy\. The transition and in particular, privatization,
proved to be one of the two forces behind the economic decline that the KEC study area has experienced
since 1991 (the other being the war)\. Privatization took the form of the transfer of economic ownership and
control of productive enterprises from government to new owners\. The bankrupting of many enterprises
through the 1990s in the country meant that factories closed, workers lost their jobs, and many of the banks
that held the debt of these failed operations went bankrupt\.
Thus, in Lika-Senj, the economic picture has changed dramatically during the past decade\. Before 1991,
stakeholders noted that almost everyone had a paying job, in forestry, tourism, or government\. To
supplement their income in one of the state-organized industries, many practiced traditional agriculture on
their family farms\. The thriving Plitvice Lakes National Park that was attracting 750,000 visitors in the
late 1 980s was an all-important source of direct employment\. It also provided largely guaranteed markets
for all the agricultural products people could produce\.
Unfortunately, the past ten years have seen the major decline of all of Lika-Senj's productive sectors, the
loss of jobs, and the out-migration of young people\. Plitvice's success as a tourism destination in the
1980s had been heavily linked with the coastal tourism industry that had been the source of 60% of the
Park's visitation\. Because of the devastating effect that the war has had on Croatia's tourism industry, and
because of the bankrupting of many hotels through privatization, the coastal tourism industry has been
severely affected, as has Plitvice's\. Access to credit, high taxation, and lack of a center to provide business
start-up are major impediments to the development of a private tourism industry\.
Today, the future of Plitvice, once the most important economic growth engine for Lika-Senj, is uncertain
at best\. One of the central findings explained more fully in the SA is that the revival of Croatia's coastal
tourism industry is closely linked with, and likely a pre-requisite for, the future of a viable tourism industry
within the KEC study area\. A second conclusion is that, while there are other secondary natural and
cultural tourism attractions in the central part of the KEC study area, the land mines present the most
severe detriment to development of altemative/'eco" tourism, given the "wandering nature" of this type of
tourist\.
Forestry jobs in Lika-Senj have declined by at least 60% from some 1,700 to 2,000 jobs in 1991 to between
570 and 700 today as a result of the bankrupting of several sawmills, and because landmines have taken
some forests out of production\. As far as agriculture is concerned, the significant decline of tourism at
Plitvice has undermined demand for produce\. Never a mainstay but long a strong supplementary activity,
it continues its decline\. The predominant elderly farm dwellers are unable to maintain the pastoral and crop
lands, while the younger people are very often unable to farm effectively due to a lack of resources and a
lack of knowledge about how to market their products\.
In the northern part of the study area around Risnjak National Park, forestry was and remains the
overwhelmingly dominant industry, accounting for approximately 1,100 jobs\. This represents about the
same employment level as in 1991, accounting for an estimated 70%-80% of total employment in the
district\. Unfortunately, a decline in employment by the sector is anticipated, as a result of reorganization
and modernization\. The situation was quite a bit different before the war and independence, as
- 73 -
municipalities used to own the forests within their boundaries and were able to generate important revenues
from this source\.
In terms of tourism, before the war many of the communities in the Risnjak National Park study area
enjoyed visitation by mostly Western European upscale tourists who were staying in nearby Istria and
Kvarner Bay (Opatija, Crikvenica) and who were attracted by the natural and cultural features\. Such
visitation included day and overnight stays and provided revenues sufficient to diversify the study area's
economy beyond forestry\. It is expected that effective recovery of the tourism industry will occur in the
next three to five years\.
In the southernmost part of the study area, around Pakienica National Park, tourism is the mainstay of the
economy, centered along the coast around Starigrad\. Forestry was not identified as an industry of any
importance in this southern region\. While agriculture was reportedly important to the area in past decades,
there are only a few remaining rural villages\. The Paklenica area is reportedly recovering well from the
effects on tourism brought on by the war, at least in terms of total numbers of visitors, reaching 120,000
visitors annually, or 60% of pre-war levels\. However, as was true in all other parts of the study area, the
Eastern European adventure travelers (e\.g\., climbers, backpackers) who spend relatively little\.
Social Development Issues
The following are the main social development issues associated with the proposed project:
Weak civil society\. The environmental NGO movement in Croatia is relatively weak, and in its early
stages of development While there are dozens of entities forwarding themselves as environmental
"NGOs", they are small and fragmented, with limited resources and capacity\. Many in the environmental
NGO community have recognized that there is a need to coordinate activities and establish some type of
umbrella organization to represent their interests more effectively\. Given the sheer number of NGOs, it
was not possible for the project team to communicate individually with all of the groups\.
Inadequate capacityfor community development\. Participation of stakeholders in KEC activities can be
difficult\. Stakeholders expressed a reticence to meet in groups and do things cooperatively\. SA findings
are that KEC project initiatives would likely have a higher chance of success if they build on areas of
"social energy", that is to say, on areas where there are indications of energy/activity, entrepreneurship, and
enthusiasm\. The SA identified a number of communities where people are attempting to work together to
develop both community and private sector activities\.
Lack of trust in local institutions\. Plans, policies and regulations are often poorly implemented and
enforced\. It was repeatedly noted by stakeholders that although some very good plans exist for county
development, park management, etc\., they tend to be "paper plans" that are rarely implemented, and laws
and regulations are not enforced\. This is an important factor for consideration during the KEC project
preparation process, as any planning/regulatory initiatives that are proposed under the KEC should be
accompanied by a high degree of confidence that they will be implemented\.
Lack of adequate community participation in park management decision making\. The parks generally
tend to function as fairly solitary entities\. Local people are generally neither consulted about, nor involved
in, park activities, even when they may be very directly affected\. Many people are living within park
boundaries, especially at Plitvice, where they report a real need for improved communications between
management and people to identify suitable activities, provide for garbage collection, etc\. Several other
local stakeholders reported that they were somewhat confused about the parks, were not consulted about
-74-
their establishment, did not know where the boundaries were, and did not understand the reasons for their
establishment\. There is a legacy of resentment that has grown up around some of the parks, which, as
many stakeholders noted, are viewed as having limited activities of those who had previously used the parks
for economic purposes\. Moreover, it was observed that the relationship between people and parks is
extremely weak\. One of the key challenges to the KEC Project will be to narrow this gap, and to bring
those who are most affected by the Parks' evolution into the decision-making process\.
Threats to Cultural heritage\. Concern was expressed by several stakeholders about the loss of cultural
heritage\. As one stakeholder wamed, "traditional knowledge will be gone in 10 years\." While there is a
very rich cultural heritage in Croatia, virtually all of its manifestations (e\.g\., heritage buildings; traditional
foods and beverages; wood arts and crafts; wool, textiles and clothing production; music and dance; etc\.)
are endangered in the study area\. For examnple, many buildings, old corn mills, fortifications, and churches
have been destroyed during the various aggressions\. Despite many official designations and protection
under the law, stakeholders observed that little is done to preserve these resources in the face of the many
other pressing issues confronting the country\. Local traditional cultural pursuits and traditional
environmental knowledge are also dwindling because the formerly very strong extended family structures
break down, and the elderly no longer pass along their knowledge to the youth\.
Vulnerabk Populations\. One of the most vulnerable segments of society in the KEC Project area are
those living in the rural villages undertaking subsistence agriculture\. Most of these people are elderly and
living off pensions that often amount to only 150 or 200 Kunas/month (US$25)\. It was observed that often
these villagers are isolated and do not necessarily have strong extended family structures to help and
support them\. Some of these villagers indicated that the young people would come back to the land if they
could make a living\. In this regard, the KEC Project may be able to play a positive role by providing
assistance to this group\. Perhaps the most vulnerable and poverty-stricken elements of society observed are
the Serbs and Croats who have returned to the rural villages in the Plitvice area in the aftermath of war\.
Both groups tend to be dominated by the elderly and live in isolated settlements with limited access to
resources\. Most are trying to reestablish agriculture and crafts production\.
Return of the Serbian Population\. In 1991, prior to the war, 43% of Lika-Senj's population, or 30,741
people, were Serb, 90% of who fled the country in 1995\. By May 2000, SA sources estimate that some
20% (approximately 5,500 people) have returned\. Those who have returned are overwhelning the elderly,
who have come back to capitalize on their pensions as they have no other sources of income available to
them\. The SA estimates that, of the 5,500 Serbs who have returned, only 678 (some 12%) are under 45
years of age, underscoring the fact that the young are not retuming\.
Gender Issues\. Little information and few issues related to the status of women in Croatia were identified\.
There are no agencies of government that deal specifically with women's affairs, and no literature related to
gender-specific information was reported\. In government, academia and business, observations and
stakeholder interviews indicated that women hold positions, at most levels (outside higher levels of
government, management and the military), in a proportion relatively equal to men\. Rural women have
difficult lives, being responsible for work on the farm as well as all household duties\. With respect to the
issue of poverty, however, it was reported that poor households headed by women (that is, widows) are not
receiving war pensions, divorced women and single mothers also are considered vulnerable, but that there
are also many households headed by divorced men who are living in very poor conditions\. The lack of a
social network outside the family makes life difficult for many women today, as in many cases almost all
family members have moved away, and there are few children to care for\.
Stakeholder Analysis and Participation Framework
- 75 -
A broad range of groups of people have a stake in the way Karst ecosystem resources are managed\. Key
stakeholders include: (a) Govemment institutions at the national, regional and local levels (including
MEPP, MOAF, HS, Ministry of Tourism); (b) national and nature parks in the project area; (c) local
residents and resource users (farmers, forest users, HS employees, herders, service providers to national
parks and park visitors); (d) national and local level NGOs; (e) the academic community and research
institutes; and (e) tourists\. Each of these stakeholder groups has specific interests and needs related to
resource use and control and will, therefore, will be affected by the project\. The stakeholders consulted
during the SA process were evaluated and grouped into three categories: those most able to influence the
KEC project; those who are likely to be most affected by the KEC project (both positively and negatively,
including the most vulnerable); and those who have potential to contribute knowledge or other support to
the KEC project\. Table 1 summarizes groups identified as being a part of each of these categories\.
Table 1: Summary of Stakeholder Analysis: Interests, Impacts and Influence
Stakeholder Groups Interests at Stake in Potential Influence of Potential Impact of the
Relation to Stakeholder Group on the Project
V______ _ The Project Project On the Stakeholder Group
Stakeholders Most Able to Influence the Project
Ministry of Oversees the KEC project Is an implementing agency Will benefit from
Environmental design and implementation\. of the KEC Project and has institutional strengthening
Protection And Has responsibility for Parks\. a fundamental influence on in parks management,
Physical Planning selection of project sustainable development and
components, natural resource
implementation and management\.
monitoring of results\.
Ministry of Oversees/manages state Revisions to forestry law KEC will promote
Agriculture and forests could affect the range of inter-sectoral cooperation
Forestry/Hrvatske permitted uses in the forests and planning
Sume of the KEC Project area; *Rural Revitalization grants
Could provide assistance are expected to include
and input to various demonstration of
forestry/agriculture related biodiversity friendly forestry
project components\. practices
Improved protected area
management should result in
improved management of
forests in their area\.
Ministry of Tourism MoT has interest in seeing Ministry could shape the KEC Project will finance
tourism revive in the KEC Terms of Reference of other studies and actions in
Project area\. upcoming national tourism support of ecotourism
studies to include analyses development
that would be helpful to the KEC project will prepare
KEC Project\. regional tourism strategy
KEC project will support,
through rural revitalization
grants program, tourism
_ ______________________ related development
County & Municipal * Interest in creating ' Can facilitate the ' Is likely to increase the
Governments employment in project areas decentralization process, connection and level of
- 76 -
and limiting reductions in and encourage participation cooperation between
permitted natural resource of its local/county government and
uses that the KEC project stakeholders; residents/participants
might impose\. Can participate directly in through participatory
specific aspects of the KEC development of protected
Project\. area management plans,
Can provide information people and parks liaison
and insights that will ensure communities and
a strong understanding of administration of small
KEC participants of local grants program
realities\. * Could affect popularity and
support of government, if
project goal of enhancing
economic development is
achieved\.
Parks Management Parks strengthening with Will be the key local KEC Project will strengthen
respect to resource contacts and facilitators of legal basis for biodiversity
management and KEC Project components\. conservation in and around
biodiversity protection are * Will be a key source of national parks\.
central to the Karst information regarding Project will help improve
ecosystem conservation and biodiversity and resource financial improve financial
therefore of strong interest use in the parks\. sustainability of biodiversity
to parks managers\. conservation efforts\.
Project will finance
management plan
development ], equipment,
training, field trips [
Project will enhance local
community support to
national parks
Project will strengthen
knowledge about
I biodiversity in parks\.
Stakeholders Most Affected by the Project - The "Key Stakeholders"
The rural poor Have a big stake to the Could be participants in * Could be beneficiaries of any
extent to which the KEC KEC Project (e\.g\. crafts, KEC project economic
project focuses on economic agriculture, tourism); development initiatives\.
development, and a lesser * If participants in KEC * Could alienate and adversely
interest if protection is the agricultural initiatives, affect the rural poor to the
focus; could help to protect extent that the KEC effects a
Do not appear, in general, to biodiversity by preserving reduction in permitted
be practicing the meadows\. resource uses, or does not
environmentally benefit them;
unsustainable resource uses; * Could have a neutral/no
effect to the extent that the
KEC does not focus on this
group as a high priority
target for participation, or to
the extent that the KEC
focuses on scientific
research\.
Serbs and Croats * Same as above\. * Same as above\. * Same as above;
retuming to villages Could induce more Serbs to
-77 -
return, particularly to the
Plitvice area\.
Young people Same as above\. Same as above\. Could help to enable young
Can provide energy and people to stay in, or be
enthusiasm through their drawn back to the project
participation\. area\.
Local entrepreneurs Have interest in economic * Could participate in ways * Could be beneficiaries of
development in the Project that help to generate support programs for
area that will enhance their employment growth and environmentally businesses\.
business\. help to keep youth in the
Producers of crafts/products project area, and preserve
that are of cultural value culturally important
wish to revive their business\. practices;
People living within Villagers use natural * Same as above; Could be beneficiaries of any
and adjacent to parks resources for their survival Can improve sustainable use KEC project economic
(including local (e\.g\. farming)\. [Note: of resources if the KEC development initiatives
farmers) Resource use was not Project successfully Project will encourage their
observed to be unsustainable encourages their participation by raising
on an overall basis\.] participation and awareness and supporting
Villagers would like to be implements measures that economic activities that are
able to sell produce and help improve their material based on sustainable
crafts to the parks again well being\. resource use
Villagers complain often, Villager will be encouraged
that they have little or no to participate in the
input to decisions that affect development of park
their lives\. management plans and in
parks and people programs\.
Tourism industry The tourism industry *The tourism industry (crafts The KEC Project will
throughout the KEC study producers, pension/other benefit the tourism industry
area is suffering from accommodations operators, by financing the promotion
reduced post-war visitation, tour guides, etc\.) can of the parks system\. and
a low-end, low-spending participate in Karst supporting the analysis,
tourist, high seasonality, a ecosystem conservation by production and marketing of
lack of funds for marketing, generating employment and local tourism services \.
and a lack of experience increasing the attractiveness
with ecotourism\. of parks as tourism
destinations\.
Community-based Currently, these groups base CBOs can be participants in The KEC project will
organizations (crafts, their activities on the use of the KEC project and have support measures to protect
fishing, hunting, natural and cultural expressed interest in hunting and fishing
mountaineering) resources\. receiving support (for crafts resources, thereby benefiting
* Currently, there is reportedly production and sales and local CBOs, whose activities
unsustainable hunting tour guiding), and for depend on the quality of the
within and around some of support to restore and environment;
the parks undertaken by manage the fishing and Mountaineers could benefit
poachers\. hunting resources\. if the KEC project supports
signage/other amenities\.
The Bosnian Croats 'Appear to be limited; Appear to be limited if not Appears to be limited but
non-existent\. project design should be
undertaken recognizing their
vulnerable situation\.
Stakeholders Who Have Potential to Contribute to the Project
NGOs * There are dozens of Some NGOs appear to have The KEC project could
- 78 -
environmental NGOs, an understanding of, and strengthen and coalesce the
including several relevant experience at the energies of an
specifically active in the local/parks level in the environmental NGO
KEC study area\. project area\. They can community that is in its
contribute to the KEC early stages of development;
project, possibly facilitating * NGOs could, as a result of
some of the components, participation in the KEC,
such as organic agriculture\. increase their overall
Some NGOs may be able to influence and effectiveness
facilitate the linkage at county/national levels, as
between parks and the local far as environmental
people\. awareness and protection,
and sustainable development
are concerned\.
Chamber of Economy * The Chamber has an interest * The Chamber could act as a *Project activities to revive
in economic development, tourism/other sector the local rural economy will
including among others, resource, and as a partner help the Chamber reach its
tourism\. with the KEC implementers, objective of economic
in terms, among others, of development\.
developing
recommendations for
changes in policies and
regulations affecting the
success of the KEC,
particularly in areas
involving economic
development\.
Croatian Livestock Is actively working in parts * Could cooperate with the The project includes a breed
Selection Center of the project area to KEC to facilitate a protection activity which
promote a return on the part strengthening of local will work with the Livestock
of farmers to the breeding of agriculture and protection of Selection Center and
indigenous livestock, which biodiversity, through potentially, enable it to
are deemed to be important keeping farmers on the generate financial support
to biodiversity\. land; from nationaVinternational
sources to continue
expanding its work\.
Tourism Institute Is actively involved in Could contribute to the * Will cooperate to collect
devising policy to promote tourism potential and information on and shape
Croatia as an ecotourism carrying capacity the policy for ecotourism
destination in addition to assessment under the development in the project
being a sun&sand country\. project\. areas\.
Interested in enhancing * Could help monitor
information on the tourism ecotourism growth in
and recreation value of the project areas and its effect
Karst region\. on the eco-system\.
Institute of Social The Institute has experience * Could provide assistance to Could strengthen the
Sciences in alternative tourism facilitate consultation with Institute's image and
development in other parts and participation of local involvement\.
of Croatia and wishes to people, in the KEC Project
contribute to it in the Karst area, particularly where
region\. KEC can benefit local
Senior members of the people's lives\.
Institute appear to have the
- 79 -
trust and understanding of
the local people in the
Project area\.
World Lutheran These groups are providing * Could provide the KEC with * KEC could provide
Federation, UNDP & relief to the most vulnerable a profound and highly value-added to the efforts of
Red Cross in the KEC Project area\. current understanding of these groups\.
social changes and poverty
in the KEC Project area and
areas of greatest need;
Could provide the KEC
Project with advice, and
with information that will
help to avoid overlap of
effort\.
Serb Democratic The SDF is interested in Organic farming and KEC could help to advance
Forum promoting the return of the alternative tourism are areas the interests of the SDF by
Serbs and particularly the of interest to the SDF and providing sustainable
young, which is, in part, which would possibly lead economic development
dependent on the creation of to their participation and opportunities\.
job opportunities\. cooperation with KEC
components dealing with
sustainable economic
development\.
SDF could criticize and
resist the KEC if it does not
give equal opportunity for
participation to both Croats
and Serbs\.
International Croatia is in the process of These agencies could top up The KEC could provide a
Agencies negotiating entry into the investments undertaken by replicable/successful
EU, which makes it eligible the KEC Project, thereby example of sustainable
for assistance and giving it a high development and
cooperation with many of value-added\. biodiversity protection\.
these agencies\.
Media * Media is interested in Journalists and others in the KEC Project will cooperate
obtaining and spreading to media may be able to act as with the media in increasing
the population information disseminators of public awareness on the
on environmental protection\. information to the importance of biodiversity
stakeholders\. and progress made by the
I_Project in its conservation\.
Stakeholder Participation Plan in Project Implementation
The findings of the SA indicate that the main focus of the KEC project should be aimed at ensuring that
decision-making be decentralized to the local level to the extent possible\. This suggestion responds to the
frequently voiced complaints by stakeholders about the traditional top-down decision-mraking process that
has effectively ignored local realities\. It also inherently recognizes that realization of the goals of the KEC
will necessarily involve, and require, the cooperation and participation of those living on and around the
karst region\. Table 2 summarizes stakeholder participation expected during project implementation\. Table
3 presents the project sub-components in which each of the major stakeholder group will participate and
their more of participation\.
- 80 -
Table 2: Stakeholder Participation During Project Implementation
Stakeholder Project Component Mode of
Participation
COL = Collaboration
CON = Consultation
INF = Information
_________________________ Sharing
Ministry of Agriculture I\. Review of and amendments to the biodiversity-related 1\. COL
Forestry Hrvatske Sume regulation, intersectoral harmonization and development
Croatian Livestock of coordinating mechanisms and decision-making
Selection Center decentralization\.
2\. Biodiversity conservation and soil protection guidelines 2\. COL
and training for land-use and sectoral planning\.
3\. Monitoring of the biodiversity components for priority 3\. INF
areas* (populations of target threatened species, selected
karst biotopes)
4\. Preparation of spatial and management plan for Velebit 5\. COL
Park of Nature and National park Northern Velebit
5\. GIS and RS based inventory and monitoring system 6\. INF
including acquisition of infrared colour aerial photos for
National Park Risnjak\.
6\. Biodiversity conservation and management of valuable 7\. CON
forests within NP Plitvice Lakes and PN Velebit\.
7\. Project for the protection of local cattle breeds (busa cow 8\. COL
and pramenka sheep)
8\. Rural economy revitalization programme (conservation 9\. CON/COL
of mountain meadows, organic farming, handicrafts
production, wood processing, etc\.) including small
grants programme for firms and NGOs\.
Ministry of Tourism 1\. Legal and regulatory framework review and subsequent I\. COL
Institute of Tourism revisions to incorporate biodiversity conservation and
sustainable use of natural resources
2\. Development of national protected areas management 2\. INF
and planning guidelines
3\. PA system market analysis, promotion and marketing in 3\. COLJCON
the project area
4\. Web site for karst biodiversity 4\. INF
5\. KEC project newsletter 5\. INF
6\. Nature based tourism strategy for karst region 6\. CON/COL
7\. Preparation of National Park Plitvice Lakes carrying 7\. INF/CON
capacity assessment and management plan
8\. Preparatory works for the project on construction of 8\. INF/CON
mountaineering path and trails in Velebit area
9\. Rural economy revitalization program (conservation of 9\. CON
mountain meadows, organic farning, handicrafts
- 81 -
production, wood processing, etc\.) including small
grants programme for firms and NGOs
10\. Implementation of Gacka river springs area protection 10\. INF/CON
and revitalization of cultural heritage (mills)
11\. Transboundary regional cooperation of karst PAs 11\. CON
(Risnjak, Kupa valley, Sneznik, gkocijanske jame,
Koeevje, etc\.)
Tourism agencies, Local 1\. Development of national protected areas management 1\. CON
Tourism Service Providers, and planning guidelines
Mountaineering and
Climbing Associations
2\. PA system market analysis, promotion and marketing in 2\. COL/CON
the project area
3\. Web site for karst biodiversity 3\. INF
4\. KEC project newsletter 4\. INF
5\. Nature based tourism strategy for karst region 5\. COLUCON
6\. Preparation of National Park Plitvice Lakes carrying 6\. INF
capacity assessment and management plan
7\. Preparatory works for the project on construction of 7\. CON
mountaineering path and trails in Velebit area
8\. Rural economy revitalization programme (conservation 8\. CON
of mountain meadows, organic farming, handicrafts
production, wood processing, etc\.) including small
grants programme for firms and NGOs
9\. Implementation of Gacka river springs area protection 9\. CON/INF
and revitalization of cultural heritage (mills)
10\. Transboundary regional cooperation of karst PAs 10\. CON/INF
(Risnjak, Kupa valley, Sneznik, gkocijanske jame,
Koeevje, etc\.)
County & Municipal 1\. Review of and amendments to the biodiversity-related 1\. CON
Governments regulation, intersectoral harmonization and development
of coordinating mechanisms and decision-making
decentralization
2\. Incorporation of biodiversity conservation in sectoral and 2\. COL
land-use plans
3\. Development of national protected areas management 3\. COL
and planning guidelines
4\. Formulation of a sustainable financing strategy for the 4\. CON
PA system
5\. PA system market analysis, promotion and marketing in 5\. CON
the project area
6\. Web site for karst biodiversity 6\. INF
7\. Biodiversity information inventory, mapping and 7\. INF
monitoring system
8\. Annual workshops on biodiversity in local county 8\. COL
centres
9\. Biodiversity conservation incorporated in land-use plans, 9\. CON
land development and natural resource use in the karst
region\.
10\. Environmental education and local awareness 10\. CON
development
11\. Demonstration of linkages between rural development 11\. COLSCON
- 82 -
and biodiversity conservation
12\. Regional Cooperation Programme for Karst Ecosystem 12\. INF/CON
Conservation (exchange of information, tourism
promotion and partnerships with other karst regions)
Parks Management and I\. Incorporation of biodiversity conservation in sectoral and 1\. COL/CON
Staff land-use plans
2\. Policies and guidelines for system of protected areas in 2\. COL/CON
karst
3\. Biodiversity information inventory, mapping and 3\. COL/CON
monitoring system
4\. Increased public awareness and support for biodiversity 4\. COL/CON
conservation with active role of NGOs
5\. Pilot demonstration projects on sustainable technologies 5\. CON
that address priority threats to karst ecosystem
6\. Nature based tourism strategy for karst region 6\. COL/CON
biodiversity conservation, monitoring and evaluation
projects
7\. Design of spatial and management plans an 7\. COL
8\. Strengthening capacity of local staff to manage 8\. COL
Protected Areas
9\. Environmental education and local awareness 9\. CON/COL
development
10\. Facility construction and equipment acquisition for PAs 10\. COL
11\. Demonstration of linkages between rural development 11\. COL/CON
and biodiversity conservation
12\. Regional Cooperation Program for Karst Ecosystem 12\. COL
Conservation (exchange of information, tourism
promotion and partnerships with other karst regions)
Local entrepreneurs 1\. PA system market analysis, promotion and marketing in 1\. INF
the project area
2\. Nature based tourism strategy for karst region 2\. CON/INF
3\. Design of spatial and management plans and 3\. CON/INF
biodiversity conservation, monitoring and evaluation
projects
4\. Environmental education and local awareness 4\. INF
development
5\. Facility construction and equipment acquisition for PAs 5\. COL
6\. Demonstration of linkages between rural development 6\. COLICON
and biodiversity conservation
People living within and 1\. Increased public awareness and support for biodiversity 1\. INF
adjacent to parks (including conservation with active role of NGOs
local farmners) Serbs and
Croats returning to villages
The rural poor Young people
Bosnian Croats
2\. Nature based tourism strategy for karst region 3\. CON
3\. Design of spatial and management plans and 4\. CON
biodiversity conservation, monitoring and evaluation
projects
4\. People and Parks program development - includes a 5\. COL
-83-
commnunity monitoring program
5\. Enviromnental education and local awareness 6\. CON/INF
development
6\. Demonstration of linkages between rural development 7\. COL/CON
and biodiversity conservation through rural revitalization
grants program
Social Development Objectives, Monitoring Indicators and Mechanisms
The findings of the SA led to the identification of social development outcomes for the KEC project and
were taken into account in reaching agreement in the design of the project\. The following presents these
outcomes and the main SA report presents monitoring guidelines:
* Decentralization of decision-making\. The project requires the participation of key stakeholders at
the local level\. Indicators would include having the local Mjesni Odbor" ("Board Place") organizations
contacted and becoming special liaisons with and conduits for local input into the KEC project; and locally
based leaders' assuming responsibility for implementing project activities where the intended beneficiaries
are local stakeholders who have the greatest vested interest in seeing that results are achieved (for example,
eco/cultural tourism; organic farming; sale of local products)\.
* Integration of people and parks\. The project will establish a partnership between park
management and park residents and/or adjacent local communities around them\. Public participation and
awareness-building programs will be required, and park management and local in-park/adjacent residents
will operate as a team to decide on policies guiding land-uses, biodiversity protection, and management
practices within park boundaries where the project will affect these stakeholders\.
* Support of existing centers of "social energy" and entrepreneurship\. The project builds on the
pockets of "social energy" and entrepreneurship that already exist\. Existing centers of "social energy" that
meet defined criteria are targeted as recipients/leaders of KEC project initiatives (for example, arts and
crafts, organic farming, community-based tourism development, environmental education, cultural
interests)\. Existing entrepreneurs are identified in sectors, consistent with KEC goals and "hands-on"
practical business/entrepreneurship training (business plan preparation, market demand and cash flow
analyses), is provided to individuals/groups who qualify, under defined and transparent criteria, as meeting
KEC project goals, by international experts; and the top tier of those undertaking training are given
financial support\.
* Poverty alleviation\. The project contributes to poverty alleviation through economic development\.
KEC support materially improves the medium/long-term outlook of the poor and vulnerable and/or does no
harm\.
* Beneficial or at least benign impact on those most vulnerable\. The project does not adversely
affect those identified as vulnerable key stakeholders, and preferably offers them some benefit\.
* Ethnic and gender equality\. The project can realistically achieve a balance of participation and
benefits among men and women and arnong different ethnic groups\. KEC projects and processes are
underscored by concerted measures to encourage participation by a balance of men and women, and to
provide equal access to participation by all ethnic groups\.
- 84 -
* Achievement of "value-added\." Because of the project's merits, it has the potential to attract
capital and technical assistance from other sources, thereby enhancing the project's long-term benefits and
sustainability\. KEC funds are supplemented by financial/technical assistance support of outside/non-KEC
sources\.
* Contributions to policy/legal changes\. Either the project does not require a change in policy or
law to realize success, or an opportunity exists for the KEC to have substantive input into dialogues to
update policy/law and/or influence new legal and regulatory initiatives (for example, Forestry Law, Law of
Nature, Corporate Law)\. The project affords the KEC leadership an opportunity to have substantive policy
input to policy areas of particular relevance to the KEC's success and to social development objectives\.
TABLE 3\. MONITORING & EVALUATION GUIDELINES FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES
Intended Outcome Outputs Process Indicators
1\. Decentralization of
decision- making
(a) Local Mjesni Odbor (Board Place) (i) Conmmunications program informs local
organizations are contacted and, where residents within and around each park and/or
appropriate, become special liaisons with, and project area of the KEC project and solicits
conduits for, local input into the KEC project\. interest in participation\.
(ii) Launch workshops are convened in each park
(b) Locally based leaders assume responsibility and/or project area to shape projects & create
for implementing those sustainable economic local oversight\.
development KEC projects in those instances
where the intended beneficiaries are local (iii) Benchmarks, defining tasks, target times for
stakeholders who have the greatest vested completion and associated budgetary
interest in seeing that results are achieved allocations are defined in a participatory
(e\.g\. eco/cultural tourism; organic farming; process using a professional facilitator\. Care
sale of local products, etc\.)\. is taken to ensure targets are measurable and
transparent\.
2\. Integration of parks (a) Parks management and local in-park/adjacent (i) Same as I (i) above\.
and people residents operate as a team to decide upon
policies guiding land uses, biodiversity (ii) A policy is adopted by the MEPP
protection, practices within park boundaries, that advocates the right of in-park
where KEC projects affect these stakeholders' residents to have a say in decisions
lives\.(c) Performance of benchmarks is made regarding KEC-related
monitored systematically\. initiatives affecting their lives\.
(iii) In-park residents' committees are
established to provide input to parks
policies affecting them\.
(iv) Measurable and transparent benchmarks are
established, using a professional
facilitator\.(i) Every 3 months (or other
appropriate time interval), senior KEC
managers receive and review progress
reports\. If targets are not met, assistance is
provided to identify and relieve barriers to
their achievement\.
(b) Performance of benchmarks is monitored (i) Every 3 months (or other appropriate time
systematically\. interval), senior KEC managers receive and
review progress reports\. If targets are not
met, assistance is provided to identify and
- 85 -
relieve barriers to their achievement\.
3\. Support of centers (a) Existing centers of social energy who meet (i) Measurable criteria are established by KEC
of existing social defined criteria are targeted as and local participants to define social energy
energy recipients/leaders of KEC project initiatives in a participatory manner\.
(e\.g\. arts and crafts, organic farming,
community-based tourism development, (ii) A short list of potential project participants is
environmental education, cultural interests)\. derived\. Criteria include demonstration of
recent exemplary initiative consistent with
KEC goals, and value-added potential, in
terms of economic, environmental and equity
goals of the KEC project\.
(iii) Social energy centers are provided with
professional assistance to generate business
plans and are selected based on a transparent
procedure;
(iv) Transparent benchmarks are established in a
participatory manner to monitor the
performance of each social energy participant\.
(b) Performance of benchmarks is monitored (i) Every 3 months (or other appropriate time
systematically\. interval), senior KEC managers receive and
review progress reports\. If targets are not met,
assistance is provided to identify and relieve
barriers to their achievement\.
4\. Support of (a) Existing entrepreneurs are identified in (i) Possible pilot project leaders are identified\.
entrepreneurship sectors consistent with KEC goals\.
(ii) Recipients of training are geographically,
(b) Hands-on practical business/ ethnically and gender-balanced\.
entrepreneurship training (business plan
preparation, market demand and cash flow (iii) Other criteria include value-added
analyses) is provided to individuals/groups (likelihood of employment; return of youth;
who qualify, under defined and transparent reinforcement of biodiversity and cultural
criteria, as meeting KEC project goals, by heritage goals) and likelihood of success\.
international experts\.
(iv) On-going business advice is provided by
(c) The top tier of those undertaking training are business monitors over the course of business
given financial support\. start-up\.
(v) Transparent benchmarks are established in a
participatory manner to monitor the
performance of entrepreneurial recipient\.
(d) Performance of benchmarks is monitored (i) Every 3 months (or other appropriate time
systematically\. interval), senior KEC managers receive and
review progress reports\. If targets are not met,
assistance is provided to identify and relieve
barriers to their achievement\.
5\. Poverty (a) KEC support materially improves the (i) Preference, in terms of selection, is given to
alleviation/benign medium/long-term outlook of the poor and those demonstrating that their success will
impact vulnerable and/or does no harm\. have a favorable direct or indirect effect on the
vulnerable and poor\. (In some cases support of
the young, for example, may have a positive
indirect effect on their vulnerable elderly
families\.
6\. Ethnic and Gender (a) KEC projects and processes are underscored (i) Communications programs introducing the
equality of by concerted measures to encourage KEC project and inviting participation reach
access to participation by a balance of men and women, all ethnfic groups\. Special efforts are made to
participation in the and to provide equal access to participation by reach women (e\.g\. through women's groups,
KEC project all ethnic groups\. the Red Cross, etc\.)
- 86 -
(ii) Mjesni Odbor/local committees formed of
residents around the parks reflect a gender
balance, and a proportional representation of
ethnic groups to their overall population;
(iii) Leadership positions in KEC projects and
programs are gender balanced and ethnically
proportional to population\.
7\. Value-added (a) KEC funds are supplemented by (i) Outside funding sources, such as those listed
financial/technical assistance support of in Section 7, are successfully solicited for
outside/non-KEC sources\. support of various KEC projects\.
8\. Participation in (a) The project affords the KEC leadership an (i) KEC works with tourism interests to exempt
policy/legal changes opportunity to have substantive policy input the tourism industry from the Corporate Law
to policy areas of particular relevance to the that is impeding the purchase of local goods by
KEC's success, and to social development the Parks\. (Tourism is different than other
objectives\. sectors in that tourists have a particular desire
to buy local, as opposed to imported,
products\.) KEC, with parks' management,
provides useful input to the new or impending
Law of Forests and Law of Nature\.
Implications for Project Design and Implementation
The following summarizes the main implications for the SA for project design and implementation:
* The KEC project should aim not only at establishing a sound participation program, but at
ensuring that decision-making be decentralized to the local level as much as possible\.
* Participation and decentralization activities should build on existing organizational structures, and
centers of "social energy" and entrepreneurship, wherever possible\. While people in the study area tend not
to get involved in organizations, there are some areas where there are notable exceptions\. These should be
capitalized whenever possible to develop participation programs and decentralize the KEC initiatives,
rather than trying to develop new organizations\. The people involved in the existing groups tend to be
those with good ideas, but they are often already over-extended\. One of the most promising vehicles for
involving villagers in decision-making, related to the KEC project, is a new type of organization called
"Mjesni Odbor" (MOs), or "board place"" These organizations were recently announced by the national
government as vehicles to allow formal village input to municipal authorities (local mayors)\. By employing
these emerging MOs as vehicles for the KEC, the project may be able to assist an important new initiative
of government, by encouraging them to develop and become active\.
* The inclusion of a "People and Parks Integration Program" can strengthen the links between the
national parks and protected areas as well as the local populations who live in and around them\. The
program can involve the development of people and parks liaison committees that include a range of
stakeholders (for example: park residents, adjacent communities, park managers, NGOs, etc)\. The
benefits to stakeholders could be significant, including reduction of conflicts through increased
understanding of conservation issues by local people, increased understanding of local issues by parks
management people, and increased employment and opportunities for adjunct economic activities by local
people\.
* The project can support the development of a National Parks and Alternative Tourism Strategy and
Action Plan\. The development of the tourism sector in the project area will need to be based on rebuilding
- 87 -
the coastal tourism industry\. As increasing numbers of tourists travel to Croatia, it may be possible to
attract them in greater numbers to Plitvice as well as the other parks in the study area and the emerging
alternative ecotourism attractions (for example, the caves) in Lika-Senj\. However, certain constraints need
to be dealt with, notably the land mines issue, which is a very major impedimnent to any "non-packaged
tour" type of tourism in the interior part of the project area\. It is recommended that a tourism initiative be
carried out as part of the KEC project, to encompass baseline research of supply-side/product; market
analysis; tour operators perceptions surveys (international and national operators); "compaTables"
evaluation (for example, Slovenia); packaging opportunities; constraints and opportunities; and action
strategy\.
To address the concerns of several stakeholders regarding the loss of cultural heritage, another
recommendation is to include in the KEC project some type of cultural heritage conservation initiative (for
example, a traditional environmental and cultural knowledge program)\. Such a program can be directly
related to karst ecosystem biodiversity conservation issues and help support the protected areas\. The
forests of Velebit, for example, hold botanical resources that have been used for generations for a wide
variety of uses by the people who have lived in the area\. Recording of traditional cultural activities related
to the environment, and devising a plan for their maintenance, can have many benefits to both present and
future stakeholders, and to the environment as well\.
The project also can be used as a vehicle for promoting linkages between biodiversity conservation and
rural development issues, through, for example, support of organic products and traditional species\. While
it is recognized that the KEC project is an initiative under the GEF program, and strongly focused on
biodiversity issues, some of its activities may be able to support and promote linkages with rural
development\. For example, there may be opportunities in line with stakeholders' interests and the
suitability of the resource base in the study area, to include activities focused on the promotion of organic
agriculture and traditional species or research on the feasibility of introducing some type of rural
resettlement program or entrepreneurship and business development program involving sustainable,
conservation-oriented activities\.
- 88 -
Additional Annex 12
CROATIA: KARST ECOSYSTEM CONSERVATION PROJECT
Financial Management Assessment Report
FM Report for PAD for PSCP - New Format
1 3112/02
1\. Executive Summary and Conclusion
A review of the Financial Management arrangements for the project was undertaken in December 2001 to
determine whether the fmnancial management arrangements within the PIU are acceptable to the Bank\. It is
concluded that the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) satisfies the Bank's minimum financial management
requirements\. The MEPP and PIU have also agreed to take the following measures:
Action Deadline
I Prepare FMRs First half year after
Effectiveness
2 The PIU to select auditors acceptable to the Bank, to audit the Grant 09/30/2002
accounts\.
A summary of financial management assessment and conclusions are as follows:
Financial Management Assessment Rating Comments
1\. Implementing Entity (PIU) Moderate PIU is successfully implementing the
Bank financed Biodiversity Conservation
Project (KECP)
2\. Funds Flow Moderate Same fimds flow as existing project
3\. Staffing Moderate Experienced project management and
___________________________________ financial team
4\. Accounting Policies and Procedures Moderate The P1U has a project specific operational
manual
5\. Internal Audit Moderate Internal Audit carried out by the Court of
Accounts (for KECP)\.
6\. External Audit Moderate The project will be audited by the same audit
firm that has audited the KECP and issued a
clean opinion\.
7\. Reporting and Monitoring Moderate PIU prepares reliable PMRs, under the
KECP
8\. Inforrnation Systems Moderate The PIU has a FM system in place
Overall Financial Management Moderate
Rating
-89 -
Detailed financial management assessment questionnaires are included in the project files\.
2\. Project Description Summary
The project has three components are as follows:
Component 1\. Build national capacity to conserve biodiversity and support sustainable resource use
US$1\.78 miDlion Activities to strengthen national capacity fall into five sub-components: (i) Strengthening
laws and regulatory framework; (ii) Strengthening national capacity to ensure biodiversity conservation\.;
(iii) Expansion of species and taxa under legal protection; (iv) Biodiversity inventory, mapping and
monitoring; and (v) Increasing public awareness and support for biodiversity conservation\.
Component 2\. Establishing community-based mechanisms for biodiversity conservation and
sustainable resource use in the karst region $US530 milion \. The project will support measures to
preserve the globally significant biodiversity in the Karst region through community level activities and
capacity building for protected area management\. Activities to meet this objective fall into three
sub-components: (i) Promotion of sustainable nature based tourism\.; (ii) Increasing local public awareness
and support for biodiversity conservation; and (iii) Improve protected area management and services for
biodiversity conservation\.
Component 3\. Project Management and Monitoring US$132 million The project will finance the
establishment and operation of a central PIU located within the MEPP in Zagreb and composed of a project
manager, a procurement specialist, financial management specialist, and assistant\. The project will also
finance a local PIU that will be located within the county/municipal physical planning office in Gospic, one
of the two county seats included in the project\. The local PITJ staff to be funded by the project are the field
coordinator and an assistant\.
3\. Country Financial Issues
CFAA for Croatia was carried out in 1999\. The reforms carried out to date in the area of financial
management put Croatia ahead of many other CEE countries\. Croatia has, in fact, set up a modem legal
and regulatory fiamework, compatible with the needs of a market-driven economy, completely discarded
the old accounting system and opted to introduce a comprehensive new framework based on international
guidelines\. In order to enhance public sector financial management and to achieve a higher level of
accountability, the issues related to the integrity and universal coverage of the budget process need to be
addressed in greater depth, together with the start of the Treasury, the modernization of accounting and
reporting systems and the further development of the institutions in charge of budget compliance through
internal and external audits\. Bank rehabilitation is under way but additional efforts are needed to strengthen
banking supervision and improve credit institutions risk-management\. Financial markets and their
regulatory institutions need further development; this would also make the privatization process more
effective\. Market competition and corporate govemance are main areas to be reformed to achieve greater
transparency and financial accountability for the private sector\. The organization of the accounting and
auditing profession should be defined by a self-regulating and standard-setting national body, ensuring the
application of high standards of ethics and progressively taking on the functions currently performed by the
government\.
To improve the overall public sector accountability, the reform of the institutions (namely, the ZAP and the
relevant Departments of the MoF) currently involved in the accounting, reporting and internal control
-90-
functions needs to be addressed\. In conclusion, the establishment of an adequate financial management
framework for the public sector requires the modemization of accounting systems, the harmonization of
reporting formats as well as the introduction of effective internal controls and auditing functions\.
4\. Financial Management System Assessment
4\.1 Project Management and Coordination
The MEPP will have overall responsibility for project implementation\. A national level project
implementation unit (PIU) will be established in the MEPP Division of General Environmental Policy\. The
PIU will build on the existence of the KECP project preparation implementation unit\. The PIU will be
responsible for all procurement, disbursement and financial management aspects of the project as well as
oversee the work of consultants, organize seminars and training\. The PIU will be responsible for
coordinating with other donors in the implementation of components which will be supported through
parallel and co-financing\. It will also be responsible for all reporting requirements to the Bank and the
Government\. It is staffed by a project director, procurement and disbursement specialist, an accountant
and an assistant, funded under the project\.
4\.2 Staffing of the Accounting/Finance Function
The accountant is familiar with financial and accounting systems as well as with Bank requirements\. The
experienced was gained during the preparation phase of the proposed project and the implementation of the
IDF and GEF Grants\. She would be responsible for all aspects of the financial management and
accounting, including maintaining books of accounts, reporting day-to-day transactions\. She will also be in
charge of the special account and preparation of SOEs and replenishment of the SA (see para 4\.3)\.
4\.3 Accounting and Internal Controls
The PIU will take all necessary steps to ensure that the project complies with the relevant Bank policies
(OP/BP 10\.02)\. This would include the establishment of proper accounting procedures and internal
controls, which has been documented in an operational manual\. The manual was reviewed and approved
by the Bank\.
4\.4 Computerized Accounting Systems
The PIU is responsible for overall project financial management and accounting for the project\. The PIU
has established a financial management system acceptable to the Bank, prior to Board\. The system will
produce simplified FMRs, in line with the Grant amount ($5 million)\.
4\.5 Audited Financial Statements and Management Letters
The PIU will recruit independent auditors under terms of reference acceptable to the Bank\. Audited Project
Financial Statements will be submitted to the Bank with the audit report six months after end of each year
audited\. Cost of the audit will be financed through Grant\. The PIU will select the auditors acceptable to
the Bank by September 30, 2002\.
4\.6 Financial Manual
Operational procedures and guidelines for project financial management is documented in a Financial
Management and Operational Manual, encompassing all levels of project management and administration\.
The Manual includes financial management and staffing, identification of accounting and auditing
standards and procedures used for the project, project reporting and monitoring, procedures for cash and
- 91 -
asset management and format of project management reports\.
4\.7 Conclusion
It is concluded that the PIU meets the Bank's minimum financial management requirements\.
5\. Financial Flows
A special account will be opened in a commercial bank acceptable to the Bank\. All contracts will be
concluded by the PIU\. The PIU will prepare all the relevant documents, obtain the required clearances\. All
payments will be made through the accounting department of the MEPP (as required by law), who will
operate the Special account in Euros and a local account (in Kuna)\. Counterpart funds would be paid from
the budget allocation of the MEPP\.
6\. Financial Monitoring Reports
The PIU will maintain accounts of the Project and will ensure appropriate accounting of the funds
provided\. It has been agreed that the PIU will be responsible for designing appropriate financial monitoring
reports (FMRs) and preparing FMRs on a half yearly basis\. The FMRs include:
* Project Sources and Uses of Funds
* Uses of Funds by Project Activity
* Special Account Statement Plus Local Bank Account Statement
* Project Progress reporting
* Procurement Monitoring
7\. Financial Risk Analysis
From a financial management perspective, the proposed KECP is considered a moderate-risk project\. A
summary of the consolidated risk assessment for the project is as follows:
Risk Assessment
H SMNComments
1\. Inherent Risk
Croatia XOverall corruption is high and
governance is inadequate\.
Project Management Unit XThe PIU established for the
operation of an IDF Grant and GEF
Grant will implement this project\.
Project XThe project is well conceived\. The
Government has demonstrated a high
level of conimitment and concern
regarding the forestry sector and will
contribute approximately 39% of
project cost\.
Overall Inherent Risk XThe project is implemented by the
PIU and not a government agency, as
a result the project is ring-fenced\.
The overall risks are moderate\.
2\. Control Risk
-92 -
1\. Implementing Entity XPIU is well versed in Bank
procedures, having dealt with Bank
projects\.
2\. Funds Flow XBased on the experience gained
under the IDF and GEF Grants , no
problems are seen\.
3\. Staffing XQualified and experienced staff are
already on board\.
4\. Accounting Policies and Procedures XPIUJ has a project specific
operational manual\.
5\. Internal Audit NA
6\. External Audit XAuditors acceptable to the Bank
will be appointed
7\. Reporting and Monitoring XSimplified reporting and monitoring
formats have been agreed and will be
implemented\.
8\. Information Systems XThe PIU has a FM system in place
Overall Inherent Risk X
H - High S - Substantial M - Moderate N - Negligible or Low
8\. Disbursements
Disbursements from the Grant will be made based on traditional disbursement methods (i\.e\., from the
Special Account with reimbursements made based on Statements of Expenditures (SOEs) and full
documentation, and direct payments from the Grant Account)\. The proceeds of the World Bank Grant will
be allocated in accordance with Table C, Annex 6\. To facilitate timely project implementation, the MEPP
will establish, maintain and operate a special account under terms and conditions acceptable to the Bank\.
The option to move to a FMR based disbursements will not be considered\.
9\. Special account:
To facilitate timely project implementation, the MEPP would establish, maintain and operate, under
conditions acceptable to the bank, a special accounts in Euros in a commercial bank for the GEF grant\.
The selection process and criteria for selection of the commercial bank will follow the Bank's
Disbursement Handbook procedures\. Applications for the replenishment of the account will be submitted
at least every three months or when 20 percent of the initial deposit has been utilized, which ever occurs
earlier\. The necessary documentation, the special account bank statement, and a reconciliation of this bank
statement will support the replenishment application
10\. Financial Covenants
The following are the covenants relating to financial matters:
* The PIU will select an audit firm to audit the project accounts by September 30, 2002\.
* The Government will cause the PIU to have its records, accounts and financial statements audited
each year, commencing with the accounts for the year ending December 31, 2002\.
- 93 -
11\. Supervision Plan
The reports of the progress of the project implementation will be monitored in detail during supervision
missions\. FMRs will be reviewed on a quarterly basis by the field based FMS and the results or issues
followed up during the supervision missions\. Audit reports of the project will be reviewed and issues
identified and followed up\. The field based FMS would monitor the agreed action plan to ensure
appropriate actions have been implemented by the PIU\.
- 94 -
A U S T R I A <,\.> ctCROATIA
_vt~ ~ ~ 1 7 _ -f \.-\ MEDAM HU NG A RY KEC PROJECT REGION
> _ *^ _ , >\. AZDA < Ct r rS\. KEC PROJECT REGION
_ ) ~ ~ ~ ~~ < [ ZAGORSKAH +, \ (t r \. _ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ NATIONAL PARKS
* ~~~~S L O V E G _9i REX 9g^ Q D_ 1\.- Rier ,-- NATURE PARKS(PAND
<< KPar t > - < > -- E~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ '' ^-|~~~~~~ 1> ~~~~ RIVERS
-;~~~~~\. 0 MAJ r ,~;tONOR TOWNS
\. - \. R|>\ liloturePX,& )|4KS: 1 \. - -- 2\. * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~NATIONAL CAPITAL
FF{ - - , F 1 ,~~~v,; 6 ~,'>1r' >t' REGION BOUNDARIES
7 | X + \ SJ Fh^c4 r > j , < 1 ALr t r -*- ~~~~~~~~~~~INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
\ Pulo g , {Wv ,j PE - - Se;|\.ccl ;~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ r rh\.5,nOO wo5 D>O ltbyllreMoohoonD5eTisopngsprdoed y donMayDeign nitofnTeowrldhonk
\ ) 2 ' ' \. \.&rk $i rX rrxrefcarA , rno'orrehenlolocceplonceof5uchbrundonr5~~~~~~~h\.boudaies coor, dmmi\.f\.nson a\.th, nf-io
\/ 7 " ; s tDIrl ; u~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~N LATAA RUSSIAN
\~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ -0 S Nn It BONA A N D D\./W,~-I !-_
\ '' - ~~ O\.zSa\. ' _> L H E R Z E G O V I N A , ,Z\. 'ALi-N ,
\ , ^ | \ > ; | r 5 l r ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~BEtARUS q
\ / t - t ori,1 \.' q ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~POLAND
C;\. - ~~~~-lo S-ber- - | , GERMAANY * ^ _, ,}
s \ j; -, - 53|1 , \ -r t B *$~~~~ ~~~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~LUX 'b UKRAINE
, r--\. \.- - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~ \ , ~~~~~~~z \. r_ gP \
0 25 50 75 100 \ \ Ob2 - R I | 3-; I E * 4\ _~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
CtlOFFS/x9'-eji,,j, E:i_ i~-~_ | APPROVAL |
P117836 | Page 1
INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS DATASHEET
APPRAISAL STAGE
I\. Basic Information
Date prepared/updated: 01/26/2010
Report No\.: AC4860
1\. Basic Project Data
Original Project ID: P056018
Original Project Name: LAND
ADMINISTRATION
Country: Nicaragua
Project ID: P117836
Project Name: Land Administration Project (PRODEP) Additional Financing
Task Team Leader: Enrique Pantoja
Estimated Appraisal Date: December 4,
2009
Estimated Board Date: February 9, 2010
Managing Unit: LCSAR
Lending Instrument: Specific Investment
Loan
Sector: General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector (50%);Sub-national government
administration (30%);Central government administration (20%)
Theme: Land administration and management (50%);Personal and property rights
(25%);Decentralization (15%);Municipal governance and institution building (10%)
IBRD Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
IDA Amount (US$m\.):
10\.00
GEF Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
PCF Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
Other financing amounts by source:
BORROWER/RECIPIENT
0\.00
0\.00
Environmental Category: B - Partial Assessment
Simplified Processing
Simple []
Repeater []
Is this project processed under OP 8\.50 (Emergency Recovery)
or OP 8\.00 (Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies)
Yes [ ]
No [X]
2\. Project Objectives
Project Development Objectives (PDOs), as per the original Development Credit
Agreement, are (a) to develop the legal, institutional, technical and participatory
framework for the administration of property rights in the Borrowers territory; and (b) to
demonstrate the feasibility of a systematic land rights regularization program\.
3\. Project Description
The proposed Additional Financing (AF) would help scale-up activities, particularly
cadastral and regularization activities in the Pacific region, to enhance Project impact\. It
will be implemented over a three-year period, starting on April 30, 2010 (current Credit
closing date) until April 30, 2013\.
The original Project (PRODEP) includes six components: (a) Policy and Legal Reforms;
(b) Institutional Strengthening and Decentralization; (c) Titling and regularization
services; (d) Demarcation and Consolidation of Protected Areas; (e) Demarcation of
Page 2
Indigenous Lands; and (f) Information Systems\. Activities under the original projects
components (a) Policy and Legal Reforms and (e) Demarcation of Indigenous Lands will
not receive funding under the AF\. These two components are being implemented
satisfactorily, have been allocated sufficient resources, and will be completed under the
original Credit\.
The AF would therefore finance activities under the other four original project
components, as follows:
Component (b) would continue the decentralization and strengthening of the Republic
of Nicaraguas agencies in charge of administration of property rights, strengthening of
implementation capacity of co-executing agencies and Technical Operational Units
(UTOs), municipal capacity development, and project management support\.
Component (c) would include provision of technical and legal support for scaling up
systematic regularization services in selected municipalities, processing of land claims
(including titling of the beneficiaries of the Republic of Nicaraguas agrarian land reform,
ex-combatants and marginal urban and peri-urban settlers) and expropriation-based
indemnification claims, and alternative conflict resolution activities\.
Component (d) Demarcation and Consolidation of Protected Areas would support
demarcation of two protected areas (Complejo Volcánico Telica-Rota and Tepesmoto
Pataste) and the carrying out of a social and environmental educational campaign\.
Component (f) Information Systems would include the implementation of SIICAR in
Chinandega, Estelí, Madriz and León and the development and implementation of the
property information system (SIIPRO), as well as the implementation of the system to
monitor the financial and administrative management and execution of the project
(SIAFI), the Monitoring and Impact Evaluation System (SMEI) and participatory
evaluations of the Project\.
4\. Project Location and salient physical characteristics relevant to the safeguard
analysis
The AF will cover the original municipalities in the pilot departments of Chinandega,
Estelí and Madriz, as well as additional municipalities in Madriz and in León\.
Specifically, the AF would include:
New municipalities, benefitting from cadastral surveying and regularization activities\.
Five of these are in León, namely Nagarote, La Paz Centro, Télica, Larreynaga y
Quezalguaque\.; and three in Madriz: San José de Cusmapa, Las Sabanas, y Telpaneca,
The AF will also scale-up regularization activities in the original Project municipalities
in Chinandega, Estelí and Madriz which cover both rural areas and urban centers\.
a\.
In Chinandega, these activities will take place in Chinandega, Posoltega,
Chichigalpa, Corinto, El Realejo, El Viejo, Puerto Morazán, Villa Nueva, Somotillo,
Cinco Pinos, Santo Tomás, San Pedro y San Francisco del Norte\.
b\.
In Estelí, in La Trinidad, Estelí, Condega, Limay, Pueblo Nuevo and San Nicolás\.
c\.
In Madriz, in Somoto, Yalaguina, San Juan de Río Coco, Totogalpa, Palacaguina
and San Lucas\.
Page 3
The Project also includes physical demarcation of two protected areas, namely,
Complejo Volcánico Telica Rota Protected Area (in Leon) and the Tepesomoto Pataste
Protected Area (between Estelí and Madriz)\.
The Project area may include any other municipalities which may be agreed upon in the
future between the Borrower and the Bank and reflected in the OM in addition to, or in
substitution of, the municipalities mentioned above\. The Project Coordination Units
environmental and social unit (ESU) and Safeguard instruments will ensure the
comprehensive and timely implementation of safeguards at such sites\.
5\. Environmental and Social Safeguards Specialists
Ms Mary Lisbeth Gonzalez (LCSSO)
Mr Juan Pablo Ruiz (LCSEN)
Ms Nicole Andrea Maywah (ECSSD)
Ms Sarah Drew (LCSDE)
6\. Safeguard Policies Triggered
Yes No
Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4\.01)
X
Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4\.04)
X
Forests (OP/BP 4\.36)
X
Pest Management (OP 4\.09)
X
Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4\.11)
X
Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4\.10)
X
Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4\.12)
X
Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4\.37)
X
Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP
7\.50)
X
Projects in Disputed Areas (OP/BP 7\.60)
X
II\. Key Safeguard Policy Issues and Their Management
A\. Summary of Key Safeguard Issues
1\. Describe any safeguard issues and impacts associated with the proposed project\.
Identify and describe any potential large scale, significant and/or irreversible impacts:
All of the direct and indirect environmental impacts originally detected as part of the
Environmental Assessment (EA) carried out in 2001, prior to the approval of the original
project, are still relevant\. The Nicaraguan Ministry of the Environment and Natural
Resources (MARENA), the co-executing agency in charge of the Protected Areas
Component, conducted a study (based on qualitative, semi-quantitative and expert inputs,
including geographic information systems) on the impacts of PRODEP\. This study did
not find any large-scale, significant negative or irreversible environmental impacts\. A
consultant has also evaluated the Projects environmental performance qualitatively
through interviews, consultations and desk reviews and has independently arrived at the
same conclusion\.
The Project has exceeded its original goals under Component D, and achieved the
following results:
Page 4
(a)
A National Land Policy Framework, including land management in PAs, was
successfully drafted\.
(b)
Twelve (12) PAs were demarcated, exceeding the original target of 11, and
additionally, certain areas of ecological importance were also identified\. Demarcation in
one of the original PAs, Tepesomoto-Pataste, was postponed, but two other PAs, the
Cañón de Somoto National Monument and the Memorial Park for Hurricane Mitch
Victims, were demarcated in its place\.
(c)
Ten (10) Management Plans for PAs were formulated, exceeding the original
target of 7\.
(d)
Activities from 3 management plans were implemented, which is one more than
originally planned\.
Since similar activities (although some in a new location) are proposed for the
Additional Financing (AF), it is unlikely that there will be any large-scale, significant or
irreversible impacts from these activities either\. It is noted that the AF will not finance
regularization activities within the PAs or implementation of their management plans\.
This Project has the potential to impact land and its usage on a large scale\. A possible
direct adverse impact previously identified, but not supported by observation in the
current PRODEP, includes the possibility that Protected Area (PA) limits would not be
respected if land regularization activities were programmed to take place prior to
demarcation activities in those areas, or that lands having, or suspected to have, culturally
valuable resources would be titled to private owners before the appropriate government
agencies had a chance to get involved in the identification and protection of such
resources\.
Most of the potential impacts are indirect and long-term and will be discussed below in
section 2\.
Given the above possible impacts, the following safeguard policies are triggered:
a)
Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4\.01) is triggered because this Project has the
potential to impact land and its usage as discussed above\.
b)
Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4\.04) is triggered because the protected areas to be
demarcated under the Additional Finance activities are generally natural habitats although
they are already inhabited\.
c)
Forests (OP/BP 4\.36) is triggered because the protected areas to be demarcated
under the Additional Finance activities are generally forested\.
d)
Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4\.11) is triggered given the possibility of
chance finds during the cadastral survey; and also that one of the direct potential adverse
impacts would be that lands having, or suspected to have, culturally valuable resources
would be titled to private owners before the appropriate government agencies had a
chance to get involved in the identification and protection of such resources\.
e)
Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4\.10) is triggered because of the presence of
indigenous groups in the Project area\.
f)
Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4\.12) is triggered because although the Project
will not result in involuntary physical displacement or relocation of people, the
demarcation of PA boundaries could materially affect the current livelihoods of
Nicaraguans within or near these zones\.
Page 5
------------------------------------
Footnote:
1\.
The draft Land Policy Framework must be submitted to the President of Nicaragua
for final approval before promulgation\.
2\.
Management plans were established for the following areas: Compl
ejo Volcánico
Cosigüina Ap, the Apacunca Genetic Resources Reserve, the Delta del Estero Real PA,
the San Cristóbal-Casita Volcano PA, the National Monument to the Victims of
Hurricane Mitch, the Quiabuc-Las Brisas PA, the Tomabú PA and the Cañón de Somoto
National Monument\.
2\. Describe any potential indirect and/or long term impacts due to anticipated future
activities in the project area:
Although not observed during the current implementation of PRODEP, potential indirect
adverse impacts reflecting a longer-term time horizon and experiences from land
regularization programs throughout Latin America could include (among others):
1)
It is possible that the landholders may accelerate land clearing activity in advance
of the arrival of the project field teams who measure, map, and register a land parcel, in
order to demonstrate the largest possible area under productive use\. It is noted, however,
that the Project area is mostly developed with possession and other rights already
established\. The Project will disseminate information to landholders and others that could
possibly accelerate land clearing activity before the cadastral surveying to discourage this
behavior as part of the Environmental Communication and Education campaign\.
2)
Upon receiving secure land titles, many landowners would enjoy increased access
to capital, resulting from improved access to credit\. This means that some might opt to
use part of their increased access to capital to clear the remaining forests on their property
to expand their area of pasture or cropland\. The Project does not include any specific
credit component\. The probability of this potential indirect impact occurring is very low,
unobserved in the current Project and will depend on peoples access to credit and their
future decisions in the long-term\. Again, the Project will disseminate information to
landholders and others that could possibly accelerate land clearing activity before the
cadastral surveying to discourage this behavior as part of the Environmental
Communication and Education campaign\.
3)
There may be increased migration to forest frontier areas\. Some rural landowners
might be inclined to sell their titled land and use the proceeds to migrate and clear more
land at the forest frontier; however, this concern is not very likely to occur as it goes
against recently observed migration trends\.
4)
A
direct adverse impact identified in other countries includes the possibility that
protected area limits would not be respected if land regularization activities were
programmed to take place prior to demarcation activities\.
5)
Lands having, or suspected to have, culturally valuable resources would be titled
to private owners before the appropriate government agencies had a chance to get
involved in the identification and protection of such resources\.
Page 6
The AF Environmental Management Plan (EMP) incorporates the lessons learned from
the review of the current Projects environmental performance so that any changes that are
deemed advisable can be taken on board by the relevant project coordination staff\.
3\. Describe any project alternatives (if relevant) considered to help avoid or minimize
adverse impacts\.
This consideration is not relevant to this Category B project\. However, the Protected
Areas Demarcation and Consolidation Component was formulated to ensure that the
demarcation of other land would not negatively impact PAs\. The AF EMP will
implement various lessons learned from the original project including those that promote
protection of Natural Habitats and Forests\.
Selected lessons learned during project implementation include: (i) the need to convey
more information to PA residents, agricultural producers and other stakeholders, (ii) the
need for environmental oversight of all components of the Project (not just the Protected
Areas), (iii) the need to monitor environmentally related impacts of the Project, (iv) the
need to ensure that the cadastral surveying and other Project activities consider the
ecological sensitivity (i\.e\. possible geo-hazards, or conservation value) of the area, and
(v) the importance of including a communication strategy and the involvement of local
authorities in the decision making process\.
4\. Describe measures taken by the borrower to address safeguard policy issues\. Provide
an assessment of borrower capacity to plan and implement the measures described\.
Environmental Safeguards:
The original Projects safeguards instruments were prepared about eight years ago, and
the AF includes a new department and two new Protected Areas\. Therefore new
environmental safeguards instruments (Environmental Analysis [EA] and Environmental
Management Plan [EMP]) were developed in order to address changes in the applicable
safeguards policies\. While the original EA was sufficient when the Project was first
approved, the AF Phase EA is more comprehensive and in-depth\. The previous EMP was
mainstreamed throughout the Project components and was not stand-alone\. Therefore the
AF Phase has developed a specific EMP contained in the EA and will establish an
Environmental and Social Unit (ESU) to follow-up on the Plan and its implementation\.
The EA and EMP have been prepared for the Additional Financing activities in order to
prevent, mitigate, and manage all potentially adverse impacts\. The EMP incorporates the
lessons learned from the implementation of the environmental management actions from
the original Project, so that any changes that are deemed advisable can be implemented
by the project coordination staff\. Additionally, under the AF an ESU will be established
under the SE-PRODEP (PCU) to help implement the EMP and coordinate environmental
and socially related activities for the entire Project including, but not limited to, the
Protected Areas Component\.
Social Safeguards:
A
new social assessment was finalized in October 2009 with the objective of identifying
challenges and risks associated with cadastral and regularization activities in the Pacific
region, and particularly in the AF area\. Beneficiaries and stakeholders were consulted to
Page 7
obtain their feedback regarding land tenure issues and best ways to carry out cadastral
surveying activities to ensure beneficiaries satisfaction with these activities and help
resolve land conflicts\. Consultations were carried out in both urban and rural areas,
including both genders,the mestizo population and indigenous peoples\. The social
assessment sets out the following: (i) legal and institutional framework applicable to
Indigenous Peoples; (ii) baseline information on the demographic, social, gender,
cultural, and political characteristics of the affected population, including indigenous
communities; (iii) local forms of social organization by gender, ethnic group and urban
and rural areas; (iv) land tenure assessment to determine the existence of communal lands
or other non-private forms of land possession; (v) process for consulting with the affected
indigenous and non-indigenous population of both genders; and (vi) measures to
minimize and mitigate any adverse effects on affected population, with particular
emphasis on indigenous communities and women\.
On the basis of the social assessment, an IPP was prepared for the AF phase of the
project in order to appropriately manage any impact, positive or adverse, which may
affect indigenous peoples\. The IPP ensures that free, prior, and informed consultation
takes place with indigenous communities, and that any identified potential adverse
impacts will be avoided, minimized, mitigated or compensated\. Both SA and IPP
highlighted the potential risk posed by the lack of a clear legal framework to handle
indigenous peoples in the Pacific Region, where the AF area is located\. As result, the IPP
includes a specific Action Plan to address any event that might emerge related to the
current legal and institutional framework to address indigenous peoples land tenure issues
under the AF\.
Although there will be no resettlement under the AF, Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP
4\.12) is triggered given the possibility that demarcation and better enforcement of the
boundaries of the two selected protected areas may potentially lead to restrictions of
access to natural resources\. Accordingly, a Resettlement Process Framework (RPF) has
been prepared outlining the participatory process for the identification, monitoring and
mitigation of such potential restrictions\. It is noted that the likelihood of restriction of
access is minimal, considering the experience of demarcation of 12 protected areas under
the original project\. Both the IPP and RPF were submitted to the Bank for final review in
November 2009\.
Borrowers Capacity:
The Procuraduría General de la República (the Nicaragua General Attorneys Office or
PGR) will continue to be the Projects implementing agency under the AF\. In the original
Project, MARENA managed the environmental safeguards for the Protected Areas
Component and the PCU staff oversaw the environmental management for the other
components\. Social aspects were managed by the Property Intendancy and the Secretariat
for Caribbean Coast Development (SDC)\. Going forward, the Project Coordination Unit
(the Secretaría Ejecutiva of PRODEP) will include an Environmental and Social
Management Unit (ESU)\. This unit, including a Social-Environmental Coordinator and a
Communication Specialist, will oversee safeguards implementation for the entire project
(not just the Protected Areas Component) through the use of checklists and other
mechanisms\. To achieve this, the ESU, under the direct purview of the Project
Page 8
Coordinator, will coordinate within the current project implementation structure,
including the technical-operational units (UTOs)\. Working with the UTOs is critical since
as part of the Departmental delegations of INETER and IP, they lead Project
implementation at the department level, helping to coordinate and administer the
relationships between regional offices of participating institutions, field work, and
cadastral surveying quality control for cadastral and regularization activities\. In this
context, ESU will work with UTOs to ensure that project activities are conducted in a
manner that ensures PA integrity and overall environmental sustainability of the Project,
including providing UTOs with information on safeguards as necessary\. The ESU will
also help implement and monitor environmental and socially relevant aspects of the
Project including the communication and education subcomponent and environmental
indicators\.
As part of the Secretaría Ejecutiva-PRODEP (PCU), ESU will have sufficient decision-
making capacity to ensure that safeguards and national regulations will be implemented
in all components of the Project\. To ensure ESUs effectiveness, it will be an integral part
of the overall leadership of the project, directly under the Project Coordinator\. Once
established, ESUs staff, who will be consultants financed under the project, will be
trained in World Bank safeguards\. In turn, ESU will train other relevant Project staff to
carry out their responsibilities according to the EMP, IPP and RPF\. The ESU will be in
place during the implementation period of the project\.
Site-specific EMP measures will be developed and determined by the ESU\. The ESU, in
coordination with other Project staff, will help implement the EMP and any site-specific
measures\. The ESU will also supervise these activities\. The Project budget includes funds
for managing safeguards aspects of the Project\. The Project Coordinator, with the advice
of the ESU and guidance from the CIP (the Projects Inter-Institutional Committee) and its
CTO (ad hoc Technical Committee), will make the final decision on what is appropriate
or acceptable for the Project\. MARENA, as an implementing agency, will abide by the
decisions of the ESU as will all the other implementing agencies\. That being said,
MARENA will be an important source of information, guidance and resources (maps,
databases, etc\.) to the ESU given their experience on the Project and their role as the
ministry responsible for environment\.
MARENA is the Nicaraguan governmental entity with the legal mandate to develop and
manage national environmental policy and, in coordination with sector ministries, to
promote the sustainable use of natural resources\. It has been and will continue to
implement the Protected Areas component of the Project\. It has sufficient personnel with
the appropriate expertise for this task as evidenced by its already proven success on the
Project\. Its capacity to implement the Protected Areas Component AF activities is
evidenced by its success in implementing the original Project activities exceeding even its
original targets\. The Intendancy of Property (IP) has a senior level official in charge of
indigenous land tenure issues, which has so far effectively followed-up on project
implementation\.
Project beneficiaries have opportunities to express their concerns on the cadastral
surveying activities during the public display of results (vistas públicas) and through the
Page 9
Intendancy of Property, the co-executing agency working in tandem with PGR in
regularization activities\. Moreover, Project beneficiaries have access to PGRs already
established grievance mechanism\.
---------------------
Footnote:
3\.
The checklists will help to identify the site specific issues (including safeguards) for
Project activities in each location\. The specific other mechanisms are to be determined
once the ESU is set up but will include, inter alia, coordination arrangements, reporting
guidelines and the like to ensure that Project Activities are carried out in accordance with
the EMP, IPP and RPF as necessary\.
5\. Identify the key stakeholders and describe the mechanisms for consultation and
disclosure on safeguard policies, with an emphasis on potentially affected people\.
Key stakeholders for the project include (among others): inhabitants in the Project areas
(including landowners, land occupants, others), inhabitants or users (agricultural
producers and others) of the Protected Areas to be demarcated under the Project,
indigenous communities and local governments\. The process of consultation,
participation, and collection of baseline information for the preparation of the safeguard
instruments was achieved through focal groups, semi-structured interviews with the
technical specialists, indigenous leaders, nongovernmental organizations, and provincial
government representatives from Madriz, Chinandega, and Sutiaba\. Inputs from
consultations indicated the need for more communication with Project beneficiaries,
which directly led to the creation of a dedicated Social and Environmental
Communications Campaign for this purpose under the Protected Areas Component\. This
is one example of how consultation feedback was incorporated in the safeguards
instruments\. The Safeguard instruments have been made available to project stakeholders
in Spanish on PGRs website and hard copies are available in the Projects Managua office
and in departmental delegations in the project area\. Additionally, the EA/EMP, IPP, RPF
have been disclosed in InfoShop under the AF phase of the project\.
B\. Disclosure Requirements Date
Environmental Assessment/Audit/Management Plan/Other:
Was the document disclosed
prior to appraisal?
Yes
Date of receipt by the Bank
11/27/2009
Date of "in-country" disclosure
12/01/2009
Date of submission to InfoShop
12/01/2009
For category A projects, date of distributing the Executive
Summary of the EA to the Executive Directors
Resettlement Action Plan/Framework/Policy Process:
Was the document disclosed
prior to appraisal?
Yes
Date of receipt by the Bank
11/27/2009
Date of "in-country" disclosure
12/01/2009
Date of submission to InfoShop
12/01/2009
Indigenous Peoples Plan/Planning Framework:
Page 10
Was the document disclosed
prior to appraisal?
Yes
Date of receipt by the Bank
11/21/2009
Date of "in-country" disclosure
12/01/2009
Date of submission to InfoShop
12/01/2009
Pest Management Plan:
Was the document disclosed
prior to appraisal?
Date of receipt by the Bank
Date of "in-country" disclosure
Date of submission to InfoShop
*
If the project triggers the Pest Management and/or Physical Cultural Resources,
the respective issues are to be addressed and disclosed as part of the Environmental
Assessment/Audit/or EMP\.
If in-country disclosure of any of the above documents is not expected, please
explain why:
C\. Compliance Monitoring Indicators at the Corporate Level (to be filled in when the
ISDS is finalized by the project decision meeting)
OP/BP/GP 4\.01 - Environment Assessment
Does the project require a stand-alone EA (including EMP) report?
Yes
If yes, then did the Regional Environment Unit or Sector Manager (SM)
review and approve the EA report?
Yes
Are the cost and the accountabilities for the EMP incorporated in the
credit/loan?
Yes
OP/BP 4\.04 - Natural Habitats
Would the project result in any significant conversion or degradation of
critical natural habitats?
No
If the project would result in significant conversion or degradation of other
(non-critical) natural habitats, does the project include mitigation measures
acceptable to the Bank?
N/A
OP/BP 4\.11 - Physical Cultural Resources
Does the EA include adequate measures related to cultural property?
Yes
Does the credit/loan incorporate mechanisms to mitigate the potential
adverse impacts on cultural property?
Yes
OP/BP 4\.10 - Indigenous Peoples
Has a separate Indigenous Peoples Plan/Planning Framework (as
appropriate) been prepared in consultation with affected Indigenous Peoples?
Yes
If yes, then did the Regional unit responsible for safeguards or Sector
Manager review the plan?
Yes
If the whole project is designed to benefit IP, has the design been reviewed
and approved by the Regional Social Development Unit or Sector Manager?
N/A
OP/BP 4\.12 - Involuntary Resettlement
Has a resettlement plan/abbreviated plan/policy framework/process
framework (as appropriate) been prepared?
Yes
Page 11
If yes, then did the Regional unit responsible for safeguards or Sector
Manager review the plan?
Yes
OP/BP 4\.36 - Forests
Has the sector-wide analysis of policy and institutional issues and constraints
been carried out?
N/A
Does the project design include satisfactory measures to overcome these
constraints?
N/A
Does the project finance commercial harvesting, and if so, does it include
provisions for certification system?
No
The World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information
Have relevant safeguard policies documents been sent to the World Bank's
Infoshop?
Yes
Have relevant documents been disclosed in-country in a public place in a
form and language that are understandable and accessible to project-affected
groups and local NGOs?
Yes
All Safeguard Policies
Have satisfactory calendar, budget and clear institutional responsibilities
been prepared for the implementation of measures related to safeguard
policies?
Yes
Have costs related to safeguard policy measures been included in the project
cost?
Yes
Does the Monitoring and Evaluation system of the project include the
monitoring of safeguard impacts and measures related to safeguard policies?
Yes
Have satisfactory implementation arrangements been agreed with the
borrower and the same been adequately reflected in the project legal
documents?
Yes
D\. Approvals
Signed and submitted by:
Name
Date
Task Team Leader:
Mr Enrique Pantoja
01/22/2010
Environmental Specialist:
Mr Juan Pablo Ruiz
01/22/2010
Social Development Specialist
Ms Mary Lisbeth Gonzalez
01/21/2010
Additional Environmental and/or
Social Development Specialist(s):
Ms Nicole Andrea Maywah
01/22/2010
Approved by:
Regional Safeguards Coordinator:
Ms Ethel Sennhauser
01/22/2010
Comments:
Sector Manager:
Comments: | APPROVAL |
P168999 |  The World Bank
West Bengal Accelerated Agriculture Transformation Project (P168999)
Project Information Document/
Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet (PID/ISDS)
Concept Stage | Date Prepared/Updated: 28-Sep-2018 | Report No: PIDISDSC25618
Oct 12, 2018 Page 1 of 17
The World Bank
West Bengal Accelerated Agriculture Transformation Project (P168999)
BASIC INFORMATION
A\. Basic Project Data OPS TABLE
Country Project ID Parent Project ID (if any) Project Name
India P168999 West Bengal
Accelerated Agriculture
Transformation Project
(P168999)
Region Estimated Appraisal Date Estimated Board Date Practice Area (Lead)
SOUTH ASIA Sep 23, 2019 Dec 12, 2019 Agriculture
Financing Instrument Borrower(s) Implementing Agency
Investment Project Financing Ministry of Finance Department of Agriculture
Proposed Development Objective(s)
To enhance the competitiveness of key agri-value-chains for increased value-added and market access; benefiting
producers and agri-entrepreneurs in West Bengal\.
PROJECT FINANCING DATA (US$, Millions)
SUMMARY-NewFin1
Total Project Cost 430\.00
Total Financing 430\.00
of which IBRD/IDA 300\.00
Financing Gap 0\.00
DETAILS -NewFinEnh1
World Bank Group Financing
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 300\.00
Non-World Bank Group Financing
Counterpart Funding 130\.00
Borrower 130\.00
Oct 12, 2018 Page 2 of 17
The World Bank
West Bengal Accelerated Agriculture Transformation Project (P168999)
Environmental Assessment Category Concept Review Decision
B - Partial Assessment Track II-The review did authorize the preparation to
continue
B\. Introduction and Context
Country Context
1\. India is one of the worldâs fastest-growing economies and well poised for a transition to a higher and more
widely shared level of prosperity by 2047âthe centenary of independence\. Already the third largest economy in the
world in purchasing power parity terms, India is expected to grow at over 7 percent per annum1, with aspirations for a
possible 8 percent growth per annum in the coming years\. To achieve its growth aspirations, India needs to overcome
certain persistent constraints\. First, growth will need to be sustained, but in a more resource efficient manner, given the
countryâs low per capita natural resource endowment and the impacts of climate change\. Second, growth will need to be
inclusive to maximize utilization of the countryâs human resources and address inequality\. Third, the country will need to
strengthen the effectiveness of the public sector especially in delivering services and enabling the private sector to thrive
and drive economic growth\.
2\. Agriculture, a vital sector in Indiaâs economy, needs higher growth2, efficiency and resilience\. Contributing about
16 percent to GDP, the agrarian footprint is visible in every corner of the country\. Most of the countryâs water (90 percent)
is used for irrigation, much of the land (61 percent) is used by the sector, and a large section of people (49 percent) work
in the sector\. Still, agricultureâs share in output has fallen steadily, while its consumption of inputs (including water
withdrawals) has steadily increased and its share in employment has declined only modestly\. In addition, the current agri-
food supply chain is not sufficiently developed to take advantage of the changing consumption patterns of a growing
middle-class in search of a diverse and nutrient-rich foods\. Rightly recognizing this paradigm, the Government of Indiaâs
(GoI) development agenda3 for agriculture focuses on seven goals: growth; stability; efficiency; food and nutrition security;
food safety; sustainability; and increasing farmers income\. GoI further emphasizes4 higher attention to the eastern region5
of the country which is well-endowed with natural resources (fertile soil and ample water) and contributes about 40
percent of the overall production of food grains in India\. West Bengal, with its large production base, robust infrastructure
and strategic location in this region will be the key anchor to drive this national goal and to unlock regional growth and
prosperity\.
3\. A fundamental shift is required towards a market-driven, higher value-added and resilient agriculture for
enhanced producer income and better jobs\. Currently, the sector is only sluggishly and sporadically responding to the
emerging demands of a wealthier urban consumer base for high-value and nutrient-rich foods\. For this to happen, the
farmers and agri-entrepreneurs need access to information and decision tools to select crops and manage them better to
meet the changing consumption patterns of the middle class and tap into global market opportunities\. Moving producers
to a higher value-added and resilient agriculture (including better post-harvest management and food safety systems) will
1
The registered growth is driven primarily by robust private consumption, a resilient services sector, and a revival in some industrial activities\.
2 Refer pp85 of the Economic Survey 2017-18\. http://mofapp\.nic\.in:8080/economicsurvey/pdf/082-101_Chapter_06_ENGLISH_Vol_01_2017-18\.pdf
3 http://www\.niti\.gov\.in/writereaddata/files/document_publication/Annual-Report-English\.pdf
4 http://niti\.gov\.in/writereaddata/files/document_publication/RAP3\.pdf
5
Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, eastern Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal
Oct 12, 2018 Page 3 of 17
The World Bank
West Bengal Accelerated Agriculture Transformation Project (P168999)
require the government to shift from being a direct market participant to becoming a catalyst and enabler for free markets
operating under an agribusiness paradigm\. Global experience suggests that an increasing agribusiness-to-agriculture ratio
has been an important driver of poverty reduction and generating better jobs, as illustrated by the experiences of
Urbanized countries\. India can expect similar benefits by transitioning to agribusiness\.
C\. Sectoral and Institutional Context
4\. West Bengal enjoys sufficient comparative advantages to tap into agribusiness development opportunities\.
Ranked sixth among Indian States in terms of state gross domestic product, West Bengal contributes more than 8 percent
to the national food basket with only 3 per cent of the cultivable land resources in the country\. The State is endowed richly
with fertile land, diverse climate, water resources, strategic location and human capital\. Enabled by its high cropping
intensity (186 percent which is third after Punjab and Tripura), the State leads in the production of rice and jute and is a
leading producer of vegetables, fruits, floriculture, ornamental plants, meat and fish\. Substantial marketable volumes of
several commodities â vegetables, potato, rice, pineapple, flowers, and meat - once steered well towards profitable
domestic and international markets, can significantly boost sectoral growth and producersâ incomes and the overall
economy of the State\.
5\. West Bengal is uniquely placed to reap benefits of the national and international trade-corridors and to
stimulate regional growth\. West Bengal stands to benefit from Indiaâs strategic plans to expand connectivity to the North
Eastern States and further to ASEAN countries, backed by its âLook Eastâ policy\. The State serves as a gateway to countries
which are part of the regional initiatives (including the BCIM6 corridor, the BIMSTEC7, the Asian Trilateral Highway and
the BBIN-MVA8) for trade and economic development\. Further, the strong logistic linkages with Bangladesh leveraging
multiple routes (sea, inland rivers and road) offer additional trade opportunities\. The State benefits from the Eastern
Dedicated Freight Corridor (EDFC), on which Kolkata is the last destination with two sea ports\. This edge in regional
connectivity lends West Bengal comparative advantage in developing agri value chains and accessing profitable markets
for income growth of producers\.
6\. West Bengal will have to create a conducive environment for market-oriented production and harnessing its
agribusiness potential\. The State has undertaken several initiatives recently to improve market access (through
establishment of farmers markets and improving market infrastructure), facilitate forward and backward linkages and
implement market reforms9 towards efficient functioning of supply chains\. To improve delivery of extension services and
outreach, the State has promoted an ICT enabled agri-extension service viz\. âMatir Kathaâ?10\. However, unorganized
producers, fragmented supply chains, lack of sufficient market orientation, lack of advisory and infrastructure support to
ensure consistent quality and standards undermine the efforts for linking producers with profitable markets\. Further, the
low penetration of institutional credit11 to producers (about 32 percent producers with credit access) in the State restricts
adoption of modern technology and inputs\. Inability of the local producers to tap into attractive economic opportunities
can be attributed to market failures such as inadequate information (specifically market intelligence) and public goods
6 Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Corridor links âKolkataâ, the capital of West Bengal, with âKunmingâ, the capital of Chinaâs Yunnan province, passing
through Myanmar and Bangladesh, with Mandalay and Dhaka among the focal points
7 Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) is a regional group of countries in South Asia and South Asia that depend
on the Bay of Bengal
8 Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal Motor Vehicle Agreement (BBIN-MVA) signed in 2015, an umbrella agreement prepared along the European Union pattern,
focuses on increasing transport options and ultimately boosting the regional economy\.
9 Such as the amendment of Agricultural Produce Marketing Regulation Act, 1972 (with provision of contract farming, producersâ markets and direc t marketing etc\.)
in 2015\.
11Even with a penetration of a good number of MFIs and small banks like Bandhan Bank, in West Bengal has only 34\.95 lakh of operative Kissan Credit Card accounts
and bank credit to the tune INR 4883 crore (2016-17)\.
Oct 12, 2018 Page 4 of 17
The World Bank
West Bengal Accelerated Agriculture Transformation Project (P168999)
(supply-driven public extension services)\. These market failures adversely impact the value chain enhancement efforts
particularly for value addition and market access, thereby limiting the growth prospects of agribusiness in the State\.
C\. Relationship to CPF
7\. The proposed project is fully aligned with the World Bank India Country Partnership Strategy (CPF: FY18-FY22)\. It
contributes to the two main objectives of the CPF: (i) Promote more resource-efficient, inclusive, and diversified growth
in the rural sector (objective 1\.1) and (ii) Enhance competitiveness and creating jobs (objectives 2\.1 and 2\.4)\. The Project
will promote resource efficient growth through value chain development that includes market-oriented production,
increased reach to profitable markets, value-addition and reduced wastage\. The Project will enhance agribusiness
competitiveness by strengthening business ecosystems; promoting service providers for value addition, marketing; and
making producers âmarket readyâ\.
8\. The proposed project is well embedded in the Government of India and West Bengalâs key strategic priorities for
agriculture development including: (i) Doubling farmerâs income; (ii) Bringing green revolution to eastern India; (iii)
National Agriculture Export policy (draft); and (iv) e-National Agriculture Market, Integrated Scheme for Agriculture
Marketing, and National e-Governance Plan schemes for strengthen market infrastructure and information\.
9\. The proposed project is also well positioned to contribute to Indiaâs National Action Plan on Climate Change and
the State Action Plan on Climate Change12 \. Recognizing the latent and profound impacts of climate change on the
agriculture sector and food systems in West Bengal, the Project will aim to support strengthening producerâs capacity and
improve their resilience to economic shocks in general with greater attention to risks emanating from market integration
and climate change\. Further, the project will advance access to climate smart agriculture technologies and practices and
measures to manage such risks\. The objective of water use efficiency, including on-farm efficiency, will be largely met
through other projects (e\.g\. Major and Minor Irrigation Projects - with which this Project is well aligned)\. The rising
consumer demand for safer and sustainable agricultural produce (through adoption of Good Agricultural Practices13 and
other relevant standards emphasizing resource optimization and environmental conservation) will be leveraged to
promote eco-friendly farming practices and mitigate the climate change impacts\. The market failure in demonstrating the
economic benefits of lower residue produce and adherence to SPS measures will be addressed through capacity
development and handholding of producers to enable them to experience these benefits firsthand\.
PROPOSED PDO/RESULTS
D\. Proposed Development Objective(s)
10\. The PDO is to enhance the competitiveness of key agri-value-chains for increased value-added and market access;
benefiting producers and agri-entrepreneurs in West Bengal\.
Key Results
11\. The following Key Performance Indicators (KPI) are proposed for measuring the core outcomes of the project:
a) KPI 1 - Farmers reached with agricultural assets or services with gender segregation (number)
b) KPI 2 - Value addition: Share of agricultural produce that is processed into high value products (percent)
12http://www\.moef\.nic\.in/downloads/public-information/West-Bengal-SAPCC\.pdf
13Widespread adoption of Good Agriculture Practices (GAP) amongst small grape growers in Maharashtra boosted their competitiveness in international market
besides reducing environmental impact\.
Oct 12, 2018 Page 5 of 17
The World Bank
West Bengal Accelerated Agriculture Transformation Project (P168999)
c) KPI 3 - Competitiveness: Incremental sales of targeted commodities in domestic and export markets (percent)
d) KPI 4 - Market access: Number of buyers and volume contracted (number)
In addition, the following indicator regarding citizensâ engagement in the Project will be measured:
e) Degree of satisfaction of project beneficiaries with the quality of services provided by the Project (gender
segregated), as a partial measure of citizensâ engagement\.
E\. Concept Description
1\. Description
13\. The proposed Project will be structured as an Investment Project Financing (IPF) over a six-year period funded by
an IBRD loan\. It will focus primarily on the value addition and marketing of primary produce in prioritized agriculture and
allied sectors namely horticulture (fruits, vegetables, spices, flowers), livestock (meat, eggs and dairy) and aquaculture
(high value species), for which the State has sufficient comparative or competitive advantage\.
14\. The following key binding constraints will be addressed in this Project to strengthen agribusiness development
opportunities in West Bengal and thereby contributing to expanding overall regional growth prospects\.
a) Unfavorable environment for agribusiness: Barring the native industrial groups and a few corporates, the
business climate of West Bengal is not viewed favorably by private sector companies and other business
entities (such as investors, multinationals, startups)\. Absence of enabling policy environment results in market
failures that are visible as inadequate investments in services and resources by market players towards
strengthening the agribusiness ecosystem in the State\.
b) Inadequate marketing support systems for farmers: Despite a diverse agro-climate, higher irrigation coverage,
strategic location and leadership position in production of several commodities, West Bengal has not been
able to tap growth opportunities for its farmers when compared to states like Maharashtra, Punjab and
Gujarat\. The state continues to be beset by inadequate focus on capacity development of farmers,
infrastructure for value addition, food safety, quality standards and logistics, systems for trade and market
intelligence, and diversification into profitable markets including export, which limit the economic potential
of agriculture sector in the state\.
c) Limited access to institutional finance for value chain actors: Low levels of market integration among
producers and agri-entrepreneurs in West Bengal, in addition to typical barriers such as lack of collateral and
professional support, limits access to institutional finance\. Reduced exposure of formal financial institutions
to enterprises and the large segment of producers leads to poor fit in products offered to these disadvantaged
segments of the value chain\.
The Government of West Bengal is keen to address the above binding constraints through improved systems, stronger
institutions, effective business processes and efficient delivery mechanisms\. The proposed agri-value chain development
strategy of the project is likely to attract private investment and unlock the agribusiness potential of the State\.
15\. The Project will seek to leverage the strategic and spatial integration of the ongoing and upcoming investments
of World Bank in West Bengal14, especially those in the irrigation and logistics domains to foster improved market access
14World Bank Accelerated Development of Minor Irrigation Project (ADMIP); World Bank Major Irrigation and Flood Management Project (MIFM); World Bank
Logistics Improvement Project (LIP);
Oct 12, 2018 Page 6 of 17
The World Bank
West Bengal Accelerated Agriculture Transformation Project (P168999)
and value addition\. The project will develop âagri-business hubsâ - a platform consolidation center for raw agricultural
produce such as fruit, vegetables, flowers, and other key commodities that would enable aggregation, storage, primary
and secondary processing, packaging, logistics and distribution\. Considering the strategic and spatial integration of Bank
supported irrigation projects in West Bengal and the connectivity of remote production areas with the agribusiness
hubs, suitable âagro-zonesâ (large areas with high concentration of targeted commodity), will be identified\. Within the
agro-zones, âclustersâ will be promoted for connecting producers to profitable markets under this Project (see Figure 1
below)\. The agro zones and clusters, will be prioritized in consultation with the market players and other value chain
stakeholders, for ensuring long-term viability of Project investments\.
Figure 1: Strategic and spatial integration of World Bank investments in West Bengal
16\. Maximizing finance for development: The Project will address key market failures by following a value chain
ecosystem development approach15, which will help to strengthen collaboration and coordination among the
stakeholders\. Inclusive public-private dialogue and multi-stakeholder governance structures will help in creating an
enabling business environment to ensure continuity and predictability of conducive policies for agribusiness development\.
The project will also improve incentives and reduce private sector transaction costs and risks by investing in aggregation
of producers, enhancement of agribusiness infrastructure (goods and works), strengthening food safety systems
(certifications and phytosanitary licensing) and capacity development of stakeholders particularly producers and agri-
entrepreneurs\. This will lead to crowding-in of private sector investments\.
15
https://worldbankgroup\.sharepoint\.com/sites/gsg/Agbiz/Documents/future%20of%20food%20paper%204-13-18%20web\.pdf
Oct 12, 2018 Page 7 of 17
The World Bank
West Bengal Accelerated Agriculture Transformation Project (P168999)
17\. The figure 2 below, illustrates the Project approach, and outlines the planned interventions for enhanced
competitiveness of key agri-value-chains through increased value-added and market access; benefiting producers and
agri-entrepreneurs in West Bengal\.
Figure 2: Intervention logic and results chain
18\. Based on the above approach, the Project is designed with three inter-related technical components: (i) Enabling
institutions and agri-business ecosystem; (ii) Support to producers for market integration; and (iii) Access to infrastructure,
finance and markets\. The fourth project component would focus on project coordination, management, monitoring and
evaluation, and knowledge sharing\.
Component A: Enabling institutions and agri-business ecosystem
19\. A1\. Promoting institutional structures for value chain governance: The objective of this subcomponent is to
promote an âagribusiness friendlyâ policy environment to improve private incentives and reduce transaction costs and
risks\. This will be achieved by developing institutional structures and mechanisms that favor cooperation and coordination
among value chain stakeholders and deepen the private-public dialogue\. The Project will support the following mix of
activities: (i) reviewing and adapting the current institutional framework to improve its effectiveness and efficiency; (ii)
facilitating increased consultations among the value chain stakeholders; for instance, through regular forums to discuss
the various constraints of the sector; review and update the sector strategy; develop a shared vision and a harmonized
approach to minimize potential conflict and devise mechanisms for coordinating private and public investments; and (iii)
strengthening the capacity of key organizations overseeing the sector (both public and private) to provide needed services
to their members and to advocate for a more enabling business environment\.
20\. A2\. Addressing market failures and service delivery gaps: This subcomponent seeks to develop a strong base of
human capital and entrepreneurial capacity for exploiting economic opportunities in the agribusiness sector viz\., value
Oct 12, 2018 Page 8 of 17
The World Bank
West Bengal Accelerated Agriculture Transformation Project (P168999)
addition and other key support services towards market integration\. To this end, the Project will support the following
activities: (i) technical assistance (TA) that enables agribusiness support entities (both public and private) to raise the
quality of their existing services and create new ones in response to the sector demand; (ii) a capacity-building program
to equip beneficiary institutions with requisite capacity; (iii) linkages and partnerships with value chain actors to better
meet the needs of local agribusinesses; and (iv) access to finance for upgrading/expanding the scope of services provided
by beneficiary institutions\. It is expected that this service provision approach will engage local entrepreneurs, to create a
catalytic effect in accelerating the agribusiness growth in the State\. The project will emphasize inclusion of youth, both
men and women\.
Component B: Support for market integration of producers
21\. B1\. Developing systems for market and trade intelligence: Market diversification for improving producer incomes
cannot be achieved merely by pushing what is produced but by producing what is demanded by the markets\. This
subcomponent aims to develop trade and market intelligence systems, which will play a key role across different phases
of the market diversification program\. The Project will invest in developing SMART (Systems for Market and Trade)
intelligence (which will entail both solution building and solution access) and in developing capacities of stakeholders for
effective deployment and continued improvement of this system\. SMART intelligence will provide producers, policy-
makers and other key entities with relevant information and decision support inputs for improving the competitiveness
of the primary and value-added produce from targeted production zones\. Using the model of Farmer Business Schools16
(covered under sub-component B3), the Project will aim to get the producers familiarized with the indicative scenarios in
which business, economic and policy decisions are made, thus helping them to become âmarket readyâ\.
22\. B2\. Ensuring improved service delivery to producers: This subcomponent will aim to strengthen the State
extension and advisory services (both public and private)17 that will enable the producers to receive timely services related
to production knowledge as well as the range of agricultural development tasks, such as credit, supplies, marketing and
markets\. The Project will strengthen the capacity of existing public extension agencies particularly improving internal
systems for effective inter-departmental coordination; linkages with research and academia; and with private service
providers for efficient delivery of extension and advisory services\. The Project will also support the private service
providers to expand outreach and address financial and non-financial barriers Enhanced uptake of quality-assured services
by the producers and producer organizations will strengthen the pre-production and production systems viz\., advisory,
climate smart technology, inputs, mechanization, irrigation, and production risk management\.
23\. B3\. Supporting capacity development of producers and producer groups: The objective of this subcomponent is
to strengthen the capacity of the producers for better management of their farms as a âbusiness unitâ and support them
to get mobilized in producer organizations for effective participation in the value chains\. This will be achieved by focusing
the âlead farmersâ in the clusters; building their entrepreneurial capacity through approaches such as âFarmer Business
Schoolâ and âThe Life Long Learning of Producers (L3F) through Mobile Phonesâ18; and mobilizing them in appropriate
institutional structures\. The core areas of training for the producers will include Good Agriculture Practices (GAP), climate
smart agriculture, post-harvest management and quality assurance, farm resource management, farm business
management, managing production and market risks, pricing, selling and negotiation skills, basic understanding of value
chain and market operations and consumer behavior\. For effective learning using peer-group approaches, producers will
participate in groups which can either be existing producer companies and farmer clubs or be newly developed under the
project\.
16 http://www2\.giz\.de/wbf/4tDx9kw63gma/GIZ_Studie%20SNRD_EN_Webversion_150914\.pdf
17 The proposed âprivate operators for irrigation servicesâ under the World Bank Major Irrigation Project will be also included to provide higher level services to the
producers\.
18
http://siteresources\.worldbank\.org/INTLL/Resources/Lifelong-Learning-in-the-Global-Knowledge-Economy/lifelonglearning_GKE\.pdf
Oct 12, 2018 Page 9 of 17
The World Bank
West Bengal Accelerated Agriculture Transformation Project (P168999)
Component C: Access to infrastructure, finance and markets
24\. C1\. Developing agribusiness hubs and clusters: This subcomponent will develop âagribusiness hubsâ to enable the
targeted commodities to reach export markets and distant domestic markets through facilities for consolidation, value
addition and logistics\. The strategic and spatial integration of relevant World Bank projects in West Bengal will inform the
identification of potential âagro-zonesâ19 and âclustersâ within these agro-zones, considering the efficiency in transportation
to the agribusiness hubs (see Figure 2 above)\. Experiences elsewhere indicate20 that a multi-stakeholder governance
system for steering the management of such facilities (hubs), leads to enhanced development outcomes\. Clusters will be
linked to the âhubsâ for connecting the producers with markets\. Appropriate business and market structures such as
Producer Companies, Productive Alliances21, network enterprises and platform businesses will be promoted in the
clusters\. Business entities, including producer companies, operating in the identified clusters will benefit from economies
of scale and scope which are typically enjoyed by large firms\. Establishment of agribusiness hubs and clusters will enable
the downstream value chain actors (lead firms, distributors, exporters) cater to the market efficiently and enhance
agribusiness growth opportunities\. This will also create business opportunities for delivery of value chain services viz\.,
compliance, handling, packaging, storage, transportation within the hubs and clusters\.
25\. C2\. Facilitating access to finance and risk mitigation services: This sub-component will seek to address the
barriers for relevant value chain actors (including producer companies, service providers, exporters, lead firms etc\.) to
access finance from mainstream institutional sources and manage production and market risks\. While the concerns of the
financial institutions related to promoterâs capacity and intent, market demand, documentation, regulatory compliances,
and business handholding assistance will be largely addressed through capacity development activities, this sub-
component will focus on the other major requirements of the financial institutions primarily related to promoterâs equity
and collateral\. Additionally, financial assistance from the Project will be mobilized through setting up an âAgribusiness
Development Fundâ primarily to provide a basket of financial and risk instruments and support measures to primarily
producer companies and other relevant entities\. This will address critical barriers to capital (financing, technology,
production facilities) and other significant needs of the value chain actors and drive innovations\.
26\. C3\. Supporting market access: Subcomponent C3 will support value chain actors including producer companies
to access profitable markets)\. Suitable partnerships will be facilitated between producers and the market facing players\.
The Project will promote a range of approaches including contract farming, linkages with integrators and other market
channels viz\. modern retail, responsible supply chains, organized national markets, e-markets, and exporters\. Trade and
market requirements such as support infrastructure and systems for Sanitary and Phyto Sanitary (SPS), traceability, and
standards-certification will be strengthened\. The Project will strategically invest in systems for differentiating the products
in destination markets and for strengthening the capacity of value chain actors and the staffs of implementing agencies in
marketing aspects by organizing events, exposure visits; facilitating trade conclaves; investing in branding and promotion;
and providing critical infrastructure)\. This subcomponent will enable the producers to come closer to profitable markets
(last mile players and consumers) and improve their bargaining power to realize higher returns\.
19 Large areas with high concentration of targeted commodity
20 http://agriporta7\.nl/
21 http://documents\.worldbank\.org/curated/en/702681480494322907/pdf/110615-WP-LinkingProducerstoMarketsthroughProductiveAlliances-PUBLIC-ABSTRACT-
SENT\.pdf
Oct 12, 2018 Page 10 of 17
The World Bank
West Bengal Accelerated Agriculture Transformation Project (P168999)
Component D Project Management
27\. The Department of Agriculture, Government of West Bengal, will be tasked with the overall management of the
Project\. The implementing agency will establish a Project Management Unit (PMU), and provision appropriate staffing and
operating resources\. The Project will plan an ICT based Management Information System (MIS) that will enable the PMU
to access project information and data from the field in real-time\. ICT will also be used to facilitate the feedback from
project beneficiaries on project activities planned/under implementation (citizen engagement) and will be mainstreamed
in the projectâs grievance and redress mechanism\. The other areas of investment include monitoring and evaluation and
knowledge management\.
2\. Overall Risk and Explanation
28\. The overall risk rating for the proposed project at the concept stage is considered Substantial\. This rating is related
to the following: (i) Technical design of project which is rated Substantial; the project is promoting innovative approaches
of value chain development which involve private sector participation and the development of clusters and agribusiness
hubs; (ii) Institutional capacity for implementation and sustainability is also rated Substantial\. This is due to coordination
challenges of multiple implementation agencies and capacity of the implementing agency (Agriculture Department) which
is yet to be assessed; (iii) Fiduciary risks are rated Substantial\. A large number of transactions and a significant number of
agreements are expected in this project, including the establishment of an Agribusiness Development Fund; and (iv)
Environmental and social risks are rated Substantial, especially due to foreseen investments in the agribusiness hubs which
may involve land acquisition, relocation of people, labour in-flux, and increased pollution from agri-processing\. Mitigation
measures will be put in place to deal with these risks, including capacity-building of project actors, ensuring proper inter-
departmental coordination mechanisms, and preparation of adequate environmental and social safeguards\.
29\. Gender\. The 2011 census figures list only 32\.8 percent women formally as primary workers in the agricultural
sector, in contrast to 81\.1 percent men\. The women are not given due recognition as farmers which hampers their ability
to access productive input\. Extension services typically engage with male farmers, while ignoring women as it is assumed
that women do not manage the farm\. The project design and approach will reflect the need for taking into account the
gender dimension and risks associated with knowledge and technology transfer\. Project will be designed to ensure that it
provides equal opportunities for women to participate in project activities\. Agricultural technologies, to be promoted will
be screened to ensure that they are gender-neutral\. Similarly, the identification of lead/contact farmers would be gender
balanced\.
B\. Economic Analysis
1\. Briefly describe the development impact in terms of expected benefits and costs
30\. The Project will mobilize producers (numbers to be determined at the time of preparation) and connect them
to more profitable markets by promoting value addition, higher competitiveness and stronger linkages with market facing
players\. This will enhance producer income, create job opportunities across value chains and trigger private sector
investments in project clusters\.
31\. The major costs of the Project will include creating enabling business environment, bridging the service delivery
gaps in value chains, creating trade and market intelligence systems, improved service delivery to producers, supporting
capacity development of producers, developing agribusiness hubs, instituting âagribusiness fundsâ and supporting market
access\. The costs of the project will be based on the number of agro-zones and clusters, number of producers to be
Oct 12, 2018 Page 11 of 17
The World Bank
West Bengal Accelerated Agriculture Transformation Project (P168999)
impacted and number of relevant value chain actors to be supported\. This will be identified through value chain analytics
and stakeholder consultations during project preparation and will be agreed with the Client\. The Project costs and detailed
cost-benefit analysis will be worked out accordingly\.
2\. Rationale for public sector provisioning/financing, if applicable
32\. The project would support the value addition and market access, in part through public provisioning of goods,
services and financing as required for these activities which are still at infant and nascent development stage\. It would
address market failures and remove/ reduce distortions that stand in the way of these activities\. It would strengthen
capacity in the agribusiness sector, including building up institutional capacity in the targeted value chains as well as
enhancing the capacity of core public services\. Project support would include development of enabling environment for
agribusiness, strengthening service delivery mechanisms and agri spatial solutions for integrating producers with market
through investment in critical infrastructure and support measure for access to finance and markets\. The Project would
strengthen the capacity of value chain actors including producers for nurturing and expanding the agribusiness ecosystem
in the State\.
3\. Value added of the Bank's support
33\. One World Bank led transformation: The project seeks to spatially and strategically leverage the existing and
upcoming World Bank investments in West Bengal to usher agribusiness growth in the State\. A multi sector approach will
be followed in the design, development and delivery of this Project\. The complementarity between the World Bank and
International Finance Corporation will be leveraged for bringing in lead private sector companies for driving efficiency and
innovation in selected Value Chains for enhanced competitiveness, increased value added and market access\. The
proposed leverage of Bank investments in âtotalityâ, as illustrated above, together with the planned interventions to
harness private sector investments for maximizing finance for development will usher âOne World Bankâ transformation
not only within West Bengal but will also trigger regional growth\.
4\. Brief description of methodology/scope and next steps
34\. General methodology for Economic and Financial Analysis\. The economic and financial analysis would determine
the viability of project activities from both the private (financial analysis) and the social (economic analysis)
perspectives\. The analysis from both perspectives is needed, as private and social costs and benefits of agribusiness
investments may diverge, owing to: (i) market failures or policy-induced distortions that may bias perceptions by economic
actors in agri-value chains; and (ii) negative externalities caused by economic shocks including climate change impacts\.
Given the uncertainty with regard to future price and production levels (due to the volatility of external markets, and/ or
the impacts such as climate change), special emphasis would be placed on risk and sensitivity analysis\. The following would
be performed: (i) estimates of project profitability for those activities that can be subjected to quantified analysis: gross
margin and cash-flow analysis, Net Present Value (NPV), Financial Rate for Return (FRR), Economic Rate of Return (ERR),
as well as switching values; (ii) sensitivity analysis of the projectâs viability and sustainability under differing cost and
revenue scenarios; and (iii) summary of the key issues affecting economic and financial returns, including the
environmental and social externalities such as the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions\.
35\. Socio-economic studies and next steps\. Socio-economic studies would be undertaken as part of project
preparation with the following objectives: (a) confirm the selection of key value chains based on an assessment of their
potential, and taking into account the support provided by other operations; (b) update the inventory of entities
potentially eligible for project support in the selected value chains; (c) establish product/ quality specifications for
producers and intermediaries based on expectations of downstream players such as traders, industrialists and exporters;
Oct 12, 2018 Page 12 of 17
The World Bank
West Bengal Accelerated Agriculture Transformation Project (P168999)
(d) propose value chain organization modalities related to the scale of the project, including identifying needs in individual
or collective productive infrastructure; (e) propose rules and financial mechanisms under the MFD approach; (f) identify
the most appropriate advisory support modalities, including technical assistance and commercial advice, as part of
Productive Partnerships; and (g) carry-out pre-feasibility studies for potential agro-zones\. The proposed studies, especially
those under sections (d), (e) and (f) would pay close attention to the special challenges faced by women and youth, and
other vulnerable groups in agribusiness development\.
36\. The team will undertake project preparation missions that will include extensive field visits for interaction with
key stakeholders, assessment of client capacity and scoping opportunities\. The Team will do extensive desk review and if
required undertake market analytics to shortlist the value chains\. Further in-depth study will be done to identify the
common barriers across the value chains, which this transformative project could address\. The study findings will be
discussed with key industry players and stakeholders to understand the various facets of business climate and supply side
issues in West Bengal\. The preparation team will also try to capture good practices and lessons from other country/ies in
implementing similar projects\.
C\. Implementing Agency Assessment
37\. The Department of Agriculture, Government of West Bengal, will be responsible for implementing this Project\. A
thorough assessment of this department will be done during the Project preparation particularly for human resources,
finance, procurement, environment and social safeguards\. Moreover, the Department of Agriculture Marketing, West
Bengal Agro Industries Corporation, as well as Department of Food Processing Industries and other related Departments
viz\., Horticulture, Livestock and Animal Husbandry, Fisheries and Industry Commerce and Enterprises are also likely to play
a role in implementation of this Project\. The team will assess their implementation capacity, besides developing a suitable
institutional mechanism to ensure adequate coordination and collaboration among these departments\.
SAFEGUARDS
A\. Project location and salient physical characteristics relevant to the safeguard analysis (if known)
In the ethnographic map of India, West Bengal (WB) occupies an important place, as it is inhabited by substantial number
of tribal communities\. The tribal communities, with a population of 4\.5 million, are found almost all the districts of the
State\. In 6 districts, tribal population exceeds 10 percent of the total district population\. The distinctiveness of each tribe
is manifested in its language, social organization, rituals and festivals, and also in their dress pattern, adornments, and art
and craft\. Tribes in general live in a close relationship with nature and depend on it for their survival\. Following the Indian
Constitutional provision (Article 342), in West Bengal as many as 40 groups have been categorized, with 3 declared as
Primitive Tribal Groups\. They live predominantly in the rural areas and their social, cultural, economic, political, and
historical characteristics induce not only vulnerability, and often 'excluded' from development interventions\. While the
project interventions will not affect adversely the tribal, these groups do require special attention for ensuring inclusion
and equity\.
WB is the only state in India which connect the Himalayas in the north to the Bay of Bengal in the south\. West Bengal is
one of the most diverse state in India from a physiographical point of view\. The Himalayan hill region in the northern
extreme of the state is a part of the eastern Himalayan range\. The narrow Terai region separates the hills from the North
Bengal plains, which in turn transitions into the Ganges delta towards the south\. The Rarh region intervenes between the
Ganges delta in the east and the western plateau and high lands\. A small coastal region is in the extreme south, while the
Sundarbans mangrove form the intertidal geographical landmark on the coast\. West Bengal is part of the one of the
Oct 12, 2018 Page 13 of 17
The World Bank
West Bengal Accelerated Agriculture Transformation Project (P168999)
largest deltas of the world, the entire Gangetic delta is divided into three distinct parts - i) the moribund delta
(Murshidabad, Nadiya, 24 Parganas); ii) the matured delta (Portions of 24 Paraganas); and iii) the active delta (Sunderbans
and the coastal areas)\. Hence, it is to be noted that the process of formation of the deltaic Bengal is still on\. WB is broadly
divided into six Agro-climatic Zones, which fall within three Agro-climatic Regions (Eastern Himalayan Region, Lower
Gangetic Plain Region, Eastern Plateau & Hill Region)\. Because of these diversity, WB possesses both opportunity and risk
for the sector and sought special attention\.
B\. Borrowerâs Institutional Capacity for Safeguard Policies
Department of Agriculture (DoA), Government of West Bengal is primarily responsible for the project implementation\. A
project
management unit (PMU) will be set up with the department for project management\. Currently DoA has no experience
of addressing safeguard issues\. However, staffing of PMU will include social development specialist and environmental
specialist\. As part of capacity building regular training program will be conducted to augment the capacity of PMU staff to
address safeguard issues\.
C\. Environmental and Social Safeguards Specialists on the Team
Parthapriya Ghosh, Social Specialist
Md Istiak Sobhan, Environmental Specialist
D\. Policies that might apply
Safeguard Policies Triggered? Explanation (Optional)
This project will support a range of sub-projects
involving research technology demonstration,
agricultural extension and value-chain development in
crops, livestock and fisheries sectors\. While many of
these sub-projects are likely to be environmentally
benign, some have the potential to cause negative
environmental impacts (relating to agro-chemical use,
agro-processing waste management, etc\.)\. The project
is classified as a âCategory Bâ? under OP/BP 4\.01 with a
partial assessment as the impacts are likely to be
small-scale, site specific with no irreversible impacts
Environmental Assessment OP/BP 4\.01 Yes
and mitigation measures can be designed more
readily\.
An Environmental and Social Management Framework
(ESMF) will be prepared to provide guidance for
environmental and social assessment and
management\. It will also identify the requirements
and responsibilities for preparing Environmental and
Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) as a precondition for
individual investments that are likely to have high
environmental impacts\. Since detailed location and
Oct 12, 2018 Page 14 of 17
The World Bank
West Bengal Accelerated Agriculture Transformation Project (P168999)
design information for conducting activity-specific ESIA
for some of the project activities will likely be available
only during project implementation, the ESMF will
define the detailed process for the corresponding
consultations, reviews, and clearances\.
Performance Standards for Private Sector
No
Activities OP/BP 4\.03
Preliminary analysis does not yet indicate much
impact on natural habitats under OP/BP 4\.04\.
However, this will be reviewed during preparation,
Natural Habitats OP/BP 4\.04 TBD once, more location-specific information for the
proposed project activities are available\. The ESMF will
therefore, incorporate information and management
guidance on the impact on natural habitats\.
Preliminary analysis does not yet indicate much
impact on forest and forest habitats under OP/BP
4\.36\. However, this will be reviewed during
preparation, once, more location-specific information
Forests OP/BP 4\.36 TBD
for the proposed project activities are available\. The
SMF will therefore, incorporate information and
management guidance on the impact on natural
habitats\.
The sub-projects supported by the West Bengal
Accelerated Agriculture Transformation Project are
likely to involve the use of chemical pesticides for pest
management\. While the project focus on interventions
Pest Management OP 4\.09 Yes on Integrated Pest Management including organic and
biological management, a Pest Management Plan will
be developed in order to systematically address, build
capacity and monitor the pest management issues in
the project\.
Policy is triggered on chance find basis\. ESA will
identify any potential religious and other physical
Physical Cultural Resources OP/BP 4\.11 TBD
cultural property sites associated with the proposed
investments\.
The tribal communities, in varying concentrations, are
found almost
Indigenous Peoples OP/BP 4\.10 Yes
in all the districts of the state\.
Government of West Bengal will acquire private land
at two places (Silligudi near Bagdogra airport and at
Involuntary Resettlement OP/BP 4\.12 Yes Balagarh in Bardhaman district\. For the Logistics
project Govt\. has already identified 900acres of land
where one hub adjacent to this place will be created\.
Not triggered, as the project has nothing to do with
Safety of Dams OP/BP 4\.37 No
dams\.
Oct 12, 2018 Page 15 of 17
The World Bank
West Bengal Accelerated Agriculture Transformation Project (P168999)
Projects on International Waterways
No Project is doing nothing related to water ways directly
OP/BP 7\.50
The project is located in West Bengal which is not a
Projects in Disputed Areas OP/BP 7\.60 No
disputed area
E\. Safeguard Preparation Plan
Tentative target date for preparing the Appraisal Stage PID/ISDS
Sep 16, 2019
Time frame for launching and completing the safeguard-related studies that may be needed\. The specific studies and
their timing should be specified in the Appraisal Stage PID/ISDS
The launching of safeguard-related studies will commence soon after the first preparation mission is completed around
November 16, 2018 and the project sites get identified\. The draft will be ready by September 1, 2019 and finalized before
the decision review meeting\.
CONTACT POINT
World Bank
Raj Ganguly
Senior Agribusiness Specialist
Borrower/Client/Recipient
Ministry of Finance
Bandana Preyashi
Director
bandana\.preyashi@gov\.in
Implementing Agencies
Department of Agriculture
Mr\. Jitendra Roy
Joint Secretary
jsrkvywb@gmail\.com
Oct 12, 2018 Page 16 of 17
The World Bank
West Bengal Accelerated Agriculture Transformation Project (P168999)
FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 473-1000
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/projects
APPROVAL
Task Team Leader(s): Raj Ganguly
Approved By
APPROVALTBL
Practice Manager/Manager: Mary Kathryn Hollifield 15-Oct-2018
Country Director: Luc Lecuit 16-Oct-2018
Oct 12, 2018 Page 17 of 17 | APPROVAL |
P159717 | PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
IDENTIFICATION/CONCEPT STAGE
Report No\.: PIDC61933
Public Disclosure Copy
Project Name EITI Post Compliance Implementation Support III
Region AFRICA
Country Zambia
Sector(s) Public administration- Energy and mining (20%), Other Mining
and Extractive Industries (80%)
Theme(s) Other accountability/anti-corruption (20%), Participation and civic
engagement (20%), Other environment and natural resources
management (60%)
Lending Instrument Lending Instrument
Project ID P159717
Borrower Name Ministry of Finance and National Planning
Implementing Agency EITI SECRETARIAT
Environment Category C - Not Required
Date PID Prepared 23-Mar-2016
Estimated Date of Approval 01-Jul-2016
Initiation Note Review The review did authorize the preparation to continue
Decision
I\. Introduction and Context
Public Disclosure Copy
Country Context
Zambia has had a long period of political stability\. Following strong growth in the last decade
Zambia has reached lower middle income status and investor confidence has been high\. However,
60 percent of Zambians lives below the poverty line and 42 percent are considered to be in extreme
poverty\. There has been some progress on corruption in recent years with Zambia ranked 76th (out
of 167 countries) in 2015 by Transparency International\.
Sectoral and Institutional Context
Zambiaâs economy is heavily dependent on mining as Africaâs largest producer and exporter of
copper and cobalt\. In 2014, mining accounting for about 12 percent of GDP, 70 percent of total
export value and 28 percent of government revenue\. The mining sector, which had declined in the
late 90s from its peak in the 70s, has been recovering sharply since 2000âwith foreign investment
playing a major role\.
Zambia became an EITI candidate country in May 2009 and was declared EITI compliant in
September 2012\. The next validation is to begin on July 1, 2016\. To date, seven EITI reconciliation
reports have been issued covering the years 2008-2014\. The 18-member Zambia EITI Council
(ZEC) is the multi-stakeholder group overseeing and coordinating EITI implementation in Zambia\.
It is chaired by the Secretary to the Treasury and is serviced by a Secretariat which is located in the
Page 1 of 4
Ministry of Mines\. Zambia's civil society has promoted the EITI, but its influence continues to be
limited by a number of factors\.
Public Disclosure Copy
EITI implementation in Zambia has been heavily dependent on donor funding, but financing from
the federal budget has increased in recent years to about US$450,000 during 2014\. The World Bank
has financed EITI implementation in Zambia through three grants from the MDTF (Multi Donor
Trust Fund)\. MDTF I (US$320,000) completed on June 30, 2012, MDTF II (US$350,000)
completed on December 31, 2014, and Post Compliance II (US$210,000) completed on December
31, 2015\. Implementation was generally satisfactory\. Further support from the World Bank under
the Governance Partnership Facility (GPF) facilitated capacity building of civil society
organization\. Zambia EITI also received financial support from the Mining Basket Fund comprising
financial contributions from the European Union, DFID, and Norway, which was mainly used to
support the operating cost of the EITI Secretariat\. The African Development Bank (AfDB) financed
the production and dissemination of the EITI Report for 2011\.
Relationship to CAS/CPS/CPF
The proposed project is in line and supports World Bank Groupâs Country Partnership Strategy
(CPS) for Zambia (FY13-16) (Report No\. 75089-ZM) and the Performance and Learning Review
conducted in July 2015 (Report No\. 95986-ZM)\. Both Outcome 3\.1 of the CPS, âStrengthened
systems and processes for public sector performanceâ and Outcome 3\.2 âCitizen access to
information increasedâ, are supported by the proposed assistance to the Zambian government in
implementing EITI\. The proposed project also supports GRZ's efforts for improving governance\.
The current government, which came to power in September 2011, has identified poverty reduction,
jobs creation, and improving governance as its main priorities\.
II\. Project Development Objective(s)
Proposed Development Objective(s)
Public Disclosure Copy
The overarching development objective is to improve transparency and accountability in Zambiaâs
extractive sector by supporting the EITI Zambia Secretariat and the Zambia EITI Council to
successfully implement the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in Zambia\.
Key Results
In line with the PDO above, the following PDO Level Results Indicators will be tracked throughout
project implementation:
(a) EITI reconciliation report for 2015 and 2016 are produced and published by end-December 2016
and end-December 2017, respectively\.
(b) Dissemination activities (including activities related to the Mining Investment and Governance
Review (MInGov) conducted in Zambia throughout 2016-2017\.
(c) Mid-year topical report produced by end-July 2017\.
III\. Preliminary Description
Concept Description
Zambia now has a strong track record in producing timely reconciliation reports\. So far the
information gained from these reconciliation reports has not been used in informing and shaping the
policy dialogue in Zambia's mining sector\. ZEITI is trying to move beyond the production and
dissemination of reconciliation reports to become a more active proponent of transparency and
Page 2 of 4
accountability in the sector\. The strategic plan that is currently being finalized elaborates further on
this\.
Public Disclosure Copy
Regarding the new 2016 EITI standard, Zambia has already made significant progress in publishing
information on beneficial ownership in its EITI reconciliation reports\. The EITI Secretariat has also
developed expertise in collecting the data used in the reconciliation reports, which might provide an
entry-point for "mainstreaming transparency" in government systems rather than reproducing the
data in EITI reporting down the road\. Funding for EITI implementation from the GRZ has increased
over time and the proposed 2-year US$350,000 grant will provide financing for a smaller portion of
the EITI work plan for the next two years\.
The proposed grant aims to support ZEITI in these efforts\. In addition to financing the production of
the next two reconciliation reports, which are needed to keep the momentum of EITI in Zambia, the
grant foresees financing more innovative and impact-oriented dissemination methods (including the
results of the Mining Investment and Governance Review (MInGov) conducted in Zambia) and a
mid-year topical report (in mid-2017) that will support ZEITI's new role\.
IV\. Safeguard Policies that Might Apply
Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project Yes No TBD
Environmental Assessment OP/BP 4\.01 â
Natural Habitats OP/BP 4\.04 â
Forests OP/BP 4\.36 â
Pest Management OP 4\.09 â
Physical Cultural Resources OP/BP 4\.11 â
Indigenous Peoples OP/BP 4\.10 â
Involuntary Resettlement OP/BP 4\.12 â
Public Disclosure Copy
Safety of Dams OP/BP 4\.37 â
Projects on International Waterways OP/BP 7\.50 â
Projects in Disputed Areas OP/BP 7\.60 â
V\. Financing (in USD Million)
Total Project Cost: 0\.35 Total Bank Financing: 0
Financing Gap: 0
Financing Source Amount
Extractives Global Programmatic Support 0\.35
VI\. Contact point
World Bank
Contact: Martin Lokanc
Title: Sr Mining Spec\.
Tel: 458-5319
Email: mlokanc@worldbank\.org
Borrower/Client/Recipient
Name: Ministry of Finance and National Planning
Page 3 of 4
Contact: Fredson Yamba
Title: Secretary to Treasury
Tel: (260-1) 257-178
Public Disclosure Copy
Email:
Implementing Agencies
Name: EITI SECRETARIAT
Contact: Siforiano Banda
Title: Head of EITI Secretariat
Tel: 260977611790
Email: siforiano2010@gmail\.com
VII\. For more information contact:
The InfoShop
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 458-4500
Fax: (202) 522-1500
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/infoshop
Public Disclosure Copy
Page 4 of 4 | APPROVAL |
P121833 | Page 1
PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
APPRAISAL STAGE
Report No\.: AB6003
(The report # is automatically generated by IDU and should not be changed)
Project Name
Housing and Community Infrastructure Reconstruction -
Urban Community Driven Development Additional
Financing
Region
LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN
Country
Haiti
Sector
Urban Housing (70%), Urban Development (30%)
Lending Instrument
Specific Investment Loan
Project ID
P121833
{If Add\. Fin\.}
Parent Project ID
P106699
Borrower(s)
Republic of Haiti
Implementing Agency
Bureau de Monétisation des Programmes dAide au
Développement (BMPAD)
Environmental Screening
Category
{
}A
{X}B { }C { }FI
Date PID Prepared
September 20
th
,
2010
Estimated Date of Appraisal
Completion
September 15
th
,
2010
Estimated Date of Board
Approval
October 26
th
,
2010
Decision
Project authorized to proceed to negotiations upon
agreement on any pending conditions and/or assessments\.
I\. Country
Context
Haiti continues to be the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, and one of the most
disadvantaged in the world\. According to 2003 data, 80 percent of Haitians are poor (living on
less than US$2 a day), and more than half (54 percent) live in extreme poverty (living on less
than US$1 a day)\. Over the past decades, the country has faced a significant number of political,
economic and social crises, as well as numerous exogenous shocks, such as adverse natural
events and commodity prices\. Its economy however had been registering positive growth since
2005, reaching 2\.9 percent in FY2009, and sustained by increased macroeconomic stability and
reform efforts in governance\.
The countrys situation changed dramatically with the January 12, 2010 earthquake, causing
widespread destruction of numerous public and private infrastructures, hindering the capacity of
the Haitian government, killing more than 200,000 people and affecting over 3\.5 million\.
IMF
estimates suggest that GDP could decline by at least 10 percent in 2010 as a result
of the earthquake\. The Post-Disaster Needs Assessment evaluated reconstruction
needs to be around $11\.5 billion\.
Page 2
II\.
Sectoral and Institutional Context
Living conditions in disadvantaged urban areas in Haiti were among the worst in the Americas
long before the January 12, 2010 earthquake\. Especially in Port-au Prince, the capital of Haiti,
violent crime within these areas was widespread, effectively blocking economic development
and threatening the political stability of the country\. Actions undertaken jointly by the
Government of Haiti (GoH) and the United Nations Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH) from
2008 onward helped bring down levels of crime and violence and allowed a return to relative
normalcy in various of these areas\. GoH and the donor community recognize that the fragile
peace remains at risk as long as the underlying causes of the instability remain\. They also
understand that restoration of basic services and the creation of economic opportunities for
neighborhood residents must go hand in hand with strengthened law enforcement and crime
reduction, as foundations for political stability and durable peace\.
The January 12, 2010, earthquake destroyed an estimated 115,000 houses in and around Port-au-
Prince and left some 14,500 others with severe damage and 167,000 with moderate damages
forcing some 1\.3 million people to seek shelter in temporary camps\. Moving people out of those
camps and creating the conditions for their safe return to the original neighborhoods has been
identified by the Government, the international community representatives in Haiti, and the
affected communities as one of the most pressing needs and is also key for securing future
political and social stability\. The proposed Additional Financing operation (AF) aims to help
residents of the most severely affected areas of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area under the
original Urban Community Driven Development Project (PRODEPUR) to return to their
communities in safe conditions, start repairing and/or rebuilding their homes, and resume
economic activities\.
Other major agencies in the shelter sector are investing in three areas: (i)
Temporary shelter
(Camps) - this is not an area of World Bank comparative advantage and is fully covered by relief
agencies such as IOM, the Red Cross, CARE, and others\.; (ii)
Transitional shelter -
the GOH
favors permanent solutions over transitional shelter; however, transitional shelter is being
planned and built to respond to specific shelter needs such as families in the major camps who
are at high risk of flooding and prioritized for relocation to new settlements primarily outside the
city\. Additionally, USAID is planning to support transitional shelter for camp residents who are
able to return to their original plots but cannot return to the original house\. UNOPS is
implementing a similar program\. In total 125,000 transitional shelters are planned by the summer
of 2011, but this number is likely to reduce as more emphasis is put on permanent shelter; (iii)
Permanent shelter
-
Permanent shelter includes both in situ reconstruction and permanent
housing in new locations for those who cannot return\. The GoH has recently recognized and
endorsed the principle that the preferred option should always be return to original location
where possible\. The key actors include World Bank, USAID, UN-Habitat, IDB, Oxfam, Habitat
for Humanity, and the Red Cross\. The Bank team will coordinate with other donors to encourage
the eventual relocation of services currently provided in the camps to the intervention
neighborhoods\.
Page 3
III\.
Project Development Objectives
The original Project Development Objective (DO) of PRODEPUR is to:
improve access to, and
satisfaction with: (i) basic and social infrastructure and services; and (ii) income-generating
opportunities for residents of targeted disadvantaged urban areas
\.
The objective is to be
achieved by supporting a participatory process in which Community-Driven Project
Development Councils (COPRODEPs) and Community Based Organizations (CBOs) propose,
select, implement, and maintain subprojects\.
With the proposed Additional Financing operation, the Project Development Objective (PDO)
would be modified slightly as follows:
to
improve access to, and satisfaction with: (i) basic and
social infrastructure and services, including housing repair, reconstruction and community
infrastructure improvement needed as a result of the Emergency
;
and (ii) income-generating
opportunities for residents of selected
Disadvantaged Urban Areas\.
"
Emergency is defined as
follows: the extraordinary event of limited duration which was caused by the occurrence of a
7\.0 magnitude earthquake in selected parts of the Recipients territory and which brought about
unprecedented physical, social and economic damage to the Recipient and its population\. The
aim of the investments under the proposed AF in selected PRODEPUR project areas
is
to restore
acceptable housing conditions and, to the extent feasible, improve the living conditions of the
area residents to levels better than those that existed prior to the January 12, 2010 earthquake\.
A
PDO level result indicator will be added to measure the impact: number of displaced
residents returning to neighborhood upon completion of repair and/or reconstruction of houses\.
The scope of the AF interventions will be deliberately limited to addressing immediate in-situ
reconstruction needs\. The AF will not aim to solve the longer-term formalization of land tenure
and/or housing property rights or other social or legal issues, which require further policy review
and clarifications from the Government of Haiti and could be the focus of future interventions\.
Nevertheless, recognizing that land tenure issues are very complex and
informal
arrangements
are the norm in these areas, two specific measures are proposed to facilitate the implementation
of the proposed AF: (i) carrying out community-based mapping to collect information on the
demographics and tenure status of residents and on the physical boundaries/characteristics of
affected land parcels and buildings; and (ii) establishing conflict resolution mechanisms to
address concerns raised by beneficiaries during the reconstruction process\.
IV\. Project
Description
General
:
The primary target area for the activities to be financed under the proposed AF will be the
Delmas 32
neighborhood of the
Delmas
Municipality, one of the five municipalities that form
the Port-au-Prince Metropolitan Area\. The
Delmas 32
neighborhood covers a total area of about
60 ha\. Prior to the earthquake it had a population of about 126,000, which has declined to about
76,000 at present\. About 40% of the housing stock of the neighborhood was affected by the
earthquake with about 1,100 houses destroyed or damaged beyond repair and about 1,400
damaged but remaining in repairable conditions\.
Page 4
Owing to their very nature emergency projects are prepared at the fastest possible pace and
therefore generally lack the detailed engineering and other preparatory studies that would be
required for regular operations\. The program of activities that is proposed to be financed under
the AF and described below is necessarily tentative and must be seen more as a general
framework rather than a final program\. It will need to be adjusted continuously in response to the
way conditions on the ground evolve and new necessities emerge\.
An additional critical reason calling for flexibility in the development of AF activities is that the
World Bank is only one of various other actors intervening in the area\. Close monitoring of such
other donor activities will be carried out by the implementing agency (Bureau de Monétisation
aux Programmes dAide au Développement BMPAD), the
Delmas
Municipality and the
service provider (Maitre dOuvrage Délegue MDOD) through the on-site Supervision Teams
of the Community Reconstruction Centers (CRC)\. If advisable, the AF activity program will be
adjusted to avoid any unwarranted
duplication and
wastage of resources\. Should, as a result of
such adjustments, the proposed program for
Delmas 32
not absorb the totality of the proposed
AF, the resources that will become available will be used to fund operations in other
PRODEPUR areas such as, for instance,
Carrefour Feuille
\.
Following are the additional
activities financed by the AF\.
Component 3 (modified): Project Administration, Supervision, Monitoring and Evaluation
(US$ 0\.9 million)
The proposed AF will finance the incremental cost of project administration, supervision,
monitoring and evaluation expenses that will be incurred by the Project Coordination Unit
(PCU)/BMPAD in the management of the AF implementation\. Items to be financed will include
the hiring of additional staff, consulting services, office equipment, and other project-related
miscellaneous expenditure\.
Component 4 (new): Housing Repair and Reconstruction (US$ 29\.1 million)
(a)
Sub-Component 1: Debris Removal
(US$ 2\.6 million)
The Sub-Component will finance the removal of a total of about 60,000 m3 of debris from the
Delmas 32
neighborhood or other selected PRODEPUR areas\. Since the earthquake the
Delmas
32
neighborhood contained an estimated 72,000 cubic meters of debris of which approximately
30,000 (50%) are currently piled up on roads and open spaces, while the remaining 42,000 are
on housing lots, and in buildings which require partial or complete demolition\. Conditions in
other PRODEPUR areas are similar\. At present, approximately 12,000 m3 have already been
cleared from
Delmas 32
by JPHRO, an international NGO\.
Estimated Volume of Debris in
Delmas 32
Location of Debris
Streets and open
spaces
Houses tagged yellow
(repairable)
Houses tagged red
(repairable)
Houses tagged red
(to be demolished)
Volume (in m3)
29,900
11,300
5,300
25,700
Given its critical role as a prerequisite for the start up of reconstruction activities, debris removal
will be organized in two phases\.
Page 5
In Phase 1, about 30,000 m3 of debris will be removed from streets and public spaces by one or
several contractors\. Assuming a daily removal of about 500 m3, the operation is estimated to
take about 4 months and, based on an estimated average cost of US$ 40\.0/m3 for loading and
transport, to cost about US$ 1\.2 million\. To accelerate the beginning of removal was agreed to
launch procurement of the Phase 1 contract prior to negotiations with pre-financing from the
original PRODEPUR and to reimburse the latter subsequently through retroactive financing
under the proposed AF\.
In Phase 2 (which depending on locations may partially overlap with Phase 1) debris will be
moved under cash-for-work arrangements from housing lots to designated collection points on
streets and/or open spaces already cleared under Phase 1 for removal by the hauling contractor\.
(Depending on their nature, some debris may be out of reach for cash-for-work activities for
reasons of worker safety and require the intervention of specialized and adequately equipped
contractors\. Removal is estimated to take about 4 months and, using the estimated average cost
of US$40/cubic meter for loading and transport, to cost about US$ 1\.2 million exclusive of the
cost of cash-for-work program (estimated to cost US$ 100,000) or the possible intervention of
specialized demolition contractors\.
While some recycling is taking place on-site, use of old construction materials should be
restricted to the extent feasible since their poor quality was a major factor in the severity of the
damages caused by the earthquake\. All collected debris will be hauled to the
Truitier
landfill site
which is implemented with the support of the Bank Infrastructure and Institutions Emergency
Recovery Project (P120895) and operated by MTPTC\. A Debris Management Pilot Program at
the site landfill allows the recycling of debris and therefore will ensure that the disposal of all
debris meets the Banks environmental safeguard requirements\.
Disaster debris removal cannot be engineered as precisely as a construction project and, as
experience elsewhere has shown, it carries a lot of unforeseeables\. A high degree of flexibility
in logistical arrangements will be imperative and corresponding provisions for cost contingencies
and time schedules built in the contracts\.
(b)
Sub-Component 2: Cash Grants for Housing Repair and Reconstruction
(US$ 13\.6
million)
Upon completion of a Community-Based Mapping exercise to determine the eligibility of
potential beneficiaries, the Sub-Component will finance the provision of a total of about 5,000
cash grants for (i) repair of houses assessed as structurally solid or (ii) on-site reconstruction of
houses either destroyed or damaged beyond repair in the
Delmas 32
neighborhood or other
selected PRODEPUR areas\. Assessments carried out in
Delmas 32
after the earthquake by PADF
under the oversight of MTPTC showed that about 1,100 houses had been either destroyed or
damaged beyond repair (red tag) while about 1,400 suffered damages but were considered
repairable (yellow tag)\. Based on architectural studies carried out by UN-Habitat cash grants for
repair work will amount to US$ 1,350\. Cash grants for reconstruction will amount to US$ 3,500
and cover the costs of the construction of a core housing unit of about 18 sqm on the basis of
detailed designs prepared by UN-Habitat\. However, qualified beneficiaries may complement the
grant funds with either their own resources (through cash contributions from family or loans
from banks or other sources) or team up with other beneficiaries to pool resources and build
larger houses (including multifamily dwellings)
after verification of project conformity with
building codes by the CRC Supervision Team\.
Page 6
In the absence of official documents proving ownership or rental status selection of beneficiaries
will be carried out through community-based mapping\. Grants will be disbursed in successive
tranches upon verification by CRC of conformity of construction with approved designs
(approval of design by CRC: 25%: completion of foundations: 25%; completion of walls: 25%,
completion of roof: 25%)\.
(c)
Sub-Component 3: Community Infrastructure Repair and Improvement
(US$ 7\.3 million)
The Sub-Component will finance the repair, improvement and extension of basic community
infrastructure such as roads and walkways, drainage channels, solid waste management, water
supply systems and sanitation facilities\. Already prior to the earthquake many areas of the
Delmas 32
neighborhood and/or other PRODEPUR areas were not accessible to motorized
vehicles and even pedestrian access was difficult and hazardous, especially during rainy weather\.
Drainage ditches and channels
whose proper functioning is essential in an environment with
high rainfalls are frequently blocked by solid waste and silt, (an issue that is also addressed
under the Banks the Infrastructure and Institutions Emergency Recovery Project (P120895) in
other areas of Port-au-Prince)\. Supply of potable water was limited and only intermittently
available, due to frequent power outages and/or lack of fuel for back-up generators in pumping
stations\. Another limiting factor was the high rate of leakage in the network as evidenced by a
leak detection study carried out in August 2010 by GRET, a French organization of water
management experts\.
A
detailed work program for the Sub-Component has not been prepared yet since many elements
of the program will only be identified progressively as the removal of debris takes place\.
Tentatively, the following activities are being considered:
Roads and pedestrian access
:
Construction of a central access road for
Delmas 32
is currently
being contemplated by USAID\. The AF is considering the financing of a series of branch roads
to expand improved access deeper into thus far inaccessible neighborhoods and/or upgrade
various unpaved track roads with paving to all-weather transit capacity\. AF financing may also
be provided for the building of hard-surface walkways (and stairs) to ensure safe all-weather
access conditions in peripheral areas\.
Drainage ditches and channels
:
AF financing will support the repair of ditches and channels that
may have been damaged by the earthquake as well as construction of complementary small
channels and ditches in neighborhoods with extensive housing reconstruction activities\. It may
also fund the one-time cleaning of some channels filled up with building debris and solid waste
(with the understanding that all subsequent regular cleaning has to be ensured by the
Delmas
Municipality)\.
Solid Waste
:
AF financing could support the provision of solid waste collection equipment and
storage facilities along the improved access road network\. Possible options need to be further
explored as to their actual feasibility and discussed with the
Delmas
Municipality and the
Metropolitan Solid Waste Collection Service of the Port au Prince area (SMCRS)
Water Supply
:
AF financing may support the rehabilitation and/or expansion of water
distribution points (
kiosques
)
as well as the repair and/or replacement of deteriorated sections of
the water supply pipe network
Sanitation
:
Given the high housing density of
Delmas 32
(which is about 6-7 times higher than
the average for Port-au-Prince) it is impossible to find space for a separate sanitation facility for
Page 7
each household\. Construction of community toilets or sanitary blocks (shared between several of
families) may be an option to improve the overall environment quality, and by reducing the risks
of gastrointestinal disease transmission may have a significant public health impact\. However, as
a
preliminary step, it will need to be ascertained that the community toilet concept is indeed
feasible in the Haiti context and does not run counter societal taboos and customs, which will
prevent proper operation and maintenance in accordance with acceptable sanitary standards\.
(d)
Sub-Component 4: Advisory Services
(US$ 5\.6 million)\.
The Sub-Component will finance international and local technical assistance and consulting
services that will be required for the efficient implementation of the activities to be financed
under Component 4 of the AF\.
Tentatively, the following activities will be supported:
Preparation of Delmas 32 Urban Restructuring Plan and Natural Risk Map
:
Delmas 32
is the
result of an invasion of a stretch of predominantly Government owned land in the early 1980s\.
Uncontrolled development of housing not only led to the production of a chaotic urban fabric,
but also the occupation of many areas intrinsically unsuitable for permanent housing because of
physical site constraints and associated risks (landslides, flash-floods, etc\.)\. The collapse of a
great many buildings during the earthquake provides a unique opportunity to combine the
housing reconstruction effort with an attempt to improve the internal urban structure of the
neighborhood by freeing up right-of-ways for streets, open spaces, and educational, health care,
and other public administration facilities\. Moreover, many houses built in areas at risk must be
prevented from being rebuilt\.
Unlike many traditional urban development plans the proposed Urban Restructuring Plan and
Natural Risk Map will attempt to use the identification of natural risks resulting from the
physical (i\.e\. topographical, hydrological, geological, etc\.) features of the site as the basis for the
preparation of urban redevelopment options for
Delmas 32
\.
Terms of Reference have been
prepared and agreed upon with the Haitian authorities\. The proposed urban restructuring plan
methodology will be first tested in
Delmas 32
but
could be rapidly duplicated in other
neighborhoods such as, for instance,
Carrefour Feuille
\.
Similarly, the community-based
mapping exercises to determine property tenure status in
Delmas 32
and possibly
Carrefour
Feuille
under this component will be based on ongoing preparatory work by Haitian authorities,
IOM, and UN Habitat and link into other metropolitan planning initiatives\.
Advisory Services for Communities
:
The implementation of both the housing repair and
reconstruction program and the community infrastructure repair and improvement program will
require close and permanent assistance by teams of adequately skilled international and local
specialists\.
The main activities that will be supported by the Sub-Component to this effect include (but are
not limited to):
MDOD Contracts:
Like the original PRODEPUR project, most of the AF funded
activities will be undertaken with the help of MDODs which will manage the
implementation on behalf of BMPAD and ensure effective coordination with
COPRODEPs, CBOs, and area municipalities, (see Annex 5/B for details)\.
Page 8
Community-based Mapping
:
The purpose of this exercise is to collect information on the
demographics and tenure status of residents and on the physical
boundaries/characteristics of affected land parcels and buildings prior to the start of repair
and/or reconstruction activities\.
Community Reconstruction Centers (CRCs
): The proposed AF will finance the cost of
the creation and subsequent operation of a CRC in each of the project neighborhoods
where AF funded activities will take place\. Costs to be covered will include staffing,
training, operating expenses as well if needed, construction of office space
Other Consulting Services
:
Additionally, the Sub-Component may finance studies or the
provision of other advisory services to assist the GoH in the preparation of medium- and long
term urban development and housing strategies and associated policy and administrative
measures\.
V\. Financing
Source:
Borrower/Recipient
IBRD
IDA
($m\.)
0
0
0
30
Others (specify)
0
Total: 30
VI\. Implementation
Summary of original PRODEPUR Implementation Arrangements
Overall project implementation arrangements will remain unchanged from PRODEPUR\.
Specific departures from ongoing PRODEPUR procedures will only occur in the implementation
management of some of the sub-projects financed under the proposed AF as detailed below:
The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) oversees the Project\. MEF delegates
overall Project execution to BMPAD, a national agency under MEF with administrative and
financial autonomy\. BMPAD in turn delegates day-to-day operations to MDODs i\.e\. Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) with sufficient capacity to ensure an efficient
implementation of project activities\.
Executing entities
(a) BMPAD
is an autonomous public institution
,
created in 1985 to: (i) receive and convert
into cash the food aid from the international donors; and (ii) identify and fund
Government development projects with relevant institutions and/or agencies, in areas
such as road construction, agriculture, education, health, and commerce\. BMPAD is
governed by a Board chaired by the Minister of Finance and including several other key
line ministries as active members\. BMPAD has a strong track record of working together
Page 9
with other sector Ministries, combined with detailed knowledge of procedures applied by
the various donors\. BMPAD is managed by a General Director, who reports to the
Boards Secretariat, and is composed of technical, finance, and administrative units\.
(b)
Project Coordination Unit (PCU/BMPAD
)
is responsible for overall Project coordination,
management, administration, and oversight\. The PCU/BMPADs responsibilities include:
(i) continuous oversight of the execution of information campaigns; (ii) Project reporting
to the Bank; (iii) overall Project financial management; (iv) maintenance and updating of
the Project Management Information System (MIS); and (v) impact evaluation\.
(c)
Community-based Organizations (CBOs
)
are groups of citizens (of 20-40 families, each
representing some 100-200 individuals) that share a common interest and are organized
into officially constituted civil associations\. They identify, prepare, implement, supervise,
operate and maintain their subprojects, assisted by technical assistance and training made
available by Community Development Councils (COPRODEPs) and the MDODs (see
below)\.
(d)
Community Development Councils (COPRODEPs)
include representatives of CBOs,
civil society, and local government\. As the principal entity for targeting benefits and
allocating Project resources at the communal level, COPRODEPs also provide a critical
link to local government and have the potential to engage in other non-project activities\.
They receive, prioritize, and approve subproject proposals from CBOs during regularly
scheduled and broadly publicized meetings that the public is encouraged to attend, and
then submit investment plans to their respective MDODs\. COPRODEPs also accompany
CBOs during subproject implementation and subsequent operation and maintenance\.
(e)
Maîtres D´Ouvrage Délégués
(MDODs
)
are NGOs that are contracted as services
providers to: (i) assist CBOs and COPRODEPs in strengthening their organizational and
operational capacity; (ii)
accompany COPRODEPs and CBOs in the on-the-ground
execution of Project activities; (iii) provide technical assistance to CBOs throughout the
subproject cycle; (iv) technically appraise subproject proposals that have been approved
by the COPRODEPs; (v) enter into subproject agreements with CBOs for the financing
of subprojects; and (vi) transfer funds for subproject execution directly to the bank
account of the concerned CBOs\. Subsidiary implementation agreements signed between
BMPAD and MDODs define the latters specific roles and responsibilities in facilitating
Project implementation\.
Implementation Procedures for AF Financed Components
Community Reconstruction Centers (CRCs)
:
In order to facilitate the implementation of the
activities to be financed under the AF, BMPAD and the municipalities responsible for the project
areas will jointly establish Community Reconstruction Centers (CRCs) (
Centres dExcellence
)\.
These centers will be located within the project neighborhoods and their purpose will be to
provide the neighborhood communities with a one-stop consultation and training
place open to
all neighborhood residents (
i\.e\. not limited to AF cash-grant beneficiaries
)
for all questions
related to housing repair and reconstruction, compliance with new building codes
,
and/or
identification and prioritization of community infrastructure improvements including, but not
limited to, technical advice and counseling on legal/social issues\. The centers will also serve as
an information facility creating a strong and permanent interface between communities,
Page 10
municipal authorities, BMPAD and MDODs\. To this end, the CRCs will be staffed with experts
with adequate professional experience in the fields of structural engineering and construction
management, urban planning, and all aspects of community work\. Ultimately, it is expected that
these centers could be converted into branch offices of the municipal administration for the
project area\.
Implementation Arrangements for Debris removal:
Debris removal from
Delmas 32
and/or any other PRODEPUR areas will be carried out under
the joint oversight of the COPRODEP and municipality responsible for the project neighborhood
and the direct supervision of day-by-day operations by the CRCs\. Even though some recycling of
debris will take place, the use of recycled building materials will not be encouraged since their
generally poor quality was a major factor in the severity of damages caused by the earthquake\.
All debris removal from streets and open spaces and hauling to the
Truitier
landfill site will be
undertaken by licensed contractors hired in accordance with Bank procurement guidelines\.
Debris removal from housing lots (including transport to collection points) will be carried out
through cash-for-work procedures unless the MDOD decides that the nature of debris is such that
workers safety is at risk and the intervention of specialized contractors is required\. The MDOD
will also be responsible for ensuring the compliance of contractors and cash-for-work workers
with environmental regulations and instructions for the handling of possibly found human
remains\. Operational plans prepared by the contractors and reviewed by MDOD and CRCs will
be submitted periodically to the communities concerned for consultation prior to implementation\.
Implementation Arrangements for Housing Repair and Reconstruction
Based on the results of a community-based mapping exercise in the project areas the AF will
finance fixed-amount cash-grants for housing repair (US$ 1,350)
a
nd housing reconstruction
(US$3,500) per household to allow qualified residents of the
Delmas 32
neighborhood and/or
other PRODEPUR areas to repair and/or rebuild their houses themselves and/or with the help of
their families\.
The implementation of repair and reconstruction program will rely on the support provided by
teams of appropriately trained facilitators operating through the CRCs\. To this effect all potential
grant beneficiaries will be encouraged to form small neighborhood beneficiary groups of about
10 households each which will, to the extent feasible, collectively organize and manage the
implementation of repair and reconstruction works under the supervision of a team of
specifically assigned facilitators and engineering/technical staff\.
A
first step in the repair and reconstruction process will be the identification of ownership or
occupancy rights\. In the absence of written documents these rights will be determined through
community-based mapping and certification procedures further detailed in Annex 5/E\. Grant
applications prepared with the help of the group specific facilitators by qualified potential
beneficiaries will be submitted to the CRCs for technical review\. Applications deemed
acceptable will be forwarded to a Grant Award Committee comprised of representatives of the
neighborhood COPRODEP, the area Municipality, and BMPAD for review and approval\.
Because of the complexity of the tenure situation in most of the PRODEPUR areas special
attention will be paid to make provision for simple, transparent and explicit rules regulating the
rights of previous renters vis-
à-vis building or land owners in order to secure their continuing
access and occupancy of their repaired or rebuilt previous dwellings\. A detailed description of
all procedures pertaining to grant administration is contained in the amended Operations Manual\.
Page 11
Upon approval of the Grant, the beneficiary will, after a site visit by CRC technical experts,
discuss and agree with the CRC facilitators on
in the case of housing repairs (houses tagged yellow or red repairable)
(i)
the scope of repairs
(ii)
the design and engineering issues and ensuing technical specifications for repair work
(iii)
the methods and schedule of work implementation
(iv)
the arrangements for work supervision by CRC
(v)
the Grant disbursement arrangements
in the case of housing reconstruction
(i)
the design of the proposed construction (using preferentially standard designs
preapproved by MTPTC)
(ii)
the design and engineering issues and ensuing technical specifications for
construction in the case of non standard pre-approved design
(iii)
the methods and schedule of work implementation
(iv)
the arrangements for work supervision by CRC
(v)
the Grant disbursement arrangements
Grants for housing reconstruction will be disbursed in four successive tranches: 25% on approval
of design by CRC; 25% on completion of foundation/platform, 25 % on completion of walls,
25% on completion of roof\. For housing repairs, the initial tranche will amount to 50% of the
Grant, with the second tranche paid upon certification of satisfactory progress\. All disbursements
will be contingent on prior certification by CRC of conformity of construction work with agreed
design and technical specifications and building codes\.
Grant disbursements will be made by the MDODs to bank accounts opened either individually or
communally by the neighborhood beneficiary groups\. For security reasons no cash transactions
will be made\.
Implementation Arrangements for Community Infrastructure Repair and Improvement
Proposals for road and pedestrian access repair and improvement, drainage repair and
improvement, solid waste collection improvement, and rehabilitation of water distribution points
will be identified by neighborhood groups, CBOs and/or in the case of water and sanitation by
existing water committees and submitted to the CRC for technical review and discussion with the
relevant local or central government authorities\. Upon agreement by the communities of final
designs, proposals will be submitted to the neighborhood COPRODEP for approval\.
Implementation methods will largely depend on the nature of works and their technical
requirements\. Execution of possibly needed repair work on the water supply pipe network will
be a joint decision of COPRODEP, CAMEP, and the area Municipality\.
VII\.
Safeguard Policies (including public consultation)
Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project
Yes No
Environmental Assessment
(
OP
/
BP
4\.01) X
Page 12
Natural Habitats (
OP
/
BP
4\.04)
X
Pest Management (
OP 4\.09
)
X
Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4\.11)
X
Involuntary Resettlement (
OP
/
BP
4\.12) X
Indigenous Peoples (
OP
/
BP
4\.10)
X
Forests (
OP
/
BP
4\.36)
X
Safety of Dams (
OP
/
BP
4\.37)
X
Projects in Disputed Areas (
OP
/
BP
7\.60)
X
Projects on International Waterways (
OP
/
BP
7\.50)
X
VIII\.
Contact point at World Bank and Borrower
World Bank
Contact:
Bernice Van Bronkhorst
Title:
Senior Urban Specialist
Tel:
+1
2024737877
Email:
bvanbronkhorst@worldbank\.org
Implementing Agencies
Contact: Henriot
Nader
Title:
Project
Coordinator
Tel:
+509
37322002
Email:
henriotnader@yahoo\.com
IX\.
For more information contact:
The InfoShop
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 458-4500
Fax: (202) 522-1500
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/infoshop | APPROVAL |
P043255 |  ICRR 12835
Report Number : ICRR12835
IEG ICR Review
Independent Evaluation Group
1\. Project Data: Date Posted : 03/10/2008
PROJ ID : P043255 Appraisal Actual
Project Name : RY Basic Education US$M ):
Project Costs (US$M): 62\.6 57\.3
Expansion Project
Country : Yemen Loan /Credit (US$M):
Loan/ US$M ): 56\.0 65\.6
Sector Board : ED US$M):
Cofinancing (US$M ):
Sector (s): Primary education
(76%)
Tertiary education
(10%)
Central government
administration (10%)
Other social services
(4%)
Theme (s): Education for all (25%
- P)
Gender (25% - P)
Rural services and
infrastructure (24% -
P)
Social analysis and
monitoring (13% - S)
Participation and civic
engagement (13% - S)
L/C Number : C3422
Board Approval Date : 10/17/2000
Partners involved : Closing Date : 06/30/2006 06/30/2007
Evaluator : Panel Reviewer : Group Manager : Group :
Helen Abadzi Kris Hallberg Soniya Carvalho IEGSG
2\. Project Objectives and Components:
a\. Objectives:
The development objective of the Basic Education Expansion Project (BEEP) was to increase the grade 1-6
enrollment of rural children, especially girls, in basic education of adequate quality \.
b\.Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?
No
c\. Components (or Key Conditions in the case of DPLs, as appropriate):
(a) Expansion of Access (US$38\.90m at appraisal, US$48\.3m actual) for school construction, extension,
education and rehabilitation and school maintenance \.
(b) Quality Improvement (US$9\.7m at appraisal, US$11\.20m actual) for improving teacher skills and deployment,
supplying furniture and teaching /learning materials to schools
(c) Capacity Building (US$7\.10m at appraisal, US$7\.8m actual) for community participation, planning, monitoring
and evaluation in the Ministry of Education as well as project management \.
d\. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates:
After extension of one year, the project was closed on June 30, 2007\. The exchange rate between SDRs and US
dollars increased the loan funds available \. As a result, reallocation among various categories changed repeatedly,
and 125 additional schools were built\. Ultimately, all funds were disbursed (ICR p\. 3)\.
3\. Relevance of Objectives & Design:
The overall relevance of Project objectives is substantial, both at the time of preparation and at completion \. As
stated in the 2006 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), about 42% of the population of 19\.2 million still live below the
national poverty line, most of them (83%) in rural areas, and Yemen ranked 151st out of 177 countries on the 2005
Human Development Index\. Despite significant improvements in basic education indicators, many areas of concern
remain without access to basic education for girls, and 70% of women are illiterate\.
Efforts to simplify design have compromised some aspects of the project \. Risks related to the implementation of the
maintenance grant mechanisms were underestimated, and there were no real outcome indicators of quality \.
4\. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy):
Increasing the grade 1-6 enrollment of rural children, especially girls, in basic education of adequate quality
(substantial)\.
- Expansion of Access : 2,961 additional classrooms have been constructed and made available to school children in
the grades 1-6\. The large part of these classrooms have been provided through the construction of 497 new schools
with 3 and 6 classrooms\. All new constructed schools were adequately equipped \. The number of enrolled children in
the surveyed schools has increased by 44,949 or about 80\.7%\. The number of boys enrolled in basic education has
increased by 26,376 (70\.8%) and number of girls enrolled in basic education has increased by 18,799 (99\.8%)\.
- Girls' share in total enrolment of school children has been increased by more than the targeted figure of 60%\. The
increase realized for girls share by the end of the project as average for all five governorates was 70%\.
- New teaching/learning methodologies were introduced with the revised education curricula for grades 1 â 6, and
extensive in-service teachers training has taken place \. Teachers were deployed to rural areas, and efforts were
made to link remuneration with work performance \. (However, there are no indicators measuring these
achievements)\.
- Community participation was activated on different activities such as identifying type of school required, selecting
the school site, supervising the construction process \. About 196 parental councils were established that contributed
to schools in cash and in kind \.
5\. Efficiency (not applicable to DPLs):
-Overall efficiency is modest\. Civil works, which accounted for 70% of project expenditures) were constructed with
modest efficiency\. Reviews of earlier projects and a 2004 IEG project performance assessment review had raised
the issues of high unit costs and mismanagement potential \. The project under review started with a unit cost of
US$138 in 2001 and increased it to US$154 in 2002\. Subsequently it adopted cost -effective school designs and
decentralized bidding procedures which lowered unit costs per square meter (US$151 in 2003)\. By comparison, unit
costs of the Social Fund for Development were US$ 158 in 2003, but those of the Department of Public Works (PWP)
were slightly lower, US$147\. The average unit cost of classroom construction was US$ 13,700, which is relatively
high by international standards \. In comments on the draft ICR Review, the Region noted that the slightly higher unit
cost of BEEP projects compared to PWP costs are explained by the higher percentage of BEEP projects located in
rural areas where construction is more expensive due to difficult access, and the fact that PWP schools have fewer
facilities than PWP schools\.
- The number of teachers who benefited from in -service training surpassed targets, though the unit cost per trainee
was 20% lower than expected\. However, the ICR does not give the reasons for reduced expenditures \. There are few
other indicators to suggest the efficiency of delivering instruction to students (e\.g\. the percentage of officially
available time students were engaged in instruction )\.
ERR )/Financial Rate of Return (FRR)
a\. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) FRR ) at appraisal and the
re-
re -estimated value at evaluation :
Rate Available? Point Value Coverage/Scope*
Appraisal No
ICR estimate No
* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated\.
6\. Outcome:
The project contributed significantly to the provision of appropriate access and improving the learning
environments for grades 1-6 students especially in the remote rural areas through building new schools, extending
and rehabilitating existing schools \.
- The overall enrollment of school children has increased by more than the targeted figure 30%; the increase by the
end of the project on average for the five supported governorates was 48%\. The gross enrollment rate of girls in
grades 1-6 has not only reached the target (54%) but exceeded the target in all five targeted governorates; field
survey has indicated that the average increase is 78%, based on population projections \. The gender gap was
reduced in the five governorates as Gender Parity Index improved globally from 0\.39 in 1999 to 0\.72 in 2006\.
- The project directly addressed the CAS objective of creation of an early stream of social benefits for the poor by
increasing enrollment in basic education (grades 1-6) in 70 underserved rural districts\. According to the beneficiary
survey, 35 to 50% of the families in the communities covered by the project were considered as poor \.
-As a result of the project, community participation improved in school identification, construction, maintenance and
management\. Around 70% of schools surveyed have established Father or Mother Councils, and 83% of the
councils were actually in operation at the time of an evaluation survey \. The beneficiary communities became
involved in the school construction and rehabilitation activities \.
a\. Outcome Rating : Satisfactory
7\. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating:
The risk to development outcome is rated moderate \. The government is committed to increased school access
and quality for all\. But project outcomes are at risk from limited maintenance of civil works, difficulties in assigning
teachers to rural areas, and uncertainty regarding the continuing operation of parents' councils \. Thus it is possible
that the newly established schools will not operate in full capacity in the future \.
a\. Risk to Development Outcome Rating : Moderate
8\. Assessment of Bank Performance:
Overall, Bank performance was satisfactory \. During appraisal, lessons from earlier operations were taken into
account, and the project components were kept simple \. However, the monitoring and evaluation was
rudimentary, and quality indicators were not included (although available)\. Supervision essentially was
continuous\. The task manager was based in the Country Office; hence was available to provide just -inâtime
advice to the Borrower\. Residence in the country office has also helped to strengthen policy and technical
collaboration with other donors \. However, the Bank did not sufficiently focus on the quality of education provided
in the schools and the basic skills of students \. The ICR says very little regarding the extent to which students
acquired basic skills\.
at -Entry :Satisfactory
a\. Ensuring Quality -at-
b\. Quality of Supervision :Highly Satisfactory
c\. Overall Bank Performance :Satisfactory
9\. Assessment of Borrower Performance:
Borrower performance is rated satisfactory \. Overall, the government maintained a high financial commitment to
education\. Over the past decade, the overall allocation to the education sector has oscillated between 5 and 7%
of GDP (5\.4% in 2005)\. The abolition of school fees for girls (grades 1-6) and boys (grades 1-3) confirmed its
commitment to achieving the MDGs of universal primary enrolment and of gender parity \.
During implementation, the Ministry of Education directly implemented the project under the overall guidance and
oversight of a Steering Committee, while a credit administration unit played only a nominal role \. The Steering
Committee approved annual plans and studies in a timely manner \.
a\. Government Performance :Satisfactory
b\. Implementing Agency Performance :Satisfactory
c\. Overall Borrower Performance :Satisfactory
10\. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization:
- The project had only a rudimentary monitoring plan \. It supported annual educational surveys and a
comprehensive school survey that were used to estimate outcome performance indicators \. An evaluation of the
teacher training activities was conducted, but the ICR does not mention its outcomes \. The project included no
monitoring indicators of capacity improvement \. The ICR does not offer indicators of actual attendance, completion,
or transition rates\.
-The ICR states that indicators for the quality component were not developed because the government had no
capacity\. However, completion and transition rates might have been used as proxy quality indicators \. In addition,
baseline data from an existing UNESCO study could have been updated, with a focus on governorates covered
under the project, in order to assess the project's impact on learning outcomes (UNESCO/ERDC 2000, "Reasons for
the Students' Level in the Primary School in Reading and Writing from the Perceptions of Teachers and Supervisors ",
Sana'a, Yemen)\.
- The ICR cites no evidence that monitoring and evaluation findings were used in the decision processes of this
project or for next projects\. The limited amount of monitoring information may have impeded such decisions \. In
comments on the draft ICR Review, the Region noted that Annual Education Surveys were used during supervision
to assess progress toward the achievement of PDOs \.
a\. M&E Quality Rating : Modest
11\. Other Issues (Safeguards, Fiduciary, Unintended Positive and Negative Impacts):
No special issues listed in this section \.
12\.
12\. Ratings : ICR IEG Review Reason for
Disagreement /Comments
Outcome : Satisfactory Satisfactory
Risk to Development Moderate Moderate
Outcome :
Bank Performance : Satisfactory Satisfactory
Borrower Performance : Satisfactory Satisfactory
Quality of ICR : Satisfactory
NOTES:
NOTES
- When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to
arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as
warranted beginning July 1, 2006\.
- The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could
cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate \.
13\. Lessons:
- In countries or areas where implementation capacity is limited, a single development objective and a simple
project design can achieve substantial changes in development trends \. Under such circumstances, it may be wise
to limit the projectâs scope to a small number of provinces \.
-Community involvement in the definition of educational needs is important in ensuring the enrollment of poor
students\. However, clear research evidence is needed to understand better how (or if) parental involvement
improves learning outcomes\.
- Decentralization of task managers to country offices facilitates rapid response to project -related problems as well
coordination with donors\.
14\. Assessment Recommended? Yes No
15\. Comments on Quality of ICR:
Overall, ICR quality is satisfactory but with some shortcomings Indicators of educational quality and learning
outcomes are not provided\. Detailed data are given about certain aspects of community participation, but little
evidence is provided to establish a link between these activities and improved instructional delivery \.
a\.Quality of ICR Rating : Satisfactory | APPROVAL |
P007524 | The original had problem with text extraction\. pdftotext Unable to extract text\. | APPROVAL |
P167726 |  â«ÙاÙستخداÙ
اÙرسÙ
Ù Ù?ÙØâ¬
â«Ø±ÙÙ
اÙتÙرÙرâªPAD2948 :â¬â¬
â«ÙØ«ÙÙØ© اÙتÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙ
سب٠ÙÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø´Ø£Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ÙØØ© Ù
ÙترØØ©â¬
â«Ø¨Ù
بÙغ ⪠71â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙاÙر Ø£Ù
رÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
٠اÙصÙدÙ٠ااÙستئÙ
اÙÙ Ùغزة ÙاÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙØ©â¬
â«Ø¥ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«ÙصاÙØâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع غزة اÙØارÙØ¡ â اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙدعÙ
اÙعÙ
٠اÙØرâ¬
â«âª 03â¬ÙÙÙÙÙâª/â¬ØªÙ
Ùز âª8372â¬â¬
â«ÙØاع اÙÙ
Ù
ارسات اÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙÙØÙ
اÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© ÙاÙعÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ÙØÙØ© اÙشر٠اأÙÙØ³Ø ÙØ´Ù
ا٠أÙ?رÙÙÙاâ¬
â«ÙÙتصر تÙزÙع Ùذ٠اÙÙØ«ÙÙØ© عÙ٠اÙجÙات ÙاأÙÙ?راد اÙÙ
رسÙØ© Ø¥ÙÙÙÙ
⪠Øâ¬ÙÙجÙز ÙÙÙ
استخداÙ
Ùا Ø£Ùداء ÙاجباتÙÙ
اÙرسÙ
ÙØ© Ù?Øسب⪠\.â¬Ùا٠ÙجÙزâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø®Ø§ÙÙ? Ø°Ù٠اÙÙØ´Ù? ع٠Ù
ضÙ
ÙÙÙا دÙ٠إذ٠Ù
٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø£Ø³Ø¹Ø§Ø± اÙعÙ
ÙØ© ÙاÙÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙÙ
عادÙØ© ÙÙاâ¬
â«(سعر اÙصرÙ? اÙسار٠Ù?٠⪠72â¬ÙÙÙÙÙâª/â¬ØªÙ
Ùز âª)8372â¬â¬
â«ÙØدة اÙعÙ
ÙØ© = شاÙ٠إسرائÙÙ٠جدÙدâ¬
â«Ø´Ø§Ù٠إسرائÙÙ٠جدÙد ÙاØد = ⪠3\.81â¬Ø¯ÙاÙر Ø£Ù
رÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¯ÙاÙر Ø£Ù
رÙÙÙ ÙاØد = ⪠0\.3â¬Ø´Ø§Ù٠إسرائÙÙ٠جدÙدâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙØ© اÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«âª 7â¬ÙÙاÙرâª/â¬ÙاÙÙ٠اÙثاÙÙ â ⪠07â¬Ø¯ÙسÙ
برâª/â¬ÙاÙÙ٠اأÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ùائب رئÙس اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙشؤÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙØÙة⪠:â¬Ù?رÙد بÙØاجâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù
ث٠اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ
ÙÙ
دÙر Ù
Ùتب اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù?٠اÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙØ© ÙÙØاع غزة⪠:â¬Ù
ارÙÙا ÙÙسâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
دÙر Ø£Ù٠بÙØاع اÙÙ
Ù
ارسات اÙعاÙÙ
Ùة⪠:â¬Ù
ÙÙا٠ج⪠\.â¬Ø±ÙتÙÙسÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
دÙر بÙØاع اÙÙ
Ù
ارسات⪠:â¬ÙÙا برÙÙسÙâ¬
â«Ø³Ù
Ùرة Ø£ØÙ
د ØÙس⪠Øâ¬ÙرÙستÙبا٠رÙداÙâª-â¬ÙاÙÙâªØâ¬â¬
â«Ø±Ø¦Ùسا Ù?رÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ùâª:â¬â¬
â«Ù?رÙدرÙÙ٠أÙتاâ¬
â«ÙائÙ
Ø© ااÙختصارات ÙاأÙسÙ
اء اÙÙ
ختصرةâ¬
â«ÙجÙØ© استشارÙة⬠â«âªACâ¬â¬
â«Ø¥Ø³ØªØ±Ø§ØªÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
ساعدة⬠â«âªASâ¬â¬
â«Ø®ØØ© اÙعÙ
٠اÙÙÙ?Øر٠اÙثاÙÙØ© بشأ٠اÙÙ
ساÙاة بÙ٠اÙجÙسÙÙ⬠â«âªC-GAP IIâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتØÙÙاÙت اÙÙÙدÙة⬠â«âªCTâ¬â¬
â«Ø¨Ø±ÙاÙ
ج اÙتØÙÙاÙت اÙÙÙدÙة⬠â«âªCTPâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù⬠â«âªC4Wâ¬â¬
â«ØµØµâ¬ â«Ù
Ø® ÙÙ⬠â«Øساب Ù?⬠â«âªDAâ¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙتØاد اأÙÙرÙبÙ⬠â«âªEUâ¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙضاع اÙÙشة ÙاÙصراعات ÙاÙعÙÙ?⬠â«âªFCVâ¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø¥Ùدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙة⬠â«âªFMâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ØªÙ?اÙÙØ© Ù
ÙØة⬠â«âªGAâ¬â¬
â«Ø¥Ø¬Ù
اÙ٠اÙÙاتج اÙÙ
ØÙÙ⬠â«âªGDPâ¬â¬
â«Ø¥Ø¬Ù
اÙ٠اÙدخ٠اÙÙÙÙ
Ù⬠â«âªGNIâ¬â¬
â«ÙØاع اÙÙ
Ù
ارسات اÙعاÙÙ
Ùة⬠â«âªGPâ¬â¬
â«Ø¯Ø§Ø¦Ø±Ø© Ù
عاÙجة اÙÙ
ظاÙÙ
⬠â«âªGRSâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ØªÙ?اÙÙØ© تÙÙ?Ùذ⬠â«âªIAâ¬â¬
â«ØªÙÙÙÙÙجÙا اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات ÙااÙتصااÙت⬠â«âªICTâ¬â¬
â«ØªÙرÙر Ù
اÙÙ Ù
رØÙÙ⬠â«âªIFRâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
بتÙرة ÙÙÙØاع اÙخاص⬠â«âªIPSDâ¬â¬
â«Ø®ØØ© Ù
ساÙدة اÙتÙÙ?Ùذ⬠â«âªISPâ¬â¬
â«ØªÙارÙر Ø£Ùضاع اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° ÙÙتائجÙ⬠â«âªISRâ¬â¬
â«ØªÙÙÙÙÙجÙا اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات⬠â«âªITâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شارÙØ© Ù?٠اأÙÙد٠اÙعاÙ
Ùة⬠â«âªLFPâ¬â¬
â«Ø§Ùرصد ÙاÙتÙÙÙÙ
⬠â«âªM&Eâ¬â¬
â«Ù
شرÙع تÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙبÙدÙات⬠â«âªMDPâ¬â¬
â«Ø§Ùشر٠اأÙÙØ³Ø ÙØ´Ù
ا٠أÙ?رÙÙÙا⬠â«âªMENAâ¬â¬
â«Ùزارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙاÙتخØÙØ⬠â«âªMoFPâ¬â¬
â«Ùزارة اÙعÙ
Ù⬠â«âªMoLâ¬â¬
â«Ùزارة اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙة⬠â«âªMoSDâ¬â¬
â«Ùرة تÙ?اÙÙ
â¬â«Ù
Ø° Ù⬠â«âªMOUâ¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø³ØªØ¹Ø±Ø§Ø¶ Ù
ÙتصÙ? اÙÙ
دة⬠â«âªMTRâ¬â¬
â«Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙة⬠â«âªNDCâ¬â¬
â«Ø®Ø§Ø±Ø¬ دائرة اÙتعÙÙÙ
ÙاÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙتدرÙب⬠â«âªNEETâ¬â¬
â«Ù
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر ØÙÙÙ
Ùة⬠â«âªNGOsâ¬â¬
â«Ø£Ø¬Ùدة اÙسÙاسات اÙÙØÙÙة⬠â«âªNPAâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙØØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙة⬠â«âªPAâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙاز اÙÙ
رÙز٠ÙØ¥ÙØصاء اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙ⬠â«âªPCBSâ¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø³ØªÙصاء Ø¥ÙÙ?ا٠ÙاستÙاÙ٠اأÙسر اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙة⬠â«âªPECSâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙدÙ? اإÙÙÙ
ائ٠ÙÙÙ
شرÙع⬠â«âªPDOâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙع⬠â«âªPIAâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙة⬠â«âªPNGOsâ¬â¬
â«Ø¯ÙÙ٠عÙ
ÙÙات اÙÙ
شرÙع⬠â«âªPOMâ¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø£Ùراض٠اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙة⬠â«âªPTâ¬â¬
â«Ø¨Ùا٠اÙÙÙ?Ùات⬠â«âªSOEsâ¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø£Ùداة اÙÙ
ÙÙجÙØ© ÙتصÙÙÙ? Ù
خاØر اÙعÙ
ÙÙات⬠â«âªSORTâ¬â¬
â«Ù
شرÙع تعزÙز اÙØÙ
اÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙة⬠â«âªSPEPâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ساعدة اÙÙ?ÙÙة⬠â«âªTAâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ØªÙ?اÙÙØ© Ù
ÙØØ© اÙصÙدÙ٠ااÙستئÙ
اÙÙ⬠â«âªTFGAâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙدÙ٠ااÙستئÙ
اÙÙ Ùغزة ÙاÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙة⬠â«âªTFGWBâ¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙ
Ù
اÙÙ
تØدة⬠â«âªUNâ¬â¬
â«ÙÙاÙØ© اأÙÙ
Ù
اÙÙ
تØدة Ø¥Ùغاثة ÙتشغÙ٠اÙاÙجئÙ٠اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙÙÙ Ù?٠اÙشر٠اأÙدÙÙ (اأÙÙÙرÙا)⬠â«âªUNRWAâ¬â¬
â«ØÙب سØب⬠â«âªWAâ¬â¬
â«Ù
جÙ
Ùعة اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⬠â«âªWBGâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙØ© ÙÙØاع غزة⬠â«âªWB&Gâ¬â¬
â«Ø¬Ø¯Ù٠اÙÙ
ØتÙÙاتâ¬
â«ØµØÙÙ?Ø© بÙاÙات âª1â¬â¬
â«Ø£ÙاÙ⪠\.â¬Ø§ÙسÙا٠ااÙستراتÙج٠âª6 \.â¬â¬
â«(Ø£) اÙسÙا٠اÙعاÙ
اÙسائد âª6 \.â¬â¬
â«(ب) اÙسÙا٠اÙÙØاع٠ÙاÙÙ
ؤسس٠âª8 \.â¬â¬
â«(ج) اÙصÙØ© اÙÙØ«ÙÙØ© باأÙÙداÙ? اÙعÙÙا âª9 \.â¬â¬
â«Ø«Ø§ÙÙا⪠\.â¬ÙصÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙع âª11 \.â¬â¬
â«(Ø£) اÙÙدÙ? اإÙÙÙ
ائ٠ÙÙÙ
شرÙع âª11 \.â¬â¬
â«(ب) Ù
ÙÙÙات اÙÙ
شرÙع âª11 \.â¬â¬
â«(ج) اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙع âª15 \.â¬â¬
â«(د) سÙسÙØ© اÙÙتائج âª15 \.â¬â¬
â«(ÙÙ) دÙاع٠Ù
شارÙØ© اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙدÙر اÙشرÙاءâª16 \.â¬â¬
â«)Ù( اÙدرÙس اÙÙ
ستÙ?ادة ÙاÙÙ
جسدة Ù?٠تصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙع âª16 \.â¬â¬
â«Ø«Ø§Ùثا⪠\.â¬ØªØ±ØªÙبات اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° âª18 \.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙترتÙبات اÙÙ
ؤسسÙØ© ÙترتÙبات اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° âª18 \.â¬â¬ â«Ø£âª\.â¬â¬
â«(ب) ترتÙبات رصد اÙÙتائج ÙتÙÙÙÙ
Ùا âª19 \.â¬â¬
â«Ø¬âª \.â¬Ø§Ø§ÙستداÙ
Ø© âª20 \.â¬â¬
â«Ø±Ø§Ø¨Ø¹Ø§âª \.â¬Ù
Ùجز اÙتÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙ
سب٠ÙÙÙ
شرÙعâª20 \.â¬â¬
â«(Ø£) تØÙÙ٠اÙجÙاÙب اÙÙ?ÙÙØ© ÙااÙÙتصادÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
اÙÙØ© âª20 \.â¬â¬
â«(ب) اÙجÙاÙب اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙاÙتعاÙدÙØ© âª22 \.â¬â¬
â«(ج) اÙسÙاسات اÙÙÙائÙØ© âª23 \.â¬â¬
â«Ø®Ø§Ù
سا⪠\.â¬Ø§ÙÙ
خاØر اÙرئÙسÙØ© âª24 \.â¬â¬
â«Ø³Ø§Ø¯Ø³Ø§âª \.â¬Ø¥Øار اÙÙتائج ÙرصدÙا âª26 \.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙØ٠⪠:7â¬ØªØ±ØªÙبات اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° ÙØ®ØØ© اÙÙ
ساÙدة âª38 \.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙØ٠⪠:8â¬Ø§ÙبØاÙØ© Ù?ÙÙ
ا بÙ٠اÙÙساء اÙÙ
اÙرات Ù?٠اأÙراض٠اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© âª40 \.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙØ٠⪠:0â¬Ø§Ø¥Ùدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© âª44 \.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«ØµØÙÙ?Ø© بÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات أساسÙØ©â¬
â«âªBASIC_INFO_TABLEâ¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
شرÙع⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙدâª/â¬Ø§ÙبÙداÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع غزة اÙØارÙØ¡ â اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙدعÙ
اÙعÙ
٠اÙØر⬠â«Ø§ÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙØ© ÙÙØاع غزةâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعÙ
ÙÙة⬠â«Ù?ئة تÙÙÙÙ
اÙتصÙÙÙ? اÙبÙئÙ⬠â«Ø£Ø¯Ø§Ø© اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙرÙÙ
اÙتعرÙÙ?Ù ÙÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØاجة اÙÙ
ÙØØ© أ٠اÙÙÙÙدâ¬
â«Ø¬ÙÙ
â اÙتÙÙÙÙ
اÙبÙئ٠غÙر Ù
ØÙÙب⬠â«ØªÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙعات ااÙستثÙ
ارÙة⬠â«âªP167726â¬â¬
â«Ø¹Ù٠اÙÙدراتâ¬
â«Øر٠اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ ÙاÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«[ ] Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ÙÙ٠اØتÙاØ٠ااÙستجابة ÙÙØÙارئ⬠â«[ ] اÙÙÙج اÙبراÙ
ج٠Ù
تعدد اÙÙ
راØÙâ¬
â«[ ] اÙدÙÙØ© (اÙدÙÙ) اÙÙشة⬠â«[ ] سÙسÙØ© اÙÙ
شرÙعاتâ¬
â«[ ] اÙدÙÙØ© (اÙدÙÙ) اÙصغÙرة⬠â«[ ] اÙÙ
ؤشرات اÙÙ
رتبØØ© باÙصرÙ?â¬
â«[ ] ÙعاÙÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙشاشة داخ٠بÙد غÙر Ùش⬠â«[ ] اÙÙسØاء اÙÙ
اÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«[â] اÙصراع⬠â«[ ] اÙضÙ
ا٠اÙÙ
ستÙد Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
شرÙعاتâ¬
â«[ ] ااÙستجابة ÙÙارثة ØبÙعÙØ© Ø£Ù Ù
٠صÙع اإÙÙساÙ⬠â«[ ] اÙسØب اÙÙ
ؤجÙâ¬
â«[ ] اÙترتÙبات اÙبدÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شترÙاتâ¬
â«Ø¹ اÙÙ
تÙÙعâ¬â«ØªØ§Ø±ÙØ® Ø¥ÙÙ?ا٠اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ØªØ§Ø±ÙØ® اÙÙ
ÙاÙ?ÙØ© اÙÙ
تÙÙعâ¬
â«âª 10â¬Ø£ÙتÙبرâª/â¬ØªØ´Ø±Ù٠اأÙÙÙ âª8180â¬â¬ â«âª 01â¬Ø£ØºØ³Øسâª/â¬Ø¢Ø¨âª8102-â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتعاÙ٠بÙ٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙÙ
ؤسسة اÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙدÙ? اإÙÙÙ
ائ٠اÙÙ
ÙترØâ¬
â«ØªÙدÙÙ
Ù
ساÙدة ÙÙشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ? Ù?٠غزة ÙتÙÙ?Ùر دخ٠عÙ٠اÙÙ
د٠اÙÙ
تÙسØ⪠Øâ¬ÙزÙادة سب٠اÙÙصÙ٠إÙÙ Ù?رص اÙعÙ
٠اÙØر اÙÙ
دعÙÙ
Ø© بشبÙØ© اإÙÙترÙتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠1â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙÙاتâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙÙÙ?Ø© (بÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙدÙاÙرات اأÙÙ
رÙÙÙØ©)⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ÙÙÙâ¬
â«âª78\.03â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠⪠:7â¬Ø§ÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ùâ¬
â«âª0\.33â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠⪠:8â¬Ù?رص اÙعÙ
٠اÙØر اÙÙ
دعÙÙ
بشبÙØ© اإÙÙترÙت (اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ)â¬
â«âª7\.03â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠⪠:0â¬Ø¥Ø¯Ø§Ø±Ø© اÙÙ
شرÙع Ùرصد٠ÙتÙÙÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙظÙ
اتâ¬
â«Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?سØÙÙÙة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùترضâª:â¬â¬
â«Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙة⬠â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°âª:â¬â¬
â«Ø¨ÙاÙات تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙع (بÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙدÙاÙرات اأÙÙ
رÙÙÙØ©)â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùخصâ¬
â«âª71\.33â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙتÙÙÙ?Ø© اÙÙÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«âª71\.33â¬â¬ â«Ù
جÙ
Ùع اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙâ¬
â«âª3\.33â¬â¬ â«Ù
ÙÙا ÙدÙ
اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙØ¥ÙÙشاء ÙاÙتعÙ
Ùرâª/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
ؤسسة اÙدÙÙÙØ© ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«âª3\.33â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ?جÙØ© اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙ?اصÙÙâ¬
â«ØªÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù
ÙدÙ
Ù
٠جÙات أخر٠غÙر Ù
جÙ
Ùعة اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«âª71\.33â¬â¬ â«ØµÙادÙ٠استئÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«âª71\.33â¬â¬ â«ØªÙ
ÙÙ٠خاصâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات اÙصرÙ? اÙÙ
تÙÙعة (بÙ
اÙÙÙ٠اÙدÙاÙرات اأÙÙ
رÙÙÙØ©)â¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙØ© اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙبÙÙâ¬
â«âª8388â¬â¬ â«âª8387â¬â¬ â«âª8383â¬â¬ â«âª8372â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«âª3\.13â¬â¬ â«âª7\.03â¬â¬ â«âª1\.33â¬â¬ â«âª2\.33â¬â¬ â«Ø³ÙÙÙاâ¬
â«âª71\.33â¬â¬ â«âª7\.03â¬â¬ â«âª70\.33â¬â¬ â«âª2\.33â¬â¬ â«ØªØ±Ø§ÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠2â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙاÙات اÙÙ
ؤسسÙØ©â¬
â«Ù
جااÙت اÙÙ
Ù
ارسات اÙÙ
ساÙÙ
ة⬠â«Ù
جا٠اÙÙ
Ù
ارسة (اÙرئÙسÙ)â¬
â«Ø§ÙØÙ
اÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© ÙاÙعÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ØªØºÙر اÙÙ
Ùاخ ÙÙ?Øص اÙÙÙارثâ¬
â«ÙÙ
ÙتÙ
Ù?Øص Ùذ٠اÙعÙ
ÙÙØ© Ù?ÙÙ
ا ÙتعÙ٠بتغÙر اÙÙ
Ùاخ عÙ٠اÙÙ
د٠اÙÙصÙر ÙاÙÙ
د٠اÙØÙÙÙ ÙÙ
خاØر اÙÙÙارثâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙع ااÙجتÙ
اعÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ ÙشتÙ
٠اÙÙ
شرÙع عÙ٠اÙÙÙاÙ
بأ٠Ù
Ù
ا ÙÙÙâª:â¬â¬
â«(Ø£) تØÙÙÙ ÙتØدÙد اÙÙ?جÙات ذات اÙعاÙÙØ© باÙÙ
شرÙع بÙ٠اÙØ°ÙÙر ÙاإÙÙاث⪠Øâ¬Ùا٠سÙÙ
ا Ù?٠ضÙØ¡ اÙÙ?جÙات اÙÙائÙ
Ø© اÙت٠تÙ
تØدÙدÙا Ù
Ù ÙعÙ
â¬
â«Ø®Ø§Ù٠اÙدراسة اÙتشخÙصÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙجÙØ© ÙØ¥Øار اÙشراÙØ© Ù
ع اÙبÙدâ¬
â«ÙعÙ
⬠â«(ب) اÙعÙ
Ù (اأÙعÙ
اÙ) اÙÙ
Øدد ÙÙتصد٠ÙÙÙ?جÙات بÙ٠اÙجÙسÙ٠اÙت٠تÙ
تØدÙدÙا Ù?Ù (Ø£) Ùâª/â¬Ø£Ù ÙتØسÙ٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
رأة أ٠اÙرجÙâ¬
â«ÙعÙ
⬠â«(ج) ÙتضÙ
Ù Ù
ؤشرات Ù?٠إØار اÙÙتائج Ùرصد Ùتائج اأÙعÙ
ا٠اÙت٠تÙ
تØدÙدÙا Ù?Ù (ب)â¬
â«Ø§Ø£Ùداة اÙÙ
ÙÙجÙØ© ÙتصÙÙÙ? Ù
خاØر اÙعÙ
ÙÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتصÙÙÙ?⬠â«Ù?ئة اÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«âª ï?¬â¬Ù
رتÙ?عة⬠â«âª \.7â¬Ø§ÙسÙاسÙØ© ÙÙ
خاØر اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø©â¬
â«âª ï?¬â¬Ù
رتÙ?عة⬠â«âª \.8â¬Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصاد اÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«âª ï?¬â¬Ù
تÙسØة⬠â«âª \.0â¬Ø§Ø§ÙستراتÙجÙات ÙاÙسÙاسات اÙÙØاعÙØ©â¬
â«âª ï?¬â¬Ù
ÙØ®Ù?ضة⬠â«âª \.3â¬Ø§ÙتصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙ?ÙÙ ÙÙÙ
شرÙع أ٠اÙبرÙاÙ
جâ¬
â«âª ï?¬â¬Ù
تÙسØة⬠â«âª \.0â¬Ø§ÙÙدرات اÙÙ
ؤسسÙØ© ÙÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° ÙااÙستداÙ
Ø©â¬
â«âª ï?¬â¬ÙبÙرة⬠â«âª \.â¬Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙاÙتعاÙدÙØ©â¬
â«âª ï?¬â¬Ù
ÙØ®Ù?ضة⬠â«âª \.1â¬Ø§ÙبÙئÙØ© ÙااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ©â¬
â«âª ï?¬â¬Ù
تÙسØة⬠â«âª \.2â¬Ø£ØµØاب اÙÙ
صÙØØ©â¬
â«âª \.2â¬Ø£Ø®Ø±Ùâ¬
â«âª ï?¬â¬ÙبÙرة⬠â«âª \.73â¬Ø§ÙتصÙÙÙ? اÙعاÙ
ÙÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠3â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙ
تثاÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙاسةâ¬
â«ÙÙ ÙØÙد Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙع ع٠استراتÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
ساعدة اÙÙØرÙØ© Ù
Ù ØÙØ« اÙÙ
ضÙ
Ù٠أ٠أÙØ© جÙاÙب أخر٠Ù
ÙÙ
Ø©Øâ¬
â«[ ] ÙعÙ
[â] اÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ ÙتØÙب Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙع أ٠استثÙاءات Ù
٠سÙاسات اÙبÙÙØâ¬
â«[ ] ÙعÙ
[ â] اÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ù⬠â«ÙعÙ
⬠â«Ø§ÙسÙاسات اÙÙÙائÙØ© اÙت٠ÙÙ?عÙÙÙا اÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«â⬠â«Ø§ÙتÙÙÙÙ
اÙبÙئ٠⪠-â¬Ù
ÙØ´Ùر سÙاسة اÙعÙ
ÙÙاتâª/â¬Ø¥Ø¬Ø±Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øª اÙبÙÙ (âª)OP/BP 4\.01â¬â¬
â«â⬠â«Ù
عاÙÙر اأÙداء Ø£ÙÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙØاع اÙخاص ⪠-â¬Ù
ÙØ´Ùر سÙاسة اÙعÙ
ÙÙاتâª/â¬Ø¥Ø¬Ø±Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øª اÙبÙÙ (âª)OP/BP 4\.03â¬â¬
â«â⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùائ٠اÙØبÙعÙØ© ⪠-â¬Ù
ÙØ´Ùر سÙاسة اÙعÙ
ÙÙاتâª/â¬Ø¥Ø¬Ø±Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øª اÙبÙÙ (âª)OP/BP 4\.04â¬â¬
â«â⬠â«Ø§Ùغابات ⪠-â¬Ù
ÙØ´Ùر سÙاسة اÙعÙ
ÙÙاتâª/â¬Ø¥Ø¬Ø±Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øª اÙبÙÙ (âª)OP/BP 4\.36â¬â¬
â«â⬠â«Ù
ÙاÙ?ØØ© اآÙÙ?ات ⪠-â¬Ù
ÙØ´Ùر سÙاسة اÙعÙ
ÙÙات (âª)OP 4\.09â¬â¬
â«â⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùارد اÙØضارÙØ© اÙÙ
ادÙØ© ⪠-â¬Ù
ÙØ´Ùر سÙاسة اÙعÙ
ÙÙاتâª/â¬Ø¥Ø¬Ø±Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øª اÙبÙÙ (âª)OP/BP 4\.11â¬â¬
â«â⬠â«Ø§ÙشعÙب اأÙصÙÙØ© ⪠-â¬Ù
ÙØ´Ùر سÙاسة اÙعÙ
ÙÙاتâª/â¬Ø¥Ø¬Ø±Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øª اÙبÙÙ (âª)OP/BP 4\.10â¬â¬
â«â⬠â«Ø¥Ø¹Ø§Ø¯Ø© اÙتÙØÙ٠اÙÙسرÙØ© ⪠-â¬Ù
ÙØ´Ùر سÙاسة اÙعÙ
ÙÙاتâª/â¬Ø¥Ø¬Ø±Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øª اÙبÙÙ (âª)OP/BP 4\.12â¬â¬
â«â⬠â«Ø³Ø§ÙÙ
Ø© اÙسدÙد ⪠-â¬Ù
ÙØ´Ùر سÙاسة اÙعÙ
ÙÙاتâª/â¬Ø¥Ø¬Ø±Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øª اÙبÙÙ (âª)OP/BP 4\.37â¬â¬
â«â⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙعات عÙÙ Ù
جار٠اÙÙ
Ùا٠اÙدÙÙÙØ© ÙÙ Ù
ÙØ´Ùر سÙاسة اÙعÙ
ÙÙاتâª/â¬Ø¥Ø¬Ø±Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øª اÙبÙÙ (âª)OP/BP 7\.50â¬â¬
â«â⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شارÙع اÙÙ
ÙاÙ
Ø© Ù?٠اÙÙ
ÙاØ٠اÙÙ
تÙازع عÙÙÙا ⪠-â¬Ù
ÙØ´Ùر سÙاسة اÙعÙ
ÙÙاتâª/â¬Ø¥Ø¬Ø±Ø§Ø¡Ø§Øª اÙبÙÙ (âª)OP/BP 7\.60â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙتÙ?اÙÙاتâª/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
عاÙدات اÙÙاÙÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙساÙ
ÙÙصÙ? Ù Ù?â¬
â«Ù Ù
ÙÙاâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجدÙ٠اÙثاÙ٠⪠-â¬Ø§ÙÙ
ÙØ٠اأÙÙ٠أ⪠\.0â¬Ùجب عÙ٠اÙÙ
تÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ?Ù Ù
Ùعد Ø£Ùصا٠أربعة (⪠)3â¬Ø£Ø´Ùر Ù
٠تارÙØ® اÙÙÙ?اذ⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù ÙعÙÙÙ Ù
دÙÙا خارجÙا Ù
ستÙا٠Ù
سؤÙا٠عÙâ¬
â«ØªÙÙ?ÙØ° تدÙÙ٠بÙظاÙ
اÙتÙ?تÙØ´ اÙÙ
Ù?اجئ بشÙ٠ربع سÙÙÙ ÙتدÙÙ٠سÙÙÙ ÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر ØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù
ختارة ÙÙ
ÙدÙ
٠خدÙ
ات Ù
ختارÙÙ ÙÙ?٠شرÙØ ÙØ£ØÙاÙ
â¬
â«Ù
ÙبÙÙØ© ÙÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠أÙ٠ا٠ÙجÙز تعدÙÙ Ùذ٠اÙشرÙØ ÙاأÙØÙاÙ
ØÙا٠عÙ
ر اÙÙ
شرÙع دÙ٠اÙØصÙ٠عÙÙ Ù
ÙاÙ?ÙØ© Ù
٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙساÙ
ÙاÙÙصÙ?â¬
â«Ø§ÙجدÙ٠اÙثاÙ٠⪠-â¬Ø§ÙÙسÙ
اÙثاÙ٠أ⪠:7â¬Ø³ÙتÙÙ٠اÙÙ
تÙÙ٠رصد اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙتÙÙÙÙ
سÙر اÙعÙ
Ù Ù?ÙÙ Ùإعداد تÙارÙر اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙÙ?Ùا ٠أÙØÙاÙ
اÙÙسÙ
⪠8\.3\.â¬Ù
٠اÙشرÙØâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙارÙØ© ÙعÙ٠أساس Ù
ؤشرات ÙتÙ
ااÙتÙ?ا٠عÙÙÙا Ù
ع اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙغØÙ Ù٠تÙرÙر Ù
٠تÙارÙر اÙÙ
شرÙع Ù?ترة ÙÙاÙ
Ùا ستة (⪠)\.â¬Ø£Ø´Ùر ÙÙÙاÙ?٠ب٠اÙبÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
Ùعد Ø£Ùصا٠خÙ
سة ÙأربعÙÙ (⪠)30â¬ÙÙÙ
ا Ù Ù
Ù ÙÙاÙØ© اÙÙ?ترة اÙÙ
Ø´Ù
ÙÙØ© بÙذا اÙتÙرÙرâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙساÙ
ÙاÙÙصÙ?â¬
â«Ø§ÙجدÙ٠اÙثاÙ٠⪠-â¬Ø§ÙÙسÙ
اÙثاÙ٠ب⪠:8â¬ÙÙتزÙ
اÙÙ
تÙÙ٠بإعداد ÙÙ
ÙاÙ?اة اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù?Ù Ù
دة Ø£ÙصاÙا Ø®Ù
سة ÙأربعÙÙ (⪠)30â¬ÙÙÙ
ا Ù Ù
Ù ÙÙاÙØ© Ù٠ربع سÙØ©â¬
â«Ù عÙ٠أ٠تÙÙÙ Ù
رضÙØ©Ù ÙÙبÙÙ Ø´ÙاÙÙ ÙÙ
ضÙ
ÙÙاÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«ØªÙÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨ØªÙارÙر Ù
اÙÙØ© Ù
ؤÙتة غÙر Ù
دÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙع تغØ٠ربع اÙسÙØ© اÙÙ
ع٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠4â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙساÙ
ÙاÙÙصÙ?â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجدÙ٠اÙثاÙ٠⪠-â¬Ø§ÙÙسÙ
اÙثاÙ٠ب⪠:0â¬ÙÙتزÙ
اÙÙ
تÙÙ٠بأ٠ÙتÙ
تدÙÙÙ ÙÙائÙ
٠اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙع ÙÙ?Ùا Ø£ÙØÙاÙ
اÙÙسÙ
âª( 8\.31â¬Ø¨) Ù
٠اÙشرÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
عÙارÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠أÙâ¬
â«ÙغØÙ Ùذا اÙتدÙÙÙ Ù?ترة ÙÙاÙ
Ùا سÙØ© Ù
اÙÙØ© ÙاØدة ÙÙÙ
تÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙØ£Ù ÙÙاÙ?٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠باÙÙÙائÙ
اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙÙ
دÙÙØ© ع٠ÙÙ Ù?ترة Ù
Ù Ùذ٠اÙÙ?ترات Ù?Ù Ù
Ùعد Ø£ÙصاÙâ¬
â«Ø³ØªØ© (⪠)\.â¬Ø£Ø´Ùر Ù
Ù ÙÙاÙØ© اÙÙ?ترةâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙساÙ
ÙاÙÙصÙ?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙسÙ
اÙثاÙ٠أ⪠:0â¬ÙÙتزÙ
اÙÙ
تÙÙ٠بإعداد تÙرÙر Ø¥Ùجاز اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° ÙÙ?Ùا ٠أÙØÙاÙ
اÙÙسÙ
⪠8\.3\.â¬Ù
٠اÙشرÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
عÙارÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠أ٠ÙÙاÙ?٠ب٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
Ùعدâ¬
â«Ø£Ùصا٠ثاÙثة (⪠)0â¬Ø£Ø´Ùر Ù
٠تارÙØ® اإÙÙÙ?اÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙشرÙØâ¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠5â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø£ÙاÙ⪠\.â¬Ø§ÙسÙا٠ااÙستراتÙجÙâ¬
â«(Ø£) اÙسÙا٠اÙعاÙ
اÙسائدâ¬
â«Ùص٠Ù
عد٠اÙÙÙ
٠ااÙÙتصاد٠Ù?٠غزة Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
رØÙØ© تÙÙÙ? Ù?عÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ø¥Ø° تÙاج٠غزة عدÙ
استÙرار Ù?٠اأÙÙضاع اÙسÙاسÙة⬠â«âª\.7â¬â¬
â«ÙأعÙ
ا٠عÙÙ? Ù
ÙØ° ÙÙت بعÙد عÙÙ Ù
د٠اÙعÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
اضÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
Ù
ا زاد Ù
٠تÙ?اÙÙ
اختاÙاÙت ااÙÙتصاد اÙÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ùبعد تأسÙس اÙسÙØØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© Ù?٠⪠Ø7223â¬ÙاجÙت غزة تÙÙبات اÙتصادÙØ© ÙبÙرة ÙتÙجة Ø£ÙعÙ
ا٠اÙعÙÙ? ÙغÙ
Ùض اÙÙضع اÙسÙاسÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ÙØ° اÙداÙع اÙÙزاعâ¬
â«Ø¨ÙÙ ØرÙت٠Ù?ØªØ ÙØÙ
اس Ù?٠⪠Ø8332/8331â¬ÙاÙت Ù
ستÙÙات اÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
رتÙ?عة اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ù
٠اÙÙ
اÙØÙÙ Ù٠اÙÙ
Øر٠اÙرئÙس٠ÙعجÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ Ùذا اÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠تراجع بصÙرة Øادة Ù
٠⪠%82â¬Ù
٠إجÙ
اÙ٠اÙÙاتج اÙÙ
ØÙÙ Ù?٠⪠8332â¬Ø¥Ù٠⪠%\.â¬Ù
ÙÙ Ù?٠⪠\.8370â¬ÙعÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙرغÙ
Ù
٠اإÙÙÙ?ا٠اÙÙبÙر عÙ٠أعÙ
ا٠إعادة اإÙعÙ
ار عÙÙ Ù
د٠اÙسÙÙات ⪠Ø8371 - 8370â¬Ø§ÙÙÙ
Ø´ اÙتصاد غزة بÙسبة ⪠%3\.0â¬Ù?Ùâ¬
â«âª( 8371â¬Ù
ÙارÙØ© بزÙادة بÙغت ⪠%8\.0â¬Ù?٠اÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙØ©)⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
٠اÙÙ
تÙÙع Ø£Ù ÙبÙغ Ù
عد٠اÙÙÙ
Ù ØÙاÙ٠⪠%8 - 7â¬Ù?٠غزة Ù?Ù âª\.8372â¬â¬
â«ÙÙد اتسعت Ù?جÙØ© اÙرÙ?ا٠بÙ٠غزة ÙاÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙØ© بÙ
رÙر اÙسÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«ØªØ¨Ùغ Ù
عداÙت اÙبØاÙØ© Ù
ستÙÙات تÙذر باÙØ®Øر⪠\.â¬Ù?Ùد تÙÙÙ? Ø®Ù٠اÙÙظائÙ? Ù?٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص تÙرÙبا ÙتÙجة ÙØاÙØ© عدÙ
اÙÙÙÙÙ⬠â«âª\.8â¬â¬
â«ÙاÙغÙ
Ùض⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙصراع اÙدائر Ù
ع إسرائÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙØصار⪠Øâ¬ÙØ£Ùج٠اÙÙصÙر اÙÙÙÙÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ?٠ظ٠خÙ?ض اÙÙ
ÙازÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙØاع اÙعاÙ
â¬
â«âª1â¬â¬
â«ÙÙÙاÙØ© اأÙÙ
Ù
اÙÙ
تØدة Ø¥Ùغاثة ÙتشغÙ٠اÙاÙجئÙ٠اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙÙÙ (اأÙÙÙرÙا) ÙادرÙ٠عÙ٠اÙتعÙÙض ع٠ذÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ع دخÙ٠⪠783â¬Ø£ÙÙ?â¬
â«Ø´Ø§Ø¨ Ù?٠اÙÙ
تÙØ³Ø Ù?٠اÙشرÙØØ© اÙعÙ
رÙØ© ⪠82 - 70â¬Ø³ÙØ© سÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù٠سÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙتÙاص٠ارتÙ?اع Ù
عداÙت اÙبØاÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùت٠بÙغت âª%03â¬â¬
â«Ù?٠اÙربع اأÙÙÙ Ù
٠عاÙ
⪠Ø8372â¬ÙÙÙ Ù
٠أعÙ٠اÙÙ
عداÙت Ù?٠اÙعاÙÙ
âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¨Ø§Øª اÙتراجع Ù?٠تدÙ?Ùات اÙÙ
عÙÙات ذا أثر ÙبÙر عÙ٠اÙخدÙ
ات ÙÙ?رص اÙعÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ÙØ° ⪠Ø8373â¬ØªØ±Ø§Ø¬Ø¹Øª Ù
عÙÙات اÙÙ
اÙØÙÙ⬠â«âª\.0â¬â¬
â«Ø¥Ù٠اÙسÙØØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© بÙسبة ⪠%83â¬Ù?٠اÙÙ
تÙØ³Ø Ø³ÙÙÙÙا⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
٠اÙÙ
Ù
Ù٠أ٠Ùؤد٠اÙتراجع اÙÙ
ستÙ
ر Ù?Ù Ù
ساÙدة اÙÙ
ÙازÙØ© Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
زÙدâ¬
â«Ù
٠تÙÙÙص اإÙÙÙ?اÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
٠شأ٠ذÙ٠تÙÙÙد اÙÙ
Ùارد اÙÙ
تاØØ© ÙÙ
راÙ?٠اÙبÙÙØ© اÙتØتÙØ© ÙاÙخدÙ
ات⪠Øâ¬ÙÙØ°Ù٠دÙ?ع رÙاتب اÙÙØاع اÙعاÙ
(اÙتÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ®Ù?ضت بÙسبة ⪠%03â¬Ù?٠⪠Ø)8371â¬ÙÙ٠تÙ
ث٠أداة أساسÙØ© ÙتسÙÙ٠اÙÙØ´Ø§Ø Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصاد٠Ù?٠غزة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ع ÙجÙد Ùسبة ÙبÙرة Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙا٠Ù?٠غزة تعتÙ
د عÙ٠اÙÙ
ساعدات اÙدÙÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ù?Ø¥Ù Ù?Ùدا٠اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ ÙÙ
Ù٠أ٠Ùضر بصÙرة Ù
باشرة باÙÙØ´Ø§Ø Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصاد٠ÙÙزÙد Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
عاÙاة اإÙÙساÙÙة⪠\.â¬Ø¹Ù٠سبÙ٠اÙÙ
ثاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ùثر Ù
Ù Ø«Ùث٠اÙسÙا٠Ù
سجÙÙ٠باعتبارÙÙ
اÙجئÙÙ Ù?٠اأÙÙÙرÙا⪠\.â¬ÙÙ?٠⪠Ø8371â¬ÙاÙ
ت اأÙÙÙرÙاâ¬
â«Ø¨ØªØ´ØºÙ٠أÙثر Ù
٠⪠03â¬Ø£ÙÙ?ا Ù
٠سÙا٠غزة Ø¥Ù
ا بصÙرة Ù
باشرة Ø£Ù Ù
٠خاÙ٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙÙ
شرÙعات اإÙÙشاءاتâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ùتراجع عدد Ù?رص اÙعÙ
٠اÙت٠تÙÙ?رÙا اأÙÙÙرÙا بÙسبة ⪠%02â¬Ù?٠اÙسÙÙات âª\.8371 - 8370â¬â¬
â«ØªØ¯ÙÙر اÙÙ
ستÙÙات اÙÙ
عÙØ´ÙØ© بÙتÙرة سرÙعة عÙÙ ÙØÙ ÙÙ?ض٠إÙÙ ØاÙ?Ø© أزÙ
Ø© Ø¥ÙساÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙتبÙ٠أØدث دراسة Ù
سØÙة⬠â«âª\.3â¬â¬
â«ÙØ¥ÙÙÙ?ا٠ÙااÙستÙاÙÙ ÙØ£Ùسر اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© ÙسÙØ© ⪠8371â¬ÙاÙ
بÙا اÙجÙاز اÙÙ
رÙز٠ÙØ¥ÙØصاء اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙ٠أ٠أÙثر Ù
Ù ÙصÙ? اÙسÙا٠Ù?Ùâ¬
â«ØºØ²Ø© Ù?Ùراء⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ?ترجÙ
Ùذا Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
عداÙت Ù?Ùر تبÙغ ⪠%00â¬ÙÙ Ù
ا ÙبÙغ ⪠3â¬Ø£Ù
ثا٠Ù
عد٠اÙÙ?Ùر Ù?٠اÙضÙ?ة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙؤثر Ùذا عÙ٠⪠233â¬Ø£ÙÙ? ÙسÙ
Ø©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¹Ø§ÙÙØ© عÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ùجد أ٠⪠%03â¬Ù
٠اأÙÙ?راد Ù?Ù ÙØاع غزة ÙعÙØ´ÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù?Ùر Ù
دÙع (Ù
ÙارÙØ© بÙ
ا ÙبÙغ ⪠%82â¬Ù?٠اÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙØ©â¬
â«ÙÙØاع غزة Ù
عاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ø±ØªÙ?اعا Ù Ù
٠⪠%8\.â¬Ù?٠⪠Ø)8377â¬Ù
Ù
ا ÙعÙ٠عدÙ
Ùدرة ÙؤاÙØ¡ اأÙشخاص عÙ٠تغØÙØ© اØتÙاجاتÙÙ
Ù
٠اÙÙ
ØعÙ
â¬
â«ÙاÙÙ
Ùبس ÙاÙÙ
سÙÙ (استÙصاء Ø¥ÙÙ?ا٠ÙاستÙاÙ٠اأÙسر اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙجÙاز اÙÙ
رÙز٠ÙØ¥ÙØصاء اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙ⪠\.)8371 Øâ¬ÙÙ
ع Ù
عدÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙ
٠اÙسÙاÙ٠اÙباÙغ ⪠%0\.0â¬Ù?٠اÙسÙة⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠اÙÙ
تÙÙع أ٠تؤد٠آÙ?ا٠اÙÙÙ
٠اÙÙاتÙ
Ø© Ùتراجع تدÙ?Ùات اÙÙ
عÙÙات Ø¥Ù٠تدÙÙر Ù
ستÙÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙشة ÙسÙا٠غزةâª\.â¬â¬
â«âª 1â¬ØªØ¨Ù٠اÙÙÙÙد عÙ٠اÙØرÙØ© اÙتÙ?اÙتات اÙÙ
ÙÙ
Ø© بÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙاØÙ Ù?Ù Ù
ستÙ٠اÙرÙ?ا٠بÙ٠اÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙØ© ÙÙØاع غزة⪠\.â¬ÙتÙاج٠غزة ÙÙÙدÙا خارجÙØ© عÙ٠اÙØرÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙâ¬
â«Ù
ا عÙÙ Ùج٠اÙتÙرÙب⪠Øâ¬ÙتتØÙÙ
إسرائÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
عظÙ
اÙتØرÙات عبر اÙØدÙد⪠\.â¬ÙÙØ´Ùر تØÙÙÙ Ù
٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ (⪠Ø)8377â¬ÙÙاÙÙ ÙÙ
ÙارÙ⬠â«ØªØ²Ø§Ù "Ù
غÙÙØ©" تÙ
ا Ùâ¬
â«(⪠) 8370â¬Ø¥Ù٠أ٠ÙجÙد ÙÙØ§Ø Ø§ÙتÙ?تÙØ´ ÙعÙ
٠عÙ٠زÙادة اÙبØاÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙÙÙ Ù
٠عدد Ø£ÙاÙ
اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاأÙجÙر⪠Øâ¬ÙÙزÙد Ù
Ù Ù
عداÙت اÙÙ?Ùر Ù?٠اÙÙر٠ÙاÙبÙدÙات اÙت٠تعاÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
٠شدة اÙÙÙÙد عÙ٠اÙØرÙة⪠\.â¬ÙتبÙÙ Ùذ٠اÙÙÙÙد Ù
عÙÙات اÙتجارة داخ٠غزة⪠Øâ¬Ù
Ù
ا أد٠إÙÙ Ù?رÙÙ Ù?٠اأÙسعار عÙÙ Ù
ستÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙاØÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙعداÙ
Ù?٠اÙÙ
ساÙاةâ¬
â«Ø¯Ø§Ø®Ù اÙÙ
ÙاØÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙØ£Ùج٠ÙصÙر اÙتصادÙØ© أخر٠Ù
Ù ØÙØ« تخصÙص اÙÙ
Ùاردâª( \.â¬Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠⪠Ø8378â¬Ø¢Ø¨Ø±Ø§ÙاÙ
ز âª\.)8371â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠6â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«ØªØ¹ØªØ¨Ø± Ù
عداÙت اÙبØاÙØ© ÙÙÙØ© اÙÙØ´Ø§Ø Ø£Ø¹ÙÙ Ù
ا تÙÙ٠بÙ٠اÙشباب ÙاÙÙساء⪠\.â¬Ù?Ù?٠⪠Ø8371â¬Ø¨Ùغت Ùسبة اÙشباب خارج دائرة⬠â«âª\.0â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتعÙÙÙ
ÙاÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙتدرÙب ⪠%37â¬Ù?Ù ÙØاع غزة⪠\.â¬ÙبÙغ Ù
عد٠اÙبØاÙØ© بÙ٠اÙÙساء ⪠Ø%\.3â¬ÙÙ٠أعÙÙ Ù
Ù Ù
عدÙÙا بÙ٠اÙرجا٠بÙØ«Ùرâ¬
â«Ù٠اÙعاØاÙت Ù
ÙÙÙ Ùسبة صادÙ
ة⬠â«(⪠)%0\.â¬Ø£Ù اÙÙساء Ù?٠اÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙØ© (⪠2\.)%81â¬Ø¨Ù ÙاÙÙضع أسÙØ£ Ù?ÙÙ
ا Ùخص اÙشابات⪠Øâ¬Ø¥ Ùâ¬
â«Ø° تش Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ùد âª( %22â¬Ù
ÙارÙØ© بÙسبة ⪠%02â¬ÙÙشباب)⪠3 \.â¬ÙÙ?٠⪠Ø8370â¬ÙÙ
ÙÙØ¬Ø Ø¥Ø§Ù âª %7\.â¬Ù
٠اÙشباب اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙ Ù?٠ااÙÙتÙا٠Ù
٠اÙتعÙÙÙ
Ø¥ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø³Ù٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ùشغ٠ÙظائÙ? Ù
ستÙرة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ?٠⪠Ø8370â¬ÙÙ
ÙÙØ¬Ø Ø¥Ø§Ù âª %3\.0â¬Ù
٠اÙشابات Ù?Ù ÙØاع غزة Ù?٠ااÙÙتÙا٠Ù
٠اÙتعÙÙÙ
Ø¥ÙÙâ¬
â«âª4â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙعÙ
Ù Ù?Ù ÙظائÙ? Ù
ستÙرة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ Ùسبة Ø£ÙÙ ÙØ«Ùرا Ù Ù
Ù Ùسبة اÙشباب Ù?٠غزة (⪠)%80â¬ÙاÙشابات Ù?٠اÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙØ© (âª\.)%2\.â¬â¬
â«ØªØ¤Ø¯Ù اÙÙ?جÙات اÙÙائÙ
Ø© Ù?٠إÙ
ÙاÙÙØ© اÙØصÙ٠عÙ٠اأÙصÙÙ ÙاÙتØÙÙ
Ù?ÙÙا Ø¥Ù٠تÙ?اÙÙ
Ùدرة Ùساء غزة ÙرجاÙÙا عÙÙ⬠â«âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شارÙØ© Ù?٠اÙÙ?رص ااÙÙتصادÙØ© ÙÙ?رص رÙادة اأÙعÙ
اÙ⪠\.â¬ØªØ³Ø§ÙÙ
Ø¥Ù
ÙاÙÙØ© اÙØصÙ٠عÙ٠اأÙصÙÙ Ù
ساÙÙ
Ø© ÙبÙرة Ù?٠اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصادÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ع Ø°ÙÙ Ù?Ù٠تÙ
ث٠تØدÙا Ù ÙبÙرا Ù Ù?Ù ÙØاع ØºØ²Ø©Ø Ø¥Ø° ÙبÙغ Ù
ؤشر أصÙ٠اأÙسرة اÙÙ
عÙØ´ÙØ© Ù?٠اÙÙ
تÙØ³Ø âª 3\.8\.â¬Ù
ÙابÙâ¬
â«Ø° ا٠ÙÙجد Ù
ÙÙ٠إا٠⪠%7\.â¬ÙÙ
ÙÙÙ Øسابا Ù Ù?Ù Ù
ؤسسة⬠â«âª 3\.0\.â¬Ù?٠اÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙة⪠\.â¬Ùتعتبر اÙÙساء عÙ
ÙÙ
ا Ù Ù
تضررات بÙØ¬Ù Ø®Ø§ØµØ Ø¥ Ùâ¬
â«Ù
اÙÙØ© Ù
Ùاب٠⪠%03â¬Ù
٠اÙرجاÙ⪠5 \.â¬ÙÙ
ا تشÙ٠اÙÙ?جÙات Ù?٠إÙ
ÙاÙÙØ© اÙÙصÙ٠إÙ٠اÙتÙÙÙÙÙجÙا عائÙا ٠أÙضاÙØ Ø¥Ø°Ù Ø§Ù ÙتÙ
تع إا٠أÙÙ Ù
Ùâ¬
â«âª6â¬â¬
â«Ø«ÙØ« اÙشباب Ù?٠غزة بإÙ
ÙاÙÙØ© اÙÙصÙ٠إÙÙ ØاسÙب⪠Øâ¬ÙاأÙشد تضررا Ù ÙÙ
اÙÙساء ÙاÙشباب اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙÙتÙ
Ù٠إÙ٠أسر ÙعÙÙÙا Ù
عاÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ù Ùزا٠تÙÙ?Ùر سب٠اÙÙصÙ٠إÙ٠اÙعاÙج اÙØبÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙÙرباء⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
Ùا٠اÙÙظÙÙ?Ø© ØرÙÙا Ù
ØÙ?ÙÙ?ا باÙتØدÙات⪠\.â¬Ù?Ùد تÙ?اÙÙ
عدÙ
⬠â«âª\.1â¬â¬
â«ÙÙ?اÙØ© Ø¥Ù
دادات اÙÙÙرباء (Ø£ÙÙ Ù
Ù ÙصÙ? اØتÙاجات غزة) بسبب ÙÙص اÙÙ
ØرÙÙات اÙبدÙÙØ© ÙتÙجة ÙÙØØµØ§Ø±Ø Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥ÙÙ Ùدرةâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØØب ÙاÙغاز⪠Øâ¬ÙارتÙ?اع تÙاÙÙÙ? اÙÙÙÙدâª/â¬Ø§ÙÙ
ØرÙÙات اÙسائÙØ© ÙعدÙ
تÙÙ?رÙا بسÙÙÙØ© ÙÙعدÙد Ù
٠اÙسÙاÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙؤد٠اÙÙØاع اÙÙÙرباءâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙثر Ù
٠⪠83â¬Ø³Ø§Ø¹Ø© Ù?٠اÙÙÙÙ
Ø¥Ù٠تÙÙÙد اÙÙÙت اÙÙ
ØªØ§Ø ÙÙدراسة Ø£Ù
اÙ
اÙØاÙØ¨Ø ÙإعاÙØ© سب٠اÙØصÙ٠عÙ٠اÙرعاÙØ© اÙØبÙØ© اÙØرجةâªØâ¬â¬
â«ÙاÙتأثÙر عÙÙ Ù
ØØات ضخ ÙتÙزÙع اÙÙ
Ùا٠اÙصاÙØØ© ÙÙشرب⪠\.â¬ÙعاÙÙØ© عÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙا٠سØب Ù
Ù?Ø±Ø Ù
Ù Ù
ÙاÙ
٠اÙÙ
Ùا٠اÙجÙÙ?ÙØ© Ù?Ùâ¬
â«ØºØ²Ø©âª Øâ¬ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
صدر اÙÙØÙد ÙÙÙ
Ùا٠اÙعذبة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ùسبة ⪠Ø%833â¬ÙتعاÙÙ Ùذ٠اÙÙ
ÙاÙ
Ù Ù
٠تسرب Ù
Ùا٠اÙبØر Ø¥ÙÙÙا⪠\.â¬ÙباÙتاÙÙ Ù?ا٠ÙصÙØâ¬
â«ÙÙشرب إا٠⪠%73-0â¬Ù
Ù Ù
Ùا٠اÙÙ
ÙاÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬ÙÙعتÙ
د ÙØ«Ùر Ù
٠اÙسÙا٠عÙÙ ÙاÙاÙت اÙÙ
Ùا٠اÙتابعة ÙÙÙØاع اÙخاص ÙÙØصÙ٠عÙÙ Ù
ÙاÙâ¬
â«Ø´Ø±Ø¨ باÙظة اÙتÙÙÙ?ة⪠\.â¬Ùا٠تتÙ
Ù
عاÙجة سÙÙ Ùسبة ضئÙÙØ© Ù
Ù Ù
Ùا٠اÙصرÙ?⪠Øâ¬ÙÙتÙ
تصرÙÙ? Ù
Ùا٠اÙصرÙ? غÙر اÙÙ
عاÙجة Ù?Ù ÙÙاÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØاÙ? (ØÙاÙ٠⪠733â¬Ù
ÙÙÙÙ Ùتر ÙÙÙ
ÙÙا) Ù?٠اÙبØر اÙÙ
تÙØ³Ø ÙÙÙجÙ
ع٠ذÙ٠تÙ?ش٠اأÙÙ
راض اÙÙ
رتبØØ© باÙÙ
ÙاÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙاج٠سÙا٠غزة Ù
Ùجات صراع ÙعÙÙ? Ø£Ùثر Ù
٠غÙرÙÙ
تؤثر عÙ٠اÙÙساء ÙاÙرجا٠ÙاÙÙ?تÙات ÙاÙÙ?تÙا٠بØرÙ⬠â«âª\.2â¬â¬
â«Ù
ختÙÙ?ة⪠\.â¬Ù?باÙÙسبة ÙÙÙساء ÙاÙÙ?تÙات⪠Øâ¬ØªØ³ØªÙ
ر اÙÙ
ستÙÙات اÙزائدة Ù
Ù Ù
خاØر اÙتعرض ÙÙعÙÙ? ضد اÙÙ
رأة بÙ
عداÙت Ù
عÙÙØ© تبÙغ âª%07â¬â¬
â«Ù?٠غزة (Ù
Ùاب٠⪠%03â¬Ù?٠اÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙØ©)⪠\.â¬Ùا٠تÙØ®Ù?ض Ùذ٠اÙÙ
ستÙÙات اÙÙ
رتÙ?عة باÙضرÙرة بعد اÙÙضاء اأÙزÙ
ات⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙÙا Ø¥Ù
ا تظÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ
ا ÙÙ ÙØ¥Ù
ا تستÙ
ر Ù?٠اÙزÙادة ÙتÙجة آثار Ù
ا بعد اÙØرب⪠7 \.â¬ÙÙ?٠أÙضاع اÙÙشاشة ÙاÙصراع⪠Øâ¬ÙÙاج٠اÙÙ?تÙا٠خØر اÙتسرب Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ùدراسة بÙ
عداÙت أعÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ا ÙÙاج٠اÙرجا٠خØر Ù?Ùدا٠إÙ
ÙاÙÙØ© Ùسب اÙعÙش⪠Øâ¬Ù
Ù
ا ÙترÙÙÙ
Ù
Ù?عÙ
Ù٠باÙشعÙر باÙعجز ÙÙÙÙص Ù
ÙاÙتÙÙ
â¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© ÙÙÙ
Ø£Ù ÙÙ?ÙسÙÙ
بخÙبة اأÙÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬Ù?عÙ٠سبÙ٠اÙÙ
ثاÙ⪠Øâ¬ØªÙجد Ù?جÙØ© عÙسÙØ© بÙ٠اÙجÙسÙÙ Ù?ÙÙ
ا ÙتعÙ٠بÙ
عداÙت إتÙ
اÙ
اÙدراسة⪠Øâ¬Ø¥Ø°Ùâ¬
â«Ùجد اÙشباب اÙØ°ÙÙر (Ùا٠سÙÙ
ا Ù
Ù ÙÙتÙ
Ù٠إÙ٠أسر Ù
عÙØ´ÙØ© Ù?ÙÙرة Ø£Ù ÙعÙÙÙا Ù
عاÙÙÙ) ÙÙ
اأÙÙثر تضرراÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا ÙعاÙ٠اÙشباب اÙعاØÙâ¬
â«Ø£Ùضا Ù ÙبشÙ٠خاص Ù
Ù Ù
ÙÙ٠اÙتØارÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙشارÙÙÙ Ù?٠أØداث اÙشغب ÙاÙÙ
ظاÙرات اÙشعبÙØ© عÙد اÙÙ
ÙاØ٠اÙØدÙدÙØ© ÙاÙجرÙÙ
Ø©â¬
â«ÙاÙعÙÙ? ÙاÙتشدÙÙ?د⪠\.â¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ØªØªÙاص٠اÙÙ
ÙاÙÙ? اÙتÙÙÙدÙØ© اÙÙ
تعÙÙØ© باÙØ°ÙÙرة Ù?٠اأÙراض٠اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙت٠ÙÙ
Ù٠أ٠تÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø§Ø¦Ùا ٠رئÙسÙا ٠أÙ
اÙ
Ù
شارÙØ© اÙÙ
رأة Ù?٠ااÙÙتصاد⪠\.â¬Ù?عÙ٠سبÙ٠اÙÙ
ثاÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙعتÙد ⪠%23â¬Ù
٠اÙرجا٠أ٠أÙÙ
دÙر ÙÙÙ
رأة Ù٠رعاÙØ© اÙبÙتâ¬
â«ÙØÙ٠اÙØعاÙ
ÙØ£Ùسرة⪠Øâ¬Ù
Ùاب٠⪠%02â¬Ù
٠اÙÙساء ÙشارÙÙÙÙ
Ùذا ااÙعتÙاد⪠\.â¬ÙعÙ٠صعÙد Ù
Ù
اثÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙعتÙد ⪠%10â¬Ù
٠اÙرجا٠أ٠زÙاجâ¬
â«âª 2â¬ØªÙرÙر Ù?ÙÙ ØÙ٠اÙÙÙÙد عÙ٠تشغÙ٠اإÙÙاث ⪠-â¬Ø¨ÙاÙات Ù
Ù âª\.8370â¬â¬
â«âª 3â¬Ø§ÙجÙاز اÙÙ
رÙز٠ÙØ¥ÙØصاء اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙ âª8372 Ø8371â¬â¬
â«âª 4â¬Ø³Ø¨Ù ااÙشتÙ
ا٠ااÙÙتصاد٠ÙااÙجتÙ
اع٠ÙÙÙ?ئات اÙÙ
ÙÙ
شة Ù?٠اÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙØ© ÙÙØاع غزةâª\.8372 Øâ¬â¬
â«âª 5â¬Ù
ؤشرات اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ©âª\.8371 Øâ¬â¬
â«âª 6â¬Ø³Ø¨Ù ااÙشتÙ
ا٠ااÙÙتصاد٠ÙااÙجتÙ
اع٠ÙÙÙ?ئات اÙÙ
ÙÙ
شة Ù?٠اÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙØ© ÙÙØاع غزةâª\.8372 Øâ¬â¬
â«âª 7â¬Ø§ÙجÙاز اÙÙ
رÙز٠ÙØ¥ÙØصاء اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙ⪠\.8378 Øâ¬ØªØ´Ù
٠اأÙØ´Ùا٠اÙÙ
ختÙÙ?Ø© ÙÙعÙÙ? بÙ٠شرÙاء اÙØÙاة اأÙØ´Ùا٠ااÙÙتصادÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙااÙجتÙ
اعÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙÙ?سÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙجÙسÙØ©âªØâ¬â¬
â«ÙاÙجسدÙة⪠\.â¬Ù?Ù Ùذ٠اÙØاÙØ© ÙÙÙ٠شرÙ٠اÙØÙاة اÙÙ
شار Ø¥ÙÙÙ Ù?٠ااÙستÙصاء ÙÙ "اÙزÙج"⪠\.â¬Ù
ÙØÙظة⪠:â¬Ø£Ù?اد تØÙÙ٠أجرت٠Ù
ÙظÙ
Ø© غÙر ØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù?٠اÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙØ©â¬
â«ÙÙØاع غزة بأ٠اÙÙساء اÙÙÙات٠ÙØÙب٠اÙÙ
ساعدة ÙÙÙ?بÙغ٠ع٠ØااÙت عÙÙ? عبر Ø®Ø Ø§ÙÙ
ÙظÙ
Ø© اÙساخ٠ازدد٠بشÙÙ ÙبÙر خاÙÙ Øرب غزة Ù?Ù âª8332-8332â¬â¬
â«Ø«Ù
خاÙ٠أزÙ
Ø© ⪠Ø8373â¬Ù
Ù
ا تØÙب ااÙستعاÙØ© بÙدرات إضاÙ?ÙØ© ÙتÙÙ?Ùر اÙدعÙ
عÙÙ Ù
د٠⪠83â¬Ø³Ø§Ø¹Ø© ÙÙÙ
ÙاÙ⪠\.â¬ÙتÙاصÙت Ùذ٠اÙزÙادة Ù?٠اÙسÙÙات اÙت٠أعÙبت Øربâ¬
â«ØºØ²Ø© ارتÙ?اعا Ù Ù
٠⪠%\.0â¬Ù?Ù âª\.8370â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠7â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«âª8â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
رأة Ø£ÙÙ
Ù
٠اÙتØاÙÙا باÙعÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬Ù
Ùاب٠⪠%07â¬Ù
٠اÙÙساء ÙشارÙÙÙÙ Ùذا ااÙعتÙادâª\.â¬â¬
â«(ب) اÙسÙا٠اÙÙØاع٠ÙاÙÙ
ؤسسÙâ¬
â«ØªØدد أجÙدة اÙسÙاسات اÙÙØÙÙØ© ÙÙسÙØØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© (⪠)7177 - 7102â¬Ù
سارا ØÙ
ÙØا ÙتÙÙÙص اÙÙ?Ùر⪠Øâ¬Ùتشجع اÙÙÙ
Ù⬠â«âª\.2â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙشاÙ
Ù ÙÙجÙ
Ùع Ù
٠خاÙ٠تجسÙد ثاÙØ«ÙØ© اأÙÙÙÙÙات اÙÙØÙÙØ© اÙÙ
تÙ
Ø«ÙØ© Ù?٠إÙاÙ
Ø© اÙدÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙÙ?اعÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
ستداÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ù
Ù Ù
ÙظÙر اÙÙ
ÙاØÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙتÙ
ث٠اÙÙ
ØÙر اÙرئÙس٠ÙÙذ٠اÙرؤÙØ© Ù?٠اÙدعÙØ© Ø¥Ù٠اÙعÙ
٠بÙدÙ? ترسÙØ® اÙÙ
ساÙاة بÙ٠اÙجÙسÙÙ Ù?٠عÙ
ÙÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¥ÙصاÙØات اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© (اÙسÙاسة اÙÙØÙÙØ© ⪠Ø)2â¬ÙتعزÙز Ø®ÙÙ Ù?رص اÙعÙ
Ù ÙÙØ´Ø±Ø§Ø¦Ø Ø§ÙÙ
ستبعدة ÙÙ
٠بÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙساء (اÙسÙاسة اÙÙØÙÙØ©â¬
â«ÙÙ?ضا٠ع٠Ùذا⪠Øâ¬ØªØ¹Ø±Ø¶ إستراتÙجÙØ© اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© (⪠)8388 - 8371â¬ÙÙزارة اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© اÙتØÙ٠اÙجÙÙرÙ⬠â«Ù⬠â«âª\.)70â¬â¬
â«ÙÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© Ù
٠اÙØÙ
اÙØ© Ø¥Ù٠اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù
ع اÙترÙÙز عÙ٠بÙاء اÙترابØ⪠Øâ¬ÙتدعÙÙ
اÙÙدرة عÙ٠اÙتÙÙÙ? ÙاÙÙ
جابÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠اأÙÙ?راد Ù
٠أسبابâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ù سÙÙ
ا اÙÙساء ÙاÙشباب ÙاÙÙ
عÙÙÙÙ ÙاÙÙ?ئات اأÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙة⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠أج٠ØÙاة ÙرÙÙ
Ø© ÙتØÙÙÙÙا ÙÙÙ
ساÙاة⪠\.â¬ÙتتÙ
ث٠اأÙÙداÙ?â¬
â«Ø§ÙرئÙسÙØ© ÙرؤÙØ© ااÙستراتÙجÙØ© اÙجدÙدة Ù?٠اÙØد Ù
٠اÙÙ?Ùر⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙضاء عÙ٠اإÙÙصاء ااÙجتÙ
اع٠بÙ٠أشÙاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙعÙ٠اÙعÙÙ? ÙاÙÙ
عاÙاةâªØâ¬â¬
â«Ø¹Ø§ÙÙØ© عÙ٠اÙØÙ?اظ عÙ٠تÙ
اس٠اÙÙسÙج ااÙجتÙ
اعÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ?٠إØار Ùذ٠اÙرؤÙØ© ااÙستراتÙجÙØ© اÙجدÙدة⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ù تÙدÙ? اÙسÙاسات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ©â¬
â«Ø¥ÙÙ ØÙ
اÙØ© اÙÙ?ئات اÙÙ?ÙÙرة ÙاأÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙØ© Ù?Øسب⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù ÙتساعدÙÙ
Ø£Ùضا ٠عÙ٠اÙÙÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬ÙعÙ٠أ٠ÙصÙرÙا Ù
ستÙÙÙÙ ÙÙسÙÙ
Ùا Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© ااÙÙتصادÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ?Ù Ùذا اÙÙظاÙ
اÙجدÙد⪠Øâ¬Ø³ØªØµØ¨Ø اÙÙÙÙد أداة Ù
اÙØ° أخÙر ÙÙ
Ù ÙÙ
Ù?٠أÙ
س اÙØاجة Ø¥ÙÙÙا (اÙÙ?Ùراء Ù?Ùرا Ù
دÙعا) ÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙبÙا اØتÙاجاتÙÙ
اأÙساسÙة⪠Øâ¬Ù?Ù ØÙ٠سÙتÙ
تÙدÙÙ
اÙخدÙ
ات ÙÙÙ?Ùراء⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
Ù Ù?ÙÙÙ
اÙÙ?Ùراء Ù?Ùرا Ù
دÙعا⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠أج٠اÙØد Ù
Ù ÙÙØ§Ø Ø§ÙضعÙ?â¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© ÙتØسÙÙ ÙدرتÙÙ
عÙ٠ااÙستÙ?ادة Ù
٠اÙÙ?رص ااÙÙتصادÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙÙ?ر برÙاÙ
ج اÙتØÙÙاÙت اÙÙÙدÙØ© ÙÙسÙØØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© أداة جÙدة اÙتÙجÙÙ ÙÙ
ÙاÙ?ØØ© اÙÙ?Ùر⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ÙØ° عاÙ
⪠Ø8373â¬ÙساÙد اÙبÙÙ⬠â«âª\.73â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙدÙÙ٠جÙÙد اÙسÙØØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© اÙراÙ
ÙØ© Ø¥Ù٠اÙØد Ù
٠اÙÙ?Ùر ÙتØسÙ٠شبÙات اأÙÙ
ا٠ااÙجتÙ
اعÙ⪠\.â¬ÙبÙ
ساÙدة Ù
٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâªØâ¬â¬
â«ÙااÙتØاد اأÙÙرÙبÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙÙ
برÙاÙ
ج اÙتØÙÙاÙت اÙÙÙدÙØ© بدÙر غاÙØ© Ù?٠اأÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù?Ù Ù
عاÙجة اÙÙ?Ùر ÙاÙتعرض ÙØ£ÙØ®Øار ÙÙ
ÙعÙÙ
ا⪠Øâ¬ÙتØÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³ØªØ¯Ø§Ù
Ø© اÙدخ٠ÙتشجÙع اÙØ´Ù
Ù٠ااÙÙتصاد٠Ùا٠سÙÙ
ا Ù?ÙÙ
ا بÙ٠اÙÙساء ÙاÙØ´Ø±Ø§Ø¦Ø Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ
شة⪠\.â¬Ùا٠Ùزا٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙتØÙÙاÙت اÙÙÙدÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§Ø£Ùداة اÙرئÙسÙØ© ÙÙÙ
ساعدة ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© Ù
٠أج٠Ù
ÙاÙ?ØØ© اÙÙ?Ùر بسبب سجÙ٠اÙتارÙخ٠اÙÙØ§Ø¬Ø ÙØ¥Ù
ÙاÙÙØ© زÙادة ÙØا٠Ùذ٠اÙتØÙÙاÙتâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø³Ø±Ø¹Ø© ÙÙ?اعÙÙØ© ÙÙ
ساعدة اأÙسر اÙÙ
عÙزة أثÙاء اأÙزÙ
ات⪠\.â¬ÙعاÙÙØ© عÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø£ØªØ§Ø برÙاÙ
ج اÙتØÙÙاÙت اÙÙÙدÙØ© اÙÙ?رصة ÙÙسÙØØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© Ù٠تÙÙÙ
بتÙØÙد ÙتÙسÙÙ ÙتØÙÙر اÙÙ
ساعدة ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© اÙت٠ÙاÙت Ù?Ù Ù
عظÙ
Ùا تÙ?ÙدÙÙ
Ù
٠خاÙ٠شبÙØ© Ù
عÙدة Ù
٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
اتâ¬
â«Ø§Ùت٠تدÙرÙا اÙسÙØØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© (Ù
٠بÙÙÙا ثاÙØ« Ùزارات عÙ٠اأÙÙÙ)⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬ÙغÙرÙا Ù
٠اÙجÙات اÙخارجÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«ØªÙدÙ? استراتÙجÙØ© ÙØاع اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© Ø¥Ù٠تØسÙÙ ØÙ
اÙØ© اÙÙ?Ùراء ÙØ¥Ù
ÙاÙÙØ© ØصÙÙÙÙ
عÙ٠اÙÙ?رص ااÙÙتصادÙة⬠â«âª\.77â¬â¬
â«Ù
٠خاÙ٠اÙخدÙ
ات⪠Øâ¬Ø¹ÙÙ
ا بأ٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù٠اÙÙ
ÙÙ?ر اÙرئÙس٠ÙÙذ٠اÙخدÙ
ات⪠\.â¬ÙÙ?٠إØار Ùذ٠اÙرؤÙØ© ااÙستراتÙجÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙجدÙدة⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ù تÙدÙ? اÙسÙاسات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© Ø¥ÙÙ ØÙ
اÙØ© اÙÙ?ئات اÙÙ?ÙÙرة ÙاأÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙØ© Ù?Øسب⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù ÙتساعدÙÙ
Ø£Ùضا ٠عÙ٠اÙÙÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬ÙعÙÙâ¬
â«Ø£Ù ÙصÙرÙا Ù
ستÙÙÙÙ ÙÙسÙÙ
Ùا Ù?٠اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© ااÙÙتصادÙة⪠\.â¬ÙعÙ٠اÙرغÙ
Ù
٠أ٠اÙتØÙÙاÙت اÙÙÙدÙØ© تستÙدÙ? اÙÙ?Ùراء اÙÙ
دÙعÙÙ ÙتÙبÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ØتÙاجاتÙÙ
اأÙساسÙة⪠Øâ¬ØªÙدÙ? اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© Ø¥Ù٠اÙØد Ù
Ù Ù
ÙاØ٠اÙضعÙ? ااÙجتÙ
اع٠ÙتØسÙ٠إÙ
ÙاÙÙØ© اÙØصÙ٠عÙ٠اÙÙ?رصâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصادÙة⪠\.â¬ÙبÙ
ساÙدة Ù
Ù Ù
شرÙع تعزÙز اÙØÙ
اÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙتÙ
تØÙÙر Ù
Ùصة Ø£ØادÙØ© ÙتÙدÙÙ
اÙخدÙ
ات ÙاÙÙ
ÙاÙ?ع ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ©â¬
â«ÙØ£Ùسر اÙÙ
عÙØ´ÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙÙرة ÙاأÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙة⪠\.â¬ÙسÙتÙÙÙ? ÙØ¬Ø§Ø Ùذ٠اÙÙ
Ùصة عÙ٠إÙ
داد اÙخدÙ
ات⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙØ°Ù Ùعتبر Ù
ØدÙدا Ù Ù?٠اÙÙÙت اÙراÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙاسا ٠عÙ٠ااÙØتÙاجات⪠Øâ¬Ùا٠سÙÙ
ا Ù?٠غزة⪠\.â¬Ùتعتبر اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙجÙات اÙرئÙسÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© ÙÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© ÙÙÙ?ئاتâ¬
â«Ù
Ùâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙÙرة ÙاأÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙة⪠Øâ¬Ùا٠سÙÙ
ا Ù?٠غزة⪠Øâ¬ÙØÙÙت سج٠إÙجازات ÙÙÙا Ù Ù?Ù Ùذا اÙÙ
ضÙ
ار⪠Øâ¬ØÙØ« تسد Ùذ٠اÙÙ?جÙات Ùت٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙخدÙ
ات اÙت٠تÙدÙ
Ùا اÙÙ
ؤسسات اÙعاÙ
Ø©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ùضع اإÙØار اÙعاÙ
ÙØ®ØØ© اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙØÙÙØ© اÙتشغÙ٠عÙÙ ÙÙ
Ø© اأÙÙÙÙÙات اÙÙØÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙدع٠إÙÙ Ø®Ù٠⪠011â¬Ø£ÙÙ? Ù?رصة⬠â«âª\.78â¬â¬
â«Ø¹Ù
٠جدÙدة عÙÙ Ù
د٠اÙعشر سÙÙات اÙÙادÙ
ة⪠\.â¬ÙÙأت٠تشغÙ٠اÙشباب ÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© رÙادة اأÙعÙ
ا٠بÙصÙ?ÙÙ
ا Ø£ÙÙÙÙتÙÙ Ù?٠أÙداÙ? اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§Ø¥ÙستراتÙجÙØ© ÙÙسÙØØ© اÙÙØÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙتÙص اإÙستراتÙجÙØ© عÙ٠تØسÙ٠جÙدة اÙتعÙÙÙ
⪠Øâ¬ÙخصÙصا ٠اÙتعÙÙÙ
اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø§Ø±Ùâ¬
â«Ø¥Øد٠اأÙÙÙÙÙات عÙ٠صعÙد اÙسÙاسات⪠\.â¬Ø¹Ø§ÙÙØ© عÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ØªÙدÙ? اÙسÙØØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© Ø¥Ù٠تØسÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙاءÙ
Ø© بÙ٠اÙتعÙÙÙ
اÙجاÙ
عÙâ¬
â«ÙاØتÙاجات سÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬ÙعÙ٠صعÙد Ù
Ù
اثÙ⪠Øâ¬ØªØ¯Ø±Ù ااÙستراتÙجÙØ© اÙÙØÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© ÙÙتشغÙ٠اÙعاÙÙØ© اÙÙ
تداخÙØ© بÙ٠اÙÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«âª 8â¬Ø§Ø£ÙÙ
Ù
اÙÙ
تØدة برÙÙ
ÙÙدÙâª\.8371 Øâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠8â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصاد٠ÙاÙتشغÙ٠باعتبار٠عÙصرا Ù
ØÙرÙا⪠Øâ¬ÙÙدÙ?Ùا اأÙساس٠Ù٠تÙÙئة بÙئة Ù
ÙاتÙØ© ÙÙتشغÙÙ Ù
٠خاÙ٠اÙسÙاسات ÙاÙتÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤسسÙØ© ÙاÙبÙÙØ© اÙتØتÙØ© ÙغÙرÙا Ù
٠اÙتدابÙر اÙÙ
باشرة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙذا ÙÙÙ Ù
ع ترÙÙز خاص عÙ٠اÙشبابâª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙا٠Øاجة Ù
ÙØØ© اÙتخاذ إجراءات جرÙئة ÙÙ
Ùع ÙÙÙع أزÙ
Ø© سÙاسÙØ© ÙاÙتصادÙØ© Ù?٠غزة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
٠اÙÙ
ستبعد أ٠تستØÙع⬠â«âª\.70â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙØØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© اتخاذ تدابÙر ÙاÙ?ÙØ© Ù?Ù Ùذا اÙصدد⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙاÙبÙدÙات دÙر غاÙØ© Ù?٠اأÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù?Ù Ù
ÙØ¡ Ùذاâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?راغ ÙاستÙÙ
ا٠اÙخدÙ
Ø© اÙت٠تÙدÙ
Ùا اÙÙ
ؤسسات اÙعاÙ
ة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙÙا بØاجة Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
ساÙدة ÙÙÙØ© Ù
Ù Ùب٠اÙجÙات اÙÙ
اÙØØ© ÙÙÙÙاÙ
بذÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙاÙâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø¹Ø¶ اÙÙ?رص⪠Øâ¬ÙØ¥Ù ÙاÙت Ù
ØدÙدة⪠Øâ¬ÙتØÙÙÙ ÙÙ
٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص ÙØ®ÙÙ Ù?رص اÙعÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬Ø¹Ù٠سبÙ٠اÙÙ
ثاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù?٠ظ٠اÙÙÙÙد عÙ٠اÙØرÙØ©â¬
â«Ø¯Ø§Ø®Ù Ùخارج غزة ÙزÙادة تعÙÙد اÙÙ
ÙاÙ
(أ٠إسÙادÙا Ø¥Ù٠اÙغÙر) عÙÙ Ù
ستÙ٠اÙعاÙÙ
بÙ?ض٠اÙتÙÙÙات اÙرÙÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ùعتبر اÙعÙ
٠اÙØرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
دعÙÙ
باإÙÙترÙت Ù
٠خاÙ٠شبÙØ© اإÙÙترÙت (اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ) Ù?رصة Ùاعدة ÙÙشباب Ù?٠غزة⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ù سÙÙ
ا اÙÙساء⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ
ث٠اÙعددâ¬
â«ÙبÙرا اÙستÙرار غزة⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ Ù?٠اÙÙÙت ÙÙ?سÙ⪠Øâ¬Ùعتبر اÙشباب Ø£Ù?ض٠ثرÙات غزةâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙبÙر ÙÙشباب اÙعاØ٠ع٠اÙعÙ
٠تÙدÙدÙا Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙدÙ? Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙع Ø¥Ù٠اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? Ù
Ù ÙØأة Ùذا اÙÙضع اÙÙ
ترد٠اÙØ°Ù ÙÙاج٠اÙشباب Ù
٠أبÙاء غزة اÙÙÙÙ
⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ?Ù⬠â«âª\.73â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙت ÙÙ?س٠دعÙ
Ø£ÙداÙ? اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
ستداÙ
Ø© Ù
تÙسØØ© اأÙجÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ
عاÙجة زÙادة Ùسبة اÙشباب اÙعاØ٠ع٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙÙابÙÙØ© اÙتعرضâ¬
â«ÙØ£ÙØ®Øار Ù?٠سÙا٠Ù
ØدÙدÙØ© Ù?رص اÙعÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙدÙر Ù
ØÙر ترÙÙز Ùذ٠اÙعÙ
ÙÙØ© عÙ٠تÙÙ?Ùر Ù?رص عÙ
Ù ÙصÙرة اأÙج٠(اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
ÙابÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعÙ
Ù) ÙÙشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ?⪠\.â¬ÙÙ?٠ظ٠اÙÙ?جÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙجÙدة Ù?٠اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙÙ Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙع Ø£ÙÙÙÙØ© ÙبرÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
ÙابÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعÙ
Ù Ù?٠اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ù
٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙÙÙ?ئات اأÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙØ© Ù?٠جÙ
Ùع Ø£ÙØاء ÙØاع غزة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
اâ¬
â«Ø³ØªØ¯Ø¹Ù
اÙعÙ
ÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙترØØ© Ø®ÙÙ Ù?رص اÙعÙ
Ù Ù
٠خاÙ٠تÙدÙÙ
اÙÙ
ساÙدة ÙÙشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ? ÙÙÙصÙ٠إÙÙ Ù?رص عÙ
Ù Øر Ù
دعÙÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙÙترÙت (اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ)⪠\.â¬ÙسÙشدد Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙع بصÙرة خاصة عÙÙ Ù
ساÙدة اÙشابات Ù
٠خاÙ٠اآÙتÙâª( :â¬Ø£) اÙترÙÙز عÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø±ÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù?٠اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© ÙاÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙ٠اÙÙØ°ÙÙ Ùعتبرا٠أÙثر Ù
اÙØ¡Ù
Ø© ÙÙ
شارÙØ© اÙÙ
Ø±Ø£Ø©Ø (ب) اشتراØâ¬
â«Ù٠اÙÙساء ⪠%03â¬Ø¹Ù٠اأÙÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙعâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø£Ù تش Ùâ¬
â«Ø³ØªÙÙ
٠اإÙجراءات اÙتدخÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙع اÙخدÙ
ات اÙت٠تÙدÙ
Ùا اÙÙ
ؤسسات اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙاÙت٠سÙتÙ
تÙسÙÙÙا Ù
عÙا عÙÙ⬠â«âª\.70â¬â¬
â«Ù ÙØ«ÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙÙ
Ù Ù
ÙÙ٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù?Ù Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙع اÙدرÙس اÙÙ
ستÙ?ادة Ù
٠اÙبرÙاÙ
ج اÙذ٠تدÙر٠Ùزارة اÙعÙ
Ù⬠â«ÙØ Ù?â¬
â«ÙÙبÙ٠عÙÙÙا⪠\.â¬Ùستساعد اÙخدÙ
ات اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ù
٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù
٠خاÙ٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù?٠سد Ùذ٠اÙÙ?جÙاتâ¬
â«ÙاستÙÙ
ا٠اÙخدÙ
ات اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ù
٠اÙÙ
ؤسسات اÙعاÙ
ة⪠\.â¬ÙستتشاÙر اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù
ع اÙÙ
ؤسسات اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
عÙÙØ© ÙÙ
ÙÙاâ¬
â«Ùزارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙاÙتخØÙØ Ø¨Ø´Ø£Ù Ù
ÙترØات اÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙÙ?رعÙة⪠\.â¬ÙسÙÙ?Ù
ÙØ Ø´Ø¨Ø§Ø¨ اأÙسر اÙÙ
عÙØ´ÙØ© اÙÙ
ستÙ?Ùدة Ù
٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙتØÙÙاÙتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙدÙØ© ÙÙزارة اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© Ù
عاÙ
ÙØ© تÙ?ضÙÙÙØ© ÙÙÙصÙ٠إÙ٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬ÙستستÙ?Ùد بعض اأÙسر اÙت٠تØصÙâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù٠تØÙÙاÙت ÙÙدÙØ© Ù
٠اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© اÙت٠تÙ?ÙدÙ
Ù
٠خاÙ٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬ÙسÙتÙ
اÙتØÙÙ Ù
Ù Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات اأÙÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ù
٠اÙشباب اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙتÙدÙ
ÙÙ ÙÙØصÙ٠عÙÙ Ù
ساÙدة Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙع Ù
٠خاÙÙ Ùزارة اÙعÙ
Ù ÙÙزارة اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ©â¬
â«ÙاÙصÙدÙ٠اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙ ÙÙتشغÙÙ ÙاÙØÙ
اÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙة⪠\.â¬ÙسÙتÙ
Ø¥Ùشاء ÙجÙØ© استشارÙØ© ÙضÙ
ا٠ااÙتسا٠Ù
ع استراتÙجÙات اÙسÙØØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© ÙÙتÙسÙر اÙرÙØ§Ø¨Ø ÙاÙتÙسÙ٠بÙÙ Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© (اÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°)â¬
â«ÙÙ
ؤسسات اÙسÙØØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© ذات اÙعاÙÙØ© اÙÙ
Ø°ÙÙرة أعاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠أ٠تتأÙÙ? Ù
Ù Ùزارة اÙعÙ
Ù ÙÙزارة اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© ÙاÙصÙدÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙ ÙÙتشغÙÙ ÙاÙØÙ
اÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© ÙÙزارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙاÙتخØÙØ ÙÙ
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙتعÙد اجتÙ
اعاتÙاâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø´Ù٠دÙر٠بغرض Ù
ا ÙÙÙâª( :â¬Ø£) ضÙ
ا٠ااÙستعداد اÙسÙÙÙ
ÙاÙتÙاص٠بخصÙص اÙدعÙØ© ÙتÙدÙÙ
عرÙض ÙÙ
ÙترØØ§ØªØ (ب) تØدÙدâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
ؤÙÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
ؤÙÙÙÙØ (ج) اإÙشراÙ? عÙ٠اÙتÙدÙ
اÙÙ
Øرز Ù?٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙØ¹Ø (د) تÙدÙÙ
اÙÙ
Ø´Ùرةâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø´Ø£Ù تØسÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اأÙÙØ´ØØ© عÙد ااÙÙتضاء⪠\.â¬ÙسÙتÙ
إبراÙ
Ù
Ø°Ùرات تÙ?اÙÙ
بÙÙ Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© ÙÙزارةâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© ÙÙزارة اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙصÙدÙ٠اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙ ÙÙتشغÙÙ ÙاÙØÙ
اÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© عÙÙ ÙØÙ ÙعÙس اÙتÙ?اÙÙ
ات اÙسابÙØ© ÙÙسÙØâ¬
â«Ø§ÙضÙØ¡ عÙÙ ÙØا٠اÙتعاÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙستشÙر Ù
Ø°Ùرات اÙتÙ?اÙÙ
عÙÙ Ùج٠اÙخصÙص Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
ÙاÙ
اÙÙ
تعÙÙØ© بجÙÙد اÙتÙسÙÙ ÙاÙÙ
راجعةâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
زدÙجة ÙÙÙاعد اÙبÙاÙات ذات اÙعاÙÙØ© ÙÙتØÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«(ج) اÙصÙØ© اÙÙØ«ÙÙØ© باأÙÙداÙ? اÙعÙÙاâ¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠9â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ùتس٠اÙÙ
شرÙع Ù
ع أجÙدة اÙسÙاسات اÙÙØÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© ÙÙسÙÙات ⪠Ø7177-7102â¬ÙÙساÙد اÙرÙÙزة اÙثاÙثة Ù
٠أجÙدة⬠â«âª\.7\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙاسات اÙÙØÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ "اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
ستداÙ
Ø©"⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùت٠تشÙ
٠اأÙÙÙÙÙات اÙÙØÙÙØ© بشأ٠تعزÙز ااÙستÙاÙ٠ااÙÙتصاد٠Ù
٠خاÙÙ Ø®ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù?رص اÙعÙ
Ù ÙبÙاء Ù
جتÙ
عات Ù
ØÙÙØ© Ùادرة عÙ٠اÙتÙÙÙ? Ù
٠خاÙ٠تÙبÙØ© اØتÙاجاتÙا اأÙساسÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙ
ا Ùتس٠اÙÙ
شرÙع Ø£Ùضا Ù
ع استراتÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
ساعدة اÙخاصة باÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙÙسÙÙات اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ⪠7170-7102â¬ÙÙضÙ?ة⬠â«âª\.71â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙغربÙØ© ÙÙØاع غزة (تÙرÙر رÙÙ
⪠9 \.)ZG-002710â¬ÙÙÙ ÙساÙÙ
Ù?٠اÙرÙÙزة اأÙÙÙÙ Ù
٠استراتÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
ساعدة بتÙÙئة اÙظرÙÙ?â¬
â«Ù٠اÙÙ
زÙد Ù
٠أÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙØاع اÙخاص ÙØ®ÙÙ Ù?رص اÙعÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬ÙÙ?٠سÙا٠غزة اÙØاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ù تÙجد إا٠Ù?رص Ù
ØدÙدة ÙÙÙ
٠اÙÙØاع⬠â«Ø§Ùت٠تÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ùخاص ÙØ®ÙÙ Ù?رص اÙعÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬ÙÙساÙد اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙاØدة Ù
Ù Ùذ٠اÙÙ?رص⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ٠اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ù?اÙÙ
ستÙ٠اÙعاÙÙ
٠اÙÙ
تزاÙد Ù
Ùâ¬
â«ØªØ¹ÙÙد اÙÙ
ÙاÙ
⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙذ٠تÙسر٠اÙتÙÙÙÙÙجÙات اÙرÙÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬ÙتÙØ Ù?رصة Ù?رÙدة Ùشباب غزة ÙاÙÙØ®Ø±Ø§Ø Ù?٠اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù ÙÙ?٠بعضâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØااÙت Ø¥ØاÙÙ Ù
شرÙعات أعÙ
ا٠إÙÙترÙÙÙØ© خاصة بÙÙ
⪠\.â¬ÙØ°ÙÙ Ù?Ù
٠خاÙ٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙÙÙ?ر اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙÙشبابâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ستÙدÙ? خبرة عÙ
Ù Ø«Ù
ÙÙØ© رÙØ«Ù
ا تظÙر ÙÙÙ
Ù?رص عÙ
٠أÙ?ضÙ⪠\.â¬ÙبÙ
ا Ø£Ù٠سÙتÙ
تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ù
شرÙعات برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙÙ?رعÙØ©â¬
â«Ø¨Ù
عرÙ?Ø© اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ù?سÙساÙد اÙÙ
شرÙع Ø£Ùضا Ù ÙØاع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙØ°Ù Ùعتبر جÙØ© تشغÙÙ ÙبÙرة Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ù
٠إجراءات اÙÙ
شرÙع اÙتدخÙÙة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙØاع اÙخاص ÙÙعÙ
٠عبر Ù
جÙ
Ùعة Ù
تÙÙعة ÙÙاسعة اÙÙØا٠Ù
٠اÙÙØاعات Ù?٠غزة⪠\.â¬ÙسÙÙ? ت٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات اÙبÙ٠اأÙخر٠اÙت٠تساÙد ÙÙ
٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص ÙØ®Ù٠اÙÙظائÙ? Ù?٠اÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙØ© ÙÙØاع غزة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°ÙÙ Ù
شرÙع اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
بتÙرة ÙÙÙØاع اÙخاص⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùذ٠سÙساÙد Ø¥Ùشاء Ù
رÙز تعÙÙد Ù?٠غزة (ضÙ
٠أÙ
Ùر أخرÙ)⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠إÙÙجاد Ù?رص اÙعÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙØ°Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ?Ø° تجرÙبÙا ٠سÙد تأثÙر Ø¥ÙÙ
ائ٠اÙجتذاب ااÙستثÙ
ار اÙخاص ÙÙÙÙÙض بÙ
Ùارات اأÙÙد٠اÙعاÙ
ÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙساÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙع Ø£Ùضا Ù?٠اÙرÙÙزة اÙثاÙثة اÙستراتÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
ساعدة ÙÙÙ "تÙبÙØ© اØتÙاجات اÙØ´Ø±Ø§Ø¦Ø Ø§Ø£ÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙة⬠â«âª\.72â¬â¬
â«ÙتدعÙÙ
اÙÙ
ؤسسات Ù
٠أج٠تØسÙ٠اÙخدÙ
ات اÙت٠ترÙز عÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙاØÙ"⪠\.â¬ÙعÙÙ Ùج٠اÙتØدÙد⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙÙÙ?ر اÙÙ
شرÙع⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠خاÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø±ÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬Ø´Ø¨ÙØ© Ø£Ù
ا٠Ù
ؤÙتة اÙستÙداÙ? اÙشباب ÙأسرÙÙ
⪠\.â¬ÙبترÙÙز برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠عÙ٠اÙخدÙ
اتâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© اÙت٠تÙدÙ
Ùا اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙÙÙ
جتÙ
عات اÙÙ
ØÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙÙرة⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙساÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙع Ù?٠اÙØد Ù
٠اÙعجز Ù?٠اÙخدÙ
اتâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© Ù?ÙÙ
ا بÙ٠اÙØ´Ø±Ø§Ø¦Ø Ø§Ø£Ùشد ضعÙ?ا Ù ÙÙ?٠اÙÙÙت ÙÙ?س٠ÙساÙد اÙÙ
ؤسسات اÙت٠ÙدÙÙا سج٠ÙÙÙ Ù?٠تÙدÙÙ
اÙخدÙ
ات ÙÙÙ
جتÙ
عاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙÙرة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا سÙتÙ
Ø£Ùضا ٠إعداد Ù
شرÙعات Ù?رعÙØ© ÙبرÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠بÙ
دخاÙت Ù
٠اÙÙ
جتÙ
عات اÙÙ
ØÙÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
ؤسساتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعاÙ
Ø© ذات اÙصÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ع ÙجÙد Ø¢ÙÙØ© ÙÙÙØ© ÙÙ
عاÙجة اÙÙ
ظاÙÙ
⪠\.â¬ÙسÙشدد Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙع بصÙرة خاصة عÙÙ Ù
ساÙدة اÙÙساء اÙشابات Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ø®Ø§ÙÙ⪠)7( :â¬Ø§ÙترÙÙز عÙ٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù?٠اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙ٠اأÙÙثر Ù
اÙØ¡Ù
Ø© ÙÙ
شارÙØ© اÙÙ
رأةØâ¬
â«(⪠)8â¬Ø§Ø´ØªØ±Ø§Ø Ø£Ù ÙÙÙ٠⪠%03â¬Ø¹Ù٠اأÙÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙع Ù
٠اÙÙساء⪠\.â¬ÙستÙÙ
٠إجراءات اÙÙ
شرÙع اÙتدخÙÙØ© عÙ
ÙÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠اأÙخر٠اÙت٠تساÙد اÙÙ?ئات اأÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙØ© Ù?٠غزة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°ÙÙ Ù
شرÙع تعزÙز اÙØÙ
اÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙة⪠\.â¬ÙسÙعØÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùشباب Ù
٠اأÙسر اÙÙ
ستÙ?Ùدة Ù
٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙتØÙÙاÙت اÙÙÙدÙØ© اأÙÙÙÙÙØ© ÙاÙستÙ?ادة Ù
٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬ÙستستÙ?Ùد بعض أسرâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø±ÙاÙ
ج اÙتØÙÙاÙت اÙÙÙدÙØ© Ù
٠اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© اÙت٠ÙÙدÙ
Ùا اÙشبابâª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙ
ا ÙساÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙع اÙÙ
ÙØªØ±Ø Ø£Ùضا Ù?٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° استراتÙجÙØ© Ù
جÙ
Ùعة اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙÙ
ÙØÙØ© اÙشر٠اأÙÙØ³Ø ÙØ´Ù
اÙ⬠â«âª\.72â¬â¬
â«Ø£Ù?رÙÙÙا⪠Øâ¬ÙخصÙصا ٠رÙÙزتÙا اÙÙ
عÙÙØ© بتجدÙد اÙعÙد ااÙجتÙ
اع٠Ù
٠خاÙÙ Ø®ÙÙ Ù?رص اÙعÙ
Ù ÙÙشباب ÙتÙÙ?Ùر اÙخدÙ
ات ÙÙÙ?ئات اÙÙ?ÙÙرةâ¬
â«ÙاأÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙساÙد اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙدÙ?Ù Ù
جÙ
Ùعة اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠اإÙستراتÙجÙÙ٠إÙÙÙاء اÙÙ?Ùر اÙÙ
دÙع ÙتعزÙز اÙرخاء اÙÙ
شتر٠عÙÙ ÙØÙ⬠â«âª\.83â¬â¬
â«Ù
ستداÙ
⪠\.â¬ØªÙدÙ? اÙعÙ
ÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙترØØ© Ø¥Ù٠تÙبÙØ© ااÙØتÙاجات اÙعاجÙØ© اÙÙاشئة ع٠اÙÙضع اÙØارئ Ù?٠غزة⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع Ù
ساÙÙ
تÙا Ù?٠اÙÙÙت ÙÙ?سÙâ¬
â«Ø£Ùضا Ù Ù?٠أÙداÙ? اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù
تÙسØØ© اأÙجÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠زÙادة ااÙØتÙاء ااÙÙتصاد٠ÙÙشباب ÙتØسÙ٠تÙدÙÙ
اÙخدÙ
ات ÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙØاعâ¬
â«Ø§Ùخاصâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø§Ùتسا٠Ù
ع استراتÙجÙØ© Ù
جÙ
Ùعة اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠اÙÙ
عÙÙØ© باÙÙ
ساÙاة بÙ٠اÙجÙسÙÙ (ÙÙسÙÙات اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© Ù
٠⪠7100â¬Ø¥ÙÙ⬠â«âª\.87â¬â¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«âª )7172â¬ÙØ®ØØ© اÙعÙ
٠اÙÙØر٠اÙثاÙÙØ© بشأ٠اÙÙ
ساÙاة بÙ٠اÙجÙسÙÙ ÙÙسÙÙات اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© Ù
٠⪠7102â¬Ø¥Ù٠⪠\.)7170â¬ÙÙ
ا تتس٠اÙعÙ
ÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙترØØ© Ø£Ùضا Ù Ù
ع Ù
ØÙر اÙترÙÙز اÙÙ
شتر٠ÙاÙستراتÙجÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
تÙ
Ø«Ù Ù?٠اÙÙ
ساÙاة بÙ٠اÙجÙسÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ùتعتبر اÙÙ
شارÙØ© ااÙÙتصادÙØ© ÙÙÙ
رأةâ¬
â«Ø±ÙÙزة أساسÙØ© Ù
٠رÙائز استراتÙجÙØ© Ù
جÙ
Ùعة اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠اÙخاصة باÙÙ
ساÙاة بÙ٠اÙجÙسÙÙ ÙاÙÙ
ØبÙØ© عÙÙ Ù
ستÙ٠اÙÙ
جÙ
ÙعةâªØâ¬â¬
â«âª 9â¬ÙاÙØ´ Ù
جÙس اÙÙ
دÙرÙ٠اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°ÙÙÙ Ùذ٠اÙÙ
سأÙØ© Ù?٠⪠70â¬Ø¯ÙسÙ
برâª/â¬ÙاÙÙ٠اأÙÙÙ âª\.8371â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠10â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ù?ضاÙ٠ع٠استراتÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
جÙ
Ùعة ÙÙ
ÙØÙØ© اÙشر٠اأÙÙØ³Ø ÙØ´Ù
ا٠أÙ?رÙÙÙا⪠\.â¬ÙتÙدÙ? ااÙستراتÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
عÙÙØ© باÙÙ
ساÙاة بÙ٠اÙجÙسÙÙâªØâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙÙÙØ© "اÙÙ
ساÙاة بÙ٠اÙجÙسÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙØد Ù
٠اÙÙ?Ùر⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙÙ
٠اÙشاÙ
Ù ÙÙجÙ
Ùع"⪠Øâ¬Ø¥Ù٠اÙبÙاء عÙ٠اإÙÙجازات ÙتÙدÙÙ
ØÙÙÙ Ù
جرب٠تراعÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ساÙاة بÙ٠اÙجÙسÙÙ ÙÙسÙاسات ÙاÙعÙ
ÙÙات⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
Ù "عÙاÙ
٠اÙتغÙÙر" اÙت٠تعÙرÙا ااÙستراتÙجÙØ© اÙتÙ
اÙ
Ùا ÙتستجÙب ÙÙا Ø¥Ù
ÙاÙÙØ©â¬
â«ØصÙ٠اÙÙساء عÙ٠اÙÙ?رص ااÙÙتصادÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙتØدÙدا Ù Ø®ÙÙ Ù?رص اÙعÙ
Ù ÙÙ
ÙÙÙØ© اأÙصÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø§Ø±ÙÙ
ا Ù
ØرÙÙ٠أساسÙÙÙ ÙÙÙÙ
Ù ÙاÙØدâ¬
â«Ù
٠اÙÙ?Ùر⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا تتÙ
اش٠اÙعÙ
ÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙترØØ© Ù
ع Ø®ØØ© اÙعÙ
٠اÙÙÙ?Øر٠اÙثاÙÙØ© بشأ٠اÙÙ
ساÙاة بÙ٠اÙجÙسÙÙ ÙتعزÙز اÙÙ?رص ااÙÙتصادÙØ©â¬
â«ÙÙÙساء ÙتØÙÙ٠تÙاÙ?ؤ اÙÙ?رص ااÙÙتصادÙØ© Ù
٠أج٠Ù
زÙد Ù
٠اÙÙ
ساÙاة Ù?٠اÙÙ
شارÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø§Ùتسا٠Ù
ع اعتÙ
اد اÙسÙØØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© ÙØ®ØØ© اÙعÙ
٠اÙÙØÙÙØ© بشأ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ùرار اأÙÙ
Ù
اÙÙ
تØدة ⪠0272â¬Ø¨Ø´Ø£Ù اÙÙ
رأة⬠â«âª\.88â¬â¬
â«ÙاÙساÙÙ
ÙاأÙÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬Ù?٠⪠Ø837\.â¬Ø§Ø¹ØªÙ
دت اÙسÙØØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© Ø®ØØ© عÙ
Ù ÙØÙÙØ© ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° Ùرار Ù
جÙس اأÙÙ
٠⪠Ø7080â¬Ù
Ù
ا بعث بإشارةâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتزاÙ
ÙÙÙØ© ÙتعزÙز اÙØاجة Ø¥Ù٠إشرا٠اÙÙساء باعتبارÙ٠عÙاÙ
٠تغÙÙر ÙعÙÙ ÙاÙ?Ø© اÙÙ
ستÙÙات Ù?٠جÙÙد بÙاء اÙساÙÙ
ÙØ¥ØاÙ٠اأÙÙ
Ùâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ùتتس٠اÙعÙ
ÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙترØØ© Ù
ع Ùذا ااÙÙتزاÙ
باØتÙاء اÙجÙسÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙترÙز عÙ٠اÙدÙر اإÙÙجاب٠اÙØ°Ù ÙÙ
Ù٠أ٠ÙÙعب٠اÙشباب Ù?٠اÙÙ
جتÙ
عاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙ
شة Ù?٠تØسÙÙ Ù?رص Ùسب اÙعÙØ´ Ù?٠اأÙÙ
د اÙÙصÙر ÙÙ?٠اÙÙÙت ÙÙ?س٠Ùضع اÙÙبÙات اأÙساسÙØ© اÙت٠ÙÙ
ÙÙÙا اÙÙ
ساÙÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ù?Ù ÙÙاÙØ© اÙÙ
ØاÙ? Ù?٠بÙاء اÙساÙÙ
Ù?٠اÙÙ
ستÙب٠اÙÙرÙبâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø«Ø§ÙÙا⪠\.â¬ÙصÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«(Ø£) اÙÙدÙ? اإÙÙÙ
ائ٠ÙÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«Ø¨Ùا٠اأÙÙداÙ? اإÙÙÙ
ائÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«ÙتÙ
ث٠اÙÙدÙ? اإÙÙÙ
ائ٠ÙÙÙ
شرÙع Ù?٠تÙدÙÙ
Ù
ساÙدة ÙÙشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ? Ù?٠غزة ÙتÙÙ?Ùر دخ٠عÙ٠اÙÙ
د٠اÙÙ
تÙسØâªØâ¬â¬ â«âª\.80â¬â¬
â«ÙزÙادة سب٠اÙÙصÙ٠إÙÙ Ù?رص اÙعÙ
٠اÙØر اÙÙ
دعÙÙ
Ø© بشبÙØ© اإÙÙترÙتâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشرات عÙÙ Ù
ستÙ٠اÙÙدÙ? اإÙÙÙ
ائ٠ÙÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشر ⪠:0â¬Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ اÙشباب اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙØصÙÙ٠عÙÙ Ù
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙع Øسب ÙÙع اÙجÙسâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشر ⪠:7â¬Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ اÙشباب Ù
Ù
Ù ÙØصÙÙ٠عÙÙ Ù
ساÙدة خاصة باÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙ٠اÙØ°Ù٠أدÙا عÙ
اÙÙ Øرا Ù ÙاØدا Ù Ù
دÙ?Ùع اأÙجر عÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙ٠أثÙاء Ù?ترة اÙÙ
ساÙدة أ٠بعد ستة Ø´ÙÙر Ù
Ù Ùذا اÙتارÙØ® Øسب ÙÙع اÙجÙسâª\.â¬â¬
â«(ب) Ù
ÙÙÙات اÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«ÙشتÙ
٠اÙÙ
شرÙع اÙÙ
ÙØªØ±Ø Ø¹Ù٠ثاÙثة Ù
ÙÙÙات⪠\.â¬ÙتÙ
تصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙ
ÙÙ٠⪠7â¬Øت٠ÙÙ
Ù٠بدء اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° عÙ٠اÙÙ?Ùر بعد تارÙØ® سرÙاÙ⬠â«âª\.83â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع⪠Øâ¬ÙاستÙÙ
اÙ٠بصÙرة تاÙ
Ø© Ù?٠اÙسÙØ© اÙثاÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ?تÙÙع تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
ÙÙ٠⪠8â¬Ø¹ÙÙ Ù
د٠Ù?ترة تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙÙÙاÙ
Ùا ثاÙØ« سÙÙاتâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠⪠:0â¬Ø§ÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù (⪠07\.2â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙاÙر)â¬
â«Ø³ÙÙÙ?ر Ùذا اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù
ÙØا٠Ù
اÙÙØ© Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر ØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù
ختارة ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° Ù
شرÙعات اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙÙ?رعÙة⬠â«âª\.80â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ùت٠تÙظÙ? اÙشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ?⪠\.â¬ÙستتضÙ
٠اÙخدÙ
ات سب٠Ùسب اÙعÙØ´ ااÙÙتصادÙØ© (ÙتعزÙز Ø£ÙØ´ØØ© اÙزراعة ÙاÙصÙد) ÙاÙخدÙ
اتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠11â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© (ÙاÙرعاÙØ© اÙصØÙØ© ÙاÙتعÙÙÙ
ÙÙ
ساÙدة اÙÙ
عاÙÙÙ ÙاÙÙ
سÙÙÙ ÙاÙدعÙ
اÙÙÙ?س٠ااÙجتÙ
اعÙ)⪠\.â¬ÙÙ٠ستعØ٠اأÙÙÙÙÙØ© ÙÙخدÙ
اتâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© اÙت٠تÙدÙ
Ùا اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ?ئات اأÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙØ©Ø ØÙØ« ÙعاÙ٠سÙا٠غزة Ù
٠تزاÙد ااÙØتÙاجاتâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ù سÙÙ
ا اÙÙ?ئات اأÙشد ضعÙ?ا ٠بÙÙÙÙ
⪠\.â¬ÙÙØ±ØªØ¨Ø Ø¨Ùذ٠ااÙØتÙاجات اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© اÙت٠ا٠تÙÙÙ
Ù
ؤسسات اÙسÙØØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© ÙاÙبÙدÙات بتÙدÙÙ
Ùا عÙÙ ÙØÙ ÙاÙ?⪠\.â¬Ùتعتبر اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© (اÙجÙ
عÙات اأÙÙÙÙØ©) Ù٠اÙجÙات اÙرئÙسÙØ© اÙتÙâ¬
â«ØªÙدÙ
اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© ÙÙÙ?ئات اÙÙ?ÙÙرة ÙاأÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙØ© Ù?٠غزة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙد ØÙÙت سج٠إÙجازات ÙÙÙÙا Ù?Ù Ùذا اÙÙ
ضÙ
ار⪠Øâ¬Ù
ا عÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù٠سد Ùذا اÙÙ?راغ ÙاستÙÙ
ا٠اÙخدÙ
Ø© اÙت٠تÙدÙ
Ùا اÙÙ
ؤسسات اÙعاÙ
ة⪠\.â¬ÙعاÙÙØ© عÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ØªØªÙ
تع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© بخبرةâ¬
â«Ù?٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ù
شرÙعات Ù
Ù
اثÙØ© ÙبرÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬ÙعÙ٠ضÙØ¡ اÙترÙÙز عÙ٠اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙة⪠Øâ¬Ù
٠اÙÙ
تÙÙع عدÙ
تÙ?عÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¥Ùجراءات اÙÙÙائÙØ© اÙبÙئÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙدÙ? Ù
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠إÙ٠تØÙÙÙ Ùتائج سرÙعة⪠\.â¬ÙسÙتÙاÙ٠دÙÙ٠عÙ
ÙÙات اÙÙ
شرÙع خصائص Ùذا اÙتصÙ
ÙÙ
⬠â«âª\.8\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ÙتÙ?صÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
بادئ اÙتÙجÙÙÙØ© ÙÙ
Ùاد اÙدعاÙØ© ÙاÙتÙاص٠ÙÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙستتÙاص٠اÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© عÙâ¬
â«Ø¥Ø¯Ø§Ø±Ø© تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙع Ù
ع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ا ستÙÙÙ
عÙ٠اÙÙ?Ùر بإعداد دعÙØ© ÙائÙ
Ø© بذاتÙا ÙÙ
ÙترØات برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
ÙابÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬ÙستÙÙÙ
اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙراغبة Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠بإعداد Ù
ÙترØات استÙادا ٠إÙ٠اÙÙ
بادئ اÙتÙجÙÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙع⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ùشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ? ÙÙ
عاÙÙر اختÙار اÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙÙ?رعÙة⪠\.â¬ÙسÙÙ?ØÙب Ù
٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© إعداد Ù
ÙترØات ÙبرÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
اÙâ¬
â«Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠بÙاء عÙ٠اÙÙ
زاÙا اÙÙسبÙØ© ÙÙا⪠Øâ¬ÙضÙ
ا٠Ù
ÙاÙشة Ùذ٠اÙÙ
ÙترØات Ù
ع اÙÙ
جتÙ
عات اÙÙ
ØÙÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
ؤسسات اÙعاÙ
Ø© اÙÙ
عÙÙØ© ÙبÙâ¬
â«âª10â¬â¬
â«ØªÙدÙÙ
Ùاâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ØªÙÙÙ
اÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙع باختÙار اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙÙ?رعÙØ© استÙادا ٠إÙÙ⬠â«âª\.81â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
عاÙÙر اÙÙ
Øددة Ù
سبÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠أ٠تعØ٠اأÙÙÙÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙÙ?رعÙØ© اÙت٠تÙÙ?ر اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© ÙÙÙ?ئات اأÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙØ©âªØâ¬â¬
â«ÙÙÙ ÙÙ?Ùظر إا٠Ù?٠اÙØªØ±Ø§Ø ÙاØد Ù
Ù ÙÙ Ù
ÙظÙ
Ø© غÙر ØÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا ستضÙ
٠اÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° Ø£Ùضا ٠تÙزÙع اÙÙ
شرÙعاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?رعÙØ© اÙت٠ÙÙع عÙÙÙا ااÙختÙار عبر ÙØاع غزة⪠\.â¬Ùبعد اختÙار اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙتÙ
تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙÙ?رعÙØ© عÙÙ Ù
د٠سÙØ© ÙاØدةâªØâ¬â¬
â«Ø¹Ù٠أ٠تÙ?ÙسÙ
Ùذ٠اÙÙ?ترة Ø¥ÙÙ Ù?ترتÙÙ Ù?رعÙتÙÙ ÙÙاÙ
اÙÙاØدة ستة أشÙر⪠\.â¬ÙسÙÙÙ٠اÙØد اأÙدÙÙ Ùعدد اÙشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ? اÙØ°Ù ÙتÙ
â¬
â«ØªØ¹ÙÙÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙÙ Ù
شرÙع Ù?رع٠⪠733â¬Ø´Ø§Ø¨ (⪠03â¬Ù?Ù ÙÙ Ù?ترة Ù?رعÙØ© ÙÙاÙ
Ùا ستة أشÙر)⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙتÙ
استخداÙ
⪠%72â¬ÙØد Ø£Ùص٠Ù
Ù Ù
ÙØØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙÙ?رع٠Ù?٠اÙتÙاÙÙÙ? اإÙدارÙØ© ÙاÙÙÙÙ ÙÙ
Ùاد اÙدعÙ
⪠Øâ¬ÙاستخداÙ
⪠%7\.0â¬ÙÙتأÙ
Ù٠عÙ٠اÙشباب اÙÙ
ستÙ?Ùد⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠أ٠ÙتÙ
تÙزÙعâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙسبة اÙÙ
تبÙÙØ© ÙÙدرÙا ⪠%27â¬Ø¹Ù٠اإÙعاÙات اÙÙÙدÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ØªØدد اÙÙÙئة اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙت٠تتÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙÙ?رعÙØ© ÙبرÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
ÙابÙ⬠â«âª\.82â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙعÙ
Ù ÙÙ?٠اÙÙ
عاÙÙر ÙاÙشرÙØ ÙاإÙرشادات اÙÙ
Øددة Ù?٠دÙÙ٠عÙ
ÙÙات اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙتتضÙ
٠عدة Ù
عاÙÙر Ù
ÙÙا Ù
عاÙÙر اÙتأÙÙ٠اÙتاÙÙØ©âª:â¬â¬
â«Ø£âª \.â¬Ø£Ù تÙÙÙ Ù
ÙظÙ
Ø© غÙر ØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© غÙر ÙادÙ?Ø© ÙÙØ±Ø¨Ø ÙغÙر ØزبÙØ© ÙÙدÙÙا Ù
Ùاتب Ù
سجÙØ© Ù?٠اÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙØ© Ø£Ùâ¬
â«ØºØ²Ø© Ù
ÙØ° ⪠0â¬Ø³ÙÙات عÙ٠اأÙÙÙØâ¬
â«Ø¨âª \.â¬Ø£Ù ÙÙÙÙ ÙدÙÙا Ù
Ùتب عاÙ
Ù Ù?Ù ÙØاع غزة Ù
ÙØ° سÙØ© ÙاØدة عÙ٠اأÙÙÙØâ¬
â«Ø¬âª \.â¬Ø£Ù ÙÙÙÙ ÙدÙÙا سج٠إÙجازات Ù?Ù Ù
جا٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù?٠اÙÙ
جتÙ
عات اÙÙ
ØÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙÙرة ÙاÙÙ
ÙÙ
شةØâ¬
â«Ø¯âª \.â¬Ø£Ù تÙÙÙ ÙدÙÙا Ø£ÙظÙ
Ø© إدارة Ù
اÙÙØ© ÙØ£ÙظÙ
Ø© إدارÙØ© Ù
ÙبÙÙØ© Ùد٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙÙ?رعÙØ© ÙبرÙاÙ
جâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
ÙØâ¬
â«Ù⪠\.â¬Ø£Ù تÙÙ٠صرÙ?ت Ø£Ù
ÙااÙ٠ا٠تÙÙ ÙÙÙ
تÙا ع٠⪠833â¬Ø£ÙÙ? دÙاÙر سÙÙÙا ٠بÙ٠عاÙ
٠⪠8370â¬Ù âª\.8371â¬â¬
â«Ø³ØªÙÙÙ
اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
Ø© غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
ختارة بتعÙÙ٠اÙشباب Ù
٠خاÙ٠عÙ
ÙÙØ© تÙاÙ?سÙØ© ÙØ´Ù?اÙ?Ø© ÙÙÙ?Ù Ù
عاÙÙر ااÙستÙداÙ? اÙتÙ⬠â«âª\.82â¬â¬
â«ÙØددÙا اÙÙ
شرÙع (اÙظر اÙÙسÙ
(ج))⪠\.â¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥ÙÙ Ùذ٠اÙÙ
عاÙÙر⪠Øâ¬ÙجÙز Ø£Ù ØªØ´ØªØ±Ø Ø§ÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù
ؤÙاÙت تعÙÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ù
عÙÙØ© عÙÙ Øسب ØبÙعة اÙعÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ٠سÙعØ٠اÙشباب اأÙÙ٠تعÙÙÙ
ا ٠أÙ?ضÙÙØ© Ù?ÙÙ
ا Ùخص اÙعÙ
٠اÙØ°Ù ÙØتاج Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
ستÙ٠أÙÙ Ù
Ùâ¬
â«âª 10â¬Ùظرا٠ÙÙÙضع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ا Øدث Ù
ؤخرا٠Ù
٠تعÙÙÙ ÙبرÙاÙ
ج اأÙÙÙرÙا ÙØ®ÙÙ Ù?رص اÙعÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬Ùد ÙتÙ
تÙÙ?Ùر بعض Ù?رص اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù
٠خاÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© عاÙÙØ© اÙÙدرات ÙتشغÙ٠اÙشباب اÙÙ
ؤÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
سجÙÙ٠عÙÙ ÙائÙ
Ø© اÙتظار برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙخاصة باأÙÙÙرÙا⪠\.â¬ÙسÙضÙ
Ù Ùذاâ¬
â«ØصÙ٠بعض اÙشباب اأÙشد اØتÙاجا ٠عÙ٠اÙÙ
ساÙدة اÙÙ?ÙرÙة⪠\.â¬Ùجب أ٠تستÙÙ?٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
ختارة Ù
عاÙÙر اأÙÙÙÙØ© (Ù
Øددة أدÙاÙ) ÙتÙ?عدâ¬
â«Ù
ÙترØات ÙÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙÙ?رعÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠12â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùارة ⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙتزÙ
اÙشباب اÙÙ
رشØÙ٠بتÙدÙÙ
Ù
ا Ùثبت Ø£ÙÙÙتÙÙ
ÙÙ
ؤÙاÙتÙÙ
⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠أ٠تÙÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù
سؤÙÙØ© عÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتØÙÙ Ù
Ù Ùذ٠اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات⪠Øâ¬Ùأ٠تتÙÙ٠اÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° Ù
ÙÙ
Ø© اÙتØÙ٠اÙÙÙائ٠Ù
Ù
Ù ÙÙع عÙÙÙÙ
ااÙختÙار Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ù
رشØÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ùستختار اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
رØÙتÙ٠اÙÙ?رعÙتÙÙ Ù?٠عÙ
ÙÙØ© ÙاØدة⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠أ٠ÙتÙ
تÙزÙع Ù
Ù ÙÙعâ¬
â«Ø¹ÙÙÙÙ
ااÙختÙار Ù
٠اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙ٠عÙ٠اÙدÙ?عتÙ٠اأÙÙÙÙ ÙاÙثاÙÙØ© عشÙائÙاÙ⪠\.â¬Ù?إذا Ù?ا٠عدد اÙÙ
رشØÙ٠اÙÙ
ؤÙÙÙ٠عدد اÙÙظائÙ? اÙÙ
تاØØ©âªØâ¬â¬
â«Ø³ØªÙÙÙ
اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© باختÙار اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙ٠عشÙائÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠أ٠تØتÙ?ظ اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
ختارة بÙائÙ
Ø© اÙتظارâ¬
â«ØªØ³ØªÙ
د Ù
ÙÙا اÙÙ
رشØÙ٠تØسبا Ù Ùتسرب اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
ختارÙ٠أثÙاء تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙع اÙÙ?رعÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¯ÙاÙرا Ù?٠اÙØ´Ùر⪠\.â¬ÙÙذا اÙÙ
بÙغ⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ø£ÙÙÙ Ù
باشرةâ¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø³ÙعÙ
Ù ÙÙ Ù
ستÙ?Ùد ÙÙ
دة ستة Ø´ÙÙر⪠Øâ¬ÙسÙØص٠عÙ٠أجر Ùعاد٠âª023â¬â¬ â«âª\.03â¬â¬
â«Ù
٠اÙØد اأÙدÙÙ ÙØ£ÙجÙر (اÙباÙغ ØÙاÙ٠⪠023â¬Ø¯ÙاÙراÙ)⪠Øâ¬Ùعتبر Ù
ÙاسبÙا ÙعدÙ
تشجÙع اÙÙ
شارÙØ© Ù?٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù
٠جاÙبâ¬
â«Ø§Ùشباب اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙعÙ
ÙÙ٠باÙÙ?ع٠أ٠بÙ
ÙدÙرÙÙ
Ø¥Ùجاد Ù?رصة عÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙÙÙ Ù?٠اÙÙÙت ÙÙ?س٠ÙتÙØ Ø´Ø¨ÙØ© Ø£Ù
ا٠ÙادÙ?ة⪠\.â¬ÙØت٠ÙتسÙ٠تعÙ
ÙÙ
â¬
â«Ù
ÙاÙ?ع برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠عÙ٠اأÙسر اÙÙ
عÙØ´Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙÙ?سÙ
Ø Ø¨Ø´Ø§Ø¨ Ù
ؤÙÙ ÙاØد Ù?ÙØ Ù
Ù Ù٠أسرة Ù
عÙØ´ÙØ© ÙاÙستÙ?ادة Ù
Ù Ùذاâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙبرÙاÙ
ج⪠\.â¬ÙسÙستÙ?Ùد ØÙاÙ٠⪠3333â¬Ø´Ø§Ø¨ (Ù
٠بÙÙÙÙ
⪠8833â¬Ø§Ù
رأة) Ù
Ù Ùذاâ¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
تÙÙ?Ùر دÙ?عة Ø£ÙÙÙØ© بÙسبة ⪠%03â¬Ù
Ù ÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙÙ
ÙØØ© ÙÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
ختارة Ùد٠إبراÙ
اتÙ?اÙÙات اÙÙ
ÙØ Ù
ع⬠â«âª\.07â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?Ùذ⪠Øâ¬ÙØ£Ù
ا اÙدÙ?عات اÙاÙØÙØ© Ù?ستÙ?دÙ?ع بشÙ٠ربع سÙÙ٠بÙاء عÙ٠اÙتÙدÙ
اÙÙ
Øرز⪠\.â¬ÙستتضÙ
٠اتÙ?اÙÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙØ Ù
ؤشرات اأÙداء ذات اÙصÙØ© باÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
باشرÙÙ ÙغÙر اÙÙ
باشرÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙÙ?رعÙØ© (اÙظر اÙÙسÙ
(ج))⪠\.â¬ÙسÙتÙ
â¬
â«Ø±ØµØ¯ تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙÙ?رعÙØ© ع٠Ùثب بÙ
عرÙ?Ø© اÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?Ùذ⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠أ٠Ùخضع جÙ
ÙعÙا ÙÙÙ
راجعة ÙاÙتدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¨Ù
عرÙ?Ø© اÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠اÙÙ
راجعة ÙاÙتدÙÙÙ ÙÙبت Ù?ÙÙ
ا إذا Ùا٠أ٠جزء Ù
Ù Ù
ÙØØ© اÙÙ
شرÙع اÙÙ?رع٠سÙعاد Ø¥Ù٠اÙجÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© Ø£Ù
اÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠⪠:7â¬Ù?رص اÙعÙ
٠اÙØر اÙÙ
دعÙÙ
بشبÙØ© اإÙÙترÙت (اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ) (اÙتÙاÙÙÙ? اÙتÙدÙرÙة⪠2 :â¬Ù
اÙÙÙ٠دÙاÙر Ø£Ù
رÙÙÙ)â¬
â«Ø³ÙÙÙ?ر Ùذا اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù
ÙØا Ù ÙÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ ÙÙ
جÙ
Ùعة Ù
ختارة Ù
Ù Ù
ÙدÙ
٠اÙخدÙ
ات ÙتÙدÙÙ
اÙÙ
ساÙدة ÙÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ⬠â«âª\.08â¬â¬
â«(اÙتدرÙب عÙ٠اÙتساب اÙÙ
Ùارات ÙاÙÙ
ساÙدة عÙ٠رأس اÙعÙ
Ù) ÙÙشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ?⪠\.â¬ÙتتضÙ
Ù ÙÙعÙØ© اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ (اÙعÙ
٠اÙØرâ¬
â«Ù
٠خاÙ٠شبÙØ© اإÙÙترÙت) Ù
ÙاÙ
Ù
عÙدة (عÙ٠سبÙ٠اÙÙ
ثاÙ⪠Øâ¬ØªØÙÙر اÙبرÙ
جÙات⪠Øâ¬ÙتصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙجراÙ?ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاإÙÙتاج اإÙعاÙÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬ÙتØÙÙرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØتÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙتصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙ
ÙاÙع⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙرسÙÙ
اÙÙ
تØرÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙتسÙÙ٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙترجÙ
Ø©)⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ÙاÙ
Ø£Ø¨Ø³Ø (عÙ٠سبÙ٠اÙÙ
ثا٠تسÙ
ÙØ© اÙصÙرâ¬
â«Ø£Ù اÙÙ?ÙدÙÙÙات⪠Øâ¬ÙتÙصÙÙ? اÙÙ
Ùتجات⪠Øâ¬ÙÙسخ اÙÙثائ٠ÙاÙÙ
ستÙدات اÙÙ
صÙرة باÙÙ
Ø§Ø³Ø Ø§ÙضÙئÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙجÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙات⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙرد عÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
ا Ù
٠خاÙ٠شبÙات ÙÙ
Ùصات عÙ٠شبÙØ© اإÙÙترÙت عÙ٠اÙÙ
ستÙÙÙ٠اÙعاÙÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙاÙÙ
ات)⪠\.â¬ÙØªØ±ØªØ¨Ø Ùذ٠اÙÙ
ÙاÙ
بÙ
شرÙعات Ø£Ùبر Øج Ùâ¬
â«ÙاإÙÙÙÙÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬ÙبÙ
ÙدÙر Ù
Ù ÙÙÙÙ
Ù٠بعÙ
Ù Øر دÙ٠تÙ?رغ عÙ٠شبÙØ© اإÙÙترÙت اÙعÙ
Ù ÙØسابÙÙ
Ø£Ù ÙصاÙØ Ø´Ø±Ùات Ù
ØÙÙØ© ا٠تشترØâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙ?رغâª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙØ´Ùد سÙ٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙØر عÙ٠اإÙÙترÙت تÙاÙ
Ùا ٠عÙ٠اÙصعÙد اÙعاÙÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬ØÙØ« تجاÙز باÙÙ?ع٠⪠3â¬Ù
ÙÙارات دÙاÙر Ù?Ù âª\.8370â¬â¬ â«âª\.00â¬â¬
â«ÙÙÙجد Ø£Ùثر Ù
٠⪠783â¬Ù
Ùصة ÙÙعÙ
٠اÙØر عÙ٠اإÙÙترÙت⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠عدد صغÙر ÙÙÙ Ù
تزاÙد Ù
٠اÙÙ
Ùصات اÙت٠تخدÙ
اÙعاÙÙ
â¬
â«Ø§ÙعربÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ÙÙا Ù
ÙاÙع ⪠Nabbeshâ¬Ù ⪠Mostaqlâ¬Ù ⪠Khamsatâ¬Ù ⪠\.Krwahâ¬ÙتتÙاض٠Ùذ٠اÙÙ
Ùصات ÙÙ
ØÙا ٠رسÙÙ
ا Ù ÙÙتسجÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
Ù Ù
Ù
ارس٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙØر⪠Øâ¬ÙرسÙÙ
ا Ù ÙÙشر إعاÙÙات اÙÙظائÙ? Ù
٠اÙزبائÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا Ùعتبر بعض Ù
Ùصات اÙتÙاص٠ااÙجتÙ
اعÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ÙÙاâ¬
â«ÙÙÙÙدإÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙتÙتÙر⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ?ÙسبÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ùضا Ù ÙÙاة تسÙÙÙÙØ© Ù
ÙÙ
Ø© ÙÙ
Ù
ارس٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙØر⪠\.â¬ÙÙد Ùجد تÙÙÙÙ
Ø£Ù?جر٠Ù
ؤخرا Ù ÙسÙ٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙØر عÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¥ÙÙترÙت عددا ٠صغÙرا Ù ÙÙÙ Ù
تزاÙدا Ù Ù
Ù Ù
Ù
ارس٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙØر عÙ٠اإÙÙترÙت Ù?Ù Ù?ÙسØÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙخصÙصا Ù Ù?Ù ÙØاع غزة⪠\.â¬ÙØ®Ùصتâ¬
â«Ø§Ùدراسة Ø¥Ù٠أ٠ÙÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙ٠آÙ?اÙا عظÙÙ
Ø© Ù?Ù Ù?ÙسØÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙخصÙصا Ù Ù?Ù Ù
جا٠تÙÙÙÙÙجÙا اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات ÙااÙتصااÙت⪠Øâ¬ÙØددتâ¬
â«ÙÙÙدا ٠أساسÙØ© Ù
٠ضÙ
ÙÙا اÙعÙ
٠اÙØر ÙاÙÙ
Ùارات اÙÙ?ÙÙØ© اÙÙ
تخصصة (ÙبرÙ
جÙات اÙتصÙ
ÙÙ
ثاÙث٠اأÙبعاد)Ø ÙÙÙص اÙÙع٠باÙعÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØر عÙ٠اإÙÙترÙØªØ ÙÙ
ØدÙدÙØ© Ù?رص اÙتدرÙب ÙاÙتÙجÙÙØ ÙاÙÙÙÙد اÙÙ
ÙضÙعة عÙ٠اÙÙ
دÙ?Ùعات عÙ٠اإÙÙترÙت (ÙخصÙصا Ù Ù?Ùâ¬
â«ØºØ²Ø©)Ø ÙÙ
ØدÙدÙØ© Ø¥Ù
ÙاÙÙØ© اÙÙصÙ٠إÙ٠اإÙÙترÙت عاÙÙØ© اÙسرعة ÙاÙÙÙرباء (ÙخصÙصا Ù Ù?٠غزة)âª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙا٠عدد ÙÙÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات اÙصغÙرة غÙر اÙÙادÙ?Ø© ÙÙØ±Ø¨Ø Ù?٠غزة اÙت٠تÙدÙ
خدÙ
ات اÙعÙ
٠اÙØر عÙ٠شبÙØ© اإÙÙترÙتâªØâ¬â¬ â«âª\.03â¬â¬
â«ÙÙدÙÙا براÙ
ج Ù
خصصة ÙÙ
ساÙدة Ù
٠سÙصبØÙ٠عاÙ
ÙÙ٠إÙÙترÙÙÙÙÙ (Ø£Ù ÙعÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù
٠خاÙ٠شبÙØ© اإÙÙترÙت)⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
٠بÙÙ ÙØ°Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات Ù
ؤسسة "اعÙ
٠با٠ØدÙد"⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ؤسسة جÙÙس سÙا٠غزة⪠Øâ¬ÙبÙابة غزة⪠Øâ¬ÙاتØاد شرÙات Ø£ÙظÙ
Ø© اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠13â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«(بÙتا)âª/â¬Ø§ÙØاضÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© ÙتÙÙÙÙÙجÙا اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات ÙااÙتصااÙت (بÙÙتÙ)⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ Ù
ؤسسات Ù
تخصصة غاÙبا Ù Ù?٠تÙÙÙÙÙجÙا اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
اتâ¬
â«ÙااÙتصااÙØªØ Ø¥Ø°Ù Ø¥Ù Ùذا اÙÙ
جا٠Ù٠اأÙÙثر ØÙبا Ù Ù?٠اÙسÙ٠عÙÙ Ù
ا ÙبدÙ⪠\.â¬Ùجرت اÙعادة أ٠تتضÙ
٠براÙ
ج اÙÙ
ساÙدة بعض براÙ
جâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتدرÙب اÙÙ
بدئ٠(Ù
Ùارات Ù?ÙÙØ© ÙÙ
Ùارات عÙ
Ù Øر) ÙÙ
ساÙدة أثÙاء اÙعÙ
Ù ÙÙ
دة Ù
Øددة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙØ´Ù
Ù Ø°ÙÙ Ù
Ùا٠ÙÙعÙ
٠اÙÙ
شتر٠ÙÙ
عداتâ¬
â«ÙأجÙزة (أجÙزة Øاس٠ÙØ¥ÙترÙت ÙÙÙرباء)⪠Øâ¬ÙÙظاÙ
Ù
دÙ?Ùعات⪠Øâ¬ÙبراÙ
ج تÙجÙÙâª/â¬Ù
ساÙدة Ù?ÙÙØ© ÙتÙÙ?Ùر سب٠اÙÙصÙ٠إÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
جتÙ
عاتâª/â¬Ù
جÙ
Ùعات اÙÙÙاش عÙ٠شبÙØ© اإÙÙترÙت⪠\.â¬Ùجرت اÙعادة Ø£ÙضÙا Ø£Ù ÙتÙ
صرÙ? أجر بسÙØ ÙتغØÙØ© تÙاÙÙÙ? ااÙÙتÙا٠أثÙاءâ¬
â«ØªÙÙ?ÙØ° برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ساÙدة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ?٠اÙعادة تÙÙÙ Ùسبة اÙÙØ¬Ø§Ø Ù
رتÙ?عة ÙÙÙتÙ٠اÙÙ
ØاÙ? بÙ
عظÙ
اÙخرÙجÙ٠إÙÙ Ù
Ù
ارسة عÙ
Ù Øر أ٠اÙتÙظÙÙ?â¬
â«Ø£Ù Ø¥Ùشاء Ù
شرÙع خاصâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ØªÙجÙÙ٠إÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات اÙÙ
تخصصة غÙر اÙربØÙØ© دعÙØ© ÙاØدة ÙتÙÙÙ Ù
ÙترØات تÙدÙÙ
اÙÙ
ساÙدة ÙÙشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ? Ù?Ù⬠â«âª\.00â¬â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ù
جا٠اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ
Ù٠أ٠تشÙ
٠اÙÙ
ÙترØات ÙÙ
اذج اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙ٠اÙبسÙØØ© ÙاÙÙ
عÙدة عÙ٠اÙسÙاء⪠Øâ¬ØªØ¨Ø¹Ø§ ÙÙ
ا تØÙبÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙÙ ÙاÙÙ
Ùزة اÙÙسبÙØ© ÙÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙبغ٠أÙضا ٠أ٠تبÙÙÙ Ùذ٠اÙÙ
ÙترØات ÙÙÙ? تخØØ Ø§ÙÙ
ÙظÙ
Ø© غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙÙÙÙ?اء باÙÙ
ستÙدÙ?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
تÙÙع ÙÙ٠استÙ?ادة اÙÙساء Ù
Ù Ù
ساÙدة اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ ÙاشتغاÙÙ٠باÙعÙ
٠اÙØر عÙ٠اإÙÙترÙت⪠\.â¬ÙستتضÙ
Ù ØزÙ
Ø© اÙÙ
ساÙدة Ù
اâ¬
â«Ùص٠إÙÙ Ø´ÙرÙÙ Ù
٠اÙتدرÙب عÙ٠اÙتساب اÙÙ
Ùارات (Ùجب Ø£Ù ÙتضÙ
Ù Ùذا Ù
Ùارات اÙعÙ
٠اÙØر ÙÙÙ
Ù٠أ٠ÙØ´Ù
٠اÙÙ
Ùاراتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙÙØ©)⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠ستة أشÙر Ù
٠اÙÙ
ساÙدة عÙ٠رأس اÙعÙ
Ù (Ùجب Ø£Ù ÙتضÙ
Ù Ùذا Ù
ساØØ© ÙÙعÙ
٠اÙÙ
شتر٠ÙتجÙÙزات Øسبâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙØتÙاج ÙإرشاداÙâª/â¬Ù
ساÙدة Ù?ÙÙØ©)⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا سÙتÙÙ٠اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù
٠اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙ٠أÙضا ٠بد٠اÙتÙا٠أثÙاء Ù?ترة اÙÙ
ساÙدة⪠\.â¬ÙستÙÙÙ
â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات اÙÙ
ختارة بإعداد ÙÙ
Øات Ù
Ùجزة ع٠اÙشباب اÙراغبÙÙ ÙاÙÙ
ؤÙÙÙÙ ÙتØدÙد Ù
Ù ÙÙ
ÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
Ùارات اÙÙاÙ?ÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شارÙØ© Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبرÙاÙ
ج⪠\.â¬ÙسÙتÙ
تÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات ÙاÙÙ
ÙترØات عÙ٠أساس اÙÙ
عاÙÙر اÙت٠ÙضعÙا اÙÙ
شرÙع⪠\.â¬ÙسÙتضÙ
٠تÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙ
ÙترØات اعتباراتâ¬
â«ÙÙ Ù
٠اÙجÙدة ÙاÙتÙÙÙ?ة⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ?تÙÙع أا٠تزÙد تÙÙÙ?Ø© اÙÙØدة ÙØزÙ
اÙÙ
ساÙدة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠اÙتÙاÙÙÙ? اإÙضاÙ?Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù ⪠3â¬Ø¢Ø§ÙÙ? دÙاÙر ÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
ستÙ?Ùد⪠\.â¬ÙستÙØصر اÙÙ
ساÙدة Ù?٠شاب ÙاØد Ù
ستÙدÙ? Ù
Ù Ù٠أسرة Ù
عÙØ´Ùة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ ÙÙ
Ù٠تضÙ
Ù٠اÙتÙاص٠اÙتÙعÙÙ Ù
ع Ø£Ù?راد اأÙسرةâ¬
â«ØÙ٠أÙÙ
ÙØ© عÙ
٠اÙÙ
رأة Ù?Ù Ùذ٠اÙØزÙ
Ø© بغÙØ© اÙتصد٠ÙدÙر اÙØ°ÙÙرة Ù?٠اÙتأثÙر عÙÙ Ùرارات اأÙسرة اÙÙ
عÙØ´ÙØ© اÙÙ
ØÙØØ© بعÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
رأة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
٠اÙÙ
تÙÙع Ø£Ù ÙستÙ?Ùد Ù
Ù Ù
ÙÙ٠اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ ØÙاÙ٠⪠103â¬Ø´Ø§Ø¨Ùا (Ù
٠بÙÙÙÙ
⪠010â¬Ø§Ù
رأة)âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ØªÙ?دÙ?ع دÙ?عة Ø£ÙÙÙØ© بÙسبة ⪠%03â¬Ù
Ù ÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙÙ
ÙØØ© اإÙجÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات اÙÙ
ختارة Ùد٠إبراÙ
اتÙ?اÙÙات اÙÙ
ÙØ⪠Øâ¬ÙØ£Ù
ا اÙدÙ?عات⬠â«âª\.0\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙاÙØÙØ© Ù?ستدÙ?ع بشÙ٠ربع سÙÙ٠بÙاء عÙ٠اÙتÙدÙ
اÙÙ
Øرز⪠Øâ¬Øت٠⪠%03â¬Ù
Ù ÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙÙ
ÙØØ© اإÙجÙ
اÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙØ£Ù
ا Ùسبة ⪠%83â¬Ø§ÙÙ
تبÙÙØ©â¬â«Ù?â¬
â«Ù?ستÙ?دÙ?ع Ø¨Ø´Ø±Ø ØªÙدÙÙ
اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
Ø© ÙÙ
ا Ùثبت اÙØ®Ø±Ø§Ø âª %03â¬Ø¹Ù٠اأÙÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
ÙÙ
Ø© عÙ
٠إÙÙترÙÙÙ ÙاØدة عÙ٠اأÙÙÙ Ù
دÙ?Ùعةâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£Ùجر بÙÙاÙØ© Ù?ترة اÙÙ
ساÙدة⪠\.â¬ÙسÙÙ?رصد تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙع اÙÙ?رع٠ع٠Ùثب⪠Øâ¬ÙسÙخضع ÙÙÙ
راجعة ÙاÙتدÙÙ٠بÙ
عرÙ?Ø© اÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø¹Ù إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠⪠:2â¬Ø¥Ø¯Ø§Ø±Ø© اÙÙ
شرÙع Ùرصد٠ÙتÙÙÙÙ
Ù (اÙتÙاÙÙÙ? اÙتÙدÙرÙة⪠0\.2 :â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙاÙر Ø£Ù
رÙÙÙ)â¬
â«Ø³ÙدعÙ
Ùذا اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ Ùدرات Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© Ø¥Ùدارة اÙÙ
شرÙع Ùرصد٠ÙتÙÙÙÙ
Ù Ù
٠خاÙÙ⬠â«âª\.01â¬â¬
â«ØªÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙتجÙÙزات اÙÙ
ÙتبÙØ© ÙخدÙ
ات ااÙستشارÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠تÙاÙÙÙ? اÙتدÙÙÙ ÙاÙتدرÙب ÙاÙتشغÙ٠اإÙضاÙ?Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙسÙÙ
ÙÙ Ùذا اÙÙ
ÙÙÙâªØâ¬â¬
â«Ø¨ØµÙرة Ø£Ùثر تØدÙدÙاâª( :â¬Ø£) إعداد دÙÙ٠عÙ
ÙÙات اÙÙ
شرÙع Ù
ع اإÙرشادات ÙÙ
Ùاد اÙدعاÙØ© ÙاÙتÙاص٠ÙÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙتÙâ¬
â«ØªÙدÙ
خدÙ
ات اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙÙادÙ?Ø© ÙÙØ±Ø¨Ø Ø§Ùت٠تدعÙ
اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙØ (ب) Ø£ÙØ´ØØ© اÙتÙاصÙØ (ج) اÙدعÙØ©â¬
â«ÙتÙدÙÙ
عرÙض ÙÙ
ÙترØØ§ØªØ (د) تÙÙÙÙ
ÙاختÙار اÙعرÙض ÙاÙÙ
ÙترØØ§ØªØ (Ù) تÙدÙÙ
اÙÙ
ساعدة ÙÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
ÙظÙ
اتâ¬
â«ØºÙر اÙÙادÙ?Ø© ÙÙØ±Ø¨Ø Ù?٠تØدÙد اÙشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ? ÙاÙتØÙÙ Ù
٠صØØ© Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات اÙتأÙÙÙØ (Ù) أعÙ
ا٠اإÙشراÙ? ÙاÙÙ
راجعة عÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙÙ?رعÙØ© اÙÙ
Ø®ØªØ§Ø±Ø©Ø (ز) رصد ÙÙ
تابعة ÙتÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙع Ù
Ùاب٠اÙÙ
ؤشرات عÙÙ Ù
ستÙ٠اأÙÙداÙ? اإÙÙÙ
ائÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙعâªØâ¬â¬
â«ÙاÙÙ
ؤشرات اÙÙسÙØØ© (اÙÙ
رØÙÙØ©)âª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙسÙخضع Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙÙعدÙد Ù
٠اشتراØات اÙÙ
تابعة ÙرÙ?ع اÙتÙارÙر Ù
ث٠أعÙ
ا٠اÙÙ?Øص ÙاÙÙ
راجعة ربع اÙسÙÙÙØ©âªØâ¬â¬ â«âª\.02â¬â¬
â«ÙاÙتÙارÙر اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙÙ
رØÙÙØ© غÙر اÙÙ
راجعة⪠Øâ¬ÙتÙارÙر اÙÙ
راجعة اÙسÙÙÙØ© ÙÙØسابات⪠\.â¬ÙسÙØب٠Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© ÙظاÙ
إدارة Ù
اÙÙØ© (ÙظاÙ
Ù
Øاسبة ÙائÙ
عÙ٠استخداÙ
اÙØاسب اآÙÙÙ) ÙÙ
تابعة عÙ
ÙÙØ© اÙصرÙ?⪠Øâ¬ÙضÙ
ا٠دÙØ© اÙÙ
عاÙ
اÙتâªØâ¬â¬
â«Ùسرعة اÙÙ
دÙ?Ùعاتâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
تعÙÙÙ Ù
راÙب Øسابات Ù
ستÙÙ⪠/â¬Ø®Ø§Ø±Ø¬Ù⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙÙاÙ
بأعÙ
ا٠اÙÙ?Øص ÙاÙÙ
راجعة ربع اÙسÙÙÙØ© عÙ٠أساس اÙعÙÙØ© اÙÙ
Ù
Ø«Ùة⬠â«âª\.02â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠14â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ÙÙسبة Ø£ÙÙØ´ØØ© تÙدÙÙ
اÙخدÙ
ات اÙÙ
دعÙÙ
Ø© Ù?٠إØار Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙÙتØÙÙ Ù
Ù ØدÙØ« ÙاÙتÙ
ا٠اأÙÙØ´Øة⪠Øâ¬ÙضÙ
ا٠تØÙÙ٠اÙتÙدÙ
â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اد٠ÙغÙر اÙÙ
اد٠Ù?٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙعâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ØªØ³Ø§Ø¹Ø¯ اÙتدÙÙÙات اÙÙ
Ù?اجئة⪠Øâ¬Ø¹ÙÙ Ùج٠أÙثر تØدÙداÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠اÙتØÙÙ Ù
٠تÙدÙÙ
اÙÙ
ÙاÙ
اÙÙ
ؤداة أ٠اÙتدرÙب اÙÙ
تÙÙ٠أ٠اÙخدÙ
ات⬠â«âª\.33â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© ÙÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
عÙÙÙÙ ÙاÙÙ?ئات اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ?ة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
٠خضÙع جÙ
Ùع اأÙÙØ´ØØ© ذات اÙعاÙÙØ© ÙÙرصد ع٠Ùثب ÙÙ?٠اÙزÙ
٠اÙØÙÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙسÙعØÙ Ùذا تØÙ
ÙÙا ٠إضاÙ?Ùا ٠عÙ٠إÙÙ?ا٠اأÙÙ
Ùا٠Ù?٠اأÙغراض اÙÙ
Ùررة⪠\.â¬ÙسÙتÙ
إعداد تÙرÙر ÙغØ٠اÙÙ
عاÙÙات اÙÙ
ادÙØ© بشÙ٠ربعâ¬
â«Ø³ÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠أ٠ÙÙاÙ?٠ب٠اÙبÙÙ Ù?Ù ØÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙسÙتÙ
إعداد تÙرÙر تدÙÙÙÙ Ù
ÙØÙد ÙÙتÙ?تÙشات اÙÙ
Ù?اجئة عÙد إتÙ
اÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙعâª\.â¬â¬
â«(ج) اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
باشرÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙÙ
اÙشباب اÙØ°Ù٠تتراÙØ Ø£Ø¹Ù
ارÙÙ
بÙ٠⪠72â¬Ø¥Ù٠⪠03â¬Ø³ÙØ© اÙعاØÙÙ٠ع٠اÙعÙ
Ù⬠â«âª\.37â¬â¬
â«(Ù
ÙØ° سÙØ© ÙاØدة عÙ٠اأÙÙÙ Ù?Ù ØاÙØ© اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
باشرÙÙ Ù
٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù)⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
٠اÙÙ
تÙÙع Ø£Ù ÙستÙ?Ùد ØÙاÙÙ âª3333â¬â¬
â«Ø´Ø§Ø¨ Ù
Ù Ù
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬Ù?ÙÙ
ا ÙÙ?تÙÙع Ø£Ù ÙستÙ?Ùد ⪠103â¬Ø´Ø§Ø¨Ùا Ù
Ù Ù
ÙÙ٠اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙسÙÙÙ٠⪠%03â¬Ù
٠اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙع عÙ٠اأÙÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙساء⪠\.â¬ÙسÙتÙ
اÙتØÙÙ Ù
Ù ÙضعÙØ© اÙبØاÙØ© Ù
Ùاب٠Ùاعدة بÙاÙات Ùزارة اÙعÙ
Ù Ù
ع اÙÙÙاÙ
بأعÙ
ا٠Ù?Øصâ¬
â«Ø¥Ø¶Ø§Ù?ÙØ© Ù
٠خاÙ٠ااÙستعاÙØ© بÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر ØÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ø¥Ù دعت اÙØاجة Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ
ا Ùا٠أØد Ø£ÙداÙ? Ù
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙÙâ¬
â«ØªÙÙ?Ùر شبÙØ© Ø£Ù
اÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙØص٠اÙشباب اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙÙ
Ø¥Ù
ا عÙÙ ÙائÙ
Ø© اÙتظار برÙاÙ
ج اأÙÙÙرÙا ÙØ®ÙÙ Ù?رص اÙعÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø±ÙاÙ
ج اÙتØÙÙاÙت اÙÙÙدÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¹ÙÙ Ù
عاÙ
ÙØ© تÙ?ضÙÙÙØ© ÙÙÙصÙ٠إÙÙ Ù?رص برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬ÙسÙتÙ
اÙتØÙÙ Ù
Ù ÙضعÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù
٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙتØÙÙاÙت اÙÙÙدÙØ© Ù
٠خاÙÙ Ùاعدة بÙاÙات Ùزارة اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© اÙخاصة بÙؤاÙØ¡ اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ ÙÙ?سÙ
Øâ¬
â«Ø¥Ø§Ù ÙÙ
ستÙ?Ùد ÙاØد Ù?ÙØ Ù
Ù Ù٠أسرة Ù
عÙØ´ÙØ© بااÙÙتÙ?اع بÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠أ٠Ù
ساÙدة اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙتضÙ
٠اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙ٠غÙر اÙÙ
باشرÙ٠اآÙتÙâª:â¬â¬ â«âª\.38â¬â¬
â«âª \.1â¬Ø£Ù?راد اأÙسر اÙÙ
عÙØ´ÙØ© اÙت٠ÙÙتÙ
٠إÙÙÙا شباب ÙستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù
٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ùâª\.â¬â¬
â«âª \.2â¬Ø§ÙÙ?ئات اأÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙØ© اÙت٠تستÙ?Ùد بشÙÙ Ù
باشر Ù
٠اÙخدÙ
ات اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ù?٠إØار Ù
شرÙعات اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ùâ¬
â«(ÙاÙÙ
عاÙÙÙ ÙاÙÙ
سÙÙÙ ÙاأÙØÙ?ا٠ÙاÙÙساء)âª\.â¬â¬
â«(د) سÙسÙØ© اÙÙتائجâ¬
â«Ù
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙØ´Øة⪠:â¬ÙتÙ
اÙتعاÙد عÙÙ Ù
شرÙعات اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙÙ?رعÙØ© Ù
٠خاÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬ â«âª\.7â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
خرجات⪠:â¬ØªØ¹ÙÙ٠اÙشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ? ÙتÙدÙÙ
اÙخدÙ
اتâª\.â¬â¬ â«âª\.8â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙتائج اÙÙ
تÙسØØ©âª:â¬â¬ â«âª\.0â¬â¬
â«Ø£âª \.â¬Ø§Ùشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ?⪠:â¬Ø²Ùادة Ø¥Ù
ÙاÙÙØ© اÙØصÙ٠عÙ٠عÙ
Ù ÙصÙر اأÙجÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¨âª \.â¬Ø§ÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙ٠غÙر اÙÙ
باشرÙÙ⪠:â¬Ø²Ùادة Ø¥Ù
ÙاÙÙØ© اÙØصÙ٠عÙ٠اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© بÙ٠اÙÙ?ئات اأÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙتائج اÙÙÙائÙØ©âª:â¬â¬ â«âª\.3â¬â¬
â«Ø£âª \.â¬Ø§Ùشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ?â¬
â«âª \.iâ¬Ø²Ùادة ÙابÙÙØ© اÙتشغÙÙ Ù
٠خاÙ٠اÙتساب خبرة عÙ
ÙÙØ© ÙØ«ÙÙØ© اÙصÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«âª \.iiâ¬Ø²Ùادة اÙÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙذاتÙØ© ÙاÙØªØ±Ø§Ø¨Ø Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اع٠Ù
٠خاÙ٠اÙÙ
شارÙØ© ÙااÙÙØ®Ø±Ø§Ø Ù?٠اÙشؤÙ٠اÙÙ
دÙÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«âª \.iiiâ¬ØªØ¹Ø²Ùز اÙØÙ
اÙØ© (اÙشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ? ÙأسرÙÙ
)âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¨âª \.â¬Ø§ÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙ٠غÙر اÙÙ
باشرÙÙâ¬
â«âª \.iâ¬ØªØ¹Ø²Ùز ØÙ
اÙØ© اÙÙ?ئات اأÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙ٠اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙâ¬
â«âª \.7â¬Ø§Ø£ÙÙØ´Øة⪠:â¬ÙتÙ
اÙتعاÙد عÙÙ Ù
شرÙعات اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙ٠اÙÙ?رعÙØ© Ù
٠خاÙÙ ÙÙاÙات Ù
تخصصة غÙر ربØÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠15â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«âª \.8â¬Ø§ÙÙ
خرجات⪠:â¬ØªØ²ÙÙد اÙشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ? باÙÙ
ساÙدة Ù?Ù Ù
جا٠اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«âª \.0â¬Ø§ÙÙتائج اÙÙ
تÙسØة⪠:â¬Ø²Ùادة Ø¥Ù
ÙاÙÙØ© اÙØصÙ٠عÙÙ Ù?رص اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«âª \.3â¬Ø§ÙÙتائج اÙÙÙائÙة⪠:â¬Ø²Ùادة تشغÙ٠اÙشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ? Ù?Ù Ù
جا٠اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«(ÙÙ) دÙاع٠Ù
شارÙØ© اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙدÙر اÙشرÙاءâ¬
â«ØªÙدÙ? اÙعÙ
ÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙترØØ© Ø¥Ù٠تÙبÙØ© ااÙØتÙاجات اÙعاجÙØ© اÙÙاشئة ع٠اÙÙضع اÙØارئ Ù?٠غزة⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع Ù
ساÙÙ
تÙا Ù?٠اÙÙÙت⬠â«âª\.34â¬â¬
â«ÙÙ?س٠أÙضا Ù Ù?٠أÙداÙ? اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù
تÙسØØ© اأÙجÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠زÙادة ااÙØتÙاء ااÙÙتصاد٠ÙÙشباب ÙتØسÙ٠تÙدÙÙ
اÙخدÙ
ات ÙتÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙØاع اÙخاص⪠\.â¬ÙعÙÙ ÙØ٠أÙثر تØدÙداÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙدÙ? برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠إÙ٠تÙÙ?Ùر شبÙØ© Ø£Ù
ا٠Ù
ؤÙتة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ٠أÙضا Ù Ù
ع تÙÙ?Ùر بعضâ¬
â«Ø§Ùخبرة اÙعÙ
ÙÙØ© ÙØ«ÙÙØ© اÙصÙØ© ÙÙشباب اÙعاØ٠رÙØ«Ù
ا تظÙر ÙÙÙ
Ù?رص عÙ
٠أÙ?ضÙ⪠\.â¬ÙباÙترÙÙز عÙ٠اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© اÙت٠تÙدÙ
Ùاâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙدÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙع Ø£Ùضا ٠إÙ٠اÙÙ
ساÙÙ
Ø© Ù?٠اÙØد Ù
٠اÙÙÙص Ù?٠اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© بÙ٠اÙÙ?ئات اأÙشدâ¬
â«Ø¶Ø¹Ù?اÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا ÙساÙد Ø£Ùضا Ù ÙØاع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙØ°Ù Ùعتبر جÙØ© تشغÙÙ ÙبÙرة Ù?٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص ÙÙتÙ
تع بسج٠ÙÙÙ Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ù
جا٠تÙدÙÙ
اÙخدÙ
ات ÙÙÙ
جتÙ
عات اÙÙ
ØÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙÙرة Ù?٠غزة⪠\.â¬ÙعÙ٠اÙرغÙ
Ù
Ù Ù
ØدÙدÙØ© Ù?رص ÙÙ
٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص ÙØ®ÙÙ Ù?رصâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعÙ
Ù Ù?٠سÙا٠غزة اÙØاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙساÙد اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙاØدة Ù
Ù Ùذ٠اÙÙ?رص ÙÙ٠اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ù?اÙÙ
ستÙ٠اÙعاÙÙ
٠اÙÙ
تزاÙد Ù
Ùâ¬
â«ØªØ¹ÙÙد اÙÙ
ÙاÙ
⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙذ٠تÙسر٠اÙتÙÙÙÙÙجÙات اÙرÙÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬ÙتÙØ Ù?رصة Ù?رÙدة Ùشباب غزة ÙÙÙ
شارÙØ© Ù?٠اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù ÙÙ?٠بعضâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØااÙت Ø¥ØاÙÙ Ù
شرÙعات أعÙ
ا٠إÙÙترÙÙÙØ© خاصة بÙÙ
âª\.â¬â¬
â«ØªØ¨Ù٠اÙعÙ
ÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙترØØ© عÙ٠اÙدرÙس اÙÙ
ستÙ?ادة Ù
Ù Ù
بادرات برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠اأÙخر٠اÙت٠ÙÙ
ÙÙÙا اÙÙ
اÙØÙÙ⬠â«âª\.33â¬â¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«Ù
Ù Ùذ٠اÙÙ
بادرات⪠\.â¬ÙÙد أجرÙت Ù
ÙاÙشات Ù
ع اÙÙ
اÙØÙÙ Ø°Ù٠اÙعاÙÙØ© ÙاÙجÙات اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° ÙتعظÙÙ
Ø£ÙجÙ⬠â«Ù?٠غزة Ùت٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ùتآزر ÙØ£Ùج٠اÙتÙاÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬ÙÙتÙجة ÙÙذ٠اÙÙ
شاÙرات⪠Øâ¬Ø³Ùسع٠اإÙجراء اÙتدخÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙØªØ±Ø Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
ساÙدة اÙاÙجئÙ٠اÙÙ
ؤÙÙÙ٠عÙÙ ÙائÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ø§Ùتظار اأÙÙÙرÙا ÙاÙØ°ÙÙ ÙÙ
Ùعد Ù
Ù
ÙÙا ٠استداÙ
تÙÙ
ÙتÙجة اÙتخÙ?Ùضات Ù?Ù Ù
ÙزاÙÙØ© اأÙÙÙرÙا Ù?٠اآÙÙÙØ© اأÙØ®Ùرة⪠\.â¬ÙسÙتÙاص٠اÙÙ?رÙÙ Ù
عâ¬
â«Ø´Ø±Ùاء اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© اآÙخرÙ٠سعÙا Ù ÙÙØصÙ٠عÙ٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠إضاÙ?Ù ÙصاÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙعâª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙ
ا ÙÙدÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙع Ø£Ùضا ٠إÙ٠بÙاء Ù
Ùصة ÙÙتÙÙ?Ùر اÙسرÙع ÙÙ?رص اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠استجابة ÙÙØÙارئ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙØاÙØ© اÙØارئة⬠â«âª\.34â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙØاÙÙØ© Ù?٠غزة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙتعبئة ÙتÙسÙ٠اÙÙ
ساÙدة Ù
٠اÙÙ
اÙØÙ٠اآÙخرÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙتستÙزÙ
Ùذ٠اÙÙ
Ùصة تÙÙ?Ùر Ù?رص اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù
٠خاÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© عÙÙ ÙÙئة خدÙ
ات Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
جتÙ
عات اÙÙ
ØÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙÙرة⪠\.â¬ÙÙظرا Ù ÙÙÙدرات اÙجÙدة اÙت٠ÙتÙ
تع بÙا ÙØاع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
اتâ¬
â«ØºÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù?٠غزة ÙاÙÙ?جÙØ© اÙÙبÙرة Ù?٠اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
Ù٠تÙسÙع اÙÙ
Ùصة بسÙÙÙØ© Ù?Ù ØاÙØ© تÙÙ?ر تÙ
ÙÙ٠إضاÙ?Ù Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ù
٠اأÙساÙÙب اأÙخر٠ÙتÙÙ?Ùر اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙبÙÙØ© اÙتØتÙØ© ÙاÙخدÙ
ات اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ù
٠اÙبÙدÙات⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙØÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا ÙÙ
ÙÙÙا Ø£Ùضا ٠أ٠ت٠Ùâ¬
â«Ù
٠خاÙÙ Ù
شرÙع تÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙبÙدÙاتâª\.â¬â¬
â«)Ù( اÙدرÙس اÙÙ
ستÙ?ادة ÙاÙÙ
جسدة Ù?٠تصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«ÙÙ
Ù٠اÙبÙ٠خبرة Ù?٠اإÙجراءات اÙتدخÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙترØØ© Ù?٠غزة ÙغÙرÙا Ù
٠اأÙÙ
اÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ØÙØ« ساÙد إجراءات تدخÙÙØ© Ù
Ù
اثÙة⬠â«âª\.34â¬â¬
â«ØªÙدÙ
اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù?٠أÙضاع اÙÙشاشة ÙاÙصراع ÙاÙعÙÙ?⪠Øâ¬Ù?٠أÙ
اÙÙ Ù
ÙÙا اÙÙÙ
Ù ÙÙ
اÙÙ ÙسÙراÙÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙد دÙ?Ù
جت Ùذ٠اÙخبرةâ¬
â«Ù?٠اإÙجراء اÙتدخÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙØªØ±Ø ÙتÙدÙÙ
اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ
Ù٠اÙبÙ٠خبرة ØÙÙÙØ© Ù?٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù
ع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙتÙدÙÙ
â¬
â«Ø§ÙخدÙ
ات Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
جتÙ
عات اÙÙ
ØÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙÙرة Ù
٠خاÙ٠سÙسÙØ© Ù
شرÙعات اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا ÙÙ
Ù٠اÙبÙ٠أÙضا Ùâ¬
â«Ø®Ø¨Ø±Ø© ØÙÙÙØ© Ù?Ù Ù
ساÙدة اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ Ù?٠بÙدا٠اÙشر٠اأÙÙØ³Ø ÙØ´Ù
ا٠أÙ?رÙÙÙا ÙعاÙÙ
ÙاÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ?٠غزة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙدÙ? Ù
شرÙع اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
بتÙرة ÙÙÙØاع اÙخاص Ø¥Ù٠بÙاء Ù
رÙز تعÙÙد Ù?٠غزة ÙÙصب٠ترÙÙز٠عÙ٠اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
جا٠تÙÙÙÙÙجÙا اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
اتâª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙجر٠إعداد Ù
ÙÙ٠اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ Ù?٠إØار Ùذ٠اÙعÙ
ÙÙØ© بااÙتسا٠Ù
ع Ù
شرÙع اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
بتÙرة ÙÙÙØاع اÙخاص⪠\.â¬ÙسÙتÙاصÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³ØªÙشاÙ? Ø£Ùج٠اÙتآزر Ù
ع Ù
شرÙع تÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙبÙدÙات Ùد٠ظÙÙر اÙÙ?رص Ù?ÙÙ
ا Ùخص اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù?Ù Ù
شرÙعات اÙبÙÙØ© اÙتØتÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙدÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ùسترشد تصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙع بÙ
بادرات اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠اأÙخر٠اÙت٠ÙÙ
ÙÙÙا اÙÙ
اÙØÙÙ Ù?٠غزة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠اأÙÙÙرÙاâªØâ¬â¬ â«âª\.34â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠16â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«ØÙØ« Ø´Ùدت غزة عÙÙ Ù
ر اÙسÙÙات عددا Ù Ù
Ù Ù
شرÙعات اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠اأÙخر٠اÙت٠ÙÙ
ÙÙÙا اÙÙ
اÙØÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙاÙÙ
شرÙعا٠اÙرئÙسÙاÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙØ´ÙØا٠ÙÙ
ا برÙاÙ
ج اأÙÙÙرÙا ÙØ®ÙÙ Ù?رص اÙعÙ
Ù ÙبرÙاÙ
ج رؤÙØ© غزة ⪠8383â¬Ø§Ùذ٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙÙاÙØ© اأÙÙ
رÙÙÙØ© ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙدÙÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ?Ùâ¬
â«Ø¥Øار إعداد اÙÙ
شرÙع⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù?جر٠استعراض ÙÙذ٠اÙÙ
شرÙعات⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°ÙÙ Ù
٠خاÙÙ Ù
ÙاÙشات Ù
ع اÙÙ
اÙØÙÙ ÙاÙجÙات اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© عÙâ¬
â«Ø¥Ø¯Ø§Ø±Ø© اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°âª\.â¬â¬
â«ØªØ´Ù
٠اÙدرÙس اÙÙ
عÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ستÙ?ادة Ù
٠اإÙجراءات اÙتدخÙÙØ© ÙتÙدÙÙ
اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù?٠غزة ÙÙ?٠غÙرÙا Ù
٠اأÙÙ
اÙÙâªØâ¬â¬ â«âª\.34â¬â¬
â«Ùا٠سÙÙ
ا Ù?٠أÙضاع اÙÙشاشة ÙاÙصراع ÙاÙعÙÙ?⪠Øâ¬Ù?ÙÙ
ا Ùخص Ù
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙتابع ÙÙÙ
شرÙع⪠Øâ¬Ù
ا ÙÙÙâª( :â¬Ø£) تصÙ
ÙÙ
بسÙØâ¬
â«ÙØ´Ù?اÙ? ÙتسÙ
باÙÙضÙØ ÙسÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙÙ
Ø£ÙصØاب اÙÙ
صÙØØ© ÙاÙ?Ø© (اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
ØتÙ
ÙÙÙ ÙاÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
جتÙ
عاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
ؤسسات اÙعاÙ
Ø©Ø (ب) اÙعÙ
Ù Ù
٠خاÙ٠اÙÙ
جتÙ
عات اÙÙ
ØÙÙØ© ÙاÙØÙÙÙ
ات اÙÙ
ØÙÙØ©Ø (ج) تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ø£ÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù
٠خاÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙاÙÙØاع اÙØ®Ø§ØµØ (د) Ù
راعاة Ù?رص اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙت٠تجتذب Ø£Ùضا ٠اÙÙØ³Ø§Ø¡Ø (ÙÙ) Ù
راعاةâ¬
â«Ù?رص اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙت٠تجتذب اÙشباب اأÙدÙÙ Ù
Ùارة ÙاأÙعÙÙ Ù
ÙØ§Ø±Ø©Ø (Ù) تØدÙد اإÙعاÙات اÙÙÙدÙØ© Ù?٠إØار اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
ÙابÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعÙ
٠بÙ
ا ÙÙÙ ÙÙÙاÙ٠ع٠اÙØد اأÙدÙÙ ÙØ£ÙجÙØ±Ø (ز) تصÙ
ÙÙ
برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠ا٠ÙتÙدÙÙ
اإÙغاثة اÙسرÙعة Ù?Øسب⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù Ø£Ùضا Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ
ساÙÙ
Ø© Ù?٠اأÙÙداÙ? اإÙÙÙ
ائÙØ© عÙ٠اÙÙ
د٠اÙÙ
تÙسØâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙ٠اÙÙ
دعÙÙ
باإÙÙترÙت⪠\.â¬Ø§Ø³ØªÙارت عÙ
ÙÙØ© اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙ٠اÙÙ
دعÙÙ
باإÙÙترÙت باÙÙ
عارÙ? ÙاÙبØÙØ« Ù?Ù⬠â«âª\.34â¬â¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«Ù
جا٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙØر عÙ٠اإÙÙترÙت ÙاأÙعÙ
ا٠اÙصغر٠ÙاÙÙظائÙ? اÙرÙÙ
Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙتظÙر اÙÙتائج اÙت٠تÙصÙت Ø¥ÙÙÙا دراسة اÙØدار تÙÙÙâ¬
â«(⪠)meta-regressionâ¬Ù
٠عاÙ
⪠Ø8370â¬Ø¹Ù٠سبÙ٠اÙÙ
ثاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ù اÙعÙ
ا٠اÙÙ
تÙ?رغÙ٠عÙ٠اإÙÙترÙت Ù?Ù ÙÙÙÙا ÙÙÙجÙرÙا ÙاÙسÙغاÙâ¬
â«ÙاÙÙÙد ÙÙسبÙ٠رÙاتب تعاد٠Ù
ا ÙتÙاضا٠أÙراÙÙÙ
Ù?٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙتÙÙÙد٠أ٠ترب٠عÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙباإÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠اآÙثار ااÙÙتصادÙØ© ÙÙعÙ
٠اÙØرâ¬
â«Ù?Ù Ù
جا٠تÙÙÙÙÙجÙا اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات⪠Øâ¬Ù?Ø¥ÙÙ ÙتÙØ Ø£Ùضا Ù Ù
ÙاÙ?ع غÙر Ù
اÙÙØ© ÙØ«ÙÙØ© اÙصÙØ© بÙذ٠اÙعÙ
ÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ØÙØ« تسÙ
Ø Ù
رÙÙØ© جدÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ÙØ£ÙÙ?راد برعاÙØ© أسرÙÙ
بشÙ٠أÙ?ض٠أ٠Ù
ÙاصÙØ© دراستÙÙ
Ù
ع Ø¥ØاÙÙÙÙ
Ù
شرÙع أعÙ
ا٠خاص بÙÙ
Ù?٠اÙÙÙت ÙÙ?سÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ ÙÙÙ?ر عاÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø¹ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ Ù?رصا Ù ÙÙتعÙÙ
عÙ٠رأس اÙعÙ
Ù ÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
Ùارات⪠\.â¬ÙتشÙر اÙبÙاÙات اÙÙÙعÙØ© اÙÙ
ستÙ
دة Ù
٠اÙÙساء Ù?٠دراسات Ù
جÙ
Ùعاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙاش اÙÙ
رÙز Ù?Ù Ù
صر Ø¥ÙÙ ØدÙØ« تغÙÙر اجتÙ
اع٠إÙجاب٠باÙÙسبة ÙÙÙساء عÙÙ Ùج٠اÙخصÙص ÙساÙÙ
Ù?٠اÙÙ
ساÙاة بÙÙâ¬
â«âª11â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙسÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¯Ùر اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù?٠تÙÙ?Ùر Ù?رص اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬ØªÙ?ظÙر اÙØ´ÙاÙد ÙاÙخبرات اÙØاÙÙØ© Ù?٠غزة Ø£ÙÙ Ù
Ù⬠â«âª\.45â¬â¬
â«Ø®Ø§Ù٠سÙسÙØ© Ù
شرÙعات اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© ÙغÙرÙا Ù
٠اÙÙ
بادرات أ٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ©âª( :â¬Ø£) اÙجÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙرئÙسÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© ÙÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© Ù?Ù ØºØ²Ø©Ø (ب) تتÙ
تع بسج٠ÙÙÙ Ù?٠تÙدÙÙ
اÙخدÙ
Ø§ØªØ (ج) Ù
تخصصة Ù?٠اÙتÙاص٠Ù
عâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØ´Ø±Ø§Ø¦Ø Ø§ÙسÙاÙÙØ© اأÙÙثر تعرضا ÙÙÙ
عاÙØ§Ø©Ø (د) تÙ
Ù٠خبرة Ù?٠ااÙستجابة ÙÙÙ
ÙاÙÙ? اÙØØ§Ø±Ø¦Ø©Ø (ÙÙ) تÙ
Ù٠خبرة Ù?٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ù
شرÙعاتâ¬
â«Ù
Ù
اثÙØ© ÙتÙدÙÙ
اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
ÙØ (Ù) تتÙ
تع بسج٠ÙÙÙ Ù?٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù
ع اÙÙ
جتÙ
عات اÙÙ
ØÙÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
ؤسسات اÙعاÙ
Ø©Ø (ز) تتÙ
تع باÙÙدرةâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù٠اÙتÙÙÙ? Ù
ع اÙسÙا٠دائÙ
اÙتغÙر Ù?Ù ÙØاع غزةâª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙ?ظر Ù?Ù Ù?رص اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù?Ù Ù
شرÙعات اÙبÙÙØ© اÙتØتÙØ© اÙبÙدÙØ© Ø£Ù٠اأÙÙ
ر عÙ٠أÙÙا ØرÙÙØ© (تÙÙ
ÙÙÙØ©) بدÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ⬠â«âª\.41â¬â¬
â«Ùظرا Ù ÙÙ
ØدÙدÙØ© تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙاÙÙÙص اÙØ®ØÙر Ù?٠اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙرÙز اÙÙ
شرÙع عÙ٠اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© اÙتÙâ¬
â«ØªÙدÙ
Ùا اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ?Ù ØاÙØ© تÙÙ?ر تÙ
ÙÙ٠إضاÙ?Ù ÙÙ?رص اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù?٠اÙبÙÙØ© اÙتØتÙØ© اÙبÙدÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع تÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙبÙدÙات اÙÙسÙÙØ© اأÙÙسب ÙتÙجÙÙ Ùذ٠اأÙÙ
ÙاÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø³ØªÙادا ٠إÙ٠اÙخبرة اÙÙ
ستÙ
دة Ù
٠اإÙجراء اÙتدخÙÙ ÙتÙدÙÙ
اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù?٠غزة ÙاأÙÙضاع اÙÙ
Ù
اثÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙا٠ÙدÙ?⬠â«âª\.42â¬â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙ
ÙØ¥Ùجراء اÙتدخÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙØªØ±Ø ÙتÙ
Ø«Ù Ù?٠بÙاء Ù
Ùصة ÙÙتÙÙ?Ùر اÙسرÙع ÙÙ?رص اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠استجابة ÙÙØÙارئ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙØاÙØ© اÙØارئةâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØاÙÙØ© Ù?٠غزة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙتعبئة ÙتÙسÙ٠اÙÙ
ساÙدة Ù
٠اÙÙ
اÙØÙ٠اآÙخرÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙبغ٠أ٠تÙÙÙ Ùذ٠اÙÙ
Ùصة جزءا Ù Ù
٠اأÙساÙÙب اأÙخر٠ÙتÙدÙÙ
â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù?٠غزة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ا Ù
٠خاÙ٠اÙبÙÙØ© اÙتØتÙØ© اÙبÙدÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙÙذ٠اأÙساÙÙبâª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙ
ا استرشد تصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙع Ø£Ùضا ٠بÙ
شرÙع تعزÙز اÙØÙ
اÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© اÙØ°Ù ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ (⪠)P160674â¬Ø§ÙØ°Ù⬠â«âª\.44â¬â¬
â«âª 11â¬Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙÙÙÙÙâª/â¬ØزÙرا٠âª\.8370â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠17â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«ØªÙÙ?Ø°Ù Ùزارة اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙعتبر Ù
تÙ
Ù
ا Ù ÙÙذا اÙÙ
شرÙع⪠\.â¬ÙسÙتÙ
تع اÙشباب اÙÙ
ÙتÙ
Ù٠إÙ٠اأÙسر اÙÙ
عÙØ´ÙØ© اÙÙ
ستÙ?Ùدة Ù
٠برÙاÙ
جâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتØÙÙاÙت اÙÙÙدÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¹ÙÙ Ùج٠اÙتØدÙد⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ø£ÙÙ?ضÙÙØ© Ù?٠اÙØصÙ٠عÙÙ Ù?رص اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬Ù
Ù
ا ÙÙÙ?ر Ùدرا ٠إضاÙ?Ùا Ù Ù
٠اأÙÙ
اÙâ¬
â«ÙÙذ٠اأÙسر ÙÙØ°Ù٠خبرة عÙ
ÙÙØ© Ø«Ù
ÙÙØ© ÙباÙتاÙÙ ÙزÙد Ø¥Ù
ÙاÙÙØ© ØصÙÙÙÙ
عÙÙ Ù?رص اÙعÙ
٠اÙÙ
ستÙبÙÙة⪠\.â¬Ø¨ØªØ±ÙÙز برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
ÙابÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعÙ
٠عÙ٠اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ù
٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙساÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙع Ø£Ùضا Ù Ù?٠اعادة تÙØ´ÙØ Ø¹Ù
ÙÙØ© تÙÙ?Ùرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙت٠تعتبر Ù
ØÙرÙØ© ÙعÙ
٠اÙÙ
Ùصة اÙت٠سÙتÙ
تØÙÙرÙا تØت Ù
ظÙØ© Ù
شرÙع تعزÙز اÙØÙ
اÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© ÙتÙدÙÙ
â¬
â«Ùذ٠اÙخدÙ
ات Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ?ئات اÙÙ?ÙÙرة ÙاأÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø«Ø§Ùثا⪠\.â¬ØªØ±ØªÙبات اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ø§ÙترتÙبات اÙÙ
ؤسسÙØ© ÙترتÙبات اÙتÙÙ?Ùذ⬠â«Ø£âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ùظرا Ù ÙÙÙ?راغ اÙراÙÙ Ù?٠تÙدÙÙ
اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© اÙضرÙرÙØ© بÙ
عرÙ?Ø© اÙØÙÙÙ
ة⪠Øâ¬ØªØªÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙسÙÙة⬠â«âª\.43â¬â¬
â«Ù⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ùâ¬
â«Ù?اعÙØ© ÙتÙدÙÙ
اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙتÙÙ?Ùر اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ©Ø Ø¥Ø° ÙاÙت Ùذ٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات ÙÙ
ا زاÙت عÙصرا Ù
ØÙرÙا Ù?٠تÙدÙÙ
اÙخدÙ
اتâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© اÙت٠تÙ
س اÙØاجة Ø¥ÙÙÙا Ù?٠غزة⪠Øâ¬ÙغاÙبا Ù Ù
ا تÙÙÙ
بتعÙÙدÙا اÙسÙØØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© ÙتÙدÙÙ
اÙخدÙ
ات اأÙساسÙØ© Ù?Ù ÙØاعاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙصØØ© ÙاÙتعÙÙÙ
ÙاÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙÙÙÙ Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙÙع عÙ٠اتÙ?اÙÙØ© Ù
ÙØØ© اÙصÙدÙ٠ااÙستئÙ
اÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
تÙÙÙة⬠â«âª\.44â¬â¬
â«ÙÙÙ
ÙØة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙØ¹Ø Ø¥Ø°Ù ØªÙ
تØدÙد اÙÙ
رÙز باعتبار٠اأÙÙسب ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة تÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ùذ٠اÙعÙ
ÙÙØ© ÙØ£Ùسباب اÙتاÙÙØ©âª( :â¬Ø£) ÙÙ
Ù٠اÙÙ
رÙز خبرة ØÙÙÙØ© ÙÙاجØØ© بÙصÙ?٠جÙØ© تÙÙ?ÙØ° ÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© Ù
ÙØ° âª722\.â¬Ø (ب) ÙÙ
Ù٠اÙÙ
رÙز سج٠إÙجازات ØاÙ?اÙÙ Ù?٠تÙسÙÙ ÙتعزÙز ØÙÙÙ
Ø© ÙØاع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ù?ÙسØÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ Ù?رÙد Ù
Ù ÙÙع٠Ù?Ù Ùذا اÙجاÙØ¨Ø (ج) Ø£ØµØ¨Ø Ø§ÙÙ
رÙز رائدا Ù ÙجدÙرا ٠بااÙØتراÙ
Ùد٠دÙائر اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ©âªØâ¬â¬
â«ÙÙØ¬Ø Ù?٠جذب اÙعدÙد Ù
Ù Ù
Ùارد اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙØ (د) Ø«Ù
Ø© إشادة باÙÙ
رÙز باعتبار٠آÙÙØ© رئÙسÙØ© Ù?٠تÙدÙÙ
اÙÙ
ÙØ ÙÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ©Øâ¬
â«Ø¥Ø° ÙÙÙÙ
بتÙدÙÙ
اÙÙ
ÙØ Ø¹ÙÙ ÙØÙ ÙتسÙ
باÙØ´Ù?اÙ?ÙØ© اÙشدÙØ¯Ø©Ø (ÙÙ) Ùعد اÙÙ
رÙز جÙØ© غÙر سÙاسÙØ© تعÙ
Ù Ù
ع جÙ
Ùع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ù?٠جÙ
Ùع اÙÙØØ§Ø¹Ø§ØªØ (Ù) ÙؤÙد اÙتÙرÙر اÙذ٠صدر Ù
ؤخرا ٠ع٠Ù
جÙ
Ùعة اÙتÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙ
ستÙÙØ© ÙتÙرÙر Ø¥Ùجاز اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° بشأ٠Ù
شرÙعâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© عÙ٠اأÙداء اÙÙ
رض٠ÙÙÙ
رÙØ²Ø (ز) تعتبر اÙتÙاÙÙÙ? غÙر اÙÙ
باشرة ÙÙÙ
رÙز Ø£Ù٠بصÙرة ÙبÙرةâ¬
â«Ù
٠اÙبدائ٠اأÙخرÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ù
سؤÙا٠ع٠اÙتÙÙ?Ùذ⬠â«ÙÙÙ
ا Ùا٠اÙÙ
رÙز Ù٠اÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
تÙÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
ÙØØ© (اÙÙ
ستÙ?Ùدة Ù
ÙÙا) ÙاÙÙÙئة اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠اÙتÙÙ?Ùذ⪠Øâ¬Ù?سÙÙÙÙ⬠â«âª\.44â¬â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙشاÙ
Ù ÙÙÙ
شرÙع Ùإدارة اÙØساب اÙÙ
خصص⪠\.â¬ÙسÙÙÙ?Ø° Ø£ÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙÙ?Ùا اÙتÙ?اÙÙØ© Ù
ÙØØ© اÙصÙدÙ٠ااÙستئÙ
اÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙتØÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
صرÙÙ?ات⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙدÙ
اÙÙ
دÙ?Ùعات ÙÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
ÙردÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙباÙتاÙ٠سÙÙÙÙ Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ù
سؤÙاÙ٠ع٠ÙاÙ?Ø© اÙجÙاÙب اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙاÙتعاÙدÙØ© بÙ
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠اإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙاÙتÙرÙدات ÙاÙسÙاسات اÙÙÙائÙØ© (اإÙدارة اÙبÙئÙØ©â¬
â«ÙااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ©)⪠\.â¬Ø¨Ùاء عÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
دÙر اÙعاÙ
ÙÙÙ
رÙز Ù
سؤÙاÙ٠ع٠تÙسÙ٠اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° ÙضÙ
ا٠ااÙتسا٠اÙÙ?Ù٠أÙÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«Ø¨Ùج٠عاÙ
⪠\.â¬ÙسÙرÙ?ع اÙÙ
دÙرÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© تÙارÙرÙÙ
Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
دÙر اÙعاÙ
ÙÙشرÙ?Ù٠عÙ٠عÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ÙظÙ?ÙÙÙ
ÙااÙستشارÙÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙØÙÙ٠بÙØداتÙÙ
اÙÙ
عÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙسÙرصدÙ٠أÙضا ٠أداء اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
شارÙØ© بشÙÙ Ù
باشر Ù?Ùâ¬
â«ØªÙÙ?ÙØ° اأÙÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
ÙداÙÙØ©âª\. \.â¬ÙÙع اÙÙ
Ùتب اÙرئÙس٠ÙÙ
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© Ù?٠اÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙدÙÙ Ù?رع ÙعÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø¨ÙاÙ
Ù ØاÙت٠Ù?٠غزة⪠\.â¬ÙÙترأس Ù
Ùتب غزة Ù
دÙر براÙ
ج غزة اÙذ٠سÙÙÙ٠بÙ
ÙزÙØ© Ùائب اÙÙ
دÙر اÙعاÙ
Ù?ÙÙ
ا Ùخص Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙعâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙÙÙ٠جÙاز إدارة Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© Ù
سؤÙا٠ع٠رÙ?ع اÙتÙارÙر Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
جÙس إدارت٠ÙØ¥Ù٠اÙبÙÙ⬠â«âª\.44â¬â¬
â«Ø¹Ù
ا تÙ
Ø¥Øراز٠Ù
٠تÙدÙ
Ù?٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙع⪠Øâ¬ÙسÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
رÙز Ù
سؤÙاÙ٠ع٠إعداد Ùإصدار برÙاÙ
ج اÙعÙ
٠اÙسÙÙÙ ÙÙ
ÙزاÙÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتشغÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠جÙ
Ùع اÙتÙارÙر اÙصادرة ع٠اÙتÙدÙ
اÙÙ
Øرز ÙاÙتÙارÙر اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙÙ
رØÙÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
تÙÙ?Ùر اÙÙ
ÙØ ÙÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°Ùا بÙ
عرÙ?تÙا Ù?ÙÙ
ا Ùخص اÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙÙ?رعÙØ© ÙÙ?Ùا ٠اÙتÙ?اÙÙØ© تÙÙ?Ùذ⬠â«âª\.44â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙØØ© اÙÙ
برÙ
Ø© بÙÙÙا ÙبÙÙ Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙسترÙ?ع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© تÙارÙر ربع سÙÙÙØ© Ø¥ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙسÙشرÙ? Ù
سؤÙÙ٠براÙ
ج Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© عÙ٠عÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠18â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙÙرصدÙÙÙ Ù
٠خاÙ٠اÙزÙارات اÙÙ
ÙداÙÙØ© اÙت٠ÙتÙ
تÙØ«ÙÙÙا Ù?٠تÙارÙر اÙزÙارات اÙÙ
ÙداÙÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙدÙÙ
اÙرسÙ
اÙبÙاÙ٠⪠7â¬Ø£Ø¯Ùا٠ÙصÙ?ا ÙترتÙبات اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° Ù?ÙÙ
ا Ùخص اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙاÙعاÙÙات اÙÙظÙÙ?ÙØ© بÙ٠أصØاب اÙÙ
صÙØة⬠â«âª\.44â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙساسÙÙÙ Ù?٠اÙÙ
شرÙعâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø£Ø¹Ø¯ Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© دÙÙ٠عÙ
ÙÙات Ù
شرÙع Ù
ÙبÙاÙÙ Ùد٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙÙÙ? Ùâ¬
â«ØµÙ Ù
عاÙÙر⬠â«âª\.45â¬â¬
â«Ùإجراءات اختÙار اÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙÙ?رعÙØ© ÙÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙاÙشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ? Ù?٠إØار Ùا٠اÙÙ
ÙÙÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«(ب) ترتÙبات رصد اÙÙتائج ÙتÙÙÙÙ
Ùاâ¬
â«Ø¹ ÙتÙÙÙÙ
٠بÙج٠عاÙ
اÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارâ¬
â«Ø© اÙتÙÙ?Ùذ⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùت٠ستدÙر جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙات⬠â«Ø³ØªØªÙÙÙ Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© رصد اÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«âª\.41â¬â¬
â«Ø¹ ع٠Ùثبâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø¹âª Øâ¬Ùترصد Ù
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§Øª اأÙداء اÙرئÙسÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙ⬠â«ÙتجÙ
ÙعÙا ÙرÙ?ع اÙتÙارÙر اÙدÙرÙØ© ع٠سÙر تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠19â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø¬âª \.â¬Ø§Ø§ÙستداÙ
Ø©â¬
â«Ùظرا Ù ÙÙØبÙعة اÙÙ
ؤÙتة ÙØ£ÙÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
ÙترØØ© Ùا٠سÙÙ
ا Ø£ÙØ´ØØ© برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬Ø³ØªÙÙ٠ااÙستداÙ
Ø© Ù
ØدÙدة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ⬠â«âª\.42â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع Ù
صÙ
Ù
ÙÙ
ساÙدة Ø£ÙداÙ? Ø¥ÙÙ
ائÙØ© Ù
ستداÙ
Ø© عÙ٠اÙÙ
د٠اÙÙ
تÙسØâª:â¬â¬
â«Ø³ØªØ²Ùد Ù?رص اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ? بخبرة عÙ
ÙÙØ© Ø«Ù
ÙÙØ© استعدادا Ù ÙÙ?رص اÙعÙ
٠اأÙÙ?ض٠اÙتÙ⬠â«âª\.7â¬â¬
â«Ø³ØªØ¸Ùر Ù?٠اÙÙ
ستÙبÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠إعØائÙÙ
اإÙØساس باأÙÙ
Ù ÙاÙشعÙر بااÙÙتÙ
اء Ù?Ù ÙÙت ÙتعاظÙ
Ù?Ù٠اÙشعÙرâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙØØ¨Ø§Ø Ù?ÙÙ
ا بÙ٠اÙشباب Ù?٠غزة⪠\.â¬Ø¹Ø§ÙÙØ© عÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙ ÙØ¥ÙعاÙات اÙÙÙدÙØ© اÙت٠ÙØص٠عÙÙÙا اÙشباب أثرâ¬
â«Ù
ضاعÙ?Ù? عÙ٠ااÙÙتصاد اÙÙ
ØÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ØªÙÙ?ر Ù
شرÙعات اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙÙ?رعÙØ© اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© ÙÙÙ?ئات اأÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙØ© Ù?Ù ÙÙت ØªØ´Ø Ù?ÙÙ⬠â«âª\.8â¬â¬
â«Ùذ٠اÙخدÙ
اتâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ÙعÙ
Ù Ù
ع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙساÙد اÙÙ
شرÙع Ù
ÙدÙ
اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© اÙرئÙس٠ÙاأÙÙ?ض٠Ù?٠غزة⬠â«âª\.0â¬â¬
â«Ù?Ù ÙÙت تعاÙÙ Ù?Ù٠اÙÙØ«Ùر Ù
٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù
٠اÙÙÙÙد اÙشدÙدة عÙÙ Ù
ÙزاÙÙاتÙا⪠\.â¬Ø¨Ø§ÙعÙ
Ù Ù
٠خاÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙساÙد اÙÙ
شرÙع Ø¢ÙÙØ© Ù?اعÙØ© ÙتÙسÙÙ ÙتØسÙ٠أÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
اتâ¬
â«ØºÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙدÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙع Ø¥Ù٠بÙاء Ù
Ùصة ÙÙتÙÙ?Ùر اÙسرÙع ÙÙ?رص اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠استجابة ÙÙØااÙت اÙØارئة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ا ÙÙ⬠â«âª\.3â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙØا٠Ù?٠غزة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙتعبئة ÙتÙسÙ٠اÙÙ
ساÙدة Ù
٠اÙÙ
اÙØÙ٠اآÙخرÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙساÙد Ù
ÙÙ٠اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙ٠اÙشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ? ÙÙÙصÙ٠إÙÙ Ù?رص اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ ÙÙ?٠بعض اÙØااÙت Ù?رص⬠â«âª\.44â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙعÙ
ا٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙباÙتاÙÙ ÙساÙÙ
Ù?Ù ÙÙ
٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص اÙÙ
ستداÙ
ÙتÙÙ?Ùر Ù?رص اÙعÙ
Ù Ù?٠اÙسÙا٠اÙراÙÙ Ùغزةâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø±Ø§Ø¨Ø¹Ø§âª \.â¬Ù
Ùجز اÙتÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙ
سب٠ÙÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«(Ø£) تØÙÙ٠اÙجÙاÙب اÙÙ?ÙÙØ© ÙااÙÙتصادÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«ØµÙ
Ù
اÙÙ
شرÙع باعتبار٠إØد٠أدÙات شبÙات اأÙÙ
ا٠اÙت٠ÙÙ
Ù٠تÙسÙعÙا أثÙاء اأÙزÙ
ات (ÙاأÙزÙ
ة⬠â«Ø§ÙجÙاÙب اÙÙ?ÙÙØ©âªÙ? \.â¬â¬ â«âª\.43â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙØاÙÙØ©) ÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? اÙصعÙبات ااÙÙتصادÙØ© Ù
٠خاÙ٠تÙÙ?Ùر Ù
ساÙدة سرÙعة Ùسب٠Ùسب اÙعÙØ´ ÙÙشباب اÙÙ?Ùراء ÙاأÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙة⪠\.â¬ÙاÙâ¬
â«ØªØ¹ØªØ¨Ø± عÙ
ÙÙØ© برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙÙ
ÙترØØ© Ù
بادرة Ù
ستÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù ÙÙ Ù
جÙÙد ÙÙ
ساعدة اÙسÙØØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© ÙÙØ°Ù٠أصØابâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
صÙØØ© اÙÙ
ختÙÙ?Ù٠عÙ٠تÙسÙع ÙØا٠أدÙات شبÙات اأÙÙ
ا٠اÙØاÙÙØ© ÙااÙستÙ?ادة Ù
ÙÙا ÙتÙسÙع تغØÙتÙا Ø¥Ù٠اأÙشد اØتÙاجاÙ⪠\.â¬Ø¹Ø§ÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø¹ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ØªØªÙØ Ø§ÙعÙ
ÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙترØØ© Ø¢ÙÙØ© Ù
ÙاتÙØ© ÙÙبÙÙ ÙÙÙ ÙÙب٠عÙÙ ÙØ٠سرÙع ÙÙ
ر٠ااÙØتÙاجات اÙÙائÙØ© Ù?٠سÙا٠Ù
٠اÙتراجعâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اع٠ااÙÙتصاد٠ÙأزÙ
Ø© Ù?Ù Ùسب اÙعÙØ´ ÙÙ
ا ÙÙتر٠بذÙÙ Ù
٠تدÙÙر Ù?٠آÙÙات تÙÙÙ? اأÙسر اÙÙ
عÙØ´Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙØ«Ù
Ø© Ù
ÙÙÙ
أساسÙâ¬
â«Ù
Ù Ù
ÙÙÙ
ات اÙÙØ¬Ø§Ø ÙÙÙ
Ù Ù?٠تصÙ
ÙÙ
خصائص اÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙÙ?رعÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙترØØ© Ù
تضÙ
ÙØ© إجراءات تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
رÙزÙØ© Ù
بسØØ© Ùرصدâ¬
â«ÙØ«ÙÙ ÙÙتشغÙ٠⪠\.â¬ÙÙد استÙ?اد تصÙ
ÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙع Ù
Ù Ù
راجعة دÙÙÙØ© ÙÙ
ختÙÙ? Ø£ÙÙاع Ù
شرÙعات اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙجار٠تÙÙ?ÙØ°Ùا Ù?Ùâ¬
â«ØºØ²Ø©âª Øâ¬Ù
ع اÙترÙÙز عÙ٠اÙÙ
جااÙت ذات اأÙÙÙÙÙØ© ÙاÙÙ?جÙات⪠Øâ¬Ù?ضاÙ٠ع٠إÙ
ÙاÙÙØ© اÙتÙسÙع ÙتØÙÙ٠اÙÙ
زÙد Ù
٠اأÙثرâª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙستÙد اÙÙ
شرÙع Ø¥Ù٠شراÙات Ù
ع اÙÙ
جتÙ
ع اÙÙ
دÙÙ ÙاÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
جتÙ
ع اÙÙ
ØÙÙ ÙضÙ
ا٠ااÙستداÙ
ة⬠â«âª\.44â¬â¬
â«ÙتØسÙ٠اأÙثر ااÙجتÙ
اعÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙØ°Ù٠اتساÙا Ù Ù
ع استراتÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
ساعدة اÙخاصة باÙبÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا ÙساÙد Ø£Ùضا ٠اأÙÙÙÙÙات اÙÙØÙÙØ© اÙت٠ÙÙصبÙâ¬
â«ØªØ±ÙÙزÙا عÙ٠اÙتصد٠ÙÙÙضÙØ© اÙصادÙ
Ø© اÙÙ
تÙ
Ø«ÙØ© Ù?٠بØاÙØ© اÙشباب ÙعدÙ
اÙÙ
ساÙاة بÙ٠اÙجÙسÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙتشÙ
٠اÙÙ
ÙاÙ?ع اأÙخر٠غÙرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
باشرة تدعÙÙ
رأس اÙÙ
ا٠اÙبشر٠Ù
٠خاÙ٠تØسÙ٠اÙØªØ±Ø§Ø¨Ø Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اع٠ÙØ¥ÙتاجÙØ© اأÙÙد٠اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© عÙ٠سبÙ٠اÙÙ
ثاÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙد Ø£Ùد اÙعÙ
٠اÙساب٠ÙÙبÙÙ Ù
ع Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù?٠غزة Ø£ÙÙÙ
ا⬠â«âª\.44â¬â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«ÙاÙا اÙÙ
ØÙ?ز اÙÙ
Ùاسب Ùتعبئة اÙÙ
جتÙ
عات اÙÙ
ØÙÙØ© ÙتØدÙد اÙÙ
جااÙت ذات اأÙÙÙÙÙØ© استجابة ÙÙÙ
ÙÙÙ? اÙØارئ⪠\.â¬ÙاÙØاÙÙا Ù
٠خبرتÙاâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙائÙØ© ÙاÙتشارÙا اÙجغراÙ?٠اÙÙاسع عبر ÙاÙ?Ø© اÙÙ
جتÙ
عات اÙÙ
ØÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠اÙÙ
ÙاØ٠اÙÙائÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø£Ø«Ø¨ØªØª اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«ÙدرتÙا عÙ٠تصÙ
ÙÙ
إجراءات تدخÙÙØ© Ù?اعÙØ© عÙÙ ÙØÙ Ø´Ù?اÙ? ÙÙ
ÙصÙ?âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠20â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«ÙبااÙشترا٠اÙÙØ«ÙÙ Ù
ع شرÙاء اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙاÙÙظراء اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ?تÙÙع أ٠تزÙد اÙعÙ
ÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙترØØ© ÙÙ?اءة ÙÙ?اعÙÙØ© استخداÙ
⬠â«âª\.44â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùارد Ù
٠خاÙ٠تØسÙ٠ااÙستÙداÙ? ÙتØسÙ٠اإÙدارة ÙتÙسÙÙ Ù
ختÙÙ? أدÙات شبÙات اأÙÙ
اÙ⪠\.â¬Ù?عÙ٠سبÙ٠اÙÙ
ثاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙعتÙ
د اÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù٠اÙبÙابة اÙÙ
ÙØدة ÙÙزارة اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© ÙÙاعدة بÙاÙات برÙاÙ
ج اÙتØÙÙاÙت اÙÙÙدÙØ© ÙتصÙ?ÙØ© اأÙسر اÙÙ
عÙØ´ÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙÙرة ÙتØدÙدâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ئة اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ?ة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا سÙستÙ?Ùد اÙÙ
شرÙع Ù
Ù Ùاعدة بÙاÙات صÙدÙ٠اÙتشغÙÙ Ùسج٠اÙبØاÙØ© اÙتابع ÙÙزارة اÙعÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬ÙعÙ٠صعÙدâ¬
â«Ù
Ù
اثÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙÙ?جر٠اÙÙ
شرÙع Ù
ا ÙÙزÙ
Ù
Ù Ù
راجعة Ù
زدÙجة ÙÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات Ù
ÙارÙØ© بÙاعدة بÙاÙات اأÙÙÙرÙا ÙضÙ
ا٠أÙج٠اÙتÙاÙ
Ù ÙاÙØدâ¬
â«Ù
٠أخØاء ااÙستÙداÙ? ÙتÙ?اد٠ازدÙاجÙØ© اÙجÙÙدâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙاÙب ااÙÙتصادÙة⪠\.â¬Ø§ÙÙ
ÙاÙ?ع ااÙÙتصادÙØ© اÙÙ
ØتÙ
ÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙع ÙبÙرة⪠Øâ¬Øت٠ÙØ¥Ù Ùا٠Ùصعب ÙÙاسÙا ÙÙاسا Ù ÙÙ
Ùا ٠بدÙة⪠\.â¬Ø£ÙاÙÙâª:â¬â¬ â«âª\.44â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙÙÙÙ Ùضخ اÙدخ٠أثر داعÙ
ÙاÙستÙرار عÙ٠اÙتصاد غزةâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø£âª \.â¬Ø³ØªØ²Ùد Ù?رص اÙعÙ
٠اÙÙ
ؤÙتة Ù
٠خاÙ٠تÙÙ?Ùر اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙâª/â¬Ø§ÙعÙ
٠اÙØر عÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¥ÙÙترÙت دخ٠اأÙسر اÙÙ
عÙØ´ÙØ© اÙÙ
Ø´Ù
ÙÙØ© باÙتغØÙØ© Ù?ÙراÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
Ù
ا سÙساعد عÙ٠استÙرار ÙÙتÙا اÙشرائÙØ© ÙباÙتاÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØÙب اÙÙÙÙ Ù?٠سÙا٠اÙتصاد عرضة ÙØ®Øر ااÙÙÙÙار⪠\.â¬ÙسÙستÙر اÙØÙب عÙ٠ااÙØتÙاجات اأÙساسÙØ© (اÙÙ
Ùادâ¬
â«Ø§ÙغذائÙØ© ÙاÙخدÙ
ات ÙاإÙÙجارات)⪠Øâ¬ÙباÙتاÙ٠سÙساÙد اÙÙ
شرÙع ااÙÙتصاد اÙÙ
ØÙ٠أÙثر Ù
٠غÙرÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
Øا٠بÙع اÙتجزئة ÙاÙÙ
ؤسسات اÙتجارÙØ© اÙصغÙرة⪠\.â¬ÙعÙ٠اأÙÙ
د اأÙØÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙØسÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙع صاÙØÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شارÙÙÙ ÙÙتشغÙÙ ÙÙعÙ
٠عÙ٠تÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù
ÙاراتÙÙ
(اÙÙ
Ùارات اÙتÙÙÙØ© ÙÙ
Ùارات اÙتÙاص٠اÙشخصÙØ©) ÙستÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù٠آثار Ù
Ù?Ùدة عÙ٠رأس اÙÙ
ا٠اÙبشر٠Ù?٠غزة ÙباÙتاÙ٠آÙ?ا٠ÙÙ
ÙÙاâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¨âª \.â¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙ Ù
ÙÙ٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙØر اÙÙ
دعÙÙ
بشبÙØ© اإÙÙترÙت (اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ) عÙÙ Ùج٠اÙخصÙص Ù
ÙÙ
ا Ù ÙتØسÙÙâ¬
â«Ù?رص اÙÙسب ااÙÙتصاد٠اÙدائÙ
Ø© عÙÙ Ù
ستÙÙ Ù?رد٠ÙÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙتتÙاض٠اÙÙظائÙ? Ù?Ù Ùذا اÙÙØاع ÙÙ
ØÙا ٠رÙاتبâ¬
â«Ø£Ø¹ÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
تÙØ³Ø (اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠⪠Ø)8370â¬ÙÙ
٠خاÙ٠سÙÙÙØ© ااÙÙتØا٠ÙاÙÙ
رÙÙØ© Ù?٠اÙÙ
تØÙبات اÙÙ
ÙارÙØ©â¬
â«ÙاÙÙدرة عÙ٠اÙتغÙب عÙ٠اÙÙÙÙد اÙÙ
Ù?رÙضة عÙ٠اÙØرÙØ© ÙØ¥Ù
ÙاÙÙØ© اÙÙصÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ÙÙÙا تÙÙ?Ùر Ù?رص اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙâ¬
â«Ø³ÙÙ
ا ÙÙشباب ÙاÙÙساء اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙعاÙÙ٠أشد اÙÙ
عاÙاة Ù
٠اÙبØاÙØ© ÙاÙبØاÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙعة Ù?٠غزة⪠\.â¬ÙÙتÙ
تع Ùذا اÙÙ
جاÙâ¬
â«Ø° باإÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠جاÙزÙØ© اÙبÙÙØ© اÙتØتÙØ© (ÙØ¥Ù
ÙاÙÙØ© اÙÙصÙ٠إÙ٠خدÙ
ة⬠â«Ø¨Ø¢Ù?ا٠Ùاعدة Ù?٠اأÙراض٠اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ©Ø Ø¥ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¥ÙÙترÙت ÙاÙÙØا٠اÙعرÙض بتÙÙÙ?Ø© Ù
ÙسÙرة Ù?Ù Ù
ÙاØÙ Ù
عÙÙØ©)⪠Øâ¬ØªÙÙ?ر اأÙراض٠اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© Ø£Ùد عاÙ
ÙØ© شابةâ¬
â«ÙÙ
تعÙÙ
Ø© Ù
اÙئÙ
Ø© تÙ
اÙ
ا Ù ÙÙ
Ø«Ù Ùذا اÙعÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬ÙبÙج٠عاÙ
⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
Ù٠اÙشباب اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙ Ù
Ùارات ØاسÙبÙØ© ÙÙغÙÙØ© أساسÙØ©â¬
â«âª12â¬â¬
â«Ø¨Ù
عداÙت أجÙر تÙاÙ?سÙØ©Ø Ùتعتبر Ù
عداÙت اÙبØاÙØ© Ù
رتÙ?عة ÙسبÙا ٠باÙÙ
عاÙÙر اÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ© (âª)CIA, 2010â¬â¬
â«Ùصارت اإÙÙترÙت اÙÙسÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
Ù?ض٠Ùتباد٠اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات ÙÙتÙجة Ù
باشرة ÙÙÙÙÙد اÙÙ
Ù?رÙضة عÙ٠اÙØرÙØ© ÙØ¥Ù
ÙاÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙصÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙباÙعÙ
٠عبر اإÙÙترÙت⪠Øâ¬ÙستØÙع اÙشباب ÙاÙÙساء اÙÙ
ØرÙÙ
ÙÙ Ù?٠غزة اÙتغÙب عÙ٠اÙÙÙÙد اÙÙ
ادÙØ©â¬
â«Ø£Ù
س اÙØØ§Ø¬Ø©Ø ØÙØ« Ø¥Ù Ùذا اÙعÙ
Ùâª( :â¬Ø£) ÙÙ
ÙÙâ¬â«ÙغÙرÙا Ù
٠اÙÙÙÙد ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© ÙÙسب اÙدخ٠اÙØ°Ù ÙØتاجÙ٠إÙÙÙ Ùâ¬
â«Ø£Ø¯Ø§Ø¤Ù Ù?٠أ٠Ù
Ùا٠Ù
٠خاÙ٠أجÙزة اÙÙÙ
بÙÙتر ÙÙصاÙت اإÙÙترÙت اÙÙ
تÙÙ?رة بÙØ«Ø±Ø©Ø (ب) ÙÙاج٠ØÙاجز Ø£ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø£Ù
اÙ
اÙدخÙÙ Ù
٠خاÙ٠إÙ
ÙاÙÙØ© اÙÙصÙ٠اÙÙ
Ù?تÙØØ© ÙغÙر اÙرسÙ
ÙØ© Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
ÙاÙ
اÙعÙ
٠ااÙÙ?تراضÙØ©Ø (ج) ÙتÙØâ¬
â«Ù
رÙÙØ© عاÙÙØ© Ù?٠اÙÙ
تØÙبات اÙÙ
ÙارÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙترتÙبات اÙزÙ
ÙÙØ© ÙاÙجغراÙ?Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙباÙتاÙÙ Ù?بتÙÙ?Ùر٠ÙÙÙ
ÙÙاة ÙÙÙسبâ¬
â«ÙاÙعÙ
Ù ÙÙ
ا ÙشاؤÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
Ù٠أ٠ÙÙÙ٠اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ ÙÙاة ÙبÙرة ÙتÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙشباب Ù
٠خاÙ٠اÙتشغÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¬âª \.â¬Ø³ØªÙÙÙ ÙÙ?رص اÙعÙ
Ù ÙبشÙ٠غÙر Ù
باشر آثار Ø¥ÙجابÙØ© عÙ٠ااÙØتÙاء ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ ØÙØ« تØد Ù
ساÙدة اÙدخÙâ¬
â«Ù
Ù Ù
عد٠ØدÙØ« اÙÙ?ش٠اأÙسر٠ÙاÙÙ?Ùر اÙÙ
دÙع اÙت٠ثبت ارتباØÙا باإÙÙصاء ااÙجتÙ
اع٠ÙاÙجرÙÙ
Ø© ÙعدÙ
â¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙستÙرار اÙسÙاسÙ⪠\.â¬ÙتتÙ
خض Ùذ٠اÙظÙاÙر ÙÙÙا عادة ع٠عÙاÙ
٠اÙتصادÙØ© خارجÙØ© سÙبÙØ© ÙبÙرة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ø°Ù٠عÙ٠ااÙستثÙ
ار ÙباÙتاÙÙ Ù?رص اÙعÙ
٠اÙÙ
ستÙبÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙعÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙزاÙÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙدعÙ
اÙتشغÙ٠اÙØ°Ù ÙساÙد٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠أÙضا ٠جÙدة اÙخدÙ
ات Ù?٠اÙÙØاعات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙة⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع تÙÙ?Ùر Ù
ÙاÙ?ع⬠â«âª\.44â¬â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙ
Ø© ÙعاÙ
Ø© اÙسÙا٠Ù?٠بÙئة ÙØ´ÙبÙا ضعÙ? اÙØÙ
اÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© Ùترد٠اÙخدÙ
ات اÙصØÙØ© ÙاÙتعÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙسÙعÙ
Ù Ù
عظÙ
اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙâ¬
â«Ù?Ù Ù
شرÙعات ÙاÙ
ت اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© باÙÙ?ع٠بتØدÙدÙا⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ
Ù٠أ٠تتضÙ
٠اÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙÙ
ختارة اÙعÙ
Ù Ù
ع اأÙØÙ?اÙâ¬
â«âª 12â¬ÙستÙد تصÙÙÙ? Ù
عد٠اÙبØاÙØ© Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙسبة اÙÙ
ئÙÙØ© اÙدÙÙا Ø¥Ù٠اÙعÙÙا ÙÙÙÙØ© اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© اÙت٠با٠ÙظائÙ? Ù?٠بÙد Ù
عÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ù
٠بÙ٠⪠833â¬Ø¨Ùد⪠Øâ¬Ø§ØتÙت اÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
رتبة ⪠Ø717â¬ÙÙØاع غزة اÙÙ
رتبة âª\.720â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠21â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
عاÙÙÙ Ù?٠اÙÙ
دارس ÙÙ
ساÙدة اÙØÙ?ÙÙØ© اÙÙ
بÙرة ÙÙ
ساعدة اÙÙ
سÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا سÙÙ?Ùظر Ø£Ùضا Ù Ù?٠تÙزÙع اأÙغذÙØ© عÙ٠اأÙشد اØتÙاجا Ùâ¬
â«ÙخدÙ
ات اÙرعاÙØ© اÙصØÙØ© اأÙÙÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙبÙ
رÙر اÙÙÙت⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ع تزاÙد اÙخبرات⪠Øâ¬ÙÙا٠Ù
جا٠إÙعادة تÙجÙ٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙØ°Ù ÙستÙدÙ?٠برÙاÙ
جâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙØ٠اÙÙ
جااÙت ذات اأÙثر اأÙÙبر عÙ٠ااÙستÙرار ااÙجتÙ
اع٠ÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? Øدة اÙÙ?Ùر⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع ضÙ
ا٠عدÙ
تأثر اÙتشغÙÙâ¬
â«Ù?٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاصâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر تعبئة Ù
Ùارد اÙÙ
اÙØÙ٠اإÙضاÙ?ÙØ© ÙتÙجÙÙÙا Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
ستØÙÙÙا بشÙ٠أÙ?ضÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø³ÙÙ
Ù⬠â«âª\.45â¬â¬
â«ÙستÙÙ?ر Ø£ÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات Ø«Ù
ÙÙØ© ØÙÙ ØااÙت ÙÙص اÙÙ
Ùارد Ù?٠اÙشبÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
جتÙ
ع اÙÙ
دÙ٠اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙÙÙâªØâ¬â¬
â«ÙسÙÙÙÙ Ùذا Ù
Ù?Ùدا Ù ÙزÙادة اÙÙع٠بااÙØتÙاجات Ù
٠اÙÙ
Ùارد ÙÙتبÙÙغ شرÙاء غزة اÙخارجÙÙ٠بÙذ٠ااÙØتÙاجات عÙÙ ÙØ٠أÙثر Ù?اعÙÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù٠أÙضا ٠عÙÙ ÙØ٠أسرع ÙØ£Ù?ض٠تÙجÙ٠اÙÙ
Ùارد Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
جااÙت ذات اأÙÙÙÙÙØ© اÙت٠ÙÙ
Ù٠أ٠ÙتÙÙع Ø£Ù ÙÙÙÙ ÙÙا أثر ÙبÙر⬠â«ÙسÙÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ù٠اÙرÙ?ا٠اÙعاÙ
ÙÙسÙا٠ÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© رأس اÙÙ
ا٠اÙبشر٠اÙÙØ°ÙÙ Ùعتبر ÙاÙÙÙ
ا ضرÙرÙا ÙتثبÙت دعائÙ
اÙتصاد غزة ÙÙزÙادة Ø¥Ù
ÙاÙÙاتâ¬
â«ÙÙ
ÙÙا اÙÙ
ستÙبÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«(ب) اÙجÙاÙب اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙاÙتعاÙدÙØ©â¬
â«(⪠)iâ¬Ø§Ø¥Ùدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«ØªØ¹ØªØ¨Ø± Ù
خاØر اإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙع بÙج٠عاÙ
ÙبÙرة⪠Øâ¬ØÙØ« سÙتÙ
تÙدÙÙ
اÙÙ
ساÙدة Ù
٠خاÙÙ Ù
ÙØ ØªÙدÙ
Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
ÙظÙ
ات⬠â«âª\.41â¬â¬
â«ØبÙت تدابÙر ÙÙتخÙ?ÙÙ?⪠Øâ¬ÙسÙÙÙÙ Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© Ù
سؤÙاÙ٠ع٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ùإدارة اÙÙ
شرÙع⬠â«ØºÙر ØÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙÙد Ù?â¬
â«Ø¨Ùج٠عاÙ
⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠جÙاÙب اإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ
Ù٠اÙÙ
رÙز Ùدرات ÙاÙ?ÙØ© Ù?٠اإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ùسب٠Ù٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ù
شرÙعات Ù
Ù
اثÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙسÙضÙ
٠اÙÙ
رÙز اÙ
تثا٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© بترتÙبات اإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙع اÙÙ
Ø°ÙÙرة Ù?٠دÙÙ٠اÙعÙ
ÙÙات⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا سÙÙاصÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
رÙز تÙدÙÙ
اÙÙ
ساعدة اÙÙ?ÙÙØ© ÙاÙتدرÙب Ø¥ÙÙ ÙØدات اإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© باÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙ?ذة ÙÙÙ
شرÙع⪠\.â¬ÙسÙتÙ
تخÙ?ÙÙ?â¬
â«Ù
خاØر اإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© Ù
٠خاÙÙ Ùذ٠اÙضÙابØâª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙسÙتÙ
تÙجÙ٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙبÙÙ Ù
٠خاÙÙ Ù
ÙØØ© ÙتÙ
صرÙ?Ùا Ù
٠خاÙÙ Øساب Ù
خصص ÙÙ?تØÙ ÙÙدÙر٠Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات⬠â«âª\.42â¬â¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùذ٠سÙÙÙÙ
بإعداد Ù
ÙزاÙÙØ© ربع سÙÙÙØ© Ù
Ù?صÙØ© (Ø®ØØ© صرÙ?) تستخدÙ
Ù?٠تØدÙد سÙÙ? اÙØساب اÙÙ
خصصâ¬
â«ÙØ°ÙÙ ÙتÙسÙر تÙÙ?ر اأÙÙ
Ùا٠اÙاÙزÙ
Ø© ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙع Ù?Ù Ù
ÙعدÙ⪠\.â¬ÙسÙضÙ
٠اÙÙ
رÙز اÙ
تاÙÙ ÙÙ Ù
ÙظÙ
Ø© Ù
٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§Ùت٠تØص٠عÙÙ Ù
ÙØØ© Ù?رعÙØ© ÙØساب Ù
صرÙ?Ù Ù
ÙÙ?ص٠Ù
Ù?تÙØ ÙÙذ٠اÙÙ
ÙØة⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠أ٠تÙدÙ
اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙ?ذةâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ
شرÙع Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات اÙÙ
ÙزاÙÙØ© اÙاÙزÙ
Ø© Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
رÙز⪠Øâ¬ØÙØ« ÙتÙ
تÙدÙÙ
Ùا Ø¥Ù٠اÙبÙ٠بصÙرة Ù
جÙ
عةâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³Ùعد Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© تÙارÙر Ù
اÙÙØ© Ù
رØÙÙØ© غÙر Ù
دÙÙÙÙØ© ربع سÙÙÙØ© ÙتÙارÙر Ù
اÙÙØ© Ù
د ÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙة⬠â«âª\.44â¬â¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø³ÙÙÙØ© ÙÙÙدÙ
Ùا Ø¥Ù٠اÙبÙÙ Ùرصد تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙع⪠\.â¬ÙÙجب أ٠تعرض اÙتÙارÙر اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙÙ
رØÙÙØ© عÙ٠اÙبÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
Ùعد ا٠ÙتجاÙز âª30â¬â¬
â«ÙÙÙ
ا بعد ÙÙاÙØ© Ù٠ربع سÙة⪠\.â¬ÙسÙÙ? ØªØ´ØªØ±Ø Ø§ØªÙ?اÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙØØ© رÙ?ع ÙÙائÙ
Ù
اÙÙØ© سÙÙÙØ© Ù
دÙÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙع Ù?٠غضÙ٠ستة أشÙر Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙاء اÙعاÙ
⪠\.â¬ÙسÙتÙ
إجراء تدÙÙÙات Ù
Ù?اجئة عÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
تÙÙÙØ© ÙØ£ÙÙ
Ùا٠ÙسÙتÙ
تÙدÙÙ
Ùا بشÙ٠ربع سÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙستتضÙ
٠اÙÙÙائÙ
اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙع اÙÙ
ÙØ Ø§ÙÙ?رعÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙسÙتÙ
تدÙÙÙÙا ÙÙ?Ùا Ù ÙÙ
عاÙÙر اÙتدÙÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙØ© بÙ
عرÙ?Ø© شرÙØ© تدÙÙÙ Ù
ستÙÙØ© Ùذاتâ¬
â«Ø®Ø¨Ø±Ø© ÙÙ
عترÙ? بÙا دÙÙÙا ٠عÙ٠أ٠تÙÙÙ Ù
ÙبÙÙØ© Ùد٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙÙتÙ
تعÙÙÙÙا عÙ٠أساس تÙاÙ?س٠بشرÙØ Ù
رجعÙØ© Ù
ÙبÙÙØ© ÙدÙâ¬
â«ØªÙ
Ù٠تÙاÙÙÙ? اÙÙ
راجعة اÙتدÙÙÙÙØ© Ù
Ù ØصÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙØØ©âª\.â¬â¬â«Ø§ÙبÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙسÙÙ? Ùâ¬
â«(⪠)iiâ¬Ø§ÙتÙرÙداتâ¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙتÙرÙدات ÙÙ?Ùا Ù ÙاÙئØØ© اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ "اÙئØØ© تÙرÙدات Ù
Ùترض٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙعات ااÙستثÙ
ارÙØ© ⪠-â¬ØªÙرÙدات⬠â«âª\.43â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙع ÙاأÙشغا٠ÙاÙخدÙ
ات غÙر ااÙستشارÙØ© ÙاÙخدÙ
ات ااÙستشارÙØ© Ù?٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙعات ااÙستثÙ
ارÙØ©"⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙÙ
ؤرخة ⪠7â¬ÙÙÙÙÙâª/â¬ØªÙ
Ùزâ¬
â«âª 837\.â¬ÙاÙÙ
ØدÙثة Ù?Ù ÙÙÙ?Ù
برâª/â¬ØªØ´Ø±Ù٠اÙثاÙ٠⪠\.8371â¬Ùستسر٠عÙÙ Ùذا اÙÙ
شرÙع "إرشادات Ù
Ùع ÙÙ
Øاربة ااÙØتÙا٠ÙاÙÙ?ساد Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠22â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙت٠تÙ
ÙÙÙا ÙرÙض Ù
٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙØ¥ÙÙشاء ÙاÙتعÙ
Ùر ÙاعتÙ
ادات ÙÙ
ÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
ؤسسة اÙدÙÙÙØ© ÙÙتÙÙ
ÙØ©" اÙÙ
ØدÙثة Ù?Ù âª7â¬â¬
â«ÙÙÙÙÙâª/â¬ØªÙ
Ùز âª\.837\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙع بتÙ
ÙÙ٠أÙØ´ØØ© تÙرÙدات ثاÙÙÙØ© Ù?٠إØار اÙÙ
ÙØ Ø§ÙÙ?رعÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© بÙ
Ùجب⬠â«âª\.44â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙÙÙ٠⪠7â¬Ù ⪠Ø8â¬ÙØ£Ù
ا اÙÙ
ÙÙ٠⪠0â¬Ù?ا٠ÙشتÙ
٠عÙ٠تÙرÙدات⪠\.â¬Ùا٠ÙÙ?تÙÙع Ø£Ù ÙتجاÙز Ù
خصص اÙتÙرÙدات ÙÙÙ Ù
شرÙع Ù?رع٠âª73â¬â¬
â«Ø¢Ø§ÙÙ? دÙاÙر ÙÙÙ
ÙØ Ø§ÙÙ?رعÙØ© Ù?٠إØار اÙÙ
ÙÙ٠⪠Ø7â¬Ù ⪠03â¬Ø£ÙÙ? دÙاÙر ÙÙÙ
ÙØ Ø§ÙÙ?رعÙØ© Ù?٠إØار اÙÙ
ÙÙ٠⪠\.8â¬ÙÙ?٠إØار اÙÙ
ÙÙÙ âªØ7â¬â¬
â«Ø³ØªÙ
Ù٠اÙÙ
ÙØ Ø§ÙÙ?رعÙØ© Ù?٠اÙÙ
ÙاÙ
اأÙÙ٠شراء اÙÙ
Ùاد اÙاÙزÙ
Ø© ÙتÙدÙÙ
اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙØ£Ù
ا Ù?٠إØار اÙÙ
ÙÙ٠⪠Ø8â¬Ù?ستÙ
ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
دربÙÙ ÙأدÙات اÙتدرÙب ÙاÙÙ
Ùارد⪠\.â¬ÙÙظرا Ù ÙØبÙعة ااÙستجابة ÙØااÙت اÙØÙارئ اÙت٠ÙتسÙ
بÙا اÙÙ
شرÙع⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙÙÙ
Ø© اÙصغÙرة جدا Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ٠عÙد تÙرÙدâª/â¬Ø§Ø³ØªØ´Ø§Ø±Ø§Øªâª Øâ¬Ø³ØªØªØ¶Ù
٠اÙØر٠اÙÙ
Ùرر استخداÙ
Ùا ØÙب عرÙض أسعار ÙÙسÙع⪠Øâ¬ÙااÙختÙار اÙÙ
باشر⪠Øâ¬ÙاختÙارâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙستشارÙÙ٠اأÙÙ?راد⪠\.â¬ÙÙظرا Ù ÙÙÙÙÙد اÙÙ
Ù?رÙضة عÙ٠إÙ
ÙاÙÙØ© ÙصÙ٠اÙÙ
Ùارد ÙاÙبشر Ø¥Ù٠غزة⪠Øâ¬Ø³ØªØ³ØªÙدÙ? اÙتÙرÙدات اÙسÙعâ¬
â«ÙاÙخدÙ
ات اÙÙ
تاØØ© بسÙÙÙØ© Ù?٠اÙسÙ٠اÙÙ
ØÙÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ùد ا٠ÙتÙ
تØدÙد ØزÙ
اÙتÙرÙدات ÙÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙÙ?رعÙØ© Ù
سبÙا Ù Ùظرا Ù ÙØبÙعتÙا اÙÙ
دÙ?Ùعة باÙØÙب⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ٠تÙÙÙ ÙÙا٠تÙرÙدات⬠â«âª\.44â¬â¬
â«Ù?ÙÙ
ا Ùخص اÙÙ
ÙÙ٠⪠\.0â¬Ø¨Ùاء عÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù٠تÙÙÙ ÙÙا٠خØØ© تÙرÙدات (أ٠استراتÙجÙØ© تÙرÙدات خاصة باÙÙ
شرÙع)⪠\.â¬Ùستتبع اÙتÙاÙÙÙ?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
تÙبدة Ù?٠إØار اÙÙ
ÙÙ٠⪠0â¬Ø§Ø¥Ùجراءات اإÙدارÙØ© اÙÙ
عÙÙØ© اÙخاصة بÙ
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© ÙاÙت٠رÙجعتâ¬
â«Ùثبت Ø£ÙÙا Ù
ÙبÙÙØ© Ùد٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙستÙÙÙ
اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
تÙÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
ÙØ Ù?٠إØار اÙÙ
ÙÙÙÙ٠⪠7â¬Ù ⪠8â¬Ø¨Ø¥Ø¹Ø¯Ø§Ø¯ Ø®ØØ©â¬
â«ØªÙرÙدات Ù
بسØة⪠Øâ¬ÙتÙÙ?Ø° تÙرÙدات اÙÙ
شرÙع اÙÙ?رع٠اÙÙ
ÙاÙ?٠عÙÙÙ ÙÙ?Ùا ٠اÙتÙ?اÙÙØ© تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
ÙØØ© باتباع اإÙجراءات اÙÙ
ÙصÙص عÙÙÙاâ¬
â«Ù?٠دÙÙ٠عÙ
ÙÙات اÙÙ
شرÙع⪠\.â¬ÙسÙÙÙÙ
Ù
ÙظÙ?٠براÙ
ج Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© برصد اÙتÙرÙدات اÙت٠ستÙÙÙ
بÙاâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙضÙ
ا٠اتخاذ Ùرار اÙتÙرÙدات باتباع اإÙجراءات اÙÙ
عتÙ
دة⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع ااÙÙتÙ
اÙ
اÙÙاجب باعتبارات ااÙÙتصادâ¬
â«ÙاÙÙÙ?اءة⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ
Ù٠اÙÙ
رÙز خبرة ÙبÙرة Ù?٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙت٠ÙÙ
ÙÙÙا اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙاÙÙ
اÙØÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙدÙÙ ÙظÙ
سÙÙÙ
Ø© ÙÙرصد ÙاÙÙ
راÙبةâ¬
â«ØµÙÙ?ت Ù
خاØر اÙتÙرÙدات بأÙÙا Ù
تÙسØة⪠\.â¬ÙستÙÙ٠جÙ
Ùع اÙتÙرÙدات⬠â«ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙÙ?رعÙØ© بÙ
عرÙ?Ø© اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ©âªÙ? \.â¬â¬
â«Ø¯ÙÙ ØدÙد اÙÙ
راجعة اÙÙ
سبÙØ© ÙÙبÙÙ Ù?ÙÙ
ا Ùخص اÙÙ
شرÙعات Ù
تÙسØØ© اÙÙ
خاØر⪠\.â¬ÙسÙÙÙ?Ø° اÙبÙ٠بعثتÙ٠إشراÙ?ÙتÙÙ Ù?٠اÙسÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ø°ÙÙ Ù
راجعة ÙاØدة اÙØÙØ© ÙÙتÙرÙدات تغØÙ Ù
ا ا٠ÙÙ٠ع٠⪠%73â¬Ù
٠اÙعÙÙد اÙت٠تÙ
ت ترسÙتÙا أثÙاء Ù?ترة اÙÙ
راجعةâª\.â¬â¬
â«(ج) اÙسÙاسات اÙÙÙائÙØ©â¬
â«âª \.77â¬Ø§ÙسÙاسات اÙÙÙائÙØ© اÙبÙئÙة⪠\.â¬ØªÙ
تصÙÙÙ? اÙÙ
شرÙع ضÙ
٠اÙÙ?ئة (ج)⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ ÙتÙ
تÙ?عÙ٠سÙاسات ÙÙائÙØ© بÙئÙØ© Ù
عÙÙØ©Ø Ø¨Ù
ا Ø£Ù٠اÙâ¬
â«ØªÙجد آثار بÙئÙØ© ÙبÙرة تعز٠إÙ٠إجراءات اÙÙ
شرÙع اÙتدخÙÙØ© اÙÙ
زÙ
عةâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø¥Ùجراءات اÙÙÙائÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ ÙتÙ
تÙ?عÙ٠اÙسÙاسات اÙÙÙائÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ©Ø Ù?اÙعÙ
ÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙترØØ© ستÙÙÙ ÙÙا آثار⬠â«âª\.44â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø¬ØªÙ
اعÙØ© Ø¥ÙجابÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ù ش٠أ٠اÙبØاÙØ© Ù٠اÙسبب اÙرئÙس٠ÙÙÙ?Ùر⪠Øâ¬Ù?ضاÙ٠ع٠اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ´ ااÙÙتصاد٠ÙااÙجتÙ
اعÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙد ازداد اÙØÙب عÙÙ⬠â«âª\.44â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ساعدة ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© Ù?٠غزة زÙادة ÙبÙرة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
Ùارد اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© غÙر ÙاÙ?ÙØ© Ùا٠ÙÙجد إا٠اÙÙÙÙÙ ÙسبÙا Ù Ù
٠اأÙدÙات ÙÙ
ساعدة اأÙسرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙØ´ÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙÙرة⪠\.â¬Ùأدت Ù
عداÙت اÙÙ?Ùر اÙÙ
تزاÙدة⪠Øâ¬Ù
ÙرÙÙØ© بÙ
عداÙت اÙبØاÙØ© اÙÙ
رتÙ?عة⪠Øâ¬Ø¥Ù٠تÙ?اÙÙ
اأÙÙضاع⪠Øâ¬Ù?تعرضت Ùدرات اأÙسرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
عÙØ´ÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙÙرة عÙ٠اÙتÙÙÙ? ÙØ¥ÙجÙاد اÙباÙغ⪠\.â¬ÙتتÙØ Ø§ÙعÙ
ÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙترØØ© Ù?رصة ÙØ¢ÙتÙâª( :â¬Ø£) تÙÙÙÙ
ÙÙ?اÙØ© براÙ
ج اÙÙ
ساعدات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙØاÙÙØ©Ø (ب) تعزÙز اÙتÙسÙ٠بÙÙ Ù
ختÙÙ? أصØاب اÙÙ
صÙØØ©Ø (ج) اÙØد Ù
٠اÙتداخ٠اÙØاÙÙ Ù?ÙÙ
ا بÙ٠اÙبراÙ
Ø¬Ø (د) اÙÙ
ساعدة عÙÙâ¬
â«ØªØµÙ
ÙÙ
أدÙات Ù?اعÙØ© اÙستÙداÙ? اÙشباب⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ?تÙÙع Ø£Ù ÙسÙ?ر اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙ٠ع٠اآÙتÙâª( :â¬Ø£) زÙادة اÙتشغÙÙ Ù?ÙÙ
ا بÙ٠اÙشباب اأÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ÙرعاÙØ©Ø (ب) زÙادة Ù
Ùارات اÙÙÙ
بÙÙتر ÙااÙتصاÙØ (ج) تعزÙز اÙØ«ÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
ÙاÙØ© داخ٠اأÙسر اÙÙ
عÙØ´ÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
جتÙ
عات اÙÙ
ØÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙâ¬
â«Ø³ÙÙ
ا باÙÙسبة ÙÙÙØ³Ø§Ø¡Ø ÙباÙتاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙ Ù٠أثر Ø¥Ùجاب٠عÙÙ ÙدراتÙÙ
ÙÙساÙÙ
Ù?٠تÙسÙع عÙÙÙاتÙÙ
ÙاÙÙ?تاØÙا عÙ٠اأÙÙ?Ùار اÙجدÙدةâ¬
â«Ùتعرض Ø£ÙÙÙاع جدÙدة Ù
٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬ÙسÙÙ
ÙØ Ø§ÙعÙ
ا٠اÙØ«Ùة⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø¨Ù?ض٠Ù
ا ÙتÙ
اÙتساب٠Ù
Ù Ù
Ùارات ÙÙ
بÙÙتر ÙتÙÙÙÙ Ù
٠تدرÙب عÙ٠اÙÙغاتâ¬
â«Ù?Ù ÙدراتÙÙ
ÙÙراÙ
تÙÙ
ÙاØتراÙ
ÙÙ
ÙØ°ÙاتÙÙ
âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠23â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«ÙÙع اÙجÙسâ¬
â«Ù⪠Øâ¬Ù
عداÙت أعÙÙ Ù
٠اÙبØاÙØ© ÙÙÙØ© اÙÙØ´Ø§Ø Ù
ÙارÙØ© باÙشبابâªØâ¬â¬ â«ØªÙاج٠اÙشابات⪠Øâ¬Ùا٠سÙÙ
ا اÙØاصاÙت عÙ٠تعÙÙÙ
عا Ù?⬠â«âª\.45â¬â¬
â«ÙستستجÙب اÙعÙ
ÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙترØØ© ÙÙذا اÙتØد٠Ù
٠خاÙ٠اآÙتÙâª( :â¬Ø£) Ø§Ø´ØªØ±Ø§Ø Ø£Ù ØªØ´Ù٠اÙÙساء Ù
ا ا٠ÙÙ٠ع٠ÙصÙ? اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù
Ù ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
شرÙع Ù?رعÙØ (ب) ترÙÙز Ø£ÙØ´ØØ© برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠عÙ٠اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© ÙÙ٠اأÙÙثر Ù
اÙØ¡Ù
Ø© ÙتشغÙ٠اÙÙساءâ¬
â«(اÙÙ
تعÙÙ
ات) ÙÙÙ
ÙÙÙا أ٠تعØÙÙ٠خبرة عÙ
ÙÙØ© Ø«Ù
ÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ?Ùز بÙ?رص اÙعÙ
٠اÙÙ
ستÙبÙÙØ©Ø (ج) Ù
ساÙدة اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø§ÙØ°Ù Ùعتبرâ¬
â«Ø¹ÙÙ Ùج٠اÙخصÙص ÙشاØا ٠اÙتصادÙا Ù Ùاعدا Ù ÙÙÙساء (اÙÙ
تعÙÙ
ات)Ø ØÙØ« ÙÙ
Ù٠أداؤ٠Ù
٠اÙبÙت ÙÙ?٠ظرÙÙ? Ù
رÙة⪠\.â¬ÙباÙتاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø³ØªØ³Ø§Ø¹Ø¯â¬
â«ÙÙÙÙ Ù
Ù Ù
ساعدة Ø£ØÙ?اÙÙÙ Ù?٠دراستÙÙ
بشÙ٠أÙ?ضÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ?رص ااÙÙتصادÙØ© اÙت٠ÙÙÙ?رÙا اÙÙ
شرÙع عÙ٠تÙ
ÙÙÙÙÙ Ù?٠اÙبÙت⪠Øâ¬ÙتÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ÙسÙÙÙ٠اÙÙساء Ù
٠بÙ٠اÙÙ?ئات اأÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙØ© اÙت٠ستستÙدÙ?Ùا Ù
شرÙعات اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙÙ?رعÙة⪠\.â¬ÙسÙÙ?ضÙ
٠اÙرصد اÙÙ
راعÙâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ
ساÙاة بÙ٠اÙجÙسÙÙ Ù
٠خاÙ٠تصÙÙÙ? اÙبÙاÙات عÙد اÙضرÙرةâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¢ÙÙات Ù
عاÙجة اÙتظÙÙ
اتâ¬
â«ÙÙ
ÙÙ ÙÙÙ
جتÙ
عات اÙÙ
ØÙÙØ© ÙاأÙÙ?راد اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙعتÙدÙ٠أÙÙÙ
تضررÙا Ù
٠أØد اÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙت٠ÙساÙدÙا اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠أÙ⬠â«âª\.41â¬â¬
â«ÙتÙدÙ
Ùا بشÙاÙاÙÙ
Ø¥Ù٠آÙÙات اÙتظÙÙ
اÙÙائÙ
Ø© ØاÙÙا ٠عÙÙ Ù
ستÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙع أ٠إÙ٠دائرة Ù
عاÙجة اÙÙ
ظاÙÙ
باÙبÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙتÙÙ?٠دائرة Ù
عاÙجةâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ظاÙÙ
Ù
راجعة اÙØ´ÙاÙÙ Ù?Ùر تÙÙÙÙا بغرض Ù
عاÙجة اÙÙ
خاÙÙ? ÙاÙØ´Ùاغ٠اÙÙ
تصÙØ© باÙÙ
شرÙع⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا ÙÙ
ÙÙ ÙÙÙ
جتÙ
عات اÙÙ
ØÙÙØ©â¬
â«ÙاأÙÙ?راد اÙÙ
تضررÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙع رÙ?ع Ø´ÙاÙاÙÙ
Ø¥ÙÙ ÙÙئة اÙتÙ?تÙØ´ اÙÙ
ستÙÙØ© اÙتابعة ÙÙبÙ٠اÙت٠تÙرر Ù
ا إذا Ùا٠Ùد Øدث ضرر âª-â¬â¬
â«Ø£Ù Ùد ÙØدث ⪠-â¬ÙتÙجة ÙعدÙ
اÙتزاÙ
اÙبÙ٠بسÙاسات٠ÙإجراءاتÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙجÙز رÙ?ع اÙØ´ÙاÙÙ Ù?٠أ٠ÙÙت بعد Ø£Ù ÙتÙ
ÙÙ?ت اÙتبا٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
باشرة Ø¥ÙÙ Ùذ٠اÙÙ
خاÙÙ?⪠Øâ¬ÙإعØاء اÙÙ?رصة ÙجÙاز إدارت٠ÙÙرد عÙÙÙا⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ
زÙد Ù
٠اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات ع٠ÙÙÙ?ÙØ© تÙدÙÙ
اÙØ´ÙاÙ٠إÙ٠دائرةâ¬
â«âªhttp://www\.worldbank\.org/en/projects-â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙعâª:â¬â¬ â«Ø²Ùارة⬠â«ÙرجÙ⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙبÙÙâªØâ¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙÙ
ظاÙÙ
⬠â«Ù
عاÙجةâ¬
â«âª Øoperations/products-and-services/grievance-redress-service\.â¬ÙÙاÙØاÙع عÙ٠أ٠Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات بشأÙâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ?ÙØ© رÙ?ع اÙØ´ÙاÙ٠إÙÙ ÙÙئة اÙتÙ?تÙØ´ اÙتابعة ÙÙبÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ?رج٠زÙارة اÙÙ
ÙÙع اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙâª\.www\.inspectionpanel\.org :â¬â¬
â«Ø®Ø§Ù
سا⪠\.â¬Ø§ÙÙ
خاØر اÙرئÙسÙØ©â¬
â«ØµÙÙÙ?ت اÙÙ
خاØر اÙت٠تÙاج٠تØÙÙ٠اÙÙدÙ? اإÙÙÙ
ائ٠ÙÙÙ
شرÙع بÙج٠عاÙ
بأÙÙا ÙبÙرة⪠Øâ¬ÙØ°Ù٠عÙÙ Ù
ا ÙتبÙÙ Ù?٠جدÙÙ⬠â«Ù?⬠â«âª\.42â¬â¬
â«ØµÙÙ?ت اÙÙ
خاØر ذات اÙصÙØ© باÙسÙاسة ÙاÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© ÙÙØ°ÙÙ Ù
خاØر⬠â«Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø£Ùداة اÙÙ
ÙÙجÙØ© ÙتصÙÙÙ? Ù
خاØر اÙعÙ
ÙÙات Ù?٠صØÙÙ?Ø© اÙبÙاÙات⪠\.â¬Ù Ù?â¬
â«ØµÙÙÙ?ت بأÙÙا ÙبÙرة⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ?Ùرد أدÙا٠عرضا ÙÙ
ÙاÙشة ÙØ°ÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصاد اÙÙÙ٠بأÙÙا Ù
رتÙ?عة⪠Øâ¬ÙØ£Ù
ا اÙÙ
خاØر اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙاÙتعاÙدÙØ© Ù? Ù?â¬
â«ØµÙÙÙ?ت اÙÙ
خاØر اÙسÙاسÙØ© Ùذات اÙصÙØ© باÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© بأÙÙا Ù
رتÙ?عة بسبب اÙسÙا٠اÙسÙاس٠شدÙد اÙتÙÙب ÙاÙخصÙصÙØ© اÙØ°Ù⬠â«Ù?⬠â«âª\.44â¬â¬
â«ÙÙ
Ùز اأÙراض٠اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙة⪠\.â¬Ùتظ٠اÙÙ
خاØر اÙÙ
رتبØØ© باÙÙضع Ù?٠غزة Ù
رتÙ?عة ÙÙتعذر اÙتÙبؤ بÙا Ø¥ÙÙ Øد ÙبÙر⪠\.â¬ÙÙظ٠اÙÙضعâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙاس٠اÙداخÙ٠غÙر Ù
ستÙر⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع Ù
ÙاصÙØ© اÙسÙØØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© ÙعÙ
ÙÙØ© Ù
صاÙØØ© Øا٠أÙ
دÙا Ù
ع اÙسÙØØ© اÙØاÙÙ
Ø© اÙÙ?عÙÙØ© Ù?٠غزةâ¬
â«ÙاÙت٠إذا ÙجØت ستخÙ٠تØدÙا Ù ÙبÙرا ٠عÙ٠صعÙد اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙعاÙ
Ø© Ø£Ù
اÙ
اÙسÙØØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙة⪠\.â¬Ù?Ù
٠شأ٠اÙÙ
صاÙØØ© اÙÙ
ØتÙ
ÙØ© Ù
ع غزةâ¬
â«Ø²Ùادة اÙÙ?جÙØ© اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ
تÙÙعة ÙسÙØ© ⪠8372â¬Ù
٠⪠333â¬Ù
ÙÙÙ٠دÙاÙر Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
ÙÙار دÙاÙر⪠\.â¬ÙÙ٠تÙÙ?٠اÙتدابÙر اÙت٠اÙترØتÙا اÙسÙØØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© Ùسد Ùذ٠اÙÙ?جÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙستÙجأ Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
صادر اÙÙ
ØÙÙØ© ÙÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙد Ø´Ùدت غزة تدÙÙرا Ù Ù
Øردا Ù Ù?٠اأÙÙضاع عÙÙ Ù
د٠اÙعÙدÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اضÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
Ù
ا Ø£Ù?ض٠إÙ٠اÙÙÙار ااÙÙتصاد ÙاÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© اأÙساسÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙØ´Ù?ت بÙاÙات اÙتصادÙØ© ØدÙثة ع٠اÙØ®Ù?اض Ù
عدÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙ
Ù Ù?٠غزة Ù
٠⪠%2â¬Ø¹Ø§Ù
⪠837\.â¬Ø¥Ù٠⪠%3\.0â¬Ù?ÙØ Ø¹Ø§Ù
⪠8371â¬Ù
ع ارتÙ?اع Ù
عد٠اÙبØاÙØ© Ø¥ÙÙ ØÙاÙ٠⪠\.%03â¬ÙÙÙ?عز٠Ùذاâ¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠24â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙØ®Ù?اض جزئÙا ٠إÙ٠ااÙÙØ®Ù?اض Ù?Ù Ù
عÙÙات اÙÙ
اÙØÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
Ù
ا أضعÙ? ÙØ´Ø§Ø Ø§Ø¥ÙعÙ
ار Ùأد٠إÙ٠تراجع Øاد Ù?٠دخ٠ربع سÙاÙâ¬
â«ØºØ²Ø©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³Ùرصد اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠اÙÙضع اÙسÙاس٠ع٠Ùثب ÙتÙÙÙÙ
أ٠أثر عÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙعات⪠Øâ¬ÙسÙتخذ إجراءات Ø£Ù ÙÙ?جرÙ⬠â«âª\.43â¬â¬
â«ØªØ¹Ø¯ÙاÙت Øسب اÙØاجة⪠\.â¬Ø¹ÙاÙ
٠اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? اÙتاÙÙØ© اÙت٠ستتÙØ ÙÙÙ
شرÙع تØÙÙ٠أÙداÙ?Ùâª:â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙدرات اÙÙ
ؤسسÙØ© ÙاÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°ÙØ© اÙÙÙÙØ© Ùد٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬ØÙØ« ÙÙ
ÙÙ ÙØاع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù?٠غزة⬠â«âªïâ¬â¬
â«Ø³Ø¬Ø§ÙÙ Ù
Ù
تازا Ù Ù?٠إدارة ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° سÙسÙØ© Ù
٠عÙ
ÙÙات اÙبÙ٠اÙسابÙØ© ÙÙ٠عÙ٠دراÙØ© بÙ
تØÙبات اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙاÙتعاÙدÙØ©â¬
â«ÙاÙخاصة باإÙجراءات اÙÙÙائÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتÙ
اÙ
اÙÙبÙر Ù
٠اÙÙ
اÙØÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ù?باÙÙظر Ø¥Ù٠اأÙزÙ
Ø© اإÙÙساÙÙØ© اÙسائدة Ù?٠غزة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙا٠Ù
ؤشرات تÙبئ بأ٠اÙÙ
اÙØÙÙ ÙدÙÙÙ
⬠â«âªïâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙ
اÙ
بتÙجÙÙ Ù
Ùارد إضاÙ?ÙØ© Ø£ÙÙØ´ØØ© برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°ÙÙ Ù
٠خاÙ٠آÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙÙ
ÙترØØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø¢Ùثار غÙر اÙÙ
باشرة ÙÙ?تÙÙع أ٠تساÙÙ
اÙعÙ
ÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙترØØ© Ù?٠تØسÙ٠اÙÙضع ااÙÙتصاد٠ÙااÙجتÙ
اع٠Ù?٠غزة بتزÙÙد Ù
Ù⬠â«âªïâ¬â¬
â«ÙÙع عÙÙÙÙ
ااÙختÙار Ù
٠اÙشباب بÙ?رص تشغÙÙ ÙصÙرة اأÙج٠ÙزÙادة Ø¥Ù
ÙاÙÙØ© اÙÙصÙ٠إÙ٠اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
Ù Ù
ÙاÙ?عâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعÙ
٠اÙرÙÙ
٠إÙ
ÙاÙÙØ© أداء اÙÙ
ÙاÙ
Ù
٠أ٠Ù
Ùا٠باستخداÙ
بÙÙØ© تØتÙØ© بسÙØة⪠Øâ¬Ù
Ù
ا ÙتÙØ ÙÙعÙ
اÙØ© اÙÙصÙ٠إÙ٠اأÙسÙاÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙØ¥Ùجاز اÙÙ
ÙاÙ
ÙاÙØصÙ٠عÙ٠أجر ÙÙÙ
Ù?٠بÙÙتÙÙ
⪠Øâ¬ÙÙذا بدÙر٠سÙساعد عÙ٠تÙÙ?Ùر بعض اÙزخÙ
ÙاÙÙتصادâ¬
â«Ù?Ù ÙÙت تÙاج٠Ù?Ù٠اÙغاÙبÙØ© اÙعظÙ
Ù Ù
٠اÙبراÙ
ج اÙت٠ÙÙ
ÙÙÙا اÙÙ
اÙØÙ٠تخÙ?Ùضات ÙبÙرة Ù?٠اÙÙ
ÙزاÙÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Øª Ù?عد Ù
خاØر ااÙÙتصاد اÙÙÙÙ Ù
رتÙ?عة بسبب اÙعجز اÙÙ
اÙ٠اÙÙ
تزاÙد باستÙ
رار اÙذ٠تعاÙÙ Ù
Ù٠اÙسÙØØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© ÙتÙÙÙ
⬠â«âª\.44â¬â¬
â«Ø¨ØªÙ
ÙÙÙÙ Ù
٠خاÙÙ Ù
ÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
اÙØÙ٠اÙت٠شابÙا عدÙ
اÙÙÙÙÙ ÙاÙتراجع Ù
ÙØ° عاÙ
⪠\.8332â¬ÙÙؤد٠اØتÙ
ا٠ØدÙØ« تعÙÙÙات Ù?٠تØÙÙاÙتâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¥ÙÙرادات اÙضرÙبÙØ© اÙت٠تÙÙÙ
اÙØÙÙÙ
Ø© اإÙسرائÙÙÙØ© بتØصÙÙÙا ÙØساب اÙسÙØØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© ÙعدÙ
تØÙÙ
Ùذ٠اأÙØ®Ùرة Ù?٠اÙÙ
Ùاردâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙعاÙ
Ø© Ùإدارة ااÙÙتصاد Ù?٠غزة Ø¥Ù٠زÙادة Ùذ٠اÙÙ
خاØر زÙادة ÙبÙرة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
٠شأ٠اØتÙ
ا٠ØدÙØ« Ù
زÙد Ù
٠اÙتخÙ?Ùض Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ù
ستÙÙ Ù
ساعدات اÙÙ
اÙØÙ٠أ٠ÙØ´ÙÙ Ù
خاØر ÙبÙرة عÙ٠استداÙ
Ø© ااÙÙتصاد اÙÙÙÙ ÙØ¥Øار اÙÙ
ÙازÙØ© اÙÙ
اÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙØد Ù
٠آثار صدÙ
اتâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتصاد اÙÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ùجر٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙع Ù
٠خاÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«ØªØ¹Ø¯ اÙÙ
خاØر اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙاÙتعاÙدÙØ© ÙبÙرة⪠\.â¬Ùعتبر تصÙÙÙ? Ù
خاØر اإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© بÙج٠عاÙ
ÙبÙراÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙØ£Ù
ا تصÙÙÙ? Ù
خاØر⬠â«âª\.44â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙرÙدات بÙج٠عاÙ
Ù?ÙÙ Ù
تÙسØ⪠\.â¬ÙÙتÙ
تخÙ?ÙÙ? Ùذ٠اÙÙ
خاØر Ù
٠خاÙ٠ترتÙبات اÙÙ
شرÙع اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙاÙتعاÙدÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠تدÙ?Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙ
ÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
Øاسبة Ùإعداد اÙتÙارÙر⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙضÙØ§Ø¨Ø Ø§ÙداخÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙتدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙتÙرÙدات⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ
زÙد Ù
٠اÙتÙ?اصÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùظر Ø£ÙساÙ
Ù
Ùخص اÙتÙÙÙÙ
â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
سب٠ØÙ٠اإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙاÙتÙرÙدات⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙظر ÙØ°Ù٠اÙÙ
ÙØÙ âª\.0â¬â¬
â«âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠25â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø³Ø§Ø¯Ø³Ø§âª \.â¬Ø¥Øار اÙÙتائج ÙرصدÙاâ¬
â«Ø¥Øار اÙÙتائجâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙدÙ? (اأÙÙداÙ?) اإÙÙÙ
ائ٠ÙÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«ØªÙدÙÙ
Ù
ساÙدة ÙÙشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ? Ù?٠غزة ÙتÙÙ?Ùر دخ٠عÙ٠اÙÙ
د٠اÙÙ
تÙسØ⪠Øâ¬ÙزÙادة سب٠اÙÙصÙ٠إÙÙ Ù?رص اÙعÙ
٠اÙØر اÙÙ
دعÙÙ
Ø© بشبÙØ© اإÙÙترÙتâ¬
â«ÙØدة⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشر اÙÙ
رتبØâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ستÙدÙ?ات اÙÙسÙØØ© اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ? اÙÙÙائÙ⬠â«Ø®Ø اأÙساس⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
عاÙÙر⬠â«Ù
ؤشرات اأÙÙداÙ? اإÙÙÙ
ائÙØ© ÙÙبرÙاÙ
ج Øسب اأÙÙداÙ?âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙتائجâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙاس⬠â«Ø¨Ø§ÙصرÙ?â¬
â«âª1â¬â¬
â«ØªÙÙ?Ùر Ù
ساÙدة دخ٠ÙصÙرة اأÙج٠ÙÙشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ?â¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ اÙشباب اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙØصÙÙ٠عÙÙ Ù
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙع⪠Øâ¬Øسبâ¬
â«âª30333\.33â¬â¬ â«âª80833\.33â¬â¬ â«âª3\.33â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ùعددâ¬
â«ÙÙع اÙجÙسâ¬
â«âª80833\.33â¬â¬ â«âª70733\.33â¬â¬ â«âª3\.33â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ùعدد⬠â«ØªØ´Ù٠اÙÙساء Ù
ÙÙÙ
â¬
â«Ø²Ùادة Ø¥Ù
ÙاÙÙØ© اÙØصÙ٠عÙÙ Ù
ساÙدة Ù?Ù Ù
جا٠اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ ÙÙشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ?â¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ اÙشباب Ù
Ù
Ù ÙØصÙÙ٠عÙÙ Ù
ساÙدة خاصة باÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙ٠اÙØ°ÙÙâ¬
â«âª010\.33â¬â¬ â«âª3\.33â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ùعدد⬠â«Ø£Ø¯Ùا عÙ
اÙÙ Øرا Ù ÙاØدا Ù Ù
دÙ?Ùع اأÙجر عÙ٠اأÙÙ٠أثÙاء اÙÙ
ساÙدة أ٠بعد Ø°ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø³ØªØ© أشÙر⪠Øâ¬Øسب ÙÙع اÙجÙسâª\.â¬â¬
â«âª722\.33â¬â¬ â«âª3\.33â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ùعدد⬠â«ØªØ´Ù٠اÙÙساء Ù
ÙÙÙ
â¬
â«ØµÙ?ØØ© ⪠26â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«âªRESULT_FRAME_TBL_IOâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤشر اÙÙ
رتبØâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ستÙدÙ? اÙÙÙائÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
عاÙÙر ÙØدة اÙÙÙاس Ø®Ø Ø§Ø£Ùساس⬠â«Ù
ؤشرات اÙÙتائج اÙÙسÙØØ© Øسب اÙÙ
ÙÙÙاتâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ÙصرÙ?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ اأÙÙ?راد Ù
٠اأÙسر اÙÙ
عÙØ´ÙØ© اÙت٠ÙÙتÙ
٠إÙÙÙا شباب ÙستÙ?ÙدÙÙâ¬
â«âª8\.0333\.33â¬â¬ â«âª3\.33â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ùعددâ¬
â«Ù
Ù Ù
شرÙع اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ùâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù
٠اأÙسر اÙÙ
عÙØ´ÙØ© اÙÙ
ستÙ?Ùدة Ù
٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙتØÙÙاÙت اÙÙÙدÙØ© Ø£Ùâ¬
â«âª700833\.33â¬â¬ â«âª3\.33â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ùعدد⬠â«Ø§Ø£Ùسر اÙÙ
عÙØ´ÙØ© اÙÙ
سجÙØ© عÙÙ ÙائÙ
Ø© اÙتظار برÙاÙ
ج اأÙÙÙرÙا ÙØ®ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù?رص اÙعÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ اأÙÙ?راد اأÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙØ© اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙستÙ?ÙدÙ٠بشÙÙ Ù
باشر Ù
Ùâ¬
â«âª230333\.33â¬â¬ â«âª3\.33â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ùعددâ¬
â«Ø§ÙخدÙ
ات اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ù?٠إØار Ù
شرÙعات اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙÙ?رعÙØ©â¬
â«âª\.0333\.33â¬â¬ â«âª3\.33â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ùعدد⬠â«ÙØ´Ù٠اÙÙ
عاÙÙÙ Ù
ÙÙÙ
â¬
â«âª830333\.33â¬â¬ â«âª3\.33â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ùعدد⬠â«ÙØ´Ù٠اأÙØÙ?ا٠Ù
ÙÙÙ
â¬
â«âª830333\.33â¬â¬ â«âª3\.33â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ùعدد⬠â«ØªØ´Ù٠اÙÙساء Ù
ÙÙÙ
â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙسبة اÙÙ
ئÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
باشرÙÙ Ù
٠أÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
ÙابÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙسبةâ¬
â«âª23\.33â¬â¬ â«âª3\.33â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙعÙ
٠اÙراضÙ٠ع٠اÙÙ
ساÙدة اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙع⪠Øâ¬Øسبâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ئÙÙØ©â¬
â«ÙÙع اÙÙ
ساÙدة ÙÙÙع اÙجÙسâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙسبةâ¬
â«âª23\.33â¬â¬ â«âª3\.33â¬â¬ â«ØªØ´ÙÙ Ù
ÙÙÙ
اÙÙساء اÙÙ
ستÙ?Ùدات Ù
٠أÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ئÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙسبةâ¬
â«âª23\.33â¬â¬ â«âª3\.33â¬â¬ â«ÙØ´ÙÙ Ù
ÙÙÙ
اÙØ°ÙÙر اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù
٠أÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ئÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙسبة⬠â«ÙÙت Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ø³Ùâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙسبة اÙÙ
ئÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
ØاÙبات ÙاÙØ´ÙاÙ٠اÙت٠ÙÙ?ظرت Ù Ù?â¬
â«âª\.3\.33â¬â¬ â«âª3\.33â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ئÙÙة⬠â«ØºØ¶Ù٠⪠03â¬ÙÙÙ
اÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù?رص اÙعÙ
٠اÙØر اÙÙ
دعÙÙ
بشبÙØ© اإÙÙترÙت (اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ)â¬
â«âª103\.33â¬â¬ â«âª3\.33â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ùعدد⬠â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ اÙشباب اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙتÙÙÙÙ Ù
ساÙدة خاصة باÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ Ù
Ùâ¬
â«ØµÙ?ØØ© ⪠27â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع⪠Øâ¬Øسب ÙÙع اÙجÙسâ¬
â«âª010\.33â¬â¬ â«âª3\.33â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ùعدد⬠â«ØªØ´Ù٠اإÙÙاث Ù
ÙÙÙ
â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙسبة اÙÙ
ئÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
باشرÙÙ Ù
٠اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙسبةâ¬
â«âª23\.33â¬â¬ â«âª3\.33â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙراضÙ٠ع٠اÙÙ
ساÙدة اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙع⪠Øâ¬Øسب ÙÙع اÙÙ
ساÙدةâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ئÙÙØ©â¬
â«ÙÙÙع اÙجÙسâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙسبةâ¬
â«âª23\.33â¬â¬ â«âª3\.33â¬â¬ â«ØªØ´ÙÙ Ù
ÙÙÙ
اÙÙساء اÙÙ
ستÙ?Ùدات Ù
٠اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ئÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙسبةâ¬
â«âª23\.33â¬â¬ â«âª3\.33â¬â¬ â«ÙØ´ÙÙ Ù
ÙÙÙ
اÙرجا٠اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù
٠اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ئÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙسبة⬠â«ÙÙت Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ø³Ùâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙسبة اÙÙ
ئÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
ØاÙبات ÙاÙØ´ÙاÙ٠اÙت٠ÙÙ?ظرت Ù Ù?â¬
â«âª\.3\.33â¬â¬ â«âª3\.33â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ئÙÙة⬠â«ØºØ¶Ù٠⪠03â¬ÙÙÙ
اÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø®ØØ© اÙرصد ÙاÙتÙÙÙÙ
⪠:â¬Ù
ؤشرات اأÙÙداÙ? اإÙÙÙ
ائÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ اÙشباب اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙØصÙÙ٠عÙÙ Ù
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙع⪠Øâ¬Øسب ÙÙع اÙجÙس⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§Ùشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ?⪠:â¬Ø§Ùشباب اÙØ°Ù٠تتراÙØ Ø£Ø¹Ù
ارÙÙ
بÙ٠⪠72â¬Ù ⪠03â¬Ø³ÙØ© اÙعاØÙÙÙ Ù
ÙØ° سÙØ© ÙاØدة عÙ٠اأÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ØªÙ?عØ٠اأÙÙ?ضÙÙØ© Ù?٠اÙØصÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتعرÙÙ?âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙصÙ?â¬
â«Ø¹ÙÙ Ù?رص اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙÙشباب اÙÙ
ÙتÙ
Ù٠إÙ٠اأÙسر اÙÙ
عÙØ´ÙØ© اÙÙ
ستÙ?Ùدة Ù
٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙتØÙÙاÙت اÙÙÙدÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù٠ستة أشÙرâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠اÙتÙرارâ¬
â«ÙظاÙ
Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات إدارة اÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«Ù
صدر اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙرÙر ÙصÙ? اÙسÙÙÙ ÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙجÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ØªØ´Ù٠اإÙÙاث Ù
ÙÙÙ
⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتعرÙÙ?âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙصÙ?â¬
â«ØµÙ?ØØ© ⪠28â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ù٠⪠\.â¬Ø£Ø´Ùرâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠اÙتÙرارâ¬
â«ÙظاÙ
Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات اإÙدارة ÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
صدر اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙرÙر ÙصÙ? اÙسÙÙÙ ÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙجÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ اÙشباب Ù
Ù
Ù ÙØصÙÙ٠عÙÙ Ù
ساÙدة خاصة باÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙ٠اÙØ°Ù٠أدÙا عÙ
اÙÙ Øرا Ù ÙاØدا Ù Ù
دÙ?Ùع اأÙجر عÙ٠اأÙÙ٠أثÙاء اÙÙ
ساÙدة Ø£Ùâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø¹Ø¯ Ø°Ù٠بستة أشÙر⪠Øâ¬Øسب ÙÙع اÙجÙسâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ùشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ?⪠:â¬Ø§Ùشباب اÙØ°Ù٠تتراÙØ Ø£Ø¹Ù
ارÙÙ
بÙ٠⪠72â¬Ù ⪠03â¬Ø³ÙØ© اÙعاØÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙتعرÙÙ?âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙصÙ?â¬
â«Ù
رة ÙاØدة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø¹Ø¯ ÙÙاÙØ© Ù
ساÙدة اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙ٠بستة أشÙرâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠اÙتÙرارâ¬
â«ÙظاÙ
Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات إدارة اÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«Ù
صدر اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙرÙر اÙسÙÙÙ ÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙجÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ØªØ´Ù٠اإÙÙاث Ù
ÙÙÙ
⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتعرÙÙ?âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙصÙ?â¬
â«Ù
رة ÙاØدة سÙÙÙا Ùâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠اÙتÙرارâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙرÙر اÙسÙÙÙ ÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
صدر اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ù
ÙÙجÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ØµÙ?ØØ© ⪠29â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø®ØØ© اÙرصد ÙاÙتÙÙÙÙ
⪠:â¬Ù
ؤشرات اÙÙتائج اÙÙسÙØØ©â¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ اأÙÙ?راد Ù
٠اأÙسر اÙÙ
عÙØ´ÙØ© اÙت٠ÙÙتÙ
٠إÙÙÙا شباب ÙستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù
Ù Ù
شرÙع اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ùâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«ÙاÙ?Ø© Ø£Ù?راد اأÙسر اÙÙ
عÙØ´ÙØ© اÙت٠ÙÙتÙ
٠إÙÙÙا شباب ÙستÙ?ÙدÙ٠بشÙÙ Ù
باشر Ù
Ù Ù?رص اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙتعرÙÙ?âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙصÙ?â¬
â«Ù٠⪠\.â¬Ø£Ø´Ùرâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠اÙتÙرارâ¬
â«ÙظاÙ
Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات إدارة اÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«Ù
صدر اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙرÙر ÙصÙ? اÙسÙÙÙ ÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙجÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ù
٠اأÙسر اÙÙ
عÙØ´ÙØ© اÙÙ
ستÙ?Ùدة Ù
٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙتØÙÙاÙت اÙÙÙدÙØ© أ٠اأÙسر اÙÙ
عÙØ´ÙØ© اÙÙ
سجÙØ© عÙÙ ÙائÙ
Ø© اÙتظار برÙاÙ
ج اأÙÙÙرÙا ÙØ®ÙÙ Ù?رصâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتعرÙÙ?âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙصÙ?â¬
â«Ù٠⪠\.â¬Ø£Ø´Ùرâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠اÙتÙرارâ¬
â«ÙظاÙ
Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات إدارة اÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«Ù
صدر اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙرÙر ÙصÙ? اÙسÙÙÙ ÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙجÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ØµÙ?ØØ© ⪠30â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ اأÙÙ?راد اأÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙØ© اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙستÙ?ÙدÙ٠بشÙÙ Ù
باشر Ù
٠اÙخدÙ
ات اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ù?٠إØار Ù
شرÙعات اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙÙ?رعÙة⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙ?راد اأÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙØ© اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙستÙ?ÙدÙ٠بشÙÙ Ù
باشر Ù
٠اÙخدÙ
ات اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ù?٠إØار Ù
شرÙعات اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù (ÙاÙÙ
عاÙÙÙ ÙاÙÙ
سÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتعرÙÙ?âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙصÙ?â¬
â«ÙاأÙØÙ?ا٠ÙاÙÙساء)â¬
â«Ù٠⪠\.â¬Ø£Ø´Ùرâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠اÙتÙرارâ¬
â«ÙظاÙ
Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات إدارة اÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«Ù
صدر اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙرÙر ÙصÙ? اÙسÙÙÙ ÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙجÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ÙØ´Ù٠اÙÙ
عاÙÙÙ Ù
ÙÙÙ
⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتعرÙÙ?âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙصÙ?â¬
â«Ù٠⪠\.â¬Ø£Ø´Ùرâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠اÙتÙرارâ¬
â«ÙظاÙ
Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات اإÙدارة ÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
صدر اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙرÙر ÙصÙ? اÙسÙÙÙ ÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙجÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ÙØ´Ù٠اأÙØÙ?ا٠Ù
ÙÙÙ
⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتعرÙÙ?âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙصÙ?â¬
â«Ù٠⪠\.â¬Ø£Ø´Ùرâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠اÙتÙرارâ¬
â«ØµÙ?ØØ© ⪠31â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«ÙظاÙ
Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات اإÙدارة ÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
صدر اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙرÙر ÙصÙ? اÙسÙÙÙ ÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙجÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ØªØ´Ù٠اÙÙساء Ù
ÙÙÙ
⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتعرÙÙ?âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙصÙ?â¬
â«Ù٠⪠\.â¬Ø£Ø´Ùرâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠اÙتÙرارâ¬
â«ÙظاÙ
Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات اإÙدارة ÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
صدر اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙرÙر ÙصÙ? اÙسÙÙÙ ÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙجÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙسبة اÙÙ
ئÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
باشرÙÙ Ù
٠أÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙراضÙ٠ع٠اÙÙ
ساÙدة اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙع⪠Øâ¬Øسب ÙÙع اÙÙ
ساÙدة ÙÙÙعâ¬
â«Ø§Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙسâª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙÙ
Ù ÙدÙ? Ø¢ÙÙØ© Ù
عاÙجة اÙÙ
ظاÙÙ
Ù?٠اÙÙ
ساعدة عÙ٠ضÙ
ا٠Ù
ساÙدة اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ?ÙÙ (اÙÙ
باشرÙÙ ÙغÙر اÙÙ
باشرÙÙ) ÙتÙدÙÙ
â¬
â«Ù
رضÙة⪠\.â¬ØªØ³Ù
Ø Ø¢ÙÙØ© Ù
عاÙجة اÙÙ
ظاÙÙ
باÙتعاÙ
٠بÙ?عاÙÙØ© Ù
ع اÙØ´ÙاÙÙ ÙاÙØعÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ù
٠اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ساÙدة ÙاÙ
ÙØ© ÙبØرÙÙØ© Ù
اÙئÙ
Ø© اÙتÙÙÙت Ù Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙتعرÙÙ?âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙصÙ?â¬
â«Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙعâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù٠⪠\.â¬Ø£Ø´Ùرâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠اÙتÙرارâ¬
â«ÙظاÙ
Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات اإÙدارة ÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
صدر اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ØªØ±Ù?ع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
تÙÙÙØ© تÙارÙرÙا Ø¥Ù٠اÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙجÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ØµÙ?ØØ© ⪠32â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ØªØ´ÙÙ Ù
ÙÙÙ
اÙÙساء اÙÙ
ستÙ?Ùدات Ù
٠أÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتعرÙÙ?âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙصÙ?â¬
â«Ù٠⪠\.â¬Ø£Ø´Ùرâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠اÙتÙرارâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙرÙر ÙصÙ? اÙسÙÙÙ ÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
صدر اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ØªØ±Ù?ع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
تÙÙÙØ© تÙارÙرÙا Ø¥Ù٠اÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙجÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ÙØ´ÙÙ Ù
ÙÙÙ
اÙØ°ÙÙر اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù
٠أÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتعرÙÙ?âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙصÙ?â¬
â«Ù٠⪠\.â¬Ø£Ø´Ùرâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠اÙتÙرارâ¬
â«ÙظاÙ
Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات اإÙدارة ÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
صدر اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ØªØ±Ù?ع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
تÙÙÙØ© تÙارÙرÙا Ø¥Ù٠اÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙجÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ØµÙ?ØØ© ⪠33â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«ÙÙت Ù?٠غضÙ٠⪠03â¬ÙÙÙ
اÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³Ùâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙسبة اÙÙ
ئÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
ØاÙبات ÙاÙØ´ÙاÙ٠اÙت٠ÙÙ?ظرت Ù Ù?⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ
Ù ÙدÙ? Ø¢ÙÙØ© Ù
عاÙجة اÙÙ
ظاÙÙ
Ù?٠اÙÙ
ساعدة عÙ٠ضÙ
ا٠Ù
ساÙدة اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ?ÙÙ (اÙÙ
باشرÙÙ ÙغÙر اÙÙ
باشرÙÙ) ÙتÙدÙÙ
â¬
â«Ù
رضÙة⪠\.â¬ØªØ³Ù
Ø Ø¢ÙÙØ© Ù
عاÙجة اÙÙ
ظاÙÙ
باÙتعاÙ
٠بÙ?عاÙÙØ© Ù
ع اÙØ´ÙاÙÙ ÙاÙØعÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ù
٠اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ساÙدة ÙاÙ
ÙØ© ÙبØرÙÙØ© Ù
اÙئÙ
Ø© اÙتÙÙÙت Ù Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙتعرÙÙ?âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙصÙ?â¬
â«Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙعâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø£Ø³Ø§Ø³ ربع سÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠اÙتÙرارâ¬
â«ÙظاÙ
Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات اإÙدارة ÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
صدر اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ØªØ±Ù?ع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
تÙÙÙØ© تÙارÙرÙا Ø¥Ù٠اÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙجÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ اÙشباب اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙتÙÙÙÙ Ù
ساÙدة خاصة باÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙع⪠Øâ¬Øسب ÙÙع اÙجÙس⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø¹Ø¯Ø¯ اÙشباب اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
ساÙدة اÙخاصة باÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø§ÙتعرÙÙ?âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙصÙ?â¬
â«Ø³ÙÙÙا Ùâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠اÙتÙرارâ¬
â«ÙظاÙ
Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات اإÙدارة ÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
صدر اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ØªØ±Ù?ع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
تÙÙÙØ© تÙارÙرÙا Ø¥Ù٠اÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙجÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ØªØ´Ù٠اإÙÙاث Ù
ÙÙÙ
⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتعرÙÙ?âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙصÙ?â¬
â«Ù
رة ÙاØدة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø¹Ø¯ ÙÙاÙØ© اÙÙ
ساÙدة بستة أشÙرâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠اÙتÙرارâ¬
â«ØµÙ?ØØ© ⪠34â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«ÙظاÙ
Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات اإÙدارة ÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
صدر اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ØªØ±Ù?ع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
تÙÙÙØ© تÙارÙرÙا Ø¥Ù٠اÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙجÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙسبة اÙÙ
ئÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
باشرÙÙ Ù
٠اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙ٠اÙراضÙ٠ع٠اÙÙ
ساÙدة اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙع⪠Øâ¬Øسب ÙÙع اÙÙ
ساÙدة ÙÙÙع اÙجÙس⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ
Ù ÙدÙ? Ø¢ÙÙØ© Ù
عاÙجة اÙÙ
ظاÙÙ
Ù?٠اÙÙ
ساعدة عÙ٠ضÙ
ا٠Ù
ساÙدة اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ?ÙÙ (اÙÙ
باشرÙÙ ÙغÙر اÙÙ
باشرÙÙ) ÙتÙدÙÙ
â¬
â«Ù
رضÙة⪠\.â¬ØªØ³Ù
Ø Ø¢ÙÙØ© Ù
عاÙجة اÙÙ
ظاÙÙ
باÙتعاÙ
٠بÙ?عاÙÙØ© Ù
ع اÙØ´ÙاÙÙ ÙاÙØعÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ù
٠اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ساÙدة ÙاÙ
ÙØ© ÙبØرÙÙØ© Ù
اÙئÙ
Ø© اÙتÙÙÙت Ù Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙتعرÙÙ?âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙصÙ?â¬
â«Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙع (اÙÙ?عÙÙÙ٠أ٠اÙÙ
ØتÙ
ÙÙÙ)âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù٠⪠\.â¬Ø£Ø´Ùرâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠اÙتÙرارâ¬
â«ÙظاÙ
Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات اإÙدارة ÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
صدر اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ØªØ±Ù?ع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
تÙÙÙØ© تÙارÙرÙا Ø¥Ù٠اÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙجÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ØªØ´ÙÙ Ù
ÙÙÙ
اÙÙساء اÙÙ
ستÙ?Ùدات Ù
٠اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتعرÙÙ?âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙصÙ?â¬
â«Ù٠⪠\.â¬Ø£Ø´Ùرâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠اÙتÙرارâ¬
â«ÙظاÙ
Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات اإÙدارة ÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
صدر اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ØªØ±Ù?ع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
تÙÙÙØ© تÙارÙرÙا Ø¥Ù٠اÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙجÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ØµÙ?ØØ© ⪠35â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ÙØ´ÙÙ Ù
ÙÙÙ
اÙرجا٠اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù
٠اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتعرÙÙ?âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙصÙ?â¬
â«Ù٠⪠\.â¬Ø£Ø´Ùرâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠اÙتÙرارâ¬
â«ÙظاÙ
Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات اإÙدارة ÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
صدر اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ØªØ±Ù?ع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
تÙÙÙØ© تÙارÙرÙا Ø¥Ù٠اÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙجÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ÙÙت Ù?٠غضÙ٠⪠03â¬ÙÙÙ
اÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³Ùâ¬â«Ø§ÙÙسبة اÙÙ
ئÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
ØاÙبات ÙاÙØ´ÙاÙ٠اÙت٠ÙÙ?ظرت Ù Ù?⬠â«Ø§Ø³Ù
اÙÙ
ؤشرâ¬
â«ÙÙÙ
Ù ÙدÙ? Ø¢ÙÙØ© Ù
عاÙجة اÙÙ
ظاÙÙ
Ù?٠اÙÙ
ساعدة عÙ٠ضÙ
ا٠Ù
ساÙدة اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙ٠اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ?ÙÙ (اÙÙ
باشرÙÙ ÙغÙر اÙÙ
باشرÙÙ) ÙتÙدÙÙ
â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ساÙدة ÙاÙ
ÙØ© ÙبØرÙÙØ© Ù
اÙئÙ
Ø© اÙتÙÙÙت Ù Ù?â¬
â«Ù
رضÙة⪠\.â¬ØªØ³Ù
Ø Ø¢ÙÙØ© Ù
عاÙجة اÙÙ
ظاÙÙ
باÙتعاÙ
٠بÙ?عاÙÙØ© Ù
ع اÙØ´ÙاÙÙ ÙاÙØعÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ù
٠اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙع (اÙÙ?عÙÙÙ٠أ٠اÙÙ
ØتÙ
ÙÙÙ)âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø§ÙتعرÙÙ?âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙصÙ?â¬
â«Ø£Ø³Ø§Ø³ ربع سÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
عد٠اÙتÙرارâ¬
â«ÙظاÙ
Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات اإÙدارة ÙÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
صدر اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ØªØ±Ù?ع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
تÙÙÙØ© تÙارÙرÙا Ø¥Ù٠اÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙجÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙاتâ¬
â«ØµÙ?ØØ© ⪠36â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ù
ÙشرÙع اÙØارئ Ù
ÙساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙ
Ùا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØرÙ?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«ØµÙ?ØØ© ⪠37â¬Ù
Ù âª03â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙØ٠⪠:0â¬ØªØ±ØªÙبات اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° ÙØ®ØØ© اÙÙ
ساÙدةâ¬
â«ÙشتÙ
٠اÙÙ
شرÙع اÙÙ
ÙØªØ±Ø Ø¹Ù٠ثاÙثة Ù
ÙÙÙات⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙÙ
Ù٠اÙÙ
ÙÙ٠اأÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø§Ùذ٠تخصص ÙÙ Ù
عظÙ
Ø£Ù
Ùا٠اÙÙ
شرÙع⪠Øâ¬Ù?رص⬠â«âª\.7â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙÙشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ?⪠Øâ¬Ù
Ù
ا ÙزÙدÙÙ
بشبÙØ© Ø£Ù
ا٠Ù
ؤÙتة ÙÙÙ ÙعØÙÙÙ
Ù?٠اÙÙÙت ÙÙ?س٠خبرة عÙ
ÙÙØ© ÙØ«ÙÙØ© اÙصÙØ© ÙÙبعثâ¬
â«Ù?٠أÙÙ?سÙÙ
اأÙÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬ÙÙذا إجراء تدخÙÙ Ù
اÙئÙ
Ù?٠سÙا٠غزة باÙÙظر Ø¥Ù٠ارتÙ?اع Ù
عداÙت اÙشباب اÙعاØ٠ع٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاأÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙØ©â¬
â«ÙÙ
ØدÙدÙØ© Ø¢Ù?ا٠اÙعثÙر عÙÙ ÙظائÙ? Ù?٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص⪠\.â¬ÙÙتعظÙÙ
اأÙثر ااÙجتÙ
اع٠ÙÙذ٠اÙعÙ
ÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙعØ٠اÙÙ
شرÙع Ø£ÙÙÙÙØ© ÙÙخدÙ
اتâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ?ئات اأÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ?تÙÙع أ٠تستÙ?Ùد اÙÙساء بدرجة ÙبÙرة Ù
Ù Ùذ٠اÙعÙ
ÙÙØ©Ø Ù?اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ©â¬
â«Ø£Ùسب ÙÙÙساء Ù
Ù Ù
شرÙعات اÙبÙÙØ© اÙتØتÙة⪠\.â¬ÙØ£Ù
ا اÙÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙثاÙÙ ÙÙÙ
شرÙع Ù?سÙÙ
ÙÙ Ù
ساÙدة ÙÙشباب اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ? ÙÙØصÙ٠عÙÙ Ù?رصâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعÙ
٠اÙØر اÙÙ
دعÙÙ
بشبÙØ© اإÙÙترÙت (اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙ) بÙدÙ? اÙتÙÙ?Ùر اÙÙ
ستداÙ
ÙÙ?رص اÙعÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬Ù?Ù?٠ظ٠اÙÙÙÙد عÙ٠اÙØرÙØ© داخÙâ¬
â«Ùخارج غزة ÙزÙادة تعÙÙد اÙÙ
ÙاÙ
(إسÙاد تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
ÙاÙ
Ø¥Ù٠اÙغÙر) عÙÙ Ù
ستÙ٠اÙعاÙÙ
بÙ?ض٠اÙتÙÙÙات اÙرÙÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ùعتبر اÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ù?رصة Ùاعدة ÙÙشباب Ù?٠غزة⪠\.â¬ÙسÙتÙ
تصÙ
ÙÙ
ÙÙ Ù
Ù Ù?رص اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اإÙÙÙترÙÙ٠اÙجتذاب ÙÙ Ù
٠اÙشباب اأÙدÙÙâ¬
â«Ù
Ùارة ÙاأÙعÙÙ Ù
Ùارة⪠\.â¬ÙسÙÙ
Ù٠اÙÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙثاÙØ« إدارة اÙÙ
شرÙع Ùرصد٠ÙتÙÙÙÙ
Ùâª\.â¬â¬
â«ØªÙ
تبسÙØ ØªØ±ØªÙبات اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° Ùدر اإÙÙ
ÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ٠تستÙد Ø¥Ù٠تجربة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙاجØØ© اÙÙ
Ùتسبة Ù?٠إØار اÙسÙسÙØ© اÙسابÙØ© Ù
Ù⬠â«âª\.8â¬â¬
â«Ù
شرÙعات اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙت٠ÙÙ
ÙÙÙا اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙتÙ
ث٠اÙÙدÙ? Ù?٠ضÙ
ا٠تأثÙر سرÙع ÙÙ?اع٠عÙ٠اÙØ´Ø±Ø§Ø¦Ø Ø§Ø£Ùشدâ¬
â«Ù?Ùرا Ù Ù
٠اÙسÙا٠عÙÙ ÙØÙ ÙÙب٠ااÙØتÙاجات اÙÙ
ÙØØ© Ø¥Ù٠اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙÙÙ Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙÙØ© اÙرئÙسÙØ© ع٠اإÙشراÙ? عÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙضÙ
اÙ⬠â«âª\.0â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙÙد بإجراءات اÙبÙÙ ÙإرشاداتÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
تØدÙد اÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙÙ?رعÙØ© ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°Ùا بÙ
عرÙ?Ø© اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© باÙتشاÙر Ù
ع اÙÙ
جتÙ
عات اÙÙ
ØÙÙØ© ذات⬠â«âª\.3â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙعاÙÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
ؤسسات اÙعاÙ
Ø© (Ù
شرÙعات اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙÙ?رعÙØ©)⪠\.â¬ÙستÙدÙ
اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù
ÙترØات اÙÙ
شرÙعاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?رعÙØ© Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© استÙادا ٠إÙ٠اÙÙ
عاÙÙر اÙÙ
ÙضÙعة Ù?٠دÙÙ٠عÙ
ÙÙات اÙÙ
شرÙع⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ
Ù٠أÙâ¬
â«ØªØªØ¶Ù
Ù Ùذ٠اÙÙ
ÙترØات خدÙ
ات ÙÙ
ساÙدة اأÙÙØ´ØØ© ااÙÙتصادÙØ© (ÙاÙزراعة أ٠اÙصÙد)⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ Ù?٠ظ٠اÙÙÙص Ù?٠اÙخدÙ
ات ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ©âªØâ¬â¬
â«Ø³ØªÙ?عØ٠اأÙÙÙÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ?ئات اأÙÙÙ٠باÙرعاÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ثا٠ذÙ٠خدÙ
ات اÙرعاÙØ© اÙصØÙØ© اÙÙ
تخصصة Ùإعادة اÙتأÙÙÙ ÙÙÙ
عاÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙخدÙ
اتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتعÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
ساÙدة اÙÙÙ?سÙØ© ÙØ£ÙØÙ?اÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙظرا Ù ÙاÙØتÙاجات اÙÙ
اسة Ù?٠غزة⪠Øâ¬ÙجÙز تخصÙص اأÙÙ
Ùا٠باÙÙÙÙØ© Ù?٠دÙرة Ù
ÙØØ© ÙاØدةâª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙبÙ
ا Ø£Ù Ùذ٠استجابة ÙØاÙØ© ØÙارئ⪠Øâ¬Ù?ستÙÙ٠عÙ
ÙÙØ© تÙدÙÙ
Ù
ÙترØات اÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙÙ?رعÙØ© Ù
رÙة⪠\.â¬ÙسÙÙ?جر٠Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسساتâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© تÙÙÙÙ
ا ٠سرÙعا Ù ÙÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙÙ
ÙترØات اÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙÙ?رعÙة⪠\.â¬ÙستتضÙ
Ù Ù
عاÙÙر اÙتÙÙÙÙ
صاÙØÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
ÙترØة⪠Øâ¬Ùسج٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙدراتÙا عÙ٠اÙتÙÙ?Ùذ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ÙزاÙÙØ© ÙÙ
ستÙدÙ?ات ÙاÙعÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙدÙ
دÙÙ٠عÙ
ÙÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع ÙصÙ?ا Ù ÙاضØا Ù ÙÙÙ Ùذ٠اإÙجراءات ÙÙÙ
اذج اÙØÙب ÙÙÙ
اذج تÙدÙÙ
اÙÙ
ÙترØاتâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙعØ٠اÙتخØÙØ Ø§ÙÙ
سب٠ÙااÙعتÙ
اد عÙ٠اÙترتÙبات اÙÙ
ؤسسÙØ© اÙÙÙÙØ© اÙØاÙÙØ© اÙÙ
شرÙع دÙ?عة Ù?ÙرÙØ© ÙسÙÙÙص اÙÙÙت⬠â«âª\.0â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙاÙزÙ
ÙØ¥Ùعداد⪠\.â¬ÙسÙØاÙÙ Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© اÙتÙاص٠Ù
ع Ø£ÙØ³Ø§Ø Ø§ÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© بشأÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع Ùب٠تدشÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙذا ÙستÙزÙ
âª( :â¬Ø£) ØÙ
ÙØ© إعاÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙتشاÙرÙØ© ÙبÙØ±Ø©Ø (ب) تÙسÙÙ ÙØ«ÙÙ Ù
ع اÙÙظراء اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙÙÙ ÙاÙÙ
ÙظÙ
اتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙدÙÙÙØ© ÙشرÙاء اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ©Ø (ج) تØدÙد اÙÙ
جااÙت ذات اأÙÙÙÙÙØ© ÙاÙÙ?ئات اÙÙ
ستÙدÙ?Ø©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³Ùجر٠تÙسÙ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙع عÙ٠اÙÙ
ستÙÙات اÙتاÙÙØ©âª:â¬â¬ â«âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙسÙÙ Ù
ع اÙÙظراء اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙزارة اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© ÙÙزارة اÙعÙ
Ù ÙصÙدÙ٠اÙتشغÙÙ ÙضÙ
ا٠ااÙستÙداÙ?⬠â«âªïâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙÙÙ
⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠اÙتØÙÙ Ù
٠اÙبØاÙØ© ÙÙضعÙØ© اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù
٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙتØÙÙاÙت اÙÙÙدÙØ© ÙÙشباب اÙÙ
ÙتÙ
ÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ùد ÙÙزÙ
â¬
â«Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© تÙÙÙع Ù
Ø°Ùرات تÙ?اÙÙ
Ù
ع Ùزارة اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© ÙÙزارة اÙعÙ
Ù ÙضÙ
اÙâ¬
â«Ø¥Ù
ÙاÙÙØ© اÙÙصÙ٠إÙÙ ÙÙاعد اÙبÙاÙات ذات اÙعاÙÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠38â¬Ù
Ù âª48â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙسÙÙ Ù
ع اأÙÙÙرÙا Ù?٠غزة⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙÙس٠Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø§Ø±Ù Ù
ÙدÙ
خدÙ
ات رئÙسÙا Ù Ù?Ù⬠â«âªïâ¬â¬
â«ØºØ²Ø© ÙاÙÙ
ÙÙ?ÙØ° ÙÙاØد Ù
٠أÙبر براÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬ØªÙسÙÙا ٠ع٠Ùثب Ù
ع اأÙÙÙرÙا ÙÙØصÙ٠عÙÙ Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات ØÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?جÙات اÙÙائÙ
Ø© Ù?٠اÙÙØاع ااÙجتÙ
اع٠ÙاÙÙ
جااÙت ذات اأÙÙÙÙÙØ© ÙØااÙت اÙعسر اÙÙ
تØÙÙ Ù
ÙÙا ÙاÙت٠تÙتظر ØاÙÙا Ù Ù?رصâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙÙ
ؤÙتة ÙاÙØارئة⪠\.â¬ÙسÙÙ? تÙ?ÙÙÙ Ùذ٠اÙجÙاÙب Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
ØتÙ
ÙØ© ÙÙÙ
Ù٠أخذÙاâ¬
â«Ù?٠ااÙعتبار عÙد تÙدÙÙ
Ù
ÙترØات اÙØصÙ٠عÙ٠تÙ
ÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙسÙ٠داخ٠أÙØ³Ø§Ø Ø§ÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙعبرÙ⪠\.â¬ÙتعظÙÙ
اÙÙ
ÙاÙ?ع ÙضÙ
ا٠تØÙÙÙ Ù
Ùاسب Ù
Ù ØÙØ« اÙÙ?اعÙÙØ©âªØâ¬â¬ â«âªïâ¬â¬
â«Ø³ØªÙشئ اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Ø¢ÙÙØ© ÙاÙÙعÙاد بشÙ٠دÙر٠Ùتباد٠اÙÙ
عارÙ? ÙتØدÙد اÙÙ
جااÙت ذات اأÙÙÙÙÙØ© ÙربÙ
ا تÙدÙÙ
â¬
â«Ù
ÙترØات Ù
شترÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø¥ÙشراÙ? عÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙرصدÙâ¬
â«Ø³ÙتØÙب اÙÙ
شرÙع اÙÙ
ÙترØ⪠Øâ¬ÙعÙ
ÙÙØ© Øارئة Ù?٠بÙئة Ù
تÙÙبة⪠Øâ¬Ø¥Ø´Ø±Ø§Ù?ا Ù Ù
ÙØ«Ù?ا Ù ÙÙ
ساعدة اÙÙ
رÙزÙØ© ÙÙجÙات اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© عÙ⬠â«âª\.1â¬â¬
â«Ø¥Ø¯Ø§Ø±Ø© اÙتÙÙ?Ùذ⪠\.â¬ÙسÙضÙ
Ù?رÙ٠اÙبÙ٠اÙÙ
زÙج اÙÙ
اÙئÙ
Ù
٠اÙÙ
Ùارات ÙاÙخبرات⪠Øâ¬Ù
تضÙ
Ùا Ù Ù
ÙظÙ?ÙÙ Ù
Ù ÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
Ùتب اÙÙÙ?Øر٠ÙÙ
Ùتبâ¬
â«ÙاشÙØÙ Øسب ااÙÙتضاء ÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙع بÙجاØ⪠\.â¬ÙسÙÙÙÙ
Ù?رÙ٠عÙ
٠اÙبÙ٠بزÙارات دÙرÙØ© ÙÙتابع شؤÙ٠اÙتÙÙ?Ùذ⪠\.â¬ÙسÙÙدÙ
اÙÙ?رÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ساÙدة اÙÙ?ÙÙØ© اÙاÙزÙ
Ø© ÙضÙ
ا٠اÙرصد اÙسÙÙÙ
ÙاÙتÙÙد بإجراءات اÙبÙ٠اÙخاصة باÙÙ
شترÙات ÙاإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© Ùإعداد اÙتÙارÙرâª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙسÙÙس٠باإÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ ÙÙÙائÙ
Ø£ÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
شرÙع Ù
ع ÙاÙ?Ø© شرÙاء اÙتÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
شارÙÙÙ Ù?٠إجراءات تدخÙÙØ© Ù
Ù
اثÙØ© Ù?٠غزةâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ùرصد ÙاÙتÙÙÙÙ
Ùإعداد اÙتÙارÙرâ¬
â«Ø³Ùرصد Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙÙÙÙÙÙ
٠باÙتعاÙ٠اÙÙØ«ÙÙ Ù
ع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬ â«âª\.2â¬â¬
â«ÙسÙستخدÙ
Ø¥Øار٠اÙÙائÙ
⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°ÙÙ ÙظاÙ
Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات إدارة اÙÙ
شرÙعات⪠Øâ¬Ø¥Ùدارة جÙ
ع اÙبÙاÙات ÙتجÙ
ÙعÙا ÙرÙ?ع اÙتÙارÙر اÙدÙرÙØ©â¬
â«ØÙ٠اÙسÙر Ù?٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙع⪠\.â¬ÙسÙرصد اÙÙ
رÙز Ù
ؤشرات اأÙداء اÙرئÙسÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙع ع٠Ùثب⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙÙÙÙ
اÙتÙدÙ
اÙÙ
Øرز Ù?٠تÙÙ?ÙØ°Ùâ¬
â«Ø¨Ùج٠عاÙ
⪠\.â¬ÙسÙØتÙ?ظ اÙÙ
رÙز باÙعدد اÙÙاÙ?Ù Ù
٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ?Ù٠اÙØ°ÙÙ ÙÙ
ÙÙÙ٠اÙخبرة اÙÙ
ØÙÙبة ÙتÙدÙÙ
اÙÙ
ساÙدة اÙÙ?ÙÙØ© ÙÙ
ساÙدة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° Ø¥ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا سÙضÙ
٠اÙÙ
رÙز Ø£Ùضا ٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° ÙاÙ?Ø© Ø£ÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
شترÙات ÙاإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© بÙ
ا ÙتÙ?Ù Ù
ع إجراءات اÙبÙÙâ¬
â«ÙإرشاداتÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø¥ÙباÙغ⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙÙدÙ
Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© تÙارÙر ربع سÙÙÙØ© ع٠اÙتÙدÙ
اÙÙ
Øرز ÙÙÙاÙ?٠بÙا اÙبÙÙ Ù?Ù⬠â«âª\.2â¬â¬
â«ØÙÙÙا⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا سÙعد اÙÙ
رÙز Ø£Ùضا ٠تÙارÙر Ù
اÙÙØ© Ù
رØÙÙØ© غÙر Ù
دÙÙÙÙØ© بشÙ٠ربع سÙÙÙ Ù?ضاÙ٠ع٠ÙÙائÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙع اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙÙ
دÙÙØ© بشÙÙâ¬
â«Ø³ÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠أ٠ÙÙاÙ?٠اÙبÙ٠بÙذ٠اÙÙÙائÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
Ùعد Ø£Ùصا٠ستة أشÙر Ù
Ù ÙÙاÙØ© Ù٠سÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙÙ?جر٠Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© بااÙشترا٠Ù
ع اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ Ù
راجعة ÙÙÙ
شرÙع Ù?Ù Ù
ÙتصÙ? اÙÙ
دةâª\.â¬â¬ â«âª\.73â¬â¬
â«ÙسÙعد اÙÙ
رÙز تÙرÙرا Ù ÙÙاÙ?٠ب٠اÙبÙÙ Ù
تضÙ
Ùا Ù Ùتائج Ø£ÙØ´ØØ© رصد Ø£ÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙتÙÙÙÙ
Ùا أثÙاء اÙÙ?ترة اÙسابÙØ© عÙÙ Ù
راجعةâ¬
â«Ù
ÙتصÙ? اÙÙ
دة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ÙضØا ٠اÙتدابÙر اÙÙ
Ùص٠بÙا ÙضÙ
ا٠اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙÙ?Ø¡ ÙÙÙ
شرÙع ÙتØÙÙÙ ÙدÙ?٠اإÙÙÙ
ائÙ⪠\.â¬ÙستÙ?ستخدÙ
Ùذ٠اÙÙ
راجعةâ¬
â«ÙتØدÙد Ù?رص تØسÙ٠اأÙداء Ùإعداد Ø®ØØ© عÙ
Ù Ù
ÙÙØØ© Ùسترشد بÙا اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° أثÙاء Ù
ا تبÙÙ Ù
٠اÙÙ
شرÙع⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا سÙعد Ù
رÙز تØÙÙرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© Ø£Ùضا ٠تÙرÙر Ø¥Ùجاز اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° ÙاÙÙتائج ÙÙÙاÙ?٠ب٠اÙبÙÙ Ù?٠غضÙ٠ثاÙثة أشÙر Ù
٠إÙÙ?ا٠اÙÙ
شرÙعâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠39â¬Ù
Ù âª48â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙØ٠⪠:7â¬Ø§ÙبØاÙØ© Ù?ÙÙ
ا بÙ٠اÙÙساء اÙÙ
اÙرات Ù?٠اأÙراض٠اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ùظ٠ÙÙص Ù?رص اÙعÙ
٠اÙجÙدة Ù?٠اأÙراض٠اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© (اÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙØ© ÙÙØاع غزة) تØدÙا ÙبÙرا Ø£Ù
اÙ
تØÙÙ٠اÙÙÙ
Ù⬠â«âª\.7â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙشاÙ
Ù ÙاÙساÙÙ
ÙااÙستÙرار Ù?٠اÙÙ
ÙØÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙد ظ٠Ù
عد٠اÙبØاÙØ© Ù?٠اأÙراض٠اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© Ù
رتÙ?عا ٠بشÙÙ Ù
زÙ
Ù Ù
ÙØ° عاÙ
âªØ8330â¬â¬
â«ØÙØ« بÙغ ⪠%8\.â¬Ù?٠⪠8370â¬ÙÙؤثر عÙÙ Ù?ئت٠اÙشباب (⪠)%37â¬ÙاÙÙساء (⪠)%02â¬Ø£Ùثر Ù
٠غÙرÙÙ
ا⪠\.â¬Ù?ÙÙا٠Ù?رÙ٠صارخة Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ù
عداÙت اÙبØاÙØ© بÙ٠اÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙØ© (⪠)%8\.â¬ÙÙØاع غزة (⪠Ø)%37â¬ÙاÙعÙ
Ù Ù?٠اÙÙØاع غÙر اÙرسÙ
Ù Ù
رتÙ?ع ارتÙ?اعا Ù Ù
زÙ
ÙاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¥Ø°â¬
â«Ùص٠إÙ٠⪠%\.7â¬Ù
٠اأÙÙد٠اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© âª\.8370â¬â¬
â«ØªÙبع Ù
ØدÙدÙØ© Ù?رص اÙعÙ
Ù Ù
٠تدÙÙ Ù
ستÙÙات استثÙ
ار اÙÙØاع اÙخاص ÙترÙز٠Ù?٠اÙÙØاعات ÙÙÙÙØ© اإÙÙتاجÙØ© ضعÙÙ?ة⬠â«âª\.8â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø¥ÙÙ
ÙاÙÙات عÙ٠صعÙد اÙÙÙ
Ù ÙØ®Ù٠اÙÙظائÙ?⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙشأ Ùذا اÙÙضع Ù?٠اÙÙ
ÙاÙ
اأÙÙ٠ع٠اÙصراع اÙÙ
ستÙ
ر بÙ٠اأÙراض٠اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«ÙإسرائÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ
ÙتÙ
خض اÙÙÙ
٠ااÙÙتصاد٠اÙÙ
تÙÙب ع٠ÙÙ
Ù Ù?Ù Ù
عداÙت اÙتشغÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
٠غÙر اÙÙ
Ø±Ø¬Ø Ø£Ù ÙتØس٠اÙÙضع عÙ٠اÙÙ
دÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
تÙØ³Ø Ø¯Ù٠تغÙÙرات ذات Ù
غز٠Ù?٠اÙÙÙÙد اإÙسرائÙÙÙØ© عÙ٠اÙتباد٠اÙتجار٠ÙاÙØرÙØ© ÙØ¥Ù
ÙاÙÙØ© اÙÙصÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙظ٠استثÙ
ار اÙÙØاعâ¬
â«Ø§Ùخاص Ù
تدÙÙا Ù Ùا٠ÙÙÙ?Ù ÙتØÙÙÙ Ù
عداÙت ÙاÙ?ÙØ© Ù
٠اÙÙÙ
٠ااÙÙتصاد٠ÙØ®ÙÙ Ù?رص اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙØ®Ù?اضات Ù?Ù Ù
عداÙت اÙبØاÙة⪠\.â¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø©â¬
â«Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ØªÙÙص اÙتشغÙÙ Ù?٠اÙÙØاعات اإÙÙتاجÙØ© اÙÙابÙØ© ÙÙتداÙ٠اÙتجار٠(ÙاÙصÙاعات اÙتØÙÙÙÙØ©) Ù
ع اتساع٠Ù?٠اÙÙÙت ÙÙ?س٠Ù?Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙخدÙ
ات غÙر اÙÙابÙØ© ÙÙتداÙ٠اÙتجار٠ÙاÙت٠تÙÙÙ
٠عÙÙÙا شرÙات صغÙرة غÙر رسÙ
ÙØ© Ù
تدÙÙØ© اإÙÙ
ÙاÙÙات عÙ٠صعÙد اÙÙÙ
Ù ÙØ®ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù?رص اÙعÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬ÙعÙ٠اÙرغÙ
Ù
٠أ٠اÙÙÙÙد اأÙساسÙØ© اÙرئÙسÙØ© Ù٠اÙÙÙÙد اإÙسرائÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ
Ù?رÙضة عÙ٠اÙتجارة ÙاÙØرÙØ© ÙØ¥Ù
ÙاÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙصÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù?إ٠اÙÙÙÙد اÙداخÙÙØ© تÙعب دÙرا ٠أÙضاÙ⪠\.â¬ÙتشÙ
Ù Ùذ٠اÙÙÙÙد سÙØ¡ Ù
Ùاخ Ø£ÙØ´ØØ© اأÙعÙ
ا٠اÙØ°Ù ÙتسÙ
بغÙاب اÙÙ
ÙاÙ?Ø³Ø©Ø ÙاÙعÙ
ÙÙاتâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø§Ùظة اÙتÙÙÙ?Ø© ÙغÙر اÙÙ
بسØØ© ÙÙ
Ø³Ø Ø§Ø£Ùرض ÙتسÙÙØ© اÙÙ
Ùازعات ÙاÙتسجÙÙØ ÙÙ
ØدÙدÙØ© Ø¥Ù
ÙاÙÙØ© اÙØصÙ٠عÙ٠اÙتÙ
ÙÙÙ ÙÙ
Ùشآتâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙعÙ
ا٠اÙصغÙرة ÙاÙÙ
تÙسØØ©Ø ÙÙظاÙ
اÙتعÙÙÙ
ÙاÙتدرÙب عÙ٠اÙتساب اÙÙ
Ùارات اÙذ٠ا٠ÙزÙد اÙخرÙجÙ٠باÙÙ
Ùارات اÙت٠تØتاجâ¬
â«Ø¥ÙÙÙا اÙشرÙات⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
عÙ٠أÙÙ ÙÙجد تÙ?اÙت بÙ٠اÙÙ
Ùارات ÙاØتÙاجات اÙسÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙا٠سÙ
Ø© صارخة Ù
٠سÙ
ات سÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù?٠اأÙراض٠اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© ÙÙ٠ااÙرتÙ?اع اÙÙبÙر Ù?Ù Ù
عد٠اÙبØاÙØ© Ù?ÙÙ
ا بÙÙ⬠â«âª\.0â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙساء اÙÙ
اÙرات Ù
ÙارÙØ© باÙرجا٠اÙÙ
Ùرة⪠\.â¬Ù?ÙÙا٠Ù?رÙÙ ÙبÙرة Ù?Ù Ù
عداÙت اÙبØاÙØ© بÙ٠اÙØ°ÙÙر ÙاإÙÙاث اÙØاصÙÙ٠عÙ٠تعÙÙÙ
بعدâ¬
â«ÙÙ ÙÙ Ù
٠اإÙÙاث ÙاÙØ°ÙÙر اÙØاصÙÙ٠عÙ٠تعÙÙÙ
بعد اÙثاÙÙÙ (بÙ
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠اÙÙ
ؤÙاÙت Ù?Ù٠اÙÙ
تÙسØØ©) ⪠%72â¬Ù
Ù⬠â«Ø§ÙثاÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙØ´ Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙا٠Ù?٠س٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬ÙÙعتبر اØتÙ
ا٠اÙضÙ
اÙ
اÙÙساء اÙØاصاÙت عÙÙ Ù
ستÙÙات أعÙÙ Ù
٠اÙتعÙÙÙ
Ø£Ø±Ø¬Ø ÙØ«Ùرا Ù Ù
ÙارÙØ© باÙØاصاÙتâ¬
â«ØµØ¯Ù عÙ٠اÙرجاÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ٠بدرجة Ø£ÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙباÙتاÙÙ Ù?عÙ٠اÙرغÙ
Ù
٠أ٠Ù
عد٠Ù
شارÙة⬠â«Ø¹ÙÙ Ù
ستÙÙات أدÙÙ Ù
٠اÙتعÙÙÙ
⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙØ´ÙØ¡ ÙÙ?س٠٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙساء اÙÙ
اÙرات Ù?٠اأÙÙد٠اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© (⪠)%\.2â¬Ø£ÙÙ Ù
ÙارÙØ© باÙرجا٠اÙÙ
Ùرة (⪠Ø)%22â¬Ù?إ٠ا٠Ùزا٠Ù
رتÙ?عا⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ Ù
عد٠اÙبØاÙØ© بÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙساء اÙÙ
اÙرات (⪠)%31â¬ÙزÙد عÙ٠ضعÙ?Ù Ù
عدÙÙا بÙ٠اÙرجا٠اÙÙ
Ùرة (⪠\.)%72â¬ÙعÙ٠اÙÙÙÙض Ù
٠اÙرجاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ùزداد Ø£Ùضا ٠اØتÙ
اÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙبØاÙØ© بÙ٠اÙÙساء عاÙÙات اÙÙ
Ùارة عÙ٠بÙ٠اÙÙساء Ù
تدÙÙات اÙÙ
Ùارةâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù Ù?٠سÙ٠اÙعÙ
٠عاØاÙت⪠Øâ¬Ù
ÙارÙØ© بÙسبة âª%22â¬â¬ â«Ø¯Ø§Ø®Ù ÙØاع غزة⪠%01 Øâ¬Ù
Ù ÙاÙ?Ø© اÙÙساء اÙØاصاÙت عÙ٠تعÙÙÙ
عا Ù?⬠â«âª\.3â¬â¬
â«Ù?٠اÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙة⪠\.â¬Ùتأت٠Ùذ٠اأÙرÙاÙ
عÙ٠اÙرغÙ
Ù
٠ااÙرتÙ?اع اÙشدÙد Ù?Ù Ù
عد٠اÙÙ
شارÙØ© Ù?٠اأÙÙد٠اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© ÙاÙباÙغ âª%10â¬â¬
â«âª13â¬â¬
â«Ù?ÙÙ
ا بÙ٠اÙÙساء اÙØاصاÙت عÙ٠تعÙÙÙ
بعد اÙثاÙÙÙ Ù?٠غزة⪠\.â¬ÙÙبÙغ Ù
تÙØ³Ø Ø¹Ù
ر اÙÙ
رأة اÙعاØÙØ© اÙØاصÙØ© عÙ٠تعÙÙÙ
بعد اÙثاÙÙÙâ¬
â«âª 81\.â¬Ø³Ùة⪠Øâ¬ÙØ£Ù
ا Ù
تÙØ³Ø Ø¹Ù
ر ÙظÙرتÙا اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© Ù?ÙبÙغ ⪠00\.2â¬Ø³Ùة⪠\.â¬ØªÙ
Ø«Ù٠اÙبØاÙØ© Ù?ÙÙ
ا بÙ٠اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙÙ٠اÙØاصÙÙ٠عÙ٠تعÙÙÙ
بعدâ¬
â«Ø§ÙثاÙÙÙ Ù
Ø´ÙÙØ© ÙÙشباب Ù?٠اÙÙ
ÙاÙ
اأÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ù?Ù
٠بÙÙ ÙاÙ?Ø© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙÙ٠اÙعاØÙÙ٠اÙØاصÙÙ٠عÙ٠تعÙÙÙ
بعد اÙثاÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙا٠âª%22\.0â¬â¬
â«ØªØªØ±Ø§ÙØ Ø£Ø¹Ù
ارÙÙ
بÙ٠⪠72â¬Ù ⪠03â¬Ø³Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙÙتشاب٠تÙÙÙ٠اÙشرÙØØ© اÙسÙاÙÙØ© اÙعاØÙØ© بشÙÙ Ù
ÙØÙظ Ù?ÙÙ
ا Ùخص ÙاÙÙ Ù
٠اÙرجا٠ÙاÙÙساءâªØâ¬â¬
â«Ù Ù
٠اÙرجا٠ÙاÙÙساء Ù?Ù٠س٠⪠00â¬Ø³ÙØ© Ù
٠اÙعثÙر عÙÙ ÙظائÙ? ÙعدÙ
تسربÙÙ
Ù
٠سÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ùâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù
Ù
ا ÙسÙØ Ø§ÙضÙØ¡ عÙ٠تÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ Ù Ù?Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙذا تؤÙد٠ØÙÙÙØ© أ٠اÙÙساء اÙÙ
اÙرات Ù?٠اÙÙ?ئات اÙعÙ
رÙØ© ⪠+00â¬Ø³ÙØ© تشارÙÙ Ù?٠اأÙÙد٠اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© بÙ
عداÙت تتراÙØ Ø¨Ù٠⪠\.3â¬Ùâ¬
â«âª\.%13â¬â¬
â«Ùعتبر Ù?ÙÙ
أسباب ارتÙ?اع Ù
عد٠اÙبØاÙØ© بÙ٠اÙÙساء عاÙÙات اÙÙ
Ùارة ØاسÙ
اأÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Ø£Ùغراض اÙسÙØ§Ø³Ø§ØªØ Ø£ÙÙ ÙؤاÙØ¡ اÙÙساء⬠â«âª\.0â¬â¬
â«ÙØ´ÙÙ٠غاÙبÙØ© اأÙÙد٠اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙسائÙØ©Ø ÙÙ٠أÙثر استعدادا Ù ÙÙÙ
ساÙÙ
Ø© Ù?٠ااÙÙتصاد Ù?٠غزة Ù
٠اÙÙساء ÙÙÙاÙت اÙÙ
ÙØ§Ø±Ø©Ø ÙÙÙ
Ù٠أÙâ¬
â«ÙÙÙÙ ÙتشغÙÙÙ٠أثر Ø¥ÙضاØ٠عÙ٠تشغÙ٠اإÙÙاث بشÙ٠أعÙ
⪠\.â¬ÙØÙÙÙØ© أ٠أÙثر Ù
Ù ÙصÙ? اÙÙساء عاÙÙات اÙÙ
Ùارة Ù?٠غزة عاØاÙتâ¬
â«âª 13â¬Ù
تÙØ³Ø Ø§Ø§ÙØتÙ
ا٠اÙÙ
تÙÙع ÙعثÙر اÙ
رأة Ù
اÙرة عÙÙ Ù?رصة عÙ
Ù ÙساÙ٠⪠%\.8â¬Ù?٠اÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙØ© ٠⪠%30â¬Ù?Ù ÙØاع غزة⪠\.â¬ÙØ¶Ø¨Ø Ø§Ø§ÙÙØدار اÙÙÙجستÙâ¬
â«ØªØ£Ø«Ùر اÙس٠ÙاÙØاÙØ© اÙزÙجÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠40â¬Ù
Ù âª48â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«ØªÙ
Ø«Ù Ù?رصة Ù
Ù?ÙÙدة⪠\.â¬Ù?Ùذ٠اÙÙ?ئة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ÙاراتÙا اÙÙ
تاØØ© بسÙÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø±Ø¨Ù
ا ا٠تتØÙب إا٠اÙÙÙÙÙ Ù
٠ااÙستثÙ
ار Ù?٠تÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
Ùارات ÙترÙÙتÙاâªØâ¬â¬
â«Ø®Ù?Ù?ت اÙØÙاجز Ø£Ù
اÙ
تشغÙÙÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù?Ø¥Ù Ù
عداÙت اÙبØاÙØ© اÙÙ
رتÙ?عة جدا Ù Ù?ÙÙ
ا بÙ٠اÙÙساء اÙÙ
اÙرات تÙÙ
ع٠اتجاÙ⬠â«Ø¥Ø°Ø§ Ù?â¬
â«Ù
ÙÙÙ ÙÙ٠تزاÙد ضعÙ? اÙصÙØ© بÙÙ ÙÙاتج اÙتعÙÙÙ
ÙاÙتشغÙÙ Ù?٠غزة⪠\.â¬ÙÙد ÙØ«Ø¨Ø Ùذا ااÙتجا٠ضخ اÙÙ
زÙد Ù
٠ااÙستثÙ
ارات Ù?٠رأسâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ا٠اÙبشرÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ Ù
ا ÙÙ
Ù٠أ٠تÙÙÙ Ù٠تبعات Ø®ØÙرة عÙ٠اÙرÙ?ا٠ÙااÙستÙرار Ù?٠سÙا٠Ùش⪠\.â¬ÙأخÙرا ٠تشÙ٠اÙÙساء اÙÙ
اÙراتâ¬
â«âª %1\.â¬Ù
٠اأÙÙد٠اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙسائÙØ© Ù?٠غزة⪠\.â¬Ùبعبارة أخر٠Ù?Ø¥ÙÙÙ ÙØ´ÙÙÙ ÙبÙ?اص٠ÙبÙر Ø£Ùبر شرÙØØ© Ù
٠اÙÙساء اÙاÙت٠ÙÙ?Ù?د٠بأÙÙÙâ¬
â«ÙبØث٠ع٠عÙ
Ù Ùراغبات Ù?٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬ÙستÙÙÙ ÙÙتصد٠ÙÙÙÙÙد اÙت٠تÙاجÙÙا Ùذ٠اÙشرÙØØ© آثار Ù?ÙرÙØ© عÙ٠ااÙÙتصاد⪠\.â¬ÙأخÙرا Ùâ¬
â«ÙÙ
Ù٠أ٠ÙÙÙÙ ÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? اÙÙÙÙد عÙ٠تشغÙ٠اÙÙساء اÙÙ
اÙرات أثر Ø¥ÙضاØÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¯Ø§Ù?عا ٠اÙÙساء اأÙخرÙات Ø¥Ù٠دخÙ٠سÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù?٠سÙاÙâ¬
â«Ùظ٠Ù?ÙÙ Ù
عد٠Ù
شارÙØ© اÙÙساء Ù?٠اأÙÙد٠اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© بÙج٠عاÙ
Ù
٠أÙ٠اÙÙ
عداÙت Ù?٠اÙعاÙÙ
âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù?ÙÙ
اÙÙ
عداÙت اÙÙ
رتÙ?عة ÙÙبØاÙØ© Ù?ÙÙ
ا بÙ٠اÙÙساء اÙÙ
اÙراتâ¬
â«ØªØ¬Ø¯ اÙشابات اÙÙ
اÙرات صعÙبة Ø£Ùبر Ù
٠اÙشباب اÙÙ
Ùرة Ù?٠ااÙÙتÙا٠إÙ٠سÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬ÙتترÙز بØاÙØ© اÙÙساء اÙÙ
اÙرات⬠â«âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù?٠اأÙراض٠اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© بÙ٠اÙشابات خرÙجات اÙتعÙÙÙ
Ù
ا بعد اÙثاÙÙ٠اÙاÙئ٠تتراÙØ Ø£Ø¹Ù
ارÙ٠بÙ٠⪠72â¬Ù ⪠03â¬Ø³Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ù
Ù
ا Ùد٠عÙÙâ¬
â«ØµØ¹Ùبة ااÙÙتÙا٠إÙ٠سÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙÙ?ترات سÙبÙØ© ØÙÙÙØ© Ù
٠اÙبØاÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙاج٠اÙخرÙجÙ٠اÙشباب صعÙبة Ù
Ù
اثÙØ© Ù?٠ااÙÙتÙا٠إÙÙâ¬
â«Ø³Ù٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù?٠اÙبداÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙÙÙ
عÙÙ Ù
ا Ùبد٠ÙØÙÙÙÙ Ùذا ااÙÙتÙا٠بشÙ٠أسرع Ù
٠اÙÙساء⪠\.â¬ÙتعاÙ٠اÙÙساء اÙÙ
اÙرات اÙاÙئ٠تتراÙØâ¬
â«Ø£Ø¹Ù
ارÙ٠بÙ٠⪠80â¬Ù ⪠03â¬Ø³ÙØ© Ù
عد٠بØاÙØ© ÙبÙغ ⪠Ø%02â¬Ù
Ùاب٠⪠%80â¬Ø¨Ø§ÙÙسبة ÙÙظرائÙ٠اÙرجاÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
Ù ØÙØ« اÙتÙزÙع اإÙÙÙÙÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬Ùجدâ¬
â«Ø£Ù اÙتØدÙات ااÙÙتصادÙØ© اÙÙ?رÙدة اÙت٠ÙÙاجÙÙا اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙÙÙ Ù?٠غزة تترجÙ
Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
عد٠بØاÙØ© Ù
Ø°Ù٠عÙد ⪠%\.3\.2â¬Ù
Ù ÙاÙ?Ø© اÙÙساءâ¬
â«Ù⪠\.â¬ÙÙ?٠اÙÙ
Ùاب٠Ùجد أ٠⪠%02\.0â¬Ù
٠اÙÙساء اÙØاصاÙت عÙ٠تعÙÙÙ
بعد اÙثاÙÙÙ Ù?٠اÙضÙ?Ø© اÙغربÙة⬠â«Ø§ÙØاصاÙت عÙ٠تعÙÙÙ
عا Ù?â¬
â«Ø¹Ø§ØاÙت⪠\.â¬ÙبÙج٠عاÙ
⪠Øâ¬ØªÙاج٠اÙشابات اÙÙ
اÙرات Ù
عÙÙات Ø£Ùثر Ù
٠اÙشباب اÙÙ
Ùرة Ù?٠ااÙÙتÙا٠إÙ٠سÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙÙÙجØÙ Ù?Ù Ùذاâ¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙتÙا٠بÙ
عد٠أبØØ£ Ù
Ù ÙظرائÙ٠اÙØ°ÙÙرâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù
ت٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙشباب ÙاÙشابات اÙÙ
اÙرات Ù
٠ااÙÙتÙا٠بÙØ¬Ø§Ø Ø¥Ù٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬ØµØ§Ø± اØتÙ
ا٠ØصÙÙÙÙ
عÙÙ ÙظائÙ? "جÙدة⬠â«âª\.1â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙعÙØ©" Ø£Ùبر Ù
ÙارÙØ© باÙرجا٠ÙاÙÙساء ÙÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
Ùارات⪠\.â¬ÙتترÙز غاÙبÙØ© اÙعÙ
Ù Ù?٠اÙÙØاع اÙعاÙ
ÙÙÙ٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص اÙرسÙ
Ùâª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙÙ٠اØتÙ
ا٠شغ٠اÙرجا٠ÙاÙÙساء اÙÙ
Ùرة ÙظÙÙ?Ø© غÙر رسÙ
ÙØ© أ٠عÙ
ÙÙÙ
Ù?٠شرÙØ© غÙر رسÙ
Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙاÙØÙÙÙØ© Ø£ÙÙ Ù?٠⪠8370â¬ÙÙ
ÙÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙا٠إا٠⪠%3â¬Ù
٠اÙÙساء اÙÙ
اÙرات اÙعاÙ
اÙت ٠⪠%77â¬Ù
٠اÙرجا٠اÙÙ
Ùرة اÙعاÙ
ÙÙÙ ÙعÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù?٠شرÙØ© غÙر رسÙ
Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙعÙ٠اÙÙÙÙضâ¬
â«Ù
Ù Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ùجد أ٠اÙعÙ
ا٠ÙصÙ? اÙÙ
Ùرة ÙÙÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
Ùارة Ù
Ù Ùا٠اÙجÙسÙÙ ÙعÙ
ÙÙ٠بشÙ٠غÙر رسÙ
٠بأعداد ÙبÙرة⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙسب اÙعÙ
اÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùرة أجÙرا ٠أعÙÙ Ù
Ù
ا ÙÙسب٠اÙعÙ
ا٠اأÙÙ٠تعÙÙÙ
اÙ⪠\.â¬Ùتتس٠Ùذ٠اÙÙتÙجة Ù
ع اÙØ´ÙاÙد اÙداÙØ© عÙ٠أ٠اÙÙ?ئة اأÙÙثر تعÙÙÙ
ا ٠تستØÙع عÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙØ±Ø¬Ø ØªØÙ
٠ااÙÙتظار Ù?ترة Ø£ØÙÙ ÙÙعثÙر عÙ٠اÙÙظائÙ? اÙÙ
ÙØ´Ùدةâª\.â¬â¬
â«ØªØ±Ø§Ø¬Ø¹ اÙØÙب اÙÙسب٠عÙ٠اÙعÙ
اÙØ© اÙÙ
Ùرة Ù?٠اÙسÙÙات اأÙØ®Ùرة⪠\.â¬Ù?اÙزÙادة عÙÙ Ù
د٠اÙعشر سÙÙات اأÙØ®Ùرة Ù?Ù Øصة⬠â«âª\.2â¬â¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙØاع اÙعاÙ
Ù
٠إجÙ
اÙ٠اÙÙاتج اÙÙ
ØÙ٠ا٠تعز٠إÙ٠ازدÙاد اÙتشغÙÙ Ù?٠اÙÙØاع اÙعاÙ
ب٠إÙ٠ازدÙاد اأÙجÙر⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙاÙع Ø£Ù Øصةâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتشغÙÙ Ù?٠اÙÙØاع اÙعاÙ
Ø´Ùدت تراجعا Ù ØÙ?ÙÙ?اÙ⪠\.â¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥ÙÙ Ø°ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù?إ٠إعادة تخصÙص اÙÙ
Ùارد Ù
٠اÙÙØاعات اإÙÙتاجÙØ© اÙÙابÙØ©â¬
â«ÙÙتداÙ٠اÙتجار٠إÙ٠اÙÙØاعات اأÙÙ٠إÙتاجÙØ© غÙر اÙÙابÙØ© ÙÙتداÙ٠اÙتجار٠ترتب عÙÙÙا تراجع Ù?٠اÙØÙب اÙÙسب٠عÙ٠اÙعÙ
اÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ùرة⪠\.â¬ÙÙترÙز اÙØÙب عÙ٠اأÙÙد٠اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© غاÙبا Ù Ù?ÙÙ
ا بÙÙ ØÙ
ÙØ© Ø´Ùادات اÙتعÙÙÙ
اÙثاÙÙ٠أ٠Ù
ا دÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙÙ
ا تÙÙ?رت Ø£Ù ÙظائÙ?â¬
â«Ø¬Ø¯Ùدة ÙخرÙج٠اÙجاÙ
عات⪠\.â¬Ùتراجعت Øصة اÙÙظائÙ? اÙت٠تتØÙب تعÙÙÙ
ا ٠جاÙ
عÙا Ù (بÙ
عÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙÙÙÙÙ ÙاÙÙ?ÙÙÙÙ) Ù
٠اÙتشغÙ٠اÙصاÙ?Ùâ¬
â«Ù?٠اÙÙ?ترة بÙ٠⪠8378â¬Ø¥ÙÙ âª\.8370â¬â¬
â«Ùبد٠اÙرجا٠اÙÙ
Ùرة Ø£Ùثر رغبة Ø£Ù Ùدرة عÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù?٠اÙÙظائÙ? Ù
تدÙÙØ© اÙÙ
Ùارات Ù
ÙارÙØ© باÙÙساء اÙÙ
اÙرات⪠\.â¬Ù?ÙÙاÙ⬠â«âª\.2â¬â¬
â«Ùسبة Ø£ÙÙ Ù
٠اÙرجا٠اÙÙ
Ùرة (⪠)%\.2â¬Ù
ÙارÙØ© باÙÙساء اÙÙ
اÙرات (⪠)%28â¬ØªØ¹Ù
Ù Ù?Ù ÙظائÙ? Ù
تÙاسبة Ù
ع Ù
ستÙÙاتÙÙ
â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙارÙØ©âªï¾â¬Ø¨Ø§Ø¹ØªØ¨Ø§Ø±ÙÙ
Ù
ÙÙÙÙÙ ÙÙ?ÙÙÙÙ Ù
ثاÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙØ°ÙÙ ÙÙ
شرعÙÙ ÙÙ
سؤÙÙÙÙ Ùبار ÙÙ
دÙرÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙذا ÙعÙ٠أ٠⪠%08â¬Ù
٠اÙرجا٠اÙÙ
Ùرةâ¬
â«ÙعÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙظائÙ? ÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ
Ùارة (بÙ
عÙ٠اÙÙظائÙ? اÙت٠ا٠تتØÙب غÙر اÙتعÙÙÙ
اÙثاÙÙ٠أ٠Ù
ا دÙÙÙ)⪠Øâ¬Ù
Ùاب٠⪠%2â¬Ù?ÙØ Ù
٠اÙÙساءâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙراتâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ر٠Ù?٠اÙÙظائÙ? Øسب ÙÙع اÙجÙس ÙØ±ØªØ¨Ø Ø§Ø±ØªØ¨Ø§Øا ÙØ«ÙÙا باÙÙ?رÙÙ Ù?Ù Ù
جااÙت اÙدراسة⪠\.â¬ØªÙ?ض٠اÙÙساء Ù?٠اÙعادة⬠â«âª\.73â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
جااÙت اÙدراسÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙجÙØ© ÙØ٠اÙتشغÙÙ Ù?٠اÙÙØاع اÙعاÙ
⪠Øâ¬ÙÙرÙز٠عÙ٠اÙعÙÙÙ
ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© ÙاÙدراسات اإÙÙساÙÙة⪠\.â¬Ù?Ù?Ù âªØ8370â¬â¬
â«ØصÙت ⪠%8\.7â¬Ù
٠اÙخرÙجات عÙÙ Ø´Ùادة Ù?٠اÙتربÙØ© (ÙÙعÙ
Ù ÙÙ
عÙÙ
ات) تÙÙÙا Ø´Ùادة Ù?٠إدارة اأÙعÙ
ا٠(⪠\.)%70\.2â¬ÙØ£Ù
ا اÙرجاÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠41â¬Ù
Ù âª48â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙØ°ÙÙ ÙÙتØÙÙ٠بÙÙÙات اÙتربÙØ© Ù?ÙÙ
Ø£Ù٠عدداÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¥Ø° ÙتجÙÙ٠عادة ÙØ٠دراسة اÙÙاÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙعÙ
ارة ÙاÙبÙاء⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙÙ
بÙÙتر⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙÙدسة⪠\.â¬ÙÙدâ¬
â«ÙعÙس Ùذا اÙÙ?ر٠جزئÙا Ù Ù?رÙÙا ٠جÙÙرÙØ© Ù?٠اÙتÙ?ضÙاÙت⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙÙ Ùد ÙÙÙ٠أÙضا Ù Ù
٠باب ااÙستجابة Ø£ÙÙÙاع اÙÙظائÙ? اÙÙ
تاØØ© ÙÙÙساءâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙÙد عÙ٠اÙØ®Ùارات اÙÙظÙÙ?ÙØ© اÙÙ
تاØØ© ÙÙÙساء اÙÙ
اÙراتâ¬
â«ÙØ«Ùر Ù
٠اÙÙÙÙد اÙت٠تØÙ٠دÙ٠عثÙر اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
Ùرة عÙÙ ÙظائÙ? ÙÙس ØÙرا عÙ٠اÙÙساء⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ٠اÙÙساء ÙÙ⬠â«âª\.77â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙثر تأثرا بشدة بÙ?ع٠Ùذ٠اÙÙÙÙد⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
٠اÙÙÙÙد اÙت٠تÙÙ? Ù?Ù ØرÙ٠عثÙر اÙÙساء عÙ٠عÙ
Ù Ù
ا ÙÙÙâª:â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتشرÙعات ÙاÙÙÙØ§Ø¦Ø Ø§ÙتÙظÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙت٠تØد Ù
Ù Ø®Ùارات اÙÙ
رأة Ù?٠اÙÙظائÙ? ÙاÙÙØاعات ÙاÙÙ
ÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ùا٠ÙÙØب٠بعض اÙÙÙاÙÙÙ⬠â«âªïâ¬â¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ÙتساÙ٠عÙ٠اÙÙساء اÙÙ
تزÙجات ÙاÙرجا٠اÙÙ
تزÙجÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ù?عÙ٠سبÙ٠اÙÙ
ثاÙ⪠Øâ¬Ùد ا٠ÙÙÙ٠بÙ
ÙدÙر اÙÙساء اÙÙ
تزÙجاتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØصÙ٠عÙÙ ÙظÙÙ?Ø© دÙ٠إذ٠Ù
٠أزÙاجÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙد ا٠ÙÙÙ٠بÙ
ÙدÙرÙ٠اÙسÙ?ر ÙاÙتÙÙ٠بعÙدا ٠ع٠Ù
ÙاØÙÙ٠بØرÙة⪠\.â¬ÙتØدâ¬
â«Ù
Ø«Ù Ùذ٠اÙÙÙاÙÙÙ Ù
٠استÙاÙÙÙØ© اÙÙساء ÙØرÙتÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙتزÙد عÙÙÙ٠صعÙبة ااÙÙضÙ
اÙ
Ø¥Ù٠اأÙÙد٠اÙعاÙ
ÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«ØºÙاب اÙتشرÙعات اÙت٠تتÙØ Ø§ÙØصÙ٠عÙ٠رعاÙØ© اأÙØÙ?ا٠اÙشاÙ
ÙØ© بتÙÙÙ?Ø© Ù
عÙÙÙØ© ÙعاÙÙØ© اÙجÙدة ÙÙ
ÙÙÙا تÙÙ?Ùر اÙÙÙت⬠â«âªïâ¬â¬
â«Ù
تÙ?Ø´ بÙج٠خاص Ù?٠اÙÙ
جتÙ
عات اÙتÙÙÙدÙØ© اÙت٠ÙÙعâ¬
â«Ù?Ù⬠â«Ø§Ùذ٠تØتاج Ø¥ÙÙ٠اÙÙساء ÙÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙتÙاÙ?س Ù?٠سÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬ÙÙذا اÙÙÙدâ¬
â«Ù?ÙÙا عبء رعاÙØ© اأÙسرة اÙÙ
عÙØ´ÙØ© عÙ٠عات٠اÙÙساءâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø£Ø¨ÙØ© Ù
Ùررة ÙظاÙ
ا٠⪠-â¬Ø§Ùت٠Ùد تزÙد ع٠غÙر عÙ
د اÙتÙاÙÙÙ?â¬
â«Ù
زاÙا اأÙÙ
ÙÙ
Ø© اÙت٠ÙتØÙ
ÙÙا رب اÙعÙ
٠⪠-â¬Ø¯ÙÙ ÙجÙد Ù
زاÙا Ù⬠â«âªïâ¬â¬
â«Ø§Ùت٠تتÙبدÙا اÙشرÙات ÙباÙتاÙ٠تثÙÙÙا ع٠تشغÙ٠اÙÙساءâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙÙ?تÙار Ø¥Ù٠بÙÙد ØÙ
اÙØ© اأÙÙد٠اÙعاÙ
ÙØ© اÙت٠تØÙ
Ù Ù
٠أشÙا٠اÙتÙ
ÙÙز اÙصرÙØØ© ÙاÙضÙ
ÙÙØ© Ù?Ù Ù
Ùا٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬Ùا٠سÙÙ
ا⬠â«âªïâ¬â¬
â«Ù?٠اÙÙ
Ùاتب اÙصغÙرة ÙغÙر اÙتÙÙÙدÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«ØºÙاب اÙتدابÙر اÙÙ
ضادة ÙÙتØرش اÙجÙس٠Ù?Ù Ù
Ùا٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙتشرÙعات أ٠سب٠ااÙÙتصاÙ? اÙÙ
دÙÙØ© أ٠اÙعÙÙبات اÙجÙائÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬ â«âªïâ¬â¬
â«ÙÙØ´ÙÙ Ùذا اÙغÙاب رادعا ٠آخر Ø£Ù
اÙ
ÙبÙ٠اÙÙساء ÙظائÙ? Ù?٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص اÙصغÙرâª\.â¬â¬
â«ØªÙÙÙد تشغÙ٠اإÙÙاث أثÙاء اÙÙ
ÙاÙبات اÙÙÙÙÙة⪠\.â¬Ù?عÙ٠اÙرغÙ
Ù
٠أ٠بعض Ùذ٠اÙÙÙÙد Ù
صÙ
Ù
ÙØÙ
اÙØ© اÙÙساء⪠Øâ¬Ù?Ø¥ÙÙا Ù?٠بعض⬠â«âªïâ¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
جااÙت⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ?Ùاد٠ÙاÙÙ
ØاعÙ
⪠Øâ¬Ùد تØد Ù
٠اÙÙ?رص اÙÙ
تاØØ© ÙÙÙساءâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙ
ÙÙز اÙÙ
ØتÙ
Ù Ù?٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص اÙرسÙ
٠اÙØ°Ù ÙÙ
Ùع اÙÙساء اÙÙ
اÙرات Ù
٠اÙØصÙ٠عÙ٠اÙÙظائÙ? Ø£Ù ÙعرÙÙ ÙدرتÙÙ⬠â«âªïâ¬â¬
â«Ø¹Ù٠اÙترÙ٠إÙ٠اÙÙ
Ùاصب اÙعÙÙا ÙاإÙدارÙة⪠\.â¬Ù?٠⪠Ø8370â¬ÙÙ
تÙ٠اÙÙسبة اÙÙ
ئÙÙØ© ÙÙÙساء اÙاÙئ٠شغÙÙ Ù
Ùاصب Ù?٠اإÙدارةâ¬
â«Ø§ÙعÙÙا Ù?Ù ÙØاعات اÙصÙاعات اÙتØÙÙÙÙØ© ÙبÙع اÙتجزئة ÙخدÙ
ات غÙر اÙتجزئة Ù?٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص اÙرسÙ
٠إا٠âª%7\.8â¬â¬
â«Ù
Ùاب٠Ù
تÙØ³Ø Ùدر٠⪠%0\.7â¬Ù?ÙÙ
ا Ùخص Ù
ÙØÙØ© اÙشر٠اأÙÙØ³Ø ÙØ´Ù
ا٠أÙ?رÙÙÙا ÙÙ٠٠⪠%72â¬Ø¹Ø§ÙÙ
ÙاÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ùظرا ÙÙÙجÙد اÙÙ
ØدÙد ÙÙÙساء اÙÙ
اÙرات Ù?٠اÙÙØاعات ÙاÙÙظائÙ? اÙت٠ÙÙÙÙ
٠عÙÙÙا اÙØ°ÙÙر⪠Øâ¬Ùد تÙ?تÙر جÙات اÙعÙ
Ù⬠â«âª\.78â¬â¬
â«ÙاÙ? ع٠إÙتاجÙØ© اÙÙساء⪠\.â¬Ø£Ø¶Ù? Ø¥ÙÙâ¬â«Ù?⬠â«Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات اÙاÙزÙ
Ø© ع٠أدائÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
Ù
ا ÙصعÙب عÙÙ Ùذ٠اÙجÙات تÙÙÙ٠تÙÙعات بشÙÙâ¬
â«Ø°Ù٠أ٠جÙات اÙعÙ
Ù Ù?٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص⪠Øâ¬Ùا٠سÙÙ
ا اÙشرÙات اÙصغÙرة⪠Øâ¬Ùد تÙ?تÙر Ø¥Ù٠آÙÙØ© Ù?رز Ù
ÙØ«ÙÙØ© ÙÙعثÙر عÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ?ÙÙØâ¬
â«Ø¨Ù?ض٠تÙاÙÙÙ? اÙبØØ« اÙت٠Ùد تÙÙÙ Ù
رتÙ?عة⪠Øâ¬ÙتعتÙ
د Ùذ٠اÙجÙات بداÙÙ Ù
Ù Ø°Ù٠عÙ٠اÙشبÙات غÙر اÙرسÙ
ÙØ© اÙت٠ÙÙ
Ù٠أ٠تÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙساء اÙÙ
اÙرات Ù
ستبعدات Ù
ÙÙا⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ
ا ÙÙ٠أØد أرباب اÙعÙ
Ù ÙÙ
Ùر٠غزةâª" :â¬Ø¹ÙدÙ
ا ÙØتاج Ø¥Ù٠عÙ
اÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙØÙب Ù
Ù Ù
ÙظÙ?ÙÙا اÙØاÙÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¥ÙتÙا٠بأÙاربÙÙ
أ٠أصدÙائÙÙ
ÙÙعÙ
Ù Ù
عÙØ§Ø Ø£ÙÙÙÙ
Ù
تÙÙ?رÙÙ Ù?ÙراÙ"âª\.â¬â¬
â«ØªØ¹ØªØ¨Ø± رÙادة اأÙعÙ
ا٠ÙشاØا اÙتصادÙا بدÙا٠ÙÙÙساء اÙÙ
اÙرات⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ٠رائدات اأÙعÙ
ا٠تÙاجÙÙ ÙÙÙدا Ø£Ùبر Ù
ÙارÙة⬠â«âª\.70â¬â¬
â«Ø¨ÙظرائÙ٠اÙØ°ÙÙر⪠\.â¬Ù?Ù?٠⪠Ø8370â¬Ø£Ù?ادت ⪠%7\.1â¬Ù?ÙØ Ù
٠اÙÙساء اÙÙ
اÙرات بأÙÙ٠صاØبات عÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ?٠⪠8373â¬ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠إا٠⪠%1â¬Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙساء رائدات أعÙ
ا٠صاØبات Ù
Ùشآت أعÙ
ا٠تأسست Ù
ÙØ° ثاÙØ« سÙÙات أ٠أÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù
Ùاب٠⪠%73â¬Ù
٠اÙرجاÙ⪠\.â¬Ùتعتبر اأÙعراÙ?â¬
â«Ø§Ø§ÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© ÙÙÙدا Ù ÙبÙرة إضاÙ?ÙØ© عÙ٠اÙÙساء اÙÙ
اÙرات اÙاÙئ٠ÙÙدÙ?٠إÙ٠أ٠ÙصبØ٠رائدات أعÙ
اÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
Ù Ùذ٠اأÙعراÙ? اÙضبابÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ØÙØØ© بÙ
Ùشآت اأÙعÙ
ا٠ØدÙثة اÙعÙد⪠Øâ¬Ù
Ù
ا ÙعÙ٠أ٠رÙاد اأÙعÙ
ا٠Ùد ÙضØرÙ٠إÙ٠اÙعÙ
Ù Øت٠ÙÙت Ù
تأخر أ٠ساعات عÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù?ÙضÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙتشÙ
٠اÙÙ
عÙÙات اأÙخر٠غÙاب اÙتشجÙع ÙÙجÙد تØÙزات Ù
٠جاÙب Ø£Ù?راد اأÙسرة⪠Øâ¬Ù
Ù
ا Ùؤد٠إÙ٠اÙÙÙ?Ùر Ù
٠اÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«ÙاÙØ®ÙÙ? Ù
٠اÙÙ?Ø´Ù⪠Øâ¬Ù?ضاÙ٠ع٠اإÙÙصاء Ù
٠بعض ااÙتصااÙت ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
ؤسسات داخ٠اÙÙ
جتÙ
ع اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙ٠اÙت٠تعتبرâ¬
â«Ø¹Ùصرا ٠أساسÙا Ù Ùتعبئة اأÙÙ
Ùا٠ÙاÙÙ
Ùارد ÙاÙÙ
ساÙدة ÙرÙاد اأÙعÙ
ا٠اÙجدد⪠\.â¬Ø¹Ù٠اÙرغÙ
Ù
٠تÙ
تع اÙÙساء بإÙ
ÙاÙÙØ© اÙØصÙ٠عÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙخدÙ
ات اÙÙ
اÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ù?Ø¥Ù Ù Ùترتب غاÙبا ٠عÙ٠اأÙعراÙ? ااÙجتÙ
اعÙØ© تÙÙ٠أÙ?راد اأÙسرة اÙØ°ÙÙر دÙر رب اأÙسرة اÙÙ
سؤÙ٠ع٠ÙاÙ?Ø©â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
اÙÙة⪠\.â¬Ù?Ù?٠⪠Ø8373â¬Ùا٠⪠%87â¬Ù
٠اÙÙساء اÙباÙغات Ù
٠اÙعÙ
ر ⪠70â¬Ø³ÙØ© Ù?Ø£Ùثر ÙÙ
ÙÙÙ Øسابا Ù Ùد٠Ù
ؤسسة Ù
اÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ù
ÙابÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠42â¬Ù
Ù âª48â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«âª %81â¬Ù
٠اÙرجاÙ⪠\.â¬ÙأخÙرا Ù Ù?عÙ٠اÙرغÙ
Ù
٠أ٠اÙÙاÙÙÙ ÙÙص عÙ٠اÙÙ
ساÙاة بÙ٠اÙÙساء ÙاÙرجا٠Ù?Ù ØÙÙÙ Ù
ÙÙÙØ© اÙعÙارات⪠Øâ¬ØªÙ
ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙساء Ùدرا ٠أÙÙ Ù
٠اأÙراض٠أ٠اÙعÙارات⪠Øâ¬Ù
Ù
ا ÙØد Ù
Ù ÙدرتÙ٠عÙ٠تÙدÙÙ
ضÙ
اÙات ÙÙØصÙ٠عÙÙ ÙرÙضâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠43â¬Ù
Ù âª48â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙØ٠⪠:2â¬Ø§Ø¥Ùدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙئة اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙÙÙ Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© اÙتعاÙ
Ù Ù
ع اأÙÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙاÙتعاÙدÙØ© Ù
تضÙ
ÙØ© اÙتÙرÙدات ÙاإÙدارة⬠â«âª\.7â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙسÙتÙÙ٠اÙÙ
رÙز جÙاÙب اإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙÙ?رص اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙسÙÙÙ٠اÙÙظÙر اÙرئÙس٠ÙÙبÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙسÙضÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
رÙز تÙÙ?ÙØ° اإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© Ù?٠إØار Ø£ÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙÙ?Ùا ٠إÙجراءات اÙبÙÙ ÙضÙ
ا٠استخداÙ
اأÙÙ
Ùا٠Ù?٠اÙغرض اÙÙ
Ùررâ¬
â«ÙÙاâª\.â¬â¬
â«ØªØÙÙ٠اÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
خاØر اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙاÙتعاÙدÙØ©â¬
â«ØµÙÙ?ت اÙÙ
خاØر ااÙئتÙ
اÙÙØ© عÙ٠اÙÙ
ستÙ٠اÙÙÙ?Øر٠ÙÙظاÙ
اÙسÙØØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© باعتبارÙا عاÙÙØ© Ùب٠إجراءات اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ?âª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù?⬠â«âª\.8â¬â¬
â«ÙÙرجع Ø°ÙÙ Ù?٠اÙÙ
ÙاÙ
اأÙÙ٠إÙ٠اÙتدÙÙر Ù?٠رÙ?ع اÙتÙارÙر اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© باÙسÙØØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© ÙاÙتأخÙر Ù?٠إصدار اÙبÙاÙات اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙØاعâ¬
â«ØµÙÙ?ت اÙÙ
خاØر عÙÙ Ù
ستÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙع⬠â«Ø§ÙعاÙ
⪠\.â¬ÙÙتÙ
تخÙ?ÙÙ? Ùذ٠اÙÙ
خاØر Ù
٠خاÙÙ Ù
ÙÙ?ÙØ° صاØب خبرة ÙتÙ
تع بÙدرات جÙدة⪠\.â¬ÙÙد Ù?â¬
â«ØµÙÙ?ت اÙÙ
خاØر عÙÙ Ù
ستÙ٠اÙجÙØ© بأÙÙا⬠â«Ø¨Ø£ÙÙا ÙبÙرة⪠Øâ¬ÙسÙتÙ
تخÙ?ÙÙ?Ùا باإÙشراÙ? اÙدÙÙÙ Ù
٠جاÙب اÙÙ?رÙÙ ÙاÙتدÙÙÙات اÙدÙرÙة⪠\.â¬Ù Ù?â¬
â«Ù
تÙسØØ©Ø ØÙØ« ÙÙ
ÙÙ Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© خبرة Ù?٠إدارة اÙÙ
شرÙعات اÙÙ
Ù
اثÙØ© ÙÙ
ا ÙÙ
Ù٠خبرة Ù?٠اÙعÙ
Ùâ¬
â«ØµÙÙ?ت Ù
خاØر اإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© بÙج٠عاÙ
بأÙÙا ÙبÙرة⬠â«Ø¨Ø³Ùاسات اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙإجراءاتÙ⪠Øâ¬Ù?ضاÙ٠عÙ
ا ÙدÙÙ Ù
٠رÙابة داخÙÙة⪠\.â¬Ù Ù?â¬
â«ØµÙÙ?ت اÙÙ
خاØر اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙاÙتعاÙدÙØ© بÙج٠عاÙ
بأÙÙا ÙبÙرةâª\.â¬â¬â«ÙÙ
خاØر اÙتÙرÙدات بأÙÙا Ù
تÙسØة⪠Øâ¬Ù Ù?â¬
â«Ù
خاØر اÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«ØªØ¹ØªØ¨Ø± Ù
خاØر اÙÙ
شرÙع بÙج٠عاÙ
Ù
Ù Ù
ÙظÙر اإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙبÙرة⪠\.â¬ÙتÙدÙ? ترتÙبات اإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© Ø¥Ù٠ضÙ
ا٠استخداÙ
⬠â«âª\.0â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙÙ
Ùا٠Ù?٠اÙغرض اÙÙ
ÙضÙع ÙÙا Ùإصدار Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات Ù?Ù ØÙÙÙا Ø¥Ùدارة اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙاÙرÙابة عÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙتÙÙد بÙ
تØÙبات اÙبÙ٠اÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«ÙاÙتعاÙدÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙبÙÙ Ù?ÙÙ
ا ÙÙ٠اÙÙ
خاØر اÙرئÙسÙØ© ÙتدابÙر اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ?âª\.â¬â¬
â«ØªÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙ
خاØر ÙتدابÙر اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
خاØر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø¹Ø¯ تدابÙر⬠â«ØªØ¯Ø§Ø¨Ùر اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ?⬠â«Ùب٠تدابÙر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتخÙ?ÙÙ?⬠â«Ø§ÙتخÙ?ÙÙ?â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
خاØر اÙÙ
تأصÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ستÙ٠اÙÙÙ?ØرÙâ¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙÙ٠إدارة ÙØÙ
اÙØ© Ù
Ùارد اÙÙ
شرÙع Ù
رÙز تØÙÙرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© اÙØ°Ù ÙÙ
ÙÙ Ùدرات جÙدة ÙسبÙâ¬
â«Ù
رضâ¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Ù٠تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙعدÙد Ù
Ù Ù
شرÙعات اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙ٠بÙجاØâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù
رتÙ?عâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
خاØر اÙÙ
تأصÙØ©â¬
â«ÙسÙتÙ
تعÙÙÙ Ù
دÙ٠خارج٠Ù
٠اÙÙØاع اÙخاص Ø¥Ùجراءâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتدÙÙ٠اÙسÙÙÙ ÙÙÙائÙ
اÙÙ
شرÙع اÙÙ
اÙÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠44â¬Ù
Ù âª48â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
خاØر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø¹Ø¯ تدابÙر⬠â«ØªØ¯Ø§Ø¨Ùر اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ?⬠â«Ùب٠تدابÙر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتخÙ?ÙÙ?⬠â«Ø§ÙتخÙ?ÙÙ?â¬
â«Ù
ستÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«Ø¥Ø´Ø±Ø§Ù? اÙبÙÙ ÙÙ
راجعات بÙا٠اÙÙÙ?Ùاتâ¬
â«Ù
تÙسØة⬠â«ØªØ¯Ø§Ø¨Ùر اÙÙ
راجعة اÙاÙØÙØ© (اÙتدÙÙ٠اÙسÙÙÙ) بÙ
عرÙ?Ø© اÙÙ
دÙÙ⬠â«Ù
رضâ¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙÙÙ?Ùات غÙر اÙÙ
ؤÙÙØ© ÙااÙختاÙسâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙخارجÙâ¬
â«Ù
رضâ¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
خاØر اÙÙ
تأصÙØ© بعد تدابÙر اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ?⬠â«Ù
رتÙ?ع⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
خاØر اÙÙ
تأصÙØ© Ùب٠تدابÙر اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ?â¬
â«Ù
خاØر اÙرÙابةâ¬
â«Ù
ستÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«ÙÙ
ÙÙ Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© Ù
ستÙÙ⬠â«ÙتØÙب اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙاÙÙ
رÙز٠أÙÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙÙ
شارÙØ©â¬
â«Ø¹Ø§ÙÙا Ù Ù
٠اÙÙدرات Ù
٠خاÙ٠عÙ
ÙÙ Ù?Ù ÙØاع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر⬠â«Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© Ù
ستÙ٠عاÙÙا Ùâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ٠أÙضا ٠عÙ٠دراÙØ© بسÙاسات اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ⬠â«Ù
٠اÙÙدراتâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ùإجراءات٠Ù
٠خاÙÙ Ù
شرÙعات اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Øددت Ù
عاÙÙر اأÙÙÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù⬠â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø°ÙÙ Ùدرات اإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙÙاÙ?Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙستتÙ
عÙ
ÙÙات إشراÙ?ÙØ©â¬
â«Ù
تÙررة بÙ
عرÙ?Ø© Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠اÙتدÙÙÙات اÙÙ
Ù?اجئة عÙ٠اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ ÙتدÙÙÙ⬠â«ÙÙ
Ù٠أ٠تÙ?تÙر اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙدراتâªØâ¬â¬
â«Ù
اÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ùبعد سداد اÙدÙ?عة اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© اأÙÙÙ٠إÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر⬠â«ÙÙÙا٠Ù
خاØر تتعÙ٠بااÙختاÙس ÙاÙÙÙ?Ùات غÙر اÙÙ
ؤÙÙØ© عÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ùجب أ٠تعÙد تÙارÙر اÙتدÙÙÙات اÙÙ
Ù?اجئة ÙظÙÙ?ة⬠â«Ù
ستÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù
رض⬠â«Ù
٠أج٠صرÙ? اÙÙ
زÙد Ù
٠اأÙÙ
ÙاÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù
رضâ¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø³ÙØتÙ?ظ Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© بÙسبةâ¬
â«âª %73â¬ÙÙÙ Ù
ÙظÙ
Ø© غÙر ØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© عÙ٠أ٠ÙÙ?صرÙ? Ùذا اÙÙ
بÙغâ¬
â«Ù?٠اÙربع اأÙØ®Ùر بعد اÙتØÙÙ Ù
٠استخداÙ
ÙاÙ?Ø© اÙÙ
باÙغâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ùد ا٠تعÙد اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
باÙغ اÙÙ
دÙ?Ùعة Ù
ÙدÙ
ا Ùâ¬
â«Ù?Ù ØاÙØ© عدÙ
استخداÙ
اأÙÙ
Ùا٠ÙÙÙا (Ù
خاØر اÙ
تÙاعâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ)âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙئة اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة اÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠45â¬Ù
Ù âª48â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
خاØر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«Ø¨Ø¹Ø¯ تدابÙر⬠â«ØªØ¯Ø§Ø¨Ùر اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ?⬠â«Ùب٠تدابÙر⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
خاØرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتخÙ?ÙÙ?⬠â«Ø§ÙتخÙ?ÙÙ?â¬
â«ØªÙ
اختÙار Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø¨Ù?ض٠Ùدرت٠عÙ٠تسÙÙر اÙÙ
شرÙعâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø¹Ø¯Ù
ÙÙ?اÙØ© ÙظاÙ
اÙÙ
Øاسبة Ùإعداد اÙتÙارÙر اÙØ°Ù ÙÙ
ÙÙ٠تسجÙÙâ¬
â«ÙÙ
ÙÙ Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© ÙظاÙ
⬠â«Ø§ÙبÙاÙات Ù?ÙÙ
ا Ùخص ÙاÙ?Ø© Ø£ÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
شرÙعâ¬
â«Ù
ØاسبÙا Ù Ù
ØÙسبا Ù Ù?اعاÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙسÙعاد اÙÙظر Ù?٠دÙÙ٠اÙØساباتâ¬
â«Ù
رضâ¬
â«Ù?⬠â«ÙضÙ
ا٠اÙØباÙ٠عÙ٠اÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØاÙÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ù
رضâ¬
â«Ù?â¬
â«Ø³ÙتعÙ٠إعداد دÙÙÙ ÙØ¥Ùجراءات اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© Ù?Ù ÙÙ Ù
Ù ÙجÙØ©â¬
â«Ùذا اÙÙظاÙ
Ùادر عÙÙ Ù?ØªØ Ù
رÙز تÙÙÙ?Ø© ÙتسجÙÙ Ù
عاÙ
اÙت⬠â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع ÙاÙجÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙØ© ع٠إدارة تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
شرÙع ÙÙÙÙ?اءâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع ÙاإÙباÙغ عÙÙاâª\.â¬â¬ â«Ø¨Ù
تØÙبات اإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙعâª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙاÙ
اÙبÙ٠بÙ
راجعة دÙÙ٠عÙ
ÙÙات اÙÙ
شرÙعâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù
رضâ¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Ù
خاØر اÙرÙابة بعد تدابÙر اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ?⬠â«Ù
رضâ¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Ù
خاØر اÙرÙابة Ùب٠تدابÙر اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ?â¬
â«Ù
رضâ¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Ù
خاØر اإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© بعد تدابÙر اÙتخÙ?ÙÙ?⬠â«Ù
رضâ¬
â«Ù?⬠â«Ù
خاØر اإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© بÙج٠عاÙ
â¬
â«ÙظاÙ
اإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«ØªØ¯Ù?٠اأÙÙ
Ùا٠ÙاÙترتÙبات اÙÙ
صرÙ?Ùة⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙÙÙ٠تÙ
ÙÙ٠اÙبÙ٠عبارة ع٠Ù
ÙØØ© تÙ?صرÙ? Ù
٠خاÙÙ Øساب Ù
خصص ÙÙÙ
شرÙع⬠â«âª\.3â¬â¬
â«ÙÙ?تØÙ ÙÙدÙر٠Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙد ÙÙ?ÙÙÙ
ت Ùدرات اÙÙ
رÙز عÙ٠صعÙد اإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© بأÙÙا Ù
رضÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙÙÙÙ
Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© بإعداد ØÙبات اÙسØب اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ø¥Ù٠اÙبÙÙ Ù
ع تÙÙÙعÙا Ù
Ù ÙÙ?بÙ⬠â«âª\.0â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
Ù?ÙضÙ٠باÙتÙÙÙع باÙÙ
رÙز Ùب٠تÙدÙÙ
Ùا Ø¥Ù٠اÙبÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙ
إبراÙ
اتÙ?اÙÙات تÙÙ?ÙØ° Ù
ÙØØ© Ù
ع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
ؤÙÙØ© بعد ااÙÙتÙاء Ù
٠عÙ
ÙÙØ© ااÙختÙار⪠\.â¬ÙعÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات⬠â«âª\.â¬â¬
â«ØºÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Ù?ØªØ Øساب Ù
صرÙ?Ù Ù
ÙÙ?ص٠اÙستاÙÙ
اأÙÙ
Ùا٠Ù
Ù Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙستتÙÙ٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
اتâ¬
â«ØºÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
ؤÙÙØ© دÙ?عة Ø£ÙÙÙØ© بÙسبة ⪠\.%03â¬Ùبعد Ùذ٠اÙدÙ?عة اأÙÙÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø³ØªØªÙÙÙ? عÙ
ÙÙات اÙصرÙ? اإÙضاÙ?ÙØ© عÙ٠ساÙÙ
Ø© تÙارÙرâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتدÙÙÙات اÙÙ
Ù?اجئة⪠\.â¬ÙسÙØتÙ?ظ Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© بÙسبة ⪠%73â¬Øت٠اÙربع اأÙØ®Ùر ÙتخÙ?ÙÙ? Ù
خاØر عدÙ
â¬
â«Ø¥Ø¹Ø§Ø¯Ø© اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© أ٠أÙ
Ùا٠ÙÙ
تÙÙ?ÙÙا⪠\.â¬ÙستدÙ?ع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اأÙÙ
Ùا٠ÙÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ Ù
٠خاÙ٠اÙبÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙتجارÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ØªÙØ§Ø Ø¨Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© ØصرÙا Ù Ù
سؤÙÙÙØ© اÙصرÙ? Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© ÙسÙØبÙ⬠â«âª\.1â¬â¬
â«ÙظاÙ
ا Ù ÙÙرصد ÙاإÙشراÙ? Ù
ع تÙدÙÙ
اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© تÙارÙر دÙرÙØ© Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
رÙز⪠\.â¬ÙÙ
ا سÙØتÙ?ظ اÙÙ
رÙز Ø£Ùضا ٠بÙØ´Ù? تسÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø´Ùر٠بÙ٠سجاÙت٠ÙسجاÙت اÙبÙÙ ÙÙ?Ùا Ù ÙصÙ?ØØ© "ÙصÙØ© اÙÙ
تعاÙ
ÙÙÙ Ù
ع اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ"⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠أ٠تبÙÙ Ùذ٠اÙتسÙÙØ© عÙ
ÙÙات اÙصرÙ?â¬
â«Øسب اÙÙ?ئة⪠Øâ¬Ù?ضاÙ٠ع٠رصÙد اÙØساب اÙÙ
خصص⪠\.â¬ÙستستÙد ØÙبات اÙصرÙ? ÙاÙدÙ?ع Ø¥Ù٠ااÙتÙ?اÙÙات اÙÙ
عتÙ
دة ÙاÙخدÙ
ات اÙÙ
Øددةâ¬
â«Ø³ÙÙ?ا Ù Ù?Ù Ùثائ٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ùâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ÙتÙÙÙ Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© تسÙÙØ© اÙسجاÙت اÙÙ
صرÙ?ÙØ© ÙÙØساب اÙÙ
خصص Ù
ع اÙÙÙائÙ
⬠â«âª\.2â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
صرÙ?ÙØ© بشÙÙ Ø´ÙرÙ⪠\.â¬ÙسÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙ
سؤÙ٠اÙÙ
اÙÙ ÙÙÙ
شرÙع باÙÙ
رÙز Ø´ÙرÙا ٠بÙ
راجعة Ùسخة Ù
Ù ÙÙ ÙائÙ
Ø© تسÙÙØ© Ù
صرÙ?Ùة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ø¬Ø§Ùبâ¬
â«Ùسخة Ù
٠اÙÙائÙ
Ø© اÙÙ
صرÙ?ÙØ© ذات اÙعاÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠أ٠ÙستÙص٠Ùذا اÙÙ
سؤÙÙ ÙÙÙÙÙ
بتسÙÙØ© Ù
ا ÙتبÙÙ ÙÙ Ù
Ù Ù?رÙÙات⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙث٠اÙÙسÙ
â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙ Ù
٠دÙÙ٠عÙ
ÙÙات اÙÙ
شرÙع اÙترتÙبات اÙÙ
صرÙ?ÙØ© اÙÙ
Ù?صÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¨Ù
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠إجراءات اÙرÙابة عÙÙ ÙاÙ?Ø© اÙÙ
عاÙ
اÙت اÙÙ
صرÙ?ÙØ©â¬
â«(Ù
ثاÙÙ⪠:â¬Ø§ÙÙ
ÙÙعÙ٠عÙ٠اÙØ´ÙÙات ÙاÙتØÙÙاÙت)âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠46â¬Ù
Ù âª48â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«ÙصÙ? اÙØ´Ù٠أ⪠8\.3â¬ØªØ¯Ù?٠اأÙÙ
Ùا٠أÙÙØ´ØØ© برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ùâª\.â¬â¬ â«âª\.2â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙØ´Ù٠أ⪠7\.2â¬ØªØ¯Ù?٠اأÙÙ
Ùا٠أÙÙØ´ØØ© اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ø£ÙظÙ
Ø© اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات⪠\.â¬ÙÙجد ÙظاÙ
إدارة Ù
اÙÙØ© Ù
ØÙسب ÙعÙ
٠بÙاÙ
Ù ØاÙت٠Ù?Ù Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ©âªØâ¬â¬ â«âª\.73â¬â¬
â«ÙÙÙ Ùادر عÙ٠إصدار Ù
عÙÙÙ
ات Ù
اÙÙØ© ÙعÙ٠عÙÙÙا ÙÙØ«ÙÙØ© اÙصÙØ© ÙÙ?Ù ØÙÙÙا⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙت٠ستÙ
Ùâ¬
â«Ù٠إدارة اÙÙ
رÙز Ù
٠اÙتخØÙØ ÙاÙتÙÙ?ÙØ°â¬
â«ÙاÙرصد ÙاÙتÙÙÙÙ
اÙÙ
سب٠ÙÙتÙدÙ
اÙÙ
Øرز ÙØ٠تØÙÙ٠اأÙÙداÙ? بÙج٠عاÙ
⪠\.â¬ÙسÙÙ?Ù?ØªØ Ù
رÙز تÙÙÙ?Ø© جدÙد Ù?٠اÙÙظاÙ
اÙÙ
Øاسب٠ÙÙÙ?ستخدÙ
â¬
â«Ø¨Ù
عرÙ?Ø© Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© ÙتسجÙÙ ÙاÙ?Ø© Ù
عاÙ
اÙت اÙÙ
شرÙعâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¯ÙÙ٠اÙسÙاسات ÙاإÙجراءات اÙÙ
ØاسبÙة⪠\.â¬ÙاÙ
Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© بإعداد دÙÙ٠عÙ
ÙÙات Ù
شرÙع⬠â«âª\.77â¬â¬
â«ÙغØÙ ÙاÙ?Ø© اإÙجراءات اإÙدارÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
ØاسبÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
تعÙÙØ© باÙÙ
ÙزاÙÙØ© ÙباÙÙ
Ùارد اÙبشرÙØ© ذات اÙصÙØ© باأÙÙØ´ØØ© اÙت٠ستÙ
ÙÙâ¬
â«Ù?٠إØار برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬ÙÙصÙ? Ùذا اÙدÙÙ٠إجراءات اÙدÙ?ع بÙ
ا Ù?Ù Ø°Ù٠ترتÙبات اÙرÙابة ÙاإÙشراÙ?âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
ÙظÙ?ÙÙ⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙتÙÙÙ Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© اÙتعاÙ
Ù Ù
ع Ø£ÙØ´ØØ© برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬Ù
تضÙ
Ùة⬠â«âª\.78â¬â¬
â«Ø§Ø¥Ùدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙة⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙجد باÙÙ
رÙز عدد ÙاÙ?Ù? Ù
٠اÙÙ
ÙظÙ?ÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
ا Ø£Ù Ù?ص٠اÙÙاجبات Ù
ضÙ
ÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙÙجد عÙ٠رأس اÙÙ
رÙز Ù
جÙس إدارةâ¬
â«ÙØ´Ø ÙÙتÙÙ٠أÙضا Ù Ù
ÙÙ
Ø© اإÙشراÙ?âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙارÙر اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙاÙرصد⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙتÙÙÙ Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ
سؤÙÙÙØ© اÙÙÙÙØ© ع٠اإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙة⬠â«âª\.70â¬â¬
â«Ùâ¬
â«Ø£ÙÙØ´ØØ© برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬ÙعÙÙ Ùج٠اÙتØدÙد⪠Øâ¬Ø³ÙÙÙ٠اÙÙ
رÙز Ù
سؤÙا٠ع٠اآÙتÙâª( :â¬Ø£) إدÙ
اج اÙبÙاÙات اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
ÙØØ©Øâ¬
â«(ب) إعداد Ù
ÙزاÙÙات Ø£ÙØ´ØØ© (Ø®ØØ© صرÙ?) ربع سÙÙÙØ© ÙØ£Ùضا ٠سÙÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙائÙ
تسÙÙØ© Ø´ÙرÙØ© ÙÙØساب اÙÙ
خصص⪠Øâ¬ÙبÙاÙات ÙÙ?Ùاتâ¬
â«Ø¯ÙرÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙجدÙ٠سØب⪠Øâ¬ÙتÙارÙر Ù
اÙÙØ© Ù
رØÙÙØ© غÙر Ù
دÙÙÙÙØ© ربع سÙÙÙØ© ÙÙÙائÙ
Ù
اÙÙØ© سÙÙÙØ©Ø (ج) ضÙ
ا٠أ٠تÙÙ٠ترتÙبات اإÙدارةâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
اÙÙØ© Ø£ÙÙØ´ØØ© برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù
ÙبÙÙØ© Ùد٠اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³Ùصدر Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© تÙارÙر ربع سÙÙÙØ© ÙسÙÙÙØ© عÙ٠اÙÙØ٠اÙÙ
بÙ٠أدÙا٠ÙÙÙدÙ
Ùا Ø¥ÙÙ⬠â«âª\.73â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتÙارÙر اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙÙ
رØÙÙØ© غÙر اÙÙ
دÙÙÙÙØ© ربع اÙسÙÙÙØ© (تÙدÙÙÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
Ùعد Ø£Ùصا٠⪠22â¬ÙÙÙ
ا Ù
Ù ÙÙاÙØ© اÙربع)â¬
â«ØªØ´Ù
٠اÙتÙارÙر اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙØ´Ù?ا Ù ÙبÙÙ٠اÙتدÙ?Ùات اÙÙاردة Ù?ÙÙ
ا Ùخص اÙÙ?ترة اÙزÙ
ÙÙØ© أ٠تراÙÙ
Ùا Ù (دÙرة ØÙاة اÙÙ
شرÙع⬠â«(Ø£)â¬
â«Ø£Ù سÙØ© Ø£Ù Øت٠تارÙØ®Ù) Øسب اÙÙ
صادر ÙاÙتدÙ?Ùات اÙصادرة Øسب تصÙÙÙ?ات اÙÙÙ?Ùات اÙرئÙسÙØ©Ø Ùأرصدةâ¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠47â¬Ù
Ù âª48â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙدÙØ© ااÙÙ?تتاØÙØ© ÙاÙختاÙ
ÙØ© Ø£ÙÙØ´ØØ© برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
ÙØ ÙاÙجداÙ٠اÙÙ
ؤÙدة اÙت٠تÙار٠اÙÙÙ?Ùات اÙÙ?عÙÙØ©â¬
â«ÙاÙÙ
زÙ
عة Ù
ع تØÙÙÙ Ù
Ù?ص٠ÙاÙÙØراÙ? بÙ٠اأÙرÙاÙ
اÙÙ?عÙÙØ© ÙأرÙاÙ
اÙÙ
ÙزاÙÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙائÙ
Ø© اÙعÙÙد Ù
تضÙ
ÙØ© ÙاÙ?Ø© اÙعÙÙد اÙÙ
برÙ
Ø© Ù?٠إØار اÙÙ
ÙØØ© Ù
ع ÙÙÙ
Ø© ÙÙ Ù
بÙغ Ù
صرÙÙ? بÙ
Ùجب Ù٠عÙد ØتÙ⬠â«(ب)â¬
â«ØªØ§Ø±ÙØ® اÙتÙرÙرâª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙØ´Ù? اÙØساب اÙÙ
خصص ÙاÙتسÙÙØ© عÙÙ ÙØÙ ÙبÙ٠اÙÙدائع ÙدÙ?عات اÙتغذÙØ© اÙÙ
ستÙÙ
ة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ
دÙ?Ùعات Ù
ؤÙدة⬠â«(ج)â¬
â«Ø¨ØÙبات اÙسØب⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙÙ?ائدة اÙت٠Ùâ¬
â«Ø¯Ø±Ùا اÙØساب⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙرصÙد Ù?Ù ÙÙاÙØ© Ù?ترة اÙتÙرÙرâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتدÙÙÙات اÙÙ
Ù?اجئة ربع اÙسÙÙÙØ© (تÙدÙÙÙ
Ù?Ù Ù
Ùعد Ø£Ùصا٠⪠01â¬ÙÙÙ
ا Ù
Ù ÙÙاÙØ© اÙربع)â¬
â«ÙتÙ
اختÙار ⪠%03â¬Ù
٠جÙ
Ùع اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© اÙÙ
تعاÙد Ù
عÙا ÙÙتدÙÙ٠اÙÙ
Ù?اجئ بشÙ٠ربع سÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«(Ø£)â¬
â«ÙØ°Ùر اÙÙ
دÙÙ Ù
ا إذا Ùا٠اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ ÙستÙÙ?ÙÙ Ù
عاÙÙر اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ
بÙÙØ© Ù?٠اتÙ?اÙÙØ© تÙÙ?ÙØ° اÙÙ
ÙØØ© Ø£Ù
اÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«(ب)â¬
â«ÙتØÙ٠اÙÙ
دÙÙ Ù
Ù
ا إذا Ùا٠اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ ÙؤدÙ٠أÙØ´ØØ© ÙÙ?Ùا Ù ÙاÙتÙ?اÙÙØ© Ø£Ù
اÙâª\.â¬â¬ â«(ج)â¬
â«ÙضÙ
٠اÙÙ
دÙ٠سداد اÙÙ
دÙ?Ùعات اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© Ø¥Ù٠اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙÙ ÙÙ?Ùا Ù ÙاÙتÙ?اÙÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬ â«(د)â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙائÙ
اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙسÙÙÙØ© ÙÙÙ
شرÙع (تÙدÙÙÙ
Ù?٠غضÙ٠ستة أشÙر Ù
Ù ÙÙاÙØ© اÙسÙØ©)â¬
â«ÙØ´Ù? Ù
صادر اأÙÙ
Ùا٠ÙاستخداÙ
اتÙا (Øسب Ù?ئة اÙÙ
ÙØØ©âª/â¬Ø§ÙÙØ´Ø§Ø ÙÙبÙ٠أÙ
Ùا٠اÙبÙÙ ÙاÙÙظراء بشÙÙ Ù
ÙÙ?صÙ)âª\.â¬â¬ â«(Ø£)â¬
â«ÙØ´Ù? اÙÙ
رÙز اÙÙÙد٠أÙÙ
Ùا٠برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù
Ù ÙاÙ?Ø© اÙÙ
صادرâª\.â¬â¬ â«(ب)â¬
â«ÙØ´ÙÙ? تسÙÙØ© اأÙرصدة Ù?٠اÙØسابات اÙÙ
خصصة Ù
ع اأÙرصدة اÙÙ
صرÙ?ÙØ© اÙÙ
بÙÙØ© Ù?Ù ÙØ´Ù? Ù
صادر اأÙÙ
ÙاÙ⬠â«(ج)â¬
â«ÙاستخداÙ
اتÙاâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¥ÙضاØات اÙÙÙائÙ
اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© بشأ٠اÙسÙاسات اÙÙ
ØاسبÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙÙ
Ø© ÙÙاÙ?Ø© اÙÙ
عÙÙÙ
ات اأÙخر٠ذات اÙعاÙÙØ©âª\.â¬â¬ â«(د)â¬
â«Ø§ÙسÙاسات ÙاإÙجراءات اÙÙ
ØاسبÙة⪠\.â¬Ø³ØªØ³Ø¬ÙÙÙ Øسابات Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© باستخداÙ
اأÙساس⬠â«âª\.70â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙÙد٠ÙÙÙ
Øاسبة⪠Øâ¬Ù
دعÙÙ
Ø© باÙسجاÙت ÙاإÙجراءات اÙÙ
اÙئÙ
Ø© Ùتتبع ااÙرتباØات ÙÙØÙ
اÙØ© اأÙصÙÙ⪠\.â¬ÙستÙ?عد اÙسجاÙت اÙÙ
ØاسبÙØ©â¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ÙدÙاÙر اأÙÙ
رÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتدÙÙ٠اÙخارجÙ⪠\.â¬Ø³ØªÙتض٠اتÙ?اÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙØØ© تÙدÙÙ
اÙÙÙائÙ
اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙسÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ
دÙÙØ© ÙبرÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù Ù?٠غضÙÙ⬠â«âª\.7\.â¬â¬
â«Ø³ØªØ© أشÙر Ù
Ù ÙÙاÙØ© اÙسÙØ© ÙتÙدÙÙ
تÙارÙر اÙتدÙÙÙات ربع اÙسÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ
Ù?اجئة Ù?٠غضÙ٠⪠\.3â¬ÙÙÙ
ا Ù Ù
Ù ÙÙاÙØ© ربع اÙعاÙ
⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠أÙâ¬
â«ÙتضÙ
٠اÙتدÙÙ٠اÙÙ
Ù?اجئ اأÙØ®Ùر تدÙÙÙا Ù Ù
اÙÙا Ù ÙÙاÙ?Ø© اÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
Ùة⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙتÙ
تدÙÙÙ ÙÙائÙ
برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
٠اÙÙ
اÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø³ÙÙÙا ٠بÙ
عرÙ?Ø© Ù
دÙÙ Øسابات Ù
ؤÙÙ Ù
ستÙÙ Ù
ÙبÙÙ Ùد٠اÙبÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ?Ùا Ù ÙÙÙ
عاÙÙر اÙÙ
ÙبÙÙØ© دÙÙÙا Ù ÙÙ
راجعة اÙØسابات ÙبÙ
Ùجب Ù
ÙاÙ
â¬
â«Ùاختصاصات Ù
ÙبÙÙØ© Ùد٠اÙبÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«ÙÙ?تÙÙع Ù
٠اÙÙ
دÙÙÙ٠اÙخارجÙÙ٠إبداء رأ٠Ù?٠اÙÙÙائÙ
اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙÙ
دÙÙØ© ÙبرÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ?٠ااÙستخداÙ
اÙÙ
ؤÙÙ⬠â«âª\.71â¬â¬
â«ÙÙ
ساÙÙ
Ø© اÙبÙÙ Ù?٠اÙبرÙاÙ
ج⪠Øâ¬ÙدÙØ© ÙساÙÙ
Ø© اÙÙÙ?Ùات ÙØ¥Ù٠أ٠Ù
د٠ÙÙ
Ù٠ااÙعتÙ
اد عÙÙÙا Ùأساس ÙعÙ
ÙÙات صرÙ? اÙÙرض⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
عاÙ
اÙتâ¬
â«Ø§ÙØساب اÙÙ
خصص⪠Øâ¬ÙاأÙرصدة⪠Øâ¬ÙاÙتÙÙد بإجراءات اÙبÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¨Ø§Ø¥ÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥Ù٠تÙرÙر اÙتدÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ?تÙÙع Ù
٠اÙÙ
دÙÙÙ٠اÙخارجÙÙ٠إعداد Ø®Øاب إدارة ÙبÙ٠اÙÙ
اÙØظات ÙاÙتعÙÙÙات ÙÙÙصÙ⬠â«âª\.72â¬â¬
â«Ø¨Ø§ÙتØسÙÙات Ù?٠اÙسجاÙت اÙÙ
ØاسبÙØ© ÙاأÙÙظÙ
Ø© ÙاÙضÙØ§Ø¨Ø Ø§ÙرÙابÙØ© ÙاÙتÙÙد باÙتعÙدات اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© Ù?٠اتÙ?اÙÙØ© Ù
ÙØØ© اÙبÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠48â¬Ù
Ù âª48â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
شرÙع اÙØارئ ÙÙ
ساÙدة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙعÙ
٠اÙØر Ù?٠غزة (âª)P167726â¬â¬
â«ÙتعÙ٠أÙضا ٠عÙ٠اÙÙ
دÙ٠اÙخارج٠إجراء تدÙÙÙات Ù
Ù?اجئة⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع اÙتØÙÙ Ù
Ù Ù
جÙ
Ùعة Ù
ختارة Ù
٠اÙÙ
ستÙ?ÙدÙ٠عÙ٠أساس⬠â«âª\.72â¬â¬
â«Ø´ÙرÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ù
ساÙدة اÙتÙÙ?Ùذ⪠\.â¬Ø³ØªØªØ¶Ù
٠أÙØ´ØØ© اÙبÙ٠اÙدÙÙÙ ÙØ¥ÙشراÙ? عÙ٠اإÙدارة اÙÙ
اÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠سبÙ٠اÙÙ
ثا٠ÙÙÙس اÙØصر⪠Øâ¬Ù
راجعة⬠â«âª\.83â¬â¬
â«Ø¨Ùا٠اÙÙÙ?Ùات⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
راجعة اÙتÙارÙر اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙÙ
رØÙÙØ© غÙر اÙÙ
دÙÙÙÙØ© ربع اÙسÙÙÙة⪠Øâ¬ÙÙ
راجعة اÙتدÙÙÙات اÙÙ
Ù?اجئة ÙاÙÙÙائÙ
اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙسÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
دÙÙØ© ÙØ®Øابات جÙاز اإÙدارة⪠Øâ¬Ù?ضاÙ٠ع٠اÙÙ
تابعة Ù?Ù ØÙÙÙا بشأ٠اÙÙضاÙا اÙت٠ÙØ«ÙرÙا اÙÙ
دÙ٠اÙخارجÙ⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙتÙ
اÙÙÙاÙ
بعÙ
ÙÙاتâ¬
â«Ø§Ø¥ÙشراÙ? اÙÙ
ÙداÙÙØ© عÙ٠أساس دÙر٠خاÙ٠دÙرة ØÙاة Ø£ÙØ´ØØ© برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù⪠\.â¬Ø³ØªØªØ£ÙÙ? بعثات اÙبÙ٠اإÙشراÙ?ÙØ© Ù
Ùâ¬
â«Ø²Ùارات Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© ÙاÙÙ
ÙظÙ
ات غÙر اÙØÙÙÙ
ÙØ© Øسب ااÙÙتضاء⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠أ٠ÙتÙ
تÙÙ?Ùر اÙÙثائÙâ¬
â«Ø°Ø§Øª اÙعاÙÙØ© Ùبعثات اÙبÙ٠اإÙشراÙ?ÙØ© دÙ٠إبØاءâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø¹Ù
ÙÙات اÙصرÙ?â¬
â«Ø³ØªØ³ØªØ®Ø¯Ù
عÙ
ÙÙات اÙصرÙ? اÙØر٠اÙتÙÙÙدÙØ© اأÙربع⪠Øâ¬ÙÙÙ⪠:â¬Ø±Ø¯ اÙÙ
صرÙÙ?ات ÙاÙدÙ?عات اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© ÙاÙÙ
دÙ?Ùعات اÙÙ
باشرة⬠â«âª\.87â¬â¬
â«ÙااÙرتباØات اÙخاصة⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠أ٠Ùتبع رد اÙÙ
صرÙÙ?ات ÙتغذÙØ© اÙدÙ?عات اÙÙ
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ù?٠اÙØساب اÙÙ
خصص اÙØرÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ستÙدة Ø¥ÙÙâ¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
عاÙ
اÙت⪠Øâ¬ÙØ°Ù٠باستخداÙ
بÙا٠اÙÙÙ?Ùات ÙتÙØ«Ù٠اÙÙÙ?Ùات اÙÙ
ؤÙÙØ© اÙÙ
دÙ?Ùعة⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙ
ÙÙ ÙبÙÙ ØÙبات إصدار رد اÙÙ
صرÙÙ?اتâ¬
â«ÙاÙÙ
دÙ?Ùعات اÙÙ
باشرة ÙااÙرتباØات اÙخاصة إذا Ùا٠اÙÙ
بÙغ ÙتجاÙز "اÙØد اأÙدÙÙ ÙÙØÙب" اÙÙ
ÙصÙص عÙÙÙ Ù?Ù Ø®Øاب اÙصرÙ?âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙØساب اÙÙ
خصص⪠\.â¬Ø³ÙÙÙÙ Ùذا اÙØساب اÙÙ
خصص باÙدÙاÙر اأÙÙ
رÙÙÙ⪠Øâ¬Ø¹Ù٠أ٠ÙتÙ
ااÙتÙ?ا٠عÙ٠سÙÙÙ? اÙØساب⬠â«âª\.88â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙÙ
خصص ÙاÙÙ
ؤسسة اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© اÙت٠سÙÙ?Ù?ØªØ Ù?ÙÙا اÙØساب اÙÙ
خصص أثÙاء اÙÙ
Ù?اÙضات⪠\.â¬ÙستÙ?ØÙب دÙ?عة Ù
ÙدÙ
Ø© Ù?٠بداÙØ© اÙÙ
شرÙعâªØâ¬â¬
â«ÙستÙ?ØÙب عÙ
ÙÙات اÙصرÙ? اÙاÙØÙØ© Ù?٠اÙØساب اÙÙ
خصص Ù
٠خاÙÙ ØÙبات اÙسØب ÙاÙÙØ´ÙÙ? اÙÙ
صرÙ?ÙØ© اÙت٠جرت تسÙÙتÙاâ¬
â«ÙÙسخ Ù
Ù ÙاÙ?Ø© اÙÙØ´ÙÙ?ات اÙÙ
صرÙ?Ùة⪠\.â¬ÙÙÙبغ٠أ٠تÙÙ٠اÙÙثائ٠اÙÙ
ؤÙدة ÙØÙبات اÙدÙ?ع اÙÙ
باشر سجاÙت تثبت اÙÙ
صرÙÙ?ات اÙÙ
ؤÙÙØ©â¬
â«(Ùسخ Ù
٠اإÙÙصااÙت ÙÙ?ÙاتÙر اÙÙ
ÙردÙÙ)âª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙتخØÙØ Ùإعداد اÙÙ
ÙزاÙÙة⪠:â¬Ø³ÙتÙ
إعداد Ø®ØØ© صرÙ? باإÙضاÙ?Ø© Ø¥ÙÙ Ù
ÙزاÙÙØ© Ù
اÙÙØ© ØÙا٠دÙرة ØÙاة برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
ÙابÙ⬠â«âª\.80â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙعÙ
Ù (Ù
ÙسÙ
Ø© Øسب اÙسÙØ© Ùربع اÙسÙØ©)⪠\.â¬ÙسÙعد Ù
رÙز تØÙÙر اÙÙ
ؤسسات اأÙÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ?ÙسØÙÙÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙزاÙÙØ© ÙÙسÙØ© اÙÙ
ÙبÙØ© Ù
تضÙ
ÙØ©â¬
â«Ø§Ø£ÙرÙاÙ
اÙخاصة باÙسÙØ© عÙ٠أ٠تÙÙÙ Ù
ØÙÙØ© Øسب ربع اÙسÙة⪠\.â¬ÙستعÙس اÙÙ
ÙزاÙÙØ© اÙخاصة بÙ٠ربع عاÙ
اÙÙ
ÙاصÙ?ات اÙÙ
Ù?صÙØ©â¬
â«Ø£ÙÙØ´ØØ© برÙاÙ
ج اÙÙ
ا٠Ù
Ùاب٠اÙعÙ
Ù ÙاÙجداÙÙ ÙاÙÙÙ?Ùات عÙ٠أÙØ´ØØ© اÙبرÙاÙ
ج اÙØ´ÙرÙØ© Ùربع اÙسÙÙÙة⪠Øâ¬Ù
ع إرسا٠اÙÙ
ÙزاÙÙØ© اÙسÙÙÙØ©â¬
â«Ø¥Ù٠اÙبÙÙ ÙÙ
راجعتÙا Ùب٠بداÙØ© اÙسÙØ© اÙÙ
اÙÙØ© ÙÙبرÙاÙ
ج بشÙرÙ٠عÙ٠اأÙÙÙâª\.â¬â¬
â«Ø§ÙصÙ?ØØ© ⪠49â¬Ù
Ù âª48â¬â¬ | APPROVAL |
P087004 | Page 1
PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
APPRAISAL STAGE
Report No\.: AB1343
Project Name
Road Sector Support Project
Region
AFRICA
Sector
Roads and highways (90%);General transportation sector (10%)
Project ID
P087004
Borrower(s)
REPUBLIC OF CAPE VERDE
Implementing Agency
Ministry of Finance
Cape Verde
Instituto de Estradas
Cape Verde
Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport
Cape Verde
Environment Category
[
]
A
[X] B [ ] C [ ] FI [ ] TBD (to be determined)
Safeguard Classification
[
]
S
1
[X] S
2
[
]
S
3
[
]
S
F
[
]
TBD (to be determined)
Date PID Prepared
May 13\. 2008
Date of Appraisal
Authorization
January 31, 2005
Date of Board Approval
April 21, 2005
1\. Country and Sector Background
Cape Verde is an archipelago, consisting of ten islands, covering an area of 4,039 square
kilometers\. In the year 2000, the population was about 435,000, living on nine of the ten islands\.
The country has few natural resources that can be exploited economically\. In the years prior to
2000, the economy grew at an annual rate of 6\.4%, with the growth sectors being services,
tourism, fishing and light industry\. In 2002 the overall poverty rate for the country was
estimated at 37%, with a poverty rate of 51\.3% in rural areas and 24\.5% in urban areas\.
Cape Verdes
Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRSP)
(revised September
2004) is organized along five strategic pillars: (i) Promote good governance, reinforcing
effectiveness and guaranteeing equity; (ii) Promote competitiveness to foster economic growth
and employment creation; (iii) Develop and upgrade human capital; (iii) Develop the
infrastructures, promote land use planning and protect the environment; and (v) Improve the
effectiveness and sustainability of the social security system\.
The GPRSPs long-term growth and transformation strategy focuses on exploiting advantages
offered by the countrys geographic location, i\.e\. promoting air and maritime infrastructure for
sea-linked industries, such as fish processing and commercialisation, as well as establishing Cape
Verde as an air transport hub for goods and passengers, with continued development of tourism
Page 2
potential\. Strong emphasis is also placed on agricultural development, aimed at establishing a
national agro-food system to ensure an adequate and permanent supply of food products to the
population, through distribution and the commercialization of the agricultural products\. A
dependable road system, linked with air and sea connections, is a fundamental element in
establishing effective input, marketing and distribution systems to pursue these strategies\.
The road network consists of 1,350 km spread among the nine inhabited islands\. These
relatively small island networks are characterized by: (i) major roads (often a ring road around
the island) which extend from each islands principal port and airport to municipalities and serve
many small town and rural communities; (ii) secondary roads which serve smaller ports and
fishing and agricultural communities farther off the main axes; and (iii) and municipal town
roads and tracks leading to very small communities or homesteads\. The technical characteristics
of the islands roads reflect the volcanic origins of the archipelago and the ready availability of
basalt stone most roads are paved with basalt cobblestones, with either an improved or a
basic standard, although the availability of suitable basalt varies among the islands\.
Due to the lack of maintenance, certain sections of each islands network have deteriorated
seriously, while in other cases, lack of investment has left the basic network incomplete\.
Traditionally, road network management has been hampered by the absence of a dedicated road
management agency, while responsibilities for managing various portions of the network have
not been clear\. There has been no systematic program for maintenance, which is frequently
postponed in the face of emergency operations\.
The Government is addressing the above constraints through a balanced approach of meeting
critical road infrastructure needs, accompanied by institutional reform and capacity building to
ensure rational planning, sustainable maintenance and delivery of transport services\. The
approach is articulated in its
Letter of Road Sector Policy
,
which lays out a strategic vision for
the Road Sector, namely: (i) each island has a basic road network which links administrative
centers, markets, ports and airports; (ii) each island has a system of local roads that provide rural
communities with at least minimum reliable access to markets, services and the core network;
and (iii) the country has an efficient, transparent and sustainable system for managing and
maintaining its core and local road networks\. To these ends, the Government will: (i) rationalize
management of the road network, in line with its overall policy of promoting commercial
management approaches and sustainable maintenance financing based on user-fees; and (ii)
progressively establish a maintainable network through a priority investment program on the
basic road networks\. This will involve
:
Classification of the Road Network\.
Reformed Institutions\.
In its
Letter of Sector Policy
the Government has established an
Institutional Action Plan for a Road Agency and Road Maintenance Fund\.
Assignment of Responsibilities\.
The newly created Road Agency will be responsible for
overall planning and management of the nations road network, while the General
Directorate of Infrastructure and Basic Sanitation will manage investment contracts\. The
Page 3
municipalities, for their part, are responsible for maintenance of their respective
municipal networks, albeit with technical assistance and guidance from the Road Agency\.
Funding Sources\.
Funds for road maintenance will be generated from user fees and will
be deposited directly to the new Road Maintenance Fund, while road investment will be
financed by Government and donor funds\.
Road Investment and Technical Management Strategy\.
The Governments road
investment strategy is linked to its capacity to maintain its network\. As part of this
strategy the Road Agency will introduce on a pilot basis Performance-Based Road
Maintenance and Management Contracts (
Gestão e Manutencão por Nivel de Servicio -
GMANS
), with funding from the New Road Maintenance Fund\.
2\. Objectives
Development objective:
The populations on five islands will have improved access to social
services and markets via improved and less vulnerable road networks\. Two types of network
interventions will be pursued in achieving this objective: (i) filling network gaps characterized
by poor access, thus reducing extreme isolation; and (ii) rehabilitation on key links, thus
preserving the integrity of the network\.
The project will contribute to the higher level poverty reduction objectives, stated in the GPRSP,
of promoting economic growth and improving living conditions\. This will be done by
supporting improved management of the roads and infrastructure sectors and reducing the
vulnerability of road networks, thus facilitating physical access of the poor to market
opportunities and social services\. A draft CAS for Cape Verde is complete and the project has
been identified as part of the CASs base case scenario\.
3\. Rationale for Bank Involvement
The rationale for the Banks involvement (and underlying development hypothesis) is that
improved and sustainably maintained road networks underpin economic growth, poverty
reduction and national integration strategies\. The absence of complete and reliable island road
networks constitutes a serious constraint to development, and Cape Verdes efforts to remedy
this situation therefore merits Bank support\.
The Bank has been assisting the transport sector in Cape Verde since July 1993 through the
Infrastructure and Transport Program (TIP) (Credit Nos\. IDA-24660 and IDA-24661)\. With
support from this Program, the Government took its first steps towards rationalizing management
of its Road Sector\. In particular, TIP financed the first road network inventory in 2000, and
supported the development of a logical framework for the Road Sector, in which the strategic
axes for road sector institutional reform were laid out\. Through TIP, an ongoing Road Sector
dialogue has been established, which has been enriched by the Governments participation in
Bank-sponsored Sub-Saharan African Transport Program (SSATP)\.
4\. Description
IDA will join with other donors in financing a package of sector reforms, capacity building and
civil works to meet priority needs in the road network\. IDA will take a lead role in the
Page 4
institutional aspects, particularly road management, while financing selected civil works to fill
priority gaps not covered by other donor or domestic resources\.
Component 1: Institutional Support
Total including contingencies: US$ 3\.2 million; Bank
Financing US$ 3\.0 million\.
This componen
t
will support the Governments program for reforming management of the Road
Sector, as stated in its Letter of Sector Policy\. In addition, support will be provided to the
Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport (MIT), who is undertaking to enhance its capacity to
assume its role as sector planner and guarantor of quality, in the face of expanding infrastructure
and civil works sectors\. It will consist of the following sub-components:
1\.1 Support to Road Sector Program Coordination Office\.
The Program Coordination Office
was established in the MIT in August 2004 to ensure overall management of this Project, as well
as coordination of other donor-related support for the National Transport Program\.
1\.2 Technical assistance and capacity building to the Road Agency and Road Maintenance
Fund\.
The Road Agency was established in August 2004 and is already staffed and operational,
while the Road Maintenance Fund is presently being established and is expected to be
operational in March 2005\.
1\.3 Assistance to Civil Engineering Laboratory of Cape Verde (LEC)\.
The Civil Engineering
Laboratory of Cape Verde is an autonomous public agency under the titular responsibility of the
MIT\. Based on Diagnostic Study recommendations, the Project will finance the acquisition of
equipment for laboratory testing, information management, security and communications;
improvement of physical plant; vehicles; and training for personnel\.
1\.4 Assistance to the General Inspectorate of Public and Private Works (IGOPP)\.
The
General Inspectorate of Public and Private Works (IGOPP) is presently the core service for
regulation of all civil engineering works\. A Diagnostic Study recommended that, as a long term
measure, these regulatory functions are more appropriately lodged in an independent body\. In
the meantime, the Study recommended that as a first step, relevant legislation and regulations
should be reviewed and revised for housing, public works and construction\. The Project will
finance technical assistance for this purpose\.
1\.5 Assistance to the Studies and Planning Unit (GEP)\.
The GEP which is the core service for
studies and planning for the Ministry\. The Project will complete this assistance with financing
for updating and operationalizing information management and external communication
services\.
1\.6 Other Studies and Technical Assistance\.
The Project will finance monitoring and
evaluation studies, in particular a survey of the beneficiary population at the end of the project,
annual audits and other studies and technical assistance, to be determined\. The Project will also
support policy and strategy formulation and implementation for the Transport Sector at large, in
conjunction with the Bank financed Growth and Competitiveness Project\.
Page 5
Component 2: Road Infrastructure
Total Program Including Contingencies:$ 41\.8 M;
Bank Financing: US$ 12\.0 m
2\.1 Priority Road Network Improvements\.
In its
Priority Strategic Programme for
Infrastructure and Land Management
,
the Government identified potential road network
improvements on each of the nine inhabited islands\. Among these projects, the Government has
identified a program of twelve top priority improvements on five islands\.
IDA will fund up to US$ 12\.0 million out of the total program amounting to US$ 41\.8 million\.
Below is a summary list of the investment program, followed by a summary description of the
projects\.
No
\.
Project
km
Description
1
Orgãos-Pedra Badejo (Santiago)
11
Asphalt rehabilitation of principal secondary road
2
Cruz Grand Calhetona (Santiago)
14
Asphalt rehabilitation of principal secondary road
3
Volta Monte- Ribeira Prata
(Santiago)
15
Cobblestone rehabilitation/ reconstruction to isolated area
4
Assomada-Rincão (Santiago)
16
Cobblestone rehabilitation/ reconstruction to isolated area
5
Fonte Lima-João Bernardo
(Santiago)
9
Cobblestone rehabilitation/ reconstruction to isolated area
6
Alcatraz-Figueira (Maio)
11
Cobblestone reconstruction to complete islands main ring
axis
7
Ribiera Brava-Tarrafal (São
Nicolau)
27
Asphalt rehabilitation on islands main axis
8
Tarrafal-Praia Branca-Ribiera Prata
(São Nicolau)
22
Cobblestone rehabilitation/reconstruction to isolated area
9
Caleijão-Cabeçalinho-Tarrafal (São
Nicolau)
8
Construction of new road through mountain pass
(recommended not funded at this time)
10
Salamansa-Norte de Baia Diversion
(São Vicente)
3
Asphalt reconstruction of access road to tourist
development zone
11
2 Small bridges on Ribeira Grande
(Santo Antão)
2x
60m
Br\.+
200
m
Box culvert bridges leading to commercial center; present
access through river bed and cut off during rains\.
12
1 Small bridge at Vila das Pombas
and Liaison Vila das Pombas-Eito
(Santo Antão)
40m
Br\.+
1km
Box culvert bridge and access road to commercial center;
present access through river bed and cut off during rains\.
Santiago Island\.
Priority improvements to the Santiago Island network include: (i) rehabilitation
of two heavily traveled east-west axes, which also serve agricultural communities along their
alignments; and (iii) rehabilitation/reconstruction of three rural roads linking isolated agricultural
and fishing communities to the main network\.
Road # 1: Orgãos-Pedra Badejo (11 km)\.
This road is the primary east-west link in the southern
part of the island\. It is cobblestone surface, with an average width of 4 meters and 50 cm\.
shoulders\. It is generally in poor condition certain sections are considerably degraded and there
is a lack of fine material between the paving stones, many of which have been washed away\. The
road lacks adequate drainage structures; culverts, in particular, are obstructed by stones and
debris\. Protection of the side slopes is inadequate\. The road is located in the Ribeira Seca river
basin, which is one of the most agriculturally productive zones in the country, and which
Page 6
provides produce to the capital city of Praia\. In addition to its regional importance, the road
directly serves over 10 rural communities with a population of 3,693\. Intervention will involve
establishing a uniform width of 6 meters with upgrading to asphalt surface\.
Road # 2: Cruz Grand
Calhetona (14 km)\.
This road is the primary east-west link in the center
of the island, connecting the two major north-south axes, both of which culminate in the northern
tourist area and town of Tarrafal\. It is cobblestone surface with an average width of 5 meters\.
Constructed in 1995, it is in very bad condition, characterized by many potholes, loss of riding
surface and deformation of the roadbed\. Several sections are considered dangerous because of
sliding conditions caused by erosion\. Much of the roads deterioration is due to poor drainage\.
The road is heavily traveled and located in the Ribeira de Flamengos Seca and serves numerous
communities with a population of 6,472, practicing both irrigated and rainfed agriculture, serving
the major markets of Tarrafal, Assomada and Praia\. Intervention will involve upgrading to paved
asphalt standard\.
Road # 3: Volta Monte- Ribeira Prata (15 km)\.
Located in the northwest part of Santiago Island,
this road was formerly part of the north-south axis, but abandoned with the construction of the
present ring road\. It is on very windy, mountainous terrain\. Although some of the original
drainage structures exist, most of the road has reverted to dirt track, with only a few remnants of
previous cobblestone surface\. Over eleven farming and fishing communities, with a total
population of 2,850, along this road are severely isolated due to its poor condition\. The area
includes suitable grazing areas, yet the introduction of drilling and other water development
equipment has been constrained because of lack of access for drilling facilities\. Because of its
condition, there is presently very little traffic\. Intervention will involve reconstructing the road to
improved cobblestone standard\.
Road # 4: Assomada-Rincão (16 km)\.
This road provides the sole access to seven communities
and the fishing port of Rincão to the rest of the island\. It runs from the major town of Assomada
(population 50,000), on the main road, and serves another 3,500 farming and fishing populations,
including the agricultural zone of Chão de Tanque and the fishing port of Rincão\. The first 7 km
from Assomada is cobblestone in very poor condition, while the rest is basically an earth track,
requiring reconstruction\. The 2 km section on the Achada Grande Plateau leading to Rincão
contains very fine material, which makes access difficult especially during the rainy season\.
Intervention will involve reconstructing the road to improved cobblestone standard\.
Road # 5: Fonte Lima-João Bernardo (9 km)\.
This road links 10 rural communities with a
population of 4\.100 to the main north-south axis and the rest of the island\. The first 250 meters
off the main road are cobblestone, after which the road is a narrow earth track, permitting
passage only of light vehicles and small trucks, often without capacity for two-way traffic\. The
alignment is very windy and on steep slopes, particularly after the village of Toupana\.
Intervention will involve reconstructing the road to improved cobblestone standard\.
Maio Island\.
Improvement to the Maio Island network involves filling a gap in the principal ring
road around the island\.
Page 7
Road # 6: Alcatraz-Figueira (11 km)\.
The road is currently an earth road, passable only with 4
wheel drive vehicle
s, and thus presents a gap in the islands basic network\. The rest of the island
ring road is characterized by 6 meter width cobblestone and 0\.5 m\. shoulders\. The road provides
direct access to the communities in the area, which are located on or very near the road, and
passes through an agricultural zone, with motorized irrigation and an agricultural research center\.
Intervention will involve reconstructing the road to improved cobblestone standard\.
Sao Nicolau Island\.
Improvement of the Sao Nicolau Island Network involves: (i) rehabilitating
the major axis linking the islands administrative center with its primary port, and serving
numerous communities in mountainous terrain; and (ii) a continuation of the main axis to less
populated, but isolated zones\.
Road # 7: Ribiera Brava-Tarrafal (27 km)\.
This is the principal road of the island, linking the
main city of Ribeira Brava with the second major town of Tarrafal, site of the islands main port
and fishing and commercial center, including a tuna canning factory\. The road passes through
several river basins, including the irrigated zone fed by the Galerie de Fajã\. It directly serves a
population of 8,100, not counting the town of Ribiera Brava\. It is virtually the lifeline for all
marketing of agricultural, livestock and fishing products, as well as access to social and
administrative services\. Following a northern route from Ribeira Brava, it loops around a
mountainous area to the south where it arrives at Tarrafal\. The road is currently cobblestone in a
deteriorating condition; the width is mostly 5 meters, in some places as narrow as 4 meters\. For
a
5
km
stretch Faja de Baixo Cachaco, the alignment is very narrow and consists of only rough
stones\. Intervention will involve upgrading to asphalt paved standard\.
Road # 8: Tarrafal-Praia Branca-Ribiera Prata (19 km)\.
This road is the continuation of the
principal road of the island from Tarrafal, circling the islands western and northwestern areas\.
The road is currently cobblestone\. The first 6\.5 km are in fair condition, with a width of 5 m\.
Most drainage structures are in good condition, however, the Irish crossings are in need of repair\.
The remaining section is in poor condition; the cobblestones are not cut or laid in parallel and are
considerably damaged\. The last sections are mountainous and narrow, with irregular
cobblestone coverage\. The last km before the village of Ribeira pose serious danger of falling
stones and unstable slopes\. The road links agricultural production areas to the port of Tarrafal\. A
tourism village is being constructed at km 1\.5 from Tarrafal\. Intervention will involve
establishing a uniform width of 6 meters improved cobblestone surface and establishment of
adequate drainage structures\.
Road # 9 : Caleijão-Cabeçalinho-Tarrafal (6 km)\.
This is presently only a footpath through a
mountainous zone\. If a road was built, it would link the two sections from Ribeira Brava to
Tarrafal which presently loop around the north (Road # 7), and would reduce the traveling
distance between Ribeira Prata and Tarrafal by about 10 km\. A main difficulty to construct this
road is the steep incline up the mountain, about 650 meters, between Calejao and Cabecalinho\.
For this reason, this activity has been dropped from the program\.
São Vicente Island
Road # 10: Salamanca-Norte de Baia (11km)\.
In the northeast of the island, the road links
Salamanca, at the main, along the northeast coast to the Nord de Baia, a zone in the process of
Page 8
tourism development\. A 45 hectare,
45
million physical development plan has been conceived
by the Baìas Development Group for the Baìas das Gatas Resort Project\. The Plan consists of
a
five star hotel with 400 beds and two luxury housing units\. It aims to attract investors among
foreign tour operators, émigrés with savings and the Cape Verde Diaspora\. The plan includes a
social and environmental component, which will assist fishing communities through improved
infrastructure and lobster fishing\. Without this road, The Development Plan is unlikely to occur\.
The road will also serve a population of 1,200 engaged in fishing and livestock, and currently
with marketing access to Mindelo, the major town in the north\.
Santo Antão Island\.
Improvement to the Santo Antão Island network involves ensuring all
weather access to two major towns, located at the confluence of rivers and cut off during heavy
rains\. Both towns are located on the islands primary network, which has a minimum level of
service and the absence of these bridges prevents connectivity to significant levels of traffic\.
Road # 11 : Bridges at Ribeira Grande (200 m) and Ribeira Torre (60 m)\.
In the northeast, the
town of Ribeira Grande (population 21, 480) is located at the confluence of two seasonal rivers:
Ribeira Grande and Ribeira da Torre\. The islands main road from Porto Novo arrives along the
Ribiera Grande, and at a certain point, four roads converge along these rivers at the town\. When
it rains, the river banks flood the southern end of the town on the road to Paul\. Intervention will
involve the construction of two small bridges, one on the Ribeira Grande and one on the Ribeira
da Torre, as well as protection works along the river banks\.
Road # 12 : Bridges at Villa da Pombas and Liason Vila da Pombas Eito\.
The road from Eito to
Paul (population 8,380) follows the Ribeira da Paul, then is located in the river bed, which makes
travel impossible when it rains\. Residents in the immediate area grow sugar cane, sold to an
agro-industrial complex producing a sugar-based alcoholic drink,
grog\.
It should also be noted
that an EU funded project is constructing a road from Porto Novo along the west coast to Paul,
and the construction of this bridge would guarantee continuity along the cost to Ribeira Grande\.
Intervention will replace the present access within the riverbed to the adjacent side for a length of
1
km
and construct a small bridge to assure access into the town of Paul\.
2\.2 Pilot Performance Based Road Management and Maintenance Contracts (
Gestão e
Manutencão por Nivel de Servicio - GMANS
)\.
This activity will be wholly financed through
the Road Maintenance Fund\. Its objective is to test and adapt a new approach for assuring cost-
effective road maintenance on the National Road Network through a service-level approach\.
Cape Verde has been selected as one of four countries to receive grant funds to finance the
preparation of pilot performance based road management and maintenance (GMANS) contracts\.
The preparation of these contracts is being funded by a grant from the Global Partnership for
Output-Based Aid (GPOBA), which receives most of its financing from the United Kingdom
Department for International Development (DFID)\.
5\. Financing
Source: ($m\.)
BORROWER/RECIPIENT 4
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION
15
Page 9
TBD 27\.5
Total
46\.5
6\. Implementation
The project will be managed directly by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport (MIT),
through a Program Coordination Office, attached directly to the Ministers Office\. The primary
responsibility of this Office will be to ensure overall management of the project and coordination
of other related donor support for the overall Transport Sector Program, as well as technical and
fiduciary oversight of the Road Sector Support Project\.
7\. Sustainability
The Governments commitment to and ownership of the project may be seen in the concrete
steps it has taken to reform road sector institutions, as set out in the Letter of Road Sector Policy\.
This includes the creation of the Road Agency and the commitment to reform the Road Fund to
ensure stable and sustainable maintenance financing\. The Government has also committed
significant domestic resources to the achievement of the overall Priority Strategic Programme for
Infrastructures and Land Use Management, to which this project contributes\.
Critical to the sustainability of the project will be establishing the new Road Agency and
reformed Road Maintenance Fund on a solid footing\. The project addresses this factor in the
design by emphasizing institutional support to both these agencies\.
8\. Lessons Learned from Past Operations in the Country/Sector
The project design reflects several lessons learned in Cape Verde and similar countries, through
the Sub Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP) and sector projects\. First, it has been
shown that the application of purely economic investment criteria is not sufficient for securing
minimum access requirements, in support of economic development and poverty reduction
activities, particularly on small island networks\. Rather, investment and maintenance programs
need to maintain a network and service-level perspective, so as to understand connectivity needs
within the islands and their linkages to maritime and air transport nodes\. Economic analysis tools
are then applied to achieve economically justifiable and/or cost effective technical solutions for
achieving minimum access service levels on the network as a whole\. Second, the technical
approach for road management reflects Cape Verdes successful and cost-effective approach for
lower volume roads of using basalt cobblestones, which are in abundance in the country\. Third,
the project design supports one of the main conclusions of the Government Priority Strategic
Programme that physical investments must be accompanied by viable maintenance
management systems and sustainable finance arrangements, if the benefits of these investments
are not to be short-lived\. In this regard, past experience in Cape Verde has shown that without a
dedicated agency for road management, one cannot hope to achieve a standard of service needed
to support economic development and poverty reduction objectives\. The project will benefit
from Cape Verdes participation in the SSATP, which promotes exchange of knowledge and
experience in road sector management among 30 member countries in Sub Saharan Africa\.
9\. Safeguard Policies (including public consultation)
Page 10
Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project
Yes
No
Environmental Assessment
(
OP
/
BP
/
GP
4\.01) [x]
[
]
Natural Habitats (
OP
/
BP
4\.04)
[
]
[x]
Pest Management (
OP 4\.09
)
[
]
[x]
Cultural Property (
OPN 11\.03
,
being revised as OP 4\.11)
[
]
[x]
Involuntary Resettlement (
OP
/
BP
4\.12)
[
]
[x]
Indigenous Peoples (
OD 4\.20
,
being revised as OP 4\.10)
[
]
[x]
Forests (
OP
/
BP
4\.36)
[
]
[x]
Safety of Dams (
OP
/
BP
4\.37)
[
]
[x]
Projects in Disputed Areas (
OP
/
BP
/
GP
7\.60)
*
[
]
[x]
Projects on International Waterways (
OP
/
BP
/
GP
7\.50)
[
]
[x]
Abbreviated Compensation Plan\.
The construction of a box culvert bridge on the Vila das
Pombas and 1 km liaison between Vila das Pombas and Eito will involve a widening of the road,
which is presently only 3 meters wide at the south end\. This will involve minor land taking
concerning existing stone walls, which will require compensation\. For this, an Abbreviated
Compensation Plan was disclosed in the country on January 28, 2005 and disclosed in the
InfoShop February 8, 2005\.
Implementation capacity\.
The Program Coordination Office in the Ministry of Infrastructure
and Transport, will be responsible for the overall implementation of the safeguards policies\.
Consultations\.
Consultations were carried out during the development of individual road
Environmental Management Plans\.
Disclosure\.
The draft Environmental Impact Study has been made available in the country for
comment on January 28, 2005 and was made available to the InfoShop on February 9, 2005\. The
Resettlement Action Plan Framework Policy was made available in the country on January 28,
2005 and was made available to the InfoShop on February 8, 2005\.
10\. Contact point
Contact: Gylfi Palsson
Title: Sr\. Transport Specialist
Tel: (202) 473-6713
Fax: (202) 473-8038
Email: gpalsson@worldbank\.org
11\. For more information contact:
The InfoShop
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
*
By supporting the proposed project, the Bank does not intend to prejudice the final determination of the parties' claims on the
disputed areas
Page 11
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 458-5454
Fax: (202) 522-1500
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/infoshop | APPROVAL |
P169252 |  The World Bank
Scale-Up & Responding to the needs of Refugees and Host Communities (P169252)
Combined Project Information Documents /
Integrated Safeguards Datasheet (PID/ISDS)
Appraisal Stage | Date Prepared/Updated: 26-Mar-2019 | Report No: PIDISDSA25736
Mar 13, 2019 Page 1 of 16
The World Bank
Scale-Up & Responding to the needs of Refugees and Host Communities (P169252)
BASIC INFORMATION
OPS_TABLE_BASIC_DATA
A\. Basic Project Data
Country Project ID Project Name Parent Project ID (if any)
Burkina Faso P169252 Scale-Up & Responding to P124015
the needs of Refugees
and Host Communities
Parent Project Name Region Estimated Appraisal Date Estimated Board Date
Social Safety Net Project AFRICA 01-Apr-2019 29-May-2019
Practice Area (Lead) Financing Instrument Borrower(s) Implementing Agency
Social Protection & Labor Investment Project Burkina Faso, Ministry of Ministry of Women,
Financing Economy and Finance National Solidarity and
Family
Proposed Development Objective(s) Parent
The project development objective (PDO) is to provide income support to poor households and to lay the foundations
for a basic safety net system in Burkina Faso\.
Components
Cash transfers and awareness programs for poor and vulnerable households
Laying the foundations for an adaptive national safety net system
Project management
Productive Labor-Intensive Public Works (LIPW) Program
Contingent Emergency Response Component
PROJECT FINANCING DATA (US$, Millions)
SUMMARY -NewFin1
Total Project Cost 100\.00
Total Financing 100\.00
of which IBRD/IDA 100\.00
Financing Gap 0\.00
DETAILS -NewFinEnh1
World Bank Group Financing
Mar 13, 2019 Page 2 of 16
The World Bank
Scale-Up & Responding to the needs of Refugees and Host Communities (P169252)
International Development Association (IDA) 100\.00
IDA Credit 7\.00
IDA Grant 93\.00
Environmental Assessment Category
B-Partial Assessment
Decision
The review did authorize the team to appraise and negotiate
B\. Introduction and Context
1\. The proposed second additional financing (AF2) to the Burkina Faso Social Safety Net Project (P124015) will
provide an additional credit in the amount of US$ 7 million and a grant in the amount of US$ 93 million to Burkina Faso
for scaling up the national social safety net (SSN) and supporting social and economic integration of refugees and host
communities in the fragile Sahel region\. US$ 7 million credit and US$ 7 million grant would come from the IDA 18 Refugee
Sub-Window\.
2\. The AF2 would help finance the costs associated with (a) scaling up the project to additional geographic areas
including, but not limited to, the provinces of Center-West, Boucle du Mouhoun Center-North as well as the fragile Sahel
region and covering in excess of an estimated additional 625,000 individual beneficiaries; (b) implementing new activities
aimed at refugees and host communities in the Sahel region of the country following a formal request by the Burkinabe
government to this effect; (c) covering cost over-runs in the parent project; and (d) to meet additional project
management, supervision, and incremental operating costs\. The design of the project, including its components, would
be modified to accommodate the new activities to support refugees and host communities in the Sahel region\. The
proposed scaleâ?up would lead to increased targets in selected PDO and intermediary outcome indicators\. The original
project would also be restructured to extend the project closing date to March 31, 2024\.
Country Context
3\. Despite relatively high growth, the economy has not created sufficient jobs for the rapidly growing workforce, 80
percent of which is employed in agriculture with an annual income of less than $3501\. Poverty remains widespread and
vulnerability is high\. In 2014, 40 percent of the population was living in poverty, down from 50 percent in 2003\. The
absolute number of the poor did not change significantly, however, standing at about 7 million people, due to rapid
population growth\. Clustering around the poverty line means that a large part of the population is vulnerable to falling
into poverty\. Two thirds of households report that they suffer from shocks each year, mostly related to natural hazards\.2
Poverty is largely a rural phenomenon with about 90 percent of the poor living in rural areas\. Rapid population growth of
1 World Bank\. "Burkina Faso Systematic Country Diagnostic\." 2017\.
2 Ibid
Mar 13, 2019 Page 3 of 16
The World Bank
Scale-Up & Responding to the needs of Refugees and Host Communities (P169252)
3\.1 percent per year is putting pressures on the delivery of basic services\.
4\. Indicators of human development remain low and a large part of the population lacks access to basic services\.3
For example, under-five mortality rate was 81\.6 per 1,000 live births compared to an average of 76\.5 in Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA)\. Net school enrolment of children 6-11 was 66 percent compared to 79 in SSA\. Acute malnutrition was 7\.6
percent and incidence of stunting was 27\.3 percent in 2016\.
5\. Burkina Faso hosts over 25,000 refugees, the large majority from Mali, and increasing numbers of internally
displaced persons (IDPs)\. Most Malian refugees in Burkina Faso live in the arid Sahel region\. More than half of the refugees
live in the Mentao refugee camp near the town of Djibo and the Goudoubo refugee camp near the town of Dori\. The
remaining refugees live in host communities in Oudalan and Soum provinces\. There are smaller numbers of refugees
living in the urban areas of Ougadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso\. A biometric census of the refugee population carried out
by UNHCR and the Government in 2017 found that almost two-thirds of the refugees (64 percent) were under the age of
18\. Adult women make up another 20 percent of the population\.
Sectoral and Institutional Context
Social Protection in Burkina Faso
6\. Burkina Fasoâs social protection strategy (Politique Nationale de Protection Sociale, PNPS) for 2012-2022 has a
twofold objective: (i) the development of adequate and sustainable protection mechanisms against idiosyncratic and
exogenous shocks through the use of safety nets, and (ii) the extension of social insurance coverage to
informal/agricultural sectors\. Institutional anchoring and responsibility for the PNSP is shared between the Ministry of
Public Service for the contributory social protection programs and the Ministry of Women, National Solidarity and Family
(Ministère de la Femme, de la Solidaritée Nationale, et de la Famille, MFSNF) for non-contributory ones\. The overall
coordination of the action plan arising from this strategy is entrusted to the National Social Welfare Council ( Conseil
National pour la Protection Sociale, CNPS), chaired by the Prime Minister\.
7\. The social protection system in Burkina Faso consists of programs with limited coverage, efficiency and coherence\.
Increased attention to social safety net (SSN) programs in recent years has translated in a rise in SSN spending, from 1
percent of GDP in 2010 to 2\.3 percent in 2015\.4 The largest SSN programs are: school children (school feeding program
for primary schools and school supply program, representing about 15 percent of SSN spending), cash for work program
(representing 11 percent of SSN spending), scholarships (for post-secondary schools, not targeted to vulnerable (with 86
percent of benefits going to the top quintile according to the EMC20145, and accounting for 11 percent of SSN spending),
targeted food subsidies and nutrition programs\. Spending on unconditional cash transfers has been increasing in recent
years but remains relatively low (about 1 percent of total SSN spending in 2016), and donor-driven\.
8\. The Government of Burkina Faso is aware of the situation and is taking steps to address the key challenges in the
sector through gradually scaling up the Bank-supported cash transfer project âBurkin-Naong â Sa Yaâ?, targeted to the
poorest households\. The government is also working on building a national social registry of vulnerable households, which
will help consolidate SSN programs and channel support to the neediest\.
3 Burkina Faso ranked 183 of 189 countries on the 2017 United Nations Human Development Index (UNDP 2018)\.
4 According to preliminary estimates of the ongoing SSN review
5 Household Survey - Enquete de Menages Continue (EMC)
Mar 13, 2019 Page 4 of 16
The World Bank
Scale-Up & Responding to the needs of Refugees and Host Communities (P169252)
Refugee Situation
9\. The refugee population is highly vulnerable and dependent on food and other cash and in-kind assistance from
the humanitarian community, particularly those living in the camps\. The World Food Program (WFP) is providing food
and nutritional assistance in camps\. Continued budget cuts, however, have led to increasing cuts in rations\.
10\. Women and girl refugees are disproportionally vulnerable\. While the Government has made an effort to sensitize
citizens about the illegality and negative consequences of child marriage, some girls are still married off as young as 12,
with lifetime negative consequences for the health and education of both the mothers and their children\. Fertility rates
are high (6\.7 children per woman), coupled with a high risk of maternal mortality\. UNHCR has identified 6 percent of the
female refugee population as being at risk\.
11\. Some refugees practice traditional master-servant relationships that meet the ILO definition of âforced laborâ as
wages are commonly withheld6 and which are illegal under Art\. 2 of the Burkinabe constitution and other laws7\. The Bella
ethnicity among the Tuareg, and the Rimaibe ethnicity among the Burkinabe host population, have traditionally been
used as unpaid house servants and have historically accepted these relationships to escape poverty\. While the practice is
outlawed and has become very rare in Burkina Faso, it is widespread among refugees and psychologically anchored in the
minds of many âmasterâ and âservantâ families\.
12\. The relationship between the refugees and host communities is by and large one of peaceful co-existence,
although there are potential stresses\. While of different ethnic composition, both hosts and refugees are overwhelmingly
pastoralists, with a long history of mobility and interaction between communities\. UNHCR and other partners have made
their basic service delivery open to Burkinabe, which has further supported local tolerance of refugees\. However, with
both populations relying on scarce natural resources to feed their livestock, and with increased insecurity in the region
at times associated with refugees, this positive relationship has come under increased pressure\.
13\. The Burkinabe Government has adopted a progressive approach to managing the refugee situation\. Burkina Faso
is a party to several international conventions related to refugees\. These include the 1951 United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees as well as the
1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa\. The government adopted a Refugee
Law in 2008 and two implementing decrees in 2011\.
14\. The 2008 Refugee Law reflects the main provisions of the 1951 Convention and OAU Convention\. Article 11 of the
law grants refugees the same treatment as nationals with respect to: (a) freedom of religion and worship; (b) the right to
property; (c) the right of access to justice, including legal aid; (d) the right to work; (e) the right to housing; (f) the right to
education, including free education in basic education and access to university; (g) freedom of movement; (h) the right
to transfer assets; and (i) the right to public assistance\. Article 11 also specifies that refugees may, subject to conditions
applicable to foreigners in general, be granted: the right to obtain identity documents and travel documents; the right to
acquire citizenship; and freedom of association for non-political activities
15\. The Government established the National Commission for Refugees (Commission Nationale pour les Réfugiés,
CONAREF) in 2008, which is responsible for refugee issues, including: registration of asylum seekers; refugee status
determination; provision of identity documents and attestations for various purposes (employment, purchase of
6 ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No\. 29)
7 E\.g\. Loi no\. 029-2008/AN Portant Lutte Contre La Traite Des Personnes Et Les Pratiques Assimilées
Mar 13, 2019 Page 5 of 16
The World Bank
Scale-Up & Responding to the needs of Refugees and Host Communities (P169252)
property); and camp administration\. The Commission sits in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and works closely with UNHCR
in the management of refugee affairs\.
Situation of the host population in the Sahel region
16\. The host communities in the Sahel region are facing severe difficulties in addition to those related to the refugee
presence\. The region has been structurally underserved by the central government for years and has for example 439
citizens per civil servant compared to the national average of 160\. Generally, there is a high gap in access to services such
as water, food markets, electricity, roads and schools\. This combines with higher aridity and inclement weather to expose
inhabitants to food insecurity\.
17\. The area has a high rate of child marriage\. The average age at marriage for women is lowest among all regions,
with 16 years, compared to 18 nationally and 20 in Ouagadougou\. The first pregnancy also comes early, at 18 years
compared to 19 years nationally and 20 years in the countryâs central region\. 40 percent of 15-19-year-old women have
already given birth and with more than 7 children per woman, this region has the highest fertility rate in Burkina\.
Consequently, the Sahel population is overall younger than the rest of the country\.
18\. Women are markedly disempowered in the Sahel, also with respect to the rest of the country\. 65 percent of
married women in the Sahel do not participate in any key decisions of the household, for example concerning their own
healthcare, shopping or visiting relatives, compared to 41 percent nationwide\. Only 6 percent participate in decisions on
their healthcare, compared to 24 percent nationwide\.
Security situation
19\. Since 2016, extremist armed groups have been active in northern Burkina Faso and launched attacks on other
parts of the country\. Two terrorist attacks in Ouagadougou in January 2016 and August 2017 carried out by these groups
killed 49 people and wounded many more\. Security along the borders with Mali and Niger has been deteriorating with
marked intensification of security incidents in the past year\. The number of attacks and kidnappings has shown a worrying
upward trend making it more difficult to operate in border provinces\. The World Bank staff have been unable to travel to
the Sahel region since May 2018\. Other development partners have also restricted staff travel to the north of the country
and have introduced varying security protocols\.
C\. Proposed Development Objective(s)
Original PDO
20\. The project development objective (PDO) is to provide income support to poor households and to lay the
foundations for a basic safety net system in Burkina Faso\.
Current PDO
21\. The PDO is to increase access of poor and vulnerable households to safety nets and to lay the foundations for an
adaptive safety net system in Burkina Faso\.
Key Results
22\. The project aims to provide a safety net to about 625,000 people (102,000 households) through cash transfers
and public works, including to refugees and host communities in the fragile Sahel region\. It aims to increase consumption
Mar 13, 2019 Page 6 of 16
The World Bank
Scale-Up & Responding to the needs of Refugees and Host Communities (P169252)
of the poorest households and achieve a greater targeting efficiency (of no less than 60 percent of benefits accruing to
the poorest 2 wealth quintiles)\. It also aims to provide accompanying activities related to nutrition, early childhood
development (ECD), primary education, and economic activities to the beneficiary households\. Moreover, the project
aims to continue to build safety net systems and build household resilience, including to the climate change\. Therefore,
the project will help strengthen results related to the establishment of a payment system, a targeting system, and a
temporary adaptive benefit whose technical parameter allows it to scale up and down quickly in response to shocks\.
D\. Project Description
23\. The social safety net project will benefit from additional financing of USD 100m, which is intended to expand the
activities of the on-going project and to increase the access of poor households in refugee and host communities to
earnings and human capital building opportunities\. Specifically, the additional financing will consist of 5 components as
follows\.
Component 1: Cash transfers and awareness program for poor households (US$ 83 million)
24\. The additional financing will allow the project to expand its cash transfers and accompanying measures from the
current East, Center East, Center West, and North Regions to additional regions\. These regions have been identified in
line with the Governmentâs Program to Strengthen Local Economies (PADEL) and in addition include those that host
substantial refugee populations\. Specifically, the regions the additional financing will allow to cover include all four
provinces of the Sahel region (Oudalan, Séno, Soum, and Yagha), Centre-Ouest, Centre-Nord and Boucle de Mouhoun
regions\.
25\. The component also includes accompanying measures in participating communities to assist households to
improve practices related to human development and in particular nutrition\. Furthermore, given the prevalence of child
marriage, gender-based violence (GBV) and master-servant relations in newly selected regions and among certain parts
of refugee communities, the additional financing allows to expand the projectâs accompanying measures to influence
behaviors in the direction of preventing GBV and social stigmatization and abuse, enabling due follow-up for victims, as
well as reducing the practice of child marriage\. In addition, given the closure of schools in the Sahel region as an effect of
violence, and children being out of school, the accompanying measures will also include radio-based primary schooling\.
Targeting both the beneficiaries of the cash transfers as well as those of labor-intensive public works, this is expected to
reach around 82,000 children in the Sahel\.
Component 2: Laying the foundations for a basic national safety net system (no additional allocation under additional
financing)
26\. This component assists the country in designing and developing operational building blocks that can be used for
coordinating safety net programs and increasing their effectiveness through a systemic approach\. The objective is to
contribute to the establishment of a long-term effective and sustainable (institutionally, politically and financially) system
of safety nets anchored in the national social protection strategy\. No additional funding is foreseen for this component,
but by expanding the use of the existing safety net system and including refugees and host communities as potential
beneficiaries, the current beneficiary database can take a step towards becoming a social registry\. Given the close
collaboration with actors of the humanitarian community, such as UNHCR, WFP and others, the additional financing could
encourage these actors to include their beneficiaries in the integrated national system\.
Mar 13, 2019 Page 7 of 16
The World Bank
Scale-Up & Responding to the needs of Refugees and Host Communities (P169252)
Component 3: Productive Labor-Intensive Public Works (LIPW) Program (US$ 7\.5 million)
27\. This new component targets refugees and host communities in the Sahel region\. Beneficiaries will receive income-
generating employment opportunities while rehabilitating and maintaining infrastructure in both rural and urban settings
and creating economic activity that would create additional job and income opportunities\. The LIPW component would
be implemented in 5 communes in the Sahel region, both urban and rural, but an expansion to other regions could be
envisioned in the future\. While all public works will take place outside of refugee camps, self-selected participation will
be open to refugees and host communities alike\.
Component 4: Project management (US$ 9\.5 million)
28\. This component contributes to the management and coordination activities related to the first three components\.
Component 5: Contingent Emergency Response Component (No initial allocation)
29\. Given the deteriorating security situation, increased displacement and climate-related shocks, a Contingent
Emergency Response Component (CERC) is added to the project\. Following an eligible crisis or emergency, the Borrower
may request the Bank to re-allocate project funds to support emergency response and reconstruction\. This component
would draw from the uncommitted grant resources from this project (and other projects at the decision of Country
Management) to cover emergency response\. An eligible crisis or emergency is an event that has caused, or is likely to
imminently cause, a major adverse economic and/or social impact, associated with a natural or man-made crisis or
disaster\.8 Additional criteria for the activation of the CERC include the declaration of a state of emergency (or equivalent)
by the competent national or subnational authority in accordance with Burkina Fasoâs emergency response laws and
regulations\.9 Consistent with the operational policies of the World Bank Group, the CERC does not finance humanitarian
assistance or relief but focuses on (a) rebuilding and restoring physical assets; (b) restoring the means of production and
economic activities; (c) preserving or restoring essential services; (d) establishing and/or preserving human, institutional,
and/or social capital, including economic reintegration of vulnerable groups; (e) facilitating peace building; (f) assisting
with the crucial initial stages of building capacity for longer-term reconstruction, disaster management, and risk
reduction; and (g) supporting measures to mitigate or avert the potential effects of imminent emergencies or future
emergencies or crises in countries at high risk\.10
E\. Implementation
Institutional and Implementation Arrangements
30\. Project execution is entrusted to the project implementation unit (Unité de gestion du projet, UGP), a semi-
autonomous unit under the authority of the Ministry of Women, National Solidarity and Family (Ministère de la Femme,
de la Solidaritée Nationale, et de la Famille, MFSNF)\. A multi-sectoral steering committee presided by the General
Secretary (Secrétaire Général) of the MFSNF and a vice president from the Ministry of Economy and Finance will oversee
the project\. In view of the security situation in the Sahel region that prevents the Bank from supervising activities on the
8 Operational Policy 8\.00 on âRapid Response to Crises and Emergenciesâ? revised on 1 July 2014 provides definitions and
guidance\.
9 Activation criteria for the CERC are specified in the CERC Annex to the Project Operations Manual\.
10 See Operational Policy 8\.00 on âRapid Response to Crises and Emergenciesâ? revised on 1 July 2014
Mar 13, 2019 Page 8 of 16
The World Bank
Scale-Up & Responding to the needs of Refugees and Host Communities (P169252)
ground, the project will enter in a third-party monitoring (TPM) arrangement with credible partners that are able to field
missions to Sahel and provide reports back to the PIU and the Bank\. The TPM partner will be identified through an open
tendering process\.
\.
F\. Project location and Salient physical characteristics relevant to the safeguard analysis (if known)
The project already operates in some of the most disadvantaged regions of the country - where chronic
monetary poverty and chronic malnutrition (stunting) are the highest\. These regions include the Est, Nord,
and the Centre-Est\. The expansion under the Additional Financing will prioritize Boucle du Mouhoun and the
fragile Sahel region\. Boucle de Mouhoun is particularly affected by poverty and food insecurity, and the
Sahel is the countryâs most fragile region with the lowest density of services\. The LIPWs w ould be limited to
the Sahel region at this stage and therefore the safeguard analysis also focuses on this region\. The relief in
the Sahel region is closely related to the geological context and dominated by the dune system, thalwegs
and depressions, mounds and hills, large areas of glacis\. There are four types of soils: sands on Aeolian
sands, deep clay soils or eutrophic brown soils, deep alluvial soils, soils with medium and low depths\. The
vegetation is essentially characterized by four types of vegetation: a steppe, a tiger bush, a shrub savannah
and a tree savannah respectively\. The Sahel region is characterized by frequent rainfall deficits with severe
ecological crises\. The hydrographic network is relatively dense\. The desert and the arid steppes are rarely
embellished with a watercourse (usually seasonal) or a natural or artificial water body\. The fauna is
therefore less numerous and less varied\. The landscapes however remain impressive within these large
spaces\. With the exception of the Oursi Pond, a wet ecosystem of great importance for local wildlife and
migratory birds, the protection of the spaces in northern Burkina Faso is mainly aimed at reducing the
impact of intensive exploitation\.
G\. Environmental and Social Safeguards Specialists on the Team
Fatoumata Diallo, Social Specialist
Leandre Yameogo, Environmental Specialist
SAFEGUARD POLICIES THAT MIGHT APPLY
SAFEGUARD _TBL
Safeguard Policies Triggered? Explanation (Optional)
The beneficiaries will be both the host and refugee
Environmental Assessment OP/BP 4\.01 Yes communities and between the Project Components,
some will have risks and negative environmental
Mar 13, 2019 Page 9 of 16
The World Bank
Scale-Up & Responding to the needs of Refugees and Host Communities (P169252)
impacts due to Productive Labor-Intensive Public
Works (LIPWs) to improve sanitation and establish
collective productive infrastructures, or maintain
urban infrastructure in the targeted communes\.
Overall, the impacts of the project on the target
areas and populations are expected to be positive in
terms of solutions to ecological and livelihood
problems, conservation of biodiversity, soils and
physical cultural heritage\. Nevertheless, it is also
anticipated that project activities may result in
minor negative environmental impacts and risks\.
LIPWs activities such as bottom-land development
and other small rural investments may have small
potential negative environmental impacts that may
include the loss of vegetation, an increase in solid
wastes to be managed (linked to street and drainage
systems cleaning)\.
Performance Standards for Private Sector
No The Project will not finance Private Sector Activities\.
Activities OP/BP 4\.03
The project is not intending and will not support
Natural Habitats OP/BP 4\.04 No
investments in natural habitats\.
The Project will not finance subprojects with
Forests OP/BP 4\.36 No activities dealing with commercial use of forest and
deforestation\.
The project will not support the implementation of
Pest Management OP 4\.09 No
agricultural activities\.
The Project will not involve Physical Cultural
Resources during the minor civil works in general\.
Component 3 of the Project, particularly will finance
among other activities, the establishment of
collective productive infrastructures in the context
of rural labor intensive public works\. However, in the
region, the rock art of the Burkinabe Sahel is
Physical Cultural Resources OP/BP 4\.11 Yes
manifested in Markoye (commune located at about
thirty km from the border of Mali) by rock paintings
on several sets of rocks engraved in two villages:
Sorbaia and Tondiedo)\. The prepared Environmental
and Social Management Framework (ESMF) includes
a section on Physical Cultural Resources in case of
â?Chance findingsâ?\.
Indigenous Peoples OP/BP 4\.10 No There are no indigenous people in the country\.
The Component 3 of the Project will finance among
other activities, the establishment of collective
Involuntary Resettlement OP/BP 4\.12 Yes
productive infrastructure in the context of rural
labor intensive public works (LIPWs)\. These planned
Mar 13, 2019 Page 10 of 16
The World Bank
Scale-Up & Responding to the needs of Refugees and Host Communities (P169252)
activities may involve acquisition of land that would
lead to losses of property, losses or limitations of
access to means of production or sources of income,
restrictions on access to natural resources for
categories of persons among host populations or
refugees\. Although, it is expected that the sub-
projects will have agreements or land tenure
arrangements established before commencing of
civil works, however the implementation of these
activities may lead to involuntary resettlement
operations\. Since exact types of activities and
specific locations of expected investments are not
yet known at this stage of project preparation, a
Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) has been
therefore, prepared by the Borrower as a
precautionary measure\. The RPF will serve as a guide
for developing and implementing of the subsequent
Resettlement Action Plans (RAP) as needed\. The
prepared RPF will be reviewed, consulted upon,
approved by the Borrower and the World Bank and
will be disclosed within the country and on the
World Bank website prior to project appraisal\.
Safety of Dams OP/BP 4\.37 No The project will not involve dams in its components\.
It will not support activities that require extraction
Projects on International Waterways of water from or will induce pollution discharge in
No
OP/BP 7\.50 any international waterways (river, canal, lake or any
water body that flows through two or more states)\.
Projects in Disputed Areas OP/BP 7\.60 No There are no Disputed areas in the country\.
KEY SAFEGUARD POLICY ISSUES AND THEIR MANAGEMENT
OPS_SAFEGUARD_SUMMARY_TBL
A\. Summary of Key Safeguard Issues
1\. Describe any safeguard issues and impacts associated with the proposed project\. Identify and describe any potential
large scale, significant and/or irreversible impacts:
The environmental assessment Category of the project is âBâ? and the risk is rated moderate\. The first phase of the
project does not involve any physical investments and therefore does not have any environmental or social impacts\.
However, the subsequent phases will involve minor civil works and to this end, the Borrower has prepared an ESMF as
part of the project implementation to analyze the potential risks, impacts and describe their mitigation plans\. At this
stage, the actual locations have not been identified and the impacts are not known\. Once the sites are identified,
environmental and social screening mechanisms, related to potential large scale, significant and/or irreversible
impacts, will be used to determine the type of instruments to be developed prior to project implementation\.
Mar 13, 2019 Page 11 of 16
The World Bank
Scale-Up & Responding to the needs of Refugees and Host Communities (P169252)
2\. Describe any potential indirect and/or long term impacts due to anticipated future activities in the project area:
The potential long-term impacts by and large are anticipated to be positive\. Project activities will lead to improved
access to earning opportunities for refugee and poor local households either through temporary employment or
through access to productive assets, and improve their human capital\. Overall, there are no major negative
environmental impacts expected from the proposed project\. However, LIPWs activities such as bottom-land
development and other small rural investments and/or their productive use may have small potential negative
environmental impacts that may include loss of vegetation, an increase in solid waste (linked to street and drainage
systems cleaning)\. Potential adverse environmental and social impacts of project activities are generally small scale
and site specific, and thus easily manageable to a satisfactory level\.
3\. Describe any project alternatives (if relevant) considered to help avoid or minimize adverse impacts\.
Analysis of alternatives will be conducted as part of the sub-project environmental and social impact screening during
implementation\. The projectâs approach is however to avoid impacts on dwellings and livelihoods through
identification of alternative site and other technical considerations\. Since specific locations and designs are
undetermined at this stage, an ESMF and RPF have been prepared and will be disclosed prior to appraisal\.
4\. Describe measures taken by the borrower to address safeguard policy issues\. Provide an assessment of borrower
capacity to plan and implement the measures described\.
Based on the risks profile, the project triggers OP/BP 4\.01, OP/BP 4\.11 and OP/BP 4\.12\. In order to comply with these
policies, the project has prepared an ESMF and RPF since specific locations and designs are undetermined at this
stage\. The ESMF and RPF provide the framework and guidance for environmental and social due diligence, impact
assessments and mitigation planning once the project intervention areas are identified during implementation\. The
project has made provision of a social and environmental screening for each sub-project\. The borrower is required to
prepare, publicly disclose and implement sub-project level ESIAs, RAPs as needed prior to commencement of any civil
works\. In terms of responsibility, the PIU at MFSNF will have the ultimate responsibility for ensuring successful project
implementation including adherence to safeguards measures and compliance\. At the national level, an environmental
and social safeguards specialist will be recruited to the staff of the PIU to support, coordinate and supervise all
safeguards related activities\. At the regional level (Sahel region), all implementing partners will be required to have a
safeguards specialist who will be responsible to follow all relevant ESMF and RPF procedures\. The PIU will make
arrangements to strengthen the capacity of the commune and local staff to identify and address safeguards issues in
accordance with the ESMF and RPF\. Roles and coordination among the various actors supporting safeguards
implementation will be detailed in the Project Implementation Manual (PIM)\.
5\. Identify the key stakeholders and describe the mechanisms for consultation and disclosure on safeguard policies,
with an emphasis on potentially affected people\.
Key stakeholders include the Ministry of Women, National Solidarity and Family, the project implementation unit, and
once sites have been chosen, the affected people can also be identified, including local and international NGOs and
associations in the region\. Social protection sector stakeholders and taking into account gender aspects and
vulnerable groups is an important part of this issue\. The mechanisms for consultation will follow the cultural aspects
of communication in the region; disclosure on safeguard policies will be done on the local radios, focus-groups and by
local leaders in the markets and in the refugees camps\.
Mar 13, 2019 Page 12 of 16
The World Bank
Scale-Up & Responding to the needs of Refugees and Host Communities (P169252)
OPS_SAFEGUARD_DISCLOSURE_TBL
B\. Disclosure Requirements (N\.B\. The sections below appear only if corresponding safeguard policy is triggered)
OPS_EA_DISCLOSURE_TABLE
Environmental Assessment/Audit/Management Plan/Other
For category A projects, date of
Date of receipt by the Bank Date of submission for disclosure distributing the Executive Summary of
the EA to the Executive Directors
04-Mar-2019 14-Mar-2019
"In country" Disclosure
Burkina Faso
12-Mar-2019
Comments
OPS_RA_D ISCLOSURE_T ABLE
Resettlement Action Plan/Framework/Policy Process
Date of receipt by the Bank Date of submission for disclosure
04-Mar-2019 14-Mar-2019
"In country" Disclosure
Burkina Faso
12-Mar-2019
Comments
OPS_PM_ PCR_TABLE
If the project triggers the Pest Management and/or Physical Cultural Resources policies, the respective issues are to
be addressed and disclosed as part of the Environmental Assessment/Audit/or EMP\.
If in-country disclosure of any of the above documents is not expected, please explain why:
OPS_COMPLIANCE_INDICATOR_TBL
C\. Compliance Monitoring Indicators at the Corporate Level (to be filled in when the ISDS is finalized by the project
decision meeting) (N\.B\. The sections below appear only if corresponding safeguard policy is triggered)
OPS_EA_COMP_TABLE
OP/BP/GP 4\.01 - Environment Assessment
Does the project require a stand-alone EA (including EMP) report?
Yes
If yes, then did the Regional Environment Unit or Practice Manager (PM) review and approve the EA report?
Yes
Are the cost and the accountabilities for the EMP incorporated in the credit/loan?
Mar 13, 2019 Page 13 of 16
The World Bank
Scale-Up & Responding to the needs of Refugees and Host Communities (P169252)
Yes
OPS_ PCR_COM P_TA BLE
OP/BP 4\.11 - Physical Cultural Resources
Does the EA include adequate measures related to cultural property?
Yes
Does the credit/loan incorporate mechanisms to mitigate the potential adverse impacts on cultural property?
Yes
OPS_IR_ COMP_TA BLE
OP/BP 4\.12 - Involuntary Resettlement
Has a resettlement plan/abbreviated plan/policy framework/process framework (as appropriate) been prepared?
Yes
If yes, then did the Regional unit responsible for safeguards or Practice Manager review the plan?
Yes
Is physical displacement/relocation expected?
No
Is economic displacement expected? (loss of assets or access to assets that leads to loss of income sources or other
means of livelihoods)
TBD
OPS_ PDI_ COMP_TA BLE
The World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information
Have relevant safeguard policies documents been sent to the World Bank for disclosure?
Yes
Have relevant documents been disclosed in-country in a public place in a form and language that are understandable
and accessible to project-affected groups and local NGOs?
Yes
Mar 13, 2019 Page 14 of 16
The World Bank
Scale-Up & Responding to the needs of Refugees and Host Communities (P169252)
OPS_ALL_COMP_TABLE
All Safeguard Policies
Have satisfactory calendar, budget and clear institutional responsibilities been prepared for the implementation of
measures related to safeguard policies?
Yes
Have costs related to safeguard policy measures been included in the project cost?
Yes
Does the Monitoring and Evaluation system of the project include the monitoring of safeguard impacts and measures
related to safeguard policies?
Yes
Have satisfactory implementation arrangements been agreed with the borrower and the same been adequately
reflected in the project legal documents?
Yes
CONTACT POINT
World Bank
Rebekka E\. Grun
Senior Economist
Borrower/Client/Recipient
Burkina Faso
Ministry of Economy and Finance
Implementing Agencies
Ministry of Women, National Solidarity and Family
Faty Ouedraogo
Secretaire General du Comite de Pilotage
lindaoued@yahoo\.fr
Mar 13, 2019 Page 15 of 16
The World Bank
Scale-Up & Responding to the needs of Refugees and Host Communities (P169252)
FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 473-1000
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/projects
APPROVAL
Task Team Leader(s): Rebekka E\. Grun
Approved By
Safeguards Advisor: Maman-Sani Issa 15-Mar-2019
Practice Manager/Manager: Jehan Arulpragasam 15-Mar-2019
Country Director: Pierre Laporte 03-Apr-2019
Mar 13, 2019 Page 16 of 16 | APPROVAL |
P009773 | Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No\. 8668
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
INDIA
KARNATAKA TANKS IRRIGATION PROJECT
(CREDIT 1116-IN)
MAY 29, 1990
Agriculture Operations Division
Country Department IV
Asia Regional Office
This document bas a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
Cura:ency Equivalent
Current Unit Rupees (Rs)
Appraisal Year (August 1980)
US$ 1\.00 Rs 8\.40
Intervening Years Axerage (1981-88)
US$ 1\.00 = Rs 11\.42
Completion Year Average (March 1989)
US$ 1\.00 = Rs 15\.50
Fiscal Year
(GOI and GOK)
April 1 - March 31
Glossary of Terms and Abbreviation
AD - Agriculture Department
CCA - Cultivable Command Area
CIRCLE - A PWD Echelon, controlled by a Superintending
Engineer
DIVISION - A PWD Echelon, controlled by an Executive
Engineer (approximatley four per circle)
EPS - Lxecutive Project Summary
FAO/CP - FAO Cooperative Programme
FD - Forest Department
GHATS - Western Mountain Chain
GOI - Government of India
GOK - Government of Karnatak
HA - Hectare
IIM - India Institute of Management
IIS - India Institute of Science
MIW - Minor Irrigation Wing
O&M - Operation and Maintenance
PANCHAYAT - A Locally Elected Body
PWD - Public Works Department
R&R -- Resettlement and Rehabilitation
TIP - Tank Irrigation Project
WARABUNDI - Time based Rotational Water Supply on an Area
Proportional Basis
FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY
THE WORLD BANK
Washington\. DC 20433
USA
0fice of DOrector-C\.ral
Opefitimns Viation
May 29, 1990
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on India Karnataka Tanks
Irrigation Project (Credit 1116-IN)
Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled
"Project Completion Report on India - Karnataka Tanks Irrigation Project
(Credit 1116-IN)" prepared by the Asia Regional Office with Part II
contributed by the Borrower\. No audit of this project has been made by the
Operations Evaluation Department at this time\.
Attachment
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
KARNATAKA TANKS IRRTCATION PROJECT
(Credit 1116-IN)
PROJErT COMPLE2TTN RRPORT
TARTLE __ CONTENTS
PREFACE \.
EVALUATION SUMMARY \. ii
Objectives \. ii
Implementation Experience \. ii
Results \. ii
Sustainability \. ii
Findings and Lessons Learned \. iii
PART I PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE
Project Identity \. 1
Background \. \. 1
Project Objectives and Description \. 2
Project Design and Organization \. 3
Project Implementation \. 3
Project Results \. 5
Project Sustainability \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 6
Bank Performance \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 7
Borrower Performance \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 7
Project Relationships \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 8
Consulting and Supporting Services \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 8
Project Documentation and Data \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 8
PART II PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE \. 9
PART III STATISTICAL INFORMATION \. 11
Table 1 Related Bank Loans and Credits
Table 2 Project Timetable
Table 3 Schedule of Disbursements
Table 4 Project Implementation
Table 5A Project Costs
Table SB Project Financing
Table 6A Direct Benefits
Table 6B Economic Impact
Table 6C Economic Cost and Renefift St-reArn
Table 6D Studies
Table 7 Status of Covenants
Table 8A Staff Inputs
Table 8B Missions
Table 9 Details of TIPs
Table 10A Distribution of TIPs by Zone
Table lOB Distribution of TIPs by Size
This document has a restricted distribution and may b\. used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwisec be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
INDIA
KARNATAKA TANKS IRRIGATION PROJECT
(Credit 1116-IN)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PREFACE
This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Karnataka
Tanks Irrigation Project for which Credit 11E-IN in the amount of
US$54\.0 M was approved on March 19, 1981\. The credit was closed on
March 31, 1989, three years behind schedule\. i;: was fully disbursed
and the last disbursement was on April 10, 1989\.
The PCR was prepared by the Agriculture Division of the New
Deihi Kesident Mission with assistance from the Agriculture Operations
Division in Asia Country Department IV (Preface, Evaluation Summary,
Parts I and III)\. The Borrower completed Part II\.
Preparation of this PCR was initiated during the Bank's final
supervision mission of the project in February 1989 and is based on
the Staff Appraisal Report, the Loan and Project Agreements,
Supervision reports, correspondence and internal memoranda\.
- ii -
,1INDIA
KARNATAKA TANKS IRRIGATIO1N PROJE=CT
(Credit 1116-IN)
PXOJECT COMPLETION RVPORT
EVALUATION SUMMIARY
Objectives
1\. The objective of the project was to improve incomes and relieve poverty in a
dry zone of India by improving the efficiency of water use\. Secondary objectives
wete to improve institutional capacity and to improve farmers' participation so
that continuing improvement with irrigation tanks could be expected (para\. 5)\.
Implementation Experience
2\. While the project made a slow start, implementation proceeded quite well
thereafter (para\. 12)\. Problems arose with funding by the State and with the
supply of cement (para\. 12)\. Initially design and construction standards were
unsatisfactory but they later improved markedly (para\. 13)\. A number of
innovative studies and practices were introduced during the project (para\. 14)\.
Initially resettlement was not handled well by GOK but, finally, resettling
families were treated fairly to the Bank's satisfaction (para\. 16)\. PWD's
performance on dam safety did not reach required standards (para\. 16)\. There was,
for some time, poor liaison between the Minor Irrigation Wing and the Agriculture
Department (para\. 17)\.
Results
3\. Taken overall the project was successful with respect to physical and
institutional aspects and with respect to innovations with long term impact, but
it was slow with respect to implementation\. Furthermore, increased costs, the
initial delays and commodity price reductions substantially reduced the economic
rate of return (para\. 18)\. The estimated economic rate of return fell from 20% at
appraisal to 4% at compJetion (para\. 21)\. However, the project is expected to
have a significant impact on poverty alleviation (para\. 22)\. The Minor Irrigation
wing of PWD has gained considerable experience particularly with respect to
appraisal and monitoring of projects, dam safety, rotational water supply and
catchment stabilization (para\. 22)\. A major contribution of the project has been
the initiation of close involvement of beneficiary farmers at all levels of tank
management (para\. 24)\.
3 l-nt a l n ahbi I i tv
4\. Due to sound design standard the structures are expected to be durable (para\.
25), and due to catchment work siltation is expected to be minimized\. However,
the low economic rate of return raises questions about the economic sustainability
which will have to be addressed in future work of this type by utilizing the
results of project studies to search for lower cost approaches (para\. 25)\.
- lli -
Findings and Lessons Learned
5\. The six main lessons learned appear to be the following:
(i) More preparation work on establishing the staffing capa'*tities prior to
project start-up would have avoided the delays cxperienced\.
(ii) The substantial supervision input from Bank technical staff (para\. 27),
combined with an imaginative management, enabled the introduction of a
number of innovative technical components (para\. 18)\.
(iv) Farmer participation is essential for sound management of small
irrigation systems and contact with government staff through a formal
three-tier committee system appears to be a useful model (para\. 24)\.
(v) Close supervision of the project from a Bank staff field office task
force appears to have enabled close contacts at the technical level
which had a considerable pay-off ir' termR of flpvihilitv and innovation
(paras\. 27 and 28)\.
(vi) Technical success does not ensure economic success and review of the
changing economics during the implementation period might have triggered
more attention to cost reducing strategies (para\. 18,\.
INZD1A
RA1NATAKA TANKS~ TRRTaATION PROJE~CT
(Credit 1116-IN)
PROJECT COMPtETTON R-ZZk=
PART T
PROJCT REVTEW FROM RANK'S PERSPCTITVE
Project Identity
Name: Karnataka Tanks Irrigation Project
Credit Number: 1116-IN
RVP Unit: Asia Region
Country: India
Sector: Agriculture
Subsector: Irrigation
Backaround
1\. Following Independence, India embarked on an ambitious development program to
raise agricultural production to reduce the high level of ruidl poverty, to meet
the demands of its rapidly increasing population, and to reduce its dependence on
imports\. At the time of project formulation (1980/81) some 50% of the population
were below the poverty line\. Agriculture employed about 70% of the labour force,
contributed about 45% of GNP, and was responsible for about 50% of exports\. GOI
policy was heavily dependent on irrigation development\. Due to disappointing
implementation and low productivity on many projects, GOI introduced the concept
of Command Area Development, whereby focus was put on the lower echelons of
irrigation systems with the aim of facilitating organized and equitable water
distribution, and the supply of inputs\. Karnataka had a population of about 35 M,
growing at a rate of about 2\.2% per annum\. Some 70% of the working population
were employed in the agriculture sector, which contributed about 48% to State
Domestic Product\. However, in spite of an increase in agricultural production
higher than the all India average, some 70% of the rural population were still
below the poverty line\.
2\. The Stati ;t A\.i-ded -\.t^ f_u\. di_t!ncL t;loqyicai zones as toliows:
a) the Coastal plain (3000 - 3700 mm rainfall)
b) the Western Ghats, on vlrth-south (1000 - 6400 mm rainfall)
mountain chain
c) the Northern Plateau (500 - 900 mm rainfall)
d) the Southern Plateau (500 - 750 mm rainfall)
- 2 -
The major portion of annual rainfall occurs in the S\.W\. monsoon from June to
October\. Due to the unreliability of the monsoon, many areas especially in the
plateaux areas suffer frequent droughts\.
3\. Irrigation tanks are mainly found in the southern Indian States of Karnataka,
Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, and also in Sri Lanka\. Tney may range from below
10 ha to over 1500 ha\. An irrigation tank is a sma-1 reservoir, comprising an
earth bund and a simple ungated spillway, Simple outlet sluices supply the small
commands immediately downstream, normally in unlined canals\. In the dry zones,
the tanks intercep\. the ephemeral run off from small gullies during the monsoon,
and this is utilized as supplemental supply in the kharif season, and in a year of
good rainfall to irrigate a short season rabi crop\. In the dry zones away from
perennial rivers, tanks provide the only source of water, and in addition to
irrigation supply to their commands, they provide improved seepage to groundwater
for irrigation by pumping\.
4\. In the State, tanks have tr\.ditionally been operated informally by the
beneficiaries, with a government employee controlling the supply at the dam in the
larger tankF\. This ad hoc management has led in many cases to inequitable water
allocation\. Tank maintenance is by the Irrigation Wing of the Public Works
Department for those over 200 ha, but below this size they are the responsibility
of the Zilla Panchayats (local elected bodies)\. In general, maintenance is
minimal due to wide dispersion and lack of funds\.
Project Objectives and Desr --,on
5\. The project objective was to construct a number of new irrigation tanks in
those areas where large surface water development was not feasible to increase the
efficiency of water resources use, and to relieve poverty in the dry zones'\.
Secondary objectives consisted of improving GOK's capability to prepare, appraise,
design, construct and operate tank irrigation projects (TIPs), to increase
farmers' participation, and to expand the State hydro-meteorological facilities\.
6\. Project components are detailed in Table 4, Part III\. These are summarized
as:
a) The construction of about 120 - 160 TIP's with an aggregate command area
of some 25,000 ha cultivable command area (CCA);
b) the establishment of rainfall, stream-gauging and agro-climatic stations
in representative locations in the State;
c) the development of a computer assisted runoff model based on regional
rainfall and catchment characteristics to improve yield estimates of
TIPs;
d) the study and subsequent introduction of water users' groups for TIP
management; and
e) the study of water charges with recommendations for their enhancement\.
7\. Technical criteria indicated that TIPs should generally be between 20 ha to
2000 ha command\. Each would have an earthfill embankment, an ungated
masonry/concrete spillway, one or more outlet sluices, and a lined canal system
down to 8 ha level\. Thereafter earth channels would deliver to individual farms\.
It was GOK policy to follow a size distribution of one third 20 ha to 100 ha; one
- 3 -
third 100 ha to 200 ha, and the balance 200 ha to 2000 ha\. In order to bring
maximum contribution to poverty alleviation, some 65% of TIPs would be in Lhc dty
zones and 29% in transitional zonco\. Table lOA, rart III indicates the tentative
regional distribution by area of project TIPs\. Table lOB indicates a more
detailed size distribution\.
8\. Project cost estimates at appraisal are given in Table bA, Part III\. Total
project cost, including price and physical contingencies, was estimated at Rs\.
650\.0 M (Us$ 77\.4 M)\. A weighted average cost for TIP construction was estimated
at Rs\. 21,300/ha, almost double the costs (at 1980 prices) for major and medium
schemes\.
Project Design and Organization
9\. The project as conceived was very pertinent to the national, State and
sectoral requirements\. It was positively defined, both in terms of in3titutional
and technical parameters\. Having been prepared and apprdised in concert with GOK,
there was tull agreement and understanding of the project objectives\. The project
was not innovative with respect to physical components at appraisal, but this was
changed during execution\. What was innovative was the introduction of
computerized yield estimation studies by analytical means rather than the
inaccurate empirical Strange's formula, and the introduction of farmers'
participation in formal committees in the management and operation of TIPs\. Both
responded to perceived weakness in TIP design and operation\. The water charges
study was appropriate for full recovery of 0 & M costs\.
10\. The project appears to have been well researched, prepared, and anpraised\.
The SAR is detailed, concise and clear, and gave positive guidance to both GOK
project staff and Bank supervisions\. The institutional strengthenina included
under the project made for efficient selection, appraisal and monitoring of
project TIPs\.
Pro 1ect Implementation
11\. The project made a very slow start, due mainly to GOK's inability to provide
adequate trained technical staffl, and to very serious delays in the formation of
the many newly created organizations under the project\. Table 3, Part III shows
the record of disbursements, and it is noted that significant expenditure did not
occur before mid 1983, some two years after effectiveness\. Indeed, by September
1982, only four TIPs had actually commenced construction, five were approved, and
only 21 appraised\.
12\. Once the project gained momentum in earlv 1983 it proceeded steadily\. It
was, however, beset in its later years by severe State funding constraints, which
were responsible mainly for the need to extend the closing date by three years\.
With full funding support, it is considered that only a two year extension would
have been required\. Another constraint which arose at intervals was the shortage
of cement supplies, which was partly due to the 'levy' system of supply to
governments at lower cost than to the public\. This system has now been abolished\.
13\. The technical staff of the Minor Irrigation Wing (MIW) of the Public Works
1/ Government argues that there was no inadequacy of trained staff and that
delays were due mainly to time taken to do surveys, studies, land acquisition\.
etc\.
- 4 -
and construction standards were not to the desired levels, but following
considerable FAO/CP and Bank technical assistance, these improved markedly,
demonstrating the willinqness of the engineeLs to modify their practices\. A major
problem was the practice of PWD to rotate its staff between irrigation, buildings,
and road winqs, such that none was specialized\. Partly due to Bank
representation, this policy was amended during the course of the nroject, such
that those staff opting for irrigation were not rotated to other branches\.
Standards subsequently improved\.
14\. A positive and imaginative management permitted the introduction of
additional studies and practices during the course of the project\. These
included:
a} The use of vetiver (khus) grass in catchment erosion control;
b) the model testing of an unconventional spillway weir;
c) the testing on one TIP of a new precast channel system;
d) the introduction of the north Indian designs of outlet and control
structures;
e) the introduction of the north Indian system of warabundi (time based
rotational water supply on an area proportional basis);
f) the use of gabions (rock baskets) for earth slope protection; and
g) the introduction of a further study to permit rapid computer based flood
prediction using an improved computation system\.
15\. Studies carried out under the project are listed and described in Table 6D of
Part III\. The most successful was that carried out by Indian Institute of
Management (IIM), Bangalore on the system of committees for tank management and
operation\. The study of catchment yield carried out by Anna University, Madras,
was incomplete, therefore, at the suggestion of the Bank, a proposal to continue
the study with the Indian Institute of Science (IIS), Bangalore is under
consideration\. The recently introduced flood study has been awarded to Indian
Institute of Technology (IIT), Bombay, and is progressing satisfactorily\.
16\. Resettlement and rehabilitation (R & R) of families displaced was only
significant on two TIPs\. For a conside\. )le period, successive Bank missions
reported adversely on GOK's processing uf resettlement and compensation practices,
but finally the families were fairly treated to the Bank's satisfaction\. With
respect to dam safety PWD's performance failed to reach the required standards\.
Designs of dams were scrutinized by the Dam Review Panel (DRP) but cor?liance with
this condition was delayed\. in addition, the compliance reporLs by PWD M\.W
circles were invariably very delayed (up to two years), and were not always
responsive\. Following Bank representations, this was partly corrected in the
latter period of the project\.
17\. Construction standards and quality control were variable\. Although two
quality control divisions were especially created, Bank missions reported
adversely on quality of construction, especially on canal systems\. A further
major failing over much of the project period was the very poor liaison between
MIW and the Agriculture Department (AD)\. (This point is disputed by GOK\.) This
was subsequently improved following persistent Bank representations\. Staffing
was subsequently improved following persistent Bank representations\. Staffing
constraints in the AD extension services persisted throughout\. The association of
Forest Department (PD) however in catchmient stabilization was very positive\.
Proiect Results
18\. Taker, overall, the project may be considered quite successful with respect to
physical and institutional aspects and with respect to innovations with long term
impact, but slow with respect to implementation\. Furthermore, increased costs,
delays in implementation and comnmodity price reductions substantially reduced the
economic rate of return\. It would have been useful to have probed the economics
at an earlier stage during implementation\. This might have triggered a search
for lower cost, more selective approaches\. 34 of the 78 TIPs have been comoleted
in all respects and are yielding some benefits on 16,800 ha, 30 more are in
advanced construction, and all will be fully completed by June 1991 when the
irrigated area will reach 24,100 ha\. In addition to the physical achievements,
the following results are evident:
a) Water charges were raised genetally in Karnataka on January 1, 1989 based
on project study recommendations\.
b) A three tier TIP committee system has been evolved from project studios,
which comprises the Tank Management Committee, the Irrigation Scheduling
Committee, and the Sluice Committee\. All fully involve the beneficiary
farmers, and MIW, AD, Panchayat and Revenue Department, and the results
reported are favourable\. The system is likely to be extended\.
c) The model tests on the labyrinth weir (a zig-zag weir design which at
lower cost effectively stretches the length of the crest) and subsequent
designs indicate large cost savings and significantly improved hydraulic
efficiency\.
d) The trials of plastic and fibre-glass reinforced cement concrete precast
channels on one TIP were very promising\.
e) The use of vetiver grass in catchment stabilization will, with modest
cost, reduce the rate of siltation of tanks\.
19\. Reference to Table 9, Part III indicates the district and zonal distribution
of TIPs, with their command areas, stages of completion, cost estimates and
completion dates\. It is significant, i\.i common with many projects in India, that
the distribution and micro systems invariably lag behind dam construction\.
20\. The estimate of final project cost is shown in Table 5A, Part III, from which
it is noted that the overall project cost estimate has risen in nominal Rupee
terms from Rs\. 650 M (US$ 77 M) at appraisal to Rs\. 1225 M (US$ 79 M) at full
development\. In 1989-90 constant rupee prices this represented a 51% real
increase\. Specific costs for TIP construction from Table 5A indicate an
escalation of base costs from Rs\. 21,170/ha in 1980 prices at appraisal to Rs\.
50,850/ha at present prices\. Reasons for cost increases include both price and
quantity increases over SAR Projections\.
21\. Direct benefits emanating from the project are given in Table 6A, Part III\.
It should be noted that all indicators, except benefitting farm families and
increase in employment, are estimated to be as at appraisal\. There has been
insufficient time since completion of the command areas to obtain reliable yield
- 6 -
being less than at appraisal, these two indicators both show significant increases
over appraisal estimates\. Project economic impact estimates at appraisal and at
present are indicated in Table 6B, Part III, supported by Table 6C\. Here a
dramatic reduction from 20% ERR at appLdisal to below 4% on present estimate is
noted\. As crop production estimates have not changed much, this reduction is due
principally to cost increases, delayed benefits, and fall in commodity prices\.
22\. The project will, however, have a major impact on poverty alleviation in the
drier zones, where the TIPs constructed will provide the main source of extended
water supply for both irrigation and domestic purposes\. There will be no adverse
environmental effects\. The MIW has gained considerably by its experience due to
the institutional aspects of the project, especially with regard to selection and
appraisal of irrigation projects, including economic considerations; monitoring of
projects with improved quality control surveillance; dam safety; rotational water
supply; and catchment stabilization\. The MIW has also been motivated to review
and investijate improved and more cost effective technical components\.
23\. Little was expended under the project for the hydrometeorological aspects\.
The State hydrology services have absorbed this component under their no-raal
activities\.
24\. A major contribution of the project has been the attempt to ensure
involvement of the beneficiary farmers at all levels of tank management and
operation through the three-tier committee system\. This also has the advantage of
bringing the farmers into periodic contact with the MIW, AD, Revenue Department
and Panchayats; something which would not occur under the previous arrangement\.
While evaluations show that this did not work well in all tanks, there are a
number of tanks uhere these committees are alread: demonstrating their marked
influence on farmer cropping coordination, equity of distribution, solving of
disputes, and irrigation efficiency\. This model is ready for extrapolation
throughout India, not only for TIPs\. Finally, due to a project study, GOK has
revised water rates to more realistic levels\.
roje,t Sustainability
25\. As the TIPs under the project have been constructed to higher quality
standards than those under the normal Panchayat/State program, it is ;inticipated
that they will be durable and lasting\. In addition, the involvement of Forest
Department in the stabilization of their catchments will result in reduced rates
of tank siltation, a major cause for reduced production\. As spillways have been
sized according to improved procedures, and as the embankments have been based on
correct soil mechanics principles, the risk of tank breach is much reduced\.
However, a worrying aspect of the project is the much increased costs per hectare
and the impact that has had on the economic rate of return and hence the economic
sustainability of tank development\. This must signal the need to search for lower
cost approaches in the future, with greater selectivity in the structural works\.
26\. There are no substantial future management risks in the project; indeed the
evidence to date on the new management and operation system indicates continuing
improved performance\. Only the perceived weakness in the agricultural extension
services is considered to be a constraint, GOK his been persistently reminded of
its importance, and are teking action in this direct4on\.
-\.7-
Bank Performance
27\. Bank activities throughouc the project cycle are shown in detail in Table 8B,
and a summaxy of Bank manpower inputs are given in Table 8A, Part III\. From the
former, it is noted that the Bank and FAO/CP gave above normal technical support
to the farmers' organization studies and to technical training of the engineers in
system design\. What is less evident from this table is thc additional large input
from Bank engineers of technical advice which resulted in MIW carrying out trials
on improved (and experimental) hydraulic structures and linings, and the
commissioning of additional hydrological studies\.
28\. Although Bank supervision/technical assistance missions paid above average
attention to system operation, institutions, water management and engineering, a
major criticism is the almost total lack of agricultural supervision between
Credit effectiveness in May 1981 and early 1985, when the supervision task force
concept was introduced in New Delhi Office\. Thereafter it received its just
recognition, and exposed many weaknesses in agricultural support services which
are now being addressed\. The Bank was also less than attentive to R & R in the
early years of project implementation and to the economic issues later on\. Due to
the imprecise hydrology component, the Bank supervisions were somewhat complacent
over this aspect\.
29\. A major lesson to be learned from this project is that in India, where
irrigation projects are invariably under the direction cf State Irrigation
Departments which are construction oriented, which contain limited staff with
specialist design expertise or exposure to the latest techniques, and which are
reluctant to employ specialist consultants, technical assistance by Bank
specialists can play a very important role in improving project designs and
operation\. Without such input here, the project would have been another standard
development project without advancing into new achievements\. Experience has shown
elsewhere in India that to specify such innovations in the project is not
sufficient to ensure their acceptance and development; rather constant and
persistent monitoring and representation to governments are also required\.
30\. In summary, the Bank performed well at most stages of the project cycle with
the exception of the quite serious weaknesses raised in para 28 above, and
generally utilized its staff, consultants, and FAO/CP in a balanced and effective
manner\. Staff supervision inputs were high, but with a statewide, dispersed
project of this nature this was inevitable\.
Borrower Performance
31\. The initial period of project execution indicated that MIW was not prepared
institutionally or in staff establishment to mobilize and operate the many newly
created organizations for planning, appraisal, quality control and monitoring of
TIPs\. It was not until mid 1983, some two years after effectiveness, that these
organizations became effective\. Staffing deficiencies, especially at Assistant
and Junior Engineer levels however persisted over much of the project period\. The
PWD had traditionally rotated its engineers between its various wings, resulting
in lack of specialist expertise\. This was particularly evident with respect to
hydraulic designs and TIP layouts\. Although FAO/CP and Bank specialists gave
numerous training sessions, the over rapid rotation of the recipients reduced the
effectiveness of the exercise\. Later, after GOK had agreed to permit staff to
serve continuously in a particular wing, this problem was largely resolved\.
- 8 -
32\. There were, earlier on, certain weaknesses in GOK's performance pertaining to
R & R, dam safety, and poor liaison between hIW and AD with respect to extension\.
These shortcomings were later rectified following Bank representations, although
AD's capacity does not appear to have improved\. Other failings by GOK which
adversely affected project implementation were the severe financial restrictions
of 1987/88, and failure to procure adequate quantities of cement at intervals\.
GOK was in default of covenants under Section 3\.02 (farmers' organization) and
3\.03 (water charges) even after they were rescheduled to September 30, 1987 and
December 31, 1987 respectively, but were subsequently brought into compliance\.
Audited accounts for several years were submitted late to the Bank\.
33\. Having pointed out the weaknesses in borrower performance, it must be stated
that overall, following the initial mobilization problems and delays, MIW
demonstrated a very professional and positive approach to the project\. Project
management was strong and decisive, and the Minor Irrigation Committee and other
organizations functioned efficiently\. A major strength of this management was to
encourage and develop new technical and institutional ideas, such that the project
is now a model for TIP development in India\. Monitoring and reporting became well
developed and comprehensive\. At final Bank supervision, the project was awarded a
'1' rating in all four indicators, a rare event in Indian projects\.
Project Relationships
34\. Throughout preparation, appraisal and supervision, the officials of GOK and
its concerned organizations were invariably most cooperative towards Bank
missions, and excellent rslations prevailed throughout, even at those times when
Bank had perforce to make critical comments on their performance\. This was always
accepted pragmatically in the spirit in which they were made\. Due to this, it was
possible to maintain a constructive dialogue, which was in large measure
responsible for the project's substantial measure of success\.
Consulting and Supporting Services
35\. The project was unusual in the large number of consultants it utilized for
the studies pertaining to farmers' organizations, water charges, catchment yield,
and floods\. All were well conducted, although the hydrological studies are
continuing\. All construction was by contractors, which were generally adequate
with respect to dam construction, but inadequate in canal construction\. More
recently the rate of canal construction has been increased\.
Project Documentation and Data
36\. The conditionality was weak in the following respects:
a) No legal covenant was included to ensure the fair and prompt treatment of
displaced persons from the TIP reservoir areas\.
b) No mention was made of the requirement for agricultural supporting
services to assist the TIPs, nor for conservation measures in the
catchments\.
In other respects, the conditionality was adequate\.
- 9 -
37\. The SAR was well written, and presented the project and its components
adequately for project execution and to guide Bank supervisions\. GOK cooperated
fully and promptly with data provision for FCR preparation, although there was
considerable delay in finalizing their Part II of che PCR\.
i ARZ I T
P(OJ_T RWVTRW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPPECTTVR!
38\. The adequacy of the factual information contained in Part III of the PCR is
confirmed\.
39\. Bank's performance during the evolution and implementation of the project was
quite frequent, timely and appreciable\. The designs introduced by the Bank as
against the standard Minor Irrigation (M\.I\.) designs are aimed at greater
efficiency in water delivery and management and evolving safer appropriate designs
ensuring stability of the structures\. The model studies conducted under the
guidance of the Bank were quite useful in arriving at the details of hydrology,
discharge characteristics in each of the agro-climate zones distributed throughout
the State of Karnataka, particularly for M\.I\. Tanks with small catchment areas\.
The system of warabundi suggested for distribution of water through a system of
micro-networks scientifically evolved to benefit the tail-end farmers, and for
equitable distribution, is commendable\.
40\. The design of hydraulic stru';tures such as ungated semi-modular outlets for
equitable distribution with proportionate distributors will be helpful for the
farmers' participation in management of water depending upon the crop pattern\.
41\. The visit of the Bank missions to the tank irrigation projects, in helping
the field staff to maintain the standards of construction, was a most important
guiding factor\. The lessons learned on these projects, especially after the pilot
project studies, were helpful in implementing the other M\.I\. projects and also
future projects to come\.
42\. The technical innovations and approaches with new technical inputs initiated
by the Bank were quite exemplary and the follow-up action taken thereon by the
Bank in implementing the same during every visit have helped the field staff to
implement them successfully to the satisfaction of the Bank, who also expressed
appreciation in several field reports to Government\.
43\. The innovative technical inputs that have made the tank irrigation projects
quite successful are:
i) construction of ungated semi-modular outlets; the introduction of such a
structure has not only saved the disorders in manual operation but also
controlled timely quantum distribution up to the last point under the
farmers' own managing agency\.
- 10 -
ii) construction of proportional distributories\.
iii) construction of tail clusters\.
iv) construction of special turnouts for feeding water to reach every survey
number in the block\.
v) the fibre-glass lining, laybrinth weir, overshot gates, and gabion, have
been taken up as an experimental study and the behaviors of the same will
be studied further\.
44\. The relationship between the Bank and borrower was quite cordial, educating
and guiding in successful implementation of the project from inception to the
closing date\.
45\. The IDA was the sole assisting agency for the project and there were no other
cofinanciers\.
- 1i -
STATTRTTCTr A NTFORMj¶Tp
I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Table 1
Page 1 of 3
INDIA
KARNATAKA TANKS IRRIGATION PROJECT
(Credit 1116-IN)
TABLE 1
Related Bank Loans and Credits
Loan/Credit Purpose Year Status Comments
Details of
Approval
1\. Credit 278-IN: To construct about 16,000 1972 Data not available\. Number of wells exceeded,
Mysore Agricultural wells to provide irrigation in but area benefitted was
Development Project the erstwhile Mysore State\. disappointing\.
(USS 40\.0 M)
2\. Credit 378-IN: To develop markets in 1973 The project closed on The objectives were partly
Karnataka Agricultural Karnataka\. 6130/81 after an 18 achieved\. The Credit was
Markets Project months extension\. fully disbursed\.
(USS 8\.0 M)
3\. Credit 778-IN: To complete Phase I of Stage 1 1978 The project closed on The project was not well
Karnataka Irrigation of the Upper Krishna 3/31/86, following a two phased, with little
Project Irrigation Project, and to year extension\. It was benefits deriving\. Quality
(US$ 117\.6 M) carry out minor distribution fully disbursed\. of minor distribution
development in Malaprabha and systems was poor\. R & R
Ghataprabha projects\. was inadequately carried
out\.
4\. Credit 855-IN: To strengthen location 1978 The project closed on The results of the project
National Agricultural specific research in the agro- 3/31/86, having had an were disappointing\. Only
Research Project climatic zones of India, extension of 3 years\. US$ 19\.5 M of the Credit
(US$ 27\.0 M) including Karnataka\. was utilized\.
Table 1
Page 2 of 3
Loan/Credit Purpose Year Status Comments
Details of
Approval
5\. Credit 862-IN: To improve agricultural 1978 The project closed on The project was considered
Composite Agricultural extension facilities and 6/30/85 following a 6 to have achieved its
Extension Project services in Gujarat, Haryana months extension\. objectives\. The Credit was
(US$ 25\.0 M) and Karnataka\. fully disbursed\.
6\. Credit 1034-IN: To assist in the development 1980 The project closed on The project was successful
Karnataka Sericulture of mulberry production and 9/30/88 after two in achieving most of its
Project sericulture\. extensions from the objectives\. It was fully
(US$ 54\.0 H) original closing date of disbursed\.
6130/86\.
7\. Credit 1432-IN: To assist with the production 1984 The project is in Problems are experienced in
Karnataka Social of saplings, Forest Department progress, and is audits, management and
Forestry Project plantings, training and scheduled to close in planning\.
(US$ 27\.0 IS) research\. It is cofinanced by 12188\. However, delays
ODA (UK)\. indicate an extension to
12191 to complete
prescribed works\.
8\. Credit 1569-IN: To strengthen the facilities 1985 The project is in The project in Yarnataka is
National Agricultural and services of agricultural progress\. The original suffering from budget and
Extension Project II extension in Gujarat, Haryana, closing date was March staffing shortages, but
(US$ 50\.3 M) J & K and Karnataka\. 1991, but this is now progress is improving\.
expected to extend to
March 1993\.
9\. Credit 1631-IN: To strengthen location 1985 Project still in The project is making
National Agricultural specific research in the agro- pros -ss\. The original modest progress in
Research Project II climatic zones of India, closing date was to be Karnataka\. Staffing
(US$ 69\.6 M) including Karnataka\. 12/31192, but it is constraints are causing
expected that a two-year concern, and meteorological
extension will be units are delayed\.
required\.
Table 1
Page 3 of 3
Loan/Credit Purpose Year Status Comments
Details of
Approval
10\. Credit 1770-IN: A national program, with 12 1987 The project became The project is making
National Water sub-projects in Karnataka, effective on 8/10/87\. positive improvements to 0
Management Project intended to assist the States The following sub- & M o\. the sub-projects,
(SDR 93\.2 M) to improve 0 & H on existing projects are located in and Karnataka irrigation
irrigation projects\. Karnataka - engineers are deriving
a) 4 sub-projects benefits from the training
totalling about 116,000 and practices involved\.
ha accepted into the
program;
b) 8 sub-projects
totalling about 68,000
ha in preparation\.
11\. Credit 2010-IN: To develop Phase II of Stage 1 1989 The project is yet to Project mobil3\.zation has i
Loan 3050-IN: of the Upper l\.rishna become effective\. been effective and the
Upper Krishna II Irrigation Project\. project is making a sound
Irrigation Project start\.
(SDR 119\.0 M)
(US$ 165\.0 M)
- I ) -
INplIA
KARNATAKA TANKS IRRIGATION PRQJECT
(Credit 1116-IN)
TABLE 2
Project Timetable
Planned Revised Actual
Item Date Date Date
- Identification
(EPS)
- Preparation 02-08/80
- Appraisal mission 9/80 08/80
- Credit negotiation 3/81 02/81
- Board approval 5/81 03/19/81
- Credit signing 03/26/81
- Credit effectiveness 05/05/81
- Credit completion 03/31/85 03/31/87 03/31/89
- Credit closure 03/31/86 03/31/87 03/31/89
- 16 -
INDIA
KARNATAKA TANK IRRIGATION PROJECT
(Credit 1116-IN)
fichgdul\. of Dishurs_mpnts
IBRD FY Appraisal Revised 1/ Actual % Actual
Semester/Quarter Projection Projection to SAR/Revised
Projection
-------------------- SDR M -----------------
1982 2nd 0\.8 - 0
4th 3\.2 - - 0
1983 2nd 7\.3 - 0\.1 1
4th 11\.3 - 1\.6 14
1984 2nd 16\.1 - 2\.7 17
4th 22\.6 - 5\.2 23
1985 2nd 29\.0 - 5\.8 20
4th 35\.4 - 12\.2 34
1986 2nd 39\.5 - 16\.3 41
4th 43\.5 19\.0 21\.4 113
1987 1st 22\.5 23\.8 107
2nd 25\.5 25\.9 102
3rd 29\.2 27\.9 95
4th 32\.5 31\.7 98
1988 1st 35\.0 32\.0 91
2nd 37\.4 33\.5 90
3rd 33\.8 34\.7 97
4th 35\.4 35\.6 99
1989 1st 37\.1 38\.7 96
2nd 39\.5 40\.2 98
3rd 41\.9 43\.2 103
4th 2i! 43\.5 43\.5 100
Notes:
L1/ Revised target to revised Closing Date of March 31, 1989\.
2/ Credit fully disbursed on April 10, 1989
INDIA
MRNATAKA TANK IRRIGATION PROJECT
(Credit 1116-IN)
TA&LE I
project Implementation
Indicator Unit Appraisal Revised Final Actual
estimated estimated estimated achievement
(9/86) (3/89) (3/89)
1\. Tank Irricxation Projects
- number TIPs completed No\. 120-160 79 78 34
- irrigation potential ha 25,000 25,500 24,100 16,800
created
2\. Hydromet facilities
- rain gauges (24 hour) No\. 1000 45 42
- rain gauges (self No\. 90 17 15
recording)
- river gauge- No\. 100 55 51
discharge stations
- agro-climatic No\. 6 6 6
hydromet stations
- additional class A No\. 6 - -
evaporation pans
- special river No\. 3 7 4
gauging sites
INDIA
KARNATAKA TANK IRRIGATION PROJECT
(Credit 1116-IN)
TABLES5A
PrQject Coats
Item Appraisal Revised Actual at Estimated
estimate estimate 3/89 balance costs
Local FE Total Total Total after 3/89
Total
(US$ M) 1/ (US$ Ml 21 (US$ M) \.1 (US$ M) 31
1\. Construction of Tank 54\.3 8\.2 62\.5 60\.6 52\.4 14\.5
Irrigation Projects
2\. Hydro-meteorological 0\.4 - 0\.4 0\.3 neg neg
stations and equipment
3\. Technical assistance:
- farmer's organisation 0\.06 0\.05 nil
and tank committee
Studies
- pilot TIP studies 0\.92 0\.73 nil
- improved run off 0\.03 0\.02 neg
model studies
- improved flood nil nil neg
studies
Sub/Total 0\.1 - 0\.1 1\.0 0\.8 neg
4\. Equipment 4/ ni ni ni 2\.1 1\.9 nil
5\. Engineering and ns ns ns 10\.3 7\.5 1\.9
Administration
Total base cost 54\.8 8\.2 63\.0 74\.3 62\.6 16\.4
Page 2 of 2
Item Appraisal Revised Actual at Estimated
estimate estimate 3/89 balance costs
Local FE Total Total Total after 3/89
Total
(US$ M) (US$ M) 21 (US$ M) 31 (US$ M) 3\.
Physical contingencies ni ni ni ni -
Price contingencies 12\.5 1\.8 14\.4 ni -
and escalation
Total Project Cost (US$ M) 67\.3 10\.0 77\.4 74\.3 62\.2 16\.4
Total Project Cost (Rs\. M) 565\.5 84\.5 650\.0 943\.6 971\.4 254\.1
Notes:
I/ US$ 1\.0 = Rs\. 8\.40
2/ US$ 1\.0 = Rs\. 12\.7 At September 1986, to include 79 TIPs\.
3\./ US$ 1\.0 = Rs\. 15\.5 To include 78 TIPs\.
A4\. Other than hydromet equipment\.
Abbreviations: ni - not included; ns - not specified
neg - negligible amount\.
- 2c -
KAWB'TAKA TANKS IRRIGATION PROJECT
(Credit 1116-IN)
TABLE EiR
Project Financing
Planned in Credit Revised Final Actual
Source Agreei\.,nt (9/86) (4/89)
(US$ '000) \.1/ (US$ '000) 1/ (US$ '000) 31
A\. IDA Expenditure Categories
1) Civil works 48,526 45,446 53,702
2) Equipment 457 1,948 2,212
3) Technical assistance 106 369 418
and training
4) Unallocated 1,911 0 0
Totals 51,000 47,763 56,332
B\. Cofinancing Institutions nil nil nil
C\. Other external sources nil nil nil
D\. Domestic (GOK) 26,400 26,537 6,329 \.5/
Total (US$ '000) 77,400 74,300 62,671 A/
Total (Rs\. M) 650\.0 943\.6 971\.4 4/
N /te0:
21 US$ 1\.00 = Rs\. 8\.40; SDR 1\.00 = US$ 1\.126
i/ US$ 1\.00 = Rs\. 12\.7; SDR 1\.00 = US$ 1\.098
i/1 US$ 1\.00 = Rs\. 15\.5; SDR 1\.00 = US$ 1\.295
4/ Not total project cost, additional Rs\. 254\.1 M (US$ 16\.4 M) to be
expended to complete prescribed works\.
5/ As disbursements made throughout life of project were at different
exchange rates, this is not true cost to GOK\.
- 21 -
INDIA
KARNATAKA TANKS IRRIGATION PROJECT
r(-J\. t III 6- I
TABLE 6A
Direct Benefits
i;:d cator \ppra i saa I "oai\. tat( Fuill je1L iolmei;t
cs t i mat t I mat mtate
1\. iacrease ir\. net \.Jsi I6\.8au 2,1,00
irrigated area ('a)
benefittirg fari 80J0 11,10 16,417
fam lies (Na)
3\. Increase in ciopping 10 4u ,i
intensity (I%)
1- Increase in foodgrain 63,000 7"U0 03,000/
production (ton/year)
J\. Increase in value of 105 9 105
cash crop production
(Rs\. M/year)
6\. Increase in percapita 300 10i 300
income M
7\. Increase in farm 3 million 3\.1 miiiion 1\.8 million
employment
(man days/year)
S\. Increase in %alup added 100 14 109
(Rs\. MI/year)
u\. Employment during I0 milli^n 15 million 40 million
co13struction over
project (man days)
1(\. 'ncrease itn percapita
tarm incomes
- small farm 13u01 3\.3 1300
- medium farm 3700 8'6 3r00
- iarge farr -\.700 90 Ii 5'700
(Rs\. /year)
11\. Increase in aindless 100 830 10O
labourers income (i)
1/ Insufficient data is available to obtain any accurate forecast of foodgrainFroduction or
cropping intensity\. Main reason for expected increase in cropping intensity without
commensurate increase in foodgrain production is because of anticipated continued shift
towards non-food crops\.
(revised 10/89)
- 22 -
I NDIA
KARNATAKA TANKS IRRIGATION PROJECT
(C(redit 1116-IN)
TABLE 6B
Economic Impact
Economic Rate of Return
Conlfi6urat it!n/ Appralasll Estimate at
assumpt ions est imatet
-_____-- (%)-
li '1/
Whole project '0 3\.6
Notes:
1/ Based on 120-160 TIPs, aggreaate area 2'5,000 ha\.
2/ Based on 78 TIPs, aggregate area 24,100 ha\.
- 23 -
XNAZA
(Credit 1116-IN)
Econ\. Cost Incremental Net Benefit
Year Stream Benefit Stream Stream
81/82 3\.18 0\.00 -3\.18
82/83 21\.32 0\.00 -21\.32
83/84 77\.82 0\.00 -77\.82
84/85 150\.79 0\.00 -150\.79
85/86 200\.21 0\.00 -200\.21
86/87 217\.68 0\.00 -217\.68
87/88 144\.53 1\.12 -143\.41
88/89 193\.45 21\.49 -171\.96
89/90 182\.36 35\.22 -147\.15
90/91 43\.96 47\.54 3\.57
91/92 12\.12 57\.80 45\.68
92/93 13\.52 66\.32 52\.80
93/94 13\.52 70\.74 57\.21
94/95 13\.52 71\.23 57\.71
95/96 13\.52 71\.23 57\.71
96/97 13\.52 71\.23 57\.71
97/98 13\.52 71\.23 57\.71
98/99 13\.73 71\.23 57\.50
99/2031 7\.12 71\.23 64\.11
ERR 3\.6%
Sowurna: Economic Evaluation Working Paper - Project Files\. Estimate at 9/89\.
Assmptins:
i) Traded commodities based on 1995 IBRD forecast: export parity used
for paddy, wheat, sorghum, maize, cotton; import parity for
groundnuts\.
ii) Standard Conversion Factor of 0\.8 to convert financial to economic
prices for non-traded items\.
iii) Fertilizer valued at world market pr:ices 1995 projections (79% higher
than domestic retail price)\.
iv) Shadow wage rate - Rs 16 per day compared with unadjusted wage rate
of Rs 20\.
v) Costs include production foregone in submerged land\.
vi) Benefits assumed to build up over 5 years\.
Table 6D
Page 1 of 3
INDIA
KARNATA&U TANK IRRIGATION PROJECT
(Credit 1116-IN)
Studies
Title of Purpose as defined By whom Reference Status Impact of
Study at appraisal carried in SAR Study
out
1\. Catchment To develop a computer model Center for # 5\.02 (c) The study wam The model, has not
run off model which would with regional Water # 5\.08 successfuJly carried been utilized by
for yield rainfall data, and with Studies, # 5\.29 out, and the report project planners,
studies minimal stream gauging data, Anna Uni- submitted in September, either because the
estimate the yield of a tank versity, 1985\. Four pilot tanks TIP had already been
catchment as a rapid design Madras, in were studied\. The model designed, or as the 4
tool\. conjunc- selected by Anna model was not
tion with University was not applicable to 24 hr\.
KERS, suitable for catchments rainfall\. This is
Mysore\. with only regional 24 now being modified
hour tainfall records by Indian Institute
available\. of Science,
Bangalore\.
Page 2 of 3
Title of Purpose as defined By whom Reference Status Impact of
Study at appraisal carried in SAR study
out
2\. Water Users To investigate how the Indian # 5\.02 (d) The studies were The r-commendations
organization formation of water user's Institute # 5\.30 completed and the final of the consultants
studies organizations would ccntribute of Manage- # 8\.20 (c' report submitted in were to introduce
to an increase in farmer's ment, Annex 3 March 1986\. They were the three-tier tank
participation in operation and Bangalore\. reviewed by the Bank and ccmmittee system,
maintenance of TIP's\. found to be satisfactory\. and were well
reasoned\. GOK has
introduced this
_ystem in pr3occt
TIPs, and is now
c,nsiderinq
refinements
recommended by IIM\.
3\. Studies to To consider how the farmer's Indian # 5\.30 The study was completed As a result of GOK
assess the organisations could be used to Institute # 6\.20 in March 1987, and review, water
system of assist in water charges of Manage- # 8\.20 (c) reviewed by Bank and charges were revised
water charges ccllection, and to recommend ment, Annex 3 GOK\. from January 1,
collection revised scales of charges\. Bangalore 1989\. Farmers'
with regard involvement was not
to farmer's further considered
organisa- as water charges
tions, and to collection is made
recommend under established
revised scales Revenue procedures\.
of charges
4\. Flood To develop a computer model Indian - The study wan awarded in With this model,
estimation with which to estimate peak Institute March 1989\. and is in rapid flood
studies floods using regional rainfall of Tech- progress\. estimates based o',
with an analytical estimation nology, analytical
of Ryve's constant as a rapid Pawai, improvement of the
design tool\. Bombay present empirical
Ryve's formula\.
Table 6D
Page 3 of 3
Title of Purpose as defined By whom Reference Status Impact of
Study at appraisal carried in SAR Study
out
5\. Labyrinth To develop in the model scale KERS, - The model studies have One pilot weir is
weir hydraulic proposals in published papers Mysore been progressing for being designed and
model studies in order to design, instal and several years, and in constructed, with
test a full scale weir early 1988 the Bank large estimated cost
(spillway) in a project TIP\. advised KEPS to widen savings\. At KERS,
the scope of studies further larger scale
In early 1989, the Bank model tests will be
advised RERS to compile conducted\.
a general characteListic
report\.
N'
Talef 7_
Page 1 of 5
INDIA
XAMATAKA TANKS IRRIGATION PROJECT
(Credit 1116-IN)
TABLE 7
Status of Covenants
Covenant Subject Deadline Status
Reference for
Compliance
Project Agreement
Section 2\.01 GOK shall carry out the project with due - During the years 1987 and 1988, GOK
diligence and in conformity with provided very inadequate budget
appropriate administrative, financial, allocations, and from time to time
agricultural and engineering practices, restricted the flow of funds to
and shall provide promptly as needed construction divisions\. These
funds, facilities and resources for the significantly delayed project
purpose\. completion, and may be considered to be
primarily responsible for the need for
a three year extension\. GOK has agreed
to provide sufficient funds to complete
the project by 3/91\.
Section 2\.05 (c) GOK shall not later than six months - Part I & III of the PCR prepared by the
after Closing Date prepare a Project Bank was sent to GOIIGOK on December
Completion Report\. 19, 1989 for their comments and
completion of Part II, but Part II was
not received until one year after the
closing date\.
Section 3\.01 GOK undertakes that (a) TIPs shall be - Fully complied throughout\.
planned, designed, approved, implemented
and operated according to agreed
criteria, and (b) individual TIPs to be
processed in accordance with agreed
procedures\.
Ible 7
Page 2 of 5
Covenant Subject Deadline Status
Reference for
Compliance
Section 3\.02 GOK shall by the agreed date complete 3/31/83 Although the study was not completed
according to terms of reference a study rescheduled until March 1988, due to the need to
with the purpose: to 9/30/87 monitor pilot TIPs each year, it was
(a) to investigate if water users' thoroughly executed\. Water charges
organizations, would increase farmers' revisions now fully complied\.
participation in 0 & M of TIPs;
(b) to recommend mode of effective
participaticn of beneficiaries in 0 & M;
(c) to recommend a system of water
charges in accordance with agreed
objectives of IDA\.
Section 3\.03 With the objective of recovering annual
O & M costs, and to the extent possible
the cost of capital investments, and M
considering incentives for and repayment o0
capacity of farmers, GOK shall:
(a) considering recommendations in 3\.02 3/31/84 Method of charging for irrigation water
by the due date review the method of rescheduled is laid down by State Revenue
charging for water supply and level of to 12/31/87 procedures, and may not differ between
water and water related charges for TIPs and other irrigation systems\. Thus
TIPs; and the covenant would not acpear to be
relevant\. Level of water charges
revriewed\. Thus in compliance\.
(b) as soon as feasible thereafter - Revised water charges introduced
introduce the appropriate system and statewide on January 1, 1989\. Fully
level of charges\. complied\.
Selected Water Rates (Rs/ha)
July 85 Jan 89
Sugar Cane 556 988
Paddy (13t crop) 86 247
Vlheat 54 148
Cotto:n 59 148
Page 3 of 5
Covenant Subject Deadline Status
Reference fcr
Ccmpl larnco
Section 3\.04 GOK shall maintain the following - Fully complied, following initial
organisations within Irrigation delays in creating the pr-ocribed
Department during the project execution units\.
period with adequate staff:
(a) two project formulation cells and
two quality control divisions in its
Minor Irrigation Wing;
(b) Minor Irrigation Committee for
appraisal and supervision of TIPs;
(c) special appraisa' and supervision
circle, comprising two appraisal
divisions, a technical monitoring and
evaluation division, and an
operation,monitoring and evaluation
division\.
Section 3\.05 GOK shall furnish to IDA promptly a - Regularly submitted and satisfactory\. o
project summary for each TIP approved by
Minor Irrigation Committee and minutes
of the meetings of the Committee\.
Section 3\.06 GOK shall each year by March 31 furnish March 31 Regularly submitted and satisfactory\.
to IDA the forthcoming annual yearly
implerentation program and an annual
performance surmnary of TIPs\.
Section 3\.07 GOK shall cause the establishment of - The recommended three-tier committee
separate Tank Irrigation Committees for system has been established in all 78
at least three TIPs before their TIPs\. TIP comm:ittees were generally
construction in accordance with TOR's formed on TIPs before construction\.
laid down\.
Table 7
Page 4 of 5
Covenant Subject Deadline Status
Reference for
Compliance
Section 3\.08 (a) GOK shall (i) maintain its panel of - Dam Review Panel (DRP) was formed and
experts with qualifications, experience was acceptable to IDA\. Designs are
and terms of reference acceptable to IDA reported to have been reviewed before
to review plans and designs of all dams construction commenced\.
and their associated structures with
heights above streambed over 10 M or
with a gross storage exceeding 2\.5 M
cu\.m, or where significant destruction
would occur in the event of a failure,
and
(ii) cause the panel to examine whether
changes in designs are required\.
Section 3\.08 (b) GOK shall cause the panel to - Site visits were very infrequent and
periodically inspect the dams to did not alwa3rs coincide with critical
determine any deficiencies in construction\. stages of development\. ID was dilatory
in complying with recommendations\.
Following representations by the Bank,
the position showed improvement by the
close of the project\.
Section 4\.01 GOK to cause its departments and other - Accounts maintained satisfactorily, but
agencies to (i) maintain separate audited accounts were not always
records and accounts according to sound submitted on schedule\.
procedures for expenditures under the
project;
(ii) to furnish to IDA copies of
accounts and financial statements for
each fiscal year, certified by an
independent auditor acceptable to IDA,
not more than nine months after the end
of the fiscal year\.
Table 7
Page 5 of 5
Covenant Subject Deadline Status
Reference for
Compliance
Section 4\.02 GOK shall cause its departments and - Accounts and audits satisfactory\.
other agencies responsible for project
implementation to (i} have their
accounts and financial statements
audited for each fiscal year by
independent auditor acceptable to IDA;
(ii) furnish the reports of the said
auditors immediately after finalization,
and (iii) furnish to IDA any other
information which IDA may require\.
INDIA
KARNATAKA TANKS IRRIGATION PROJECT
(Credit 11 16-IN)
Table 8A
Staff Inputs
(in Staffweeks)
Stage of Fiscal Years
Project Cycle 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 TOTAL
Preappraisal 28\.4 30\.6 12\.0 1\.4 72\.4
Appraisal 61\.2 61\.2
Negotiation 4\.8 4\.8
Supervision 3\.0 16\.5 14\.6 31\.4 15\.0 26\.4 19\.1 18\.1 144\.1
Other 1\.9 0\.2 2\.1
28\.4 0 30\.6 82\.9 18\.1 14\.6 31\.4 15\.0 26\.4 19\.1 18\.1 284\.6
Tabl 188
Page I of 3
ZDA
KARUNATAKA TANKS IRRIGATION PROJECT
(Credit 1116-IN)
TALE 8B
Migsions
Stage of Project Month/ Number Days Specialisations Performance Types of Comments
Cycle Year of in represented 1/ rating 2/ Prolems 3\.i
Persons Field
1\. Before Appraisal
1/80 3 EN/AG/EC Identification misstcn
2/80 2 3 EN/EC Reconnaissance m1ssirn
4/80 2 28 WM/EC Water management prep\.
5/80 2 AG/EC Preparation
2\. Appraisal to Board
Approval
8-9/80 5 20 EN/AG/EC Appraisal mission
10/80 2 8 WM/EC Post appraisal
1/81 3 5 WM/SOC/EC Farmers' organization
2/81 2 3 EN Post appraisal
3\. Board Approval to
Effectiveness
4/81 2 3 WM/EC Mobilization
4\. Supervisi n
6/81 3 3 EN/EC 2/2 M/T First review
8/81 1 3 EC Expediting
11/81 1 2 EN Tech\. training (FAO/CP)
11/81 2 2 WM/EC Farmer's organazaticn
2/82 2 2 WM/EC Farmer's organization
2/82 2 4 EN Tech\. training (FAO/CP)
2/82 4 5 EN/EC 2/2 M/T Periodic super\.ision
4/82 1 3 EN Tech\. training (FA/OCP)
5/82 1 6 WM Farmer's organizations
6/82 1 10 EN Tech\. training (FAO/CP)
7/82 1 4 EN Tech\. training (FAO/CP)
9/82 3 6 EN 2/3 M/T Periodic supervision
Table 8B
Page 2 of 3
Stage of Project Month/ Number Days Specialisations Performance Types of Comments
Cycle Year of in represented 1/ rating 21 Problems 3/
Persons Field
9/82 1 10 EN Tech\. training (FAO/CP)
11/82 2 3 FIN/PROC Periodic supervision
12/82 1 6 EN Tech\. training (FAO/CP)
12/82 2 3 MAN/EN Management review
4/83 2 6 EN Tech\. training (FAO/CP)
6/83 2 6 EN 2/3 M/T/HYD Periodic supervision
7/83 2 4 EN Tech\. training (FAO/CP)
7/83 1 2 MAN Management discussions
7/83 1 4 PROC Periodic supervision
11/83 1 5 WM Farmer' s organizations
11/83 5 5 EN/AG/EC 2/2 M/T/HYD Periodic supervision
1/84 2 8 EN/WM Farmer's organizations
2/84 1 5 EN Expediting
2/84 2 10 EN Tech\. training (FAO/CP)
3/84 2 8 EN/EC 2/2 M/T/F/RR Periodic supervision
6/84 2 5 EN Tech\. training (FAO/CP)
8/84 3 5 EN 2/1 T/LA/AG Periodic supervision
9/84 2 EN Tech\. training (FAO/CP)
3/85 1 EN Tech\. training (FAO/CP)
4/85 3 5 EN/AG 2/1 T/M/AG Periodic supervision
11/85 6 5 EN/AG/PROC/FIN 1/1/2/2 M/LEG/LA/RRPeriodic supervision
3/86 1 6 EN Expediting
5/86 3 5 EN/AG 1/1/2/2 AG/PR/RR/ Periodic supervision
LA/LEG
7/86 2 3 PROC/FIN Periodic supervision
9/86 2 12 EN/SOC 1/1/2/2 LEG/AG/T/RRPeriodic supervisicn
11/86 1 1 EN Technical review
1/87 3 8 EN/AG/WM 1/1/2/2 LEG/AG/F/LAPeriodic supervision
4/87 1 2 EN Credit extr\. review
9/87 2 10 EN/AG 2/1/2/2 LEG/AG/F/ Periodic supervision
PR/LA
9/87 2 4 PROC/FIN Periodic supervision
10/87 1 3 EN Technical review
2/88 3 5 EN/AG 3/1/2/2 F/PR/DS Periodic supervision
8/88 1 3 FIN Periodic supervision
9/88 1 3 PROC Periodic supervision
2/89 2 5 EN 1/1/l/1 DS/OP Final supervision
7/89 1 3 EN PCR mission
Table 8B
Page 3 of 3
Stage of Project Month/ Number Days Specialisations Performance Types of Comments
Cycle Year of in represented 1/ rating 2/ Problems 31
Persons Field
1/ Abbreviations used:
EN - Engineers; EC - Economist; AG - Agriculturist; PROC - Procurement Specialist; FIN - Financial Analyst;
WM - Water Management Specialist; SOC - Sociologist; MAN - Management\.
2/ Performance ratings:
a) Previous nomenclature (prior to November 1985)
1st indicator: 1 - minor problems; 2 - moderate problems; 3 - major problems
2nd indicator: 1 - improving; 2 - static; 3 - deterio\.rating
b) Present nomenclature (since NIovember 1985)
rating: 1 - minor problems; 2 - moderate problems; 3 - major problems being addressed by borrower;
4 - major problems not being addressed by borrower
subject: 1st indicator - fundi\.ng; 2nd indicator - project management; 3rd indicator - development impact;
4th indicator - overall status\.
3] Abbreviations used:
M - management problems, including staffing, infrastructure, attention to project components and schedules;
T - technical shortcomings (engineering); F - financial problems; RR - resettlement and rehabilitation shortcomings;
DS - dam safety shortcomings; LA - land acquisition delays, including forest land release;
PR - procurement infringement or delays; OP - system operation deficiencies; LEG - serious non-compliance with
covenants; AG - agricultural support shortcomings; HYD - hydrological component deficiencies\.
Table 9
Page 1 of 4
INDIA
KARNATAKA TANKS IRRIGATION PROJECT
(Credit 1116-IN)
TABLE 9
Details of TIP's
f1
District/TIP Zone 2/ Coumand Stage of Completion as at March 1989 Date of Estimated
Area Dam/ Distribution Micro Completion Cost (Rs\. M)
(ha) spillway network network
Bangalore ED (5)
- Muninagara 300 1 2 4 12/89 3\.4
- Thattigupe 378 1 2 4 12/89 7/3
- Medamaranahalli 320 2 2 4 6/90 4\.2
- Ravathanahalla 1250 2 2 4 6190 33\.4 1
- Hosadoddi 130 4 4 0 6/90 5\.3
- Doddathanda 275 4 4 0 12/90 9\.0 1
- Y\.J\. Gudda 800 4 0 0 6/90 43\.5
Tumkur ED (5)
- Muchaveeranahalli and 105 C 1 1 6/89 2\.4
- Voddarahalli CD (4) 73 C 1 1 6/89 1\.8
- Balamadihalli 34 C C C comp 1\.0
- Bellibettadathore 70 C 1 1 6/D9 2\.9
Kolar ED (5)
- Obleshwaragudda 32 C C C comp 1\.1
- Dandiganahalli 213 C C C comp 8\.1
- Kamareddipalli 56 C C C comp 2\.2
- Settikal 80 C C C comp 3\.9
- Badipalli 65 2 1 4 12j89 2\.6
Shimoga ST (7)
- Jodithimmalapura and 80 C C C comp 3\.0
H (q)
Table 9
Page 2 of 4
1/
District/TIP Zone 2/ Command Stage of Completion as at March 1989 Date of Estimated
Area Dam/ Distribution Micro Completion Cost (Rs\. M)
(ha) spillway network network
Chitradurga CD (4)
- Arasinagundihalla 48 C C C comp 2\.8
Mysore SD (6)
- Mavinahalli and 30 C C C comp 1\.2
- Minnathuhalla ST (7) 1215 1 2 4 6/90 39\.9
- Kudregindihalla 816 1 2 4 12/89 25\.4
- Managallih\.lla 100 C C C comp 2\.0
- Mantipura 163 C C C comp 6\.4
- Yerraganahalli 80 C C C comp 2\.6
- Bheemanhalli 160 C C C comp 5\.0
Mandya SD (6)
- Gudikalahalla 58 C C C comp 2\.2
- Bindenahalli 25 C C C comp 0\.9
- Kottigehalli 59 C C C comp 2\.2
- Mosarhallababy 95 C 2 4 6/89 3\.4
Chikkamagalur CD (4)
- Biagerhalla and 203 C C C comp 5\.6
- Aregundihalla H (9) 124 C 1 1 6/89 3\.1
Dharwad ND (3)
- Jelligere and 95 C C C comp 3\.0
- Asundinala NT (8) 900 C 3 0 6/90 19\.5
- Mundwad 700 2 3 0 12/90 20\.9
- Guddadachannapura 45 3 4 0 12/89 1\.6
- Veerapura 225 3 4 0 12/90 6\.7
Uttara Kanada ND (3)
- Durgadahalla 750 2 3 0 12/90 34\.3
- Attiveri 350 2 3 0 6/90 19\.4
Table 9
Page 3 of 4
11
District/TIP Zone 21 Command Stage of Completion as at March 1989 Date of Estimated
Area Dam/ Distribution Micro Completion Cost (Rs\. M)
(ha) spillway network network
Belgaum ND (3)
- Bidi and 120 C C 1 6/89 7\.9
- Hebbal NT (8) 110 C 2 2 6/89 4\.7
- Kadasagatti 165 1 2 4 12/89 5\.5
- Bhairapura 460 1 1 4 12/89 7\.5
- Yellammawadi 260 1 2 2 1s/89 7\.2
- Madhaobhavi 130 C C C comp 3\.6
Biiapur
- Yetanchi ND (3) 125 1 3 0 12/89 6\.4
- Herurthammadodi 114 1 3 4 12/89 14\.0
- Arasanal 58 4 4 0 6/90 2\.9
- Huvinahippergi 170 1 2 4 12/89 8\.2
- Aheri (Jambagi) 330 2 2 4 6/90 13\.4 w
- Godihal 250 2 3 0 6190 9\.3 Q
Gulbarga NED (2)
- Dinshi and 210 C C C comp 5\.4
- Bachanal NET (1) 134 C C C comp 4\.3
- Mavinsoor 465 C C C comp 7\.2
- Gobur 1000 C 1 Z 6/90 42\.5
- Vaizpur 375 C C C comp 10\.9
- Itkal 165 C C C comp 3\.6
- Hunshihadagali 66 C C C comp 2\.5
- Alur 'B' 400 C 3 4 6/90 14\.2
- Pangarga 220 C C C comp 4\.0
- Beeranahalli 1950 C 1 1 3190 60\.8
- Naunihal 350 4 3 0 6/90 8\.7
- Hadalgi 77 4 0 0 6190 3\.3
Table 9
Page 4 of 4
11
District/TIP Zone 2/ Conmmand Stage of Completion as at March 1989 Date of Estimated
Area Dam/ Distribution Micro Completion Cost (Rs\. M)
(ha) spillway network network
Bidar NET (1)
- Changlair 396 C C 1 6189 10\.8
- Jamalpur 180 C C C comp 3\.9
- Bonthi 188 C C C comp 4\.0
- Lada 170 C C C comp 3\.0
- Bandharkunta 420 C 1 1 6/89 8\.8
- Bardhapur 185 C C C comp 3\.7
- Bhopalgadbelkoni 1000 C 1 2 12/89 14\.9
- Almaspur 550 C C C comp 13\.6
- Khandikere 260 1 2 3 3190 6\.1
nellary ND (3)
- Hosachinnapura 50 C C C comp 2\.1
- K\. Kallahalli 84 C C C comp 3\.2
- Rajapuram 150 1 4 0 6/90 4\.3
Raichur ND (3)
- Julugudda 120 C C 1 6/89 3\.7
- Indargi 170 C C C comp 4\.7
- Upperhirenala 1850 1 2 3 6/90 56\.1
- Narnal 85 C C C comp 4\.2
Notes:
11 Abbreviations: C - completed; 1 - 762 to 992; 2 - 512 to 752; 3 - 26Z to 50Z; 4 - 1Z to 25Z;
0 - not commenced\.
21 For zone location, see Figure 1, Annex 1; for zone description, see Annex 1\.
INDIA
KARNATAKA TANKS TRRTGATION PROJECT
(Credit 1116-iN)
TABTLE IDA
1/
Distribution of TIPS by Zone,
Zone Appraisal projection Actual
_______ ______________( 0 )
________
Northeastern Trans\.ition Zone 17 17
Northeastern Dry Zone 8 10
Northern Dry Zone 20 21
Central Dry Zone 2 1
Eastern Dry Zone 9 18
Southern Dry Zone 13 15
Southern Transition Zone 13 5
Northern Transition Zone 6 8
Hilly Zone 9 5
Coastal Zone 3 0
Notes:
1/ By command area\.
44
4 a
- 41 -
TNDTA
XAkNATAKA TANWK IRRTGATION PROJECT
(Credit 1116-IN)
TABLE 1 0B
1' ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1/
ni-stri-butijoin of TTPs byhuz
Size range Appraisal Actual
(ha) estimate
----------------(a)--_-__________-
Less than 100 34 31
100 - 200 32 27
200 - 300 9 12
300 - 500 18 14
500 - 1000 1 8
Above 1000 6 8
Notes:
1/ By number of TIPs\. | APPROVAL |
P154586 | PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
IDENTIFICATION/CONCEPT STAGE
Report No\.: PIDC20928
Public Disclosure Copy
Project Name Kenya Climate Venture Facility
Region AFRICA
Country Kenya
Sector(s) SME Finance (100%)
Theme(s) Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise support (100%)
Lending Instrument Lending Instrument
Project ID P154586
Borrower Name Kenya Climate Innovation Centre
Implementing Agency Kenya Climate Innovation Centre
Environment Category B - Partial Assessment
Date PID Prepared 09-Apr-2015
Estimated Date of Approval 30-Apr-2015
Initiation Note Review The review did authorize the preparation to continue
Decision
I\. Introduction and Context
Country Context
The Government of Kenyaâs Vision 2030 sets out objectives for the country to achieve middle-
income status by 2030\. Vision 2030 envisions transforming Kenya into a newly-industrializing
Public Disclosure Copy
country with a globally competitive and prosperous economy and high quality of life in a clean and
secure environment\.
The GoK understands both the threat climate change poses to economic development and the
opportunities possible through development of new technologies and investments in this fast-
growing sector\. In March 2013, the GoK launched the National Climate Change Action Plan
(NCCAP) which states that Kenyaâs âeconomy is highly dependent on climate sensitive sectors
including agriculture, tourism, and energyâ and that climate change could cost the country as much
as $500 million per year, or approximately 2\.6% of national GDP\. The Action Plan calls for âLow
Carbon Climate Resilient Developmentâ to address climate change and reach the economic goals of
Vision 2030\. Such an approach can âattract international climate finance, technology and capacityâ
and âthe transition to a low carbon climate resilient development pathway can include a shift to
green jobs\.â
A range of challenges in climate-relevant sectors such as energy, water and agriculture currently
impede economic growth in Kenya\.
⢠Only 14-16% of Kenyan households are connected to the grid, creating a major energy
divide in the country\. Grid penetration is growing at a lower rate than general population growth\.
⢠75% of health centres and 75% of primary schools in Kenya lack reliable electricity supply\.
Page 1 of 9
⢠Traditional biomass-based fuels for cooking and heating are currently the most important
source of primary energy in Kenya with wood fuel accounting for 68\.3% of total consumption\.
⢠Availability of clean water in the required quantities and adequate sanitation facilities
Public Disclosure Copy
constrain industrial development and economic growth\. The access to safe water is estimated at
60% in urban and 40% in rural areas while sewer systems cover only 14% of the population\.
⢠80% of Kenyaâs land area is classified as arid and semi-arid and receives annual rainfall of
less than 1,000 mm, impeding agriculture as crucial factor for development\.
Sectoral and Institutional Context
Countries that pro-actively develop, commercialize and deploy novel climate-friendly technologies
â rather than being simple technology takers â can benefit from economic development and
competitiveness through participation at earlier stages of the innovation value chain\. Kenya has
aspects of a strong innovation capacity and the opportunity to become a leader in Africa to develop
solutions locally that address region-specific issues\. Primary sectors include: renewable energy and
energy efficiency, water supply, and climate-smart agriculture\. Some figures highlight the
opportunities in new climate technology development:
⢠Global new investment in renewable energy and fuel generation reached $269 billion in
2012 and is expected to reach $460 billion by 2030\.
⢠Kenya is considered one of the most prominent sub-Saharan countries in terms of
renewable energy\.
⢠African BoP households and small businesses spend over $10\.5 billion annually on
lighting\.
⢠The market opportunity for households that use a paraffin lamp for Kenya, Ghana and
Ethiopia combined is $635 million/year\.
⢠The BoP water market in Africa (252\.4 million people) is measured at $2\.5 billion\.
⢠550 million people worldwide have mobile phones but no reliable way to charge them,
creating a large market segment to serve with advanced off-grid clean technologies\.
Public Disclosure Copy
Challenge: The Financing Gap for Early-Stage Climate-Tech Companies in Kenya
One key factor inhibiting innovative ventures in Kenya is lack of appropriate financing\.
Entrepreneurial companies are essential to drive innovation, but many early-stage yet promising
companies cannot find the investment needed to develop and scale-up their innovative solutions to
climate challenges\. Start-up companies in Kenya can usually obtain very small grants of up to
$100K for ideation and incubation; more established companies with a proven track record and
ability to offer collateral could likely secure approximately $2M and up from more commercially-
minded financiers\. However, start-up and early-stage companies seeking investment from $100K -
$1M have a difficult time accessing appropriate financing\. Traditional investors shy away from
such investments due to (i) the high transaction / due diligence costs relative to transaction size and
(ii) the risks associated with early-stage companies\. Similarly, the Kenyan banking sector remains
conservative in its lending with loans given primarily to larger companies that meet their collateral
and other requirements\. The dearth of appropriate early-stage investment is particularly acute in
climate-related sectors where investors lack experience and thus perceive greater risk\.
In recent years, there has been in an increase in the number of âimpact investingâ venture funds
focusing on the East Africa region, including Kenya; such funds have a strong impact focus and in
principle have a higher risk appetite than traditional investors\. In practice however, such funds
mostly invest in companies getting ready for growth (with developed business models) and prefer
Page 2 of 9
investments in the $1 - 2\.5M range (with deals below $1M more the exception than the norm)\.
There are two funds â BPI and Grofin - that make investments in the $50 - 500K range; however
both of these funds target small but profitable companies looking to expand further, and typically
Public Disclosure Copy
focus more on traditional sectors rather than new innovation industries like climate-tech\. Impact
investors do acknowledge that the absence of appropriate financing - combined with intensive
handholding â to promising start-ups also makes it difficult for such investors to find quality deal-
flow\.
Start-up and early-stage companies in the climate-tech space in Kenya and East Africa are therefore
at the risk of stalling in the so called âvalley of deathâ between the ce iling of their initial
funding and the floors of most investors and financiers\. With nowhere to turn for funding, these
companies face stagnation or failure\.
Relationship to CAS/CPS/CPF
The project also relates to the Kenya CPS which identifies 3 domains of engagement:
⢠Competitiveness and sustainability;
⢠Protecting the vulnerable and help them develop their potential;
⢠Focusing on building consistency and equity\.
The proposed project aligns with the competitiveness and sustainability domain as it seeks to
enhance the potential of the clean tech subsector as well as ramping the financing sector by
increasing the supply of early stage investment finance to start-up and early stage local innovative
firms with commercial potential to address clean-energy and climate change mitigation or
adaptation needs in Kenya\.
The economic pillar of the Government of Kenya Vision 2030 Second Medium Term Plan 2013 â
2017 (MTP-2), envisages moving up the value chain in key areas, including agriculture and
Public Disclosure Copy
financial services, to consistently deliver 10 percent annual growth that is necessary to make Kenya
a middle-income country\. The MTP -2 proposes to integrate the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) post 2015 which among others include: ending extreme poverty and hunger; achieve
development and prosperity for all without ruining the environment; increasing agricultural
production in an environmentally sustainable manner, to achieve food security and rural prosperity;
curb human-induced climate change with sustainable energy; protect ecosystems and ensure sound
management of natural resources
By focusing on supporting the Government of Kenya goal of âgreeningâ the economy, the proposed
project is therefore also aligned with MTP-2 SDGs\.
II\. Project Development Objective(s)
Proposed Development Objective(s)
The development objective is to pilot an innovative investment facility that addresses the financing
gap for promising start-up and early-stage climate technology companies in Kenya, and to develop a
deal flow of investible, sustainable and scalable enterprises that contribute to Kenyaâs growing
climate innovation and clean tech sectors\.
Key Results
Page 3 of 9
(a) Total financing invested in the target firms;
(b) Number of profitable and scalable climate technology companies that are creating positive
social, environmental and/or economic impact;
Public Disclosure Copy
(c) Complementary financing leveraged and/or catalyzed within 5 years of investment;
(d) Number of new/ improved technologies or products offered by portfolio companies;
(e) Number of new seed-stage investment vehicles/facilities (in East Africa or beyond) that are
influenced by the KCVF investment model\.
Knowledge and Learning
Because the project will pilot a new approach, a key deliverable is the iterative knowledge and
learning generated for the World Bank Group on the opportunities and challenges of developing
sustainable seed investment models\. This is consistent with infoDevâs mandate to test and develop
innovative models for growth oriented enterprises and to share learning from our work within the
World Bank Group and other relevant stakeholders\.
Some of the key questions the project will help address are:
⢠What are the most effective seed investment/support models and practices to enable start-
up/early stage climate technology companies to move into the growth phase and become
commercially viable?
⢠How and to what extent can private capital be leveraged to invest in promising but riskier
early stage companies?
⢠To what extent can seed/early stage investing vehicles in developing countries like Kenya
and sectors like clean-tech become commercially sustainable, and what role should public/donor
financing play to develop this space?
Given the increased interest globally in the seed and early-stage financing space in developing
countries, these learnings will be shared widely to inform thinking on how to structure such
solutions\. The knowledge products developed â including reports, blogs, workshops, webinars - will
Public Disclosure Copy
include what works as well as what does not\.
III\. Preliminary Description
Concept Description
1\. Description
The project is to establish an innovative financing facility, the Kenya Climate Venture Facility
(KCVF) to provide seed and early stage financing to promising start-up and early-stage climate
technology firms in Kenya\.
(a) KCIC Background and Context
The KCVF will be set up by and capitalize on the activities of the existing Kenya Climate
Innovation Center (KCIC, http://kenyacic\.org/)\. The KCIC was launched in September 2012 in
Nairobi and currently supports more than 80 start-up and early-stage Kenyan firms developing
innovative technologies and businesses in climate change sectors such as renewable energy, climate-
smart agriculture and water and sanitation\. The KCIC provides its client companies with a range of
services including proof-of-concept grants (US$25K - US$100K), business advisory services and
training, access to technical and office facilities, information and international linkages\. Companies
being supported by the KCIC benefit from assistance to get from concept to initial market testing in
the course of a successful incubation process, which typically takes at least 12 months or more\.
Page 4 of 9
The KCIC is implemented by a consortium of four organizations that bring complementary
strengths to the project:
Public Disclosure Copy
⢠Global Village Energy Partnership (GVEP) â GVEP is a non-profit firm that supports
Kenyan SMEs providing renewable energy access to under-served communities\. GVEP supports
KCIC clients with strategy/business plan development, access to finance and related activities\.
⢠PriceWaterhouse Coopers (PWC) â PWC provides back-office financial management for
the project\.
⢠Kenya Industrial Research and Development Institute (KIRDI) â KIRDI is a government
research and development body that supports KCIC clients with technology prototyping and
development as well as getting key IP protection for their technologies\.
⢠Strathmore University â Strathmore provides office facilities for KCIC and its clients in its
business school as well as technology development support\.
The KCIC is strongly supported by the Government of Kenya and is featured prominently in the
Kenya National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP):
âKenya has recently established the first Climate Innovation Centre (CIC) in the world at the
Strathmore Business School\. Dedicated to supporting climate change technologies and research and
development entrepreneurship, its main focus will be on innovative technologies in the area of
energy, agriculture and water supply that will contribute to Green Development and growth\. The
CIC will play an important role in developing green technologies in Kenya and will target solutions
that are relevant across the East Africa Region\.â
(b) KCVF Overview
Now that the KCIC has gained critical traction with the Kenyan clean tech startup community, it is
the right time to launch the KCVF with a mandate to support the financing of the most viable of
these firms\. KCVF will focus on those innovative companies that are at a stage of development
when they require financing for further market testing and business model validation, leading to a
Public Disclosure Copy
full market roll-out\. The KCVF will pioneer an innovative financing model â among the first of its
kind in the East Africa region âby investing patient capital (in the form of equity, debt and/or related
instruments) along with high engagement management and technical assistance (Figure 1)\. It will
target companies that will have the potential for a positive financial return on investment while also
creating social, economic and/or environmental impact\. These will include companies developing
promising - but unproven - business models in renewable energy (on-grid, off-grid, and home-based
products such as solar lighting or cook-stoves), water/sanitation and climate-related agriculture\. To
maximize deal flow however, portfolio companies for the KCVF will include but not be limited to
KCIC clients\.
The KCVF will be set up by KCIC, which will capitalize it with an anchor equity contribution of
approximately $4\.5M (made possible through a grant of $4\.9M to KCIC from infoDev)\.
Key features of the KCVF model are as follows:
⢠Geographic Focus - The principal geographic focus of the Facility is Kenya, but KCVF will
also be open to investment possibilities in the greater East Africa region in due course\.
⢠Investment Size - Individual investments could range from $100K -$1M; however most
investments will be under $500K\. To mitigate risk, investments will be milestone based, with
smaller amounts of initial capital and subsequent capital injections tied to performance milestones
and growth outlook\.
⢠Legal Structure â KCVF is envisioned to be an investment company, as this structure is
Page 5 of 9
more suited to this type of higher risk investment category than traditional VC/PE models\. The
actual details of the legal structure will be further developed during the project development phase\.
⢠Investment Instruments and Approach - Individual investments will consist of equity,
Public Disclosure Copy
equity-like debt and other innovative non-grant instruments (such as revenue based financing), and
priced on commercial terms using a disciplined investment approach\. However, they will be more
patient and flexible in structure than traditional commercial sources of capital, given the early stages
of the companies and their need for more tailored and flexible sources of capital\. Such investment
principles are already being effectively applied in impact investing\.
⢠Management/Technical Assistance â A key features in the KCVF model â alongside capital
provision - is the strong focus on management/technical assistance to portfolio companies\. Start-up
and early stage companies need a lot of hand-holding and support to realize their potential\. Some of
the areas for management /technical assistance will include:
o Talent development â Mentoring/coaching for entrepreneurs, and building core management
team;
o Strategy and business model development
o Financial and operational systems development;
o Market intelligence and marketing support;
o Government linkages and assistance on getting regulatory approvals;
o Access to finance linkages (with banks, donors, other investors) for companies, value-chain
players, and end-consumer financing;
o New business development and partnerships\.
infoDev has applied for an additional $0\.8 M in grant funding for Technical Assistance for KCVF
portfolio companies from the SREP Private Sector Set-Aside of the Climate Investment Funds
administered by the World Bank\. The proposal has been endorsed by an Expert Group reviewing all
proposals and is pending formal approval from the SREP Approval Committee\.
Because of the pioneering nature of KCVF as one of the first seed-stage investment and TA vehicles
Public Disclosure Copy
in Africa focused on climate technologies, details of its business and investment model, strategy and
structure will need to be kept open at this point to encourage the KCVF to adapt itself as it is
informed by the experiences from its early investments\.
(c) Operational Relationship between KCIC and KCVF
A central element of KCVF âand a principal innovation in its investment model which sets it apart
from other early-stage funds - is its close operational relationship with the KCIC\. The KCIC will
support KCVF in the following ways:
⢠Pipeline sourcing and pre-screening â Start-up and early-stage companies being developed
by KCIC will be a principal source of deal flow for the KCVF\. The KCIC will also be able to vet/
screen them for suitability for KCVF investment as per the Facilityâs funding criteria\. At present,
KCIC management estimates that about 25 of the 80 companies currently being supported by KCIC
are seeking to raise their first round of investment capital and would be potential pipeline for KCVF\.
Additionally, KCIC also has built a network of other early-stage clean-tech companies that were too
mature for KCICâs incubation support, but would be promising pipeline for KCVF\. This ready-
made pipeline from KCIC will reduce the KCVFâs time and cost in sourcing deal pipeline and
screening\.
⢠Post-investment management & technical assistance â The KCIC has the infrastructure to
build capacity and provide support to start-up and early-stage climate-tech companies\. For
companies that KCVF invests in, KCIC will provide management/technical assistance alongside the
Page 6 of 9
KCVF team\.
(d) Management of KCVF
Public Disclosure Copy
It is envisioned that the management of the Facility will be done by an investment firm with strong
experience in SME investing (including managing early-stage investments) and with a local Kenyan
presence\. The Facility manager will:
i) source deals (in addition to the pipeline generated from KCIC);
ii) conduct due-diligence and negotiate/structure/close individual investments;
iii) conduct post-investment monitoring and governance of portfolio companies;
iv) coordinate management assistance to portfolio companies from the KCVF investment team
and KCIC;
v) administer the Facility governance and reporting requirements;
vi) bring additional investors into the project\.
An alternative management option is to hire an in-house investment team within KCIC/KCVF to
manage the Facility\. The investment team would be led by a seasoned VC/PE investment
professional (who would serve as the Chief Investment Officer) and include a small team of finance
professionals (which will grows as needed as the portfolio expands)\. In this scenario, the KCVF
investment team will remain independent of KCIC incubation team, reporting instead to an
investment committee (on investment matters) and to the KCVF Board (on general governance
matters)\.
Both management options appear feasible at this stage and this will be finalized during project
development prior to disbursement of the grant to KCIC\. The Facility managerâs contract terms
(along with the compensation/incentive structure) will be developed during project development as
well\.
(e) Leveraging Additional Capital
KCVF will initiate investing with the $4\.5 M anchor equity contribution from KCIC, laying its
Public Disclosure Copy
structural foundations and refining its model based on its initial investment experiences\. As these
foundations are built, the project will aim to leverage and âcrowd inâ other public and/or private
funders to increase the overall funding base for target companies\. Such leverage can come at two
levels:
i) Investors can invest directly into KCVF, adding to the pool of funds contributed by KCIC\.
The goal is to increase the size of KCVF to at least $15 M in total capitalization over time\.
ii) Investors can co-invest with KCVF directly into the target portfolio companies\. The pre and
post-investment activities of KCVF/KCIC will make it easier for potential co-investors to reduce
their diligence/transaction and post-investment management costs\.
One source of financing is other institutional donors who also have a strategic interest in enabling
early-stage climate-tech companies\. Another source is impact investors, who seek to address social
and/or environmental problems while also making reasonable financial returns\. Impact investors are
interested in areas such as SME financing, clean/renewable energy and sustainable agriculture\. They
also recognize the importance of early-stage businesses in developing such innovations\. However, in
practice all these possible partners struggle to make investments because of the higher risks of
failure associated with them\. These other investors may wish to avail themselves of risk mitigation
support from the KCVF\.
To prepare for and enable risk mitigation support for such investors, infoDev submitted a request for
$6M guarantee funding to the SREP Private Sector Set-Aside of the Climate Investment Funds, as
mentioned above\. The guarantee will be in the form of a âfirst lossâ cover on the principal amount
Page 7 of 9
invested and will be available both type of target investors for the project\. Those co-investing with
KCVF directly into portfolio companies will have a portion of their principal protected in individual
deals\. Likewise, those investing into KCVF directly will have a portion of their investment into the
Public Disclosure Copy
Facility also protected\. Initial estimates are that the âfirst-lossâ cover could be between 25-35% of
the principal amount invested, potentially unlocking about $20 M in additional financing for the two
investment categories\. The exact extent of the first-loss protection and how the guarantee structure
works will be determined during the project development following conversations with potential
investors\.
IV\. Safeguard Policies that Might Apply
Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project Yes No TBD
Environmental Assessment OP/BP 4\.01 â
Natural Habitats OP/BP 4\.04 â
Forests OP/BP 4\.36 â
Pest Management OP 4\.09 â
Physical Cultural Resources OP/BP 4\.11 â
Indigenous Peoples OP/BP 4\.10 â
Involuntary Resettlement OP/BP 4\.12 â
Safety of Dams OP/BP 4\.37 â
Projects on International Waterways OP/BP 7\.50 â
Projects in Disputed Areas OP/BP 7\.60 â
V\. Financing (in USD Million)
Total Project Cost: 4\.9 Total Bank Financing: 0
Financing Gap: 0
Public Disclosure Copy
Financing Source Amount
InfoDev 4\.9
VI\. Contact point
World Bank
Contact: Aun Ali Rahman
Title: Financial Sector Specialist
Tel: 473-3146
Email: arahman9@worldbank\.org
Borrower/Client/Recipient
Name: Kenya Climate Innovation Centre
Contact: Edward Mungai
Title: CEO
Tel: 254-703-034400
Email: emungai@kenyacic\.org
Implementing Agencies
Name: Kenya Climate Innovation Centre
Contact: Edward Mungai
Title: CEO
Page 8 of 9
Tel: 254-703-034400
Email: emungai@kenyacic\.org
VII\. For more information contact:
Public Disclosure Copy
The InfoShop
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 458-4500
Fax: (202) 522-1500
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/infoshop
Public Disclosure Copy
Page 9 of 9 | APPROVAL |
P106188 | Page 1
INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS DATASHEET
APPRAISAL STAGE
I\. Basic Information
Date prepared/updated: 04/24/2008
Report No\.: 43597
1\. Basic Project Data
Country: Lao People's Democratic
Republic
Project ID: P106188
Project Name: LA - Poverty Reduction Fund Project
Task Team Leader: Iamele P\. Rigolini
Estimated Appraisal Date: February 4,
2008
Estimated Board Date: July 8, 2008
Managing Unit: EASHD
Lending Instrument: Specific Investment
Loan
Sector: General education sector (30%);Roads and highways (30%);General agriculture,
fishing and forestry sector (20%);Health (10%);Water supply (10%)
Theme: Rural services and infrastructure (P);Participation and civic engagement
(P);Education for all (S);Health system performance (S);Other rural development (S)
IBRD Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
IDA Amount (US$m\.):
15\.00
GEF Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
PCF Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
Other financing amounts by source:
BORROWER/RECIPIENT
0\.00
0\.00
Environmental Category: B - Partial Assessment
Simplified Processing
Simple []
Repeater []
Is this project processed under OP 8\.50 (Emergency Recovery)
or OP 8\.00 (Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies)
Yes [ ]
No [X]
2\. Project Objectives
The Project Objectives are: (i) Financing community infrastructure activities, and other
community public capital investments endeavors and training activities at the village
level; (ii) Building local capacity at the village level in poor districts to manage public
investment planning and implementation; and (iii) Strengthening the capacity of local
institutions to support participatory decision-making at the village, koumban, and district
levels\.
3\. Project Description
The Poverty Reduction Fund Project (PRFP) has three main components:
A\. Village Sub-Project Grants
This component finances grants for eligible infrastructure sub-projects identified by the
villages, such as access and transport infrastructure; schools and nurseries; clinics;
community halls and other public buildings (but not village administrative offices);
Page 2
communal water supply systems or structures; and local markets\. Training sessions to
communities on livelihood activities, and to individuals or communities related to the
O&M of infrastructure and environmental management are also financed\.
B\. Local Capacity Building
This component supports the PRFP objective of empowering communities by training
them in assessing their own needs, in discussing them with the district, and in
implementing and supervising the construction of public infrastructure\. The component
also reinforces capacity at the district and provincial level via training sessions and
targeted assistance/incentives mechanisms to improve ownership of PRFP infrastructure
by district line agencies; improve the quality of service delivery of PRFP infrastructure;
promote participatory planning at the district and provincial level; and facilitate the
dialogue between districts and communities\. The component therefore finances, among
others, PRF district offices costs (including operating costs, equipment and staff
salaries), the costs associated to the meetings of villagers (such as village needs
assessment meetings, prioritization and decision meetings), to communities training on
funds management,procurement methods, sub-project implementation, infrastructures
operation andmaintenance, etc\. It also finances the field travel costs of PRF provincial
staff, the development of IEC tools and PRF staff training costs\.
C\. National Project Management
This component finances the cost of staffing, managing, monitoring, reporting and
operating the PRFP\. It includes salaries and fees of PRF staff; office equipment; vehicles
needed to carry out operational work; operating costs not covered by Government
counterparts; evaluations; technical assistance in the areas of training, monitoring, MIS,
accounting, procurement assessments, legal services, auditing, and other specialist areas,
at the exception of the costs financed by the Component B\.
4\. Project Location and salient physical characteristics relevant to the safeguard
analysis
The PRFP will only operate in "first priority" districts\. At the beginning of the Additional
Financing phase, it will operate in the provinces of Champassak, Huaphan, Luang
Namtha, Saravane, Savannakhet, and Xiengkhoang\.
5\. Environmental and Social Safeguards Specialists
Mr Juan D\. Quintero (EASRE)
Ms Gillian M\. Brown (EASSO)
Mr Hiroshi Ono (EASRE)
Page 3
6\. Safeguard Policies Triggered
Yes No
Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4\.01)
X
Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4\.04)
X
Forests (OP/BP 4\.36)
X
Pest Management (OP 4\.09)
X
Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4\.11)
X
Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4\.10)
X
Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4\.12)
X
Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4\.37)
X
Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP
7\.50)
X
Projects in Disputed Areas (OP/BP 7\.60)
X
II\. Key Safeguard Policy Issues and Their Management
A\. Summary of Key Safeguard Issues
1\. Describe any safeguard issues and impacts associated with the proposed project\.
Identify and describe any potential large scale, significant and/or irreversible impacts:
Since most subprojects are very small (the estimated average is US$8,500), no major
environmental and adverse social impacts are expected\. The project will, by the nature of
the decision-making process, not fund any investment that is not acceptable to a
significant number of villagers involved\. Decisions on the allocation of funds are made
by villagers themselves, through a negotiation process, and with information provided by
project facilitators and consultants\. However, small-scale civil works may require minor
land acquisition or may have minor adverse impacts on ethnic minorities or the
environment\. Thus, guidelines are included in the operations manual in order to avoid or
minimize adverse environmental and social impacts of sub-projects and to ensure that
they meet with the requirements of the Bank as described in its safeguards policies\. The
Social and Environmental Guidelines prescribe a screening and review process for all
sub-projects that may cause adverse impacts on the environment, physical cultural
resources, or people; procedures to avoid or mitigate these impacts; complaint
mechanism; and procedures for monitoring and evaluation\. Screening and review will
take place prior to submission of sub-project proposals to the district meeting\.
With the majority of the population in the project areas being of smaller ethnic groups,
the entire project is considered as an ethnic groups development plan\. A Social
Assessment was done which focused on the challenges faced by smaller ethnic groups in
Lao PDR, and in the challenges the PRFP has encountered in working with these groups\.
The Social guidelines have been revised to help the PRFP better address these challenges\.
The ethnic composition of the district will influence the design of communication
materials to ensure messages are well targeted and appropriate to the population groups\.
Any activity unacceptable to an ethnic group in a village of mixed ethnic composition
cannot be funded without prior review\. Activities that will have significant adverse
impacts on ethnic groups in neighboring villages cannot be funded\. In addition, to these
safeguards for ethnic groups incorporated into the planning phase as described in the
Operations Manual, the project itself has been designed to ensure that all ethnic groups
Page 4
will be included and benefit in appropriate ways\. Specific measures to support the
involvement of all ethnic groups include: hiring staff, as far as possible and needed, that
come from local smaller ethnic groups, and providing additional training if needed;
training of project staff and facilitators on ethnic minority issues; grievance redress
mechanism that allows all ethnic groups an avenue for complaints; and particular
attention to indigenous peoples issues in monitoring and evaluation\.
In the PRFP operational cycle, the Provincial Technical Support Team and district
facilitators will play an important role in overseeing the application of these procedures,
monitoring their results, and educating village teams to their importance\. The aim is to
integrate environmental and natural resource education and awareness raising at the
village level through the Technical Support Team and facilitators\.
2\. Describe any potential indirect and/or long term impacts due to anticipated future
activities in the project area:
No major indirect and/or long term impacts are envisaged given the scale and nature of
the subprojects\.
3\. Describe any project alternatives (if relevant) considered to help avoid or minimize
adverse impacts\.
Given the scale and nature of the subprojects, the project has adopted a negative list and
will screen out a subproject upfront which may potentially involve substantial
environmental issues, rather than considering subproject alternatives\.
4\. Describe measures taken by the borrower to address safeguard policy issues\. Provide
an assessment of borrower capacity to plan and implement the measures described\.
With the majority of the population in the project areas being of smaller ethnic groups,
the entire project is considered as an ethnic groups development plan\. A Social
Assessment was done which focused on the challenges faced by smaller ethnic groups in
Lao PDR, and in the challenges the PRFP has encountered in working with these groups\.
The Social guidelines have been revised to help the PRFP better address these challenges\.
Involuntary Resettlement will not be allowed, and as such the Banks OP4\.12 will not
be triggered\. Nonetheless, procedures to regulate and document voluntary contributions
have been put in place and are contained in the Operations Manual\.
In order to address potential environmental issues, an Environmenral Management
Framework is included in the Social and Environmental Guidelines to screen out
subprojects in the negative list, identify the nature and magnitude of environmental
impacts, develop adequate mitigation measures to address the impacts, and ensure public
involvement and adequate monitoring\.
With respect to the negative list, the project will not support projects that involve new
roads; electrical, gasoline or diesel generators or pumps; chain saws, pesticides,
insecticides, herbicides, asbestos or other investments detrimental to the environment\.
Also, no forest operations, including logging, harvesting or processing of timber products
Page 5
will be supported\. No new settlement or expansion of existing settlements will be
supported in critical habitats, protected areas or areas proposed for protection\. Where
settlements already exist proposals for funding should be in compliance with any local
regulations on land management and other provisions of the protected area management
plan\. No road construction or rehabilitation of any kind will be allowed inside critical
habitats and existing or proposed protected areas\.
The project will not fund the acquisition of land under any conditions, however some
may occur on a voluntary basis or with compensation paid by the village's own funds\.
Involuntary resettlement is not allowed and any voluntary movement or resettlement of
more than five households or household structures will need special approval from the
National Executive Office in Vientiane prior to decision at the district level meeting\.
Finally, the project will not support government programs involving village
consolidation and/or resettlement that are not consistent with Bank policies\.
5\. Identify the key stakeholders and describe the mechanisms for consultation and
disclosure on safeguard policies, with an emphasis on potentially affected people\.
Key stakeholders are the beneficiary districts and villagers included in the project\. At the
beginning of project implementation in a district, a large scale socialization process
informs districts and villagers of the project, including the safeguards requirements
included in the Operations Manual\. During the environmental screening and assessment
process, information disclosure to and consultation with key stakeholders will take place
in accordance with the Environmental Management Framework in the Social and
Environmental Guidelines\.
B\. Disclosure Requirements Date
Environmental Assessment/Audit/Management Plan/Other:
Was the document disclosed
prior to appraisal?
No
Date of receipt by the Bank
04/08/2008
Date of "in-country" disclosure
04/08/2008
Date of submission to InfoShop
04/08/2008
For category A projects, date of distributing the Executive
Summary of the EA to the Executive Directors
Resettlement Action Plan/Framework/Policy Process:
Was the document disclosed
prior to appraisal?
Date of receipt by the Bank
Date of "in-country" disclosure
Date of submission to InfoShop
Indigenous Peoples Plan/Planning Framework:
Was the document disclosed
prior to appraisal?
No
Date of receipt by the Bank
04/08/2008
Date of "in-country" disclosure
04/08/2008
Date of submission to InfoShop
04/08/2008
Page 6
Pest Management Plan:
Was the document disclosed
prior to appraisal?
Date of receipt by the Bank
Date of "in-country" disclosure
Date of submission to InfoShop
*
If the project triggers the Pest Management and/or Physical Cultural Resources,
the respective issues are to be addressed and disclosed as part of the Environmental
Assessment/Audit/or EMP\.
If in-country disclosure of any of the above documents is not expected, please
explain why:
C\. Compliance Monitoring Indicators at the Corporate Level (to be filled in when the
ISDS is finalized by the project decision meeting)
OP/BP/GP 4\.01 - Environment Assessment
Does the project require a stand-alone EA (including EMP) report?
Yes
If yes, then did the Regional Environment Unit or Sector Manager (SM)
review and approve the EA report?
Yes
Are the cost and the accountabilities for the EMP incorporated in the
credit/loan?
Yes
OP/BP 4\.11 - Physical Cultural Resources
Does the EA include adequate measures related to cultural property?
Yes
Does the credit/loan incorporate mechanisms to mitigate the potential
adverse impacts on cultural property?
Yes
OP/BP 4\.10 - Indigenous Peoples
Has a separate Indigenous Peoples Plan/Planning Framework (as
appropriate) been prepared in consultation with affected Indigenous Peoples?
Yes
If yes, then did the Regional unit responsible for safeguards or Sector
Manager review the plan?
N/A
If the whole project is designed to benefit IP, has the design been reviewed
and approved by the Regional Social Development Unit or Sector Manager?
Yes
The World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information
Have relevant safeguard policies documents been sent to the World Bank's
Infoshop?
Yes
Have relevant documents been disclosed in-country in a public place in a
form and language that are understandable and accessible to project-affected
groups and local NGOs?
No
All Safeguard Policies
Have satisfactory calendar, budget and clear institutional responsibilities
been prepared for the implementation of measures related to safeguard
policies?
Yes
Have costs related to safeguard policy measures been included in the project
cost?
Yes
Does the Monitoring and Evaluation system of the project include the
Yes
Page 7
monitoring of safeguard impacts and measures related to safeguard policies?
Have satisfactory implementation arrangements been agreed with the
borrower and the same been adequately reflected in the project legal
documents?
Yes
D\. Approvals
Signed and submitted by:
Name
Date
Task Team Leader:
Mr Iamele P\. Rigolini
03/27/2008
Environmental Specialist:
Mr Hiroshi Ono
03/25/2008
Social Development Specialist
Ms Gillian M\. Brown
03/27/2008
Additional Environmental and/or
Social Development Specialist(s):
Approved by:
Sector Manager:
Mr Emmanuel Y\. Jimenez
04/08/2008
Comments: | APPROVAL |
P004449 | FILE COPY
Report No\. 1311a-PH
Philippines
Appraisal of the
Jalaur Irrigation Project
January 5, 1977
East Asia and Pacific
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Document of the World Bank
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients
only in the performance of their official duties\. Its contents may not
otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
US$1\.00 = Pesos (P) 7\.50
P 1\.00 = US$0\.133
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES - METRIC SYSTEM
1 hectare (ha) 3 2\.47 acres
1 kilometer (km) 2 0\.62 miles
1 square kilometer (km ) 0\.3866 square miles
1 meter (m) 2 39\.37 inches
I square meter (I2) - 10\.76 square feet
1 cubic meter (m ) 35\.31 cubic feet
1 million cubic meters (Mm ) 810\.7 acre feet
1 millimeter (mm) 0\.039 inches
1 kilogram (kg) - 2\.2 pounds
1 cavan (paddy) 50 kg
20 cavans 1 metric ton
ABBREVIATIONS
ACA - Agricultural Credit Admnistration
ADB - Asian Development Bank
ADCC - Agricultural Development Coordinating Council
AMIADP - Angat-Magat Integrated Agricultural Development Project
ARIS - Aganan River Irrigation System
BAE - Bureau of Agricultural Extension
BPI - Bureau of Plant Industry
DAR - Department of Agrarian Reform
DLGCD - Department of Local Government and Co=uaity Development
ECI - Engineering Consultants, Inc\.
JRIS - Jalaur River Irrigation System
NGA - National Grains Authority
NIA - National Irrigation Administration
NISIS - National Irrigation Systems Improvement Study
RB - Rural Banks
SBIS - Santa Barbara Irrigation System
SRIS - Suague River Irrigation System
UPRP - Upper Pampanga River Project
WMT - Water Management Technologist
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PHILIPPINES
APPRAISAL OF THE
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Table of Contents
Page No\.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION \. i i
I\. INTRODUCTION \. \. \.
II\. BACKGROUND
General \.1
The Agricultural Sector \. \. 2
The Critical Role of Water Development \. 2
Project Formulation \. \. \. 3
III\. THE PROJECT AREA
General \. \. 4
Climate \. 5
Topography, Drainage and Soils \. \. 5
Land Tenure and Farm Size \. \. \. 5
Existing Irrigation Facilities \. \. 7
Agricultural Production \. \. 7
Transportation \. 7
IV\. THE PROJECT
Project Works \. 8
Water Supply, Demand and Quality \. \. 9
Status of Engineering \. \. 10
Water Management Training \. \. 11
Cost Estimates \. 11
Financing \. 12
Procurement \. 12
Disbursements \. \. 13
Accounts and Audit \. \. 13
Environmental Effects \. \. 13
V\. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
Project Management \. 14
Supporting Agricultural Services \. 15
Cost and Rent Recovery \. 16
This report is based on the findings of an appraisal mission
composed of Messrs\. K\. E\. Ireland, A\. N\. Khan, J\. van Holst Pellekaan,
R\. S\. Baskett and M\. Goldman\. Mr\. E\. G\. Giglioli also assisted in pre-
paration of the report\.
This document hs restricted distribution and may be ud by recipients only in the perfomfance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclseed without World Bank authorIution\.
-2-
Page No\.
VI\. PRODUCTION, MARKET PROSPECTS, PRICES AND FARM INCOMES
Production \. \. \. 17
Market Prospects \. 18
Prices \. 18
Farm Incomes \. * \. \. \. 19
VII\. BENEFITS, JUSTIFICATION AND RISKS \. \. 20
VIII\. AGREEMENTS TO BE REACHED AND RECOMMENDATION \. 21
ANNEXES
1\. Climatological Data
2\. Land Tenure and Reform
3\. Project Works
4\. Water Supply, Demand and Quality
5\. Cost Estimates
6\. Equipment List
7\. Estimated Schedule of Expenditures and Disbursements
8\. Organization and Management
9\. Supporting Agricultural Services
10\. Present and Projected Cropping Patterns and Production
11\. Market Prospects and Prices
12\. Crop and Farm Budgets
13\. Farm Labor Analysis
14\. Cost and Rent Recovery
15\. Economic Analysis
16\. Schedule of Early Events
CHARTS
Implementation Schedule No\. 16409
NIA Organization for Special Projects No\. 9533 (3R)
Proposed Organization for Project Construction No\. 16392
Proposed Organization for Operation and Maintenance No\. 16391(R)
Proposed Cropping Calendar No\. 16408
Marginal Economic Cost of Farm Labor No\. 16428
MAP
Jalaur Irrigation Project No\. 12414
PHILIPPINES
APPRAISAL OF THE JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
i\. The Government of the Philippines has requested Bank assistance
to carry out the Jalaur Irrigation Project located on Panay island in the
Western Visayas\. The project consists of the rehabilitation of four
existing irrigation systems now serving a total area of 22,000 ha and
the construction of new facilities on some 2,700 ha\. The project also
provides for a training program for water management staff and for technical
assistance\.
ii\. Major Government objectives in the agricultural sector are to
achieve self-sufficiency in basic foods and to correct regional economic
and social imbalances\. The project would help to meet both objectives by
improving and expanding irrigation facilities for the rice crop in one of
the poorer regions in the nation\.
iii\. The deficit in rice, the main staple crop, has been a persistent
problem for the Philippines, and annual rice imports have averaged about
300,000 tons in recent years\. With improved water control being a prere-
quisite to obtaining optimum results from the new high-yielding rice varie-
ties, an annual total of about 50,000 ha of rice lands would have to be
rehabilitated or provided with new irrigation facilities for the next decade
to allow the country to achieve rice self-sufficiency\. The proposed project
would be the seventh Bank-assisted project aimed at helping the Government to
achieve this goal\. The Upper Pampanga (Loan 637-PH), Aurora-Penaranda
(Loan/Credit 984/472-PH) and Tarlac projects are in Central Luzon; the Magat
(Loan 1154-PH) and Chico (Loan 1227-PH) projects are in the Cagayan Valley of
Northern Luzon; and the Rural Development Project (Loan 1102-PH) is on the
island of Mindoro\. The proposed project would be the first Bank-assisted
irrigation project in the Visayas\.
iv\. Total cost of the project is estimated at P 255\.0 million
(US$34\.0 million), of which US$15\.0 million, or approximately 44%, would
be in foreign exchange\. The Bank would finance the foreign exchange
component\. Equipment costing about US$4\.5 million would be procured
after international competitive bidding in accordance with Bank Group
Guidelines\. Civil works would not be suitable for international competi-
tive bidding because of their nature and would be carried out by locally
advertised contract (US$8\.2 million) or by force account (US$5\.5 million)\.
v\. The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) would be the
executing agency for the project\. NIA's responsibilities would be
carried out by the Special Projects Organization, which is in charge of
all Bank-assisted irrigation projects\. This body is well staffed with
competent personnel and would be able to implement the project successfully\.
- ii -
vi\. At full development of the project, nine years after commence-
ment of work, annual paddy production from the project area is expected
to reach 147,000 tons compared with a current level of production of
80,000 tons\. The increased production would make a contribution to the
national campaign for self-sufficiency by providing enough rice to feed
nearly 425,000 persons per year\.
vii\. Under the Government's program of agrarian reform, share-
cropping has been abolished and title to land in holdings over 7 ha is
now being transferred to the cultivators\. When the transfer is completed,
tentatively by the end of 1977, about 54% of the land in the project area
will be farmed by owner operators and the rest by leasehold tenants of
small landlords\. Some 12,000 farm families cultivate the project area,
working an average unit of 2\.1 ha\. The project would increase the annual
per capita income on a 1\.5 ha farm from a current range of between US$45
and US$80 to between US$110 and US$220 at full agricultural development
in 1985, depending on cropping intensity\. For a 3 ha farm the per capita
income at full development would range between US$200 and US$390\. By
comparison about 75% of the project's farm families are presently at or
below the Bank's estimated absolute per capita poverty level of US$155\.
These comparisons indicate that the project would narrow the income gap
between the project area and other parts of the country\.
viii\. The project would result in about a 19% increase in cropping
intensity, which in turn would create an increase in farm labor employment
opportunities equivalent to about 3,500 full time jobs\. The economic
rate of return of the project is expected to be about 20%\. The rate of
return is only moderately sensitive to a delay or a reduction in benefits\.
However, even under extremely adverse conditions, the rate of return would
not fall below 15%\.
ix\. The proposed project is suitable for a Bank Loan of US$15\.0 mil-
lion for a period of 20 years, including a 4\.5-year grace period\. The
borrower would be the Republic of the Philippines\.
PHILIPPINES
APPRAISAL OF THE JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
I\. INTRODUCTION
1\.01 The Government of the Philippines has requested Bank assistance
in financing the Jalaur Irrigation Project in Iloilo province of Panay
island\. The project would provide a dependable water supply to irrigate
about 24,700 ha of rice in the wet season and 12,000 ha in the dry season\.
1\.02 The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) prepared the feasi-
bility report for the project with the assistance of Engineering Consultants,
Inc\. of Denver, Colorado (ECI)\. This report is based on the findings of a
Bank appraisal mission, which visited the Philippines in June-July 1976,
composed of Messrs\. K\.E\. Ireland, A\.N\. Khan, J\. van Holst Pellekaan, R\.S\.
Baskett and M\. Goldman\. Mr\. E\.G\. Giglioli also assisted in the preparation
of the report\.
II\. BACKGROUND
General
2\.01 The Philippines covers some 297,000 km scattered over more than
7,000 islands between the Pacific Ocean and the China Sea\. The 45 largest
islands account for 98% of the area\. The population is around 43 million
(1975), growing at a rate of about 2\.8% annually\. Real GNP, which had a
trend growth rate of 5 to 6% in the 1960s, grew by 10% in 1973 due to high
prices for export commodities, but has grown at only about 6% in 1974-75
as some industries have been adversely affected by the recession in the
economies of the Philippines' trading partners\. Inflation related to high
export prices and increased oil and food prices was a major problem in 1974,
but abated markedly in 1975 and 1976\. Unequal income distribution and
underemployment remain major economic problems\.
2\.02 Out of a total land area of some 30 million ha, more than half
is forest and about one-third under cultivation or in plantations\. About
2\.0 to 2\.5 million ha of fairly level land is still available for grow-
ing crops, although some 1\.0 million ha of this is cogon grassland which
would be difficult to reclaim\. Bringing this additional land under culti-
vation would be insufficient to meet increasing food needs or to improve
rural income significantly\. These goals also call for increasing produc-
tion from currently cultivated areas through yield improvements and
increased cropping intensity where water is available\.
-2-
The Agricultural Sector
2\.03 Agriculture accounts for about one-third of net domestic
product, about 55% of total employment and 70% of export earnings\.
During the 1960s the rate of growth of agricultural output accelerated
gradually and averaged 4\.7% per year for the 1965-70 period, stimulated
by the spread of improved rice varieties\. During the next five years,
the spread of new varieties decreased; typhoons in 1972 and high ferti-
lizer prices in 1974 further affected agricultural output, which grew by
only 3\.2% a year on the average from 1970-75\. The growth rate of rice
production from 1970 to 1975 was only 1\.4% a year\. Although the early
typhoon of 1976 had the heaviest rainfall in modern history, it occurred
between rice growing seasons\. The resulting damage to total production
was estimated at less than 3%\. The failure of food supply to keep pace
with demand has caused the ratio of food prices to prices in general to
increase over the 1970-75 period\. This, combined with a short period of
high world prices for sugar and coconut products, led to a substantial
shift in the internal terms of trade in favor of agriculture, which has
prevented a widening of the disparity between rural and urban incomes\.
In the face of sluggish growth of manufacturing employment, much of the
growth of the labor force in recent years has therefore taken place in
agriculture\. Although value added per worker in agriculture has increased
in current prices, it has declined in real terms, implying growing rural
underemployment\.
2\.94 In the Philippines the population density is 131 people per
km , compared with the Asian2average of 86\. The density in Iloilo
province is about 250 per km \. Migration is heavy from this overcrowded
region (the Visayas) and Central Luzon to the Cagayan Valley in Northern
Luzon and Mindanao in the south\.
2\.05 Agricultural sector performance will be crucial in determining
whether the drive towards a rapid but more equitable income expansion
succeeds\. The major goals for the sector are self-sufficiency in cereals,
particularly rice and corn; development of the livestock and fisheries
sector; expansion of agricultural exports; intensification of agrarian
reform; better conservation of natural resources; and strengthening of
institutional support\. Self-sufficiency in cereals is important not only
to strengthen the balance of payments, but also to raise incomes for much
of the rural population\.
The Critical Role of Water Development
2\.06 After allowance for increases in rainfed rice production, the
Philippines cannot reach self-sufficiency in rice without substantial
investment in irrigation expansion and improvement\. Performance of
existing systems falls far short of their potential\. The Sector Survey /1
estimates that, out of a total of 960,000 ha which could be served by
existing systems, only 630,000 ha are served in the wet season and
254,000 ha in the dry season\. Almost all the irrigated area is devoted
to rice\. The NIA's gravity systems are the main component\. In addition,
NIA has constructed and rehabilitated a substantial part of the small
privately operated communal systems, averaging 250-300 ha\. The Irriga-
tion Services Unit, now under NIA's administrative supervision, is res-
ponsible for pump irrigation schemes\. The 104 NIA gravity systems, varying
in size from 130 ha to 83,000 ha, are usually run-of-the-river schemes
with insufficient control structures in the canals, inadequate drainage
and little provision for access\. Even when the systems are new, water
distribution is uneven during the wet season and limited during the dry
season\. Maintenance has been minimal due to shortages of staff and funds
and the lack of access roads for maintenance machinery\. A vicious circle
has developed by which lack of maintenance discourages farmers from pay-
ing operation and maintenance charges, which in turn precludes further
maintenance\.
2\.07 This unsatisfactory situation began to change in the late
1960s when the NIA was reorganized, more advanced irrigation designs
were introduced and much higher levels of water management became a
goal\. Simultaneously, the need for intensified agricultural supporting
services on irrigation projects was accepted\. The Bank-assisted Upper
Pampanga River Irrigation Project (UPRP) (Loan 637-PH) and the Asian
Development Bank (ADB)-assisted Angat-Magat Integrated Agricultural
Development Project (AMIADP) typify the new approach\. The pattern of
rehabilitation, new construction and operation exemplified by these
projects is essential for large-scale rice production\. To meet the
growing domestic rice demand a program of rehabilitation and new con-
struction in rice lands for some 50,000 ha per year will be needed over
the next decade\. The proposed project would thus be entirely compatible
with Government objectives for water resources development\.
Project Formulation
2\.08 Since the late 1960s NIA, with assistance from the Bank and
from the ADB, has been engaged in upgrading and extending large irrigation
systems, mainly in Luzon and to a lesser extent in Mindanao\. In addition
to rehabilitation of existing canals and structures, the construction of
new ones, the provision of better drainage and access and the introduction
of water management and rotational irrigation practices, extra water
supplies are being provided in some areas through the construction of
storage or by trans-basin diversion\. However, NIA has not neglected the
need for rehabilitation and upgrading of the badly deteriorated, smaller
systems scattered through the Philippines\. The National Irrigation Systems
Improvement Study (NISIS) was set up with Bank assistance (Loan 1080-PH)
/1 IBRD Agricultural Sector Survey, Philippines, May 2, 1974 (Report
No\. 39a-PH)\.
to inventory the smaller systems and to select a total of about 150,000
ha with the highest priority for improvement and allowing for a balanced
regional distribution\. The feasibility study for the first 50,000 ha of
rehabilitation prepared under NISIS will be completed in late 1976\.
2\.09 The proposed Jalaur project, consisting of the rehabilitation
and up-rading of 22,000 ha of land in four contiguous irrigation systems
and the construction of irrigation facilities for an additional 2,700 ha
of rainfed land, falls logically in place in terms of size between the
large Luzon projects and the small scattered NISIS projects\. The proposed
project is located on Panay island in the Western Visayas and would meet
the NIA objective of more balanced regional distribution of development\.
It has fertile soils, is a rice basket for the region and is relatively
free of typhoons\.
III\. THE PROJECT AREA
General
3\.01 The project is located in Iloilo province in the southeastern
section of the island of Panay in the Western Visayas\. The region con-
tains about 12% of the area planted to rice annually in the Philippines
and accounts for 12% of total national production\. Iloilo province is
responsible for 35% of the region's rice production and the project area
accounts for about 40% of the provincial rice area and 60% of production\.
The mean rice yield in Iloilo is about 18% above the national average\.
This is due to the existence of irrigation systems, fertile soils well
suited to rice production, good external drainage, rapid adoption of
high yielding varieties and a fairly even rainfall distribution\. Panay
is a surplus rice producer and about 65% of Iloilo's production is
exported to the nearby sugar growing island of Negros\.
3\.02 The project area includes 22,000 ha of rice land in the exist-
ing Jalaur River Irrigation System (JRIS), the Suague River Irrigation
System (SRIS), the Aganan River Irrigation System (ARIS) and the Santa
Barbara Irrigation System (SBIS)\. In addition, about 2,700 ha of
currently rainfed rice land on the left bank of the Jalaur river would
be irrigated and included in the JRIS (Map No\. 12414)\.
3\.03 There are a number of small towns with populations between
5,000 and 10,000 scattered throughout the area\. The larger towns, includ-
ing the provincial capital of Iloilo which lies on the southern edge of
the project area, provide banking, storage and processing facilities as
well as supplies of inputs to the surrounding agricultural area\. The
project area is connected to the capital city and port of Iloilo by a
national highway and paved provincial roads\. Daily air service and
frequent interisland boat services connect Iloilo with Manila\.
-5-
Climate
3\.04 The climate in the project area is tropical and monsoonal\. Warm
temperatures throughout the year allow a twelve-month growing season with
irrigation\. About 85% of the average annual rainfall of 2,150 mm falls in
the seven-month period of May through November with the heaviest rain in
July\. The rainfall, together with river flows in the wet season, is
generally adequate for a single rice crop\. Dry season cropping, however,
entails a greater risk and irrigation is essential to ensure a crop\. Panay
island is hit by an average of one typhoon per year, with the highest fre-
quency in November\. The project area is less affected than the northern
part of the island\. Further climatic details are presented in Annex 1\.
Topography, Drainage and Soils
3\.05 The project area is located on the alluvial terrace fans of
the Aganan, Tigum, Suague and Jalaur rivers\. The Suague empties into the
Jalaur river about 33 km northeast of Iloilo, while the Tigum and Aganan
join 8 km north of Iloilo emptying into the ocean near the city\. The
slope of the land is from northwest to southeast\. In the upper part of
the project area, the slope is steeper with paddies sometimes terraced
but it flattens out towards the sea with three-fourths of the area fairly
level\. Surface drainage is generally adequate, although there are drainage
problems in a few scattered areas\. Some of these are as large as 200 ha
in size, but would be provided with the necessary drainage facilities under
the project\. In order to obviate possible drainage difficulties which
could occur as a result of the belt of marine fish ponds lying between the
project area and the ocean, additional drainage outlets would be built
under the project\.
3\.06 Soils in the project area are predominantly of the Santa Rita
series with Santa Rita clay covering about 65% of the area and Santa Rita
clay loam about 30%\. Recent alluvial deposits of fine sandy loam along
the rivers make up the remainder\. These soils are slightly acid with
fair cation exchange capacity\. Some phosphate is needed particularly if
rice is to be double-cropped for a period of years\. The soils of the
project area are well supplied with potash for rice production, but addi-
tional amounts of this element should be added when planting sugarcane\.
The Santa Rita soils are fair in organic matter content\. They have slow
internal drainage and are well suited for rice, which has been grown in
the project area for many years without difficulty\. Sugarcane is planted
on the fine sandy loam soils or the lighter textured portions of the Santa
Rita soils where surface drainage is good and a high water table is not a
problem in the wet season\.
Land Tenure and Farm Size
3\.07 Since 1972 the Government has pursued a program of agrarian
reform aimed at the transfer of land ownership to tenant farmers on rice
and corn lands\. Presidential Decree No\. 27 (PD 27), the basic legislation
of the new program, provides for the transfer to the tenant, whether share-
cropper or leaseholder, of the land he tills up to 3 ha in an irrigated
area and 5 ha in a rainfed area\. According to PD 27, the landlord may
- 6 -
retain up to 7 ha if he tills the land himself\. Since there are some
2 million rice and corn farmers on about 4 million ha, of which less than
I million ha are irrigated, there is little prospect of achieving the 5 ha
rainfed and 3 ha irrigated family farms nationwide\. Furthermore, some 85%
of the landlords have holdings of less than 7 ha and there are no plans at
present for transfer of lands in this category\. The Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) completed the issue of land transfer certificates to tenants
for all land in holdings over 24 ha in 1975\. In November 1974 the Govern-
ment decided to proceed with the transfer of land in holdings between 24
and 7 ha\.
3\.08 DAR surveys show that some 12,000 farm families, averaging
5\.8 members for a total of about 70,000 people, live in the project area\.
The average farm unit is about 2\.1 ha\. Average farm holdings are approxi-
mately 1\.7 ha on rainfed rice areas, 2\.0 ha on irrigated rice areas and
about 13 ha on the 1,000 ha of sugarcane farms within the project area\.
The farm size distribution on the 23,700 ha of rice lands is as follows:
Farm Size No\. of Farms Area of Farms
(ha)
--
( )
Less than 1 13 3
1-2 38 23
2-3 28 29
3-5 17 30
More than 5 4 15
Total 100 100
About 66% of the farms, covering 52% of the land, fall between 1 and
3 ha, while 96% of the farms covering 85% of the area are smaller than
5 ha\. The figures vary somewhat between subproject areas\. Survey and
census data indicate that in addition to farm operating households, there
are approximately 2,000 landless agricultural households\.
3\.09 According to DAR information the 23,700 ha of rice land in the
project area are owned by some 8,100 people, 88% of whom hold less than
7 ha\. This group accounts for 54% of the land\. The remaining 12% of
the owners account for 10,900 ha or 46% of the area\. The actual number
of farmers cultivating the land is somewhat different with about 9,000
tenants operating 17,600 ha and 3,000 owner operators farming 6,100 ha\.
After completion of land transfers under agrarian reform, there will be
7,100 owner operators and 4,900 farmers operating under a written lease
agreement providing for payments of fixed rents cultivating 12,700 ha
and 11,000 ha respectively (Annex 2)\.
- 7-
Existing Irrigation Facilities
3\.10 Approximately 22,000 ha of land in the project area fall within
the existing four systems operated by NIA\. The oldest system is the Santa
Barbara, which was completed in 1922 to serve 4,600 ha from the Tigum
river\. The Aganan system was completed in 1925 to serve 5,500 ha from the
Aganan river\. The largest is the Jalaur system, completed in 1954, to
serve 9,000 ha from the Jalaur river\. The Suague river system was completed
in 1958 to serve 2,900 ha\. Irrigation in the dry season is limited to some
7,500 ha, partly because of inadequate river flows, but mostly because of
reduced canal capacities due to siltation and a lack of on-farm distribution
facilities\. The systems have suffered from insufficient maintenance due to
lack of funds and equipment\. They also have poor distribution networks
which make it impossible for the majority of the farmers to get water
at the right time in the right amount\. In addition, there is a general
lack of access roads which renders movement of inputs and produce difficult\.
There are drainage deficiencies, particularly in portions of the area
nearest the sea, due to insufficient collector drains and inadequate outlet
conditions\.
Agricultural Production
3\.11 Rice grown by transplanting is by far the most important crop in
the area\. In the last two seasons about 12% of the rice area has been sown
directly\. Sugarcane is grown on less than 1,000 ha in the project area,
although about 10% of the land area is suitable for the crop\. Crops such as
corn, mungbean, cowpea and melons are grown on a small part of the area as
nonirrigated dry season crops for home use or local consumption\. The majo-
rity of farmers in the irrigated areas use improved rice varieties, while
in the rainfed areas farmers rely mainly on the lower yielding, but hardier
local varieties\. In the irrigated areas the average paddy yield is 2\.7 ton/
ha in the wet season and 2\.4 ton/ha in the dry season, due to inadequate
water supply and poor distribution facilities\. The average yield of rain-
fed paddy is 1\.8 ton/ha\. Yields in the project area are slightly higher
than in the Bank-assisted Central Luzon projects because of better soils,
greater use of inputs, and more even rainfall distribution in the wet
season\.
3\.12 In rainfed areas most farmers rely almost entirely on animal
power for land preparation, while in the irrigated areas mechanical land
preparation is practiced on about 45% of the crop area\. Mechanical culti-
vation in the rice areas is done with small two-wheel tractors, while four-
wheel tractors are used on sugar farms of 5 ha or more\. Threshing of the
rice crop is almost entirely manual, there being only a few small mechanical
threshers in the area\.
Transportation
3\.13 A national highway connects the towns of Pototan, Barotac
Nuevo and Leganes, within the Jalaur and Santa Barbara systems, with the
port city of Iloilo\. Paved provincial roads link the national highway
with the towns of San Miguel, Santa Barbara and Mina, in the Aganan,
Santa Barbara and Suague systems\. The Department of Highways has a
ten-year plan to upgrade some of the existing limited network of largely
unpaved provincial and municipal roads serving the area\. There is an
- 8 -
irregular railroad service connecting the eastern coastal city of Roxas
'th Tialo\. Under the project, farm and O&M roads for the irrigation
facilities would also serve as feeder roads to handle increased production\.
IV\. THE PROJECT
4\.01 The project proposed for Bank financing would upgrade four existing
irrigation systems and extend irrigation service to currently rainfed rice
lands, a total of 24,700 ha, to standards adopted for similar Bank projects
in the Philippines\. The project would include:
(a) rehabilitation of four existing NIA irrigation
and drainage systems serving a total area of
about 22,000 ha;
(b) construction of new irrigation and drainage
facilities for about 2,700 ha of rainfed rice;
(c) construction of a project headquarters building
and facilities for O&M; and
(d) procurement of vehicles and equipment\.
The project would also provide for a water management training program and
for a small amount of tehnical assistance, if required, for further studies
on expansion of the project\. A detailed description of the project works is
given in Annex 3\.
Project Works
4\.02 NIA systems serving irrigable areas at Jalaur (9,000 ha), Suague
(2,900 ha), Santa Barbara (4,600 ha) and Aganan (5,500 ha) would be rehabi-
litated and upgraded by repairing existing canals and structures as well as
providing additional control structures, drains and turnouts to manage water
deliveries effectively\. New irrigation works would be constructed to serve
about 2,700 ha of rainfed lands on the left bank of the Jalaur river\. New
outlet works would be constructed on the left abutment of the diversion dam\.
4\.03 Rice has been grown in the project area for many years and the land
is reasonably level and well laid out with little fragmentation of land hold-
ings\. Consequently, no land leveling, boundary realignment, or consolidation
would be required\. The main farm ditches, serving units of approximately
50 ha, would have a turnout for each 10 ha block, from which supplementary
farm ditches built as part of the project would provide direct delivery to
about 80% of all the holdings\. Each 10 ha block would also be served by a
collector drain, except in steeper areas with slopes in excess of 0\.4% where
the farm drainage would be from field to field with a provision of collector
drains for about 50% of the steep area\. All canals would be unlined except
in selected short portions, where the soils are erosive\. Small buildings
would be provided for Water Management Technologists operating2500 ha of irri-
gated land apiece (para\. 5\.03) and rice drying floors of 400 m would be
provided near or adjacent to the buildings\. About 20 km of new access
roads would be built\. Some 400 km of roads for operation and maintenance
would be built along the major canals and laterals, as well as about 170
km of farm roads along some of the major farm ditches\.
Water Supply, Demand and Quality
4\.04 Each of the four systems gets its water from a separate unreg-
ulated river source, using its own diversion and conveyance facilities\.
Stream flow records at or near the points of diversion for each of the
four streams are available for 10 to 20 years but not concurrently and in
some cases the records are fragmentary\. By correlation with other
station records, stream flow data were built up at the four diversion
points to cover the years 1949-1971, a period including exceptionally low
dry season flows and considered representative of normal water supply
flow conditions\.
4\.05 Water requirements for the project were based on two rice
crops per year, except for about 1,000 ha under irrigated sugarcane\.
Taking into account the higher farm irrigation efficiencies expected
after project development, anticipated conveyance and operational losses
and effective rainfall, annual diversion requirements are estimated to
total 2\.1 m for rice, of which 1\.6 m would be required in the dry season,
and 1\.2 m for sugarcane\. The proposed cropping calendar would maximize
the use of rainfall for both wet and dry season crops without exceeding
local manpower constraints\.
4\.06 The size of the project area was determined from simulated
operation studies using the 22 year period of synthesized discharge records
at each diversion and the estimated seasonal water requirements for rice\.
The irrigable areas selected for the project and the currently irrigated
areas are as follows:
Irrigation System
JRIS SRIS ARIS SBIS TOTAL
Selected Irrigable Area (ha) /a
Wet season 11,700 2,900 5,500 4,600 24,700
Dry season 10,100 1,300 100 500 12,000
Currently Irrigated Area (ha)
Wet season 9,000 2,900 5,500 4,600 22,000
Dry season 5,600 1,300 100 500 7,500
/a Includes year-round irrigation of 1,000 ha of sugarcane\.
- 10 -
The principal water rights on the four rivers are already vested in the
four national irrigation systems\. Although existing upstream uses of water
are minor, assurances were obtained that the necessary water rights for the
Jalaur extension would be granted to NIA and no other water rights except for
domestic use would be granted which could adversely affect the project water
supply\.
4\.07 Tests of samples from the Jalaur river show good water quality
with total dissolved solids under 300 ppm\. Water samples for the other
three rivers have not been analyzed\. However, water diverted from
these rivers has been used to irrigate for more than 20 years without
adverse effects on soils or crops in the project area (Annex 4)\.
Status of Engineering
4\.08 Project planning studies, designs and estimates of the irrigation
and drainage systems with associated works were carried out by NIA\. For
rehabilitation of the existing systems, surveys were made of the main
canals, major creeks and drains, and within the sample area for secondary
canals, by taking cross sections at 20 to 50 m intervals to determine
excavation quantities\. Rehabilitation costs of the remaining laterals,
drainage and on-farm facilities were based on unit cost estimates obtained
from a sample area for which designs were prepared\. Canal structure
requirements in the rehabilitation area were determined in the field by
NIA inspectors and costs were estimated for repairs, replacements or
additions\. Operation and maintenance roads were based on canal capacity
and needs within the service area and were checked in the field to ensure
that adequate access to project works would be provided\. Access roads
were also provided as a link between service and existing major roads\.
Surveys were also made of the main canal in the Jalaur extension area to
determine construction quantities\. Existing 1:4,000 scale maps were used
to determine lateral and drain locations, and costs were based on unit
costs for a 1,600 ha sample area\. Requirements for structures in the
extension area were determined according to basic irrigation design
practices\. Repair work on river diversion structures was determined from
field inspection of each structure\. Sufficient investigations have been
made to ensure that suitable materials are available for construction of
canal embankments and maintenance roadways\.
4\.09 Aerial photographs of the project service area taken in 1966 at a
scale of 1:15,000 were supplied by DAR and were used for preparation of the
1:4,000 scale topographic maps used in the sample area studies\. These maps
have been extended to cover the four systems to be rehabilitated, including
the extension area, and would be used for final designs and estimates for
construction\. Where required the maps would be supplemented by additional
topographic mapping at 20 to 25 cm contour intervals for on-farm facilities\.
The base maps for land classification were prepared by using these photographs
enlarged to a scale of 1:10,000\.
- 11 -
4\.10 Construction of the irrigation and drainage system would begin
at the end of 1977, with preconstruction activities starting in the early
part of the year (see Chart No\. 16409)\. All project works are expected
to be completed by mid-1981\. Water management training for the project
personnel would be completed by 1980, but the training center would
continue operating for other NIA projects within the Visayas region\.
Water Management Training
4\.11 Irrigation efficiencies on NIA's gravity systems are low due to
lack of terminal facilities, poor maintenance and inadequate staff\. NIA
has recognized the need for more and better water management staff and is
putting a Water Management Technologist (WMT) in charge of every 500 ha of
irrigated land\. The newly recruited staff is not well versed in water
management, crop production aspects of irrigation or in methods of communi-
cation with farmers\. In the Bank-assisted Central Luzon and Cagayan Valley
projects, water management training programs have been established to train
about 450 WMTs under the Tarlac and Magat projects (Loans 1080-PH and
1154-PH)\. About 50 WMTs and 150 ditch tenders would be required for the
Jalaur project\. The training center to be established under the project
would serve the Visayas region covering about 170,000 ha of irrigation and
with an ultimate requirement of about 350 WMTs\. The training program would
be based on three pilot water management units of 500 ha\. Theoretical
training would be reinforced by putting all trainees through a range of
field situations on the pilot units where they could apply their new
knowledge\. NIA personnel with extensive technical knowledge and field
experience would provide the training\.
Cost Estimates
4\.12 Total project costs are estimated at US$34\.0 million, of which
US$15\.0 million or 44% is foreign exchange\. Project costs are based on
quantity estimates from feasibility designs and unit prices prevailing in
Bank-assisted Luzon projects in mid-1976, adjusted to the conditions on
Panay\. Unit prices for equipment, materials and supplies are based on
recent quotations received by NIA\. NIA's costs for design and construction
supervision are included under engineering\. All costs were indexed to a
common level, January 1977, and this is the base cost level for the
project\. A physical contingency factor based on the degree of investi-
gations completed to date was applied\. It amounts to 25% for the irri-
gation and drainage system, and 10% for the O&M facilities and the water
management training program\. A higher contingency of 25% for irrigation
and drainage systems was used to allow for unforeseen works or repairs
which would become apparent after dewatering the canals\. Costs due to
expected price increases over the implementation period amount to about
26% of total project costs, assuming the following annual inflation rates:
Annual Inflation Rate (%)
1977-79 1980-81
Civil works 12 10
Equipment and services 8 7
- 12 -
4\.13 Details of the project costs are presented in Annex 5 and are
summarized below:
Foreign
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Exchange
---- (Pesos M)
---- ---- (US$ M) ----- (%)
Irrigation systems 85\.9 62\.5 148\.4 11\.5 8\.3 19\.8 42
Water management training 2\.4 1\.9 4\.3 0\.3 0\.3 0\.6 50
O&M equipment 0\.2 3\.0 3\.2 - 0\.4 0\.4 100
Technical assistance 0\.2 0\.6 0\.8 - 0\.1 0\.1 80
Base cost estimate 88\.7 68\.0 156\.7 11\.8 9\.1 20\.9 43
Physical contingencies 17\.3 15\.7 33\.0 2\.3 2\.1 4\.4 48
Expected price increases 36\.5 28\.8 65\.3 4\.9 3\.8 8\.7 44
Total project cost 142\.5 112\.5 255\.0 19\.0 15\.0 34\.0 44
Financing
4\.14 The proposed Bank loan of US$15\.0 million would finance the full
foreign exchange costs of the project\. It would cover 44% of total project
costs\. The Government would provide the remaining P 142\.5 million (US$19\.0
million) to NIA from annual budget appropriations\. To ensure the continuous
and timely flow of funds, assurances were obtained that the Government would
cause NIA to set up a special account for the project which would be replen-
ished by the Government at monthly intervals to a level equivalent to the
estimated requirements for the next two months\.
Procurement
4\.15 Equipment and vehicles for force account construction, operation
and maintenance and the water management training program, costing about
US$4\.5 million, would be procured after international competitive bidding in
accordance with Bank Group Guidelines\. A preference limited to 15% of the
c\.i\.f\. price of imported goods, or the customs duty, whichever is lower, would
be extended to local manufacturers in the evaluation of bids\. Local procurement
practices are appropriate for off-the-shelf items costing less than US$10,000
each because the advantages of international competitive bidding would be
clearly outweighed by the administrative costs involved\. The total cost of
such items would not exceed US$200,000\. Bank staff have reviewed the local
procedures and they are acceptable\. There is adequate competition and foreign
firms can participate\. A detailed list of equipment requirements is given in
Annex 6\.
4\.16 Works on the project service area (US$13\.7 million) would be
scattered over five separate areas and include rehabilitation of four
systems with a total area of 22,000 ha and construction of a new system
for 2,700 ha of rainfed rice lands\. These have to be planned and executed
to avoid as far as possible the growing season and bad weather\. In the past,
- 13-
NIA has experienced considerable difficulty in attracting bids for such
works\. Several steps have been taken on Bank-assisted projects to streng-
then local contractors, including financing of reconditioned equipment and
providing mobilization allowances, as a result of which there has been an
encouraging response on the recent bids\. However, it is doubtful that all
civil works could be done by contract and some of them would therefore be
carried out on force account\. Nevertheless, in light of NIA's large work
program in the years ahead, it would not be desirable to expand its force
account work too rapidly\. An assurance was obtained that NIA would ensure
that the amount of work done by force account would not exceed 40% of the
total cost of the work\. Competitive bidding in accordance with local proce-
dures is appropriate for the balance of the work\. Bank staff have reviewed
the local procedures and they are acceptable\. There is potentially adequate
competition and foreign firms can participate\.
Disbursements
4\.17 Disbursements would be made at the rate of 100% of the foreign
exchange cost of directly imported equipment, 100% of the ex-factory
price of locally manufactured equipment and 65% for imported equipment
procured locally\. Disbursements for civil works would be 25% of certified
monthly progress payments or expenditures\. For civil works contractors'
mobilization and equipment, disbursements would be at 100% of foreign
exchange cost\. Disbursements would be at 100% of total cost for technical
assistance for further studies on expansion of the project\.
4\.18 Disbursement of the Bank loan would be against import documen-
tation, contracts and certified records of payment or expenditure\. It is
expected that disbursements would be completed by June 30, 1982, approxi-
mately one year after the end of construction\. Upon completion of the
project any undisbursed Bank funds would be cancelled\. An estimated
schedule of expenditures, a semi-annual disbursement schedule and a pro-
posed allocation of loan proceeds are given in Annex 7\.
Accounts and Audit
4\.19 The NIA is a Government agency and its accounts are audited
annually by the Government's Commission on Audit\. Assurances were
obtained that NIA would maintain separate accounts for the project and
that after audit by the Commission on Audit, the project accounts, to-
gether with the auditor's comments, would be sent to the Bank within four
months of the close of each financial year\.
Environmental Effects
4\.20 Schistosomiasis does not exist in the project area\. Although
a few cases are occasionally reported in the area, malaria is generally
not a problem\. Poor drainage in scattered areas would be corrected by the
project\. The incidence of the mosquito nuisance caused by poor drainage
in low lying areas behind the belt of coastal fish ponds, would be reduced
by improved project drainage\. The principal health problems in the area
are protein deficiences in preschool-age children, enteric diseases and
tuberculosis\. The proposed project would have little direct impact on
these\.
- 14 -
V\. ORGANiIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
Project Management
5\.01 NIA was created in 1964 and given responsibility for developing,
operating and maintaining all national irrigation systems in the Philippines\.
The Government finances NIA through the sale of bonds or from appropria-
tions\. A Board of Directors is responsible for the agency and the
Administrator, who is appointed by the President of the Philippines,
handles management\. NIA has recently been reorganized to meet the
requirements of the Government's policy of accelerated irrigation develop-
ment\. The integration of the major foreign-assisted projects under a
Special Projects Organization office headed by an Assistant Administrator
is one of the first results of the reorganization\. Although this has
been a step in the right direction, the number and complexity of projects
presently under implementation has created certain administrative diffi-
culties which are likely to increase as NIA continues to expand its
activities\. There is evidence that the senior management of NIA is
already stretched considerably and has difficulty in maintaining tight
control over the development and implementation of projects\. To a large
extent this is due to the heavy administrative burden on management which
diverts scarce technical talent away from important engineering matters\.
To ease the situation NIA is proposing to engage two officers with broad
experience in public and/or business administration to work directly
under the Assistant Administrator\.
5\.02 The Special Projects Organization (Chart No\. 9533-3R) would
also be responsible for execution and operation of the Jalaur project\.
Day-to-day responsibility for construction would rest with the Assistant
Project Manager stationed near Pavia, the proposed location of project
headquarters\. He would report on all matters concerning the project to
the NIA's Regional Engineer stationed in Iloilo, who would be appointed
Project Manager of the Jalaur project\. The Project Manager and his
assistant would report to the Assistant Administrator for Special Projects\.
NIA would provide all the additional support staff and facilities required
to allow the Project Manager to carry out his responsibilities\. There
would be two construction divisions, the first located at Pototan for
the rehabilitation works of the Jalaur and Suague systems and the Jalaur
extension, and the second located at Pavia for the rehabilitation of the
Santa Barbara and Aganan systems (Chart No\. 16392)\. Selection of an Assis-
tant Project Manager and arrangements for his appointment were confirmed at
negotiations\.
5\.03 For O&M purposes NIA would establish four support divisions
dealing with engineering and operation, administration, agriculture and
equipment (Chart No\. 16391R)\. The project area would be divided into two
irrigation districts based on Pototan and Pavia\. The Pototan district
would serve a total area of 14,600 ha covering the existing Jalaur system
and extension area, as well as the Suague system\. The Pavia district
- 15 -
would cover the Santa Barbara and Aganan systems serving a total area of
about 10,000 ha\. The districts would be divided into 50 ha irrigation units
with a ditch tender handling two such units (100 ha)\. A Water Management
Technologist (WMT) would control five ditch tenders covering a 500 ha area,
while a supervisor would be responsible for a water management division and
five WMTs (2,500 ha)\. Details of the organization are given in Annex 8\.
5\.04 The Director appointed to supervise the Central Luzon and
Magat water management training programs would also be in charge of the
program proposed for the Jalaur project\. A field supervisor would be
attached to each of the two irrigation districts to be in day-to-day
charge of the program\. Training personnel would be drawn principally
from well qualified and experienced O&M staff and from specialized NIA
units\.
Supporting Agricultural Services
5\.05 An Agricultural Development Coordinating Council (ADCC) would
be established in the project area to coordinate the work of the various
agencies providing services to the farmers (Annex 9)\. The arrangement
has been working well in the Central Luzon projects and a similar organiz-
ation has been set up for the Cagayan Valley projects\. Assurances were
obtained that an ADCC based on Iloilo province would be established for
the proposed project\.
5\.06 A total of 95 agricultural graduates from a number of govern-
ment agencies provide extension services to farmers in the municipali-
ties involved in the project area\. The Bureau of Agricultural Extension
and the Department of Agrarian Reform supply the majority\. The ratio of
extension workers to farmers is about 1:210\. Under the project, the
extension coverage would be strengthened by the addition of the water
management staff (para\. 5\.03) and there would be better coordination
through the ADCC (para\. 5\.05)\. At present the area is covered more
intensively than most rice growing areas in the country because of
extensive involvement in the Masagana program\.
5\.07 Current fertilizer consumption in the project area amounts to
about 5,800 tons per year, with urea as the most frequently used product\.
At full development, the project area would require some 9,600 tons of
fertilizer annually on the basis of 80 kg/ha nitrogen and 40 kg/ha
phosphate per season\. Existing supply channels would handle the increased
demand without difficulty\. The certified rice seed requirement at full
development would total 450 tons per year and no problems are expected
in obtaining the amount\.
5\.08 The increase in the irrigated area, higher cropping intensity
and better farming practices resulting from the project would require
- 16 -
an increase in production credit\. Under the agrarian reform and Masagana
programs the Government has strengthened the credit institutions and
eased credit to small farmers, previously dependent on the landlords and
private lenders for their requirements\. A system of "supervised credit"
is used which includes the provision of technical services to the borrower
to ensure that recommended practices, such as variety, fertilizer and
agrochemical inputs, are adopted\. Under the system no collateral is
required\. During 1974 wet season crop, agricultural loans granted to
farmers in the project area by Rural Banks, the Philippine National Bank
and the Agricultural Credit Administration amounted to P 9\.5 million
(US$1\.3 million)\. At full project development, annual production credit
requirements are estimated to be about P 34\.2 million (US$4\.6 million)\.
The existing credit institutions are expected to be able to meet the
requirement\.
5\.09 The Agricultural Department of the Special Projects Organization
would be responsible for monitoring the deployment of extension and
water management personnel, pace of land reform, preparation of farmers
to receive irrigation, cropping patterns, use of inputs and credits,
incidence of pests and diseases, etc\. The Department already performs
these functions in the Bank-assisted Luzon projects\.
Cost and Rent Recovery
5\.10 Republic Act No\. 3601 establishing NIA gave it the authority to
collect fees from users of irrigation systems to finance operations and
to reimburse construction costs\. Fees on the national irrigation systems
were increased in July 1975, to the equivalent of 2\.0 cavans of paddy per
ha in the wet season and 3\.0 cavans in the dry season, to be applied
uniformly to all national irrigation systems\. As an exception to the
uniform rate policy, the Government has agreed to raise rates on Bank-
assisted projects to the equivalent of 3\.5 cavans of paddy/ha in the wet
season and 4\.4 cavans in the dry season\. These rates would be reached
gradually over a period of five years from completion of construction\.
Rates in the UPRP have already been raised to the equivalent of 2\.5 and
3\.5 cavans of paddy/ha in the wet and dry seasons respectively\.
5\.11 After a series of discussions with the Bank concerning the
collection of water charges the NIA agreed to review the rate of collec-
tions for the national systems and to identify the factors affecting
collection\. The NIA completed a report in June 1976 which showed that
for FY75 the total collection rate was about 59%, a small improvement on
the collection rate in 1974\. Preliminary FY76 information indicates that
the national collection rate has fallen to less than 25% since the fourfold
increase in water charges in July 1975\. Collection rates in the region
which includes the Jalaur project are amongst the better ones in the Philip-
pines\. The study also resulted in some preliminary findings on the factors
affecting collection\. NIA is making the necessary arrangements to study the
factors in greater depth\. The objective of the investigations will be to
identify administrative and managerial obstacles to improved collection, as
well as to determine the causes of farmers' resistance to payment\. Assurances
were obtained that NIA would prepare by October 31, 1978 a plan of action for
improved collection of irrigation fees and after reviewing such plan of action
with the Bank would proceed with its implementation\.
- 17 -
5\.12 In view of the problems encountered in collecting water fees
and the negative effect on collections of the recent increase in fees,
NIA should give priority to improved collection\. Under the provisions of
the Chico project (Loan 1227-PH) the Government has agreed to consult
annually on the adequacy of water charges and the collection thereof\. In
the meantime NIA proposes to apply to the Jalaur project the same rates
used on other Bank-assisted projects, i\.e\. the equivalent of 3\.5 cavans
of paddy/ha in the wet season and 4\.4 cavans in the dry season\.
5\.13 Various indices are used to compute the proportion of cost
recovered and the relationship of the proposed water charges to the
ability of the farmers to pay\. Definitions of the indices used and
detailed computations are in Annex 14\. In brief, the ratio of total
water charges to total public sector outlays (total cost recovery index)
is 35%, while the incremental cost recovery index is 15%\. Total water
charges are almost double O&M costs\. The ratio of total water charges to
total farm rent (farm rent recovery index) is 33% while the incremental
project rent recovery index is 23%\. The farm rent recovery index shows
that one third of the farm's total surplus (after deducting returns for
capital, labor, management and uncertainty) is paid in water charges\. In
view of this large contribution in relation to the income levels of project
beneficiaries, the proposed water charges are acceptable\.
5\.14 To ensure sound operation and maintenance practices and an
equitable contribution by beneficiaries toward recovery of project
capital costs, assurances were obtained that:
(a) the NIA would make annual budgetary provisions to supply
the funds necessary for operation and maintenance of the
project;
(b) irrigation fees would be levied to provide NIA with suffi-
cient funds to maintain and operate the project and to
allow for the recovery of investment cost within a reason-
able period, taking into account farmers' incentives and
capacity to pay\. A gradual increase in irrigation fees
over a period of five years from completion of construction
to a level equivalent to about 3\.5 cavans of paddy per ha
in the wet season and 4\.4 cavans in the dry season would
meet the requirement; and
(c) the NIA would take all necessary actions to ensure full
and prompt collection of the irrigation fees\.
VI\. PRODUCTION, MARKET PROSPECTS, PRICES AND FARM INCOMES
Production
6\.01 Upon completion of the project the irrigated area would increase
to 24,700 ha, of which at present 22,000 ha are irrigated and 2,700 ha
are rainfed during the wet season\. The project would not increase the
- 18 -
dry season water supply, but the greatly improved distribution system and
better water management would allow the present dry season irrigated area
of 7,500 ha to be expanded to 12,000 ha\. Annual cropping intensity would
increase from 130% to 149%\. Better water control, improved extension
services and expanded credit facilities would encourage increased plantings
of high-yielding rice varieties, heavier fertilizer applications and
greater use of crop protection chemicals\. The use of machinery for land
preparation and threshing would increase to meet more exacting crop
calendars\. It is expected that at full agricultural development in 1985,
about 50% of the threshing would be mechanical compared to 5% at present
and most farmers would use a combination of machinery and animal-drawn
implements for land preparation\.
6\.02 At full development, estimated paddy yields for the wet and dry
season crops would average 4\.0 ton/ha per crop\. Farmers would achieve
these yield levels five years after the introduction of water control\. The
expected yields would be about 30% above the estimated "without project"
level\. The greatly improved water control and distribution provided by the
project, together with the strengthened water management staff, would allow
farmers to take full advantage of inputs such as improved varieties,
fertilizers, agrochemicals and credit\. Total paddy production from the
project area would be about 147,000 tons at full development compared with
80,000 tons at present and an estimated 91,000 tons in the future without
the project (Annex 10)\.
Market Prospects
6\.03 A major Government objective in the agricultural sector is self-
sufficiency in basic foods, especially rice and corn\. The deficit in rice,
the main staple food crop, has been a persistent problem for the Philippines,
and in recent years annual rice imports have averaged around 300,000 tons\.
The 1975 Basic Economic Report projects the 1985 Philippine demand for
milled rice to be 5\.0 million tons, equivalent to 8\.5 million tons paddy,
including seed requirements\. To meet this demand local production would
have to increase over the next decade by slightly more than 3\.5% per year
and the incremental paddy production from the project area would be marketed
without difficulty\. Traditionally Iloilo province has produced paddy sur-
plus to its requirements, and has exported the bulk of the surplus to the
neighboring sugar growing island of Negros\. A small part of the province's
production goes to the nearby provinces of Antique and Aklan and to Manila\.
The pattern would continue with the project\.
Prices
6\.04 In 1957 the Government introduced an annual farm gate support
price for paddy to encourage production and to allow purchases of paddy by
Government to build stocks\. From 1965 to 1970 the support price was about
10% higher than the market price but since 1971 the market price has
generally exceeded the support price\. In December, 1975 the official farm
gate support price for paddy was P l,000/ton, which was considerably lower
than the corresponding price of imported rice (P 2,650/ton c\.i\.f\. Philippines),
which would correspond to a farm gate price for paddy of about P 1,500/ton\.
The low farm gate price is maintained by Government sales of imported rice
on the domestic market below cost\. In 1974 this subsidy cost the Government
about US$20 million\. As of mid-1976 the price of imported rice had fallen
- 19 -
and the support price was raised to the point where the prices of domestic
and imported rice were nearly the same\. The latest Bank commodity price
forecasts show the world market price in 1985 of Thai 25-35% broken rice
to be about US$280, c\.i\.f\. Philippines (in January 1977 constant dollars)\.
The corresponding farm gate price (in January 1977 constant dollars)
would be P 1,285 (US$170) per ton (Annex 11)\. The use of a shadow
exchange rate gives an economic farm gate price of p 1,425 per ton\. It
is assumed that the actual farm gate price, on average, would correspond
to the equivalent price for imported rice, namely P 1,285 per ton\.
6\.05 The Government subsidizes fertilizers used to grow food crops
for domestic consumption\. With the recent fall in international prices
for fertilizer, the farm gate fertilizer prices are nearly equivalent to
the "subsidized" fertilizer prices\. For sugar, coconut and other cash crop
farmers the Government has maintained fertilizer prices substantially above
international prices\. At full development, the financial prices for
nitrogen and phosphate based fertilizers are assumed to correspond to the
Bank's forecasted world market prices for both food and cash crops\. On
this basis farm gate prices were estimated to be P 1,905 (US$254) per ton
for urea and P 1,725 (US$230) per ton for triple super-phosphate\. The use
of a shadow exchange rate gives economic farm gate prices of about P 2,100
and P 1,900 per ton respectively\.
Farm Incomes
6\.06 Rice farm models have been prepared for four water supply situa-
tions, two typical farm sizes and two types of tenure\. These are presented
in detail in Annex 13\. Estimated and projected incomes are summarized
below for farm sizes of 1\.5 and 3\.0 ha, which would accotnt for 80% of the
project's area and over 90% of the farmers, for the JRIS and ARIS-SBIS
systems covering 77% of the project area and for amortizing owners who
would constitute 60% of the farmers\.
Farm Irrigation Cropping Intensity Farm Income /b
Size System Present Future Present Future Present Future
(ha) /a ------- (%) ---- (P) ---- (US$)
1\.5 ARIS-SBIS 105 105 2,500 4,900 330 650
JRIS 162 200 3,500 8,150 470 1,090
3\.0 ARIS-SBIS 105 105 3,850 8,600 510 1,150
JRIS 162 200 5,550 17,150 740 2,290
/a ARIS-SBIS = 41% of project area; JRIS = 36% of project area\.
/b Rounded to nearest P 50 and US$10\.
- LO -
6\.07 Estimated present total net incomes for 1\.5 to 3 ha farms vary
Lbtween US$270 and US$770\. Tenant farm families who do not doublecrop rely
ora employment on other farms and off-farm earnings for most of their
in ome\. According to NIA data, other income averages P 1,000 in irrigated
areas ard nearly P 1,200 per annum in the Jalaur rainfed area\. Off-farm
earnings estimated at 60% of "other income" rise with farm size, but
constit, e a smaller percentage of total income for larger or doublecropped
farms\. It was assumed that, except for farmers who would increase their
cropping intensity and hence decrease significantly the time available for
off-farm employment, "other income" would remain at present levels\. At
full development incomes are expected to double for 1\.5 ha tenant farmers
on the Aganan/Santa Barbara area, where cropping intensity would remain
unchanged\. The increase is likely to be about 300% to 400% for amortizing
owners with land in the existing rainfed area\. Farmers in the Jalaur
area, where cropping intensities would rise to 200%, are expected in all
types of tenancy situations to more than double their incomes with the
project\.
6\.08 Assuming a household of 5\.8 members, present per capita incomes
in 1\.5 ha farm households vary between US$45 and US$80, while those in 3
ha households range from US$65 to US$135\. These figures correspond to
between 12% and 35% of the national GNP per capita\. About 75% of the
project's farm families are presently at or below the Bank's estimated
absolute per capita poverty level of US$155 (expressed in 1977 constant
price levels)\. At full project development in 1985, the projected per
capita incomes would range from US$110 to US$220 for a 1\.5 ha farm to
US$200 to US$390 for a 3 ha farm, depending on cropping intensity\. Per
capita incomes would be some 20-71% of the 1985 projected per capita GNP of
US$550\. These comparisons indicate that the project would help to narrow
the income gap between the project area and other parts of the country\.
VII\. BENEFITS, JUSTIFICATION AND RISKS
7\.01 The proposed project would increase yields on about 24,700 ha
currently dependent on run-of-the-river irrigation and rainfed cultivation
by providing better water control, improved drainage and the necessary
agricultural supporting services\. Rice would be the main crop grown in
the area\. Approximately 12,000 farm families and 2,000 landless labor
families, for a total of about 80,000 people, would benefit directly from
the increased production and consequent employment\. The project would
also create a demand for an additional 840,000 man-days of farm labor
per year, equivalent to some 3,500 full time jobs\. It would also provide
farmers with increased access to markets through an improved and denser
network of roads to be constructed along the canals and drainage system\.
The project would meet the Government's objectives of increased food
production and more balanced regional distribution of development at a
capital cost of US$2,010 per benefited farm family\. This would be at the
low end of the cost range for irrigation projects in the Philippines, due
to the high proportion of rehabilitation compared to new construction\.
7\.02 Assuming a 50-year project life, a five-year construction period
full agricultural benefits being attained in 1985, farm gate prices for
- 21 -
rice and fertilizer based on the Bank's commodity price forecasts for 1985,
a shadow price for foreign exchange, and a seasonably variable
shadow wage rate for unskilled farm labor, the economic rate of return
of the project would be 20%\. Rates of return for rehabilitation of the
individual irrigation systems ranged between 13% for the Santa Barbara
system and 28% for the Jalaur system\. The rate of return for the Jalaur
extension was 13% (Annex 15)\.
7\.03 The rate of return showed little sensitivity to the estimates
of project costs\. It showed most sensitivity to a reduction in the level
of benefits, as well as to the timing of benefits\. In none of the cases
tested, however, did the rate of return fall below 15%\. On the other hand,
if the world market price of rice turns out to be 25% higher than forecast,
the rate of return would be 25%\.
7\.04 At full agricultural development the project would result in rice
imports savings of US$9\.9 million per year at the forecast world market
prices\. After deducting the incremental cost of imported fertilizer,
chemicals and fuel, the net foreign exchange savings would amount to about
US$8\.8 million\.
7\.05 There are no unusual risks associated with the project\. The
risks normally associated with irrigation projects have been accounted
for in the estimates of yields and in the areas to be irrigated during
the dry season\.
VIII\. AGREEMENTS REACHED AND RECOMMENDATION
8\.01 During negotiations, agreement with the Government was reached
on the following principal points:
(a) the necessary water rights for the Jalaur extension would
be granted to the NIA and no other water rights which could
adversely affect the project's water supply except for domestic
use would be granted (para\. 4\.06);
(b) NIA would establish a special account for the project which would
be replenished at monthly intervals to a level equivalent to the
estimated requirements for the next two months (para\. 4\.14);
(c) NIA would ensure that the amount of civil works done by force
account in the project's service area would not exceed 40%
of the total cost of the work (para\. 4\.16);
(d) NIA would maintain separate accounts for the project and,
after audit by the Commission on Audit, project accounts
would be submitted to the Bank within four months of the
close of each financial year (para\. 4\.19);
- 22 -
(e) an Agricultural Development Coordinating Council based on
Iloilo province would be established for the proposed
project (para\. 5\.05);
(f) NIA would prepare by October 31, 1978 a plan of action for
improved collection of irrigation fees and after reviewing such
plan of action with the Bank would proceed promptly with its
implementation (para\. 5\.11); and
(g) NIA would make annual budgetary provisions to supply
the funds necessary for operation and maintenance of the
project; would take all necessary action to ensure full
and prompt collection of irrigation fees; and would
gradually increase irrigation fees over a period of
five years from completion of construction to a level
equivalent to about 3\.5 cavans of paddy/ha in the wet
season and 4\.4 cavans in the dry season (para\. 5\.14)\.
8\.02 The proposed project would be suitable for a Bank loan of
US$15\.0 million, with a 20 year maturity including a grace period of
4\.5 years\. The borrower would be the Republic of the Philippines\.
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Climatological Data
Iloilo City Jan\. Feb\. Mar\. ALL\. May Jun\. Jul\. Aug\. Sep\. Oct\. Nov\. Dec\. Total
Rainfall /1
Average (mm) 57 32 31 43 156 254 383 354 281 250 202 109 2,152
Maximum (mm) 198 209 113 298 514 517 1,403 808 616 560 484 528 6,248
Minimum (mm) 1 0 0 0 () 87 57 73 31 32 3 10 294
Number of rainy days /2 8 6 6 5 12 18 19 20 19 17 15 12 157
Relative humidity (%) /3 82 81 77 74 77 82 84 84 84 84 85 85
\.4, rature /4
1ban ( 0C) 25\.7 26\.0 26\.8 28\.1 28\.6 27\.9 27\.4 27\.2 27\.3 27\.2 26\.9 26\.2
MIean Maximuim ( C) 28\.5 29\.1 30\.0 3i\.5 32\.0 30\.9 30\.1 29\.9 30\.9 30\.3 29\.8 28\.9
Me\.an Minimum (0C) 22\.9 22\.9 23\.5 24\.7 25\.1 24\.8 24\.6 24\.5 24\.5 24\.2 24\.0 23\.5
Ivaporation (mm) /5 147 154 207 212 206 166 152 152 141 144 134 139 1,954
Prevailing wind direction /6 NE NE NE NE NE SW SW SW SW NE NE NE
t!ind velocity (km/hr) /7 2o\.3 19\.3 19\.6 16\.5 11\.9 10\.6 10\.7 13\.7 10\.4 11\.9 15\.0 17\.8
Ntumber of typhoons /8 0 1 0 1 0 ( 0 0 0 1 3 1 7
(Panay Island, Northern area)
/1 Period of observation 1902-1940, 1947-1973
/2 Period of observation 1950-1970
/3 Period of observation 1949-1975
/4 Period of observation 1949-1973 a F
/5 Period of observation 1957-1965 (Pototan, Iloilo) X x
/6 Period of observation 1956-1970
/7 Period of observation 1956-1960
/8 Period of observation 1964-1972
ANNEX 2
Page 1
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Land Tenure and Reform
Background
1\. Since 1972, the Government has pursued an agrarian reform program
aimed at the transfer of land ownership to tenant farmers on rice and corn
lands\. Presidential Decree No\. 27 (PD 27), the basic legislation of the
new program, provides for the transfer to the tenant, whether sharecropper
or leaseholder, of the land he tills up to a total of 3 ha in an irrigated
area and 5 ha in a rainfed area\. The landlord is allowed to retain up to
7 ha providing he cultivates the land himself\. The Decree lays down a system
of valuing the land and provides for the tenant to pay for it in 15 equal
annual installments at an interest rate of 6% per annum\.
2\. It is estimated that the total number of rice and corn tenants is
about 1\.0 million on some 1\.5 million ha owned by about 430,000 landlords\.
Some 85% of these landlords have holdings of less than 7 ha\. In addition,
the total number of rice and corn farmers probably exceeds 2 million, while
the total area of rice and corn lands is not much more than 4 million ha,
of which less than 1 million ha are irrigated\. There is, therefore, little
prospect of achieving the objective of 5 ha rainfed or 3 ha irrigated
family farms nationwide\.
3\. A recent survey by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) reports
that 55% of the tenants farming 45% of the tenanted area are under landlords
with holdings smaller than 7 ha\. The Government is anxious not to antagonize
the small landowners, and is looking for a solution equitable to both tenants
and landlords\. For holdings under 7 ha the Government has announced its
intention to enforce leasehold with security of tenure\. To prevent abuses
pending the issue of rules and regulations under the various decrees, the
Government has forbidden evictions, and has declared sharecropping illegal\.
DAR is proceeding with the transfer of land in holdings over 24 ha, and by
June 1976, had issued land transfer certificates to 218,000 tenants covering
381,000 ha in 64 provinces but valuation and payment has been slow\. DAR
reports that landlords and tenants have submitted to the DAR valuations of
61,000 ha, involving 1,370 landlords and 43,500 tenants in 42 provinces\.
The Land Bank has paid compensation to 1,065 landlords for 48,600 ha,
involving 25,500 former tenants\.
4\. In November 1974, the Government decided to proceed with the
transfer of land in holdings between 24 and 7 ha\. This work began in
January 1975 and is targeted to be finished by the end of 1977\. To expedite
land transfer and resolve land valuation disputes, barrio (hamlet) land
valuation committees began functioning in April 1975\. The committees
consist of the barrio captain, four tenant farmers, two owner cultivators,
two landowners, a representative from the DAR and one from the samahang
nayon (precooperative organization)\.
ANNEX 2
Page 2
Situation in the Project Area
5\. DAR has identified nearly all of the rice holdings subject to
land reform in the municipalities where the project is located\. As of
June 1976, land transfer certificates were issued to some 2,650 tenants
on about 4,200 ha out of a total of about 6,870 tenants on holdings over
7 ha\. Only 5,260 tenant farmers on holding below 7 ha have thus far been
identified in the municipalities concerned\. For Iloilo province as a whole
as of June 1976, land transfer certificates have been issued to 10,680
tenants on 17,540 ha out of a total of about 17,000 tenants on holdings
over 7 ha\. About 21,000 tenants on holdings below 7 ha have been identi-
fied thus far\.
6\. According to DAR and NIA data, an estimated 8,075 people own the
23,660 ha of rice land in the project area\. Some 88% of the owners have
properties of less than 7 ha, and account for 54% of the area\. The remaining
12% of holdings larger than 7 ha, the existing operational limit for land
transfer, comprise 46% of the area (10,880 ha)\. The rice land ownership
pattern in the project area by size of holding in January 1975 was as follows:
Size of Holdings /a Owners Area Owned /b
(ha) % ha %
Less than 7 88 12,780 54
7 - 12 6 2,360 10
12 - 24 3 2,130 9
24 - 50 1 1,660 7
50 -100 2 1,890 8
More than 100 2,840 12
Total 100 23,660 100
/a Refers to owner's holding size, within and outside project area\.
/b Refers to area within project area only\.
7\. The average rice farm unit in the project area is 2 ha\. Mlost farms
(96%) are between 1 and 5 ha, and cover 85% of the project area\. The rice
farm size distribution is as follows:
ANNEX 2
Page 3
Farm Size Farms Cultivated Area
(ha) No\. % ha %_
Less than 1 1,540 13 710 3
1 - 2 4,510 38 5,440 23
2 - 3 3,320 28 6,860 29
3 - 5 2,020 17 7,100 30
Mlore than 5 470 4 3,550 15
Total 11,860 100 23,660 100
According to the NIA survey the size distribution varies between systems with
the average rice farm in Jalaur somewhat smaller than in Suague and Santa Bar-
bara which in turn are smaller than Aganan\.
8\. As of early 1975, the project area tenure situation for rice farms
was as follows:
Tenure Farms Area
No\. % -No\. %
Owner operated 2,965 25 6,150 26
Leasehold 6,760 57 14,195 60
Sharecropped 2,135 18 3,315 14
11,860 100 23,660 100
The proportion of tenant farmers is 75% for the entire project area\. In
Aganan and Santa Barbara, the percentage was higher (78%) while in Jalaur
and Suague, it was 74%\. The average owner operator unit was about 2\.07 ha
compared to an average tenant unit of 1\.97 ha\.
9\. The project area also contains about 1,040 ha of sugar farms not
subject to land reform\. Each of the areas contains some sugar land, but the
bulk is located in the Jalaur and Suague systems\. Jalaur contains 600 ha,
Suague 230 ha, Santa Barbara 130 ha and Aganan 80 ha\. While half of the
farms are of 5 ha or less, the average farm size is 13 ha and there are
6 large farms\. About 80 farmers cultivate the 1,040 ha\. Six of the farms
include 39% of the sugar area, while the 39 farms below 5 ha account for
only 13% of the area\. The information available suggests that most of the
farms are owner operated\. The largest farm includes a sizeable portion of
land which is rented, while a number of the smallest farms include rented
land\.
ANNEX 2
Page 4
10\. The mean farm size of the project area is smaller than in the
Cagayan valley, where the Magat and Chico projects are located, and compar-
able to some of the project areas in Central Luzon where the range is from
1\.5 to 2 ha\. With a high population density, Iloilo traditionally has
supplied manpower to Negros and Manila\. According to NEDA data, the annual
migration rate from Iloilo was nearly 1% of the population until the
1970s\. In recent years, the migration rate has slowed and the project is
expected to assist in continuing that trend\.
11\. The transfer by DAR of landlord holdings larger than 7 ha would
involve an estimated 6,600 ha and about 4,100 tenants\. The transfer would
result in owner operators comprising 60% of the farmers and cultivating some
12,750 ha or 54% of the project area\. The 4,900 tenant farmers on holdings
of less than 7 ha would operate under a leasehold contract\.
ANNEX 3
Page 1
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Project Works
1\. The Jalaur Irrigation Project would provide irrigation service
to 24,700 ha of rice land by improving four existing national systems
with a total irrigable area of 22,000 ha and constructing new irrigation
and drainage facilities in a presently rainfed area of 2,700 ha located
on the left bank of the Jalaur river\. The unregulated Jalaur river flow
records of the last 20 years indicate that an additional area of 5,500 ha,
of which 4,700 ha are presently in sugar cane, can be irrigated, so the
intake works and main canal for the new area would be built to provide
for future inclusion of this area\. The project works would consist of:
(a) rehabilitation and upgrading of irrigation, drainage and
road facilities on the following existing NIA irrigation
systems:
(i) Jalaur River Irrigation System, 9,000 ha;
(ii) Suague River Irrigation System, 2,900 ha;
(iii) Santa Barbara Irrigation System, 4,600 ha; and
(iv) Aganan River Irrigation System, 5,500 ha\.
(b) construction of new irrigation, drainage and access facilities,
including intake works and main canal, on the left bank of the
Jalaur river for 2,700 ha of currently rainfed rice lands\.
Rehabilitation of Existing Systems
2\. The layout of the irrigation systems and principal works
are shown pn Map 12414\. Table 1 summarizes the main features of the
project; the number of structures which would be modified, repaired
or newly provided under the project are listed in Table 2\. Costs per
hectare and the density of on-farm facilities are given in Tables 3 and 4
respectively\.
3\. The improvements would include minor repairs to existing
diversion structures and outlet works, the construction and/or enlarge-
ment of canals and drains, repairs and modification of existing and
provision of new water regulating and delivery structures, and the
construction of O&M, access and farm roads\. General features of the
improved irrigation systems would include additional canal structures
ANNEX 3
Page 2
such as checks, control structures and turnouts and installation of gates
on existing canal structures to more effectively control water deliveries
and to provide water more efficiently to each field as needed\. Constant
head orifice turnouts to sublaterals would be provided for water deliveries
to rotational areas of about 50 ha\. Turnouts would be provided for each
10 ha unit from which farm ditches, constructed as part of the project,
would convey water directly to most farms\. Farm drains would convey
excess water from each 10 ha unit to the main project outlet drains in
flat areas\. For more steeply sloping areas, where the land gradient in
the direction of flow is in excess of 0\.4%, the farms would drain from
field to field, and consequently the intensity of farm and collector
secondary drains would be somewhat lower\. A few farms would still
receive water through their neighbor's fields\. Canals would be unlined
except in selected portions of short length where the soils are erosive\.
Working stations for Water Management Technologists (WMT) would be provided
for about each 500 ha of irrigated land\. The stations would provide space
for temporary storage and drying of paddy\.
4\. Gravel surfaced O&M roads would be construsted on the canal
banks\. Canals with a design flow greater than 5\.0 m /sec, would be
provided with a roadway 5 m wide on both banks if the service area is
on both sides of the canal and one bank where the canal se ves the area
on one side\. Canals with capacities between 2\.0 and 5\.0 m /sec, would be
provided with a 3\.5 m wide road 3on one bank\. The roadway along waterways
with capacities less than 2\.0 m /sec, and along some of the major farm
ditches would be a nongravel, 2\.0 m wide, cycle or cart path\. Access
roads 5\.0 m wide would also be provided as links between the existing
major roads of the area and the canal O&M roads\. These roads would
also serve as farm-to-market roads\. The surfacing of the roads would be
20 cm thick for 5\.0 m wide roadways and 15 cm thick for 3\.5 m roadways\.
To allow continuous passage along the O&M roads, bridges and/or culverts
across the existing drainage waterways would be built\. However, on
major streams or rivers, the O&M roads would be connected to existing
bridges by short access roads instead of constructing expensive, multi-
span bridges\.
5\. The proposed level of on-farm distribution and drainage is
similar to that being implemented in other Bank-assisted projects, and
would be a substantial improvement on the present, practically non-
existent system\. Rice has been grown in the project area for many years
and the land is reasonably level and well laid out with little fragmen-
tation of land holdings\. Therefore, no land leveling, boundary realignment
or land consolidation would be required at this stage\.
ANNEX 3
Page 3
Extension Area
6\. An intake structure for the Jalaur Extension would be built
near the left abutment of the existing Jalaur diversion dam, to serve
a new main canal 24 km long\. Hydrological records indicate that the
unregulated river flows would be adequate to serve an area on the left
bank of 8,200 ha in the wet season and 6,800 ha in the dry season
(Annex 4)\. The potential service area would include 3,500 ha of currently
rainfed rice lands and 4,700 ha presently under medium to large sugar
farms\. The proposed main canal would provide irrigation to 2,700 ha of
rice lands divided into four blocks, two of which are about 1,200 ha
each, while the other two total 300 ha between them\. The remaining 800
ha of rice land are distant from the canal and scattered among the sugar
holdings which would not be provided with irrigation under the project\.
New irrigation, drainage and access facilities would be built on the
four blocks comprising the 2,700 ha extension\. The intake works and main
canal would be sized for future inclusion of both the sugar area and the
remaining rice area\. This would be done to protect the safety of the
water supply for the 2,700 ha extension from interference by sugar
growers adjoining the canal and to avoid the unnecessary expense of
duplicate facilities should it be decided to provide the sugar area with
water at a future date\.
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Principal Project Features
Rehabilitation
Santa Jalaur
Jalaur Suague Barbara Aganan Extension Total
Net irrigable area (ha) 9,000 2,900 4,600 5,500 2,700 24,700
Main canals (km) 25 9 5 12 24 75
Laterals (km) 121 39 66 90 34 350
Project drains: (km)
Rehabilitation 47 7 13 28 5 100
New construction 37 18 18 18 29 120
Farm ditches (km) 420 140 210 250 130 1,150
Farm drains (km) 230 80 120 130 80 640
Service roads: (km)
O&M roads
- Along main canals (3\.5-5 m) 25 9 5 12 24 75
- Along laterals (3\.5 m wide) 113 35 60 82 30 320
Access roads (3\.5 m wide) 3 4 3 4 6 20
Farm roads (2\.0 m wide) 50 20 40 40 20 170
ANNEX 3
Table 2
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
List of Structures
Rehabilitation
Santa Jalaur
Jalaur Suague Barbara Aganan Extension Total
Diversion Dams
Replace existing gates (No\.) 2 - - - - 2
Mechanized gates operation (No\.) 8 - - - - 8
New intake structure (No\.) - - - - 1 1
Main Canals
Modification of existing structures:
Install gates on checks, siphon &
check drops (No\.) 20 5 5 10 - 40
Repair of existing structures (No\.) 10 8 4 28 - 50
Extension of existing drainage
structures (m) 50 20 20 30 - 120
Repairs to flumes (No\.) 2 - - - - 2
ew additional structures:
Checks or check drops (No\.) 2 - - 2 6 10
Bridges across canals 2 1 2 5 5 15
Operation road bridges (No\.) 3 1 2 2 2 10
Culverts or thresher crossings (No\.) 5 2 3 8 17 35
Drainage structures (No\.) 4 1 2 2 6 15
Secondary Canals
Modification of existing structures:
Install gates on checks, etc\. (No\.) 14 5 5 6 - 30
Repair of existing structures (No\.) 80 25 35 60 - 200
Extension of existing drainage
structures (m) 60 20 70 80 - 330
New additional structures:
Parshall flumes (No) 14 5 3 4 4 30
New small checks without gates (No) 30 10 10 25 15 90
New checks with gates (No) 10 4 4 6 6 30
C\.H\.O\. turnouts (No) 22 8 20 30 10 90
Bridges across canals (No) 9 3 4 4 20 40
Operation road bridges (No) 4 1 2 4 4 15
Culverts or thresher crossings (No) 30 10 10 10 15 75
Main and Secondary Drains
New structures:
Drops (No) 35 20 15 55 15 140
Road crossings (No) 15 6 21 8 10 60
Drainage inlets (No) 180 50 80 110 50 470
ANNEX 3
Table 3
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Irrigation Facilities Cost
Irrigation Systems
Santa
Jalaur Suague Barbara Aganan Average
----------------- (US$/ha)/l---------------------
I\. Rehabilitation Area (ha) 9,000 2,900 4,600 5,500 22,000
(a) Canal system
Diversion dam 15 2 1 9 9
Main canal 35 36 35 60 42
Secondary canals 116 116 66 73 95
Subtotal 166 154 102 142 146
(b) Drainage system 59 93 70 80 71
(c) Road system 184 234 120 144 162
(d) On-farm distribution /
and drainage 210 221 215 205 211
Subtotal 619 702 507 571 590
II\. Extension Area (ha) 2,700
(a) Canal system /3
Intake work 3 -152
tMain canal - 511
Secondary canals 226
Subtotal 889
(b) Drainage system 63
(c) Road system 352
(d) On-farm distribution /2
and drainage 230
Subtotal 1,534
TOTAL 693
/1 Not including contingencies (25%) and engineering, supervision and administration (10%)\.
/2 Includes Water Management Technologist Stations\.
_ iacity for a service area of 8,200 ha\.
ANNEX 3
Table 4
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Density of Terminal On-Farm Facilities on IBRD Projects
On-Farm Facility
O&M
Project Irrigation Drainage Roads
-------------- (m/ha) ----------------
UPRP 57 12 13
Tarlac 55 40 13
Magat 60 40 15
Chico 59 40 18
Jalaur 47 /1 24 /2 24 /3
/1 Lower than other projects due to higher density of
secondary laterals\.
/2 Lower than other projects due to steep areas in upper
reaches covering about 70% of total area\.
/3 Jalaur project includes 7 m/ha of farm roads\.
ANNEX 4
Page 1
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Water Supply, Demand and Quality
Water Supply
1\. Each of the four systems gets its water supply from a separate
river source using its own diversion and conveyance systems\. The project
would not develop new irrigation supplies, but would improve and expand
the area covered by the existing irrigation systems\. About 40% of the
project area would be supplied with water during the dry season\.
2\. The Jalaur River Irrigation System (JRIS) is served through a
diversion dam on the Jalaur river where the river drains an area of
about 1,065 Km \. Reliable discharge records are available for a gauging
station originally located a few hundred meters upstream of the diver-
sion dam from 1948 to 1956\. After completion of the dam in 1956, the
station was relocated to a site about 500 mm below the dam\. The records
for the period from 1957 to 1971 were adjusted by adding the amount of
diversions for the Jalaur system\.
3\. The Suague river, a right bank tributary of the Jalaur, is
the main source of supply for the Suague River Irrigation (SRIS) system\.
The catchment area at the diversion site is 181 Km \. Reliable stream
flow records for the period from 1949 to 1971 are available for a gauging
station located below the diversion dam\. As no diversion records are
available, the stream flow was adjusted for the period after construc-
tion of the diversion dam in 1959 by correlation with nearby stations
on the Ulian and Jalaur rivers for a concurrent period of records\.
4\. The Santa Barbara Irrigation System (SBIS) receives its water
supply from the Tigum river through a diversion dam completed in 21923\.
At the diversion dam the drainage area of the river is at 193 Km \.
Continuous and reliable stream flow records are not available at the
diversion point, so the long term discharge records were synthesized
for the period from 1950 to 1971 by correlating the available record
of the station with concurrent records of the nearby Suague and Ulian
rivers\.
5\. The Aganan river, with a drainage area of 104 km2 at the diversion
dam completed in 1925, is the source of supply for the Aganan River Irri-
gation System (ARIS)\. A stream gauging station established in 1911 was
Ai-s , -
Page 2
operated until 1923 with available records for six years for the period
from 1911 to 1913 and 1919 to 1923\. Development of a long-term record
(1950-71) for the station was based on correlation with concurrent
records of the Sibalom river at Leon\.
Water Demand
6\. An area of about 1,000 ha is currently under irrigated sugar-
cane cultivation with the remaining 23,700 ha under rice\. It was
assumed that transplanted rice using 120-day nonphotosensitive vari-
ties in both the wet and dry season would remain the dominant crop in
the project\. Water requirements for rice were based on the following
cropping calendar:
Operation Dates
Wet Season Dry Season
Land preparation & nur-
sery Early May to mid-Sept\. Mid-Oct\. to mid-Feb\.
Transplanting Late June to Late Sept\. Early Dec\. to late Feb\.
Harvesting Late Sept\. to late Dec\. Mid-Feb to mid-May\.
7\. Land preparation and nursery were estimated to take 30 days
with requirements for saturation, evaporation and percolation of 310 mm
in the wet season and 335 mm in the dry season\. Flooding requirements
to provide a minimum depth of water in the field for culitvation in
each season were estimated to be 20 mm immediately after transplanting
followed by an additional 50 mm about two weeks later\. Subsequent water
applications to compensate for evapotranspiration and deep percolation
losses were based on a percolation loss of 2\.0 mm/day and evapotrans-
piration rates estimated to be equal to the observed open-rim pan evap-
oration at Pototan, Iloilo between 1957 and 1965\. The effective rain-
fall was determined from observed daily rainfall records at Pototan,
between 1950 and 1971, allowing water depths to fluctuate with the
growth of the rice plants and limiting depth to 150 mm\.
8\. The overall irrigation efficiency was estimated to be 43% in
the wet season and 50% in the dry season at full development, based on
farm irrigation wastes of 40% in the wet season and 30% in the dry
season, system operation losses of 10% and conveyance losses of 20%\.
9\. The consumptive use of sugarcane was assumed to be a ratio
of observed monthly evaporation at Pototan\. The following crop coeffi-
cients were used to obtain the consumptive use for sugar cane:
State of Growth Crop Coefficient
Planting - 3 months 0\.50
3-4 months 0\.80
4-7 months 1\.00
7-9 months 0\.75
ANNEX 4
Page 3
10\. The effective rainfall was computed on the basis of daily rainfall
records at Pototan and soil moisture capacity assumed as 30 mm for the first
two months after planting and 50 mm for the remaining period\. An overall
irrigation efficiency of 50% was used to derive diversion requirements for
the sugarcane\.
11\. Monthly project water requirements for the rice and sugarcane crops
are shown in Table 1 and seasonal and total annual diversion requirements are
developed in Table 2\. Monthly project water requirements and average river
flows for each irrigation system are shown in Table 3\.
12\. The size of the project area was determined from simulated opera-
tion studies using synthesized discharge records for each of the four systems
for the 22-year period, 1949-1971, and the estimated seasonal water require-
ments for rice\. The cropping calendar was chosen to maximize the use of
rainfall without exceeding local manpower constraints\. No use of return
flows was assumed\. About 1,900 ha can be irrigated during the dry season in the
Suague, Santa Barbara and Aganan systems\. During the wet season there would
be some risk of shortage in the month of October in the Aganan system\. River
flows in the Jalaur system are sufficient for wet season cropping of 9,000 ha
under the existing system and another 8,200 ha in the extension located on
the left bank of the river\. The extension area consists of 4,700 ha under
sugarcane and 3,500 ha under rice\. Due to the relatively large size of
holdings under sugarcane, present development in this area would be limited
to about 2,700 ha of rice land located in four blocks, the remaining 800 ha
of rice are scattered amongst the sugar areas\. However, the diversion intake
works and main canal of the extension area would be sized to include future
addition of the remaining 5,500 ha (4,700 ha sugarcane and 800 ha rice)\. Dry
season cropping in the rehabilitated area of Jalaur on the right bank of the
river would be carried out on 9,000 ha for a cropping intensity of 200%, while
on the left bank extension 1,100 ha would be cultivated in the dry season for
a cropping intensity of 141%\.
13\. The irrigable areas selected for development under the project
and the currently irrigated areas are as follows:
Irrigation System
JRIS SRIS SBIS ARIS Total
Selected Irrigable Area (ha)
Wet season 11,700 2,900 4,600 5,500 24,700
Dry season 10,100 1,300 500 100 12,000
Currently Irrigated Area (ha)
Wet season 9,000 2,900 4,600 5,500 22,000
Dry season 5,600 1,300 500 100 7,500
ANNEX 4
Page 4
Water Quality
14\. Tests of water samples from the Jalaur river indicate good
water quality with total dissolved solids under 300 ppm\. The waters are
of low salinity, slightly alkaline (pH 7-9) and are free of toxic elements\.
Water samples from the other three rivers have not been taken for analysis\.
However, no adverse effects have been noted on the soils or crops irri-
gated with these waters for periods ranging from 20 to 50 years\.
ANNEX 4
Table 1
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Estimated Water Requirements
Jan\. | Feb\. Mar\. | Apr\. M iay June July I Aug\. I Sept\. I Oct\. | Nov\. Dec\. Total |
I I I I I I I \._ 1 -1 I I
I I I I I ILP+N I I n
Wer Season 'addy j j j j 4 F F i I i
1 1-- 1 ,-1 I ~ ~ ~~I I I I I I I I
I+ i'L tl I I I I ILP+N I I
Prydeasoefaddy - ae Ii I i i t I I
LP = Land preparation, N = Nureery, T = Transplanting, M4 = Management, 0 = Drainage, = Harvest
I | | |~ ~ ~ I , , , , , I I I I
Paddy Water Requirements (mm) j j j j j j j j I I
I I I i I i I I I I I
l,and preparation and nursery j I I j I 80 | 140 j 90 i i | 100 125 | 110 | 6451|
Flooding for cultivation i 20 I i I 20 i 30 | 20 | I 20 30 i 1401
Evapotranspiration j 139 1 139 104 i i I | 76 I 151 I 146 72 16 55 i 898|
Deep percolation i60 55 3 30 i 6 j 30 60 58 j 30 15 251 369 |
Field requirement / 219 j 194 4 134 j i 80 166 6 226 j 231 | 204 j 202 1 76 | 220 | 2,U52|
Effective rainfall - I 23 j 14 10 - | 66 j 131 j 181 I 191 j 179 | 72 110 64 j 1,0411
Net farm requirement j 196 I 180 124 0 | 14 | 35 | 45 I 40 i 25 j 130 66 | 156 | 1,011|
Overall efficiency 1 50 i 50 50 j _ i 43 | 43 | 43 I 43 | 43 49 i 50 | 50 i i
Diversion requirement | 392 | 360 | 248 j 0 | 33 | 79 103 i 91 j 56 265 | 132 | 312 | 2,0711
/2 I I I I I I I I
Sugarcane Water Requirements (mm) -1 j j j j I j I j j j
Lvapotranspiration 1 103 | 108 | 104 106 124 | 133 | 152 1 52 127 122 | 107 | 104 | 1,4421
Effective rainfall - 25 j 17 | 10 j 13 | 54 | 79 j 90 j 121 | 127 122 | 107 7 77 | 8421
Net farm requirement | 78 | 91 | 94 | 93 | 70 I 54 | 62 j 31 j - _ - _ - _ 27 | 600
Diversion requirement - I 156 1 182 188 | 186 I 140 j 108 j 124 I 62 I - I _ I _ I 54 | 1,20O|
_ I I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~I I I I I I I I I I I I
/J Effective rainfall esceeded in 4 out of 5 years (1949-1971) computed separately for paddy and sugarcane\.
/2 March Planting\.
/3 Based on 50% overall efficiency\.
ANNEX 4
Table 2
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Project Water Requirements Summary
Wet Season Dry Season Annual
--------------(mm)--------------
Paddy
Land preparation
Saturation 75 50
Evaporation 175 225
Percolation 60 60
Subtotal 310 335 645
Flooding for cultivation 70 70 140
Crop water requirements
Evapotranspiration 445 453 898
Deep percolation 184 185 369
Subtotal 629 638 1,267
Total field water requirement 1,009 1,043 2,052
Less effective rainfall 820 221 1,041
Net farm irrigation requirement 189 822 1,011
Farm irrigation efficiency (%) 60 70
Farm requirement (turnout) 315 1,174 1,489
Conveyance efficiency (%) 80 80
System operation efficiency (%) 90 90
Diversion requirement (headworks) 432 1,639 2,071
Overall irrigation efficiency 43 50 49
Sugarcane
Evapotranspiration 1,442
Less effective rainfall 842
Net farm irrigation requirement 600
Overall irrigation efficiency (%) 1 50
Diversion requirement (headworks) 1,200
/1 Estimated efficiencies - farm 70%, conveyance 80% and system operation 90%\.
ANNEX 4
Table 3
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Estimated Water Requirement and Supply
Jan\. Feb\. Mar\. Apr\. May June July Aug\. Sept\. Oct\. Nov\. Dec\.
Irrigation Diversion Requirement
Rice: early planting (mm) 392 360 248 0 33 79 103 91 56 265 132 312
late planting (mm) 454 426 328 298 - - - 81 98 291 200 244
Sugarcane (mm) 156 182 188 186 140 108 124 62 - - - 54
Jalaur | Cropped area
System | Rice: wet season (ha) <10,900 >
dry season (ha) <- 9,300 -> < 9, 300->
| Sugarcane (ha) 800- >
3
| Diversion requirement (Mm
Rice 36\.5 33\.5 23\.1 - 3\.6 8\.6 11\.2 9\.9 6\.1 28\.9 12\.3 29\.0
| Sugarcane 1\.3 1\.5 1\.5 1\.5 1\.1 0\.9 1\.0 0\.5 _ - - 0\.4
Total 37\.8 35\.0 24\.6 1\.5 4\.7 9\.5 12\.2 10\.4 6\.1 28\.9 12\.3 29\.4
3
| Water supply (Mm)
| critical year /I 53\.6 38\.3 26\.3 14\.8 34\.3 70\.5 97\.8 80\.3 84\.8 141\.7 99\.8 85\.7
Suagloe Cropped area
Sy'tem - Rice: wet season (ha) < 2,700 >
| dry season (ha) <- 1,100-> < 1,100->
Sugarcane (ha)
3 < ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~200 >
Diversion requirement (Mm 2
I Rice 4\.3 4\.0 2\.7 - 0\.9 2\.1 2\.8 2\.5 1\.5 7\.2 1\.5 3\.4
| Sugarcane 0\.4 0\.4 0\.5 0,5 0\.2 - - _ _ _ 0\.1 0\.2
Total 4\.7 4\.4 3\.2 0\.5 1\.1 2\.1 2\.8 2\.5 1\.5 7\.2 1\.6 3\.6
3
I Water supply (Mm \.
critical year /1 9\.1 4\.4 3\.3 1\.9 2\.1 6\.1 16\.2 13\.3 14\.9 22\.5 15\.8 10\.8
Santa I Cropped area
barbara Rice: wet season (ha) - ,609
dry season (ha) <_soe_> <
3
Diversion requirement (Mm \.
I Rice 2\.3 2\.1 1\.6 1\.5 - - - 3\.7 4\.5 13\.4 1\.0 1\.2
I~~~~~~
i Water supply (Mm )
I critical year /1 5\.3 3\.1 1\.6 1\.6 1\.8 5\.4 8\.4 7\.3 11\.2 15\.8 10\.8 7\.4
Aganan | Cropped area
System Rice: early planting: wet season (ha) 3,001 >
late planting: wet season (ha) < 2,5001\.
dry season (ha) 100 -- < 100->
| Diversion requi recent (M\. 3
Rice: early planting: wet season - - - - 1\.0 2\.4 3\.1 2\.7 1\.7 2\.1 /2
late planting: wet season - - - - - - - 2\.0 2\.5 7\.3
dry season 0\.5 0\.4 0\.3 0\.3 - - - - - - 0\.2 0\.3
Total 0\.5 0\.4 0\.3 0\.3 1\.0 2\.4 3\.1 4\.7 4\.2 9\.4 0\.2 0\.3
3
| Water supply (Mm )
I critical year /1 0\.6 0\.6 0\.3 0\.4 1\.0 3\.5 4\.3 8\.9 7\.9 7\.6 2\.7 2\.6
/L Monthly flows with 80% probability of occurrence (four out of five years)\.
/2 Irrigation diversion requirement for wet season rice (early planting) is 70 mm\.
ANNEX 5
Table 1
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Cost Estimate
Foreign
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Exchange
------ (Pesos '000) ------- -------(US$ '000) --------- (%)
1\. Irrigation Systems
Diversion dam & intake works 2,320 2,330 4,650 310 310 620 50
Main canal 6,900 10,270 17,170 920 1,370 2,290 60
Secondary distribution system 10,120 10,050 20,170 1,350 1,340 2,690 50
Main & secondary drainage system 6,530 6,450 12,980 870 860 1,730 50
Service, access & farm roads 16,880 16,870 33,750 2,250 2,250 4,500 50
On-farm ditches & drains 20,770 13,730 34,500 2,770 1,830 4,600 40
Water management stations 3,450 1,500 4,950 460 200 660 30
Subtotal 66,970 61,200 128,170 8,930 8,160 17,090 48
Contingencies 25% 16,730 15,300 32,030 2,230 2,040 4,270 48
Engineering, supervision
& admin\. 10% 16,050 - 16,050 2,140 - 2,140 -
Subtotal 99,750 76,500 176,250 13,300 10,200 23,500 43
2\. O&M Buildings
Project headquarters 1,650 750 2,400 220 100 320 30
Field offices 1,270 530 1\.800 170 70 240 30
Subtotal 2,920 1,280 4,200 390 170 560 30
Contingencies 10% 300 150 450 40 20 60 -
Subtotal 3,220 1,430 4,650 430 190 620 30
3\. Water Management Training
Project personnel 1,650 450 2,100 220 60 280 20
Equipment and supplies 750 1,430 2,180 100 190 290 66
Subtotal 2,400 1,880 4,280 320 250 570 44
Contingencies 10% 230 220 450 30 30 60 50
Subtotal 2,630 2,100 4,730 350 280 630 44
4\. O&M Equipment 150 3,070 3,220 20 410 430 95
5\. Technical Assistance 150 600 750 20 80 100 80
Subtotal Project Costs (Items 1-5) 105,900 83,700 189,600 14,120 11,160 25,280 44
Expected Price Increases /1 36,600 28,800 65,400 4,880 3,840 8,720 44
TOTAL PROJECT COSTS 142,500 112,500 255,000 19,000 15,000 34,000 44
/1 Based on Annex 5, Table 7\.
PHITIPPINES
JALAUR TRPICATION PROJECT
PROJECT SERVICE AREA
Cost Estimate
Irrigation System
Santa Jalaur Total
Jalaur Suague Barbara Aganan Extension Cost Local Foreign
---------------------------------- (US$ 000) ----------------------------------
1\. Irrigation and Drainage Facilities
Diversion dam and intake works 140 10 10 50 410 620 310 310
Main canal 320 100 160 330 1,380 2,290 920 1,370
Secondary distribution system 1,040 340 300 400 610 2,690 1,350 1,340
Main and secondary drainage system 530 270 320 440 170 1,730 870 860
Service, access and farm roads 1,530 680 550 790 950 4,500 2,250 2,250
On-farm ditches and drains 1,650 560 870 980 540 4,600 2,770 1,830
Water management stations 240 80 120 140 80 660 460 200
Subtotal 5,450 2,040 2,330 3,130 4,140 17,090 8,930 8,160
Contingencies 25% 1,360 510 580 780 1,040 4,270 2,230 2,040
Engineering, supervision and
administration 10% 680 260 290 390 520 2,140 2,140 -
Subtotal 7,490 2,810 3,200 4,300 5,700 23,500 13,300 10,200
2\. O&M Buildings - - - - - 560 390 170
Contingencies 10% - - - - - 60 40 20
Subtotal - - - - - 620 430 190
3\. O&M Equipment - - - - - 430 20 410
TOTAL 7,490 2,810 3,200 4,300 5,700 24,550 13,750 10,800
(D >1
t,\. m
ANNEX 5
Table 3
PagE I
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IURRIGATION PROJECT
Quantities and Cost Estimates of Irrigation & DrainaRe Works
Quantity /2 Cost (Pesos '0003
Rehabilitation Rehabilitation
Unit Santa Jalaur Santa Jalaur
Items Uoit price /I Jalaur Suague Barbara ARanan Extension Total Jalaur Suague Barbara Aganan Extension Total
(Pesos)
DIVERSION DAM S INTAKE WORKS
Class A concrote 03 l\.000 40 - - 300 2,000 2,340 40 - - 300 2,000 2,340
Grooed riprap m3 15C 60 - - 300 160 520 9 - - 45 24 78
(ravel filter below riprap m 5i 20 - - 100 60 180 1 - - 5 3 9
Demol\.tion of reinforced ronorete 3
and/or riprap m 50 20 _ 240 300 560 1 _ - 12 i5 21
Cates with hoistisg & installattos ton 30,OOC 25 - - - 8 33 750 - - - 2411 99D
Motors 6 mechanism for gates ea5h 15,00C 8 - - - 2 10 lZ0 - - - 30 150
Excavation and backfill 03 6\.50 - - - - 20,000 20,000 - - - - 130 130
Rock excavation m 35 - - - - 40,000 40,000 - - - - 140 140
Coffer dam and/or other diversion
facilities lump sum - - 8 300 398
Foundation treatment lump sum - - - - - - - - - 100 100
Miscellaneous lump sum - - - - - - 3 59 70 80 - 98 287
Subtotal 1,050 70 80 370 3,080 4,650
MAIN CANAL
Right of way hi 17,000 7 2 2 2 50 63 119 34 34 34 850 1,071
Ordioar y escariatn m3 6\.50 10,000 6\.000 34,000 38,000 240\.000 328,000 65 39 221 247 1,560 2,132
Rock ex-avation m 40 - - - - 15,000 15,000 - - - 600 60(l
Compacted fill aning excavation
material m 3\.50 10,000 4,000 10,000 20,000 22,000 66,000 35 14 35 70 77 231
Compacted till using borrowed material
with 300 m overhauling m 15 5,000 10,000 8,000 12,000 90,000 125,000 75 150 120 180 1,350 1,875
Concrete lining i-clodimg trimming
and joints m 400 1,500 - 300 600 800 3,200 600 - 120 240 320 1,280
Clams A concrete m3 1,000 600 120 300 1,000 3,200 5,220 600 120 300 1,000 3,200 5,220
Crouted riprap m3 130 900 300 400 1,400 3,000 6,000 117 39 52 182 390 780
Sard \. zravel bedding below riprap m 35 400 200 200 400 1,000 2,200 14 7 7 14 35 77
GCtes with hoisting 6 installatiom tom 30,000 7 10 2 12 15 46 210 300 60 360 450 1,380
Misc,lalneous metalwork ton 16,000 2 1 1 2 10 16 32 16 16 32 160 2S6
Rai' iros for bridges and other
\.tr-ctures m 75 200 80 200 240 400 1,120 15 6 15 18 30 84
Prec-st slbs for bridges m 900 450 - 200 - 800 1,450 405 - 180 - 720 1,305
concret, pipe work (36" to 54"
din\. pipes) m 400 100 50 75 75 1,250 1,550 40 20 30 30 500 620
lliscriianeoos lump sum - - - - - - - 73 5 10 63 108 259
Subtotal 2,400 750 1,200 2,470 10,350 17,170
SECONDARY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
Right of way hi 17,000 10 - 2 2 45 59 110 - 34 34 765 1,003
Ordinary e-a-ation m 6\.50 220,000 70,000 70\.000 90,000 60,000 510\.000 1\.430 455 455 585 390 3,315
Compacted fill using excavation
material m3 3\.50 80,000 30,000 10\.000 20,000 50,000 190,000 280 105 35 70 175 665
Compacted f ill using borrowod material
with 300 m overhauling m3 15 120,000 36,000 20,000 16,000 30,000 222,00 1,800 540 300 240 450 3,330
Concrete liming including trimming
and joints m3 400 3,800 1,200 1,100 1,200 1,200 8,500 1\.520 480 440 480 480 3,400
Class A concrete m3 1,000 1\.100 400 500 800 1,600 4,400 1,100 400 500 800 1,600 4,400
Grouted tiptap m3 130 900 400 400 1,600 700 4\.000 117 52 52 208 91 520
Sand 8 gravel bedding below riprap m 35 400 200 200 600 200 1,600 14 7 7 21 7 56
(ate\.s with hoisting 6 installation ton 30,000 32 10 8 11 10 71 960 300 240 330 300 2,130
Mliscellaneous metalwork ton 16,000 7 2 1 1 4 15 112 32 16 t6 64 240
:1 Iings for bridges and other
ct-ct-ares m 75 800 400 200 200 400 2\.000 60 30 15 L5 30 1S0
Pfp-W,rk (18" to 36" dia\. pipes) m3 250 300 200 400 500 700 2,100 75 50 100 125 175 525
( canc rote and/or riprap demolition n 50 300 100 200 200 - 800 15 5 10 to - 40
'Iis-Iloane\.us lump sum - - - - - 147 94 46 66 43 396
Subtotal 7,800 2,550 2,250 3\.000 4,570 20,170
11rN 6 SECONDARY DRAINAGE SYSTEM
Right of way hi 17,000 56 27 27 27 17 154 952 459 459 459 289 2,618
irdioary excavation m3 5 330,000 160,000 170,000 180,000 100,000 940,000 1,650 800 850 900 500 4,700
Class A concrete m3 1,000 900 500 700 1,300 300 3\.700 900 500 700 1,300 300 3,700
Mass ron-rete m3 600 400 200 300 600 1O0 1,600 240 120 180 360 60 960
Grouted riprap m3 130 1,000 600 1,000 1,600 400 4,600 130 78 130 208 52 598
Sand 6 gravel bedding below riprap m 35 400 200 400 600 200 1,800 14 7 L4 21 7 63
Drainage inlets (complete) each 340 200 50 100 100 50 500 68 17 34 34 17 170
Mtiscellaneous lump sum - - - - - - - 26 39 33 18 55 171
Subtotal 3,980 2,020 2,400 3,300 1,280 12,980
ANNEX 5
Table 3
Page 2
Quantity /2 Cost (Pesas '000)
Rehabilitation Rehabilitation _
Unit Santa Jalaur Santa Jalaur
Item Enit Price /1 Jalaur Suagne Barbara Aganan Extension Total Jalaur Suagne Barbara AMacan Extension Total
(Pesos)
SERVICE, ACCESS & FARlf ROADS
Right of way hi 17,000 49 21 28 33 27 158 825 355 475 568 452 2,675
Ordinary excavation m 6\.50 20,000 12,600 20,300 29,400 29,200 111,500 130 82 132 19L 190 725
Compacted fill using borrowed 3
material with 300 n overhauling m 15 310,000 160,000 70,000 100,000 250,000 890,000 4,650 2,400 1,050 1,500 3,750 13,350
Gravel and/or selected material for 3
surfacing inclading compaction m3 25 130,000 60,000 50,000 56,000 85,000 381,000 3,250 1,500 1,250 1,400 2,125 9,525
Glass A concrete 03 1\.000 1,800 400 400 1,400 300 4,300 1\.,800 400 400 1,400 300 4,300
Granted riprap 3 130 500 200 300 1,200 200 2\.400 65 26 39 156 26 312
S0ud and granl bedding below riprap rm 35 200 100 100 400 100 900 7 4 4 14 4 33
Precast concrete slabs for bridges m 900 - 40 230 50 - 320 - 36 207 45 - 288
Pipe railings for bridges \. 75 600 300 600 1,200 200 2,900 45 23 45 90 15 218
Miscellaneous metalwork ton 16,000 6 2 3 6 1 18 96 32 48 96 16 288
Farn roads 2\.0 n wide, earthwork and
compac-tio km 10,000 50 20 40 40 20 170 500 200 400 400 200 1,700
Pipework (18" to 24" dia\. pipes) m 140 800 300 500 500 300 2,400 112 42 70 70 42 336
Subtotal 11,480 5,100 4,120 5,93O 7,120 33,750
ON-FARi DITCHES & DRAINS
Right of way ha 17,000 150 50 80 90 50 420 2,550 850 1,360 1,530 850 7,140
Earthwork for maim farm ditch km 14,000 170 60 90 100 50 470 2,380 840 1,260 1,400 700 6,580
Earthwork for supplementary
field ditch km 11,000 250 80 130 150 80 690 2,750 880 1,430 1,650 880 7,590
Earthwork for farm drain km 8,000 230 80 120 130 80 640 1,840 640 960 1,040 640 5,124
Compacted fill in c-ncrete lining
parts of ditch k3 10,000 6 2 3 4 2 17 60 20 30 4O 20 170
Concrete lining m3 400 500 180 250 300 180 1,410 200 72 100 120 72 564
Class A concrete m3 1,000 700 250 350 420 250 1,970 700 250 350 420 250 1,970
MiscelLaneous metalwork run 16,000 2 1 1 2 1 7 32 16 16 32 16 112
Gates with installation ton 30,000 14 5 6 7 5 37 420 150 180 210 150 1,110
Pip, work (18" to 24" din\. pipes) m 140 2,000 700 1,000 1,200 700 5,600 280 98 140 168 98 784
'ar- turnouts with stop-plank grooves each 180 3,500 1,200 1,900 2,200 1,100 9,900 630 216 342 396 198 1,782
1'\. ast check structures for main
:1rm ditch each 200 500 180 270 300 150 1,400 100 36 54 61 30 280
:-want check stractares for
upplenentary field ditch and
ud structures each 190 1,000 320 520 600 320 2,760 190 61 99 114 61 525
lsell \.aneous lump sum - - - - - - - 248 71 199 170 85 773
Subttral 12,380 4,200 6,520 7,350 4,050 34,500
WATIER IIANAGEMENT STATIONS
Right of way h2 17,000 15 5 7 9 5 41 255 85 119 153 85 697
Water master working station m9 350 720 240 360 440 240 2,000 252 84 126 154 84 700
Storage area m 200 450 150 230 280 150 1,260 90 30 46 56 30 252
Covered drying floor (nipa & bamboo
roofing) m2 100 5,550 1,800 2,850 3,050 1,800 15,050 555 180 285 305 l80 1,505
Open drying floor m 6o 10,800 3,600 5,400 6,370 3,600 29,770 648 221 324 382 221 1,796
Subtotal 1,800 600 900 1,050 600 4,950
TOTAL COST 40,890 15,290 17,470 23,470 31,050 128,170
/0 Unit cost indexed to January 1977 levels\.
/2 Quantities revised from feasibility estimates by 5 to 151 during mission review\.
ANNEX 5
Table 4
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
O&M BUILDINGS
Quantities and Cost Estimates
Unit
Item Unit Quantity Price Amount
(Y) (P '000)
1\. Project Headquarters
Land with landscaping & fencing, etc\. Ha 3 60,000 180
Roads, sewage & water supply, etc\. LS - - 300
Buildings: 2
Offices, infirmary & staff quarters m2 1,450 800 1,160
Laboratory facilities m2 80 750 60
Warehouse, workshop & powerhouse, etc\. m2 850 600 510
Car garage m 150 400 60
Sport courts, etc\. LS - - 130
Subtotal 2,400
2\. Field Offices
Land with landscaping & fencing, etc\. Ha 2 60,000 120
Roads, sewage & water supply, etc\. LS - - 200
Buildings: 2
Offices & staff quarters m 1,000 800 800
Warehouse, workshop & security force 2
barracks, etc\. m2 850 600 510
Car garage m 100 400 40
Sport courts, etc\. LS - - 130
Subtotal 1,800
ANNEX 5
Table 5
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
O&M BUILDINGS
Cost Estimate
Local Foreign Total
-(US$ 000)
1\. Project headquarters 220 100 320
2\. Field offices 170 70 240
Subtotal 390 170 560
Contingencies (10%) 40 20 60
TOTAL 430 190 620
ANNEX 5
Table 6
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
WATER MANAGEMENT TRAINING
Cost Estimate
Local Foreign Total
___--
(US$000)
1\. Project personnel 220 60 280
2\. Equipment, supplies and materials
(a) Office supplies, materials
and furniture 15 15 30
(b) Farm equipment 8 16 24
(c) Vehicles - 70 70
(d) Hydromet\. equipment - 10 10
(e) Fuel, oil, spares - 30 30
(f) Field supplies and materials - 40 40
(g) Sundries 77 9 86
Subtotal 100 190 290
Subtotal Items 1 & 2 320 250 570
Contingencies (10%) 30 30 60
TOTAL 350 280 630
ANNEX 5
Table 7
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Expected Price Increases
Calendar Year
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 Total
- -- (US$ '000)
1\. Civil Works
Irrigation and drainage facilities 2,200 6,700 7,000 4,800 2,800 23,500
O&M buildings 120 300 200 - - 620
Subtotal 2,320 7,000 7,200 4,800 2,800 24,120
Annual inflation rate (%) /1 12 12 12 10 10 -
Expected price increases 160 1,500 2,600 2,440 1,820 8,520
2\. Equipment and Services
Technical assistance 100 - - - - 100
O&M equipment - 300 130 - - 430
Water management training 60 200 150 150 70 630
Subtotal 160 500 280 150 70 1,160
Annual inflation rate (%) /1 8 8 8 7 7 -
Expected price increases 10 60 60 40 30 200
Total without price increases 2,480 7,550 7,480 4,900 2,870 25,280
Expected price increases 170 1,560 2,660 2,480 1,850 8,720
Total with price increases 2,650 9,110 10,140 7,380 4,720 34,000
/1 Calculated by compounding the estimated rate of price increases in prior year and one-
half the rate of increase in the year concerned\.
ANNEX 6
Table 1
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Equipment for Force Account Work
Unit Total
Item Quantity Cost Cost
Tc--,(US$ c l 1)---7
Tractor, crawler 140 hp 3 70 210
Tractor, crawler 90 hp 5 48 240
Crane, crawler, dragline 3/4 cu\. yd\. 4 85 340
Hydraulic backhoe, crawler 0\.4 cu\. yd\. 7 35 245
Tractor, industrial w/backhoe loader 15 30 450
Front end loader, wheeled 1\.5 cu\. yd\. 5 34 510
Farm tractor with blade 5 15 75
attachment 75 hp
Truck, tractor w/25 ton trailer 1 50 50
Motor grader, 125 hp 3 50 150
Roller, 3-wheel steel 12 ton 1 30 30
Roller 5 ton 3 15 45
Roller 1\.0 m wide 6 10 60
Mixer, concrete 1/2 cu\. yd\. 13 12 156
Compactor 19 x 24 in\. plate w/generator 13 6 78
Water pumps 2 to 6 in\. size 16 1 16
Truck, dump 6-8 cu\. yd\. 13 25 325
Truck, flatbed 6 ton 7 20 140
Truck, water 1 20 20
Truck, forklift 1 20 20
Truck, fuel and lubrication service 1 40 40
Truck, pickup 3/4 ton 4 x 4 8 10 80
Mobile repair shop, truck mtd\. 1 70 70
Station wagons 4 x 4 6 10 60
Jeep, utility vehicle 4 x 4 10 9 90
Miscellaneous tools & equipment 40
Subtotal 3,540
Spare parts 10% 360
TOTAL 3,900
ANNEX 6
Table 2
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Equipment for Operation and Maintenance
Unit Total
Item Quantity Cost Cost
---- (US$ 000)----
Water pumps 2 to 4 in\. size 8 1 8
Station wagon 4 x 4 4 10 40
Jeep, utility vehicle 4 x 4 8 9 72
Truck, pickup 3/4 ton 4 x 4 6 10 60
Motor bike 100 cc 70 1 70
Weed cutter 250 0\.3 75
Radio transceiver (single Sb) 6 4 24
Miscellaneous tools & equipment (lump sum) 41
Subtotal 390
Spare parts (10%) 40
TOTAL 430
ANNEX 6
Table 3
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
WATER MANAGEMENT TRAINING
List of Equipment and Vehicles
Unit Total
Item Quantity Cost Cost
(US $)
1\. Office and Training Equipment
Typewriters 4 500 2,000
Mimeo machines 4 1,000 4,000
Desk calculators 8 100 800
Slide projectors w/screens 4 250 1,000
Cameras 3 300 900
Movie projector 1 2,400 2,400
Public address systems 5 1,600 8,000
Tape recorders w/cassettes 4 200 800
Moisture meters 3 500 1,500
Miscellaneous office furniture - - 8,600
Subtotal 30,000
2\. Farm Equipment
Row seeders 3 300 900
Transplanters 3 300 900
Rotary weeders 30 50 1,500
Power tillers w/attachments 3 1,200 3,600
Boom sprayers 3 400 1,200
Threshers 3 2,500 7,500
Farm tractor w/attachments 45 hp 1 8,400 8,400
Subtotal 24,000
3\. Vehicles
Bicycles\. 12 100 1,200
Motorcycles 100 cc 6 1,000 6,000
Truck, pickup 1/2 ton 3 8,000 24,000
Jeep, wagon 4 x 4 2 9,000 18,000
Bus, 40 seat 1 20,800 20,800
Subtotal 70,000
4\. Hydromet Equipment
Portable Parshall flumes 3 600 1,800
Water level recorders 3 500 1,500
Raingauges 3 200 600
Evaporation pans 3 300 900
Miscellaneous 5,200
Subtotal 10,000
5\. Miscellaneous Equipment
Provision for unlisted items of equipment,
apparatus and instruments\. 16,000
TOTAL 150,000
ANNEX 7
Table 1
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Estimated Schedule of Expenditures
Total
Item Cost FY78 /1 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82
-------------------- (US$ o000) -
---------------
Project service area 24,120 5,820 7,100 6,000 3,800 1,400
O&M equipment 430 150 210 70 - -
Water management
training 630 160 180 150 110 30
Subtotal 25,180 6,130 7,490 6,220 3,910 1,430
Expected price
increases 8,820 960 2,130 2,600 2,190 940
Total Project Cost 34,000 7,090 9,620 8,820 6,100 2,370
/l IBRD Fiscal years\.
ANNEX 7
Table 2
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Estimated Schedule of Disbursements
IBRD Fiscal Year Accumulated Disbursements
and Semester US$'ooo Equivalent
Fiscal Year 1978
1st 1,300
2nd 3,100
Fiscal Year 1979
1st 5,100
2nd 7,600
Fiscal Year 1980
1st 9,800
2nd 11,500
Fiscal Year 1981
1st 12,600
2nd 13,500
Fiscal Year 1982
1st 14,200
2nd 14,700
Fiscal Year 1983
1st 15,000
ANNEX 7
Table 3
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Proposed Allocation of Proceeds of Loan
Costs
Proposed
Category Total Forei_n Loan
------------(US$ million)-------------
I\. Civil Works:
Project service area /1 13\.80 4\.43 6\.8*
Water management training /2 0\.40 0\.10
Expected price increases 6\.80 2\.12
Subtotal 21\.00 6\.65
* Of which (a) US$2\.0 million for mobilization and contractors' equipment
and (b) US$4\.8 million for other civil works\. Disbursement for (a) will
be 100% of foreign expenditure up to 20% of the value of each contract and
for (b) 25% of total expenditure\.
II\. Equipment: /3 4\.50 4\.30 6\.4
Expected price increases 1\.90 1\.87
Subtotal 6\.40 6\.17
Disbursement will be 100% of foreign expenditure for directly imported
equipment, 100% of expenditure (ex-factory) for locally manufactured
equipment and 65% of total expenditure for imported equipment procured
locally\.
III\. Technical Assistance 0\.10 0\.08 0\.1
Disbursement will be 100% of total expenditure\.
IV\. Unallocated: /4
Physical contingencies 4\.40 2\.10 1\.7
(Administrative & engineering) (2\.10) -
Total 34\.00 15\.00 15\.0
/1 Force account equipment (US$3\.9 million) excluded and transferred to
Category II; Annex 6, Table 1\.
/2 Excludes cost of equipment (US$150,000); Annex 6, Table 3\.
/3 Includes equipment for force account (US$3\.9 million), O&M (US$430,000),
and water management training (US$150,000)\.
/4 See Annex 5, Table 1\.
ANNEX 8
Page 1
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Organization & Management
1\. Since 1964 overall responsibility for the national irrigation
systems in the Philippines has been vested in the National Irrigation
Administration (NIA)\. The NIA was set up under Republic Act No\. 3601 to
investigate, study, improve, construct and administer all national
irrigation systems\. It was given the power to investigate all available
water resources in the country in order to utilize them for irrigation
and to collect water rates from the beneficiaries of the national irriga-
tion systems\. Presidential Decree No\. 552 of September 11, 1974 has
further widened NIA's scope by giving it "\. broader powers and authority
to undertake concomitant projects such as flood control, drainage, land
reclamation, hydraulic power development, domestic water supply, road or
highway construction, reforestation and projects to maintain ecological
balance, in coordination with the agencies concerned\." The NIA is financed
by the Government through the sale of bonds or from appropriations\.
2\. The governing body of the NIA is the Board of Directors,
composed of a Chairman and five members, who are all ex-officio except
for one member appointed by the President of the Philippines on the
recommendation of rice and corn growers\. Management of the NIA is the
responsibility of an Administrator appointed by the President\. The
Administrator is also Vice-Chairman of the Board\. Directly below the
Administrator there are three Assistant Administrators, respectively
responsible for Special Projects, Engineering and Operation, and Finance
and Administration\. Field services are managed by eight regional and two
subregional offices, together with a number of special project offices\.
3\. The NIA has recently been reorganized and expanded to meet the
wider responsibilities imposed on it by Presidential Decree No\. 552 and
by the Government's policy of accelerating irrigation development\. As a
result of this reorganization all of the major foreign-assisted projects
have been integrated under the Special Projects Organization office, thus
avoiding duplication and increasing transfer of experience between
projects\. The Special Projects Organization would also be responsible
for executing and operating the Jalaur project\.
4\. NIA would appoint the Regional Engineer (Region V) stationed in
Iloilo as Jalaur Project Manager; he would be responsible to the Assistant
Administrator for Special Projects\. Day-to-day responsibility for construc-
tion would rest with an Assistant Project Manager to be stationed near
Pavia, the proposed location of project headquarters\. NIA expects to meet
the staff requirements by transfer from the Angat-Magat Integrated Agricul-
tural Development Project, which is nearing completion\. The Special Projects
Engineering Department would design plans and prepare estimates for the
Project works, except for on-farm facilities (para\. 5), and would also
undertake contract administration work\.
ANNEX 8
Page 2
5\. The proposed organization for construction is shown in Chart
No\. 16392\. The Project Engineering Division would be responsible for the
preparation of plans, programs, design and estimates of on-farm facilities
as well as revisions dictated by field conditions of those works designed in
the central office\. The Administrative Division would be responsible for
personnel and records management, accounting, property, procurement and
other services\. The agricultural phase of the project would be handled
by the Agricultural Division and the Equipment Division would provide main-
tenance and services for construction equipment and vehicles to be used on
force account construction\. There would be two construction divisions: the
first, located at Pototan would be responsible for the rehabilitation of the
Suague system and the rehabilitation and extension of the Jalaur system; the
second, located at Pavia, would be responsible for work on the Santa Barbara
and Aganan systems\.
6\. The proposed organization for operation and maintenance is shown in
Chart No\. 16391(R)\. The headquarters staff under the project Manager would
consist of four support divisions: an Engineering and Operation Division,
an Agriculture Division, an Equipment Division and an Administrative Division\.
The Equipment Division would handle the equipment of the project, and the
Agriculture Division would be responsible for the water management training
center, introducing new water management techniques and farming methods as
well as ensuring that necessary agricultural support services are established
in the area\. The Engineering and Operation Division would be responsible for
day-to-day maintenance activities and operation of the system including water
scheduling, while the Administrative Division would handle personnel and
records management, accounting and other services\. For operation and main-
tenance purposes, the project area would be divided into two irrigation
districts based in Pototan and Pavia\. The Pototan district would serve a
total area of 14,600 ha covering the Jalaur and Suague systems\. The Pavia
district would cover the Santa Barbara and Aganan systems serving a total area
of about 10,000 ha\. Each district would be further subdivided into divisions
of about 2,500 ha each controlled by a supervisor and would be subdivided into
500 ha units, each under a Water Management Technologist (WMT)\. A ditch
tender would be employed for every 100 ha, two of the basic 50 ha units\. Each
WMT therefore would be responsible for about five ditch tenders\. The estimated
annual cost of operation and maintenance is P 180 (US$24) per ha as shown below:
ANNEX 8
Page 3
Cost of Irrigation Operation and Maintenance /1
Annual Cost
(P/ha) (US$/ha)
Salaries and wages 110 14\.60
Equipment operation 35 4\.10
Materials and supplies 5 0\.70
Administrative & general expenses 30 4\.00
Total 180 24\.00
/1 From detailed NIA estimates of personnel and equipment
requirements, based on experience in UPRP\.
ANNEX 9
Page 1
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Supporting Agricultural Services
1\. Many Government organizations currently have dealings with the
farmers, the principal agencies are:
(a) Bureau of Agricultural Extension (BAE);
(b) Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI);
(c) Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR);
(d) Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA);
(e) Department of Local Government and Community Development
(DLGCD);
(f) National Grains Authority (NGA); and
(g) National Irrigation Administration (NIA)\.
In addition, there are the non-Government Rural Banks (RB)\.
2\. In the Upper Pampanga River Project (UPRP) the need for coordi-
nating the various agencies providing services to the farmers was clearly
felt\. An Agricultural Development Coordinating Council (ADCC) was estab-
lished for the project to provide day-to-day control and coordination of
the activities of the various agencies within the project area\. The ADDC
consisted of the Provincial Heads of all the participating agencies\. The
arrangement is working well in UPRP and similar organizations are being set
up for the Tarlac Irrigation Systems Improvement Project, the Rural Develop-
ment Project on Mindoro and the Magat project\. An ADCC based on Iloilo
Province would be established for the proposed project\.
3\. The BAE is mainly responsible for agricultural extension, with
technical back-up provided by the BPI\. Under the Masagana 99 program aimed
at increasing rice production, a total of 95 agricultural technicians was
used in the project area\. The technicians, all graduates, came mainly from
BAE and DAR\. This worked out to a ratio of one extension worker to about
210 farmers\.
4\. The project would be organized on the basis of irrigation units
of 50 ha in the same manner as the Pampanga, Tarlac, Magat and Chico projects\.
The 20 to 25 farmers in such a unit would be given every incentive to work
together as a group\. The NIA would schedule irrigation on a rotational
ANNEX 9
Page 2
basis thus promoting a uniformity of operations within each unit at any
given time\. The rotational area would also be the basic unit for the
provision of credit and the building block for the eventual organization of
irrigation associations and cooperatives\. In the Bank-assisted irrigation
project,, the NIA is assigning a Water Management Technologist to every ten
units\. The same staffing pattern would be applied to the Jalaur project
(see Annex 8)\. The water management staff would supplement the existing
extension personnel provided by the various Government agencies and would
help to increase extension coverage in the project area\.
5\. New extension work items to be emphasized would include improved
irrigation and drainage practices, the importance of scheduling operations,
the use of good quality seed and even planting, proper fertilizer application,
weed and pest control, and the use of tillage and threshing machinery\.
Research
6\. The Visayas Rice Experiment Station at Leganes in the project area
is operated by the BPI\. Research work includes varietal screening, fertilizer
rates, direct seeding methods with the attendant weed, insect and rodent con-
trol, and multiple cropping plus some minor projects\. Some 42 ha of the
station are used to produce foundation seed for the certified seed program
of the province\. A water management pilot project was set up at Potatan in
1974 by the NIA in cooperation with the Philippine Council for Agricultural
Research (PCAR)\. The research undertaken at this station includes water
use studies of rice and the use of effective rainfall as a guide for timing
of irrigation in relation to HYV and different fertilizer rates\. The work
would be valuable to the project in developing information for making maximum
use of limited water supplies\. The BAE conducts trials and demonstrations in
cooperation with the Agricultural College of the University of the Philippines
and the International Rice Research Institute\. The Bureau of soils has a
unit in the province\. NIA has good working relations with these agencies
and the project would be able to draw on research back-up from all these
sources\.
Fertilizer
7\. Annual consumption of fertilizer in the project area currently
amounts to 5,800 tons, of which about 30% is in the form of urea and
armnonium sulphate and the balance is evenly divided between amnonium
phosphate and compound formulations like 15-15-15\. Application rates
run at fairly high levels, the average being 55, 17 and 6 kg/ha for
nitrogen, phosphate and potash respectively\. At full development the
project would require some 9,600 tons of fertilizer annually of which
68% would be urea and the balance triple super-phosphate\. In terms of
nutrients the average rate of application per crop season would be
80 kg/ha nitrogen and 40 kg/ha phosphoric acid\. There are four dealers
and 28 subdealers of fertilizer and agro-chemicals in the project area
who would handle the increased demand without difficulty\.
ANNEX 9
Page 3
Seed
8\. About 2,000 tons of rice seed per annum are presently used
in the project area\. The requirement that Masagana program farmers use
certified seed has promoted the development of a large seed growing
capability\. There are currently about 100 registered growers of certi-
fied seed on just under 2,500 ha under BPI supervision\. Production from
this area already exceeds local demand\. At full development the annual
seed requirement for the project area would total about 1,840 tons, of
which not more than about 450 tons would be certified\. There would be
no difficulty in obtaining this amount\.
Farmers' Organizations
9\. As part of the Agrarian Reform program, the Government, through
the DLGCD, is promoting the formation of precooperative farmers' organiza-
tions\., based on the barrio or hamlet\. The organizations would serve
as channels for the inflow of technical services, credit and inputs and as
assembly points for produce intended for market\. There are 255 pre-
cooperatives with 10,000 members in the project area, with 34 assigned
field workers and 216 volunteer barrio workers\. It is hoped that
these organizations will grow into fully-fledged, formally constituted
cooperatives\. This approach to cooperative organization fits in well with
the 50 ha irrigation unit approach by NIA on Bank-assisted irrigation
projects\.
10\. The NIA is committed to the creation of irrigation associations
among the farmers which would eventually assume a large part of the responsi-
bility for the operation and maintenance of the national irrigation systems\.
Without losing sight of the ultimate objective, the main thrust of NIA's
efforts in the Bank-assisted projects has been to organize the farmers
within the 50-ha units, primarily for production and water management\. The
immediate aim is to demonstrate to the farmers that working together and
using water efficiently is possible and profitable\. Once this has been
established, a realistic framework for setting up irrigation associations
would exist\. The project area would be expected to follow the pattern and
gain from the experience of the earlier Luzon projects\.
Credit
11\. Some 40% of the farmers in the project area finance their
requirements of farm inputs and hired labor from their own resources\. The
remainder use some form of credit\. The principal sources are:
(a) banks, notably the Rural Banks (RB), the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) and private banks;
(b) the Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA);
ANNEX 9
Page 4
(c) input dealers, marketing organizations and millers; and
(d) money lenders\.
Fifteen of the 26 RBs in Iloilo province are within reach of the project
area farmers\.
12\. To ensure the success of the Agrarian Reform program, the Govern-
ment has proceeded to strengthen the credit institutions and to facilitate
the granting of production credit to small farmers who previously depended
on the landlord and private money lenders for their requirements\. RBs have
been authorized rediscounting privileges of 100%, Government guarantees of
up to 85% of the loans made and low-cost money is available from the Central
Bank\. The easier credit thus made available is employed under a system of
"supervised credit", which includes the provision of technical services to
the borrower to ensure that recommended practices, including variety,
fertilizer and agro-chemical inputs, are adopted\. Loans granted under
supervised credit are not secured by collateral, but are covered by a
Government guarantee; the interest is at 12% per annum and the loan is for a
period of six months\. During the 1974 wet season crop, a total of about
P 40\.7 million (US$5\.4 million) was issued as production credit to rice
farmers in the Masagana program in Iloilo province\. The PNB accounted for
about 48% of the total, the RBs for 47% and the ACA for the balance\. The
area covered by the credit amounted to 53,000 ha\. It is estimated that
about 11,000 ha in the project area, or 45% of the total, received P 9\.5
million (US$1\.3 million) under the program\.
13\. Under the Masagana program, production credit was given up to
P 800/ha, consisting of P 430 for inputs and P 370 for labor and subsis-
tence\. The Government has since raised the rate to P 1,200/ha, made up
of P 680 for the inputs and P 520 for labor and subsistence\. The increased
rate is a little below the production costs estimated at full development\.
Assuming that at full project development about 20% of the farmers in the
project area would find their requirements of inputs and hired labor from
their own resources, some 9,600 farmers would need credit from institutional
sources\. At a loan level of P 1,200/ha the total annual credit requirement
at full development would amount to P 34\.2 million (US$4\.6 million)\. The
existing credit institutions would be able to meet the requirement\.
ANNEX 10
Page 1
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Present and Projected Cropping Patterns and Production
Present Cropping Pattern
1\. All but a small portion /1 of the 24,700 ha in the project
are cultivated to rice in the wet season\. Of these about 22,000 ha are
irrigated and the remaining 2,700 are rainfed\. The irrigated land is
located in four gravity systems operated by NIA\. In the irrigated area
approximately 7,500 ha are cultivated during the dry season for a cropping
intensity of 134%\. However, for the project area as a whole the present
cropping intensity is 130%\. Rice is by far the most important crop in the
area\. Small areas of corn, mung beans, cowpea, melons and vegetables are
grown without irrigation in the dry season\. Annual paddy production is
estimated at about 80,000 tons\.
2\. Wet season irrigated rice is grown between June and December\.
Transplanting time in this area is about eight weeks, which is shorter
than other areas in the Philippines; any use of direct seeding would
reduce it further\. About 10% of the farmers own small tractors and about
half of the farmers utilize these tractors for land preparation in combin-
ation with animal power\. There is an ample supply of agricultural labor in
the area and much of the field work is still done manually\. On about 85% of
the area rice is transplanted from field nurseries onto previously puddled
land, while on the balance of the land it is direct seeded with soaked seed
and broadcast into fully drained puddled fields\. The dry season crop is
planted in January and February and harvested by traditional, manual
methods between mid-April and mid-May\. Only a few mechanical threshers are
in use in the area\.
3\. On the presently irrigated land 85% of the area is planted to
improved varieties\. The average paddy yield in the rainfed areas is about
1\.8 ton/ha, on the irrigated areas the yield in the wet season is about
2\.7 ton/ha and 2\.4 ton/ha in the dry season\./2 Higher yields are expected
in the dry season due to better growing conditions, but water supply and
distribution are unsatisfactory in the project area in the dry season\.
The rice yields in Iloilo are better than in Central Luzon\.
/1 Less than 1,000 ha of sugarcane are scattered in patches along the
rivers\.
/2 Yields in the Aganan system are about 20% lower because of higher
risks of water shortage\.
ANNEX 10
Page 2
Future Cropping Pattern
4\. In the absence of the project the rate of increase in yield
in the rainfed area is estimated at about 1\.4% per annum and would probably
be due to a slow increase in the area under high yielding varieties\. In
the irrigated areas the yields in both wet and dry season crops are esti-
mated to increase about 1\.5% per annum as a result of gradual improvement
of crop management\. The use of inputs would be expected to increase with
the availability of greater supplies of credit and further extension
efforts as part of the Government's campaign for national rice self-
sufficiency\. Existing cropping intensities would remain unchanged in the
absence of additional water supplies and improvement of the systems\.
5\. The expected changes in the cropping pattern and production
under the project are shown in Table 1\. Some 24,700 ha would be provided
with wet season irrigation, of which 2,700 ha are currently rainfed\.
Improved facilities in the four irrigation systems and better water manage-
ment would allow dry season cropping to increase from the current 7,500 ha
to 12,000 ha\. Overall cropping intensity in the project area would rise
from the present 130% to 149%\. The proposed cropping pattern based solely
on rice is consistent with soils and topography and the customs of the local
people\.
Future Yields
6\. With good water control, adequate supplies of credit and inputs
and increased extension service support, future paddy yields under irriga-
tion are expected to be 4\.0 ton/ha in both the wet and dry seasons\. The
projected yields would be reached five years after the rehabilitation of
the present facilities and the completion of the Jalaur extension\. The
improved yields would be obtained from the use of high yielding varieties
throughout the project area, better land preparation through greater use of
machinery, certified seed, heavier fertilizer inputs and greater expendi-
tures on crop protection and weed control\. The improved road network
envisaged under the project would improve access to the farms, thus facili-
tating the inflow of inputs and outflow of produce\.
Development Constraints
7\. The project would add 4,500 ha of dry season cropping resulting
in an 28% increase in labor requirement, a greater degree of mechanization
of both land preparation and harvesting, and a demand for additional drying
and storage facilities\. The most important issues are examined briefly\.
8\. Cropping Calendar\. Chart No\. 16408 shows the existing cropping
calendar which would remain unchanged under the project\. The cropping
calendar minimizes weather hazards by harvesting in November and December
ANNEX 10
Page 3
for the wet season crop and in April and May for the dry season crop\.
Typhoons are infrequent, particularly in the wet season harvest period\.
The calendar allows for a 30-day closure period for system maintenance in
April for the Jalaur-Suage river systems and in May for the Santa Barbara-
Aganan systems\.
9\. Labor Availability\. The supply of and demand for labor with and
without the project are examined in detail in Annex 13\.
10\. Mechanization\. Mechanization has not progressed in the project
area to the same degree that it has in Central Luzon\. At present, 10% of
the farmers own small tractors which are used on about half of the project
area for the basic cultivation, with animal-drawn equipment doing the sub-
sequent harrowing and smoothing operations\. On the remainder of the land
all operations are done with animal-drawn implements\. With improved water
management, better access to fields, tighter operating schedules to maxi-
mize water use, increased cropping intensities, and use of earlier maturing
varieties, it is estimated that about 70% of land preparation would be
mechanical\. It is anticipated that the machinery, mostly two-wheel tractors
and rotary tillers, would be owned by farmers and contracted out to their
neighbors, as is currently the practice\.
11\. Harvesting\. A sickle is used for harvesting and threshing is
done manually\. There are no large threshers in the project area\. Under
project conditions of better access to the fields, it is assumed that some
50% of the cropped area would be threshed mechanically\. The small drum-loop
type thresher is manufactured in Iloilo and the area could easily be
supplied with the machines\.
12\. Drying and Storage\. Threshed paddy is currently sun-dried or
air-dried on whatever suitable surfaces are available\. Some of the rice
mills and farmers' cooperatives have concrete drying floors\. In addition,
the NGA operates three grain driers in the area with a capacity of 15 tons
per 8-hour day\. Existing arrangements appear to be adequate for the
present paddy crop of 80,000 tons\. At full development the annual produc-
tion from the project would total 147,000 tons\. Production from the wet
season crop would increase by 60%\. Production from the dry season crop
harvest should not present problems as it would take place mainly between
February and April, at the driest time of the year\. Some expansion in
drying facilities, both solar and mechanical, would be needed to deal with
the increased output of the wet season crop harvested in the relatively
wetter October-November period\. The DLGCD is currently engaged in a
program to provide every barrio with a paved area to be used for recreation
and crop drying\. The project would provide additional solar drying facil-
ities attached to the WMT stations\. Millers and farmers' cooperatives are
aware of the need for drying and can be expected to provide whatever
additional facilities are required\. Storage capacity in the project area
and at the nearby port of Iloilo is ample for existing requirements, but
would need some expansion to meet increased yields\. The NGA plans to
build additional storage and the private sector is expected to follow suit
to accommodate rising paddy production from the project area\.
ANNEX 10
Page 4
12\. Processing\. There are 400 privately owned rice mills and hullers
in the project area, many of the hullers are portable and move along the
main roads to barrios and municipalities\. Assuming a 12 hour working day
and a 200-day milling season, the mills have a capacity of 135,000 tons of
paddy per year\. In addition, the NGA owns a mill with a capacity of 5 tons
of paddy per 12-hours operation or 1,000 tons per year\. The existing
annual capacity of 136,000 tons is greatly in excess of present needs but
some expansion would be required to handle production from the project at
full development\. No difficulties are anticipated in providing the required
extra milling capacity as the private sector is enterprising and has access
to capital\.
Marketing
13\. The farmer may sell his surplus paddy to a middleman, store
it in a private or Government-owned warehouse in the hope of obtaining a
better price, have it milled and sell the rice to a trader, or sell the
paddy to the NGA at the Government support price\. While the Government is
involved in the marketing sector, there is no authority with specific
responsibility for marketing\. The part played by Government agencies and
farmers' marketing cooperatives is remarkably small\. With the emphasis
currently being placed on the development of cooperatives as an essential
support to agrarian reform, it is likely that at full project development,
cooperatives would play a larger role in marketing paddy\.
Table 1
Summary of Rice Cropping Pattern and Production
Cropped Area Paddy Production
Present Future Present Future /1
(ha) ------ --('000 tons)---
Wet Season
Irrigated rice 22,000 24,700 55\.6 98\.8
Rainfed rice 2,700 - 4\.9 -
Subtotal 24,700 24,700 61\.5 98\.8
Dry Season
Irrigated rice 7,500 12,000 18\.0 48\.8
Total 32,200 36,700 79\.5 146\.8
Cropping Intensity 130% 149%
/1 At full development 1985\.
ANNEX 11
Page 1
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Market Prospects and Prices
Market Prospects
1\. One of the Philippines Government's main policy goals is self-
sufficiency in basic foods, especially rice and corn\. A deficit in rice,
the main staple food crop, has been a persistent problem\. Official figures
show that for 1963-1967 the Philippines imported an average of about 300,000
tons of rice annually\. Although the Government did not import rice in 1969
or 1970, stocks declined in those years\. Rice imports were again over
300,000 tons in 1971, 1972 and 1973, reaching 456,000 tons in 1972 because
of disastrous floods that year\. Good domestic crops allowed smaller rice
imports of 170,000 tons in 1974, and about 150,000 tons in 1975\. Due to an
exceptionally good 1975/76 harvest, there have been no imports thus far in
1976\.
2\. For the second year running, the Philippines produced a record
rice crop in 1975\. For the crop year ending June 30, 1975, paddy production
officially was 5\.7 million tons harvested from 3\.5 million ha, yielding some
1\.6 ton/ha\. This was slightly larger (by 1%) than the record 1973/74 crop\.
Despite good harvests the last two years, rice self-sufficiency is not immi-
nent\. With a population of 42 million, converting paddy to milled rice at a
63% recovery rate, and adding 200,000 tons consumed from imports, per capita
consumption of milled rice in 1974/75 was 90 kg\. Based on a population fore-
cast of 55 million in 1985 (Philippines Basic Economic Report, 1975), and
assuming that the annual per capita consumption of milled rice remains at
90 kg, total Philippine rice demand in 1985 would be some 5\.0 million tons\.
At a 63% recovery rate, this is equivalent to 7\.9 million tons of paddy\.
To meet this demand, paddy output would have to increase by 4% yearly between
1975 and 1985\. This rough demand computation is in line with the Basic
Economic Report, 1975, which suggests rice production will have to expand by
4% per year if domestic demand is to be met and imports eliminated\. Compar-
ing the 3 year averages of 1965 to 1967 and 1973 to 1975, paddy production
increased by an average of 3\.4% per annum\. This increase was due in large
part to the spread of high yielding varieties (HYVs), especially in irri-
gated areas\. With the use of HYVs fairly widespread where applicable,
other sources of growth will have to be sought to maintain the previous
decade's 3\.4% growth rate let alone increase that rate to 4%\. The project
would help maintain the country's growth rate in rice production, and
farmers should have no difficulties in marketing the additional rice from
the project area\. The project area has traditionally supplied rice for
consumption in Iloilo, Negros Occidental, and Aklan and Antique provinces
on Panay island\. With the project, this pattern would mainly continue,
with buyers from Negros purchasing most of the additional rice\.
ANNEX 11
Page 2
Prices
3\. Since 1957 the Government has set an annual farm gate support
price for paddy to encourage production and allow some purchases of paddy
by Government to build stabilization stocks\. Responsibility for operating
the system rested with an independent body, the Rice and Corn Administra-
tion, which operated unsatisfactorily\. On September 28, 1972, the responsi-
bility for rice and corn was transferred to a statutory body, the National
Grains Authority (NGA)\.
4\. During the late 1950s and early 1960s the support price remained
virtually unchanged and was P 9\.5 per cavan /1 (P 216/ton) in 1961\. There-
after, it was gradually increased and by 1971 it reached P 20\.0 per cavan
(P 454/ton)\. Although no precise figures are available to compare the annual
average market and support prices for paddy before 1965, the Sector Survey /2
shows the market price about 10% higher in 1965, and the support price
about 10% higher from 1966 to 1970\. Since 1971 the market price has gener-
ally exceeded the support price, except in areas where the NGA has not
operated\. The NGA only commenced buying in the project area in crop year
1974/75\. Before then, unofficial figures suggest the market price was con-
siderably below the support price in the project area\.
5\. The behavior of market prices in relation to the support price
is consistent with the record of domestic paddy output during the past
decade\. In the early 1960s, domestic production was unable to meet the
growing demand for rice and this tended to raise market prices above the
support price\. After the mid-1960s, increased production as a result of
the spread of high yielding varieties improved the balance between domestic
production and consumption and tended to depress market prices\. During the
last three to four years the trend has reversed and the market and support
prices are practically the same\. As a result of continuing inflation and to
encourage farmers to increase paddy production, the Government has continued
to raise the official support price for paddy, which in June 1976 was Y 55
per cavan (P 1,100/ton)\. In the project area, the market farm gate price
was P 52 per cavan (1 1050/ton)\.
6\. Through 1972, the farm gate support price for paddy and the domes-
tic consumer price for rice kept pace with changes in the world market price
for rice\. Between 1972 and 1975, however, to keep domestic prices down in
the face of record high world market prices for rice, the Government has
subsidized consumers by maintaining a low official ceiling price for rice
and a correspondingly low farm gate price for paddy by sales of imported
rice on the domestic market below cost\. This subsidy cost the Government
about US$20 million in 1974\.
/1 Before 1974 a "cavan" or sack of paddy was equivalent to 44 kg\. Since
1974 the official weight of a cavan of paddy is set at 50 kg\.
/2 IBRD Agricultural Sector Survey, Philippines, May 2, 1973 (Report
No\. 391-PH)\. Annex 10, Table 13\.
ANNEX 11
Page 3
7\. The Bank projects the world market price of Thai 25%-35% broken
rice to rise (at constant January 1977 prices) from US$220 per ton f\.o\.b\.
Bangkok in 1976 to around US$260 per ton in 1985\. These projections have
been used to estimate the present and future farm gate prices of paddy for
the farm budgets and the economic analysis\. In the farm budgets, using the
official exchange rate (US$1\.00 = P 7\.50), the corresponding farm gate
prices rise from B 1,050 per ton (P 52 per cavan) in 1976 to P 1,285 per
ton (P 65 per cavan) in 1985\. For the economic analysis, using a shadow
priced foreign exchange rate (US$1\.00 = I 8\.33), farm gate paddy prices
rise from P 1,225 per ton (P 61 per cavan) to P 1,425 per ton (P 71 per
cavan)\. Over the same period the current paddy support price of P 55 per
cavan is assumed to rise to P 65 per cavan at constant January 1977 prices\.
This implies that by 1985 the subsidy to consumers would fall to zero, and
the market farm gate price and the support price for paddy on average would
be equal\.
8\. Table 1 shows the present and projected price structure for
rice as used in the economic analysis\. In the project area, rice ex-mill
has been valued at the c\.i\.f\. price Bacolod, Negros of imported rice\.
Based on unofficial data from the project area, the value of by-products
was found to be equal to the costs of milling plus transport from farm to
mill\.
9\. Table 2 shows the price of fertilizer, based on the most econo-
mic sources of nitrogen and phosphate\. Since the Philippines is not
expected to be self-sufficient in fertilizer in the foreseeable future,
the cost of imported fertilizer was used for the analysis\. Urea is the
predominant source of nitrogen in the project area, while ammonium phos-
phate is the major source of phosphate\. The future price is based on the
cheapest source of phosphoric acid, triple-super-phosphate\.
ANNEX 11
Table 1
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Rice Price Structure, 1977 and 1985 /1
1977 1985
P/ton US$/ton P/ton US$/ton
Export price of Thai 25-35% brokens,
f\.o\.b\. Bangkok 1,850 222 2,165 260
Ocean freight and insurance 190 23 190 23
Import price, c\.i\.f\. Bacolod, Negros 2,040 245 2,355 283
Less freight and insurance, Iloilo to
Negros 25 3 25 3
Less transport mill to Iloilo port 75 9 75 9
Rice price, ex-mill project area 1,940 233 2,255 271
Paddy equivalent price (63% recovery) 1,225 147 1,425 171
Value of by-products less milling cost
less transport and handling farm to
mill - - - -
Farm gate paddy price 1,225 147 1,425 171
(Financial farm gate price) /2 (1,050) (1,285)
P/cavan P/cavan
Economic 61 71
(Financial) /2 (52) (65)
/1 P or US$/ton at constant January 1977 prices\. P at shadow-priced
exchange rate of US$1\.00 = P 8\.33\. P figures per ton rounded to nearest
5 pesos\.
/2 At official exchange rate of US$1\.00 = P 7\.50\.
ANNEX 11
Table 2
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Fertilizer Price Structure /1
1977 1985
P/ton US$/ton F/ton US$/ton
Urea
Export price, f\.o\.b\. Europe, bagged 1,315 158 1,480 178
Ocean freight and insurance 335 40 335 40
Handling and distribution 250 30 250 30
Retail price project area 1,900 228 2,065 248
Transport to farm gate 50 6 50 6
Urea farm gate price 1,950 234 2,115 254
(Financial farm gate price) /2 (1,905)
P/kg N P/kg N
Nitrogen, farm gate price 4\.2 4\.6
(Financial) /2 (4\.0) (4\.1)
Triple Super-phosphate
Export price, f\.o\.b\. US, bagged 1,060 127 1,325 159
Ocean freight and insurance 290 35 290 35
Handling and distribution 250 30 250 30
Retail price, project area 1,600 192 1,865 224
Transport to farm gate 50 6 50 6
TSP, farm gate price 1,650 198 1,915 230
(Financial) /2, /3 (1,725)
P/kg P P/kg P
Phosphate, farm gate price 3\.7 4\.3
(Financial) /2 (3\.8) (3\.75)
/1 P or US$/ton at constant January 1977 prices\. P at shadow-priced exchange
rate of US$1\.00 P 8\.33\. P figures per ton rounded to nearest 5 pesos\.
/2 At official exchange rate of US$1\.00 = P 7\.50\.
/3 The present financial price for phosphate is based on the phosphate
fertilizer which is currently available to farmers, namely Ammonium
phosphate (16-20-0)\.
ANNEX 12
Page 1
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Crop and Farm Budgets
1\. Present and proposed cropping patterns and agricultural prac-
tices are given in Annex 10\. This Annex gives the basis for the economic
and financial calculation of production costs and examines the impact of
the project on individual farms\.
2\. Per hectare production costs and labor requirements for irri-
gated and rainfed rice at present and in future with and without the
project are presented in Table 1\. Present costs are based on the results
of a survey conducted in the project area by NIA and of interviews in the
area during appraisal\. In the future without the project, input levels
would change marginally in rainfed areas, but crop husbandry would improve
in the irrigated areas\. Future input levels for "with project" conditions
are based on consultations with various Government agencies and expected
increases in mechanized cultivation and threshing\. Physical input assump-
tions and unit prices are presented in Table 2\.
3\. Monthly labor requirements for the wet and dry season crops per
hectare, based on present and proposed cropping calendars are presented
in Table 3\. Under project conditions, the labor requirements for land
preparation and threshing would be reduced by the use of machinery, while
the labor requirements would increase for crop management including such
activities as weeding, fertilizer and pesticide application and irrigation,
and for harvesting and hauling\.
4\. Table 3 presents a per hectare budget for rice farms\. This
table uses present and projected market prices and is the basis for the
farm budget included in Table 4\.
5\. Farm budgets for 1\.5 and 3 ha (the average farm size for the
project area is 2 ha) family farms are presented in Table 5\. The sizes
were chosen to represent the 50% of the farms (25% of the area) of less
than 2 ha and the 45% of the farms (60% of the area) of between 2 and
5 ha\. For each farm size, budgets are included for four different areas
with different present and future cropping intensities\. For each area,
budgets are presented for a tenant farm and an amortizing owner operated
farm, which are estimated to comprise 40% and 35% of the farms, respectively,
in the future\. The budgets are presented in terms of cash flows and there-
fore include an estimate of hired labor costs, though not of family labor\.
Budgets for conditions with the project refer to those at full agricultural
development\. The basis for each calculation is detailed in the footnotes\.
ANNEX 12
Page 2
6\. Table 6 presents an income summary for the families whose farm
budgets are given in Table 5\. Other income, including income earned from
earnings on other farms and off-farm income, is based primarily on the
survey conducted by NIA in the project area\. According to the survey,
other income averages P 1,000 per annum in irrigated areas and P 1,200
per annum in rainfed areas\. With the exception of farmers who would
increase their cropping intensity significantly and therefore reduce the
time available for off-farm employment in the future, it was assumed that
other income would, in constant 1977 prices, remain at present levels\.
PHII\.PPINES
JALAUKR TRRIGATION PROJECT
Rice Crop P'roduction Costs /1
Present Future Without Project Future With Project
Wet Season Dry Season Wet Season Dry Season Wet Season Dry Season
Rainfed Irrigated Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated Irrigated Irrigated Irrigated
Cash Input (P/ha) /2
Cultivation 150 195 195 200 210 210 240 240
Seeds 130 (110) 135 (115) 130 (110) 120 (110) 135 (120) 130 (115) 135 (120) 135 (120)
Fertilizers 230 (215) 315 (295) 300 (280) 300 (270) 445 (400) 415 (375) 540 (480) 540 (480)
Chemicals 160 (145) 165 (150) 160 (145) 180 (160) 285 (260) 190 (175) 285 (260) 285 (260)
Harvesting 5 ( 5) 10 ( 10) 10 ( 10) 20 ( 20) 155 (140) 140 (125) 200 (180) 200 (180)
Other /3 20 35 30 30 45 40 55 55
Interest /4 ( 65) ( 50) ( 50) ( 30) ( 50) ( 45) ( 60) ( 60)
Total cash inputs 695 (710) 855 (850) 825 (820) 850 (820) 1,275 (1,225) 1,125 (1,085) 1,455 (1,395) 1,455 (1,395)
Labor Inputs (man-days/ha) /5
Land preparation 20 19 16 17 19 15 21 19
Planting 27 26 27 27 24 26 23 23
Crop management 17 21 20 19 22 22 28 30
Harvesting 26 29 27 27 30 27 33 33
Total labor inputs 90 95 90 90 95 90 105 105
/1 Prices based on world market rice and fertilizer prices (see Annex 12), are used in the economic analysis\. Figures in parentheses
indicate financial costs only when they differ from economic costs\. Financial costs are used in the farm budgets, Table 4\.
/2 Physical inputs and unit cost assumptions are given in Table 2\.
/3 1% of gross value of production\.
/4 Present is based on combination of institutional and noninstitutional borrowing derived from survey data; future is based on 80i of farmers
borrowing 90X of cash inputs for 6 months @ 12Z/year\.
/5 Excludes labor handling farm machinery, the cost of whichi Is included under cash inputs\.
(DX
_ z
mx
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Crop Production Costs: Physical Inputs and Unit Prices
Wet Season Dry Season
Inputs Units Rainfed Irrigated Irrigated Units Unit Price/Input /1
Present
Cultivation - Mechanical (%) 25 45 45 P/ha 320
- Animal (%) 75 55 55 P/ha 95
Seed - Transplanted (%) 90 85 90 kg/ha /2 60
Fertilizer - N (nutrient kg) 40 55 52 P/kg 4\.2 (4\.0)
- P (nutrient kg) 13 18 17 P/kg 3\.7 (3\.8)
- K (nutrient kg) 6 9 8 P/kg 1\.8 (0\.9)
Threshing - Mechanical /3 (%) 2 5 5
- Manual (%) 98 95 95
Future Without Project
Cultivation - Mechanical (%) 50 55 55 P/ha 300
- Animal (%) 50 45 45 P/ha /2 95
Seed - Transplanted (%) 90 80 85 kg/ha 50
Fertilizer - N (nutrient kg) 47 70 65 P/kg 4\.6 (4\.1)
- P (nutrient kg) 20 30 30 P/kg 4\.2 (3\.8)
- K (nutrient kg) - - -
Threshing - Mechanical /3 (%) 10 50 50
- Manual (%) 90 50 50
Future with Project
Cultivation - Mechanical (M) 70 70 P/ha 300
- Animal (%) 30 30 P/ha /2 95
Seed - Transplanted (7 80 80 kg/ha 50
Irertilizer - N (nutrient kg) 80 80 P/kg 4\.6 (4\.1)
- P (nutrient kg) 40 40 P/kg 4\.2 (3\.8)
- K (nutrient kg) - -
Ihreshing - Mechanical /3 (%) 50 50
- Manual (%) 50 50
/1 Figures in parenthesis are financial unit prices where they differ from economic unit prices\.
az
/2 Figures given are for transplanted seed\. Direct seeded rice is estimated to require 100 kg\. x
/3 Unit cost for mechanical threshing is calculated at 7% of yield\. r
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Monthly Labor Requirements for Rice Crop /1
(man-days/ha)
Crop /2 Jan\. Feb\. March April May June July Aug\. Sept\. Oct\. Nov\. Dec\. Total
Wet Season
Irrigated
P 3 14 22 19 5 10 14 8 95
W 3 14 22 17 6 10 15 8 95
w 4 15 22 18 10 11 16 9 105
Rainfed
P 18 25 15 7 14 11 90
W 15 25 15 8 15 12 90
Dry Season
Irrigated
P 21 8 14 11 2 9 25 90
W 22 9 14 11 2 8 24 90
W 25 13 15 15 3 10 24 105
/1 Excludes labor handling farm machinery\.
/2 P = present\.
W = future without project\.
W = future with project\. ^
D'x
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Rice Crop Budgets /1
Present Future Without Project Future With Project
Wet Season Dry Season Wet Season Dry Season Wet Season Dry Season
Rainfed Irrigated Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated /2 Irrigated Irrigated /2 Irrigated
Yield (ton/ha) 1\.8 2\.7 2\.4 2\.1 3\.1 2\.8 4\.0 4\.0
Farm gate price (P/ton) 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,285 1,285 1,285 1,285 1,285
Gross value of production (P/ton) 1,890 2,835 2,520 2,700 3,980 3,600 5,140 5,140
Production costs, excluding
labor (P/ha) 710 850 820 820 1,225 1,085 1,395 1,395
Net value of production without
accounting for labor (P/ha) 1,180 1,985 1,700 1,880 2,755 2,515 3,745 3,745
Labor requirement
(man-days/ha) 90 95 90 90 95 90 105 105
/1 Financial costs and prices are used, based on Table 1\.
/2 Wet season yields in the Aganan system area are estimated to be 20% less at present and in the future without the project\.
Total labor requirements and production costs are assumed to be the same as in other systems\.
1m
tD X
v \.
PIIILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Farm Budgets
A\. 1\.5 ha Farm
Jalaur Extension Aganan-Santa Barbara Jalaur Suague
Present Future w/Proj\. Present Future w/Proj\. Present Future w/Proj\. Present Future w/Proj\.
Total paddy cropped area (ha) 1\.5 1\.5 1\.5 1\.5 1\.5 1\.5 1\.5 1\.5
Cropping intensity (%) 100 141 105 105 162 200 145 145
Total paddy production (ton) 2\.7 8\.4 3\.8 6\.3 6\.3 12\.0 5\.7 8\.7
Gross value of production (P) /L 2,835 10,800 3,990 8,095 6,615 15,420 5,985 11,180
Production costs
(excluding labor) (P) 1,065 2,930 1,335 2,195 2,040 4,185 1,830 3,035
Cost of hired farm labor (P) /2 - - - - - - -
Net value of production
(before water charges) (P) 1,770 7,870 2,655 5,900 4,575 11,235 4,155 8,145
Water charges /3 - 510 170 365 300 765 260 530
Net crop income 1,770 7,360 2,485 5,535 4,275 10,470 3,895 7,615
(a) Annual payment for land /4 730 730 1,010 1,010 1,620 1,620 1,465 1,465
Net crop income (owner-operator
who received a land transfer) 1,040 6,630 1,475 4,525 2,655 8,850 2,430 6,150
(b) Annual payment to landlord /5 670 2,060 895 1,550 1,480 2,940 1,345 2,160
Net crop income (tenant farmer) 1,100 5,300 1,590 3,985 2,795 7,530 2,550 5,455
/1 Based on Tables 1 and 4\.
/2 Based on maximum of 40 man-days/month and a total of 480 man-days/year of family
labor; hired labor priced at wage of P 7/man-day\.
/3 Based on present charges of approximately P 104/ha in the wet season and P 156/ha X
in the dry season and on future charges of P 225/ha in the wet season and P 285/ha a
in the dry season\. e
/4 Based on amortizing owner with annual payments over 15 years at 6% in the unpaid
balance; based on price of land of 2\.5 times present gross value of production\.
/5 Based on 30% for present and 25% for future of gross value of production minus
seed, harvesting, and water costs\.
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Farm Budgets
B\. 3\.0 ha Farm /1
Jalaur Extension Aganan - Santa Barbara Jalaur Suague
Present Future w/Proj\. Present Future w/Proj\. Present Future w/Proj_\. Present Future w/Proj\.
Total paddy cropped area (ha) 3\.0 3\.0 3\.0 3\.0 3\.0 3\.0 3\.0 3\.0
Cropping intensity (%) 100 141 105 105 162 200 145 145
Total production (tons) 5\.4 16\.9 7\.6 12\.6 12\.6 24\.0 11\.4 17\.4
Gross value of production (P) 5,670 21,715 7,950 16,190 13,230 30,840 11,970 22,360
Production costs,
excluding labor (P) 2,135 5,860 2,670 4,395 4,080 8,370 3,660 6,070
Cost of hired farm labor (P) 390 575 335 385 665 1,325 540 600
Net value of production 3,145 15,280 4,945 11,410 8,485 21,145 7,770 15,690
Water charges - 1,025 340 725 600 1,530 520 1,060
Net crop income 3,145 14,255 4,605 10,685 7,885 19,615 7,250 14,630
(a) Annual payment for land 1,460 1,460 2,015 2,015 3,245 3,245 2,935 2,935
Net crop income (for owner-
operator who received land
transfer certificate) 1,685 12,795 2,590 8,670 4,640 16,370 4,315 11,695
(b) Annual payment to landlord 1,345 4,120 1,780 3,095 2,960 5,880 2,690 4,320
Net crop income (for tenant
farmer) 1,800 10,020 2,825 7,590 4,925 13,735 4,560 10,310
/I See footnotes on page 1\. m a,
MN
ANNhX 12
Table 6
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Estimated Farm Family Income in Project Area /1
Farm Size and Cropping Intensity Status of On Farm Income /3 Other Income /4 Total Income
Location Present Future Tenure /2 Present Future Present Future Present Future
______(%)_ _ _____ p ----- ----- p ----- ------ p
----
1\.5 ha
Jalaur Extension 100 141 T 1,100 5,300 1,000 700 2,100 6,ooo
O/A 1,050 6,650 1,000 700 2,050 7,350
Aganan/Santa Barbara 105 105 T 1,600 4,000 900 900 2,500 4,900
0/A 1,450 4,500 900 900 2,350 5,400
Jalaur 162 200 T 2,800 7,550 700 600 3,500 8,150
O/A 2,650 8,850 700 600 3,350 9,450
Suague 145 145 T 2,550 5,450 700 700 3,250 6,150
0/A 2,450 6,150 700 700 3,150 6,850
3\.(1 ha
Jalaur Extension 100 1h1 T 1,800 10,000 1,100 900 2,900 10,900
0/A 1,700 12,800 1,100 900 2,800 13,700
Aganan/Santa Barbara 105 105 T 2,850 7,600 1,000 1,000 3,850 8,600
0/A 2,600 8,650 1,000 1,000 3,600 9,650
Jalaur 162 200 T 4,900 13,750 900 800 5,800 14,550
O/A 4,650 16,350 900 800 5,550 17,150
Suague 145 145 T 4,550 10,300 900 900 5,450 11,200
0/A 4,300 11,700 900 900 5,200 12,600
/1 Figures are rounded to the nearest P 50\.
/2 T - tenant farmer; 0/A - owner paying amortization for land transfer payments\.
/3 From Annex 12, Table 4\.
/4 Based largely on NIA survey\.
ANNEX 13
Page 1
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Farm Labor Analysis
Labor Supply
1\. According to an NIA survey, data from the 1970 Census of Popula-
tion and Housing, the 1971 Agricultural Census and the National Economic
Development Authority, the 1976 rural population of the project area is
about 80,000\. This consists of about 12,000 farm families, and some
1,950 landless families occupied principally or entirely in agricultural
production\. The average farm family is 5\.8 persons, of which two full-
time\.workers are available for farm work, giving a total family labor
supply of about 24,000 workers\. Assuming each of the other 1,950 families
also supply two workers, the total estimated rural labor force in the
project area is 27,900\. On the basis of 240 days per worker per year, a
monthly average of 20 days, the total annual labor supply is 6\.7 million
man-days, or 0\.56 million man-days per month\.
2\. From 1960 to 1970, while the total Philippine population grew
3\.0% per year, the population in the project area municipalities grew
at 1\.6% per annum due to migration to Manila and elsewhere in the Philippines\.
Since 1970, however, migration has slowed and the population has grown at
more than 2\.5% per annum\. Assuming that some migration continues in the
future, and the rural work force in the project area gIrows at 2\.5% per year
(versus the 1975 Basic Economic Report's average 3\.0% growth projection for
the Philippine work force over the same period), rural labor would total
some 34,000 at full project development in 1985\. This would give a total
annual labor supply of 8\.16 million man-days, and a monthly average supply
of 0\.68 million man-days\.
Labor Demand
3\. Annex 12, Table 3 gives estimates of average monthly and annual
labor requirements per ha for different rice crops\. Mechanization of
land preparation is already widespread, particularly on land with some
existing irrigation\. In future without the project, some additional
mechanization of land preparation and threshing is assumed, thereby slightly
reducing labor requirements per ha\. The timing of cropping operations
throughout the project area varies widely\. This diversity contributes to
the difficulties of water management in present irrigated areas, and of
scheduling inputs and support services\. With the project, strict scheduling
of operations would be essential to permit adequate irrigation of the whole
area\. This in turn would require further mechanization of land preparation,
particularly for the dry season crop\. At the same time it is expected
that the high cost of manual threshing will result in substantial increases
in the hiring of mechanical threshers\. Notwithstanding this additional
ANNEX 13
Page 2
mechanization, average labor requirements per ha at full project develop-
ment are estimated to be slightly higher than present levels because of
higher crop management and harvesting and hauling requirements\.
4\. Table 2 gives estimates of total monthly labor requirements in
the project area\. The present annual requirement is some 3\.0 million man-
days, or 45% of the estimated rural labor supply\. Yearly labor demand has
a pronounced seasonal pattern\. Peak monthly demand occurs in July and
nearly half of total yearly labor is needed during the three-month period,
June through August\. Present dry season labor demand is much less than
that of the wet season, requiring only 23% of total yearly labor demand\.
In future without the project, it is estimated that increased mechaniza-
tion would be balanced by increased labor for crop management and harvest-
ing and annual labor requirements would remain at present levels\. Except
for small monthly variations, the seasonal employment pattern would remain
as now\. At full development with the project, annual labor requirements
would be 3\.9 million man-days, 0\.8 million man-days (28%) greater than
without the project\. Most of the additional labor requirements would be
for the dry season crop and hence would increase demand in periods of low
labor requirements\. NIA would maintain the system during the dry condi-
tions of April and May and farmers would grow their dry season crop from
November through April\. At 1\.3 million man-days, total dry season labor
demand would be 49% of the total wet season labor demand of 2\.6 million
man-days\.
Economic Cost of Farm Labor
5\. Detailed information on wages actually paid in the project
area is limited\. Most work is done by unpaid family labor and tradi-
tional "exchange" labor\. Information on off-farm employment is even less
reliable\. The wage for hired labor in peak agricultural seasons is around
P 7 per man-day, which is assumed to reflect the opportunity cost of labor
to the economy at such times\. In months of high rural unemployment, which
characterize most of the year, the opportunity cost of labor would be much
lower\. The economic cost of farm labor in the project area was, therefore,
estimated by taking account of the generally prevailing rural unemployment
and extreme seasonal fluctuations in labor demand\.
6\. The economic cost of labor at different times of the year for
the project area was determined by the use of a technique developed in
the Thailand Phitsanulok Irrigation Project (Report No\. 2486-TH) and used
recently in the Philipppines Chico River Irrigation Project (Report No\.
1009a-TH)\. It is postulated that the marginal opportunity cost of farm
labor in the project area can be approximated by an S-shaped curve\. The
marginal opportunity cost is positive at all levels of labor demand and
increases as more labor is employed in farm work\. The increase is slow
initially, reflecting the scarcity of alternative productive employment,
but becomes more rapid as the labor supply is more fully used\. At full
employment in the project area, the opportunity cost is assumed equal to
market wage of P 7 per man-day during periods of heavy labor demand\.
ANNEX 13
Page 3
As labor demand increases beyond this point, the market wage rate conti-
nues to rise until it reaches the observed maximum of P 8\.5 per man-day,
at which level it remains constant for subsequent demand increases\. With
the mobility of the Philippines rural labor force, large numbers of laborers
would be attracted to the project area from surrounding areas at a wage of
P 8\.5 which is in fact the prevailing contract wage rate for migrant sugar-
cane labor from the neighboring provinces of Antique and Aklan\.
7\. In practice, the S-shaped curve can be approximated by three
straight line segments\. Figure 1 gives the curve of approximate shadow wage
rates used in the analysis\. The curve shows the estimated marginal oppor-
tunity cost of labor as a function of demand (expressed as a proportion of
supply)\. The shape of the curve is determined by points A, B, C and D\.
Point A represents the minimum opportunity cost of farm labor which is esti-
mated to be P 2 per man-day, equal to P 1\.5 as the economic value of alter-
native employment (casual nonfarm labor, fishing, house repairs, etc\.) plus
P 0\.5 to supply the additional food requirements of more strenuous farm
work with the project\. Point B represents the opportunity cost of farm
labor when the demand for labor begins to exceed the supply of family labor
and the hiring of landless and very small farmers is required\. The oppor-
tunity cost at B is approximated by the minimum market rate of P 4\. Point C
indicates that at full employment of rural labor the opportunity cost would
equal the market wage of P 7 per man-day\. The horizontal segment to the
right of Point D indicates that at P 8\.5 per man-day as many laborers as
needed would be available for farm work in the project area\.
8\. The monthly marginal opportunity cost may be read directly from
the curve at the corresponding level of labor demand\. With the project,
it varies from P 2\.8 per man-day in months of high unemployment to P 5\.0 per
man-day in the month of July\. The total economic cost of farm labor is then
the area under the curve up to the level of employment\. Computed this way,
the future economic cost of farm labor would be P 11\.1 million with the
project at full development and P 8\.4 million without the project, or an
incremental cost of P 2\.7 million\. This would be equivalent to pricing the
incremental employment of 0\.8 million man-days per year at a shadow wage
rate of P 3\.2 per man-day\. The corresponding shadow wage rate for the total
labor demand of 3\.9 million man-days at full development would be P 2\.9 per
man-day\.
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Total Monthly Labor Requirements /1
('000 man-days)
Area Jan\. Feb\. March April May June July Aug\. §Spt\. Oct\. Nov\. Dec\. Total
(ha)
Wet Season
Irrigated rice
P 22,000 66 308 484 418 110 220 308 176 2,090
W 22,000 66 308 484 374 132 220 330 176 2,090
W 24,700 99 371 543 445 247 272 395 222 2,594
Rainfed rice
P 2,700 49 68 41 19 38 30 245
W 2,700 41 68 41 22 41 32 245
Dry Season
Irrigated rice
P 7,500 158 60 105 83 15 68 188 677
W 7,500 165 68 105 83 15 60 180 677
W 12,000 300 156 180 180 36 120 288 1,260
Total
P 32,200 158 60 105 83 66 357 552 459 129 273 406 364 3,012
W 32,200 165 68 105 83 66 349 552 415 154 276 422 356 3,012
W 36,700 300 156 180 180 99 371 543 445 247 308 515 510 3,854
/1 P = Present\.
W = Future without project\.
W = Future with project\.
PHLiLlPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Economic Cost of Farm Labor in 1985 /1
Jan\. Feb\. March April May June July Aug\. Sept\. Oct\. Nov\. Dec\. Total
Labor requirement W \.30 \.16 \.18 \.18 \.10 \.37 \.54 \.45 \.25 \.31 \.52 \.51 3\.86
(million man-days) W \.17 \.07 \.11 \.08 \.07 \.35 \.55 \.42 \.15 \.28 \.42 \.36 3\.03
Marginal opportunity W 3\.3 2\.8 2\.8 2\.8 2\.5 3\.6 5\.0 3\.9 3\.1 3\.3 5\.0 5\.0
cost (P/man-day) W 2\.8 2\.3 2\.5 2\.4 2\.3 3\.5 5\.1 3\.8 2\.7 3\.2 3\.8 3\.6
Average economic W 2\.7 2\.4 2\.4 2\.4 2\.3 2\.8 3\.2 3\.0 2\.6 2\.7 3\.1 3\.1 2\.9
cost of farm labor
(P/man-day) W 2\.4 2\.2 2\.3 2\.2 2\.2 2\.8 3\.2 2\.9 2\.4 2\.6 2\.9 2\.8 2\.8
Economic cost of W \.81 \.38 \.43 \.43 \.23 1\.04 1\.73 1\.35 \.65 \.84 1\.61 1\.58 11\.08
farm labor (P million) W \.41 \.15 \.25 \.18 \.15 \.98 1\.76 1\.22 \.36 \.73 1\.22 1\.01 8\.42
Incremental economic
cost of farm labor W - W \.40 \.23 \.18 \.25 \.08 \.06 -\.03 \.13 \.29 \.11 \.39 \.57 2\.66
(P million)
/1 W = Future with project\.
W = Future without project\.
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Marginal Economic Cost of Farm Labor
D
8
7
0 A
ui 4
3
2A
o l I ,
0 1 0 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 1 20
LABOR DEMAND AS % OF SUPPLY
\.1 \.2 \.4 \.68
MILLIONS OF MAN/DAYS
World Bank-16428
ANNEX 14
Page 1
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Cost and Rent Recovery
1\. This Annex examines the implications for public revenues and
project beneficiary incomes of proposed water charges for the project\. In
determining the extent of cost recovery and the relation of water charges
to benefits, four indices have been used which are defined as follows for
the present project:
(a) Cost Recovery Index: the ratio of revenues from incre-
mental water charges paid by all project beneficiaries
to project construction and incremental operation and
maintenance costs\.
(b) Total Cost Recovery Index: the ratio of revenue from
total water charges paid by all project beneficiaries to
project construction costs and total operation and main-
tenance costs\.
(c) Project Rent Recovery Index: the ratio of incremental
water charges to "project rent" before paying water
charges, where "project rent" is defined as incremental
farm income less the value of incremental family labor,
management costs and allowances for uncertainty\.
(d) Farm Rent Recovery Index: the ratio of total water
charges to total "farm rent", where "farm rent" is
defined as total farm income less the value of family
labor, management costs and allowances for uncertainty\.
2\. Table 1 presents the cost and rent recovery indices and the bases
of their calculations\. All figures are in terms of January 1977 constant
prices and except where otherwise labelled are incremental values ("with" less
"'without" the project)\. The rate of discount applied is 10%\. It is assumed
that there would be no incremental payments of general taxes due to the
project\.
Cost Recovery
3\. In the cost recovery analysis, the present value of construction
costs amounts to P 158 million\. The present value of the incremental O&M
costs is P 22 million\. Water charges would be the equivalent of 3\.5 cavans
of paddy/ha in the wet season and 4\.4 cavans in the dry season as in other
Bank-assisted projects in the Philippines\. This would be equivalent in 1985
to P 225 and P 285/ha (in January 1977 constant prices) in the wet and dry
ANNEX 14
Page 2
seasons, respectively, at the forecast farm gate price for paddy (Annex 11)\.
Such rates would be reached gradually over a period of five years from comple-
tion of construction\. Without the project, lands already irrigated are
assumed to be charged at the present prevailing rate of 2\.0 cavans (P 130) in
the wet season and 3\.0 cavans (P 195) in the dry season\. The present value
of incremental charges on the entire project area over the 50-year life of
the project would be P 27 million, indicating a cost recovery index of about
15%\. The low cost recovery rate reflects the fact that this project is a
rehabilitation project, with water charges which are already high compared
to other countries in the Region, and incremental charges which are conse-
quently small relative to total water charges\. As a better measure of how
much beneficiaries would actually be expected to pay, the ratio of total
water charges to total public sector outlays (Total Cost Recovery Index)
would be 35%\.
Rent Recovery
4\. Of the farms examined in the farm budgets (Annex 12), four were
selected for analysis of rent recovery (see Table 1)\. Farm A, a 1\.5 ha
farm in the Aganan-Santa Barbara systems would have a per capita income of
P 950 at full project development\. This income is below the estimated cut-off
level where a peso of private consumption would have the same social value as
a peso of public saving (Critical Consumption Level or CCL)\. Farm B, a 1\.5 ha
farm in the extension area, would benefit the most from the project and would
have an income significantly above the CCL\. A 3\.0 ha Farm C in the Aganan-Santa
Barbara systems would have a per capita income at full project development
slightly above the CCL\. A relatively well-off owner-operated farm D, of 3 ha
in the Jalaur area, currently however has a per capita income only slightly
above the CCL and would have an income of more than triple the CCL at full
production\.
5\. While the project rent recovery index is somewhat low, less than 20%
for rehabilitated areas, where cropping intensity remains unchanged as a result
of the project, it is higher at 35% for the area with new irrigation facilities\.
Overall, the project rent recovery index is estimated to be 23%\. The farm rent
recovery index (see para\. Id), however, is a better indicator of what the farmer
must pay for irrigation\. Of the farms examined, between 29% and 44% of total
farm rent would have to be paid in water charges\. Since water charges are
fixed in terms of paddy, the rate of inflation would not affect the cost and
rent recovery calculations\.
Water Charge Policy
6\. The Government increased the water charges on all national irriga-
tion systems by five times in July 1975 and has agreed to a further increase
in water charges for all Bank-assisted projects\. It has also built in a
form of "indexing" by setting the rates in terms of paddy rather than pesos\.
Considering that:
(a) farmers in the project area are paying on average 33% of
their total farm rent in water charges; and
ANNEX 14
Page 3
(b) 15% of the project beneficiaries would be below the
CCL at full development and 85% would be at or below
the national average per capita personal income;
further increases in water charges are judged to be unwarranted\.
Collections
7\. The Government is also faced with the important issue of
collecting water charges\. Between the late 1960s until 1975, NIA efforts
resulted in noticeable improvement with total collections (current plus
back collections) averaging about 50% to over 60% of current charges\.
During the past year, however, with the five-fold increase in water rates,
collections dropped precipitously to below 25% (based on preliminary
information)\. Any additional increases in water charges before NIA learns
more about farmers' willingness to pay would therefore likely be counter-
productive\.
8\. At the suggestion of the Bank, NIA is conducting a study to
identify the factors affecting payment and collection of water charges,
with an aim to devise policies and actions to deal with collections\. The
Bank would continue to consult with NIA on this study and on formulating
actions to improve water charge collections\. Once the combination of
factors affecting collections are clearly delineated by the study and
further experience is gathered with the new levels of water charges,
appropriate actions to improve collections would be taken\.
ANNEtX 14
Table I
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Rent and Cost Recovery /1
A /2 B /2 C /2 D /2 Total Project
MiLlion Indices
---------- (P) ---
- of P
1\. Incremental gross value of production 2,455 6,750 4,915 12,200 7o\.9
2\. Less incremental - production costs
(including hired labor) 275 1,700 605 3,330 13\.9
3\. payments to landlord - - 950 -
4\. imputed return on capital /3 490 1,350 20 2,420 ) 13\.9
5\. imputed value for family labor /4 65 520 45 510 5\.2
6\. imputed value for management /5 245 675 735 1,830 8\.5
7\. allowance for risk /6 370 1,015 735 1,220 4\.2
8\. Equals project rent 1,010 1,490 1,825 2,890 20\.2(119) /7
9\. Incremental water charges /8 155 510 310 790 4\.7(27)
10\. Project rent recovery index (%) /9 15 34 17 27 23
11\. Net public sector outlays (net present value) 181
12\. Cost recovery index (%) /11 15
13\. Total water charges 365 510 725 1,540 9\.1(61)
14\. Total farm rent 1,260 1,695 1,665 4,640 29 (184)
15\. Farm renc recovery index (M) /10 29 30 44 33 33
16\. Gross public sector outlays i93
17\. Total cost recovery index (%) /12 35
18\. Farmer's income per capita at full
development /13 950 1,250 1,500 3,500
19\. Estimated critical consumption level P1,160
20\. Estimated per capita personal income, 1985 P3,300
21\. Estimated per capita GDP, 1985 P4,400
/ All peso values are in January, 1977 constant pesos; items 1 through 12 are incremental values for 1985 at full
produiction\.
/2 Farm A is a 1\.5 ha owner operated farm with amortization payments for land transfer in the Aganan-Santa Barbara
systems, with a cropping intensity of 105%\.
B is a 1\.5 ha owner operated farm with amortization payments for land transfer in the Jalaur extension with a
cropping intensity with the project of 141%\.
C is a 3\.0 ha tenant farm in the Aganan-Santa Barbara systems with a cropping intensity of 105%\.
D is a 3\.0 ha owner operated farm in the Jalaur system with a cropping intensity of 200%\.
/3 Imputed return on land and 10% on incremental cash investment; incremental cash investment estimated at 28% of
production costs\.
/4 Incremental labor requirements less incremental hired labor valued at average market wage of P 6\.00/man-day
/5 10% of incremental gross value of production for 1\.5 ha farms, 15% for 3\.0 ha farms\.
/6 15% of incremental gross value of production for tenant farms and for 1\.5 ha owner-operated farms and 10%
for 3 ha owner-operated farms\.
/7 Figure in parenthesis is the net present value of project rent over the life of the project\.
/8 Figure in parenthesis is the net present value of total project incremental water charges for the life of the project\.
/9 Incremental water charges as a percent of project rent, each discounted over the life of the project\.
/10 Gross water charges as a percent of project rent, each discounted over the life of the project\.
/11 Incremental water charges as a percent of capital and 0&M costs, each discounted over the life of the project\.
/12 Gross water charges as a percent of capital and 0OM costs, each discounted over the life of the project\.
/13 Income per capita figures include off farm income (rounded to nearest F50)\.
ANNEX 15
Page 1
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Economic Analysis
1\. The following assumptions were made in evaluating the economic
rate of return:
(a) Benefits - The expected paddy yields, prices, gross returns,
production costs, net returns (without accounting for labor
costs) and labor requirements per ha are given in Annex 12\.
Chart 16408(R) shows the proposed cropping calendar\. Annex 11
gives the calculations for the farm gate prices of paddy,
which are based on the Bank's world market price projections
for milled rice\. Table 1 gives the expected project benefits
at full agricultural development for the entire project area\.
(b) Foreign Exchange - Because of import taxes and quantitative
restrictions, the official exchange rate understates the value
to the economy of foreign exchange used in carrying out the
project and saved by reducing rice imports\. In the absence
of detailed information needed to compute specific conver-
sion factors and using the Squire-van der Tak approach /1, the
estimated standard conversion factor (SCF) for the Philippines
was about 0\.9 for the three years 1972-74\. This ratio implies
a shadow exchange rate of US$1\.00 = E 8\.33, which was used in
the economic analysis\.
(c) Investment Costs - The total investment cost, expressed in
January 1977 prices, is US$23\.7 million, and includes the
cost of training Water Management Technologists\. Annual incre-
mental 0&M costs of US$22 per ha on the newly irrigated area
and US$13 per ha on the rehabilitated area include the incre-
mental cost of the Water Management Technologists\. All costs
include physical contingencies but exclude costs due to price
increases\.
(d) Development Period - According to the project implementation
schedule, all works would be completed by mid-1981 in time
for the 1981 wet season crop\. Main and secondary canals
/1 L\. Squire and H\. G\. van der Tak; Economic Analysis of Projects;
Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975\.
ANNEX 15
Page 2
and on-farm facilities would be completed for approximately
two thirds of the project area in time for the 1980 wet season
crop\. In each sub-area sufficient land would be irrigable
under improved conditions for the full 1981 dry season crop\.
Beginning with the first crop grown under upgraded conditions,
farmers would achieve the projected yield levels over five
years in equal installments\. The project would reach full
development in 1985\.
(e) Labor Pricing - Farm labor was evaluated at a shadow wage rate,
which varies seasonally and averages P 2\.9 per man-day over
the year "with" project conditions at full development, com-
pared to a full employment market wage of P 7\.0 per man-day\.
Annex 13 presents a detailed analysis\. The use of unskilled
labor in construction and development works is limited and
all labor employed in such works is valued at the market
wage rate\.
2\. Using the foregoing assumptions and discounting benefits and
costs over 50 years, the economic rate of return is 20% (Table 2)\. Rates
of return for the individual sub-project areas vary between 13% and 28%
and are given along with the respective cost and benefit streams in Table 2\.
Sensitivity Analysis
3\. Sensitivity of the rate of return was tested to cost overruns,
reduction and delays in benefits, and a 25% increase in the world market
rice price\. The effects of these changes in assumptions were as follows:
Alternative Rate of Return
(a) A two-year delay in reaching full
project benefits 17
(b) A 20% increase in construction costs 17
(c) A combination of a two-year delay in 15
reaching full project benefits and a
20% cost overrun
(d) A 25% decrease in project benefits 16
because farmers failed to attain pro-
jected yields and/or cropping intensity
(e) A 25% increase in the world market 25
price of rice\.
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Economic Analysis - Net Value of Production - Total Project Area
Paddy Farm Gate Gross Value of Production Net Value of Net Value of Production
Area /1 Yield /i Price /2 Production Costs /3 Production in Project Area
(ha) (ton/ha) (P/ton) -----------------(P/ha)----------------------- (P million)
Wet Season
Irrigated Rice W /4 16,500 3\.1 1,425 4,420 1,275 3,145 51\.8
W 5,500 2\.5 1,425 3,565 1,275 2,290 12\.6
W 24,700 4\.0 1,425 5,700 1,455 4,245 104\.8
Rainfed Rice W 2,700 2\.1 1,425 2,995 850 2,145 5\.8
W_
Dry Season
Irrigated Rice W 7,500 2\.8 1,425 3,990 1,125 2,865 21\.5
W 12,000 4\.0 1,425 5,700 1,455 4,245 50\.9
Total W 32,200
W 36,700
/1 From Annex 10, Table 1\.
/2 From Annex 11, Table 1\. W W
/3 From Annex 12, Table 1\.
/4 W4 = Future without project\. -------(P million)------
W = Future with project\. Total net value of production
/5 From Annex 13, Table 2\. (before costing labor) 91\.7 155\.7
Less imputed labor cost /5 8\.4 11\.1
Total net value of production 83\.3 144\.6
Net incremental value of
production at full project
development 61\.3
mZ
5 x
ANLA 15
Table 2
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Economic Costs and Returns
(US$ million)
Year Project Costs Incremental Project Costs Incremental
Capital O&M Project Benefits Capital 0&M Project Benefits
Total Project Suague System Rehabilitation
1 2\.3 0 0 \.3 0 0
2 7\.1 0 0 \.9 0 0
3 7\.0 0 0 \.9 0 0
4 4\.6 \.24 1\.2 \.5 \.03 \.1
5 2\.7 \.35 3\.0 \.3 \.04 \.2
6 0 \.35 4\.4 0 \.04 \.4
7 0 \.35 6\.1 0 \.04 \.4
8 0 \.35 6\.9 0 \.04 \.5
9 to 50 0 \.35 7\.4 0 \.04 \.6
Economic Rate of Return 20% 14%
Aganan System Rehabilitation Santa Barbara System Rehabilitation
1 \.4 0 0 \.3 0 0
2 1\.3 0 0 1\.0 0 0
3 1\.3 0 0 1\.0 0 0
4 \.8 \.04 \.17 \.7 \.04 \.1
5 \.5 \.07 \.36 \.4 \.06 \.3
6 0 \.07 \.72 0 \.06 \.4
7 0 \.07 \.90 0 \.06 \.5
8 0 \.07 1\.08 0 \.06 \.6
9 to 50 0 \.07 1\.26 0 \.06 \.7
Economic Rate of Return 18% 13%
Jalaur Extension Jalaur System Rehabilitation
1 \.5 0 0 \.8 0 0
2 1\.7 0 0 2\.3 0 0
3 1\.7 0 0 2\.2 0 0
4 1\.1 \.04 \.08 1\.5 \.08 \.67
5 \.6 \.06 \.23 \.8 \.12 1\.52
6 0 \.06 \.46 0 \.12 2\.40
7 0 \.06 \.77 0 \.12 3\.00
8 0 \.06 1\.00 0 \.12 3\.51
9 to 50 0 \.06 1\.15 0 \.12 3\.70
Economic Rate of Return 13% 28%
ANNEX 16
Table I
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Schedule of Early Events
Activitv Target Date
1\. First Civil Works Contract
(a) Complete detailed engineering design
tender documents and advertise June 1977
(b) Preparation and submission of bids July-August 1977
(c) Evaluate bids and award contract October 1977
(d) Start construction December 1977
2\. Procurement of Force Account Construction Equipment
(a) Complete tender documents for force account
equipment and advertise (ICB) June 1977
(b) Evaluate bids and award contracts August 1977
(c) Receive construction equipment March 1978
3\. First Force Account Construction
(a) Complete detailed engineering design for
initial vear's construction October 1977
(b) Start construction of small structures and
features requiring none of the earthmoving
equipment December 1977
(c) Start construction with equipment December 1978
PHI LIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Implementation Schedule
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
WORK ITEM J]|MjA|j3,J|J |A|S|O|NO J | F|M AIM | i Li J |MA J J iIFAIiI1I- O4s J F|M|A|M|J| J IA|S|1tN J|F|M|A|M|JJ t|S|O|Nj
N\\>»'' N\N\\\\ 'N\.'\. x\N\ N\\\\ \\
I Rehatul(iatlon of Existing Systems 'N>> \. N NNN N
(a) Jalaur- Suagun Systems (111,900 hal f\\\\ \.>\\ N -
Contract Work >>\ >NN>N\\ NN \N\ N\\ -\ '\ N'i\\ \\\<\\
Diversion Dam & Main C,axls \\ '\\N \.>
Se,con,dary Canals \. ' N N N 'N \. \.
O&M & Access Roads N \. N N' \
Force Account Work N' NNN
Small Strucltures N>NNNNN NN\N
Maln & Seon-dary Dra\.-is N\N\NN\ N\. \.
On farm Ditches, Dra,ns & Roads
(b) Santa Barbara - Aganan Systems NN \ \'\. N \. \.>
110,100 h\.a) N\ \.NN\ N N N N 'N
Contract Work N - N> ' N' - i\.
Drorsion Dam & Main Canals \. N N ' N N
Secondary Canals N ' N \NN\NN NN N NN N \.' -
O&M & Access Roads
ForceAccountW Work N NN'i \NNN\\\ \ - -
Small Structures NN-NN- \.>,\.
Main & Secondary Drams> \»NN» N N> NN>> NN N > N
OD farm Ditches\. Drains & Roads NNN >\NN> \. ii NN N
(c) O&M Baidinqs (Contract) \. ,\. \.
2\. Extension ot JalaurSystem 'NN»N>NNN> 'N>> NN> N NNN iij N - N
(a) Jalbur Left Bankf2,700 ha) N>»»>'NN> NNN N'\.> NN>N N N N N> ,N N N N ' \.
Contract Work \ > NN\ii i> ' * > \.''
Intnek Works & Main Canat NN>NNN, N N N N N> N
Secondary Canats
O&M & Access Roads NNNN>NNNNN \>N \ > '' N\.
Force Account Work N \. ' \»\N»N > N - - \
Main & Secondary Drains N N \. »N N> N N \.>>
On-farm Ditches, Drains & Roads NN N>» N> -N \
3 Procurement of Equipment N > N> -' - \> \.
Force Accoant Work NN N> N> N - - \ \\. \.
Contract Administration -N>» N N
Award & Dehicery * N N N \.
O&M Equipment \. >N N >iiNj>' \. N N
Contract Admrnrstratixn N>NNN N>NN NN\ NN N
Award & Delivery \.NN>N NN NN\N N N NN'\.
4\. Water Management Training NNN >N»>NN N>NNN N N»NN\.
Equipment & Supplies i,,\. N>N N N NNNNNN ' '
Contract Administration »>\N> N »\ N NN>NN \. \ \.>\.'NNN
Award & Deiivery i »NNNi >i>\ N>> \.NN
NOTE: Shading indicates wot season m-nths World Bank 16409
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
NIA Organization for Special Projects
NIA BOARD
[ ADMINISTRATOR
ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR
SPECIAL PROJECTS
ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT
P PLANNING AND DESIGN DIVISION | ( WATER MGT\. AND LAND USE DIV\.
lFARMERS ASSISTANCE
- CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT DIV\. J 1 AND TRAIN\. DIV
U-
I-
U-
Q OPERATION AND MAINT\. DIVISION EVALUATION AND STATISTICS DIV\.
0
I BUSINESS MANAGEMENT
u - EQUIPMENT DIVISION llOFC
2 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~OFFICE
l (t) l l ~~~~~~~~~~~~GROUNDWATER PUMP
CENTRAL LUZON PROJECTS I GROUNDWATE PUMP
I I IRRIGATION PROJECT
_ ANGAT-MAGAT INTEGRATED
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT LMGTMLIUPS
z (AMIADP) PROJCTI
-J
DAVAO DEL NORTE
INTEGRATED IRRIGATION PROJECT E _
(DNIIP) STAGEI
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT | AGUSAN DEL SUR
IRRIGATION PROJECT
Includes Upper Pampanga, Aurora-Penaranda & Tarlac Projects
World Bank-9533(3R)
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Proposed Organization for Project Construction
NIA BOARD
I
NIA
ADMINISTRATOR
ASST\. ADMINISTRATOR
SPECIAL PROJECTS
PROJECT MANAGER
ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT
AGRICULTURE ADMINISTRATIVE
ASST\. PROJECT MANAGER
DIVISION I DIVISION II
JALAUR-SUAGUE SANTA BARBARA-
SYSTEMS AGANAN SYSTEMS
World Bank-16392
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Proposed Organization for Operation and Maintenance
NIA
ADMINISTRATOR
ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR
FOR SPECIAL PROJECTS
I
PROJECT MANAGER
(JALAUR)
ENGINEERAIONG | AGRICULTURE ||EQUIPMENT ||ADMiNISTRATIVE
& OPERAION || DIVISION || DIVISION || DIVISION |
| DISTRICT - | DISTRICT - II
(PAVIA) ( POTATAN) I
| DIVISION hI DIVISION h
SUPERVISOR _SUPERVISOR
(,14) SWMT ) S [WMT
VV M T __W M T r
(20) _(29) _
DITCHTENDER DITCHTENDER
NOTE:
ONE SUPERVISING WATER MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGIST (SWMT) - 2,500 HAS\.
ONE WATER MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGIST (WMT) - 500 HAS\. World Bank-16391 (R)
ONE DITCHTENDER - 100 HAS\.
DISTRICT I -STA\. BARBARA - AGANAN IRRIG\. SYSTEMS
DISTRICT II -JALAUR - SUAGUE IRRIG\. SYSTEMS
PHI LIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Proposed Cropping Calendar
J F M A M J J A S 0 N D
Jalaur-Suague &CP _ I _ in c _ a
Jalaur Extension N , N _ _ _
(14,600 ha) \. e TM N _
'Maintenance mm m _ _
Wet HMM N
Season
Rice Santa Barbara-
Aganan N
(10,100 ha) NONE
:System:
:Maintenance H_ _
Jalaur-Suague & NEC cm M * *
Jalaur Extension N * - N *
(9,100 ha) \.T I T
-l *_- M MI
Dry El 0 M NO
Season
Rice Santa Barbara- _m_C C
Aganan N N _
(600 ha) EM_ T
383
354
Rainfall mm\.
281
Notation: 254 250
C: Cultivation
N: Nursery 202
T: Transplanting
M: Management 156
H: Harvest
1og
57
43-
32 31
X~~~~~~~~E X M \.
J F Ml A M J J A S 0 N D
World Bank-16408
IBRD 12414
OCTOBER 1976
PHILIPPINES
JALAUR IRRIGATION PROJECT
Proposed:
seem Main conal
Lateral canals
-; \. Jal-ur river left banx e,ten-n,
(2730ha) a
E\.,sting
Main conals
Lateral canals
Irrigation areas
Rivers
Diversion dan,s DIngle
____Roads\.\ n3 e <
Railways
Potentmiol
Potential extension of
irrigation areas
onto~_
rbr \. PROJT AR
0, t 3 3 4 'i 6 f 8\. MN A A
2-1,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2
KIIOMETERS \.' \.,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ABAE
MILES~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~AA 120', | APPROVAL |
P002101 | Documat of
The World Bank
FOR OMCIL USE ONLY
Rbhtr No\. 8035-UNI
STAFF APPRAISAL REPORT
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
FIRST TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROJECT
MAY 16, 1990
l~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
l~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Africa Region, Western Africa Department
Industry and Energy Operations Division
This ub a tstRicted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanc of
dtir ofical dtiks\. Its otents may not otberwise be\dclosed without World Bank authorizado\.
Curwmy sad Usiwala_t Units
N rreucy Unit - ira (3);
Us$1 - b
11 " 1$0\.13
3- Kobo 100
l1imhts *od Ifbtae
metric System
List of Abbrwviatio s
DEL - Direct Exchange Line
PGN - Federal Governmnt of Nigeria
ICB - International Competitivp Bidding
N LCB - Local Competitive Bidding
LIB , - Limited International Bidding
MOC - Ministry\of Coumimcations
NEPA - \ National glectricity and Power Authority
NET - \Nigerian External Teleco nications
'NITEL - Nigerian Telec""^u-ications Limited
OECF - Overseas Ec9nomic Cooperation Fund Japan)
PABX - Private Automatic Branch Exchange
PHBX - Private Manual Branch Exchange
PPF - 'Project Preparation Facility
TCPC - Technical Cooittee for Privatization and
Csurcialisaticn
UF - Ultra High Frequency
VFT - NVoice Frequency Telegraph
Fiscal Year
January I - December 31
\~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
FOR OFFXCIAL USE ONLY
FIRST TZLICOSHCIICATIOES PROJECT
STAFF APPRAISAL REPORT
Table of Contents
Pan No
LQOA AND PROJECT SUI(ARY \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. iv
I\. WRODUCTION\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.1
II\. THETEECOMUNICATIONSSXCTOR\. \. \. \. \.
1\. Background
A\. Sector Organization \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.1
B\. Access to Service \. \. *\. * *\. \. 2
C\. Usage of Service \. \. \. \. \. *\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 3
D\. Existing Facilities \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 3
E\. Quality of Service \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 3
F\. Demand for Service \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 4
2\. The Entity
A\. Institutional Background \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.5
B\. Organization and Management \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 5
C\. Co ercialization of llTEL \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 6
D\. Staff and Training \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 7
E\. Accounts \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 7
F\. Billing and Collection \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 8
G\. Audits \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 8
3\. Development
A\. Sector Objectives\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 9
B\. Sector Constraints \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.9
C\. Sector Strategy \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 10
D\. Rationale for Bank Involvement \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 10
III\. THE PROGRAH AND THE PROJECT \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.11
1\. The Program\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.*\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 11
This report is based on the findings of a mission in April 1989 composed of
Messrs\. Rajesh Pradhan (Task Manager and Financial Analyst)\. Rogati Kayani
(Senior Telecommunications Engineer), and James Cowie (Senior
Telecommunications Specialist) and technical discussions held in Washington
in March 1990\.
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclsed without World Bank authorization\.
Pagte No\.
2\. The Proiset \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. s 13
A\. Project Objectives \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 13
3\. Project Description \. \. \.13
C\. Project Costs \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 15
D\. Project Financing \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 16
3\. Procure ent and Implentation
A\. Procurement \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 17
S\. Disbursement \. \. \. \. \. \. 19
C\. Implemntation \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 20
D\. Overall Project Mauagement \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 20\.
Z\. Performance Indicators \. * * * 21\.
IV\. FIWICIAL AND CONOMIC ANALYSIS \.22
1\. Financial Analysis
A\. NITEL's Past Financial Performance \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 22
B\. NITEL's'Present Financial Position \. 23
C\. Financial Objectives \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 24
D\. Projected Financial Performance\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 25
E\. Projected Financing Plan \. \. \.2\. \. \. \. \.26
2\. Economic Analysis
A\. Tariffs \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.27
B\. Benefits \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.27
C\. Least Cost Solution \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.28
D\. Return on Investment \. \. \. \. \. 2 \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.28
E\. Risks \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.29
P\. Environmental and Health Aspects \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.29
V\. AGREEMNTS REACHED AND RECOMMENDATIONS \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.29
ANNEES AND CHARTS
2-1 Existing Teleco amnications Facilities\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 32
2-2 Exint i g Demand \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.33
2-3 NITCL Organization Chart \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 34
2-4 CoamFrcialization of NITEL \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \\. \. \. \. \. \. 35
3-1 Investent Program (1990-1994) \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.39
3-2 Detailed Project Description \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.42
3-3 Tenip of Reference for Consultancy Services \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 45
3-4 ProjS ct Financing Plan \. * \. \.*\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.3
3-5 Schedule of Disbursemrnts \.59
-iv -
lDZRhL\. Ii !C Ot NIGUU
PIRSS TRLZCOHNICATIONS PROJECT
LOAN AND PROJECT SIDIRY
Borrower: Nigerian Telecaounications Limited (NITEL)
Guarantor: Federal Republic of Nigeria
Amounts US$225 million equivalent
Trerst Twenty years, lncluGng a five year grace period, at
the Bank's variable Luterest \ate\.
Project The main objectives of the project are to support and
Descriptions strengthen the Institutional and policy framework and
to ficilitate the cmommrcialisation of NITEL; improve
the access to and quality of telecommunications
services: and improve NMTML's financial performance\.
The proposed project consists of'
(a) an institutional development program including
technical assistance too develop a long-term
network development strategy and realistic
lnvestment program; undertake tecbnical audit of
Lagos networkt review NITEL's accounting and
financial systems and procedures as well as its
billing and collqction system implement an
Integrated management information system\. review
tariff levels and sttucture, and revalue fixed
assets: Improve project management, financial
ma\.nagement,,materials management, and network
planning: atid human resource development for
NITEL; and
(b) a physical development program inclUdings
rehabilitation of existing facilities; supply,
Installation and commissioning of new exchanges
and matching external line plant in the Lagos
metropolitan area and major c*ties;
rehabilitation of the Lanlate satellite earth
station; expansion of lpns distance transmission
links; establishment of'tt\.M teleprinter and telex
module repair center; construction of buildings;
and provision of telepbone Instruments, vehicles
and ancillary equipment\.
Prolect Benefits Investments focussed on reobabilitation and
and Riskss bmproved utilisation of existing assets as well
as expansion in high demand areas woul4 *4-aximia
the utilisation of NITIL' existing facilities '
an4 hence'lmprove its financial and economic
- L -
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGRIA
FIRST TELECOIIUNICATIONS PROJECT
LOAN AND PROJECT SUHMARY
Borrowers Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL)
Guarantors Federal Republic of Nigeria
Amounts US$225 million equivalent
Terms: Twenty years, including a five year grace period, at
the Bank's variable interest rate\.
Proiect The main objectives of the project are to support and
Description: strengthen the institutional and policy framework and
to facilitate the commercialization of NITEL; improve
the access to and quality of telecommunications
services; and improve NITEL's financial performance\.
The proposed project consists of:
(a) an institutional development program including
technical assistance to: develop a long-term
network development strategy and realistic
investment program; undertake technical audit of
Lagos network; review NITEL s accounting and
financial systems and procedures as well as its
billing and collection system; implement an
integrated management information system\. review
tariff levels and structure, and revalue fixed
assets; improve project management, financial
management, materials management, and network
planning; and human resource development for
NITEL; and
(b) a physical development program including:
rehabilitation of existing facilities; supply,
installation and comissioning of new exchanges
and matching external line plant in the Lagos
metropolitan area and major cities;
rehabilitation of the Lanlate satellite earth
station; expansion of long distance transmission
links; establishment of the teleprinter and telex
module repair center; construction of buildings;
and provision of telephone instruments, vehicles
and ancillary equipment\.
Proiect Benefits Investments focussed on rehabilitation and
and Risks: improved utilization of existing assets as well
as expansion in high demand areas would maximize
the utilization of NITEL's existing facilities
and hence improve its financial and economic
returns\. Tbh project will alleviate a major
infrastructure constraint to the sustainability
of ecoonmic developmeat and adjustment in Nigeria
through upgrading the country's standard of
telecommunications, currently among the lowest in
Sub-Saharan Africa\. Furthermore, the
institutional building and strengthening of
ITIL's maangmnt system would result in
improved financial perforamace and net transfer
of funds from the sector to MC\. While progress
has been made in seeking comitment from both IGN
and NITIL on major areas and required actions for
substantially Improving the performance of the
sector, the principal risk relates to the pace at
which NITEL's implemntation capacity can be
strengthened\. However, this risk is minimized by
Bank requirement of upfront actions by FGM and
NITEL wherever appropriate and NITEL's agreement
to an action plan for strengthening the sector
and entity management and other related issues\.
In addition, annual review by FGN and the Bank of
NITML's achievements would provide a framework to
ensure satisfactory implementation of the
institutional aspects of the proposed project\.
Estimated Project Costs:
Local Foreign Total
By Items ---US$ Million Equivalent---
Switching Equipment 5S8 102\.1 107\.9
External Line Plant (ELP) 19\.4 149\.2 168\.6
Transmission 1\.2 10\.9 12\.1
Space Communication 0\.1 3\.0 3\.1
Telephones and Teleprinters 0\.1 9\.1 9\.2
Buildings 25\.8 0\.0 25\.8
Rehab\. of Power and Airconditioning 0 \. 1\.2 1\.3
Vehicles 3\.0 2\.0 5\.0
Training (Equipment and Fellowships) 0\.1 6\.1 6\.2
Consultancy 0\.4 7\.2 7\.6
Miscellaneous and Ancillary Equipment 0\.0 1\.0 1\.0
Customs Duties 37\.8 0\.0 37\.8
Base Cost 93\.9 291\.7 385\.6
Physical Contingency 9\.4 14\.6 24\.0
Price Contingency 9\.3 28\.7 38\.0
Project Cost 112\.6 335\.0 447\.6
Interest During Construction
On Bank Loan 0\.0 20\.5 20\.5
On Other Loans 0\.0 15\.4 15\.4
Total Financing Required 112\.6 370\.9 483\.5
- vi -
Project PlnUocsAE Plan\.
sources Local Forelin Total
------- U8$ Mllion gquivalent------
IUD - 225\.0 225\.0
Cofinanciers - 110\.0 110\.0
NITSL 112_6 3S_9 14U\._
Total Project Financing 112\.6 370\.9 483\.5
\.Istited Disbureementes
IBitD Y FY91 11 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95
-----------S$ Million Equivalent-----------
Annual 20\.0 58\.0 88\.0 41\.5 17\.5
Cumulative 20\.0 78\.0 166\.0 207\.5 225\.0
I/ Includes refinancing of PPF
Economic Rate of Return: 23\.72
Hans IBRD No\. 21860
L
FEDERAL URPUILIC OF NIGRUIA
FIRST TELWCOFUNICATIONS PROJECT
I\. I?ROD?CTION
1\.01 The Federal Govrniment of Nigeria (FGN) recogpixes
teleco unications as an infractructure vital to the mustainability of
economic development and adjustment in Nigeria\. FCI has requested Bank
assistance in financing the development of its telecoinnications sector\.
PON's principal objectives are focussed on developing a sound
telecomunications policy and institutional framevork; commercializing
Nigerian Telecomsunications Limited (NITZL) end improving the quality of
and access to teleco;aunications services\. This will be the Bank's first
lending operation in the telecon unications sector in Nigeria\.
1\.02 The estimated cost of the project is US$483\.5 million with a
foreign exchange component of US$370\.9 million, about 77Z of total cost\.
The project comprises the new works of NITEL's telecomAunications
development program for the 1990-94 period\. The foreign exchange cost of
the project is expected to be financed from a loan of US$225 million
equivalent from the Bank and credits totaling US$110 million from co-
financiers\. The interest during construction (US$35\.9 million) and local
cost of the project (US$112\.6 million) are expected to be financed from
NITL' s internal cash generation\.
II\. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
1\. BACKGROUND
A\. Sector Organization
2\.01 The responsibility of the telecommunications sector in Nigeria
rests with the Ministry of Communications (HOC)\. Under MOC, NITEL is
responsible for management and development of domestic and internationtl
public telecomnnuications services\. In addition to the public
telecommunications services, dedicated networks exist to meet the
specialized requirements of the police, military, railway, civil aviation
and the oil companies\. Other private users also operate radio services
especially in areas without public networks but even in areas served by
NITEL, private users operate radio link services to supplement NTTEL's
unreliable network\.
2\.02 MOC is responsible for setting policies and carrying out the
regulatory functions such as licensing of private operators while NITEL
carries out the more technical regulatory functions such as setting
equipment standards and granting of equipment type approvals o*a behalf of
MOC\. Management of the radio frequency spectrum is carried out by the
Nigerian Frequency Registration Board which is chaired by the NOC and
2-
consists of members from the mlitary, police, civil aviation, MOC, Federal
Ministry of Informtion, NITEL and the national security\. HOC has prepared
a national telecouuications policy paper to articulate the operating and
regulatory frawork and determine conditions and areas under which service
will be provid6d for telocomunications\. The Bank has had extensive policy
dialogue both with the HOC and NITZL during the project preparation and has
prowided HOC with its assessment of the i\.port#nt considerations in the
formilation of a national telecomunications policy paper\. During
negotiations, the Minister of Communications reassured the Bank that the
policy paper is in line with the trends in the sector in most other
countries and is consistent vith the Bank's dialogue on the policy
fraework\. In addition, he stated that the FOR has already taken
substantive actions along the lines proposed by the Bank in its dialogue\.
Some of the major steps that have been taken are: (i) a decision to fully
co me rcialize NITEL; (ii) an implementation of a rational digitalization
policy; (iii) limiting investment to reasonable levels; (iv) a decision to
open up previously contracted equipment to international competitive
bidding; and (v) substantial increases in tariffs\. In addition, MOC will
employ consultants to strengthen its capacity to regulate the sector and
monitor sector performance\.
B\. Access to Service
2\.03 Access to telephone service is currently limited t? 20Z of the
country's area\. Coverage, both in terms of percentage of area and
population served, varies regionally\. Considerable differences exist in
availability of telephone facilities between the Northern and Southern
parts of the country which more or less reflect regional disparities of
population densities and econemic development\.
2\.04 At the end of 1988, Nigeria had a total of about 260,000 direct
exchange liaes (DELs)\. This translates to an overall telephone density of
0\.2 lines per 100 inhabitants, which is only about 50? of average
penetration in Sub-Saharan Africa\. The available telephone facilities are
inadequate for the level oL economic development as reflected by the long
list of waiting applicants (para 2\.11)\. The existing facilities are not
only inade4uate but there is an imbalance between urban and rural areas\.
Telephone service is concentrated in the 21 state rjpitals, which accounts
for 732 of the total lines but only 82 of the population\. The 21 state
capitals shor an average density of 2\.5 lines per 00 inhabitants compared
to the national average of 0\.2 lines per 100 inhabitants\. ,The rural
density is only about 0\.07 lines per 100 inhabitants\. However, to improve
the current very poor quality of service, the project concentrates on
rehabilitation of the netwofk in main urban centers, with expansion
restricted to that feasible within the constraints of NITEL's limited
manpower and finah*cial resources\.
2\.05 At the end of 1988, automatic telex service was available to
about 5,900 subscribers of whom 60X were located in Lagos\.
\. \.,~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~7
C\. taaa of Service
2\.06 atiowide, the distributLan of telepho lines between business
and residential urs rs almost evlth a slight phasia an remidential
telephons\. 551\. Regionally, residential subscribers prevail In the
southern sam\.end bu siess subscribers In the nortern ames\. In _maller
e_cheg areas, the majorlty of subscribers are busiess\. in Laos the
statistics show an equal dLstrLbution of residentLal and business
subscrlbers\. NowereT\. within the city, certain areas (uch as Lagos
Islnd, Ikeyi and Apapa) are busiuet5 oriented 4ad others predaaomntly
residential\. In igeria\. like In my developing countries where telephone
servico Is underprovided, many of the residentLal telephones are used for
both business and private purposes\.
D\. Ezisting Facilities
2\.07 - The telecomunications services provided by NITIL includes
telephone; telex; telegram, private wires and leased circuits; data
transmission; bureaufax (facsimile); T\.V\. transmission; and mobile maritime
service\. Details of the existing facilities are given in An_nex 2-1\.
2\.08 Among the services, the telephone service is the most important
with the greatest impact on social and economic activities\. At the end of
1988, total telephone switching capacity (exchanges) installed was about
394,300 lines\. About 97Z of the lines were served from automatic exchanges
and the remaining lines were provided by manual exchanges\. Due to the lack
of an appropriate policy in the past, there are nine different types of
analog automatic exchanges in use which create inter-working, maittenance
and spare part problems\. Future expansion will be based on a
digitalization policy which aims at a maximum of three different system\.
Total telex capacity was 12,800\. The average capacity utilization for
telephone and;telex exch"gea was low at 662 and 422, respectively\. This
was mainly due to the fact that many telephone exchanges have been recently
comuieioned and, uit)ll recentlys there has been a shortage of teleprinters
,,to condect new telex subscribers\. The main long distance transmission
media is microwave radio with a few UHF spurs\. There is one coaxial cable
in the trunk network running from Lagos via Ibadan and Ilorin to Kaduna\.
Same local exchanges are conwected via coaxial tail-links to the nearest
mLcrowave stations\. There icsa domestic satellite syste* (DOSSAT) with 21
eprth stations used primarily for TV transmission\. For international
telecounsmications, there are two earth stations and two international
eschaziges located at Lagos and Kaduna\. Nigeria in directly connected to 20
countries by satellite system\. Nigeria is also linked to West Africa and
Kurope by a subuarine cable which handles about lOZ of total international
traffic\.
I Qulitr of Service
2\.09 The quality of service is poor due to congestion in the local
switch4ing Juipment eading t -long dial tone delay and low call Vcplation
rates\. On thee\.average, the call completion rates for local, long distance
(STh) and incoming international calls are low at about 302, 302 and ZZ0,
respectively\. Ope major finding of tbs conaultants employed under a *e;*
o " () V \ \. t~~(
-4-
PtP advance to investlgate the problems of the Lagos network and recomend
appropriate steps to improve its performance was that, contrary to NITSL's
bellef, the *nount of *qulpment avallable is sufflcient to carry all the
traffic generated by the existing subscribers\. The low call completion
rate of 30S (instead of the expected 60S) for local calls is due to a large
proportion of faulty comon control equipment\. This results in excesslve
repeat attempts whlch generate false trafflc thus overloading the available
comon control equipment\. On average, in Lagos, for every successful call,
the caller has to attempt five times\. The isolation of faulty equipment at
some of the exchanges has led to improvement in the call completion rates
by 30S\. NITCL was unable to analyze the problem and take these measures
prior to the consultants' assLstance because of:
a) inadequate operations and maitenance organization;
b) lack of trained staff to diagnose the problems; and
c) lack of maintenance tools and test equipment\.
The project will address the above problems and provide the necessary spare
parts and modules to repair the faulty equipments (paras 3\.08 and 3\.10)\.
2\.10 Other main causes of poor quality of service are breakdown of
power equipment and airconditioning plant\. Due to the unreliable power
supply from NEPA, NITEL's standby power equipment is often used beyond its
design capacity leading to frequent breakdowns\. NITEL has not been able to
repair most of the broken down standby power equipment due to lack of
foreign exchange to procure the necessary spare parts\. Some 752 of the
faults on the long distance transmission network are caused by problems in
the power supply systems\. This problem is being addressed in this project
through the provision of rehabilitation equipment and spare parts\. Unlike
many other developing countries, the fault rate on the external local cable
network is relatively low because most of the network is fairly new, having
been constructed after 1976\.
P\. Demand for Service
2\.11 Consultants, financed under the Bank's PPF advance, have carried
out a detailed survey of national telephone demand\. They assessed that the
total demand nationwide for March 31, 1988 was about 1\.0 million potential
subscribers, which is over 300Z of the supply of about 246,000 DELs at that
period\. However, expressed demand (DELs plus registered waiting
applicants) was only 400,000 indicating a large euppressed demand
(600,000)\. Suumary of subscriber potential is shown in Annex 2-2\. The
large suppressed demand indicates that many would be applicants have been
discouraged from applying for telephone service probably because of:
(a) the long average waiting time for connection (exceeding ten years) due
to lack of facilities; and (b) the quality of service has been poor
(para 2\.09)\. This is comon in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa\.
During the five year period covered by this project, the total demand is
conservatively expected to grow at about 32 per annum reaching about
1\.2 allion at the end of 1994\. However, because of the very poor quality
of existing network and the urgent need for its rehabilitation, the project
-5-
provides for only high priority development works\. Thus, during the same
period, the supply will increase at about 9S per annM to about 438,500 by
1994 due to the project and ongoing works in the progiam and the demand
will still be about 200Z above supply\.
2\.12 As regards to telex service, the present potential demand is
estimated at about 8,000 with registered vaiters of about 2,000\. There is
adequate telex switching capacity available but the shortage of
teleprinters and cable pairs have hindered the utilization of this
capacity\. The project will overcome these deficiencies\. The demand for
telex service is estimated to reach about 12,000 in 1992 and 14,700 in
2002, an average growth of about 52\. However, the actual demand for telex
is likely to be less than forecast because of higher expected penetration
of data and facsimile in the Nigerian network\.
2\. THE ENTITY
A\. Institutional Background
2\.13 Until 1984, responsibility for the operation of domestic
telecommuninations services was vested in the Posts and Telecomnunications
Department (P&T) of the government, and responsibility for international
services rested with a wholly government owned company, Nigeria External
Telecommunications Limited (NET)\. In 1984, PGN decided in favor of
creating a single entity to 'enhance service provision" through improved
planning and coordination and reduced staffing and overlap between the two
entities\. The merged entity was required to operate telecommunications
services in Nigeria on a commercial basis\.
2\.14 NITEL was established on January 1, 1985 under the Companies Act
of 1968 through a merger of the 'Department of the Telecommunications
Section of the Posts and Telecommmnicationsw of the Ministry of
Communications and the 'Nigerian External Telecommunications Limited' as a
wholly government owned limited company with responsibility of providing
domestic and international public telecommunications services\. According
to its Memorandum and Articles of Association, it has a share capital of
N4 million which cannot be increased without government approval\. NITEL is
required to be managed by an eight-member Board, of whom five including the
chairman must be nominated by government\. Currently, the functions of the
Board are being carried out by three members, namely the Minister of
Communications as Chairman, the Director General of the Ministry of
Communications and the lanaging Director of NITEL\. The autonomy of NITEL
including the independence of the Board of Directors is being actively
pursued by the Technical Coumittee for Privatization and Commercialization
(TCPC) for NITEL as for all other public enterprises that have been
nominated to operate on a fully conmmercial basis\.
B\. Organization and Management
2\.15 There was inadequate advance planning of the merger of P&T and
NET, with the result that a stable and rational organization and management
structure and adequate trained staffing were not in place until about
August 1986\. The organization structure, together with job descriptions,
was prepared by a telecomunications consulting firm in 1986\. Under this
structure, the post of Deputy Managing Director for Operations and
Maintenance has been introduced\. Operations are decentralized to the
managers of five regional zones, one of which is Lagos\. A further level of
subdivision is the territory, which corresponds to Nigeria's state
boundaries\. To streamline its functions and improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of its various functional units, NITEL restructured its
organization effective January 1, 1989\. This, however, did not include the
financial functions because the consultant financed under the PPF advance
had not finalized its recoendation\. The financial functions were
restructured effective April 1, 1989 based on the consultant's
recomendation\. The new organizational structure is shown in Annex 2-3\.
2\.16 While NITEL's structure is appropriate for commercial operation,
it at present lacks proper management systems and procedures essential to
manage it as a commercial enterprise\. In addition, NITELI's management
reporting is fragmented and there is no formal gnd uniform structure for
flow of information\. This has contributed to weaknesses in planning,
operations and maintenance, financial management, billing and collection,
procurement and project management\. Consultants will be employed to assist
NITEL in its efforts in these areas (paras 3\.08 and 3\.09)\.
C\. Cumuercialization of NITEL
2\.17 In July 1988, in furtherance of its efforts to mprove NITEL's
performance, FON announced its decision to fully commercialize NITEL as
part of the broad reforms of the public enterprise sector involving
privatization and commercialization of some 135 parastatals\. A sub-
committee of the Technical Comimttee for Privatization and
Comercialization (TCPC) has examined NITEL's situation in detail and made
its recommendations on commercialization of NITEL to TCPC for its review
and implementation\. 1GN has clearly recognized the need for NITEL to
become a financially sound commercial entity and the proposed project will
provide the support for FGN's efforts\. The Bank submitted its input to the
sub-committee of the TCPC dealing with NITEL on appropriate steps to enable
autonomy for NITEL and the continuing policy oversight by the MOC to be
effective\. The Minister of Commuications, who is the Chairman of the
committee responsible for implementing TCPC's recommendations, assured the
Bank that the recommendations of the TCPC sub-committee are in line with
the Bank's dialogue with FGN\.
2\.18 During negotiations, an understanding was reached with FGN and
NITEL on the main elements of the commercialization of NITEL to ensure that
NITEL will become self-reliant, have more autonomy in personnel policies,
salaries, procurement, and management of its financial affairs, etc\., and
in return, making it accouitable for its performance (Annex 2-4)\. FGN's
operational and financial objectives for NITEL will be incorporated in a
formal performance contract between FGN and NITEL against which NITEL's
achievements will be monitored\. It was agreed that a draft performance
contract between the PGN and NITEL will be submitted to the Bank for
comments by October 31, 1990 and will be made effective by January 1, 1991\.
There will be an exchange of views with the Bank on NITEL's progress in
meeting agreed specific targets under the performance contract\. Key
-7\
performance objectives and targets for inclusion in such a contract were
also agreed (para 3\.25 and Annexes 2-4 and 3-9)\.
D\. Staff and Training
2\.19 As of December 31, 1988, NITEL employed about 17,000 staff, of
wham about 12,000 were technical\. This represented a considerable
reduction since September 1984 (prior to reorganization), when there were
severe overstaffing problems in the sector\. At that time, the total
telecomnunications staff was estimated at 27,000, equivalent to a staffing
ratio of 180 per 1000 DELs\. The staffing ratio decreased to 66 per 1000
DELs by the end of 1988\. The staffing ratio in Nigeria compares well with
other African countries but is still higher than in most developing
countries\. The staff ratio will be closely monitored during the project to
reduce it to a target of about 60 per 1000 DELs by the end of 1990, 55 by
1991, 50 by 1992\. This will be included as part of the performance
contract between FGN and NITEL\.
2\.20 All three consultants financed under the PPF advance identified
the inadequacy of trained and experiencLed manpower in NITEL, in all
disciplines and at all levels, as a major issue\. The introduction of
digital technology and commercialization of NITEL will change the
composition of the staff profile of NITEL requiring better educated and
trained staff to effectively manage the sector\. NITEL with the assistance
of consultants has identified skill gaps and the training needs, and
recruitment requirements\. NITEL has started an intensive recruitment
effort to employ the necessary staff with special efforts to attract
qualified accountants, who are in short supply\.
2\.21 Training is provided through the main school at Oshodi, at Kano
and at a series of six regional schools\. Whilst generally well equipped,
there are shortcomings for technical training in the latest technologies,
e\.g\., optical fiber, digital, and training in finance and information
management\. NITEL h4s embarked on an intensive training of Its staff at
all levels and disciplines, including finance, personnel, maiagement,
cxmputer, and technical\. During 1989, about 900 staff received training In
non-technical areas and about 1,800 staff received training in technical
areas\. The training was held in Nigeria as well as overseas with foreign
administration and equipment suppliers\. This effort will continue during
the project period\. The project will provide a total of 130 man yoars of
fellowships for all disciplines, which is considered adequate for the next
five years, to complement NITEL's efforts to train its staff overseas
(para 3\.08)\. In addition, the project will provide 24 manmonths of experts
for setting up courses in data and digital technology at the training
school\.
E\. Accoun A
2\.22 The;process of merging the two different accounting Systems of
P&T (cash based) and NET (commercial based) after the creation of NITEL is
not fully completed\. Whilst external consultants have been eutloyed\to
help, this process has been rendered difficult by the loss of most
experienced financial staff during the reorganization and the lack of
adequate training of PtT finacuial staff on accrual accounting concepts\.
As a result, there is a shortage of reliable informtion for evaluation of
KITIL's fin ncial position and performnce\. A consulting accountancy firm
was retained by government to prepare an opening statement of a*ffairs as of
December 31, 1984 for NITEL\. This difficult task was only realized in
November 1986, vith substantial qualifications about the validity of the
stateent\.
2\.23 Consultants financed under the PPF advance to review NITZL's
accounting and financial systems , procedures and policies have idMrtified
numerous deficiencies\. Their main findings are as follows: (a) no official
consolidated statement of NITEL's accounting policy exists; (b) the
existing accounting system is largely cash based; (c) lack of appropriate
financial management systems and procedures; and (d) lack of adequately
trained financial staff at all levels on accrual accounting systems\. The
consultants recom\.ended reorganization of financial functions in the
headquarters, zones and territories to avoid duplication of tasks and
better management and control of NITEL's finances\. NITEL has implemented
some of the recoumendations of the consultants\. Under the project,
financial contultants will be employed to assist NITEL in its
implementation efforts (para 3\.08)\.
F\. Billing and Collection
2\.24 On its creation, NITEL inherited major problems of billing and
collection\. The billing system is based on two mainframe computers in
Lagos and Kaduna, and manual systems are to be replaced shortly by
minicomputers in the other zonal headquarters of lbadan, Enugu and Bauchi\.
The ezisting equipment, however, functions poorly due to spore parts and
service problems\. Up to 201 of subscribers do not receive bills at all\.
Current collection rates are difficult to estimate because, at present,
collection data do not separate outpayment for current billing and arrears\.
Further, there is no aging analysis\. The outstanding subscriber accounts
receivable as of December 31, 1988 was about five months of billing for the
year, which is high compared to an accqptable norm of two months\.
Consultants were employed under PPF financing to review the existing
billing and collection systems and procedures at NITEL and recommend
improvements\. NITEL has already started implementing some of the
recoummendations of the PPF consultants on billing and cbllection and this
has resulted in improvements both in the billing and collection
performance\. Experts will be provided under the project to assist NITEL in
its efforts to further improve the billing and collection performance
(par* 3\.08)\. During negotiations, it was agreed that NITEL will reduce its
outstanding subscriber receivables to 120 days of billing for the year by
1990,' 90 days by 1992, 60 days by 1994, and maintain it thereafter\. Those
targets will be monitored during the implementation of the project
(para 3\.25)\.
G\. Audits
2\.25 External auditors are appointed by NITEL in accordance with its
Articles of Association\. Currently, two reputed private auditors carrT out
joint auIits of NITEL's accounts\. This arrangement is satisfactory and
-9-
will be continued under the proposed loan\. The long delays in completing
audits are due to delays in completion of the accounts and their poor
quality (para 2\.22)\. m5 audited statements for RITZL vas ready only in
NovmWber 1988 and it had nu erous qualifications\. The auditors were unable
to fomn an opinion as to wbether the financial statem nts give a true and
fair view of the state of the company's affairs\. MIT!! is presently unable
to meet either the special governient requirement for audits or the
requirement of its Articles of Association to present such audited accounts
within nine months after the end of the fiscal year\. This is mainly a
result of the problem of maintaining regular and proper accounts\.
Recently, NITIL's management has placed high priority on the completion of
the outstanding audits and mobilized the necessary staff to assist the
auditors\. This has resulted in the completion of the draft audits for 1988
which are being discussed between NITEL and the auditors\. The situation is
expected to improve further after the recommendations of the PPF
consultants are fully implemented after which NITEL should be able to meet
its audit requirements\. During negotiations, the timetable for submission
to the Bank of draft and audited financial accounts were agreed as follows:
(a) audited PY87 accounts will be conditions for loan effectiveness;
(b) audited PY88 accounts will be within eighteen months of the close of
the fiscal year; and (c) draft and audited FY89 accounts will be within
nine and twelve months of the close of the fiscal year, respectively, and
for each year, thereafter, the unaudited and audited accounts within four
and six months of the close of the fiscal year, respectively\.
3\. DEVELOPMENT
A\. Sector Obiectives
2\.26 The present situation of undersupply and poor quality of
telecommunications service is a severe constraint to economic grpwth,
particularly in the export and trade sectors\. FGN has recognized the need
to: (a) develop telecommunications as an economic infrastructure vital to
the sustainability of development and adjustment in Nigeria and as a
vehicle for autional as well as regional integration; and (b) strengthen
and commercia'lize the sector organization an4 management to improve the
sector performance for sustained growth in telecommunications services\.
With these objectives in view, and as mentioned earlier, the FGN on January
1, 1985 established NITEL to operate telecommunications services on a
commercial basis (para 2\.14)\. In July 1988, NITEL was included as one of
the public enterprises to be fully commercialized as part of the FGN's
broad reforms of public enterprise involving privatization and
commercialization of key public enterprises\.
B\. Sector Constraints
2\.27 The main constraints to sector development are:
(a) lck of compkehensive PGN policy on telecommunications
d=elopment (para 2\.02);
(b) lack of autconmy for NITEL (para 2\.14);
- 10 -
(c) lack of proper maagment systems end procedures (pars 2\.16) and
of adequate trained manpower (pars 2\.20), which constrails
IITIL's capacity to maintain the existing facilities and to plan
and Implement develop nt projects; and
(d) lack of adequate funds, both local and foreign, which lidit
procurement of essential equipment and mterials for
mintenance, rehabilitation and expansion\.
Constraints (a) to (c) are being addressed through the SCPC work and tho
institutional component of the proposed project\. Regarding (d) the project
provides the foreign exchange required for maintenance, rehabilitation and
limited expansion and includes m\.asures for increasing the availability of
local funds through improved operational and financial performance of
NITEL\.
C\. Sector Strategy
2\.28 In its continued effort to achieve its objectives, the FGN's
medium tern strategy for the sector are as follows*
(a) separation of BITEL's role as the operating entity from that of
MDC as the unit responsible for regulation and control of the
sector (para 2\.17);
(b) full co ercialization of NITEL through, inter alias
Mi) reinforcement of NITEL's autonomy
(para 2\.18);
(ii) adequate measures of tariff increases and improved
operational efficiency of NITEL to ensure financial
viability (par 4\.06); and
(iii) strengthening of NITCL's operating framework by agreeing on
explicit operational, technical and financial performance
targets (pars 2\.18), and establishing appropriate control
mechanLsms such as regular external audit (pars 2\.25)\.
(c) improvement In the quality of service to existing subscribers
through rehabilitation and better utilization of eristing
facilities (para 3\.10); and
(d) provision of new facilLties to improve access to
telecommunications services (para 3\.10)\.
D\. Rationale for Bank Involvement
2\.29 The Bank's proposed support for telecoununications in Nigeria is
an important component of the public enterprise refoss process, a key
objective of the FP's structural adjustment program\. This program calls
for easures to reduce unproductive capital investment, improve efflcLency
in operations and adopt economic pricing policAes\. It specifically
-~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 11 -
addresses the pooz past performance of the public enterprise sector which
has absorbed substsntial amounts of govortnuet subventions, budgetary
support and concessionary loans\. FCN's concern is focussed primarily an a
group of large parastatals, including NITSL\.
2\.30 The Bank supports VON's objective of improving the performance
of the tolecomunications sector\. Through this first telecoiunications
lending operation in Nigeria, the Bank would play an important role in
assisting FGN and NITIL tot (a) implement a rational national
toleco muications sector policy and institutional and development
strategies for the efficient long-term developmat of the
teleccommications sector; (b) implement a realistic investment program
that would maximize benefits consistent with NITEL's implementation
capacity and resource availability; and (c) accelerate the implementation
of comercializatibn of NITEL\. The Bank's cross country experience in the
teleccomunications sector in Sub-Saharan Africa would be directly and
im_ediately relevant in assisting FGN and NITEL in their efforts\. In
addition, the Bank has considerable experience in the region in the
'commorcializations of such public sector entities and in particular in the
introduction of practical steps towards improved performnce monitoring and
target setting\. Such steps would be heavily emphasized during project
processing and project supervision\. Furtherore, the multi-disciplinary
approach of the Bank will be of particular value in Nigeria because of the
need to develop solutions for interrelated engineering and financial
problems as well as ensuring that the progra meets the priority economic
constraints\.
2\.31 The Bank has already assisted in the process of rationalizing
NITEL's investment program through the emloyment of consultants under the
PPF advance for developing medium and long-term sector development
strategies and proposing a realistic investment program consistent with
NITEL's implementation capacity and resource availability that would
improve service and expand coverage in high priority areas\. The Bank's
participation in the project would also help in ensuring efficient
procurement of equipment and mobilization of cofinancing\. In the current
economic climate, the teleco o nications sector is one of the few in which
incremental cofinancing opportunities exist\. However, there is a need both
to avoid the dissipation of expensive money as happened in the past and to
ensure that, in the medium-term, new investment concentrates on
rehabilitation and maintenance\.
III THE PROGRAM AND THE PROJECT
1* THE PROGRAM
3\.01 In 1985, NITEL prepared its fifth five year investment program
(1986-1990)\. The program consisted of ongoing works carried over from its
third (1975-1980) and fourth (1981-1985) five year prog)ams, and a large
expansion component aimed at meeting IGN's stated goal bf one million DELs
- 12 -
by 1990, equivalent to average access to telephone service in the sub-
region\. The total cost of the progiam was N3\.3 billion (equivalent to
US$3\.0 billion at the then exchange rate of N1\.0 - US$1\.0)\. This was an
interim objective to an even more ambitious goal of access for all to
telephone services by year 2000\. Subsequently, PCG realized that these
goals were clearly over ambitious and unrealistic relative to NITEL's
implementation capacity and fin ncial resource availability\.
3\.02 In December 1986, MITZL requested Bank assistance to review the
viability of the program\. The Bank's prelilinary review found the program
overly ambitious In addition, the progrm was highly focussed towards
expansion without due consideration to the most urgent needs of NITEL which
are rehabilitation and institutional development\. On the Bank"s
recomendation, MITEL employed consultants under a PPF advance to review
the investment program and propose a realistic program which will, inter
alia, address the most urgent medium-term requirements in compliance with
the long-term network strategy\. In parallel, consultants were also
employed to investigate the specific problems of the Lagos network and
propose a rehabilitation program aimed at removing the present bottlenecks\.
3\.03 NITEL's original program for 1986-1990 (rolled to 1987-1991),
estimated to cost about US$1\.8 billion, was analyzed by the consultants\.
Part of the program was already under implementation financed under the
'Siemens' Loan' of US$250 million equivalent from the Federal Republic of
Germany\. The consultants reviewed the component financed by Siemens to
determine if it complies with the long-term network development strategy\.
The consultants proposed some equipment rearrangements that would not
impede the speed of implementation\. However, the consultants focussed
mainly on a review of the rest of the program consisting of new works
estimated by NITEL to cost about US$1\.6 billion\. These were scaled down by
the consultants to US$980 million to include requirements to meet the
rehabilitation needs and most urgent demand\.
3\.04 The Bank reviewed the program proposed by the consultants and
refined it to be within the framework of FGN's and NITEL's goals and
constraints (paras 2\.27 and 2\.28)\. The revised program which incorporates
the Bank project is not sufficient to meet the rising demand for
telecommunications services (para 2\.11), but reflects the implementation
and resource constraints\. The Bank emphasized the need to prioritize
investments and to concentrate on rehabilitation, maintenance and
institutional development with marginal expansion before embarking on a
large expansion of the network in the next phase\. Since even the proposed
investment program is large in light of the current constraints, any major
addition to the program could impose a serious itrain on NITEL's financial
and institutional resources\. Accordingly, during negotiations, an
agreement was reached with NITEL that it will review with the Bank not
later than October 31 each year the composition of its capital expenditure
program for the five years immediately following such review together with
details of the financing plan prepared for such program until the
completion of the project\.
3 05 The revised program, which is for the period 1990-94, consists\
of: (a) the ongoing works including Siemens' contract, mobile\ exchanges \.d,
13
Standard A larth Station in Victoria Island; and (b) new components, which
will constitute the proposed project\. The cost of the revised program,
including interest during construction, is estimted at about
US$670 million including foreign cost of about US$523 million (Annex 3-1)\.
2\. THE POJECT
A\. Project Objectives
3\.06 To support the PGN's development strategy in the sector, the
project has the following physical and institutional development
objectives:
(a) to support strengthening of the institutional framework and
facilitate full commercialization of NITEL;
(b) to improve the quality of service and system efficiency
through, inter alia better utilization of existing
facilities, reducing faults and increasing call completion
rates;
(c) to improve NITEL's financial performance so as to reduce,
and finally eliminate existing government subsidies and
enable HITEL to be a net contributor to government
treasury; and
(d) to expand available facilities so as to satisfy the
most urgent demand\.
B\. Proiect Description
3\.07 The project is described in detail in Annex 3-2\. It includes
the following components:
Part I - Institutional Development
3\.08 The institutional development component of the project provides
for consultants and experts to assist NITEL in the tasks specified below
and 1,600 manmnths of fellowships for overseas training of NITEL's
personnel\. The technical assistance under the project are as follows:
(a) drawing up long-term network development strategy and
medium-term investment program, undertaking technical
audit of the Lagos network and revieving NITEL's
accounting, financial and billing and collection
policies, procedures and systems;
(b) establishing a project management team in the
implementation of the project;
(c) designing and implementing financial management systems and
procedures, including implementation of accrual accounting
system, and improvement of budgeting, forecasting, cost control,
14
etc\. to ensure that the financial objectives of the project are
achieved; ,_001
(d) providing experts in traffic engineering\. switching, and
transmission for network planning;
te) setting up of comprehensive and integrated materials and storage
management control systes and procedure ;
(f) reviewing teleconications tariff levels and structure;
tg) establishing a management information system for monitoring
technical and financial performnace at different levels of
management;
(h) re-valuing fixed assets;
ti) computerizing subscriber records and stock records and
valuation; and
(j) providing training fellowships to NITEL staff\.
3\.09 For the tasks under (%), 50 musmonths of consultants were
employed under PPF advance approved on July 3, 1987\. Consultancy seFvices
and t\.r&ining requirements under (b) to (3) are based on the findings of
those consultants\. The detailed terms of reference for those consultancy
serviees were discussed and agreed with NITEL and terms of reference for
consultancy servIces to be financed by the Bank are given in Annex 3-3\. It
has also bveen agreed with NITEL that% (a) it will identify and nominate
counterpart personnel for each task and inform the Bank prior to issuance
of the letter of invitation to consultants for proposals; and (b) NITEL and
the Bank will each year review the impact of the technical assistance
Including counterpart staff training and agree on the implementation
objectives for the following year\. Letters of invitation for project and
financial management consultants have been issued\. Appointment of those
consultants and issuance of letters of invitations for remaining
consultancy services are conditions of loan effectiveness\.
Part II - Rehabilitation and Expansion
3\.10 This component comprises the new works in the revised investment
program for 1990-94, includings
(a) rehabilitation of existing switching, transmission, power
and airconditioning equipment including the provision of
spare parts, modules, tools and test equipment to repair
and refurbish them;
(b) supply, installation and comuissioning of:
Mi) 265,000 lines of switching qquipment incl4'ding 143,000
lines in the Lagos metropolitan area and 122,000 lines
in other major cities;
(ii) complementary external line plant to match item (1)
aboawt and
(iii) digital sicrowave radio systems in high priority
areas\.
(c) design, procureomnt of facilities, and establishent of a
teleprinter and telex module repair centers
(d) rehabilitation and upgrading of Lanlate satellite earth
statioun
(a) prowision of 100,000 telephone instrumnts and 8,000 pay
phomes for replacement of unserviceable instrument and
connecting new subscribers;
(f) provision of 300 motor vehicles for plannaing, construction
and maintenance works;
(8) construction of buildings to accommodate equipment and for
residential purposest and
(h) ancillary equipment, including software for management
informtion system\.
C\. Prolect Costs
3\.11 The total cost of the project is estimated at 34\.7 billion
(US$483\.5 million equivalent) with a foreign exchnge cost of about
13\.6 billion (US$370\.9 million equivalent), i\.e\. about 771 of total cost\.
The costs of equipment and consultants are based on NITCL'c contracts for
ongoing works and experience in other countries vith adjustmnts up to July
1989\. The project costs include 1370\.2 million (US$35\.9 million) of
Ointerest during constructions (IDC)\. Project cost estimates are detailed
in Annex 3-1 and are nu marited in Table 3\.1\.
k
- 16 -
Table 3\.1: Project Cost Sugmarv
Loc l F*r\.l Toe! Leoe l Forein Tot l Foreign
By itneb ,re, 91 Ile)VIIIlea) OfTote I
swItchlng quipw\._t 4\.6 301\.4 #67\.0 5\.3 102\.1 107\.9 96
£xteree Line Pleat (ELF) 15U\.5 1,104\.8 1,8 0\.5 19\.4 14e\.2 180\.0 so
Tranelei e 9\.7 90\.7 96\.4 1\.2 10\.9 12\.1 s0
$P_\. Commueniatie 0\.5 24\.0 24\.5 0\.1 *\.0 8\.1 U
Tolt n - mmd T\.l-prln\.tre 1\.2 71\.9 73\.1 0\.1 9\.1 9\.2 94
utildnwg 205\.0 0\.0 205\.0 23\.3 0\.0 25\.3 0
Rehab\. of Po\.ur and A/C 1\.0 0\.5 10\.5 0\.1 1\.2 1\.8
Veic les 24\.0 15\.0 809\.0 \.0 2\.0 5\.0
Training 0\.7 49\.8 49\.0 0\.1 S\.0 6\.2 of
Coeultency 8\.5 56\.0 0\.4 0\.4 7\.k 7\.6 94
Viec\. &ad Ancillary Eqpt\. 0\.1 7\.9 4\.0 0\.0 1\.0 1\.0 90
Customs Duties 800\.0 0\.0 800\.0 87\.3 0\.0 87\.8 0
Bs" Cost 74-\.0 YMW\.7 u,0W:3 7NE9 2\.6 --iiX
Physical Contingency 74\.0 115\.0 190\.4 9\.4 14\.6 24\.0 S 61
Price Contingency 272\.0 *09\.4 1 051\.4 9\.8 28\.7 3U\.0 70i
Project Cost ,092\. T\.1\. 4i&J4:0 --ff2\.0 1U7\.0 --7A 75
Interest During Construction
On Bank Loan 0\.0 211\.8 120\.1 0\.0 20\.6 20\.5 100
On Other Loans 0\.0 158\.9 153\.9 0\.0 15\.4 16\.4 100
Totol Finanaing Required 1,092\.4 8,611\.0 4,704\.2 112\.6 870\.9 488\.5 7?
3\.12 The physical contingencies are 52 on local and foreign costs for
equipment and services and 1OX on civil works\. Price contingencies are
based on annual domestic inflation rates as follows for local costs at 252
in 1990 and 102 thereafter; and international inflation rates for foreign
costs at 4\.9Z for 1990 and onwards\. It is assumed that the exchange rates
will vary during the period to adjust for the difference between local and
foreign inflation\.
D\. Protect Financing
3\.13 The sources of project financing are detailed in Annex 3-4 and
summarized in Table 3\.2\. The Bank loan of US$225 million will meet about
672 of the foreign cost requirement excluding interest during construction\.
The PGN has informed the Bank that it has approached the Japanese
government for possible co-financing for an amount up to US$110 million\.
The African Development Bank has shown interest in co-financing the
project\. NITEL will finance the interest during construction amounting to
US$35\.9 million\.
-17_
Table 3\.2\. Project Financing
Source Loal Foreign Total
--------US$ Million Equivalent-------
IEUD - 225\.0 225\.0
Cofinanciers - 110\.0 110\.0
NITSL 112\.6 35\.9 148\.5
TOTAL 112\.6 370\.9 483\.5
3\.14 The Bank loan of US$225 million equivalent vould be lent to
NITEL at the Bank's variable interest rate for 20 years including a five
year grace period\. Credits from co-financing sources are currently assumed
to be onlent by FGN to NITEL at 82 p\.a\. for 15 years including five years
grace on principal repayment\. NITSL will bear the foreign exchange risk on
Bank loan and credits\.
3\.15 Until 1988, FGN was meeting most of the local costs of ongoing
telecomunications development, Bsed on the improved financial
performance in 1989, domestic tariff increase effective February 1990
(para 4\.10) and actions agreed to be taken by NITEL (paras 4\.04 and 4\.06),
NITEL is expected to meet its local cost requirement of its investment
program estimated at about 11\.4 billion, through internal cash generation\.
3\. PROCUREMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
A\. Procurement
3\.16 Procurement arrangements are summarized in Table 3\.3\. Gods and
services to be financed by bilateral sources will comply with the
guidelines of the individual donor country\. Equipment worth
US$202\.4 million to be financed by the Bank would be procured through
international competitive bidding (ICB) in accordance with the Bank's
guidelines\. Proprietary items totalling US$7\.3 million covering spares and
rehabilitation of existing equipment will be procured from sole source by
direct negotiations with original suppliers\. Given the limited number of
suppliers, limited international bidding (LID) would be used to procure
training equipment, test equipment and specialized tools (US$1\.2 million)\.
Bank financed contracts fot more than US$300,000 equivalent each, which are
expected to cover 902 of the total value of Bank financed contracts, *ould
be subject to the Bank's prior review of procurement documentation\.
Selection of ,ank financed consultants (about US$8\.8 million equivalent)
wi ould be in accordance with Bank guidelines\. Local and overseas
fellowships estimated at US$5\.9 million would be provided by direct
negotiations with the academic institutions concerned\. Contracts, for
consultants emloyed under PPF advance (US$0\.75 million), or 92 of total
V consultancy contracts under the project, have already been executed wnder
Bank guidelines\. Tender for the spare parts and equipment for
rehabilitation of Lagos network estimated at US$15 million has been issued\.
- l -
Table 3\.3: Procureamt ArraneeU_ts 1/
(US$ millions)
Pu\.1\.~ I*_ Puua~ee\. ICC rcl TLDL42O
b16lm q 0"ips 4\.0 4\.4 - - 454\.0 / 1V4\.2
(01\.0) (4\.5) (06\.1)
Lxbterel Limo PlaIt 182\.0 - - - 01\.4 V 164\.8
(117\.4) (117\.4)
Left DIslm 7\.0 1\. - - 4\.9 / 14\.0
Tratm_lssio (\.69) (1\.4) 0\.1)
Ips_ cemlcatlhe 8\.6 - - - - 5\.5
(8\.4) (8\.4)
Tel -p_ and 10\.6 - - - - 10\.0
T\.l\.prilmtr (10\.4) (10\.4)
Poor and 1\.6 - - - 1\.
Airconditloning (1\.4) (1\.4)
B\.l dle" - - - 81\.8 _ 81\.8
Vbeicls 5\.9 - _\._
(2\.8) (2\.3)
Tratinng - - 1\.2 3/ - \.9 7\.1
(1\.2) (6\.3) (7\.0)
Consultwlny - - - - 8\.6 M/ *5\.
(6\.8) (6\.8)
Ancillary 1\.2 - - - 1\.2
Esuemn _\. 1:! (11 - - -c,1
tx a T 9 1 2 u 8 ~~~~1U\.6 40z\.6
TOTAL (202\.4) 7\.8) (1\.2) (14\.1) (5\.0)
(Pigures In parentheses are amounts to be financed by Bank loan\.)
) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ '
11 Zxcludes duties and txes (US$45\.3 million) and Interest during
construction (US$35\.9 million) but includes contingencies\.
2/ According to co-financiers' procurement procedures\.
31 LID me od to be used for specialized training equipment available
from liited suppliers\.
4/ Da^mk guidelines for the eployment of consult:ats\.
- 19-_
S\. Disbursement
3\.17 The Bank loan of US$225 d llion ould be disbursed against 1002 of
foreign expenditures for equipment, vehicles, training and consultancy
services, as shown in Table 3\.4\.
Table 3\.4: Disburoement of Proposed Loan
Amount Financed by
C4tegory (USS Million) lank
1\. Switching, tranmission 159\.40 1002 foreign
and subscriber terminal expenditure
equipment and cables
2\. Vehicles, power, airconditioning, 13\.30 1002 foreign
tools and test equipment expenditure
3\. Training (includiog equipment) and 6\.10 1002 foreign
fellowships expenditure
4\. Consultancy Services 6\.50 1002 foreign
expenditure
5\. Refinancing of PPF 0\.75
6\.\Unallocated 38\.95
225\.00
3\.18 The estimated disbursement schedule is shown in Annex 3-5 and
includes disbursement in FY88, FY89 and FY90 for PPF\. Based on the Bank's
standard disbursement profile for a11 projects in West Africa,
disbursments mould be completed in December 31,\ 1999\. However, since
NITEL will appoint project management consultants and execute contracts on
turnkey basis to accelerate project implementation, the disbursements are
expected to be completed by June 30, 1995\. A special foreign currency
account of US$10 million equivalent will be established by NITEL in a
commercial bank on terms and conditions acceptable to the Bank\. This
amount represents four months estimted payments to contractors and
consultants directly by NITEL durinft the peak implomentation period of 1992
and 1993\. The special account would be used fot disbursements against all
eligible expenditures and it would be replenished by the Bank on
application by NITEL\. All disbursement applications would be fully
documentea with the exception of applications relating to expenditures
under contract valued less than US$50 000 equivtlent, which would be
disbursed on the basis of statement of expeMditures (80E)\.
N'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- 20 -
3\.19 NITIL will maintain separate accounts in accordance with accepted
accounting principles to maintain records of all expenditures specific to
the Bank project, coemitments, reimbursements and the status of project
funds\. With respect to the amount withdrawn on the basis of SOEs, NITML
will prepare and maintain records such as contracts, invoices and evidence
of payments readily available for inspection\. During negotiations, it was
a*reed that Special Accounts, Project Accounts and SOEs will be audited by
independent auditors acceptable to the Bank, and the reporcs will be
submitted to the Bank with audited financial accounts for each fiscal year\.
C\. Implementation
3\.20 The project implementation schedule is shown in Annex 3-6\. The
implementation of this complex project requires very careful planning to
optimize NITEL's limited financial and manpower resources\. In addition,
the timely completion of the project is a prerequisite for the financial
viability of NITEL\. This calls for a comprehensive project management
organization to supplement NITEL's existing organization\.
3\.21 NITEL's physical projects are implemented by five zones with
the headquarters' Planning and Operations Unit playing only a monitoring
role\. Since NITEL has not planned and executed such a large project, to
ensure its timely completion NITEL has agreed to:
ge) employ consultants to assist in overall coordination,
preparation of technical specifications and bid
documents, evaluation of bids and contract negotiations,
supervision of contractors, installation and acceptance
testing;
(b) execute contracts on turnkey basis; and
(c) train planning, installation and maintenance personnel\.
3\.22 The efficient implementation of the management consultancy
services is critical to the success of the project\. The action plan for
the implementation of the project is detailed in Annex 3-7\. To ensure
timely appointment of these consultants, the appointment of the project
management and financial consultants is a condition of loan effectiveness\.
D\. Overall Proiect Management
3\.23 The physical and institutional components of the project will be
managed by five functional units within NITEL consisting of:
a) physical project implementation;
b) network planning;
c) manpower development and training;
d) finance; and
e) computerizatin\.
I
An organizational chart for overall project management is shown at
Annex 3-8\. Each of these units will have a qualified team leader who will
- 21'-
report directly to the concerned Director of the function in NITEL\. For
instance the team leader of the financial consultmncy service will report
to the Director of Finance who will be his controlling officer\. The
physical execution, which includes installation, supervision and acceptance
testing of the physical components vill be under the control of the
respective Zonal General Managers\. A Project Director reporting directly
to the Managing Director will directly supervise the overall project
implementation and coordination\. The consultants for the project
management will be under the control of the Project Director\. These
consultants vill assist the Project Director in preparing all procurement
documents, evaluation of bids, and contract negotiations\. They would also
assist NITEL's staff in supervision of contractors and acceptance testing
and commissioning of equipment\.
3\.24 Each functional team leader in the headquarters and in the
individual zones will prepare, with consultants' assistance, and issue
monthly progress reports to the Project Director who will convene regular
monthly meetings to discuss these reports\. ?The Project Director, assisted
by the Project Management Team Leader will prepare and issue consolidated
quarterly progress reports for the management with Executive Summaries to
be submitted to the Bank\. During negotiations, the project management
arrangements were agreed\.
E\. Performance Indicators
3\.25 NITEL will prepare annually for the Bank's review a compairative
analysis of its actual performance against the target indicators\.
Accordingly, NITEL's overall performance during project implementation will
be monitored by means of selected performance indicators relating to
technical, operational and financial performance, subscriber connections,
service quality, and staffing\. These indicators and the annual targets
which will form a part of the performance contract between FGN and NITEL
(para 2\.18) are shown in Annex 3-9\. While targets for later years are
indicative, those for 1990 were agreed duriig negotiations as representing
desirable and feasible levels of attainment\. The target for subsequent
years will be agreed jointly between NITEL and the Bank by October 31 of
the preceding year together with any corrective actions necess4ry\.
Continuous monitori#g of project implementation as well as NITEL's
operational and financial performance and efficiency\vill assist NITEL in
improving its management and allow timely corrective ictions to be taken,
when nedessary\. During negotiations, it was agreed that NITEL will report
progress against technical and operational indicators in the quarterly
progress reports to be submitted to the Bank within 4ix weeks of the end of
each,quarter, and against financial indicatoes in annual financial
statements\.
- 22 -
IV\. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
1\. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
A\. NITEL's Past Financial Perforsance
4\.01 Audited and unaudited financial state_ents for the years FY85-88
are at Annex 4-1, and the key elements are su=arized in Table 4\.1\.
Table 4\.1: Selected Historical tinancial Performance Indic-tors
(Nairs Million)
1985 1986 1987 1988
Gross Revenue 283\.5 260\.9 406\.3 676\.9
Outpayment 21\.3 37\.6 181\.4 143\.9
Net Revenue 262\.2 223\.3 224\.9 533,0
Total Operating Cost 11 424\.8 340\.1 271\.1 234\.4
Net Operating Income(Loss) (162\.6) (116\.8) (46\.2) 298\.6
terest on Loans 21 82\.5 37\.6 2\.0 2\.1
Nt Income(Loss) (245\.1) (15\.4) (48\.2) 296\.5
Subscriber Accounts Receivable 228 242 178 145 |
(Days Billing)
Current Ratio (Times) 0\.5 0\.5 0\.5 0\.9
Debt/Equity Ratio 23:77 27s73 28:72 31s69
1/ In 1985 pre-NITEL bad debt of 344\.2 million ws written off\. Total cost
also includes bad debt provision for the year which accounts for about
20Z of total billing\. Depreciation charges are low because some assets
which are in service are yet to be transferred from work in progress
account to fixed assets account\.
2/ The financi4l statements include only actual payment of interest for the
fiscal year\. Due to poor financial\I erformance, NITEL did not service
its debt in full, only some interest payments were made\.
4\.02 NITEL*s financial performance during FY85-87 peri4d has been
poor\. NI*EL incurred losses during this period and the rate of return\was
negative and internal cash generation was insufficient to cover its debt
service obligations\. The factors that had contributed to poor financ al
performance w res (a) low tariffs (pares 4\.08 and 4\.09); (b) poor quality
of servic; (para 2\.09) due to poor maintenance of the network for lack of
\ :~~~~~~
- 23 -
spare parts as well as proper maintenance systems and procedure resulting
in low revenue earning traffic; and (c) high billing inefficiencies\. It is
estimted that 402 of intenmational traffic was not billed for technical
and other reasons\.
4\.03 gffective February 1988, international tariffs were increased
substantially to avoid an imbalance between incoming and outgoing
international traffic and avoid net outflow of funds to other countries\.
This resulted in higher total international revenues and NITIL realized a
pre-tax profit of 3296\.5 aillion for the year, which is a return of about
61 on revalued net fixed assets\. The increased international tariff also
resulted in a net flow of internatioial traffic in favor of Nigeria, which
is a source of foreign exchange income for NITEL\. During 1989, the quality
of service and billing and collection performance have been improved
through better maintenance efforts and implementation of recommendations of
consultants financed under the PPF Advance\. These will be further liproved
under the Project\. In addition, the domestic tariffs have been increased
substantially effective February 1990 (para 4\.09),
B\. NITIL's Present Financial Position
4\.04 The absence of asset revaluation distorts the balance sheet of
NITEL\. Consultants have been employed by NITEL to assist it in the
revaluation of its fixed assets and prepare an asset register, and the
consultants will also proposesa methodology to revalue NITEL's assets
annually based on agreed procedure so as to reflect their current
replacement value\. The financial position of NITEL, as per its unaudited
balance sheet at the end of 1988 is summarized in Table 4\.2\. NITEL ias
facing liquidity problems, and had to rely on FGN for servicing of its
external debt and on non-payment of debt service to FGN on Naira debt\. It \
had a negative working capital of about 3206 million in 1988 (a current
ratio of only 0\.9) and significant debt service arrears\. The factors that
have contributed to this are: (a) very poor financial performance (pars
4\.02); (b) poor collections performance with accounts receivable (net of
bad debt provision) at 3272 million, which is equivalent to about five
months of billing for the year as against an acceptable norm of two months
of billing\.
-24-
Table 4\.2: NISTL USaudited Balance Shoet as of December 31, 1988
: (Ba Zetisate)
laira As 2 of
Million Total Assets
Assets
Total Not Fixed Assets 259\.8 5
Work in Progress 1I 3,006\.0 62
Investments 48\.4 1
Current Assets 1,535\.5 32
Total Assets 4,849\.7 100
Liabilities
Equity 2,117\.9 44
Long-term Debt 21 962\.7 20
Others 27\.5 1
Current Liabilities 1,741\.6 35
Total Liabilities 4,849\.7 100
Current Ratio (times) 0\.9
Debt/Eauity Ratio 31:69
1l Work in progress account Includes some assets which are already in
service\.
21 The balance sheet does not include about 3348 million equivalent of loan
for works carried out during'FY88 under the Siemens' contract which is
to be transferred to NITEL from FGN\.
C\. Financial Obiectives
4\.05 As an important step in the comamercialization of NITEL and to set
NITEL on the path towards financial self-sufficiency, the following
financial objectives were agreed during negotiationst
(a) finance from internally generated funds net of debt
service obligations, the local cost component of its
annual investment progrm;
(b) earn an annual rate of return on revalued net fixed
assets of not less than 102 in 1991 and thereafter;
(c) maintain a debt service coverage ratio of at least 1\.5
throughout the project period;
(d) maintain debt equity ratio not more than 60:40;
and
-23-
(6) maintain accounts receivable at a nazimu of 120
days of billing by 1990, 90 days by 1992 and 60
days in 1994 and thereafter\.
D\. Proiected Financial Performance
4\.06 The projected financial perfomanc of NITlL and the assuptions
used are at Annexes 4-2 and 4-3, respectively\. These projections reflect
the improved financial performance in FY69\. The key eleMents of the
projections-are suarized in Table 4\.3\.
?tble 4\.3: Selected Financial Performance Indicators
(Naira Million)
19a 19w0 l99l zest is 1994
Not Revenue 1,147\.1 2,297\.1 2,659\.2 8,159\.4 8,693\.0 4,7U\.1
Totl Operating Cost 526\.7 772\.6 942\.9 1,127\.6 1,80\.9 1,740\.5
Not Operatimg Income (La") 620\.4 1,524\.5 1,716A\. 2,081\.6 2,802\.1 8,014\.9
Intrest on L*4ns 188\.0 214\.2 2M5\. 807\.1 8S\. 872\.8
Foreign Exchang Los 1\.b 1\.1 0\.5 25\.0 127\.6 18\.1
Tax 194\.6 52S\.7 572\.0 079\.0 744\.2 991\.
Net Income(Loss) 291\.3 75\.5 656\.0 1,019\.7 1,116\.8 1,487\.7
Operating Revenue/DEL
Constast ('9 Pricm) 5,062 C 6,998 6,762 6,567 6,817 O,7
Cash Op Cost/DEL
Conetnt ('59 Prieos) 1,620 1,580 1,474 1,406 1,867 1,897
Net InOernal Csh Genwration 1025 111W sOX s1i 783 179X
Rate of Return on Not
Rovel d Asset 7s ' 18x 18x 14X 1in 1o
Subscriber Account Receivable 150 120 110 g0 75 6
(Days IlliI 1g9)
Current Ratio (Time) 1\.0 1\.8 1\.6 1\.9 2\.2 2\.9
Debt/Equity Rtilo 87:68 U0:62 89s61 46:54 48:57 89:61
Debt Srvice Coverge 2\.6 4\.2 2\.6 8\.0 8\.5 4\.1
4\.07 The financial situation of NITEL is ezpected to improve and N$TEL
is expected to meet its financial objectives (para 4\.05) with the following
measures being adopted by FGN and NITEL:
(a) annual review of tariffs and Implementation of
adjustments necesqary (para 4\.10);
(b) improvement in billing and collection performance
(para 2\.25);
(c) improvement of tecbnical efficiency and quality
of service to improve the call completion rates
and consequent increase in revenue per
subscribe\. Reduce average faults per DEL per
year from 2 in 1988 to 1 by 1993,in the whole
country and from 0\.4 in 1988, to 0\.2 by 1993 in
Lagos\. Improve call completion rate for local
- 26 -
calls from about 20S to 701 by 1993, for long
distance from 20X to 601 by 1993, *nd thereafter
and for international calls from 3OZ to 501 by
1993 and thereafter (para 3\.25 and Aner 3-9)1
and
(d) reduction of operating costs through Improved staff efficiency
and reduction in staff ratio\. Reduce staff per 1000 DEL\. from
66 in 1988 to 60 in 1990, 55 In 1991 and 50 in 1992, and
thereafter (para 2\.19)\.
As a result of the above seasures, net profit is expected to Svrove from
about 3292 million in 1989 to about 31,488 dillio, by 1994, resulting Ln an
increase in rate of return on revalued net fixed assets In operation from
about 71 in 1989 to about 16Z by 1994\. Operating revenue per DEL in real
terms is expected to increase from about 15,082 In 1989 to 36,705 in 1994,
reflecting expected improvement in quality of service due to better
maintenance and rehabilitation of the network, and Improved billing
efficiencies\. Cash operating cost per DEL during the sa period is
expected to decrease in real terms from 31,520 to 31,397 due to staff
efficiencies\. During the forecast per1od, MITEL s expected to gnerate
internal funds adequate to meet its local cost component of its annual
investments\. The liquidity position of NITEL is expcted to Improve from
0\.9 in 1988 to 2\.9 in 1994\. The debt equity ratlo remains satisfactory
throughout the forecast period\.
E\. Pro3ected Financing Plan
4\.08 Table 4\.4 below stm-arizes NITZi's sources and applications of
funds for the 1990-94 period\. MITEL is expected to finance about 592 of
the total cost of its investment progrm and work$ng capital needs\.
- 27 -
Table 4\.4: NITIL - Prolected Sources and,Applications of Funds
(Naira Million)
Period Percentage
1990-94 of Total
Sources
Net Income Before Interest 6,7G0 64
Depreciatioa 1,708 16
Foreign Exchange Loss (Gain) 318 3
Internal Cash Generation 8,786 83
Less: Debt Service 2,570 24
Net Internal Cash Generation 6,216 59
Loans 4,402 41
Total Sources 10,618 100
Applications
Capital tsxpenditure 6,793 64
Working Capital 3,826 36
Total Applications 10,618 100
2\. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
A\. Tariffs
4\.09 The present telecommunications tariffs are at Annex 4-4\.
International tariffs were substantially increased (average of about 6002)
effective February 1988, to adjust for changes in exchange tate and
accounting rate\. This has been an important step in the government's
effort to commercialize NITEL's operation\. PGN and NITEL are fully aware
of the need for regular adjustments in international tariffs to reflect
changes in exchange rate to ensure that the net flow of traffic continues
in favor of Nigeria\.
4\.10 The domestic tariffs were substantially increased effective 1990\.
Call charges for telephone and telexes were increased by 8002 and 16001,
respectively\. Rental charges for both services were increased by 3002\.
These increases should enable NITEL to achieve its financial objectives
(para 4\.04)\. For the past decade, no attempt other than increasing the
connection charges has been made\. The structure has been unchanged since
1972 except for the timing of local calls from October 1988 which will ease
soe of the congestion in the local network\. FGN is aware of this problem
as well as the need for adequate and timely adjustment of tariffs\.
therefore, the President has constituted a Commission which has been
charged with the responsibility to review tariffs for the parastatal
sector, including telecommunications\. This Commission is expected to
employ consultants specialized in different sectors to review tariff levels
and structure and identify an appropriate tariff review procedure to permit
-28-
sowe automaticity for future tariff increases\. rGN has agreed to furnish
the Bank with a copy of the recommendations on telecommunications tariffs\.
S\. Bnefits
4 11 Tolecomunlications is a highly cost effective and preferred
alternative to physical transportation, as it is more efficient in terms of
energy and capital consumption and of user tim\. The project would
therefore promote more efficient counmications, in particular within
Lagos, and between Lagos and some of the larger state capitals\.
Telecommunications is necessary for making markets work better by providing
a cost effective means for the flow of information\. The project will
therefore particularly benefit business and the export trade whose
encouragement is a central feature of FGN's Structural Adjustment Program\.
4\.12 The project at this time would confer additional benefits\. The
more rational development of the network, allied vith appropriate pricing
policies, would increase the flow of resources from the sector to the
government\. This increased flow could be used to expand service in the
rural areas, where economic benefits would exceed the financial capacity to
pay, to the benefit of the economy as a whole\.
C\. Least Cost Solution
4\.13 The project design has been based on least cost solution
methodologies for telecommunications development\. The timing and
dimensioning of the project components are based on generally accepted
engineering practice after the study of feasible alternatives, and taking
into account existing investments\. Network rehabilitation and expansion
will be carried out by using the latest digital and optical fiber
technology except in those cases where the marginal cost of expanding
existing analog equipment is comparatively lower; for instance where the
basic capacity is available and expansion would only involve minor
additions of sub units\.
D\. Return on Investment
4\.14 Assuming that the domestic and international tariffs are adjusted
to reflect changes in cost and in exchange rate, respectively, from 1994,
the internal financial rate of return on NITEL's 1990-94 investment program
is about 17\.22 (Annex 4-5)\. Adjusting for taxes from financial costs and
benefits and shadow pricing local costs, the minimum estimated internal
economic rate of return is about 23\.72\. This underestimates the benefits
to be derived from the investment, because it does not take into account
consumer surplus and indirect, as well as external benefits received by
non-users of telecommunications services\. Sensitivity analysis shows that
a 202 increase in capital costs combined with a 202 reduction in benefits
would reduce the estimated internal economic rate of return to 172\. This
is, however, unlikely because: (a) the cost of telecommunications equipment
will continue to decrease in real terms, due to advances in technology;
(b) each year NITEL will review with the pank the composition of its
capital expenditure program for the next five years (para 3\.04); and
- 29 -
tc) benefits will be ensured through timely implementation of the project
(para 3\.21) and maintaining tariffs at appropriate levels (para 4\.06)\. On
balance, there is a good prospect that the project will earn a high
economic return\.
E\. Risks
4\.15 There are three principal risks of the project\. Firstly, the
project itself could be subject to considerable delays in execution given
the poor implementation record in the sector in Nigeria\. This risk is
being mlainized by both adequate advance procur mnt planning and review of
NITEL' s procurement procedures and appointment of project management and
financial management consultants as conditions for loan effectiveness\.
Secondly, the project may be poorly coordinated or compromised by other
investments under the program\. This risk is being minimized through
consultancy financed under the project to review the investment program\.
Thirdly, there may be delays in terms of assuring the commercialization of
NITEL\. This risk is considered small given the commitments by FGN\.
Finally\. annual review by FGN and the Bank of NITEL's achievements would
provide a framework to ensure satisfactory implementation of the
institutional aspects of the proposed project\.
F\. Environmental and Health Aspects
4\.16 The project is expected to have no adverse environmental and
health aspects\. Indeed, the project should improve both by reducing the
need for wasteful physical transportation and improving the delivery of
health services\.
V\. AGREEMENTS REACHED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5\.01 During negotiations, the following agreements were reachedt
(a) furnish to the Bank, by October 31, 1990, for its
review and coments the final draft of the
,performance contract to be entered into between NITEL
and FGN; begin implementation by January 1, 1991
(para 2\.18);
(b) improve NITEL's billing and collection performance,
and reduce outstanding subscriber receivables to 120
days of billing for the year by 1990, 90 days by 1992
and 60 days by 1994 and maintain it thereafter
(paras 2\.25 and 4\.04):
(c) submit draft and audited financial accounts for each
fiscal year within four and six months of the end of
the fiscal year starting in fiscal year 1990\. Submit
- 30 -
draft and audited accounts for fiscal year 1989
within nine and twelve onths of the end of the
fiscal year (para 2\.25)\.
(d) submit audits of project accounts, special
accounts and statemnt of expenditures along with
audited financial accounts for each fiscal year
(para 3\.19);
(e) review with the Bank not later than October 31 of
each year the composition of its capital expenditure
progran for the five year i ediately following such
review, together with details of the financing plan
prepared for such program until the completion of the
Project (para 3\.04);
(f) technical, operational and financial performance
indicators and targets for 1990\. Targets for
subsequent years, together with action plan to
improve performance, if necessary, will be agreed
upon by October 31 of the preceding year (para 3\.25
and Annex 3-9);
(g) report progress on the project implementation and
against technical and operational indicators in the
quarterly progress reports to be submitted within six
weeks of the end of each quarter and against:
financial indicators in the annual financial
statements (para 3\.25); and
(h) NITEL will: (i) finwnce from internally generated
funds net of debt service obligations, the local cost
component of its annual investment program; (ii) earn
an anntal rate of return on revalued net fixed assets
of not less than 10X in 1991 and thereafter;
(iii) maintain a debt service;coverage ratio of at
least 1\.5; a*d (iv) maintain debt equity ratio not
more than 60:40 (para 4\.05)\.
5\.03 The main conditions for loan effectiveness are:
(a) the appointment of consultants for project
management and financial management (para 3\.09);
and
(b) the issuance of letters of invitation for remaining
consultancy services (para 3\.09)\.
\ 31-
5\.04 Subject to agreemmt being reached on the above, the proposed
project Is mitable for a *k lo*a of V8$225 millien equivalent at the
Bank' variable rate of Interest for 20 years, including a five-year grace
period\.
AFTIE
may 16, 19i0
I~~~~~~~~~~~~
32-
Annex 2-1
FEDEAL RZPUILIC oF gIoSkI
RIGhBRIAN TLOSCCflICAftI\.'S LIMITD (NITEIL)
1IR8T TILICOSNICATIONS PROJCT
zxisting Telecomunications Facilities
(As of March 31, 1968)
It\. XNumber
Local Telephone Exchanges 259
- of which manually operated 8
Installed Capacity Lines 387,602
Subscribers iconnected 246,104
Local Networks
- primary pairs (pair x kna) $,874,400
- secondary pairs (pair x kms) 414,500
National Transit Exchanges 46
installed Trunks 20,214
International Transit Exchanges 2
International circuits 541
Microwave Systems 376
Route-km Trunk Routes 9,600
Route-km Toll-routes 4,640
Trunk Circuit Capacity (channel x km) 27,786,800
Toll Circuit Capacity (chann4l x km) 2,437,200
Coaxial Cable (channel x km) ,1,632,600
Multiplex, primary groups terminated 5,188
Telex Exchanges 17
Telez Installed Capacity 12,800
Telex Subscribers Connected 5,727
Gent*x Stations 301
Telex Transit Exchanges 3'
Telex Trunk Circuits 5,432I
International Telex Exchanges 1
International Telex CiFcuits 245
gatellite Earth Statioias
- international 2
- domestic 21 k
Coastal Radio Station (Maritim Nobile Radio) 1
I - 33-
Annex 2-2
N RIFA DERL RZPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
j NIGDRIAN TELWCOMMUNICATIONS LIMITED (NI$TL)
FIRST TELECOIIUNICATIONS PROJECT'
! Existing Demand
(March 31\. 1988)
Zone
Item N-E S-E N-V S-W Lagos Total
Subscribers 17,503 49,751 33,988 55,354 89,508 246,104
Registered 10,157 29,622 41,054 27,421 55,163 163,417
Waiters
Expressed 27,660 79,373 75,042 82,775 144,671 409,521
Demand
Suppressed 36,790 107,835 119,929 115,985 226,000 606,539
Demand
Total Potential 64,450 187,208 194,971 198,760 372,671 1,016,060
Subscriber 0\.075Z 0\.212 0\.11Z 0\.25Z 2\.50? 0\.232
Demand Density 1/
Demand Density \0\.12Z 0\.342 0\.23Z 0\.37Z 4\.00t 0\.39?
Potential Density 0\.28? 0\.81Z 0\.61? 0\.90Z 10\.30Z 0\.98Z
1/Lines per 100 population\.
I~ ~ ~a I 'LAB Snw uv 1 ,MVL Ia\.
x~~~~~~~~In 7 m 77 I am
o* oivm I =aw*w91=
(\.4,
urn
Kmum La miuv
n U-
amm
-35-
ANNEX 2-4
Page 1 of 4
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
NIGERIAN TE40b"ICATIONS LI_ITED (NITEL)
FIRST TKLECOOUNICATIONS PROJECT
Commercialization of"'NITEL
The future relationship\ between the Goverbment and NITEL should
be base^ on the following: (a) establishing clear and attainable,\
objectives compatible with commercial operations; (b) providing NZTEL's
management greater autonomy over its:operations and the selection of
managers capable of operating independently; (c) establishing clear rules
and procedures for government involvement in decision making; and (d)
holding the management accountable by negotiating targets, monitoring and
evaluating results and rewarding them and their staff on the basis of
performance\.'
2\. The above new relationship between the Government and NITEL
could best be achieved through a 'performance contract,' under which the
Government would set up medium-term objectives for NITEL, pledge to meet
its financial and other obligations in a timely manner and extend greater
autonomy in exchange for NITEL's commitment to achieve agreed performance
in the efficiency and Feliabilit' of its telecommunications services and in
the maintensnce of itslassets\. The performance contract could be reviewed
annually and modified as necessary based on experience\.
3\. The Government should agree to the followings
(a) Provide support for NITEL's efforts to make its
organization more responsive to telecomuunications
sector needs in fulfillment of its assigned role under
its Act\.
(b) Hake NITEL's management accountable to its board and
not to the Ministry of Comunnications (HOC)\.
Therefore, it would be self-defeating for the Chairman
of NITEL's',Board to be from within either the
Government or NITEL itself\. The members of the Board
should include individuals and representatives of
commercial and consumer groups who are properly
qualified with extensive and proven management
capabil ties and who offer a diversity of skills,
independent viewpoints and experiences\. They s9ould
be compensated well an} take the job seriously\. The
Government should decentralize power to the Board of
Directors as a way to depoliticize decisions and take
NITEL's interests inio account\.
(c) Assure that the management team of NITEL 2s competent,
business-minded, and action-oriented with utmost
regard to efficiency in 'operationallfinancial matters\.
The Managing Director should be appointed by the Board
- 36 -
ANNM= 2-4
Page 2 of 4
in coniultation with and approval of the Government\.
The HManaging Director should be left free to appoint\
his top wanagement teas\.
(d) Give the Board the primary responsibility for
providing strategic guidance to the management and
m onitoring performance within the overall framework of
long-term objectives of the Government for the
telecammunications sector\. The Board's functions
would include decision-making on the medium and long-
term borrowing over and above stated amounts, short-
term borrowings in excess of normal requirements,
major capital expenditures exceeding predefined
limits, new or revised compensation programs, salary
increases and bonuses for the Managing Director and
top executives\. It would review and approve strategic
plans, annual budgets and audited financial
statements, and discuss regular and special reports\.
It would review management's effectiveness in running
the day-to-day business, but abttain from intervention
in day-to-day operations\. The Board should be
responsible to the Government, which would restrict
its role to the setting of long-term objectives for
NITEL including key monitorable performance
indicators, against whith the performance of the
organization and its Board wouldWbe judged\. If this
performance is unsatisfactory, the Government could
replace the Board in part or in its entirety\.
(e) Delegate authority to NITEL to determine all contract
awards for,capital goods, spares and maintenance\.
NITEL's management should be able to award all
contracts with Board approval\. The NITEL management
should be\able to award contracts (without the Board's
approval) up to US$5 million\. These limits should be
revised regularly to keep pace with inflation\.
(f) Delink NIXEL's salary structure form that of the civil
service, as in the case of NNPC\. The salary structure
should be competitive and flexible to attract and
retain qualified and highly competent personnel\."
(g) Agree on financial objectives for the sector\.
(h) Provide NITEL in a timely manner with the capital
required for commercially unatractive projects the
Government wishes NiTEL to constlruct (e\.g\., rural
telecoimnunications)\.
Mi) Arra nge for the immediate settlement by Government
-37-
AMNEX 2-4
Page 3 of 4
departments and parastatals of their past due
telecounications bills with NITEL; and also of
arrears of DITUL to other parastatals\. Institute a
mechanism to ensure that the Governent dbpartments
and parastatals will pay their bills to NITZL within
30 days\.
tj) Allow NITCL to effect regular tariff increases as
neqessary to achieve its financial objectives\. Allow
NIIfL to incorporate an automatic adjustment clause in
tariffs so as to neutralize the impact of change in
exchange rate and inflation to NITEL vithout the need
to obtain specific Government's approval for this
purpose\.
4\. To summarize, the Government's role should be limited to setting
basic objectives for NITEL (to develop and maintain an efficient,
coordinated and economical system to provide telecoummications on a
comercial basis)5 approving Board members, and the Board's selection of
the Managing Directors reviewing and evaluating perfornmnce of the Board in
meeting the above objectives; reviewing financing decisions that affect
pub'ic fundn (for example, requests for Government equity, debt vith
Government guarantee, etc\.); reviewing tariff levels proposed by NITEL
according to agreed principles; and long-range planning and coordination
across sectors\. The performance evaluation should focus only on a
comparison of efficiency and profitability achievements with targets\.
Reliable and timely flow of appropriatt standardized information is
critical to good performance evaluation\.
5\. NITEL should agree to the following:
(a) ZBevelop and implement improved personnel management
policies and a staffing plan aimed at streamlining the
work force to match job requirements with appropriate
skills and eliminate overstaffing\.
(b) Promote operat tonal efficiency, increase staff
productivity from 46 employees per 1,000 DELs in 1988
to 50 by 1992, reduce average faults per DEL per year
from 2 to 1 by 1993 in Nigeria and from 0\.4 to 0\.2 by
1993 in Lagos\. Improve call completion rate for local
calls from about 202 to 60Z by 1993\.
(c) Reduce the average aie of accounts receivaol? from
about 140 days gf revenue to 120 days by end\1990, 90
days by end 1992, and 60 days by end 1994, and
maintain it thereafter at the same level\.
\(d) Develop plans by June 30, 1991 for improved management
information, budgeting and financial reporting systams
and take stlps for their implementation\.
- 38 -
Ahuzi 2-4
Page 4 of 4
(e) Develop plans by June 30, 1991 for an improved
innpower development program, and take steps to
fi pleet the findings ia phased manner by December
31, 1992\.
(f) Nave its accounts audited by qualified and independent
auditors in a timely manner within six months of the
close of the fiscal year\.
(g) Improve its tariff levels and operations to (i)
'generate adequate internal funds to finance all t#e
local costs required for its annual capital
xpenditure, (ii) earn a rate pf return on net
revalued fixed assets of not 1lss than 72 in 1990, lOZ
In 1991 and thereafter, (iii) maintain a debt service
coverage ration of at least 1\.5, and (iv) maintain
debt equity ratio not more than 60:40\.
06STMA0IIIIIII&AMS LM QM
zl pref- c 11w -4
pT Trcigs wojiT
- 1wo------ -awl- --aws----- -1awe- -Iw_--
F It\.M ,ua lineal ai Tv\.;w\. 7\.1 i w\. ToW k a"\.l 7\.0mg Tom,Il f i \. r\.i Tsui ia"I Pl T
A\. _S S: \.61 806\.0 *0\.4 11\. \. a \.0 0\.0 n0\.0 0\. 0 o0\.0 o0\.0 0\.0
t\. _--t,
1\.1 1 de _ Li\. 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 118\.3 115\.2 \. 40D\.0 467\.0 17\.7 I14\.6 U18\.2 *4\.6 4\.s e\.
1\.1 To\.ol\. e\. Ta\. 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 4\.0 4\.0 0\.1 30\.0 30\.1 0\.1 11\.1 11\.8 0\.6 o\. 0\.0
S\. I\.0\.1 0\.0 0\.1 0\.1 0\.0 \. 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 6\.0 0\.0 0\.0
3\.1 wOe Ihodi 6s20d,16 I\. 14g 0\.01 0 18\. 7\. 166\.6o 75\.4 O\.8 m\. 10,6 14\.1 0\.0 11\. 601 10
6\.1 ?W\.e bbeb _10\.2\. 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 06\.7 U\.? 14\.0 165\.0 106\.0 *4\.0 30\.0 40\.0 0\.0 0: 11::
4-t uis O t2 8 8 ° °:8 t 4 $X° X u @ o:t 1 477 qo " 01 e: 4
4\.1 _umg 0l"*l_AWM\.isuI 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 1\.4 10\.7 11\.1 5\.1 47\.3 S6\.5 1\.4 10\.7 21\.1 0\.6 6\.0 6\.4
4\.2 1 bllt\.ti\. of La"g 0\. 0\. 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 1\.0 1\.6 0\.5 7\.1 7\.0 0\.5 o\.s a\. 0O \.0 0\.0 \.
TooeauIsolef
8\. 34\.e CeIat 0 0\. \. \. \. \. \. \. 48 1\. \. \. \. \.0 1\.4 0\.4
7\. 41\.0 0\.0 41\.0 41\.0 o\.0 41\.0 41\.0 0\.0 t41\.0 41\.0 \.0 41\.0 41\.0 *0\. 40\.0
6\. fe\. S \.1 \. Tit0\.0 0\.0 0\.6 0\.6 1\.8 0\. s\. 0\.
0\. C*t\. 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 \.0 2\.a U\. 0\. 7\. 0\.0 1\.0 0\.4 18\.4 0\.0 0\. \.
10\. ?w\.lgCSsuIo\.t sad -0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 @\.a 11\.0 11\.0 0\.1 11\. 12\.5 0\.0 11\. 11\.1 0\.1 11\.0 1111\.4
U1\. iUtWP4\.0 1\.j\. \. 18\.8 14\.0 0\.0 16\.5 17\.4 0\.6 I8\.8 14\.1 0\.7 10\.6 11\.6
12\. NI\.uII\. W Ad ; MeI Ia I\.,I,\. 0\.0 0\.0 0\. 0\. a6 10 01 6\. 63 00 00 00 06 00 0\.
18\. @in0\. Dot; m 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\. 0\. o0 1800 0\. 1\. 1':8O' \. O': 1: 0 - 0 0oo 0\.0
on\. CS of p\._J\. 41\.6 1\.0 44\.4 *\.1 860\.7 4M\.0 1\. 18\.0 166\.4 67\.0 8\.1 6"\. iu\.6 17\.0 S17\.t
- iaI Cntiastm 4\.2 0\.1 4\.0 6\.2 18\.0 24\.1 31\. 07\. wA 91\.6 1g\.1 48\.n0 6\.0 it's 16\.0
Pr to\. CWRMMYusez 0\.5 0\.1 6\.6 10\.0 S2\.0 06\.4 107\.0 441\.7 646\.7 110\.4 1661\.0 1704 16\.1 1860 140\.1
Preje Cs" 84\. 8\.2 57\.5 0\.2 400\.8 848\.8 46\.0 a\.m\.a 3\.3\. 404\. 867\.1 7\.1 \.0 3\. 45\.0
took Lu\. 0\.0 0\.1 0\.2 0\.0 6\.8 S\.8 0\.0 8\.* 1 0\.2 0\.0 0\.4 63\.4 0\. 64\.1 66\.1
6\. LOW\. 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.1 0\.1 0\.0 87\.6 7\.6 0\.0 0\.0 00\.6 0\.0 46\.8 41\.6
7101 prWJ 6 \. 84\.8 S\.4 W7 i U\. 474\.0 30\.0 453\.0 1,00\.1 3\.4001 404\. 78\.1 17\.3 6\.0 461\.6 \.8
0\. 781L 1111i34 c T 27\. 791\.1 "0\.0 16\.0 611\.2 1,140\.1 444\.1 2,061\.6 1,406\.0 404\.0 7M\.* 1,t7\.2 ti\.0 461\.0 311\.6
------
4it
~~~~~~~~~m\.iwc w w *
mmii\.0 iUJMWUAMs LWK 0O3W
pT t i DNP 0-
-iei- -1-- -
Legal Fereigi, 1 \.1 n Ts Loal P\.i\.g T_tal tool lw\.ip Tsual 1a P i To%al Local Pwlp Tot"
" * *_V Teg
A\. _ILO 11t 1\., t\.4 1lt\.O 6\. I\.0 "4\. I\.A 7\.8 *\.7 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0
1\. Tole&um tAbltakle wdwameo
1\.1 t-n LgU_ 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 1S\.8 14\.8 1\., S7\.2 Ji\.0 8\. 18\.7 10\.1 0\.4 la\.s 0,i
1\.b2 a, a\. Ta, 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\. 0\.0 2\. 2\.5 0\.0 1\.4 1\.4 0\.0 0\.0 9\.0
1\. Tel\. botanga 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0
8\.1 oh tit 1\.1 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 2\.4 1i\.8 0\.0 O-i 67\.2 76\.7 2\.4 18\.2 30\.8 1\.6 12\.7 14\.8
*\.1 ti ib ieltio 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 4\.0 4\.0 1\.0 24\. 25\.8 1\.0 8\.8 8\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0
4\. T,eeamiggla
4\.1 Lm0Iot_inK Tr_m_1_7_s 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.2 1\.4 1\.8 0\.4 8\.0 6\.6 0\.2 1\.4 1\.8 0\.1 1\.1 1\.1
4\.2 <ltatiam of Lome D01l_o\. 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.2 0\.2 0\.1 0\.0 1\.0 0Ai 0\.1 0\.2 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0
Trom\.emil\.a
8\. see" Ce\. 1\.tsk 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.8 0\.5 0\.0 1\.6 1\.6 0\.0 0\.8 0\.8 0\.0 0\.8 0\.8
\. Tel__,meg d Telsprmiera 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 1\.4 1\.4 0\.1 4\.1 4\.2 0\.1 8\.6 3\.7 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0
7\. ibildka 8\.2 0\.0 8\.2 8\.2 0\.0 8\.2 8\.2 0\.0 5\.2 8\.2 0\.0 8\.2 8\.2 0\.0 8\.1
8\. Nn\. it Ieee, md A/C 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.2 0\.2 0\.1 0\.0 1\.0 0\.1 0\.1 0\.2 \. \. \.
0\. V46lgke 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.8 0\.8 1\.8 0\.8 2\.4 18 0\.8 1\.
10\. Tr Inh e\.i ~41~Pm) d 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 1\.8 1\.1 0\.0 1\.6 1\.4 0\.0 1\.8 1\.4 0\.0 1\.4 1\.8
11\. 8gunUit 0\.1 00\.4 0\.4 0\.1'1l? 1\.6 0\.1 2\. 2\.2 80 \.1 £7o 01\.6 0\.1 1\.4 1\.4
13 4stellemae "so miIle\. t 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.2 \. \.0\. \. \. 0\.0\.0 \.0 0\.0 0\.0
\. 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 1_\.0 18\. 0\. 18\.6 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0
Cue \.o ProJt \.2 0\.4 S\.6 7\.S 48\.4 88\.2 80\.4 170\.4 210\.0 88\.7 46\.1 61\. 7\.S 37\.4 it\.0
'"¶sisal Cmmtin\.a 0\.8 0,0 O \.8 0\.6 2\.8 8\.1 4\.0 -8\.5 12A\. 8\.4 2\.4 5\.3 0\.6 1\.4 1\.1
Pr to Camtimw\.y 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.8 8\.0 8\.? * \.6 II\.6 10\.6 5\.1 6\.* *\.9 0\.7 4\.1 4\.6
Project Cue 6\.7 0\.4 7\.1 0\.4 80\.7 80\.0 47\.4 104\.7 242\.0 40\.2 B6\.e' 0\.6 9\.0 J2\.9 41\.0
IstarOet DQPMe C\.Ngt,WWWO
mt11w Legs 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 5\.1 8\.1 0\.0 6\.6 6\.6 0\.0 8\.0 \.-W -
Wther Len 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.7 0\.7 0\.0 8\.0 8\.0 0\.0 6\.5 0\.6 0\.0 4\.5 4\.5
Total project cmS 6\.7 0,4 7\.1 0\.4 82\.2 61\.6 47\.4 20\.6 -t1\.0 40\.2 7\.8 11\.6 \. 4l\.8 02\.
0\. TIA3tL 10 COSVT(A\._ -40 6i\.8 11\.0 18\.8 10Q\.2 12U\.S 4S\.8 211\.1 25\.7 40\.2 71\.8 111 0\.0 46\.8 iU\.2
- -
- 41 -
ANNE 8-I
EUAL WAUUC OF MXIA
FIST IEECUCATI PRJET
=MIA * M (MXX)
Ravetmat Prys\.(19160-1904)
TOTAL TOTAL
(Mmi\. Mill) 1811 mll)
8, Itm- 19004 - 19044---
Locl Forein Total Local Foreign Total
A\. 0OODI PROGRAM 6\.6 1,S\.0 ,\. \.9 152\.4 166\.
S\. NEW WORKS:
1\. Telephone SwItching Exchgd\.
1\.1 Now Exchange Lin 4\.2 "e\.2 S21e4 C\.S 97e6 10Se$
1\.2 Spar* Ports, Module, Tools, 0\.J U\.2 8\.4 0\.0 4\.4 4\.5
and Toot Equlpmet
2\. T l x Exchange 0\.2 0\.0 0\.2 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0
3\. External 1\.ine Plant (ELP)
8\.1 ELP to batch Switching In 1\.1 15\.5 92C 0 1,060\.5 15\.6 116\.5 132\.3
8\.2 ELP Network Rehab iltatlon 28\.0 259\.6 207\.6 8\.5 82\.7 86\.2
4\. Tranmsesion
4\.1 Long Distance Tronamelo\. 6\.6 77\.2 6\.6 1\.1 9\.2 10\.6
4\.2 Rehabibt ation of Long Distane 1\.1 9\.5 10\.6 0\.1 1\.2 1\.8
Tranaleeton
S\. Space Coamunlcation 0\.5 24\.1 24\.5 0\.1 8\.0 8\.1
6\. Telepone and Teleprinters 1\.2 71\.9 78\.1 0\.2 9\.1 9\.2
7\. Building\. 205\.0 0\.0 206\.0 25\.8 0\.0 25\.6
6\. Rehab\. of Power and A/C 1\.0 9\.5 10\.5 0\.1' 1\.2 1\.S
9\. Vehicle\. 24\.0 1\.9 89\.9 8\.0 2\.0 6\.0
10\. Tralni n (EquipmnOt 4\.nd 0\.7 4\.1 49\.0 0\.1 6\.1 6\.2
F* lowskip\.)
il Consultancy 8\.5 \.6 600\.2 0\.4 7\.2 7\.6
12\. ulscellaneous and Ancilliory E q \. 0\.1' 7\.9 *\.0 0\.0 1\.0 1\.0
18\. Custom Outi" 00\.0 0\.0 800\.0 87\.8 0\.0 87\.8
Sasm Cost 745\.6 2,816\.1 8,062\.2 93\.9 291\.7 385\.7
Physi al Contingency 74\.6 115\.6 190\.4 9\.4 14\.6 24\.0
Price lContingency 272\.0 6009\.4 1,061\.4 90\. 29\.7 37\.9
*-- *- --- ---
Project Cost 1,062\.4 8,241\.0 4,884\.0 112\.6 8\.O 447\.6
Interest During Construction
Sank Loan 0\.0 211\.8 211\.8 0\.0 20\.5 20\.5
Other Loane 0\.0 16\.9 156\.9 0\.0 15\.4 15\.4
Total Project Cost 1,092\.4 8,611\.9 4,704\.8 112\. $70\.9 483\.5
C\. TOTAL PRORM COST 1,876\.0 4,914\.6 6,22\.9 146\.5 528\.8 66908
I~~ - ---
- 42 -
Annex 3-2
Page 1 of 3
FEDERAL XIYUBLIC OF NIGERIA
NIGERIAN TELECGMUNICATIONS LIMITED
FIRST TZLZCOIIUNICATIOMS PROJECT
Detailec Proiect Description
A\. EXCHANGIS
A\.1 LAGOS
Existing Proposed
Exchange Capacity Capacity
1\. Lagos C toll (trunks) 5\.900 18,000
2\. Iponri A local (LU) 10,000 30,000
3\. Ikeja A local (LU) 5,000 30\.000
4\. Lagos E (LU) with 5,000 lines - 45,000
RSU at Ikoyi
5\. Ap*pa (LU) with 5,000 lines 10,000 10,000
RSU at Ajegunle
6\. Isolo (LU) 7,000 5,000
7\. Victoria Island (LU) with 5,000 - 10,000
RSU at Lekki
A\.2 ZONAL CENTERS (Switching)
Existing Proposed
Exchange Zone Capacity Capacity
1\. Enugu Local (LU) SE 16,000 20,000
2\. Enugu (trunks) SE 3,876 3,200
Secondary Centre
3\. Onitshia Local (LU) SE 10,000 15,000
4\. Onitshia (trunks) SE 1,241 1,800
5\. Aba Local (LU) SE 8,000 20,000
6\. Aba (trunks) SE 477 1,000
7\. Port Harcourt (LU) SE 7,000 20,000
8\. Port Harcourt (trunks) SE 1,452 2,000
9\. Nnewi Local (LU) SE 1,000 10,000
10\. Ogoja Local (LU) SE 500 5,000
11 Ogoja (trunks) SE 700
12\. Orlo Lotal (LU) SE 1,000 5,000
13\. Overri Local (LU) SE 5,000 10,000
14\. Owerri (trunks) SE 1,390 2,000
15\. Makurdi Local (LU) NE 4,800 10,000
16\. Makurdi (trunks) NE 1,200
17\. Gboko Local (LU) NE 1,000 5,000
18\. Oturkpo Local (LU) NE 500 5,000
19\. Zaria Local (LU) NV 4,200 10,000
20\. Zaria (trunks) NW 1,000
-43-
Annex 3-2
Page 2 of 3
3\. LOCAL CAULZ NETUK
Locations Now ErDr Pairs
lequired
1\. Lagos C 42,000
2\. Lagos 5 42,000
3\. Iponri A 45,000
4\. Apapa 10,000
S\. Isolo (Zjigbo) 6,000
6\. Victoria Island 6, 00
7\. Zaria 2,400
8\. Ilorin 7,500
9\. Enugu 18,000
10\. Onitmlia 18,000
11\. Aba 12,000
12\. Port Harcouri 12,000
13\. Nnevi 10,000
14\. Owerri 8,000
15\. Makurdi 6,750
C\. Transmission
1\. Lagos Area Optical fibre junction network\.
2\. Kaduna - Kano digital microwave radio\.
3\. Kaduna - Be i - Ilorin - Ibadan - Ijebu-Ode - Ikorodu
digital mic ovave radio\.
4\. Benin - Onitsha - Enugu digital microwave ra4io\.
5\. Enugu - Umuahia - Aba - Port Harcourt digital microwave radio\.
5\. Euugu - Makurdi digital microwave radio\.
6\. Port Harcourt - Warri - Benin digital microwave radio\.
D\. Space Comunication
Rehabilitation of STD A earth station at Lanlate
F\. Telephone and Payphones
Procurement of 50000 telephones and 8,000 pay phones\.
G\. Vehicles
Procurement of 300 vehicles\.
B\. Telex/Gentex
Establishment of a teleprinter repair center and telex module repair
center\.
-44-
Annex -
, ~~~Page 3 of 3
Total Initial
I\. Consultancy to be financed by the Denk Ma-ribhs Contract
1\. P"1 Consultants 50 S0
2\. Project Manag _nt- Tranminssion -2 96 48
Switching -2 96 48
ILP -2 96 48
3\. Planning -Transmission -1 24 -
Switching -1 24
4\. Traffic -Traffic -1 24 24
Administration
5\. Financial Managemant 3 546
Total 464 254
J\. Training
(i) Fellowships
Management High Level
15 staff/4 months 60
Engineers Traunsmission 2014 months s0
switching 2014 months 80
Ppver 2014 months 80
ELP 2014 months 60
Technicians Transmission 5014 months 200
Switching 50/4 months 200
Power 50/4 months 200
XLP 5014 months 200
Finance 50/6 manmonths 300
Supplies 20/6 manmonths 120
365 1,600 manmonths
(it) Instructors
24 manmonths for setting up courses in data and digital
technology at the Oshodi training Centre\.
K\. Buildings
Construction of buildings to accomod4te equipment and for
residential pu!rposss\.
L\. Ancillary EcquiDment
Ancillary euipment including software for management
information system\.
-45-
Annez 3-3
Page 1 of 12
PnDhR*L RIPIMLIC OF WIGRIA
VNIOERI"N TZSCCO1UIICATIONS LIMITED (NITEL)
FIRS? TL CCOHMICATIONS PROJECT
TeDn of Reference for Comsultancy Servicel
I CONSULTANCY SERVICES FINANCED NDR PP
1\. Tslecomnznications consultancy firma were employed under PPF
\.financing to undertake the following three tasks:
A\. TASK 1: ENGINEERING ASSISTANCZ
Objective: To carry out diagnostic assessment of the performance of Lagos
Network, recomend equipment requirements and as ist NITEL in the
implementation of the Lagos Rehabilitaition work under World Bank Project\.
ELEME NS
1\. In collaboration with local task force carry out a
technical and traffic audit of Lagos Network including
equipment validation and traffic measurements on all
junction groups and common control equipment\.
2\. Recommend rearrangements and additions to circuitit
groups as a result of (1)\.
3\. Recommend suitability of Lagos junction cable Network
for PCM Transmission including suitability of existing
manholes for PCM repeater installatioi\.
4\. Produce a junction traffic and circuit matrix for I
Lagos Network present, 2 year and 5 year requirements\.
5\. Document the forecasting methodology employed for (4)
and the iecomended trunking chan!e applicable at the
2 year and 5 year dates\.
6\. To prepare technical specifications and general bid
doouments for goods and services to be procured under
this project\. i
7\. To assist in bid evaluation and preparation of
r!comendations for NITEL and Bank approf a\.
8\. To assist in drawing up contracts with successful,
bidders\.
9\. To assist in supervision of implementat4on of works
and periodic inspection\.
10\. To assist in acceptance testing and on site and
comissioning of equipment financed under the project\.
INPUT Three Consultants working with counterparts for up,to
10 manmonths over a period of up to 4 manmonths\.
OUTPUT Design, plan and bid documentation necessary to invite
tenders for th\. required works\.
-46- '
Annex 3-3
Page 2 of 12
S\. TASK 2\. rV F o S3TI9 2MST US
Obcctivj: To review the 196-1991 ilvstuet progrm prepared by NITEL
and sot out 1ig-tern networkt develqmet strateg a:plas\.
U E~LDENITS
1\. Review the program In light of Nigeria's 4evelo t
objective for the year 1992 and long-term objectives
to the year 2,000\.
2\. Analyze the balance between rehabilitation and
expansion\.
i Review financall and manpower requiremstU for the
program in the context of NITCL's financial position
presented and projected in close collaboration with
financial consultants to be appoainted by NITCL\.
4\. Review unit costs for material and labor used in
determining total local *pd forsign costs\.
5\. Review NITEL's Implementation capkcity of the program
and reconnd appropriate strategy for niplemntatiots\.
6\. Review technical feasibility of program In light of
digitalization and Introduction of new services\.
7\. Prepare standar4 specifications for Switching,
transmission and local network In line with the
digitalixation policy and strategy\.
S\. 8 tablish demad projection for various NITCL services
over 5 and 10 year periods according to available
de*ographic and economic data\.
9\. Maio projections of traffic and circuit requirements
for 5 and 10 years\.
10\. Zstablish series of #ypotheses for d*cting this demand
and indicate potential use of computer programing\.
11\. Review the network digitalization policy and strategy
prepared by NITTL and recommend appropriate
amndmnts\.
12\. Develop fumdan\.ntal plans for signallfting, numbering,i
routing, transaission, and synchronization consistent
with the digitalization strategy\.
13\. Develop plans for witching, transxissioi and local
network needs of tb" 1987-1992 developent program
includ ng network ootinization\.
INPUT tour Consultants (Engineers and Econoaists as
appropriate) for a period of six oaths (24 manmmnths)
vorking with counterparts\.
OUTPUT :s Report On inventenet program t 1992, fundamental
plans to year 2,000 plus methodologies to employ,
; including potential uses of computer programs\.
-47-
Annex 3-3
Page 3 of 12
OUTPUT 2 In addition and on the assumption that positive
recomendations are mde on the potential use of
computer programming, element 10, bidders are also
requested to present optional proposals for thi
development of a series of a computerixed network
planning programs\. NITUL will determine whether or
not and when to exercise this option at the time of
evaluation of proposals\.
C\. TASK 3: FINANCIAL MAXAGHMENT (NON-INGINREEIMG)
Objective: Preparation of fundamental financial data for loan application
and selected review of financial systemu with emphasis on billing and
collection\.
ELEMENTS
1\. Preparation of Memorandum internal accounts (including
Balance Sheets, Profit and Loss Accounts and source
and application of funds statements) on an Approximate
Basis for calendar years 1985 and 1986\.
2\. Financial Evaluation of current and medium term
NITEL's investment program, including the financing
plan giving due consideratiQn to findings of technical
consultants to be appointed 'by NITEL\.
3\. Preparation of a financial presentation document in
support of the Government's application for a first
World Bank Nigerian Telecoms Project (including issues
such as ihe financial implications of stated policies
on Tariffs, Capital Restructuring\. Medium-term
investment programs and debt service implications)\.
4\. Review of existing systems (and related consultant
proposals) traffic billing, collection and receivable
management\.
5\. Recommendation of short-term improvements and
assistance with implementation of priority tasks in
traffic billing and receivables management\.
6\. Formulation of recoamendations for medium-term
improvemnt to management accounting, financial
control and related Data Processing Systems\.
INPUTs Three Consultants (as appropriate) for up to 12
manmonths in total with counterparts\. Accesb to
Historical Financial Statements for NET and PfT prior
to 1965, and for NITEL as of 1985\.
OUTPUTs Memorandum accounts for years 1985 and 1986 with
sxpporting commentary, financial presentation document
and report giving full analysis and detailed plan of
actions for billing, collection and receivables
manageaent\.
-48-
Anne- 3-3
Page 4 of 12
II\. COISULTANCY SEVICES TO 33 WINAMCZD DRING TSE PROJECT
TASK As Protect 'anms nt, Network Plaring and Traffic Management
Ob1ectives
1\. The Nigerian S lecoinanications Limited (NITL) is executing a
1990-1994 inveetupit progrm of rehabilitation and expansion of
telecoiunicatilns facilities and inastitutionil development of NITEL\. The
progrm is being financed by IBED and bilateral and other sources\. The
broad tasks for which the Project Planning, Engineering and Management
Consultants are proposed to be emloyed to assist NITEL in implementation \
of this progrm are as follows:
(a) assist NITEL's staff to carry out design, detailed
engineering, procurement, supervision of installation,
acceptance testing and commissioning of all eq4ipment
items (switching and transilssion equipment, outside
plant network and subscriber facilities) and civil
workst coordination of implementation of different program
components; and in general project management including
supervision of contracts and coordination of project
implementation;
(b) provide suitably skilled perionnel to work with
Nigerians as counterparts in undertaking the following
tasks:
- development of detailed netwqrk plans for
implementing the first tqlecommunications
development project; and
- set up traffic engineering group in NITEL\.
(c) transfer know-how to NITEL staff in planning, design,
techno-economic evaluation, engineering and project
management for all program components through direct
class tiaining andlor on the job training, etc\.
Scope of Services
2\. The scope of services to,be provided by the consultants in
conjunction with NITEL's counterpart are grouped as follows:
(a) design and detailed network system engineering;
(b) procurement;
(c) supervision of installation, acceptance tests and
conissioningi
½ (d) transfer of know-how and training; and
te) project management\.
Thc above services are to be coordinated by NITEL\.
\½
\½
Annez S-3
Pase 5 of 12
Detailed Rhuinserin
S\. eThe consultants shall guide NITL staff to prepare detailed
eqipmet desig and detaiUe engineering to achieve:
(a) the least-cost solution appropriate to the c _ment;
(b) effective Integration with existing facilitiest
(c) satisfactory grad* of service; and
(d) adherence to appropriate CCITTICCUX rec_amdationa\.
4\. The consultants In conjunction with IIThL will be required tot
undertake full field/site surveys and test measurements or mke spot checks
to verify data and minimize implementation risks due to deficient basic
data\.
Procurement
5\. The consultants shall prepare all the required tender documents
including comercial conditions, technical specifications, schedules of
requirements and delivery, draft contract) for procurement of all equipment
items and for civil works, through international/local competitive bidding
for neiq items or sole source repeat orderl for extensions to existing
equipment\.
6\. The consultants' role in the procurement cycle shall include,
ibut not be limited to the followings
(a) joint preparation of tender documunts\. The documnts
shall include the procedure for repeat orders, if the
long-term development program includes such
recosuendation, and the formala for future pricing of
such repeat orders that takes into account inflation,
technology advances, induced economies in
sanufacturing costs, and international market
situation at time of orderinS;
(b) assist NITEL i answering bidders' queries an tender
documnts and participate in bidders' conforences,
when scheduled, for complicated cases;
(c) joint evaluation of bids, and preparation of technical |
and financial evaluation reports with recomnedations
on contract award;
(d) after, NTZL managemnt's decision on selection of the
contractor, drafting contract and assisting in contract
negot^iations and award;
(e) prepare amendments/addenda to contracts as may become
necessary during program implementation; and
(f) tasks (a) and (e) shall primrily be carried out by
NITEL's staff under supervision and guidance by the
consultants\.
\~~~~~~~~~~~~
-50-
Annez 3-3
Pag 6 of 12
Installation, Acceptance Testing and Co issionins
7\. The consultants shall provide detailed support and actively
assist NITIL in adabinstration of NITuL's contracts for equipment supplies
and civil works, through:
(a) review and approval of all contractor's submission in
respect of engineering designs, plans and schedules;
lists of main equipqent, installation and maintenance
test equipment, tools an4 spare parts; installation
and acceptance test procedures, etc\.;
(b) monitoring of delivery and installationiconstruction
schedules;-
(c) undertaking factory testing when called for;
(d) checking types and quantities of equipment, materials,
documentation, software, etc\. supplied by contractors
to ensure conformation to contractss
(e) coordination in implementation of different program
components and resolution of problems that may arise
in interaction between contractors of different
components;
if) supervision of equipment installations and civil works
construction per contracts to ensure quality and
completqness;
(g) prepagatiion of schedules, and conductance of
acceptance tests;
(h) commissioning of equipment; and
Ii) assist NITEL in resolution with the equipment
contrtctors of problems that arise in the commissioned
equipment during the warranty period\.
Transfer of Know-how and TraininA
8\. An essential item of the consultaiits' tot&l assignment shall be
the upgrading and development of NITEL's human resources through transfer
of know-how and training of NITEL's staff in all aspects of th\. vork
undertaken by the consultants in Nigeria\. The transfer of know-how and
training of NITEL's staff shall cover but not be limited to techniques and
methods of planning, design aed detailed engineering; technical and
economic evaluati4n of different alternatives; preparation of technical
specifications; procurement documentation and procedures; installation,
acceptance tests \and conuissioning of equipment; general project
management, etc\., and shall include mode of updating these technologies and
methods\.
9\. The consultants shall prepare a detailed plan for\. transfer of
know-how and training which is a major task of their assignment\. The
transfer of know-how can be through training courses to be conducted in
NITEL's tr ining school and/or through on-the-job training\. The training
plan should be designed with the objective that, on co pletion of the
consultants' assignmnt, the NITEL staff shall have developed inherent
Annex 3-3
Page 7 of 12
capability of implementing independently a significant proportion of
NIUL's future develop ent program _ it-fiout substantial further external
technical assistance\.
10\. The consultants shall review the availability of RITEL's staff
to act as counterparts, specify the required qualifications for each such
staff, *asist NIT6L in selecting such staff from within NITEL or through
outside recruitment and, if necessary\. recoonend foreign training of NITEL
staff in specific disciplines\.
Proiect Management
11\. NITEL shall provide the organization, staff and infrastructure
necessary for management of the total scope of work as detailed above\. It
shall establish and maintain necessary project files and records (including
records of all expenditures)\.
12\. The consultants shall appoint a team leader who will assume
overall responsibility for the total assignment and liaison with NITEL for
all activities and performance of other consultants' personnel and
settlement of all accounts in Nigeria\.
13\. The consultants shall prepare and submit to NITEL'within five
days at the end of each month, a composite and detailed report on \.ach task
preceded by an Executive Summary for the information of the senior NITEL's
management\.
Network Planning
14\. Using the demand data, fundamental plans and digitalization
policy articulated in the master plan study, develop detailed plans for
switching, transmission and local network needs of the 1990-1994
development program\.
15\. Prepare a planning manual (engineering instructions) containing
rules and procedures for rational development of the network\.
16\. Review the engineering planning organization of NITEL including
staffing and propose suitable changes\.
17\. Identify training needs for plEnning staff in light of
digitalization\.
18\. Propose suitable courses for planning staff\.
Traffic Administration
19\. Propose a suitable org&iization for a traffic planning and
monitoring group in NITEL\.
-52-
Annex 3-3
Page a of 12
20\. Draw up systems for monitoring traffic flow for local, national
and internat4onal traffic, including a suitable management informatio
*ystem\.
21\. Prepare technical specifications and recommend list of test
equipment for measuring traffic\.
22\. Identify training needs for traffic engineering personnel and
recomind suitable courses of study\.
23\. Prepare qnd conduct initial courses in traffic engineering for:
(a) exchange supervisory staff with emphasis oi practical
application of traffic measuremnt, monitoring and
analysis in maintaining quality of service;
(b) managerial staff to be given a better understanding of
the network and the importance of traffic engineering
in its planning, design and operations\.
Experts Requirements
\.24\. It is estiated that the following expertise will be required
during the implementation of the project:
(a) Switching Expert;
(b) Transmission Expert;
(c) External Plant Expert;
(d) Traffic Administration Expert\.
dhe duration for each expert or experts will be different, but the
eipertise will be required for about four years\.
TASK B: Financial ManaRement
Background
1\. NITEL was established as of January 1, 1985 as a limited
liability company under the 1968 Company Decree\. NITEL was specifically to
undertake the business of telecommunications, both external and internal to
Nigeria\. The company is 1001 owned by the Government\. However, since
inception there has been a considerable lack of adequately trained manpower
in the company's Finance Division\. This situation, thereforF, has resulted\
in serious delay in the efforts of the Division to keep and'maintain proper
and adequate up-to-date accounting and management accounts information
records\.
2\. In order to improve its financial management and to eiazble NITEL
to operate on a coimercial basis, financial consultants were employed under
the Wbrld Bank Project Prtparation Facillty (PPF) advance to carry out
--53 -
Annex 3-S
Page 9 of 12
diagaostic analysis of NITIL's financial and accounting policies,
procedures and systems, and propose an action plan for improvement\. The
major findings of the consultants were as followsX
(i) significant short cosings and delays in accounts recording and
processing in most functional areas;
(ii) lack of meaningful management accounts\. There are
delays in finalization of financial accounts and
audited accounts have had nuierous qualifications;
(iii) absence of effective financial management and control of working
capital;
(iv) technical and operating difficulties resulting in
problems in billing and collection for the services
rendered; and
(v) adequately trained accounting and finance staff to carryout the
financial function in NIEL\.
3\. The basic approach to implementation of improvements recommended by
the consultants will involve the following taskes
i)\. prepare detailed manuals setting out the step by step
description of the tasks to be carried out by each level of
staff in accomplishing the objectives of the revised systems and
ensure the implementationg
(ii) develop training programs for each staff level in the
aspects of the procedures and systems relevant to each
financial staff and carry out the necessary training;
(iii) assist the special teams and task forces setup at NITEL to carry
out any investigation or exercise to bring arrears of processing
of all records up-to-date\. This will particularly apply to the
accounting records at headquarters, zones and territories, fixed
assets register*, consolidation of territorial records and
dthers;
(iv) develop and implement financial and accounting systems
at headquarters, zones and territory closely with
NITEL staffs;
(v} monitor the performance of the staff in the operation of the
systems and make necessary improvements; and
(vi) assist the deputy directors in the finance department
at NITEL to manage their functions and any other tasks
they would require to be carried out\.
4\. NITEL, since the Consultants Reports, has reviewed some
accounting systems, billing and collection procedures and these are working
effeciently\. Also t4e backlog of accounts preparation has been cleared and
the existing staff tve updated processing and recording of cArrent
transactions with the effect that the audit of both 1987 and 1988 fiscal
years are now at the final stage\. ', The situation of a permanent backlog
has therefore b eliinated\.
- 54 -
Amnex 3-3
Page 10 of 12
5\. A tern of financial experts will be required for a period of one
year with the possibility of a six sioths extension to assist Task Force to
Implement Ithe reilndations of the Task group, to mprove the financial
ad accmting policies, procedures and syst_n that may require
mpro-t\. Oe ezpert will be the te_ leader and will be responsible
for coordinating the work of the tern and ensure that the tasks are carried
out effectively\. The tern will consists of three experts\. Each expert
will be attached to the three deputy directors in the Finance Department in
the headquarters\. Impl4entation of systems and procedures will be carried
out with WIT L counterparts staff from the headquarter, zones and
territories\. In addition, each expert,will also be required to undertake
any other tasks that the deputy directbrs they are assigned to requests\.
6\. The current organization chart of the Finance Department, which
isUbased an the recorendations of the PPF financed consultants, is
attached as Annex 1\. The Finance Department consists of three
subdirectorates, Financi al Accounts, Management Accounts, and Treasury and
Traffic\. NITZL has its national headquarter in Lagos, five zonal
headquarters and 22 territorial offices\. Each of these territorial offices
Is self accounting\. In addition,' each territotial office controls several
district offices where sonw limited accounting functions take place\.
7\. The assignuents will include a requireaent to field train
NITEL's counterpart staff and assigned officers in the expert's activities
to the maximu extent possible while performing the tasks\.
S\. The specific tasks and the responsib4lities associated with the
three experts and their qualifications are set out below\.
Expert 1s Treasury and Traffic Accountant
Scope of Work
S\. The expert who should report to Deputy Director of Treasury and
Traffic will lead a group of NITEL staff in implementation of the
recoendations of the consultants and those of the Task Force after
approval by the Deputy Director Treasury and Traffic and in particular in:
- billing and collection, review the efficiency of the
newly Installed system\.
- accounts receivables/aging analysis\.
- monitoring the incoming and outgoing transaction\.
- monitoring of inpayment and outpayment ratios\.
- cash nanagement, including cash Olow projections\.
- foreign exchange mnagemnt\.
- credit control
- ensure compliance with policy already developed\. Review
weakness and update policy\.
- prepare appropriate mothly/quarterly management
lnformation required as appropriate for NITZL
mtanageent in the related financial functions\.
- 55 -
Annex 3-3
Page 11 of 12
9\. A qualified accountant with over five yoars experience as a
cnm rcial mlnager in a telecosumications eatity and relevant work
experience La a developing country\. The assi nt is expected to start in
August 1990 and be for a period of about 12 months As the position
requires an unusual amount of tis and resources for staff development and
training, candidates with a track record andlor capacities in these areas
would be preferred\.
Ezpert 2 - Financial Accountant
Scope of Work
10\. The expert will assist the Deputy Director of Financial
Accounts in the implementation of the recoendations of the consultants
and those of the Task Force after approval of Deputy Director Financial
Accounts and in particulart
- prepare of headquarter accounts;
3 development of a costing system to deterdine traffic
costs\.
- payroll;
- staff loans and pension; and
prepare appropriate regular management information
report as related to fidancial functions\.
Reqgirements
11\. A qualified accountant with over five years experience as a
chief accountant and relevant work experience in a developing country\. The
assignment is expected to start in August 1990 and be for a period of about
12 months\. As the position requires an unusual amount of tine and
resources for staff development and training, candidates with a track
record andlor capacities in these *reas would be preferred\.
Expert 3 - Management Accountant
Scope,of Work
12\. The expert who should report to the Deputy Director of
Management Accounts will lead a group of NITIL staff in the implementation
of the recomendations of the consultants/Task Force after the approval of
the Deputy Director Management Accounts and in particulars
- prepare consolidated of Group accounts for NITEL\.
- review financial accounting recording procedure\.
- project accounts\.
- prepare financial projection model with full capacity
for sensitivity analysis to test financial objectives\.
- prepare uonthly and annual operational and development
budget\.
- monitor actual versus budget estimates\.,
- 56 -
Annex 3-3
Page 12 of 12
- prpare appropriate regular anagemsent inforeation
rporets related to finascial functions\.
13\. A qualified accountant with orvr ton years experience as
monagnent accountant and relevant work experience in a developing country\.
The assigmnt Is expected to start in August 1990 and be for a period of
about 12 month\. As th position requires an unusual amount of time and
resources for staff development and training, candidates with a trAck
record and/or capacities in these areas would be preferred\.
! N
- 57 -
AN=EX 3-4
Page 1 of 2
FEDERAL REPUILIC OF NIGERIA
NIGRI N TZL2KC"MNICATIONS LIITSED (NITUL)
FIRST TELECOWfICATION8 PROJECT
Project Financing Plan
______________________
--------- TOTAL --------- --------- TOTAL ---------
(Naira Kill) (US$ Hill)
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
IBRD 2,178\.5 2,178\.5 225\.0 225\.0
-THER SOURCES 1,063\.1 1,063\.1 110\.0 110\.0
NITEL 1,092\.4 370\.3 1,462\.7 112\.6 35\.9 148\.5
Project Financing 1,092\.4 3,611\.9 4,704\.3 112\.6 370\.9 483\.5
L - 58
_ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ M s4
Mm"X 1-4
Pe" 2 of 2
NIiamE 1 UM OMWUCATUWS EIUU1ED (ITEL)
FIRST TELECOISUMICAT011 PROJEeCT
Projoet Flmeinme by It_m\.
------- FrlF Co - - Loe l - - Total -
uS millo\. Equl vs - - - l-------
By Ites UID OTHERS NITEL TeO l WITh\.
- Switching Exchnge
-pExpe o 60\.4 $1\.6 112\.2 6\.9 119\.1
"- - R\.hbiltatlon 6\.1 5\.1 0\.1 5\.2
- Extrnal Lim Plant (ELP)
- Expansion 60\.0 53\.S 1n\.6 1S\.9 152\.7
- RhabillItation a?\.8 37\.8 4\.2 41\.6
Transistsion
- Expanlon 6\.3 4\.4 11\.2 1\.8 12\.6
-Rehabilitation 1\.4 1\.4 0\.2 1\.5
- Spao Comunication 8\.5 8\.5 0\.0 3\.5
- Telephne 10\.4 10\.4 0\.1 10\.S
- Suding 0\.0 81\.3 81\.3
- Rohabtitati on of Poer A A/C 1\.4 1\.4 0\.2 1\.6
- Vehicl ' 2\.3 2\.8 3\.6 659
- Training (Equipment and 7\.0 7\.0 0\.1 7\.1
F llowehtpe)
Conoultacy 6\.2 8\.2 0\.6 6\.8
- isc\. and AncilIIary Eqpt\. 1\.1 1\.1 0\.0 1\.2
- Custoas Duties 0\.0 45\.8 45\.3
- Interet During Construction 8\.09 85\.9 0\.0 85\.9
Total Project Financing 225\.0 110\.0 85\.9 S70\.9 112\.6 483\.5
Annex 8-5
MlAlWUC C iMIA|
*bhedul t Il&r _
mlIIIl")
330b CumsIet1v w m&s Pr\.tIlm
PY/Smeter Dl mbere\.m t Thregh for all sectors TeIeom Sector
EndIng \.In Semeso r Semester la West ALe\.c World Wide
FY60
MRe0 go, im 0\.i I/ 0\.1 /
FY60
6P\. I,im0
Ju 8ne 1066o 0\.2 o0-t --
FY9
\.iwEe 80, 19060 1 \. t
M\. 81, 1969 0\.0 0\.7 -
Jun\. 80, 1000 0\.0 0\.7 -
FY91
O;F $I, 1900 10\.0 10\.7 2\.4 2\.4
June 80, 1001 \.8 20\.0 10\.7 6\.1
FY92
Fe-: 81, 1001 20\.0 40\.0 24\.9 16\.4
Jun\. 80, 1002 58\.0 78\.0 40\.8 80\.6
FY98
ec\. *1, 100 48\.0 126\.0 69\.2 49\.7
Jun\. 80, 1990 40\.0 166\.0 79\.8 70\.9
FY94
9e\. S1, 1008 0\.5 192\.5 0\.09 94\.7
June 80, 1994 15\.0 207\.5 119\.6 119\.6
FY06
D 8\. 1, 1994 12\.0 219\.5 188\.4 138\.4
June $0, 1990 5\.5 225\.0 157\.5 165\.4
FY96
;: 81, 1006 - - 178\.9 178\.9
Jun 80, 19906 - - 166\.5 189\.6
FY97
De\. 81, 1006 - - 100\.6 200\.1
June 80, 1990 - - 201\.7 210\.6
FY90
Dc\. 81, 1096 - - 211\.2 214\.0
Jun\. 80, 1999 - - 228\.2 222\.6
FY00
De $1, 1900 - - 225\.0 225\.0
3/FInanod througI PMF1
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- - - - -- W \. - - - - \. \. *\.
FEDERAL REPULIC OF NIGERIA
-- NIGEIAN TELECCIICATIma! LIMITED (NiliL
FIRST TELEC\.UMICiAIWNS PROJECTF
Iu\.leme itatlon Schedul
Cale_r Y\.r 1i9 1990 1091 1992 39 104
lbxrtwr 12 a 4 1 2 a 1 2 s 4 1 2 a 4 1 2 * I 2*
1\. CeeS te o\.LI\.j 1 3 __ _____
5\. traitnIn -- - 'I
C\. Swlch1n \. l o -ll--0-
D\. Ezteral Ltin Plant _-l D -I--- 1-
E\. L b3stnce -l----- -- - _I -D
Troaneisilon
F\. IeeCeinm\.ition \. - - 0- \.- -
0\. Power and Aircondltloning -I 0 1- - -
H\. Telephone 1- _
S\. 5l\.dinge 1_ I-_ _
J\. Vehicle s- -
LE6W: \. Tender amnouncemeet or call for quetation\.
I Contract Award
O Delivery In Nipria
Intlletion
* End of Instal lotion or Assignment
FEDERAL REPIUEC OF NIGERIA
NIGEIA TELECOWA34ICATIUMS LIMITED(MT)
FIRST TELECAMRIICATIUNS PROJECT
Action Plan for Consultanci Serices
Ca ll for S\.lo\.tion of Commencement IUplemeawstaft
Took Propesale Consultont of Work Flnal Report of R\.esmswdwtion
i lopo \.t Plan\. Msrch 19#7 Notvkr 1967 may 1966 November 1966 J"\. 1996
Lagos Network Audit March 1937 NoVember 19#7 May 19 November 1966 June 199
Financial Systems March 1967 Novmber 1967 May 196 January 1#9 J\. 1960
2\. Project Ma $at,
Planning a Traff ic April 1990 October 1960 Deceber 1960 Quartely Reports Througheet the Project
Adinistration
S\. Financial Managommt April 1990 October 1990 Decetmr 1990 Quarterly Report Threouheet the Prop,"ct
\. - _ _ _~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
FEDERAL REPULC OF NIGERIA
NI
FIRST TULACUICATIUN5 PRDg\.T
Ovet 1I ProlO\.e MaIaassbn Oroanlzatlon Chart
*MANADING tItECTORt
* SUO~
* - ~p-
DIRECTo C OCT DC DC *
FA K m S D COOE AMAI * d
LIZ -\. \.m\.s
* E x * St*S"
* 5 * * 5N Olt>O E***I^
*S * * * IIN l
_ * _ S" _S
E | ExSl S S S S
* S
* * Modiflied Structure tor Projet Implementatlon
SSSSSSSSSSSS Ii
FEDEIIA IqC OF NIMIA
NLIT TUUMICATIUM u
Phatcal ProJoct kunaum\.ot Oonlizatlon Chart
\.j 1W ZE *ROJECT ENE ZONE S Z
tl"L ~ZONAL IUN *\. REOt *ZONAL MAA1 ZOIU1 11 ZONAL MA#A
_ \. _ \.
a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
:
*
~\.* \.
* eS * e
* * \. * S
* * * S S
* | I SWO E S E
t PUM/I LElMl
um w zm m Zoe Im ZDNE~~~~~~~~~~~
mm/nna PLAPAWUW MM/imM PLAN/nmm~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@
- 64 -
Pes1 of 8
FRAL rVIUC WP NII
FrMS TELEC05IICATION5 PIOJCT
lw 190 19K n L > n uo 1
I;
1\. Teleh\. lhGo Capacity: - - - - -
-Lgoso; 115,000 115,000 15,000 1,000 185,000 28,000
-brth Wt 68,620 09,620 150,6 150,M 150,620 15,420
North Eas 2,250 2,20 28,250 28,250 25,250 41,960
-South Wst "0,60o 99,880 99,860 W0,540 "0,860 99,860
-South East 82,100 82,100 90,100 90,100 90,100 146,600
Tote al 84, 80 414,880 8,880 50,880 508,880 677,8$0
2\. Dtret Exchags Ltrn Year-end:
-Lagoa 0,100 90,100 108,100 112,100 110,100 140,100
-North Wet 42,140 48,500 62,140 88,700 96,500 106,000
-North EDt 20,210 21,750 22,250 22,7M0 28,250 25,750
-So0th ot 68,6o0 68,3oo 78,360 78,86O 38,36 68,80O
-South East 55,00 60,00 64,300 66,300 70,000 60,300
Tots I 275,150 209,010 820,160 866,210 894,510 488,610
8\. Exchange Fill (I
ULN 6ix on 7S X On '
-North W\.t 61: 54X 41X 56X 64X 695
-North East 72X 77X 79X S1# 62X 6O1
-South West 64X 6SX 74X 705 841 34X
-South E\. 6OJ 74S 72X 76s 7?9X S5
Total 705 72X 65X 78X 781 O6X
4\. Number of sW Circuits (Lgops) 6,160 6,160 3,160 3,160 3,160 3,160
5\. Copcity of Iatornatioal Tolphoe1 980 900 8,80 $,80 8,0 8,$80
6\. Telex Exchage Capacity:
-Lago 4,900 6,864 6,864 6,564 6,864 6,84
-North west 2,450 8,460 $,450 ' 8,450 8,460 8,450
-North East 9060 050 95 960 9C0 060
-South W\.kt 2,200 2,200 2,200 2,200 2,200 2,200
-South East 2,W0 2,800 2,80 2,800 2,80 2,800
Total 12,300 15,264 15,264 15,264 15,264 15,264
7\. Telex Subscriber LUm Year-end:
-Lags\. \.4,020 4,470 4,700 4,900 5,060 5,170
-North West 7C 9060 1,1U0 1,80 1,660 1,*0
-North East 285 880 860 80 480 480
-South Wet 6o 770 25 30 900 1,110
-South East 690 *10 360 920 1,040 1,150
Total 6,890 ?,840 7,95 6 ,480 9,160 9,780
S\. Exchange Fill (I)
-Lagos sx2 705 75 77X 75x 31i
-North West 810 29S 8451 189 4J% 585
-North East 8O 855 88 40S 45S 51%
-South West 805 8us 885 40X 45X 505
-South East 8X 85X 8751 405 455 50X
TOtl 05 480 52% so5 60% 645
-65-
, ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I
1 (iWO t 1 l 1
9\. Averag NAmber of FaultsfEL per Year
-Natl\.e\.i 1\.7 1\.5 1\.8 1\.1 1\.0 1\.0
-La\. j0\.5 0\.5 0\.5 0\.1 0\.2 0\.2
10\. X of Foult\. Cleared (Natleel)
Within 24 Hor
-WIbtim 48 Hors N 7 7
-Withis 7 Days Sam on US
Within s0 Days so 10s U5 1 005 100
11\. Dal Ten - X Within S
-Natooal 505 S01x so1 S 10015 1005
-Up* sox *OX so on 10,0N 1005
12\. Call Coepletlon Rates
-Interatenoel - Outgoing so 490 45 so 50 5o
-Iteratlonal - Incoming 20X 405 4tX so s0o so
-National (S1D) 21 3OX 405 soI 605 s
-Local - National 805 so 605o 6o 70 7
-Local - La\. 8o 60 705 ?OX
13\. Average Operor Answrtng Time
S Within 10 Seos
-International 20 40 60 70 90 90
-In land 20 40 60 70 90 90
14\. Tel\.com Staff/1000 DEL\. 6O sO Is SO 50 50
!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
I \.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
l~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- 66 -
AM=
Pegs 8 \.f 8
1M am im low 19m 1904
16\. op rstng Rb enuelDEL
e,- 6,705~ -
Cons15\.t (" Prio ) C,002 0Re91 C,7 # ,567 6,817, ,70
Current c,on C,741 9,88r 9,082 10,510 12,27
16\. Telehone Revenue/DEL
Constant ('69 Pries) 8,629 5,678 4U 5,8 5,0l2 5,590
Current $,29 7,002 7,589 *,00 3,089 10,241
17\. T*l-x R v nuo/Suboerib n
ConsRvnt (u9 Prircu) 17,018 2,907 23,285 24,025 28,200 28,770
Current 17,018 84,904 86,078 87,140 8,590 48,502
13\. Cash Operatilng Cost;DEL
Constnt ('69 Prlces) 1,520 1,50 1,474 1,405 1,U67 1,89?
Current 1,520 1,915 2,027 2,125 2,807 2,657
19\. Op\.ratlng Ratio() M 89 81x so So 85 84U
20\. Net Internal Cash GCneration (X) 102X 111X 90 s1X 7SS 179X
21\. Rate of Reurn on Lv\. NFA (Revalued) 7X 18o 18X 14X 186 101
22\., Accounta Roceivables (Days BliIng) 15O 120 110 90 75 60
28\. Current Ratio (Times) 1\.0 1\.8 1\.6 1\.6 2\.2 2\.9
24\. Debt/(D*bt\.Equity) Ratto 87X us l9o 40X 48X s9X
25\. Debt Service Covorage 2\.6 4\.2 2\.0 8\.0 8\.5 4\.1
- 67 -
ANNEX! 4-1
Page 1 of 2
FEDUAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
NIGEIANW TELBCOIMUNICATIONS LDIITED (NITEL)
FIRST SCLICOMHUNICATIONS PROJECT
Historical Incoe Stat _ nt
(Naira Millions)
Revenuel 1985 1986 1987 1988
Billed Revenue_1/ 268\.6 254\.0 336\.1 644\.5
Others 14\.9 6\.9 70\.2 32\.4
Gross Operating Revenue 283\.5 260\.9 406\.3 676\.9
Net Outpayments 21\.3 37\.6 181\.4 143\.9
Net Revenue 262\.2 223\.3 224\.9 533\.0
Operating Expenses
Salaries & Wages 112\.0 107\.0 115\.1 136\.1
Other Operating_2/ 210\.5 191\.6 74\.4 72\.4
Bad Debt Provision 67\.3 14\.7 51\.3 10\.9
Depreciation 3/ 35\.0 26\.8 30\.3 15\.0
Total Operating Expenses 424\.8 340\.1 271\.1 234\.4
Net Operating Income(Loss) (162\.6) (116\.8) (46\.2) 298\.6
Lesst Interest on Loans _41 82\.5 37\.6 2\.0 2\.1
Net Income(Loss) Before Tax (245\.1) (154\.4) (48\.2) 296\.5
Tax-5/ 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0
Net Profit (Loss) (245\.1) (154\.4) (48\.2) 296\.5
t/ Includes inpayments from foreign administrations for incoming
international calls\.
'2/ 1985 figure includes bad debt write off of Naira 44\.2 million
pre-NITEL\.
3/ Depreciation charges are low because some assets which are in service
ari# yet to be transferred from work in progress to fixed assets\.
4/ Interest charges are on cash basis\. Interest charges in 1987 and
1988 lower than in 13986 because unpaid interest charges are not
reflected\.
5,1 Losses can be carried over for three years\.
- 68 -
ANNEX 4-1
Page 2 of 2
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
NIGERIAN TZLZCASWNICATIONS LIMITE (NITEL)
FIRST TZLZCOHOUNICATION$ PROJECT
Historical Balance Sheets
(Naira Mllion)
ASSSTS 1985 1986 1987 1988
Gross Fixed Assets 273\.4 287\.4 301\.8 411\.0
Accumulted Depreciation 79\.3 105\.9 136\.2 151\.2
Total Fixed Assets 194\.1 181\.5 165\.6 259\.8
Work in Progress ii 2,498\.3 2,530\.6 2,679\.8 3,006\.0
Investments 28\.1 29\.7 27\.8 48\.4
Current Assetss
-Cash and Bank Deposits 229\.7 272\.8 249\.4 1,054\.6
-Subsqriber Accounts Receivable 21 179\.6 175\.7 201\.0 272\.0
-Other Receivables 40\.0 105\.2 133\.3 156\.5
-,Inventory 45\.2 48\.7 49\.6 52\.4
Total Current Assets 494\.5 602\.4 633\.3 1,535\.5
TOTAL ASSETS 3,215\.0 3,344\.2 3,506\.5 4,849\.7
LIABILITIES
Equity 1,760\.k 1,605\.9 1,599\.3 2,117\.9
Loans_3/ 526\.0 585\. 609\.9 962\.7
Staff Pension Scheme 14\.4 17\.4 26\.2 27\.5
Current Liabilities:
-Accounts Payable 732\.6 893\.4 1,022\.9 1,448\.9
-Bank Overdrafts 145\.6 205\.7 212\.0 256\.5
-Taxation 36\.2 36\.2 36\.2 36\.2
Total Current Liabilities 914\.4 1,135\.3 1,271\.1 1,741\.6
Total Liabilities 3,215\.0 3,344\.2 3,506\.5 4,849\.7
11, Work in progress includes some assets which are already in service\.
\. 2/'Net of bad debt provision\.
-31 Includes N347\.8 million equivalent of loan for works carried out during FY88
under the Siemens' contract which is to be transferred to NITEL from
the government\.
-69-
ANNEX 4-2
Pae 1 of J
PSNRAL rULIC OF NIEIA
N11*N 1\.ECommickTONS UNTE (NITEL)
FIRST TVECONMUNICATINS POACT
(Naire MlI)
Eat < Fe rwA-t
ReWnue 1929 1990 1i1 1992 1908 1994
Telephone 1,024\.8 2,032\.8 2,8$2\.7 2,792\.4 8,235\.9 4,260\.4
Tolex 104\.0 240\.2 276\.4 806\.7 839\.5 410\.9
Telegraph 8\.2 8\.3 4\.6 5\.5 0\.6 6\.0
International Inpeymente 227\.5 220\.7 230\.9 84\.7 865\.4 420\.6
Ors" Operating Revenue 1,869\.5 2,505\.0 2,914\.6 8,438\.8 $,997\.6 6,110\.8
Lsee: International Outpayeont* 212\.4 207\.9 266\.4 273\.9 804\.5 855\.5
Net Revenue 1,147\.1 2,207\.1 2,069\.2 8,159\.4 8,693\.0 4,766\.8
Operating Expenxw
Salaries & Wage 178\.5 245\.1 284\.0 884\.9 410\.7 634\.9
Other Operating 288\.1 308\.0 848\.5 400\.9 460\.9 530\.0
Bad Oebt Provision 44\.8 50\.6 0\.7 77\.5 90\.0 116\.9
Depreciation 76\.8 167\.0 244\.7 814\.8 422\.7 556\.6
Total Operating Ex e 5 20\.7 772\.0 942\.9 1,127\.3 1,j90\.9 1,740\.5
Net Operating Income(Lose) 020\.4 1,524\.5 1,710\.8 2,081\.0 2,802\.1 8,014\.9
Lee: Interest on Loans 1J8\.0 214\.2 285\.8 807\.1 818\.3 372\.3
Foreign Exchange Lo" 1\.0 1\.1 0\.5 25\.0 127\.3 103\.1
Net Incoe(Loee) Before Tax 408\.4 1,409\.2 1,429\.9 1,099\.5 1,860\.4 2,479\.4
Tax 194\.6 528\.7 572\.0 079\.6 744\.2 991\.8
NHt Profit (Lo") 291\.6 7;95\.5 35\.0 1,019\.7 1,116\.8 1,487\.7
- ---_,-
- 70 -
AMU 4-2
Peg\. 2 \.4 3
FU*I\. UFOIc OF NiZA
NaiOM ThJCUhSZCA?h6U LIMIT QSITh)
FI eCATIS POECT
i \. ii\.m MII)
Eat ece
ASSETS l969 1990 lf1 199 19W 1994
- - _ e~ - _ _-
;irm\. Fixed Asets 1,611\.0 2,669\.1 3,66\.1 4,727\.6 6,54\.2 6,31\.9
AccIulated Depr\.lotio\. 227\.0 394\.T 630\.3 54\.1 1,376\.8 1,935\.5
Total Fixed Assets 1,84\.0 2,464\.4 3,006\.7 8,773\.5 5,166\.4 6,416\.8
Work to Progrem 2,47\.0 2,173\.6 2,516\. 3,966\.1 3,403\.5 2,816\.6
Iavegt\.etg 49\.7 49\.7 49\.7 49\.7 49\.7 49\.7
Current Aseets:
-Cosh anW al\. Deposits 1,202\.5 1,130\.? 1,166\.4 1,966\.3 2,919\.9 4,127\.7
-Subeorilber Acounts Rocev*btI_1/ 56\.5 SU\.0 69\.6 69\.0 632\.9 C61\.6
-0ter Rcelvable\. 65\.6 761\.5 7\.7 67\.7 $99\.6 511\.1
-nveeory 66\.1 125\.0 1SS\.S 304\.3 343\.2 390\.9
Total Current Assets 2,492\.7 2,6\.0 3,17\.1 3,617\.6 4,699\.5 5,681\.4
TOTAL ASSETS 6,373\.8 7,531\.0 8,764\.1 11,627\.1 13,521\.1 15,164\.0
-_-\.--
LABILITIES
Equity 2,460\.1 3,254\.7 4,113\.2, 5,157\.9 6,402\.0 0,052\.8
Loans 1,424\.0 1,975\.7 2,66\.7 4,344\.8 4,600\.2 5,067\.0
Othe 27\.5 27\.5 27\.5 27\.5 27\.5 27\.5
Current Liabilitls:
-Accounts Payable 2,011\.7 1,5\.6 1,006\.2 1,049\.8 99\.2 706\.5
-Taxetos 5\.4 523\.7 572\.0 679\.6 744\.2 991\.6
-Other 406\.0 33\.? 379\.5 8367\.8 351\.0 19\.6
Total Current LiabIlitie 2,453\.7 2,273\.2 1,969\.7 2,096\.9 2,091\.4 2,016\.8
Total LlabilItlee 6,373\.3 7,531\.0 6,764\.1 11,627\.1 1l,321\.1 15,164\.0
1/ Nt of bd debt provieoln\.
- 71 -
ANNM 4-2
F \. WU\.C UF NIIA
K11hN TUEIICTSUMIT ('SIlL)
PWT\.EiUcmATWS PSOJCT
Fur_ Flow
Est\. <_r---F\.roat
im iuo ion 1992 19i
Intrnal Cash Ogwration
-Nst Incam Before Interet 990\.7 1,148\.6 1,8t6\.7 1,480\.1 1,660\.0
-Depreciation 167\.6 244\.7 814\.0 422\.7 55\.6
-Foretgn Exchange Lass 1\.1 1 0\.5 25\.0 127\.6 1"\.1
Internal Cash Gswrstion 1,16\.5 1,8s\.0 1,\.5 1,960\.6 2,U1\.4
Otwrs 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0
Loeans 611\.5 941\.5 1,910\.0 561\.6 857\.0
TffAL SOURCES 1,700\.0 2,880\.6 8,576\.6 2,562\.2 2,989\.4
APPLICATIONS
Capital Expendittur 978\.9 1,149\.2 2,4645\.0 1,127\.2 1,066\.5
Investments 1\.8 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0
Debt Service Long Term Debt
-interest 214\.2 25\.6 807\.1 818\. 8 72\.8
-Principal 61\.0 254\.0 254\.0 254\.0 254\.0
Total De4t Service 275\.2 509\.6 CSl\.0 567\.6 626\.8
Chang In Working Capital 580\.0 641\.6 209\.6 67\.2 1,256\.6
APPLICATIONS 1,780\.0 2,880\.6 8,576\.J 2,562\.2 2,909\.4
- _--
N~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-72-
Annex 4-3
Page 1 of 3
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
NIGERIAN TSLEC0MDNICATIONS LIMITZD (NITEL)
FIRST TELECQMHUNICATIONS PROJECT
Notes and Assumptions for Finahcial Proiections
Price Levels and Tariffs
1\. Prices\. The following inflation and exchange rate were assumeds
Year Foreign Local Exchange Rates
(Z) (Z) Naira/(US$)
1989 4\.9 45 7\.40
1990 4\.9 25 8;\.85
1991 4\.9 10 9\.32
1992 4\.9 10 9\.81
1993 4\.9 10 10\.33
1994 4\.9 10 10\.87
1995 4\.9 10 11\.43
1996 3\.7 10 12\.10
2\. Tariffs\. Tariffs schedules as shown in Annex 4-4 are used\. Domestic
tariffs were increased substantially effective February 1, 1990\. Domestic
and international tariffs are assumed to be adjusted to reflect changes in
cost and exchange rate, respectively\.
Income Statements
3\. Operating Revenues\. The operating revenues are calculated
individually for the f!ve zones\.
li) Telephone and Telex - Traffic revenues are calculated by
multiplying the traffic per line times the average number
of lines, and the average changes for local, long distance
and international calls\. The subscription installation
revenues are calculated on the basis alf existing lines and
additional lines installed\.
(ii) Telegraph - FPrecast to growth by 20 percent per annum\.
(iii) ether revenues - Forecast to growth by 10 percent per
annum\.
4\. Operating Expeises\. The 1perating expenses are assumed as follows:
li) Personnel is average number of employees times average
salary per employee\. The total number of employees is
73
Annex 4-3
Page 2 of 3
expected to increase, gut the staffing ratio is expected to
decrease as measures are taken to improve operational
efficiency, annual salaries are projected to increased by5
percent p\.a\. in real terms, to account for increase in
proportion of skilled staff\.
(ii) Other Costs comprising administrative and maintenance cost
expected to increase in real terms by 5Z p\.a\.
(iii) gad Debt Provision is a percentage of billed revenues and
is projected at 5S\.
(iv) Depreciation has been calculated on a straight line at an
average composite rate of 7\.5 percent on average gross
fixed assets in operation\.
(v) Exchange losses resulting from projected currency
devaluation were charged against operating income per
current accounting practices\.
(vi) Interest expense\. A schedule of assumed rates, loan
amounts available during the 1988-94 period, and repayment
terms for the various foreign/FGN financi4g sources is
tabulated on page 3\.
Bilance Sheet Items
5\. Gross fixed assets reflect the investment program (Annex 3-1) and
transfers from work-in-progress\.
6\. Accounts Receivable is a percentage of total operating revenue\. It
is assumed to decrease to a level of 60 days of billing in 1994\.
7\. Inventories is estimated as a percentage on gross fixed assets in
service and work in progress with a gradual build-up over the period
1988-94 to achieve an average inventory level of 3\.5 of GFA by 1992\.
8\. Other Receivables are assumed to decrease to lOZ of operating revenue
by 1994 and remain at that level thereafter\.
9\. Long-term debt and current portion are based on the project financing
plan, cost of funds and projected debt service, including financing
restructuring\.
10\. Accounts Payable is a percentage of cash operating cost and capital
expenditure\. It is expected to decrease to 40 percent by 1994 and remain
at that level thereafter\.
11\. Capital lavestment\. Details of NITEL's investment program are given
in Annex 3-1\.
- 74
Annex 4-3
Page 3 of 3
12\. Loans and Terms ong\.rteru loans and their terms are assumed as shown
belows
Amount Onlending Grace
(Fz Cur) late of Period Repayment
Currency (Kill) Interest Principal Years
Existing
MPR-N1ITE4 Naira 302 7\.50? 3 10
NITIL-85& 86 lairs 130 9\.00? 3 10
NITZL-87 Naira 152 16\.00? 3 10
NITVL-87 Naira 26 13\.00? 3 10
NITEL-88 Naira 36 15\.OOS 2 10
SIEENS Naira 1,930 8\.00? 3 10
New
IBRD 1/ US$ 225 7\.75Z 5 15
OTHERS US$ 110 8\.00? 5 10
lt Comitment charge lf 0\.25?\.
- 75 -
Annex 4-4
Page 1 of 3
PEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
NIGERIAN TELECOSHUNICATIONS LIMITED (NITEL)
FIRST TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROJECTS
Tariff Schedule
A\. Telephone Services
1\. Installation Charges
Private (Residential) Telephone Line
- Installation Charges N 500\.00
- Advanced Rental for 3 months N 25\.00
- One copy of current National
Telephone Directory (Soft Cover) N 10\.00
- Refundable Deposit N 300\.00 11
For Bus:ness Telephone Line
- Installation Charges N 700\.00
- Advanced Rental for 3 months N 30\.00
- One copy of Current National
Telephone Directory (Soft Cover) N 10\.00
- Refundable Deposit N 300\.00
2\. Extensions
- Each Internal Extension N 30\.00
- Each External Extension I N 100\.00
- Each Socket for Plugs N 100\.00
3\. Monthly Rental Charges
Exclusive Exchange Lines
- Direct Exchange Line N 20\.00
- Direct Exchange Business Line N 50\.00
Extension Lines - Internal
\ - Private N 20\.00
- Business N 50\.00
1/ Effective December 1967\.
- 76 -
Annex 4-4
Page 2 of 3
4\. Call Charges
The Periodic Metering Pulse Method is applied for STD service\. The
unit fee per pulse is 90 Kobo (0\.9 Naira)\. The pulse rates,
(duration) are as followst
Rate Class Distance (in 1m) Pulse Rate 1/
1 Local Call 3 plus 5 minutes 2/
2 lCharging Areas
(short distance calls) 3 minutes
3 < 50 60 seconds
4 51 -- 90 30 seconds
5 91 -- 160 20 seconds
6 161\.-- 250 15 seconds
7 251 -- 400 12 seconds
8 > 400 9 seconds
1/ The off-peak (6pm to 7am) pulse rate (or half rate pulse) is double the
above for each rate class\.
2/ Si-ice October 1988, local calls in all electronic exchanges are timed
at a pulse rate of 3 minutes for the first pulse and five minutes for
subsequent puls"s\.
5\. International Charges
To participate in International Direct Dialing the subscriber has
to register with NITEL, paying a fee of 3500\.00 and making a
rafundable deposit of N1,000\.00 (N2,000\.00 for business lines)\.3/
The international call charges ores
for: Europe N22\.00 per minute
Americas N25\.00 per minute
Asia, Oceania N25\.00 per minute
Africa N16\.00 per minute
For Europe, there is a minimum charge of N66\.00 for 3 minutes\.
31 All Victoria Island subscribers are required to have IDD Services all
on connected DELs\.
- 77 -
Annex 4-4
Page 3 of 3
B\. Telex and TelepraDh services
1\. The Periodic Metering Pulse Method is also *pplied in the telex
inland service\. The fee per pulee ie t0 Kobo\. The pulse rate
varies between 60 seconds and 4\.5 seconds tdepending On the
distance\.
2\. International charges are as follows:
-- Europe N20\.00 per sinute
\ -- Americas N20\.00 per minute
-- Asia, Oceania N20\.00 per minute
-- Africa N15\.00 per minute
3\. The charges for telegrams are:
-- Ordinary 12 words 30 Kobo
Urgent 12 words 60 Kobo
-- Greeting staidard 50 Kobo
-- Press ordinary 50 words 30 Kobo
International All Countries N 5\.00 per word\.
-78-
Annex 4-5
Page 1 of 3
FEDERAL REPUNLIC OIF NIGERIA
VIGhRIJ TLECCWEICATIOWS LDHITD (NITEL)
FIRST TZLWCOMMUNICATIOS PROJECT
Return on Investmnts
1\. Thelproposed project is an integral part of NITEL's 1990-1994
investment program which also includes ongoing works from various projects\.
The inter-relationship betwee the various components of the investment
prograu makes it difficult =n arbitrary to separate the incremental
'benefits and costs of the project and the rest of the program\. Hence the
rates of return computed below are based on the overall investment program
plus the pre-investment in 1989 for the ongoing works\.
2\. The benefit period of the investment program extends from 1991-
2010, ihen on average the equipment provided under the program is expected
to have' completed its useful life\. Without th* program, the network is
expected to deteriorate, resulting in falling revenue and increasing costs
of operation\. The rate of return calculation assumes that without the
program, the revenue and operating cost will remain at the 1990 levels\.
The benefits attributed to the program, due to the increase in traffic on
the new lines connected and higher traffic on existing lines, are assumed
to be the incremental revenue with respect to 1990 level\. Similarly, the
operating costs attributed to the program due to the costs of the new lines
less the operating cost savings realized on existingUlines are assumed to
be the incremental operating cost with respect to 1990 level\. From 1996
on, benefits and operating costs relating to the program ake assumed to be
constant\. No residual values of fixed assets have been taken into account
as the present value of these in real terms,would be minimal\.
3\. A summary of financial and economic costs and benefits are given
on page 3\. All the benefits 4ad costs have been deflated to comparable
1989 prices\. The internal financial rate of return for the program is
estimated at 17\.2 percent\. Adjusting for taxes ard applying a standard
consumer factor of 0\.85 to all local costs to convert them into economic
border prices, the minimum economic rate of return for the program is
estimated at 23\.7 percent\. This return underestimates the benefits to be
derived from the teleconmunications investmefht program\. It does not take
into account consumer surplus and indirect and external benefits received
by non-users of the telecommunications services\.
- 79 -
Annex 4-5
Page 2 of 3
4\. A senSitivity analysis vas made on the economic rate of return
with the following resultst
Sensitivity Analysis on Rates of Return
Economic
Component Chanse (X) Rate of ReXurn (Z)
- Progvan Cost +20 21
I -20 28
- Benefits +20 28
-20 19
- Combination:
Program Cost +20 17
Benefits -20
- Combination
Program Cost -20 32
Benefits +20
- tA1 lU t8L1C Iwe ~OiAQ- h
NIoetm T=W"tTCSTIONS LDIrTW CUM)
FRTETh\.CMgIIcATIOM FROWt
Financial and Sccioaic Ret\. of etsurn
Financial RIN Stress --- ------ FM
Pr"ogr Proram Total (Constant 1969 Priceo) (Cnetaut lot Pri_\.)
Del Iatlor Coat Coat Progrus Oprating Taxes Operating Incrmant\.l Increnta l Ineremt\.l
'eer (1) Local Foeitgn Cont Coat R\.nujut Program 4\._eCt Op\. Net Progra Incremental t, KIM
(Net IDC Cost aTaxes\. Revenwe Nmenett coat op\. cost Rg\.enu\. Imefit
1g 9 W3 640 4 of40*
19 12 248 726 814 a" 84 227 70 4 0
1ow- 186 166 99 1\.13 8W 672 2,69 19 98 (77 SO? to
18W 13 464 1\.92 2\.396 73NS319135 7 143 I\.53" 41 8
11i1 4141 40 367 92 744 8\.69 364 117 U62 a" 73 1'
11104 2 o44242 216 761 28Ui in 7 01
200a lot -: 17 2'1010 4'1 SWU *e in No
191118 ia * 1\. 8 t * 4\.71i
it" 47 179 840
2005 647 1,0 Do9
3008 so 2,05? 1\.210 so ,07 1\.
1005 "7 2\.057 1\.210 54 \.W \.9
2607 847 2 06 1\.210 946 1\.5 \.61
2000 64 2\.06p 1\.210 *4 105 1\.891
2041 66 2,051 121 MO8 9\.0 1\.01*
201 647 2 067 1,210 948 \.5 1,61
PUt a 17\.23 - 3\.75
1\. The KrP of066Ie hasbo apilied to Is\.al \.te and bandit\.
for fAs yew*a 199is 1986\.
S\. The\. rmesatre of return to the mini\. retrom\.
Wi
- 81 -
Annex 6
Page 1 of 1
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
NIGERIA TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANY (NITEL)
FIRST TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROJECT
Selected Documents and Data Available in Prolect File
Draft List of Documents to be sent to Project File
1\. Nigeria: Public Expenditure Review (1986-90), World Bank, October 29,
t985\.
2\. Nigeria: Telecommunications Sector Review, World Bank, August 5,
1985\.
3\. Situation Review 1986: Document prepared for African
Telecommunications Development Conference, Tunis, January 1987\.
4\. World Bank Project Identification Mission, November 1987: Back-to-
Office Report dated December 17, 1987; report on financial consultant
dated December 18\. 1987; report of engineering consultant dated
November 1987\.
5\. NITEL: Memorandum and Articles of Association, dated December 20,
1984,
6\. Nigeria: Fifth Five Year Development Plan for Telecommunications, May
1985\.
7\. Press Briefings on the activities of the Ministry of Communications,
June 16, 1986 and March 6, 1987\.
8\. Reports and Papers presented at the Telecommunications Policy
Seminar, January-February 1987\.
9\. CTO: A Survey of the Telecommunications Network, May 1986\.
10\. BT: Report on the Proposed Organizational Structure of NITEL, January
1986\.
11\. Coopers and Lybrand: Opening Balance Sheet of NITEL based on book
valuation, November\.15, 1986\.
12\. DETECON: Review of NITEL's Development Plan for 1987 to 1991 and Long
Terms Network Development Strategy\.
13\. Hydroservices: Diagnostic Assessment of the Performance of Lagos
Network\.
14\. Peat Marvick: Review of NITEL's financial and accounting system\.
!15\. Peat Xarwicki Financial Presentatiou Document for Bank loan
application\.
N^IG-ERIA A, CHAD \.
FIRST TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROJECT
BURKINA NI G E R X
i FASO Yol R\.4
< 1 \ } ~~SOKOTO tX,BORNO
{ s \\ ~~~~NORTH\. WESTK P 47sk
BENIN (
II) mumwS; g £ - f
KWAR
) B x ~~~~~~~BENUE
(~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~drn th prjet
A n r ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Existing Mkoae tUnks
1AGOS Standr W Eaf S_ i '^s
- AKWA-IBOM I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~zntenuE Boundaries | APPROVAL |
P004486 | Document of
The World Bank
FOR OmCIAL USE ONLY
Report No\. 11512
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PHILIPPINES
COMMUNAL IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2173-PH)
DECEMBER 29, 1992
Agriculture Operations Division
Country Department I
East Asia and Pacific\.Regional Office
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Pesos per US$)
Year Exchange Rate
1981 (Appraisal Year) P8\.1
1991 (Completion Year) P27\.5
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
Metric System
ABBREVIATIONS
BOD Board of Directors
CIDP Communal Irrigation Development Project
CIS Communal Irrigation System
DOA Department of Agriculture
ERR Economic Rate of Return
IA Irrigator Association
IDO Institutional Development Officer
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
IOSP Irrigation Operations Support Project
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MOA Minitry of Agriculture
NFA National Food Authority
NIA National Irrigation Administration
O&M Operation and Maintenance
OMM Operation and Maintenance Monitoring
PIO Provincial Irrigation Office
PCR Project Completion Report
RIO Regional Irrigation Office
SAR Staff Appraisal Report
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission
TOR Terms of Reference
FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER
1 January - 31 December
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
THE WORLD BANK
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
U\.S\.A\.
Office of Director-General
Operations Evaluation
December 29, 1992
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on the Philippines
Communal Irriaation Development Proiect (Loan 21 73-PH)
Attached is a copy of the report entitled "Project Completion Report on the
Philippines Communal Irrigation Development Project (Loan 21 73-PH)" prepared by the
FAO/CP with Part II contributed by the Borrower\.
This project pioneered a new relationship between irrigators and National Irrigation
Administration\. With major irrigator participation and NIA providing financing, advice, training
and contracting services, 144 small, scattered, irrigator-owned rice systems were upgraded,
extended or built\. Despite rebellions, typhoons, cost over-estimates, shortage of Government
funds, and implementation delays, results are very good\. If a way is found to cope with major
maintenance which the owners cannot handle, benefits should be sustained\.
The Project Completion Report is comprehensive and informative\. An audit is
planned\.
Attachment
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the performance of
their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
I
I
I
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PHILIPPINES
COMMUNAL IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(Loan 2173-PH)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No\.
Preface\. \. i
Evaluation Summary \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. iii
PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.
Project Identity \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.
Background \. \. 1
Project Objectives and Description \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 2
Project Design and Organization \. \. 2
Project Implementation \. \. 3
Project Results \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 9
Project Sustainability \. \. 10
Bank Performance \. \. 10
Borrower Performance \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 11
Project Relationship \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 11
Consulting Services and Procurement \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 11
Project Documentation and Data \. \. \. \. \. \. 12
PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 13
PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 15
Related Bank Loans \. \. 15
Follow-on Project \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 15
Project Timetable \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 15
Loan Disbursements \. \. 16
Project Implementation \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 17
Project Costs and Financing \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 18
Project Results \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 19
Status of Covenants \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 21
Use of Bank Resources \. \. \. \. \. 22
MAP: IBRD 16197
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
I
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PHILIPPINES
COMMUNAL IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2173-PH)
PREFACE*
This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Communal
Irrigation Development Project (CIDP) in the Philippines, for which
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) Loan 2173-PH of
US$71\.1 million and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) Loan
108-PH of SDR 10\.8 million (equivalent to US$12 million) were approved on June
8, 1982 and September 15, 1982, respectively\. The project was restructured and
enlarged in scope in March 1988\. However, as implementation costs in US$ dollar
terms proved to be much lower than expected, mainly because of the lower Peso
exchange rate and partly because of the lower actual costs of irrigation works,
the amount of the IBRD Loan was reduced at that time by US$20\.1 million, to US$51
million\. The loan amount was further reduced by US$12\.5 million to US$38\.5
million in December 1989\. The IBRD Loan was closed on November 21, 1991 and the
IFAD Loan on November 15, 1991, respectively, when the disbursements under the
loans amounted to US$38\.1 million and SDR 6\.9 million, respectively\. The
undisbursed balances of US$0\.4 million from the IBRD Loan and of SDR 3\.9 million
of the IFAD Loan were cancelled\.
Parts I and III of the draft PCR are based on the report of an
FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program mission which visited the Philippines in
February-March 1992\. They reflect a review of all relevant project
documentation, field visits to selected project areas and discussions with the
Borrower's project staff and associated Bank staff\. Part II was prepared by the
National Irrigation Administration (NIA) on behalf of the Borrower\.
The Bank staff wishes to thank the management and staff of NIA, and
other involved agencies, for their cooperation and support in preparing this PCR\.
I
- iii -
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PHILIPPINES
COMMUNAL IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2173-PH)
EVALUATION SUMMARY
Objectives
1\. The main objectives of the project were to: (a) support a national
program under which farmers would effectively participate in the planning and
construction of communal irrigation systems (CIS) and, after completion, would
assume full control of the operation and maintenance (O&M) of the systems; (b)
strengthen the capabilities of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) and
its Provincial Irrigation Offices (PIO) to select, design and implement efficient
CISs, and maintain and operate small national systems; and (c) increase rice
production and the incomes of about 24,000 farm families currently growing
rainfed crops by providing irrigation facilities and support services\. To
achieve these objectives, the project, over a six-year period (1982-87), was to:
(a) strengthen 67 PIOs through construction and rehabilitation of existing PIO
offices and equipment workshops and provision of equipment and vehicles; (b)
support training of about 2,600 Institutional Development Officers (IDO) and
technical staff of PIOs, extension staff of the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)
and farmer leaders from 1,900 Irrigator Associations (IA); (c) construct 94 new
CISs on about 22,800 ha and rehabilitate and extend 50 existing CISs to cover
about 10,700 ha; (d) establish a new monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system
within NIA; and (e) finance a consultant study to improve NIA's internal
financial reporting system\.
2\. Total project costs were estimated at US$121\.9 million\. The Bank and
IFAD approved loans of US$71\.1 million and US$12 million, respectively, were to
finance all foreign exchange costs (51Z) and about 35% of local costs\. The
balance of the project costs was to be met by Government (US$33\.8 million) and
through farmers' equity contributions (US$5 million or up to 10% of the initial
investment costs of CISs in the form of land, labor, materials or cash)\. Overall
responsibility for project implementation was with NIA\. Its PIOs, with close
participation from the IAs, were to be the principal functionaries of the
project\.
Implementation Experience
3\. The project had a clear conceptual framework which fitted well with
the Government's development goals of increasing food production and incomes of
the rural poor, using highly participatory approach\. The project was prepared
by NIA and further pr__essed by two successive Bank pre-appraisal and appraisal
missions\. Although the design was basically satisfactory, more attention should
have been given to provision of agricultural support services (including credit
- iv -
and the post-harvest facilities) to the farmers expected to benefit from CIS
development\. The inadequacy of support services, combined with the lack of
suitable drying and storage facilities for the incremental paddy production,
caused the pace of agricultural development during the earlier years to be slower
than expected\. The pace of development improved in later years as coordination
among implementing agencies improved\. Costs of CIS development seemed to be
somewhat overestimated at appraisal as, through adoption of more appropriate
engineering solutions and a shift of emphasis on rehabilitation over new
construction, considerable savings occurred during implementation\. This,
together with the declining Peso exchange rate against the US dollar, provided
room for later restructuring of the project and for enlarging its scope\.
4\. Overall, despite considerable delays, project implementation was
satisfactory\. Initial delays were caused by a 9-month lapse in the effectiveness
of the IFAD loan\. Problems of timely recruitment of staff and procurement of
equipment caused further delays\. But the most serious problem causing
implementation delays was the shortage of counterpart funds\. Other difficulties
included lengthy procurement delays, sporadic law and order problems, delay in
approval of staff positions and reorganization within NIA\. Individual sub-
projects were usually completed in one year or one season, and the standard of
construction, intake structures and distribution works, sometimes built by
farmers themselves, was adequate for the purpose\. However, some inaccuracy in
surveying and mapping resulted in over-estimation of the service areas\. This
also resulted from the failure to exclude from the service area calculation
permanently cropped areas within some subprojects crop lands\.
5\. Because of the substantial savings in the loan funds for reasons
mentioned earlier, the project was restructured and substantially enlarged in
scope in March 1988\. Total project cost was re-estimated at about US$92 million
in March 1988, although this estimate was further lowered to US$70\.8 million in
December 1989\. Project implementation was rescheduled for completion in 1990\.
The Bank loan amount was reduced to US$38\.5 million by cancelling US$20\.1 million
in March 1988 and US$12 million in December 1989\. The restructured project
increased the total service area by about 60%, from the original of 33,500 ha to
53,000 ha\. The service area to be covered by the new CISs increased marginally
from 22,800 ha to 23,800 ha, while the area expected to benefit from the
rehabilitation and extension of the existing CISs almost tripled, from 10,700 ha
to 29,200 ha\. The proposed study of NIA's internal financial reporting system
was cancelled as a similar study had already been completed in 1987 under an
Asian Development Bank-financed project\.
6\. As of November 1991, 136 CISs covering a total service area of 33,315
ha were completed\. These included 45 new CISs (11,210 ha) and 91 existing CISs
(22,105 ha)\. The remaining 29 CISs (20 new and 9 existing), started under the
project, are being completed under the ongoing Second Communal Irrigation
Development Project (CIDP II, Loan 3261-PH)\. These final 29 CISs have already
generated a total service area of about 4,200 ha, or about 23% of the total
potential irrigable area of 18,645 ha\. The loan was closed on November 21, 1991,
3½ years behind schedule, with total IBRD and IFAD loan disbursements of US$38\.1
million and US$8\.5 million, respectively\.
- v -
7\. The other project components, namely the strengthening of PIOs,
training of staff and farmer leaders and M&E, were satisfactorily implemented as
anticipated at appraisal\.
8\. The participatory approach was successfully established and largely
accepted by farmers\. Farmers were organized into lAs and adequate training was
provided\. The operation of the system was generally acceptable and water was
used effectively\. However, subsequent major repairs which required either the
purchase of material or special skills exceeded the financial capacities of the
lAs, which had to wait until NIA could find funds to carry them out\.
Results
9\. General\. Despite various implementation difficulties, the project has
achieved its overall objectives and even surpassed some of the physical
development targets set at appraisal\. NIA was able to build up its own
institutional capability to implement the communal irrigation development program
throughout the country\. The foundation of the participatory approach has been
established and is working satisfactorily\. Although the agricultural impact was
slow, the increases in irrigation intensities and paddy yields are now
satisfactory and higher than the appraisal estimates\. The project has also
succeeded in increasing the farm incomes of about 37,000 farm families\.
10\. Impact\. At full development in 2001, the project is expected to
generate a total service area of about 51,960 ha, comprising 22,800 ha under 65
new CISs and 29,160 ha under 100 existing CISs\. Based on the results of M&E
surveys, the average irrigation intensity has increased by 108%, which is
marginally higher than the increase of 105% estimated at appraisal\. Increases
in cropping intensity averaged 60%, about 10% lower than the appraisal estimate
of 70%\. The lower incremental cropping intensity is due to the higher cropping
intensity of about 124% estimated for the without project situation at PCR,
compared with 96Z assumed in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR)\. On average,
yields of irrigated paddy have increased by about 0\.90 ton/ha, about 50% higher
than the increase of about 0\.6 ton/ha estimated at appraisal\. Total annual
incremental paddy production is estimated at 189,520 tons, 80% higher than the
appraisal estimate of 106,225 tons\.
11\. Economic Rate of Return\. The economic rate of return (ERR) for the
overall project, calculated in 1991 constant prices over a project life of 30
years after completion of construction, is re-estimated at 17% assuming the
import parity price of paddy in calculating the economig benefits\. The re-
estimated ERR is almost at the same level as the SAR estimate, due to the fact
that substantial increases in the service areas and yields of irrigated paddy
offset the low prices of paddy\. The re-estimated ERRs range from 14% for the
construction of the new CIS component to 20% for the rehabilitation and extension
of the existing CIS component\.
12\. Farm Incomes\. The annual per capita income of beneficiaries,
excluding other off-farm incomes and assuming a family of six persons, ranges
from US$33 for the 0\.9 ha share tenant farms to US$204 for the 2\.4 ha Own-er-
operator farms\. The per capita incomes resulting from the rehabilitatton and
extension component are higher than those from the new CIS component\. These farm
- vi -
incomes are about double those in the pre-project period and are close to the SAR
estimates\. The per capita income from the rehabilitation and extension of CISs
for the 2\.4 ha owner-operator farms, accounting for about 10% of the total
farmers in the project areas, is slightly higher than the absolute per capita
poverty income of US$200, while the remaining 90I of farmers are still below it\.
Sustainability
13\. The prospects for sustainability are good\. The seeds of success were
contained in the original project concept, which gave the users responsibility
for the control and care of their own production facilities\. The greatest
weakness lay in the repairs and maintenance function: O&M among CISs is mixed,
ranging from quite good to rather weak\. As in the rest of the Philippines,
disaster ( mainly typhoon) damage is a factor for some systems\. The follow-up
Second Communal Irrigation Development Project (CIDP II, Loan 3261-PH) continues
to provide valuable farmer institution-strengthening and training support,
thereby enhancing the prospects for long-term sustainability\.
Findings and Lessons Learned
14\. The project suffered from some shortcomings in design and
implementation\. The most important ones were funding and organizational
constraints\. The funding constraint resulted from the serious budgetary problems
faced by the Philippines throughout much of the past decade\. The organizational
difficulties arose from a lack of clearly defined responsibilities and
arrangements needed for the concerned agencies to provide the necessary
agricultural support services to farmers and slowed down the pace of agricultural
development under the project\.
15\. The implementation experience suggests a number of lessons\. The most
important ones are:
(a) In order to ensure timely and successful project implementation, the
size of a project and Government counterpart funding requirements
should be realistically assessed, taking into account other priority
demands on the budget;
(b) Given the country's financial problems, the adoption of least-cost
construction techniques, combined with users assuming responsibility
for O&M of small-scale systems, resulted in low-cost irrigation
development which still has good prospects for sustainability; and
(c) Organizational arrangements for the provision of adequate agricultural
support services need to be clearly defined and agreed from the start
of a project\.
16\. These lessons, and others discussed in the body of the PCR, were taken
into account in the design and implementation of the now ongoing Second Communal
Irrigation Project\.
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PHILIPPINES
COMMUNAL IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2173-PH)
PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE
1\. Prolect Identity
Project Name Communal Irrigation Development Project
Loan No\. : Loan 2173-PH
RVP Unit East Asia and Pacific
Country : Philippines
Sector : Agriculture
Subsector Irrigation
2\. Backaround
2\.1 The World Bank's agricultural sector strategy for the Philippines in
the early 1970s included supporting the Government's objectives of attaining
self-sufficiency in cereal production, particularly rice and corn, and
strengthening sectoral institutions\. Self-sufficiency in cereal production was
considered important to raise farm incomes, as well as to strengthen the balance
of payments position\. In support of this strategy, the Bank approved a series
of irrigation development projects from December 1969 to March 1980, as expansion
of the irrigated area was considered to be a major factor contributing to
increased domestic cereal production\.
2\.2 Towards the late 1970s, the National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
recognized that, because of budgetary constraints and decreasing opportunities
and need for large national irrigation projects, its operations must inevitably
shift from large new construction towards the operation, maintenance and
rehabilitation of existing systems\. Many of the remaining opportunities for new
construction and rehabilitation would tend to be smaller in scale and well suited
for communal-irrigation-system (CIS) development\. In consultation with the Bank,
NIA prepared a proposal in 1980 and requested the Bank and the International Fund
for Agricultural Development (IFAD) to assist in financing a program for
strengthening its Provincial Irrigation Offices (PIO) and CIS development\. For
the Bank, this would be the first project in the Philippines focussing entirely
on CISs and based on beneficiary participation\. The Communal Irrigation
Development Project was approved by the Bank in June 1982, with co-financing from
IFAD\. Subsequent related Bank-funded operations are the Irrigation Operations
Support Project (IOSP, Loan 2948-PH), approved in June 1988, and the Second
Communal Irrigation Development Project (CIDP II, Loan 3261-PH), approved in
October 1990\.
3\. Proiect Oblectives and Description
3\.1 The project was designed to support a national program under which
farmers would effectively participate in the planning and construction of CISs
and, after completion, assume full control of the operation and maintenance (O&M)
of the systems\. It would also strengthen the capabilities of NIA and its PIOs
to select, design and implement efficient CISs, and maintain and operate small
irrigation systems\. The project would increase rice production and the incomes
of about 24,000 farm families who were then growing rainfed crops\. The project
was to finance a six-year (1982-1987) development program, incorporating the
following elements: (a) strengthening of 67 PIOs through construction of 23 new
and rehabilitation of 36 existing PIO offices and equipment sheds or workshops
and provision of equipment and vehicles; (b) training of about 2,600
Institutional Development Officers (IDO), technical staff of PIOs, extension
staff in the Department of Agriculture (DOA), and farmer leaders from 1,900
Irrigator Associations (IA); (c) construction of 94 new CISs on about 22,800 ha
and rehabilitation and extension of 50 existing CISs to cover about 10,700 ha;
(d) establishment of a system within NIA for monitoring the implementation of
CISs and evaluating the impact of the project; and (e) consultant study of NIA's
internal financial reporting system and the preparation of a five-year work
program to develop an integrated financial management and reporting system\.
3\.2 Total project costs at appraisal were estimated at US$121\.9 million\.
The Bank and IFAD approved loans of US$71\.1 million and US$12 million,
respectively, to finance all the foreign exchange costs (51%) and about 35% of
local costs\. The balance of the project costs was to be met by the Government
(US$33\.8 million) and through farmers' equity contributions (US$5 million or up
to 10% of the initial investment costs of CISs in the form of land, labor,
materials or cash)\. Overall responsibility for project implementation was with
NIA\. Its PIOs, with close participation from IAs, were to be the principal
functionaries of the project\.
4\. Project Design and Organization
4\.1 The project had a clear conceptual foundation which fitted well with
the Government's development goals of increasing food production and incomes of
the rural poor\. The project concept was based on the participatory approach
developed by NIA since 1976, under a Special Communal Irrigation Pilot Project,
implemented with assistance from the Ford Foundation\. The approach mobilized the
participation of beneficiaries as a group in the planning and construction
process and, after construction completion, in taking over full control of the
O&M of the systems\. NIA's role was limited to financial and technical assistance
in the planning and construction of physical works and in development and
training of lAs\. The project scope was generally adequate\. However, due to
lower implementation costs in US dollar terms than those estimated at appraisal,
mainly because of the lower Peso exchange rate, and through adoption of lower-
- - - - - - -
cost engineering solutions and a shift of emphasis on rehabilitation over new
construction, the project was restructured and enlarged in scope in March 1988
(para 5\.1)\.
4\.2 The project was prepared in 1980 by NIA\. Two successive Bank missions
pre-appraised and appraised the project in early and late 1981\. In general,
project preparation was adequate, but certain institutional and organizational
aspects should have received more attention at that stage\. Fortunately,
additional support for organization and training of lAs, M&E and a consultant
study of NIA's internal financial reporting system were included during project
appraisal\. However, the SAR also did not clearly define the responsibilities and
organizational arrangements needed for agricultural support services, including
credit and post-harvest facilities\. At the outset, the pace of agricultural
development was slower than expected and beneficiary farmers faced difficulties
due to lack of adequate drying and storage facilities for their incremental paddy
production, but the pace increased as coordination among implementing agencies
improved\.
5\. Proiect Implementation
Adiustments in Proiect Scope during Implementation
5\.1 Due to substantial savings in the loan funds, for reasons explained
earlier (para 4\.1), the project was restructured and substantially enlarged in
scope in March 1988\. The total cost was re-estimated at P1,750 million (US$92
million) in March 1988, although this re-estimate was lowered to US$70\.8 million
in December 1989\. Project implementation was rescheduled for completion in 1990\.
The Bank loan was reduced to US$38\.5 million 'y cancelling US$20\.1 million in
March 1988 and US$12\.0 million in December 1989\. The project as restructured
increased the total service area by 60%, from the original 33,500 ha to 53,000
ha\. The service area to be covered under the new CISs increased marginally from
22,800 ha to 23,800 ha, while the area expected to benefit from the
rehabilitation and extension of existing CISs almost tripled, from 10,700 ha to
29,200 ha\.
5\.2 The small size of individual works and their dispersed locations
rendered these works unattractive to contractors\. For this reason, and in order
to increase beneficiary participation in the construction of their irrigation
systems, the proportion of civil works carried out through force account was
increased from 40%, as stipulated at appraisal, to 95%\. The actual proportion
of force account work at project completion amounted to about 86% of the total
cost of civil works\.
5\.3 Based on mutual agreement between the Government and the Bank, the
proposed study of NIA's internal financial reporting system was cancelled at the
time of the 1988 project restructuring, because a similar study has been
completed in 1987 under an Asian Development Bank-financed project\.
General
5\.4 Overall, project implementation was satisfactory, despite the fact
that it took about four years longer than originally anticipated\. The last
extension of six months was mainly to enable NIA to complete equipment
- 4 -
procurement\. Initial delays were caused by a nine-month lapse in the
effectiveness of the loan from IFAD\. Problems of timely recruitment of staff and
procurement of equipment caused further delays\. But, the most serious problem
causing implementation delays was the shortage and late release of counterpart
funds\. Other difficulties encountered were lengthy procurement delays, sporadic
law and order problems, delay in approval of staff positions and re-organization
within NIA\. Individual sub-projects were usually completed in one year, or one
dry season, and the standard of construction, intake structures and distribution
works, sometimes built by farmers themselves, was adequate for the purpose\.
However, some inaccuracy in surveying and mapping resulted in the overestimation
of the service areas\. The presence of permanent crops in some areas and
difficulties encountered in the development of some abandoned lands into
irrigated crop lands also contributed to reducing the service areas\.
5\.5 The other project components, namely the strengthening of PIOs,
training of staff and farmer leaders and M&E, were satisfactorily implemented as
anticipated at appraisal\.
5\.6 The participatory approach was successfully established and largely
accepted by farmers\. Farmers were organized into IAs and adequate training was
provided\. System operations were generally acceptable and water was used
effectively\. However, in later years major repairs which required the purchase
of material or special skills exceeded the financial capacity of the IAs, which
therefore had to wait until NIA could find funds to carry them out\.
Strengthening of PIOs
5\.7 The project was designed to strengthen the capabilities of PIOs to
plan, design and construct CISs through the organization of IAs and the
application of the participatory approach\. This was to be achieved through: (a)
construction of 23 new and rehabilitation of 36 PIO office buildings with staff
quarters and equipment sheds or workshops; (b) provision of office and workshop
equipment, instruments for topographic surveying and hydrologic observations, and
machinery and vehicles for the construction of minor and scattered works under
force account; and (c) provision for O&M activities to 67 PIOs\.
5\.8 Fifty-nine provincial irrigation office buildings, including equipment
sheds or workshops and staff quarters, were targeted for rehabilitation or
construction at appraisal, but this target was changed during the 1988 project
restructuring to 61 office buildings, 47 staff quarters and 52 equipment sheds\.
As of November 1991, 57 office buildings (93% of the revised target), 46 staff
quarters (98%) and 49 equipment sheds (94%) were completed\. The design of the
inspected buildings was appropriate and the quality of construction good\.
However, after some years of service, most displayed signs of insufficient
maintenance, especially to roof and drainage details\. An adequate budget for
annual maintenance operations which is essential to preserve the value of the
investment\.
5\.9 Recruitment of incremental staff and procurement of equipment and
machinery were completed as anticipated at appraisal, though with consi4erable
delays\. However, this had little effect on project implementation sance
implementation progress was slower than anticipated due to counterpart fiar4ang
problems\.
- 5 -
5\.10 The process of strengthening PIOs is a long-term one\. Incremental
staffing, improvements in office accommodation and provision of necessary
equipment have already had a positive impact\. Training, both local and overseas
(paras 5\.11 and 5\.12), coupled with the opportunity to work on actual development
of CISs, is providing valuable experience\. The trend is in the right direction
and encouraging\. The process will certainly need more time, therefore continuing
effort by the Government is required to reach the stage where PIOs would fully
run their operations on their own\.
Training
5\.11 The importance of training was recognized at appraisal and this led
to the component's satisfactory outcome\. The project was to provide: (a) local
training to 2,600 NIA and DOA staff and farmer leaders from 1,900 IAs; and (b)
overseas study tours for two combined teams of farmer leaders and NIA staff,
selected from existing successful CISs\. The SAR described in detail the training
needs and proposed topics relevant for training technical staff to broaden their
background and capacity to handle CIS development\.
5\.12 The training effort surpassed the appraisal targets by about 60% and
from the evidence amongst farmers whom the PCR mission found in the field, the
quality of instruction was good\. Allowing for double counting, about 3,000 staff
and some 6,000 key farmers received training\. Overseas training comprised visits
of two-week duration each by four teams to similar irrigation schemes in Thailand
and Korea and deputation of seven other staff to training courses in USA,
including four who attended EDI training courses at the World Bank\.
5\.13 One criticism noted was that farmers' training courses were
occasionally given late\. For example, the sub-projects had already been taken
over by lAs in some cases before the courses on "water management" training were
given\. This affected initial water distribution arrangements\.
5\.14 The success of this component demonstrates the utility of specifying
in detail at appraisal the content and size of the training program and is a
direct consequence of a clearly identified goal and knowledge of the practical
difficulties of reaching it\.
Communal Irrigation Rehabilitation and Development
5\.15 The preparation and evaluation of sub-projects, and their design and
construction are discussed below\.
5\.16 Sub-project Preparation and Evaluation\. The SAR laid down seven
criteria which a sub-project would have to meet in order to be eligible for
financing\. If the sub-projects were accepted, they were listed for the potential
construction program and the first formal contact would be made by Institutional
Development Officers (IDOs), who would explain the obligations of participation
to the farmers concerned\. If the farmers decided to proceed, two parallel and
linked chains of action were started, one inst-tutional and the other technical\.
IDOs would guide farmers in the institutional procedures to constitute themselves
as an Irrigator Association (IA), recognized by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)\. The technical processes of studies, topographical surveys,
design and location of structures and planning of distribution systems through
- 6 -
procurement to final construction would all be discussed with farmers, stage by
stage, and each stage agreed before the next started\. Farmers participated
physically at topographic surveys and construction stages and contributed equity
for the initial investments of CISs\. After acquiring water rights and receiving
training, IAs accepted full responsibility for O&M\. IDOs remained with each IA
for a year after it became the proprietor of the sub-project and remained in
touch thereafter by regular visits\.
5\.17 Sub-projects selected for construction were evaluated by PIOs,
applying the set selection criteria, and then approved by Regional Irrigation
Offices (RIOs) and NIA headquarters\. In general, sub-project preparation and
evaluation were satisfactory and the selection criteria were useful\. Weaknesses
encountered in some cases, all of which are remediable for the future, were that:
(i) PIOs occasionally attempted to make sub-projects economically viable by
assuming an unrealistically high cropping intensity; (ii) lack of rainfall and
flow data, inaccuracies in surveying and mapping and the overly optimistic
expectation of the development of some abandoned lands into irrigated crop lands
led to the overestimation of service areas; (iii) design was sometimes influenced
by leading farmers, resulting in high development costs due to inclusion of non-
essential infrastructures, such as unduly wide service roads and more culverts
than required; and (iv) involvement of farmers at the planning and designing
stage of sub-projects was limited to an interim committee of farmer leaders, but
not the full assembly of irrigator beneficiaries, which sometimes resulted in the
change of design later on when the full group was constituted\.
5\.18 Design\. Technical design was well adapted to the circumstances\.
Structures, especially in the distribution networks, are simple, which lead to
cost effectiveness in construction and facilitate maintenance repairs using
locally obtainable materials and resources\. During the project period, data
gathering for candidate sub-projects improved, but basic hydrology data
collection, processing and documentation remained weak\.
5\.19 Construction\. Out of the total 65 new CISs and 100 existing CISs
started under the project, 45 new and 91 existing CISs were completed by November
1991\. The remaining works of 20 new and 9 existing CISs have been carried over
to CIDP II for completion\.
5\.20 Rehabilitation works consisted typically of the replacement of a
traditional brush dam or an existing damaged diversion dam by a permanent
concrete structure with appropriately designed arrangements to pass floods\.
These are usually simple Ogee weirs, with sluice gates in addition where
required\. Sluice gates are usually of "stop-log" construction, simple, cheap and
easy to replace\. Some relatively few, rehabilitation sub-projects include lining
or piping of part of the main canal\.
5\.21 New CISs have diversion dams similar in design and construction to
those used for rehabilitation, because the performance required is the same\.
Typically, new CISs have a higher proportion of lined canals than do
rehabilitation works\. The essential difference between new and rehabilitation
works is that a complete distribution system has to be built for the former,
whereas it already existed in the latter case and usually required only small
spot improvements\.
-7-
5\.22 The quality of construction was adequate everywhere and, particularly
on diversion dams, the standard of finish was good\. These structures were
designed by RIOs, which have had considerable experience in this scale of work
over many years\. Construction was frequently also done by RIOs under force
account, otherwise by local contractors\. Farmers themselves with the help of
local masons did most of the works on the distribution systems and the result was
satisfactory\.
Monitoring and Evaluation
5\.23 The project was to establish an M&E system to monitor the O&M of a
sample of CISs during the first three years after the completion of construction
and to evaluate the impact of the project\. The M&E works were carried out by
nine M&E units attached to 12 RIOs\. A central M&E unit was also established
under the project at NIA headquarters for overall coordination, training of M&E
personnel, planning and preparation of final M&E reports\. Generally, the
performance of M&E units was satisfactory and adequate information was collected
for project impact evaluation\.
5\.24 Three types of surveys were conducted, including the baseline, the
operation and maintenance monitoring (OMM), and the ex-post evaluation\. The
baseline surveys, covering 100 preconstruction sub-projects, were conducted for
the periods 1983-84 and 1986-87\. The OMM surveys were designed to collect
information on the operation of CISs, and the use of farm inputs and yields of
paddy after the turnover of CISs to lAs\. A total of 88 sub-projects, each
covering four seasons, were covered by OMM surveys\. However, findings were not
fully utilized by NIA and other agricultural support service agencies for
improvement of project implementation and, in particular, the pace of
agricultural development\. The ex-post evaluations, using 60 sample sub-projects,
were conducted in 1989, 1990 and 1991\. Complete information covering the
baseline, OMM and ex-post evaluation surveys, was available for 22 sub-projects
and this has been used for the project impact re-evaluation (para 6\.3)\.
Participators Approach
5\.25 The project was to strengthen the capabilities of IDOs to organize
farmers into IAs and provide them with training for participating in sub-project
planning, design and construction and with technical assistance for O&M\. This
was to be achieved by mainly providing training to IDOs\.
5\.26 The participatory approach was established and largely accepted by
farmers\. About 46 IDOs, all contractual assignments, have already been working
in PIOs since 1982, but additional training was provided under the project (para
5\.12)\. Despite the lack of employment security and mobility, the performance of
IDOs was generally satisfactory\. IDOs have fulfilled their responsibilities in
the organization of IAs, provision of training and technical assistance to lAs
for O&M, mobilization of farmers for sub-project planning and construction as
well as collection of equity and amortization\. Each IDO is presently responsible
for three completed CISs and one CIS under construction\. The operation of IAs
still depends heavily on IDOs' assistance due mainly to frequent changes in the
members of IAs' Boards of Directors (BODs), whose membership is re-elected
annually\.
-8-
5\.27 As of November 1991, approximately 30,000 farmers were organized into
136 lAs and formally registered with the SEC\. As discussed in para 5\.17,
participation of farmers in planning was limited to an interim committee of
farmer leaders, and this resulted in delays in construction due to changes of
design in some cases, particularly in the distribution systems\. Some service
areas also had to be reduced due to exclusion of lands under permanent crops and
lands abandoned by absentee landlords\. Participation of farmers in construction
was in the form of paid labor and equity contribution\.
5\.28 The operation of CISs was generally acceptable and water was used
effectively\. IAs appoint and pay gate and water tenders and arrange water
distribution collectively\. Because CISs are small, farmers can perceive if their
collective interests and O&M arrangements have been adequate\. Annual O&M costs
have been met through farmers' contributed labor and local materials, while the
costs for hiring gate- and water-tenders and for making minor repairs have been
met through collection of a service fee established by the IAs themselves\.
Difficulties experienced by IAs were in making major repairs which require the
purchase of materials or special skills (para 5\.6)\. Moreover, system operations
have sometimes been affected by changes in members of BODs of lAs\. To ensure the
sustainability of CISs, follow-up training and continuing assistance from IDOs
appear necessary (para 5\.23)\. Other difficulties encountered were the lack of
institutional credit, especially for drying and storage facilities (para 4\.2)\.
5\.29 Equity Contribution and Amortization Payment\. The average up-front
payment of equity contribution from 136 CISs amounted to about 6% of the
chargeable cost of construction, compared with 10% anticipated at appraisal\.
This reflects the low incomes of farmers at the pre-construction stage
(para 6\.6)\. Whenever possible, equity payment was somewhat improved by increasing
the contribution in kind in the form of local materials and labor\. When a system
is turned over to the IA, the amount of unpaid equity is included in the amount
to be amortized subsequently\. Collection of amortization payments averaged about
50%, slightly higher than the national average of 42%\. The low level of
amortization payments reflects the incidence of crop failures due to adverse
weather conditions, high prices of farm inputs, the large number of farmers who
have very small land holdings, and the need to strengthen NIA's financial system
for amortization collection\. Strengthening of NIA's financial system as it
relates to amortization collection is addressed in CIDP II\. Moreover, since
1991, most of the amortization collected has been in paddy, priced at P5/kg,
which poses storage and marketing difficulties for NIA\. Arrangements have been
made between NIA and the National Food Authority (NFA) to minimize these
problems, however quite often NFA does not have adequate funds to purchase the
paddy collected by NIA on this account\.
5\.30 The actual total cost of the project was P1,400 million (US$69\.2
million)\. In US dollar terms, this would constitute almost 98% of the revised
project cost estimated after the 1988 and 1989 project restructuring, and 57% of
the project cost originally estimated at appraisal\. If costs of works necessary
to complete 29 CISs carried over to CIDP II (paras 5\.19 and 6\.2) were to be
included, the total project cost would rise to about P1,560 million (US$75
million equivalent)\.
-9-
6\. Proiect Results
6\.1 General\. Despite various implementation difficulties, the project has
achieved its overall objectives and has even surpassed some of the physical
development targets set at appraisal\. NIA was able to build up its own
institutional capability to implement the communal irrigation development
program in the country, and the foundation for the participatory approach has
been established and largely accepted by farmers\. Although the agricultural
impact was slow, the increases in irrigation intensities and yields of paddy are
now satisfactory and are higher than the appraisal estimates\. The project also
succeeded in increasing farm incomes of about 37,000 farm families\.
6\.2 As already noted (para 5\.19), as of November 1991, 136 CISs covering
a total service area of 33,315 ha had been completed\. These included 45 new CISs
(11,210 ha) and 91 existing ones (22,105 ha)\. The remaining 29 CISs (20 new and
9 existing), started under the project, will be completed under the ongoing CIDP
II\. These 29 CISs have already generated a total service area of about 4,200 ha,
or about 23% of the total potential irrigable area of 18,645 ha\.
6\.3 Impact\. At full development in 2001, the project is expected to
generate a total service area of about 51,960 ha, including 22,800 ha under 65
new CISs and 29,160 ha under 100 existing ones\. Based on results of M&E surveys,
the average irrigation intensity has increased by 108% (ranging from 90% under
the rehabilitation of CISs to 130% under the new CISs) from 76% in the without
the project situation to 184% in the with the project situation, which is
slightly higher than the 105% estimated at appraisal\. Increases in cropping
intensity have averaged 60% (ranging from 40% under the rehabilitation of CISs
to 80% under the new CISs), or about 10% lower than the appraisal estimate of
70%\. The lower incremental cropping intensity is due to the higher cropping
intensity of about 124%, estimated for the without the project situation at PCR,
compared with 96% assumed in the SAR\. On average, irrigated paddy yields have
increased by 29% from 3\.1 tons/ha in the without the project situation to about
4 tons/ha with the project, compared to the appraisal estimates of 22% from about
2\.7 tons/ha without the project to 3\.3 tons/ha in with the project\.
6\.4 Based on the above benefitted areas, irrigation and cropping
intensities and yields of paddy, total annual incremental production of paddy is
estimated at 189,520 tons, 80% higher than the appraisal estimate of 106,225
tons\.
6\.5 Economic Rate of Return\. The economic rate of return (ERR) for the
overall project, calculated in 1991 constant prices over a project life of 30
years after completion of construction, is re-estimated at 17% assuming the
import parity price of paddy in calculating economic benefits\. The re-estimated
ERR is at almost the same level as the SAR estimate due to the fact that
substantial increases in the service areas and yields of irrigated paddy offset
the lower prices of paddy\. The re-estimated ERRs range from 14% for the
construction of new CIS to 20% for the rehabilitation of the existing CIS\. It
should be noted that the SAR used the export parity price of paddy in its ERR
calucluations, although this is no longer considered relevant as the Phihppines
is already a net importer of rice on a small scale and is likely to remaLn s co
any increasing degree over the long term\. For comparative proposes, however, the
- 10 -
re-estimated ERR for the overall project would be about 10% using current export
parity price protection, or 29% using the export parity price projections in the
SAR\.
6\.6 Farm Incomes\. The impact on farm incomes has been analyzed for the
two typical farm sizes of 0\.9 ha and 2\.4 ha farms, accounting for 30% and 55%,
respectively, of the total 37,000 farm families in the project areas\. The
analysis has been carried out in 1991 constant prices and excludes off-farm
incomes\. The annual per capita income, assuming a family of 6 persons, ranges
from US$33 for the 0\.9 ha share tenant farms to US$204 for the 2\.4 ha owner-
operator farms\. It should be noted that the per capita income resulting from the
rehabilitation of CISs is higher than from the construction of new CISs\. These
farm incomes are about double those during the pre-project period and are close
to the SAR estimates\. The per capita income from the rehabilitation of CIS for
the 2\.4 ha owner-operator farms, accounting for about 10% of the total farms in
the project areas, is slightly higher than the absolute poverty per capita income
of US$200, while the remaining 90% of farmers are still below it\.
7\. Proiect Sustainability
7\.1 The prospects of sustainability are good\. The seeds of this success
were contained in the original project concept which gave the users
responsibility for the control and care of their own production facilities\. The
greatest weakness lies in the repair and maintenance function: O&M among CISs
is mixed, ranging from quite good to rather weak\. As in the rest of the
Philippines, disaster (mainly typhoon) damage will be a factor for some systems\.
The follow-up Second Communal Irrigation Development Project (CIDP II), Loan
3261-PH, continues to provide valuable farmer institution-strengthening and
training support, thereby enhancing the prospects for the long-term
sustainability of the CISs\.
8\. Bank Performance
8\.1 The project was formulated on the basis of an approach which had been
pilot tested with Ford Foundation assistance\. The concept was sound and basic
data were sufficient for the scale of works\. However, the SAR did not clearly
define the organizational arrangements for agricultural support services to
farmers in the project (para 4\.2), or the credit needs, particularly for drying
and storage facilities in some areas\.
8\.2 The Bank mounted 12 supervision missions over 9½ years\. At least one
Irrigation Engineer participated in 10 missions and the same project task manager
was maintained during about seven of these years\. Staff continuity and quality
of advice was good\. The Bank demonstrated understanding and flexibility when the
Borrower requested project restructuring and an extension of the implementation
period\. Given that it was possible during restructuring to both increase the
proportion of rehabilitation to new construction works and simplify construction
works, it appears in retrospect that the appraisal did not fully exhaust all
possibilities for least-cost approaches or the best mix of works\.
8\.3 The most important lessons of experience for the Bank are: (a) in
order to ensure timely and successful project implementation, the size of a
project and Government's counterpart funding requirements should be realistically
- 11 -
assessed, taking into account other priority demands on the budget; (b) given the
country's financial problems, the adoption of least-cost construction techniques,
combined with the user having responsibility for O&M of small-scale systems,
resulted in low-cost irrigation development which still has good prospects for
sustainability; and (c) organizational arrangements for the provision of adequate
agricultural support services need to be clearly defined and agreed from the
start of a project\.
9\. Borrower Performance
9\.1 In general, but especially in the organization and training of IAs,
the Borrower performed well\. However, the lack of sufficient and prompt
counterpart funding, because of national budgetary problems, slowed progress\.
Within this constraint, NIA used its best endeavors to obtain scarce funds and,
where possible, NIA used its own corporate funds to bridge gaps arising from slow
budgetary releases\. The resulting success is demonstrated by the good
achievements in physical targets\.
9\.2 The data base for rainfall, stream flows and existing irrigated areas
was not adequate and this affected design and planning as well as system
operation\.
9\.3 The Borrower substantially complied with the loan covenants\. There
were delays in submission of audit reports for some years\. However, this was
attended to and all reports have been received and are satisfactory\.
9\.4 In other respects, the Borrower demonstrated considerable strength\.
NIA, though hampered by a serious shortage of local counterpart funding, is
adequately staffed with qualified and competent professionals\. Project
organization was generally adequate\.
10\. Proiect Relationship
10\.1 Based on the foundation of years of close cooperation, the
relationship between NIA and the Bank was consistently good\. This relationship
was strengthened by maintaining staff continuity on both sides\. At the level of
Government Departments, inadequate integration of irrigation operations with the
agricultural extension services has been noted, although this has improved to
some extent\. In locations where coordination exists, the benefits are apparent\.
Within NIA itself, coordination between the Communal Irrigation Department and
the Institutional Development Department still needs further improvement\.
11\. Consultine Services and Procurement
11\.1 Based on mutual agreement between the Government and the Bank, the
proposed study of NIA's internal financial reporting system was cancelled at the
time of the 1988 project restructuring because a similar study had been completed
in 1987 under an Asian Development Bank-financed project\.
11\.2 Procurement was in general satisfactory, although, due to financial
constraints, the procurement of equipment was considerably delayed and was
completed only during the last loan closing date extension period\. Some local
civil works contracts were also delayed due to lengthy contracting procedures\.
- 12 -
12\. Proiect Documentation and Data
12\.1 The SAR provided an adequate implementation framework for both the
Bank and the Borrower\. The proposed implementation of sub-project preparation,
evaluation and construction; organization of farmers for participation in project
activities; and assigning responsibility for irrigation O&M were well described\.
This framework contributed to the successful implementation of the project\.
12\.2 The provisions of the loan agreement were generally observed\. The
project maintained proper accounting and good data records for the project's
impact evaluation\.
- 13 -
PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE
1\. Implementation Review
1\.1 The information outlined in Part III of the PCR is adequate and
accurate\. The statistics on loan disbursement, project cost and financing,
project implementation results, and other relevant facts are more or less
consistent with records and reports that are kept at the project office\.
1\.2 The analysis contained in Part I presents a comprehensive review of
the whole project cycle from identification, preparation and appraisal to
implementation and completion\. The project's strengths and weaknesses,
implementation problems, potential for project sustainability, and performance
of lender and borrowers are well explained in the report\. Further comments on
Part I, particularly on deviations from SAR targets are discussed below:
(a) Force account works accounted for 85% of total costs of civil works
as against the appraisal estimate of 40%\. This arrangement allowed
for greater flexibility for the farmers to increase their equity
participation during construction\.
(b) Training for NIA staff enhanced their capability to assist farmers
in various stages of project implementation\. Delays in farmer
training were mainly due to inadequate funding and difficulties in
scheduling group training sessions for farmer leaders\.
(c) Hydrology data collection, processing and documentation in the early
years of the project were weak due to the inadequate training,
shortage of experienced staff and delays in procurement of
instruments\. NIA is now paying close attention to the improvement
of this aspect by updating, through studies, the coefficients
currently applied in prediction models of water yields\.
(d) Low equity and amortization collection efficiency were due not only
to floods, droughts, and the unsystematic financing management
system, but also to some behavioral factors like the sudden change
from non-amortizable to amortizable CISs\. (Before the project
[CIDP] all CISs were constructed by government free !of charge to
farmer beneficiaries)\. The problem was aggravated because some
radical groups and lawmakers advocate abolition of irrigation fees,
thereby undermining farmers willingness to pay\.
(e) The various lessons learned in CIDP implementation guided NIA to
promulgate and develop many simple strategies that may be
instrumental in preparation and management of similar on-going and
future projects\.
- 14 -
1\.3 Bank participation was satisfactory during project preparation and
implementation\. It responded favorably to numerous GOP requests such as for loan
extension and for higher disbursement rates at times of tight and difficult
financial situations\. The observations on project cost presented in Para 8\.3 of
Part I are reasonable\. Overestimation of project costs may have been minimized
also if local and foreign inflation rates could have been predicted with greater
accuracy\. (For instance, it was not expected that the Peso would depreciate from
P8\.10:US$ 1 in 1982 to P27\.5: USS 1 in 1991)\.
1\.4 The most serious constraint to project implementation was inadequate
government counterpart funding and untimely budget releases\. Budget difficulties
were experienced by all government agencies in the early 1980s and during the
last year of the project (1990-91)\. The effect was to delay project activities,
thereby forcing government to request four extensions of the loan closing date\.
1\.5 The weaknesses of NIA in project preparation, particularly in
hydrological data generation that caused overestimation of the service area at
feasibility level were recognized and relevant measures have already been taken
to avoid similar problems in the future\.
1\.6 The physical targets set at appraisal were generally attained but the
target for the actual area developed may not be achieved because of the severe
effect of water shortages due to droughts and forest denudation\. Government has
required this factor (including farmers' awareness of the need for environmental
protection) to be included in the design of future projects\.
1\.7 In CIDP I, institutional linkage among NIA, IA members, and DA's
agricultural technicians to support and assist farmers in crop production did not
materialize, resulting in a slow attainment of targeted output\. This experience
has served to provide NIA with lessons to improve the process and to give
emphasis to better coordination in preparing agricultural development plans in
monitoring and evaluating implementation, and in modifying targets whenever
necessary\.
1\.8 Generally, the Borrower has complied with loan covenants\. Problems
with audit reports and procurement were properly analyzed and corrective steps
were taken by NIA and the government to avoid a recurrence in succeeding
projects\.
1\.9 There was a cordial and cooperative relationship between the Bank and
the Borrower for the entire project period\.
1\.10 As mandated in the loan agreement the Cooperating Institution (the
Bank) performed almost all the works for the Co-financing Institution (IFAD)\.
The co-financier was considerate and cooperative in granting various government
requests\. However, tardiness in replying to various government inquiries and
requests contributed to some extent to the delays in project execution\.
- 15 -
PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION
1\. Retoed Bank Loa
Yew of Stbtus
Loain No\. Purposes Approval
Loan 637-PH Upper Pampanga River 1969 PPAR# 3063 6/1/80
Loan 984-PH Auror - Penaranda 1974 IER # 8494 3/1/90
Loan 472-PH
Loan 1080-PH TawEc Itrigation System Improvement 1974 PPAR # 5960 12/1/85
Loan 1227-PH Chico River Irrigatbon 1976 PPAR # 7923 6/1/89
Loan 1387-PH JalaL, Irrigation 1977 PPAR # 5969 6/1/89
Loan 1154-PH Mhgat River - Stage I 1976 PPAR # 7923 I1/8l>
Loan 1567-PH Magat River - Stage II 1978 PPAR # 7923 6/1/89
Loan 1e39-PH Magat River - Stage 11/krigabon 1978 PPAR J 7923 2/11/90
Loan 1414-PH National Irrigation System Improvemert I 1977 PPAR # 8390 6/1/89
Loan 1526-PH National Irrigation System Improvemert II 1978 PPAR # 7820 8/1/89
Loan 1809-PH Medium-Scale Irrigation 1980 PCR unde preparation
Loan 2948-PH Irrigation Operations Support 1988 Ongoing
Loan 3261 -PH Second Commurlal Irrigation Dovelopmert 1990 Ongoing
Folow-on Probdt
Name: Second Communal Irrigation Developmert Project (CIDP II)
Loan: 3261 -PH
Loan Amount: US$4a\.2 million
ate of Board Approval: April10,1990
Commowita:
CIDP 11 aims to provide for conbinLity and improvemerts in the impilmentation of the ongoing communal
irrigtion development efforts in the Philippines, based on experience gained under the first Bank and IFAD-financed CIDP
(IBRD Loan 2173-PH/IFAD Loan 108-PH) It would help to develop about25,000 ha of CISs in impoverished
rural locatiors, thus contributing to Government's goals of poverty allevition and food sufficiency,
and would strengthen both NIA and lAs in the fields of managemert, financial administration,
design and constuction, and operation and maintenance of communal facilties\. Tho project
also provides funds for the compleibon of 29 incomplete CIS& carried over from CIDP I\.
The project is schoduled for completion in 1996\.
2\. Proiot Timtabb
Date Planned Date ActuAl
Preparabon _ 1979-80
Pro-Appraisal - May-June 1981
Appraisal _ Sept-Oct 1981
Negotiation _ April 26-30,1982
Board Approval _ Juno 8, 1982 (IBRD)
Sept 15, 1982 OFA0
Loon,Credit Signature June 30,1982 (IBRD)
_ Nov\. 16,1982 (1FAD)
Loan Effectivenen April 8,1983 (IBRD)
March 29,1983 OFAD)
Complbtion June 30,1987 June 30,1991
Closing June20,1988 Nov\. 21,1991 (BRD)
June 30,1991 (IFAD)
- 16 -
3\. Loan Disbursements
Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements (USS million)
Fiscal Years
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Appraisal Estimato
IBRO 3\.6 15\.5 30\.0 45\.8 61\.7 71\.1
IFAD 0\.4 2\.4 4\.8 7\.4 10\.1 12\.0
Total 4\.0 17\.9 34\.8 53\.2 71\.8 83\.1
Revised
IBRD 51\.0 38\.5
IFAD 12\.0 12\.0
Total 63\.0 50\.5
Actual
IBRD 1\.70 9\.8 12\.8 19\.1 20\.5 23\.7 26\.9 29\.9 37\.7 38\.1
IFAD 0\.03 0\.7 2\.2 3\.2 3\.3 3\.9 5\.1 6\.5 8\.5 8\.5
Total 1\.73 10\.5 15\.0 22\.3 23\.8 27\.6 32\.0 36\.4 46\.2 46\.6
=== === ==-S = =:a= \.-- M-
Actual as % of SAR 43 59 43 42 33 44 63 72 91 92
Date of Final IBRD Loan: November 21, 1991 - IFAD Loan: June 30, 1991
Disbursement
Comments: Despite upward adjustments in the physical targets, but as a result of the drastic fall In the
value of Peso vis-a-vis US dollar and savings arising from lower actual costs of irrigation works, IBRD
loan was reduced to US$38\.5 million through cancellations of US$20\.1 million, eff ective March 3, 1988,
and US$12\.5 million, effective December 22, 1989\. The undisbursed balance under the Bank loan of
US$0\.4 million was cancelled on November 21, 1991\. IFAD loan was maintained at US$12 million\.
Toal disbursement of IFAD loan was SDR6\.95 millin (US$8\.5 million)\. Since FY 1988, actual
disbursements have been compared with the revised disbursement schedule of IBRD/IFAD loan
amounts\.
- 17 -
4\. Prolect Implementation
Key Indicators as of December 1991
Appraisal Revised Actual Actual as %
of Revised Targets
No\. of CISs:
- New 94 65 1/
- Rehabilitated 50 100 1/
Service Area (ha):
- New CISs 22,800 23,800 2/ 22,800 3/ 96
- Rehabilitated CISs 10,700 29,200 2/ 29,160 3/ 100
Strengthening of PlOs:
- Office Buildings 59 61 57 93
- Staff Quarters 59 47 46 98
- Equipment Sheds 59 52 49 94
Training:
- Local (man-days) 55,520 100,710 90,130 89
- Overseas (man-days) 2\.760 1,545 1,671 108
Consultant Service (man-months) 65 4/
Irrigation Systems:
- Diversion/Intakes (No\.) 144 163 149 91
- Main and Lateral Canals (km) 812 800 747 93
- Service Road (km) 200 236 234 99
- Distribution Canals and Drains (km) 2,097 652 624 46
- On-farm Ditches and Drains (ha) 33,500 53,000 46\.232 87
Irrigator Associations (lAs):
- No\. of lAs 136
- Service Area (ha) 33,500 33,100
- Number of Farmers 24,000 30,000
1/ 20 incomplete new CISs on 11,590 ha out of the total 65 CISs on 22,800 ha, and
9 Incomplete existing CISs on 7,055 ha out of the total 100 CISs on 29,160 ha, have been carried over
to CIDP lI for completion\.
2/ Total service area was increased to 65,200 ha in March 1988, but reduced to 53,000 ha in December 1989\.
3/ Total service area at full development\.
4/ Cancelled at 1988 project restructing\.
- 18 -
5\. Proiect Costs and Financins
A\. Project Costs
SAR I/ Actual
Peso USS Peso USS
million million million million
Strengthering of PlOs
Buildings 40\.30 4\.98 64\.02 3\.47
Machinery and Equipment 178\.90 22\.09 346\.88 2/ 14\.93
Training 31\.30 3\.86 45\.45 2\.33
Sub -total 250\.50 30\.93 456\.35 20\.73
Irrigation Systems
Diversion Works, Main Canals and Roads 479\.40 59\.19 656\.95 3/ 34\.22
Distribution and On-farm 137\.00 16\.91 15\.87 0\.79
Sub-total 616\.40 76\.10 672\.82 35\.01
Land Acquisition 36\.10 4\.46 0\.82 0\.04
Monitoring and Evaluation 15\.10 1\.86 17\.32 0\.87
Engineering, SupeNrsion and Administrabon 58\.40 7\.20 198\.43 2/ 9\.56
Interest during Construction 41\.07 1\.96
Financial Reporting System Study 2\.00 0\.25 0\.00 0\.00
Front- End Fee 8\.50 1\.05 11\.56 1\.05
Sub-total 120\.10 14\.82 269\.20 13\.48
Total 987\.00 121\.85 1,398\.37 69\.22
1/ Including physical and price contngenci s\.
2/ Substantially more procurement and at the increasing unit cost\.
3/ The rehabilitation works of existing CISs were more than triple the SAR's targets\.
4/ Unit cost lower than estbmated at SAR and most of the works were carried out through hired labor\.
B\. Financina (USS million)
SAR R Id / AcdLs
US$ USS US$
million % million % milion
IBRD/IFAD 83\.10 68 50\.50 71 46\.60 67
Farmers' Contributon 5\.00 4 3\.00 4 1\.00 I
GOP 33\.75 28 17\.30 25 21\.62 32
Total 121\.85 100 70\.80 100 69\.22 100
1 / After March 1988 and December 1989, IBRD loan cancellations\.
- 19 -
6\. Project Results
A\. Direct Benefits
Appraisal Actual/PCR
Estimate Estimate
Service Area (ha) 1/
- New CiSs 22,800 22,800
- Rehabilitated CISs 10,700 29,160
Total 33,500 51,960
Incremental Paddy Production (tons) 106,225 189,520
Beneficiaries (No\.) 2/ 24,000 37,000
Employment (man-days million)
- O&M of Completed Systems 0\.15 0\.25
- Farm Activities 3 4\.70
I/ Potential irrigable areas at full development including potential
irrigable areas of 29 incomplete CISs\.
2/ Number of beneficiaries increased by about 20% due to substantial
increase in the service area\.
B\. Economic Impact
Appraisal Actual/PCR
Estimate Estimate
ERR (%) 19 17
Assumptions
Project Lfe (years) 30 30
Full Development (year) 1990 2001
Standard Conversion Factor 0\.82 0\.83
Farm Labor Conversion Factor 0\.52 0\.60
- 20 -
C\. FINANCIAL IMPACT
Per Capita Income
Appraisal Estimate V > Actual/PCR Estimate Y 31
Pre-Project With Project Pre-Project With Project
___________-\.______________(USS)
---- -------------
A\. Owner-Operator
New CISs:
- 0\.9 ha 32 106 24 76
- 2\.4 ha 89 283 59 184
Rehabilitated CISs:
- 0\.9 ha 45 106 40 81
- 2\.4 ha 130 283 100 204
B\. Lease Holder
New CISs:
- 0\.9 ha 15 53 14 (9) 45 (35)
- 2\.4 ha 40 158 32 (23) 101 (76)
Rehabilitated CISs:
- 0\.9 ha 22 53 23 (16) 48 (33)
- 2\.4 ha 59 158 53 (38) 116 (86)
1/ Excluding off-farm incomes\.
2/ In mid-1982 constant prices and at the exchange rate of US$1 - P6\.1\.
3/ In 1991 constant prices and at the exchange rate of US$1 - P27\.5\.
Note: Figures in brackets are for share tenants\.
- 21 -
7\. STATUS OF COVENANTS
Loan Appraisal
Agreement Report Subiect Action Required Deadline Status
3\.02 (b) 5\.06 Special Account Borrower to 30\.11\.82 Complied
establish (loan
effective)
4\.02 (b) 4\.23 Terms of Reference NIA to furnish 31\.12\.82 Complied
(TORs) for
consultant study
1/
4\.06 4\.15 Implement phased NIA to begin to 31\.12\.83 Complied
program for implement
uniform criteria
and design
standards for all
communal systems
4\.07 4\.16 Sub-project NIA to submit Complied
evaluation reports
4\.8 4\.19 Monitoring and NIA to submit 31\.12\.82 Complied
evaluation
5\.02 5\.12 Audit Report NIA to submit 9 months Complied
after FY
0\.103 (c) 8\.09 Report on water NIA to send 31\.12\.83 Complied
charges 2/
0\.04 5\.06 Operating account Borrower to 01\.01\.83 Complied
cause NIA to
open and
maintain
I/ TORs prepared by NIA and concurred by the Bank\. However, at the Government's request,
the proposed study was deleted from the project during the 1988 project restructuring\.
2/ NIA has prepared a paper on the "Policy Issues and Operational Strategies for
Irrigation Fee Pricing and Cost Recovery" and an "Irrigation Study" under the
Agricultural Sector/Inputs Project (Loan 2469-PH), which covers pricing of irrigation
water\. The Government is committed to improve cost recovery for irrigation and is
implementing measures in this aspect under the recently approved Irrigation Operations
Support Project (Loan 2948-PH)\. However, the Government believes that the scope for
increases in serivce fee rates, before substantial improvement in the overall national
economy occurs, is difficult\.
- 22 -
S\. USE OF BANK RESOURCES
A\. Staff Inruts
Stage of Project Cycle Actual (Staff Weeks)
Pre-appraisal (LENP) 21\.9
Appraisat through Board
Approval (LENA + LENN) 72\.9
Supervision 98\.3
P C R 6\.9 I/
TotaL 220\.0
af Estimate
B\. MISSIONS
Stage of Month/ | No\. of Days Specialization | Performance | Trend Types of
Project Year Persons in Represented If Ratfng Problem sJ
CycLe I Field I status b/
Pre-Appraisal 5-6/81 3 55 A,B,E
AppraisaL 9-10/81 6 140 A,2S,C,D,E,F
Supervision:
I 10-11/82 4 7 3B,F 1 N
II 5-6/83 3 14 B,C,D 1 1 F
III 10/83 1 7 B 2 1 F
IV 6-7/84 1 10 B 3 2 F
V 3/85 1 7 8 A B C D F
3 1 1 2 2
VI 4-5/86 2 7 28 2 1 1 2 2 F
VII 3-4/87 2 14 B,C 2 1 1 2 2 F
VIII 3/88 1 7 B 2 1 1 2 2 F
IX 11/88 2 30 A,S 2 1 1 2 2 F
x 3/89 !/ 1 7 B 11 1 2 1 F
Xi 8f90! 1 10 A 1 1 1 1 2 F
XII 8/91w 1 13 B 3 1 1 2 2 F
P CR 2-3/92 3 42 B,2C 2 F,M
TOTAL 370
af A: AgricuLture; B s Engineer; C n Economics; D 2 Finance; E u Institution; and F a SocioLogy/Anthropology\.
b/ Performance Rating: 1 a Problem-Free or Minor Problems; 2 x Moderate Problems; and 3 a Major Problem\.
_/ Trend: 1 a Improving; 2 z Stationary; and 3 a Deteriorating\. After 1985, the cLassification was broadened to show performance
ratings for each of the folLowing: A a AvaiLability of Funds; B a Project Management; C * Development Inpact; and D a Overall
Status\.
d/ Type of problems: Fx Financial; M a Management; and T a TechnicaL\.
_/ During the period, CIDP I took place in additiqn to the time recorded in this tabLe\.
IBRD 16197
tati° l20 124° ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~JANUARY 1002
CLASSIFICATION OF PROVINCES PHILIPPINES
BY GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS
I ILOCOS VI WESTERN VISAYAS COMMUNAL IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT
2 Abra 38 Capiz
3 llocos Su, 39 Antique PROJ ECT
20° 4 Mountain 40 i Boilo 80
La Union 41 Negros Occidental PROJECT PROVINCES IRRIGATION WORKS)
5 La UnionVillCENTRAL VISAYAS
6 Bge 42 CebuB e * CIP (NEW PROPOSED SAMPLE SUBPROJECT)
2 Pangasinan 43 Negros Oriental
J1CAGAYAN VALLEY 44 BaoOt, A CIS (REHABILITATION SAMPLE SUBPROJECT)
8 Batanes 45 Siqujor
9 Cagayan "VIIEASTERN VISAYAS ROAYS
10 KalingaApayao 46 Northern Samar +8* RAILWAYS
I IIabl 47 SaMar RIER
12 Iugo 48 Eastern Samer RIVERS
13 Noona Vizcaya 49Lye- RVICA1OUDRE
"14 1urinn0 5ij Southern Leyiteau RVICA OUDRE
1 CENTRAL LUZON IX WESTERN MINDANAO REGIONAL BOUNDARIES
16 Nueva Ecija Ii Zamboanga del Nore ) I i
16 Tarlac 52 Zamboanga del S INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
17 Zambalas 53 Basilan(I
Il Pamping\. 54 Solo N NOTE Institutional deielopment co:mPonents not Mcluded in
19 Bolacan ss Tewi Tawi a Baanes, Oasilan, Sulu, Twm Twoii and Camioeii,,
20 Batman X NORTHERN MINDANAO
IV SOUTHERN TAGALOG 56 Surigao del Norte tt
21 Quezon 57 Camiguin San 6
J2 RCzat b8 Agusun del Norte 4 I 5
24 LttunJS b9 Mismia Orientatl 0 1 S 0 150 200 260 300
16° 25 Batangas 60 Misamis Occidental 7 KILOMETERS T6O
26 Marinduque 61 Bukidnori 0 so too I60 200
27 Mindoro Oriental 62 Agustn del Sur
28 Mindoro Occidental XI SOUTiERN AMiNDANAO MILES
29 Romnblon 63 Surigao del Sur ) t
30 Palewan 54 Da ua Oriental 2 < ¾
V BICOL 55 Dteto del Noert
31 Camarines Norte SB Dawao del Sur
32 Cararinesn ur X7 South Cotabeto 01onBP II /NS
33 Catanduanes XII SOUTHWESTERN MlIP IL PPNIVE 20
34 Albay 6B Letnsa del Nonte \.
35 Sorsogon B9 Lanao del Sur
36 Masbate 720 North Catabato ,7at
36 Macbate 71 Maguildanao
72 Sultaii Kuderat
30~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~0\.
S O IJrTh C H I N A L28AAI
h \\ / -g W sa ^N<f )] j >~~~~~~~~~~vi 48
PANWANV DANA StA i
to ''"' d
MALOYSSA I 9Iomt
N U \.r \.i,1d I A _
I j I 12 B° l-N | APPROVAL |
P102475 | Page 1
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
1
CAMBODIA
GPOBA COMMITMENT DOCUMENT
Project name:
Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia (P102475)
Objectives:
The objective of the project is to bring basic voice telephony services to low income
families in rural areas of northern and northwestern Cambodia\. A secondary objective is to
demonstrate a private-public partnership through the output-based aid (OBA) subsidy approach\.
Summary of changes made to project scope:
Two changes have been made to the original
project scope based on the market update conducted in November 2007:
a)
The original list of target locations has been updated\. The project will provide a one-time
capital subsidy for the provision of voice telephony service in locations that would
otherwise be considered commercially unviable by the telecommunications industry\.
b)
The original design separated the two types of service: network coverage (sub-project A)
and public access to voice telephony (sub-project B)\. The two sub-projects have now
been combined into one package in which the winning Service Provider will be obliged
to provide both network coverage for voice telephony and one public access point in each
of the target locations\. The public access points in each of the locations will ensure that
the poorest households have access to voice telephony\.
Approach to competitive tender:
To ensure that the project will result in least-cost solutions,
the project will involve competitive tendering\. It is envisaged that a single contract will be
awarded for all target locations to the single Service Provider requesting the lowest subsidy\.
Voice telephony service can be provided with any technology chosen by the Service Provider
who will construct and operate the systems\. Prospective bidders can also offer additional services
in their proposals to justify the proposed and any additional investment\.
Target locations:
The target locations are in four provinces of the country which are home to a
large number of very poor households, with income levels estimated to be around 50% less than
the 2006 GNI per capita for Cambodia of US$480
1
,
and in some extreme cases such over 50% of
the population in Preah Vihear and Odtar Meanchey subsisted below the poverty line in 2003-04\.
Total expected beneficiaries:
The target locations consist of approximately 261,000 people or
52,200 households
2
\.
Outputs
:
For basic voice telephony service:
Volume of incoming and outgoing call minutes per month (based on network traffic
measurement)
Demonstration of network coverage in target locations, namely by submission of lists of
locations covered to date\. This list will be verified (Independent Verification Agent) by
1
A
National Institute of Statistics survey conducted in 1999 found that the average monthly household
income in rural locations was US$82 (or US$16\.42 per person)\.
2
There are on average 5 people in a Cambodian household\.
48621
Page 2
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
2
matching the locations list with a separate list of subscriber numbers and corresponding
addresses
3
(payment trigger for disbursement)
;
Provision of service at a quality (with respect to network congestion and dropped calls)
similar to the rest of their network;
Provision of service at the same prices as in other locations (e\.g\. Phnom Penh)\.
For public access points:
Volume of incoming and outgoing calls from the public access numbers;
Existence of public access points with active network access in 80% of villages in the
target locations to be verified
(payment trigger for disbursement)
;
Availability of public access points for 8 hours a day, five days a week (excluding mid-
day break)\.
Total investment (GPOBA subsidy + Service Provider investments)
:
Estimated at $4,751,914
(includes operators investment of $2,375,957, of an estimated 50% of total costs)
GPOBA funding requested (Window 3):
$2,625,595 (Annex 1 Project Cost Table)
Total GPOBA funding to date (GPOBA Technical Assistance Window 1):
$491,737
GPOBA Window 1
Phase I consultancy
$66,000
Phases 2, 3 and update of
Phase 1 consultancy
$328,000
WB/GPOBA supervision
$97,737
TOTAL $491,737
GPOBA subsidy efficiency
:
$9\.10/person or 50% of total costs\.
Economic and financial returns:
The economic internal rate of return (E-IRR) is 71%\. A
discount rate of 18% is used as it reflects the expected required return for an investment in the
country\. If no subsidy were given, the financial internal rate of return would be 4\.5%, too low for
an investor to be attracted to this project (the net present value using the 18% discount rate is of
US$2\.2 million\. The expected subsidy in order to make this project attractive to an investor (that
is, to make the internal rate of return equal to the discount rate) is of US$2\.4 million (see Annex
6)\. While the project is technology neutral, for the purposes of project costing and subsidy
calculations, it will be assumed that the Service Provider will choose to provide a voice telephony
service using mobile technology\. Proceeding on that assumption, the project will support the
provision of about 33 Base Transceiver Station (BTS) rural sites, most likely 10 in Banteay
Meanchey, 5 in Otdar Meanchey, 3 in Pursat and 15 in Preah Vihear\.
Grant recipient
:
Kingdom of Cambodia
Financial management
:
Risks are assessed as low\. Private operators competitively selected and
GPOBA subsidies disbursed to a Service Provider through direct payment upon outputs certified
by the Independent Verification Agent\. An Independent External Auditor will be appointed to
audit the Project Financial Statements at the end of the project\.
3
Operators will be able to provide a list of numbers and corresponding addresses as address registration is
necessary to purchase a SIM card in Cambodia\. This information will be verified by the Independent
Verification Agent\. The coverage of each location can then be roughly mapped out with the locations of
households with voice telephony\.
Page 3
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
3
Disbursement schedule:
10%
of contract amount upon contract award;
30%
of contract amount upon successful provision of network coverage in 50% of target
locations and installation of public access points in 40% of target locations
(refer to
aforementioned outputs)
;
30%
of contract amount upon provision of network coverage in 100% of target locations and
installation of public access points in 80% of target locations;
30%
of contract amount upon supervision of all target locations to check upon network
coverage, existence of public access points with active network access, and availability and
quality of service for one year\.
Procurement
:
All contracts for goods, works and non-consulting services shall be procured in
accordance with the World Banks Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA
Credits dated May 2004 revised October 1, 2006, and all contracts for consultant services shall
be procured in accordance with the World Banks Consultant Guidelines: Selection and
Employment of Consultants by World Bank Borrowers dated May 2004 revised October 1,
2006\. The main procurement-related issues and risks and the mitigation measures are provided in
Annex 3\. With incorporation of the mitigation measures into the procurement design and
implementation arrangements, the overall project risk for procurement is rated as Substantial\.
Environmental clearance
:
Category C rating assigned to this project\.
Government endorsement
:
Yes, MPTC
Exchange rate
:
3,887 Cambodian Riel = US$1 as of 7 April 2008
Page 4
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
4
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ACG
Anti-Corruption Guidelines (of the WB)
BMC
Banteay Mean Cheay
BTS
Base Tranceiver Station
CSO
Civil Society Organization
E-IRR
Economic Internal Rate of Return
E-NPV
Economic Net Present Value
EMP
Environmental Management Plan
F-IRR
Financial Internal rate of Return
FM
Financial
Management
FMM
Financial Management Manual
F-NPV
Financial-Net Present value
GNI
Gross
National
Income
GPOBA
Global Partnership for Output Based Aid
IBRD
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICT
Information and Communications Technology
IDA
International Development Association
IFR
Interim Financial Reports
IOC
Incremental Operating Costs
IPA
Independent Procurement Agent (for Externally Assisted Projects)
ITU
International Telecommunications Union
IVA
International Verification Agent
MDG
Millennium Development Goal
MEF
Ministry of Economy and Finance
MPTC
Ministry of Post and Telecommunications of Cambodia
NOL
No
Objection
Letter
OMC
Otdor Mean Chey
PM
Procurement
Manual
RFP
Request for Proposal
SOP
Standard Operating Procuedure
TF
Trust
Fund
TOR
Terms of Reference
TTL
Task Team Leader (of the WB)
UNDP
United Nations Development Program
WB
World
Bank
Page 5
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
5
Table of Contents
A\.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT AND RATIONALE\.6
A\.1\.
Country and Sector Issues\.6
A\.2\.
Rationale for GPOBA involvement \.8
A\.3\.
Higher level objectives to which the project contributes\.9
B\. PROJECT
DESCRIPTION\.9
B\.1\.
Project development objective and key indicators\.9
B\.2\. Project
description\.10
B\.3\.
Economic and financial analysis\.13
B\.4\.
Lessons learned and reflected in the project design\.14
B\.5\.
Alternatives considered and rejected\.14
C\. IMPLEMENTATION\.15
C\.1\.
Milestones for project implementation\.15
C\.2\. Partnership
arrangements \.16
C\.3\.
Institutional and implementation arrangements \.16
C\.4\.
Monitoring and evaluation of outcomes/results\.17
C\.5\. Sustainability\.18
C\.6\.
Critical risks and possible controversial aspects\.18
Annex 1\. Project Costs Schedule\.19
Annex 2: Financial Management and Disbursement Arrangements\.21
Annex 3\. Procurement\.25
Annex 4\. Environmental and Social Safeguards\.28
Annex 5\. Sector Summary \.29
Annex 8\. Documents in the Project File \.38
Annex 9\. Good Governance Framework\.39
Page 6
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
6
A\.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT AND RATIONALE
A\.1\.
Country and Sector Issues
Country background
Over the past decade, Cambodia has undergone significant economic, political, and social
transitions, and continues its path to recovery from three decades of conflict\. Cambodia
experienced rapid institutional changes as it restored peace, moved from a centrally planned to a
market-oriented economy, and moved from isolation to regional and global integration\. In this
context, the first local and national elections in 2002 and 2003 respectively, an impressive 7
percent economic growth rate in 2005, and the accession to the World Trade Organization
constitute major achievements\.
Nevertheless, Cambodias economy remains vulnerable, and economic growth has not translated
into widespread poverty reduction\. With a GNI per capita of US$480
4
and some social indicators
showing little progress since the 1960s, Cambodia remains one of the poorest countries in the
world\. The legacies of war, the losses in physical and social capital, depleted human capital, and
the remaining land mines, will continue to challenge the countrys overall development in the
short and medium terms\. In addition, the countrys small and open economy is faced with the
challenge of establishing institutions and infrastructure that will allow it to realize the benefits
and mitigate the risks of regional and global integration, in an increasingly competitive regional
environment\.
Telecommunications market structure
There have also been some major developments in Cambodias telecommunications sector\. In
1990, the first full year of peace, most of the communications infrastructure in the country was
outdated and there was extensive damage to the fixed line network\. There were 0\.032 phones for
every 100 people or a total of only 3,115 fixed lines\. In 1995, the ITU and UNDP helped prepare
a
master plan for the sector, which focused mainly on the installation of fixed line facilities, and
resulted in some very limited improvements in connectivity (mainly in the capital Phnom Penh)\.
Since then, the sector has been characterized by a high level of foreign and private investment\.
There is no incumbent telecommunications company in the traditional sense\. Telecom Cambodia
was only established in January 2005\. The assets of Telecom Cambodia were transferred from
MPTC which, prior to the establishment of Telecom Cambodia, was also an operator\. These
assets principally comprised some long distance backhaul network and a limited number of fixed
line connections\.
Most of the growth and development has been in mobile communications, as is the case
elsewhere in the world\. In Cambodia this was achieved through a policy of foreign investment
promotion, private participation, and light-handed regulation\. Four mobile operators are offering
services as of December 2007:
Mobitel established in 1996 as a joint venture between Luxembourg-based Millicom
International and the Royal Group of Cambodia;
Hello GSM Telekom Malaysia International (Cambodia) Co\. Ltd (TMIC), a subsidiary of
Malaysian company Telekom Malaysia Berhad (TM);
4
Figure is for 2006 and is based on the World Bank Atlas method (current US$)\.
Page 7
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
7
Camshin
trades under the name Camshin, is a subsidiary of Shin Satellite PLC, Thailand;
and
Starcell (owned by Applifone Company Limited) currently operational only in Phnom
Penh\.
Estimated market shares for the above operators are shown in Annex 5\. Viettel and Cadcomms
are due to launch mobile services in 2008\. According to ITU estimates, in 2006, there were 1\.14
million mobile subscribers, or 8 mobiles per 100 persons, compared to 32,800 fixed lines, or less
than 1 per 100 persons\. At the end of 2006, reports estimated that there were over 1\.5 million
mobile subscribers with the number of subscribers growing at a rate of around 35% per annum\. In
2007, publicly reported figures from Millicom, Shin Corporation and TM for the second quarter
suggest that there are in excess of 2 million subscribers, or a national teledensity of 14 percent\.
Sector issues and government objectives
Rural access remains a major challenge\. The population of Cambodia in 2006 was 14\.4 million,
of whom around 18 percent live in urban locations and 82 percent in rural locations\. The National
Institute of Statistics estimates that while 28\.1 percent of urban households own a mobile or fixed
line phone (65\.3 percent in Phnom Penh), only 5\.8 percent of rural households own a phone\. 50
percent of all phone subscribers are in Phnom Penh and Siem Reap\.
Access to mobile telecommunications has improved in smaller towns such as Battambang, Kratie,
Kampong Chum\. Coverage in some rural locations is also improving, particularly those close to
the border of Thailand and Vietnam or along roads which lead to Thailand or Vietnam\. However,
there remain large obstacles to the provision of telecommunications services in rural and remote
locations\.
Rural and remote communes tend to be less commercially attractive to Service Providers because
there are higher operating costs and lower average revenue per user (ARPU)\. Access to suitable
backhaul networks is often a key cost and technical consideration for Service Providers\. The fiber
optic network in Cambodia is still being developed; satellite backhaul is generally not cost-
effective, and has capacity and quality of service constraints\.
Targeting
Four of the poorer provinces in the northern and north-western regions have been selected based
on two distinct dimensions: limited or no access to voice telephony services, and unviable
opportunities for investments in the short to medium term\. The locations are:
Province
Total Population
Districts
Communes
Villages
Banteay Meanchey
680,251
8
64
635
Otdar Meanchey
147,913
5
24
231
Preah Vihear
143,565
7
49
208
Pursat 391,481
6 49 501
MPTC has also confirmed that these locations would benefit from the project\.
These locations are home to a large number of very poor households, with income levels are
estimated to be significantly less than the 2006 GNI per capita for Cambodia of US$480\. A
National Institute of Statistics survey conducted in 1999 found that the average monthly
Page 8
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
8
household income in rural locations was US$82 (or US$16\.42 per person)\. Furthermore, over
50% of the population in Preah Vihear and Odtar Meanchey subsisted below the poverty line in
2003-04\.
Many of the rural and remote villages in these provinces are currently ignored by the commercial
market (by both the fixed and the four active mobile operators) or significant gaps exist in the
commercial coverage, and are perceived to be commercially unviable in the short to medium
term\. Many remote border villages and hamlets adjacent to the Thailand border that were once
home to the Khmer Rouge have also been left without any phone service\.
Improved telecommunications will likely impact access to markets and economic opportunities in
these areas\. As the most populated of the four targeted districts Banteay Meanchey produces
relatively large quantities of fish, cattle and rice\. Fishing represents an important feature of
agricultural output in Odtar Meanchey\. In Preah Vihear, the farming of cattle accounts for the
largest sector in agricultural production\. In Pursat, which borders the Tonle Sap to the east, most
households are involved in rice cultivation during the wet season\.
A\.2\.
Rationale for GPOBA involvement
GPOBA has a mandate to fund pro-poor infrastructure services through output-based subsidies,
with special emphasis on the poorest countries\. This proposed project in rural Cambodia fulfills
these and other operational criteria:
explicit use (i\.e\. targeting) of subsidies;
increasing accountability of the service provider;
attracting increased private participation in operations and financing;
providing incentives for innovation and efficiency;
enhancing sustainability; and,
monitoring of results\.
This project will help to strengthen the role of the local private sector, building upon sector
reforms that began in the early part of this decade by the Cambodian Government, The World
Bank, and other donors\. It shifts increased performance risk to the provider by disbursing
subsidies on the delivery of agreed outputs\. Furthermore, upon project completion, the market is
expected to prove financially sustainable after the investment subsidy\.
This project will
complement the Government
s efforts to encourage private investment as contained in the private
investment policy documents\.
Chances for replication are high in the communications sector and other sectors\. Based on the
experiences in bringing communications access to non-commercial rural and remote locations of
northwestern Cambodia, this project will provide a demonstration for replication in Cambodia
and possibly in neighboring Lao PDR\.
Page 9
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
9
A\.3\.
Higher level objectives to which the project contributes
There is growing consensus that information and communication technologies (ICT) are being
used to tackle development issues such as those identified by the Millennium Development Goals
(MDG)\. In tackling the MDG #1, to halve population in poverty, ICTs are being used as tools to
raise household income in developing countries through:
stimulating local business development: directly by promoting new economic opportunities
such as the developmen
t
of
village phone services, and indirectly by creating new
marketing and information channels;
reducing business transaction costs and increasing productivity by reducing or eliminating
travel costs (direct) and time (indirect);
improving access to markets and market information, facilitating local trade, and promoting
direct communication along the supply chain;
improving opportunities for alternative financing sources and migrant worker jobs;
facilitating the adoption of value-added technologies or ICT applications such as mobile text-
message based market information services, other data services; and
improving access to health information sources and emergency response teams\.
Moreover, the introduction of mobile services in these locations will open the way for other ICT
services (ICTs)which can have an impact on human development issues, such as in education
(MDG #3) and health (MDG # 5 and 6), by providing ways to lessen the impact of distance
between teacher and student, and doctor and patient\. ICTs are not only tools for communication
but are also portals to the information highway that is steadily growing and expanding into
isolated locations, and subsequently incorporating traditionally marginalized people into the
formal economy (MDG #8)\.
B\. PROJECT
DESCRIPTION
B\.1\.
Project development objective and key indicators
The objective of the project is to bring basic voice telephony services (and other additional
services supported by the Service Providers business case) to low income families in rural and
remote locations in four defined locations in northern and northwestern Cambodia\.
The project will include locations where residents currently have limited or no access to basic
voice telephony but where there is sufficient population base that would allow a Service Provider
to establish a commercially viable operation in the area\. Another key objective of the project is to
ensure the ongoing viability of outputs for which the capital expenditure will be subsidized with
the GPOBA funding\.
The target locations in Pursat, Preah Vihear, OMC and BMC have been selected using the
following criteria:
there is limited or no connectivity within a 15-20km distance;
there is a cluster of villages with a population exceeding 2,000 persons;
the area is characterized by low-income households (i\.e\. less than the GNI per capita income
of US$480), low levels of education, limited infrastructure, geographical remoteness\.
The expected beneficiaries in the target locations are set out in the table below:
Page 10
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
10
Province
Expected number
of beneficiaries
5
Districts
Communes
Villages
Banteay Meanchey
105,997
7
13
136
Otdar Meanchey
61,944
4
11
72
Preah Vihear
41,860
7
24
99
Pursat 51,168
3
6
45
Total
260,969
21
52
352
To ensure that the pilot will result in least cost solutions, the project will involve competitive
tendering for the private Service Provider that will construct and operate the systems\. It is
envisaged that a single contract will be awarded for all target locations to the Service Provider
requesting the lowest subsidy\. A single contract will maximize the value of the subsidy, while
multiple contracts would likely render the investment unviable, particularly given the current
level of investment by mobile operators and other parties in Cambodia\.
Key indicators:
The main development objective of increased access will be measured by the
establishment of public access points in the target locations and the traffic volume generated\.
Network coverage in target locations, will be verified namely by submission of lists of locations
covered\. Other indicators will include: (i) number of monthly incoming and outgoing call
minutes; (ii) provision of service at a quality similar to the rest of their network; (iii) provision of
service at the same prices as in other locations; and (iv) availability of public access points for 8
hours a day, five days a week\.
B\.2\. Project
description
Scope:
Targeting the unserved and underserved peri-urban and rural locations of BMC, OMC,
Pursat and Preah Vihear, the project will facilitate the provision of:
1\.
basic voice telephony service
the service can be provided with any technology but the
Service Provider must provide full network access and the service must be at a quality
and price similar to the rest of their network in Cambodia; and
2\.
basic access to services the Service Provider must ensure the provision of public access
points to 80% of the villages in the target locations\.
The project will also support the provision of any additional service(s) the Service Provider offers
in their bid proposal, to justify the proposed investment and any additional investment\. This
additional service may also provide an extra revenue stream for the Service Provider which would
enable it to request a lowest subsidy\.
5
Based on population figures in the Commune Database, which was generated as part of the SEILA
Programme in 2005\. We have calculated the total number of beneficiaries as the total population of the
communes that are targeted by the project\. The number of beneficiaries is assumed to be greater than usage
because of the nature of the project, which requires the supply of a basic voice telephony service and basic
access to that service\. The provision of such services would likely benefit each household in the village and
not simply individual direct users\.
6
To be covered by 3 BTS\.
Page 11
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
11
The project components are discussed in more detail below:
Basic voice telephony service:
While the project is technology neutral, for the purposes of project costing and subsidy
calculations, it will be assumed that the Service Provider will choose to provide a basic voice
telephony service using mobile technology\. This is the predominant telecommunications
infrastructure available in Cambodia and the mobile segment has significantly higher penetration
rates than fixed lines and Internet\. The use of mobile technology will maximize the benefits
obtained through the subsidy due to existing economies of scale\.
Proceeding on that assumption, the project will likely support the provision of about 33 Base
Transceiver Station (BTS) rural sites, most likely 10 in BMC, 5 in OMC, 3 in Pursat and 15 in
Preah Vihear\. The winning operator is responsible for ensuring that the new site installations are
fully compatible and inter-connectable with existing telecommunications networks in Cambodia\.
For costing purposes it is estimated that this can be achieved by the build out of about 33 BTS
65 meter telecommunications towers with associated transceivers and transmission equipment\.
These installations will provide access to a mobile network to a new rural subscriber base within
the range 10 to 20 km radius of the BTS\. In practice, most of the villages served are well within
10 km of the projected BTS site\. Each BTS will have a mobile network backhaul connection and
be powered 24/7 by a combination of a diesel generator and solar panels feeding batteries\.
The OBA subsidy has been projected at a level that covers 50% of the total initial investment for
each new BTS tower and dial tone connection\.
Output:
Provision of basic voice telephony will be measured against the following dimensions\.
(i) Existence of basic voice telephony service in the target locations; (ii) Achievement of
performance with respect primarily to network congestion and dropped calls (similar to rest of
Cambodia network); and (iii) Volume of outgoing call minutes moving through each of the target
locations\.
Basic access to services:
The Service Provider must ensure that there are public access points which are accessible to
residents in the target locations\. Access points should be provided to 80% of the villages in the
target locations (although note that the cost estimates assume 100% coverage of villages)\.
This component does not require the Service Provider to establish and/or install a retail outlet or
public payphone points\. Rather, the Service Provider can choose the distribution channel they
wish to use to ensure that there is basic access to their services in the target locations\. In their bid
proposal, the Service Provider would need to show that they are capable of delivering services
into the target locations using their selected distribution channel(s)\.
The access point phone is intended to connect seamlessly with the parent proprietary networks
and offer similar quality and pricing of services as in the Service Providers existing network\.
There are a number of distribution models which are currently utilized by telecommunications
operators in Cambodia, including service provider-owned and operated access points, exclusive
and non-exclusive dealerships, agents and entrepreneur-operated access points\. Entrepreneurs
Page 12
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
12
who operate these access points (e\.g\. a phone booth, store) usually purchase network connectivity
though the Service Providers distribution channels at commercial tariffs\.
The specific distribution model chosen by the Service Provider - as well as the administrative and
financial arrangements associated with the above options - are the responsibility of the Service
Provider to determine\. This may involve negotiation with local entities and entrepreneurs\. There
will be no direct contractual or formal relationship with any entities other than the winning
Service Provider\.
For costing and subsidy calculating purposes, it is assumed that access points will be run by local
entrepreneurs or dealers selected by the Service Provider\. Capex will therefore be incurred to
install the access point\. We have assumed that 75% of villages within the coverage area will only
require Ultra Low Cost Handsets (ULCHs) or equivalents to be made available to access the
mobile network\. In 15% of cases we have assumed a passive repeater would be required at a cost
of $2,000 per village\. In 10% of cases, we have assumed an active repeater would be required at a
cost of $12,000 per village\. We also assumed that 7 villages would be covered by each BTS\.
Output:
Provision of basic access to services will be measured against the following dimensions:
A) Existence of access points for 80% of villages in the target locations; B) Availability of access
point for 8 hours a day, five days a week (excluding mid-day break); C) Volume of outgoing calls
from the public access number\.
Additional services to be offered by Service Provider:
The Service Provider must also offer additional services such as basic data and Internet access in
their bid proposals\. The additional services that a Service Provider offers may depend on the
technology chosen for the provision of basic telephony services\. The Service Provider can offer
these additional services to justify the proposed and any additional investment they intend to
make, and also to enhance their bid proposal by using the expected revenue stream from the
additional services to lower their requested subsidy amount\.
Output:
Additional services will not be measured\. Rather, revenue from additional services may
be used to enhance a Service Providers offering and to lower the requested subsidy\.
Competitive tendering:
Licensed telecommunications operators are invited to bid on the
provision of a basic telephony service and basic access to that service\. Bidding documents will
specify any requirement to pre-qualify by offering to bid on all the target locations\. Award will be
based on lowest subsidy required for the provision of mobile phone service in the target project
locations\. Smart subsidies will be payable against the prescribed outputs\.
Technical Considerations:
All bidding documents will be technologically neutral, to anticipate
potential changes in technology\. We have assumed for costing purposes that existing GSM
technology would be used by the contracting Service Provider, together with digital microwave
for backhaul (as is the current practice for the mobile operators)\. Bidders who can provide more
efficient technology with lower resulting costs may do so, provided they meet the required
outputs\.
Project Management and Supervision Support
Provision of support for project administration, including financial management, technical
supervision audits and monitoring and evaluation will be provided through consultancies\.
Page 13
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
13
B\.3\.
Economic and financial analysis
Economic and Social Benefits:
This project aims to provide a tool to poor rural households to gain greater access to information
and knowledge sources\. Public access points in towns with no previous coverage will allow
villagers access to: market prices, job opportunities, resources for agronomy and fishery, tracking
of remittances from migrant family members, new business contacts, access to government
programs and services; and speedier calls for emergency responses\. Economic benefits include
better integration of rural producers into the cash economy; higher margins for local producers as
they become aware of prices elsewhere, economic integration with other regions and nearby
locations, less waste in unsold fisheries and fresh food products, and improved opportunities for
alternative financing sources, among others; all of which increase rural productivity and
household income\. Health benefits from improved communications can include easier access to a
variety of specialists and prescriptive drugs, improved information about public health practices
and avoidance of communicable diseases such as TB and HIV AIDS, and faster emergency health
responses\. These benefits and others will help to lessen the widening income gap between
Cambodias rural and urban locations\.
The economic internal rate of return (EIRR) is 71% (see Annex 6), which suggests that the
subsidy is convenient for society as the benefits it generates offset the amount of the subsidy
required\. The operation has positive cash flows after the second year, so operators are expected to
continue the service after the disbursement of subsidy payments is completed\.
Financial Analysis
:
A
discount rate of 18% is used as it reflects the expected required return for an investment in the
country\. If no subsidy were given, the financial internal rate of return would be 4\.5%, too low for
an investor to be attracted to this project (the net present value using the 18% discount rate is of
US$2\.2 million\. The expected subsidy in order to make this project attractive to an investor (that
is, to make the internal rate of return equal to the discount rate) is of US$2\.4 million (see Annex
6)\.
The number of BTS was determined after a field visit to the areas that will be benefited with the
project\. Population and household information come from the 1998 census, whereas income
statistics come from the survey conducted by the National Institute of Statistics in 1999\.
The cost of BTS equipment is based on information gathered from companies in other countries\.
Base stations are expected to be rolled out throughout two years, with an expected lifetime of five
years for radio equipment\. With respect to investment in access points, it has been assumed that
75% of villages will only require handsets to be made available to access the mobile network\. In
15% of cases we have assumed a passive repeater would be required at a cost of $2,000 per
village\. In 10% of cases, we have assumed an active repeater would be required at a cost of
$12,000 per village\. We also assumed that generally 7 villages would be covered by each BTS\.
With regards to revenues, it has been assumed that up to 4 percent of income will be spent on
telecommunications services\. This number follows previous estimations done by the World Bank,
and are assumed to be reached after five years of operation (not all households will use the access
point at first)\.
Page 14
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
14
B\.4\.
Lessons learned and reflected in the project design
Lessons learned to date demonstrate the need to be flexible in
the application of OBA approaches, and the importance of a
project design that fits within the context of sector
reform in each country\. For example, bid processes that fix
the subsidy, while varying the user contribution/tariff
level, tend to be less optimal than vice versa: placing the
risk with the provider seems to be more effective\. By
contributing to the payment of any service, a greater sense
of ownership and more effective use of resources are
usually engendered\. The enabling environment in the chosen
locations for an ICT telecoms project also needs to be
considered, as does the need to ensure that these locations
are sweet spots, just beyond the fringe of existing
commercial operations, but not so isolated or with such low
area income that they could not become self-sustaining
communications clusters over time\.
It is important to establish early, and well before the award
of winning bids to Service Provider, that there are no
remaining awkward backhaul or interconnect issues that may
cause bidders uncertainties in estimating rural service
costs, thereby increasing the size of the required
subsidies to initiate network services\.
Another key lesson is the importance of timing when
implementing OBA projects in the ICT sector\. Delays between
the timing of each phase of the project need to be reduced
so that the objectives of the project do not become
obsolete in light of a rapidly changing ICT sector\. Project
planning and the selection of target locations also needs
to be undertaken with consultations with industry, to
factor in the aggressive ongoing infrastructure investments
of existing Service Providers\.
B\.5\.
Alternatives considered and rejected
A
range of provinces were considered as prospective candidates to represent the complexity
of rural Cambodia\. Dimensions taken into considerations were: topography, border
geography, remoteness, economic activities, population density, per capita income and
education levels, and exclusion from telephone service provision\. Dependence upon
output from agriculture, forestry or fishery were important factors in selecting locations\.
The sample locations
Battambang, Pursat and BMC were then chosen to obtain a
useful understanding of how a successful initiative could be later replicated across many
of the countries rural and remote locations in the northeast, north and southeast\.
These sample locations, however, had to be re-selected following consultation with the
industry during the auction design phase of the project (May to July 2007)\. A number of
mobile operators indicated that coverage in Battambang and Pursat had improved
significantly since 2005 and that they were continuing to invest in those provinces in the
next 6-12 months\. Operators suggest that there were locations to the north-east of those
Page 15
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
15
provinces that would benefit more from the project\. This was confirmed in a field trip to
the original locations and the north-east provinces in November 2007\.
Further information provided by the MPTC Postmaster in Pursat showed that a majority of
villages in Pursat had mobile coverage and districts such as Sampov Meas, Bakan and
Krakor were well-served by existing coverage\. Coverage in the large Veal Veaeng
district (west-most district in Pursat) was not as good, though Mobitel and TMIC both
have base stations there\. However, each commune in Veal Veaeng is quite geographically
isolated and three of the five communes have populations of less than 1,000 inhabitants
and therefore did not meet the criteria for the target locations as set out above\.
After further close investigation and consultation with MPTC, we have concluded that there
is a case for installing 1 BTS in the Phnum Kravanh district, namely serving the Phteah
Rung and Samraong communes which have a combined population of over 25,500 and
currently have little or no coverage\. The MPTC also indicated that the Srae Sdok
commune in Kandieng district, which has a population of over 11,000, was not currently
covered by existing networks because of its distance from Highway 5\. Me Tuek in the
Bakan district also has low levels of coverage with information from MPTC showing that
10 villages have no coverage\. We have therefore identified target communes in Pursat
which would be served by 3 BTS for the project and this represents a total of
approximately 51,500 people\.
A
number of technology options were also considered\.
Ca
mbodias main optical fiber cable runs along Highway 5 on the eastern perimeter of the
chosen project pilot locations\. However, the trunk is not seen as being completely 24/7
reliable or secure\. Operators such as Mobitel and Camshin view it as a back-up rather
than a first line facility and will do so until it is replaced or up-graded by a newer OFC
installation that is buried well below ground level\. Most operators are therefore likely to
continue to use their own microwave link set-ups and to rely on existing inter-operator
agreements for efficient backhauls and interconnections\. Furthermore, it is widely
accepted that extension of fixed wire services outside Cambodias main urban locations is
unlikely to be economically feasible\. It is also presumed that VSAT services will be too
costly for most regions and necessary to service only the most difficult to reach and
sparsely populated locations, close to Cambodias frontiers\.
Thus wireless servicesmobile and fixed wireless are expected to be the chosen
technologies\. However, efficiency and effectiveness in technology choices is strictly up
to the Service Provider\.
C\. IMPLEMENTATION
C\.1\.
Milestones for project implementation
The timeline allowed for the project is approximately two years, with the following proposed
implementation schedule\.
Key Milestones
Activities
Indicative Schedule
GPOBA provides subsidy commitment
April 2008
Page 16
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
16
Activities
Indicative Schedule
Documentation to government for review, including Grant Agreement
May 2008
Bidding documentation to government for review
August 2008
Signature of GPOBA Grant Agreement
August 2008
Launch of Bid
September 2008
Contract Award
December 2008
Project Implementation and Subsidy Disbursement begins
December 2008
Recruitment of Independent Verification Agent
August 2009
Mid-Term Review
June 2010
Recruitment of Independent External Auditor
October 2010
GPOBA Subsidy disbursement ends
December 2011
C\.2\.
Partnership arrangements
No other international agencies are financing this project\.
C\.3\.
Institutional and implementation arrangements
The relationships between the parties to this project will be governed by a contract between the
service provider/contractor and the MPTC\. The responsibilities are as follows:
MPTC: (i) Project coordination; (ii) operations manual; (iii) to provide technical
inputs/specifications/design for bidding document; (iv) to provide Terms of Reference (TOR)
for consulting services; (v) formation of the Procurement Review Committees (PRC)
7
;
and
(vi) contract administration and execution\.
Independent Procurement Agent (IPA): conducting the procurement process, including (i)
preparation of bidding document and inviting bids/proposals, (ii) evaluation and selection of
Service Provider/consultants; (iv) assist in negotiating and finalizing contracts for signing by
MPTC
8
\.
Management and Administrative support: a consultant may be hired on a needs-basis to
provide MPTC with support for project implementation and for fulfilling GPOBA reporting
requirements\.
Independent Verification Agent: responsible for output measurement against prescribed
criteria, monitoring and evaluation of project elements\.
Independent External Auditor: responsible for review of internal controls in the project and
compliance with the financing agreement\.
GPOBA/World Bank: Assistance in development of the overall project concept, and
financing for consultancy services and investment subsidy\.
Selected operator: Provide communications service in target locations in accordance with
their contract with MPTC\.
7
For each procurement package, a PRC will be formed in accordance to the Government's Procurement
Manual for externally financed projects in Cambodia\. Each PRC will be formed within MPTC, and MEF
representatives will be invited to become a member of the committee\. The role of the PRC is to review and
approve documents prepared by the IPA namely, the bidding document, RFPs, and draft contracts, and lead
contract negotiations with consultants with assistance of the IPA\.
8
The IPA will review and finalize the bidding document/RFP including the technical requirement prepared
by MPTC with the help of the international consultant and obtain necessary approvals of PRC and WB
before proceeding with inviting bids and awarding contracts\.
Page 17
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
17
The IPA is expected to take the primary responsibility for carrying out the procurement process
up to stage of having the contracts ready for MPTCs signature, while MPTC will provide
technical inputs during the procurement process and will be responsible for subsequent contract
administration and execution\.
Contractual Arrangements and Funds Flow
MPTC
GPOBA
Contractor / IVA / Auditor
Other Beneficiaries for IOC
C\.4\.
Monitoring and evaluation of outcomes/results
Following contract award and execution, MPTCs project management team will monitor
and enforce the compliance of the selected Service Provider for the procurement
package in implementing their obligations under the Service Agreement, and also to
authorize disbursement of the subsidy payments in accordance with the agreed
milestones\. The proposed monitoring and evaluation framework is as follows:
Compliance reports
The Service Provider will be expected to provide regular written reports to the MPTC
within 60 days of the Effective Date of their Service Agreements and within 45 days
of the end of each calendar quarter (i\.e\. a period of three months), detailing the status
of fulfillment of the contract obligations\. These reports shall include the following
information:
a
detailed description of facility installation plans and progress for the current period,
including details on the installation and operation of Public Access Facilities in the required
locations, according to the milestones set out in the Service Agreement;
a
report on the extent of service demand, usage, revenues, and other customer utilization of
the services and facilities, for each location where service has been established;
a
report on the achievement of the quality of service obligations set forth in the Service
Agreement;
complete explanation of any difficulties encountered or anticipated in the implementation of
the contract services; and
other such information as determined by the MPTC\.
Page 18
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
18
Independent Verification
The MPTC will appoint a qualified person to serve as an Independent Verification Agent
for the package to be implemented under this program\. This agent shall:
Review the compliance reports submitted by the Service Provider , and advise MPTC on their
completeness and appropriateness;
Conduct site visits to selected service installations to evaluate the status and quality of the
basic voice service and public access facility, including both technical functionality and
service delivery to end users;
Obtain and review usage and financial reports from Service Provider in relation to the
required service installations, and validate results against the progress reports and contract
obligations;
Provide certification to MPTC of the Service Provider compliance with their contract
obligations, to authorize payment milestones; alternatively, withhold such certification,
explaining reasons for non-compliance, and measures necessary to mitigate any problems
encountered;
Evaluate the impact and extent of any extenuating circumstances, including force majeure
that may affect operator compliance, and advise MPTC on such circumstances and the
appropriate response\.
Reports by the Independent Verification Agent shall be provided simultaneously to
MPTC
and to GPOBA/World Bank for a maximum of 5 working days review before
authorization of disbursement\.
C\.5\. Sustainability
Sustainability has been factored into the project design in several ways:
Subsidies are one-off investment subsidies, and not for consumption
Winning bidders will co-invest about 50 percent of construction costs of the BTS towers
Government of Cambodia has expressed interest to scale-up the OBA approach if the first
pilot delivers positive results\.
C\.6\.
Critical risks and possible controversial aspects
Risk
Mitigation
Rating
Failure of the OBA
subsidy bidding
process to produce
bids on all sites
Consultations with winning bidders on other sites to recognize
their reasons for not offering to bid on the ignored sites, and what
is required to stimulate their participation in a re-bidding\.
(Operators have been consulted throughout the planning process
and operators have indicated a willingness to participate\.)
Medium
Selection of non-
acceptable or
technically
unreachable sites\.
Circulation for comment to pre-qualifiers, prior to bidding, of site
and village location lists for comment and adjustments\. (Target
locations have been verified to be unserved or underserved during
a
field trip in November 2007, as well as interviews with
operators\.)
Low
Affordability and
willingness to pay for
new phone services by
the poor and very poor\.
The project does not depend on users being subscribed\. It uses
small unit pre-paid cards to stimulate use with very small one-time
outlays\. It depends on the successful bidder/operator undertaking
marketing to sell ULCH and low cost SIM cards bundled with
giveaways to get service use results\.
Low
Measurement and
The Service P
rovider
will be required each month to record
Medium
Page 19
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
19
monitoring of service
q
uantity and access
availability\.
incoming and outgoing call minutes from targeted locations and
e
ach new public access point and to ensure through market
mechanisms that traffic achieves certain pre-set norms\.
Verification and audit functions to be preformed by external
agents\.
Selection of
distribution channel(s)
Selection of the distribution channel(s) through which to deliver
services will be the responsibility of the Service Provider and
based upon the usual market criteria of performance\.
Low
Service doesnt
conform to the voice
or inter-operability of
service standards of
the mobile operators
network as a whole
Monitoring of service quality will be the responsibility of MPTC
and monitored twice a year, unless faults are specifically notified
to MPTC by users\.
Low
Payment of outputs
Payment of outputs to be made directly from GPOBA to the
Service Provider\.
Low
Inconsistency with
existing mobile
operator licenses
Although the licenses are at national level they are granted to
various operators all of whom have an opportunity to bid for the
proposed project\.
Low
Sustainability
The project targets locations are perceived to be not commercially
attractive\. By subsidizing entry into these markets, the average
revenue per unit (ARPU) costs can be carried at lower levels, thus
ensuring medium to long term sustainability\.
Medium
Annex 1\. Project Costs Schedule
Component
Local
US$ million
Foreign
US$ million
Total
US$ million
Project Subsidy
:
Voice telephony (Window 3)
$2,375,957
$2,375,957
Consulting Services
9
:
(i) Management and Administrative
support to Implementing Agency
(Window 3)
(ii) Independent External Auditor
(Window 3)
(ii) Independent Verification Agent
(Window 3)
(i) $10,000
(ii) $35,000
(ii) $70,000
$115,000
Incremental operating costs (IOC)
$10,000
$10,000
Bank supervision for subsidy
$124,638
$124,638
9
The International Procurement Agent fee included in the previous project cost table will be covered by a
separate grant awarded to the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)\.
Page 20
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
20
implementation
TOTAL GPOBA Funding
$2,625,595
Page 21
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
21
Annex 2: Financial Management and Disbursement Arrangements
1\.
Summary of the Financial Management Assessment
Overall, the project financial management risk assessed is low\. The main risk of the project is
related to the weak overall country environment control, especially related to the process of
selection of operator\. However, this process will be undertaken by an Independent Procurement
Agent\. In addition, the design of the project whereby more than 99% of grant proceeds will be
made via direct payment, especially payments to operators will be made only upon specified
output of the project delivered and verified by an Independent Verification Agent, contributed to
lessening the project risk\. A qualified MPTC staff will be appointed to handle the day-to-day
admin and finance tasks including the preparation of the withdrawal applications\. Under these
agreed implementation arrangements, the project financial management arrangements are
considered adequate to meet the Worl
d
Banks minimum requirements\.
2\. Risk
Analysis
The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications of Cambodia (MPTC) will be the implementing
agency for the project\. MPTC has no experience in implementing the Bank-funded project, but
other donors-funded project\. However, the project is to be executed entirely by a private sector
entity through a least subsidy competitive process\. The main risk of the project is related to the
weak overall country environment control, especially related to the process of selection of
operator\. The GPOBA/WB, therefore, having the international consultant hired under the
GPOBA Window I project to assist in the preparation of technical requirements and inputs for of
bidding documentation for the output-based subsidy\. Procurement activities will be carried out by
the International Procurement Agent (IPA) on behalf of MPTC\. The IPA is expected to take the
primary responsibility for carrying out the procurement process up to stage of giving the contracts
ready for MPTCs signature, while MPTC will provide technical inputs during the procurement
process and will be responsible for subsequent contract administration and execution\. The
subsidy amount will be payable against prescribed outputs\. Once the report is submitted by the
operator, it will be verified by an Independent Verification Agent, and the payment will be done
via direct payment\. Very minimal funds (an Incremental Operating Cost (IOC) of about
US$10,000) will be provided by GPOBA for payments of small expenditures, such as office
supplies, one computer and office equipment, communications, office administration costs, utility
charges, domestic travel and Daily Subsistence Allowance (DSA) in connection with the
supervision of the Project, but excluding salaries of officials of the Recipients civil service\. Items
under the IOC will be pre-financed by MPTC and reimbursed from the GPOBA, all other
expenditures (more than 99% of project proceeds) will be made via direct payment\. All the above
contributed to lessening the project risk to low\.
Based on the above risk, below are the proposed risk mitigation measures to mitigate the project
risk\.
Risk Risk
Rating
Risk Mitigating Measure
1
MPTC has no
experience with Bank-
funded project\.
M
(1) a qualified MPTC staff may be appointed to
handle both administrative and finance tasks,
including the preparation of the withdrawal
applications\.
(2) WB to provide training on Bank policy and
procedures on FM and disbursement during
project launch workshop\.
Page 22
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
22
2
Weak financial control
environment as limited
segregation of duties\.
M
(1)
all payments will be made via direct payments
with full supporting documentation\. The
subsidy payments will be made upon
verification of specified outputs\.
(2)
an independent auditor to be appointed to
audit the Project Financial Statements\.
3\. Implementation
Arrangement
The MPTC is responsible for: (i) Project coordination; (ii) operations manual; (iii) to provide
technical inputs/specifications/design for bidding document; (iv) to provide Terms of Reference
(TOR) for consulting services; (v) formation of the Project Review Committees (PRC)
10
;
and (vi)
contract administration and execution\. The Independent Procurement Agent (IPA): (i) preparation
of bidding document; (ii) preparation of TOR for consulting services; (iii) selection of Service
Provider and consultancies; (iv) assist in negotiating and finalizing contracts for signing by
MPTC
11
\.
4\. Staffing
The MPTC has no experience in implementing the Bank-funded project, but has successfully
implemented other donor-funded projects\. Initially, existing staff of MPTC will undertake
financial management and administrative duties with intensive training provided by Bank staff
during the Project launch on Bank financial management policy and procedures and disbursement
arrangements, to ensure that simple accounting books and proper supporting documents are
maintained and filed for subsequent review and audit\. After six months of Project
implementation, if either MPTC or the Bank decide that management and administrative support
is required for existing MPTC staff, provision is made in the Project budget for the recruitment of
a
qualified individual consultant to be responsible for project coordination, simple bookkeeping,
disbursement and preparation of Withdrawal Application, and annual financial statements\. The
consultant would be required to have an accounting background so that he/she can maintain the
project accounting books and ensure that proper supporting documents are maintained and filed\.
5\.
Accounting Policy and Procedure
The projects accounts and records would be maintained in accordance with the acceptable
accounting standards and practices and with RGC government regulations and procedures\. Due to
minimal transactions, the project accounts will be maintained manually by using Excel
spreadsheet\. Simple contract register will be maintained to keep track of how much funds have
been paid to the service provider\.
No separate accounting manual would be prepared for the proposed project\. The Standard
Operating Procedures (SOP) and the Financial Management Manual (FMM) for WB/ADB
financed projects, which were developed in 2005 and issued by Sub-Decree in February 2007 will
be followed and applied instead\.
10
For each procurement package, a PRC will be formed in accordance to the Government's Procurement
Manual for externally financed projects in Cambodia\. Each PRC will be formed within MPTC, and MEF
representatives will be invited to become a member of the committee\. The role of the PRC is to review and
approve documents prepared by the IPA namely, the bidding document, RFPs, and draft contracts, and lead
contract negotiations with consultants with assistance of the IPA\.
11
The IPA will review and finalize the bidding document/RFP including the technical requirement
prepared by MPTC with the help of the international consultant and obtain necessary approvals of PRC and
WB before proceeding with inviting bids and awarding contracts\.
Page 23
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
23
6\.
Funds Flow and Disbursement Arrangement
Allocation of GPOBA Proceeds\. The GPOBA proceeds of $2\.50M will be disbursed over a 3
year period\. Disbursement will be against the following expenditure categories: Output-based aid
contract ($2\.37M),
Consultants Services ($115K), and incremental operating cost ($10K)\.
Subsidy Payment\. Under the GPOBA grant, the payment of subsidy will be made towards output-
based disbursement via direct payment procedure\. Disbursement from the Grant will be based on
the submission of full documentation / copies of accounting evidence (including reports from the
operator certified by the Independent Verification Agent) along with the Withdrawal
Applications\.
The structure of disbursements is envisaged as follows
(subject to the finalization of
recommendations by the consultants who are preparing the bidding documents):
10%
of contract amount upon contract award;
30%
of contract amount upon successful provision of network coverage in 50% of target
locations and installation of public access points in 40% of target locations;
30%
of contract amount upon successful provision of network coverage in 100% of target
locations and installation of public access points in 80% of target locations;
30%
of contract amount upon supervision of all target locations to check upon network
coverage, existence of public access points with active network access, and availability and
quality of service\.
Following the initial payment, all subsequent payments will be made only upon verification of the
operators performance in constructing the facilities and commissioning the services according to
technical, operating and quality of service specifications\. Verification is to be done by an
Independent Verification Agent on behalf of the Regulator MPTC, by validating outputs and
issuing a no-objection opinion to the MPTC for payment to the operator/contractor\.
Payment of IOC\. The Incremental Operating Costs (IOC) will be pre-financed by MPTC and
reimbursed later from the GPOBA\. All other payments will be made via direct payments\. MPTC
will be responsible for preparing the application for withdrawal to be submitted to the Bank\. All
documentation for expenditures submitted for disbursement will be retained at the implementing
unit and shall be made available to the auditor for audit and to the Bank and its representatives if
requested\.
7\. Internal
Controls
Due to limited no\. of staff, it is very difficult to undertake a proper segregation of duties to ensure
that different people perform different responsibilities such as bank reconciliation is undertaken
on a monthly basis by someone other than the one who makes or approves payments, etc\. The
compensating control will be all payments be done via direct payments with full supporting
documentation\. The outputs of the project upon which GPOBA subsidies to be disbursed will be
certified by the Independent Verification Agent, appointed by MPTC with a no objection from
the GPOBA\.
9\. Audit
Arrangement
Internal Audit
\.
The Internal Audit department of MPTC was recently established and currently
staffed with 11 personnel\. To address financial risks and to provide management with advice on
the effectiveness of financial systems and internal controls of the project, it is recommended that
Page 24
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
24
MPTC makes arrangements for the project to be included in the program of review by its Internal
Audit department and that the audit findings from review of the project be provided to the Bank\.
External Audit
\.
The project duration is about three years, but there would be few disbursement
transactions (4 times each for the operator and Independent Verification Agent, and some for
IOC), therefore, only one audit is required for the whole project life\. An independent auditor,
acceptable to the Bank, will be required to audit in accordance with International Standard on
Auditing, under terms of reference satisfactory to the Bank\. The audit TOR will require the
auditor to undertake a review of internal controls in the project and compliance with the financing
agreement\. The auditor will also be required to issue a Management Letter which will: (a)
identify any material weakness in accounting and internal control; (b) report on the degree of
compliance of financial covenants of the financing agreement; and (c) communicate matters that
have come to the attention of the auditors which might have a significant impact on the
implementation of the Project\. The audit report is required to be submitted to the Bank within 6
months after the end of the project\. Audit fee will be paid out of project funds as an eligible
expenditure\.
Page 25
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
25
Annex 3\. Procurement
1\. General
Procurement for the proposed project would be carried out in accordance with the World Banks
Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits dated May 2004 revised October
1, 2006; and Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants by World Bank Borrowers
dated May 2004 revised October 1, 2006, and the provisions stipulated in the Grant Agreement\.
Guidance for implementing the Procurement and Consultant Guidelines is provided in the
Kingdom of Cambodia's Externally Assisted Project Procurement Manual: Goods, Works and
Services, issued under Sub-Decree 14 dated February 26, 2007, on Promulgating of the Standard
Procedure for Implementing the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank Assisted Projects\.
The various items under different expenditure categories are described in general below\. For each
contract to be financed by the Grant, the different procurement methods or consultant selection
methods, the need for prequalification, estimated costs, prior review requirements, and time frame
are agreed between the Recipient and the Bank in the Procurement Plan\. The Procurement Plan
will be updated at least every six months or as required to reflect the actual project
implementation needs and improvements in institutional capacity\.
Procurement of Output-Based Schemes:
This will include contract for provision of voice
telephony to low income families in remote rural areas\. The GPOBA grant funds will be used for
providing subsidy, through competitively procured output-based contracts, to create sufficient
economic incentives for operators to provide network coverage and public access points in the
remote locations\. The contract will be procured through International Competitive Bidding (ICB)
procedures\. Since the Bank does not have standard bidding documents for this type of
procurement, the Bidding Documents will be prepared by the Recipient in consultation with the
Bank and must be satisfactory to the Bank\. Domestic preference will not be provided\. The
evaluation criteria will be based on the general principle that the contract will be awarded to the
qualified bidder that is substantially responsive to the requirements of the bidding documents and
offers to carry out the contract with the minimum financing (lowest subsidy) from the
Government\.
Selection of Consultants:
Consulting services under this Project will include services to be
provided by firms and individual consultants, such as: (i) Management and Administrative
support; (ii) Independent External Auditor and (iii) Independent Verification Agent\. Short lists of
consultants for services estimated to cost less than US$100,000 equivalent per contract may be
composed entirely of national consultants in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2\.7 of
the Consultant Guidelines\.
Consultant Services requiring employment of consultant firms would be procured mostly through
the Quality and Cost Based Selection (QCBS) method, whereas the Quality Based Selection
(QBS), Fixed Budget Selection (FBS) and Least Cost Selection (LCS) methods may also be used
where appropriate in accordance with the circumstances described in the Consultant Guidelines\. \.
If appropriate, the Selection Based on Consultants Qualifications (CQS) method may be used for
consulting services estimated to cost less than $50,000 equivalent\. Individual consultants would
be selected in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 5\.1-5\.4 of the Consultant Guidelines\.
For all contracts for selection of firms, the Banks Standard Request for Proposals will be used\.
2\.
Assessment of the agencys capacity to implement procurement
This will be MPTCs first implementation of a World Bank-financed project\. They do not have
knowledge and experience in the Banks procurement procedures\. International consultants have
Page 26
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
26
been hired under the GPOBA Window I project to assist in the preparation of technical
requirements and inputs for preparation of bidding documents for the output-based subsidy\.
Procurement activities will be carried out by the Independent Procurement Agent (IPA) on behalf
of MPTC\.
The IPA has been contracted by MEF to carry out, on behalf of the respective project
implementing agencies, procurement for selected World Bank-financed projects in Cambodia,
which will include the proposed GPOBA project\. The IPA is expected to take the primary
responsibility for carrying out the procurement process up to stage of having the contracts ready
for MPTCs signature, while MPTC will provide technical inputs during the procurement process
and will be responsible for subsequent contract administration and execution\. The IPA will
review and finalize the technical requirements and bidding documents prepared by the
international consultants and obtain necessary approvals before proceeding with inviting bids\.
An assessment of the capacity of the Implementing Agency (MPTC) to implement procurement
activities under the Project has been carried out as part of the project preparation\. The assessment
reviewed the organizational structure and capacity for implementing the project procurement and
full reports will be available in the project files\.
The main procurement-related issues and risks identified include: the generally weak fiduciary
environment in the country, inadequate capacity of MPTC in undertaking procurement in general
and the World Banks procurement procedures in particular, and procurement delays\. To mitigate
the high risk it has been agreed that (a) international consultants would assist in the preparation of
technical requirements and inputs for bidding documents for the output-based-aid services; (b)
output-based-aid contracting arrangements will be adopted, with significant investment
contribution by the Operators and direct payment of the subsidy by GPOBA upon verification of
specified outputs by an Independent Verification Agent hired under the project for MPTC, (c)
International Competitive Bidding (ICB) procedures will be used, (d) the procurement process
will be carried out, on behalf of MPTC, by the IPA contracted by MEF and paid from a separate
Grant; and MPTC will provide technical inputs during the procurement process, (e) all contracts
will be subject to prior review, and (f) procurement plans will be closely monitored and there will
be regular supervision and follow up by the Bank\.
In addition, MPTC and the IPA will follow a good governance framework during the
procurement process, including but not limited to the following: (a) enhancing transparency
through greater public disclosure of procurement related information (such as procurement plans,
bidding documents and RFPs, consultant long-lists and short-lists, and contract awards); (b)
complying with the procurement complaint handling procedures and sanction requirements as set
forth in the existing Government rules and regulations, (c) involvement of project beneficiaries in
bid opening proceedings, and (d) integrity pledges by staff involved in the procurement process
and by suppliers, contractors and consultants, etc\.
With the incorporation of the mitigation measures into the procurement implementation
arrangements, the overall project risk for procurement is rated as Substantial\.
Page 27
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
27
A\. Procurement
Plan
The Recipient will develop a detailed Procurement Plan for project implementation which
provides the basis for the procurement methods\. The Procurement Plan will be reviewed,
finalized and agreed upon by the Bank prior to the signing of the Grant Agreement\. It will also be
available in the Projects database and in the Banks external website\. The Procurement Plan will
be updated on a six-monthly basis or as required to reflect the actual project implementation
needs and improvements in institutional capacity\.
B\.
Frequency of Procurement Supervision
It is recommended that the first procurement supervision mission be carried out three (3) months
after effectiveness and every six months thereafter\. Ex-post review of contracts not subject to
prior review, if any, would be included in the ex-post review program which will be carried out
by the Bank\.
C\.
Details of the Procurement Arrangement involving international competition\.
1\.
Goods and Works and non consulting services\.
(a) List of contract Packages which will be procured following ICB and direct
contracting:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Ref\.
No\.
Contract
(Description)
Estimated
Cost
(US$
000)
Procurement
Method
P-
Q
Domestic
Preference
(yes/no)
Review
by Bank
(Prior/Post)
Expected
Bid-
Opening
Date
1
Voice Telephony
2,376
ICB No No
Prior October
29,
2008
(b) All contracts will be subject to prior review by the Bank\.
2\. Consulting
Services\.
(a) List of Consulting Assignments with short-list of international firms\.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Ref\.
No\.
Description of
Assignment
Estimated
Cost
(US$ 000)
Selection
Method
Review by
IDA
(Prior /
Post)
Expected
Proposals
Submission
Date
Comments
1\. Management
and
Administrative support
to Implementing
Agency
10 IC Prior
November
4,
2008
2\. Independent
External
Auditor
35 LCS Prior August
3,
2010
3\. Independent
V
ification Agent
70 IC Prior August
4,
2009
Page 28
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
28
Verification Agent
2009
(b) All Consultancy services contracts for firms and individuals will be subject to prior review by
the Bank\.
Short lists composed entirely of national consultants
:
Short lists of consultants for services
estimated to cost less than $100,000 equivalent per contract may be composed entirely of national
consultants in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2\.7 of the Consultant Guidelines\.
Annex 4\. Environmental and Social Safeguards
Potential environmental and social impacts from the proposed investments are likely to be
minimal, mostly construction related and localized\. Therefore, in lieu of a full fledged
Environmental and social safeguards policy, the project proponent developed Environmental and
Social Management Framework (ESMF) covering mitigation measures for Environmental
Management Plan (EMP) and Land Acquisition Policy Framework (LPF)\.
2\.1\. Environmental Management Plan
All possible environmental issues can be effectively avoided providing that the project takes into
consideration through the EMP at the pre-site selection criteria and design phase\. All mitigation
measures should not only be taken in dealing with potential environmental issues but also be used
as guide to make the project more environmentally sound\. The EMP covers the following key
elements at minimum:
¾
site selection criteria
-
avoid or minimize destruction of natural habitats, culturally
significant sites, and environmentally sensitive locations;
¾
standard mitigation measures for construction related impacts
-- adopt sound engineering
design; minimize dust, noise, soil erosion; ensure proper construction waste management;
implement safety procedures;
¾
monitoring program
-
supervision by qualified staff
¾
public notice
to provide advance inform the local population of upcoming project
activity; and
¾
sources of electricity
-
to evaluate impacts of alternatives for sources of electricity (use of
solar panels, disposal of used batteries, emissions from diesel generators)\.
The EMP is to serve as an implementation guideline to overcome environmental concerns caused
by the project\. The potential adverse issues should be avoidable through good site criteria,
environment friendly construction materials, construction supervision methods, and (hazardous
and non-hazardous) waste management techniques\. It thus takes into account different phases of
the project implementation including project design, site construction, and operation\.
The proponent will ensure to attach the EMP into bidding documents, with an appropriate clause
to ensure compliance/enforcement of the EMP before and during the construction of telephony
towers\.
Land Acquisition Policy Framework (LPF)
Though the project will most likely require land for constructing towers, it is not perceived to
have any major issue with neither land acquisition nor resettlement\. The project should
Page 29
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
29
follow/abide by the practice of commercial purchase transactions between the project and
affected persons for land acquisition\.
Where local villagers select/choose to make voluntary contribution of land acquired for
construction without compensation, this should be acceptable only for marginal potential impacts
(without causing any displacement or impact on livelihood structure and with remaining assets
viable for continued usage)\. Acquisition of land for constructions would be obtained through
transparently voluntary offer (with no coercion or cheating)\. Land Acquisition Plan should be
developed and carried out with proper consultation with affected and potentially affected people
and local authority\. In the incident of land acquired for construction affects livelihood of or falls
to the property of indigenous people, OP\. 4\.10 shall be fully followed/abided by\. The project will
fully comply with land acquisition policy as described in OP\. 4\.12\.
Annex 5\. Sector Summary
Cambodia Telecoms Market Participants, 2007
Market
Segment
Structure
Main Providers
Esimated
Market
Share, 2007*
Mobile
Competition
Mobitel 012
(Millicom)
Camshin
(Cambodia Shinawatra)
HelloGSM
(TMIC)
Starcell
(Applifone)
Viettel
-START-UP 2008
Cadcomms (Telenor)
START-UP
2008
65 percent
17 percent
13 percent
n\.a\.
n\.a\.
n\.a\.
Fixed-line
Local Access
Fixed-line
monopoly in two
urban service
locations, but
subject to
intense local
competition
from mobile
service operators
Telecoms Cambodia [2006], TC
services main urban locations;
Camshin
offers some fixed-line
access; and
Camintel
provides fixed
wire in a few provincial towns and
some rural locations\.
It is the ILD operator\.
TC has been accused of charging too
high fees for the use of its national
OFC trunk system\.
Page 30
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
30
International
Data and ISP
Partially
competitive;
two gateways,
plus regulated
and un-
regulated VOIP
competition
TC
Tele2
VOIP operators
Mobitel
Camshin
Cogetel
Camnet
Others (including Online)
23 percent*
53 percent*
24 percent*
37 percent
25+ percent
25 percent
15+percent
n\.a\.
*
e--estimates, note that market share data in this table for mobile were estimated using Millicom, TM and
Shin Corporations publicly reported information and information provided by operators in 2007\. Other
market shares were provided by the General Manager of Mobitel\. International market shares are 2004
data\.
Page 31
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
31
Annex 6\. Economic Analysis
Economic and social benefits
This project aims to provide a tool to poor rural households to gain greater access to information
and knowledge sources\. Public access points in towns with no previous coverage will allow
villagers access to: market prices, job opportunities, resources for agronomy and fishery, tracking
of remittances from migrant family members, new business contacts, access to government
programs and services; and speedier calls for emergency responses\. Economic benefits include
better integration of rural producers into the cash economy; higher margins for local producers as
they become aware of prices elsewhere, economic integration with other regions and nearby
locations, less waste in unsold fisheries and fresh food products, and improved opportunities for
alternative financing sources, among others; all of which increase rural productivity and
household income\. Health benefits from improved communications can include easier access to a
variety of specialists and prescriptive drugs, improved information about public health practices
and avoidance of communicable diseases such as TB and HIV AIDS, and faster emergency health
responses\. These benefits and others will help to lessen the widening income gap between
Cambodias rural and urban locations\.
A
financial and economic model has been prepared to assess the net economic benefit of the
project and the expected subsidy under a conservative scenario\. The following table summarizes
the results from the model:
Figure 6\.1 Financial and Economic Analysis Main Results
Discount Rate
18%
Financial IRR (before subsidy)
4\.5%
Net Present Value @ 18%
-2,194,740
Expected Subsidy
2,375,957
Net Present Value (after subsidy)
0
Financial IRR (after subsidy)
18%
Economic IRR
71%
A
discount rate of 18% is used as it reflects the expected required return for an investment in the
country\. If no subsidy was given, the financial internal rate of return would be of 4\.5%, too low
for an investor to be attracted to this project (the net present value using the 18% discount rate is
of US$2\.2 million\. The expected subsidy in order to make this project attractive to an investor
(that is, to make the internal rate of return equal to the discount rate) is of US$2\.4 million\.
The economic internal rate of return is of 71%, which suggests that the subsidy is convenient for
society as the benefits it generates offset the amount of the subsidy required\. The operation has
positive cash flows after the second year, so operators are expected to continue the service after
the disbursement of subsidy payments is completed\.
A
more detailed description of the model and its main assumptions is provided in the following
sections\.
Page 32
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
32
Main Assumptions
The following chart describes the main assumptions used in the model:
Figure 6\.2 Main assumptions
Investments
Number of Towers
33
Villages covered per Tower
7
Persons to be connected
261,000
Households to be connected
52,200
Investments per Tower
Cost (US$)
Mast
10,000
Shelter
15,000
Fence and Yard
5,000
Civil and mechanical works
15,600
Power / air conditioning
20,000
Land (est\.)
11,000
BTS equip\. / mw transmission
35,000
Mark-up for lower purchasing power
5%
Rollout (years)
2
Access point CAPEX
Cost
% of villages
Cost of handset
30
Require passive repeater
2,000
15%
Require active repeater
12,000
10%
Lifetime (Yrs\.)
5
%
of initial investment that is replaced
49%
Revenues and Operations Costs
Monthly income per household
82 per month
%
of income spent on telecommunications
4\.0%
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Revenues (as a % of Max\. Potential)
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Operations Costs (% of CapEx)
20%
Income Taxes
19%
Economic Benefits
A\. Saved Time
Reduced time to make a phone call / HH / day
0\.25 Hours
Phones call per day / HH (average)
1
People working per household
2
Days worked per year
312
Average salary per hour
$0\.20
Discount
50%
B\. Economic Multiplier
Multiplier on household income
2\.50%
The number of BTS was determined after a field visit to the areas that will be benefited with the
project\. Population and household information come from the 1998 census, whereas income
statistics come from the survey conducted by the National Institute of Statistics in 1999\.
The cost of BTS equipment is based on information gathered from companies in other countries\.
Base stations are expected to be rolled out throughout two years, with an expected lifetime of five
Page 33
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
33
years for radio equipment\. With respect to investment in access points, it has been assumed that
75% of villages will only require handsets to be made available to access the mobile network\. In
15% of cases we have assumed a passive repeater would be required at a cost of $2,000 per
village\. In 10% of cases, we have assumed an active repeater would be required at a cost of
$12,000 per village\. We also assumed that generally 7 villages would be covered by each BTS\.
Since not all of the original infrastructure needs to be replaced and prices are expected to
decrease, only 49% of the original investments are expected to be required after the fifth year\.
Operations expenses are assume to be 20% of the original investment\. This number is an industry
standard and is maintained throughout the period\.
With regards to revenues, it has been assumed that up to 4% of income will be spent in
telecommunications services\. This number follows previous estimations done by The World
Bank, and are assumed to be reached after five years of operation (not all households will use the
access point at first)\.
With these assumptions, a cash flow for the operation was estimated
12
:
Figure 6\.3 Cash Flow Analysis
Year 0
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Year 6
Year 7
Year 8
Year 9
Year 10
New Installed Towers
17
17
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Total villages served
116
231
231
231
231
231
231
231
231
231
Households covered
26,100
52,200
52,200
52,200
52,200
52,200
52,200
52,200
52,200
52,200
Towers
1,933,470
1,933,470
0
0
0
952,875
952,875
0
0
0
Access Point
176,715
176,715
0
0
0
87,091
87,091
0
0
0
Total Investments
2,110,185
2,110,185
0
0
0
1,039,966
1,039,966
0
0
0
0
Revenues
205,459
821,837
1,232,755
1,643,674
2,054,592
2,054,592
2,054,592
2,054,592
2,054,592
2,054,592
Costs
422,037
844,074
844,074
844,074
844,074
844,074
844,074
844,074
844,074
844,074
EBITDA
0
-216,578
-22,237
388,681
799,600
1,210,518
1,210,518
1,210,518
1,210,518
1,210,518
1,210,518
Depreciation
422,037
844,074
844,074
844,074
844,074
630,030
415,986
415,986
415,986
415,986
Earnings before taxes
0
-638,615
-866,311
-455,393
-44,474
366,444
580,488
794,532
794,532
794,532
794,532
Taxes
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
100,928
150,961
150,961
Net Operating Profits after Taxes
0
-638,615
-866,311
-455,393
-44,474
366,444
580,488
794,532
693,603
643,571
643,571
Free Cash Flow
-2,110,185
-2,326,763
-22,237
388,681
799,600
170,552
170,552
1,210,518
1,109,590
1,059,557
1,059,557
memo: subsidy payments
50%
50%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
Subsidy
1,187,979
1,187,979
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Free Cash Flow (after subsidy)
-922,206
-1,138,784
-22,237
388,681
799,600
170,552
170,552
1,210,518
1,109,590
1,059,557
1,059,557
Net Present Value w/o subsidy @ 18%
-2,194,740
Internal Rate of Return w/o subsidy
4\.5%
Expected Subsidy
2,375,957
Net Present Value w/subsidy @ 18%
0
It is important to note that the operation is expected to have a positive cash flow after the second
year\.
For the economic analysis, two different factors were included: (i) the savings in time due to the
availability of a public access point and/or a personal phone; and (ii) the increase in income that
telephony would bring to the benefited areas\.
Savings in time
\.
On average, it was estimated that each household saved 15 min\. daily\. To
calculate the opportunity cost of this time, an estimation of 312 working days per year was taken\.
Additionally, a 50% discount was applied due to the low opportunity cost compared to the
average salary of a villager\.
12
It has been assumed that an existing operator will be providing the services, so no overhead costs have
been included\.
Page 34
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
34
Increase in income
\.
It was assumed that on average household income would increase by 2\.5%,
and accounts for the increase in productivity, margins and new job opportunities that telephony
will bring to the area\.
Taking into account these two effects, along with the estimated expected subsidy for the project,
the economic analysis is as follows:
Figure 6\.4 Net Economic Benefits
Year 0
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Year 6
Year 7
Year 8
Year 9
Year 10
H
ouseholds covered
0
26,100
52,200
52,200
52,200
52,200
52,200
52,200
52,200
52,200
52,200
A\. Save time
T
ime saved by households (hrs\.)
0
2,035,800
4,071,600
4,071,600
4,071,600
4,071,600
4,071,600
4,071,600
4,071,600
4,071,600
4,071,600
Opportunity cost of time saved
0
200,644
401,288
401,288
401,288
401,288
401,288
401,288
401,288
401,288
401,288
B
\.
Multiplier Effect
Income from households covered
0
25,682,400
51,364,800
51,364,800
51,364,800
51,364,800
51,364,800
51,364,800
51,364,800
51,364,800
51,364,800
I
ncrease in income due to project
0
642,060
1,284,120
1,284,120
1,284,120
1,284,120
1,284,120
1,284,120
1,284,120
1,284,120
1,284,120
Economic Benefits from Project
0
842,704
1,685,408
1,685,408
1,685,408
1,685,408
1,685,408
1,685,408
1,685,408
1,685,408
1,685,408
S
ubsidy Payment
1,187,979
1,187,979
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
N
et Economic Benefits
-
1,187,979
-
345,275
1
,685,408
1
,685,408
1
,685,408
1
,685,408
1
,685,408
1
,685,408
1
,685,408
1
,685,408
1
,685,408
Economic Rate of Return
71%
Finally, it is important to highlight the fact that the tender is expected to attract more than one
provider in the country (there are currently six providers operating in the country), so competition
for the subsidy should maintain the actual subsidy request within the limit indicated by this
model\.
Page 35
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
35
Annex 7\. Project Preparation and Supervision
A\.
Institutions responsible for project preparation:
1) GPOBA c/o World Bank
2) Ministry of Post and Telecommunication of Cambodia (MPTC)
B\. GPOBA/World
Bank
Team:
Core Team:
Name Title
Unit
Natasha
Besch
orner
Task Team Leader,
Senior ICT Policy
Specialist
CITPO
Cledan
Mand
ri-
Perrot
t
Sr\. Infrastructure
Specialist
FEU/GPOBA
Naomi
Halew
ood
Co-TTL, Operations
Analyst
CITPO
Joshua
Gallo
Infrastructure Specialist
FEU
Arturo
Muent
e
Kunig
ami
ETC (rural
telecommunications
specialist)
CITPO
Juan
Navas
-
Sabat
er
Senior
Telecommunication
s
Specialist
CITPO
Rajendra
Singh
Senior Regulatory
Specialist
CITPO
Kashmira
Daru
walla
Senior Procurement
Specialist
CITPO
Ahsan Ali
Senior Procurement
Specialist
EAPCO
John
Richa
rdson
Governance Specialist
(Consultant)
EAPCO
Sokunthea
Sok
Procurement Assistant
EAPCO
Kannathee
Danai
sawat
Financial Management
Specialist
EAPCO
Bunlong
Environmental
EASES
Page 36
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
36
Leng Specialist
Vanna Nil
Social Development
Specialist
EASSO
Roch
Leves
que
Senior Counsel
LEGEA
Maria
Lourd
es
Pardo
Consultant LEGES
Gilbert
+Tobi
n
Telecommunications
Consulting Law
Firm
External
Advisory team:
Name Title
Role
Unit
Patricia
Veev
ers-
Carte
r
Program
Mana
ger
Peer
R
e
v
i
e
w
/
A
d
v
i
s
o
r
y
FEU/GPOBA
Irving
Kucy
nski
Panel of
Exper
ts
Review/Advisory
GPOBA
Alejandro
Jadre
sic
Panel of
Exper
ts
Review/Advisory
GPOBA
Iain
Menz
ies
Sr\.
Infras
tructu
re
Speci
alist
Peer
R
e
v
i
e
w
/
A
d
v
i
s
FEU/GPOBA
Page 37
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
37
o
r
y
Lars
Johan
nes
operations
Analy
st
Peer
R
e
v
i
e
w
/
A
d
v
i
s
o
r
y
GPOBA
C\. Project
Preparation
Costs
Committed expenditures as of May 2008 for project preparation: US$491,737 (including all
external consultancies)\.
Page 38
GPOBA Commitment Paper: Improved Access to Communications in Rural Cambodia April 9, 2008
38
Annex 8\. Documents in the Project File
(a)
Telecom Cambodia Sub-decree, Kingdom of Cambodia (2005)
(b)
Telephone Interconnection Regulation, Minister of Posts and Telecommunications (2003)
(c)
Joint Venture Agreement for the Rehabilitation and Expansion of the Ex-UNTAC
Telecommunications Network in the Kingdom of Cambodia, between MPTC and Indosat
(d)
Statistical Yearbook 2006, National Institute of Statistics (Ministry of Planning
Cambodia)
(e)
General Population Census of Cambodia 1998, National Institute of Statistics (Ministry
of Planning Cambodia)
(f)
Commune Database 2005, SEILA Programme
(g)
Prime Investment Information in Cambodia (Provinces-Cities), Council for the
Development of Cambodia
(h)
Food Security Atlas of Cambodia, United Nations World Food Programme
(i)
Cambodia Human Development Report
Expanding Choices for Rural People, UNDP
(2007)
(j)
Cambodia: Options for Rural Telecommunications Development by Arno Wirzenius
(2002)
(k)
Bringing Cellular Phone Service to the Rural Areas: Grameen Telecom and village pay
phones in Bangladesh by Cina Lawson and Natalie Meyenn (2000)
Page 39
G
P
O
B
A
C
o
m
m
i
t
m
e
n
t
P
a
p
e
r
:
I
m
p
r
o
v
e
d
A
c
c
e
s
s
t
o
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
R
u
r
a
l
C
a
m
b
o
d
i
a
A
p
r
i
l
9
,
2
0
0
8
3
9
A
n
n
e
x
9
\.
G
o
o
d
G
o
v
e
r
n
a
n
c
e
F
r
a
m
e
w
o
r
k
-
D
R
A
F
T
N
o
\.
I
s
s
u
e
A
c
t
i
o
n
t
o
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
e
R
i
s
k
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
T
a
r
g
e
t
/
M
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
1
\.
E
l
e
m
e
n
t
1
:
P
r
o
c
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
1
\.
a
N
e
e
d
f
o
r
p
r
o
c
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
t
h
e
I
P
A
t
o
r
e
d
u
c
e
r
i
s
k
o
f
i
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
i
t
i
e
s
\.
U
n
l
e
s
s
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
a
g
r
e
e
d
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
t
h
e
R
G
C
a
n
d
t
h
e
W
B
,
t
h
e
R
G
C
s
h
a
l
l
u
s
e
t
h
e
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
o
f
a
n
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
P
r
o
c
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
A
g
e
n
t
(
I
P
A
)
e
n
g
a
g
e
d
b
y
M
E
F
u
n
d
e
r
T
O
R
s
a
t
i
s
f
a
c
t
o
r
y
t
o
I
D
A
f
o
r
a
l
l
p
r
o
c
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
u
n
d
e
r
t
h
e
P
r
o
j
e
c
t
\.
I
P
A
w
i
l
l
f
i
n
a
l
i
z
e
b
i
d
d
i
n
g
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
t
s
i
n
a
c
c
o
r
d
a
n
c
e
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
W
B
s
P
r
o
c
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
C
o
n
s
u
l
t
a
n
t
G
u
i
d
e
l
i
n
e
s
a
n
d
t
h
e
p
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
s
o
f
t
h
e
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
n
g
A
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
,
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
g
u
i
d
a
n
c
e
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
d
u
n
d
e
r
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
O
p
e
r
a
t
i
n
g
P
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
f
o
r
I
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
i
n
g
E
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
l
y
A
s
s
i
s
t
e
d
P
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
P
r
o
c
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
M
a
n
u
a
l
(
S
O
P
/
P
M
)
,
m
a
n
d
a
t
e
d
b
y
S
u
b
-
D
e
c
r
e
e
N
o
\.
1
4
o
f
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
2
6
,
2
0
0
7
\.
I
P
A
w
i
l
l
c
a
l
l
a
n
d
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
e
b
i
d
s
a
n
d
r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
d
a
w
a
r
d
\.
M
P
T
C
m
a
y
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
t
e
c
h
n
i
c
a
l
i
n
p
u
t
t
o
I
P
A
f
o
r
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
b
i
d
s
f
r
o
m
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
r
s
\.
M
E
F
\.
D
o
n
e
\.
I
P
A
w
i
t
h
M
E
F
o
v
e
r
s
i
g
h
t
\.
P
r
i
o
r
r
e
v
i
e
w
b
y
W
B
o
f
e
v
e
r
y
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
\.
I
P
A
c
o
m
m
e
n
c
e
d
w
o
r
k
o
n
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
3
,
2
0
0
7
\.
R
e
f
l
e
c
t
i
n
g
r
a
n
t
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
\.
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
i
o
n
o
f
I
P
A
b
y
t
h
e
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
s
I
n
t
e
r
-
M
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
i
a
l
P
r
o
c
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
C
o
m
m
i
t
t
e
e
\.
F
i
r
s
t
W
B
p
r
o
c
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
r
e
v
i
e
w
3
m
o
n
t
h
s
a
f
t
e
r
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
a
n
d
e
v
e
r
y
6
m
o
n
t
h
s
t
h
e
r
e
a
f
t
e
r
\.
1
\.
b
N
e
e
d
f
o
r
t
e
c
h
n
i
c
a
l
l
y
s
a
t
i
s
f
a
c
t
o
r
y
d
e
s
i
g
n
s
f
o
r
a
n
o
u
t
p
u
t
-
b
a
s
e
d
t
e
l
e
p
h
o
n
y
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
\.
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
c
o
n
s
u
l
t
a
n
t
s
h
a
v
e
p
r
e
p
a
r
e
d
d
e
s
i
g
n
,
t
e
c
h
n
i
c
a
l
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
n
d
i
n
p
u
t
s
f
o
r
d
r
a
f
t
b
i
d
d
i
n
g
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
t
s
f
o
r
I
P
A
t
o
f
i
n
a
l
i
z
e
\.
W
B
u
n
d
e
r
G
P
O
B
A
w
i
n
d
o
w
1
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
n
g
\.
W
B
N
O
L
t
o
f
i
n
a
l
d
e
s
i
g
n
\.
W
B
N
O
L
p
r
i
o
r
t
o
I
P
A
p
r
e
p
a
r
i
n
g
b
i
d
d
i
n
g
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
t
s
\.
1
\.
c
I
n
a
d
e
q
u
a
t
e
o
r
d
e
l
a
y
e
d
P
r
o
c
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
P
l
a
n
s
\.
P
r
e
p
a
r
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
r
e
a
l
i
s
t
i
c
a
n
n
u
a
l
P
r
o
c
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
P
l
a
n
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
a
n
n
u
a
l
w
o
r
k
p
l
a
n
a
n
d
b
u
d
g
e
t
\.
M
P
T
C
w
i
t
h
W
B
N
O
L
\.
A
g
r
e
e
f
i
r
s
t
y
e
a
r
P
l
a
n
p
r
i
o
r
t
o
g
r
a
n
t
s
i
g
n
i
n
g
\.
P
l
a
n
w
i
l
l
b
e
u
p
d
a
t
e
d
a
t
s
i
x
-
m
o
n
t
h
l
y
i
n
t
e
r
v
a
l
s
w
i
t
h
W
B
N
O
L
\.
Page 40
G
P
O
B
A
C
o
m
m
i
t
m
e
n
t
P
a
p
e
r
:
I
m
p
r
o
v
e
d
A
c
c
e
s
s
t
o
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
R
u
r
a
l
C
a
m
b
o
d
i
a
A
p
r
i
l
9
,
2
0
0
8
4
0
N
o
\.
I
s
s
u
e
A
c
t
i
o
n
t
o
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
e
R
i
s
k
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
T
a
r
g
e
t
/
M
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
2
\.
E
l
e
m
e
n
t
2
:
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
(
F
M
)
2
\.
a
S
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
l
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
\.
E
n
s
u
r
e
t
h
a
t
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
u
s
e
s
S
O
P
/
F
M
M
,
t
h
e
r
e
w
i
l
l
b
e
n
o
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
-
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
F
M
m
a
n
u
a
l
f
o
r
t
h
i
s
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
\.
M
P
T
C
t
o
e
n
s
u
r
e
c
o
m
p
l
i
a
n
c
e
\.
M
a
n
d
a
t
e
u
s
e
o
f
S
O
P
/
F
M
M
i
n
g
r
a
n
t
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
\.
W
B
t
o
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
d
u
r
i
n
g
F
M
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
i
o
n
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
\.
2
\.
b
P
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
n
e
e
d
t
o
s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
F
M
c
a
p
a
c
i
t
y
f
o
r
t
h
e
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
\.
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
l
y
,
M
P
T
C
w
i
l
l
d
e
s
i
g
n
a
t
e
F
M
a
n
d
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
v
e
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
s
t
a
f
f
t
o
b
e
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
b
l
e
f
o
r
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
,
b
o
o
k
k
e
e
p
i
n
g
,
p
r
e
p
a
r
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
w
i
t
h
d
r
a
w
a
l
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
a
n
d
p
r
e
p
a
r
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
a
n
n
u
a
l
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
s
\.
W
B
t
o
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
t
o
d
e
s
i
g
n
a
t
e
d
o
f
f
i
c
e
r
s
o
n
F
M
p
o
l
i
c
y
a
n
d
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
l
a
u
n
c
h
w
o
r
k
s
h
o
p
\.
M
T
P
C
a
n
d
t
h
e
W
B
w
i
l
l
r
e
v
i
e
w
t
h
e
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
o
f
P
r
o
j
e
c
t
F
M
a
n
d
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
i
x
m
o
n
t
h
s
a
f
t
e
r
c
o
m
m
e
n
c
e
m
e
n
t
\.
I
f
d
e
e
m
e
d
n
e
c
e
s
s
a
r
y
b
e
e
i
t
h
e
r
M
P
T
C
o
r
W
B
,
a
q
u
a
l
i
f
i
e
d
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
c
o
n
s
u
l
t
a
n
t
w
i
t
h
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
q
u
a
l
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
n
d
e
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
w
i
l
l
b
e
r
e
c
r
u
i
t
e
d
t
o
s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
c
a
p
a
c
i
t
y
\.
M
P
T
C
\.
W
B
\.
M
P
T
C
a
n
d
W
B
\.
I
f
c
o
n
s
u
l
t
a
n
t
i
s
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
,
M
P
T
C
t
o
p
r
e
p
a
r
e
a
n
d
a
g
r
e
e
T
O
R
w
i
t
h
W
B
\.
I
P
A
t
o
r
e
c
r
u
i
t
c
o
n
s
u
l
t
a
n
t
w
i
t
h
W
B
n
o
o
b
j
e
c
t
i
o
n
d
u
r
i
n
g
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
\.
S
t
a
f
f
t
o
b
e
d
e
s
i
g
n
a
t
e
d
b
y
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
\.
D
u
r
i
n
g
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
l
a
u
n
c
h
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
\.
R
e
v
i
e
w
a
c
c
e
p
t
a
b
l
e
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
o
f
F
M
a
n
d
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
i
x
m
o
n
t
h
s
a
f
t
e
r
P
r
o
j
e
c
t
c
o
m
m
e
n
c
e
m
e
n
t
\.
I
f
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
,
c
o
n
s
u
l
t
a
n
t
t
o
b
e
i
n
p
l
a
c
e
f
o
u
r
m
o
n
t
h
s
t
h
e
r
e
a
f
t
e
r
\.
2
\.
c
E
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
\.
O
n
e
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
r
e
p
o
r
t
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
n
o
t
m
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
s
i
x
m
o
n
t
h
s
a
f
t
e
r
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
i
o
n
\.
A
d
o
p
t
T
O
R
f
o
r
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
a
u
d
i
t
a
s
a
l
r
e
a
d
y
a
g
r
e
e
d
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
M
E
F
/
W
B
w
i
t
h
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
e
m
p
h
a
s
i
s
o
n
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
l
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
\.
M
E
F
t
o
c
o
n
f
i
r
m
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
w
i
l
l
b
e
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
i
n
a
f
u
t
u
r
e
a
u
d
i
t
b
u
n
d
l
e
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
\.
M
E
F
t
o
r
e
c
r
u
i
t
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
w
i
t
h
W
B
N
O
L
i
n
t
i
m
e
f
o
r
a
u
d
i
t
a
t
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
i
o
n
,
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
i
n
m
i
d
2
0
1
1
\.
2
\.
d
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
r
e
p
o
r
t
i
n
g
\.
M
P
T
C
w
i
l
l
m
a
i
n
t
a
i
n
a
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
r
e
g
i
s
t
e
r
t
o
k
e
e
p
t
r
a
c
k
o
f
f
u
n
d
s
p
a
i
d
t
o
t
h
e
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
o
r
a
n
d
t
h
e
I
V
A
,
M
P
T
C
A
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
v
e
a
n
d
F
i
n
a
n
c
e
O
f
f
i
c
e
r
\.
M
P
T
C
t
o
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
b
y
c
o
m
p
a
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
a
m
o
u
n
t
s
p
a
i
d
Page 41
G
P
O
B
A
C
o
m
m
i
t
m
e
n
t
P
a
p
e
r
:
I
m
p
r
o
v
e
d
A
c
c
e
s
s
t
o
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
R
u
r
a
l
C
a
m
b
o
d
i
a
A
p
r
i
l
9
,
2
0
0
8
4
1
N
o
\.
I
s
s
u
e
A
c
t
i
o
n
t
o
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
e
R
i
s
k
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
T
a
r
g
e
t
/
M
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
a
n
d
w
i
l
l
s
u
b
m
i
t
a
n
a
n
n
u
a
l
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
t
o
W
B
\.
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
v
a
l
u
e
\.
2
\.
e
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
o
n
r
e
i
m
b
u
r
s
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
i
n
c
r
e
m
e
n
t
a
l
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
n
g
c
o
s
t
s
(
I
O
C
)
\.
T
h
e
w
i
t
h
d
r
a
w
a
l
o
f
g
r
a
n
t
f
u
n
d
s
f
o
r
r
e
i
m
b
u
r
s
i
n
g
I
O
C
w
i
l
l
b
e
l
i
m
i
t
e
d
t
o
o
f
f
i
c
e
s
u
p
p
l
i
e
s
,
o
n
e
c
o
m
p
u
t
e
r
,
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
p
u
b
l
i
c
a
n
n
o
u
n
c
e
m
e
n
t
s
a
n
d
a
d
v
e
r
t
i
s
e
m
e
n
t
s
,
o
f
f
i
c
e
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
c
o
s
t
s
,
u
t
i
l
i
t
y
c
h
a
r
g
e
s
,
a
n
d
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
t
r
a
v
e
l
a
n
d
p
e
r
d
i
e
m
i
n
c
o
n
n
e
c
t
i
o
n
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
P
r
o
j
e
c
t
,
t
h
e
l
a
t
t
e
r
b
e
i
n
g
r
e
i
m
b
u
r
s
e
d
a
t
r
a
t
e
s
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
e
d
i
n
M
E
F
D
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
L
e
t
t
e
r
N
o
\.
2
0
0
0
o
f
A
p
r
i
l
2
3
,
2
0
0
7
\.
M
P
T
C
w
i
t
h
W
B
v
e
t
t
i
n
g
o
f
w
i
t
h
d
r
a
w
a
l
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
\.
M
P
T
C
t
o
e
n
s
u
r
e
c
o
m
p
l
i
a
n
c
e
d
u
r
i
n
g
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
\.
W
B
t
o
v
e
r
i
f
y
d
u
r
i
n
g
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
i
o
n
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
\.
3
\.
E
l
e
m
e
n
t
3
:
D
i
s
c
l
o
s
u
r
e
3
\.
a
M
i
n
i
m
i
z
e
c
o
n
f
l
i
c
t
o
f
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
o
f
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
t
a
f
f
\.
M
P
T
C
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
t
a
f
f
t
o
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
e
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
a
n
d
p
u
b
l
i
c
a
f
f
i
l
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
r
p
e
r
s
o
n
a
l
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
b
e
f
o
r
e
b
e
c
o
m
i
n
g
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
d
i
n
a
n
y
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
t
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
u
c
h
a
s
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
a
w
a
r
d
\.
M
P
T
C
P
r
o
j
e
c
t
D
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
t
o
a
s
k
f
o
r
a
n
d
r
e
t
a
i
n
w
r
i
t
t
e
n
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
u
r
e
\.
W
B
t
o
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
d
u
r
i
n
g
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
i
o
n
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
\.
3
\.
b
E
n
h
a
n
c
e
t
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
p
u
b
l
i
c
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
u
r
e
o
f
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
\.
A
g
r
e
e
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
t
o
b
e
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
e
d
i
n
a
s
u
m
m
a
r
y
a
d
v
e
r
t
i
s
e
m
e
n
t
i
n
a
w
i
d
e
c
i
r
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
n
e
w
s
p
a
p
e
r
b
i
a
n
n
u
a
l
l
y
,
w
i
t
h
h
a
r
d
c
o
p
i
e
s
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
f
o
r
p
u
b
l
i
c
i
n
s
p
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
t
M
P
T
C
o
f
f
i
c
e
s
o
n
r
e
q
u
e
s
t
a
n
d
a
t
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
t
o
b
e
a
g
r
e
e
d
\.
A
s
a
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
,
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
e
d
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
t
o
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
:
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
n
a
m
e
,
o
b
j
e
c
t
i
v
e
s
,
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
a
n
d
r
e
v
i
s
e
d
a
m
o
u
n
t
,
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
o
f
f
u
n
d
i
n
g
,
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
d
a
t
e
,
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
c
l
o
s
i
n
g
d
a
t
e
,
r
e
v
i
s
e
d
c
l
o
s
i
n
g
d
a
t
e
,
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
e
x
t
e
n
s
i
o
n
s
,
n
a
m
e
a
n
d
a
d
d
r
e
s
s
o
f
e
x
e
c
u
t
i
n
g
a
g
e
n
c
y
,
n
a
m
e
o
f
P
r
o
j
e
c
t
D
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
w
i
t
h
c
o
n
t
a
c
t
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
(
i
n
c
\.
e
-
m
a
i
l
)
,
n
a
m
e
o
f
W
B
o
f
f
i
c
e
r
i
n
c
h
a
r
g
e
,
a
n
d
c
o
n
t
a
c
t
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
t
h
e
M
E
F
-
W
B
u
n
i
t
,
a
n
d
W
B
o
f
f
i
c
e
i
n
C
a
m
b
o
d
i
a
M
P
T
C
a
n
d
W
B
t
o
a
g
r
e
e
f
i
n
a
l
l
i
s
t
a
n
d
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
o
r
p
u
b
l
i
c
i
n
s
p
e
c
t
i
o
n
o
f
h
a
r
d
c
o
p
i
e
s
\.
M
P
T
C
P
r
o
j
e
c
t
D
i
r
e
c
t
o
r
t
o
a
r
r
a
n
g
e
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
u
r
e
\.
I
P
A
w
i
l
l
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
e
p
r
o
c
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
o
n
M
E
F
w
e
b
s
i
t
e
\.
A
u
g
u
s
t
2
0
0
8
\.
B
i
a
n
n
u
a
l
l
y
\.
W
B
t
o
v
e
r
i
f
y
d
u
r
i
n
g
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
i
o
n
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
\.
Page 42
G
P
O
B
A
C
o
m
m
i
t
m
e
n
t
P
a
p
e
r
:
I
m
p
r
o
v
e
d
A
c
c
e
s
s
t
o
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
R
u
r
a
l
C
a
m
b
o
d
i
a
A
p
r
i
l
9
,
2
0
0
8
4
2
N
o
\.
I
s
s
u
e
A
c
t
i
o
n
t
o
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
e
R
i
s
k
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
T
a
r
g
e
t
/
M
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
d
e
t
a
i
l
s
o
f
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
s
,
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
i
o
n
,
d
a
t
a
o
n
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
a
n
n
u
a
l
W
o
r
k
P
r
o
g
r
a
m
a
n
d
P
r
o
c
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
P
l
a
n
,
i
d
e
n
t
i
f
y
i
n
g
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
s
t
o
b
e
p
r
o
c
u
r
e
d
i
n
n
e
x
t
1
2
m
o
n
t
h
s
,
n
a
t
u
r
e
o
f
e
a
c
h
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
,
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
,
m
e
t
h
o
d
o
f
p
r
o
c
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
,
m
e
a
n
s
o
f
a
d
v
e
r
t
i
s
e
m
e
n
t
,
b
i
d
d
i
n
g
p
e
r
i
o
d
,
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
w
h
e
r
e
b
i
d
d
i
n
g
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
t
s
a
n
d
R
F
P
s
c
a
n
b
e
i
n
s
p
e
c
t
e
d
,
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
d
a
t
e
o
f
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
,
a
n
d
c
o
s
t
o
f
b
i
d
d
i
n
g
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
t
s
c
o
n
s
u
l
t
a
n
t
l
o
n
g
a
n
d
s
h
o
r
t
l
i
s
t
s
b
i
d
d
i
n
g
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
t
s
a
n
d
R
F
P
s
t
o
b
e
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
f
o
r
i
n
s
p
e
c
t
i
o
n
b
i
d
c
l
o
s
i
n
g
d
a
t
e
s
,
n
a
m
e
s
o
f
b
i
d
d
e
r
s
a
n
d
t
h
e
i
r
b
i
d
p
r
i
c
e
s
a
t
o
p
e
n
i
n
g
l
i
s
t
a
n
d
d
e
t
a
i
l
s
o
f
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
s
a
w
a
r
d
e
d
,
n
a
m
e
s
o
f
l
o
s
i
n
g
b
i
d
d
e
r
s
a
n
d
,
i
f
t
h
e
i
r
b
i
d
p
r
i
c
e
s
w
e
r
e
l
o
w
e
r
t
h
a
n
t
h
e
w
i
n
n
i
n
g
b
i
d
d
e
r
,
t
h
e
r
e
a
s
o
n
f
o
r
t
h
e
i
r
r
e
j
e
c
t
i
o
n
q
u
a
r
t
e
r
l
y
C
o
m
p
l
i
a
n
c
e
R
e
p
o
r
t
s
p
l
a
n
n
e
d
a
n
d
a
c
t
u
a
l
d
i
s
b
u
r
s
e
m
e
n
t
s
b
y
s
u
b
c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
a
n
n
u
a
l
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
s
a
n
d
a
u
d
i
t
o
p
i
n
i
o
n
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
p
r
e
p
a
r
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
I
V
A
c
o
m
p
l
a
i
n
t
s
r
e
m
e
d
i
e
s
a
n
d
m
e
c
h
a
n
i
s
m
4
\.
E
l
e
m
e
n
t
4
:
C
i
v
i
l
S
o
c
i
e
t
y
R
o
l
e
4
\.
a
G
r
e
a
t
e
r
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
m
e
n
t
b
y
C
i
v
i
l
S
o
c
i
e
t
y
O
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
s
(
C
S
O
s
)
\.
M
P
T
C
t
o
i
d
e
n
t
i
f
y
C
S
O
(
s
)
a
p
p
r
o
p
r
i
a
t
e
t
o
b
e
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
d
i
n
s
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
a
s
p
e
c
t
s
o
f
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
i
n
v
i
t
e
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
v
e
s
t
o
o
b
s
e
r
v
e
s
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
e
v
e
n
t
s
,
s
u
c
h
a
s
:
M
P
T
C
t
o
s
e
l
e
c
t
C
S
O
(
s
)
a
n
d
o
b
t
a
i
n
M
E
F
c
o
n
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
e
\.
S
e
l
e
c
t
b
y
e
n
d
-
A
u
g
u
s
t
2
0
0
8
\.
M
E
F
c
o
n
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
e
b
y
e
n
d
-
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
0
8
\.
Page 43
G
P
O
B
A
C
o
m
m
i
t
m
e
n
t
P
a
p
e
r
:
I
m
p
r
o
v
e
d
A
c
c
e
s
s
t
o
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
R
u
r
a
l
C
a
m
b
o
d
i
a
A
p
r
i
l
9
,
2
0
0
8
4
3
N
o
\.
I
s
s
u
e
A
c
t
i
o
n
t
o
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
e
R
i
s
k
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
T
a
r
g
e
t
/
M
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
p
u
b
l
i
c
b
i
d
o
p
e
n
i
n
g
s
(
I
P
A
t
o
i
n
v
i
t
e
)
;
m
e
e
t
i
n
g
s
t
o
r
e
v
i
e
w
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
p
r
o
g
r
e
s
s
;
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
o
n
o
f
t
e
l
e
p
h
o
n
y
f
a
c
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
i
n
v
i
l
l
a
g
e
s
;
t
e
s
t
i
n
g
o
f
f
a
c
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
a
n
d
h
a
n
d
o
v
e
r
c
e
r
e
m
o
n
i
e
s
;
o
t
h
e
r
s
a
s
i
d
e
n
t
i
f
i
e
d
b
y
M
P
T
C
\.
A
l
l
m
a
j
o
r
C
S
O
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
m
e
n
t
t
o
b
e
r
e
c
o
r
d
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
P
r
o
v
i
d
e
r
i
n
i
t
s
q
u
a
r
t
e
r
l
y
C
o
m
p
l
i
a
n
c
e
R
e
p
o
r
t
s
t
o
M
P
T
C
,
c
o
p
i
e
d
t
o
M
E
F
a
n
d
W
B
T
T
L
a
f
t
e
r
r
e
v
i
e
w
b
y
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
e
r
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
A
g
e
n
t
(
s
e
e
i
t
e
m
8
\.
a
)
\.
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
P
r
o
v
i
d
e
r
s
w
i
t
h
M
P
T
C
o
v
e
r
s
i
g
h
t
a
n
d
I
V
E
r
e
v
i
e
w
\.
W
B
t
o
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
r
e
v
i
e
w
o
f
I
V
A
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
a
n
d
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
i
o
n
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
\.
5
\.
E
l
e
m
e
n
t
5
:
C
o
m
p
l
a
i
n
t
s
a
n
d
R
e
m
e
d
i
e
s
M
e
c
h
a
n
i
s
m
5
\.
a
N
e
e
d
f
o
r
s
y
s
t
e
m
a
t
i
c
c
o
m
p
l
a
i
n
t
s
a
n
d
r
e
m
e
d
i
e
s
m
e
c
h
a
n
i
s
m
c
o
v
e
r
i
n
g
a
l
l
a
s
p
e
c
t
s
o
f
t
h
e
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
\.
(
s
e
e
o
u
t
l
i
n
e
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
d
)
D
e
s
i
g
n
a
n
d
a
d
o
p
t
w
e
l
l
-
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
m
e
c
h
a
n
i
s
m
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
b
l
e
t
o
a
l
l
c
o
m
p
l
a
i
n
t
s
o
n
a
n
y
a
s
p
e
c
t
o
f
t
h
e
P
r
o
j
e
c
t
\.
C
o
m
p
l
a
i
n
t
s
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
s
r
e
g
a
r
d
i
n
g
p
r
o
c
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
t
o
f
o
l
l
o
w
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
s
e
t
o
u
t
i
n
S
O
P
/
P
M
\.
M
P
T
C
w
i
t
h
W
B
N
O
L
\.
I
P
A
a
n
d
M
P
T
C
\.
W
B
N
O
L
b
y
e
n
d
-
A
u
g
u
s
t
2
0
0
8
\.
W
B
t
o
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
a
d
o
p
t
i
o
n
d
u
r
i
n
g
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
i
o
n
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
\.
W
B
t
o
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
d
u
r
i
n
g
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
i
o
n
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
\.
6
\.
E
l
e
m
e
n
t
6
:
C
o
d
e
o
f
E
t
h
i
c
a
l
C
o
n
d
u
c
t
6
\.
a
C
o
m
p
l
i
a
n
c
e
C
o
d
e
o
f
C
o
n
d
u
c
t
f
o
r
c
i
v
i
l
s
e
r
v
a
n
t
s
\.
M
P
T
C
t
o
d
i
s
s
e
m
i
n
a
t
e
t
o
a
l
l
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
t
a
f
f
t
h
e
c
o
d
e
o
f
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
C
i
v
i
l
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
S
t
a
t
u
t
e
o
f
1
9
9
4
a
n
d
e
n
s
u
r
e
t
h
a
t
s
t
a
f
f
c
o
m
p
l
y
\.
M
P
T
C
\.
D
e
s
i
g
n
a
n
d
f
u
r
n
i
s
h
c
o
p
y
t
o
W
B
b
y
e
n
d
-
A
u
g
u
s
t
2
0
0
8
\.
W
B
t
o
v
e
r
i
f
y
a
d
o
p
t
i
o
n
d
u
r
i
n
g
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
i
o
n
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
\.
7
\.
E
l
e
m
e
n
t
7
:
S
a
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
7
\.
a
N
e
e
d
t
o
r
e
i
n
f
o
r
c
e
C
o
d
e
o
f
E
t
h
i
c
a
l
C
o
n
d
u
c
t
w
i
t
h
s
a
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
f
o
r
I
d
e
n
t
i
f
y
a
n
d
a
p
p
l
y
s
a
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
u
n
d
e
r
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
l
a
w
a
n
d
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
f
C
a
m
b
o
d
i
a
a
n
d
a
n
y
M
P
T
C
t
o
i
d
e
n
t
i
f
y
a
n
d
d
i
s
s
e
m
i
n
a
t
e
w
i
t
h
C
o
d
e
o
f
D
e
f
i
n
e
a
n
d
f
u
r
n
i
s
h
c
o
p
y
t
o
W
B
b
y
e
n
d
-
A
u
g
u
s
t
2
0
0
8
\.
W
B
t
o
Page 44
G
P
O
B
A
C
o
m
m
i
t
m
e
n
t
P
a
p
e
r
:
I
m
p
r
o
v
e
d
A
c
c
e
s
s
t
o
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
R
u
r
a
l
C
a
m
b
o
d
i
a
A
p
r
i
l
9
,
2
0
0
8
4
4
N
o
\.
I
s
s
u
e
A
c
t
i
o
n
t
o
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
e
R
i
s
k
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
T
a
r
g
e
t
/
M
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
f
r
a
u
d
u
l
e
n
t
a
n
d
c
o
r
r
u
p
t
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
b
y
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
t
a
f
f
,
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
o
r
s
,
s
u
p
p
l
i
e
r
s
a
n
d
c
o
n
s
u
l
t
a
n
t
s
,
w
h
i
c
h
a
r
e
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
l
y
n
o
t
p
r
o
p
e
r
l
y
d
i
s
s
e
m
i
n
a
t
e
d
\.
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
l
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
f
M
P
T
C
\.
W
B
t
o
a
p
p
l
y
s
a
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
i
n
i
t
s
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
a
n
d
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
-
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
l
e
g
a
l
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
s
,
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
i
t
s
G
r
o
u
p
s
A
n
t
i
-
C
o
r
r
u
p
t
i
o
n
G
u
i
d
e
l
i
n
e
s
(
A
C
G
)
a
n
d
S
a
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
R
e
g
i
m
e
i
s
s
u
e
d
i
n
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
2
0
0
6
a
n
d
a
s
m
a
y
b
e
s
u
b
s
e
q
u
e
n
t
l
y
u
p
d
a
t
e
d
\.
E
t
h
i
c
a
l
C
o
n
d
u
c
t
\.
W
B
t
o
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
M
P
T
C
a
c
o
p
y
o
f
i
t
s
A
C
G
a
n
d
S
a
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
R
e
g
i
m
e
\.
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
d
u
r
i
n
g
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
i
o
n
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
\.
P
r
o
v
i
d
e
M
P
T
C
a
c
o
p
y
o
f
t
h
e
A
C
G
b
e
f
o
r
e
g
r
a
n
t
s
i
g
n
i
n
g
\.
W
B
m
a
y
a
p
p
l
y
s
a
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
w
h
e
n
e
v
e
r
e
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
i
s
f
o
u
n
d
\.
8
\.
E
l
e
m
e
n
t
8
:
P
r
o
j
e
c
t
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
E
l
e
m
e
n
t
s
8
\.
a
V
e
r
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
r
s
c
o
m
p
l
i
a
n
c
e
w
i
t
h
t
e
r
m
s
o
f
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
s
A
p
p
o
i
n
t
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
e
r
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
A
g
e
n
t
(
I
V
A
)
\.
I
V
A
t
o
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
a
n
d
r
e
p
o
r
t
t
o
M
P
T
C
o
n
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
r
s
o
u
t
p
u
t
s
a
n
d
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
\.
M
P
T
C
t
o
f
o
r
w
a
r
d
I
V
A
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
t
o
G
P
O
B
A
a
n
d
W
B
a
f
t
e
r
r
e
v
i
e
w
\.
M
P
T
C
t
o
p
r
e
p
a
r
e
T
O
R
a
n
d
o
b
t
a
i
n
W
B
N
O
L
\.
I
P
A
t
o
r
e
c
r
u
i
t
I
V
A
w
i
t
h
W
B
p
r
i
o
r
r
e
v
i
e
w
a
n
d
N
O
L
d
u
r
i
n
g
r
e
c
r
u
i
t
m
e
n
t
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
\.
I
V
A
t
o
v
a
l
i
d
a
t
e
o
u
t
p
u
t
s
a
n
d
i
s
s
u
e
N
O
L
o
p
i
n
i
o
n
t
o
M
P
T
C
f
o
r
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
t
o
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
r
(
s
)
\.
A
g
r
e
e
T
O
R
b
y
g
r
a
n
t
s
i
g
n
i
n
g
\.
S
t
a
r
t
r
e
c
r
u
i
t
m
e
n
t
i
m
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
l
y
t
h
e
r
e
a
f
t
e
r
\.
P
r
o
p
o
s
a
l
s
b
y
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
0
8
,
s
i
g
n
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
b
y
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
0
8
\.
T
w
o
w
e
e
k
s
b
e
f
o
r
e
e
a
c
h
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
d
w
i
t
h
d
r
a
w
a
l
a
f
t
e
r
t
h
e
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
\. | APPROVAL |
P007980 | Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No\. 8658
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PERU
HIC-HER AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION PROJECT
(LOAN 2208-PE)
MAY 25, 1990
Human Resources Operations Unit
Country Department IV
Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office
Ths document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their offcial duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
ACRONYMS
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
MEF Ministry of Economics and Finance
NAU National Agrarian University
PIU Project Implementation Unit
CURRENCY
Currency Unit: 1000 Soles -1 Inti as of 01101/86
At Appraisal: US$1 S/\.550
At Completion: US$1 - I/\.1200
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
Metric System
FOR OFCAL USE ONLY
THE WORLD SANK
Washington\. D\.C\. 20433
U\.S\.A\.
O0fic t4 Dweciwv\.Gufw\.i
May 25, 1990
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Completion Report: PERU - Higher Agricultural
Education Project (Loan 2208-PE)
Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled
"Project Completion Report: Peru - Higher Agricultural Education
Project (Loan 2208-PE)" prepared by the Latin America and the Caribbean
Regional Office\. No audit of this project has been made by the
Operations Evaluation Department at this rime\.
Attachment
This document has a rtdcted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performnce
of their official duties\. Its contents rnay not otherwise be diselosd without World Bank authodration\.
FOR OMCIL USE ONLY
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PERU
HIGHER AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION PROJECT
(LOAN 2208-PE)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No\.
Preface \.*0\. i
Evaluation Summary \. \. \.*\. iii
PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE \. \. 1
Project Ideutity \. 1
Background \. 1
Project Objectives and Description \. 2
Project Design and Organization \. \. 3
Project Implementation \.*\.**\.*\.**\. *\.**\. 3
Project Results \. \. 4
Project Sustainability \. \. \. \. \. 5
Bank Performance \. \. \. \.*\.* \. \. \. \. 5
Borrower Performance \. \. \. 6
Project Relationship \. 7
PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE \.O\. 9
PART III: SUMMARY OF STATISTICAL DATA \. \. 11
Annex 1 - Related Bank Loans \.** \.**\. 11
Annex 2 - Project Timetable \. 12
Annex 3 A\. Loan Disbursements \. \. 13
B\. Project Implementation \. 13
Annex 4 - Project Costs and Financing \. 14
A\. Project Costs \. 14
B\. Project Financing \. \. *\.*\. 15
Annex 5 - Project Results \. \. 16
A\. Direct Benefits \. \. \. \. \. \. 16
Annex 6 - Status of Covenants \. \. \. 17
Annex 7 - Use of Bank Resources \. 18
A\. Staff Inputs \. \. \. \. \. \. 18
B\. Mission Data \. \. \. \. 18i
ATTACHMENT I: Comments from the Borrwer \. 19
This document hass restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otiberwise be discosed without World Bank authoriation\.
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PERU
HIGHER AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION PROJECT
(LOAN 2208-PE)
PREFACE
Tnis is a Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Higher
Agricultural Education Project in Peru, for which Loan 2208-PE in the
amount of US$17\.30 million was approved on September 11, 1982\. The project
account was closed on December 31, 1988, the original closing date\.
This PCR was prepared by the Human Resources Division of the
Technical Department in the Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office\.
It is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report, the record of the
Board discussion of this project, the Loan Agreement, and material in the
Bank's file pertaining to this project\.
The draft PCR (Parts I and III) were sent to the Borrower with the
request to prepare Part II but none was received\. However, a copy of the
draft PCR was discussed with the project implementation anit staff and the
Directorate of Public Credit within the Ministry of Economics and Finance
(MEF) during a field mission from March 13 to 21, 1989\. Comments received
were taken into account in finalizing the PCR\.
This PCR was read by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED)\.
The draft PCR was sent by OED to the Borrower and its agencies for comment
in March 1990\. Comments received have been reproduced, in English, as
Attachment I\.
- iii -
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
HIGHER AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION PROJECT
(LOAN 2208-PE)
EVALUATION SUMMURY
Introduction
At the time of project development the Peruvian Government was
trying to implement a multi-faceted agricultural development strategy in
order to revitalize the agricultural sector\. Availability of high quality
professionals in agriculture and related occupations was viewed as essen-
tial to implement the strategy which included complementary investments in
agricultural infrastructure, price incentives to farmers, and rebuilding
extension services and research (para\. 1)\.
gbiectives and Proiect Content
The project focused on strengthening the National Agrarian
University (NAU), the only one out of 19 Peruvian Universities viewed as
capable of producing high level professionals for the agricultural sector
(paras\. 2 and 3)\. The project's principal objectives were to: improve the
quality of instruction of graduate and undergraduate students especially in
agricultural economics; upgrade skills of professionals working in agri-
cultural extension, teaching, research and public administJation; and
contribute to further develop applied agricultural research (para\. 4)\. The
project included the folloving four components: rehabilitation and
expansion of the RAU campus at La Molina, Lima; construction of four NAU-
affiliated Regional Development Institutes; teacher upgrading; and tech-
nical assistance to overhaul the agricultural economics program at NAU\.
Imylementation Experience
Project implementation was extremely slow, spanning over six
years\. Total disbursements by project closing date were only US$3\.5
million or just 20X of the total US$17\.3 commitment\. The substantial
project implementation delays were due in part to factors beyond project
control (political instability, and insufficient financial support by the
government for the project, rapidly raising inflation\. However, design
factors also played an important role includings (i) the Bank's agreement
to a poorly conceived financial plan for provision of counterpart funds
which depended on the sale of NAU's land, which in fact was not legally
possible; (ii) ineffective project administration (highly centralized
decision making, cumbersome administrative procedures, and inadequate
oversight of the project by a part-time project coordinator); (iii) serious
inefficiencies in the contracting of civil works, exacerbated during the
final year of project execution by the severe scarcity of construction
material in the local market (paras\. 8, 9 and 20)\.
- iv -
Results
The comparison between project results and appraisal objectives is
complicated because (i) quality objectives such as Improvements in agricul-
tural economics were not realized at all; And (ii) project eomponent\. were
only partially implemented (para\. 10-12)\. Although overall project per-
formance was far below acceptable Bank standards, the project achieved a
modicum of success in meeting select objectives, particularly given the low
percentage of loan disbursement (201)\. The rehabilitation and expansion of
the HAD campus in La Molina, Lima, was largely achieved, although no con-
struction and equipping of research facilities was undertaken because of
counterpart funds shortages\. The professional upgrading of faculty compc-
nent was highly successful, with regard to overseas long term training with
1001 for Ph\.D degrees and 252 for M\.S\. All of the targeted numbers of
teachers were trained and returned to NMU\. Short-term training, however,
fell short of targets (602)\. Of the four NAU-affiliated regional develop-
ment institutes which were to be strengthened, only one was virtually
completed (about 90?); only partial equipping of the remaining three was
attained\. Finally, the technical assistance component to overhaul the
graduate program in agricultural economics was tarted, but never completed
(para"\. 10-12)\.
Sustainability
Institutional development objectives for NAU were not achieved
because:
{i) no attempt was made to limit enrollment growth,
(ii) curriculum reform measures were not instituted,
(iii) the NAU-affiliated regional development institutes and
research facilities failed to materialize, and
(iv) agricultural policies encouraging sectoral development were
never implemented\.
Given these circumstances and the fact the project did not achieve its
major objectives, it is unlikely that benefits will be sustainable\.
Findinas and Lessons
The project appraisal was overly optimistic regarding the
Borrower's financial ability and commitment to the project, resulting in a
major impasse in launching project execution, immediately after appraisal
and Board approval\. Experience with this project suggests that during the
early years of project implementation the Bank should have intensified
supervision and reassessed the status of the Borrower's commitment to the
project, making new investment commitments contingent upon the Borrower's
performance of earlier agreements (paras\. 15 and 17) More careful atten-
tion should have been paid by the Bank at appraisal to implementation
mechanisms and definition of ctaff functions and needs (para\. 23)\. Overall
project results highlight the need for: (i) ensuring firm political and
financial commitment to projects, including more realistic assessment of
counterpart funding availability over the life of the project; (ii) insti-
tuting viable implementation mechanisms; and (iii) promoting continuity of
Bank task mamagers (para\. 23)\.
PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE
Project Identity
Project Names Higher Agricultural Education
Loan Number: 2208-PE
RVP Unit: LA4HR
Country: Peru
Sectors Education
Subsector: Higher Education
Backaround
1\. At the time of project development the Peruvian Government was
trying to implement a multi-faceted agricultural development strategy in
order to revitalize the agricultural sector in Peru\. The main elements of
this strategy vere (i) investment in agricultural infrastructure; (ii)
introduction of price and other incentives to farmers to increase produc-
tion within a broad framework of increasing private initiatives; and (iii)
rebuilding the extension service and improving research activities\. The
availability of high quality professionals in agriculture and related
octupations was cons4\.dered an important element for successful implementa-
tion of this strategy\. Hence, the anr \.al demand for trained personnel in
the following areas was estimated: Cooperative farms, private farms,
research, extension services and public administration\.
2\. Although a total of 19 Peruvian Universities were producing, in
aggregate, between two to three times the number of high level personnel
needed to fill projected positions in the agricultural and fisheries areas,
the quality of graduates from 18 of these universities was below satisfac-
tory standards for high level managerial, technical, research and teaching
positions\.
3\. The project was justified on the ground that it would focus on
improving Peru's National Agrarian University (NAU)\. This university had
been able to maintain a high quality teaching staff over the previous
decade, and as a result, was the only institution in Peru viewed as capable
of producing the quality of graduates needed for the agricultural sectors\.
Proiect Obiectives And Description
4\. The project's principles objectives weres:
(a) To improve the quality of instruction and to augment the
practical orientation and management skills of undergraduate
and graduate students in agricultural related areas;
(b) To upgrade skills of professionals who were already working
in agricultural extension, research, publi^ administration
and university teaching\.
(c) To contribute directly to applied research and innovatien in
agriculture\.
5\. In furtherance of the above general objoctives, specifically, the
project included four major components:
(a) Rehabilitation and expansion of the La Molina CamDus in Lima1
1\. Rehabilitation and expansion to provide about
27,000m2 of classrooms and laboratories, and repair
of about 1,600m2 of classrooms and laboratories at
the central campus to be used by 4,500 undergraduate
and 500 graduate students;
2\. Rehabilitation and expansion to provide about
22,000 m2 of research facilities;
3\. Construction of circulation roads and sewer net-
works, landscaping of grounds, and provision of
->4ated equipment;
4\. Provision of furniture and equipment for the teach-
ing and research facilities;
(b) Construction of RAU-affiliated Regional DeveloDment
Institutes\.
Construction and equipping of four farm facilities to serve
as NAU's Regional Development Institutes to train local
farmers in appropriate technology\. Each farm was to become
financially self-sufficient through the sale of its products\.
(c) Teacher Uparadina\. Provision of scholarships for post-
graduate studies abroad of NAU faculty (including about 40 at
the M\.Sc and 20 at the Ph\.D level, and 60 to attend short
term courses)
(d) Technical Assistance\. Provision of about two staff-years of
expert services to overhaul the graduate program in agri-
cultural economics and strengthen agricultural economics and
business courses offered to undergraduates;
I/ Many structures in the teaching and research facilities of the La
Molina campus had been rendered inoperative due to heavy damage from
the 1974 earthquake\. Therefore, the project was geared to rehabilita-
tion of facilities and quality improvement of teaching (rather than
quantitative expansion) and research (See Annex 6, Section 2\.08)\.
- 3-
Prolect DeslMn and Organization
6\. The project, as appraised, vas rather simple technically\. How-
ever, in retrospect it appears that while the Bank "packaged" the project
appropriately with substantial institutional development components, the
University and the Government were never fully committed to these curri-
culum reform components\. It seems NAU wanted only assistance for physical
facilities\. Actually, the loan funds were used largely for desired
construction and renovation\. The full completion of civil works was con-
strained ultimately by the economic crisis, and hence the short fall in
local financing\. Bank disbursements were suspended on country grounds from
May 1987 throtigk project closing\.
Proiect Imnlementation
7\. Following Board approval on September 11, 1982, the Loan Agreement
was signed on March 28, 1983 and became effective on June 6, 1983\. The
first supervision mission took place in February 1983\. After five and one-
half years of implementation, only three out of the five major components
had been even partially completed, and only US$3\.5 million or 202 of the
US$17\.3 million loan was disbursed\.
8\. The slow pace of implementation was caused mainly by:
(a) the serious scarcity of counterpart funds, particularly
during the periods between January 1983 and June 1985, and
September to December 1988;
(b) cumbersome, ineffective project administration as the project
decision-making process within the university was highly
centralized, and relatively slow, and project supervision by
the coordinator was only on a part time basis, given that he
retained his full teaching responsibilities; (see para\. 19,,
(c) serious inefficiencies in the contracting of civil works,
which was interrupted by short falls in counterpart funding:
and
(d) severe scarcity of construction materials on the local
market, in the final years of execution\.
9\. Other factors that adversely affected the project during implemen-
tation included political instability, rapidly rising inflation and diffi-
culties arising from linkage of counterpart funding to the sale of land\.
Major political changes occurring during the life of the project impaired
the development of a strong commitment to the project on the part of the
Government\. During the initial (1982-85) and final (1987-88) stages of
project implementation, the financial support provided by the Government to
the project was much lower than expected, reflecting the relatively low
priority accorded to the project\. Escalating inflation contributed heavily
to the Government's difficulties in providing national counterpart funding
for the project on a timely basis\. The poor conception of the financial
plan served to compound the difficulties that were encountered\. In 1982,
immediately after project negotiatione there was an agreement between the
Government and RAU to sell RAU land in order to provide counterpart funds
for the first year of project implementation\. After some failed attempts
to sell the land, the University Council ruled based on legal considera-
tions that NAU's land was an intangible good; therefore, the land was never
sold\. Ir\. retrospect, the Bank should have insieted on a more reliable
source of funds, rather than assuming funds would be made available through
sale of land\. This would have improved project execution considerably,
particularly over the 1983-1985 period\.
Project Results
10\. Despite its many implementation problems and shortcomings, the
project seems to have achieved a modicum of success in some of its objec-
tives\. Two of the project components (9\.6Z of project cost) were at large
satisfactorily met by the end of the project: (a) the reconstructiGn and
upgrading of the main campus infrastructure (road, sewerage system ard
lighting) and (b) the upgrading of faculty through an extensive overseas
training program\. Indeed, the training has been the most successful com-
ponent of the project, with a total of 41 faculty having received graduate
degrees with project support, all of which returned to the university\.
(Over 661 of the appraisal target, see Annex 5)\.
11\. The extent to which the three other physical targets (71\.5% of
project cost) were met by the end of the project is estimated to be as
follows: (a) construction of 38 classrooms (representing 5,000 M2 out of
the appraisal target of 27,000 M2) was 702 to 902 completed: (b) con-
struction and equipping of one of the four planned Regionsl Development
Institutes was about 902 completed; and (c) procurement and installation of
equipment at the main campus's laboratories as well as at two regional
institutes were partly completed, but the percentage of completion could
not be assessed with precision\. Detailed variances between planned and
actual results are shown in Annex 5\.
12\. Where the project fell quite short in meeting its targets was in
the overhauling of the graduse:'- program (0\.61 of project cost) in agri-
cultural economics and the cor\.btruction and equipping of research facili-
ties (19\.61 of project cost) in the main campus\. In the former case, there
was no progress over the course of the project, despite interest of the
subject Department, because of lack of support from University administra-
tion\. A technical assistance component, which was an integral part of the
project design, aimed mainly at assisting in the reorganization of the
graduate program in agricultural economics and the expansion of under-
graduate program in economics and business\. However, the coordination of
the execution of this aspect of the project proved to be a difficult and
frustrating task for the project coordinator\. This was caused mainly by:
(a) change of priority in NAU's top management (b) the lack of strong
leadership by the project coordinator and the academic department direc-
tors; and (c) the poor communication between all parties concerned\. In
the case of research facilJties, no action was takeu, reportedly due to the
lack of counterpart funds\.
-5-
Pro10ct Sustainabilitl
13\. Institutional development objectives were not achieved for NAU as
no provisions were made to limit enrollment growth, or to implement curri-
culum reform components (see para\. 6)\. Furthermore, given the severe eco-
nomic crisis facing Peru, it is doubtful that the Government, at least over
the short to medium term, will be able to provide the University with an
acceptable level of resources to complete even the physical facilities
program\. Therefore, it is unlikely that project sustainability could be
attained without further substantial external assistance provided that the
govertment is committed\.
Bank Performance
14\. The project's formulation extended over 17 months and involved a
pre-appraisal and appraisal mission\. Although this project was the first
higher education operation in the country, Bank assistance during project
development was not sought extensively\. However, project preparation was
relatively fast since it was already at an advanced stage at the time that
Bank involvement commenced, mainly as a result of preparatory work funded
by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)\.
15\. The project appraisal was overly optimlstic regarding the
Government's ability to contribute counterpart funds for implementing the
project and the implementation capacity of the NRA\. The Bank also mis-
judged the Government commitment to the project\. Those factors led to a
major standstill of the project shortly after appraisal, and were key
contributing factors to the failure to achieve fully intended project
objectives\.
16\. Between 1983-88 there were nine supervision missions representing
17 staff-weeks of effort, a level of input which is reasonable for this
type of project in the LAC Region\. However, at the start of project imple-
mentation, more intensive supervision could have assisted in applying
appropriate remedies before larger problems developed\. For example, the
Bank might have insisted on a major modification of the project scope when
the country faced a major economic and financial crisis in 1986 and con-
sequently a crucial shortage of counterpart funds for project execution\.
In addition, during implementation the turnover in Bank staff assigned to
the project was considerable (with nine staff members, including four
project managers, participating in supervision missions)\. This lack of
continuity made supervision less effective as focus on main problems could
have been lost\. Since the Borrower's executing capabilities were weak, as
acknowledged at project appraisal, there was in fact a clear need for the
Bank to maintain continuity of its personnel with a view toward assisting
the University to strengthen its own supervision and monitoring capability\.
17\. In general, the Bank has demonstrated considerable sensitivity to
the Borrower's difficulties in implementing the project as reflected in a
large amount of correspondence\. However, experience with this project
suggests that the overall performance of the Bank could have been improved
by reassessing the status of Government commitment to the project during
- 6 -
the early years of implementation, particularly after the change in
Government of 1985, and making new investments contingent upon performance
of earlier agreements\.
Borrower Performance
18\. Overall performance with regard to both project preparation and
implementation by RAU was poor\. Original architectural and engineering
designs of the project, which were prepared by local consulting firms under
supervision of NAU's staff, were generally sound\. However, during imple-
mentation some construction plans and technical specifications required
time consuming corrections which were adequately done under the supervision
of the NAU's Planning Office Director\.
19\. During implementation, the NAU was responsible for the overall
management and coordination of the project\. The Project Agreement called
for the Rector of the University to serve as official project director, to
be assisted by a full-time project coordinator responsible for tbi_ day-to-
day execution of the project\. Thiq planned administrative arrangement did
not work\. Over the course of project implementation the post of Project
Director was largely an honorary one, characterized by cumbersome clearance
procedures, and long waiting periods for the coordinator to obtain deci-
sions, etc\. The bulk of the project management workload fell upon a part-
time project coordinator assisted by a small team\. In addition to the
usual academic administratiye and teaching functions of a full time univer-
sity professor, the project coordinator had responsibility for the coor-
dination and implementation of all proje it activities with appropriate
authorities of the NAU and the MEF\.
20\. Project administrative inefficiency was due mainly to:
(a) a thin core of staff without previous project experience who
had direct responsibility for carrying out the project (one
coordinator, one administrative assistant and one secretary)
throughout most of the implementation period, though NAU did
add one accountant, one assistant accountant and one secre-
tary in 1987 to facilitate financial processing;
(b) lack of delegation of authority for management by the Rector
to the coordinator or assignment of special authority status
for the project coordinator role within the University; and
(c) ineffective financial control during implementation with
project records merged within NAU overall accounting system,
creating substantial problems of bookkeeping, and audit
preparation, resulting in long delays in submission of
required audit reports, and several irregularities noted in
them\.
21\. Notwithstanding the lack of fin&ncial commitment, the Borrower's
technical commitment to most project compo\.ients was high during the initial
years, and its receptivity to the views and suggestions of the Bank was
- 7 -
also positive\. However, after Bank suspension of disbursements, there was
extremely limited political support for this project within both the NEF
and the NAU\. The project was widely viewed as a relatively low priority
investment inherited from the previous Administration\. This slowed further
the flow of resources to the project, and hence execution\. Moreover, the
Government did not totally fulfill its commitment to finance overseas
training, once such disbursements from the Bank ended December 31, 1987\.
The Project Coordinator had to expend much time in administrative proce-
dures in order to secure alternative funding for professc-s abroad\.
Finally, the Borrower did not fully comply with key loan covenants such as
holding undergraduate enrollment growth to 22 per annum (due to the poli-
tical decision in 1985 of the new Government to double enrollments) which
adversely affected classroom accommodation\.
Proiect Relationship
22\. In retrospect, the Bank's supervision effort was adequate in
quantitative terms which is reflected in the reasonable manpower coeffi-
cients but has not always been effective\. It appears that in the early,
critical stages of project execution, supervision missions did not address
sufficiently important issues such as the lack of appropriate project
performance monitoring by NAU and the failure to adjust project design, as
circumstances dictated, e\.g\., lack of counterpart funding\. Furthermore,
because of both the inexperience of the NAU's staff in executing
externally-financed projects, and the seriovu political and financial
constraints and pressures facing the Borrower, the supervision missions
frequently found themselves dealing with emergency problems which could not
easily be resolved\. Important issues regarding staffing of the project
administration unit and "mechanisms adopted for financial planning as well
as availability of counterpart funds were not discussed adequately with the
University but rather accepted by the Bank as "faits accomplis\." Notably,
the initial agreement that the local funding requirement would be met
through the sale of land by NAU de facto substituted for obtaining the
Government's own firm financial commitment to this project (see para\. 9)\.
23\. Overall project performance was far below acceptable Bank
standards\. Many problems could not have been foreseen at appraisal,
particularly the extremely difficult economic and political environment in
which the project was executed particularly from 1986\. Nevertheless,
actual project results would have been closer to original objectives if
more careful attention had been paid to the need to establish a strong
implementation mechanism - especially with regard to clarifying scheduling
and procedures for transfer of local funds and assignment of a full-time
project coordinator (see para\. 8)\. The experience points to the need in\.
future investments for the Bank and the Peruvian authorities to: (i)
ensure adequacy of local financing with, therefore, more stringent finan-
cial analysis of new operations and consideration given to tranched release
of loan proceeds based on adequate annual budgetary provisions; (ii)
establish implementation mechanisms which are workable with individual
functions and responsibilities and delegation of authority clearly defined\.
At the seame time, the project highlights the heavy toll which high turnover
in Bank staff exacts on supervision effectiveness\. Continuity of task
manager should be pursued to the extent possible, especially in social
sector projects in which Government implementation capacity is extremely
weak, and hence strong Bank leadership is critical to project outcome\.
Importantly, the failure of the project to achieve its institutional
development objectives--the very heart of the project from the Bank's
perspective--underscores the inherent dangers of designing projects with
such components, however, desirable, without a firm commitment from the
Government to these objectives\. The Bank, therefore, must be extremely
cautious in the future in pushing institutional development components as
an implicit condition for Bank financing, when the Government clearly is
only interested in civil works, as in the end, as this project striking
illustrate, the Government often tends to accomplish only what it truly
wants\.
PART II: PROJECT REVIEW nON THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE
A draft PCR (Parts I and III) was sent to the the borrower with
the request to prepare Part II, but none was received\. However, a copy of
the draft PCR was discussed with the project implementation unit staff and
the Directorate of Public Credit within the Ministry of Economics and
Finance (MEF) during a field mission from March 13 to 21, 1989\. Comments
received were taken into account in finalizing the PCR\.
- 11 -
PART III: SUMMARY OF STATISTICAL DATA
Annex 1
Related Bank Loans
------------------------------------------------------------------__------
Loan/Credit Year of
Title Purpose Approval Status Comments
First Education To support the 11/13173 Completed PPAR issued
Project educational on 12/30/83
reform of 1972
Primary Education To improve primary 07/10/84 Under
Project education in implement-
selected rural ation
and marginal urban
areas
- 12 -
Annex 2
Proiect Timetable
Date Date Date
item Planned Revised Actual
- Identification 07120181 01105182al 03/20182a1
(Project Brief)
- Preparation n\.a\. n\.a\. 12181
- Appraisal Mission 03182 n\.a\. 03/82
- Negotiations 09/82 n\.a\. 09/82
- Board Approval 09/11182 n\.a\. 09/11182
- Signature n\.a\. n\.a\. 03/28183
- Effectiveness n\.a\. n\.a\. 06/08/83
- Completion 06130188b1 n\.a\. n\.a\.
- Closing 12/31/88c/ n\.a\. 12/31/88
Comments
a/ Date refers to issue of final version of Project Brief\.
b/ At the time, implementation of the project has undergone substantial
delays, owing mainly to counterpart funding constaints and inadequvste
project management\.
cl At the 1988 Spring PIR, regional management agreed not to further
extend the closing date\.
- 13 -
Annex 3
A\. Loan Disbursements
Cumulative Estimated _nd Actual Disbursements
(US$ '000)
FY83 FY84 FY85 FX86 FY87 FY88 FY89
Appraisal Estimate 0\.50 3\.00 7\.50 12\.10 15\.90 17\.00 17\.30
Actual 0\.30 0\.40 0\.90 2\.20 2\.90 3\.52 3\.52
Actual as X of Estimate 60 13 12 19 18 20 20
Date of Final Disbursement - December 31, 1988
B\. Proiect Implementation
-------------------------------------------------------__------
Appraisal Actual (or
Inldicators Estimate PCR Estimate)
Available Funds al/ 4b/
Project Management 1 2
Development Impact 1 2
Overall Status 1 4¢/
Coments
a/ Since there were fiscal difficulties in Peru at the time of
preparation it was agreed between the Government and the
University (NAU) that a salet of land by the NAU, would provide
counterpart funds for the fitst year of project implementation\.
b/ After the suspension of disbursements in May 1987, the Special
Account rapidly was depleted and very limited public budgetary
resources have been made available to the University to support
the project, principally to sustain support for overseas training
of NAU faculty already enrolled in long term programs at the time
of suspension\.
ct At the Closing Date (12/31/88) the overall performance of the
project remained extremely poor, i\.e\., just US$3\.5 million or 20X
of the US$17\.3 million loan had been disbursed over the five and
a half year period since the loan became effective\.
- 14 -
Annex 4
Page 1 of 2
Proiot Cost and PinancLin
A\. Project Costs (USM)
Appraleal!t Actuals/ Difference
ProlecmtCoomonent t AmAt X of Totel As X of Anoraisal
1\. Rehabilttation and
Expansion of Central
(a) Acadenic Area 19\.08 55 4\.46 60 23
(classroom & laboratories)
(b) Research Area 6\.82 20 0 0
2\. Refonal Development 5\.08 14 1\.09 15 21
Institutes
3\. Teacher Upgradfng 3\.15 9 1\.08* 15 34
4\. Reorg\.Agr\.Econ\.Prog\. 0\.32 1 0\.02 0 6
5\. Project Coordination 03 I Le 1 26
Total 34\.76 100 7\.44 100 21
af Including contfngencies
bI Data as of 12/31/88
Comments:
*Some fetlowships were complementary to previous programs\.
- 15 -
Annex 4
Page 2 of 2
B\. Pro1ect Finanel"
Amwunt of the
Loan Allocated Aaiunt Actually Actual
(Expressed in Disbursed Disbursements/
SS39PrY ogttar WyMvaent (US EouiXalet Amcunt Attocated
(l) Civil works (exctudino 6,865,000 803,938\.88 11\.7
aounts withheld as
performance guarantee)
and professlonat fees
C2) Equipment and furniture: 5200,000 1,408,369\.20 27\.1
(a) Direetly
nported
(b) locally
procured
(3) Teachers studies abroad 2,700,000 998,994\.58 37\.0
(4) Experts# services for:
Ca) Part 0\.1 of 156\.000 24,144\.68 15\.5
the Project
(b) Part 0\.2 of 104\.000 0 -
the Project
(5) Project Coordination:
(a) Travel abroad 50,000 5,975\.50 12\.0
and per diem
(b) Salaries 50\.000 16,015\.26 32\.0
(6) Front-end fee 255\.665 255,665\.00
(7) Initial deposit 400\.000
in Specfal Account
(8) Uatllocated 1,49° 335 1,499,335\.00
Total Amzunt DSsbwsed 3,513,103\.10
Cancelled 13,786,896\.90
TOTAL 17,300,000 17,300,000\.00
- 16 -
Annex 5
Prolect Result\.
Dlroct Benefits
Apprafsat Estimated at Appralsal
Irditators EstimLti C mos Ja Date a
1\. Rehabilitation/
Expansion 5000 student n\.a\. n\.a\.
Central Capus Places
a) Cltesroems
and labora-
tories 27,000 N2 5,220 N2/ 20
b)Research Centers 22,000 N2 0 0
2\. Regifna Develop-
ment Institutes 4 units I unit 25
3\. Teacher Upgrading
a\. Doctor Degrees 20 professors 20 professors c/ 100
b\. Nester Degrees 40 li4d 25
c\. Upgrading 60 38 63
via short
cowles
4\. Expert Services 24 staff/months 2\.5 staff/months 10
Comments
a/ Dats as of 12/31/88
b/ Laboratories were not built and classroos are partially capleted but the
proportion cunot be assessed\.
c/ additional 8 still are studying abroad suWorted by private funds\.
d/ additional 2 stitl are studying abroad supported by private funds\.
- 17 -
NNE X 6
Status o£ Loan Covenants
---------------------------------------------------__--------_----------_--
Covenants
Project Agreement status Comment
--------------------------------------------------------------__-----------
Section 2\.02
Project Coordinator to be M
agreed by Bank
Section 2\.03
Consultants and Expert to
be agreed by Bank N
Section 2\.06\. (b)(iv)
Preparation of plan for N Project provided specifically
evaluation of project neither financing nor technical
benefits assistance both badly need to
fulfill this condition
Section 2\.08
Limit enrollment growth N This covenant was unrealistic to be
fulfilled\. Actual undergraduate
enrollments doubled in 1985 when new
government assumed power\. Because
of political reasons, it is unlikely
that this will change substantially\.
Section 2\.09
Fellowship candidates
selection U
Section 2\.10
Reports of experts to be
furnished to Bank n
Sectlon 4\.02(a)
Annual auditing of NAU P There is compliance with this
condition only partially because the
project's Special Account has never
been audited and project audits for
1987 and 1988 are still outstanding\.
Covenant Status
N-Met
N - Not met
P - pending
Anulex Z
A\. tfi\.iJw\.uts (Staff Weeks)
Fr 83 85 Total
Preappraleal 21\.1 21\.1
Appraisal 16\.4 - - - 16\.4
Negotiation 0\.1 8\.3 - 8\.4
Supervision - 2\.9 5\.3 7\.7 16\.5 13\.7 6\.9 53\.0
Other 0\.3 - 0\.3
Total 37\.8 11\.2 5\.3 7\.7 16\.5 13\.7 6\.9 99\.1
B\. issigns
Stage of month/ No\. of Staff Specializations Performance Types of
Prolect Cyl>e Year Persons Davs Retresented/' Ratinab/ Problems
Identification 07/81 3 21 a,b n\.a\. n\.a\.
Preappraisal 12/81 4 92 a,boc n\.a\. n\.a\.
Appraisal 03/82 3 39 a b,c n\.a\. n\.a\.
Supervision 1 02/838j 2 12 bc 1 F
Supervfsion 2 1O/830 3 12 a\.b\.c 2 F
Supervision 3 10/84d 2 22 a,b 2 F
Supervision 4 09/85 1 8 a 4 F
Supervision S 02W86 2 12 a,b 4 F
Supervision 6 11/86 4 28 a,c 2 F
Supervision 7 05/87'd 2 11 a c 2 F
Supervision 8 03/88 2 12 b,c 4 FN
Supervision 9 11/88 1 3 b 4 Fn
Total SPE
Completion 03/89dj 1 5 c n\.a\. n\.a\.
a aseducator; baeconomist; c-architect; d-loan officer; eafinancial
mnapgmment specialist; f-division chief\.
l' 1problemo-free or minor problems; 2-moderate problems; and 3=major
problems\.
0/ F-financial; N-managerial; Tutechmical; P-political; and Oother
d Combfned with other duties\.
e/ Estimated mxrber of staff-days attributable to this project (including
travel time)\.
n\.a\. * not available\.
- 19 -
COMMENTS FROM THE BORROWER TTACHMENT I
Translation of Incoming Telex
Lima, April 17, 1990
To: Mr\. Graham Donaldson
Chief, Agriculture, Infrastructure
and Human Resources Division
Operations Evaluation Department
Subject: Project Completion Report
"Higher Agricultural Education" - UNA
IBRD Loan 2208
In response to your letter of February 28, 1990, requesting comments on the
Project completion Report for the "Higher Agricultural Education" Project
(IBRD Loan 2208), we would advise you as follows:
* On the closing date of December 31, 1988, the project was 20 percent
completed, being roughly three years behind schedule; this resulted
in unanticipated financing costs for the Government in respect of
commitment fees\.
* The currency pooling system applied by the World Bank has resulted in
approximately a 36 percent increase in the amount outstanding, equi-
valent to US$1\.25 million\.
* Suspension of loan disbursements as of May 1987 was another of the
factors that prevented the project from moving forward\.
* Given the existing restrictions on use of the revolving fund for
other project components, it would be useful for the Bank to look
into alternative procedures for streamlining disbursements under
future loans, having regard to liquidity and resource availability
problems in the borrowing country\.
* In light of the situation as described, the Bank should in future
examine alternative mechanisms with the Borrower designed to ensure
the availability of financing up to completion of the project, so
that the pre-established objectives and benefits can be achieved by
both the Borrower and the Bank\.
Regards,
Dr\. Rosa Rodriguez Farias
Director General of Public Credit
Mini\.stry of Economy and Finance
Telex 171
25403PE MINDEF | APPROVAL |
P005642 | Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No\. 15857
PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
TUNISIA
HEALTH AND POPULATION PROJECT
(LOAN 2005-TUN)
June 28, 1996
Operations Evaluation Department
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
Currency Equivalents (annual averages)
Currency Unit = Dinars
US$ SDR
1980 0\.4050 0\.5340
1981 0\.4930 0\.6002
1982 0\.5907 0\.6792
1983 0\.6788 0\.7612
1984 0\.7768 0\.8494
1985 0\.8345 0\.8314
1986 0\.7940 1\.0277
1987 0\.8287 1\.1035
1988 0\.8578 1\.2090
1989 0\.9493 1\.1888
Abbreviations and Acronyms
BHC Basic Health Center
BHS Basic Health Services
CA Central Administration
CBR Crude Birth Rate
CNI National Computing Center
CRFP Center for Pedagogical Research and Training
DBHS Directorate of Basic Health Services
EPI Expanded Program of Immunization
EPS Public Health Establishment (Etablissement Public de Sant6)
FP/MCH Family Planning/Maternal and Child Health
GOT Government of Tunisia
IDA International Development Agency
JEC Information, Education and Communication
IMR Infant Mortality Rate
INE National Institute of Child Health
INNTA National Institute of Nutrition and Food Technology
MAS Ministry of Social Affairs
MCH Maternal and Child Health
MIS Management Information System
MOP Ministry of Planning and Finance
MOPH Ministry of Public Health
OED Operations Evaluation Department
ONPFP National Office of Family Planning and Population
PAR Performance Audit Report
PCR Project Completion Report
PCU Project Coordination Unit
PHN Population, Health, and Nutrition
RDH Regional Directors of Health
SAR Staff Appraisal Report
SPD Studies and Planning Directorate (MOPH)
TFR Total Fertility Rate
UNFPA United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNICEF United Nations Childrens Fund
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WHO World Health Organization
Fiscal Year Government: January I - December 31
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The World Bank
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
U\.S\.A\.
Office of the Director-General
Operations Evaluation
June 28, 1996
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Performance Audit Report on Tunisia
Health and Population Project (Loan 2005-TUN)
Attached is the Performance Audit Report on the Tunisia Health and Population project prepared
by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED)\. The loan for US$12\.5 million equivalent was
approved in May 1981\. In March 1987, US$4\.0 million was canceled at the request of the Tunisian
Government, principally due to the dramatic appreciation of the US dollar\. The project was closed in
December 1988 after two extensions, and an undisbursed balance of US$0\.4 million was canceled
following final disbursement in October 1989\.
The project's objectives were to integrate preventive, curative, family planning, nutrition, health
education and sanitation services to establish a basic health care delivery system in eight governorates;
and to strengthen the planning and management capacities of the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) in
order to extend basic health services gradually to the rest of the country\. The project had five
components: (i) to strengthen the management capacity of the MOPH; (ii) to improve and expand the
basic health care delivery system by extending physical infrastructure in eight governorates; (iii) to
increase the scope and effectiveness of communications programs in health, population, and nutrition;
(iv) to upgrade the training system and infrastructure, and train, upgrade and redeploy health personnel in
the project area; and (v) to provide technical assistance in support of all components\.
Several factors hindered implementation, the most important being the institutional rivalry
between the MOPH and the National Office of Family Planning and Population (ONPFP) that prevented
the planned integration of family planning with basic health services\. Despite the circumstances, the
project successfully constructed and equipped 161 health facilities, representing more than a 50 percent
increase in the number of basic health facilities, thus greatly improving access to basic health services in
rural areas\. The project also succeeded in strengthening the capabilities of the basic health system and
the orientation of the MOPH through internal reorganization and decentralization\. Because the planned
management information system failed-the system never became operational although 30 computers
were acquired-the original project indicators were never updated\. Thus the project monitoring database
is poor, making it difficult to measure attainment of specific project goals or assess health service
outreach\. Under the training component, the project constructed or remodeled and equipped six
paramedical schools, developed curricula, and provided consultant services to prepare programs and
seminars\. The project also stimulated much training activity, though it was not directly funded by the
project\. Achievements under the health education component were modest, as health education was of
uneven quality and most health posts were without basic educational materials\.
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their
official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
2
OED, in agreement with the PCR, rates the project as satisfactory, sustainability as likely, and
Bank and borrower performance as satisfactory\. The audit upgrades the institutional development rating
to substantial, for two reasons: eight years after project closure the institutional framework it helped put
in place for district health services still serves as the national model, and the service delivery methods
developed under the project have been standardized across all governorates\. In addition, the Directorate
of Basic Health Services has been strengthened and the decentralization of authority for the Basic Health
Services to the governorates is being continued under the 1991 Population and Family Health project\.
The project offers some important lessons\. To ensure the feasibility of project goals, it is
essential to examine the existing health system priorities, related political and organizational factors, the
government's long-term policy goals, and the process envisioned for meeting them\. To measure the
success of population, health, and nutrition projects it is vital to build monitoring and evaluation systems
into the project from the start\. The Bank should not put undue reliance on technical assistance\.
Attachment
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Contents
Preface\.3
Basic D ata Sheet\. 5
Evaluation Sum mary \. 7
1\. Sector Background \. \. \. \. 11
Health Status \. \. 11
Tunisia's Family Planning Program\.11
Integration of Family Planning and Health Services\. \. \. 12
Decentralization\. \. 12
Bank Activities in the Sector \. \. 13
The Integration Debate \.3\. \.13
Subsequent Bank Activities in the Sector \. 14
2\. Project Objectives and Content\. 16
Project Components \. \. 16
Relevance\. 17
3\. Project Implementation and Results\. 19
Overall Implementation \. \. 19
Disbursements\.9\. \.19
Procurement \. 20
Management Capability\.20
Basic Health Care Services\.22
Health, Population and Nutrition Communications \. \.28
Training\. \. 28
4\. R atings \. 29
Outcome \. 29
Sustainability \. \. 29
Institutional Impact\.30
Borrower Performance\. 30
Bank Performance \. \. 30
5\. Issues and Lessons \. 32
Integration of Family Planning and Basic Health Services \.32
Project Monitoring and Evaluation\. \. \.33
Lessons \. 34
This report was prepared by Ms\. Laura Raney, Health Economist, guided by Mr\. Robert van der
Lugt, Task Manager who audited the project in December 1995\. Ms\. Diana Qualls and Ms\.
Sophie Lefebvre provided administrative support\. The report was issued by the Agriculture and
Human Development Division (Roger Slade, Chief) of the Operations Evaluation Department
(Francisco Aguirre-Sacasa, Director)\.
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their
official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed wiLhout World Bank authorization\.
Figures
Figure 1\.1: Tunisia Health Sector Activities Timeline\. 15
Tables
Table 3\.1: Evolution of Density of Basic Health Centers in the Eight Project Governorates
1982-1986\. 24
Table 3\.2: Family Planning, Prenatal and Vaccination Medical Consultation
Activities in Basic Health Centers, 1986\. \. \.25
Table 3\.3: Distribution of Responsibility for the Delivery of Family Planning Activities\.26
Table 3\.4: Basic Health Care Activities, 1993 \. 27
Annexes
I\. Tunisian Legislative Changes \.37
2\. Major Phases of the MOPH Program and Decennial Characteristics \. \.39
3\. Borrower Comments\.44
Map IBRD 15368R
3
Preface
This is a Performance Audit Report (PAR) for the Tunisia Health and Population
Project, for which a loan in the amount of US$12\.50 million equivalent was approved on May
28, 1981 (Loan 2005-TUN) 1\. In March 1987, US$4\.0 million was canceled at the request of the
Tunisian government, principally due to dramatic appreciation of the US dollar\. The government
estimated and the Bank confirmed that only US$8\.5 million of the loan would be needed\. The
loan closing date was extended twice, and the project was closed on December 31, 1988\. The
loan account was kept open until September 30, 1989 to complete disbursements\. On October
1989, the remaining amount of $353,225\.79 was canceled\.
The PAR is based on the Project Completion Report (PCR),2 the President's Report, the
Staff Appraisal Report (SAR), a review of Bank files, sector and economic reports, and
discussion with Bank staff\. An OED mission visited Tunisia in December 1995, discussed
project experience and outcomes with government officials, and visited several of the project
sites in the governorates of Jendouba, Le Kef, and Sousse\.
The PCR was completed in October 1990 and provides an excellent account of the
implementation of the project as well as lessons learned\. Parts I and 3 were prepared by regional
staff, and Part 2 includes the Borrower's comment\. The PAR confirms the major findings of the
PCR but examines in more detail several of these findings as well as some not fully covered in
the PCR, in particular the integration of family planning and basic health services and
monitoring and evaluation\. It also examines the outcome of the project in the context of Bank
lending for the sector as a whole\. The findings of the PAR will be a building block for OED's
forthcoming study of experience with health lending\.
In accordance with normal OED procedures, copies of the draft PAR were sent to the
Government of Tunisia for comments\. These comments have been included in Annex 3 with
appropriate cross references and annotations\.
1\. All references to the Loan amount in the text and tables of this report are in US$ equivalent\.
2\. Project Completion Report, Tunisia Health and Population Project (Loan 2005-TUN), Report No\. 9054, October
11, 1990\.
3\. President's Report, Tunisia Health and Population Project, Report No\. P-3063, May 1, 1981\.
4\. Staff Appraisal Report, Tunisia Health and Population Project (Loan\. 2005-TUN), Report No\. 3204, May 6, 1981\.

5
Basic Data Sheet
HEALTH AND POPULATION PROJECT (LOAN 2005-TUN)
Key Project Data (amounts in US$ million)
Item Appraisal Estimate Actual Actual as % of Appraisal
Estimate
Total Project Cost 41\.0 19\.8 48\.3
Loan Amount 12\.5 8\.5 68\.0
Economic Rate of Return (%) n\.a\. n\.a\. n\.a\.
Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements (amounts in US$ million)
FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 FY90
Appraisal Estimate 0\.9 3\.8 7\.9 10\.6 12\.5 8\.5 8\.5
Actual - 0\.08 1\.44 1\.97 2\.77 3\.79 5\.64 6\.69 8\.3
Actual as% of Appraisal - 2\.1 18\.2 18\.6 22\.0 44\.6 59\.8 71\.6 97\.6
Project Dates
Date Planned Date Actual
Identification 1977 June 1977
Preparation September 1977 March 4 1978
Pre-appraisal June 1979, October 1979
First Stage Appraisal November 1979
Second Stage Appraisal May 1980
Post Appraisal September 1980
Negotiation n\.a\. April 27, 1981
Board Approval FY79 May 28, 1981
Loan Signing n\.a\. July 15, 1981
Loan Effectiveness October 15, 1981 March 23, 1982
Loan Closing' December 31, 1986 December 31, 1988
Loan Completionb December 31, 1986 September 30, 1989
a\. Loan Closing date was extended twice from original of December 31, 1986, principally to complete procurement of computers
for the MIS, and x-ray equipment\.
b\. Loan Account held open to complete disbursements
6
Staff Inputs (staff weeks)
FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88
Identification/ Preparation 75\.7 18\.2 0\.1
Appraisal 81\.2 60\.3
Negotiations 5\.3
Processing Time 4\.7 7\.0 25\.3
Administration 2\.0 \.6 \.9 1\.3 3\.4 1\.0 1\.4 n\.a\.
Supervision 2\.5 14\.4 14\.4 15\.2 14\.6 20\.4 19\.6 19\.6
Mission Data
Month/ No\. of Staff Specializationc Performance Types of
Year Persons Days Rating db Problems'
Supervision 1 10/81 4 17 EC, PH, AC 2 M
Supervision 2 07/82 3 17 EC, PH, AC 1 M
Supervision 3 03/83 3 9 EC, PH, AC 2 M
Supervision 4 09/83 3 6 EC, PH, AC I M
Supervision 5 06/84 I 3 EC 2 MP
Supervision 6 06/85 2 10 EC, PH 2 MP
Supervision 7 11/85 3 10 EC, PH 2 TP
Supervision 8 07/86 2 14 EC, PH 2 T
Supervision 9 12/86 2 1 EC, PH 2 TF
Supervision 10 09/87 3 14 EC, PH 2 TF
Supervision 11 02/88 1 2 PH 2 0
Supervision 12 07/88 2 5 PH 2 0
Supervision 13 10/88 1 5 PH 2 0
c\. Specialization: AC= Architect, EC= Economist/Operations Officer, PH = Public Health Specialist
d\. Performance Rating: 1 = problem free or minor problems, 2 = moderate problems, 3 = major problems
e\. F = Financial Problem, T = Technical Problem, M = Management Problem, P = Political Problem, 0 = Other
7
Evaluation Summary
Introduction
1\. The Tunisia Health and Population Project was the second World Bank Group operation
in the population, health, and nutrition (PHN) sector in Tunisia and the first in the health
subsector\. It assisted the government in implementing the new basic health services (BHS)
strategy as set out in the Fifth National Development Plan (1977-81)\. The strategy focused on
integrated health, nutrition, and family planning services delivered through a decentralized and
more cost-effective system\.
Objectives
2\. The project had five components aimed at (a) strengthening the management capability
of the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) through the provision of supporting staff and services;
(b) improving and expanding the basic health care delivery system and infrastructure by
extending the physical infrastructure and equipment in eight governorates; (c) improving and
expanding the scope, content and effectiveness of national education and communication
programs in health, population, and nutrition; (d) improving the health training system and its
infrastructure and training, upgrading and redeploying health personnel in the project area; and
(e) providing technical assistance in support of all components\.
Implementation
3\. As stated in the PCR, despite rapid and promising initiation of major components,
several factors hindered implementation\. The most important of these factors was the
institutional rivalry between the MOPH and the National Office Family Planning and Population
(ONPFP) that prevented the planned integration of family planning with basic health services\.
Technical discussions regarding BHS were soured by conceptual and ideological differences
regarding the future responsibilities functions of the MOPH and the ONPFP in addition to
personality clashes among management of the two organizations\. The change of ministers at the
MOPH in 1983-84 compounded the ongoing difficulties and caused profound delays in project
implementation, as it was accompanied by criticism and reassessment of project goals and BHS
policy, turnover of staff (including the Project Coordinator) in the Directorate of Basic Health
Services, and dissolution of the original MOPH team\. It also resulted in a one-year cessation of
project supervision (see Figure 1\.1)\.
4\. In addition, the complexity and scale of the MIS component contributed to its ultimate
failure, and the studies and the applied research program suffered from lack of supervision\. The
efforts of the borrower to obtain local expertise rather than utilizing more expensive foreign
assistance limited training programs, made supervising civil works difficult, and reduced the use
of consultants\. Procurement was delayed due to cumbersome bidding and evaluation procedures
and overestimation of borrower's capacity\.' Slow disbursements were attributed to chronic
tardiness in governorates' submission of documents supporting expenditures\.
1\. In the government's view it was not overestimation of borrower capacity, rather it came from difficulties related to
the normal procedures followed by the public sector (Annex 3)\.
8
Results
5\. Despite the circumstances, the project achieved its major objective of extending basic
health care in the eight governorates\. The project constructed and equipped 161 health posts and
dispensaries simultaneously in the 8 governorates with only a year's delay\. This construction
represented an increase of more than 50 percent in the number of basic health facilities\. In
addition 57 staff houses and 7 vehicle maintenance workshops were constructed under the
project, and an additional 103 existing health posts and dispensaries were renovated and/or
remodeled\. While this remarkable achievement in expanding the infrastructure most certainly
had a positive impact on the health status of the population, it was difficult to measure the
effects\. The MIS which was supposed to monitor specific project indicators, never functioned as
planned, and thus no results on project impact were available\. The project also succeeded in
strengthening the capabilities of the BHS and the orientation of the MOPH through internal
reorganization and decentralization\.
6\. In spite of the fact that BHS was well-conceived and supported by beneficiaries, it
encountered several difficulties: many centers were underutilized and overstaffed; bureaucratic
inefficiencies caused long delays in the paying of staff salaries (with attendant loss of morale);
and budgetary restrictions and procurement problems slowed the process of equipping health
posts\. Most importantly, the ONPFP, a well-staffed and well-funded vertical program to supply
family planning services, successfully resisted integration into the BHS system\.2 Thus, the goal
of integrating family planning with BHS was not achieved due to failure to resolve the
institutional dispute between the ONPFP and the MOPH\.3
7\. To bolster training infrastructure, the project constructed or remodeled and equipped six
paramedical schools, developed curricula, and provided consultant services to prepare programs
and seminars\. Despite the fact that the project did not directly fund hands-on training, according
to the PCR, it did stimulate much training activity, especially in the early years\. Because the
MIS component failed -as the system never became operational despite the fact that 30
computers were acquired-the original project indicators were never updated\. The project
monitoring database is poor, making it difficult to measure attainment of specific project goals or
assess health service outreach\. About half the new computers were used in the MOPH to process
data collected from an inventory of health services\. The other computers were used for patient
registration at a major hospital, on a test basis in the DBHS in the Jendouba Governorate, within
the planning and epidemiology units of the MOPH, and at the Center for Pedagogical Research
and Training (CRFP)\.
8\. Three studies were successfully carried out under the studies and applied research
component on infant mortality, vaccinations and hepatitis\. The study on infant mortality was
published as a book that enjoyed wide circulation and discussion and greatly influenced policy in
the health sector\. Data was also collected for an inventory of health resources\. Other planned
research activities were not carried out\. The PCR stated that achievements under the health
2\. In the government's view, the measures were not taken to formulate the teams capable of providing the integrated
services\.
3\. The PCR states that in addition to the unresolved institutional dispute, integration suffered further through the
governments failure to specify arrangements for providing family planning services, after transferring the ONPFP to
the new Ministry of the family in 1986, an agency with only a minimal budget and agenda\.
9
education component were modest, as health education was of uneven quality and most health
posts were without basic educational materials\.
Ratings
9\. OED rates project outcome as satisfactory\. The component to strengthen basic health
care services was successfully implemented\. Accessibility to basic health services improved
owing to the construction or renovation and equipping of over 264 health facilities in
underserved rural areas\. The construction completed under this project represented an increase of
more than 50 percent in the number of basic health facilities at the time of project appraisal\.
Maternal and child health (MCH) services were successfully integrated into basic health
services, with the exception of family planning services\. At the time of the audit, integration of
family planning services with MCH services had taken place\. The services have not yet been
evaluated for efficiency and quality and can undoubtedly be improved\. The training component
was successful\. The management improvement component had modest success, but one of the
three research studies produced on infant mortality was very influential in later health policy,
including the 1991 Population and Family Health project\.
10\. OED rates sustainability as likely, confirming the PCR rating\. While the PCR rated
institutional impact as negligible, the audit upgrades the rating to substantial, based largely on
the fact that eight years after project closure, the institutional framework it helped put in place
for district basic health services is still operational as the national model\. The position of the
DBHS has been strengthened, and the decentralization of authority for Basic Health Services to
the regions is being continued under the 1991 Population and Family Health project\. In addition,
the service delivery methods developed under the project have become standardized across all
governorates\.
11\. Overall, the audit agrees with the satisfactory ratings given by the PCR for borrower and
Bank performance\. Neither the borrower nor the Bank paid sufficient attention to the political
and institutional impediments of the Government of Tunisia's (GOT) integration policy\. The
result was that family planning services were not integrated with BHS as planned under the
project\. With this exception, both borrower and Bank performance were very good with regard to
project design and implementation until 1984, when institutional changes in the MOPH
interrupted the momentum of the project\. Despite the ensuing delays, the borrower met the
project conditionalities and the project was successfully completed\.
Lessons
12\. The lessons from this project are as follows:
(a) In order to ensure the feasibility ofproject goals, it is essential to examine the
existing health system priorities, the political and organizational factors, the
government's long term policy goals, and the process envisaged for meeting
them\. The integration of health and family planning services envisaged in this
project-a major policy change-did not occur\. The parties concerned did not
fully understand the policy of integration and therefore did not respond well to
it\. This project needed to give more attention to differing priorities (including
conflicting views between external aid agencies); to place greater emphasis on
rational, mutually agreed collaborative arrangements; to develop an
10
implementation time table; and to delegate the authority to take remedial
measures\.
(b) Monitoring and evaluation systems are vital to measuring the success ofPHN
projects\. While the project did seek to implement a thorough MIS, the design
ultimately proved to be too complex, owing to the chosen computer technology
and the desire to do everything at once\. Thus, the project had no mechanism to
record achievements in component to improve basic health services\.
(c) The Bank should not put undue reliance on technical assistance\. Tunisia, like
many countries, has been reluctant to borrow for this purpose, preferring to
obtain such assistance free of charge from other donors and agencies such as
USAID, WHO, and UNICEF\. Given the experience of the First Population
Project, the Bank should have explored alternatives to technical assistance,
which was seen to be crucial for the success of this project\.
(d) It is essential that procurement procedures are documented at the outset ofa
project and/or the Bank work carefully to establish acceptable bidding and
evaluation procedures\. In this project, the Bank overestimated the procurement
capacity of the MOPH and procurement progressively became the single greatest
practical impediment to project implementation, as well an inordinate drain on
supervision time\.4
(e) Projects of massive scope and scale seeking to attain complex objectives
simultaneously should be avoided in favor of a series o simpler, phased efforts
which address logical steps in a longer-term program\. This is especially true
where institutional capacity is weak and vulnerable to political pressures\.
4\. The government has suggested that the problem was not capacity but overly cumbersome administrative
procedures\.
5\. It is the opinion of the government that the scope of the project is not the main handicap if a good program of
continuous evaluation is established, using all the components of the project during its execution, so as to be able to
intervene on time in order to make the necessary corrections\. The SAR identified as a major project risk the fact that
the scale and design of the project were too difficult for effective MOPH coordination and implementation, an
assessment which proved to be correct, despite actions taken or suggested to countervail their occurrence\.
11
1\. Sector Background
1\.1 Since Tunisia became independent in 1956, the government has emphasized the
development of the country's human resources and, in particular, the health of the population\.
Health expenditures averaged 2\.5 percent of GDP from 1956 to 1980, contributing to impressive
gains: life expectancy increased from 41 years in 1956 to 57 years in 1978, the crude birth rate
fell from 49 to 32 per thousand, and infant mortality declined from 202 to 123 per thousand\.
Given its resources and potential, however, there were still improvements to be made at the time
this project was identified\.
Health Status
1\.2 In general, the status of the Tunisian health sector in 1980 reflected the emphasis of its
public health policy on hospital-based curative medicine\. This orientation, typical of
industrialized countries, gave insufficient attention to preventive care and did not provide
sufficient coverage of the 50 percent of the population living in rural areas\. The system resulted
in sharp contrasts in the health status of the urban and rural populations\. For example, in 1978
infant mortality was 170 per thousand live births in rural areas compared with only 70 in urban
areas\. Access to prenatal and postnatal care was lacking, especially in rural areas, where most
births went unattended\. Malnutrition of both mothers and children increased the susceptibility of
infants to disease\. About half of all deaths in Tunisia in 1979 were of children under five, and
about half of all child deaths occurred during the first year of life\. In addition, morbidity
associated with common diseases was high, due to insufficient coverage of the population by the
health care delivery system\. Poor health and nutrition resulted in high dropout and repeater rates
in primary schools and contributed to the low labor productivity, especially in agriculture\. The
existing clinical infrastructure was underutilized, particularly in rural areas, due to the limited
range of services and medication available and the limited qualifications of staff\.
Tunisia's Family Planning Program
1\.3 The Tunisian family planning program, initiated in 1964, was the first in Africa\. It
offered free contraceptive advice and services and included provision for sterilization (tubal
ligations) and social abortions for women with at least five living children\. Considering the time
and the social and cultural setting of the country, this policy was strongly progressive\. In 1973,
the National Office of Family Planning and Population (ONPFP) was created\. While under the
tutelage of the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH), the ONPFP acquired the legal status of a
parastatal organization\. The ONPFP formulated a family policy and introduced a wide range of
programs, particularly in the areas of information, education, personnel training, research and
evaluation\. It provided services through its own facilities, but also those of the MOPH, especially
the latter's Maternal and Child Health (MCH) Centers\. The lack of clarity in the division of
work between the ONPFP and the MOPH and the uncertain status of the family planning
personnel hindered cooperation between the two entities\.
1\.4 In spite of some opposition to abortion and sterilization, family planning enjoyed broad
political, religious, and legislative support, and was able to achieve a dramatic transformation in
family planning knowledge, attitudes and practice\. The number of family planning acceptors
increased almost tenfold between 1966 and 1978\. However, ONPFP services were largely
12
confined to the urban population; rural women accounted for less than a third of the clients\. A
slowing in the rate of increase of new acceptors serviced by the public sector program was noted
during the period 1977-1980 and was attributed to logistical problems within the ONPFP's
service delivery structure\. After having largely satisfied urban demand, the ONPFP faced the
need to expand services to rural areas, where demand had been stimulated by well-designed
information and education programs\.
Integration of Family Planning and Health Services
1\.5 Beginning in 1975, the government moved slowly toward a policy of integrating its
health services with a series of pilot programs in various governorates (1975-1978)\. These
programs combined preventive and curative health services, family planning and health
education\. The government permitted the ONPFP to retain its established delivery system as a
practical way of maintaining momentum in the family planning program pending the outcome of
those efforts\. In 1977, a Presidential Decree was issued that called for integrated regional
delivery of curative and preventive medicine, and family planning and nutrition activities and
called for the ONPFP to divest itself of its field activities and concentrate on research, policy
formulation, and the training of specialists in its own field\. Routine delivery of family planning
services would be managed by the MOPH\. However, neither the Decree nor the Fifth National
Development Plan (1977-81) which endorsed it provided any concrete proposals for
implementation of the integration policy\. A preparation mission noted that "there remains much
ambiguity at the MOPH and ONPFP about the structural and administrative implications of the
proposed concept of 'integration' of services", indicating the Bank's recognition that this
structural problem was central to population policy\.'
1\.6 The government's integration policy was aimed to change the balance of the public
health system as reflected in the Fifth National Development Plan, which gave priority in the
health sector to basic health care and preventive medicine, improved cost effectiveness and
better regional distribution of facilities and personnel\. Integrating ONPFP and MOPH services
would serve these ends\. The proposed integration system also made financial sense, as the
government was not prepared to finance a costly, parallel system of family planning service
delivery in rural areas\.
Decentralization
1\.7 The government also hoped decentralization of health, family planning and nutrition
services would strengthen the public health system\. The MOPH began decentralization by
delegating increased authority to the six medical regions\. In addition, the MOPH began the
process of separating the management, administration, and the budget of hospital-based medicine
from those of the peripheral basic health services\. At the governorate level, Regional Directors
of Health (RDHs) were created to coordinate and control all health activities, including
budgeting matters\. A Director of Basic Health Services was appointed, and in each region
specially appointed physicians (Chefs des Services de Sant6 de Base) were responsible for
integrating all basic health services under the Director's supervision\.
1\. Internal Bank document dated April 3, 1978\.
13
Bank Activities in the Sector
1\.8 In 1971, the World Bank extended a credit (Cr\. 0238-TUN) to Tunisia for the First
Population Project\. This project aimed to expand and improve the family planning program
through construction of maternity hospitals and maternal and child health centers and the
provision of technical assistance\. The project was first administered by the MOPH, and later,
from 1974, by the ONPFP\. Relations between the ONPFP and the Bank steadily deteriorated
during project implementation\. The Project Performance Audit Report concluded that while the
Bank had a role in helping mold the status of the ONPFP, the project failed to achieve its
institution-building goals\. As explanation, the audit suggests that the Bank focused on
construction and:
\.abandoned its institutional interest in the ONPFP\.None of the supervision
missions addressed the problem [of linkages] with concrete suggestions\. In the
atmosphere of tensioa that gradually developed between the MOPH and ONPFP,
the Bank was caught in the middle and was unable to overcome the personality
and political constraints which ensued\.2
1\.9 The outcome of the population project was rated as unsatisfactory\. It was scheduled for
completion by the end of 1975 but was not completed until 1981\. As a result of the delays in
implementation and price escalation, the total estimated cost increased to about US$35 million,
up from the initial appraisal estimate of US$7 million\. Additional financing was provided by the
Norwegian Development Agency (NORAD) and the government\. The failure of the First
Population Project and the deterioration of relations between the Bank and the ONPFP resulted
in a break in continuity between the First Population Project and the population component of
the 1981 projects\. Unresolved issues of institutional and programmatic integration between the
ONPFP and the MOPH continued to constrain program effectiveness as the project was
identified\.
The Integration Debate
1\.10 At the start of the 1981 Health Development Project, the MOPH lacked the continuity,
commitment, infrastructure and management skills to take up additional operational
responsibilities for family planning delivery, and the ONPFP saw itself as filling the vacuum by
expanding its own parallel delivery system despite the inefficiencies resulting from duplication
of facilities, high unit costs, and the inability to cover rural areas adequately\. These tensions over
relative roles reflected, and perhaps fueled, a larger debate on the relative merits of service
integration\. The ONPFP, supported by USAID and UNFPA, was sensitive to the possibility that
the integration process would slow the progress being made with the vertical approach\.
1\.11 The situation in Tunisia was a microcosm of the worldwide debate occurring among
family planning practitioners, policy makers, and donors regarding integration\. The 1971 Bank-
financed Population Project reflected the view prevalent in the 1970s that vertical programs and
hospital- and clinic-based postpartum programs were the most effective method of recruiting
new family planning acceptors\. But subsequent experience in Tunisia and other countries
suggested that this approach was costly and could reach only a small proportion of the rural
2\. Project Performance Audit Report, Tunisia First Population Project (Credit 238-TUN), Report No\. 5135, June 21,
1984, paras\. 38 and 48\.
14
population\. Integrationists further argued that health services had to be offered in conjunction
with maternal and child care services and family planning to attract a larger proportion of the
rural population\. A Bank Sector Review in 1975, "The Population Program of the Government of
Tunisia," recommended that family planning services be further increased and that they be
provided by MOPH field staff under ONPFP supervision-that is, the services should be
integcated\.
1\.12 The Bank's position throughout preparation of the 1981 Health and Population Project
was that the government's strategy and program for developing the family health care system,
based on the establishment of a network of basic health centers, should be clarified\. It requested
conceptual clarification of "integration" and of its operational implications for family planning
and the ONPFP\. However, at the beginning of the project, fundamental questions of
organizational responsibility for health remained unresolved\. The three key donors were also at
variance on the issue of integration, a situation that did not bode well for future collaboration\.
Subsequent Bank Activities in the Sector
1\.13 The Bank undertook a sector review, "The Demographic Challenge," in 1990 which was
followed in 1991 by the simultaneous introduction of two projects, the Population and Family
Health Project (Loan 3307) and the Hospital Restructuring Support Project (Loan 3308)\. The
Population and Family Health Project pursued related goals to the 1981 Health Development
Project\. Its objectives were to assist the government to lower both fertility and mortality by
targeting basic health care services to underprivileged groups with a strong focus on mothers and
children\. The project aims to reduce regional disparities in access to basic health care and in the
availability of resources and improve the quality of basic health care, including family
planning/maternal and child health services\. One of the project's four components seeks to
integrate FP/MCH services in BHC facilities\. The 1991 Hospital Restructuring Support Project
aims to support the government in improving the efficiency of major hospitals by containing
costs while improving quality of services, and providing the information to permit adjustments in
financial burden-sharing by better linking utilization of hospital services to financial
contributions\. Figure 1\.1 details the evolution of Bank activity as well as key changes in the
health sector in Tunisia\.
Tunisia Health Sector Activities Timeline
Exterior Changes
1964 The Ministry of I ieali was replaced
Tunisian Family twice in three months from October 1o
Plannig ____________________ 1983 to January 1984, with attendant196E
Planning 18
Program (TFPP) 1973 turnover in the Director of Basic lalth ONPFP transferreu E
initiated as the National Office of Family Sevices, Project Cocidinator, and from MOPI to new
first in Africa Planning and Population dissolution of he MO I team\. of
(ONPFP) created as a semi-
autonomous organization 1984 1987
under the MOPHI\. Project Coordinator left MOPHI ONFP transferred
in January and replacement not back to MOPH
named until 1985
1 64 1971 19/ 1975 1978 1980 1981 1983 1984 1985 86 1987 1988 1990 1991 1996
1981 1
1971 1980 1lelth & 1988 1990 1991 January 1996
Popultion Ban Repot: 1986 I
Pouation \98 [Health & Bank Sector Population & [ roect1 E
Proect"Tnisa: ocal lelt & op rom M Po e
inPopulation Review The Family Health Identiication
Project Cordna ojet OP ONFPpranserre
PCrojc 23Tuniesia ocia Projec Prjet005ppaie End Date Demographic Project for I ealth
(Crv23)lApet"n 2005) hut blocked by MOPII Challenge" (Ln\. 3307) Sector Project
1975 Dvlpeidue to concerns about (Rpt\. 8903) 19
Bank Sector the achievements 1987
Review (Rpt\. 651 under the first project A Third Health & 1990 Hospital
"The Population and the recurrent cost Population Project Health & Restructuring
(mplications of the was identified but set Populatioc Project
Program of the BIDpS policy aside by the Ministry Project PCR (L\.n\. 3308)
Government of th a
Tunisia" of Planning in favor of
1984 health sector work
Population emphasizing services
Project PPAR and finance
Evolution of Baik Activity
16
2\. Project Objectives and Content
2\.1 The 1981 Health Development Project (Loan 2005-TUN) was designed to integrate basic
health services delivery and to provide 90 percent coverage to the project population (eight
governorates) in the following areas: family planning services; immunizations; preventive and
curative services for children; general curative services, and hygiene and sanitation services
among the rural population\. These services were to be delivered using simple and economic
health facilities, paying special attention to problems of management and training\.
2\.2 Based on the achievements of a pilot program in Medjez-el-Bab, the project design
called for specific outcomes in the eight governorates: (a) reducing infant mortality to about
80/1000 from an estimated national average of 123/1000 considered representative of the project
area; (b) lowering the birth rate from about 43/1000 to 36/1000; and (c) reducing morbidity from
tuberculosis, other respiratory diseases, and parasitic and viral infections\. These objectives,
which were to be achieved over a five-year period once the project had become fully operational,
were seen as ambitious but attainable if the project services operated as planned\.
Project Components
2\.3 The project had five components: (a) strengthening the management capability of the
Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) through the provision of supporting staff and services; (b)
improving and expanding the basic health care delivery system and infrastructure by extending
the physical infrastructure and equipment in eight governorates; (c) improving and expanding the
scope, content and effectiveness of national education and communication programs in health,
population, and nutrition; (d) improving the health training system and its infrastructure and
training, upgrading and redeploying health personnel in the project area; and (e) providing
technical assistance in support of all components\.
2\.4 Management Capability\. The project proposed to develop a more efficient management
information system (MIS) for the MOPH to permit better planning and control of resources\. The
existing system processed data at governorate and national levels, but little of the large amount
of data collected was analyzed because the information was considered unreliable, and there was
no effective feedback at any level\. The basic features of the improved MIS were to be (a)
standardized collection forms covering a limited number of basic health indicators; (b)
systematic data collection by MOPH personnel; (c) the expansion of statistical and supporting
staff; and (d) computerized data handling (including new programs) using the central computer
of the National Computer Center and decentralized regional terminals\.
2\.5 In addition, the project included a program of studies and applied research to identify
through experience improved ways of meeting health needs in rural areas and the cost and
relative impact of essential services\. The research program would be designed by the Directorate
of Basic Health Services (DBHS) and the Center for Pedagogical Research and Training (CRFP)\.
Several research topics were identified, including (a) the costs of preventive and curative
services at the periphery; (b) family planning research into behavioral patterns; (c) management
issues such as communication within the MOPH and interagency coordination and cooperation at
central and local levels, as well as basic indicators for local health planning and drug distribution
at the local level; and (d) the comparison between the impact of population, health, and nutrition
17
services in a project governorate and in one outside the project\. To support these activities, the
project would provide equipment and materials, vehicles, and external and local technical
assistance\.
2\.6 Basic Health Care Services\. The project selected the medical regions of Sousse and
Jendouba (comprising seven governorates) and the governorate of Zaghouan for the
reinforcement of primary family health services\. The selected governorates, with the exception
of the areas surrounding Sousse and Monastir, were mainly rural and underequipped\. In both
regions, the findings of earlier primary health care pilot projects were taken into account in the
design of the project\. Health, family planning, and nutrition services would be delivered by
teams of public health nurses, general physicians, and midwives, who would be assisted by
nutritionists, nurse-supervisors, health educators and sanitary technicians\. In rural areas, each
team would serve an average of ten dispensaries on a regular schedule\. The system would also
provide an adequate supply of drugs and contraceptives at the peripheral level\. To support this
component the project provided for construction and remodeling/expansion of health posts, rural
and urban dispensaries, staff houses, and vehicle maintenance workshops\. The project also
provided equipment and vehicles\.
2\.7 Health, Population, and Nutrition Communications\. The communications component
was designed to strengthen and develop the population, health, and nutrition activities of the
ONPFP, the MOPH, the National Institute of Nutrition and Food Technology (INNTA) and the
Ministry of Education\. A working party was to be established by the MOPH to draw up and
coordinate a communications development program to help field workers do a better job of
motivating families to adopt improved health, family planning, and nutrition practices\. The
members of the Communications Working Party would organize in-service training courses for
the field workers of all four agencies\. The project provided for the construction of and equipment
for two regional health education centers to be used by the working party as training and
retraining centers and as centers for the production of simple visual aids, as well as for storage
and distribution\. The Central Health Education Center in Tunis would be expanded to produce
more effective exhibition matter and additional types of educational visual aids\. Equipment,
vehicles and material were also to be provided\.
2\.8 Training\. This component financed in-service training for middle-level health managers
and statisticians, paramedical personnel and their teachers, health educators, and physicians in
the project area\. It also financed curriculum development for training of physicians and
paramedical personnel, provided for the construction/remodeling and equipment for six
paramedical schools, vehicles and local and external technical assistance, short-term scholarships
for training abroad, and internal travel expenditure\.
Relevance
2\.9 The project addressed the government's goals for the sector as laid out in the Fifth
National Development Plan (1977-81), which itself appropriately focused on improving family
planning and MCH services and strengthening the public health system\. In the context of
Tunisia's epidemiological status and demographic objectives, the project is therefore judged to
have been relevant\. However, on review of documents, it appears that although the integration of
public health services, including family planning, was a clearly stated broad policy objective, the
two concerned implementing agencies did not share a common vision of how integration was to
18
be achieved\. The SAR states that:
The Government has decided that all public health services, including family
planning, will be provided by MOPH staff through MOPH channels, and that the
ONPFP will therefore confine itself to its original functions of policy
formulation, research, education and training\. The integration of health and
family planning activities, already underway in the medical regions of Sousse
and Jendouba, is essential if the government is to extend its family planning
program effectively throughout rural Tunisia\.3
2\.10 Thus, while the project's objectives were designed based on the government's integration
policy, it is doubtful that the implementing agencies were sufficiently committed to this
objective\. The Bank recognized that the implications of the integration policy for project
implementation had not been frankly faced within the government and noted that implementation
could eventually have a profound effect on the structure, role, and function of the ONPFP\. While
the Bank saw integration as an internal issue to be decided by the government, it hoped that the
project would add momentum to the process, as integration was essential for the project\. In
retrospect, the objectives of the project were clearly relevant in the demographic sense, but their
fit with current organizational capacities was seriously flawed\.4
3\. Staff Appraisal Report, Tunisia Health and Population Project (Loan 2005-TUN), Report No\. 3204, May 6, 1981,
para\. 1\.15\.
4\. The region believes that while the above may be true, the project was indeed successful at creating momentum for
reform, since now, fifteen years later, integration is close to being generalized\.
19
3\. Project Implementation and Results
Overall Implementation
3\.1 Project implementation can be divided into two time periods: 1981-1984 and 1985-
1988, before and after changes in the Ministry of Public Health\. MOPH staff at all levels were
highly motivated and committed to project objectives, and project implementation thus started in
July 1981 in an optimistic climate\. Project execution was also facilitated by the fact that the
Project Coordinator simultaneously held the positions of Director of Basic Health Services as
well as the political position of Chief of Staff for the Minister of Public Health, a situation that
prevailed until 1984\. After 1984, project implementation was hampered by political changes
within the MOPH (the appointment of two Ministers within a three month period, October 1983-
January 1984), the general economic crisis (bread riots which broke out in January 1984), and
management problems (the Project Coordinator left and was not replaced for over a year)\.5 The
results were paralysis in the MOPH due to political and financial problems; a halt in the
momentum in project implementation; and a hiatus in project supervision of one year\. The
dialogue between the borrower and the Bank suffered\. The project had two one-year extensions,
mainly to complete procurement of computers for MIS and x-ray equipment\. The project was
completed in December 1988, and the loan account was kept open to September 30, 1989 to
complete disbursement\.
Disbursements
3\.2 The second supervision mission in July 1982 reported that no disbursements had taken
place, though they should have reached $0\.9 million by June 1982\. By February 1983
disbursements were still slower than expected-$56,000 by March 31, 1983 vs\. $1\.86 million in
the revised disbursement schedule\. This chronic slow disbursal was attributed to administrative
procedures involving regional authorities, including low incentives for submission of
applications for withdrawal among regional authorities\. In September 1983, arrangements were
agreed with a Bank supervision mission for the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) to accelerate
disbursements, improve and simplify the bids/evaluation procedure, and speed up the delegation
of credits to government authorities\. In June 1984, however, disbursements were still only
US$1\.4 million versus the revised disbursement target of $3\.4 million and the appraisal estimate
of $7\.9 million for this period\. Other factors contributing to slow disbursements included the
MOPH's reluctance to use project funds earmarked for technical assistance;7 chronic delays in
awarding contracts for goods; and dramatic appreciation of the US dollar (about 80 percent)\. At
closing in December 1988, disbursements were US$5\.6 million\. In the end, US$4\.35 million was
canceled\.
5\. The borrower is correct in observing that while the changes within the MOPH were an important factor, they were
not the only factor\.
6\. Preparation of a follow-up project during the same period suffered as well\.
7\. The borrower states that it is rather due to difficulties related to the procedures for the recruitment of the consultants
that are followed in the country\.
20
Procurement
3\.3 In October 1983 a supervision mission reported lengthy (nine month) delays in the
evaluation of bids for the procurement of equipment and furniture\. These delays were due to the
shortage of procurement specialists in the PCU as well as the MOPH, and cumbersome
administrative procedures\. To further complicate matters, the MOPH halted procurement in 1984
in order to re-examine its procurement and standardization policies, further slowing
disbursements\. The PCR states that the Bank overestimated the procurement capacity of the
MOPH, and that the PCU was unable to expedite or effectively coordinate procurement, which
became the single greatest practical obstacle to project implementation, as well as an inordinate
drain on Bank supervision missions\. It was also the main reason for the two one-year extensions
of the project\.
Management Capability
3\.4 Management Information System (MIS)\. The MIS was to remedy deficiencies in the
collection and analysis of health statistics\. Until March 1983, development proceeded on
schedule\. A technical report prepared in 1982 provided a critical evaluation of the existing
system of data collection and information flows, described the objectives of the new MIS, and
laid out performance and implementation indicators including activity levels, outreach and
performance, impact and recurrent costs\. However, technology improvements caused the
National Computer Center (CNI) to make proposals for a new configuration-eight independent
microcomputers instead of eight regional terminals linked to CNI\. The new proposal entailed 50
percent higher investment costs but significant savings in terms of operating expenditure\. The
new proposal, however, was not supported by the MOPH or the Bank due to the increased costs\.
After the new Minister of Public Health was appointed in 1984, the MIS was put on hold as the
MOPH was uncertain of the direction it should take regarding the system\. A new proposal was
approved by the MOPH and the Bank in 1986, and bids were launched for the computer
equipment in early 1987\. Due to procurement delays, 30 computers were acquired only during
the last months of the project\.
3\.5 The MIS was never implemented\. The PCR noted that half of the computers were being
used by the MOPH to process data collected from an inventory of health services (Carte
Sanitaire), not service utilization data\. Other computers were used for (a) patient registration at a
major hospital; (b) on a test basis in the DBHS in Jendouba Governorate; (c) within the planning
and epidemiology units of MOPH; and (d) at the Center for Pedagogical Research and Training
(CRFP)\. The PCR states that the indicators developed for the MIS were never collected, thus
there was no data to evaluate the project outcomes in terms of reaching its basic health goals\.
The fact that the last three supervision reports from 1988 are missing from the files (and are
presumed lost due to the Bank reorganization) rendered it impossible to determine what became
of the indicators developed for the MIS and to ascertain why data was not collected against these
indicators\.
3\.6 Studies and applied research\. The program of studies and applied research, designed to
identify better ways of meeting health needs in rural areas and the cost and relative impact of
8\. The missing reports and related files also rendered it difficult to determine what happened with the studies and
applied research and health education under the health, population and nutrition communications component (paras\.
3\.7 and 3\.25)\.
21
essential services, was slow to start and suffered from lack of supervision\. In early 1983 an ad
hoc working group was established to identify and prepare an inventory of research topics in
BHS, orient future research, identify consultants, and award and supervise contracts\. In March of
the same year, at a national seminar, research priorities were discussed and five subject areas
were chosen, and additional research areas which were supported by WHO were included\. These
research priorities included tuberculosis; malnutrition; communicable diseases; improvements of
records and statistics; accessibility and utilization of services; drinking water; school health;
maternal mortality; child morbidity and mortality; and acute respiratory infections\. As of June
1983, nine research proposals had been reviewed but research grants had not been awarded as the
ad hoc working group was absorbed by other activities and did not function as planned\.
3\.7 A supervision report in September 1983 reported that applied research was being carried
out in the field in three governorates, however, funds from the project were not being utilized,
reportedly because of the formalities involved\. The June 1984 supervision report recommended
that the next mission focus on this component, but the planned supervision did not take place,
and there was a year's hiatus\. The report of the next supervision mission in June 1985 stated that
little progress had been made on the software side (MIS, applied research studies, and health
education) due to (a) changes in senior MOPH staff; (b) departure of the project coordinator; (c)
failure of new staff to take critical decisions; and (d) a breakdown in relations with the Bank\.
With the appointment of a new coordinator later that year, communications with the Bank were
back to normal; however, little progress was made with the applied research component\. It was
already several years behind schedule\. It did not produce applied research as envisioned\.
However, three studies were completed under this component, on infant mortality, vaccination
and hepatitis\. The national study on infant morbidity and mortality was published as a book, "Un
Enfant et Deux Tunisies"9 that has had considerable impact on policies in the sector and was
used extensively in the preparation of the 1991 Bank-assisted Population and Family Health
Project\.
3\.8 Health Planning\. After some delay, due in part to the Tunisians' reluctance to use
technical assistance funds, a health sector planning advisor was recruited in September 1983 for
two months and assisted the Directorate of Basic Health Services (DBHS) in designing and
implementing a methodology to identify specific interventions at the regional level\. This work
was aimed at the governorates to be included under the Second Health Development project that
was under preparation but was to be expanded to all governorates under the proposed project\.
This project, the Second Health and Population Project, was appraised in December 1984 but
was subsequently blocked by the new Minister of Health due to concerns about the achievements
and the recurrent cost implications of the BHS policy\. A Third Health and Population Project
was identified in 1987 but was set aside by the Minister of Planning in favor of sector work
emphasizing services and finance\.
3\.9 In terms of strengthening the MOPH's capacity for policy formulation, planning,
management, and evaluation, the project was not very successful\. The reliance on the MIS for
policy formulation, management, and evaluation was a poor design choice, as it was too narrow
an instrument to accomplish all the goals\. In addition, its sheer complexity did not bode well for
its smooth operation\. The reliance on technical assistance for the services of a health planner was
9\. Gueddana, N\. Ben AYcha, N\. et Jarraya, S\., February 1989, "Un Enfant et Deux Tunisies, Rdsultats d'une Enquete
Nationale sur la Mortalit6 et la Morbidit6 Infantile, Indices de Mortalitd, D6terminants, Causes Mddicales des D6cks,
Stratdgie pour une Meilleure Survie," R6publique Tunisienne, Ministare de la Sant6 Publique, Tunis\.
22
also unwise as Tunisia was known to be reluctant to pay for such services, preferring to obtain
them free of charge from other donors\. The studies and applied research component might have
been rescued with better supervision\.
Basic Health Care Services
3\.10 Decentralizativn\. Even before loan effectiveness, important changes were made in
training and organization and budgetary allocation (method and level) within the MOPH\. In June
1981 the MOPH required management staff to provide a breakdown of 1980 expenditures
between hospitals and basic health services as a step in the preparation of the 1982 budget\. In
addition, the MOPH's decentralization policy delegated budgetary, technical, and administrative
responsibilities to regional authorities, including training\. In 1983 a supervision mission reported
that the MOPH's decentralization policy had led to significant and rapid progress in
strengthening basic health services\. A Deputy Director of BHS was appointed in February 1987,
further strengthening the DBHS team\.
3\.11 Organizational Changes\. At the outset of the project, BHS consisted essentially of health
facilities scattered throughout eight governorates, with little cohesion\. They provided minimum,
low-standard medical care\. Beginning in 1981 with the project, the MOPH appointed well-
trained and experienced staff in key technical and administrative positions for the development
of its integrated health development system and implementation of the project\. Within the first
eighteen months of the project, BHS structures were strengthened with the addition of staff, staff
were trained, and norms and instructions for medical activities were issued\. The number of
public health physicians in the project area practically doubled, the health budget was
substantially increased, and separate budgets were prepared for BHS in all medical regions\.
These budgets included all expenditures except salaries which continued to be administered at
the centrally\. Additional vehicles, office accommodations, and equipment improved working
conditions\.
3\.12 Civil Works\. Price increases for cement and labor resulted in higher unit construction
costs than estimated at appraisal that was partially compensated by regrouping contracts\. In
addition, to stay within the limits of the financial envelope agreed upon at appraisal, the MOPH
decided in 1981 to accelerate implementation and to reduce the number of new facilities to be
10
built from the 265 planned at appraisal to 225\. The first phase of the construction program was
launched in March 1982, all sites were acquired by July 1982, good bidding documents were
prepared, and almost all contracts were awarded by February 1983\. New construction was given
priority over remodeling and/or extensions which began in May 1983\. The number of facilities to
be remodeled and/or extended was reduced to 103 from the 288 identified at appraisal\. Despite
the fact that construction was begun in eight governorates simultaneously and there were
recurrent problems with reimbursement of travel allowances which hindered supervision,
construction proceeded smoothly with only a year's delay\. The positive results achieved in the
implementation of the construction program can be credited to the efficiency of the PCU, the
project architect and the two construction supervisors\.
3\.13 Integration\. Regarding the new policy of integration, the SAR noted that sustained
government efforts would be required to ensure full cooperation of the ONPFP, which was
10\. Plans for the construction of II facilities were canceled while the remaining 29 were postponed-to be financed in
subsequent years by government\.
23
accustomed to a high degree of autonomy, in the integrated delivery of services that it formerly
11
provided separately\. Progress in defining services, training staff and mobilizing additional
resources in family planning was limited, in contrast to the progress that was being made in other
basic health services under the project\. While the MOPH relied heavily on ONPFP cooperation
for the effectiveness of the new DBHS and its regional representatives in establishing the
integrated basic health services, it was unable to promote a working dialogue free of personal
and political rancor\. The ONPFP felt no incentive to take the initiative given that it believed,
genuinely, that its work and existence were at stake\. The sustained technical and logistical
support needed by the DBHS from the ONPFP to reinforce the former's ability to provide family
planning services within the basic health services framework thus did not materialize\. Relations
between the MOPH and the ONPFP deteriorated progressively in the first 18 months of
implementation with adverse operational effects\. Efforts by the Bank to establish dialogue
between the two organizations proved futile\. Donor agencies also became embroiled in the
conflict, on the side of ONPFP and advised the Bank to leave ONPFP alone, as the Bank was
seen as siding with the MOPH\. In 1984, Bank staff noted that:
It is evident that there have been major differences of opinion, to the
point of animosity, on these issues within the Tunisian Government,
between the Government and the Bank, and also among the donors\.
Everybody apparently was squabbling with each other!! The question\. in
Tunisia's case, is what is the Government's policy'? Although Tuni,ia is
said to be pursuing an integrated approach, it seems that powerful
elements within the Government are fiercely resisting its adoption\. 1
3\.14 Family planning services continued to be delivered by the ONPFP\. The MOPH was
unable or unwilling to work with the ONPFP on this basis\. In 1986, the ONPFP was moved to a
newly created Ministry of the Family and Protection of Women but was moved back under the
MOPH the following year, and a new director was appointed\. Despite these changes\. neither the
ONPFP's legal status, the conflict with the DBHS, nor the integration schedule was settled\. The
political and institutional environment which prevailed was not conducive to integration\. It was
reported that some integration of family planning services with basic health services ocrr d\. in
the field, yet the institutional squabbles prevented any progress in integration at the central level,
i\.e\. agreement over an implementation plan and a timetable\. Thus, the population focus of tht
project was lost, and the project did not succeed in fully integrating family planning and NICH
services\. In 1991 it was reported that such integrated services were being provided in only !6
percent of health facilities, com ared to 55 percent of clinics receiving family planning services
from the ONPFP though visits\.
3\.15 Service Delivery\. The project constructed 67 health posts, 79 rural dispensaries, and 15
urban dispensaries-a total of 161 new health facilities, representing an increase of more than 50
percent in the number of basic health facilities at appraisal (287)\. An additional 103 existing
health facilities were renovated and/or remodeled, and 57 staff houses, and 7 vehicle
maintenance workshops were constructed\. While no figures are available for the total lumber of
I1\. SAR 198 1, para\. 6\.04\.
12\. Internal Bank memo dated February 27, 1984\.
13\. Staff Appraisal Report, Tunisia Population and Family Health Project (Loan 3307-TUN)\. February 19, 1991,
Report No\. 9128, para\. 1\.23\.
24
basic health facilities in the eight governorates in 1988 at the time of project completion, the
audit mission was able to collect such data for 1993 (627)\.14 These data show that the
construction completed under the project represented 26 percent of existing basic health facilities
in 1993\. This remarkable achievement in expanding the infrastructure most certainly had a
positive impact on health services delivery\. However, the impact of the project is difficult to
measure as the MIS that was supposed to monitor specific project indicators never functioned as
planned, and no results are available about the project's goals of increased coverage, reduction in
IMR, CBR and morbidity\.
3\.16 In spite of the fact that BHS was well-conceived and supported by beneficiaries, several
difficulties were encountered: many centers were underutilized and overstaffed; bureaucratic
inefficiencies caused long delays in the payment of staff salaries with attendant loss of morale;
and equipping of health posts was very slow due to budgetary restrictions and procurement
problems\.
3\.17 The PCR states that the borrower reported a doubling of the rate of medical consultations
(from 15 to 30 percent) across the project areas, though the PCR provides no figures indicating if
the coverage goal was met-from 50 percent of the population to 90 percent\. The audit mission
was able to obtain some data\. Table 3\.1 shows the evolution of the density of basic health
centers (BHCs) in the eight governorates from 1982-1986, where density is defined as the ratio
of population per BHC\. The figures illustrate that coverage did improve though it is unclear
exactly how much can be attributed to this project\.15 The ratio of population per basic health
center decreased significantly, with improvements ranging from 42 percent in Zaghouan, 39
percent in Jendouba, but only six percent in Monastir\.
Table 3\.1: Population per Basic Health Center in the Eight Project Governorates, 1982-86
1982 1986 % Improvement
B6ja 5,853 4,622 21
Jendouba 9,063 5,517 39
Kairouan 9,113 6,458 29
Kef 5,196 3,947 24
Mahdia 4,533 4,043 11
Monastir 4,940 4,662 6
Sousse 6,285 4,886 22
Zaghouan 6,290 3,620 42
Source: Carte Sanitaire-Plan des CSB, 1986, MOPH\.
3\.18 As stated above, the project did not achieve integrated family planning and basic health
service delivery\. However, family planning services, prenatal care, and vaccinations were
provided in most basic health facilities in the project governorates\. Table 3\.2 provides a snapshot
in 1986 of the family planning, prenatal, and vaccination consultation activities in BHCs\. In
Mahdia in 1986, only seven percent of BHCs offered family planning, versus the high of 82
percent in Beja\. In terms of prenatal consultations, again a very low figure is found in Kairouan,
14\. Source: MSP/DSSB/Evaluation Database (funded by the 1991 Population and Family Health Project), November
1995\.
15\. Other facilities were constructed during the time of the project, financed by the government, the Bank-financed
Rural Development Program, and USAID\.
25
seven percent, as opposed to rates between 42\.5 and 82 percent in the other governorates\. Most
centers offered vaccinations, however\.
Table 3\.2: Percent of Basic Health Centers Offering Family Planning, Prenatal and Vaccination
Medical Consultation Activities, 1986
Family Prenatal Vaccination
Planning
B6ja 82\.0 82\.0 93\.5
Jendouba 78\.0 53\.0 92\.5
Kairouan 67\.0 7\.0 81\.5
Kef 67\.5 67\.5 84\.5
Mahdia 7\.0 72\.0 85\.0
Monastir 60\.5 60\.5 81\.0
Sousse 42\.5 42\.5 83\.0
Zaghouan 60\.0 65\.5 88\.5
Source: Ibid\.
3\.19 In 1993 a DBHS study examined the volume of preventive and curative services, the
availability of resources and supervisions, and the integration of MCH/FP services with BHS for
a random sample of BHCs across the country\.16 The results showed that, on average, 58 percent
of BHCs offered prenatal and family planning services-100 percent in those centers with the
program for mothers and children (PMI), 87 percent in the larger BHCs (type IV), and between
17
40-60 percent in the majority of facilities, the smaller BHCs (types II and III)\. It is these latter
facilities that include those constructed under the project\.
3\.20 In Table 3\.2 above, family planning availability does not indicate which agency, ONPFP
or MOPH/DBHS, delivered the services\. Table 3\.3 shows the distribution of responsibility for
the delivery of family planning services in 1993\.18 By then, unlike at the time of the PCR, there
was cooperation between the two agencies, as midwives from both DBHS and ONPFP delivered
family planning services\. At the national level in 1993, ONPFP midwives supplied 57 percent of
family planning services\. Data from the eight project governorates show that this percentage
varied from 16 percent in Sousse to 98 percent in Monastir\.19
16\. "National Evaluation Study of the Degree of Achievement and the Quality of Services offered in the Basic Health
Centers\." 1993\. DSSB, MOPH\. Tunis\.
17\. At the time of the audit there were 102 PMI, 89 Type IV BHCs (the largest facilities), 291 Type III BHCs, 875
Type 11 BHCs, and 263 Type I BHCs (rural dispensaries)\.
18\. The borrower notes that these data concern only the sample of basic health centers chosen for this 1993 survey\.
Data concerning all the structures are available at the Directorate of Basic Health Services\. Likewise, regarding Table
3\.2, in 1993 78 percent of basic health centers offered these activities\. It is also possible to calculate the rates for the
structures built within the framework of the project\.
19\. It is unclear if the breakdown in data reflects the distinction between ONPFP mobile teams and the DBHS MCH
records, or if the records merely indicate which staff provided the service, regardless of how it was provided (mobile
teams or fixed staff\.
26
Table 3\.3: Distribution of Responsibility for the Delivery of Family Planning Activities (DBHS
Midwives or ONPFP Midwives) 1993
Governorate DBHS Midwives ONPFP Midwives
(%) (%)
Zaghouan 33 67
Bdja 16 84
Jendouba 32 68
Le Kef 34 66
Kairouan 43 57
Sousse 84 16
Monastir 2 98
Mahdia 27 73
National Total 43 57
Source: 1993 Annual Report, DSSB, MOPH, Tunisia, volume 1\.
3\.21 Thus, while there is no doubt that access to facilities and services improved under the
project, measuring the projects' outcome against its objectives is almost impossible due to the
lack of data, as the MIS did not function as envisioned\. As of 1988, the borrower reported a 50
percent decline in infant mortality (which was 123/1000 in 1981)\. In addition, project staff
reported that total fertility rates had fallen to 4\.3-though there was no comparison figure for the
pre-project era, as the indicator in the SAR was the CBR\. The national TFR in 1981 was 5\.3\.20
The contraceptive prevalence rates were reported to be 51 percent in the project area in 1988
(compared with 17 percent in 1981)\. However, with the exception of medical consultations, it is
unlikely that these changes can be attributed solely to project intervention\.
3\.22 Indicators are not available for other health and population targets under the project,
namely reduction in the CBR (43/1000 in 1981); morbidity; maternal mortality rates; neonatal
deaths; and BCG vaccination rates\. National figures are available to trace the movement of
several health and population indicators, however the audit mission was unable to disaggregate
these to the governorate level, despite working with the Evaluation Unit in the DBHS\. At the
national level, TFR stood at 5\.3 in 1981 and had fallen to 3\.3 in 1992; the CBR in 1981 was
34\.6/1000 but curiously it was reported to be higher in 1993 at 44\.1/1000 (different sources)\. For
other indicators, the only ones available are comparisons (obviously, unsatisfactory) of the
project area in 1981 with the national level in 1992/4: IMR in the project area in 1981 was
123/1000; at the national level in 1992 it was 32/1000\. Vaccination rates for BCG were 45
percent in 1981 in the project area; nationally they were 98\.2 percent in 1994\.
3\.23 Despite the lack of comparable, pre-project indicators, the audit mission was able to
collect statistics on utilization for 1993 for the eight project governorates and compare them with
the national averages\.21 Table 3\.4 shows that the average number of medical consultations per
person per year is less than one (0\.93) nationally but across the eight governorates the average is
higher (1\.21), ranging from a low of 0\.77 in Kairouan to a high of 1\.82 in Mahdia\. The average
20\. Source: Office National de la Famille et de la Population, !995, "Population, Family\. Health: Key Figures 1994,"
Republic of Tunisia\. September\.
21\. Caveat: these data refer to medical consultations provided by the public sector only (MOPH data)\. As the private
sector provides a large portion of medical services in urban areas, data reported here for governorates with large urban
populations (Sousse, Monastir) as well as data for the national average underestimate the actual number of medical
consultations\.
27
number of family planning consultations per married woman of reproductive age is also higher
on average in the project governorates (0\.59) than the national average (0\.45)\. Again, there is
high variability across governorates, from 0\.12 in Monastir to 1\.28 in Zaghouan\. Similarly, the
average number of prenatal consultations per pregnant woman across the eight governorates is
higher (2\.44) than the national average (1\.50)\. The reduction of neonatal mortality and maternal
mortality were project goals\. However no data are available on the average number of prenatal
consultants per pregnant woman in 1981 in order to ascertain if this objective was met\.
Table 3\.4: Basic Health Care Activities, 1993
Ave\. Frequency of Visits to CSB
CL\.u
Mnsi1\.7 012 14 \.31 1\.9 192 09
B \.
Governorate
Makdia 1\.82 1\.13 2\.26 3\.15 1\.78 1\.78 1\.51
Zaghouan 1\.53 1\.28 2\.89 2\.43 1\.45 1\.44 0\.54
Sousse 1\.08 0\.38 3\.49 3\.76 2\.79 2\.79 1\.24
Monastir 1\.37 0\.12 1\.49 4\.31 1\.89 L\.92 0\.90
U~ja 1\.10 0\.47 2\.67 2\.00 1\.34 1\.34 1\.19
Le Kef 1\.13 0\.79 2\.83 2\.58 1\.26 1\.23 1\.03
Jendouba 0\.87 0\.22 1\.93 1\.92 1\.38 1\.33 1\.32
Kairouan 0\.77 0\.29 1\.94 2\.09 2\.05 2\.05 1\.55
Governorate Average 1\.21 0\.59 2\.44 2\.78 1\.74 1\.74 1\.74
National Average 0\.93 0\.45 1\.50 2\.82 1\.94 1\.93 1\.19
Source: MSP/DSSB/Evaluation Database (Funded by the 1991 Population and Family Health Project), November 1995
3\.24 Table 3\.4 also indicates the average frequency of visits to basic health centers (BHCs),
disaggregated by type of visit\. The number of consultations per week in 1993 averaged across
the project governorates (2\.78) was slightly less than the national average (2\.82) \. The
governorate average for family planning consultations (1\.74) was slightly less than the national
average (1\.94)\. A similar pattern is to be found for the number of prenatal consultations per
week\. However, the number of vaccinations per week in 1993 across the eight governorates is
substantially higher (1\.74) than the national average (1\.19)\. Vaccinations also showed the
greatest variance across the governorates, with the number of vaccinations per week in Mahdia
almost three times that in Zaghouan\.
3\.25 Thus, despite the lack of data with which to evaluate the project, there is some evidence
to support the borrower's claims that coverage has improved and utilization has increased\.
Information, such as that in Tabe 3\.4, would have been extremely helpful in measuring the
impact of the project had it been gathered in the project area before and after the project\. Due to
the absence from the files of the last three supervision reports, there is no information as to why
nothing was done to measure the impact of the project, such as a cross-sectional survey, when
the MIS was obviously failing\.
28
Health, Population and Nutrition Communication
3\.26 The health, population, and nutrition communication component was designed to help
field workers do a better job of motivating families to adopt improved health, family planning
and nutrition practices\. There was very little information either in the files or the PCR regarding
the implementation or results of this component\. A supervision report in June 1985 reported that
little progress had been made, however there was no elaboration\. The audit mission visited the
Regional Health Education Center in Sousse and found that the building was being utilized for
other purposes\. The audio visual equipment and materials were financed by the government not
by the project\. In Jendouba, the center was constructed, but due to a shifting foundation, the
building was never occupied\. The National Education and Communication center in Tunis was
supposed to be renovated but the audit mission did not obtain any evidence to confirm this\. The
PCR states that achievements under the health education component were modest, as health
education was of uneven quality and most health posts were without basic educational materials\.
The audit finds no reason to disagree with this assessment\.
Training
3\.27 The Center for Pedagogical Research and Training (CRFP) was responsible for training
and was strongly supported by the DBHS\. Many training programs took place in 1981-1983
spurred by the project, though they were not all funded under this component\. The project
financed training for middle-level health managers and statisticians (40), full-time teachers (45),
physicians (80), and paramedical personnel in the project areas\. The retraining program for
physicians and paramedicals focused on preventive care, outpatient treatment of common
ailments, health education, and communication techniques\. The project also financed curriculum
development for training of physicians and paramedical personnel\. Through the revision of
medical and paramedical curricula, an increasing number of graduates were made aware of the
specific needs of rural populations\. In addition, two new paramedical were constructed, four
paramedical schools were remodeled, and equipment and vehicles were provided\.
3\.28 Five of the eight regional directors of BHS attended short-term tra-ning courses in
Europe under WHO fellowships\. In addition, four national sem;nars were held under the project,
and an international training course was given in Tunis on immunization\. In June 1983, a
supervision report stated that training activities were continuing at a rapid pace and were
reaching an increasing audience through decentralized responsibilities given to regional
authorities\. The continuing education program was actively implemented in the regions and
acceptance and participation were excellent\. The first national seminar on the implementation of
the BHS strategy was very well attended\. The MDs participating organized similar seminars for
paramedics in their representative regions\. Thus training completed during the time of the project
was very successful\. Though only a few training activities were actively funded under the
project, they built up a momentum for other training activities\.
29
4\. Ratings
4\.1 The PCR rated the project outcome as satisfactory, sustainability as likely, and
institutional development as negligible\. The audit confirms the outcome and sustainability
ratings and upgrades the institutional development rating to substantial\. Borrower and Bank
performance are rated as satisfactory, although there were substantial periods during project
implementation when this was not the case\.
Outcome
4\.2 The project was a success\. It succeeded in the establishment, staffing, and equipping of
major health infrastructure in eight governorates\. At the time of the project, this new
construction represented more than a 50 percent increase in the number of basic health facilities\.
The basic health care services component was satisfactorily implemented despite slight delays\.
Maternal and child health services (MCH) were successfully integrated into basic health care
services (vaccinations, prenatal, and postnatal visits)\. Family planning services were integrated
into basic health care services to a much lesser extent during project implementation, but the
audit found that significant changes have taken place since, and at present integration is now no
longer an issue\. Accessibility to basic health services improved in the eight governorates due to
the increased infrastructure, and general health almost certainly improved despite the difficulties
in measuring project outcomes\. The main issues that remain concern the efficiency of service
delivery and quality of care\. These issues are being addressed in the 1991 Population and Family
Health Project\. The project also strengthened BHS capacity and the orientation of the MOPH
through internal reorganization including the establishment of the DBHS whose functions were
in turn decentralized in an effective manner to the governorates\. The project also created
momentum with its small but successful training component which resulted in an improved
health training system\.
4\.3 Achievements in other components were not as strong\. The studies and applied research
program had a modest outcome, though one of the studies (on infant mortality) did prove to be
extremely influential in future health policy and the follow-on 1991 Population and Family
Health Project\. The health, population, and nutrition communications component also had
limited success\. The project failed to implement the MIS component, which suffered from
complex design, changing technology, and lacked support in the MOPH\.
4\.4 Given the overriding importance of the project's health objectives and the remarkable
achievements in expanding health infrastructure and the availability of services, the project is
rated successful\.23
Sustainability
4\.5 The service delivery methods developed under the project have now been replicated
across all governorates in Tunisia\. The project provided the catalyst for decentralization of basic
22\. Or, rather, these were the OED confirmed ratings during PCR review\.
23\. The PCR called the project a qualified success, probably a reflection of some remaining institutional problems at
the time\.
30
health services to the regions\. Beginning in 1982 the MOPH budgets separated BHS and hospital
expenditures in the Sixth Development Plan (1982-87)\. In addition, the 1991 Population and
Family Health project reaffirmed the government's commitment to the BHS program\.
Sustainability is therefore likely\. However, most of Tunisia's health system is in the public
sector, and therefore there is concern about the financial sustainability of the sector as a whole\.
Institutional Impact
4\.6 Institutional impact is rated as substantial; eight years after project closure, the
institutional framework it helped put in place is not only still operational but has also became the
national model\. The position of the DBHS has been strengthened and the decentralization of
responsibilities to the regional directors has been effective\. The institutional rivalry between the
ONPFP and the MOPH which plagued the project has largely disappeared\. The scope and level
of each organization's interventions have also been clarified, and their staffs share responsibility
for the delivery of family planning services (para\. 3\.20)\.
Borrower Performance
4\.7 From the beginning, insufficient attention was paid to the political and institutional
impediments of the integration policy\. Combined with the personality conflict and high level
MOPH staff changes, these unresolved issues of implementation of the integration policy caused
complications and hampered the dialogue with the Bank\. With this exception, borrower
performance was very good with regard to the design of the project and implementation until
1984 when institutional changes interrupted the momentum of the project and seemed to call the
basic BHS policy into question\. As the PCR stated, the principal factors affecting borrower
performance throughout the project were the MOPH's fluctuating level of influence in the system
and managerial shortcomings, unsteady commitment to the central project concept, political
pressures, and deteriorating economic conditions which adversely affected social spending\. As
evidenced in the 1971 First Population Project and again in this project, the borrower was
reluctant to use loan funds for technical assistance, preferring grants from other donors\. The new
Minister of Public Health who was appointed in 1984 was critical of the project and repeatedly
postponed and delayed supervision missions\. Ultimately, however, the project was successfully
implemented despite the delays and the borrower imposed break in supervision\. The borrower
met the project conditionalities, and a major effort was made to maintain the momentum of a
project covering eight governorates simultaneously despite the lack of supervision staff and
funding\. Borrower performance is thus rated as satisfactory\.
Bank Performance
4\.8 The Bank spent substantial resources and time (1977-1980) on the identification and
preparation of this project\. The PCR praised the great effort and vision that went into the design
of a new program reflecting the government's policy shift to national basic health care but states
that the Bank failed to adequately address the implications of the government's new policy-the
interests at stake and its feasibility\. Potential implementation difficulties which should have been
foreseen were not addressed during preparation or appraisal\. A review of the files shows that the
Bank did, however, try on numerous occasions to get the MOPH to clarify the implementation
plan and provide a timeline\. It regarded the issue as an internal matter and felt that pressure
should not be applied, especially given the very real possibility of further damaging the already
31
strained relations with the ONPFP\. Despite the Bank's failure to realistically consider the
organizational capacities to implement the integration policy, on the whole, project design was
relevant to Tunisia's demographic goals, and supervision was regular, with the exception of the
1984-85 hiatus\. The audit agrees with the PCR that the MIS component and the applied research
studies could perhaps have been rescued following the 1985 resumption of supervision if enough
attention had been directed towards them\.
4\.9 At times, however, there were serious problems\. Some were caused by over optimism\.
Insufficient attention to bottlenecks during implementation also caused major problems\.
Following the change in the Minister of Public Health in 1984, dialogue with the borrower was
constrained at times, as is illustrated by the disruption of supervision and the failure to follow
through on project preparation on two occasions (1984 and 1987)\. At times it must have been
tempting to stop the Bank's involvement in health\. However, with the benefit of hindsight it is
clear that the Bank's perseverance paid off\. In a sector where policy issues are long term and
funding issues mostly recurrent, policy dialogue over an extended period is the most important
instrument the Bank has at its disposal to promote achievement of development objectives\.
Overall, Bank performance is rated as satisfactory\.
32
5\. Issues and Lessons
5\.1 This audit raised a number of issues but this section focuses two deemed the most
important-the integration of family planning and basic health services, and project monitoring
and evaluation\.
Integration of Family Planning and Basic Health Services
5\.2 The goal of integration was the extension of family planning services to underserved
rural areas where logistical problems and the absence of links with the health services limited the
effectiveness of the ONPFP\. This shift in emphasis from a vertical family planning program to
its integration with health signaled profound changes in the structure, role and function of the
ONPFP and its relationship to the MOPH\. It called for collaboration and coordination between
two powerful national agencies whose willingness to integrate their activities was declared but
not guaranteed\. These institutional changes were insufficiently addressed by the government and
the Bank and contributed to a prolonged preparation and implementation delays\. The
government's early proposals focused on civil works construction and skirted the definition of
project organization, administration and financing\.
5\.3 Integration was an over-riding but unstated goal in the 1981 Health and Population
Project\. There were two schools of thought regarding integration, and the Bank took a position of
being in favor, while the major players in the population field, USAID and UNFPA, took the
opposite position and continued to support the vertical family planning program of the ONPFP\.
With hindsight, the Bank's stance appears to have been divorced from the political reality in
Tunisia\. It also brings into question the government's commitment to its integration policy\.
Neither the Decree in 1977 nor the Fifth National Development Plan (1977-82) provided any
concrete plans for implementation of the integration policy, leaving it to the MOPH and the
ONPFP to settle\. This pronouncement, at least in the eyes of the ONPFP, appeared to come at the
behest of the Bank and the MOPH\. Thus from the beginning, an atmosphere of distrust existed,
and it was very difficult to get the concerned parties to come to an understanding or to prepare an
implementation plan\. These institutional rivalries existed throughout the project and hindered
implementation of its family planning goal (paras\. 3\.13-3\.14)\.
5\.4 The Bank has not acknowledged that it may have played a role in creating the conflict\.
Beginning with the 1971 First Population Project, the Bank's relations with the ONPFP
deteriorated (para\. 1\.8)\. Tensions were further exacerbated when the responsibility for
preparation of the 1981 Health and Population Project that had been delegated to the ONPFP was
taken over by the MOPH (after the Bank deemed the ONPFP's efforts lacking and its proposal
unrealistic)\. This planning exercise highlighted the lack of cooperation and coordination between
the ONPFP and the MOPH, was a harbinger of what was to come, and served to further
exacerbate the tensions between the Bank and the ONPFP as well as the ONPFP and the MOPH\.
The Bank did not attempt an analysis of the political and organizational factors in Tunisia,
preferring to be swayed by the enthusiasm of the MOPH for the integration policy\. The Bank and
the other donors became enmeshed in the ensuing conflict, and integration did not occur in the
time frame of this project\. At the time of the audit, the conflict over integration appeared to have
been settled (paras\. 3\.20 and 4\.2)\. However, it is evident that the enormous loss of time and
energy, not to mention good will, could have been avoided or at least the impact lessened in the
33
first place had the Bank paid adequate attention to the realities of the situation in Tunisia and to
the practicalities of attempting institutional change\.
5\.5 Integration was pursued again as an objective in the follow-on 1991 Population and
Family Health Project\. The SAR states that the government, in full agreement with the MOPH
and the ONPFP, decided to accelerate the integration of family planning and MCH into the
routine BHS\. A 10 year timetable was proposed and was said to be a realistic as it took into
account the need to transfer skills and experience from one institution to the other\.24 Bank staff
say that this time integration was fully supported by the government, whereas previously it had
been viewed as imposed from the outside\.
Project Monitoring and Evaluation
5\.6 At the time of appraisal the government, with Bank concurrence, decided against either a
pre-project baseline study or the monitoring of a control population outside the project areas due
to prohibitive costs, technical difficulties and most serious, human resource implications\.
Monitoring and evaluation was to be based on comparisons with the first (baseline) year of
operations and was to be a part of the MIS to be designed under the project\. Quantitative
objectives on several demographic indicators were mentioned in the SAR: reduction of IMR and
the CBR, and increase in attended births, contraceptive prevalence, and vaccination rates\.
5\.7 The proposed MIS for the health system was to provide systematic and timely data about
project activity in the eight governorates and thus enable speedy identification and correction of
problems (para\. 2\.3)\. It was to rely on activity, performance, and impact indicators compiled
monthly by health supervisors at dispensaries and consolidated by the governorate statistician,
who would then forward the information to Tunis for analysis\. The original design called for
computer terminals for data processing at the regional hospital, and regional level data
processing was to take place at the regional directorate\. National level data processing was to
take place at the CNI, where the central computer would be located\. All the data results would go
to the Central Administration (CA) for studies and planning as well as basic health services\. The
CA would have the responsibility for diffusion of results and instruction\.
5\.8 Specific indicators were to encompass (a) activity levels, (b) outreach and performance,
and (c) impact\. The main indicators are described in the SAR (paras\. 5\.15-5\.16)\. The collection,
processing and interpretation of indicators which constituted the MIS were reviewed with the
chief epidemiologist of the DBHS in early 1983\. As a result, some indicators were refined while
others were expanded or abandoned as impractical\. Data was to be collected both in dispensaries
and by visiting nurses whose registers would record births, deaths and pregnancies in the
estimated 200 households in each assigned community\. Supervisory staff would check these
registers periodically for completeness and at random for accuracy\. In addition, the DBHS was to
collect indicators of consumer's satisfaction by sample studies\.
5\.9 The MIS was also to collect and analyze data on recurrent costs of the dispensary and
outreach parts of the health system in project areas in order to disaggregate the MOPH budget to
permit specific provision for financing the services placed under the authority of the DBHS\.
These data would also make it possible to asses the alternative unit costs of various services
provided at the peripheral level\.
24\. SAR, 1991, paras\. 1\.37-1\.38\.
34
5\.10 The proposed MIS was too complex, as the CNI attempted to keep up with changes in
computer technology occurring at the time\. Thus, even though all the right elements were
planned, its comprehensiveness and its complexity were its downfall\. With hindsight, placing
reliance on one complex system was unwise\. It would have been more advantageous to begin
with a less intricate system and to build it up\. The MIS never became operational, and as a result
there are few data with which to judge the project's outreach, integration, or effectiveness\.
5\.11 The audit team was unsuccessful in its attempt to collect data relating to the goals of the
project\. Extensive data was collected by the regional directors in the governorates, pooled from
records of the basic health centers, and include detailed information about consultations (sex,
age, social group/payment category, reason for visit, and treatment), vaccinations, respiratory
infections, chronic illnesses, and special campaigns against tuberculosis, scorpions, diarrhea, and
rabies\. In addition, data is available on the number and type of facilities, staffing, and health
education activities\. However, there are no statistics enabling a comparison of project goals with
actual outcomes\. The existing data does not conform with those indicators originally designed to
measure the outcome of the project-they appear to be more programmatic in nature, allowing
comparisons of process more than an evaluation of change in health status\. Thus the health and
population indicators envisioned for this project are not being collected and no definitive answer
can be put forth regarding the outcomes of this project in terms of achievement of its health
goals\.
Lessons
5\.12 The lessons from this project are as follows:
(a) In order to ensure the feasibility ofproject goals, it is essential to examine the
existing health system priorities, the political and organizational factors, as well
as the government's long-term policy goals, and the process envisaged for
meeting them\. The integration of health and family planning services envisaged
in this project-a major policy change-did not occur\. The parties concerned
did not fully understand the policy of integration and therefore did not respond
well to it\. Attention to differing priorities, a greater emphasis on rational,
mutually agreed collaborative arrangements, an implementation time table, and
the authority to take remedial measures were needed in this project\.
(b) Monitoring and evaluation systems are vital to measuring the success of PHN
projects\. While the project did seek to implement a thorough MIS, the design
ultimately proved to be too complex, owing to the chosen computer technology
and the desire to do everything at once\. Thus, the project had no mechanism to
record achievements in component to improve basic health services\.
(c) The Bank should not put undue reliance on technical assistance\. Tunisia, like
many countries, has been reluctant to borrow for this purpose, preferring to
obtain such assistance free of charge from other donors and agencies such as
USAID, WHO, and UNICEF\. Given the experience of the First Population
Project, the Bank should have explored alternatives to technical assistance,
which was seen to be crucial for the success of this project\.
35
(d) It is essential that procurement procedures are documented at the outset of a
project and/or the Bank work carefully to establish acceptable bidding and
evaluation procedures\. In this project, the Bank overestimated the procurement
capacity of the MOPH and procurement progressively became the single greatest
practical impediment to project implementation as well an inordinate drain on
supervision time\.25
(e) Projects of massive scope and scale seeking to attain complex objectives
simultaneously should be avoided in favor of a series of simpler, phased efforts
which address logical steps in a longer-term program\. This is especially true
where institutional capacity is weak and vulnerable to political pressures\.
25\. The government has suggested that the problem was not capacity but overly cumbersome administrative
procedures\.
26\. It is the opinion of the government that the scope of the project is not the main handicap if a good program of
continuous evaluation is established, using all the components of the project during its execution, so as to be able to
intervene on time in order to make the necessary corrections\. The SAR identified as a major project risk the fact that
the scale and design of the project were too difficult for effective MOPH coordination and implementation, an
assessment which proved to be correct, despite actions taken or suggested to countervail their occurrence\.

37 Annex I
Tunisian Legislative Changes
1\. Personal Status Code of August 13, 1956
This code granted Tunisian women the civil status of majority\. The code abrogated
polygamy and abandonment, and established divorce laws\. The code also forbade the
marriage of pre-adolescent girls (minimum legal age of 15) and guaranteed freedom of
choice of the spouse\.
2\. Law of November 1958
Adopted the plan for school attendance, however, no mandatory attendance requirements
were placed on education\.
3\. Law of January 9, 1961
Re-established the legal importation, sale and distribution of contraceptive products
(repealed the 1920 French law which prohibited such products)\.
4\. Law of December 31, 1962
A\. Limited the payment of welfare benefits for families with dependent children to
the first four children only\.
B\. Limited tax allowances and salary allowances for the head of the household to
the first four children only\.
5\. Law of February 20, 1964
Established a new minimum legal age for marriage, 17 for women and 20 for men, thus
changing the Personal Status Code of 1956\.
6\. Law of July 1, 1965
This law legalized abortion under sanitary conditions by a doctor during the first three
months of the pregnancy and only after the birth of the fourth child\.
7\. National Family Planning Program, 1966
Established the following fundamental objectives:
A\. Improvement of the quality of life of the citizen;
B\. Realization of demographic balance through controlling the process of
procreation;
C\. Safeguarding the health of mothers and children; and
D\. Promotion of the flourishing of the basic cell upon which all society is build, the
family\.
Annex 1 38
8\. National Institute of Family Planning and Maternal and Infant Health Care
Assists the Family Planning Administration of the Ministry of Public Health with the
National Family Planning Program\. The institute was responsible for all activities
relevant to family planning (i\.e\., medical, educational, and training)\.
9\. Labor Law of April 30, 1968
A\. Guaranteed women the equal right to employment\.
B\. Forbade the employment of children under 15 years of age in industry\.
10\. Law of March 23, 1973
Shifted the Family Planning Program to the Office of Family Planning and Population
under the auspices of the Ministry of Public Health\.
11\. Law of September 26, 1973
Further liberalized the practice of abortion\. Legalized abortion within the first three
months of pregnancy provided that it be carried out in a "suitable facility"\.
12\. Decree of January 31, 1974
Provided for joint operation of the National Office of the Family and Population and the
Superior Council of Population\. Established regional population councils\.
13\. Decree of December 27, 1985
A\. Regarding regulation of marriage certificates: Established that each prospective
spouse would undergo a complete medical examination, including blood count, prior to
marriage\. The examining physician would then provide suggestions on birth spacing\.
14\. Law of January 13, 1987
Changed the National Office of Family Planning and Population to the National Office
of the Family and Population\.
15\. Law of May 6, 1988
Limited benefit payments to families for the first three dependent children\.
Source: Cochrane, Susan and David K\. Guilkey, 1992\. "How Access to Contraception Affects Fertility and
Contraceptive Use in Tunisia\." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series No\.841, Washington, DC: The
World Bank\.
39 Annex 2
Republic of Tunisia-Ministry of Public Health
Major Phases of the Program and Decennial Characteristics
The Fifties
Setting up of Institutional Foundations for a Modern State
1956: Independence year (March 20th)
1956: General Census of the Population (February 13th)
1956: Promulgation of the "Code of Individual Rights"
Abolition of Polygamy and Repudiation
Limitation of the age of marriage (15 years for woman and 18 years for man)
1958: Reform of Education (November 4th)
Access to school for all the children of both sexes from the age of six years
1959: The Tunisian Constitution (June Ist)
Equality of rights and duties between men and women: constitutional rights, as well as
administrative, economic and social rights
Main Characteristics (1956)
Population: 3 Million 782 thousand inhabitants
Total Fertility Rate: 7\.2 children per woman
Birth Rate: about 50 per thousand
Death Rate: 25 per thousand
Infant Mortality Rate: 200 per thousand
Life Expectancy at Birth: 47 years
The 2/3 of the population live in rural areas
Illiteracy Rate: 85% (99% for women)
1 Physician per 7000 inhabitants
Half of the population is under 15 years (49%)
Annex 2 40
The Sixties
Starting of the First Economic and Social Development Plans
1960: Family Allowance System (December 14th)
1961: Selling contraceptive products became permitted
1962: First Economic and Social Development prospects
Decennial Development Perspectives (1962-1971)
First Triennial Development Plan (1962-1964)
Second Triennial Development Plan (1965-1967)
Third Quadrennial Development Plan (1968-1971)
1964: Starting of an Experimental Family Planning Program
1964: Increase in the age of marriage
(Woman: 17 years; Man: 20 years)
1965: Abortion permitted from the fifth child (July Ist)
1966: Starting of a National Family Planning Program
1966: Institution of the Labor code:
Equality between both sexes (April 30th)\.
1966: General Census of Population and Housing (May 3rd)
Main Characteristics
Population: 4 Million 533 thousand inhabitants
Total Fertility rate: 7\.1 children per woman
Birth Rate: 45 per thousand
Death Rate: 15 per thousand
Infant Mortality rate: 120 per thousand
60% of the population live in rural areas
Illiteracy rate: 67% (82% for women)
46% of the population is under 15 years
41 Annex 2
The Seventies
Establishment of Institutional Framework of the Demographic Policy
1972: Fourth quinquennial Development Plan (1972-1976)
1973: Creation of the Office National du Planning Familial et de la Population
1973: Abortion became permitted without restriction regarding the number of children
1974: Creation of the High Population Council (January 31st)
1975: General Census of Population and Housing
1977: Fifth quinquennial development Plan (1977-198 1)
1978: National Survey on Fertility
Main Characteristics (1975)
Population: 5 Million 577 thousand inhabitants
Total Fertility Rate: 5\.77 children per woman
Birth Rate: 36 per thousand
Death Rate: 9\.9 per thousand
Infant Mortality Rate: 84 per thousand
50% of the population live in rural areas
Illiteracy rate: 55% (68% for women)
42% of the total population is under 15 years
31\.4% of married women use a contraceptive method
Annex 2 42
The Eighties
Success ofthe Demographic Policy
1982: Sixth quinquennial Development Plan (1982-1986)
1983: National Survey on Contraceptive Prevalence
1984: The "ONPFP" became Office National De La Famille et de la Population
1984: General Census of Population and Housing
1987: Political Change of November 7th-H\.E\. Zine el Abidine Ben ali, New President of
the Republic of Tunisia
1987: United Nations Award for Population Activities
1988: Meeti g of the Higher Population Council
1989: Family allowances granted only to the first three children
Main characteristics (1984)
Population: 6 Million 975 thousand inhabitants
Total Fertility rate: 4\.7 children per women
Birth Rate: 31\.1 per thousand
Death Rate: 6\.6 per thousand
Infant Mortality Rate: 65 per thousand
Illiteracy Rate: 46% (58% for women)
40% of the population is under 15 years
41\.1% of married women use a contraceptive method in 1983
49\.8% of married women use a contraceptive method in 1988
43 Annex 2
The Nineties
New Qualitative Orientation of the Demographic Policy: Family Health and Sustainable
Development
1991: Compulsory education up to the age of 15 years
1991: New orientations of the Program---"Family Health"
1992: Eighth Development Plan (1992-1996)
1992: New presidential measures in favor of Women and Family (August 13th)
1992: President of the Republic Award for the promotion of family
1992: United Nations Award for the exemplary contribution made by ONPFP for the
preparation of the International Year of the Family, 1994
1992: First Regional Award for the promotion of family awarded to the Regional Family
Planning Center of Sidi Bouzid
1993: Priority given to the intervention in rural regions and unprivileged areas
1993: First Regional Award for the promotion of family awarded to the Regional Family
Planning Center of Kasserine
1994: General Census of Population and Housing (April 20th)
1994: National Survey on Mother and Child Health (PAP\.CHILD)
Main Characteristics
Population: 8 Million 785 thousand inhabitants (1994)
Total Fertility Rate: 3\.32 children per woman (1992)
Birth Rate: 24\.1 per thousand (1993)
Death Rate: 5\.8 per thousand (1993)
Natural Growth Rate: 1\.84 percent (1993)
Infant Mortality Rate: 36 per thousand (1992)
Life Expectancy at Birth: 68\.8 years (1991)
Female: 70\.2 years and Male: 67\.4 years
39% of the population live in rural areas (1994)
33% of the total population is under 15 years (1994)
1 Physician per 1,660 inhabitants (1992)
59\.5% of married women use a contraceptive method (1994)
Source: Office National de la Famille et de la Population, undated, "Major Phases of the
Programme and Decennial Characteristics," Republic of Tunisia, Ministry of Health\.
UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION 44
Annex 3
Tunisia Republic
Ministry
of Public Health
No MSP/153/UCT
June 11, 1996
Mr\. Roger Slade, Chief
Agriculture and Human Development Division
Operations Evaluation Department
World Bank
Subject: Performance Audit Report
Tunisia - Health and Population Project (Loan 2005-TUN)
Reference: Your letter dated of May 2, 1996
Our fax dated of June 1, 1996\.
In answer to your transmission mentioned above and relative to the
report cited in subject, I have the honor to present you the comments of my
department:
We agree that the
situation was very
1\. Some explanations were given to justify the difficulties or some complex\. However
observed failures\. In those explanations, it is quoted that some changes of changes in the
responsible at the head of the Ministry\. However, it is not certain that those eadership of the
Ministy were
events were at the origin of those difficulties\. We think that the explanations among the factors
given are very superficial and that the situation was more complex\. It is for this that influenced the
execution and
reason that we are proposing the suppression of those passage in the report\. outcome ofthe
project\. The same
observation had
earlier been made
in the PCR report
no\. 9054 dated
10/11/90, para\.
5\.02\. View cross-
referenced in
footnote 5 (text)\.
45 Annex 3
2\. We totally agree on the diagnostic of the actual situation\.
3\. A few passages of this document bear overall pejorative judgments It is OED's
resonsiibility' in
and we ask for their suppression in the final report\. Those passages are as a tofairy
follows: assess the situation
and report what we
believe to be the
facts\. The
conclusions we
have drawn are
based on reading
the files and
interviews with
both Bank and
government staff
involved with the
project\.
Page7w para\. 4: Lines 12-13: "Borrower reluctance to use
technical assistance funds limited training programs, civil works supervision, Text amended
and use of consultants"\. This affirmation does not seem to be justified\.
Lines 14-15-16: "overestimated Borrower This comment
:It originates from difficulties related to the normal procedures to be aded infootnote I
capacity" : Itoiiae rmdfiute eae otenra rcdrst e (evaluative
followed by the public sector\. summary)\.
PageJ8- para\. 6\. Lines 10-11-12-13: "many centers were The same
underutilized and overstaffed; bureaucratic inefficiencies caused long delays in observations e
made in the PCP,
the payment of staff salaries\." "equipping of health posts was very slow\.": para\. 5\.18\.
these are very disparaging affirmations\.
Lines 14-15: "Most importantly the ONPFP, a This view cross-
well-staffed and well-funded vertical program \.": It is in fact due to an absence referenced in
footnote 2
of implementation so as to build up teams able to provide the integrated services\. (evaluative
summary)\.
Page-9 para\. 9: lines 4-5: "\.though issue remain regarding
efficiency and quality" : how can we bring this non justified judgment in the Text amended\.
presence of the possible results recorded?
Pagg9a lessons and conclusion: a) line 13-14:
"Instead, antagonism quickly arose from the perception that the integration was Text amended
being imposed"\. This is a pejorative judgment\.
Page 10: d) lines 11-12: "the Bank overestimated the
procurement capacity of the MOPH\." is it the capacity of administration of the This view cross-
MOPH or the necessity to respect the administrative procedures in effect\. referenced in
footnote 4
(evaluative
summary) and
footnote 25 (text)\.
Annex 3 46
This view cross-
e) lines 15-16: "Projects of massive scope and scale referenced in
seeking to attain complex objectives simultaneously should be avoided in favor footnoteie
of a series of simpler, phased efforts": The scope of the project is not the main summary) and
handicap if a good program of continuous evaluation is established, using all the footnote 26 (text)\.
components of the project during its execution, to intervene on time in order to
make the necessary correctives\.
Text amended\.
Page 11: para\. 1\.3: lines 17-18-19-20: "Relations with the
MOPH, however, were never smooth because of an unclear institutional division
of labor in the population sector and the equally unclear status of family
planning personnel borrowed from the MOPH\.": This is a very disparaging
judgment\.
Page Ie para\. 1\.8: lines 11-12-13-14-15 "\.abandoned its
institutional interest in the ONPFP\.In the atmosphere of tension that gradually
developed between the MOPH and ONPFP\." The report insisted on this aspect
without trying to go in depth in the analysis\.
Page 13 para\. 1\.10: lines 12-13 "The ONPFP opposed Text amended
integration and was supported by USAID and UNFPA\." : disparaging judgment\.
Text amended
Page 14a para\. 1\.12: lines 9-10-11-12 "\. three key donors
disagreed on the issue, and relations between the operating agencies in Tunisia
were contentious at best" : disparaging judgment\.
Page 17: para\. 2\.6 Monastir instead of "Mogadir"\. Translation error
corrected\.
Pare 19: para\. 3\.1: lines 9 to 15: "After 1984, project This view cross-
Eag~19\.par\. 31 chnge wihinthe OPH \.the referenced in
implementation was hampered by political changes within the MOPH\.the eonc(text)\.
general economic crisis\.": refer to point I of the observations\.
Page 19 para\. 3\.2: lines 11-12: "\.the MOPH's reluctance to use This comment
project funds earmarked for technical assistance\.": it is rather due to difficulties added in footnote 7
related to the procedures for the recruitment of the consultants that are applied in (text)\.
the country\.
Page 21: para\. 3\.8: lines 7-8 "This project, the Second Health Text adjusted
and Population project, was appraised in December 1994\." In fact it is accordingly\.
December 1984\.
47 Annex 3
Page 23: para\. 3\.13: last paragraph: "It is evident that there have Ibis sentence was a
been major differences of opinion, to the point of animosity\." disparaging quoteo ma
judgment\. memo dated
2/27/84\.
Page 24: para\. 3\.16: many centers were underutilized and The same
overstaffed; bureaucratic inefficiencies caused long delays in the payment of observation was
staff salaries with attendant loss of morale\."very disparaging affirmations\. para\. 5\.18\.
Page 25: para\. 3\.20: table 3\.2: the data concerning the proportion Text adjusted in
of basic health centers that offer prenatal and family planning consultations footnote 18 (text)\.
concern the sample of basic health centers chosen for this survey\. It is to be
noted that the data concerning all the structures are available at the Directorate
of Basic Health Services (DBHS)\. In 1993, 78% of the structures offered these
activities\. Likewise, it is possible to calculate these rates for the structures built
within the framework of the project\.
Page 26: para\. 3\.21: concerning the table 3\.3, the proportion of Table 3\.3 amended
basic health centers where family planning consultations were offered by a
midwife in 1993 were 16% in B6jA and not 1%\.
Note: As noted
Hoping that you will take into consideration, during the revision of the above, to the extent
that it was feasible,
preliminary version of the report, the above comments, OED has taken into
account the
Sincerely, borrowers'
comments\. Some
adjustments to the
text have been
The Minister of Public Health made; however, in
other cases,
changes could not
Signed Dr\. H6di MHENNI be made as OED
feels that we are
reporting facts and
our best judgment
based on our
review of the
project\.

MAP SECTION

-I, TET RAS DJEBEL
E T, E-
Di ANE MENZEt S
-37» ~MATEu BOURGulB TIQUE 5EL AOUAIRIA 3\.
-37 - NEF
i HABET\.
NI1
OBE J BOUR
lA 0 DRAHA AMDOUN Tu MMAJAF NA BEILU MENZIL
EJA Â 50IMAN TEMIME
JE DOUB\.3 ME NZE BOUYELfA
BOLUSALE ED Et B ATGRIOMBANA
TEST B\. KRBA
PARJECT B
E ZAGHO AN NASEUJ
S g GH MAO , A AD HAMAE
SA1T NEBEUL A u Z G FASO U A N NAMAE
YO SSEF 6,/11
5 i A N A
LEKEF 51UANAdADOURoEN CDAVill
E FdSERS1al 36-
TAD\.EOUIN E DAHMAIN SBIKH KIA
KSOURI S- SOUSSE
M94C\.AR EL \.MONAST IR
KALAAT OUJSSELTIA KAI A' KSAR HELLAL
ESENA -K A R O U A N M AKEN BOULGA
R- HAFFOUZ2 - DE
(HAEA - -\. M A TIR ,
---- MAHDIA
u t K A S S E R l N E BOU i A KSOUR-E55AF
HEEtNASR
AUN ALLAH DJM -HEBBA
\., CHOUR
5BEIIL E L
KA55ERiNE ENC\.A
"SID' O, tIJliD, DjENMANA 5,
FEIN S1 D 1 81 U1Z D /PmZEt 1AKER
\.I5DI Ali BEN AOUN R S F A X
(!EN KHAL1IFA
E Z iO MAFHARES
 , oe GAF--
METLAou, EtLUETAR
PEDEYEFES-SEKHIRA
G A F S A
T\.11\.R EIG\.IH MEIHOUJIAOUTS K
NE ZEU DEAC GABES HUTSU
\. NFAEl HAMMA 4
ID o ADJIM
K EBI L1 DJORF
MAIMATA ZARIS5
DOUZ
TUNISIA
HEALTH AND POPULATION MEDENINE
PROJECT KEDCEE
33'Project Area GHOUIMRA55 R NE33 J-
- - -- Medical Region Boundarnesl~N
Health Education Centers 11NUN
Medical Schools
Paramedical Schools to be RemodeIied M E D E N I N E
Under he ProjectIUs
0 Medical Region& Capitals
S Goverinoratte Capitals A F R l C A
Governorare Boundaries
P~vd Roads Q
Earth and Grovel Roads
Ra\.lways 0 REMADA
Poirts
International Airportsr , ,,, , ,
Salt Lakes m cn\.,a\.i,\.d,o
-37\. R~vrs reeo,aos ee m
--International Boundaries 0 , 0 , 40 80 , 0 -o-p2"""\.'f'2J 'f'"
KI1LOM E TE RSpy e eige ltso


 | APPROVAL |
P104943 | Page 1
INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS DATASHEET
APPRAISAL STAGE
I\. Basic Information
Date prepared/updated: 06/06/2008
Report No\.: AC3723
1\. Basic Project Data
Country: Uganda
Project ID: P104943
Project Name: OBA in Kampala - Water Connections for the Poor
Task Team Leader: Yogita Mumssen
Estimated Appraisal Date: September 25,
2007
Estimated Board Date: May 1, 2008
Managing Unit: GPOBA
Lending Instrument: Specific Investment
Loan
Sector: Water supply (100%)
Theme: Access to urban services and housing (P)
SPF Amount (US$m):
0\.00
GEF Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
PCF Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
Other financing amounts by source:
Borrower
0\.00
Global Partnership on Output-based Aid
3\.00
3\.00
Environmental Category: B - Partial Assessment
Simplified Processing
Simple []
Repeater []
Is this project processed under OP 8\.50 (Emergency Recovery)
or OP 8\.00 (Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies)
Yes [ ]
No [X]
2\. Project Objectives
The Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid (GPOBA), a multi-donor trust fund
(program) administered by the World Bank, will fund an output-based aid (OBA) scheme
for Kampalas urban water supply and sanitation sector\. The scheme will be
implemented by Ugandas National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC), also the
grant recipient\. The project will provide yard tap and public water point (PWP)
connections to Kampalas urban poor using performance-based subsidies, whereby
NWSC will pre-finance the connections, and once the connections are independently
verified to be working, of appropriate quality, and targeted to the poor, then GPOBA will
disburse payments to NWSC\. The OBA scheme will provide for a one off connection
payment (subsidy) to partly defray the costs of making these new metered connections\.
This is an important pilot for OBA, as it is being conducted with a purely (100%
government-owned) public utility, and is therefore particularly innovative, and hopefully
will provide interesting lessons for future replication\.
3\. Project Description
The project aims to provide subsidized connections to the existing water supply network
to poor households living in the slums and poor peri-urban areas in and around Kampala\.
Page 2
The type of targeting is to be done by areas (i\.e\. geographic)\. Further, the project will
only subsidize outdoor yard taps and public water points, which the poor are more likely
to use (and the non-poor not as likely to use)\.
The total project envisages making about 20,000 new connections over a four-year
period\. Of these connections, about 19,000 will be yard taps\.
As part of the projects implementation, an Urban Pro-Poor Unit has been set upto
coordinate effective implementation of services in low income areas\. This unit is
specialized in dealing with the poor, and will help ensure that appropriate capacity is
provided regarding: demand management; payment of bills; sanitation, health and
hygiene considerations; etc\. NWSC will be responsible for ensure that all fiduciary
aspects of the project are met, including the environment and social requirements
outlined in the ESMF and RPF\.
In addition, an impact evaluation will be undertaken to determine the actual health,
education, and income benefits of the project, to be funded separately by GPOBA\.
4\. Project Location and salient physical characteristics relevant to the safeguard
analysis
This project will involve extensions from the existing piped network in Kampala, into the
poorest parts of Kampala\. The project will not fund the extension of any primary and
secondary networks, as for the most part these already exist: the project areas were
selected based on where there are existing networks\. Production capacity is sufficient,
especially given the recent completion of the GABA3 water treatment facility, which was
developed prior to and regardless of this GPOBA pilot being undertaken\.
As described above, as part of the project's implementation, an Urban Pro-Poor Unit has
been set up within NWSC to coordinate effective implementation of services in low
income areas\. This unit is specialized in dealing with the poor, and will help ensure that
appropriate capacity is provided regarding: demand management; payment of bills;
sanitation, health and hygiene considerations, etc\. NWSC will also be responsible for
ensuring that all fiduciary requirements (especially environment and social safeguards
aspects) of the project are met in the approval, contracting, and monitoring and in
accordance with the procedures outlined in the ESMF and RPF\.
5\. Environmental and Social Safeguards Specialists
Ms Kristine Schwebach (AFTCS)
Page 3
6\. Safeguard Policies Triggered
Yes No
Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4\.01)
X
Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4\.04)
X
Forests (OP/BP 4\.36)
X
Pest Management (OP 4\.09)
X
Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4\.11)
X
Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4\.10)
X
Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4\.12)
X
Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4\.37)
X
Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP
7\.50)
X
Projects in Disputed Areas (OP/BP 7\.60)
X
II\. Key Safeguard Policy Issues and Their Management
A\. Summary of Key Safeguard Issues
1\. Describe any safeguard issues and impacts associated with the proposed project\.
Identify and describe any potential large scale, significant and/or irreversible impacts:
OP/BP 4\.01 and OP/BP 4\.12 were triggered by the project, although in both cases, the
risk was seen as minimal, and existing procedures used by the highly reputed NWSC
were seen as adequate to meet the safeguards requirements\.
Environmental Assessment
No potential large scale, significant or irreversible impacts are expected\. The main
safeguard issue with regards to OP/BP 4\.01 was construction/site location impacts\.
Therefore detailed
and existing construction guidelines are provided in the ESMF
report\. The construction guidelines describe how to deal with many aspects of
environmental safeguards, including (but not limited to):
Site establishment and management (pollution and noise control, hazardous
chemicals, soil erosion, traffic management,)
house-keeping,
fire-risk and burning,
destruction of plants and trees,
disturbance of animals,
control of damage to soil or water,
worker safety, and
drinking water quality\.
Social Assessment
Involuntary resettlement is not expected to be associated with this project\. For public
water points, all connections will be made in local public spaces in the form of public
water points, with the consent of communities after community consultation has taken
place\. In the case of yard taps, connections will only be made if the connection is
demanded by the household who will be responsible for paying the bills for the water
supplied\. Therefore the project is purely demand driven\.
Page 4
However, there may be temporary disruption to household activities, and in some cases
there may be property damage\. Therefore, an RPF was requested, and prepared by the
Recipient\. The Recipient will use well tested and locally appropriate procedures that are
already in place\. The Urban Pro-Poor Unit will ensure that the potential beneficiaries are
well apprised of their rights, and are able to achieve maximum benefit from this GPOBA-
funded project\.
2\. Describe any potential indirect and/or long term impacts due to anticipated future
activities in the project area:
Environmental
As described above, the main adverse impacts may occur only dueto
mismanagement during construction period\. The ESMF provides Construction
Guidelines for the project to follow\. These are the normal construction guidelines
followed by the National Water and Sewerage Corporation for all of its donor-funded
projects\.
Social No land acquisition is expected, and as all of the connections are external yard
taps or public water points, which either the household must demand (in the case of yard
taps) or the community must agree to (in the case of PWPs), involuntary land acquisition
is not expected under any circumstance\. Nevertheless, as there may be some occasions of
temporary disruption, NWSC will use its normal course of action to inform, discuss and
compensate those affected, as described in the RPF\. This is normal NWSC policy, and is
well-documented and inclusive\.
3\. Describe any project alternatives (if relevant) considered to help avoid or minimize
adverse impacts\.
N/A
4\. Describe measures taken by the borrower to address safeguard policy issues\. Provide
an assessment of borrower capacity to plan and implement the measures described\.
The construction guidelines (included as part of the ESMF) used by the Recipient are
extensive, and describe how to deal with many aspects of environmental safeguards,
including (but not limited to):
Site establishment and management (pollution and noise control, hazardous
chemicals, soil erosion, traffic management,)
house-keeping,
fire-risk and burning,
destruction of plants and trees,
disturbance of animals,
control of damage to soil or water,
worker safety, and
drinking water quality\.
The RPF clearly explains the extensive existing policy on how any claim can be placed
with NWSC regarding property damage or disruption\. There is an well-laid out
procedure to discuss claims, based on local practice, but well documented and structured
Page 5
to ensure proper and fair consultation and compensation\. Claim forms and receipt of
compensation forms are provided as part of the RPF\.
The Recipient has prepared the ESMF and RPF with its own staff and own funds\. The
Recipient has provided detailed information on existing guidelines for construction and
social policies, and included these in the ESMF and RPF\. The Recipient has placed these
reports locally at several prominent locations to ensure maximum disclosure\. The
Recipient is also providing workshops from its own funds to ensure that users are fully-
apprised on the potential benefits of the project, and related health, hygiene and sanitation
issues\.
Further, GPOBA is providing funds for workshops to ensure additional capacity in
terms of sanitation and hygiene to ensure maximum benefit of the water connections, as
well as on the implications of the RPF\.
As described above, as part of the projects implementation, an Urban Pro-Poor Unit has
been set up within NWSC to coordinate effective implementation of services in low
income areas\. This unit is specialized in dealing with the poor, and will help ensure that
appropriate capacity is provided regarding: demand management; payment of bills;
sanitation, health and hygiene considerations; etc\. NWSC will be responsible for ensure
that all fiduciary aspects of the project are met, including the environment and social
requirements outlined in the ESMF and RPF\.
NWSC is regarded as one of the best public utilities in Sub-Saharan Africa, and has very
high capacity\. The Urban Poor Unit is well staffed and highly dedicated to its mission of
ensuring that the poor can benefit from the network water supply, and that the rights and
capacities of the poor are taken well into account in project design and implementation\.
5\. Identify the key stakeholders and describe the mechanisms for consultation and
disclosure on safeguard policies, with an emphasis on potentially affected people\.
1) The National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC) is the national utility
providing water and sewerage services in Ugandas main cities, and is 100%
government-owned\.
2) The Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) is responsible for overall water and
sanitation environment concerns, and sits on the Board of the NWSC\. All NWSC
activities that impact the environment are discussed with the MWE as required under
Ugandan law\.
3) Local communities play a key role in this project, in particular when it comes to
a)
dispute resolution that can be resolved through mediation, and
b)
the establishment of public water points, for their use and management within the
community\.
Page 6
Local communities are usually represented by a community liaison officer or, on a
larger scale, a parish leader\.
4) Households are key to the project, as all yard taps must be owned by a household
that will be responsible for paying the bills\. The project is completely demand driven:
only after a household demands the connection and is able to pay the user connection fee
will a household receive a connection\.
The project beneficiaries the poor households and community leaders themselves are
directly included in the consultation process both prior to the projects implementation,
and throughout the projects implementation\. Most importantly, these beneficiaries will
be consulted long into the future once the project has closed, as this is the role of the
Urban Pro-Poor Unit\.
The project beneficiaries have good access to the safeguard documents, and will be
actively encouraged to attend the workshops funded provided by NWSC and GPOBA\.
B\. Disclosure Requirements Date
Environmental Assessment/Audit/Management Plan/Other:
Was the document disclosed
prior to appraisal?
Yes
Date of receipt by the Bank
11/22/2007
Date of "in-country" disclosure
12/06/2007
Date of submission to InfoShop
11/28/2007
For category A projects, date of distributing the Executive
Summary of the EA to the Executive Directors
Resettlement Action Plan/Framework/Policy Process:
Was the document disclosed
prior to appraisal?
Yes
Date of receipt by the Bank
11/22/2007
Date of "in-country" disclosure
12/06/2007
Date of submission to InfoShop
11/28/2007
Indigenous Peoples Plan/Planning Framework:
Was the document disclosed
prior to appraisal?
Date of receipt by the Bank
Date of "in-country" disclosure
Date of submission to InfoShop
Pest Management Plan:
Was the document disclosed
prior to appraisal?
Date of receipt by the Bank
Date of "in-country" disclosure
Date of submission to InfoShop
*
If the project triggers the Pest Management and/or Physical Cultural Resources,
the respective issues are to be addressed and disclosed as part of the Environmental
Assessment/Audit/or EMP\.
Page 7
If in-country disclosure of any of the above documents is not expected, please
explain why:
C\. Compliance Monitoring Indicators at the Corporate Level (to be filled in when the
ISDS is finalized by the project decision meeting)
OP/BP/GP 4\.01 - Environment Assessment
Does the project require a stand-alone EA (including EMP) report?
Yes
If yes, then did the Regional Environment Unit or Sector Manager (SM)
review and approve the EA report?
Yes
Are the cost and the accountabilities for the EMP incorporated in the
credit/loan?
Yes
OP/BP 4\.12 - Involuntary Resettlement
Has a resettlement plan/abbreviated plan/policy framework/process
framework (as appropriate) been prepared?
Yes
If yes, then did the Regional unit responsible for safeguards or Sector
Manager review the plan?
Yes
The World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information
Have relevant safeguard policies documents been sent to the World Bank's
Infoshop?
Yes
Have relevant documents been disclosed in-country in a public place in a
form and language that are understandable and accessible to project-affected
groups and local NGOs?
Yes
All Safeguard Policies
Have satisfactory calendar, budget and clear institutional responsibilities
been prepared for the implementation of measures related to safeguard
policies?
Yes
Have costs related to safeguard policy measures been included in the project
cost?
Yes
Does the Monitoring and Evaluation system of the project include the
monitoring of safeguard impacts and measures related to safeguard policies?
Yes
Have satisfactory implementation arrangements been agreed with the
borrower and the same been adequately reflected in the project legal
documents?
Yes
Page 8
D\. Approvals
Signed and submitted by:
Name
Date
Task Team Leader:
Ms Yogita Mumssen
01/22/2008
Environmental Specialist:
Ms Kristine Schwebach
01/22/2008
Social Development Specialist
Ms Kristine Schwebach
01/22/2008
Additional Environmental and/or
Social Development Specialist(s):
Approved by:
Regional Safeguards Coordinator:
Mr Warren Waters
01/22/2008
Comments:
Sector Manager:
Ms Patricia Veevers-Carter
01/22/2008
Comments: | APPROVAL |
P007937 | *R E S T R I C T E D
F'L aPpy R e p or t N o\. P-153a
This report was prepared for use within the Bank\. In making it
available to others, the Bank assumes no responsibility to them for
the accuracy or completeness of the information contained herein\.
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
MEMORANDUM ON A
LOAN OF $15 MILLION TO THE PERUVIAN CORPORATION
FOR THE REHABILITATION
-OF THE CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN RAILWAYS
(GUARANTEED BY THE REPUBLIC OF PERU)
March 24, 1958
Department of Operations
Western Hemisphere
i
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
MEMORANDUM ON A
LOAN OF $15 MILLION TO THE PERUVIAN CORPORATION
FOR THE REHABILITATION OF THE CENTPAL & SOUTHERN RAILWAYS
(GUARANTEED BY THE REPUBLIC OF PERU)
PART I - HISTORICAL
1\. The Corporation was incorporated in England in 1890 and since
that dat-e has operated, inter alia, the Central Railway of Peru Limited
and the Southern Railway of Peru Limited\. In 1928, the Republic of
Peru granted the Corporation the perpetual ownership of these two rail-
ways\. For the greater part of its existence, the Corporation has been
in financial difficulties and substantial amounts had accrued in arrears
of interest due to the Debenture Holders\.
2\. In February 1956, a capital reconstruction scheme was put into
effect whereby the Corporation became the wholly owned subsidiary of
the Peruvian Transport Corporation Limited, a new company incorporated
in Canada, In May 1956, the Peruvian Corporation and its subsidiaries
moved their residence from England to Canada, with a consequent saving
of taxes\. The reorganization by simplifying the Corporation's capital
structure enabled it to raise additional capital\.
3\. A leading part in the capital reconstruction of the company was
played by the firm of S\.G\. Warburg and Company Limited of London, England\.
In February 1956, a member of the firm visited the Bank to discuss
informally the possibility of the Bank financing a rehabilitation pro-
gram for the Central and Southern Railways\.
4\. In April 1956, the Corporation engaged engineering consultants
to study and report on the requirements and prospects of the Southern
and Central Railways\. In August 1956, before the consultants! report
could be completed, traffic conditions became very congested on the
Southern Railway due to large grain shipments sent by the United States
Government to relieve the famine caused by severe droughts in the Puno
and Cuzco areas in Peru, After consulting with the Bank, the Corpora-
tion applied for and received from the Export Import Bank, a loan of
$1,550,000 to cover the cost of three twin-unit diesel electric
locomotives to combat these emergency conditions\.
5\. iThe report of the engineering consultants was presented to the
Bank in December 1956, and after suggestions from the Bank, a revised
report was completed in March 1957\. Thereafter a Bank Mission visited
Peru in March and April\. Technical discussions with the Manager of the
Id
A4
_2_
Southern Railway and the Manager of the Central Railway, together with
representatives of S\.G\. Warburg and the Chairman of the Corporation,
were held in Washington in August and September\.
6\. Nerotiations took place in September and October with 1Hr\. Korner,
a Director of S\.G\. Warburg, Mr\. Grierson and Mr\. Williaim White repres-
enting the Corporation\. A Bank Mission visited Peru in November to
negotiate the Guarantee Agreement and other financial arrangements wfith
the Peruv-ian\. Govrernment\. Legislation enabling the Peruvian Government
to sign the Guarantee Agreement was promulgated in kiarch 1958\.
7\. rn the proposed loan is made it would increase the total amount
of Bank loans in Peru to 8r55\.9 million equivalent net of cancellation\.
PART II - DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED LOAN
8\. The proposed loan would finance a substantial part of the foreign
exchange cost of a rehabilitation program for the Southern and Central
Railways uf Peru\. Purchases under the proposed loan would include diesel
locomotives, shunters and spare parts, freight cars, rails and
accessoriss, station handling equipment and equipment to deal with
derailmens3 and wrecks\.
9\. The Loan would have the following characteristics:
Borrower : The Peruvian Corporation Limited
Guarantor :The Republic of Peru
Amount : The equivalent, in various currencies of
$15,000,000\.
Tern :The Loan would be for a period of 15 years,
amortized by semi-annual instalments from
February 15, 1961 to February 15, 1973\.
Interest Rate :5-1/2 per cent per annum, including 1 per
cent commission\.
Commitment :3/4 of 1 per cent per annum\.
Charge
Legal Instruments and Security
10\. Attached are drafts of the following legal instruments which would
give effect to the proposed loan:
(a) Loan Agreement between the Bank and Peruvian Corporation
Limited (No\.l)\.
4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-3-
(b) Guarantee Agreement between Republic of Peru (the
Guarantor) and the Bank (No\.2)\.
11\. The draft Loan Agreement conforms generally to the normal pattern
of the Bank's Loan Agreements\. Attention is specifically drawn to the
following provisions:
(a' The Bank is to receive, as security for the loan, a first
mortgage upon the immovable and movable properties comorised in
the Central and Southern Railways\. The Borrower is to be at
liberty, however, to create similar and pari passu mortgages in
favor of the Export-Import Bank to secure the Borrower's indebted-
ness to the latter\. Also, the Borrower may create similar but
Junior mortgages in favor of the Banco Industrial del Peru as
r3presenting the Guarantor, by way of indemnity to the latter
against liabilities under its guarantee (Section 5\.04)\.
(b) The Borrower and its subsidiaries are precluded from dispos-
ing of any property having a value in excess of $100,000, or the
equivalent, in any period of twelve months, unless the Bank shall
otherwise agree (Section 5\.10)\.
(c) Unless the Bank shall otherwise agree, the future borrowings
of the Borrower and its subsidiaries must be in the ordinary course
of business and may not exceed $\.500,000, or the equivalent (exclus-
ive of inter-grouD borrow-ings), (Section 5\.11)\.
(d) Payments by the Borrower to its parent company, the Peruvian
Transport Corporation Limited, may be made only under certain
specified conditions -which are designed to ensure that the Borrower
retains adequate surplus and working capital\. Nevertheless, the
Borrower may pay its parent company during the period ending June
30, 1960 sums aggregating $1,323,000 to enable it to service the
parent Company's own debentures (Sections 5\.12 and 5\.13)\.
(e) Additional conditions of effectiveness include the completion
of the security arrangements, the completion of the i4ortgage, the
completion of arrangements between the Borrower and its parent
company regarding their financial arrangements and the completion
of an agreement between the Guarantor and the Borrower regarding
railway tariffs\. (Section 7\.01)\.
12\. The Guarantee Agreement is similar, in substance, to previous
Guarantee Agreements given by the Republic of Peru\. Since the Borrower
is a private corporation, the guarantee would extend only to the payment
of principal, interest and other charges\. In addition, the Agreement
contains a covenant regarding the timely adjustment of railway tariffs
(Section 3\.06)\.
A
-4 -
PART III - APPRAISAL OF THE PROPOSED LOAN
13\. A detailed appraisal of the project, T\.O\. 154 (a) (No\.3) is
attached,
14\. The Central and Southern Railwjays are two distinct and separate
systems\. Together they represent more than two-thirds of Peru's
present railway transportation system and their efficient operation is
necessary to the economic development of the important regions which
they serve\.
15\. The Central Railway links the capital, Lima, and the nearby
Port of Callao (Peru's chief port) with the Sierra (highlands)\. Its
most important function is the carrying of refined metals, ores and
concent:ates from the Sierra to the Port of Callao for export, and
bringirnJ back supplies for the mining companies, such as fuel and
cement\. Forty per cent of Peru's foreign exchange earnings are derived
from the export of minerals\. The major part of such exports are
carried by this railway\. The remainder of the Central's traffic con-
sists of agricultural produce brought from the Sierra to Lima, and
petroleum products, manufactured goods and foodstuffs destined for the
Sierra\. Since agricultural production on the coast is limited by the
small amount of water available, the Lima area will have to look more
and more to the Sierra for the foodstuffs needed to supply its growing
industrial population\.
160 The Southern Railway links the populated southern highlands of
Peru,including Peru's second largest city, Arequipa, with the Port of
Mollendo and by a separate spur line with the Port of Matarani\. A
link with landlocked Bolivia is also provided by means of steamer
service across Lake Titicaca and rail service from Guaqui (in Bolivia)
to La Paz, the Capital, both services being operated by the Corporation\.
17\. Traffic carried by the Southern Railway is much more diversi-
fied in character than that carried by the Central Railway, the greater
nart consisting of general merchandise moving both ways for destinations
in Peru\. A considerable part of the traffic carried is general
merchandise to Bolivia, and minerals from Bolivia for export through
Peruvian ports\. There are alternative routes for the Bolivian
traffic through the Chilean ports of Arica and Antofagasta, but it is
expected that the Southern Railway will increase its share of Bolivian
traffic\. For traffic destined for points in Peru, there is no
substitute form of surface transportation, as roads have not yet been
constructed which will permit the operation of trucking services\.
Due to the necessity of constructing new roads in many parts of Peru
where there are at present no means of mechanical transportation, it
is unlikely that, for many years to come, roads will be constructed
which would permit substantial truck competition with the Southern
Railway\.
Ii
18\. The prospects of the Central Railway are more uncertain than
those of the Southern Railway\. The Central is more dependent upon
mineral traffic, for Twhich freight rates are tied to the selling price
of the minerals, a large part of which is generated by a single company
(Cerro de Pasco)\. Since there is a road from Lima to the Sierra,
which the Cbvernment is in the process of improving, the Central is
also more likely to encounter serious competition from road transporta-
tion\. This further limits its ability to combat falling revenues or
increasing costs by increasing tariff rates\. However, since the costs
of road transportation are more likely to increase than to decline, it
seems urlikely that road transportation can displace rail transportation
for such commcdities as refined metals, concentrates, ores and bulk
merchandise, provided the railway can furnish an efficient, reliable,
and reasonably-priced service\. The rehabilitation of the Central Rail-
way should enable it to offer such a service\.
19\. The earnings of the railways in recent years have not been
impressive, They increased in 1956, the year the new Board of Directors
took office, but declined in 1957 due to a decline in Cerro de Pascofs
operations (due to labor disputes and to a shortage of power caused by a
drought)\. Failure of the Government to adjust tariffs promptly also
contributed to a fall in the net revenues of both railways\. Howeverv
the Goverm-iment has very recently granted the Southern Railway the full
amount of the tariff increases requested by the Corporation under the
formula set out in Section 3\.06 of the Guarantee Agreement\. If rail-
way tariffs continue to be adjusted by the Government promptly to meet
changing conditions, future earnings should be more satisfactory\. In
this connection, it should be noted that the Technical Operations Depart-
ment Report has allowed for a decline in the projected operating revenues
for 1957/58, as a consequence of the current slump in non-ferrous metals
prices, and only a slow rate of growth thereafter\.
20, Over a period of years, the economies realized from the
rehabilitation program should reduce real costs of both the Central and
Southern Railways, with a substantial savings in the cost of maintenance
of rolling stock\. On balance, there is a reasonable probability that
modest increases in wages and in the price of materials and supplies can
be absorbed by increases in traffic volume and in efficiency and by
adjustments in rates without seriously affecting the competitive position
of either of these two railways\.
Procurement
21\. The Borrower has secured and will secure equipment and supplies
on the basis of international competitive bidding\.
a
Economic Situation
22\. The basic economic prospects of Peru remain favorable\. The
country has developed rapidly since 1949 and the basic conditions for
continuirg advance remain\. The country's exports are well diversi-
fied and should continue to increase\. Industry for home consumption
is developing and the country continues to be regarded as providing
a favorable climate for private foreign investment\.
23\. While the basic economic prospects of Peru remained favorable,
there was a serious deterioration in the financial situation in the
last 18 months\. As inflationary pressures grew, exchange reserves
were reduiced and the need for immediate action in the monetary and
fiscal field became evident\. While remedial actions were not taken
as firmly or as quickly as might have been hoped, the situation is now
being brought under better control\. By permitting the exchange rate
to find its own level, the Peruvian authorities have again demonstrated
their firm intention to have the Peruvian economy live within its means\.
While complete financial stability is not assured, there are good grounds
for expecting that financial instability will not reach the point where
it counteracts the favorable long term trends operating in the
Peruvian economy\.
24\. Service payments on Peru's external debt are high but are
scheduled to fall rapidly and, in view of the countryts economic
prospects, leave a sizeable margin for long-term borrowing provided
short-term credits are undertaken in moderation\.
Expenditures Necessary to Comnlete the Project
25\. The total cost of the project is estimated to be $20\.4 million\.
The balance of the funds necessary to complete the project will be
supplied by the Corporation from its own resources\.
Prospects of Fulfilment of Obligations
26\. The General Managers of each of the railways and their
respective staffs are competent and these two railways have been well
operated in past years\. The new Board of Directors of the Corpora-
tion have decided to give the local management board a full measure of
local autonomy and have agreed to strengthen the local Board, particularly
its ability to handle relations with the Peruvian Government\. The
Corooration has agreed to establish a contingency fund independently
invested to take care of tax and other contingent liabilities\.
-7
27\. In the Guarantee Agreement and in a separate agreement between
the Government and the Corporation, the Government, the rate making
authority, would undertake to adjust railway tariffs to such levels as
will be calculated to cover the CorporaVLon's operating costs, interest
upon all outstanding debt, and a fair return upon the equity\. So that
the Government may be in a position to implement its undertaking as
promptly as possible, the Government has agreed to the establishment of an
independent railway tariff commission to inform appropriate Government
departments of the financial condition of all railways in Peru and to
make recommendations to the Miinister of Development and Public Works who
has the power to fix railway tariffs\. A formal undertaking in this
respect will be signed at the same time as the Loan Documents\.
28\. Given these arrangements on tariffs, and various other provisions,
the Corporation should be able to operate on a sound financial basis
and to meet the service requirements on the Bank loan\. The transfer of
the loan service into foreign exchange should not impose an undue burden
on the Peruvian economy\.
Eugene R\. Black
Washington, D\.C\.
March 25, 1958
j~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
A a
id | APPROVAL |
P154808 | \.
PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
CONCEPT STAGE
Report No\.: PIDA116521
\.
Project Name Jobs and Skills for the Modern Economy (P154808)
Region EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA
Country Uzbekistan
Project ID P154808
Borrower(s) Republic of Uzbekistan
Implementing Agency Ministry of Labour of the Republic of Uzbekistan
Environmental Category B-Partial Assessment
Date PID Prepared/Updated 30-May-2017
Date PID Approved/Disclosed 01-Jun-2017
Estimated Date of Board 14-Dec-2017
Approval
\.
I\. Introduction and Context
Country Context
Uzbekistan has experienced impressive shared growth\. Economic growth outpaced economic growth
in most Europe and Central Asian and OECD countries\. GDP growth averaged 8\.2% per year over the
period 2004â12 according to official statistics, and reached US$56\.8 billion (in 2013, current US$,
World Bank), while GDP per capita grew on average 6\.4% per year over the same period\. Poverty
declined from 27\.5% of the population in 2001 to 15\.0% in 2013\. The Government of Uzbekistan
(GoU) has set itself an ambitious development agenda known as the Vision 2030, which is further
elaborated in the 2017-2021 Development Strategy\. Under the 2017-2021 Government Strategy, the
Government has identified five priority directions for reform including a pillar on economic growth
and liberalization\. The Strategy is aimed at achieving 2030 goals which include lifting 2012 gross
national income per capita from US$1,700 to more than US$4,000, thereby reaching upper middle-
income status\.
Uzbekistanâs economic reform agenda, coupled with the impact of the economic slowdown of its
neighboring countries on migrant labor, are resulting in some emerging socioeconomic challenges that
are critical to be addressed for a sustainable growth and as well as political stability\. These include:
increasing concerns about employment outcomes among youth, women and return migrants, and
therefore their economic and social inclusion; managing the transition from a state-dominated
economy to a private sector-driven economy; and managing the economyâs shift away from
agriculture toward industry and services, and towards more intensive use of modern production
techniques\.
There are increasing concerns about employment outcomes among youth, women and return migrants\.
First, Uzbekistan has a young and growing population\. A quarter of its 31 million population is under
the age of 14, and almost 20 percent of the population is between 15 and 24 years of age\. Therefore,
the country is facing the challenge of creating sufficient and good jobs given the rapidly increasing
Page 1 of 6
labor force which grows by an average of 500,000 people per year\. Second, jobs outcomes among
women are significantly lower than jobs outcomes among men\. Women are underrepresented in
employment, and women are disproportionately represented among unpaid care work\. Third, the
economic slowdown in the Russian Federation has led to decreased remittances from migrant workers
from Uzbekistan\.
GoU is accelerating its transition from a state-dominated toward a private sector-driven, market-based
economy\. This transition from state dominance has become more urgent because of the realization that
Uzbekistanâs public sector will not be able to create the large number of jobs required to meet the
needs of a labor force that is projected to continue increasing until 2040\.
In this context, GoU is putting more effort into supporting the micro, small and medium enterprise
(MSMEs) sector by increasing access to finance, removing the bias against credit provision and
strengthening the skills and entrepreneurial capacity of MSMEs\.
Uzbekistanâs economy is transforming, with a shift away from agriculture toward industry and
services, and towards more intensive use of modern production techniques\. The Governmentâs 2017 â
2021 Development Strategy aims to improve the investment climate and infrastructure, and privatize
and modernize specific sectors\. Implementation of the strategy is expected to result in firms
demanding more workers with higher-order analytical and organizational skills that cannot be easily
automated\. Therefore, Uzbekistanâs challenge will be to build skills for tomorrow's economy in the
face of rapid modernization and change, and to support private sector growth and productivity\. The
engine of sustained long-term growth in a robust economy is a well-skilled workforce that meets the
demands of a dynamic labor market focused on high value-added industries\.
The proposed project aims to support Uzbekistanâs job creation strategy by addressing specific labor
market challenges from both the demand and supply sides\. This will entail: (a) supporting the growth
and productivity of private enterprises, especially the MSMEs where labor intensity is expected to be
higher (more jobs); (b) addressing the skills gap and enhancing skills of job-seekers in order to
enhance their employability in higher wage jobs (better jobs); and (c) ensure inclusiveness of labor
market interventions, especially for youth, women, and return migrants and improving access to labor
information and labor market intermediation services (inclusive jobs)\.
Sectoral and Institutional Context
Uzbekistanâs public sector will not be able to create the large number of jobs required to absorb the
growing population and hence, private sector development and investment are essential for creating
high-productivity, high-paying jobs for its growing population\. This is in turn vital to sustaining
economic growth, reinforcing social stability, and enabling further improvements in the welfare of the
bottom 40 percent households\. Additionally, in the context of an economy undergoing transformation
from agriculture to industry and services, the Government recognizes that improving labor market
matching and skills are important requirements among other reforms to increasing productivity and
maintaining Uzbekistanâs global competitiveness\.
The first challenge in Uzbekistanâs labor market is that of the limited supply of private sector jobs\. A
2014 study shows that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) remain the largest employer (37 percent),
followed by self-employment (34 percent), while private firms provide only about 20 percent of the
employment\. The report also shows that ninety percent of all the self-employed workers interviewed in
the survey work at firms with fewer than six workers, and around 70 percent of all self-employed
individuals do not employ any additional workers\. The GoU is keen to develop and promote growth
of the micro, small and medium enterprise (MSME) sector, as it entails a great potential for job
creation and economic growth\. To develop appropriate interventions in support of MSMEs, it is
Page 2 of 6
important to understand and address the constraints faced by different sizes of MSMEs\.
Constraints for smaller MSMEs include: (i) access to finance due to collateral requirements of 125%
to 150% of loan value, along with the terms of finance â both in high interest rates and short terms of
lending\. While such terms may work for firms engaged in trade with rapid turnaround of inventory,
MSMEs wanting to finance assets or growth struggle to borrow; (ii) smaller MSMEs also face a range
of skills gaps both in general management and financial literacy as well as with respect to technical
skills needed to improve productivity in their field; and (iii) constraints for larger MSMEs include
their ability to comply with standards required in export markets\. These standards may include specific
technical regulations governing how goods are prepared and packaged, requirements for market entry,
and both specific technical and general management skills\. In many sectors, Uzbekistanâs standards
are not harmonized with potential export markets and the required quality infrastructure may not be in
place to help firms meet the standards\.
The second challenge in the labor market is related to relevant skills and information gaps\. Skills gaps
make it hard for firms to find the caliber of employees they need, while information gaps make
matching between worker skills and employer needs difficult and inefficient\. Moreover, there are
limited opportunities for relevant training and re-training for adults in the country\. Uzbekistan uses
vocational training for about 80 percent of its secondary school students, where they receive narrow
and specific training that does not easily support job mobility\. The problem of access to job-oriented
and relevant training opportunities is compounded by the fact that less than one-quarter of all firms
offer their full-time employees formal training programs\. This is less than half the proportion of firms
offering training in Eastern Europe\. In addition, the effectiveness of the public employment centers
(managed by the Ministry of Labor) in providing referrals of job-seekers to job vacancies and skill
upgrading opportunities, as well as registering vacancies and helping employers to fill open positions,
is hindered in many cases by poor infrastructure, low visibility within the community, little outreach to
employers, and lack of provision of counseling and other services to job-seekers\. In addition, some
harder to employ groups (e\.g\. youth, women, returning migrants) appear not to receive specialized
attention at employment centers\.
Relationship to CAS
The project is closely aligned with the strategic objectives of the WBGâs Country Partnership
Framework (CPF) for Uzbekistan for Fiscal Year 2016-2020\. The CPFâs principal objective is to
support the Governmentâs goal of creating productive and sustainable jobs\. The project contributes
specifically to the first focus area of the CPF â private sector growth and job creation\. The project will
contribute to the Governmentâs plan to shift from state-dominated investment and growth to a private-
sector driven growth and job creation, especially focusing on the MSMEs where more jobs are
expected to be generated; it will also support a private-sector led model for delivering the market-
driven skills upgrading needed for higher productivity and growth of private enterprises\. By improving
labor intermediation, targeted outreach, and an incentive structure to reach to vulnerable job-seekers,
the project will also support the inclusion agenda, contributing to an inclusive job market\. The
proposed project is also in line with the Governmentâs priorities, as reflected in the 2017-2021
Development Strategy, with focus on supporting private-sector growth and addressing the skills gap\.
The project is moreover featured in the Governmentâs Directive âOn Measures to Further Expand the
Financial Corporation with the World Bankâ, July 2016\.
\.
II\. Proposed Development Objective(s)
Proposed Development Objective(s) (From PCN)
The proposed project development objective (PDO) is to improve the employment outcomes among
Page 3 of 6
job-seekers; and enhance the capacity of micro, small and medium private enterprises to create jobs\.
More specifically:
(i) Employment outcomes among job-seekers will be improved as evidenced by greater workers
mobility from a lower to higher wage jobs, job security as evidenced by formal employment contracts,
and greater duration in jobs following skills upgrading;
(ii) New jobs will be created by MSMEs that are supported by the project as they expand their
production, and grow within the spectrum of MSMEs sizes\.
Key Results (From PCN)
The project outcome indicators will include:
(i) Rate of job placement of those receiving employability and skills training support (disaggregated
by gender, youth, return migrants);
(ii) Percentage of increase in earnings among those receiving employability and skills training support
(disaggregated by gender, youth, return migrants);
(iii) Satisfaction rate among job-seekers regarding the services provided by the public employment
centers;
(iv) Number of jobs created by the MSMEs borrowing from the MSME Line of Credit (disaggregated
by gender, youth)\.
Further indicators related to employment outcomes, such as workers mobility from lower to higher
wage jobs, job security and duration in jobs following skills upgrading, will be included as the
intermediary outcome indicators in the projectâs results framework\.
\.
III\. Preliminary Description
Concept Description
The proposed project will improve the quality of job outcomes through labor market intermediation
and skills upgrading, as well as facilitate the growth in new job creation among MSMEs\. These will be
achieved through: (i) enhancing the effectiveness of labor market intermediation, including for hard-
to-reach groups, while providing access to and enhancing the effectiveness of skills training that is
responsive to private sector labor demand; and (ii) improving access to financial and non-financial
services by MSMEs, especially those with the potential for creating more and better jobs, and
therefore contribute to higher growth and productivity\. The project design will include features that
ensures gender equity in accessing project-supported labor market opportunities\. An incentive
structure will be developed to encourage PFIs and training providers to target and reach to female-
owned MSMEs and female job-seekers\.
The project will include the following components:
Component 1: Labor market intermediation and skills upgrading\. The component aims to increase
labor productivity and employability by improving job matching and upgrading skills to respond to
employersâ demands\.
Component 2: Financial and non-financial services for MSMEs\. The component aims at addressing
key constraints faced by the MSME sector in their access to financial and non-financial services\.
Component 3: Project Management and Monitoring and Evaluation\.
IV\. Safeguard Policies that Might Apply
Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project Yes No TBD
Page 4 of 6
Environmental Assessment OP/BP 4\.01 X
Natural Habitats OP/BP 4\.04 X
Forests OP/BP 4\.36 X
Pest Management OP 4\.09 X
Physical Cultural Resources OP/BP 4\.11 X
Indigenous Peoples OP/BP 4\.10 X
Involuntary Resettlement OP/BP 4\.12 X
Safety of Dams OP/BP 4\.37 X
Projects on International Waterways OP/BP 7\.50 X
Projects in Disputed Areas OP/BP 7\.60 X
\.
\.
V\. Financing (in USD Million)
Total Project Cost: 100\.00 Total Bank Financing: 100\.00
Financing Gap: 0\.00
Financing Source Amount
International Development Association (IDA) 100\.00
Total 100\.00
\.
\.
VI\. Contact point
\.
\.
World Bank
PHWB
Contact: Afrah Alawi Al-Ahmadi
PHWB
Contact: Christopher David Miller
PHWB
Title: Sr Social Protection Specialis
PHWB
Title: Senior Private Sector Speciali
PHWB
Tel: 458-4158
PHWB
Tel: 5763+157 / 9
PHWB
Email: aalahmadi@worldbank\.org
PHWB
Email: cmiller1@ifc\.org
\.
\.
Borrower/Client/Recipient
PHBORROWERSEC
TION
PHBORROWERSEC
TION
Name: Republic of Uzbekistan
PHBORROWERSEC
Contact:
TION
PHBORROWERSEC
Title:
TION
PHBORROWERSEC
Tel:
TION
Email:
\.
\.
Implementing Agencies
\.
PHIMPLEAGENCYS
ECTION
Name: Ministry of Labour of the Republic of Uzbekistan
Page 5 of 6
PHIMPLEAGENCYS
ECTION
Contact: Aziz Abdukhakimov
PHIMPLEAGENCYS
ECTION
Title: Minister
PHIMPLEAGENCYS
ECTION
Tel: 03712394121
PHIMPLEAGENCYS
ECTION
\.
Email: abdukhakimov@mehnat\.uz
\.
\.
VII\. For more information contact:
\.
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 473-1000
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/projects
Page 6 of 6 | APPROVAL |
P008433 | Document of
¶ The World Bank
FOR OMCiAL USE ONLY
Report No\. 4930
PROJECT COMPLEIION REPORT
THE ELLNIC STATE (GREECE)
FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 1539-GR)
February 10, 1984
a
Education and Manpower Development Division
Europe, Middle East and North Africa Region
documnt arsicteddWb dmay be wed/by recpieu d in the performe of
their ofdical duti s lb IIteots may owthdwise be disdosed without World Bak au}horlzadon\.
FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY
-1!
GLOSSARY
DGP - Directorate General for Programming
DIEP - Directorate of Implementation of Educational
Projects in MOE
KATE - Higher Technical and Vocational Education
Center
KENE - Center for Educational Studies and Advanced
Training of Teachers
KEPE - Center for Planning and Economic Research
KETE - Vocational and Technical Education Center
MOE - Ministry of National Education and Religious
Affairs
PWM - Ministry of Public Works
OSK - Organization for School Buildings
SELETE - School for Teachers of Vocational and
Technical Education
SELME - School for Advanced Training of Secondary
Education Teachers and Officials
Gymnasium - Lover secondary school (Grades 7-9)
Lyceum - Secondary school (Grades 10-12)
I This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of I
their ofrfcl dufis Its contents may not otherwie be dissed without World Bank authorizaon|
THE HELLENIC STATE (GREECE)
FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 1539-GR)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Table of Contents
Page No\.
PREFACE \. i
BASIC DATA SHEET \.i\.i\.,\.
HIIZHIGHTS \. o\. v
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS \. \. \. vii
I\. INTRODUCTION \. I
II\. PROJECT BACKGROUND \. \. 2
Formulation and Objectives of the Project \. 2
The Socio-Economic Background \.k r u\. d\. 3
Project Content \. 4
III\. PROJECT PLEMENTAMN \. \. \. \. 5
Overview \. 5
Project Management Performance \. 6
Sites \. \. 6
Design \. \. 6
Interim Measures \. \. \. 7
Furniture and Equipment \. \. 7
Covenants \. 8
Bauk Performance \. \. \. \. 8
IV\. PROJECT COST AND FINANCING \. \. 9
Capital Cost \. 9
Disbursements \. \.11
\.
Table of Contents (Cont'd\.)
Page No\.
TABLES:
Table 1 - Project Breakdown by Cost \. \. 4
Table 2 - Project Breakdown by Type of Institution \. 4
Table 3 - Estimated Project Costs by Categories \. 9
Table 4 - Estimated Area Per Student Place \. 10
Table 5 - Estimated Cost Per Student Place \. \. 11
Table 6 - Planned Disbursements \. \. \. \. \. 11
CHARTS AND ANNEXES:
Chart 1 - Estimated and Actual Implementation and Disbursements \. 13
Chart 2 - Administrative Arrangements for Project Implementation \. 14
Annex 1 - Gross Floor Areas \. 15
Annex 2 - Compliance with Loan Covenants \. 16
Annex 3 - Administrative Arrangements for Project Implementation \. 17
Annex 4 - Administrative Modifications in Second and Third
Education Projects \. 20
Annex 5 - Estimated Project Costs \. 21
\.
THE HELLENIC STATE (GREECE)
FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 1539-GR)
PROJECT CONPLETION REPORT
PREFACE
This is a completion report of the Fourth Education Project in Greece
(Loan 1539-GR) for which a loan of US$60\.0 million was extended to the
Hellenic State in April 1978\. No disbursements were made and the Loan was
cancelled as of the original Closing Date of December 31, 1982\.
The Operations Evaluation Department decided not to audit the project
and sent the Project Completion Report to the Borrower and its agencies for
comment in September 1983\. No comments have been received from the Borrower\.
- ii -
THE HELLENIC STATE (GREECE)
FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 1539-GR)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
BASIC DATA SHEET
A\. KEY PROJECT DATA
Appraisal Current
Item Estimate Estimate
Total Project Cost (US$ million) 123\.5 190\.8
Overrun (Z) - 54Z
Loan Amount (US$ million) 60\.0 60\.0
Disbursed 60\.0 0\.0
Cancelled - 60\.0
Date Physical Components Completed 03/82 03/87
Months Since Loan Signing 47 107
Proportion Completed by Above Date (Z) 100% 0%
Proportion of Time Overrun (x) - 128Z
Institutional Performance Good Unsatisfactory
Comparison of Actual and Estimated Cumulative
Disbursements (US$ million)
FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83
Appraisal Estimate 0\.00 1\.50 21\.00 56\.00 60\.00
Actual Disbursement 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
Actual as % of Estimate 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
B\. OTHER PROJECT DATA
Original
Item Plan Revisions Actual
First Mention in Files or Timetable - - 05/76
Government's Appiication -- -- 10/76
Negotiations 02/78 02/78
Board Approval 04/78 03/78
Loan Agreement Date 06/78 04/78
Effectiveness Date 10/78 12/78;05/79; 09/80
11/79;05/80;
10/80
Closing Date 12/82 12/82
Borrower The Hellenic State (Greece)
Executing Agency The Ministry of National Education
and Religious Affairs
Fiscal Year of Borrower January 1 - December 31
Follow-on Project Name: None
- iii -
THE HELLENIC STATE (GREECE)
FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 1539-GR)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
BASIC DATA SHEET
C\. MISSION DATA
Sent No\. of No\. of No\. of Date of
Mission By Date Weeks Persons Manweeks Report
Reconnaissance I Bank 05/76 1\.5 1(a) 1\.5 06/08/76
Reconnaissance II Bank 10/76 1\.5 l(a) 1\.5 12/29/76
Preparation Bank 02/77 2\.0 2(a;d) 4\.0 03/18/77
Appraisal Bank 05-06/77 4\.0 4(c;d;e; 16\.0 10/17/77
f)
Post-Appraisal Bank 11/77 1\.5 2(a;c) 3\.0 11/11/77
Pre-Negotiation Bank 01/78 1\.0 l(b) 1\.0 01/26/78
27\.0
Supervision I Bank 05/78 1\.5 1(c) 1\.5 06/15/78
Supervision II Bank 07/78 1\.0 2(b;c) 2\.0 08/24/78
Supervision III Bank 01/79 1\.5 l(b) 1\.5 01/19/79
Supervision IV Bank 01/79 1\.0 1(g) 1\.0 03/06/79
Supervision V Bank 05/79 1\.5 2(a;c) 3\.0 07/18/79
Supervision VI Bank 11/79 2\.5 2(c;d) 5\.0 01/18/80
Supervision VII Bank 05-06/80 2\.5 2(c;c) 5\.0 07/08/80
Supervision VIII Bank 10/80 1\.0 2(c;e) 2\.0 12/02/80
Supervision IX Bank 07/81 1\.5 3(c;c;d) 4\.5 08/21/81
Supervision X Bank 12/81 1\.5 2(c) 3\.0 01/29/82
Supervision XI Bank 05/82 1\.0 l(c) 1\.0 07/22/82
Supervision XII Bank 09-10/82 1\.5 2(c;d) 3\.0 12/07/82
32\.5
a: educational planner
b: facilities planner
c: architect
d: technical educator
e; general educator
f; economist
g: controller
- iv -
THE HELLENIC STATE (GREECE)
FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 1539-GR)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
BASIC DATA SHEET
D\. LOAN ALLOCATION AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS
Original Revised Actual
Type of Expenditure Allocation Allocation Disbursements
~~--(US$Million)- ----
Civil Works 18\.3 0\.0
Furniture 2\.2 - 0\.0
Equipment 35\.5 0\.0
Unallocated 4\.0 0\.0
Total 60\.0 0\.0
E\. CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATES
Name of Currency (Abbreviation) Drachma (Dr\.)
Appraisal Year (1978) US$1\.00 = Dr\. 36\.70
Intervening Years' Average US$1\.00 = Dr\. 50\.40
Completion Year (1983) US$1\.00 = Dr\. 84\.00
-v
THE HELLENIC STATE (GCEECE)
FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 1539-GR)
PROJECT OOIPLETION REPORT
HIGHLIGHTS
1\. The Fourth Education Project (Loan 1539-GR) was intended as the
culmination of the Bank's efforts to assist in modernizing and expanding the
Greek education system, to make it a more effective instrument for economic
development\. It was intended to respond to specific manpower needs of the
economy in priority sub-sectors not completely covered by previous projects,
with a heavy emphasis upon the industrial sector which was expected to
become particularly important on the eve of Greece's entry into the European
Economic Community (EEC) (para\. 2\.05)\. During project identification,
preparation and appraisal, a basic defect in the formal education system in
Greece was seen as the over-emphasis upon traditional academic studies in
the secondary schools\. The major aim of the education development strategy
was to reform the system through strengthening the teaching in science and
vocational subjects and, in general, improving the quality of technical and
vocational education (para\. 2\.03)\. The enactment of Law 576 of 1977
covering these reforms was speeded up as project appraisal was made
conditional upon its passage (para\. 2\.02)\. The project assisted withz
(a) extension of a new upper secondary level program of vocational and
technical education (KETE);
(b) expansion of the network of post-secondary technical and vocational
institutes (KATE) initiated under the first project and further
extended under the third;
(c) expansion of science and vocational subjects in the lower secondary
school (gymnasium); and
(d) advanced training of secondary education teachers and officials via
a new, specialized institute (SELME)\.
2\. The loan of US$60\.0 million (Loan 1539-GR) was approved in March
1978, to assist with (a) the design, construction, furnishing and equipping
for ten KETEs, four KATEs, and one SELME, (b) provision of instructional
equipment for 40 existing gymnasia and 21 gymnasia under construction\.
3\. The Ministry of National Education and Religious Affairs' (MOE)
Directorate General for Programing (DGP), assisted by the Directorate of
Implementation of Educational Projects (DIEP), was given the overall
responsibility for implementing all components of the project, which was
complex and geographically scattered, involving some 76 different
institutions throughout the country (para\. 3\.03)\. The project was to be
completed by June 1982\. However, due to the two year delay in ratification
of the Loan Agreement by Parliament (which required five postponements of
- vi -
the Loan effectiveness date), frequent government changes and institutional
weaknesses, no construction had begun by the Closing Date (paras\. 3\.04-05)\.
However, the MOE proceeded with initiating KATE and KETE programs at the
project locations in temporary premises\. In 1980/81 the enrollments in the
KATEs were 2,050 and KETEs 29,600 (para\. 3\.12)\.
4\. By the original Closing Date (December 31, 1982), none of the Loan
proceeds (US$60\.0 million) had been disbursed and the Bank cancelled,
effective December 31, 1982, the entire Loan amount (para\. 4\.06)\. Despite
this poor physical implementation record, certain aspects of the project
were successful, notably: (a) the general acceptance of the KATEs and KETEs
into the formal education system in Greece with their valuable contribution,
through improving the quality of technical and vocational education, to
industrial development (para\. 1\.03); (b) the development of SELME, thus
contributing to modernizing and improving teaching and administration in
secondary education (para\. 1\.03); (c) the development of functional and
economic architectural designs for the 15 new educational institutions,
including sets of contract documents for each (paras\. 3\.08-11); (d) the
preparation of furniture and equipment lists, specifications and contract
documents for all 76 project institutions (para\. 3\.14); and (e) the
institution development of the MOE's implementation agencies; i\.e\. the
Organization for School Buildings (OSK) and DIEP were reorganized and
strengthened in the last year of the project implementation cycle (para\.
3\.11)\. The designs and the contract documents prepared with Bank technical
assistance should help the Government implement the project which it is
committed to do with its own funds\.
- vii -
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A Bank Loan (Loan 1539-CR) for US$60\.0 million was extended to the
Hellenic State (Greece) in 1978 to assist the Government in completing all
of its educational reforms, in particular improving the quality of
vocational and technical education across a broad spectrum of levels and
types of institutions in order to meet the demand for vocational and
technical manpower that became approved with the proposed entry of Greece
into the European Economic Community\.
ii\. The Loan provided financing for the construction and equipping of;
(a) ten vocational and technical education centers (KETEs); (b) four higher
technical and vocational education centers (KATEs); and (c) one school for
advanced training of secondary education teachers and officials (SELME)\.
Equipment only was also to be provided for 40 existing gymnasia and 21
gymnasia under construction\. A total of 76 different institutions were thus
involved in the project\. No financing of technical assistance for project
implementation was provided\. Technical assistance for curriculum
development and for preparation of equipment lists was financed under the
Third Education Project (Loan 1134-GR)\. Training abroad of technical and
vocational teachers was financed by UNDP\.
iii\. The Government recognized as priority the need to reorganize and
reform the education training system, not only to meet the new
socio-economic situation, but also to promote greater equity in regional
access to educational opportunities\. The appraisal of the project was made
conditional to the enactment of the technical and vocational education
system reforms\. The Education Law 576, that was passed in early 1977, was a
major piece of legislation\. It concerned the basic policies of the
technical lyceum and vocational schools (KETEs), the KATEs and the
Vocational Teacher Training Institute and their organization (para 2\.02)\.
iv\. Despite five postponements of the Loan effectiveness date, no
construction has begun on any of the 15 new institutions nor was equipment
procured under the Loan for the 61 gymnasia\. Only one of the project's
physical objectives, design of the educational institutions, has been
realized\. KATEs and KETEs have been operating at the project locations in
temporary premises\. In 1980/81 their enrollments stood at 2,500 and 29,600
respectively\. Some 138 KATE teachers attended 13-week specialized training
courses abroad and 10 directors completed one--moth study visits abroad
(para 3\.12)\.
v\. The Loan in its entirety (US$60\.0 million) was cancelled on
February 15, 1983, effective as of the original Closing Date, December 31,
1982\. No disbursements of the Loan proceeds have been made\. The Government
is, however, proceeding with the project and is committed to completing it
with its own funds and considers it of utmost importance in the culmination
of its efforts in the reform and modernization of the school education
system\.
- viii -
vi\. The main causes for the lack of success in implementing the
physical components of the project were;
(a) The two year delay in passage of the law in Greece's Parliament
ratifying the Loan Agreement\. The difficulties which the
Government in 1978 encountered in ratifying the Loan stem mostly
from the considerable criticism of the Bank's involvement in the
policies of the education sector, originally caused by the
coincident presentation to Parliament of the Amending Agreement for
the Second Education Project (deleting the controversial
Univerisity of Patras), at the time this fourth project was being
negotiated in Washington (February, 1978)\. Though the law
permitted openings for additional staff positions in the
Organization for School Buildings (OSK), these positions became
available only in mid-1980 (para 3\.04)\.
(b) Although OSK was responsible for almost a decade for constructing
and equipping of all primary and secondary schools in Greece (para\.
3\.03), the tasks of designing project schools under the first three
Bank education projects were contracted to private architectural
firms\. As these firms had performed poorly during the
implementation of these projects, an explicit objective of the
Government and of the fourth project was institution building in
the MOE by reorganizing and strengthening OSK and DIEP (para\.
3\.03)\. The institution building was set back by the delayed
approvaL of staff positions in OSK and the slow recruitment of
experienced architects (para 3\.06)\.
(c) The development of designs was slow initially due to the lack of
cooperation between OSK and DIEP and the tardiness is obtaining
approval from the directorates of the MOE responsible for the
educational aspects of the project institutions (para\. 3\.03)\. As
much as 302 of the delay in finalizing construction designs is
attributable to design changes due to changes in space allocation
at the request of the MOE and to energy saving measures decreed
government-wide (para 3\.05)\.
vii\. Bank supervision missions were aware of these problems and took all
possible steps to bring their concern to the knowledge of the Greek
authorities concerned (para 3\.06)\. Bank senior staff raised this point at
every Country Implementation Review (CIR): in December 1978, August 1979,
and again in August 1980, as well as during the Annual Meetings\. The
representatives of the monitoring unit in the Ministry of National Economy
attended the Country Review Meeting in Washington in February 1981 and were
fully alerted to the steps required to improve implementation performance\.
At this time and again in December, 1981, the Government was informed that
unless agreed implementation targets were agreed, the Bank would not
consider favorably any request to extend the Closing Date\. Even this effort
failed to bring needed results as there was inadequate follow-up by the
lx -
monitoring unit with the MOE's Directorate of Implementation of Education
Projects (para 3\.19)\. In December 1982, senior Bank staff mission informed
the Government that because of the lack of implementation progress their
view was that the Bank should reaffirm its intention not to postpone the
December 31, 1982 Closing Date\.
viii\. The physical aspects of the project as a whole were poorly
implemented, although MDE began scheduled operations of the project schools
at project locations in temporary premises, procuring essential equipment
from its own budget\. It was intended by the Bank to have sites selected and
acquired and preliminary designs and lists of equipment completed by Loan
signing date in order to avoid the delays suffered by the previous Bank
education projects in Greece\. In fact, these activities did not start until
after the Loan was signed\. None of the project's civil works or equipment
contracts were tendered before the Closing Date\. Should the project be
completed in 1987 as presently envisioned, the project implementation period
will have been 9\.75 years compared with the 4\.75 years expected at
appraisal\. The resultant cost overrun of the project would likely be about
US$67\.3 million over the appraisal estimate of US$123\.5 million, or a 54Z
cost overrun due to successive drachma devaluations (para 4\.02)\.
Conclusions
ix\. Although the initiation of the project gave impetus to the
Government to enact speedily a principal piece of legislation concerning
policies and organization of vocational and technical education system, it
was overly optimistic to expect rapid ratification of the Loan Agreement in
the face of criticism of the Bazk's involvement in Greece\.
X\. The ministerial objective of institution-building of OSX, in tandem
with project implementation, has been slow to achieve\. Although the OSK was
reorganized and strengthened through the project, difficulties in hiring
experienced architects and other constraints resulted in significant
delays\. The project, which was complex in its content, was not implemented
satisfactorily\.
xi\. None of the 15 new institutions in the project was constructed
and/or equipped\. However, the preparation of functional and economic
architectural designs for these new institutions and equipment contract
documents will greatly aid the Government in implementing the project\.
Also, the project's belated success in institution-building at OSK and DIEP,
should significantly contribute to implementation capacity for future
government projects in the sector (para 3\.11)\.
xii\. The technical institutions which will now be built with the
Government's own funds will reinforce this movement of change and provide
the economy with much-needed manpower at the technician and skilled-worker
levels\.
I\. INTRODUCTION
1\.01 This report, prepared by Mr\. J\.E\. Kulski (consultant architect/
planner) and division staff, is a completion review of the Fourth Education
Project in Greece financed through Loan 1539-CR in April 1978\. The First
Bank Education Project (Loan 711-GR), introduced into Greece the concept of
a diploma level, multi-disciplinary technical institution (KATE) offering
specialized instruction in agriculture, business, engineering, food
processing and health\. This project was innovative and the concept of the
KATE has caught on so strongly that there still is an overwhelming student
demand for entry into these institutions\. Extension of the KATE program was
further assisted by the Third and Fourth Projects\.
1\.02 The Second Education Project (Loan 859-GR), provided for an
upgrading in the quality of instruction in primary schools through the
consolidation of the existing primary teacher training system with a
reformed curriculum\. In addition, the Bank widened its activities beyond
the Ministry of Education (MOE) in this project and provided assistance in
meeting manpower requirements in agriculture, industry, the merchant marine,
and tourism at skilled worker and technician levels\. A further
break-through in the reform of the Greek education system were realized in
the Third Education Project (Loan 1134-GR)\. This project included, on an
experimental basis, 10 multilateral upper secondary schools (POSME) which
provided for the juxtaposition of academic and technical "streams" on the
same campus with common facilities notably administrative, scientific and
technical\.
1\.03 With the inclusion of the advanced secondary school admini-
strator/teacher training center (SELME) and of the integrated technical
lyceum and vocational school (KETE) in the Fourth Education Project, all of\.
the major educational reform measures identified at the beginning of the
Bank's operations in the education sector in Greece were realized, with the
exception of those referencing the university system\. The main result of
the reform is that, the technical education system has been greatly expanded
and modernized--with regard to vocational training centers, new secondary
technical\.vocational (KETE) schools, and in post-secondary diploma technical
institutes (KATE)\. The transformation of the Greek education system is due
to the emergence on the Greek education scene of progressive educators and
administrators who were willing to break with tradition and to experiment
with modern educational concepts, and in part to the Bank-initiated dialogue
on the need for such actions\.
1\.04 The completion study was carried out through a review of records
and reports available in the Bank, through discussions with Bank staff
involved with the project and through discussions with officials in the MOE
responsible for project implementation\. Expected outcomes of project
implementation were reviewed against achievements planned at the time of
appraisal, taking into consideration that (the entire Loan was cancelled or
"no disbursements were made") and before construction or equipment
procurement had begun\. Completion will be with government funds\. The
review thus concentrates on issues and conditions that led to the serious
implementation problems and delays\.
-2-
II\. PROJECT BACKGROUND
Formulation and Objectives of the Project
2\.01 In May and October 1976 Bank missions identified a project designed
to continue and complement the educational reforms implemented under the
first three education projects (Loans 711, 859 and 1134-GR), notably by
improving the country's education and training capabilities in vocational
and technical education at all levels\. The project was prepared in
February, and appraised in May-June 1977\. Its cost was estimated at
US*123\.5 million, with a proposed Bank loan of US$60\.0 million\. During
appraisal, the project was expanded to include the construction and
equipping of an advanced training school for secondary education teachers
and administrators, on the basis of a satisfactory, feasibility study\. The
Educational Materials Production Center and the training vessels for the
Merchant Marine Training Directorate were not included in the project\.
Furthermore, the equipping of a further two merchant marine officers'
schools was deleted because of the reported, five-year delay in construction
of similar schools to be equipped under the second project (Loan 859-GR)
which had led to the transfer of the equipment to other institutions\.
2\.02 At the time of appraisal, the Greek education system, compared with
that of other developing countries in the region, was considered
quantitatively well developed, but suffering from qualitative weaknesses, in
particular some serious deficiencies in vocational and technical education\.
For example, in the lower-level secondary schools (gymnasia), there was
still an over-emphasis upon traditional academic studies\. On the other
hand, lower vocational schools were in the process of being phased-out
because they prepared students at too early an age for semi-skilled
employment, without giving them a general education sufficient for their
later re-training\. Consequently, the major aim of the Government's
education development strategy at the time of project formulation was to
adapt the whole education system to Greece's manpower requirements by
providing more appropriate opportunities for technical and vocational
education\. Appraisal of the project was made conditional to the enactment
of technical and vocational education system reforms\. The Education Law 576,
passed in early 1977, was a major piece of legislation\. It concerned the
basic policies of the technical lyceum, vocational schools, the KATEs and
the Vocational Teacher Training Institute, and their organization\.
2\.03 The Fourth Project addressed these reforms in part by supporting a
new concept for Greece, that of a combined technical lyceum and vocational
school (KETE), and in part by extending the Bank's support for additional
post-secondary technician training institutes (KATES)\. Thus, the project
provided assistance for a qualitative improvement of instruction in
technical and vocational education through support of a major reform\.
-3-
Socio-Economic Background
2\.04 The labor force in 1975 was estimated to be about 3\.2 million
people, 37% of whom were employed in agriculture and related activities,
27\.8% in industry (19% in manufacturing) and 35\.2% in service-related
activities\. The growth of emplv'aent in the various economic sectors
reflected the changes in the str cture of the economic activities of the
country; for example, during 1971-75 employment in agriculture declined
annually on an average by 1\.5%, while in the secondary and tertiary sectors
employment increased by 0\.7% and 2\.0%, respectively\.
2\.05 At the time of appraisal Greece's industry had been a dynamic
sector of the economy with an annual 10% growth in real terms since 1960\.
Its share of GDP increased from 26% in 1965 to 31% in 1971\. The economic
trends, combined with ongoing negotiations for Greece's admission into full
membership in the European Economic Community, called for several structural
changes and created certain economic problems not unlike those found in
lower-income developing countries\. The combination of rapid economic
expansion and slow population growth resulted in a GNP per capita in 1978 of
about US$2,590 or about twice as large as in 1968\. In general, with low
population increases (0\.7Z annually), Greece was able to direct its
expanding resources for social services towards qualitative rather than
quantative needs\.
2\.06 Structural changes were apparent in the labor force\.
Non-agricultural employment grew while agricultural jobs fell\. Greece's
rapid economic growth and low rate of population increase, assisted by
significant external migration, had combined to reduce non-agricultural
unemployment to the low level of 2\.5%\. Although there was, and still is, a
large rural manpower reserve, these rural workers lacked the skills
necessary for work in the rapidly-growing, technologically-oriented sectors
of the economy\. Consequently, labor supply in the most rapidly growing
sectors--industry and services--was tight and would remain so unless
appropriate training or retraining facilities were developed in the spirit
of the Education reform\.
-4-
Project Content
2\.07 In line with the objectives and background outlined above, the
prol4ct consisted of'construction, furniture and equipment, as outlined in
Tables 1 and 2\.
Table 1: PROJECT BREAKDOWN BY COST
Dr\. Millions USS Millions
Type of Institution Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
KETEs (Secondary level
Vocational and 976\.3 898\.6 1,874\.9 26\.6 24\.5 51\.1
Technical Education
Centers)
KATEs (Post secondary
Technical and 604\.1 566\.6 1,170\.7 16\.5 15\.4 31\.9
Vocational Education
Centers)
SELME (Advanced 70\.2 42\.0 112\.2 1\.9 1\.2 3\.1
Training of Secondary
Teachers and
Administrators)
GYMNASIA 7\.9 70\.5 78\.4 0\.2 1\.9 2\.1
Baseline Cost 1,658\.5 1,577\.7 3,236\.2 45\.2 43\.0 88\.2
Contingencies 673\.6 621\.2 1,294\.8 18\.3 17\.0 35\.3
TOTAL PROJECT COST 2,332\.1 2,198\.9 4,531\.0 63\.5 60\.0 123\.5
Table 2; PROJECT BREAKDOWN BY TYPE OF INSTITUTION
Student Estimated
Types of Institution Grades Enrollment Annual Output
Technical and Vocational Education
Construction and equipping:
10 Technical Lyceums combined 10-12 9,240 2,500
with Vocational Schools (KETEs) 10-11 5,920 2,700
4 Centers of Higher Technical
& Vocational Education (KATEs) 13-15 4,200 1,380
(student
places)
General Education
Construction and equipping:
School for Advanced Training ungraded 1,000 3,000
of Secondary Education Teachers post- (full time
and Administrators (SELME) university equivalent)
Equipping only:
40 existing Gymnasia 7-9 16,320 5,200
21 Gymnasia under construction 7-9 10,920 3,600
-5-
III\. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
Overview
3\.01 At appraisal, preliminary designs, equipment lists and site
acquisition were scheduled to be completed by June 30, 1978; project
implementation was scheduled to be completed by March 31, 1982; and the
Loan disbursed by December 31, 1982\. Delays in ratification of the Loan
Agreement by Parliament had a serious effect upon project implementation
by delaying timely provision of additional design staff for the
Organization for School Buildings (OSK) and adequate local funds\. The
difficulties which the Borrower met in ratifying the Loan stem mostly from
the considerable political criticism of the Bank's involvement in the
policies of the education sector, originally caused by the presentation to
Parliament of the Amending Agreement for the Second Education Project
(deleting the University of Patras), at the time this fourth project was
being negotiated\. In addition, it took much longer to obtain the support
for the Government's education reform program than originally envisaged\.
Cabinet level approval for the Loan Agreement was obtained only in late
1979 and the draft law of ratification was not introduced and passed by
Parliament until mid-1980\. It was only then that additional staff for OSK
and the project implementation unit were appointed\.
3\.02 Added to the delays brought about by the slow passage of the
ratification law, was the impact of a major earthquake and repairs to
existing educational institutions\. The terminal date of Loan
effectiveness was postponed five times (initially to December 1978, then
to May 1979, November 1979, May 1980 and finally to October 1980)\.
Construction of buildings and installation of equipment is now expected to
begin in 1984 (Chart 1)\. Consequently, actual implementation is now
expected to take 9-3/4 years, as compared with 4-3/4 years estimated at
appraisal; the regional average for the education sector is nine years and
the average for Bank-financed education projects in Greece is ten years\.
3\.03 At appraisal, it was decided to entrust all physical design work
(up to and including final construction drawings) to OSK an autonomous
body reporting directly to the Minister of Education (Chart 2) which for
almost a decade had been responsible for constructing and equipping of all
primary and secondary schools\. By 1976, OSK had 209 full time employees
and it was agreed that further reinforcement (11 architects, 2 mechanical
and electrical engineers, and 12 other design support staff) would take
place to accommodate the fourth project\. The DIEP--the project
implementation unit of the MOE under the general directorate responsible
for planning and programming, would be responsible for actual procurement
of civil works and for site-level supervision\. It would also be
appropriately reinforced to ensure appropriate inputs to educational
specifications of buildings and of equipment as well as to provide advice
on software aspects\. The general directorates responsible for training,
for general education (special secondary schools) and for
technical/vocational education would each appoint liaison officers to work
with OSK and DIEP\. Thus, arrangements for project implementation were
based on existing organizational responsibilities with appropriate
reinforcement\.
-6-
Project Management Performance
3\.04 Parliamentary approval (para 3\.02) required to increase OSK's
payroll took considerable time and once obtained it proved difficult to
recruit experienced staff because of OSK terms and conditions of
employment\. Collaboration by the general directorates of the MOE in
regard to educational specification of facilities and preparation of
equipment lists was weak and intermittent\. Although the Loan Agreement
and a supplemental letter had adequately addressed the staffing and
organizational arrangements for project implementation, they proved
difficult to implement (Annex 4)\.
3\.05 Delay in appointing experienced staff to OSK tended itself to
delay the finalization construction plans and preparation of tender
documents\. Construction procurement was the critical path of the project,
and incurred the major delay\. As much as 30X of this delay is
attributable to design modifications due to changes in space allocation
(at the request of the MOE) and to energy saving measures decreed
government-wide\.
3\.06 Bank supervision missions were aware of these problems and took
all possible steps to bring their concern to the knowledge of the Greek
authorities involved\. The missions continuously urged the Borrower to
(a) ratify the Loan Agreement;
(b) strengthen OSK and DIEP in accordance with the provisions of
Schedule 5 of the Loan Agreement; and
(c) expedite design of buildings and preparation of equipment lists\.
Sites
3\.07 All sites had been selected at appraisal and site surveys and
acquisition were expected to be completed by Loan signing\. However, there
remained risks involved in obtaining the Ministry of Public Works (MPW)
rulings and Presidential decrees required before selected sites could in
fact be assigned to project institutions\. Acquiring all 15 sites proved
to be time consuming (Chart 1)\. One site, at Mytilini, was selected
without adequate technical survey\. Another site at Lamia, was
requisitioned by the Air Force and a new site had to be selected\. These
two sites still present problems and the Government is considering
deletion of these institutions from the project\.
Design
3\.08 An explicit objective of the project was to increase the school
design and construction implementation capacity of MOE by reorganizing and
strengthening OSK and DIEP\. This approach was all the more reasonable in
that private architectural firms had performed poorly during implementa-
tion of three previous education projects (Loans 711, 859 and 1134-GR)\.
-7-
3\.09 The designs of the KATEs, the KETEs and the SELME were all
prepared by OSK staff architects\. Each institution was given to a
different architect, consequently each project design is different and the
quality of design is uneven\. There was initially no attempt to develop a
standardized approach and specification for each type of institution\.
3\.10 OSK architects were also handicapped initially in their design
work by the fact that the architect's briefs were generally insufficient,
additional inputs in the design process were to be made by the general
directorates of the MOE (para 3\.03) but their participation was seldom
timely and approval of designs frequently delayed\.
3\.11 However, after continued insistence from the Bank, OSK and DIEP
were reorganized and strengthened in the last year of the project
implementation cycle and there has been a considerable improvement in
design work thereafter\. These designs and tender documents should help
the Government carry the project forward\. Thus, although the
institution-building objective was achieved late in the Bank's involvement
with the project, the project's contribution to school building and
construction in Greece may turn out to be positive\.
Interim Measures
3\.12 MOE has not let the delays in construction prevent opening KATEs
and KETEs in temporary premises at the locations in the fourth project\.
In 1980/81, the enrollments were respectively 2,050 and 29,6000\.
Furthermore, some 138 KATE teachers attended 13-week training courses
abroad, and 10 school directors completed one month study visits abroad\.
Furniture and Equipment
3\.13 According to Schedule 5 to the Loan Agreement, representatives of
KEME, the General Directorate of Vocational and Technical Education and
the General Directorate of General Education were responsible for
supervising the preparation of furniture and equipment lists and for
setting up expert teams as necessary for that purpose\.
3\.14 The total cost of furniture and equipment, inclusive of
contingencies, was estimated at appraisal at about US$48\.0 million\. It
was envisioned at appraisal that equipment lists would be prepared by
consultants\. The British Council prepared equipment lists in the new
course offerings in the KATEs and KETEs\. The Government proposed that the
lists for existing course offerings be prepared by MOE teachers based on
their experience with existing equipment\. After some delay arising out of
payments to teachers under civil service regulations, some 32 working
groups were appointed by the MOE\. Technical assistance was also provided
by Bank supervision missions\. Lists of equipment and specifications both
for the institution under the third and fourth Education Projects have
been completed\. However, with the delay in construction, no urgency was
felt in completing the lists\. Consequently, the lists, specifications and
tender documents, which were to take 1-3/4 years to complete, thus took
5-112 years (Chart 1)\.
-8-
Covenants
3\.15 Key covenants were only partly implemented\. In particular
sections 3\.01(b) and 3\.04(b) and paras\. 4 and 5 of Schedule 5, to the Loan
Agreement specified that: (a) the functions set forth in Schedule 5 be
performed in accordance with a time-table satisfactory to both parties;
(b) sites be acquired as needed; (c) adequate numbers of qualified staff
be provided within OSK; and (d) liaison officers be appointed by the
operating departments to DIEP and OSK to provide educational
specifications\.
Bank Performance
3\.16 Prior to Loan signing, the project was identified, prepared and
appraised by six Bank missions (Basic Data Sheet)\. The preparation effort
was intensive and totaled some 135 man-days\. During negotiations the
Secretary General of the Ministry of Coordination expressed appreciation
of this and proposed to senior Bank staff that Greece continue to have
such access to Bank technical assistance\.
3\.17 Subsequent to Loan signing, the project was supervised by 12 Bank
missions (Basic Data Sheet) and there was reasonable staff continuity\.
The supervision effort was extensive, totalling some 162\.5 man-days, or an
average of 36 man-days per year\. Bank supervision missions, fully aware
of implementation problems encountered by DIEP and OSK, took all possible
steps to bring their concern to the knowledge of the Greek authorities
concerned\. Bank senior staff brought this concern up at every Joint
Problem Project Review; in December 1978, August 1979 and again in August
1980, as well as during the Annual Meetings\. The representatives of the
monitoring unit in the Ministry of National Economy attended the Country
Review Meeting in Washington in February 1981 and were made fully aware by
senior Bank staff of the steps required to improve implementation
performance\. Even this effort failed to bring needed results as there was
inadequate follow-up by the monitoring unit with the MOE's Directorate of
Implementation of Education Projects\. The Government, while disappointed
with the Bank's decision to cancel the Loan, expressed satisfaction with
the Bank's implementation assistance in general and with the technical
assistance and institution-building efforts in particular\.
3\.18 Overall, the Bank and the Government seem to have developed good
relations\. The difficulties which arose with design, sites and equipment
lists were beyond the control of the Bank\.
-9-
IV\. PROJECT COST AND FINANCING
Capital Cost
4\.01 The project cost was estimated at appraisal to be US$123\.5
million\. However, the project will now not be completed until 1987
(Chart 1) and it is estimated that the final cost may be as high as
US$190\.0 million, an overrun in USS equivalent of about 54% (Annex 4)\.
4\.02 This increase in the total project cost is mainly due to (a) the
doubling of the period of implementation estimated at appraisal; and
(b) the unanticipated inflation rate in Greece during 1978-82, the effects
of which until very recently exceeded the benefits of successive drachma
devaluations\. During the period between appraisal and completion, the
cost of construction in drachmas has increased at the rate of about 20%
annually\. Appraisal and completion estimates are summarized in the
following table;
Table 3: ESTIMATED PROJECT COSTS BY CATEGORIES
Appraisal Current
Estimate % of Estimate X of
Category of of Costs Total of Costs Total
Expenditure (US$ Million) Cost (USS Million) Cost
I\. Construction 75\.5 61 115\.8 61
II\. Furniture and
Equipment 48\.0 39 75\.0 39
TOTAL 123\.5 100 190\.8 100
Appraisal Year (1978) Exchange Rate; US$1 = 36\.70
Intervening Years' Average US$1 = 50\.40
Completion Year Average (1983) US$1 = 84\.00
- 10 -
Unit Space Allocation Per Student
4\.03 Gross areas per student place are approximately as follows;
Table 4; ESTIMATED AREA PER STUDENT PLACE
Gross Unit Areas in m2
Type of Appraisal Current Difference
Institution Estimate Estimate (percent)
KETEs
Vocational and Technical Education 7\.53 7\.47 -1
Centers
KATEs
Post secondary Technical Vocational 16\.91 17\.02 +1
Education Centers
SELME
School for Advanced Training of 7\.67 7\.52 -2
Secondary Teachers and Administrators
There is general conformity of unit area per student place between appraisal
estimates and designs due, chiefly to Government's wish to avoid the cost
overruns suffered by previous Bank education projects, and to the Bank's close
monitoring of the design process\.
Unit Cost Per Student Place
4\.04 The estimated unit cost per student place covers all expenditures
including contingencies and professional fees and is based on the present
implementation schedule (Chart 1)\. Given the quality and quantity of the
educational spaces and the furniture and equipment which will be provided,
they are reasonable\. Unit costs per place are estimated approximately as
follows:
- 11 -
Table 5: ESTINATED COST PER STUDENT PLACE
Cost Per Student Place in US$
Type of Furniture &
Institution Construction Equipment Total
KETEs
Vocational and Technical Education
Centers 4,479 2,737 7,216
KATEs
Post secondary Technical Vocational
Education Centers 10,214 6,405 16,619
SELME
School for Advanced Training
of Secondary Teachers &
Administrators 5,000 2,100 7,100
Disbursements
4\.05 There were no disbursements from the Loan due to delays in project
implementation\. The Loan was cancelled before the Bank received any
withdrawal applications\. The estimate of withdrawals planned at appraisal is
shown in the following table:
Table 6: PLANNED DISBURSEMENTS
Disbursements per Year Cumulative Disbursements
Fiscal Planned Planned
Year (US$ million) (US$ million)
1979 0\.0 0\.0
1980 1\.5 1\.5
1981 19\.5 21\.0
1982 35\.0 56\.0
1983 4\.0 60\.0
- 12 -
4\.06 Although the undisbursed Loan was cancelled on February 15, 1983,
effective as of December 31, 1982, it is escimated that approximately US*190\.O
million will be required, principally for construction, furniture and
equipment\. At the time of writing, the Government had committed about US$55
million of the amount\. The Government has already incurred a total
expenditure of about USt3\.2 million mostly in professional fees and in
preparing contract documents, and about US$2\.0 million in Loan commitment
charges\.
GREECE
FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT - LOAN 15394R
ConpItllon Repot
EslmoWd and Aclual Impoemen'albn and Dlsbusmnhs
eS VW I t" 19)1 II 1919- 1 111 1 l 9ii iN Ilk 0113 *n II11 I)
c I 1 t -- - I t" te I I_ loss i - I * *\.
GOR -- - I 1 11 1 11 I 11 - 4 1 1- 1 I3 I I I I I 11
*\.~ I -= \. - -1 \. \. \. - -;1 -\. IhJ I I\.
-
C \.^ IWA"I e m \. me I e a * m\. s I I I s e a I
____\.______ : \. Zsm \. gg III
ft"P& I" comf ges Lo a i m emI s ls I aI I A gl 55 I 5- 5 i s Ii o W IM I Is
eo as is Ili I-
tuc~a 16ff~ II II 7t imi II le it, so Is II 11 " I11 |
\.- \.-\. U_ w"
_ 0 b _- --- --
I EI EU \. \.se
111111AV~0 Woom JsaApuup a 1K101
FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT - LOAN '1041R
CoidPl lion Repoe
AdmlinitIolh Arrann'mnt ta 1 Pro ect lMnIpAnttlle
MlnlIt ft Nationat Education enJ Raligbw Atb ha IMOR0
\.;\.: \. -, :;
* \.",',"! ,- \.R\. \.,
Et IONALtteH L bHt H DICHNA WAN Z-ZSt tfHtOR ; HOV eO tR i il atlem --
VOCATHONALt0UCATION t0UtAtl COWIUtO>ON ItUCAAtONALUI0T * VOCAIG' tHHD --A*AWOOL
tOHtULTAtIVI COWIIttt CO - CIL HlGHttDUtAtl0A SANNIAVANCEDOTAP TtCHNOALtDUCAT RAOIOAID
Fc''L, 10 \.0
OININALCIMICTOnATI OPUNiVICCITY ~ G6N6RALIOUCATIONCAI A IoutA IOIOP
Op NILIOICIAAPPAIRSNLOUCALMICORN \.CINIRALD'M 01-/
DiAicoAAIS G1WvAc VOATINAL CAND1CUN
'USIN AFTAIION AANDRC OT NIAL OUCDIN HICL O AOGIMI
U,,NII\.
DIlRICORATU UTCHNICALC IT I OMINIStNATIOI4O p\.
EDAUA PNRtUAR | _FI4IONNIL ICUCAtIONAL M J
| OIRECTORAAt BD tUCAtlOh I P| RSONNELl\.w r--- _ _
DORICIORAlt P ST0UUOllI of Irn OltOflAtI| ADMINIStAAIIVSP fINAhCI P COtfUPtlhG AND IT AlINt
SihON \.CSIIODI tANDi ANORtISIANH |S|tlCNORY ARVNfi OlRICtORAAtI S tTleIl n tUtt
NOFCHRCHIS IAN IDUCAACIICUL ONolAl f
AFMINITRAIINI |- tOUCAt P PRIVAIEVOCATIONAL | t = lION IIERNATIONAL|
AFFAIRS EDUCAINSITTIOTIUCAIO
STAFF \. CIICTOAAtI -TECHhtCACl OUCAttOPE O| EDUCATIONAL PROIICMt I_DUATHAlL I
I PNANCI DOICORtAtI # IIIAN
|TEAChER D IORICIEtAAT
OIRICtORAtt |OIT EUAT
| YSICAC | DJCAIO
* 01 R t C tDOREA ORA |
EDtOtCAtION 1s O L , tt|
| ORitCtORAT P
CHRISUCAltON
A FlRtCtOAtL I | P_-VOT
OIAICTOAATE -- - -LOC DUAIOA
ism ;] 4T fIlLATIONS~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I
- 15 -
Annex 1
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
GREECE - FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT (Loan 1539-GR)
Gross Floor Areas in m2
Physical Facilities
Project Institution Percentage
Appraised As Designed Change
A\. School for Advanced Training
of Secondary Teachers and
Officials (SELME) 7,672 8,270 1/ +8
B\. Vocational and Technical Education
Centers (KETEs)
Athens I 15,098 14,500 -4
Athens II 13,564 13,820 +2
Athens III 15,217 15,200 -1
Yannitsa 6,150 7,000 +14
Thessaloniki 16,890 15,200 -10
Aegio 6,832 6,240 -9
Karditsa 12,297 10,875 -12
Komotini 9,705 12,545 +29
Mytilini 11,250 9,945 -12
Hessolongi 7,088 7,905 +11
C\. Higher Technical and Vocational
Education Centers (KATEs)
Lamia 16,793 14,500 -14
Kalamata 16,055 15,500 -3
Messolongi 17,512 18,500 +6
Athens - Piraeus 20,678 23,000 +11
Total 192,801 193,000 0
1/ Capacity of SELME was increased from 1,000 to 1,100 student places\.
{0832V)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
GREECE - FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT (Loan 1539-GR)
COMPLIANCE WITH LOAN CONDITIONS
Status of Compliance
Conditions Conditions
Covenant Fully Partially Unfulfilled
Description of Covenant in Loan Complied Complied Conditions
in Loan Agreement Agreement With With Coments
The functions set forth in Sect\. 3\.01(b) X There have been major delays and
Schedule 5, will be performed numerous revisions of timetables\.
in accordance with a timetable
satisfactory to the parties to
the agreement\.
Sites for project institution Sect\. 3\.04 X 15 required sites have been acquired to
shall be acquired as and when date, but 2 (Lamia & Mytilini) have
needed\. long-term problems and may result in
deletion of these institutions from the
Out of 30 teacher trainers Sect\.4\.03(b) Xproject\.
required, at least 10 shall be
employed before the 1979-80
academic year\.
Arrangements for the traininB Sect\. 4\.03(c) X
abroad of technical and 0
vocational teachers shall be
completed with UNDP not later
than September 30, 1978\.
An engineer and a procurement Schedule 5, X The Government requested extension of
officer shall be appointed to para\. 2 June 1978 date in the Covenant to
DIEP on a full-time basis by June 1980 and was granted the
June 30, 1978\. extension\.
The School Building Organiza- Schedule 5 X The Government was unable to supply
tion (responsible for design para\. 4 OSK with adequate numbers of qualified
development) will be staffed and experienced scaff during project
with qualified and experienced design development\.
staff including at least 11
architects, 2 mechanical and
electrical engineers and 12
other supporting staff to be
assigned during project design
development\.
Liaison officers to DIEP and Schedule 5, X While liaison officers have been
08K shall be appointed\. para\. 5 appointed, they failed to provide the N
required educational impact\.
- 17 - Annex 3
Page 1 of 3
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
GREECE - FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 1539-GR)
ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
MOE Department
Functions
Al Directorate General of Programming (DGP)\.
1\. Responsible for overall management of project\.
2\. Coordinate the activities of the Government's services and
agencies involved in carrying out the project\.
3\. Perform or cause DIEP and OSK to perform such functions as
detailed below, all in accordance with a timetable
satisfactory to the Government and the Bank\.
4\. Ensure, through its Director General within his powers and in
consultation with the other responsible services, that
appropriate allocations out of the Government's annual budget
are made for the design, construction, furnishing and
equipping of the project institutions, and the recruitment,
appointment and training of an adequate number of qualified
teachers and teacher trainers\.
A2 Directorate of Implementation of
Educational Projects (DIEP) under
the Directorate General of Programming,
and with assistance, as may be
necessary, of the Government's relevant
services and agencies\.
1\. Scheduling, monitoring progress and supervision of execution,
including follow-up of site acquisitions and review of
designs, at all stages, of the project institutions\.
2\. Compilation of final lists of furniture and equipment required
for the project\.
3\. Preparation of bidding documents, evaluation of bids and award
of contracts for civil works, furniture
and equipment, and more generally, ensuring that procurement
procedures comply with the requirements of the Loan Agreement\.
-18- Annex 3
Page 2 of 3
4\. Supervision and on-site inspection of, construction of, and
installation of equipment for the project institutions\.
5\. Review and approval of reports, specifications and other
materials submitted by the Borrower's services and agencies
involved in the carrying out of the project or any part
thereof\.
6\. Maintenance of project accounts and preparation of interim
evaluations and financial statements\.
7\. Preparation of applications for withdrawals from the Loan
Account\.
8\. Preparation and submission of progress reports to the Bank; and
9\. Acting as liaison between the Bank and the Borrower's services
and agencies involved in the carrying out of the project or
any part thereof\.
B Organization for School Buildings (OSK)
established in 1968 and expanded in 1976;
autonomous body reporting to
the Minister of Education\.
1\. Responsible for the preparation of the preliminary and final
architectural designs of all project institutions\.
2\. Collaborate with DIEP, upon DIEP's request, in the preparation
of the bidding documents for the project institutions and in
the supervision of their construction\.
C Operating Departments
(1) Directorate General of Vocational
and Technical Education (KETEs and
KATEs); (2) Center for Educational
and equipment layout\.
Studies and Advance Training of
Teachers (KEME) (for SELME);
(3) Directorate General of General
experts' teams, as necessary, for these purposes\.
Education (for project gymnasia)\.
1\. Advise DIEP and OSK on all educational aspects of the relevant
project institutions\.
2\. Assist in the examination of preliminary architectural designs
for conformity with educational programs
3\. Ensure preparation of furniture and equipment lists for the
respective institutions and setting up
-19- Annex 3
Page 3 of3
Qualified and experienced officials
appointed by Operating Department to
liaise with DIEP and OSK\.
4\. Initiate programs of training teachers and recruitment of
teachers for project institutions\.
r 5\. Advise on technical assistance programs available under the
Third Project for meeting the immediate requirements of Fourth
Project and the UNDP/UNESCO Project\.
- 20 -
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Annex 4
GREECE - FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT (Loan 1539-CR)
ADMINISTRATIVE MODIFICATIONS IN SECOND AND THIRD GREECE EDUCATION PROJECTS
CONTAINED IN FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT APPRAISAL REPORT
Source of Status of lmple entation
Procedures
in Appraisal
Description of Procedures in Report, Fully Partially Not
Appraisal Report, Annex 12\. Annex 12\. Implemented Implemented Implemented Commnts
Each operating ministry or para\. 5 (a) X There have been significsnt delays and
agency vill have primsry revisions of implementation schedules\.
responsibility for implementing
its own project items under a
designated Director-General
within each ministry/agency who
will ensure the implementation
is carried out according to
schedules acceptable to the
Bank;
at the same time, the role of pars\. 5 (b) X
the Central Project Unit (CPU)
in the Ministry of Coordination
will be limited to ensuring the
timely transmittal of documents
and reports to the Bank,
payment and accounting services
and providing a limited amount
of technical assistance to L,e
operating ministries other than
Education;
a Director-General or Deputy- para\. 5 (c) X Both projects have suffered from
Director General in the inadequate coordination and
Ministry of Coordination will insufficient implementation momentum\.
be designated to supervise the
CPU and will liaise with the
Director-Generals in each
operating ministry to ensure
continuance of implementation
*moentum;
additional appropriate staffing pars\. 5 (d) X Shortage of qualified and experienced
has been provided to the staff has adversely affected
Ministries of National implementation of construction and
Education and Agriculture, and equipment procurement\.
will be maintained;
simplified review procedures of pars\. 5 (e) X
civil works will be followed
within the operating
ministries, without s further
review or approval stage in
CPU;
construction contracts will pare\. 5 (f) X Proved to be ineffective with poor
stipulate a reduced construc- contractors\.
tion period with a penalty
clause for non-compliance;
under a new law, design para\. 5 (g) X Partially successful with consulting
architects vill have archi- architects but ineffective with OSK
tectural responsibility during architects\.
construction and periodic
visits to sites will be
mandatory\. vith the result that
previous delays in issuance of
orders during construction
should be obviated or greatly
reduced; and
to ensure more expeditious pars\. 5 (h) X
equipment procurement, improved
bidding and evaluation
procedures will be isplemented\.
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
GREECE FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT (Loan 1439-GR)
Estimated Project Coats (in US$ million)
CONSTRUCTION FURNITURE AND EQUIPMENT TOTAL
Appraisal Current Percent Appraisal Current Percent Appraisal Current Percent
Project Institutions Estimate Estimate Difference Estimate Estimate Difference Estimate Estimate Difference
A\. Gymnasia - - - 2\.9 4\.5 55 2\.9 4\.5 55 N
B\. School for Advanced Training
of Secondary Teachers and
Officials (SELME) 3\.3 5\.0 52 1\.3 2\.1 62 4\.6 7\.1 54
C\. Vocational and Technical
Education Centers (10 KETEs) 44\.5 67\.9 53 26\.6 41\.5 56 71\.1 109\.4 54
D\. Higher Technical and Vocational
Education Centers (4 KATEs) 27\.2 42\.9 55 17\.2 26\.9 56 44\.9 69\.8 55
Total 75\.5 115\.8 53 48\.0 75\.0 56 123\.5 190o8 54 | APPROVAL |
P095049 | Page 1
PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
CONCEPT STAGE
Report No\.: AB1595
Project Name
CADASTRE SPPLMNT
Region
EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA
Sector
Central government administration (75%);Sub-national
government administration (25%)
Project ID
P095049
Borrower(s)
REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
Implementing Agency
Environment Category
[
]
A
[
]
B
[X] C [ ] FI [ ] TBD (to be determined)
Date PID Prepared
May 3, 2005
Estimated Date of
Appraisal Authorization
April 15, 2005
Estimated Date of Board
Approval
June 16, 2005
1\. Key development issues and rationale for Bank involvement
Moldovas transition experience has been a difficult one\. However after falling by more than
60 percent between independence and 1999, cumulative growth has now reached 20% since
2000, and average growth has averaged more than 6\.7% in the last three years\. Important
structural reforms, including privatization coupled with increases in real wages and a sizable
inflow of workers remittances had a positive impact on growth\.
Moldova obtained an IDA Credit towards the First Cadastre Project in April 1998\. The
strategic objective of the Project at the time was to support Moldovas transition to a market
economy by establishing the legal and institutional framework for private property ownership
and the development of the private sector\. The privatization of land and building had started and
it was felt that order and stability was needed for the various actual and potential uses of land and
real estate, which can only be provided by a land administration system that creates security for
property owners as well as for investors\. This strategic objective remains important today on
two fronts: (i) the development of the private sector; and (ii) consolidation of agricultural land
through market means\.
The First Cadastre Project (15\.9 million USD equivalent) was approved by the Board of
Executive Directors on April 23, 1998, and became effective in March 1999\. The Projects
primary objective is to develop and implement a national unified real estate registration program
for urban and rural land, and thereby to establish a system of clear and enforceable ownership
rights so as to promote the privatization of land and the development of real estate markets in
Moldova\.
2\. Proposed objective(s)
Page 2
The proposed additional financing is to support the objectives of the First Cadastre Project\.
The supplemental financing would strengthen the national unified real estate registration
program for urban and rural land, and expand the existing system of ownership rights\. The
additional financing would allow more real estate plots to be registered in the legal cadastre, thus
giving new owners security of tenure and possibilities to obtain credit or undertake transactions
involving their properties\.
3\. Preliminary description
The activities to be supported by the additional financing are an expansion of ongoing
activities under the First Cadastre Project, and include: (i) additional surveying; (ii) additional
registration; and (iii) upgrade of the existing information system\. These components are the
main elements of the First Cadastre Project and are the necessary steps to register properties and
strengthen the cadastre system through improved technology\.
4\. Safeguard policies that might apply
Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project
Yes
No
Environmental Assessment
(
OP
/
BP
/
GP
4\.01) [
]
[x]
Natural Habitats (
OP
/
BP
4\.04)
[
]
[x]
Pest Management (
OP 4\.09
)
[
]
[x]
Cultural Property (
OPN 11\.03
,
being revised as OP 4\.11)
[
]
[x]
Involuntary Resettlement (
OP
/
BP
4\.12)
[
]
[x]
Indigenous Peoples (
OD 4\.20
,
being revised as OP 4\.10)
[
]
[x]
Forests (
OP
/
BP
4\.36)
[
]
[x]
Safety of Dams (
OP
/
BP
4\.37)
[
]
[x]
Projects in Disputed Areas (
OP
/
BP
/
GP
7\.60)
*
[
]
[x]
Projects on International Waterways (
OP
/
BP
/
GP
7\.50)
[
]
[x]
5\. Tentative financing
Source: ($m\.)
BORROWER/RECIPIENT \.5
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION
1\.5
Total
2
6\. Contact point
Contact: Maha J\. Armaly
Title: Operations Officer
Tel: (202) 473-7057
Fax: (202) 614-0109
Email: Marmaly@worldbank\.org
*
By supporting the proposed project, the Bank does not intend to prejudice the final determination of the parties' claims on the
disputed areas
Page 3 | APPROVAL |
P099099 | Page 1
PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
CONCEPT STAGE
Report No\.: AB1986
Project Name
Rehabilitation & Completion of Irrigation & Drainage
Infrastructure Additional Financing
Region
EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA
Sector
Irrigation and drainage (88%); Central government administration
(12%)
Project ID
P099099
Borrower(s)
REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN
Implementing Agency
State Amelioration and Irrigation Agency
Environment Category
[
]
A
[X] B [ ] C [ ] FI [ ] TBD (to be determined)
Date PID Prepared
November 22, 2005
Estimated Date of
Appraisal Authorization
January 4, 2006
Estimated Date of Board
Approval
February 23, 2006
1\. Key development issues and rationale for Bank involvement
Agricultural Reform\.
Agriculture is one of the major contributors to Azerbaijan's Gross Domestic
Product (GDP)\. During the past few years, the sector contributed between 20 and 25 percent of
GDP and around 35 percent of employment\. Before Independence in 1991, Azerbaijan was a
main producer of cotton, wheat, grapes, and vegetables for the Former Soviet Union (FSU)
markets\. Real output declined rapidly between 1991 and 1994, when the production of grains
fell by 19 percent, of cotton by 48 percent, of grapes by 66 percent, and of vegetables by 43
percent\. The decline in agricultural production leveled out during the past few years\. From 1996
to date, fundamental changes have been introduced, including the abolition of the state order
system for agricultural products, the removal of most controls on external trade in agricultural
products, the discontinuation of official pricing of inputs and outputs, the replacement of state
input supply and farm output marketing organizations with privately owned and managed
companies, and distribution of farm land to individual farm members\.
Irrigation and Drainage\.
The country has favorable growing conditions for a wide variety of
crops, the cultivation of which is largely dependent on irrigation\. Almost all agricultural land is
under arid or semi-arid conditions, with average annual rainfall of 200 to 350 mm, more than
half of which falls outside the main growing season\. Consequently irrigation is a key input for
reliable crop production\. The total area equipped for irrigation is about 1\.45 million ha, which
represents more than 80 percent of all arable land in the country\. Many of the irrigation systems
were developed a long time ago during the FSU period\. Since Independence, operation and
maintenance (O&M) budgets have been far below required levels, as a result of which irrigation
and drainage systems have gradually deteriorated\. This has resulted in irregular and inadequate
availability of irrigation water at farm level, which in turn results in yields that are much below
the irrigated yield potentials\. Similarly, lack of adequate drainage is suppressing yields and the
arable area is shrinking year by year due to growing salinity and water logging conditions\.
Page 2
2
IDAs Assistance\.
IDA is assisting the government with two irrigation projects, namely the
Rehabilitation and Completion of Irrigation and Drainage Infrastructure Project (RIDIP) and
Irrigation Distribution System and Management Improvement Project (IDSMIP)\.
RIDIP (US $42 million credit) became effective on January 11, 2001\. Recently a 13-month
extension of the closing date was approved and the current closing date of the project is June 30,
2007\. The project focuses on works in two project areas, namely rehabilitation of irrigation
infrastructure in the Samur Apsheron Canal (SAC) System, and completion of drainage
infrastructure in the Main Mill-Mugan Collector (MMMC) area\. Smaller components relate to
institutional strengthening (already completed) and project implementation support\. This project
will be discussed in more detail below\.
IDSMIP (US $35 million credit) started in early 2004 and is mainly focusing on establishment
and development of Water Users Associations (WUA) and rehabilitation and modernization of
irrigation and drainage infrastructure that will be under the management of WUAs (typically
coinciding with the areas covered by the former state and collective farms)\. The project is still in
an early stage of implementation\. So far, a WUA support structure has been set up within the
State Amelioration and Irrigation Agency (SAIA), with small teams of specialists in each raion
working on WUA development issues\. Awareness creation and training of WUAs is ongoing\.
Rehabilitation of WUA-managed infrastructure is expected to start in 2006\.
Samur-Apsheron Canal\.
The SAC System is located in the north-eastern part of the country, and
comprises a headworks across the Samur River, an 182 km long main supply canal, a reservoir
near Baku City, pumping stations, three non-operating sediment basins, and a number of
secondary (inter-farm) canals that supply water to irrigation areas\. The System was seriously
deteriorated and its vulnerability to failure threatened the continuity of both the irrigation
supplies to about 86,000 ha and the water supply to the population of the Baku-Apsheron
Peninsula (the SAC main canal supplies approximately 40 percent of the drinking and industrial
water needs of the 2\.5 million people living in Baku and on the Peninsula)\. RIDIP focuses on
the rehabilitation of the canal system from km 0 to 50, which is compatible with any future
development plan of the system beyond km 50\. As per project design, RIDIP covers the
following activities: (i) rehabilitation of the 50-year old Samur headworks (completed); (ii)
rehabilitation of secondary canals leading from the first 50 km of the SAC main canal,
commanding about 60,000 ha (completed for 18,000 ha and ongoing for rest, with a May 2006
completion); (iii) construction of a large sediment basin near the SAC headworks (ongoing, with
a
May 2006 completion); and (iv) rehabilitation and enlargement of the SAC main supply canal,
which has been in operation almost continuously for over 50 years (ongoing for km 0 to 27, to be
completed by spring 2007)\.
As a result of higher than expected increases in the cost of construction materials and greater
than anticipated rehabilitation needs under the project, there is insufficient funding remaining
under the original project for the rehabilitation and enlargement of the SAC main supply canal
from km 27 to 50\. As explained further in Section 3 below, the Additional Financing is
proposed to cover the cost overruns\.
Page 3
3
Main Mill-Mugan Collector\.
Drainage is essential for many irrigation systems in Azerbaijan, but
most critical in the flat low-lying Kura-Araz and Mugan-Salyan plains in the center of the
country where soil salinity has developed for lack of natural drainage\. The development plan for
the construction of collector systems to drain these areas was prepared in the early 1960s\. The
Kura left bank collector system has been completed\. Developments on the right bank started in
the 1980s\. About 110 km of the Main Mill-Mugan Collector has been completed\. This left a 28
km missing link to complete this drainage system and link it to the Main Mill Karabakh
Collector (MMKC)\. This latter Collector is now linked to the Main Shirvan Collector on the left
bank of the Kura River, which often results in overload, which is why some of the saline MMKC
drainage water is released in the Kura River during peak drainage periods\. The project supports
completion of this last, critical link in the MMMC\. The activities are as follows: (i) the diversion
of the Araz River over a new siphon that links the completed collector on the right bank of the
river with the collector to be constructed under RIDIP (completed); (ii) construction of 28 km of
main collector drain, with structures (8\.5 km completed, rest ongoing, with a completion date of
May 31, 2006); and (iii) rehabilitation or construction of 70 km of inter-farm collector drains
(ongoing, with a completion date of May 31, 2006)\.
2\. Proposed objective(s)
The part of the original development objective that is of relevance to the proposed Additional
Financing is: (i) to prevent the decline in supplying water to Baku City; and (ii) to eliminate
further deterioration of the supply of irrigation water to approximately 86,000 hectares (ha) along
the SAC\.
3\. Preliminary description
In comparison with estimates at appraisal (February 2000), overall civil works costs have risen
by about 21 percent\. During project preparation, consultants spent time costing the project
works, including a review of at that time ongoing civil works projects to determine actual unit
costs for different works and materials\. Price and physical contingencies were included in the
cost estimates as well\. However, material costs (especially fuel, cement, and steel) have
increased much more than the original estimates during the past three years, which has especially
affected the cost of the currently ongoing contracts and the remaining design\. Large price
increases of especially steel and fuel are not unique to Azerbaijan, but are common all over the
world\. In addition, the estimate for the works quantities on the SAC main canal is much higher
than at appraisal stage\. At preparation stage, the canal could not be fully dewatered, so
quantities were estimated based on a visual inspection of the canal lining\. During the detailed
design phase, the canal was dewatered and detailed investigations showed much higher
rehabilitation needs than estimated at preparation stage\. This is actually not unusual for
rehabilitation works that are not so accurately quantifiable and that typically increase over time\.
The favorable SDR-USD exchange rate has increased the available USD amount from the Credit
by about US $3 million\. This means that all ongoing contracts could just be completed with the
available funds\. There would be no financing for the rehabilitation and enlargement of the SAC
main supply canal from km 27 to 50\. Disbursement forecasts indicate that US $5 million in
additional financing would be required to fund this remaining activity in full\. This would mainly
Page 4
4
be needed for financing civil works, but there would also be need for small amounts for
financing additional construction supervision consultants and the PIU for an extended project
duration\.
Without the additional financing an important activity along the SAC main canal would not be
completed\. If the main canal would not be rehabilitated, but instead deteriorates further, the
investments already made in the SAC System would not result in the expected benefits, as
adequate and timely delivered water could not be guaranteed\. The development objective,
described above, would thus not be fully achieved\. The Additional Financing will allow the
rehabilitation and enlargement of the section of the SAC main canal from km 27 to 50\.
4\. Safeguard policies that might apply
Three Operational Policies (OPs) applied for the original project, namely Environmental
Assessment (OP 4\.01), Safety of Dams (OP 4\.37), and International Waters (OP 7\.50)\. As the
Additional Financing is to cover a cost overrun for activities that were proposed under the
original project, no other OPs will apply\.
Environmental considerations are considered well by the implementing agency\. Tender
documents have environmental clauses and environmental monitoring takes place\. The PIU has
a
dedicated environmental specialist\.
The Dam Safety OP applied for the MMMC command area\. There are no dams in the SAC
project area\.
Before appraisal of the original project, Government notified Russia and agreement was reached
among the parties regarding the rehabilitation of the SAC headworks\. Government was of the
opinion that the SAC canal rehabilitation and completion of the MMMC are exempt from the
notification requirements of OP 7\.50\. This was accepted by the Association\.
5\. Tentative financing
Source: ($m\.)
BORROWER/RECIPIENT \.5
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION
5
Total
5\.5
6\. Contact point
Contact: Joop Stoutjesdijk
Title: Lead Irrigation Engineer
Tel: (202) 473-3754
Fax: (202) 614-0583
Email: Jstoutjesdijk@worldbank\.org
Page 5
5
wb149608
P:\AZERBAIJ\RURENV\RIDIP\1LENP\Additional Financing\PID for RIDIP Additional Financing-as submitted_November2005\.doc
11/22/2005 3:51:00 PM | APPROVAL |
P086294 | Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ReportNo: 39704-ZR
PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT
ONA
PROPOSED GRANT
INTHEAMOUNT OFSDR99\.2 MILLION
(US$lSO\.O MILLIONEQUIVALENT)
TO THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
FOR
AN EDUCATIONSECTOR PROJECT
May 4,2007
Human Development 3
Central Africa 2
Africa Region
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the
performance o f their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective March31,2007)
Currency Unit = Francs Congolais
437\.00 = US$1
US$1\.51326 = SDR 1
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 - December31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AAFM Administrative, Accounting and Financial IMF InternationalMonetaryFund
Manual
AAP Africa Action Plan INT DepartmentofInstitutionalIntegrity
AfDB African DevelopmentBank IRC InternationalRescue Committee
AIDS AcquiredImmuneDeficiencySyndrome ISR ImplementationStatusReport
BCC Banque Centrale du Congo (CentralBank LCS Least-Cost Selection
o f Congo)
BCECO Bureau Central de Coordination (Central M&E Monitoring andEvaluation
Office for Coordination)
BP BankProcedure MASSN Ministere des Affaires Sociales et de la Solidarite'
Nationale (Ministry o f Social Affairs and National
Solidarity)
CAF CountryAssistanceFramework MDG Millennium DevelopmentGoal
MinistPre de I 'Enseignement Primaire, Secondaire et
~~
CDD Community Driven Development MEPSP
Professionnel (Ministry of Primary, Secondary and
ProfessionalEducation)
CFAA Country Financial Accountability MESU Ministere de I'Enseignement Supirieur et Universitaire
Assessment (Ministry of HigherEducationandUniversities)
CFO ChiefFinancialOfficer MRS Ministere de la Recherche Scientifique (Ministry of
ScientificResearch)
COBOL Common-BusinessOriented Language MTEF MediumTerm ExpenditureFramework
CP ~~~~
CapacityBuilding NCB NationalCompetitiveBidding
CPA ~~
ContractedProcurementAgent NGO Non-GovernmentalOrganization
CPAR CountryProcurementAssessment Review NM Non-Mecanisis (Not regularized)
CRC Citizen's ReportCard OP OperationalPolicy
FOROFFICIAL USE ONLY
CRS Catholic Relief Services PA Postes atitorisis (Authorized positions)
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization & PAD Project Appraisal Document
Reintegration
DFID Departmentfor International Development PADEM Pacte de Modernisation de 1'Enseignement Supirieur et
Universitaire (Pact to Modernize Higher Education)
DRC DemocraticRepublic ofCongo PDO Project DevelopmentObjective
EAD Entitis Administratives Dbcentralisies PER Public ExpenditureReview
(DecentralizedAdministrative Entities)
EFA Educationfor All PETS Public ExpenditureTracking Survey
EMRRP Emergency Multi-Sector Rehabilitation & PFM Public Financial Management
ReconstructionProject
EN Ecole normale (Teacher training school) PIU Project Implementation Unit
EO1 Expressionof Interest PMCU Project Management and Coordination Unit
EPSP Enseignemenf Primaire, Secondaire et PPF ProjectPreparationFacility
Professionnel (Primary, Secondary and
Professional Education)
ESMF Environmental and Social Management PROVED Province Educative (Provincial EducationDirectorate)
Framework
EU EuropeanUnion PRSP PovertyReduction Strategy Paper
EUSRP EmergencyUrban & SocialRehabilitation PTA Parent-TeacherAssociation
Project
FC Francs Congolais (Congolese Francs) PTS Paie Transitoire Simplifiie (Simplified Temporary
Payment System)
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance o f
their official duties\. Its contents may not be otherwise disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
FiscalYear TransitionalSupport Strategy
TSS
UN IIUnitedNations
~
UNDB UnitedNationsDevelopmentBusiness
GP GoodPractice UNDP UnitedNationsDevelopment Program
HIPC HeavilyIndebtedPoor Countries UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization
HIV HumanImmunodeficiencyVirus
HLNC High-LevelNationalCommission
IAPSO Inter-AgencyProcurementServicesOffice UNICEF UnitedNationsChildren'sFund
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction & UPE UniversalPrimaryEducation
Development
ICB InternationalCompetitiveBidding UPN UniversitP PPdagogique Nationale (National Pedagogical
University)
IDA InternationalDevelopmentAssociation USAID United StatesAgency for InternationalDevelopment
IFMIS Integrated Financial Management WGI World-WideGovernance Indicators
InformationSystem
IGF Inspection GPnkrale des Finances
(GeneralInsoectionof Finances)
Vice President: Obiageli K\.Ezekwesili
Country Director: Pedro Alba
Sector Manager: Laura Frigenti
Task Team Leader: Susan Opper
DEMOCRATICREPUBLIC OF CONGO
EDUCATIONSECTORPROJECT
Table of Contents
A\. STRATEGIC CONTEXT AND RATIONALE\. 1
1
6
Higher level objectives to which the project contributes \.
Rationale for Bank involvement\.
Country and sector issues \.
2\.
1\.
3\. 7
B\. PROJECTDESCRIPTION \. 8
2\. Project development objective and key indicators \.
1\. Lendinginstrument\. 8
8
3\. Project components\. 9
4 Lessons learned and reflected inthe project design\. 12
5 \. Alternatives considered and reasonsfor rejection\. 15
C\. IMPLEMENTATION \. 16
2\. Institutionalandimplementation arrangements \.
1\. Partnership arrangements \. 16
17
4\.
3\. Monitoring and evaluationo f outcomes/results \.
Sustainability \. 18
19
5 \. Critical risks and possible controversial aspects \. 21
6\. Grant conditions and covenants\. 22
D\. APPRAISAL SUMMARY\. 24
24
Technical \.
Economic and financial analyses\.
2\.
1\.
26
Fiduciary\. 26
4\.
3\. Social \. 27
29
Environment\.
Governance\.
6\.
5\.
29
7\. Safeguardpolicies\. 30
\. \.
8\. Policy Exceptions and Readiness \. 30
Annex 1: Country and Sector Background\. 31
Annex 2: Major Related Projects Financed bythe World Bank and other Agencies \.47
56
Annex 4: DetailedProject Description\.
Annex 3: ResultsFramework and Monitoring\.
62
Annex 5: Project Costs \.
Annex 6: ImplementationArrangements \. 72
73
Annex 7: Financial Management andDisbursementArrangements\. 79
Annex 8: Procurement Arrangements \. 99
Annex 10: Safeguard Policy Issues \. 116
Annex 9: Economic andFinancial Analysis\. 105
Annex 11:Project Preparationand Supervision\. 120
122
Annex 14: Country at a Glance \. 129
Annex 13: Statement ofLoans and Credits\.
Annex 12: Selected Documentsinthe Project File\.
128
Annex 15: Monitoringand Evaluation Arrangements \. 132
Annex 16: Critical Risksand GovernanceResponse\. 134
Annex 17: Education SectorPolicy Letter \. 139
Map N o IBRD33391
CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
ZR EDUCATION SECTOR PROJECT
PROJECTAPPRAISAL DOCUMENT
AFRICA
AFTH3
Date: May 4,2007 Team Leader: Susan Opper
Country Director: Pedro Alba Sectors: Primary education (89%); General
Sector Manager: Laura Frigenti educationsector (8%); Tertiary education (3%)
Themes: Education for all (P)
Project ID: PO86294 Environmental screening category: B - Partial
I Assessment
LendinnInstrument: Specific InvestmentLoan
[ ] Loan [ ] Credit [XI Grant [ 3 Guarantee [ 3 Other:
For Loans/Credits/Others:
Total Bank financing (US$m\.): 150\.00
IDA Grant 49\.00 101\.00 150\.00
Total: 49\.50 101\.00 150\.50
Borrower:
Democratic Republic of Congo
ResponsibleAgency:
Ministry ofPrimary, Secondary and ProfessionalEducation
S\.E\.M\.Maker MwanguFamba, Minister
Croisement des Avenues
Batetela et Cliniques
Congo, Democratic Republicof
Tel: 243 081 99 08 976
Estimateddisbursements (Bank FYIUS$m)
TY 8 9 10 11 12
4nnual 10\.9 49\.3 42\.4 28\.2 19\.2
hmulative 10\.9 60\.2 102\.6 130\.8 150\.0
Project implementation period: Start September 30,2007 End: June 30,2012
Expectedeffectivenessdate: September 30, 2007
I
IExpected closing date: December 31,2012
Does the project depart from the CAS in content or other significant respects?
Re$ PAD A\.3 [ ]Yes [XINO
Does the project require any exceptions from Bank policies?
R& PADD\.7
Have these beenapproved by Bank management?
I s approval for any policy exception sought from the Board? [ ]Yes [XINO
Does the project include any critical risksrated"substantial" or "high"?
Re$ PAD C\.5 [XIYes [ ] N o
Does the project meet the Regional criteria for readiness for implementation?
Re$ PAD D\.7 [XIYes [ ] N o
Project development objective Ref: PAD B\.2, TechnicalAnnex 3
To prevent further deterioration in the delivery o f essential services for primary education and
prepare ground for a sustainable development and financing of the sector that will facilitate
donor coordinationand future transition to a sector wide program\.
Project description Re$ PAD B\.3, TechnicalAnnex 4
*Increase access and equity at primary level by providing resources to reduce the cost o f
education to households (reduce primary school fees) and rehabilitating 1570 classrooms which
will boost the demandfor and supply ofeducation\.
*Improve quality o f primary education by providing textbooks inmathematics and reading for
every pupil in grades 1-2 o f primary school, and by creating research capacity to assess and
monitor quality o f education which i s instrumental to future quality improvement\.
*Strengthencapacity for policy planning, budgetingand program execution inpivotal areas for
the sector includingteacher career structure andteacher training, andthe development o fa sector
wide mediumterm strategy for education\.
Which safeguard policies are triggered, ifany? Re$ PAD 0\.6, TechnicalAnnex 10
Environmental Assessment (OP/BP/GP 4\.01)
Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4\.12)
Significant, non-standard conditions, if any, for:
Re$ PAD D\.7
Covenants applicable to project implementation:
Effectiveness Covenants:
The Government will:
(i) Enact an inter-ministerial Arr&te`(bylaw) in form and substance satisfactory to IDA,
setting up an exclusive nomenclature and levels o f fees to be levied in connection
with primaryeducation;
(ii) Establish (a) the Project Management and Coordination Unit (PMCU) in form and
with functions satisfactory to IDA and with the following staff having qualifications
and experience satisfactory to IDA: a National Coordinator, a CFO, an Accountant, a
Treasurer, a Civil Engineer, and a Monitoring and Evaluation specialist; and (b) adopt
the Project Operations Manualinform andsubstance satisfactory to IDA;
fiii) Establish an operational fiduciary management system satisfactory to IDA including:
(a) the adoption o f the Manual o f Financial and Accounting Procedures in form and
\.
11
substance satisfactory to IDA; (b) the recruitment o f an international auditing firm
satisfactory to IDA, under terms and conditions satisfactory to IDA, to carry out
internal audit activities under the Project; and (c) install a software for financial
management, accounting and procurement withinthe PMCU;
(iv) Recruit the Procurement Agent on terms and conditions satisfactory to IDA;
(v) Recruit the independent(a) external financial auditing firm and (b) technical auditor\.
Progress in fulfilling the effectiveness conditions was as follows at the time negotiations were
completed inApril 2007:
The inter-ministerial Arr&te' (bylaw) setting up the nomenclature and levels o f fees
received IDA'Scomments during negotiations\. The MEPSP i s scheduling sign-off in
the Council ofMinisters byJune\.
The MEPSP has allocated office space for the PMCU\. The inter-ministerial technical
team established by Arr&te'(bylaw) no 0508/2005 (January 26, 2005) to prepare the
Project will continue up to Grant effectiveness\. The team i s preparing the
advertisements for all six PMCU positions noted above\. The PPF provides for the
National Coordinator and CFO to sign contracts by July 2007; they will be financed
initially from the PPF until the Grant becomes effective\. The MEPSP i s overseeing
preparations o f the Project Operations Manual, the outline o f which was discussed
with IDA at negotiations\. The PPF provides financing for a consultant, to sign a
contract by July 2007, to helpproduce the final draft Manual\.
A consultant to be financed from the PPF is scheduled to signa contract by July 2007
to draft the Manual o f Financial and Accounting Procedures\. An additional
consultant, also financed from the PPF, i s scheduled to sign a contract by August
2007 to install software for financial management, accounting and procurement for
the PMCU\. The inter-ministerial technical team i s preparingthe TOR for recruitment
o f an international auditing firm for the Project's internal audit activities\.
IDA has approved the TOR for the Procurement Agent\. Recruitment will be
underway before June 2007\.
The inter-ministerial technical team is preparing the TOR for recruitment o f the
independentexternal financial auditing firm and technicalauditor\.
Dated covenants:
(i) By July 31, 2008, the Recipient will have established an appropriate structure
comprising representatives o f relevant institutions and education sub-sectors including
primary, secondary and higher education and adult literacy to oversee the formulation
and implementation o f the comprehensive education strategy including an appropriate
legal framework and financing plans for all relevant sub-sectors including primary,
secondary and higher education and literacy programs;
(ii) By December 31, 2008, the Recipient will have: (a) formulated the comprehensive
education strategy described above; (b) carried out studies designedto promote equity
and to improve school achievement rates including inter alia: i)a feasibility study to
establish a sustainable and efficiently performing students' transportation scheme; ii)a
\.
111
nutrition study to supplement students' nutrition status within the school environment;
and iii)a health study aimed at sustaining good health for students within the school
environment\.
Conditions for disbursement:
No withdrawal shall be made for payments o fprimary school teachers' salaries and payments for
primary school operating cost subsidies until the Recipient has furnished to the Association
evidence satisfactory to it that each o f the actions described below has beentaken in a manner
satisfactory to the Association:
(i)Nowithdrawalshallbemade:(a) forpaymentoftheinitialinstallmentoftheteachers'
salaries (Category 6 o f the Grant) unless the Beneficiary has provided evidence that: i)an
Arr&te'ministe'riel (ministerial bylaw) has beenenacted freezing any transfer o f personnel
in primary school; and an Arr&te' inter-ministe'riel (inter-ministerial bylaw) has been
enacted freezing the opening or accreditation o f new public primary schools until a
comprehensive census o f primary schools, students, classrooms and teachers has been
completed; ii)all teachers currently enrolled into the public payroll schedule furnished by
SECOPE are integrated into the Paie Transitoire SimpliJie'e(PTS, Simplij?ed Temporary
Payment System) ;iii)a comprehensive list comprising the names o f all teachers to be
progressively integrated into the public payroll system and to be paid with the proceeds
o f the financing allocated to Category (6) has been delivered to IDA; and iv) SECOPE
has been granted exclusive authority to handle all payments o f teachers' salaries; (b) for
payment o f each subsequent installment o f teachers' salaries under Category (6) unless
the Beneficiary has submittedto IDA an audit report related to the use o fthe proceeds o f
the preceding installment for teachers' salaries satisfactory to IDA;
(ii) withdrawalshallbemadeafter December31, 2008: (a) forpaymentoftheinitial
No
installment o f the Subsidies for School Operating Costs (Category 7 o f the Grant) unless
the Beneficiary has provided evidence that: i)a comprehensive list identifying all public
primary schools eligible to receive subsidies for school operating costs through the
proceeds o f the financing allocated to Category (7) has beendelivered to IDA; and ii)the
Beneficiary has adopted a comprehensive school map covering its territory; and (b) for
payment o f each subsequent installment o f subsidies for school operating costs under
Category (7) unless the Beneficiary has submittedto IDA an audit report related to the
use o fthe proceeds o f the preceding installment for subsidies for school operating costs\.
iv
A\. STRATEGICCONTEXTAND RATIONALE
1\. Countryandsector issues
1\.1Countryissues
1\. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has made extraordinary progress inthe last few
years\. The success o f its democratic elections in 2006 can be a turning point to reverse decades
o f deterioration, provided that action i s taken to consolidate the post-election situation\. A
significant part o f the challenge lies in the education sector, where the Government's
commitment to free and compulsory primary education goes hand-in-hand with the need to
deliver a "peace dividend" in terms o f visible results on the ground\. If the new Government
cannot present such a dividend, there i s a risk o f regression to violence, triggered by unmet
expectations\. The regional ramifications could be serious because o f the influence o f the DRC -
Africa's third largest country - on the stability o fthe entire African continent\.
2\. Severely deteriorated living conditions render the social situation explosive inmany parts o f
the country\. It is highly polarized in political preferences while being one o f the poorest
countries inthe world despite rich endowmentsinnatural resources\. The annual Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) per capita o f about US$120 i s six times below the average for Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA)\. The DRC ranks 167 out of 177 countries surveyed by the UnitedNations Human
Development Index\.
3\. The country has beentaken close to bankruptcy by decades o f mismanagement and years o f
conflict\. It gained independence from Belgium in 1960, and in multi-party elections Patrice
Lumumba was elected prime minister\. He was murdereda year later\. In 1965 Mobutu Sese
Seko took power through a coup d'Ctat, introducing a one-party system that lasted until 1997\.
The Mobutu regimebroughtthe country to near-collapse\. Fromthe mid-1990s to 2001, the DRC
was the main battlefield for Africa's first continent-scale war that caused around four million
casualties and massive displacement o f the population\. The conflict exacerbated ethnic tensions
and secessionistmovements,posing a long-term challenge to the transition to peace\.
4\. Despite this legacy, the DRC made remarkable progress since 2001 moving from conflict to
reconstruction\. A peace accord was signed in South Africa in 2002\. By late 2003, a fragile
peace prevailed as a Transitional Government was formed\. Inthe democratic elections o f 2006,
the population elected the President and the National and Provincial Assemblies\. Governors
were indirectly elected through the Senate\. By early 2007, the newGovernment was formed\.
5\. On the economic front, the efforts made since 2001 are paying off\. Real GDP growth has
averaged five percent a year since 2003\. Increased export and inflows of foreign direct
investment (FDI), together with renewed donor involvement, structural reforms in the public
sector and a more stringent monetary policy have been vital\. Even if the macroeconomic
situation has improved, it is still fragile\. Inflation reached about eighteen percent year-on-year
by March 2007\. Major structural reforms need to be implementedin order for the country to
reapthe fruits o f its rich base o f natural resources and to increase well-beingfor its citizens\.
6\. Growth and stability are a prime concern, and indeed a prerequisite, for sustainable
improvementsinthe education sector\. It is badly financed, however, at currently less thantwo
percent o f GDP\. Other SSA countries provide an education budgetthat on average i s about five
percent o f GDP\.
1
7\. Corruption and poor governance impede the DRC's progress\. The latest Corruption
Perception Index released by Transparency International ranked the DRC among the ten most
corrupt countries in the world (156 out o f 163 countries)\. There is, however, a trend o f
improvements registered inthe Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, 2006), suggestingthat
reforms which the Transitional Government took to strengthen unsatisfactory economic and
financial control environments are having some effect\. While the WGI still ranks the DRC as
very weak, it also registers strong improvements in the ability o f the government to formulate
and implementregulatory policies for private sector development, andinpolitical stability, voice
and accountability\.
8\. The new Government i s well aware o f the importance o f combating poor governance and
corruption and has put this at the top o f its agenda (see Annex 16: Critical Risks and Governance
Response)\. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), finalized by the Transitional
Government in 2006, i s a key instrument for programming domestic and external investments
over the mediumterm\. It, too, addresses poor governance as the root cause o f the crisis which
ledto state failure and civil war\.
1\.2 Education Sector Issues
9\. The configuration o f the education system presents daunting challenges as a result o f the
decades o f generalized disruption\. The most formidable constraint i s the lack o f a sustainable
financing mechanism for the delivery o f education services\. Less than ten percent o f the national
budget (2006) is allocated to education\. This chronic under-funding is the main factor that
perpetuates low enrollment rates and the extremedegradation inthe quality o f services delivered\.
10\. Equity o f access i s a problem - especially at the base o f the system\. Even compared with
other African countries, the DRC has low coverage at the primary stage, whereas it has similar
levels o f coverage at the secondary and tertiary stages\. Gross enrollment ratios in the DRC are
estimated at 64 percent for primary, 23 percent for secondary and 6 percent for tertiary'\.
11\. The Constitution (2005) stipulates that primary education is compulsory and fee-free, but
affordability limits access and seriously challenges the Government's pro-poor objectives\. As
households are made to take on the major part o f financing for schools and teachers' salaries in
order to compensate for the lack o f public resources, this shuts out children from poor
households\. Especially vulnerable are the children inrural areas, and girls\. This reality prevents
the education system from expanding towards bothMillenniumDevelopment Goals (MDGs) for
education: (1) universal completion o f primary school, and (2) closing the gender gap in
education\. Untilthe affordability issue i s addressed, most other neededreforms inthe education
sector cannot be effectively tackled\.
12\. Quality i s abysmal and i s manifest in low retention rates\. Only about a third o f children in
urban centers and a fifth o f those inrural areas who enter school reach the fifth grade\. No recent
research has analyzed the determining factors on quality o f education inthe DRC, but it i s clear
that the elements known internationally to have an impact on quality are largely impaired or
missing in the Congo\. These include direct inputs (textbooks - which are the most important
resource for teachers and students inpoor settings; infrastructure; and trained teachers), the time
available for teaching, the nature o f the teaching-learning process, and school climate\. Less is
Lack o f recent census data and sampling difficulties due to geographic inaccessibility mean that gross enrollment
ratios are subject to a wide margin of error despite the improved sector analysis o f recent years\.
2
known about factors outside the pedagogical, institutional and management structure, such as
parental support for children's learning, other than that parents pay fees\.
13\. The deplorable degradation o f physical facilities also impacts on access\. Schools which
have decayed from decades o f neglect or have been destroyed during recent conflict have not
beenrepaired\. This rendershundreds o f classrooms unusable\. The destruction is widespread, so
the backlog incapital development and maintenance is immense\. An estimated one-third of the
country's schools are in such poor condition that they offer no shelter from inclement weather\.
Very few schools have functioning latrines\. Government estimates that at least US$l50 million
would be needed over 2007-2010 to rehabilitate 3,000 primary schools and 1,100 secondary
schools (750 primary and 275 secondary schools a year) to reach the MDGs in20-25 years\. Few
schools have learning materials\. The majority o f Congolese students never see the written word
until they take the national examination at the end o f primary school\. Most o f the country's
238,000 primary school teachers are relatively old and have not had their skills updated for
decades\. Pre-service training o f new entrants, which i s mostly offered through the pedagogical
stream o f secondary education (humunite'spe'dagogiques),does not confer adequate pedagogical
or professional skills\.
14\. The system i s not responding adequately to the special schooling needs o f children and
young adults made vulnerable by the years of conflict: child soldiers, street children, refugees
and orphans\. The Ministry o f Social Affairs and National Solidarity (MinistBre des Affaires
Sociales et de la Solidarite'Nationale, MASSN) has a new constitutional mandate for literacy,
but lacks sufficient knowledge of which programs may actually be operating\. There is no
national policy on resourcing non-formal education, nor guidelines on its role v i s - h i s formal
education incombating illiteracy on a massive scale\.
15\. The environment in which education services are delivered must be defined and improved\.
The prolonged period o f economic decline and the isolation o f large areas o f the country during
times o f conflict fostered pragmatic adaptation to evolving needs\. Haphazard growth and
mismanagement widened the discrepancy between the formal and legal framework on the one
hand, and actual practice on the other\. The resultingduality and lack o f clarity infunctions and
responsibilities in the system's administration, aggravated by incomplete decentralization,
created massive internal and external inefficiencies which constrain the education sector's
development today\. Accountability relationships between the schools and parents, on the one
hand, and between schools and policy-makers on the other, have successively deteriorated and
needurgentlyto be rebuilt\.
16\. Despite all odds, a solid foundation still exists to undertake sound planning, but it needs to
be strengthened\. This calls for updating the legal framework for the education sector, revamping
professional norms and standards, empowering local communities, and improving teacher quality
at an affordable price\. It means redefining an appropriate role and financing strategy for
Government in service delivery, in partnership with the religious organizations, which run
roughly seventy percent o f all public primary and secondary schools\. In addition, local
communities need to be empowered to exert their role as oversight bodies and participate
effectively inschool-level decisions\.
1\.3 Governmentresponse
17\. The first statements o f the new democratically elected Government, which outline the key
principles o f a recovery strategy, accord high priority to improving the delivery o f education
3
services\. Education i s one o f five pillars in the recovery strategy; especially prominent i s the
goal to provide free basic education for all\. Taken as a whole, the Government's principles for
recovery outlined inthe Governance Compact as a binding agreement betweenGovernment and
Parliament also address critical supporting factors for improving education services: improving
governance and fighting corruption; restoring security throughout the country; rebuilding
infrastructure, including inthe transport, water and energy sectors; and improving the delivery o f
health services\. An organic budget law for decentralization i s being drafted and will have an
impact onthe above results\.
18\. The new government's emphasis on education amplifies the already significant achievement
o f the Transitional Government which endorsed a Letter o f Education Sector Policy (2006; see
Annex 17) to guide the sector's reconstruction\. The commitment to rebuild the sector also
carries through inrecent strategic documents including the Education for All (EFA) Action Plan
and a proposal for reforming higher education (Pacte de Modernisation de I'Enseignement
Supe`rieur et Universitaire, PADEM - Pactto Modernize Higher Education)\.
19\. At the operational level, there i s the nucleus o f a Government-led initiative to integrate
efforts to improve education into a coherent, Sector-Wide Assistance Program (SWAP)\. This
dynamic i s ledby ajoint working group created by three ministrieso f education: the Ministry o f
Primary, Secondary and Professional Education (MEPSP); the Ministryo f Higher Education and
Universities (MESU); and the Ministryo f Social Affairs andNational Solidarity (MASSN)\. The
group i s a focal point for engaging with external partners,promoting synergies across the various
investments in the sector\. The PRSP process further encouraged regular liaison between the
education sector and the ministries o f Budget, Finance, and Civil Service to improve the budget
preparation process (allocation o f public spending to reflect the priorities o f the education
sector), as well as to strengthen accountability chains for allocated funds to reach intended
beneficiaries\. Research indicates that, if properly directed, additional investments in the sector
could enable the DRC to reach a 75 percent gross enrollment rate inprimary school by 2012 - a
realistic target for broadening access\.
20\. The national authorities have stepped up their dialogue with education sector stakeholders:
the religious organizations, parent associations, teachers and civil service unions\. Whereas the
dialogue has at times been volatile - negotiations alternated with massive teacher strikes - the
Government managed to end strikes inlate 2005 by using domestic budget resources to respond,
to the extent possible, to the teachers' demands for higher salaries\. This action brought an
average 100 percent increase in primary and secondary teacher salaries nationwide, generating
an immediate positive impact on the reduction o f the elevated co-financing from households -
particularly regarding the feefrais de motivation (FDM, Fees for teachers' motivation) that has
become directed toward teachers' salaries\. Still, the direct contribution from parents via these
FDM (which finances both the top-up "salary incentives" for teachers who draw a salary from
the public sector, andthe entire salary ofteachers who are not onthe public payroll) is equivalent
involume to about halfofthe public financing o fteachers\. The FDMare fees set by each school
and constitute roughly half the total amount of the various fees that parents must pay to send
their childrento public primary schools\.
21\. The increase in salaries decided at the start o f school year 2005-2006 was accompanied by
two other policy interventions\. The first intervention was the announcement that the
Government would start using HIPC funds (funds released due to the International debt relief
initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) to introduce a block grant program aiming at
4
reducing running costs apart from teacher salaries at publicly administered schools\. Such
runningcosts are partly charged as school fees known asfrais defonctionnement (FDF, Fees for
school's running costs)\. The program originally covered about 22,900 primary and secondary
schools and disbursedapproximately US$530 a year in identical annual tranches to each school\.
The combination o f targeting less than half o f the country's schools and neglectingthe differing
needs in schools - in terms o f size o f enrollment, age and degree o f deterioration o f the
buildings and facilities - led to increasing inequities and inefficiencies\. As a follow-up, the
Government has set new criteria for allocation o f block grants according to the size o fthe school,
and sanctions are in process to address specific cases o f improper handling o f the funds, in
accordance with the inter-ministerial circular that governs the distribution o fthese grants\.
22\. The second policy intervention was the announcement that all but four fees were no longer
to be charged for primary school (Arr&te'No MINEPSP/CABMIN/6635/2005, September 3, 2005)\.
The four fees to be allowed were: the Minewal, school insurance, and two forms o f examination
fees\. This announcement was probably the most significant o f all the measures because it
established the illegitimacy o f the two main fees charged at the primary school level: the FDM
and FDF\. Together, these two make up more than three quarters o f all fees paid by households
to sendtheir children to public schools\. After the announcement was made, calculations showed
that the financial loss would be more than US$lOO million a year, if no other sources o f revenue
were forthcoming to fill the gap\. Therefore, although the Government did raise salaries
significantly and initiated a block grant program to offset the collection o f FDF, this
compensation package was not enough\. A package at least twice the size would have been
necessary\. To that amount should be added the costs o f providing schooling for the estimated
five million school-age childrenwho currently do not attend primary school at all\.
23\. The recent decisions mark significant progress toward the goal o f decreasing school fees
and increasing teacher salaries, but these measures have not been adequate to eliminate the main
hurdles to access\. TOO,the September 2005 package was undertakenon an emergency basis\.
There was no guarantee o fprogressive increases to the far higher salary levels that teachers were
demanding\.
24\. To have a sustainable impact, the Government needs to increase its effort to improve and
broaden access to education through a combination of: i)an increase in domestic and external
resource mobilization, including persuading donors to scale up aid efforts; ii)an increase intotal
spendingon education (currently at about 2 percent o f GDP); iii)an increase inthe share o f the
education budget allocated to primary; and iv) an improvement inthe quality o f service delivery
carefully calibrated with implementation o f the ongoing decentralization process and civil
service reform, as the latter impact on teachers and education administrators\.
25\. The authorities are fully aware that the comprehensive reform o f the public administration i s
the context inwhich a new statute on teachers will needto be formulated\. Government drafted
(2003) a framework for civil service reform with technical support from a multi-donor program\.
This aims to define the key missions o f priority ministries and public service agencies at central
andprovincial levels, and upgrade the skill levels and productivity o ftheir staff\. The first set o f
actions (for the triennium 2004-2006) have included: (i) audit o f service delivery mechanisms,
especially at the local level, covering health, education and justice; (ii) an operational audit of
ministries to prepare their reorganization; and (iii) obligatory retirement program for staff
an
who has passedthe legal retirementage by the end o f 2004\.
5
26\. Inthe meantime, donors contributed roughly US$60 million for education up to 2006, most
o f which targets primary education\. With support from the United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF), the UnitedNations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and
the Belgian Cooperation, the MEPSP has developed a new curriculum for primary level and
distributed this to schools\. For academic year 2004-2005, with support from the Belgian
Cooperation, reading and mathematics textbooks for grades 5 and 6 were deliveredto all primary
schools inthe country, and for academic year 2007-2008, the Belgian Cooperationhas decided to
provide textbooks for grades 3 and 4\. The Government has also been using an estimated total
US$20 million from various InternationalDevelopment Association (IDA)-financed multi-sector
programs (Emergency Multi-Sector Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project - EMRRP,
Emergency Early Recovery Project, Post-Conflict Economic Recovery Credit and Emergency
Trust Fund) to rehabilitate classrooms mainly in primary and secondary schools, and procure
learningmaterials, furniture, and laboratory equipmentfor all levels o f education (see Annex 2)\.
With UNICEF support, the MEPSP is targeting some 3,000 schools for intensive support to
school management at local level, while also mounting a new campaign nationally to encourage
enrollment, particularly for girls\. Importantly, there i s consensus among the multilateral and
bilateral partners on the urgency o f concerted action to reduce primary school fees\. Selected
partners have begunto orient their support directly to this imperative\. The UnitedStates Agency
for International Development (USAID) and Oxfam International are piloting some small-scale
initiatives whereas the World Bank through the Emergency Urban and Social Rehabilitation
Project (EUSRP) approved inMarch 2007 i s supporting the government to finance block grants
to primary and secondary schools on a national level to continue offsetting the fees otherwise
requiredfor runningcosts (FDF)\.
27\. The proposed Education Sector Project plays a significant role in the consensus already
reached on working together, through an education sector SWAP, especially to support
progressive elimination o f primary school fees\. Discussions are underway on the modalities for
the external partners to contribute to a multi-donor trust fund that would scale up the financing
available for the government to put into the education sector budget in order to offset the
charging o f school fees\. The modalities are expected to be agreed after the grant for the
proposed Education Sector Project becomes effective\.
2\. Rationale for Bank involvement
28\. The challenges faced by the education sector inthe DRC are enormous\. The sector involves
more than twelve million students within a highly pyramidal distribution where the probability
that a child who starts primary school would ever reach a tertiary institution i s only two percent\.
The internal inefficiency o f the system is low as evidenced by the low survival rates between
levels or grades, and there are abysmally low primary school access rates, fostered by a
disproportionate and compulsory co-financing from households that make the system unviable
and unsustainable inthe long run\.
29\. The sector needs are immense in many regards: data collection; mapping o f real school
needs; reorganization and simplification of the cumbersome administrative structures, including
payment o fteachers; financial assistancefor dealing with direct and indirect costs o f education at
all levels; empowering local communities to participate in school-level decisions; and an urgent
infrastructure boost, among others\. Prioritizing policies of assistance to the sector i s therefore a
critical exercise that needs to be undertaken to obtain the largest social returns for the proposed
6
Project\. IDA funds are, inthis sense, the most important tool the DRC Governmenthas inorder
to address the immediateneeds on a large scale\.
30\. No other major donor i s involved in sector-specific service delivery issues in tandem with
macro issues (e\.g\. public expendituremanagement) which impact on long-term education sector
development\. Current donor coverage for education, despite the evolving support for a SWAP,
i s uneven\. The financial flows o f other donor investments are not managed by government
systems\. Inthis respect as well, the Bank leads inadapting its instrumentsinorder to strengthen
anduse country systems, with appropriate safeguards\.
31\. The Bank's role i s critical at this juncture in the DRC's history insofar as the Bank's
presence lends credibility to the process and strengthens the hands of the reformers within
government and civil society\. The Bank also acts as a catalyst to galvanize support from other
development partners, as witnessed through the process in 2006 that resulted in an agreed
framework of joint action to support the new government's priorities in the education sector\.
Without sufficient external financial support, however, it i s likely that many reform programs
would be false starts\.
32\. The Bank has also accumulated broad-scale, on-the-ground experience in all provinces o f
the DRC\. The Bank team has provided the main analytical underpinnings for sector
development since 2001,through the analysis o f education finance including in-depthstudies o f
the teacher salary payment system, enrollment trends, education for under-served groups,
institutional and policy assessment\. In addition to the in-depth and comprehensive Country
Status Report on the education system (World Bank, 2005b), the Bank has carried out a Country
Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA, 2005), a Country Procurement Assessment
Review(CPAR, 2004), a Public ExpenditureReview (PER, a second one has begunin2007), a
survey o f users o f public services (BERCI, 2004, see Annex 12), a Risk & Vulnerability
Assessment to help prepare the IDA-financed Emergency Social Action Project, as well as a
more comprehensive Poverty Report (Poverty Diagnostic and Priorities o f the Poor, 2005)\. The
proposed Education Sector Project draws on these experiences and findings\. The Project intends
to provide the financing needed to accelerate development in key areas and generate further
analytical work to guide future IDA investments\. As this i s the Bank's first stand-alone
education sector project after re-engagement, it is expected that projects in other areas such as
secondary, technical or higher education will follow\.
3\. Higher level objectives to which the project contributes
33\. The Education Sector Project contributes to the higher level objectives set out by the
Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) inFebruary2004 to mitigate the acute risks perpetuatingthe
erosion o f social capital inthe DRC\. The TSS recommends revitalizing education to consolidate
the process of recovery and stabilization on grounds that through investments in the social
sectors, the population will quickly see concrete results on the ground\. The Project will also
provide the building blocks to devise a medium term education sector development program\.
The proposed approach for the Project is anchored in a joint donor diagnosis articulated in the
new Country Assistance Framework (CAF) of support to the newly elected Government, the
context in which the Project will operate\. The CAF i s framed in the perspectives of the PRSP
and the Bank's Africa Action Plan (AAP), in which good governance i s the central element
driving capacity building for an effective State\. Both PRSP and AAP endorse progress toward
MDGsas animportant indicator ofprogress indevelopment\.
7
B\. PROJECT DESCRIPTION
1\. Lendinginstrument
34\. The lending instrument i s an IDA sector investment grant in the amount o f
US$l50 million\.
2\. Projectdevelopmentobjectiveand key indicators
35\. The Project Development Objective (PDO) i s to prevent further deterioration inthe delivery
o f essential services for primary education and to prepare the ground for a sustainable
development and financing o f the sector that will facilitate donor coordination and future
transition to a sector wide program\.
36\. Success in achieving this objective will be observed in improved quality, and higher
enrollment rates at the primary school level, mainly as a result o f a lower financial burden on
households for the subsistence o f the system\. It cannot be expected that significant policy
change will happen quickly\. The ground must be prepared through technical work to understand
specific issues more thoroughly, and through coalition and consensus building, as first steps for
the newGovernment to take on amore ambitious set ofreforms\.
37\. The focus on primary education i s motivated by its underdeveloped status in the DRC in
terms o f the historical trends in enrollment growth, the importance o f primary education to the
poor, and the priority that the newly elected Government has accorded to universalizing basic
education\. By also focusing on the broader institutional and financing framework for the sector,
the Project embeds the support to primary education ina conscious effort to sustain these gains
inthe longerterm\.
38\. Inorder to achieve its objectives, the Project will provide support for: (i) reducing primary
school fees and providing free access to textbooks to increase equity in the supply o f primary
education services; (ii) buildingquality through monitoring learning achievement and improving
the status for teachers; (iii)restoring access to primary education o f at least minimal quality,
especially in areas affected by the conflict o f the last decade; (iv) providing technical assistance
and material support to build the system capacity o f government and prepare policies which
update and re-structure the legal governance, financing, and administration o f the education
sector; and (v) strengtheningaccountability relationships and empowering local communities to
enable them to take part inschool-level decisions and oversee the supply o f education services\.
39\. The Project will cover the entire country\. All public and public-subsidizedprimary schools
will be targeted by the support for reducing school fees and distribution o f textbooks
(Components 1and 2)\. The same i s true for classroom rehabilitation, although two-thirds o f the
classrooms rehabilitated will be inareas most affected by the war\.
40\. The outcome indicators o fthe Project will be (see also Annex 3):
(i) Growth inthe Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) from 64% in2007 to 75% in2012\.
(ii) Increase inprimary education completionrate from 29% in2007 to 35% in2012\.
(iii) Reform o fteacher career structure (training, deployment, salary, incentives) approved\.
(iv) Education sector strategy (including mediumterm financing plan) with indicators agreed
with donors and approved by the Government\.
8
3\. Projectcomponents
(See Annex 4 for detailed descriptionand Annex 5 for detailed cost breakdown)
Component 1:IncreaseAccess and Equityat PrimaryLevel
(Estimated costs, includingcontingencies: US$104\.52 million)
0 Sub-componentla:Rehabilitate primary school infrastructure (US$28\.73 million)\.
41\. The sub-component will provide support to rehabilitate primary school infrastructure and
establish a sustainable national strategy for school rehabilitation through (i) and technical
studies
work on such issues as norms for low-cost construction, community participation, good
governance; financial, technical and logistics management; as well as maintenance; (ii)
rehabilitation o f about 1570 primary school classrooms (approximately 260 schools) and the
school directors' offices and latrines; equipment (desks, storage closets for textbooks); and (iii)
capacity building for the Infrastructure Directorate o f the MEPSP and the provincial education
authorities and school personnel in such fields as strategic planning, low-cost techniques,
financial and procurement management, contracting out works to the private sector,
decentralized community-managed school construction, and maintenance through the carrying
out o fworks andthe provision o f goods, services and training\.
0 Sub-Component lb: Rehabilitate the Universite`Pe`dagogiqueNationale (UPN, National
Pedagogical University) (US$3\.38 million)\.
42\. This large university, located in Kinshasa, i s the only high level institution in the country
that i s exclusively focused on training teachers and tertiary level teacher educators, and
pedagogical research\. The University i s critical for providing DRC with resources to support its
education sector reforms, but i s constrained by lack o f facilities and equipment\. The Project will
provide support to rehabilitate UPN (classroom blocks, latrines, and offices; as well as
equipment and pedagogical materials including desks and laboratory equipment) through the
carrying out o fworks and the provision o f goods\.
0 Sub-component IC: EquityofAccess to Primary Education(US$70\.10 million)\.
Improve
43\. This finances expenditures to empower the government to (i) eliminate parents' monetary
contributions to sustain operating costs for primary schools; and (ii) integrate 30,000 primary
school teachers into the public payroll for public primary schools\. These are teachers who are
already operational on the ground and who are inthe pipeline, according to agreed criteria, to be
financed through the public sector pending availability of funds\. Presently these teachers are
financed by fees collected through the FDM\. Project support will apply to primary teachers and
primary schools only, in keeping with the focus on the MDGs\. Project funds for this sub-
component will be channeled through the country's mechanism for paying teacher salaries\.
44\. The Project will also support strengthening accountability and empowering local
communities to participate in school-level decisions\. Citizen's Report Cards (CRCs) conducted
on an annual basis during the Project aim to permit students and parents to assess primary
education along basic quality dimensions\. A Needs Assessment o f training needs for parent
committees, parent-teacher associations (PTAs), and teachers' trade unions will establish a
program at local levels for strengthening their capacity for planning, budgeting, financial
management, and fighting corruption\. The objective i s to empower school communities to work
better in their function as oversight bodies, and strengthen their abilities to influence school
9
management in more efficient ways\. In addition, a communication strategy that covers all
phases and components o f the Project will be formulated\. The strategy i s to facilitate both the
flow o f information and the dialogue on the fee policy, governance, corruption, tendering o f
contracts under the Project and other service delivery issues\. The Project will assess compliance
through technical audits and through focus group discussions with school management and
parent committees\. Additional support activities are insub-component 1d\.
0 Sub-ComponentId: StrengthenSafeguards inTeacher Pay System (US$2\.3 1million)\.
45\. The Service de ContrGZe de la Paie des Enseignants (SECOPE, Department for Monitoring
the Payment ofTeacher Salaries) at MEPSP is the agent designated to assist the BudgetMinistry
for payment o f teachers' salaries and to transfer central Government block grants to schools to
subsidize operating costs\. The SECOPE database i s a vital planning and management tool for
the education sector yet is maintained on out-of-stock hardware (computers) and software
(Common-Business Oriented Language or COBOL)\. This presents imminent risk o f breakdown
that would have serious political consequences if teachers could not be paid\. This sub-
component will provide services to enhance safeguards inthe Government's teacher pay system
through: (i) strengtheningSECOPE's capacity at the central and provincial level inthe field o f
database planning and management, as well as resources management and monitoring; (ii)
providing goods (upgraded computers, software, and internet connections for the SECOPE
central and Provincial offices); (iii)
carrying out o f information and communications campaigns
on the policy to eliminate primary school fees; (iv) training of parent groups in monitoring the
fee-free policy for primary schools; (v) transportation costs o f audits comprising mixed teams
from the Ministries o f Finance, Budget and Primary, Secondary and Professional Education
(EPSP, Enseignement Primaire, Secondaire et Professionnel), and independent third party
observers; and (vi) carrying out o f two Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) o f
payments o f salaries for primary education teachers and fees for operating expenditures in
primary education\. One PETS will establish baseline conditions\. A second PETSwill follow in
the Project's fourth year\.
Component2: ImproveQualityofPrimaryEducation
(Estimatedcosts, including contingencies: US$28\.76 million)
0 Sub-Component2a: ProvideTextbooks (US$26\.01 million)\.
46\. The initial objective o f this component was to provide reading and mathematics textbooks
for grades 1, 2, 3 and 4 to complement the grades 5 and 6 textbooks financed by the Belgian
Cooperation for academic year 2004-2005\. Since the Belgian Cooperation has decided to
provide textbooks for grades 3 and 4, the IDA Grant would focus on support for (i) acquisition o f
textbooks for grades 1 and 2 inmathematics and reading, ina ratio of 1textbook per student, and
1 textbook and the corresponding teacher's guide per teacher for all public schools and
government supported private schools\. This will represent a total o f about 11million textbooks
and 278,000 teachers' guides; (ii) training inspectors, school advisers and school directors inthe
use o f textbooks; (iii)
production and distribution to primary schools o f 172,000 manuals inthe
care and management o f textbooks; (iv) establishment o f a database in the MEPSP to track
textbook stocks in the schools; (v) carrying out study tours in selected countries with good
experience in developing databases to track textbook stocks; (vi) training of Curriculum and
Learning Materials Division staff o f the MEPSP in evaluation o f textbook content and in
definition of textbook pedagogical and technical specifications; and (vii) carrying out of a book
10
sector study aimed at gathering relevant information and knowledge to develop and implement
an adequate national textbook policy\.
0 Sub-Component2b: BuildCapacity to Assess LearningAchievement (US$2\.75 million)\.
47\. This sub-component will improve institutional capacity to assess learning achievement and
conduct research on learningand retention in school inorder to inculcate a culture o f monitoring
the quality of education inthe DRC\. The activities aim to take the next step, to buildout from
previously modest, donor-led standardized assessments o f learning achievement, and will also
include research into determinants o f quality and its impact on learning achievement and
retention inschool\. The sub-component aims to establish a partnership between the UPN andthe
Inspectorate who will administer the assessments\. The Project will support (i)international
technical assistance to train relevant staff at UPN inresearch on learning achievement, statistical
sampling, diagnostic learning assessment tools and assessment design, including for the
preparation o f the survey to be carried out inprimary education; (ii) establishing capacity within
UPN to provide baseline information on learning achievements inprimary schools; (iii) carrying
out two rounds of assessments inselected primary schools\.
0 Component 3: Strengthen Institutional and Financial Capacity o f the Education Sector
(Estimated costs, including contingencies: US$5\.06 million)
48\. The objective o f this component i s to contribute to revising the legal and institutional
framework o f the education system, and to reinforce institutional capacities for planning, budget
formulation, and program execution\. Key aspects include the career structure o f teachers,
teacher training, and development o f coherent, technically sound and results-oriented strategies
for education sector development which are based on realistic financing plans andbudgets\.
0 Sub-Component 3a Support Policy Reform-Teacher Career Structure (US$0\.91 million)\.
49\. This sub-component will provide technical advisory services to support policy reform inthe
field o f pre-service and in-service teacher training, including inter alia: (i)analysis o f existing
resources and reform options for pre-service teacher education; (ii) evaluation o f existing in-
service teacher training experiences and options for scaling up; (iii)
feasibility studies for reform,
including study tours in selected countries; (iv) assistance to a National Commission to be
created to review the career structure and reward system for teachers and draft the policy
document on the proposed reform; and (v) information and communication activities to help
build national consensus on reform proposals\. The new training policies will be formulated in
tandem and linked with the Government's redefinition o f the career structure o f teachers within
the ongoing civil service reform\. Expectedresults are: (i)new statute on teachers' careers and
a
salaries, formulated and adopted within the civil service reform; (ii) a plan to modernize the
system o f pre-service teacher training; and (iii) strategy and action plan for in-service teacher
a
training with the view to providing certification in line with the new statute and guidelines on
teacher qualifications\.
0 Sub-Component 3b Support Preparation o f a Sector-wide Education Strategy (US$4\.15
million)\.
50\. This sub-component will provide support to the formulation and implementation of: (i)a
comprehensive education strategy including an appropriate legal framework and financing plans
for all relevant sub-sectors including primary, secondary and higher education and literacy
programs; and (ii) pilot programs designedto increase literacy and school remediation across the
11
country; as well as (iii) establishment o f an appropriate structure comprising representatives
the
o f relevant institutions and education sub-sectors, including primary, secondary and higher
education and literacy to oversee the formulation and implementation o f the comprehensive
education strategy referred to above; (iv) carrying out o f workshops, seminars, publicity
campaigns and technical audits aimed at disseminating the new comprehensive education
strategy and fostering sustainable dialogue between key stakeholders in the education sector
including parents, teachers, school administrators and representatives o f civil society; and (v)
carrying out o f studies designed to promote equity and to improve school achievement rates
including inter alia: (a) a feasibility study to establish a sustainable and efficiently performing
students' transportation scheme; (b) a nutrition studyto supplementstudents' nutrition withinthe
school environment; and (c) a health study aimed at sustaining good health for students within
the school environment\. The technical assistancewill include support for updating the Zoi cadre
(organic law) to define the roles and responsibilities o f the State at all levels, the religious
organizations, rural and urban communities and parents in financing and managing schools; as
well as financial modeling techniques and designing medium term expenditure frameworks
(MTEF)\.
Component 4: ProjectCoordinationand Management
(Estimated costs, including contingencies: US$l1\.17 million)
51\. The Project will strengthenproject management and coordination o f the Steering Committee
comprised o f the MEPSP, the MESU, the MASSN, the Ministryo f Finance and the Ministry o f
Budget with an increment in resources required to operate a Project Management and
Coordination Unit (PMCU) described elsewhere inthis document\. The Project will also provide
financing for the acquisition o f technical advisory services, computer equipment, office
materials, supplies and vehicles requiredfor the Project; and the provision o f training (including
study tours) to enhance the capacity and expertise o f the ministry staff involved in carrying out
the Project\.
PPF: (US$l\.O million)
52\. An IDA-approved Project Preparation Facility (PPF) was under implementation to complete
activities requiredfor readiness for Project implementation\. The PPF was to be managed by the
Bureau Central de Coordination (BCECO), but following the Department o f Institutional
Integrity (INT) general investigations inthe DRC, the government and IDA agreed instead that
an implementationunit that already manages another IDA-financed operation inthe DRC would
handle procurement and financial management for the PPF under a Grant Agreement with IDA,
and a service contract with the above-mentioned Steering Committee (see Institutional and
ImplementationArrangements, below)\.
4\. Lessonslearnedand reflectedinthe projectdesign
53\. The design o f the Project incorporates lessons learned from: (i) Bank operations in
recent
conflict-affected countries including Afghanistan, East Timor, Iraq, Kosovo, Tajikistan; (ii)
current Bank operations inDRC, particularly the EMRRP and budget support operations, as well
as the findings o f the INT investigation in 2006; (iii) abolition efforts and education sector
fee
financing strategies to reach the MDGs in education in low-income countries; and (iv)
international research on effective approaches for stimulating demand from the poor (e\.g\. free
12
textbooks and lower school fees) and to improve quality (support for textbooks, teachers and
management)\. Lessonhighlightsare below\.
54\. Bank operations inconflict-affected countries:
(i) Investments during the emergency recovery and stabilization phase of a country
following a period o f conflict will be more effective if they are oriented into a cohesive
development strategy - even an iterative one\. Reconstructionefforts ineducation should
be integrated into the broader development framework o f debt relief, poverty reduction,
promotion o f economic growth, and other measures to transition to normal operating
conditions\. This implies balancing investments between essential inputs (as learning
materials, teacher training) and technical assistance instrategic planning to strengthenthe
education sector ministries' participation in the macro process o f stabilizing recurrent
budgets and re-establishing the mechanisms that regulate institutionalprocedures (such as
the handlingofteachers' salaries)\.
(ii) To maintain the focus on education as a priority during post-conflict reconstruction and
development, the coordination o f external donors i s key\. Promoting complementarity
among donor initiatives will leverage the country's capacity to implement programs and
develop reform policies in education\. The Project builds on the efforts o f the Bank's
education team, incollaborationwith the Belgian Cooperation and the UnitedKingdom's
Department for International Development (DFID), which established regular donor
consultations to ease the DRC Government's task in coordination\. Principles were agreed
to at the Education Round Table of September 2004\. A Comite` de Concertation
(Cooperation Committee) o f government, donor and civil society representatives in
education meets regularly and supports the evolving efforts to develop a SWAP\.
56\. Bank operations inthe DRC
Investing in education only through sub-components in multi-sector projects constrains
the ability to bring results as it limits the Bank's engagement in the education sector
policy dialogue\. This is because the multi-sector projects provide inadequate
administrative budget for education sector experts to participate\. As a consequence,
multi-sector projects which include education tend to focus on simple civil works
investments\. This does not allow the Bank to achieve the neededbalance o f investments
inthe education sectorto support sustainable development\.
Deteriorated roads outside urban areas, and security risks, make it difficult to execute and
supervise the progress o f investment activities\. The Project will support the use o f a
combination o f local education authorities and consultants and contracted agents who
have mechanisms for reaching remote areas\.
It is essential to the success and sustainability o f the Project to empower the technical,
sector ministries\. Unlike the EMRRP where BCECO i s the implementing agency, the
sector ministries directly involved in education are responsible for the oversight o f the
proposed Project\. A Project Management and Coordination Unit that i s adequately
staffed, and that also builds capacity within the participating ministries during the
Project's lifetime, will equip the education authorities at the central and decentralized
levels to carry out their roles effectively during the Project; and improve chances that this
will continue after the Project closes\.
13
(vi) Implementation must be accompanied by effective and timely monitoring and evaluation
o f progress and results\. There must be flexibility to adjust duringthe course o f execution
if this becomes necessary to improve the results of the Project\. Sector analytic work
during the preparation phase o f the Project has begun to strengthen the DRC's own
capacity to obtain reliable and timely data\. This aspect must continue to receive
sufficient attention and resources duringthe Project\.
(vii) Previous IDA-financed operations inthe DRC have demonstrated that it i s possible to use
the country's own systems, with appropriate safeguards, to transfer earmarked budget
support from the central ministerial and Treasury level, to schools using the teacher
salary payment system\. In particular, grants designed to address the demand-side
problem-namely that the user fees are too highfor poor parents to send their children to
school -have successfully beenimplementedin2005 and 2006 usingHIPC funds\.
56\. Fee abolition efforts inprimary education:
(i) Equality o f opportunity in severely impoverished environments could only be achieved
by ending the practice o f charging fees inpublic schools\. However, the elimination o f
fees - even for primary education - should be sequenced, particularly in fkagile
economies (like the DRC) which are unable to deliver the basic minimum services\. The
process o f eliminating school fees requires long term commitment from government and
donors\.
(ii) Removing school fees i s not effective unless accompanied by complementary measures\.
At a minimum, a strong dissemination campaign is needed to inform the public and
administrative authorities through the media, written circulaires (circulars), and through
face-to-face discussion\. Accompanying measures should include investments in quality,
and planning to address the follow-on effects at secondary and higher education\. In all
cases where African countries (as Uganda, Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya) have removed fees
as part o f efforts to achieve Universal Primary Education (UPE), the increase in
enrollments has led to deterioration inthe quality o f primary education and to increased
demand on secondary education\. Ifthese follow-on effects are not adequately addressed,
there i s a risk that enrollments will decrease over time if quality declines (as the case o f
Nigeria) and if there are supply constraints on middle and upper levels o f schooling (as
Ghana)\. Accordingly, the Project includes support for quality inputs (textbooks, teacher
training) and for building capacity to assess quality and learning achievement\. The
Project will be accompanied in parallel by analytical work especially on secondary
education\.
(iii) The negative consequences o f removing primary school fees are less severe (as in
Tanzania) where there i s a planned schedule for phasing out the fees, government
systematically programs funds (as in use o f HIPC) to close the financing gap left by
cessation o f fee revenues and finances quality inputs\. Ideally, the government commits
to far-reaching restructuring o f the public sector to increase spending on education from
domestic resources\. The proposed Project provides balanced support by including
assistance for formulating the sector wide financing plan in addition to emergency
investmentsingoods and civil works\. The Project is also coordinated with other donors
who are preparing co-financing to help close the funding gap inthe education sector\.
14
(iv) `Leveling down' the quality o f education couldbe unpopular with those more able to pay,
and could lead to expansion o f the private sector in education\. The Project supports
sector wide planningand updating the loi cadre (organic law) that will address private -
public partnerships indelivering education services\.
(v) User fees limit access to school and contribute to attrition and absenteeism from school\.
However, despite increasing enrollment, abolishing fees may not change the fact that the
poorest children, especially girls, are least likely to attend school and are the most likely
to drop out\. There are opportunity costs o f school attendance that may persist even after
financial constraints are lessened\. The Project will provide opportunities for feedback
from parent groups, and monitor results o f diagnostic instruments on the private rates o f
return to primary education, to identify constraints on demandfor education\. Inaddition,
the Project will support the government informationand education campaigns, including
efforts promoting girls' education\.
(vi) Local discretion in publicly managed schools can support quality improvements and the
use o fpublic funds for intendedpurposes\. Since the elimination o f school fees could also
reduce teacher accountability to parents, measures are needed to strengthen school and
community level parent committees in monitoring the use o f public funds, to encourage
local accountability o f teachers and administrators to communities\. The local
participation must be supported by transparent and bindinglegal documents - such as the
DRC developed in using the HIPC funds to offset fees for school operating costs - and
incorporated into the sector's legal framework\.
5\. Alternatives consideredand reasonsfor rejection
57\. Include education as a component in a larger, multi-sector program: rejected\.
Including education as a sub-component in a larger Project managed by a non-education expert
reduces the prospects o f the Bank's participation in education sector policy dialogue with
adequate education expertise\. This also risks inadequate operations support to the education sub-
component duringProject execution\.
58\. Extensive investment in operations in each sub-sector through a sector-wide assistance
program (SWAP) o f investments:rejected\. There are three main reasons:
(0 The education sector in the DRC is not yet ready for such an ambitious investment
because the overall policy framework i s not coherent\. Decisions cannot be taken in
several key areas (e\.g\. secondary education) until extensive analysis identifies appropriate
options\.
(ii) Inthepost-election period, there isawindow ofopportunity to influencekeypolicy,
governance and financing issues\. Responding quickly with a project that provides
targeted support to restore minimum operating conditions inprimary schools for visible
results on the ground, while simultaneously supporting work on systemic issues to
prepare the way to implement more ambitious reform, i s believed to be a more
sustainable strategy than deferring action by taking time to prepare a more ambitious
SWAP\.
(iii) The DRC has limited capacity for development planning, for carrying out national
programs such as for civil works, and procurement management i s weak by international
standards\.
15
59\. Exclusive focus on primary or basic education: rejected\. There i s broad consensus that
investment in primary education is priority because o f its pro-poor benefits and because of the
need to prepare better quality students who will continue through the education system\.
However, if investments in primary are not made in concert with the formulation o f an overall
sector development plan that has a tenable financing strategy, there i s little assurance that the
support for primary education inthe Projectwill be sustained beyond its lifetime\.
C\. IMPLEMENTATION
1\. Partnershiparrangements
60\. Government has designed investmentso fthe proposed Project to build synergies with and to
help scale up, other donor programs in related areas (see Annex 2)\. The following
complementarities are o f key importance:
School rehabilitation: The 1570 classrooms rehabilitated under this Project will bring the
total number of classrooms rehabilitated by the various ongoing projects to 4000\.
Primarv school textbooks: The textbooks in mathematics and in reading for grades 1 and 2
provided by the Project will complement the provision o f textbooks inthe same subjects for
grades 3 to 6, financed by the BelgianCooperation\.
Assessing quality and learning achievement: The Project's support to build up a culture o f
monitoring quality through standardized assessments o f primary school students builds on
smaller scale standardized assessments o f grade 4 pupils supported by UNESCO and
UNICEF at various periods since 1999\.
Capacity building for education sector planning & management, and school management:
Support under the Project complements the programs o f UNESCO and the African
Development Bank (AfDB) for training educational planners and building up an Education
Management Information System; and UNICEF's capacity buildingprogram for school head
masters and school management committees\.
Reform o f teacher training and career structure: The support for policy reform and consensus
buildingunder the Project links with the government's larger policies and programs o f civil
service reform and decentralization\.
Support for reduction o f primary school fees: The financing for primary school operating
cost subsidies follows on, after the bridge financing for the same purpose provided by the
EUSRP\.
61\. The proposed Project support for reducing school fees will be implemented through the
Government's own systems, in particular the teacher salary system\. These same mechanisms
can accommodate additional support from other donors duringthe life o f the Project and specific
co-financing arrangements with the DFID and Belgian Cooperation are plannedto follow Grant
effectiveness\.
16
2\. Institutionaland implementationarrangements
62\. Project implementation will be for five years\. Effectiveness i s expected inthe first quarter
o f fiscal year (FY) 2008\.
63\. Institutional arrangements are designed to strengthen capacity in the sectoral ministries to
manage development projects\. The institutional arrangements will place responsibility for
Project implementation with the group o f three mandated for education: MEPSP, MESU and
MASSNinclose collaborationwith the Ministries ofFinance andBudget\.
64\. Overall Project Management: At Project start, none o f the three education ministries
above has the technical capacity that conforms to World Bank standards\. To overcome this, and
to build capacity within the ministries for the future, a Project Management and Coordination
Unit (PMCU) will be established\. The primary responsibility of the PMCU will be to handle
execution on a day-to-day basis\. Project funds will support the recruitment o f individual
consultants and accounting firms on a competitive basis for the senior posts in the PMCU\. In
addition, a Contracted Procurement Agent (CPA) will be recruited on the basis o f its documented
experience in procurement management conforming to IDA standards\. This entity will be
engaged by the PMCUthrough a service contract to manage the procurement o f all components
underthe Project\. Implementationwill follow the Project Operations Manual, the annual Project
Action Plans, and the Procurement Plan (the plan for the first 18 months was approved at
negotiations) that will be updated on a rolling basis according to World Bank procedures\. The
Procurement Plansets out the procurement methods for each activity listed\. The service contract
between the PMCU and the procurement agent will list all activities for which the latter i s
responsible\.
65\. To ensure transparency in the decision making process and a mechanism for the
coordination o f multiple ministries in Project execution, a Steering Committee (SC) comprised
o f high level representatives o f the MEPSP, MESU, MASSN, and Ministries o f Finance and
Budgetwill oversee all Project implementation and decision making\. The SC was created during
Project preparations (Arrite' Inter-Ministe'riel EPSP-ESU-AS N00510/2005, Inter-Ministerial
Bylaw EPSP-ESU-AS No0510/2005 - dated 26 January 2005) and currently oversees the PPF as
well as the inter-ministerial team of technicians who prepared the Project, as a precursor to the
PMCU\. The SC i s chaired by the MEPSP since the bulk o f Project resources are inthis domain\.
66\. The responsibilities of the three principal parties are summarized below\. See Annexes 6 and
7 for further explanation:
0 The inter-ministerial Steering Committee (SC) is the decision making body for the
Project\. It shall meet at least once ineach calendar quarter\. The SC responsibilities include:
(i)coordination o f the Project activities with Government strategy, policy development, and
relations with other development partners; (ii) approving annual work programs and related
budgets; and (iii)providing strategic guidance for efficient executiono fthe Project\.
0 The Project Management and Coordination Unit (PMCU) will be created before grant
effectiveness, as the operational arm o fthe SC to implementactivities\. It will be responsible
for all aspects o f financial and technical management including: (i) preparing and costing
detailed annual implementation plans based on the Action Plans approved by the SC; (ii)
managingProject resources (including financial management and managing the contract for
the procurement agent for the civil works sub-components, the procurement of textbooks,
17
vehicles, consultants and all other procurement under the Project; (iii) recruiting external
auditors; (iv) monitoring implementation progress and impacts, (v) compiling activity,
evaluation, financial and audit reports; (vi) coordinating with technical departments o f the
MEPSP, MESU, MASSN, and the Ministries o f Finance, Budget, Civil Service,
Infrastructure, and Interior; and (vii) ensuring coordination of Project activities with those o f
other international and domestic partners\. The PMCU personnel, to be recruited on a
competitive basis, comprise: a) a National Coordinator; b) an international accounting firm
for financial control and internal audit o f the Project; c) a team o f nationals comprising a
Chief Financial Officer (CFO), an Accountant, and a Treasurer; d) an Operations Officer
specialist in Monitoring and Evaluation; e) a Civil Engineer; f) a specialist in Information
Technology; and g) support staff\. The external auditing function will be contracted out\.
0 The ContractedProcurementAgent (CPA): A contract will be signedbetweenthe PMCU
and a procurement agent, whereby the procurement agent will act as a service provider
according to specific terms o f reference (TOR)\. The procurement agent will manage
procurement and execution o f all civil works and procurement o f equipment for schools
under the Project, large size contracts for goods which include textbooks, computers, and
laboratory equipment, vehicles, and the selection o f consultants\.
67\. In addition to setting up the PMCU, the Project will also finance training to strengthen
ministerial capacity especially at MEPSP, MESU, and MASSN to assist project management\.
Specific training plans will be designed and carried out for ministry staff that will be designated
bythe SC\.
68\. The respective roles o f PMCU, the CPA, and the various ministries and units involved in
Project execution, and accountability procedures, will be detailed in the Project Operations
Manual that will be finalized by the PMCU by Effectiveness\. The Manual will also document all
financial management arrangements for the Project (see Annex 7)\.
3\. Monitoringand evaluation of outcomes/results
69\. The Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) o f the Project will support M&E activities at
different stages o f Project implementation - on a continuous basis during implementation, at
mid-termandproject end-and at differentlevels (see Annex 15)\.
70\. At the aggregate level, monitoring and evaluation will be consolidated by the PMCU, for
which an M&E Officer will be recruited\. International consultants will be recruited on a short-
term basis to conceptualize, design, and set up the Project M&E system andto train national staff
on M&E activities\. The system will include indicators identified by the Project, which are
Project-specific, other sector-specific variables, and data from other donors\. Citizens' Report
Cards (CRCs) and the communication strategy play important roles for monitoring Project
implementation regularly from the school level\. CRCs conducted on an annual basis will serve
as instrumentsfor strengthening accountability relationships, and monitoring transfers as well as
quality aspects in the Project\. The communication strategy will facilitate both the flow o f
information and the dialogue on the fee policy, governance, corruption, tendering o f contracts
under the Project and other service delivery issues\. Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys
(PETS) will add to instruments for monitoringthe flow o fpublic resources to schools\.
71\. At the disaggregated level, the Direction des Infrastructures Scolaires (Direction o f School
Infrastructures) and the Direction des Manuels Scolaires et Materiels Didactiques (Direction o f
18
Textboooks and Didactic Materials) o f the MEPSP, and the Direction de 1'Alphabe'tisation
(Direction o f Literacy) o f the MASSN, will be responsible for collecting and analyzing data for
their respective activities\. All data collected will feed into the Project M&E system for
monitoring progress o f Project implementation as well as the national statistical system\. The
Project will finance the settingup o f databases for each o fthe units mentionedabove\.
72\. The PMCU will be responsible for producing the following time-bound reports for
evaluation o f Project implementation: monthly reports on project activities; quarterly reports to
IDA and the Ministries; yearly reports to IDA and the Ministries; and a midterm review two
years after Grant effectiveness\.
4\. Sustainability
73\. The Project design has been kept simple, and investments are balanced across several
domains\. Over half o f IDA'Ssupport for this Project i s in the various areas of: civil works
(school rehabilitation), goods (textbooks, school desks, computers, and vehicles), training,
workshops and consultant services\. Prospects are strong that Project benefits and results inthese
areas will be delivered and sustained\. First, these inputs have highprobability for visible results
on the ground, thus responding to the Government's interest to deliver a post-election dividend\.
Second, to promote sustainability o f the one-time investments in rehabilitation (Component 1)
and textbooks (Component 2), the Project will provide schools with guidelines for maintaining
textbooks and learning materials, and assist schools and the National Pedagogical University to
establish their own maintenance plans for classrooms and the school grounds\. During the first
half o f the Project, the Grant will cover recurrent costs associated with maintenance, in line with
the Country FinancingParameters approved for the DRC inFebruary 2005\.
74\. Since nearly half o f proposed investments o f the Project supports the reduction or
elimination o f primary school fees, the Project i s vulnerable to risks o f changes in Government
commitment and/or to risks that schools unilaterally determine to continue charging highfees to
parents\. The critical reforms needed inthe sector - backed by an updated legal and regulatory
framework - require commitment from Government actors in addition to the ministries
managing the Project\. In particular, support i s needed from the Ministries o f Finance, Plan,
Budget and Civil Service, as well as from the religious organizations, national Parent
Association(s) and unions\. IDA i s working with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
Government to ensure that the implied future budgetary outlays, beyond the life o f this Project,
are accounted for in a credible and sustainable Government macro-economic strategy\. In
addition, the Project has taken the following measures to mitigate political risk: (i)an inter-
ministerial Arrite' setting out the school fees i s a condition for Grant effectiveness, and (ii) to
facilitate input from key stakeholders inthe Project and the policies it will helpto develop for the
sector, the Government has agreed through the Financing Agreement for the Project to establish
appropriate structures to coordinate the formulation o f the education sector strategy and the
Policy Reform o f Teachers' Career Structure, in which representatives from stakeholders and
civil society are members\. These measures respond to the chief concerns o f the other external
donors and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who express interest in
providing additional support for the reduction o f school fees if appropriate guarantees are in
place\.
75\. Research linked with the Project's preparation and financed by IDA and other respective
donors i s examining the levels o f decentralized public administration and individual schools to
19
document the extent to which fees are being reduced, especially following the Government's
announcement at the beginning o f the school year 2005-2006 which prescribed that only four
main fees (Minewal, school insurance, and two forms o f examination fees) were allowed to be
charged for primary school (Arrgte` No MINEPSP/CABMIN/6635/2005, Bylaw No\.
MINEPSP/CABMIN/6635/2005,dated September 3,2005)\. Preliminary results indicate that parents
still pay high fees, and in particular, they still pay for fees which are no longer allowed\. The
Project aims at ensuringthat school fees are lowered at school levels by monitoring the situation
on the ground and by interventions that will empower stakeholders (parents, teachers' unions,
parent committees, parent-teacher associations or PTAs, students, civil society, etc) and keep
them well informed about the fee policy\. The Project communication strategy aims to ensure
that all parents are informed about their rights, and the Project provides resources for training to
strengthen civil society's powers to oversee and influence decisions at school levels\. CRC
surveys will be used as an instrument for empowering parents as well as to get feedback on
implementation and results on the ground\. These interventions will seek to strengthen and
establish sustainable accountability relations between beneficiaries and service providers\.
76\. For the longer term, the sustainability o f the Project's contribution to reverse acute
deterioration of the education sector depends upon the timeliness and robustness o f the country's
economic recovery, and increase inpublic expenditures for education\. The focus inthis Project
on developing a technically and fiscally sound sector development program and financing plan
should make a significant contribution to the sustainability o f the Project's specific direct
investments,as well as other investments inthe sector\.
77\. The Project has also taken important measures for:
0 Institutional and financial sustainabilitv: The Project has integrated good governance and
anti-comption measures into the Project design\. Following the recommendations of a recent
INT inspection, the Project team took measures to redesign the Project's institutional
arrangements to avoid agents about which the investigationhad raised questions inrelationto
other ongoing projects\. The Project's supervision methods emphasize monitoring that
includes clear roles and responsibilities for all stakeholders involved; strengthened checks
and balances in procurement and payment systems; action plans for anti-corruption and
financial management; and technical and financial audits to be conducted systematically
throughout the Project's lifetime\. It directly supports reinforcing the capacity o f government
and administrative infrastructure through: (i) the establishment of the PMCU; (ii) training,
professional development, and capacity building for personnel in central and decentralized
administration in areas including financial and procurement management; cost effectiveness
inschool construction; textbook evaluation andpolicy formulation; assessment of education
quality and learning achievement; (iii) appropriate safeguards in line with the CFAA and
CPAR; and (iv) adherenceto the Project's FinancialManagement Action Plan (FMAP)\.
0 Social sustainabilitv: The confidence level between civil society (religious organizations,
teachers' unions, parent committees, and PTAs) and education administration i s a key
element inthis Project\. Itwill assist the authorities to gainthe confidence o f stakeholders by:
(i)providingefficient andtransparent service; (ii)enabling stakeholders to participate in
decision making and monitor resource use in the education sector including school
rehabilitation, learning achievement, flow o f funds fiom central government transfers; (iii)
updating the legal framework for the education sector); (iv) promoting information and
20
communication between central education authorities and the population and local
administration, and withinthe populationitself\.
5\. Critical risks and possible controversialaspects
78\. The risks are summarized inthe following table (more details are provided inAnnex 16)\.
Risk RiskRating RiskMitigation Measure
\.
before
Mitigation
The fragile post-election political an( S Government actions to increase tangible results on the
iecurity situation may lead to disruption! ground which build on the marked improvement over the
n the Government's commitment to thc last few years in the overall political context: the Project
'roject\. will address current inequities in the education sector and
\.
provide"quick wins"\.
International community and financial support to
facilitate successful implementation of the elections;
economic and political monitoring of the democratic
institutionsbeingbuilt up; security sector reformon-going\.
lecentralization reform rapidlj H 1 Agreed conditions, incl\. on procurement and financial
mplemented without sufficient plannini management, must be met before disbursements of Project
)r capacity could lead to administrativt finds\.
mdmanagerialchaos\. \. Project M&E system with integrated performance
milestones\.
I Multipleindependenttechnicalandfinancial audits\.
Training and institutional capacity building under the
Project\.
,ack o f government ability to cove] H 1 Reasonable macroeconomic assumptions calibrated with
nultiplicity of school fees currently paic [MF and based on in-depth analysis (Economic Sector
)y parents (the project is financiall) Work)\.
#ustainableunder certain assumptions 01
:conomic growth and budget reallocatior I Use gradual approach to shift burdenof school fees from
o increase the share o f education in tota parents to government through increased public
ublic expenditures)\. zxpenditure\.
I Assist government in developing strategy for engaging
3dditionaldonorswhere there are financinggaps\.
nefficient use o f Project resources due tc S I Education is target sector in CFAA, CPAR, PER and
:orruption, mismanagement or non\. results of thorough analyses of the Public Financial
ransparencyin governmentsystems\. Management (PFM) system are integrated into the Project
iiesign, including financial management and anti-
:orruption safeguards; a special procurement agent has
Jeen selected after recommendationsof INT investigation\.
I Computerizationof key government units complemented
~yadequate training in accountability and transparency at
illlevelsofthesystem\.
I Clear understanding with government (SC) regarding
:xpectations\.
21
lchools continue to charge high fees to H \. Government policy on school fees documented in
larents despite the Project's funding and Constitution and inter-ministerial Arr&te'(bylaw) on fees;
o endangerthe Project's maingoal\. stronginterestfrom donors and other sources\.
\. Stakeholders' power and oversight function is
strengthened; communication strategy ensures stakeholders
are informedabout the fee policy and their roles in making
it work; Annual CRCsto monitorfees\.
\. Government channels for transfer of funds are
strengthened through better budget tracking under
improvedexpenditure chain\.
:oordination among the five ministries M \. Competitively recruited directorate to manage Project
nay prove difficult and jeopardize day-to-day implementation as operational arm of
ficient Projectexecution\. governmentministerial SC for the educationsector\.
Inclusion of Ministrieso f Finance and Budget in SC to
enhancealignment ofactionwith realistic financingplans\.
\. Close cooperation during Project execution with the
Government-donor Comitd de Concertation (Cooperation
Committee)ina sector-wideapproach\.
Yeak implementationcapacity and delays S \. Choice of project implementation unit, recourse to
n implementingthe Project contractmanagement (incl\. ProcurementAgent) and use of
agentdexperts with proven track record of results (e\.g\.
SECOPE)\.
andProcurementPlanprovideclear roadmap\.
\. Project Operations Manual and detailed cost estimates
Bankexperiencewith similar biddingdocuments\.
\.Introduction o f monitoring and tracking reinforced with
hands-onimplementationsupport and capacity buildingin
areaswhere there areproblems\.
I
Conclusion: Overall, the Project risk i s graded as S (Substantial)\.
6\. Grant conditions and covenants
79\. By Grant effectiveness, the Government will:
(i) Enact an inter-ministerial Arr&te' (bylaw) in form and substance satisfactory to IDA,
setting up an exclusive nomenclature and levels o f fees to be levied in connection with
primary education;
(ii) Establish (a) the Project Management and Coordination Unit (PMCU) in form and with
functions satisfactory to IDA and with the following staff having qualifications and
experience satisfactory to IDA: a National Coordinator, a CFO, an Accountant, a
Treasurer, a Civil Engineer, and a Monitoring andEvaluation specialist; and (b) adopt the
Project Operations Manual inform and substance satisfactory to IDA;
(iii) Establish an operational fiduciary management system satisfactory to IDA including: (a)
the adoption o f the Manual of Financial and Accounting Procedures in form and
substance satisfactory to IDA; (b) the recruitment o f an international auditing firm
satisfactory to IDA, under terms and conditions satisfactory to IDA, to carry out internal
22
audit activities under the Project; and (c) install a software for financial management,
accounting andprocurementwithinthe PMCU;
(iv) Recruit the Procurement Agent onterms and conditions satisfactory to IDA;
(v) Recruit the independent (a) external financial auditing firm and (b) technical auditor\.
80\. Progress in fulfilling the effectiveness conditions was as follows at the time negotiations
were completed inApril 2007:
The inter-ministerial Arrgte' (bylaw) setting up the nomenclature and levels o f fees
received IDA'Scomments during negotiations\. The MEPSP i s scheduling sign-off inthe
Council o fMinistersby June\.
The MEPSP has allocated office space for the PMCU\. The inter-ministerial technical
team established by Arrgte' (bylaw) no 0508/2005 (January 26, 2005) to prepare the
Project will continue up to Grant effectiveness\. The team i s preparingthe advertisements
for all six PMCU positions noted above\. The PPF provides for the National Coordinator
and CFO to signcontracts by July 2007; they will be financed initially from the PPF until
the Grant becomes effective\. The MEPSP is overseeing preparations of the Project
Operations Manual, the outline o f which was discussed with IDA at negotiations\. The
PPF provides financing for a consultant, to sign a contract by July 2007, to help produce
the final draft Manual\.
A consultant to be financed from the PPF i s scheduled to sign a contract by July 2007 to
draft the Manual o f Financial and Accounting Procedures\. An additional consultant, also
financed from the PPF, is scheduledto sign a contract by August 2007 to install software
for financial management, accounting and procurement for the PMCU\. The inter-
ministerial technical team i s preparing the TOR for recruitment o f an international
auditingfirm for the Project's internal audit activities\.
IDA has approved the TOR for the Procurement Agent\. Recruitment will be underway
before June 2007\.
The inter-ministerial technical team is preparing the TOR for recruitment o f the
independentexternal financial auditingfirm and technical auditor\.
81\. Datedcovenants:
(i) By July 31,2008, the Recipient will have established an appropriate structure comprising
representatives o f relevant institutions and education sub-sectors including primary,
secondary and higher education and adult literacy to oversee the formulation and
implementationof the comprehensive education strategy including an appropriate legal
framework and financing plans for all relevant sub-sectors including primary, secondary
and higher education and literacy programs;
(ii) By December 31, 2008, the Recipient will have: (a) formulated the comprehensive
education strategy described above; (b) carried out studies designed to promote equity
and to improve school achievement rates including inter alia: i)a feasibility study to
establish a sustainable and efficiently performing students' transportation scheme; ii)a
nutrition studyto supplementstudents' nutritionstatus withinthe school environment;
23
(iii) and health study aimed at sustaining good health for students within the school
environment\.
82\. Conditions for disbursement:
No withdrawal shall be made for payments for payments o fprimary school teachers' salaries and
payments for primary school operating cost subsidies until the Recipient has furnished to the
Association evidence satisfactory to it that each o f the actions described below has beentaken in
a manner satisfactory to the Association:
(i) Nowithdrawalshallbemade:(a) forpaymentoftheinitialinstallmentoftheteachers'
salaries (Category 6 o fthe Grant) unless the Beneficiary has provided evidence that: i)an
ArrCte` ministe`riel(ministerial bylaw) has beenenacted freezing any transfer o f personnel
in primary school; and an ArrCte` inter-ministe`riel (inter-ministerial bylaw) has been
enacted freezing the opening or accreditation o f new public primary schools until a
comprehensive census o f primary schools, students, classrooms and teachers has been
completed; ii)all teachers currently enrolled into the public payroll schedule furnished by
SECOPE are integrated into the Paie Transitoire SimplijZe (PTS, SimpliFed Temporary
Payment System) ;iii)a comprehensive list comprising the names o f all teachers to be
progressively integrated into the public payroll system and to be paid with the proceeds
o f the financing allocated to Category (6) has been delivered to IDA; and iv) SECOPE
has been granted exclusive authority to handle all payments o f teachers' salaries; (b) for
payment o f each subsequent installment o f teachers' salaries under Category (6) unless
the Beneficiaryhas submitted to IDA an audit report related to the use o fthe proceeds o f
the preceding installment for teachers' salaries satisfactory to IDA;
(ii) Nowithdrawal shallbemadeafterDecember31, 2008: (a) for payment ofthe initial
installment o f the Subsidies for School Operating Costs (Category 7 o f the Grant) unless
the Beneficiary has provided evidence that: i)a comprehensive list identifying all public
primary schools eligible to receive subsidies for school operating costs through the
proceeds o f the financing allocated to Category (7) has been delivered to IDA; and ii)the
Beneficiary has adopted a comprehensive school map covering its territory; and (b) for
payment o f each subsequent installment o f subsidies for school operating costs under
Category (7) unless the Beneficiary has submitted to IDA an audit report related to the
use o f the proceeds o fthe preceding installment for subsidiesfor school operating costs\.
D\. APPRAISAL SUMMARY
1\. Economicand financial analyses
83\. As the DRC starts to recover from decades o f conflict, economic crisis, and
mismanagement, the Project will:
(i) Provideaninjectionofresourcesintotheseverelyunder-resourcededucationsector;
(ii) Preventfurtherdeteriorationinthedeliveryofessentialservicesforprimaryeducation;
(iii) Reducethe burdenoffinancing education largely borne by households ina country
where estimated per capita income is among the lowest inthe world; and
(iv) Initiate the establishment o f broader accountability mechanisms between service
providers, beneficiaries, andthe political level\.
24
84\. Severe cuts in Government funding, and the withdrawal of external aid inthe early 1990s,
left households to bear most o f the cost o f education services (see Annex 1)\. Government
education spending i s starting to recover but is still very low\. In primary and secondary
education, public expenditure per pupil in 2002 was 3\.7 percent of the level in 1980\. Actual
expenditurein2006 onprimary education remains low at less thanUS$20 per pupilper year\.
85\. The DRC spending pattern on education is atypical even when compared with other poor
African countries: (i) total public spending on education i s much lower than average (about 2
percent o f GDP compared with an average o f about 5 percent); (ii) share o f education in
the
Government expenditure (9\.1 percent in 2006) i s the lowest on the continent; (iii) share o f
the
primary education (43 percent o fthe education budget) should increase significantly to reach the
African average or values recommended in the Education for All (EFA) - Fast Track Initiative
(FTI) framework; (iv) student to teacher ratio could be increased by up to 10 percent without
expected decline in quality but with substantial savings; and (v) average teacher take-home pay
including parents' contributions i s relatively high at about 6 times the per capita GDP, but falls
to 3 times the GDP per capita, on average, when only the official salaries are counted\.
86\. The economic and financial analyses conducted duringProject preparation (Annex 9) show
that financial sustainability of the Government's decision in2005 to eliminate many of the fees
that households were paying depends essentially on four policy parameters:
(i) Increaseinthesizeofthepublicsector(asmeasuredbytheproportionofpublicrecurrent
expenditures inthe nominal value o fthe GDP) from its current 8\.6 percent in2006 to 12
percent by 2011\.
(ii) Increase in resource allocation to primary education (interms o f recurrent expenditures)
from its current estimated 20 percent to reach 27\.5 percent by 2011\.
(iii) Renegotiation of the terms of the work contract between the State and the teachers, and
adoption o f a long-term perspective for the upgrade o f the teacher compensation and
career structure;
(iv) Improvement of efficiency and controlling unit cost through the rationalization o f the
numberofteachers andtheir rigorous allocation according to needs andthe school map\.
87\. The specific set o f actions agreed with the Government will entail the progressive
regularization, through 2012, o f 30,000 teachers who are not on the payroll (non-mecanisks, NM
- not regularized) but whose situation has been recognized by the Provincial authorities and
SECOPE as authorized to be operational and paid throughthe public payroll, provided that funds
are formally allocated through the national budget\. Specifically, the criteria for selecting
teachers to be regularized are: (i)teachers working ina registeredschool which grew beyond the
authorized original license o f number o f teachers to operate (postes autorisks, PA - authorized
positions); and b) teachers working in a non-registered school which SECOPE has approved to
be registered provided the national budget allocates funds for the payment o f these teachers'
salaries\. In addition, the Government will eliminate once and for all the levies charged at the
school level directly related to running operating costs (FDF), including the occasional charges
for one-time expenditures fiais d'interventions ponctuelles, FDIP - fees for specific purposes)\.
88\. The DRC will need the above policy actions to meet the double challenge o f expanding the
system to pursue UPE and close current access gaps in gender, as well as promoting equity of
access by reducingthe financial burdenon households\. Substantial scaling up o f donor funding
25
will be required for years to come, to help meet the financing gap in education and progress
towards the two education MDGs\. Only a substantial commitment o f the Government to
increase in parallel both the share o f education in the national budget and the share o f primary
education in the education budget (see Annex 9) will make any o f these reforms sustainable in
the long-term, However, even if financial sustainability is not be achieved inthe five years of
the Project, the Project as a whole will yield significant positive economic returns through
increased participation, better quality o f education and increased institutional capacity\. In
addition, the World Bank contribution to the Project i s an IDA grant, so this will not contribute
to the country's debt load\.
2\. Technical
89\. This i s a technically solid Project\. Its design draws from in-depth sector analysis which
helped bring to the fore the key issues for restoring minimum operating conditions in primary
schools, and for preparing for more fundamental investmentsoverall inthe sector\. The Project
design also draws upon poverty assessments carried out inconjunction with the PRSP, technical
work on financial analysis and modeling in collaboration with the IMF, numerous social
assessments and research on school fees documented inthis Project Appraisal Document or PAD
(see Annex 12)\. The Bank and Government teams' experience managing ongoing IDA-financed
projects in all provinces o f the DRC further helpedrefine the technical design and methodology
o fthe proposed Project\.
90\. Giventhat affordability i s the chief constraint on pro-poor access to primary education, and
given the weak capacity in the public sector, the history o f a de facto public-civil society
partnership in education service delivery, as well as results and durable elements from existing
IDA and other donor-supported projects in the sector, the proposed Project focuses on the
following approaches: (i) lowering costs o f education to households, to improve equitable access
to primary education; (ii) providing learning materials and stimulating a market for textbooks
and improving their quality; (iii) introducing schemes to produce qualified teachers and support
their practice more effectively; (iv) enabling the public (including local authorities) and civil
society groups to manage education service delivery and participate in school level decisions
effectively (i\.e\. updating the Zoi cadre - organic law - to define the role that the religious
organizations and civil society play inmanaging education; buildingnational capacity for school
rehabilitation, enabling and empowering stakeholders to be better informed and participate in
decisions at school level); (v) promoting coherence in service management and delivery by
linking formulation o f new policies in education with macro-structural reforms including civil
service and public expenditure management; (vi) providing for suitable contracting out
arrangements for Project implementation; and (vii) systematic attention to monitoring and
evaluation o f results, outputs, and outcomes\.
3\. Fiduciary
91\. The financial management assessment o f the participating ministries conducted during
Project preparation revealed the following weaknesses: (i) o f sufficiently qualified staff; (ii)
lack
absence o f an accounting system acceptable to IDA; and (iii) o f familiarity with IDA
lack
procedures for reporting, disbursement arrangements and auditing\. To address these weaknesses,
it was agreed to create a PMCU to reinforce the ministries, and to staff the PMCU with
consultants competitively selected for the required expertise, and to outsource the internal audit
26
function\. Therefore, financial management, disbursement, and audit functions for the proposed
Project will be undertaken inthe following manner:
The PMCU will be responsible for all aspects o f financial management, accounting and
auditing o f the Project\. In particular, these include: designing and establishing a
computerized Financial Management System (FMS); approving disbursemento f funds to
implementingpartners; maintainingup-to-date accounting records and ledgers; recording
fiduciary transactions for all activities pertaining to the Project; fiduciary reporting;
submittingaudit reports; and ensuring that a proper internal control system is inplace to
achieve accountability at all levels\.
A service contract will be signedbetweenthe PMCU and a procurement agent to define
the agent's responsibilities interms o fprocurement and reporting\.
Disbursement from the IDA grant will be transaction-based (replenishment,
reimbursement)\.
A Special Account in US Dollars and maintained by the PMCU, will be opened in a
commercial bank on terms and conditions acceptable to IDA\. The Special Account will
finance all eligible expenditures except for the cash transfers for teachers' salaries\.
IDA will transfer funds on a quarterlybasis, for each of the five years ofthe Project, into
an earmarked account at the National Treasury located at the Central Bank o f Congo, to
be used for the sole purpose o f the Government's payment o f i)the identified primary
school teachers to be added to the public payroll, and ii)subsidies for primary school
operating costs in return for abolishing fees for this purpose\. These grants will be
transferred along with the pay envelope using the existing procedures for payment o f
teachers' salaries\. These procedures involve an officially mandated role for SECOPE (a
unit ofthe MEPSP) to establishthe list ofqualifying teachers andmonitor delivery o fthe
salary payments to teachers\. The Ministry o f Finance will be responsible for authorizing
release o f these funds from the Treasury\. The Ministry o f Budgetwill be responsible for
the signature ofthe validation orders which are infact summary payroll statements\. Each
installment payment will be audited as described in the disbursement conditions
elsewhere inthe current document\.
A qualified, experienced and independentexternal auditor will be appointed on approved
TOR\. This will cover all aspects o f the Project activities, including eligibility o f
expendituresandphysicalinspections\.
4\. Social
92\. Inaddition to the extensive social assessments and analytical work noted above, the Project
preparation team consulted a wide range o f stakeholders including the religious organizations,
African Association o f Pygmies, teacher trade unions, indigenous NGOs and community based
organizations, as well as education authorities from ministry to school levels\. The Project team
worked closely with other key donors as part o f a harmonized strategic effort through which a
joint diagnosis and ajoint programming are beingprepared for the DRC\.
93\. Findings across the board highlight inequity o f access at the base o f the DRC's education
system as its defining characteristic\. The pattern o f participation in education at all levels is
largely a manifestation o f the distortion effects o f access equated with the inability to pay fees\.
Rough estimates point to households paying on average twenty percent o f their income for each
27
child they send to school\. The (lack of) affordability o f education i s also a key determinant o f
persistence in primary education\. The mean age o f children from poor and rich households in
each class suggests that children from poor households enroll late and tend to drop out; a greater
proportion o f children from rich households get enrolled at the right age but they tend to repeat
classes and stay inschool\.
94\. The situation in the DRC exemplifies many o f the challenges faced by post-conflict
countries\. Significant progress has been made over the last years, but challenges remain
daunting\. Inline with the improved situation, key stakeholders inthe education sector, including
the teachers' unions andreligious organizations who hadassumedmanagement of schools during
the long periodwhenGovernment was absent from the sector, are calling for an endo fthe over-
reliance on financing from households\. The Constitution, which was approved by referendum in
December 2005, called for obligatory and fee free primary education\. Since this was not backed
by adequate budgetary resources for Government to replace all school fees, there were sporadic
outbreaks o f civil unrest especially over the issue o f teachers' salaries, which would take the
largest cut if school fees were removed\. Negotiations are ongoing, but there i s inherent risk to
the already fragile stability ofthe country\.
95\. The Project i s addressing these issues through attention to demand side issues and to
targeting public spendingto basic education\. The Project responds to immediate fiscal shocks by
proposing cash transfers (Component 1) for Government to increase the primary school teacher
force on payroll and for schools as a compensation for completely abolishing FDF, including the
FDIP\. The Project also contributes to providing for free accessto textbooks inall public schools
and Government assisted private schools (Component 2)\. As participating in primary school
becomes more affordable, the social impact should be seen inan increased proportion o f children
aged 5-14 who are inschool, and inprogress toward equity o f access for girls\.
96\. It i s striking that the user surveys referred to earlier in the current document reveal that
parents seemedto accept that education was not useful\. Parents were willing to pay, but saw this
as a social and moral value to send their children to school\. Parents did not see the usefulness in
terms o f economic value (their children's subsequent employment)\. The Project has been
designed around an assumption, based on documented research, that parents will find education
to be o f greater value ifthey can see visible improvements inthe availability o f essential inputs-
textbooks, teachers trained to use them, classrooms which offer adequate shelter from the
elements - and can see that this translates into learning inthe classroom\. This i s the rationale for
including a sub-component to scale out assessments o f learning achievement and to build up a
culture o f monitoring the relationship between quality o f education, learning and retention in
school\. It i s expected that this will help to raise teacher awareness that they are accountable for
learning in the classroom, and that the research will also generate specific recommendations
which can be fed into the policy work on teacher development and other areas\.
97\. The extensive consultations also enabled the Bank team to probe the dynamics o f local
participation around the school\. What i s striking i s that parents and parent committees are not
involved in the life o f the school, although they have beenpressuredto contribute financially to
its operation\. Parent committees are seen primarily as the liaison between parents and school
management, to extract payments for teachers and school fees\. This highlights the need for
direct interventions to train and sensitize local parent committees that they have a role in
monitoring the important reform initiatives (e\.g\. elimination o f FDF) as well as a role for
28
keeping schools accountable for results and quality o f primary education\. Moreover, parent
committees ought to be assistedwith a legal base should they call for sanctions\.
5\. Governance
98\. The Project faces high risks and has therefore integrated good governance and anti-
corruption measures into the design (see Annex 16)\. Three guiding themes in each o f the
Project's four components have been integrated into the design: (i) performance, through
monitoring targets whose attainment will be the indication o f success; (ii) anticipation, through
planning and programming all interventions on the basis o f thorough analysis o f the situation on
the ground; and (iii)participation and transparency, through mechanisms which allow
stakeholders to influence and share control over decision-making\. In particular, following the
recommendations o f a recent INT inspection, the Project team took measures to redesign the
Project's institutional arrangements in January- February 2007, to avoid agents which the INT
investigationhadraised questions inrelationto other ongoing projects\.
99\. The Project design takes into consideration to build up the presently weak accountability
relationships between service providers (schools) and beneficiaries (parents and students), as
well as between service providers and policy-makers (national and local authorities)\. Parents'
committees, PTAs, and teachers' trade unions will be strengthenedthrough training inplanning,
budgetingand financial management, as well as anti-comption\. An entry point for strengthening
accountability i s to give voice to beneficiaries by introducing citizen report cards\.
100\. Accountability relationships between service providers and political levels will be
strengthened by Project interventions which aim at creating a legal basis for regulating roles and
responsibilities\. Service providers are to deliver primary education in line with instructions or
according to a contract, and policy makers (national and local levels) use instruments o f
financing, regulation, monitoring and evaluation to exert control and oversight\. Such a contract
i s missing for the great majority o f public schools (especially those run by religious networks)\.
The Convention (Agreement) that dates from the end o f the 1970s to regulate the roles and
responsibilities for public schools managed by religious networks i s long overdue for an update
insome form andwillbe addressedwith support from the Project\.
101\. A communication strategy will further strengthen accountability, including participation,
transparency and performance\. It will provide for consistent messages being conveyed to all
relevant stakeholders: government officials inimplementingagencies; contractors, suppliers, and
consultants who may be involved in bidding on the Project; service providers (including school
management boards and school directors) members o f civil society affected by the Project
(parent committees, parents, students, teachers, teachers' trade unions)\. The objective is to
inform about particular events o f the Project (e\.g\. public delivery o f textbooks to schools), to
highlight noteworthy achievements in quality, cost-effectiveness, and sustainability, as well as
any incidents o f alleged collusion, fraud, or corruption\. Further, feedback from each o f the
groups noted above will be important for monitoring and improving the Project\.
6\. Environment
102\. The Project i s classified as environmental category B\. OP (Operational Policy) / BP (Bank
Procedure) / GP (Good Practice) 4\.01 Environmental Assessment and OPBP 4\.12 Involuntary
Resettlement are triggered because o f the rehabilitation activities at primary schools and the
National Pedagogical University, although no new land acquisition i s envisaged\. Most
29
investments will be small and unlikely to have more than some localized, temporary
environmentalimpacts, easily mitigatedthrough the application o f sensible site selection criteria,
good construction practices, and diligent management practices in the operational phase\. No
Project support will be provided in areas with activities involving involuntary resettlement\.
Activities that would have adverse impacts on social groups within the community and/or in
neighboring communities cannot be funded\. Capacity building of the implementing agents is
expected to have positive impact on the physical environment\. An Environmental and Social
Management Framework (ESMF) and a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) were,produced during
preparations and disclosed in the DRC and through the World Bank Infoshop in January 2006\.
Recommendations are being operationalized into the Project Operations Manual and Technical
Guidelines which describe the roles and responsibilities o f all actors who will implement the
ESMF\. The PMCU is responsible for the implementation o f the ESMF's provisions and
necessary resources to cover the cost o f the anticipated activities have been budgeted in the
Project's overall financing plan\. The M&E framework has beendesigned to capture data on the
identification and mitigation o f environmental and social impacts, including the Project's
contribution to the pro-poor objective o f reducing primary school fees\. Annex 10 provides
further details\.
7\. Safeguardpolicies
Safeguard Policies Triggeredby the Project Yes No
Environmental Assessment (OP/BP/GP 4\.01) [XI [I
Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4\.04) [I [I
Pest Management (OP 4\.09) [I [I
Cultural Property (OP 11\.03, beingrevisedas OP 4\.11) [I [I
Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4\.12) [XI [I
Indigenous Peoples (OP 4\.20, beingrevisedas OP 4\.10) [I [I
Forests (OP/BP 4\.36) [I [I
Safety o fDams (OP/BP 4\.37) [I [I
Projects inDisputedAreas (OP/BP/GP 7\.60) [I [I
Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP/GP 7\.50) [I [I
8\. PolicyExceptionsand Readiness
103\. There are no policy exceptions required for the Project\. The Government team i s working
towards meetingthe conditions for Effectiveness agreed duringnegotiations\. These are detailed
in Section C6 of the PAD and include standard operational requirements (Le\. financial
management; recruitment o f a procurement agent; recruiting o f an auditor, etc\.)\. All these
conditions are expected to be met by the Effectiveness date\. This should guarantee a prompt
jump start o fthe implementationactivities\.
30
Annex 1:Country and Sector Background
1\. CountryBackground
1\. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one of the poorest countries inthe world, with
an estimatedGDP per capita of about US$120\. This is six times below the average for countries
inSSA despite that the DRC is the richest innaturalendowments\. Key social indicators pointto
widespread poverty and suffering of the Congolese population\. Under 5 mortality, for example,
i s 22 percent higher inthe DRC compared with the SSA average - a newborn child has only an
80 percent chance of surviving its 5 year birthday inthe DRC\. About 13 percent of all newborns
die before they reachtheir first birthday\. One percent of Congolese women dies when pregnant
or giving birth\. The primary gross enrolment rate is about 64 percent inthe DRC, whereas it i s
about 92 percent inSSA countries\.
ChartAl\.l\. Key Social and Economic Indicatorsin the DRC and SSA Countries
800 -
600 -
Primary Infant mortality Under 5 Mortality Maternal mortality GDP per capita
enrolment rate (per 1000) (per 1000) (per 100000) (current USD)
(%)
Source: World Bank Development Gate, 2006
2\. After 50 years as a Belgian colony, the Congo became independentin 1960\. Conflict inthe
immediate post-independenceperiod was followed by corruption and mismanagement under the
Mobutu Sese Seko regime (1965-1997), which brought the country to near-collapse\. From the
mid-1990s to 2001, the DRC was the main battlefield for Africa's first continent-scale war,
resulting in around four million casualties and many more displaced\. The conflict exacerbated
ethnic tensions and secessionist movements, posing long-term challenges to the transition to
peace\.
3\. A ceasefire was agreed after the assassination of President Laurent Kabila in 2001\. The
period of national dialogue that ensued established a tenuous peace that allowed the country to
resume productive activities to reverse the damage of decades of mismanagement and unleash
31
the country's growth potential\. Aided by the resumption o f support from the Bretton Woods
institutions, the country made considerable progress at the macroeconomic level\. Within a few
years, the Government had succeeded in breaking hyperinflation through restrained monetary
and fiscal policies\. The economy started a steady growth, and the debt burden became less
onerous when the DRC was granted debt relief on Naples terms by the Paris Club in 2002, and
on Cologne terms when it reached the Decision Point under the enhanced HIPC Initiative in
2003\.
4\. On June 30, 2003, an all-inclusive government o f national unity was appointed following
agreements reached through the inter-Congolese dialogue\. This new period enabled the
launching o f in-depth structural reforms in economic governance, public expenditure
management and transparency, poverty reduction, financial sector, and public enterprises\. The
cornerstones o f public policy were three-fold: i)to restore institutional unity while allowing for
necessary decentralization; ii)to implement urgent pro-poor policies and actions; and iii)to
provide rapid financial support inthe eastern and northern provinces which were still devastated
and indisarray from the last round o f conflict duringwhichthese areas hadbeenadministeredby
a variety of armedgroups\.
5\. A new Constitution was adopted by national referendum in December 2005\. It proposed a
new territorial organization - increasing the number o f provinces from 11to 26 inthe medium
term - and provided for direct elections of the provincial assemblies and executive\. The
Transitional Government's PRSP, released in July 2006, sets out a series o f medium-term
development objectives to move forward with pro-poor programs and particularly to improve
service delivery inthe social sectors\. Finally, backed up by a large contingent o f peace-keeping
forces from the United Nations (more than 17,000 troops), the country held its first free
democratic elections in two rounds in July and October 2006\. The Transitional Government's
President, JosephKabila, was confirmed as the newdemocratic president, with almost 60 percent
o fthe votes\.
6\. The country is now at a turning point to embark for the first time in decades on a sustained
path o f growth and development\. Yet, many challenges constrain progress\. The most basic i s
the tremendous deficit interms of human development\. Out o f 177 countries surveyed in the
UnitedNations HumanDevelopmentIndex, the DRC currently ranks 167\. Another issue is the
security environment\. The DRC i s highly polarized interms o fpolitical preferences and portrays
a clear picture o f ethnic divisions and secessionist movements which erupt inviolent clashes\. A
further threat to the country's development is given by the poor governance standards\.
According to the last Corruption Perception Index released by Transparency International, the
DRC ranks 156 out o f 163 countries in the world\. The DRC ranks 175 out o f 175 countries
surveyedinterms o f the ease o f doingbusiness, according to the index elaborated by the World
Bank\. Despite this ranking, however, the DRC managed to attract about US$1 billion in FDI
during2006\.
32
2\. Sector Background
7\. The Country Status Report (World Bank, 2005b) released in January 2005 presented an
extensive overview o f the challenges the education sector faces inthe DRC\. Four problems are
critical: i)a relatively low coverage at the primary level, with huge inequalities in access; ii)a
serious deterioration inthe quality o f education at all levels; iii)a proliferation o f administrative
structures inthe education sector; and iv) a low level o f public spending, with an inefficient and
inequitable system of education financing\. The current annex draws on the findings o f the
Country Status Report (World Bank, 2005b) and updates its conclusions with more recent
research that was conducted in2006 andpart o f 2007\.
2\.1 Sector overview
8\. The education sector inthe DRC i s overseen by four ministries: (i) Ministry of Primary,
the
Secondary and Professional Education (MEPSP); (ii)the Ministry of Higher Education and
Universities (MESU); (iii) Ministry of Scientific Research (MRS); and (iv) the Ministry of
the
Social Affairs and National Solidarity (MASSN)\.
9\. The MEPSP regulates the activity of the first three levels o f education: pre-primary, primary,
and secondary\. Only the primary level is compulsory under the Congolese law\. The staff roster
for EPSP entails, as of December 2006, 225,723 agents working directly in schools and 1,791
agents at the ministerial offices in the capital and the provinces\. The EPSP group is
approximately 37 percent o f all civil servants in the country\. The MESU and MRS encompass
the higher education sector and involve 34,631 agents, approximately six percent o f the civil
servants' payroll\. Finally, the MASSN oversees, among other activities, those related to non-
formal education, basically including literacy centers, centers o fprofessional training, and school
catch-up courses\. The total staff devoted to these activities is approximately 5,600\.
10\. The personnel affected to the education sector inthe DRC i s about halfthe size ofthe public
sector\. This becomes an important factor interms o f the recurrent expenditureso f the national
budget, withthe education sector bearing slightly more thanhalfthe public sector wage bill\.
11\. This magnitude o f the education sector i s enormous: around 49,500 institutions, 458,000
teachers, and roughly 12\.2 million students (see Table Al\.1)\. The primary education level alone
represents, on average, 59 percent o f the system, comprising about 29,000 schools, 238,000
teachers, and an estimated 8\.2 million students\. The secondary education level represents about
39 percent o f the total, with around 19,000 schools, 209,000 teachers and 3\.7 million students\.
Finally, the pre-primary and the higher education sub-sectors make up around 1 to 2 percent of
the system\. The system is highlypyramidal as only about 40 percent of the students entering
primary school ever reach secondary level, and only a small minority attend at tertiary level or
the university\. The probability that an incoming primary education student reaches higher
education is two percent\.
33
TableAl\.l Dimensionsof the educationsector in the DRC (estimatesfor 2006)
Pre-primary Primary Secondary Higher Non-formal Total agents
Abs %tot\. Abs %tot\. Abs %tot\. Abs %tot\. Abs %tot\.
Schools 1,200 2\.3 29,000 56\.6 19,000 37\.1 430 0\.8 1,600 3\.1 51,230
Teachers 3,000 0\.7 219,000 49\.1 209,000 46\.8 10,400 2\.3 4,800 1\.1 446,200
Students 70,000 0\.6 7,000,000 63\.2 3,700,000 33\.4 250,000 2\.3 57,500 0\.5 11,077,500
Source: World Bank estimations\. For pre-primary, primary, and secondary, we used RDC (2005a) and on the ground estimations of: a) total number of
schools (registered and non-registered); b) total teachers (regularized and non-regularized) by Johan Verhaghe (consultant)\. For higher education, we used
estimationson enrollment and enrollment growth from World Bank (2005b)\. For non-formaleducation, we usedUNESCO(2006) and extrapolatedto the rest
of the country on the basis of public and private sector ratios of Kinshasa to the rest o f the country in each of the three categories (schools, students, and
teachers) for allthreeEPSP levels of education\.
12\. Many factors contribute to the low survival rates across the system\. One is the combined
effect o f high repetition and high dropout rates\. Both indicators combined account for a 40
percent impact at the grade 1 level\. Another factor negatively affecting retention i s the large
number o f over-age pupils\. Only about 12 percent o fpupils infirst grade are aged 6 or less (net
admission rate)\. Half o f the pupils start school (grade 1) at age 10 or more\. Even if the older
children succeed in moving along grades smoothly, by the time they reach grade 3 or 4, the
opportunity cost to stay inschool increases importantly vis-a-vis their possibility o f entering into
remunerative activities or coping with the burdeno f housekeeping activities\.
13\. Added to the above inefficiencies are severe problems o f access\. The Gross Enrolment
Ratio (GER) inprimary i s an estimated 64 percent, but eventhis low average nationally conceals
large differences across gender: the GER for males hovers around 72 percent, compared with 56
percent for females\. There are also striking asymmetries across provinces, as well as between
urban (72 percent) and rural (44 percent) areas\. A huge mass o f an estimated five million
school-aged children still remains without access\.
14\. Interestingly, it does not appear that the system's absorption capacity i s the main limiting
factor on internal efficiency and the low access to school\. There appears to be scope within the
education sector's present capacity to accommodate sudden expansion if required\. The average
primary school involves around 241 students and 8 teachers, at a rate o f about 32 students per
teacher\. Both indicators are relatively low by SSA standards\. Likewise (see Table A1\.2 below),
potential expansion at other levels appears to be feasible: the secondary level studentheacher
ratio i s 18, and the corresponding student/school ratio i s 195, at a rate o f around 11teachers per
school\. Only the universities present a larger use o f existing capacity with around 580 students
per institution, butagain, with a relatively low studentkeacher ratio (24)\.
34
Table A1\.2 Basicindicatorsof size, by level of education
Pre-primary Primary Secondary Higher Non-
education education education education formal All levels
Studentsper institution 58 241 195 581 36 216
Students perteacher 23 32 18 24 12 25
Teachers per institution 3 8 11 24 3 9
Source: World Bank estimations\. For pre-primary, primary, and secondary, we used RDC (2005a) andon the ground estimations of:
a) total number of schools (registered and non-registered); b) total teachers (regularized and non-regularized) by Johan Verhaghe
(consultant)\. For higher education, we used estimations on enrollment and enrollment growth ffom World Bank (2005b)\. For non-
formal education, we used UNESCO (2006) and extrapolated to the rest of the country on the basis of public and private sector
ratios of Kinshasato the rest of the country ineach of the three categories (schools, students, and teachers) for all three EPSP levels
ofeducation\.
2\.2 Organizationof the sector
15\. The bulk o f the education sector i s represented by the primary and secondary levels\. The
central Government i s the "organizing power" (pouvoir organisateur) and, despite its limited
fiscal resources, has the capacity to manage teacher deployment and conduct examinations\. The
religious organizations assumed responsibility for managing the majority o fprimary (72 percent)
and secondary (64 percent) schools through contracts ("Conventions") with the State in the late
1970s and have continued because o f the severe lack o f public financing for decades\. Together
with parents who have been willing to pay high school fees, the religious organizations have
been responsible for the survival o f the public education system through decades o f official
neglect\. Yet, the Loi-cadre (1986) - the legal framework that inprinciple governs the sector -
makes no reference to the religious organizations\. The "Conventions" from the 1970s, which
were specifically created to regulate the State's partnership with the religious organizations, are
out o f date\.
16\. Decentralized administration o f primary and secondary education is foreseen by the
Constitution, and a new law on decentralization has recently been passed, although not fully
implemented\. In the interim, the current territorial/ administrative structure and division of
responsibilities for primary and secondary education within the public administration are based
on a law enacted in July 1998\. The heads o f administrative structures at decentralized level,
Entite`s Administratives De`centralise`es (EAD), oversee education services along with other
central government services within their jurisdiction\. Only some EADs have a juridical status,
and whereas the law provides for each EAD to have a consultative council nominated by the
government, in reality no such councils have been formed\. Prior to the general elections o f
2006, provincial governors (who often head the EADs) were nominated by the National
Government, but are now elected by the Senate\. Provincial Assemblies have been directly
elected by the people, but their roles and responsibilities for education have not yet been spelled
out\. The central Government i s responsible for the determination o fthe minewal (the annual per
capita user fee levied on students since 1997 i s currently 100 FC), the salaries o f teaching
personnel, the opening/ closure/ approval o f schools, the general inspection and the end o f cycle
examinations\. The EADs are responsible for management o f educational institutions, proposing
some o fthe fees and the opening and closure o f classes\.
35
17\. The resources o f the EAD are comprised o f local taxes and intergovernmental transfers
(re'trocessions)\. Re'trocessions were set at 20 percent o f revenues collected inthe provinces until
the enactment ofthe DecentralizationLawthat doubledthat proportion\. Upto the passing ofthis
law, only ten percent o f these revenues were automatically transferred to the EADs in the
province\. The extent to which there will be or have been changes in this regard is presently
unknown\. The central Government directly pays the wages o f primary and secondary education
personnel through the civil servants' payroll and should finance the functioning o f services inthe
provinces as well as other running costs o f the schools\. Inrecent years, however, little has been
paid apart from wages - and at that, not all teachers are on the public payroll\. Effective
decentralization will depend in part on the clear assignment o f fiscal responsibilities, tax and
expenditureassignments, as well as fiscal transfers (both tax and non-tax revenue) betweenthe
central Government and the EADs\. The delegation o f authority needs to be combined with
effective control over local administrative structures, local revenues and financial resources
transferred from the center\.
2\.3 The financingof education
18\. Any analysis o f the financing o f the primary and secondary education sub-sectors in the
DRC needs to single out the contribution from the Government (public financing) and the
contribution from households (private financing)\. In regard to the former, a key feature i s the
highly inequitable public financing across levels o f education\. Table Al\.3 shows that, whereas
public pre-primary and primary education present similar levels o f per pupil spending from the
government (around US$1\.5 a month), public secondary education students receive almost 90
percent more, and students attending public higher education institutions receive, on average,
greater than 8 times more\.
19\. A second characteristic o f the public financing o f the system i s the sharp deterioration inthe
level o f State funding over time\. In 1980, the proportion o f the national budget allocated for
education was 25 percent\. This fell to 17 percent in 1983, and two years later to 7 percent\. The
proportion continued to drop until2004, when budget allocations to education started to increase\.
The sharp fall occurred mainly through declining teachers' salaries, which hardly rose innominal
terms for years\. In 2002, the social sectors represented only an approximate 7 percent o f total
public expendituresinthe national budget, compared with 18 percent for defense, 14 percent for
the Presidency, and 4 percent, each, for security services and public works\. Among the social
sectors, the only ministries for which the public expenditureswere higher than 1 percent were:
the MEPSP (2\.25 percent), the MESU(1\.27 percent), and the Ministry o f Health (1\.52 percent)\.
Since 2004, the education sector expenditures have been steadily increasing\. Yet even the 2006
budget shows only a meager 9 percent in terms o f total Government expenditures (salary and
non-salary recurrent expenditures, capital expenditures and debt services)\. Interestingly, as
pointed out above, the education sector represents more than half the wage bill o f the national
budget\.
36
TableA13
Publicfinancingo fthe fionnaleducationsector inthe DRC
Perpupil
Lmlo feducation eqendiiure Ratiotoprimary
(US dollars, 2006) level
~~ ~
Pre-primaty 1\.o
Primaty 17 1\.o
Secondary 32 I\.9
Highereducation 146 8\.B
Ssmc: WorldBank estimations onthe basis o fTable A I \.l, A1\.2
Table
andRDC (2006a)\.
20\. Private financing o f education increased to compensate for decreasing public funding since
the mid-1980s and became the predominant source o f financing at all levels o f education\.
Household financing o f education takes two forms: the financing o f education in private
institutions and the financing o f education in public institutions\. The size o f the private sector
for primary and secondary levels i s very small nationwide (on average less than 10 percent in all
provinces, except Kinshasa), so it affects a relatively small portion o f the universe o f students,
and quite plausibly, the relatively better-off\. Yet, the bulk o f the public system, both for primary
and secondary, is financed by the students or their parents, since the absolute levels o f public
expendituresare very low andhave beenso since the mid 1980s\.
21\. For education at public institutions, students are requiredto pay a number o f charges\. Table
A1\.4 lists the percentage distribution o f the main fees usually charged, by province, at the
primary school level\. The minervul (referred to in section 2\.2) i s the least burdensome o f all
these levies\. Roughly half o f all school fees fall under the category o f FDM, which contributes
to finance teachers' salaries, either in the form o f a top-up to the official salaries paid by the
Government or by fully covering the "unofficial" salary o f teachers who remain NM\. The
second largest category o f school fees i s the so-called FDF\. These fees are usually required by
schools to cover the operation costs o f schools, and can account for up to thirty percent o f all
school fees insome cases\. FDIPare also frequently usedby the schools as a one-time charge for
a particular expenditurethat may represent, for example, a large share o f an average maintenance
charge to replace a roof on a classroom\. Fruis d'exumen (exam fees) are usually charged to
cover the costs associated with the end o f cycle examinations and certificates\. Although these
charges are only leviedon pupils ingrade 6, the relative weight o f this levy could reach up to 34
percent o fthe total school fees insome provinces (e\.g\. Equateur)\. Finally, thefruis d'imprimerie
(printing fees) are usually charged to cover the expenditure associated with identity cards for
students and report cards\. Although the various fees described above are the most common,
there are often numerous additional charges set at central, provincial andor school levels\. These
can involveprimes d'ussurunce scoluire (insurance for students), fruis depromotion scoluire (to
meet expenditures of provincial gatherings of teachers and administrators o f the province), and
puis deformation (to meet travel and per diem expenses o f inspectors for school visits)\.
37
Table A1\.4
Listof mainschoolfees paid per student, by province
% oftotal
~~
Province
Minerval FDM FDF FDIP Printingfees Examfees Total
Bandundu 2\.2 52\.1 19\.3 9\.1 3\.2 14\.2 100
Bas-Congo 1\.5 43\.3 30\.4 9\.5 1\.9 13\.4 100
tquateur 2\.4 25\.3 24\.0 10\.8 3\.8 33\.8 100
KasaFOccidental 3\.4 34\.1 26\.2 3\.4 4\.1 28\.7 100
Kasa'i-Oriental 3\.4 42\.2 23\.1 4\.4 3\.8 23\.1 100
Katanga (Lubumbashi) 1\.7 40\.8 18\.0 23\.5 2\.1 13\.9 100
Katanga (Rest) 2\.9 32\.1 22\.5 10\.7 3\.3 28\.5 100
Kinshasa 0\.8 58\.5 15\.2 16\.8 0\.7 8\.2 100
Maniema 5\.2 37\.6 22\.0 1\.6 2\.1 31\.4 100
Nord-Kivu 1\.5 58\.0 20\.5 11\.1 1\.4 7\.5 100
OrientaleProv\. 4\.0 39\.8 34\.5 3\.1 2\.3 16\.4 100
Sud-Kivu 1\.6 52\.2 16\.0 10\.7 0\.9 18\.7 100
Average 2\.0 46\.8 21\.0 11\.8 2\.0 16\.4 100
Source:World Bank estimations on the basis ofWorld Bank (2005b) and onthe ground collection of data by Johan Verhaghe (consultant)\.
22\. The multiplicity o f school fees charged by public schools in the DRC reveals how
households have been expected to finance not only local school costs, but also the cost o f
administration o f the education system\. In principle, the system for levying, collecting and
distributing these charges is well laid out, although the practice varies considerably both in
relation to the official procedure as well as across provinces\. Very rough estimates o f the total
incidence o f the collection o f these school fees show that, at the primary school level, they
represent a compulsory co-financing o f the system by households at around US$lSO million a
year\. This co-financing by households i s a 1:l match, on average, with what the national
Government invests inprimary education per year\.
23\. It is worth noting that private schools have similar charges, the main difference being that
the FDF cover all operational expenses for the school; hence, there are no separate FDM for
teachers, since teachers' salaries are paid out o f the general pupil charges\. In principle, the
school fees in private schools are set by the management in consultation with the chef de sous-
division (sub-division chief) and the school committee, comprising teachers and parents o f
students\. In addition, private schools charge for the renting o f books; this also exists in some
public Catholic schools at the secondary level\.
24\. Data collected through a public school survey during preparation o f the Country Status
Report (World Bank, 2005b) showed an astonishing variation in charges across provinces and
across schools\. These findings are corroborated by follow-up surveys o f fees for the 2004-2005
school year\. It should be pointed out, however, that the accounting system at the school level i s
often in disarray and responses to survey questions on receipts and expenditures are erratic,
incomplete, and not entirely internally consistent\. Important capacity-building efforts (training
o f personnel as well as equipping schools with basic stationery and accounting books) are
required to re-organize the system o f school finances to enable schools to monitor receipts and
expenditures effectively\.
38
25\. The public neglect o f the entire education sector for decades, and the heavy reliance on
household funding, especially teachers' salaries, prevents the system from expanding to give the
population universal access and the prospects o f completing basic education\. The DRC i s very
much off-track towards the fulfillment o f the MDGs, and until the fee issue i s addressed, most
other neededreforms inthe sector cannot be effectively tackled\.
2\.4 What is behindthefrais de motivation (FDM)?
26\. The origin o f FDA4 charged at the primary school level i s tied to two key factors: i)low
official salary levels; and ii)a high rate o f non-registered schools and non-regularized teachers\.
Eachofthese issues i s discussed inseparate sub-sections below\.
2\.4\.1 The analysis of teacher salaries
27\. The average salary for a primary education teacher holding a 4-year diploma inteaching is
about US$28 a month\. For teachers who hold a 6-year diploma, the average official salary i s
around US$30 a month\. Ifthe teacher has finished a 3-year tertiary teacher training course, the
salary is, on average, US$37 a month\. For the purposes o f comparison, the monthly salary o f a
school director i s around US$54\. These salary levels (only three times the GDP per capita) are
low by SSA averages (between six and seven times the GDP per capita)\. The low base of
teachers' salaries has forced public schools to start charging FDM to top up the salaries in
attempts to retainteachers and keep schools operating\.
28\. Salary scales for teachers inthe DRC present several noteworthy characteristics\. First, pre-
primary, primary, and secondary school teachers share the same salary scales\. This means that a
teacher with the same qualifications - for example, a 3-year diploma in teaching obtained at a
pedagogical tertiary institution (a "G3" diploma) - will earn the same regardless o f the level (or
grade within level) taught\.
29\. A second characteristic i s that there are three different elements in the current net salary
received by a teacher: i)the base salary; ii)the indemnith (allowances); and iii)theprimes (top-
ups)\. The base salary is the only component that was originally designed to account for
qualifications and years o f experience\. Starting withthe first year o fwork, there i s an increase in
the base salary every three years (e`chelons) of accrued experience within the same qualification
(grade)\. The indemnite`s are a monetary compensation for the cost o f living o f a particular
regional location\. They involve two components: a housing allowance (only paid to teachers
working inKinshasa) and a transport allowance\. Finally, the primes are lump sum additions to
the base salary: ancient prime (old top-up) and nouvelle prime (new top-up)\. Although the
principle in creating them was the same for both - namely to increase the level o f salaries
without changing the base o f calculation for retirement - these primes differed in their
application\. The ancient prime was a lump sum increase to the salaries based on qualification
(the highest qualified got higher primes), but identical across the country\. The nouvelle prime,
instead, differs inboth regards: it i s identical for certain types o f qualifications (e\.g\. D 4 and D6
receive the same absolute increase); and it i s different for different parts o f the country (i\.e\.
teachers working in Kinshasa receive a higher absolute rise than teachers in the rest o f the
country)\.
30\. Differences across the three aforementioned components o f the salary created the current
configuration o f a three-zone salary system for teacher payments inthe DRC\. Table Al\.5 below
depicts this system\. The three zones comprised: i)the province of Kinshasa; ii)the city o f
39
Lubumbashi (within the province o f Katanga); and iii)the rest o f the country\. Absolute salary
levels are, on average, twice as highinKinshasa as inthe rest o f the country, whereas salaries in
Lubumbashi are about 60 percent lower than Kinshasa, but 30 percent higher than the rest o f the
country\.
Table A1\.5
Official average primary education salary levels, by salary zone and teacher qualification (US dollars
a month)
Primarylevel qualifications
D4 D6 G3 Directors
Salary zone
YOdiff YOdiff
Average Average w/rest of
YO diff Average w/rest of
YO diff Average
salary w/rest of w/rest of
country salary country salary country salary country
Kinshasa 58 106 60 99 67 83 86 59
Katanga (Lubumbashi city) 37 33 39 31 47 27 66 21
Restof the country 28 30 37 54
Source: WorldBankestimationsonthe basisofinformationprovidedby SECOPE\.
D4= Schoolteacherwitha4-year secondary-levelteachingdiploma\.
D6 = School teacher with a6-year secondary-levelteachingdiploma\.
G3 = School teacherwith a3-year tertiary-levelteachingdiploma\.
31\. The key aspect behindthe large differences between Kinshasa and the rest o f the country i s
the differential monetary compensation for transport (nine times higher inthat province thanthe
rest; see Table A1\.6)\. The transport allowance for Kinshasa explains 30 percent o f teacher
salaries inthis province\. Other than that, the key differential between Lubumbashi and the rest
o f the country i s the nouvelle prime, which represents more than 60 percent o f the current salary
levels inthat city\.
Table A1\.6
Key components determining the level of official salaries of primary school teachers -Average levels by salary zone and teacher
qualification (US dollars a month)
D4 D6
Provinceand division
Base salary Old topup New topup TramP@rtstim
allowance
Housing Transpartstion
alloxalre salary
Total Basesalary Oldtopup Newtopup allowance pllmame salary
~~
Kinshasa 6 4 26 5 17 58 7 5 26 5 17 60
% oftotal salary I1 8 44 8 29 IO0 12 9 43 8 28 IO0
Lubumbashi 6 4 19 0 2 31 7 5 19 0 2 34
% of total salary 19 I 4 61 0 6 IO0 22 16 57 0 5 100
Rest of the country 6 4 12 0 2 24 7 5 12 0 2 26
% oftotal salary 25 I 8 49 0 8 IO0 28 ' 20 45 0 7 100
World Bank estimationson the basisofinformationprovidedby SECOPE
D4 Schoolteacherwith a 4-year secondary-levelteachingdiploma\.
-
D6 Schoolteacherwith a 6-yearsecondary-lweiteachingdiploma\.
-
40
32\. A final characteristic to note interms o f teacher salaries i s that, although the salaries remain
low inabsolute terms, the current levels o f official salaries increased between 75 percent and 200
percent in September 2005, when the newprime was added\. Inabsolute terms, Kinshasa got the
largest absolute increase\. In relative terms, however, the increase for teachers in Lubumbashi
was the most significant of all three salary zones (between 150 and 200 percent), and the
Kinshasa zone the least significant (between 90 and 125 percent)\. Therefore, the last wave o f
teacher salary increases inthe DRC helpednarrow the gap betweenKinshasa and the rest of the
country, especially Lubumbashi, but created a gap between Lubumbashi and the rest o f the
country (see Table Al\.7)\.
Table A1\.7
Latest increaseinteacher salaries Comparative analysisby salary zone and
-
teacher qualification(US dollars a month)
Primary level qualifications
D4 D6
Salary zone
Salary up to Salary from
Sept 2005 Oct 2005 on `YOincrease Salary up to Salary from
Sept 2005 Oct 2005 on YOincrease
~~
Kinshasa 32 58 79 34 58 68
Katanga (Lubumbashi city) 12 37 199 15 37 156
Rest of the country 12 28 125 15 28 93
Source: World Bank estimations on the basisof informationprovidedby SECOPE\.
D4 = Schoolteacherwith a4-year secondary-levelteachingdiploma\.
D6 = Schoolteacherwith a 6-year secondary-levelteachingdiploma\.
33\. To sum up, official salaries for teachers inthe DRC received an important boost at the start
of school year 2005-2006, and mostly as a result o f demonstrations and strikes in two o f the
biggest cities o f the country: Kinshasa and Lubumbashi\. The rise in salaries may have partially
satisfied teachers, probably helpingto offset an important part o f what FDM constituted up to
that moment: the greatest portion o f teachers' take-home pay\. Yet, this measure was unable to
eliminate FDM, which have been a fundamental financing element o f the system that still tops
up, on average, 50 percent of all "real" teacher salaries\. Added to that, the extension o fthe two-
zone salary systemto the current three-zone configuration increased the inequities o f the system,
where teachers with a similar level o f qualification can earn up to thirty percent more inabsolute
terms if they, for example, move from any place within the province of Katanga to within the
district borders o fthe city o f Lubumbashi2\.
* Although differential cost o f living adjustments may have been part o fthe consideration in creating the three salary
zones, it is still questionable whether it might have been better to create at least ten or more different zones rather
than only three\. These differential increases in salaries for teachers located in different regions o f the country
41
2\.4\.2 The status of NMteachers
34\. A second reason FDMare still collected at the school level i s because o f the large portion o f
the teacher corps that is not on the public payroll and therefore not included in the SECOPE
database\. This category o f teachers is referred to as NM\. The characteristics o f this group o f
teachers may vary widely although all o f them share the same treatment: their "salaries" are
financed entirely by school fees\. According to the Provincial Education Directorates
(PROVEDs), the branches o f the Ministry o f Education in the provinces, around 38 percent o f
the teacher force is NM (see Table A1\.8 below)\. This national average hides important
asymmetries across provinces\. For example, the Province o f Katanga outside o f Lubumbashi,
together with Maniema and Nord Kivu, has around 60 percent o f teachers fully financed by
parents\. Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Bas-Congo, and Bandundu have less than a quarter o f teachers
inthis situation\.
35\. The group o fNMteachers i s not homogeneous; it consists mainly o f four sub-groups:
(i)Teachers working inregistered schools and whose positions have been authorized by
SECOPE, but who are not yet incorporated into the public payroll due to budgetary constraints\.
This group o f teachers is known as postes autorids (PA, authorized positions) and constitutes
the priority group inthe pipelineat SECOPE\.
(ii)Teachersworkinginregisteredschools, whosepositions havenotbeenauthorized yetby
SECOPE, but who are currently operational on the ground\. This group may entail teachers who
were added at schools to keep upwith enrollment growth (e\.g\. a school may have built a new 5th
grade ina school originally authorized to have only up to 4thgrade)\. Inthis situation, usually: a)
schools (or networks) are in the process o f requesting authorization from authorities (either
preparingthe paperwork or awaiting final authorizationfrom the authorities); or b) schools have
unilaterally decided to increase their current teacher force, but have not started the authorization
process\.
(iii)Teachers working in schools which have formally been authorized by SECOPE to function,
but have not yet been registered (by SECOPE)\. These teachers are in the pipeline to be
incorporated in the public payroll system pending sufficient funds (&coles d mecaniser)\.
Therefore, this group o f teachers i s NM, but they belong to the priority group to be incorporated
into the public payroll system\.
(iv) Teachers working in non-registered schools, where the school has not been authorized
because it didnot submit, or complete, the documentation for authorization\.
exacerbatedthe debate on how much a school teacher should earn and, in some cases, e\.g\. Goma, led to situations
where the FDMstilloutweigh the portion o f the salary paid by the public sector\.
42
Table Al\.8 Primary educationworkforce, by status and province
-
Primarylevelteachers YOwithin provinces
Province Registered Notregistered Registered Notregistered
(mecanisis) (non-mecanisis) Total (mecanisis) (non-mecanisds) Total
Bandundu 25,791 7,09 1 32,882 78\.4% 21\.6% 100%
Bas-Congo 12,928 3,263 16,191 79\.8% 20\.2% 100%
Equateur 15,786 11,556 27,342 57\.7% 42\.3% 100%
Kasai-Occidental 10,47 1 2,693 13,164 79\.5% 20\.5% 100%
KasaY-Oriental 9,873 10,896 20,769 47\.5% 52\.5% 100%
Katanga(Lubumbashi city) 8,947 2,591 11,538 77\.5% 22\.5% 100%
Katanga(Rest ofprovince) 5,332 5,764 11,096 48\.1% 5 1\.9% 100%
Katanga(Total) 14,279 8,355 22,634 63\.1% 36\.9% 100%
Kinshasa 11,946 3,383 15,329 77\.9% 22\.1% 100%
Maniema 3,704 6,003 9,707 38\.2% 61\.8% 100%
Nord-Kivu 6,967 12,871 19,838 35\.1% 64\.9% 100%
OrientaleProv\. 13,802 11,683 25,485 54\.2% 45\.8% 100%
Sud-Kivu 9,628 5,735 15,363 62\.7% 37\.3% 100%
Total 135,175 83,529 218,704 61\.8% 38\.2% 100%
Source: WorldBankestimationsonthe basis o finformationcollectedby JohanVerhaghe (consultant) at SECOPEandthe PROVEDs\.
36\. Teachers ini)and iii)above have beenvetted by the education authorities and are the priority
for regularization; whereas the remaining two groups merit further analysis o f feasibility for
regularization\. SECOPE i s in process o f documenting which o f the total 83,500 NM teachers
falls into each o f the four groups and i s most advanced interms o f the PA (group i)above)\. The
group o f PA comprises approximately 24,500 teachers (see Table Al\.9 below), which i s around
11 percent o f the total teacher force or about one third o f the positions estimated to need
regularizing at the primary school level\. Interestingly, this is around 10 percent o f the
corresponding teacher force in each province, except for Equateur, for which it represents more
than 20 percent\.
37\. It i s important to bear in mind that, although this partial picture o f the situation o f non-
regularized schools and teachers brings some clarity on one o f the priorities for policy reform,
the second group on which more analysis is needed contains a potentially very large group o f
teachers whose regularization would have considerable budgetary impact should they all be
taken onto the public payroll as civil servants\.
43
\ Table A1\.9 Primary education workforce, by status and province
-
(further disaggregationwithin the non-registered category)
Primarylevelteachers %within provinces
Not registered Not registered
Province
RegisteredAuthorized Non-authorized Total Registered Authorized Non-authorized Total
positions positions positions positions
Bandundu 25,791 2,758 4,333 32,882 78,4% 8\.4% 13\.2% 100\.0%
Bas-Congo 12,928 2,343 920 16,191 79\.8% 14\.5% 5\.7% 100\.0%
iquateur 15,786 5,488 6,068 27,342 57\.7% 20\.1% 22\.2% 100\.0%
Kasa'i-Occidental 10,471 1,022 1,671 13,164 79\.5% 7\.8% 12\.7% 100\.0%
Kasa'i-Oriental 9,873 2,063 8,833 20,769 47\.5% 9\.9% 42\.5% 100\.0%
Katanga(Lubumbashi city) 8,947 1,42 1 1,170 11,538 77\.5% 12\.3% 10\.1% 100\.0%
Katanga(Rest of province) 5,332 1,074 4,690 11,096 48\.1% 9\.7% 42\.3% 100\.0%
Katanga (Total) 14,279 2,495 5,860 22,634 63\.1% 11\.0% 25\.9% 100\.0%
Kinshasa 11,946 995 2,388 15,329 77\.9% 6\.5% 15\.6% 100\.0%
Maniema 3,704 1,237 4,766 9,707 38\.2% 12\.7% 49\.1% 100\.0%
Nord-Kivu 6,967 2,384 10,487 19,838 35\.1% 12\.0% 52\.9% 100\.0%
Orientale Prov\. 13,802 2,080 9,603 25,485 54\.2% 8\.2% 37\.7% 100\.0%
Sud-Kivu 9,628 1,692 4,043 15,363 62\.7% 11\.0% 26\.3% 100\.0%
Total 135,175 24,557 58,972 218,704 61\.8% 11\.2% 27\.0% 100\.0%
Souree: World Bank estimationson the basisof information collectedby Johan Verhaghe (consultant) at SECOPEand the PROVEDs\.
2\.4\.3 The financial implications of the collection of FDM
38\. The previous subsections addressed the two main reasons why schools started collecting
FDM: (i) official salary levels; and (ii) important number of teachers that remains out o f
low an
the public payroll system\. The financial implications at the teacher level are depicted in Table
A1\.10 below\. It shows that, on average, teachers who are NMget a matching 1:1top-up to their
official salary levels\. In fact, while the (weighted) official salary in the DRC i s around US$32,
the (weighted) average contributionfrom FDMis approximatelyUS$28\.
39\. The significance o f these figures is that they indicate potential minimum salary levels for
teachers\. It i s also important to note, once again, that figures differ widely across provinces
following a pattern o f higher top-up being paid in the comparatively better-off provinces, and
lower top-ups inpoorer provinces\. This contrasts with the broad uniformity o f the official salary
system across the country, but in some way also suggests that from a strictly technical point o f
view, the official salary system would do well to take better account o f the differential cost o f
living adjustments needed to attract teachers\. To illustrate, the two poorest provinces o f the
country (Bandundu and Equateur) have the lowest absolute private contribution to teacher
salaries\. In the case o f Bandundu, in particular, the Catholic network o f schools which runs
about 40 percent o f all public primary schools inthe province, decided to stop requiring FDMto
top upthe Government salaries o f mecanids (regularized) teachers\. The schools inthis province
are only allowed to collect FDM to pay the NM teachers\. Better-off provinces like North and
Sud Kivu, on the other hand, contribute proportionally more through the FDM to top up
teachers' salaries\.
44
Table A1\.10
"Real salaries'' earned by primary education teachers, by status (US dollars a month)
Teachersonthe payrollsystem Impact of FDM
(%they representofofficial
(mecanbds ) Teachersnot teacher salaries) Ratio of "real
currently on the salaries''earned by
Province payrollsystem registeredteachers
pori- to non-registered
Official "Real mecanires ) Noa-mecanis~es Nom teachers
salaries FDM salaries" mecaniskes
Bandundu 29\.3 0\.0 29\.3 17\.4 0\.0 59\.5 1\.68
Bas-Congo 28\.9 38\.3 67\.2 20\.0 132\.4 69\.2 3\.36
Jiquateur 28\.8 6\.1 34\.9 14\.8 21\.2 51\.4 2\.36
Kasa'i-Occidental 29\.2 10\.4 39\.7 24\.4 35\.7 83\.3 1\.63
Kasa'i-Oriental 29\.3 21\.8 51\.0 17\.4 74\.3 59\.5 2\.93
Katanga(Lubumbashi) 38\.1 43\.5 81\.6 38\.3 114\.1 100\.5 2\.13
Katanga(Rest of province) 28\.9 38\.3 67\.2 38\.3 132\.3 132\.3 1\.76
Kinshasa 59\.5 55\.1 114\.6 55\.1 92\.7 92\.7 2\.08
Maniema 29\.1 30\.5 59\.5 35\.7 104\.8 122\.8 1\.67
Nord-Kivu 29\.2 41\.8 71\.O 28\.7 143\.1 98\.4 2\.47
OrientaleProv\. 28\.6 19\.1 47\.8 27\.0 66\.9 94\.2 1\.77
Sud-Kivu 28\.9 32\.2 61\.1 28\.7 111\.3 99\.3 2\.13
Total 32\.3 28\.1 60\.4 28\.8 86\.9 89\.2 2\.10
-World Bankestimationsonthe basisofinformationcollectedby Johan Verhaghe (consultant)at SECOPE andat the PROWDs
40\. It i s critical to note that the current cohabitation of a system with regularized and non-
regularized teachers creates asymmetries within the system, and within schools in some cases\.
As Table A1\.10 shows, on average, the "real salaries" for regularized teachers are more than
double those for NMteachers\.
41\. Several conclusions can be derived from the analysis o f the collection of FDM at the
primary school level in the DRC\. The first and most important i s that the problem i s directly
related to the inability of the public system to finance fully the two elements of the teacher
supply: quantity (teacher needs) and price (salary needs)\. As the systemoperates with a demand
exceedingly greater than the supply, the system adjusts by price (much higher "real salaries")
and quality (lower number o f qualified teachers on the ground due to the insecurity in stream of
payments, even with household co-financing)\. The quantitative impact in monetary terms is
shown inTable A1\.11below\.
45
Table Al\.11
Frais de motivation (FDM, teachers' motivation fees) and their impact,
by status of the school students attend
Total students Total spent on Average FDM Average FDM
Province involved FDM paid per teacher paid per student
(estimated) (US dollars a (USdollarsa (USmonth)
dollarsa
month) month)
Bandundu 924,394 123,436 8\.7 0\.3
Bas-Congo 559,3 15 560,415 29\.2 0\.8
hquateur 764,147 267,164 10\.4 0\.4
Kasa'i-Occidental 455,303 174,993 17\.4 0\.5
Kasa'i-Oriental 975,724 404,500 19\.6 0\.4
Katanga (Lubumbashi) 186,95 1 488,586 40\.9 3\.O
Katanga (Rest) 179,789 424,936 38\.3 2\.9
Kinshasa 352,692 844,987 55\.1 2\.5
Maniema 578,73 1 327,053 33\.1 1\.o
Nord-Kivu 299,656 660,750 35\.3 2\.3
Orientale Prov\. 749,367 579,507 23\.1 0\.8
Sud-Kivu 892,609 474,779 30\.5 0\.5
Total 6,918,679 5,331,106 28\.5 0\.7
Source: World Bank estimations onthe basis of World Bank (2005b) and on the ground collection of data by
Johan Verhaghe (consultant)
42\. The approximate 7 million students actually coming to class in any primary school in the
DRC, registered or not, spend around US$5\.3 million a month, only to cover the price o f
teaching\. This represents, on average, US$0\.7 per student a month or, alternatively, a co-
financing o f US$28\.5 towards the take-home pay of the teacher force\. If we take into
consideration the fact that there are about 5 million school-aged children outside o fthe education
system at the primary school level, the financial implications o fproviding UPEfor all children o f
school age are simply staggering for the salary considerations alone\. This does not even take
into account the massive capital investmentswhich would also be neededto improve quality\.
46
Annex 2: Major RelatedProjectsFinancedby the World Bank and otherAgencies
1\. External assistance to education has increased since 2003 within an evolving framework of
coordination\. The World Bank has the greatest input in both financial investment and sector
analytic work\. The proposed Education Sector Project injects considerably more resources into
the sector and is an organizing force sector-wide\. The Project is a pathfinder for joint work on
the development of a sector strategy and sector planning and financing work involving all sub-
sectors o f education and the donor community\. The prospect o f additional donor co-financing
after Project effectiveness indicates that the Project's Steering Committee can be a model for a
future, more ambitious SWAP that would increase and enhance the predictabilityo f support for
the education sector longer term\.
2\. These future prospects are taking off from an exceptionally modest level o f donor financing
ineducation\. During2003-2005, education received less than five percent of all donor activity\.
Table A2\.1 (below) presents an overview showing main sectors of focus and total levels o f
disbursement\. The total disbursed assistance provided by various donors amounted to about
US$3\.3 billion (excluding humanitarianaid, the total assistance was at US$2\.2 billion) o f which
investmentineducation was approximately US$60 million\.
3\. Preliminary estimates o f probable donor commitments under the Country Assistance
Framework (CAF) show that the support to education should increase compared with its standing
vis-a-vis other sectors in 2003 - 2005 (see Chart A1\.2 below)\. The estimated US$250 million
for education i s largely from the World Bank through the approved EUSRP's US$40 million
component for primary education (grants to offset school fees) and the US$150 million proposed
for this Education Sector Project\. The balance inthe CAF education commitments i s largelythe
35 million (approximately US$47 million) Belgian Cooperation financial programming for
education over 2008-2010, a third o f which i s earmarked for sectoral support in primary
education\. Other partners have not yet announced specific commitments, but DFIDhas signaled
that it i s considering a significant contribution to co-finance this IDA Education Sector Project
especially inregard to actions aimed at reducing primary school fees\.
4\. External partners' assistance ineducation focuses on primary education (see Tables A2\.2 and
A2\.3 below), which i s consistent with the DRC's policy priorities and the global encouragement
o f the MDGs and EFA\. Apart from Belgium, the bilaterals (notably, Japan, Canada, Italy,
Sweden, Switzerland, France, and the United States) on the whole are funding comparatively
small-scale projects\. On a similar scale, internationalNGOs typically integrate education among
other activities intheir projects, mainly targeting provinces affectedby conflict\.
47
Table A2\.1: DRC- Donor activity all sectors -2003-2005
Aid (including Aid (excluding
humanitarian) humanitarian)
Donors Sectors Recent
Trend
Share Millions Share
("A) (us9 W)
Netherlands CommunityDrivenDevelopment 184\.8 6 158\.5 7 No change
(CDD), Disarmament,
Demobilization& Reintegration
(DDR), Humanitarian
Belgium Capacity Building (CP), CDD, 153\.5 5 146\.3 Positive
DDR, Health, Education,
Humanitarian
UnitedStates Agriculture, CP, CDD, DDR, 349\.7 11 141\.7 Negative
Humanitarian, Environment,
Education
United CP, Humanitarian,Infrastructure 192\.8 6 104\.2 5 Positive
Kingdom-DFID
Other Bilaterals Budget support, CP, CDD, 277\.4 8 198\.3 9 No change
Education, Health, Humanitarian,
Democracy
United Nations Agriculture, Humanitarian, CP, 561\.0 16 200\.0 9 Negative
(UN)Agencies CDD, Health, Education,
Democracy
EuropeanUnion Agriculture, CP, CDD, DDR, 500\.5 15 167\.1 8 Negative
(EU) Health, Humanitarian, Democracy,
Infrastructure
IMF CP, CDD 194\.7 6 194\.7 9 No change
WorldBank Budget support, Agriculture, CP, 812\.5 24 806\.6 36 Positive
CDD, DDR, Education, Health,
[nfrastructure,Social Protection
~~
AfDB Budget support, CP, Agriculture, 89\.0 3 83\.0 4 No change
Health, Education
Total 3\.315\.9 100 2,200\.4 100
48
Chart A2\.1: DRC-Possible donor commitments* --
CountryAssistance Framework(millions of US dollars)
GROWTH -OTHER '
COMMUNITY RECOVERY
HEALTH
GOVERNANCE
GROWTH-TRANSPORT
-
GROWTH - POWER
--
EDUCATION
HIV/AIDS
WATER AND SANITATION
GROWTH-AGRICULTURE
GROWTH - FORESTRY
GROWTH - MINING
SOCIAL PROTECTION
* Amounts are basedon preliminary estimates, to be confirmed\.
5\. The support from multilaterals has been strategic in building alliances, as exemplified by the
Protocol of Collaboration agreed in 2002 between the Government and EFA partners:
UNESCO, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), UNICEF, the United Nations
Population Fund (UNFPA) and the World Bank\. Of note i s that UNICEF has the longest
standing, continuous involvement in education inthe DRC; it has been active in education since
1995\. In 2005, UNICEF's portfolio was just over US$5 million\. The African Development
Bank (AfDB) is supporting UNESCO (UA 5 million) to carry out projects aiming at institutional
capacity building\. In 2006, the World Bank was instrumental in includingthe DRC as a focus
country for the global (joint UNICEF-World Bank) initiative supporting the reduction of school
fees ("School Fee Abolition Initiative")\. The World Bank i s also leading efforts to assist the
DRC to prepare a finding request to the EFA Fragile States Initiative to bolster ongoing work to
generate a strategic longer term financing plan for the sector to accompany the country's future
application for financing under the EFA-FTI\.
6\. This IDA Education Sector Project i s designed to complement the programs in education
highlightedabove, to enable the DRC to achieve broader and more lasting progress inreversing
the sector's deterioration\. The proposed project builds on the regular Government and
development partner consultation committee (Comite` de Concertation des Acteurs du Secteur de
Z'Education en RDC) that is gainingprominence since 2003 as an informal avenue for ministries
to re-engage in the sector with donors, to coordinate inputs more coherently\. An education
donor Round Table in September 2004 helped to consolidate consensus in favor o f
49
Government's decision to use HIPC funds to reduce school fees\. As documented elsewhere in
this Project Appraisal Document, the Round Table was a springboard for bolder policy
statements on the elimination o f school fees which now figure in the Constitution and the
Education Sector Policy Letter from the period o f the Transitional Government, and as part o f
the mainpillars o fthe recovery programpromulgatedbythe newly elected Government\.
7\. The most distinctive advance the Project seeks i s in the reduction o f school fees\. Whereas
donors and international NGOs are unanimous on this priority and engaged in the policy
dialogue, few partners have committed funding duringthe past few years\. This i s partly because
o f competing priorities to finance, for example, the election process\. The largest existing
program o f support for reducing school fees - apart from the World Bank's support - i s the
USAID US$7 million 3-year pilot (2005-2008) that consists of financing community income
generating activities to create and maintain local school funds to pay fees\. The USAID program
operates at sites inEquateur and SudKivuProvinces\.
Table A2\.2: Main areas of multilateraland bilateraldonor assistance inthe educationsector
Specific area Primary Secondary Technical- Higher
supported Education Education Vocational
Education Education
Policy UNESCO,UNICEF, World Bank WorldBank
development WorldBank, Belgian
Cooperation,DFID,
UNDP, USAID
Education UNICEF, UNESCO
management (financedby AfDB),
World Bank
School WorldBank, Japan, World Bank, Belgian WorldBank, Japan, UNHCR,
infrastructure & USAID,UnitedNations Japan, Cooperation, UNDP
equipment HighCommissionsfor UNHCR UNHCR,
Refigees (UNHCR) AfDB Japan,
Canada
Teacher training UNICEF, USAID, BelgianCooperation,French
UNESCO 1AfDB Cooperation
Curriculum and UNICEF, Belgian
textbooks Cooperation,UNESCO,
EuropeanUnion
Scholarships WorldBank, Belgian
Cooperation
50
Table A2\.3: NGOswith activitiesinEducation
Name Main Education-relatedActivities
Oxfam In Kinshasa and selected provinces: Oxfam supports local NGOs,
community groups and schools to improve water and sanitation facilities
including school latrines; and provides some financial support for teacher
training and school committees\.
Care International Finances literacy programs for demobilized children in Maniema Province\.
Catholic ReliefServices (CRS) Provides support for primary education in Nord-Sankuru (Katako-Kombe,
Lodja, Lubeh, Bena-Dibele), province o f Kasai'Oriental\.
Save the Children Finances literacy programs in the Western Provinces; reintegration o f
demobilized children in Nord Kivu, Sud Kivu, Northern Katanga and Kasai`
Oriental\.
War Child UK Supports programs o f social reinsertion for children who are victims o f
armed conflict inthe Northern Equateur province\.
International Rescue Committee Institutional and financial support to local NGOs and social services in
(IRC) education, literacy, remedial classes for disadvantaged children including
street children, child ex-combatants, orphans inSud Kivu\.
Christian Aid Institutional and financial support to the DRC Civic Education Network
activities and assistanceto street children inthe provinces o fNord Kivu and
Sud Kin\.
8\. The proposed Education Sector Project links support for reducing school fees (in Component
1) with the critical imperative o f structural reforms in the civil service vis-a-vis the role of the
private sector, to improve the overall conditions for teachers' salaries and career pattern (in
Component 3)\. The key to success will be government's ability to use Component 3b o f the
Education Project to continue harmonizing work - begunduring Project preparation-with other
donors, other projects, and analytical work (e\.g\. PER, Governance and Public Service) which
focus on governance and structural reforms in the public sector, especially in regard to the civil
service salary system\. The Education Sector Project contains activities to complement the civil
service reform while the Project also uses that broader context to offset risks o f distortion if
salary issues in education are treated in isolation\. As part o f preparations, the Education Sector
Project generated financing scenarios to outline a feasible roadmap for the Government to meet
the public wage bill for teacher salaries as the system is progressively updated to incorporate
teachers in government approved schools - who are currently being paid only through school
fees\.
9\. The Project's support for Government to establish a sector-wide education strategy (in
Component 3) concentrates financial and technical assistance on systemic financial and legal
regulating functions o f the sector which must be reformed in order for institutional capacity
building and further reform to be effective\. This complements the emphasis o f the Comite` de
Concertation (Cooperation Committee) to progress on a SWAP, as well as the discrete
institutional capacity building activities o f UNESCO (training ministerial planning directorates,
51
inspectors, and school heads), UNICEF (training school heads and school-parent management
committees for some 3000 primary schools in Bandundu, Bas Congo, Equateur, Kinshasa,
Maniema, Nord Kivu and Sud Kivu) and to some extent the bilateral donors (e\.g\. USAID) and
NGOs (e\.g\. OXFAM International)\.
10\. UNESCO, with the AfDB support, is also working with the MEPSP Planning Directorate
and SECOPE to improve education sector databasemanagement as well as to set the groundwork
for a more comprehensive school mapping (carte scolaire)\. DFID intends to finance the
technical assistance to complete the carte scolaire and a census o f teachers, to make up for the
shortcomings o f the census conducted under the civil service reform\. This i s harmonized with
the proposed Education Sector Project to ensure the Government will meet disbursement
conditions for the grants for teachers' salaries and subsidies for school operating costs\. Related
to the school mapping i s that the proposed Education Sector Project (in Component 1) will
support the MEPSP to formulate new norms for low cost school construction so the DRC can
more affordably go to scale nationally with a school construction program\. Presently, since the
DRC lacks a carte scolaire, the Education Sector Project's support for civil works inthe primary
sector i s limited to rehabilitation o f existing sites\. The rehabilitation builds on lessons learned
and adds to the overall number of infrastructure rehabilitated through the education components
o f several existing multi-sector projects financed by the World Bank (see Table A2\.4), and the
smaller scale investments inschool infrastructure by several o fthe bilateral donors\.
11\. Finally, the Education Sector Project's investmentintextbooks for mathematics and reading
for primary grades one and two i s designed to complete the provision o f books in the same
subjects for grades three to six by the Belgian Cooperation\.
Table A2\.4\. RelatedWorld BankProjects
Projects ID# Effective Closing Amount Latest Objectives of Projects
(US% IP/ DO
million)
Emergency Early PO75660 12/08/01 Closed 50\.0 S I S The Project assisted the
Recovery Government to: (i)strengthen
Project institutional capacity and
formulate economic policy; and
(ii) address urgent needs
including the pilot o f a higher
education scholarship scheme to
promote excellence ineducation\.
Emergency PO57296 11/08/02 12/31/08 454\.0 s / s Aim is to (i)initiate a long-term
Multi-Sector process for reconstruction and
Rehabilitation& economic rehabilitation; (ii)
Reconstruction prevent further deterioration o f
Project social services - rehabilitating
(EMRRP) schools, enhancing food security,
delivering health care, restoring
water, and energy supply ; and
(iii) lay foundation for future
policy and institutional reforms
including the education sector\.
52
Projects Project Effective Closing Amount Latest Objectives of Project
ID# (US% IP/DO
million)
PrivateSector PO71144 12/02/03 04131110 120\.0 s / s To increase the competitiveness
Development& o f the economy and contributing
Competitiveness to economic growth by assisting
with: (a) improving the
investment climate; (b)
supporting reform of public
enterprises in the mining,
telecoms, financial, transport, and
energy sectors; (c) stimulating
economic diversification and
development in the Katanga
region through CDD approaches;
and (d) facilitating the
reintegration o f retrenched
workers in the local economy
through support for training,
business development services
and finance\.
Emergency PO81850 12/05/03 9130108 214\.0 s / s Aim is to: (i)introduceor restore
Economic& economic governance system and
Social implement key reforms; (ii)
Reunification complement actions underway to
address urgent needs, finance
rehabilitation in parts o f the
country where no major
economic assistance program has
been under implementation; and
(iii)prepareextensionofEMRRP
to all partsofthe country\.
Post- PO82443 05/13/04 Closed 200\.0 s / s The objective is to assist the
Reunification Government with foreign
Economic exchange to: (i)support the
RecoveryCredit continued implementation of
economic reforms; (ii) support
civil service reform, and in
particular the retirement of staff,
and (iii)complete process of debt
reduction and restructuring
relatedto arrears\.
53
Projects Project Effective Closing Amount Latest Objectivesof Project
ID# (US$ IP/DO
million)
Multi-sector PO82516 10/08/04 01/3 1111 102\.0 MS/U The objective is to mitigate the
Human negative impact of the
Immunodeficiency HIVIAIDS epidemic on the
Virus (HIV) stabilization, recovery, and
/Acquired Immune development of DRC by: (i)
Deficiency reducing risk of sexual,
Syndrome (AIDS) intravenous and vertical
transmission of HIV; (ii)
improving health status and
quality of life of people living
with HIVIAIDS; (iii)
mitigating socio-economic
impact of the epidemic on
vulnerable groups\. Includes
support for micro-projects
prepared by beneficiaries,
including schools\.
Emergency PO78658 11/09/04 0313 1/08 100\.0 U/MS Objectives are to help
Demobilization consolidate peace and promote
Reintegration economic stability and
sustainable development in
DRC and Great Lakes region
by (i) demobilizing up to
150,000 ex-combatants and
help support their return to
civilian life, (ii) promote
reallocation o f Government
expenditure from military to
social andeconomic sectors\.
Emergency Social PO86874 07126/05 0313 1/09 60\.0 MU/ Aim is to (i)improve access of
Action MU the poor to social and
economic services, and (ii)
increase availability and
management of development
resources at community level:
education, infrastructure,
incomegeneration(pilotbasis)\.
Transitional PO91990 12/08/05 Closed 90\.0 s / s Objective is to: (i) support
Supportfor selected strategic targets of
Economic Interim PRS, (ii) reinforce
Recovery essential state functions
especially for benefit of the
underprivileged, (iii) help
government consolidate policy
achievements including
reduction o f primary school
fees, (iv) support improved
governance in key sectors to
ensure fiscal and
environmental sustainability in
the longrun\.
54
Projects Project Effective Closing Amount Latest Objectives of Project
ID# (US$ IP/ DO
million)
EmergencyLiving PO88619 09123IO5 09130110 82\.0 S I S Aim is to assist in improving
Conditions living conditions by
Improvement strengthening the socio-
economic situation in key
urban centers by: (i)improving
delivery of basic services
including education in
provincial capitals and medium
urban centers, (ii) restore
transport links to reconnecttwo
isolatedregions\.
Health Sector PO88751 04/13/06 06130110 150\.0 UIMU Aim is to (i)ensure that target
Rehabilitation population of selected health
support care zones has access to, and
use, a well-defined package of
quality essential health
services, (ii) strengthen
capacity of local communities,
implementing partners and
government officials at all
levels of planning and
monitoring\.
EmergencyUrban P104497 07110107 05131111 182\.0 N A The aim is to help DRC face
and Social (expected) urgent post-elections
Rehabilitation challenges by: (i) providing
Project (EUSRP) resources to maintain macro-
economic stability and find
critical expenditure in the
immediate future; and (ii)
address urgent rehabilitation
and social needs in Kinshasa\.
US$40 million of the Project
finances grants to offset school
fees for operatingcosts\.
* IP=Implementation Progress; DO=Development Objective; S=Satisfactory; MS=Moderately Satisfactory;
MU=Moderately Unsatisfactory;U=Unsatisfactory;NA=Not Applicable
55
Annex 3: ResultsFrameworkandMonitoring
ResultsFramework
OutcomeIndicators
Prevent further deteriorationinthe Growth in GER from 64%3 in2007 Provide indicatorsto monitor
delivery of essential services for to 75% in 2012 (totals and progress inreversing deterioration in
primary educationand prepare disaggregated by gender)\. delivery ofprimary education
groundfor a sustainable services, to put on track to pursue
development and financing ofthe Increase inprimary education the MDGs\.
sector that will facilitate donor completion rate from 29% in2007 to
coordinationand future transition to 35% in2012 (totals and Provide policy recommendations
a sector wide program\. disaggregated by gender)\. and costed programoptions, and
baselinedata for an educationsector
Increase girls to boys ratio in developmentprogram with a
primary schoolfrom 85% in2007 to realistic financing plan that will
95% in2012\. attract more ambitious level of
funding from donors\.
Reform ofteacher career structure
(training, deployment, salary and Monitor progress inMDG2 and
incentives) approvedby the MDG3, the PRSP, andthe
Government\. Government's commitment to
education\.
Educationsector strategy(including
mediumterm financing plan) with
indicatorsagreed with donorsand
approvedby Government\.
IntermediateResults Results Indicators for Each Use ofResultsMonitoring
One per Component Component
Component One: Component One: Component One:
Access and equity inparticipation in About 1570classrooms rehabilitated Monitor progress inrebuilding
primary schoolare improved\. and equippedwith desks by 2012\. primary education\.
Draft guidelines for efficient use of
resources for school construction on
large scale\.
Compliancewith Arr&te`(bylaw) on Follow-up on Government's
abolition ofprimary schoolFDF as commitmentto fee-free primary
measuredby annualCRC surveys education\.
that show reduction inschool fees
from first surveyto last survey\. Monitor progress toward the MDG
goals\.
Data is from Government sources and subject to wide margin of error (see World Bank, 2005b); will be verified
and indicatorsrevisedas appropriate\.
56
Component Two: ComponentTwo: ComponentTwo:
Quality ofeducationservices offered About 11milliontext booksand Assess availability of textbooks in
inprimaryschool is improved\. 278,000 teachers' guides inreading the schools andto measureimproved
and inmathematicsfor primary efficiency inthe system\.
grades 1and2 producedand
distributedto schools achievinga Buildpartnershipbetweenthe public
ratioof 1textbook per student and 1 andthe private sectors as well as
textbook andthe corresponding address the issuesoftextbook
guideto eachteacher byend o f publishinginnationallanguages\.
Project\.
Assess quality aspects, including
In-servicetraining inuse o f accountability relations, in primary
textbooksreaches80% ofprimary education\.
inspectorsandschooladvisersby
end o fProject\.
The Governmentadoptsanupdated
textbook policyby 2011andbegins
implementationbeforeend of
Project\.
CRC surveyshows improvementsin
quality as measuredby less teacher
absenteeism, increased availability
o ftextbooks, improvedresponse
from schools to parents' concerns\.
Nationalpupillearningassessment
mechanismfor grade 4 o fprimary is
inplace\.
ComponentThree: ComponentThree: ComponentThree:
Educationsystem legal, institutional, A newteachers' statute is approved Monitor improvementsinpolicy
andfinancial capacity is bythe Governmentand reforms, e\.g\. civil service/teachers
strengthened as a foundationfor implementationhasbegun\. career inthe educationsector\.
developmentinthe educationsector\.
Reformedguidelinesfor pre-service Draftguidelines for supportto
and in-serviceteacher training are teacher trainingandto definenew
developedand are beingapplied\. career profiles\.
Loi cadre (organic law) andthe Monitorstrengthenedaccountability
Conventionof Partnershipsare relationshipsbetweenschools and
updated or replacedby2011\. policylevels\.
An educationsector strategyand The educationsector strategyis an
mediumterm financing planhave essentialfoundation for harmonizing
beenapprovedbythe Government\. internationalsupportandmobilizing
domesticand externalresources\.
57
u
3
i?
a
\.53
\.e
B
m
m
Annex 4: DetailedProjectDescription
0 COMPONENT 1: IncreaseAccess and Equityat Primary Level
\. (Estimated costs, including contingencies: US$lO4\.52 million)
Sub-ComDonent la: Rehabilitate Primary school infrastructure
(Estimated costs, including contingencies: US$28\.73 million)
1\. Issues: School infrastructure inthe DRC is extremelydegraded, andthe deteriorationis most
acute in the war-torn areas o f the North and East\. Government estimates that 750 primary
schools would need to be rehabilitated each year over 2007 - 2010, to strike a pace capable o f
reaching the MDGs in 20-25 years\. Government lacks the capacity to respond\. This i s partly
because o f a funding shortfall; partly because unit costs (US$lO,OOO per classroom) o f
construction using the current norms and standards are too high to make economical use o f
resources\. Many communities have constructed classrooms at lower cost, but assessments show
that few community sponsored structures are durable\. There i s also a need to retrofit nearly all
the more than 26,000 existingprimaryschools with functioning latrines\.
2\. Objective: (a) improve access to primary education by restoring severely deteriorated
classrooms so they can be brought back to use, rehabilitating a proportionally greater number o f
classrooms in areas o f the country which were most affected by conflict, and (b) establish a
sustainable national strategy for school rehabilitation and construction that will keep pace with
increases inprimary school enrollment\.
3\. Strategy: The Project will rehabilitate school infrastructure in existing Government-
registered schools, staffed with teachers\. In the first eighteen months o f the Project, a classic
approach will be used whereby tenders are issued and the selected contractors will follow the
existing school building norms and standards\. This approach i s being used to execute the
education sub-component o f the EMRRP that aims to rehabilitate 126 schools in approximately
four years\. Also inthe first year o f the Project, the Infrastructure Directorate o f the MEPSP will
be assisted ina technical reviewo f norms and guidelinesto propose appropriate school building
options emphasizing low-cost durable techniques which will be more economical to scale out
rehabilitation nationally\. Validated results o f this study will be incorporated into the second
batch o f rehabilitation under the Project\. The Project midterm review will particularly assess
progress in remote access areas and recommend any further adjustments in the rehabilitation
strategy\.
4\. TheProjectwill finance:
(a) Studies and technical work: (i)one study on norms and standards for low-cost
construction; (ii) an evaluation o f existing experience in the DRC involving community
participation, which will especially assess governance structures for managing funds and
technical/logistics management; (iii) preparation, printing, distribution o f a maintenance
manual for school buildings and furniture to schools\. The manual will be distributedin
training workshops at provincial level, which the Project will also finance\.
(b) Rehabilitation o f about 1570 classrooms (approximately 260 schools); the directors'
offices and latrines; equipment (desks, storage closets for textbooks in each rehabilitated
school)\.
62
(c) Capacity building for the Infrastructure Directorate o f the MEPSP in (i)strategic
planning, emphasizing low-cost techniques, (ii) financial and procurement management
for contracting out large-scale civil works to private enterprises, (iii) mechanisms for
contracting through a decentralized community-managed school construction and
rehabilitation approach; and (iv) maintenance, with attention to the respective roles o f
\. central, Provincial and school-level authorities\.
Sub-Component1b :Rehabilitate theNationalPedagogical University
(Estimated costs, including contingencies: US$3\.38 million)
5\. Issues: The National Pedagogical University(UPN) i s the only highlevel research institution
that i s exclusively focused on education\. It trains personnel for the Pedagogical Institutes
(Instituts Supe'rieursPe'dugogiques) which train secondary school teachers\. The UPN has also
begunto offer doctoral programs inpedagogy\. The University conducts research and i s a focal
point for donor technical assistance for the sector since the university can be contracted for tailor
made training programs\. The UPN resources are important, in view o f the studies and pilot
programs expected in the future education reforms inthe DRC\. The UPN is constrained by the
lack o f facilities and equipment; its physical infrastructure i s severely degraded\.
6\. Strategy: Rehabilitate the classroom blocks, latrines, and offices which are essential for
training trainers for teachers inthe education system\.
7\. The Project will finance: (i) rehabilitation o f classroom blocks, latrines, and offices related
to core in-service training and, (ii)equipment (desks for students, specific equipment and
pedagogical materials for in-service training laboratories)\.
\. Sub-ComponentIC : Improve Equityo fAccess to Primary Education
(Estimated costs, including contingencies: US$70\.10 million)
8\. Issues: Fee-free primary education i s a pillar in the Government's pro-poor strategy\. The
national Constitution stipulates that primary education i s obligatory and fee-free\. Government
has not built up domestic resources to implement this\. Some fees were waived on a limited
geographic basis for girls enteringprimary school inthe first year\. This was accomplished with
UNICEF support\. For academic years 2004-2005 and 2005-2006, the Government used HIPC
resources to offset a portion o f the fee for school operating costs (FDF) and intends to continue
this practice through July 2007\. A bolder step was taken through the ministerial bylaw (Arrgte'
No MINEPSP/CAPIMIN/6635/2205 dated September 3,2005) that abolished all but four fees as
from academic year 2005-2006\. However, the reality on the ground i s that fees are still being
charged as they cannot simply be abolished without replacement income\. The strongest prospect
for significant, sustainable progress inphasing out primary school fees is, as argued elsewhere in
this document, to obtain support from external partners to help fill financing gaps over a period
in which Government progressively increases the education sector allocation of the national
budget\. External partners support this strategy, provided there i s a clear roadmap\. This needs to
be based on a number o fpolicy decisions, including: timing o f steps to increase the allocation to
education from the national budget, teacher salary policy (which i s tied to ongoing civil service
reform), improving efficiencies (e\.g\. increasing pupil-teacher ratios inprimary), and striking an
adequate balance betweenpublic and private sectors inthe delivery o f education services\. The
Project finances capacity strengtheningactions to prepare and adopt neededpolicies\. To guide
63
and anchor the effort, Government has prepared a Letter o f Education Sector Policy, in addition
to the PRSP document, and has agreed as a condition o f effectiveness for the Project to issue an
inter-ministerialArr&te` (bylaw) to establish which fees are allowed, andtheir amounts\.
9\. Objective: The objective i s to assist Government to keep up the momentum and concrete
results from its policy to eliminate primary school fees\.
10\. Strategy: The Project will focus on the largest fees households have been paying and will
provide cash transfers on a temporary basis i\.e\. over the lifetime o f the Project ina two-pronged
approach to help Government make up for revenue lost from fee income\.
11\. The Project will finance: expenditures to empower the government to (i) eliminate parents'
monetary contributions to sustain operating costs for primary schools; and (ii) integrate 30,000
primary school teachers into the public payroll for public primary schools\. These are teachers
who are already operational on the ground and who are in the pipeline, according to agreed
criteria, to be financed through the public sector pending availability o f funds\. Presently these
teachers are financed by fees collected through the FDM\. Project support will apply to primary
teachers only, inkeepingwith the focus on the MDGs\. Project funds for this sub-component will
be channeled through the country's mechanism for paying teacher salaries\. Conditions for
disbursementwill apply, as specified elsewhere inthis document\.
12\. The Project will also support strengthening accountability and empowering local
communities to participate in school-level decisions\. Citizen's Report Cards (CRCs) aim to
permit students and parents to assess primary education along basic quality dimensions\. Annual
CRCs will also be used as instruments for monitoring reductioninschool fees and improvements
in quality o f service delivery\. A Needs Assessment o f training needs for parent committees,
PTAs, and teachers' trade unions will establish a program at local levels for strengthening their
capacity for planning, budgeting, financial management, and fighting corruption\. The objective
i s to empower school communities to work better in their function as oversight bodies, and
strengthentheir abilities to influence school management inmore efficient ways\. Inaddition, a
communication strategy that covers all phases and components o f the Project i s proposed\. The
strategy i s to facilitate both the flow o f information and the dialogue on the fee policy,
governance, corruption, and service delivery issues\. The Project will assess compliance through
technical audits, including focus group discussions with school management and parent
committees\. Additional support activities are insub-component 1d\.
13\. Through parallel measuresinComponent 3, the Project will assist Government inimproving
internal efficiency and raising the cost-effectiveness o f the education system, particularly as
regard to the pupil-teacher ratio\. The aim is that by Project close, the domestic budget can
sustain the 30,000 additional primary teacher salaries with no co-financing fiom parents and
minimal or no funding from external donors, as well as ensure that the FDF and the FDIP are
abolished without a rise inother fees to compensate at school level\.
\. Sub-component Id: StrengthenSafeguards inthe Teacher Pay System
(Estimated costs, including contingencies: US$2\.31million)
14\. Issues: The Service de ContrGle de la Paie des Enseignants (SECOPE) at MEPSP i s the
agent designated to assist the Budget Ministryfor payment o f teachers' salaries\. SECOPE also
facilitates transfer o f Government's block grants to schools to subsidize the FDF\. The latter i s
helping to restore public confidence in the Government as it re-engages in the sector\. The
64
SECOPE database on teachers and schools i s vital for education sector management and
planning, yet i s maintained on out-of-stock hardware (computers) and software (COBOL)\. The
risk of breakdown is imminent\. The consequences would be serious including possibilities o f
civil unrest ifteachers were not paidbecause o f the size o f the teaching corps, the strength o f the
teachers' unions, and the influence of the religious organizations which are managing the
majority o fpublic schools\.
15\. Objective/ Strategy: Strengthen safeguards in the Government's teacher pay system by
strengtheningSECOPE and capacity in other relevant ministries(e\.g\. Budget), ensuring that the
support underthis Project complementsand i s integratedwith the support providedthrough other
sources (inter alia, UNESCO, Belgian Cooperation, the IDA-financed EUSRP)\.
16\. The Project will finance: services to enhance safeguards in the Government's teacher pay
system through: (i) strengthening SECOPE's capacity at the central and provincial level in the
field o f database planning and management, as well as resources management and monitoring;
(ii)providing goods (upgraded computers, software, and internet connections for the SECOPE
central and Provincial offices) and (iii)carrying out o f information and communications
campaigns on the policy to eliminate primary school fees; (iv) training o f parent groups in
monitoring the fee-free policy for primary schools; (v) transportation costs o f audits comprising
mixed teams from the Ministries of Finance, Budget and EPSP, and independent third party
observers); and (vi) carrying out o f two Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) o f
payments of salaries for primary education teachers and fees for operating expenditures in
primary education\. One PETS will establish baseline conditions\. A second PETS will follow in
the Project's fourth year\.
a COMPONENT 2: Improve Quality of Primary Education
(Estimated costs, including contingencies: US$28\.76 million)
17\. Objective: Contribute to improving quality and internal efficiency o f primary education,
by: (i)improving the availability o f textbooks and teachers' guides in core subjects; (ii)
providing in-service teacher training in the use o f textbooks; (iii) building capacity to assess
learningachievement nationally\.
Sub-Comuonent2a: ProvideTextbooks
(Estimated cost, includingcontingencies: US$26\.0 1 million)
18\. Issues: The DRC education system i s markedby a shortage o f textbooks and other learning
materials\. The shortage i s especially acute at the primary level\. Most primary schools have no
textbooks\. In some areas, pupils complete their primary school without seeing a printed word\.
The MEPSP has a Curriculum and Learning Materials Division and a Committee for textbook
evaluation and approval\. These units need to be strengthenedin order for DRC to achieve the
important next steps in building its domestic capacity to assure an adequate availability of
textbooks and other learningmaterials inschools\.
19\. Objective: To address the shortage o f textbooks, the Belgian Cooperation provided
textbooks in reading and mathematics for primary grades 5 and 6\. The books were purchased
off-the-shelf and distributedthroughout the DRC during school year 2004-2005\. The Belgian
Cooperation has also decided to provide textbooks for grades 3 and 4 for school year 2007-2008\.
The objective of this sub-component is to provide textbooks and teachers' guides for grades 1
65
and 2 in the same subjects\. The sub-component will also build capacity in the Curriculum and
Learning Materials Divisionfor textbook evaluation, selection, procurement, and distribution\. It
will also helpthe MEPSP produce a new textbook policy that will lay out the responsibilities o f
the public and private sectors as well as address the issue o f textbook publishing in national
languages\.
20\. Strategy: Inorder to provide primary schools with textbooks, which conform to the primary
school curriculum o f year 2000, existing titles will be selected and adapted\. International and
national publishersand authors will be invitedto propose titles for selection\. Giventhe country
circumstances, the sub-component will adopt the approach o f the Belgian Cooperation and select
one title per subject/grade\. The adaptation, production and delivery o f the books to the regional
education offices (PROVEDs) o f the selected titles will be procured through international
competitive bidding\. Distribution from the regional education offices to the schools will be
entrusted to transporters and distributors selected through national competitive bidding\. The
books will be the property o f the individual schools, which will loan them to pupils and teachers
free o f charge\. Each pupil will receive a set o f 2 textbooks (1 inreading and 1 in mathematics)\.
Each teacher will receive a set o f 2 textbooks and the corresponding teachers' guides\. The sub-
component will also train inspectors, school advisers, and school directors in the use o f
textbooks\. It will prepare, print and distribute to schools a manual inthe care and management
o f textbooks\. It will develop a database in the MEPSP to track textbook stocks in the schools\.
The sub-component will build capacity in the Curriculum and Learning Materials Division in
textbook evaluation, selection, procurement, and distribution on the job\. It will also organize: (i)
study visits to selected countries with good databases for textbook stocks tracking; (ii)
training in
evaluation o f textbook content; and (iii) training in definition o f textbook pedagogical and
technical specifications\. The sub-component will also conduct a book sector study to provide
background documentation for the formulation o f national textbook policy\.
21\. The Project will finance: (i) acquisition o f about (a) 11 million textbooks inreading and in
mathematics for primary grades 1 and 2 and (b) 278,000 teachers' guides in the same subjects;
(ii)training ofinspectors, school advisers andschool directors inthe use oftextbooks; (iii)
production and distribution to schools o f 172,000 manuals in the care and management o f
textbooks; (iv) establishment o f a database to track the textbook stocks in the schools; (v)
carrying out study tours to selected countries with good experience in developing databases to
track textbook stocks inthe schools; (vi) training o f the MEPSP staff in evaluation o f textbook
content; (vii) training in definition o f textbook pedagogical and technical specifications; and
(viii) carrying out o f a book sector study aimed at gathering relevant information and knowledge
\.
to develop and implementan adequatenational textbook policy\.
Sub-component 2b: BuildCapacity to Assess Learning Achievement
(Estimated costs, including contingencies: US$2\.75 million)
22\. Issues: Quality i s low inthe DRC because o f inadequate inputs, although this has not been
assessed empirically\. The monitoring o f students' and teachers' performance i s hampered by the
lack o f systematic assessments and incentive mechanisms to improve students' learning\. The
present learning assessment system relies almost exclusively on grade repetition and the
examination at the end o fprimary school for indicators o f students' achievement\. Because o fthe
widespread practice o f topping up exam fees with "motivation payments" to proctors, pupils'
examination results may indicate more the ability to pay rather than actual learning achievement\.
66
Other achievement tests are ad hoc\. The existing program lacks sufficient diagnostic learning
assessment methods and tools\. Fewteachers are trained, intheir everyday use inthe classroom,
to assess pupils' learning needs as a way o f monitoring the quality o f schooling outcomes, which
would help make the system learning-driven and promote retention in school, the core result
expected by the MDGs\.
23\. Objective: Build up domestic capacity to establish a culture o f defining and monitoring
standards for educational quality, and specifically to assess primary school students'
performance against those standards\. These activities will also provide outcome indicators o f the
Project's inputs (e\.g\., textbooks, teacher training) against baseline conditions, and assist
Government indeveloping further strategies\.
24\. Strategies: Strengthendomestic capacity (UPN, Inspectorate) to institutionalize assessments
o f learning achievement and research on learning and retention inschool to establish a culture o f
monitoringthe quality o f education inDRC\. The activities will buildout from the modest, donor
led standardized achievement tests at grade 4 o f primary school (which provide important
baseline data) to establish a partnership between the UPN and the Inspectorate who would
administer the assessments\. The Project activities will also broaden the assessment efforts, to
include research on the relationbetweenquality, learning achievement, and retention inschool\.
25\. The Project will finance: (i) internationaltechnical assistance to train relevant staff at UPN
in research on learning achievement, statistical sampling, diagnostic learning assessment tools
and assessment design, including for the preparation o f the survey to be carried out inprimary
education; (ii)establishing capacity within UPN to provide baseline information on learning
achievements in primary schools; and (iii) carrying out two rounds o f assessments in selected
primary schools\.
0 COMPONENT 3: Strengthen Institutional and Financial Capacity of the Education
Sector (Estimated costs, including contingencies: US$5\.06 million)
26\. Issue: The education sector capacity to implement its development agenda i s severely
compromised by the lack o f a functional legal and institutional structure\. There are large
discrepancies between the formal legal framework, mostly a sequel o f the centralized
government o f the pre-war period, and actual practice, shaped in large part by ad-hoc responses
to years o f government neglect and unmet needs\. A key result o f this evolution i s the change
from state to mostly household financing o f education\. Re-establishing the previous regulatory
framework i s not economically viable and would furthermore miss the opportunity to forge a
beneficial partnership with the components o f society (e\.g\. religious organizations) which
sustained education intimes o f crisis\. This cannot be done without developing a clear response
to the teachers' insistent demand to renegotiate the terms o f their work contract\. Nor can it be
done outside the framework o f a sector strategy that sets goals, defines priorities and funding
responsibilities, and allocates public resources according to stated objectives\. Finally, it cannot
be done inisolation from the structural reforms which are beingimplementedat the macro level,
including the public expenditure reform, civil service reform, and decentralization reform\.
27\. Objective: This component will contribute to revisingthe legal and institutional framework
o fthe education system, and reinforcing institutional capacities for planning,budget formulation,
and program execution in pivotal areas for the sector including teacher career structure and
67
teacher training, and the development o f a sector wide medium term strategy for education,
buildingonthe PRSP goals and integrating long-term financial constraints\.
Sub-Component 3a: Support Policy Reform o fTeacher Career Structure
(Estimated costs, including contingencies: US$O\.91 million)
28\. Issues\. One o fthe most disastrous impacts o fthe crisis inthe 1990s and the years o f conflict
i s the continuous and concomitant decline inthe teachers' morale and professionalqualifications\.
Existing teachers' pre-service and in-service training methods and quality do not confer
sufficient professional expertise\. The pre-service training o f primary school teachers i s mostly
provided by the 4000 secondary schools which have a 3-year pedagogical stream (humanite`s
pe`dagogiques) o f theoretical training that follows an initial 3-year common program for all
secondary school students\. The quality o f the humanite`s pe`dagogiques i s widely seen as
mediocre\. On-the-job training and skill upgrading opportunities are scarce, irregular and depend
mostly on donor-funded projects\. Teachers also resent the vulnerability o f their compensation
system, which lacks retirementbenefits and relies heavily on financial contributions from parents
that recently have come under attack from many parts\.
29\. There are three principal issues which are interconnected and which need to be dealt with
jointly:
i) Inadequacy o f primary school teachers' knowledge o f subject content and didactic
skills, which require a significant overhaul o fthe selection and training methods;
ii) Theneedtolinkthisoverhaultoanewandimprovedsocialandprofessionalstatus
("revalorisation")\. This improvement should not be limited to salary issues, but
rather adopt a broader approach that includes stricter selection criteria, better defined
career structure, and promotion and other incentives linked to both academic
achievement and actual performance\.
iii) Finally, former graduatesofthe "humanite`spe`dagogiques, who will continue to
"
constitute the bulk o f the profession for many years to come, will likely block this
reform unless it i s accompanied by easily accessible skill upgrading programs, which
would enable them to make progress toward the new professional standards and seek
a certification at this level\.
30\. The magnitude o f these issues i s too great to treat them simply from the perspective o f a
more favorable compensation system\. The deficiencies are structural and institutional, and must
be addressed at these levels\. There is no consensus among education authorities on a vision for
reform, although there is noticeable support for transforming the humanite`s pe`dagogiques into a
system o f Ecoles normales (EN, Teacher training schools) to strengthen the base o f initial
professional training\. Proponents are inspired by pilot activities which began in the 1980s in
three schools, although these pilots dissipated without proper evaluation\.
31\. Objective:This sub-component will assist the preparation o f a policy to be adopted for the
reform o f pre-service and in-service teacher training\. The policy will also recommend a career
structure and links between professional training, actual performance and salary levels for
education staff\. Expected results from this component are: (i) a new statute on teachers' careers
and salaries, formulated and adopted within the civil service reform; (ii) a plan to modernize the
system o f pre-service teacher training; and (iii)strategy and action plan for in-service teacher
a
68
training with the view to providing certification in line with the new statute and guidelines on
teacher qualifications\.
32\. Strategy: The recently initiated civil service reform provides a unique opportunity to rethink
the career structure of primary school teachers and link it with an upgraded system o f
professional training and standards\. The new training policies supported under the Project will
be formulated intandem and linkedwiththe Government's redefinition o f the career structure o f
teachers within the ongoing civil service reform\. The Project will support policy dialogue and
coalition building, and analyses to prepare the policy reform\. Specifically, a high-level structure
(possibly a National Commission) will be created to review the career structure and reward
system for teachers inthe context o fthe education system's renewal and the broader civil service
reform\. Membershipo f this structure (Commission) will include stakeholders including religious
organizations andteachers' representatives, inaddition to Government\.
33\. The Project will finance: technical advisory services to support policy reform inthe field o f
pre-service and in-service teacher training, including inter alia: (i) analysis o f existing resources
and reform options for pre-service teacher education; (ii) evaluation o f existingin-service teacher
training experiences and options for scaling up; (iii) feasibility studies for reform, including
study tours in selected countries; (iv) assistance to a structure (National Commission) to be
created to review the career structure and reward system for teachers and draft the policy
document on the proposed reform; and (v) information and communication activities to help
buildnational consensus on reformproposals\.
9 Sub-Component 3b: Support Preparation o f a Sector-wide Education Strategy
(Estimated costs, including contingencies: US$4\.15 million)
34\. Issues\. Many action plans have beendeveloped over the emergency recovery period\. These
include the EFA Action Plan and the Pacte de Modernisation de I'Enseignement Supe`rieur et
Universitaire (PADEM, Pact for Modernizing Higher Education)\. Yet, many issues persist to
challenge the formulation o f a coherent sector wide strategy: (i) the legal framework for the
education sector i s no longer appropriate, (ii) multiplicity o f project, program and reform
the
proposals fragments the sector and sets up competing rather than prioritized needs, (iii) few
action plans are based on realistic cost projections that integrate domestic financing constraints,
(iv) large parts o f the sector, especially higher education and non-formal education, lack reliable
development plans and finally (v) there i s no agreement on a resource allocation formula
between sub-sectors that would confirm the priority o f primary education while recognizing the
needto find core programs inother sub-sectors\. Government has demonstrated highpriority for
addressing these issues in the Transitional Government's overall Letter o f Development Policy
and the education pillar inthe new government's recovery program\.
35\. Objective: This sub-component will put inplace a process that aims to (i) consensus
reach
on a more appropriate legal framework, which clarifies the role o f the state and formally
recognizes the current partnership arrangements with the religious organizations and the families
with respect to school management and education financing, (ii)fill in current gaps in the
education strategy and (iii) establish priorities and rigorous financing plans\. By the end o f
help
the Project an education sector strategy linkedto a realistic long-term financing plan and backed
by an initial Medium Term ExpenditureFramework (MTEF) and three annual updates will have
beenproduced\.
69
36\. Strategy: This sub-component will be carried out through a series o f linked actions,
overseen by a national level structure (possibly a second High-Level National Commission,
HLNC)\. The work will be carried out infour separate sequences\.
(i) Sequence 1: the Legal Framework\. A reformed legal framework constitutes the
foundation o f the sector strategy and should be undertaken as priority\. Activities duringthis ,
first sequence will aim to generate recommendations to Government, to be taken into
consideration in completing the revision o f the loi-cadre (organic law), which dates from
1986, and the partnership conventions between the state, the churches and other religious
organizations, which date from the late 1970s\.
with(ii) Sequence 2: Filling in the Knowledge Gaps\. While undertaken concomitantly
Sequence 1, this second sequence i s nonetheless independent and consists in: (a)
producing a national policy on non-formal education (essentially adult literacy programs) and
recommending an execution strategy based on pilot activities to be tested and evaluated with
resources from the Project, and (ii) completing the reform agenda o f PADEM by producing
an overall financing strategy for higher education and agreeing on internal reforms to
improve efficiency\.
(iii) Seauence 3: Building Capacity for an MTEF\. A team will be trained in MTEF
design data collection and financial modeling techniques\. An initial MTEF should be
produced within eighteen months o f this activity start and will be updated yearly\. Outcomes
from previous sequences will feed into the yearly MTEFs\.
(iv) Sequence 4: Stratem Development\. This sequence uses results from previous
activities to set goals for the education system, priorities and credible financing plans\. It i s
essentially a consultation and consensus-building phase\.
37\. The High-Level structure (High-LevelNational Commission, HLNC) will be composed o f
representatives from the MEPSP, the MESU, the MASSN, the Ministryo f Finance, the Ministry
o f Budget, the Ministry o f Planning, the Ministry o f Civil Service and representatives from key
stakeholders\. A precursor technical committee for the HLNC was established during Project
preparation\.
38\. The Project will finance: support to the formulation and implementation o f (i)a
comprehensive education strategy including an appropriate legal framework and financing plans
for all relevant sub-sectors including primary, secondary and higher education and literacy
programs; and (ii) pilot programs designedto increase literacy and school remediation across the
country; as well as (iii) establishment o f an appropriate structure comprising representatives
the
o f relevant institutions and education sub-sectors, including primary, secondary and higher
education and literacy to oversee the formulation and implementation o f the comprehensive
education strategy referred to above; (iv) carrying out o f workshops, seminars, publicity
campaigns and technical audits aimed at disseminating the new comprehensive education
strategy and fostering sustainable dialogue between key stakeholders in the education sector
including parents, teachers, school administrators and representatives o f civil society; and (v)
carrying out o f studies designed to promote equity and to improve school achievement rates
including inter alia: (a) a feasibility study to establish a sustainable and efficiently performing
students' transportation scheme; (b) a nutrition study to supplementstudents' nutrition withinthe
school environment; and (c) a health study aimed at sustaining good health for students within
the school environment\. The technical assistance will include support for updating the Zoi cadre
70
(organic law) to define the roles and responsibilities o f the State at all levels, the religious
organizations, rural and urban communities and parents in financing and managing schools; as
well as financial modeling techniques and designing a Medium Term ExpenditureFramework
(MTEF)\.
0 COMPONENT4: Proiect Coordination andManagement
(Estimated costs, includingcontingencies: US$11\.17 million)
39\. The Project will strengthenproject managementand coordination o f the Steering Committee
comprised of the MEPSP, the MESU, and the MASSNwith an increment in resources required
to operate a Project Management and Coordination Unit (PMCU) described elsewhere in this
document\. The Project will also provide financing for the acquisition o f technical advisory
services, computer equipment, office materials, supplies and vehicles required for the Project;
and the provision o f training (including study tours) to enhance the capacity and expertise of the
ministrystaff involvedincarrying out the Project\.
PPF:(US$1\.O million)
40\. An IDA-approved Project Preparation Facility (PPF) was under implementationto complete
activities requiredfor readiness for Project implementation\. The PPF was to be managed by the
BCECO, but following the INT general investigations in the DRC, the government and IDA
agreed instead that an implementation unit that already manages another IDA-financed operation
in the DRC would handle procurement and financial management for the PPF under a Grant
Agreement with IDA, and a service contract with the above-mentioned Steering Committee (see
Institutionaland ImplementationArrangements, elsewhere inthis document)\.
71
Annex 5: ProjectCosts
ProjectCost by Componentand/or Activity usLocal
million usmillion
Foreign usTotal
million
Component 1:IncreaseAccess Primary School 20\.5 77\.3 97\.8
Component2: Improve Quality Primary Education 8\.9 16\.8 25\.7
Component 3: Support to Education Sector 2\.9 1\.4 4\.3
Management
Component4: Project Operating Costs 10\.0 3\.7 13\.7
PPF 0\.9 0\.1 1\.o
Total Baseline Cost 43\.2 99\.3 142\.5
Physical Contingencies 2\.2 1\.o 3\.2
Price Contingencies 3\.8 1\.o 4\.8
Total Project Costs' 49\.2 101\.3 150\.5
Interest during construction
Front-end Fee
TotalFinancingRequired 49\.2 101\.3 150\.5
'Identifiable taxes and duties are approximately US$0\.5 million, and the total project cost, net of
taxes, i s US$150 million\.
72
Annex 6: ImplementationArrangements
1\. Project execution directly involves three ministries\. These are the Ministry o f Primary,
Secondary and Professional Education (MEPSP); the Ministry o f Social Affairs and National
Solidarity (MASSN); and the Ministry of Higher Education and Universities (MESU)\. At
Project start, the ministries do not have technical capacity that conforms to World Bank
standards\. Some functions will therefore be contracted to specialists to assist with Project
implementation, overseen by a Steering Committee (SC) o f the ministries involved in Project
execution\. As part of Project implementation, the Ministries' and other stakeholders' capacities
will also be strengthenedthrough training and mentoring, systematically involving them in the
execution processeso fthe Project\.
2\. Among the functions which will be outsourced through a Procurement Agent is the
procurement for all civil works and school furniture, textbooks, computers, laboratory
equipment, vehicles and all consultants\. A second function that will be strengthened by
contracted services i s the financial management o f the Project at the Project Management and
Coordination Unit (PMCU)\.
3\. The PMCU i s the execution arm o f the SC\. The SC will ensure overall transparency in
decision making processes for the Project as well as mechanisms which coordinate multiple
ministries inProject execution\. For example, the Ministryof Finance and the Ministryo f Budget
have a direct role inexecuting the Project's support to reduce primary school fees since this will
use the country's system for the payment o f teachers' salaries\. The relationships are outlined in
Chart A6\.1 below\.
The Project Steering Committee (SC)
4\. The SC, which was created during Project preparation by an inter-ministerial bylaw (Arr2te`
Inter-Ministeriel EPSP-ESU-AS No0510/2005 dated 26 January 2005) prescribed that there be
representatives of: MEPSP, MESU, MASSN\. The Government subsequentlydecided to increase
the membership to include representatives from the Ministries o f Finance and Budget and the
Arrite` (bylaw) will be amended accordingly\. The SC is chaired by the Minister o f Primary,
Secondary and Professional Education since the bulk of Project resources are inthis ministry's
domain\. As the SC i s the decision making body for the Project, its responsibilities include: (i)
coordination o f the Project activities with Government strategy, policy development, and
relations with other development partners; (ii) approving the Project's annual work plans and
budgets; and (iii)providing strategic guidance for efficient execution o fthe Project\. The SC i s to
meet at least once a calendar quarter\.
73
Chart A6\.1 OverallProjectManagement
Decision Level
Ministry o f
SocialAffairs Higher
E d u c c ---- Ministry of
~~
Universities
(MESU) I-- STEERING COMMITTEE
Secondaryand
Professional
Education
1
f v
Project and Management and Coordination Unit
(PMCU)
eG1 MEPSP ?4 MASSN MESU I
SECOPE Planning
PlanningDirectorate Directorate
PlanningDirectorate
I
I I I I I
Literacy Directorate Civil Works
School Infrastructures
Directorate National
I I I Pedagogical
I University
Program and Didactic
Material Directorate
Provincial Directions ProvincialDirections Provincial Directions
andlocal services and local services and local services
1 I 1 I
\.3 3
% 2
E 'E Stakeholder and Development Partners 1
I "
a 3 /
74
TheProjectManagementand CoordinationUnit (PMCU)
5\. The PMCU will be created under the SC to handle Project execution on a day-to-day basis\.
The PMCU management and procedures will be described in the Project Operations Manual,
prepared with World Bank assistance according to international standards\. The PMCU will be
the Bank's main counterpart and focal point for implementation o f the Project\. The PMCU will
be responsible for all aspects o f financial and technical management including: (i) preparing and
costing detailed annual implementation plans based on the Action Plans approved by the SC; (ii)
managing Project resources (including financial management, managing the contract with the
Procurement Agent); (iii) recruiting external auditors; (iv) monitoring implementation progress
and impacts, (v) compiling activity, evaluation, financial and audit reports; (vi) coordinating with
technical departments o fthe MEPSP, MESU, MASSN, Ministry o f Finance, Ministry o f Budget,
Civil Service Ministry; and (vii) ensuring coordination o f Project activities with those o f other
international and domestic partners\.
6\. The PMCU (see Chart A6\.2) will retain staffing resources appropriate to its level of
operations, and sufficient to maintain accounting records relating to project financed
transactions, and to prepare the project's financial reports\. Personnel will be recruited on a
competitive basis and will include: (i) a National Coordinator; (ii) international accounting
an
firm for financial control and internal audit of the Project; (iii)team o f nationals comprising a
a
CFO, an Accountant, and a Treasurer; (iv) a Civil Engineer; (v) an Operations Officer specialist
in Monitoring and Evaluation; (vi) a specialist in Information Technology; and (vii) support
staff\. The external auditing function will be contracted out\.
ChartA6\.2 ProjectManagementand CoordinationUnit (PMCU)
[ National Coordinator
iI International Support Staff
Accounting Firm AdminAssistants (2)
Internal audit Drivers(3) 1
I
I
/
National firm Civil Engineer Operations
Financial Officer:
Management Monitoring &
CFO Evaluation
Treasurer
Accountant
75
PMCUcooperationwith importantMinistriesfor implementation:
7\. Whereas the PMCU will be responsible for all aspects o f technical execution and financial
management o f the Project, it will work together with staff o f several ministries and their
decentralized levels o f administration that will help guide and monitor the various processes o f
introducing, implementing,and monitoring Project financed activities intheir respective areas:
The MEPSP technical departments and General Inspectorate at the central level will
participate and benefit from in-service training related to the textbook program o f
Component 2; the technical departments o f MEPSP and MESUwill participate inand
benefit from, respectively, the rehabilitation and provision o f equipment for primary
classrooms and the National Pedagogical University (Component 1); UPN and the
General Inspectorate will benefit from the learning assessment and related research
(Component 2);
The MASSN, benefiting from technical assistance under the Project, will lead in
developing the national literacy policy and pilot literacy activities;
Central level and Provincial education authorities, school heads and management
committees will benefit from institutional strengthening financed by the Project; this
will particularly benefit SECOPE as a measure to reinforce the teacher salary
payment system and mechanisms for block grant transfers to schools, and as a
measure to improve the information management system in the education sector\.
Central, Provincial and local authorities and school level committees will also be
involved in all phases o f the school rehabilitation program that will function on a
national basis\.
The technical departments o f MEPSP, MESU,MASSNand the Ministries o f Finance
and Budget who participate in strategic analysis of budgeting and financing for the
education sector as a system will benefit from technical assistance under the Project
(Component 3);
The MEPSP, MESUand MASSN, from whom certain staff will be designated by the
SC to be trained under the Project, will benefit from capacity building that will
enhance the ministries' prospects to manage future projects after this Project closes\.
Contracted Procurement Agent (CPA)
8\. A Procurement Agent will be contracted under a services contract, by the PMCU, to provide
the procurement services ofall components o fthe Project according to specific TOR\.
9\. All TOR and technical specifications for contracts awarded under the Project will be
developed by the Procurement Agent in collaboration with the relevant ministry units, and these
TOR and technical specifications will be approved by the PMCU\. The contracts will be signed
by the PMCUand overseen by it, evenincases where the contracts are directly supervisedby the
CPA\. The major procurement contracts to be managed by this entity concern the rehabilitation
o f primary school classrooms and latrines, procurement o f equipment (e\.g\. desks), the
rehabilitation o f the National Pedagogical University and procurement o f its equipment,
computers, textbooks, vehicles, and all consultants\.
76
10\. Disbursement for the contracted activities will be managed by the PMCU (see Annex 7 for
the Project Special Accounts)\. The Procurement Agent will be responsible for providing the
financial reporting directly related to procurement, as requiredby the PMCU\. The PMCU will
carry out the overall financial reporting required by the Financing Agreement\. Further details
are provided inAnnex 7 on FinancialManagement and DisbursementArrangements\.
ImplementingPartners for the Payment o f Primary School Teachers' Salaries and for Primary
Schools for Operating Cost Subsidies
11\. IDA will transfer funds for the grants to a designated account in the Central Bank o f the
DRC\. The funds will be released upon payment authorization and payment order issued by the
MinistryofFinance, following the BudgetMinister's confirmation that the payroll list is correct
and the salary payments have been committed (via the Directeur de la Paie, Director of
Payments)\. Only teachers who are verified to be on the payroll will qualify to receive the grants\.
The central office o f SECOPE will be responsible for furnishing the list o f qualified teachers to
the Minister o f EPSP, for transmittal to the Budget Ministry\. The grants will be released from
the Central Bank, following the existing procedures for the payment o f teachers' salaries, using
the country's procedures and division o f roles, responsibilities at Provincial and local levels to
ensure salary payments reach the teachers\. Further details on the payment o f the teachers'
salaries and the primary school operating cost subsidies are set out in Annex 7 on Financial
Management and Disbursement\.
Implementationand Monitoringof ProjectActivities
12\. The Project is expected to be fully implementedwithin five years o f effectiveness\. Besides
the standard early activities, most o f which are to be completed as Effectiveness conditions (e\.g\.
setting up the PMCU, for which the office premises have already been designated by MEPSP),
the first activities o f the Project will include selecting the external financial auditors, signing
contracts for textbook procurement, launching the study on school construction norms, and
consolidating the list o f primary school classrooms for the first batch for rehabilitation according
to the selection criteria which were agreed duringProject preparations\.
13\. By Effectiveness, the Project Operations Manual will be finalized with technical assistance
from a consultant financed by the Project Preparation Facility (PPF)\. The Manual includes: (i) a
description o f the relationship between the various actors involved in implementation; (ii) a
detailed description o f procurement and financial management procedures to be adhered to by
each actor; (iii)description o f specific arrangements for key activities, including environmental
a
safeguards\. Interms o f format, the Manual will draw on the existing manuals for the EMRRP
and other manuals of IDA-financed projects inthe DRC\. Interms of content, the main tools are
the present Project Appraisal Document and the detailed tables of estimated Project costs, by
activity as well as the draft TOR for the key functions (e\.g\. Procurement Agent) and actions
agreed between the government and IDA\. To ensure transparency, copies o f the Project
Operations Manual will be widely disseminated to all Projectparticipants\.
14\. The process o f issuingtenders and selecting firms for the civil works (rehabilitation) and for
procurement o f the primary school textbooks, as well as certain consultancies including for the
literacy activities, start under the PPF phase\. These will be overseen by the national preparation
team from MEPSP, MESU and MASSNthat was designated by the SC, combining efforts with
77
the Procurement Agent who should be recruited (internationally) with assistance from a Project
Implementation Unit o f another IDA-financed Project, agreed by the SC to handle financial
management and procurement under the Education Sector PPF\. Expressions o f interest for the
contracts above will be evaluated prior to Effectiveness in order to assure the Project readiness
for implementation\.
15\. The selection o f the Project Coordinator; a team o f nationals comprising a CFO, an
Accountant, a Treasurer; a Civil Engineer; and an Operations Officer specialist in Monitoring
and Evaluation will be completed prior to Effectiveness\. The contract with the CPA will cover
its procurement services for the latter part o f Project preparation and the period after
Effectiveness\. The draft contract will be submitted to IDA for no-objection\. Prior to
Effectiveness, the Government will also adopt the Project Operations Manual in form and
substance satisfactory to IDA and establish an operational fiduciary management system
satisfactory to IDA including: (i) adoption o f the Manual o f Financial and Accounting
the
Procedures, (ii) the recruitment o f an international accounting firm to carry out internal audit
activities o f the Project, and (iii)
installation o f a software for financial management, accounting
and procurement withinthe PMCU\.
16\. Once the PMCU i s operational and the Project Operations Manual i s issued, the main tasks
o f the PMCU will be to ensure that (i) Procurement Agent progresses rapidly to finalize the
the
contracts for the first batch o f civil works and all activities in the agreed procurement plan; (ii)
the MEPSP has communicated the list of teachers who qualify to be taken onto the public
payroll, financed from transfers from the Project; and (iii) management o f day-to-day activities
and reporting\. This includes oversight and support to the technical departments o f the MEPSP,
MESU and MASSNand liaison with the Ministries of Finance and Budget; supervision of the
Procurement Agent; communication with the World Bank; reporting and liaison with other
project implementingactors as detailed inthe Project Operational Manual\.
78
Annex 7: FinancialManagementand DisbursementArrangements
ExecutiveSummary
1\. The financial management (FM) arrangements for the Project have been designed with
consideration for the country's post-conflict situation\. The arrangements aim to facilitate
disbursementsand to ensure effective use o fProject resources and funds while the country's own
systems are used to the extent possible\. To this end, overall coordination o f the financial
management aspects o f the Project will be the responsibility o f the Project Management and
Coordination Unit (PMCU) to be set up within the participating education sector ministries,
except for the PPF phase when financial management will be carried out by a Project
Implementation Unit (PIU) already managing other IDA-financed projects\. The principal
objective o f the Project's FMS will be to support the Project in the use o f resources to ensure
economy, efficiency and effectiveness in delivering the results required to achieve Project
objectives\. The FMS must be capable o f producing timely, understandable, relevant and reliable
financial information that will enable the Project's management to plan, implement, monitor and
assess the Project's overall progress toward its objectives\.
2\. The financial management department o f the PMCU composed o f three staff will be headed
by a qualified, experienced Financial Manager selected on a competitive basis\. The department
will be further strengthenedthrough the recruitment o f a firm of accountants to provide support\.
The financial management department o f the PMCU will be responsible for (i)approving
payments to the CPA and other contracted service providers, suppliers o f equipment and goods,
and implementingagents; and (ii) submittingconsolidated Financial Monitoring Reports (FMR)
and audited financial statementsto IDA\. The auditing firm, recruited on a competitive basis, will
assist the PMCU financial management team to ensure adequate and effective use o f Project
funds\. The auditing firm will provide a qualified, experienced staff to review any request o f
payments by the implementing agents and carry out the regular internal audit activities o f the
Project\. These will include the verification o f eligibility o f expenditures as well as physical
inspection o f works and goods acquired by the Project\. The findings o f the auditor will be used
by the PMCU and the Project Steering Committee to make decisions regarding Project
implementation, and regarding payments and contracts for the various service providers and
implementingagents\.
3\. One designated bank account will be opened in U S Dollars in a commercial bank on terms
and conditions acceptable to IDA\. The account will be maintainedby the PMCU\. Funds will be
disbursedto contractors and providers o f services, equipment, and goods subject to the approval
o f the National Coordinator o f the PMCU\. Disbursement under components 2, 3, and 4 from the
IDA grant, as well as the civil works incomponent 1, will be transaction-based (replenishment,
reimbursement)\.
4\. Disbursements under component 1 for financing primary school teachers' salaries and
primary school operating cost subsidieswill be tranche-based, and subsequent payments will be
made subject to an audit satisfactory to IDA o f the use o f the funds o f the previous tranche\. For
the financing o f primary school teachers' salaries and subsidies for primary school operating
costs, IDA will transfer funds on a semester (every six months) basis, for each o f the five years
o f the Project, into an earmarked account at the National Treasury located at the Central Bank o f
Congo (Bunque Centrule du Congo,BCC)\. This account will be used for the sole purpose o f the
Government's payment o f salaries to primary school teachers and payment o f subsidies for
79
primary school operating costs to help eliminate the practice o f corresponding fees charged at
school level\. These funds will finance (i) the salary for a specifically identified list of teachers
(by name) who are currently not "mecanisds" but who are already identified by the Service de
ContrGlede la Paie des Enseignants (SECOPE) progressively to be added inits official database
o f teachers who will be financed through the public payroll system, and (ii)subsidies for
operating costs o f a defined list o f qualifying primary schools\. The list o f qualifying teachers
and schools will be transmitted to IDA before the initial tranche installment o fthe two respective
purposes i s made\. The financing from the Project for salaries o f these identifiedteachers will be
transferred through the existing procedures for payment o fteachers' salaries\.
5\. These procedures are inline with the officially mandated role o f SECOPE to establish the list
o f qualifying teachers, to update data and information on teachers' status (recruitment,
promotion, departure, transfer, reallocation) and to monitor delivery o f the salary payments to
teachers\. The Ministryo f Finance will be responsible for authorizing release o f these funds from
the Treasury after the Budget Minister has signed the verification (liquidation) orders which are
summary payroll statements\. Specifically, based on the Budget Minister's verified payroll
statement (liquidation de la liste de paie), the Treasury issues a disbursement authorization
(ordonancement)which is validated by the Finance Minister who then gives origin to a payment
order\. Similar arrangements will be applied for the payments o f primary school operating cost
subsidies(to offset the FDF and FDIP)\. However, for the purpose o fthis Project, disbursements
for the grants for operating cost subsidies will be effective subject to the completion o f the
implementation o f the component 1 o f the E M W which i s providing bridge financing for the
same purpose\. This condition does not apply to the above-mentioned teacher salary payments\.
6\. The overall conclusion o f the financial management assessment o f the EPSP payroll system is
that in order to progress towards satisfaction o f the World Bank's minimum financial
management requirements, the Government and the MEPSP should adopt an action plan
described in detail in this FM assessment report\. This includes completion o f a comprehensive
census o f primary schools, students, classrooms and teachers prior to disbursement o f the first
tranche o f funds from the Project to finance the identifiedprimary school teachers' salaries, as
well as updatingthe teachers' database and rosters managedby SECOPE, taking into account the
pending request for authorization to add teachers to the public payroll\. This will be done in
collaborationwith the Ministries o fFinance and Budget\.
7\. Any payment o f tranche under component 1 that involves primary school teachers' salaries
and financing for primary school operating subsidies will be immediately audited by the
government control institution, Inspection Ge`nirale des Finances (IGF, General Inspection o f
Finances)\. The audits will include inspection and field visits on the ground\. Upon receipt o f a
satisfactory audit report as well as completion o f the additional disbursement conditions
described elsewhere in this Annex, the Central Bank will receive the amount necessary for the
next tranche payment - and the process will be repeated\.
8\. The PMCU will be responsible for the accounting and reporting standards, including the
FMRs for all sub-components of the Project, under terms and conditions which are specified in
the Financing Agreement and the Project Operations Manual, which includes detailed procedures
for the payment o f the teachers' salaries and operating costs and other activities financed by the
project\.
80
9\. Qualified, experienced and independent auditors ("external auditors") will be appointed on
approved TOR and will conduct an audit every six months unless and untilit i s established to the
satisfaction o f IDA that the fiduciary risks are diminished to a level that would require an audit
only once a year\. The external financial audit, including eligibility o f expendituresand physical
inspections, will cover all aspects o f Project activities as well as payments o f the salaries o f the
teachers who are identified to be added to the public payroll and who will thus be formally
incorporated into the SECOPE database, and the payment o f subsidies for primary school
operating costs\. Inaddition, there will be separate, independentaudits o f each installment o f the
Project's funds that are used to pay these teachers' salaries and subsidies for school operating
costs\. The latter audits will be carried out by a team o f auditors composed o f representatives o f
MEPSP (SECOPE) and the Ministries o f Finance (staff o f the IGF,, and Budget, along with an
independent third party observer\. Following the first tranche transferred by the Project, any
subsequent installments will be released subject to the submission o f the audit report o f the use
o f the preceding payment by IDA o f funds for teachers' salaries and primary school operating
cost subsidies, and a satisfactory report on the same remitted to IDA\. In addition, annual
citizen's report card surveys will be used for monitoring the implementation o f the Project from
a school level\. Furthermore, two Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) will be
conducted to trace the flow o f public funds, including teachers' salaries and school operating
costs, to school level\. One PETS will be conducted inthe first year o f the Project, and a second
PETS in year four\. Due to the risks embedded in the Project and the need to monitor its
performance so as to ensure sustainable results, activities in all four Components o f the Project
will also be subject to technical auditing, including o f procurement, on a sampling basis every
year\.
10\. An anti-corruption action plan will be developed within four months after Grant
effectiveness and will specify oversight mechanisms by the civil society (e\.g\. parent committees,
trade unions, etc\.) inmonitoringresults on the ground, development o f effective communications
strategies (to inform beneficiaries, publicly disclose the name o f companies and amounts o f
contracts signed and similar information about the Project), investigation o f wrongdoing, and
sanctioning those found guilty\. Among the good governance and anti-corruption measures, the
World Bank will schedule supervision missions with greater frequency (a minimum o f three per
year) duringthe first years of Project implementation\.
DRC Economicand FinancialControlEnvironment
11\. The DRC has experienced a long period o f instability and conflict during which the
administrative and regulatory institutions in the country seriously deteriorated\. Tremendous
efforts are being taken to reestablish these\. The open and democratic process o f the recent
elections opens a new phase inthe country's history after decades o f mismanagement\.
12\. The existingcapacity to assume financial management responsibility inthe ministries and at
decentralized administrative levels i s weak\. A recent, joint IMF/World Bank assessment o f the
DRC's eligibility for assistance under the enhanced Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) provides insight into the status o f the country's public sector management\.
This, together with other analyses including the CFAA completed inMay 2005, portrays a highly
unsatisfactory economic and financial control environment\. In-depth structural reforms have
been launched in the areas o f economic governance, public expendituremanagement, financial
81
Key weakness Priorityrecommendations
Outdatedandpoorlyadapted legaland The legalandregulatoryframework for publicfinance
regulatoryframework management must be completelyrevamped, inparticularthe
FinancialLaw(organic law)\.
Inadequatebudgetpreparationcycle 1Reviewthe budgetcycle and establishthe budgettimetableby
law\.
Non compliancewith standardbudgetexecution Strengthenex ante budgetarycontrolsto ensure adherenceto
procedures normalbudgetexecutionproceduresand limitthe incidenceo f
exceptionalprocedures\.
Inadequatedebt management Strengthencoordinationbetweenthe units involvedinpublicdebt
management\.
Irregular, incomplete,unreliableproductionof Produce andpublishexecutionreportsina timely mannerusing
reports the computerizedpublic expendituresystem database\.
Lack ofan accountingframeworkthat meets Finalize, adopt, and effectively implementa double-entry
standardnorms accountingframework\.
Weak managementandcontrol ofpublic funds Strengthenthe procedures for openingandmaintainingbank
due to proliferation ofbank accounts accounts, ensuringproper reportingoftransactions\.
Weakness ofex post administrativeoversight of Reinforcethe capacityofthe InspectorateGeneralo f Government\.
expenditureexecution
Major needfor training andhumanresources Establishstrategies andplansto improvecapacityofstaff
responsiblefor managementandtrackingo fpublic finances,
14\. Although there is cause for cautious optimism, it will take a longtime for these reforms to
yield substantialimprovements in the management of public funds\. Given the fragility of the
fiduciary environment, and the challenge that with multiple sector ministries involved in the
Project there is joint ownership of the Project accounts, the only financial management and
disbursement arrangements which provide the fiscal and fiduciary safeguards required for
Projects financedby IDA are the arrangementsdescribedinthe presentAnnex\.
82
InstitutionalArrangementsfor FinancialManagement
The Steering Committee CSC)
15\. The Project's implementation arrangements are designed to reinforce the education sector to
assume responsibility for managing a similar development project in future\. To this end, a
Steering Committee (SC) will take up the responsibility for overall policy guidance and
oversight o f Project implementation, including its financial management aspects\. The SC will
ensure that Project funds are used according to the agreed objectives\.
The Project Management Coordination Unit CPMCU)
16\. Responsibility for the financial management and operational aspects o f the project will be
assigned to the Project Management Coordination Unit (PMCU) set up at the MEPSP\. The
PMCU will implement and manage the project activities, including activities pertaining to
monitoring and evaluation, as well as managing project funds\. The PMCU will be adequately
staffed at all times with professional staff who ensure effective coordination between the
executive divisions o f the Ministries involved in the Project, the CPA, and other contracted
implementingactors\. The PMCUwill beheaded by a Project Coordinator (PMCU Coordinator)\.
The financial management team, which consists o f competitively selected consultants, will be
responsible for: (i) maintaining PMCU expenditure accounts; (ii)approving payments to the
CPA and other service providers, contractors and suppliers o f goods; (iii)consolidating the
project financial statements (budget, FMRs and annual accounts); and (iv) auditing and reporting
to IDA\.
17\. Internal auditing and financial control functions which are under the responsibility o f the
PMCU will be outsourced through contracts to firms with qualifications and experience
satisfactory to IDA\. Such an arrangement will enable the PMCU to focus on its main
responsibility o f coordination and supervision\. The firm that will be contracted for the internal
auditing function will provide staff to be located on the PMCU premises\.
18\. The PMCU will directly implement specific (selected) activities, and manage the contract
for the Procurement Agent\. The contract with the Procurement Agent will clearly specify the
activities covered by its contract in the context o f this Project\. The PMCU will also supervise
implementation o f the IDA transfers into the earmarked account at the National Treasury, to be
used for payment o f the identified primary school teachers' salaries and grants for primary
school operating cost subsidies\.
Financialmanagement assessment of the three Ministriesparticipatingin the project
19\. The capacity assessment conducted during the project preparation phase revealed capacity
shortages in the three ministries in respect o f financial management and procurement\. These
weaknesses include: (i)the lack o f sufficiently qualified staff in the areas o f financial
management (ii) the absence o f an accounting system acceptable to IDA; (iii)non-familiarity o f
ministry staff with IDA financed-projects and procedures for reporting requirements,
disbursement arrangements and auditing\. Furthermore, the CFAA confirmed the lack o f an
adequate tracking and reporting system and a formal accounting system within the ministries\.
Therefore, the FMS the ministries normally have in place does not meet the Bank financial
management requirements\.
20\. The overall conclusion o fthe financial management assessment is that inorder to satisfy the
World Bank's minimum financial management requirements, an independent PMCU at the
83
MEPSP using IDA financial management procedures should be established\. For this purpose,
three consultants (Financial Manager, Treasurer and an Accountant) will be recruited to lead the
financial management function\. An auditing firm will be recruited to lead the internal audit
function\. Management o f the designated account ("Designated Account") will be the
responsibility o f the PMCU and controlled by the auditing firm\. The PMCU will be responsible
for auditing andreporting to IDA\.
Summary of the assessment of the teacher payrollsystem
21, Teachers' payroll inthe DRC i s managedwithinthe framework o f the government's overall
payroll system described in detail inthe CFAA report, as well as in an independent assessment
commissioned to assist this Project's preparation (Verhaghe 2007)\. The CFAA mission found
two methods being used in Government's overall personnel payroll preparation: (a) the
mechanized payroll (partially computerized, and for which the only supporting documentation
for the expenditure i s a computer listing by name); and (b) a manual payroll system\. The
management of the Government's payroll expenditure i s the responsibility o f the Payroll
Directorate o f the Budget Ministry\. Lists of names are submitted by the line ministries to the
Payroll Directorateupon whichthe payroll payments are based\.
22\. In practice, validation to update payroll slips is performed manually by the six Validation
Divisions, based on payroll rosters, lists o f names submitted by the ministries, or notes from
Civil Service to the Payroll Directorate requestingthe validation o f the global payroll envelope
rather than the detailed list o f names\. The validation orders constituted by a summary payroll
statement are signed by the Minister of Budget\. The payment authorization orders are also
prepared after inputtingupdated slips pendingthe endorsement o fthe validation\. The statements
o f the amounts to be validated (accompanied by validated orders) are then signedby the Minister
o f Finance\. The payment instructions are signed by the Delegated Payment Authorization
Officer prior to payment by the BCC\. Inthe case o f the provinces, the payroll i s processed by
overall ceiling for all employment statusestaken together\.
23\. The teacher payroll inspection unit called SECOPE i s a specialized unit o f the MEPSP
created by ministerial bylaw (No\. DEPS/CCE/001/0121/85 dated September 24, 1985)\.
SECOPE i s responsible for monitoring and verifying the payroll for that ministry\. SECOPE
draws up a payroll list containing details o f each teacher\. In order to be paid, teachers sign the
payroll list\. Individual pay slips were discontinued inthe mid-1980s\. Currently, SECOPE issues
two separate listings: one for the base salaries and one for the specific bonuses called "primes\."
24\. The following are the main weaknesses identifiedinthe reviewo fthe EPSP payroll system:
(i) Supporting documentation for payment o f salaries i s not complete, particularly with
respect to pay slips, and copies o f the listings signed by the teachers are not sent to
SECOPE, the MEPSP Public Accountant or the Delegated Payment Authorization
Officer (Ordonnateur Delegue?;
(ii) The handlingo fcashby the school headspresents a risk;
(iii) Statutory deductions are not appliedto salaries;
(iv) There is a lack of financial reporting to or by SECOPE on the payment o f the
teachers' salaries;
84
(v) Amounts to be paid to teachers are calculated on the basis o f information providedby
SECOPE, while payments are made on the basis o f the listings prepared by the
Government's delegated payment agents (Gestionnaires) inthe Provinces, usinginput
from the heads of schools;
(vi) There are discrepancies between the listings o f SECOPE and those o f the school
heads due to delays inupdatingthe teachers' database androsters by SECOPE\.
25\. The overall conclusion o f the financial management assessment o f the payroll system i s that
in order to satisfy the World Bank's minimum financial management requirements, the
governmentand the MEPSP should adopt an actionplan consisting ofthe following:
(i) Complete the general census of teachers and qualified primary schools prior to
disbursement of IDA funds to be used for payment o f teachers' salaries, and update
the teachers' database and rosters managed by SECOPE taking into account the
pendingrequest of authorization; this will be done incollaboration with the Ministry
o fFinance and the Ministry of Budget;
(ii) Submit the report o f a detailed assessment o f the payroll system relating to teacher
salaries, with the relevant report indicating the necessary safeguards and government
guarantees to adopt inthe area; the assessment and recommendationswill need to be
coordinated with the new payroll procedures and systembeingimplemented;
(iii) StrengthenSECOPE's capacity (interms ofequipment, humanresources) to fulfill its
originally mandatedresponsibilities related to financial reporting and auditing\.
The Contracted Procurement Agent (CPA)
26\. A contract will be signed between the PMCU and the CPA through which the latter will act
as a service provider for all procurement under the Project\. The agreement will state the scope o f
work and specific responsibilities o fthe CPA withrespect to the Project\.
27\. For the purposes o f payment o f the Project funds to the CPA, the latter will open a separate
bank account denominated in US Dollars in a commercial bank in the DRC, on terms and
conditions acceptable to IDA\. This bank account will be audited by the internal and external
auditing firms contracted at the PMCU\. The Project's technical audits will also cover the
activities carried out by the CPA and will include physical inspections on the ground\. A report
on the status o f the implementationof the FMaction plan will be requiredto support the request
for disbursement o f funds to the above-mentioned CPA bank account\.
Summary RiskAnalysis
28\. The main financial and fiduciary risks associated with the Project are summarized and rated
interms of severity intable A7\.1\. The table also specifies the risk mitigation measures which
have been incorporated into the Project and identifies those which are conditions for Project
effectiveness\.
29\. This table i s followed by table A7\.2\. This table sets out the FMAP, i\.e\. the actions which
must be taken to ensure a strong and effective FMS will be in place for the Project to deliver
services quickly over a large geographic area to a wide variety o f stakeholders\. The objectives
o f the Project's FMS are to: (i) ensure that funds are usedonly for their intendedpurposes in an
efficient and economical way while implementingagreed activities; (ii) the preparation o f
enable
accurate and timely financial reports; (iii)ensure that funds are properly managed and flow
85
smoothly, rapidly, adequately, regularly and predictably to implementingagencies; (iv) enable
Project management to monitor the efficient implementation o fthe Project; and (v) safeguard the
Project's assets and resources\.
30\. Insum, it i s stipulated that the implementingagencies should have an adequate number and
mix of skilledand experienced staff\. Their internal control systems should ensure the conduct of
orderly and efficient payment and procurement processes, and proper recording and safeguarding
o f assets and resources\. The accounting systems should support the Project's requests for
funding and meet its reporting obligations to the providers o f Project financing including IDA
and any other donors\. The system should also be capable o f providing financial data to measure
performance when linked to the outputs of the Project\. Lastly, an independent,qualified auditor
should be appointed to reviewthe Project's financial statements and internal controls\.
TableA7\.1 Riskassessment and mitigationmeasures
RiskMitigating Measures Remarks
Incorporated into Project
Design
Inherent H
risk
Country level H The Government o f DRC is No The CFAA report outlined significant
highly committed to a reform Public Financial Management (PFM)
program that includes the weaknesses at government as well as
strengthening o f budget sector ministry level in terms o f (i)
classifications and budget formulation and execution,
implementation of an interim financial reporting, and oversight
Integrated Financial systems; (ii)weak linkage between
Management Information agreed policies, budget planning and
System (IFMIS)\. A new legal execution; (iii)inadequate tracking
framework is being prepared\. and reporting systems, or formal
However, there are still accounting system within the
weaknesses in auditing and ministries; (iv) lack o ftransparency or
preparation of consolidated predictability in public resource
accounts; efforts are management at central government
continuing to strengthen and public enterprise levels; and (v)
capacity\. insufficiently qualified staff in the
areas offinancial management\.
UseofIDA FMprocedures\.
86
RiskMitigatingMeasures Conditions Remarks
Incorporated into Project for
Design Effectiveness
Entitylevel H Creation of a PMCU and use Yes The assessmentofthe three Ministries
o f IDA FM system revealed significant internal control
requirements: weaknesses, lack of accounting
FM system requirements systems acceptable to IDA, and non-
include, among others, the familiarity o f the staff with IDA
requirement that the financed-projectsandFMprocedures\.
Government will adopt an
action plan consisting of a
census of teachers, updating
the teachers' database, and
other safeguards prior to
disbursement o f IDA funds for
teachers' salaries and school
operating costs\. The
Government will adopt an
anti-corruptionplan and other
safeguards withinthe first four
months aftef project
effectiveness\.
Projectlevel S Recruitment o f a Financial Yes The Government system for payment
Management Agent (FMA) o f teacher salaries may not be
with significant experience on sufficient to ensure the transparent
a competitivebasis\. management of project funds for
teachers' salaries\.
The PMCU will adopt
measures to strengthen ex-
ante and ex-post control o f
payroll lists to ensure proper
entitlementto grants\.
Control S
Risk
Budgeting M Annual work plan and budget No
required each year\. The
project's Financial Procedures
Manual (FPM) will define the
arrangements for budgeting,
budgetary control and the
requirements for budgeting
revisions\. Annual work plan
andbudgetrequired\.
87
RiskMitigating Measures Remarks
Incorporated into Project
Design
Accounting S The project will adopt Yes The accounting system currently used
international accounting by MEPSP doesnotcomply with IDA
standards, and accounting FM requirements and does not
procedures and policies will support making management
be documented in the FPM\. decisions\.
The FM finctions will be
carried out by qualified
individual consultants
supported by an FMA and
installation of a computerized
accountingsystem\. Training in
IDAFMproceduresplanned\.
Internal H Manualo fProceduresrequired Yes The distribution of responsibilities
control before grant effectiveness and between the three ministries and the
recruitment ,of an internal SC required clarifications\. Internal
auditor\. audit function does not exist\.
FundsFlow H (i)Payment requests will be No Funds, especially for implementation
approved by the Financial agencies, teachers' salaries, grants for
Manager prior to school operating costs, and the
disbursement o f funds to PMCU, may not be used in an
contractorsor consultants and efficient and economical way, or
teachers\. exclusively for intendedpurposes\.
(ii)Performance audits will
be conducted and integrated The complexity, the nature o f some
to ensure a close link between activities financed under this Project
physical progress and and the weak financial and banking
financialreporting\. sector, may result in delays in the
(iii)AFMAwillberecruited disbursemento f fundsto agencies and
to carry out regular physical beneficiaries\.
inspections, to assess the
eligibility of expenditures and
to review the quarterly
FinancialMonitoringReport\.
(iv) Audit o f the payment of
each tranche o f the teachers'
salaries and school operating
costs\.
Financial S (i) To reduce delays and Yes The PMCUmay lack qualifiedstaffin
Reporting ensure proper financial specific areas of the Project such as
reporting, a computerized disbursements, accounting and
accounting system will be put budgeting leading to delays in
in place and will be under the submission of the Project accounts
supervisiono fthe FMA\. andthe FMR\.
(ii) Recruitment of an
additional accountant\.
88
Remarks
Auditing M (i) The project's institutional Yes The auditingprofession inthe DRC is
arrangements allow for the still generally weak\. International
appointment o f adequate auditing standards are followed in the
externalauditors\. industry\. Audit reports are generally
(ii) Annual auditing timely, and management letters
arrangements will be carried contain issues that assist management
out for the entire period of to ensure the continuing adequacy of
the financial management
Project implementation\. arrangements\.
Performance and technical
audits will be conducted to
ensure a close link between
physical progress and
financialreporting\.
(iii) internalauditorwillbe
An
recruited to carry out regular
physical inspections and to
assess the eligibility o f
expenditures\.
(iv) Each tranche payment
under Component 1 will be
audited prior to the
disbursement of following
tranche\.
Overall H
Risk
Rating
* H-High,S-Substantial,M-Moderate, L-Low
89
TableA7\.2 FinancialManagementAction Plan(FMAP)
I
r RemedialAction Recommended Responsible Deadline
Issue body
Staffing Recruitment of the Financial Manager, the Accountant PMCU Effectiveness
andthe Treasurer ofthe PMCU
Information System Acquisition and installation of accounting software for PMCU Effectiveness
accounting the project\.
software
Administrative, Produce AAFM of proceduresthat also includes detailed PMCU Effectiveness
Accounting and procedures describingthe teachers' payroll system
Financial Manual
(AAFM)
Internal Auditing TOR for the selection of the auditing firm responsiblefor PMCU Effectiveness
andFinancial the internal audit activity agreed and expressions of
Controller interest advertised\.
(outsourcedto an Selection of the Auditor completed, and agreed by the
auditing firm) Bank
External Financial TOR for the selectionofthe External Auditors agreed and PMCU Effectiveness
Auditing expressionsof interest advertised\.
Selectionofthe External Financial Auditor completed
TOR for the selectionofthe technical auditors agreed\. PMCU Effectiveness
Auditing Recruitmentcompleted\.
Conduct (consultant) a detailed assessment of the payroll PMCU Disbursement
paymentofprimary system relating to teacher salaries, with the relevant ofthe first
schoolteacher report indicating the necessary safeguards to employ in tranche ofthe
salaries this area\. IDA funds for
Completethe census of teachers and schools; draw up the the payments
list o f beneficiariesof IDA funds for teachers' salaries\. ofteachers
Set up (by arrtrk ministerial, ministerial bylaw) the `salaries
structure and composition of the team of auditors
responsible for the ex-post control of the payment of the
identified teachers' salaries as well as the mechanismfor
allocating, distributing, reporting, and monitoring of
payments\.
Implementation of the Component 1 of the EUSRP is PMCU Disbursement
schooloperating completedand audit reports are acceptable to IDA\. o fthe first
cost subsidies School mappingcompleted and list of primary schools to tranche of
benefit is transmittedto IDA\. IDA funds for
ArrCfe infer-minisreriel (inter-ministerial bylaw) EPSP/ the payments
Finance/ Budget sets out the mechanisms for allocating, ofprimary
distributing, reporting, and monitoring grants for school schools'
operatingcost subsidies\. operating
costs
Selection of the consultant completed and contract PMCU 3 months after
Tracking Survey signed\. effectiveness
The government will develop and adopt an anti- ~~~~ PMCU 4 months after
corruptionplan effectiveness
90
FinancialandAdministrativeManagement
31\. Upon Effectiveness, the overall coordination o f the fiduciary aspects o f the Project will be
underthe responsibility o fthe PMCU:
Overall Responsibilities
32\. The Financial Department o f the PMCU will be responsible for all financial management,
accounting and audit aspects o fthe Project\. Inparticular, it will be responsible for the following:
(i)designingand establishing acomputerized FMS; (ii) approving disbursement o f funds to
implementing partners; (iii)maintaining up-to-date accounting records and ledgers; (iv)
recording fiduciary transactions for all activities pertaining to the Project for which the Financial
Department o f the PMCU i s held responsible; (v) fiduciary reporting; (vi) submitting audit
reports; and (vii) ensuring that a proper internal control system i s in place to achieve
accountability at all levels\.
33\. At least three sets o f financial reports will be prepared and consolidated by the Financial
Department o f the PMCU, namely the annual budget o f the project, the quarterly Financial
Monitoring Reports (FMRs), and the project financial statements\.
Administrative\. accounting and financial manual (AAFM) o fprocedures
34\. The accounting systems and policies, administrative (including procurement) and financial
procedures employed by the project will be documented in the project's AAFM\. This will be
used by (i) Project staff as a reference manual; (ii) to assess the acceptability o f the
the IDA
Project accounting, reporting and control systems; and (iii)the auditors to assess Project
accounting systems and controls and to design specific Project audit procedures\. Specific
procedures will be documented for each significant accounting function\. They will be written to
depict document and transaction flows, and will cover the following aspects: flow o f funds;
record keepingand maintenance, the chart o f accounts, formats o f records and books o f account;
authorization procedures for transactions; planning and budgeting; financial reports (including
formats, linkages with Chart o f Accounts and procedures for reviewing these); and auditing
arrangements\. The AAFM will also describe the PMCU organizational chart and administrative
andprocurement procedures as agreed inSchedule 3 o fthe GrantAgreement\.
35\. The PMCU will prepare an annual work plan and budget for implementingProject activities
taking into account the Project's objectives\. The work plan and budgets will identify the
activities to be undertaken and the role o f respective parties in implementation\. Annual work
plans and the budgets will be consolidated into a single document by the PMCU, which will be
submittedto the SteeringCommittee for approval, and thereafter to IDA for no objectionno later
thanNovember 30 of each year proceeding the year the work planshould be implemented\. The
consolidation will be done after the PMCU ensures, through its technical department, that the
plan and budget meet the Project objectives\.
Staffing,
36\. The PMCUwill retain staffing resources that are adequate for the level o f Project operations
and activities and are sufficient to maintain accounting records relating to Project financed
transactions, and to preparethe Project's financial reports\. Training and capacity buildingplans
will also be designedfor all potential staff\. The financial management department o fthe PMCU
91
will be composed of a qualified and experienced Financial Manager (CFO), in charge o f
supervising the overall financial management function o f the Project, and an experienced
Accountant and a Treasurer\. The management accounting and internal auditing functions will be
outsourced to a firm\. The firm will assist inthe management o fthe withdrawal applications\.
Record keepingand maintenance
37\. The FMteam o f the PMCU will be responsible for maintaining the Project's records related
to expenditures incurred by the PMCU\. All accounting documents o f contracted implementing
agencies including the CPA will be kept at their premises and made available upon request
during supervision missions and audit missions carried out by internal and external auditors
(auditing firms )\. For ex-ante control purposes, the listings signedby the teachers andthe payroll
statementswill be kept at the premises o fthe SECOPE offices inthe provinces\.
Financial Reporting
38\. Consolidated financial reports (FMRs) will be designed to provide quality and timely
information on Project performance to Project management, and relevant stakeholders\. Formats
of the periodic FMRs to be generated from the FMS will be developed using the World Bank's
Guidelines for Borrowers on Financial Monitoring Reports\. The quarterly FMR includes
financial statements (e\.g\. sources o f funds and Project revenues, uses o f funds; statement o f
expenditures classified by Project component, disbursement category, expenditure types and
'
implementingagent, showing comparisons with budgets; cash forecast, physical progress report,
notes to the FMR, Special Account activity statements and information on contracts above and
below the prior review threshold)\. The FMRwill include the use o f IDA funds transferred to the
National Treasury account for the teachers' salaries and the grants for school operating costs\.
39\. The firm in charge o f the internal auditing functions will monitor and review all the reports
submitted\. The finding of the reviews o f the FMR will be used by the PMCU to approve
payments and withdrawal applications\. In compliance with International Accounting Standards
and IDA requirements, the Project will produce annual financial statements\. These include: a
Balance Sheet that shows Assets and Liabilities; a Statement o f Sources and Uses o f Funds
showing all the sources o f Project funds, expendituresanalyzed by Project component and credit
category; a Statement o f Cash Receipts and Payments which recognizes all cash receipts, cash
payments and cash balances controlled by the project; a Special Account Activity Statement; an
Implementation Report containing a narrative summary o f the implementation progress o f the
Project; and a Summary o f Withdrawals using FMR, listing individual withdrawal applications
by reference number, date and amount; Notes related to significant accounting policies and
accounting standards adopted by management and underlying the preparation o f financial
statements\. The FMRs and financial statements, whose format will be developed by project
Effectiveness, will be submittedfor audit at the endof each year\.
Integrated Financial Management System
40\. For the Project to deliver on its objectives, a computerizedFMS will be developed based on
software to be acquired by the PMCU\. The system should integrate budgeting, operating and
accounting systems to facilitate monitoring and reporting\. The formats o fperiodic reports would
be developed and agreed withProject management\.
92
Audit arrangements
InternalAuditing and Management accounting
41\. A separate Internal Audit and Management Accounting Department outsourced to an
international auditing and accounting firm will be established at the PMCU\. The role o f the
department will be to ensure that the Project's fiduciary procedures and regulations are adhered
to by all the implementingagencies\. The selected firm will inspect accounting procedures used
by the PMCU and the MEPSP to ensure that they conform to the established procedures\. This
inspection will cover the verification of expenditures including payments o f the identified
primary school teachers' salaries, primary school operating cost subsidies, civil works and
acquisition o f goods and equipment\. The scope of the firm's mission will also include review of
the quarterly FMR as well as any financial statements submittedto IDA by the PMCUand other
entities\. The AAFM as well as the TOR for the selection o f the firm will contain a description o f
the roles andresponsibilities ofthe internal audit department andthe arrangements that guarantee
the necessary level of independence\.
ExternalFinancialAuditing
42\. A firm o f qualified independent auditors will be contracted by the PMCU to carry out the
audit of the financial statements o f the Project on a semester (every six months) basis\. The
selection of the successful firm will be based on TOR that set forth the scope o f the audit\. The
audit firm will also be recruited on terms that meet IDA requirementsrelating to independence,
qualifications and experience\. The scope o f the audit will cover the activities performed by any
entity managing Project funds, mainly the PMCU\. The audit also includes the transactions
relating to the primary school teachers` salaries and subsidies for primary schools' operating
costs\. The audited financial statements together with the auditor's report and management letter
covering identifiedinternal control and accounting system weaknesses will be submittedto IDA
no latter than four months after the end o f each accounting period (semester)\. A single audit
opinion will be issuedwith respect to Project income and expenditures, special accounts and the
FMRs\. A second audit opinion will be issued on specific controls such as compliance with
procurement procedures and FMR requirements and consistency between financial statements
and management reports and review o f the use of the teachers' salaries and primary school
operating cost subsidies\. The audit report will thus refer to any incidences of non-compliance,
and ineligible expenditures identifiedduringthe audit mission\.
43\. In addition, the PMCU will set up an ex post auditing mechanism (MEPSP, Ministries o f
Finance and Budget) and the AAFM will set out the detailed procedures for payment o f the
identified primary school teachers' salaries and primary school operating cost subsidies\. No
expenditures o f IDA funds on teachers' salaries or grants for schools' operating costs will be
made unless an audit satisfactory to IDA has been carried out with respect to payments made
underthe precedinginstallment, and a satisfactory report onthe same remittedto IDA\.
External Technical Auditing
44\. A firm will be contracted to review procurement, as well as verify the physical existence of
goods, works, equipment, and services acquired through the Project\. This audit will be
conducted on an annual basis\. The selection ofthe successful firm will be based on TOR that are
acceptable to IDA\. The TOR will also set out the scope o f the audit\. The audited documents
93
together with the auditor's report will be submittedto IDA four months following the end o f the
FY\.
Closing the accountability cycle: following up on audit queries
45\. The duties o f the Management o f the PMCU and the Steering Committee will include the
review o f audited financial statements and internal and external audit findings\. The firm o f
independent auditors (internal auditing department of the PMCU) will require corrective actions
to be taken by the PMCU and any other implementation agencies as relevant, to address any
weaknesses in the fiduciary management system or incidence o f non-compliance with
procedures\. The internal auditing department will also use the results o f the audits inmonitoring
the performance of other agencies such as SECOPE and the IGF in regard to the Teachers
salaries\. This arrangement i s intendedto ensure the satisfactory follow-up o f audit findings\.
Conclusion of the Assessment
46\. The recruitment o f qualified and experienced consultants at the PMCU and the outsourcing
o f the internal auditing functions to an auditing firm will enable the establishment o f a financial
fiduciary management system for the project that satisfies the Bank's minimum requirements
under OPBP 10\.02\. The financial management arrangements, including the actions intendedto
strengthen them, will be adequate to provide, with reasonable assurance, accurate and timely
information required by IDA on the status o f the Project\. The actions which are required by
Grant effectiveness to facilitate the establishment o f this system are set out inthe FMAP\.
Supervision Plan
47\. Financial management supervision missions will be conducted over the Project's lifetime, at
least on a semi-annual basis\. However, due to the high fiduciary risks associated with the
Project, the budget allocationfor supervision missions will be higher duringthe first two years o f
Project execution in order to increase frequency o f controls (at least four supervision missions
per year)\. The objective o f the supervision missions is to ensure that adequate and effective
FMSs are maintained throughout the Project's lifetime\. Regular reviews will be carried out to
ensure that expenditures incurred by the Project remain eligible for IDA funding\. The
Implementation Status Report (ISR) will include a financial and procurement management rating
for the component\.
Disbursementarrangementsand flow of funds
Designated Account
48\. To facilitate Project implementation and reduce the volume o f withdrawal applications, one
Designated Account denominated in US Dollars will be opened in a local commercial bank on
terms and conditions acceptable to IDA\. The Designated Account will finance civil works
contracts relating to the renovation o f schools and the rehabilitation o f the National Pedagogical
University as well as the purchase o f textbooks, and other project expenditures including the
purchase o f goods and vehicles, training and workshops, consultant services and the PMCU's
operating costs\. The contract signed between the PMCU and CPA for procurement services
under the Project will also be financed from the Designated Account\. The Designated Account
will be managed by the PMCU lodged at the Ministry o f Primary, Secondary and Professional
Education (MEPSP)\. As part o f its overall fiduciary project oversight, an international auditing
firm will berecruitedto control the PMCUmanaging the Designated Account\.
94
49\. The authorized ceiling o fthe designated account would be US$300,000\.
50\. The Designated account will be used for all payments less than 20 percent o f the authorized
allocation and replenishment applications will be submitted at least once a month\.
51\. The Designated Account will be audited every six months by external auditors acceptable to
IDA as part of the overall Project audit\. Disbursement from the IDA grant under components 2,
3 and 4 as well as the civil works in component 1, will be transaction-based (replenishment,
reimbursement)\. The option o f disbursingthe funds through direct payments on contracts above
a pre-determinedthreshold will also be available\. Withdrawal applications for such payments
will be accompanied by relevant supporting documents such as copies o f the contract,
contractors' invoices and appropriate certifications\. Replenishment o f the bank account opened
at the Central Bank o f Congo for component 1 financing o f primary school teachers' salaries and
grants for school operating cost subsidies will be made through direct payments and will be
tranche-based\. Replenishment o f the bank account opened by the CPA will be included in the
scope o fthe audit o fthe Project\.
Local taxes
52\. Funds will be disbursedin accordance with Project categories o f expenditures, as shown in
the Financing Agreement and inline withthe agreed country financing parameters\. Financing of
each category o f expenditure will be authorized at 100 percent, except for local expenditures
under the civil works, goods, textbooks, and services (categories 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5) which will be
financed at 100 percent excluding local taxes (TCA)\. In accordance with Bank standard
procurement requirements, contracts will continue to be approved "all taxes included" for local
expenditures\. The PMCU will, however, claim invoiced amounts excluding taxes\. The
Government will take appropriate steps to cover the tax portion o f contracts signed by the PMCU
with contractors and suppliersof goods and services\.
Disbursemento ffundsto service providers, contractors and suppliers
53\. The PMCU will make disbursements to service providers, contractors and suppliers o f goods
and services for specified activities under Components 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 o f the Project\. Payments
will be made in accordance with the modalities specified in the respective contracts for goods,
works and services, and in accordance with Bank procurement guidelines\. Disbursementswill
be made in the respective contract currencies, not to exceed the amounts stipulated in the
contract for each respective currency\. The PMCU will promptly provide IDA with signedcopies
o f contracts above the prior review threshold in order to ensure timely payments when
withdrawal requests are submitted to IDA\. Summary sheets enclosed with the withdrawal
applications will include the contract number shown on the system "Client Connection," inorder
to facilitate disbursements\. In addition to a review o f supporting documents, the PMCU will
consider the findings o f the internal auditing firms prior to the approval o f the payments\.
Payments to contracted agents will also be made on the basis o f services contracts\. The PMCU,
with the assistance of the auditing firm, will reserve the right to verify the expendituresincurred
under a services contract ex-post, and refunds might be requested for non respect o f contractual
clauses\. Misappropriatedactivities could result inthe suspension o f financing for a given entity\.
Disbursementof funds for teachers' salaries and primary school operating cost subsidies
54\. IDA will transfer tranches on a semester (bi-annual) basis for each o f the five years o f the
Project, into an earmarked account at the National Treasury located at the BCC\. This account
95
will be used for the sole purpose o f the Government's payment o f the identified primary
teachers' salaries and grants for primary school operating cost subsidies, to help reduce the
practice o f charging fees (the FDM and FDF and FDIP, respectively)\. Conditions o f
disbursement will apply for the payment of Teachers' Salaries Installments (Category 6 in
Allocation o f Grant Proceeds, below) and for the School Operating Costs Subsidies Installments
(see Category 7)before IDA transfers respective funds to the Treasury Account\.
55\. The conditions for disbursementare as follows:
No withdrawal shall be made for payments untilthe Recipient has furnished to IDA evidence
satisfactory to it that each o fthe actions described below has beentaken ina manner satisfactory
to IDA:
(i) No withdrawal shall be made: (a) for payment o f the initial installment o f the
Teachers' Salaries (Category 6 o f the Grant), unless the Beneficiary has
provided evidence that: i)anArrdte` ministe`riel has been enacted freezing any
transfer o f personnel in primary schools; and an Arrdte` inter-ministe`riel has
been enacted freezing the opening or accreditation o f new public primary
schools untila comprehensive census o fprimary schools, students, classrooms
and teachers has been completed; ii)all teachers currently enrolled into the
public payroll schedule furnishedby SECOPE are integrated into the PTS; iii)
a comprehensive list comprising the names o f all teachers to be progressively
integrated into the public payroll system and to be paid with the proceeds o f
the financing allocated to Category (6) has been delivered to IDA; and iv)
SECOPE has been granted exclusive authority to handle all payments of
teachers' salaries; (b) for payment o f each subsequent installment o f teachers'
salaries under Category (6) unless the Beneficiary has submitted to IDA an
audit report related to the use o f the proceeds o f the preceding installment for
teachers' salaries satisfactory to IDA;
(ii) No withdrawal shall be made after December 31, 2008 (i\.e\. the point at which
the bridge funding o f the EUSRP ends) : (a) for payment of the initial
installment o f the Subsidies for School Operating Costs (Category 7 o f the
Grant) unless the Beneficiary has provided evidence that: i)a comprehensive
l i s t identifying all public primary schools eligible to receive subsidies for
school operating costs through the proceeds o f the financing allocated to
Category (7) has been delivered to IDA; and ii)the Beneficiary has adopted a
comprehensive school map covering its territory; and (b) for payment o f
subsequent installment o f subsidiesfor school operating costs under Category
(7) unless the Beneficiary has submittedto IDA an audit report related to the
use o f the proceeds o f the preceding installment for subsidies for school
operating costs
56\. The funds will be made available in local accounts opened at the BCC, and the utilization
will follow the government personnel expenditure system for primary school teachers\.
Appropriate corrective action will be sought from the SteeringCommittee where such actions are
identified as needed, as a result o f the scrutiny o f the auditing firm, the external auditors, and
Bank staff duringsupervision missions to verify expendituresand performance\.
96
Uses o f Statement o f Expenditures
57\. Disbursementsfor all expenditures would be made against full documentation, except for the
following items o f expenditures: (a) contracts for works inan amount less than US$500,000; (b)
contracts for equipment and goods in an amount less than US$250,000; (c) contracts for
consulting firms in an amount less than US$lOO,OOO equivalent per contract, and contracts for
individual consultants in an amount less than US$50,000 equivalent per contract, as well as all
operating costs, which would be claimed on the basis o f Statement o f Expenditures(SOEs)\. All
supporting documentation for SOEs would be retained at the PMCU or by each implementation
partner and readily accessible for review by periodic IDA supervision missions and external
auditors\.
97
Allocationof IDA Grant Proceeds(excludingtaxes)
Category Amount of the Grant Allocated YOof Expendituresto be
(Expressedin SDR) Financed
(1) Civil Works
(a) Primary schools (a) 13,200,000 100%
(b) UPN (b) 2,200,000
(2) Goods, Vehicles 4,600,000 100%
(3) Textbooks 10,700,000 100%
(4) Training, workshops 5,500,000 100%
(5) Consultant services 12,600,000 100%
I I
(6) Teachers' Salaries 24,700,000 100%
Installments
(7) School Operating
Costs Subsidies 20,100,000 100%
Installments
(8) Operating Costs 4,300,000 100%
(9) Refinancing o f the Project 660,000 Amount payable pursuant to
Preparation Advance Section 2\.07 o f the General
Conditions
(10) Unallocated 640,000
TOTAL 99,200,000
98
Annex 8: ProcurementArrangements
General
1\. Procurement for the proposed Project would be carried out in accordance with the World
Bank's "Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits" dated May 2004; and
"Guidelines: Selection and Employment o f Consultants by World Bank Borrowers" dated May
2004, and the provisions stipulated in the Legal Agreement\. The general description o f various
items under different expenditurecategories i s described below\. For each contract to be financed
by the Grant, the different procurement methods or consultant selection methods, estimated costs,
the need for prequalification, prior review requirements,and time frame are agreed betweenthe
Recipient and the Bank Project team in the Procurement Plan\. The Procurement Plan will be
updated at least annually or as required to reflect the actual Project implementation needs and
improvements ininstitutional capacity\.
2\. A CPAR was prepared by the Government with World Bank support and presented at a
workshop heldinJune 2004\. This assessment identifiedmajor flaws inthe country's procurement
rules and systems - with outdated procedures and compromised administrative capacity\. While
remedial measures are being designed and implemented, national procedures cannot yet be used
for the purposes o f implementingBank-financed projects\. Overall, procurement arrangements for
the Project build on experience to date withearlier Bank-financedProjects\.
3\. Procurement of Works: Works procured under this Project would include (i)the
rehabilitation of about 260 schools including approximately 1570 classrooms scattered in all
provinces, and (ii) the rehabilitation of the National Pedagogical University (UPN) in Kinshasa\.
The procurement will be done using the Bank's Standard Bidding Documents (SBD) for
International Competitive Bidding (ICB) for rehabilitation o f the National Pedagogical University
estimated to cost US$1,400,000 and National Competitive Bidding(NCB) procedures agreed with
the Bank for the rehabilitation of classrooms\. Contracts estimated to cost less than the equivalent
o f US$500,000 will be awarded on the basis of NCB\. Contracts estimated to cost less than the
equivalent o fUS$l00,000 can be procuredthrough prudent shopping procedures\.
4\. Procurementof Goods: Goods procuredunder this project would include: (i) the purchase and
distribution o f textbooks, including a teacher's guide, for primary grades 1-2 in French and
mathematics estimated to cost US$14,800,000; and, (ii) school furniture, computers, laboratory
equipment, vehicles, and related products\. The procurement o f textbooks, computers, and
vehicles will be done through ICB using the Bank's SBD\. Contracts estimated to cost less than
the equivalent of US$250,000 will be awarded on the basis of NCB\. Office equipment and
purchase o f off-the-shelf items may be procuredthrough prudent shopping procedures inpackages
estimated to cost US$50,000 equivalent, or less, per contract\.
5\. DirectContracting: Goods and works whichthe Association agrees meet the requirementsfor
Direct Contracting may, with the Bank's prior agreement, be procured in accordance with the
provisions o f said procurement method\.
6\. Procurement from UN Agencies: Equipment, such as computers and vehicles estimated to
cost less than US$2,000,000 equivalent per contract may be procured directly from Inter-Agency
Procurement Services Office (IAPSO) in accordance with the provision of paragraph 3\.9 o f the
Procurement Guidelines\.
99
7\. Procurement of non-consulting services under this Project would use N C B procedures
agreed with the Bank and would include the distribution o f textbooks inall provinces by different
means of transportation deemed to be the most convenient and economical way to reach all
schools, many of which are inremote areas o fthe country\.
8\. Selection of Consultants: The consulting services under this Project will be selected on a
competitive basis and are related to the selection o f (i)the Project Manager (National
Coordinator), (ii) an international accounting firm for the internal audit functions o f the Project;
(iii)ProcurementAgent,(iii)teamofnationalscomprisingaCFO,Accountant,andTreasurer
a a
(iv) a Civil Engineer; (v) an Operations Officer specialist inMonitoring andEvaluation; and(vi) a
specialist in Information Technology as well as (vii) technical auditors, (viii) technical assistance
inspecific areas including literacy, textbook selection, andpublic sector planning, (ix) consultants
for civil works (studies and supervision), and (x) for the Project midterm review and final
evaluation\.
9\. Consulting firms for all assignments estimated to cost the equivalent o f US$lOO,OOO or more
will be selectedthough Quality and Cost Based Selection (QCBS) methodology\. For assignments
costing less than US$lOO,OOO, QCBS or Least-Cost Selection (LCS) procedures may be used
provided the assignment meets the requirements o f paragraph 3\.6 inthe case of LCS\. Consultant
services provided by firms estimated to cost less than the equivalent o f US$lOO,OOO may be
contracted by comparing the qualifications o f consultants in accordance with paragraph 3\.7 o f the
Guidelines\. Assignments estimated to cost the equivalent of US$200,000 or more would be
advertisedfor Expressions o f Interest(EOI) inUnitedNations Development Business (UNDB), in
DgMarket online and inat least one newspaper of wide national circulation inDRC\. Inaddition,
EO1for specialized assignments may be advertised inan international newspaper or magazine\. In
the case of assignments estimated to cost less thanUS$200,000 the assignment will be advertised
nationally\.
10\. Short lists of consultants for services estimated to cost less than US$lOO,OOO equivalent per
contract may be composed entirely of national consultants in accordance with the provisions o f
paragraph 2\.7 o fthe Consultant Guidelines\.
11\. Operational Costs which would be financed by the Project such as material and supplies,
finding of the Project Management and Coordination Unit (PMCU), would be procuredusingthe
implementingagency's administrative procedures described in the Project Operations Manual to
be reviewedandfoundacceptable to the Bank\.
ProjectProcurementArrangements
12\. The Project activities span three central ministries: the Ministry o f Primary, Secondary and
Professional Education, the Ministry o f Higher Education and Universities; and the Ministry o f
Social Affairs and National Solidarity\. All of them lack experience in procurement and none of
them has any mechanism in place for procurement management acceptable to IDA\. For these
reasons, a Procurement Agent will be selected to assist the PMCU\. All the procurement activities
o f the Project will be carried out by the Procurement Agent which will act as a service provider
for procurement\. The Procurement Agent activities under the Project will be governed through a
service contract with PMCU\. The contract will be subject to approval by IDA\.
13\. After Effectiveness, the PMCU will implement the Project and be responsible for all aspects
o f technical managementexcept the rehabilitation o f schools and the UPN where the Procurement
100
Agent has a clear advantage over the PMCU\. The PMCU personnel will be recruited on a
competitive basis\. All TOR and technical specifications providedby the ProcurementAgent will
be approved by the PMCU\. The contracts will be signed by the PMCU and supervised under the
PMCU's responsibility\.
14\. Most o f the issues/risks concerning the procurement component for implementation of the
Project have been identified and include the current low procurement capacity inthe three central
ministries\. The corrective measures which have beenagreed are the use of a Procurement Agent
and the training o f the staff in the ministries, starting in 2007, in accordance with the
recommendations and action plan o fthe CPAR\.
15\. Considering the safeguards needed to be put inplace as described in this Annex, the overall
project risk for procurement i s high\.
ProcurementPlan
16\. The Recipient developed a Procurement Plan for Project implementation which provides the
basis for the procurement methods as well as identifyingthe thresholds for prior review for each
item\. This planwas agreed betweenthe Recipient and IDA at negotiations and is available at the
PMCU\. The Procurement Plan will also be available inthe Project's database and on the Bank's
external website\.
Publicationof resultsand debriefing
17\. Publication of results o f the biddingprocess will be requiredfor all ICBs, NCBs, and Direct
Contracting\. Publication should take place as soon as the no objection i s received, except for
Direct Contracting and NCB, which may be done quarterly and in a simplified format\. For
selection o f consultants, disclosure o f results i s also required\. All consultants competing for the
assignment would be informed o fthe result ofthe technical evaluation (number o fpoints that each
firm received) before the opening o f the financial proposals, and at the end o f the selection
process the results should be published\. The publication of results in selection of consultants
applies to all methods, however for QCBS and Single Source Selection (SSS) the publication may
be done quarterly and in a simplified format\. Losing bidders/consultants will be briefed on the
reasons why they were not awarded the contract, if the losing biddedconsultants request
explanation\.
Fraud, coercion and corruption
18\. The Procurement Agent, the PMCU, and BiddedSuppliedContractors shall observe the
highest standard o f ethics during the procurement and execution of contracts financed under the
Project inaccordance with paragraphs 1\.15 & 1\.16 of the Procurement Guidelinesandparagraphs
1\.25 & 1\.26 of the Consultants Guidelines\.
Frequencyof ProcurementSupervision
19\. In addition to the prior review supervision to be carried out from World Bank offices, it i s
recommendedto have one supervision mission every six months to visit the field to carry out post
review ofprocurementactions\.
Detailsof the ProcurementArrangementInvolvingInternationalCompetition
20\. Goods and Works and non-consulting services
(a) List of contract packages whichwill be procured following ICB and direct contracting:
101
Ref\. Contract Estimated Procurement Domestic Review Expected
No\. (Description) Cost Method Preference by Bank Bid-Opening
(US$ (yedno) (Prior / Post) Date
million)
1 Rehabilitationof US$1\.5 ICB Yes Prior June 2008
the National
Pedagogical
I University (UPN)
2 ITextbooks I US$12\.9 ICB No Prior I March2008
Equipment, US$8\.1 ICB No Prior March2008
Vehicles
(b) ICB Contracts estimated to cost above US$500,000 for works and above US$250,000 for
goods per contract and all direct contracting will be subjectto prior review by the Bank\.
21\. Consulting Services
(a) List of Consulting Assignments recruitedinternationally:
I I
Review b: Expected
Descriptionof Estimated Selection Bank (Prior Proposals Comments
Assignment cost Method Post) Submission
(US$ Date
million)
[nternational financial US$2\.7 QCBS Prior Sept2007 Forthe 5 years
managementfirm o f the Project
ProcurementAgent US$2\.0 QCBS Prior Sept 2007 iFor the first 3
years ofthe
project
(contract
subjectto
renewal)
QCBS Prior Sept2007 Once every 6
audits monthsfor 5
vears
Externalaudits of USS0\.30 QCBS Prior Sept 2007 Once every6
xocurement monthsfor 5
lyears
QCBS Prior Oct 2007 19people-
EvaluationSystem- months
Zoncept, design,and
mdementation
Medium-term
:xpenditures USs0\.39 QCBS Prior March2008 7people-
iamework(MTEF) months
102
Review by Expected
Ref\. No\. Descriptionof Estimated Selection Bank (Prior / Proposals Comments
Assignment Cost Method Post) Submission
(US% Date
million)
7 Formulatesector US$0\.39 QCBS Prior March2008 3 people-
strategy months
Ref\. Descriptionof Estimated Selection Review by Expected
No\. Assignment cost Method Bank(Prior / Proposals Comments
(US% Post) Submission
million) Date
ProceduresManual for
administrative,
1 accounting, and US$0\.02 ICB Prior May 2007 PPF
financial management
ofthe Project
Settingup ofthe FMS
2 ofthe Project US$O\.Ol ICB Prior May 2007 PPF
Evaluationof existing US$0\.09 ICB Prior April 2007 PPF
3 literacy programs
4 Textbook expert US$0\.09 ICB Prior Aug 2007 PPF
5 Technicalaudits ofthe US$O\.l5 ICB Prior April 2008 Once ayear
Project for 5 years
6 Projectmid-term US$0\.06 ICB Prior November 2008 1mid-term
evaluation 1final
- evaluation
7 Literacy experts US$0\.35 ICB Prior Aug 2007 4 missions per
year for 5
- years
8 Study for reforms Sept 2007
teacher career US$0\.30 ICB Prior 9 people-
- structures months
9 Study on Legal Nov 2007
framework of sector US$0\.06 ICB Prior 2 people-
months
10 Conceptualizepilot Nov 2007
literacy programs US$0\.13 ICB Prior 4 people-
months
Training for pilot US$0\.35 ICB Prior March2008 4 people-
11 literacy programs months per
year for 5
years
12 Evaluationofpilot US$0\.06 ICB Prior August 2008 1mid-term
literacy programs 1final
103
1 Descriptionof Selection Review by Expected
Assignment Method Bank(Prior / Proposals Comments
Post) Submission
million) Date
13 ITechnical assistanceon IIUS0\.62 ICB Prior Nov 2007 4 people-
learningachievement monthsper
methodology year for 5
years
14 Develop US$0\.029 ICB Prior Nov 2007
communications
strategy
15 Assessment of stake- US0\.029 ICB Prior Nov 2007
Holders' training needs
16 Train civil society US0\.418 ICB Prior Dec 2007 - 0\.5 - 3 people-
groups (e\.g\. parent 2011 monthslyear
committees)and for
unions 5 years
17 Develop Citizen Report US0\.145 ICB Prior NOV 2007 - 1person-
Cards 2011 month
per year for 5
years
(b) Consultancy services estimated to cost above US$lOO,OOO per contract for firms and $50,000
for individual consultants and Single Source Selection of consultants (firms) for assignments
estimated to cost above US$lO,OOO will be subject to prior reviewby the Bank
(c) Short lists composed entirely of national consultants: Short lists of consultants for services
estimated to cost less than US$lOO,OOO equivalent per contract may be composed entirely o f
national consultants in accordance with the provisions o f paragraph 2\.7 of the Consultant
Guidelines\.
104
Annex 9: Economicand FinancialAnalysis
1\. Rationalefor GovernmentInterventioninthe DRC EducationSector
1\. Education has significant and positive economic and socio-political outcomes in the DRC\.
The mainjustification for public intervention inthe education sector is education's contribution
to poverty reduction\. Results from the most recent Poverty Report on the DRC have established
that investinginexpanding and improving basic education and literacy has a significant positive
impact on wealth creation and on household assets, although compared with other SSA
countries, there are somewhat lower gains in wealth and assets observed in the DRC due to the
collapse o fthe private economy and low public sector wages\.
2\. While education i s a key determinant o f household wealth status, education for all i s a goal
unlikely to be achieved without significant Government intervention to offset the cost o f
education, and make it affordable across social layers, geography and gender\. Household
surveys inthe DRC (BERCI, 2004, see Annex 12) show that for three children out o f four who
are not enrolled, the reason for not going to school was the inability o fparentsto pay for the cost
o f schooling\. This result is confirmed by qualitative analyses using focus groups\. The
affordability issue i s more prevalent in rural than in urban areas, and i s significant among all
quintiles o f wealth except the highest one\. High cost o f education to families also generates a
significant gender bias: both focus groups and survey data have confirmed that when faced with
affordability issues parents typically withdraw their youngest child first, hoping that the child can
still attend school at a later age, before withdrawing girls, and finally other male children\.
Therefore, Government intervention in, and funding of, education i s necessary both to boost
access and to realize equity\.
2\. EconomicAnalysis of the Project
Component 1:Increase Access and Equity at Primary Level\.
3\. The mainpriority to improve access and equity i s to break the poverty-illiteracy cycle\. At the
local level, and particularly in war-affected areas, priorities also include the need to provide
resources for the rehabilitation o f schools\. Paradoxically, the need for new schools i s not a
factor as decisive as one would have expected given the lack o f public expenditures on basic
infrastructure for social services\. The relative availability o f schools inmany areas i s essentially
due to the response o f the private sector, religious groups and other civil society components to
the need o f the population that could not be met through public provision\. It also reflects
stagnant enrollment rates\.
4\. The project addresses the above issues by reducing the cost o f education to households and
rehabilitating 1570 classrooms, which will boost both the demand for, and supply of, education\.
Expectedresults include a turn around from the decade-long decline o f the gross enrollment rate
inprimary education to an increase ofenrollment rates from 64 percent in2007 to 75 percent by
Project end in 2012\. The proportion o f girls i s also expected to grow from 85 percent to 95
percent duringthe same period\.
105
Component 2 Improve Quality ofPrimary Education
5\. While solving the affordability issue i s the most important agenda from a poverty reduction
perspective, parents are also raising important questions about quality\. Improving quality would
normally reduce repetition and subsequentlyreduce the cost o f educating a childthrough primary
education\. Due to lack o f empirical research, little i s known on the determinants o f education
quality inthe context o f DRC\. The project addresses this issue from two different angles\. First,
textbooks will be provided to every school child\. Research inSSA countries confirms that this i s
one o f the most cost-efficient interventions with respect to quality o f education\. Second, the
project seeks to create a research capacity to assess and monitor quality o f education, which i s
instrumental to future quality improvement\.
Component 3: StrengthenInstitutionalandFinancialCapacity ofthe EducationSector\.
6\. The education sector capacity to implementits development agenda is severely compromised
by the lack o f functional institutions\. This component will strengthen capacity for policy
planning, budgeting and program execution in pivotal areas for the sector including teacher
career structure and teacher training, and the development o f a sector wide mediumterm strategy
for education\.
7\. In conclusion, this shows that the project has a design that is in accordance with the
diagnostic o f the education system as analyzed through the Country Status Report (World Bank,
2005b) and other analyses reported elsewhere inthis PAD\. The economic impacts o fthe Project,
through the increased participation, better quality o f education and increased institutional
capacity, will be significant, and the project as a whole will yield significant positive economic
returns\.
8\. Table A9\.1 below, which presents a stylized PDO-level cost benefit analysis, highlights the
Project's main benefits\.
TableA9\.1: Cost-benefitAnalysis of the Project
konomiccosts and ben fits
PDO costs Benefits
A\. Reversedownturn in Project costs: US$104\.5 a) 2\.5 million additional students in
enrollment, completion and million primary education by Project end\.
parity ratio: GER grows from Longterm effects are reduced poverty
64% in2007 to 75% in2012, and better social cohesion\.
completion rate grows from Recurrent costs: substantial,
29% in2007 to 35% in2012, as a result o f shifting the b) better equity as reduced education
and Girls to Boys ratio grows burdeno fpaying fees from cost will lead to higher enrollment rate
from 85% in2007 to 95% in household to public sector\. among the poor
2012\. See estimatesbelow under c) higher enrollment rates o f girls
different scenarios\. yield high social and economic returns
(smaller households, better family
health status and higher level o fassets
cf\. Poverty Report)
106
I B\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.
Improve quality o fEducation Project costs: US$28\.8 a) Reading materials readily available
mi11ion inall schools\. Expected impact on
learning achievement is not yet
I quantifiable but international
Recurrent costs: Negligible experience shows that it is likely to be
substantial across all categories o f
schools
b) reduceddropout rates are likely
c) capacity to monitor quality and
undertake related research is
instrumental for future improvements
\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.
C\. Reform teacher career Project costs: US$5\.06 a) More efficient partnership between
structure (training, million State and civil society will improve
deployment, salary and efficiency o f school operations
incentive structure); renovate
legal and institutional Recurrent costs: substantial b) better motivatedteachers
framework and prepare as a result o f salary increase\. c) clear strategic direction and
strategy and action plan See estimates below under coherent budget allocation, in line
different scenarios\. with priorities
3\. FinancialAnalysisof the Project
3\.1 What would berequiredto reachinternational EFA benchmarks?
9\. Financial simulations developed within the framework o f the Country Status Report (World
Bank, 2005b) identified policy variables with the greatest impact on expenditures, and
highlightedthe trade-off that the government will need to make to meet the goal o f UPE while
improving quality at all levels\. More importantly, these simulations have also shown that the
requirements for external financing are considerable, because of the enormous needs at the
primarylevel\. This sectiontakes these simulations one step further by including anevaluation o f
the Project impact on government finances by taking into account the increase inrecurrent costs
resulting from the Project, likely budget shortfalls and prospects for reducing them, the
Government's current fiscal situation and the overall level o f recurrent costs requiredto operate
the sector adequately\.
10\. Table A9\.2 below recapitulates how the DRC's spendingpattern on education is somewhat
atypical even when compared to other poor African countries: i)the share o f education in
Government expenditures i s the lowest on the continent, ii)the share o f primary education in
total education expenditures should increase significantly to reach the African average or values
recommended inthe EFA-FTIframework, iii)studentsto teacher ratio could be increased by up
to 10 percent without expected decline in quality while generating substantial savings, and iv)
average teachers' income, including parents' contributions, are relatively high at 8\.1 times the
per capita GDP, but fall to more reasonable levels when only official salaries are accounted for,
at 4\.3 and 2\.0 times the GDP per capita, for Kinshasa and outside Kinshasa, respectively\.
107
Table A9\.2 :International Comparisons
Share of Share of Student Average
Educationin Primary to Teacher
Government Education Teacher Wage as a
Budget in Total Ratio multipleof
("/I Education per capita
Budget(YO) GDP
DRC (2005) 9 I 43 I 37 I 8\.1
Cameroon(2002) 15 40 57 3\.9
Republic of Congo(2002) 10 39 65 2\.3
CentralAfrican Republic (2002) 10 52 d a 4\.9
Uganda(2002) 30 47 53 2\.9
Chad (2003) 25 49 66 5\.4
Average SSA (2001) 19 49 42 4\.6
FTIIndicative Framework 20 I1I 50 11I 46 III 3\.5
11\. Giventhese characteristics o f the education system, three different scenarios were formulated
with different assumptions for key policy factors, with the aim to identify ways to minimize the
financing shortfalls generated by the Government decision in 2005 to eliminate the teachers'
bonuses paid by families (FDM)\. To reduce expenditure, various realistic efficiency gains are
introduced gradually, including a reduction o f repetitionrates from 17% percent to 10 percent in
2015\. Macro-economic data have beenset inline with most recent Bank and IMFprojections o f
economic growth and fiscal revenue\. All scenarios aim to achieve a completion rate o f primary
education o f 100 percnet by 2015, which i s consistent with PRSP goals, but rather optimistic
given the starting point\. The scenarios also exclude capital expenditures, which are assumed to
be covered by external financing\.
0 Scenario 1assumes no compensation for teachers' lost income from FDM, while official
salary levels remain unchanged with reference to the per capita GDP\. Key funding
allocation parameters are also kept unchanged from their 2005 level, i\.e education
receiving a low priority in Government budget (8\.8 percent o f total expenditures) and
primary education share remaining stable intotal spendingon education, at 43\.4 percent\.
This scenario, since it affects teachers' morale and disruptsthe working climate at school
as confirmed by recent teacher strikes triggered by the Government decision to eliminate
the bonuses, is the worst case scenario from a political perspective\. It does, however,
leave a relatively minor financing gap for the period 2006-2011, an estimated FC 18
billion (est\. US$35 million), or 8 percent o f projected primary education expenditures\.
The financing gap becomes unsustainable thereafter, and rises to FC 106 billion (est\.
US$212 million) during the 2011-15 period or 21 percent o f total primary education
expenditures\.
108
0 Scenario 2 seeks gradually to align the key policies illustrated in Table A9\.2 with
regional standards and FTI-recommended values, and shifts the responsibility o f paying
the teachers' bonuses to the state\. A key implication is the alignment o fthe budget share
allocated to education with the stated PRSP goal o f 25 percent\. Despite its proposed
significant increase in resources to education, this scenario leaves a financing gap
estimated at FC 410 billion (est\. US$ 0\.8 billion) in2006-2010, and FC 620 billion (est\.
US$1\.2 billion) in 2011-2015, which i s equivalent to 53 percent and 35 percent o f total
expenditures on primary education, respectively\. To attenuate this funding shortfall, an
alternative scenario would be to stabilize teachers' remuneration after the initial increase,
which would translate into a gradual decline of their real remuneration\. This alternative
scenario remains unsustainable inthe long run\.
0 Scenario 3 i s a result o f significant efforts, both to reduce expenditure and increase
funding\. Expenditure is reduced by assuming that teachers accept an initial 25 percent
reduction in their total earning (including FDM) before this earning starts increasing
again at a moderate rate to stabilize over the long term around 6 and 4 times the per
capita GDP for Kinshasa and outside Kinshasa, respectively\. Funding i s improved by
increasing the share o f primary education intotal education expenditure up to 60 percent
as soon as 2010\. This scenario also assumes that students to teacher ratio could increase
to 50:l inKinshasa and 40:l outside Kinshasa, which i s not optimal but still lower than
most countries inthe comparator group\. Inthis scenario, the shortfall remains relatively
highin2006-2011 at FC 110 billion est\. US$220 million), or 28 percent o ftotal primary
education expenditures, but declines rapidely thereafter to become sustainable in 2011-
2015 at FC 30 billion (est\. US$60 million), or 3 percent o f total primary education
expenditures\.
12\. Chart A9\.1 summarizes the financial state o f the education sector for these scenarios by
2015\. While these scenarios are only indicative at this stage, they have the merit to help identify
the most sensitive policies at play\. They also show that the financing gap in2011-2015 couldbe
considerable, reaching as high as 53 percent o f expected expenditureson primary education for
Scenario 2, but with certain policies, this shortfall could be reducedto an acceptable level by
2015\. Assuming that transition rates from primary to secondary education, and from secondary
to higher education, are stabilized at their current levels, financial sustainability depends
essentially on four policy parametersbelow:
0 Increasing resource allocation to education to reach 25 percent o f fiscal revenues
by 2015;
Increasing the share o f primary education in the next 5 years from 43 percent to
60 percent in 2006-2011, before reducing this level to 50 percent in the 2011-
2015 period;
0 The renegotiation o f the terms o f the work contract between the State and the
teachers, and adopting a long term perspective for the upgrade o f the teacher
compensation and career structure;
0 Improving efficiency and controlling unit cost through the rationalization o f the
number o fteachers andtheir rigorous allocation accordingto needs\.
109
Chart A9\.1: Resources Shortfall
Resources Shortfall in % of Projected Education
Budgets
60%
50%
40%
30% E2006-2010
E2011-2015
20%
10%
0%
I Scenario 1 scenario 2 scenario 3
3\.2 What is politically feasible?
13\. It i s unlikelythat the new Government, which i s under pressure to stabilize the post-election
situation and eager to show a "post-election dividend" would win support by announcing cuts in
teacher salaries\. Furthermore, no matter how prominently the new Government promotes
universal basic education, it may be difficult to reallocate domestic resources on the order o f the
first two policy parameters suggested inthe previous section\. What, then, would be a politically
feasible approach for the new Government to show traction on its commitment to phase out
school fees, while also showing sensitivityto the situation o fteachers?
14\. To answer this, the Project preparation team generated another set o f scenarios focused on
the fees which make up three-quarters of the overall fee burden for primary education: FDM,
FDF, and FDIP\. The interest that guidedthese calculations was to explore the extent to which
the new Government could continue to improve on the package o f policy interventions initiated
by the previous Government: the practice o f subsidizingthe FDFwhile also improving the salary
conditions o f practicing teachers\. Would it be possible, in fact, to take a much bolder step and
completely abolish the FDF and FDIP? Could the Government take a greater number o f
practicing (primary school) teachers onto the public payroll, thus offering betterjob stability and
reducing the number of teachers who would otherwise be paid entirely through the FDM?
Would it be financially feasible to take both o f these steps, evenunder more cautious projections
about growth rate o f the public sector and the level to which the national budget could increase
allocations to education?
15\. Using similar assumptions as inthe scenarios above regardingthe introduction o f efficiency
gains and assuming a five percent annual average growth rate o fthe economy, the new scenarios
outlined two key parameters o f effort requiredo f Government:
110
(i) Steady increase of recurrent expenditure in the public sector as a percentage of the
GDP, from the present level o f 8\.6 percent to 12 percent by the end o f the Project\.
This would entail that the 2006 envelope for recurrent expenditure would increase
nominally by year 2011 by around 78 percent\.
(ii) Reallocationto primary and secondary education (EPSP budget) within the recurrent
portion o f the national budget to increase from the current 20 percent to 27\.5 percent
by the end o f the Project\. This means that the 2006 allocation o f recurrent
expendituresfor primaryeducation would increase innominal terms by 75 percent by
2011\.
16\. The combined effect of increasing the share o f primary education expenditure within an
overall increased public sector budget could raise the total expenditurefor primary education by
144 percent by year 2011, in nominal terms\. This is only recurrent spending\. The scenarios
exclude capital expenditures\.
17\. Three new scenarios were developed for supporting the reduction o f school fees\. Each
scenario embeds the previous one and adds a new policy variable\. The scenarios follow below,
andTable A9\.3 at the end o fthis section summarizes the impact o feach scenario\.
Scenario 1
0 DescriDtion: This involves only the part o f FDMthat completely finances primary school
teachers who are NM (in either registered schools i\.e\. PA, or non-registered schools)\.
Government estimates that around 25,000 primary school teachers are PA, and that an
additional 59,000 teachers are operational on the ground, but not drawing public salaries
(estimates providedby SECOPE and the Provincial branches ofthe Ministry of Education)\.
In the latter group, only about a quarter (15,000 teachers) are believed to be working in
situations, which are deemed fully "viable" by the national and local governments; that is,
these teachers have been identified for inclusion in the public payroll pending availability
o f funds\. This scenario would thus entail "regularizing" roughly a maximum o f about
40,000 NMteachers by takingthem onto the public payroll\.
Qualitative assessment: Insofar as all these NMteachers are currently being financed by
FDM, this policy measure would automatically benefit households whose children attend
schools where the roster o f teachers has not yet been fully regularized\. In these cases,
putting teachers onto the public payroll should result in an automatic abolition of FDM,
provided that what parents were paying was, on average, less or equal to the official salary
level that the subsequently regularized teachers would receive\. However, if the new
payment from the Government could not cover the entire amount that the teachers were
making formerly when fully paid through the FDM, there i s a risk that the schools would
continue charging this fee to top up the salaries o f these teachers\. In sum, the extent to
which the actual take home pay o f the teachers newly incorporated into the public payroll
differs from what they were getting from fees before will determine the potential for
actually reducing the level o f the FDM at school level\. In addition, in cases where the
teachers newly taken onto the public payroll would be working in schools alongside
teachers who had been paid public salaries all along - and who are also getting top-ups
from parents - the potential for reducing the FDM at school level would be even lower
since the newly regularized teachers may claim that they, too, should have an additional
top-up\.
111
0 Financial implications: As this option may have an immediate impact in about 20
percent o f the public school system, but not more, the largest potential impact on
enrollment overall could be about 10percent, but only for the first year\. The evolution of
financing needs for the Government show an important financial gap o f roughly US$25
million inthe first two years o fthe project, quickly going down across time and rendering
this approach fully feasible by the last year o f the Project (2011-2012)\. The financing
needs would therefore be largest inthe first three years o f this initiative; and the average
needon a yearly basis would be around US$12 million\.
Scenario 2
DescriDtion: This involves both the FDM and the FDF, which together represent
between 75 percent and 80 percent o f all school fees at the primary school level\. Inthis
case, this scenario retains the regularization o f teachers as above but supplements this
with full abolition of the FDF and the FDIP\. As a compensation for the revenue loss to
cover school operating costs, the Government would implement a compensation system
by which lump sum grants are distributedto all registered primary schools\. Criteria for
distribution would take into consideration school size, among other indicators\. Finally,
the system could use the same disbursement mechanisms currently prevailing for the
allocation o f HIPC funds to 22,900 primary and secondary schools\.
0 Pros and cons: This alternative adds the potentially attractive political move for
Government to completely abolish a couple very significant fees, and to reduce another
major fee (FDM) while stabilizing the situation for a sizable number o f primary school
teachers by taking them onto the public payroll\. Since schools will be automatically
compensated for the elimination o f these fees, this alternative should automatically
impact enrollment more greatly thanthe effects foreseen for Scenario 1\.
0 Financial implications: The impact on enrollment o f scenario 2 i s estimated to be twice
as large as Scenario 1, meaningthat enrollment inpublic primary schools could grow by
20 percent inthe first year\. The size o fthe financing gap i s fairly large at the start (about
US$50 million for the first two years) but it decreases over time (reaches about US$30
million by 2011)\. The average annual financing gap i s approximately US$43 million\.
Yet, the decreasing trend inthe gap means that this alternative would eventually become
sustainable later on, say, by 2015\.
Scenario 3
0 Description: This goes one step further inthe process o f abolishing school fees\. On top
o f the regularization approach (as above for primary school teachers) and abolition o f
FDF and FDIP, it tackles the bulk of the system: the FDMused as top-ups for salaries\.
Inthis case though, the compensation package is slightly different as it needs to add to
the lump sum grants to primary schools an additional amount that will directly impact on
teachers' salaries\. It is critical to remember that the immediate abolition o f top-ups for
salaries would automatically lead to a de facto reduction o f about 50 percent in the
amount o fteachers' take-home pay\. Therefore, the only way o f carrying out a successful
full abolition o f both FDF (including FDIP) and FDM- i\.e\. 75 percent to 80 percent o f
all primary school fees across the country - i s to implement an immediate compensation
package to both schools and teachers o f about the same magnitude o fthe financial loss in
each case\.
112
Pros and cons: This option is, by far, the most comprehensive o f the Scenarios analyzed
for moving towards a full abolition o f primary school fees\. In this case, the policy
reform envisaged would have an immediate impact on enrollment that would be
sizeable: estimated increase o f 40 percent in the first year, and almost 100 percent
cumulative in5 years\. This would helpput the country quickly on track for reaching the
MDGs in terms of access\. Teachers would receive a second increase in salaries (after
the important one they received in September2005) that would finally validate their red
market prices, bringing the system to a new equilibrium that, especially in the regions
outside Kinshasa, would probably attract people to teaching, increase their real pocket
salaries, and plausibly increase quality as a result\.
Financial imDlications:The cumulative financing gap would be around US$900 million
over 5 years, which would make the situation for Government unsustainable in the
longer term due to the increase inboth the quantity (caused by the enrollment upsurge)
and price o fteachers\. Therefore, although this Scenario is attractive intheoretical terms
to redress the burden that school fees represent for parents and immediately increase
primary school enrollments, the automatic impact on the national budget would be such
that the Government would face high and increasing financial gaps\. In addition, there
would be both financial and political costs ifthis alternative would leadto strikes or civil
unrest causedby pressure groups perceivingthat teachers are favored,
Table A9\.3: Financial implications of three scenarios for abolishingprimary school fees
Financial implications Sector-wide approach
-
Policy :ompensation Total financinggap -
reforms package for Effect on Shock Measuredinterms ofthe gap inrecurrent
mbedded revenueloss enrollment (specific educationalpolicyapplied) expenditures at primaryeducationlevel
(in millions ofUSdollars)
Completeregistrationofall schools currentlyinthe
Cleanupof Minor (10% increax i pipelineat SECOPEf Completeregularizationoft
system None 1styear only)
- I 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
teachersinbothformerly registeredschools(pstes 24\.9 23,l 13,7 3,7 -6\.8 58\.6
autorisk) andnewlyregisteredones
Cleanupof
system+
Schoolfee 51\.0 52\.9 455 37\.7 29\.5 216\.6
-
abolition schools
policy
Cleanupof
system+ Lumpsum f Significant(40%
Schoolfee reachersalariesincreaSein 1styear, 5% Scenario2 f Immediatereductionofallfrais de 144,3 161\.0 169\.6 204\.8 230\.9 910\.7
abolition ncreax(IN%) annualincrew in motivurion in2007
-policy following4 years)
113
3\.3 Toward a financing strategy for EPSPas a whole
18\. The analysis o f scenarios presented above depicts the magnitude o f the potential financing
gaps involved if a set o f reforms dealing with different degrees o f reduction o f school fees took
place inthe primary school system\. As referred above, Table A9\.3 illustrates the gaps: a) at the
level o f recurrent spending (i\.e\. without considering the impact on necessary and complementary
capital expenditures); b) for the primary school level o f education (although both pre-primary
and secondary school sub-sectors were also modeled)\. Any analysis o f potential reforms
introduced to gradually eliminate user fees inprimary education, however, needs to incorporate
an overview o f how the entire EPSP sub-sector will adjust and cope with the needs o f all three
levels of education involved\.
19\. The parts o f the EPSP sub-sector other than primary are also plagued with problems\. There
i s very limited supply o f pre-primary education in the public sector (less than 15 percent o f all
pre-primary schools in the DRC are public), except for the province/city o f Kinshasa where the
private sector has a significant contribution\. The secondary level has a larger overall coverage in
the public sector thanpre-primary, but secondary education i s halfthe size o fthe primary and, on
average, charges higher school fees partly because it suffers from a higher rate o f non-
regularized teachers\.
20\. Table A9\.3 above showed that the amount o f public funding that would be necessary to
eliminate the financial contribution parents currently make to send their children to public
primary education is enormous, and not feasible to be dealt with in the absence o f a firm
commitment from the national Government to increase the overall allocation to education inthe
national budget\. Given the obvious needs in other sub-sectors o f EPSP, it is also important to
explore how the rest o f EPSP would fare if a disproportionate effort were made to increase
resources for primary duringthe lifetime o fthe Project\.
21\. Table A9\.4 below presents a detail o f the financing gaps within EPSP if scenario 2 were to
be implementedand different strategies for increasing the percentage allocation to education in
the national budget were carried out along the scale of a moderate increase to a large boost
during the lifetime o f the project4\. The message is clear\. In the absence o f other sources of
income, it i s impossible for the Government to enhance the public education system without a
commitment that will ultimately more than double current education spending within a few
years\. And yet, even with a moderate increase in the education share o f an ever increasing
national budget, an entire set of complementary reforms would be needed, for instance, to
eliminate school fees at the primary level\. This suggests that only by fostering a healthy
environment for sustained rates o f economic growth and by reaching international standards for
the allocation o f public funds to education (e\.g\. 20 percent), the DRC will be able to achieve a
significant expansion o f access within its education system at all levels\.
Notethat the simulationexerciseuses a set ofassumptionsofvaried implications,the most importantbeingthat: a)
the GDP ofthe country grows 5% rate annually for the next 5 years; b) the size ofthe public sector, as measuredby
the national budget remains constant as a percentage of the GDP; c) the share of primary education within the
education budget grows until reaching the 50% mark; and d) no reform other than the one implemented at the
primaryeducationlevel is undertakenduringthe lifetimeofthe project\.
114
Base Year Lifetime o f the project Total
2006 II 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 cumulative
Education's importance in budget increases slowly
Assumptions
% EPSP Education on national budget 9\.4 9\.9 10\.4 10\.9 11\.4 11\.9
% PnmaryEducation on educaaon budget 40 42 44 46 48 50
Financing available by sub-sector(millions of USdollars)
PrnW 72 101 116 134 153 175
Others (Re-Pnmary, Secondary) 61 81 90 99 109 119
Total 134 182 206 233 262 294 1,176
Educational needs by sub-sector (millions of US dollars)
Prunary 123 144 156 169 175
Others (Pre-Prmary, Secondary) 64 79 92 107 124
Total 187 222 247 276 299 1,232
Financing gap by sub-sector (millions of US dollars)
Prlmary (22\.5) (27\.3) (22\.2) (15\.6) 0\.3
Others (Re-Pnmary, Secondary) 17\.1 10\.9 7\.3 1\.9 (5\.5)
Total (5\.4 (16\.4) (14\.9) (13\.7) (5\.1) (55\.5)
WEducation'simportanceinbudgetincreasesmoderately(expected)
Assumptions
% Education onnational budget 9\.4 10\.4 11\.4 12\.4 13\.4 14\.4
% Pnmary Education onnational budget 40 42 44 46 48 50
Financing available by sub-sector (millions of USdollars)
Primary 72 106 128 152 180 212
Others (Pre-Primary, Secondary) 61 86 98 112 128 144
Total 134 191 226 265 308 356 1,346
Educational needsby sub-sector (millions of USdollars)
Primary 123 144 156 169 175
Others (Pre-Pnmary, Secondary) 64 79 92 107 124
Total 187 222 247 276 299 1,232
Financing gap by sub-sector (millions of USdollars)
Primary (17\.3) (15\.9) (3\.6) 11\.5 37\.4
Others (Pre-Primary, Secondary) 21\.3 19\.6 20\.9 20\.9 19\.6
Total 4\.0 3\.6 17\.4 32\.5 56\.9 114\.4
Scenario 3: Education's importance i n budget increases quickly
Assumptions
% Education on national budget 9\.4 11\.4 13\.4 15\.4 17\.4 19\.4
% PrunaryEducation onnational budget 40 42 44 46 48 50
Financing available by sub-sector(millions of USdollars)
PnmW 72 116 150 189 234 286
Others (Pre-Primary, Secondary) 61 94 116 140 166 194
Total 134 210 266 329 400 480 1,684
Educational needsby sub-sector (millions of USdollars)
Primary 123 144 156 169 175
Others (Pre-Primary, Secondary) 64 79 92 107 124
Total 187 222 247 276 299 1,232
Financing gap by sub-sector (millions of USdollars)
pnmaty (7\.1) 6\.4 33\.3 65\.4 111\.0
Others (Pre-Primary, Secondary) 29\.5 36\.9 48\.2 59\.1 69\.6
Total 22\.4 43\.3 81\.5 124\.5 180\.6 452\.2
w
I)WeassumethattheGDPgrowatanannualrateof5%throughouttheilfebmeoftheproject\.TheproprhonofthenationalbudgetinternofGDP ISheldconstant at 26\.3%
2) Budgetaryallocahonsby sub-sector havebeen eshmated from the last AmmendedBudget2006\. We assumethat capital expenditureswill remam at 25% of total expendimesby sub-sector\.
We also assumethat the proportionof expenditureson pre-primaryand secondaryeducabonremansconstant at 34%, the current eshmatedallocation\.
3) EPSP refersto the pre-primary,primary, and secondarylevelsof education\.T h e highereducation level is not simulatedheredue to their budgetingbeing w e d out by adifferentMinishy\.
Annex 10: SafeguardPolicyIssues
Environmentaland SocialManagementFramework(ESMF)and ResettlementAction Plan
(RAP)
The Project has beenclassified as a "B" category for environmental screening purposes\.
1\. This annex summarizes the guidelines and decision-making processes that will be used to
avoid or minimize adverse environmental and social impacts o f the Project, ensuring that its
implementation meets with the requirements o f the International Development Agency o f the
World Bank as described in its safeguard policy on Environmental Assessment (OP 4\.0) and
Involuntary Resettlement (OP 412)\. These safeguard policies have beentriggeredbecause o f the
rehabilitation activities at primary schools and at the National Pedagogical University, although
no new land acquisition i s envisaged\.
2\. No major environmental or adverse social impacts are expected\. However, small-scale civil
works may have minor adverse environmental and social impacts\. The ESMF and the RAP
disclosed in the DRC and through the World Bank Infoshop during Project preparation have
therefore outlined mechanisms to address the safeguards challenges: a screening and review
process for potential environmental and social impacts; procedures to avoid or mitigate
prospective adverse impacts on the environment; a complaint mechanism; and procedures for
monitoring and evaluation\.
ProhibitedActivities
3\. Screening and review will take place prior to the submission o f rehabilitation activities for
funding\. To avoid adverse impacts on the environment and people, the ESMF and the Project
Operations Manual and Technical Guidelines specify activities which are eligible / not eligible
for support\. For example, the Project will not support new land acquisitions or the expansion o f
existing settlements in protected areas or areas proposed for protection\. Where settlements
already exist, proposals for funding must be in compliance with national land management
regulations, and provisions in protected area management plans\. N o track upgrading or road
rehabilitation o f any kind will be allowed inside natural habitats and existing or proposed
protected areas\. No Project support will be provided if activities involve involuntary
resettlement\. Activities which will have adverse impacts on social groups withinthe community
and/or in neighboring communities cannot be funded\. Prohibited activities also include the use
o f construction materials which contain asbestos\.
Rolesand Responsibilities
4\. Overall responsibility for implementingthese guidelines lies with the Project Management
and Coordination Unit (PMCU)\. It will ensure that the guidelines are appropriately disseminated
and that Project staff have the requiredskills and receive training to ensure that the safeguards
procedures and screening process will be followed as prescribed, and that no activities prohibited
underthese guidelines are funded\. The PMCU is responsible for proper monitoring of social and
environment issues and will incorporate necessary changes to the guidelines and procedures
based on recommendations from monitoring exercises and inagreement with the World Bank\.
Screeningand Analysis ofAlternativeDesigns
5\. All activities supported by the Project funds must avoid or minimize negative environmental
impacts by exploring viable alternative designs and by following the Project Operations Manual
116
and Technical Guidelines\. It i s anticipated that most adverse impacts will be highly localized
and be temporary in nature, easily mitigated through the application o f sensible site selection
criteria for the rehabilitations, good constructionpractices, and diligent management practices in
the operational phasewith specific guidance on how to manage environmental aspects\. Standard
operating procedures for various types o f rehabilitation projects will be incorporated into the
Technical Guidelinesproviding technical designs and costs\.
6\. The Project covers the entire country and aims to rehabilitate 1570 primary school classrooms
and the National Pedagogical University\. The Infrastructure Directorate o f the Ministry o f
Primary, Secondary and Technical Education will carry out an initial screening o f schools which
may be recommended for rehabilitation\. A screening checklist will be used to classify the
schools into three categories:
Rehabilitation with low or no environmental impacts: Rehabilitation activities will follow
the standard operating procedures, and may be submitted for consideration without any
environmental evaluation;
Rehabilitation expected to generate moderate impacts: This will require preparation o f a
simple environmental evaluation and incorporation o f recommended mitigation measures in
the tender documents prior to submission\. Rehabilitation activities in this category are
eligible for support, but only if appropriate measures are taken to reduce and avoid negative
impacts\. Activities which require an environmental evaluation include proposals which
involve large-scale or sensitive landandwater use changes, or extensive rehabilitation\.
Rehabilitation with signiJicant andor excessive environmental risks: This should not be
submittedfor consideration, andwill not be supported\.
There will be no involuntary resettlement\. Therefore, assessment will include screening for
possible involuntary resettlement, usingthe Resettlement Action Planprepared for the Project\.
8\. The above will generate a list o f schools for possible rehabilitation\. More detailed technical
assessmentswill then be required, and will be conducted by firms contracted by the Procurement
Agent the PMCUwill contract for the Project\. The TOR for the firms will specify that they must
use the more detailed environmental screening instrument that was disclosed in the ESMF and
that i s beingincorporated into the Project Operations Manual\.
9\. Decisions on the sites to be rehabilitated are made by the Project Steering Committee upon
recommendation, and with information provided by, the Project Management and Coordination
Unit (PMCU)\. The PMCUbases its recommendations on the proposals of the firms\. The CPA
forwards these proposals after vetting them, in consultation with the environmental unit o f the
Ministryofthe Environment\.
10\. As part o f the selection requirements, all rehabilitation proposals must include a brief
description o f the existing environment at the site, any known environmental sensitivities, and
any sites affected with known paleontological, historical, cultural, religious or unique natural
values\. The contracted firms, assisted by the CPA and ministry technicians, will expand on the
environmental information collected through reference to existing reports and studies (if
available), through discussions among community members or through new data collection if
necessary\. Rehabilitation proposals which do not provide adequate environmental data cannot
be considered for financing untilthey meetthe above requirements\.
117
Resettlement
11\. Proposals must be carefully reviewedby the CPA, inconsultation with the authorities o f the
Ministryfor Primary, Secondary and Professional Education, the Ministry for HigherEducation
and Universities, the Ministryofthe Environment, provincial and local education authorities, and
the managers o f the educational institutions concerned, to ensure that the Project does not fund
any rehabilitation leading to involuntary displacement, loss o f income, or source o f income
restrictionto commonly heldresources\.
Ethnic Minorities
12\. The Project will follow the key principles o f the World Bank's policy concerning ethnic
minorities (Operational Policy 4\.20 on Indigenous Peoples), which are to "ensure that indigenous
peoples do not suffer adverse impacts during the development process\. \.,and that they receive
culturally compatible social and economic benefits\." These concerns are met through the design
o f the Project itself, the screening form and the monitoring and evaluation framework, including
external assessments\. The PMCU i s tasked to review rehabilitation proposals to ensure that all
groups in the population have been consulted and will benefit from Project activities in the
Project areas\.
Mitigation Measures
13\. The Project will apply appropriate mitigation measures to reduce or avoid negative impacts
on people or the environment\. The ESMF and Project Operations Manual provide specific
guidelines on managing environmental aspects such as work place debris, including the removal
of asbestos\. Where rehabilitation proposals trigger environmental evaluation and the need for an
impact mitigation plan, the tenders to be issued for the rehabilitation work will include a
description o f the mitigation activities required\. To produce this, the CPA will work with the
environmental unit o f the Ministry o f the Environment\. The PMCU will oversee this process to
ensure that no tenders are issued without the required mitigation plans\. The firms who are
selected will be obligated by contract to carry out the mitigation actions as well as the
construction activities for rehabilitation\.
Monitoring
14\. The promotion o f sound management o f environmental and social impacts i s incorporated
into the Project's monitoring and evaluation framework\. Approved projects with environmental
and/or social impacts will be supervised and monitored by the technicians o f the CPA, in
consultation with the MEPSP technicians and Provincial education authorities, and oversight by
the PMCU\. The technicians o f the CPA and MEPSP engineers will monitor execution o f the
rehabilitations on an ongoing basis, at least at mid-point and completion, following the
information provided instandard sheets inthe Project Operations Manual\.
15\. General monitoring and evaluation o f the Project, including monitoring and evaluation by
independent entities or consultants, will pay particular attention to issues concerning the
environment, social impacts and ethnic minorities and resettlement/land acquisition\. The
findings and any recommendations from the above will be recorded in quarterly reports to be
furnishedto the PMCU and sharedwith WorldBank implementation support missions\.
118
CapacityBuildingand Training
16\. The Project provides for training to strengthen environmental and social awareness, and to
build capacity for environmental and social impact assessment and mitigation measures within
the PMCU, the participating ministries and provincial authorities, the CPA and other contracted
firms and participating schools\. By incorporating the environmental unit o f the Environment
Ministry in the training and screening processes, the Project is harmonizing environmental
assessment capacity building in the present Project with interventions in other IDA Projects
which finance rehabilitation inthe education sector\.
ComplaintMechanism
17\. Complaints about environmental, ethnic minority or settlement issues will be handled as
follows:
Step 1: Persons potentially affected or concerned present their complaints orally or inwriting to
the local education authorities who are responsible for the activity in question\. The authorities
will respond, on the record, within fourteen (14) days\. The persons bringing the complaint(s)
will be exempt from all administrative or legal charges (notary public, legal fees) associated with
filing the complaint\. The authorities will transmit a report on eachdispute to the CPA\.
Step 2: Inthe event that a local or provincial level education authority does not resolve the issue
to the satisfaction o f the person(s) who brought the complaint, the case i s referred to the PMCU
andthe ProvincialAssemblyfor reviewandaction\.
Step 3: The PMCU i s expected to work with the local authorities (mayors), the authorities at
provincial level (PROVED), and others as they may be involved, to bring final resolution to all
complaints and other sources o f conflict during all steps o f identification, conception, planning,
implementation, and monitoring o fthe Project activities\.
119
Annex 11:ProjectPreparationand Supervision
Planned Actual
PCNreview October 28,2004 October 27,2004
Appraisal November 22-30,2005 Nov 22 - Dec19,2005
(Second Appraisal
January 17- February 10,2007)
Negotiations December57,2005 December 19-23,2005
(SecondNegotiations
April 19-26,2007)
Board approval May 31,2007
Planneddate of effectiveness September 30,2007
Planneddate of mid-termreview December31,2009
Plannedclosing date December31,2012
Key institutionsresponsible for preparationof the project:
Ministries of: (i)Primary, Secondary and Professional Education; (ii)Higher Education and
Universities; (iii)Social Affairs and National Solidarity; (iv) Finance; (v) Budget; (vi) Civil
Service\.
Peer reviewers: Birger Fredriksen (Consultant, AFTHD); Keiko Miwa (Senior Education
Economist, ECSHD); Richard Cambridge (Operations adviser, AFTOS); Thomas Walton (Lead
Regional Coordinator, Environmental Safeguards); Rosita Maria Van Meel (Senior Education
Specialist, SASHD); Juan Prawda (Lead Education Specialist, LCSHE); Robert Prouty (Lead
Education Specialist, HDNED); Kai Kaiser, PRMPR (Senior Economist), and Norbert
Mugwagwa (AFTHD)\.
Bankstaffand consultantswho worked on the Projectincluded:
Name Title Unit
Susan Opper Sr\. Education Specialist, TTL AFTH3
JuanDiego Alonso Economist AFTH3
MouradEzzine LeadEducation Specialist AFTH3
William Saint LeadEducation Specialist AFTH3
SakhevarDiop Sr\. Education Specialist AFTH3
Sajitha Bashir Sr\. EducationEconomist AFTH3
Luc Gacougnolle EducationPlanner HDNED
Peter Materu Senior Education Specialist AFTH3
BrendanHorton LeadEconomist AFTP3
Keiko Kubota Senior Economist AFTP3
120
Helena Maria Grandao Ramos Public Financial Specialist AFTP3
Gilles Marie Veuillot Legal Counsel LEGAF
T\. MpoyKamulayi Legal Counsel LEGAF
Renee Desclaux DisbursementOfficer LOAG2
Agnes Albert-Loth DisbursementOfficer LOAG2
L e i f Jensen LeadFinancialMgt Specialist AFTFM
JosephKizito Sr\. Financial Mgt Specialist AFTFM
Jean Charles Kra Sr\. Financial Mgt Specialist AFTFM
Pierre Morin Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPC
Philippe Mahele Procurement Specialist AFTPC
Luc Lapointe Consultant, Procurement AFTPC
Nadege Nouviale Program Assistant AFTH3
Astania Kamau Program Assistant AFTH3
Jean-Bernard Rasera Consultant, Sector Analysis AFTH3
Maude Svensson Consultant, Governance AFTH3
BernardKwindja Consultant, Education AFMCD
Gabrielle Rooz Consultant, Finance AFTH3
SouleymaneZerbo Consultant, Civil Works AFTH3
Fay Chung Consultant, Teacher Training AFTH3
Richard Akoulouze Consultant, Teacher Training AFTH3
Binta Rassoulala Aw Sal1 Consultant, Nonformal AFTH3
Education
Bank funds expended to date on project preparation:
1\. Bankresources: US$670,000
2\. Trust funds: US$141,000
3\. Total: US$811,000
EstimatedApproval and Supervision costs:
1\. Remaining costs to approval: US$15,000
2\. Estimated annual supervision cost: US$200,000
121
Annex 12: SelectedDocumentsin the ProjectFile
(i)WorldBankDocuments
Proiect Documents
Aides Memoires
Back-to-office Reports
Project Concept Note
Project Concept Note Review
Quality Enhancement Review
Project Appraisal Document
Integrated Safeguard Data Sheet
Project PreparationFacility
Other World Bank and Consultant Documents
Al-Samarrai, S\. and H\. Zaman\. (2002) "The Changing Distribution o f Public Education
Expenditure in Malawi," Africa Region Working Paper No\. 29, March, World Bank,
Washington\.
Avenstrup, R\., X Liang and S\. Nelleman\. (2004) "Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi and Uganda:
Universal Primary Education and Poverty Reduction," a case study from Reducing Poverty,
Sustaining Growth\. A Global Exchangefor Scaling UpSuccess Scaling UpPoverty Reduction: A
Global Learning Process and Conference Shanghai, May 25-27, 2004, World Bank,
Washington\.
BERCI (2004) "Etat des lieux des mkanismes de gestion et de l'efficacitk de la fourniture des
services de base au niveaulocal en RCD," Kinshasa\.
Colleta, N\. and M\. Sutton (1989) "Achieving and Sustaining Universal Primary Education:
International Experience Relevant to India," World Bank Working Paper 166, Population and
HumanResourcesDepartment\. World Bank, Washington\.
Duraisamy,P\., E\. James, J\.I\. Laneand J-P\. Tan\. (1997)"Is there a Quantity-Quality Tradeoff
as Enrollments Increase? Evidence from Tamil Nadu, India," World Bank Research Working
Paper 1768, World Bank, Washington\.
Gelb, Ngo, and Ye (2004); "Implementing Performance Aid inAfrica: The Country Policy and
InstitutionalAssessment", World Bank
Kagia, R and Patrinos,A (forthcoming); "Maximizing the performance o f Education Systems:
The Case of Teacher Absenteeism", World Bank
IMFWorld BankHIPC2003
122
iTerme,RA\. (2002) "The Elimination o f User Fees for Primary Education inTanzania: A Case
Studyonthe PoliticalEconomy o fPro-Poor Policies," June, PREM, World Bank, Washington\.
Kattan, R\.B\. and N\. Burnett\. (2004) User Fees in Primary Education, Education Sector
HumanDevelopmentNetwork, June, World Bank, Washington\.
Lavvy, V\. (1992) "Investment in Human Capital\. Schooling Supply Constraints in Rural
Ghana," World Bank, Washington\.
Leal, F\.C\. (1996); "Who Benefits from Public Education SpendinginMalawi? Results from the
Recent EducationReform," World Bank DiscussionPaper No\. 350, December\.
Mauro, P (1998); "Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Agenda for Further Research",
Finance and Development
Mossige, A\. et\. al\. (2003); Une Etude Pilote de Risques et de la VulnCrabilitC en RCpublique
Dimocratique du Congo (A Pilot Study on Risk and Vulnerability inthe Democratic Republic o f
Congo) (World Bank Working Report, Washington, D\.C\.)\.
Murphy, P\. (2002); "Achieving Universal Primary Education in Uganda\. The Big Bang
Approach,"Education Notes, World Bank, Washington\.
Rijckeghem, C, and Weder, B (1997); "Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low
Wages inthe Civil Service Cause Corruption?", IMF
SwaroopandRajkumar(2002); "Public Spendingand Outcomes: Does Governance Matters?",
World Bank
Tiongson, E\. (2004); "Education Policy Reforms," Research Note, ESSD, World Bank,
Washington\.
UNESCO (2006); Statistiques du Secteur de 1'Education: Prk-primaire, Primaire, Secondaire,
Education Non-Formelle; Ville Province de Kinshasa, 2005-2006 (Education Sector Statistics:
Pre-Primary, Primary, Secondary, Non-Formal Education; City Province o f Kinshasa, 2005-
2006), Project d'Appui au Secteur de l'Education (PASE), Composante I1: Systbme
d'Information pour la Gestionde 1'Education (SIGE); Cellule Technique pour les Statistiques de
1'Education\.
Verhaghe, Johan (2006); "Notre BeauMCtier" (Our Beautiful Profession): Ensuringthe Quality
o f Primary School Teachers inthe DRC, UnpublishedManuscript\.
(2007)\. "SIDA: Salaire InsufJisant Dfficilement Acquis (Salary Insufficient
and Acquired with Dfficulty): Addressing the issue o f effective teacher payroll expenditure in
the DRC", UnpublishedManuscript\.
123
World Bank (2000a)\. Project Appraisal Document - Education Development Project - Bosnia
and Herzegovina Report No\. 20170 BIH (Human Development Sector Unit, Europe and Central
Asia Region)
(2000b)\. Project Appraisal Document - Education and Health Project - Kosovo\.
Report No\. 20288 (Human Development Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region)\.
(2001)\. Project Appraisal Document Fundamental School Quality Project East
Timor\. Report No\. 22294-TP\. (Human Development Sector Unit, East Asia and Pacific Region)\.
(2003a)\. Project Appraisal Document Education Modernization Project Republic of
Tajikistan Report No\. 25806 (Human Development Sector Unit, Central Asia Regional Office,
Europe and Central Asia Region)\.
(2003b)\. "World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor
People"
(2005a)\. "Democratic Republic of Congo: Poverty Diagnostic and Priorities of the
Poor (Poverty Reduction and Economic Management SectorUnit)\.
"
(2005b)\. "Education in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Priorities and Options
for Regeneration", A World Bank Country Study, Washington, DC\.
(2005~)\.Program Document for a Proposed Grant to the Democratic Republic of
Congo for a Transitional Support for Economic Recovery Operation\. Report No\. 33785-ZR
(Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit)\.
(2006)\. "A DecadeofMeasuring the Quality of Governance", Washington, DC\.
(ii)DRCGovernmentDocuments
A r r W inter-ministiriel EPSP-ESU-AS No\.0510 26/01/2005 portant creation du Comite
National de Pilotage du Programme (Inter-ministerial bylaw creating the Program Steering
Committee)
Democratic Republic of the Congo (2004) "Minimum Partnership Program for Transition and
Recovery of the Democratic Republic o fthe Congo", November, Kinshasa\.
Ministhe de I'EPSP et la CoopCration belgo-congolaise (2005)\. Foumiture de manuels
scolaires\. Module de Formation des Enseignants\. Utilisation Efficiente des Manuels ((A Nous
1'Ccole)) (Textbook provision: Training Module for Teachers Efficient use of textbooks
- Our
School D)
124
RDC (2003) Pacte de Modernisation de 1'Enseignement Supe`rieur et Universitaire, PADEM
(Pact for Modernizing Higher Education), Ministere de I'Enseignement SupCrieur et
Universitaire,Kinshasa, RCpubliqueDCmocratiquedu Congo\.
(2005a) Annuaire Statistique de la RDC 2001/2002 (Statistical Yearbook of the
DRC, 2001/2002), MEPSP with the technical and financial support from UNICEF, Kinshasa,
RCpubliqueDCmocratiqueduCongo\.
(2005b) Lettre de politique de de`veloppement (Letter of Development Policy)\.
Kinshasa, RCpubliqueDCmocratiqueduCongo\.
(2005~)Projet d'Appui au Redressement du Secteur Educatif Congolais :Cadre de
Gestion Environnementale et Sociale (Education Sector Support Project : Environmental and
SocialManagementImpact Framework), Kinshasa, RCpubliqueDCmocratiqueduCongo\.
(2005d) Projet d'Appui au Redressement du Secteur Educatif Congolais :Cadre de
Re`installation Involontaire (Education Sector Support Project :Resettlement Policy Framework),
Kinshasa, RCpubliqueDCmocratiquedu Congo\.
(2006a) De`cret N" 06/109 du I1 Juillet 2006 Portant Amenagement du Budget de
1'Etatpour 1'Exercice 2006 (Decree #06/109 of July 11,2006, Containing the Ammendment o f
the National Budget for the Fiscal Year 2006), Ministere du Budget, Kinshasa, Republique
DCmocratiquedu Congo\.
(2006b) Document Strate`gique pour la Reduction de la Pauvrete` (Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper), Kinshasa, RCpubliqueDemocratique duCongo\.
(2006~)Plan Strate`giquepour la Re`habilitation et la Revitalisation de 1'Universite`
de Kinshasa (Strategic Plan for the Rehabilitation and the Revitalization of the University of
Kinshasa), UniversitCde Kinshasa, RCpubliqueDCmocratiquedu Congo\.
(iii)DeveloDmentPartners
Boyle, S\., A\. Brock, J\. Mace and M\. Sibbons\. (2002) "Reaching the Poor The `Costs' of
Sending Children to School\. A Six Country Study Synthesis Report," August, Department for
International Development, London\.
Educationfor All (2007); "Education for All GlobalMonitoringReport 2007"
Feezel, C\. Lee, S\., Miller-Grandvaux, Y\. (2005); School Fees Reduction Program inthe DRC\.
(USAIDKinshasa, USAID/Africa Bureau, USAID/EGAT/Office of Education), Unpublished
Manuscript
IMF International Monetary Fund (2005); Democratic Republic of Congo: Fifth
Review\. \. )) ((
\.
125
Mehrotra, S\.K\. (1998); "Education for All: Policy Lessons from High Achieving Countries,"
UNICEF Staff Working Papers Evaluation, Policy and Planning Series\. No\.EPP-EVL-98-005,
September, Paris\.
Protocole d'Accord entre le Gouvernement de la Rbpublique Dbmocratique du Congo et les
Parrains de 1'Educationpour Tous UNESCO, PNUD, UNICEF, FNUAP, Banque Mondiale
(Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the
partners for Educationfor All -UNESCO, UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank) (2002)
Tomasevski, K\. (2003) School Fees as hindrance to Universalizing Primary Education\.
Background Study for EFA Global MonitoringReport 2003," UNESCO\.
Watkins, K\.(2000) The Oxfam Education Report\. Stylus Publishing: Herndon, Virginia\.
(iv) Others
Asagwara Prince, K\.C\. (1997) "Quality of Learning inNigeria's Universal Primary Education
Scheme, 1976-1986," The Urban Review, Vol\. 29, No\. 3, p\.189-203\.
Bedi, A\.S\., P\.K\. Kimalu,D\.K\. Manda and N\.Nafula\. (2004); "The Decline inPrimary School
Enrolment inKenya," TheJournal of African Economies 13:1, p\. 1-43, March\.
Delamonica, E\., S\. Mehotra and J\. Vandemoortele\. (2004); "Education for All: How Much
Will it Cost?"; Developmentand Change, Vol\. 35, No\. 1, p\. 3-30\.
Deininger, K\. (2003); "Does Cost of Schooling Affect Enrollment by the Poor? Universal
Primary Education inUganda," Economics ofEducation Review\.Vol\. 22, No\. 3, p\. 291-305,
Fiske, E\.B\. and H\.F\. Ladd\. (2003); Balancing Public and Private Resources for Basic
Education: School Fees in Post-Apartheid South Africa," Terry Sandford Institute of Public
Policy, DukeUniversity\.
Kadzamira,E\. and P\. Rose\. (2003); "Can Free Primary EducationMeet the Needs ofthe Poor?
Evidence from Malawi," International Journal of Educational Development, Vol\. 23, p\. 501 -
516\.
Lemon,A\. (2004); "Redressing School Inequalities inthe EasternCape, South Africa," Journal
of SouthernAfrican Studies,Vol\. 30, No\.2, June\.
Mehrotra, S\.K\. (1998); "Improving Cost-effectiveness and mobilizing Resources for Primary
Education inSub-SaharanAfrica," Prospects,Vol\. 28, No\. 3, p\. 469-498, September\.
Mukudi, E\. (2004); "The Effects of User-fee Policy on Attendance Rates among Kenyan
ElementarySchoolchildren," International Review of Education, Vol\. 50, No\. 5-6\.
126
Najamus, S\. (1998); "The Willingness to Pay for Primary Education inRural Pakistan," Ph\.D\.
Dissertation, JohnHopkins University\.
Sperling, G\. and R\. Balu\. (2005); "Designing a Global Compact on Education," Finance and
Development,Vol\. 42, No\. 2, June\.
Tanaka, S (2001); "Corruption in Education Sector Development: A Suggestion for
Anticipatory Strategy", International Journal of Educational Management
Tilak, J\. (1999); "Education and Poverty in South Asia," Prospects, Vol\. XXIX, No\. 4, Issue
No\. 12\.
Tomasevski, K\. (2003); Education denied: Costs and Remedies\.Zed Books\.
Transparency International (2004); "Corruption inthe Education Sector: An Introduction"
127
Annex 13: Statementof Loans and Credits
OriginalAmount in US$
Millions
Project FY Purpose IBRD IDA SF GEF Cancel\. Undisb\.
ID
P104497 2007 Emergency Urban and Social 0\.00 180\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 180\.00
Rehabilitation
PO88751 2006 Health Sector Rehabilitation 0\.00 150\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 140\.39
support
PO88619 2005 Emergency Living Conditions 0\.00 82\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 65\.55
Improvement
PO86874 2005 Emergency Social Action 0\.00 60\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 5 1\.32
PO82516 2004 Multisectoral HIV/AIDS 0\.00 102\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 74\.80
PO81850 2004 Emergency Economic & 0\.00 214\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 81\.23
Social Reunification
PO78658 2004 Emergency Demobilization & 0\.00 100\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 4\.17
Reintegration
PO71144 2004 Private Sector Development 0\.00 120\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 47\.43
& Competitiveness
PO57296 2003 Emergency Multi-Sector 0\.00 579\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 303\.32
Rehabilitation & Recovery
Total: 0\.00 1587\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 948\.21
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
STATEMENT OF IFC'S
Heldand DisbursedPortfolio
In MillionsofUS Dollars
Committed Disbursed
IFC IFC
FY Company Loan Equity Quasi Partic\. Loan Equity Quasi Partic\.
Approval
2003 Celtel DROC 3\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 3\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
2005 PCB Congo 0\.00 0\.45 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.45 0\.00 0\.00
Total portfolio: 3\.00 0\.45 0\.00 0\.00 3\.00 0\.45 0\.00 0\.00
Approvals PendingCommitment
FY Company Loan Equity Quasi Partic\.
Approval
Total pending 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
commitment:
128
Annex 14: Countryat a Glance
Congo, Dem\. Rep\. at a glance 9/14/06
sub-
K e y Development Indicators Saharan LOW
Congo, Dem\. Rep\. Africa income Age distribution\. 2006
(2005) Male Female
Population,mid-year (millions) 57\.5 741 2,353 110-74
Surface area (thousandsq\. km) 2,345 24,265 29,265
Population growth (%) 3\.0 2\.1 1\.8 6064
Urban population (% of total population) 32 35 30 50-54
4044
GNI (Atlas method\. US$ billions) 7\.0 552 1,364 30-34
GNI per capita (Atlas method, US$) 120 745 580 20-24
GNI per capita (PPP\. international$) 720 1,981 2\.486 10-14
04
GDP growth(%) 6\.5 5\.3 7\.5 20 10 0 10 20
GDP per capita growth (%) 3\.4 3\.1 5\.6 percent
(most recent estimate, 2000-2005) 7
Poverty headwunt ratioat $1 a day (PPP\. %) 44
Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP, %) 75 Under4 mottalityrate (per 1,000)
Life expectancyat birth (years) 44 46 59
Infantmortality (per 1,000 live births) 129 100 80
Child malnutrition (O hof children under 5) 31 29 39 200
Adult literacy,male (% of ages 15 and older) 81 73 150
Adult literacy\. female (% of ages 15 and older) z
54 50
Gross primary enrollment\. male (% of age group) 99 110 100
Gross primary enrollment,female (% of age group) 87 99 50
Access to an improvedwater source (% of population) 46 56 75 0
Access to improved sanitation facilities (% of population) 30 37 38
OCongo\. Dem Rep BSub-Saharan Afnca
Net Aid Flows 1980 1990 2000 2006 *
(US$ mi//ions)
Net ODA and official aid 428 897 184 1\.815 (Growth of GDP and GDP per capita (%)
TOP3 donors fin 2004):
United Kingdom I 3 8 301
Belgium 170 95 27 265
United States 11 32 13 190
Aid (% of GNI) 3\.1 10\.5 4\.7 28\.8
Aid per capita (US$) 15 24 4 32
Long-Term Economic Trends
[1saGDP gs -
Consumer prices (annual % change) 00 O!
46\.6 81\.3 550\.0 21\.3
GDP implicit deflator (annual % change) 51\.4 109\.0 515\.8 21\.5 GDP per capita
Exchange rate (annual average, local per US$) 0\.0 0\.0 69\.0 473\.9
Terms of trade index (2000 = 100) 100 131
1880-80 1880-2000 2000-06
(average annual growth %)
Population,mid-year (millions) 28\.0 37\.8 50\.1 57\.5 3\.0 2\.6 2\.8
GDP (US$ millions) 14,395 9,350 4,306 7,103 1\.6 -4\.9 4\.4
(% of GDP)
Agriculture 26\.8 31\.0 50\.0 46\.0 2\.5 1\.4 0\.4
Industry 35\.0 29\.0 20\.3 25\.3 0\.9 -8\.0 9\.2
Manufacturing 15\.2 11\.3 4\.8 5\.5 1\.6 -8\.7 3\.1
Services 38\.2 40\.0 29\.7 28\.7 2\.0 -12\.3 5\.5
Householdfinal consumption expenditure 81\.5 79\.1 88\.0 66\.9 3\.4 4\.5
General gov'tfinal consumption expenditure 8\.4 11\.5 7\.5 6\.8 0\.0 -17\.4
Gross capitalformation 10\.0 9\.1 3\.5 14\.5 -5\.1 -0\.7
Exportsof goods and services 16\.5 29\.5 22\.4 34\.5 9\.6 -0\.5 7\.8
Imports of goods and services 16\.4 29\.2 21\.4 42\.7 10\.7 -2\.4 25\.2
Gross savings 7\.9 0\.8 -3\.5 12\.9 -13\.3
Note: Figuresin italics are for years other than those specified\. 2005 data are preliminaryestimates\.,,indicates data are not available\.
a\. Aid data are for 2004\.
Development Economics\.Development Data Group (DECDG)
129
Congo, Dern\. Rep\.
Balance of Payments and Trade 2000 2005
(US%millions)
Total merchandiseexports (fob) 692 2,042
Total merchandiseimports(cia 669 2,465 Voice and acmunfabilify
Net trade in goods and services 46 -922
Workers'remittancesand
compensationof employees(receipts) Regulatoryqualify
Current account balance -199 -451 Rule of law
as a % of GDP -4\.6 -6\.3 Control of comption
Reserves,induding gold 51 360 0 25 50 75 100
Central Government Finance I m2004 Counws permntile rank (0-100)
02000 hghW Y d M S mpy tetter ,slings
(% of GDP)
Revenue 5\.2 8\.2 Soum: Kaufmann-KraayMartNni, World Bank
Tax revenue 3\.5 6\.3
Expense 6\.6
Technology and Infrastructure 2000 2004
Cash surpiusldeficit -4\.0
Pavedroads (% of total)
Highestmarginaltax rate (%) Fixedlineand mobilephone
Individual 60 50 subscribers(per 1,000people) 0 37
Corporate 40 40 Hightechnologyexports
(% of manufacturedexports)
External Debt and Resource Flows
Environment
(US%mi//ions)
Total debt outstandingand disbursed 11,692 11,841 Agriculturalland (%of land area) 10 10
Total debt service 25 121 Forestarea (% of landarea,2000 and 2005) 59\.6 58\.9
HlPC and MDRldebt relief(expected;flow) 10,389 Nationallyprotectedareas(% of land area) 5\.0
Total debt (% of GDP) 271\.6 180\.2 Freshwaterresourcesper capita(cu\.meters) 16,114
Total debt service(% of exports) 2\.5 5\.8 Freshwaterwithdrawal(% of internalresources) 0\.0
Foreigndirect investment(net inflows) 23 0 C02 emissionsper capita(mt) 0\.05 0\.03
Portfolio equity(net inflows) 0 0
GDP per unit of energy use
(2000 PPP$ per kg of oil equivalent) 2\.3 2\.1
Composition of total external debt, 2004
Energyuseper capita(kg of oil equivalent) 292 293
(US$ millons)
IBRD
Total debt outstandingand disbursed 81 0
Disbursements 0 0
Pnnupal repayments 0 0
Interestpayments 0 0
US$ millions IDA
Total debt outstandingand disbursed 1,188 2,050
Disbursements 0 226
Private Sector Development 2000 2005 Total debt service 0 46
Time requiredto start a business (days) - 155 IFC (fiscalyear)
Cost to start a business (% of GNI per capita) 503\.3 Total disbursedand outstandingportfolio 0 24
Time requiredto registerproperty(days) -- 106 of which IFCown account 0 24
Disbursementsfor IFC own account 0 20
Rankedas a majorconstraint to business
(% of managers surveyedwho agreed) 0 2
n\.a\.
n\.a\.
Grossexuosure 0 5
Stock marketcapitalization(%of GDP) Newguarantees 0 7
Bank branches(per 100,000people) I
Note: Figures in italicsare for years otherthan those specified\. 2005 data are preliminaryestimates\.
\.indicatesdata 8/23/06
are not available\. -indicates observation is not applicable\.
DevelopmentEconomics,DevelopmentData Group (DECDG)\.
130
Millennium Development Goals Congo, Dem\. Rep\.
W/tbselected targets to achieve between 1990and 2015
(eshmate closestto date shown, +/- 2 years)
Goal 1: halve the rates for $1 a day poverty and malnutrltlon 1990 1995 2000 2004
Povertyheadcount ratio at $1 a day (PPP, % of population)
Povertyheadcount ratioat national poverty line (% of population)
Share of incomeor consumptionto the poorest qunrtile (%)
Prevalenceof malnutrition(% of children under 5) 34 31
Goal 2: ensure that chlldren are able to complete primary schoollng -
Pnmaryschool enrollment (net,Oh) 54
Primarycompletion rate(% of relevantage group) 46 42
Secondaryschool enrollment (gross, %) 22 24 18
Youth literacyrate (% of peopleages 15-24) 69 70
Goal 3: ellmlnate gender disparity Ineducatlon and empower women
Ratioof girls to boys in primaryand secondaryeducation (%) 80
Women employed inthe nonagnwltural sector (% of nonagriculturalemployment) 26
Proportion of seats heldbywomen in nationalparliament (%)
Under-5mortality rate (per 1,000) 205 205 205 205
Infant mortalityrate (per 1,000live births) 129 129 129 129
Measlesimmunization(proportionof one-year olds immunized, %)
Maternal mortalrtyrati
Births attended by ski
Goal 6: halt and beginto reverse the spread of HlVlAlDSand other majordiseases
Prevalenceof HIV (% of population ages 15-49) 3 2
Contraceptive prevalence(% of women ages 15-49) 31
Incidenceof tuberculosis (per 100,000people) 133 366
Tuberculosis cases detected under DOTS (%) 42 52 70
Goal 7: halve the proportion of peoplewlthout sustalnable access to basic needs
Accessto an improvedwater source (% of population) 43 46
Accessto improvedsanitation faciliies (% of population) 16 30
Forest area (% of total landarea) 62 0 59\.6 58\.9
Nationally protectedareas (% of total landarea) 5 0
C02 emissions(metrictons per capita) 0\.1 0\.1 0\.0 0\.0
GDP per unit of energy use (constant 20W PPP $ per kg of oil equivalent) 5\.0 3\.3 2\.3 2\.1
Goal 8: develop a global partnership for development
Fixed line and mobile phonesubscribers (per 1,000people) 1 1 0 37
Internet users (per 1,000people) 0 0 0 1
Personal computers (per 1,000people)
Youth unemployment(% of total laborforce ages 15-24)
Iducatlon Indicators (%) Measleslmmunlzatlon (%of 1-yearolds) CT lndlcators (per 1,000 people)
"1
IW]
75
1998 2003 XIM 2004
1990 1995 2oW 2034
---O-Primary net enrollmentratio (\.)
+Ratio of girls to boys in primary & 0Congo,Dam Rep 0Sub-SaharanAtnca 0Fixed+ mobilesubscnbers
secondaryeducation Internet users
Note: Figuresin italicsare for years otherthanthose specified\.indicatesdataare not available 8/23/06
Development Economics,Development Data Group (DECDG)\.
131
Annex 15: Monitoring and Evaluation Arrangements
1\. Overview
1\. The Project activities emerge from discussions with government andanalytic work on how to
coordinate and improve the utilization o f scarce education system resources\. The Democratic
Republic o f Congo i s a country where there will be insufficient funding for the education system
over the next twenty years, making it a candidate for eventual EFA-FTI funding\. The
Monitoring and Evaluationplan for this Project uses a modified FTI approach based on:
i) the use of a results-based framework with indicators and targets which are country-
specific and agreed upon by country partners and donors as a result o f the PRSP
process;
ii) M&E that will be built into the use o f planned systems for data collection and
analysis with the country driving the M&E process and being supported by capacity
buildingfor M&Eunderthe proposed Project;
iii) donorharmonizationinmonitoring,reportingandanalyticalwork;
iv) school level monitoringthrough annual CRC surveys and a communication strategy\.
2\. Continued work on donor coordination will be supported under the Project (Component 3)
and includes discussion about key indicators for education sector success as well as specific co-
financing arrangements for the Project after effectiveness\. Where possible, the Bank and
government teams will work to ensure that key indicators will be the same across projects, and
that data from all levels feed into national data analysis systems\.
2\. Approaches to M&E
3\. Monitoring for specific Project activities will provide information for process and outcome
evaluations, and to assess how the Project contributes to strategic objectives for the sector\.
There are four aspectsto monitoringand evaluation undertakeninthe context o fthe Project:
i) Monitoring for accountability o f government commitment to reforms, based on the
implementation o f a set o f key country-specific policy targets (access, equity, quality,
efficiency)\. Monitoring compliance with the Arrete' on school fees will be central to
assess commitment to the policy o f fee-free primary education\. A format for
demonstrating outcome measurements for key indictors o f the PRSP i s also under
consideration; see also Table A9\.1 inAnnex 9 o fthis PAD\.
ii) Monitoringandevaluationforeducationprogramimprovementfocusedonasetof
core indicators which are Project-specific (see Annex 3 and Annex 10)\.
iii) Analyticworkfordevelopingknowledgeforeducationreformandforwardplanning
and capacity building(Component 3)\. This provides important baseline data\.
iv) Monitoring for accountability of donor harmonization and financial support\. This
should be undertakenboth by the education ministries and by the donor coordination
group to ensure that projects fit government strategy and are sustainable\. Since 2003,
donors inDRC have worked together through the PRSP and have created a Comite'de
Concertation en Education (Cooperation Committee for Education), together with the
132
government partners, to identify key strategies for developing the education sector
and indicators to gauge progress\.
3\. How the Projectwill Manage M&E
4\. As outlined in Section C\.3\.of the Project Appraisal Document, there will be several layers o f
monitoring and evaluation\.
5\. Data will be collected by the PMCU from the schools and Provinces, analyzed and submitted
to IDA in quarterly reports, using the formats in Annex 3 for tracking progress in Project
activities, and additional indicators\. Specific component indicators will also be found in the
component outlines o fthe Project Operations Manual\.
6\. Monitoring will include all aspects o f the Project's annual work program and the operational
sub-project cycle, as well as regular feedback into improving Project design and functioning\.
Drawing upon qualitative and quantitative measures, Project evaluation will focus on the
implementation o f activities and the degree o f conformity with the established work program;
economic, social and environmental impacts o f the activities; and institutional development
including beneficiary involvement and capacity to manage and sustain the activities\.
7\. In addition to the oversight responsibilities o f the Steering Committee and the specific
monitoring functions o fthe PMCU and the CPA, the Project will have an annual technical audit,
the conditions o f which will be defined in the Project Operations Manual\. The audit will be
conducted by independenttechnical auditors acceptable to IDA\. The technical audit will assess
the Project's performance against the results indicators for each component (Annex 3), as well as
reviewprocurement, statements o f expenditures, and verify the physical existence (and delivery)
o f goods, equipment, and services acquired through the sub-components o f the Project\. This i s
in addition to the audits on use of the cash transfers for teachers' bonuses, and PETS, as
described for Component 1 o f the Project\. Annual citizen's report card surveys will complement
technical audits and PETS, to provide regular monitoring from the viewpoint o f beneficiaries and
other community stakeholders\.
8\. Guidelinesfor annual and quarterly reports will be included inthe Project Operations Manual\.
Regular reporting requirements include outputs such as the number o f activities implemented;
impact and viability o f projects, such as number o f teachers provided with training inthe use of
textbooks; activity disbursementsand recurrent cost expenditures\. Other annual reports prepared
by the PMCU will address environmental aspects\. The PMCU will also be responsible for the
Project Mid-Term Review, conducted incollaboration with IDA, and a final report at the end o f
the Project, with recommendations from the Government\. The report should be finalized no later
than six months after the end o fthe Project\.
133
Annex 16: Critical Risksand Governance Response
1\. CriticalRisks
1\. The Project entails risk that the Government and IDA will be unable to deliver the Project as
outlined since its effectiveness depends on a number o f factors outside the Project's control\. An
Anti-corruptiodGovernance Note was drafted incompliance with the World Bank procedures to
circulate inaccompaniment to the Project Appraisal Document and should be read alongside the
latter document\.
2\. To mitigate risksto the proposed Education Sector Project, the Government and World Bank
teams conducted a thorough risk assessment jointly with key donors active in the education
sector and inpromoting good governance\. The main risk areas were agreed to be ingovernance
and corruption, political and macroeconomic risks\. Partnersalso agreed that although riskswere
substantial, the risks o f not intervening were also high, given the Government's strong
commitment to build up democratic institutions\. There was consensus that urgent action was
needed to take advantage o f existing windows o f opportunity in the post-election period and
prevent deterioration o f the situation\. Donors further agreed on the criticality o f working
together in a harmonized way to avoid giving conflicting messages to the new Government\. In
the high-risk setting of the DRC, mixed signals from donors could undercut progress on
governance\.
3\. There i s a new Government Program from February 2007 that i s based and interlinkedwith
the PRSP and the common framework for donor assistance (CAF)\. The Government Program
attaches priority to security sector reform, decentralization, anti-corruption, strengthening public
financial management, civil service reform, and transparency\. A detailed plan for March -
December 2007 i s outlined in the Governance Compact, which forms part o f the Government
Program and which constitutes a bindingdocument betweenthe Government and the Parliament\.
4\. The decentralization process in particular carries opportunities, risks, and several
uncertainties\. The new Constitution, approved by referendum in 2005, foresaw: (i) territorial
reform with an increase in the number o f provinces from 11 to 26; (ii) transfer o f significant
responsibilities from the center to the provinces; and (iii) fiscal decentralization with increased
intergovernmental transfers\. An organic law for decentralization is being drafted, and a
permanent committee on decentralization has been added at the National Assembly\. Currently
some decentralized structures exist and operate without a proper legal framework, notably the
governors and provincial assemblies, o f which the latter are newly created\. The organic
decentralization law will assign roles and responsibilities for these as well as for other
decentralized structures, including provincial governments and sub-provincial levels\.
2\. RiskMitigation Strategy
5\. The risk matrix derivedjointly by the World Bank education team and donors was used first
to identify the general risks and risk mitigation measures, and then as an entry point for
identifyingmore specific corruptionand governance risks at sector andproject level\. Riskswere
rated on a scale from 1 to 4, from low to high\. In all areas, there were risks rated as "high"
before risk mitigation measures\. This considered the political risk o f pursuingdecentralization
too fast without adequate systems inplace (political risk); the Government not increasing budget
allocations to education (macroeconomic risk); corruption inthe flow o f funds (governance and
corruptionrisks); and, schools continuing to charge high school fees despite donors' contribution
134
(other risk)\. These risks could all be mitigated by measures proposed to take place within or
outside o f the Education Sector Project\. After risk mitigation, risk ratings decreased, and none
were rated as "high"\.
TableA16\.1 SummaryJoint RiskAnalysis
Risk Risk RiskMitigation Measure RR Comment
Rate after
0 Mitig\.
Politicalrisks
The fragile political and security -Democratic
S institutions are beingbuilt up with M Unstableregion, resourcerich
situationleads to conflicts (either the support ofthe internationalcommunity\. country, longhistory of conflict,
widespreador local) or civilian unrest Security sector reform on-going and short history of democracy,
(triggered by highexpectationsthat arl strengthened\.Dialoguewith other countries in
not met)\. This could leadto the regionintensified\.The educationprojectwil
disruptions ingovernment's address current inequitiesinthe system\. Itwill
commitmentsto the Project, provide"quick wins'' to households all over the
undermineresults/effectivenessand country (Le\. reducedschool fees, teacher
cause country developmentfailures\. salaries, training)\.
Decentralizationreform implemented H Agreed conditions, incl\. on procurement and M Decentralizationis partofthe new
without sufficientplanning and financial management, must be met before Constitutionand might be
capacity\.This could leadto manageriz disbursements\.Projectproposes reforms in implementedrapidly as a power-
and administrative chaos at provincial payment system for disbursementofteachers' sharingmechanismafter the new
level, which would impede Project salaries\.M&E system with integrated Governmentis formed\.
executionand increasethe performancemilestones\. Multiple independent
opportunities for corruption\. technical andfinancial audits\. Training in
financial managementpracticesfor effective
projectimplementationis providedto cadres in
the MPSP andthe Ministry ofPlan
The political commitment to educatior M Hands-onsupport to Government's reform L The Government's commitmentto
reform is low\. Politicalcommitmentir efforts, incl\. capacitybuilding\. Donor the policy on fiee school fees is
crucial for effectiveProject community engaged in dialoguewith key strong, as documented inthe
implementation\. stakeholdersto help strengthenthe constituency Constitution, the PRSP, the Letter
for reform\. on EducationSectorPolicy,
President's speeches, as well as
inter-ministerialArrgtd on fees\.
Strikesor civilian unrest as aresult M The projectis plannedand implemented in close L
of pressure groupsperceivingthat cooperationwith Civil Service reform\. Salaries
teachers are favored\. are proposedto increase gradually and broadly
amongthe teacher collective\.Discussionfor a
phased implementation of similar reformsis
-engagedwith other arms ofthe civil service\.
Macroeconomicrisks
Insufficient rate of economic growth M Reasonablemacroeconomic assumptions L Project's impacton inflationrate is
and high inflationrates underminesthi (including inflationrate), calibrated with IMF
financial stability ofthe Project\. and basedon in-depthanalysis(ESW) shared difficult to forecast
and agreedwith donor partnershavebeen used
throughoutthe designofthe Project\.The burden
o f school fees has beenshiftedgraduallyfrom
parentsto governmentthrough abalancedpublic
budget consistentwith fiscal stability\.
Insufficient progressinother sectors o M The Bank and other donorssupportthe DRC L Project's results dependenton other
the economy, in particularsecurity, through multi-sectoralprograms\.The Project sectors, such as healthandfood
infrastructure, health system will indirectly improveand affect other sectors security for primary school
improvements, and food security, through increasinghouseholds' purchasing attendance, infrastructurefor both
hinders accessto schoolingand power\.Assessmentsand feasibility studies access to schoolingand textbooks,
deliveryofthe Project's goods and includedalongsidedirect investmentsin :tc\.
services, inparticulartextbooks\. rehabilitation, textbook provision,teacher
training; monitoring and evaluationduring
-Project execution\.
135
I Donors' funds increaseraoidlv and in I
\.~ M lTheBankandother donors areworkingcloselv
\.- II Experiencefromotherpost-conflict
an uncoordinatedmanner after the on aCountryAssistanceFramework(&F) in- countriesis that donor funds
DRC's first democratic elections\.This DRC\.The EducationSectorProjecthasbeen increasetoo rapidly the first few
would challengealready low preparedjointly with other donors, who are years after peace\.After 3-4 years,
absorptioncapacity, andthreatenthe eitherfinancingand implementingpartsofthe when absorptivecapacitiesare being
Project's efficiency\. Projector complementingitwith coordinated rebuilt, donorstend to withdraw
assistance\.An analysisof donors' current and funds andprovide insufficient aid in
plannedinterventionsis presented inAppendix relationto countries' capacity\.
2 ofthe PAD, "Major RelatedProjectsFinanced
by the Bankand/or other Agencies"\.
Agreed budgetreallocationsand H Budget executioncloselymonitoredin Securityand/or strongpressure
increasesin educationspendingare not cooperationwith the IMF\. Budgetprocess groupsmightneedto be prioritized
forthcomingdue to lackof liquidity or strengthened\.Donorssupportreformof security inorder to keepthepeace\.
other pressingbudget priorities\. sector\. Policydialogue\.
Governance and corruption risks
H Basedonfield experiences as well as analysiso iecent INTinvestigationpointed
neficient useof Projectresourcesdu the education sector inthe CFAA, CPAR, PER, )utprocurement irregularitiesin
o cormption, mismanagementor non\. INTreview, CAF, high-risk operationswithin )ther Bankprojects\.NewWB
ransparency ingovernmentsystems\. the Projecthavebeenidentified andrisk iafeguardsandroutineshavebeen
mitigationmeasuresproposed\. ntrcducedinaccordanceto INT
Recommendationshavebeenadheredto, for indings\.
instancere\. procurementand paymentsystems\.
A thoroughanalysisof the Financial
Managementsystemhasbeenundertakenwithi:
the preparationofthe Project, includingaspeck
FMriskanalysisandaFMactionplanagreed
with the Government(See Appendix 6 ofthe
PAD)\. There are appropriatefinancial
managementsafeguards inthe LegalAgreemen
institutional arrangements for the Project's
implementation,Project OperationsManual, an'
ProcurementPlan; monitoredjointly with other
donorsandthroughIDA implementation
support\. Governmentchannels for transfer of
funds are strengthenedthroughbetter budget
tracking(PETS)underimprovedexpenditure
chains that reduceopportunitiesfor conuption\.
Computerizationofkey governmentunits
complementedby adequatetrainingin
accountabilityandtransparencyat all levelsof
the system\. A strongmeasurableresults
framework that ties the flow of moneyto
concrete andmeasurable resultshas been
introducedinorder to reducethe risk ofmisuse
of Bankresources (See Appendix 3 o fthe PAC
2apacity inpublic and privatesectors M The choice ofprojectimplementationunit and
D execute projectobjectivespromptly use ofagentswith proventrackrecordofresult!
ndefficientlyis weaker than (e\.g\.SECOPE, contractingin of international
xpected\. expertise on acompetitive basis- intargeted
-
areas)were guidedby concerns of low capacity
Specialmonitoringand trackingprocedureswe1
introducedwiththe aim of facilitatingand
improvingimplementationcapacity, reinforced
with hands-onimplementationsupportand
capacity buildinginareas where thereare
problems\.More informationabout civil service
capacity will follow the IMFBank forthcoming
Civil Servicemission inFebruary2007\. It is als
expected to speedupthe Government's on-goin
civil service reform\.
136
rcoordinationand communication M IA directorateto managethe Proiectday-to-dav L
amongthe three ministriesmay prove implementationwill be recruitedona
~
difficult andjeopardize efficient competitivebasis\. It will act as the operational
projectexecution\. arm ofthe Government's ministerial Steering
Committee for the educationProject\.Close
cooperationwith the Government-donor CornitP
de Concertation inasector-wideapproachwill
facilitatecommunicationflows about the
ongoingcontributionofthe Projectto the agreed
developmentobjectivesfor the sector\.
Other risks
Schools continueto charge high fees H Stakeholders'(parents, teachers' unions, other
to parentsdespite Donors' supportto civil society)power is strengthenedwithin the
the government to implementits Projectthroughcommunications,consultation
policyofphasingout school fees\. Thii andtraining\. Informationandtransparencyare
would endangerthe Project's mainair key within the Project; media,direct informatior
of increasingaccess to primary to nationallobbyingorganizations (PTAsand
schoolingthroughreducedschool fees trade unions), and out-reachto schools\.The
strongcommitment ofthe Governmentto
abolishschool fees and give DRCcitizens a
"peace dividend" would addto the likelihoodof
widespread andaccurate information\.
M The Bankand other donorssupportthe DRC Informationandmeasureof
higherthanexpectedratesof throughmulti-sectoralprogramswhere HIV/AIDS, TB, malaria, etc\. hasn
HIV/AIDS, TB or malariaaffect HIV/AIDS is integrated, includingawareness beenpossibleinall areasdue to lac
Projectimplementation\. raising,etc\.Healthprogramsinclude awareness o f security\.Conflictsincreaserisk
raising,bednets, etc\. anti-malariameasures\. o f HIV/AIDS\.
3\. Governance Concerns Integrated into Project Design
6\. Measures to counteract corruption and to build up institutions and capacity for financial
management require the integration o f anticorruption approaches in the early stages o f Project
design\. From the identification stage, by considering the country and sector environments as
well as the nature o fpotential Project activities, the Project was designedwith a heightenedfocus
on governance\. Three guiding themes in each o f the Project's four components have been
integrated into the design: (1) performance, through monitoring targets whose attainment will be
the indication o f success; (2) anticipation, through planning and programming all interventions
on the basis o f thorough analysis o f the situation on the ground; and (3) participation and
transparency, through mechanisms which allow stakeholders to influence and share control over
decision-making\.
7\. The design enhances oversight mechanisms, disclosure of information, timely handling o f
complaints, and strengthened supervision\. It seeks to increase the accountability o f
implementingagencies and service providers through instrumentsthat give voice to beneficiaries
(through citizen report cards, communication strategy, strengthened parents committees, and
more)\. There is an enhanced focus on internal controls, supervision, audits, and fiduciary
arrangements for Project implementation\. Action plans for financial management and
anticorruptionhave beenproposed, as well as anticorruption safeguards, andrigorous control and
supervision systems for procurement and contracting\.
8\. The Project's supervision methods emphasize monitoring which includes clear roles and
responsibilities for all stakeholders involved; strengthened checks and balances in procurement
and payment systems; thorough risk analysis, including risk mitigation measures, action plans for
anticorruption and financial management, corruption safeguards, and technical and financial
audits to be conducted systematically throughout the Project's lifetime\. Procurement procedures
have been analyzed in-depth\. In particular, following the recommendations o f a recent INT
137
inspection, the Project team took measuresto redesignthe Project's institutional arrangements to
avoid agents which the INT investigation had raised questions in relation to other ongoing
projects\.
138
Annex 17: Education Sector Policy Letter
- @pu64ue Dimocratiquedu Congo
I*
Ministere de I'Enseignement Primaire, Secondaire et Professionnel
139
REPUBLIQUE DEMCICRATIQUEDU CONGO
Les Minisfres
ARRETE INTER-MINISTERIEL EPSP-ESU-AS no a$%\.DUA&d2006 PORTANT
POLITIQUE EDUCATIVE EN REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
Le Ministre de I'Enseignement Primaire, Secondaire et
Professionnel ;
Le Ministre de I'Enseignement Superieur et Universitaire ;
Le Ministre des Affaires Sociales ;
Vu la Constitution de la Republique DGmocratique du Congo ,
specialement en son article 91 ;
Vu le Decret no 03/25 du 16 septembre 2003 portant organisation
et fonctionnement du Gouvernement de Transition ainsi que les modalites
pratiques de collaboration entre le President de la Republique , les
Ministres et les Vice-Ministres, specialement en son article 24 ;
Vu le Dkcret no 03/27 du 27 septembre 2003 fixant les attributions
des Ministres specialement en son article ler,point 8-32 ;
Vu tel que modifie et complete a ce jour le Dkcret no 05/001 du 03
janvier 2005 portant nomination des Ministres et Vice-Ministres du
Gouvernement de Transition ;
Vu la volonte maintes fois exprimke par le Gouvernement de la
Rkpublique Dkmocratique du Congo de redresser le systeme educatif
congolais longtemps plonge dans la routine et I'empirisme ;
Soucieux de rkorganiser le bon fonctionnement du systeme
educatif par la mise en awvre d'une bonne gouvernance dans I'intMt
d'un developpement integral, integre et harmonieux du pays ;
Considerant la necessite pour le pays de disposer d'un texte de
politique educative qui definit les priorit& du Gouvernement en matiere pc
140
de I'education, les options strat4giques a entreprendre ainsi que la
determination du nlveau de responsabilite de tous les intervenants dans le
systeme educatif congolais ;
ConsidCrant la charte congolaise des Droits de I'Homme et du
peuple ;
Reaffirmant son adhesion a la Declaration universelle des droits de
I`homme, 6 la Declaration des droits de l'homme et des peuples, a la
Declaration mondiale sur I`education pour tous, a la Convention relative
aux droits de I'enfant, a la declaration mondiale sur I'enseignement
superieur pour le 21"` siecle, aux Objectifs de ddveloppement du
Millhaire et a la charte africaine des droits de I'homme et des peuples ;
Convaincu du r61e capital que joue 1`6ducation dans le
d6veloppement du pays ainsi que dans I`intggration nationale, africaine et
mondiale ;
Considerant les resolutions et les recommandations issues de
diffkrentes assises sur I`enseignement national, notamment les Etats
GBneraux de I`education de janvier 1996 ;
Constatant que certaines dispositions de la Loi-Cadre n086-005 du
22 septembre 1986 de I'enseignement national ne r6pondent plus aux
exigences et aux besoins actuels de notre pays ;
Preoccupe par le niveau de destruction et I`etat de deterioration du
systeme educatif atteint par le pays ;
Determid a accorder une attention particuliere au secteur educatif
en tant que vecteur privilegie du developpement ;
Prenant en compte I'imperatif de 1'4ducation pour tous en vue
d`enrayer les inegalites sociales ;
et a Persuade de la priorit4 a accorder 2 la formation A tous les niveaux
la recherche scientifique et technologique afin de doter le pays des
competences necessaires a son progres ;
Conscient du r6le que doivent jouer les langues nationales et
locales dans le processus educatif du peuple ;
Soulignant la necessite d`assurer au peuple les ressources que
requiert la realisation des objectifs B atteindre dans le secteur Bducatif ;
Adh6rant a I'idke que I'dducation doit permettre le plein
6panouissement des citoyens responsables et vecteurs de developpernent
141
Invitant tous les partenaires a soutenir le Gouvernement dans la
r&alisation des objectifs assignes au nouveau systeme educatif en vue
d'accroitre leur assistance et d`harmoniser leurs interventions qui doivent
s`inscrire dans le cadre des priorites du secteur ;
Engage a promouvoir la culture de la paix et a lutter contre les
antivaleurs telles que la tricherie, la corruption, la loi du moindre effort,
etc\. \.
Prenant I'engagement de s`impliquer resolument au redressement
du systeme &ducatif congolais ;
Prenant en compte les mutations intervenues dans I'environnement
interne et externe du secteur educatif et determine a s'ouvrir aux
differents defis a relever pour reduire la pauvrete de maniere durable et
permettre a tous les citoyens de contribuer a la reconstruction du pays ;
PreoccupC par I'allegement de la charge financiere qui p h e
actuellement sur les familles, considede comme le frein principal a la
scolarisation et qu'il y a lieu de prBner la gratuite de I`enseignement
primaire ;
Considerant I'etat gen6ral du systkme educatif congolais
caracterisk par :
- la devalorisation de la fonction enseignante et I`insecurite sociale
professionnelle de I'enseignant entrainant la perte de la vocation
- enseignante, la fuite des cerveaux ;
la sous-qualification d'un bon nombre d'enseignants ;
- la mauvaise gestion des ressources;
- I'absence d`une politique de formation continue du personnel
- educatif;
les infrastructures insuffisantes, vetustes, inadaptees et tres
- inegalement reparties ;
les effectifs plethoriques d'apprenants par rapport a la capacite
d'accueil specialement dans les grands centres;
- I'absence d`une planification en matiere d`implantation des
- etablissements d`enseignement et de creation des filieres d'etudes;
I'insuffisance et le manque criant d`equipements et des materiels
- didactiques appropries ;
Le manque des programmes d'enseignement, des manuels scolaires,
des guides pedagogiques, et d`autres supports pedagogiques ;
---
- I`inversion des valeurs ;
les taux d`admission et de scolarisation en r4gression constante ;
les disparites croissantes entre les sexes et les milieux;
I`accroissement du taux d`analphabetisme, d`abandon
redoublement;
142
- les taux d'encadrement defiant les normes pkdagogiques dans bon
-- nombre d'ktablissements d'enseignement;
I`insuffisance du contr8le et de I'evaluation;
I'inadaptation des programmes de formation aux realites et aux
besoins du pays ainsi qu'a I'evolution de la science et de la
- technologie ;
la modicite de la part du budget de I`Etat alloue au systeme educatif
avec comme corollaire, la prise en charge des salaires des
enseignants et du fonctionnement des etablissements par les
- I`inversion des valeurs dont I`impunite\.
parents d'eleves et d'btudiants ;
Considerant la necessite de fonder I'action educative sur une
politique gouvernementale globale et coherente ;
Vu I'urgence et la nkessite ;
ArrGtent :
ARTICLE le` la finalite du nouveausysteme Cducatif\.
:De
La finalit6 du nouveau systeme educatif est de former des hommes et des
femmes compktents, impregnes des valeurs humaines, morales,
spirituelles, culturelles, civiques et artisans creatifs, bstisseurs d'une
nouvelle societC congolaise, democratique, solidaire, prospere et
pacifique\.
II s'agit avant tout de liberer I'homme de toutes les pesanteurs qui
I'emp&chent de participer efficacement au developpement de son pays, en
suscitant en lui le savoir-&e, c'est-h- dire des attitudes et des
comportements qui le disposent a agir pour la promotion de sa condition
competent pour participer a la construction de sa socikte , ainsi que du
de vie et en le dotant du savoir et du savoir-faire qui le rendent
savoir-vivre qui constitue le socle de la vie en societe\.
C'est dans cet ordre d'idkes que s`inscrivent les axes prioritaires sur
lesquels repose le nouveau systhme educatif, a savoir :
--
- I`affirmation de I'kducation comme priorite absolue ;
I`organisation d'une education pour tous et par tous ;
'8
la rehabilitation de I'education aux valeurs humaines, morales,
spirituelles et civiques\.
143
Leur rkalisation requiert une programmation 2 court, a moyen et 3 long
termes\. Elle exige que d&s 2 present des efforts soient portes sur :
La mise a jour du cadre juridique du systeme educatif ;
La revision fondamentale des structures et des programmes
d`enseignement ;
L`amelioration des mecanismes de gestion administrative ;
La mobilisation des ressources financikres ;
La rehabilitation et la construction des infrastructures scolaires et
acadgmiques et leur repartition equitable 2 travers le territoire
national ;
La revalorisation de la carriere du personnel oeuvrant dans le
systeme educatif ;
La prise en compte reelle du partenariat comme mode de gestion
essentiel du nouveau systeme educatif ;
Le renforcement de la formation des enseignants en cours d'emploi
et du personnel oeuvrant dans le systeme educatif ;
L'evaluation reguligre des curricula ;
La dotation des etablissements de I'enseignement national en
equipements et en supports didactiques appropries ;
L'elaboration de la carte scolaire et universitaire ;
La remise gratuite des manuels scolaires aux &Eves ainsi que des
guides aux maitres du primaire\.
Article 2 :Des objectifs du systeme educatif
Les differents types d'objectifs que doit poursuivre I`action educative se
resument comme suit :
1\.1\. Les objectifs gkneraux :
1) Les objectifs humanistes\.
I 1 s'agit de transformer I`apprenant pour lui-m6me en lui transmettant
Ades
reflechir , comprendre
connaissances et des informations, en dbveloppant ses capacites
a I acreer et a evaluer en un mot, former
,
I'homme de culture : un &re ayant un sens moral eleve et qui est
soucieux du bien, du beau du vrai et de la justice, un homme qui vit
I
en societe en harmonie avec autrui et avec son environnement\.
2) Les objectifs socio-politiques\.
L`action gducative vise A integrer I'homme dans sa communaute, a
former des hommes et des femmes conscients de leur appartenance a
Pf
une nation et 2 la societe congolaise, ayant un sens aigu du bien
commun, une culture de la democratie, de la tolerance et de la
paix\.
144
3) Les objectifs economiques
L'action educative pour une nouvelle societe doit ouvrir I'ecole aux
pr6occupations konomiques du pays\. En effet, elle doit cesser d'etre
une education qui apprend pour apprendre et devenir une education
qui apprend pour produire\.
Desormais, la societe congolaise doit former des hommes capables de
transformer leur milieu par I'acquisition des connaissances, aptitudes,
attitudes et habitudes favorables, non seulement a la saine
consommation, mais surtout a la production et a I'epargne\.
4) Les objectifs professionnels
L'education doit susciter chez I'apprenant I'amour du travail productif
et le choix d'une profession,
1\.2\. Objectifs spkcifiques
1) Au niveau pr&colaire
-- creer les structures d'6ducation la oh elles sont inexistantes ;
le rendre obligatoire et gratuit ;
- former les enseignants\.
2) Au niveau primaire :
-- reformer les programmes ;
- rendre obligatoire et gratuit I'enseignement ;
privilegier I'etude et I'assainissement du milieu dans les programmes
- de formation ;
promouvoir I'acquisition d'aptitudes pratiques en rapport avec les
activites vitales du milieu ;
- creer ou rehabiliter les infrastructures\.
3) Au niveau secondaire ;
- reformer et moderniser les programmes de tous les cycles dans le
sens de la professionnalisation et en vue de les adapter aux besoins
de dheloppement national ;
- rendre I'apprenant capable, en fonction de son type d'apprentissage,
de trouver des reponses aux problemes particuliers de son metier
de son milieu\.
145
4) Au niveau superieur et universitaire :
- former une elite intellectuelle et des cadres superieurs de
conception, capables de participer au developpement du pays, de
- transformer la societe pour la rendre plus humaine;
promouvoir la recherche scientifique dans les divers domaines de
connaissances pour le developpement du pays\.
5) Au niveau de I'education non formelle:
- former des alphabetiseurs et des formateurs d`apprentissage
- professionnel A travers le pays ;
cr6er des infrastructures (bibliotheques publiques, etc\.) d'kducation
non formelle a travers le pays ;
- accorder une attention particuliere a I`alphabetisation des femmes et
des jeunes filles ainsi qu'a celle des groupes defavorises\.
Article 3 :Des principaux probl&mesa r6soudre
La nouvelle socikte 21 construire devra tenir compte a la fois des
evolutions actuelles du monde dominees par la mondialisation des
economies et des societes et par I'imperatif d`un dkveloppement
national plus exigeant en termes de ressources financi6res et
humaines et des performances technologiques\. La mondialisation
des economies et le developpement des technologies de
I'information et de la communication qui sous-tendent cette
evolution, ptacent le pays darts la nkessitk de s'irnpliquer dans une
dynamique de cornpetitivit-4 et de grandes performances a rkaliser
pour &re de son temps sans, toutefois, perdre son identitk\.
Dans cette perspective, la mise en valeur de son enorme potentiel
humain et economique constituera, pour le pays, un atout majeur
pour assumer le futur, dans un monde qui devient a la fois ouvert et
competitif\. Dans cette mGme optique, I'effort porte sur une gestion
dkmocratique du pays, sur la rentabilitk economique et sur
I'assainissement de la gestion financiere, devra reposer sur la valeur
intrinseque des hommes et des femmes reconcilies avec les valeurs
kthiques, morales et culturelles\.
- Ainsi l`education des populations ne doit pas seulement se limiter au
niveau de I`kcole, mais elle devra egalement &re assumke par
I'ensemble de la societe\. Aussi, les questions ci-apres appellent un
-- nouvel examen :
le budget alloue 2I I'kducation ;
les objectifs et les orientations de I'education
146
--- les programmes d'enseignement ;
les supports didactiques ;
I'organisation et la planification du systkme 6ducatif ;
- I`inadequation entre les objectifs d`une formation de masse et les
- strategies pour sa realisation ;
I'inadequation entre la formation et I'emploi ;
-
- la formation, la prise en charge et I'kvaluation des formateurs ;
I'evaluation des acquis des apprenants et des conditions
d'apprentissage,
Article 4 :Des axes prioritaires
Les efforts importants a deployer pour organiser efficacement le
systkme educatif afin qu'il puisse rbpondre aux besoins specifiques
du pays portent sur les grandes priorites qui sont :
9 I`accessibilite a une education de base de qualite pour tous :
o I'education de la petite enfance ;
o I`enseignement primaire ;
o I'enseignement special et integre pour les enfants vivant avec
handicaps ;
o I'alphabGtisation, celle des femmes en particulier ;
9 I'enseignement technique et professionnel de qualite ;
9 I`enseignement superieur et universitaire et la recherche-
developpernent ;
9 la prise en compte des specificites de differentes provinces ;
> la formation des formateurs ;
+ la formation continue ;
3 La prise en compte des problemes spkcifiques de la jeune fille et de
la femme en matiere d'education ;
9 L`education non forrnelle\.
En rapport avec chacune de ces priorit&, il importe de definir la politique
a mettre en ceuvre, de planifier les actions a mener et de preciser les
modalites d`administration et de gestion du systgme 6ducatif national\.
4\.1, L`acc&sa une education de base de qualite pour tous
Etendre la scolarisation 3 tous les jeunes sans discrimination de
sexe, de religion, d'ethnie, etc\. Une importance particuliere doit &re
accordee a l'education des jeunes filles et des femmes\.
- Lgducation de la petite enfance\.
Les structures d`bducation prescolaire sont quasi inexistantes dans
le pays, a I'exception de quelques ecoles maternelles, creches, et
centres communautaires d'eveil situ& dans les centres urbains\. I 1
est nkessaire de g4n6raliser progressivemen
d`kducation, de la rendre obligatoire parce qu'elleh
f P cette forme
147
Jcontribue au prolongement de I'Gducation familiale et a la mise
en place des structures de formation d`un personnel specialise
pour ce niveau ;
J prepare I'enfant a aborder le cycle primaire\.
- I`enseignement primaire
Rendre accessible, obligatoire et gratuite la scolarisation au niveau
primaire\. Cette education vise a assurer I'epanouissement de la
personnalite de I'enfant en harmonie avec son milieu familial et
social\.
--- Aussi, est-il important aux niveaux prescolaire et primaire :
que I'enseignement se donne en langue nationale et/ou locale ;
que les manuels et les materiels didactiques s`inspirent du milieu\.
L`enseignement spkcial et integre pour les enfants vivant avec
handicaps
L`enseignement special, formel et non formel, s'adresse aux hommes
et aux femmes de tous ages atteints d`un ou de plusieurs handicaps,
aux defavoris6s et aux exclus et lutte contre les inegalit6s en matiere
de I'education\.
I t est donc necessaire de Ilktendre partout ob le besoin existe dans le
pays\.
- L`kducation non formelle celle des femmes en particulier\.
Institutionnaliser I'alphabetisation basee sur les besoins reels des
d'aIphab6tisation, Ies centres sociaux, Ies centres d`a pprentissage
bknkficiaires, en implantant et en developpant les centres
professionnel et d'education permanente pour adultes et les centres de
recuperation\. La realisation de cet objectif peut se concretiser dans le
cadre des programmes nationaux d'alphabetisation des masses (et
particulierement celle des femmes), car I'alphabetisation doit &re
avant tout une alphabetisation pour le developpement ;
4\.2\. L'enseignement secondaire technique et professionnel
Mettre un accent particulier sur un enseignement technique et
professionnel de qualitk\. Realiser au prealable un inventaire exhaustif
et rigoureux des professions pouvant finaliser les filieres de formation
afin d'etablir une adequation entre la formation et I'emploi sur des
bases prealablement definies\.
Restructurer I'organisation des @colestechniques et professionnelles,
par la mise sous I'autoriti! d'une seule tutelle la gestion et I'administration
de toutes les formations professionnelles et techniques eparpilli!es
travers le pays\.
148
Accorder a ce secteur les moyens necessaires consequents pour son
developpement \.
4\.3\. I`enseignement sup&ieur, universitaire et la recherche -
developpernent\.
- Parachever la reforme de I`enseignement superieur ,universitaire et de
la recherche scientifique en vue de renforcer leur efficacite et les doter
des plans sectoriels ambitieux mais realistes\.
Renforcer les capacites des institutions d`enseignement superieur et
universitaire a exercer leur mission traditionnelle d'enseignement -
formation, de recherche et de service a la collectivite\.
Dans cette optique, le Gouvernement Cree des universiths technologiques,
pbdagogiques ainsi que des instituts supdrieurs techniques et
pedagogiques\.
Concernant la recherche, le Gouvernement ameliorera les conditions
en modernisant I'&quipement, en formant et en recyclant le personnel
et en accordant un financement consequent a ce secteur\.
4\.4\. La prise en compte des specificit& de diffkrentes provinces\.
Dans le respect de I`unitd dans la diversit&, le nouveau systgme &ducatif
doit concevoir un programme national minimum d'enseignement de base
applicable sur toute I'ktendue de la Republique et compikte par des
apports specifiques a chaque milieu\.
4\.5\. La formation des formateurs\.
Dans le souci d'assurer aux apprenants un enseignement de qualite, le
nouveau systeme educatif doit benbficier des moyens adkquats pour que
les formateurs a tous les niveaux soient form& conformement aux
exigences du nouveau systgme hducatif national et benkficient d'actions
de formation continue\.
4\.6\. L a formation continue
Afin d'assurer une meilleure adaptation des adultes au developpement
technique, technologique , ainsidoit
qu'aux exigences de la societe moderne,
le nouveau systkme mettre un accent particulier sur la
formation
149
4\.7\. L'education non formelle
Dans le cadre de cette formation, on orientera les apprenants vers
I'exercice d'un mktier\.
Article 5 :Des strat6gies d'action\.
Face a I'etat de delabrement avance de notre systeme educatif et a
I`eventail des defis a relever pour la sauvegarde et la reconstruction de
ce systeme, le Gouvernement doit &laborer un plan national de cette
reconstruction, qui devra &re une composante du plan de
dkveloppement national\.
Les actions a entreprendre pour la mise en place du nouveau systkme
Bducatif doivent tenir compte :
5\.1\.Des conditions socio-konomiques, notamment :
- du taux de croissance de la population ;
-
- du niveau croissant du ch6mage et du sous-emploi ;
du manque de qualification d `une grande partie de la main d'ceuvre
--- nationale ;
du taux croissant de I'analphabetisme surtout chez les femmes ;
des capacites financieres, materielles et humaines du pays ;
des indicateurs de la pauvrete\.
5\.2\.De l`6volution de la science et de la technologie, de m&me que de
I'0bIigation d'un developpement durable des ressources \.
5\.3\.Du renforcement de la cooperation en matiere d'education\.
5\.4\.De la necessite d'instituer un organe de suivi, d'encadrement et
d'evaluation\.
Article 6 :Du partage des responsabilites\.
Bien que I'Etat soit le principal responsable du systkme educatif,
celui-ci ne peut cependant se developper de maniere harmonieuse
sans que la famille, I'ecote et la societe travers ses entites
decentralisees, s'associent pour mettre en cornmun les ressources
intellectuelles, morales, materielles et financikres et partager les
responsabilites et les tdches pour la realisation des objectifs
educatifs communs\.
Des mecanismes juridiques, divers suivant les niveaux, les matigres,
les conditions de lieu et de temps, definiront clairement les droits et
devoirs des partenaires\.
De faGon generale on reconna'itra
150
A I`Etat, en tant que pouvoir organisateur et premier partenaire, le
rble :
de definir les objectifs, les finalites et les stratPlgies de I'education et
d'en assurer le contrble et I`evaluation ;
d'arreter les mesures generales de fonctionnement de
I'enseignement 3 tous les niveaux ;
de planifier le developpement de I'enseignement national ;
de veiller a la mise sur pied des structures administratives,
pedagogiques et financieres par lesquelles pourra s'exprimer le
partenariat ;
de negocier et de formaliser les accords de cooperation
internationale, bilaterale, ou multilat&-ale pour qu'ils soient
benbfiques a I`Plducation nationale dans tous ses aspects, y compris
les aspects specifiques\.
de prendre en charge le financement du syst6me 6ducatif\.
Aux partenaires, notamment les entites decentralisees, les
parents, les etablissements d'enseignement, les confessions
religieuses, les entreprises, les O\.N\.G, les promoteurs des ecoles
priv4es et diverses autres organisations, le rble :
de participer activement et democratiquement aux structures
arrStPles, a la d4finition des finalites, des objectifs et des strategies
pedagogiques, a la revision et a la modification des programmes, au
contr6le et a I`evaluation de I'enseignement ;
d`assurer le suivi et I'utilisation rationnelle de la formation
dispensee, de veiller a la conformite de I'enseignement avec les
exigences du monde de travail et les besoins du milieu ;
de contribuer de diverses fasons au ressourcement moral, humain,
materiel et financier de I'education ;
de favoriser les activites para-scolaires et para-acadhmiques\.
Le niveau, la nature et les modalites de participation des partenaires
a tous les niveaux doivent Stre precises\.
Article 7 :Des moyensop6rationnels
La mise en route du nouveau systeme educatif sera d'autant plus
facilitee qu'il sera dote de moyens operationnels en vue d'assurer
son efficacite\. II s`agit de definir son cadre d'execution et de prevoir
des mecanismes d'encadrement et d`kvaluation pour le deroulement
de differentes phases de la politique educative, le plan national de
reconstruction et de developpement du systeme educatif et la loi
organique organisant le secteur, s'inscrivent dans cette optique\.
a court, moyen et a systeme
de`veloppement dudu
7\.1\. S'agissant plan national de reconstruction et de
educatif, iI fixe les &tapes de realisation
long termes des actions a entreprendre\.
I
151
Le plan prevoit trois phases de realisation :
une phase d'urgence au cours de laquelle it sera surtout question de
repondre aux urgences de maniere a assurer le maintien de
I`existant avant de proceder aux innovations commandees par la
mise en place du nouveau systhme ;
une phase de mise en place des fondements du nouveau systeme
educatif, par I`elaboration des programmes de la &forme et leur
experimentation a travers des structures renovees, decentraIis4es et
soumises 2 une evaluation constante pour des ajustements
eventuels ;
Enfin, une phase de consolidation et d'extension au cours de laquelle
le nouveau systeme educatif sera definitivement operationnel a tous
les niveaux et sur I'ensemble du territoire national\.
7\.2\. Quant 5 la Loi-cadre, iI s`agit d`un instrument juridique
important sans lequel les differentes structures du secteur educatif
manqueraient de coherence\.
Cette loi ne devrait pas seulement se limiter 5 determiner le mode
de fonctionnement et d'organisation du systeme educatif, mais
egalement integrer l'imperatif democratique qui guide desormais les
actions de I'Etat et donc s'inscrire dans la dude par rapport au
principe d'alternances propres aux regimes democratiques\. Aussi,
est-it souhaitable de soumettre le projet aux d6liberations du
Padement\.
Article 8 :Du financement de I'education
En vue de la construction du pays, le Gouvernement de la Republique a
pris I`option de I'economie qui presente I'avantage :
-- d'exclure le dirigisme;
de promouvoir dans un esprit de partenariat les initiatives des
individus, des groupes ou des collectivites humaines;
- de favoriser, dans un esprit de r6ciprocite et de discernement,
I'ouverture des hommes et de la societe vers les autres, vers les
marches et les technologies exterieurs, bref vers tout ce qui conduit
- au progres et au bien-&re de tous ;
de susciter la participation communautaire la mobilisation des
ressources financikres\.
Pour atteindre les objectifs vises en matiere d'education, le secteur
doit Stre dote de ressources financieres importantes et
consequentes\.
Fond4 sur le principe de partenariat, le financement du nouveau
- systeme educatif sera assure :
par I`Etat (financement direct) e$ @
152
- par les partenaires actifs du secteur (financement indirect)\.
Le financement direct represente I'engagement de I'Etat d'affecter
progressivement a ce secteur une part conskquente du budget
national, effort qui sera complete par des apports de la cooperation
bilaterale et multilaterale\.
Le financement indirect proviendra des apports en nature et en
espece des partenaires actifs de I'education a savoir : les entit&
decentralisees, les parents, les ecoles, les confessions religieuses,
les promoteurs des &coles privees agreees, les entreprises, les
O\.N\.G\. et autres organismes tant nationaux qu'internationaux\. Les
activites d'autofinancement des etablissements seront aussi
encouragees comme appoint au financement indirect\.
La Loi-cadre fixera les modalit& de participation de differents
partenaires au financement du secteur educatif et determinera la
compensation 2 leur accorder notamment en matiere administrative
et fiscale\.
En clair, il faut prendre en compte les indications suivantes en cette
matiere :
- le renforcement de la responsabilite de I'Etat, principal partenaire
qui doit, non seulement contribuer au financement de I'education a
raison d'un pourcentage important du budget national, mais aussi
faire bkneficier a I`education des apports de la cooperation tant
bilaterale que multilat&-ale ;
- la maximisation de la contribution des partenaires, bbneficiaires
- directs et indirects de I`education et de la recherche scientifique ;
la repartition de I'intervention de I'Etat suivant le poids
demographique de chaque province en tenant compte des
populations scolarisees et scolarisables a tous les niveaux ;
- la fixation du niveau de financement de I'education par les provinces
et les entites dkcentralisees pour les reseaux d'enseignement ;
- I'appel aux confessions religieuses et autres associations
enseignantes pour contribuer 2 la rehabilitation des infrastructures
de leurs reseaux d`enseignement en dehors de participation dgfinie
par leurs statuts propres ;
- l`incitation des O\.N\.G, promoteurs des ecoles privees et autres
associations a participer au financement conformement a leur objet
social et leur champ d'action\.
- La creation du Fonds de Promotion de I'Education cornme appoint au
financement direct 8 charge de
153
Article 9 :Du suivi et evaluation
Pour garantir la bonne execution de la politique educative, le
Gouvernement de la Republique disposera d'un organe interministeriel
charg6 d'assurer le suivi et I'evaluation des engagements y souscrits\.
Article 10 : Les Secretaires Gengraux de I'Enseignement Primaire,
Secondaire et Professionnel, de I'Enseignement Superieur et Universitaire
et des Affaires Sociales sont charges chacun en ce qui le concerne de
I'execution du present ArrGt6 qui entre en vigueur 2 la date de sa
signature\.
Fait a Kinshasa, le d~/oJ-/n406
Pour le Gouvernement de la RepubliqueDemocratique du Congo
LE
154
(Translatedfrom the original French)
PREAMBULE
The Governmentof the DemocraticRepublicofthe Congo,
Inview ofthe Constitution;
Considering the need to base education development on a comprehensive and coherent
government policy;
Consideringthe Congolese Charter on HumanRightsandthe Rightso fthe People;
Reaffirming its adhesion to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, to the Declaration of
Human Rights and the Rights of the People, the World Declaration on Education for All, the
Convention on the Rights o f the Child, the World Declaration on Higher Education for the 21"
Century, the Millennium Development Objectives, and the African Charter on Human Rights
and the Rightsof the People;
Convinced of the crucial role that education plays inthe development o f the country, as well as
inintegrationonthenational, African and global levels\.
Considering the resolutions and recommendation issued by various conferences on national
education, notably the General Statement on Educationo f January 1996;
Notingthat certainprovisions of LawNo\. 86-005 o f September 22, 1986 onNational Education
no longer meet the current demands and needs o f our country;
Concerned about the level ofdestruction anddeteriorationofthe nation's education system;
Seekingto reorganize the proper functioning o f the State by implementing good governance for
sustainable, integral, integrated and harmonious development o fthe country;
Determined to pay particular attention to the education sector as a privileged factor in
development\.
Takinginto accountthe importance of education for all inview o fcurbing social inequalities\.
Convinced that priority is to be givento all levels oftraining, andto scientific andtechnological
research, inorder to provide the country with the expertise necessary for its progress\.
Consciouso fthe role that nationaland local languages mustplay inthe education process;
Emphasizing the need to provide the people with the resources required to achieve the
objectives for the education sector;
Subscribing to the view that education must enable the fill development of citizens to be
managers and vectors for development;
Invitingall partnersto support the Government incarrying out the objectives that have been set
for the new education system in view o f increasing their assistance and coordinating their
activities, which should be withinthe context o fpriorities for the sector;
Committed to promoting the culture of peace and to fight against anti-social values such as
cheating, corruption, laziness, etc\.
Making the commitmentto be resolutely involved inturning around the Congolese education
system;
155
Taking into account the changesthat have taken place inthe internal and external environment
o f the education sector, and determined to face the various challenges that arise, in order to
reduce poverty in a sustainable manner and to allow all citizens to contribute to the
reconstruction o fthe country\.
Concerned about reducingthe financial burdenpresentlyborne by families, which is considered
to be the principal barrier to education, andto advocate for free primary education\.
Adopts the present wording o fthe education policy ofthe Democratic Republic o fthe Congo\.
1\. GeneralContext
The history o f our country has beenmarked by various crises which have hindereddevelopment
andjeopardized the Nation's future\. Within this context, the education system i s one o f the most
affected sectors\. It i s characterized notably by:
the downgrading of the teaching function and the professional social insecurity o f the
teacher, leadingto the loss o f calling for the teaching professionand brain drain;
the under-qualification o f a large number o fteachers;
poor management o fresources;
absence o f a continuous training o f education personnel;
inadequate, outdated, unsuitable andvery unequally apportioned infrastructure;
over-abundant number o fpupils inrelationto intake capacity especially inthe major centers;
the absence o fplanning for the settingup of educational institutions and creationof channels
o f education;
noticeable insufficient or lack o f equipment and appropriate teaching materials;
lack o fteaching programs, textbooks, teaching manuals andother pedagogical support;
reversal o fvalues;
admission rate and schooling inconstant decline;
increasing disparity betweensexes and social background;
rise inthe level o f illiteracy, dropout and class repetition;
supervision level below the education norms ina large number o f teaching institutions;
inadequate control and evaluation;
failure o f training programs to adapt to the realities andto the needs o f the country as well as
the development o fscience andtechnology;
the small portion o fthe State budget allocated to the education system; with the consequence
o f studentsand parentsbearingthe cost o f salaries and runningo fthe institutions;
the decline invalues including indiscipline\.
156
The different sector reforms inoperation since 1961did not provide a coherent education policy\.
The building of a new Congolese society must rely on human resources capable o f harnessing
the enormous potential of the country\. In fact, human resources constitute the true wealth and
real engine o f growth through which other resources will be harnessed\.
2\. Aim of the New EducationSystem
The aim o f the new education system is to educate competent men and women imbued with
human, moral, spiritual, cultural and civic values; they should further be creative artisans,
buildersofa new democratic, united,prosperous andpeacefulCongolese society\.
This involves, above all to liberate man o f all burdens which prevent him from participating
effectively inthe development o f his country, by arousing inhim a feeling o f well-being, i\.e\. the
attitudes and behavior which will enable him to work towards the improvement o f his living
conditions, and the expertise that would make him competent to participate in the development
o f society, as well as the proper behavior which constitute the pinnacle o f life within society\.
Itis alongthese lines that the priority areas ofthe neweducation system are based, Le\.:
- declarationofeducationasanabsolutepriority;
- organizationofeducationforallandbyall;
- rehabilitationofvaluebasededucation\.
Attainment o f the above requires short, medium and long term programs\. Actions to be taken
now must be based on the following;
updatingthe legal framework o fthe education system;
fundamental review o fthe education structures andprograms;
improvement o fthe mechanisms o f administrative management;
mobilization of financial resources;
rehabilitation and construction of schools and academic infrastructure and their equitable
distribution across the nation;
enhancement o f education personnel's careers;
the actual taking into account o f partnerships as an essential means o f managing the new
educational system;
strengthening o f "on the job training" for teachers as well as other education service
personnel;
regularevaluationof curricula;
provision o f appropriate equipment and teaching aids to national education institutions;
development o f a school mapping;
distribution o f free text books to students as well as teacher's guide for primary school
teachers\.
157
3\. Objectivesof the EducationSystem
The differenttypes o fobjectives which the education policy mustpursueare as follows:
3\.1 General Objectives:
1) Humanist objectives
This involves transforming the learner by passing on knowledge and information, by developing
his ability to reflect, to understand, to create and evaluate, in short to train a cultured man, a
beingwith a highsense o f morals and who is concerned about what is good, beauty, true justice
-amanwholivesinharmonywithothersandwithhisenvironment\.
2) Socio-political objectives
The education policy aims at integrating man within his community, training men and women
who are conscious o f their belonging to a nation and the Congolese society, having a keen sense
o fthe common good, a culture o f democracy, o ftolerance and peace\.
3) Economic Objectives
The education policy for a new society must expose the school to the economic concerns o f the
country\. In fact, it must cease to be an education which teaches for the sake o f teaching, and
become an education which teaches to produce\. Henceforth, the Congolese society must train
men capable o f transforming their community, by the acquisition of knowledge, aptitude,
attitudes and good habits not only inhygienebut especially inproduction and saving\.
4) Professional Objectives
Education must arouse inthe student the love for productive work and love for the choice o f a
profession
3\.2 Specijic objectives:
1) Pre-school level
to create structures o f education where they do not exist;
make them free and compulsory;
train teachers\.
2) Primary level
- programreform;
- compulsory education;
- emphasizeenvironmental studiesandhealthwithintheprograms;
- promotetheacquisitionofpracticalskillsinrelationtovitalactivitiesinsociety;
- createorrehabilitate theschoolinhastructure;
3) Secondary level
- reform and modernize programs of all cycles towards vocations and adapt them to the
development needs o fthe nation;
158
- ensure students are capable inrelationto their fields ofstudy-findsolutions to particular
problems o ftrade and the local community\.
4) Tertiary level and university
- trainanintellectualeliteandinnovativehighlevelpersonnel capable ofparticipatinginthe
development o fthe country to transform the society andmake it more humane;
- promotescientificresearchindifferentareasforthedevelopmentofthenation\.
5) Nonformal education level
- trainliteracyandvocationaleducationtrainersthroughoutthecountry;
- createnonformaleducationinfrastructure (public libraries, etc)throughoutthecountry;
- payspecialattentiontoilliteracy amongwomenandyounggirlsaswell asunderprivileged
groups\.
4\. Major Challenges
The new society to be built-upmust take into account both current world development which is
dominated by globalization o f economies and societies, and the need for a more demanding
national development in terms o f financial and human resources and technological performance\.
The globalization of economies and development o f information and communications
technology which support this evolution makes it necessary for the country to be ina position o f
competitiveness and to be highperforming to keepup with the times, without losing its identity\.
To this end, the exploitation o f the country's enormous human and economic potential will
constitute a major asset for facing the fbture, in a world which i s both open and competitive\. In
this vein, the effort placed on democratic management of the country, on a profitable economy
and on prudent financial management, must in turn depend on the intrinsic values o f men and
women who are reconciledwith their ethical, moral and cultural values\.
Thusthe education ofthe people mustnot only be limitedto the school level but mustequally be
tackled for the whole society\. Also, the following questions must be examined:
the budget allocated to education;
the objectives andorientation ofeducation;
education programs;
support to education;
organization and planning o fthe education system;
matching objectives o fmass training and the strategies for achieving them;
relationbetween training andemployment;
training, managing and evaluating trainers;
evaluation o f learners' knowledge and learningconditions;
159
5\. Priority Areas
Important efforts to be employed to organize the education system efficiently to enable it to
address the specific needs o fthe country are based on major priorities which are:
9 accessto quality basic educationfor all:
o early childeducation
o primary education
o specialized and integrated education for children with disabilities
o literacy education for women inparticular
9 quality technical andvocationaleducation
9 tertiary anduniversityeducation anddevelopment research
9 consideration ofthe specific needs ofdifferentregions
9 training oftrainers
9 continuous on-the-job training
9 consideration ofspecific problemsofthe girl childandwomeninthe areaofeducation\.
With each o f these priorities, it is necessary to define the policy to be put in place, to plan the
actions to take and to specify the modalities for administration and management o f the national
education system\.
5\.1Access to quality basic educationfor all
Expand education to all young persons without discrimination o f gender, religion, ethnicity etc\.
Emphasis must be placedon girl-child and women education\.
1) Early child education
The pre-school education structure is almost non-existent inthe country with the exception o f a
few nurseries, crkches and community day care centers located inurbancenters\. It is necessary
progressively to extendthis form o f education andmake it compulsory because it
- contributes to the extension of family education and setting up structures for training
specialized personnel for this level;
- preparesthechildforprimaryeducation\.
2) Primary education
Make education accessible, free and compulsory at the primary level\. This level aims at
ensuring the development o f the personality o f the child in harmony with his family
environment\.
Also, it is important at the pre-school andprimarylevel that
- teachingisthroughthenationallanguageand/or locallanguage
- themanualsandteachingmaterialsoriginatefromwithinthesociety\.
3) Special and integratededucationfor children with disabilities
160
Special education within the formal system and non formal education are to target men and
women o f all ages with one or more disabilities, the underprivileged and the marginalized in
order to tackle inequalities inthe area o f education\.
4) Nonformal education of women inparticular
The aim is to institutionalize literacy based on the real needs o f the beneficiaries, by setting up
and developing literacy centers, social centers, centers for vocational and permanent education
for adults and rehabilitation centers\. The achievement o f this objective can be concretized within
the framework o f national mass literacy programs (and especially women's education) because
literacy must, above all, be literacy for development\.
5\.2 Secondary technical and vocational education
This is to place particular emphasis on quality technical and vocational education\. The aim is to
identify an exhaustive list o f vocations to be introduced into training, in order to establish a
conscious relation between training and employment\. This sector must be provided with the
necessarymeans for its development
5\.3 Tertiary, university,and research development
The aim is to complete reform o f tertiary, university and scientific education in order to
strengthen their effectiveness and ambitious but realistic plans for these sub-sectors\. The
capacities o f higher education institutions and universities must be strengthened to enable them
to play their traditional role o f teaching, training, research and service to the community\. To this
end, the government i s creating technological, as well as technical and educationcolleges\.
Regarding research, the Government will improve the conditions by modernizing equipment, by
training and retraining personnel and providing the necessary financing to this sector\.
5\. 4 Consideration of theparticularities of the different provinces
Respecting the notion o f unity in diversity, the new education system must look at a minimum
national program o f basic education applicable throughout the republic and complement it by
specific inputsfrom each region\.
5\.5 Training of trainers
With a view to ensuring quality education for students, the new education system must benefit
from adequate means so that trainers at all levels are trained according to the needs o f the new
national education systemand that they benefit from refresher courses\.
5\.6 Continuing education
To ensure a better adaptation o f adults to development, technical, technological as well as the
demands o f modern society, the new education system must place special emphasis on
vocational training\.
5\.7Nonformal education
Withinthis training, learners will be directed towards learning a trade\.
6\. Action Strategies
Due to the advanced state of deterioration o f our education system, and the plethora o f
challenges to confront inorder to save and reconstruct the system, the Government must develop
161
a national plan for this reconstruction, which must be a component o f the national development
plan\.
Actions to take to set up the neweducation system mustconsider:
6\.1 Socio-economic conditions,notably:
- populationgrowthrate;
- increasinglevelofunemploymentandunder-employment;
- lackofqualificationofamajorpartofthenationalmanpower;
- growingratesofilliteracyespeciallyamongwomen;
- material, financial, andhumancapacityofthecountry;
- povertyindicators\.
6\.2 Development in science and technologv, as well as the obligation of a sustainable
developmentof resources\.
6\.3 Strengthening cooperationin education
6\.4 Theneed to institute a Unitfor follow-up, supervision and evaluation
7\. Sharingof Responsibilities
Although the state i s mainly in charge o f the education system, the system cannot develop
harmoniously without the family, the school and the society through their decentralized entities
pooling together intellectual, moral, material and financial resources, and sharing the
responsibilities and tasks to achieve the common objectives for education\.
Different legal devices, depending on the level, subject areas, ground conditions and time, will
clearly define the rights and duties o f all partners\.
Generally the following will be established:
The state as public organizer andfirst partner - its role:
- to define the objectives, results and strategies of education andto ensure monitoring and
evaluation
- tosetoutgeneralmeasuresforoperationsofeducationa1alllevels;
- toplanthedevelopmentoftheeducationsystemnationally;
- to ensurethat administrative, teaching andfinancial structures aresetupthroughwhichthe
partnershipwill operate;
- tonegotiateandformalizeinternational, bilateral, andmultilateralcooperationagreementsto
benefitall aspects o fthe national education system;
- totakechargeoffinancingtheeducationsystem\.
Partners, notably decentralized entities, parents, educational institutions, religious groups,
NGOs, owners o f private schools, and various other organizations should have the following
roles:
162
to actively and democratically participate in the structures set up in relation to the goals,
objectives and strategies o f the education system, reviewing and revision o f programs, and
monitoring and evaluation o f education;
to ensure follow-up and reasonable use o f the education provided, to ensure conformity o f
education with the demands o fthe labor market andthe needs o fthe community;
to contribute in various ways to the moral, human, material and financial resources o f
education;
to encourage out o f school activities\.
The level, nature andmodalities o fparticipationo fpartners at all levels mustbe clarified\.
8\. Operational Methods
The implementation o fa new education system will be better facilitated ifit is providedwith the
operational means to ensure its effectiveness\. The framework for implementation must be
defined\. Mechanisms for supervision and evaluation o f the different phases o f the education
policy must be put in place\. The national plan for reconstruction and development o f the
education system and the law underlyingthe sector are part o fthis framework\.
8\.1 The national plan for reconstruction and development of the education
system must set out the actions to undertake in the short, medium and longer
term\.
The plan shouldhave three stages:
- emergency reconstruction, to maintain the existing system before proceeding with more
widespread change and reform;
- layingthe foundationfor anewsystemofeducation throughnewstructures, decentralized
administration;
- consolidationandexpansion sotheneweducationsystembecomes operational at all levels
throughout the country\.
8\.2 Theframework is an important legal instrument without which the different structures
of the sector would lack coherence\.
This legal framework should not only determine the mode o f operation o f the education system,
it should also integrate democratic approaches as mandatory imperatives henceforthto guide the
actions o fthe State\. It i s also desirable to submit the proposal to parliament for discussion\.
9\. Financing of Education
Inreconstructing the country, the Government hastakenthe economic paththat:
- promotespartnershipthroughtheinitiativesofindividuals,groups,orsocialcollectivities;
- encourages opening education to the demands of society, toward external markets and
technologies; inshort towards all that leads to progress and the well beingo f all;
- encouragescommunityparticipationinmobilizingfinancialresources\.
To achieve these objectives, the sector must be provided with adequate financial resources\.
163
Based on the principle o f partnership, the financing o f the new education system will be ensured
by:
- theState(direct financing) and
- partners(indirect financing)\.
Direct financing represents the commitment of the State progressively to allocate a sizeable
portion o f the national budget to the education sector, an effort which will be complemented by
bilateral and multilateral support\.
Indirect financing will come from support inkindand cash from active partnerso f education i\.e\.
decentralized entities, parents, schools, religious bodies, private approved school proprietors,
companies, NGOs, and other national and international organizations\. Self-financing o f schools
will also beencouraged as support to indirect financing\.
The legal framework will set the modalities o fparticipationo f the different partners infinancing
the education sector\.
The following points mustbe considered:
strengthening the responsibility o f the state, the principal partner which must not only
contribute to financing o f education through a sizeable portion o f the national budget, but
also enable education to benefit from bilateral and multilateral cooperation;
maximizing the contribution of partners, direct and indirect beneficiaries;
distributingthe state contribution according to demographic patterns ineach region;
fixing the level o f financing of education by the provinces and decentralized entities for
education;
appealing to religious bodies and other associations to contribute to the rehabilitation of
infrastructure inthe education system, beyondparticipationdefinedby their own statutes;
giving incentives to NGOs and other promoters o fprivate schools to participate infinancing;
creating an Education Promotion Fund as an additional financing mechanism for the direct
financing by the state\.
10\. Monitoring and Evaluation
To ensure proper implementation o f the education policy, the Government will have an inter-
ministerial organ charged to monitor and evaluation the aforementioned actions\.
164
10¡E 15¡E CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 25¡E 30¡E
S U D A N
To
5¡N Ubangi To Bangasso 5¡N
To Kembe
Bangui To
Zongo Juba
Bondo Faradje
Libenge Uele
Businga
DEM\. REP\. Titule
Gemena Buta Watsa Kibali
OF CONGO
Aketi Isiro To
Imese Akula Lisala Bumba O R I E N TA L E Pakwach
Wamba
Oubangui UGANDA
Bongandanga Congo Mongbwalu Bunia
Banalia
Lulonga A ruwimi Lake
Basankusu Bafwasende ts\.
M Albert
Yangambi Beni
E Q U AT E U R Kisangani
Butembo Margherita Peak
0¡ Wanie Rakula
Mbandaka Boende itumba(5,110 m) 0¡
CONGO M Lake
GABON Tshuapa Lubutu N O R D Edward Lake
Bikoro
Luilaka Salonga Ikela Lomami
Lomela K I V U -
Lowa Goma Victoria
To Ruhengeri
Inongo
gnoo
C Ulindi Lake Kivu
Yumbi Betamba
To RWANDA
Kutu Kalima Bukavu Kibuye
S U D -
Bandundu Buna Lodja Kindu
KINSHASA Kasai Lukenie K I V U Uvira To
ATLANTIC B A N D U N D U K A S A I M A N I E M A Kama Bujumbura BURUNDI
Mangai Sankuru
Ilebo
OCEAN O R I E N TA L
KINSHASA Bulungu KASAI Malela
Kenge Lusambo Kasongo Lulimba
5¡S CABINDA Kikwit Idiofa OCCIDENTAL 5¡S
(ANGOLA) B A S - C O N G O Kongolo
To TANZANIA
Pointe- Boma Mbanza-Ngungu Mbuji-
Noire Kwilu Kananga Lukuga Kalemie Lake
Matadi Feshi Mayi
To Kabinda Tanganyika
Damba Kwango Kabalo
Tshikapa Kasai Moba
Mwene-Ditu Manono
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC K ATA N G A Luvua
OF CONGO Lomami
Kapanga Kamina Pweto
A N G O L A Lulua Lueo Mts\.
a
Lake
SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS Kilwa
Mweru
Sandoa
PROVINCE CAPITALS Lubudi MitumLbufira
10¡S
NATIONAL CAPITAL
To
RIVERS 0 100 200 300 400 Kilometers Dilolo Kolwezi Luwingu Z A M B I A
Likasi Lake
MAIN ROADS To
Lucano Lualaba Malawi
NOVEMBER 0 100 200 Miles I
RAILROADS Lubumbashi
IBRD
PROVINCE BOUNDARIES This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank\.
The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information
shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank ZAMBIA To Sakania 33391
Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any Kitwe ALAW
2004 INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries\. M
25¡E 30¡E | APPROVAL |
P007156 | Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No\. 8659
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
EL SALVADOR
FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT
(LOAN 1738-ES)
MAY 25, 1990
Population and Human Resources Unit
Country Department II
Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their offcal duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
ACROIYS
GDP Gross Domestic Product Producto Interno Bruto
GOES Government of El Salvador Gobierno del Salvador
PIU Project Implementation Unidad Coordinadora del
Unit Proyecto
PLANALIBRE Education Books National Plan Nacional del Libro
Plan Educativo
PPMS Pedagogic Program for Programa Pedagogico para
Inservice Teachers Profesores en Servicio
UNESCO United Nations Educational Organizacion de las
Scientific and Cultural Naciones Unidas ,ara la
Organization Educacion Cienca y
Cultura
USAID United States Agency for Agencia para el Desarrollo
International Development Internacional del
Gobierno Norteamericano
CURRENCY
Name of Currency : Colon
Appraisal Year : US$1 - 2\.5
Completion Year : US$1 5\.0
WEIGHT AND MEASURES
Metric System
OlR OFFKICAL USE OnLY
THE WOtRD BANK
Washington\. DC\. 20433
U\.S\.A\.
Office Of Ov\.euv\.Gaw"A
Ops\.ns f'tinn
May 25, 1990
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Completion Report: EL SALVADOR - Fourzh Education
Proiect (Loan 1738-ES)
Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled
"Project Completion Report: El Salvador - Fourth Education Project
(Loan 1738-ES)" prepared by the Latin America and the Caribbean Regional
Office\. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations
Evaluation Department at this time\.
Attachment
Tnis document has a restricted distribution and may be used bry ncpits only in the performance
of ther official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclood without World Dank autboramtin\.
FOR OMCIAL USE ONL
PROJECT COMPiETION REPORT
EL ShLVADOR
FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT
(LOAN 1738-ES)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No\.
Preface \.i\.
Basic Data Sheet \. *\. \. \. ii
Evaluation Summary \. \. \.*o v
I\. Project Preparation \. \. 1
fI\. Project Implementation \. \. \. 2
III\. Project Results \. \. \. 4
IV\. Bank Performance \. 00 \.*** \. \. 6
V\. Borrower Performance \. \.7\. 7
VI\. Project Relationship \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 7
VII\. Specialists and Fellowships \. \. 8
VIII\. Project Documentation and Data \. 8
1\. Project Content and Subsequent Revisions \. 9
2\. Related Bank Loans *\.*\.** \.**** \.*\. 11
3\. Project Timetable \. \. \. \. 12
4\. A\. Loan Disbursements \.* \. 13
B\. Project Implementation \. 13
5\. Project Costs and Financing \. *\.* \. 14
A\. Project Costs \.0\. **\. 14
B\. Project Financing \. \. \. 15
6\. Status of Covenants \.04# \. \. 16
7\. Planned and Actual Construction
of Schools and Classrooms \. \. 17
8\. 1988 Enrollment of Project
Schools by Department \. \. \. 18
9\. Technical Assistance \. \. \. \. \. 19
CgONINTS FROM THE BORROWER
Attachment I: Comments from the Ministry of Finance \. 21
Attachment II: Comments from the Ministry of Education \. 22
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclsed without World Bank authorization\.
- i -
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
EL SALVADOR
FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT
(LOAN 1738-ES
PREFACE
This is a Project Completion Report (PCR) of the Fourth Education
Project in El Salvador (Loan 1738-ES)\. The total loan amount was US$23\.5
million, as approved by the Board on June 21, 1979\. The loan amount
disbursed vas US$18\.68 million and US$4\.82 million was cancelled\. The
final disbursement took place on January 26, 1989\.
This PCR was prepared by the Human Resources Division of the
Technical Department in the Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office\.
It is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report, the record of the
Board discussion of this project, the Loan Agreement, and material in the
Bank's file pertaining to this project\. Bank staff connected with the
project were interviewed\. Discussions were held with Borrower staff by a
Bank mission who visited San Salvador in May 1989\. No travel was
undertaken to the project areas outside San Salvador because of security
concerns\.
This PCR was read by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED)\.
The draft PCR was sent to the Borrower and its agencies for comment in
January 1990\. The comments received have been reproduced, in English, as
Attachments I and II\.
- iili-
PROJECT CoCtPLETION REPORT
EL SALVACOR
FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT
(LOAN 1738-ES}
BASIC DATA SHEET
Key Pro2ecc Data
(US Million)
Oritinal Amended Disbursed Cancelled
Loan No\. 1738-ES 23\.5 19\.5 18\.7 4\.8
CumUlative Loan Disbursement
7s 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89
Planned 0\.70 6\.70 13\.70 20\.70 23\.50
Actual 0 0 0\.14 0\.59 3\.32 3\.85 7\.90 10\.58 14\.7 18\.68
As X of (1) 0 0 1 3 14 16 34 45 63 80
Date of Final Disbursement: January 26, 1989
PROGRAM/PROJECT
Date Date Date
item Planned Revised Actual
Board Approval 6/21/79 6/21/79
Loan Signature 6/29/79 6/29/79
Loan Effectiveness 7/27/79 10/26/79 & 1/15/80
11/28/79
Loan Completion 12/83 12/85 and 12/87 12/88
Loan Closing 2/84 12185 and 12/87 12/87 /a
Total Project Cost
(US$Killion) 33\.6 25\.5
Completion Time
(in months) 55 109
Time overrun (t) - 198
La Disbursements continued until January 26, 1989\.
- :Lv-
STAFF INPUTS (Staff Weeks)
FY a 79 IQ 81 _ 83 Di 85 _8 88 Total
Preappraisal 27\.9 3\.5 - - - 31\.5
Appraisal - 43\.0 - - - 43\.0
Negotiation - 7\.0 - - - - - - - - 7\.0
Supervision - 0\.4 3\.1 0\.7 4\.1 3\.1 14\.7 6\.6 14\.5 20\.8 15\.5 83\.6
Total 27\.9 53\.9 3\.1 0\.7 4\.1 3\.1 14\.7 6\.6 14\.5 20\.8 15\.5 165\.1
MISSION DATA
Stage of Monthl No\. of Staff Specializations Perf ormaice Types of
Project Cvcle Year Persons Days Re=resenteda/ RatingO/ Problems
Reconnaissance 10/77 2 5 a,b n\.a\. n\.a\.
Identificaticn 02/78 4 10 a,b,c,d n\.s\. n\.a\.
Preparation 04/78 3 5 a,d(2) n\.a\. n\.a\.
Assistance
Preparation
Assistance 05/78 1 5 a n\.s\. n\.a\.
Preappraisal 06/78 1 4 a n\.a\. n\.a\.
Appraisal 09/78 5 32 a,b,c,d(2)
Post-Appraisat 04/79 1 5 a n\.a\. n\.s\.
Supervision 1 09/79 1 5W a n\.a\. n\.a\.
Supervisior 2 12/79 1 12d/ c 1 P
Supervision 3 02/82 2 Id/ a,c 3 PF
Supervision 4 06/82 3 10/d a,c,d 3 FP
Supervision 5 08/83 2 10/d a,c 3 FP
Supervision 6 12/83 2 5 a,d 3 F
Supervision 7 07/84 2 5 a,c 3 MT
Supervision 8 01/85 3 4 a,c,d 3 MT
Supervision 9 06(85 1 3 c 4 FM
Supervision 10 04/86 2 5 a,c 2 N
Supervision 11 07/86 1 5 a 3 FM
Supervision 12 04/87 2 5 b,c 3 MF
Supervision 13 09/87 1 5 a 2 FM
Supervision 14 10/87 1 5 c 2 FM
Supervision 15 05/88 1 5 c I M
C-apletion 05/89 1 5 a n\.a\. n\.s\.
a/ a-educator; b-econonist; c=architect; d=specialist\.
b' 1problem-free or minor problems; 2=moderate problems; and 3/4=major problems\.
c/ F=financial; Mxmanagerial; Tutechnical; P=political;
d' Combined with other duties\.
n\.a\. = not available\.
- v -
PROJECT CoMmLETION REPORT
EL SALVADOR
FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT
(L-OAN 1738-ES)
EVALUATION SUMMARY
Introduction
Identification of the Fourth Education Project was carried out by
a Bank mission in January 1978 and the project was appraised in September
1978, approved by the Board in June 1979 and the loan became effective in
January 1980\. The project's total cost was estimated to be US$33\.6
million, including US$23\.5 million from the Bank loan and US$10\.1 million
from the Government of El Salvador (GOES)\.
Objective and Content of the Proiect
The Fourth Education Project aimed to support the broad objectives
set by the Salvadurian Government's Second and Third Education Development
Plans\. It's main objectives includee\. expanding bastc education and train-
ing opportunities for children and adults in rural areas; improving
quality, efficiency and school administration and supervision through the
establishment of an improved nuclearization system; and giving support to
industry by the training of technicians at a new post-secondary technologi-
cal institute (para\. 2)\.
At appraisal the project was expected to be completed in 55 months
and comprised: (a) construction, furnishing and/or equipping of the
following institutions: 50 rural basic education nuclei that included 356
schools (new, extensions/replacements as well as equipping only); office
and storage for teacher training (PPMS); office building for the Textbook
Division (PLANALIBRE); and a postsecondary technical institute; (b) teacher
training programs (pre-service, in-service and other training courses); (c)
textbooks and teaching materials (design, development, production and dis-
tribution of textbooks); (d) technical assistance (specialists services and
fellowships) and (e) project administration assistance - (Annex 1)\.
Implementation Experience and Results
Implementation of the project faced adverse circumstances and
complex situations (para\. 4\.) resulting in: time overrun, reduction of
project size and scope and incorporation into the project of a new
component on school reconstruction in the San Salvador metropolitan area\.
Implementation of the project spread over a period of 109 months (a 198
percent time overrun) and remained practically inactive for about two years
following project effectiveness date (disbursements were only 1 percent of
the appraisal estimate)\. The time overrun was caused mainly by the
- vi -
Government's existing financial difficulties, which were aggravated by its
inability to cope with the financial and administrative burden imposed by
the simultaneous implementation of the Second and Fourth Education projects
and by a worsening of civil disobedience and political conflict in the
country\. In adjusting to the situation, the project size and scope was
reduced (para\. 5b)\. On the other hand, the component on reconstruction of
300 classrooms was incorporated to the project in view of destruction
caused by the October 10, 1986 earthquake\.
The project potential for meeting appraisal objectives and targets
was curtailed by the significant alterations/deletions that took place\. A
main project objective consisting of training technicians for industry was
not achieved because the technology institute was deleted from the project\.
The target for expanding basic education opportunities for rural children
was scaled down from 90,000 beneficiaries estimated at appraisal to 46,000
(para\. 8)\. The introduction in the project of the school reconstruction
coimponent switched the focus of the main project objective from rural to
urban basic education\.
Perhaps the most significant achievement of the scaled down proj-
ect Was that nearly 54,000 children (41,500 rural and 12,000 urban) bene-
fitted fr new or better school facilities and that an even greater number
benefitted from more and better books and better trained teachers\. These
accomplishments were made possible by the successful implementation of
components that included construction, furnishing and equipping education
units\. They included: 500 rural school classrooms (83% of the adjusted
appraisal target); facilities for the PLANALIBRE and PPMS programs; and
the reconstruction of over 190 urban school classrooms (64% of the added
post-appraisal target)\. Other targets were also successfully met\. The
PLAHALIBRE and the PPMS components both largely surpassed the appraisal
target (over twofold) and 4\.5 million textbooks and teachers' guides were
produced and printed and over twenty thousand teachers, school directors/
administrators and school technicians were trained (paras\. 8-10 and 11 and
Annex 1)\.
The project success in implementing quantitative targets was not
matched by improvements in quality, efficiency and school administration
and supervision, another project objective\. The major instrument for
achieving quality improvements (nuclearization) did not fully operate as
planned because four-grade associate schools (included at appraisal as an
innovation in nuclearization) did not fit local conditions and were sub-
sequently deleted from the project, while the use of multigrade teaching
did not materialize\. The components on education supervision, curriculum
review and pre-service teacher training were not implemented and the train-
ing of school administrators had limited success (para\. 9)\. The PLANALIBRE
and PPlS components were unable to utilize facilities provided by the
project, which handicapped their operations; despite this, PLANALIBRE was
able to produce books of good quality and content\. However, the extent to
which the provision of textbooks and better qualified teachers improved the
quality of teaching measured by student performance is a matter that follow
up activities should be able to assess\. The project studies on these
- vii -
matters were not implemented\. The specialists services component was
scaled down in size and scope and was not implemented sufficiently early
and with adequate planning (Annexes I and 9)\. Lack of specialists services
adversely affected the areas of curricular revision and textbooks and in-
service teacher training education (para\. 24)\.
Project effectiveness vas reduced by Borrower's difficulties in
meeting counterpart fun"' obligations, by political decisions made for
reasons of expedience and by weak PIU management during several years of
project implementation\. It is quite likely that with a stronger PIU during
early implementation, better support to the project by the Ministry of
Education authorities and improvement of the cumbersome bureaucratic
procedures (para\. 18), implementation time could have been greatly reduced
and project results could have been better\.
9\. As far as IBRD performance is concerned, a major strength was
staff patience and flexibility\. Major weaknesses were: launching the
Fourth Education Project at an inappropriate time when scarce financial and
administrative scarce resources were co-mitted to the implementation of the
Second Project; accepting a model of school nuclearization unsuitable to
locel conditions; and being too lax with the Borrower regarding the early
approval of the "special account" and the implementation of education
quality and management improvements (para\. 16)\.
Sustainability
Provided that the financial and political situation normalize and
the Government supports rural basic education as a priority, there should
not be concern about any serious sustainability problems\. PLANALIBRE,
perhaps the most successful and promising component, may face 0ceater sus-
tainability risks because of Its large dependence on external aid, pressing
demand and commitments regarding textbooks and its still-insufficient
institutional consolidation\. An evaluation study to examine means to
consolidate PLANALlBRE and alternatives to reduce the financial burden of
the program on the Government, including cost recovery options, should be
carried out\.
Findinas and Lessons
In hindsight, it is clear that: (a) greater caution should have
been exercised at appraisal on assessing the Borrower's financial capacity
to implement the project simultaneously with another Bank-assisted project;
(b) the inclusion of components inconsistent with the main focus and objec-
tives of the project should have been discouraged; (c) educational models
or methods not supported by previous country experimentation should have
been avoided; (d) successful performance requires a strong PIU and an
aggressive PIU coordinator fully committed to the job; and (e) specialists
services programs require detailed planning and should be clearly defined
in the project to get full benefits\. A system for monitoring and assessing
quality of services should be established by the Borrower\.
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
EL SALVADOR
FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT
(LOAN 1738-ES)
1\. PROJECT PREPARATION
Proiect Background
1\. At the time of project generation the country's conventional
economic policies (mainly import substituting industrialization and
improvement in agricultural productivity) had produced slow economic
growth; the annual growth rate of GDP per capita between 1968 and 1978 was
about 1\.4Z\. In order to make up for this shortcoming, the Salvadorian
Government was encouraging the use of the country's abundant human
resources by importing raw materials for domestic processing\. This
strategy required specialization in export-oriented industrial activities
and investment in human capital formation to improve productivity of the
labor force\. Therefore, the Government had prepared a Third Education
Development Plan (1978-82) on the basis of a comprehensive USAID assisted
sector study\. The Government also had plans to expand and improve basic
education further through implementation of its strategy program "Expansion
and Improvement of Rural Basic Education\." Py the year 1985, the program
was expected to increase enrollment in the first two cycles of rural
schools (grades 1 to 6) from 702 (1970) to 89Z of students in the corres-
ponding age group and for the third cycle from 81 (1970) to 372, through
construction of 4,000 additional classrooms\. Strategies for improving the
efficiency and quality of rural basic education relied on the extension of
a revised nuclearization system,\.J which included the expanding double
shift attendance and multigrade teaching\. Other areas of improvement
included teacher training, curriculum and teaching materials revision and
education services\. The vlan's main objectives were to: (a) strengthen
the education system and i\. ;rove quality and efficiency of basic education
to redress inequities between urban and rural areas; (b) fill the gaps in
post-secondary technological education; and (c) continue expanding non-
formal education and training programs for out-of-school youths and adults\.
Project Obiectives
2\. The fourth education project provided technical and financial
assistance to the government to help implement the high priority educa-
tional investment programs included in the aecond and third education
development plans\. It supported the following efforts selected at
appraisal: (a) expand basic education and training opportunities for
11 Nuclearization is a school location and administrative system whereby a
Central Nuclei School (trades 6 to 9) is linked to a number of
neighlioring schools offering either six grades ("subcentral" schools)
or four grades ("Associate" schools)\. Central nuclei-schools have
responsibility for overseeing administration and supervision of the
nuclei\.
- 2 -
children and adults in rural areast (b) improve the quality, efficiency,
and school administration and supervision through the establishment of an
improved school nuclearization eystem; tc) expand in-service training
programs for basic education teachers and school directors; (d) 6xpand
production of textbooks and teacher materials for basic education; and (e)
establish a new post eecondary technological institute to increase oppor-
tunities for training of technician\. in selected priority specialties
needed for industrial developwint\. Subsequent project revisions are shown
in Annex 1\.
Project Design and Ornsnization
3\. The project was designed following GOES priorities identified in a
USAID assisted eCication sector study\. It covered two main areass (a)
rural basic education (Grades 1-9); and (b) establishment of the post-
secondary San Miguel Technological Institute\. More details on the project
composition are given in Annex 1\. The project aim was to strengthen rural
basic education and to expand nuclearization, a new system the GOES had
been experimenting with for several years\. It should be pointed out how-
ever, that in rural basic education an innovation adopted in the project
consisting in the introduction of four-grade associate schools in the
organization of the nuclearization system did not fit into the structure of
basic education in the country (3 cycles of 3 grades each); also that the
inclusion in the project of the Institute of Technology was questionable
considering that the Institute's level, technical nature, complexity of
execution and objectives departed drastically and vere offline with the
major focus of the project\. Both the associste schools and the Institute
of Technology were deleted from the project at a later stage\.
II\. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
4\. Implementation of the project faced many adverse circumstances,
some unforeseen, with serious implications for project content, progress
and outcome:
(a) A substantial fall in the country's economy and shortage of avail-
able counterpart financing hampered project implementation partic-
ularly in the period 1980-1983;
(b) Civil disobedience and political turmoil weakened the country's
economy, caused loss of life and destruction (including project
schools, as in Usulutan department) and impaired project implemen-
tation and supervision leading to Bank suspension of loan dis-
bursements (January - July, 1981) and an amendment to scale down
school construction in areas of conflict (see Annex 1);
(c) The earthquake on October 10, 1986, destroyed hundreds of schools
in Metropolitan San Salvador, and GOES priority switched from the
construction of rural basic schools to the reconstruction of
schools in metropolitan Ssn Salvador (see project amendment in
Annex 1);
(d) Certain factors intrinsic to the project affected implementation:
Insufficient support from some higher authorities of the Ministry
of Education; weak project management in the initial years of
implementation; political interference and burdensome procedures
for the approval of contracts, bidding documents, and other dis-
bursements\. The lack of liquidity, identified in supervision as
early as 1982, was not addressed until 1986 when a "special
account" was established by the 8orrow\.r after a long legal and
bureaucratic process\. Even so, it subsequendly remained inactive\.
5\. Critical gaps between planned and actual project implementation
appear in the elapsed time required for project closing and proiect
content\.
(a) Elapsed Time\. The project was closed nearly five years beyond the
closing date expected at appraisal\. Major causes for delay were
rightly predicted at appraisal under the risks section: shortage
of counterpart funds and inability of the existing adw4nistration
to adhere to a fixed schedule\. GOES was unable to cope with the
financial and administrative burden imposed by the simultaneous
implementation of the second and fourth education projects\.
During the period 1980-1982, only 12 of the appraisal estimate was
disbursed\. Only in 1986, with the change of PIU director did
disbursements climb to about 342 of the appraisal estimate\. The
appointment of arother PIU director employed on a permanent basis,
who replaced another appointed on an acting position, improved
management during the period 1987-1988, so that by the closing of
the project, disbursements had attained 802 of the appraisal
estimates\. The speed of project implementation could have been
significantly improved by a stronger PIU with better support from
authorities in the Ministry of Education\.
(b) Proiect Content\. The major variances in project content were the
following:
(i) reduction by amendment in August 1983 of the number of
education nuclei from 50 to 40 and the total number of
schools from 245 to 205 - (see Annex 1);
(ii) deletion of equipment for 111 existing schools, which
was subsequently financed instead by USAID;
(iii) deletion of the San Miguel Institute of Technology by
amendment of July, 1986 (see Annex 1)\.
(iv) failure to implement the cmponent on training 700 new
teachers at Ciudad Normal because the premises of the
institution were occupied by the armed forces;
(v) deletion of the conetruction of four-grade associate
schools - see para\. 3k(c) - by IBRD/Borrower agreement
because rural basic schools with less than six grades
were inappropriate to local conditions;
(iv) Due to political and security reasons nuclei supervision
was discontinued, and project assistance to educational
3upervision did not materialize\.
6\. The following lessons for design, organization and implementation
may be drawns
(a) The Borrower's capability to provide counterpart fuuds and manage
the project should be assessed carefully at appraisal, especially
when another Bank-assisted project is being implemented simul-
taneously\. The experience in this project shows that the
appraisal assessment indicated risks of shortage of counterpart
funds and weakness in management\. The seriousness of these risks
and the likelihood that implementation would be disrupted were
perhaps underestimated (para\. 5)\.
(b) The project should exclude components inconsistent with the main
focus and overall objectives of the project (see para\. 3C related
to the San Miguel Institute of Technology);
(c) Educationsl models or methods not supported by previous country
experimentation should be avoided unless the project is itself
experimental\. The "revised" model of nuclearization included
associate schools which were inadequate to the country and
structure of the education system\. This was a model that did not
operate and the multigrade method of teaching was not extended
(paras\. 3C and 9)\.
III\. PROJECT RESULTS
7\. The comparison between actual project results and appraisal proj-
ect objectives is complicated because of significant alterations/deletions
that took place during implementation (see Annex 1)\.
8\. A major project objective was to expand basic education and train-
ing opportunities to 90,000 rural children and 12,500 out-of-school youths
and adults in the rural area\. The project target of 90,000 students was
later reduced to about 46,000 students when the equipping of 111 school was
deleted from the Project\.21 Project school enrollment in 1988 reached over
41,000 students in rural schools and 12,000 students in urban schools (see
Annexes 7 and 8)\. For rural students, enrollment met 91S of the adjusted
target (46,000 students)\. Given all project problems this is a remarkable
result\.
9\. The results of the project on quality, efficiency, administration,
and supervision were not fully satisfactory\. The major instrument to
achieve improvements (nuclearization) did not operate as expected because
associate schools were deleted and multigrade teaching was not expanded as
planned\. Education supervision was practically abolished for security
reasons, and curriculum improvement was not reviewed as expected\. Attempts
2/ Financed by USAID\.
- 5 -
to improve nuclei administration through the training of nuclei directors
were offset by high job mobility\. The major quality improvements made were
perhaps related to the PLANALIRRE31 and PPMS components\.4/
10\. The PLANALIBRE's component produced about 4\.5 million copies of
textbooks and teacher guides for grades 1 to 6, nearly 2\.4 times the com-
bined appraisal targets (see Annex 1)\. Design and quality of the books is
good\. The planning for the production of textbooks for grades 7 to 9 has
also been implemented (not included originally in the project) and teachers
have been trained in the use of the books\. PLANALIBRE'S buildings have
been constructed and equipped\.
11\. There are, however, three points of concern about the PLANALIBRE
component: (a) no information is available on the impact of PLANALIBRE'S
textbooks on student performance; (b) the project building and vehicles for
PLANALIBRE are being used for purposes other than the project as the build-
ing was taken over by the Ministry of Culture as a consequence of the
earthquake; and (c) there is uncertainty about sustainability of the
PLANALIBRE program, a matter dealt with in the "sustainability" section\.
12\. The PPMS component exceeded the appraisal target by about 2001
(see Annex 1)\. It provided in-service training to teachers, school direc-
tors and deputy schools directors\. The quality of the courses did not
fully satisfy expectations, owing to a shortage of funds and a reduction in
time devoted to the program by instructors\. The construction and equipping
of the building for the PPMS component was fully implemented\. PPMS major
drawbacks are: (a) lack of adequate planning, strategy and evaluation of
the program (for example, the proposed study of the impact of school
resources input on the performance and achievement of trainees was not
done); (b) inadequate management (for example, there are no data on number
of participants by type of course in the various regions); and (c) project
PPMS facilities are currently lodged in the Ministry of Education
Technology Department\. Both PLANALIBRE and PPMS are operating in this
building\. An evaluation study along the lines of that recommended for
PLANALIBRE in para\. 15 is warranted\.
13\. Actual project costs (US$25\.5 million - see Annex 5A) represent
76% of the project cost estimated at appraisal (US$33\.6 mi:llion)\. The
Borrower utilized 80% of the US$23\.5 million loan fund originally allocated
to the project - see Annex 4A\. The actually-used loan funds amounted to
US$18\.7 million\. US$4 million was cancelled when the Technological
Institute was dropped and US$0\.8 million cancelled at the closing date\. In
the final analysis, the Loan covered 732 of the actual project costs, as
opposed to the 70% originally stipulated in the Loan Agreement which was
subsequently amended to 75%\.
14\. In summary, nearly 54,000 students (41,500 rural and 12,000 urban)
benefited from better schools and an even greater number benefitted from
more and better textbooks and better trained teachers\. The impact on
3/ Education Books National Plan - in charge of the technical
implementation of the textbook component\.
4/ Pedagogical Program for In-service Teachers\.
- 6 -
student p;r\.z\.,c, ,nu \.aievement is unknown\. Appraisal objectives to
improve quality, eificiency and supervision and administration were probab-
ly too ambitious\. Adult education was practically nil because of shortage
of funds and inadequate organization\. The many obstacles, some unforeseen,
and discussed elsewhere in this report, explain why the project did not
meet the objectives more fully\.
Proiect Sustainabilitv
15\. It is hoped that once the economy improves and the political situ-
ation stabilizes in the country, project inputs not being currently
utilized for project purposes would be restored (PLANALIBRE, PPMS, Ciudad
Normal) and educational services would be normalized and improved, giving a
higher return on investments made in the project\. With regard to the text-
book component (PLANALIBRE), which was successfully developed from its
embryonic stage due to project assistance, there are three important points
to consider for its consolidation and further development: (a) the program
has been so far heavily dependant on external assistance; (b) immediate
program needs include the printing of textbooks for 7-9 grade students and
for the substitution of a large part of textbooks for 1-6 grade students
and increase enrollment by new students in these grades; and (c) available
information is insufficient regarding the immediate and longer term
planning of PLANALIBRE's textbook production and printing and on other
important aspects such as textbook demand, program effectiveness (measured
by students performance), management efficiency, feasibility of local text-
book printing (most are done abroad), costs, program financing require-
ments, institutional needs\. PLANALIBRE program requires consolidation, and
to this effect, it is suggested that: (a) an evaluation study be carried
out on the financial, managerial and educational aspects of the program;
and (b) the study should examine cost recovery options or other alterna-
tives to reduce GOES financial burden of the program\.
IV\. BANK PERFORMANCE
16\. Perhaps the major strength in Bank performance was the attitude of
patience and flexibility adopted to resolve complex project situations\. On
the other hand, the completion mission considers that: (a) the timing to
launch the Fourth Education Project was inappropriate for reasons already
discussed; (b) the Bank should have avoided including a theoretical model
of nuclearization that was not operational at the time of appraisal (see
para\. 3c); (c) the Bank suipervision should have stimulated the Borrower to
implement improvements in quality and management (curriculum, technical
assistance, evaluation studies on school resources inputs on students
performance and achievements, teacher training management); (d) the Bank
should have been more active in promoting the Borrower's approval of the
"special account" (lack of liquidity was consistency identified from 1982
onwards; the special account was eventually approved by Borrower four years
later); and (e) the Bank should have maintained close communication with
the Borrower in the early years of project implementation (no progress
reports from the Borrower and two years 12/79-02/80 with no supervision
visiting the country) - see page iii\.
V\. BORROWER PERFORMANCE
17\. The major weaknesses in Borrower performance were financial,
political and managerial in nature\. The Borrower had serious financial
difficulties in meeting its counterpart funding obligations, a major reason
for reducing the size of the project and for the numerous extensions in the
closing date\. The Borrower made several decisions for reasons of expedi-
ency (understandable given civil disorder and the earthquake) that reduced
project effectiveness: appointments; transfers of personnel; the switch
from rural schools to reconstruction of urban schools, cancelling the
educational supervision component; utilizing project facilities (PLANALIBRE
and PPMS) for activities other than those targeted at project appraisal\.
18\. The project had its weakest point in PIU's management during the
first six to seven years of implementation; The Ministry of Education gave
it only cursory support\. Cumbersome procedures of the "Corte de Cuentas"
(local control office) in processing the approval of contracts, biddings
and other documents (on average seven months elapsed between contract award
and contract effectiveness) were a further problem\.
19\. The PIU director held another job, which prevented his full
commitment to the project\. With the change of PIU coordinator after nearly
six years of project implementation, the Borrower's performance started to
improve, and with the assignment of a permanent position in 1987 of a new
PIU coordinator there was an even greater improvement\. Better performance
was due to better management and helped by: availability of new funds
allocated by the Bank to the "Special Account" converted to colones; a
better defined geographical area of stability in the political conflict;
and that implementation of civil works for the reconstruction program was
made up of larger units with higher disbursement value\.
20\. The lesson is that successful performance requires a strong PIU
and an aggressive PIU coordinator fully committed to the job\. The Bank
should be assured by the Borrower at appraisal of the above condition for
appointing the PIU coordinator and should monitor the matter in project
supervision\.
VII\. PROJECT RELATIONSHIP
21\. The relationship between Bank and Borrower was characterized by:
(a) Bank patience that permitted several extensions and a grace period, (b)
flexibility tha\. permitted amendments to adapt the project to the changing
socio-economic environment including the Bank's decision to increase in
the Bank share of the total project cost financing from 702 to 752, and (c)
a positive and swift reaction to the October 10, 1986, earthquake, which
permitted the development of a school reconstruction program in metro-
politan San Salvador from Loan 1738-ES\.
22\. Good collaboration between GOES/BANKIUSAID developed in the pre-
appraisal atsge for assisting rural basic education\. USAID supported the
expansion of existinx rural schools and pre-service teacher training; the
- 8 -
Bank supported construction of new, and replacement of existing, rural
schools and in-service teacher training\. In project amendments this
collaboration continued including in the reconstruction of schools in
Metropolitan San Salvador due to the October 1986 earthquake\. However,
duplication was not completely avoided, as happened in the area of text-
books, an area where financial responsibilities were not well defined
originally\. This definition is an essential element for establishing a
system of successful collaboration\.
23\. The PlU was unsuccessful in maintaining an adequate relationship
with other Government departments and in some cases (PPMS) it was unable to
get timely and appropriate information about project activities and costs\.
VII\. SPECIALISTS AND FELLOWSHIPS
24\. The appraisal technical assistance component was modified and
reduced (see Annexes 1 and 9)\. Implementation of the technical assistance
program had a late start because the PIU had some difficulties acquiring
specialist services, whether through personal contacts or through institu-
tions (UNESCO)\. Implementation of specialists services was low in relation
to the original target (35Z) because this was reduced by amendment and
better in relation to the adjusted target (842) - see Annex 1\. On the
other hand, the fellowship program surpassed the revised target and met 82%
of the original appraisal target\. The failure to obtain specialist
services in some areas (curriculum, in-service teacher training evaluation,
school supervision and administration) is likely to have adversely affected
project outcomes, particularly as these were areas not covered by the
fellowship program - see Annex 9\. Technical assistance programs, because
of their nature and complexity, require detailed planning and they should
be clearly delineated early in the project to get full benefits\. This was
not the case in the project\. The lack of a system for monitoring these
services during project execution renders impractical any judgement on
their quality in this report\.
VIII\. PROJECT DOCUMENTATION AND DATA
25\. The Borrower expressed the view that the list of covenants in the
Loan Agreement was adequate and considered them helpful to maintain the
structure of the project despite the numerous changes of administration in
the Ministry of Education\. The Borrower failed to prepare a PCR draft, as
agreed with the Bank, because bureaucratic procedures delayed approval of
the contract for consulting services\. See Annex 6 about this covenant
Section 3\.10(d)\. However, the mission was provided by the PIU with suffi-
cient information to prepare the PCR\.
-9-
Annex 1
EL ~SULVAOOR
FOIRTh EDucTION PROJECT (LOAM 178U-tS)
PROJECT COWLETION REPORT
Protect Content\. Subaceunt Rwev Ilon nd VW \. It\.
Th\. project content at appraisal, aubsquent revisTon\. and re ult\. arm *umrised In Tabl- 1\.0
belows
Table 1\.0: Project Content, Reviaiona *nd Rsults
(a) Conatruction, furnishing, and/or equIPPing of tho Institutions indicated below:
Appraisal R hiion_ Results
talZ\.!1 7U) (1-a717E Cloeng Dte ADD nriel X
(i) Rural heIc
Education Nucl-i (RBEN)1/ U 40 lda\. tie\.
school- 245 2065 170 73
N - U4 1t Iden Ida_ 20 87
Extensien A Replacement 101 137 158 68
(It) OffIce end Stor g for
Teacber Training 1 ide Id"_ ida_ 1 100
(111) Office-building for the
Textbook Division 1 Id Ide_ ide_ 1 10
(iv) Post Secondary Technical
Institute 1 Idea deloted - -
(b) Provision of eut fore
(1) existing ce=e" 111 Ide_ Ide _ db - _
(11) vehicles for supervision 11 idea ide_ ide_ 4 36
(e) Tnacher training
(i) Pr-service tOecher
pregrm to gradute now
toachers 760 lde ide_ Id"_ 08/ 0
(i) In- rvice teacher
tratning cour to
prpare *xisting
teacher IG,e Ide idem lda\. 20,2784/ 204/
(111) Traoining course of
nuclei director, hos
Oeonomic and
Industrial arts t ehor 150 200 160 lde _/
(iv) A pilot phase and
eventual expnesIon
of special uprading
program for teacher with
&ore than six yere but
less than 20 years of
experience\. 190 deleted - - -
(d) Textbooks and Teaching Materials
() Design, dwvlopmet
production and distribution
of textbooks 1\.6I Ide 8\.96 lde\. 4*65^/ 2888/
i) Deign, deeloment produc-
tien and distribution of
t4eahitg gud ,m ", ida i dea lde
(e) Technical e losnce, comprising
() specialist service, and
staff/eat, 252 9a 104 idem e8 3S
(tl) -fllowshipe for treining
abroad 180 72 so Ide\. 146 62
(f) Reconstruction of moe\. Is2 a met
polst-\. S#ft Salvador 800 224 75
1/ Nulei; technlcnl/administrative learning units, each including a e ntral school surrounded by
subcentrsl and asciated schools\.
2/ Financed by USAID and deleted frm the project\.
8/ Not iplemented because the Norm l School was util zed for other purpose
4/ Includes 1, sechool directore/wdhinlatrators\. 270 school technicians\.
6/ Included In 4/
0/ Includes tem (d) (11)
7/ Not included In appralonl but Incorporated to the project by Leon Amndmet (June 27, 1007) -
S\. Annex 1 (cont'd)\.
- 10 -
Annex 1 (Cont'd)
As shown in the above table, the Loan Agreement and project
content were admended as follows:
(a) On August 11, 1983
(i) some project targets were readjusted as shown in the
above table
(ii) proceeds of the loan were reallocated; and
(iii) the closing date was postponed from June 30, 1984 to
June 30, 1985
(b) On June 2, 1986
(i) a special account was established;
(ii) the post secondary technical institute and related
training component were deleted and the aliount of US$4\.0
million corresonding to these items was cancelled\.
(iii) proceeds of the loan were reallocated;
(iv) the closing date was postponed from June 30, 1985 to
December 31, 1986\.
(c) On January 27, 1987
(i) The project was expanded to include construction and
reconstruction, furnishing and equipping of urban
schools in the San Salvador metropolitan area\. This
component was added in response to the greatest needs
for schools\. after the earthquake of October, 1986\.
(ii) proceeds of the loan were reallocated; and
(iii) the closing date was postponed from December 31, 1986 to
December 31, 1987\.
NOTE: The grace period was extended for one year until December 31, 1988\.
- 11 -
Annex 2
El Salvador
Fourth Education Proiect (Loan 1738-ES)
Project Cgmtletion Report
Summary of Basic Data (PART II)
Related Bank Loans
Loan/Credit Year of
Title Purpose Approval Status Comment
609-ES Education I Secondary Agricultural 1969 closed 1 year
& Technical Education in 1974 delay
1007-ES Education II Rural Basic Education 1974 closed 3 years
in 1983 delay
1571-ES Education III Industrial & Agri- 1978 closed in 5 years
cultural Training in 1987 delay
- 12 -
Annex 3
Project Tlmetable
Date Date Date
Item Planned Revised Actual
- identification 2178 - 10/77
- Preparation 4/6/78 - 2-6/78
- Appraisal Mission 10178 - 6-9/78
- Loan/Credit Negotiations 4/79 - 5179
- Board Approval 6121179 - 6/21/79
- Loan Signature 6/29179 - 6129179
- Loan Effectiveness 7/27/79 10/26179 & 1115180
11128179
- Loan Completion 12183 12/85 & 12187 12188
- Loan Closing 2184 12185 & 12187 12187
A\. Loan Disbursements
Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements
(us$ '000)
FY8Q Y81 Y82 EY8 EY8 FY5 M6 F8 YB F8
Appraisal Estimate 0\.70 6\.70 13\.70 20\.70 23\.50
Actual 0 0 0\.14 0\.59 3\.32 3\.85 7\.90 10\.58 14\.7 18\.68
Actual as 2 of Estimate 0 0 1 3 14 16 34 45 63 80
Date of Final Disbursement: January 26, 1989
B\. Proiect Implementation
Indicators Appraisal Estimate a/ Actual Estimate
Available Funds 1 1
Project Management 1 2
Development Impact 1 1
Overall Status 1 1
(a) Experience with this project points to the importance of proceding to implementation only after
ensuring that prerequisites for success are present, an obvious point but one that was ignored
in the face of substantial pressure to lend, i\.e\., (i) the project was permitted to proceed
with only minimal or weak assurance that the Government was able to provide the required
counterpart funds during implementation without reallocating from other p-)jects or important
activities; (ii) the most serious risk at appraisal was considered the possible delay in
execution due to frequent changes in high level personnel, lack of coordination among Ministry
of Education departments and inability of existing administrative machinery to adhere to a
fixed schedule\.
(b) This is a rating from the last SPN (6/09188)
-14 - Annex 5
Page 1 of 2
Proiect Costs and Financing
A\. Proiect Costs
(USsM)
Appraisal Estimatea/ Actual Appraisal
Pro,ect Component Amount % of Total Amount X of Total 2
New Replacement &
Extension Schools 20\.30 60 19\.0 74 94
Reequipment of
Existing Schools 0\.33 1 -- -- --
Teacher Training 3\.46 10 1\.17 5 34
School Supervision 0\.13 0\.5 -- -- --
Curriculum Development 0\.47 1\.5 -- -- --
Textbooks and Teaching
Materials 4\.02 12 4\.00 16 100
S\.M\. Technological
Institutebl 2\.62 8 -- -- --
Technical Assistance 1\.62 5 0\.23 1 14
Project Administration 0\.65 2 1\.04 4 160
Total 33\.60 100 25\.50 100
a/ Including contingencies\.
b/ This item was deleted from the project\.
- 15 -
Annex 6 (cont'd)
Page 2 of 2
S\. ProJect Financinc
Original Revised Al loctions tctual
Catemorv Al location (0/11/83) (0/2/88) (1/6/87) Disbureement
(1) Civil Works 9,3sa,61o 1,76a,e00 10,680,00 12,200,0 12,081,486\.60
(2) Furniture, equip-
Mant and teaching
materials 5,700,in 4,06,000 8,268,600 8,16860 8,107,877\.51
(3) Supplies and
printing of
materials sao,e 2,60,e06 8,7W0,068 2,568,608 2,528,208\.11
(4) Remuneration of
staff 1,800,M 6,400,000 soo,m 560,068 465,034\.78
(6) Teacher Training
and evaluation 568,eaa 2so,0ao 068,o60 260,060 29,485\.68
(6) Technical assistance
and tellouships 1,800,O 1,28,0010 406,0681 o 668,0 486,869\.2s
(7) Una located 4,100,800 1,19,0 600,00 350,o -
Total Amount Disbursed
Cancelled 4,680,000 822,781\.86
Total 28,568,000 28,5,00 19,608,000 19,600,600
Note: In twe componnte costs were euch sea I lr than the appr Isal
estimates, the reasons were the following:
Technical Trainins: (a) the training of new teachers (costed at USS\.6
millIon at approtisi) was not Implemented; and (b) the type\. of course
were modified with shorter periods or *sminars, which reduced costs\.
Technical Assistance: (a) By Loan Amendments, the appraisal target were
reduced to 41S for specialists services and to 32W In fellowships; (b) a
large proportion of speciallst services wre rendered by Salvadorias and
several fellowships were for course within the country, both factors costs
much lower\.
- 16 -
Anex 6
Status of Coveatn
Sectlon Covewnat Bating comeont
S 01(a) Project to be carried out 2 Tho projhet was loplementod
offtclently and provided efetwy ony during the years
wlth sufficient operational 1"8I/88 nd Inadqutely
Iut= provid iOth fund\. during the
first four years of lmplemenation
8\.01(b) Borrowr to maintain PIU 1
8\.62(a) Iorera to employ euprts for 1
site surveys, construction,
proparstion of bidu\.
8\.62(b) Baorrowe to eploy education I
special let\.
3\.6 orrower to provide ounterparte 1
8\.04 Borrower to consult Sonk on I
Fellowhips eolwetion and
training arrangements
8 \. sorrower to estblish Project 2 Proj et Fund was nver
Fund activatod\. Special Account
also approved by sank In
12/88 but sativated by
Blorrowr in 1886\.
*\.118() Appoint nuloe director 1
8\.66(b) Staff project shoolo 1
8\.66(c) Aign no or than 85 d 2 Clas sizes numbr up to 40
to multlgrade tzeahers\. etudant
8\.67(s) Employ T took production st I
8\.67(b) Undertake evluationon on 8 Borrower neither used financing
effect of school reor nor technical aesistance both
inputs by 12/81/85 badly needed to fulfill this
condition
8\.06 Undrtake yearly physical and a PPUS and PLANALID only Completed
educationl audit of completed In 4/85\. The formr buliding Is
Institutions being usd only In pert for project
purpoce and the latter for
ateivitios other than the project
as a eoneqence of th 1086
earthquake\.
-\.10(a) Borrower to furnish Bank with 1
plane, sedulho, revl*ions
ete\.
8\.10(b) orroer to Implement plans, 1
procuremnt schedules only with
Bank approvol
8\.10(e) Borrwer to mintin record\. ond 1
provide intormation to Bank as
8\.16(d) Borrower to prpare comletion a U Inof tficiency In contracting
report PCR with a consultant firm\.
8\.11 Site cslection and cequlsition 1
4\.02 Borrowr to maintain accounting 1
records
4\.68 Implement a nuclerization system 1
4\.04 Staffing of technical institute 8 Technical Institute was deleted from
project
4\.06 Establish student tracer and 8 Tchtnical Institute was deleted from
evaluation system for techno- project
logical Institute
4\.07(a) Establish nucldo supervision 1
system!
4\.07(b) losu reulations and provide 1
budget for nucleo supervision
system\.
4\.06 Operate lnstitutlon In accordane 2 Flnancial diffIculties constrain
wIth sound administrativ budgetary llocation
practicos, and provide annual
budget for m*intenance
RATWGS: 1 - Complied with, without undue difficulty
2 - Complied with, with m*jor problems
3 - Not compled with
- 17 -
Annex 7
Pleannd am Astasi ConWtfwoloa, of Itobwol n Clesomm
Na\. inhamla Aaalaa\.ntjSaaanaia\., Total
hbm~ ~ h~ gzu M~A &bmm -P'*_h a m - Ack
16hol Cihols, Classro C as CCS C
A\. BiisL
Ahnchpsn - s aa s is 3a
wmnet\. 1 2 - - t1 t10 20 5 5f tO
LaLZborted 7 Ls a * S s9 o S0 2 74 a a
go Saiv&4o, 2 9 1 1 2o0 02 10 o 91 10
Ch w is- - - - 9 U i 9 9 i a 9
cuaCtis\.e 1 2 1 2 4 11 14 82 ai i5 56
LsPea - - _ u 21 O 13 as 22 65
Cabanas 7 14 - - 12 7 a 1 19 41 a is
Son V;icente - 9 _ 9 2
uelitsn - - - 7 21 72 8 23 21 72 a as
Son Nitg\.l 12 27 1 2 12 22 l0 as 24 s0 is U
4os 4 6 - - 9 s 2 a i 24 2 6
, Union 6 10 la S 2 49 l2 22 so 14 as
St A" 15 *4 2 i 20 45 17 as S5 79 19 44
Sb-Totl 84 121 12 47 191 401 155 454 245 on2 1I 402
a Ufaa
(Rocen\.truction)
Sen Salvodk n\.e\. n\.e\. 7 1111 \.*\. \.a\. 2 n\.a\. 10 142
La Libarted - 1 12 n\.e n 2 S9 n\.m800 S 51
k-b-Total (Urban) n\.s\. a\.*\. S l2a n \. n\. 5 * ns\. a8w is 132/
otal 84 12T't7S le 20 175 1912 41 in 19 245 402 g175 69
111 istino _chool, to be priwtded Vyl with *In are not Inoludedlo _tie ann\.
2/ Spac" to, adisi,trat (02) *M r li brvy (11) sAd Labeatmwl\. (a) no Included
ClO""-- a taut lndlcatlon of wimber of echoa\.e and spaces other then dlaaa,e-\.a
a
- 18 -
Annex 8
1988 Enrollmeuet in\.Pro1ect Schools by Department
Replacement/
Expansion
Department New Sohodols Schools Total
Rural
Ahuachapan - 3,144 3,144
Sonsonate - 843 843
La Libertad 481 7,464 7,945
San Salvador 546 6,618 7,164
Chalatenango - 1,569 1,569
Cuscatlan 84 3,225 3,309
LaPas 101 4,170 4,271
Cabanas - 512 512
San Vicente - -
Usulutan - 1,945 1,945
San Miguel 50 3,505 3,555
Morazan - 200 200
La Union 758 3,287 4,045
Santa Ana 48Q 02\.489 2,969
Sub-Total (Rural) 2,500 38,971 41,471
Urban (Reconstruction)
San Salvador 5,274 2,248 7,522
La Libertad 1\.098 3\.120 4,218
Sub-Total (Urban) 6,372 5,368 11,740
Total (Rural & Urban) 8,872 44,339 53,211
- 19 -
Annex 9
Technical Assistance
Specialities Appraisal Actual Appraisal 2
Man/Months Man/onths
Curriculum Development 12
Curriculum Evaluation 12
Educational Research
Tecbniques 12
Educational Technology 12
Distance Learning Techniques 12
Learning Modules Development 24
Inservice Teacher Training
Evaluation 12
School Nuclearization 12 261I
Student guidance 12
Multigrade Teaching
Techniques 24
Textbook Production
(short term) 24 12
School Administration
and Supervision 24
School Reconstruction
San Salvador -- 3
Textbook Review -- 36
Editing and Printing
Textbooks -- 1
Technical Education
Modular Methodology 6 -
Preparation of Teaching
Materials 6 -
Agro-Industry 12 2
Industrial Maintenance 12 -
Industrial Engineering 12 2
Followup and Evaluation
System 12 --
Civil Engineering -- 2
Electrical Engineering -- 4
Total 252 88 35
Fellowships
Curriculum Development (6) 48 45
Distance Learning
Techniques (6) 48 41\.5
Textbook Production (12) 72 16\.5
Technical Education (4) 12 --
School Nuclearization -- 45
Total 180 148\.0 82
11 Includes two months in Curriculum and Naclearization course\.
- 21 -
COMMERTS IrOimSEE T ORROWg ATTACHMENT I
(An English translation of a letter dated March 28, 1990 received from
the Ministry of Finance, San Salvador, El Salvador)
San Salvador, March 28, 1990
Ministry of Finance Department of Fiscal Planning and
State Secretariat Department of Public Credit and
Transfers
Reference: El Salvador - Project Completion
Report, Fourth Education Project
(Loan 1738-ES)
Mr\. Graham Donaldson
Chief
Agriculture, Infrastructure and
Human Resources Division
Operations Evaluation Department
1818 H Street, N\.W\.
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
U\.S\.A\.
I refer to your note of January 31, 1990 where you request
comments on the PCR Fourth Education, Loan 1738, prepared by the Latin
America and the Caribbean Regional Office\.
I would like to inform you that due to the fact that there
were deficiencies in the execution of this project on the part of said
Bank as well as the Government of El Salvador, represented by the
Ministry of Education, I would like to suggest that in order to reach
the objectives in the projects financed by said institution in due
time and avoid negative results as those stated in the report, there
should be made periodic evaluations that will allow us to solve the
deficiencies during the process of same\.
We thank you for consideration\.
Ing\. Jorge Alberto Diaz
Vice Minister of Revenues
- 22 -
CONSOBTS YRf Tae gORROWE4 ATTACHMENT I
(An English translation of a telex dated April 17, 1990 received from
the Ministry of Education, San Salvador, l Salvador)
APRIL 17, 1990
MR\. GRAHAM DONALDSON
CHIEF
AGRICULTURE, INFRASTRUCTURE AND
HUMAN RESOURCES DIVISION
OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D\.C\.
U\.S\.A\.
TELEX: RCA 248423
WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR LETTER DATED JANUARY 31, FORWARDING THE PROJECT
COMPLETION REPORT ON THE FOURTH EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 1738-ES), WITH
RESPECT I COMMUNICATE TO YOU THAT THIS MkINISTRY AGREES WITH THE REPORT
AND HAVE NO ADDITIONAL COMMENTS TO PROVIDE AT THIS TIME\.
DR\. RENE HERANDEZ VALIENTE
MINISTER OF EDUCATION
TELEX 21046
EL SALVADOR, C\.A\. | APPROVAL |
P068730 | Document of
The World Bank
Report No: 25539-BR
PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT
ONA
PROPOSED GRANT
IN THE AMOUNT OF US$5\.8 MILLION
(US$5\.1 MILLION FROM USAID/WORLD BANK TRUST FUND
AND
US$0\.7 MILLION FROM RAIN FOREST TRUST FUND)
TO THE
FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL
FOR A
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SUBPROGRAM PHASE n PROJECT
APRIL 2005
Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Sector Management Unit
Brazil Country Management Unit
Latin America and Caribbean Region
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective March 22, 2005)
Currency Unit = Real (R$)
R$2\.70 = US$1\.00
US$1 = R$2\.70
FISCAL YEAR
January I -- December 31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
CAS Country Assistance Strategy
CGCTM General Coordinating Unit for Earth and Environmental Sciences (CNPq)
CNPq National Council for Scientific and Technological Development
CORPAM Regional Coordinating Commission for Research in the Amazon
DflD United Kingdom Department for International Development
EC European Commission
EU European Union
FINEP Agency for Financing of Studies and Projects
GOB Government of Brazil
INPA National Institute for Amazonian Research
LBA Large-Scale Biosphere-Atmosphere Experiment in Amazonia
MCT Ministry of Science and Technology
MMA Ministry of the Environment
MPEG Emilio Goeldi Museum of Para
PADCT III Science and Technology Reform Support Project
PCU Project Coordination Unit (MCT)
PIP Project Implementation Plan
PIU Project Implementation Unit (CNPq)
POA Annual Work Plan
PPG7 Pilot Program to Conserve the Brazilian Rain Forest
PRONEX Nuclei of Excellence Program
PROSAB Program in Basic Sanitation Research
R&D Research and Development
RFT Rain Forest Trust Fund
SEPED Secretariat for Policies and Programs of Research and Development (MCT)
SOE Statement of Expenditure
USAID United States Agency for International Development
Vice President: Pamela Cox
Country Manager/Director: Vinod Thomas
Sector Manager/Director: John Redwood
Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Judith Lisansky
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
BRAZIL
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SUBPROGRAM PHASE II PROJECT
CONTENTS
A\. Project Development Objective Page
1\. Project development objective 3
2\. Key perforrnance indicators 5
B\. Strategic Context
1\. Sector-related Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) goal supported by the project 6
2\. Main sector issues and Government strategy 6
3\. Sector issues to be addressed by the project and strategic choices 7
C\. Project Description Summary
1\. Project components 9
2\. Key policy and institutional reforms supported by the project 13
3\. Benefits and target population 14
4\. Institutional and implementation arrangements 14
D\. Project Rationale
1\. Project alternatives considered and reasons for rejection 16
2\. Major related projects financed by the Bank and/or other development agencies 17
3\. Lessons learned and reflected in the project design 19
4\. Indications of borrower and recipient commitrnent and ownership 21
5\. Value added of Bank and Global support in this project 21
E\. Summary Project Analysis
1\. Economic 21
2\. Financial 22
3\. Technical 22
4\. Institutional 22
5\. Environmental 23
6\. Social 25
7\. Safeguard Policies 26
h phis document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in
the performance of their ofricial duties\. Its contents may not be otherwise -disclosed
n vithout World Bank authorization\.
F\. Sustainability and Risks
1\. Sustainability 26
2\. Critical risks 27
3\. Possible controversial aspects 28
G\. Main Conditions
1\. Effectiveness Condition 28
2\. Other 28
H\. Readiness for Implementation 28
I\. Compliance with Bank Policies 29
Annexes
Annex 1: Project Design Summary 30
Annex 2: Detailed Project Description(A) Summary Draft Call for Proposals 33
Annex 3: Estimated Project Costs 43
Annex 4: N/A 44
Annex 5: Financial Summary for Revenue-Earning Project Entities, or Financial Summary 45
Annex 6: (A) Procurement Arrangements 47
(B) Financial Management and Disbursement Arrangements 51
Annex 7: Project Processing Schedule 55
Annex 8: Documents in the Project File 56
Annex 9: Statement of Loans and Credits 58
Annex 10: Country at a Glance 61
Annex 11: Monitoring and Evaluation Plan 63
BRAZIL
Science and Technology Subprogram Phase II Project
Project Appraisal Document
Latin America and Caribbean Region
LCSEO
I ate: April 15, 2005 Team Leader: Judith M\. Lisansky
S ector Director: John Redwood Sector(s): General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector
( ountry Director: Vinod Thomas (100%)
oject ID: P068730 Theme(s): Biodiversity (P), Other environment and natural
resources management (P), Participation and civic
engagement (S)
F 'roject Financing Data
- Loan [ 1 Credit [X] Grant [ Guarantee [ ] Other:
l'or Loans/CreditslOthers:
Amount (US$m): 6\.5
F inancing Plan (US$m): Source Local Foreign Total
BORROWER/RECIPIENT 0\.75 0\.00 0\.75
L S: AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 0\.00 5\.10 5\.10
( JSAID)
LOCAL GOVTS\. (PROV\., DISTRICT, CITY) OF BORROWING 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
COUNTRY
LOCAL SOURCES OF BORROWING COUNTRY 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
RAIN FOREST 0\.00 0\.70 0\.70
Total: 0\.75 5\.80 6\.55
Borrower/Recipient: FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL
MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (MCT) AND CNPq
Responsible agency: MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (MCT) AND CNPQ
MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (MCT)
Secretaria de Politicas e Programas de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento
Coordenacao Geral de Politicas e Programas Ambientais
Address: Esplanada dos Ministerios, Bloco "E", 2° Andar
CEP 70067-900 Brasilia, D\.F\. Brazil
Contact Person: Luiz Carlos de Miranda Joels
Tel: (+55 61) 317-8112 Fax: (+55 61) 317-7766 Email: joels(mct\.gov\.br
Other Agency(ies):
National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq)
Diretoria de Programas Tematicos e Setoriais
Coordenacao Geral do Programa de Pesquisas em Ciencias da Terra e do Meio Ambiente
Address: SEPN 509 Bloco "A", Ed\. Nazir I, 30 Andar
CEP 70\.750-501 Brasilia, D\.F\. Brazil
Contact Person: Helena Luna Ferreira
Tel: (+55 61) 2108-9281 Fax: (+55 61) 2108-9313 Email: hluna(cnpq\.br
Estimated Disbursements ( Bank FYIUS$m):
FY 2005 2006 2007 2008
Annual 1\.60 2\.25 1\.60 1\.10
Cumulative 1\.60 3\.85 5\.45 6\.55
Project implementation period: 4 years
Expected effectiveness date: 08/16/2005 Expected closing date: 09/01/2008
-2-
A\. Project Development Objective
1\. Project development objective: (see Annex 1)
Project Background
Although tropical rain forests contain most of the earth's biodiversity, and perform a range of important
environmental services, such as carbon sequestration to offset the effects of global climate change, they
remain one of the least understood ecosystems in the world\. This is especially relevant in the case of the
Brazilian Legal Amazon which encompasses about 5 million square kilometers (an area larger than
western Europe), represents 61% of Brazilian national territory, and comprises 30% of the world's
remaining tropical forest\. The Amazon, with its 23 distinctive ecoregions, is the repository of some of the
greatest genetic diversity on earth\. The Amazon region is also home to 17 million people both rural and
urban, including indigenous people, rubbertappers, nut gatherers, fishermen and small farmers, as well as
hosting an increasing number of enterprises in agribusiness, cattle ranching, and other industries -
comprising a pattern of expanding economic and demographic occupation and use of the region's natural
resources\.
The Pilot Program to Conserve the Brazilian Rain Forest supports a set of projects aiming to optimize the
environmental benefits offered by rain forest ecosystems in a way that is consistent with the development
goals of Brazil\. With about US$340 million of financial and technical assistance pledged to date by the G-7
countries, the Commission of the European Communities and the Netherlands, this program is the largest
multilateral donation for environmental conservation in a single country\. Its 16 projects include twelve
currently under implementation with 3 closed, as well as this project\. These include initiatives in Brazil's
Amazon and Atlantic forest regions designed to (i) help strengthen the capacity of the public sector to set
and enforce sound environmental policy; (ii) improve management of special protected areas, including
parks, extractive reserves, national forests, and indigenous lands; and (iii) increase the knowledge base on
conservation of the rain forest and sustainable utilization of its resources\. The Pilot Program is managed by
the Brazilian Government in coordination with the World Bank\. The Bank administers the Rain Forest
Trust Fund in accordance with agreements reached by the program participants, Brazil and donor
countries, as well as administering other donor specific Program trust funds such as the USAID Trust Fund
that would finance the operation which is the subject of this Project Appraisal Document (PAD) for the
Science and Technology Subprogram-Phase 2 Project (Science-2)\.
The Pilot Program's specific objectives have included: (i) demonstrating that economic and environmental
objectives can be pursued at the same time in tropical rain forests; (ii) preserving the huge genetic resources
of the rain forests; (iii) reducing the Amazon's contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions; and (iv)
providing a model of intemational cooperation between developed and developing countries on global
environmental issues\. Over the past four years, the Program has undergone an intensive mid-term
evaluation, a revision of its govemance structure, and process of planning for a possible future second
phase (still under debate) to scale up and mainstream its activities\. In addition, the "mission" of the
Program has been refined as follows: to contribute to policies that promote conservation and sustainable
development of Brazil's Amazon and Atlantic rain forests, including due attention to the livelihood of local
populations, by pursuing the following objectives: (i) generating, validating and disseminating knowledge
within Brazil\.
The Legal Amazon is defined under Brazilian law as the area comprised of the States of Acre, Amapa, Amazonas, Pari, Rondonia, Roraima, Mato
Grosso, Tocantins and parts of Maranha\.
-3 -
and the Amazon and Atlantic Forest regions; (ii) catalyzing the adjustment of policies and mobilizing
political support for their adoption and their effective implementation; (iii) promoting and selectively
supporting the mainstreaming and scaling-up of successful experiences and models; and (iv) strengthening
capacity in public, private and civil society institutions to implement such policies and apply new
knowledge\.
Brazil has a long tradition of supporting science and technology, but, until relatively recently, its
investments for environmental research on and in the Amazon have represented only a small fraction of
total S&T funding\. Furthermore, cutbacks in national S&T funding during the 1980s and early 1990s
further restricted the availability of resources for supporting research on environmental issues in the
Amazon and contributed to deterioration of the region's scientific infrastructure\. This was the context in
1994 for the Pilot Program's two interrelated projects under the Science and Technology
Subprogram-Phase 1 -- Emergency Assistance and the Science Centers and Directed Research -- which
sought to promote the generation and dissemination of scientific knowledge relevant to conservation and
sustainable management of the Amazon\. These two projects, which provided total funding in the amount of
about US$27 million (US$17\.43 million equivalent in grants from RFT, USAID, EC and DffD, and about
US$9\.23 million equivalent from GOB) and closed in June 1999 and December 1999 respectively, were
largely successful in rehabilitating the region's two premier science centers, the National Institute for
Amazon Research in Manaus (INPA) and the Emilio Goeldi Museum of Para (MPEG), as well as
supporting 23 competitively bid interdisciplinary research projects at multiple institutions focused on the
Amazonian ecosystems' structure and function; sustainable natural resource management and
socioeconomic and cultural systems (see ICR for Phase I and Emergency Assistance Projects)\. An
additional ECU 5 million was provided by the EC bilaterally in 1998 through the Pilot Program to fund a
second round of 30 directed research projects under the same themes (plus a fourth theme of low
environmental impact infrastructure) which were completed in early 2003\.
In addition to the jump start provided to S&T in the Amazon by the Pilot Program, in recent years the
situation has improved somewhat with S&T policy changes targeting and earmarking resources for the
region (see Section B\.2) and the advent of a number of national and international initiatives (see Sections
D\.2 and D\.3) designed to address some of the limitations affecting research in the Amazon\. Outstanding
among recent initiatives, the Brazilian govemment is currently coordinating a large international
multidisciplinary research program entitled "The Large-Scale Biosphere-Atmosphere Experiment in
Amaz6nia (LBA)" that seeks to understand how the Amazon functions as a regional entity, and how
changes in land use and climate affect the biological, chemical, and physical functions of the Amazon,
including the sustainability of development in the region and the influence of the Amazon on the global
climate\. LBA is funded by the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the EC and
the Govemment of Brazil\.
The proposed second phase project under the Pilot Program's Science and Technology Subprogram
(Science-2) has initially pledged financing of US$10 million from USAID of which US$5\.8 million is
already conmmitted and available in a World Bank trust fund (the remaining funds are under discussion) as
well as eleven percent counterpart financing\. The new project is designed to build on the accomplishments
and lessons learned from the subprogram's first phase, as well from other ongoing and planned Pilot
Program projects and related S&T initiatives in the region\. A major criticism of the first phase was the
degree of perceived disconnect between support for S&T and the interests of the Pilot Program overall and
regional end users in particular\. Hence, Science-2 was prepared with significant and broad stakeholder
participation, and its design enhances the incorporation of Pilot Program and regional concerns in the
targeting of S&T research priorities as well as emphasizing dissemination to end users\. The new project
- 4 -
also seeks to enhance the synergies between research groups at diverse institutions with special emphasis on
strengthening regional research groups and increasing the regional scientific cadre via the formation of
research networks described in detail in Sections C\. 1\.2 and Annex 2\. Furthermore, Science-2 has been
firmly integrated into the Ministry of Science and Technology's (MCT) strategic policies for Brazil that
seek to provide for the long-term consolidation, maintenance and expansion of the nation's S&T, as well as
MCT's specific strategic policies with respect to the Amazon that include, among others, strengthening and
fostering regional S&T capacity and infrastructure, linkages to the Pilot Program, and improved
dissemination of its results to benefit regional end users\.
Project development objective
The development objective of the proposed project is to promote and disseminate targeted and coordinated
scientific and technological research on key questions contributing to the conservation and sustainable
development of the Amazon region\.
To accomplish this objective, the project would support (i) targeted research subprojects in science and
technology in priority thematic research areas as well as capacity building of regional human resources; (ii)
the selection and use of innovative dissemination methods to augment the applicability and transfer of
scientific and technical knowledge to conservation and sustainable development end users in the Amazon;
and (iii) the development and use of an effective and efficient system of project and subproject
coordination, including an integrated system of monitoring and evaluation of project outcomes and impacts\.
2\. Key performance indicators: (see Annex 1)
Project impact would be determined on the basis of the useful and relevant scientific and technological
results that are produced, utilized and disseminated in an effective, coordinated and transparent manner\.
Key project performance indicators would include:
* The generation of high quality research results in science and technology contributing to the
conservation and sustainable development of the Amazon by integrated research networks, as measured
by the timely implementation of appropriate research methodologies, the achievement of well-defined
research objectives, and the originality and applicability of research results as evaluated by a panel of
experts\.
* The participation of a diverse range of institutions, multidisciplinary groups and other partners in
carrying out research, as measured by the number of entities involved, the inclusion of less experienced
research groups' and the number of high quality, multi-authored, juried publications\.
* The effective training of human resources under the research networks, as measured by the number of
participating scholarship recipients fulfilling 80% or more of their work programs\.
* Number of Pilot Program and other regional beneficiary comniunities reached via innovative
dissemination activities targeting nonscientific audiences\.
* Successful leveraging of additional resources to carry out dissemination strategy\.
* Full implementation of project management arrangements and use of integrated Monitoring and
Evaluation System for adaptive management of project, research networks and targeted research
subprojects\.
Less experienced research groups are"junior" (emergente) research groups led by a coordinator with a PhD earned less than five years ago, based in
the Amazon region, but litde known with only incipient contributions to S&T research\.
-5 -
the project is focused on the Amazon region, and has been carefully tailored to complement other
governmental and donor financed S&T initiatives in the region\. In addition, although competing research
groups do not have to be physically located in the Amazon region, they do need to be affiliated with
Amazonian institutions\. In addition, proposals would be favored that include collaboration with less
experienced Amazon research groups and the emphasis for scholarship support would be targeted to
students in the Amazon or those intending to remain, hence the project also addresses the sector issue of
strengthening S&T human resource capacity for and in the Amazon region\.
The proposed project would focus on supporting targeted research in key areas related to the conservation
and sustainable development of the Amazon\. Five Priority Thematic Research Areas were identified by the
CAN for the Amazon region overall, including: (i) the impacts of land use and climate change on
ecosystems; (ii) biodiversity and environmental functions; (iii) integrated management of terrestrial
ecosystems and the recuperation of degraded areas; (iv) land use and endemic diseases of the Amazon; and
(v) integrated management of watersheds, aquatic ecosystems and recuperation of degraded areas\.
During preparation, it was proposed that the project further target its regional research support to two
Priority Thematic Research Areas considered essential for the conservation and sustainable development of
the Amazon region's natural resources\. These are (i) integrated management of terrestrial ecosystems and
recuperation of degraded areas; and (ii) integrated management of watersheds, aquatic ecosystems and
recuperation of degraded areas - being referred to in shorthand as the "Forest" and "Water" themes\. These
were selected strategically for two main reasons\. One is to maximize the complementarity of the project to
other existing ongoing programs and projects already being supported or under development for the
Amazon region, and the second is because of the relevance of these two themes to the focal interests of the
Pilot Program\. In addition, the two themes were endorsed by six regional stakeholder consultations carried
out by MCT\.
The project also directly addresses the issue of increasing the involvement, relevance and dissemination of
S&T results to regional stakeholders and end-users, with special attention to the Pilot Program\. This would
be done in several ways\. First, research subproject selection would include specific criteria to promote
more applied research, intra- and inter-institutional collaborations, and adequate dissemination plans\.
Second, it is expected that the networks and sub-networks (research clusters) would encourage a more
inclusive learning environment where a wider range of institutions (such as universities and research
centers) and groups (such as NGOs, community organizations) would participate\. Third, the project
includes a component specifically focused on the dissemination of research findings to nonscientific
audiences and particularly Pilot Program beneficiary populations\. Fourth, the project management would
be supported by a Consultative Committee including Pilot Program representation; and lastly, the project
monitoring and evaluation system would be designed to monitor dissemination activities\.
- 8 -
C\. Project Description Summary
1\. Project components (see Annex 2 for a detailed description and Annex 3 for a detailed cost breakdown):
Indicative Bank- % of
Component Costs % of financing Bank-
(US$M) Total (US$M) financing
Component 1: Support for Targeted Research Subprojects 5\.38 82\.1 5\.03 86\.7
Component 2: Dissemination of Information and Results 0\.34 5\.2 0\.34 5\.9
Component 3: Support for Project Management and 0\.83 12\.7 0\.43 7\.4
Network Activities
Total Project Costs 6\.55 100\.0 5\.80 100\.0
Total Financing Required 6\.55 100\.0 5\.80 100\.0
Project Context
To provide the context for the project components, this section will briefly describe the project's approach
to (a) targeting research areas; (b) research networks; (c) the Request for Proposals (Edital) and (d)
dissemination\. Further details are provided below and in Annex 2 and Annex 2(a) (Summary of Draft
Request for proposals)\.
(a) Prioritizing and Targeting Research
It was agreed that the project would focus on stimulating research activities in only two Priority Research
Thematic Areas, selected with extensive consultation to complement national S&T strategy, existing
programs and projects and the focal interests of the Pilot Program on conservation and sustainable
development of the Amazon's natural resource\. These thematic areas are:
* Integrated management of terrestrial ecosystems and recuperation of degraded areas, which is being
referred to in shorthand as the "Forest" theme; and
* Integrated Management of watersheds, aquatic ecosystems and recuperation of degraded areas, being
referred to as the "Water" theme\.
To further direct and target the research activities to be financed under the project, a series of specific
research areas or Priority Research Topics were further defined for each of the Priority Research
Thematic Areas\. Hence, under the "Forest" theme, the Priority Research Topics defined for the bidding
process include: (i) the conservation and use of plant genetic resources; (ii) biogeochemical cycles; (iii) the
conservation and recuperation of wildlife resources; (iv) the recuperation of degraded areas; and (v) timber
and nontimber products\. Priority Research Topics to be bid under the "Water" theme would include: (i)
water quality; (ii) the biology and ecology of aquatic organisms; (iii) aquiculture; (iv) the recuperation of
degraded areas and/or systems; and (v) the conservation and use of fishery resources and fishery
technologies\.
In addition, the research competition would encourage Cross-Cutting Research in the ethnosciences,
natural resource economics and the social sciences (especially the relations between the state and society)
-9-
linked to the above cited Priority Research Topics\. Further information on research targeting is in Annex 2
and Annex 2(a) - Summary of the Draft Request for Proposals\.
(b) Network Approach\. The proposed project is designed to encourage the formation and strengthening of
research networks both within the Amazon region and with researchers and research groups outside the
region\. The methodological approach for this would be as follows: the Request for Proposals (see Annex
2(a)) would require researchers and research groups at diverse agencies and institutions both inside and
outside the Amazon region with interest in specific but interrelated research subprojects to get together and
propose the formation of a Research Cluster (consortium or sub-network) of researchers investigating
different but related aspects of research questions linked to the same Priority Research Topic\. Hence, the
screening and evaluation of proposals would be evaluated both in terms of the quality of the individual
subprojects being proposed by research groups as well as on certain features of the entire Research Cluster
which would represent a "package" or consortium of interrelated subprojects\.
After considerable debate about how best to induce these consortia, consensus emerged that it would be
best to allow researchers to spontaneously form and propose their own Research Clusters\. While the
competition is open to subprojects being carried out both by researchers based in the Amazon region and
elsewhere, the proposed scientific coordinator of the Research Cluster (as well as being a coordinator of a
specific subproject) is expected to be a researcher with recognized outstanding scientific standing who is
based in a high quality scientific institution in the Amazon region which has committed itself to serving as
the focal point for the Research Cluster\. These coordinators of the Research Clusters, with the assistance of
CNPq, would promote a variety of periodic interchanges among the research subprojects\.
Lastly, the project would also support the formation of two larger Networks - one for the "Forest" theme
and one for the "Water" theme - to be comprised of all the pertinent Research Clusters\. CNPq would
organize meetings of the two networks every two years\.
(c) Request for Proposals\. The Request for Proposals would specify that the competition will be a single
process consisting of two sub-parts, using weighted criteria to direct the process\. In the first sub-part,
proposals for Research Clusters would focus on the definition of the scientific question, scientific
qualifications of researchers, commitment of the diverse institutions, and cross-cutting themes as well as a
plan for integration of the Cluster\. Proposals for Research Cluster will further specify that the maximum
financing for a Research Cluster would be US$900,000 and that each Cluster should be comprised of four
or more research subprojects\. There would be no set amount for the financing of individual research
subprojects, which may vary\.
In the second sub-part, Research proposals would include detailed proposals for each research subproject,
the dissemination potential of research results to nonscientific audiences, as well as other details (see Annex
2(a))\. Research Cluster and Research proposals would be evaluated and finalists selected\. Research
proposals would be evaluated and winners selected\.
Detailed proposals for each research subproject will include dissemination potential of research results to
nonscientific audiences, a plan for integration of the Cluster, as well as other details (see Annex 2(a))\.
Proposals would be evaluated and winners selected\.
(d) Dissemination Approach\. The project would include dissemination activities in two components\.
Under Component 1, Research Clusters (and their constituent subprojects) would be encouraged to develop
dissemination activities oriented toward nonscientific audiences\. In addition, dissemination beyond the
scientific community is anticipated for the network and sub network conferences and related activities\.
- 10 -
Furthermore, given that the traditional target audiences of scientific dissemination are primarily the
scientific community rather than regional end-users, a separate component (Component 2 - Dissemination
of Information and Results) was designed to support innovative methods of outreach to Pilot Program and
Amazon regional end users\. It is anticipated that Component 2, described in detail below and in Annex 2,
would be a separate competitive fund\. Selected activities under Component 2 would likely be carried out by
nongovernmental organizations and other entities engaged in extension and technical assistance in the
region\.
Project Description (see Annex 2 for a detailed description)
Component 1: Support for Targeted Research\. (Estimated cost US$5\.382 million or 87% of total project
cost)\.
This component would support a grants program to fund the formation and implementation of consortia of
integrated research subprojects (organized in Research Clusters) to be evaluated on a transparent
competitive basis and responding to established priorities\. The maximum financing for a Research Cluster
would be US$900,000 to fund four or more specific research subprojects the size and costs of which may
vary\. Up to 30% of the total grant funding of each research subproject may be used for scholarships\. MCT
and CNPq emphasized their intention to provide additional scholarships for winning Research Clusters, as
supplementary counterpart, but were unable to a priori determine the size of this commitment\.
Specifically, this component would support (i) issuance of the Request- for-Proposals; (ii) evaluation and
selection of grouped proposals (see definition of Research Cluster above); (iii) implementation of grouped
subprojects; and (iv) regional network and sub-network activities such as conferences, specialized training
and regional information exchanges\.
Qualified grantees would include researchers with doctoral degrees or the equivalent who are linked to
public and private universities, nonprofit research centers, foundations and other nonprofit research
organizations\. Researchers or research groups outside the Amazon may compete for subproject financing
but must be part of a regionally based Research Cluster (see definition above)\.
Further information on the targeted Priority Thematic Areas and Priority Research Topics is outlined above
and in Annex 2(a) - Summary of the Draft Request for Proposals\. Depending on the quality and number of
proposals and given the current financing available, it is anticipated that approximately five to ten Research
Clusters addressing Priority Research Topics under the two Priority Research Thematic Areas are expected
to be funded during this initial stage of the project\. A second Request for Proposals is planned if the
anticipated additional financing becomes available\.
The agreed screening criteria for proposals are specified in Annex 2(a), Summary of the Draft Request for
Proposals\. It is important to note that apart from the scientific merit of the individual subprojects,
qualifications of the scientists and institutional commitment normally required in research competitions, the
criteria also assign the maximum number of points for (i) the applied potential of the research subprojects
to Amazon regional environmental and socioeconomic issues, (ii) whether or not less experienced
researchers or research groups in the Amazon region are included in the Research Cluster; (iii) an
integration plan for the Research Cluster (iv) qualifications for research team, and (v) Institutional
Stability\. The objective of the first criterion is to target research of the highest relevance to Pilot Program
goals\. The objective of the second is to stimulate more established research groups and institutions (
consolidados) to collaborate with less experienced researchers (grupos emergentes) to strengthen scientific
human resources in the Amazon region\. The third criterion looks at the proposed intra- and
- 11 -
inter-institutional collaboration and linkages being proposed for the Research Cluster overall\. The fourth
consists of an evaluation of Curriculo Lattes of the coordinator and team members\. The fifth criterion
works to ensure the infrastructure of the participating institutions are adequate to the scope of the research\.
Lastly, to further encourage interdisciplinary collaboration, one criterion assigns up to three points for if
the Research Cluster includes subprojects involving the Cross-Cutting Themes (ethnosciences, natural
resources economics and social sciences)\. With respect to the screening criteria for the research proposal,
the same criteria are applied with four additional criteria which include: (i) scientific methodology; (ii)
potential for dissemination of research results for nonscientific audiences; (iii) timetable; and (iv) detailed
budget\.
Each research subproject would have a coordinator with scientific and admninistrative responsibilities\.
CNPq would provide management, financial and procurement assistance to subproject coordinators\. Each
Research Cluster would have one scientific coordinator at the selected lead institution responsible for
inter-institutional collaboration and exchange\.
Direct support for the selected research subprojects would correspond to approximately US$4\.7 million or
73% of total project costs and include funding for research, research equipment, upgrading of research
facilities or equipment, training and scholarships, and travel and dissemination activities\. Training and
scholarships (bolsas) under this component would focus on providing the necessary scientific and technical
skills to students and technicians from the Amazon region participating in the research groups\. Individual
institutional overhead is not eligible for project funding; rather, individual institutions are expected to
provide counterpart in terms of institutional support for the research groups\. Financing for the activities
related to the Request for Proposals and network-wide activities, such as workshops, meetings and
conferences, would be handled by CNPq\. Preparation of a satisfactory final draft Request for Proposals is
a condition of effectiveness\.
Component 2: Dissemination of Information and Results (Estimated cost US$0\.344 million or 6% of
total project cost)\.
The second component would support the identification and implementation of innovative dissemination
methodologies targeting specific nonscientific stakeholder audiences for public awareness raising and
training purposes, as well as for the direct application of research results to key regional concerns\. This
component is predicated on the assumption that the transfer of science and technology information to Pilot
Program and regional end users is rarely the main goal, function or comparative advantage of the scientific
community\. To ensure that the project addresses the dissemination concerns of the Pilot Program to
beneficiaries and other regional end users, and given the general lack of governmental extension services in
the Amazon region, it was concluded that this component should be designed as a competitive fund to
support dissemination activities more frequently undertaken by universities, nongovernmental organizations
and specialized research institutes\. These entities provide many of the currently available extension and
technical assistance to regional communities, often working for example in agroforestry, sustainable
timbering, recuperation of degraded areas, natural resource management and other topics\. To broaden the
base of the science and technology knowledge transfers and to ensure that such transfers occur well before
the conclusion of the research subprojects under this operation, it was agreed that dissemination proposals
may draw upon research results generated by previous phases of the Science and Technology Subprogram
as well as scientific research results from all Pilot Program-supported activities provided they are related to
themes of approved clusters for Phase II\.
During the first year of the project, CNPq would develop a simplified competitive process for application to
these funds which they would subsequently admninister and supervise, through a cooperative process and
- 12 -
with the participation of specialists from different areas and with experience in dissemination activities to
nonscientific audiences\. Because the funds are relatively limited, it is anticipated that they would be applied
to complement existing outreach activities by regional organizations\. The development of a satisfactory
competitive mechanism for use of these funds is a condition of disbursement for the comnonent\. with the
exception of the first subcomponent which is the development of the mechanism\.
Specifically, this component would support: (i) development of a dissemination strategy for nonscientific
audiences during the first year of project implementation that would include, among other things, the
definition of the mechanisms for inviting and selecting proposals for innovative dissemination activities;
and (ii) implementation of competitively selected dissemination activities designed to use relevant research
results to address regional and community concerns, provided they are related to the approved thematic
networks for Phase II\.
Component 3: Support for Project Management and Network Activities\. (Estimated cost US$0\.827
million or 7% of total project costs\.)
This component would support the implementation of an efficient project management system to facilitate
subproject execution (including the administration of the research networks, their composite sub-networks
and research groups, and dissemination subprojects) and an effective monitoring and evaluation system\.
Specifically, this component would support: (i) project coordination activities by MCT; (ii) project
implementation activities by CNPq; and (iii) implementation of the monitoring and evaluation system,
including physical and financial monitoring, outcome and impact indicators for the assessment of
subproject and project success in attaining its specific and overall development goals, as well as
independent mid-term and final evaluations\. Further information on project implementation arrangements
can be found in Sections C\.4 and E\.4, and further information on monitoring and evaluation is in Annex 11\.
The project would also establish a project Consultative Committee (see Section C\.4 and Annex 2) the
objectives for which would include, among others, facilitating effective and efficient inter-institutional
coordination, helping to resolve implementation problems encountered, and providing oversight for the
project\.
A detailed draft project operational manual as well as a draft project implementation plan (PIP) have been
prepared\. Adoption of a satisfactory final draft of the operational manual is a condition of effectiveness\.
2\. Key policy and institutional reforms supported by the project:
As the second phase project under the Pilot Program's Science and Technology Subprogram, the proposed
project would seek to sharpen the focus of regional research under the subprogram to address the most
important concerns related to Pilot Program initiatives for the conservation and sustainable development of
the Amazon\. The project would also support the development of an innovative system of networks linked to
priority research themes and composed of interdisciplinary research groups who would focus on subproject
design and implementation to address agreed research questions\. The networks would focus not only on the
generation and dissemination of research results to a narrowly defined technical audience; they would also
assist in the process of linking the research results generated to the most pressing concerns of regional end
users\.
- 13 -
3\. Benefits and target population:
Benefits under the proposed project would include the generation, dissemination and application of targeted
research results to support conservation and sustainable management efforts in the Amazon, especially in
relation to Pilot Program initiatives\. The project would also support the development of an innovative and
dynamic research network composed of science institutions, multidisciplinary research groups and other
entities, who would engage in activities that move beyond the traditional research agenda to include training
of local human resources in the targeted regions, and the direct application of relevant research results to
help local populations\.
Main beneficiaries include the regional science and technology community, who would benefit from
activities under the project that aim to (i) strengthen, integrate and reinforce emerging research groups in
the Amazon through the proposed research network strategy; and (ii) help build capacity in order to
consolidate the regional human resource base for S&T research in the Amazon\. In addition, local
communities and end users would benefit from the generation and improved dissemination of
multidisciplinary, applied research results under the project to help address local sustainable development
issues\. Pilot Program stakeholders would also benefit from the targeted research approach, which would
focus in part on research priorities and information needs related to Pilot Program initiatives\.
4\. Institutional and implementation arrangements:
General project coordination and supervision as well as oversight of project monitoring and evaluation
would be the responsibility of MCT's Technical Secretariat for the Science and Technology Subprogram,
under the Unit for the General Coordination of Environrmental Policies and Programs of the Secretariat for
Policies and Programs of Research and Development (SEPED)\. The direct implementation of project
activities, project monitoring and evaluation, and coordination of the research clusters would be the
responsibility of MCT's premier research agency, the National Council for Scientific and Technological
Development (CNPq) through its General Coordinating Unit for Earth and Environmental Sciences
(CGCTM)\.
MCT would establish a Project Coordination Unit (PCU) within the Technical Secretariat (SEPED) to
oversee the project\. The PCU's responsibilities would include (i) overseeing/supervising project activities in
coordination with CNPq, the Consultative Committee, other participating entities, and project donors; (ii)
coordinating/analyzing project progress and financial management reports for submission to the Bank; (iii)
reviewing annual work plans; (iv) managing the flow of project funds in coordination with the Bank and the
National Treasury Secretariat; (v) integrating coordination of the Science 2 project with other Pilot
Program projects; (vi) conducting strategic analysis of project results for regional policy purposes; and (vii)
overseeing the implementation of the project monitoring and evaluation plan\. The establishment of the
Project Coordination Unit within MCT with staff in adequate numbers and qualification under Terms of
Reference satisfactory to the Bank\. is a condition of Grant effectiveness\.
CNPq would establish a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) responsible for: (i) carrying out the bidding
process regional dissemination and selecting and contracting targeted research subprojects; (ii)
coordinating, managing and supervising the research networks, clusters and research subprojects, including
provision of administrative and technical assistance; (iii) preparing the dissemination strategy and
mechanisms, and identifying, selecting and contracting targeted dissemination subprojects; (iv)
implementing the project monitoring and evaluation strategy, including subproject level monitoring and
evaluation; (v) preparing annual work plans for MCT review; (vi) preparing project progress and financial
management reports for MCT review; and (vii) day to day management of project funds\. The establishment
of the Project Implementation Unit within CNPq with staff in adequate numbers and qualification under
- 14 -
Terms of Reference satisfactory to the Bank, is a condition of Grant effectiveness\.
The project would also establish a project Consultative Committee which would, among other things,
facilitate effective and efficient inter-institutional coordination; help resolve implementation problems that
may arise; and provide oversight assistance for the project\. Membership on the Consultative Committee
would include one representative each from: MCT's Secretariat for Policies and Programs of Research and
Development (SEPED); CNPq's General Coordinating Unit for Earth and Enviromnental Sciences
(CGCTM); the Technical Secretariat of another Pilot Program project; and a representative of the scientific
community with previous experience in research networks similar to the one to be implemented in the
Science 2 project\. The Consultative Committee would invite representatives of other organizations or
institutions to meetings as needed\. Each institution or program would select their representative and the
representative of the scientific community would be selected by MCT from a short list of six candidates to
be prepared by CNPq\.
Within the research networks, each research subproject would have a coordinator with scientific and
administrative responsibilities\. The PIU within CNPq would provide administrative, procurement and
financial management assistance to subproject coordinators\. In addition, each Research Cluster (or
sub-network) would have a scientific coordinator at the selected lead institution responsible for
inter-institutional collaboration and exchange\. To facilitate the management of the research networks,
clusters and research subprojects, the PIU would include two network management assistants to, among
other things, assist in administering, monitoring and integrating the targeted research activities\. Also on
PIU staff would be two financial management officers, a procurement specialist, and three technical
assistants\.
The project's administrative and financial management procedures would be further specified in a detailed
Operational Manual\. A detailed draft Operational Manual has already been prepared\. Adoption of a
satisfactory final draft Operational Manual is a condition of effectiveness\.
The project would be implemented according to a four-year Project Implementation Plan (PIP) specifying
activities, implementing agencies, timing and costs\. A draft PIP has already been prepared\. The PIP would
be further operationalized by Annual Operating Plans (POAs) detailing for the coming year, by component
and subcomponent, the activities, goals, implementation responsibilities, time frames/dates and monthly
expenditures\. The POA would be prepared by the PIU/CNPq in consultation with research subproject
coordinators for review and analysis by the PCU/MCT prior to submission to the Bank\. Preparation of a
satisfactory POA for the first year of project implementation is a condition of effectiveness\.
The selection of CNPq as the implementing agency for the current project should contribute significantly to
improving project outcomes\. CNPq is a specialized, semi-autonomous agency of MCT responsible for a
large portion of the financial and administrative management of science and technology projects throughout
Brazil\. Established in 1951, and made a public foundation in 1974, CNPq is also the lead national agency
for the administration of national and international scholarships, awards and stipends to Brazilian scholars\.
It has almost a decade of previous experience in promoting and implementing research networks, such as
PRONEX, and others\. CNPq also has ample experience in international cooperation, and in the
management of internationally funded projects, including responsibilities under the Bank-funded PADCT
III project\. Signature of a satisfactory Operating Agreement (Convenio) between MCT and CNPq is a
condition of effectiveness\.
-15 -
D\. Project Rationale
1\. Project alternatives considered and reasons for rejection:
The main project alternative considered was a continuation of the Phase I project, which included both
directed research support and infrastructural assistance for the development of two regional science centers
of excellence, the Emilio Goeldi Museum of Para (MPEG) and the National Institute for Amazonian
Research (INPA)\. The Phase I project was implemented by a specially created project management unit
within MCT, with financial management performed by the Agency for Financing of Studies and Projects
(FINEP/MCT)\.
The continuation of the Phase I design was eventually ruled out for the following reasons: (i) the
implementation arrangements of the Phase I project contributed to a variety of difficult and persistent
financial management and administrative bottlenecks throughout the Phase I project implementation period;
(ii) the full development of regional institutions into centers of excellence requires considerable additional
funding and implementation follow-through not available through the Pilot Program; (iii) the selection,
coordination and implementation arrangements for Directed Research subprojects under the Phase I project
did not sufficiently support the identification of innovative approaches adequately integrated with the needs
of end users and the objectives of the Pilot Program as a whole; (iv) recent policy developments within the
S&T strategy of the Brazilian government have resulted in the creation of long-term sectoral funds with a
certain percentage earmarked to fund science and technology development (including infrastructure) in
universities and research institutions of the Amazon and other regions of Brazil; and (v) other initiatives,
including the Millennium Science Initiative under PADCT III, have been developed in recent years to
provide infrastructure support to science centers in the Amazon and other regions of Brazil\.
The Phase I project design was thus passed over in favor of a more innovative approach which would focus
on supporting targeted research groups and contributing to related capacity building of regional science and
technology personnel as well as placing a greater emphasis on the transfer of information to regional end
users\. In addition, the designation of CNPq as project implementing agency would further enhance project
performance, due to CNPq's prior experience in the administration of science and technology projects as
well as research networks\.
Furthermore, in light of the serious financial management issues that emerged during the first phase of the
subprogram, special attention was paid during project preparation to designing effective and efficient
administrative arrangements to support the innovative aspects of the second phase project\. To this end, a
comparative analysis was conducted of the relative advantages and risks of various financial management
arrangements\. These included channeling project funds through: (i) private, nonprofit entities such as
Social Organizations (Organizacao Social - OS); and (ii) Public Interest Civil Society Organizations
(Organizacao da Sociedade Civil de Interesse Publico - OSCIP); (iii) semi-autonomous public finance
agencies, such as the Bank of Brazil or FINEP; (iv) specially established finance foundations, such as
FUNBIO; and (v) government agencies, such as CNPq\. The various options and entities were assessed
primarily on the basis of their capacity for agile, efficient management of project funds (including ease of
transferring counterpart funds); their legal/bureaucratic advantages and constraints; their capacity to meet
Bank financial management requirements; and their capacity to support the achievement of project
development objectives\.
CNPq was ultimately confirmed as project implementing agency on the basis of this comparative analysis,
which demonstrated, among other things, that while the other options might offer fewer bureaucratic
requirements and greater flexibility overall (especially the OS's and OSCIPs), they: (i) would present
- 16 -
additional costs in terms of higher administrative fees and formation of project financial management teams
(in the case of OS's and OSCIPs, and to a lesser extent Bank of Brazil and FINEP); (ii) have not been
performing especially well in recent years (especially the case for the Bank of Brazil which has started
charging higher overheads while providing fewer services, and FINEP which has lost its designation as a
private enterprise); (iii) would still require the involvement of CNPq in the disbursement process (in the
case of Bank of Brazil); (iv) would require additional agreements for processing Government counterpart
funds (in the case of all entities except CNPq); and (v) may not have the capacity to meet Bank financial
management requirements (in the case of OS's and OSCIPs)\. Furthermore, CNPq would be in the best
position overall to achieve and intemalize project development objectives, due to its above-mentioned prior
experience in the administration of science and technology projects as well as research networks\. Lastly,
the Ministry of Science and Technology strongly articulated its preference for using CNPq for this project\.
During project preparation, various approaches to the formation and organization of research networks and
clusters were also explored\. One option considered was to use geographic distribution criteria instead of
priority thematic research areas as an organizing principle for the networks\. This approach was eventually
rejected due to the following issues: (i) lack of consensus on the identification of appropriate geographic
criteria to inform the organization of the networks; (ii) the risk of geographic distribution criteria becoming
arbitrary or irrelevant insofar as sub-regional distinctions cannot be adequately reflected in broad
geographic categories; (iii) research priorities defined on a geographic basis cannot be scientifically
sustained; (iv) in light of information needs and scant human resources in the region, the organization of
research networks based on targeted research thematic areas would contribute to optimizing the generation
and dissemination of scientific knowledge\. Nevertheless, a geographic based approach could still be
proposed under the current project given that the formation of Research Clusters would be spontaneous\.
2\. Major related projects financed by the Bank and/or other development agencies (completed,
ongoing and planned)\.
Latest Supervision
Sector Issue Project (PSR) Ratings
(Bank-financed projects only)
Implementation Development
Bank-financed Progress (IP) Objective (DO)
Science and Technology Reform The objective of this project is S S
Support Project/Millennium Institutes to improve the overall
(PADCT III) performance of Brazil's science
(CNPq) and technology sector by
undertaking activities that
promote scientific research and
technological innovation in
priority thematic areas\.
Brazil National Biodiversity Project This project supports (i) a series S S
(GEF) (MMA, CNPq) of workshops to set biome-level
priorities for biodiversity
conservation and development
of a national biodiversity
strategy, (ii) establishment of a
national biodiversity
information network, and (iii)
- 17-
funding of model biodiversity
projects involving various
combinations of public and
private sector organizations\.
Science Centers and Directed Research The Phase I project aimed to S S
Project, Phase I promote the generation and
(closed 12/99) and Emergency dissemination of scientific
Assistance (closed 6/99) knowledge relevant to
(MCT/FINEP) conservation and sustainable
development activities in the
Amazon region through: (i)
support for a competitive grants
program for funding directed
research projects in the Amazon
region; and (ii) strengthening
two established research
institutions of the Amazon, the
National Institute for Amazon
Research (INPA) in Manaus,
and the Emilio Goeldi Museum
of Para (MPEG) in Beldm\.
Emergency Assistance was
associated with the Phase I
project and aimed to strengthen,
on an emergency basis, the two
science centers\.
Other development agencies
Amazon Biosphere-Atmosphere Large The objective of this project is
Scale Experiment (LBA) (US/NASA; to understand how the Amazon
EC, MCT, CNPq) functions as a regional entity,
and how changes in land use
and climate affect the
biological, chemical, and
physical functions of the
Amazon, including the
sustainability of development in
the region and the influence of
the Amazon on global climate\.
Program in Basic Sanitation Research The focus of this project is on
(PROSAB) (IDB, MCT, CNPq) developing and improving water
treatment and sanitation
technologies on the basis of
priority research themes and
research networks involving
universities, technology
institutes and the private sector\.
- 18 -
Other Relevant Projects: This project aims to enhance
Program to Support "Nucleos" of and disseminate science and
Excellence (PRONEX) technology information through
(Govt\. of Brazil) support for integrated research
(CNPq) networks, including newly
established/emerging research
groups\.
Program for the Humid Tropics The focus of this project is on
(CNPq, other research institutions such providing support for the
as INPA, MPEG) development of
multidisciplinary research
networks to investigate relevant
economic, social and strategic
themes for the sustainable
development of the Amazon
region\.
Inter-American Institute for Research This initiative supports
into Global Change (CNPq, INPE) development of projects on
issues related to climate change,
comparative ecosystem studies,
socioeconomic impacts from
global change, and related
policy/private sector issues\.
Science & Technology Programs for The objective is to develop,
Ecosystem Management (INPA, 1NPE, disseminate and promote
MCT, Sociedade Civil Mamiraua, utilization of S&T knowledge
MPEG) for Brazilian ecosystem and
biodiversity management\.
lP/DO Ratings: HS (Highly Satisfactory), S (Satisfactory), U (Unsatisfactory), HU (Highly Unsatisfactory)
3\. Lessons learned and reflected in the project design:
Lessons from previous Bank lending for science and technology, including the Brazil-PACDT, include the
need to: (i) assess current and future science and technology needs for development in order to plan
resource development and allocation among research priorities; (ii) promote opportunities for
inter-institutional and interdisciplinary collaboration of the extended local scientific community; (iii)
monitor and evaluate project implementation and outcomes; (iv) introduce incentives related to efficient,
appropriate productivity, primarily by basing access to resources on demonstrated performance; (v)
promote access to information resources; (vi) provide basic infrastructure and equipment needs in order for
science and technology projects to prosper; (vii) support the vital role of the private sector in science and
technology education and research; (viii) link research and teaching to assure relevance, and (ix) move to
decentralized self-management of education and research\.
The design of the current project incorporated many of the above lessons, as well as lessons learned from
the initial operations under the Pilot Program's Science and Technology Subprogram Phase 1, including the
- 19-
Emergency Assistance and Science Centers and Directed Research Projects, as well as the second round of
Directed Research Projects (PPD2) supported bilaterally by the European Commission\. Lessons learned
from Phase 1 include the need to: (i) better target directed research; (ii) improve integration of the
subprogram with the Pilot Program as a whole; (iii) better disseminate results to possible users of scientific
knowledge; (iv) screen research for innovation since previous operations tended to finance the continuation
or repetition of existing or previous work; (v) improve attention to emerging institutions and S&T capacity
building in the region (beyond the flagship institutions); (vi) design monitoring and evaluation systems in
advance; and (vii) improve the administrative, financial and procurement arrangements\. Lessons learned
from PPD2 also emphasized the need for better coordination and integration of research groups; improved
dissemination of research results both to scientific and to broader stakeholder audiences; improved
admninistrative assistance to research groups to facilitate the timely procurement of necessary equipment;
and the provision of scholarships to facilitate the involvement of regionally based students in the directed
research projects\.
The new project is based on an updated assessment and more targeted prioritization of regional research
needs that was also broadly discussed with Pilot Program and regional stakeholders\. Science-2 is more
explicitly linked to addressing the focal interests of the Pilot Program in the conservation and sustainable
development of the Amazon's natural resources, as well as improving dissemination to regional end-users\.
The new project seeks to specifically encourage interdisciplinary and inter-institutional collaboration and
synergies by means of the proposed formation of research networks designed to include emerging research
groups and build S&T capacity\. Revised criteria for the selection of research subprojects should help target
both innovative research, and research considered more relevant to Pilot Program needs\. In addition,
Science-2 includes a well-designed monitoring and evaluation system, with a requirement that each research
subproject proposal include its expected results and its goals in terms of products, which would be useful to
the monitoring and evaluation, since the impact of scientific research, especially in relation to biodiversity
conservation or natural resource management, can generally only be adequately captured in the long-run\.
Furthermore, the new operation's administrative, financial and procurement arrangements have been
thoroughly redesigned\. Finally, the second phase project will support the provision of scholarships to train
regional S&T resources\.
In addition, the new operations incorporates lessons learned from the implementation of other research
networks in Brazil and the Amazon region, such as PROSAB (Programa de Saneamento Basico),
PRONEX (Programa Nicleos de Excelencia), the Long-Term Ecology Program (Programa de Ecologia de
Longa Duracao) and the Millennium Institute\. Under PROSAB, for example, CNPq has effectively
coordinated the establishment of four thematic research networks involving about six institutions each for
the development and application of appropriate technologies for water/sanitation management\. The
experience thus far has demonstrated how the effective integration of diverse research groups in a
cooperative effort can foster the development of innovative and complementary methodologies to address
targeted issues in water and sanitation management\.
Lessons learned from the PROSAB and other experiences include that: (i) establishing research networks
can dynamize research synergies and optimize the use of financial and human resources; but (ii) often
necessitate some cultural change on the part of the scientific community more accustomed to more
individualized and isolated research endeavors; and (iii) require strong and respected scientific leadership
for such networks to be successful including that the coordinators must be highly respected active
researchers with a broader vision of the interrelationship of scientific questions as well as a strong interest
in the applied aspects of results\. Other key elements of successful research networks are the need to: (iv)
clearly formulate research questions; (v) form strong inter-regional and international partnerships; (vi)
ensure satisfactory individual institutional support for research groups; (vii) avoid groups assuming more
- 20 -
responsibilities than they can operationally handle; and (viii) ensure adequate monitoring and evaluation\. In
addition, it is clear that in the Amazon region, (ix) previous research experience has largely been of a more
isolated nature; (x) many Amazon region research groups are emerging groups with less experience and/or
less educational qualifications; and (xi) to date there has been a dearth of more programmatic approaches
emphasizing inter-institutional exchanges and linkages\.
The new project has targeted and well defined research priorities and questions, intends to actively
disseminate the research network approach prior to the Request for Proposals, as well as providing
extensive implementation support and supervision to ensure success\. It is designed to select outstanding
scientific leadership, promote partnerships including with less experienced groups or institutions, ensure
operational assistance to participants, and would require individual institutional counterparts\.
4\. Indications of borrower and recipient commitment and ownership:
Within the S&T sector, the Government of Brazil has engaged in an active program of growth and reform,
providing significant funding for research and innovation in recent years, and developing an extensive
policy agenda\. With respect to the proposed project, the GoB has demonstrated commitment and ownership
through development of a specific S&T regional strategy for the Amazon that aims to: (i) strengthen
regional capacity and infrastructure; (ii) enhance linkages to the Pilot Program; (iii) strengthen strategically
targeted research thematic areas in the Amazon; (iv) improve dissemination of results to benefit regional
end users; and (v) support regional conservation and sustainable development\. The Government has also
established a region-specific coordination unit within MCT to improve integration of diverse Amazonian
programs and projects within the context of national and regional S&T policies, and has already charted
substantial experience in the formation and coordination of research networks on a national and regional
basis under three ongoing initiatives\. In addition, national funding for S&T has been significantly increased
in recent years, with some 30% earmarked for S&T support to traditionally under-funded regions of the
North, Northeast and Central West\.
5\. Value added of Bank and Global support in this project:
Bank involvement in this project would add value on the basis of the Bank's experience with:
* Science and technology projects, worldwide, including those related to tropical natural resource
management;
* Science and technology lending and grant-financed operations in Brazil;
* Promoting decentralized management and brokering partnerships in Brazil;
* Innovative methods of providing technical assistance to poor populations\.
0
E\. Summary Project Analysis (Detailed assessments are in the project file, see Annex 8)
1\. Economic (see Annex 4):
O Cost benefit NPV=US$ million; ERR = % (see Annex 4)
O Cost effectiveness
* Incremental Cost
O Other (specify)
-21 -
2\. Financial (see Annex 4 and Annex 5):
NPV=US$ million; FRR = % (see Annex 4)
The total project costs of US$6\.5 million are divided between investment (US$6\.0 million) and recurrent
(US$0\.5 million) costs\. The resources to fund these costs would be provided by the Bank through the Rain
Forest Trust Fund (US$0\.7 million), USAID (US$5\.1 million) and the Government of Brazil (US$0\.7
million)\.
Fiscal Impact:
N/A
3\. Technical:
The major technical issues addressed during the project preparation included: improving research targeting;
implementing a network approach; disseminating research results to regional end users; and establishing an
effective monitoring and evaluation system\. The research targeting, described in Sections B\.3, C\.1\.2 and
Annexes 2 and 2(a), has been improved to more closely align the project to Pilot Program objectives\. The
research network approach, described in Sections C\.1\.2 and Annexes 2 and 2(a), both builds on existing
research network approaches in Brazil and introduces several innovative features including targeting the
Amazon region and fostering partnerships with less experienced research groups\. The challenge of
dissemination to Pilot Program and regional end users, described in Section C\.1\.2 and Annex 2, is being
addressed primarily by a proposed mechanism to finance, on a competitive basis, regional organizations
already specializing in providing extension and technical assistance; in addition, scientists are also being
encouraged to formulate dissemination plans for nonscientific audiences\. Considerable work was carried
out to formulate an integrated monitoring and evaluation system for the project which is summarized in
Annex I 1\.
4\. Institutional:
4\.1 Executing agencies:
The Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT) would serve as project executing agency, while its
National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) would serve as the project
implementation agency\. Research and dissemination subprojects selected competitively to be financed
would be executed by their proponents; subproject coordinators would be assisted by CNPq technical
support staff\.
4\.2 Project management:
The predominant concerns during preparation were to avoid the administrative, financial management, and
financial flow problems that plagued the first phase, ensure an integrated M&E system, and address the
challenges of efficient management of subprojects organized into networks and sub-networks\. Given
CNPq's successful track record both with administering scientific research and facilitating a network
approach, together with detailed reviews during preparation of the management arrangements, more
effective and efficient management of Phase 2 is anticipated\. In addition, project management would be
guided by a detailed project operational manual, a draft of which has already been provided\.
4\.3 Procurement issues:
Special attention was paid during preparation of the Phase II project to the lessons learned from
procurement bottlenecks experienced during the first phase project\. A procurement capacity review was
conducted to (i) evaluate the procurement implementation capacity of both MCT and CNPq; (ii) assess the
- 22 -
risks that may negatively affect the ability of the project implementing agencies to carry out the
procurement process; (iii) develop an action plan to address any deficiencies detected; and (iv) propose a
suitable Bank procurement supervision plan for the project\. Based on the results and recommendations of
the review, the following procurement arrangements were agreed and incorporated into the project (see
Annex 5(a) for more details):
* Procurement responsibility\. The PIU within CNPq would be directly responsible for overall
procurement activities, including compliance with procedures and timetables agreed with the Bank\. It
was agreed that the PIU would appoint a procurement specialist under Terms of Reference agreed with
the Bank within one month after project effectiveness, to prepare annual procurement plans; draft
standard procurement documents, carry out overall supervision of procurement being implemented by
the research subprojects; prepare procurement processes in selected cases; and train/coach personnel
involved in procurement under the targeted research subprojects\. The implementation of the project
would require that most of the procurement would be done in small packages by an estimated 20-50
research subprojects\. The subproject coordinators are responsible for procurement at the subproject
level, with the help of administrative assistants\. The procurement specialist within the PIU would also
be in charge of procurement monitoring and reporting, and maintaining the project's procurement files\.
* Procurement plans\. Given that the bulk of procurement would take place under the research
subprojects, which would be selected and initiated only late in the first year of project implementation
(i\.e\., by late 2005), it was agreed that CNPq would prepare annual procurement plans on the basis of
the annual work plans (POAs) which would define the research subprojects per item\. It was agreed that
a procurement plan for 2005 would be submitted for discussion during project negotiations\.
* Procurement monitoring/supervision\. Close monitoring and supervision is critical to minimizing
identified risks associated with the fact that most of the procurement would be carried out by
scientists/technicians on a decentralized basis\. To facilitate this process, it was agreed that procurement
data would be integrated into the financial management information system by project effectiveness,
and that independent procurement reviews would be carried out at the end of 2006 and 2007\. In
addition, detailed procurement procedures would be spelled out in a detailed Operational Manual\.
4\.4 Financial management issues:
During project preparation, a detailed review of financial management issues and the capacity of MCT and
CNPq to administer project resources was undertaken with resulting recommendations being incorporated
into the design of Phase II project implementation arrangements (see Sections C\.4, and Annex 6(b) for
more information)\. A comparative analysis of altemative financial management mechanisms was also
undertaken during project preparation (see Section D\.1)\. The FM arrangements were revised during
negotiations in November 2003, and again in November 2004\. Based on these reviews, it was concluded
that both MCT and CNPq have the comparative advantage and requisite experience for project
implementation, provided the following actions are taken prior to effectiveness: full implementation of
SIGMA system including agreed financial management report and SOE formats: and the composition of a
financial management team within the project implementation unit (PIU) of CNPq\. Detailed financial
management procedures would also be documented in the Operational Manual\.
5\. Environmental: Environmental Category: C (Not Required)
5\.1 Summarize the steps undertaken for environmental assessment and EMP preparation (including
consultation and disclosure) and the significant issues and their treatment emerging from this analysis\.
The project retains a "C" for environmental assessment purposes\. It is not expected to produce any
- 23 -
negative environmental effects\.
In terms of general environmental impacts, the proposed project is expected to increase capacity in the
environmental sciences in the Amazon and in Brazil, and improve the technological knowledge needed to
sustainably utilize the resources from the rain forest\.
Key stakeholders include the national and regional science and technology community, the PPG7, national
and international NGOs, grass-roots based organizations, and local end users\.
5\.2 What are the main features of the EMP and are they adequate?
N/A
5\.3 For Category A and B projects, timeline and status of EA:
Date of receipt of final draft:
N/A
5\.4 How have stakeholders been consulted at the stage of (a) environmental screening and (b) draft EA
report on the environmental impacts and proposed environment management plan? Describe mechanisms
of consultation that were used and which groups were consulted?
Stakeholder consultations were initiated before closure of the Phase I project and continued during
preparation of the Phase II project summarized below\.
* During the mid-term review (September 1997) of the Science Centers and Directed Research, Phase I
and Emergency Assistance Projects, two meetings were held in Manaus and Belem with research
scientists, technicians and administrators from a broad range of regional research institutions, including
entities already involved in implementation of Phase I Directed Research subprojects, to discuss the
issues, lessons learned and suggestions for improving directed research implementation in future phases
of the subprogram\.
* In March 1999, a two-day seminar was held in Brasilia bringing together stakeholders of the Science
and Technology Subprogram and the Pilot Program (particularly project technical secretariats) to
discuss recommendations for a second phase with attention to incorporating Pilot Program concerns in
the Science and Technology Subprogram\.
* Towards the end of Phase I in December 1999, a two-day seminar was held in Manaus including both
stakeholders of Phase 1 and Pilot Program representatives to discuss the results of the first phase
activities, and recommendations for the proposed design of the Phase 2 S&T subprogram\.
* In March 2000, the MMA held a Pilot Program retreat that identified potential linkages between
projects and specifically generated a list of Pilot Program research needs\.
* In June 2000, the CGPA established a high-level committee (CAN) of eminent national scientists to
advise MCT on research priorities for the Amazon as well as to make recommendations for the Phase
II project\.
* From September to December 2001, CGPA held stakeholder workshops on the Phase II projects in five
cities in the Amazon as well as in Brasilia\.
- 24 -
5\.5 What mechanisms have been established to monitor and evaluate the impact of the project on the
environment? Do the indicators reflect the objectives and results of the EMP?
N/A
6\. Social:
6\.1 Summarize key social issues relevant to the project objectives, and specify the project's social
development outcomes\.
The main social issues pertain to (i) the applicability and dissemination of research results to Pilot Program
and Amazon regional end users, and (ii) strengthening regional scientific capacity\. With respect to the first
issue, the preparation of the second phase project included extensive consultations with a broad range of
project stakeholders, including regional nongovernmental organizations, on the design of the new project, as
well as discussions on potential dissemination activities\. The current project is designed to better target
research oriented toward Pilot Program concerns as well as including evaluation criteria on research
applicability and dissemination\. It is expected that the network activities would also facilitate linkages
beyond the scientific community\. In addition, the innovative dissemination component proposed would
finance a variety of activities designed to transfer S&T knowledge to regional end users by universities,
nongovernmental organizations and other agencies already engaged in the region in extension and technical
assistance activities\. Hence the project is expected to improve the applicability and dissemination of
research results to Pilot Program and regional end users\.
The second issue of strengthening regional scientific capacity is addressed by the network approach that
encourages the participation of less experienced research groups in the sub-networks as well as the
inclusion of scholarships for the training of regional S&T human resources\.
6\.2 Participatory Approach: How are key stakeholders participating in the project?
See Section 5\.4 for a description of the involvement of key stakeholders during the preparation process\.
During project implementation, it is expected that key stakeholders of the scientific community would
participate through their involvement with subprojects, sub-networks and networks\. Funding is included for
a variety of exchange activities such as meetings and conferences\. It is further expected that network
meetings would periodically include broader stakeholders such as pertinent government agencies and
nongovernmental organizations as well as representatives of community organizations\. Pilot Program
beneficiaries and regional end users are expected to participate directly in the dissemination subprojects
(Component 2)\. In addition, there would be a Pilot Program representative on the project consultative
committee\.
6\.3 How does the project involve consultations or collaboration with NGOs or other civil society
organizations?
Nongovernmental research organizations could participate directly by competing for project financing for
research activities under Component 1\. Civil society organizations could also participate in network
conferences and meetings to be financed under Component 1\. In addition, it is expected that
nongovernmental organizations and other civil society organizations would participate directly in
dissemination subprojects to be financed under Component 2\.
6\.4 What institutional arrangements have been provided to ensure the project achieves its social
development outcomes?
The project would finance, on a transparent competitive basis, research and dissemination subprojects to be
- 25 -
carried out by a wide variety of eligible institutions\. The decentralized subprojects at diverse institutions
would receive technical and administrative assistance from CNPq\.
6\.5 How will the project monitor performance in terms of social development outcomes?
The project monitoring and evaluation system includes indicators to measure (i) that innovative
dissemination activities are carried out by experienced organizations leveraging existing extension and
technical assistance activities; (ii) awareness and application of research results to Pilot Program and
regional end users; (iii) participation of a diverse range of institutions and partners in research and network
activities; and (iv) effective training of human resources under the research networks\. See Section A\.3 and
Annex 1 1\.
7\. Safeguard Policies:
7\.1 Are any of the following safeguard policies triggered by the proje ct?
Policy Triggered
Environmental Assessment (OP 4\.01, BP 4\.01, GP 4\.01) 0 Yes 0 No
Natural Habitats (OP 4\.04, BP 4\.04, GP 4\.04) 0 Yes * No
Forestry (OP 4\.36, GP 4\.36) 0 Yes 0 No
Pest Management (OP 4\.09) 0 Yes * No
Cultural Property (OPN 11\.03) 0 Yes * No
Indigenous Peoples (OD 4\.20) 0 Yes 0 No
Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4\.12) 0 Yes * No
Safety of Dams (OP 4\.37, BP 4\.37) 0 Yes * No
Projects in International Waters (OP 7\.50, BP 7\.50, GP 7\.50) 0 Yes 0 No
Projects in Disputed Areas (OP 7\.60, BP 7\.60, GP 7\.60)* 0 Yes * No
7\.2 Describe provisions made by the project to ensure compliance with applicable safeguard policies\.
N/A
F\. Sustainability and Risks
1\. Sustainability:
1\.1 Financial\. The future financial sustainability of science and technology investments in the Amazon
region appear to be more promising than ever before due to recent major policy shifts in the Ministry of
Science and Technology (MCT) including the approval of major long-term sectoral and infrastructural
S&T investment programs which for the first time will be allocated in part by percentages to specific
regions of Brazil\. It is expected that these longer-term policies will be continued under the new
administration\. The project would also contribute to the future financial sustainability of research
institutions in the Amazon region insofar as research groups are strengthened in their capacity to compete
for national and international research funds\.
1\.2 Political/Institutional\. The second phase project is expected to greatly benefit from execution by
CNPq, Brazil's most experienced and effective research oversight institution, by the network approach, and
by the inclusion of scholarships to strengthen regional S&T human resources\. The research networks to be
established by the project are likely to be sustainable in terms of the more favorable S&T national
investment program, as well as the emphasis Government is placing on improving S&T in the Amazon
region\. Furthermore, it is expected that exchanges among research institutions would be maintained by
other means after the project\. In addition, policies favoring the dissemination and application of S&T
- 26 -
results to regional end users are likely to receive continued support from the new administration with its
focus on social equity as well as issues of sustainable development\.
2\. Critical Risks (reflecting the failure of critical assumptions found in the fourth column of Annex 1):
Risk Risk Rating Risk Mitigation Measure
From Outputs to Objective
Development Objective: M This risk has been minimized by involvement of
The PPG7 Science Subprogram continues key stakeholders in the definition of research
to fail to adequately address concerns questions; specific criteria to select relevant
relevant to the conservation and research subprojects; and targeted support to
sustainable development of Brazil's broader dissemination activities including a
tropical forests\. dissemination component that will finance
innovative ways to link research results with
end-users\.
From Components to Outputs
The research networks are incorrectly M The Request for Proposals has been carefully
constituted and/or the complexity of the designed; and CNPq has accumulated
networks undermines the smooth considerable experience in establishing and
functioning, coordination and exchange supporting the implementation of research
among research groups\. networks\.
Persons trained under the research grants N Emphasis of human resource training program
do not remain in the Amazon region\. will be on providing training for students and
young professions at Amazonian institutions and
research organizations thus maximizing the
probability that the trained people will remain in
the region\.
The dissemination activities fail to M The risk will be addressed by weighted criteria
adequately target and deliver pertinent favoring applied research and dissemination to
information to the correct audiences, and nonscientific audiences as well as by an
hence the Science Subprogram continues innovative component to support S&T
to be considered as mainly not addressing knowledge transfers by NGOs and other entities
the needs of the Pilot Program\. to regional end users\.
Similar administrative and financial M Alternative project administrative and financial
management problems that plagued the management arrangements have been carefully
first phase continue in this follow-on assessed and the arrangements selected are
operation\. expected to maximize effectiveness\. Plus
switching the executing agency from FINEP to
CNPq should facilitate overcoming numerous
problems encountered in the first phase\.
Overall Risk Rating M
Risk Rating - H (High Risk), S (Substantial Risk), M (Modest Risk), N(Negligible or Low Risk)
- 27 -
3\. Possible Controversial Aspects:
Although the Science 2 Project has incorporated numerous elements to ensure improved linkages with the
Pilot Program, it would be unrealistic to expect that the project could substitute for the wider lack of
available extension and technical assistance in the Amazon region; hence there remains a possibility that the
operation might be perceived by some as continuing to not address the needs of Pilot Program stakeholders\.
G\. Main Conditions
1\. Effectiveness Condition
* Satisfactory Operating Agreement (Convenio) between MCT and CNPq signed\.
* Satisfactory Annual Operating Plan (POA) for the first year of project implementation prepared\.
* Satisfactory Operational Manual prepared\.
* Satisfactory financial and procurement management system established\.
* MCT Project Coordination Unit (PCU) established with staff in adequate numbers and qualification
under Terms of Reference satisfactory to the Bank\.
* CNPq Project Implementation Unit (PIU) established with staff in adequate numbers and qualification
under Terms of Reference satisfactory to the Bank\.
* Satisfactory Request for Proposals prepared\.
2\. Other [classify according to covenant types used in the Legal Agreements\.]
Disbursement condition for Component 2, Subcomponent 2\.2
* Satisfactory competitive mechanism to carry out dissemination subprojects developed\.
H\. Readiness for Implementation
[ 1\. a) The engineering design documents for the first year's activities are complete and ready for the start
of project implementation\.
X 1\. b) Not applicable\.
E 2\. The procurement documents for the first year's activities are complete and ready for the start of
project implementation\.
El 3\. The Project Implementation Plan has been appraised and found to be realistic and of satisfactory
quality\.
C1 4\. The following items are lacking and are discussed under loan conditions (Section G):
- 28 -
I
1\. Compliance with Bank Policies
1 1\. This project complies with all applicable Bank policies\.
O 2\. The following exceptions to Bank policies are recommended for approval\. The project complies with
all other applicable Bank policies\.
Judith M\. Lisansky John Redwood Vinod Thomas
Team Leader Sector Director Country Director
-29 -
Annex 1: Project Design Summary
BRAZIL: Science and Technology Subprogram Phase II Project
Key Performance Data Collection Strategy
Hierarchy of Objectives Indicators Critical Assumptions
Sector-related CAS Goal: Sector Indicators: Sector/ country reports: (from Goal to Bank Mission)
To contribute to policies Functioning research Project monitoring and Political climate conducive to
promoting conservation and networks established and evaluation system reports\. harmonizing economic and
sustainable development of contributing to addressing key environmental objectives\.
the Amazon and Atlantic Pilot Program concerns\. Pilot Program M & E reports
Forest regions, including (AMA project)\. Policy makers open to
necessary attention to the Dissemination of research incorporation of research
livelihoods of local results to Pilot Program results into public policies\.
populations, through the beneficiaries and end users\.
generation, evaluation and
dissemination of knowledge\.
Project Development Outcome I Impact Project reports: (from Objective to Goal)
Objective: Indicators:
To promote and disseminate Research results produced, Mid-term review The Science 2 Project
targeted and coordinated shared and utilized in an adequately addresses concerns
scientific and technological effective, coordinated and Independent evaluations relevant to the conservation
research on key questions transparent manner\. and sustainable development
contributing to the Implementation Completion of the Amazon region\.
conservation and sustainable Regional research capacity Report -ICR
development of the Amazon enhanced\.
region\. Final reports of research
subprojects, CNPq and/or
technical consultancies\.
Reports of Consultative
Committee
M&E system reports
Output from each Output Indicators: Project reports: (from Outputs to Objective)
Component:
Innovative research on High quality research results Subproject proposals and The research networks can be
strategic regional themes in science and technology implementation reports\. appropriately constituted and
effectively carried out and generated by well-defined and their complexity managed to
regional research capacity integrated research groups, as Feedback on subproject results ensure smooth functioning,
strengthened\. measured by the timely by independent panel\. coordination and exchange
implementation of appropriate among research groups\.
research methodologies, the Subproject findings and
achievement of well-defined dissemination in scientific Researchers trained under the
research objectives, and the and other fora (e\.g\., meetings, subprojects remain in the
originality and applicability of peer-reviewed journals, etc\.) Amazon region\.
research results as evaluated
by a panel of experts\. Scholarship recipient progress
- 30 -
reports\.
Participation of diverse
institutions, multidisciplinary Minutes of research network
groups and other partners in and sub-network meetings\.
carrying out research, as
measured by the number of M&E system reports
entities involved, the
inclusion of less experienced Supervision missions
research groups and the
number of high quality,
multi-authored, juried
publications\.
Effective training of human
resources, as measured by the
number of participating
scholarship recipients
fulfilling 80% or more of their
research programs\.
Innovative methods utilized Number of Pilot Program and Dissemination strategy The dissemination strategy
to disseminate research other regional beneficiary defines appropriate methods
results to pilot program and communities reached via Dissemination subproject for adequately targeting and
regional end users\. innovative dissemination proposals and implementation delivering pertinent
activities targeting reports\. information to Pilot Program
nonscientific audiences\. beneficiaries and other
Verification of effectiveness of regional end-users\.
Successfuil leveraging of dissemination to targeted
additional resources to carry groups\.
out dissemination strategy\.
M&E system reports
Supervision missions\.
Project managed and Full implementation of project Operational Manual The measures to correct the
research subprojects management arrangements, administrative and financial
functioning efficiently, and use of integrated Implementation reports\. management problems of the
effectively and adaptively\. Monitoring and Evaluation first phase are adequate\.
System for adaptive Supervision missions\.
management of project,
research networks and M&E system reports
targeted research subprojects\.
-31 -
Key Performance Data Collection Strategy
Hierarchy of Objectives Indicators Critical Assumptions
Project Components / Inputs: (budget for each Project reports: (from Components to
Sub-components: component) Outputs)
Comnonent 1 US$5,381,767 Workshop reports\.
Support for Research
Subprojects on Strategic Report on process/outcomes of
Themes competitive bidding process\.
1I\.1 Publication of Request for Semiannual project progress
Proposals (Edital) reports\.
Semiannual research
1\.2 Evaluation and selection subproject implementation
of Research Clusters reports\.
1\.3 Implementation of Independent evaluations of
subproject proposals research subproject
implementation\.
1\.4 Support for regional Network and sub-network
network and sub-network event reports\.
activities\. Supervision missions\.
M&E system report
Component 2 US$344,333 Semiannual reports on
Dissemination of \.
Information and Results dissemination\.
Implementation\.
2\.1 Development of Report on process/outcomes of
Dissemination Strategy competitive bidding process\.
2\.2 Implementation of Semiannual project progress
activities under Dissemination reports\.
Strategy (including public Semiannual research
awareness and education subproject implementation
campaigns and appropriate reports\.
methodologies for \. \.
dissemination of research
results to end users)\. M&E system reports\.
Component 3 US$827,453 Semiannual project progress
Support for Project reports\.
Management and Network
Activities Quarterly financial
management reports (FMRs)\.
3\.1 Support to MCT
Annual audits\.
3\.2 Support to CNPq
Supervision missions\.
3\.3 Implementation of
Monitoring and Evaluation M&E reports\.
Plan
- 32 -
Annex 2: Detailed Project Description
BRAZIL: Science and Technology Subprogram Phase II Project
Project Overview
The development objective of the proposed project is to promote and disseminate targeted and coordinated
scientific and technological research on key questions contributing to the conservation and sustainable
development of the Amazon region\.
To accomplish this objective, the project would support: (i) integrated targeted research subprojects in
science and technology in priority thematic areas, as well as capacity building of regional human resources;
(ii) the selection and use of innovative dissemination methods to augment the applicability and transfer of
scientific and technological knowledge to conservation and sustainable end users in the Amazon; and (iii)
the development and use of an effective and efficient system of project and subproject coordination and
management including an integrated system of monitoring and evaluation of project outcomes and impacts\.
The proposed project components, described in more detail below, are:
* Component I - Support for Targeted Research;
* Component 2 - Dissemination of Information and Results; and
* Component 3 - Support for Project Management and Network Activities\.
While this second phase of the Pilot Program's Science and Technology Subprogramn builds on the first
phase already executed, the second phase has been modified to improve research targeting, implement a
network approach and strengthen dissemination\. The second phase approach is summarized in the
following paragraphs\.
Prioritizing and Targeting Research\. First, after considerable discussion and stakeholder consultations,
consensus was reached that the project would focus on stimulating research activities in only two Priority
Research Thematic Areas\. These thematic areas are: (1) Integrated management of terrestrial ecosystems
and recuperation of degraded areas, which is being referred to in shorthand as the "Forest" theme; and (2)
Integrated Management of watersheds, aquatic ecosystems and recuperation of degraded areas, being
referred to as the "Water" theme\. The two themes were selected to complement national S&T strategy,
existing programs and projects, and the focal interests of the Pilot Program on the conservation and
sustainable development of the Amazon region's natural resources\.
To further direct and target the research activities to be financed under the project, a series of specific
research areas or Priority Research Topics were further defined for each of the Priority Research
Thematic Areas\. Hence, under the "Forest" theme, the Priority Research Topics defined for the bidding
process include\. (i) the conservation and use of plant genetic resources; (ii) biogeochernical cycles; (iii) the
conservation and recuperation of wildlife resources; (iv) the recuperation of degraded areas; and (v) timber
and nontimber products\. Priority Research Topics to be bid under the "Water" theme would include: (i)
water quality; (ii) the biology and ecology of aquatic organisms; (iii) aquiculture; (iv) the recuperation of
degraded areas and/or systems; and (v) the conservation and use of fishery resources and fishery
technologies\.
In addition, the research competition would encourage Cross-Cutting Research in the ethnosciences,
- 33 -
natural resource economics and the social sciences (especially the relations between the state and society)
linked to the above cited Priority Research Topics\. Further information on the targeting is in Annex 2(a) -
Summary of the Draft Request for Proposals\.
Network Approach\. Second, the proposed project is designed to encourage the formation and
strengthening of research networks both within the Amazon region and with researchers and research
groups outside the region\. The methodological approach for this would be as follows\. The Request For
Proposal (see Annex 2(a)) would require researchers and research groups at diverse agencies and
institutions both inside and outside the Amazon region with interest in specific but interrelated research
subprojects to get together and propose the formation of a Research Cluster (consortium or sub-network)
of researchers investigating different but related aspects of research questions linked to the same Priority
Research Topic\. Hence, the screening and evaluation of proposals would be evaluated both in terms of the
quality of the individual subprojects being proposed by research groups as well as on certain features of the
entire Research Cluster which would represent a "package" or consortium of interrelated subprojects\.
After considerable debate as to if such Research Clusters should be formed from the top down or from the
bottom up, consensus emerged that it was best to allow research groups to spontaneously form and propose
their own Research Clusters\. In addition, to encourage the inclusion of less experienced researchers and
research groups (grupos emergentes), proposals evaluation criteria for competing Research Clusters would
assign full weight (five points) for the inclusion of less experienced research groups (see Annex 2(a))\.
Furthermore, since the network approach is relatively new, especially in the Amazon region, CNPq agreed
to the importance of carrying out a series of preliminary activities to acquaint a wide range of researchers
and institutions with the methodological approach that would be utilized by the project prior to formally
issuing the Request For Proposals\. These preliminary activities (see Component I below) would include: (i)
involving state environmental and science and technology agencies, universities and research institutions in
identifying and mobilizing a wide range of both more experienced (consolidated) research groups as well as
less experienced research groups; and (ii) encouraging the inclusion of less experienced Amazon regional
researchers and research groups in the proposals for the formation of Research Clusters\. Given that
southem researchers are generally more competitive, better informed about research funding and more
familiar with the network approach, CNPq concluded that it was unnecessary to hold orientation
workshops in the south\.
While the competition is open to subprojects being carried out by researchers based both in the Amazon
region and elsewhere the proposed scientific coordinator of the Research Cluster (as well as being a
coordinator of a specific subproject) is expected to be a researcher with recognized outstanding scientific
standing who is based in a high quality scientific institution in the Amazon region which has committed
itself to serving as the focal point for the Research Cluster\. The coordinators of the Research Clusters, with
the assistance of CNPq, would promote a variety of interchanges among the research subprojects\.
Lastly, the project would also support the formation of two larger Networks - one for the "Forest" theme
and one for the "Water" theme - to be comprised of all the pertinent Research Clusters\. CNPq would
organize biannual meetings for representatives of the two networks every two years\.
Request for Proposals\. The Request for Proposals would specify that the competition will be a single
process consisting of two sub-parts, using weighted criteria to direct the process\. In the first sub-part,
proposals for Research Clusters would focus on the definition of the scientific question, scientific
qualifications of researchers, commitment of the diverse institutions, and cross-cutting themes as well as a
plan for integration of the Cluster\. Proposals for Research Cluster will further specify that the maximum
- 34 -
financing for a Research Cluster would be US$900,000 and that each Cluster should be comprised of four
or more research subprojects\. There would be no set amount for the financing of individual research
subprojects, which may vary\.
In the second sub-part, Research proposals would include detailed proposals for each research subproject,
the dissemination potential of research results to nonscientific audiences, as well as other details (see Annex
2(a))\. Research Cluster and Research proposals would be evaluated and finalists selected\. Research
proposals would be evaluated and winners selected\.
Dissemination Approach\. The project would include dissemination activities in two components\. Under
Component 1, Research Clusters (and their constituent subprojects) would be encouraged to develop
dissemination activities oriented toward nonscientific audiences\. In addition, dissemination beyond the
scientific community is anticipated for the network and sub network conferences and related activities\.
During the biannual network meetings, it is anticipated that one day would be reserved to invite
representatives of nonscientific organizations and agencies specifically with the goal of expanding the
dialogue on science and technology beyond the scientific community\. However, since the traditional target
audiences of scientific dissemination are primarily the scientific community, a separate component
(Component 2- Dissemination of Information and Results) was designed to finance innovative methods of
reaching Pilot Program and Amazon regional end users\. It is anticipated that Component 2, described in
more detail below, would be a separate competitive fund and selected activities would likely to be carried
out by nongovenmmental organizations and other entities engaged in extension and technical assistance in
the region\.
By Component:
Project Component 1: Support for Targeted Research\. - US$ million
(Estimated cost US$5\.382 million or 87% of total project cost)
This component would support a grants program to fund the formation and implementation of integrated
research subprojects (organized in Research Clusters) to be evaluated on a transparent competitive basis
and responding to established priorities\. The maximum financing for a Research Cluster would be
US$900,000 to fund four or more specific research subprojects the size and cost of which may vary\. Up to
30% of the total grant funding of each research subproject may be used for scholarships\. MCT and CNPq
emphasized their intention to provide additional scholarships for winning Research Clusters, as
supplementary counterpart, but were unable to a priori determine the size of this extra commitment\.
Specifically, this component would support: (i) issuance of the Request for Proposals; (ii) evaluation and
selection of submitted grouped proposals (see definition of Research Cluster above); (iii) evaluation and
selection of grouped subproject proposals; (iv) implementation of grouped subprojects; and (v) regional
network and sub-network activities such as conferences, specialized training and regional information
exchange\.
Further information on the targeted Priority Thematic Areas and Priority Research Topics is outlined above
and in Annex 2(a) - Summary of the Draft Request for Proposals\. Depending on the quality and number of
proposals and given the current financing available, it is anticipated that approximately five to ten Research
Clusters addressing Priority Research Topics under the two Priority Research Thematic Areas are expected
to be funded during this initial stage of the project\. A second Request for Proposals is planned if the
anticipated additional financing becomes available\.
- 35 -
The agreed screening criteria for proposals are specified in Annex 2(a), Summary of the Draft Request for
Proposals, Tables A and B, respectively\. At , it is important to note that apart from the scientific merit of
the individual subprojects, qualifications of the scientists and institutional commitment normally required in
research competitions, the criteria also assign the maximum number of points for (i) the applied potential of
the research subprojects to Amazon regional environrmental and socioeconomic issues, (ii) whether or not
less experienced researchers or research groups in the Amazon region are included in the Research Cluster;
(iii) an integration plan for the Research Cluster (iv) qualifications for research team, and (v) Institutional
Stability\. The objective of the first criterion is to target research of the highest relevance to Pilot Program
goals\. The objective of the second is to stimulate more established research groups and institutions
(consolidados) to collaborate with less experienced researchers (grupo emergentes) to strengthen scientific
human resources in the Amazon region\. The third criterion looks at the proposed intra- and
inter-institutional collaboration and linkages being proposed for the Research Cluster overall\. The fourth
consists of an evaluation of Cirriculo Lattes of the coordinator and team members\. The fifth criterion
works to ensure the infrastructure of the participating institutions are adequate to the scope of the research\.
Lastly, to further encourage interdisciplinary collaboration, one criterion assigns up to three points for if
the Research Cluster includes subprojects involving the Cross-Cutting Themes (ethnosciences, natural
resources economics and social sciences)\. With respect to the screening criteria for the research proposal,
the same criteria are applied with four additional criteria which include: (i) scientific methodology; (ii)
potential for dissemination of research results for nonscientific audiences; (iii) timetable; and (iv) detailed
budget\.
Qualified grantees would include researchers with doctoral degrees or the equivalent who are linked to
public and private universities, nonprofit research centers, foundations and other nonprofit research
organizations\. Researchers or research groups outside the Amazon may compete for subproject financing
but must be part of a regionally based Research Cluster\.
The screening and evaluation committees would be formed by CNPq utilizing their existing extensive
database of qualified scientists, and their standardized procedures for evaluation of research proposals (see
Annex I 1)\.
Each research subproject would have a coordinator with scientific and administrative responsibilities\.
CNPq would provide management, financial and procurement assistance to subproject coordinators\. Each
Research Cluster would have one scientific coordinator at the selected lead institution responsible for
inter-institutional collaboration and exchange\. The Research Clusters in each of the Priority Research
Thematic Areas would make up the two larger networks to be established\.
Direct support for the selected research subprojects would correspond to approximately US$4\.7 million or
73% of total project costs and include funding for research, research equipment, upgrading of research
facilities or equipment, training and scholarships, and travel and dissemination activities\. Training and
scholarships (bolsas) under this component would focus on providing the necessary scientific and technical
skills to students and technicians from the Amazon region participating in the research groups\. Individual
institutional overhead is not eligible for project funding; rather, individual institutions are expected to
provide counterpart in terms of institutional support for the research groups\. Financing for activities related
to the Request for Proposals and network and sub-network activities, such as workshops, meetings and
conferences, would be handled by CNPq\.
- 36 -
Project Component 2: Dissemination of Information and Results\.
(Estimated cost US$0\.344 million or 6% of total project cost)\.
The second component would support the identification and implementation of innovative dissemination
methodologies targeting specific nonscientific stakeholder audiences for public awareness raising and
training purposes, as well as for the direct application of research results to key regional concems\. This
component is predicated on the assumption that the transfer of science and technology information to Pilot
Program and regional end users is rarely the main goal, function or the comparative advantage of the
scientific community\. Furthermore, given the lack of a well developed extension service in the Amazon
region, the question posed was what mechanisms could be used to stimulate the transfer of knowledge\.
-\._
While the design of the research competition in Component 1 assigns weight to more applied research that
would be relevant to regional socioeconomic and environmental issues as well as requesting dissemination
plans for nonscientific audiences from research groups and Research Clusters, it was agreed that there was
still a need to finance extension type activities to ensure that the project addresses the concems of the Pilot
Program that scientific research results become more useful and available to Pilot Program and regional
end users\. Given the relative lack of govemmental extension services in the Amazon region, it was
concluded that universities, nongovemmental organizations and specialized research institutes provide
many of the currently available extension and technical assistance to regional communities, often working
for example, in agroforestry, sustainable timbering, recuperation of degraded areas, natural resource
management and other areas\. These organizations often have many years of experience in targeting and
disseminating scientific research results for the benefit of a wide stakeholder audience\. Since it is assumed
that many of these organizations would have a strong interest in becoming more updated on the most
relevant recent research findings which they would then translate into outreach, training and technical
assistance activities with regional end users, the proposal for this component is to develop a competitive
fund to which such organizations could apply for updating and improving their dissemination activities\.
Since the research findings from research subprojects to be supported by this second phase would likely not
be available for several years, the scope of research results to be used would focus on but not be limited to
all scientific work financed by the Pilot Program and other research results related to themes of approved
clusters for Phase II could also be considered (for example, Phase 1 and EC supported directed research)\.
Similarly the target audiences would be expected to include Pilot Program beneficiaries but could also
include other regional end users with a focus on poor rural communities\.
During the first year of the project, CNPq would develop a simplified competitive process for application to
these funds which they would subsequently administer and supervise, through a competitive process and
with the participation of specialists from different areas and with experience in dissemination activities to
nonscientific audiences\. The development of a satisfactory competitive mechanism for use of these funds
would be a condition of disbursement for the component, with the exception of first subcomponent which is
the development of the mechanism\.
Specifically, this component would support: (i) development of a dissemination strategy for nonscientific
audiences during the first year of project implementation that would include, among other things, the
definition of the mechanisms for inviting and selecting proposals for innovative dissemination activities;
and (ii) implementation of competitively selected dissemination activities designed to use relevant research
results to address regional and community concerns, provided they are related to the approved thematic
networks for Phase II\.
- 37 -
Project Component 3: Support for Project Management and Network Activities\.
(Estimated cost US$0\.827 million or 7% of total project costs)\.
This component would support the implementation of an efficient project management system to facilitate
subproject execution (including the administration of the research networks and their composite
sub-networks and research groups, and dissemination subprojects), and an effective monitoring and
evaluation system\.
Specifically, this component would support: (i) project coordination activities by MCT; (ii) project
implementation activities by CNPq; and (iii) implementation of the monitoring and evaluation system,
including physical and financial monitoring, outcome and impact indicators for the assessment of
subproject and project success in attaining its specific and overall development goals, as well as
independent mid-term and final evaluations\. Further information on project implementation arrangements
can be found in Section C\.4 and further information on monitoring and evaluation in Annex 12\.
A project coordination unit (PCU) to be established in MCT would be responsible for general project
coordination and supervision as well as oversight of project monitoring and evaluation\. A project
implementation unit (PIU) to be established in CNPq would be responsible for the implementation of
project activities, in particular the administration and management of the research networks, clusters and
research subprojects, implementation of dissemination activities and execution of the monitoring and
evaluation strategy\. The establishment of the PCU/MCT and the PIU/CNPq are conditions of project
effectiveness\.
A detailed draft project operational manual as well as a draft project implementation plan (PIP) have been
prepared\. A satisfactory final draft of the operational manual is a condition of effectiveness\.
The project would also establish a Project Consultative Committee the objectives for which would include,
among others, facilitating effective and efficient inter-institutional coordination, helping to resolve
implementation problems encountered, and providing oversight for the project\. The core membership would
include a representative from MCT's Secretariat for Policies and Programs of Research and Development
(SEPED); a representative from CNPq's General Coordinating Unit for Earth and Environmental Sciences
(CGCTM); a representative from the Technical Secretariat of another Pilot Program project (preferably a
person with a background in science and technology); and a representative of the scientific community with
previous experience with research networks similar to the one being implemented in the project\. The
Consultative Commnittee would invite representatives of other organizations or institutions to meetings as
needed\. Each institution or program would select their representative and the representative of the scientific
community would be selected by MCT from a short list of six candidates to be prepared by CNPq\.
- 38 -
Annex 2(a)\. Summary of the Draft Request for Proposals
Objective
The objective of the Request for Proposals under the Science and Technology Subprogram Phase 2 Project
is to support the formation of research networks aimed at promoting and disseminating in a coordinated and
cooperative manner, scientific and technological research into relevant areas aimed at contributing to the
conservation and sustainable development of the Amazon region\.
1\. Priority Research Areas
Two research networks will be organized to address Priority Research Thematic Areas (see 2\.1 and 2\.2)\.
Each network would be composed at the sub-network level of five Research Clusters spontaneously
proposed and fortned by researchers and research groups from diverse institutions\. A total of ten Research
Clusters will be formed to address the Priority Research Topics under each of the two priority thematic
areas\.
2\.1 Priority Research Thematic Area 1: Integrated Management of Terrestrial Ecosystems and
Recovery of Degraded Areas
* Priority Research Topic 1: Conservation and use of genetic plant resources
* Priority Research Topic 2: Biogeochemical cycles
* Priority Research Topic 3: Conservation and recovery of wildlife resources
* Priority Research Topic 4: Recovery of degraded areas
* Priority Research Topic 5: Timber and nontimber products
2\.2 Priority Research Thematic Area 2: Integrated Management of watersheds, aquatic ecosystems
and recuperation of degraded areas
* Priority Research Topic 1: Water quality
* Priority Research Topic 2: Biology and ecology of aquatic organisms
* Priority Research Topic 3: Aquaculture
* Priority Research Topic 4: Recovery of degraded areas and systems
* Priority Research Topic 5: Conservation and use of fishery resources and technology
2\.3 Cross-Cutting Themes
The following cross-cutting themes should also be considered by the Research Clusters: ethnosciences,
natural resource economics and social sciences\. The importance of the cross-cutting themes is highlighted
in various aspects of the Request for Proposals, including the objectives and in proposal evaluation criteria\.
3\. General Considerations for the Formation of Research Clusters
Each Research Cluster should be spontaneously formed by established and less experienced researchers and
research groups (grupos consolidados, e emergentes)\. The researchers would organize themselves to
present a proposal of the formation of a Research Cluster made up of Research Subprojects investigating
different but related aspects of research questions linked to the same Priority Research Topic\. Coordinators
- 39 -
of the research subprojects will choose from among themselves a Research Cluster coordinator, who would
be responsible for coordinating the scientific development and coordination of the cluster as a whole\. The
Research Cluster coordinator should be based in an Amazonian institution, which would serve as the
research cluster's reference institution\. The reference institution should be a "Center of Excellence" and
would be expected to offer the necessary conditions to ensure the viability and implementation of the
research subprojects, including the provision of adequate counterpart human resources, facilities and
materials\. In addition to the reference institution, all participating entities would be expected guarantee the
provision of effective support to research cluster participants, including laboratory facilities and libraries\.
4\. Eligibility Criteria
Individual proponents must have a PhD or equivalent, with relevant experience in the area of research\.
Proponents must also have an updated Curriculo Latteswith CNPq, and be on the staff of a
teaching/research institution or other nonprofit research center or foundation\.
5\. Budget and Timetable
The maximum financing for a Research Clusters would be US$900,000 to fund four or more specific
research subprojects the size and costs for which may vary\. Up to 30% of the total grant funding of each
research project may be used for scholarships\. Evidence of institutional support must be provided\. The
maximum period for subproject implementation would be 30 months\.
6\. Proposal Process
a) The process of analyzing, evaluating and selecting of Research Clusters and Research Proposals will
be carried out as a single process consisting of the following two sub-parts:Presentation of the Research
Cluster and Research Coordinator Proposals is analyzed, evaluated and selected according to established
criteria (see Section 6\.1 below)\.
b) Presentation of the Research Proposals, including a proposal for subprojects to be carried out by each
Research Sub-project in the cluster, is analyzed, evaluated and selected in accordance to established criteria
(see Section 6\.3 below)\.
6\.1 Presentation of the Research Cluster and Research Coordinator Requirements
a) Indicate which Priority Research Topic will be addressed\.
b) Indicate the title of the Proposal of the formation of the Research Cluster\.
c) Present the Coordinator of the Research Cluster\.
d) Present the objectives of the Research Cluster Proposal\.
e) Present project justification, including scientific relevance, contribution to the conservation of and the
substantial development of the Amazon Region\.
f) Present the Research Cluster's estimated total costs/expenses\.
g) Present potential socioeconomic and environmental impacts of the proposal\.
h) Include a detailed integration plan for the Research Cluster\.
i) Indicate the inclusion of any cross-cutting themes in the proposal\.
j) Define the technical and administrative responsibilities of each participating institution, including the
expected level of support (infrastructure and equipment) to be provided to the Research Subprojects
under the cluster\. All participating institutions must pledge effective support to all Research Cluster
participants, individually and collectively, including access to labs and libraries\.
-40 -
k) Have a minimum of four research subprojects, where one is for the formation of the Research Cluster
1) Present a detailed description of all research subprojects in the cluster, including the qualifications of
the coordinator and principle researchers, the main lines of research to be carried out by the groups,
and the specific roles to be played by each member of the research group\.
m) Briefly provide a summary, with objectives and methodology, of each research subproject\.
Note: Participants in the project should only include: researchers, technicians and collaborating institutions
that have received a formal invitation, which should be maintained by the coordinator of the project until
the documents are sent to CNPq\.
6\.2\. Research Proposal Requirements
The full proposals presented by Research Clusters selected during the preliminary phase must:
a) Indicate which Priority Research Topic will be addressed\.
b) Indicate the title of the Proposal of the formation of the Research Cluster\.
c) Indicate the title of the Research Proposal\.
d) Describe the scientific responsibilities of the Research Cluster coordinator and of participating
researchers, including definition of specific roles and weekly responsibilities of each participant\.
e) Provide a detailed description of each research subproject under the Research Cluster, with clearly
defined objectives, justification (scientific relevance, contribution to the conservation and the
substantial development of the Amazon Region), methodology, and expected results\.
f) Present the potential socioeconomic and environmental impacts of the proposal\.
g) Describe how the various subprojects within the Research Cluster will be coordinated and integrated,
including in relation to cross-cutting themes, and how they are linked institutionally\.
h) Present the potential for the Dissemination of scientific research\.
i) Present a list of ongoing projects of which the participants of the Research Cluster are implementing,
explaining how these projects relate to the current proposal, including titles, dedication (hour/weekly
responsibilities), implementation period, funding levels/sources and each projects function\.
j) Describe the activities that will be carried out, including start date, duration, descriptions,
responsibilities, participants and progress indicators\.
k) Indicate counterpart institution(s), including human resources, the administration-finance assistant who
will help and coordinate the Research project, infrastructure, equipment, etc\. to be made available for
the Research project in question\.
1) Present proof of specific authorization/permission request(s), and reasons\.
m) Indicate any additional funding received from other sources for the proposed research\.
n) Specify, as needed, the potential for patents, designs, prototypes and technological products and the
mechanisms foreseen for the transfer of the technology developed\.
6\.3 Analysis, Evaluation and Selection
The process of analyzing, evaluating and selecting the proposals by research clusters to CNPq, will be
carried out through comparative means of analysis and evaluation\. In effect, this process will include the
following phases:
Phase I- Analysis by CNPq Technical Team - Preliminary Selection/Screening
This phase consists of a preliminary screening of the presented proposals, which will be carried out through
analysis and evaluation by the CNPq's technical team, on the basis of how each proposal meets eligibility
-41 -
criteria and obligatory requirements\.
Phase II- Analysis by the Specialists Committee (Comite de Especialistas-CE) - Evaluation and
Classification
This stage consists of detailed analysis of required qualifications and scientific merits of each research and
research cluster project proposal\.
The process of analyzing, evaluating and selecting the proposals would be preformed by a Specialists
Committee (Comite de Especialistas - CE) composed of recognized specialists in the given thematic area
with Curriculo Lattes and recent history of funding from CNPq\. The selection process would be regulated
by a proactive attitude on the part of the CE, which could during the process recommend changes,
syntheses and linkages of the constituent research subprojects\. No member of the research teams submitting
proposals may have a seat on the CE\. No member of the CE will be granted access to any proposals
submitted by his own institution\. The results of the review process would be communicated to the
proponents along with the technical report of the CE\.
7\. Monitoring and Evaluation
CNPq would form a special monitoring and evaluation commission focused on assessing the achievement
of research network, cluster and subproject objectives against specific performance and impact indicators,
within the context of the global objectives of the science and technology subprogram of the Pilot Program
to Conserve the Brazilian Rain Forest\. M&E activities would be conducted on the basis of reports,
Research Cluster meetings and field visits to research subproject sites\.
-42 -
Annex 3: Estimated Project Costs
BRAZIL: Science and Technology Subprogram Phase 11 Project
USAID RFT GOB Total
Components US$ US$ US$ US$
Component 1\. Support for Targeted Research 5,033,059 348,708 5,381,767
1\. I Issuance of Request for Proposals 1,700 300 2,000
1\.2\. Evaluation and selection of Research Clusters 48,875 8,625 57,500
1\.3\. Implementation of subprojects 4,707,000 4,707,000
1\.4 Support for regional network and sub-network
activities 275,489 339,783 615,267
Component 2\. Dissemination of Information and
Results 337,286 7,047 344,333
2\.1 Development of detailed dissemination plan 37,286 7,047 44,333
2\.2 Implementation of dissemination plan 300,000 300,000
Component 3\. Support for Project Management
and Network Activities 66,941 362,714 397,798 827,453
3\.1 Support to MCT 94,003 93,570 187,573
3\.2 Support to CNPq 218,711 209,758 428,469
3\.3 Monitoring and Evaluation 66,941 50,000 94,470 211,413
Total 5,100,000 700,000 753,553 6,553,553
- 43\.-
Annex 4
BRAZIL: Science and Technology Subprogram Phase 11 Project
N/A
-44 -
Annex 5: Financial Summary
BRAZIL: Science and Technology Subprogram Phase 11 Project
Table 5\.1\. - Project Investment Costs by Year4
COMPONENTS YEAR TOTAL
- 2005 2006 2007 2008
Comronent 1: 1,236,250 1,852,539 911,139 1,381,839 5,381,767
Support for
Targeted Research
Subprojects
1\.1 Issuance of 2,000 0 0 0 2,000
Request for
Proposals
1\.2\. Evaluation and 57,500 0 0 0 57,500
selection of
Research Clusters
1\.3\. Implementation 1,176,750 1,647,450 706,050 1,176,750 4,707,000
of subprojects
1\.4 Support for 0 205,089 205,089 205,089 615,267
regional network and
sub-network activities
Comronent 2: 44,333 100,000 100,000 100,000 344,333
Dissemination of
Information and
Results
2\.1 Development of 44,333 0 0 0 44,333
detailed dissemination
lan
2\.2 Implementation 0 100,000 100,000 100,000 300,000
of dissemination plan
Component 3: 308,531 206,928 155,998 155,996 827,453
Support for Project
Management and
Network Activities \.
3\.1 Support to MCT 55,720 58,053 36,900 36,900 187,573
3\.2 Support to CNPq 224,269 114,600 44,800 44,798 428,467
3\.3 Monitoring and 28,542 34,275 74,298 74,298 211,413
Evaluation
TOTAL 1,589,114 2,159,467 1,167,137 1,637,835 6,553,553
4US$ 1,00 =R$ 2,70
-45 -
Table 5\.2 - Total Financing Required (US$ ,000)
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
Investments 1,280 1,952 1,011 1,481 5,724
Recurrent Costs 308 206 155 155 824
TOTAL 1,588 2,158 1,166 1,636 6,548
Table 5\.3 - Financing Sources (US$ ,000)
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
USAID 1,275 1,785 1,275 765 5,100
RFT 175 245 175 105 700
GOB 188 204 188 173 753
TOTAL 1,638 2,234 1,638 1,043 6,553
Table 5\.4 - Financing Sources as Percentage of Total Project Cost
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
USAID 78 79 78 73 78
RFT I11 1_1 1_1 10 11
GOB 1_ 1 10 1_1 17 _11
TOTAL_ _ 100 100 100 100 100
-46 -
Annex 6(A): Procurement Arrangements
BRAZIL: Science and Technology Subprogram Phase 11 Project
Procurement
Annex 6(a): Procurement and Disbursements Arrangements
Procurement for the proposed project would be carried out in accordance with the World Bank's
"Guidelines: Procurement Under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits", published in January 1995 (revised
January/August 1996, September 1997 and January 1999); and "Guidelines: Selection and Employment of
Consultants by World Bank Borrowers", published in January 1997 (revised in September 1997, January
1999 and May 2002); and the provisions stipulated in the Grant Agreement\. The Bank's Standard Bidding
Documents and Standard Request for Proposals would be used for Bank-financed ICB for goods and
consultant services respectively\. For NCB procurement of goods and services, the PIU and the research and
dissemination subprojects would use the model standard bidding documents issued by SEAIN and for
shopping, a standard "Modelo para Cotacao de Precos\."
1\. Procurement Responsibility\. The project is constituted by a group of research and dissemination
subprojects, to be carried out by an estimated 30-50 research groups, often attached to universities\. Each of
these subprojects would require the carrying out of procurement in rather small packages of goods, civil
works, and consultant and other services\. These groups also would receive financing for travel expenses,
including per-diems and for consumables\. At the central level, project procurement would mostly consist of
hiring consultants for project coordination, preparation, evaluation, supervision and monitoring of
subprojects, to be carried out by the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) at CNPq\. It is estimated that the
research and dissemination groups, in the aggregate, would spend about 75% of the funds, while CNPq and
MCT would spend the remaining the remaining 25%\.
2\. The MCT has designated CNPq as directly responsible for the implementation and monitoring and
evaluation of project activities\. Accordingly, the PIU would be responsible for the overall project
procurement activity, including the compliance with procedures and timetables agreed with the Bank\. The
PIU would appoint a procurement specialist to be responsible for CNPq and MCT procurement, for
training and coaching the staff responsible for procurement at the research and dissemination groups, and
the overall supervision and control of procurement carried out by such groups\. The specialist would also be
in charge on keeping the procurement monitoring and reporting and the project procurement files\. The
contracts (convenios) between CNPq and the research groups would include provision for compliance with
the Bank's procurement procedures\.
3\. At the research or dissemination subproject level, responsibility would rest with the subproject
coordinator, who would be assisted in administrative matters, including procurement by a consultant
appointed in Research Cluster (or sub-network)\. Both would attend procurement sessions prepared by
CNPq\.
4\. Procurement Plan\. As subprojects would selected and become eligible in late 2005, when the
selection process is finished, and because procurement under these subprojects represents about 75% of the
project's procurement, the design of detailed procurement plans during project preparation is not possible\.
CNPq has prepared a rather detailed implementation schedule covering the project implementation period
2005-2008\. Most detailed planning would follow the preparation of the annual budgetary instruments -
POAs, which defines subprojects per item\. On that basis, CNPq would prepare annually procurement
plans\. The plans would consists of: (i) procurement plans for goods and works, including contract
-47 -
packaging, applicable procedures and schedule; (ii) a consultant selection plan, including packaging,
applicable procedures, short lists and selection criteria\. CNPq agreed during appraisal on the preparation of
a procurement plan for 2003, to be submitted at grant negotiations\.
5\. Procurement Arrangements\. The project's procurement arrangements are summarized in Table A\.
Annex 6(a)\. Table A: Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements
(in US$ thousand equivalent)
Expenditure X\. \. \. Prmen4,Metbod , , f \. t4 -
Category ICB INCB\. ?e \.w e,\.
1\. Research 700 4,535 5,235
(630) (4,080) (4,710)
2\. Dissemination 365 365
(330) 1(330)
3\. Consultant Services 110 110
_ ~~~ ~ ~ ~~(88) (8O)
4\. Training 510 510
(430) (430)
5\. Incremental Operational 333 333
Costs __(242) (242)
TOTAL 700 5,853 6,553
(630) ~~(5,170) (5,800)
Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank grant\. All costs include contingencies
ICB: International Competitive Bidding; NCB: National Competitive Bidding
Other includes National and International Shopping, consultant services, travel costs, per-diems and consumables\.
6\. Research subprojects\. The project would finance (a) goods, consisting of research and laboratory
equipment, transportation, and technology equipment, to support the activities of the research subprojects\.
The aggregate value of the goods, which are expected to be procured by shopping procedures is estimated
at US$2\.2 million; (b) works, estimated at US$540,000 in the aggregate, would consist of the rehabilitation
of existing installations, which would be procured using shopping procedures; (c) consultant services,
mostly by individuals, who would carry out studies and research; and (d) travel expenses, including tickets
and per-diems\. The beneficiaries of the grants for subprojects would sign grant agreements with CNPq,
which provide for the use of the procurement procedures and rules agreed under the Grant Agreement\.
7\. Dissemination subprojects\. Procurement would include the hiring of consultant and other
services, purchase of tickets and payment of per-diems, purchase of supplies, training events, and expenses
related to editing, layout, publication and dissemination of materials developed under these subprojects\.
8\. Consultant Services\. In addition to the consultant services required by under the research and
dissemination subprojects, consultant services are required to assist CNPq and the MCT in project
selection and evaluation, and project supervision, monitoring and evaluation\. The aggregate value of the
individual consultant contracts is estimated at about US$2\.0 million\. The project's selection and
employment of consultants would be carried under arrangement acceptable to the Bank (Table A2), using
the Bank's standard forms and contracts\. The contracting of consulting firms would be carried following
the Quality and Cost-Based Selection (QCBS) method\.
9\. Training\. This category involves the organization and carrying out of events, including expenses
-48 -
for educational materials, food and travel for the beneficiary research institutions and CNPq and MCT
staff participation\.
10\. Operational Costs\. Incremental operational costs refer to the management and supervision of the
project, including mostly travel and subsistence expenses for CNPq, MCT and the subproject groups, audit
procedures and maintenance and supplies\. These services estimated to cost US$335,000 would be
identified in the annual work plans\. Identification of suppliers of consumables and minor services would be
made through market inquiries locally\. Purchase orders would be issued to least-cost providers\. Market
inquiries would be updated periodically\.
Annex 6(a)\. Table A\.1: Thresholds for Procurement and Prior Bank's Review
(in US$ thousand equivalent)
Category ICB NCB Shopping Prior Review Ex-Post ReAiew
Goods >250 100-250 <100 All ICB; NCB Independent
over 150; 2 first procurement
shopping reviews at the end
of years 2006 and
2007
Works >1,000 100-1,000 <100 All ICB; 2 first
NCB; 2 first
shopping
Services >1,000 100-1,000 <100 NCB over 250; 2
first shopping
Annex 6(a)\. Table A\.2: Consultants Selection Arrangements
(in US$ thousand equivalent)
Category QCBS QBS SFB SBC Other Prior Retiew
Not
identified in
initial plan
Firms >100 <100 All
Individual CQ Over $50,000
11\. Procurement Review and Methods\. In view of the nature of the expenses, Bank's prior review of
procurement for goods, works and services would be limited, as follows: (a) ICB is not expected because of
the low cost of the project's procurement packages and the acceptability of Brazilian procurement
procedures; (b) NCB would be limited to exceptional cases, if required, which would be known when
subprojects be selected and procurement plans be prepared, and for one case for purchase of air tickets at
CNPq\. The rest of procurement for goods, works and services would be for small packages by shopping,
inviting three contractors or suppliers\. Due to the decentralization of decisions, packaging in larger sizes
would be difficult\. Regarding consultant services, most contracts are expected to be in the range of US$10
to 50 thousand, and with individuals\. Prior review is required with respect to each contract for the
employment of individual consultants estimated to cost the equivalent of $50,000 or more\. Contracts with
firms are not yet defined (and would likely be with nongovemnmental agencies)\.
12\. Advertising\. As all procurement is expected to be local, no General Procurement Notices are
-49 -
required\. Detailed purchases by ICB and for consultant services and assignments would be advertised, as
become available, in at least one national newspaper of large circulation\. The agencies may also seek
"expressions of interest", giving at least 14 days for the responses, before the preparation of the short-lists\.
13\. Procurement Risk Assessment\. Although CNPq appears to be experienced in the implementation
of project of similar characteristics than the proposed project, and consistent in the application of rules for
procurement of goods and services, the project is rated as high risk for procurement\. The reason being that
procurement decisions are heavily decentralized, and taken by specialists, which may or may not have
background in administration\. To minimize risks the project provides for the following:
a\. Appointing by CNPq a full-time procurement specialist under Terms of Reference agreed with the
Bank within one month after project effectiveness;
b\. Integration of procurement into the information system, by project effectiveness;
c\. Carrying out Independent Procurement Reviews at the end of 2006 and 2007\.
14\. In addition, CNPq prepared a detailed draft Project Operational Manual, including specific
guidelines and procedures for procurement, which have been reviewed and found to be highly satisfactory\.
15\. Independent Procurement Reviews\. The PIU would provide the Bank not later than six months
after the end of 2006 and 2007, the reports of the independent procurement reviews audited by procurement
experts acceptable to the Bank\. The terms of reference for such reviews should be based on internationally
accepted standards\.
16\. Frequency of Procurement Supervision Missions: The Bank would carry out ex-post reviews
during selected supervision missions, with a frequency of once a year\. The Bank would review the annual
procurement plans\.
Procurement methods (Table A)
See above\.
- 50 -
Annex 6(B): Financial Management and Disbursement Arrangements
BRAZIL: Science and Technology Subprogram Phase II Project
Financial Manag-ement
1\. Summary of the Financial Management Assessment
Annex 6(b) Financial Management and Disbursement Arrangements
Country Issues
The Country Financial Management Accountability Assessment - CFAA concluded that Brazil has a well
developed and centralized system of public financial management\. Overall it is able to reliably track budget
expenditures\. However the institutional arrangements and processes are complex\. While good results are
achieved in terms of aggregate fiscal control, the government is less successful in achieving good
expenditure prioritization and operational efficiency\. The Brazilian system of public financial management
yields reliable information and adequate management and tracking of the receipt and use of funds at
national level, and is able to support Bank's lending programs\.
Strengths and Weaknesses
This project would be implemented by both the Ministry of Science and Technology - MCT and the
National Council for Scientific and Technological Development -- CNPq\. In this respect, MCT would have
to establish a Project Coordination Unit (PCU), considering allocation of a small financial and
administrative team and put in place an adequate financial management information system\. This should
not be difficult for MCT due to previous experience with Bank project execution\. However, even though
CNPq has a portfolio of about 6,000 research projects amounting to approximately R$ 200 million, with
good financial mechanisms in place to control funds transferred to the researchers, CNPq has never been an
implementing agency for a Bank-financed project\. The financial management information system developed
by MMA - the SIGMA system will be implemented to control, monitor and report this Project
implementation\. An action plan is included in this annex which would provide the Project Implementation
Unit (PIU) to be established by CNPq with management capability to implement and manage the project\.
Implementing Entity and Staffing
MCT would be the coordinating agency for this project and the PCU is expected to be located in the
Secretariat for Policies and Programs of Research and Development - SPED/ MCT\. CNPq would
implement the components related to research, as well as dissemination, and it would establish a Project
Implementation Unit (PIU) responsible for selecting the research subprojects according to eligibility criteria
set out by CNPq, MCT and the Grant Agreement\. MCT would be responsible for general project
coordination and supervision, as well as oversight of project monitoring and evaluation, while CNPq would
be responsible for direct execution of project activities, including coordination of research and
dissemination subprojects and implementation of the project monitoring and evaluation system (see Section
C\.4 on institutional and implementation arrangements)\.
MCT and CNPq would have to allocate staff as per the proposal established in the organizational chart of
the project included in the draft Operational Manual\. The proposed project staffing structure for the PIU
within CNPq includes one Executive Coordinator, three Technical Assistants for the networks, and two
Financial and Administrative Assistants\. The financial team would be responsible for all the financial
- 51 -
routines, which includes preparing SOEs and FMRs from SIGMA, following up on funds transfers to the
research subprojects\.
Funds Flow
A Budgetary Cost Center (UG)' will be opened for the Project in SIAFI\. Approved Budgetary annual
resources will be allocated in the UG\. The PIU will commit funds (empenho) as required and approved in
the Budget, directly in the Budget Account in SIAFI\. Payments will be made from the Treasury single
Account on basis of the commitments recorded in SIAFI\. CNPq would prepare and submit SOEs based on
actual expenditures to MCT for consolidation and send these SOEs to STN to submit the application form
to the Bank for reimbursement directly from the Loan Account to the Treasury single Account\.
2\. Audit Arrangements
External Audit
The annual financial audit of the project accounts for the period January 1 to December 31 of the year
would be carried out by the Secretaria Federal de Controle - SFC, acceptable to the Bank to perform the
Bank's financed projects\. SFC would submit to the Bank no later than June 30 of the following year that
the expenditures were incurred\. The Auditor's TOR would be submitted to the Bank, for final review\. It
would include the issuance of a management letter on internal controls six months after effectiveness\.
The following audit reports would be required:
Audit Report Due Date
Project accounts (FMRs) Up to six months after closing of fiscal year
SOE Up to six months after closing of fiscal year
Special Accounts Up to six months after closing of fiscal year
Compliance with Legal covenants \. Up to six months after closing of fiscal year
Management Letter Up to six months after closing of fiscal year
Reporting and Monitoring
MCT and CNPq would report the progress of the project activities on the format of FMRs\. These FMRs
would be formatted to reflect the project design and support the project coordinator during the
implementation stage\. It has been agreed that the set of FMRs would be generated by SIGMA\. They would
be submitted quarterly to the Bank\. The year end FMRs would be considered as the annual Financial
Statements of the project to be certified by the Auditors\.
Supervision Plan
In view of the high risk rate given in this assessment, this project would need more supervision at the
beginning of its implementation\. The supervision mission time table would be discussed with the
responsible World Bank Task Team Leader in due course\.
UG - Unidade Gestora - Budgetary Cost Centerwill
SLAFI-Sistema Integrado de Administraclo Financeira\.
- 52 -
Action Plan
Following is the action plan agreed with the TFG to comply with all FM requisites\.
Action Due Date
1\. MCT to establish the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) and CNPq to establish By Effectiveness
Project Implementation Unit (PIU)
2\. Financial/Administrative teams established within PCU and PIU By effectiveness
3\. Information system and control processes - SIGMA fully operational, including: By effectiveness
\. Financial Management/Monitoring System;
\. Agreed FMR and SOE formats
4\. Auditing \. Six months after
\. Management letter prepared by auditors commenting upon the effectiveness
PIU's internal controls adequacy; and \. June 30 each
\. Audited yearly Financial Statements year
Financial Covenants
The project would have to:
1\. Have the records, accounts and financial statements, the records and accounts for each Special
Account for each fiscal year audited, in accordance with auditing standards acceptable to the Bank,
consistently applied, by public auditors acceptable to the Bank;
2\. Furnish to the Bank as soon as available, but in any case not later than six months after the end of each
such year: (A) certified copies of the financial statements audited; and (B) an opinion on such
statements, records and accounts and report of such audit, by said auditors, of such scope and in such
detail as the Bank shall have reasonably requested; and
3\. Furnish to the Bank such other information concerning such records and accounts, and the audit\.
Enable the Bank's representatives to examine such records; and ensure that such records and accounts
are included in the annual audit\.
4\. The package of model reports referred to above, covering expenditures and disbursements,
procurement and contracts, and information related to financial audits, would be up to date each
month, and would be available to the Bank supervision team as needed\.
3\. Disbursement Arrangements
Disbursements would be made on the basis of transactions (SOEs) considering actual expenditures incurred
by MCT and CNPq\. However, MCT would receive the SOEs prepared by CNPq and would consolidate
them to allow STN to reimburse itself from the Loan Account\. The exception to the rule would be where
goods are valued above US$150,000\.00 equivalent, contracts with consulting firms are valued above
US$100,000 equivalent, and individual consultants above US$50,000\.00\. In these cases all contract
information would have to be attached to the Summary Sheet (SS)\.
Although the financial management information system to be implemented would have the capability to
produce FMRs, the project does not intend to disburse on the basis of reports\.
- 53 -
Financial and Accounting Systems and Procedures
MCT and CNPq are executing agencies of the Federal financial/accounting and administration system of
the Brazilian government, and all accounting and financial transactions are recorded in SIAFI - Sistema de
Administra,Ao Financeira Integrada do Govemo Federal (Federal Integrated Financial Administration
System)\. SIAFI is centralized in Brasilia and is extended to each of its executing agencies\. It is based on
chart of accounts structure which allows the project to identify the source of funds and the nature of the
expenditures\. The project program would be recorded in SIAFI\. For proper financial execution\. MCT and
CNPq would put in place an information system capable of capturing the accounting records made in each
of the executing agencies for reporting purposes\. The system to be used is the SIGMA developed by MMA\.
Disbursement Categories US$ ,000 Percentage Financed
Research Subprojects 4,330 100%
Dissemination Subprojects 300 100%
Consultants 80 80%
Training/Seminars 393 85%
Operational Costs 255 85%
Unallocated 472
Additional Scholarships*
Total 5,800
*Supplementary GoB counterpart, amount to be determined/added during project implementation\.
Disbursement Categories USAID RFT GoB Total
Uss ,000 US ,000 US$ ,000 USs ,000
Research Subprojects 4,300 430 4,730
Dissemination Subprojects 300 30 330
Consultants 80 20 100
Training/Seminars 393 69 462
Operational Costs 255 45 300
Unallocated 407 65 159 631
Additional Scholarships*
Total 5,100 700 753 6,553
Allocation of grant proceeds (Table C)
Use of statements of expenditures (SOEs):
Special account:
Recent regulations from STN indicate that no special account would be opened for new Projects, although
STN may retain the right to open one if considered necessary\.
- 54 -
Annex 7: Project Processing Schedule
BRAZIL: Science and Technology Subprogram Phase 11 Project
Project Schedule Planned Actual
Time taken to prepare the project (months) 42
First Bank mission (identification) 06/01/1999
Appraisal mission departure 06/01/2003
Negotiations 11/01/2004
Planned Date of Effectiveness 08/16/2005
Prepared by:
Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT), National Council for Scientific and Technological
Development (CNPq)
Preparation assistance:
World Bank, US Agency for International Development, US Department of State\.
Bank staff who worked on the project included:
Name Speciality
Judith Lisansky Senior Anthropologist, Task Manager
Gregor V\. Wolf Manager, Brazil Rain Forest Unit
Loretta Sprissler Social Development Specialist
Tuilio Correa Financial Management Specialist
Claudio Mittelstaedt Financial Management Specialist
Susana Amaral Financial Management Analyst
Emilio Rodriguez Procurement Specialist
Luciano Wuerzius Procurement Analyst
Alberto Ninio Lawyer
Daniel Gross Senior Anthropologist, Peer Reviewer
Claudia Sobrevila Senior Biodiversity Specialist, Peer Reviewer
Jessica Winn Junior Professional Associate
Project Budget (in US$)
A\. Proiect Budget (in US$) Actual
FY 00
FY 01 57,000
FY 02 64,000
FY 03 117,000
TOTAL 238,000
- 55 -
Annex 8: Documents in the Project File*
BRAZIL: Science and Technology Subprogram Phase 11 Project
A\. Project Implementation Plan
GIAC, Relat6rio de Avaliacao do Subprograma pelo Grupo Intemacional de Assessoramento
Cientifico-GIAC (July 10, 1997)\.
GIAC, Relat6rio de Avaliacao do Subprograma de C&T pelo grupo Intemacional de Assessoramento
Cientifico-GIAC (Nov 20, 1999)\.
MCT, Subprograma de Ciencia e Tecnologia, Oficina de Trabalho, Subsidios para Nova Etapa, June 8-9,
1999\.
MCT, Subprograma de Ciencia e Tecnologia, Seminario de Apresentacao de Resultados, Consolidacao,
Conclusoes e Propostas (December 1999)\.
MCT, Documento de Ideias Basicas (Concept Note) (December 2000)\.
MCT, Diretrizes para a Fase de Pre-Investimento (December 2000)\.
MCT/Elmar Wagner, Relat6rio Final de Consultoria (October 2001)\.
MCT, Subprograma de Ciencia e Tecnologia-Fase II, Documento do Subprograma (December 2002)\.
MCT, Draft Operational Manual (December 2002)\.
MCT, Draft Project Implementation Plan (December 2002)\.
MCT, Draft Request for Proposals (December 2002)\.
WB, Memorandum and Recommendation of the Director, Science Centers and Directed Research Project,
Phase I (June 27, 1994)\.
WB, Grant Agreements, Science Centers and Directed Research Project, Phase I (September 21, 1994) and
Emergency Assistance (November 22, 1994)\.
WB, Post Mission Letter to Government (September 29, 1997) and Aide Memoire from September 2-15,
1997, Science Centers and Directed Research Project, Phase I and Emergency Assistance, Mid-Term
Review Supervision Mission\.
WB, Post mission letter to Government (February 26, 1999) and Aide Memoire from February 1-12, 1999
Supervision Mission for Science Centers and Directed Research Projects (Phase I and Emergency
Assistance)\.
WB, Post Mission Letter to Government (June 30, 1999) and Aide Memoire from June 7-12, 1999, Science
and Technology Subprogram, Phase II Preparation Mission\.
WB, Implementation Completion Report (ICR), Science Centers and Directed Research Project, Phase I
- 56 -
and Emergency Assistance (March 2001)\.
WB, Project Concept Document, Directed Research Project, Phase II (June 22, 2001)\.
WB, Minutes from PCD review meeting (July 6, 2001)\.
WB, Post technical discussions letter to Government and Next Steps Table (June 11, 2001)\.
WB, Post mission letter to Government (November 25, 2002) and Aide Memoire from November 8-14,
2002, Science and Technology Subprogram, Phase II Pre-Appraisal Mission\.
WB, Science and Technology Subprogram, Phase II\. Summary Report on the Capacity Assessment on
Procurement (November 2002)\.
WB Aide Memoire from June 9-13, 2003, Science and Technology Subprogram, Phase II Appraisal
Mission\.
B\. Bank Staff Assessments
C\. Other
*Including electronic files
- 57 -
Annex 9: Statement of Loans and Credits
BRAZIL: Science and Technology Subprogram Phase 11 Project
23-Nov-2004
Difference between expected
and actual
Original Amount in USP Millions disbursements
Project ID FY Purpose IBRD IDA GEF Cancel\. Undisb\. Orig Fmm Rev'd
P082328 2005 BR4nteg\.Munic\.Proj\.-Betim Municpality 24\.07 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 24\.08 0\.00 0\.00
P083533 2005 BR TA-Sustain\. & Equit Growth 12\.12 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 12\.12 0\.00 0\.00
P087711 2005 BR Espirito Santo Wtr & Coastal Pollu 36\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 36\.00 0\.57 0 00
P069934 2005 BR-PERNAMBUCO INTEG DEVT: EDUC QUAL t 31\.50 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 31\.50 0\.00 0\.00
P060573 2004 BR Toaentins Sustainable Regional Dev 60\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 60\.00 6\.00 0\.00
P080830 2004 BR Maranhao Integrated: Rural Dev 30 00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 30 00 1\.53 0 00
P087713 2004 OR(CRL1)BolsaFamilialstAPL 572\.20 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 572\.20 0\.00 0\.00
P083013 2004 BR Disease Surveillance & Control APL 2 100\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 99\.50 0\.00 0\.00
P058503 2003 GEF ER Amazon Region Prot Areas (ARPA) 0\.00 0\.00 30\.00 0\.00 26\.31 0\.00 0\.00
P049265 2003 BR-RECIFE URBAN UPGRADING PROJECT 46\.00 0 00 0\.00 0\.00 44\.99 5\.60 0\.00
P054119 2003 BR BAHIA DEVT (HEALTH) 30\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 28\.51 5\.51 0\.00
P070827 2003 BR-2nd APL BAHIA DEV\. EDUCATION PROJEC 60\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 42\.99 19\.79 0\.00
P080400 2003 BR-AIDS & STD Con"mI 3 100\.00 0 00 0\.00 0\.00 91\.85 14\.15 0\.00
P076977 2003 BR-EnergySectorTAProject 12\.12 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 12\.12 3\.72 0\.00
P074777 2003 BR-Municipal Pension Refom TAL 5\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 4\.90 4\.10 0 00
P055954 2002 BR GOIAS STATE HIGHWAY MANAGEMENT 65\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 34\.46 33\.79 0\.00
P073192 2002 BR TA Financial Sector 14\.50 0\.00 0\.00 000 9\.30 5\.98 0\.00
P057665 2002 BR-FAMILY HEALTH EXTENSION PROJECT 68\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 50\.81 37\.74 0 00
P057653 2002 BR- FUNDESCOLA IIIA 160\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 209\.31 -22\.78 0\.00
P051696 2002 BR SAO PAULO METRO LINE 4 PROJECT 209\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 163\.48 122\.58 0\.00
P074085 2002 BR Sergipe Rural Poverty Reduction 20\.80 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 3\.13 -2\.40 0\.00
P066170 2002 BR-RGN 2ND Rural Poverty Reduction 22\.50 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 13\.68 5\.88 0\.00
P070552 2002 GEF BR PARANA BIODIVERSITY PROJECT 0\.00 0\.00 8\.00 0 00 8\.47 5\.86 0 00
P043869 2002 BR SANTA CATARINA NATURAL RESOURC & P 62\.80 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 59\.96 18\.22 0\.00
P060221 2002 BR FORTALEZA METROPOLITAN TRANSPORT 85\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 111\.47 55\.68 0\.00
P073294 2001 BR Fiscal & Fin\. Mgmt\. TAL 8\.88 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 674 5\.78 0\.00
P059566 2001 BR- CEARA BASIC EDUCATION 90\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 71\.32 -18\.68 0 00
P057649 2001 BR Bahia Rural Poverty Reduction Project 54\.35 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 7\.01 -0\.76 0\.00
P050881 2001 BR PIAUI RURAL POVERTY REDUCTION PROJ 22\.50 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 8\.93 7\.27 0\.00
P050880 2001 BR Pemambuco Rural Poverty Reduction 30\.10 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 17,05 12\.78 0\.00
P050875 2001 BR Ceara Rural Poverty Reduction Project 37\.50 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 8\.64 2\.64 0\.00
P050772 2001 BRLAND-BASEDPOVRTYALLEVIATIONI(S 202\.10 0\.00 0\.00 58\.13 151\.01 152\.74 0\.00
P039199 2000 BR PROSANEAR 2 30\.30 0 00 0\.00 6\.40 22\.29 28\.69 22\.29
P047309 2000 BR ENERGY EFFICIENCY (GEF) 0\.00 0\.00 15\.00 3\.29 9\.26 11\.17 4\.36
P006449 2000 BRCEARAWTRMGTPROGERIRHSIM 136\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 68\.66 45\.66 2\.90
P035741 2000 BRNATLENV2 15\.00 0\.00 0\.00 2\.32 561 7\.93 1\.79
P062619 2000 BR INSS REF LIL 5 05 0 00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.36 -0\.14 0\.67
P050776 2000 BR NE Microfinance Development 50\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 30\.15 -19\.85 0\.00
P058129 1999 BR EMER\. FIRE PREVENTION (ERL) 15 00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 5\.46 5\.46 -0\.02
P048869 1999 BR SALVADOR URBAN TRANS 150\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 65\.95 85\.95 0\.00
P050763 1999 BR- Fundescola 2 202\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 17\.29 17\.29 0\.00
P042565 1998 BRPARAIBAR\.POVERTY 60\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 11\.16 11\.16 0\.00
P057910 1998 BR PENSION REFORM LIL 5\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.50 1\.48 1\.98 1\.08
P035728 1998 BR BAHIA WTR RESOURCES 51\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 4 03 4\.03 -0\.97
P006559 1998 BR (BF-R)SP\.TSP 45\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.02 0\.02 0\.00
P038895 1998 BR FED\.WTR MGT 198\.00 0\.00 0\.00 40\.00 54\.67 94\.67 21\.29
P006474 1998 BR LAND MGT 3 (SAO PAULO) 55\.00 0\.00 0\.00 10\.00 36\.98 46\.98 19\.96
P043421 1998 BR RJ M\.TRANSIT PRJ\. 186\.00 0\.00 0\.00 27 78 92\.74 120\.52 0\.00
P043420 1998 BRWATERS\.MOD\.2 150\.00 0\.00 0\.00 125\.00 1933 144\.30 3\.28
P006532 1997 BRFEDHWYDECENTR 300\.00 0\.00 0\.00 50\.00 61\.51 111\.51 111\.51
P034578 1997 BR RGS Highway MGT 70\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 32\.54 32\.54 32\.54
P043873 1997 BRAG TECH DEV\. 60\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 15\.24 15\.24 15\.24
P043868 1997 BR RGS LAND MGTtPOVERTY 100\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 10\.94 10 94 10\.94
- 58 -
Difference between expected
and actual
Original Amount in US$ Millions disbursements
Project ID FY Purpose IBRD IDA GEF Cancel\. Undisb\. Orig Frm Revd
P006210 1996 GEF BR-NATL BIODIVERSITY 0\.00 0\.oo 10\.00 0\.00 1\.84 2\.59 1\.10
P037828 1996 BR (PR)R\.POVERTY 175\.00 0\.00 0,00 10\.00 39\.68 49\.68 49\.68
Total: 4330\.39 0\.00 63\.00 333\.42 2679\.02 1311\.62 297\.64
BRAZIL
STATEMENT OF IFC's
Held and Disbursed Portfolio
Mar - 2004
In Millions US Dollars
Committed Disbursed
IFC IFC
FY Approval Company Loan Equity Quasi Partic Loan Equity Quasi Partic
2001 AG Concession 0\.00 15\.00 15\.00 0\.00 0\.00 14\.07 0\.00 0\.00
2002/05 Amaggi 30\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
2002 Andrade G\. SA 27\.50 0\.00 10\.00 16\.67 27\.50 0\.00 10\.00 16\.67
2001 Apolo 7\.61 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 5\.11 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
1998 Arteb 20\.00 7\.00 0\.00 18\.33 20\.00 7\.00 0\.00 18\.33
1999 AutoBAn 24\.35 0\.00 0\.00 19\.41 24\.35 0\.00 0\.00 19\.41
1998 BSC 1\.54 0\.00 0\.00 0\.66 1\.46 0\.00 0\.00 0\.66
1996 Banco Bradesco 1\.19 0\.00 0\.00 1\.75 1\.19 0\.00 0\.00 1\.75
2001 Brazil CGFund 0\.00 20\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.60 0\.00 0\.00
1994/96 CHAPECO 1\.78 0\.00 0\.00 5\.26 1\.78 0\.00 0\.00 5\.26
2002/04 CN Odebrecht 25\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 25\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
2003 CPFL Energia 0\.00 0\.00 40\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 40\.00 0\.00
1992 CRP-Caderi 0\.00 0\.32 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.32 0\.00 0\.00
1996/97 CTBC Telecom 0\.00 8\.17 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 8\.17 0\.00 0\.00
2004 Comgas 45\.00 0\.00 0\.00 45\.00 5\.00 0\.00 0\.00 5\.00
1997/00 Coteminas 0\.00 0\.29 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.29 0\.00 0\.00
1980/92 DENPASA 0\.00 0\.12 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.12 0\.00 0\.00
1998 Dixie Toga 0\.00 15\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 15\.00 0\.00 0\.00
1997 Duratex 6\.76 0\.00 0\.00 3\.95 6\.76 0\.00 0\.00 3\.95
1999 Eliane 21\.33 0\.00 13\.00 0\.00 21\.33 0\.00 13\.00 0\.00
1998 Empesca 5\.00 0\.00 10\.00 0\.00 5\.00 0\.00 10\.00 0\.00
2001/02 Escola 0\.00 0\.25 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.25 0\.00 0\.00
2000/04 Fleury 20\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
1998 Fosfertil 5\.30 0\.00 0\.00 21\.36 5\.30 0\.00 0\.00 21\.36
1998 Fras-le 6\.00 0\.00 10\.00 0\.00 6\.00 0\.00 6\.70 0\.00
1994 GAVEA 0\.94 0\.00 5\.50 0\.00 0\.94 0\.00 5\.50 0\.00
2001 GP Cptl Rstrctd 0\.00 8\.70 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 8\.62 0\.00 0\.00
1997 GPC 9\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 9\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
1998 Guilman-Amorim 21\.88 0\.00 0\.00 33\.53 21\.88 0\.00 0\.00 33\.53
1999 Icatu Equity 0\.00 14\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 12\.61 0\.00 0\.00
1980/87/97 Innova SA 13\.75 5\.00 0\.00 35\.00 13\.75 5\.00 0\.00 35\.00
1999 Ipiranga 23\.62 0\.00 0\.00 39\.75 23\.62 0\.00 0\.00 39\.75
2000/02 Itaberaba 0\.00 5\.34 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 5\.34 0\.00 0\.00
1999 Itau-BBA 103\.63 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 64\.08 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
1995 JOSAPAR 7\.57 0\.00 7\.00 0\.00 2\.57 0\.00 7\.00 0\.00
1992/99 Lojas Americana 4\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 4\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
2002 MBR 15\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 15\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
- 59 -
2002 Macae 45\.25 0\.00 10\.00 37\.50 45\.25 0\.00 10\.00 37\.50
2002 Microinvest 0\.00 1\.25 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.42 0\.00 0\.00
1994 Net Servicos 0\.00 31\.74 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 31\.74 0\.00 0\.00
1996 Para Pigmentos 8\.60 0\.00 9\.00 0\.00 8\.60 0\.00 9\.00 0\.00
1994/00/02 Perdigao 4\.38 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 4\.38 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
2000 Portobello 0\.00 1\.15 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 1\.15 0\.00 0\.00
Puras 2\.67 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 2\.67 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
Total Portfolio: 667\.98 162\.50 159\.67 358\.38 475\.43 132\.86 141\.37 280\.28
Approvals Pending Commitment
FY Approval Company Loan Equity Quasi Partic
2005 ABN AMRO REAL 50\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
2000 BBA 10\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
2002 Banco Itau-BBA 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 100\.00
1999 Cibrasec 0\.00 0\.00 7\.50 0\.00
2002 Net Servicos 2 50\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
2002 Suape ICT 6\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
2004 TermoFortaleza 55\.50 7\.00 0\.00 112\.50
2004 TriBanco Brazil 10\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00
2002 Unibanco-CL 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 150\.00
Total Pending Commitment: 181\.50 7\.00 7\.50 362\.50
- 60 -
Annex 10: Country at a Glance
BRAZIL: Science and Technology Subprogram Phase II Project
Latin Lower-
POVERTY and SOCIAL America middle-
Brazil & Carib\. Income Development dlamond
2003
Population, mid-year (millions) 176\.6 534 2,655 Life expectancy
GNI per caPita (Atlas method, USS) 2,720 3,260 1,480
GNI (Atlas method, USS billions) 479\.5 1,741 3,934
Average annual growth\. 1997-03
Population (%) 1\.3 1\.5 0\.9 _Go
Labor force (%) 1\.6 2\.1 1\.2 Gpe pnmary
Most recent estimate (latest year avallable, 1997-03) capita enrollment
Poverty (% of population below national Poverty line) 22
Urban population (% oftotal POPLuatIon) 83 77 50
Life expectancy at birth (Years) 69 71 69
Infant mortality (par 1,000 live births) 33 28 32
Child malnutrition (% of children under 5) 6 1\. 1 Access to improved water source
Access to an improved water souce (% of population) 87 86 81
Illiteracy (% of population age 15+) 14 11 10
Gross primary enrollment (% of school-age population) 148 129 112 Brazil
Male 153 131 113 LoWer-middle-income group
Female 144 126 111
KEY ECONOMIC RATIOS and LONG-TERM TRENDS
1983 1993 2002 2003
Economic ratios'
GDP (USS billions) 203\.3 438\.3 460\.8 492\.3
Gross domestic investment/GDP 16\.7 20\.8 19\.8 20\.1 Trade
Exports of goods and services/GDP 11\.4 10\.5 15\.5 18\.9
Gross domestic savinqs/GDP 19\.1 22\.3 21\.8 23\.8
Gross national savinqs/GDP 20\.2 18\.5 20\.7
Current account balancelGDP -3\.4 -0\.1 -1\.6 0\.8 Domestic Investment
Interest payments/GDP 3\.9 0\.6 2\.9 2\.7 savings +
Total debt/GDP 48\.5 32\.9 49\.6 48\.0
Total debt service/exports 54\.7 24\.4 70\.3 65\.1
Present value of debtGDP 52\.6
Present value of debttexports 329\.6 Indebtedness
1983-93 1993-03 2002 2003 2003407
(aveamge annual growth) Brazil
GDP 24 2\.3 1\.9 -0\.2 3\.9
GDP per capita 0\.6 1\.0 0\.7 -1\.4 3\.2 Lower-middle-income group
STRUCTURE of the ECONOMY
1983 1993 2002 2003 Growth of Investment and GOP (%)
% of GDP)
Agriculture 10\.9 7\.6 5\.8 5\.8
Industrv 44\.0 41\.6 20\.6 19\.1 r_
Manufacturing 33\.2 25\.0 12\.4 11\.4
Services 45\.1 50\.8 73\.5 75\.1 o ' 0
Private consumption 71\.2 60\.1 58\.1 56\.9 -10 I
General govemment consumpton 9\.7 17\.7 20\.1 19\.3 GDI -GDP
Imports of aoods and services 9\.0 9\.1 13\.4 13\.1
1983-93 199343 2002 2003 Growth of exports and Imports (%)
(average annual growth)
Aqriculture 2\.4 3\.9 5\.0 5\.5 20
Industrv 1\.2 1\.8 2\.6 -1\.0 10
Manufacturing 0\.0 1\.4 1\.4 2\.7
Services 3\.0 2\.5 1\.6 -0\.2 o _- ______o o___ 0_ __
Prvate consumption 0\.8 1\.9 -0\.4 -3\.3 -10
General govermment consumption 6\.4 2\.0 1\.0 11\.6 -20
Gross domesbc investment 4\.9 1\.2 4\.3 -4\.5 Exports e-Imports
Imports of goods and services 5\.9 4\.0 -12\.3 -1\.9
- 61 -
Brazil
PRICES and GOVERNMENT FINANCE
1983 1993 2002 2003 Inflation (%)
Dom esti prices 1
(% change)
Consumer pnces 135\.0 1,928\.0 12\.5 9\.3 10
lmptidttGDPdeflator 140\.2 1,996\.6 10\.2 12\.8
Government finance
(% of GDP, includes current grants)
Current revenue \. \. 23\.9 23\.7 go 99 00 01 02
Current budqet balance \. \. 2\.8 3\.0 GOP deflator -*-CPI
Overall surPkjsldefrit \. \.
TRADE
1983 1993 2002 2003 Export and import levels (US$ mill\.)
(USS millions)
Total exports (fob) \. 38,563 60,362 73,084 \.000
Coffee \. 2,466 3,049 3,456
Soybeans \. 3,074 3,032 4,290 0\. 000
Manufacdures \. 25,935 33,000 39,653
Total imports (cif) \. 25,256 47,237 48,260 0\.0()_)
Food \. 1,089 1,085 924 20_000
Fuel and energy \. 2,139 6,240 6,577
Calpital goods \. 8,369 11,643 10,348 o
Export prce index (1995=100) 80 91 88 95 97 gE 99 00 01 03
lmportpriceindex(1995=100J 57 67 91 90 *Exports ElnipoorI
Ternms of trade (1995=100) 140 136 97 105
BALANCE of PAYMENTS
(US$ millions) 1983 1993 2002 2003 Current account balance to GOP (%)
Exportsofqoodsandservices 23,611 41,616 69,913 83,567 2
Imports of qoods and services 19,534 31,795 61,709 63,819
Resource balance 4,077 9,821 8,204 19,748 o
Net income -11\.022 -12,099 -18,191 -18,552
Net current transfers 108 1,686 2,390 2,867 -2 * I- I- - -
Current account balance -6\.837 -592 -7,597 4,063
Financing items (net) 4,946 9,805 -6,003 -963
Changes in net reserves 1,891 -9,213 13,600 -3,100
Memo:
Reserves induding gold (USS millions) 4,563 32,211 37,823 49,296
Conversion rate (DEC, locet'US$) 2\.10E-10 3\.22E-2 2\.9 3\.1
EXTERNAL DEST and RESOURCE FLOWS
1983 1993 2002 2003
(USS millions) Composition of 2003 debt (USS mill\.)
Total debt outstandinq and disbursed 98,525 144,104 228,662 236,245
IBRD 3,628 6,575 8,585 8,588 A: e,5s3
IDA 0 0 0 0 22O3C231
Total debt service 13\.304 10,883 51\.636 56\.793
IBRD 507 1,858 1,518 2,010
IDA 0 0 0 0 / D12\.211
E' 9\.122
Compositon of net resource flows
Official grants 16 59 0 \.
Official creditors 1,576 -1,033 916 \.
Pdvate creditors 2,659 10,073 -9,541 233
Foreign direct investment 1,609 1,292 0 \.
Portfolio equity 0 6,570 0 \. F 5ss,904
World Bank program
Commitnments 2,067 636 1,276 1,217 A- IaRD E - Bilateral
Disbursernents 1,204 471 1,384 1,291 B - IDA D - other multiltlerat F - Pnvate
Principal repayments 270 1,279 1,063 1,633 C - IMF G - Shod-temn
Net flows 934 -808 322 -342
Interest payments 237 579 456 377
Net transfers 698 -1,387 -134 -719
Uevelopment rocenomics 4/1i!/05
- 62 -
Additional Annex 11: Monitoring and Evaluation Plan
BRAZIL: Science and Technology Subprogram Phase II Project
Annex 11\. Monitoring and Evaluation Plan
The PIU in CNPq would carry out the project monitoring and evaluation (M&E) strategy, in conjunction
with overall project coordination and oversight provided by the PCU in MCT\. The M&E strategy focuses
on the overall project but also incorporates a specific M&E strategy developed for M&E of the research
subprojects, sub-networks and networks\. The M&E strategy is based on the project logframe (see Annex
1), which is closely linked to the conceptual scheme below illustrating three measures of project success:
* Effectiveness,which refers to the project impacts corresponding to the overall goal or goals (e\.g\.,
"Improved enviromnental conservation");
* Efficacy, which measures the quality and quantity of project outcomes and outputs (e\.g\., "Scientific and
technical knowledge disseminated and applied" and "Number of regionally based researchers trained,"
among others); and
* Efficiency,which measures the relation between project inputs or activities and outputs (e\.g\., "Number
of institutional partners per publication")\.
INPUTS/ OUTPUTS OUTCOMES IMPACTS
ACTIVITIES
Financial Researchers Advances in
resources trained scientific Improved
_ ~~~~~~~~knowledge _ environmental
Personnel Scientific conservation
Personnel ~~~publications and Knowledge
Research other formns of disseminated & Improved quality of
dissemination , used life
Dissemination Target audiences Regional
Training reached research capacity
* enhanced
- Eftency Efficacy4 Effectiveness
; (Performance) (Results) (Impacts)
Project X Relation between Quality & quantity of Degree of impacts
Performance, X inputs or outputs & outcomes
1 ; = ~~~~~rs ~~activities & l
outputs
- 63 -
Because of time lags and other limitations, it is usually impossible to measure project impacts directly, and
even the outcomes are usually only inferred from the outputs\. In the case of the Science and Technology
project, a limited number of specific output indicators would be measured directly (see also Annex 1)\. Of
these indicators, three are especially significant, providing robust measures of the three project outcomes
and associated with key premises on which the project is based (see table below)\. These premises, in turn,
correspond to innovative aspects of the project in Phase II: (i) rigorous and comprehensive criteria for
selecting research proposals, (ii) appropriate and targeted dissemination of research results, and (iii)
organization of research subprojects within networks\.
Underlying Premise Output Indicator (type) Corresponding Outcome
Ranking of proposals Quality and quantity of Significant advances in
according to selection criteria research results as predicted scientific and technological
is a good predictor of by proposal ranking knowledge\.
research efficacy\. according to selection
criteria (Efficacy)\.
Appropriate and targeted Awareness and application Scientific and technological
dissemination of research of research results by knowledge disseminated and
results enhances their targeted groups (Efficacy)\. applied\.
application by end users\.
Research networks enhance Productivity per researcher Regional research capacity
efficiency by facilitating before and after enhanced\.
information exchange and establishment of research
distribution of functions\. networks (Efficiency)\.
For Component I with respect to the specific research subprojects, each research proposal would be
required to submit information that would be useful for the M&E system based on verifiable impact,
outcome and output indicators\. As a result, specific indicators at this level have not yet been defined,
however, the instruments (as well as a methodology and pertinent instructions) for subproject M&E have
been developed and are being refined\. One of these instruments is to be used for independent evaluation of
the research subprojects, to be carried out periodically [three times per year] during the course of the
project\.
With respect to Component 2, apart from the awareness indicator (efficacy level) discussed above, a second
indicator at the efficiency level has been proposed which is to measure the nonproject funds and resources
leveraged for each project dollar invested in dissemination subprojects\.
The M&E system for the project and the specific instruments for Component 1 would be finalized before
project effectiveness and would be included in the project operational manual\.
In addition, the project, specifically the PIU in CNPq would carry out the standardized physical and
financial monitoring based on annual physical and financial planning as reflected in the Project
Implementation Plan (PIP) and the Annual Operations Plan (POA)\.
Reports from the project M&E system would be included in the project's semi-annual reports\. Financial
reporting would be quarterly (see Annex 6(b))\.
-64 -
In sumniary, the proposed M&E strategy sets this project apart from its predecessors\. At the project level,
the strategy identifies a limited number of measurable indicators linked to outcomes and associated with
underlying premises\. At the subproject level, it provides a practical set of instruments that would facilitate
M&E by both independent evaluators and the research teams themselves\. This strategy should provide
measurements of project success at diverse levels while also pernitting strategic course directions during
project implementation\.
-65 -
-66 -
I | APPROVAL |
P010016 | R E S T R I C T E D
R e p o r t N o\. P-2zo
This report was prepared for use within the Bank\. In making it
available to others, the Bank assumes no responsibility to them for
the accuracy or completeness of the information contained herein\.
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE
PRESIDENT
TO THE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS
ON A
PROPOSED LOAN
TO
PAKISTAN
FOR THE
INDUS BASIN PROJECT
April 18, 1960
Department of Operations
South Asia and Middle East
IMNTERKATIOMTAL BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEN7TLOPYENT
REPORT AND RECO0NPDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT
TO THE ECtITTIVE DIRECTORS ON A
PROPOSED LOAN TO PAKISTAN FOR THE INDUS BASIN PROJEC'
1\. I submit herewith the following report and recommend-tions on
a proposed Loan, in various currencies equivalent to 390 million, to the
Republic of Pakistan\. The proceeds of the Loan would be used to finance
part of the cost of constructing a system of works which would enable
Pakistan to use and develop the share of the waters of the Indus River
Basin allocated to it under a treaty which is expected to be concluded
shortly between India and Pakistan\.
2\. If approved, the proposed Loan would be the Bank's thirteenth
loan to Pakistan\. The previous loans were as follows
Year Borrower Amount
million equivalent)
1952 Pakistan (Railway Rehabilitation) $ 27\.20
Pakistan (Agricultural Machinery) 3\.25
1954 Sui Gas Transmission Company, Ltd\. 14\.00
1955 Karachi Electric Supply Corp\. Ltd\. 13\.78
Karnaphuli Paper Hills Ltd\. 4\.20
The Trustees of the Port of Karachi 14\.80
1957 Pakistan (Railway Rehabilitation) 31\.00
PICIC Limited 4\.20
1958 Karachi Electric Supply Corp\. Ltd\. 14\.00
l959 Karachi Electric Supply Corp\. Ltd\. 2,40
PICIC Limited 1MOCO
Pakistan (Railway Improvement) 12?50
Total (net of cancellations) $ 151\.33
of which has been repaid 18\.87
Total now outstanding $ 132\.46
Amount sold or agreed to be sold $ 9\.11
of which has been repaid 6\.56 $ 2\.55
Net am4unt held by Bank $ 129\.91
The above total includes $55\.1 million not yet disbursed\.
-2
PART I - HISTORICAL
3\. The Indus River and its tributaries all rise in the Himalayas\.
The three Eastern Rivers - the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej - flow
directly from India into Pakistan\. The three vJestern Rivers - the Jhelum,
the Chenab and the Indus itself - flow through the territory of Jammu
and Kashmir before entering Pakistan\. The sharing of the waters of these
rivers has been a source of friction for many years\. Until 1947, the
dispute was carried on primarily between the Sind and the Punjab Provinces
of undivided India\. With Partition, the division of the waters ceased to
be a provincial matter and became an international problem; it has since
remained a cause of strained relations between India and Pakistan\. The
border betwieen the two countries was drawn right across the Indus river
system so that Pakistan became the downstream riparian on all the rivers\.
In some places the border left in India barrages which controlled canals
and irrigation in Pakistan\.
4\. In 1951 I offered the good offices of the Bank in an attempt to
find a solution to the dispute, and suggested that the two countries seek
to work out together a comprehensive co-operative plan for the use of the
waters which would substantially increase the amount of useful water
available to both countries\. The offer was accepted by the two Govern-
ments early in 1952\. In 1954, after two years of study in collaboration
with India and Pakistan, the Bank put fonArard a basis for solution re-
cognizing that, in the existing state of relations, a plan based on
co-operative development of the Basin would not be acceptable to either
country\.
5\. The Bank Proposal had three essential features\. It allocated
the waters of the three Western Rivers (the Indus, Jhelurm and Chenab) to
Pakistan, and the three 7Tastern Rivers (the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) to
India\. The uses in those parts of Pakistan which had historically been
fed from the three Eastern Rivers were to be met thenceforward from sup-
plies to be transferred from the Western Rivers through a system of link
canals\. India was to make a contribution towards the cost of the replace-
ment works\. During the period of construction of these works, India was
to limit her withdrawals from the Bastern Rivers to amounts relative to
Pakistan's ability to replace\. The Bank Proposal was accepted by both
countries, although with substantial reservations, as a basis for a settle-
ment of the dispute\.
6\. Since 1954 the Bank has been engaged in discussions with the
two countries and in the preparation of engineering studies to try to
devise an Engineering Plan in conformity with the Bank Proposal\. The
objective of the Plan was to accomplish adequate replacement of the waters
diverted from the existing uses in Pakistan and also to provide a sub-
stantial element of development for both countries; the Bank also had
the problem of discovering means by which such a Plan might be financed\.
During this period, the use of the rivers has been regulated either by
temporary arrangements negotiated with the Bank's good offices, or at
times by less formal understandings\.
7\. Any Plan which would satisfy the criteria mentioned above would
have to be of very large magnitude and far beyond the capacity of the two
- 3 -
countries to finance\. The Plan which has finally emerged will require
total financing, in local currency and foreign exchange, of more than
$1,000 million equivalent\. The est of the works in Pakistan is estimated
at t838 million equivalent\.
8\. During a visit to the Sub-continent in Mlay 1959, I was able to
reach an understanding with the Pakistan Government on a plan of works
acceptable to it, and with the Indian Government on the amount of the
Indian financial contribution and the length of the transition period dur-
ing construction of these works\. This understanding, however, was subject
to the availability from foreign sources of adequate financing\. I have
since been in contact with various governments with a view to finding out
whether they would be prepared to assist in providing the necessary financ-
ing\. In view of the pressures which already exist, entirely apart from
this project, on the Pakistan balance of payments, it was necessary that a
very substantial part of the financial contributions be made in a form
which would not impose further foreign exchange repayment burdens\.
9\. I am happy to say that the Governments of Australia, Canada,
the Federal Republic of Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the
United States have offered substantial contributions in the form of grants,
or loans repayable in rupees\. These Governments, together with the Gov-
ernment of Pakistan and the Bank, would sign an international agreement,
to be known as "The Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement" (attached
hereto, No\. 1), embodying the financial arrangements for meeting the cost
of the works in Pakistan\. There is a provision in the Agreement leaving it
open to any other government or institution which wished to do so to become
a party to the Agreement at any time\.
10\. Discussions are continuing between India and Pakistan, with the
good offices of the Bank, towards the conclusion of an international water
treaty to be known as "The Indus Waters Treaty 1960"\. All parts of the
settlement, including the Fund Agreement and the proposed Loan, are con-
tingent on the signing and ratification of the Treaty\. A memorandum will
be circulated on the obligations which it is proposed that the Bank should
assume under the Treaty\.
PART II - FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGF'ENTS
11\. The cost of the works to be constructed by Pakistan would be met
from a Fund to be established under the Fund Agreement, to which Pakistan,
the other participating Governments and the Bank would be parties\. The
Fund, which would be held in trust and administered by the Bank, would
receive contributions from the parties, as well as the payments to be made
by India under the Treaty totalling E 62,500,000 (equivalent to
$ 175,000,000)\. Subject to such parliamentary or congressional action as
may be necessary in each case, the Governments have agreed to contribute
the following amounts to the Fund in their own currencies, which for
purposes of the Fund would be freely useable or convertible for purchases
anywhere:
-4-
US$ equivalent
Australia ;A 61965oOOO in grants $ 15,600,000
Canada $Can\. 22,100,000 in grants $ 22,984,000*
Germany DM 126,000,000 in grants $ 30,coo,000
New Zealand TNZ 1,000,000 in grants $ 2,800,000
United Kingdom ; 20,860,000 in grants $ 58,408,000
United States $US 177,000,000 in grants $ 177,000,000
$US 70,000,000 in loans (repayable
in rupees) $ 70,000,000
Total $ 376,792,000
*Calculated at Can\.$ 1 = US$ 1\.04
12\. The amount of the proposed Bank loan to be paid into the Fund
for the works would be ,80 million, bringing the total foreign exchange
resources of the Fund to 85632 million equivalent\. The balance of the
Loan (6,10 million) Twould be available to meet interest and commitment
charges on the Loan\.
13\. In addition to its contributions in foreign exchange, the
United States has agreed, subject to the necessary congressional action,
to contribute to the Fund an amount in rupees equivalent to $235 mil-
lion\. Pakistan would contribute 227\.6 million equivalent in rupees\. The
balance of the local currency requirements of the project -would be met
by the purchase of rupees from the State Bank of Pakistan by the Fund,
against foreign exchange; the amount estimated to be required is $155
million equivalent\.
14\. The total contributions to the Fund in foreign exchange and
local currency, as indicated above, amount to -1894\.6 million, which is
larger by f,6\.6 million than the presently estimated requirements for
the works in Pakistan (%838 million)\. The difference is accounted for
in part by the SDecial Reserve (-$27\.6 million) to be accumiulated from
the Indian payments to the Fund against the possibility that Pakistan
may have to make compensatory payments to India, which Pakistan would
be required to do under the Treaty if it requested an extension of the
Transition Period (see Fund Agreement, Article IV)\. The balance of the
difference (1,2Q million) is a general reserve available to be drawn on,
if required, to meet price increases and other contingencies\.
15\. As Administrator of the Fund, the Bank would receive contribu-
tions to the Fund, hold the assets of the Fund in trust, and make
disbursements from the Fund so far as possible in accordance with the
Bank's normal procedures\. In agreeing to act as Administrator the Bank
would, in effect, be assuming responsibility for the general supervision
of the project, in both its technical and financial aspects, on behalf
of the parties to the Fund Agreement\. Given the nature of the financial
arrangements, I consider that such supervision, which will be essential
if this immense project is to be executed successfully within the limits
of time and money laid down for it, could most appropriately be carried
out by the Bank\. To assist it in fulfilling its task as Administrator,
- 5 -
the Bank proposes to engage the services of experienced engineering and
accounting consultants, as described in the Technical Report (attached,
No\. 2)\. The Bank would be entitled to reimburse itself out of the Fund
for these and other expenses incurred solely because of its services as
Administrator\.
PART III - DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED LOAN
16\. Particulars of the proposed Loan are :
Borrower: The Republic of Pakistan
Amount: Various currencies equivalent to i9O million, of which
;80 million equivalent for the project and $10 mil-
lion for interest and commitment charge\.
Amortization: 40 semi-annual instalments beginning October 1, 1970
and ending April 1, 1990\.
Interest rates: Rates in effect at the time when parts of the loan are
credited to the Loan Account\.
Commitment 3/4 of 1% per annum on amounts in the Loan Account\.
charge:
Closing Date: September 30, 1973\.
17\. The Bank Loan would finance part of the cost of the system of
works described in the Technical Report\. The works comprise two large
storage dams on the Indus and Jhelum Rivers, the latter equipped with
facilities for the generation of 300,000 KWs of electricity; barrages
and link canals to transfer water from the Western to the Eastern
Rivers; tubewells and drainage works to contribute additional supplies
of water for irrigation and to assist in lowering the water-table in
areas threatened by water-logging and salinity\.
18\. In view of the exceptional nature of the transaction of which
the proposed Loan would form a part, and the long construction period of
the project, special arrangements would be made for the disbursement of
the proposed Loan and for the determination of interest and cormitment
charge\.
19\. Disbursement of the Loan would be made by the Bank (a) to the
Fund in accordance with periodic calls made by the Bank acting as Adminis-
trator of the Fund, and (b) in payment of interest and commitment charge
on the Loan during the first 8 years\. Under Article III of the Fund
Agreement the Administrator would estimate the requirements of the Fund
during each six months' period, beginning with the period April 1 -
September 30, 1960, and apportion these requirements among the Parties\.
As soon as the proposed Loan became effective, and thereafter on October 1
and April 1, the amount to be met from the Bank Loan during the six
months would be credited to the Loan Account\. On the same day (through
October 1, 1967) the Bank would also credit the Loan Account with the
- 6 -
estimated interest and commitment charge which would accrue on the Loan
during those six months\.
20\. Commitment charge would accrue from the dates on which amounts
were credited to the Loan Account, and interest would run from the time
such amounts were transferred to the Fund or paid to the Bank on the due
dates for payment of interest and commitment charge\. 'Each part of the
Loan would carry its own interest rate, which would be the Bank's cur-
rent rate at the time such part was credited to the Loan Account\.
PART IV - LEGAL INSTRUVIENTS AND AUTHORITY
21\. It is contemplated that the Treaty, the Fund Agreement and the
Loan Agreement would be signed by the respective parties at the same time\.
The Treaty vould come into force upon ratification by India and Pakistan,
and the Fund Agreement by its terms would come into force simultaneously,
both with effect retroactively from April 1, 1960\. One of the conditions
of effectiveness of the Loan Agreement would be the coming into force of
the Treaty (Section 8\.01(b))\.
22\. Attached is a draft Loan Agreement between the Republic of
Pakistan and the Bank (nTo\. 3)\. I would draw attention to the following
features:
a) Loan Regulations have been incorporated in the Loan Agreement\.
This has been done in order to avoid setting out numerous
minor changes in the Regulations, and in order to have a self-
contained document vhich can be annexed to the Fund Agreement\.
b) A number of provisions which are normally included in Bank
loan agreements have been either omitted altogether or substan-
tially modified, as they are covered by corresponding provisions
of the Fund Agreement\. These concern the use of the proceeds
of the Loan (covered by Article V of the Fund Agreement and by
Article II of the Loan Agreement), the withdrawal arrangements
(Article II of the Fund Agreement) and particular covenants of
the Borrower, including those relating to maintaining records,
furnishing information and inspection (Article -II of the Fund
Agreement)\. The Project is described in Annexure D to the
Fund Agreement, to which the Loan Agreement makes reference
(Section 2\.01)\.
c) The arrangements for crediting the Loan Account and for the
payment of interest and commitment charge, described in
paragraphs 19 and 20 above, are set out in Article I\. Section
1\.02 of that Article provides for separate credits to the
Loan Account :
(i) to meet the requirements of the Fund as specified by the
Administrator, up to a maximum of ')80 million equivalent;
(ii) to pay interest and commitment charge on the Loan during the
first eight years, up to a maximum of "l0 million equivalent\.
23\. I would also draTA special attention to Article 7lII of the Fund
Agreement, which defines the rights and responsibilities of the Bank acting
as Administrator of the Fund, and to Article IX which provides for the
suspension of disbursements from the Fund and the termination of the Fund
Agreement in certain eventualities\.
PART V - APPRAISAL OF THE PROPOSED LOAN
24\. The Engineering Plan which is to be financed - so far as the
works in Pakistan are concerned - from the Indus Basin Development Fund,
including the proceeds of the proposed Loan, has made it possible for
India and Pakistan to approach a final settlement of the vexatious issue
of the division of the Indus waters that has so embittered relations bet-
ween them since they attained Independence\. The costs of the Plan are far
beyond the capacity of the two countries to meet from their own resources,
and they would not have accepted it without financial assistance on the
scale to be provided by the contributing countries and the Bank\.
25\. Apart from easing the general relationships between the two
countries, following a settlement of the water dispute, the Engineering
Plan would bring important economic benefits to both of them\.
26\. For India, it would release the whole flow of the Eastern Rivers
for new irrigation developments there\. India has already constructed, or
has under construction, barrages, canals and a reservoir which are capable
of using the flow of the Eastern Rivers\.
27\. For Pakistan, the system of works to be constructed, as well as
permitting replacement of the waters of the Eastern Rivers, would provide
substantial additional irrigation, develop important sources of hydro-
electric power, make an important contribution to soil reclamation and
drainage, and afford a measure of protection against floods\.
Procurement
28\. All goods and services required for the works in Pakistan are to
be procured on the basis of international competition, except as the
Administrator otherwise agrees (see Fund Agreement 7\.01(b))\.
Economic Situation
29\. A Memorandum on the Economic Situation and Prospects of Pakistan
was circulated on April 14, 1960 (R60-44)\. The Memorandum points out that
the financial situation of Pakistan has, in general, been improving\. The
Government has refrained from borrowing from the banking system, and
exchange reserves have been restored to the level at which they stood
before the serious drain on the reserves began in 1957\. However, import
restrictions continue to be severe although the private sector now has
access to unlicensed imports of specific items, including raw materials
and replacement parts, through the operation of an export bonus scheme
under which exporters receive entitlements to imports which they may sell
freely\. Available statistics on industrial production do not extend beyond
June 1959; these, however, indicate a continued growth of industrial pro-
duction which now contributes 8% of national income\. Preliminary crop
estimates for the current year suggest that over-all agricultural pro-
duction is about the same as in 1958/59, with an increase of food crops
and a drop in non-food crops and fibers\.
30\. The Government has been giving serious attention to improving
the country's administration and a number of steps in this direction have
already been taken\. Development projects which are to be financed domes-
tically or externally are now subject to scrutiny and approval by the
Economic Committee of the Cabinet\. A longer range development program
for the five years beginning July 1960, has been drawn up by the Planning
Commission, and its Report (the Second Five Year Plan) wsill shortly be
issued\. It is intended, however, that development programing should be
flexible and the Second Five Year Plan mill in fact be executed through
a series of Annual Development Programs, the public sector of which will
be embodied in the Budget\.
31\. Much remains to be done to strengthen Pakistan's basic economic
position\. Agricultural production has not yet begun to increase, savings
are lom in relation to national income and no expansion of exports is yet
discernible\. The Government is aware of the importance of these problems,
and the agricultural question in particular has been given high priority\.
But the underlying difficulties will not be solved easily and, except per-
haps in the case of food production, the desired results are not likely
to be achieved in any short period\.
32\. Pakistan's total public external debt amounted to $26h\.8 million
as of December 31, 1959\. Debt service is estimated to average $33 million
annually during the 5 years 1961-65, with a peak of 488 million in 1962\.
Service payments on this debt decline to q19\.1 million in 1968 and to
812\.5 million in 1970\. Service of $33 million represents 8\.6% of current
account exchange earnings in 1958/59 and 7\.9% of average current account
earnings for the fi-ve year period 1960/61 to 1964/65, as estimated by the
Planning Commission\. In view of Pakistan's present weak balance of pay-
ments position, this burden of service on existing debt is heavy and the
Government should exercise restraint in incurring any new debt involving
transfer payments\.
Prospects of Fulfilment of Obligations
33\. In view of the fact that priority is to be given to the works
needed for replacement and that Pakistan wo7ould not begin to enjoy develop-
ment benefits until towards the end of the period of construction, interest
on the proposed Loan would be capitalized for the first eight years and
repayment would not begin for 10 years\. Seriice on the proposed Loan would
start in April 1968 and would amount to $3\.7 million in that year, to
"4\.3 million in 1q69 and to &6\.0 million in 1970\. Thereafter service of
the Loan (from October 1970 to April 1990) would add approximately `7\.8 mil-
lion a year to the country's annual payments in foreign exchange\.
34\. This addition to the calls on Pakistan's limited foreign exchange
earnings is considerable\. But since the proposed Loan would not increase
Pakistan's debt service until the service on its existing debt had passed
the peak and until Pakistan had cbtained benefits from the project, the
proposed Loan should be within Pakistan's capacity to repay\.
35\. Attention is also called to the attached chart (No\. 4) which
shows that the actual amount of the Bank's net investment in Pakistan
would not be increased beyond the level of about $125 million at any time
by reason of the proposed Loan\. In effect disbursements under the pro-
posed Loan after 1963 would be approximately offset by repayments under
previous Bank loans in Pakistan\.
PART VI - COMPLIANCE rIZTH ARTICLES OF AGREMEINT
36\. I am satisfied that the proposed Loan complies with the Articles
of Agreement of the Bank\. The Report of the Committee provided for in
Article III, Section 4Viii) of the Articles of Agreement is attached (No\. 5)\.
PART VII - RECMMMMNDATIONS
37\. I recommend that the Executive Directors approve the Bank's
acting as Administrator of the Fund substantially on the terms and con-
ditions set forth in the attached draft of Indus Basin Development Fund
Agreement and adopt a resolution to that effect in the form attached
(No\. 6)\.
38\. I further recommend that the Executive Directors approve a
loan by the Bank to Pakistan in an amount in various currencies equivalent
to $90,000,000 substantially on the terms and conditions specified in
the attached draft Loan Agreement and adopt a resolution to that effect
in the form attached (No\. 7)\.
Eugene R\. Black
Attachments\.
Uashington D\.C\.
April 18, 1960\. | APPROVAL |
P009202 | Doument of
The World Bank
FOM OFFCIaL USE ONlY
Iqpot No\. 11490
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
YUGOSLAVIA
SERBIA REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2307-YU)
DECEMBER 24, 1992
M1ICROFICHE COPY
Report No\.:11490 YU Type: (PCR)
Title: SERBIA REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PRI
Author: JAMES, ENERGY
Ext\. :31756 Room:T 9057 Dept\. :OEDD1
Agriculture and Water Supply Operations Division
Country Department II
gurope and Central Asia Regional Office
Tbis document has a restricted dstribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
tbeir official duties\. Its contet may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
(Average for the calendar year\.)
Currency Unit - Dinar (Din)
Appraisal Year (1982): US$ 1 - Din 46
Intervening Years:
1983 US$l - Din 93
1984 US$1 - Din 153
3985 US$1 - Din 270
1986 US$1 - Din 379
1987 US$l Din 737
1988 US$1 - Din 2,523
1989 US$1 - Din 28,764
1990 US$1 - New Din 11\.321
Completion Year (1991): US$ 1 - New Din 19\.63
ABBREVIATIONS
CA Consortium Agreement
CP World Bank Cooperative Program
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
HA Hectare
GSP Gross Social Product
ICOR Increurental Capital Output Ratio
IRC Intercommunal Regional Communities
SAL Structural Adjustment Loan
SAR Staff Appraisal Report
SDK Social Accounting Service
SFUR Serbian Fund for Underdeveloped Regions
UBB Udruzena Beogradska Banka
UOC Union of Cooperatives
EISCAL =EA
January 1 to December 31
3 so N g Od 190\. a New oamen (Now ss at bsd S1 te antm of Now 0lna 1 - OMas 10\.000\.
FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY
THE WORLD BANK
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
U\.S\.A\.
Offlo of DireotorvGomal
Opeadens Evaluation
December 24, 1992
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIQENT
SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Yugoslavia
Serbia Regional Develonment Project (Loan 2307-Y:I=)
Attached is a copy of the report entitled "Project Completion Report on Yugoslavia
Serbia Regional Development Project (Loan 2307-YU)* prepared by the Europe & Central Asia
Regional Office\. The Borrower did not contribute Part II\.
The project succeeded in Its first major objective: development of the private farm
sector through improved drainage and on-farm investments\. The project was managed by
Agrobanka, a new financial interrnediary, which was institutionally strengthened by project
completion\. The second major objective, modernization and reconstruction of the social
sector agroindustry component did not succeed\. These Industries require financial
strengthening, improved management and appropriate legislation\. The project was extended
2\.5 years and 31 percent of the loan funds were cancelled\.
Overall, the project is judged as marginally satisfactory because the farm
component had a significant impact in regional development and job creation\. However, its
sustainability is rated as uncertain\.
The Project Completion Report provides an adequate account of project
achievements\. No audit is planned\.
1\.
Attachment
Th documen has a rsstrted dbton sad may be used by redplt oy I the performce of
tIr off-i duts\. he ontent may not ohwise be disce wthout Word Ban _utoa\.
FOR OMCIAL Use ONLY
PRWJECT Cao= RZR
; WS~~~~~~~~~~UOSLLI
SERBIA RtEGIONAL DEVELPMEN PROJECT
(L 2307-YU)
TABLE COTNS
Preface \.4
Evaluation Suary \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. ill
PART Is PROJECT REVIEW PREO BANK'S PERSPECTIVE \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 1
A\. PROJECT IDENIFY \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 1
B\. BACKGROUND \. \. \. \. \. \. o\. o\. \. \. a\. \. \. *\. \. \. \. 1
The Main Features of Agriculture in Yugoslavia \. \. \. \. 1
PolicyContext \.*\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 1
Linkage\. Between Project, Sector and Macro Policy \. \. \. 2
Objectives
C\. PROJECT OBJEJ71VES AND DESCRIPTON \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 2
Project Background \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. * \. \. 2
ProjectObjectives \. 3
Project Components \.o\. 3
D\. PROJECT DESIGN AND ORC&NII O \. \. 4
Conceptual Foundation of Project Design \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 4
Innovations Under the Project Concept \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 5
Appropriateness of Project Scope and Scale \. \. \. \. \. \. 5
Quality of Project Preparation \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 5
Appropriateness of Project Timing \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.*\. \. \. 6
Responsibilities of Participating Institutions' \. \. \. \. 6
E\. PROJECT I L h NT TIO \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 7
Variances Between Planned and Actual Project \. \. \. \. \. 7
Implementation
Identification of ProjectRisks\. \.* \.9\. \. \. \. 8
Fo PROJECT RESMLTS \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 8
Geveral A sseammet * \. o\. \. o\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. o 8
Project Impact \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. * * \. \. \. \. \. * \. \. 9
G\. BPOJECTSUIL \.ST\.T\. 10
HO* BANK PERFORMANCE \. 10
Bank Performance During Preparation and Appraisal Phase 10
Bank Performance During Implementation Phase \. \. \. \. \. 11
Lessons Learned \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. # \. \. \. \. \. \. \. o \. 12
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
TABL1E 0 -CgE=S (Cant'd)
ILBORROWERPRPO BANCE \. 12
Bowror Performance During Preparation aud Appraisal Phase 12
Borrmor Performae Duriug Implementation \. \.* \. \. \. 13
Jo PROJECT RELATIONSHIP \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 14
L PR\.JECT DOCMUHT&TONDAND DATA \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.o 14
PART Is PROJECT REVIE POR BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE \. \. \. \. 15
PART IIt STATISTICAL IWORMATION \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 17
TablelsRelatedBank Loans \. \. 17
Table2: ProjeatTietable\. \. \. \. 18
Table3s LoanDisburesemet\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 19
Table 4 Project Costs \. \. **\. * \. 20
Table5: ProjectFinancing\. \. \. 20
Table6: Project eults \. \. \. \.**\. \. \. 21
Table 7: Status of Legal Coveants \. \. 23
Table8: StaffveekSuwy \. \. 25
Table9S MissionData \. 26
NAPSs IBRD 16607
IB 16608
PRCT COMLTON P
YTIGSLAVI&
SnIAI REGCO DEVLOP PROJECT
a1 2307=n11
PRilACZ
This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Serbia
Regional Development project In Yugoslavia, for which Loan 2307-YU
in the mount of US$136\.0 mllion equivalent was approved on June 9,
1983\. The loan was closed on Aursot 31, 1991, about two aud a half
years behind schedule\. An amount of US$42\.0 million equivalent was
canceled from the loan account in April 1986\. Total disbursements
amounted to US$94\.0 million or 69Z of the original loan amount\. The
last disbursement was made on September 19, 1991\.
The PCR was prepared for the Agriculture and Water Supply
Operations Division (EC2AW) of the Burope and Central Asia Region by
the Agriculture Operations Division (ENTAG) in the Technical
Department of the Europe and Central Asia, and the Middle East and
North Africa Regions (Prefaces, Ealuation Suraty, Parts I and IUI)\.
The draft PCR was sent to the Borrower for comments, but none were
received\.
The report is based an the Staff Appraisal Report; the
Loan, Guarantee, and Project Agreementst Supervision Reports;
correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower; and internal Bank
memoranda\.
WOCOSL&VI
SERBIA REGIONAL DEVELOPMEWT PROJECT
(LOAN 2307-YU)
Obiectives
1\. The Serbia Regional Development Project was appraised by the Bank
in 1982 as one of several similar projects intended to support the less
developed regious, promote agriculture, carry out institutional reforms, and
reduce the external resource gap\. Agriculture has been a priority sector from
the point of view of both the government and the Bank, and its development has
contributed to the realization of other objectives related to reducing
regional income disparities and generating employment\. The specific objectives
of this project, as described in the Staff Appraisal Report, were to focus on
the development of the individual farm sector of the Kolubara and Danube
regions by generating economic growth that would specifically aim at (i)
increasing agricultural production; (ii) improving rural incomes and
employment opportunities; (iii) reducing income disparities between developed
and less developed communes; (iv) increasing availability of processed food
products for the domestic and export markets; and (v) strengthening the
technical support and credit d4livery systems in the project area\. The
project comprised of six major components: (a) on-farm production investments,
aimed at achieving an increase in the labor-intensive production of livestock
and crops through provision of credit to about 10,900 individual farmers 2;
(b) support services, that included farm mechanization equipment, seed
processing plants, repair workshops, fuel storage depots, poultry hatchery and
breeding farms, sheep and pig breeding farms, milk collecting centers, and a
tobacco drying plant; (c) extension services; (d) agro-industries, including
investments in modernization and reconstruction of 14 agro-industry
facilities; (e) improved drainage over an area of about 27,000 ha; and (f)
technical assistance to Agrobanka, the executing financial intermediary for
the project (paras\. 5 to 8)\.
Implementation Experience
2\. Although project implementation encountered many difficulties,
efforts to address them led to progressive improvement, especially in the
organization and management aspects of the implementation process\.
Implementation experience in respect of the different project components was
mixed; while some were, on the whole, implemented successfully, e\.g\. the
drainage and primary production components, others were less successfully
V ftwdda Wm= who wwo igib to r\.csi r no proj er ha to te memder d coopwads or be aoct\.d wth ft
swWsia - by du Cf bcomm *il thmelo r produce or cpaUh9 t0h soda r\.
- iv -
executed\. Four areas, in particular, reflect significant variance between the
planned (at appraisal) and the actual implementation: (a) the Bank funds
actually borrowed under the project (about US$92 million) were significantly
less than expected (US$186 million that included, in addition to US$136
million under the Bank Loan, also a B loan of US$50 million which was not
signed), and the remaining US$44 million of the Bank loan had to be canceled
in 1986; (b) funds actually borrowed for the primary production component
constituted only about one quarter of the originally estimated amounts; (c)
implementation of the major part of the drainage component started after a
significant delay, and to allow completion of this component, the project had
to be extended by two and a half years; and (d) the extension services
component was implemented only to a very limited extent (paras\. 20 to 25)\.
3\. The estimated project cost, as appraised, was about US$486\.0
million but the actual cost is estimated at about US$230\.0 million\. The much
'' wer than expected cost of the project can be attributed to several reasons:
ka) significant overestimation at appraisal of the funds needed for interest
during construction; (b) lower borrowing for primary production than was
expected at appraisal; and (c) savings arising from exchange rate changes that
resulted in a faster rate of devaluation of the Dinar against the US dollar as
compared to the rate of domestic inflation\. While some of the variances
between the expected and the actudl cost of the project could not have been
avoided, in re;:ospect, a more rigorous review process could, perhaps, have
prevented some of the unfavorable discrepancies (paras\. 20 to 25)\.
Results
4\. Overall, the project has had a significant impact on the
development of the two regions targeted under the project, and the economy of
Serbia in general (para\. 28)\. The project has also made a major contribution
in respect to human resources development, creating about 2,000 new jobs
(para\. 29)\. In respect to therperformance under the different project
components, results were mixed; objectives were substantially met in respect
of some components whereas success was limited in the case of others\. The
drainage component can be considered a success because the expectations of the
beneficiaries were met in regard to improvement in production yields and
income\. Economic rates of return of the subareas under the drainage component
are likely to meet the expectations at appraisal\. The\. financial and economic
results of farms which received credit under the project for investments under
the primary production component are likely to be satisfactory as well (para\.
27)\. In respect of institutional strengthening, there has been a noteworthy
improvement in the operations of Agrobanka (paras\. 38 to 39)\. However, the
achievements in respect of the agro-industries and supporting services, and
the extension services, components were much more limited\. While twenty-two
of the twenty-nine originally planned agro-industries and supporting services
were established, only six of the investments showed positive financial
results, the rest facing significant financial difficulties that stemmed, to
various degrees, from ineffective management, marketing problems, insufficient
capacity utilization, insufficient raw material supply, poor domestic demand
for the manufactured products, barriers in foreign markets, an overvalued
exchange rate, and other causes (para\. 27)\. Improving the situation in the
agro-industries would require, among other things, the development of a
program of privatization and restructuring\. Although this has been generally
the intention of both the Federal and the Republican governments, the
appropriate enabling legislation has not yet been enacted, and prospects in
-v -
this regard remain uncertain in the face of the current unclear political
situation in the country (para\. 27)\.
Sustainabilitv
5\. Project benefits are more likely to be sustainable in certain
areas than in others\. Most investments under the primary production and
drainage components are expected to be sustainable, and to be able to maintain
* an acceptable level of net benefits throughout their economic life\. In regard
to the agro-industries and supporting services components, sustainability is
not assured for all the investments under the components\. Kost of these
investments, including even those that are presently profitable, are likely to
need substantial restructuring in rogard to management, accounting, marketing,
production, labor force utilization, and ownership\. However, such
restructuring goes beyond the scope of this project, because the difficulties
experienced by the investments under the project reflect issues resulting from
the socio-economic system of the country\. Project sustainability will also
be subject to stabilization of the macroeconomic situation--int ility of the
government to stabilize the economy and control inflation would drive many
producers out of business, including those in the project areas\. Finally, the
operation and maintenance of the drainage system as established under the
project is critical to its viability, and in that regard, appropriate user
fees, and their efficient collection and management, are imperative (para\.
30)\.
Findings and Lessons Learned
6\. The main lessons from the experience under this project are: (a)
The implications of a distorted and deteriorating macroeconomic environment on
sectoral operations, like the project, should be more explicitly assessed
during project preparation\. In hindsight, it would appear that the project
concept was formulated without sufficient regard to difficulties steaming from
problems in the macroeconomic environment; because of this the borrowing for
primary production, and the results of the investments in agro-industries and
supporting services, have been substantially less than expected\. (b)
Attention must be paid to the link between formulating a comprehensive project
concept that would relate primary production to end-users (agro-industries),
* supporting services, marketing, and both the individual and the social sectors
involved in the production activities\. (c) Directed credit in a Bank lending
operation may have some justification if the market mechanism has not
developed sufficiently; however, the project may have been over-designed in
this respect in that it deprived sub-borrowers of the flexibility required to
adjust to changing market and economic conditions\. (d) The difficulties in
project implementation arising from the complexity of a project that included
so many components demonstrates the need to simplify the project concept from
the outset\. It was necessary to have several supervision teams to cover
different aspects like drainage, agroindustries, primary production, credit
operations, and the institution building activities concerning Agrobanka\.
Without adequate supervision resources, it would be difficult to focus on
effective implementation of such a complex project, and to provide timely and
appropriate assistance to the Borrower and the beneficiaries\. (e) Timely
evaluation of the financial management system of the project beneficiaries and
intermediary banks is essential in diagnosing elements that are critical to
the project's successful implemi;ntation\. (f) The technical assistance needs
under the project were identified correctly but, in retrospect, without
- vi -
sufficient repard to relevant maWemefit and organization aspects, and their
fulfillment proved difficult under the politically uncertain environment\.
These considerations apply as well to the extension services under the
project, and to the improvement of the operations in Agrobanka\. Under the
socio-economic system prevailing at that time the government had no role in
providing extension services\. Despite the substantial improvement in the
operations of Agrobanka, many more improvements are needed which could only be
undertaken under a comprehensive reform of the banking system\. The Bank had
been engaged in supporting the government in its eC:arts to carry out a
fundamental reform of the financial sector which, \.40ever, was brought to a
halt by the outbreak of the hostilities in Yugoslavia (para\. 36)\.
YUL'JIAV
SERI REIMOAL DSVELOPNT PROECT
(LOAN 2107-YU)
PART I: PROJECT REIRV PR I BANR'S PSRSEC4=VE
A\.Eg= IETT
Name: Serbia Regional Development Project
Loan Number: 2307-YU
RVP Unit: Europe and Central Asia
Country: Yugoslavia
Sector: Agriculture
Subsector: Agricultural Credit
B\.
The Main Features of Ajriculture in YuLoslaXia
1\. Agriculture is an important sector in the Yugoslav economy\. In
1988 it contributed around 14 percent of Gross Social Product (GSP) and,
together with agro-industries, about 9\.5X of exports\. The sector employs
approximately 17 percent of the labor force (19 percent with agro-industries)\.
The importance of agriculture is, however, higher than these figures suggest
since over half of the total po tion is rural and remains closely linked \.to_
agriculture, even if not actively engaged in production\.
2\. A special feature of Yugoslav agriculture is the dual existence of
a large scale, "modern' social sector, and a small scale family sector where
yields and labor productivity are comparatively low\. Although about 80
percent of cropped land is in the hands of private farms, only 48 percent of
the coamercialized production originated from the private sector in 1988, down
from 55 percent in 1982\. This was maiuly because of the virtual complete
control that the social sector had over credlt, marketing, and inputs\.
Consequently, during the difficult economic period of the 1980s, priority for
provision of subsidized capital, inputs, and other services was given, under
the then prevailing Yugoslav system, to the needs of the social sector\.
F°licv Context
3\. Prior to the political changes and outbreak of hostilities in
Yugoslavia in 1991, the Government was implemuenting a major reform program
that included a stabilization and structural adjustment program which was
expected to lead to a market-oriented and more competitive economy\. The
agricultural sector was prominent in the structural adjustment program because
the sector, along with other productive sectors, had been subject to
inefficient systems of production, input distribution, and marketing patterns,
which stymied economic incentives and constrained growth performance\. The
2
significance of agriculture also arises from its impact on the standard of
living, employment, and regional development\. The sector provides essential
goods required by the population, with food products constituting about half
of household consumption expenditures\. While the need for policy reform of
the sector received little attention in the past, the Government at the same
time provided incentives in the form of subsidies for inputs, such as
fertilizer, and for interest rates with the objective of stimulating
production\. Low interest rates encouraged the use of debt, led to a
relatively rapid pace of capital investment, especially in the social sector,
and eventually contributed to problems of liquidity\. However, only a
relatively small number of individual farmers had access to credit for
agricultural investments other than in the form of farm inputs for crops grown
under contract\. Liquidity shortages in social secto- enterprises was the main
cause for the severely restricted access of individual farmers to credit\.
Prior to the onset of the uncertainties stemming from the currently difficult
political situation, the Government was taking measures to gradually reduce
agricultural subsidies, including subsidized credit, and to encourage
producers, including those in the agriculture sector, to apply economic and
financial criteria to the making of investment decisions\.
Linkages Between Proiect\. Sector\. and Macro Policy Objectives
4\. The Bank's objectives in respect of its assistance to Yugoslavia
have been to support: the development of the less developed regions,
promotion of agriculture, design and implementation of institutional reforms,
and reduction of the external resource gap\. Agriculture has been a priority
sector from the point of view of both the government and the Bank, and its
development has contributed to the realization of other objectives related to
reducing regional income disparities and generating employment\. Although
agriculture has been the only major sector, other than personal services, in
which social ownership is not predominant, the social sector, until recently,
was predominant in terms of ids access to financial resources and inputs, as
well as its control of agricultural marketing and processing\. The official
policy toward the role of the individual farmer changed during the late 1980s,
and it is now realized that the individual sector contains many unexploited
opportunities that should be realized by provision of inputs and greater
market orientation\. The Government's policy to borrow for the promotion of
agriculture in the less developed regions of the count)ry coincided, at the
time the project was prepared, with the Bank's concern for lending to benefit
the poor\. To that extent, the project, which was formulated and prepared in
the early 1980s and is located in the less developed areas of the Socialist
Republic (SR) of Serbia, supported the objective of reducing income
disparities between regions, and fits well the criteria mentioned above\.
C\. PROJECT OBJECT-VES AND DESCRIPTION
Project Background
5\. The Serbia Regional Development Project was first identified by
the Serbian government in 1980, and the early preparatory work was carried out
by the Institute for Agricultural Economics and the Institute for Industrial
Economics in Belgrade\. The project was subsequently further prepared, and
pre-appraised, by the Bank in 1981 and 1982 respectively\. Preparation of the
3
drainage component of the project was assisted by the FAO/CP\. The project was
appraised in July 1982\.
6\. The project area is located in the Kolubara and Danube regions,
which are in the northern parts of Serbia\. The area has a total population of
about one million persons, of which about 60 percent reside in rural areas,
representing about 27 percent of the agricultural population of the republic\.
Individual farmers own over 90 percent of the agricultural land\. The per
capita income within the project area is the lowest in Serbia with the
exception of the Morava region\. Pockets of rural poverty and considerable
income disparities are present\. Of a total of 25 communes in the project
area, 16 have been declared less developed (per capita income between US$1200
and US$1500) by the Government and were qualified for assistance from the
Serbian Fund for Underdeveloped Regions (SFUR)\. At the time of project
preparation, it was perceived that the development of agriculture in the
project area was constrained due to a high level of migration from the rural
areas to the urban centers, lack of- credit and extension services to the
individual sector, inadequate market arrangements, and lack of capital to
improve land drainage and to replace outdated equipment and machinery\. The
project was designed to address these development constraints\.
Proiect Obiectives
7\. The main objectives of the project, as described in the Staff
Appraisal Report, were to focus on the development of the individual farm
sector of the Kolubara and Danube regions by generating economic growth that
would specifically aim at (i) increasing agricultural production; (ii)
improving rural incomes and employment opportunities; (iii) reducing income
disparities between developed and less developed communes; (iv) increasing
availability of processed food products for the domestic and export markets,
and; (v) strengthening the technical support and credit delivery systems in
the project area\.
Proiect Components
8\. The project components included the following:
(a) On-farming oroduction investments\. EThis component was aimed
at achieving an increase in the labor-intensive production
of livestock and crops through provision of credit to about
10,900 individual farmers 3 with a specified pre-appraised
number of livestock production, hectares of deciduous
orchards, tobacco, sugarbeet, fruit nurseries, wheat, maize,
sunflower, and vegetables\.
(b) Sunporting services\. This included farm mechanization
equipment; two seed processing plants; repair workshops and
fuel storage depots; a poultry hatchery and two poultry
breeding farms; a sheep breeding farm; milk collecting centers; a tobacco
drying plant; and a pig breeding farm\.
2/tXNVI bm\. howeer, Wh0o W_ eligib, to flw mod! unhe C l ei~he hd toemenhem_ fd coopetae or anowith
UW soc" cOr hy dI bi conmed to nmau ther produc or Cro thUgh the aW l $ oc\.
4
(c) Extension services\. This component was intended to
strengthen the existing extension services at the level of
those basic organizations and cooperatives that were
directly involved in the implementation of the on-farm
investments\. Financing under the project was intended to be
provided for vehicles, apartments for extensionists, and
preparation of a master plan for extension and research for
Serbia\.
(4) Agroindustries, Sub-loans were to be provided for
modernization and reconstruction of 14 agro-industry
facilities, including four fruit and vegetable processing
plants; three cold storage facilities for fruits,
vegetables, and meat products; two livestock feed milling
plants; a potato processing plant; two poultry
slaughterhouses; a grain elevator facility, including dryer
and silo; and a vegetable oil mill\.
(e) Drainagle This was aimed at improving drainage over an area
of about 27,000 ha, in seven sub-areas\.
(f) Technical assistance to Agrobanka, the executing financial
intermediary of the project to improve its operations in
selected areas\.
D\. PROJECT DESIGN AND ORGANIZATION
Conceptual Foundation of Project Design
9\. The project actually consisted of five (rather than six) distinct
and diverse components because two of the components, namely those for
supporting services and agro-fndustries included somewhat similar items, e\.g\.
the supporting services included items such as investments in a tobacco curing
and drying plant, two seed processing plants, a hatchery and two poultry
farms, similar to investments included in the agro-industries component\. Each
component under the project was designed in great detail, e\.g\. in regard to
the number of beneficiaries, number of livestock, machinery and equipment, and
type of products to be developed\. Despite the overalL detailed design of the
project, the individual project components were in fact largely independent of
each other\. Th\. primary production component, for example, which was very
detailed at appraisal, was only marginally related to the increase in
production capacity of the agro-industries and support services financed under
the project\. In retrospect, it would appear that the project design was
actually more a collection of individual investments rather than a systematic
plan that coherently established a link between developing additional
production of raw materials, and availability of labor, marketing, and
capital\.
10\. Despite the detailed design of the primary production component,
when project implementation started, it turned out that most of the farmers
who were polled during preparation regarding their interest in investing under
the project, actually did not apply for sub-loans\. In retrospect, it would
appear that the local institutes that prepared the project, and later the Bank
as well, did not sufficiently take into account the likely adverse effects on
S
credit demand of the distorted and deteriorating macro-economic conditions,
which included price controls, negative but rising interest rates, rapid
inflation, and lagging dinar devaluations\. These factors also caused
significant differences between the original targets and actual implementation
of investments in other components\.
Innovations under the Project Concent
11\. While the project concept, as a whole, was not innovative, certain
components had innovative features, e\.g\. the technical aspects of the drainage
component were innovative in that they approached comprehensive development of
well-defined areas in a way that major physical and institutional constraints
were to be addressed, and measures were to be taken to optimize production,
albeit under the constraints of distorted prices and interest rates\.
Anprogriateness of Project Scope and Scale
12\. In retrospect, the project scope would appear to have been
designed somewhat over-optimistically\. Also, both the project cost and the
ensuing financing needs seem to have been substantially overestimated\. For
example, the funds required for interest during construction were estimated to
be about 35 percent of the base cost, of which the foreign exchange component
was about 27 percent\. In hindsight, these figures appear to be rather high in
relation to the anticipated implementation schedules of the agro-industry,
supporting services, or the drainage components, none of which were expected
to exceed two years\. The primary production component was expected to be
implemented in an even shorter period\. Subsequent realization of the possible
overestimation in this regard appears to have obviated the need for the
supplementary financing from the negotiated B loan (US$50 million) which,
consequently, was not signed by the Yugoslav team\.
13\. At the time the Ba&k loan was approved by the Board, it was the
largest Bank-financed project in Yugoslavia\. For Agrobanka, at the time a
recently created bank, it was the first experience in handling a Bank-
financed project\. Again, in retrospect, the relative inexperience of the
executing bank would appear not to have been taken sufficiently into
consideration in regard to its ability to handle a project of such magnitude
and complexity\. Experience in other similar Bank projects, all much smaller
in size, has shown that such projects can be implemented only at a much slower
pace, even under the management of more experienced financial intermediaries
than was the case, at the time, in this project\.
Qualitv of Proiect Preparation
14\. The feasibility studies carried out by the institutes that first
prepared the project served as a basis for the Bank's technical and economic
evaluation of the agro-industry and the supporting services components of the
project\. The engineering and technical aspects of project preparation were
covered well\. However, it appears that the business and accounting systems of
the enterprises involved were inadequately evaluated throughout the process of
project preparation and appraisal, and marketing aspects were insufficiently
reviewed as well\. The Bank would seem to have accepted the local institutes'
judgement as to whether sufficient market demand existed without looking
critically enough at the institutional aspects affecting the capability of the
6
project beneficiaries to compete domestically or internationally, or reviewing
whether the concerned enterprises had viable marketing strategies\. At the
time of project processing, the domestic market was quite protected, but this
was not the case concerning exports, which called for independent reviews of
the export marketing practices of the-beneficiaries\. These were apparently
not undertaken\.
15\. The feasibility studies for the drainage component of the project
were well prepared\. But in several instances the final design was not
prepared before Board approval, but rather during project implementation\.
Significant effort was made to preserve the environmental aspects of the
drainage subareas\. Environmental impact studies were carried out for all the
drainage sub-projects, and reviewed by international agencies and consultants\.
The results were supported by the relevant institutions concerned\. Bidding
documents were prepared by various consulting groups\. Most were adequately
prepared, but a few required substantial modifications and resulted in
delaying implementation\.
ADpropriateness of Project Timing
16\. The project was prepared in the early 1980s when inflation in the
country was relatively low, but was showing a persistent trend towards
increasing\. By the time the project was approved in 1983, a Structural
Adjustment Loan (SAL) loan to Yugoslavia had also been approved\.
Nevertheless, expectations that the overall macroeconomic situation would
improve in a sustained manner did not materialize, and the project
implementation period was marked by a deteriorating macroeconomic environment\.
Resionsibilities of Participating Institutions
17\. Udruzena Beogradsl& Banka (UBB) was the Borrower of the Bank loan\.
It had only nominal responsibility for project implementation, since all the
proceeds of the Bank loan were to be passed on to the executing bank,
Agrobanka, of which UBB was the holding bank\. Agrobanka, together with the
two Intercommunal Regional Communities (IRCs) of the Kolubara and the Danube
regions, signed a Project Agreement with the Bank for the implementation of
the project\. A Consortium Agreement (CA) was executed between UBB, Agrobanka
and some other major banks to ensure the availability of local funds for the
project\. In addition, Agrobanka signed an agreement with SFUR to provide
republican funds at concessionary interest rates for local financing\.
18\. Project coordination was carried out at three levels\. The overall
responsibility was assumed by a committee headed by Agrobanka that included
representatives from the Serbia Executive Council, the Republican Committee
for Agriculture, SFUR, UBB, the two IRCs, and the Union of Cooperatives (UOC)\.
At the regional level, there was a coordinating board presided over by the
president of the IRC, and comprised of representatives from the local chamber
of commerce, the association of cooperatives, communes, and basic banks' work
organizations\. A third level of coordination was established at the kombinat
level to coordinate on-farm investments for associated farmers, and to
implement investments related to kombinats\.
19\. The organizational set-up was, in effect, a command system and was
to an extent effective in reaching consensus at the board level in regard to
7
targeting and implementation of credit lending\. It did not prove to be as
efficient in dealing with the effects of changing circumstances, such as when
relative prices changed, and farmers or enterprises declined to borrow funds
according to their original plans\. Even with the liberalization of the system
in 1990, when all farmers, including non-associated farmers, became eligible
to receive credit, the above situation has not changed significantly in that
individual non-associated farmers are still not adequately represented
regarding their specific interests\.
E\. IKJLECT 5ymE oN
Variances Between Planned and Actual Progegt Imnlementation
20\. Four areas, in particular, reflect significant variance between
planned (at appraisal) and actual implementation: (a) The Bank funds borrowed
under the project (about US$92 million) were significantly less than the
estimates at appraisal (US$186 million)\. The B loan of US$50 million, as
mentioned before, was not signed (para\. 12), and US$44 million of the Bank
loan were canceled in 1986\. (b) Funds borrowed for the primary production
component constituted only about one quarter of the amounts provided for the
purpose\. (c) Implementation of the major part of the drainage component
started after a significant delay, and to allow completion of this component,
the project had to be extended by two and a half years\. (d) The extension
services component was implemented only to a very limited extent\.
21\. Interest During Construction\. In hindsight, the variance
attributed to the substantial overestimation of interest during construction
(para\. 12) could have been avoided if, during the project review process, more
attention had been paid to the underlying assumptions in regard to the project
costs as is currently done through reviews by departmental/regional advisers\.
22\. Primary Productio* Conmonent\. The problem of the lower than
expected borrowing for the primary production component could have been
mitigated if, at the time of project preparation and appraisal, more attention
had been paid to the experience gained from similar ongoing projects in
Yugoslavia and in other countries facing difficult and deteriorating macro-
economic situations\. In retrospect, the allocation for the primary production
component (originally about US$47 million) was significantly overestimated
when compared to other similar loans in Yugoslavia\. For example, in a
countrywide multipurpose credit project (Loan 1801-YU), whose implementation
period overlapped for about three years with that for the project, it took
approximately seven years to disburse about US$55 million of the primary
production component\.
23\. Savings Attributed to Exchange Rate Differences\. Savings
resulting from exchange rate changes as a result of the faster rate of
devaluation of the Dinar against the US dollar as compared to the rate of
domestic inflation could not have been foreseen at appraisal\.
24\. Delay in Implementation\. The drainage component consisted of
seven subareas\. Some communities that initially expressed interest in
borrowing funds under the project for this purpose later decided to drop out\.
Others delayed their decision until they could observe the results of the
drainage implementation investments in the first few areas, and also because
8
of the uncertain macroeconomic environment\. Some new coumunities were allowed
to come in as substitutes for those that dropped out, but the inclusion of
these now drainage areas required significant lead time for preparation\.
Bidding documents were of differing quality standards, and were generally
prepared well after the concerned projects had been approved by the Bank\.
Some of the delay could have been avoided, but at a cost of not implementing a
major part of the drainage component\. Since the experience in implementing
the drainage schemes in the first two areas was positive, extension of the
loan closing date to accommodate completion of this component was justified\.
25\. Extension Services Component\. A master plan for extension and
research for SR of Serbia was prepared by the Agricultural University of
Zemun\. However, the master plan was not implemented because the Serbian
Government did not have the budgetary appropriations for it, and because,
under the socio-economic system at the time, each agro-kombinat was
responsible for providing its own extension services\. In retrospect, it
appears that these factors may not have been sufficiently appreciated at
appraisi\.-\. The sub-borrowers for the extension services were social sector
enterprises (for all the elements other than the master plan for extension,
para\. 8 (c)), but the beneficiaries were to be the individual farmers
associated with the social sector\. Since the social sector enterprises were
reluctant to bear the foreign exchange risk for loans that would benefit
individual farmers, this component was implemented very slowly and most parts
did not materialize\. Again, in hindsight, these implications may not have
been adequately appreciated at appraisal\. However, the Yugoslav counterparts
did not object to including the extension services component under the
project\. It is, therefore, difficult to see how this variance could have been
avoided\.
Identification of Proiect Risks
26\. Most of the projeet risks that actually transpired were identified
in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR)\. However, the risk of macroeconomic
instability, which the project encountered throughout its implementation,
impacted on project performance much more significantly than was foreseen at
appraisal\. The SAR identified the possibility that farmers might be reluctant
to invest if there were to be significant changes in input/output price
ratios\. It suggested that these would have to be dealt with on a case by case
basis as new price ratios developed\. Since the Bank loan was, by and large,
directed credit, there was little flexibility given to the executing bank to
deal with any adverse impact on a case by case basis, short of canceling part
of the loan\. Agrobanka, to its credit, developed a system of lending in kind
for primary production, which was quite successful in offsetting the
detrimental impact of inflation on demand for credit (para\. 38)\.
F\. PROJECT RESULTS
General Assessment
27\. Overall, the project results were mixed; objectives were
substantially met in respect of some components whereas success was limited in
the case of others\. The drainage component can be considered a success
because the expectations of the beneficiaries were met in regard to
improvement in production yields and income\. Economic rates of return of the
9
subareas under the drainage component are likely to meet the expectations at
appraisal\. The financial and economic results of farms which received credit
under the project for investments under the primary production component are
likely to be satisfactory as well\. In respect of institutional strengthening,
there has been a noteworthy improvement in the operations of Agrobanka\.
However, the achievements in respect of the agro-industries, supporting
services, and extension services components were much more limited\. While
twenty-two of the twenty-nine originally planned agro-industries and
supporting services were established, only six of the investments showed
positive financial results, the rest facing significant financial difficulties
that stemmed, to various degrees, from ineffective management, marketing
problems, insufficient capacity utilization, insufficient raw material supply,
poor domestic demand for the manufactured products, barriers in foreign
markets, an overvalued exchange rate, and other causes\. Improving the
situation in the agro-industries would require, among other things, the
development of a program of privatization and restructuring\. Although this
has been generally the intention of both the Federal and the Republican
governments, the appropriate enabling legislation has not yet been enacted,
and prospects in this regard remain uncertain in the face of the current
unclear political situation in the country\.
Project ImDact 4
28\. The project has had a significant impact on the development of the
two regions that were targeted under the project, and the economy of Serbia in
general\. The project has not yet reached its full development potential, but
based on an estimated Incremental Capital Output Ratio (ICOR) of 3 for
agriculture in Yugoslavia, the project cost, estimated at about US$230 million
in 1991 prices (Part III, Table 3), would generate at the project's full
development, an estimated total production valued at about US$75 million of
which about 60 percent to 70 percent would be value added\. At appraisal, the
estimated FAR varied from 13 prercent to 60 percent for the primary production
investments, 12 percent to 17 percent for the drainage component, and 13
percent to 28 percent for the agro-industries and supporting services
components\. Most investments under the drainage and primary production
components are likely to be within the range estimated at appraisal\. The
investments in the agro-industries and supporting services have not yielded
the results expected at appraisal\. However, many of thiem, with improved
management and restructuring, could possibly turn around and produce better
results\.
29\. From the point of view of human resource development, the project
has had a major contribution\. Approximately 2,000 new jobs were created, of
which about one-third are estimated to have been for skilled labor\. These
included technical staff or engineers in food processing enterprises,
agronomists in chicken breeding farms, nurseries, orchards, and horticulture
crops\. The physical environment was also improved, as a result of elimination
of water logging, while preserving areas of marshes, forests and green belts\.
The environmental authorities in Yugoslavia have not recorded any significant
detrimental impact arising from the project on wildlife or fauna in the
J/ Bem c li\. ongingamdlUl Yugohta maiotduDa tmet plci resuieonde _s - ctnceled\.
TeWe Is tc OUg da to iesMst VW M edtuMM cd lit\. lWesdtmWs K nd s bb ma eNdor MUMasu cb su MO
inkde on\.
10
project areas\. In regard to the social environment, the project areas,
considered to be poor and underdeveloped by Yugoslav standards, have
experienced robust development\. The project also resulted in increasing
demand for improvement of the social infrastructure, but the funds available
were insufficient to meet this demand\. The Yugoslav authorities requested
that a new project financed by the Bank should address this issue\. Lastly,
during the course of project implementation, there has been a noteworthy
improvement in the institutional functioning of Agrobanka: a well-organized
management information system was put into operation; a monitoring and
evaluation unit was established and consistently provided Agrobanka's
management and the Bank with well-informed reports; remarkable improvement has
taken p'ace in Agrobanka's accounting system; and the project unit in
Agrobanka has become a well-administered and managed organization\.
G\. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY
30\. Project benefits are more likely to be sustainable in certain
areas than in others\. Most investments under the primary production and
drainage components are expected to be sustainable, and to be able to maintain
an acceptable level of net benefits throughout their economic life\. In regard
to the agro-industries and supporting services components, sustainability is
not assured for all the investments under the components\. Most of these
investments, including even those that are presently profitable, are likely to
need substantial restructuring in regard to management, accounting, marketing,
production, labor force utilization, and ownership\. However, such
restructuring goes beyond the scope of this project, because the difficulties
experienced by the investments under the project reflect issues resulting from
the socio-economic system of the country\. Project sustainability will also
be subject to stabilization of the macroeconomic situation--inability of the
Government to stabilize the economy and control inflation would drive many
producers out of business, including those in the project areas\. Finally, the
operation and maintenance of the drainage system as established under the
project is critical to its viability, and in that regard, appropriate user
fees, and their efficient collection and management, are imperative\.
H\. BANK PERFORMANCE
Bank Performance Durin2 Pre2aration and ApDraisal Phase
31\. The Bank provided skilled and competent staff for t\.eparation and
appraisal\. As a result, the Bank gained the confidence of the Borrower, the
executing bank, the Government of the SR of Serbia, and other institutions
involved in the project organization and implementation\. However, the main
focus of the Bank's review was the engineering and economic justification
aspects of the project\. The inadequacies in the financial management system
of Yugoslav enterprises, however, was an issue that was not appropriately
reviewed at the preparation and appraisal stage\. The Bank does not appear to
have seriously questioned the way that the financial system was functioning,
even though it was the main cause for the financial and economic failure of
investments and enterprises as going concerns\.
11
32\. The staffing of the Bank missions at the preparation and appraisal
stages did not include financial analysts\. Consequently, there was no
critical review of the financial position of the investing enterprises, and
significant deficiencies in important areas such as adequate management
information systems, cost accounting practices, cash flow projections, and
other elements of appropriate financial discipline were insufficiently
addressed\.
33\. Bank missions would seem to have made only a cursory review of the
marketing aspects of investments, particularly when it involved sizable
* exports into markets that were not tested, and tended to accept investors'
claims regarding the viability of the exports or that such exports were not
significant in comparison to total market demand\.
34\. The Bank's review of Agrobanka was documented in a meticulous
diagnostic report that covered almost every aspect of the bank's organization
and its operations\. Despite substantial shortcomings that the report listed,
including inadequate organization, insufficient staffing, lack of internal
auditing, inadequate accounting, and deficient training, Agrobanka was
recommended to be the executing bank for the project in the expectation that
improvements in its operations could be secured relatively quickly\. In
practice, this could only be gradually achieved over a number of years (para\.
29), which affected project implementation unfavorably during the early years\.
Bia Performance Durins Im2lementation Phase
35\. At the beginning of the implementation stage, Bank supervision
missions encountered typical issues concerning procurement and interpretation
of the legal documents\. However, it immediately became clear that the project
faced difficult problems that resulted from Agrobanka's relative lack of
experience to undertake its tesponsibilities for this complex project\. The
project unit in Agrobanka at first lacked adequate leadership, and its staff
lacked experience in banking operations in general, and in project
implementation in particular\. The accounting system in Agrobanka was mostly
manual, and the project accounts, the foreign exchange accounts, and the
general accounting of the bank were incompatible with each other\. In
addition, there was no consolidated client account system, and the client
accounts and the bank accounts were incompatible\. Agrobanka also did not have
a monitoring and evaluation system\. All these shortcomings were pointed out
to Agrobanka's management during Bank supervision missions, and were gradually
remedied over time (para\. 29)\. The Bank demonstrated its support during
implementation by providing skilled and competent staff for supervision\. As a
result, the Bank gained the confidence of Agrobanka's staff and management,
and investors, who accepted the Bank's advice on issues concerning project
implementation and management\. Cooperation between the Bank, Agrobanka, and
investors was based on mutual respect, and generally facilitated improvements
in impleme :ation of the project\. The main weaknesses, on the other hand,
related tu: (a) the overall complexity of the project which called for
deployment of much higher supervision resources than proved possible in the
last three years of implementation because of budgeting constraints; and (b)
occasional delays in processing bidding documents\. This was later remedied
when specialized staff were assigned to deal with procurement issues\.
12
Lessons Learned
36\. The main lessons from the experience under this project are: (a)
The implications of a distorted and deteriorating macroeconomic environment on
sectoral operations, like the project, should be more explicitly assessed
during project preparation\. In hindsight, it would appear that the project
concept was formulated without sufficient regard to difficulties stemming from
problems in the macroeconomic environment; because of this the borrowing for
primary production, and the results of the investments in agro-industries and
supporting services, have been substantially less than expected\. (b)
Attention must be paid to the link between formulating a comprehensive project
concept that would relate primary production to end-users (agro-industries),
supporting services, marketing, and both the individual and the social sectors
involved in the production activities\. (c) Directed credit in a Bank lending
operation may have some justification if the market mechanism has not
developed sufficiently; however, the project may have been over-designed in
this respect in that it deprived sub-borrowers of the flexibility required to
adjust to changing market and economic conditions\. (d) The difficulties in
project implementation arising from the complexity of a project that included
so many components demonstrates the need to simplify the project concept from
the outset\. It was necessary to have several supervision teams to cover
different aspects like drainage, agroindustries, primary production, credit
operations, and the institution building activities concerning Agrobanka\.
Without adequate supervision resources, it would be difficult to focus on
effective implementation of such a complex project, and to provide timely and
appropriate assistance to the Borrower and the beneficiaries\. (e) Timely
evaluation of the financial management system of the project beneficiaries and
intermediary banks is essential in diagnosing elements that are critical to
the project's successful implementation\. (f) The technical assistance needs
under the project were identified correctly but, in retrospect, without
sufficient regard to relevant management and organization aspects, and their
fulfillment proved difficult utider the politically uncertain envirorment\.
These considerations apply as well to the extension services under the
project, and to the improvement of the operations in Agrobanka\. Under the
socio-economic system prevailing at that time the Government had no role in
providing extension services\. Despite the substantial improvement in the
operations of Agrobanka, many more improvements are needed which can only be
undertaken under a comprehensive reform of the banking system\. The Bank had
been engaged in supporting the Government in its efforts to carry out a
fundamental reform of the financial sector which, however, was brought to a
halt by the outbreak of the hostilities in Yugoslavia\.
I\. BORROU PEPRNANCE
Borrower Performance During Prenaration and Appraisal Phase
37\. UBB was the nominal borrower and did not play a significant role
at any stage of project preparation or implementation (para\. 17), except for
participation in the negotiations for the project and for the cofinancing\.
Agrobanka acted on behalf of the Borrower as the executing agent and handled
all the business that related to the project\. Agrobanka was cooperative
during the preparation period and served well in its capacity of coordinating
the various organizations involved in project preparation (para\. 18)\.
13
Borrower Performance During Proiect Implementation
38\. The initial period of implementation was particularly difficult\.
There was a large turnover of staff and managers in Agrobanka during the first
three years with adverse effects on project implementation\. The situation,
however, gradually stabilized and the staff became increasingly effective in
performing work related to project processing and management\. To counter the
decreased demand for credit by the individual sector as a result of the high
inflation rate in Yugoslavia, Agrobarnka introduced a unique system of credit
denominated in kind for financing primary production\. Under this system the
terms of a farmer's loan were fixed in terms of the commodity to be produced,
and the interest was set at 12 percent for the life of the loan\. For
Agrobanka the value of the principal varied according to the price of the
commodity, and the real interest rate was the same as the nominal rate if the
price of the commodity rose with the general price level\. Agrobanka, of
course, took the risk in case the commodity prices rose to a lesser extent
than the general price level\. Nevertheless, the system encouraged an increase
in demand for borrowing, and to that extent was very successful\.
39\. During the second half of project implementation, Agrobanka
perhaps performed better than most other financial intermediaries that managed
Bank- financed projects in Yugoslavia\. Aspects that showed particular
improvement were the timely submission of progress reports, consistent
collection of information regarding monitoring and evaluation of project
performance, timely preparation of annual reports, improved managing of
disbursements and collections, and timely repayments of amortized loans\.
Performance in certain procurement matters was less than adequate at times,
but progressively improved\. Agrobanka was generally cooperative and
accommodated itself well to the requirements under International Competitive
Bidding (ICB) procedures\.
40\. Compliance with ptovisions of the legal documents was mixed\. The
first main area concerns the onlending interest rate\. Under a provision in
Supplemental Letter No\. 7 that refers to the Letter of Development Policy of
1983, Agrobanka was supposed to adjust upwardly its onlending interest rate at
the start of project implementation\. This provision was not complied with
until at least the middle of 1985\. However, Agrobanka was not exceptional in
regard to non-performance in respect to the interest rate provision\. Most
other banks in Yugoslavia would seem to have not complied with the interest
rate guideline of the 1983 Letter of Development Policy\. The second area
relates to a provision in Schedule 2\.C of the Project Agreement that
stipulated that 'repayment of the principal of the portion of Sub-loans
financed out of the proceeds of the Loan shall be determined from the
projected cash flow of the Investment Project financed\." Non-performance in
this case arose from the view taken by Agrobanka (and other Yogoslav banks)
that, under a provision in then prevailing Yugoslav Banking Law, a bank was a
fiscal agent of its borrowers\. This meant, according to the Yugoslav
interpretation, that the terms and conditions of Bank lending to Agrobanka
applied to the sub-borrowers as well\. This dispute was not resolved until
1990 when the banks in Yugoslavia became joint stock enterprises under the
ongoing reform program\. By then, all the sub-loans under the project were
already signed\. The third area concerned foreign exchange risk\. In
accordance with Supplemental Letter No\. 6, social sector sub-borrowers were
supposed to bear the full foreign exchange risk\. This was only complied with
in regard to the direct foreign exchange portion of sub-loans\. However, when
14
it concerned the indirect portion of the foreign exchange in sub-loan, the
National Bank of Yugoslavia undertook to bear the full foreign exchange risk\.
This issue was not resolved until 1987\.
J\. PQaICT RELATXIUNSgIP
41\. The relationship between the Bank and project management remained
excellent at all times\. Although, Bank supervision missions from time to time
pointed out to Agrobanka various shortcomings, this was accepted as being
constructive, and sincere efforts were made to correct deficiencies\. This
resulted in a significant improvement in Agrobanka's performance of its
responsibilities during project implementation\. In particular, the exchange
of technical views in regard to the drainage component of the project was
productive, and helped in upgrading the design of the concerned sub-projects
and their implementation\. A very good relationship was also established
between the Bank and the Social Accounting Service (SDK); this was useful in
discussions concerning the annual financial statements of Agrobanka, and
resulted in streamlining certain accounting procedures in Agrobanka\. The SDK
representative occasionally joined the Bank field supervision team and
provided significant assistance in clarifying various aspects of the sub-
borrowers' financial statements\.
K\. PROJECT DOC!NENTATION AND DATA
42\. The SAR and loan documents followed the standards of other
Yugoslav agricultural projects\. Because of the many changes in political and
economic conditions in the country during project implementation, the value of
the SAR for project implementation was, thereby, limited\.
43\. Agrobanka prepared good semi-annual progress reports, and
excellent annual reports based on adequate monitoring and evaluation\.
1S
PROJC CG TION ItPORT
YUGOSLAVIA
SERBIA REGIONUL DEIZOPiT PROJECT
LOQANI 230-_
PART IIl PROJECT RMVIEW IRO= BORROWER'S PERSPEC
The draft PCR was sent to the Borrower for comets, but
none were received\.
d dod d d dl d, dl R d n lE
E~~~ U __ 3 _d _d dgf
- _ _--- - - - I - I I - -
Fi E o
0iE|!XXX§MEE
'-4 E¢ESa33ii f
AR r
'- 46tgipi l8X4||i2f
0SFS2
~- =====
ii IiI}t l' II
'-4l 0g 1-1
i_~~ ~~ ;1 4 10*g! Xiibi gi
co~ ~ ~~~c
0' a a1114111 - a a1 - i i -- - - a
r1~~~~~c
11881# #+PPPiCttitSm
,0 j
~~~~~ ~~P 1I IIII
C0
20
Table 4: Proiect -Cost (US$ Million)
Compofloot _ _ _ _" IM
Local PoFOlgP Toma Laws____ Fonig TOMa
On Fean 6m SUus 1\.4 S24 113\.8 122 184 30\.6
Suppo SMM 31\.4 3z? 64\.1 36\.3 19\.4 #i\.7
E8de ton SerIc\. 1\.5 1\.4 2\.9 0\.1 02 0\.3
AgOIrAtaY383 3a\. 74\.9 39\. 2\.7 672
Oralne M15 187 34\.0 42\.3 1&2 65
AqofognrIa 0\.3 0\.3 _ _
Total Se Coa 147\.9 142\.1 200\.0 130\.4 85\.9 216\.3
PhyaSconlngnoth 3ie 14\.9 28\.5 ma0M
mm ca mnclc\. 21\.0 19\.9 40\.9 \. n\.
Total PROW cam 82\.5 176\.9 359\.4 130\.4 85\. 2183
FfortEndFee 1\.0 1\.0 ntL 1\.0 1\.0
mm" 9ow Conls 91\.3 34\.1 125\.4 7\.a 7t1 14\.9
Total Raoi"et |Wf 273\.8 | 212\.0 r 4856 f 138\.2 | 94\.0 2322
Table 5: Proiect Financina (US$ Million)
~~~~~~~~~~\.
sum Appala E-tm AdI'
-cd 8u* 136\.0 "A
A _ __ 1 0 1258 38\.3
SPUR 25\.1 1 18\.3
Locld SW" 127\.0 4\.7
lieaos COnC _to 71\.9 429
TOTAL 488 252\.2
3 Ema Cost d IAmwtl rvUeId up to eomba 31\. 190t
!J The Owe Of ls locl ftia Wu WAl uptO Osmmw 31\.1 i9
jQ tU niiae tapeslta oiadn ono abutUS50mIlIn oudsuplmn goalmsswo oug
21
Table 6: Proiect Results
Investments Implemented Uner the Ploiect
A\. Amroindustries and Suorting Services
The suiwp d ATV of nvstmnt '
I\. FAt JiU fMey ht Vae n n I peduln cactY fom 14 to 11
_________________ 26 thousand tone per etr\. _VW
\.Z Gran Eevaar ad oiw in vaElb Cw aply d iO0O tons a dr wi
\.______________ cy dapaclof 12 t/h\.
3 ane Room" In Vaoi Ma cpacty of 10\.250 tons\.
4\. CoNd Stoa ant FM Us V e Incrm cIan ay m 3 to8 thousand
toas and now feezngte l itW 1\.5 t/h
I\. Cold Stoe Pan In S8bac Cpi 1zOoO tos 11\.
PaP Cl at In Iuboa New MOo of pmne cad capcty 3\.O00 tofn 39
7\. Percpan hls In Oena C4pa 1o 50 tons per annum\. 1O\.
8 Cold Store Plant ILaoo Capacity of 5800 ton$ a horem In 4J
__ be dialtber Cap4iy by 2000 tos l
9\. vegetale on Rpat In Vaco Gadle Inf iC In Cspety f tm mNtan_t as
proc n m t18 to 55 thousa tons,
10\. feed MMa b Poc In Capacity ffam 30 to 50 stousand 0t
toil
1I\. Col St e P"nt Ir Pac Capacty of 250 tons an feming tune 7
f 2\.5 t/h\.
12\. Seed RooMng Plant In Sabc CapacIty 34\.000 tons per annum 11\.6
3\. lm an PAn In Sova Capacity d0 tons ot drtd plum pw 1\.0
anntum
14\. FPum Cry od _ I Va w d t200 tons o a"d plum pw
1 ToDaco ytg and cn" Par in CsPedY d 5\.000 tn Of cured atoao per Q S
la Storage Pte WA Shac S OD Storage atils wAth toa 240 ubcm 1J
WordStops capacty a4 sewc uuops _______________
17\. Chkn Fafm and atcry In CapaCty to a 60\.000 onety old chIc 55
vtadlr and hatche r 8\.4 mSL\. eggs
18 Chcken reedin Pain In Powa Capaiy ofIt00 ancstl pbr and a\.n
1hac d 1\.5 mi eggs
t9\. Seed rocong lt In POazravc Capaciy d 10\.000 ton per anm\. 4\.1
20\. Sneep Brdng Farm mI Z2ubca Capacy d 2000 wes and 5 rat an 0A
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~devslOPMerit 0(40 ha mteadoWs\.L_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
21\. Famin MechanIzato in PozmArew Rnancing agIculftua machlney and6m
equ\.pmm _ _
2\. Plg Bren Fum in Vezil PRana Capc it 1,1000 so and forow h lm as
S es on kted bIAstment as d De er 31\. 1900
22
B\. Drainag2
Eight sub-projects were completed as follows:
Area Name Ha Amount (USS million
Danube Region
1\. Zabari 7,074 16\.9
2\. Malo Gernice, Right Bank 1\.311 2\.2
3\. Halo Cernice, Left Bank 1,750 2\.4
4\. Petrovac - Rosanac 3,342 8\.4
5\. Zabari Extension (Kusilijevo) 2,168 2\.1
6\. Smedervska Planka 3,600 7\.6
7\. Equipment for O&M 3\.0
Kolubara Region
8\. Velika Plana 3,400 3\.5
9\. Cer Canal 7,771 9\.5
10\. Equipment for O&N 2\.7
11\. Gravel Roads Along Main
and Secondary Drains 2\.2
Total 30,416 60\.5
j3/ Rswu as d Decembr 31\. I80
23
Table t- Status of Legal Covenants
Section of Loan Short Description | Compliance
or Project I
Agreement13 1
PA Section 2\.04 Require any of the Social This provision was only
(a)(vii) Sector Sub-borrowers: (A) to partially and
have its accounts and inconsistently complied
financial statements (balance with\. Most of the
sheets, statements of income social sector
and expenses and related enterprises, in fact,
statements) for each fiscal have not complied with
year audited in\. accordance this provision, but also
with appropriate accounting those enterprises that
principles consistently attempted to comply,
applied by the Social were unable to do so
Accounting Service; (B) to because of the
furnish to Agrobanka as soon difficulty faced by the
as available, but in any case Social Accounting
not later than six months Service due to the
after the end of each year, shortage of auditors in
certified copies of its Yugoslavia\.
financial statements for each
year as so audited and the
report of such audit;
PA Section 2\.10 Promptly after completion of Not complied\.
(e) the project, but in any case
not later than six month after
the Closing Date, Agrobanka
shall prepare and furnish to
the Bank a project completion
report\.
PA Section 4\.02 Agrobanka shall have its Complied\.
(a) accounts and financial
statements of income and
expenses, and related
statements (balance sheets,
statements of income and
expenses and related
statements) for each fEscal
year audited by the Social
Accounting Service\.
Table 8:
continued
_LM " D4USSt I MtW a LA OM RPOM sOPmM* a PX
24
PA Section 4\.02 Agrobanka to submit certified Complied
(b) financial statements and SDK
audit reports on a yearly
basis, within six months of
the end of each year\.
PA Schedule 2 1\. Sub-loans to individual Not complied\.
B\. (b) (v) farmers should include
provision of extension
services and recovery of
service charge\.
PA Schedule 2 C Repayments of sub-loans Not complied\.
financed out of the proceeds
of the Loan shall be
determined from the projected
cash flow of the Investment
Project financed\.
Table 8: Staff Inuts staffteeks
FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 ms FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91 Total
Lending Operations
Pro-appraisal 7\.8 67\.3 3\.6 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 78\.7
Appraisal 0\.0 13\.9 92\.8 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 106\.7
Negotiation 0\.0 0\.0 10\.5 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 10\.5
Subtotal 7\.8 81\.2 106\.9 0\.0 OgO 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 0\.0 195\.9
Project Supervision 0\.0 0\.0 1\.4 24\.0 27\.9 28\.2 10\.0 27\.3 15\.7 19\.7 9\.3 183\.5
TOTAL 7\.8 81\.2 108\.3 24\.0 27\.9 28\.2 10\.0 27\.3 15\.7 19\.7 9\.3 379\.4
26
Table 9: Lsion Dal&
Hisslo Hsntb It\. og Da,L s\.uSeaaLat\.ln foumuo\. Tle\. of
Yew Perz,s Field Re4"sead a/ Rating b/ TSrcd Psfblis ct
IdeatifticatU 03/61 1 6 A
Idet±ficat$n 06/81 3 4 A\.lN\.!
Pr\.ooat1ont 09/81 5 it AIN Y\. E E
Presat403 12/81 1 3 A
PrepeatIam 02/82 3 9 A\.F\.Z
AppaieaJa 08/82 \.L& ; A,f,A,llE\.,\.HM,NF,D\.O
subtotal 24 57
Superviason 1 05/83 4 10 z,e,a\., 1 2 F\.M\.T
Supervision 2 03/84 3 4 1\.3E 1 1 F,M
Superviuion 3* 02/84 1 8 3 1 1 T
Supervs1ion 4 10/84 2 12 1,F 3 3 F\.M
Superviston 5 03/85 2 18 I\.? 3 1 F\.M
Supemar on 6 09/85 4 21 E1Y N,V 3 2 F\.A\.?
Supesvision 7* 05/86 1 3 N 1 1 T
Supervision g 05/88 3 7 Ely 3 3 F\.M,t
Supevision 9 05/87 3 9 F\.F\.R 3 3 F\.M\.t
Supervision 10 06/88 3 It Z,1, 2 2 F\."
Supervision 11^ 08/89 1 13 I 2 2 T
Su>pevsion 12 05/90 1 14 F,3 2 Z F\.t
Supervision 13 11/90 I 5 E 1 2 F7M
Subtotal 12 131
TOTAL a
8 A - Agriculturalst\. K - Eonomist, F - Financial AnsLyst\.
i - Enuginer, I - Iortioulturist, M - Marketins Speotalf t
0 - Education
b/ 1 - Mint prblm\. 2 * toderate Prablms 3 - ItWe loblew
/ F Financial, T - ocbnical\. M - anagerial
upervision of the drainage component only\.
34/ Thep at FAO/CP mimlne
wiUch low ple bi 9 ot1 \. aZe IcerS v* PedduUlem ib nut _
AUSTRS \.NG 20 SEPTEM1lER 19M
YUGOSLAVIA r f < R ROMANIA
SERBIA REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT * \.4 0 ' \.4
DANUBE REGION * ROMANIA
\.R J\. RO< AA A0 N I A Zk ,tt
* ^ Coldstore V O VODIN
8 Animal Feed /Mitt
* Center 4oW Sed Processing R\.rAEO
t Milk 4foducoicn i Pose<so ; j
M Sbeep Sreeing 4
I J Cattle Fattening
N Piglet Production 0#39 40
M Pig Fattening m
II Broiler Fattening A
@ Eggs Production
® Beekeeping
Fruit Orchards T
A Extension Services
a an Drainage Areas
Vineyards PODRUCJE iA3
IL Oil Factory BEOGRADA
U Mechanization KuUvoesc
@ Poultry Farm
Vine Rootstok Nursery\Y
SOMIEPrimary Roads
Secondary RoadsrhM
Tertiary Roads \t A Xk2:l7 |
-s--Railways '
S z Rivers a ( / J / i *-'* \ ) ZAJECARSKI
Commune Boundaries REGION
Region Boundaries
Republic and Autonomous Province Boundaries
\. International Boundaries
ELEVATIONS:
500 -1000 meters
200-500 X }< Voa b
la 10- 200 Tob $ W)
O 10 20 30 Kilometers SUMADIJSKO- POMORAVSKI REGION
teed&*\. \.hm~*, 5\. dm v\.*,\. mfd Wsd dU\.*\.If
\.o,5 of \.55 5\.b \. e \. id\.*Tw eXU#
##y4 4lL>@UP#4S4'7Ss4fl8wf
IBRD 16601
-SEPTEMER E19l;
YUGOSLAVIA
SERBIA REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
KOLUBARA REGION
ELEVATIONS: Primary Roads A Juice Production
1000-2000 meters Secondary Roads 0 Finishing and Packing of Prunes
500 -1000 Tertiary Roads DO Grain Elevator with Dryer
200-500 Railways U Coldstore
S R BOSNA t S E so =_ 0- 200 ---- 'iuers Service W orkshop
10 - - - - ~~~~~~~Subregional Boundaries Fuel Oil Storage
HERZEGOVINA Region Boundaries Milk Collection Center
VOJ VODIIVA -\.- Republic and Autonomsous 0 Plum Dryer
Province Boundaries S Mechonized Sugar Beet Production
m ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~International boundaries 03Mill and Flour Elevator
o Animal feed Mill
* Center for Seed Processing
9| Broiler Hatchery
13Poultry SlaughterhoAse
To Balgnrde 10~~~~~ Fruit Nursery
41 Center for Medicinal Herbs
/ < 9 g3 li V l a d - 5 (TERITORIJA I "Redrying" Tobacco Dryer
BEOGRADA ® Prune Coke
* Communal Slaughterhouse
ADairy / Beef Farm
IlSheep Breeding
I\.lCattle Fattening
(I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Piglet Production
-- -\. III ~~~~~Pig Fattening
IlBroiler Fattening
@ Eggs Production
ID 70 Fitovo Uiico ; 7itovo UzBeekeeping
*Fruit Growing
A Extension Services
ljoacDrainage Areas
Kilomneters
die cwirrEiianca of tile macrate or ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ A T / 1~~~~~ ROMANiOANI
flk apha he prwwadby the EzY Lvl
aflt convenmceh of o U
w W*&y w any ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~KRALJEVA& KIREGION
W cracaptac Of such hacnsdaias
To Titovo Ulice , r'v ice*\.EC | APPROVAL |
P169071 |  The World Bank
Punjab Rural Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P169071)
For Official Use Only
Combined Project Information Documents /
Integrated Safeguards Datasheet (PID/ISDS)
Appraisal Stage | Date Prepared/Updated: 04-Mar-2021 | Report No: PIDISDSA28023
Mar 04, 2021 Page 1 of 23
The World Bank
Punjab Rural Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P169071)
BASIC INFORMATION
OPS_TABLE_BASIC_DATA
A\. Basic Project Data
Country Project ID Project Name Parent Project ID (if any)
Pakistan P169071 Punjab Rural Sustainable
Water Supply and
Sanitation Project
Region Estimated Appraisal Date Estimated Board Date Practice Area (Lead)
SOUTH ASIA 20-Apr-2021 24-Jun-2021 Water
Financing Instrument Borrower(s) Implementing Agency
Investment Project Financing Islamic Republic of Pakistan Local Government
Department, Government
of Punjab
For Official Use Only
Proposed Development Objective(s)
Provide equitable and sustainable access to safely managed water and sanitation and reduce child stunting\.
Components
Project Management
Water Supply and Sanitation Infrastructure Development
Behavior Change and Capacity Development
Service Delivery Improvement
PROJECT FINANCING DATA (US$, Millions)
SUMMARY -NewFin1
Total Project Cost 553\.00
Total Financing 553\.00
of which IBRD/IDA 442\.40
Financing Gap 0\.00
DETAILS -NewFinEnh1
World Bank Group Financing
Mar 04, 2021 Page 2 of 23
The World Bank
Punjab Rural Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P169071)
International Development Association (IDA) 442\.40
IDA Credit 442\.40
Non-World Bank Group Financing
Counterpart Funding 110\.60
Borrower/Recipient 110\.60
Environmental Assessment Category
B-Partial Assessment
OPS_TABLE_SAFEGUARDS_DEFERRED
Have the Safeguards oversight and clearance functions been transferred to the Practice Manager? (Will not be
disclosed)
No
For Official Use Only
Decision
The review did authorize the team to appraise and negotiate
Other Decision (as needed)
B\. Introduction and Context
Country Context
1\. Pakistan is at a crossroads as it deals with the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic\. Over the last two
decades, economic growth has averaged 4\.4 percent a year, below the South Asian annual average of 6\.3 percent\.
The country was making good progress in stabilizing its economy and implementing much needed structural
reforms\. However, real gross domestic product (GDP) growth (at factor cost) is estimated to have declined from
1\.9 percent in FY19 to -1\.5 percent in FY20, reflecting monetary and fiscal tightening prior to the outbreak and the
effects of COVID-19 containment measures that followed\.
2\. In response to COVID-19, the government announced a fiscal stimulus package of US$7\.5 billion\.[1] This
aimed to: (i) support the health sector in combatting and mitigating the virus; (ii) implement social assistance
measures for those adversely affected; and (iii) provide stimulus to businesses and industries to protect productive
assets\. The financing comprises approximately US$2\.5 billion of additional resources and a re-appropriation from
the existing budget\. Pakistan has availed of the Debt Service Suspension Initiative and expects US$1\.6 billion to
US$2\.4 billion in temporary fiscal space\.
3\. Pakistan is facing severe health and economic consequences from the COVID-19 pandemic\. The crisis is
expected to lead to a sizeable increase in poverty, reversing the sustained reduction observed over the past 20
[1] Estimated USD equivalent for PKR 1\.2 trillion stimulus package\.
Mar 04, 2021 Page 3 of 23
The World Bank
Punjab Rural Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P169071)
years\. Deterioration of health indicators is expected due to demand-side issues induced by the crisis, such as lower
utilization of non-COVID-19 healthcare due to fear of contagion and income constraints\. The pandemic has also
resulted in an increase in the number of out-of-school children\.
4\. Human capital accumulation is low\. According to the World Bank Human Capital Index (HCI), if no
improvements in health and education service delivery take place, a Pakistani child born today is expected to be only 40
percent as productive as s/he could be by age 18\. Stunting among children under five is a fundamental health and
development challenge in Pakistan\. After four decades of stagnation, the country has made some progress in improving
nutrition, but stunting rates remain very high\. The latest Pakistan DHS indicates a decline in child stunting from 44
percent in 2011 to 37 percent by 2018\.1 The NNS (2018) indicates an overall stunting rate of 40 percent\.2 These results
are broadly consistent and reflect a stunting rate that is very high despite the countryâs success in poverty reduction, the
increase in household investments in WASH infrastructure, improvements in dietary diversity, even among the poorest,
the reduction in open defecation and the institutional and policy focus on nutrition\.3
5\. The absence of significant investment in safe management and disposal of fecal waste coupled with virtually
no investment in the treatment of drinking water in rural areas is responsible for the anomaly of persistently high
For Official Use Only
rates of diarrhea and stunting\. The rapid expansion of household investment in latrines has reduced the rate of open
defecation across Pakistan from 29 percent in 2004-05 to under 13 percent by 2015\. However, the lack of attention to
fecal waste management has resulted in an unprecedented concentration of untreated fecal waste near human
settlements and the consequent contamination of water and soil\. This concentration, coupled with poor hygiene
practices and the use of inadequately treated water for drinking purposes, has exacerbated the oral transmission of
fecal bacteria, causing diarrhea and environmental enteropathy in young children\. The latter causes malabsorption and
maldigestion of nutrients in young children, undermining the impact of improved diets and health practices, and leading
to a host of growth and developmental issues that are manifested in child stunting\.4 This fecal-oral transmission is
especially acute in rural areas where households abstract groundwater from shallow depths for drinking purposes\.
According to the National Nutrition Survey 2018, 56 percent of the water samples collected from survey households
were contaminated with coliforms, with a higher rate in rural areas\.
6\. Within Pakistan, while the province of Punjab has fared well in terms of overall poverty reduction, close to
one half (48 percent) of the countryâs poor live in Punjab (which is broadly proportional to Punjabâs share of
Pakistanâs total population)\. There is significant spatial disparity in poverty across Punjab and human development
outcomes are similarly skewed\. Overall child health outcomes are far worse in south Punjab, with an average child
stunting rate of 42 percent, as compared to 25 percent in the North and 33 percent in the central districts\.5 Similarly, 18
percent of children age 0 to 5 had an episode of diarrhea in a 2 week period in the southern districts as compared to 12
percent in the central and northern districts\.6 7 The disparity in health outcomes is mirrored in differences in the quality
of water and sanitation services and in the levels of contamination of drinking water as discussed below\.
1 Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey, 2017-18
2 Pakistan National Nutrition Survey: Key Findings Report\. 2018\. UNICEF
3 Mansuri et al\. 2018\. When Water Becomes a Hazard: A Diagnostic Report on The State of Water Supply, Sanitation and
Poverty in Pakistan and Its Impact on Child Stunting\. WASH Poverty Diagnostic Series\. Washington, D\.C\. World Bank Group\.
http://documents\.worldbank\.org/curated/en/649341541535842288/When-Water-Becomes-a-Hazard-A-Diagnostic-Report-on-
The-State-of-Water-Supply-Sanitation-and-Poverty-in-Pakistan-and-Its-Impact-on-Child-Stunting
4 Ibid\.
5 Punjab MICS 2017-18
6 Punjab MICS 2017-18
7 The prevalence of diarrhea is measured over a 2 week period\.
Mar 04, 2021 Page 4 of 23
The World Bank
Punjab Rural Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P169071)
Sectoral and Institutional Context
7\. Access to an improved source of drinking water is high in Punjab, with 98\.3 percent households having
access through one mechanism or another8\. In rural areas, a majority of households secure this access through
privately owned hand or motorized pumps, while some are served by piped schemes or community drinking
points constructed by government departments or non-government organizations and handed over to
community-based organizations to operate and maintain\. The sustainability of the public water schemes is low
and according the Public Health Engineering Department, a third of the schemes they constructed and handed
over are now dysfunctional\. While access is high, water quality is a significant issue affecting the health of
households in Punjab\. According to the Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources (PCRWR) about a third
of all drinking water sources, across Punjab, were contaminated with E\. coli, at source\.9 Contamination rates in
public water systems were significantly higher than in water taken from motorized pumps\. The Punjab MICS
2017-18, finds very similar numbers more than 7 years later\. Across Punjab, 36 percent households had E\. coli in
their source water, and this percentage increases to 60 percent when assessing E\. coli in household drinking
water\. Overall, less than one in two rural households across Punjab have access to safely managed water\.10
For Official Use Only
Given the high rate of self-provision, high rate of dysfunctionality among public schemes, and poor water
quality, it is fair to say that rural Punjab is broadly unfamiliar with professional water service delivery by the
public sector\.
8\. Among rural households in Punjab, 73 percent are seen as having access to improved sanitation\.11
However, only 4\.9 percent have access to flush/pour-flush latrines connected to a sewer system, and another 50
percent have access to flush/pour-flush latrines connected to septic tanks with any overflow leading to a
communal drain\. These can be relatively safe if properly engineered and the sludge properly disposed of, but
neither of those conditions is routinely met in rural Punjab12\. Many septic tanks are so poorly constructed that
they routinely develop cracks â thereby contributing to groundwater contamination\. The other types of toilets
considered âimprovedâ? are variants of pit latrines which are clear contributors to groundwater contamination,
particularly in areas where the water table is shallow\. Of the remaining 27 percent, 7 percent use unimproved
sources and close to 20 percent practice open defecation\. Across Pakistan, Punjab has the highest rate of open
defecation, despite being the province that has made the most progress on poverty\.
9\. There is virtually no public investment in the treatment and safe disposal of wastewater and fecal
sludge\. Typically, wastewater from these poorly engineered septic tanks flows through village lanes in open
drains and empties into a pond intended for treatment through natural processes, or into a canal or stream
where no further treatment occurs\. The vast majority of these ponds have become stagnant pools filled with
waste and with no capacity to treat fecal waste\. The rapid expansion of poor quality toilets over the past two
decades is likely a major source of the endemic bacterial contamination of surface and groundwater and the lack
8 Punjab MICS 2017-18
9 PCRWR (2011)
10 Safely managed water is defined as âPercentage of household members with an improved drinking water source located on
premises, free of E\. coli and available when neededâ?\. Source: MICS Punjab (2017-18)\.
11 Punjab MICS, 2017-18 defines an improved sanitation facility, âas one that hygienically separates human excreta from human
contact\. Improved sanitation facilities include flush or pour flush to piped sewer systems, septic tanks or pit latrines, ventilated
improved pit latrines and pit latrines with slabsâ?\. Data taken from MICS Punjab (2017-18)\.
12 Only 36 percent of households with septic tanks reported emptying it once, while 95 percent of those that had emptied their
septic tanks, did so manually without any protection\.
Mar 04, 2021 Page 5 of 23
The World Bank
Punjab Rural Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P169071)
of progress on diarrhea and other water borne diseases and child stunting despite a significant reduction in
open defecation, which fell nationally from 29 percent in 2004-05 to 13 percent by 2014-15\.13
10\. The gaps in sanitation and wastewater treatment directly impact on the quality of drinking water\.
While drinking water is accessed through a variety of mechanisms in rural Punjab, most rural households in
Punjab rely on groundwater as the main source\. The relatively shallow depth of the groundwater and the
permeability of the soil mean that pollutants from the land surface can move directly to the water table without
much filtration\. In addition to unmanaged human, solid and animal waste, agricultural effluent and randomly
discarded solid waste are known contributors to drinking water quality problems\. In addition to these
anthropogenic sources of contamination, groundwater (and therefore drinking water) in parts of Punjab
contains geogenic contamination in the form of arsenic and fluoride\. A further common source of groundwater
quality problems is the natural salinity present in groundwater which can be exacerbated by inappropriately
designed infrastructure\.
11\. Poor solid waste management and animal fecal waste management in rural areas also contribute to
the fecal contamination of the village environment, including the contamination of water resources\.
For Official Use Only
12\. Underlying the poor outcomes of the rural water supply and sanitation sector are institutional issues
that are reflected in the low sustainability of past public investments coupled with their poor targeting\.
(a) There is a high rate of dysfunctionality among existing water supply schemes\. According to the
Public Health Engineering Department, Government of Punjab, as of August 2019, out of a total of
5,137 rural water supply schemes created through public programs, 1,784 were found to be
dysfunctional\. Of those that are functional, a large number are performing below design
parameters, providing unsafe and intermittent water supply\. This is compounded by poor
operations and maintenance (O&M), resulting from the practice of transferring responsibility for the
schemes to communities who lack the technical and financial capacity to operate these schemes\.
(b) The near absence of any tariff collection is a major driver of poor financial sustainability of water
and sanitation services\. Where tariffs are imposed and collected for public water supply schemes,
the tariff is not designed to cover major repairs, treatment, or upgradations/extensions resulting in
eroding infrastructure over time\. This sets in motion a cycle in which the deteriorating quality of
water supply services negatively impacts the willingness of households to pay for water, further
deepening the cycle of unsustainability\. In most cases, where water is largely self-provided, rural
households pay for water in three ways\. The first is the cost of electricity for pumping water, the
second is the payments made for health care needs associated with water borne diseases and the
third is lost days of work and low productivity due to morbidities related to water borne pathogens\.
(c) When it comes to sanitation, there has been virtually no public investment in rural Punjab in the
safe disposal of fecal waste and wastewater treatment\. Though âsanitationâ is a part of WASH
allocations in provincial development budgets, less than 10 percent is allocated to this crucial
subsector\. Moreover, sanitation expenditures also include village civil works (e\.g\. construction of
soling/pavement) that are, at best, tangentially related to sanitation and hygiene\.
13 PSLM 2004-05 and 2014-15
Mar 04, 2021 Page 6 of 23
The World Bank
Punjab Rural Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P169071)
(d) Public spending on WSS in Punjab has historically suffered from a lack of targeting and WASH
budget allocations to districts do not reflect district need as measured by indicators of access to
and quality of water and sanitation\.
13\. In 2019, the Government of Punjab passed into effect four key pieces of legislation that underlie
governance in the water supply and sanitation sector\. These are the Punjab Water Act (PWA) 2019, the Punjab
Local Government Act (PLGA) 2019, the Punjab Village Panchayat and Neighborhood Council Act (PVPNCA)
201914, and the Aab-e-Pak Authority Act (APAA) 2019\. These have put the governance structure for rural WSS
service delivery in flux, but collectively these hold the promise of a very significant shift towards the sustainable
management of water resources and a move towards higher quality WSS service delivery\. However, more work
is needed to clarify the division of responsibilities between the institutions created/empowered by these Acts
and between them and existing government departments\. There is also a serious need for the creation of a
system for monitoring service quality and resource allocation decisions to create better incentives for
accountability\.
For Official Use Only
C\. Proposed Development Objective(s)
Development Objective(s) (From PAD)
The project development objective is to provide equitable and sustainable access to safely managed water and
sanitation and reduce child stunting\.
Key Results
PDO Level Indicators
(a) Number of beneficiaries provided safe drinking water in areas with high exposure to heat stress and water
scarcity (6 million)
(b) Number of villages provided with wastewater treatment facilities that mitigate risk of fecal contamination
of water resources in heat stressed and water-scarce areas by generating safe effluent (2000 villages)
(c) Percentage of households that have WHO quality drinking water at point-of-use (75 percent)
(d) Percentage of O&M costs covered through tariff collection (75 percent)
(e) Reduction in the incidence of stunting among children aged 0-3 (40 percent)
D\. Project Description
14\. The proposed project will combine infrastructure investments with a comprehensive behavior change
and communication (BCC) campaign to: (i) provide potable water through cost-effective and sustainable
14The PVPNCA 2019 was repealed in February 2021 through an amendment to the PLGA 2019\. The result was the Punjab Local
Government (Amendment) Ordinance 2021 that established a new tier of local government at the village level called Village
Councils, which incorporated the main functions of village panchayats prescribed in the PVPNCA 2019 with regard to water,
sanitation, and waste management\.
Mar 04, 2021 Page 7 of 23
The World Bank
Punjab Rural Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P169071)
investments; (ii) provide safely managed sanitation facilities to reduce the total fecal burden in the village
environment; and (iii) raise awareness and promote behavior change for better hygiene practices at the
household and community level to promote health and ensure the sustainability and quality of the water
source\.
15\. The project design will combine these three anticipated outputs to ensure: (i) significant progress on
SDG 6 with a focus on SDG 6\.1, 6\.2, 6\.3, and 6\.B15 in project areas; (ii) improved nutritional health among young
children measured by a decrease in the incidence of diarrhea 12 months after the interventions are fully rolled
out in a village and an increase in birth weight and a reduction in child stunting 24 and 36 months after the
interventions are fully rolled out in a project village; (iii) improved adult health and productivity, measured by
days of work lost to illness and out of pocket health care costs related to diseases acquired through the fecal
oral route; (iv) more hygienic public spaces with lower plastic use and better waste management; (v) water
resource conservation and water quality monitoring; (vi) higher levels of community engagement in village and
household hygiene and in monitoring and guiding resource allocation decisions through an IT-based MIS and a
strong focus on participation by women\.
For Official Use Only
16\. The Project supports four components, a brief explanation of each of them is as follows:
17\. Component 1: Water Supply and Sanitation (WSS) Infrastructure Development (US$ 477\.7 M)\. This
component will address the infrastructure gaps in the existing traditional rural WSS systems that underlie the
low access to safely managed water and sanitation in rural Punjab\. The water supply systems will predominantly
consist of piped metered household connections that are supplied water through canal-side pumps after
treatment to ensure adequate quality for drinking purposes, in line with WHO standards\. Existing infrastructure
will be incorporated and rehabilitated/improved where feasible\. For settlements that cannot be feasibly
connected to these canal-seepage based schemes, alternative options will be considered and operated in
accordance with the projectâs emphasis on groundwater sustainability, adequate water quality, and high
standards of service delivery\. The sanitation systems will consist of a covered conveyance system that connects
household toilets to a location for wastewater treatment and safe disposal or reuse\. The project will support
wastewater treatment, with a preference for Anaerobic Baffled Reactors (ABRs) as the main treatment units due
to their low capacity requirements for O&M and comparatively lower costs compared to quality of effluent
generated coupled with the elimination of need for septic tanks to intercept sewage before the treatment
chamber\. Fecal sludge will also be treated and safely disposed or reused as fertilizer\. The existing open drains
will be cleaned and restored for storm water drainage\.
18\. Component 2: Behavior Change and Capacity Development (US$ 16\.1 M)\. This will finance activities
that facilitate and induce health protective behavior change and build community capacity to support WSS
service delivery\. The component will focus on providing residents of villages with information on the health and
environmental impacts of poorly managed water and sanitation, and household and community behaviors that
exacerbate these impacts\. The project will train women in the village to become agents of change and will
15SDG 6: Clean water and sanitation\. SDG 6\.1: Safe and affordable drinking water\. SDG 6\.2: End open defecation and provide
access to sanitation and hygiene\. SDG 6\.3: Improve water quality, wastewater treatment and safe reuse\. SDG 6\.B: Support local
engagement in water and sanitation management\.
Mar 04, 2021 Page 8 of 23
The World Bank
Punjab Rural Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P169071)
support Covid-19 mitigation measures, awareness-raising and information campaigns related to safely managed
water and sanitation and training and capacity building of village-level institutions\.
19\. Component 3: Service delivery Improvement (US$ 42\.3 M)\. This will include: the establishment of a
Service Delivery Unit (SDU) in each project Tehsil that will be responsible for the quality of WSS infrastructure
built under the project, as well as its maintenance and management, and all other aspects of day-to-day service
delivery; a subcomponent on Solid Waste and Animal Waste Management; and Institutional Development and
Alignment with Punjab Governance Structure\.
20\. Component 4: Project management (US$ 16\.9 M)\. This will include: Project Monitoring through a
customized Management Information System to track project implementation progress, WSS service delivery
performance, the flow of public and donor funds earmarked for water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and
related financial management information, and outcome indicators; Strengthening of Project Implementation
and Management Unit (PMIU), the key implementation tier with responsibility for overall coordination,
planning, and reporting; and a grievance redressal mechanism\.
For Official Use Only
E\. Implementation
Institutional and Implementation Arrangements
21\. The project will be steered by a Project Steering Committee (PSC), headed by the Chairman, Planning &
Development Board, Government of Punjab\. The PSC will act as the provincial coordination platform for the project
on behalf of the Government of Punjab\.
22\. Another layers of government oversight will be developed upon approval by the PSC, as part of the project
implementation arrangement, which will be positioned to continue oversight and steering functions of the SDU-TOs
after the project is over and the PSC is dissolved\. This will be either the Divisional Steering Committee or the District
Steering Committee\.
23\. The Punjab Water Resources Commission and the Punjab Water Services Regulatory Authority were
created by the Punjab Water Act 2019\. However, neither is currently fully operational and granting licenses to
water and sanitation undertakers to abstract water, dispose into waterbodies, deliver services, and impose
tariffs\. Once the system created by the PWA 2019 is in place, the service delivery structure of the project will
align itself with the provisions of PWA, the flexibility for which has been built into the project implementation
arrangements\. This will provide an additional layer of regulatory oversight, with a focus on service quality, water
quality, resource sustainability, fair pricing, and equity\.
24\. The core project implementation functions will be undertaken by the Project Implementation and
Management Unit (PMIU) which will be linked to the Implementing Agency - Provincial Local Government
Department\. The PMIU will be established and registered as a public-owned Section 42 company and function
as the Head Office of the Service Delivery Unit (SDU)\. The SDU Head Office (SDU-HO) will be the apex body of
Tehsil Offices (or field offices) that will deliver routine operations and maintenance services to all villages in their
respective tehsils\. The SDU Tehsil Offices (SDU-TO) will coordinate with Community Caretakers and Operators
(CCOs) who will assist with day-to-day one-button/one-lever infrastructure operations and support for tariff
Mar 04, 2021 Page 9 of 23
The World Bank
Punjab Rural Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P169071)
collection\. The CCOs that may be drawn from Village Councils, Village Organizations, or just village residents\.
This three-tier system of service delivery will be made financially self-sustainable and remain a permanent
institutional arrangement for WSS service delivery after the project closes\. The service delivery structure is
shown in Figure 1\.
For Official Use Only
Figure 1 Service Delivery Model under PRSWSSP
25\. In its capacity as PIMU, the SDU-HO will be responsible for project implementation including
technical implementation, fiduciary and safeguards compliance, legal compliance, monitoring and evaluation,
etc\. It will be supported by consultants, NGOs, and Third Party Monitors to support engineering design, quality
assurance, social mobilization, ICT integration, etc\.
26\. The project implementation arrangement and a snapshot of the plan for transition to post-project
WSS service delivery is shown in figure 2\.
Mar 04, 2021 Page 10 of 23
The World Bank
Punjab Rural Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P169071)
For Official Use Only
Figure 2 Project Implementation Arrangement and transition to post-project service delivery
\.
F\. Project location and Salient physical characteristics relevant to the safeguard analysis (if known)
The project will be implemented in 16 districts of Punjab province that are the poorest and have the worst outcomes
on child stunting, access to and quality of sanitation infrastructure, and bacterial contamination of drinking water at
source and at point of use\. Climatically, Punjab is characterized by extremes of heat and cold with fluctuations in
temperatures seasonally and, regionally from north towards south\.
Topographically, most of Punjab is an extensive plain with some mountainous and hilly areas on the
northwest and south west extremes and sandy desert in the south east\. The mountainous region and hills in
the north western part are the sub Himalayas or Siwalik range\. The height of these mountain ridges varies
from 2000 to 2500 meters above sea level\. Climatically, Punjab is characterized by extremes of heat and cold
with fluctuations in temperatures seasonally and, regionally\.
Punjabâs water supply is dependent on groundwater, which in southern part is mostly brackish\. In rural
Punjab, 41% of the households that rely on groundwater, either practice open defecation or use pit latrines\.
This combination enables fecal-oral route which leads to diarrhea and stunting (Pakistan WASH Poverty
Diagnostics)\. The incidence of diarrhea (17\.4%) and prevalence of stunting (36\.7%) are high and persistent in
rural Punjab e\.g\. diarrhea was the fourth largest reason for death in 2016 (36,862 children died)\. In rural
Punjab, about 97% households use improved water but access to water piped into dwellings is only 4\.6% and
declining\. Among those with access to piped water supply, about 92% receive less than 6 hours of piped
Mar 04, 2021 Page 11 of 23
The World Bank
Punjab Rural Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P169071)
water supply\. Punjab has the lowest level of access to piped water at 18%, compared to 33% in Baluchistan,
35% in Khyber Pakthunkhwa and 41% in Sindh\.
Inadequate sanitation is one of the major determinants of high levels of stunting and malnutrition\. 67
percent of Pakistanâs rural population now has access to sanitation compared to 23 percent in 1991\.
However, closing the gap that exists due to inequities between urban and rural residents in terms of
improved access to water and sanitation services, remains a challenge\. 25\.4 percent of the rural population
of Punjab defecates in the open with poorer districts experiencing even higher levels\. About 50 percent of
the households have access to flush/pour-flush latrines that are generally connected to septic tanks with
overflow arrangements leading to a communal drain\. In the absence of regulatory oversight and any
enforcement of design standards, septic tanks are either poorly designed and/or are manually emptied
without any protection, with the fecal waste disposed into nearby water bodies or open spaces, causing
water and soil contamination\.
For Official Use Only
Rural Punjab is home to 63 percent of Punjabâs population children in rural Punjab are much more likely to
be underweight or stunted\. Children in Dera Ghazi Khan Division are twice more likely underweight and
stunted (44 percent and 47 percent) than children in Rawalpindi division (21 percent)\.
G\. Environmental and Social Safeguards Specialists on the Team
Rahat Jabeen, Environmental Specialist
Babar Naseem Khan, Social Development Specialist
SAFEGUARD POLICIES THAT MIGHT APPLY
Safeguard Policies Triggered? Explanation (Optional)
This OP is triggered because the project interventions
under Component 1: Water Supply and Sanitation
Infrastructure Developmentâ? such as: construction
and provision of sanitation infrastructure (including
Environmental Assessment OP/BP 4\.01 Yes drainage networks, wastewater treatment options,
septic tanks etc\.) and water supply infrastructure
(including provision of water supply networks with
skimming wells, pumping stations, reverse osmosis
treatment, disinfection, etc\.) may have some
Mar 04, 2021 Page 12 of 23
The World Bank
Punjab Rural Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P169071)
negative impacts on the environment during the
construction phase, such as soil and water
contamination due to improper project siting,
improper disposal of waste, contamination of open
irrigation water channels to be used as a source,
excavation and digging of trenches for laying pipes,
excessive noise related to use of machinery, vehicular
movement and tube well boring operation\. In
addition, health and safety issues are also anticipated
due to improper handling of construction machinery,
unprotected deep excavation and non-compliance
with the SOPs/ guidelines related to COVID-19 and
safety guidelines\.
Similarly, the adverse impacts during the
implementation phase may include health and safety
For Official Use Only
issues due to use of chlorine for water
treatment/disinfection which includes malpractices
related to storage, improper application and/or
handling, possibility of bad smell\. In addition,
improper wastewater treatment operation may
create conditions conducive to breeding of
mosquitos\.
Most of these impacts are, however, moderate,
temporary, site-specific, reversible, not
unprecedented and can be avoided, reduced or
mitigated through better engineering design/
practices and applying simple and cost-effective
mitigation measures\.
The social impacts are related to accessibility issues,
potential elite capture, and inequitable distribution of
benefits to project beneficiaries including vulnerable
and marginalized groups\.
Small-scale contractor firms will likely be needed for
construction work under the project, which might
pose occupational health and safety related
challenges for labor staff\.
Performance Standards for Private Sector This policy is not triggered as project interventions
No
Activities OP/BP 4\.03 are not associated with known private sector\.
This policy is not triggered as project interventions
Natural Habitats OP/BP 4\.04 No
are not planned in natural habitats at this point and
Mar 04, 2021 Page 13 of 23
The World Bank
Punjab Rural Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P169071)
largely planned in areas that are already
built/transformed\.
Project interventions do not involve any forest areas\.
Forests OP/BP 4\.36 No
Therefore, this policy is not triggered
The project interventions do not use any pesticides
Pest Management OP 4\.09 No
and hence this policy is not triggered\.
The policy is not triggered\. The project activities do
not involve large excavation and are not expected
to impact the cultural resources\. However, chance
find procedures are included in the ESMF as
Physical Cultural Resources OP/BP 4\.11 No
precautionary measures\. On a similalr note
precautionary procedures would be included in
susbequent SG documents such as ESMPs, and
followed if needed\.
No indigenous people as defined in the Policy are
Indigenous Peoples OP/BP 4\.10 No known to exist in the area\. Hence OP 4\.10 is not
For Official Use Only
triggered\.
OP 4\.12 is triggered as some project interventions
may need to acquire land (e\.g\. for water filtration
plants, holding and overhead tanks, basic filtration
unit, drainage and disposal)\. In most instances, small
parcels of land will be required for project
interventions\. In addition, right of way might be
required through agricultural fields in a few cases,
where the water source is located away from the
point of use\. Certain interventions may also involve
minor temporary impacts on livelihoods (due to
restricted access during construction; temporary
displacement of vendors/hawkers etc\.) which could
require small scale compensation\.
Involuntary Resettlement OP/BP 4\.12 Yes
For any land requirements under the project, use of
Government lands and voluntary land donation
(VLD) will be the preferred mechanisms\. A
Resettlement Planning Framework (RPF) has been
developed as part of the ESMF\. It contains relevant
procedures and documentation requirements at the
project level, including the criteria for accepting
donations and process for ensuring voluntariness\.
The Framework will be consulted upon, and publicly
disclosed on the client's website (in-country) and by
the Bank prior to appraisal\. The Framework will also
be accessible and available locally and at the levels
of the PIU and district level offices of implementing
agencies\. Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs), if
Mar 04, 2021 Page 14 of 23
The World Bank
Punjab Rural Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P169071)
required, will be subsequently developed and
implemented\. The VLD process will be monitored
closely at the local level to ensure that there is no
coercion for donations and that community
members do not become worse off or lose their
livelihood due to the donation\.
The project does not involve or depend on any dam
Safety of Dams OP/BP 4\.37 No
related activity\.
The proposed project activities are located in the
command area of tributaries of the Indus River,
which is an international waterway (river)\. The
proposed project activities under component 1
qualify to trigger this policy\. The Project however
Projects on International Waterways
Yes has got the PAD cleared from Legal department\. An
OP/BP 7\.50
exemption for notification has been approved by the
SAR VP\. More than 86% households have backyard
For Official Use Only
groundwater abstraction arrangement, the project is
expected to decrease the net groundwater
withdrawals due to water metering and BCC\.
Projects in Disputed Areas OP/BP 7\.60 No The project is not located in a disputed area\.
KEY SAFEGUARD POLICY ISSUES AND THEIR MANAGEMENT
A\. Summary of Key Safeguard Issues
1\. Describe any safeguard issues and impacts associated with the proposed project\. Identify and describe any potential
large scale, significant and/or irreversible impacts:
The nature of the project is such that no large scale or irreversible negative social impacts are anticipated\. In fact, the
project is expected to bring about positive and direct social impacts at the household level in the target area within a
short span of time\. However, few negative impacts of temporary nature are envisaged, most notably through
requirement of small land parcels for constructing the water supply or sanitation infrastructure at the village level\. In
most cases, the land requirement is expected to be fulfilled through government owned land or communal lands
(Shamilat)\. The project safeguard category has been assessed as B with partial assessment\.
Component 1 âWater Supply and Sanitation Infrastructure Developmentâ? of the project include activities such as:
construction and provision of sanitation infrastructure (drainage networks, wastewater treatment options, septic
tanks etc\.) and provision of water supply infrastructure (water supply networks with skimming wells, pumping
stations, reverse osmosis treatment, disinfection, etc\.)\. These activities are likely to have some adverse environmental
impacts\.
In addition, health and safety issues are also anticipated due to improper handling of construction machinery,
unprotected deep excavation and not complying with the SOPs/ guidelines related to COVID-19\.
Mar 04, 2021 Page 15 of 23
The World Bank
Punjab Rural Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P169071)
Most of these impacts are however moderate, temporary, site specific, reversible, not unprecedented and can be
avoided, reduced, or mitigated through better engineering design/ practices and applying simple and cost-effective
mitigation measures\.
The applicability of sanitation and water supply technologies has been assessed through an investment options study\.
Any failure of the selected technology at the implementation stage in providing the promised benefits will negatively
impact the social acceptability of the project\.
GBV/SEA risks are low since no labor influx of scale is expected in the construction works nor women labor force
participation is expected at a considerable scale\. Also, the project contributes to minimizing SEA risks by removing
disproportionate access of WASH facilities to women, which usually forces them to move out of the house for
defecation and otherwise (putting them at risk of GBV/SEA)\.
Water governance in Punjab has several overlapping stakeholders, including many line departments, local
governments, and in many cases the civil society including politicians\. This institutional complexity may limit
implementing agenciesâ ability to effectively complete activities within timelines\. The project targets the poorest
For Official Use Only
districts of the province that house relatively more vulnerable or disadvantaged groups\.
Other potential social impacts are related to lack of labor standards compliance for construction labor, absence of
social security benefits, unsafe working conditions, workplace accidents, below minimum wage payments, and use of
child labor\.
The overall environmental impact of the project investments is however expected to be positive\. As the project activities
will contribute towards a healthier and improved environment in project areas besides reducing diarrheal diseases
attributed to poor WASH conditions\. These will in turn contribute in reducing cost of health care, and in lost productivity
and income due to illness as well as significant reductions in child stunting and associated lifetime cognitive and learning
deficits among children, the treatment of fecal waste and the resulting removal of bacterial pathogens from water
bodies and the environment, will also have downstream health and environmental benefits\.
2\. Describe any potential indirect and/or long term impacts due to anticipated future activities in the project area:
Potential indirect and/or long term impacts due to anticipated future activities in the project area because of this project
will largely be positive as the implemented activities shall: further improve the environmental and living conditions by
improved access to water and sanitation facilities; better solid waste management practices coupled with project
supported enhanced capacity and awareness of beneficiary communities\. Further the project is expected to decrease
the net groundwater withdrawals due to water metering and BCC; as currently more than 86% households have
backyard groundwater abstrraction arrangement that would likely to adopt new practices/option\.
In the presence of various other water governance stakeholders, the Village Council will play a key role in deciding about
the siting and later, deliver, own and mainten the infrastructure provided under the project, which will make it socially
acceptable, enabling the Village Councils to exercise much broader influence in the developmental plans for their
respective areas\. This in turn, will mean that development needs are not only truly identified from the grassroots, but
also the decision making is done through real consent of the beneficiaries\.
Success of the project will help replicate the service delivery model applied under the project first to other Tehsils of
the target districts, and then to other areas of the province in general\.
Mar 04, 2021 Page 16 of 23
The World Bank
Punjab Rural Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P169071)
3\. Describe any project alternatives (if relevant) considered to help avoid or minimize adverse impacts\.
The analysis of the alternatives was a part of ESMF to select the best among all possible project options\. The ESMF
underpins that the alternatives of a project are the options that could help to meet the objectives by different means
including alternative project sites, technology or material, design or inputs\. The key criteria when identifying alternatives
is that they should be feasible and reasonable, environmentally sustainable, and socially acceptable\.
Selection of preferred alternative should be based on scores of factors including cost, schedule of delivery,
environmental and social impact, and the cost for their redressal\.
The ESMF suggests different types of alternatives that would be analyzed and assessed during preparation of the sub-
project SG instruments, depending upon its environment and social category defined by the operational policies above\.
These include: (i) no action alternative; (ii) design alternative; (iii) site alternatives; (iv) technological alternatives; and
(v) any other type of alternative relevant to the type of sub-project\.
For Official Use Only
Small parcels of land will be needed under the project for construction of water storage tanks or sanitation related
infrastructure\. As the adopted alternative, the project will utilize government land for this purpose as the first choice\. If
government land is not available, or if the beneficiary population does not deem it suitable, then community owned
land will be used\. Only in very rare cases, private land could be utilized for the project, through Voluntary Land Donation\.
Besides, right of way might be required through agricultural fields in few cases, where the water source is located away
from the point of use\. The project will use existing right of way of any utility (road, street, canal etc) to maximum possible
extent\. If laying pipe network through private lands in unavoidable, the project will prefer unirrigated lands belonging
to the people of beneficiary villages\. Using lands of any village that is not a direct beneficiary of the project will be
avoided\. Every land parcel used in the project will be after free, prior, informed, and written consent of the owner(s)\.
4\. Describe measures taken by the borrower to address safeguard policy issues\. Provide an assessment of borrower
capacity to plan and implement the measures described\.
The Government of Punjab through its LG&CD department â the implementing agency (IA) - has conducted a detailed
E&S assessment as required by World Bank policies and practices\. As the exact location and type of project interventions
are not known at appraisal, the Implementing agency has used a framework approach and prepared an ESMF that has
identified the potential adverse environmental and social impacts against each sub-component /activity, suggested
generic mitigation measures and provided detailed guidance for the process to be followed\. ESMF also provides a
criterion for environmental and social screening of each sub-project, based on land acquisition / resettlement impacts
on number of households and environmental factors\. The screening would lead to adopting an appropriate SG
document\. ESMF screening will classify each sub-project into three categories to adopt an appropriate safeguard
approach\. The three screening categories include: E1 sub-projects; All those sub-projects having negative environmental
impacts of severe nature (significant, widespread, irreversible and/or unprecedented will be categorized as E-1; though
it is expected that no sub-projects will fall under E-1\. However, such type of subprojects will not be financed by WB under
PRSWSSP; E2 sub-projects that may have some negative impact that is localized and temporary environmental and social
impact that will require preparation of EMPs (particularly for construction related activities); and E3 sub-projects that
may have minimal environmental impacts; and will require simple checklists with some mitigation measures\.
A Resettlement Planning Framework (RPF) has been developed as part of the ESMF\. It contains relevant procedures and
documentation requirements at the project level\. The project will also make use of WB Group âEnvironment, Health,
Mar 04, 2021 Page 17 of 23
The World Bank
Punjab Rural Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P169071)
and Safety (EHS) Guidelinesâ? and comply with the COVID-19 related SOPs/ WHO guidelines to address health and safety
issues likely to occur during project implementation\.
The borrower capacity to ensure good environmental and social management of the project and avoid negative impacts
will need to be strengthened in the form of engaging fulltime social and environmental experts\. The ESMF provides clear
guidance on environmental and social management and compliance monitoring that will be carried out by the
Environmental and Social Specialists (ES and SS) of PIMU\. PIMU will house two experts, one for environment and the
other for social & GRM\. The latter will be responsible for both, social development and grievance related works\. In
addition, a Gender Specialist will also be hired at the provincial level\. Since the project will be implemented
simultaneously in 16 districts, 16 E&S experts (one for each tehsil) who will ensure environmental and social compliance\.
The 16 officers at tehsil level will report to the three PIMU Specialists and work as an integrated team\. The additional
capacity at PIMU and tehsil offices will ensure that the mitigation plans are regularly and effectively implemented\.
All EMPs/ SG documents will become an integral part of relevant BOQ/ bidding document(s) to ensure SG compliance
during execution of each sub-project by the contractor\. Sub-project EMPs will be clustered based on similarities\. The
specific EMP/SG document clauses would propose mandatory requirements such as: the contractor and his
staff/employees shall adhere to the mitigation measures set out; and take all other measures required by the Engineer
For Official Use Only
to prevent harm, and to minimize the impact of his operations on the environment including, among others: removal of
surplus material, proper handling of excavation and borrow pit, proper treatment of effluent before discharging into
the water bodies and regular maintenance of machinery and limiting operations during day hours for avoiding excessive
noise and air pollution etc\.
During execution, the project will also make use of existing institutional set-up of the department at field level to support
Environment Specialist at PIMU/tehsil SDU who will interact with contractors/ communities in ensuring SG compliance
in project activities\. For the purpose, these staff will be prior trained for ESMF/SG compliance, E&S awareness and
reporting non-compliances for subsequent follow ups\. LG&CDD will ensure SG compliance monitoring at three levels
i\.e\. at the PIMU level, Tehsil level and at field level\. At the PIMU level, the Environment, Social & GRM and Gender
Specialists will carry out ESMF monitoring to ensure that the mitigation plans are being effectively implemented and
will conduct field visits on a regular basis\. Tehsil level E&S experts (/Environmental & Water Quality Officers) will be
responsible for ESMF implementation monitoring and evaluation at Tehsil level and to technically facilitate the TCs\.
SDU/ ES will carry out monitoring at field level\. SDUs will also conduct consultation with communities especially women
and vulnerable groups during execution\.
The ESMF also provides guidance on the institutional set up, capacity building and compliance monitoring requirements
to implement safeguard (SG) documents\. ES and SS will be responsible for handling and managing all aspects related to
environmental and social safeguards\. S/he will support the monitoring of project interventions, facilitate screening, and
review the implementation of mitigation measures\. Further, s/he will assess safeguards training needs as guided by
ESMF and carry out capacity building/ and training sessions for project/ contractorsâ staff, as an ongoing process, and
will produce and maintain a good record of all documentation and periodic reporting on SG\.
Additionally, it is worth mentioning that mitigating the adverse environmental and health impacts for likely water
contamination during operations, is inherently in-built into the project design\. For instance, under sub-component 3\.3
â water quality monitoring - the project will support regular water quality testing in every village where water supply
and sanitation network is provided\. In this regard, the project will engage a reputed institute (public or private) with
adequate capacity for sample collection and testing against agreed water quality parameters\. Similarly the National and
Provincial Environmental Quality Standards will be complied for effluent quality in case of wastewater treatment
facilities, through sound engineering design and by adopting proper operating procedures; which in turn, will ensure
Mar 04, 2021 Page 18 of 23
The World Bank
Punjab Rural Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P169071)
that wastewater disposal does not cause environmental harm to receiving water bodies or soil\. Also as a part of project
preparation a âhydrologic studyâ? was conducted; and that monitored existing skimming wells for over 10 hours running\.
The study found that the water table did not drop\. Experiences in different parts of Punjab province also confirm the
study findings\. The project will however further ensure and conduct hydrologic assessment for every canal where
skimming wells will be provided before executing such interventions
The LG&CDD has already nominated an officer as an E&S Focal Person for coordination who deals with the
environmental related aspects\. PIMU/SDUs will also benefit from the experience already gained for E&S SG
compliance while implemenitng various donor funded projects (WB & ADB); through proactive cross-learning
between/among LG&RDDâs different sections/bodiesâ?\. The ESMF adequately guides and elaborates several capacity
and training measures including hireing of dedicated E&S staff\. PIMU will also engage an independent Third-Party
Monitoring Consultant (TPM) firm to verify, among others, the effectiveness and adequacy of SG implementation,
compliance monitoring and quality of supervision\.
For Official Use Only
5\. Identify the key stakeholders and describe the mechanisms for consultation and disclosure on safeguard policies,
with an emphasis on potentially affected people\.
Local communities- who are the direct beneficiaries or affected persons from the program interventions (including
vulnerable groups such as women, children, women headed households, people in old age, people with disabilities,
landless peasants, people living below the poverty line etc\.)\. Moreover, influential people like numberdars (village
heads), religious leaders and landlords etc\. might play important role in actual realization of project activities in their
particular village and therefore identified as the Primary/Internal Stakeholders\.
Local Government and Community Development Department are also identified as primary stakeholders of PRSWSSP\.
Other institutions that have an important role in enabling the realization of the project interventions and therefore
identified as the Secondary/External stakeholders\.
As a part of ESMF preparation, client (LG&CDD) carried out stakeholder consultations through various meetings and
briefing sessions in selected villages of project districts\. The consultations were focused on: project activities, anticipated
impacts, WB safeguard policies, mitigation measures and documenting the consultation outcomes (concerns and
suggestions)\. The stakeholders include: (i) local communities - of the selected villages who are direct beneficiaries of the
project PRSWSSP; (ii) community leaders, landlords, influential/religious people who can help in mobilization of the
community and smooth implementation of the project intervention; and (ii) Government Organizations/Departments
(16 Project districts/tehsils) who may play an important role in the strengthening of project activities\.
The outcomes of the consultation remained positive; the stakeholders provided their suggestions on overall project
designs, its implementation arrangements; and mitigation measures\.
Local Communities were of the view that implementing PRSWSSP activities would provide improved sanitation system
of the villages and better access to good quality drinking water; that would improve overall health and save them from
many water borne diseases; increase crop yields as currently contaminated water was affecting the quality and quantity
of their crops; and may help providing livelihood opportunities (temporary employment for construction related
activities)\.
Mar 04, 2021 Page 19 of 23
The World Bank
Punjab Rural Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P169071)
Consultation with the influential groups, landlords and religious leaders revealed that: land owners would facilitate in
community owned land which would be donated by them for project interventions through VLD\. They further suggested
that project activities may be carried out after harvest period to avoid any inconvenience\. The project team ensured
that execution of project activities will be planned accordingly\.
Consultation with the Government Departments/Organizations proposed that for project implementation; area specific
environmental management plans need to be prepared for taking appropriate mitigation measures; training and
capacity-building of relevant Government Organizations must be made part of overall implementation processes;
community awareness and sensitization must be ensured throughout project; and waste management system should
be designed along with awareness campaign to adopt the best solid waste management practices; and treatment of
wastewater must be ensured before using for irrigation purposes\. The LG&CDD officials and ESMF Consultants briefed
that most of stakeholdersâ concerns are already covered under the Project design and ESMF procedures would further
ensure complying the mitigation measures\.
Consultations with these stakeholder groups have been carried out as an essential step in the formation of the ESMF\. A
For Official Use Only
stand-alone Stakeholder Engagement Plan has also been developed, providing clear guidelines about the times lines,
modes and content of the future stakeholder engagement\.
The Stakeholder Engagement Plan has been included in the ESMF, and finalized and cleared by the World Bank and
disclosed on client website and Image Bank of the World Bank respectively\. Final version of ESMF has been consulted
upon, cleared by the WB and disclosed on LG&CDDâs official website on April 22, 2021; and on WB Image Bank on April
22, 2021\.
B\. Disclosure Requirements (N\.B\. The sections below appear only if corresponding safeguard policy is triggered)
OPS_EA_DISCLOSURE_TABLE
Environmental Assessment/Audit/Management Plan/Other
For category A projects, date of
Date of receipt by the Bank Date of submission for disclosure distributing the Executive Summary of
the EA to the Executive Directors
March XXXX 2021 March XXXX 2021
"In country" Disclosure March xxxx2021
OPS_RA_D ISCLOSURE_T ABLE
Resettlement Action Plan/Framework/Policy Process
Date of receipt by the Bank Date of submission for disclosure
Mar 04, 2021 Page 20 of 23
The World Bank
Punjab Rural Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P169071)
"In country" Disclosure
C\. Compliance Monitoring Indicators at the Corporate Level (to be filled in when the ISDS is finalized by the project
decision meeting) (N\.B\. The sections below appear only if corresponding safeguard policy is triggered)
OPS_EA_COMP_TABLE
OP/BP/GP 4\.01 - Environment Assessment
Does the project require a stand-alone EA (including EMP) report?
If yes, then did the Regional Environment Unit or Practice Manager (PM) review and approve the EA report?
Are the cost and the accountabilities for the EMP incorporated in the credit/loan?
For Official Use Only
OPS_IR_ COMP_TAB LE
OP/BP 4\.12 - Involuntary Resettlement
Has a resettlement plan/abbreviated plan/policy framework/process framework (as appropriate) been prepared?
If yes, then did the Regional unit responsible for safeguards or Practice Manager review the plan?
Is physical displacement/relocation expected?
Is economic displacement expected? (loss of assets or access to assets that leads to loss of income sources or other
means of livelihoods)
OPS_ PIW_COMP_ TABLE
OP 7\.50 - Projects on International Waterways
Have the other riparians been notified of the project?
If the project falls under one of the exceptions to the notification requirement, has this been cleared with the Legal
Department, and the memo to the RVP prepared and sent?
Has the RVP approved such an exception?
OPS_ PDI_ COMP_TAB LE
The World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information
Mar 04, 2021 Page 21 of 23
The World Bank
Punjab Rural Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P169071)
Have relevant safeguard policies documents been sent to the World Bank for disclosure?
yes
Have relevant documents been disclosed in-country in a public place in a form and language that are understandable
and accessible to project-affected groups and local NGOs?
Yes
All Safeguard Policies
Have satisfactory calendar, budget and clear institutional responsibilities been prepared for the implementation of
measures related to safeguard policies?
Yes
Have costs related to safeguard policy measures been included in the project cost?
Yes
Does the Monitoring and Evaluation system of the project include the monitoring of safeguard impacts and measures
For Official Use Only
related to safeguard policies?
Yes
Have satisfactory implementation arrangements been agreed with the borrower and the same been adequately
reflected in the project legal documents?
Yes
CONTACT POINT
World Bank
Mohammad Farhanullah Sami
Senior Water Supply and Sanitation Specialist
Borrower/Client/Recipient
Economics Affairs Division
Azam Khan
Deputy Secretary
azamkhan66@yahoo\.com
Implementing Agencies
Local Government Department
Ahmed Javed Qazi
Secretary Local Government
secretarylgcd\.punjab@gmail\.com
Mar 04, 2021 Page 22 of 23
The World Bank
Punjab Rural Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (P169071)
FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 473-1000
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/projects
APPROVAL
Task Team Leader(s): Mohammad Farhanullah Sami
For Official Use Only
Approved By
Safeguards Advisor: Pablo Cardinale
Practice Manager/Manager:
Country Director:
Mar 04, 2021 Page 23 of 23 | APPROVAL |
P006132 | Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No\. 10703
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
BOLIVIA
URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 1489-BO)
JUNE 1, 1992
'~~~~~A0 ~ ~ ~ '
Infrastructure and Energy Operations Division
Country Department III
Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 to December 31
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Currency Unit = Peso (Col$)
US$1 = Col$ 79 (1983)
= Col$ 383 (1989)
Col$ 1 = US$ 0\.0127 (1983)
Col$ 1 = US$ 0\.0026 (1989)
Col$ 1 million = US$12,682 (1983)
Col$ 1 million = US$ 2,614 (1989)
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
I meter (m) = 3\.28 feet (ft)
1 kilometer (km) - 0\.62 mile (mi)
I kilogram (kg) = 2\.20 pounds (lb)
1 ton - 2,205 pounds
ABBRFVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
BCH Banco Central Hipotecario
BR Banco de la Republica
CRC Corporaci6n para la Reconstruccion y el Desarrollo del
Departamento del Cauca
DNP Departamento Nacional de Planeaci6n
ICT Instituto de Credito Territorial
FOR OFFCIAL USE ONLY
THE WORLD BANK
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
U\.S\.A\.
Office of Director General
Operations Evaluation
June 1, 1992
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Bolivia
Urban Proiect (Loan 1489-BO)
Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project
Completion Report on Bolivia - Urban Project (Loan 1489-BO)" prepared by the
Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office\. No audit of this project has
been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time\.
Attachment i
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
BOLIVIA
URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1489-BO)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No\.
PREFACE \. \. \. \. \. \.$
HIGHLIGHTS \. ii,
BASIC DATA SHEET \. \. -\.*o\.*\. \.o \.* iv
i\. BACKGROUND \. \. \. \. I
II\. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL \. 2
Project Origin \.0\. \. 2
Project Preparation \. \. \. \. \. \. 2
CONAVI \.o\. \.o************ 3
BSANV *#\.o\.*\.oo\.o \. e\. \.o \. togooot\. 3
Ministry of Health o\.*****\.*\. ***\.*\. ***0*00\. 3
Coordinating Commission \.o \. \.- 3
III\. PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION \. \. 4
Project Objectives and Descripti\.on oo\.0\. \. 4
Project Implementation *\.00\. \. \. 4
HAM "V\. *00\.0 \. 7
BISA \. ** **o \.*o\.o*\.******\. 8
Health \.nit \. 8
C3ISA io \. *\.*\. \. ** *******---*-* *******--* 8
Dealth unit \. \. 8
Coordination ooooo\.oo\.o* ooo\.o\.ooo\.0\. 8
contracting 9490006*06090*96000**\.0\.0 \. 00\.000\. 9
Delays \. \.#99*\. 9
Project Costs and Financing 9e \. 10
IV\. OPRATING RESULTS *\. \. 10
Project Results oo \. \.** \. \.40\.** 10
Consultants Performance and Technical Assistance \. \. 11
Community Organization ***see \. \. \. \. \. 11
Operation and Maintenance \.o\.*\.*\.***\.***** \. 1
Cost Recovery \. 11
Reporting Arrangements \.1\.3\. \. 13
Cozpliance with Loan Cand±tions \. 13
Disbursemnets \. 13
V\. BENEFITS \. 14
co-nomic and Social Benefits \. 14
E rtloymeat *\. \.*\.** 14
Poverty Impact 1\. 4
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont\.)
Page No\.
VI\. OVERALL E"ALUATION \. ********************* \. 15
General \. \. 15
Role of Project Agencies \. 15
The Government's Role \. 15
The Bank's Role \. 16
TABLES
1\. Population Estimates \. 18
2\. Income Distribution at Appraisal \. \. 19
3\. General Indicators, 1977-1985 \. \. 20
4\. Summary Project Costs \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 21
5\. Description of the Project (Page 1-7) \. \. 22-28
6\. Project Fund Allocation \. \. \. \. \. 29
7\. HAM-BIRF Project Beneficiaries \. \. 30
8\. Sources of Funds \. 31
9\. (a) Cost Calculation of CONAVI's Units \. * \. 32
(b) Cost of Coimnercial Area \. 33
(c) CONAVI Basic Units Completed \. \. 34
10\. Cost of HAM-BIRF Project Works \. \. \.35
11\. Recovery Sources \. \. \. \.36
12\. Index of Consumer Prices \. \. \. 37
CHARTS
1\. Bolivia Urban Development Project Implementation Schedule \. 38
2\. Actual aiad Assumed Inflation, 1975-1986\. 39
3\. Official and Parallel Exchange Rate by Trimesters \. 40
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
BOLIVIA
URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1489-BO)
PREFACE
This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Urban Development
Project in Bolivia for which Loan 1489-BO in the amount of US$17\.0 million was
approved on October 4, 1977\. The loan was closed on December 31, 1986, two and
one-half years behind schedule\. The last disbursement was on January 15, 1987,
with US$85,000 of the loan cancelled\.
The PCR was prepared by the Infrastructure and Energy Operations Division,
Country Department III, Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office\.
This PCR is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report, the Loan,
Guarantee and Project Agreements; supervision reports; correspondence between the
Bank and tbe Borrower; and internal Bank memoranda\.
- il -
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
BOLIV'IA
IJRBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LOAN 1489-BO)
HIGHLIGHTS
1\. This was the first Bank-assisted urban project in Bolivia\. It was
identified in early 1976 aud prepared with active Government support during
mid-1976\. It was appraised in February, 1977, and a loan for US$17 was
signed in November of that year\. The loan became effective in June, 1978\.
2\. The project had several goals, chief among whiCh were to: (a)
increase access to shelter and other urban services, particularly for the
lower-income groups; (b) strengthen the institutional arrangements needed to
promote such projects efficiently, while improving the prevailing income
distribution and enviroamental conditions in urban centers; (c) demonstrate
the feasibility of providing essential services to low-income groups at
affordable costs, to increase replicability and avoid subsidies; (d) expand
job opportunities and the economic participation of artisans and small-scale
entrepreneurs; and (e) develop effective systers for the delivery of urban
services and for the rational management of urban growth through new and
existing institutions\. The principal components of the project were:
(a) development of about 5,525 new serviced sites with core dwelling units
and 142 commercial plots; (b) infrastructure upgrading for about 4,500
families living in low-income neighborhoods of La Paz; (c) construction of
five new retail food markets in low-income areas of La Paz; (d) provision of
a line of credit for artisan and small-scale entervrises in the project
areas; and (e) technical assistance and training for project institutions and
for a health component\. The project was to be implemented by four special
project units which were to be established within the four agencies involved
in the sector: HAM (upgrading), CONAVI (shelter), BISA (artisan lending),
and the Health Ministry\. A special coordination commission was also to be
established to assist with project implementation\. BANVI was initially
involved as a financial coordinator for the proje^t but it later became an
executing agency also after CONAVI had start-up problems\.
3\. InsSead of the originally envisaged four years, the project took
eigIt years to complete\. Initial delays were due to start-up problems and
questions in some of the institu:ions (CONAVI and BISA) regarding the extent
of their involvement in low-income activities\. As the reluctance of these
institutions became apparent, the Bank agreed with tne Government that some
project funds should be re-allocated to those agencies which were progressing
well with their components or those which showed interest in assuming a
larger role (e\.g\., HAM, BANVI)\. Before these re-allocations became fully
effective, the Bolivian economy began to move into a recession and it was
ravaged by hyper- inflation (reaching 50,000% on an annualized basis in late
1985), along with the accompanying political and socio-economic turmoil\.
Within this environment it was almost impossible to implement the project in
- iii -
any systemati^ way; unit staff and heads were Changed frequently, conztractors
became bankrupt, materials were not available (those that were, were very
expensive), employees went on strikes (there were 1,043 strikes in 1984
alone), and general ^haos ensued\.
4\. Those units which had some continuity of leadership and were well
sfaffed (e\.g\., HA\.M) were able to plan ahead and avoid many of the problems of
Lyper-inflation\. They stockpiled supplies and used force account prudently
and they also had reasonable adjustment clauses in their contracts\. Units
which were not staffed with experienced technical people (e\.g\., BANVI)
suffered from both long delays and high prices\. In spite of the very serious
adverse environment, HAM surpassed its physical project targets, while
CONAVI, BANVI and BISA managed to achieve satisfactory physical
accomplishments, albeit over a much longer period\. The Health Unit began
well and had excellent initial success in a mother-child nutrition program\.
Unfortunately, because of infighting within the Ministry and the later
economic situation, it was closed and the remain\.;'g funds were used to build
a health center in La Paz\.
5\. While, in physical terms, the achievements of the project are
substantial, in financial terms, Whe results are not so good\. This is due
primarily to the arastic decline in real inccae throughout the country and
the use of an indexation system\. As a result, although most of the project
beneficiaries legally have the obligation to pay for the benefits they
received, they do not have the resource to meet such obligations and there is
need to renegotiate their debts\. The success of the HAM unit was impressive
enough for it to be used as the model for much of a second Bank operation in
Bolivip (Credit 1842-BO)\. In this sense, one project goal of re-integrating
the project units into their respective agencies is being fulfilled\. For
CONAVI, this has not occurred to the degree which it has for HAM\.
Nevertheless, the Government is presently considering consolidation of all of
its housing funds and agencies and having them focus more upon low-income
housing as those built by CONAVI\. BISA has also begun to re-orient its
lending activities under a new management team and it is now giving greater
priority to artisan and small-scale enterprise\. Its project unit has already
been incorporated into the parent agency\. With the disbanding of the Health
Unit, no absorption into the parent agency was possible\. Nevertheless, the
Health Ministry has a national program which incorporates most of the
succ-ssful elements of the mother-child nutrition program\. Even with the
cost recovery problems, when assessed in light of the political and
socio-economic environment which prevailed during its implementation, the
achievements of this project are remarkable\. Its urban upgrading
achievements continue to influence preparation of projects not only in
Bolivia, but in other countries (e\.g\., Guatemala and Ecuador)\.
- iv -
BOLIVIA
PRCJECT COMPLETION REPORT
URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(\.Loan 1489-BO)
BASIC DATA 9HEET
Key Project Data Appraitsal Estimate Actual
Total project cost
(US$ Million) 2\.5 22\.5 1/
Overrun (%W
Loan amount (US$ million) 17\.0 17\.0
Disbursed 16\.9
Cancelled o\.,
Date physical cnmponents completed 12/82 12/86
Proportion completed by above date 50% 100%
Time overrun (%) - 100%
Economic rate oJ' return (%) 18% N\.A 2/
Other Project Data Original Plan Actual
First r,:_vioned in files
or timetables - January, 1976
Government application - N/A
Negotiations - April, 1977
Board approval - October 4, 1977
Loan agreement date - November 30, 1977
Effectiveness date - June 22, 1978
Closing date June 30, 1983 December 31, 1986
Borrower Government of Bolivia
Executing Agency CONAVI, RAM, BISA, BANVI
Fiscal year of the Borrower January 1 - December 31
C,2mulative Actual Disbur2emezt (Bank fiscal Year)
6/78 6/79 6/80 6/81 6/82 6/83 6/84 6/85 6/86
Estimated (US$ million) 3\.7 11\.6 9\.6 12\.0 13\.5 13\.5 13\.5 17\.0 17\.0 3/
Actual (US$ million) 0\.0 0\.3 1\.1 2\.5 5\.1 7\.0 9\.1 13\.0 16\.9
Actual as % of estinated 0% 3% 7' 15% 30% 41% 54% 76% 100%3/
1/ There were frequent sharp devaluations of the peso during the 19e?-1986 period
and so US$ figure pravides an estimate of project costs\.
2/ Hyperinflation and markst distortions preclude re-calculation of actual figure
See text for greater details\.
3/ US$85,000 of the loan was cancelled\.
v
MAN- DATE PERFORMANCE
Mo0/YR\. WEEKS PERSONS WEEKS REPORT RATINGS
Identification: 03/76 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Preparation: 05/76 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
08/76 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
11/76 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Appraisal: 02/77 2\.0 7 14\.0 09/09/77 N/A
Supervision 01/78 2\.0 4 8\.0 02/16/78 2
05/78 1\.5 2 3\.0 05/23/78 1
10/8 1\.5 2 3\.0 10/19/78 2
01/79 1\.0 2 20\. 03/19/79 2
05/79 2\.0 2 4\.0 06/15/79 2
09/79 2\.0 3 6\.0 10/05/79 2
01/80 3\.0 4 12\.0 12/15/80 3
04/80 2\.0 3 6\.0 04/29/80 2
09/80 2\.0 2 4\.0 10/10/80 2
03/81 2\.0 3 6\.0 04/10/81 2
12/81 1\.0 2 2\.0 01/13/82 2
04/82 1\.0 2 2\.0 04/28/82 2
10/82 1\.0 2 2\.0 10/22/82 3
03/83 1\.0 1 1\.0 04/08/83 3
, 05/83 1\.0 1 1\.0 06/10/e3 3
10/83 1\.0 2 2\.0 11/07/83 3
54/84 1\.0 2 2\.0 05/04/84 3
05/85 1\.0 2 2\.0 05/27/85 2
02/86 1\.0 1 2\.0 02/12/86 2
09/86 1\.5 3 4\.5 PCR
BOLIVIA
URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT -- LOAN 1489-BO
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
I\. BACKGROUND
1\. Despite its potential for economic growth, Bolivia is the poorest
country in Latin America\. Its GNP per capita was US$ 510 in 1983 and at
present, in the wake of an extended period of hyper-inflation and a
consequen- drop in real incomes, is estimated to be in the region of
US$200-30U\. Its 1985 population was estimated at 6,400,000 (see Table 1)\.
La Paz, the capital city, now has &bout 993,000 people (nearly half of the
residents of the Department of La Paz) and it growing at an estimated 4% per
annum\.
2\. Nearly 80% of Bolivia's population is concentrated in the Altiplano
and Valles regions\. The pattern of urbanization has developed as a function
of existing population concentrations, the availability of employment
opportunities, and the existence of unusually difficult physical and climatic
conditions in large parts of the country\. Previous migration to the once
expanding mining centers has given way to increasing flows to the larger
cities, primarily to La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz\. Much of the
population increase experienced by urban centers until about 1982 can be
explained in terms of the economic attractions of these expanding centers and
the expectations of the rural populations of finding better jobs in cities\.
During the recent period of hyper-inflation (1982-85), worsening conditions
in the countryside drew people to urban areas\.
3\. At appraisal, the Ministry of Planning and Coordination, the main
institution responsible for spatial development and urban growth in the
country, based its urban growth strategy on social, economic and geopolitical
considerations in order to generate physical expansion\. A major element of
this strategy was the Government's objective to encourage the growth of what
is coasidered to be the most important development axis contaiaing the cities
of La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz\. Because of its social and economic
implications, housing was considered one of the most tmportant sectors by the
Government, and the housing investment goal for the sector during the period
for the five year plan was $b997 million (US$49\.5 million)\. For other urban
construction, it was $b950 million (US$47\.5 million)\.
4\. Though the size and urban growth rate of Bolivia are not unusual by
Latin American standards, the Government was not able to match growth with
appropriate levels of urban services and adequate \.iousing programs\. In 1977,
less than 57% of the country's urban population had access to piped water
supply, and less than 23% to any type of sewerage facilities\. Average life
expectancy at birth was 47 years, infant mortality was more than 147 per
thousand, and malnutrition among pre-school children was about 22%\. Almost
one quarter of the population of La Paz had monthly household incomes of
under $bl,500 (US$75) and about half earned less than Sb3,500 (US$175): see
Table 2\. In marginal areas, almost 40% of all households had income below
$bl,000 (US$50); and 93% of the residents of such settlements on the slopes
around La Paz were estimated to have incomes below the 43rd percentile of the
citygs income distribution\.
-2 -
5\. The total number of housing units built annually in Bolivia by
public agencies and the formal and informal private sector was about
15,000-23,000\. However, an estimated 10,000 additional units per year were
required to provide everyone with at least minam um shelter solutions\. The
average cost of the public and formal sector units, estimated at
US$7,000-8,600, made them clearly inaccessible to a majority of the urban
population\. Although the Government took steps to improve housing conditions
in both urban and rural areas, its ability to serve the urban poor was
severely constrained by both relatively high construction standards and very
low incomes of these target groups, and by the costs of traditional schemes
for provision of urban services\. The Government was unable to provide
services efficiently and in sufficient quantities partly because of poor cost
recovery and public subsidy limitations\. It therefore, decided to inLcrease
its financial support to the Banco de la Vivienda (BANVI) to establish new,
more appropriate layout and design standards for low cost housing and
infrastructure schemes; and to increase the eff±iciency and capa^ity of
institutions in charge of coordination, promotioa and implementation of such
programs\.
6\. La Paz\. The city of La Paz is located on the western slopes of the
Andean mountains at an altitude ranging between 3,500 and 4,000 meters\. The
city itself, including most residential areas, the business district and all
government offices, is located in a narrow valley surrounded by steep slopes
that fall ff the eastern edge of the Altiplano plateau\. Most of these
slopes consist of extremely unstable geologicali layers of very loose
materials which, when saturated by rainfall and the water carried by some of
the more than 200 rivers and streams that criss-cross the city, collapse and
cause massive mudflows and landslides, which primarily affect the lower
income groups living on such steep slopes\. The very establishment of
marginal settlements on these slopes, and their lack of appropriate sewerage
systems have significantly increased the amount of water that filters into
the ground, thus aggravating pravailing conditions\. The city's expansion
possibilities are thus very limited, with one of the few available options
being on El Alto, the Altiplano area which has become an extension of
metropolitan La Paz\.
II\. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL
7\. Project Origin\. Early in 1976, the Government requested Bank
assistance for an urban investment prog-am and the project was identified in
the course of a mission in February-March of that year\. It was prepared with
active Government support during three missions in the period May-August
1976\. A pre-appraisal mission followed in Octobor-November of the same year,
and an appraisal mission was undertaken in February 1977, with the SAR being
issued in September 1977\. A loan of US$17 million was approved and signed in
November 1977 and became effective in June 1978\.
8\. Project PreDaration\. The project was based on plans prepared by
the Government with participation of what later became the five main project
implementation agencies; HAM, CONAVI, BISA, BANVI and the Ministry of
Health\. A brief description of each agency is given below with greater
details presented in the appraisal report of this project\.
9\. HAM\. The La Paz Municipality (The Honorable Alcalde Municipal),
has increasingly devoted its attention to the plight of the urban poor, and
devised innovative measures to assist them\. It developed Accion Comunal, a
well organized department to coordinate and assist communities in
establishing infrastructure and other urban services, carried out in close
cooperation and with the full participation (via mutual aid) of the affected
communities\. HAM has steadily in_reased its coverage and improved its cost
recovery procedures and its revenues with the help of a value-added tax on
property (plusvalia)\. Its planned responsibilities under the project were
the urban upgrading and markets components\.
10\. CONAVI\. The Consejo Nacional de la Vivienda (CONAVI) is the main
national agency involv\.d in the construction of low-cost public housing\.
CONAVI is a semi-autonomous agency dependent on the Ministry of Urbanization
and Housing and is in effect the implementing arm of the Ministry in the
housing sector\. CONAVI has a steady source of income from a 2% tax on wages
and salaries paid directly by public and private sector employers\. Its
projeCt components as planned at appraisal were the sites and servi:es,
community facilities and industrial sites\.
11\. BANVI\. Created in 1974 as a housing bank, Banco de la Vivienda
(BANVI) was to promote and coordinate the financial aspects of low-cost
housing and infrastructure schemes through the technical secretariat of the
Coordinating Commission; and through the flow of project funds via the
Central Bank\. In addition, it was to set up an evaluating and monitoriag
system for the project\.
12\. BISA\. The Banco Industrial (SA), BISA, is a Drivate development
bank engaged mainly in financing industrial and mining ventures\. It was
given the task of implementing the Artisan Credit Program under the project\.
In order to reduce its administrative costs and more efficiently use HAM's
staff, its was expected that HAM's staff would publicize the Artisan Program
and pre-screen beneficiaries who would then receive loans from BISA\.
13\. Ministry of Health\. Technical assistance in the form of foreign
experts was to be provided to the Ministry of Health to address lack of
coordination among policies aimed at the urban poor and their effectiveness\.
On the basis of this review, it was to identify a more substantive program
for financing in a future Bank project\. Specific support was to be given to
on-going efforts in the promotion of preventiv-e medicine and maternal-child
health care; training and education programs relating to nutrition;
preventive health care relating to epidemiology; and training programs for
community health promoters\.
14\. Coordinating Commission\. Established under the chairmanship of the
Undersecretary of Coordination of the Ministry of Planning and Coordination,
the Coordination Commission was to be responsible for the formulation of
policy to ensure the effective implementation of the project and the
effective coordination of all participating agencies\. It was also to provide
policy guidelines and coordination among other institutions whose investments
were likely to have an impact on the region\.
-4-
III\. PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION
15\. Project Objectives and Description\. As described in the appraisal
report, the project was designed to: (i) increase access to shelter and other
urban services, particularly for the lower income groups; (ii) strengthen the
institutional arrangements needed to promote such projects efficiently while
improving the prevailing income distribution and environmental conditions in
urban centers; (iii) demonstrate the feasibility of providing essential
services to low-income groups at affordable costs, to increase replicability
and avoid subsidies; (iv) provide and improve shelter for beneficiaries down
to the lowest 5th percentile of income distribution; (v) expand job
opportunities and the economic participation of artisans and small-scale
enterpreneurs by means of the provision of a line of credit; (vi) complement
and strengthen past Bank support to BISA by using it as an implementing
agency; and (vii), develop effective systems for the delivery of urban
services and for the rational management of urban growth through the
establishment of new and strengthening of existing institutional
arrangements\.
16\. The project consisted of: (a) a program to develop 5,525 new
serviced sites with core dwelling units and 142 industrial/commercial plots
in the El Alto area of La Paz; (b) an upgrading program to prov_e 4,500
families living in low income areas of La Paz with essential infrastructure
and other urban services and coastruction materials credits; (c) the
construction of five new retail food markets to serve the marginal
settlements of La Paz; (d) the provision of a line of credit for artisans and
small-scale entrepreneurs to increase incomes and generate 1,560 new jobs
among low income groups in the Sites and Services and Upgrading areas of the
project; and (e), the provision of technical assistance and training\. The
technical assistance and training component comprised support for the
agencies involved ia management or implementation of project components
(CONAVI, BISA, Accion Communal), and those participating in complementary
activities (BANVI, Ministry of Health)\. Under this component 214 man months
of consultancy services were to be provided at US$6,000/month; US$395,000 for
equipment; and US$200,000 for other institutional support and training
programs\. Consistent with the Bank's approach of that time, special project
units were established in all of the agencies involved in the implementation
of the various project components\. The aim was essentially to bypass
existing institutional rigidites and facilitate project implementation\. It
was also felt that the technical assistance package would improve operations
within the agencies in a parallel fashion, so that by the end of the loan
period, the specialized units would inject an additional boost to efficiency
of operations of the parent agencies after they were re-absorbed into the
overall operations\.
17\. Project Implementation\. Project implementation was subject to a
number of delays\. It took eight yearm (July 1978 - June 1986) to implement
the project instead of the expected four years\. During this time, the
closing date was extended three times\. At the national level, considerable
political turmoil prevailed in the country from 1980\. Indicators of this
situation were the large number of strikes which occurred during the period
-5 -
(1,043 in 1984 alone), along with the ten changes in national presidents and
the even more frequent cabinet and lower level changes which occurred during
1977-1985\. The economic recession in 1981 resulted in deeper economic crisis
from 1982 to 1985, two project-specific consequences of which were lack of
counterpart funds and the Bank's suspension of disbursements to Bolivia
during 1983-84 because of overdue payment\.
18\. The project was restructu--ed in 1981, partly as a result of these
delays, and also because of unresoi;ed administrative and institutional
problems in the main project implementation agencies\. At the project unit
level, delays occurred as a result of inter and intra-institutional problems,
particularly within CONAVI, BISA and the Health Ministry\. The HAM unit was
quick to organize its staff and proceed with definiag and programming its
tasks\. The Health unit began in a similar brisk manner, but as its
accomplishments and its role increased, inter-departmental rivalry surfaced
and paralysed continuation of its work\. For BISA and CONAVI, there were
unresolved policy questions of their management regarding the role of their
respective project units\. As a result, BISA's management could not initially
decide to what extent the institution should cater to the need for artisan
loans\. CONAVI's management had similar questions regarding its role in
providing core unit dwellings\. To add to the problem, there were several
changes in the directors of the Health and CONAVI project units (4 and 5
respectively), and BISA and CONAVI had a prolonged dispute regarding the
price and sale terms of the land which CONAVI was to sell to BISA for its
industrial building\. Greater details on these issues are presented in the
sections which contain reviews of the performance of the specific agencies\.
Many of the delays which occurred at the national level could not have been
foreseen at appraisal\. However, with hindsight, the ability and more
especially, the commitment of the respective institutions to implement their
project components should have been more carefully evaluated with more
adequate provisions made to deal with them\.
19\. At the pre-appraisal stage, the Bank's doubts about the capacity of
existing institutional apparatus for project implementation led to the
creation of project units and the appointment of BANVI as the project's
fiscal agent\. In the interest of getting the works started, there was some
lack of clarity in the allocation of institutional responsibilities and in
defining project components (e\.g\., in the health component)\. Also, the
project evolved in a physical environment in which hyperinflation caused
considerable distortions (e\.g\., in beneficiaries' ability to pay for shelter
in the light of severely reduced real incomes); and a political environment
in which numerous strikes resulted in considerable delays to project
implementation\.
20\. If the delays caused by strikes and cash flow problems were not
counted, CONAVI's actual project implementation time would be less than two
years\. Differences in planned versus actual costs of the respective project
components are summarized in Table 4\. Actual costs in $b far exceeded even
the amended estimates due to hyperinflation and the consequent effect on
prices\. However, in US$ terms, actual project costs are similar to those
estimated at appraisal\. It should be noted here that because of the
hyperiaflationary environment, any detailed cost comparison should be done
with caution\.
- 6 -
21\. As it became evident that some agencies (e\.g\., CONAVI and BISA)
were still trying to define their respective roles, the Bank decided to re-
assign responsibilities among the various agencies, reducing the tasks of
those which were performing poorly, and increasing the role of the others
which did well or showed the potential to do so\. Consequently, the urban
upgrading and market subcomponents of HAM were expanded and CONAVI's shelter
component was reduced\. Although the Bank had not initially considered BANVI
as an executing agency, its role was expanded with the introduction of a
pilot sites and services component (based conceptually on the example of the
CONAVI-BIRF dwelling units)\. Coverage area of the Health component was
increased (since it was initially doing well), and HAM was given a share of
BISA's funds for artisan loans for use in a similar manner without the
participation of BISA\. Also effected were modifications to procurement
procedures to avoid delays (by increasing the threshold for ICB and for prior
Bank review for civil works contracts to US$1 million for ICB and to US$0\.5
million for HAM's contracts threshold) and reassignment of responsibility for
the provision of industrial lots from CONAVI to BISA\. A summary of the
changes made in the first amendment of March, 1981 is presented in Table 5,
while Table 6 shows the allocations among the various project entities\.
22\. These changes were made with two main purposes in mind: to get the
project implemented without undue delays, and to put the agencies on notice
that if they delayed implementation of their respective components they stood
to lose all of the allocated funds in any further changes\. The intent of
this action by the Bank was understandable, given the then prevailing
conditions; however, in retrospect, it should have analysed the long-term
implications of these actions in greater detail\. Getting a financial
institution such as BANVI involved in physical implementation of housing
works led to greater administrative and technical difficulties in BANVI\.
Also, indications are that not much consideration was given to the
implication of having HAM lending and collecting for its artisan loan
subcompoaent\.
23\. Having noted the above, it should be stated that the reallocation
appeared to have had the desired results insofar as it spurred the agencies
into action\. However, by that time, the economic crisis was negatively
affecting all sectors of the economy to a greater degree, and funding for all
public investment programs became very scarce\. It became increasingly
impossible to obtain government funds and to locate materials and contractors
for project works, and in order to ameliorate the situation, the Bank agreed
to open a special account and increase its share of financing from 77% to 95%
for all works except for the BISA component\. It was felt that BISA still had
private resources to do its program and although it had begun to show
interest in artisan lending, it apparently was still not fully committed to
the project component\. The legal agreements were amended in 1983 to reflect
these new changes\.
24\. Implementation of the sites and services, upgrading ard market
components as well as the technical assistance elements of the Health
component were expected to take about four years from the date of loan
effectiveness\. However, actual project implementation took eight years, from
July 1978 to June 1986, mainly because of the reasons discussed above
(Chart 1)\. Disbursements were scheduled to be completed by December 1980,
but following three extensions of the loan closing date, the last
- 7 -
disbursement was made in December 1986\. Actual implementation by project
institutions is documented below\.
25\. BANVI\. Instead of preparing 400 serviced plots with 304 basic
housing units on some of these plots as originally planned, a total of 650
lots were provided\. BANVI built 441 houses on these lots leaving 209
serviced lots without houses\. In physical terms, it thus exceeded original
targets, although in terms of implementation time and costs (in pesos), the
actual results were worse than anticipated\. This accomplishment was achieved
at a price since it distracted BANVI from its main functions as financial and
fiscal agent, as well as that of a bank\.
26\. The BANVI site is about 2 km away from Villa Adela and has produced
much needed low-income housing\. Compared to the CONAVI units, these houses
are more attractive\. Neverthelecs, indications are that site selection was
dictated more by land availability than by demand\. Consequently, the
location is not presently very attractive to many potential beneficiaries,
since it lacks adequate transport facilities (it is 2 km from a bus route),
adequate access roads and community facilities\. Additionally, the poor
quality of some of the building materials (e\.g\., roof tiles), and poor
installation on some units do not make the dwellings as weather proof as they
should be, a significant consideration in the harsh climatic conditions of El
Alto\. These deficiencies affected the commercial value of the houses built
under this component of the project\.
27\. In their explanation of the situation, officials of BANVI ^liimed
that the selected site was the only one which had the size they-needed to
accommodate the units to be built\. Additionally, they saw it as an area
which would be settled within a few years and so it would have the needed
services\. Regarding the quality of the materials and workmanship, they
explained that the inflation drove many suppliers into bankruptcy and they
had to buy what was available in the market or do without\. Given the
situation which existed during BANVI's construction period, most of the above
points appear valid\. However, there are also the elements of lack of
technical experience and frequent changes in staff in BANVI which accounted
for some of the problems\.
28\. HAM\. HAM-BIRF's participation in the project began well and
continued smoothly during the inflation period and even surpassed project
targets (see Tables 5 and 7)\. This record was due mainly-to its professional
approach, its foresight to make advanced purchases, and to the skills mix and
continuity of its staff and director\. (The HAM unit is the only one which
maintained its senior level staff intact throughout the project
implementation period\.) Devaluations of the $b occurred so rapidly that
HA14-BIRP's prudent savings, good contract adjustmeants provisions, and general
efficiency and creativity enabled it to increase the target area of coverage,
reach five times the beneficiary coverage for water supply, and build 40%
more of the number of market stalls originally planned (see Table 7)\. An
example of HAM-BIRF's creativity at a time of intease shortages in Bolivia
was to use the incentive of food-for- work and self-help to enable Continued
amocTh implementation of the project component\. This approach contrasts
markedly with those of CONAVI-BIRF and BANVI-BIRF, which did not take
defensive measures in light of inflation, nor did taey give sufficient
priority to the social components of their work\.
29\. CONAVI\. CONAVI was to acquire land totalling some 20 ha\. adjacent
to the Rio Seco and Villa Adela sites for the construction of 1,277 sites and
services and commercial plots\. It acquired 46 ha\. of land adjacent to the
Rio Seco site, of which 43 ha\. received urban services and 1,982 serviced
plots were developed along with 166 commercial plots\. This compares well
with CONAVI's revised target of 1980 serviced plots (but it is much lower
than the original target of 5,525 plots)\. Because of delays in receiving
municipal approvals, CONAVI did not follow normal procedures and some site
layouts and construction standards were not approved by the municipality\.
Although this did not affect the quality of the works done, it caused some
delays in transferring them to the municipality for maintenance\.
30\. BISA\. In addition to funds made available by the Bank, BISA was to
contribute US$500,000 of its own funds for credits to artisans and
small-scales enterprises\. This contribution was made in the form of
technical assistance to the project for consultancy servic3s end study trips
for staff of BISA\. Government initially guaranteed 30% of defaults of
outstanding loans of artisans, up to a limit of US$30,000, but these
guarantees were not honored in light of the economic crisis\. Lack of
knowledge of (and interest in) the small-scale enterprise sector on the part
of BISA led to half-hearted efforts to serve this market initially\. Later,
as BISA became interested in the program, it became impossible to establish
and maintain a revolving credit fund because of hyperinflation\.
31\. Health Unit\. A project unit in the Health Ministry defined and
implemented a mother-child nutrition program throughout La Paz\. Health-posts
were established and staffed by nurses and visiting doctors and the program
quickly expanded in the El Alto area\. However, as the popularity of the
program grew, the unit began to attract greater a-tention from the Health
Ministry, and various charges and criticisms were levelled egainst its Senior
staff\. As the in-fighting grew, the efficiency of the unit declined\. Its
staff resigned and the unit was disbanded\. The Health Ministry kept no
record of the unit and its quantitative achievements cannot be measured\. As
the unit became more entangled in inter-departmental rivalry, the Bank
permitted remaining project funds to partially finance and equip a health
training center in La Paz\. This center is staffed and operated by the Health
Ministry with assistance from UNICEF\.
32\. Coordination\. Both intra- as well as inter-agency coordination
were weak\. During the pre-inflation period, project implementation was
characterised by a lack of inter-inastitutional contacts and coordination
between CONAVI and other executing institutions\. The Coordinating Commission
held weekly meetings, and although these assisted somewhat in getting the
different participants to work together, the Commission was ineffective
because the project agencies did not want to surrender any of their
autonomy\. Except for HAN, the project units did not benefit from the
experience of their parent institutions in the implemeatation of project
works\. As a result, the sites and services component had a history of
administrative and control problems such as works not being properly
sequenced, staff salaries not being paid on time, and accounts aot being
separated for the units\.
33\. Separate project units were created to allocate greater direct
financial and administrative authority\. In the case of HAM-BIRP, it
- 9 -
maintained excellent communication links with the parent Municipality\. This
did not occur with the other project units because of reasons already noted
above\. Coordination between HAM and other project agencies (e\.g\., BISA) and
between BANVI and BISA were generally good\. Poor institutional coordination
between CONAVI and BISA severely hampered the implementation of the
industrial minipark\.
34\. Contracting\. The urban upgrading component (US$3\.36 million
without the construction materials loans); and about 27% (US$3\.70 million) of
the sites and services component where mutual aid was envisaged, were to be
carried out by force account\. The supply of major equipment and vehicles was
to be secured under international competitive bidding\. All other civil
works, procurement and the supply of minor equipment were to be done through
competitive bidding advertised locally, in accordance with procedures
satisfactory to the Bank\. During the early phase of project implementation,
contracting problems for both ICB and LCB were mainly due to lengthy and
cumbersome procedures, particularly for CONAVI, a Government agency\.
Inflation complicated the problem with contractors unwilling to offer fixed
price and suppliers running out of stocks\. Problems arose even when the
project units managed to negotiate equitable arrangements for adjustments
because the Government passed an adjustment law which was very favorable to
contractors and had to be applied in all cases\. During the worst economic
period, CONAVI and BANVI had to post guards at each partially completed house
to prevent dismantling and sales of the fixtures\.
35\. As inflation reached the four and five digit range (50,000% on an
annualized bases in September, 1985), it was almost impossible to negotiate
any contract for work or make any purchases on a planned basis\. No supplies
were available, and when they were, price quotations were being changed
literally by the minute and the US$ was used as the reference price\. Also,
the project units received loan funds from the Central Bank at the
artificially high fixed official exchange rate\. As the situation worsened,
the Bank ag\.eed to raise the minimum threshold amounts for ICB and prior
reviews and establish a special account for the project\. It also agreed to
requests of HAM and later, CONAVI, to buy materials from Brazil and stockpile
these for later use\. Bank missions worked with Government and project
officials to' modify adjustment laws which were too generous to contractors
and which in effect rewarded project delays\.
36\. Delays\. Given Bolivia's history of political and economic unrest,
the implementation period set at appraisal was perhaps over-optimistic\.
However, there was no reason to suppose at that time that the country would
undergo the severe economic problems which it faced during 1982-85, with a
consequent loss of produ-tivity; lack of counterpart funds; lack of access to
funds via the Central Bans; non-acquisition of land by BISA; and devaluation
of the peso coupled with hyperinflation\. Whereas during appraisal the
expectation was that the future rate of inflation was likely to drop even
further (to 7%) than the 10% experienced at that time, the actual situation
was unprecedented inflation (Chart 3)\. The environment of continued
political and economic change and frequent strikes at the Central Bank
delayed definition of an exchange rate for Bank reimbursements, and this also
led to project implementation delays, as did the Bank's suspension of all its
disbursements to Bolivia during 1983-84, because of overdue loan repayment\.
It is estimated that politieal turmoil resulted in delays of about 18 months
to the project; and suspensions of disbursements by the Bank caused some two
- 10 -
years of delays\. Since there is some overlapping, the net result is a
shorter overall period of delay (about three years)\. As a result of delays,
project costs in pesos show considerable variation from the US$ amounts
quoted at appraisal\.
37\. Project Costs and Financing\. Table 4 contains a summary of
estimated and actual project costs\. Given the then-prevailing economic
conditions, no real comparison can be made between these figures\. Exact
correspondence between estimated and actual project costs in US$ could not be
verified by the PCR mission because of the frequent devaluations\. Project
modifications also make such comparisons diff'cult\. Nevertheless, since the
Bank's share of project cost was re'latively high (80%), it is reasonable to
assume that final project cost was similar to original estimates\.
38\. Planned and actual project financing arrangements are shown in
Table 8\. Estimated and actual proportions of project funding from Government
and the Bank remained the same (20% and 80% respectively), although changes
were made in the Bank's allocation of funds to the different project
components\. The amount spent on technical assistance increased by 5% over
that originally estimated, and funds were reallocated from sites and services
components to urban upgrading as a consequence of the first loan
restructuring in 1981\.
39\. Government's inability or unwillingness to provide counterpart
funding (which has to be considered in the light of Bolivia's overall
economic difficulties and lack of liquidity), led the Bank to increase the
proportion of its overall funding from 77% to 82% under the second loan
amendment in May 1983\. This adjustment was achieved through increasing its
disbursement percentage to 95% for categories 2 and 3 of BANVI, CONAVI, HAM
and the Health components and to use loan savings due to devaluation\.
IV\. OPERATING RESULTS
40\. ProjsctResults\. Despite numerous difficulties of national
strikes; hyperinflation; delays due to suspensions of disbursements to
Bolivia by the Bank; and lack of intra- as well as inter-institutional
coordination, in physical terms, the project has achieved a great measure of
success particularly in the provision of urban services\. Many original
targets were surpassed\. With respect to HAM, compared to original targets of
providing about 4,500 families with upgraded services, as Table 7 indicates,
over 20,000 families throughout a 1,500 ha\. area were provided with drinking
water services\. There were 1,541 new retail stalls constructed instead of
the 1,100 originally envisaged, and approximately 700 beneficiaries received
artisan loans\. A comprehensive self-help program was also established and
strengthened\. Furthermore, the achievements of HAM have provided a model for
selective incremental upgrading works with self-help, and on a largely cost-
recoverable basis\. This is being done through a larger city-wide upgrading
component which is currently underway with partial Bank financing
(Credit 1842-BO), and with the project unit being the nucleus of the team for
the larger operation\. The staff of HAM also made visits to other countries
(e\.g\., Guatemala and Ecuador) to provide technical assistance in setting up
- 11 -
similar programs there\. For CONAVI 1,532 new shelter units were provided
compared to 4,696 envisaged at appraisal (and later modified to 1,980
units)\. Additionally, the Government is reviewing CONAVI's achievements and
is considering plans to consolidate all current housing programs to provide
more appropriate low-income housing\. BANVI provided 441 units anrd 650
urbanized lots, while BISA granted about 300 artisan credits\.
41\. Land purchase was the subject of a protracted dispute between BISA
and CONAVI\. BISA was to have bought land for the industrial park component
of the project (which formed an intergral part of CONAVI's program); instead,
it allowed CONAVI to do so\. Following CONAVI's purchase of land from various
private sector groups, it asked BISA for a higher price than BISA was willing
to pay and considerable delays resulted\. BISA finally bought its land in a
different location altogether, relatively far from the CONAVI project housing
(whose beneficiaries the industrial workshops were designed to serve)\. These
delays and lack of early definition and decision-making by BISA's
adm±nintration (due partially to the macro-economic crisis in Bolivia at that
time), led to the non-implementation of the workshop component of the
project\. Nevertheless, the land purchased by BISA was urbanized and it is in
close proximity to the units which BANVI built\. It could therefore, still
serve some of the beneficiaries of the project as well as other low-income
residents who are expected to settle in the area\.
42\. Consultants Performance and Technical Assistance\. The consultants
performed effectively, although the short time spent in the country (5-8 days
for most consultants) prevented integration into the project units\. As a
consequence, they tended to lack locally-based perspectives and their
counterparts had difficulty understanding and thus fully implementing their
recommendations\. For example, core unit designs and lower norms and
standards were initially not understood and accepted by CONAVI\. Very
effective use was made of regionally-based consultants from the Salvadoran
agency, Fundacion Salvadorena de Desorrollo y V%vienda Minima (FUNDASAL),
which transferred much of their previous experience on Bank-financed
projects\. Also, many local professione\.ls who worked on the project were able
to gain experience outside Bolivia, and this contributed to increased
efficiency and objectivity\.
43\. Community Organization\. HAM's predecessor, Accion Comunal, was
particularly strong in community organization, a legacy which it passed on to
HAM\. The demonstration effect of its initial involvement in the 8 de
diciembre residential area demonstrated a replicable approach to housing and
urban upgrading to the community\. This approach irvolves intensive
orientation programs for residents interested in the services\. They are told
what options are available and what the associated costs would be and they
are given the opportunity of reducing their costs through self-help and
(sometimes) food-for-work program\. The community having the greatest number
of residents signing up for the program and paying an advance for works to be
done gets priority on HAM's list\. On the strength of its initial activities,
HAM has received requests for upgrading from more than 100 neighborhoods and
has implemented a downpayment policy of 10-25% (according to ability to pay)
from would-be beneficiaries\.
- 12 -
44* O2pertioanand Mait9enaace\. Responsibility for the administration
of municipal services lies with the municipality through the intermediary of
SAMAPA, the water and sewerage authority\. SAMAPA will operate and maintain
all the water and sewerage systems instdlled by HAM\. Though CONAVI is
legally obliged to transfer the operation and maintenance function of its
installations to SAMUP , at the time of the PCR mission, it had not yet
submitted its project component for municipal approval (the first step in the
transfer process)\. It was conducting an inventory of the works at that time,
after which it would effect the handover to the municipality\. Handover of
the Rio Seco site suffered delays because the Education Ministry wanted to
have furniture and equipment in the school before it accepted the
facilities\. The equipment and furniture were to be pla"ed in the school
shortly after the PCR mission was in the field\.
45\. Cost Recovery\. At appraisal, US$17\.7 million (78%\.of the total
cost) were to be directly recovered from inLdividual beneficiaries\.
Indirectly recovered costs (via property taxes) were to include some
community facilities, technical assistance and some offsite infrastructure\.
Recovery of costs for the project were to come mainly from charges and sales
to final users\. The remaining costs were to be absorbed by Government aad
recovered from general tax revenues, including local taxes\. Table 11 shows
estimated and actual costs and recovery sources for each of the components
and in total\.
46\. Before the hyperinflation period, as project works were being
implemented for the upgrading component, beneficiaries entered into contract
to pay their share of costs in non-indexed pesos\. With the onset of
inflation, many beneficia\.ies were able to prepay their debts with inflated
pesos\. Since it was mainly beneficiaries of upgrading works who were
affected in this way (the shelter units were sold later), HAM held meetings
with some of the beneficiaries and renegotiated their obligations to pay in
US$ equivalent terms\. This was done even though these beneficiaries had no
legal obligation to r:enegotiate and it reflects the excellent relationship
between HAM and the beneficiaries\. Shortly after that, all of the other
agencies decided to set legal obligation in US$ terms\. Complicating the
matter even more, since the units were built over a period of time when
inflation ranged from two to five digits, determining the final unit costs
was also a probl_m\. Afterwards, with the obligations decided upon in indexed
mortgage schedules, beneficiaries were unable to pay their debts, since their
salaries were not commensurately adjusted\. As a consequence of repayments in
inflated pesos, and later indexation of debt obligations, 94% of the costs of
HAM's urban improvements had not been recovered at the time of the PCR
mission and a similar case existed with respect to the market component,
although only 62% of artisans credits and 51% of housing materials credits
were still to be recovered at that time\. Cost recovery had not yet been
initiated by BANVI and CONAVI, and in BANVI's sites and services component,
tenure had not yet been legally transferred to beneficiaries -- a
pre-requisite for initiation of cost recovery\. CONAVI too has not yet
legalized its transfer of title to beneficiaries, some of whom are already
living in the units with some even renting rooms to tenants\. In theory, it
is assumed that beneficiaries would pay monthly installments with penalty
interest from the first day's default\. However, given current conditions,
this would not be possible for most beneficiaries and there would be need to
- 13 -
renegotate the loans outstanding\. Table 11 indicates that in the project as
a whole, an estimated 74% of costs are likely to be recovered directly from
beneficiaries if they meet their obligations\. It is,however, very difficult
to predict what would actually happen, given the unprecedented inflation rate
and its impact upon the economy and real income\. During the period of
intense inflation, living conditions were so acute that many residents began
to dismantle and sell fittings, doors, wash-basins, etc\., from their homes in
order to survive\.
47\. It is the task of SAMAPA, the water and sewerage authority, to
recover HAM's investment through househol4 water bills, which will now
include an additional payment for urban improvements to water and sewerage\.
To date, of the $b15,741 million invested by 1985, $bl,133 million (7%) was
recovered by the time the projec^t c-losed\.
48\. Since BISA's initial artisan loans were not indexed, the value of
its recovery funds in real terms was substantially lessened\. After May 1986,
US$900,00 was reassigned to it from other components\. With these new funds,
an intense campaign of marketing and identification of beneficiaries was
initiated and US$865,088 of the funds were used up\. To prevent
decapitalization, about 104 indexed loans have now been granted to
beteficiaries\. This represents one third of the total granted by BISA over
the entire project period\.
49\. Reporting Arrangements\. With the exception of CONAVI and of the
Ministry of Health following the Government's abandonment of the health
component of the project in 1983, reporting arrangements were implemented as
specified at appraisal\. Though delayed in many instances, the respective
agencies produced trimestral reports of good quality\. CONAVI was continually
behind in fulfilling its reporting obligations (for example, its 1984 audit
report was not received until Aagust 1986), and it w\.s unable to prepare its
own completion report on time\. Its auditors were unable to examine its
accounts for the years 1984 and 1985 primarly because the project unit had
not consolidated them and separated the parent agency transactions from
project agency ones; furthermore, balances shown lacked proper supporting
information\. An average of 9-12 months delay occurred in ?roduction of the
audited reports, due in part to the multi-tiered approval process for
contracting auditors, and later, by the worsening economic situation\.
Central Bank project documentation was also incomplete, particularly for the
1983-85 period, because of strikes and bookeeping problems due to inflation\.
50\. Project participation (including reporting) by the Health Unit went
well initially, but was completely absent after 1983\. Following the
departure of the director in 1982, a request was made by the staff of the
Ministry for a special audit of the Unit's accounts\. The records of the Unit
were not located even after the Ministry of Health made repeated attempts to
obtain them for the PCR mission\. Officials of the Health Ministry said that
with the closing of the unit, the records were in rented facilities and they
cannot be found\. Unlike each of the other agencies, which prepared a final
report, none was prepared on the health component\.
51\. Compliance with Loan Conditions\. It was specified at appraisal
that SAMAPA was to provide adequate quantities of water in time to meet the
project's requirements for CONAVI's Rio Seco sites and services plots\.
However, although SAMAPA constructed the infrastructure and aspervised and
- 14 -
installed water mains in the project area, financial problems prevented it
from providing adequate sewerage treatment facilities in all of the
neighborhoods before untreated effluent was discharged into Rio Seco\. This
problem is being addressed through the ongoing municipal development and
water distribution program\. Also, as noted above, Government agencies
responsible for staffing, operating and maintaining the schools and health
programs financed by the project have not been up to date in fulfilling their
responsibilitJes; again, because of severe financial constraints and
coordination problems\.
52\. Disbursements\. As a consequence of the Bank's suspension of
disbursement to Bolivia in 1981 and 1983-4, project disbursements were
delayed, which in turn delayed implementation by a period of about wo
years\. This was further aggravated by the large number of strikes (including
those in the Central Bank) which occurrea during the period and severely
hampered the flow of project funds\. Disbursements were again suspended
between July 2 and December 13, 1985, because of non-payment of debts to the
Bank by Bolivia\. The project was closed in June 1986, with outstanding
works continuing until December 1986, when the final disbursement was made\.
At that time, an unspent balance of approximately US$85,000 was cancelled\.
V\. BENEFITS
53\. Economic and Social Benefits\. At appraisal, the internal economic
rates of return (IERR)-for the sites and services and urban upgrading
components were estimated to be about 16% and 27% respectively, with the IERR
for both components together estimated at 18%\. The appraisal computation of
the rate of return assumed that the benefits included the imputed rental
values of the completed housing units, estimated by the market value of
similar houses\. The cost streams were assumed to be investment and
maintenance costs\. The useful life of the component was assumed to be twenty
years\.
54\. In light of the environment of instability and hyperinflation which
occurred during the life of this project, it is not very meaningful to
calculate an IERR for comparlson\. On the cost side, even though adjustments
could be made to estimate some type of real cost stream of investments, on
the benefits side, the PCR mission was not able to make reasonable estimates,
since there was no comparable market to analyse\. Although no regular sales
transactions took place, owners of houses comparable to those of the project
area were quoting speculative and widely varying prices for their units\.
As a result, project houses costing approximately US$2,000 to build were
being quoted at US$6,000 - US$8,000\. For the upgrading component, a similar
problem exists in reesonably estimating the associated benefits of the
project works\. Nevertheless, for similar works which are currently being
continued under Credit 1842-30, (and for which the economic analysis was done
at a later date), it is estimated that t1-e IERR is about 33x\. It is
therefore reasonable to assume that the actual IERR of this project would be
no less than the 18% rate projected at appraisal\.
55\. Employment\. HAM-BIRF's activities generated an estimated 977
man-months of employment and the project unit staff have accumulated
considerable technical, economic and social expertise through participation
in project implementation\. Also, almost all of the market-related jobs
- ?5 -
benefitted working women, many of whom are heads of households\. Under Loans
granted by BISA during tt\., project, 299 productive units \.aave benefitted from
credits, about 508 new jobs have been cxaated and 344 people have m«intaiLed
their jobs\. Systems of production have been semi-mechanised and the
productive capacities of artisans in particular have improved\. Consequently,
living standards of beneficiaries and their families have been raised and
greater efficiency demonstrated in the management procedures and strategy of
firms which received loans from BISA\. Benefits accruing to BISA itself
include the experience gained in artisan lending and the recent institutional
shift in its policy, under which it diversified its exposure and is lending
more to small-scale and artisan operations\.
56\. Poverty Imoact\. The sites and services component directly and
indirectly benefited residents in the project area and surrounding
population\. During its relatively short life the health component reached
several thousand families (mostly mothers and children), and improved their
nutritional and health maintenance habits\. More importantly, the initial
success of the program continues to influence policymakers and another
similar program is now in place at the national level\. Overall, it is
estimated that about 80% of the project benefits went to beneficiaries in the
lowest quartile of household income in the project area\.
VI\. OVERALL EVALUATION
57\. General\. This project was the Bank's first urban project in
Bolivia\. Like other early urban projects, it goal was to show borrowers that
there were alternatives to the extremes of physical eradication of slum areas
and the provision of fully furnished shelter units at highly-subsidized
prices to a few lucky beneficieries\.
58\. At appraisal, the Bank was still considering a unified
comprehensive approach to urban problems and the project was thus formulated
with housing, infrastructure, health, employment and technical assistance
components\. Bank staff felt that the creation of separate project units was
needed to avoid bureaucratic impediments and provide a nucleus for improving
performance in the parent organization\. (This practice has been discarded in
later Bank projects after its weaknesses became evident, e\.g\., in friction
with other agencies, talent drain from other agencies, etc\.)\. An additional
layer of project management, the Coordinati>\.n Commission, was created to
facilitate inter-institutional coordination\.
59\. Role of Project Agencies\. Even without the added complication of
hyperinflation and its resulting economic chaos, the project scope now
appears to have been too ambitious for a first operation\. With the exception
of the HAE unit, all of the other units were apparently not fully apprised of
their roles and their tasks\. Consequently, when they were called upon to
create and support special project units, they were not as cooperative as
they could have been, partly because of a lack of understanding of the
project and partly because of suspicion that their power base was being
eroded\. The Health Unit provides a very good example of this situation where
the parent agency saw the project unit as a direct threat, both in terms of
its initial accomplishments and in job related benefits which were accruing
to the unit staff\.
- 16 -
60\. The implementing units and their parent agencies spent almost a
year reconciling their positions and deciding what their respective roles
should be\. CONAVI's staff was not comfortable with the proposed new
direction of the loan, preferring the old policy of building a few high cost
finished units for members\. It consequently never fully cooperated in
assisting the project unit to implement the program and it never tried to
facilitate staff continuity, proper accounting and reporting procedures,
etc\. In a similar fashion, BISA's initial administration was not interested
in the artisan lending component, preferring \.nstead to focus upon lending
for mining and heavy industrial operations\. It kept the unit staff at a
minimum and at tines withheld salaries from the staff\. In addition, there
wero frequent changes at all levels: from presidents of the republic to
ministers, directors and lower level staff in the various units\. The only
unit which did not suffer such changes was the HAM unit and this was due
partly to the good relations which it had with the pa\.,:qt municipality and
partly to the Bank's efforts to have the unit staff remain to facilitate
project implementation\.
61\. The Government's Role\. The Government, facing other more pressing
problems, was not able to provide leadership to the project\. It agreed to
re-allocate project funds in favor of those agencies willing to implement the
project and it reduced the roles of CONAVI and BISA while those of HAM and
BANVI were increased\. As inflation grew and economic conditions worsened,
real wages declined substantially and contracts for some unit sta\.' were not
being renewed\. The Government was helpless in taking corrective actions\.
Also, for contracting, it used a lengthy process of approvals and it approved
a contract readjustment formula which unduly favored contractors\. Finally,
the Government insisted in drawing down loan funds at the much lower (peso)
official exchange rate for the US$, thus making project costs much more
expensive in US$ terms and negatively affecting the project\.
62\. The Bank's Role\. Indications are that the Bank was not initially
able to explain project goals fully\. It could have done more to orient the
various agencies and to define project goals and targets more clearly\. A
good example of this shortcoming was the Health component which was left to
be defined during project implementation\.
63\. As project delays grew longer, the Bank apparently put more
emphasis upon getting the work done than upon long-term implications of some
of its actions\. It drew BANVI, a financial institution, into physical
implementation of housing units\. In some cases, with a worsening economic
situation, the Bank apparently tried too hard to get some components moving\.
In order to compensate somewhat for the grossly inadequate salaries,
especially for higher level unit staff, project funds were used to cover some
administrative expenses\. Although not inconsistent with Bank policy, this
practice created friction with Government officials who were not receiving
similar assistance\. Given the economic situation which prevailed at that
time in Bolivia, the best course of action may have been to leave questions
of lo\.g-term institutional development until later on when the situation was
expected to improve and to focus upon the more immediate problem of removing
constraints to implementation of physical works\.
- 17 -
64\. Overall, the project resulted in significant achievements,
especially in light of the socio-economic situation which prevailed during
its implementation\. The institutional and physical achievements of the HAM
component are remarkable by any measure, although this is somewhat tempered
by cost-recovery problems which are likely to occur if real wages do not rise
soon\. The CONAVI and BANVI physical works have had more qualified success,
although for CONAVI, indications are that the Government is now willing to
consolidate its housing program and focus more upon low-income housing,
similar to those of the project\. Similarly, with BISA, its new administra-
tion has begun a comprehensive re-orientation aimed at diversifying its
operations and providing greater assistance to artisan and small-scale
enterprises\.
BOLIVIA
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
LOAN 1489-BO: URBAN PROJECT
________________________ ___
POPULATION ESTIMATES
I------- -
- ------
Total Population La Paz
of Bolivia Department City
1980 5,599,592 1,800,269 812,641 G
1981 5,755,072 1,854,860 845,816
1982 5,915,844 1,913,184 881,404
1983 6,081,722 1,969,261 916,297
1984 6,252,721 2,029,008 953,634
1985 6,429,226 2,091,429 992,592
Growth Rates (1980-1985) 3%
Rural-Urban Population Distribution
Urban % Rural %
1980 2,488,628 44\.04 3,110,964 55\.56
1981 2,595,237 45\.09 3,159,835 54\.91
1982 2,706,626 47\.75 2,209,218 54\.25
1983 2,822,546 46\.41 3,259,176 53\.59
1984 2,942,944 47\.07 3,309,776 52\.93
1985 3,068,051 47\.72 3,361,175 52\.28
BOLIVIA
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
LOAN 1489-BO: URBAN PROJECT
INCOME DISTRIBUTION AT APPRAISAL
________________________________
La Paz Project Beneficiaries
Upgrading Works Sites & Services
Monthly Family Income Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative
--------$b----------- % %
1 - 500 2\.09 2\.09 8\.67 8\.67
501 - 1,000 10\.66 12\.7', 30\.51 39\.18 15\.00 15\.00
1,001 - 1,500 11\.05 23\.8 30\.95 70\.13 65\.00 80\.00
1,501 - 2,500 18\.42 42\.22 22\.78 92\.91 20\.00 100\.00
2,501 - 3,500 10\.65 52\.87 5\.38 98\.29
3,501 - 5\.000 13\.40 66\.27 1\.71 100\.00
5,001 - 6,500 7\.35 73\.62
6,501 - 8,000 4\.72 78\.34
8,001 - 10,000 6\.09 84\.43
10,001 - 12,000 3\.31 87\.74
12,001 + 12\.26 100\.00
- 20 -
TABLE 3
BOLIVIA
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
LOAN 1489-BO: URBAN PROJECT
GENERAL INDICATORS, 1977-1985
Ilterest
Rate (%)
Paid by laterest
SBoI per Parallel Inflation Bank's Charged (%)
Year US$ Rate Rate Savings Account by Bank
1977 20 10 10 19
1978 20 10 10 19
1979 25 19 15 23
1980 25 47 17 25
1981 25 32 22 32
1982 196 123 30 43
1983 500 275 43 67
1984
Mar 500
Apr 2,000
Aug 2,000 5,000 2,177 140 155
Nov 9,000 25,000
1985
Feb 45,000 150,000 Not Available
May 45,000 180,000
Number of Strikes in 1984: 1043
Number of Natiooal Proside3ta 1977-85: 10
BOLIVIA
FROJECT COKPLETION REPORT
LOAN 1489-BO: URBAN PROJECT
SUMMARY PROJECT COSTS
521 041 4 115I*4- an U\.S\.* 58\.-
1\.6S\.l\.d A\.nd\.d ikt\.I \.4 b\. \.4446\. 22*4 4-60 62\. t\.6\. 4b\.A\. d 6 Okt\. 6\.id 0\.0\. g\.t\.-t\.d 66\.dd a\.601 I\.
S04\.So 28a49\.?,i \.140 6\.4\. 6 'IO :,O, 6\.*l 27607\.14 )1\.2 31544\.6 214\. I\. 2\.3 \.4 S\.6 \.60 2\.644Ps P\.
a\.4\.,\.l\. C,\.J\.1\. 20\.0~~0 De 1to is ItSSi : Joeu 10\.4 WW)4\.8 322 144\.1 jSladal2 \.64 0\.6 \.2 0\.5a 0\.14 05a a\.0\. \.1 9\.9
1\.4 \. 4-4- 11\.60 419\. la ?6\. 56\.112 346\.44 ts"96\.2l \.2\.0 86&\.111 WPH14\.0\.: 11\.4 0\.45 S\. 4\.16 0\.as 0\.642 1\.14 0\.A1 6\.6
ft\.6\.,\.l\. 64\.4\.6\. 11~~s\.110 102\.21 \.64b%\.w, 225\. 0\. 1\. 41011\.46 45\.2\.2 2\.?\. IV 41146\.4i 11\.M6 0\.2t 2\.4 4\.02, 0\.1) D\.as 0\. us 0\.4 0\.11A
C *\.i\.6\. 1~~~~~~~~~\.60 16\.41? 1486\.0\.t 1\.4 44\.11I 1114\. 4 \. \. 44\.24 Olo)\.90 1\. -S 0\.14 0\. \.:) 0\.0\. 0\.0? 0\.ak2 &\.21 0\.61 0\.a1
0 '\. C\.dt\. * \.5\. 21\.60\. 16\.22 22444b9\.6\. ko\.k\. 60 \. Si1 840&0\.11 3\.4 wow \.,4 *2916\. 8\.1,w 0\.4) Iti 1 0\.06 0\. 12 2\.06 0\.04 2\.24
I\. 1\.h\.1 A\.4\. 0\.44 124\.16 214141iv\.04 W\.60 pb 26\.I 6 30S4sm 04 151 \. ?16215\.0 0\. 06 5\.06 16* 164 0 G\. M 1\.60 566 2\.14
$\.s 86\.60 46G\.46\.4 269l2sk\.l 815\.406 66814\.0? 192600\. 22 226\.62 So0i\.4 2"46106\.9% 4\.01 S\.12 626\. \.4 2\.4---\.-- O-\.7---\. -- I \.11
12\.40 344\.1 0612S30\.01 0\. do *44\.02 6014\.44 11\.166 W51\.01 Abbi4\.41 0\.42, 0\.42 o\.bs 6\. Wk 0\.24 0\. 26 0\.6 0\. 14 O\.?
S\.4 6o 640\.14 2701036\. 0\.20 10\. 24 6l42\.69 6\.4\. 220\.0 66\.64\.06 (0\.41 0\.22' 0\.2\. 0\.45 0\.10 0\. 1; 0\. 2\. 0\.)) 0\.20o
27 60 708\.44 16\.61\.2\.25 0\.00 211\.64 41106\.41 *1\.40~~~~~b a102\.00 27716 \. 4 8\.1il 8\.26 9\.04 0\.91h 0\.60 a\.6 641 14
1\.46\.6\.6 44\.60 542 12 0604\.4 1\.w At\.) 146164\.40 *t 40 l5\.61, 46\.444\.0" k\.;:6 1\.01 2\.11 0\.07 0\.01 5\.650 2\.12 2\.?4 I\.&$
is 60 36 "A\.'a CM &~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\.02 0\.A 0\.14 \. QG \. \.o
4%00 W4,\. 56\.0"401\.6 144\.24 \.4 29\.1 21\. 244 40\.2 2228 0\.10!---- 0\.4 \.0 ---- 5\.60 0
24\.1 211311\.96 50114\.114 122564\.od 1244\.5 142\.411 5\.4\.1 2\.4 0\.49S\.:0 25
1\.ft\.v 2\. of"I P\.40
\.222540\.129 262\.4 1\.l 140A\.00 10264\.062401;aoC\.1\.1 542\.60 4142\.4 5 01M41\.41 46-0\.2 66040\.4? 141111\.1 24\.24 66\.14 86\.js ?\.11 1\.5? ?\.11 22\.66 22\.65 22\.w6
I4
BOLIVIA
PROJECT CONPLETION REPORT
LOAR 1489-BO: URBAN PROJECT
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT
pal * I a I 6 I U a L 6 a A t S
*- ---*- - --- --- -- - -- ---- ----- - -- - -- -- - ----- -- - - - - -- - -- ---- --- - - -- ----- - --- A c I u a t
Avrai AsII AiEtIld AS OF NaRCN 25, 1991
At r Sites ad Snwirnesto be crried Mut by CINAYII Sitn and Sevicesilo be carried oIt by CENAVII Sites and Servicn tcarried out by 0AVYII
Ierelopmot of about 5525 serviced plots witb hevelopent of about 1,91 sevited plots with rue kevelopent *l l\.U2 serviced plots, milkth 16 inds-
care duelling oits, of comaity facilities, delting anits, of conmunty facilities, and f a- Itrial plots ol IU *7 each One, in the Ro Srco loni
amd of abt III Idtriallcsanercial plots im bout 3\.5 ha\. of indostraliconserial plots in the of the I Alto areA of ta Fal\.
the It alIt area of to Paz, and provision of Rio Sec tone ofl be [I Alto area de La Pat, asd
credits lor construction aterials provision of cgedits for cossiruction saterials -
I\.- veltopsnt of about 5,525 urbkaited plots I\.- Developmeat at about 19K serviced plots wtb I\.- tvulopuent ol 192 serviced plots, provision of
in the E1 Alto area of La Pal Oa sites core dtelliug avits is the Rio Selo one of the 1512 basic units in the hBo Seca lone of S t Alto
already ownd by CONaVI ad appwoasmatety Vi Altt area of La Pat an sites aIready owned ou sites lfready med by CIVI\.
23 tectrn of aiitinoal adjacent land tO by CUVI\.
be acquired by ClNVI!\. N
2\.- Provision of a core duelling seected fron
A"g I different typen to about 651 GI said
plots\.
J\.- tFioislon of basic esseAtidl services uatlu, 2\.- Provision of basic esSNtsal services fuater, 2\.- 1kw\. is provision of basic essntial services
lentricity, sweragr, acrOss roadsl\. electrimaty ,sewerage ,access roads)\. twater, electricitt, sneerage)\.
4\.- lostiruction of about 5\.5 Is\. of eater J\.- Construtlion of about lte\. of water trunt
truak line espassions onnecting the sites lian expansimns cuonecting the sites
iKludEd in PrI A of thk Projict With the included in Prla A of the Proajct with the
main wadte spply artlor of La Paz\. Main water supply nettwrk of La Pa\.
5\.- Constrution of abort seven neU eleneSay 4\.- Construction of reuired elemntary schools and 4\.- Ialugtment of the * l1alter alpit * school,
schools d of on appropiate refuse disposal conmitl cnters mad of an appropiate reulse a comity center, awd a child cre center\.
faciliy and lwbilding of two tcon ity disposal facility\.
crnters by otua0l-aid\.
6\.- Provisioe of credits for const; action S\.- Provision of credits for construction
sateirils And contracted labor to purtcasers materials and contracted labor to purchasers
wishing to d9eve1l,ezPasd ,or improve their wishing to developepamd ,wr iwrove their
initial duilings by self-help initial dwellings by self-help a
0
7\.- brelop nt of about 14 additioal 6\.- 3evelopnest of about 3\.5 ha of 6\.- levelopnent of I isndrstrial plots ofI JU n
plots,adjacent to those set forth is Nlo\. iwdostriallromuercial plots is the tio Seco each, tn tte Rlo Sec\. lose\.
hereoffor rtlnsas and snll-scalr zone of the El Alto area ot the ta Pai\.
eoterprists,prinartly labor-intensive and
simply technology enterpisses\.
BOLIVIA
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
LOAN 1489-DO: URBAN PROJECT
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT
fARI R I 6 I U A L 6 I A L S
------_-----__--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- A C I u A L
A P P a 1AI 6 E I MnENDED AS If nIRNCH 25, I"I
Part 3
lrsbaa Upgradiag Ito be carried out by fIIII Urban Uplrading (to be carried out by RA) Urban tpgrading I carried out by HAtD
Provision of basic infrastracture and other Ptevision of basic infrasIructure and other urban Potvisiom oi Basit infiaestruEtu,e and other ur-
uria\. services to about 4SU families services to not less than 5,1S 1 families living in ban services to 21,221 families liviing in 9 lou-
1i7iq* in let-i\.cma areas of ta Paz, aod of lto-ince areas of ta Pfa, and of credits for income areas of La Paz, and credits for housing
credits lor construction materials\. house improvements and lor saull artisans\. iprovements and for small arlisans\.
I\.- Provisi,n of basic urba I\.- Preovision of basic urban I\.- Provision of Basic inirestrocture and other
services,subh as mater supply and services,such as maler supply and urban services to 29,22? , mere provided\.
sanrage, a reluse collection samerage, a refust collection The upgrading vas limited 1o uater
system, pathways and street system, pathuays and street supply and sewerage\.
pavment, and coaunity facilities pavement, and community lacilities,
sod retreational spaces,to about 453 suck as community cenlers, day-care
families living in seven lou-income failities and eecreational spaces\. to not
areas of La Pa;r less than 5UP3 falilies living in lc-income
areas of [ Pat\.
2\.- Provision of secure tenure for 2\.- Provision of secure tenure for 2\.- thtere is provision of secure tenure for
partitcipats I the urban upgrading *ith participants ia the urban upgrading milk participants in the urbas upgrading *ith
regard to Ihier respective plots\. regard to thier respective plols\. regard to thier respeKtive plots\.
3\.- Provision of constraction materials 3\.- Provision of constructiol materials 3\.- Ihe credits for self-help beusing
credits fIr self-help bousiag improvements credits for sell-kelp bousing improvemeuts improvements mere give\. to 5,&U9 families\.
to about 453 participants\. to not less than 3311 participasts\.
4\.- Provision of credits to about 313 I\.- there sete 469 credits given to ' -
artisans, wbose operations are tao small to arlisans uhose operations are too small
qualify for tauns from 3ISA, in tie zones to qualify for loans from IISA\.
slcKted for carrying out Part A and C of Ihe Program helped to create 1,2U ieu LN
the Projecl\. jobs\. 0
rth
BOLIVIA
PRE CONPLEtION RR3P0T
WAN V48'-8O: URBAN PROJEC
__ \. _, ---------------------
DESCRIPTION OF ille PROJCT
-_______-______----------
__\. __\. \. __\. \. \._ \. \. __ \. \. \. \. \. \._ \. \. \. \.- -_------------- --- ---------------- -------- ------
mtl U a I C I I A L t I A L S
__ _ __________ __\._-- ------------- a C I - a t-
apPaaIS S IItIlms *5 as of a ic 25, 191
Put r btld l brlils I to hi ctried ml by 11 bytlil Imbs I bhe cu,ied rt by Ml Rtisl ubrles I curied ut by Ml
\._~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-- - -- --- \. __\. \.
Cmltrntlm tt l retail ld CinrKtiU Of liVe mt retil fIim rSa e mm S*tail fod awhts wre bilt to
Mkits bI Mu Iv-IKM t_ ee at La Ja, wiftste ni e r-iKcen uOes dI la Ftt\. Vrn 10-aiKoe trei Of La Pat\.
da as me\.
selp cmeltilm ad qurdisi of live S ni, C elrtim aid epraitl Ol live Siva s retail Ind sutts, Ise is Ibe
pilic reail Im its Is thbt fsllimimg m rasil fIew swets b snrve uev l Cents of La Pat seter ad thrne is El Alto
10CdtiMs lm-imcm weas of Li Pat\. aes, OrW deemsed\.
e\.l be 1d ig te ill Aild a tid le Sate Im use 1Itds created 1,541 sllit spts,
sectuim of th El 15A em dte La teat; 441 te th1 att it us n,slbed\.
b\.l In is b vtuisity of the SWr
Cerum wastfn l the La I ad
C\.J 6 eatch Im tI i11r mle-iKam Mses
d te Paz\.
pat aS ridits for rtiuss SW smaIl-scale sterpries Svelopeat of ,dustrdal Ad cssseral oeelp l mehsital aNW csancial
\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. -\.-\.---\.-----------------------\.
I tbe carried Mt by PISA 1\. plots ad Credits for ktkseas aid plats ad Creditk f\. ktisas aid
\. \. \._ \. \.--------\.-\.---\.-_-\.
Bull-kate aterpri n I So be crried eNt Ssell-Sele talerrisen I to be currvd at
by sign\. by @SAI5\.
Pravisin f a sweId tin the c"edit 1f knvlepmtl of t l 1 a kttarn *1\. be tVisdin of a It ha\. plot is he tl
ertieSm and emIl-scle umlarpiee lmt rallca tial plate ad ebd isa Sh Alatm ws l La Pat\. the ealtstrial Park ea
"Vpd IsleaiK e bts ad preidet El Alto re dI La Pu aid pivises of a no develip"d\.a speial lise of rEdit hr
dit I54S se _b m leriKM grep spKial ise *1 Credit flr uliums Jd utisame said a scale nattrprisnenva
prlmril is the arm coevrd by Put A \. sull tscale aterprisn dnipsd ts iKIceast qweud, dich bemfifed 9 prectinv
Pnt I buts all as ee cstists l - is sad provide Abt IM ea As wits, ceated 5o ase isma ad IJed 4 llowi al
Sailt sem available to b 'sam ml ues 1m-iKcme ytsW Priuily is Sh peSvle tso SrCt ther bs\.
uell-scle eml prisn for v fle ieg area cvtmd by part A ad flat hkereo
Lmms to trtisms ad lil-scale te tons ts artisais ad lIl sale niterpries eA
nttrrisn e Ir khe lelSlase pupasnt helped ta °
BOLIVIA
PROJECT COlPLETION REPORT
LOAN 1489-80t URBAN PROJECT
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT
P011 I B I C I I t U I L 6 S A S
------ -------- ------ ----- -C I tt a t
A t t a EA ItEtSECI AS of Ianct s, lSaI
lil to preet and J ntablished artisus lil to prude weo and ntablisbed artisas l i 29 prodctive aits havt ben heliltd
oers as r_sidsts is tbh areas to h Ire asl resideets in tbe areas to be alklouis their ttaeaiatms* rearntivatasm "a
"Waded sif part a of the project\. qyadd ider tart I Do the rojecil iupIeetatioe f tithe Prject\.
tiiI to etablish artisrs eisg is the tiil tes tablish atisans selis, to the sites liil Ikte cratm of 5t eson jobs\. de Ite ses-
site to be erviced nde fart A of the to be survied dor fatrs A ad C ol tk city of the job to 344 pens\.
PrjcKt As dsli4s therein ie Mtcepetedt Proej as duellims therei are completed Ihe nber oft credits gives to the dill erst
sectors wre:
lii to itustder nidstis sall-scale tiiil i truasler wsistiuT stall-scale a) Sall Scale Esterpries Sl
nierrinss free aes ilb lisited entrprisas ott ares uith lieited bl dtisans 241
espesses pssiblitin to plots provided is npasis pnibilities to plots provided so ----------
the rel site a of ta Pat porsoast to Pat thb El Alto aUa eloa Lar Pat wsat to Parts leOiN\. 29
A of te Projet;ad A ad A of the frojecti aso
lidi to estabtish ae Iahee-mstenssve liv) to establish ae labor -,micste
small-scale uaterpses ma plots provided as small-stalt nstenupuss cs plots prvided is
the El llet aKea of a raz pursuant to fart tht El Alto Asea oLa Pat psuantDl to trtFs
A et Ite Prect, a a d A of the Project\.
tih proclim of aWpippit tetheical fart 3 oI the Priect cmasists of provision of
assietate prst tea Pat E\.1 O tht apprupnate techaical assistance related to carrying
Project sill cmleets the gatin el Got tart I ot lte rhoifjt\.
Ies to "ueI the sccns of tart I of the
vl eleest of a t 1 he o1 la ud for kItisitios Ofl I bh\. Of lad fer isdOStriltOsG-
isdsstrarlilcoeercil plots ad shids is th El Alto mlial plots ad sheds is the lt AIto area\.
rea of La par\. Ihere is a Proet tor the Cimstrectin of as
lIdnstrial Part\. tivil subs have not ket du\. e
part E
lecheical kslstaece lechoscal Assistance technical assistance U
Provisin of ltechlical assistance to provision ol techoical assistaire to s Provasios of tehostal assastaUce to a
I\.- E VI tse *ehaSuil ud cOeputerias at'S I\.- CIIAVI to chasae baid computerize it's I\.- CIIMAVI did not reach its plasud goals,
adisiitrative an acctlitiel pr,cedurs ad adsisistralive id accostieag progdlulrs and the elpesses a\. this part ci the Projelt
to deeriop aee design usd tcosnltrucla to develop sew design nd construilmos Pete side sainll on design\.
\.i,\.4\.4 I ,11- N\. -t blnl-an 4 Ag4 o4AlIad aiandork for Iota si -\.1 hmemiq and irltled
BOLIVIA
PROJECT COKPLETION REPORT
LOAN 1489-DO: URBAN PROJECT
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT
\. \. \. \.
Put 2 I C I 11N A t l O A L S
--- ---- ----- --- ----- ---- ----- ---- ------ -- --- - ---- ---- - -- -- -- ----- A C I V A I
AIp aAIs I AN II II[f a FS Of NAB EN 25, 1981
_____________\.___---~- -- --- --- - ----- --- --1--- -- --- ----- -- --- --- --- - ------- ---- ---- -- - ---- ---- --- --- - ---- - --- -- - ----- - --
Provision of about 24 man-months of Provision ol about 24 mag-months DI
techniEal assistasnc by foreign and lonl technical assistance by Ioreign and local
experts sod acquisition ol aecessa y esperts and acquisition of necessary
eipipmeat to support LOAVI to: i) cgmvert equipmet to support LthlilY a O: 1\.1 convert
sonr of it's administiative and atcounting Somt Of it's adnisistr tive and accounting
preoedures lo a schanited dnd computerized procedures to a mechaied and computerized
systnm sad t 1ii couplet the developuent systen; and I iii complete the dtvelopeent
ad lormalinatiom of a paciage ol neu design and forealinatian of a package of ote design
and costruction stndards ht lot-cost and construction standards for low-cost
hosing prograes in coordination nith HAN\. housing progans in coordination ma fI\.
N
2\.- IN to prKess loan applictlions aide 2- NAIl to process loan applicalions made W\.- NAR prncessed loan application made undef part t
pider Pul I of the Proiect, to train its usder Part of the Pruaett, to train it's ofl the Project, trained its stall and analiaed
staff and to analyze its socic-economic staff and to analyze its socin-econnsic its sofia-economic sirveys%
swrveys; surveys;
Previsioa of about Al *an-ontlhs of fortegi Provtsion o about 61 an-months of foriegn Frovision ol 15 San months of lonal Consultants
and local consultants and acquisition ol aid local consultants and acquisition of ad acquisition ol neesary equipment to assist
nnesary equipment la assist Accion Coauual necessary equipenl to Assist the Project the Project Unit In the:
in the I Unit in the I
lot carrying out of hart I of the rojetf (di catrying Out of Part I of the Project; fal carryin out ol Part I of the Project;
Ibl poessing el loon application from (bi processing of loan application I-Os ib Carrying Dot ol Part S of the Pvoyect\.
artisans in cortdination lhb SISA nader artisans ian coordinatiocn uith 9ISA ander
Part I of the Project; Part O of the Project;
Itl traininal of is staff is the ntt
dscribed in tbI hereoll and t i}
3\.- 9ISA to manage the granting of loans, 3\.- lISA to eanage the developrinl ol 3\.- 9ISA has utilized funds oi technical Assistance 0
wade Parit I of the Project, to artians and industrial and couerncial plots and the for design purposes\.
small-scale enteptrises; qgnting oi the loans to artisaAS and Ihe lndustrial Part has san preittc design lef
small-scale enlerpfises under Pa 0 ol the constraEtiDn, approved by the Municipality\.
Pro ect;
BOLIVIA
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
LOAN 1489-BO: URBAN PROJECT
____________________________
DESCRIPTION OP THE PROJECT
__________________________
faa, | Ia I s I i A L 6 0 A L S
aP PI alshEi8E8RS ANUENUIfEI as or NA lICtH 25 1S81
4\.- INII to strengthet it's eahical 4\.- lUNI to sitengthen it's techical 4\.- (lteral Corsultants wne btred by FAN
capacities, to upport it's pfojeet wit, to cqacitins to support it's project wit, to naaly olr iested to support it's Project tiit\.
mcmlitt a_ evaluate the Project atn ppa,\. no\.itt aid etvalute the Frojet and prepare
similar wbhn delopient proijectsi ad sielar urban developoent projeKts and
Prtision ii out 79 on-mlbs of Part E\.i cossists ol the provision of f(etenal Consultants Wre hited to tarry out tech-
teKhiCal assistane by foreall aid loal tecI1ical ansistalce bV loreign and local aical stuodHs concerning thte uthallitnon of the
coesultants to streeqthea SltIt s tecbhscal coonsltants to stvengthen SANVI s tethnical FPocint\. Also, adesinistatire lonsultants anre
capaitin is enera, to support the capacities in eneral, to support the hared to elaborate a accountiog saouat for the
PrOjeKt tnit io he ntablished withim litRtl Pfooict Ulit to be established within 8NtI spcial projelt liit\.
to mit an W ewalete the FrOjKet , Nd to ottor aid evatwate the the PrOJKt,
to prepare sisila trba developmnt and to prepare sielar rbdan developeent
proeiKts\. pojects\.
S\.- linistfr of Health to prepare ad catrC S\.- Ninistry f Hreallb to prepare aid carry
eel a health and outrFtion Prajr4G; out a health and nutritiom prog la; 5\.- the inloraataon *as not availalbt to PER mission\.
Part F
Health Iraining Center and Basic Health Health rfaming Center and Basic Healtb
Progral ito be carried out by the Dirision Frogras Ito be carried out by thp Division
H terto lulantill\. iaterno Inlaoitl)\.
I\.- Cestruction and equipping ot a Health I\.- the Health ?rainng enater in ta Pat was
Iraining Ceeer imn La Paz to serve, inter tuilt
ai , as the base for the health aJd
aotritiva pboqras described sis Part f\.2
------------------ beloul and
2\.- A basic health and nutrition program for 1h indoreation was available to PER siss \.
lon-income areas ol La Pat , including
adsioistrative capestis and purchase and
utvliiation thereOf of equipment auid
- -vehicles\.
BOLIVIA
PROJECT COIIPLBTION 11FO3T
LOAN 1489-BO: URBAU PROJECT
DESCRIPTION Of THi PROJICT
Mt a a I C I t A t s a A t S
_ _ _ __ __ _ _ __\.---\.---~-- _- -----*-------- - --------------- A t I 0 A t
AtPIIISE A IENCEC o tf NAICu N S,lY3
Fart 6 Sitn fd Srvicn to ibt carried out by KIWII\. Sites ad Servics (to be *caried Mt by "Mil\.
khvlopmt of about tU srviced plots Kith kveloput of in plots\. uith 44 t ielliag units
-ere dllio "its ai cooemity ald 29 serviced plots addiltml to thoe uider
Iiailgies ,aditional t\. thaw "du Part A Part A o te Ike PojK is the El A el \. the l\.ke
of the Projet , is the El Alto area of La project sate, easd 'Las hismarasO is lDated i
Far, Ud owuisit\. of credits for I\. bwde of wha\. e"pais asi ea is O Alto\. I
constructiou materials, all as te fully PibliE lissport service cold he a pnrblel fwr
desribtd is Schedule to the DM1W project its lcali\. Ike credits for cmstrvutno uterials
runmt\. have not hm "lowed becase the bhousts waits havt
4at yet been adjedcated\.
*Part 6 cot ists of thk preparatio of about kv'Ioeuut of An plots, eith tll duelling units
EU serviced plots aid basic *usiag "its aid 2 setviced plots ithb the provishi\. of
is La Pat, tht provisum of nsnlial nsntial sevfics alter, eletricity, sewteae
ervice luter ,electrlcity *serag, and ad access rfeSl\.
accs rasl, sessary of-site 411 plots uith dtliag gaits fully
isfrastruttre, basic cuauaity latiliti*, aomplish the specilicatims\.
aid the provisio of credits, is mterials M plots provided for espmsios provided
or is cash to partwlpatiag *esolds to uilt strtet essatial uaaicipa services\.
develepnepaad,er improve the basic aits\. s\.
_a
0
- 29 -
TABLE 6
NOLITIA
PROJ1CT COIPLETION REPORT
\.
LolN 1489D80: URBAN PROJICT
\.
PIOJICT IOID ALLOCATIO1
\.
(US 1,allion)
Reallocations
laitial Barch Jue Jue ly
\. \.
I198 S l161 S 1883 S 1965 t 1986 t
CONAVi 9,915 59 5,147 31 4,758 28 41,836 28 3,852 23
% periodic (48) (7\.6) (1\.6) (20\.3)
variation
I 7\.1978:100 100 (48) (52) (51) (61)
NAN 3,360 20 5,846 34 6\.470 38 7,11484 44 7,547 44
2 perlodic 74 11 15\.7 0\.8
variation
I f\. 1978:100 100 74 92\.6 122\.7 124\.6
lISA 2,1800 16 3,631 21 2,208 13 1,009 6 1,909 11
x periodic - 29\.7 (39) (54) 89
varlation
I 1\. 1978:100 100 29\.? (21) (63\.9) (31\.8)
BaIwl 500 3 1,1170 7 819 5 1,1144 7 754 4
S periodic 134 (30) 39\.7 (65\.9)
variation
S 1\.1978:100 100 134 63\.) 128\.8 50\.8
Kia\. of Iatltl 424 2 1,206 7 1,1891 11 2,52? 15 2,938 17
S periodic 183\.8 56\.8 33\.S 16\.3
variation
I 1\. 1578:100 100 183\.8 345 416\.0 591\.3
1TT M0L\.
NO-LssioE 17,060 1o0 17,500 100 17,000 17,000 100 17,000 100
- 30 -
TABLE 7
BOLIVIA
PIOJICt caspLItI 8P0IS
\.
LolN 1489-BO: 0IlI3 PIOJtCT
\.
III9-BIR PROJECT EtlEiIClil8iS
\. \.
lstigated lo\. Nusber of Number of
Beneficiaries Beneficiaries idditioall
at ProJect Juno 30 1986 Beneficiaries
Ippraisal Served
Urban 4\.500 20,22? 15,127
Upgrading ( + 349S)
(Infrastructure
Provision)\.
Shelter 500 5,653 5,153
Isprovesemt ( + 1,031S)
(Construction
Credits;
Assistance)
Construction of 1,100 1,541 441
Retail food Dee eso new
barkets stalls stalls stalls
( + 402)
Artisans 300 691 391
Credits credits credits credits
I + 3412)
TOTAL 6,400 28,257 21,857
- 31 -
TABLE 8
BOLIVIA
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
_________________________
LOAN 1489-BO: URBAN PROJECT
____________________________
SOURCES OF FUNDS
(U\.S\.$ MILLIONS)
TOTAL COST I B R D GOVERMENT B I S A
ORIGIN AMEND ACTUAL OR16INAL AMENDED ACTUAL ORIGINAL AMENDED ACTUAL ORISI AMENOED ACTu-
AGREEQ TOTAL AGREEMENT AGREEMENT AGREEMENT AGREEMENT A6REE AGREEMENT
-- - -
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ---
1\. Sites and Services
Lani 1\.85 1\.35 1\.35 - - - 1\. 1\.35 1\.65 -
Civil marks 13\.93 8\.93 7\.83 9\.37 6\.37 5\.27 2\.56 2\.56 2\.56 -
Construction materials
Loans 1\.66 1\.39 1\.39 1\.27 - - 3\.39 3\.39 3\.3 -
Subtotal 13\.64 13\.37 9\.27 9\.64 6\.37 5\.27 4\.83 4\.38 4\.6 -
2\. Urban Upgrading
Civil rvks 2\.65 3\.22 3\.17 2\.33 2\.63 2\.55 3\.62 3\.62 3\.62
Construction materials
Loans 3\.58 1\.14 1\.19 3\.44 1\.0i 3\.95 3\.14 1\.14 3\.14 -
Subtotal 3\.23 4\.36 4\.26 2\.47 3\.63 3\.sa 0\.76 1\.76 3\.76 -
"goats
Land 1\.31 1\.31 1\.31 - - - t\.1 3\.31 0\.61
Civil Works 3\.60 1\.17 1\.31 3\.46 1\.63 3\.9Z 3\.14 1\.14 3\.14
Subtotal 0\.61 1\.19 1\.32 1\.46 1\.33 3\.87 6\.15 3\.15 6\.15
ISall-Scale Enterprises
(Credits) 3\.15 1\.96 2\.46 2\.55 1\.96 2\.46 - - - 3\.53 -
5\. Technical Assistance
Vehicln and Equipment 1\.98 2\.12 2\.95 1\.89 1\.52 2\.35 3\.13 1\.11 \.113 1\.5t 0\.!
Enoinemring Design - 2\.52 2\.55 - 2\.52 2\.55 - , -
TOTAL PRWECT COST 22\.51 22\.51 22\.51 17\.33 17\.93 17\.N3 5\.31 5\.31 5\.3t 3\.59 1\.50 O\.
- 32 -
TABLE 9(a)
BOLIVIA
P2OJICT COUPLITIOI DEPORT
\.
LOU 1489-BO: BHA PRQOJlCT
-\.------------------------
COSt CALCOLATIOI OF CONAlI'S ONITS
,\. \.
Description 1,407 Bas\. Units 120 Basic Units 452 Serviced 3 lodel TOTAL
(126,630 m2) Self Kelp Sites Units
(10,800 \.2) (40,680 *2) (2710 *2 USS
1\. Land 15,385 1,312 4,942 33 21,672
2\. lIfrastracture 6,217 533 2,007 13 8,800
3\. CoAstruction of
Basic Units
443 Basic Units 752,205 752,205
444 Basic Units 790,848 790,848
440 Basie Units 602,300 602,300
200 Basic Uaits 94,058 141,086 235,144
80 Finished (obra rieusl)
Basic Units 7,262 7,262
lxecution 120 Basic
units (self-help) 14,811 (aaterials) 14,811
Construction 3 lodel
nits 24,776 24,776
B uie Uits
investeent 1985
asagebent 1,296 1,296
Basic units
prograused to
larch 31 1986 324,000 324,000
\. ~~~~\. \. \. -----\.--
2,577,969 155,897 24,t76 2,158,642
4\. Supernisios \.uid
Adaisistratiua
Costs 468,907 39,992 150,637 1,000 660,535
\. \. \. \. \.
3,063,508 197,734 157,586 25,822 3,449,650
\. \. \. \. \.
oil? COStS (MS) 2,111 1,648 349
-33-
TABLE 9(b)
BOLIVIA
PROJlCT COMPLITIOI RIPORT
\.
LOl1 1489-BO: CUII PROJICT
-\.------------------------
COST OF COMMERCIAL AREA
Ites: Area of plot\. Area of TOTlL
for indea\. Mlii Induties COST
(13,124\.03 s2) (36,649\.32 2) (US$)
1\. Lud 1,594 4,453 6,04?
\. \. \. \. \.
2\. Infrastructure
earth bo""ct 1,484 4,145 5,629
sewerage installation 3,864 10,189 14,653
water installatiol 3,2t4 9,143 12,417
- p b 1,288 3,59? 4,885
t-Aal *ater liAes 445 1,243 1,688
s;tra drainage 647 1,808 2,455
,\. \. \. \. \.
11,002 30,725 41,727
3\. Supervision & AdM\. Costs 48,598 135,711 184,309
61,1i4 170,889 232,083
\. ~ ~ ~ \. \. \.
BILIVIA
PROUECT CCMPLIEION REPORP
IAD 1489-f: URBAN HIOKr
CONAVI BASIC UNIT OCIMPED AS OF MAY 30, 19B6
Sites 1ype I lkusing Type 2 Housing Type 3 1uISL
($b) ($b) ($b) ($b)
1\. Lss QCiswares Lmd for Urbaxdzation
116,723\.20 \.2 used 153,345,780\.52 153,345,780\.52 153,345,780\.52 460,037,341\.56
2\. Stbdies & Projects
Erika Constructian Fium 368\.41 368\.41 368\.41 1,105\.23
3\. Housing Conetruction Contract
Claura Nikben, C\.C\.A\. &
SEBOL Construetion Firs 418,534,531\.64 835,505,639\.00 1,314,040,170\.64
4\. Construction & Infrastructure Contract
Erika, Becit, C\.C\.A\. Finas 153,345,78D\.53 379,432,135\.39 542,400,935\.71 1,075,178,901\.62?
5\. Finsuizg Costs:
Canissions BIR Credit
BANVI, T\.G\.N\. & Central Bank of
Bolivia
Paid April 30, 19)6 29,946,251\.07 72,780,910\.00 104,648,094\.) 2017,375,245\.97
Short & Iag Tenm Obligations 209,544,264\.0) 509,273,170\.87 732,258,800\.23 1,451,076,235\.10
6\. Adinistrative & Inspection Coats 22,455,039\.77 59,569,194\.77 83,306,212\.12 165,330,446\.66
7\. Censtruction Materiala for Incorporation 58,867,643\.00 68,466,173\.() 127,333,816\.00
8\. InstaUstion of Electricity Lisu 4,915,595\.53 4,915,595\.53 9,831,191\.06
TarAL 0SI PER UNIT 568,637,484\.30 1,716,719,330\.12 2,524,847,639\.42 4,810,204,453\.84
WIAL Nl= F IEXEM 206 173 268 647
r-
WMA BAIANCE 117,139,321,758\.00 296,992,444,111\.(00 676,659,167,366\.0D 1,090,790,933,235\.00
- 35 -
TABLE 10
BOLIIIJ
PROJECT COIPLITIOI RIPORT
LOIS 1489-BO: guRlA POJICT
COST 01 IAN-BIlI PROJECT WORKS
OSS State of Works
URBhN ISPROVIMINTS
I de diciembre 317,936\.00 Concluded Aug\. 1981
San Aatoaio 153,862\.00 Concluded Oct\. 1983
Cotabua -Tembladerani 22,847\.00 Coacluded Nov\. 1981
La Portada 96,812\.00 Concluded March IQ81
16 de folio - Loa Aldes 1,394,272\.00 Concluded July 1984
villa Idela 733,580\.00 Concluded July 1985
pampabami 19,660\.00 Concluded Aug\. 1986
Bajo Tejar 8,365\.00 Concluded Msrch 1986
Villa Adela 2da lase 1,065,069\.00 Concluded Sept\. 1986
Ballivian 20,619\.00 Concluded Sept\. 1986
Sob Total 3,893,022\.00
MARIETS
Strongest 186,203\.00 Concladed log\. 1981
BartoliAu Sina 147,464\.00 Concluded Nov\. 1981
Alto Lisa 151,634\.00 Concladed low\. 1983
Antofagasta 148,880\.00 Concluded Aug\. 1983
Bolivar 155,002\.00 Concluded Feb\. 1983
llto Obrajes 136,847\.00 Concluded Feb\. 1983
Rio Seco 147,772\.00 Concluded Jan\. 1985
\.
Sob Total 1,073,752\.00
Artioua Credits 663,782\.00
louuing Credits 168,692\.00
TOTAL 5,1799,248\.00
BOLIVIA
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
_________________________
LOAN 1489-BO: URBAN PROJECT
RECOVERY SOURCES
(UL L ILLION)
Ptuacr cost \.Wrlcma:uus t rwtvCH r to rrfl
auntgs ass
t\.t*i\.t\.* Ace6n t\.t&nt\.d *twol t\.tdrntod aceq\.il 9\.tiotl d ct\. gotss\.t\.d act\.4
*\. Stw\. sw 5w\.c
ts\. *\.05 *\.05 0\.90 6\.90 tlj) (93) 0\.0? 0\.07 (7) '7)
eneArtt d *\.50 S\.94 6\.0 1S\. (200) (200) - - - -
_\.d Ceaawi11 talSilItea 2\.43 I\.OS 0\.15 a\.s\. o 6J - 2\.30 \. (95) -
Ce\.tw\.eto4sti_ a\.erls In\. a\.C6 0\.39 2\.66 6\.39 (200) (300)
s\.blt\.2 23\.64 9\.21 82\.27 \.53 4_ 03) (79) 2\.3? 00\.7 <(nf (Ca)S
SSraste,ucwe 2\.00 2\.27 2\.00 2 (27 (200)> - - - - 0 \.2
Cs\.ul t\.c53414|*s^ 0\.656 0\.e 0\.25 \. (23) - 0\.60 n\.a\. £77) - 0\.06
ce\.ons is, oeterole 2a\.n\. 0\.50 2\.06 0\.5 3\.09 (200) (00) - - - - 0\.04
S \.*-tk\.t 3\.23 4\.26 2\.71 3\.fl C05) (79 0\.' n\. - 51 - 0\.26
lead 6\.01 0\.02 - _ _ - 0\.01 0\.03 30) (200) -_
C\.ottc::t d\.,o 3\.o0 0\.60 \.02 Ctoo,C (00\. - - * - 0\.04
d^We \.6i 1\.402 0\.60 2\.02 *W> t% 0\.n3 0\.02 2 t ip 0\.04
d\. Cadil\. te 64\. 9 \.0 2\.46 1\.06 2\.46 *200) (12C0 - - - - 0\.ld
*\.3 tnlbtAceI Afl\.^*St 4\.90 2\.5 __ - - 2\.10 2\.95 \.30) (200) -_
Gqll>q Dnn ^ esig
S\.qr\.l\.2\. \.d O\.d4 tr - 2\.55 - 2\.55 (20)
t o r OIL 22\.52 22\.58 31\.66 86\.69 470) 474) 4\.66 3\.63 22 - 0\.40
a SOW) s\.d corn kneeve ml ,l stwed t*, r"*- tt2 \.coots\.
flfr5%s41o n*\.d aleel see e\. at be\.t \. adj\.e-dc\.lPd\.
\.USt) ale\. be\. el2g\.3i\.d rertl tr-t\. to baa-lasene at S--ac
- 37 -
TABLE 12
B0LI1I1
PPOJICt CONPLITION REPORT
\. \. \.
Lo01 1489-BO: URBAN PROJICT
\.
IIDEX Of CONSlIER PRICIS
Years General General
lade: Index
(Base Year (Base Year
1966:100) 1916:1Q0)
1976 332\.2 100
197t 259\.12 108
1978 196\.32 119
1979 474\.48 143
1980 698\.63 210
1981 923\.12 178
1982 2,063\.52 621
1983 7,750\.21 2,333
1984 107,058\.22 32,227
1985 12,686,008\.G1 3,818,786
BOLIVIA
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
LOAN 1489-BO: URBAN PROJECT
URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION SCIIEDULE
* S 2 S_ 4 S _ - 4 _ I 1 4 4 a 1 4 5 a 1 4
14361sO *9 e _ _C =
=
590019 AN* £99901eg
Au CQIUCISIIO9
col^|*fOl fAC@"f{*"D _
WV1^@|"^*|fI- - =_\. _ -\. =- _ = =
"^*zZZSI -fC\.-l _-- _ __ ___-- ___± _,_
MkIHSCA ASSISTANC
3,00690 CO9II900TIOM
Df99 S UX C AD XSU C : _
011109~~~~~~ __ _9119 \. \.- _-_ _ ,__: -__ _ -:_ -_
EOM1IUC0 - _-- -
COSSISUCI IOU 9*1691*__ - ' : - _-_---_=-_\.__
CaISISI 99069*9 \.oil AN \.- \.- oil
49AM909111 4 OFM SlOMI RClf"itll
tnt R^ivuazeiC De dtOIVIC\. 93:- 60
SIC"SNC Of ACRIINORN CUPIAVI\.
- 39 -
BOLIVIA -CIT 2
PROJECT COMLETION REPORT
ACTUAL AND ASSUMED INFLATION 1975-86
L= \. ,\. \.
X l l~~~~~~[ !NPUX> VMALIUUA
qc~ ra n i -l - eln ta 19
°' 'I I II I 1 jW 6 @
7\.000-
;, LEa P\.24\.a\. I I l1S
L000 Hpreprarat onaImemenato|l
40
-30
20 l eg Xg
0 /I Pro ect Ass tion
Pro ect Ass tion
0 OX sr7 7d 79 oSi 8 864 85 ea S6 T a8 Year
- 40 -
CITAT
BOLIVIA
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
LOAN 1489-BO: URBAN PROJECT
____________________________
OFFICIAL AND PARALLED EXCHANGE RATE
BY TRThESTERS
:_ ~~~~~~~Loss-of
;__,e purchasing power
,," i ~~Paralld l1;
"'-"
6\.4" official rLoateo
-m"Yri~gpmesters
*@@ | t§§ § t*@4 | *** | ~~Years\. | APPROVAL |
P160771 | COMBINED PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENTS / INTEGRATED
SAFEGUARDS DATA SHEET (PID/ISDS)
Additional Financing
\.
Report No\.: PIDISDSA23312
Date Prepared/Updated: 19-Dec-2017
I\. BASIC INFORMATION
A\. Basic Project Data
Country: Guinea Project ID: P160771
Parent Project ID (if P146696
any):
Project Name: Power Sector Recovery Project - Additional Financing (P160771)
Parent Project Name: Power Sector Recovery Project (P146696)
Region: AFRICA
Estimated Appraisal Date: 20-Dec-2017 Estimated Board Date: 15-Mar-2018
Practice Area (Lead): Energy & Extractives Financing Instrument: Investment Project
Financing
Borrower(s) The Republic of Guinea/Ministry of Planning and International
Cooperation
Implementing Agency Electricite de Guinee (EDG)
Financing (in USD Million)
Financing Source Amount
International Development Association (IDA) 25\.00
Financing Gap 0\.00
Total Project Cost 25\.00
Environmental Category: B-Partial Assessment
Appraisal Review Decision The review did authorize the team to appraise and negotiate
(from Decision Note):
Other Decision:
Is this a Repeater project? No
\.
\.
B\. Introduction and Context
Country Context
Guinea is a resource-rich country, but it figures among the poorest in the world with an annual per
capita income of only US$460\. To boost its socio-economic development, the country has recently
adopted a five year development plan âPNDES : 2016-2020â, which covers all sectors of the economy,
with an objective to promote strong and high-quality growth to improve the well-being of Guineans
and to effect the structural transformation of the economy, while putting the country on the path of
sustainable development\.
The energy sector will play a crucial role as prime mover for the implementation of the PNDES\. The
countryâs vision is to make use of low-cost hydroelectricity to meet domestic energy demand,
including the mining demand, and in the medium term, to become a major exporter of electricity to
neighboring countries within the West Africa Power Pool\. The sectorâs medium term objectives
include the increase of access to electricity from 29 percent (including 11 percent of illegal
connections) to at least 35 percent by 2020, and increase the access to renewable energy (excluding
large hydropower) by 10 percent by 2020\.
The proposed AF provides an opportunity to effectively implement the PNDES\. The additional
financing would allow the utility to improve its technical and commercial performance by reducing
system losses and improving revenue collection and improve its creditworthiness to be able to bring in
the sector private investments\. It will ultimately enable reduction of subsidies in long run, so that
scarce public resources can be used to finance other priority activities\.
Sectoral and Institutional Context
The key sector institutions include the Electricité de Guinée (EDG), the state-owned electricity utility
that was created following the failure of the privatization of the power network in the 1990s\. EDG is
currently being managed by the consortium, Veolia-Seureca, since October 2015, under a
Management Service Contract (MSC) signed between the GoG and the consortium on June 19, 2015\.
PwC Belgique was hired in August 2016 as Technical Auditor to supervise the MSC between GoG
and Veolia-Seureca as well as the Performance Contract between EDG and the GoG that was signed at
the same time as the MSC\. An Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee, chaired by a Minister of State in
the Presidentâs Office and composed of representatives from the Presidentâs Office, Prime Ministerâs
Office, MEH, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Budget, Ministry of Planning and International
Cooperation, Major Projects Management Office (Administration et Contrôle des Grands Projets,
ACGP ACGP) and EDG was established by the decree D/2017/101/PRG/SGG on May 11, 2017 to
supervise the two contracts\. The IPPs AON and La Guinéene dâElecricité (GDE) produce around 31
percent of annual electricity generation while CWE operates Kaleta HPP (45 percent of electricity
generation) under an O&M contract, leaving less than 30 percent of the generation to EDG\. The MEH
sets the sectorâs policy and plays an overarching surveillance role of the sector\. The recently
established Agence Guinéene dâElectrification Rurale (AGER), created by the decree
D/2017/099/PRG/SGG on May 9, 2017, will oversee the development of rural electrification programs
including decentralized off grid electrification solutions\. There is currently no independent regulator
for the sector, however, the MEH is planning to establish one in 2018\. The law establishing an
independent regulator has been submitted to the cabinet secretariat for cabinet approval and
subsequent submission to the parliament for adoption\. There is a director general in charge of
regulation of energy and water sectors in the MEH with purely advisory function\. The electricity law
is being updated to reflects new development and liberalize the sector to encourage private
participation, with financial support from the African Development Bank (AfDB)\. A set of regulations
will follow to enforce the law\.
The installed capacity in 2016 is about 590 MW while the available capacity is limited to around
458MW due to ongoing rehabilitation of the existing power plants\. In 2016, EDG produced 1531\.5
GWh to meet the needs of its 246,527 customers, of which 65 percent live in the capital city of
Conakry\. About 45 percent of the energy was produced by the Kaleta hydropower plant, 31 percent by
thermal IPPs and 24 percent by EDGâs legacy power plants\. The electricity demand has grown by 13
percent in 2015 and it is expected to grow at 9 to 10 percent per annum in the next five years\. The
demand for electricity in Guinea is not accurately known because (i) a large number of households and
businesses are connected to the network illegally and are not listed in the EDG customer database, and
(ii) up to 85 percent of Low Voltage (LV) customer billing is based on a flat fee with no metering\. The
demand forecasted in 2025 is estimated at 1,623 MW driven by: (i) meeting unserved demand; (ii) the
acceleration of access to electricity under SE4All initiative and the national electricity access scale up
program; and (iii) the likely development of industrial activities including major mining projects\. A
significant number of potential and illegal customers have asked to be connected or regularized\. The
mining demand has the potential to more than double the rate of growth of domestic demand in the
next decade\. The country launched the construction of the 450 MW Souapiti I Hydropower Plant to
meet 2022 demand, and reduce overall risks in the sector\. Other regional hydropower projects are
under development including Sambangalou through the Gambia River Basin Development
Organization OMVG (120 MW) and Koukoutamba through the Senegal River Basin Development
Organization OMVS (290 MW), Other projects in pipeline include Amaria hydropower plant (300
MW), Poudaldé (60 MW), and other renewable energy project to be developed through PPP
framework\.
EDG is under the Management Service Contract (MSC) since October 9, 2015\. Preliminary positive
results of the MSC include reduction of annual power outages, reduction of annual load shedding
duration, reduction of operations expenditures, increase in generation capacity in rural secondary
cities, increase in the annual turnover and increase in billing collection rate\.
Despite those positive developments, challenges are still high and significant efforts are required to
turn around the performance of EDG\. About 85 percent of electricity consumers still do not have
meters and are billed a lumpsum amount regardless of their actual consumption\. Technical and
commercial losses are high, estimated at 35 percent\. The billing collection rate of about 79 percent is
still low\. Electricity tariffs are far from being cost-reflective: the average electricity service operating
cost stands at around US$0\.20/kWh while the average price is US$0\.09/kWh\. The gap is bridged
through subsidies from the GoG\. The utility is unable to cover its operating costs and/or maintain the
existing electricity network, yet alone invest in new assets to expand the network\. In terms of debts, as
of June 30, the GoG owes EDG around GNF 600 billion for public administration and street lighting\.
On the other hand, EDG had accumulated around GNF 1600 billion of arrears to different suppliers as
of Oct\. 2015, before the start of the MSC\. The IMF is preparing a program to assist the GoG find a
solution to the utility short term debts and the parent project will assist in undertaking a financial
restructuring of the utility\.
The Bankâs ongoing operations in Guinea include (i) the PSRP (P146696) with an overall financing of
US$50 million to finance the MSC and associated grid investments to improve the performance of
EDG; (ii) the US$2\.1 million Bank-executed SE4All TA (TF015026) that finances the electricity
access scale up investment prospectus to mobilize concessional financing for access, the M&E
framework to track the performance of the power sector, the capacity building of the MEH in PPP to
be able to develop hydropower projects and promote private sector financing and the development of
hydropower atlas for the country and internet viewer for potential investors; (iii) Regional
interconnection projects: CLSG project (Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea
interconnector), and Organisation de Mise en Valeur du fleuve Gambie (OMVG) project (Gambia,
Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Senegal), financed by the Bank and other donors; (iv) a series of
Development Policy Operations (DPOs) including energy sector related prior actions\. The Electricity
Sector Efficiency Improvement Project (ESEIP) with an overall financing of US$30 million closed on
June 30, 2016 as well as the Decentralized Rural Electrification Project with financing of US$7
million closed on June 30, 2013\.
\.
C\. Proposed Development Objective(s)
Original Project Development Objective(s) - ParentPHORGPDO
The Project Development Objective (PDO) is to improve the technical and commercial performance of
the national power utility\.
Key Results
⢠Electricity losses have reduced from 42% to 23%;
⢠Bill collection rate has increased from 77% to 98%;
⢠Average interruption frequency per year in the project area has reduced from 942 to 350;
⢠People provided with new or improved electricity Service
\.
D\. Project Description
The proposed investments to be carried out under the AF aims at improving technical and commercial
performance of EDG by financing critical investments prescribed in the Internal Recovery plan of
EDG as adopted by the GoG\. Those investments include (i) the additional efforts (man-months) of
experts from the MSC contractor and additional specific technical missions to improve the
performance of EDG within the contract period of the MSC; (ii) the construction of a new substation
of Kissosso and supply and installation of smart meters and a revenue protection system of about 6500
large electricity consumers; (iii) the installation of about 20,000 electric meters to residential
consumers and; (iv) the implementation of capacity building program of EDG staff and institutional
support to the MEH, AGER, EDG and the regulator\.
PHCOMP
Component Name:
Component 1: Support the improvement of EDG's performance through a Management Services
Contract
Comments ( optional)
The AF will provide additional financial resources to the MSC following the approval of the
Internal Recovery Plan (IRP)of EDG\. The resources will support the extension of contracts for the
key experts whose required time was underestimated in the original MSC\. This component would
also finance additional specific missions identified by of the IRP of EDG and additional missions of
the technical MSC auditor\.
PHCOMP
Component Name:
Component 2: Improvement of Conakry Distribution Network and Commercial Performance of
EDG
Comments ( optional)
This component will finance critical investments identified by the IRPof EDG to improve (i)
distribution network for better service delivery by constructing a new substation of Kissosso
(110kV/20kV) and (ii) commercial performance of EDG through the implementation of a revenue
Protection Program for about 6500 large non-residential consumers and the supply and installation
of about 20,000 meters to residential consumers\.
PHCOMP
Component Name:
Component 3: Technical Assistance, Capacity Building and Project Implementation Support
Comments ( optional)
This component will finance the implementation of human resource capacity building program of
EDG including training program for a critical mass of EDG staff, industrial attachment in better
performing utilities and one time payment to voluntary retirement beneficiaries\. It will also provide
institutional support to MEH, EDG, AGER and the newly establishment independent regulator for
electricity and water sectors\.
E\. Project location and Salient physical characteristics relevant to the safeguard analysis
(if known)
Projectâs activities, in particular component 2, will be undertaken in Greater Conakry Area and in the
regional cities of the country where EDGâs main networks are located\.
\.
F\. Environmental and Social Safeguards Specialists
Demba Balde, Social Safeguards Specialist
Emeran Serge M\. Menang Evouna, Environmental Safeguards Specialist
Emmanuel Ngollo, Environmental Safeguards Specialist
II\. IMPLEMENTATION
The project will be implemented by EDG and the Ministry of Energy and Hydraulics\.
A project steering committee made of representatives of EDG, Ministry of Energy and
hydraulics, Minister of Economic Planning and Finance and Minister of Planning and Economic
Development will be established to oversee the project implementation\.
\.
III\. SAFEGUARD POLICIES THAT MIGHT APPLY
Safeguard Policies Triggered? Explanation (Optional)
Environmental Assessment OP/BP Yes An environmental audit of EDG was prepared
4\.01 and disclosed before appraisal during the
preparation of the parent project\. This was fed
into the Management Contractâs
environmental requirements, applicable to the
client (MEH and EDG) as well as to the
contractors, in line with Bank safeguard
policies\. The audit included an assessment of
potential impacts and proposed mitigation
measures\. However, the construction of a
substation of high voltage in Kissosso with
limited scope will lead to the preparation of an
Environmental and Social Impact Notice,
consulted upon and disclosed in the country as
well as in the Bankâs website prior to
appraisal\. Likewise, the construction of 39
power distribution posts/cabins and
rehabilitation of existing 22 posts/cabins,
spread around Dixinn distribution network
will be a reason for the preparation of specific
site environmental and social management
plan to counter the negatives effects generated
by these construction activities\.
Natural Habitats OP/BP 4\.04 No During project implementation, no
interventions are expected to finance activities
undertaken in critical or sensitive natural
habitats\. Therefore, this policy is unlikely to
be triggered\.
Forests OP/BP 4\.36 No No interventions are financed by this project
will entail to undertake any activities in forest
areas, including deforestation or afforestation\.
Pest Management OP 4\.09 No This project will not entail procurement of
pesticides, use of pesticide or equipment
pertaining to pesticide applications which
would cause OP/BP 4\.09 to be triggered\.
Physical Cultural Resources OP/BP Yes The project will not involve significant
4\.11 physical work, excavations and demolitions\.
However, the Physical Cultural Resources
policy OP/BP 4\.12 is triggered because the
nature of the proposed physical activities and
the project areas, may involve the possibility
of finding evidence of physical cultural
resources during civil works\. As a result, the
ESMF on the parent project includes a
procedure for dealing with cases of chance
finds on any activities impacting on cultural,
historic or archeological significance\.
Indigenous Peoples OP/BP 4\.10 No There are no Indigenous Peoples in the project
area\.
Involuntary Resettlement OP/BP 4\.12 Yes OP 4\. 12 is triggered in the parent project as
well as in the additional financing because this
project involves the building of physical
infrastructure including the substation of
Kissosso and sixty-one distribution
posts/cabins to be rehabilitated and/or
constructed\. These activities may result in loss
of assets, relocation or obstruction of small
business\. A Resettlement Action Plan (RAP)
will be prepared for these activities since the
locations are known\. The RAP will be cleared,
disclosed in-country and the Bank website
prior to Board approval, and fully
implemented before civil works commence\.
Safety of Dams OP/BP 4\.37 No The project interventions will not finance the
building of dams nor will it support any dam
infrastructure\. Therefore, this policy is not
triggered\.
Projects on International Waterways No Projects activities will not be implemented in
OP/BP 7\.50 the area of international waters nor have any
impacts on international waterways\.
Therefore, this policy will not be triggered\.
Projects in Disputed Areas OP/BP No Project activities will not be implemented in
7\.60 disputed areas as there are no known disputes
over project areas\. Therefore, this policy is not
triggered\.
\.
IV\. Key Safeguard Policy Issues and Their Management
A\. Summary of Key Safeguard Issues
1\. Describe any safeguard issues and impacts associated with the proposed project\. Identify and
describe any potential large scale, significant and/or irreversible impacts:
The project is classified as Category B as the parent project and sub project activities are not
expected to lead to any large scale, significant, or irreversible environmental or social
impacts\. It is expected to positively impact the beneficiary communities by improving the
quality and reliability of electricity services that are provided to them\. The net social and
environmental effect of the project is expected to be highly positive as greater access to
reliable energy will improve the living conditions for the beneficiaries\. This includes
household and consumers as well as small businesses and industries in Conakry districts
(Ratoma and Matoto), in the capital city\. Households, which currently depend on illegal
connections for electricity, will not be left without electricity but will be connected by legal
connections through extension of the power network; and businesses and institutional users
(local government, schools, places of worship, etc\.) would also benefit from reliable service
provision\. The potential negative environmental and social impacts of the proposed project
activities are expected to be small-scale and site-specific\. These activities will be carefully
reviewed following the procedures set out in the RPF to ensure compliance with the Bankâs
safeguards policies and Government regulations\. However, any potential environmental
safeguard concerns related to the project are minimal to moderate, given that the project is
largely confined to rehabilitation / maintenance of the existing distribution network\. Most
impacts will essentially be related to safety management\.
2\. Describe any potential indirect and/or long term impacts due to anticipated future activities in
the project area:
Given that the additional financing does not involve major civil works, no indirect or long
term adverse environmental or social impacts are expected\. Through consultation, the project
will identify and improve other basic socio-economic issues and livelihoods of Project
Affected People (PAPs)\.
3\. Describe any project alternatives (if relevant) considered to help avoid or minimize adverse
impacts\.
The chosen activities utilize the existing distribution lines and thus minimizes adverse
impacts\.
4\. Describe measures taken by the borrower to address safeguard policy issues\. Provide an
assessment of borrower capacity to plan and implement the measures described\.
EDG has an established record in implementing World Bank projects under the Bankâs
safeguard policies\. They have a professional Environmental Officer who is responsible for
infrastructure projects and who has experience in implementing Bank financed projects, but
may require skills upgrade and resources\. The RPF prepared under the parent project contains
guidance for preparing specific Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) for issues related to land
acquisition and loss of economic activities and assets to minimize negative impacts on Project
Affected Persons\. Any RAPs will need to be cleared by relevant authorities in Guinea and by
the World Bank and subsequently disclosed in-country and at the World Bankâs website
before any civil works can begin\. EDG will be responsible for the implementation and
monitoring of the RAPs to ensure compliance with national and Bank policies and procedures\.
Training in safeguards will be provided to PIU staff (EDGâs environmental and social
safeguards officer) by Bank safeguards staff to facilitate these activities\. Regular monitoring
reports (two per year) on the implementation of environmental and social safeguards
provisions will be provided to the Bank for approval\. These reports will be verified during
project implementation support and supervision missions, which will include environmental
and social safeguard experts\.
5\. Identify the key stakeholders and describe the mechanisms for consultation and disclosure on
safeguard policies, with an emphasis on potentially affected people\.
Key stakeholders include the Ministry of Energy and Hydraulics, the national power utility
EDG, Ministry of Environment, and the potentially affected population\. During the
preparation of the NIES, consultations were held with these key actors in order to discuss the
project contents as well as to understand any concerns the affected people may have and to
ensure any concerns are taken into account in the project design\. Similar consultations,
including consultations with the project affected people (PAPs), will be undertaken during the
preparation of RAPs and the report will be validated in a national level workshop\.
The safeguards instruments will be disclosed at the national, and local levels as well as in the
Bank website\. Places of disclosure include print media, various institutions including Ministry
of in charge of energy and the affected local communities\.
\.
B\. Disclosure Requirements
Environmental Assessment/Audit/Management Plan/OtherPHEnvDelete
Date of receipt by the Bank 14-Dec-2017
Date of submission to InfoShop 18-Dec-2017
For category A projects, date of distributing the Executive Summary of the
EA to the Executive Directors
"In country" Disclosure
PHEnvCtry
Guinea 14-Dec-2017
Comments:
Resettlement Action Plan/Framework/Policy ProcessPHResDelete
Date of receipt by the Bank 14-Dec-2017
Date of submission to InfoShop 18-Dec-2017
"In country" Disclosure
PHResCtry
Guinea 14-Dec-2017
Comments:
If the project triggers the Pest Management and/or Physical Cultural Resources policies, the
respective issues are to be addressed and disclosed as part of the Environmental
Assessment/Audit/or EMP\.
If in-country disclosure of any of the above documents is not expected, please explain why::
\.
C\. Compliance Monitoring Indicators at the Corporate Level
PHCompliance
OP/BP/GP 4\.01 - Environment Assessment
Does the project require a stand-alone EA
Yes [X] No [] NA []
(including EMP) report?
If yes, then did the Regional Environment Unit
or Practice Manager (PM) review and approve Yes [X] No [] NA []
the EA report?
Are the cost and the accountabilities for the
Yes [X] No [] NA []
EMP incorporated in the credit/loan?
PHCompliance
OP/BP 4\.11 - Physical Cultural Resources
Does the EA include adequate measures related
Yes [] No [] NA []
to cultural property?
Does the credit/loan incorporate mechanisms to
mitigate the potential adverse impacts on Yes [] No [] NA []
cultural property?
PHCompliance
OP/BP 4\.12 - Involuntary Resettlement
Has a resettlement plan/abbreviated plan/policy
framework/process framework (as appropriate) Yes [] No [X] NA []
been prepared?
If yes, then did the Regional unit responsible for
safeguards or Practice Manager review the Yes [] No [] NA []
plan?
Is physical displacement/relocation expected?
Yes [X] No [] TBD []
15 Provide estimated number of people affected
to date, or to be affected\.
Is economic displacement expected? (loss of
assets or access to assets that leads to loss of
income sources or other means of livelihoods)
Yes [X] No [] TBD []
20 Provide estimated number of people affected
to date, or to be affected\.
PHCompliance
The World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information
Have relevant safeguard policies documents
Yes [X] No [] NA []
been sent to the World Bank's Infoshop?
Have relevant documents been disclosed in-
country in a public place in a form and language
Yes [X] No [] NA []
that are understandable and accessible to
project-affected groups and local NGOs?
PHCompliance
All Safeguard Policies
Have satisfactory calendar, budget and clear
institutional responsibilities been prepared for
Yes [X] No [] NA []
the implementation of measures related to
safeguard policies?
Have costs related to safeguard policy measures
Yes [X] No [] NA []
been included in the project cost?
Does the Monitoring and Evaluation system of
the project include the monitoring of safeguard
Yes [X] No [] NA []
impacts and measures related to safeguard
policies?
Have satisfactory implementation arrangements
been agreed with the borrower and the same
Yes [X] No [] NA []
been adequately reflected in the project legal
documents?
V\. Contact point
World Bank
PHWB
Contact:Yussuf Uwamahoro
\.
Title:Senior Energy Specialist
\.
Borrower/Client/Recipient
PHBorr
Name:The Republic of Guinea/Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
Contact:Moussa Ben Conde Ben Conde
Title:Directeur des Investissements Publiques
\.
Email:mconde1955@yahoo\.com
\.
\.
Implementing Agencies
PHIMP
Name:Electricite de Guinee (EDG)
Contact:Abdenbi Attou
Title:Administrator General
\.
Email:attou\.abdenbi@veolia\.com
\.
\.
VI\. For more information contact:
\.
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 473-1000
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/projects
VII\. Approval
Task Team Leader(s): Name:Yussuf Uwamahoro
Approved By:
PHNonTransf
Safeguards Advisor: Name: Maman-Sani Issa (SA) Date: 19-Dec-2017
Practice Manager/Manager: Name: Charles Joseph Cormier (PMGR) Date: 19-Dec-2017
Country Director: Name:Jose R\. Lopez Calix (CD) Date:02-Jan-2018 | APPROVAL |
P086505 |  Document of
The World Bank
Report No: ICR00001747
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IBRD-4770)
ON A
LOAN
IN THE AMOUNT OF
US$ 130\.0 MILLION
TO THE
PEOPLEâS REPUBLIC OF CHINA
FOR A
NINGBO WATER AND ENVIRONMENT PROJECT
June 23, 2011
China and Mongolia Sustainable Development Unit
Sustainable Development Department
East Asia and Pacific Region
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Exchange Rate Effective May 1, 2011
Currency Unit = Renminbi
RMB 1\.00 = US$ 0\.15
US$ 1\.00 = RMB 6\.6
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 - December 31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AIFC Average Incremental Financial Cost
BOD Biochemical Oxygen Demand
CMSC Cixi Municipal Sewerage Company
COD Chemical Oxygen Demand
DRC (Ningbo Municipal) Development and Reform Commission
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
EIRR Economic Internal Rate of Return
EMP Environmental Management Plan
EPB Environmental Protection Bureau
FMS Financial Management Systems
FRR Financial Rate of Return
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEF Global Environment Facility
GOC Government of China
ICB International Competitive Bidding
ICR Implementation Completion and Results (Report)
ISR Implementation Status Report
KPI Key Performance Indicators
MOF Ministry of Finance
NCB National Competitive Bidding
NMFB Ningbo Municipal Finance Bureau
NMG Ningbo Municipal Government
NMPMO Ningbo Municipal Project Management Office
NPV Net Present Value
NWEP Ningbo Water and Environment Project
NWSC Ningbo Water Supply Company
PAD Project Appraisal Document
PDO Project Development Objective
PMO Project Management Office
PMU Project Management Unit
RAP Resettlement Action Plan
SA Special Account
SEPA (China) State Environment Protection Agency
2
SOE Statement of Expenses
TA Technical Assistance
UFW Unaccounted for Water
UMB Urban Management Bureau
WTP Water Treatment Plant
WTW Water Treatment Works
WWTP Wastewater Treatment Plant
Vice President: Mr\. James W\. Adams, EAPVP
Country Director: Mr\. Klaus Rohland, EACCF
Mr\. Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez, EASCS/Mr\.
Sector Managers:
Vijay Jagannathan, EASIN
Project Team Leader: Ms\. Meskerem Brhane, EASIN
3
Â
CHINA
Ningbo Water and Environment Project
CONTENTS
Data Sheet
1\. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design \. 5
2\. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes \. 7
3\. Assessment of Outcomes \. 11
4\. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome \. 15
5\. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance \. 16
6\. Lessons Learned\. 19
7\. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners\. 20
Annex 1\. Project Costs and Financing \. 21
Annex 2\. Outputs by Component\. 23
Annex 3\. Economic and Financial Analysis \. 25
Annex 4\. Resettlement Implementation Report \. 32
Annex 5: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes \. 34
Annex 6\. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR \. 36
Annex 7\. List of Supporting Documents \. 47
Annex 8: Environmental Monitoring Indicators \. 48
Maps: IBRD 33554R and IBRD 33702R
4
Â
A\. Basic Information
CN-Ningbo Water and
Country: China Project Name:
Environment Project
Project ID: P086505 L/C/TF Number(s): IBRD-47700
ICR Date: 06/27/2011 ICR Type: Core ICR
NINGBO
Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower:
MUNICIPALITY
Original Total
USD 130\.0M Disbursed Amount: USD 130\.0M
Commitment:
Revised Amount: USD 130\.0M
Environmental Category: A
Implementing Agencies:
Ningbo Municipal Development and Reform Commission/Project Management Office
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:
B\. Key Dates
Revised / Actual
Process Date Process Original Date
Date(s)
Concept Review: 07/22/2004 Effectiveness: 09/02/2005 09/02/2005
Appraisal: 12/03/2004 Restructuring(s):
Approval: 03/17/2005 Mid-term Review: 12/01/2008 02/23/2009
Closing: 12/31/2010 12/31/2010
C\. Ratings Summary
C\.1 Performance Rating by ICR
Outcomes: Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome: Low or Negligible
Bank Performance: Satisfactory
Borrower Performance: Satisfactory
C\.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)
Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings
Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory
Implementing
Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Satisfactory
Agency/Agencies:
Overall Bank Overall Borrower
Satisfactory Satisfactory
Performance: Performance:
i
C\.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators
Implementation QAG Assessments
Indicators Rating
Performance (if any)
Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry
No None
at any time (Yes/No): (QEA):
Problem Project at any Quality of
No None
time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA):
DO rating before
Satisfactory
Closing/Inactive status:
D\. Sector and Theme Codes
Original Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Sewerage 45 45
Water supply 55 55
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Municipal governance and institution building 20 20
Pollution management and environmental health 40 40
Water resource management 40 40
E\. Bank Staff
Positions At ICR At Approval
Vice President: James W\. Adams Jemal-ud-din Kassum
Country Director: Klaus Rohland David R\. Dollar
Sector Manager: Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez Keshav Varma
Project Team Leader: Meskerem Brhane Greg J\. Browder
ICR Team Leader: Meskerem Brhane
ICR Primary Author: Chandra Godavitarne
Meskerem Brhane
F\. Results Framework Analysis
Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)
The project will facilitate the expansion of water and wastewater services in Ningbo City
and Cixi City respectively in an economically efficient and environmentally sustainable
manner, thereby protecting public health, improving the environment, and supporting
economic growth\.
ii
Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)
(a) PDO Indicator(s)
Original Target Formally Actual Value
Values (from Revised Achieved at
Indicator Baseline Value
approval Target Completion or
documents) Values Target Years
Increase in % of domestic water supply from high quality and reliable water
Indicator 1 :
sources in Ningbo
Value
quantitative or 10% 75% 83%
Qualitative)
Date achieved 03/31/2005 11/30/2010 12/31/2010
Achieved\. The 500,000 m3/d water supply system meeting Class II standards and
Comments
97% reliability started operating in 2010\. The WTP's spare capacity will be used
(incl\. %
as existing WTP's are phased out and water sales agreements with townships are
achievement)
executed\.
Indicator 2 : Increase in % wastewater treated from industries and urban areas of Cixi City\.
Value
quantitative or 10% 65% 65\.4%
Qualitative)
Date achieved 03/31/2005 12/31/2010 12/31/2010
Comments Achieved\. 2 WWTPs with a total capacity of 150,000 m3/d are operating at about
(incl\. % 70% capacity\. Spare capacity will be used when works on secondary and tertiary
achievement) sewers connecting industries and townships are completed\.
(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)
Original Target Actual Value
Formally
Values (from Achieved at
Indicator Baseline Value Revised
approval Completion or
Target Values
documents) Target Years
Indicator 1 : Water treatment plants and ring main completed
Maojiaping WTP of
Value Maojiaping WTP
capacity 500,000
(quantitative N/A and ring main
m3/d and ring main
or Qualitative) completed
completed
Date achieved 03/31/2005 12/31/2010 12/31/2010
Comments Achieved\. The first phase 250,000 m3/d WTP was completed in July 2010\. The
(incl\. % second phase 250,000 m3/d WTP and the ring main were completed in
achievement) December 2010\.
Indicator 2 : Wastewater treatment plants meet discharge standards
Value
Class 1B discharge Class 1B discharge
(quantitative N/A
standard standard
or Qualitative)
iii
Date achieved 03/30/2005 12/31/2010 12/31/2010
Comments
Achieved\. The stipulated discharge standard, i\.e\., Class 1B, was achieved at both
(incl\. %
treatment plants\.
achievement)
Indicator 3 : NWSC and CMSC meet loan financial covenants
Meet O&M, debt
service & 20%
Water supply tariff-RMB annual capital Water supply tariff-
Value 1\.37/m3 expenditure by RMB 2\.40/m3
(quantitative 2010\.
or Qualitative) Wastewater tariff-RMB Wastewater tariff-
0\.40/m3 Adequate revenue RMB 0\.60/m3
to O&M & debt
service by 2010
Date achieved 03/31/2005 08/30/2010 08/30/2008
Partially achieved\. CMSC met the revenue generation requirement with a
Comments
subsidy from Cixi\. Despite tariff increases, CMSC & NWSC were unable to
(incl\. %
meet the debt service coverage ratio\. NWSC is able to generate enough cash
achievement)
revenue for service delivery\.
Indicator 4 : Ningbo City integrated water supply plan
Value
(quantitative None existed Plan Developed Plan developed
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 03/30/2005 06/30/2006 06/30/2006
Comments Achieved\. NWSC adopted the plan for investment planning and operations
(incl\. % developed\. Plans includes retirement of old WTPs and supply of water sources
achievement) to 25 townships\. 9 townships are purchasing water supply from NWSC\.
Indicator 5 : NWSC strategic business plan
Value
(quantitative None existed Plan developed Plan developed
or Qualitative)
Date achieved 03/30/2005 12/30/2007 12/30/2007
Achieved\. NWSC operations are consistent with the business plan\. Network
Comments
expansion, water sales agreements, and water source protection have been
(incl\. %
implemented to ensure water utilization, reliability and availability of high
achievement)
quality raw water supply\.
G\. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
Actual
Date ISR
No\. DO IP Disbursements
Archived
(USD millions)
1 05/20/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0\.00
2 05/08/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 9\.54
3 06/28/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 22\.24
4 06/29/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 56\.62
5 06/25/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 97\.43
6 06/23/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 128\.56
iv
7 02/26/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 130\.00
H\. Restructuring (if any)
Not Applicable
I\. Disbursement Profile
v
Â
1\. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design
1\.1 Context at Appraisal
Ningbo Municipality is located near Hangzhou Bay, and comprises: six districts, three
county-level cities (one of which is Cixi) and two rural counties\. Ningbo City generally
refers to the six districts\. At appraisal in December 2004, Ningbo City faced a two
dimensional water crisis â frequent shortages and poor water quality - which impeded
economic growth and endangered public health\. The core urban area of Ningbo City was
served by the Ningbo Water Supply Company (NWSC), established about 80 years ago,
while about 25 township water supply companies served populations located around
Ningbo City\. The companies drew water primarily from highly polluted local rivers and
used outdated treatment technology that diminished the quality of piped water\. Due to the
lack of storage reservoirs and reliance on local rivers, Ningbo City often experienced
water shortages during the dry season\. With the Cityâs rapid economic expansion, the
demand for water was increasing at about 5 to 10% per year\. In spite of an aggressive
water conservation program, the duration and the intensity of the shortages were
increasing\. In response, Ningbo Municipal Government had formulated a plan to develop
a new safe and reliable water supply project\. The long-term plan of the Ningbo Municipal
Government was to expand the new water supply to all residents of Ningbo City by
incorporating the surrounding township water supply companies within NWSC\.
Cixi City, located on the shore of Hangzhou Bay, also had a rapidly expanding economy\.
At appraisal, only 10% of its wastewater in the city was treated, and heavy pollution
loads were flowing directly to the environmentally sensitive Hangzhou Bay, creating
environmental and public health concerns, and inhibiting potential investments\. In 2004,
a new company, Cixi Municipal Sewerage Company (CMSC), was established, to be
responsible for all wastewater collection and treatment facilities\. The new CMSC
management faced the dual challenge of starting up a new company and managing a large
capital works program designed to provide coverage to all urban areas and industries by
2010\. Against this back-drop, the Ningbo Municipal Government requested Bank
assistance for the Ningbo Water and Environment Project\.
1\.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators
The project development objective was to facilitate the expansion and quality of water
and wastewater services in an economically efficient and environmentally sustainable
manner, thereby protecting public health, improving the environment, and supporting
economic growth\. The key performance indicators agreed at appraisal, to measure results
were: (i) increase in the percentage of water supplied from high quality and reliable water
sources and treatment plants in Ningbo City from 10% to 75%; (ii) increase the
percentage of wastewater collected and treated in Cixi City from 10% to 65%\.
5
1\.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators,
and reasons/justification
Not applicable\.
1\.4 Main Beneficiaries
The main beneficiaries of the water supply investments were the 1\.2 million people of
Ningbo City and the population in surrounding townships\. The main beneficiaries of the
wastewater investments in Cixi were about one million people in the urban areas of Cixi
City and townships within the Cixi City administrative area\.
1\.5 Original Components
Component 1: Ningbo Water Supply (US$ 157\.9 million; 54% of total project cost):
(i) raw water supply line consisting of an intake tower at Jiaokou reservoir and a 9\.6 km
tunnel; (ii) 500,000 m3/d Maojiaping water treatment plant (WTP); and (iii) treated water
transmission pipes, including a new 47 km ring main around Ningbo City, and 29 km of
transmission pipes from the Maojiaping WTP to the new ring main\. The component was
part of Ningboâs overall plan to provide a safe and reliable water supply to the entire city\.
Component 2: Cixi Wastewater (US$ 128\.4 million; 44% of total project cost): (i)
two wastewater treatment plants (WWTP), one located in the north of Cixi (100,000
m3/d) and one in the east of the city (50,000 m3/d); (ii) associated system mains and link
sewers (230 km of pipes and 58 pumping stations); and (iii) engineered wetlands to
demonstrate the feasibility of lower cost treatment of wastewater\. This component was to
provide wastewater services for all urban areas of Cixi and reduce pollution to
Hangzhou Bay\.
Component 3: Institutional Development (US$ 4\.5 million; 2% of total project cost):
technical assistance to improve water planning, utility pricing and service regulation, and
enhance NWSC and CMSC operational and business management capacities\. This TA
supported strategic business planning and consultant services for design review, project
monitoring and construction management to ensure smooth project implementation\.
1\.6 Revised Components
Not applicable\.
1\.7 Other significant changes
Increase in Total Project Costs\. The overall project costs rose to 128\.6% of the appraisal
cost, from US$ 292 million to US$ 374\.7 million at completion, due to: (a) increased
resettlement costs for both components; (b) additional slope protection works necessary
for the WTP; and (c) construction of more sewer networks than originally planned\.
6
Change in Exchange Rate\. The US$-RMB exchange rate changed from 1:8\.27 in
February 2005 to 1:6\.67 in December 2010, resulting in increased project costs, requiring
implementing agencies to mobilize additional counterpart funds to implement the works\.
Revision of Disbursement Percentage\. The disbursement percentage for consulting
services was increased from 91% to 100% in July 2008, in line with a Bank decision to
include tax expenditures in disbursements for consultant services\.
Enhanced Discharge Standard for Wastewater Treatment\. After project approval,
Ningbo Municipal Government mandated Class 1A discharge standard for all treatment
facilities discharging into the Hangzhou Bay, from the Class 1B standard agreed at
appraisal\.
Financing of Wetlands\. Initial plans were that construction for the two wetlands, to
enhance treatment at the northern and eastern WWTPs in Cixi, would be financed
through a blend with a GEF grant\. However, the GEF grant approval was delayed until
June 2006; hence wetlands for the eastern WWTP were financed through the loan
proceeds, while the northern wetlands were financed through a stand-alone GEF project
scheduled to close on December 31, 2011\.
2\. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2\.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry
Soundness of Background Analysis\. The projectâs background analysis was consistent
with the priorities of both Ningbo and Cixi Cities and with the approach supported by the
(Ningbo Municipal) Development and Reform Commission (DRC)\. The key issues (see
section 1\.1) revealed during preparation were incorporated carefully into the design\.
Project formulation was consistent with two key themes of the China Country Assistance
Strategy: accelerating the transition to a market economy through improving public
sector management and delivery of services, and facilitating an environmentally
sustainable development process, through better management of resources\.
Project design also incorporated lessons from previous water sector operations in China:
(a) the need to avoid creating excessive treatment capacity; (b) the policy of phased cost
recovery for wastewater services allowing more time for consolidation; (c) the need to
improve water water supply planning; and (d) the need to modernize utility management\.
Reforms and Innovations\. An institutional and financial reform agenda was also
incorporated into the project design: (i) improving planning of water supply and water
resource planning; (ii) improving financial management in the established Ningbo Water
Supply Company; (iii) establishing an autonomous company in Cixi City to manage
wastewater services; and (iv) introducing financial performance targets to improve
financial management of the two companies\. Project design included financial
7
performance criteria and covenants for both NWSC and CMSC\. The performance
requirements for the newly-established CMSC were appropriate, but somewhat ambitious\.
Project Development Objectives (PDO)/Key Performance Indicators (KPI)
Formulation\.
Judged against standards currently used in Bank-financed projects, the PDO was: (a) too
broad, especially with reference to protecting public health, improving the environment
and supporting economic growth, where the linkage was conceivable, but the projectsâ
contribution could not be easily attributed; and (b) unclear in its formulation as to which
city had deficiency of water supply or wastewater services\.
There were only two key performance indicators (KPIs) to measure outcome: one
measured the increase in water supplied and the second, the increase in wastewater
collected and treated\. However, these indicators did not capture the projectâs role in
improving coverage\. Furthermore, there were no KPIs to measure improvements in
public health, economic efficiency, environmental sustainability, improved environment
or economic growth, attributable to the project\. The indicator on the discharge standards
was appropriate to measure project outcomes\. The indicators for measuring compliance
with the terms of the loan financial covenants specified only two tariff increases\. These
targets were too modest to enable the companies to meet their obligations and could not
ensure compliance with the financial covenants\.
Risk Assessment\. The risks to the projectâs development objectives were appropriately
assessed as âmodestâ? at appraisal\. Project design incorporated mitigation measures
including: technical assistance (TA) and financial performance covenants for NWSC and
CMSC; strategic business plan for NWSC to expand water supply services based on
sound water supply planning; project management support to CMSC to enhance its
capacity to implement the wastewater component; and technical assistance to improve
business management and revenue to CMSC to enable it become commercially oriented\.
Project design appropriately addressed the risk that government might not adjust tariffs
adequately to assure the financial viability of the two utility companies by providing for
ânon-operating incomeâ, i\.e\., government subsidies, to meet shortfalls\. The requirement
for NWSC to provide 20% of annual average capital expenditure from internally
generated revenue was highly appropriate for an established water supply company, but
compliance depended on its ability to raise revenue through tariff revisions, which were
not under its control\.
One risk not identified at appraisal, but which materialized during implementation was
the potential risks associated with large volume excavation in rock involving blasting, for
which a more generous physical contingency provision should have been provided\.
2\.2 Implementation
The project was successfully completed as appraised, and required no extension of the
loan closing date\.
8
Ningbo Water Supply\. Some delay and increased costs were incurred for the water
supply component, e\.g\., alignment changes for the ring main in sections that required
pipe jacking; the increased excavation for the treatment plant site; and the slope
protection works that became necessary to stabilize the exposed sloping face of the
excavation\. The operation of the water supply system, including the Maojiaping water
treatment plant (WTP), began in 2009, a year later than anticipated in the PAD\. Loan
funds allocated for the water supply component were not adequate to finance all the
works, but the NWSC was able to provide additional counterpart funds to complete the
works by the original loan closing date\. NWSC was able to increase tariffs twice during
the project period, generated adequate revenue each year to operate and maintain services
satisfactorily, and continued to provide 24-hour water supply services\.
Cixi Wastewater\. All planned investments for the two WWTPs and 280 km of sewers
(over and above the target of 230 km) were completed by the original closing date\. In
order to accelerate the connection of remaining households, the Cixi City Government
has established a fund to assist townships in constructing secondary and tertiary
collection networks\. With financial support from the Cixi City Government, CMSC
operated and maintained services satisfactorily\.
Institutional and Financial Development\. Capacity building technical assistance was
implemented by both NWSC and CMSC\. CMSC engaged consultant services late in the
project (October 2008 to September 2010) and therefore, some improvements are still
being internalized, especially financial planning and projection of revenue requirements\.
2\.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization
Design\. The key performance indicators agreed for the water supply and wastewater
components were somewhat satisfactory\. However, they could have been enhanced to
demonstrate the outcomes such as: (i) the impact of the reduction of wastewater
discharges to Hangzhou Bay, through monitoring water quality in key rivers or streams
leading to Hangzhou Bay; and (ii) water quality improvement achieved from the use of
lower cost natural treatment through the use of wetlands in Cixi\.
Implementation\. The performance monitoring system was adequate\. Monitoring and
evaluation (M&E) was carried out primarily through monitoring the agreed outcome and
output performance indicators, and reported in the semi-annual progress reports\. The
consolidated semi-annual progress reports summarized physical and financial progress,
financial expenditures by component, details of resettlement, revisions to the resettlement
action plans (RAPs), and the progress in meeting the key performance indicators\.
Utilization\. The monitoring indicators were utilized by the two cities to: adjust
implementation schedules; promote industry sites to investors; monitor pollution levels in
Hangzhou Bay, and make decisions on policy, investments and regulatory interventions
by the local governments\.
9
2\.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance
Social Safeguards\. The project made adequate provisions to compensate for the losses of
the affected population\. Almost 70 ha of land were acquired, in contrast to the 61 ha planned
at appraisal, and 427 m2 of structures were demolished, in contrast to 916 m2 planned at
appraisal\. Cost of resettlement was about 11% higher than the amount estimated at appraisal
and was fully covered by Ningbo Municipality\.
As confirmed by the independent resettlement monitoring consultant, (i) the goal of the
resettlement rehabilitation was achieved, the negative impacts on the incomes and
livelihoods of the displaced families were restored and improved; (ii) compensation for
property losses was appropriate, houses and facilities were reconstructed, and their living
conditions were greatly improved, and farmers affected by the land acquisition were able
to increase their family incomes satisfactorily; (iii) internal monitoring and independent
monitoring played adequate roles in resettlement activities; and (iv) the PMO carried out
all involuntary resettlement related work (See Annex 4)\.
Environmental Safeguards\. This project was appropriately categorized as an âAâ? project\.
The Environmental Assessment was well prepared, and on time, to meet the processing
requirements\. All implementing agencies established independent environmental
management teams that were responsible for implementation, supervision and monitoring
of the Environmental Management Plans (EMP)\. Specific environmental protection
measures included staffing and training, dust control, noise control, and disposal of
sludge\. The long-term internal and external environmental monitoring results confirmed
that the environmental impacts during construction were mitigated and controlled to
acceptable levels\. Monitoring data also indicated that the applicable standards for water
supply and wastewater treatment were met\. No complaints on environmental issues were
registered\.
Dam Safety\. Construction of the Zhougongzhai dam was satisfactorily completed,
according to approved designs\. Annual progress reports on construction progress were
submitted to the Bank, and emergency preparedness plans were also prepared for the
Jiaokou and Zhougongzhai dams, in compliance with the projectâs legal covenants for
dam safety\.
Cultural Property\. The project was not expected to affect any above ground cultural
heritage sites\. Chance find procedures were included in all contracts, but none were
uncovered\.
Procurement\. In general, procurement of works, goods and services was carried out in
accordance with the Bank procurement policy\. The Procurement Plan was updated
periodically, contracts were awarded on time, and there were no cases of mis-
procurement\.
Financial Management\. The project had an adequate project financial management
system that provided, with reasonable assurance, accurate and timely information that the
loan proceeds were used for the intended purposes\. Audits were received on time and
10
without any qualifications\. The project accounting and financial reporting were in line
with the regulations issued by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the requirements
specified in loan agreement\. Withdrawal procedures and funds flow arrangements
remained appropriate enabling the loan to be disbursed in a timely manner\.
2\.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
NWSC owns all the assets created with project funds\. NWSC has adequate capacity,
staffing skills and resources to operate them satisfactorily\. NWSC plans to increase water
sales to utilize the full capacity of the new WTP (currently at 80%), and to retire old
WTPs\. NWSC plans to enter into more sales agreements with the township water supply
companies to supply them with the new treated water\. Incremental water consumption is
expected to reach 380,000 m3/d from 2016 onwards and demand for water is high, so
entering such agreements should proceed smoothly\. NWSC has applied to the Ningbo
Municipality to increase tariffs in 2011 to generate adequate revenue to meet full
operating costs\. Over the long-term, Ningbo Municipality intends to consolidate the
township water supply companies within NWSC - a significant innovation in itself,
enabled by the project investments\.
CMSC plans are to: (i) encourage townships to expand the secondary and tertiary sewers
and connect to the trunk sewer lines constructed under the project, for which the Cixi
Government allocated RMB 200 million (about US$ 30 million) in 2010; (ii) propose to
government to incorporate the township wastewater systems into the CMSC service area;
and (iii) apply for another tariff increase\.
CMSC plans to make the wetlands for the northern treatment plant operational in 2011,
following completion of necessary repairs and planting vegetation\. Bank missions for the
GEF project will continue to monitor the completion and operation of the wetlands for
the northern WWTP, to ensure that the higher discharge standard is achieved in both
wetlands\.
3\. Assessment of Outcomes
3\.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation Rating: Satisfactory
The project objective was highly relevant at appraisal, and remained relevant and
consistent with the Country Partnership Strategy through to completion\. The projectâs
focus on expanding safe and reliable water supply in Ningbo and on comprehensive
wastewater management in Cixi City were necessary to sustain the rapid urban
development of Ningbo City and the industrial expansion in Cixi City, located along the
environmentally sensitive Hangzhou Bay, an area reputed, particularly, for rare bird
species\. The project also addressed institutional reforms, including planning and
sustainability of the utility companies\.
11
3\.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives Rating: Satisfactory
Project development objectives were satisfactorily achieved\. Ningbo City has, indeed,
expanded water supply, which is both safe and 97% reliable\. Cixi has adequate
wastewater treatment capacity, with tertiary treatment, to treat most of the wastewater
generated\. These improvements have resulted in arresting Chemical Oxygen Demand
(COD) and Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD) discharges of 2,439 tons and 711 tons,
respectively, in the first year (2010) after completion of the treatment plants\. These
pollutants would have otherwise reached the environmentally sensitive Hangzhou Bay\.
The PDO had no KPIs to measure improvements in public health, the environment and
economic growth\. Although no direct link can be established, the two cities are vibrant,
and have maintained their economic growth and have continued to increase their shares
of domestic and foreign direct investments\. Given that project investments were
completed in late 2010, it is still too early to make a definitive assessment on the
projectâs impact on economic growth prospects\. Achievements measured through the two
key performance indicators are described below\.
Increase in the domestic water supply from high quality and reliable water sources in
Ningbo City\. The percentage of high quality, reliable water supplied in Ningbo City rose
from the 2005 baseline of 10% to 83%, surpassing the target of 75%\. By loan closure,
nine of the 25 townships had already switched to the new water supply under water sales
agreements with NWSC; construction of new water distribution systems to service five
townships in Beilun and Zhenhai was also in progress at loan closure (see Annex 2)\.
Increase in the percentage of wastewater treated in Cixi City\. The wastewater treated in
Cixi City increased from about 10% to 65\.4%, meeting the indicator target (see Annex 2)\.
The WWTPs and the eastern wetlands now meet the discharge standards, namely, Class
1B and Class 1A, respectively (see Annex 8)\.
Compliance with financial covenants: The table below provides a summary (see Annex
3 for details)\.
Description of Covenant NWSC CMSC
Generate adequate revenue to Partially complied with, but Complied with tariff
cover O&M, debt service sufficient revenue is revenue and subsidy
requirements and (for NWSC only, generated to meet from Cixi City
generate 20% of annual capital immediate service delivery Government
expenditures) needs\. NWSC aggressively
increased tariffs during the
project period and receives
support from NMG to meet
shortfalls when necessary\.
With increase in water
sales, NWSC is expected to
generate positive net
12
Description of Covenant NWSC CMSC
income in 2 to 3 years\.
Maintain a debt service coverage Complied with delay Complied with delay
ratio greater than 1\.3 (starting 2010 and debt (starting 2010 and
levels for 2011 expected to debt levels for 2011
remain the same in 2011) expected to remain
the same in 2011)
Debt to asset ratio Complied Complied with delay
(2010 and 2011)
Maintain a maximum debt to asset Complied Complied
ratio of 0\.7
NMG to ensure tariff adjustments Complied with but tariff Complied with delay
for NWSC and CMSC levels remain low
3\.3 Efficiency
Economic Rating: Satisfactory
With the successful construction and operation of the Ningbo water supply system and
the Cixi wastewater treatment facilities, the main economic benefits foreseen at appraisal
were achieved\.
Ningbo Water Supply Component\. The cost-benefit analysis conducted at appraisal
estimated an economic internal rate of return (EIRR) of 15\.59% as reported in the PAD\.
Following those same valuation techniques and adopting same assumptions of the
willingness-to-pay values for improved water supply and cost saving in bottled water, the
EIRR at ICR is 15\.64%\. Therefore, the performance of this component is satisfactory
from an economic point of view\.
Cixi Wastewater Treatment Component\. The amount of wastewater collected and treated
in Cixi City increased from 10% to 65\.43% for the one million residents, achieving the
target of 65%\. The cost effectiveness approach was adopted at appraisal to help select the
least cost technology of wastewater treatment for the Cixi wastewater component\. The
result from project implementation shows that the wastewater treatment technology was
indeed selected based on the least-cost approach, and the technology provided the
advantage of quality effluent and lower operating costs, enabling compliance with the
Class 1B agreed at project appraisal\. In addition, the wetlands at the eastern WWTP were
able to demonstrate the feasibility of enhancing the treatment level, at a lower cost, to
achieve the Class 1A discharge standard, mandated by the Government after appraisal\.
Financial Rating: Satisfactory
The after-tax financial internal rate of return (FRR) of Ningbo water supply component at
completion was 8\.8%, which is close to the FRR (8\.7%) calculated at appraisal\. This is
equivalent to a net present value (NPV) of RMB 2,969 million over the project
13
componentâs estimated 35 year economic life, which is 54% more than the NPV at
appraisal\. This difference is due to the weighted average cost of capital at completion
which is much lower than the one at appraisal\.
3\.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Satisfactory
The overall outcome rating of the project is assessed as satisfactory because the project
objectives were achieved and the economic benefits were realized\. Financial
sustainability was substantially achieved by both the water supply and wastewater
companies with periodic tariff increases approved by the Ningbo Municipal Government
and the Cixi City Governments, and financial support to meet shortfalls, as provided for
in the legal agreements\. Despite the stricter financial performance requirements on
NWSC, it continuously generated revenue to operate and maintain services satisfactorily,
and provided a high quality service\.
3\.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts
(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development
The project was not designed to directly address poverty or gender issues\. However, it
did improve the living environment for the broader population â including the poor â in
the two cities through better sanitation services\. During construction, a large number of
temporary jobs were created that benefited the cityâs population, especially the poor\.
Moreover, the resettlement activities under the project fully restored and in some cases,
enhanced the living standards of project affected persons, especially the poor\.
(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening
The capacity building TA introduced the following improvements in NWSC and CMSC:
Institutional Development and Managerial Sustainability\. NWSC introduced
organizational reform, clarifying staff responsibilities for key areas of accountability\. An
evaluation was also conducted to assess staff training needs\. CMSC introduced an
institutional structure for managerial independence and accountability - an important
factor for organizational sustainability\.
Financial Sustainability of NWSC and CMSC\. Financial projections indicate that the
anticipated tariff increase in 2012 will enhance NWSCâs revenue enabling it to fully
recover operating costs\. Financial projections indicate that Cixi would require significant
increases in wastewater tariffs to make up for budget shortfalls and reduce government
subsidies\. CMSC has recommended to the Cixi City Government to maintain the
wastewater tariff for the urban area at the current level, and increase the tariff for towns
and villages to RMB 0\.80/m3, which will enable it to operate without the need for a
subsidy\.
14
Operational Sustainability\. NWSC developed a Central Monitoring and Control System
for the entire water supply and distribution network, which is a system-wide performance
monitoring, reporting and evaluation system to support its operations\. This system will
provide much needed system performance indicators to further improve efficiencies\. The
CMSC instituted a number of organizational reforms, including outsourcing management
of WWTPs, in order to ensure effective and efficient operation of its facilities, including
operational standards, and staff training\.
(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)
Not applicable\.
3\.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops
Not applicable\.
4\. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome
Rating: Low
NWSC has well trained staff as well as sufficient budget that will allow it to operate the
new system efficiently\. Moreover, the financial status of NWSC will continue to
strengthen with the expansion of consumers, signature of more water sales agreements,
growing demand for good quality water, and further tariff revisions\. NWSC has
consistently generated adequate revenue to meet O&M costs, and the commitment of the
NMG to provide a quality water supply in Ningbo City will ensure necessary financial
support when necessary\.
Although CMSC is a relatively new utility, it has put in place a number of organizational
reforms that ensure the effective operation of its facilities\. It has recruited qualified staff
and provided them with proper training\. It has also established a special operational unit
responsible for contracting out network maintenance to specialized and qualified
contractors\. Cixi Municipal Governmentâs commitment to support the development of
the industrial zone in Cixi City and to address environmental concerns of pollution
discharges to Hangzhou Bay will also ensure that risks to development outcomes will be
low\. The ambitious development plan of the newly-established Hangzhou Bay New
Development Zone also assures low risk to development outcomes\.
15
5\. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance
5\.1 Bank Performance
(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Satisfactory
The Bank ensured a satisfactory quality at entry through incorporation of best practices in
system design, innovations, improved utility management, and long-term planning, as
described below:
(a) Ningbo Water Supply: Design included: reliability and quality of the water source,
adequate to meet the long-term demand; expanded coverage including all of Ningbo City
and neighboring townships; uniform pressure system-wide through using the ring main;
consolidation of water supply services to achieve economies of scale and improved
service standards; long-term water supply planning and business development; and
sustainability of operations through improved utility and financial management;
(b) Cixi Wastewater: Expanded design coverage included all of Cixi City and townships;
secondary wastewater treatment to Class 1B standard; enhanced, lower cost tertiary
treatment in engineered wetlands to Class 1A standard consolidation of all wastewater
services in the long-term; and enhanced utility and financial management\.
The goal to achieve full cost recovery for wastewater services in Cixi in five years
(including the construction period) was ambitious\. This was addressed, however, through
the definition of âtotal revenueâ in the legal agreements, which provided for ânon
operating incomeâ, i\.e\., government subsidies, which provides for a phased approach to
full cost recovery\.
Additional outcome indicators that could have captured the important interventions and
innovations were: the reduction of pollution discharges to Hangzhou Bay; the higher
discharge standard achieved at lower costs, in the engineered wetlands (in the Cixi
WWTPs); and the utilization rate of the new water supply in the surrounding townships
of Ningbo City\. The PDOs relating to public health improvements and economic growth
were not easily measurable, as it is difficult to directly attribute them to the project\.
A higher provision for physical and price contingencies, in the preparation of cost
estimates, could have better provided for the uncertainties associated with constructing
tunnels, the large quantity of rock excavation, the rising value of the RMB, and the
increased counterpart funding risks for NWSC\.
(b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory
The performance of the task team in the supervision of all aspects of project
implementation was satisfactory\. The task team focused on: institutional development
activities; compliance with loan covenants\. and other agreements geared toward
achieving sustainability\. In the last 3 years of implementation, the task team leader was
16
based in the Beijing Office which helped to resolve issues more quickly, and enabled the
Bank to stay closely associated with project implementation\.
The mid-term review was conducted somewhat later in the project due to a change in task
team responsibility\. However, this delay had no impact on the project as no restructuring
was necessary, and there were no loan savings\.
The task team devoted special efforts to guide the CMSC through its consolidation and
the challenges it faced in improving its financial systems and extension of services to the
townships\. The task team provided guidance on the design of wetlands that were to
demonstrate the lower cost treatment, and upgrade the discharge standard to Class 1A\.
Safeguards Compliance Rating: Satisfactory
Environmental and social safeguards specialists based in the Beijing office satisfactorily
supervised implementation of all safeguard issues specified in the legal agreements\. The
team carried out adequate field visits to review progress and ensured the submission of
the external monitorâs report on safeguard implementation\.
Fiduciary Compliance Rating: Satisfactory
Procurement and financial management specialists based in the Beijing office
satisfactorily supervised implementation of all fiduciary aspects of the project specified
in the legal agreements, and carried out adequate field visits to review physical progress\.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Satisfactory
Overall Bank performance is rated satisfactory based on satisfactory quality at entry,
supervision and satisfactory achievement of outcomes\.
5\.2 Borrower Performance
(a) Government Performance Rating: Satisfactory
The Ningbo and Cixi Municipal Governments were fully supportive of the project
objectives because of the importance of improving water quality and expanding
wastewater treatment to support economic growth\. Both municipal governments
increased water and wastewater tariffs as required in the legal agreements, although not
to adequate levels as final decisions were made by the governments on the basis of social
and economic factors\. NMG ensured preparation of the Ningbo City Integrated Water
Supply Plan\. The highly experienced Ningbo Municipal Project Management Office
(NMPMO) provided excellent project management functions\.
The two municipal governments also ensured that counterpart funds were available as
necessary for NWSC and CMSC throughout project implementation\. For instance, as the
RMB/US$ exchange rate increased, NMG provided additional funds to complete the
17
slope protection works at the WTP\. Cixi also provided 15 percent towards the cost of
sewage connections for towns and villages and provided subsidies to CMSC enabling it
to meet the loan covenants\. NMG approved two tariff increases during the project period,
and stood ready to provide necessary financial support to NWSC to enable it to maintain
a high quality water supply\.
Ningbo and Cixi municipal governments provided close oversight to ensure that
resettlement activities conformed to the RAPs; necessary stakeholder consultations were
carried out; and affected personsâ livelihoods were restored\. Compliance with dam safety
requirements was also satisfactorily implemented\.
(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Satisfactory
Ningbo Water Supply Company\. Backed by its well-established professional capacity,
the performance of the NWSC in the implementation of this innovative construction
project was fully satisfactory\. NWSC used internally generated funds to meet the
increased costs associated with slope protection works\. All the original works and the
strategic plans were completed within the original loan closing date\. NWSC made annual
financial projections to identify necessary revenue increases\. Water supply tariffs were
increased twice during the project period which enabled it to generate adequate revenue
to fully meet O&M costs and a major portion of other operating costs\. The increases were
not adequate to fully meet the financial performance covenants but with increased water
sales, it is expected to do so in 2 to 3 years\.
Cixi Municipal Sewerage Company (CMSC)\. The company, established in 2004 prior to
project appraisal, performed satisfactorily, first concentrating on the large investment
program and later addressing the institutional reform issues\. CMSC successfully
implemented a large investment program comprising two WWTPs and associated
networks before loan closure, and expanded wastewater coverage in Cixi City from 10%
to 65%\. In an effort to contain costs, CMSC outsourced operation and maintenance of the
two treatment plants\. Wetlands were constructed at each treatment plant in the last year,
designed to achieve a discharge standard of Class 1A\. CMSC faced two major challenges,
to ensure that: (i) the townships construct secondary and tertiary sewers to increase the
utilization of the trunk sewers constructed, under the project; and (ii) the revenue
collected by the townships for wastewater services was remitted to CMSC\.
Because of its concentration on construction activities in the early years, attention to
financial management systems commenced late in the project, when financial projections
were finally prepared\. CMSC suffered losses on its township wastewater operations
because it only received a portion of all revenues collected by townships\. However, the
Cixi Municipal Government provided subsidies to meet the revenue shortfalls\.
Wastewater tariffs were increased twice during the project period, albeit from a low base\.
CMSC was in compliance with the revenue generation covenant in 2010, with a subsidy
from Cixi City Government, as provided for in the legal agreements\. CMSC plans to (i)
collect more wastewater by increasing connections, (ii) request an increase in the
wastewater tariffs in towns and townships from RMB0\.30/ m3 to RMB0\.80/ m3, and (iii)
18
increase wastewater tariff collection efficiency in order to improve its financial
performance\.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Satisfactory
The overall performance of the Borrower is rated satisfactory due to the strong support
and project management from the Municipal Government, successful implementation of
all the original components within the original project period, satisfactory maintenance of
water supply and wastewater services, and the overall performance in complying with
projectâs legal covenants,
6\. Lessons Learned
Advanced Technical Design\. The adoption of the ring main concept for balancing water
pressure throughout the system is an innovation worth replicating in other cities\. Many
water supply systems in developed cities, including London, rely on the ring main design
for its efficiency and balancing pressures\. A computer-aided network design was adopted
for Ningboâs trunk water supply network, which is also long overdue in China\.
Optimization software provides a modern tool for design of economically efficient
distribution networks, which makes computations simple, and provides optimal pipe sizes
to accommodate varying site conditions\. This approach is a good example of efficiencies
that can be achieved with the use of a large diameter ring main and can be replicated in
other cities in China\.
Wetlands for Natural Treatment of Wastewater\. With the increasing requirements for
wastewater companies to provide Class 1A treatment standards, the potentially costly
tertiary treatment is now imperative\. Available data from other projects in China indicate
that tertiary treatment would add about RMB 0\.30/m3 to the cost of treatment\. The use of
engineered wetlands provides a lower cost alternative to achieve the mandated discharge
standard\. The prevailing understanding of âwetlandsâ is to provide large water surfaces
with some plants along the edges, that may be aesthetically pleasing but have minimal
treatment functions\. However, properly designed wetlands are comprised of shallow
water depth, adequate retention periods, and most importantly, the correct vegetation that
will absorb the pollutants\. The Ningbo Water and Environment Project has demonstrated
the feasibility of using constructed wetlands for wastewater treatment at lower costs\.
Advantages of Regional Planning and Implementation\. The prevailing practice in
China is for each local government jurisdiction to construct its own facility for water
supply and wastewater treatment\. This approach increases unit costs; requires the levy of
higher tariffs; and does not realize economies of scale that could be achieved through
regional planning, rationalization and consolidation of services\. The stated policy of
Ningbo Municipality â to integrate the 25 water supply companies under NWSC â is a
fine example for the rest of China\. Municipal Government leadership and commitment
are required to fully achieve this objective; NWSC by itself, had no power to make it
happen, because townships were generally unwilling to merge and give up their
independence\. Water sales agreements must be considered as an interim step, but they do
19
not capture the full benefits that can be achieved\. The upgrading of distribution networks
in the townships is essential to reduce leakages in the network that increase with higher
pressures available with the new supply\.
Effective Project Design\. This project was successful and was completed on time
without restructuring because its design was straight-forward and well within the capacity
of the implementing agencies\. The project involved only two geographical areas within
the same municipality, and the two second-level borrowers (NWSC and CMSC) had
strong technical capacity, particularly NWSC, and were well funded; and the design of
the project was built around high priority policies and objectives\.
Utility Financial Performance Covenants\. The project included financial performance
covenants for both NWSC and CMSC, and compliance by the utility companies was
possible only through the provision in the legal agreements for ânon operating incomeâ
(subsidies)\. Under prevailing practice in China, higher priority is given to service quality
over tariff increases, which are introduced over a longer period\. In projects where this
provision was not made, the implementing agencies remained in a state of non-
compliance throughout the project period\.
7\. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners
(a) Borrower/implementing agencies
The Borrower appreciates value addition from its association with the Bank and the
projectsâ technical assistance for capacity enhancement\. The Borrower appreciates,
specifically, the knowledge transfer, Bank procurement procedures, and the advice
received from Bank experts\. The Borrower has indicated two issues of concern: (i) the
number of Bank task team leaders over the five years, which had impacts on
implementation; and (ii) inconveniences caused by the Bankâs delays in providing
mission Aide Memoires, which did not facilitate smooth project implementation\.
(b) Cofinanciers
Not Applicable
(c) Other partners and stakeholders
Not Applicable\.
20
Annex 1\. Project Costs and Financing
CHINA: Ningbo Water and Environment Project
Actual/Latest
Appraisal Estimate Percentage of
Components Estimate (USD
(USD millions) Appraisal
millions)
Ningbo Water Supply 157\.00 204\.60 130\.3
Cixi Wastewater 130\.00 166\.57 128\.2
Institutional Development 5\.00 2\.84 56\.23
Total Baseline Cost 292\.00 374\.01 128\.1
Physical Contingencies
0\.00
Price Contingencies
0\.00
Total Project Costs 292\.00 374\.01 128\.1
Front-end fee IBRD 0\.00 0\.65 100
Total Financing Required 292\.00 374\.66 128\.6
(a) Detailed Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)
Appraisal Actual/Latest
Percentage of
Components Estimate (USD Estimate (USD
Appraisal
millions) millions)
1\. NINGBO WATER SUPPLY
New Water Intake and Tunnel 10\.90 8\.34 76\.5
Maojiaping WTW 33\.90 41\.92 123\.7
Water Transmission Main 29\.20 37\.91 129\.8
Water Transmission Ring Main 52\.00 76\.44 147
Overhead/Engineering Services 13\.20 9\.88 74\.8
Resettlement 10\.90 19\.16 175\.8
Interest during construction 7\.80 10\.95 140\.4
Sub-totals 157\.90 204\.60 129\.6
2\. CIXI WASTEWATER
Northern WWTP 15\.50 22\.55 145\.5
Mid Trunk Sewer System 17\.90 15\.56 86\.9
Western Trunk Sewer System 18\.40 17\.90 97\.3
Eastern WWTP 11\.00 13\.90 126\.4
Easter Trunk Sewer System 15\.20 16\.46 108\.3
City and Town Link Sewer System 28\.80 53\.72 186\.5
Overhead/Engineering Services 9\.80 8\.33 85
Resettlement 5\.60 8\.64 154\.3
Interest during construction 6\.10 9\.51 155\.9
Sub-totals 128\.40 166\.57 129\.7
3\. INSTITUTIONAL
21
Appraisal Actual/Latest
Percentage of
Components Estimate (USD Estimate (USD
Appraisal
millions) millions)
DEVELOPMENT
Design Review, Construction 62\.7
1\.50 0\.94
Supervision
NWSC Central Control System TA 0\.50 0\.51 102\.0
Price and Service Regulatory TA 0\.50 0\.86 66\.2
Strategic Water Planning 0\.80 0\.25 31\.3
CMSC TA 1\.00 0\.77 77\.0
General Training 0\.20 0\.06 30\.0
Sub-totals 4\.50 3\.14 69\.8
Total Project Costs 290\.85 374\.01 128\.6
Front-end fee IBRD 0\.65 0\.65 100\.0
Total Financing Required 291\.50 374\.70 128\.5
(b) Financing
Appraisal Actual/Late
Type of Estimate st Estimate Percentage
Source of Funds
Cofinancing (USD (USD of Appraisal
millions) millions)
Borrower 161\.50 244\.70 151\.4
International Bank for
130\.00 130\.00 100\.0
Reconstruction and Development
Total 291\.50 374\.70 128\.5
22
Annex 2\. Outputs by Component
CHINA: Ningbo Water and Environment Project
All outputs planned at appraisal were achieved, as described below\.
Ningbo Water Supply: (i) a water intake tower in Jiaokou reservoir and a 9\.6 km raw
water conveyance tunnel; (ii) a water treatment plant (WTP) at Maojiaping with capacity
of 500,000 m3/d ; (iii) a water transmission system, including a new 47\.3 km ring main
and a 30\.2 km of transmission pipes from Maojiaping WTP to the ring main; (iv) central
automatic control system; (v) strategic business plan for NWSC; and (vi) the Ningbo
integrated water supply plan\. The installed water supply capacity increased by 500,000
m3/d\. Nearly 90 percent of the cityâs population (2\.8 million) now enjoys high quality
water, in contrast to 23 percent (1\.2 million) in 2006\. The new water source meets
Chinese drinking water standards (see Annex 8, Table 1) for Class 1-II and has a
reliability of about 97%\.
Cixi Wastewater: (i) two WWTPs with a total treatment capacity of 150,000 m3/d
comprising the 100,000 m3/d northern WWTP and the 50,000 m3/d eastern WWTP; (ii)
engineered wetlands to enhance final effluent quality of WWTPs to Class 1A standards;
(iii) 280 km of main and link sewers, including 58 pumping stations; and (iv)
management information system; institutional and organization plan, and (v) business
plan and operating procedures\. The target was met through construction of two WWTPs
with a combined capacity of 150,000 m3/d, about 280 km of sewers and 58 pumping
stations\. The collection network now covers the urban areas in the administrative region
of Cixi City and a number of townships\. Capacity utilization at loan closure was 63\.3%,
and is projected to increase as more township secondary and tertiary sewers are
completed in about three years\.
A comparison of outputs by component, at appraisal and end of project, are compared in
the table below\.
Output Description At Appraisal Actual Completed
Ningbo Water Supply
Reservoir Intake (m3/sec) 6\.13 6\.13
Raw Water Tunnel (km) 9\.58 9\.55
Treatment Plant (m3/d) 500,000 500,000
Treated Water Transmission Mains (km) 18\.9 27\.6
Ring Main (km) 47\.0 47\.3
Cixi Wastewater
Northern WWTP (m3/d) 100,000 100,000
Western trunk Sewer System-(km) 77\.0 104\.6
Eastern WWTP (m3/d) 50,000 50,000
Eastern Trunk Sewer System (km) 30\.0 65\.9
City and Town Link Sewers (km) 133\.0 110\.9
23
Output Description At Appraisal Actual Completed
Constructed Wetland (m3/d) Specifics not 50,000
defined at appraisal
The table below illustrates the status of compliance with covenants\.
Project Description of Covenant Due Status
Agreement Date
Reference
Schedule 3 NWSC to generate adequate revenue to 12/31/05 Partially
Para 7 cover O&M, debt service requirements and complied
20% of annual capital expenditures
Schedule 3 CMSC to generate adequate revenue to 12/31/05 Complied in
Para 8 cover O&M and debt service requirements 2010 & 2011
Schedule 3 NWSC and CMSC to maintain a debt 12/31/05 Complied in
Para 9 service coverage ratio greater than 1\.3 2010 & 2011
Schedule 3 NWSC and CMSC to maintain a maximum 10/01/10 -Complied
Para 10 debt to asset ratio of 0\.7 (respective status -Complied with
indicated) delay
Schedule 3 NMG to ensure tariff adjustments for 07/01/06 -Complied
Para 7 and NWSC and CMSC 07/01/06 -Complied with
8 delay
Schedule 2 NMG prepares an Integrated Water Supply 12/31/06 Complied
Para 9 Plan for Ningbo
Schedule 3 NWSC to prepare a Five-year Strategic 12/31/07 Complied
Para 6 Business Plan
Schedule 2 Prepare Zhougongzhai and Jiakou Dam 12/31/06 Complied
Para 11 Safety Emergency Preparedness Plan
Schedule 2 Submit semi-annual progress reviews of 07/31/05 Complied
Para 10 Zhougongzhai construction progress
24
Annex 3\. Economic and Financial Analysis
CHINA: Ningbo Water and Environment Project
Economic Analysis
The development objective of the Ningbo Water Environment Project (NWEP) was to
facilitate the expansion and quality of water and wastewater services in Ningbo City and
Cixi City in an economically efficient and environmentally sustainable manner, thereby
protecting public health, improving the environment, and supporting economic growth\.
There were no changes in the PDOs\. With the successful construction and operation of
Ningbo water supply and Cixi wastewater treatment facilities, as appraised, the project
development objectives have been successfully achieved, although without the full
benefit of the desired financial sustainability\.
Benefits accrued to residents, industrial, commercial and institutional organizations in
Ningbo and Cixi, in terms of higher quality of water supply, protection of local water
resources, and improved environmental conditions in the Hangzhou Bay\.
The key monitoring indicators associated with economic benefits were: (i) increase in the
percentage of water supplied from high quality and reliable water sources and treatment
plants in Ningbo City from 10% to 75%; and (ii) increase in the percentage of wastewater
collected and treated in Cixi City from 10% to 65%\. The actual values against target
values for each of these two indicators are highlighted below, with the details shown in
the Results Framework table in Section F in the Data Sheet\.
Ningbo Water Supply Component
Ningbo water supply was greatly improved through this project\. With high quality raw
water supply, the expanded water treatment capacity, NWSC provided high quality water
supply to all of Ningbo city and a large number of townships as well, thereby offering an
essential element in protecting public health and living conditions\. The percentage of
residents with high quality water supply increased from 1\.2 million (23%) in 2006 to 2\.5
million (almost 90%) at project completion, while the water supply capacity increased
from 820,000 m3/d to 1,300,000 m3/d\. The operation of the Bank-financed water supply
system including Maojiaping WTP began in 2009 (instead of in 2008 as projected in
PAD)\. The project component provided the incremental water consumption of 194,000
m3/d in 2010\. It is estimated that the incremental water consumption will reach 380,000
m3/d from 2016 onward\. With the completion of new water supply network, which
provides improved water quality and service reliability, the component also helped
improve the quality of non-incremental water consumption\. The volume of improved
non-incremental water consumption due to the project was reported as 669,000 m3/d in
2009, and is projected to reach 880,000 m3/d in 2016 onwards\.
Cost-benefit analysis was conducted at appraisal, which estimated an economic internal
rate of return (EIRR) of 15\.59% as reported in the PAD\. The main economic benefits
25
identified at appraisal have remained unchanged\. They include: (i) value of the increased
consumption of high quality water supply; (ii) improved water quality; and (iii) cost
saving due to the reduction in bottled water usage\. Using exactly the same valuation
methodology adopted in PAD (i\.e\., same valuation techniques and same willingness-to-
pay values for improved water supply and unit cost saving in bottled water), the EIRR at
ICR stage was estimated at 15\.30%\. The slightly lower EIRR was due to the delay in
operation of Maojiaping WTP by one year\. Nevertheless, the performance of this
component is still satisfactory from an economic point of view\.
Cixi Wastewater Treatment Component
The PAD adopted the cost effectiveness approach to select the least cost technology of
wastewater treatment for the Cixi wastewater component\.
The percentage of wastewater collected and treated in Cixi City increased from 10% to
65\.43% for the one million residents, slightly above the project target of 65%\. Cixiâs
economy grew by 102% over the period of project implementation from 2005 to 2010\.
The average per capita GDP grew by 97% over the same period\. Particularly noteworthy
is the growth in tourism, which increased by 223% from 2005 to 2010\. The net income
per capita for urban and township residents increased by 62% and 84%, respectively,
over the same period\. With the completion of the Cixi wastewater component, the Cixi
Municipality achieved a wastewater treatment capacity/coverage of 80% for the urban
districts, 60% for the rural townships and 100% for industrial discharges located within
industrial parks\. This achievement will greatly reduce pollution loads discharged to the
Hangzhou Bay\.
This component included two wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs) using A2O
treatment technology\. In planning for the wastewater projects, options for fewer and
larger treatment plants versus numerous smaller treatment plants were assessed and
dismissed, in favor of the least cost approach of two WWTPs, located in the northern and
eastern parts of the city respectively\. The selection of the A2O technology for the
treatment process was based on the least-cost approach, and the technology provided the
advantage of quality effluent and lower operating costs\. Therefore, it is concluded that
the Cixi wastewater component will continue to achieve the project targets related to
wastewater treatment\.
In summary, the project economic objectives have been largely achieved\.
Financial Analysis
The financial analysis was conducted at both project and entity levels at appraisal\.
Project Level Analysis
Ningbo Water Supply Component\. The after-tax financial internal rate of return (FRR) of
this component at completion is 8\.8%, which easily exceeded the 0\.01% weighted
26
average cost of capital at completion\. This is equivalent to a net present value (NPV) of
RMB 2,969 million over the project componentâs estimated 35 year economic life\.
This FRR, was close to the FRR (8\.7%) calculated at appraisal\. The FRR was calculated
on the basis of the capital cost (RMB 1,412 million, 23% higher than at appraisal),
operation and maintenance expenses and taxes (RMB 2,932 million, 40% higher than at
appraisal), and revenue (RMB 7,716 million, 35% higher than at appraisal)\. The NPV
under this FRR is 54% more than the NPV at appraisal\.
Cixi Wastewater Component\. The average incremental financial cost (AIFC) of this
component at completion is RMB 2\.82/m3, which is 21% higher than the AIFC (RMB
2\.33/m3) at appraisal\. This is mainly due to (i) higher capital cost (6%), (ii) more
operating expenses (9%), and (iii) lower volume of wastewater (-4%) collected and
treated\. This AIFC is much higher than the average wastewater tariff at completion as
well, which is RMB 1\.01/m3 in 2010\.
Entity Level Analysis
This project was implemented by NWSC and CMSC\. The financial analyses at entity
level were conducted at completion to assess whether NWSC and CMSC complied with
the financial covenants set forth in Project Agreement\. These financial covenants include:
(i) cash generation for NWSC; (ii) revenue requirements for CMSC; (iii) debt service
coverage ratio for both NWSC and CMSC; (iv) debt asset ratio for both NWSC and
CMSC\.
Ningbo Water Supply Company
Operating and Financial Performance\. NWSC had six water treatment plants in 2010
and a total water production capacity of 1\.87 million m3 per day\. It provided piped water
to a population of 2\.8 million through 672,000 customer connections within 6 districts of
Ningbo City, which covers the area of 700 km2\. The following table presents the
operating and financial indicators of NWSC, compared to those at appraisal\.
27
Table 3-1 NWSC Operating and Financial Indicators
At Appraisal At
Indicator Completion
Value Year Value
Operating:
Average daily water sales (m3) 588,000 2003 858,900
Ratio of domestic to non-domestic 28:72 2003 56:44
water sales
Non-revenue water 20% - 2001 â 19%
25% 2004
Staff 990 2004 1,236
Staff per thousand water connections 3\.4 2004 1\.84
Financial:
Collection performance (% billings 98% 2004 99%
collected)
Customer receivables (days worth of 19 2003 19
billings)
Current ratio 0\.4 2001 â 0\.24
2003
Total debt (RMB million) 577 Oct 2004 2,541
Short-term debt (RMB million) 252 Oct 2004 320
Return on equity -2\.8% 2003 -0\.8%
Water Tariffs\. Since the start of project implementation, the water tariff in Ningbo City
was increased twice\. The first increase was in December 2007 and the second increase
occurred in July 2010\. The actual increase of weighted average water tariff in 2008 was
close to the one projected at appraisal\. However, these tariff increases alone did not help
NWSC comply with the financial covenant set forth in the Project Agreement\. The
following table lists water tariffs in Ningbo City, existing and projected\.
Table 3-2 Water Tariffs (RMB/m3) in Ningbo City
Projected Actual
Customer Group Actual
At Appraisal At Completion
2004 2006 2008 2006 2008 2010
Residential 1\.19 1\.60 1\.85 1\.40 1\.65 2\.40
Institutional 1\.39 1\.90 2\.20 1\.60 2\.50 4\.15
Commercial 1\.44 1\.95 2\.25 1\.65 2\.50 4\.15
Industrial 1\.44 1\.95 2\.25 1\.65 2\.50 4\.15
Special Users 1\.78 2/40 2\.75 5\.00 9\.00 11\.00
Weighted Average 1\.42 1\.88 2\.16 1\.56 2\.13 2\.44
% Increase 32% 15% 10% 37% 15%
Status of Compliance with Financial Covenants for NWSC\. NWSC submitted to the
Bank its reviews on the compliance with financial covenants in 2009 and 2010\. These
reviews showed that NWSC had complied with the financial covenants\. However, these
28
reviews were conducted based on forecasting\. By comparing the audited financial
statements for 2007, 2008, and 2009 sent to the Bank by NWSC, it was found that the
financial information contained in NWSCâs reviews was not accurate and complete\.
During the ICR process, the compliance with the financial covenants was recomputed
based on the audited NWSCâs financial statements\. The following table summarizes the
key information from NWSCâs financial statements which relates to the financial
covenants\. Detailed analysis is available in the project files\.
Table 3-3 NWSCâs Compliance with Financial Covenants (in RMB million)
Actual Projection
Financial Covenant 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
CASH GENERATION
Funds from internal sources -166\.93 -954\.54 -1,086\.46 -212\.18 -139\.29
20% capital expenditure 170\.25 246\.46 132\.84 55\.55 13\.24
Compliance with covenant Not complied Not complied Not complied Not complied Not complied
DEBT SERVICE RATIO
Long term debt 1,579\.67 1,979\.75 2,402\.77 2,224\.44 2,241\.18
Net revenues 250\.60 366\.31 359\.28 990\.03 656\.90
Debt service requirements 561\.21 700\.75 1,081\.95 640\.88 497\.00
Debt service ratio 0\.45 0\.52 0\.33 1\.54 1\.32
Compliance with covenant Not complied Not complied Not complied Complied Complied
DEBT ASSET RATIO
Debt 3,111\.10 3,151\.10 3,390\.94 3,332\.97 3,383\.39
Total assets 4,746\.88 4,938\.67 5,275\.42 5,288\.92 5,442\.70
Debt asset ratio 0\.66 0\.64 0\.64 0\.63 0\.62
Compliance with covenant Complied Complied Complied Complied Complied
The main reasons for non-compliance with financial covenants are the lower amount of
operating revenues which were caused by low water tariff and large amount of debt
service requirements\. Since the increases of water tariff did not reach a sufficiently high
level, the status of non-compliance with financial covenants will remain for the coming
years\. It is projected that Ningbo City has to increase its water tariff in 2011 to
RMB3\.70/m3 to be in compliance wit the cash generation covenant\.
Cixi Municipal Sewage Company
Company Overview\. At project completion, CMSC operated three wastewater treatment
plants, including one was built before the project, namely, the Jiaochangsha WWTP,
Northern WWTP, and Eastern WWTP with treatment capacities of 80,000 m3/d, 100,000
m3/d, and 50,000m3/d, respectively\. CMSC receives all wastewater generated in the area
under the administration of Cixi City Government\.
29
Northern WWTP was put into operation in July 2009 and now is operated by Shanghai
Fudan Water Engineering Technology Co\., Ltd\., while Eastern WWTP is operated by
CSD (Beijing) Environmental Protection Development Co\., Ltd\. since November 2009\.
The terms of operating contracts are for six years\.
CMSC is now negotiating with the suppliers to set up operating contracts for sewers and
pumping stations, in order to reduce labor costs\.
Wastewater Tariff\. Since the start of the project, Cixi City Government increased
wastewater tariff twice; the first increase in June 2006, and the second in June 2008\.
Because of restructuring of water sector in Cixi City in 2011, the third increase of
wastewater tariffs could be implemented in 2012 after the completion of restructuring\.
The following table summarizes the adjustment of wastewater tariffs in Cixi City since
2004\.
Table 3-4 Wastewater Tariffs (RMB/m3) in Cixi City
Projected Actual
Customer Group Actual
at Appraisal At Completion
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2006 2008 2010
Residential 0\.15 0\.30 0\.55 0\.65 0\.75 0\.40 0\.60 0\.60
Institutional 0\.25 0\.50 0\.90 1\.05 1\.20 0\.40 1\.35 1\.35
Commercial 0\.85 1\.85 3\.35 3\.90 4\.50 1\.35 1\.35 1\.35
Industrial 0\.25 0\.70 1\.60 1\.90 2\.20 0\.65 1\.35 1\.35
Special Users 1\.15 2\.60 4\.25 4\.90 5\.65 2\.65 4\.50 4\.50
Weighted Average 0\.37 0\.86 1\.43 1\.69 1\.95 0\.45 1\.01 1\.01
% Increase 132% 66% 18% 15% 22% 124% 0%
From the above table, it is clear that the increases of wastewater tariff in Cixi City
reached the projection at appraisal\. However, due to the increases of capital expenditures
of the project and operating expenses, and reduced wastewater volume, the increases of
wastewater tariff did not help Cixi City to comply with the financial covenants set forth
in Project Agreement\.
Status of Compliance with Financial Covenants\. With assistance of a local consultant,
CMSC provided the Bank with its reviews on the compliance with financial covenants in
2009 and 2010\. These reviews showed that CMSC was in compliance with the covenants
in 2010 with the government subsidy\. The table below summarizes the key information
from CMSCâs financial statements which relates to the financial covenants\. Detailed
analysis is available in project files\.
30
Table 3-5 CMSCâs Compliance with Financial Covenants for (in RMB million)
Actual Projection
Financial Covenant 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
REVENUE REQUIREMENTS
Total revenues 41\.24 30\.28 19\.47 653\.14 323\.14
Total operating expenses 24\.82 36\.95 68\.68 116\.96 123\.70
Debt service requirements 70\.00 100\.00 97\.00 97\.00 194\.00
Revenue requirements 0\.43 0\.22 0\.12 3\.05 1\.02
Compliance with covenant Not complied Not complied Not complied Complied Complied
DEBT SERVICE RATIO
Long term debt 542\.09 745\.17 933\.65 849\.96 678\.56
Net revenues 25\.05 6\.72 -19\.27 586\.54 273\.92
Debt service requirements 70\.00 100\.00 97\.00 97\.00 194\.00
Debt service ratio 0\.36 0\.07 -0\.20 6\.05 1\.41
Compliance with covenant Not complied Not complied Not complied Complied Complied
DEBT ASSET RATIO
Debt 754\.00 998\.25 1,173\.45 1,134\.29 865\.89
Total assets 1,075\.99 1,378\.58 1,582\.81 2,101\.87 2,016\.45
Debt asset ratio 0\.70 0\.72 0\.74 0\.54 0\.43
Compliance with covenant Not complied Not complied Not complied Complied Complied
The above table shows that CMSC did not comply with the financial covenants for
CMSC until 2010\. Compliance with the revenue requirements was difficult because Cixi
City Government kept the wastewater tariff at a low level, which made it impossible for
CMSC to fully cover its capital expenditures and operating costs\. CMSCâs strategy to
improve its financial performance is to: (i) collect more wastewater by increasing
connections; (ii) increase the wastewater tariff in the town and township from current
RMB0\.30/m3 to RMB0\.80/m3; and (iii) increase the tariff collection efficiency\. To enable
CMSC comply with covenant of revenue requirements in 2011, it is projected that the
wastewater tariff should be increased to RMB3\.80/m3\.
31
Annex 4\. Resettlement Implementation Report
CHINA: Ningbo Water and Environment Project
1\. In their final evaluation report, the independent monitoring consultant (Resettlement
Research Center of Hehai University), highlighted the following: Almost 70 hectares of land
were acquired, 427 m² structures were demolished, and four rural households were relocated
within their original villages\. The goal of the resettlement rehabilitation was reached and the
potential negative impacts on the displaced persons were successfully mitigated, and in some
cases, livelihoods were improved\. In short, adequate provisions were made for appropriate
compensation of losses\. The internal and independent monitoring of resettlement activities
were effective in ensuring compliance with Bank policies
2\. The implementing agencies ensured that:
ï Resettlement units were created for effective coordination with project affected people
and other relevant stakeholders;
ï Broad resettlement information was appropriately disclosed, and the proactive
participation of displaced persons was encouraged;
ï Sufficient resettlement funds were available;
ï Effective coordination with major agencies and stakeholders were carried out;
ï Detailed resettlement implementation plan and timely resettlement policy modifications
were done in accordance with local social and economic development;
ï Compensation for the project affected people was provided at replacement cost prior to
the actual move; and
ï Assistance was given to project affected people in their efforts to restore their livelihoods\.
Resettlement Action Plan (RAP)
3\. In accordance with the World Bankâs safeguard policies, a Resettlement Action Plan
(RAP) was prepared and disclosed in English and Chinese prior to the start of civil works\.
The RAP described the extent of resettlement, identified affected persons and resources,
defined how resettlement would be addressed, and provided details of the institutional
arrangements\.
Institutional Arrangements
4\. A Resettlement Office was established within the Project Management Office under
Ningbo Development and Reform Committee to prepare and supervise the implementation of
the resettlement activities\. Each subproject set up a resettlement office in charge of the
execution of the resettlement activities required by the PMO\.
32
Scope of Resettlement Components
Subproject Water Supply Water Treatment Total
Planned 14\.2 46\.7 60\.9
Actual 19\.3 50\.5 69\.9
Land acquisition (ha) Difference 5\.1 3\.8 9\.0
Planned 0 916\.4 916\.4
Actual 0 427\.17 427\.17
Housing (m2) Difference 0 -489\.23 -489\.23
Cost for the resettlement
5\. The total cost of implementing the RAP reached US$ 1\.542 million, about 10\.8%
above the appraisal estimate of US$ 1\.390 million\. All resettlement work was funded by the
Borrower\.
Unit: RMB 10 Thousands
Category of the Items Planned Actual
Permanent land 465 1020\.16
Temporary land 373\.6 2547\.13
Agricultural land 6392\.6 1383\.16
Others 1806\.4 5071\.43
Total 9037\.6 10021\.87
Socio-Economic Surveys
6\. All of the displaced families elected to keep living in the same area or very close to
it\. Their living conditions have largely improved: 12\.5% of displaced families were highly
satisfied; 62\.5% satisfied; and 25% moderately satisfied\. All of the displaced families
affected by land acquisition and house demolition expressed that their resettlement was
carried out in accordance with their entitlements\.
7\. The displaced families affected by land acquisition received the resettlement
information through village meetings and other channels; 75% expressed satisfaction, which
indicates that project information disclosure was adequate\. On property surveys, 81\.2% were
highly satisfied; 12\.5% were satisfied; and 6\.3% were moderately satisfied\.
8\. In addition to the above information, the data gathered by the independent monitoring
consultant confirms that the impact of resettlement on the affected households has indeed
been very positive\. The average household income in 2004 was US$ 1,569 and reached as
US$ 2,673 in 2009, and increased US$ 1,105 higher than the average household income
during the same year in Ningbo city\.
33
Annex 5: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes
CHINA: Ningbo Water and Environment Project
(a) Task Team membersÂ
Responsibility/
Names Title Unit
Specialty
Lending
Greg J\. Browder (TTL) Lead Water and Sanitation Specialist LCSUW Water Resources
Yi Dong Sr Financial Management Specialist EAPFM Fin\. Management
Daniel R\. Gibson Lead Social Development Specialist ECSOQ Social Safeguards
Lixin Gu Senior Infrastructure Specialist EASIN Infrastructure
Chongwu Sun Sr Environmental Specialist EASCS Envir\. Safeguards
Zhefu Liu Senior Social Development Specialist EASCS Social Safeguards
Zhentu Liu Senior Procurement Specialist EAPPR Procurement
David I Sr Financial Management Specialist EAPFM Fin\. Management
John Smithson Municipal Engineer (Consultant) EASCS Engineering
Supervision/ICR
Greg J\. Browder (TTL) Lead Water and Sanitation Specialist LCSUW Water Resources
Shenhua Wang (TTL) Senior Financial Specialist EASIN Financial Analysis
Meskerem Brhane (TTL) Senior Urban Specialist EASIN Urban Planning
Yi Dong Sr Financial Management Specialist EAPFM Fin\. Management
Daniel R\. Gibson Lead Social Development Specialist ECSOQ Social Safeguards
Chandra\. Godavitarne Municipal Engineer (Consultant) EASCS Engineering
Lixin Gu Senior Infrastructure Specialist EASIN Infrastructure
Anne K\. Harrison Program Assistant EASIN
David I Sr Financial Management Specialist EAPFM Fin\. Management
Xujun Liu Procurement Specialist (Consultant) EASCS Procurement
Zhentu Liu Senior Procurement Specialist EAPPR Procurement
Zhefu Liu Senior Social Development Spec EASCS Social Safeguards
John Smithson Municipal Engineer (Consultant) EASCS Engineering
Chongwu Sun Sr Environmental Specialist EASCS Envir\. Safeguards
Peishing Wang Environmental Specialist (Consultant) EASCS Envir\. Safeguards
Yuan Wang Procurement Analyst EAPPR Procurement
Ning Wu Financial Specialist (Consultant) MNSSD Financial Analysis
Ji You Urban Specialist EASCS Urban Planning
Fang Zhang Financial Management Analyst EAPFM Fin\. Management
EASUR â
Zezhen Zhang Consultant
HIS
34
(b) Staff Time and CostÂ
Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)
Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including
No\. of staff weeks
travel and consultant costs)
Lending
FY04 89\.85
FY05 223\.99
FY06 0\.97
FY07 0\.00
FY08 0\.00
Total: 314\.81
Supervision/ICR
FY04 0\.00
FY05 41\.04
FY06 33\.79
FY07 79\.05
FY08 47\.23
FY09 94\.90
FY10 50\.32
FY11 80\.89
Total: 427\.22
35
Annex 6\. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR
CHINA: Ningbo Water and Environment Project
This Annex is a summary of a comprehensive Borrowerâs Implementation Completion Report
(ICR), and does not repeat matters presented in the main text of the ICR\. In addition to detailed
account of implementation, achievements and outcomes, it provides a good discussion on project
design, ground realities, and lessons and suggestions for future project formulation\. The Bank
ICR has drawn liberally from the Borrowerâs ICR\.
PROJECT/PROGRAM CONTEXT, DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES, AND PROJECT DESIGN
Original Objective\. The Project Development Objective and key performance indicators are available in
the ICR main text and the Project Appraisal Document\.
Revised Objective\. There has been no change in the main Project objectives during implementation\.
Main Beneficiaries\. Beneficiaries of the project are residents, industrial, commercial and institutional
organizations in Ningbo and Cixi in terms of higher quality of water supply, protection of local water
resources, and improved environmental conditions in the Hangzhou Bay\.
Original Project Components\. The project investment program is provided in the ICR main text and the
Project Appraisal Document\.
Revised Project Components\. No project sub-components were revised, added or deleted during
implementation\. A number of changes were made, however, to the technical details in the project design\.
Other Significant Changes
Ningbo Water Supply Component\. Geotechnical risks were identified during construction of the WTP,
requiring additional reinforcement to improve the stability of the excavated side slopes and WTP
foundation â see increased project cost in Appendix 1\.
Cixi Wastewater Component\. As recommended by consultants wetland size was increased from 26 ha to
60 ha to improve the performance standards for the North WWTP to reach Class 1-A discharge standards\.
Land acquisition requirement was increased\. There was no additional safeguard issue as land is vacant
and no undue delay of the overall project progress\.
The maintenance facility for the East WWTP was revised to be the laboratory\. Facility maintenance work
is to be outsourced\. Available laboratory facility can provide monitoring and testing capability for water
qualities\. Wastewater collection system for townships was expanded to increase service area, with
collection system along the main roads upgraded from open trenches to pipeline\.
KEY FACTORS AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOMES
(a) Quality at Entry\. Project preparation of the physical investments at appraisal was carefully conducted
to ensure an acceptable level of quality\. Alternatives were considered prior to selecting the preferred
approach for several key project sub-components:
36
(b) Critical assessment of growth demand\. Original water demand by NWSC was revised downward as
recommended and verified by national and international consultants, with a short-term planning period to
2010 and a long-term demand forecast to 2040\.
(c) Water tariff increase\. Tariff increased twice during project implementation in 2006 and 2008\. Water
users already received a consolidated bill for water supply and wastewater services\.
(d) Assessment for appropriate technologies\. Project design examined the relevance of selected
technologies with full considerations to financial and operational implications\. Proposed activated-carbon
filtration for Maojiaping WTP was dropped\. Three alternative sites for WTP were considered, resulting in
the selection of the Maojiaping facility at the lowest cost and least resettlement issues\. Optional scheme
for Ningbo water distribution system was critically examined, resulting in the selection of one ring main
fed from two WTPs, providing maximum flexibility and reliability\.
For Cixi WWTP, an engineering-economic analysis was conducted, resulting in the selection of two new
plants (North and East) for optimal balance of capital and operating costs\. Conventional tertiary treatment
with chemical coagulation and filtration for Cixi WWTP was replaced with engineered wetland with
lower operating cost and complexity\.
Outcome/Achievement of Objective and Environmental Benefit
Ningbo water supply system has constructed all subcomponents to ensure that percentage of water supply
of high quality from 10% to 75%\. The Cixi wastewater system has increased the collection and treatment
capacity from 10% to 65%, consistent with the project objectives of protecting public health; improve the
quality of environmental conditions to support sustainable economic growth in Ningbo\.
Outputs by Components
Ningbo Water Supply (US$157\.9 million with IBRD-US$69\.71 million in PAD; US$ 204\.85 at project
completion):
Outputs included: (i) a raw water supply line with an intake tower in Jiaokou reservoir and a 9\.6 km
tunnel;(ii) 500,000 m3/d water treatment plant; and (iii) a water transmission system, including a new
47\.3 km ring main and a 30\.2 km of transmission pipes from Maojiaping WTP to the ring main has been
completed and put into service\.
The first 250,000 M3/d of the Maojiaping WTP was completed and put into service in August 2009\. The
second 250,000 M3/d plant was commissioned and put into service in November 2010\. At the end of 2010,
an average of 300,000 M3/d was provided to the Ningbo water supply system\. Output of Maojiaping WTP
is to increase as existing WTPs are scheduled to be retired from service and water sales arrangements
with townships are completed over the next year or two; and
By the end of 2010, actual monitoring indicated that the percentage of Ningbo City covered by the new
high quality water supply system has reached 83%, exceeding the planned target of 75%\. The ring main
was the first of its kind in China and is one of the major technical innovations under the Project\. The ring
main approach will provide operational flexibility in supporting water supply needs (quantity, quality and
pressure) over the entire network without unduly affected by changing land use developments\.
Cixi Wastewater (US$128\.4 million with IBRD-US$59\.64 million in PAD; US$ 166\.07 at project
completion):
37
Outputs include: (i) two WWTPs with a total combined treatment capacity of 150,000 M3/d (100,000
M3/d North plant and a 50,000 M3/d East Plant); and (ii) Sewer mains and links have been constructed
with 230 km of pipe and 58 pump stations\.
Engineered wetlands to enhance final effluent quality of WWTPs to Class 1A standards have largely been
completed\. Remediation to the north wetland is needed to ensure the wetland is fully functioning\.
Actual monitoring indicated that the percentage of wastewater treatment from industries and urban
sources have reached 65\.43%, slightly exceeding the Project design target of 65%\.
Institutional Development (US$4\.5 million with IBRD -US$4\.1 million in PAD; US$ 3\.14 at
completion):
This technical assistance component provided the understanding and skills to NWSC and CMSC in
carrying out water planning, utility price and service regulations, and enhancing operational and business
management capacities\. Significant impacts to institutional development and reform have taken place
within NWSC and CMSC such as strategic business planning, human resources management, operational
accountability and financial forecasting\. Details are provided in Appendix 9\.
Institutional Strengthening Achievement:
Strategic Business Planning: The outcome of TA package C was a comprehensive business plan for the
NWSC, covering a broad range of strategic issues, including: strategic management framework, water
supply demand forecast to 2030, performance measurement and financial planning for full cost recovery\.
NSWC has acquired the ability to conduct future business planning, thereby contributing to sustainability\.
Management Information System: Package E provided technical assistance to the CMSC in developing
an MIS system\. Institutional and organizational reforms were introduced for issuance of sewer connection
permits, operational supervision and performance monitoring\.
Economic Benefits and Utility Finances
Economic Benefits
Ningbo Water Supply\. The project development of providing a safe and reliable water supply to support
the sustained economic development of Ningbo was achieved\. The planned investments were completed
at about the costs estimated at project appraisal, barring the unforeseen additional cost for remedial works
to stabilize a rock face\.
The high quality water supplied to the entire Ningbo city and a large number of townships, and made a
significant contribution to protect public health and improve living conditions\. The percentage of
residents with high quality water supply increased from1\.5 million (23%) in 2006 to about 2\.5 million
(90%) at project completion\.
The economic benefits projected at appraisal were substantially achieved: the value of the
increased consumption of high quality water supply; and cost saving due to the reduction in
bottled water usage\. The siting of the WTP location at an elevated level resulted in reduction in energy
costs, usually about 70% of costs, were achieved\.
The innovative design concept for the ring main contributed significantly to enhance sustainability of the
water supply system will generate significant cost savings from avoided costs for system modifications in
38
the future years\. Operational efficiency was achieved through the innovative ring main adopted for water
distribution system, which eliminates the need for frequent adjustments and re-routings of the water
distribution system, and provides consistent water flow over the entire water distribution system\.
Cixi Wastewater\. Least cost analyses for the Cixi wastewater component\. Both WWTP designs adopted
the A2O treatment technology, which was the least cost treatment option, which provides the advantage of
quality effluent and lower operating costs\. In planning for the wastewater projects, options for fewer and
larger treatment plants vs\. more and smaller treatment plants were assessed and dismissed, in favor of the
least cost approach adopted in the two WWTPs\.
Cixi Municipality has achieved a wastewater treatment capacity of 80% for the urban districts, 60% for
the rural townships and 100% for industrial discharges located within industrial parks\. This will greatly
reduce pollution loadings discharged into the Hangzhou Bay\. Cixiâs economy grew by 102% over the
period of project implementation from 2005 to 2010\. Average per capita GDP grew by 97% over the
same period\.
Utility Finances
Financial performance of both NWSC and CMSC depends on implementation of tariff adjustments\.
However, this is a matter that is within the control of the companies, because tariff setting is the
prerogative of the respective governments\.
Cixi Wastewater\. The Cixi Government approved tariff increases twice - in May 2006 and May 2008\.
The current average wastewater tariff is RMB 1\.01/\.3\. However the tariff levels remain low within the
urban districts and no wastewater tariff is being collected from most townships\. Therefore, financial
sustainability of CMSC cannot be maintained based on tariff alone\. Hence, the Cixi Municipal
government provided financial subsidies to the CMSC for each year from 2007 to 2010 (RMB 28\.31
million in 2007; 14\.95 million in 2008; 6\.37 million in 2009 and 94\.53 million in 2010)\. It is anticipated
that the trend of increasing tariff and tariff collection area will continue gradually over time to reach full
cost recovery\.
Monitoring and Evaluation Design, Implementation, and Utilization
The PAD provided a result monitoring framework that specifies the collection of various data to
demonstrate outcome indicators achieved under each of the Project Development Objectives and
intermediate results\. Details of the Results Monitoring Framework are provided in Appendix 5\.
M & E design: Quality of water supply before and after project implementation demonstrated tangible
outcome\. Effluent qualities from both WWTPs and the engineered wetland demonstrated reduction of
pollutant loadings to local receiving water bodies as well as the final output to the Hangzhou Bay, see
details Appendix 5\. At the present time, north wetland is not operating as designed due to a damage
discharge pipe from the north WWTP\. CMSC committed to complete the repair work by mid May 2011\.
M & E Implementation: Appropriate data was actually collected through reports on regular pre-
determined frequencies to track project progress of physical works and institutional development plans\.
Responsibilities for data collection and reporting were appropriately assigned\.
M & E utilization: The results monitoring framework primarily provided data to track the construction of
physical works and to some degree, institutional reforms for business planning and IT capabilities for
operational management\. Additional monitoring data at the end of project implementation provided
39
further evidence of achieving underlying project development objectives of protecting public health,
improving environmental conditions to support sustainable economic growth\.
Procurement
A number of technical design changes were made to project subcomponents\. These changes do not
contain any substantial changes in the nature or purpose of any subcomponents\. Changes were made for a
number of reasons, mostly for enhancing the quality of facility design and construction\. Some
subcomponents are more appropriately repackaged to facilitate the procurement process, due to the nature
of the works or services being acquired\. A few changes were made in light of additional field data
obtained during project constructions\.
Project Resettlement
A Project Resettlement Policy Framework and a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) was prepared during the
project design and appraisal stage for both the Ningbo water supply and the Cixi wastewater components,
which meet the World Bankâs OPBP 4\.12\. The Framework and the RAP addressed specific issues ranging
from key principles of resettlement, replacement costs, funding arrangements, as well as consultation and
disclosure processes and grievance procedure\. The Ningbo PMO established a resettlement office, staffed
with specialists from NWSC and CMSC, to manage and supervise the resettlement process\. There were
no significant resettlement issues during project implementation\. The largest impact had been the
temporary use of approximately 467 ha during construction\. No minority community was involved in the
resettlement process\. The following table provides the summary of the scope of the resettlement\.
Number of Land acquired Residential Amount of
people affected (ha) housing removed Compensation
(M2) (Million RMB)
Ningbo 864 19\.59 121\.19
Cixi 300 17\.91 427\.18 58\.75
Environmental Management during Implementation
The Project was classified as a âCategory Aâ? project, and a full Environmental Impact Assessment was
prepared\. The Project as a whole has significant net positive environmental impact as it improves the
quality and reliability of water supply, reduces water pollution, and promotes the sustainable development
of Ningbo Municipality\. An Environmental Management Plan (EMP) was prepared at the project design
specifically address potential environmental impacts and mitigation measures during project
implementation\. No significant environmental management issues arose during project construction and
provisions of the EMP were complied with to mitigate potential adverse environmental impacts during
implemented\.
Poverty Alleviation and Social Improvements
(a) Employment and Staff Training\. The Project was implemented between 2005 and 2011\. During the
6-year project design and construction phase, the project created a large number of temporary jobs for the
local community\. Permanent employment will continue to grow at both the NWSC and CMSC for the
newly constructed facilities\. Training was provided to existing staff and new recruits for operation of new
water and wastewater systems\. Newly constructed facilities are expected to continue to acquire services
and materials from area businesses, thereby spurring business growth in the local economy\.
40
(b) Improvements to Water Supply Quality\. Water quality monitoring was conducted to demonstrate
actual improvements to the qualities of raw water supply and qualities of treated water released from the
Maojiaping WTP\. Details of representative monitoring results for one month are provided in Appendix 5\.
Monitoring data indicates that qualities of treated water consistently exceed the national standards\.
(c) Improvements to Effluent Quality from WWTPs and Discharges to Hangzhou Bay\. Discharges from
the North and East WWTPs have demonstrated to be consistently meeting meet national standard,
GB18918-2002 Class 1B quality\. Further details of environmental improvements as shown by the
monitoring data are presented in Appendix 5, as project outcomes\.
MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME
Factors outside the Control of Government or Implementing Agencies
Currency exchange rate: The exchange rate of US$ with RMB has declined by almost 18% from 1:8\.27
to less than 1:68 over period of project implementation\. This significantly reduced the real value of WB
loan and increased the level of local funding required as most contracts were denominated in Chinese
RMB, causing difficulties for the IAs in terms of securing additional local funds to cover shortfalls\.
Market price escalation: Price increase for major construction materials (such as: steel etc\.) caused
problems for construction progress on some fixed cost contracts\.
Selection of the lowest bid: This approach caused some problems for contract management in China, as
low quality local subcontractors are often used\.
Factors Generally Subject to Government Control
Ningbo and Cixi governments provided strong project management by ensuring timely resolution of
resettlement, financial and technical issues\. Governments also constructed some physical works in
support of project components including, an investment of 200 million RMB as subsidy for 200 km
township connections; sewer connection for more than 2,700 industries; expansion of Qiaoshanshen WTP
from 50,000 M3/d to 80,000 M3/d; expansion of WTP at the industrial park from 30,000 M3/d to 50,000
M3/d; and installation of 6 km sewer collection pipe in the Cixi City centre district\.
Lack of tariff increases resulted in NWSC and CMSC continue to rely on annual financial subsidies from
the government\.
Design institutesâ lack of the experience and interest in WB project procedures also negatively affected
project costs and work schedule\.
Factors Generally Subject to Implementing Agency Control
Some engineering design work was undertaken with insufficient field data, especially relating to
geotechnical information\. This situation had caused significant difficulties in conducting some civil works,
resulting in changes to field work and delays that can otherwise be avoided\.
Project Costs and World Bank Financing
A breakdown of project cost by component is provided in Annex 1 of the ICR\. Total project cost provided
in the PAD was US$ 291\.50 million or RMB 2,419\.30 million with a US$ to RMB exchange rate of 8\.3,
including a front-end financing cost of US$ 0\.65 million\. The final project cost was 128% more than the
cost estimated at project appraisal\.
41
Two key conclusions can be drawn from an examination of the cost data: The overall project cost (in
USD) at completion is significantly higher than those provided in the PAD\. However a significant portion
of the increase is due to the factor of exchange rate which had dropped about 18% over the period of
project implementation (Exchange rate 8\.3 at PAD; 6\.81 at project completion)\. The total cost for
institutional development was considerably lower (more than 32%) that estimated in the PAD\. It is felt
that additional resources could be deployed for institutional capacity building\.
PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY
Sustainability Assessment\. In general, the Project is deemed to be sustainable while lack of tariff
collection remains a critical challenge for NWSC and CMSC during the transitional phase\.
The sustainability of the Project needs to be assessed in terms of three key aspects: (a) availability of an
appropriate institutional structure to provide managerial autonomy; (b) capacity for operation and facility
maintenance; and (c) financial viability\.
Institutional Development and Managerial Sustainability
Strategic Business Planning\. With the TA support, NWSC developed a strategic business plan,
especially in terms of performance monitoring and measurement, and asset management\. Organizational
reform was introduced to provide a focus on staff responsibilities for key areas of accountabilities\. An
evaluation was conducted to assess staff training needs\.
An institutional structure was introduced in CMSC for managerial independence and accountability, an
important factor for organizational sustainability\. Cixi Municipal Construction Bureau established a
separate Wastewater Administrative Office with the responsibilities of issuing permits for wastewater
connections from urban area and industrial discharges, and compliance enforcement\. The Municipal
Environmental Protection Bureau will be responsible for compliance monitoring and enforcement for the
quality of discharges from the WWTPs\.
Financial Sustainability
NWSC: Over the ten year period from 2002 to 2011, there had been a significant investment in NWSC
infrastructure, causing an urgent need to increase water tariff\. Through previous increases, the water tariff
level had increased 95\.1% above the 2004 level\. It is anticipated that there will be another significant
increase in 2012\. NWSC felt that with the anticipated increase in 2012, revenue from tariff collection will
be able to fully recovery operational costs\.
CMSC: In accordance with the Loan Agreement, the financial sustainability of CMSC would rely on
revenue from wastewater tariff collected\. Significant increased in wastewater tariff would have to be
instituted based on the current cost analysis and financial projections\.
The current wastewater tariffs reflect the latest increase introduced in 2008\. In 2010, for urban districts,
the wastewater tariff is set at RMB 1\.05 per cubic meter, and the cost for the towns and village covered by
the water supply network is RMB 0\.30 per cubic meter\. There is no wastewater tariff for towns and
villages outside the water supply service area\.
According to the World Bank appraisal and agreement, an increase in 2009 was planned, but was not
introduced\. The reasons for failing to introduce the 2009 increase are: a) it was recognized that the water
prices are already among the highest in Ningbo and the surrounding areas; b) at this initial stage of project
42
completion, and work has just began to integrate sewer connection works and water supply network, it
was considered inappropriate to institute a wastewater tariff to those residents who had not received the
services\.
However, CMSC has submitted a report to the municipal government regarding the need to adjust the
wastewater tariff in Cixi\. The report recommended that the wastewater tariff for the urban area should be
kept at the current level, and the tariff for towns and villages should be increased to RMB 0\.80 per cubic
meter\.
At the present time, it is anticipated that a new organization will be established as an overall water service
company, and to integrate the tariff collection system in Cixi\. As such, it is anticipated that the proposed
tariff increase will not be introduced in 2011, and the proposed plan for tariff increase will be modified
and a revised tariff plan will mostly likely be realized in 2012\. This anticipated tariff adjustment in 2012
may provide much needed revenue to CSMC\. However, prior to 2012, the municipal government has
committed to make up the shortfall with government subsidy in order to maintain the financial
sustainability of the CMSC in the near term\.
Operational Sustainability
With the TA support, NWSC developed a Central Monitoring and Control System for the entire water
supply and distribution network â a system-wide performance monitoring, reporting and evaluation
system to support the operation, including the use of GIS for data collection and management, customer
and asset management, hydraulic modeling and UFW analysis and reduction\. This system will, over time,
provide much needed system performance indicators to NWSC to introduce further efficiencies in all
aspects of its operation\.
The CMSC instituted a number of organizational reforms in order to ensure effective and efficient
operation of its facilities:
Operational Standards: Operations of individual WWTPs are monitored by designated staff from CMSC,
in order to ensure that corporate operational standards are followed by the management and operational
staff at all WWTPs\.
Staff Training: Operators for pump stations are hired by CMSC\. The pump station operator would receive
training and be qualified by CMSC\. CMSC also established a special operational unit responsible for
contracting out network maintenance work to contractors with specialized workforce\.
BANK AND BORROWER PERFORMANCE
Bank Performance
The borrower feels satisfied with the Bank performance during the project identification, preparation,
appraisal and project implementation phases\. Staff members from the World Bank Beijing Office provided
clear description of project development procedures required by the Bank, as well as suggestions for
improving project preparation work\. Bank staff provided timely assistance to the borrower in reviewing and
completing procurement documents\.
From project identification to the the implementation phase, WB has changed the project manager several
times\. Each of them made significant contribution to the eventual successful completion of the project\.
However, this staff turn-over had undoubtly brought some difficulties and negative influence to project
43
development\. The borrower felt that there has been some delay in receiving Bankâs Aide Memoires,
resulting in not being able to implement Bank suggestions and instructions on a more timely manner\.
Borrower Performance
During the project implementation phase, Ningbo DRC provided a pivotal role in project planning,
approvals and project management and coordination, and the IAs effectively discharged their respective
duties and responsibilities and had provided the necessary resources to ensure the projectâs successful
implementation\.
The Ningbo Finance Bureau provided strong support and worked in close cooperation with IAâs during
project implementation with efficient financial management and allocation of funds\.
The NWSC and CMSC expressed that Ningbo Municipal Government provided strong support to the
project from the very beginning by establishing a strong project leading group which was essential in
ensuring effective project implementation\. In particular, the Ningbo and Cixi Municipal governments
provided great assistance in terms of land acquisition, execution of the resettlement program, as well as
played an important coordinating role for securing land spaces for temporary use for construction
activities\. Furthermore, local governments made significant efforts in adjusting water and wastewater
tariff levels during the period of project implementation, which greatly support the plan for financial
viability of the water and wastewater services, and paved the way for further increases in the future for
full cost recovery\.
The CMG also provided financial assistance to the extent of 15% towards the cost of sewage connections
for towns and villages\. This increase in sewage connections allowed the CMSC to expand its ability for
tariff collection, as the service areas were expanded and embarked on a program to eliminate direct
sewage discharges to the rivers within the city\. In addition, the CMG upgrades to sewage collection
network in the old urban districts as well as installing new sewage collection pipelines along newly built
roads\. These efforts will make significant contributions in optimizing sewage infrastructure in the longer
term\.
LESSONS LEARNED
It is fully recognized by all implementation agencies in Ningbo and Cixi that the policy guidance and
support provided by the National DRC and the Ministry of Finance were invaluable in securing project
success, not only in terms of effective project implementation, but more importantly, in achieving the
underlying objectives and expected outcomes of the project in terms of enhancing the protection of
public health, environment and natural resources for sustainable economic growth of the region\.
Highlights and Lessons of the Project
Since the commissioning of the project components, both quantity and quality of raw water sources, water
supply from WTP, effluent from WWTPs and engineered wetlands have been greatly improved\.
World Bank financing did more than providing the necessary funds\. The project also introduced best
practices and experience for best practices for project management, bid tendering and contracting,
construction supervision, performance evaluation\.
With the completion of this project, it has been fully recognized that the Bankâs detailed procurement
process and the fair and just approaches in contract management and construction supervision are
essential factors in ensuring the successful project implementation\. The most valuable aspect is the
44
experience gained by relevant IAs and various government departments and agencies\. This will certainly
benefit infrastructure development projects in the future\.
Institutional Capacity Building\. Ningbo has gained a team of professionals with experience and skills in
a number of areas, including project management, engineering design, monitoring and site supervision,
project reporting and evaluation\.
Improvements to Urban Environment and Public Health\. With the successful implementation of this
project, there have been measurable improvements to the urban environmental conditions by essentially
eliminating all direct wastewater discharges around the urban districts thereby reducing pollution loadings
to the Hangzhou Bay\. Quality water supply is now available to most of the Ningbo residents and some
townships\. Further gradual further expansion of service area is anticipated in coming years\. This
improvement to quality water supply and wastewater treatment will make significant contribution to the
key Project design objective of sustainable economic development in Ningbo\.
Institutional Reform for Wastewater Management\. TA support evaluated CMSC structure and operation
over two years\. The study enabled Cixi to establish an unprecedented institutional structure\. The Sewage
Network Company was established and is charged with the responsibility of issuing permits for sewer
connections from urban and industrial sources and monitoring of sewer discharge qualities\. This new
organization and its mandate filled an existing functional gap in wastewater management in Cixi\.
Capacity in Water Quality Monitoring\. An on-line monitoring system was established to provide real-
time monitoring of water quality output from the WTPs\. CMSC also established an on-line monitoring
system for its operation\. Data generated allows trend analysis and other data interpretation functions in
controlling and improving WWTP operations, as well as system and network planning for the future\.
Technology Improvement and Upgrade:
(a) Strategic Site Selection of WTP â The siting of the WTP at higher elevation greatly reduces the
number of pump stations required and energy consumption\.
(b) Water Supply Ring Main - This approach is a significant technology innovative in system design,
which addressed an on-going weakness in most designs of urban water distribution system in China\. The
Design of Ring Main provides the necessary system flexibility for water flow, pressure and quality\.
(c) Wastewater Treatment & Operation â The Eastern and Northern WWTPs had both eliminated the
primary settling ponds and adopted the reverse A2O technology for higher efficiencies for two key
contaminants - de-nitrification and the removal of phosphorous, at a lower cost than conventional
technology\.
(d) Water Conservation â Both WWTPs had increased the capability for sludge dewatering with filter
press\. Recycled water is used within the WWTPs for landscaping purposes, consistent with Chinaâs
national policy for water conservation\.
(e) Sludge Management & Waste to Energy â Both WWTPs had installed belt filter press for sludge
dewatering, with the dewatered sludge having a water content of around 80% being used as fuel at a
power plant for power production\.
(f) Improvements to Discharges from WWTPs â Discharge from the WWTPs reached Chinaâs Class 1-B
standards\. After further treatment through the wetland, the final discharge is expected to reach Chinaâs
45
Class 1-A standards\. The engineered wetlands had improved local environmental conditions and provided
a nesting ground for migrating birds\.
(g) Impacts of the World Bank Safeguard Policies and Measures: Careful considerations were given
during project design to minimize potential impacts for resettlement to reduce the number of residents and
businesses that will be affected, as well as reducing costs to government in terms of compensation and
resettlement costs\. Resettlement activities for sub-components were completed in a satisfactory manner
and reasonably on schedule\.
Lessons Learned during Project Construction
(a) Support from local government is essential with the formation of a strong Project Leading Group for
oversight and coordination of major issues\.
(b) Time for Institutional Reform â Institutional reforms in China often take a much gradual approach
over a longer period of time\.
(c) Benefits of General Contractor â The use of general contractor by NWSC and CMSC have helped to
effectively implement relatively large complex projects that, otherwise would require closer supervision
by IAs in resolving on-site construction issues and quality of output\.
(d) Benefits of consulting services â Consulting services had provided essential assistance in resolving
technical issues and strengthened project management\. This aspect is usually less recognized in China\.
Areas for Further Improvements:
(a) More Details and Accuracy for Bid Documents â More specific details and accuracies in the bid
documents in order to facilitate bid evaluation and avoid changes to bid documents and the practice of
under bidding\.
(b) Structure of bid documents to reduce the ability of excessive sub-contracting by the winning bidder,
in order to assure quality of outputs\.
(c) Stronger overall project management and coordination is required for complex projects\. Closer
monitoring and coordination of project completion dates are crucial to timely identify contractor
deficiencies\.
(d) Outsourcing WWTP operation and plant maintenance work can be strategic measures in reducing
costs and gain specialized services\.
46
Annex 7\. List of Supporting Documents
CHINA: Ningbo Water and Environment Project
1\. Project Appraisal Document
2\. Loan Agreement
3\. Project Agreement
4\. Resettlement Action Plans
5\. Environmental Impact Assessment
6\. Environmental Management Plan
7\. Mission Aide Memoires and Back-to-Office Reports
8\. Project Status Reports and Implementation Status Reports
9\. Semi-annual Project Progress Reports
47
Annex 8: Environmental Monitoring Indicators
CHINA: Ningbo Water and Environment Project
This annex provides detailed data on pollution reduction, water quality and the performance of
wastewater treatment plants financed under the project\. The data presented below includes: (i)
data of treated water quality from the Maojiaping WTP; (ii) wastewater collection and treatment
rates; (ii) influent and effluent quality in the WWTPs; (iv) amount of pollution reduction; (v)
performance of the wastewater treatment plants in meeting the controlled parameters of the Class
1B discharge standard, which contributes to improving water quality data in Hangzhou Bay and
other water bodies\.
Table 1 below provides parameters of treated water quality from Maojiaping WTP, illustrating,
that the new water supply system provides a safe and reliable water supply that meets Chinaâs
drinking water standards\.
Table 1: Treated Water Quality from Maojiaping WTP
Sampling Treated Water from
(mg/l, except noted otherwise) Maojiaping WTP
Date 2009\.12\.7
Chromaticity Degree ï¼5
Turbidity NTU 0\.18
Odor None
Visible Particle None
PH 7\.1
Total hardness (CaCO3) 33
Fe ï¼0\.05
Sensory Mn ï¼0\.04
Characteristics Cu ï¼0\.08
and Chemical
Indicators Zn ï¼0\.03
Al 0\.014
CODMn (O2) 0\.72
Volatile Phenol ï¼0\.002
Anion Synthetic Detergent ï¼0\.1
Sulfate 12
Chloride 9\.4
DSS 98
Fluoride ï¼0\.1
Cyanide ï¼0\.002
Se ï¼0\.001
Toxicological
As ï¼0\.001
Indicators
Hg ï¼0\.0001
Cd ï¼0\.0002
Cr6+ ï¼0\.004
48
Sampling Treated Water from
(mg/l, except noted otherwise) Maojiaping WTP
Pb ï¼0\.0030
Nitrate 1\.8
Chloroform 0\.017
CTC 0\.0002
DDT ï¼0\.00002
BHC 0\.00006
Total Bacterial Count CFU/ml None
Microbiological Total Coliforms CFU/100ml None
Indicators Fecal Coliforms CFU/100ml None
Free Chlorine Residual 0\.90
Radioactive Gross α Radioactivity Bq/L ï¼0\.01
Indicators Gross β Radioactivity Bq/L ï¼0\.1
Total Alkalinity (CaCO3) 8\.0
Nitrite ï¼0\.001
NH3-N 0\.07
Temperature â /
Results obtained from Ningbo station of National Water Quality monitoring network
Project Contributions to Water Quality Improvements in Hangzhou Bay
Table 1 above indicate the various environmental and treated effluent standards, and reduction of
pollution loads, that otherwise would have ultimately entered Hangzhou Bay\. This data
illustrates the projectâs positive impact on the Bayâs water quality, even though no specific data
were available to track improvements in the Bayâs water quality, as it receives flows from many
sources\.
How much the water quality in Hangzhou Bay improves ultimately depends on how much
pollution is released into the Bay from all sources\. Obviously, as these WWTPs have been
operating for only a relatively short period of time, actual measurable reduction of pollution level
in Hangzhou Bay would be unlikely, even if detailed baseline data had been established prior to
project implementation\.
However, the actual reduction of waste water related pollutants discharged into the surface water
bodies (and eventually in Hangzhou Bay) can be directly calculated from effluent qualities
discharged from the project financed WWTPs and the engineered wetlands constructed, as
shown below\.
Cixi Wastewater Component â Performance Results and Representative Monitoring Data
Table 2 below shows the total annual pollution load reduction from the two WWTPs in Cixi\.
49
Table 2: Pollutant Discharge Reduction in 2010 for Cixi Wastewater Subcomponent
Pollutant Discharge Reduction of Discharge Reduction of
Northern Treatment Plant (t) Eastern Treatment Plant (t)
COD 2134\.01 305\.6
BOD 581\.76 128\.7
NH3-N 72\.11 18\.52
TN 176\.49 -
TP 102\.76 1\.5
SS 3865\.81 221\.8
Discharge Standard Achieved in the Cixi WWTPs
The data presented below illustrate the performance of the WWTPs and the eastern wetlands in
meeting the stipulated discharge standard, namely, Class 1B for WWTPs and Class 1A for
wetlands\. For purposes of comparison, permitted concentrations of Basic Controlled Parameters
of China National Standard GB18918-2006, commonly referred to as Class 1A and Class 1B, are
provided in Table 3 below\.
Table 3: National Discharge Standard (GB18918-2006)
Pollutant Influent (â¤) Effluent Effluent
Class 1B (â¤) Class 1A (â¤)
CODcr (mg/L) 400 60 50
BOD5 (mg/L) 200 20 10
SS (mg/L) 300 20 10
NH3-N (mg/L) 30 8 (15) 5 (8)
TN (mg/L) 50 20 15
TP (mg/L) 5\.5 1\.0 0\.5
Coliform No\. (Number/L) 108~109 108~109 103
Treated Effluent Quality Achieved in North and East WWTPs (GB18918-2002)
The following tables illustrate the concentrations of parameters that indicate the degree of
pollutant removal\. Table 4 indicates that the average effluent achieved meets class 1B
and in some cases, even Class 1A discharge standards\.
Table 4: Performance of North WWTP â October 2010
Removal Removal
Influent Effluent (ton/month) (ton/year)
Item
Max Min Avg Max Min Avg Removal
(mg/L) (mg/L) (mg/L) (mg/L) (mg/L) (mg/L) (%)
CODcr 2094 89 483 41 21 32 93\.3 623\.25 2,134\.01
BOD5 144 23 62\.29 18 3\.3 11\.81 81\.0 69\.78 581\.76
50
Removal Removal
Influent Effluent (ton/month) (ton/year)
Item
Max Min Avg Max Min Avg Removal
(mg/L) (mg/L) (mg/L) (mg/L) (mg/L) (mg/L) (%)
SS 7840 66 1517 33 2 15 99\.0 2,075\.50 3,865\.81
NH3-N 22\.00 3\.40 9\.42 0\.12 0\.01 0\.03 99\.7 12\.98 72\.11
TP 182\.80 0\.50 36\.66 1\.27 0\.09 0\.64 98\.3 49\.79 102\.76
TN 153\.00 6\.63 24\.43 6\.41 3\.17 4\.59 81\.2 27\.43 176\.49
pH 7\.78 7\.28 7\.56 7\.85 7\.36 7\.66 â â â
Table 5: Performance of East WWTP â October 2010
Influent Effluent
Item Max Min Avg Max Min Avg Removal
(mg/L) (mg/L) (mg/L) (mg/L) (mg/L) (mg/L) (%)
CODcr 366 68\.8 125\.3 76\.2 34\.4 47\.4 62\.2
TP 1\.2 0\.33 0\.79 0\.83 0\.12 0\.51 35\.4
NH3-N 4\.81 1\.83 2\.52 0\.41 0\.14 0\.23 90\.9
pH 8\.21 6\.77 7\.77 8\.21 6\.67 7\.82 -
SS 194 19 80 34 5 15 81\.25
Item Removal (tons/month) Removal (metric tons for the year) Note
CODcr 60 305\.6
Since March 2010
BOD5 29\.7 128\.7
NH3-N 1\.75 18\.52
TP 0\.19 1\.5 Since April 2010
SS 50\.2 221\.8
Table 6: Performance of Constructed Wetland in the Eastern WWTP â October 2010
Influent Effluent
Daily
flow BOD CO BOD Colo
COD TP NH3-N SS Color TP NH3-N SS
5 pH D 5 pH r
M3/d (mg/L) (mg/L)
10/2 23,417 44\.2 16 7\.35 16 24 0\.156 0\.0954 1 7\.42 8
10/7 26,357 54\.1 6\.6 0\.404 17 8\.18 16 31\.2 6\.4 0\.168 0\.119 4 8\.30 4
10/12 20,775 76\.2 0\.596 0\.409 24 8\.21 32 36\.4 0\.152 0\.153 2 8\.18 8
10/14 20,088 61\.7 2\.3 0\.223 18 8\.05 32 37 0\.0895 6 7\.77 8
10/19 25,359 41\.8 0\.154 15 8\.21 16 30\.4 0\.0916 0\.136 5 8\.44 8
10/21 23,116 39\.7 0\.165 15 8\.09 16 29\.5 8\.1 0\.120 0\.183 2 8\.48 8
10/25 29,490 35\.9 7 7\.93 8 35\.2 0\.200 0\.148 4 8\.35 8
51
10/28 33,424 35\.9 0\.212 16 7\.99 8 25\.4 0\.156 0\.299 2 8\.43 4
Total 202,026 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
31\.1
Ave\. 25,253 48\.68 4\.45 0\.596 0\.261 16 8\.00 18 7\.25 0\.149 0\.153 3\.25 8\.17 7
4
Max 33,424 76\.2 6\.6 0\.596 0\.409 24 8\.21 32 37 8\.1 0\.200 0\.299 6 8\.48 8
Min 20,088 35\.9 2\.3 0\.596 0\.154 7 7\.35 8 24 6\.4 0\.0916 0\.0895 1 7\.42 4
52
IBRD 33554
Hangzhou Bay
NINGBO WATER SUPPLY
CHINA
NINGBO WATER AND ENVIRONMENT PROJECT
Andong Chongshou Daishan Island
Shengshan Xinpu CIXI WASTEWATER COMPONENT
Kandunjiedao Fuhai
Xiaocao'e Changhe For detail, see inset at bottom right\.
Tianyuan
Zonghanjiedao Xiadin JIANGSU Tai Hu
Simen Zhouxiang Cixi Qiaolou Guanhaiwei RUSSIAN FEDERATION SHANGHAI
Linshan Linxia Dilang Kuangyan Shanglin Lake
Henghe Zhangqi HEILONGJIANG ANHUI
Huangijiabu
ZHOUSHAN
Du Lake Haining
Laofangqiao Meihu Fanshi
Moushan Mazhu Reservoir Sanbei Longshan MONGOLIA JILIN Sea
HANGZHOU Area of Main Map
Yuyao Zhoushan Island
L of Cixi
Xiepu O Japan
NG LIAONING D\.P\.R\. OF
Sanqishi Jintang ZHOUSHAN MO Shaoxing
Dagondye Undustrial Waterworks Jiulonghu
Xinanjiedao Meilin Waterworks Island I BEIJING KOREA Tonglu NINGBO
Zhangting 50 x 104 m3/d (planned) 10 x 104 m3/d NE
Luotuojiedao BEIJING TIANJIN
Dongnanjiedao Hemudu REP\. OF
Sheng Xian
Luhu Cicheng HEBEI Jiande Xiangshan
Zhenhaiqu Jiangdong Waterworks
SHANXI
SHANDONG KOREA JAPAN
NINGXIA
NINGBO WATER SUPPLY
Yellow
Hongtang Xiaogang 35 x 104 m3/d Sea Lanxi
Dayin QINGHAI
For detail, see IBRD 33702\. Zhuangqiao Zhuangshijiedao
Beilunqu
Daxie
GANSU JIANGSU Qu Xian
Island SHAANXI HENAN
Nanjiao Waterworks Gaoqiao
Nangnong
20 x 104 m3/d
Yongjiang
NINGBO Daqi ANHUI
SHANGHAI
East
ZHEJIANG Linhai
Xiapu HUBEI
Jishigang Yinzhouqu Chaiqiao Baifeng China
G
ZHEJIANG
IN
Jiaokou Reservoir Hengjie SICHUAN JIANGXI Lishui
GQ
Qiu'ai Guoju Sea
ON
500,000 m3/d Beilun Waterworks
XI
CH
HUNAN
JIANG
Gulin Zhonggongmiao 30 x 104 m3/d (under construction) Taohua FUJIAN
Yunhe
Zhangshui Dongwu Meishan Island GUIZHOU Longquan Wenzhou
Zhougongzhai Reservoir Xiaying Dongqianhu TAIWAN E A S T
Sanshan Meishan
(under construction) Island YUNNAN GUANGDONG Ruianyaozhuang
Jiangshan Yunlong GUANGXI Philippine
Dongqiao C H I N A
Zhangxi Longguan Yinjiang Dongqian
HONG KONG Sea
³/d
Maoshan Lake MACAO S E A
Zhanqi LAO VIETNAM
0m
Simingshan Liuheng
00 HAINAN
Xiaozhen Pumping 2 50 ,
Hengxi
Island
P\.D\.R\. PHILIPPINES F U J I A N
Station
Hengxi Xianxiang
Xikou Xiwu Lake Tangxi
Tingxia Reservoir
Beidu Pumping
Fenghua
/d Dongqianhu Waterworks CIXI WASTEWATER COMPONENT WASTEWATER COMPONENTS:
m³
Station 0 0 50 x 104 m3/d (under construction) COLLECTION SYSTEM PIPES
Shanxian 0,0
25
0- Qiucun Song'ao FUTURE PUMPING STATIONS
20
Hengshan Reservoir Hangzhou Bay
Chunhu Huangbi'ao WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANT (EXISTING)
/ d Tuci
m³ WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANTS (FUTURE)
00 Shitangheng North WWTP
0 0,0 Daxu
-7 Sea-Gate Scale 10 x 104 m3/d SERVICE AREAS
00
SHAOXING Dayan 6
Xidian Western Trunk Sewer System
EXISTING SEA-GATES
Xizhou Juexijiedao DN400 â 1800mm; L: 30km
Qiangjiao Xiashen Qiangtou Xiangshan WETLANDS
Jiushanlie
Daijiahe Archipelago EXISTING CANALS
Shenzhen
Maoyang
Dongehen
Sizhoutou BANK PROJECTS:
Chongshou
WATER SUPPLY LINES
Andong Mid Trunk Sewer System
DN400 â 1800mm; L: 36km
Chayuan Huchen Xinqiao INTAKE TOWERS 0 2 4 6 8 10
Shuangleng Ninghai
Liyang Shengshan Xinpu
TREATMENT PLANTS KILOMETERS
Huangtan Kandunjiedao Fuhai
Baixi Reservoir WATERWORKS:
Yuexi Chengie Changguo Changhe
Dingtang PIPELINES
Qiantong
Xiaotang Shipu
PUMPING STATIONS
Tianyuan
Yishi
Chalu East WWTP
Minggang Zonghanjiedao
TREATMENT PLANTS Zhouxiang Cixi Xiadin Scale 5 x 104 m3/d
Hepu Guanhaiwei
MAIN TOWNS Sangzhou Qiaolou Danshuihong
Gaotang Island
Dilang Sea-Gate
SUB-MUNICIPALITY (COUNTY) CAPITALS Gaotang Nantian
Island
Kuangyan
0 5 10 15 20
MUNICIPALITY (PREFECTURE) CAPITALS
RESERVOIRS KILOMETERS Henghe
Hua'ao Zhangqi
RIVERS AND CANALS Island Shanglin
Lake Du Lake
RAILROADS Laofangqiao Fanshi
EXPRESSWAYS TA I Z H O U This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank\.
Meihu
Reservoir
Sanbei
NATIONAL HIGHWAYS The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information
shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank
Longshan
SUB-MUNICIPALITY (COUNTY) BOUNDARIES Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any
endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries\. Yuyao Eastern Trunk Sewer System
MUNICIPALITY (PREFECTURE) BOUNDARIES DN400 â 1650mm; L: 34km
MAY 2011
IBRD 33702
Hangzhou Bay
NINGBO WATER SUPPLY
CHINA
NINGBO WATER AND ENVIRONMENT PROJECT
Andong Chongshou Daishan Island
Shengshan Xinpu CIXI WASTEWATER COMPONENT
Kandunjiedao Fuhai
Xiaocao'e Changhe For detail, see IBRD 33554\.
Tianyuan
Zonghanjiedao Xiadin JIANGSU Tai Hu
Simen Zhouxiang Cixi Qiaolou Guanhaiwei RUSSIAN FEDERATION SHANGHAI
Linshan Linxia Dilang Kuangyan Shanglin Lake
Henghe Zhangqi HEILONGJIANG ANHUI
Huangijiabu
ZHOUSHAN
Du Lake Haining
Laofangqiao Meihu Fanshi
Moushan Mazhu Reservoir Sanbei Longshan MONGOLIA JILIN Sea
HANGZHOU Area of Main Map
Yuyao Zhoushan Island
L of Cixi
Xiepu O Japan
NG LIAONING D\.P\.R\. OF
Sanqishi Jintang ZHOUSHAN MO Shaoxing
Dagondye Undustrial Waterworks Jiulonghu
Xinanjiedao Meilin Waterworks Island I BEIJING KOREA Tonglu NINGBO
Zhangting 50 x 104 m3/d (planned) 10 x 104 m3/d NE
Luotuojiedao BEIJING TIANJIN
Dongnanjiedao Hemudu REP\. OF
Sheng Xian
Luhu Cicheng HEBEI Jiande Xiangshan
Zhenhaiqu Jiangdong Waterworks
SHANXI
SHANDONG KOREA JAPAN
NINGXIA
NINGBO WATER SUPPLY
Yellow
Hongtang Xiaogang 35 x 104 m3/d Sea Lanxi
Dayin QINGHAI
For detail, see inset at bottom right\. Zhuangqiao Zhuangshijiedao
Beilunqu
Daxie
GANSU JIANGSU Qu Xian
Island SHAANXI HENAN
Nanjiao Waterworks Gaoqiao
Nangnong
20 x 104 m3/d
Yongjiang
NINGBO Daqi ANHUI
SHANGHAI
East
ZHEJIANG Linhai
Xiapu HUBEI
Jishigang Yinzhouqu Chaiqiao Baifeng China
G
ZHEJIANG
IN
Jiaokou Reservoir Hengjie SICHUAN JIANGXI Lishui
GQ
Qiu'ai Guoju Sea
ON
500,000 m3/d Beilun Waterworks
XI
CH
HUNAN
JIANG
Gulin Zhonggongmiao 30 x 104 m3/d (under construction) Taohua FUJIAN
Yunhe
Zhangshui Dongwu Meishan Island GUIZHOU Longquan Wenzhou
Zhougongzhai Reservoir Xiaying Dongqianhu TAIWAN E A S T
Sanshan Meishan
(under construction) Island YUNNAN GUANGDONG Ruianyaozhuang
Jiangshan Yunlong GUANGXI Philippine
Dongqiao C H I N A
Zhangxi Longguan Yinjiang Dongqian
HONG KONG Sea
³/d
Maoshan Lake MACAO S E A
Zhanqi LAO VIETNAM
0m
Simingshan Liuheng
00 HAINAN
Xiaozhen Pumping 2 50 ,
Hengxi
Island
P\.D\.R\. PHILIPPINES F U J I A N
Station
Hengxi Xianxiang
Xikou Xiwu Lake Tangxi
Tingxia Reservoir
Beidu Pumping
Fenghua
/d Dongqianhu Waterworks NINGBO WATER SUPPLY 0 1 2 3 4 5
m³
Station 00 50 x 104 m3/d (under construction) KILOMETERS
Shanxian 0,0
25
0- Qiucun Song'ao BANK PROJECTS:
20
Hengshan Reservoir Hemudu
Chunhu WATER SUPPLY LINES
d
Huangbi'ao Luotuojiedao
/ Tuci
m³ INTAKE TOWERS Cicheng
00
0,0 Daxu
70 Water Supply Ring Main
0- TREATMENT PLANTS
60
SHAOXING Dayan
Xidian WATERWORKS:
DN2000 â 8\.83km
Xizhou Juexijiedao Hongtang
Qiangjiao Xiashen Qiangtou Xiangshan PIPELINES
Jiushanlie Water Supply Ring Main
Daijiahe Archipelago PUMPING STATIONS
Shenzhen DN2000 â 12\.35km Zhuangqiao
Dayin
Maoyang TREATMENT PLANTS Meilin Waterworks
Dongehen Dagongye Waterworks 10 x 104 m3/d
Sizhoutou BANK PROJECTS: 50 x 104 m3/d (planned)
Yongjiang
WATER SUPPLY LINES
Chayuan Huchen Xinqiao INTAKE TOWERS Gaoqiao
Liyang
Water Supply Main
Shuangleng Ninghai TREATMENT PLANTS DN2000 â 6\.84km +
Huangtan DN1800 â 5\.2km
Baixi Reservoir WATERWORKS: Intake Tower of NINGBO Yinzhouqu
Yuexi Chengie Changguo Jiakou Reservoir Jishigang
Dingtang PIPELINES 50 x 104 m3/d
Qiantong Jiangdong Waterworks
Shipu Hengjie
Chalu Yishi Xiaotang PUMPING STATIONS Diameter Change 35 x 104 m3/d
Minggang Point
TREATMENT PLANTS Water Supply Main Nanjiao Waterworks
Hepu DN2000 x2 â 1\.16km + 20 x 104 m3/d
MAIN TOWNS Sangzhou
Gaotang Island DN2600 â 6\.97km
SUB-MUNICIPALITY (COUNTY) CAPITALS Gaotang Nantian Gulin
MUNICIPALITY (PREFECTURE) CAPITALS
Island 0 5 10 15 20 Zhonggongmiao
Zhangshui Water Supply Main
RESERVOIRS KILOMETERS DN2000 â 3\.7km + Water Supply
Hua'ao DN1800 â 5\.0km
RIVERS AND CANALS Island Ring Main
Raw Water Transmission Tunnel DN2000 â 18\.1km
RAILROADS DN2400 â 9\.55km Beidu Pumping Station
EXPRESSWAYS TA I Z H O U ³/d Water Supply Ring Main
0m
This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank\. Maojiaping Waterworks
,00
NATIONAL HIGHWAYS The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information 50 x 104 m3/d DN1800 â 8\.03km
shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank
2 50 Yunlong
SUB-MUNICIPALITY (COUNTY) BOUNDARIES Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any
endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries\.
Yinjiang
MUNICIPALITY (PREFECTURE) BOUNDARIES Longguan
MAY 2011 | APPROVAL |
P000844 | CIRCULATING COPY \. \.
TO BE RETURNED TO REPORTS DESK 77 mn
DOCUMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION
Not For Public Use
Report No\. P_1254
REPORT AND RECOVMENDATION
OF THE
PRESIDENT
TO THE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS
ON A
PROPOSED CREDIT
TO
THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA
FOR A
FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT
October, 15, 1973
hie Orepors prtedPpaed fo offrcialuseonlybythe Bac G°up\. Ip tnay not be Published,
I q u t edo r it e w i h o u B a k G r u p ut1 onz ti0 T h B a k GGo up d o e s n o t acc ep t
RATE CF EXCHA?NGE
(since February 12, 1973)
Currency Unit = Cedi (%)
US$1\.00 = ¢1\.15
$1\.00 = US$0\.87
¢1\.00 = 100 pesewas
Fiscal Year - July 1 to June 30
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOP MENT ASSOCIATION
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT
TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A PROPOSED CREDIT
TO THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA
FOR A FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT
1\. I submit the following report and recommendation on a proposed
development credit to Ghana for the equivalent of US$13\.0 million on
standard IDA terms to help finance a project for the rehabilitation of
about 345 miles of trunk roads and preparation of further road rehabili-
tation works\.
PART I - THE ECONOMY
2\. The last IBRD Economic Report (R72-223, October 3, 1972) drew
attention to the structural problems of Ghana's economy\. It described,
in particular, the imbalances on external account and in public finances
which have characterized the economy in recent years\. Country data are
given in Annex I\.
3\. On external account, the problem has been a persistent failure
to reduce dependence on cocoa exports or to develop domestic production of
import substitutes\. Cocoa still accounts for about 70 percent of merchandise
exports\. With slow-growing world demand and widely fluctuating world cocoa
prices, the balance of payments situation remains highly unstable\.
4\. On public finances, there has been a persistent tendency for
budget current expenditures to rise at a rapid rate and to outstrip
budget revenues which are overly dependent on cocoa export duties and
import taxes\. In addition to the imbalance in the government budget
per se, there are a large number of public agencies and enterprises whose
activities have not been subjected to adequate economic tests, and which
have remained dependent on budget support or easy access to bank borrowings,
This imbalance in public finances and the generally high conswuption orienta-
tion of the economy have eroded potential savings and produced strong
inflationary pressures\.
5\. In describing these basic problems, the last report concluded
that, even with vigorous and determined policies on the part of the Govern-
ment, the necessary structural adjustments could only be effected gradually\.
Nevertheless, favorable external developments and government policy action
over the past year have led to some progress in laying the basis for a more
secure and sustained development\.
6\. Preliminary estimates for 1972 1/ indicate that, largely as
a result of restrictions imposed by the Government, the level of imports
was reduced by about 35 percent below the 1971 level\. This seems to have
been achieved without yet creating any major shortages or bottlenecks in
the economy\. However, the high level of stocks held at the end of 1971
was an important contributing factor\.
7\. Merchandise exports increased by about 7 percent in 1972\. While
this increase in exports was in large measure due to favorable world cocoa
prices, which rose from about US cents 24 per lb at end 1971 to US cents 38
per lb at end 1972, gold and timber exports also increased significantly\.
8\. As a result of the heavy retrenchment of imports and improved
export earnings, there was a trade surplus of US$155 million in 1972 com-
pared to a deficit of US$28 million in 1971\. With the cut in imports,
net payments on freight and insurance as well as on investment income
account also registered a sharp decline\. Furthermore, following the
Government's February 5, 1972 announcement on debt, there were no service
payments on the very sizable medium-term supplier credits contracted before
February 1966\. The result was an apparent overall surplus of about $140
million in 1972, and after payments to the IM1' and to several countries on
bilateral trade agreements, central bank net reserves went up b-y about
$125 million during the year\. World prices for Glana's principal exports
remained favorable during the first seven months of 1973\.
9\. Unlike previous years, the balance of payments surplus in
1972 has been used to build up reserves and to repay some short-term debt
($33 million during January-June 1973) rather than to permit a rapid ex-
pansion in imports\. At the same time, a bonus scheme ias encouraged non-
traditional exports with success in expanding exports of textiles and
cocoa beverages\.
10\. Provisional information on the likely out-turn of the government
budget for 1972/73 (fiscal year ending in June) indicates higher-than-estimated
receipts from cocoa export duties and continued improvements in personal income
and company tax collections\. Recurrent expenditures have been kept close to
the original budget target, and in contrast with previous years there has been
no significant slippage in development expenditures\. As a result, the overall
budget deficit for 1972/73 is likely to be kept down to about ¢70 million, which
would be in line with the original budget estimates\. Another favorable develop--
ment has been the sharp cut-back during the second half of the fiscal year in
the expansion of bank borrowing by the extra-budgetary state enterprises and
agencies\.
1/ A more precise analysis of recent balance of payments developments is
impeded by the sharp turn around in "errors and omissions" which changed
from a positive position of $14 million in 1971 to a negative $60 million
in 1972\. When more final estimates of imports, trade credits, arrears on
current payment, direct investment, etc\. are available, the large fluctuations
in the item "errors and omissioad'may be more adequately explainable\. Pre-
liminary estimates for 1972 balance of payments are therefore subject to
these limitations\.
- 3 -
11\. From April 1972 to April 1973, money supply (including quasi-money)
expanded by about 20 percent, compared to arn increase of 33 percent in the
corresponding period a year earlier\. This monetary expansion appears to
have resulted in somewhat more moderate price increases than had been anti-
cipated in the last Bank economic report\. Preliminary indications are that
the cost-of-living index for 1972 was about 11-12 percent above the level of
the previous year\. However, the main buffer between the considerable monetary
expansion and actual price increases has been the rapid build-up of liquidity
in the banking system (saving and time deposits increased substantially in
1972)\. Thus, there remains a latent, serious inflationary pressure which points
to the need for a further tightening in monetary and budget policy\.
12\. Reliable information on overall production developments in 7972 is
still not available\. The "Operation Feed\. Yourself" programu had a favorable
effect on certain food crops, but its full effects remain to be determined,
and there is evidence of difficulties in the storage and distribution of the
expanded food supplies\. With the substantial decline in imports, the supply
of goods to the economy is unlikely to have expanded in 1972, and the growth
of GDP has probably been only about 2 percent in real terms\.
13\. While therefore there has been some improvement in Ghana's economic
Derfonrance, a solution has still to be found for the external debt problea\.
Significant progress has been made in this direction since the sugar rehabili-
tation project was approved by the Executive Directors last December\. In
late July a first meeting was held in Aecra between the Government of Ghana
and representatives of sone of the creditor Governments to prepare the wa-y for
full-scale discussions later this year\. Tne possibility of having fraitfiul
direct discussions on the debt issue in the fall depended upon Ghana's oroposing
a formula for its review of the contracts which gave rise to the disputed
medium-tens debts, contracts which the Government has reserved its right to
challenge on the ground that some of them have been shown to be "tainted and
vitiated by corruption and other forms, of illegality", while in other cases
"there has been a fundamental breach of contract on the part of the contractors"
Such a formula was presentec to the creditors in mid-September which naow removes
the major obstacle in the way of further talks\. Accordingly, the creditors
Rave proposed a new date for the continuation of talks in which the Government
of ahana had previously indicated its preparedness to participate\. From our
review of the questions raised in the creditors' counnunication and from sub-
sequent discussions with the Ghanaian authorities irn early October, we can
reasonably expect substantive negotiations to begin before the end of 1973,
14\. Meanwhile, the Ghana Government is currently engaged in negotiations
with certain foreign firms over its acquisition of a 55 percent interest in
foreign-owned extractive industries in accordance with a decree issuaed last
December\. The Government issued a further statement in January 1973 anmouncing
its intention to negotiate participations ranging from 20 percent to 55 percent
in the equity of other foreign -owned enterprises, and negotiations with respect
to some of these participations hLave also begun\.
15\. No meaningful assessment can be made of Ghanars creditworthiness for
external borrowing pending a settlement of the debt and compensation issues,
and no Bank lending to Ghana is contemplated at tne present time\. The further
- 4 -
IDA operation now proposed can, however, be justified by the improvement in
the economic situation, which is directly attributable in part to changes in
government policy, and by Ghana's readiness to enter into direct discussions
on meaium-term debt with its creditors\.
PART II - BANK GROUP OPERATIONS IN GHANA
16\. The Bank Group has lent Ghana US$100\.5 million, of which US$47 million
was a Bank loan for the Volta dam and associated infrastructure in 1962\. The
remainder has been lent since 1968 for power, cocoa, waver supp`y and sewerage,
fisheries, highway design and sugar rehabilitation\. Annex II contains a
summary statement of loans and creaits as of August 31, 1973 as well as notes
on projects in execution\. Tnere are no major problems in these activities
with the exception of the fisheries project (Credit 163-GH)\.
17\. As indicated in the last economic report, Ghana is facing the major
task of restructuring its economy\. The Government's appreciation of this
is clearly manifested in its efforts to achieve greater self-sufficiency
in food and to spread agricultural development more widely\. Bank Group support
of this objective will entail stronger emphasis on the agricultural sector,
as reflected in the sugar rehabilitation project approved in December 1972\.
Proposed cotton, livestocl; oil palrr\. and rice projects will be given particular
emphasis in future Bank Group lending\. It also will be important to improve
the Agricultural Development Bank which coula serve an important function
in the Governmentis new agricultural program\. Projects in wnich the Bank
Group participates will focus on institution-buildirLg and training of Ghanaian
nationals as a basis for further improvements in project preparation and greater
competence in project implementation\.
18\. In infrastructure, future Bank Group activity will remain substantial
but should gradually decline as joint financing with other donors develops\.
The public utilities with which the Bank has been cooperating are functioning
well and should increasingly be able to attract financing from a number of
bilateral sources\. Except for the new field of telecommunications, future
infrastructure projects are likely to be mainly follow-on projects in line
withl growth oI demand for water, power and sewerage\.
19\. The Bank has also appraised water supply and telecommunications
projects\. The first project entails a proposal to increase water supply to
the Accra/Tema metropolitan area and adjacent rural sections, following on the
successful execution of Credit 160-GH\. Further, a project has been prepared to
meet Ghana's more pressing telecommunications requirements, including the reha-
bilitiation of exchanges and long-distance facilities, expansion of local
exchange caapacity, and extension of long-dictance and telex networkse
Co-financing arrangements for the latter two projects are now being
discussed with other aid agencies\.
20\. The Bank Group's share in Ghana's total external debt is small
(about 10-11 percent) in relation to other lenders, but it was approximately
20 percent of long-term official debt outstanding at the end of 1971\.
Bilateral commitments of external assistance just before 1972 totalled just
over $50 million per annum\. In the future, Ghana will not only need to
reach a satisfactory settlement of the medium-term debt problem cited in
paragraph 13 above\. It also must mobilize substantial resources for its
development\. There are some prospects for further diversification of the
sources of external aid\. The Consultative Group, if it can be reactivated,
should facilitate the enlistment and coordination of this assistance, in-
cluding co-financing arrangements\.
PART III - TTh41ISPO0TAT-I0-N IN GHAINA
21\. Ghana's transnort infrastructure caln support a hilher level of
Juture eco-omic activity if there i\. ormt rehabilitation of some fast-
deterioratin road sect-ons and if a regular', more adequate maintenance
prograr is inmtircuted\. Road transport is the domnnant mode, acconting for
about 70 percr t and i0 percent of tota-l freight anid passenger move;ients
rcZpectiveli " ine next izportant \.mcaa_ 2 c te\. 1caiy aio ' es'1 Ui
connects Chonalz three main cities and has carried a decliirnrC voiiu-;e of
freight, mo-t]-y tim,ber\. over the lat few years\. Coastal shipping and
rrver transpor' are ne-ligible0 TMe Ghana Airma\.ys provides both do;,restic
and international services, but is characterized by low domestic demncud
and stiff intcrnlational ccmpetition\.
22\. Ln 1960\. Ghana possessed perhaps the finest road network- of any
country in tropical Africa\. Since tha,t time, hoTevere, the 20,000-mile
oad nctwcrk lias deteriorated si-nificantly, partly because of a series
of disruotive organizational\. chanpes in the odministration of road
construction and maintenance\. Previously adeqoate budget, for maintenance
wyere cut to rmeager amounts and some of thes_ vare dierute to other pro-
kjttsA r 1967, the iUovermnent \.auinch-d a\. sizab:le fee6eir road program\.
wh-\.-ch re eeif\.d the Tcal70or pat)\.rt of trincport ;udget support) in order to Join
pro;ring agr-icultural areas to exi-;ting rads\. It also decided to
ae\.tl'rict thie construction of nei, buays\. P espite the feea'er\.c roadl efforts,
tra\.s-portsticdn bottlenecks have con-tiAnued to -e s:eriouls constraint-s to
t'i grnth of the cconmy\., pa-ticu'i\.rly on thc; mcv;:an cf agr1c1'tr\.
coni]itoditie5 r
- 6 -
23\. Within the overall highway net;rork, Ghanals fairly sizable truik
road systum (totalling about 6,3CO -,les) was built a-t low cost0 For tbhe
reasons indicated above, \.a car re nwnuhr of those roads are now deficient
vo hand-iLc their pre_ent -trafi,o They r-equire considerably stepped-up
rehabilitation and maintenance mne &overnm\.ent has been aware of
those problenis tad , t reaed to lestore this system to better corct,aa-ons0
Over tfr-t n-st eir\. vet S t inr\.reased h:i nh maintenanice expendI:-
ture considerably-\. Govenment uinds hose 'Leen expoKiued on a number of 'oad
rehabilkieattion and improvement projects\. The 1972/73 buIdget riclded a
relatively high level of highway expendi,tures (about P`28 million)0
24\. Ghana dons not hare an effective highway planning agency and
highway 1t:-\.aiintcnance is g*ano3rally socrr±aic and inadequate\. Traf fic regula-
tions and enforcecm\.e\.nt also) nleed strvengthe: i g\. Sect,or plarxning and coor-
diJ-iatioci are w-eek at all levrlO\. 7Variou5s asDects and modes of trans-
portatiaon have beer vested in differeri ministries and corporations at
both state ard local\. levels with poor results\. Followi_ng the recorrendiations
cof a P19¼-7TO st-udy, ca planning and bucidgot unit was established in Ule
Yinistrn of Transport and Ccmrnicaticnz Concerted planningS in the sector
is imnpeded, howeve-, yr the l-ack of qualified and experienced prsonnel\.
Althouh- the cuirrent GcovernninbLt hlas not disseminated an explicit transport
sector volicy, it r:ealizes t'he importance cf comrpDrehensive planning and
eoordxnation and is wforking closely with the ,arn to establish effective
adsnn\.l ::§;z- -trilarly c,the a i at it2s
-uit'fl l th; n:eed tow st;'engtiie ii4 way riaanenaceB and t4o overco,e the
deficiencies in thle construction of feeder roads0
25\. With the fruition of these plub , the attendant improvements
wo-ld sL;:cngly norment the Gosernment s efforts in the agriculture sW-tor0
For tV-h past several years, there has been a pressing need to ensure that
availblch\.e fcod sun,lies -each uribar markets more regularly and expeditiously>
Frequently, such ex'onlies have stroiled in rural producing areas wThile
food prrices in the main no-ulation centers have fluctuated because cf
shortag,es acrn r-g from 3Jek'nse so in the distribution system\. Tne trans-
port of raw\. natarials to local inustries has also been irregular0
'di ilarDy, cocoa aUc timber excorts ha-ve suffered from shortages in
effeobivnf ;transport0 7The pro<posedl proje'ctu, therefore, is of high priority
i,with-in the now govcrnuc asTr eccnoric prop-yam
PA'T TrV - TsHL PROJECT
26\. A ror-l- r iled (l- Amps sisal of a First Highway Project"'
(KlX >--l l Jt ~|fl Sy -1)73) is boing;> ' t, circulatcd s\.erarataLy to the E\.-ecutivc
DJie- ^ot§a o0 A';: cred\.t a\.,d pro`eca, s-rrrx i, provided in Annex lDII\.
-7-
27\. The proposed project fc ]lowis a Bank G,roup highway engineering
o-era\.ion zir 3,han:\. T? project preparation credit (S7-GH) which was made in
1969 helped to finance the engineering design of two new highways in the "Golden
Trianrge` between Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi\. The work was completed satisfac-
tori\.ly, but the Governmentp with Association agreement, chose to defer construction
ef thosse :rlaWor hign \. iy in fa-vor of grea'er oriorities on highway re\.s-
t-r,ation -\.nd onllntace olus n,7-icsi,on of feedler roads\. Consequently,
urn; uo~ar:Lue lt \.reuosLud dann3ak CGroup assistarnce to help rehabilitate the
- :t \.it _Ltic *\.et'\.Li '' s its t ; road n:\.twc-\.;s\.
28 rThe proposed project is based on the conclusions of economic and
enrinneering stubdies by Scott, W4i]son, Kirkpatrick and Fartners (S\.;?;T) whose
services were obtained under UJK financing\. SWKP's study of some
2,:0o mi]es Of roads led -to a olPn for rehalbilitating and improving abcut
?'5c n;ilcs o' particular u-:gencvy A project pr'oposal was first appra-ised
i0n October/ANovember 1971\. It was reappraised in lNovember 1972 due to
changes in its scove recuested b- the Govern nent and attendant cost
-\.-i0Js ion 'iThe Government, which meanmwhile i:moroved some 30 percenit of
roads incJ\.ude?d in the original list, has si\.nce also postponed the improvecment of
mo)\.le \.iuan 1T,G mil es of the initi\.a:L scope of iiork\. l'he rehabilitation of
the bulk of th-e remai_nder o' the highi priority road improvements SvKl?
i\.dentifi\.ed ccnstitutes the basis of this project\.
29\. The project consists of:
athrc: year n-c-ran o i-' 17i '1 im_\. \._n?
sect,ioO o£ tr,:n3 road t,otalling- about 34 miles and
consultant-s ' services in su,,cr-vi sina suc'; works:
ii) pre-irnvestment studies which would provide the
basis of further road improvement projects;
ii:l\.) provisai cci of equ:ipnent for tra,\.fic cointrol and pavement
surveys; and
iv) the formu\.lation of a program, to improve road maintenance\.
30Q The trunk roads -which waould be rehabilitated under thhe project
ore locatUed pr2cnazrily along four major routes principally in the densely
populated sou-thern re-ions of Ghanala\. These are in zones with high ar-ri'
cuD tural ichivity\. Th*n main traffic of the road secti-ons in the project
iLncluldes cocoa, fish,, naaze and other foodstuffs, as well as timber\. The
project would therefore complement the Government's present substarbial
:'' nde\.rnt,s 0-er trejt'r \.acri cultulrcl prcdiiction\. Significant -crc'\. \.ser
co-t snv5nr-~\. should accrue, as -ell as reductions in maintenance expcnditures\.
31\. Tha'r, projmCt ha1s rporVrUt\. in-titution-building ai-ms\. Its provisions
seekc to reiniforce rt«enit; (3ov,erc, deotor;, -tand *:ctions desi\.gned to correct
the organizational \.nd admL nistrJ,l`ive problem\.s which have plagued the
nat-onal -ca_;6 acti-vities, over the ras't- years\. These nreasures are related
to (i) im-2pro%ing 'hc l,a'Lning and superv\.is:iet- of highway invest,m-rients,
(51i;) fi-;\.3r ctronir- c Ztr l asthorit:r to eoordirate and 2upervri ' hi_- Tay
c; a-n lana ranagam'mt; and (iii ) str,e\.ngtIhen-,,n finac il co-nt2rCl
over the reg(ions' hi j^h,-iay exp2 nditu,res\. Tia p)articular the project w,ould
tr'G7er~g i,w,i,\.e: thle Duhil'c ':i'O!:'kS Bu';il\.i'\. ,;,-n,S pHsen,'l-T, nucleus of a plan1Ling
unit whhose exoanoded :fJnctionrs arm 5 r,esponsi1\.ilit'ies wer- agreed upon in
nae;otiatio\.ns,\. T'h prozeed\. of the Credit include provisions for the
procure-l!enl4t of equ-pr-i,enr\.G for tile uLrnit to ccf!lplete: a roa\.d inventory\. Addi--
t ional funcds are nrcvided tGo assis,t in t,ne preparation of a highway
rraintenance progran\.l
32\. The tot1l cost of the --oject is estimeted at ahout US$19\.5
-,3illion eq-uivalent, with an estimated foreign exchange componenrt of about
US$t13_0 -n-'llon or c<out 55 *perc\.nt\. An hA credit of JS$13\.0 rillion e-uTd
finance the foreign e-:change and mirake a contribution to local CoS\. Ene
balanco of local costs, amount:i;ig to about 33 Percent of the total cost
would be financed by the Ghanaian Govermnent\. The Credit would finarce
approximately 70 percent of project costs net\. of taxes\.
33\. The -Iroject would i-nvolve -widening\., base reconstruction- and bitu-
n\.nizat ion of thirtee-n sections of trunkc roac s\. Thi, would reduce vehicle
n-\.rat`i--; th-i\.m K;hz otI rwise contin< to rise a\.nd avert more cor- t
reconst\.ruction in the near future\. Tlhe supervision and training services
to be provid'ied under the project are required for qualiLy control which thie
un,ve:-nmen-, cannot undertale\. and for imnar 'LJ_!ang iamportant skills to Cn\.maian
perso nnel The prorosed project, would \.;0so provide traffic counters and
eo\.uipment, for tasting the s-t6ructural strengt71h of road pavements, as wel'
as vehicle -w-eigh-ng sc\.ales which would assist, in the reinforce,nent of we½,Zht
l-irut regulat,ions\.
34\. all major work's =nd proculreoment under the credit would be through
_nternati,onal competit;\.ve biddinc\. procedures in accordan-ce with t,he Bank'I
Guidelines\. The project affords an excellent opportunity for local small-
scale contractors to compete in the bidding\. The thirteen road sections to
be improved range from 2\.5 to 81 miles, and individual lots will range from
about GO`,0C0000 to, abouw,i million\. Cort c\. tors mav bid for a single road
sectiol Or(i or (o),Ontio, Dule to the small size of many lots,
involviing only a li_ited amount of heavy earthi works, relatively labor-
sntcnsive operations aroe e`pecte-to resu]lt, giving employment to about 1_000
35\. tis;i rsciorns3 undrl the Cred it will be made for: (a) 65C percent
of total efxvendit ure ",r aroad reh ilit-t ion and imnrovement work-s!
0b) 7'0 ercent ot te t,ota:L co\.t of consult ig servnices for the suTervision
controct ac n prepar\.,tion :\.L' firther road rrhlabilitation activities; (c) 100
use:1,_- eC2 1: ;\.l( " O lf al I I( Ie '\.":0 o\. ,\.r-' c\.rw -ne road rniaintenronce
*\.r ogc; an,cl (a) thc f"l' Cost o` ccuiPment purchases\.
-9-
36\. The arinistry of l'orks and Rousing will be responsible for executing
the project and will retain consultants to provide direct field super-
vision\. Consultants would help establish a project unit under Ghanaian
directioin to support field steff, and coordinate execution of the rehabilitation
and improvemnent ,Torl:s\. Preparation of pre-qualifications and invitation to
ten,oer dcu"'ents has beg-'n\. Theo GT^errnent also is proceeding :\.ith arr-n,,\.e-
\.n-ts to aetair' '\.' f'or procezssng zrd evaluating pre-qualitic&ation
applicants in advance of the possible approval of the recommended Credit\.
About U$4-3-i,O2C000 of the Credit iwou1d £inai1\.ce the forcion exchange cost of
these services retroactively\. The Governnvent further has been pursuing
the negotiation of a contract for const\.ruction supervision with SWK P\.
37\. The road Dnprovements envisaged in the project will reduice high
operating costs on the roads preserntly in disrepair\. They should facilitate
more efficient and increased agricultural production\. The analysis of all
road sections indicates a weighted average economic return of
about 22 percent for the total rehabilitta\.on and improvement works\.
PART V - LEGAL INSTRUM4ENTS AND AUTHORITY
38\. A draft Credit Agreement between the Republic of Ghana and the Asso-
ciation,, thle Pecorinu*ndation of the Cormnittee provided for in Article V\.
Sectio,, 1 (d) of t Ae Articles of Agreemint of the A\.ssociation, end the tet of
a resolui;ionl approv:ing the proposed credit; a^e being distributed separate'y
to the Exccut-r- Dixectors * The draft' a\.-Le;;;rent confonr:s to the norrne v
pattern for credits for highway rehabilitation\. pro,jects\.
39\. I am satisfied that the proposed developTent credit would comply
with the Articles of A\.greemont of the Association\.
PART VI - RECO4-LEIDATION
4a\. I reconmmend that the Executive Directors approve the proposed
Credit\.
Robert S\. McNsirara
-'resident
Octbtacer i,nt97
October 15\. 1973
ANNEX 1
Pave 1 of 2 paves
COUNTRY DATA - GHANA
ARF-A 2/ POPULATION DENSITY
238537 kacr 8\.6\. million (mid-1970) 36 per 16/
Rate of Growth: (from 1960to1970 ) * per kmVof arable land
2\.6 - 3\.0
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS ( 1970 3EALTH (year)
Crude Birth Rate (per 1,000) 48 Population per physician 14 956 (1969)
Crude Death Rate (per 1,000) 17 Population per hospital bed i231 (1970)
Infant Mortality (per 1,000 live births) 160 (1960 census)
INCOME DISTRIBUTION (1 967 ) Urban Rural DISTRIBUTION OF LAND OWNERSHIP
% of national income, lowest quartile k75\.f8 42\.8 % owned by top 10% of owners
highest quartile 11\.4 ll\.l % owned by smallest 107\. of owners
ACCESS TO PIPED AiD FID 7 \.LIC V WATER (1970/71) ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY (year)
% of population - urban 70% % of population - urban ) 17%
- rural 10% - rural
NUrRITION (year) EDUCATION ( 1969-70)
Calorie intake as % of requirements \. Adult liter\.ay rate %0o
Per capita protein intake \. Primary school enrollment % 74% (6-11 age group)
1/
GNP PER CAPITA in 1971: US $ 254
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN 19703/ ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH (7\. constant prices)
US $ Mln\. 7% 1960-65 1965-70 1971
GNP at Market Prices 2/ 2L77 100\.0 3\.2 2\.0
Gross Domestic Investment 318 12\.8 4\.2 -5\.5
Gross National Saving 25? 10\.2 10\.3 -11\.0
Current Account Balance -66 -2\.7
Exports of Goods, NFS 465 18\.8 4-3 -1\.5
Imports of Goods, NFS 495 20\.0 0\.7 -0\.4
OUfPUT, LABOR FORCE AND
PRODUCTIVITY IN 196 8 Y
Value Added Labor Force V\. A\. Per Worker
US$ ln\. 7\. Mln\. % US$ %
Agriculture 617 41\.8 \. **
lndustry 295 20\.0 \. \.*
S\.rvices 56k 38\.2 *-
U\.al located
Total/Average 1k76 100\.0 100\.0 100\.0
COVERNM:ENT FINANCE
General Government Central Governmernt
Mln\.) 70 of GDP ( Mln\.) 7 of GDP Ii!
197 197 196 -7 1970/71 197 071 1960&71
Current Receipts \. ,\. \. 479\.4 18\.2 15\.6
Current Expenditure (No information available 36\.D0 12-7 -4-4\.1
Current Surplus but totals for all items 143\.4 5\.4 1\.6
Capital Expenditures would be only slightly 118\.2 4k5 3\.7
External Assistance (net) higher than for Central 19\.1 0-7 0\.9
Government)
/ The per ca!pJ\.ta GCP estim-~t9 i3 at 1971 nar1-et prices, calculated by the samo conversion
tecuniqule \.Li the 1973 Wor];\ Atla3\. All other conversion to dollars in this table are
at the nyrhnenFig: rate preveli me durireg the reriod a \. \.O\.
2/ Based on unuewrised convent;ionai iatio',2A lrIcome accounts and the balance of payments data for 1970
cor\.vcrted at\. the then vailin2 '\.xchae\. e rate\.
3/ Latest yearn for which thr reliable NalQcnal Income Statistics are available\.
l/ In the a' c;icr o- a1icn\.1 f-icur,: \. ft ax i li\.c e>1'i71 aT :1 1 -7', fi -,cel r ltios for m\.,re ie\.ent yeai-c\.i\.d
not bc g:ri%n
Page 2 of 2 paees
COUNTCRY DATA - t,HqNA
MONEY, CREDIT and PRICES 1965 1969 1970 1971 1971 1972
(Million 9 outstanding end period)
Money and Quasi Money 350 388 427 474 666
Bank Credit to Public Sector 421 480 378 545 671h
Bank Credit to Private Sector 67 92 126 175 174
(Percentages or Index Numbers)
Money and Quasi Money as "I\. of CDP 16\.9 16\.7 16\.6 17\.5
General Price Index (1963 = 100) 169\.7 181\.8 188\.8 2o5\.4
Annual percentage changes in:
General Price Index 8\.1 7\.1 3-9 8\.8
Bank credit to Public Sector 3\.4 \. 21\.2 44\.2 23a7
Bank credit to Private Sector 10\.1 37\.3 37\.0 38\.9
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MERCHAiNIISE EXPORIS (AVERAGE 1970-71)
1969 197 0 1971 197? US $ Mln Z
(Millions US $)
Cocoa (beans and products) 279 72
Exports of Goodis, NIFS 385 465 386 1t56 Gold 26 6
Imports of Goods, NFS 397 495 L479 4,55 Timber (logs and sawn timber) 34 8\.8
Resource Gap (deficit = -) -30 93 - Dianond 13 3*3
-12 -30 93 III ~Manganese 7 1\.8
Interest Payments (net) -20 -23 -22 -6 All other comamodities 26 _6\.8
Workers' Remittances 0 \. Total 15 *\.0
Other Factor Payments (net) -17 -12 -23 -17
'Tet Transfcrs -2 -1 1 - EXTERNAL DEBT\. DECEMBER 31\. 1971
ilance on Current Account -51 -66 -137 US $ Mln
Direct Foreign Investment 11 66 14 15
Nlet M;LT bor roiring Public Debt, incl\. guaranteed 644
Disbursements 53 48 42 36 Non-Guaranteed Private Debt
Amortization _1L \.4Q -1 -7 Total outstanding & Disbursed 545
Subtotal 1 38 -66 T37
Capital Grants DEBT SERVICE RATIO for 1972
Other Capital (net\.) +i5 ;o -17 12\.6 7
Oth er itesis n\.e\.i +
Increase il Reserves (+) 3 +9 _14 119 Public Debt, incl\. guaranteed
Non-Guaranteed Private Debt
Gross Reserves (e; d year) 90 75 66 121 Total outstanding & Disbursed
Net Reserves (end year) / 19 28 14 112
RATE OF EXCI'uNGE IBRD/IDA LENDING, ( Auusnt 31\.1973) (Million Ua\.$):
Throagh Febrjuae-i 11 1973 IBRD IDA
US $i 1\.00=
1\.00 US $0\.78 Outstanding & Disbursed 43\.4 25\.6
Undisbursed 0\.2 25\.2
Since F 12 1973 Outstanding incl\. Undisbursed h3\.6
1\.G() -TS $ 0\.07
L/ Incl aciJn credit tfr financiLcg cocoa experts
/ i ~ -\. Kn :' e "e-rt of go5'>S end XFS in 197- Ia estinmtee- of Cebt Service payments which assume
l ' ! _: \.at-: \.-\.' t:-e _ , 1 and 19970 de-t re-;eihedu1inrg eiejits with participants fn the
- i ;r e - nr rnr\.11c sr- rr-- ' with rfrhr'\.A -\. r' T-ht ser'd'e ratio based on
_ _c\.' _\.! p\. acn i l l:u b 1: l97l 1 '\.tui h!ave unde :ft3d the situat\.ion teczu:e of non-implementation of
p"'wioue° res z;hs-du ja : reements\.
6/ lae1,'di\.n- t:Lh but e cluding bilateral balanree ;'rd trr;de arrears\.
ANNEX II
THE STATUS OF BANK GROUP OPERATIONS IN GHANA
A, STATEMENT OF BANK LOANS AND IDA CREDITS
(as at August 31, 1973)
Loan or US$ million
Credit Amount (less cancellation)
Number Year Borrower Purpose Bank IDA Undisbursed
One loan and two credits fully disbursed 47\.0 11\.5 -
618-GH 1969 Volta River Power Generation 6\.0 0\.2
Authority
160-GH 1969 Republic of Water Supply and
Ghana Sewerage 3\.5 O\.4
163-GH 1969 Republic of Fisheries 1\.3 1\.1
Ghana
205-GH 1970 Republic of Cocoa Rehabilitation 8\.5 7\.9
Gh=~-na
256-GH 1971 Republic of Power Distribution 7\.1 001
Ghana
354-GH 1972 Republic of Sugar Rehabilitation
Ghana Project 15\.6 1 5,6
Total 53\.0 47\.5
of which has been repaid 9\.4 3
Total now outstanding 43\.6 47\.2
Amount sold \.2
of which has been repaid \.2 -
Total now held by Bank and IDA 4306 47\.2
(prior to exchange adjustments)
Total undisbursed 0\.2 25\.1 25
NOTE: There have been no IFC investments in Ghana\.
ANNEX II
Page 2
B\. PROJECTS IN EXECUTION1
Loan No\. 618 - Electric Power; US$6\.0 million Loan of June 23, 1969;
Closing Date: December 31, 1973
This project included the installation of the final two gener-
ating units at Akosombo Power plant and expansion of its transmission lines\.
The project was executed effectively and the new facilities are now in oper-
atione
Credit No\. 160 - W4ater Supply and Sewerage; US$3\.5 million Credit of
August 28\. 1969; Closing Date: June 30, 1974
This project comprised the extension of water distribution sys-
tems in the Accra/Tema metropolitan area and improvement of Accra's sewer-
age system\. These works are substantially completed, approximately on sched-
ule and at estimated cost\. The credit also included the improvement of the
organization and operations of the national authority responsible for Ghana's
water supply and sewerage sector\. The Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation
is now functioning with significantly improved management and satisfactory
financial performance\. The original Closing Date of June 30, 1973 has been
extended to June 30, 1974 in order to permit retention funds for contrac-
tors' services to be paid\.
Credit No\. 163 - Fisheries; US$1\.3 million Credit of September 25, 1969;
Closing Date: December 31! 1973
This project was to have provided for (a) the construction
of forty purse seiners; (b) credits to fishermen for purchasing such ves-
sels; (c) fishing harbor improvement and expansion studies; and (d) the
improvement of the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation's Boatyard Division\.
Implementation of the project has been substantially delayed for all phases
except the fishing port studies\.
At the outset, problems arose concerning the design and price of
the proposed boats which caused initial delays and necessitated further in-
vestigation\. It was found that the original concept of the fishing vessel was
no longer financially viable due to decreased catches and prices of landed
fish, exacerbated by increased costs\. Instead, it was determined that fit-
ting the project boats with larger engines with dual purpose rigging (in
order to extend the fishing season) could be viable provided the number of
boats was restricted in line with known fish resources\. On this basis,
the Bank and Government agreed to reduce the number of boats involved in
the project to ten vessels from the original fortye All ten have been
sold; six have been completed and delivered to fishermen and the remainder
should be finished in two months\. All procurement for these vessels is
virtually completed\.
lThese notes are designed to inform the Executive Directors regarding the
progress of projects in execution, and in particu'lar to report any problems
which are being encountered, ard the action being taken to remedy them\. They
should be read in this sense, ind with the understanding that they do not
purport to present a balanced evaluation of strengths and weaknesses in
proiect execution\.
ANNEX II
Page 3
In May 1972, the Government suggested that the balance of the
Credit, approximately US$4oo,o00, be reallocated to rehabilitate three
high-seas vessels not now fully operative and to refit an additional trawler\.
It was not possible to achieve an agreement on this matter\. The project was
recently cut short for various reasons and Government has agreed to cancel
the remaining proceeds of the Credit except for those funds required to complete
procurement in process and the port studies\. IDA meanwhile is discussing with
the Government a thorough reexamination of the fisheries sector and identification
of further investment needs for a possible second activity\. The original Closing
Date of December 31 , 1972 was extended to December 31,v 1973\.
Credit No\. 205 - Cocoa Rehabilitation; US$8\.5 million Credit of
June 26, 1970\. Closing Date: December 31, 1976
The project, principally involving the rehabilitation and re-
planting of 87,000 acres of cocoa plantings, is proceeding quite well\.
During the first year of field work, the replanting targets were met with
excellent nursery practices\. Control of swollen shoot virus disease is
similarly well ahead of project requirements\. However, the Sahelian
drought caused a reduction in the acreage of the 1972/73 replanting
campaign to 56% of the target\. Lower annual replantings in the future
are likely in addition\. An extension of the project period by one year
on this account is contemplated\. The rehabilitation component of the
project previously postponed is now underway\. 2,000 sprayers have been
ordered and should be delivered this month\.
Credit No\. 256 - Power Distribution: US$7,1 million Credit of June 21,
1971: Closing Date: June 20, 1974
The project is intended to further expand Ghana's power
distribution network\. It should be completed on schedule late in 1973\.
Due partly to the economic stagnation in Ghana, sales of electricity
have not increased as much as forecast and the Electricity Corporation
is proposing rate increases\.
Credit No, 354 - Sugar Rehabilitation: US$15\.6 million Credit of
January 29, 1973; Closing Date: March 31, 1979
Work on the project is proceeding satisfactorily\. HVA Inter-
national has been assisting Ghana Sugar Estates Ltd\. in the operation
of the two sugar factories and estates, including preparations for the
plantings in May-June 1973, Similarly, two advisers from Berenschot
Bosboom are in Accra working with the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB)
in accounting and credit control\. The Sugar Industry Committee has been
established and ADB has written off its unrecoverable debts, A recent
supervision mission found that sugar production in the first full milling
season is estimated to be higher than originally forecast, Both sugar
factories are now being overhauled, but progress is relatively slow\.
ANNEX III
Page 1
CIIAMI
First Highwayv Prciect
Crfdit and ?r-sc-ct SJurqnqm\.L
korrower: The Revpublic of Ghana
Amount: US$13,0O millionl equivalent
Terms: Standard DA terms
Proje\.ct_ Do=ription' Rehabilitat-nr and imoroving 13 sections of
t:runk roads totalling some 345 miles; consultants
for supervision of construction, pre-investment'
studies for further road rehabilitation, and
preneration of road maintenance project; and the
provrisior of equipmont for traffic control and
pavement surveys0
YLstimated Cost: The estimat-d total cost of the project is US$19\.5
million equivalent, including a foreign exzchango
component of US$I11\.0 million\. Details are given
below\.
ForeiFn Local Total
(US$ million)
Rehabilitation and improvement
of paved roads 7\.0° 5\.79 12\.87
Construction supervision 0\.89 0\.38 1\.27
Ereinvestment studies 0\.41 0\.32 0\.73
EquipmTii,ent for traffic control
and pavement survey 0\.30 0\.03 0\.33
Contiin,ennies 2\.16 2\.10 b\.26
10084; 8 \.62 1-9\. l
½-inancin~; Plan: IDA - US$ 13\.0 million
Governmcn4 = US$ 6\.5 r\.illicn
lag>e 2
List-i\.acved_;-\.L,sburse, n,s: \. riscal Year
~~~~~~~~~( TJW 9w7Li 11TiO E)
1973/7li l9-7)4/7' ±975/76 1976/77
Oci I 5\.5 2 5
rAr,-^llnm,OC\., bnel-tJq be^Jl!r\.s^rr^\.hl9-ir;T-q<? e
awardiod in as cdr-or,c -A\.th normal T1TV orocedures
on th,e basis oi internaton al competitive bidding, for
whichl there e13 oe considerable C6m\.m½iti on
frcm local i oad emuinment finr2nced by
the Assorlatun fill\. also be procured th-rough\.
inter!aiionlaJ co:;c; 1\. itive biddir,\.t\.
Q'osulti;fit-;: Consultants wv i- 1e emplsed for const\.r-\.uctioin
supervision and pre-lanvostmont studies under termis
and conditions aececaiable to the Association\.
i?ate of PeAtum: Economic return for the Individual\. road improve-
ments ran\.-e from ' 2 to 36 percent3 wieighted average
22 cercent\.
\.A\.rw,raiS7W \. - 'ort: \.tReport No\. 76-Grii, dt,ed June 29, 1973\.
_ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Atce i\.
7K KG P0K K ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~GKKK0P~~~~~~~~~~G !~~~BRD-3figRl
r 7 ~~~~u\. P-f P- El R , ro OdA0V-jC'Otz L,'\.'% \.-e : tz ordb 7| UE 19?3
00P0 E R \. \. \. \. owe 0 \.BOLGATANGA ( \.
U~~P P ~E R ---
\. PrOS noesd, fat Study
P,oj-Kt Rolds f0, ARlbIl1tltIoK
> aWC W g\ < Ncs;~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1~~~~ ) /\ s~~~~\. on 3undery
,0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'f\. p'\.j "g \. 1, ~ >/g g i '1
_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\. k\. , 0Wj
0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
\ H , / OnCorof X _ e , t CH R
0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0
- ) 0 R T H E t N t BR 9 G iOsCN G I
<, ( f A i 1SgA fX' ---
> R Gg OINtt\.A I< \ R jE Gl'_ HI
W E\. ' S R N | APPROVAL |
P155968 | Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No: PAD2246
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION
PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT
ON A
PROPOSED LOAN
IN THE AMOUNT OF US$12\.40 MILLION
AND
PROPOSED IDA CREDITS
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 9\.3 MILLION
(US$12\.80 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
AND
PROPOSED GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY GRANT
IN THE AMOUNT OF US$2\.00 MILLION
TO THE
REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
FOR A
CLIMATE ADAPTATION PROJECT
MAY 18, 2017
Environment & Natural Resources Global Practice
Agriculture Global Practice
Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global Practice
EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their
official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective May 2017)
SDR 0\.73 = US$1
US$ 1\.37 = SDR 1
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 - December 31
Regional Vice President: Cyril E\. Muller
Country Director: Satu Kristiina J\. Kahkonen
Country Manager: Alexander Kremer
Senior Global Practice Director: Karin Erika Kemper
Practice Manager: Valerie Hickey
Task Team Leader(s): Emilia Battaglini, Anatol Gobjila
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ACSA National Rural Development Agency
CER Contingent Emergency Response
CIS Centralized Irrigation System
CPESS Civil Protection and Emergency Situations Service
CSA Climate Smart Agriculture
DA Designated Account
DES Department for Exceptional Situations
DRM Disaster Risk Management
EA Environmental Assessment
ECC Emergency Command Center
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
ESMP Environmental Management Plan
ESMF Environmental and Social Assessment Framework
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEF Global Environment Facility
GFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
GNI Gross National Income
GOM Grant Operational Manual
GRS Grievance Redress Service
GRM Grievance Redress Mechanism
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICAS Forest Research and Management Institute
IDA International Development Bank
IPF Investment Project Financing
LPAs Local Public Authorities
M&E Monitoring & Evaluation
MAFI Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry
MCC Millennium Challenge Corporation
MDL Moldovan Leu
MIA Ministry of Internal Affairs
MOE Ministry of Environment
MTR Mid-term Review
ND-GAIN Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index
NPA National Plan for Afforestation
NPV Net Present Value
OP Operational Policy
PDO Project Development Objective
PMT Project Management Team
POM Project Operational Manual
PP Procurement Plan
PPSD Project Procurement Strategy for Development
RF Results Framework
RPF Resettlement Policy Framework
SC Steering Committee
SDA Sustainable Development Account
SDR Special Drawing Right
SEI State Ecological Inspectorate
SFE State Forest Enterprise
TA Technical Assistance
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
WUA Water User Association
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
BASIC INFORMATION
Is this a regionally tagged project? Country(ies) Financing Instrument
No Investment Project Financing
[ ] Situations of Urgent Need of Assistance or Capacity Constraints
[ ] Financial Intermediaries
[ ] Series of Projects
Approval Date Closing Date Environmental Assessment Category
09-Jun-2017 30-Sep-2023 B - Partial Assessment
Bank/IFC Collaboration
No
Proposed Development Objective(s)
The Project Development Objective (PDO) is to enhance the adoption of climate-smart practices in agriculture,
forestry and pasture management in targeted landscapes and strengthen national disaster management systems\.
Components
Component Name Cost (US$, millions)
Climate-smart Practices in the Agriculture Sector 12\.40
Climate-smart Forest and Pasture Management 8\.80
Climate and Disaster Risk Management 4\.70
Project Management and Monitoring 1\.30
Organizations
Borrower : Republic of Moldova
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
Implementing Agency : Ministry of Environment
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry
Ministry of Internal Affairs
Safeguards Deferral OPSTABLE
Will the review of safeguards be deferred?
[ ] Yes [ ] No
PROJECT FINANCING DATA (IN USD MILLION)
[ ] [ â ] IBRD [ â ] IDA Credit [ ] IDA Grant [ â ] Trust [ ]
Counterpart Funds Parallel
Funding [ ] Crisis Response [ ] Crisis Response Financing
Window Window
[ ] Regional Projects [ ] Regional Projects
Window Window
FIN_COST_OLD
Total Project Cost: Total Financing: Financing Gap:
27\.20 27\.20 0\.00
Of Which Bank Financing (IBRD/IDA):
25\.20
Financing (in US$, millions)
FIN_SUMM_OLD
Financing Source Amount
Global Environment Facility (GEF) 2\.00
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 12\.40
International Development Association (IDA) 12\.80
Total 27\.20
Expected Disbursements (in US$, millions)
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
Fiscal Year 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Annual 0\.00 2\.00 4\.00 6\.00 8\.00 5\.00 2\.20
Cumulative 0\.00 2\.00 6\.00 12\.00 20\.00 25\.00 27\.20
INSTITUTIONAL DATA
Practice Area (Lead)
Environment & Natural Resources
Contributing Practice Areas
Agriculture
Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global Practice
Climate Change and Disaster Screening
This operation has been screened for short and long-term climate change and disaster risks
Gender Tag
Does the project plan to undertake any of the following?
a\. Analysis to identify Project-relevant gaps between males and females, especially in light of country gaps identified
through SCD and CPF
Yes
b\. Specific action(s) to address the gender gaps identified in (a) and/or to improve women or men's empowerment
Yes
c\. Include Indicators in results framework to monitor outcomes from actions identified in (b)
Yes
SYSTEMATIC OPERATIONS RISK-RATING TOOL (SORT)
Risk Category Rating
1\. Political and Governance ï¬ High
2\. Macroeconomic ï¬ Substantial
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
3\. Sector Strategies and Policies ï¬ Moderate
4\. Technical Design of Project or Program ï¬ Moderate
5\. Institutional Capacity for Implementation and Sustainability ï¬ Substantial
6\. Fiduciary ï¬ Moderate
7\. Environment and Social ï¬ Low
8\. Stakeholders ï¬ Low
9\. Other
10\. Overall ï¬ Moderate
COMPLIANCE
Policy
Does the project depart from the CPF in content or in other significant respects?
[ ] Yes [â] No
Does the project require any waivers of Bank policies?
[ ] Yes [â] No
Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project Yes No
Environmental Assessment OP/BP 4\.01 â
Natural Habitats OP/BP 4\.04 â
Forests OP/BP 4\.36 â
Pest Management OP 4\.09 â
Physical Cultural Resources OP/BP 4\.11 â
Indigenous Peoples OP/BP 4\.10 â
Involuntary Resettlement OP/BP 4\.12 â
Safety of Dams OP/BP 4\.37 â
Projects on International Waterways OP/BP 7\.50 â
Projects in Disputed Areas OP/BP 7\.60 â
Legal Covenants
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
Sections and Description
Section I\.A\.1\. The Recipient shall appoint and maintain, until the completion of the Project, a Steering Committee,
with composition and responsibilities acceptable to the Association and set forth in the Project Operational
Manual, including, inter alia, the responsibility to provide strategic guidance and facilitate inter-agency
coordination during the implementation of the Project\. The Steering Committee shall be headed by the
Recipientâs General Secretary of the Government in charge of donor aid coordination\.
Sections and Description
Section I\.A\.3\. The Recipient shall maintain, throughout Project implementation, a project management team
(PMT) within MOE, with staffing, functions and responsibilities satisfactory to the Association and set forth in the
Project Operational Manual, including inter alia: (a) responsibility for all fiduciary aspects of the Project; and (b)
overall planning, coordination and monitoring of Project activities\.
Sections and Description
Section I\.B\.1\. Prior to carrying out Part 1\.2 (b) of the Project, the Recipient, through MAFI and the PMT, shall enter
into an agreement with SDA (âSDA Implementation Agreementâ), under terms and conditions approved by the
Association\.
Section I\.B\.3\. Prior to carrying out Part 2 of the Project, the Recipient, through MOE, shall enter into an agreement
with ICAS (âICAS Implementation Agreementâ), under terms and conditions approved by the Association\.
Sections and Description
Section I\.D\.1\. he Recipient, through MAFI, shall ensure that Part 1\.1 (a) of the Project is carried out in accordance
with the provisions of the Grants Operational Manual, acceptable to the Association\.
Sections and Description
Section I\.F\.1\. The Recipient shall ensure that the Project is carried out in accordance with the provisions of the
ESMF and the RPF, including carrying out the specific ESMPs derived from the ESMF and the respective RAPs
derived from the RPF, and ensure that the same obligations are appropriately reflected in any pertinent contract
further entered into for purposes of the Project\.
Conditions
Type Description
Effectiveness The Project Operational Manual, satisfactory to the Association, has been
approved by the SC and adopted by MAFI, MOE and MIA\.
Type Description
Disbursement 1\. No disbursements will be made for matching grants under Part 1\.1 (a) of the
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
Project, unless the Grants OM, satisfactory to the Association, has been approved
by the SC and adopted by MAFI and the PMT\.
2\. No disbursements will be made for emergency expenditures under Part 3\.2 of
the Project, unless the CER specific conditions listed in the FA have been fulfilled\.
PROJECT TEAM
Bank Staff
Name Role Specialization Unit
Team Leader(ADM Environment & Climate
Emilia Battaglini GEN03
Responsible) Change
Anatol Gobjila Team Leader Agriculture GFA03
Procurement Specialist(ADM
Elena Corman Procurement GGO03
Responsible)
Financial Management
Oxana Druta Financial Management GGO21
Specialist
Arcadii Capcelea Safeguards Specialist Environment GEN03
Daniel Werner Kull Team Member Disaster Risk Management GSU09
Grace O\. Aguilar Team Member Team Assistant GEN03
Jeren Kabayeva Team Member Agriculture, Operations GFA03
Luis M\. Schwarz Team Member Disbursement WFALN
Mohamed Ghani Razaak Safeguards Specialist Social GSU03
Nina Rinnerberger Team Member Environment, Operations GEN03
Pilar Elisa Gonzalez
Counsel Country Lawyer LEGLE
Rodriguez
Natural Resources
Stephen Ling Team Member GEN01
Management
Tamara Ursu Team Member Team Assistant - Chisinau ECCMD
Tuukka Castren Team Member Forestry GEN03
Extended Team
Name Title Organization Location
Aurel Lozan Forestry Consultant Chisinau,Moldova
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
Bogdan Popa Landscape & Forestry Specialist Consultant
Cristobal Mena Disaster Risk Specialist Consultant
Henry Phillips Forestry Specialist FAO
Rajagopal Srinivasan Senior Irrigation Specialist Consultant
Turi Fileccia Senior Agronomist FAO Rome,Italy
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
MOLDOVA
CLIMATE ADAPTATION PROJECT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I\. STRATEGIC CONTEXT \. 1
A\. Country Context \. 1
B\. Sectoral and Institutional Context \. 1
C\. Higher Level Objectives to which the Project Contributes \. 5
II\. PROJECT DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES \. 6
A\. PDO \. 6
B\. Project Beneficiaries \. 6
C\. PDO-Level Results Indicators \. 7
III\. PROJECT DESCRIPTION\. 7
A\. Project Components \. 7
B\. Project Cost and Financing \. 10
C\. Lessons Learned and Reflected in the Project Design \. 11
IV\. IMPLEMENTATION\. 12
A\. Institutional and Implementation Arrangements \. 12
B\. Results Monitoring and Evaluation \. 12
D\. Role of Partners \. 13
V\. KEY RISKS \. 14
A\. Overall Risk Rating and Explanation of Key Risks \. 14
VI\. APPRAISAL SUMMARY \. 15
A\. Economic and Financial (if applicable) Analysis \. 15
B\. Technical \. 15
C\. Financial Management \. 15
D\. Procurement \. 16
E\. Social (including Safeguards) \. 17
F\. Environment (including Safeguards) \. 18
G\. Other Safeguard Policies (if applicable) \. 19
H\. World Bank Grievance Redress \. 19
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
VII\. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND MONITORING \. 20
ANNEX 1: DETAILED PROJECT DESCRIPTION \. 30
ANNEX 2: IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS \. 35
ANNEX 3: IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT PLAN \. 48
ANNEX 4: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS\. 50
ANNEX 5: ELIGIBLE CLIMATE ADAPTATION INVESTMENTS \. 54
ANNEX 6: GREENHOUSE GAS ACCOUNTING \. 57
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
I\. STRATEGIC CONTEXT
A\. Country Context
1\. Despite many years of solid economic growth and impressive poverty reduction gains, Moldova
remains vulnerable to economic and financial shocks and political instability\. Moldova is a landlocked country
between Romania to the west and Ukraine to the north, east and south\. The country has a surface area of
33,840 km2, and is home to 3\.6 million people with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of US$2,240 (Atlas
methodology, 2015)\. In the context of overall economic growth, Moldova has made significant progress in
reducing poverty and boosting shared prosperity\. The economy was growing at 5 percent annually after 2000,
and the national poverty rate (below US$5 per day) dropped from 68 to 11\.4 percent between 2000 and 2014\.
Public and private transfers, namely pensions and remittances, as well as labor markets had an important role
in reducing poverty\. The Moldovan economy, however, moved into recession in 2015 (-0\.5 percent growth in
GDP) because of weaker external flows, large-scale banks fraud, and a drought\. Economic slowdown in Russia
and Ukraine, together with Russiaâs restrictions on agro-food imports from Moldova sharply reduced
remittances from these countries and halved Moldovaâs exports to Russia\. Further, a banking crisis brought on
by massive fraud in three banks has lowered confidence in the banking sector, leading to significant interest
rates and reduced credit to the private sector\. The monetary and fiscal resolution of the three insolvent banks
(12 percent of GDP) has led to higher public debt and lower foreign exchange reserves, damaged business
confidence and reduced macroeconomic buffers to sustain economic shocks\.
2\. Poverty is concentrated in rural areas where livelihoods depend on agriculture and natural resources
that are increasingly at risk due to climate change\. Moldova remains one of the poorest countries in Europe\.
Poverty (US$5 or less per day) is largely a rural phenomenon as rural national poverty stands at close to 19
percent (2013) compared to around 8 percent for urban areas (2012)\. With 57 percent of the population living
in rural areas, 84 percent of the poor are concentrated there\. Those in rural areas, poor and non-poor, rely
more on agriculture and remittances for income sources than their urban counterparts who derive more
income from non-agricultural employment\. For example, rural areas felt the impact of the 2007 drought much
more than urban areas, with poverty rates increasing from 31 percent in 2007 to a peak of 36 percent in 2009
in the affected areas\. Stocks of agricultural products vanished in many rural households, and prices and
expenditure in householdsâ budgets for food and energy rapidly grew\. Similarly, a severe summer drought in
2015, along with lower remittances and higher inflation, further pushed the poverty rate up to 41\.9 percent in
the affected areas\. As the frequency of droughts and other extreme weather events is expected to increase due
to climate change, lack of climate adaption measures and coping mechanisms will adversely impact food
security, livelihoods and economic growth in vulnerable rural areas and further undermine progress made in
poverty reduction\.
B\. Sectoral and Institutional Context
3\. Moldova is highly vulnerable to climate change especially in rural areas where the majority of poor
live\. Moldova ranks among the most climate vulnerable countries in Europe and Central Asia based on a range
of social and economic indicators and faces a number of adaptation challenges\.1 Climate models predict future
1
According to the widely used Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN, http://index\.gain\.org/), which summarizes a
country's vulnerability to climate change and other global challenges in combination with its readiness to improve resilience,
Page 1 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
mean temperature rises exceeding 2 degrees Celsius by mid-century, and a significant decline or slight increase
in precipitation by 2050, depending on the region and overall decline in precipitation after 2050\. Climate
change is expected to increase the frequency and intensity of most extreme events and natural disasters (e\.g\.
droughts and floods, as well as other severe weather events such as hailstorms, torrential rains, late frosts,
heavy winds) and present new climate-related pest and disease challenges\.2 This will have important
implications for economic growth, especially for the rural poor, who are more dependent on natural resources
and vulnerable to climate-related shocks with fewer resources to cope\. Agriculture, water resources and
forestry are among the sectors considered most at risk from climate change impacts, as are human health,
energy and infrastructure\. Agricultural productivity will significantly decrease due to increasing water stress on
crops, even without accounting for the increasing impact of extreme weather events\. Total water availability
will fall below total demand within a couple of decades with implications for irrigation (which constitutes a vital
input to improving resilience and therefore productivity of the agriculture sector)\. The productivity of
Moldovaâs forests, which have an estimated total economic value of US$66\.77 million (2015), will also diminish
and pathology (disease) patterns are expected to adversely change\. In addition, climate change will increase
the vulnerability of people and assets to the impact of natural hazards and can significantly challenge the ability
of a country to mitigate, prepare and respond to natural disasters\.
4\. The present total cost of inaction on climate adaptation is estimated at around USD600 million,
equivalent to 6\.5 percent of GDP\. This value is expected to more than double in real terms by 2050 to around
US$1\.3 billion\. In comparison, the direct costs of climate change by 2050 (i\.e\., the decrease in production
caused by climate change, plus the increase in damage and costs of prevention) are expected to be of a similar
magnitude at around US$1 billion, 70 percent of which are incurred in the agriculture sector (which faces the
biggest challenges but also investment opportunities)\. While the costs of inaction cannot be completely
eliminated, it can be significantly reduced by prioritizing and undertaking climate adaptation investments in key
sectors and by improving the ability to manage climate and disaster risks, including preparing and responding
more effectively and efficiently once a climate-related disaster occurs\.
5\. Climate vulnerability in the agriculture sector\. Agriculture has traditionally been a key sector in
Moldovaâs economy as its rich soils and mild climate are ideal for farming\. The sector represents about 15\.5
percent of Moldovaâs GDP (2014) with a current value of about 14\.88 billion MDL (about US$800 million, 2015)\.
Agriculture employs nearly a third (28 percent) of the countryâs population, and agro-food exports account for
roughly 50 percent of the countryâs total exports\. Moldovan farms are largely dominated by small holdings of
0\.8-10 ha\. The sector is highly sensitive to weather conditions, and small-holders lack access to rural finance for
investments to improve productivity and resilience in the sector\. Access to irrigation, a vital input to the sector,
is limited and only around 6 percent of the area irrigated during Soviet times is currently under functional
irrigation\. The average agricultural sector growth rate performance has been low at 3\.6 percent per annum
over the last 10 years, and most crop yields are around a quarter to a third lower than other Eastern European
countries\. Irrigation for agricultural land is a vital component to ensure sustainable development of the sector,
as vegetable and fruit growing, cereal and fodder crops, and animal breeding require permanent access to
water\. However, further investment and capacity are needed to expand the up-take of irrigation services by
farmers and agriculture producers\.
Moldova ranks as the fourth most climate vulnerable country in Europe and Central Asia (behind Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan) (January 2017)\.
2
World Bank\. 2016\. Republic of Moldova â Moldova Climate Adaptation Investment Planning Technical Assistance\. Report
No: ACS18562\.
Page 2 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
6\. Climate change is expected to exacerbate existing challenges in the agriculture sector: Land degradation
and soil erosion are projected to worsen (around 37 percent of all agricultural lands or 953,900ha (2015) are
already degraded to some degree) and the productivity of most current crops may decline by 10-30 percent\.
The 2015 summer drought, an unprecedented extreme weather event in terms of severity and distribution,
negatively impacted both agriculture and cattle herding and is expected to further contribute to the increase of
rural poverty in the country, particularly for small to medium size farmers\.3 Crop losses are also incurred from
flooding, late frosts, hail and windstorms, all of which may worsen as a result from climate change\. The
expected annual cost of climate change impacts on the agriculture sector by 2050 is around USD700 million4\.
Climate-smart and sustainable agricultural technologies, as well as on-farm irrigation access, will be critical to
increase the productivity and resilience of the agriculture sector and for managing future climate impacts\.
7\. Climate vulnerability and mitigation benefits of forest and pasture lands\. While Moldovaâs forest cover
is among the lowest (11 percent) in Europe, forests provide critical habitat for biodiversity and other essential
environmental benefits and services such as soil protection, water regulation and carbon sequestration\. The
forests are mainly broadleaved - oak, ash, hornbeam, black locust and poplar being the most significant species\.
Protective forest belts have a long tradition dating back to 1947 when shelterbelts were first established to
reduce soil erosion on agricultural land, and as riparian buffers for water sources and protection of
transportation routes\. The total extent of forest belts is 30,300 ha\. The main species in forest belts are non-
native black locust (36 percent) and walnut (38 percent)\. Different studies indicate that forest belts contribute
to increased agricultural productivity\. Pastures (land suitable for hay and grazing) occupy 14 percent of the
total land used for agriculture in Moldova\. Land degradation is evident in pasture areas and 48 percent are
affected by different levels of degradation\. The current productivity of pasture land has been estimated at 20-
50 percent of its potential\. Many areas are also affected by illegal logging (unsustainable domestic consumption
of forest resources, often driven by the need in energetic wood), abusive and uncontrolled grazing, waste
pollution or other degradation factors\. Capacity for ecological restoration is limited and there is little awareness
of the necessity to collect seed stands from provenances or genotypes that are more resilient to climate
change\. There is currently no capacity for containerized seedling production of any species\.
8\. Climate change is expected to further reduce the productivity of pastures and natural forests and
change pathology patterns\. The key climate change impacts up to 2050 are forecast to limit growth of tree
species due to a decrease in water availability (different tree species will react differently, but native oak
species are expected to fare better than non-native species) and increase the areas affected by pests (15
percent), the areas subject to drying (25 percent) and fire risk (30 percent), and soil erosion due to temperature
increase, changes in precipitation and a reduction in year-round water availability\. The greatest impact is
expected to occur in the South (already the lowest forest cover at 8 percent of land area), followed by the
Centre (with the greatest proportion of forests, 209,000 ha or 15 percent of total land area)\. Annual
opportunity costs of inaction on climate change are estimated to be around US$40 million, and to increase
marginally over coming decades\.
9\. Climate and disaster risk management and emergency response\. Moldova is exposed to a range of
3
FAO drought assessment\.
4
Calculated from the difference in future production under the climate change and no-climate change scenarios (roughly
USD430 million, including USD235 million from crops and USD195 million from livestock) and the portion of the increase in
damages and losses that are attributable to the increased frequency and extent of extreme events (roughly USD270 million)\.
Page 3 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
natural hazards, many of which are weather-related: torrential rain, hail, strong wind, floods, droughts, and
landslides\. While not always devastating, hydro-meteorological disasters can damage property and affect
livelihood and can have a large cumulative effect on the country\. The 2007 drought caused estimated losses of
about US$1 billion5 while the 2008 and 2010 floods cost the country about US$120 million and US$42 million
respectively6\. During the period 2011-2016 all natural disasters reported by the Civil Protection and Emergency
Situations Service (CPESS) were weather and climate related\. Current annualized costs of flooding are
estimated to be around US$100 million7, and expected to increase by several times over the coming decades as
flood frequency and the volume of assets at risk increase\. Increasing peopleâs resilience to prepare for and
respond to climate disasters is critical to manage climate impacts and eradicate poverty\. In Moldova disaster
risk management is performed at different government levels, with CPESS, within the Ministry of Internal
Affairs in charge of planning, coordinating and managing disaster preparedness and response\. While disaster
risk management (DRM) has improved over time, it is still based on outdated technology and limited
connection/coverage in some parts of the country\. Effective emergency response needs further strengthening,
e\.g\. bolstering sub-national command structures, facilities and equipment, and ensuring that local first
responders, authorities, public services and businesses are better prepared\.
10\. Government programs, policies and institutions for climate change\. In 2014, the Government of
Moldova, through the Ministry of Environment (MOE) and with support of United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) and the Government of Austria, developed and approved a National Climate Change
Adaptation Strategy, reviewing climate change vulnerabilities in the six sectors considered most vulnerable:
agriculture, water resources, forestry, human health, energy and infrastructure\. The strategy includes an Action
Plan to 2020, at an estimated budget of US$155 million, based on institutional and investment activities
recommended within each sector\. Intended to serve as an umbrella strategy that creates the enabling
environment for specific sectors and ministries to âmainstreamâ climate change adaptation and risk
management in their existing and future strategies, its goal is to âassure that the Republic of Moldovaâs social
and economic development is less vulnerable to climate change impacts by becoming more resilient\.â It
recognizes that this will require a coordinated response across key sectors\.
11\. The National Plan for Afforestation (NPA) covers the period 2015-18 and envisages the afforestation of
13,000 ha (10,300 ha restoration of degraded lands and 2,700 ha of new riparian buffers and forest belts)\.
Objectives of the NPA include increased sustainability of land resources managed by Local Public Authorities
(LPAs), improved landscape level climate resilience and improved public awareness concerning sustainable land
use practices\. The areas identified for action in the NPA are currently mostly owned by LPAs and have been
included in the NPA based on proposals from local communities reflecting their willingness towards allocating
degraded lands for landscape restoration\. Since the NPA was approved in 2015, only limited areas (around
1,000 ha) have in fact been afforested\.
12\. In 2010 the Government of Moldova signed a Compact Agreement with the Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC) an initiative of the United States to support policies and programs that advance a countryâs
progress in achieving sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction\. The Moldova Compact Program
5
World Bank (2010)\. Project Appraisal Document: Disaster and Climate Risk Management Project \. Report No: 53050-MD,
World Bank, Washington, D\.C\.
6
Republic of Moldova (2010)\. Post Disaster Needs Assessment: Floods 2010\. Prepared by the Government of the Republic
of Moldova with support from the European Union, the United Nations, and the World Bank
7
WBG & GFDRR (2016)\. Europe and Central Asia (ECA) Risk Profiles \. World Bank Group and Global Facility for Disaster
Reduction and Recovery, Washington, D\.C\.
Page 4 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
(2010-2015) was the first opportunity for the country to rehabilitate some of the centralized irrigation schemes
(CIS)\. Within the framework of the Transition to High Value Agriculture Project with a budget of around US$80
million, the program reconstructed 10 CISs with a command area up to 11,728 ha with possible addition of
another 3,500 ha within these schemes\. The system covers 23 communities along the Nistru and Prut River and
will serve about 9,200 land users\. Unfortunately, the program concentrated on bringing water to the hydrants
only, while the on-farm development aspects were left to the farmers\.
13\. In 2016, the World Bank supported the Government of Moldova to carry out a more systematic analysis8
of the costs of inaction within the most vulnerable sectors and the potential volumes and cost-benefit of
physical investments for climate adaptation\. It showed that the biggest challenges and investment
opportunities are in agriculture, which includes scaling up adoption of irrigation (which has proved to be the
most efficient way to address drought risks), through rehabilitation and modernization of centralized small-
scale irrigation systems and drainage infrastructure, combined with institutional capacity-building for
management of irrigation systems\. Other options include soil management and climate risk management
technologies (e\.g\., anti-hail nets), and the potential for changes in crop mix towards perennial crops
(i\.e\., grapes and fruit trees), which will be more resilient to climate change\. In forestry, areas for immediate
interventions are ecological reconstruction of the present forest estate and the expansion of forest vegetation,
including the creation of new forest shelter belts\. On disaster risk management, a set of modest investments,
such as for emergency prevention and preparedness and improving emergency response capabilities, is
expected to provide key gains for public safety as well as substantial economic returns\. The proposed Project
builds on the findings of the Technical Assistance (TA) and will contribute to implementing some of the
recommended adaptation investments\.
C\. Higher Level Objectives to which the Project Contributes
14\. The Project will contribute to the World Bankâs twin goals to end extreme poverty and promote shared
prosperity in a sustainable manner by reducing the vulnerability of rural households, which represent a
disproportionately high share of the bottom 40 percent, to the impacts of climate change, and enhancing the
capacity of government institutions, key stakeholders, communities and the public to manage climate change
risks\. The Project is well aligned with the FY14-17 Country Partnership Strategy between the Republic of
Moldova and the World Bank, and contributes to the third pillar on âpromoting a green, clean and resilient
Moldova\.â In addition, the Project will contribute towards the IDA-17 commitment âto scale up support to IDA
countries to develop and implement country-led, multi-sectoral plans and investments for managing climate
and disaster riskâ\. The Project also supports the World Bank Group Climate Change Action Plan9, which aims to
scale up climate action and integrate climate change across its operations with a major emphasis on increasing
resilience and climate adaptation of client countries\.
15\. The Project is also fully consistent with the GEF Land Degradation Focal Area and will contribute towards
Strategic Objective LD-1 â Maintain or improve flows of agro-ecosystem services to sustain livelihoods of local
communities, and Strategic Objective LD-3 - Reduce pressures on natural resources from competing land uses in
the wider landscape\. GEF financing will contribute directly to Aichi targets 5, 7 and 15, referring to reducing the
rate of loss of natural habitats, biodiversity-friendly sustainable land management and restoration of degraded
8
World Bank, Technical Assistance, Moldova Climate Adaptation Investment Planning (Oct 2016), Report No: ACS18562\.
9
World Bank Group Climate Change Action Plan (April 7, 2016),
http://pubdocs\.worldbank\.org/en/677331460056382875/WBG-Climate-Change-Action-Plan-public-version\.pdf
Page 5 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
ecosystems, respectively\. Support to local level land management planning and community consultations will
support achievement of Aichi target 14 on protection of environmental services taking into account the needs
of women, indigenous and local communities, and the poor and vulnerable\.
16\. The Project supports the Governmentâs Action Plan for the Implementation of the Climate Change
Adaptation Strategy to 2020 (approved in 2014) as well as the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in
support of the 2015 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Paris Agreement\.10
The Moldova NDCs include the country commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 64-67 percent
below 1990 levels by 2030\. While the project core objective is to increase the resilience and adaptation of
farmers and rural communities to the impacts of climate change, the proposed interventions in agriculture, and
especially in forestry and pasture management also bring significant climate change mitigation co-benefits\. To
measure the greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation potential, the project quantifies the net carbon balance by
estimating GHGs emitted or sequestered with and without project11\. Over a lifetime of 16 years (6 years of
project implementation and 10 years of capitalization phase), the project supports a carbon sink of 54,652 tCO 2
equivalent per year\. This is due to agricultural soil improvements that result from the adoption of sustainable
climate-smart practices and technologies, improved forestry and pasture land management practices,
rehabilitation of shelterbelts and degraded pasture land, and planting of new shelterbelts (see Annex 6)\.
17\. To address the multi-faceted challenge posed by climate change the Project takes an integrated
approach to managing climate risks in two ways\. It looks at the rural landscape as a continuum between
agricultural, forest and pasture lands since the livelihoods and resilience of poor rural communities depend on
the mutually sustainable management of these natural resources\. It also takes a comprehensive (ex-ante and
ex-post) approach to climate risk management by taking preventive measures to reduce the vulnerability of
rural populations to climate impacts as well as strengthening the government capacity to manage and respond
to climate-related disasters once they occur\.
II\. PROJECT DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES
A\. PDO
18\. The Project Development Objectives (PDOs) are to enhance the adoption of climate-smart practices in
agriculture, forestry and pasture management in targeted landscapes and strengthen national disaster
management systems\.
B\. Project Beneficiaries
19\. The Projectâs direct beneficiaries include individual farmers and agriculture producers, Water User
Associations (WUAs) and their members, LPAs and the communities they represent, and the public institutions
that are active in the agriculture, irrigation, forestry and disaster risk management sectors\. While interventions
aimed at rural farmers are demand-driven, the Project estimates that some 800 farmers across the country
could receive direct financial support to improve the resilience of their agricultural practices and some 8,000
10
The Paris Agreement, adopted by the UNFCCC members in December 2015, aims to respond to the threat of climate
change by limiting the increase in global temperatures to well below two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and
strengthen the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change\. Moldova signed the Paris Agreement on
September 21, 2016\. The NDCs reflect the country commitments for climate action in support of the Paris agreement\.
11
Based on the use of the EX AXT tool\.
Page 6 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
farmers would benefit from the education and knowledge sharing programs\. Interventions to increase the up-
take of irrigation target 10 WUAs and their members although the uptake will depend on actual farmersâ
demand\. Interventions to improve the planning and management of community-owned degraded lands target
LPAs in raions located in the central and southern part of the country with an estimated participation of some
110 LPAs and their communities\. Training and institutional strengthening activities will benefit farmers, WUAs,
and staff of institutions involved in the Project, including the Forest Research and Management Institute (ICAS),
Moldsilva, local State Forest Enterprises (SFEs) and the Civil Protection and Emergency Situations Service
(CPESS)\. Strengthening disaster preparedness and response will benefit the population at large\. In addition, the
adoption of climate-smart technologies in agriculture and improved forest and pasture management will have
global climate change mitigation benefits\.
C\. PDO-Level Results Indicators
20\. The project takes a landscape approach and supports the adoption of climate-smart technologies and
practices in agriculture, forestry and pasture management to reduce the vulnerability of farmers and rural
communities to climate change impacts\. It also takes a comprehensive risk management approach by
strengthening the capacity to respond to climate-related disasters\.
21\. Project Development Objective indicators include:
a\. Land area under sustainable landscape management practices (hectare):
(i) Area of agricultural land with climate-smart technologies adopted (hectare)
(ii) Area of agricultural land with improved access to irrigation services (hectare)
(iii) Area of forest land, shelterbelts, and pastures established or rehabilitated (hectare)
b\. Rate of compliance with standard emergency response time (percent)
III\. PROJECT DESCRIPTION
A\. Project Components
COMPONENT 1\. Climate-smart Practices in the Agriculture Sector (US$12\.4 million)
22\. This component aims to enhance adoption of climate-smart practices in selected rural landscapes by
supporting: (i) the scale-up of farmersâ climate-smart technologies and agricultural practices and provision of
related advisory services; and (ii) expanded up-take of irrigation services\.
23\. Sub-component 1\.1\. Scale-up of Farmersâ Climate-smart Agricultural Practices (US$9\.8 million)\. Sub-
component 1\.1 will provide matching grants to eligible farmers, including rural households and
private/agricultural entities, to scale up successful climate adaptation measures on agricultural farmlands, as
well as training, promotion and public awareness activities to facilitate the adoption of climate adaptation
measures and technologies by the beneficiaries\. The Project will make available climate adaptation grants for
on-farm climate-smart investments and technologies such as anti-hale protection, rain water/surface water
harvesting, drip irrigation, greenhouse climate control systems; no-till and other soil conservation measures
(examples of potential interventions are in Annex 5)\. It is anticipated that the great majority of grants will
benefit farmers operating on small plots and will support micro-investments for low-cost solutions, with the
remaining grants targeted at bigger, commercial farmers for small- and medium-size investments in more
complex technologies\. The grant size and co-financing ratio will vary depending on the type and size of
Page 7 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
investments\. Eligible micro-investments could receive a grant up to US$2,200 and would require at least 20
percent co-financing; small-size investments could receive a grant up to US$20,000 and would require at least
30 percent co-financing; medium-size investments could receive a grant up to US$40,000 and require at least
50 percent co-financing\. Eligibility criteria in the Grants Operational Manual will include among others: (i) land
titling rights; (ii) willingness to contribute financially; (iii) commitment to participate in capacity building
activities; and (iv) willingness to provide access to the farm/site for knowledge and experience sharing\.
24\. Sub-component 1\.2\. Expanded Up-take of Irrigation Services (US$2\.6 million)\. Sub-component 1\.2 will
provide on-farm irrigation equipment to eligible WUAs to help their member-farmers access irrigation schemes
that were recently rehabilitated by the government with support from the US-funded Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC)\. This activity will address the current lack of adequate and appropriate on-farm irrigation
equipment (e\.g\. mobile aspersion irrigation machines with reel and console and a hydraulic turbine) that can
satisfy the minimum pumping capacity requirement of the rehabilitated MCC schemes\. The requirements for
the transfer of ownership of the equipment to the WUAs will be set forth in the Project Operational Manual
(POM) and will include, inter alia, the WUAâs agreement to contribute financially to the operation and
maintenance cost (10% of the equipment cost)\. This sub-component will also provide capacity building to
WUAs to manage irrigation more effectively and improve their governance and management processes\. Finally,
the sub-component will finance the review of current functions of Apele Moldovei to identify the required
measures to enhance its role in monitoring and supporting WUAs\.
COMPONENT 2\. Climate-smart Forest and Pasture Management (US$8\.8 million)
25\. This component aims to enhance the climate resilience of Moldovaâs forest and pasture lands through
restoration of degraded lands at the community and village level and improved climate-smart management of
forest reproductive material\. The first sub-component focuses on afforestation12 and rehabilitation of degraded
lands and pastures\. The second sub-component will support provision of climate-adapted forest reproductive
material (seeds and seedlings) and capacity building on ecological restoration of natural forests\.
26\. Sub-component 2\.1\. Community Forest and Pasture Management (US$5\.8 million)\. Activities will
support integrated participatory forest and pasture management planning at the Local Public Authority (LPA)
level13, as well as investments in afforestation and rehabilitation of community lands and pastures prioritized in
the management plans for selected raions (districts) in the central and south regions that are considered to be
more vulnerable to climate change\. The Project includes LPA-level landscape mapping (i\.e\. land use âmaster
plansâ) and 10-year operational management plans for approximately 29,000 ha of forest land and pastures
that aim at more efficient and sustainable use of these resources\. Eligibility criteria for participating LPAs (set
forth in the POM), include, among others: willingness to participate, capacity and opportunity for collaboration
with neighboring LPAs, and availability of suitable land\. Investments in selected LPAs will include restoring
approximately 1,000 ha of degraded pastures and 1,500 ha of other degraded communal land, as well as
establishing and restoring 1,600 ha of agricultural or riparian shelterbelts\.
27\. Sub-component 2\.2\. Ecological Restoration of Degraded Forests (US$3\.0 million)\. This sub-component
will include the establishment of a National Centre for Forest Genetics and Seeds (NCFGS) within ICAS to
improve production capacity (both quantity and quality) of certified forest reproductive material mainly from
12
Includes both reforestation and afforestation\.
13
Local Public Authority, or Primaria, includes incorporated communes, municipalities and cities\.
Page 8 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
native climate resilient species\. The main purpose of the NCFGS will be: seed base management; regeneration
material certification; seed processing and conditioning; production of containerized seedlings (nursery); and
genetic research and in vitro multiplication\. The Project will specifically include investments in containerized
seedling production (annual capacity of approximately 1 million seedlings), equipment for processing seeds,
nursery equipment, and laboratory equipment for quality assessment, as well as related civil works\. In addition,
support will be provided for identification and preparation of a national register of seed stands and works to
better manage the seeds stands\. The seedlings would be used in landscape and forest restoration under
Component 2\.1 and elsewhere in the country\. The genetic material would mainly consist of domestic species
and would thus partially replace introduced species that currently dominate seedling production\. ICAS and
Moldsilva staff will benefit from capacity building and training on nurseries, forest reproductive material, and
climate-resilient ecological restoration, as well as hands-on practice through field trials and best practice
demonstration sites\.
COMPONENT 3\. Climate and Disaster Risk Management (US$4\.7 million)
28\. This component aims to strengthen Moldovaâs climate and disaster risk management systems and, in
the event of an eligible crisis or emergency, provide immediate financing to respond quickly to said crisis or
emergency\.
29\. Sub-component 3\.1\. Improved Climate-related Disaster Preparedness and Response (US$4\.7 million)\.
This sub-component aims to strengthen the capacity of national and regional Civil Protection authorities to
prepare for and respond to extreme weather events linked to climate change, through (i) provision of
preparedness and response equipment and training; and (ii) modernization and upgrading of the Balti regional
Emergency Command Center (ECC) to international standards\. The provision of modern, environmentally-
friendly equipment and certified training, such as the renewal of fire and rescue units, will reduce critical
response time and improve the safety and efficiency of interventions\. A more streamlined management
process and reduced maintenance costs are expected\. The refurbishment of the regional ECC in Balti will
provide redundancy and interoperability to the national emergency management system, ensuring a modern
and continuous management of incidents of diverse scales at local and national levels, and will render a more
efficient use of resources for emergency preparedness and response\. The regional ECC will facilitate joint
disaster response with local agency representatives\. Training of ECC staff will enhance crisis management
decision-making processes, allowing CPESS (responsible for implementation of this component) to issue timely
warnings and undertake prevention and response measures, including evacuating affected populations\.
30\. Sub-component 3\.2\. Contingent Emergency Response (US$0\.0 million)\. The objective of this sub-
component is to help the government to respond quickly in case of a crisis or emergency\. Following an eligible
adverse natural or man-made event that causes a major disaster, the Government of Moldova may request the
World Bank to re-allocate project funds to this component to partially cover emergency response and recovery
costs\. This sub-component could also be used to channel additional funds should they become available as a
result of the emergency\.
COMPONENT 4\. Project Management and Monitoring (US$1\.3 million)
31\. This component will finance the operating costs of a Project Management Team (PMT) housed within
the Ministry of Environment (MOE) to carry out project management functions for the Project\. Support will be
Page 9 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
provided for procurement, financial management (including audits), environmental and social safeguards,
coordination, reporting, and monitoring and evaluation\. The PMT will be responsible for coordination among
the implementing agencies to ensure smooth project implementation\.
B\. Project Cost and Financing
32\. The Project has a total cost of US$27\.2 million and will be implemented over six-year period\. The
financing envelope for this Investment Project Financing of US$27\.2 million includes an IBRD loan of US$12\.4
million, an IDA credit of US$12\.8 million equivalent (US$11\.1 million equivalent (blend) and US$1\.7 million
equivalent (hard terms)) and a grant of US$2 million from the Global Environment Facility (GEF)\.
IDA Financing IDA Financing
Project Components Project cost IBRD Financing GEF Financing
(blend) (hard terms)
1: Climate-smart Practices in the
US$12\.4 M US$6\.1 M US$5\.4 M US$0\.9 M
Agriculture Sector
1\.1: Scale-up of farmersâ CSA practices US$9\.8 M US$4\.8 M US$4\.3 M US$0\.7 M
1\.2: Expanded up-take of irrigation
US$2\.6 M US$1\.3 M US$1\.1 M US$0\.2 M
services
2: Climate-smart Forest and Pasture
US$8\.8 M US$3\.4 M US$3\.0 M US$0\.4 M US$2\.0 M
Management
2\.1: Community forest and pasture
US$5\.8 M US$1\.9 M US$1\.7 M US$0\.2 M US$2\.0 M
management
2\.2: Ecological Restoration of
US$3\.0 M US$1\.5 M US$1\.3 M US$0\.2 M
Degraded Forests
3: Climate and Disaster Risk
US$4\.7 M US$2\.3 M US$2\.1 M US$0\.3 M
Management
3\.1: Improved Climate-related
US$4\.7 M US$2\.3 M US$2\.1 M US$0\.3 M
Disaster Preparedness and Response
3\.2: Contingent Emergency Response US$0\.0 M
4: Project Management and
US$1\.3 M US$0\.6 M US$0\.6 M US$0\.1 M
Monitoring
Total Project Costs US$27\.2 M US$12\.4 M US$11\.1 M US$1\.7 M US$2\.0 M
33\. Rational for GEF Financing\. The Project will be partly financed by a US$2 million grant from the Global
Environment Facility (GEF) Land Degradation focal area\. GEF financing will support activities under Component
2\.1 and specifically afforestation and rehabilitation of forest belts and degraded pastures (LD-1 Program 1) and
preparation of integrated and participatory forest/pasture management plans for selected LPAs (LD-3 Program
4)\. GEF support will help LPAs to develop modern management plans for community-owned land, rehabilitate
degraded lands, improve and increase forest coverage and improve the overall management of lands that have
suffered from inadequate management\. Improved forest and pasture management practices will provide
Page 10 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
multiple benefits: improved livelihoods for rural population, carbon sequestration and prevention of further
degradation\. Without additional grant financing the area covered by afforestation and rehabilitation of forest
belts and degraded pastures and the related demonstration effect and uptake of improved land management
practices would be significantly reduced\. Additionally, increased use of native oak species will replace the use
of black locust (Robinia pseudoacacia), which is an introduced species currently widely used in Moldova\.
Without additional GEF support it is likely that dominance of fast growing exotic species would continue\.
C\. Lessons Learned and Reflected in the Project Design
34\. The World Bankâs recent review of investment operations in the country reveals that projects can be
more effective and impactful when acting as a catalyst for future reforms rather than being anchored to very
difficult and lengthy reform processes\. In particular, lessons show that projects that work with weak institutions
are implemented more efficiently when a reform process is already underway\. In the case of the proposed
Project, both Moldsilva and Apele Moldovei face serious institutional constraints but have not yet initiated
reform processes to address them\. The Project design was therefore adjusted to take into account the risk
associated with this weak institutional context and focused on working more closely with the target
beneficiaries (small farmers and rural communities) by relying on technical agencies, including ICAS and SDA,
and involving beneficiary entities such as SFEs and WUAs in the implementation of core activities\.
35\. An emerging lesson from the recently completed Disaster and Climate Risk Management Project is that
the use of project management teams for fiduciary and compliance purposes as well as for overall coordination
is an extremely practical and valuable arrangement, particularly when the project involves several
implementing agencies\. To build on this lesson, the PMT has been involved early in Project preparation to
ensure that: (i) the PMT has an organically developed understanding of the Project; (ii) other implementing
agencies quickly gain a clear understanding of the PMTâs role in implementation; and (iii) enable early detection
of potential misconceptions about roles and responsibilities of PMT versus implementing agencies, thereby
allowing corrective action before the Project begins implementation\.
36\. A review of the implementation of World Bank-financed projects in the rural sector provides a clear
lesson that the best stimulant for widespread adoption of new or additional technologies is demonstration of
benefits\. The best aid for demonstration is demonstration plots or sites, for which grant funding is required to
co-finance the investment and advisory costs for the pioneering farmers\. The Project will, therefore, explore
opportunities for scaling-up these practices by combining a matching grant program with provision of related
extension services\. It is envisaged that all sub-projects of the climate adaptation grants (estimated to be 800)
will become the venues for a broader audience of farmers (estimated to be around 8,000), who will become
familiar with climate smart agriculture technologies and techniques through a Farmer Field School approach\.
37\. The Project design also builds on the recommendations provided in the Moldova Forestry Note and
Social Accountability Review: Forestry in Moldova, as well as on the experiences derived from the ENPI East
Countries FLEG II Program that highlighted the fact that engaging local public authorities in forestry
management is an effective way to mainstream climate change into community-level planning\. However, most
often LPAs have neither resources nor capacity for forest management and do not meet the legal requirements
for forest management\. Therefore, preparation of forestry management plans, and rapid implementation of
these plans by the LPAs are central part of the Project design\. The Project will primarily focus on local needs
and will aim to (i) strengthen capacity for community forests, and (ii) improve governance at the local level,
Page 11 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
including cooperation between state forest units and public and private sector\.
IV\. IMPLEMENTATION
A\. Institutional and Implementation Arrangements
38\. This multi-sectoral Project will be implemented by the 3 ministries that are responsible for agriculture,
forestry and civil protection respectively, under the oversight and coordination of an existing Steering
Committee (SC) chaired by the General Secretary of the Government within the State Chancellery\. The Ministry
of Agriculture and Food Industry (MAFI) will implement Component 1 with the participation of MOE for specific
activities as explained below\. MAFI will enter into a consultancy contract14 with the non-government
organization ACSA (National Extension Agency) for sub-component 1\.1 and an implementation agreement with
SDA Moldova (Sustainable Development Account Moldova) for strengthening the capacity of Water User
Associations under sub-component 1\.2\. SDA will provide technical assistance to WUAs and their members,
while MAFI and the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) (including the PMT), will provide equipment for the
benefit of the WUAs and carry out the review of the functions of Apelei Moldovei\. The MOE will implement
Component 2 through an implementation agreement with ICAS (National Forestry Research Institute),
responsible for coordinating the main technical assistance and landscape design works\. ICAS will provide
technical assistance to Local Public Authorities (LPAs)\. Local State Forest Enterprises (SFE) will carry out
afforestation and rehabilitation of community lands15, and private contractors selected competitively will carry
out community pasture land restoration based on terms agreed with the LPAs, as per current practice\. The
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) will implement Component 3 through its Civil Protection and Emergency
Situations Service (CPESS, sub-component 3\.1) and the Coordinating Authority for the contingent emergency
response (sub-component 3\.2)\. Composition and responsibilities of the Steering Committee are included in the
POM\.
39\. Overall Project Management: An existing, well experienced PMT that was established in the MOE to
implement World Bank-funded projects will manage all fiduciary arrangements for the Project\. The PMT
consists of the project manager, financial management officer, procurement specialist, project assistant and a
driver\. Additionally, safeguards and Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) specialists will be recruited specifically for
this Project\. Staffing, functions, and responsibilities of the PMT are also included in the POM\.
B\. Results Monitoring and Evaluation
40\. The Project Results Framework (RF) is provided in Section VII of this PAD\. The Projectâs Monitoring &
Evaluation (M&E) system will be based on: (i) continuous data collection; (ii) regular monitoring of the results of
all Project component interventions; (iii) the Project baseline survey; and (iv) Mid-Term review (MTR), and final
impact assessment\. Data collection and monitoring of outcomes and results will occur at the level of all Project
entities, and will be consolidated by the PMTâs M&E Specialist\. Each Project entity will have adequate staffing
14
The rationale for the direct selection of ACSA is provided in paragraph 19 of Annex 2\.
15
The rationale for the direct procurement approach of the SFEs is provided in paragraph 19 of Annex 2\. The
selection method for SFEs is Force Account\.
Page 12 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
and technical capacity to properly implement data collection and monitoring\. A baseline study will be carried
out to determine the initial conditions of the Project\. The baseline will focus on determining the current status
of variables that are directly pertinent to the Project interventions\. Given the specific nature of some of the
activities under Component 1 and 2, i\.e\., their narrow focus on easily identifiable Project beneficiaries and/or
targets, the baseline variables will be defined at the inception of these activities\. The key participating Project
entities and service providers (ACSA, ICAS, SDA and CPESS) will provide semi-annual progress reports using a set
of agreed monitoring variables as provided in the Project Results Framework (RF), to report on the
implementation progress of their respective components\. Adjustments, if needed, can be introduced to fine-
tune the agreed monitorable variables as the Project progresses, as agreed with the World Bank\.
C\. Sustainability
41\. Institutional Sustainability\. Government commitment to the Project objective is an essential
requirement for Project sustainability\. Climate change adaptation is high on the Government agenda as
demonstrated by the commitment made for IDA-17 replenishment and the willingness to pilot climate resilient
measures in previous operations\. The Government ownership of this operation has been strong since the very
beginning of Project preparation when it made available staff and technical experts â through a grant from the
Europe and Central Asia Capacity Development (ECAPDEV) Trust Fund - to help develop the Project concept and
design the components and activities\. The Project enjoys the support of the three implementing ministries as
well as the State Chancellery, which is in charge of donor aid coordination and will lead an inter-ministerial
steering committee to guide and oversee Project implementation that includes the Ministry of Finance\. The
fiduciary PMT includes well-qualified staff with experience in other World Bank-financed projects (e\.g\. the
Disaster and Climate Risk Management Project)\. ACSA, ICAS and CPESS have also had previous experience in
implementing World Bank-financed projects\. The Project will support institutional strengthening through
technical training and capacity building of WUAs, ICAS, SDA, LPAs, and SFEs\.
42\. Technical and Financial Sustainability\. The Project builds on and scales up interventions previously
piloted and successfully implemented under other projects\. Climate-resilient agricultural technology and
practices have been previously tested (in Moldova and elsewhere) and are likely to be maintained after the
Project given their impact on increased productivity and livelihoods\. WUAs will be responsible for the
operations and maintenance of the equipment provided by the Project for the benefit of their members\. The
Project provides capacity building for WUAs that would include improving asset management\. Maintenance of
rehabilitated degraded forest and pasture land will be ensured by long-term service contracts between
communities and the service providers\. The long-term sustainability of investments made for the benefit of
public agencies will depend upon continuing Government budgetary support and sufficient institutional
capacity\. Government and implementing agencies are aware of the need to ensure adequate operating and
maintenance budgets and the expectation is that financial support will continue given the level of commitment
already demonstrated\.
D\. Role of Partners
43\. Several development partners are active in the area of climate change adaptation and disaster risk
management in Moldova including the European Union, EBRD, EIB, Austrian Development Cooperation, Swiss
Development Agency, UNDP, USAID, IFAD\. As part of the IDA-17 commitments, the government is preparing a
Climate Adaptation Investment Plan that would help to coordinate climate financing from various donors and
Page 13 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
sources\. The Project is a significant building block of the plan\. The Project is also partnering with GEF who is
providing direct co-financing for rehabilitation of degraded lands and with GFDRR who is providing a parallel
technical assistance grant for disaster risk management\.
V\. KEY RISKS
A\. Overall Risk Rating and Explanation of Key Risks
Table 1: Risk Ratings Summary Table
Rating
Risk Categories
(H, S, M or L)
1\. Political and governance H
2\. Macroeconomic S
3\. Sector strategies and policies M
4\. Technical design of project or program M
5\. Institutional capacity for implementation and sustainability S
6\. Fiduciary M
7\. Environmental and social L
8\. Stakeholders L
9\. Other n/a
Overall M
Risk ratings: H = High; S = Substantial; M = Moderate; L = Low
44\. The Projectâs overall risk rating is moderate\. The sources of risk most intrinsic to the Project are of lower
magnitude as the technical design is mostly based on activities that have already been successfully piloted in
Moldova, and whose relevance for climate adaptation is well established\. In addition, project management will
be conducted by an established PMT who has successfully implemented multiple projects\.
45\. Political and governance risks are high, reflecting the serious political instability that brought seven
substantive or interim heads of government and three periods without a government between September
2014 and January 2016, Moldovaâs 17th percentile World Governance Indicator ranking for Control of
Corruption, and 2018 elections\. Macroeconomic risks associated with the financial sector, institutional
weaknesses in the implementation of structural reforms and vulnerabilities to external and climatic shocks are
deemed substantial\. Institutional risks are also significant due to the multi-sectoral nature of the operation and
the ongoing effort to consolidate ministries, that could bring some temporary delays and changes in
counterparts\. These risks will be mitigated by using the SC as the inter-ministerial body overseeing Project
implementation and technical agencies such as ICAS and SDA for the implementation of core activities\. The
incorporation of experience and lessons learned from previous and current projects in the Project design
reduces the likelihood of project risks associated with design, environmental and social issues, and stakeholder
participation\.
Page 14 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
VI\. APPRAISAL SUMMARY
A\. Economic and Financial (if applicable) Analysis
46\. The ex-ante economic and financial analysis suggests that Project-supported investments will generate
substantial benefits for beneficiaries in areas served by the Project, as well as substantial benefits for
Moldovaâs society as a whole\. Overall, the Net Present Value (NPV) is projected to reach US$16 million (using 6
percent discount rate)\. The investments evaluated for the economic analysis will generate an internal rate of
return of 20 percent\. The economic analysis thus shows that if Project implementation is effective and efficient,
Project-supported investments will bring substantial economic benefits to the beneficiaries\. Due to data
limitation, this assessment focuses only on short-term impacts as well as direct impacts\. It does not take into
account long-term effects nor indirect impacts â which the specialized literature suggests are positive and non-
negligible\. Therefore, the Project estimates correspond to conservative estimates or a lower bound of potential
benefits\. It is important to keep in mind that relevant data is scarce and not easily available\. Therefore, this
economic analysis, and its results, should be interpreted with caution\. More data collection at the producer
level is essential to have a better picture of the associated benefits\.
B\. Technical
47\. The Project is designed to scale-up interventions that were piloted and successfully implemented under
three previous World Bank operations: the ongoing Agriculture Competitiveness Project (2012-19;
US$46\.54 million), which supports mainstreaming agro-environmental and sustainable land management
practices as a way to enhance the competitiveness of the agro-food sector; the Disaster and Climate Risk
Management Project (2010-16; US$12 million), which strengthened the capacity to forecast severe weather
and improved disaster preparedness and emergency responses; and the Carbon Fund Community Forestry
Project (2009-18; US$2\.6 million) which aimed at restoring degrade land to economic and environmental use
for the benefit of rural communities and to increase carbon sequestration\.
48\. The Project also build on extensive analytical work, in particular the 2016 Climate Adaptation
Investment Planning TA, which provides the underpinning for prioritizing the project interventions\. The TA
supports the project focus on resilient rural landscapes - especially on land management and upscaling the
adoption of irrigation â and disaster response, and provides a strong argument for why inaction to address
climate resilience in key sectors over the period to 2040 will prove to be inordinately costly\. The Project also
follows the recommendations of the 2015 Forestry Policy Note that identified key steps to support the
sustainable development of the forestry sector\. Moreover, the Project is anchored to and supports the
implementation of government policies and strategies, such as the 2015-2018 National Plan for Afforestation
and the 2014 National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy and Action Plan to 2020\.
C\. Financial Management
49\. Financial management function will be managed by the PMT under the Ministry of Environment (MOE)
which has gained considerable experience in the implementation of the range of World Bank-financed projects
in the past several years\. The PMT expertise has been regularly assessed as part of World Bank reviews and was
subjected to annual audits by independent eligible audit firms\. The financial management arrangements
Page 15 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
established within the PMT have always been found to be satisfactory, with adequate internal control system
and satisfactory compliance with legal requirements\. The FM assessment confirmed that the PMT has
acceptable FM arrangements in place, particularly: (i) qualified and knowledgeable personnel; (ii) a well
systematized filing system that allows to keep all supporting financial documentation; (iii) well-prepared
semiannual IFRs received and deemed acceptable; and (iv) due annual project audits that were unqualified and
acceptable to the World Bank\. As such, these arrangements will serve as start point for the new project and will
be slightly adjusted to reflect its features\. More specifically, the accounting system will be adjusted to reflect
new financing sources, its components and respective chart of accounts\. Two USD-denominated Designated
Accounts â a pooled account for IBRD & IDA funds, and a segregated account for GEF funds - will be opened at
the National Bank of Moldova\. The disbursements into the Designated Account will be sequenced in an order
specified in the Disbursement Letter\. The format of interim financial reports per se will remain the same and
will reflect the project specific components and financing sources\. The accounting software will be adjusted to
this particular project to provide disaggregated information on project expenses per each financing source\.
Annual audits of Project financial statements will be provided to the World Bank within six months after the
end of each fiscal year as well as at Project closure\. The Borrower has agreed to disclose the audit reports for
the Project within one month of their receipt from the auditors, by posting the reports on the MOE website\.
Following the World Bank's formal receipt of these reports from the Borrower, the World Bank will make them
publicly available in accordance with World Bank Policy on Access to Information\. As part of Project
implementation support and supervision missions, semiannual IFRs will be reviewed and regular risk-based FM
missions will be conducted\. An operational review will be required for the matching grants program\. More
details on FM arrangements are provided in Annex 2\. The overall residual financial management risk for the
Project is moderate\.
D\. Procurement
50\. Procurement under the Project will be carried out in accordance with the World Bank Procurement
Regulations for Investment Project Financing (IPF) Borrowers â Procurement in IPF of Goods, Works, Non-
Consulting and Consulting Services, issued in July 2016 (Regulations) and with the latest Guidelines on
Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption in Projects Financed by IBRD Loans and IDA Credits\.
51\. An assessment of the capacity of the Implementing Agencies and the PMT was carried out in January
2017\. The team assessed the risks associated with the implementation of procurement processes including:
limited knowledge and no experience with the new World Bank Procurement Framework; limited technical
capacity of the implementing agencies to accurately assess their needs and develop technical specifications and
Terms of References; difficult coordination of procurement activities due to the complex Project structure with
three implementing agencies carrying out activities planned under their respective components through
subordinated agencies; limited technical capacity to procure specialized equipment for the National Center for
Forest Genetics and Seeds; delays in implementation of contracts and approval of deliverables under consulting
contracts due to internal processes\.
52\. The following mitigation measures have been recommended: (i) the World Bank team will offer a more
in-depth training on the new approach to procurement and specifically on Regulations and the Systematic
Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement (STEP)16; (ii) the Implementing agencies will employ technical experts to
16
STEP is an online procurement planning and tracking tool to prepare, clear and update the project procurement
plan
Page 16 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
enhance their capacities in particular areas where they lack expertise; (iii) the PMT will closely follow up and
monitor the performance of consultants to avoid delays in contract implementation through a proper contract
administration (regular inspections/meetings), suitable provisions for deliverables linked to payment, where
appropriate, and timely action in giving notice to consultants for remedying the delays and defaults; (iv) since
the same Project structure was adopted in the previous Bank-funded project implemented by the same
agencies with the support of the same PMT, the PMT will maintain the coordination mechanism established
under that Project\. This involves strengthening each implementing agency with focal points to ensure effective
coordination and efficient implementation of activities and using an existing inter-ministerial Steering
Committee to provide overall guidance and ensure cross-sectorial collaboration; (v) the PMT will offer
continuous support to the implementing agencies in assessing their needs to ensure that these are accurately
defined especially given the extensive experience of the PMT staff with similar Projects\.
53\. The World Bank will exercise its procurement oversight through a risk-based approach comprising prior
and post review and independent procurement reviews, as appropriate\. The PMT developed a Procurement
Plan (PP) for the entire scope of the project consistent with the Project implementation which specifies prior
review thresholds\. Post reviews will be conducted on the procurement processes undertaken by the PMT to
determine compliance with the requirements of the Financing Agreements and Procurement Plan\.
E\. Social (including Safeguards)
54\. The Project design has been informed by the Social Assessment (SA) which was carried out as part of the
preliminary social and environmental assessment process\. The overall social impacts of the Project are
expected to be positive\. Project interventions will help different social/resource user communities including
farmer groups, water user associations, pasture management and/or user groups, as well as LPAs to improve
their capacities and resource endowments\. An Involuntary Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) has been
prepared to address potential social risks and adverse impacts due to Project interventions, especially issues
related to restrictions on access to livelihood resources during afforestation activities on degraded lands17\. The
RPF focuses on social risk assessment/screening of interventions to identify appropriate mitigation measures,
screening checklists and safeguards instruments, key principles for livelihood restoration, âaccess restriction
frameworkâ in case there are limitations for users to access forest, pasture and other nature resources, public
consultation and participation plan with affected persons prior and during Project implementation, draft
entitlement matrix and institutional arrangement for RPF implementation\.
55\. Citizen Engagement\. The Project is planning to engage all types of stakeholders and beneficiaries
through Project specific activities\. As part of the Social Impact Assessment, a stakeholder engagement plan was
prepared and outlines key stakeholders and Project Affected People who would be consulted and engaged in
planning and implementing interventions to build local ownership and thus contribute to more sustainable
Project outcomes\. The specific elements of the framework for citizen engagement include: (a) planning and
implementation of afforestation/rehabilitation based on participatory decision making process; (b) engaging
WUAs in upgrading irrigation systems and developing their capacities for adequate operation and maintenance;
(c) encouraging LPAs to support community engagement in determining local investment needs to ensure local
communitiesâ participation; (d) designing and implementation of training programs based on training needs
assessment and designing training to meet the needs of the participants, and (e) launching a feedback
17
The RPF was disclosed in country on February 17, 2017 and on the World Bank website on February 21, 2017\.
Page 17 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
mechanism to process complaints, concerns, and questions from stakeholders at different levels\.
56\. Gender\. The Project includes several gender-related actions\. In Sub-component 1\.1: (i) interventions will
be designed in a way that addresses the gender-specific constraints of farmers so that women and men benefit
equally from the Project; (ii) during Project consultations, female farmers will be encouraged to apply for
support under the climate adaptation grant scheme; and (iii) some capacity building and training sessions for
the climate adaptation grants will be targeted exclusively at women beneficiaries to encourage and increase
female participation\. In Sub-component 1\.2 consultation/citizen engagement processes will ensure
participation of women\. Under Component 2 the impact of investments on women will be assessed and
training on ecological restoration of forests will encourage participation of female professionals\.
F\. Environment (including Safeguards)
57\. Generally, the Project will provide many environmental and social benefits, such as improved farmer
skills and investments in climate change adaptation technologies, improved forest management, strengthening
disaster response capacity, etc\. At the same time, the proposed Project activities might generate various
adverse environmental and social impacts related to the following: (a) biodiversity degradation; (b) increased
pollution of ground and surface waters due to soil erosion; (c) health and environmental risks due to
inappropriate pesticides handling; and (d) noise, dust, air and water pollution, health hazards and labor safety
issues during civil works; etc\. All these impacts are expected to be typical for afforestation, agricultural
production and pasture improvement activities as well as for small scale construction/rehabilitation works,
temporary by nature and site specific and can be easily mitigated by applying best agro-forestry and
construction practices or relevant mitigation measures\.
58\. The Project will trigger a series of World Bank Operational Policies (OPs)\. OP 4\.01 on Environmental
Assessment is triggered as the Project activities would generate some environmental and social impacts\. While
the Project will not support any commercial wood harvesting, OP 4\.36 on Forests is triggered as the Project will
support afforestation activities along with the forest reconstruction activities in the degraded forests\. While the
Project will not finance purchasing and/or application of pesticides, it might support purchasing special
equipment and would provide training on pest management in the forestry sector and thus the Project triggers
OP 4\.09\. OP 4\.12 on Involuntary Resettlement is also triggered\. Although it is expected that all forestry and
pasture management activities/subprojects will be implemented on public lands, the rehabilitation work might
temporarily restrict access of the local population to the pasture lands\.
59\. To address identified environmental and social risks and impacts the government prepared an
Environmental and Social Assessment Framework (ESMF) which will guide the Project activities and the
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of the matching grants (once identified and selected)\. The ESMF
specifies the set of mitigation and monitoring measures to be taken during the implementation of Project
activities and matching grants to eliminate, offset, or reduce adverse environmental and social impacts to
acceptable levels\. The document provides also ESMF institutional responsibilities\. The document covers the
following: rules and procedures for environmental screening; guidance for conducting activities/matching
grants (EIA and/or preparing simple Environmental and Social Management Plans (ESMPs) as well as the ESMP
Checklist; possible mitigation measures for different proposed activities and matching grants to be supported
by the Project; requirements for monitoring and supervision of implementing of EIA/ESMPs requirements\.
Based on the ESMF guidelines, the implementing entity will prepare site specific ESMPs for each matching grant
Page 18 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
and proposed Project activity with potential impacts\. Per World Bank and national EIA rules and procedures,
the ESMPs will be disclosed and publicly consulted\. For the rehabilitation of the regional Emergency Command
Center (ECC) and for the National Center for Forest Genetics and Seeds, the client will prepare ESMP Checklists
to be disclosed, consulted on and further used during Project implementation\. To avoid potential impacts on
natural habitats and biodiversity conservation, the ESMF specifies rules and procedures for environmental
screening and assessment of land plots given for afforestation or forest shelterbelts as well as the degraded
forests selected for restoration activities\. Lastly, the ESMF includes measures to raise awareness and educate
foresters on safe pesticide handling and use of Integrated Pest Management to enhance sustainability and
reduce human and environmental exposure to pesticides\. Per World Bank requirements, the ESMF was
disclosed and publicly consulted in-country on February 17, 2017 and made publicly available on the World
Bank website on February 20, 2017\.
G\. Other Safeguard Policies (if applicable)
60\. The Project triggers also the OP 7\.50 on International Waters because it will provide on-farm irrigation
equipment to WUAs to help their member farmers access 10 existing large-scale irrigation systems that are
connected to the Dniestr and Prut Rivers, which are Transboundary Rivers and pass through Moldovaâs
territory, flowing into the Black Sea or Danube River (sub-component 1\.2)\. The proposed activities (purchase of
mobile aspersion irrigation machines with reel and console and a hydraulic turbine and similar equipment) do
not require civil works and will not lead to incremental abstraction of water from the two transboundary rivers\.
Accordingly, these activities have been qualified as minor additions, or alterations to the existing irrigation and
drainage schemes that will not (i) adversely change the quality or quantity of water flows to the other riparians;
and (ii) be adversely affected by the other riparians' possible water use\. On this basis, the Project falls within
the exception to the notification requirement under Paragraph 7(a) of the World Bankâs Safeguard Policy on
International Waterways\.
H\. World Bank Grievance Redress
61\. Communities and individuals who believe that they are adversely affected by a World Bank-supported
Project may submit complaints to existing project-level grievance redress mechanisms or the World Bankâs
Grievance Redress Service (GRS)\. The GRS ensures that complaints received are promptly reviewed in order to
address Project-related concerns\. Project affected communities and individuals may submit their complaint to
the World Bankâs independent Inspection Panel which determines whether harm occurred, or could occur, as a
result of World Bank non-compliance with its policies and procedures\. Complaints may be submitted at any
time after concerns have been brought directly to the World Bank's attention, and World Bank Management
has been given an opportunity to respond\. For information on how to submit complaints to the World Bankâs
corporate Grievance Redress Service (GRS), please visit http://www\.worldbank\.org/en/projects-
operations/products-and-services/grievance-redress-service\. For information on how to submit complaints to
the World Bank Inspection Panel, please visit www\.inspectionpanel\.org\.
\.
Page 19 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
VII\. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND MONITORING
Results Framework
COUNTRY : Moldova
Climate Adaptation Project
Project Development Objectives
The Project Development Objective (PDO) is to enhance the adoption of climate-smart practices in agriculture, forestry and pasture management in
targeted landscapes and strengthen national disaster management systems\.
Project Development Objective Indicators
Unit of Responsibility for
Indicator Name Core Baseline End Target Frequency Data Source/Methodology
Measure Data Collection
Name: Land area under Hectare(Ha) 0\.00 8650\.00 Semi-annual Site visit and verification\. ACSA, SDA, ICAS
sustainable landscape
management practices
Area of agricultural land Hectare(Ha) 0\.00 2900\.00 Semi-annual Site visit and verification ACSA
with climate-smart following investments\.
technologies adopted
Area of agricultural land Hectare(Ha) 0\.00 1650\.00 Semi-annual Site visits and verification WUAs, SDA
with improved access to following investments\.
irrigation services
Page 20 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
Unit of Responsibility for
Indicator Name Core Baseline End Target Frequency Data Source/Methodology
Measure Data Collection
Area of forest land, Hectare(Ha) 0\.00 4100\.00 Semi-annual Site visits and verification of LPAs, ICAS
shelterbelts, and works\.
pastures established or
rehabilitated
Description: This is a corporate result indicator\. It measures in aggregate the area of agricultural land, forest and pastures that have been improved, rehabilitated or
established by adopting climate-smart technologies and practices\.
Name: Rate of compliance Percentage 7\.00 60\.00 Semi-annual emergency response CPESS
with standard emergency statistical records
response time
Description: This indicator is linked to the PDO (strengthen national disaster management systems) and relates to component 3\.1 improved climate-related disaster
preparedness and response\. It measures the percentage of selected emergencies (floods, heavy snow, open fires) resolved within a pre-defined time frame (from dispatch
to end of rescue)\.
Intermediate Results Indicators
Unit of Responsibility for
Indicator Name Core Baseline End Target Frequency Data Source/Methodology
Measure Data Collection
Name: Number of climate Number 0\.00 800\.00 Semi-annual Regular inspection of ACSA
adaptation grants investment
satisfactorily implemented
micro grants Number 0\.00 600\.00 Semi-annual Regular inspection of ACSA
investment
Page 21 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
Unit of Responsibility for
Indicator Name Core Baseline End Target Frequency Data Source/Methodology
Measure Data Collection
small and medium size Number 0\.00 200\.00 Semi-annual Regular inspection of ACSA
grants investment
of which share of grants Percentage 0\.00 10\.00 Semi-annual Regular inspection of ACSA
provided to female investment
beneficiaries
Description: Beneficiaries include agriculture producers, farmers, rural households and private / agricultural entities who meet eligibility criteria set out under the project\.
Name: Rate of adoption of Percentage 0\.00 30\.00 Semi-annual Survey ACSA
improved climate-smart
technologies in agriculture
Description: Rate of adoption of climate-smart technologies in the agriculture sector by beneficiaries as a result of extension services provided\.
Name: Number of irrigation Number 0\.00 10\.00 Semi-annual Site visits SDA
systems operationalized
Description: Number of MCC-rehabilitated irrigation schemes connected to WUAs' members\.
Name: Average increase in Percentage 0\.00 30\.00 Semi-annual Financial Reports WUA, SDA
collection rate of Irrigation
Service Fees by the Water
Page 22 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
Unit of Responsibility for
Indicator Name Core Baseline End Target Frequency Data Source/Methodology
Measure Data Collection
User Associations
Description: Average of individual WUAs' increase in collected ISF\.
Name: Area covered by Hectare(Ha) 0\.00 29000\.00 Semi-annual LPA's management plans LPA, ICAS
forest and pasture
management plans adopted
by Local Public Authorities
Forest area under Hectare(Ha) 0\.00 22000\.00 Semi-annual LPA's management plan LPA, ICAS
management plans
Pasture area under Hectare(Ha) 0\.00 7000\.00 Semi-annual LPA's management plan LPA, ICAS
management plans
Description:
Name: Area of new forests Hectare(Ha) 0\.00 1500\.00 Semi-annual Site visits for verification of LPA, ICAS
established works
Description: This indicator includes rehabilitation of degraded lands through afforestation and reforestation (but not shelterbelts, which are included separately as an
intermediate indicator)\.
Name: Area of forest belts Hectare(Ha) 0\.00 1600\.00 Semi-annual Progress Reports LPA, ICAS
Page 23 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
Unit of Responsibility for
Indicator Name Core Baseline End Target Frequency Data Source/Methodology
Measure Data Collection
rehabilitated and established
Description: This includes shelterbelts on agricultural land and riparian belts along water basins\.
Name: Area of pastures Hectare(Ha) 0\.00 1000\.00 Semi-annual Progress Reports LPA, ICAS
rehabilitated
Description: Pastures owned by LPAs (communal land)\.
Name: Share of nursery Percentage 0\.00 60\.00 Semi-annual Certification Reports ICAS
seedlings from certified
seeds
Description: This intermediate indicator measures the improved quality and origin of seeds\.
Name: Number of forest Number 0\.00 120\.00 Semi-annual Training and field work ICAS
engineers trained in attendance records\.
ecological reconstruction
that use the acquired skills in
field work\.
of which share of female Percentage 0\.00 10\.00 Semi-annual Training and field work ICAS
professionals attendance records\.
Description: This includes technical specialists from Moldsilva, ICAS and SFE senior staff\.
Page 24 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
Unit of Responsibility for
Indicator Name Core Baseline End Target Frequency Data Source/Methodology
Measure Data Collection
Name: Share of flood Percentage 0\.00 60\.00 Semi-annual emergency response CPESS
emergencies resolved within statistical records
80 hours
Description:
Name: Share of open fire Percentage 20\.00 50\.00 Semi-annual emergency response CPESS
emergencies resolved within statistical records
3 hours
Description: Open fire over an area between 5 ha and 10 ha\.
Name: Share of heavy snow Percentage 0\.00 70\.00 Semi-annual emergency response CPESS
emergency resolved within 5 statistical records
hours
Description: This indicator measures the response time of snow rescue from isolated villages, towns, and national roads\.
Name: Share of emergency Percentage 10\.00 70\.00 Semi-annual emergency response CPESS
calls processed within 120 statistical records
seconds by the Balti ECC\.
Description:
Page 25 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
Unit of Responsibility for
Indicator Name Core Baseline End Target Frequency Data Source/Methodology
Measure Data Collection
Name: Grievances registered Percentage 0\.00 100\.00 Rolling basis Comments and grievances PMT
related to delivery of project forms and complaint
benefits addressed (%) register\.
Description: This indicator measures the transparency and accountability mechanisms established by the project so the target beneficiaries have trust in the process and
are willing to participate, and feel that their grievances are attended to promptly\. It is understood that local sensitivities and tensions will not allow grievance or redress
mechanisms to be established in all projects\.
Page 26 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
Target Values
Project Development Objective Indicators FY
Indicator Name Baseline YR1 YR2 YR3 YR4 YR5 YR6 End Target
Land area under sustainable
0\.00 0\.00 1600\.00 3900\.00 6150\.00 8250\.00 8650\.00 8650\.00
landscape management practices
Area of agricultural land with climate-
0\.00 0\.00 500\.00 1000\.00 1500\.00 2500\.00 2900\.00 2900\.00
smart technologies adopted
Area of agricultural land with
0\.00 0\.00 100\.00 400\.00 850\.00 1650\.00 1650\.00 1650\.00
improved access to irrigation services
Area of forest land, shelterbelts, and
0\.00 0\.00 1000\.00 2500\.00 3800\.00 4100\.00 4100\.00 4100\.00
pastures established or rehabilitated
Rate of compliance with standard
7\.00 7\.00 30\.00 60\.00 60\.00 60\.00 60\.00 60\.00
emergency response time
Intermediate Results Indicators FY
Indicator Name Baseline YR1 YR2 YR3 YR4 YR5 YR6 End Target
Number of climate adaptation grants
0\.00 0\.00 100\.00 300\.00 500\.00 600\.00 800\.00 800\.00
satisfactorily implemented
micro grants 0\.00 0\.00 75\.00 225\.00 375\.00 450\.00 600\.00 600\.00
small and medium size grants 0\.00 0\.00 25\.00 75\.00 125\.00 150\.00 200\.00 200\.00
Page 27 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
Indicator Name Baseline YR1 YR2 YR3 YR4 YR5 YR6 End Target
of which share of grants provided to
0\.00 0\.00 10\.00 10\.00 10\.00 10\.00 10\.00 10\.00
female beneficiaries
Rate of adoption of improved
climate-smart technologies in 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 10\.00 20\.00 25\.00 30\.00 30\.00
agriculture
Number of irrigation systems
0\.00 0\.00 3\.00 5\.00 7\.00 10\.00 10\.00 10\.00
operationalized
Average increase in collection rate of
Irrigation Service Fees by the Water 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 10\.00 20\.00 25\.00 30\.00 30\.00
User Associations
Area covered by forest and pasture
management plans adopted by Local 0\.00 0\.00 3500\.00 9250\.00 15000\.00 21250\.00 29000\.00 29000\.00
Public Authorities
Forest area under management plans 0\.00 0\.00 2500\.00 6250\.00 10000\.00 14570\.00 22000\.00 22000\.00
Pasture area under management
0\.00 0\.00 1000\.00 3000\.00 5000\.00 6500\.00 7000\.00 7000\.00
plans
Area of new forests established 0\.00 0\.00 400\.00 1000\.00 1500\.00 1500\.00 1500\.00 1500\.00
Area of forest belts rehabilitated and
0\.00 0\.00 500\.00 1000\.00 1450\.00 1600\.00 1600\.00 1600\.00
established
Area of pastures rehabilitated 0\.00 0\.00 150\.00 500\.00 850\.00 1000\.00 1000\.00 1000\.00
Share of nursery seedlings from 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 20\.00 40\.00 60\.00 60\.00
Page 28 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
Indicator Name Baseline YR1 YR2 YR3 YR4 YR5 YR6 End Target
certified seeds
Number of forest engineers trained in
ecological reconstruction that use the 0\.00 0\.00 20\.00 40\.00 80\.00 120\.00 120\.00 120\.00
acquired skills in field work\.
of which share of female
0\.00 0\.00 10\.00 10\.00 10\.00 10\.00 10\.00 10\.00
professionals
Share of flood emergencies resolved
0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 30\.00 60\.00 60\.00 60\.00 60\.00
within 80 hours
Share of open fire emergencies
20\.00 20\.00 20\.00 30\.00 50\.00 50\.00 50\.00 50\.00
resolved within 3 hours
Share of heavy snow emergency
0\.00 0\.00 0\.00 30\.00 70\.00 70\.00 70\.00 70\.00
resolved within 5 hours
Share of emergency calls processed
10\.00 10\.00 10\.00 10\.00 30\.00 70\.00 70\.00 70\.00
within 120 seconds by the Balti ECC\.
Grievances registered related to
delivery of project benefits addressed 0\.00 0\.00 100\.00 100\.00 100\.00 100\.00 100\.00 100\.00
(%)
Page 29 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
ANNEX 1: DETAILED PROJECT DESCRIPTION
COUNTRY: Moldova
Climate Adaptation Project
1\. The Project Development Objectives (PDOs) are to enhance the adoption of climate-smart practices in
agriculture, forestry and pasture management in targeted landscapes and strengthen national disaster
management systems\. The overarching goals are to reduce climate vulnerability in selected rural landscapes
and enhance the adaptive capacity of government institutions, key stakeholders and the public to manage
climate change risks\. The Project cost is US$27\.20 million financed by an IBRD loan of US$12\.4 million, an IDA
credit of US$ 12\.8 million equivalent (US$11\.1 million equivalent IDA blend and US$1\.7 million equivalent IDA
hard terms) and a GEF grant of US$2 million (co-financing Component 2\.1))\. The Project has four
components:
Component 1: Climate-smart Practices in the Agriculture Sector (US$12\.4 million)
Component 2: Climate-smart Forest and Pasture Management (US$8\.8 million)
Component 3: Climate and Disaster Risk Management (US$4\.7 million)
Component 4: Project Management and Monitoring (US$1\.3 million)
COMPONENT 1\. CLIMATE-SMART PRACTICES IN THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR (US$12\.4 MILLION)
2\. This component aims to enhance adoption of climate-smart practices in selected rural landscapes by
supporting: (i) the scale-up of farmersâ climate-smart technologies and agricultural practices and provision of
related advisory services; and (ii) expanded up-take of irrigation services\.
3\. Sub-component 1\.1\. Scale-up of Farmersâ Climate-smart Agricultural Practices (US$9\.8 million)\. Sub-
component 1\.1 will provide matching grants to eligible farmers, including rural households and
private/agricultural entities, to scale up successful climate adaptation measures on agricultural farmlands\. It
will also provide training, promotion and public awareness activities to facilitate the adoption of climate
adaptation measures and technologies by beneficiaries\.
4\. The Project will make available climate adaptation grants for on-farm climate-smart investments and
technologies such as anti-hale protection, rain water/surface water harvesting, drip irrigation, greenhouse
climate control systems; no-till and other soil conservation measures\. The agricultural producers selected to
receive grants will undertake an intensive training program on the specific technology for which the grant is
provided\. All sub-project sites of the climate adaptation grants will become venues for a broader audience of
farmers (around 8,000) at which climate smart agriculture (CSA) technologies and techniques will be
demonstrated through a Farmer Field School approach\. Several public awareness campaigns, including TV
and radio programs, will be carried out in all raions to promote the Projectâs CSA grant program\.
5\. Some estimated 800 grants will be provided on a demand-driven basis to eligible producers, out of
which a larger number of grants (roughly 600) will finance micro operations of farmers mainly operating on
their backyards and small plots, the remaining grants will be provided to bigger commercial farmers\. The
grant size and co-financing ratio will vary depending on the type and size of investments: micro-investments
Page 30 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
with a grant ceiling of US$2,200, requiring at least 10 percent co-financing; small-size investments with a
grant ceiling of US$20,000 and at least 30 percent co-financing; medium-size investments with a grant ceiling
of US$40,000 and at least 50 percent co-financing\.
6\. Eligibility criteria in the Grants Operational Manual will include, among others: (i) land titling rights; (ii)
willingness to contribute financially; (iii) commitment to participate in capacity building activities; and (iv)
willingness to provide access to the farm/site for knowledge and experience sharing\. Only beneficiaries of
small- and medium-size grants will be required to be legally registered, while the beneficiaries of micro grants
may include individuals or households with only land in legal possession\.
7\. Sub-component 1\.2\. Expanded Up-take of Irrigation Services (US$2\.6 million)\. Sub-component 1\.2 will
provide on-farm irrigation equipment to eligible WUAs to access existing large-scale pumped systems
rehabilitated by the government with support from the MCC\. This activity will address the current lack of
adequate and appropriate on-farm irrigation equipment (e\.g\. mobile aspersion irrigation machines with reel
and console and a hydraulic turbine) that can satisfy the minimum pumping capacity requirement of the
rehabilitated MCC schemes\. The requirements for the transfer of ownership of the equipment to the WUAs
will be set forth in the Project Operational Manual (POM) and will include, inter alia, the WUAâs agreement to
contribute financially to the operation and maintenance cost (10% of the equipment cost)\. The WUAs, in
turn, will provide irrigation services to its members represented by small and medium farmers who are most
disadvantaged and have limited possibilities to invest in on-farm irrigation equipment\. The availability of
shared on-farm irrigation equipment will create the possibility to provide water in every segment of the
system, therefore facilitating a larger number of farmers to transition to irrigated agriculture, allowing them
to better cope under adverse weather conditions\.
8\. This sub-component will also focus on building upon the results of MCCâs institutional and investment
efforts to provide further capacity training to WUAs\. The training will be aimed to support the associations in
effectively managing the irrigation process, improving the irrigation schemesâ operation and maintenance,
and attain good governance and management\. Finally, the sub-component will finance the review of current
functions of Apele Moldovei to identify the required measures to enhance its role in monitoring and
supporting WUAs\.
COMPONENT 2\. CLIMATE-SMART FOREST AND PASTURE MANAGEMENT (US$8\.8 MILLION)
9\. This component aims to enhance the climate resilience of Moldovaâs forest and pasture lands through
restoration of degraded lands at the community and village level and improved climate-smart management
of forest reproductive material\. The first sub-component seeks to strengthen forest and pasture
management planning at the Local Public Authority (LPA) level (Primaria, includes incorporated communes,
municipalities and cities) and provides investments in afforestation and rehabilitation of degraded lands
(around 3,130 ha) and pastures (at least 1,000 ha)\. Selected LPAs will benefit from training and awareness
raising on how to manage their lands sustainably and enhance landscape resilience to address climate change
challenges\. The second sub-component will help address the need for climate-smart ecological restoration in
the Moldovan forest sector through provision of climate-adapted forest reproductive material (seeds and
seedlings)\. Capacity building and training will be provided to the Forest Research and Management Institute
(ICAS) and Moldsilva staff on nurseries, forest reproductive material, and climate-resilient ecological
restoration, including field trials and best practice demonstration sites\.
Page 31 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
10\. Sub-component 2\.1\. Community Forest and Pasture Management (US$5\.8 million)\. The Project will
help address capacity needs of LPAs to manage their lands more sustainably by supporting the development
of integrated participatory forest and pasture management plans for LPAs selected in accordance with the
criteria set forth in the Project Operational Manual, including the elaboration of integrated landscape
mapping (i\.e\. land use âmaster plansâ) and operational forest and pasture management plans within eight
priority raions (districts) in the central and south regions, considered to be more vulnerable to climate
change\. Activities will include informing and reaching out to LPAs and seeking their interest in participating in
the Project\. LPAsâ eligibility for Project support will be screened by ICAS according to the following criteria:
willingness to participate; capacity and opportunity for collaboration among neighboring LPAs, readiness to
contribute with own resources; and availability of suitable degraded lands\. The Project will aim at preparing
as many as 110 master plans for eligible LPAs\. Preparation of the master plans will be led by ICAS, working
jointly with the LPAs, and will map land resources (forests and shelterbelts, degraded lands, watersheds,
arable land, perennial plantations, pastures, ecological corridors and protected areas) to provide a
foundation for the development of detailed operational management plans\.
11\. Based on ICASâ assessed capacity, 10-year operational management plans will be prepared for
approximately 29,000 ha: 22,000 ha covered by forest management plans and 7,000 ha covered by pasture
land management plans\. The forest and pasture management planning will follow a consultative process
involving community members\. It is expected that LPAs will seek approval of the operational management
plans by the local Councils, who would also be responsible for enforcing them\.
12\. Based on the operational management plans, the Project will support investments18 in afforestation and
rehabilitation of community lands and pastures, focused on:
a) Rehabilitation of shelterbelts: 750 ha;
b) Planting of new shelterbelts on agricultural land: 560 ha;
c) Planting riparian belts along water basins: 320 ha;
d) Rehabilitation of degraded land (through af/reforestation): 1,500 ha
e) Rehabilitation of degraded communal pastures: 1,000 ha
13\. Selection criteria for investment sites include: (a) land must be owned by the LPA; (b) willingness of the
LPA for including the land for afforestation and rehabilitation; (c) selection needs to be based on participatory
decision making process; (c) land must not be in a protected area; (d) current land use and potential for
positive socio-economic impact at community level; (e) lands classified in the National Cadaster as degraded
land and for afforestation activities, lands must have a bonitet19 <40 to ensure productive land remains
available for agriculture; (f) minimum area of 300 ha for developing pasture management plans, and 200 ha
for forests and other forest vegetation, (g) minimum land area for afforestation of 5ha and a maximum of
200ha at the level of the LPA; (h) LPAs must ensure the sustainability of the investment by taking a range of
appropriate measures such as allocation of staff, technical resources and operating budget for
implementation of management plans; and (j) capacity of local State Forest Enterprises (SFEs) to undertake
the required Project fieldwork\. Interventions will focus on degraded lands with site productivity classes of III
and IV and avoid, where possible, the most severely degraded land where the chance of successful activities
is low\. Additional criteria for including pasturelands improvement activities are (a) importance of livestock-
18
Based on a number of selection criteria for investment sites\.
19
The scale to indicate the richness of the soil, from 0 to 100\.
Page 32 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
based economic activities for communitiesâ livelihoods, and (b) an evident interest to engage in pastureland
management jointly with neighboring LPAs\.
14\. Capacity building for forest and pasture management planning will be provided to the LPAs in the form
of awareness raising, workshops, and study tours on best resilience practices to address climate change
challenges\. The Project will also provide technical assistance on how to prepare technical designs and
procurement specifications for goods and services, and carry out the actual field works, including robust
monitoring, technical supervision and maintenance of the rehabilitated areas\.
15\. Sub-component 2\.2\. Ecological Restoration of Degraded Forests (US$3\.0 million)\. This sub-component
will include the establishment of a National Centre for Forest Genetics and Seeds (NCFGS) within ICAS to
improve production capacity (both quantity and quality) of certified forest reproductive material mainly from
native climate resilient species\. The main purpose of the NCFGS will be: seed base management;
regeneration material certification; seed processing and conditioning; production of containerized seedlings
(nursery); and genetic research and in vitro multiplication\. The Project will specifically include investments in
containerized seedling production (annual capacity of approximately 1 million seedlings), equipment for
processing seeds, nursery equipment, and laboratory equipment for quality assessment, as well as related
civil works\. In addition, support will be provided for identification and preparation of a national register of
seed stands and works to better manage the seeds stands\. The seedlings would be used in landscape and
forest restoration first under Component 2\.1 and also elsewhere in the country\. The genetic material would
mainly consist of domestic species and would thus partially replace introduced species which currently
dominate seedling production\. ICAS and Moldsilva staff will benefit from capacity building and training on
nurseries, forest reproductive material, and climate-resilient ecological restoration, as well as hands-on
practice through field trials and best practice demonstration sites\.
COMPONENT 3\. CLIMATE AND DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT (US$4\.7 MILLION)
16\. This component aims to strengthen Moldovaâs climate and disaster risk management systems and, in
the event of an eligible crisis or emergency, provide immediate and effective response to said eligible crisis or
emergency\. The first sub-component provides investments for the establishment of one regional Emergency
Control Center (ECC) in Balti, as well as support for preparedness and response capacity and equipment\. The
second sub-component will house a zero-budget contingent emergency response (CER) to be triggered in the
event of an eligible climate-related emergency or crisis\.
17\. Sub-component 3\.1: Improved Climate-related Disaster Preparedness and Response (US$4\.7 million)\.
This sub-component aims to strengthen the capacity of national and regional civil protection authorities to
prepare for and respond to extreme weather events linked to climate change, including disaster management
systems to support a wide range of sectors with risk management planning and response to extreme hydro-
meteorological events\. The Project will support Moldovaâs national integrated risk management technical
strategy by modernizing and upgrading to international standards one regional Emergency Command Center
(ECC) in Balti\. This will ensure: better quality of services nationally and at the local level; improved efficiency
of support for remote locations; better support for tactical field operations; and increased redundancy for
critical Civil Protection and Emergency Situations Service (CPESS) infrastructure\. In addition, preparedness
and response equipment and training will be provided\.
Page 33 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
18\. Sub-component 3\.2: Contingent Emergency Response (US$0\.0 million)\. Following an eligible crisis or
emergency, including an adverse natural event that causes a major natural disaster, the Government of
Moldova may request the World Bank to re-allocate Project funds to support response and reconstruction
and partially cover emergency response and recovery costs\. This sub-component could also be used to
channel additional funds should they become available through as a result of the emergency\. Details on the
conditions for triggering the CER and the fiduciary and safeguards requirements are provided in the CER sub-
component Operational Manual\.
COMPONENT 4\. Project Management and Monitoring (US$1\.3 million)
19\. This component will finance the operating costs of Project management functions to be carried out by
the PMT, housed in the MOE\. Key functions will include procurement, financial management, environmental
and social safeguards, budgeting, preparation of annual work plans, reporting, and monitoring and evaluation
of the PDO and the Project Results Framework (RF) indicators\. The PMT will provide support for the
implementation of all three components, whilst ensuring close cooperation between the line ministries and
implementing agencies, as well as other project stakeholders\.
Page 34 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
ANNEX 2: IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS
COUNTRY : Moldova
Climate Adaptation Project
Project Institutional and Implementation Arrangements
1\. Oversight and Coordination\. The implementation of Project activities will be coordinated by an inter-
ministerial Steering Committee (SC) to be chaired by the General Secretary of the Government in charge of
donor aid coordination within the State Chancellery and has overall responsibility for coordination and
monitoring of Governmentâs activities to implement state policies\. The SC will be the same as the one that
oversaw the Moldova Disaster and Climate Risk Management (DCRM) Project, but will be augmented to ensure
that all key implementing partners under the proposed Project are included\. The SC will provide overall policy-
level guidance and ensure cross-sectoral collaboration\. It will include, among others, representatives from the
Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of Environment (MOE), the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry
(MAFI), and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA)\. The specific composition and responsibilities of the SC will
be included in the Project Operational Manual\.
2\. Overall Project Management\. Fiduciary arrangements for all components of the Project will be managed
by an existing PMT housed in the MOE\. The PMT supported the implementation of the Persistent Organic
Pollutants Project in the past, and supported the implementation of the DCRM Project\. While implementing
ministries and agencies will focus on substantive elements of Project implementation, the PMT will deal with
fiduciary management in compliance with World Bank policies and systems, and will facilitate overall
implementation\. Currently, the PMT has adequate capacity to start Project implementation\. The PMT consists
of the project manager, financial management officer, procurement specialist, project assistant and a driver\. In
addition, an environmental and social safeguards specialist, an M&E specialist and an accountant will be
recruited specifically for this Project\. The specific staffing, functions and responsibilities of the PMT will also be
included in the project Operational Manual\.
3\. Implementing Agencies and Service Providers\. The Project will have three main implementing agencies:
the MAFI responsible for Component 1 (and jointly with MOE for one activity under sub-component 1\.2, as
described in paragraph 4 below); the MOE, which will also house the PMT, for Component 2; and the MIA for
Component 3\. The three ministries will assign Focal Points to assist with technical aspects (including evaluating
bids) of Project activity implementation within each respective component and its sub-components\. A
Technical Evaluation Committee responsible for operational decisions (e\.g\. approval of annual work-plans,
terms of references, technical specifications, etc\.) and procurement evaluations, chaired by the Focal Point
delegated by the component implementing agency, will include a representative from the MOF, the State
Chancellery and the PMT (as standing members), as well as one other relevant technical member\.
4\. Sector-specific activities will be implemented by the appropriate technical agencies and/or service
providers: the National Rural Development Agency (ACSA), a non-government extension agency with
experience and satisfactory performance in managing similar grants in the agriculture sector under World
Bank-funded projects and through its country-wide network, will support farmers in upscaling the adoption of
climate-smart technologies and agricultural practices (sub-component 1\.1\.) under a single-source contract with
Page 35 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
MAFI20\. The Sustainable Development Account Moldova (SDA Moldova), a public agency established to
implement the MCC program, will provide capacity building in support of irrigation-related interventions for
the Water User Associations (sub-component 1\.2), with the exception of the review of Apele Moldeveiâs
functions carried out directly by MAFI in coordination with MOE and the PMT\. The SDA has a proven record of
working with WUAs and participatory irrigation management\. The SDA has an office in Chisinau staffed with
professionals and all necessary technical means to support the successful implementation of the sub-
component activities and provide necessary backstopping\. The Forest Research and Management Institute
(ICAS) will provide technical assistance in support of the implementation of both sub-component 2\.1 (for the
benefit of the Local Public Authorities (LPAs)) and sub-component 2\.2\. Forestry work under component 2
(afforestation, shelterbelts, watersheds) will be carried out by State Forests Enterprises using a direct
procurement approach, while pasture management work s will be carried out by private contractors selected
competitively by the MOE, with technical inputs from ICAS\. The Civil Protection and Emergencies Service
(CPESS), under MIA, will implement sub-component 3\.1 and the Coordinating Authority for the contingent
emergency response will implement sub-component 3\.2\.
5\. The Projectâs Organizational Chart is presented below\.
Note: SDA and ICAS provide technical advisory services while physical investments are carried out by the respective
Ministries in coordination with the PMT\. An activity under sub-component 1\.2 is implemented jointly with MOE, as
explained in paragraph 4 above\.
6\. Arrangement for the Matching Grants Program\. To ensure efficiency and transparency in the selection of
grant beneficiaries the technical evaluation committee established by MAFI for the implementation of
Component 1 and responsible for operational decisions and procurement evaluations will also be in charge of
announcing competitive grant selection rounds, reviewing and evaluating grant financing applications, and
20
The rationale for the singe-source contract for ACSA is provided in the Procurement section of this Annex\.
Page 36 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
making grant award decisions\. To ensure the transparency of the grant review, evaluation and award process,
the decisions of the committee (both awards and rejections) will be made public on MAFIâs and MOEâs
websites\. For the implementation of the matching grant program the technical evaluation committee would
include representatives of ACSA (as technical/ financial experts) in addition to the Focal Point from MAFI, and
representatives of MOF, the State Chancellery and the PMT\. To facilitate the operations of the evaluation
committee, an initial eligibility screening of incoming applications could be carried out by ACSA\.
Implementation of the Projectâs matching grant scheme will be based on a Grant Operational Manual (GOM),
which will be approved by the Projectâs SC and adopted by MAFI and the PMT\. The GOM will contain a detailed
description of the operating principles and evaluation criteria for the Projectâs grant scheme, including
environmental and social safeguards responsibilities\.
7\. Project Operational Manual and Specialized Operational Manuals\. The Project will be implemented based
on a Project Operational Manual (POM) that will be approved by the Projectâs SC and adopted by MAFI, MOE
and MIA\. The POM would include, inter alia: (i) the Projectâs overall operating, fiduciary and decision making
procedures and (ii) results monitoring arrangements\. The POM will include one Annex on criteria for the
selection and implementation of the forestry and pasture investments and will be further supported by two
detailed Operational Manuals for the matching grant program; and the contingent emergency response\. Only
the SC will have the authority to amend these documents, provided such amendments are acceptable to the
World Bank\.
8\. Contingent Emergency Response (CER) Implementation Arrangements\. Following an eligible crisis or
emergency, the Government of Moldova may request the World Bank to re-allocate project funds to support
response and reconstruction\. The CER (sub-component 3\.2\.) would draw from the uncommitted credit
resources under the Project from other Project components to cover emergency response\. The CER could also
be used to channel additional funds should they become available as a result of an emergency\. The activities
financed by this sub-component will be demand- and event-driven and will be detailed in the Governmentâs
Action Plan of Activities\. The submission of an acceptable Action Plan of Activities, along with an official
declaration by the Government that a âdisaster for the Stateâ has occurred are two of the conditions that must
be fulfilled in order to trigger this sub-component\. The specific steps for triggering this sub-component, along
with the unique coordination and implementation arrangements for the Action Plan of Activities will be
contained in the CER-Operational Manual\.
Financial Management
9\. Since it was agreed that the PMT already established within MOE will handle financial management
functions, including flow of funds, budgeting, accounting, reporting, internal controls and external audit, for
the Project, the existing financial arrangements have been assessed in terms of their reliability and
trustworthiness\. Thus, it has been concluded that the PMT has adequate FM system in place\. Besides, the PMT
performance on financial management side has been assessed always satisfactory: they have in place a robust
and efficient internal control, accounting, financial reporting and monitoring systems, and comply with legal
requirements of financial management side\. As such, these arrangements will serve as start point for the new
project and will be slightly adjusted to reflect its particularities as described under this Chapter\. The inherent
risk of the Project is rated as Moderate; the Control Risk and the overall residual FM Risk are also considered to
be Moderate\.
Page 37 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
10\. Budgeting and planning\. The PMT has acceptable budgeting and planning capacity to carry out the Project\.
The Project procurement plan would serve as basis for annual budget planning that is done in accordance with
national regulations\. The budget would form the basis for allocating funds to Project activities\. The budget
execution is monitored through IFRs and monthly reports to the Ministry of Finance\.
11\. Accounting and Reporting\. The Project will use cash basis accounting\. The PMT would maintain its current
accounting system\. Project management-oriented Interim unaudited Financial Reports (IFRs) will be prepared
under the Project\. The PMT will produce a full set of reports every calendar semester throughout the life of the
Project\. The IFRs will follow the same format used under existent Project which comprises: (i) Project Sources
and Uses of Funds, (ii) Uses of Funds by Project Activities, (iii) Project Balance Sheet, (iv) Designated Account
Statement, and (vi) Withdrawal Schedule\. IFRs would be produced by the accounting software\. These financial
reports would be submitted to the World Bank within 45 days of the end of each calendar semester\.
12\. Internal Controls\. The PMT internal controls systems were assessed to be capable of providing timely
information and reporting on the use of Project funds\. The FM chapter of the existing Project Operational
Manual (POM) is well prepared and fully documents accounting and financial reporting policies and procedures
of existing projects such as internal control procedures, including authorization of expenditures and approval
of the payments; bank reconciliations, verification of expenditures eligibility by the Financial Manager;
description of financial documents flow/circulation; budgeting procedures, formal reconciliation procedures of
project records with Client Connection and XDR/USD reconciliation, safeguards for assets, including at least
annual inventory of fixed assets and regular monitoring of assets purchased for beneficiaries on their existence
and use, etc\. Similar internal control systems would be maintained for the purpose of the Project\. Similar POM
would be prepared by the PMT to reflect specific activities of the proposed Project, including Chart of
Accounts, Audit TOR, frequency of submission, format of IFRs, and so forth\.
13\. Staffing\. The PMT has experienced FM staff responsible for overall Project FM arrangements, including
preparation of the quarterly IFRs and their submission to the World Bank\. The PMT should consider hiring an
additional accountant to manage the increased workload associated with multiple sources of funds\.
14\. External Audit\. The Project audit would be conducted (i) by independent private auditors acceptable to the
World Bank, on the TOR acceptable to the World Bank, and selected by the PMT; and (ii) according to the ISA
issued by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board of the International Federation of
Accountants\. The annual audited Project financial statements together with the audit opinion and
Management Letter would be provided to the World Bank within six months of the end of each fiscal year as
well as at the Project closing\. In accordance with "The World Bank Policy on Access to Information" dated July
1, 2010, which requires that the audited financial statements are made publically available, the Project
financial audit reports would be published within one month after their receipt\. The reports would be
published on MOE web-site\. The World Bank will also publish them on its external site\.
Matching grants program
15\. The program will be delivered by the National Rural Development Agency (ACSA)\. ACSA is regularly audited
as an entity but also as a service provider of individual projects, and no significant issues which would
undermine the program have been identified by the auditors\. The funds would be transferred to ACSA by the
Page 38 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
PMT based on agreed contractual arrangements and ACSA will provide detailed reports on the funds used for
the matching grants program\. The grant beneficiaries will be required to provide their portion of co-financing
upfront, and no grants will be disbursed until the Beneficiaries prove that they contributed financially to the
agreed investment\.
16\. Operational review\. At the project mid-term or thereabouts a competitively selected consulting company
will perform an operational review of the matching grants program implemented by ACSA\. The objective of the
review would be to assess the program delivery on the basis of efficiency and effectiveness criteria, and check
the Beneficiariesâ compliance with the eligibility criteria, including co-financing requirements\.
Disbursements and flow of funds
17\. Disbursements\. The proceeds of the Loan/Credits/Grant will be disbursed over a period of six years or for
such longer period as will be agreed with the World Bank\. Credit/Loan/Grant funds will flow through Direct
Payment and via disbursements of advances to two Designated Accounts (DA) maintained by the PMT\. The
Project will follow transaction-based disbursement procedures (payments through DA, reimbursement, direct
payments, and special commitments, where appropriate)\. Withdrawals from the Credit/Loan/Grant Accounts
will be requested in accordance with the guidance to be given in a Disbursement Letter\. Withdrawal
applications will be signed by authorized representatives of the Borrower/Recipient as indicated in the
Authorized Signatory Letter\.
18\. Designated Account\. To facilitate timely disbursements for eligible expenditures on works, goods and
services, the Borrower/Recipient will open two Designated Accounts in US Dollars at the National Bank of
Moldova\. One will be a pooled account where the project-related IDA & IBRD funding are to be deposited; the
second one will be a segregated account for the GEF funds\. Sequencing in the use of funds by financing
instruments is specified in the Disbursement Letter\. The PMT will be responsible for the appropriate
accounting of the funds deposited into the designated accounts, for reporting on the use of these funds and
for ensuring that they are included in the audits of the financial statements\. Ceiling of the Designated Accounts
and the Minimum Application size for Direct Payment or Special Commitment have been communicated in the
Disbursement Letter\.
Procurement
19\. Project Procurement Strategy for Development (PPSD)\. During the preparation of the Project, the PMT
developed a PPSD which describes how the procurement approach will support the development objective of
the Project and deliver the best value for money\. The project will finance goods, works, non-consulting and
consulting services\. Based on the nature, size and complexity of the procurement to be financed under the
Project, the strategy suggests the most appropriate methods to be applied in order to achieve value for money\.
The strategy also analyzes the supply positioning in order to determine the relative supply risk and value of
specific procurement within the Project\. This exercise revealed that all the contracts planned to be financed
under the Project have a relatively low value and low level of supply risk\. Overall, Open National competition
will be adopted for the contracts with no application of Best and Final Offer and Negotiations options\. No
packages of large value and complex nature that would require pre-qualification are foreseen\. Civil Works: The
market analysis revealed that while the construction market in Moldova is well developed with many local
construction companies, the quality of bids needs to be improved both from the technical and commercial
Page 39 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
prospective\. There are also international companies that participate in national tenders\. However, overall the
competition is low given the small value of tendered contracts\. It is recommended to advertise widely
procurement opportunities to ensure strong competition\. Given the value and complexity of the works
contracts, Open National competition is the suggested approach to be procured by applying the Request for
Bids method\. ICT: There is strong competition for ICT contracts in Moldova and since the project will finance
procurement of ICT equipment to modernize and upgrade the Balti Regional Emergency Command Center, it is
expected that both local and international companies will participate in tenders\. These contracts provide for
the procurement of non-complex IT equipment and software development\. These will either be purchased by
applying Request for Bids or Request for Quotations methods\. Given the strong supply market, the suggested
approach for these types of contracts is Open International and Open National with single envelope without
applying the Best and Final Offer and Negotiations options\. Goods: There will be procurement of non-complex
goods which will be either purchased by applying Request for Bids or Request for Quotations methods\.
Component 2 foresees the establishment of the National Center for Forest Genetics and Seeds which will
require procurement of specialized equipment\. It is advisable that an expert is hired to assist the implementing
agency in the development of technical specifications\. Consulting Services: These are of various size and nature
and will also follow the Open National and International market approach and selection methods will be
decided taking into account fit-for-purpose and value-for-money considerations\. Small Grants: Component 1
will provide technical advisory services and matching grants to eligible farmers and agricultural producers,
including rural households and private/agricultural entities\. The administrator of the grants program will be the
National Rural Development Agency (ACSA) which is a local NGO with unique experience in managing grants
programs of such value and coverage\. Direct Selection method will be applied to contract ACSA based on
prevailing market rates\. The NGO has implemented similar programs in several Bank-funded projects by being
single-sourced given its unique country-wide network\. In previous projects, there were several attempts to
have a competitive selection which failed and resulted in having no qualified firms to perform the task\. All
procurement under the grants will be carried out centrally by ACSA following the commercial practices
procedures that have been assessed as meeting the Bankâs Core Procurement Principles\. ACSA is expected to
submit to the Bank on semi-annual basis procurement reports that will provide information on the tenders
conducted, methods applied, amounts of contracts awarded and names of suppliers\. The detailed procedures
for procurement practices and reporting requirements will be defined in the Matching Grants Operations
Manual\. Non-Consulting Services: Component 2 provides for procurement of afforestation services,
rehabilitation of community lands and rehabilitation of degraded pastures\. The afforestation services and
rehabilitation of community lands will be carried out by State Forest Enterprises (SFE) which are authorized
agencies to carry out such works in accordance with the Forestry code No\. 887 dated June 21, 1996 and
Government Decision No\. 150 dated March 2, 2010 which specify that the Agency âMoldsilvaâ through its SFEs
organizes the planning/afforestation and care of forest belts and water basins on contractual basis with the
owners and holders thereof as well as organizes the development and implementation schemes and
technologies for forest regeneration and afforestation of degraded lands\. Rehabilitation of degraded pastures
will be procured through a competitive selection given the presence of local private companies able to provide
these services\. Overall the PPSD provides an adequate justification for the selection methods in the
Procurement Plan (PP)\. The strategy was reviewed and agreed with the World Bank\.
20\. Contingent Emergency Response Sub-Component (CERC)\. Component 3 includes a CERC to help the
Government to respond quickly in case of crisis or emergency\. It was agreed that the PPSD developed by the
PMT will be adjusted (when or if needed) to include a section applicable to the CERC\. The CERC-PPSD will focus
mainly on complex contracts and procurement that is new or innovative, rather than on smaller, routine
Page 40 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
procurement\. The strategy will describe, among others, how procurement opportunities and risks will be
managed in emergency circumstances and how suppliers and contractors will be motivated to bid and be
incentivized to perform\. Procurement arrangements under CERC will be streamlined\. The Bankâs oversight and
due diligence of procurement will be done through augmented implementation support with close monitoring,
increased procurement post-review, and/or third party procurement reviews\. All these arrangements will be
described in details in the CERC-PPSD and CERC Operations Manual which will be developed by the PMT\. Given
that CERC is by definition contingent and event-driven, no PP for the CERC is prepared ex-ante\. This PP will be
formulated once CERC is triggered\.
21\. Public Procurement in Moldova\. The new Public Procurement Law (PPL) No\. 131 that entered into effect
on May 1, 2016 is better adjusted to the EU Directives\. While the PPL provides good basis for the public
procurement system and properly draws the legal framework for a sound public procurement system, the law
has not been implemented/applied in full\. Some of the remaining challenges are to complete all the necessary
secondary legislation, Standard Bidding Documents and the establishment of the National Agency for Solving
Complaints (NASC)\. Under the previous PPL, handling of complaints was the task of the Public Procurement
Agency (PPA)\. Given that the PPA does not have the authority to handle complaints under the PPL and given
the delays in establishing of NASC, complaints related to public procurement are either not addressed or
complainants are advised to go straight to the court\. Given that the PMT has limited experience in handling
procurement based on the national procurement procedures and given the current situation in public
procurement in Moldova, it has been proposed that the World Bankâs Standard Procurement Documents are
used even for contracts for which the national approach is foreseen\. It is recommended that the administration
and handling of procurement-related complaints arising in connection with contracts financed under the
project will be carried out in line with the procedures defined in the Regulations\. Bankâs mandatory provisions
for procurement under the project subject to national public procurement procedures will be specified in the
PP\.
22\. Capacity Assessment\. As part of the assessment, the organizational structure and staffing within PMT and
implementing agencies have been reviewed\. The PMTâs Procurement Specialist has extensive experience with
World Bank procurement policies and procedures and the World Bank Procurement and Consultant Guidelines
based on which the recently closed Disaster Risk Mitigation and Adaptation Project was implemented\. The
Procurement Specialist attended several training courses on World Bank procurement, including those
organized by the World Bank in the region and has already participated in a workshop organized by the World
Bank in Moldova on the new Procurement Framework and received a hands-on training on Systematic Tracking
of Exchanges in Procurement (STEP) which is an online procurement planning and tracking tool to prepare,
clear and update the project PP\. The PMT Procurement Specialist also attended the in-depth hands-on training
on STEP organized by the World Bank in the region in March 2017\.
23\. The PMT has a strong fiduciary and technical capacity\. Internal approval processes are functioning
generally well without affecting the procurement cycle\. Given the risks identified, the existing capacity within
PMT, as well as the previous experience with World Bank-funded projects, the overall risk for procurement is
Moderate\.
Risk Mitigation Measure Responsible Timeline
Party
Limited knowledge and no More in-depth training on the new approach to World Bank After project
Page 41 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
experience with the new procurement and specifically on Regulations and effectiveness
Procurement Framework STEP
of the World Bank
Limited technical capacity Employ technical experts to enhance IAs capacities PMT/IAs Throughout
of the implementing in particular areas where they lack expertise project
agencies to accurately implementation
assess their needs and Offer continuous support to the implementing period
develop technical agencies in needs assessment to ensure that these
specifications and Terms are accurately defined especially given the PMT
of References extensive experience of PMT staff with similar
Projects
Difficult coordination of Maintain the coordination mechanism established PMT/IAs Throughout
procurement activities due under the previous project\. Strengthen IAs with project
to the complex project focal points to ensure effective coordination and implementation
structure efficient implementation of activities\. Involve the period
inter-ministerial Steering Committee to provide
overall guidance and ensure cross-sectorial
collaboration
Limited technical capacity Employ technical experts to enhance the PMT/IA Throughout
to procure specialized responsible IAâs capacity project
equipment for the implementation
National Center for Forest period
Genetics and Seeds
Delays in implementation Closely follow up and monitor the performance of PMT/IAs Throughout
of contracts and approval consultants to avoid delays in contract project
of deliverables under implementation through a proper contract implementation
consulting contracts due administration (regular inspections/meetings), period
to internal processes suitable provisions for deliverable linked to
payments where appropriate and time action in
giving notice to consultants for remedying the
delays and defaults
24\. Procurement Plan (PP)\. The PMT developed a PP for the entire scope of the project consistent with the
Project implementation plan\. The PP provides information on procurement packages, selection methods,
procurement approach and evaluation methods to be adopted for each contract to be financed under the
Project\. Any updates to the PP will be submitted to the World Bank for review and approval\. The detailed PP
will be prepared in STEP and will be also published on the World Bankâs website\.
25\. Record Keeping\. All documentation with respect to each procurement will be retained by the PMT
according to the requirements of the Financing Agreements\. The PMT will furnish such documentation to the
World Bank upon request for examination by the World Bank or by its consultants/auditors\. Documents with
respect to procurement subject to post review will be furnished to the World Bank upon request\.
26\. Procurement Prior Review Thresholds\. The Procurement Prior Review Thresholds were set by the World
Bank based on the Project procurement risk level\. All contracts at or above the set thresholds are subject to
international advertising and the use of the World Bankâs Standard Procurement Documents\. The thresholds
will be specified in the PP\. While currently procedures such as best and final offer, procurement processes
Page 42 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
involving contract negotiations, competitive dialogue and sustainable procurement are not foreseen under the
Project, these will be subject to the World Bankâs procurement prior review irrespective of the contract value,
if the decision is taken to apply them during Project implementation\.
27\. World Bankâs Procurement Oversight\. The World Bank will exercise its procurement oversight through a
risk-based approach comprising prior and post review and independent procurement reviews, as appropriate\.
The post reviews will be conducted on the procurement processes undertaken by the PMT to determine
whether they comply with the Procurement Regulations\. Procurement supervision will be carried out at least
once in 12 months\. These will include special procurement supervision for post-review\.
Major Procurement Packages as per the Project Procurement Plan
Contract Title, Description and Category Procurement Selection Methods Evaluation Method
Approach
Scale-up of Farmersâ Climate Smart Agricultural
Practices including Climate adaptation grant Direct Direct Selection Not Applicable
package
On-farm irrigation equipment National RFB/Post qualification Lowest Evaluated Cost
Strengthening FPM capacity (equipment ICAS &
field and lab equipment) Open RFB/Post qualification Lowest Evaluated Cost
Afforestation and rehabilitation through
Direct Force Account Not Applicable
Moldsilva State Forest Enterprises
Rehabilitation of degraded pastures National RFQ Lowest Evaluated Cost
Establishment of Genetics Research and Seed
National RFB/Post qualification Lowest Evaluated Cost
Centre (GR&SC)
Establishment of Nursery Containerized
National RFB/Post qualification Lowest Evaluated Cost
Production Center (NCPC)
Processing Seed &Nursery Equipment including
International RFB/Post qualification Lowest Evaluated Cost
Laboratory Equipment for Quality Assessment
Technical Rescue intervention equipment International RFB/Post qualification Lowest Evaluated Cost
Refurbishment works of a technical hub for
National RFB/Post qualification Lowest Evaluated Cost
equipment management
Refurbishment works, operational infrastructure
procurement of Regional Balti ECC National RFB/Post qualification Lowest Evaluated Cost
Operational infrastructure equipment for
Regional Balti ECC (UPS, Air conditioning, National RFB/Post qualification Lowest Evaluated Cost
Generator, Furniture, Cabling, Security system)
IT and Communication system equipment for
Regional Balti ECC (PC, Server, Communication International RFB/Post qualification Lowest Evaluated Cost
system, Printing and Network equipment)
Page 43 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
Environmental and Social (including safeguards)
28\. Safeguards issues will be managed by the PMT whose staff has substantial experience in implementing
environmental and social safeguards under previous World Bank Projects\. The PMTâs environmental
assessment (EA) capacity has been assessed as satisfactory to date\. The PMT will hire a full time safeguards
specialist responsible for both environmental and social safeguards, and if needed, the World Bank
Environmental and Social Specialists will provide adequate on-the-job training\.
29\. PMT Safeguards Specialist\. For the purpose of implementing environmental and social safeguards, a
full-time Safeguards Specialist will be hired within the PMT during the first year of Project implementation\.
Thereafter, the Safeguard Specialist would be hired on a full-time or part-time basis, based on periodic
assessment of Project environmental and social arrangements, and the associated level of effort required to
sustain them\. The Safeguard Specialist will be in charge of overall coordination for implementing and reporting
on the ESMF, inspecting environmental compliance at worksites, advising ACSA and Project participants on
environmental issues, and coordinating the overall environmental monitoring at Project level\. The Safeguard
Specialist will also be responsible for assisting, when needed, ACSA and ICAS in reviewing environmental
management plans, monitoring their implementation, advising and guiding on specific environmental issues
and management options, and ensuring that cumulative environmental impacts are addressed\. The Safeguard
Specialist will periodically collect information on changes and impact of Project activities and will study the
environmental condition of the areas of supported by the sub-projects and identify main environmental
parameters\. The Safeguard Specialist will also be responsible for monitoring any land acquisition and/or
resettlement issues under the sub-projects\. The Safeguard Specialist will also have to selectively visit sub-
projects, and ensure proper monitoring for all Category B sub-projects\. The Safeguard Specialist would work
under the supervision of the PMT Executive Director as well as in close collaboration with ACSA and relevant
MOE/SEI staff and other stakeholders including local public authorities and concerned NGOs\.
30\. Environmental Safeguards\. The PMT will ensure that all Project activities are assessed from an
environmental point of view and that when needed, the ESMPs prepared in accordance with the ESMF are
prepared and adequately implemented\. Its major responsibilities in this regard are the following: (a)
coordination of environmental and EA related issues; (b) evaluation of the sub-project eligibility from the
environmental point of view and sub-projects environmental screening as well as overseeing ACSAâs
environmental work for the matching grants (see point below); (c) provision of environmental management
advice to sub-project applicants and, if needed, ACSA and ICAS, in particular in terms of environmental
screening criteria to be used, EIA requirements and procedure etc\.; (d) supervision of the sub-project ESMPs
implementation and monitoring of related environmental impacts; (e) reporting to the national environmental
authorities and the World Bank on ESMF implementation and environmental compliance; and (f)
communicating with EIA competent authorities (MOE, State Ecological Inspectorate, SEI)\.
31\. Arrangements for Climate Adaptation Grants\. The matching grants for climate adaptation will be
implemented by ACSA, whose experience with safeguards activities is considered satisfactory given that its staff
includes highly qualified agriculture and environmental specialists\. ACSA will ensure all grants are assessed
from an environmental point of view and that beneficiaries conduct an appropriate EIA and, where necessary,
prepare an ESMP for each sub-project, per stipulations of the ESMF Environmental Guidelines\. ACSA will be
involved in the process of grant implementation from the very beginning, i\.e\. at the grant appraisal stage: they
Page 44 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
will evaluate grant proposals, assign an environmental category according to ESMF Environmental Guidelines
and determine the type of EA that must be conducted for the proposed sub-project\. ACSA will review the set of
documents prepared by beneficiaries, complete the Environmental Screening Checklist and submit the grants
documents along with the EA forms to the PMT\. Before grant appraisal, ACSA will ensure that any proposed
grant is in compliance with all national environmental laws and standards, as certified by the relevant local or
national authorities of Moldova\. All relevant documents and permits should be kept in each grant document
file maintained by ACSA, and be made available for review by the PMT and World Bank representatives\. The
implementation of grant ESMPs will be the direct responsibility of ACSA, and of beneficiaries, including
responsibilities for grant supervision and monitoring\. Compliance with the ESMPs and monitoring of the impact
during the implementation phase will be undertaken by ACSA and periodically by the PMTâs Safeguards
Specialist\. The grant ESMPs will be also integrated into the contracts for approved activities, and the
contractors will be required to include the cost in their financial bids and grant proposals\. In case of non-
compliance with presumed mitigation measures during grant implementation, ACSA will propose to PMT
recommendations whether or not to suspend funding\. The Projectâs Grant Operational Manual (GOM) will set
forth the rules and procedures for environmental assessment of grants as described in the ESMF\. To ensure
successful implementation of the grants, ACSA will hire/assign a Safeguards Specialist among its staff (who will
receive capacity-building prior to approving any grants)\.
32\. Arrangements for forest and pasture improvement activities and for upscaling adoption of irrigation\.
The proposed forest and pasture activities will be implemented by ICAS who will be responsible for safeguard
implementation of this sub-component\. Specifically, ICAS will conduct a preliminary environmental screening
during the preparation of the LPAâs operational forest and pasture management plans to ensure any lands that
represent environmentally sensitive areas and/or areas valuable from a biodiversity point of view are excluded
to avoid adverse effects on biodiversity conservation and natural habitats\. ICAS has extensive experience in
safeguards activities (e\.g\. as the key implementing institution for a series of World Bank carbon sequestration
Projects supported by Prototype Carbon and Biocarbon Funds) and its performance is considered as highly
satisfactory to date\. The proposed activities to upscale the adoption of irrigation do not require civil works and
will not lead to incremental abstraction of water from the Dniestr and Prut Rivers\. SDA Moldova will be
responsible for conducting a preliminary environmental screening of the equipment to be procured, making
sure no environmental and social impacts will be generated\. SDA Moldovaâs staff includes qualified
environmental specialists who have proven their high environmental management performance during the
implementation of the MCC Program\.
33\. Environmental Monitoring and Reporting during implementation will be carried out by the PMT and
ACSA, who will provide information on the project environmental impacts and the effectiveness of mitigation
measures\. Such information will allow corrective action(s) to be implemented, if and when needed\. During the
sub-project operational phase, the PMT and ACSA, along with the local (raion) environmental
authorities/inspection (when required) will perform environmental supervision and monitoring to ensure that
sub-projects are implemented in full compliance with the ESMPs and implement corrective measures if needed\.
PMT and ACSA will report the status of compliance in their regular (semiannual) reports to the World Bank on
Project implementation and during periodic World Bank supervision visits\. In cases of non-compliance, the PMT
and ACSAâs environmental specialists (with SEI assistance, if needed) investigate the nature and reason(s) for
non-compliance, and decide whether remedial actions to bring a sub-project into compliance should be
implemented, or whether financing should be suspended\.
Page 45 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
34\. Integration of the ESMPs into Project documents\. The ESMF and in particular ESMP provisions will form
part of the design documents and construction contracts for Project activities\. Contractors and matching grants
beneficiaries will be required to include the cost of ESMP requirements in their financial bids/Project
documents and required to comply with them while implementing the Project activities\.
35\. Social Safeguards\. The Project design has been informed by a Social Assessment (SA), which was carried
out as part of the preliminary social and environmental assessment process\. The overall social impacts of the
Project are expected to be positive\. Project interventions will help different social/resource user communities
including farmer groups, water user associations, pasture management and/or user groups, as well as LPAs to
improve their capacities and resource endowments\. Following are some of the key areas that people will
benefit from as a result of the Project: improved livelihood of farmers through enhanced crop production;
increased land productivity with concomitant increases in employment and income; increased efficiency of land
usage at community level with potential additional economic benefits; efficient and sustainable use of pasture
areas with fodder crops; improved irrigation systems and water user participation in management; improved
pasture areas and increased livestock rearing activities; improved natural disaster response services and so on\.
However, the social assessment points out that these interventions may also affect some resource user
communities adversely during Project implementation\. For example, activities related to restoration of
degraded land and afforestation, protection/shelter belts improvements, pasture rehabilitation or
establishment of the forest shelter belts, upgrading of existing irrigation systems might lead to potential
disturbance or temporary restrictions to the uses of such resources\.
36\. All the forestry and pasture management activities will be located on public lands\. The proposed
interventions will avoid land that is included in any Protected Areas (PAs), both national and local ones\.
Furthermore, the selection criteria for lands that will be included are as follows: (a) land must be owned by the
LPA, (b) LPAâs willingness for including the land for afforestation/rehabilitation; the selection needs to be based
on participatory decision making process, (c) land must not be in a protected area\. Although it is expected that
all activities/sub-projects will be implemented on public lands, in the cases of conducting afforestation
activities on degraded lands the proposed activities might restrict access of the local population to the pasture
lands\. In addition, protection/shelterbelt improvements, pasture rehabilitation, upgrading of existing irrigation
systems might lead to potential disturbances or temporary restrictions to the uses of such resources\. Thus OP
4\.12 on Involuntary Resettlement is triggered in order address these temporary and rehabilitation related
economic displacements/livelihood losses\. All the interventions, regardless of type of land ownership, would be
screened to ensure that there is no informal use or occupation\. These risks are not expected to be significant,
although at this stage it is impossible to estimate the levels of impact\. Sub-projects specific
screenings/assessments will therefore be carried out (as described above) to determine the risks and prepare
the necessary mitigation measures/plans\. However, the Project will not support activities that result in any
physical displacement or resettlement of population\.
37\. In order to address social risks and adverse impacts due to Project interventions, especially issues
related to restrictions on access to livelihood resources during afforestation activities on degraded lands,
rehabilitation and irrigation infrastructure improvement activities, a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) has
been prepared by the client\. The RPF focuses on social risk assessment/screening of interventions to identified
appropriate mitigation measures, screening checklists and safeguards instruments, key principles for livelihood
restoration, âaccess restriction (process) frameworkâ in case there are limitations for users to access forest,
Page 46 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
pasture and other nature resources, public consultation and participation plan with affected persons prior and
during Project implementation, draft entitlement matrix and institutional arrangement for RPF
implementation\. The RPF was disclosed locally on February 17, 2017 and on the World Bank website on
February 21, 2017 and publicly consulted in the country\.
Monitoring and Evaluation
38\. The Projectâs M&E system will be based on: (i) continuous data collection; (ii) regular monitoring of the
results of all Project component interventions; (iii) the Project baseline survey; and (iv) Mid-Term review (MTR),
and final impact assessment\. Data collection and monitoring of outcomes and results will occur at the level of
all Project entities, and will be consolidated by the PMTâs M&E Specialist\. Each Project entity will have
adequate staffing and technical capacity to properly implement data collection and monitoring\. A baseline
study will be carried out to determine the initial conditions of the Project\. The baseline will focus on
determining the current status of variables that are directly pertinent to the Project interventions\. Given the
specific nature of some of the activities under Component 1 and 2, i\.e\., their narrow focus on easily identifiable
Project beneficiaries and/or targets, the baseline variables will be defined at the inception of these activities\.
The key participating Project entities and service providers (ACSA, ICAS, SDA and CPESS) will provide semi-
annual progress reports using a set of agreed monitoring variables as provided in the Project Results
Framework, to report the implementation progress of their respective components\. The PMT will consolidate
semi-annual progress reports for submission to the Government and the World Bank\. Adjustments, if needed,
can be introduced to fine-tune the agreed monitorable variables as the Project progresses\.
Role of Partners (if applicable)
39\. Several development partners are active in the area of climate change adaptation and disaster risk
management in Moldova including the European Union, EBRD, EIB, Austrian Development Cooperation, Swiss
Development Agency, UNDP, USAID, IFAD\. As part of the IDA-17 commitments, the government is preparing a
Climate Adaptation Investment Plan that would help to coordinate climate financing from various donors and
sources\. The Project is a significant building block of the plan\. The Project is also partnering with GEF who is
providing direct co-financing for rehabilitation of degraded lands and with GFDRR who is providing a parallel
technical assistance grant for disaster risk management\.
Page 47 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
ANNEX 3: IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT PLAN
COUNTRY : Moldova
Climate Adaptation Project
Strategy and Approach for Implementation Support
1\. The Implementation Support Plan (ISP) describes how the Bank will assist the client in achieving the
PDO of the project\. In particular, the ISP puts emphasis on accomplishing the following objectives: (i) provide
necessary technical advice to the client and bring international experiences and good practices to ensure that
the project meets the Bankâs technical standards; (ii) ensure that the Implementing agencyâs measures meet
the standards approved by the Bank in terms of project supervision; and (iii) ensure that the required fiduciary,
social, and environmental safeguards are put in place and implemented per the Financing Agreements and
other project documents\.
Implementation Support Plan
2\. Given the diversity of activities that the project supports, the Bank task team will require a
corresponding range of skills covering climate institutions/environment management, sustainable land
management, general agriculture, water resources management, disaster risk management, and social
development\. The expertise should have sufficient adaptability to cover operational and technical aspects of
project activities, as well as related policy issues\. Enhanced implementation support will be critical during the
first 18 months of implementation, with appropriate resources required\. The Bank team will review
implementation progress at least 2 times a year, provide recommendations and guidance, and agree on the
action plan/next steps\. More frequent interaction will be carried out by the country-based staff if needed\. The
ISP will be reviewed at least once a year to ensure that it continues to meet the implementation support needs
of the project (for instance, need for technical skills in a new domain of climate investments, to be agreed with
the client)\.
3\. Procurement Supervision and Ex-post Review\. Routine procurement reviews and supervision will be
provided by the procurement specialist based in the country office\. In addition, two supervision missions are
expected to take place per year during which ex-post reviews will be conducted for the contracts that are not
subject to Bank prior review on a sample basis (20 percent in terms of number of contracts)\. One ex-post
review report will be prepared per fiscal year, including findings of physical inspections for not less than 10
percent of the contracts awarded during the review period\.
4\. Financial Management Implementation Support\. Routine financial management reviews and
supervision will be provided by the financial management specialist based in the country office\. During project
implementation, the project team will supervise the projectâs financial management arrangements in the
following ways: (i) review the projectâs semiannual IFRs as well as the projectâs annual financial statements, the
auditorâs management letters, and remedial actions recommended in the auditorâs management letters, and
(ii) during the Bank Teamâs on-site missions, review the following key areas: project accounting and internal
control systems; budgeting and financial planning arrangements; disbursement arrangements and financial
flows, including counterpart funds, as applicable; and any incidences of corrupt practices involving project
Page 48 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
resources\.
5\. Environmental and Social Safeguards Implementation Support\. A Bank Environmental Specialist will
review the implementation of the ESMF and the specific ESMPs and provide guidance to the PMTs safeguards
specialist and the Project implementing agencies to ensure compliance with the Bankâs environmental
safeguards policies\. Similarly, a Bank Social Development Specialist will review the implementation of the RPF
and the citizen engagement plan, including the gender dimension, and provide support to the PMT regarding
the implementation of the grievance mechanism\.
Table 1: Skills mix required for the duration of project implementation
Skills Needed Number of Staff Weeks Number of Trips Comments
Task Team Leader/ 8 staff weeks annually At least 2 mission per year HQ-based
Environment Specialist
Co-Task Team Leader/ 8 staff weeks annually Site visits as needed CO-based
Agriculture Specialist
Technical (Forestry and 4 staff weeks annually At least 2 missions per year HQ-based
Pasture Management)
Technical (Irrigation, WUAs) 4 staff weeks annually At least 2 missions per year HQ-based
Technical (DRM) 4 staff weeks annually At least 2 missions per year CO-based
Environmental Specialist 2 staff weeks annually At least 1 mission per year CO-based
Social Specialist 2 staff weeks annually At least 1 mission per year HQ-based
FM Specialist 4 staff weeks annually Site visits as needed CO-based
Procurement Specialist 4 staff weeks annually Site visits as needed CO-based
Page 49 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
ANNEX 4: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
1\. The Moldova Climate Adaptation Project aims to enhance adoption of climate-smart agriculture and
forestry practices in targeted landscapes and strengthen national disaster management systems\. The
corresponding economic analysis is broken down by component with associated benefits and cost
streams for each component: Component 1 (Climate-smart Practices in the Agriculture Sector),
Component 2 (Climate-smart Forest and Pasture Management), and Component 3 (Climate and
Disaster Risk Management)\. The first component represents the bulk of the budget ânearly 45 percent
of the total resource allocationâ, while the second and third component comprises the other half of
the budget (33 percent and 17 percent for component 2 and 3, respectively)\. The rest finances Project
management\.
2\. The economic analysis follows a conservative cost-benefit approach due to important data limitations\.
If agricultural, forestry and disaster practices are effectively adapted to climate variability, there are
positive impacts both in the short and long term, as well as reductions related to climate inaction
costs\. However, due to information restrictions, this analysis narrows down to short term impacts as
well as direct impacts displaying a conservative estimate or a lower bound of potential benefits\.21
3\. A recent study by the World Bank (2016) suggest that the expected annual costs of inaction22 in
Moldova are substantial, amounting US$600 million, equivalent to 6\.5 percent of Moldovaâs GDP\. On
average, up to 2050, the estimated cost of inaction on climate adaption is more than US$100 million
per annum\. The costs are mostly due to damages caused by flooding and a variety of weather impacts
on agriculture, as well as the cost of climate-related health impacts\.
4\. Our conservative results show that the US$27 million to be invested in the Project are expected to
generate efficiency benefits with a net present value of US$16 million using the 6 percent discount
rate recently adopted by the World Bank for Project evaluation\. The internal rate of return (IRR) to
this investment is estimated to be 20 percent\. Results are robust to adverse changes in the key
parameters\.
5\. Public Funding Rationale\. In addition to quantitative assessment, and considering the scarcity of
public funds, the World Bankâs economic analysis guidelines require an assessment of the public
funding justification for all World Bank lending programs\. A public funding justification requires that
either an important market failure be present, or that additional investment is needed to remedy a
policy/government failure, and that the intervention address the relevant failure(s) in some
convincing way\.
6\. After reviewing the Project, it is clear that in all areas of the program âagriculture, forest, irrigation,
and disaster managementâ there are classic market failures which can justify public funding from an
efficiency standpoint, as long as delivery is well designed and cost effective\. In some cases, an equity
21
We expect during the course of the project to gather detailed data at the farm level to promote deeper analysis for future
World Bank projects\.
22
The cost of inaction in this report is measured as (i) the potential savings from reducing harmful effects of climate (or from
reducing the cost of defending against harmful effects), and (ii) the potential gains from enhancing primary production that is
directly dependent on climate (i\.e\., agricultural & forest products & services, water services, and weather-based renewable
energy generation)\.
Page 50 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
goal provides an important justification as in the case of small farmers (Component 1)\. The Project
aims to strengthen local farmerâs capacity to better respond to climate change encouraging climate
smart agriculture and irrigation strategies, as well as strengthening local public institutions for better
disaster management and emerge response, which clearly provide public goods to the society (e\.g\.,
rapid emergency response to disasters) in several ways\. Mitigating impacts at the farm level (mainly
Component 1), and promoting better and more efficiently management for public institutions (mainly
Component 2) clearly justify public funding in order to achieve well function markets\. Consequently,
given the public good nature, the justification is justified since it will strengthen small farmers and
stimulate better and more efficient public agencies where the World Bank could play a catalytic role\.
7\. Analytical Approach\. Systematic data at the farm level is scarce and not easily available\. Therefore,
additional benefits were calculated based on indicative intermediate indicators prepared by the local
Project preparation team which consists of local specialists working with the relevant counterparts
from the Government of Moldova\. Therefore, this economic analysis and its results should be
interpreted with caution\. For the first two benefit streams (Component 1 and 2), profitability
measures were calculated at the level of individual sub-projects and then aggregated up to the
Project level\. For the third benefit stream (Component 3), economic analysis was carried out at the
Project level\. The results for all three components were then combined to derive overall measures of
Project worth\.
8\. Component 1 and 2\. Component 1 and Component 2 have important resources assigned to demand
driven sub-project which will be competitively selected\. Therefore, the precise nature, mix, and scope
of the investments to be financed cannot be known with certainty in advance\. Consequently, any
attempt to assess the economic viability of the Project on an ex ante basis is necessarily uncertain\.
Nonetheless, to provide a sense of the likely economic feasibility of Project-supported investments,
cost/benefit analysis was carried out on a set of subprojects of the type that are likely to be financed\.
Therefore, it is assumed that all sub-projects will be a combination of the main five agricultural
products (apples, grapes, maize, potatoes and wheat) for which productivity and prices were obtained
from FAO stats website\. The composition of the basket is assumed as follow: 10 percent under table
grapes, 10 percent under apple, 30 percent under wheat, 30 percent under maize and 20 percent
under potatoes\.23 See table 1 and table 2 for average productivity and prices, correspondingly, used in
this analysis\.
Table 1: Agricultural Productivity (tons / ha)
Apples Grapes Maize Potatos Wheat
2010 3\.6 3\.6 3\.5 10\.2 2\.3
2011 4\.8 4\.6 3\.3 12\.0 2\.6
2012 5\.1 3\.9 1\.2 7\.5 1\.6
2013 5\.7 4\.8 3\.1 10\.1 2\.8
2014 8\.3 4\.4 3\.3 11\.8 3\.2
Average 5\.5 4\.3 2\.9 10\.3 2\.5
Source: FAOstat data
23
These percentages were assumed following the economic analysis for the Agriculture Competitiveness Project (P118518)\.
Page 51 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
Table 2: Average Prices (US$ / ha)
Product Price (in 2012)
Apples 199\.9
Grapes 355\.7
Maize 239\.9
Potatoes 113\.7
Wheat 203\.3
Source: FAO stat data
9\. For component 1, indicative intermediate indicators assume that productivity will increase due to the
Project by 10 percent in the 3rd year of the Project, 15 percent in the 4th year, and 20 percent in the 5th
and 6th year\. Similarly, it is assumed that nearly 2,900 has will be improved during the Project life\.24
Finally, it is assumed that up to 8,000 producers will be trained on climate smart agriculture\.25
Regarding component 2, Moldovaâs forest has a total economic value estimated of US$66\.77 million
(TUB, 2015)26 suggesting that the value per hectare is nearly US$149\. This assessment includes the
values of provisioning services (e\.g\., timber, fuelwood, NTFPs) and of environmental services, such as
carbon sequestration, soil protection, and hydrological regulation\. We also use the relevant indicative
intermediate indicators defined in the Project\. It assumes that the Project will attain up to 29,000 has
of forest under sustainable management27, and up to 1,600 has of degraded land afforested including
riparian buffers and new forest belts\.28 In the case of forest climate smart management, productivity
is expected to increase by 56 percent (from 1\.8 to 2\.8 DM t/ha), while in the case of forest
rehabilitation, productivity is expected to increase by 100 percent (from 1\.5 to 3\.0 DM t/ha)\.
Considering these parameters for component 1 and 2, we are able to estimate the marginal benefits
associated to the Project\.
10\. Component 3\. For the third benefit stream, benefits were estimated following the methodology
proposed in previous Disaster and Climate Risk Management Project29, which basically estimate the
average damages due to hydro-meteorological shocks in the past and assume the marginal benefit
due to similar investments based on expertâs opinions\. This analysis assumes that average annual loss
is 0\.71 percent of Moldovaâs GDP, which corresponds to the average losses from 2011 to 2016 using
local data from the Civil Protection and Emergency Situations Service (CPESS)\. Notice that this
assumption is conservative considering that the average annual loss for the period 1994 â 2010 was
1\.76 percent based on EM-DAT data,30 substantially higher to the value used at this time\. On the other
24
500 has in the 2nd year, 1000 has up to the 3rd year, 2500 has up to the 5th year, and 2900 has up to the end of the
Project\.
25 st nd rd th
300 in the 1 year, 1300 up to the 2 year, 2500 up to the 3 year, 4000 up to the 4 year, and 8000 up the end of the
Project\.
26
TUB (2015) Evaluation of Forest Ecosystem Services (FES) in the Republic of Moldova, Transilvania University from
Brasov, ENPI FLEG Program\.
27
Cumulative distribution per year is as follow: 3500 has on year 2, 9250 has up to year 3, 15000 has up to year 4, 21250 up
to year 5, and 27000 up to year 6 and 29000 ha up to the end of the Project\.
28
Cumulative distribution per year is as follow: 1000 has on year 3, 1450 up to year 4, and 1600 up to the end of the Project\.
29
Specifically, the Disaster and Climate Risk Management Project in Moldova (P115634)\.
30
1\.7% was used in the previous DRM Projects in Moldova\.
Page 52 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
hand, globally, assumptions on the economic loss reducing potential due to strengthening of disaster
management systems and effective response to emergency ranges from 5 percent to 20 percent\. In
this analysis, it is assumed the lower bound of 5 percent, based on our conservative approach as well
as the benefits start realizing in year 4 and onwards\. Finally, it is assumed that the marginal
contribution of the Project is 25 percent of the total benefit due to interviews with experts\.31
11\. Combined analysis for all three Components\. For the Project-level analysis, Project management
costs to be financed under Component 4 were allocated to each component on a pro-rated basis\.
Likewise, disbursement rate for the total Project cost is assumed as follow: 10 percent on year 1, 15
percent on year 2, 30 percent on year 3 and 4, 10 percent on year 5, and 5 percent on year 6\. Given
the expected durability of investments, this analysis assumes a 15-year horizon\. Expected benefits
after the end of the Project are assumed constant and similar to year 6\. Using this approach, the
US$27 million to be invested in the Project are expected to generate efficiency benefits with a net
present value of US$16 million using the 6 percent discount rate recently adopted by the World Bank
for Project evaluation\. The internal rate of return (IRR) to this investment is estimated to be 20
percent\. (See table 3 for details\.) Results are robust to adverse changes in the key parameters\.
Assuming a more restrictive discount factor (doubling it to 12 percent), benefits are still positive and
the net present value is US$8 million\. If the Project disbursement is accelerated and executed only
during the first year, the net present value decreases up to US$16 million\. Both results suggest that
the Project worth are quite robust to adverse changes\.
12\. Conclusions\. The ex-ante economic and financial analysis suggests that Project-supported
investments will generate substantial benefits for beneficiaries in areas served by the Project, as well
as substantial benefits for Moldovaâs society as a whole\. Overall, the NPV is projected to reach US$16
million (using 6 percent discount rate)\. The investments evaluated for the economic analysis will
generate an internal rate of return of 20 percent\. The economic analysis thus shows that if Project
implementation is effective and efficient, Project-supported investments will bring substantial
economic benefits to the beneficiaries\. Due to data limitation, this assessment focuses only to short-
term impacts as well as direct impacts\. It does not take into account long-term effects nor indirect
impacts â which the specialized literature suggests are positive and non-negligible\. Therefore, our
estimates correspond to conservative estimates or a lower bound of potential benefits\.
13\. It is important to keep in mind that relevant data is scarce and not easily available\. Therefore, this
economic analysis, and its results, should be interpreted with caution\. More data collection at the
producer level is essential to have a better picture of the associated benefits\.
31
Similar to the previous project, Disaster and Climate Risk Management Project (P115634)\.
Page 53 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
ANNEX 5: ELIGIBLE CLIMATE ADAPTATION INVESTMENTS
Climate Adaption Grants to Framers
Typology & Beneficiaries
Anti-hale infrastructure
An anti-hale net system is designed to provide protection from hale effects to perennial plantations
(horticultural, grapes or berries), which at the same time allows for shade and sunbeam refraction\. Structures
include: (i) bearing pillar system (concrete or wood) on the perimeter of protected plantation area; and along
the rows; (ii) anchoring elements, anti-sink support for pillars, zinc-plated wire network and multi-fiber metal
cable cord, mountable locks and flanges, auto-blocking caps for the pillars, and (iii) the anti-hale net/mesh with
required attachment elements\. The anti-hale net is made of interweaved HDPE (High-density polyethylene)
fiber (0\.28-0\.32 mm thick, specific weight of 50-70 g/m2)\. The mesh measures are 4x4 mm, 3x9 mm, 4x6 mm
and 4x8 mm\. A shading effect is granted by the mesh gray to black color grades\. The anti-hale unit investment
is circa 15,000-16,000 US$/ha, depending on the plantation scheme and the land profile\. Structure durability is
of circa 15 years; while the anti-hale mesh lasts 8 to 10 years\.
Rain and surface water harvesting basins
Rain water/surface water harvesting basins are designed to mitigate drought effects and to create irrigation-
water buffer systems\. Investment actions include: (i) geological and environmental studies; (ii) public
discussions and debates; (iii) design and construction approval issuance; (iv) construction of water basins; (v)
coating with geo-membrane; (vi) safe-guard provisions\. Investment works include: (i) excavations and shaping
of the water harvesting body; (ii) construction of protection dam; (iii) coating with a geo-membrane (optional);
and (iv) construction of the water bottom evacuator and overflow\. The investment cost is circa 2 US$/m3 for
constructing natural water basins, and artificial lakes and ponds, and circa 4 US$/m3 for constructing natural
water basins coated with a geo-membrane\. The operation period of the natural water basins and artificial lakes
and ponds is of circa 25-30 years, while the water bodies coated with a geo-membrane would effectively
operate for circa 10 to 15 years\.
Irrigation systems
Investments include design, assembling and running the follow typical irrigation systems: (i) surface drip
irrigation systems for perennial plantations; (ii) underground irrigation systems for perennial plantations; (iii)
surface drip irrigations systems for vegetable plantations, nurseries and others; (iv) micro-aspersion irrigation
systems, with support pillars, to mitigate drought and frost, and (v) mobile irrigation machines with roller and
console\. The underground and surface drip irrigation systems would include the following components
(together with infrastructure): (i) water pumps with reduced energy consumption and a whirlpool, and afferent
accessories; (ii) filtering and fertilizing stations in basic set-up and/or with optional add-ons; (iii) primary water
supply irrigation pipes (HDPE, PE, PN, PVC), hydrants and main accessories; (iv) tertiary network formed of
tubes or irrigation tapes with basic or optional accessories; (v) electronic systems combined with sensors for
automated irrigation and irrigation monitoring (optional); (vi) photovoltaic systems combined with pumps for
reduced energy consumption â optional\. The fixed micro-aspersion irrigation systems would include the
following elements: (i) water pumps with reduced energy consumption and whirlpool with main accessories; (ii)
filtering and fertilizer stations in basic set-up and/or with optional add-ons; (iii) support system formed of
pillars made of concrete of wood; (iv) anchorage system formed of diversely constructed anchors, anti-sink
support for the pillars, zinc-plated wire network or metallic multi-fiber cable cord, locks and flanges in basic
options; (v) primary water supply irrigation pipes (HDPE, PE, PN, PVC), hydrants and main accessories; (vi)
Page 54 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
micro-aspersion systems formed of micro-sprinklers and accessories; (vii) electronic systems combined with
sensors for automated irrigation and irrigation monitoring - as optional; (viii) photovoltaic systems combined
with pumps for reduced energy consumption â optional\. The mobile aspersion irrigation machines with roller
and console would consist of: (i) mobile irrigation machine with a roller, hose, computer with solar module and
accumulator in basic options; (ii) rap with a 3600 rotating platform with sprinklers and super-thin sprinkling
nozzles, a hydraulic turbine with a watering width of up to 40 m; (iii) a cart for the ramp; (iv) additional
accessories and add-ons (optional), filters, pumping station operated through the tractor power socket, a shaft
to connect to the tractor socket, manometer, manual pump, aspiration and repression duct\. Investment costs
for design, assembly and putting into operation, including infrastructure, are:
i\. surface drip irrigation systems for perennial plantations: circa 2000 US$/ha with a lifetime of 15
years for the primary system and 6-8 years for the tertiary system;
ii\. underground irrigation systems for perennial plantations: circa 2500 US$/ha with a lifetime of 15
years for the primary system and 8-10 years for the tertiary system;
iii\. surface drip irrigation systems for vegetable plantations and nurseries: circa 1500 US$/ha with a
lifetime of operation of circa 15 years for the primary system and 2-4 years for the tertiary;
iv\. fixed micro-aspersion irrigation systems with pillars: circa 5000 US$/ha with a lifetime of 15 years
for the primary system and circa 8-10 years for the tertiary;
v\. mobile aspersion irrigation machines with reel and console: circa 1250 US$/ha; reel, hoes and
console can be used for circa 25 years; the nozzles would have to be changed after 3-5 years of
operation\.
Micro-climate control systems in greenhouses
To mitigate extreme temperatures and excess UV ray effects, micro-climate control systems include technical
endowments, equipment and accessories that allow to set and sustain controlled temperature, humidity and a
large spectrum of illumination in greenhouses, tunnels of semi-permanent structures for vegetables, berries,
seedlings or flowers production\. A typical investment will include designing, assembling and operating: (i)
building and equipment for the boiler room and/or cooling station; (ii) heating system based on biomass
combustion boilers; (iii) cooling systems and air conditioning; (iv) air heaters or coolers; (v) corrugated pipes for
heating-cooling the soil base; (vi) water accumulation and expansion vessels; (vii) water circulation pumps; (viii)
thermal screens for attracting infrared rays and for shading; (ix) water supply system, pipes, fittings and
accessories\. The specific investment would vary from 18 to 20 US$/m2, depending on the area, volume and
type of greenhouse construction\. The expected lifetime of the boiler and water supply system is of circa 20
years\. The other systems, equipment and accessories last up to 15 years, while the thermal screens can
effectively operate for about 10 years\.
No-till in perennial plantations
No-till technology is a technology meant to address soil erosion and drought impacts\. In perennial plantations,
mulching with crop residues or a permanent grass cover crop is applied between tree rows\. In case of perennial
plantations located on slopes with an inclination of over 50 permanent grass cover crop is preferable\. The
technology is also meant to rehabilitate soil fertility\. Investment would include: (i) small-scale direct seeding
equipment for planting perennial grass; (ii) grass cutters; (iii) drought-resistant perennial grass seeds and (iv)
deep sub-soiling tillage operations in case of existing hard pans\. The investment cost is 1100-1200 US$/ha, for a
20 hectare (up to, and for a minimum of 12 hectare) plantation size\. The lifetime of the perennial plantations
under this particular agricultural system is about 20-25 years, while the equipment depreciates over 7-10 years\.
Page 55 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
Other possible investment options
Frost control in perennial and berry plantations
Active methods of prevention and control of late spring and early fall frosts include: (i) equipment for
production and reflection of infrared beams through special FrostBuster and/or FrostGuard devices; and (ii)
wind machines\. In both cases it is mandatory to install automated frost risk control equipment\. The investment
costs include the following variants:
i\. The equipment for production and reflection of infrared beams to be used 3-5 hours during night
(FrostBuster) requires an investment of circa 3300 US$/ha, on a protected area of circa 7-8 ha\. The
lifetime of the equipment would reach 10 years;
ii\. The equipment for production and reflection of infrared beams (FrostGuard) to be used 4-6 hours
during night, requires an investment of circa 5500 US$/ha, on a protected area of circa 1-1,5 ha\. This
equipment would depreciate over a 10-year period;
iii\. The wind machines to be used 5-6 hours during night require a specific investment of circa 5000
US$/ha, working on an area of 7-8 ha of protected field\. The lifetime of the equipment would reach
10 years\.
Water condensation devices
This involves investing in (i) generators that condensate water from air (atmospheric water generator AWG),
polyethylene covers with fog additives and basins to collect the water; or (ii) methods like Airdrop irrigation
concept, which envisage water extraction from ambient humidity via condensing vapors by cooling the air
under the temperature point and transform it into dew\.
Perennial grass seed production
Perennial grass seed production is a business opportunity for climate adaptation inputs provision\. It would
improve seed quality of existing local varieties and increase availability of varieties of herbs/grass adapted to
local soil and climate conditions\. This investment will enable the use of intensive technologies of seed
production differentiated by ecologic zones, and provide for significant improvement of production potential
while reducing the time required to obtain the first yield of seeds\. The species mostly regarded are: alfalfa, red
clover, white clover, common sainfoin, orchard grass, perennial and hybrid ryegrass, orchard fescue, tall fescue,
bunchgrass, Timothy-grass and Sorghum Sudanese\.
Other (e\.g\. IPM investment packages to address CC induced pest/diseases; Restoring degraded soils for climate
change resilience through Integrated Soil Fertility Management (ISFM); Energy-smart technology investment;
etc\.)
Page 56 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
ANNEX 6: GREENHOUSE GAS ACCOUNTING
Background and Methodology
1\. In its 2012 Environment Strategy, the World Bank adopted a corporate mandate to conduct
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions accounting for investment lending\. The quantification of GHG
emissions is an important step in managing and ultimately reducing GHG emissions, and is becoming a
common practice for many international financial institutions\.
2\. To estimate the impact of agricultural investment lending on GHG emission and carbon
sequestration, the World Bank has adopted the Ex-Ante Carbon-balance Tool (EX-ACT), which was
developed by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in 2010\. EX-ACT allows
the assessment of a projectâs net carbon-balance, defined as the net balance of carbon dioxide
equivalent (CO2-eq) GHGs that were emitted or sequestered as a result of project implementation
compared to a without project scenario\. EX-ACT estimates the carbon stock changes (emissions or
sinks), expressed in equivalent tones of CO2 (tCO2-eq) per hectare and year\.
Application of EX-ACT
3\. Project boundaries\. GHG accounting for this Project considers: (i) increasing climate-smart
agricultural (CSA) practices (on-farm, with a target area of 2,900 ha); (ii) rehabilitating shelterbelts (with
a target value of 750 ha); (iii) planting of new shelterbelts on agricultural land (with a target value 560
ha); (iv) planting of riparian belts along water basins (with a target value of 320 ha); (v) rehabilitating
degraded land through af/reforestation (with target value of 1,500 ha); and (vi) rehabilitating degraded
communal pastures (with target value of 1,000 ha)\. The activities are aligned along four lines of support:
(i) strengthening of human, institutional and technical capacity for the implementation of climate
adaptation activities; (ii) financing matching investment grants to farmers for the adoption of
sustainable CSA practices and technologies; (iii) investing in afforestation and rehabilitation of
shelterbelts with the purpose of maintaining and enhancing the productivity of agricultural land; and (iv)
rehabilitating degraded communal pastures\.
4\. Basic assumptions\. Moldova has a cool temperate climate and moisture regime\. The dominant
soil type is High Activity Clay soil (mostly Chernoziom, black soil)\. The project implementation phase is
six years and the capitalization phase is assumed to be 10 years for the purpose of this analysis\.32 The
âwithout project scenarioâ is assumed not to differ from the âinitial scenarioâ\. This default assumption is
deemed reasonable as changes in agricultural, forest and pasture management activities crucially
depend on the technology available, which is a contribution of the project\. The analysis further assumes
the dynamics of change to be linear over the duration of the project\.
32
The 16-year implementation period is standard in the use of EX-ACT\.
Page 57 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
Results
5\. Net carbon balance\. The net carbon balance quantifies GHGs emitted or sequestered as a result
of the project compared to the without project scenario\. Over the project duration of 16 years, the EX-
ACT analysis estimates that the project constitutes a carbon sink of 54,652 tCO2-eq per year\. This is due
to the improvements as a result of adoption of sustainable CSA practices and technologies, improved
forestry and pasture land management practices, rehabilitation of shelterbelts and degraded pasture
land, and planting of new shelterbelts\. Specifically, the analysis estimates a carbon sink of (i) 6,263 tCO2-
eq for the adoption of CSA practices by farmers; (ii) 25,240 tCO2-eq for the rehabilitation of degraded
land; (iii) 16,923 tCO2-eq for the afforestation activities; and (iv) 6,226 tCO2-eq for the rehabilitation of
degraded pasture land (Table 1 and Figure 1)\.
Page 58 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
Table 1: Results of the ex-ante GHG analysis in tCO2-eq\.
Project Name Climate
Moldova Climate Adaptation Project Cool Temperate (Moist) Duration of the Project (Years) 16
Continent Eastern EuropeDominant Regional Soil Type HAC Soils Total area (ha) 4130
Components of the Gross fluxes Share per GHG of the Balance Result per year
project Without With Balance Without With Balance
All GHG in tCO2eq CO2 N2O CH4
Positive = source / negative = sink Biomass Soil Other
Land use changes CO2-Soil
CO2-Biomass CO2-OtherN2O CH4
Deforestation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Afforestation 0 -270,765 -270,765 -231,459 -39,306 0 0 0 -16,923 -16,923
Other LUC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Agriculture
Annual 0 -105,183 -105,183 0 -105,183 0 0 0 -6,574 -6,574
Perennial -6,120 -1,148 4,973 0 4,973 0 0 -383 -72 311
Rice 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Grassland & Livestocks
Grassland 0 -99,623 -99,623 0 -99,623 0 0 0 -6,226 -6,226
Livestocks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Degradation & Management 134,613 -269,225 -403,838 -301,950 -101,888 0 0 8,413 -16,827 -25,240
Inputs & Investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 128,493 -745,944 -874,436 -533,409 -341,027 0 0 0 8,031 -46,621 -54,652
Page 59 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
Figure 1: GHG emission and carbon sequestration in tCO2-eq, as well as net carbon balance per project activity and the entire project as well
as the share of emission sources and carbon sinks in tCO2-eq for the entire project\.
Page 60 of 61
The World Bank
Climate Adaptation Project (P155968)
Page 61 of 61 | APPROVAL |
P166648 | The World Bank
Strengthening DRM Capacity in ECCAS
Project Information Document/
Identification/Concept Stage (PID)
Public Disclosure Copy
Concept Stage | Date Prepared/Updated: 23-Apr-2018 | Report No: PIDC146828
Apr 24, 2018 Page 1 of 10
The World Bank
Strengthening DRM Capacity in ECCAS
BASIC INFORMATION
A\. Basic Project Data
Environmental
Project ID Parent Project ID (if any) Project Name
Assessment Category
Strengthening DRM Capacity
P166648 B - Partial Assessment
in ECCAS
Region Country Date PID Prepared Estimated Date of Approval
AFRICA Central Africa 23-Apr-2018
Initiation Note Review
Financing Instrument Borrower(s) Implementing Agency
Decision
Economic Community of
Investment Project The review did authorize the
Public Disclosure Copy
Central African States ECCAS DRR unit
Financing preparation to continue
(ECCAS)
Financing (in USD Million)
SUMMARY -NewFin1
Total Project Cost 0\.00
Total Financing 0\.00
Financing Gap 0\.00
DETAILS -NewFin2
B\. Introduction and Context
Country Context
Africa is highly vulnerable to natural disasters like volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, and particularly
meteorological and hydrological hazards such as droughts, floods, storms, and heat waves\. The continent is
highly exposed to industrial hazards and infectious epidemics\. The incidence and severity of these events in
the region have been increasing in recent years, resulting in increased economic, social and environmental
damages and losses at national, local and community levels\. There are concerns that climate change could
exacerbate the intensity of meteorological and hydrological hazards in many parts of Africa in near future\.
Apr 24, 2018 Page 2 of 10
The World Bank
Strengthening DRM Capacity in ECCAS
Vulnerabilities to natural hazards are compounded by rapidly evolving economic, social, and environmental
processes\.
From South Sahara in the north to the south of Angola, Central Africa region is bordered by the West-African
shield in the east and by the Great Rift Valley in the west\. ECCAS comprises 11-member states: Angola,
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda and Sao Tome & Principe, covering a population of around 181 million
inhabitants\. Due to its wide geographic scope, Central Africa region is particularly vulnerable to a large
variety of disaster risks such as floods, droughts, volcanic eruptions, landslides, earthquakes, sea level rise as
well as fires and industrial hazards particularly linked to the petroleum and mining industry and epidemics
such as malaria, cholera, and Ebola\. One of the unique features of the Central Africa region is the strong link
Public Disclosure Copy
between exposure to natural hazards and environmental degradation\. The high rate of deforestation
increases vulnerability to the risk of floods, landslides and drought\. For examples, CRED-EMDAT reported one
flood in DR Congo and two in Angola causing respectively 50 and 54 deaths in 2016, while a flash flood
resulted in 154 deaths in DR Congo in 2014\. On the economic side, the flood in DR Congo in 2015 caused a
damage and loss of US$15 million while the economic cost of the 2008 earthquake in DR Congo has been
estimated at US$ 8 million\.
ECCAS Countries are highly vulnerable to a changing climate and most disasters are climate-related with
flooding being the most prevalent, Droughts have also afflicted the sub-region, severely impacting North
Cameroon and Burundi in recent times\. Chad has experienced the drying of rivers and lakes in recent years,
most notably of Lake Chad\.
Seven of the ECCAS member states are coastal (Angola, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic
of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome & Principe)\. In these, sea level rise poses a great risk and
increases the vulnerability of people living in the coastal areas\. For example, sea level rise represents a
serious flooding risk for Cameroonâs coastal region, and adaptation strategies are key to reduce the risk of
coastal flooding\. Additionally, these sea level rise affects mangrove ecosystems and can cause saltwater
intrusion into coastal aquifers impacting the use of this water resource for agricultural irrigation\.
Consequently, weather-related events regularly affect economic activities including transport, tourism, and
agriculture\. In the coming years, many Central African countries could experience more severe droughts and
declines in water supply, which would put food security at stake in the region, which also exacerbates social
discord, conflict and fragility\.
Apr 24, 2018 Page 3 of 10
The World Bank
Strengthening DRM Capacity in ECCAS
Sectoral and Institutional Context
The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is one of the African Unionâs eight Regional
Economic Communities (RECs)\.
Since its creation in 1983, ECCASâ mandate is the promotion of regional economic co-operation in Central
Africa\. It has mainly focused on regional collaboration for peace and stability in the region, which remains a
major challenge\. The community aims to achieve collective autonomy, raise the standard of living of its
populations and maintain economic stability through harmonious cooperation\.
The aim of ECCAS as stated in Article 4 of the ECCAS Treaty is to âpromote and strengthen harmonious
cooperation and balanced and self-sustaining development in the fields of economic and social activity, in
particular in the fields of industry, transport and communication, energy, agriculture, natural resources,
trade, customs, monetary and financial issues, human resources, tourism, education, skills development,
Public Disclosure Copy
culture, science and technology and the movement of people with a view to achieving collective self-reliance,
raising the standard of living of the population, increasing and maintaining economic stability, strengthening
the close peaceful relations between the Member States, and contributing to progress and development of
the African continentâ\.
With the help of its development partners (EU, AfDB, AU, UNISDR, UNOCHA, WB), ECCAS is investing in
programs that should help accelerate regional integration in Africa as per the objectives âECCAS Strategic
Vision 2025â, adopted in October 2007 by the 13th Conference of ECCAS Head of States and Governments in
Brazzaville, Republic of Congo\. In particular, regarding the environment, ECCAS pursues the overall objective
of taking advantage and enhancing the regional natural resources to increase their contribution and added
value in the respective national economic development in a sustainable and climate-resilient manner, and to
improve decision-making through the observation of ecosystems and climate variability\. Because of the
importance of the Congo Basin, the Central African Forests Commission (COMIFAC) is the main body
responsible for the conservation and sustainable management of the forest ecosystems and savannas of this
basin\.
In addition, ECCAS has the mandate to lead the general political dialogue on disaster risk management (DRM)
and climate change\. Its recently created DRM and CCA unit, thanks to the ACP-EU Result 2 Program, is
housed in the Department of Physical, Economic and Monetary Integration (DIPEM)\. Its capacity remains
very weak with only one staff coordinator for the unit and a technical assistant funded by UNISDR\. Disaster
Risk Management is one of the twelve strategic areas of the ECCAS General Policy on environment and
natural resources management\. Important formulations on DRM have been enshrined in ECCAS policy or
strategic frameworks: The âECCAS Strategic Vision 2025â addresses 3 strategic priorities: (i) the assessment
and early warning for the management of natural and manmade disasters, (ii) the fight against climate
change, and (iii) the fight against desertification, drought and land degradation\.
In June 2012, in line with the AU/NEPAD (New Partnership for African Development) and the Africa strategy
for DRR and Plan of Action, a regional strategy "Central Africa Regional Strategy for Risk Prevention, Disaster
Management and Climate Change Adaptation (SRPRGC)", was adopted by the Ministers in charge of DRR, and
Apr 24, 2018 Page 4 of 10
The World Bank
Strengthening DRM Capacity in ECCAS
a framework for action for the DRR regional strategy implementation was developed\. In 2015, ECCAS has
aligned its Regional Strategy for Risk Prevention, Disaster Management and Climate Change Adaptation Plan
to the four priorities of the Sendai Framework 2015-2030: (i) Understanding disaster risk (ii) Strengthen
disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk (iii) Investing in DRR for resilience, (iv) Enhancing disaster
preparedness for effective response and to âBuild Back Betterâ in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction\.
The Strategy was adopted by ECCAS Member states during the 3rd DRR Conference of Ministers in October
2017\.
Nonetheless remaining key regional challenges are still to be addressed, such as: identification of regional
and national hazards and vulnerabilities and related risk, development and harmonization of DRM legal
frameworks, improvement of DRR and climate change integration into sectoral policies, and reinforcing
capacities on post-disaster needs assessment and recovery framework\.
Public Disclosure Copy
Relationship to CPF
The project is aligned with the World Bank Africa Strategy (âStriving towards disaster resilient development
in SSA â Strategic Framework 2016-2020â, World Bank, 2016 and âAfricaâs future and the World Bankâs
support to itâ, World Bank, 2011), which address vulnerability and resilience\. The strategy emphasizes
building resilience to the negative effects of climate change and natural disasters\. It further identifies the
need for âenhancing the ability of African countries to cope with current climate variability\.â This response is
centered around having better understanding of risks and vulnerability, strengthening the capacity for
managing disaster risks, improving preparedness and early warning systems, mainstreaming risk reduction in
all development policy, programs and investments, and establishing effective risk financing strategies\.
C\. Project Development Objective(s)
Proposed Development Objective(s)
The development objective is to strengthen DRM coordination, planning and policy advisory capacity of the ECCAS
through regional collaboration and knowledge dissemination capacity of ECCAS\. The project will accelerate the
effective implementation of a comprehensive disaster risk reduction and risk management framework in the ECCAS
region\.
Key Results
The project expects to achieve the following results:
1\. Enhanced regional knowledge on natural hazards and risk information
2\. DRM Capacities on are strengthened at national and regional for DRR/CCA mainstreaming (including
mainstreaming gender, Indigenous Peoples and traditional local communities and occupational safety
aspects) in national strategies and plans\.
3\. Regional DRR policy dialogue is reinforced and national strategies, policies and plans of action aligned
with the Sendai Framework for DRR
Apr 24, 2018 Page 5 of 10
The World Bank
Strengthening DRM Capacity in ECCAS
4\. Regional capacities are improved to support post disaster needs assessments and
recovery/reconstruction planning
5\. Implementation and coordination capacity at the ECCAS Secretariat is strengthened
D\. Preliminary Description
Activities/Components
The project is part of the European Union (EU) Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) cooperation program
âBuilding Disaster Resilience to Natural Hazards in Sub-Saharan African Regions, Countries and
Communitiesâ, so-called âBuilding Disaster Resilience in SSAâ financed under the 10th European
Development Fund (EDF)\. The overall objective of this program is to strengthen the resilience of sub-
Saharan African regions, countries and communities to the impacts of natural disasters, including the
Public Disclosure Copy
potential impacts of climate change, to reduce poverty and promote sustainable development\. To achieve
this objective, five Result areas[1] were identified, to be implemented by several partners, including the
African Development Bank (AfDB), African Union Commission (AUC), the United Nations International
Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) and the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
(GFDRR), managed by the World Bank\.
Result area 2 â âR2 - African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have disaster risk reduction (DRR)
coordination, planning and policy advisory capacities operational to support their respective member states
and regional and sub-regional programsâ â is implemented by the GFDRR through an additional EU
contribution of EUR 20 million to the ongoing âACP-EU Natural Disaster Risk Reduction (NDRR) Single Donor
Trust Fund (SDTF) in its regional/sub-regional component (Window 1), with a particular focus on sub-Saharan
Africa\.
The specific objective of Result 2 is to strengthen and accelerate the effective implementation of an African
comprehensive disaster risk reduction and risk management framework at regional level\. This will be
achieved by providing targeted support to African RECs to strengthen their capacities for improved
coordination, planning, policy advisory and knowledge dissemination to advance the regional Disaster Risk
Management (DRM) agenda and better support their respective member states in taking informed decisions
in building resilience to disasters\. Activities are supporting and are aligned with the strategic approach
articulated by the AUCâs Program of Action for the Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk
Reduction 2015-2030 in Africa - PoA, the RECs strategies and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk
Reduction\. Special attention will be given to indigenous peoples and local communities who are especially
vulnerable to, and disproportionately impacted by, climate change and natural disasters\. They also play an
important role in climate mitigation and adaptation\. The role for traditional/local knowledge is also to be
included in such strategies as stipulated in the Sendai Framework\.
Result 2 is targeting four African RECs, namely the Economic Community for Central African States (ECCAS);
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Intergovernmental Authority on
Apr 24, 2018 Page 6 of 10
The World Bank
Strengthening DRM Capacity in ECCAS
Development (IGAD); the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as their key partners
such as African universities and research centers, river basin authorities or technical organizations\.
The ECCAS specific project will be implemented in two phases - the first phase is from the effectiveness of
this Grant till December 31, 2019 and the second phase will be from 1st January 2019 to 31 December
2019\. This Recipient-Executed grant complements an existing Bank-Executed project (P154341)\. The Bank-
Executed project has the same components as the Recipient-Executed but implements different
complementary activities under the same program\. The total budget available for ECCAS activities is US$ 5
million among which US$ 2,205,000 will be Recipient Executed\.
The following section describes the five components of the project with corresponding budget and the
respective implementation as Recipient (including phase 1 for the present project) and Bank executed
activities\.
Public Disclosure Copy
Component 1: Regional Hazards/vulnerability identification and Risk mapping (RE US$200,000 with no
allocation in phase 1; BE US$620,000)
This component will first provide ECCAS with a regional hazards/vulnerability identification and risks mapping
with a focus on major trans-boundary hazards\. A geoportal âWater and Disaster risksâ combining the ECCAS
Water Information System and the regional risk information database will be developed as well as a regional
Atlas\. A pilot project will be further developed to address trans-boundary flood risks, including EWS and a
Contingency Planning simulation\.
Intermediate Result Indicators:
ï A Database is developed and uploaded, and geo portal is operational, and atlas published
ï A Regional validation workshop has been organized
ï At least one contingency plan for transboundary flood risks is developed
ï ECCAS Expert is trained on Geoportal and GIS
Component 2: Capacity Building for Disaster Risk Reduction/Climate Change Adaptation (DRR/CCA) (RE
US$580,000 including phase 1: US$430,000; BE US$960,000)
This component will mainly provide support to ECCAS in (i) reinforcing member states capacity building and
institutional strengthening ensuring that member states capacity on DRM/CCA is enhanced and awareness is
raised to improving DRM measures implementation, (ii) building regional practice research and capacity
building collaboration with Academic/Technical centers of excellence, including internships for students, (iii)
creating a DRM/CCA website page to strengthen communication on DRR on the ECCAS, develop
communication tools, and (iv) supporting Gender mainstreaming of ECCAS Gender Action Plan in the
DRR/CCA plan of Action\.
Intermediate Result Indicators:
Apr 24, 2018 Page 7 of 10
The World Bank
Strengthening DRM Capacity in ECCAS
ï At least 3 students have done internships within ECCAS HQ
ï At least 8 countries have received support on office equipment and human capacity improvement
and training for users
ï Training modules on DRM and CCA are developed and conducted for ECCAS Sct and MS
ï Communication tools and developed and disseminated, Social media communication campaigns are
developed
ï A web site page for DRM/CCA is developed
ï At least 5 ECCAS FP have been facilitated on knowledge exchange missions for national platform or
coordination mechanisms
ï Gender action plan mainstreamed in national strategies and plans
Component 3: Strengthening of Policy Dialogue and legislation on DRM (RE US$425,000 including phase 1:
US$265,000; BE US$650,000)\.
Public Disclosure Copy
The component will include the review of national and regional policies and legislations on disaster risk
reduction and climate change adaptation to promote regional harmonization and coordination at regional
level\. Workshops and seminars on sensitization of ECCAS Parliamentary Network for Disaster Resilience
(REPARC) will be organized to promote DRR in National legislations; an ECCAS Hydromet Forum will be
organized; and Central Africa DRR Platform events will also be organized under this component\.
Intermediate Result Indicators:
ï An action plan for modernization of hydromet services at regional and national levels is developed
ï At least 4 countries have their strategies drafted or aligned to SF
ï REPARC is reinforced and DRM advocacy is made in MS national parliaments
Component 4: Enhance Regional Capacity for Preparedness, Response & Post Disaster Assessment
and Recovery/Reconstruction Planning (RE US$200,000 including phase 1: US$100,000; BE
US$563,000)
The component will consist of enhancing ECCAS coordination capacities thru training national sectoral
experts on assessment, planning and coordination of post-disaster needs and recovery framework,
develop national contingency plans and undertake a study on ECCAS Regional and Member States'
hydromet and flood/drought Early warning systems and services\.
Intermediate Result Indicators:
ï At least 4 PDNA/DRF trainings have been undertaken
ï At least 2 countries have developed National contingency plans and validated it
ï A detailed Regional Technical Report is produced on HydroMet EWS institutions and capacities and a
clear set of recommendations for strengthening is provided
Apr 24, 2018 Page 8 of 10
The World Bank
Strengthening DRM Capacity in ECCAS
Component 5: Implementation technical and coordination capacity at the ECCAS Secretariat is
strengthened (RE US$802,000 including phase 1: US$470,000)
ï The component will include the general administrative costs of the Project Implementation Unit,
staffing and equipment, including a Senior DRM Specialist, an Administrative and Financial Specialist,
a Procurement Specialist, an Accountant, a DRM Junior expert and a Monitoring and Evaluation
Specialist\.
Intermediate Result Indicators:
ï The PIU is set up and operational
ï Trainings for Administrative and Financial Specialist and a Procurement Specialist have been
undertaken
Public Disclosure Copy
[1] R1 - Extended Programme of Action for the Implementation of the Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster
Risk Reduction operational (PoA)\. To be implemented by the AUC and the UNISDR\.
R2 - African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have DRR coordination, planning and policy advisory
capacities operational to support their respective member states and regional and sub-regional programs\. To
be implemented by the GFDRR\.
R3 - Core capacities of the specialized national and Regional Climate Centers (RCCs) are improved, to meet
the needs of DRM agencies and socio-economic sectors for effective use of weather and climate services and
Community-focused and real-time Early Warning Systems (EWS)\. To be implemented by the AfDB\.
R4 - African countries have improved knowledge of risks through, the compilation of historical disaster
related data to inform the assessment and modelling of future risks\. To be implemented by the UNISDR\.
R5 â Multi-risk financing strategies are developed at regional, national and local levels to help African
countries make informed decisions and to mitigate the socio-economic, fiscal and financial impacts of
disasters\. To be implemented by the GFDRR\.
SAFEGUARDS
E\. Safeguard Policies that Might Apply
Safeguard Policies Triggered by the
Yes No TBD
Project
Environmental Assessment OP/BP 4\.01 X
Apr 24, 2018 Page 9 of 10
The World Bank
Strengthening DRM Capacity in ECCAS
Natural Habitats OP/BP 4\.04 X
Forests OP/BP 4\.36 X
Pest Management OP 4\.09 X
Physical Cultural Resources OP/BP 4\.11 X
Indigenous Peoples OP/BP 4\.10 X
Involuntary Resettlement OP/BP 4\.12 X
Safety of Dams OP/BP 4\.37 X
Projects on International Waterways
X
OP/BP 7\.50
Projects in Disputed Areas OP/BP 7\.60 X
Public Disclosure Copy
CONTACT POINT
World Bank
Contact : Prashant Singh Title : Senior Disaster Risk Managemen
Telephone No : 202-473-8162 Email :
Borrower/Client/Recipient
Borrower : Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
Secretary General of Communauté
Contact : Ahmad ALLAM-MI Title :
Economique des Etats de lâAf
Telephone No : 2410144732 Email : macmfoula@yahoo\.fr
Implementing Agencies
Implementing ECCAS DRR unit
Agency :
Contact : Dominique Kuitsouc Title : DRR coordinator
Telephone No : 24101444731 Email : dkuitsouc61@gmail\.com
FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 473-1000
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/projects
Apr 24, 2018 Page 10 of 10 | APPROVAL |
P000358 | Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No\. 8831
PROJECT PERFO1MANCE AUDIT REPORT
CAMEROON
FIRST URBAN PROJECT
(LOAN 2244-CM)
JUNE 25, 1990
Operations Evaliation Department
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their officid duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank atherization\.
ABOREVIATIONS AND ACRe\.JYMS
ARAN Agence de Restructurati4n et d'Aménagement de Nylon
ARYNO Agence pour la Restructuration de Yaoundé Nord-Ouest
BEAC Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale
BLAF Burau de Liaison Jes Affaires Foncières
CAPME Centre d'Assistance aux Pet1te* et Moyennes Entreprises
CFC Crédit Foncier du Cameroun
CPN Calse Populaire de Nylon
DDA Coopération Suisse au Développement et à l'AIde Humanitalre
FEICOI Fonds Spécial d'Equipement et d'Intervention Interdormunal
MAETUR Mission d'Aménagement et d'Equip\.ment des Terrains Urbains et Ruraux
MINUH Ministère de l'Urbanisme et de l'Habitat
NOO Non-govern»ental Organizatlon
OPC Organisation, Pi lotage, Contr8le de Travaux
PiE Petites et Moyennes Entreprises
RFP Request for Proposai
ROW Right of Way
SIC Société Immobilière du Caomaroun
SNEC Société Nationale des Eaux du Cameroun
SONEL Société Nationale d'Electricit6
UCPY Union des Caisses Populaires de Yaoundé
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
THE WORLD BANK
Washington\. D\.C 20433
U\.S\.A\.
OM1Ce as DMIrect-CenWra
opatwis eviatiti
June 25, 1990
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Performance Audit Report on
Cameroon - First Urban Development Project
(Loan 2244-CM)
Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project
Performance Audit Report on Cameroon - First Urban Development Project
(Loan 2244-CM)" prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department\.
Attachment
This document has a restricted distribution and may be umed by recipents only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed withoat World Bank authoriation\.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
CAMEROON
FIRST URBAN PROJECT
(LOAN 2244-CM)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No\.
Preface \. i
Basic Data Sheet \. ii
Evaluation Summary \. v
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT
I\. PROJECT BACKGROUND \. 1
A\. The Economic, Demographic and Political Context \. 1
B\. The Urban Sector \. 1
C\. Bark Involvement and Strategy \. 2
II\. THE PROJECT \. 3
A\. Origin, Development and Objectives \. 3
B\. Project Components and Costs \. 4
C\. Costs, Financing and Administration \. 4
III\. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND ACHIEVEMENTS \. 6
A\. Time Delays \. \. 6
B\. Cost Overruns \. 7
C\. Achievements and Continuity \. 11
IV\. POINTS OF INTEREST \. 17
A\. Cost Recovery \. 17
B\. Community Participation and "Animation" \. 19
C\. Credit Foncier - Home Construction Finance \. 20
D\. Support for Small Businesses and Artisans \. 22
E\. Economic Rate of Return \. 23
F\. The Second Urban Project \. 24
V\. PROJECT IMPACT \. 24
A\. Physical Impact \. 24
B\. Environmental Impact \. 25
C\. Institutional Impact \. 25
D\. Policy Impact \. 27
E\. Poverty Impact \. 28
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
Table of Contents (Cont'd)
VI\. ROLE OF THE BANK \. 28
VII\. LESSONS LEARNED \. 28
VIII\. CONCLUSIONS \. 30
ANNEXES
1\. Diagrams \. 31
2\. Swiss Calculations \. \. 33
3\. Photographs \. 34
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
I\. BACKGROUND AND PROJECT DESCRIPTION \. \. 43
II\. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COST \. 46
III\. PROJECT RESULTS AND SUSTAINABILITY \. 52
IV\. BANK, BORROWER AND CONSULTANT PERFORMANCE \. 56
V\. LESSONS LEARNED \. \. 60
i
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
CAMEROON
FIRST URBAN PROJECT
(LOAN 2244-CM)
PREFACE
1\. This is a Project Performance Audit Report (PPAR) on the First Urban
Development Project, partially financed by Loan 2244-CM in the amount of US$ 20
million to the Republic of Cameroon\. The loan was approved on March 15, 1983
and became effective on May 3, 1984\. The project closed on June 30, 1988 as
expected at appraisal and an unutilized loan balance of less than US$ 200,000
was cancelled on January 25, 1989\.
2\. The PPAR consists of the Project Performance Audit prepared by the
Operations Evaluation Department (OED) and a Project Completion Report prepared
by the Infrastructure Operations Division of the Occidental and Central Africa
Department (AFlIN)\. The PPAR is based on the attached PCR, the Staff Appraisal
Report, project legal documents, project correspondence files, a transcript of
the Executive Directors' discussions at Board presentation, interviews with Bank
staff and other releva\.t materials\. An OED mission visited Cameroon in February
1990 to discuss the project with local and national government officials\. 1\.sair
kind cooperation and valuable assistance in the preparation of this report is
gratefully acknowledged\.
3\. The PCR provides a good account and assessment of the project
experience and indicates its successes and failures\. In order to give a wider
perspective, OED has attempted to provide additional information about the
project, its history, its outcome, the issues it raised and the problems
encountered during implementation\.
4\. Following standard OED procedures, copies of the draft PPAR were sent
to the Government\. No comments, however, were received\.
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
CAMEROON
FIRST URBAN PROJECT
(LOAN 2244-CM)
BASIC DATA SHEET
KEY PROJECT DATA
Appraisal Actual or
Item Expectation Current Estimate
Total Project Cost (USS million) 54\.7 74\.0
overrun (W) * 355
IBRD Loan Amount (US$ million) 20\.0 20\.0
Disbursed -- 19\.8
Cancelled -- 0\.02
Repaid -- 0\.47
outstanding - 19\.33
Date Physical Cojvnents Completed 06/30/88 06/30/90
Proportion Completed by Above Date (W) 70 100
Proportion of Tim Overrun (W) -- 40
Economic Rate of Return (W) 18 24
Flancial Performance ** Acceptable
Institutional Performance ** Acceptable
CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS
(US$ million)
itet FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89
Appraisal Estimate 0\.3 3\.7 11\.6 17\.0 19\.4 20\.0 **
Actual 0 0\.4 1\.7 3\.0 8\.6 17\.8 19\.8
Actual as % of Estimate 0 9 15 18 43 89 99
OTHER PROJECT DATA
Item Original Amended Actual
Government's Application 08/24/76
First Mention to Timetable 08/01/77
Negotiations 10/1979 06/1981 03/04/82
Board Approval 11/1979 10/1981 03/15/83
Loan Agreement Date 01/1980 06/15/83 09/15/83
Effectiveness Date 12/15/83 05/03/84
Closing Date 06/30/88 06/30/88
Dorrower Republic of Cameroon
Executing Agencies Ministry of Urban Developaint and Housing, MAETUR and CFC
Fiscal Year of Borrower July 01 -- June 30
Follow-on Project Name Second Urban Project
Loan number 2999-CM
Amount (US$ million) 146
Loan Agreement Date January 25, 1989
La Including US$13\.1 N additional financing provided under Second Urban Project (La\. 2999-CM)
/ US$166,945\.90 cancelled on 01/25/89
MISSION DATA
Mission No\.of No\. of Date
Item Composition Mo\./Year Weeks Persons StaffWeeks of Report
Identification 1 UP/EC 10/76 2 2 4 02/02/77
Identification 2 UP 06/77 2 1 2 08/01/77
Identification 3 UP 03/78 1 1 1 05/01/78
Preparation 1 UP 07/78 1 1 1 09/14/78
Preparation 2 UP/2EC q**79 1 3 3 04/04/79
Preparation 3 2EC */79 3 2 6 06/07/79
Preparation 4 UP/EC : 79 2 2 4 09/17/79
Preparation 5 UP/EN 10/79 2 2 4 11/19/79
Preparation 6 UP 12/79 1 1 1 01/15/80
Preparation 7 UP/ME/FA/EC/TE/INST 02/80 2 6 12 03/03/80
Preparation 8 UP 05/80 1 i 1 06/30/80
Pre-appraisal UP/FA/LC/INST/C / 07/80 3 8 24 08/20/80
Appraisal UP/FA/EC/CE/TE 12/80 3 5 15 12/19/80
Post-appraisal UP/EC 02/81 1 2 2 03/04/81
Post-appraisal UP/FA/TR 0581 2 3 3 06/02/81
Post-appraisal UP 09/81 2 1 2 10/05/81
Post-negotiation/
Supervision 1 / UP/FA/ME/EC/INST 04/82 2 5 10 05/03/82
Post-negotiation/ UP/ME/2EC/FA/EN 12/82 2 6 12 02/04/83
Supervision 2 /b
Supervision 3 UP/EC/ME 06/83 2 3 6 06/29/83
Supervision 4 UP/ME 10/83 2 2 4 01/13/84
Supervision 5 / P//FA/C/CA/INSTE/ 02/84 2 8 16 03/23/84
Supervision 6 UP/ME/EC 07/84 1 3 3 08/15/84
Supervision 7 UP/EC 10/84 1 2 2 12/05/84
Supervision 8 A ME/EM/TE/DE 01/85 2 4 8 02/08/85
Supervision 9 /c ME/ENG/EC/TE/DE 04/85 3 5 15 05/07/85
Supervision 10 A ME/ENC/T/DE 07/85 3 4 12 09/06/85
Supervision 11 c ME/ENG/DE 10/85 2 3 6 11/05/85
Supervision 12 A TR 12/85 1 1 1 01/13/86
Supervision 13 A ME/UP/ENG 06/86 2 3 6 07/31/86
Supervision 14 A UP/ENG/DE 02/87 1 3 3 04/01/87
Supervision 15 A UP/INST/ENG/DR/2RE 05/87 1 6 6 07/17/87
Supervision 16 A UP/EC/RE 11/87 1 3 3 12/17/87
Supervision 17 jd UP/RE/INST 06/88 1 3 3 09/06/88
Completion / UP/EC 10/88 3 1 3 12/27/88
/ UP - Urban Planner ME * Municipal Engineer SS * Soils Specialist
EC * Economist TE - Traffic and Transport Engineer ID - Loan Officer
FA - Financial Analyst INST - Institutional Expert AR = Architect
EN - Energy CE - Civil Engineer TR * Training
CA * Cadastre DE * Drainage Engineer RE * Road Engineer
A Sector mission\.
/ Preparation mission, Second Urban Project
Ld Pre-negotiation mission, Second Urban Project
L Project launch, Second Urban Project
- iv -
CURENCY EXCHANGE RATES
Name of Currency (Abbreviation): (FCFA)
Year
Appraisal Exchange Rate US$1 - 270 CPA
Intervening Years Average:
Disbursement 2% 1984 Excbange R&te US$1 = 437 CFA
Disbursement 7% 1985 Exchange Rate US$1 - 449 CFA
Disbursement 8% 1986 Exchange Rate US$1 - 346 CFA
Disbursement 27% 1987 Exchange Rate US$1 - 300 CFA
Disbursement 56% 1988 Exchange Rate (E) US$1 = 300 CFA
Weighted Average Rate (E) US$1 = 317 CFA
Completion Year Average Exchange Rate (E) US$1 = 300 CFA
(E) Estimated\.
STAFF INPUT
(Staff Weeks)
Fiscal Year: FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 FY90 Total
Preappraisal 104\.9 -- -- 104\.9
Appraisal -- 50\.9 24\.0 -- ** -- ** -- -- ** -- 74\.9
Negotiations -- -- 22\.6 3\.4 -- -- -- -- -- -- 26\.0
Supervision -- -- -- 4\.0 12\.3 22\.2 10\.0 14\.5 7\.9 6\.5 ** 77\.4
Other -- -- -- - -- -* - -- -- 5\.2 1\.1 6\.3
Total 104\.9 50\.9 46\.6 7\.4 12\.3 22\.2 10\.0 14\.5 7\.9 11\.7 1\.1 289\.5
V
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
CAMEROON
FIRST URBAN PROJECT
(LOAN 2244-CM)
EVALUATION SUMMARY
Introducti2n
1\. The first urban project in Cameroin came at the end of a period of
sustained economic growth, but its implementation coincided with the crisis which
followed the collapse of oil prices in the mid 1980's\. Project preparation was
drawn out from 1977 to 1983 as the Bank worked along with other bi-lateral
agencies and the Government of Cameroon to develop policy instruments which
would complement the Government's focus on high and middle-income housing with
programs for low-income families\. The Zirst project aimed to introduce a
replicable model for urban development\. I is marked, however, by the change
in the country's economic outlook which produt-wd a shift from the social interest
policies to a focus on productive investments\. As a result, the project's scale
was reduced during the final stages of preparation\. Works proposed for the
coun:ry's capital, Yaound6, were postponed and the serviced lot components were
eliminated, leaving as the project's centerpiece the upgrading of a 600 hectare
squatter settlement in Cameroon's largest city, DouAla\.
Objectives
2\. The project represented a bold attempt to introduce several new
concepts including upgrading of squatter neighborhoods, land regularization,
resettlement on unserviced plots, home construction financing, cst recovery and
support for small businesses\. Hefty and troubling cost overruns, resulting from
the problematic terrain of the project area, Nylon, and inadequate engineering
studies led to dramatic cutbacks in the proposed infrastructure\. Once the civil
works 1 :ogram had been redefined, through a renegotiation in 1987, the operation
moved ahead rapidly, completing disbursement in record time (five years as
opposed to the Bank average of 9\.5 years for urban projects), although several
components were left to be completed under a second project\. Cost overruns
continue to occur and a true economic evaluation of the project will not be
possible until final works are completed and paid for\. At that point, the
cost/benefit ratio may look less sanguine than at present\.
3\. The first project included studies leading to the development of a
second urban project, which appeared to absorb most of the time and interest of
the Bank and the Government during supervision missions given the shift in the
focus of urban policy\. The second project is geared toward the development of
primary urban infrastructure and municipal revenues on a national scale\. It
includes, nonetheless, certain priority works for Nylon in Douala\.
vi
Implementation Experience
4\. The project has had a marked positive impact on the urban environment
of Nylon and on the city as a whole and has, in addition, stimulated economic
growth in Nylon and strengthened community development\. Cost recovery appears
to be going well\. Delays in resettlement of expropriated families and in issuing
land titles, together with the failure to generate a viable home financing system
or a program to support small businesses, represent the main shortcomings in an
otherwise successful operation\.
5\. The project established a special executing agency in Nylon, ARAN
(Agence de Restructuration et d'Am6nagement de Nylon)\. ARAN's position as
technically independent, but actually under the aegis of two other agencies, led
to considerable complications during implementation\. In addition to its own
identity problems (PCR para\. 1\.12), ARAN suffered from the imposed collaboration
with other agencies for small business promotion and assistance and, more
ihportantly, for home loans, plot acquisition financing, and, thus, for cost
recovery of on-site civil works\. Despite its isolation, ARAN managed the project
effectively, although it has had periodic difficulties rerulting from its
distance and consequent lack of support from national government\.
6\. Cooperation with the Swiss technical assistance agency, DDA, led to
a fortunate, if occasionally disjointed: collaboration\. DDA financed community
facilities in Nylon and filled in where technical assistance was lacking\. While
the Bank focused on hardware components, the Swiss were able to work with the
executing agency, ARAN, in areas of cost recovery, resettlement, land titling
and home construction finance\.
Results
7\. The existence of a strong community organization in Nylon,
"Animation," made the area an attractive locus for a first project\. Indeed, the
collaboration between ARAN and Animation has been key in the success of
components such as cost recovery and resettlement, and has led to additional
programs focusing on small-business development, infrastructure construction
through mutual assistance and the local credit union as a source of financing
and savings generation\. The experience of ARAN and Animation lends support to
arguments for community part' -pation in urban development projects\.
8\. Among other aborted attempts to involve national agencies, the plan
to establish CFC, the national home credit institution, as a financial
intermediary for home construction loans and for cost recovery failed\. CFC
proved unprepared and/or unwilling to work with the informal sector and to
collaborate with ARAN in project cost recovery as the Appraisal had specified\.
In retrospect, it was a mistake to assign cost recovery to a separate agency\.
Under the circumstances, ARAN has managed to develop a viable cost recovery
system on its own, and is supporting the local credit union, the Caisse Populaire
de Nylon (CPN), as an alternative home financing agent\.
vii
Sustainability
9\. Although a primary objective of the first project was to establish
a replicable model for urban upgrading, to date no such replication has taken
place\. Nevertheless, the interest generated by the events in Nylon and the
adoption of certain policy measures which support the legitimacy of squatter
settlements suggest that urban upgrading has gained a small but sure foothold
in Ganeroon's urban sector\.
Findings and Lessons
10\. The project has been important for institutional development within
Cameroon's urban sectGr insofar as it brought various agencies together and set
a new precedent for coordinating efforts in the sector\. In addition, it set in
place a new lir\. of communication from the community up to the Ministry\.
11\. Studies financed under the first project led to the preparation and
negotiation of a second urban project in 1988\. In addition to the Ussons
learned about tite design of an effective management structure, the first project
identified areas of institutional and policy weakness, and led to a reassessment
of institutions in the sector without which the second project could not have
moved forward\. For example, both the rejection of the complicated institutional
set-up of the first project, including a local executing agency, and the fact
that the municipalities were given an important role in the urban development
process in the follow-on project resulted from lessons learned in the first
operation\.
12\. Complex barely begins to describe this project which vas apprairad
twice, renegotiated in mid-stream and continues to be implemented even after
disbursements have been completed\. The PCR, completed ir, 1989, gives a very
thorough account of events and clarifies the outcome of the principal components\.
The Audit has thus been able to focus on additional points of interest and to
complement the PCR with information which has subsequently become available\.
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
CAMEROON
FIRST URBAN PROJECT
(LOAN 2244-CM)
I\. PROJECT BACKGROUND
A\. The Economic\. Demographic and Political Context
1\.01 During the fifteen years prior to appraisal in 1981, Cameroon was
characterized by steady economic growth in an atmosphere of social stability and
gradual national unification\. Real annual GDP growth increased from an average
of 4\.2% between 1966 and 1971 to 4\.5% during the following five years, and then
to between 7% and 8% from 1976 to 1981\. From 1966 to 1980 per capita GDP rose
by an annual rate of 3\.1% Donations from the French Government averaged around
US$ 45 million a year during the 1960's\. Thereafter, French foreign aid
continued, increasing to about US$ 90 million per year during the 1970's, but
grants diminished and most assistance came in the form of loans\.
1\.02 From 1978 to 1982 petroleum gained importance as a major export,
moving from a 1% share of total exports to about 63% and replacing cocoa and
coffee as the nation's leading export product and a major component of GDP\.
Government's concerns, echoed in dialogues with the Bank, centered on finding
ways to convert the windfall of oil revenues into productive investment\.
Unfortunately, the economy's sudden boom was followed by a general crisis when
oil prices fell in the mid 1980's\. Despite its efforts to consolidate
agriculture and industry, the Government could not contain the repercussions of
the crisis which marked the project during its implementation and afterwards\.
1\.03 With a population of 8\.9 million in 1983 and promising economic
potential in many areas, tte Government of Cameroon had focused on agriculture
(livestock and forestry), agro-industry, trade and commerce, port facilities and
a transport network also serving neighboring landlocked Chad and the Central
African Republic\.
B\. The Urban Sector
1\.04\. At the time of appraisal, Cameroon ranked as the fourth most
urbanized country in West Africa\. Rapid urban growth suggested that half of the
population would be living in cities by 1990, a prediction which has been borne
out\. At the same time, problems burgeoned along with the urban population, the
majority of which were squatters on poorly drained and poorly serviced periurban
land\. Forty five percent of the residents had no access to piped water\. Fewer
than 10% held legal title to their land\.
2
1\.05 Nowhere was the incrasing urban squalor more evident than in Douala
and Yaound6, Cameroon's two largest cities\. Although the secondary urban centers
were growing almost twice as fast, Douala and Yaound6, already housed more
persons than all the secondary cities combined, a full 38% of the national urban
population and 12% of the country's population as a whole\. As Douala and Yaound6
continued to expand, the existing squatter se 'ements of Nylon (PCR para\. 1\.06)
and the Briqueterie lacked infrastructure , -t suffered chronic envi-onmental
problems: residual flooding, no drainage and insufficient garbage collection,
resulting in the accumulation of solid waste and serious health hazards\.
1\.06 Jes,-ite these conditions, Douala and Yaoundd enjoyed certain
advantage\. t- -\. >sitive prospects\. Urban poverty was less pronounced than in
other cou\.- 9c-\. Both cities enjoyed high levels of formal employment: three-
fourths of the work force in iaoundd and two-thirds in Douala were reported to
be salaried employees\. Although 17% of Douala's households and 25% of those in
Yaound6 were estimated to earn below the respective poverty levels (higher than
in other African countries), these percentages are markedly lower than those
found in Cameroon's neighbors, or in the country's secondary cities\. A high rate
of internal mobility characterized both Douala and Yaound6 -- from 1972 to 1982
over 70% of their households moved at least once -- indicating that the cities'
formation was still, to a certain degree, in flux\.
1\.07 In institutional terms, the urban sector in Cameroon was largely
dominated by centcalized agencies, following the French model\. Urban and
regional policy, planning and housing functions, as well as land registry and
land management, rested with the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing
(MINUH), more specifically with its Division of Urbanism and Housing (DUH),
formed in 1976\. Three parastatal agencies were developed to assist MINUH: (i)
SIC (Socift6 Immobili&re du Cameroun), the national housing agency, traditionally
dedicated to housing for middle-income families and civil servants; (ii) MAETUR
(Mission d'Amdnagement et d'Equipement des Terrains Urbains et Ruraux), created
in 1977 and charged with developing residential land, but similarly geared to
upper-income families, and; (iii) CFC (Cr6dit Foncier du Cameroun), established
in the 1960's, but reborn in 1976 when a funding mechanism through a payroll tax
was developed\. The latter was responsible for financing MAETUR and SIC operations
and generating affordable home financing\. The municipal councils, presided over
by a delegate from the national government, in turn, had limited budgets and
functions\. Infrastructure was and is the business of national parastatal
companies, while state land was held and managed by the national government\.
C\. Bank Involvement and Strategy
1\.08 By 1982, the Bank had financed 41 projects in Cameroon\. Transport
and agriculture each accounted for about 40 percent of Bank commitments, although
the period from 1975 to 1982 witnessed a growing tendency for the lending program
to be broadened into areas such as industrial development, technical assistance,
education and water supply\. The recommendation to the President in 1983 notes
that Cameroon's disbursement rate had been highly efficient in the past, but that
recent problems in the central procurement agency had caused setbacks in the
country's performance vis-&-vis Bank operations\.
3
1\.09 Bank efforts in Cameroon supported three main areas of development:
(i) international trade and transportation -- strengthening and extending the
trunk road and rail systems and improving the port of Douala; (ii) raising
agricultural output and exports; and (iii) improving education\. The Bank
strategy in the early 1980's was to continue along the same basic lines, but to
strengthen other infrastructure, in particular telecommunications, energy,
health, water supply/sewage and urban\. The sectoral diversification of Bank
lending was seen as a reflection of the growing complexity of the country's
development\.
1\.10 Although an urban sector mission visited Cameroon in 1975, project
identification came some time later\. In the interim, the Bank offered technical
assistance and opened an important dialogue involving the sector, focusing on
development of a national housing and urban growth policy\.
II\. THE PROJECT
A\. Origin, Development and Objectives
2\.01 Given their predominance in the sector (paras\. 1\.05 and 1\.06) Yaound6
and Douala emerged as the primary targets for an urban project in the context
of planned growth and squatter upgrading\. A first project memorandum appeared
in February 1977, mentioning the two cities and Nylon, Douala's most prominent
squatter settlement -- well-known because of its community organization -- as
areas of action and proposing an appraisal date for 1979\.
2\.02 By 1979, the Cameroon Government had only recently established the
MINUH-DUH and a first feasibility study was contracted in July 1979\. The Bank
resident mission provided an advisor to the Director of Urbanism and Habitat in
MINUH from 1979-1981 to help develop a national housing policy\. Other bi-
lateral agencies were also starting up activities in the shelter subsector in
Cameroon, emphasizing low-cost solutions for low-income families\. The
Government, accordingly, redirected its planning efforts towards urban upgrading
and serviced lots\.
2\.03 Given the focus of policy development, the project began to take form
with a double objective: that of raising infrastructure standards for low-income
families (PCR 1\.08) and that of setting in place a sustainable and replicable
program for dealing with sub-standard settlements in both existing and new
developments\. The project underscored two other key policy issues: granting
tenure to squatters and cost recovery\. The Government enunciated its goals as
follows: "to develop the means of improvement which will permit a progressive
evolution of (such) zones leading, ultimately, to publicly-acceptable living
conditions\. Moreover, the proposals seek to change the marginality and
inaccessibility which characterize the zone(s) and touch every aspect of the
population's life\." 1
1 P\.D\.U\. evaluation, p\.6\.
4
2\.04 The proposed project included serviced and unserviced lots and
squatter upgrading for both Douala and Yaound6\. From 1979 to 1981 other
components found their way into the project in accordance with the prevalent
fashion for multi-faceted operations: home improvement loans, community
facilities, market construction, small business support, urban transport, energy
and municipal services\.
2\.05 With appraisal set for late 1980, the Bank concentrated on reducing
projected costs, which ranged between US$ 100 and 120 million, to an acceptable
US$ 74 million, and postponed negotiations until completion of the consultants'
feasibility studies\. When the Mayor of Yaoundd did not appear at pre-appraisal
mission meetings in July, 1980, the upgrading and municipal support components
for that city were dropped\. With a total project cost of US$ 94 million, the
Bank invited the Government of Cameroon to negotiate\.
2\.06 The concurrent reclassification of Cameroon from an IDA to an IBRD
country turned the tables by giving the Government of Cameroon motives for
further reducing project costs\. As the rCR recounts (para\. 1\.08), negotiations
resulted in elimination of serviced lot components for both cities, leaving only
a skeletal program of community services for Yaound6 and making the upgrading
of Nylon in Douala the project's centerpiece\.
B\. Project Components and Costs
2\.07 As the Table below shows, 74% of project investment covered
infrastructure works in Douala\. While certain measures benefitted the entire
city, the bulk was destined to upgrading, primary roads, drainage, water supply
and electricity for Nylon, which, at the time, covered some 600 hectares and had
a population estimated at 90,000\. Another 3\.7% of the total investment was
allocated to finance secondary and tertiary infrastructure -- including house
connections as warranted -- additional standpipes and home improvement loans to
a pilot upgrading zone of 50 hectares with a population of 20,000, within Nylon\.
In addition, the Swiss technical assistance agency, DDA, was to finance community
facilities in Nylon, specifically a major market and secondary markets, community
centers and health posts\. Bank financing also covered the development of
serviced lots for resettlement of families uprooted by upgrading activities,
support for small businesses and technical assistance and studies focused mainly
on the development of a second project\.
C\. Costs\. Financing and Administration
2\.08 Total project costs came to US$ 54\.7 million, of which the Bank loan
covered US$ 20 million, or 36%\. The DDA loan accounted for US$ 5\.5 million, or
10%, excluding grants for Swiss technical assistance\. The Government of Cameroon
was to finance US$ 29 million, or 54% of the total investment\.
2\.09 Chart 2-1, taken from the SAR (para\. 3\.05) shows the flow of funds
and the various agencies designated to implement the project\. A special land
development agency for Nylon, ARAN (Agence de Restructuration et d'Amdnagement
de Nylon) was established as an extension of MAETUR\. ARAN\MAETUR, technically
independent, but actually under the aegis of MINUH-DUH, was responsible for the
5
Cè¯ç¹TZã1
CAMEROON URBAå¯nRV次äºnpééå¯ï¼,oh?âæ¶ï¼
ï¼ããï¼ãäºï¼ãï¼âãï¼ãå
«âuovãâUrnåå¹T FROJECT
FLOå¯OF FUNDS
å¹ä¸äºä¸ä¸JÂï¼-
å±ï¼lä¸Itç´°â¢â¢ç´°â¢ç¹ï¼â¢â¢ãï¼
lä¸ï¼¿11æ¶ï¼&ï¼â¢æ¶â¢â¢â¢â¢â¢jåé¥åL--seä¸ä¸ä¸ï¼Tç´°ç´°èªï¼ï¼â¢éâåâ
l&-L,11ä¸â¢1èªç´°èªâ¢
&L-eesees-weseä¸ä¸ä¸ãããç¾Cï¼å±Lâ¢â¢â¢â¢â¢â¢â¢â¢â¢â â¢â¢ï¼--ï¼å馴森éå£å£ç´°â¢é³¥å£å£æ¸
IããLï¼ä¸ï¼¿å
«ãåå£â¢è±³â¢ç´°ï¼è³¼â¢é¨â¢ç¸
ãããIæºé¦´é¢å£åè§â¢ä¼¯éâå
ãããæ¥ä¸é¢å¹ç´°ç©ç´°ç´°é¦´â¢Oé馴â
ãããå±ãå¿
å£é鬨åç©â¢åçâ¢â¢
ãï¼Iå£1 00å£å©¦Cç´°ç´°åå£ç´°â¢âå£â¢
ãï¼âæ¥â¢ç´°âé¨æ¿é¦´ç´°â
ä¹â¢â â â â â¢â¢â ï¼â¢å¥å£â¢ç´°ç´°ç´°é¬¨
1___å£Iå±â¢èªï¼â¢â¢ç¶²â¢ï¼ï¼éç´°ç¸
å¿
äºäºããâ&&&
ç©å£ç´°â¢å£èªä¸èªè®è«
6
bulk of the project\. In addition to its own identity problems (PCR para\. 1\. 12),
ARAN suffered as a result of the imposed collaboration of other agencies, notably
CAPME (Centre d'Assistance aux Petites et Moyermes Entreprises), for small
business promotion and assistance and, more importantly, CFC, for home loans,
plot acquisition financing, and, thus, cost recovery of on-site civil works\.
(SAR para 3\.05)
2\.10 Community facilities, with the exception of the major (Madagascar)
market, technical assistance and primary infrastructure, were to be financed by
the Government of Cameroon as an outright grant\. The secondary infrastructure
in the pilot upgrading zone and the home improvement loans, estimated at a total
of US$ 2\.02 million, were to be recovered by CFC from direct project
beneficiaries\. The construction costs of the Madagascar market were to be
recovered from vendors through rents for market stalls\.
III\. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND ACHIEVEMENTS
A\. Time DelM
3\.01 Although the project had advanced considerably during preparation,
with the dredging of the Mgoua River (PCR para\. 2\.02) and identification of the
first resettlement area, Dibom II, once negotiations were completed, a certain
sluggishness set in, amply described in the PCR (paras\. 2\.02 - 2\.06)\. Compliance
with loan conditions proved elusive, in particular the definition of CFC's role
in managing the home improvement loans program in terms acceptable to the Bank\.
CFC's subsequent performance turned out to be disappointing (paras\. 4\.13-4\.18)
and the general eagerness to have the relevant covenants agreed may have led to
acceptance of an ultimately unworkable format\.
3\.02 The repercussions of the delays in loan effectiveness were passed
on to project implementation\. The engineering studies for the general upgrading
of Nylon actually began in 1984, more than a year after negotiations\. The
studies for the pilot zone were contracted out a full two years after their
scheduled completion\. Because the SDAU (Schema Directeur d'Amdnagement et
d'Urbanisme) presented a radically new urban road plan (PCR para\. 2\.07) in late
1984, new terms of reference were developed\. Furthermore, ARAN\KAETUR and MINUH
were unfamiliar with Bank procurement requirements QCR paras\. 2\.04, 4\.02 and
4\.12), but the lengthy internal procedures imposed by the complicated relations
between implementing agencies also played a role (PCR paras\. 4\.08-4\.10) in the
observed delays\. After road construction had begLu, in the fall of 1987,
additional stumbling blocks became apparent (PCR paras\. 2\.13-2\.15), while cost
overruns (paras\. 3\.06-3\.14) eventually led to an amendment of the project in
early 1988\.
3\.03 Although the key project data chart shows a time overrun of 40%, the
project remained stubbornly on course; in a surprising about face, ARAN managed
to invest 56% of the total project in a single year\. By the scheduled date of
project completion almost 90% of the amount projected at appraisal had been
disbursed, belying the pessimistic supervision mission reports which predicted
that the project would have to be extended until 1992 and making a very positive
7
showing over the worldwide average of nine and a half years for Bank urban
projects\.
3\.04 In retrospect, the project officer at the time (of the great leap
forward) attributes the slowdowns to blockages in funding from the Central
Government as a result of the fall in oil prices in the mid 1980's\. He also
notes that the Douala project was small in comparison to MINUH's other
operations, suggesting that it was the prospect of a larger second project, on
a nationwide scale (paras\. 4\.28-4\.29) and which would give more prominence to
MINUH, that actually spurred on implementation\.
3\.05 Amendment of the project (para\. 3\.02) meant that it was considered
closed when funds ran out even though the financing for certain activities
foreseen under the first operation was relegated to the second project\. Thus,
in a sense, the first project remains incomplete (paras\. 3\.15-3\.18) and the
supervision reports' predictions of the need for an extension until 1992 may,
in practice, prove correct\.
B\. Cost Overruns
3\.06 From any angle, the project proved far moze costly than originally
foreseen\. The PCR calculates a 35% cost overrun based on the addition of US$
13\.1 million financed through the second urban project and an increase of US$
2\.7 million of DDA funds\. The DDA evaluation shows an even higher figure --
closer to 50% -- taking into accr\.tnt the final costs of community facilities (the
Madagascar Market came in at 200% over the original estimate) and the extension
2
of technical assistance to ARAN (some 160% of the appraisal estimate)\. The
Audit calculated a 56% overrun in the costs for Nylon upgrading to date (Table
3-1), although this figure lacks some important inputs, notably land costs for
Ndogpassi and ARAN's operational costs throughout\.
3\.07 As the Table below indicates, the main cost overrun stems from
infrastructure, associated studies and extended technical assistance\. The
original estimates for road and drainage costs were already considered high at
the time of appraisal "because of the unique situation in Nylon\. It is low-
lying, it drains a large part of the surrounding area and is often subject to
flooding\." (SAR para\. 2\.04)\. With base costs of US$ 220,296 per kilometer (for
a 12 meter wide road) for major roads and US$ 359,411/km for drains, Bank
engineers had li-tle reason to assume that cost estimates were low, particularly
when the first engineering study came in 1984 at half the Appraisal estimate\.
3\.08 According to final construction costs, as amended in late 1989, base
road costs, however, have risen to US$ 1,961,009/km, for a 12 meter wide road\.
How could the Bank and project management be caught so unaware ? According to
the project officer at the time, the road designs as developed in the feasibility
and subsequent engineering studies were simply inadequate for the hydraulic
conditions at Nylon and for the performance required of a major road (PCR para\.
2\.13)\. The PCR suggests that the after-effects of the dredging of the Mgoua
River and the subsequent rise in the water table changed hydraulic conditions
2 Dossiers Sectoriels #5 para 1\.1\.1
8
at Nylon, (PCR para 2\.13), an explanation supported by the supervising engineers
at ARAN\.
Project !Costs at Apraisal and Comletion
(US Dollars '000)
ARRraisal Cpletion
A\. Development of NXlon 3
Land Acquisition 0\.49 0\.8% 0\.95 1\.1%
Mgoua Drainage 6\.95 12\.7% 6\.95 8\.1%
Water 1\.95 3\.5% 0\.85 1\.0%
Roads 9\.96 18\.0% 30\.0 35\.0%
Drainage 9\.25 16\.8% 1\.3 1\.5%
Solid Waste 0\.3 0\.5% 0\.0 0\.0%
Resettlements 1\.27 2\.3% 15\.55 18\.2%
Electricity 0\.77 1\.4% 0\.58 0\.7%
Market 4\.55 8\.3% 6\.8 8\.0%
Small Business Project 0\.96 1\.8% 0\.5 0\.6%
Community Facilities 2\.91 5\.3% 6\.7 7\.8%
Housing Loans 1\.15 2\.1% 0\.83 1\.01
Engineering Studies inc\. 18\.31 21\.4%
TOTAL br-ON 40\.55 74\.1% 70\.56 82\.5%
B\. Yaondn
Community Facilities 1\.82 3\.3%
Market 1\.58 2\.9%
Small Business Project 0\.86 1\.6%
TOTAL YAOUNDE 4\.26 7\.8%
3 The US$ 49,000 for land acquisition refers to the cost of Dibom II\. The
cost of additional lots, Ndogpassi 1 and 2 are not available\. Completion water,
roads, drainage and electricity costs are from the contractor's records\.
Resettlement costs on completion include US$ 10\.34 million for expropriation and
US$ 3 million for land development for Ndogpassi 2 under the second project (SAR
Annex 2-4), US$ 2\.2 million in development costs for Ndogpassi 1 and studies for
an alternative site (1'Aeroport)\. Completion market, small business project and
community facilities costs are drawn from DDA's final report\. Housing loans
include the FFCA 20 million disbursed by CFC outside the project, but does not
include CPN loans or loans made by private banks\. Engineering study costs are
from PDU 2\.
9
C\. Studies and Technical Assistance '
Project Execution 5\.99 10\.9% 7\.6 8\.8%
Studies 4\.28 7\.8% 7\.4 8\.6%
TOTAL TECH\. ASSISTANCE 10\.26 18\.8% 15\.0 17\.5%
TOTAL 54\.7 100\.0% 85\.56 100\.0%
3\.09 Furthermore, under the French construction system, it is common for
the contractor to produce the final design of works\. In this case, the
contractor who won the contract on the basis of the engineering design (albeit
at a cost about 40% over the SAR estimate) proposed important changes in
specifications which resulted in a revised cost of approximately US$ 600,000 per
kilometer (again based on a 12 meter road)\. Two independent consultants reviewed
and confirmed the validity of the contractor's proposed specifications and costs\.
The increased cost, however, implied a dramatic reduction in works\. A proposal
to cut back on the roads (para\. 3\.15) and eliminate water, electricity and a
major portion of the d-ainage (paras\. 3\.15-3\.18) was accepted in principle during
project revision in 1987 (PCR para\. 2\.14), although ARAN insisted on substituting
primary water and electricity infrastructure (para\. 3\.17) for additional road
works, including a round-about linking the East-West Boulevard to the Boulevard
d'Aviati6n (See Diagrams in Annex 1)\.
3\.10 The final road costs are taken from the revised construction contract
which indicates an addition of some US$ 7\.8 million, ' bringing road costs close
to ten times the figure used at appraisal\. The amendment to the contract came
after construction costs in Cameroon increased due to the Government's stated
policy of paying only 25% of a contract on completion, with the remaining 75%
payable over nine years with interest\. This may account for the notable
increase, although its impact should have been limited since the contractor is
paid directly by the Bank on completion of works\. The supervising engineers
accept these cost increases, explaining that they resulted from the need to
increase the foundations or base materials underlying the roads\.
3\.11 It is notable that the cost of water piping, electricity and drains
should have augmented in approximately the same proportion as that of the roads\.
The supervising engineers considered that the installation of services required
the previous construction of the road; the completed roads must be opened and
later rebuilt to lay water piping, for example\. Had the full costs of civil
4 Costs from MINUH-Cellule PDU2 including technical assistance in
sanitation (48 months), in cadastres (42 months), in civil engineering (36
months), in institutional development (4 months), in economics (30 months),
special assistance to ARAN (36 months), supervising engineers, audit and
equipment for ARAN and for MINUH\.
s The amended contract became available only one month prior to the Audit
and, according to the supervizing engineers, has yet to be reviewed by the Bank\.
10
works been known earlier, alternative solutions, such as leaving the secondary
and tertiary roads unpaved and laying infrastructure under sidewalks, might have
been considered\. The situation is complex and belies a certain lack of control
which resulted from a combination of circumstances: the project officer most
closely involved was taken sick shortly after the project was amended; current
construction technically falls outside of both the first and the second projects;
and, the supervising engineers, who are not particularly sympathetic to project
objectives (para\. 5\.04), are presented as the on-site representatives of the
Bank, ' thus precluding the need for further consultation between ARAN and the
Bank on construction issues\.
3\.12 The Bank has financed several upgrading projects in low-lying urban
areas\. Given the dramatic cost increases in the present project, a comparison
of costs and solutions applied could be helpful for planning and supervising such
operations in the future\. Specifically, the first urban project in Ecuador
financed housing in the Guasmo area in Guayaquil, and the second urban project
in Colombia financed upgrading in the Southeast Zone of Cartagena\. According
to the PCR for the latter, actual costs ran up to 240% of SAR estimates\. Road
costs, however, were not exaggerated, first because an overall infill solution
was applied, rather than the drainage system proposed for Nylon, and second
because secondary roads were left unpaved with sidewalks and curb drains built
in concrete to protect infrastructure\.
3\.13 Designs for community facilities developed by DDA architects, in
turn, also ran over original cost estimates to a point where MINUH felt they were
unjustifiable\. The DDA and ARAN countered with the argument that the state had
yet to do anything for Nylon\. It was further argued that since the Government
was undertaking somethinf important, it was necessary that the people see that
it was of good quality\.
3\.14 Cost overruns led to important changes in project financing,
affecting, in particular, the residents of Nylon who have been carrying the
project's administrative costs for the past four years\. The increases in costs
hold even greater implications for the families of Nylon in the future\. As costs
rose, so did the amounts and percentages of cost recovery (para\. 4\.02) which was
designed to finance future upgrading\. The resulting development levy jumped from
US$ 233 per family to US$ 650 per family, on average\. If costs of the homes
which the relocated families were required to build -- estimated at between US$
3,520 and US$ 30,000 (PCR para\. 2\.19) -- are included as a logical part of total
costs, then the beneficiary's direct contribution to total project costs becomes
considerable\.
6 The supervising engineers stated to the Audit mission that they work
directly for the Bank\. At the same time, they complain that their payments are
several months overdue\.
7 Dossiers Sectoriels para 3\.2\.4
11
C\. Achievements and Continuity
1\. Civil Works
3\.15 Roads and Drains\. The SAR called for some 17 kilometers of secondary
roads (12 meters wide), three kilometers of primary roads (30 meters wide - the
"North-South Boulevard") and a total of 16 kilometers of tertiary roads in the
pilot zone\. Diagrams 1 and 2 in annex show the original road plan projected in
the SAR for Nylon and for the pilot upgrading zone\. The roads which have been
completed as of the Audit are blackened in and roads to be constructed under the
second project are hatched\. The diagrams make the differences between the
original plan and what has been implemented to date quite clear\. Although the
roads are solidly constructed and, as the PCR points out (paras\. 2\.09 and 2\.10),
were crucial to Nylon's development as a working part of Douala, they are
concentrated in one sector and presently lack the vital connections to the
downtown and the circur-erential highway (1'Axe Lourd)\.
3\.16 Approximately US$ 15 million has been set aside in the s3cond project
for complementary construction\. Once completed, however, the road network could
be in jeopardy because of lack of maintenance\. The contractor's guarantee
expires in July 1990 and the city of Douala has not: yet accepted responsibility
for maintenance\. The rest of Nylon's road network will be financed through
collections from residents\. Given the evident high cost of primary roads, the
future of Boulevard Este remains in doubt and, in any event, will be difficult
to finance without outside help\.
3\.17 Tertiary road construction in the pilot zone is about half completed,
but should be taken care of under the second project\. According to its long-
term plan, ARAN hopes to complete Nylon upgrading, including construction of
secondary and tertiary roads, by 1996\. The program has begun well, but is facing
serious financial problems (para\. 4\.07)\.
3\.18 The primary drainage (14 kilometers in earth and 3 kiliveters in
reinforced concrete) has been contracted out to the same company in charge of
roads\. Engineering studies have been completed and works should be financed
under the second project\. The number and length of drains has been greatly
reduced, but secondary drains were installed along major roads and community
efforts in collaboration with ARAN promise to assist 4n completion of drains
along secondary and tertiary roads\.
3\.19 Water and Electricity\. The SAR calls for 9\.4 kilometers of primary
electrical lines to permit public street lighting and, eventually, private
domestic hook-ups\. It also included 10 kilometers of primary water mains and
the installation of 40 public standpipes throughout Nylon\. Finally, some 39
garbage dumpsters were to be purchased for the area\. By the time of the
project's official completion, however, nothing had been done in these areas
and the contractor, together with the supervising engineers, recommended
concentrating all efforts in road construction\.
3\.20 ARAN, nevertheless, has concluded contracts to install electrical
transformers and mains along the North-South Boulevard and Road R8, as shown in
Diagram 1\. The same contract includes a general water main, ten fire hydrants
12
and the necessary piping to allow eventual individual hook-ups in the pilot
upgrading zone\. The public standpipes were eliminated after a virtual veto from
the water company which is already suffering serious financial problems and
maintains that it cannot afford to offer free water from standpipes\.
Institutional problems still threaten the continuity of Nylon's infrastructure
and the electric company has not agreed to a cost recovery scheme which would
finance future investment in Nylon\.
3\.21 Garbage Collection\. With the reduction in road construction, the
garbage dumpsters had little purpose and were eliminated, but the city has placed
containers at strategic locations along the new roads and the community has
organized a collection system which serves unpaved roads and unimproved
neighborhoods (para\. 4\.11)\. Final garbage disposal and maintenance of the new
roads and drains will depend, however, on relations with the municipality of
Douala, which are presently elusive\. Although personal relations between ARAN
officials and the city's leadership were essentially cordial throughout
implementation, the municipality was never given a clear role in the project\.
A recent impasse reveals the fragility of this arrangement as garbage dumpsters
have not been cleaned in over a month (photo 1)\.
3\.22 Resettlement Sites\. An initial resettlement area of 30 ha was
developed in DIBOM II, South-East of Nylon\. Dibom II, with 923 fully serviced
plots (individual electric and water hook-ups and dischargeable septic-tanks,
street drainage, unpaved -- but banked and curbed -- streets with sidewalks),
was completed in 1984\. Although slightly less than half of the plots appear to
be currently occupied, virtually all of the remainder have houses under
construction and the neighborhood already exudes a vibrant air (photo 2)\. The
high quality of the early construction w would lead one to believe that Nylon's
evicted residents either fooled the census-takers about their low incomes or that
they subsequently sold out to wealthier families (photo 3)\.
3\.23 A second resettlement area was opened in 1987 in the Ndogpassi III
area, where a 279-ha site able to accommodate over 3,000 plots was incorporated
into State lands by Presidential Decree\. In 1987, ARAN developed a first of
34 ha at Ndogpassi III/1 with 1,032 plots\. The development of a second site
at Ndogpassi 111/2 with 1,350 plots was scheduled to start in 1988 but the works
were postponed due to the Government financial difficulties\. The high standards
introduced in Dibom II were discontinued at Ndogpassi, to the frustration of many
resettled families who were charged the same rate per square meter as at Dibom
II (Photo 4)\. With a simply paved road and staked out lots, Ndogpassi, in fact,
followed the model of unserviced plots proposed in the first project proposals\.
The process of eviction and relocation is described in greater detail in paras\.
3\.25-3\.32 below\.
3\.24 Community Facilities\. Agreements between the Swiss Technical
Assistance Agencies (DDA) and the Government of Cameroon called for the
construction of twenty community facilities, listed in Annex 2 (and in PCR paras\.
2\.20 and 2\.21) in addition to the Madagascar Market\. High costs and prolonged
* This was the consequence of an obligation imposed by the first model
house plans as explained in the PCR paras\. 2\.19 and 3\.10\.
13
implementation led to alterations in the overall p-\.gramming of these facilities,
including the elimination of a cemetery and a park, two secondary markets, a
secondary health post, a community center for Ndogpassi and the second phase of
Ndogpassi elementary school\. The Madagascar Market, completed in the first
semester of 1989, currently houses ARAN offices and the CPN, but its formal
inauguration has been postponed indefinitely since negotiations with the
municipality have stumbled (para\. 3\.21)\. Given its size and facilities (see
photos 5, 6 & 7), the Madagascar Market, once open, could easily replace the
city's central market as Douala's principal commercial center
2\. Relocation
3\.?5 Forced evictions and resettlement were not new to the residents of
Nylon, which itself was first occupied by families %'to had been uprooted when
the neighboring settlement of New Bell was developed in the early 1950's\. This
may account for the high degree of compliance on the part of the evacuated
population\. Starting in early 1983, ARAN began to conduct socio-economic surveys
of the households to be displaced using maps produced through photogram\.etric
techniques\.
3\.26 MINUR established a scheme for varying compensation and indemnization
according to the legal status of the families involved\. For the majority who had
no legal title and no building permit, MINUH gave no compensation, but a letter
of attribution, or right to settle on a newly developed plot in a resettlement
site\. These families, however, had to pay the cost of infrastructure (roads,
electrical and water hook-ups and dischargeable septic tanks in the case of Dibom
II) and associated financing charges\. ARAN argued, logically enough, that
families who remained at Nylon would have to pay for infrastructure, so the
resettled families should assume the same costs for an improved living situation\.
Families who remained at Nylon, however, did not lose their homes in the bargain\.
The second project's provision of indemnization for all families, to a total of
US$ 10 million, may be a mixed blessing insofar as it gives due compensation to
expropriated families, but accentuates the plight of the first group who were
removed from their homes without such support\.
3\.27 In theory, the resettlement areas were to offer services better or
equal to those of Nylon\. However, the DDA evaluation notes that many families
never made it to the resettlement areas\. Between one a\. I three years elapsed
between the moment of eviction and the time when lots became available for
resettlement and the initial conditions were tough; once assigned plots, families
had four months to pay for them in full, the standard MAETUR requirement which
presumed the availability of credit\. Fewer than 5% of the displaced families
actually received loans (para\. 3\.36)\. Futthermore, families were allowed to move
on to their assigned lots only after they had built according to pre-approved
plans with construction costs ranging from US$ 18,000 to US$ 30,000 (photo 3)\.
For families paying rent in temporary lodging, it was extremely difficult to
9 With DDA assistance, ARAN and Animation used local small enterprises as
sub-contractors in market construction\.
14
manage the various payments, which may explain why the Audit could only confirm
that some 10% of the evicted families actually live in resettlement areas outside
of Dibom II\.
3\.28 Since project initiation, ARAN has taken steps to ease the costs of
relocation\. Most importantly, ARAN cbtained an exemption from MAETUR allowing
up to one year for plot payment and it is currently seeking a further extension
of up to five years\. Insofar as ARAN has respected families' rights to
resettlement plots even when they do not pay within the time limits, a de facto
extension already exists\. Moreover, ARAN now offers families the option of
moving on to half of the plot when half of the cost is paid\. New, lower cost
housing models emphasizing progressive development were approved in 1989 (PCR
para\. 2\.19) (photos 8, 9 & 10) and CPN has made close to 30 home construction
loans (para\. 4\.17)\. Finally, agreements were reached whereby commercial
property-owners were not evicted from their roadfront lots, 10 but instead
became co-owners of the plots in back of their former properties\. Thus,
continuity of the commercial street front was guaranteed and a significant number
of evictions were avoided\. Temporary housing is now available in Nylon for about
200 families (photos 11 & 12)\. A flexible attitude and working relations with
the community (paras\. 4\.07-4\.10) have helped ARAN to resolve problems as they
have emerged\.
3\.29 To an unfortunate extent, the Bank skirted the entire relocation
issue by not financing any resettlement areas\. According to the SAR (para\. 4\.19),
"MAETUR/ARAN will\. be responsible for\. the compensation and resettlement of
those current residents displaced by the reblocking and the installation of
infrastructure and community facilities\. The Government has also acquired and
developed 30 hectares for resettlement requirements in Nylon and additional land
is available as needed\. This has been confirmed at negotiations\." 1 Early Bank
supervision reports considered the resettlement component as 100% complete once
the lots in Dibom II were allocated\. However, they did not appear to be
concerned that Dibom II remained initially largely unoccupied or that it could
not accommodate even half the number of displaced families, estimated at 2,000
it, the feasibility study (and an item in the 1980 issues paper), and at 3,000
by 1984\.
3\.30 The 1,032 plots of Ndogpassi III/1 only became available in 1987 and
the occupation of this site proved slower than expected\. Ndogpassi will remain
a thorn in ARAN's side for some time to come\. Still in a very rural state, its
access roads are as much potholes as paving (photo 4), while residents wait for
the extension of the water and electricity distribution networks\. Ndogpassi is
adjacent to Nylon but some ten kilometers from the center of Douala, and the
recent construction of a handsome primary school at the site eases travel for
children (photo 13)\. The development of Ndogpassi 111/2 was delayed as a result
1o Plot owners along the East-West Boulevard were evicted and their
properties resold at commercial rates\.
11 This was apparently not the case, however, as a mid-1984 supervision
mission reported that Dibom II was still awaiting installation of septic tanks
and plot allocation\.
15
of Government financial difficulties\. The proposed settlement area for the
remaining families has yet to be cleared and provided with access ways, even
though 1,600 families have already been notified of their eviction\. At the
moment, Ndogpassi 111/2 is a forest (photo 14), although its development is
assured through financing under the second urban project\.
3\.31 As a result of the delays in providing resettlement sites, dislodged
families looked for abandoned lands on which to settle\. This situation was
worsened by the absence of formal land development operations in Douala, and
uncontrolled settlements have grown up around the airport recalling the
beginnings of Nylon itself\. A DDA-financed study undertaken in one squatter
settlement on the "axe lourd Yaound6-Douala" in 1987 revealed that 700 families
displaced from Nylon had temporarily moved into the area\.
3\.32 The second urban project initially included the development of 1,000
lots in Ndogpassi (SAR Annex 2-1, para\. 14 (d)), as, at the time of appraisal
(November 1987), it was still expected that the Government would finance the
development of an additional 1,350 new plots at Ndogpassi 111/2\. It could be
argued that the growing number of displaced families resulted in large part from
the increased standards applied to the road construction (PCR naras\. 2\.10-2\.11)
and that the Bank should have considered the additional relocations as part of
its increased financing of road costs\. When it became obvious that the
Government would not finance Ndogpassi 111/2, the Bank did so and agreed to make
financing available for the development of sufficient resettlement plots\. It
likewise requested ARAN to update the list of families' rights to resettlement
plots and to ease relocation conditions (para\. 3\.28)\. In any case, the point
may be marginal since present estimates of the final number of displaced
families, after complete reblocking of Nylon's 13 neighborhoods, run to
approximately 6,500, a full 30% of the original population\. Furthermore, ARAN
has reportedly modified its upgrading strategy to ensure that all future evicted
families will have access to a resettlement plot and receive payment of due
compensation\.
3\. Land Titling
3\.33 Although the SAR indicates that, compared with the rest of the
project, land regularization is "a much slower process" (SAR para\. 2\.63), it
could not foresee the problems which would ultimately arise when ARAN, focusing
on the pilot area and the resettlement zones, found itself utterly without
established procedures or legal precedents and was left to develop original
survey techniques and to coax the collaboration of various ministries (PCR para\.
2\.17)\. The Bank included financing for an expert in cadastres, but to be located
at MINUH\. DDA assistance filled the gap by helping out at BLAF (Bureau de
Liaison des Affaires Fonci6res)\.
"Report of Jean-Claude Bolay to DDA, 1989, pg\. 8\.
16
3\.34 As of the visit of the Audit mission, BLAF had obtained legal land
titles for only fourteen families in the pilot upgrading zone, out of a total
of some 2,000\. The titles have yet to be turned over to the residents\. BLAF
is waiting for an appropriate moment, such as the inauguration of the Madagascar
Market, to present the first titles with due ceremony\. To qualify for a title
deed, residents must first cancel the upgrading development levy and pay
additional costs running about 120,000 FCFA (US$ 428), to cover, among other
things, survey and mapping and various officia' papers and stamps\. This comes
to an average of about 5,000 FCFA (US$ 18\.87) per square meter\.
3\.35 Issued titles, moreover, are conditional upon the residents' building
and occupying a dwelling meeting municipal building standards within two years\.
The PCR (para\. 3\.10) points out the implicit contradictions which had to be
overcome to get this far; legal title depends on an architect-designed, legally
sanctioned construction, with a building permit which can only be granted for
legally-registered and titled plots\. In order to avoid future disappointments,
BIAF has obtained certificates from the municipality which confirm that houses
on titled lots already, in fact, conform to municipal standards\. Even after home
construction is approved, title holders must wait another three years before
they can sell\. Such complications suggest some of the problems which ARAN and
BLAF had to deal with in establishing a titling procedure at all, and, more
fundamentally, in convincing other authorities that it made sense to legitimize
tenure of Nylon residents, or of those in any squatter neighborhood\.
4\. Home Improvement Loans
3\.36 The home construction loans foreseen at the time of Appraisal and
in the Loan Agreement were not implemented as such for a variety of reasons\.
CFC was supposed to provide some 450,000,000 FCFA from its own funds for loans
to the residents of the pilot upgrading zone for service hook-up, home
construction and improvement and plot purchase (SAR para 2\.07; Loan Agreement
Schedule 2, Part A (ii) and Part D, CFC Project Agreement, Section 2\.01)\. At
the same time, Central Government was to loan CFC some 600,000,000 FCFA\. As the
President of CFC recalls, works in the upgrading zone were still stalled by the
time of project completion and CFC had not been able to make loans to the
residents partly because the stipulated upgrading had not taken place and partly
because the financial crisis kept Central Government from providing CFC with its
advance\. Indeed, CFC has not received its standard budget appropriation, based
on a national payroll tax, since 1986\.
3\.37 Even though the home loans for the upgrading zone never materialized,
ARAN sought ways to develop a credit line to help evicted families to build in
resettlement areas which eventually resulted in 120 loans through CFC and 30 from
CPN\. The complications which arose suggest that CFC had little interest in
risking a credit program in Nylon (PCR para\. 3\.06)\. Regrettably, CFC did not
keep separate accounts for its loans to Nylon residents and there is, thus, no
way to analyze cost recovery or loan performance\. Both programs are explained
more fully in Section IV C\. below and in the PCR (paras\. 3\.00-3\.10)\.
17
5\. Small Business Support
3\.38 Agreements with CAPHE to open a small business support center in
Nylon were never confirmed, although the assistance to the CPN -- financing of
a bookkeeper and a general manager -- was in place from 1983-1984\. These
activities were to be complemented by a line of credit for small business under
a separate Bank loan (SAR para 2\.10)\. This loan, however, was, in fact, geared
to businesses larger than those found in Nylon (para\. 4\.20)\. During the course
of implementation, moreover, the intermediary agency, BCD, closed, so results
of Bank efforts in this area were minimal\. Nonetheless, ARAN and Animation have
been active in identifying, organizing and assisting small businesses in Nylon\.
The DDA has sent several consultants and hopes to set-up a fully-fledged artisan
and business support program with the completion of the Artisan Center scheduled
for 1992 (paras\. 4\.21-4\.24)\.
6\. Studies and Technical Assistancp
3\.39 Studies to develop a second project were completed satisfactorily
(PCR para\. 4\.17) and led to the negotiations of a second project in 1988\.
Technical assistance, concentrated on MINUN, was increased by about 50% beyond
appraisal estimates (see Table, page 8)\. In particular, the economic advisor
remained in place for an extra six months, while the cadastre expert's contract
was extended from 24 to 42 months\. In addition, specialists in the following
areas worked with MINUH: sanitation and drainage - 48 months; civil engineering -
36 months; and institutional analysis - 4 months\. While the assistance to ARAN
appears to have been minimal, but useful, adding manpower support to the project
team, MINUH's staff report that the consultants tended to work in isolation,
leaving little useable knowledge or techniques behind\.
IV\. POINTS OF INTEREST
A\. Cost Recovery
4\.01 The SAR (para\. 5\.02) specified that the costs of the secondary and
tertiary infrastructure installed as part of pilot neighborhood upgrading would
be recovered from the residents\. In addition, the investment in the market was
to be recovered through rents charged to vendors\. The SAR, however, left the
question of cost recovery in resettlement areas open and gave only vague and
even contradictory indications as to how overall cost recovery should be managed\.
Table 5 of the SAR indicates that final beneficiaries would repay improvements
at terms of 4 years with 2 yearr grace at 5% interest\.
4\.02 CFC was expected to offer 90% financing to final beneficiaries over
15 years with one year of grace "at an average rate of 4\.5%\." The SAR (para\.
3\.05) stipulates that CFC would be the financial intermediary \.nd would assume
all foreign exchange risk which was reaffirmed in the Loan Agreement\. Since
CFC's lending component was calculated to cover only half the residents of the
pilot upgrading zone, the SAR left open the question of how the remainder of the
beneficiaries were to be financed\. And neither the SAR, nor the Loan Agreement
mention any condition or form of cost recovery from the resettled families\.
18
4\.03 Despite its irresolute mandate, ARAN took cost recovery very
seriously\. Judging from both the terms of reference and subsequent supervision
mission reports during the first four years of implementation, ARAN got little
guidance from the Bank in this area, and covenants with CFC did not mention its
role in debt collection\. Left to itself, ARAN, nonetheless, developed an
effective system which aims to carry the full cost of upgrading all of Nylon to
completion through 1996 (PCR para\. 3\.16)\. This implied the recalculation of
charges to residents in terms of future costs, including studies, legal and
administrative expenses, rather than just completed investments in civil works
as implied in the SAR\. The project evaluation financed by DDA sets the amount
to be recovered from project beneficiaries at 16% of the total cost, is
considerably higher than the 5% stipulated by the SAR\.
4\.04 In principle, ARAN based debt service charges (the "development
levy") on MAETUR's financing terms which called for 100% repayment in four months
(para\. 3\.27)\. Even after MAETUR granted an exemption, the new terms for Nylon
remained tight: 20% in four months and 80% within a year at 5% interest\. For
residents of the pilot upgrading zone, whose monthly household income averages
90,000 FCFA (US$ 340), 1 the monthly payments on a 100 s Iuare meter plot would
come to 41,600 FCFA, or close to half of family income\. ARAN has, however,
taken its cue from MAETUR in allowing families to pay as they can (para\. 3\.28)\.
Residents of resettled areas , who are not permitted to move on to their plots
before completing payments, have a clear incentive to meet ARAN's requirements
and have made an impressive contribution thusfar\.
4\.05 After five years, the costs of Dibom II are 89% reimbursed\. Recovery
of Ndogpassi has reached 48% after three years\. ARAN enjoys less leverage in
the upgrading areas where families already reside and where improvements, by and
large, are yet to be seen\. After two years, ARAN has recovered only 23% of the
projected costs from the first pilot upgrading zone and only 1\.6% for the second
upgrading zone, Bilongue, after one year\. ARAN does not calculate financial
costs beyond the first year, so the real cost recovery rate is actually less than
these amounts ARAN has currently proposed new financial terms to MINUH and to
MAETUR which would allow families to pay over five years at 5% interest, possibly
with a threat of eviction for non-payment\. Based on its work with the community,
ARAN feels assured that the application of an easier, but regulated, payment
system would be acceptable to residents and would speed up cost recovery\.
4\.06 Given the current economic crisis and ARAN's tough payment schedules,
it is noteworthy how much families have paid in development levies, particularly
1 But it is not clear whether or not the additional US$ 13 million from
the second project is included in the total\.
Average reported by BLAF\. Other estimates from Bank sources set median
household income for all of Nylon somewhere between 30,000 and 40,000 FCFA per
month\.
i The development levy is calculated according to the size of the
beneficiary's plot\. Cost per square meter also varies with plot location,
increasing as plots get closer to the main roads\.
19
since ARAN uses no regular collection system aside from community meetings and
promotion through Animation\. At ARAN, only three people work part time in the
collection and cost recovery department\.
4\.07 Insofar as residents pay on the basis of plans, and not for completed
works, cost recovery and, indeed, the project's continuity depend on ARAN's
credibility which is currently in jeopardy\. Since 1986, the Government of
Cameroon has withheld appropriations for ARAN's operating budget and ARAN has
used its income from cost recovery payments to finance project administration\.
Consequently, it has not accumulated enough funds to complete services in
Ndogpassi (para\. 3\.29), nor to begin works in the second upgrading zone,
Bilongue\. Upgrading in the pilot zone is also lagging and, in all likelihood,
these factors combine to discourage residents from meeting cost recovery
requirements\. The sale of plots at Ndogpassi 11/2 should produce a new source
of income for ARAN and the agency's director is also working on a plan to reduce
staffing and, consequently, its operating costs\. Nonetheless, the continued
success of cost recovery operations at Nylon will depend on continued visible
progress\.
4\.08 In addition to neighborhood upgrading, revenues from the Madagascar
Market were expected to add to cost recovery funds for reinvestmenc in Nylon\.
This scheme, however, has run into two snags\. First, the municipality claims
that it, and not ARAN, should dispose of the income from the market for city-
wide needs\. Second, the operating and investment costs were considerably higher
than originally foreseen, making it difficult to attract vendors, particularly
from Nylon\. ARAN was forewarned\. A rather outspoken consultant's report in 1981
stated that "it would be a fantasy to imagine that any municipal market could
be a profitable venture, let alone amortize the investment in its own
construction\. It has become clear that the World Bank's assumptions are
completely unrealistic and partially wrong\. It is not clear where the World
Bank got its rate schedule, but it is wrong\. \.The operating costs were not taken
into account by the Bank\." " At this point, ARAN is not counting on income from
the Madagascar Market\.
B\. Community Participation and "Animation"
4\.09 Besides its physical achievements, the project generated a series
of community development projects at the neighborhood level, owing to the mutual
cooperation between ARAN, the newly formed project administration unit, and
Animation, the existing community organization, which made Nylon such an
attractive place to work in the first place\. Animation grew out of the joint
efforts of Sister Marie Roumy, a French nun who went to live in Nylon in 1973,
and the community leaders who were Nylon's founding fathers\. Originally formed
as a civil defense network in an area with no police protection or public
lighting and which was cut off from the rest of the city, Animation evolved into
a mutual assistance association that undertook major infill works when Nylon
was little more than a swamp\.
1 Dolf, Benedickt, Mission Report of June 1981\.
20
4\.10 Relations between ARAN and Animation passed through a rocky period
at first as ARAN moved into direct works and relegated the community to an
observer status\. In 1986, a DDA consultant's survey showed that few residents
understood what ARAN was and that those who did thought badly of it\. A hefty
percentage thought that a "Mr\. Laran" was going to evict all of Nylon and keep
the land for himself\. Relations between the community and ARAN became smoother
once the issue of expropriation was settled (paras\. 3\.25-3\.30)\. ARAN's
flexibility respect\. Five meetinghouses for Animation were refurbished under
Swiss-financed project components\.
4\.11 The peaceable acceptance of the expropriations and the progress of
cost recovery are due, in large measure, to ARAN's present good relations with
the community of Nylon, which in turn stem from ARAN's collaboration with
Animation\. Community members help un censuses and measure plots for the
calculation of cost recovery charges (para\. 4\.04)\. In 1987, under ARAN's
auspices, the leaders of Animation, presided by Soeur Marie, became directors
of the CPN\. In addition, Animation established a youth organization, Coopje,
which has close to 1,000 members and collaborates in neighborhood upgrading
projects such as trash recycling, garbage collection and infills\. A women's
association containing about 500 housewives is also involved in community
improvement, handicrafts and small businesses\. Residents of upgraded areas are
currently building storm water drains along new roads\. ARAN donates the cement
and the technical advice, while Animation furnishes cement blocks and labor\.
4\.12 Tf, as Animation leaders mention, the project has laid a certain
groundwork for community-managed upgrading, the project has likewise enjoyed a
multiplier effect thanks to Animation\. The individual investments in home
improvement, as well as the neighborhood efforts, bespeak a confidence in the
project and in ARAN which stems, at least in part, from its association with
Animation\. Community development, as opposed to physical upgrading, could be
measured in terms of the number of families who have chosen to remain in Nylon
versus those who opted to cash in on their appreciated property values by selling
and moving elsewhere\. It is, therefore, telling that Nylon's population has
almost doubled since the project was first initiated, suggesting that new
families are moving in, while the older residents are profiting from upgrading,
but staying put\. ARAN and Animation appear to have hit upon an inspiring form
of collaboration whereby ARAN installs the infrastructure and Animation insures
the community's continuity\.
C\. Crddit Foncier - Home Construction Finance
4\.13 The issue of home improvement loans and the SAR's undefined role for
CFC has already been mentioned (para\. 4\.02)\. With its steady income from a
payroll tax, CFC subsidized interest rates and had little desire to branch into
unknown areas\. The Bank, however, openly hoping to convert CFC into an
independent home finance operation, funded a study aimed at identifying ways
for CFC to expand its activities, specifically in the area of low-income housing\.
(PCR para\. 3\.09)
4\.14 The study, presented in 1982, focused on the evident high capacity
to save among low-income Cameroonians, the viability of a savings and loan system
and the need to eliminate CFC's practice of differential interest rates\. This
21
study pointed out the inherent weaknesses involved in the multiplier/credit
system based on the French contract-savings plan ("dpargne-logement") and
proposed a simpler savings and loan approach modelled on the British "building
societies"\. One month after receiving the Bank consultant's report (April 1982),
CFC proceeded to establish a home-savings program which ran precisely counter
to his recommendations, requiring regular fixed deposits and offering automatic
loans for three times the amount saved\. As the consultant predicted, CFC's
saving for housing program failed within two years and the Bank abandoned further
efforts to work out a home-financing program through CFC\.
4\.15 Two years later, the same consultant reappeared in Douala, this time
at the invitation of the Swiss technical assistance agency to work with ARAN and
at the grass roots level\. He analyzed the savings capacity of the local
population through the "tontines" (an important traditional form of group
savings), the local credit union, CPN (Caisse Populaire de Nylon), and the CFC
to develop a three tier system to generate savings at the lower levels (tontines
and CPN) and to guarantee loans from CFC\. The consultant pointed out that the
CFC approach, typical of housing finance institutions in many developing
countries, effectively inherited the biases and outlook of the "Socidt6s
Immobili6res" -- parastatal construction companies -- focusing on construction
projects to resolve the housing problem of low-income families\. This problem,
however, in reality, had very little to do with a lack of construction capacity,
but, rather, involved the limited access of low-income people to legalized urban
land and credit\. CFC confirmed the consultant's suspicions by not appearing at
meetings organized with ARAN and failing to provide standard information about
its operations\. The consultant's report conta\.ns a dignified chapter of blank
pages in the place of CFC's contribution\.
4\.16 Undaunted, the DDA funded two more studies focused on the CPN\. The
first, a rather discouraging evaluation of the CPN by the Union of Caisses
Populaires de Yaoundd cited the agency's disorganization and lack of credibility\.
The second, carried out in 1986, analyzed CPN in terms of the recommendations
of the original housing finance study\. The three-tiered savings and loan system
remained unworkable because the upper two tiers lacked interest, in the case of
CFC, and ability, in the case of CPN\. The study did note that CPN had increased
its membership to 428, but despite technical assistance financed by the Bank
(para\. 3\.38), its record-keeping had not improved, it was not legally
incorporated, its portfolio was extremely limited and it was not well-known in
Nylon\.
4\.17 Since it merged interests with Animation in 1987 (para\. 4\.11),
however, CPN has taken a new lease on life\. Membership has doubled annually and
the savings portfolio has grown accordingly\. The CPN has already made about
thirty home construction loans for around 3,000,000 FCFA each and is making small
business loans as well\. DDA has agreed to provide an equivalent of one million
Swiss Francs to the CPN\. The new national director of CFC has expressed interest
in working with CPN through a two or three tiered guarantee system, although
the local director of CFC professes to know nothing about projects in Nylon\.
So the Bank's original hope for a savings and loan program catering to low-
income families may yet materialize\.
22
4\.18 In retrospect, the point stressed in the original housing finance
study has been borne out\. The issues which clouded formal sector financing
agencies do not appear to be tied directly to the question of land titles or the
salaries of the borrowers; rather they involve a viable guarantee\. Both CFC and
commercial banks have made substantial loans to residents in Dibom II and
Ndogpassi, where legal tenure has yet to established\. However, they chose their
clientele carefully and assumed that the houses to be financed would have a high
resale value (PCR paras\. 3\.06 and 3\.08)\. It remains to be seen whether or not
CPN will be able to proviA- satisfactory guarantees to CFC\.
D\. Support for Small Businesses and Artisans
4\.19 The project components designed to assist small businesses and
artisans were rather unfocused and did not have much effect on Nylon (and, in
the case of the Swiss financed components, have yet to take place\.) Nonetheless,
the project has resulted in several advances in small business development\.
4\.20 The Bank had proposed a three-pronged action, one of these being to
help organize CPN in the eventuality that it could offer small business loans
(paras\. 3\.38 and 4\.16)\. CPN may yet become an effective source of finance for
Nylon's entrepreneurs, but it will not be due to the Bank's support\. Bank
financing also covered eight man-months of technical assistance to CAPME, to
develop training programs in coordination with the BCD (Banque Cameroonaise de
Developpement) business loans project\. CAPME, however, never signed the agreement
officializing its participation in the project, although it did develop training
programs in Nylon, particularly in conjunction with contractors who worked on
construction of the Madagascar Market\. The BCD program was really oriented to
enterprises of a larger scale than those that generally exist at Nylon, offering
loans from 1\.5 million FCFA (US$ 5,555) to 10 million FCFA (US$37,000)\. During
the three years prior to BCD's demise, it extended 118 such loans, but none is
recorded as having benefitted Nylon residents\.
4\.21 DDA, working on the Madagascar Market and a proposed artisan center,
was inevitably drawn into the realm of business support\. By obligating the
contractor of the Madagascar Market to sub-contract out to small local firms,
DDA and ARAN helped promote the local small construction industry and evidently
improved construction time and costs\. The market itself is supposed to benefit
Nylon's merchants and entrepreneurs, but negotiations with the city are currently
stumbling over, among others, the issue of what percentage of vendors should come
from Nylon\. ARAN is pushing for a 60-40 balance, while the city is arguing for
a 50-50 split\. In any event, the deciding factor will be the rents charged to
vendors (para\. 4\.08)\. An attempt to form an all-Nylon "self-managingh market
failed, apparently to the relief of the vendors who prefer that the city of
Douala run the market\.
4\.22 Even so, the mere presence of the market and the construction of its
access roads appear to have stimulated local commerce\. A consultant's report
in 1981 counted some 500 vending stands in all of Nylon\. The number of merchants
in the old market place plus those along the roadways would now easily reach five
times the earlier total\.
23
4\.23 The DDA consultant who visited Nylon in the early 1980's recommended
against building an artisan center, noting that previous attempts to organize
artisans into cooperatives had failed and that the groups involved -- artisans
and their supporters --could not agree on what exactly the center should consist
of, despite a general feeling that such a facility would be a good thing\. The
artisan center appears to be no better defined today, but its construction will
go ahead shortly, based on a flexible floor plan whereby partitions can be
shifted to accommodate different uses over time\.
4\.24 Local efforts to promote artisans and entrepreneurs began in the late
1970's through the combined efforts of Animation and PDI (PanAfrican Development
Institute)\. Several small businesses were founded along import substitution
lines, notably: Confijunyl, which produces candies and juices; Siropcam,
manufacturing fruit juices; Chipscam, a maker of plantain chips and a needlecraft
group\. COOPAN, an umbrella organization serving the artisans of Nylon, had a
sales outlet for members, but appears to be in decline at the moment\. PDI and
Animation ran small, but fairly successful, youth training programs in metalwork,
carpentry and handicrafts, but floundered when it came to organizing their
graduates into cooperative business ventures\. Given the general rejection of
cooperative businesses, Animation appears to be focusing on individuals\.
Concurrent with the project, the youth cooperative, Coopje, has helped get young
people started on, among other enterprises, home poultry, cigarette sales,
carting and popsicle vending\. New hopes are pinned on CPN as a promoter of local
businesses\.
4\.25 The particular efforts of Animation and ARAN notwithstanding, Nylon's
physical development has been, perhaps, the project's greatest support to local
business\. The new connection to Douala has stimulated Nylon's artisans and has
generated considerable commercial development along the main roads\. Individual
electric and water connections - - not to mention public street lighting - - should
do even more to increase the productive and commercial capacities of Nylon's
entrepreneurs\.
E\. Economic Rate of Return
4\.26 The SAR presents an economic justification of the project based on
a projected increase in Nylon's rental values and on appreciation of land costs
as a result of infrastructure investments in Nylon, leading to an overall ERR
of 18%\. The PCR (para\. 3\.18) reports a tentative completion ERR of 24%\. Indeed,
the project evaluation by DDA notes that the average land price in Nylon has
jumped from 500 FCFA/m2 in 1983 to 1000 FCFA/m2 in 1988 (the exchange rate has
gone down by 2% over the same period)\. Commercial land runs from 5,000 FCFA/m2
to 30,000 FCFA/m2 and land in the pilot action zone now sells for 2,500-9,000
FCFA/m2\. Rents have increased by 50% since 1983\. The fact that Nylon's
population is now estimated at 220,000 indicates that the area's carrying
capacity has increased by about 245%\.
4\.27 On the other hand, final project costs within Nylon will probably
exceed the original investment estimates by about the same proportion\. If land
values increased so dramatically with the constructton of roads and
infrastructure in a limited part of Nylon, it is difficult to believe that they
will continue to increase at the same rate when Nylon as a whole is upgraded\.
24
According to the present tally, some 73% of the project funds are invested in
primary roads, engineering studies and technical assistance\. Were the ERR
revised to measure total investment in terms of overall benefits to Nylon (or
to Douala in terms of land appreciation), the results might have been less
sanguine\. The Swiss evaluation adds a further note of caution, "it must be
emphasized that the distribution of (project) benefits has not been particularly
even and that the total o Peration will present a serious negative outcome for
the dislodged families\." To this, the Audit adds that a true ERR will depend
on final project costs\.
F\. The Second Urban Project
4\.28 The Government requested the Bank to consider a second urban project
focusing essentially on the upgrading of urban transport and drainage
infrastructure in Douala\. Engineering studies, financed under the first urban
project, began in early 1985 and appraisal of an infrastructure project for
Douala took place in February 1986\. Negotiations were scheduled first in July
1986, then in October 1986, but never took place\. The dialogue continued between
the Government and the Bank, however, on a low-key basis, due partly to the
illness of the project officer and partly to the Bank reorganization\. In
September 1987, the Government requested that the project be broadened in scope
to complete elements of the first urban project, to undertake policy actions in
line with its strategy for the urban sector including resource mobilization\.
Aside from its focus -- away from urban upgrading and low-income settlements -
- the second project, which was appraised in November 1987 for a total cost of
US$222\.4 million, differs substantially from the first in its implementation
scheme\. A project development unit (PDU-2) based in MINUH is responsible for
overall administration and the municipalities manage implementation of
subprojects, with financing from CFC\.
4\.29 The first project led to the realization that municipalities must
become involved in urban development projects and that MINUH should be the single
project overseer\. The second urban project also includes about US$20 million
to complete works initiated in Nylon under the first project\. Negotiations
proceeded smoothly, once the Douala infrastructure project was redesigned to
cover a range of municipalities\. Despite the project's initial concept, the
Government of Cameroon was not interested in concentrating investments in a
single area\.
V\. PROJECT IMPACT
A\. Physical Impacg
5\.01 The project has had a major positive impact not only on Nylon, but
also on the structure of the city of Douala\. The new road networks link the
project area to the city center, increasing considerably the area of influence
of downtown Douala\. Furthermore, they offer the promise of public services
(water, electricity, drainage and garbage collection) to the 220,000 residents
' Dossiers Sectoriels
25
of Nylon\. At the other extreme, Ndogpassi, located 15 kilometers from Douala,
should, over time, become a new growth pole\. The project's dynamic impact (PCR
para\. 3\.01), however, should be qualified\. The expropriations have also led to
the formation of new squatter settlements and sites which will require future
upgrading (paras\. 3\.30 and 5\.13)\.
B\. Environmental Impact
5\.02 The dredg\.ng of the Mgoua River in 1982 evidently improved Nylon's
environmental conditions, reducing the residual impact of annual floods\. Since
that time, however, the silting up of the Mgoua and the construction of secondary
roads under the project, coupled with the completion of a major highway (1'Axe
Lourd) which converted Nylon into a virtual basin, have complicated the area's
drainage (PCR para\. 3\.04)\. In 1988, ARAN was obliged to undertake a study to
find a solution for the \.new puddling which occurred and has subsequently
organized community works to help drain house lots\. Nonetheless, according to
an independent evaluation done by DDA, "at least one third of the lots in the
pilot zone run the risk of having poorer drainage after the completion of works
than before\." is
5\.03 While engineering supervision consultants note acidly that there is
no solution to Nylon's drainage and add that "the project would have done better
to raze the area completely," residents can be seen undertaking individual inf ill
projects to raise the level of their house plots by up to 1\.5 meters\. The
community itself is building and maintaining secondary street drains (para\.
4\.11)\. Nylon's residents are, evidently, not ready to give up and the project
appears to have sparked both communal and individual efforts to deal directly
with environmental problems\.
5\.04 As the PCR (para\. 3\.03) notes, the lack of piped water continues to
threaten Nylon's environment\. With only six public standpipes, Nylon's residents
draw water from individual and communal wells on the same plots where latrines
discharge black and gray waters, thereby presenting a major health and sanitation
hazard\. However, DDA evaluators note that 10% of Nylon's residents now have
piped water connections, as opposed to a mere 1% in 1980\. 19 Again, it is to be
hoped that residents will themselves eventually install the solutions which the
project itself could not implement\.
C\. Institutional Impact
5\.05 When analyzing institutional development, it is difficult to
distinguish the input of the first project from that of the second or from the
force of circumstance\. In any case, the advent of the former appears to have
served both as a first step and as a filter\. Aside from those noted below,
certain institutions, such as CAPME and BCD, dropped out of the urban development
sector altogether\. Others, which were not taken into account in project design,
such as the municipality of Douala and the State Land Bureau, proved too
18 Dossiers Sectoriels
19 Dossiers Sectoriels #9 p\.3\.
26
important to be overlooked and have been brought into more active roles in urban
development\. Indeed, the most important changes to be noted concern the
evolution of inter-institutional coordination among the agencies involved in the
first project and the growing awareness of an urban sector interest beyond that
of individual institutions\.
5\.06 MINH was charged with overseeing the first project and preparing
a second one\. As noted in the PCR (para\. 1\.12), however, MINUH tended to eschew
its role as coordinator\. Its involvement with ARAN was somewhat erratic and the
project coordinator operated quite apart from the rest of MINUH staff, as well
as from other agencies\. In retrospect, the technical assistance offered through
the project was not seen as particularly helpful to MINUH over the long term
(para\. 3\.39)\. MINUH did, nonetheless, carry out studies for the second project,
appraised in 1987, and its urban development unit subsequently appears to have
taken on new life\.2 Implementation of a large and complex program appears to
be going smoothly\. In the sense that the first project prepared MINUH for a
follow-on operation, including the flushing out of inefficient management
systems, its impact must be considered positive\.
5\.07 The project gave MAEglt its first real taste of land development for
low-income families and pointed out the limits of the agency's procedures and
standards for the target population\. Under the second project, MAETUR appears
better equipped both to meet the ieeds of the low-income population and to take
on a broader role in urban land development\. It is not clear, however, whether
MAETUR should be involved in upgrading projects or whether these should be left
to the cities themselves\. As the PCR points out (para\. 1\.12), moreover,
relations between ARAN and MAETUR were often sticky and the positive impact on
ARAN was not also transferred to MAETUR\.
5\.08 While the project appears to have failed in its attempts to develop
GC (paras\. 4\.13-1\.17) as a major credit institution for low-income families,
the present director of CFC, notably influenced by the agency's involvement in
the second project, has expressed clear interest in augmenting its savings
portfolio and in working out a loans program to serve the informal sector\.
Interestingly, the director has requested copies of the Bank consultants' reports
written under the auspices of the first project\. Although CFC's interest may
be largely a temporary result of its present economic crunch, the first project
may still prove to have had an important impact on CFC\.
5\.09 At the local level, the project doubtless strengthened Animation and
set CPN on stronger ground\. The most marked institutional development, however,
occurred at AAN, which seems quite capable of completing the upgrading of Nylon
on its own, barring unforseen economic problems\. The question remains, however,
as it often does in urban projects of this sort, what will become of ARAN after
1\.996?
2o The change may also be attributed to a difference in personalities\.
Furthermore, while the former director of the PDU lacked support from auxiliary
staff, his successor has relied on a more open management style\.
27
D\. Poliev Impact
5\.10 Urban policies in Cameroon appear to have gone a full circle\. In
preparing the first project, the Bank attempted to concentrate MINUH's efforts
on informal settlements and urban growth\. But as the Bank itself changed its
vision of urban development, it seems also to have led MINUH to shift focus\.
In the words of the director of PDU2, "we are interested in productive
investments now rather than social investments\." MINUH may be reaffirming the
country's original outlook\.
5\.11 At the same time, as the PCR (para\. 2\.05) observes, the first project
broke ground in several key areas such as cost recovery, legalization of tenure
and the installation of services and infrastructure in squatter settlements\.
It also pointed out the need for policy changes to facilitate future urban
development, the most important of which include:
a) The -ole of municipalities\. The dissocittion of Douala from the
first project led to implementation problems and jeopardizes the
project's future\. By contrast, municipalities play a key role as
developers in the second project;
b) Land titling\. The problems with transferring land from the national
government complicated and prolonged the land regularization process
considerably\. The State Lana Bureau is currently studying a new
procedure which will give development agencies the power to control
and sell government land; and,
c) Resettlement\. It has become clear that urban development projects,
like neighborhood upgrading, must be accompanied by resettlement and
site planning programs\. The second project includes components to
develop settlement plots in tandem with upgrading and adds financing
for adequat%\.- indemnization of families evicted for urban improvement
projects\. This constitutes a de facto recognition of squatters'
rights to land\.
5\.12 The first project's involvement with one quite particular community
has opened a new line of communication which can influence MINUH policies
directly\. Changes in financing terms, in expropriation procedures, in building
standards and in land regularization practices offer some examples of policy
reform which grew out of the experience at Nylon and developed directly from the
dialogue with Nylon residents\. This reversal of the previously established
pattern represents an important policy shift in and of itself\.
5\.13 While upgrading projects were not included in the second project,
events of the last two years suggest that they may well prove as productive as
other municipal development activities\. If its cost recovery continues on
schedule, ARAN will be able to present a strong case to MINUH for including
upgrading projects in future municipal development programs\. Even if MINUH
chooses not to support upgrading projects, the experience at Nylon has,
nevertheless, sparked local interest\. The Mayor of the adjacent township of New
Bell, moreover, has invited ARAN and Animation to advise on the feasibility of
an upgrading program for this community as well\.
28
5\.14 Douala's agreement to reduce building standards (PCR para\. 5\.08) and
its approval of construction on unregistered plots represents an important
precedent, in line with the recognition of squatters' rights (para\. 5\.11c) The
fact that such constructions have already been financed by formal sector
institutions is a hopeful advance in credit policy\.
E\. Poverty Impact
5\.15 The residents of Nylon were identified as the poorest and most needy
in Douala in terms of income levels and standards of living, respectively\. The
project had a noted positive impact on both\. This success remains qualified,
however, by the less positive situation of certain of the expropriated families,
as well as of those adversely affected by continuing drainage problems at Nylon\.
VI\. ROLE OF THE BANK
6\.01 The Bank clearly played a key role in developing government policy
and support for urban upgrading prior to project appraisal\. Judging from
internal reports, however, once negotiations were completed, the Bank
concentrated on preparing the second project and, unfortunately, tended to leave
the first operation largely on its own\. Bank missions also became involved in
the problems of highway costs, sending in two different consulting groups, and
engaged in a long dialogue over alternative construction schemes for drainage
canals, the Bank pressuring for a lower-cost, labor- intensive construction system
which was eventually selected\. But the "software" components of the project
were virtually ignored (para\. 3\.31, PCR para\. 4\.12)\.
6\.02 The Bank did use its influence to have resettlement sites transferred
to MAETUR, but it could have offered considerable assistance with cost recovery,
the housing loans program and budget transfers to ARAN and to CFC\. The Bank's
direct lines of payment to the supervising engineers and its evident concern for
technical components may have led project directors to feel that civil works
were beyond their control, while the remaining components held little interest
for the Bank\. The coordination with Swiss missions after April 1988 (PCR para\.
4\.14), albeit late in coming, was welcomed as evidence of renewed Bank concern
for all project components\.
VII\. LESSONS LEARNED
7\.01 The Audit concurs with the findings of the PCR (paras\. 5\.01-5\.06),
adding the observations in the following paragraphs\.
7\.02 The first project is typical of the "Christmas tree" approach,
prevalent among Bank-supported urban operations in the late 1970's and early
1980's, which focused on a particular site with a multitude of loosely-related
components\. Experience in Cameroon tends to confirm that such projects can be
very difficult to administer locally and defy the supervision capabilities of
the Bank\. Specific projects, moreover, run the risk of incurring resentment at
a national level\. Most successful pilot projects take place in the country's
29
capital city and part of Nylon's administrative problems can be attributed to
its location elsewhere\.
7\.03 As to the multiple components, here as elsewhere, the smaller
elements tend to be eclipsed and key issues related to them tend to be overlooked
by Bank supervision missions unless they have a significant impact on
disbursements\. Indeed, the project's success in resettlement, land
regularization, cost recovery and small business support are due in large part
to ARAN's dynamic director, who stayed with the project eight years and to
alliances forged with the community, through Animation and the Swiss technical
assistance program\.
7\.04 In retrospect, it was a mistake to give ARAN responsibility for
project implementation, while farming out cost recovery to another agency (CFC)\.
The second project has opted for a more streamlined model of administration
whereby the municipalities are charged with both execution and cost recovery\.
7\.05 The project demonstrates, however, that urban upgrading can result
in efficient cost recovery and, thus, be replicable\. If ARAN fails to carry out
its upgrading program for all of Nylon, it will be because of insufficient
government backing, rather than lack of local revenues\. The experience at Nylon
also points to the need to include adequate programs for resettlement and new
settlement in conjunction with upgrading and municipal development projects in
general\.
7\.06 The project likewise illustrates the difficulties faced by an
executing agency working in isolation\. ARAN had to manage with only limited
support from MAETUR, MINUH and the Bank\. Had the municipality been enlisted in
project implementation, the project might have run more smoothly and its future
might have been better assured (PCR para\. 5\.04)\. Again, the second project has
attempted to avoid this problem by establishing a stronger relationship with
the municipalities\.
7\.07 The importance of defining clear and workable systems of financing
and cost recovery should be stressed\. This includes prior agreement with a
viable financial intermediary\. It also means developing affordable projects and
payment schemes, a lesson which ARAN learned and applied in the course of
implementation\. Problems with financing and cost recovery have plagued Bank
urban projects in the past and will probably continue to do so in the future\.
Successful experiences, therefore, should be well documented and effective
technical assistance 1,p:r)moted in these areas\.
7\.08 Inasmuch ar* the project could have benefitted from closer assistance
with regard to certain problem areas occurring during implementation -- notably
cost recovery, land titling and resettlement -- it might be advisable to leave
unallocated funds for unforeseen technical assistance needs, particularly in
pilot projects\. The fact that technical assistance centered on MINUH, rather
than ARAN, did little to help the situation\. Under the circumstances, DDA's
assistance and flexibility were invaluable\.
7\.09 The impa-,t of a first project may not be felt immediately\. Several
lessons of this experience are just beginning to be reviewed at the national
30
level and their results will probably not be fully observable until a th:rd
project is implemented or until local initiatives, such as that at New Bell,
take place\.
7\.10 The project points out the advantages of collaboration with community
organizations and co-financiers working on site\. In many instances, DDA made
up for the Bank's weaknesses in supervision\. The efforts of ARAN and Animation
in the areas of small business support and community development, however,
suggest that such activities may be better suited for management by donors other
than the Bank\.
7\.11 The troublesome cost overruns experienced in this project suggest
that additional emphasis is needed on the review of cost calculations,
consideration of alternative solutions and better control of construction
activities and costs\.
VIII\. CONCLUSIONS
8\.01 The project represented a bold attempt to introduce several new
concepts including the upgrading of squatter neighborhoods, land regularization,
resettlement on unserviced plots, home construction financing, cost recovery and
support for small businesses\. The problematic terrain at the project site,
Nylon, led to hefty and troubling cost overruns and a dramatic reduction in the
civil works program\. Compared with Bank urban experience world-wide, however,
the project completed disbursement in record time (five years as opposed to 9\.5
years), although several components were left to be completed under a follow-
on operation\.
8\.02 The project has had a marked positive impact on the urban environment
of Nylon and on the city of Douala as a whole\. In addition, it has st-Imulated
economic growth in Nylon and strengthened community development\. Unlike many
other Bank-financed urban projects, cost recovery appears to be going well\.
Delays in the resettlement of expropriated families and in issuing land titles,
together with the failure to generate a viable home financing system and a
program to support small businesses, represent the main shortcomings in an
otherwise successful project\.
8\.03 Although a primary objective of the first project was to establish
a replicable model for urban upgrading and, to date, no such replication has
taken place, the policy changes and interest generated by the experience at Nylon
suggest that urban upgrading has gained a small, but secure, foothold among
official urban development activities in Cameroon\.
8\.04 Studies financed under the first project led to the preparation and
negotiation of a second urban operation in 1988\. The first project identified
and took the initial steps to address areas of institutional and policy weakness,
without which the second project could not have moved forward\.
ç¥ï¼
â¢ï¼â¢â¢â ï¼éï¼ââ¢â¢â¢â¢ï¼âä¸ä¸ï¼ä¸ä¸ä¸ä¸Âä¸ä¸â-\.ï¼ä¸ç¶¢â¢ç¶²â¢ï¼ï¼ä¸ï¼ä¸Âä¸ä¸ä¸ï½-ï¼ä¸ä¸ä¸ä¸ç²ä¸ï¼Âä¸ï¼\.-ââ¢ä¸ï¼ï¼Âä¸ï¼Âï¼ä¸ä¸ä¸ä¸ä¸ä¸ä¸ï¼ä¸â
馴
33
ANNEX 2
S V 1 S S CAL C-U-LAT 1 ON-S
1988 1989 1990 199 1 1992
et\. - SOLDE
Cout ant 1T 2T 3 4T IT 21 3Y 4T IT ZT 3T 4T
0 E P E M S-E 1
ECOLE DE BILONGUE 312 147 97 54 14
CENTRE DE SOBOUM 280 40 75 90 65 10
MAISON SOCIALE DE C\.C\.C\. 26 5 5 il 5
MAISON SOCIALE D'OYACK 26 5 16 5
DISPENSAIRE DE BILONGUE 100 is 35 30 is 5
JEUX D'ENFANTS DE BILONGUE 20 4 8 6 2
ESPACE COLLECTIF
DE NKOLMINTAC 222 40 50 52 60 20
JEUX D'ENFANTS DIOYACK 20 4 5 8 3 0
MAISON SOCIALE DE KDOGPASSI 0
MARCHE DE NDOGPASSI
CENTRE DE JEUNESSE DE TERGAL 200 10 25 45 65 35 20
COMPLEXE SPORTIF DE DIBON Il 280 50 60 60 70 40
JEUX D'ENFANTS DE BRAZZAVILLE 20 3 9 6 2
ECOLE DE NDOGPASSI 111/2
DISPENSAIRE DE NOGGPASSI 100 20 20 25 25 10
CENTRE DE SANTE DE C\.C\.C\.
CENTRE COMMERCIAL DE OISON Il
ESPACE COLLECTIF DE NYLON
CIMETIERE DE OISON Il
CENTRE ARTISANAL
DE MADAGASCAR 100 30 40 10 5 0
1M 1-47 -fi 54 54 'fl0 T36 T98 M 29 97 o 0
ETUDES ET CONTROLES 99 _M 2 1 2 o
TOTAL EQUIPEMENTS COLLECTIFS 1805 235 99 55 56 82 112 137 199 235 222 237 109 22 5 01 0
MARCHE MADAGASCAR (SOLDE) 599 _ 108 12 56 23
MONTANT TOTAL \. 2404 235 607 67 112 82 112 137 199 235 2221 23-11 109 22 5 0 23
REPORT \. 554 -53 nà 111 129 17 207 10_8_ 153 31 14 50 28 23 23
F 1 M A M C E M E M T S
S U 1 S S E 2019 789 258 327 280 220 145 0
CAMEROUN 385 20 _ -Ab\. -0 1 luui - 100 - 100 - - - - 0
MONTANT TOTAL \. 2404 789 01 343 100 01 3271 1001 2801 1001 2201 \. 145 01 01 01 0
SOLDE A REPORTER \. 554 -531 M_ 1111 1-1 -- 171 2071 1081 1531 -311-141 so ul 23r 231 0
ANNEX 3
PHOTOGRAPHS Page 1 of 7
Photo I Problems with public service
maintenance--like garbage collec-
tion--stem from the runicipalityTs
distance from the project
Photo 2\. Dibom II under construction
35 ANNEX 3
Page 2 of 7
Photo 3\. The first house models were beyond
the means of most Ny1on req*-ents
Photo 4\. Ndogpassi is more of wilderness
than a settlement
36 \.NNEX 3
Page 3 of 7
Phote
Photo 6\.
37 ANNEX 3
?age of 7
W-P
Photos 5, 6 7\. The Madagascar Market
Photo 8\. Differunt house models at Dibon II
38 ANNEX 3
Page 5 of 7
Photo 9 Progressive houses financed
by CPN
Photo 10\. Another CPN housing loan
\.~~> \.~ \.' \. ---
r --
Photos 11 & 12\. e c\.r us e
left side of te <treet -r 1- V
right side
,f7
æ¶ç¥å«
å
ãï¼ï¼å
ï¼Bï¼ä¸«ï¼ä¸âä¸
&
&âå¿
ä½
嫵ç±
:&\.&toââï¼ä¸ï¼ï¼å
d n\.&rï¼äºeä¸äº¡ï¼éã註t 11ä¸æ¶1åä¸
&ï¼ä¸ãï¼ï¼ãï¼ï¼ä¸f
41
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
CAMEROON
FIRST URBAN PROJECT
(IDAN 2244-CM)
October 5, 1989
Occidental and Central Africa Department
Infrastructure Operations Division
42
43
REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON
URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, LOAN 2244-CM
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
I\. BACKGROUND AND PROJECT DESCRIPTION
Sector Background and Project Identification
1\.01 In 1980 when the project was appraised, about a third, or 2\.6 million
people, of Cameroon's 8\.4 million population lived in urban areas\. In 1987 when
a follow-up Second Urban Project was appraised, 40Z of the 10\.5 million
population were urban residents\. The steady rate of urbanization is a major
factor contributing to strong growth of GDP in non-oil sectors during this
period\. Urban-based activities generated over two-thirds of new employment
opportunities and real growth in non-oil GDP\. Cameroon's unusually
well-developed and dense network of urban settlements has allowed, through the
development of the internal food market, for increased agricultural production
and the related shift from subsistence into market-oriented agriculture\. Besides
its polycentric structure, the urban network is notable for the market importance
of the secondary centers, which play as large a role in absorbing urban migrants
as the two main cities put together\.
1\.02 Douala, the site of this project, is the country's main port and
industrial center and also the regional economic center for the provinces of
the western region, Cameroon's agricultural and commercial heart and its most
densely settled region\. Douala is also the largest city, with about 600,000 in
1980 and about 842,000 in 1986\. Located at the mouth of the Wouri River on'the
Gulf of Guinea, it has been a major trade center since the arrival of the
Portuguese in the sixteenth century\. Its port now handles virtually all import-
export traffic for Cameroon as well as goods en route to or from landlocked Chad
and the Central African Republic\. The second-largest city, Yaoundd, the capital,
is located centrally and has served as the administrative center of Cameroon
since 1915\. These two cities contain about a third of the country's urban
residents\. Douala will pass the one million mark within the next few years and
Yaound4 will pass it by 1995\.
1\.03 The identification of the First Urban Project grew out of an extended
and fruitful consultation concerning urban and housing policy between the Bank
and Government, initiated in 1975 by Government's request for a sector mission\.
Important aspects of the secter mission's findings were reflected in the urban
and housing sections of the Fourth Plan (1976-80) and the dialogue continued
through project preparation missions assisted by the Resident Mission, and by
an advisor to the Ministbre de l'Urbanisme et de 1'Habitat (MINUB), provided from
1979-81 througi the First Technical Assistance Project (Credit 673-CM)\.
1\.04 The project was initially conceived in 1978 as a three-pronged effort
to: initiate urban upgrading,operations, institute a sites and services program,
and strengthen the institutions on which the future of urban development depends\.
Both upgrading and sites and services involve provision of basic road, drainage,
water, education and health facilities in urban areas, along with land tenure
and housing credit arrangements which encourage private investment in permanent
housing stock\. Upgrading involved the introduction of these measures in existing
uncontrolled and usually illegal settlement areas, while sites and services
programs opened new areas\. Both types of infrastructure programs were receiving
44
Bank Group support from the early 1970s in a number of countries as the most
practical means of addressing the need to extend basic infrastructure networks
in the face of rapid urbanization, and to provide for the basic needs of the
urban poverty group\.
1\.05 The sites and services approach formed the basis for Government
creation in 1978 of a new Agency for Urban and Rural Land Development (Mission
d'AmOnagement et d'Equipement des Terrains Urbains et Ruraux or MAETUR), under
the aegis of MINUH\. The Government was prepared to envisage a long-range, multi-
city program for sites and services but wanted to proceed more cautiously
regarding upgrading efforts\. The Bank considered that priority should be given
to upgrading operations as the main mechanism for clearing the urban infrastruc-
ture backlog as well as to sites and services programs, providing that
appropriate action be taken to eliminate two major constraints: lack of
provision of sites for households below the 25th income percentile, and the
discontinuation of heavily subsidized housing loans (interest rates below savings
deposit rates)\.
1\.06 The Nylon area of Douala was clearly identified by both partners as
the highest priority area to upgrade from all points of view: technical, social,
and political\. Nylon was the largest slum and the worst squatter area in the
country\. Housing 90,000 residents in 1980, a sixth of the city's population and
a quarter of its poor, Nylon was located on marshy ground along the airport road
and directly adjacent to already developed areas, whose runoff it received\.
Unlike its namesake, Nylon never dried out\. First established in the 1950s as
an extension area for residents of next-door New Bell, it was for many years
designated as a "green area' by the urban master plan\. Bypassed by
infrastructure extensions, the residents of Nylon, noted for their cohesive
social structure, formed an effective and well-organized system of thirteen
neighborhood action committees\. Beginning in 1970, these committees mobilized
work groups equipped with hand tools who filled the swampy land and constructed
and maintained makeshift bridges, drainage canals, and dirt roads\.
1\.07 While the solidarity of the community has been and continues to be a
great strength, there was a limit to what it could achieve\. In 1980 the area
was served by a single water standpipe, a single low-tension electric line, and
lacked street lighting\. It was inaccessible to buses, garbage vehicles or trucks
and deficient in health and education facilities\. Vendors were plentiful but
there was no market since these are built and run by the city government, and
in any case trucks could not have gotten through\.
Project Obiectives and Description
1\.08 The project's main objectives were to raise urban infrastructure
standards to an envir 'tally acceptable minimum, and to strengthen the
institutional base and % - -op appropriate mechanisms for a continuing upgrading
program in Cameroon\. The project was designed to attain these objectives by
supporting the folloving activities:
(a) construction of primary infrastructure for the whole 600-ha Nylon area,
and to raise the environmental sanitation conditions and road access
to an acceptable minimum\. This included the provision of major roads,
drainage, dredging of the Mgoua River, water supply, electricity and
street lighting, as well as the development and servicing of
45
resettlement areas to accommodate the households displaced by
infrastructure construction (56Z of total base cost);
(b) complete upgrading of a first neighborhood of 50 ha, including the
provision of secondary and tertiary infrastructure, reblocking of
plots, land tenure regularization, housing credit, and cost recovery
mechanisms (3% of total base cost);
(c) community facilities for Nylon and the resettlement areas, including
a major market, community centers, public health facilities and primary
schools financed by Swiss bilateral assistance (15? of base cost);
(d) community facilities in Yaound4 Northwest, an under-serviced densely
settled low-income area of the capital city (8% of total base cost);
and
(e) institution building consisting of support for the urban development
institutions responsible for carrying out the project, support to
strengthen MINUH, in particular its land administration sections, and
financing for preparation cf a Second Urban Project and other urban
studies (192 of total base cost)\.
1\.09 In addition to the community facilities program, Swiss bilateral aid
(Coopdration Suisse au Ddveloppement et & l'Aide Humanitaire -- DDA) also
provided a wide range of support activities for the existing community
associations, including three full-time project unit staff members, tools and
supplies for ongoing neighborhood self-help infrastructure maintenance, and a
health and nutrition education program\. The community facilities program was
extended twice to include another group of community facilities and further
support\. This support included training for project unit staff and for small-
scale contractors involved in the construction sector, design and establishment
of an artisan center in the market, proposals for market management, and
management assistance to the Nylon residents' housing credit association\.
Project Design and Oraanization
1\.10 The above project components were designed over a two-year period
culminating in a November 1980 appraisal of a much larger project to be financed
by a US$40 M IDA credit, twice the amount of the loan eventually approved\. The
project size was reduced during negotiations in February 1982 at the Government's
request by the withdrawal of a large component originally intended to support
the launching of a sites and services program and the technical assistance
associated with this component\. This cut was requested because of the increase
in the cost of local financing associated with the shift of the project from the
last IDA credit to Cameroon to the first IBRD loan\.
1\.11 The institutional setup originally agreed at appraisal, to create a
project-specific independent agency to carry out the upgrading of Nylon, was
eventually retained, despite strong pressure from the Bank to establish a
program-oriented one\. Once the decrees to create the agency reached the
Presidency, the President ruled in summer 1981 that the agency should be created
within MAETUR, itself newly created, in order to discourage proliferation of
parastatal institutions\. This option had earlier been considered and rejected
due to the risk of overburdening MAETUR, which was engaged in launching
government's first land development efforts\. A compromise was sought which would
46
separate the Nylon agency's management and budget from those of the MAETUR land
development arm\. The setup finally approved left administrative and accounting
functions with the central MAETUR office in Yaound4 and operational respon-
sibility with the director and staff of the Nylon agency in Douala, named ARAN
(Agence de Restructuration et d'Am6nagement de Nylon)\.
1\.12 The subsequent experience with this institutional arrangement was not
satisfactory\. Poor working relations between the Douala ARAN office and the
Yaoundd MAETUR office, which had to approve every administrative and technical
action, remained a constant source of friction and delay throughout the project's
life\. Lack of delegation of authority from Yaoundd along with rigidity and
detail-ridden procedures rooted in the legal tradition were to blame for much
of this friction\. A Steering Committee made up of Ministry, municipal and
community representatives was to have played an important role in setting work
programs and budgets; this arrangement also did not work: the Committee met only
once\. The project's financial arrangements, designed at appraisal to strengthen
two inexperienced financial intermediaries, were complex, and made the drafting
of the legal documentation required for effectiveness quite time consuming\.
II\. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COST
Overview
2\.01 The most critical variances between planned and actual project
implementation were a four-year delay in start-up of civil works, and a
consequent extension from four to seven years of project technical assistance\.
These delays were due in part to factors known at appraisal but which could not
be accurately estimated, in particular the slowness of procurement and land
administration procedures in Cameroon\. Also, some factors were not foreseen:
in particular the need to redesign basic infrastructure in response to the 1985
master plan revision, and the 1986187 economic crisis plus the fall of the
dollar\. However, new land administration procedures and institutional
arrangements worked out during the first project made it possible to plan more
realistically for implementation of the Second Urban Project\.
Start-up Activities
2\.02 Government's commitment to the project was clearly demonstrated by
the fact that even before negotiations, it undertook about US$4 H in preparatory
civil works adjacent to Nylon\. A Bank urban sector mission which visited
Cameroon in spring 1982 found that works to prepare a first resettlement site
to accommodate roughly half of the households to be displaced and to dredge the
Mgoua River which drained Nylon, had already been completed under Cameroonian
financing\. Retroactive financing for these works was originally intended to be
included in the project, but dropped at Government's request in order to reduce
the size of the proposed loan\.
2\.03 During the two-year period between negotiations and effectiveness
(February 1982--May 1984), activity was stalled on three fronts: institutional,
technical andland availability\. Institutionally, the responsibilities of MINUB
and of the kJnistry,\5 Plan for the overall supervision of the First Urban
Project were not clearly defined\. Then during the 4rafting in Cameroon of legal
documentation required for effectiveness, it became necessary to incorporate the
47
concerns of agencies who had not participated in negotiations\. At issue was not
the project concept, but rather the project's complex financial arrangements and
the procedures for repayment and disbursement of sub-loans\.
2\.04 Other delays resulted from the requirement that the selection of
consultants for design and engineering contracts comply with the Bank guidelines\.
This requirement acccunted for about four of the six months delay between initial
consultant selection and start of design work (December 1983--June 1984)\.
2\.05 On the land availability front, a search was going on for a second
resettlement site\. The first resettlement site (30 ha) called Dibom II which
was part of State lands at the time of negotiations could accommodate only about
a third of the households to be resettled\. At negotiations, Government had
assured the Bank that additional land was available for extension of the
resettlement area as needed\. In fact the situation turned out to be much more
complex\. A second site called Ndogpassi I which was set aside for public use
in spring 1985 turned out to be unusable because 80 of the 180 ha was titled and
would have required compensation, and 35 ha were occupied by squatters\. Another
site called Ndogpassi III, 3 km east of Nylon, was designated and integrated into
State lands in fall 1985\. This 279-ha site was large enough (over 3,000 plots)
to accommodate the remaining households to be relocated from the project and also
those anticipated to require resettlement as part of the Second Urban Project
which was then under preparation (see map)\.
2\.06 The two years between negotiations and effectiveness were also a time
of intense activity for sector work and identification of follow-on projects\.
Three interdisciplinary sector missions visited Cameroon during this period, and
an Urban Sector Review Report (4540-CM) was issued July 5, 1984\. The supervision
mission which coincided with the last of these (February 1984) also formally
identified a US$200 M Douala Infrastructure Project focussing on major road and
drainage improvements in Douala, as well as a Cadastre (land administration)
Project and a Secondary Cities (municipal development) Project, in line with the
recommendations of the sector work\. The First Urban Project included financing
for the preparation of a Second Urban Project, and supervision of the feasibility
study for this project took up a large share of project supervision staff time\.
At the same time, the prospect of this follow-on project acted as an incentive
to resolve satisfactorily certain complex issues, particularly land tenure
arrangements, which arose during implementation of the First Project\. Other
start-up activities during this period were the recruitment of technical
assistance staff and training of Cameroonian counterpart staff\.
Road and Drainage Infrastructure Design
2\.07 Project civil works components accounting for about 60Z of project
costs were grouped in two large contracts, one covering the basic primary road
and drainage network in the whole of Nylon and the other covering secondary
infrastructure in the 50-ha pilot upgrading zone\. In early 1985, at the same
time that adequate drainage design to cope with severe geotechnic problems was
becoming a major concern, Government decided to change the basic structure of
the road and drainage network in Nylon to reflect the new Urban Master Plan for
greater Douala\.
2\.08 The above change in the basic structure of the road and drainage
network was a fundamental one, involving a shift in perspective from viewing
Nylon as a quartier, albeit a large and important one, to viewing it as a major
48
commercial center\. For one thing, in the five years separating engineering
design from appraisal, Nylon had outgrown its earlier boundaries\. Described in
the appraisal report as a 600-ha area with 90,000 population, Nylon had grown
to 700 ha with 120,000 by the spring of 1984\.
2\.09 In addition, the time had come in the growth of Douala that the four-
lane road east-vest approach to the city had to be extended, and Nylon happened
to be the logical location for a crucial link\. Such a revision would have been
impossible to avoid at this point in time\. The same Bank and MINUH teams who
were supervising the First Urban Project were simultaneously involved in
preparing the Douala Infrastructure Project which was intended to identify those
road and drainage investments critical to the efficient functioning of the city
as a whole\.
2\.10 The design consultants for the project were instructed to quickly
develop preliminary design solutions taking into account the transformation of
the north-south access road into a four-lane highway and the east-vest highway
into a six-lane highway\. Thirty meter rights-of-way for there segments had been
included in the design in anticipation of future needs but initial project cost
had not provided for construction of such wide roads\. The cost increase implied
by this type of design upgrade could now easily be accomLodated, it was thought,
since the Bank loan was denominated in US dollars and the dollar had risen from
270 CFAF at the time of negotiations to 400 CFAF\. The expected date of bidding
documents was postponed from December 1984 to March 1985 to allow for the
redesign\.
2\.11 Final design and final bidding documents were in fact not completed
until late 1985, following a detailed review and comments on preliminary versions
by a spring Bank mission\. No sooner were the bidding documents satisfactorily
revised than the terms of reference for on-site supervision (Organization,
Pilotage, Contr6le des Travaux (OPC)) had to be rejected\. Revised versions of
the terms of reference for OPC bounced back and forth between the Bank, ARAN,
MAETUR and the Ministry of Public Contracts, the Government procurement ministry,
from mid-1985 to mid-1986; the Marchds Publics then proceeded to call for local
bidding against Bank procurement guidelines\. A short list agreeable to all
parties was finalized in August and the Bank was informed of OPC bid evaluations
in November\. The selection process for the consultants in charge of on-site
supervision created additional delays\. The preparation of a request for
proposals in compliance with Bank guidelines took over one year and Bank approval
of the OPC contract was not given until receipt of the bid evaluation report
(February 1987), final TOR (March 1987) and the detailed contract (April 1987)\.
2\.12 Bids for civil works in Nylon were opened in April 1986 and the bid
evaluation was reviewed with the Bank mission in June 1986\. The Bank was
informed in September of the July decision of the Procurement Commission
concerning the selection of a civil works contractor\. Following several months
of Bank-ARAN-MAETUR disagreement concerning important details of the winning bid
proposal, a Bank mission visited Cameroon in February 1987 and resolved these
difficulties\. A preliminary engineering report was approved by the Bank in late
April, rights-of-way were cleared beginning in early 1987 and road construction
began in fall 1987\.
2\.13 The construction contractors soon ran into two unanticipated problems:
geotechnical difficulties requiring the construction of special road bases
impervious to water which led to substantial increases in costs, and errors in
49
the quantity survey\. At the same time, Cameroon had to face a deteriorating
economic and financial environment\. Oil production had begun to drop in FY86,
but Government spending had continued to increase, drawing on accumulated oil
proceeds\. By late 1986, the economic crisis due to the fall in oil prices,
combined with the weakening of the US dollar, was belatedly making itself felt
at the project level\.
2\.14 Due to these technical and financing constraints, it was agreed
following a mission in late 1987 that the Bank would increase its share of the
project financing\. It was also agreed that the scope of the First Urban Project
would be limited to components already committed, by reallocating to these
components uncommitted funds which had been reserved for the training program,
the Yaound4-Northwest community facilities, non-essential technical assistance,
and small components for health education and artisan assistance\. From this
point on, efforts focussed on the completion of primary roads and drainage, and
of secondary infrastructure in the pilot upgrading zone on which construction
had begun in fall 1987, and on improvement of the land tenure situation\.
2\.15 The most important design changes at this stage were to accept a
reduced configuration for the east-west highway which provides the main access
road to the area, rather than the six-lane highway which under earlier economic
conditions would have been affordable, and to realign the north-south road to
become a link in a new ring road, while retaining its four-lane configuration\.
At the time of negotiations for the Second Urban Project in July 1988, which now
consisted of a scaled-down Douala Infrastructure Project combined with priority
works in Yaound4 and secondary cities, an additional US$13 M was added to the
Second Urban Project to complete the upgrading of the Nylon area\. All works in
Nylon initiated under the First Urban Project are expected to be completed by
June 1990\.
Improvement of the Land Tenure Situation
2\.16 The vast majority of Nylon residents had developed their plots outside
of all legal procedures for land acquisition, subdivision, development and
registration\. As a result, they were considered illegal squatters by the urban
authorities, and were refused the right to any secure land tenure which in turn
limited their willingness to invest in the improvement of their housing\. One
of the project's major objectives was to develop appropriate procedures and
mechanisms to regularize land tenure in uncontrolled settlements\. The delivery
of secure land tenure would be conditionai to the payment of an infrastructure
servicing fee in order to allow for the financial replicability of the operation\.
Mechanisms to improve the land tenure situation were developed for two types of
situationst (a) the upgrading of uncontrolled settlements; and (b) the
development of resettlement areas to accommodate households displaced as a result
of the clearing of the rights-of-way required for the provision of priority
infrastructure in h1lon\.
2\.17 ARAN, through its land management bureau, Bureau de Liaison des
Affaires Foncibres (BLAF), and with the support of DDA, developed detailed
procedures for the restructuring and land regularization of a pilot area of 50
ha\. All plot occupants were identified by a Land Commission assisted by the
neighborhood associations\. Aerial photographs were used to restructure the
plots layout in order to allow for minimal infrastructure servicing\. After the
incorporation of the corresponding area into State lands, the subdivision plan
was officially approved and individual plots were demarcated\. Files were
50
prepared by BLAF for the beneficiaries of the 1703 plots as well as for the 407
households which had to be displaced as a result of the upgrading operation\.
The first land titles were delivered in mid 1989 after payment of an infrastruc-
ture servicing fee averaging CFAF 4500 per square meter\.
2\.18 The clearing of the rights-of-uay of the primary infrastructure and
community facilities planned as part of Nylon upgrading led to the displacement
of a total of roughly 3,000 households among the 20,000 households which
originally occupied the site\. BLAF, together with neighborhood associations,
conducted surveys of the households to be displaced allowing for the expropria-
tion commission to determine corresponding compensation rights\. The vast
majority of the households concerned were illegal squatters and did not have any
official right to compensation\. However, MINUH agreed to grant each displaced
household the right to a resettlement plot against pay-Aent of its infrastructure
servicing costs\.
2\.19 An initial 30-ha site, called Dibom II (para\. 2\.05), was prepared in
1984\. All of its 923 plots were allocated, and 865 of them were paid in full
with house construction completed or actively underway\. A second resettlement
area was opened in 1987 in the Ndogpassi III area, where a 279-ha site able to
accommodate over 3,000 plots was incorporated into State lands\. Plots occupancy
and house construction in Ndogpassi III is slower than expected\. Among the first
1,032 plots, only 933 had been allocated and 345 paid in full by mid 1988\. ARAN
commissioned a non-governmental organization (NGO) to analyze problems
encountered by resettled households\. The major conclusions and recommendations
of this study are that the delay for plot payment should be extended from four
months to two years and that the standard housing designs prepared by ARAN to
accelerate the delivery of building permits led to construction costs of over
CFAF 5 million each which was out of reach of the majority of the households\.
Consequently, the NGO was commissioned, under DDA financing, to design and
supervise the construction of core housing units for a cost of CFAF 2 million\.
These recommendations, which were already included in the Resettlement Action
Plan of the Second Urban Project, will be integrated into ARAN's future
operations\.
2\.20 Community facilities in Nylon were covered by the Government's
agreement with DDA\. This agreement provided for the construction of the
Madagascar Market as well as 13 other community facilities in Nylon as originally
appraised by the Bank\. While construction on the market had begun in 1984 and
was completed in early 1989, only one of the other community facilities had been
started, a primary school for the Ndogpassi III resettlement area miles away from
the nearest existing school\. The delay in building community facilities was a
consequence of ARAN's decision to carry out all the design, contracting and
supervision functions for community facilities in-house and to develop new
designs rather than adapt existing ministerial building prototypes\. The new
designs appear more innovative and functional but took longer to design and
construct, and also proved to be more expensive\.
2\.21 Despite these problems, DDA and Cameroon Governments agreed to
additional financing in 1987 to complete the remaining primary school, two health
facilities, and eight sociallsports facilities, and to further extend the program
to include a community center, three kindergartens, and an artisan center in
the Madagascar market; in Ndogpassi III, an additional school, market and
dispensary; and in Dibom II, a market and cemetery\. ARAN has recently agreed
to delegate the design function to local architects\. Most community facilities
51
are in the design stage and discussions center around cost reduction measures\.
A five-year schedule agreed with the DDA in spring 1989 shows construction
starting on the Soboum community center in fall 1989 as the Bilongue school is
being completed, with nine more facilities starting up during winter 1989/90 and
the remaining nine facilities coming on stream over the 1991-94 period\.
2\.22 Following the creation in spring 1986 of the Agence pour la
Restructuration de Yaound4 Nord-Ouest (ARYNO), a HAETUR agency responsible for
upgrading operations in Yaound4, preliminary proposals for community facilities
in Northwest Yaoundd were first presented in 1987\. The area had substantially
changed since appraisal as a result of major road works by both central and
municipal governments and subsequent private building construction\. The sites
previously considered for these facilities were no longer available and the
proposed location would have required considerable demolition\. The costs of the
proposed facilities were also much higher than available financing\. As noted
in para\. 2\.14, this component was postponed and the uncommitted project funds
allocated to the completion of priority works in Nylon\. Central and municipal
governments are in the meantime proceeding to construct the needed facilities
as financing permits\.
Institution Building
2\.23 Five technical assistants and experts were in place from 1984 until
1988, with contract extensions being covered either by the reallocation of
project funds agreed in November 1987 or by Government funds\. The main
achievements of the project's institutional development component, along with
an urban sector training component financed under the Second Technical Assistance
Project (Credit 1168-CH), are the support provided to ARAN, creation of new
units within the MINUH to deal with urban infrastructure maintenance and with
training, supervision of the engineering studies for the priority infrastructure
project in Douala and preparation of an action program to improve Cameroon's land
cadastre\.
Proiect Cost (Table 1)
2\.24 The project costs amount indicated at appraisal was US$54\.3 M, or
14\.8 billion CFAF at the 1983 exchange rate (US$1 - 270 CFA), of which 51% was
the foreign exchange component\. The Loan amount of US$20\.0 M was to be applied
to finance civil works (50%), materials and equipment (60%) and consultants and
studies (70?)\. The Loan was to finance 36Z of total project costs, the
Government of Cameroon, 542, and the DDA, 10%\. A February 18, 1988 amendment
to the Loan Agreement modified the Bank financing share to 85? for works and 100%
for consultants\. Total project cost at closing (30 June 1988) was estimated at
CFA 22\.2 billion, or US$74\.0 M at the then current rate of exchange
(US$1 - 300 CFA)\. This corresponds to a 35% cost overrun for all project works,
including those to be completed with funding from the Second Urban Project\.
2\.25 Of the US$19\.8 M disbursed under the First Urban Project, US$13\.5 M
went for civil works in Nylon, compared to the US$11\.9 M planned, and US$6\.0 M
was disbursed for institution building, compared to US$5\.6 M planned (Table 2)\.
The final allocation of funds to the two main components thus generally reflects
the original intent of the project\. The main change has been in the share of
funding assumed by the Bank, which was to have been 36? but became 72? following
the adjustment in financing arrangements made in November 1987 in response to
52
the economic crisis and the provision of additional funds under the Second Urban
Project\.
III\. PROJECT RESULTS AND SUSTAINABILITY
Impact on the Urban Environment
3\.01 Physically, the project has resulted in the construction of a primary
road and drainage network over a 600-ha site in Nylon which for the first time
fully incorporates this area into the urban fabric of Douala\. This
infrastructure, along with the completion early in 1989 of a huge modern market,
has transformed Nylon from a swamp into one of the city's most dynamic commercial
zones\. The Nylon market, Marcho Madagascar, is actually more easily accessible
to many city residents than is the main Lagos market in downtown Douala\.
3\.02 Equally important, two new housing sites, Dibom II and Ndogpassi III,
have been developed, subdivided, allocated, and occupied\. Over two thousand
plots have been completed to resettle households\. Individual land titles for
those Dibom residents whose permanent structures are in place have been approved
by the provincial cadastral office, and their actual delivery began in July 1989\.
3\.03 The most disappointing shortfalls from a physical standpoint are the
difficulties in securing the systematic provision of basic urban services and
facilitis\. Provision of water and electricity networks was delayed because of
financial difficulties with the utilities parastatals responsible for these
works, limiting their capacity to service their clientele\. This in turn has
delayed installation of standpipes and street lighting by the municipality\. As
a result, a temporary water line, financed under the project, had to be installed
in 1988 to serve Nylon proper, including Dibom II\. Other difficulties result
from delays in adjusting the contract with the private contractor in charge of
garbage collection to include Nylon in its routes\. These matters should be
resolved in the near future\.
3\.04 Following the initial dredging of the Mgoua River in 1982, the water
table in Nylon had fallen from a centimeter or two beneath the surface to as
much as a meter\. Since then, it has been slowly rising as the Mgoua gradually
silted again\. Dredging is again required; however, appropriate financing
mechanisms between central and municipal government have not yet been approved\.
Until the Mgoua is dredged and the water table lowered, runoff from the new
highways in Nylon will adversely affect those living alongside\. The lack of
adequate dredging would be likely to create adverse conditions for some of the
plots in the pilot upgrading zone which would be less well drained than they were
before the new highway construction (para\. 2\.09)\.
Policy Impact
3\.05 New mechanisis and procedures have been worked out for resettling
households displaced by public works, for carrying out public works improvements,
for recovering infrastructure servicing costs, and for regularizing land tenure
in existing illegal or irregular settlements (urban upgrading)\. The development
of these mechanisms and procedures extended over much of the project's life
because the situations produced by the project had never been addressed before,
administratively, legally, or financially\. Procedures were developed to
53
streamline land rights assessment and registration within irregular settlements,
and to resettle and compensate households in such settlements displaced from
infrastructure rights-of-way\. Cost recovery procedures were developed and appear
to be working well which should permit replicability of upgrading operations\.
The experience gained by the project executing agency, ARAN, is a valuable asset
created through the project and probably the project's most important
achievement\.
3\.06 Less satisfactory were arrangements made for housing credit\.
Cameroon's housing credit bank, CFC (Credit Foncier du Cameroon) had agreed to
loan about CFAF 220 million to 600 households for plot purchase and home
improvement in the pilot neighborhood\. This provision left out of account the
needs of the over 2,000 resettled families who needed financial support to
accelerate the house construction process\. By fall 1985 only 60 loans had been
approved; by spring 1987, this had risen to 121 loans, but the average amounts
were much larger than had been envisaged\. Although the overall amount loaned
by CFC exceeded that agreed at appraisal, the end result is far from that
intended\.
3\.07 A major barrier which was anticipated and provided for at appraisal
was the CFC's policy of lending only to salaried workers, which constitute the
upper income segments of Nylon\. CFC was to work out an arrangement with the
Nylon neighborhood savings association (Caisse Populaire de Nylon) to encourage
non-salaried workers to start CFC savings accounts in order to qualify for loans\.
This arrangement proved difficult to conclude because of residents' reluctance
and unfamiliarity with formal sector financial institutions\. CFC then worked
out an agreement to lend to non-salaried household heads provided the Caisse
Populaire de Nylon constituted a guarantee fund\.
3\.08 Another important housing finance issue resolved during the project
concerns CFC's insistence over most of the project lifetime that housing
construction laans would be conditional on receipt of individual title\. CFC in
fact suspendad all 121 loans made to salaried wage earners in late 1986 because
borrowers had no title\. Since receipt of title is conditional on erecting a
permanent structure under the law, the CFC condition developed into an impasse
for resettlement plot allottees\. The project provided the need and incentive
for CFC to agree, in the resettlement case, that a plot allocation award
certificate and receipt for payment in full of plot costs would constitute
sufficient documentation for a housing loan application\.
3\.09 However, the issue of avalable funds remains\. By the time the Caisse
Populaire guarantee fund and loan conditionality arrangements had been agreed
on, and CFC had agreed to extend its formal agreement with MAETUR and reserve
CPAF 150 million a year for three years to resettlement plot allottees, CFC had
no more funds to lend\. The CFC financial crisis was due both to worsening
economic conditions, slowness in identifying other sources of funding than the
payroll tax, a generally inappropriate interest rate structure, and other
problems of the country's and region's banking and financial system\. The
interest rate problem and structural problems with the Cameroonian finance system
had been a major concern prior to negotiations; they had been resolved at that
point by agreeing to undertake a study and reassessment of the financial sector\.
This was done, but rigidities of regulations established by the Central Bank for
States of Central Africa (BEAC) have continued to be a stumbling block\.
54
3\.10 Another policy problem not adequately anticipated was the municipal-
ity's insistence on applying building code standards to new structures going up
on the resettlement plots which far exceeded the means of most Nylon residents\.
The building code issue was resolved in 1989 for both the First and Second Urban
Projectss allottees who have paid half the plot charge may build a temporary
structure; once they are fully paid up, a permanent structure, required to
receive permanent land title, may be erected\.
Urban Strategy issues and Institution Building
3\.11 The First Urban Project proved instrumental in assisting Government
in clarifying its strategy for the urban sector, to be implemented as part of
the Sixth Development Plan (1986-91)\. The priority objectives of this revised
urban strategy include: (a) the rationalization of public investment in the
urban sector; (b) the strengthening of municipalities; (c) the improvement of
urban land management; and (d) the strengthening of the role of the private
sector in housing and land development\.
3\.12 The Second Urban Project, initially appraised in February 1986, was
revised at Government's request in November 1987 to broaden its geographic scope
and include priority works in Yaound6 and other cities and to support the revised
urban strategy\. In addition to urban infrastructure improvements, this project
includes a program to improve urban resources mobilization and the implementation
of a policy action plan to consolidate the Government's urban strategy\. As a
first step in the policy action plan, the Government has created an
inter-ministerial Urban Development Steering Committee to coordinate urban
development policies and implement the urban strategy\. Other actions include
the strengthening of urban institutions (MINUH and municipalities) and the
rehabilitation of parapublic enterprises in the urban sector\. In addition, a
Project Special Unit was created by Presidential Decree to be directly
responsible for project administration coordination and inform the Steering
Committee on the status and progress of the project's components and policy
actions\.
3\.13 Implementation experience under this project has also put project
executing agencies and the Bank in a good position to design and undertake
efiective rehabilitation of the parastatals in this sector within the larger
effort of the Structural Adjustment Loan approved in June 1989\.
Cost Reco%very and Sustainability
3\.14 The cost recovery principles defined at negotiations were carried out
as agreed\. Primary infractructure and community facilities costs amounting to
about 80% of project costs, not normally charged directly to beneficiaries, were
borne by Government\. The cost of the market is to be charged to users, and
standpipes, street lighting, and garbage depots are to be provided at the expense
of the city government\. The cost of secondary and tertiary infrastructure in
the pilot zone and the two resettlement sites is recovered from the residents
of the zone in the first case and from plot allottees in the second case; in both
cases the cost varis according to location\. Commercially zoned property along
primary roads is priced at two to four times the actual servicing costs, while
property along internal footpaths is priced to sell at less than cost to those
with lower incomes\. For Dibom II, no distinction was made between plots
according to location and the cost of secondary and tertiary infrastructure and
55
of latrine installation is being recovered through plot charges which are equal
for all allottees (average cost)
3\.15 Cost recovery for Dibom II has gone well since plot allocation in 1984,
with allottees 52Z paid up after a year, 68% after two years and 85% after three
years\. It has gone more slowly for Ndogpassi III where only 27? of the amounts
due had been received after a year\. This is due to the fact that plot allocation
in early 1987 coincided with the economic crisis\. Cost recovery is going even
more slowly in the pilot upgrading zone, where only about 6Z of the total amounts
due were collected in the first year\. This is due to the fact that households
remaining in the upgrading zone already occupy their plot and are paying
primarily in order to receive a title at some time in the future\. They had
little incentive to pay as long as they could see that those who have already
constructed permanent houses in the resettlement areas suffered abnormal delays
in receiving their title documents\. With the streamlining of land titles
delivery currently underway, this situation should improve significantly\.
3\.16 ARAN has prepared a 10-year program to achieve the complete upgrading
of all twelve neighborhoods constituting the whole Nylon area\. Based upon the
experience of the First Urban Project, new mechanisms were developed to better
adjust infrastructure levels of service with actual cost recovery in order to
allow for the replicability and sustainability of the program\. ARAN has already
extended the program of upgrading operations to additional zones not included
in the initial project: construction of secondary infrastructure in these zones
is to commence following surveying, recovery of costs from households and sale
of commercial plots bordering the new roads and is to be self-financing\.
Preparations in these zones, covering 50 ha each, had reached the following
stages in early 1989: design and engineering studies had begun for the second
zone, the subdivision plan was being reviewed for the third zone, and site
surveying was completed for the fourth zone\. ARAN's intention is to complete
the secondary infrastructure for the remaining 11 neighborhoods in Nylon by the
late 1990s\.
3\.17 From a financial point of view as well, ARAN appears to have achieved
considerable success in its development; construction volume in FY88 exceeded
that of all previous years combined and was higher than that of MAETUR's own land
development programs, which have declined during the economic crisis\. Cost
recovery funds from upgrading and resettlement plot charges are estimated in an
early 1989 budgeting exercise to cover ARAN's administrative budget and all works
in the upgrading zones\. All conditions appear to be met to fulfill the objective
of the replicability of the upgrading operations\.
Economic and Poverty Impact
3\.18 The ex-post economic rate of return for the upgrading of Nylon has been
recalculated based on land values in 1988\. It reaches 24Z as compared to an
expected 182 in the staff appraisal report\. All direct and tangible benefits
enumerated in the project economic analysis will have been realized by the
completion of project works in mid 1990\. Economic rates of return will be
recalculated after project works are completed\. It is expected that they will
far exceed those appearing in the staff appraisal report, since actual increases
in the rental value of property in Nylon have outstripped expectations\. As
income for many households fell during this same period, the current economic
crisis has increased the pressure to transfer plots\. For this reason, DDA is
56
redirecting the focus of its follow-on efforts to a more coordinated and longer-
term effort to organize new income generating activities for Nylon residents\.
3\.19 At the time of appraisal, about 552 of Nylon area residents were
estimated to have incomes below the poverty threshold for Douala, leading to an
estimate of about 502 of total costs with direct benefits to the urban poverty
group\. Because effective economic monitoring of the beneficiary population is
currently being mounted with DDA assistance, no information is yet available
concerning changes in the resident population due to legal or illegal transfer
of land rights\. Earlier DDA-supp-rted efforts to set up a monitoring and
evaluation system failed because it was too complex\.
3\.20 Upgrading can leave the intended beneficiaries no better off in terms
of housing, and lead to the proliferation rather than the reduction of illegal
settlements, if the windfall realized by any resale of land or rights to higher
income groups cannot readily be reinvested by these beneficiaries in serviced
residential land\. The Bank's willingness to support upgrading in this project
was based on an assumption that MAETUR would be supplying at least all but the
lowest 10 of the market for serviced land during the upgrading project's
lifetime, this was indeed one reason why the project as originally appraised
included both upgrading and serviced sites programs\. MAETUR's programs have been
slower starting without external assistance, and they have provided little land
affordable below the 50th income percentile\. Therefore it is possible that some
original beneficiaries have chosen to depart for new uncontrolled settlements\.
Mitigating against unfavorable economic and land market circumstances are an
unusually strong sense of community solidarity observed in Nylon for the last
20 years, and the close and continuing involvement of community representatives
in the project implementation process, through liaison effected by two ARAN staff
members, one Bank- and one DDA-financed\. The issue of redirecting MAETUR's
operations towards lower-income groups is being addressed as part of its
rehabilitation action plan to be implemented under the Second Urban Project\.
IV\. BANK, BORROWER AND CONSULTANT PERFORMANCE
Bank Performance
4\.01 The Bank's main strength throughout the project lay in correctly
identifying major issues and in pressing for their resolution\. This applies to
the debate about institutional arrangements for the upgrading agency and about
housing finance which preceded negotiations; the technical, procurement and
resettlement site issues preceding start-up of civil works, and the land
administration issues raised throughout the project\. In retrospect, the Bank
wanted the project to be executed as conceived; the main case where the Bank
position did not in the end prevail, that is, regarding the institutional
arrangements for the upgrading agency, the resultant compromise handicapped
project execution\. The lack of resolution (to this day) of the housing finance
issue (para\. 3\.09), discussed at length before negotiations, remains a handicap
to many project beneficiaries unable to qualify for housing credit\.
4\.02 The Bank's main weaknesses were, at the design stage, failing to
simplify the project financial arrangements, underestimating physical
contingencies for civil works, and overlooking the need for periodic redredging
of the Kgoua River\. Given the low-lying, swampy nature of the site and the fact
57
that Douala's annual rainfall is one of the highest in the world, on the order
of 3-4 m, the contingency estimates in the appraisal report were overly
optimistic\. The lack of accurate topographical ant soils data led to an
underestimation of total project cost\. Following the appraisal of the project,
the Bank began to require progressively more advanced stages of design and
engineering prior to project appraisal in response to similar problems in many
other projects\.
4\.03 Another approach to coping with technical uncertainty suggested by
the Borrower in its Completion Report (see Preface), which would also mitigate
the vulnerability of project implementation to currency fluctuations, is to
divide project works into discrete subproject phases which could be finsaced
sequentially on the basis of available financing during the subperiod\. In
addition, the Borrower suggested the introduction of the concept of an acceptable
exchange rate band; movement outside this band would automatically require some
form of formal adjustment in project design and financi-&\. Such a proposal is
not acceptable considering the Bank's existing lending guidelines\.
Borrower Performance
4\.04 The Government's greatest strength throughout the project's life has
been its demonstrated commitment to overall project and sector objectives, and
willingness to assume financial responsibility\. Government committed about
US$4\.0 M prior to Loan effectiveness for initial dredging of the Mgoua and
preparation of the first resettlement site\. Until early 1987, when the economy
was in rapid decline, counterpart funding was furnished as required\. During the
economic crisis, Government arranged with contractors to keep the project going
after loan funds were exhausted in 1988, until arrangements could be made for
follow-on financing under the Second U,ban Project\. Cost recovery from residents
of the upgrading zones begun under the project is now continuing as the project
execution agency extends upgrading to the other zones of Nylon\. Land transfer
procedures and the delivery building permits were modified to provide for orderly
and fair development of resettlement zones and tenure regularization\.
4\.05 The Douala municipal government participated financially in the
construction of the Madagascar Market, for which it has agreed to pick up a hefty
construction cost overrun (around CFAF 3 million)\. However, the city has not
yet provided the garbage collection, street lighting and standpipes for which
it is responsible\.
4\.06 The main shortcoming of Government performance was the slowness of
its political and administrative processes, a phenomenon which affects all
projects in Cameroon\. Two factors can explain this situation:
(a) top decision-makera remain uninvolved at preparatory stages and are
not prepared to take a timely decision; they must first seek advice
from those who have been involved and arrive at a consensus; and
(b) responsibility for technical, legal and administrative matters are
not sufficiently separated and participants often get involved in
areas beyond their expertise\.
Management deficiencies stemming from these factors also reduced the
effectiveness of technical assistance, which was frequently diverted to solve
problems not directly related to project matters\.
58
4\.07 Two areas in particular suffered from the general delay phenomenon:
selection of a resettlement site and housing credit\. While the particular
political sensitivity of land matters may have enhanced the delay factors, it
is difficult to believj that the proposal of Ndogpassi I as the second
resettlement site could have been made in ignorance of the many encumbrancqs of
this site\. A suitable site was then proposed (Ndogpassi III), but six months
had already been lost\. It is also regrettable that new arrangements for housing
credit to non-salaried household heads and resolving the CFC requirement for
title prior to loan approval were not given higher priority by Cameroonian
authorities\.
4\.08 Apart from general delay factors, Government's position on the
institutional arrangements at the outset of the project had a negative impact
on project implementation\. Government's insistence that the upgrading project
execution agency be established within MAETUR rather than as an independent
agency may have been reasonable in principle, but the specifics of the relations
between ARAN and the MAETUR Yacund4 office had the result of handicapping ARAN's
functioning\.
4\.09 The problem of poor relations between ARAN's Douala office and the
HAETUR central administration in Yaoundd was a recurrent theme in supervision
reports\. A management consultant was asked to study the situation and recommend
ways of alleviating it in early 1985\. His conclusions were that while some
procedures could be simplified, the time-consuming nature of the administrative
procedures was irremediably imbedded in the project institutional setup and the
requirements of the legal system\. It was agreed that additional staff in ARAN's
Douala office could help, and they were recruited in late 1985: an additional
engineer, three technicians, three topographers, and a secretary\. Arrangements
were also made to computerize ARAN's accounting system\.
4\.10 Besides absorbing energy and time, the friction between ARAN and MAETUR
impacted negatively on project monitoring and audit\. ARAN would forward its
quarterly reports to MINUH which would hold them\. It may be that MINUH's
intention was to consolidate them with its own reports on technical assistance
and training and forwarding them to the Bank; however, this was never done\. The
solution eventually adopted was for each agency to forward its reports directly
to the Bank\. In a similar vein, the First Project audit was rejected by the Bank
because it covered only ARAN's accounts and contained no consolidated project
accounts\. The accounts for 1985/86 were successfully audited in June 1987\.
4\.11 Taking a longer view, it is also regrettable that at negotiations,
the Government chose to drop the sites and services component and that no
alternative financing was found\. As a result, MAETUR programs were slow to get
underway and did not follow the policy of responding to all segments of demand,
including households below the 50th income percentile\. The economic crisis has
brought MAETUR programs virtually to a standstill\. As a result, most of the
population, including Nylon residents, with or without resettlement plots who
desire or need to set up housekeeping elsewhere, have little choice but to squat
illegally as long as there are no low-cost plots coming on the marke\.: for sale,
in a variety of urban locations\.
59
Proiect Relationship
4\.12 The necessity to follow Bank procurement guidelines was more than just
a recurrent theme in Bank supervision reports and a constant source of friction
between the Bank and Borrower teams\. Both teams poured so much energy into
resolving this problem that little was left for other important aspects of
project management and implementation\. As a result, non-civil works aspects of
the project were neglected, the housing credit issue dragged on, coordination
with DDA languished\. On the surface, the friction over procurement could be
interpreted as due to poor understanding of procurement procedures\. The Bank
repeatedly had to remind the project agency to send TOR and full contract
documentation for its review and to specify selection criteria in TOR\. Some
kind of local assistance in procurement could be helpful in this case, as will
the drafting of standard contract clauses being carried out under the Second
Urban Project\.
Relationship with Swiss Aid
4\.13 Following the preparation stages of the project, the Bank and DDA
efforts in the Nylon area were implemented virtually independently\. The Swiss
Government wrote the Bank in summer 1986 regretting the infrequence of contact
and proposed regular meetings; they also requested that the Bank inform them on
a routine basis of the timing of Bank missions\. In its own Project Completion
Report (para\. 4\.03), the Government expresses its regret and surprise at the
Bank's apparent lack of interest in the housing credit, employment generation
and community development aspects of the project\. Both this report and the DDA-
financed report on project replicability stressed the necessity of community
participation in upgrading operations, at least one of whose objectives is to
improve living conditions for the resident population\. In particular, the
Government praised the financial and technical flexibility of DDA in comparison
to the Bank, which allowed it to adapt more readily to changing needs\.
4\.14 In April 1988, the Bank took up the suggestion made earlier by DDA\.
It announced its upcoming mission to finalize investments required to complete
the First Urban Project and invited DDA to join the mission in Cameroon\. DDA
replied immediately, agreeing to synchronize missions and outlining their primary
concernst secondary and tertiary roads and drainage, housing finance and income
generation; housing improvement, house construction assistance, support to
artisans and small enterprises, and waste collection\. From this point on, close
coordination has been maintained\.
Consultants' Performance
4\.15 Consultants' performance was generally good with the exception of the
Nylon civil works design and engineering\. Of particularly good quality was the
technical documentation for Douala roads and drainage improvements, financed
under the First Urban Project, in preparation of the Second Urban Project\. This
information will prove essential for the implementation of infrastructure
improvements over the entire city\.
4\.16 Concerning the civil works design and engineering for the Nylon civil
works, Bank supervision teams devoted considerable effort to require that drain
lining technologies appropriate to the environment be considered, among other
shortcomings in the drainage design\. It was not until the civil works contractor
began work that errors in the quantity survey for roads design were discovered\.
60
In the Borrower's view, the underestimate of project costs at appraisal
encouraged the design engineering consultant to underestimate quantities at the
quantity survey stage\. It is also true that technical standards were being
substantially revised upwards during the design stage, due to the need to make
the project road and drainage network compatible with the newly issued Master
Plan, and this created a difficult situation for all parties\.
V\. LESSONS LEARNED
3\.01 This was an innovative project, and one which was ambitious in seeking
to remedy the deep-rooted and longstanding problems presented by the Nylon area\.
It is not surprising that there were unusual resistances and obstacles to be
overcome, even without vnfavorable economic circumstances\. It is also not
surprising that the project was so rapidly overtaken by events during the
numerous delays it suffered, given the inherently dynamic nature of urban milieux
generally and that of Douala, one of West Africa's major port cities, in
particular\. What is surprising is that the project succeeded as well as it did,
and paved the way for the Second Urban Project, which is tackling directly
structural areas that had resisted earlier attempts to address: land management
and urban institutional environment\.
Benefits of Cofinancing
5\.02 The project demonstrates one effective means of integrating "hard*
and 'soft' elements with the same project, that is, for the Bank to focus its
efforts primarily on the first, while cofinanciers better adapted to working
closer to the ground handle the second\. In this project, staff within a single
project unit managed both Bank supported infrastructure investments and grant
cofinanced activities oriented to human and community development\.
5\.03 This arrangement proved particularly useful as a way of providing an
umbrella for community and NGO participation\. House construction in the
resettlement sites benefitted from low-cost designs and construction methods
worked out with the help of the French NGO Architectes Sans Frontibres\. House
renovation in the pilot upgrading zone has been receiving assistance from a
group organized by the University of Geneva's School of Architecture\. Artisan
training involved two local NGOs\. Pit latrine construction was carried out by
small local contractors, who also carried out about half of the works to
construct the Nylon market\. As mentioned above, DDA found that creating work
for small contractors and artisans does not form a sound foundation for a longer
term effort to improve economic opportunities in such a community\. They are
currently developing a strategy which takes a broader view of the zone's economic
development within a citywide context\.
Payoff from Project/Sector/Country Work Coordination
5\.04 The project history demonstrates the kind of payoff which can come from
close association of sector and project work, though this means some hard
decisions by Bank missions on the inevitable tradeoffs between supervision,
preparation and sector work\. The aide-memoire of the July 1988 urban mission
is a good example, covering a wide range of issues concernir, the First and
Second Projects, infrastructure in Yaound4 and secondary ci\.ies, municipal
assistance, and urban sector action plan and strategy\. In the sector strategy
61
itself, the redefinition of responsibilities for infrastructure as between
central and local government grew directly out of the experience with the First
Urban Project\. Central government financing should be limited to primary
infrastructure, while city governments and private developers should be given
more scope for action and their responsibilities broadened to include financing
and execution of secondary and tertiary infrastructure\.
5\.05 The sector strategy also reflects project experience in defining other
strategic objectives -- opening up of the land and housing finance markets --
and emphasizes the need for strong cointry economic support in order to resolve
stubborn structural problems such as those blocking housing credit\. It will be
very important to future operations in this sector that the housing credit agency
(CFC) along with the land development agency (MAETUR) and other institutions
involved in housing and industrial development have partiLipated in the current
parapublic rehabilitation program being carried out with Bank support\.
5\.06 The experience gained by ARAN through project implementation will allow
for the continuation of a program of replicable urban upgrading operatior\.s\. In
addition, this project proved instrumental in assisting Government in the
clarification of its strategy for the urban sector which will be consolidated
with the support provided by the Second Urban Project\.
Issues to be Resolved under Future Projects
5\.07 As obvious as it seems, it is important to restate a verity amply
demonstrated by this projects a first project in a new sector is not likely to
be smooth-sailing\. On the other hand, the payoff can be greater than expected:
the years-long working out of new detailed procedures for compensation and
transfer of title, applicable to resettlement of residents of rights of way or
of illegally settled urban areas, will mean that the Bank's Second Urban Project,
among other projects, should be spared such delays\.
5\.08 The Second Urban Project will also profit from lessons learned in the
First Project about infrastructure cost recovery and housing construct'on on
resettlement plots\. While most households had little difficulty coming up with
the roughly US$1,000 equivalent to pay for basic infrastructure costs of
resettlement plots, unrealistically high building standards imposed by the city
government and a drying up of housing credit meant that, until recently, those
allocated resettlemeat plots were hindered in their efforts to set up new
permanent homes\. This situation was resolved by agreeing with the city
government that an exception to formal city building standards should be made
for resettled families\.
5\.09 Conflicts regarding the application of Bank procurement guidelines
consumed many valuable weeks of Bank staff time that could have more usefully
been devoted to other aspects of project implementation\. To remedy the
shortcomings of tendering practices, Government has created a new body which
should be fully in operation in early 1990\. As part of the Second Urban Project,
efforts are now underway to draft standard administrative clauses for works and
equipment contracts which can accelerate approval by Cameroon and the Bank\.
Improved dialogue on procurement will be essential if Bank missions are to
properly supervise important institution-building aspects of the Second Urban
Project\.
62
5\.10 Better coordination is required with water and electricity parastatals
to persuade them to install their services in parallel with road and drainage
works\. Provision should be made for financing periodic redredging of the Mgoua
River, as well as for garbage collection by the city of Douala\. The Urban
Development Interministerial Committee created in the framework of the Second
Urban Project will ensure improved coordination between the various urban
agencies\.
5\.11 More appropriate design standards should be selected in designing
future community facilities\. This would have made it easier for local
contractors to build, speed up construction and lower costs\.
5\.12 A lesson learned, but still unimplemented, involves identifying better
arrangements for housing credit (paras\. 3\.06 and 4\.07) to unsalaried household
heads not eligible for loans from the government parastatal\. The arrangement
would involve setting up a guarantee fund by the Nylon neighborhood savings
organization, for which the Swiss are prepared to provide backing\.
Unfortunately, the parastatal's current lack of funds has rendered this agreement
moot\.
63
Table 1
REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON
URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, LOAN 2244-CM
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Prolect Cost and Financing (US$ M)
* ----- Appraisal L! --------- ---------------Actual Lb *------
Project Component Total Cameroon IBRD Swies-DDA Total Cameroon IBRD SwIes-ODA Other
NYLON
-- Preparatory Works 2\.6 2\.6 -- - 2\.5 2\.5 - - --
- Resettlement Areas 4\.8 4\.8 -- - 8\.5 8\.5 -- --
Roads and Drainage 28\.8 11\.9 11\.9 -- 32\.6 0\.0 18\.5 - 18\.1
** Market and Comm\. Fec\. 7\.0 1\.6 - 5\.5 11\.0 5\.2 - 5\.8 -
YAOUNDE NORTH-WEST
-- Market and Comm\. Fec\. 8\.5 1\.8 1\.7 - 8\.5 8\.5 -- - -
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
- Support to ARAN 4\.3 2\.2 2\.1 -- 6\.2 4\.5 1\.3 2\.4 --
- Support to MINU 6\.8 8\.5 3\.3 - 16\.9 6\.4 4\.5 -- -
-- Other 1\.5 0\.8 0\.7 - 1\.6 1\.8 0\.2 * --
FRONT END FEE 9\.8 - 6\.8 0\.8 - 6\.3
Total 643 28\.8 0\. \. 74\.0 2\.9 19\.1\.
/a USS a 270 CFAF (Appraisal Estimate)
b US$ 817 CFAF (Project Average)
Is To be financed under the Second Urban Project
AFlIN
October 8, 1989
A:T1\.pcr (S)
64
Table 2
REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON
URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, LOAN 2244-CM
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Loan Disbursement by Expenditure Category (USS1,0M)
--Original Financing Plan-- ---Revised Financing Plan--- ------ Total--------
from 65/03f4 to 92/18(88 from 62/118/88 to 91/25/89 from 0S/98/84 to 01/26/89
Expenditure Category IBRD IBRD Gov't\. IBR) IBRD Gov'$t\. IBRD Gov't\.
Share Diab\. Share Total Share D1s\. Share Total Dieb\. Share Total
1A\. Works Nylon BO 4,851 4,851 8,702 85 9,111 1,068 19,719 18,462 5,959 19,421
2A\. Equip\. Nylon 601 184 89 228 61 7 5 12 141 04 285
28\. Equip\. Yaound6 691 47 81 78 60 - - - 47 81 78
$A\. Consult\. Nylon 701 611 282 878 1ow 79w -- 706 1,311 262 1,578
3C\. Consult\. CAPME 791 8 8 11 101 - - - 8 8 11
SD\. Consult\. MINUH 70% 8,190 1,867 4,557 100m 1,879 - 1,879 4,69 1,867 5,988
FRONT END FEE - 296 -- 298 298 -- 298
Total S\.S87 S18 47 1\.9 1\.S 2\.810
AF1IN
October 8, 1989
A:T2\.pcr (SS)
65
Figure 1
REPUBLIQUE OF CAMEROON
URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, LOAN 2244-CM
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Map of Nylon and Ndogpassi
r5=
I \. \. \. ' \. \. \.
A-- At*
%* \.
\. *"*aw*
kQe 4xe | APPROVAL |
P008638 | Document of
The World Bank
FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY
Report No\. 11078
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PORTUGAL
TRAS-OS-MONTES RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(LOAN 2175-PO)
SEPTEMBER 1, 1992
Agriculture Operations Division
Country Department I
Europe and Central Asia Region
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
CURRENCY EOUIVALENTS
Currency Unit Portuguese Escudo (ESc\.)
1 conto (c) = 1,000 Esc\.
Appraisal Esc\. 79 u US$ 1\.00
Year (1982) Esc\. 1,000 (1 conto) = US$ 12,66
Completion Esc\. 157 - US$ 1\.00
Year (1989) Esc\. 1,000 (1 conto) Z US$ 6\.37
ABBREVIATIONS
CCAM Caixa de Credito Agricola Mutuo (Agricultural Credit
Cooperative)
CCRN ComissAo de Coordenacao da Regiao do Norte (Commission of the
Northern Region)
DGHEA Direcg&o Geral de Hidraulica e Engenharia Agricola
(General Directorate of Hydraulics and Rural Engineering)
DHEA Divisao de Hidraulica e Engenharia Agricola (Division of
Hydraulics and Rural Engineering)
DRATM Direcg&o Regional de Agricultura de Tras-os-Montes (Regional
Directorate of Agriculture for Tras-os-Montes)
EEC European Economic Community
FAO Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
FENACAM Federaqao Nacional das Caixas de Credito Agricola Mutuo
(Federation of Agricultural Saving Cooperatives)
GAT Gabinete de Apoio Tecnico (Office of Technical Support)
ICIM Instituto do Credito para Investimentos Municipaes (Credit
Institute for Municipal Investments)
IFADAP Instituto Financeiro de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento da Agricultura
e Pescas (Agriculture and Fisheries Development Fund)
PAU Project Administration Unit
PBI Participating Banking Institution
PCR Project Completion Report
PDRITM I & II Projecto de Desenvolvimento Rural Integrado de Tras-os-Montes
(Tras-os-Montes Rural Development Project)
PEU Project Evaluation Unit
UTAD Universidade de Tras-os-Montes e Alto Douro
(Tras-os-Montes and Alto Douro University)
GOVERNMENT OF PORTUGAL
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 - December 31
FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY
THE WORLD BANK
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
U\.S\.A\.
Office df DitreO-CAenwal
Op\.atsoM Evakustkmn
September 1, 1992
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Completion Report - Portugal
Tras-Os-Montes Rural Development Project
(Loan 2175-po)
Attached, for your information, is a copy of a report
entitled "Project Completion Report on Portugal - Trau-Oa-Montes
Rural Development Project (Loan\. 2175-PO)", prepared by the Europe
and Central Asia Regional Office\. No audit of this project has
been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time\.
Attachmenth
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their oflicial duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
FOR OmCIAL USE ONLY
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PRUGAL
TRAS-OS-MONTES RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(Loan 2175-PO)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No\.
Preface\.
Evaluation Summary \.1\.1\.1\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.
PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE \.1
1\. Project Identity \.1
2\. Background \.1\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.
3\. Project Objectives and Description \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 2
4\. Project Design and Organization \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 3
5\. Project Implementation \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 4
6\. Main Project Results\. 5
General Agricultural Outcome \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 5
Rehabilitation of Traditional Irrigation Schemes\. 6
Development of New Irrigation Schemes\. 6
On-Farm Investments \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 7
Strengthening of Agricultural Services \.8
Agricultural Research\. 8
Agricultural Extension \.9\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 9
Studies \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 10
Non-Agricultural Components \.1\.0\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. lo
Monitoring and Evaluation \.11
Technical Assistance and Training \.11
Financial and Economic Rate of Return \.12
7\. Project Sustainability \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 12
8\. Bank Performance \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 13
9\. Borrower Performance \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 13
10\. Project Relationship \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 14
11\. Consulting Services \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 14
12\. Project Documentation and Data \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 15
PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE \.16
13\. Critical Risks \.16
14\. Some limiting Factors \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 16
15\. Main Results \. 17
16\. Lessons Learned \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 18
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 19
1\. Related Bank Loans \. 19
2\. Project Timetable \. 20
3\. Credit Disbursements \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 21
4\. Project Implementation Ratios \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 23
5\. Project Coats and Financing \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 24
6\. Project Results \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 26
7\. Status of Legal Covenants \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 31
8\. Use of Bank Resources \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 32
9\. Economic and Financial Analysis \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 34
Appendix: List of the 17 Reports Prepared by UTAD \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. 43
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PORTUGAL
TRAS-OS-MONTES RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(Loan 2175-PO)
PREFACE
This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Tras-Os-Montes Rural
Development Project in Portugal for which the Loan 2175-PO in the amount of
US$51\.0 million equivalent was approved in June 1982\. The loan was closed on
December 31, 1989, one year behind schedule\. A total of US$44\.32 million was
disbursed and US$6\.7 million was cancelled at closing\.
The PCR (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III) was prepared by
FAO/World Bank Cooperative Programme (FAO/CP) for Agriculture Operations
Division of the former Europe, Middle East & North Africa Regional Office\.
Part II was prepared by the Project Administration Unit (CCRN)\. The report is
based,inter alia, on findings of the Staff Appraisal Report, the Loan
Agreement, World Bank supervision reports and a project completion report
prepared by the CCRN\.
- iii -
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PORTAL
TRAS-08-NONTES RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(Loan 2175-PO)
EVALUATION SUIDARY
Proiect obiectives and description (311
1\. The objectives of this rural development project were to: (a) establish
a base for technological progress in agriculture in the region, and improve
agricultural services in order to stimulate such progress; (b) raise farm family
incomes by rehabilitating traditional irrigation schemes and by supporting
changes in farming systems, particularly an orientation towards livestock
production, and an expansion of production of quality wines; (c) raise standards
of living and support development in the poorest region of Portugal by improving
physical and social infrastructure; and (d) encourage decentralization of public
activities through expansion and strengthening of regional agricultural services,
support for municipal infrastructural development programs, and improvement of
planning, design, and maintenance capabilities of regional institutions\.
2\. The project had a total of 19 components which fell under the general
headings of Irrigation Development, On-farm Investments, Rural Infrastructures,
Agriculture Service Strengthening, Studies, Research, Technical Assistance and
Fellowships\.
Proiect costs (5\.31
3\. The estimated project cost at appraisal was Escudos 10\.85 billion (US$154\.8
million), of which US$51 million, representing the foreign exchange component,
constituted the total Loan amount\. The final project expenditures amounted to
Escudos 10\.43 billion, but only US$ 67\.5 million (due to a considerable
devaluation of the escudo), of which US$44\.32 million were disbursed by the Bank;
an undisbursed balance of US$6\.68 million was cancelled in September 1990\. The
actual economic rate of return is about 18%, compared to the appraisal estimate
of 16% (6\.37)\. The project was completed, as planned, in 7 years\.
1/ Para numbex in main text\.
- iv -
Implementation Zxierience and Results
4\. The successful project components were: (a) the rehabilitation of
traditional irrigation schemes (6\.2); (b) the non-agricultural component,
providing water supply and sewage systems, rural roads, village streets and
classrooms for village schools (6\.27); (c) the on-farm investment in the Douro
Valley for vineyard establishment (6\.10) and in the High Valley zone for
livestock up-grading (6\.1); (d) the strengthening of agricultural services
(6\.15); (e) the feasibility study for the Chaves irrigation development (6\.25);
and (f) the project monitoring by the CCRN\.
5\. The components whose objectives were only partially achieved, and the
reasons for limited results, are the following: (a) the on-farm investment in the
Terra Quente region, which benefitted only the large farms (6\.12); (b) the
agricultural extension services, becoming operational only towards the end of the
project (6\.20); (c) the agricultural research studies whose results have not been
disseminated to the farmers (6\.16); and (d) the training component, which mainly
benefitted CCRN staff of whom two managers left to join the private sector
(6\.31)\.
6\. The unsuccessful project components were: (a) the on-farm investment in the
Mountain and Planalto Mirandes zones because of the inadequacy of the proposed
technical packages (6\.13-6\.14); (b) the evaluation system which did not provide
quantified project results (6\.33); (c) the new irrigation development, as
presently designed, which is not economically viable because of high investment
costs (6\.7); (d) the Freixo olive grove feasibility study which proposed too high
investments for the pumping system to justify any development (6\.26); and (e) the
groundwater investigations which showed that no significant underground water
resources exist for further irrigation development (6\.24);
sustainabilitv
7\. Most of the successful project components are likely to maintain an
acceptable level of benefit throughout their economic life, in particular the
rehabilitation of traditional irrigation schemes, on-farm investments aiming to
upgrade vineyard and livestock production, as well as rural infrastructures built
for living conditions' improvement (7\.1)\.
Main Lessons Learned
8\. The major lessons learnt and recommendations for other projects of this
type are as follows: (a) although integrated agricultural development has now
been questioned, the success of the PDRITM project was mainly due to this type
of approach which was considered to be the best given the prevailing regional
conditions; (b) the complexity of integrated rural development projects requires
a close and permanent coordination between the implementing agencies: (c) due to
the very high cost of the pilot irrigation scheme, the design and economic
viability of future schemes should be thoroughly studied; (d) more effort should
be made to monitor applied agricultural research in order to ensure that
practical recommendations and messages are disseminated to farmers through
extension agents; (e) the early implementation of an effective monitoring and
evaluation system is of great support to project activities; and (f) the work
program of the UTAD evaluation unit should have been more clearly defined\. There
should have been closer collaboration between CCRN, charged with monitoring the
project, and the UTAD specialists (9\.4)\.
PORTUGAL
TRAS-OS-"MNTES RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(Loan 2175-PO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE
1\. Proiect Identity
- Project Name: Tras-Os-Montes Rural Development Project
- Loan No\.: 2175-PO
- RVP Unit: EC1
- Country: Portugal
- Sector: Agriculture
- Sub-sector: Area Development
2\. Background
2\.1 The Tras-Os-Montes Rural Development Project (PDRITM-I) was the third Bank
Group assisted agricultural project in Portugal (Part III, Table 1)\. It was
identified as an effort to save foreign exchange through an efficient import
substitution program and to get the agricultural sector in shape for Portugal's
entry to the EEC\. In 1982, that sector was producing very little more than the
levels of the sixties and therefore its share of GDP was continuously declining\.
The agricultural trade balance was substantially negative with imports being more
than three times as great as exports, and the agricultural trade deficit was
about one third of the total trade deficit\. The stagnation of agricultural
production was partly due to Government policy of price controls, guarantees, and
subsidies\. Furthermore, there were marked regional variations within Portugal
in terms of economic development and living standards\. In 1970, for example, the
average income per capita for the whole country was twice that of Tras-Os-Montes,
the poorest region, while per capita income in the richest region was four times
that in Tras-Os-Montes\.
2\.2 The project was identified by a Bank agricultural sector survey mission in
late 1976 and prepared by a national team with important assistance from the
FAO/World Bank Cooperative Programme (FAO/CP)\. An identification report was
prepared in August 1978 and a preparation report two years later (Part III, Table
2)\. Appraisal took place in November 1980\. Due to the need to resolve
outstanding issues, negotiations were delayed until April 1982, one month after
a Post-Appraisal mission\. The project was then approved by the Board in June
1982, signed in March 1983 and became effective in July 1983\. It closed at the
end of December 1989, one year behind schedule, and was completed in June
19901/\.
1 The closing date marks the end of new commitments; the completion date corresponds to the end
of payments\.
2\.3 The Bank's support of Portugal's efforts to increase efficient agricultural
production and to reduce the difference between regional economic development
matched Government's development strategies\. It is still in line with present
strategy as a second phase of PDRITM-I, the Tras-Os-Montes Regional Development
Project (PDRITM-II) started operations in February 1991\. The estimated total
cost of the second phase, also prepared with the assistance of FAO/CP is US$416
million to which the World Bank will contribute financing of US$90 million and
the EEC, US$213 million\.
3\. Prolect Oblectives and Descriotion
3\.1 The objectives of the PDRITM-I were to: (a) establish a base for
technological progress of agriculture in the region, and to improve agricultural
services to stimulate such progress; (b) raise incomes of farm families by
rehabilitating traditional irrigation schemes and supporting changes in farming
systems, particularly an orientation towards livestock production, and an
expansion of production of quality wines; (c) raise standards of living and
support development in the poorest region of Portugal by improving physical and
social infrastructure; and (d) encourage decentralization of public activities
through expansion and strengthening of regional agricultural services, support
for municipal infrastructural development programs, and the improvement of
planning, design, and maintenance capabilities of regional institutions\.
3\.2 At appraisal, the project consisted of the following main components:
Irriaation Development\. (a) Rehabilitation of 150 small irrigation schemes in the
Mountain and High Valley zones, covering about 2,720 farms with 7,500 ha
irrigated; and (b) Agricultural credit to farmers to support the development of
intensive dairying in the above irrigated areas, beef cattle and sheep production
on rainfed pastures in the Planalto Mirandes zone and the Terra Quente zone, as
well as vineyard establishment in the Douro zone\.
Agricultural Services\. (a) Construction of 109 cooperative milking parlours, and
credit to cooperatives for storage facilities, and vehicles for transportation;
and (b) Investments in buildings, houses, vehicles, and equipment for
agricultural research, extension, animal health and breeding, and irrigation
services\.
Non-agricultural Comoonents\. Construction of about 80 km of new rural roads,
improvement of about 120 km of existing roads, and paving of streets in 61
villages; (b) Investments in water supply schemes in 56 communities,
improvements in small water supply schemes with standpipes in about 160 villages,
and construction of sewage schemes in 65 communities; (c) Rehabilitation of
construction of about 60 classrooms for primary schools; and (d) Construction and
equipping of 2 health centers and 12 health posts, as well as other community
development works\.
Technical Assistance\. Studies\. (a) Studies covering irrigation, groundwater, and
olive development; (b) Irrigation trials, consulting assistance for agricultural
research, livestock husbandry and breeding, the credit system, cooperatives,
management training in concelhos, and monitoring/evaluation; and (c) fellowships
for training\.
3\.3 As discussed in chapters 5 and 6 and shown in Table 4, almost all of the
components in the project were implemented\.
4\. Proiect Desian and Orranization
4\.1 The lack of applied agricultural and livestock research in the area and the
rather unfavorable ecological conditions (severe climate, poor and shallow soils,
etc\.) were the major constraints to agricultural development in Tras-Os-Montes\.
In addition, living conditions, well below the national standards, required
considerable improvements\.
4\.2 The project was well designed, having taken into account various conditions
prevailing in the agro-ecological zones of the project area\. Particularly
relevant were:
(a) the priority given to the development of irrigation; in the Mountain
and High Valley zones, irrigation facilitated greatly the change
from a two-year rotation to a four-year rotation including two years
of temporary pasture;
(b) the proposal to plant or replant 2,200 ha of high quality vineyard
in order to maintain in the long run, the quality of port wine;
(c) the importance given to animal production, particularly milk
production, to balance crop and animal production and provide
farmers with regular incomes\. On the other hand, technological
packages proposed for the drier areas were less elaborate with high
risks to be taken by farmers compared with the expected benefits\.
Furthermore, the phasing of adoption was optimistic\.
4\.3 Since project identification, it was recognized that the ambitious project
objectives could only be realized in the long term and that implementation would
require several phases\. In spite of the large requirements in social
infrastructure (water supply and sewage schemes, rural roads, schools) it was
agreed that the non-agricultural component should not mobilize more than one
third of the total investment\.
4\.4 The responsibility of project coordination was entrusted to the Project
Administration Unit under the existing Coordination Commission for the Northern
Region (CCRN) based in Porto\. The agricultural components of the project were
implemented by the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture (DRATM)
in Mirandela\. The evaluation, socio-economic studies, and research aspects were
sub-contracted to the University of Tras-Os-Montes and Alto-Douro (UTAD)\.
Despite some coordination issues, the project organization can be considered to
have been well designed and having fulfilled its roles\.
-4-
5\. Proiect Implementation
5\.1 Project negotiations took place in April 1982 and the project was
presented to the Board in June 1982\. But it was only in July 1983 that it became
effective\. Much of the delay in fulfilling the conditions of effectiveness,
mostly related to the credit component, was due to the formation of a new
Government\.
5\.2 The project closing date was initially fixed at end December 1988, and
further extended by one year\. Notwithstanding the initial delay in declaring
the loan effective, the project was actually implemented in about 7 years,
corresponding more or less to the estimated period at appraisal time\. In June
1990, all project components were physically completed, but the last payments for
the milking parlours and the Curalha new irrigation scheme, made beyond June
1990, have not been financed by the Loan\.
5\.3 Proiect costs\. The estimated project cost at appraisal was about Escudos
10\.85 billion (US$154\.8 million), of which US$51 million, representing the
foreign exchange component, constituted the loan amount\. The final project
expenditures amounted to Escudos 10\.43 billion (US$ 67\.5 million), of which
US$44\.32 million were disbursed by the Bank; the undisbursed balance of US$6\.68
million was cancelled in September 1990\. The loan allocation was modified in
August 1985 to transfer US$10 million from the agricultural credit component to
finance 40% of the civil works of the non-agricultural component\. Actual
component costs compared with SAR estimates are shown in Table 5\.A\.
5\.4 The rapid and considerable devaluation of the local currency against the
USS since 1982 (70 Esc\. per US$ at appraisal; max 170 Esc\. per US$ in 1985;
average 1983-90: 154 Eac/US$) explains why the total project cost in US$ is less
than 50% of the SAR estimates while in Escudos, there is almost no difference\.
The changes in the exchange rate explains why with a reduced loan the Bank
financed 65% of the total project costs compared to 32% estimated at SAR (Part
III, Table 5\.B)\.
5\.5 Procurement\. About 28 contracts financed under the project, representing
about Escudos 1\.3 billion (12% of the total cost), were contracted by CCRN and
DRATM as follows:
(a) 4 contracts (Esc 140 million) under international competitive
bidding (ICB) for the purchase of equipment for the milking parlours
and vehicles;
(b) 4 contracts (Eac 25 million) under limited international bidding
(LIB) for the groundwater and irrigation studies;
(c) 20 contracts (Esc 910 million) under local competitive bidding (LCB)
for the construction of the new irrigation scheme, of various
project buildings and supply of equipment\. In addition, LCB
procedures were used by the municipalities for most of the
infrastructures constituting the non-agricultural component\.
5\.6 Imolementation variances\. The variances between planned and actual
implementation are as follows: (a) rehabilLtation works of the traditional
irrigation schemes were considerably delayed due to organizational issues and the
initial lack of equipment and staff\. The 150 schemes were completed by the end
of 1989 instead of end of 1987; (b) on-farm investments (credit component) took
time to be initiated, due to the time-consuming drafting of credit regulations
and guidelines\. First loans were disbursed in 1984 (SAR: estimated early 1983)\.
The number of credit requests was much lower than expected (600 instead of 3,050)
but this was partly compensated by higher average amounts; (c) equipment and
buildings for agricultural services strengthening were generally procured on
time; some delays are reported for the completion of the second lot of milking
parlours\. Surprisingly, some of the extensionists' houses, although completed,
remained unoccupied for several months; (d) the non-agricultural component was
implemented according to schedule (1982 to 1988), despite the increased volume
of construction\. The health posts and centers were implemented as scheduled, but
these were not financed from the loan; (e) the agricultural research contracts
were considerably delayed (almost 2 years) because of administrative procedures
and disagreement on the themes to be tackled\. The dissemination of some research
results, although not performed during the project period, were to be started
during second phase; (f) the irrigation and groundwater studies which started 2
years later than planned due to lengthy procurement procedures, were completed
by the end of 1987; (g) the implementation of the three new irrigation schemes
was delayed by an initial unsuccessful bidding\. A separate contract was made for
the Curalha scheme, the construction of which lasted from July 89 to early 91\.
The two other irrigation schemes are due to be developed during the follow-up
project; (h) the fellowship component concentrated on the training abroad of five
CCRN executives (66 man\.months) of whom only one is still employed by the
project\.
5\.7 One of the major risks initially identified was that the technical
proposals for agriculture, entirely new for the farmers, would encounter
application difficulties; therefore a sound and well funded research component
was designed, including interaction with the extension staff\. Unfortunately, the
results of that component were not available during the project period; so the
impact of those packages would be assessed only during the follow-up project\.
6\. Main Prolect Results
General Agricultural Outcome
6\.1 The major agricultural development achievements within the project area
were largely due to changes in the cropping pattern and genetic improvement of
cattle\. The project endeavored to convert areas under cereals into productive
permanent sown pastures, to limit nematode infestations in the potato areas and
to increase fertilizer applications on traditional pastures\. In the Douro area,
the main project emphasis was on financing the plantation of new vineyards in
selected areas, supported by modern methods of vine husbandry\. Project actions
also encompassed livestock production, which was assuming an increasingly
important role in agriculture, cattle and sheep providing a significant
contribution to national milk and meat production\. The main project thrust here
was on genetic improvement of animals, better management of pastures, more
efficient fodder harvesting and conservation, and organization of modern
technologies of milk collection\.
Rehabilitation of Traditional Irriaatiou Bch--es
6\.2 Out of a potential of 1,500 small irrigation schemes, the project
rehabilitated 150 schemes, totalling 5,860 ha, i\.e\. 39 ha on average per unit
(SAR estimate: 50 ha)\.
6\.3 Rehabilitation works consisted mainly of repair or reconstruction of
diversion weirs, construction of concrete water tanks and main canals of limited
size and simple design\. The project supplied basic material (cement, iron, wood,
etc\.), construction equipment, skilled labor and technical assistance, the
unskilled labor being provided by the beneficiaries (about 20% of the total
cost)\. The development of such a collaborative effort has been an important
outcome of the project\. The quality of the works has been generally good\.
6\.4 Due to initial difficulties (farmer mobilization, lack of technical staff
for design and supervision, lack of equipment and vehicles) the implementation
rate was limited to 10 schemes per year in 1983 and 1984, but this increased to
30 schemes from 1986 to 1990\.
6\.5 The considerable success of this component, which fully achieved its
specific objectives, is demonstrated by the magnitude of the present demand for
further rehabilitation works: more than 400 requests are on the waiting list\.
6\.6 The conditions of implementation and qualitative achievements were assessed
by the UTAD Evaluation Unit2/; but the accurate impact of the works on
agricultural production remains to be quantified\.
Develoiment of Now Irriaation Schemes
6\.7 The project envisaged the construction of 3 new irrigation schemes of about
150 ha each; the future of irrigation development in Tras-O-Montes, the farmers'
response, the administration capacity of implementation and its economic
viability was to be assessed\.
6\.8 The results of this component are disappointing: after lengthy and
complicated procurement procedures, the Curalha irrigation schemer was
constructed in 1989/90, to irrigate 100 ha of potatoes, wheat and forages for
1 Ref\. UTAD - Helhoria dos Regadios Tradicionais - Dec\. 1990\.
v One earth dam\. 16m high, would store 800,000 m\. and deliver water to an irrigation network\.
comprising a 2,900 m long concrete canal and a mixed 4,600 m long system of PVC pipes and
open concrete watercourses\.
-7 -
livestock\. The main constraints for further development have been: the lack of
suitable sites combining favorable conditions for water storage and for
irrigation, the extremely high cost of this scheme which was more than US$ 21,000
per ha, the difficulty of introducing high value crops which results in the very
low economic rate of return (Part III, Table 6\.C) and the administrative
difficulties involved in the management of such scheme\. A new approach is
required for the future\. The aim should be the design of low-cost main
infrastructure, the involvement of farmers in the financing of the distribution
networks and the on-farm works, and looking for innovative means to increase
agricultural production\. In order to improve the project economic viability, the
preferred approach should be for multi-purpose development (power, domestic water
supply and irrigation)\.
On-Farm Investments
6\.9 In order to support efforts to increase agricultural production, five farm
models were designed and for each of them, credit provided from the project was
due to help farmers to finance the required investments\. These investments were
officially specified for each farm model\. Many farmers have not taken advantage
of the credit facilities even if they have partially adopted the technical
package\. Besides, the latter was not always adaptable to the specific conditions
of each farm\. However, farmers were requested to adopt the full package\. This
and the fact that smaller farmers would not need to use the credit facility if
they would be willing to use only part of the package are probably the main
reasons why the number of loans distributed by the project was largely below the
target (Part III, Table 4)\. On the other hand, the average areas of farms having
benefitted from loans were always larger, and in some cases much larger, than the
planned areas\. This explains why some targets, in terms of ha, were exceeded
even when the planned number of farms were not met\.
6\.10 Vineyard Establishment\. The loan agreement had planned that 1,200 ha of
plantation and 1,000 ha of replantation would be financed by the project\. The
target has been revised by the Government which has gazetted that 2,500 ha of
Vineyard could be planted or replantedY (Portaria No\. 685/82)\. Applications
for new vineyards totalled 9,000 ha out of which 2,535 ha were authorized
(2,525 ha of plantation and 10 ha only of replantation)\. Two main reasons
explain the success of that model: plantation permit and the credit conditions
(15 years including four years grace)\.
6\.11 Vales Sub-Montanas\. The objective of that model was to better balance the
crop and animal productions by modifying the cropping pattern and investing in
cows and stables\. Farmers have understood the rationale of that model, which was
to secure regular income from milk production\. However, the profitability of the
model was marginal, and therefore the number of loans disbursed was 62% lower
than planned (Part III, Table 4)\. On the other hand, the average farm size was
much larger than estimated and the actual total area largely exceeded the target
Y Plantation of vineyard is strictly controlled in the Douro zone\.
- 8 -
by 154%\. It should also be noted that many farmerg have totally or partially
adopted the technical package proposed by the project even if they have not
applied for a credit\. As a result, milk production has increased significantly;
that increase was also facilitated by the construction and equipment of more than
one hundred milking parlours disseminated within the region (Para 32)\.
6\.12 Terra Ouente\. The financial viability of this model remains doubtful and
it had limited success: 11% and 60% respectively of the planned number of farms
and total area\. Some large farms (from 70 to 700 ha), but no small farmers (6
ha on average) who were invited to form groups in order to be eligible for credit
participated in the project\. The limited success can be explained by the
uncertain profitability of the recommended investments combined with the
obligation to join groups which were not attractive enough to convince small
farmers to participate in the project\.
6\.13 Montanha\. The lack of success of the Montanha model (10% and 19%
respectively of the planned number of farms and total area) was most likely the
result of reservations farmers had vis-a-vis the technical package\. In addition,
it was only in 1986 that the Ministry of Agriculture removed the ban on import
of the breed provided in the project\.
6\.14 Planalto Mirandes\. The technical package proposed by the project, largely
based on meat production, did not convince the farmers who, at that time, were
interested in increasing their milk production\. The latter seems to be the main
reason why, about 5% only of the planned 350 farmers applied for credit\.
Strencythening of Agricultural services
6\.15 The project was to provide 60 new houses and 157 vehicles for the extension
staff, two veterinary laboratories, an artificial insemination unit, a seed
laboratory and 109 milking parlours\. With the exception of the veterinary
laboratories, artificial insemination unit and seed laboratories which were not
built and equipped, the planned targets were met at 90%\. The 131 procured
vehicles have been allocated, most of the 54 houses for the extension staff are
now occupied, and the 107 milking parlour\. are already being used at 75% of their
capacity\. Small farmers were convinced that milking parlours are the best
solution to reduce labor requirements and to get high quality milk thus
benefitting from better prices\. Milking parlours are managed by cooperatives
which charge 1 Esc\. per litre to farmers to cover operating and capital costs\.
Agricultural Research
6\.16 Research priorities included three categories of research programs: (a)
research on the main farming systems in the project area, to identify socio-
economic and technical constraints at farm level, to test solutions that address
these constraints and to initiate research according to farmers' needs; (b)
specific research programs to support on-going development activities, such as
chestnut, almond and olive tree planting, improvement of water use under
irrigated and rainfed conditions, potato seed production, etc\.; and (c) research
programs to identify new promising crops suitable for the ecological conditions
of the project area such as agroforestry species, aromatic and medicinal plants,
legume crops (e\.g\. chick-peas, groundnuts), etc\.
6\.17 In 1984, a contract was signed between CCRN and UTAD for the implementation
of 17 agricultural research and economic studies!/, (selected by the parties
involved and the DRATM); one of the studies was related to the Evaluation Unit
of the project (see para 50)\.
6\.18 Each subject was to be monitored by a DRATM specific subject matter
specialist, but due to high staff turn-over, this monitoring left much to be
desired\. The progress of the studies was assessed twice a year by 3 research
specialists of the Regional Agriculture Development Programme which is now
entrusted with field applications of the studies' results\.
6\.19 The quality of UTAD contribution is considered too academicV as it is not
easy to extract technical messages which could be practically disseminated to the
farmers\.
Agricultural Extension
6\.20 At Agrarian zone level, the "training and visit" extension system was set
up as recommended by the project\. Total staffing and level of training of the
DRATM extensionists are as follows: 11 extension coordinators, 97 field extension
agents, of whom 5 engineers, 40 technical engineers, and 52 technicians; in
addition, 12 extensionists are employed by the cooperatives\.
6\.21 Despite early staff mobilization (2/3 of the staff recruited in 1983) the
system was difficult to establish until the end of 1989\. The main constraints
reducing the efficiency of the service included: lack of extensionists training,
absence of subject matter specialists and of Documentation and Information
support, absence of a comprehensive annual extension program, lack of transport,
limited budget allocations, and problems with the Cooperative extension,
particularly Cooperative Unions Potato Seed Growers and Lactimontes\.
6\.22 The situation has now improved for the following reasons: four training
courses are now available for the extensionists: fruit crops, vineyard, livestock
and horticulture; conditions of service, in particular salaries, have improved
considerably since 1990; the DRATM extension program is now in line with the
national program and benefit from elaborated guidelines; 57 liaison vehicles were
provided in 1990 and 1991\.
S 5AR: 25 studies were pIoposed\.
E Bach topic was the subject of a University Degree\.
- 10 -
Studies
6\.23 The project financed hydrogeologic investigations to evaluate the
groundwater potential of the region and two feasibility studies on promising
sites for irrigation development\.
6\.24 Groundwater Sivestiaations\. In 24 representative sub-areas, 322 boreholes
and 68 shallow wells were drilled\. The overall results were disappointing:
specific boreholes discharges did not exceed 5 1/s and the total for the 322
boreholes was 350 1/s\. All collected data were communicated to the
municipalities, with a view to using the boreholes for domestic water supply\.
More encouraging results were obtained in the alluvial Chaves Plain, where unit
discharges of up to 40 1/s could be exploited for irrigation\. In total, 3\.5Mm3
of groundwater could be pumped annually which will be mixed with 13\.3Mm3 of
surface water to be regularized, in order to supply the future 3,800 ha Chaves
irrigation perimeter\. Geothermical resources, for possible further development
of urban complexes and greenhouses heating, were also identified during the
campaign\.
6\.25 Chaves Valley Irrigation DeveloDment\. Between mid 1985 and the end of
1987, a feasibility study was undertaken by a group of consultants\. A priority
area of about 2,500 ha (out of a potential totalling 3,800 ha), including the
rehabilitation of the existing 1,000 ha irrigated, would be developed under the
second phase project; the construction should start early 1992\. Water resources
would be provided by diversion of the Tamega river, storage dams are to be
constructed on tributaries and groundwater pumped in the aquifer\. Cropping
pattern would give priority to forages (alfalfa, maize) but also corn and
vegetables (mainly potatoes and cabbages) would be produced as well as fruit
trees\. The economic rate of return of the sub-project was estimated to be 18%\.
6\.26 The Freixo-de-Espada-A-Cinta Olive grove Irrigation Studies\. The study
aimed to develop a 950 ha irrigation system to pump the Douro water and to
distribute it to an existing olive grove installed on a steep bank of the river\.
High costs of infrastructure and excessive recurrent operation expenses induced
the Administration to abandon the project since it was not considered to be
economically viable\. As requested by the 30 owners of the grove, an electric
power line was installed along the river (financed by EEC funds) and individual
pumping systems were installed by most of the farmers at their own costs\.
Non-Aaricultural Comoonents
6\.27 The project assigned 48% of the total expenses to the municipalities for
the construction of general and social infrastructure (para\. 5 and table 4)\.
6\.28 It is estimated that 360,000 inhabitants, i\.e\. 62% of the Tras-Os-Montes
population, have benefitted from at least one of the 720 schemes implemented
under this component\. The whole program was completed by the end of 1988\.
- 11 -
6\.29 The initial program of construction has been considerably amplified in
terms of quantities without exceeding significantly the initial cost estimates
(see Table 4)\. This was mainly due to the prevailing economic conditions in
Portugal from 1983 to 1986, which induced lower construction costs than expected,
thus allowing a significant program expansion\.
6\.30 Designs of the infrastructure were prepared by the Offices for Technical
Support (GAT) installed in each of the 6 agrarian zones\. The project contributed
to the strengthening of those GAT, by providing equipment and vehicles\.
6\.31 The operation and maintenance activities will be the responsibility of the
municipalities\. The corresponding recurrent expenses for the rural roads, the
sewage system and school classrooms are covered by their own budgets; for the
water supply schemes, these expenses are fully recovered by the water charges
paid by the users\.
6\.32 This non agricultural component had a positive impact on the standards of
living in the region and allowed this neglected region to move closer to national
standards\.
Nonitorina and Evaluation
6\.33 The project established in January 1983 a Project Administration Unit (PAU)
within the CCRN\. The PAU which was adequately staffed, prepared semi-annual
progress reports which were sent on time to the Bank; project Accounts were
correctly kept\. These satisfactory results were achieved in spite of a frequent
staff turn-over\. However, due to a lack of professionals with a practical
experience in evaluation, the PAU was unable to guide the Project Evaluation Unit
(PEU) established, as recommended by the SAR, within the University of Tras-Os-
Montes and Alto Douro\. The PEU did not recruit enough researchers and assistants
to staff the Unit and did not receive adequate support from internationally
recruited specialists in monitoring and evaluation as recommended by the SAR\.
As a result, the PEU program of work has not included the planned general
economic survey, but gave priority to qualitative studies on sociological issues\.
The lack of basic economic data of the Tras-Os-Montes region has not helped
project management in its decision-making process\.
Technical Assistance and Training
1\. Technical Assistance
6\.34 The bulk of the technical assistance (TA) has been provided by local
consulting firms for the above described studies (para 40)\. Several specific
agronomic, economic and social studies were carried out by UTAD upon CCRN and
DRATM requests, in addition to agricultural research studies (para 37)\. Some
limited TA was provided by DGEAH to start the irrigation rehabilitation
component\. The project did not make full use of the TA expertise foreseen at
appraisal, namely for animal health, artificial insemination, monitoring and
- 12 -
evaluation, local staff training, for which international consultants should have
been recruited\.
2\. Trainin
6\.35 The training component focused on fellowships in British and French
Universities for 5 CCRN executives of whom only one is still employed by the
project\. Two Deputy Directors left the administration a few months after
rejoining the project, one obtained a continuing fellowship under other funding
arrangements\. As a result, the 66 man-months used by CCRN, or 86% of the
training expenses, have had little impact on the project\. The remaining 14% was
allocated to local training of DRATM and FENACAM staff\.
Financial and Economic Rates of Return
6\.36 Although project impact data were not collected by the PEU, the mission,
working with DRATM and CCRN specialists, was able to make reasonable estimates
allowing for a without and with project comparison of some models\. Two farm
models, (Montanha and Planalto Mirandes) have not been included in the
calculation, the number of participating farmers having been considered too low\.
The Financial Rates of Return (FRR) on the farm investment were estimated in the
SAR to vary from 19% to 37%\. They are presently calculated to vary from 1 to 16%
(Part III, Table 6B)\. The Douro model has the highest FRR and the Terra Quente
model the lowest\. The FRR of the Vales Sub-Montanes model (9%) is marginal\. In
addition to these models designed during preparation, a fourth model for
Irrigation Rehabilitation has been included in the analysis to take into account
the large areas which were rehabilitated by the project and whose beneficiaries
have not been included in the other models\. The FRR of the fourth model is very
high (more than 89%) because farmers were only asked to finance 20% of the
rehabilitation cost\.
6\.37 The estimated actual Economic Rate of Return (ERR) is slightly higher than
anticipated at appraisal (18% instead of 16%) in spite of a lower than planned
rate of farmer participation and a low ERR of two of the models (Part III, Table
6C)\. This results from the fact that the high ERRs of the Irrigation
Rehabilitation and the Douro models have more than compensated for the low
profitability of the other two models mentioned above\.
7\. Proiect Sustainability
7\.1 Most of the project components are likely to maintain an acceptable level
of benefits throughout their economic life:
(a) the rehabilitated traditional irrigation schemes are expected to be
correctly maintained because farmers appreciate the value of water
and they have agreed to contribute to the rehabilitation works\. The
expected benefit resulting from the use of increased quantities of
- 13 -
water and from a more practical management (night irrigation is no
longer necessary) were sufficiently attractive to convince farmers
of contributing to the rehabilitation work and this should be a
guarantee that maintenance will be properly carried out;
(b) farmers who have adopted new technical packages namely for milk and
high quality grapes production, are likely to continue following the
advice of the Agriculture Service, if farm-gate prices are
maintained\. It is even probable that due to the strengthening of
the extension services, new technical packages developed by the
applied research will be disseminated within the project area;
(c) the milking parlours constructed and equipped by the project are
already or are in the process of being managed by cooperatives\.
Until now, the experience has shown that cooperatives run the
milking parlours efficiently and that operating and capital costs
are adequately covered by the charge paid by the farmers\.
(d) the infrastructures built under the non-agricultural component
should remain operational for several decades, provided sufficient
funds are put at the disposal of the municipalities for their proper
maintenance\.
8\. Bank Performance
8\.1 Bank performance during preparation and appraisal was satisfactory, taking
into account the political situation in Portugal and the complexity of the
project\. Generally, Bank supervision missions identified key problems and were
able to propose actions to remedy them\. There was, nevertheless, discontinuity
in supervision staffing during part of the project (three Task Managers in seven
years) and some specializations were not often or never represented (Economist,
Monitoring and Evaluation specialist, in particular)\.
9\. Borrower Performance
9\.1 The project benefitted from very competent staff, most of them fully
involved from the beginning of preparation and during the whole implementation
period\. It is worth mentioning the exceptional performance of the DRATM Director
of Agricultural Planning, to whom the project successes should mainly be
attributed\.
9\.2 The Borrower's main strengths were: the full involvement in project
preparation of the local team responsible for its implementation which was very
useful in determining project objectives\. Also, the project benefitted from
strong management, particularly at the regional level; the difficult tasks to
optimize the use of the various financing agencies was quite successfully
performed\. Finally, the active participation of the implementing agencies, in
particular those involved in the agricultural credit and the vineyard
development; the dynamism of municipalities in implementing the social
- 14 -
infrastructure; and the generally favorable response of the farmers to the
project activities are worthy of note\.
9\.3 The main weaknesses of the Borrower relate to: reluctance to mobilize TA,
in particular to recruit international consultants; the limited assistance
provided by DGEAH for the development of new irrigation schemes; the incomplete
project evaluation by UTAD which was reluctant to provide quantified results; the
difficulties to extract from the agricultural research studies practical
technical messages which could be disseminated to the farmers through the
extension services and the difficulties in organizing the extension services\.
Lessons Learned
9\.4 The main lessons learned and recommendations for projects of this type are:
(a) although integrated agricultural development has now been questioned, the
success of the PDRITM project was mainly due to this approach which was
considered to be the best given the prevailing regional conditions; project
managers sought integration within project components and consistency with the
regional policies; (b) the complexity of such integrated rural development
projects requires a close and permanent coordination between the executive
agencies; (c) due to the very high cost of the pilot irrigation scheme, the
design and economic viability of future schemes should be thoroughly studied; (d)
more effort should be made to monitor applied agricultural research in order to
ensure that practical recommendations and messages are disseminated to farmers
through extension agents; (a) the early establishment of a monitoring and
evaluation system is of great importance for effective project implementation;
(f) the work program of the UTAD evaluation unit should have been more clearly
defined\. There should have been closer collaboration between CCRN, charged with
monitoring the project, and the UTAD specialists; interim reports should have
been discussed by all parties involved and short-term action programs should have
guided the work of the evaluation unit\. For the second phase project, CCRN and
UTAD responsibilities, as far as monitoring and evaluation is concerned, should
be redefined and a detailed program of work for the evaluation unit should be
drafted as soon as possible\.
10\. Proiect Relationshio
10\. 1 The relationship between the Bank and the Borrower was excellent during the
whole project implementation period\. The recommendations made by the numerous
supervision missions were considered useful and were generally followed by
concrete action\. and when necessary, corrective measures\.
11\. Consulting Service\.
11\.1 The groundwater investigations and the two irrigation feasibility studies
were satisfactorily carried out by local consulting firms, associated with
foreign consultants\. The total cost of two consultant services was almost twice
- 15 -
the SAR estimate, due to the increase volume of work for the reconnaissance
drillings\. While one of the main tasks of these consultants was supposed to be
the training of local staff, the latter did not appear to benefit from any
significant transfer of knowledge\.
11\.2 Out of the 20 man-months of internationally recruited consultants provided
under the project, to help implement the Monitoring and Evaluation component, 20
man weeks only have been utilized\. As a result, the project manager has not been
supported as foreseen\.
12\. Proiect Documentation and Data
12\.1 Both the Loan Agreement with the Republic of Portugal and the Project
Agreement with IFADAP (for the Credit Component) were quite adequate and
appropriate for achieving project objectives in the key organizational and
financial aspects\. The SAR provided a useful guide to the project management
during implementation and to the PCR mission\. Nevertheless, the Bank did not
point out that it was to be used only as a "guide" and that changes may be
required\.
12\.2 From 1983 to 1990, the CCRN Project Administration Unit (PAU) prepared 11
semestrial progress reports following a standard presentation agreed to by the
Bank\. Early in 1991, the PAU drafted a final progress report summarizing the
whole project implementation\. Some information was extracted from that report
for the PCR, but the content of the PAU report does not respond clearly to the
queries listed in the World Bank guidelines for preparing PCRs\. Perhaps, an
additional effort should have been made by the last supervision mission to
describe the type of information required for the final progress report\.
- 16 -
PART II: PROJNCT REVIEW FROM BORROWNR'S PZRSPECTIVE'
13\. Critical Risks
13\.1 The progressive and selective process that commanded the preparation of the
project identified a set of implementation risks, mainly related with the
following areas:
(a) irrigation - related with the capability for planning and
construction of new irrigation schemes; and
(b) agricultural credit - inherent to the relative adequacy of the
investment models to be proposed to the farmers, and to their
adoption of new practices and cultural systems\.
13\.2 In what concerns to the construction of new irrigation schemes, and with
the purpose of minimizing the risk identified, we have limited this action to the
construction of three schemes, which was an attainable goal, considering the
implementation capability of the institutions involved\. By the end of the
project implementation period only two of such schemes had been built, one of
them not yet completed as its irrigation network was still under construction\.
13\.3 In what refers to the technical packages to be presented to the farmers,
although partly developed and dominated on experimental stations, they had not
been exhaustively tested in the region\. As a result, it was assumed they
eventually might not fully address the local expectations, thus calling for a
need of further adjustments\. In order to minimize such risk, a large programme
of applied agricultural research was implemented, together with the strengthening
of the DRATH's extension services and the establishment of credit lines in
particularly favourable conditions\. In practice, however, some of the investment
models, namely in " Montanha" and "Planalto" experienced very low rates of global
adoption, by the farmers who, nevertheless, have adopted an important part of the
technical recommendations for agricultural restructuring proposed under the
project\.
14\. Some Li-itina Factors
14\.1 The project has experienced some external factors which limited the full
achievement of its fundamental objectives, with more serious consequences in
areas related with the agricultural component\. As major external causes for that
situation it may be referred:
(a) a 9-month delay in the signature of the Loan Agreement, followed by
another period of 4 months that became necessary for the Portuguese
Government to fulfill its conditions of effectiveness;
V This section was prepared by the Commission of the Northern Region (CCRN), the project's
administration unit\.
- 17 -
(b) the late definition and operationalization of the agricultural
credit lines, which did not permit any investment project to be
financed under the Loan before the end semester of 1984;
(c) institutional difficulties that restricted both the recruitment of
staff and the definition and timely availability of budgetary funds,
which resulted in a serious barrier to the implementation and
follow-up of the project; and
(d) the progressive do-valuation of the national currency against the US
Dollar, which limited the actual disbursements schedule,
comparatively to the SAR estimates\.
15\. Kain Results
15\. 1 As a first and general conclusion, we can point out that the project's most
important objective - "the improvement of the living standards of the population"
- was satisfactorily achieved, particularly in what the non-agricultural
component was concerned, whereby an important part of TOM population benefitted
from the infrastructure programme carried out by the municipalities under the
project\.
15\.2 On the contrary, the improvement of the living standards linked to
increases of the farmers, revenue had only a significant expression through the
investment models of "Douro" and "Vales Sub-Montanos"\. It must also underline
the strong impact that the "Rehabilitation of Traditional Irrigation Schemes" had
on the improvement of the social and economical levels of inhabitants of the
areas affected by that component\.
15\.3 In what concerns to be the strengthening of the Public Administration
structure in the region, the project supplied the participating institutions and
departments with material conditions (premises, equipment, etc\.) at a level
considered acceptable\. However, it was never possible to overcome the
difficulties in keeping the staff at the levels identified as necessary, either
because of the non-flexible recruitment policies imposed, or due to the lack of
specific benefits that could be made available to that staff, in order to
encourage their attraction to less developed areas, as the TOM region\.
15\.4 Likewise, the efforts made in order to increase the dynamics and the
strengthening of cooperatives and agricultural organization were not considered
as satisfactory\.
15\.5 Despite the above-mentioned limiting factors, it must be acknowledged that
the project was a general success and even exceeded some of the targets initially
set\. Much of this performance was only possible due to the well-coordinated
intervention of the different institutions and departments participating in the
project coordination, management and implementation, at the regional level,
namely CCRN/GATs, DRATM, Local Authorities, IFADAP and FENACAM/CCAMs\. It can
even be stated that one of the positive results of the project was, indeed, the
adoption, by the regional Public Administration of new standards of inter-
- 18 -
institutional relationship, which allowed - and still allow - the problems of
regional development to be approached on a consensual basis\.
15\.6 It was further acknowledged that the organizational structure established
under the project, namely the Administration and the Evaluation Units, strongly
contributed to the timeliness and effectiveness of the decisions taken by the
project coordination\.
16\. Lessons Learned
16\.1 The main lessons of experience that can be drawn from the project
implementation include:
(a) the need to ensure an effective and permanent institutional support;
(b) the importance of guaranteeing, since early stages, an effective
monitoring and evaluation system working closely with the project
coordination and the departments involved on its implementation;
(c) the need for a flexible management process, to ensure that timely
measures are taken to adapt proposals and schedules to the real
evolution of project implementation; and
(d) the decisive role played by the World Bank Supervision Missions, in
recommending and defining proposals which are vital to an adequate
implementation of this kind of project\. In particular, a special
emphasis is needed in establishing the frequency and composition of
those Missions, so that projects can take the best out of them\.
- 1Q -
Table I
PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION
1\. Related Bank Loans
Loan Number Year of Purpose Loan Amount Status
Approval (USS Millions)
L-1603 1978 Agricultural Credit 70 Closed June 1984
L-1853 1980 Forestry so Closed September 1989
L-2175 1982 TOM Rural Development 51 Closed December 1989
L-24S7 1984 TA Agriculture 7\.4 Closed June 1989
L-3035 1989 TOM Regional Development 90 Under Implementation
-20- Table 2
2\. Project Timetable
Item Planned Date | Revised Date | Actual Date
Reconnaissance - - XI 1977
Identification IV 1978 VII 1978 IX 1978
Pre-preparation IX 1979 - IX 1979
Preparation III 1980 - VIII 1980
Appraisal - - XI 1980
Post-appraisal - - III 1982
Negotiations VII 1981 - IV 1982
Board Approval X 1981 - VI 1982
Loan Signature - III 1983
Loan Effectiveness - - VII 1983
Loan Closing XII 1988 - XII 1989
Loan Completion VI 1989 - VI 1990
- 21 - Table 3
Page 1 of 2
3\. Credit Disbursements
A\. Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements
SAR Es-imates Acauaj
WB Semester I Ac tuaa %
Yerr Ending |CumlatDisbursement I Cuuativ Disbusemen d t s
Year Dis~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~fbursed
l_____\. USMillion\._
1983 XII 1982 0\.8 0\.8
VI 1983 0\.9 1\.7 -
1984 XII 1983 2\.4 4\.1 0\.0 0\.0 0 0
VI 1984 4\.0 6\.4 0\.3 0\.3 0 S
1985 XII 1984 4\.3 10\.7 0\.3 0\.6 1 6
VI 1985 4\.2 14\.9 1\.7 2\.3 5 iS
1986 XII 1985 5\.8 20\.7 8\.7 11\.0 25 53
VI 1986 5\.4 26\.1 7\.5 18\.5 42 71
1987 XII 1986 6\.3 32\.4 4\.3 22\.8 51 70
VI 1987 5\.8 38\.2 3\.0 25\.8 58 68
1988 XII 1987 4\.5 42\.7 2\.9 28\.7 65 67
VI 1988 3\.8 46\.5 6\.2 34\.9 79 75
1989 XII 1988 4\.5 51\.0 2\.5 37\.4 84 73
VI 1989 - - 6\.2 43\.6 98 85
1990 Xll 1989 - 0\.7 44\.3 100 87
VI 1990 ' 4431t 100 87
US$6\.7 million were cancelled at closing date\.
B\. Disbursements by category
e te1/ n~ n nT n n n nT I T IrT u Actu l
I I I I I I 9 I (revised) Estimte
\. \.UsS'000 \.
1\. AgriculturaL credit
a\. by IFADAP \. - - - - 2\.000 0
b\. distributed by Pls -U 4,231 3,096 4,176 3,087 1,137 15,817 19,000 83
2\. a\. C utruction mterials 96 32 177 170 931 328 432 2,168 2,000 108
for irrigation
rehabiitatian works
b\. Equipgnt, vehicles wnd 114 542 530 320 620 225 60 2,411 4,000 60
materials for
agricultural services
3\. Civil works for - 664 366 318 558 411 309 2,626 3,200 82
agricultursl services
4\. Research, studies, pilot 42 416 903 1,337 1,864 2,174 1,768 6,50 6,000 106
projects wid trainirg
S\. Civil morks for - - 7,306 2,077 914 2,421 67 12,M 10,000 128
nmicipalities
6\. untilocated - \. - 2,800 0
TOTAL U,311 51,600 87
w a'
Ft
U
Accadng LA scheAd* 1\.
-23- Table 4
4\. Project Implementation Ratios
(Key Indicators)
I ~~Planned SARRao
CoUpoocat Unit (or sevisd) Atuall actua/planned
A\. Irritio Rebilitation
- Number of schemes U 150 1WO 100
- Are rehabilitated ba 7,50 5,860 78
a O0-arm investments
1\. Farm models ('P Loans /Ha) Revised
- Vales Sub-Montanos N° 150 93 62
ha 900 1,389 154
- Montanha N' 200 19 10
ha 1,200 223 19
- Planalto Mirandes N' 350 18 5
ha 7,000 524 7
- Terra Quente N' 150 17 11
ha 4,500 2,680 60
- Douro N' 2,200 455 21
ha 2,200 2,535 115
2\. Procurement (main items)
- Heifers U 6,100 900 IS
- Lambs U 7,500 3,580 48
- Construction (shelters) m2n 27,000
- Permanent pasture ha 7,900 2,315 - 29
- Tractors U 180 73 41
- Seed drills U 30 2 1
- Mowers U 180 26 33
- Pick-up balers U 30 1
C Agricultural Services
- Houses for extension staff U 60 54 90
- Vet\. LAboratories +
Insemination Unit U 3 - -
- Milking pariour U 109 107 98
- 4-WD vehicles U 25 14 56
- Cars U 132 117 89
D\. Noo-Agricultural Inhastructure
- Construction of rural roads km 80 140 175
- Improvement of rural roads km 120 256 213
- Paving of strect '000 rr2 343 595 173
- Water Supply Schemes N' 220 242 110
- Sewage systems N' 65 154 236
- Construction & rehabilitation of
dassrooms N' 60 157 262
- Health posts'l/ U 2 2 100
- Health centres1/ U 12 7 58
a Aicltural R--earch (see AppendiL 1)
- Research contracts U 2S 17 68
P\. Iriation Trias
- Nce irrigation schemes ha 3 x 145 1 x 100 23
(Curalha)
GL FeP_iy Studies
- Groundwater investigations U 1 1 100
(incl\. exploratory wells)
- Expanson of the Chaves irription
schemes U I 1 100
- Olive development study (Freixo) U 1 1 100
IL Feloashp\.
CCRN m\.m\. 36 66 183
1, not financed by the project\.
S\. Project Costs and Fi\.a*cmdg
A\. PDRITM - Breakdown of project costs by Loan Categories (in 1,000 C = 106 Esc\.)
at 30\.06\.1990
Cateorles (-eeefagn sdhedute I 19e 1954 19d 19eo 197 19U 19w 19WO Total SA5RI/
of the Lomn Agre _nt) I I
1 - Credit (On-form Investment) - 368 668 407 545 374 - 2,362 3,095
2 - Irrigation Red*ablitation 2 16 24 37 80 105 140 57 461 622
(eonstr\. Naterists)
2b Agricultural Organization - 49 150 62 32 33 22 19 367 422
Equipment * Vehicles
3 Agricultural Orgenization - 14 203 92 101 57 89 54 610 630
Civit Works
4 - Research, fellow ship 5 61 190 324 215 343 258 212 1,608 716
Consultents, pilot projects
and technical assistance
5 mon-agriculturat Component - - 2\.726 956 427 665 250 5,024 5,164
(municipalities Works)
TOTAL 7 140 3,661 2,139 1,262 1,748 1,133 342 10,432 10,U49
s\.,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I-'
0
' k' uchzing physical and p\.1ce contingencies\.
Total project coats are US$7\.5 eqiivatant\.
- 25 -
Table 5
Page 2 of 2
B\. Financing (US$ million)
Planned Actual as
Source (Loan Actual % of
Agreement) Planned
IBRD 51\.0 44\.31 87
Government 29\.2 8\.58 29
Credit Institutions 48\.0 7\.77 16
Sub-borrower 6\.8 0\.62 9
Municipalities 14\.7 6\.22 42
TOTAL 154\.8 67\.50 44
- 26 - Table 6
Page 1 of 5
6\. Project Results
A\. Direct Benefits
Indiloes 1 ttt tcAppeakl IDimtm a E md at
Emtc ~Caxg Date FM
-pindom Dewapmemat
- Irription rehabilitation (ha) 7,500 S,860 5,860
- Number of beneficiaries 550 430 430
- Number of bencficiaries 2\.200 450 450
- Production (tons of grspCs9 13,00 3,400 11,100
Otber Pat Modes
- Number of benrficiaries 850 147 147
- Production of potItoesl NA NA 14,600
- Production of fodder11 NA NA 42,600
- Producion of milklp 24,700 NA 41,500
- Number of parlours 109 60 107
- Milk collecded (tons) NA 7,200 23,400
Nom-picultural lanrasiructures
* Water supply schemes (1,000 inhabitants) 188 I88
- Sewage schemes (1,000 inhabitants) I 117 121 121
* Vi0tage streets (number villages) 61 101 101
(83,0O0 inh\.) (83,000 nh\.)
- Rural roads (number villaps) 55 234 234
(102,000 inh\.) (102,000 inh\.)
- Schools (1,000 inhabitants) NA 92 92
1/ Incremental production in tons or '000 fodder units\.
- 27 - Table 6
PaRe 2 of 5
B\. Financial Impact
Financial Rate of Return SAR Estimates PCR Estimates
I ~~~% \. \.
New Irrigation n\.a\. - I
Irrigation Rehabilitation n\.a\. 89
Douro Zones 20 16
Vales Sub-Montanes 37 9
Terra Quente 37 1
Montanha 19 n\.a\.
Planalto Mirandes 23 n\.a\.
The main assumptions forming the basis for the calculation of the financial rate
of return are summarized hereunder:
(a) Staff Appraisal Report
- Without the project, yields of grapes from vines to be replaced are
projected to fall to zero over ten years, which implies that production
on existing farms would level off at about 26% below current
production\.
- Full project effect of crops are assumed to be reached by the 12th
year after project commencement whereas livestock effects would
continue to increase up to the 20th year\.
(b) Project Completion Report
- In the without project situation, no account has been taken of any
production decrease in spite of the past trend\.
- In the absence of a second phase, it is assumed that the Agricultural
Service would simply assure a technical follow-up and that, therefore,
no further production increase would be obtained\.
N No rate of return as farmers do not participate at the financing of the investment costs\.
28 -Table 6
-28- Page 3 of 5
C\. Economic Impact
Economic Rate of SAR Estimate PCR Estimate
Return
I ~% \. I
Project 16 18
Farm Models
- New Irrigation n\.a\. 2
- Irrigation n\.a\. 28
Rehabilitation
- Douro Zone n\.a\. 22
- Vales Sub-Montanes n\.a\. 2
- Terra Quente n\.a\. 7
The main assumptions underlying the calculation of the project economic rate
of return are summarized hereunder:
(a) Staff Appraisal Report:
- Econornic benefits and costs, have been valued at economic prices;;
costs include production, investment and operating costs\.
- Without the project, yield of grape vines to be replaced are projected
to fall to zero over ten years which implies that production on
existing farms would level off at about 26% below current
production\.
- Full project effects of crops are assumed to be reached by the 12th
year after project commencement whereas livestock effect would
continue to increase up to the 20th year\.
- The investment and operating costs related to roads and social
infrastructure are omitted from the calculation, implying that their
unquantified benefits are at least equal to their cost\.
- The project life in 35 years and project costs include physical
contingencies allowances\.
- The official rate of exchange is considered to be a correct estimate
of the shadow exchange rate\.
- 29 - Table 6
Page 4 of 5
- Agricultural labour is priced at the current daily wage for male
labourers\.
(b) Project Completion Report
* In the without project situation, no account has been taken of any
production decrease in spite of the present trend\.
- In the absence of a second phase, it is assumed that the Agricultural
Services would simply assure a technical follow-up and that therefore
no further production increase would be obtained\.
- Economic benefits and costs have been valued at economic prices
(Table 9\.A)\. Costs include investments, operating and production
costs\. Investment and operating costs related to components whose
benefits have not been estimated have been omitted from the
calculation\.
* The project's life is 30 years\.
* The official rate of exchange is considered to be a correct estimate
of the shadow rate of exchange\.
- The opportunity cost of labour is estimated to amount to 75% of the
current daily wage\.
-30 - Table 6
Page 5 of 5
D\. STUDIES
Studies Purpose status Impa
1\. Groundwater study Identification of source of Drilled: Favourable conditions in the
(general investiption) Irripgtion water in 24 - 322 bormholes Chaves Plain; elsewhere,
representative sub-aras - 68 shallow wells disappointing results; total
potential discharge: 350 lls
Completed
in Dec\. 1987 Pousible use for local drinking
water supply schemes
2 Master plan for water Expansion of irrigation from Completed Sound management of water
use in the Chaves Plain 900 to 6,000 ha in 1986 resources
Feasibility study for the Rehabilitation of the existing Completed Detailed designs of a first slice
expansion of the perimeter (900 ha) and in Dec\. 1987 project now under preparation
Chaves perimeter preliminary design of new (TOM 11)
irrigable areas
3\. Olive development Dcvelopment of irription Completed Due to high infrastructure
study (Freixo) infrastructure for an olive in April 1987 costs, GOP financed only a
plantation (952 ha) crossing power line; individual
pumps were installed by the
farmers
4\. Agricultural research studies Set-up a plan for applied 17 studies eompleted Prctical rcommendations
research to supply should be disseminated to
information for crop See App\. I farmers through extension
production incrase agentsA
- 31 - Table 7
7\. Status of Legal Covenants
Apeement Section Sbort Descriptioa of Cotmts C|mplian
Loan 3\.02 ICIM to provide credit to municipalities Full
3\.04 Staff adequately GATs CCRN Full
3\.05 PAU adequately staffed Too frequent turn-over
3\.06(a) Establish research team under project coordinator Full
3\.06(b) GOP to strengthen extension service Acted upon under new TOM U project
3\.06(c) Establish Monitoring Unit Full\. but IaMJy
3\.06(e) Establish Evaluation Unit Unit established at UTAD
3\.08(a) Submit training programme for CCAMs and Done
FENACAM
3\.08(b) GOP to carry out Agricultural Credit Services Done
3\.09(a) Prepare animal health programmes Due to opposition of Association of
Vets, programme never prepared
3\.09(b) Cost recovery for use of facilities constructed Theoretically recovered
3\.09(c) Equity contribution (20%) of irrigation beneficiaries Full
3\.10(a) On-lending rate 14\.5% Due to decrease in innation a new rate
was set (3/87) equal to Bank rate plus
2\.5% spread
3\.12 Progress reports Submitted regularly
4\.03 Participating institutions to have independent audit Full
reports
Schedule 5 Municipalities to agree to administer infrastructure Full
investment programme
Project 2\.02 Refinancing and acceptance of PBls after Bank Full
approval
2\.03 IFADAP to provide at least 10% of subloan amount Full
and submit first 10 subloans for Bank approval
2\.04(a) IFADAP loan not to exceed 85% of project cost Full
2\.10 IFADAP to establish branch ofrice in Chaves Never done as considered not necessary
2\.11 IFADAP to prepare training programme for Done
DRATM and PBls staff
4\.01(b) IFADAP and PBIs to maintain separate accounts Done
Schedule IA Traditional banking procedures to be applied in Done
lending
2(c)(d) Subborrowers to provide collaterals and ensure Done
investment financed by loan
2(e) Grace and maturity periods to be determined on Done
basis of cash nlow
S\. Use of Bank Resources
A\. Staff Inputs (Staff Weeks)
Tmsk IoFn 9SI IugS? FY 193 FY 194 FY 5 | 19U |nT19tl FYi8 119h9 |n1990 O1991 | OTAL
Preparation 149\.0 - 149\.0
Appraisal 66\.5 6\.3 - - - - - - - - 72\.8
Negotiations 20\.6 - - - - 20\.6
Loan Operation 4\.1 \. 7\.4 - - - - - - 11\.5
ond Pltming
Sau-total 219\.6 34\.3 - - - - 253\.9
Supervision - - 15\.7 23\.5 22\.9 18\.2 8\.4 46\.5" 6\.0 14\.4 4\.2P 159\.
Project - - \.4 1\.2 1\.3 \.3 1\.3 - - 4\.5
Adminsitration
Anmatl - \.3 1\.1 - - - 1\.4
lopl_nmtoticn
Review
SL-total t - 16\.1 24\.7 24\.2 18\.8 10\.8 6\.S 6\.0 14\.4 4\.2 165\.7
TOTAL 219\.6 34\.3 16\.1 24\.7 24\.2 13\.8 10\.8 4\.5 6\.0 14\.4 4\.2 419\.6
0 c
*\.:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
0
1/ include tim spent In preparing the Tras-os-Nntes legional Development Project ihich followed\.
2/ To be added: 11 mn\.weeks allocated to the Completion Mission\.
- 33 - Table 8
Page 2 of 2
B\. Mission Data
star cc Year Numtber of Period in fild Spedaltio| Perfonmance Tnd Type of
pnjcyde pellns (day) zpc Dted rating _ 3 pblem
Preprantion III 1980 3 6 n\.a\.
Appaisal )a 1980 7 28 n\.a\.
Post-appraisal 1 1982 2 15 n\.a\.
Supervision 1 VII 1983 4 11 2A, 2E 1 - F
2 XII 1983 2 13 A E 2 2 F
3 Vll 19S4 3 7 2A, E 2 2 M
4 111985 4 7 2A, E, F 2 2 M\. P
5 Vll 19S5 2 6 A, E 2 1 M, P
6 1119S6 2 9 A, L 2 1 M, P
7 VI 19S6 1 2 A n\.s\. n\.a\. n\.a\.
8 TV 1986 1 11 L 2 n\.a\. n\.s\.
9 X 19S7 2 10 F, C 2 n\.a\. n\.a\.
10 VII 1989 4 13 F, 1, T 1 n\.a\. n\.s\.
11 in 1990 4 18 F,l,A,C -
Completion VI 1991 2 13 C,E -
1/ A\. Agronomist; E: Economist; F: Fmancial Analyst; L: Livestock Specialist; C: Civil Engineer, 1:
Agroindustrial Specialist; T: Extension Specialist\.
2/ 1: Problem free or minor problems; 2: Moderate problems; 3: Major problems\.
3/ 1: Improving, 2\. Stationary, 3: Deteriorating\.
4/ F: Fnancial; M: Managerial; T: Technical; P: Political; 0: Other\.
Table 9
Page 1 of 9
9\. Economic and Financial Analysis
A\. List of Financial and Economic Prices at Farm gate (Page 1)
Unit inanlPrio c I E PmocicPrice
oUrms \. \. \.
Wheat kg 49\.7 40
Rye kg 45\.7 31
Potatoes kg 35 35
French Bean kg 75 75
Italian Cabbage kg 65 65
Grapes for Porto Wine kg 200 200
Grapes for Table Wine kg 70 70
,Fodder Unit
- Cattle Production FU 30 26
- Sheep Production FU 20 20
- Wheat kg 50 38
-Rye kg 46 35
- Vets kg 120 90
- Lolium Italicum kg 300 225
- Qover kg 550 413
, Potatoes kg 85 64
- French Beans kg 450 338
- Italian Cabbage plant 20 15
Fertilizes
- Anonium Nitrate kg 29 22
- Superphosphate kg 24 18
- Compound 7,14,14 kg 39\.7 30
- - 10,10,10 kg 36 27
15,15,10 kg 51 38
Insecticide kg 600 450
Foagicde kg 1,320 990
Animl Feed (Milking Cow) kg 42 32
Table 9
Page 2 of 9
A\. List of Financial and Economic Prices at Farm gate (Page 2)
U-it a *u1 Pdal pEcoomic Puce
Mechankatio :
- Tractor hour 2,200 1,650
- Combine hour 13,000 9,750
- Mower hour 1,000 750
Labour Unsilled day 1,500 1,125
Labour Un ekiled (Peak Sesonl ) day 2,C00 1,500
EQU1PMNT, BULDINGS, IRRIGATION -
Hcifer head 270,000 202500
Ewe head 13,000 9,750
Ram head 20,000 15,000
Cowshed m2 15,000 12,000
Pen m2 7,500 6,000
Temporary Pasture ha 65,000 48,750
Fence m 50 38
Vineyad ha 1,900,000 1,425\.000
; rintign
- New scheme ha 4,082,000 2,932,000
- Rehabilitation ha 184,000 147,000
Source: DRATM, DHEA, TOM Regional Development Project SAR and Mission estimate\.
1/ Douro Zone only\.
-36- Table 9
Page 3 of 9
B\. Farm Model 1 - New Irrigation (1 ha) -
Cash Flow
1-2 3-4 5 6 7 8-19 20-30
A\. Without project situatfon
Gross value of production 66\.1 66\.1 66\.1 66\.1 66\.1 66\.1 66\.1
Production costs
Mechanization 10\.1 10\.1 10\.1 10\.1 10\.1 10\.1 10\.1
inputs 20\.3 20\.3 20\.3 20\.3 20\.3 20\.3 20\.3
Labour 8\.6 8\.6 8\.6 8\.6 8\.6 8\.6 8\.6
Sub-total 39\.0 39\.0 39\.0 39\.0 39\.0 \.39\.0 39\.0
Balance without project situation 27\.1 27\.1 27\.1 27\.1 27\.1 27\.1 27\.1
S\. With project situation
\. \.
Investment costs
Production costs
\. \. \.
Mechanization 10\.1 7\.6 35\.8 44\.8 44\.8 44\.8 44\.8
Inputs 20\.3 15\.2 62\.6 78\.2 78\.2 78\.2 78\.2
Labour 8\.6 6\.5 57\.2 71\.5 71\.5 71\.5 71\.5
water charges /a - - 51\.0 -
Sub-total 39\.0 29\.3 155\.6 194\.5 194\.5 245\.5 194\.5
Total costs 39\.0 29\.3 155\.6 194\.5 194\.5 245\.5 194\.5
Gross value of production 66\.1 49\.6 251\.0 334\.7 376\.6 418\.4 418\.4
Balance with project situation 27\.1 20\.3 95\.4 140\.2 182\.1 172\.9 223\.9
C\. Incremental
Increfmental costs - -9\.7 116\.6 155\.5 155\.5 206\.5 155\.5
Incremental benefits - -16\.5 184\.9 268\.6 310\.5 352\.3 352\.3
Incremental net benefits - -6\.8 68\.3 113\.1 155\.0 145\.8 196\.8
s=== ==== = = :=== =
== ====
Source: DRATM, OHEA and Mission Estimates
\.
,\. \. \.
/a Cost recovery calculated on the base of the present policy:
1SX of total Investment Costs to be reimbursed in 15 years
including three years grace period, starting year 5\.
\.
C\. - Fam Model 2 Irrigation Rehabilitation (I ha)
financial Rate of Return
\. \. \.,,,,\. ,,,, ,\. \. :\. \.
1 2 3 4 S 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13-30
A\. Without project situation
\. \. \. \.
Gross value of production 239\.3 239\.3 239\.3 239\.3 239\.3 239\.3 239\.3 239\.3 239\.3 239\.3 239\.3 239\.3 239\.3
Productoln costs 14\.0 69\.0 181\.0 291\.0 407\.0 548\.0 738\.0 1060\.0 1316\.0 1437\.0 1SSS\.0 1569\.0 1587\.0
Mechanization 92\.7 92\.7 92\.7 92\.7 92\.7 92\.7 92\.7 92\.7 92\.7 92\.7 92\.7 92\.7 92\.7
EmJtC 29\.4 29\.4 29\.4 29\.4 29\.4 29\.4 29\.4 29\.4 29\.4 29\.4 29\.4 29\.4 29\.4
Waeour 31\.9 31\.9 31\.9 31\.9 31\.9 31\.9 31\.9 31\.9 31\.9 31\.9 31\.9 31\.9 31\.9
Sub-totat 154\.0 154\.0 154\.0 154\.0 154\.0 154\.0 154\.0 154\.0 154\.0 154\.0 154\.0 154\.0 154\.0
laltnce without project situation 85\.3 85\.3 85\.3 85\.3 85\.3 85\.3 85\.3 85\.3 85\.3 85\.3 85\.3 85\.3 85\.3
B\. With project situation
\.
investoment cots /a 36\.8
Production costs
\.w
Mechaniation 69\.5 35\.8 44\.8 44\.8 44\.8 44\.8 44\.8 44\.8 44\.8 44\.8 44\.8 44\.8 44\.8
22\.1 62\.6 78\.2 78\.2 78\.2 78\.2 78\.2 78\.2 78\.2 78\.2 78\.2 78\.2 78\.2
Labour 23\.9 57\.2 71\.5 71\.5 71\.5 71\.5 71\.5 71\.5 71\.5 71\.5 71\.5 71\.5 71\.5
water charges /b \. - \. \. \. \.
Sub-total 115\.5 155\.6 194\.5 194\.5 194\.5 194\.5 194\.5 194\.5 194\.5 194\.5 194\.5 194\.5 194\.5
Total costs 152\.3 155\.6 194\.5 194\.5 194\.5 194\.5 194\.5 194\.5 194\.5 194\.5 194\.5 194\.5 194\.5
Gross value of production /c 179\.5 251\.0 334\.7 376\.6 418\.4 418\.4 418\.4 418\.4 418\.4 418\.4 418\.4 418\.4 418\.4
Balance vith project situation 27\.2 95\.4 140\.2 152\.1 223\.9 223\.9 223\.9 223\.9 223\.9 223\.9 223\.9 223\.9 223\.9
C\. Incremental
Incremental costs -1\.7 1\.6 40\.5 40\.5 40\.5 40\.5 40\.5 40\.5 40\.5 40\.5 40\.5 40\.5 40\.5
Incremental gross benefits -59\.8 11\.7 95\.4 137\.3 179\.1 179\.1 119\.1 179\.1 179\.1 179\.1 179\.1 179\.1 179\.1
Incremental net benefits -58\.1 10\.1 54\.9 96\.8 138\.6 138\.6 138\.6 138\.6 138\.6 138\.6 138\.6 138\.6 138\.6
=\.== ====*======= === ======== === ======== ==== X-==== *====== P F
\. \. \. 2\. \. \. -\. --= =* \. =Q
Source: DRAltt OHEA wid Mission estimates\. \.D
__________---\.---------- \.--- O x--D------
~0
/a 20X of rehabilitation costs provided by the farmers\.
lb No vater charges because farmersparticipated at the rehabilitation\.
/c Assusing that in year 1 only75X of the larI is cultivated
due to the rehabilitation of the Irrigation scheme\.
Net Present Value at OCC 11X = 834\.8
Internal Pate of Ret Jrn = 89\.1I
D\. - Farm MQdel 3 - Douro Zoes (1 ha) -
Financial Rate of Return
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13-21 22-30
\._\. _\.___\. \. \. __\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.
A\. Without project situation /a
Gross value of proauction 10\.0 10\.0 10\.0 10\.0 10\.0 10\.0 10\.0 10\.0 10\.0 10\.0 10\.0 10\.0 10\.0 10\.0
Production costs - - - - -
galance without project situation 10\.0 10\.0 10\.0 10\.0 10\.0 10\.0 10\.0 10\.0 10\.0 10\.0 10\.0 10\.0 10\.0 10\.0
S\. With project situation
Infestment costs 23\.0 232\.0 1481\.0 1436\.0 934\.0 1029\.0 792\.0 719\.0 247\.0 145\.0 32\.0 16\.0
mechanization 1050\.0 7\.5 25\.0 51\.5 51\.5 - - - - -
Inuts 552\.5 296\.5 37\.0 49\.5 49\.5 - - - - - -
Labour 127\.5 171\.0 133\.0 169\.0 169\.0 - * - - - -
Sub-total 1230\.0 475\.0 195\.0 270\.0 270\.0 - - -
Production costs 14\.0 69\.0 181\.0 291\.0 407\.0 548\.0 738\.0 1060\.0 1316\.0 1437\.0 1555\.0 1569\.0 1587\.0 1587\.0
mechanization - - - - - 51\.5 51\.5 51\.5 51\.5 51\.5 51\.5 51\.5 51\.5 51\.5
Inputs 49\.5 49\.5 49\.5 49\.5 49\.5 49\.5 49\.5 49\.5 49\.5
Labour - - - - - 169\.0 169\.0 169\.0 169\.0 169\.0 169\.0 169\.0 169\.0 169\.0
sub-totat - - - - - 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0
Total costs 1230\.0 475\.0 195\.0 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0
Gross value of production - - 60\.0 168\.0 879\.5 893\.5 907\.5 907\.5 907\.5 907\.5 907\.5 907\.5 872\.5
Balance with project situation -1230\.0 -475\.0 -195\.0 -210\.0 -102\.0 609\.5 623\.5 637\.5 637\.5 637\.5 63?\.5 637\.5 637\.5 602\.5
C\. Incremental
incremental costs 1230\.0 475\.0 195\.0 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0 270\.0
Incremental gross benefits -10\.0 -10\.0 -10\.0 50\.0 158\.0 869\.5 883\.5 897\.5 897\.5 897\.5 897\.5 897\.5 897\.5 862\.5
Incremental net benefits -1240\.0 -485\.0 -205\.0 -220\.0 -112\.0 599\.5 613\.5 627\.5 627\.5 627\.5 627\.5 627\.5 627\.5 592\.5
Source: DRATM, CEVD and Mission estimates\.
kn
____\.___\._:\._\.___\.__\.
/a Agsuming ast of newvinwards have been 0
established on HORtORIOS left fallow\.
Met Present Value at OCC 11i i1220\.8
Internal Rate of Return * 16\.5X
Coupon Equivalent Rate of Return * 15\.6X
- 39 - Table 9
Page 6 of 9
E\. - Farm Model 4 - Vales Sub-montanes (12 ha) -
Financial Rate of Return
1 2 3 4-30
A\. Without project situation
Gross value of production 2563\.7 2563\.7 2563\.7 2563\.7
Production costs
Mechanization 342\.3 342\.3 342\.3 342\.3
Inputs 797\.0 797\.0 797\.0 797\.0
Labour 336\.9 336\.9 336\.9 336\.9
Sub-totaL 1476\.2 1476\.2 1476\.2 1476\.2
Total costs 3453\.0 1100\.0 1150\.0 1154\.5
B\. With project situation
Investment costs /a 2403\.0
Production costs
Mechanization 251\.0 263\.0 274\.0 275\.7
Inputs 526\.0 551\.0 577\. 0 578\.9
Labur 273\.0 286\.0 299\.0 299\.9
Water charges /b -
Sub-total /c 1050\.0 1100\.0 1150\.0 1154\.5
\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.
Total costs 3453\.0 1100\.0 1150\.0 1154\.5
Gross value of production 2050\.0 2300\.0 2450\.0 2506\.5
Salance with project situation -1403\.0 1200\.0 1300\.0 1352\.0
C\. Incremental
Incremental costs 1976\.8 -376\.2 -326\.2 -321\.7
Incremental benefits -513\.7 -263\.7 -113\.7 -57\.2
Incremental net benefits -2490\.5 112\.5 212\.5 264\.5
Source: DRATM, DHEA and Mission estimates\.
\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.
/a Including 4 cows, 68 m2 of stable,2 ha of temporary pasture
and 2\.4 ha of Irrigation Rehabilitation\.
/b No water charges because farmers participated
at the rehabilitation\.
/C Gross vaLue of production is slightly lower
in the with project situation than in the without project situation
because the new cropping pattern increases drastically the fodder
production in spite of a fodder unit price which is Low\.
Indeed due to low costs of production, the fodder profitability is better
than the cereal one\.
\. \. \. \. \. \. \.
Net Present Value at OCC 11X - -343\.9
Internal Rate of Return a 9\.1X
Coupon Equivalent Rate of Return * 18\.9X
40- Table 9
Page 7 of 9
F\. - Farm Model 5 - Terra Quente (100 ha) -
Financial Rate of Return
\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. _\. \._\. \. \. \. \.
1 2 3 4 5-30
A\. Without project situation
Gross value of production 1330\.3 1330\.3 1330\.3 1330\.3 1330\.3
Production costs
Mechanization 350\.2 350\.2 350\.2 350\.2 350\.2
Inputs 331\.8 331\.8 331\.8 331\.8 331\.8
Labour 255\.0 255\.0 255\.0 255\.0 255\.0
Sub-total 937\.0 937\.0 937\.0 937\.0 937\.0
Balance without project situation 393\.3 393\.3 393\.3 393\.3 393\.3
B\. With project situation
Investment costs /a 9225\.0
Product ion costs
Mechanization 350\.0 470\.0 490\.0 510\.1 510\.1
Inputs 630\.0 860\.0 910\.0 939\.0 939\.0
Labour 270\.0 370\.0 400\.0 408\.9 408\.9
Sub-total 1250\.0 1700\.0 1800\.0 1858\.0 1858\.0
\. \. \. \. \._\. \. \.
Total costs 10475\.0 1700\.0 1800\.0 1858\.0 1858\.0
Gross value of production 1500\.0 2000\.0 2300\.0 2500\.0 2635\.8
BaLance with project situation -8975\.0 300\.0 500\.0 642\.0 777\.8
C\. IncrementaL
Incremental costs 9538\.0 763\.0 863\.0 921\.0 921\.0
IncrementaL benefits 169\.7 669\.7 969\.7 1169\.7 1305\.5
Incremental net benefits -9368\.3 -93\.3 106\.7 248\.7 384\.5
Source: DRATM and Mission estimates\.
\. \.__\. \.
/a Including 350 mZ\. of pen\. 20000 m\. of fencing,the
establishment of 50 ha of temporary pasture and
the purchase of 170 ewes and 7 rams\.
Net Present Value at OCC 11% * -6,123\.9
Internal Rate of Return a 0\.6%
Coupon Equivalent Rate of Return * 6\.3X
- 41 - Table 9
Page 8 of 9
G\. Phasing of Farm Models
Farm Modell| Unit| 1 2 3 4 | S 6 7 8 | Total
1983 1984 1985 19861 1987 19881 19891 19901
2\. Irrigation Ha 162 456 387 443 833 896 1,300 1,160 5,637
Rehabilitation21
3\. Douro Zones3/ Ha - - 606 758 431 583 70 87 2,535
4\. Vales Sub-Montanesel No 8 49 32 2 2 - - 93
5\. Terra Quente5 No - - 7 6 1 3 - 17
1/ Farm model 1 'New irrigation' has been designed to estimate the financial and economic viability of
a pilot scheme and therefore has not been included in the economic analysis of the project\.
2/ Farm model 2 'Irrigation Rehabilitation' whose area is 1 ha has been designed to take into account
benefits and costs resulting from the largest part of the area rehabilitated (5,637 ha out of 5,861 ha)\.
The balance (224 ha) is already accounted for in the Farm model 4 - "Vales Sub-Montanes"\.
31 Farm model 3 'Douro Zones" has an area of 1 ha\.
4/ Farm model 4 "Vales Sub-Montanes" has a total area of 12 ha out of which 2\.4 ha of irrigation i\.e\. twice
the area of the model designed in the SAR\.
5/ Farm model 5 "Terra Quente" has a total area of 100 ha i\.e\. more than three times the area of the
model designed in the SAR (30 ha)\.
M\. Cash-flow for Ec kmic Rate 01 Retrn/in I9I content Million Ec\.
\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.
2963 1964 21965 986 1967 1966 1969 199 1991 1992 993 2994 299S 199 2997 2996 t99 2000 2001 2002 2003 -2012
\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. -\. \. \. \. \.
Vith project situation
cross value at prodictimn 20 131 343 370 827 1142 1636 2576 3448 406 43551 4676 4747 4*no 4751 473 470 466 4 18 4S66 662
Investmnt Costs 23 232 1461 1436 934 1029 792 719 247 243 32 18
Production Costs 14 69 218 291 407 548 738 1060 1316 1437 1555 1569 1567 1567 1587 1587 258? 1587 1587 1587 1587
iecre ntat Operating Costs - - - - 200 100 100 100 200 200 2 00 2 00 006 200 100 100
~~~~~\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. :\. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \. \.
Total ecm ic costs 37 302 1662 In7? 2341\. IS77 1530 179 2663 26u2 167 1687 1687 2667 2687 1687 1607 2687 2687 1607 2667
met Benefits 9 -170 -2319 -2157 -524 -435 106 799 1785 2336 2871 2989 3060 3063 36 3043 3016 3002 2982 2978 2972
Vlthout project situation
\. \. \. \.
eg,ftas 29 so 194 294 396 507 657 7 790 790 790 790 790 790 790 790 790 790 790 790 790 i
Incrsntat
\. \.
\.Kr\._ntat ne b\.wfits 2O -2\.8 -151\. -\.4\.I -920 \.92 -5\.9 9 9s 1546 2001 21W 2270 22n 227\. 225 2226 2211 219\. 2\.m 21\.5
Suet: DtEATH wrd Nissiln estimtes\.
\. \. \. \.
Internal Rates of Return of Met Streams
e \. was \. 0
UBIEC 17\.931
- 43 - Appendix
Page 1 of 2
Appendix
Agricultural Research
List of the 17 Reports Prepared by UTAD
Projecto No\. 1 - Estudos de Adaptacao de Algumas Cultivares de Trigo, Centeio e
Triticale e a Obtencao de Novas Variedades Melhoradas
(Responsavel: Prof\. Henrique de Pinho Guedes Pinto) Universidade
de Tras-os-Montes e Alto Douro, Vila Real, Faneiro de 1990\.
Projecto No\. 2 - Melhoramento de Castas da Regiao do Douro - Estudos Sobre a Sua
Fertilidade e Produtividade (Responsavel: Prof Nuno Pizarro de
Campos Magalhaes) Universidade de Tras-os-Montes e Alto Douro,
Vila Real, Janeiro de 1990\.
Projecto No\. 3 - Producao e utilizacao de forragens em Prodes de Regadio e
Lameiros\. Prof\. A\.M\. Pereira\.
Projecto No\. 4 - Producao de Forragens e Pastagens nas Areas de Sequeiro
Mediterranico de Tras-os-Montes (Responsavel: Prof Nuno Manuel
Vasconcelos Moreira) Universidade de Tras-os-Montes e Alto
Douro, Vila Real, Janeiro de 1990\.
Projecto No\. 5 - Nematodos da Batateira - Macrozonagem do Nematodo Dourado da
Batateira e Estudo de Tecnicas de Controlo (Responsavel: Eng\.
Fernando Franco Martins) Universidade de Tras-os-Montes e Alto
Douro, Vila Real, Janeiro de 1990\.
Projecto No\. 6 - Fertilizacao em Triticale, Centeio e Trigo\. Prof\. C\. Mendes\.
Projecto No\. 7 - Definicao de um Modelo Agricola para Implementar a Producao de
Leite nas Terras Altas de Tras-os-Montes (Responsavel: Prof\. Carlos
Alberto Sequeira) Universidade de Tras-os-Montes e Alto Douro,
Vila Real, Janeiro de 1990\.
Projecto No\. 8 - Melhoramento da Producao Ovina (Responsavel: Eng\. Jorge Teixeira
de Azevedo) Universidade de Tras-os-Montes e Alto Douro, Vila
Real, Janeiro de 1990\.
Projecto No\. 9 - Desenvolvimento de Recomendacoes Alimentares para Ruminantes
(Responsavel: Pro\. Arnaldo Dias da Silva) Universidade de Tras-os-
Montes e Alto Douro, Vila Real, Janeiro de 1990\.
Projecto No\. 10 - Unidade de Avaliacao\. Prof\. J\. Portela\.
Appendix
- 44 - Page 2 of 2
Projecto No\. 11 - A Produtividade e a Rentabilidade dos Bovinos Locais (Responsavel:
Eng\. Virgilio Cardos Alves) Universidade de Tras-os-Montes e Alto
Douro, Vila Real, Janeiro de 1990\.
Projecto No\. 12 - Cartografia de Solos do Nordeste de Portugal (1/100\.000)\.
Projecto No\. 13 - Metodos de Rega
Sub-projecto 13\.1 - Avaliacao e Melhoramento dos Metodos
Tradicionais de Rega (Responsavel: Prof\. Dr\. Zozimo de Castro
Rego)\.
Sub-projecto 13\.2 - Determinacao do Balanco Hidrico das Cultura
(Responsavel: Prof Dr\. Luis Santos Pereira)\.
Universidade de Tras-os-Montes e Alto Douro, Vila Real, Janeiro de
1990\.
Projecto No\. 14 - Estudo do Impacto Economico da componente de Investigacao
Agricola Aplicada do PDRITM (Responsavel: Prof\. Antonio
Cipriano Pinheiro) Universidade de Tras-os-Montes e Alto Douro,
Vila Real, Janeiro de 1990\.
Projecto No\. 15 - Mecanizacao das Vinhas de Encosta na Regiao Demarcada do
Douro (Responsavel: Prof\. Fernando Bianchi de Aguiar)
Universidade de Tras-os-Montes e Alto Douro, Vila Real, Janeiro de
1990\.
Projecto No\. 16 - Projecto altemativo para a armazenagem do batata\.
Projecto No\. 17 - Avaliacao e melhoramento dos metodos de irrigacao\. | APPROVAL |
P008723 | Document of
The World Bank
FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY
IIICROFICHE COPY
Report No\. 10301-RO Type: (PCR) ReprtNo\. 10301
WATKINS, H/ X31708 / T-9102/ OEDD3
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
ROMANIA
LAND TRANSPORT PROJECT
(LOAN 2034-RO)
FEBRUARY 4, 1992
Infrastructure Operations Division
Country Department I
Europe and Central Asia Regional Office
Tis document has a restsicted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their offcial duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank autorization\.
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Currency Unit - Leu, Lel (plural)
Lei 18\.0 - US$1\.00 up to December 31, 1980
Lei 15\.0 m US$1\.00 from January 1, 1981
Lei 16\.5 - US$1\.00 from January 1, 1983
Lei 17\.5 - US$1\.00 from June 30, 1983
Lei 21\.5 US$1\.00 from January 1, 1984
Lei 17\.5 = US$1\.00 from November 1, 1984
Lei 16\.0 = US$1\.00 after July 1, 1986
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
Metric System British/US System
1 meter (m) - 3\.2808 feet (ft)
1 kilometer (km) - 0\.6324 mile (mi)
1 square kilometer (km2) - 0\.3861 sq\. mile (mi2)
1 metric ton (m ton) 0\.9842 long ton (lg ton)
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
CFR (DEPCF) Romanian Railways (Departamentul Cailor Ferate)
DR (DD) Directorate of Roads (Directia Drumurilor)
EMENA Europe, Middle East and North Africa
EMTIN Infrastructure Division of the Technical Department of the
Europe and Central Asia Regional Office
ER Economic Return
GNP Gross National Product
IB Investment Bank of Romania
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction & Development
ICB International Competitive Bidding
(ICPTT) Technological Research and Design Institute for Transport
(Institutul de Cercetari si Proiectari Technologice in
Transporturi)
MTTc (MTTC) Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications
PCR Project Completion Report
SAR Staff Appraisal Report
TU Traffic Unit
FISCA1\. YEAR
January 1 to December 31
THE WORLD BANK FOR OMCUL USE ONLY
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
U\.S\.A\.
Okfe of tDisor-G\.wal
Opralkmnh {v&atl
February 4, 1992
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Romania Land Transport Project
(Loan 2034-RO)
Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project
Completion Report on Romania - Land Transport Project (Loan 2034-RO)" prepared
by the Europe and Central Asia Regional Office with Part II of the report
contributed by the Borrower\. No audit of this project has been made by the
Operations Evaluation Dapartment at this time\.
Attachment
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performnnco
of their oficial duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed %ithout World Dank authorization\.
FOR OFmFCIAL USE ONLY
ROMANIA
LAND TRANSPORT PROJECT
(LOAN 2Q34-RDfl
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface
Evaluation Summary
PART I PROJECT REVIEW FROM TPE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE
I Project Identity 1
II Background 1
III Project Objectives and Description 3
IV Project Design and Organization 4
V Project Implementation 5
Loan Effectiveness 5
Project Start-up 5
Implementation Schedule 5
Procurement 6
Project Costs and Financing 7
Disbursement 7
Loan Covenants 8
VI Project Results 8
Project Objectives 8
Physical Targets 8
Economic Performance 8
Financial Performance 10
Technical Assistance and Training 11
VII Project Sustainability 12
VIII Bank Performance 12
IX Borrower Performance 14
X Bank-Borrower Relationship 14
XI Consulting Services 14
XII Project Documentation and Data 14
PART II MROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE 16
PART III STATISTICAL INFORMATION: 18
Table I - Related Bank Loans 20
Table 2 - Project Timetable 21
Table 3 - Loan Disbursement 22
Table 4 - Project Implementation 23
Table 5(A) and (B) - Project Costs and Financlng 25
Table 6(A) through (E) - Project Results 26
Table 7 - Status of Covenants 30
Table 8(A) and (B) - Staff Inputs 31
(cont'd)
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
Table of Contents (cont\.'d)
Annex 1 - List of Equipment Procured 34
Annex 2 - Traffic Trends 35
Annex 3-5 - Audited Financial Statements (1981-85) 38
Annex 6 - Key Indicators for Romanian Railways' (CFR) Operation 41
(1980-85)
MAP - IBRD 15462R2 - Romania - Land Transport Project
PROJECT COMPLETIO REPORT
ROMANIA
LAND TRANSPORT PROJECT
(IWAN 2034-RO)
PREE&CE
This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Land Transport
Project in Romania for which Loan 2034-RO in the amount of US$125 million was
approved on April 21, 1981\. The Loan was closed in May 1987, about two months
behind schedule\. US$124\.8 million was disbursed and about US$0\.2 million
cancelled\. The last disbursement was on March 24, 1987\.
This Completion Report was jointly prepared by the Infrastructure
Operations Division (EKTIN) of the Technical Department of the Europe and
Central Asia Reginal Office (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III),
and the Borrower (Part II)\.
The report is based on-information obtained from Project files in
the ECAMENA Information Services Unit, Staff Appraisal Report, President's
Report, Staff Supervision Reports, procurement documents and several working
papers\.
PROJEaT CONPLETION REPORT
ROMANIA
LAND TRANSPORT PROJECT
(LOAN 2034-RQ)
EVA LUATION SUMMARY
Objective2
1\. The project was designed mainly to relieve transport bottlenecks
and mounting congestion on some of the most heavily trafficked railways and
road sections (e\.g\. the Bucharest-Constanta corridor)\. The project also made
suitable provision for regional secondary and feeder roads, so essential for
the less developed regions to cater for and induce economic development\. In
addition, the project included a traffic optimization study designed to
improve resource allocation in the transport sector by transport policy
analysis (paras 3\.01, 4\.02 and 6\.01)\. The project objectives have been
substantially achieved (paras 6\.02-6\.11\.)
Implementation Exoerience
2\. The Investment Bank (I8) of Romania, the Borrower, supervised the
execution of the project with the participation of the Ministry of Transport
and Communications (MTTc), which was responsible for the overall co-ordination
of the project and project-related activities within the MTTc\. The proceeds
of the Loan were passed on e\. the Railway Department (CFR) and the Roads
Directorate (DR) for execution of the railway and highway components\. The
arrangements proved to be satisfactory\. Once the Loan became effective, the
projent took off smoothly\. A substantial number of civil works proceeded
according to schedule and were completed on target dates (para 5\.02)\. The
execution of a few sub-projects, however, faced significant delays due to
unforeseen problems encountered in tunnel constructions and the unduly long
delivery period of steel for the mainspan superstructure of the Danube
bridges\. In consultation with the Bank, the Government employed advanced type
shield equipment to improve productivity in tunnel works\. Furthermore, the
Government introduced easing injections to stabilize sandy soil in the
tunnels, as well as a new system of worker rewards for increasing labor
productivity in relation to these works\. These arrangements did help speed up
the works, but could not fully recover the lost time (para 5\.03)\. The quality
of construction of civil works was satisfactory\.
3\. Regarding procurement matters, procurement actions as a whole
appeared at the time to be in compliance with the letter of the Bank's
procurement rules\. However, this loan was part of a general pattern that was
unsatisfactory, i\.e\. Romania won virtually all contracts\. At an early stage,
the Bank mission found that the technical specifications, schedules of
delivery and bill of quantities (lists of unit prices) prescribed at the time
of bid invitation needed amplification to permit an adequate response from
international competitors, but the Borrower readily revised the necessary
documents\.
4\. During project implementation a high-level decision was taken to
economize the use of petroleum products in the country which had an impact on
the design of three of the project roads where the asphaltic concrete pavement
- ii -
was, in consultation with the Bank, altered - without sacrifice of strength -
to one of Portland cement (Para 5\.02)\. The Bank's flexible approach in such
situations facilitated smooth implementation of the project and was greatly
appreciated by the Borrower (paras 5\.02 and 8\.01)\.
5\. The traffic optimization study began on time but progressed slowly
and was completed almost three years behind schedule\. The study approach was
comprehensive and the methodology followed was sound (para 5\.05)\.
6\. A major problem of implementation was faced in respect of the
training program\. After a delay of 3-4 years the Borrower carried out a
limited training program, but even within this limited program execution of
the railway tunnel by mechanical methods, which had been agreed because of its
importance for future infrastructure works, was ultimately cancelled by the
Borrower\. In spite of the urgent need for technology transfer in the country,
the Bank mission perceived a great reluctance on the part of the country to
offer adequate exposure to its technical personnel abroad to familiarize
themselves with the state-of-the-art (para 5\.06)\.
Results
7\. The estimated cost of the project at appraisal was US$767\.1
million\. The actual cost was US$611\.2 million\. Several factors are
responsible for the savings in construction costs\. For instance, intense
competition due to International Competitive Bidding (ICB) and lower bid
prices obtained than those in the appraisal estimate resulted in a
considerable savings in several items (Paras 5\.07 and 5\.08)\. A strong US
dollar in the early 1980s also contributed to substantial savings (para 5\.08)\.
Furthermore, price contingencies provided for in the cost estimates at
appraisal turned our to be liberal\. Actual disbursements were faster thar\. the
appraisal estimates (para 5\.09)\.
8\. Actual traffic on the railways compared well with appraisal
estimates for both passenger and goods traffic 1981-85 (para 6\.10, Annex 2B
Pt III)\. However, recent railway traffic figures (1989/90) show a clear
departure from the past trend\. Railway traffic in 1990 actually dropped about
30% from the peak traffic of 1989 (Annex 2C Pt III)\. As regards highway
traffic the recent traffic figures indicate that the declining trend of the
1980s has been arrested and the road traffic which was suppressed by physical
control and regulations in the 1980s is gradually picking up in 1990\. Taking
into account the latest traffic trend, economic returns for the different sub-
projects have been re-evaluated under different future traffic scenar\.os (Para
6\.06 and Table 6B Pt III)\. Re-evaluated ERs show that due to an unforeseen
downturn of the economy during 1989/90, the rate of return for the different
sub-project(s) is lower than the appraisal estimate(s) but still almost all
the project components remain well justified under different scenarios
considered, excepting one road stretch, namely Fetesti-Cernavoda (ER 10)
which has particularly suffered due to the steep decline in tourist traffic\.
The project's overall re-evaluated ER is about 15 or 16% as compared with 20X
estimated at appraisal\. It should be emphasized, however, that the re-
evaluated ER for the overall project and for its components is subject to a
margin of error, or uncertainty, considerably larger than is normally the
case\. This is because of inadequate information on the actual traffic using
the improved or new rail and road sections provided under the project (see
Note to Table 6B)\.
iii -
9\. The financial performance of the railways during the period 1981-
85 did not come up to appraisal expectations (para 6\.07)\. Appraisal
expectations of higher availability of electric/diesel locco, other rolling
stock and staff productivity did not materialize\. This was primarily due to
denied access to critical inputs or spare parts from abroad due to excessive
cotiiession of imports and the elimination of foreign borrowing\. Furthermore,
rail tariffs remained unchanged despite a substantial increase in input (e\.g\.
diesel fuel) costs\. Fortunately, a reduction of about 5,000 railway surplus
staff to some extent mitigated the adverse financial trend\. The depreciation
charges\. together with benefits (profits), still generated adequate internal
resources which enabled CFR to finance about 40 to 50 percent of its
investments, the other helf being financed mostly through state allocations
(paras 6\.08 and 6\.10)\. Thd CFR continued to make at least some profit (para
6\.10)\.
10\. Use of the results of the traffic optimization study was
constrained by an administrative decision which resulted in a highly skewed
traffic split in favor of rail transport (paras 5\.05 and 6\.11)\.
sust2-ra* 'b 'ity
11\. The railways and highways organization are technically strong
and competently managed\. There is reasonable expectation that project
benefits will be sustained (para 7\.01)\. It is, however, necessary that
railway tariffs be reviewed continuously and rationally restructured whenever
necessary, and that continuity of close Bank-Government collaboration be
maintained to strengthen the groundwork laid in the first land transport
project\.
Findings and Lessons Learnt
12\. The project has been successful in meeting most of its
objectives, and a number of lessons have been learnt\. These lessons are:
(a) Considering the large size of the combined rail-cum-road
bridges on the two arms of the Danube, the Bank should have
advised the Government to introduce International Competitive
Bidding (I13) for such major civil works' to ensure cost-
effectiveness\. This could have been an important breakthrough
and could possibly also have avoided many of the problems
encountered in implementing this important sub-project (para
8\.01a);
1, Introduction of ICB in a similar situation in Hungary
(construction of Budapest by-pass including two bridges on the
river Danube) in a Bank-financed project paid rich dividends\.
- iv -
(b) The Bank should have been more forceful in persuading the
Government to implement the findings of the traffic
optimization study mainly by economic criteria rather than
administrative policy decisions and physical regulations (para
6\.11)\. It is, however, understandable that the political
climate in those days was rather hostile for a successful
implementation of the study results but with the recent opening
up of the economy, and on-going restructuring process, the Bank
should encourage the Government to adopt a more market-oriented
transport system;
(c) Lack of continuity in the Bank's supervision, particularly
following Romania's unilateral decision to discontinue
borrowing from the Bank, reduced the Bank's leverage in
addressing the institutional issues, especially poor
implementation of the training program\. Furthermore, for
future training programs to fulfill objectives, it would be
advisable to take into account participants' weakness in or
lack of knot-ledge of English so that adequate preparatory
arrangements could be planned in advance (paras 6\.11 and 7\.01)\.
(d) We have learned from these operations that the Romanian
counterparts have only modest experience in procurement
matters, particularly in the international recruitment of
consulting services under the Bank's Guidelines, and will
therefore require a great deal of help in these matters\.
Secondly, the Government should issue a dectz\.e interim
regulation as soon as possible to ensure that all government
agencies strictly follow procedures acceptable to the Bank for
procurement of goods and services, including consulting
services\. This should be a prerequisite for resumption of Bank
lending in Romania\.
PROJECr COMPLEFION REPORT
ROMANIA
LAND TRANSPORT PROJECr
(LOADN 2034-RO)
PART - rR REVIEW IMM -AN
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
ROMANIA
LAND TRANSPORT PROJECT
(LOAN 2034-RO)
PART I
I\. PRQJECT IDENTITY
Project Name LAND TRANSPORT PROJECT
Loan No 2034-RO
RVP Unit EMTIN
Country Romania
Sector Transport
Subsector Railways and Highways
II\. BACKGROUND
2\.01 Despite the existence of extensive mcuntainous areas, Romania has a
fairly well developed and evenly distributed transportation network (see MAP)
to integrate its 240,000 sq\.km of territory and to serve the needs of its
population of over 23 million\. The transportation network includes about
11,000 route-km of railways, 73,500 km of roads, one major seaport, four main
commercial river ports and a sizeable network of inland waterways and
pipelines\. The Danube river, which is navigable, flows through 1,075 km of
Romania, mainly along its southern border\. Ninety percent of foreign trade is
handled through the port of Constanta on the Black Sea\. Pipelines have been
the principal carriers of petroleum and natural gas but have a limited and
specialized role\. Air and coastal shipping are relatively unimportant for
inland transport\.
2\.02 The backbone of Romania's internal freight transportation is the railway
network, which has the crucial responsibility for moving traffic over
relatively long distances from the various concentrated centers of manufacture
and trade to important consumption centers\. Although road traffic is
sustaining high volume in tonnage, it functions mainly as a short-haul mover\.
It is significant that for passengar traffic, the railways' former dominance
passed to roads in the late 1960s\.
-2
2\.03 Neither the truck fleet nor the highway system is adequate to make
trucking a flexible long-haul alternative to railroads\. The limited emphasis
on road development is best understood within a broad view of Romania's
transport strategy, with industrial development being a key factor in the
development'of the transport system\. The transport sector has first of all,
therefore, been required to meet the needs of heavy industry and associated
large construction projects\. The needs of light industry, agriculture, and
passenger transport have been secondary\. Distribution of industrial and
consumer goods is made from distribution centers which have been established
in every "judet" (county)\. While transport to and from those centers within
the judet is by road, this pattern of geographically concentrated development
of production and consumption centers has favored railways because of their
ability so handle dense freight traffic flows from one center to another which
are generally well equipped with sidings and handling facilities for bulk
traffic\. About three-quarters of railway traffic moves from siding to siding\.
Furthermore, the production of consumer goods and light manufacturing
industries which normally favor the use of road transport, is less developed\.
2\.04 Sea transport has been used exclusively for foreign trade and there is
little coastal traffic\. With the exception of crude oil, most movements in
the past to and from the Constanta port were by rail\. Completion of the
Danube-Black Sea Canal has resulted in significant additional transport
capacity to serve the economy and facilitate movement of freight traffic to
and from Constanta by water transport\. This canal was the major component of
a larger program which also includes construction of deep-water facilities at
the port of South Constanta-Agigea, designed to handle large bulk carriers\.
2\.05 Overall, transport accounted for less than 10 of Romania's total
investments generally, while in other countries it generally accounted for
about 15-25X\. Thus, Romania's transport investments have been low by
international comparison\. Transport agencies are granted only few resources
for expansion\. Instead, efforts are made to intensify the use of existing
facilities\.
2\.06 Energy has become a critical sub-sector for the Romanian economy\.
Having begun to import oil in 1968, Romania became a net importer of energy by
1977, and in 1980 was for the first time to import more crude oil than was
produced\.
2\.07 The principal objectives of transport policy during the last decade were
the efficient provision of services, a lowering of the share of transportation
costs within the total costs of the economy, and reduction of energy
consumption\. To these ends, the authorities were fostering the use of rail
and water transport for long- and medium-distance commodity hauls, and of road
transport for short hauls, the development of integrated transport facilities
(e\.g\., containers), and the use of common carriers in preference to transport
on own account\.
-3-
III\. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION
3\.01 The objectives of the project were to assist Romania:
(a) to avoid transport cost increases by providing timelv
relief of existing traffic congestion through road and rail
investments intended to widen and increase the capacity of
transport links which are approaching saturation;
(b) to provide all-weather access to a development area, which
heretofore has been served by only a fair weather track,
and to provide transport for a new mine;
(c) to improve the economic evaluation of projects;
(d) to improve monitoring of the use of the road network;
(e) to improve resource allocation in the transport sector by
transport policy analysis (especially in respect of the
modal split); and
(f) to familiarize the railway and highway organizations with
recent developments and trends in operating, monitoring and
maintenance techniques utilizing the latest technology\.
3\.02 DescriRtion of the Project
The project consists of high priority items included in Romania's
1981-85 railway and highway Investment Plans and technical assistance\. The
railway components include: (i) construction of 77 km of two new lines
together with about 7 km of tunnels, 3 km of bridges and 2 km of viaducts;
(ii) doubling of three line sections of approximately 125 km; (iii)
electrification of 470 route km of main lines; (iv) procurement of special
steel for the superstructure of Cernavoda bridge over the Danube; and (v)
procurement of about 3301 frei-;t cars\. The highway components include: (i)
paving of three two-lane gravel roads (110 km); (ii) widening of one road (6
km) from two to four lanes; and (iii) construction of a 17 km new road between
Fetesti and Cernavoda on the two arms of the Danube to shorten the distance
between Bucharest and Constanta\. Technical assistance comprises a traffic
optimization study (150 man-months) and related study visits abroad by
Romanian officials as well as other such visits in connection with
improvements in car control and loeomotive utilization and in highway
maintenance practices\. Provisions have been made for the equivalent of about
30 man-months for such visits\. Visits to Romania by foreign experts in
connection with the traffic optimization study are also envisaged\.
l/ Subsequently increased to 830 freight cars, which formed a part of
the total requirements of CFR's 1981-85 acquisition plan (Table 11
of SAR) which was appraised by the Bank\.
-4-
IV\. PROJECT DESIGN AND ORGANIZATION
4\.01 The project was designed mainly to relieve transport bottlenecks
and mounting congestion on some of the most heavily trafficked railways and
road sections\. These lines and road sections connect several large cities and
industrial areas and are of critical importance both for the transport network
and the country\. Parallel to the overall economic growth objectives, the
Government was keen to reduce inter-regional disparities in development levels
and to generate employment opportunities in rural areas with the development
of small-scale processing units\. The project was, therefore, designed
especially to address some pressing socio-economic problems by the suitable
provision of regional, secondary and feeder roads, so essential for the less
developed regions to cater for and induce economic development\. The major
thrust in the project design was the construction of the combined road-cum-
rail bridges over the two arms of the Danube on the Bucharest-Constanta
corridor - which was probably Romania's most critical transport bottleneck\.
4\.02 In the project designing stage, the Romanians for the first time
prepared transport feasibility studies using methodology customarily employed
in Bank projects\. As a result of the Bank's subsequent reviews of these
studies and discussions with officials, a number of marginal components
originally proposed for inclusion in this project were either reformulated or
postponed\. More important, however, was the traffic optimization study to be
carried out under this project\. The principal objective of the study was to
review the existing procedures for determining transport linkages and the
modal split with a view to conserving energy, improving inventory control and
more closely aligning tariffs to service-specific costs\. The study was
designed to assist the development of local skills and formulate a policy
framework within which further development of the Romanian transport sector
could be considered\.
4\.03 The total project cost was estimated at about US$767\.1 million,
with a foreign exchange component of about US$330\.7 million\. The Bank
financed only US$125 million, the balance of the foreign exchange costs as
well as the local costs being financed by the Romanian Government\. The Bank,
provided financial support for the traffic optimization study to be carried
out by Romanian consultants mainly because this would help the country to: (a)
develop local skills needed to assist the modal institution and (b) establish
an appropriate basis to foster inter-modal co-ordination and provide the Bank
with significant leverage to assist in institutional development\. The Bank
Loan did not exceed the foreign exchange costs of the project and it was more
a question of the Bank's preference for items to finance\.
4\.04 The Investment Bank (IB) of Romania, the Borrower, supervised the
execution of the project with the participation of the Ministry of Transport
and Telecommunications (MTTc), which was responsible for the overall co-
ordination of the project and project-related activities within the NTTc\. The
proceeds of the Loan were passed on to the Railway Department and the Roads
Directorate for the railway and highway components included in the project\.
-5 -
Responsibility for the technical assistance element and coordination of the
traffic optimization study was vested in MTTc\.
V\. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
5\.01 Loan effectiveness and proiect start-up:
The Loan (2034-RO) was approved on July 7, 1981 and was signed on
July 17, 1981 (Table 2, Pt III)\. The original planned Loan Effectiveness Date
(October 1981) was slightly delayed (to November 16, 1981) mainly because of
the unfamiliarity of the project executing agencies with Bank procedures and
requirements, as this was the first Bank-financed land transport project in
the country\. Once the Loan was effective, the project took off smoothly\.
5\.02 Implementation schedule:
Originally all the project roads were scheduled to be completed by
the end of 1984 and the railway works by the end of 1985, with the possible
exception of the cantilevers to carry the roads over the two Danube bridges at
Fetesti and Cernavoda\. A substantial number of civil works proceeded
according to schedule (Table 4, Pt III) and completed on target dates with
minor variations\. During project implementation, a high-level Government
decision was taken to economize on the use of petroleum products in the
country which had an impact on the design of three of the project roads where
the asphaltic concrete pavement was, in consultation with the lank, altered --
without sacrifice of strength -- to one of Portland cement concrete\. This
change resulted in an increase of initial investment cost which was gradually
neutralized over time due to lower maintenance cost\. This change also
resulted in the need for bitumen (financed under the project) -- from 27,000
to about 16,000 tons -- reducing the cost eligible for reimbursement by about
US$3 million\. However, as Romania had purchased equipment and materials
valued at about US$34 million, this reduction did not affect the Bank's rate
of reimbursement, which for this element of the project was limited to US$30
million\.
5\.03 The execution of civil works for several sub-projects, however,
faced significant delays (Table 4A, Pt III) due to unforeseen problems
encountered in tunnel construction and an unduly long delivery period for
steel for the mainspan superstructure of the Danube bridges\. The construction
of several tunnels was greatly hampered by water infiltration and bad soils\.
In consultation with the Bank, the MTTc employed advanced type shield
equipment to improve the productivity in tunnel works, and started working the
shields at both ends of the tunnel to speed up the works\. These arrangements
did help improve productivity but could not fully recover the ground lost\.
Furthermore, the MTTc introduced a new method of easing injections to
stabilize sandy soil in the tunnels for improving the rate of progress in
tunneling work, as well as a new system of worker rewards for increasing labor
productivity in relation to these works\. Inadequate information at the ICB
prequalification stage regarding contractor's capability to supply steel for
- 6 -
the mainspan superstructure of the Danube bridges on time hindered progress
and significantly delayed completion of this important sub-project which in
turn greatly influenced the economic viability\.
5\.04 The completion of track overhaul of priority sections commenced
slightly behind schedule (Table 4B, Pt III) in some cases and a major portion
of the works was completed on schedule though overhaul of some sections was
delayed by a year or so\. The quality of construction of civil works was, in
general, satisfactory\.
5\.05 The traffic optimization study began on time but progressed slowly
because of insufficient interest on the part of the Borrower and was completed
almost three years behind schedule (Table 6, Pt III)\. The Bank mission
maintained close liaison with the Consultants (ICPTT) carrying out this study,
exchanged ideas and clarified, at an early stage, the need to take into
account the costs of storing and maintaining inventories at each end of the
transport linkage in the study to arrive at a proper optimization of mode-
selection\. This suggestion was accepted by the Consultant\. The study
approach was comprehensive and the methodology followed was sound\. But
because of excessive emphasis on energy conservation, the Government imposed
strict rationing of motor fuel and severe restrictions on the movement of road
transport, and did not fully apply the results of the study\. Infrastructure
investments remained narrowly designed only to save fuel and the traffic split
remained highly skewed in favor of rail transport (para 6\.11)\.
5\.06 A major problem of implementation was faced in respect of the
training program component included in the project\. The project envisaged
training arrangements for improvements in car control, locomotive utilization
and highway maintenance practices\. After a delay of about 3-4 years, the
Borrower carried out a limited training program (Table 6E) and even within
this limited program, execution of the railway tunnel by mechanical methods,
which was agreed because of its importance for future infrastructure works,
was ultimately cancelled by the Borrower\. In spite of the urgent need for
technology transfer in the country, the Bank mission perceived a great
reluctance on the part of the country to offer adequate exposure to its
technical personnel abroad to familiarize themselves with the state-of-the-
art\. This was most unfortunate, to say the least\.
5\.07 Procurement:
This was the first Bank-financed land transport project in the
country\. Close Bank-Government collaboration was, therefore, essential,
particularly at the initial stage, to make the agencies concerned aware of
Bank requirements\. In many instances the Bank mission found that technical
specifications, schedules of delivery and bills of quantities (lists of unit
prices) needed amplification to permit an adequate response from international
competitors\. Based on the Bank's suggestions, the Borrower readily revised
the necessary documents\. Romanian bidders were successful throughout, despite
considerable foreign competition for some items, where bids were so close that
the local preference provision had to be invoked\. Because of intense
competition and lower bid prices obtained than those in the appraisal
estimate, considerable savings were realized in some items which were
-7-
subsequently utilized, in consultation with the Bank, for other important
items included in the project but which could not previously be financed
because of the limitation imposed by the loan amount\. Regarding procurements
matters, procurement actions as a whole appeared at the time to be in
compliance with the letter of the Bank's procurement rules\.
5\.08 Project costs ane financing:
The estimated cost of the Land Transport Project at appraisal was
US$767\.1 million\. The final cost came to about US$611\.2 million (Table SA)\.
The decrease in total cost of about 20% in terms of US dollars was due to
several factors\. For instance, intense competition due to the introduction of
ICB resulted in a considerable savings in several items (para 5\.07)\. The
changes in official exchange rates from time to time2 during project
execution also affected some savings\. Furthermore, the amount of price
contingencies provided in the appraisal estimate turned out to be too much on
the liberal side\. The structure of project financing was slightly different
from what was planned at appraisal\. The share of railways net resources,
state resources and IBRD Loan towards financing the project was set at 24\.3%,
59\.4% and 16\.3% respectively, at appraisal, as against the corresponding
figures of 29\.4%, 50\.2% and 20\.4% actually obtained on completion (Table 5B)\.
A small amount ($0\.2 million) was cancelled from the Bank Loan because of
incomplete implementation of the planned training program (para 5\.06)\.
5\.09 Disbursement:
For railwayr equipment and materials the Loan was disbursed against
the full ex-factory cosc of contracts won by Romanian organizations (para
5 17)\. Highways disbursements were made at 25% of total expenditures on civil
works, which roughly accounted for about 75% of the foreign costs of the sub-
project\. Statements of expenditures, against which the Bank disbursed, were
submitted at regular intervals by the Directorate of Roads (DR) through IB\.
However, no disbursements were made from the Loan allocation for highway civil
works until the Bank received satisfactory evidence from the Government that
ICB procurements were made for highway construction equipment and materials in
an aggregate amount sufficient to cover the requested withdrawals\. This
procedure was adopted because the Bank did not insist on ICB for highway civil
works construction in Romania\. The Bank realized that introduction of ICB
into civil works construction in Romania at that stage would require profound
legislative changes, the success of which could not be taken for granted, and
that there were substantial practical problems such as the availability and
price of labor and domestic inputs to enable any foreign civil works
contractor to operate satisfactorily in Romania\. Given the situation, it was
considered prudent that a variant of the conventional system which protected
the principles of ICB and offered control over civil works performance was the
most desirable approach\. Apart from at the very initial stage, actual
disbursements were faster than the appraisal estimates (Table 3, Part III)\.
The Loan was closed on May 1987 with a delay of only two months mainly to
2/ Exchange rates at different points of time are shown under
"Currency Equivalents"\.
- 8 -
explore the possibility of a better execution of the training program (para
5\.06)\.
5\.10 Loan covenants:
Compliance with Loan covenants was generally good in spite of some
delay in implementation of a few sub-projects and reduction in scope of the
training program (Table 7, Pt III)\. The Borrower's part (Pt II of the PCR) of
the Project Completion Report and the Government's comments on Part I of the
report are still awaited\. (See note under Part II of the PCR)
VI\. PROJECT RESULTS
6\.01 Proiect objectives:
Overall, the project was successful in meeting its principal
objectives of relieving critical transport bottlenecks on the transport links
which were approaching saturation\. The project also provided all-weather
access to a development area which remained isolated for a major part of the
year, and a transport link for a new mine\. Improvement of management,
operation and monitoring of the use of the transport network was also
addressed with a limited amount of success through transport policy analyses
(particularly in respect to the modal split - paras 5\.05 and 6\.11) and
increasing use of methodology customarily used in the Bank for evaluation of
transport investments (para 4\.02)\.
6\.02 Physical targets:
The physical targets of the project have been achieved
substantially as planned (paras 5\.02 and 5\.03) with some slippage in time
schedule mainly due to unforeseen difficulties (sandy soil and water
infiltration) faced in tunnel construction and in the supply of steel for the
mainspan superstructure of the Danube bridges\. The quality of construction of
civil works was good\.
6\.03 Economic gerformance:
The general and sub-project specific methodologies followed for
the economic re-evaluation of the completed project are, basically, the same
as those used at appraisal\. For example, in Romania prices of railway
traction and rolling stock, rails, road trucks, diesel fuel, electricity and
several other important items influencing transport activity are significantly
below the border prices\. For calculating economic benefits and costs, both at
appraisal and in the preparation of the completion report, international
prices (Table 34 of Staff Appraisal Report - SAR) have been used for such
tradeable commodities\. Labor, land and other non-tradeable items like
"ballast and stones" have been valued at local prices in both situations\. As
envisaged at appraisal, quantified benefits due to the proposed project
resulted mainly from reduced maintenance and operating costs\.
-9-
6\.04 Lower transport costs due to substantial distance savings in
specific cases, such as (i) the new Fetesti-Cernavoda road (a distance saving
of about 60 km); (ii) the road between Adjud/Podul Turculi and Birlad (a
distance saving of 40 km); (iii) the Craiova-Balchesti road (a distance saving
of 30 km); and (iv) the new Vilcele-Rm\. Vilcea interlinked with doubling of
Rm\. Vilcea-Podul Olt section (saving considerable distances in travel for
about 3 million tons of freight traffic per annum) amply justified the
investments made as assessed at appraisal (Table 6B Pt III), excepting the
Fetesti-Cernavoda road (para 6\.06)\.
6\.05 Electrification of three heavily trafficked lines, namely Dej-
Cluj-Simeria (carrying 33 million gross ton-km per route km in 1980), Mintia-
Arad (carrying 23 million gross ton-km per route km in 1980) and Faurei-
Tandarei (carrying 30 million gross ton-km per route km in 1980), which were
already prime candidates for electrification on economic grounds, was
postponed by the Government in the past because of unattractive financial
returns since CFR was receiving diesel fuel far below resource costs, although
Romania was importing substantial quantities of crude oil\. Based on the Bank-
style feasibility studies prepared at appraisal and on completion,
justification of electric traction based on resource costs has been fully re-
established (Table 6B, Pt III)\. Doubling of the Ilia-Arad and Faurei-Tandarei
lines results in relatively high benefits as expected at appraisal because the
expenditures are for completing a relatively small portion of a large on-going
works, yielding full benefits on completion by avoiding substantial detour of
freight traffic on circuitous routes\.
6\.06 The actual traffic growth and its projection have been re-assessed
at completion\. Railway traffic growth during the project construction period
(1981-65) and at completion compares favorably with appraisal estimates (para
6\.10 and Annex 2B Pt III)\. However, the recent (1989/90) traffic figures
(Annex 2C Pt III) show a significant departure from the past trend and a drop
of about 301 in rail freight traffic (and 20Z in rail passenger traffic) in
one year, namely, 1990 compared to 1989\. It is not clear whether this
declining trend in traffic will continue or there will be a modest recovery of
railway traffic from its 1990 figure during the next decade\. For the purpose
of re-evaluation of economic returns (ERs) actual traffic trend up to 1990 has
been taken into consideration and thereafter two alternative scenarios have
been assumed\. For railway traffic, (i) a drop of about 40% from the peak in
1989 to 2000 due to the on-going economic restructuring and, alternatively,
(ii) a modest annual growth of about 2 to 3% from the 1990 low traffic during
the next decade\. It is possible that in reality the ERs will lie in between
the two bounds discussed\. As regards highway traffic the recent traffic trend
(1989/90) shows that the declining trend of the 1980s has been arrested and
there is a growth of about 6X in freight traffic (and 11 in passenger traffic)
in 1990 compared to 1989\. For the purpose of re-evaluation of ERs for highway
sub-projects, the actual traffic trend up to 1990 has been utilized and a
traffic growth of about 4X per annum has been assumed during the 1990s and
thereafter up to 2005\. This assumption appears to be realistic particularly
because the road traffic has been suppressed by physical control and
regulations during the 1980s\. Re-evaluated economic returns for the different
sub-projects (Table 6B Pt III) show that, due to an unforeseen downturn of the
economy in the late 1980s, the rate of return for the different sub-projects
- 10 -
is lower than the appraisal estimate(s) but still almost all the project
components remain well justified under the different scenarios discussed above
excepting one road stretch, namely Fetesti-Cernavoda, with a marginally lower
ER of about 10, which has particularly suffered due to the steep decline in
tourist trade\. The overall project remains economically justified as
appraised with a weighted E\.R\. of about 15-16% (Table 6B Pt III)\. It should
be emphasized here that these estimates are, however, subject to a margin of
error, or uncertainty, considerably larger than is normally the case because
of inadequate traffic information; see Note to Table 6B and footnotes to Table
6A and Annex 2A\.
6\.07 Financial Rerformance (CFR):
The financial statements of Romanian Railways (CFR) including both
appraisal estimates and actual results for FY 81-85 are given in Annex 3-6 (Pt
III)\. The target for the railways was to produce for all activities combined
a benefit (profit) of about 12-l5%3 during 1981-85, and a return of more than
3% on the average net fixed assets in use during that period\. These targets
were not optimistic since they were generally exceeded in the previous five
year plan period\. However, the desired results were not achieved, and a
profit of barely 2-3% was realized in most of the years and the return on the
net fixed assets was below 3% during this entire period and was less than 2%
in 1982 and 1983\. This was mainly because tariffs did not keep pace with
inflation, particularly with the significant rise in costs of diesel fuel and
electricity\. The overall operating revenue of the railways, though, exceeded
the appraisal estimates in absolute terms in all these years, but was not
sufficient to offset an increase of about 20-30% in operating expenses (Annex
3, Pt III)\. Railways tariffs remained unchanged during all these years, and
only recently in 1990 has the tariff been more than doubled to reverse the
deteriorating trend\.
6\.08 The depreciation charges, together with benefits, still generated
adequate internal resources which enabled the railways to finance about 40 to
50 percent of its investments, the other half mostly being met through state
allocations (Annex 4, Pt III)\. CFR did not enter into any foreign loan other
than the Bank Loan during the period under review\.
6\.09 Repayable state allocations which were expected to rise by about
50% from about Lei 17 billion in 1981 to about Lei 26 billion in 1985 at
appraisal continued to increase more sharply during this entire period and
stood at Lei 47 billion in 1985 (Annex 5, Pt III)\. Consequently, the
debt/equity ratio projected at appraisal as 27/73 in 1985 actually worked out
at 36/64\.
3/ Operating ratios (including track overhaul expenses) varying
between 85 and 88%\. Capital overhaul of track, normally
capitalized, is in Romania charged to operations\. When capital
overhaul of tracks is excluded from operational expenses,
operating ratios and rate of return on net fixed assets improve by
about 7-8% and 0\.4-0\.5% respectively\.
- 11 -
6\.10 The financial performance of the railways during the period under
consideration (1981-85) was interlinked with three basic factors, namely: (i)
traffic mix and its growth, (ii) railway productivity and (iii) input costs
and tariff adjustments\. Traffic materialization on the railways compared
favorably with appraisal estimates for both passenger and goods traffic (Annex
2B, Pt III)\. As regards the commodity mix, principally increased coal
movement in bulk and relatively low volume of higher-rated traffic had an
unfavorable impact on railway finance to some extent\. Appraisal expectations
of higher availability of electric/diesel locos, other rolling stock and staff
productivity did not materialize\. This was primarily due to denied access to
critical inputs or spare parts from abroad due to the excessive compression of
imports and the elimination of foreign borrowing\. However, utilization of
traction and rolling stock in 1985 improved in absolute terms compared to
1980\. Rail tariffs remained unchanged despite increased input costs (para
6\.07)\. Fortunately, a reduction of about 5,000 railway surplus staff
mitigated to some extent this adverse trend and the CFR continued to make at
least some profit\. The latest operational statistics (1986-89, Annex 7)
indicate that the improvement in staff productivity was maintained during the
1980s and the turnaround time of wagons improved significantly during the
entire period 1980-89\.
6\.11 Techrical assistance and training:
The major technical assistance component under the project was the
traffic optimizatioa study\. The study was designed to review the existing
procedures for optimizing transport linkages and the modal split, in order to
furcher sharpen and refine them, taking into account multiple objectives
including energy conservation, inventory control and the relation between
tariffs and service-specific costs\. The Romanian Consultants (ICPTT) carried
out the studies in depth\. The multi-criterial approach which was used to
compute economic (social) cost comparisons went beyond the criteria agreed at
appraisa'l and included a number of environmental considerations\. The results
of the study were put to use starting in 1984, by some 2000 regional,
industrial, transport and planning agencies throughout Romania\. However, the
optimization criterion used in the a-,-llcation was the "least energy"
criterion imposed by the Government to correspond to its prevailing policy for
the 1986-90 plan period\. In short, the selection of optimization criteria was
not a result of the study but an administrative policy decision which resulted
in a highly skewed traffic split in favor of rail transport (Table 6D, Pt
III)\. The study demonstrated that even in the Romanian situation trade-off
points between rail and road transport costs, depending on the type of rail
terminal service (road or rail siding) and type of product vary considerably
even using economic-cost optimization, and can reach as much as 430 km on-road
(even with railway alternatives available) for high-value commodities\. But
these results were not put to any practical use and remained a show-piece of a
theoretical exercise\. The training program achieved only very limited
success, as stated earlier (para 5\.06)\. For future training programs to meet
objectives, it would be advisable to take into account, inter alia,
participants' weakness or lack of knowledge in English so that adequate
preparatory arrangements could be made in advance\.
- 12 -
VII\. PROJECI SUSTAINABILITY
7\.01 The project sought to relieve critical transport bottlenecks and
mounting congestion on some of the most heavily trafficked railway and road
sections in Romania and open up some areas which were isolated for much of the
year\. The principal benefits of the project would accrue from savings in
operational and congestion costs, reduced travel time, greater safety,
increased comfort and convenience\. Experience based on the completed project
would also enable them to compare Bank-style tnalyses with those previously in
use\. The management and staff of CFR -iid DR are technically well qualified
and competent\. Planning staff were quick to grasp Bank-style investment
analysis\. There is, therefore, reasonable expectation that project benefits
will be sustained\. The possibility of changes in the political environment
leading to a reversal of the on-going reform process in the transport sector
could be a potential risk to sustaining the institutional benefits generated
by the project\. It is essential that continuity be maintained to strengthen
the groundwork laid in the first land transport project\. Romania's unilateral
decision to discontinue borrowing from the Bank in the late 80s hampered close
Bank-Government collaboration for further progress in the transport sector and
stood in the way of the consolidation effort of project benefits, particularly
adequate implementation of the training program (para 5\.06)\. With the recent
opening up of the country, much of the lost ground may well be recovered\.
Based on the results of the traffic optimization study, the Government should
encourage equitable treatment of all modes in their access to capital, foreign
exchange and markets and allow the transport market to respond freely to
users' choice\.
VIII\. BANK PERFORMANCE
8\.01 Through the Land Transport Project, the Bank made a positive
contribution to the physical and institutional development of the transport
sector\. Inclusion of both rail and road components in the same project
helped to take an integrated view of the land transport system during
supervision stage and identify some of the system-wide problem such as
infrastructure investments narrowly designed only to save fuel\. Close project
supervision by the Bank helped speed up and improve productivity in critical
tunnel and earth works\. The procurement actions on the whole appeared to
proceed satisfactorily, except procurement of steel for the mainspan
superstructure of the Danube bridges (paras 5\.03 and 5\.07) because of timely
action taken by Bank missions to assist the Borrower to carry out the
necessary amplifications in technical specification, schedules of delivery and
Bill of Quantities, to permit adequate response from international competitors
(para 5\.07)\. At an appropriate stage of the traffic optimization study, the
Bank mission argued the need to include the implications of inventory holdings
on cost and choice of transport mode selected\. The study group had not
previously considered this aspect fully, but appreciated and implemented the
Bank mission's suggestion\. The Bank's flexible approach towards pavement
- 13 -
design without sacrifice of strength (para 5\.02) was also greatly appreciated
by the Borrower\. Because of intense competition and lower bid prices obtained
than those in the appraisal estimates, considerable savings were realized in
some items which were subsequently utilized, in consultation with the Bank,
for other important items, such as freight cars, excavators, etc\. included in
the project but which could not be previously financed because of the
limitation imposed by the Loan amount (para 5\.07)\. The Borrower fully
appreciated the Bank's helpful and reasonable approach in this regard\.
However, in retrospect, the following lessons may be learnt from the
experience of the project:
(a) Considering the large size of the combined rail-cum-road
bridges on the two arms of the Danube, the Bank could nave
advised the Government to introduce International Competitive
Bidding (ICB) for such major highway civil works\. This could
have been an important breakthrough and the country could have
reaped the benefits of international competition to make the
sub-project more cost-effective'\. Such an approach could
possibly also have avoided many of the problems encountered in
implementing this important sub-project (para 5\.03);
(b) The Bank should have been more forceful in persuading the
Government to implement the findings of the traffic
optimization study through appropriate distribution of traffic
among the different transport modes mainly by economic criteria
rather than administrative policy decisions and physical
regulations imposed by the Government (para 6\.11)\. It is,
however, understandable that the political climate in those
days was rather hostile for a successful application of the
study results but now with the opening up of the economy and
on-going restructuring process, the Bank should encourage the
Government to adopt a more market-oriented transport system;
(c) A lack of continuity in the Bank's supervision, particularly
during Romania's unilateral decision to discontinue borrowing
from the Bank (para 7\.01) near the end of this project (1986-
87) removed considerable Bank leverage in addressing the
institutional issues and to a great extent led to the poor
implementation of the training program\. Furthermore, in the
planning of future training programs it would be advisable to
take into account, inter alia, participants' weakness or lack
of knowledge in English so that adequate preparatory
arrangements could be made in advance\.
4/ Introduction of ICB in a similar situation in Hungary
(construction of Budapest by-pass including two bridges on the
river Danube) in a Bank-financed project paid rich dividends\.
- 14 -
ix\. BORROWER PERFORMANCE
9\.01 On the whole, the Borrower's performance was satisfactory\.
Background action taken for Loan Effectiveness and timely disbursements
(mostly ahead of appraisal schedule) of the Bank Loan bore ample testimony to
that effect\. The quality of construction of civil works included in the
project was satisfactory\. The technical approach to the traffic optimization
study was comprehensive and sound\. IB, MTTc, CFR and DR are all well-managed
organizations and they maintained good co-operation amongst themselves\.
Compliance with the loan covenants was generally good, excepting the training
program element (para 5\.06 and Table 7, Pt III)\.
X\. BANK-BORROWER RELATIONSHIP
10\.01 Good relations between the Bank and the Borrower contributed to
clarification and resolution of many issues (paras 5\.02, 5\.03, 5\.05 and 5\.07)
that arose during project implementation\. However, a lack of continuity,
particularly following Romania's unilateral decision to discontinue borrowing
from the Bank (para 8\.01c), resulted in inadequate attention being paid to
institutional issues, particularly the training program and use of the traffic
optimization study results (Table 6D & E, Pt III)\.
XI\. CONSULTING SERVICES
11\.01 The Romanian authorities insisted that the traffic optimization
study be undertaken by Romanian consultants since foreign consultants were not
familiar with the Romanian system\. The Technological Research and Design
Institute for Transport (ICPTT) in Romania was entrusted with this task,
mainly to help the country develop the local skills required to foster inter-
modal co-ordination\. The quality of the Consultant's work was satisfactory
(para 5\.05 and 6\.11)\.
XII\. PROJECT DOCUMENTATION AND DATA
12\.01 The appraisal report and the Loan documents were well documented
and provided a useful framework for both the Bank and the Borrower for review
of project implementation\. Supervision reports contained in-depth, on-going
analysis of physical, financial and operational aspects of rail/road sub-
sector, in general, and project components in particular, excepting in 1986 at
the end of the project completion stage due to Romania's unilateral decision
to discontinue borrowing from the Bank (para 7\.01)\. Timely submission of
audit reports of the CFR also facilitated preparation of the PCR\.
PROJECT COMPLETON REPORT
ROMANIA
LAND TRANSPORT PROJECr
(LOAN 2034-RO)
PART II - ROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORRQWER'S PERSPECIV
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
ROMANIA
LAND TRANSPORT PROJECT
(LOAN 2034-RO)
PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BOSRROWiRSPERSPECTIVE
The project principally reflected the political decisions of the former
leadership of the country, and to a lesser extent the criteria of efficiency
and economic return\. The economic and political decision-making factors at
that time directed that the extension of IBRD loans be followed by local
measures being taken which made it compulsory that bids be awarded to local
suppliers\. Accordingly, the foreign exchange loan amounts made available by
the IBRD were mostly used for the external payments balance\.
However, an independent analysis of lessons learned reveals these to be the
same as those to be derived from the majority of projects benefiting from
World Bank loans, namely:
1) difficulties faced by the Bank in obtaining the data, especially those
regarding the overall transport sector, required for the perspective
analysis, i\.e\. overall need, priorities and plans for all transport modes;
2) delays experienced in the implementation of civil works, due on one hand
to unforeseen factors (water infiltration and bad soils in the case of
several tunnels) and on the other to certain political decisions
(economizing on the use of petroleum products, the effect of which was to
change the way in which three roads within the project were built);
3) delays in the supply of locally manufactured goods, for instance the metal
parts required for construction of the superstructure for the Danube
bridges;
4) reduction to a minimum level of the loan amounts to be used for imports,
which explains the limited implementation of the programs for the training
of technical staff abroad\.
Irrespective of the aforementioned facts, one has to appreciate the efforts
undertaken both by IBRD and by the institutions involved which succeeded,
following special cooperation during procurement and supervision, in finally
achieving project implementation\.
This is the appropriate occasion to congratulate IBRD on their insistence that
a study of transport optimization be prepared\. This study, although it was
not taken into account at the time, is now being used to meet the emerging
needs of a transportation system operating according to the requirements of a
market economy\.
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
ROMANIA
LAND TRANSPORT PROJECT
(LOAN 2034-RO)
PART III - STATISTICAL INFORMATION
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
ROMANIA
LAND TRANSPORT PROJECT
(LOAN 2034-RO)
PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION
CONTENTS
Table 1: Related Bank Loans
Table 2: Project Time Table
Table 3: Loan Disbursements
Table 4: Project Implementation
Table 5: Project Costs and Financing
A\. Project Costs
S\. Project Finandng
Table 6: Project Resuits
A\. Economic Benefits
B\. Economic Rate of Retums
C\. Financiaimpact - Romanian Railways (CFR)
D\. Project Study
E\. Training Program
Table 7: Status of Covenants
Table 8: Staff Inputs
A\. Bank Missions
B\. At Headquarters
Annex 1 - Ust of Equipment Procured
Annex 2 - Traffic Trends
A\. Comparison of Actual and Forecast of Traffic on Project
Sections\.
B\. Modal Traffic Trends - Comparison of Appraisal
Estimates with Actual\.
C\. Recent Traffic Trends (1989/1990)
Annex 3- Audcted Financial Statements (1981\.85) - Income Statements
Annex 4 - Avdted Financial Statements (1981-85) - Cash Flows
Annex 5- Audited Financial Statements (1981-85) - Balance Shts
Annex 6- Key Indicators for Romanian Railways (CFR)-Operation (1980\.85)
\.20-
Table 1: RELATED BANK LOANS
(in Millions US Dollars)
Year of Loan
Title Loan No\. Approval Amount Purpose Comments
Danube- 1794 1980 100\.00 To assist In the construction of a 64-km canal This was the first transport
Black from Cernavoda on the Danube to South sector project and the loan
Sea Constanta Agigea on the Black Sea in order to was fully disbursed in May
Canal provide an energy efficient and cost effective 1982 and the cana\. has been
Project means of transportation\. open to traffic since May
1984\. PPAR No\. 6565
December 23, 1986\.
Source: Bank Mission
February 1991
-21 -
Tabe 2: PROJECT TIME TABLE
Date Date
Item Planned Actual
Preparatlon by the Country February 1979 - January
1981
First Presentation to the Bank
and first Bank mission to
consider the project March 1979
Appraisal mission September/October 1980
Negotiations completion date May 29, 1981
Board Approval July 7, 1981
Loan Signature July 17, 1981
Loan Effectiveness October 1981 November 16,1981
Loan closing March 31, 1987 May 1987 1/
Project Completion June 30, 1986 October 30, 19882/
Source: Bank Mission
Februarv 1991
1/ Loan was fully disbursed after cancelling an amount of US$ 0\.22 million\.
2/ Delayed due to unforeseen difficufties experienced in tunnelling works and delivery of main span super structure
for Danube river bridge\.
-22-
Table I LOAN DISBURSEMENTS
(in Millions US Dollars)
IBRD Appraisal Actual Actual as %
Fiscal Year Estimate Disbursement of Estimate
Dec\. 81 6\.1 0\.0 0\.0
June 82 28\.2 16\.0 56\.7
1983
Dec\. 82 51\.4 55\.2 107\.4
June 83 75\.3 81\.5 108\.2
Dec\. 83 96\.4 106\.9 110\.9
June 84 109\.4 119\.3 109\.0
Dec\. 84 117\.0 123\.6 105\.6
June 85 121\.0 124\.4 106\.3
Dec\. 85 123\.0 124\.5 101\.2
June 86 124\.0 124\.8 100\.6
1987
Dec 86 124\.8 124\.8 100\.0
June 87 125\.0 124\.8 1/ 100\.0
Source: Bank Supervision Reports\.
1/ About US$ 0\.2 million was cancelled and the final disbursement was made on March 24, 1987\.
Febmtu 199
- 23 -
Page 1 of 2
Table 4: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
A - COMPLETION OF CML WORKS CONSTRUCTION 1/
Scheduled Actual
Total Completon Completion
Ouantiy at appraisal Date Comments
A\. RAILWAY COMPONENT
I\. NEW UNES
1\.1 Vlcela-Rm\. Vilcea 39\.6 km Sept\. 1985 Nov\.1988 Unforeseen difficulties
experienced In tunneling works
1\.2 Babenl Barbesti 37\.0 km Dec\. 1984 Dec\. 1986 In operation since Dec\. 198
II\. UNE DOUBUNG
2\.1 RmC Vilcea-Podu Oq!t 39\.6 km Dec\. 1985 Dec\. 1985
2\.2 llia-Arad 64\.0 km Dec\. 1985 May 1988
2\.3 Faurel-Tandarei 20\.0 km Dec\. 1983 End 1984
Ill\. ELECTRIFICATION OF UNES
3\.1 Dej-Cluj-Slmeria 236\.0 km June 1984 Nov\. 1984 In operation by end 1984
3\.2 MInta-Arad 142\.0 km Dec\. 1985 Mid 1986 Operational June 1986
3\.3 Faurel-Fetesti 89\.0 km Dec\. 1985 Jun\.1984
IV\. DANUBE BRIDGE (Cemavoda) Dec\. 1982 Oct\. 1987 Delivery of steel for the main
span superstructure was delayed
B\. HIGHWAY COMPONENT
1\. PAVING OF lWO-LANE GRAVELROAD
1\.1 Schtu-Golesti-Curtea de Arges 41\.0 km Dec\. 1984 March 1986
1\.2 Crabova-Balcesti 23(40)km Dec\. 1984 Dec\. 1984
1\.3 Adjud-Birlad 29 km Dec\. 1984 Jun\. 1984
II\. WIDENING FROM TWO TO FOUR LANES
2\.1 Brashov-Harman 6 km Dec\. 1984 Jun\. 1984
III\. FOUR LANES BETWEEN BRIDGES
3\.1 FetestWCemavoda 17 km Dec\. 1984 Oct\. 1987 See Cemavoda against item (IV)
above
1/ In addition (a) 830 ralwvay freight cars Included In the Loan have been supplied as scheduled and (b) technical assistance
and training program amounting US$ 1\.0 million Included in the project always remained behind schedule\.
- 24 -
Page 2 of 2
Table 4: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
B - COMPLETION OF TRACK OVERHAUL - PRIORITY SECTIONS
Rail Type Year
to be Year in Overhaul
Priority Length Overhauled Overhaul Actually
No\. Secions km (kg) to Commence Commenced Remarks
1\. Golest-Vilcele 30\.0 49 1982 1983 Overhaul of all
2\. IIla-Birzava 64\.0 60 1982 1982 Priority Sections
3\. Videle-Caracal 11 105\.0 65 1981 1982 Completed before
4\. Brasov-Deda 228\.0 60 1981 1981 June'8 instead of
5\. Tecucl-Jasi 100\.0 65 1982 1983 December84 planned
6\. Simeria-Hunedoara 9\.0 49 1981 1982 at appraisal\.
7\. Simeria-Pestis 10\.0 60 1982 1981
8\. Alexeni-Tandarei 65\.0 65 1981 1980
611\.0
February 1991
Source: Supervision Reports and Staff Appraisal Report
*25-
Table 5: PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING
A - PROJECTC
Anaraisal Estimate Revised Estimate Actual
Items Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
-U US$ milflon - US$ million- -US$ million
Railway Component
New lines 86\.4 39\.3 125\.7 107\.2 49\.2 157\.0 109\.4 48\.0 157\.4
Une doubling 63\.6 37\.9 101\.5 62\.0 32\.1 94\.1 53\.0 25\.0 78\.0
Electrification
& signalling 46\.0 84\.6 130\.6 44\.1 75\.2 119\.3 40\.0 61\.1 101\.1
Danube bridges 75\.8 50\.3 126\.1 86\.3 52\.5 138\.8 78\.5 45\.5 124\.0
Freight Cars 0 12\.2 18\.2 1 9Q3 297 9\.4 136 23\.0
Rail Subtotal 277\.8 224\.3 502\. 310 0 28_2 290\.3 193\.2 4
Highwav Comoonent
Paving of 2-lane
gravel roads 25\.3 11\.6 36\.9 25\.3 12\.5 37\.8 24\.0 10\.2 34\.2
Widening 2 to 4 lanes 1\.7 1\.2 2\.9 2\.9 1\.5 4\.4 2\.9 1\.3 4\.2
New Constructon 706 17\.9 88\.5 72\.4 1 3 \.7 71\.1 17\.2 82\.3
Hinhway Subtotal 97\.7 3Q2 128\.4 100 6 3213 32 9 98\.0 287 126\.7
Technical Assistance QZ Q3 1\.0 Q0 5 _ 0\.8 0 0\.2 1\.0
Subtotal 376\.2 25\. 63t5 411\.1 261\.5 672\.6 389\.1 222\.1 611\.2
Physical Contingencies 37\.0 24\.3 613 - - - - -
Price Contingencies 23\.2 5 1 74\.3 _ - _ -
Total 436\.4 3307 767\.1 411\.1 261\.5 672\.6 I/ 3891 222\.1 611-\.2 1/
I/ Physical and price contingencies included\.
B - PROJECr FINANCING
Source Planned Revised Final Comments
US$ million
CFR NET Resources 186\.7 200\.0 179\.6 Regarding co-financing proposed
State Resources_/ 455\.4 347\.6 306\.8 by the Bank, Romania was
IBRD's Loan 3/ 125\.0 125\.0 124\.8 considered capable of financing
the balance of Foreign exchange
Total 767\.1 672\.6 611\.2 costs, as well as, local costs\.
2/ State Resources Include interest-free State Budget Allocations, interest bearing State Credits and differences between
Bank estimated costs of imported items (both direct and indirect) and catalog or contract prices charged to MTTC which
are otherwise absorbed by the State pricing mechanisms\.
3/ Include Technical Assistance of 15 million Lei (US$ 1\.0 million) to be financed in full from the Bank loan\.
Februarv 1991
Source: Supervision Reports and Staff Appraisal Report
\.26-
Page 1 of 4
Iable 6 PROJECT RESULTS
A - =NQyQMIC BENEFITS I/
Beneft 1/
at Full Ooeraton
Revised Estimates on
Completion of Works when
Estimated at Rail/Road Sections were
Appraisal open to Traftc
(in million Lei)
RAI-L SgCTIONS
1\. Now Unff
1\.1 Babenl-Barbesti 140 285
II\. Doublina gt LUi
2\.1 llia-Arad 230 235
2\.2 Faurei-Tanderel 100 103
11\. New Lines and Doublina of Unes
3\.1 ViDcele-R Vllcea and Rm Vilcea Podu Oft 450 455
IV\. ElriGgWcat1on
4\.1 Dej-Cluj-Simeria 220 224
4\.2 Mintia-Arad 150 153
4\.3 Faurel-Tanderel 70 74
llOAD SECTIg
V\. Paving of Two Lane Gravel Roads
5\.1 Schitu Golesti-Curtea de Arges 35 37
5\.2 CrakNa-Balcesti 18 16
5\.3 Podul Turculul-Birlad 25 21
VI\. Widenina of Two-to-Four Lanes
6\.1 Brasov-Harman 10 10
Vil\. First Two Lanes of Eyentual Four EMes
7\.1 Fetestl-Cemavoda 180 172
VIII\. Combined Rail/Road Bridoe
8\.1 Danube Bridges 350 355
1/ Include savings in operational costs, maintenance costs and passenger travel time on two highly congested highway,
sections, namely Brasov-Harman and Fetesti-Cemavoda (see Annex 2)\. The benefit estimates are subject to a margin of
error considerably larger than Is normally the case; see footnote to Annex 2A\.
March 1991
Source: Mission Estimates
-27
Page 2 of 4
Table PROJECT RESULTS
B - ECONOMIC RATE OF RETUBNB (ER)
Project Appraisal Revaluated at
Component Estimate Prolect Completion
(most Probable ER %,-
Sc\.1 1/ Sc\.2 2/
RAILWAYS
I\. Now line
1\.1 Barbeni-Barbesti 13 13 15
II\. Doubilna -of Lines
2\.1 IIla-Arad 40 23 25
2\.2 Faurel-Tanderel 70 43 44
III\. New U Rne and Doublno of Line
3\.1 Vilcele-Rm Vilcea & Rm Vlcea-Podul 22 15 17
-V\. Electrifcato-n
4\.1 De-CluJ- Simerda 21 18 19
4\.2 Mintla - Arad 20 20 22
4\.3 FaureiTanderel 24 1 18
Sub-Total 24 / 17 / 19a/
RC2AD SECTIONS
V\. Paving of Two Lane Gravel Roads
5\.1 Schitu Golesti-Curtea de Arges 13 12
5\.2 Cralova - ialcesti 19 18
5\.3 Podul Turculul - Biriad 17 14
VI\. Widening from Two-to-Four Lane
8\.1 Brasov - Harman 23 16
ViI\. First Two Lanes of Eventual Four
7\.1 Fetesti - Cemavoda 1 10
Sub-Total 15a/ 12 X/
VilI\. Combined Rail/Road Bridae
8\.1 Danube Bridges 14 13
Grand Totai 20a/ 15a/ 16i/
jf Sc\.1 - Scenario I assumes that the raiwNay traflic will continue to decline In the 1990s and will drop to about 40% of the
1989 peak level by 2000 A\.D\.
2/ Sc\.2 Scenario 2 assumes that the railway traffic, after 1990 s actual drop, will recover modestly to the extent of about
2% per annum during the 1990s\.
X/ Weighted Average\.
NgWt: These ER estimates are subject to a margin of error, or uncertainty, considerably larger than is normally the case
because of inadequate traffic information; see footnote 1 to Table 6A, and footnote to Annex 2A\.
Source: Mission Estimates, March 1991 and Staff Appraisal Report
- 28 -
Page 3 of 4
Table 6: PROJECT RESULTS
C - FINANCIAL IMPACT - ROMANIAN RAILWAYS (CFRI
Operating Ratio 1/_ Return on Net Fixed Assets
Appraisal Appraisal
Year Estimate Actual_/ Estimate Actual_/
1981 88 93 3\.3 2\.2
1982 88 97 3\.3 1\.3
1983 87 97 3\.3 1\.8
1984 88 98 3\.3 2\.2
1985 88 97 3\.2 2\.7
1/ Operating expenses (including track overhaul expenses) divided by operating revenues\.
2/ Based on audited financial statements - details are given in Annex 3, 4 and 5\.
D - PROJECT STUDY
Typo of Purpose as Defined Impact of
Study at Appraisal Status Study
Traffic Optimization To establish an The study was delayed Study results were not
Study appropriate basis for and was completed by satisfactorily applied to
developing a policy the middle of 1987\. The the transport sector\.
frame work for the quality of the study was Motor fuel was strictly
economic development satisfactory\. rationed and
of the transport sector regulations/restricions
and for the efficient were imposed to curb
utilization and co- motor fuel oil
ordination of transport consumption\.
facilities\. To be Consequently, present
completed by the end of traffic split remains
1983\. highly skewed in favor
of rail transport\.
-29-
Page 4 of 4
Table : PROJECT RESULTS
E - RAINING PROGRAM
Purpose as Defined
at Appraisal Status Remarks
30 man-months of The Loan Agreement envisaged that necessary arrangements for the
technical assistance for training would be finalized by the Borrowver In Consultation with the
the methodological Bank by June 30, 1992\. After a delay of about 3-4 years, the Even within this
aspect of the traffic Borrower carried out a limited training program as shown below\. limited program,
optionalization study training on
referred in Part D SUNieQj Countr No\.of Men days Man-dav execution of railway
above and for 1\. Railway traffic safety France 2 7 14 tunnel by
improvements In car 2\. Optimization study mechanical
control, locomotive methodology USA 3 24 72 methods was
utilization and highway 3\. Tech\. and comm\. aspect agreed, but was
maintenance practices\. of running goods France/ 3 15 45 ultimately
train\. Canada cancelled\.
4\. Traffic Management Sweden/ 2 15
W\. Germany
_ _~~~~~~~
March 1991
Source: Supervision Reports
\.30-
TIll: STATUS OF COVENANTS
Loan Agreement Desoripion Status
Reference
3\.04(a) and (b) Traffic optimization study to be oompleted Study completed by mid-1985 and
by Dec\. 31, 1984\. the final report received in the Bank
In August 1985\.
3\.04(c) Technical Asssance focusing on the Arrangements for the training
training program lncluding Improvements In program suffered a delay of three
car contro, locomotive utlizon, highway to four years\. A limited training
maintenanoe etc\. program proposed and agreed with
the Bank was completed by
September 1987 except the training
for tunnelling\.
4\.01 (b) Overhaul of 600 km of heavily used track\. Work on these lines were
completed with some adjustments
In the time schedule (see Table\.3)
4\.01(c) Parallel development of mining and power Complied with\. The Babeni-Barbesti
sectors In BabeniBarbesti corridor\. new line was completed by the end
of 1988 and placed progressively in
operation\. During 1987, the line
was carrying about 7 million tons of
coal to thermal power stations\.
4\.01(d) Improvement of the Bucharest-Fetesti Complied with\.
highway contemporaneously with the
construction of the Fetest-Cemavoda road\.
4\.01(e) Measures needed for carrying out of the Complied with\.
projt lndudir\. prompt acquWon of land,
rights and interest In respect of land\.
4\.01(fl Provsion of a suitable number of heavy-duty The Romanians bought 4 heavy-
track maintenance machines, and about 80 duty machines from Plasser and
pieces of traffic counting equipment by manufactured several heavy-duty
1985\. machines under Plassers license in
1985 and 1986\. For the highway
component the Romanians bought
about 190 units of loop traffic
counting equipment in 1985/86\.
6\.02(fl and (g) Finandal staements and audied reports to Complied with\.
be submtted wihin siX months of the end of
the fcal year\.
6\.020) Project Completion Report Complied with\.
Enbruary lJ91
Source: Supervision Reports
-31 -
Page 1 of 2
TbIl: STAFF INPUTS
A - BANK MINQIONS
Stage of Month/ No\. of No\. of Staff Weeks Date
Prolect Cycle Year Staff Weeks In Field of Report
Identffication March/79 4 2 8 March 30,1979
Preparation September/79 3 2 6 October 3, 1979
Pr2-appraisal March/80 5 3 15 April 24, 1980
Appraisai September/80 6 4 24 November 11, 1980
Post-Appraisal March/81 4 2 j April 16, 1981
Sub-Total 61
Supervsion
1\. September/81 3 2 6 October23, 1981
2\. March/82 2 2 4 Aprl 16, 192
3\. June/82 3 2 6 June 29, 1982
4\. September/82 3 2 6 October 18, 1982
5\. March/83 1 2 2 April 11, 1983
6\. September/83 2 2 4 September 30, 1983
7\. September/84 2 2 4 October 18, 1984
8\. March/85 2 2 4 Mwch 29,1985
9\. September/85 3 2 6 October 23, 1985
10\. April/86 1 1 1 May 16\. 1986
11\. August/87 2 1 \.2 September 21, 1987
Sub-Total 45
Grand Total 106
ELbruary Id9
Source: Supervision Repofs
-32
Page 2 of 2
Iable : STAFF INPUTS
B - AT HEADQUARB
Stage of Month/ No\. of No\. of Staff Weeks
Project Cycle Year Staff Weeks at Headquarters
Preparation/ August - October 1979 3 4 12
Pre-appraisal February- April 1980 5 7 35
Appraisal August - October 1980 6 8 48
Post Appraisal March '81 4 1 4
Loan Negotiation May'81 A
Sub-Total 109
Supervision FY '82 3 5 15
- do - FY '83 2 7 14
- do - FY'84 2 5 10
- do- FY'85 2 2 4
- do- FY'86 2 6 12
-do- FY'87 1 3 3
-do- FY'88 2 1 2
Completion Report FY '90 1 3 3
- do- FY'91 2 4 _
Sub-Total 71
Grand Total 180
April 1991
Source: Bank-s MIS
-33-
Annex 1
UST OF EOUIPMENT PROCURED UNDER THE PROJECT
Amount j/
Item Quantf fUS mDihion)
Ralhvav
1\. Rails 21,060 tons 9\.85
2\. Copper Contact-wire for electrification 1,287 tons 3\.64
3\. Cables for Telecom, Signalling for
electrification, new lines and doubling 2,060 km 13\.37
4\. Speclal Steel for Danube bridge 20,510 tons 8\.19
5\. Sub-station equipment 357 pcs 4\.54
6\. Points and Crossings 291 no 9\.41
7\. Track fittings 8,850 tons 6\.08
8\. Equipment for remote control on electrification 162 pcs 0\.65
9\. Equipment for telephone and radio communications 1,478 pcs 7\.69
10\. High tensile steel for reinforcement for concrete
sleepers 4,000 tons 3\.00
11\. Railway freight cars 830 no 27\.47
Sub-Total 93\.89 (say 94\.00)
Hbhg
1\. Excavators (0\.5 cm) 9 no 0\.47
2\. Bulldozers (180 hp) 8 no 0\.83
3\. Rollers (10-12 t) 26 no 0\.63
4\. Motorgraders (180 hp) 10 no 0\.85
5\. Concrete Batch Plant 2 no 0\.30
6\. Mobile crane (120 hp) 9 no 0\.69
7\. Loaders (180 hp) 11 no 0\.58
8\. Dump Trucks (16\.5 t) 90 no 4\.50
9\. Bitumen 15,000 tons 2\.70
10\. Steel 44,000 tons 18\.82
Sub-Total 30\.37 (say 30)
1/ Commited at exchange rate of January 1, 1983\.
February 1991
Source: Supervision Report October 1985
- 34 -
Annex 2
Page 1 of 3
IBhEEl/IBFND
A - COMPARISON OF ACTUAL AND FORECAST OF TRAFFIC ON PROJECT SECTIONS
Traffic (Gross t,on km In millions)
Railway Length 1980 - 1985-
Lines of Route (km) (Actual) Appraisai Revised
Estimate Estimate jj
1\. Del - Cluj - Simeria 236 7812 8594 9080
2\. lIla - Arad 125 2920 4892 5189
(doubling of
Ilia - Blrzava \. 64 km)
3\. MInta - Arad 142 3317 5558 5873
(ElecStificatlon)
4\. Faurel - Fetesti 89 2625 2941 3107
(Doubling of Faurei -
Tanderel 20 km and
eletrification of
Faurel - Fetesti 89 km)
5\. RmViicea- Podul Ont 40 636 785 829
(doubling)
Road Length Daily Traffic (Number of Motor Vehicles)
Sections of Route (kmn) 1980- - 19
Actual Aporaisal Est\. Revised Est\. 1/
Trucks Others Total Trucks Others Total Trucks Others Total
1\. Adjud (Podul TurculuQ)
- Birad 29 o 800 - 575
2\. Cralova-Balcest 40 320 480 800 440 660 1,100 350 450 800
3\. Brasov-Harman 6 4,800 3,200 8,000 6,720 4,480 11,200 5,040 3,360 8,400
4\. FetestCernavoda 17 8,000 3,700 11,700 6,000 2,775 8,775
1/ These are crude traffic estimates based on nework totals for 1985\. It would, of course, have been far preferable to have
had actual and up-todate trafc data for Individual rail and road links, In particular for the four links which were expected to
register very high traffic Increases because of traffic diversion\. The Bank has repeatedly asked the Romanian authorities to
provide this information as well as the corresponding data for the links from which traffic was to be diverted\. But, to no avail\.
The resulting ER estimates, though the best available, are therefore subject to a margin of error, or uncertainty, coneiderably
larger than is normally the case, i\.e\. when actual and up-to-date traffic data are available\.
March 191b
- \.5 -
Page 2 of 3
B - MODAL TRAFFC TRENDS (1981\.85)
- COMPARISON OF APPRAISAL ESTMATES WITH ACTUAL
Freiaht IVoum in bilL tonm) Passe VoL in blL Pass4kon
Railway HlghA I/ Rhier Total Raiway Highway 11 Total
A\.E ?( Acual A\. E\. 2 Actual A\. E\. / Aual A E\. /Aaual A\. E\. Aotuac A\. E g Actual A\. E\. /Actual
1980 75\.5
1981 69\.9 75\.2 11\.5 11\.8 3\.2 2\.4 84\.6 89\.4 23\.6 24\.4 24\.8 24\.7 48\.4 49\.1
(888) (84\.1) (13\.6) (13\.2) (3\.8) (2\.7) (100\.0) (100\.0) (486) (49\.7) (51\.2) (50\.3) (100Q (100\.0)
1982 71\.8 71\.1 11\.8 11\.1 4\.5 2\.5 88\.1 84\.7 239 25\.6 26\.1 24\.2 50\.0 49\.8
(81\.5) (89) (134) 13\.1) (5\.1) (3\.0) (100\.0) (100\.0) (47\.8) (51\.4) (522) (4&6) (100\.0) (100\.0
1983 73\.8 72\.3 12\.1 8\.3 17\.2 2\.4 103\.1 83\.0 24\.2 27\.6 27\.4 21\.4 51\. 49\.0
(71\.7) (87\.1) (11\.7) (10\.0) (1&6) (2\.9) (I=Q) (100\.0) (469 (58\.3 (53\.1) (43\.7) (100\.0) (100\.0)
1984 76\.0 75\.2 12\.6 7\.3 19\.0 2\.5 107\.6 85\.0 24\.5 288 28\.7 22\.5 53\.2 51\.3
(70\.7) (88\.4) (11\.7) (6\.6) (17\.6) (3\.0) (100\.0) (100\.0) (48\.0) (561) (54\.0) (439) (100\.0) (100\.0)
1985 78\.4 74\.2 13\.3 7\.5 21\.0 2\.8 112\.7 84\.5 24\.9 31\.1 30\.0 21\.7 54\.9 52\.8
(69\.) (879) (11-8) (9) (1 (3\.2) =ag) (O0\.0) (45\.4) (589 (54\.6) (41-1) (100\.0) (100\.0)
1/ Rebat to Pubrlc Tramport only\.
2/ A\. E\. indcates Appraisal Esimat
Note: Fgures wtin parentsis idcate percentge distibution\.
Sourc - CFR and Supevsion MissioL
-36-
Annex 2
Page 3 of 3
C - RECENT TRAFFIC TRENDS U M19
Freiahlt olume in bill\. ton-km) Passenaers Nolume in bill\. oass-km)
Railway Highwayl/ River Total Railway Highwayl/ Totai
(Actual) (Actual)
1989 81\.1 5\.7 3\.5 90\.3 35\.4 23\.1 58\.5
(89\.8) (6\.3) (3\.9) (100\.0) (60\.5) (39\.5) (100-0)
1990 56\.1 6\.0 2\.5 64\.6 28\.6 23\.3 51\.9
(86\.8) (9\.3) (3\.9) (100\.0) (55\.1) (44\.9) (100\.0)
1/ Retes to Public Transport only\.
Figures wkhin parenthesis Indicate percentage distribution\.
2/ Figures for 1990 are provisional\.
Source: CFR and MTTC
-37 -
Annex 3
ROMANIAN RAILWAYS (CgR) - AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
INCOME STATEMENTS
(Lel in million)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Basic Appraisal Appraisai Appraisai Appraisal Appraisai
Advitv Forecast Actual Forecast Actual Foe-m Forecast Actual Forecast Aaual
O0eratina Revenues
Passengers 4,134 4,327 4,170 4,650 4\.211 5202 4,257 5,377 4,308 5,880
Freight 11\.949 12\.173 252 13354 1249 J 12 14\.528 13\.149 14\.162
Sub-Total 16\.083 16,500 16,422 18,004 16,709 19,228 17,065 19,905 17,457 20,042
Ooeratina Exoenses 14,214 15,417 14,393 17,371 14,530 18,585 14,707 19,469 14,906 19,3B8
Net Operating Income 1,869 1,083 2,029 633 2,179 643 2,358 436 2,551 654
Auxliary Activities
Revenues 751 1,056 779 1,808 780 2\.168 781 6,851 782 1,446
Expenses 471 6 3 422 4 9 8 t4 537_ 4 760
Net Auxillary Income 280 420 281 386 282 702 283 1,314 284 686
Total Net Income 2,149 1,503 2,310 1,019 2,461 1,345 2,641 1,750 2,835 1,340
Interest Charges 5 465 100 _/ 94 133 124 474 141 565
Net Income 2\. 1\.498 I 224 2\.37 1\.212 2\.57 1\.218 2\.9 a
Operating Ratio J 88 93 88 97 87 97 86 98 86 97
Return on net fixed assets 3\.3 2\.2 3\.3 1\.3 3\.3 1\.8 3\.3 2\.2 3\.2 2\.7
1/ Including track overhaul expenses\. In Romania, capital overhaul of track normally capitalzed, is charged to
operations\. Audited financial statements supplied by the Romanian authorities accordingly incdude capital overhaul
of track with operations and no separate figures for capital overhaul of track were available\. To enable valid
comnparison appraisal, forecasts have been adjusted accordingly on the basis of the detailed figures given in Table
36 of the SAR\. The relative picture remains unaffected because exdusion of capital overhaul of track improves
operating ratios and return on net fixed assets by about 7-8% and 0\.4-0\.5% respectively for both *appraisar forecasts
and *actuals\.
2/ Mission estimates\.
Februarv 1991
Source: Romanian Railways
- 38 -
ROMANIAN RAILWAYS ( -R \. AUDITED FNAtANCAL STATEMENTS - CASH FLOWS Annex 4
1981 1982 1983 1984 in
Apprasa Appraial AppraiaA Appna -
Es6tm Acual Emate Actal Estimate Aual Esimate Actual Esfimate Actual
(Lei miMon)
SOURCES OF IUNDS
Cash avbbl fom ravav"s ad
1\. Total not Inm (benft 2,149 1,298 2,310 890 2,461 1,12 2,41 1,277 2, 8 1
2\. Depcato (basic activ" 2117 2,153 2,211) 2,304 2,426 2,573)
3\. Depredation (oa assets) 124 129 127) 2,401 131 2,534 134 2,812 137) 2\.819
4\. Ot sc es (seap sales, OM) la in In 197 10 228 117 125 149
5\. Sub-Totl hntemal funids 4,480 3,758 4,738 3,488 4,996 3,974 5,318 4,346 5,670 4,573
Stale AlocadonCrd
6\. N _neaag \. \. \. \. \.
7\. RepayaNe w^^** xnwnyst 3,123 1,521 1,754 1,411 2,132 2,345 3,471 3,719 3\.924 3\.478
EL Repayblge wh knrest 61 767 45 t\.Q02 la 509 6 419 736 147
9\. Sub-Total state aloations/credits 3,184 2,288 1,799 2,433 2,191 2,854 3,537 4,138 4,660 3,625
Egernal E
10\. Pfoposed I8RD Loan 90 570 669 480 838 150 151 90 -
11\. OOwl k:
12\. Sub4ot exwnaoloans Q 80 150 151
13\. Tot resource avlable 7,154 6,046 7,105 6,590 7,667 7,668 9,005 8,635 10,420 8,198
APPIUCATIONS OF FUNDS
Fowed Asse s
14\. Addkons to fixed ats In use 6,419 6,617 5\.192) 6,098 6,648 6e342 8,062 6,974 9,815) 7,143
15\. Increase (decrase) in wokn-rogrpess 3Z (1\.064) 3 _ 24 22 413
16 Subo40t capital vestrmnt 6,746 5,553 5,517 6,098 6,892 8,342 8,084 6,974 9,402 7\.143
DebtService
17\. Interestpamsn 5 10 46) 227 94 263 124 422 141) 710
1& RpaymenofprincOpal ; §if U4 a 166 _146 18 _-
19\. Sub4otal debt servioe 35 76 70 227 122 429 154 588 289 710
20\. Not koeae (dooneae) 38 111 25 (58) 10 242 35 31 9 (123)
Benefit Dismbdn
21\. Not homem (bwene
used fo rnoncptal ptposes ff 9 \.9 2 4 §g732 102 720 46
22\. Total resoures applied 7,734 6,046 7,105 6,590 7,667 7,666 9,005 8,635 10,420 8\.198
FINANCING OF INVESTMENT FROM RAILWAYS
23\. CapInvsment (kw 18) 6,746 55 5,517 6,098 6,9 6,342 8,084 6,974 9,402 7,143
24\. Lose edmal resources ms 9 + 12) 3\.274 228 2,369 3,102 2,671 3,692 3,687 429 4,750 3,625
25\. Ralws resrs (net) 3,472 3,285 3,148 2,996 4,221 2,650 4,397 2,S85 4,652 3,518
26\. %ofcapithalh estanced frm 51\.5 58\.9 57\.1 49\.1 61\.2 41\.8 54\.6 38\.5 49\.4 49\.2
hbrnml resOUres
Source CFR
- 39 -
Annex 5
CFR - AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
6AIANCE SHEET SUMMARY
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Appraisai Actual Appaisa Actual Appraisa Acd Appraisa Actual Apprais Actul
Assets Estimate Estimate __ £sEsnata _-Esbmatee
(W mnilrion) -
Fixed Assets 120,179 120,434 124,702 126,331 130,615 131,451 137,867 139,807 146,792 146,88
Less Depreiaion 49\.749 49\.98 51\.537 5223 _ S\.0 §9 \.19 57\.126 6\.842
Net Fixed Assets 70,430 70,446 73,165 74,115 77,283 76,449 82,673 81,612 89,666 85,744
Add-Workoin Progiess 5\.837 25\.041 5 29\.696 6\.205 36\.626 6227 42\.310 S\.814 486\.0
Sub-Total 76,067 95,487 79,127 103,811 83,488 112,075 88,900 123,922 95,480 134,344
Current Assets 2,531 3,612 2,626 4,177 2,711 4,726 2,816 6,040 2,901 6,734
Less: Current Liabilities 1\.S10 &8 1\.580 4\.151 1\.655 4\.5 1\.725 5\.72 1\.801 6i
Sub-Total 1,021 28 1,046 26 1,056 223 1,091 312 1,100 79
Total 77\.088 95\.515 80\.173 103\.837 84\.544 11229 89\.9 124\.234 965 134\.423
Liabilites and Eauitv
Long Term Debt
Foreign 90 - 660 669 1,140 1,608 1,290 1,658 1,282 1,524
Local 17\.071 25\.41 ,5 29\.a28 WM 34\.018 22\.423 40\.652 25\.939 47\.076
Sub-Total 17,161 25,041 18,915 29,697 20,695 35,626 23,713 42,310 27,201 48,6D0
Equity
Fixed Assets & retained benefit 59,927 70,474 61,258 74,141 63,849 76,672 66,278 81,924 69,379 85,823
Total 77,088 95,515 80,173 103,838 84,544 112,298 89,991 124,234 96,580 134,423
Source: CFR and Bank Mission
February 1991
-40^
Annex 8
KEY INDICATORS FOR ROMANIAN RAILWAYS' OPERATION
(Actual)
A\. iLENGTH OF LQNE km 11,110 11,093 11,125 11,106 11,169 11,192
Standard gauge km 10,506 10,527 10,559 10,589 10,652 10,675
Narrow gauge km 559 521 521 472 472 472
Broadgauge km 45 45 45 45 45 45
B\. Traffic
Passengers million 348 378 375 414 433 460\.0
Net tons million 275 274 271 280 289 284\.0
Passenger-km billion 23\.2 24\.4 25\.6 27\.7 27\.8 31\.1
Net ton-km billion 75\.5 75\.2 71\.1 72\.3 75\.2 74\.2
Tariff ton-km j/ billion 65\.0 63\.8 62\.8 63\.6 65\.1 64\.3
Traffic units billion 98\.7 99\.7 96\.7 103\.0 103\.9 105\.3
Average passenger Joumey km 66\.7 64A 68\.3 66\.9 66\.5 67\.6
Average freight haul km 236\.7 233\.4 232\.2 227\.7 225\.1 226\.4
Passenger gross ton-km billion 28\.2 28\.6 29\.9 31\.2 31\.3 30\.6
Freight gross ton-km billion 139\.5 140\.2 132\.5 133\.5 137\.7 136\.7
Total gross ton-km billion 167\.7 168\.8 162\.4 164\.7 169\.0 167\.3
Gross ton-km per million 15\.1 15\.2 14\.6 14\.8 15\.1 14\.9
route-km (of line)
Gross ton-km by type of traction
Standard aauae
Steam billion 0\.2 0\.2 0\.1 0\.1 0\.2 0\.1
Diesel billion 109\.5 100\.3 85\.8 77\.5 68\.4 60\.1
Electric billion 57\.5 67\.7 75\.7 87\.8 101\.0 105\.4
Diesel rail buses billion 0\.4 0\.3 0\.1 0\.3 0\.4 0\.4
Narrow aauae
Steam million 18\.0 -
Diesel million 192\.2 246\.8 239A 236\.8 232\.3 230\.0
C\. UTILIZATION OF TRACTION AND
ROLLING Q
Engine-km per engine-day
available (main line)
Passenaer traffic S\.G\.
Steam locomotives km 181 178 178 -
Diesel locomotives km 383 378 370 366 352 398
Electric locomotives km 507 514 518 527 537 531
Freoiht traffic S\.G\.
Steam locomotives km 98 38 61 -
Diesel locomotives km 257 259 259 245 241 243
Electric locomotives km 331 330 335 337 340 342
Turnaround time of S\.G\.
Freight cars days 4\.57 4\.43 3\.99 4\.00 4\.11 4\.08
Average load per freight
car loaded tons/axle 10\.65 10\.75 10\.78 10\.81 10\.94 10\.90
D\. STAFF
Employees '000 number 176\.4 177\.1 178\.4 178\.6 175\.8 172\.0
(175\.8) (176\.1) (176\.4) (176\.7) (177\.0)
Traffic unit per employee thousand 559\.5 563\.0 542\.1 559\.9 591\.0 612\.2
(586\.1) (598\.9) (609\.9) (623\.6) (638\.6)
Employee per km of line empl\./km 15\.9 16\.0 16\.0 16\.1 15\.7 15\.4
1/ Tariff ton-km refers to charged km even when goods are carried over longer route for operational reasons\.
Figures within parenthesis are appraisal estimates\.
February 1991
Source: SupenMao Repons
- 41 -
Annex 7
Page 1 of 4
ROMANIAN RAILWAY OPERATIONAL INDICATORS
(1986-1989)
Unit 1986 1987 1988 1989
A\. Length of Line km 11221 11275 11298 11343
- standard gauge km 10704 10803 10826 10871
- narrow gauge km 472 427 427 427
- broad gauge km 45 45 45 45
B\. Traffic
- passengers mil\. 469 472 473 481
-net tons mil, 307 304 315 306
- passenger-km bil\. 32\.3 33\.5 34\.7 35\.5
- net ton-km bil\. 79\.1 78\.1 80\.6 81\.1
- tariff ton-km bil\. 67\.9 66\.0 69\.4 67\.2
-traffic units bil\. 111\.4 111\.6 115\.3 116\.6
-average passenger journey km 68\.9 71\.0 73\.4 73\.8
- average freight haul km 221\.2 217\.1 220\.3 219\.6
- passenger gross ton-km bil\. 32\.4 33\.0 34\.9 35\.3
- freight gross ton-km bil\. 135\.4 143\.0 148\.8 148\.1
- total gross ton-km bil\. 167\.8 176\.0 183\.7 183\.4
- gross ton-km per route
km (of line) mil\. 15\.0 15\.6 16\.3 16\.2
Gross ton-km by type
of-traction
Standard gauge
- steam bil\. 0\.1 0\.1 0\.4 0\.7
- diesel bil\. 62\.2 61\.1 60\.3 54\.4
- electric bil\. 113\.5 112\.8 121\.7 127\.4
- diesel rail buses bil\. 0\.4 0\.4 0\.5 0\.5
Narrow gauge
- steam mil\. - - - -
- diesel mil\. 240\.0 230\.0 180\.0 270\.0
- 42 -
Annex 7
Page 2 of 4
ROMANIAN RAILWAY OPERATIONAL INDICATORS
(1986-1989)
Unit 1986 1987 1988 1989
C\. Traction Stock
- Standard gauge
Stem locomotives number 1213 1114 1021 995
in traffic X - - - -
Diesel electric locomotives number 1495 1495 1492 1490
availability X 72 69 68 67
Diesel hydraulic locomotives number 680 681 689 699
availability % 75 75 74 73
Electric locomotives number 902 925 978 1019
availability X 82 84 84 83
Rail buses number 149 140 140 140
availability Z 60 59 54 52
- Narrow Gauge
Stea locomotives number 30 29 29 29
in traffic X 63 66 66 69
Diesel hydraulic locomotives number 45 44 44 44
availability % 84 86 84 84
- Broad gauge
Steam locomotives number 12 12 12 12
in traffic X 67 58 67 67
Diesel locomotives number 6 8 8 8
availability X 67 75 75 75
Diesel hydraulic locomotives number 16 16 16 18
availability X 75 69 69 72
- 43 -
Annex 7
Page 3 of 4
ROMANIAN RAILWAY OPERATIONAL INDICATORS
(1986-1989)
Unit 1986 1987 1988 1989
D\. Rolling Stock
Passenger cars number 5993 6068 6191 6213
- standard gauge number 5864 5941 6068 6091
- narrow gauge number 125 123 119 118
- broad gauge number 4 4 4 4
- no\. of seats thousands 420\.7 431\.6 438\.8 442\.4
- no\. of seats s\.g\. thousands 416\.9 427\.9 435\.3 438\.8
- no\. of seats n\.g\. thousands 3\.5 3\.5 3\.3 3\.3
- no\. of seats b\.g\. thousands 0\.3 0\.3 0\.3 0\.3
Freight cars number 139585 140912 142464 144028
Total capacity thous\.tons 6171 6250 6358 6458
Standard gauze number 138334 139666 141227 142791
Total capacity thous\.tons 6150 6228 6337 6436
Average car capacity tons 44\.2 44\.6 44\.9 45\.0
Narrow gauge number 1224 1219 1210 1210
Total capacity thous\.tons 20 20 20 20
Average car capacity tons 17\.0 17\.0 17\.0 17\.0
Broad gauge number 27 27 27 27
Total capacity thous\.tons 1 1 1 1
Average car capacity tons 26 26 26 26
E\. Utilization of Traction and
Rolling Stock
Engine-km per engine-dav
available (main line)
a) Passenger traffic S\.G!
- steam locomotives km - - - -
- diesel locomotives km 397 387 388 385
- electric locomotives km 538 542 536 536
- 44 -
Annex 7
Page 4 of 4
ROMWANI RAILWAY OPERATIONAL INDICATORS
(1986-1989)
Unit 1986 1987 1988 1989
b) Freight traffic S\.G\.
- steam locomotives kmk
- diesel locomotives km 249 248 234 299
- electric locomotives km 350 346 341 399
passenger-km per mil\. 5\.39 5\.52 5\.60 5\.71
passenger car km
passenger-km per thousand 76\.8 77\.6 79\.1 80\.2
seat pass km
net ton-km per thousand 567 559 571 568
freight car tons km
net ton-km per thousand 12\.8 12\.5 12\.7 12\.6
ton cap\. of fleet km
average load per tons/ 11\.00 11\.05 11\.15 11\.20
car loaded axle
turnar und time
of S\.G\. freight cars days 3\.79 3\.90 3\.50 3\.52
F\. Staf
employees number 171400 171100 171400 171300
traffic unit per employee thousand 649\.9 652\.3 672\.7 680\.7
employee per km of line employees 15\.3 15\.2 15\.2 15\.1
1 22- j r Zd' ' 20 ' ~ ,IBRD 15462R2
U S S R
L_>U (FORMER) R ROMANIA W
>S~' '>~ e r 7LAND TRANSPORT PROJECT
-; X /~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ S'4-\.AIA AI' c , \. &o r
F\., c"- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - 0\.H 00
< ; t ZEA--Y S z v \C/C \ t -|- o OX0 Ee \. mEO\.e5 Ot,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~l \.
0 0 ' /
8 B U G AiR R A
FEBRUARY 1992 | APPROVAL |
P007093 |  | APPROVAL |
P000168 | The original had problem with text extraction\. pdftotext Unable to extract text\. | APPROVAL |