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LegalSupport

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{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "the State must establish the defendant's criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence", "sentence": "See State v. Cabrera, 73 Wn. App. 165, 169, 868 P.2d 179 (1994) (holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the Washington classification of an out-of-state conviction, the State must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence); see also State v. Herzog, 48 Wn. App. 831, 834, 740 P.2d 380 (1987) (the State must establish the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence), aff’d, 112 Wn.2d 419, 771 P.2d 739 (1989); RCW 9.94A.110." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the Washington classification of an out-of-state conviction, the State must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendant's criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence", "sentence": "See State v. Cabrera, 73 Wn. App. 165, 169, 868 P.2d 179 (1994) (holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the Washington classification of an out-of-state conviction, the State must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence); see also State v. Herzog, 48 Wn. App. 831, 834, 740 P.2d 380 (1987) (the State must establish the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence), aff’d, 112 Wn.2d 419, 771 P.2d 739 (1989); RCW 9.94A.110." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "the State must establish the defendant's criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence", "sentence": "See State v. Cabrera, 73 Wn. App. 165, 169, 868 P.2d 179 (1994) (holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the Washington classification of an out-of-state conviction, the State must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence); see also State v. Herzog, 48 Wn. App. 831, 834, 740 P.2d 380 (1987) (the State must establish the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence), aff’d, 112 Wn.2d 419, 771 P.2d 739 (1989); RCW 9.94A.110." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the Washington classification of an out-of-state conviction, the State must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendant's criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence", "sentence": "See State v. Cabrera, 73 Wn. App. 165, 169, 868 P.2d 179 (1994) (holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the Washington classification of an out-of-state conviction, the State must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence); see also State v. Herzog, 48 Wn. App. 831, 834, 740 P.2d 380 (1987) (the State must establish the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence), aff’d, 112 Wn.2d 419, 771 P.2d 739 (1989); RCW 9.94A.110." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the Washington classification of an out-of-state conviction, the State must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendant's criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence", "sentence": "See State v. Cabrera, 73 Wn. App. 165, 169, 868 P.2d 179 (1994) (holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the Washington classification of an out-of-state conviction, the State must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence); see also State v. Herzog, 48 Wn. App. 831, 834, 740 P.2d 380 (1987) (the State must establish the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence), aff’d, 112 Wn.2d 419, 771 P.2d 739 (1989); RCW 9.94A.110." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "the State must establish the defendant's criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence", "sentence": "See State v. Cabrera, 73 Wn. App. 165, 169, 868 P.2d 179 (1994) (holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the Washington classification of an out-of-state conviction, the State must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence); see also State v. Herzog, 48 Wn. App. 831, 834, 740 P.2d 380 (1987) (the State must establish the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence), aff’d, 112 Wn.2d 419, 771 P.2d 739 (1989); RCW 9.94A.110." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "748 F.2d 109, 112", "parenthetical": "\"Failure to apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal.\"", "sentence": "Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 773 (2d Cir.1999); see Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir.1984) (“Failure to apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal.”); see also Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir.1987) (“Where there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of the right to have her disability determination made according to the correct legal principles.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "817 F.2d 983, 986", "parenthetical": "\"Where there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of the right to have her disability determination made according to the correct legal principles.\"", "sentence": "Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 773 (2d Cir.1999); see Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir.1984) (“Failure to apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal.”); see also Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir.1987) (“Where there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of the right to have her disability determination made according to the correct legal principles.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "411 F.3d 762, 772, 774", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e conclude the right of a nonviolent [and non-resistant] arrestee to be free from unnecessary pain knowingly inflicted during an arrest [for disorderly conduct] was clearly established as of November 9, 2000.\"", "sentence": "See St. John v. Hickey, 411 F.3d 762, 772, 774 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e conclude the right of a nonviolent [and non-resistant] arrestee to be free from unnecessary pain knowingly inflicted during an arrest [for disorderly conduct] was clearly established as of November 9, 2000.”); see also Minchella v. Bauman, 72 Fed.Appx. 405, 408-09 (6th Cir.2003) (denying summary judgment to officers on an excessive-force claim — relating to an arrest in 1999 — because the plaintiffs “crime was not severe,” the plaintiff “posed no threat to the Officers or the community” and the evidence was “inconclusive as to whether [the plaintiff] was ‘slammed’ into the car, and ... as to whether [the plaintiff] physically resisted the arrest”); Davis v. Yovella, No. 95-5415, 1997 WL 159363, at *5-6 (6th Cir. Apr. 2, 1997) (denying qualified immunity to an officer on an excessive-force claim because “the charges against [the plaintiff] ... were not serious,” “there [was] no evidence that [the plaintiff] posed a risk to the officers or anyone present,” “the record show[ed] that he did not resist arrest” and the plaintiff “sought medical attention for pain in his neck and back”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "72 Fed.Appx. 405, 408-09", "parenthetical": "denying summary judgment to officers on an excessive-force claim -- relating to an arrest in 1999 -- because the plaintiffs \"crime was not severe,\" the plaintiff \"posed no threat to the Officers or the community\" and the evidence was \"inconclusive as to whether [the plaintiff] was 'slammed' into the car, and ... as to whether [the plaintiff] physically resisted the arrest\"", "sentence": "See St. John v. Hickey, 411 F.3d 762, 772, 774 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e conclude the right of a nonviolent [and non-resistant] arrestee to be free from unnecessary pain knowingly inflicted during an arrest [for disorderly conduct] was clearly established as of November 9, 2000.”); see also Minchella v. Bauman, 72 Fed.Appx. 405, 408-09 (6th Cir.2003) (denying summary judgment to officers on an excessive-force claim — relating to an arrest in 1999 — because the plaintiffs “crime was not severe,” the plaintiff “posed no threat to the Officers or the community” and the evidence was “inconclusive as to whether [the plaintiff] was ‘slammed’ into the car, and ... as to whether [the plaintiff] physically resisted the arrest”); Davis v. Yovella, No. 95-5415, 1997 WL 159363, at *5-6 (6th Cir. Apr. 2, 1997) (denying qualified immunity to an officer on an excessive-force claim because “the charges against [the plaintiff] ... were not serious,” “there [was] no evidence that [the plaintiff] posed a risk to the officers or anyone present,” “the record show[ed] that he did not resist arrest” and the plaintiff “sought medical attention for pain in his neck and back”)." }

{ "signal": "but cf.", "identifier": "336 F.3d 8, 13", "parenthetical": "finding waiver due to delay in demanding arbitration until after discovery complete and trial date approaching", "sentence": "Cf. Creative Solutions Group, 252 F.3d at 33 (waiver not found when there was no discovery or other activity aside from plaintiffs filing a request for production); Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 807 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.1986) (no prejudice despite plaintiffs replying to over 300 interrogatories and twelve comprehensive requests for production of documents); J & S Constr. Co., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 520 F.2d 809, 809-10 (1st Cir.1975) (thirteen month delay not enough to constitute waiver); but cf. Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir.2003) (finding waiver due to delay in demanding arbitration until after discovery complete and trial date approaching); Restoration Pres. Masonry, 325 F.3d at 61 (waiver found where party opposing arbitration was involved in at least five depositions and thirteen pre-trial conferences); Navieros Inter-Americanos, S.A. v. M/V Vasilia Express, 120 F.3d 304, 316 (1st Cir.1997) (finding waiver where delay lasted from filing of complaint until the eve of trial); Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 42 (waiver found when party seeking arbitration engaged in deposition-taking, a pre-trial conference, cross-motions for summary judgment, and oral argument)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "252 F.3d 33, 33", "parenthetical": "waiver not found when there was no discovery or other activity aside from plaintiffs filing a request for production", "sentence": "Cf. Creative Solutions Group, 252 F.3d at 33 (waiver not found when there was no discovery or other activity aside from plaintiffs filing a request for production); Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 807 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.1986) (no prejudice despite plaintiffs replying to over 300 interrogatories and twelve comprehensive requests for production of documents); J & S Constr. Co., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 520 F.2d 809, 809-10 (1st Cir.1975) (thirteen month delay not enough to constitute waiver); but cf. Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir.2003) (finding waiver due to delay in demanding arbitration until after discovery complete and trial date approaching); Restoration Pres. Masonry, 325 F.3d at 61 (waiver found where party opposing arbitration was involved in at least five depositions and thirteen pre-trial conferences); Navieros Inter-Americanos, S.A. v. M/V Vasilia Express, 120 F.3d 304, 316 (1st Cir.1997) (finding waiver where delay lasted from filing of complaint until the eve of trial); Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 42 (waiver found when party seeking arbitration engaged in deposition-taking, a pre-trial conference, cross-motions for summary judgment, and oral argument)." }

{ "signal": "but cf.", "identifier": "325 F.3d 61, 61", "parenthetical": "waiver found where party opposing arbitration was involved in at least five depositions and thirteen pre-trial conferences", "sentence": "Cf. Creative Solutions Group, 252 F.3d at 33 (waiver not found when there was no discovery or other activity aside from plaintiffs filing a request for production); Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 807 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.1986) (no prejudice despite plaintiffs replying to over 300 interrogatories and twelve comprehensive requests for production of documents); J & S Constr. Co., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 520 F.2d 809, 809-10 (1st Cir.1975) (thirteen month delay not enough to constitute waiver); but cf. Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir.2003) (finding waiver due to delay in demanding arbitration until after discovery complete and trial date approaching); Restoration Pres. Masonry, 325 F.3d at 61 (waiver found where party opposing arbitration was involved in at least five depositions and thirteen pre-trial conferences); Navieros Inter-Americanos, S.A. v. M/V Vasilia Express, 120 F.3d 304, 316 (1st Cir.1997) (finding waiver where delay lasted from filing of complaint until the eve of trial); Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 42 (waiver found when party seeking arbitration engaged in deposition-taking, a pre-trial conference, cross-motions for summary judgment, and oral argument)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "252 F.3d 33, 33", "parenthetical": "waiver not found when there was no discovery or other activity aside from plaintiffs filing a request for production", "sentence": "Cf. Creative Solutions Group, 252 F.3d at 33 (waiver not found when there was no discovery or other activity aside from plaintiffs filing a request for production); Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 807 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.1986) (no prejudice despite plaintiffs replying to over 300 interrogatories and twelve comprehensive requests for production of documents); J & S Constr. Co., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 520 F.2d 809, 809-10 (1st Cir.1975) (thirteen month delay not enough to constitute waiver); but cf. Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir.2003) (finding waiver due to delay in demanding arbitration until after discovery complete and trial date approaching); Restoration Pres. Masonry, 325 F.3d at 61 (waiver found where party opposing arbitration was involved in at least five depositions and thirteen pre-trial conferences); Navieros Inter-Americanos, S.A. v. M/V Vasilia Express, 120 F.3d 304, 316 (1st Cir.1997) (finding waiver where delay lasted from filing of complaint until the eve of trial); Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 42 (waiver found when party seeking arbitration engaged in deposition-taking, a pre-trial conference, cross-motions for summary judgment, and oral argument)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "252 F.3d 33, 33", "parenthetical": "waiver not found when there was no discovery or other activity aside from plaintiffs filing a request for production", "sentence": "Cf. Creative Solutions Group, 252 F.3d at 33 (waiver not found when there was no discovery or other activity aside from plaintiffs filing a request for production); Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 807 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.1986) (no prejudice despite plaintiffs replying to over 300 interrogatories and twelve comprehensive requests for production of documents); J & S Constr. Co., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 520 F.2d 809, 809-10 (1st Cir.1975) (thirteen month delay not enough to constitute waiver); but cf. Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir.2003) (finding waiver due to delay in demanding arbitration until after discovery complete and trial date approaching); Restoration Pres. Masonry, 325 F.3d at 61 (waiver found where party opposing arbitration was involved in at least five depositions and thirteen pre-trial conferences); Navieros Inter-Americanos, S.A. v. M/V Vasilia Express, 120 F.3d 304, 316 (1st Cir.1997) (finding waiver where delay lasted from filing of complaint until the eve of trial); Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 42 (waiver found when party seeking arbitration engaged in deposition-taking, a pre-trial conference, cross-motions for summary judgment, and oral argument)." }

{ "signal": "but cf.", "identifier": "120 F.3d 304, 316", "parenthetical": "finding waiver where delay lasted from filing of complaint until the eve of trial", "sentence": "Cf. Creative Solutions Group, 252 F.3d at 33 (waiver not found when there was no discovery or other activity aside from plaintiffs filing a request for production); Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 807 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.1986) (no prejudice despite plaintiffs replying to over 300 interrogatories and twelve comprehensive requests for production of documents); J & S Constr. Co., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 520 F.2d 809, 809-10 (1st Cir.1975) (thirteen month delay not enough to constitute waiver); but cf. Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir.2003) (finding waiver due to delay in demanding arbitration until after discovery complete and trial date approaching); Restoration Pres. Masonry, 325 F.3d at 61 (waiver found where party opposing arbitration was involved in at least five depositions and thirteen pre-trial conferences); Navieros Inter-Americanos, S.A. v. M/V Vasilia Express, 120 F.3d 304, 316 (1st Cir.1997) (finding waiver where delay lasted from filing of complaint until the eve of trial); Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 42 (waiver found when party seeking arbitration engaged in deposition-taking, a pre-trial conference, cross-motions for summary judgment, and oral argument)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "252 F.3d 33, 33", "parenthetical": "waiver not found when there was no discovery or other activity aside from plaintiffs filing a request for production", "sentence": "Cf. Creative Solutions Group, 252 F.3d at 33 (waiver not found when there was no discovery or other activity aside from plaintiffs filing a request for production); Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 807 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.1986) (no prejudice despite plaintiffs replying to over 300 interrogatories and twelve comprehensive requests for production of documents); J & S Constr. Co., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 520 F.2d 809, 809-10 (1st Cir.1975) (thirteen month delay not enough to constitute waiver); but cf. Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir.2003) (finding waiver due to delay in demanding arbitration until after discovery complete and trial date approaching); Restoration Pres. Masonry, 325 F.3d at 61 (waiver found where party opposing arbitration was involved in at least five depositions and thirteen pre-trial conferences); Navieros Inter-Americanos, S.A. v. M/V Vasilia Express, 120 F.3d 304, 316 (1st Cir.1997) (finding waiver where delay lasted from filing of complaint until the eve of trial); Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 42 (waiver found when party seeking arbitration engaged in deposition-taking, a pre-trial conference, cross-motions for summary judgment, and oral argument)." }

{ "signal": "but cf.", "identifier": "671 F.2d 42, 42", "parenthetical": "waiver found when party seeking arbitration engaged in deposition-taking, a pre-trial conference, cross-motions for summary judgment, and oral argument", "sentence": "Cf. Creative Solutions Group, 252 F.3d at 33 (waiver not found when there was no discovery or other activity aside from plaintiffs filing a request for production); Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 807 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.1986) (no prejudice despite plaintiffs replying to over 300 interrogatories and twelve comprehensive requests for production of documents); J & S Constr. Co., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 520 F.2d 809, 809-10 (1st Cir.1975) (thirteen month delay not enough to constitute waiver); but cf. Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir.2003) (finding waiver due to delay in demanding arbitration until after discovery complete and trial date approaching); Restoration Pres. Masonry, 325 F.3d at 61 (waiver found where party opposing arbitration was involved in at least five depositions and thirteen pre-trial conferences); Navieros Inter-Americanos, S.A. v. M/V Vasilia Express, 120 F.3d 304, 316 (1st Cir.1997) (finding waiver where delay lasted from filing of complaint until the eve of trial); Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 42 (waiver found when party seeking arbitration engaged in deposition-taking, a pre-trial conference, cross-motions for summary judgment, and oral argument)." }

{ "signal": "but cf.", "identifier": "336 F.3d 8, 13", "parenthetical": "finding waiver due to delay in demanding arbitration until after discovery complete and trial date approaching", "sentence": "Cf. Creative Solutions Group, 252 F.3d at 33 (waiver not found when there was no discovery or other activity aside from plaintiffs filing a request for production); Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 807 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.1986) (no prejudice despite plaintiffs replying to over 300 interrogatories and twelve comprehensive requests for production of documents); J & S Constr. Co., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 520 F.2d 809, 809-10 (1st Cir.1975) (thirteen month delay not enough to constitute waiver); but cf. Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir.2003) (finding waiver due to delay in demanding arbitration until after discovery complete and trial date approaching); Restoration Pres. Masonry, 325 F.3d at 61 (waiver found where party opposing arbitration was involved in at least five depositions and thirteen pre-trial conferences); Navieros Inter-Americanos, S.A. v. M/V Vasilia Express, 120 F.3d 304, 316 (1st Cir.1997) (finding waiver where delay lasted from filing of complaint until the eve of trial); Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 42 (waiver found when party seeking arbitration engaged in deposition-taking, a pre-trial conference, cross-motions for summary judgment, and oral argument)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "807 F.2d 16, 19", "parenthetical": "no prejudice despite plaintiffs replying to over 300 interrogatories and twelve comprehensive requests for production of documents", "sentence": "Cf. Creative Solutions Group, 252 F.3d at 33 (waiver not found when there was no discovery or other activity aside from plaintiffs filing a request for production); Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 807 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.1986) (no prejudice despite plaintiffs replying to over 300 interrogatories and twelve comprehensive requests for production of documents); J & S Constr. Co., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 520 F.2d 809, 809-10 (1st Cir.1975) (thirteen month delay not enough to constitute waiver); but cf. Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir.2003) (finding waiver due to delay in demanding arbitration until after discovery complete and trial date approaching); Restoration Pres. Masonry, 325 F.3d at 61 (waiver found where party opposing arbitration was involved in at least five depositions and thirteen pre-trial conferences); Navieros Inter-Americanos, S.A. v. M/V Vasilia Express, 120 F.3d 304, 316 (1st Cir.1997) (finding waiver where delay lasted from filing of complaint until the eve of trial); Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 42 (waiver found when party seeking arbitration engaged in deposition-taking, a pre-trial conference, cross-motions for summary judgment, and oral argument)." }

{ "signal": "but cf.", "identifier": "325 F.3d 61, 61", "parenthetical": "waiver found where party opposing arbitration was involved in at least five depositions and thirteen pre-trial conferences", "sentence": "Cf. Creative Solutions Group, 252 F.3d at 33 (waiver not found when there was no discovery or other activity aside from plaintiffs filing a request for production); Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 807 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.1986) (no prejudice despite plaintiffs replying to over 300 interrogatories and twelve comprehensive requests for production of documents); J & S Constr. Co., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 520 F.2d 809, 809-10 (1st Cir.1975) (thirteen month delay not enough to constitute waiver); but cf. Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir.2003) (finding waiver due to delay in demanding arbitration until after discovery complete and trial date approaching); Restoration Pres. Masonry, 325 F.3d at 61 (waiver found where party opposing arbitration was involved in at least five depositions and thirteen pre-trial conferences); Navieros Inter-Americanos, S.A. v. M/V Vasilia Express, 120 F.3d 304, 316 (1st Cir.1997) (finding waiver where delay lasted from filing of complaint until the eve of trial); Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 42 (waiver found when party seeking arbitration engaged in deposition-taking, a pre-trial conference, cross-motions for summary judgment, and oral argument)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "807 F.2d 16, 19", "parenthetical": "no prejudice despite plaintiffs replying to over 300 interrogatories and twelve comprehensive requests for production of documents", "sentence": "Cf. Creative Solutions Group, 252 F.3d at 33 (waiver not found when there was no discovery or other activity aside from plaintiffs filing a request for production); Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 807 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.1986) (no prejudice despite plaintiffs replying to over 300 interrogatories and twelve comprehensive requests for production of documents); J & S Constr. Co., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 520 F.2d 809, 809-10 (1st Cir.1975) (thirteen month delay not enough to constitute waiver); but cf. Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir.2003) (finding waiver due to delay in demanding arbitration until after discovery complete and trial date approaching); Restoration Pres. Masonry, 325 F.3d at 61 (waiver found where party opposing arbitration was involved in at least five depositions and thirteen pre-trial conferences); Navieros Inter-Americanos, S.A. v. M/V Vasilia Express, 120 F.3d 304, 316 (1st Cir.1997) (finding waiver where delay lasted from filing of complaint until the eve of trial); Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 42 (waiver found when party seeking arbitration engaged in deposition-taking, a pre-trial conference, cross-motions for summary judgment, and oral argument)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "807 F.2d 16, 19", "parenthetical": "no prejudice despite plaintiffs replying to over 300 interrogatories and twelve comprehensive requests for production of documents", "sentence": "Cf. Creative Solutions Group, 252 F.3d at 33 (waiver not found when there was no discovery or other activity aside from plaintiffs filing a request for production); Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 807 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.1986) (no prejudice despite plaintiffs replying to over 300 interrogatories and twelve comprehensive requests for production of documents); J & S Constr. Co., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 520 F.2d 809, 809-10 (1st Cir.1975) (thirteen month delay not enough to constitute waiver); but cf. Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir.2003) (finding waiver due to delay in demanding arbitration until after discovery complete and trial date approaching); Restoration Pres. Masonry, 325 F.3d at 61 (waiver found where party opposing arbitration was involved in at least five depositions and thirteen pre-trial conferences); Navieros Inter-Americanos, S.A. v. M/V Vasilia Express, 120 F.3d 304, 316 (1st Cir.1997) (finding waiver where delay lasted from filing of complaint until the eve of trial); Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 42 (waiver found when party seeking arbitration engaged in deposition-taking, a pre-trial conference, cross-motions for summary judgment, and oral argument)." }

{ "signal": "but cf.", "identifier": "120 F.3d 304, 316", "parenthetical": "finding waiver where delay lasted from filing of complaint until the eve of trial", "sentence": "Cf. Creative Solutions Group, 252 F.3d at 33 (waiver not found when there was no discovery or other activity aside from plaintiffs filing a request for production); Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 807 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.1986) (no prejudice despite plaintiffs replying to over 300 interrogatories and twelve comprehensive requests for production of documents); J & S Constr. Co., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 520 F.2d 809, 809-10 (1st Cir.1975) (thirteen month delay not enough to constitute waiver); but cf. Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir.2003) (finding waiver due to delay in demanding arbitration until after discovery complete and trial date approaching); Restoration Pres. Masonry, 325 F.3d at 61 (waiver found where party opposing arbitration was involved in at least five depositions and thirteen pre-trial conferences); Navieros Inter-Americanos, S.A. v. M/V Vasilia Express, 120 F.3d 304, 316 (1st Cir.1997) (finding waiver where delay lasted from filing of complaint until the eve of trial); Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 42 (waiver found when party seeking arbitration engaged in deposition-taking, a pre-trial conference, cross-motions for summary judgment, and oral argument)." }

{ "signal": "but cf.", "identifier": "671 F.2d 42, 42", "parenthetical": "waiver found when party seeking arbitration engaged in deposition-taking, a pre-trial conference, cross-motions for summary judgment, and oral argument", "sentence": "Cf. Creative Solutions Group, 252 F.3d at 33 (waiver not found when there was no discovery or other activity aside from plaintiffs filing a request for production); Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 807 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.1986) (no prejudice despite plaintiffs replying to over 300 interrogatories and twelve comprehensive requests for production of documents); J & S Constr. Co., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 520 F.2d 809, 809-10 (1st Cir.1975) (thirteen month delay not enough to constitute waiver); but cf. Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir.2003) (finding waiver due to delay in demanding arbitration until after discovery complete and trial date approaching); Restoration Pres. Masonry, 325 F.3d at 61 (waiver found where party opposing arbitration was involved in at least five depositions and thirteen pre-trial conferences); Navieros Inter-Americanos, S.A. v. M/V Vasilia Express, 120 F.3d 304, 316 (1st Cir.1997) (finding waiver where delay lasted from filing of complaint until the eve of trial); Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 42 (waiver found when party seeking arbitration engaged in deposition-taking, a pre-trial conference, cross-motions for summary judgment, and oral argument)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "807 F.2d 16, 19", "parenthetical": "no prejudice despite plaintiffs replying to over 300 interrogatories and twelve comprehensive requests for production of documents", "sentence": "Cf. Creative Solutions Group, 252 F.3d at 33 (waiver not found when there was no discovery or other activity aside from plaintiffs filing a request for production); Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 807 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.1986) (no prejudice despite plaintiffs replying to over 300 interrogatories and twelve comprehensive requests for production of documents); J & S Constr. Co., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 520 F.2d 809, 809-10 (1st Cir.1975) (thirteen month delay not enough to constitute waiver); but cf. Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir.2003) (finding waiver due to delay in demanding arbitration until after discovery complete and trial date approaching); Restoration Pres. Masonry, 325 F.3d at 61 (waiver found where party opposing arbitration was involved in at least five depositions and thirteen pre-trial conferences); Navieros Inter-Americanos, S.A. v. M/V Vasilia Express, 120 F.3d 304, 316 (1st Cir.1997) (finding waiver where delay lasted from filing of complaint until the eve of trial); Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 42 (waiver found when party seeking arbitration engaged in deposition-taking, a pre-trial conference, cross-motions for summary judgment, and oral argument)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "415 U.S. 724, 726", "parenthetical": "outlining the same interests cited in Garza and noting that the State has a compelling interest in protecting the stability of the political system", "sentence": "See, e.g., Garza, 924 F.Supp. at 73 (identifying a number of important interests served by section 162.015 in affirming the constitutionality of the “sore loser” provisions of the statute); see also Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 726, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974) (outlining the same interests cited in Garza and noting that the State has a compelling interest in protecting the stability of the political system)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "924 F.Supp. 73, 73", "parenthetical": "identifying a number of important interests served by section 162.015 in affirming the constitutionality of the \"sore loser\" provisions of the statute", "sentence": "See, e.g., Garza, 924 F.Supp. at 73 (identifying a number of important interests served by section 162.015 in affirming the constitutionality of the “sore loser” provisions of the statute); see also Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 726, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974) (outlining the same interests cited in Garza and noting that the State has a compelling interest in protecting the stability of the political system)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "outlining the same interests cited in Garza and noting that the State has a compelling interest in protecting the stability of the political system", "sentence": "See, e.g., Garza, 924 F.Supp. at 73 (identifying a number of important interests served by section 162.015 in affirming the constitutionality of the “sore loser” provisions of the statute); see also Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 726, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974) (outlining the same interests cited in Garza and noting that the State has a compelling interest in protecting the stability of the political system)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "924 F.Supp. 73, 73", "parenthetical": "identifying a number of important interests served by section 162.015 in affirming the constitutionality of the \"sore loser\" provisions of the statute", "sentence": "See, e.g., Garza, 924 F.Supp. at 73 (identifying a number of important interests served by section 162.015 in affirming the constitutionality of the “sore loser” provisions of the statute); see also Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 726, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974) (outlining the same interests cited in Garza and noting that the State has a compelling interest in protecting the stability of the political system)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "924 F.Supp. 73, 73", "parenthetical": "identifying a number of important interests served by section 162.015 in affirming the constitutionality of the \"sore loser\" provisions of the statute", "sentence": "See, e.g., Garza, 924 F.Supp. at 73 (identifying a number of important interests served by section 162.015 in affirming the constitutionality of the “sore loser” provisions of the statute); see also Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 726, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974) (outlining the same interests cited in Garza and noting that the State has a compelling interest in protecting the stability of the political system)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "outlining the same interests cited in Garza and noting that the State has a compelling interest in protecting the stability of the political system", "sentence": "See, e.g., Garza, 924 F.Supp. at 73 (identifying a number of important interests served by section 162.015 in affirming the constitutionality of the “sore loser” provisions of the statute); see also Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 726, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974) (outlining the same interests cited in Garza and noting that the State has a compelling interest in protecting the stability of the political system)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"We of course do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop.\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 952-54 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc) (noting that the Fourth Amendment allows for a broader range of law enforcement actions where a traffic stop is supported by probable cause); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 n. 29, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 n. 29, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (“We of course do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "277 F.3d 947, 952-54", "parenthetical": "noting that the Fourth Amendment allows for a broader range of law enforcement actions where a traffic stop is supported by probable cause", "sentence": "See United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 952-54 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc) (noting that the Fourth Amendment allows for a broader range of law enforcement actions where a traffic stop is supported by probable cause); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 n. 29, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 n. 29, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (“We of course do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "277 F.3d 947, 952-54", "parenthetical": "noting that the Fourth Amendment allows for a broader range of law enforcement actions where a traffic stop is supported by probable cause", "sentence": "See United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 952-54 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc) (noting that the Fourth Amendment allows for a broader range of law enforcement actions where a traffic stop is supported by probable cause); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 n. 29, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 n. 29, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (“We of course do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"We of course do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop.\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 952-54 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc) (noting that the Fourth Amendment allows for a broader range of law enforcement actions where a traffic stop is supported by probable cause); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 n. 29, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 n. 29, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (“We of course do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "277 F.3d 947, 952-54", "parenthetical": "noting that the Fourth Amendment allows for a broader range of law enforcement actions where a traffic stop is supported by probable cause", "sentence": "See United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 952-54 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc) (noting that the Fourth Amendment allows for a broader range of law enforcement actions where a traffic stop is supported by probable cause); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 n. 29, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 n. 29, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (“We of course do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"We of course do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop.\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 952-54 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc) (noting that the Fourth Amendment allows for a broader range of law enforcement actions where a traffic stop is supported by probable cause); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 n. 29, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 n. 29, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (“We of course do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "228 F.3d 19, 22", "parenthetical": "rejecting a claim that Miranda warnings are generally required before a person is subjected to \"in-court questioning\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Jones, 299 F.3d 103, 110-11 (2d Cir.2002) (concluding that a person charged with a supervised release violation who voluntarily chooses to testify at a revocation hearing cannot later claim that his testimony was compelled); see also United States v. Meléndez, 228 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir.2000) (rejecting a claim that Miranda warnings are generally required before a person is subjected to “in-court questioning”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "299 F.3d 103, 110-11", "parenthetical": "concluding that a person charged with a supervised release violation who voluntarily chooses to testify at a revocation hearing cannot later claim that his testimony was compelled", "sentence": "See United States v. Jones, 299 F.3d 103, 110-11 (2d Cir.2002) (concluding that a person charged with a supervised release violation who voluntarily chooses to testify at a revocation hearing cannot later claim that his testimony was compelled); see also United States v. Meléndez, 228 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir.2000) (rejecting a claim that Miranda warnings are generally required before a person is subjected to “in-court questioning”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "95 F.3d 864, 870", "parenthetical": "\"In today's world, a medical examination that does not include either a blood test or urinalysis would be unusual. Nonetheless, any such medical examination would still implicate the Fourth Amendment.\"", "sentence": "Yin v. State of Cal., 95 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir.1996) (“In today’s world, a medical examination that does not include either a blood test or urinalysis would be unusual. Nonetheless, any such medical examination would still implicate the Fourth Amendment.”); see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (explaining that the collection and testing of urine is a search, which “intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable”). Accordingly, the Court must determine whether the County’s urinalysis mandate “fit[s] within the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.”" }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "489 U.S. 602, 616-17", "parenthetical": "explaining that the collection and testing of urine is a search, which \"intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable\"", "sentence": "Yin v. State of Cal., 95 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir.1996) (“In today’s world, a medical examination that does not include either a blood test or urinalysis would be unusual. Nonetheless, any such medical examination would still implicate the Fourth Amendment.”); see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (explaining that the collection and testing of urine is a search, which “intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable”). Accordingly, the Court must determine whether the County’s urinalysis mandate “fit[s] within the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.”" }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "explaining that the collection and testing of urine is a search, which \"intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable\"", "sentence": "Yin v. State of Cal., 95 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir.1996) (“In today’s world, a medical examination that does not include either a blood test or urinalysis would be unusual. Nonetheless, any such medical examination would still implicate the Fourth Amendment.”); see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (explaining that the collection and testing of urine is a search, which “intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable”). Accordingly, the Court must determine whether the County’s urinalysis mandate “fit[s] within the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.”" }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "95 F.3d 864, 870", "parenthetical": "\"In today's world, a medical examination that does not include either a blood test or urinalysis would be unusual. Nonetheless, any such medical examination would still implicate the Fourth Amendment.\"", "sentence": "Yin v. State of Cal., 95 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir.1996) (“In today’s world, a medical examination that does not include either a blood test or urinalysis would be unusual. Nonetheless, any such medical examination would still implicate the Fourth Amendment.”); see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (explaining that the collection and testing of urine is a search, which “intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable”). Accordingly, the Court must determine whether the County’s urinalysis mandate “fit[s] within the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.”" }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "explaining that the collection and testing of urine is a search, which \"intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable\"", "sentence": "Yin v. State of Cal., 95 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir.1996) (“In today’s world, a medical examination that does not include either a blood test or urinalysis would be unusual. Nonetheless, any such medical examination would still implicate the Fourth Amendment.”); see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (explaining that the collection and testing of urine is a search, which “intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable”). Accordingly, the Court must determine whether the County’s urinalysis mandate “fit[s] within the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.”" }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "95 F.3d 864, 870", "parenthetical": "\"In today's world, a medical examination that does not include either a blood test or urinalysis would be unusual. Nonetheless, any such medical examination would still implicate the Fourth Amendment.\"", "sentence": "Yin v. State of Cal., 95 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir.1996) (“In today’s world, a medical examination that does not include either a blood test or urinalysis would be unusual. Nonetheless, any such medical examination would still implicate the Fourth Amendment.”); see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (explaining that the collection and testing of urine is a search, which “intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable”). Accordingly, the Court must determine whether the County’s urinalysis mandate “fit[s] within the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.”" }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "491 U.S. 794, 794-96", "parenthetical": "holding that the city's sound-amplification guideline and the city's interpretation of the guideline provided sufficient limiting instructions to render the ordinance's statements ensuring the \"best sound\" and \"appropriate sound quality\" immune from an over-breadth challenge", "sentence": "See Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 131, 112 S.Ct. 2395 (“In evaluating [the] facial challenge, we must consider the [association’s] authoritative instructions of the [rule], including its own implementation and interpretation of it.”); see also Ward, 491 U.S. at 794-96, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (holding that the city’s sound-amplification guideline and the city’s interpretation of the guideline provided sufficient limiting instructions to render the ordinance’s statements ensuring the “best sound” and “appropriate sound quality” immune from an over-breadth challenge)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "505 U.S. 131, 131", "parenthetical": "\"In evaluating [the] facial challenge, we must consider the [association's] authoritative instructions of the [rule], including its own implementation and interpretation of it.\"", "sentence": "See Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 131, 112 S.Ct. 2395 (“In evaluating [the] facial challenge, we must consider the [association’s] authoritative instructions of the [rule], including its own implementation and interpretation of it.”); see also Ward, 491 U.S. at 794-96, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (holding that the city’s sound-amplification guideline and the city’s interpretation of the guideline provided sufficient limiting instructions to render the ordinance’s statements ensuring the “best sound” and “appropriate sound quality” immune from an over-breadth challenge)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "505 U.S. 131, 131", "parenthetical": "\"In evaluating [the] facial challenge, we must consider the [association's] authoritative instructions of the [rule], including its own implementation and interpretation of it.\"", "sentence": "See Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 131, 112 S.Ct. 2395 (“In evaluating [the] facial challenge, we must consider the [association’s] authoritative instructions of the [rule], including its own implementation and interpretation of it.”); see also Ward, 491 U.S. at 794-96, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (holding that the city’s sound-amplification guideline and the city’s interpretation of the guideline provided sufficient limiting instructions to render the ordinance’s statements ensuring the “best sound” and “appropriate sound quality” immune from an over-breadth challenge)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that the city's sound-amplification guideline and the city's interpretation of the guideline provided sufficient limiting instructions to render the ordinance's statements ensuring the \"best sound\" and \"appropriate sound quality\" immune from an over-breadth challenge", "sentence": "See Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 131, 112 S.Ct. 2395 (“In evaluating [the] facial challenge, we must consider the [association’s] authoritative instructions of the [rule], including its own implementation and interpretation of it.”); see also Ward, 491 U.S. at 794-96, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (holding that the city’s sound-amplification guideline and the city’s interpretation of the guideline provided sufficient limiting instructions to render the ordinance’s statements ensuring the “best sound” and “appropriate sound quality” immune from an over-breadth challenge)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"In evaluating [the] facial challenge, we must consider the [association's] authoritative instructions of the [rule], including its own implementation and interpretation of it.\"", "sentence": "See Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 131, 112 S.Ct. 2395 (“In evaluating [the] facial challenge, we must consider the [association’s] authoritative instructions of the [rule], including its own implementation and interpretation of it.”); see also Ward, 491 U.S. at 794-96, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (holding that the city’s sound-amplification guideline and the city’s interpretation of the guideline provided sufficient limiting instructions to render the ordinance’s statements ensuring the “best sound” and “appropriate sound quality” immune from an over-breadth challenge)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "491 U.S. 794, 794-96", "parenthetical": "holding that the city's sound-amplification guideline and the city's interpretation of the guideline provided sufficient limiting instructions to render the ordinance's statements ensuring the \"best sound\" and \"appropriate sound quality\" immune from an over-breadth challenge", "sentence": "See Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 131, 112 S.Ct. 2395 (“In evaluating [the] facial challenge, we must consider the [association’s] authoritative instructions of the [rule], including its own implementation and interpretation of it.”); see also Ward, 491 U.S. at 794-96, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (holding that the city’s sound-amplification guideline and the city’s interpretation of the guideline provided sufficient limiting instructions to render the ordinance’s statements ensuring the “best sound” and “appropriate sound quality” immune from an over-breadth challenge)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"In evaluating [the] facial challenge, we must consider the [association's] authoritative instructions of the [rule], including its own implementation and interpretation of it.\"", "sentence": "See Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 131, 112 S.Ct. 2395 (“In evaluating [the] facial challenge, we must consider the [association’s] authoritative instructions of the [rule], including its own implementation and interpretation of it.”); see also Ward, 491 U.S. at 794-96, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (holding that the city’s sound-amplification guideline and the city’s interpretation of the guideline provided sufficient limiting instructions to render the ordinance’s statements ensuring the “best sound” and “appropriate sound quality” immune from an over-breadth challenge)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that the city's sound-amplification guideline and the city's interpretation of the guideline provided sufficient limiting instructions to render the ordinance's statements ensuring the \"best sound\" and \"appropriate sound quality\" immune from an over-breadth challenge", "sentence": "See Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 131, 112 S.Ct. 2395 (“In evaluating [the] facial challenge, we must consider the [association’s] authoritative instructions of the [rule], including its own implementation and interpretation of it.”); see also Ward, 491 U.S. at 794-96, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (holding that the city’s sound-amplification guideline and the city’s interpretation of the guideline provided sufficient limiting instructions to render the ordinance’s statements ensuring the “best sound” and “appropriate sound quality” immune from an over-breadth challenge)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "593 F.3d 1025, 1030", "parenthetical": "approving reliance on an alien's admission that he had been convicted of a controlled substance offense in denying application for adjustment of status", "sentence": "See Ortiz v. INS, 179 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir.1999) (no prejudice where petitioner failed to describe the evidence that his counsel incompetently failed to introduce); see also Esquivel-Garcia v. Holder, 593 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir.2010) (approving reliance on an alien’s admission that he had been convicted of a controlled substance offense in denying application for adjustment of status)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "179 F.3d 1148, 1153", "parenthetical": "no prejudice where petitioner failed to describe the evidence that his counsel incompetently failed to introduce", "sentence": "See Ortiz v. INS, 179 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir.1999) (no prejudice where petitioner failed to describe the evidence that his counsel incompetently failed to introduce); see also Esquivel-Garcia v. Holder, 593 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir.2010) (approving reliance on an alien’s admission that he had been convicted of a controlled substance offense in denying application for adjustment of status)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"nothing in this record indicates that the beeper signal was received or relied upon after it had indicated that the [container] had ended its automotive journey at rest on respondent's premises in rural Wisconsin\"", "sentence": "Id. at 283, 103 S.Ct. 1081 (noting “limited use which the government made of the signals from this particular beeper”); see also id. at 284-85, 103 S.Ct. 1081 (“nothing in this record indicates that the beeper signal was received or relied upon after it had indicated that the [container] had ended its automotive journey at rest on respondent’s premises in rural Wisconsin”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting \"limited use which the government made of the signals from this particular beeper\"", "sentence": "Id. at 283, 103 S.Ct. 1081 (noting “limited use which the government made of the signals from this particular beeper”); see also id. at 284-85, 103 S.Ct. 1081 (“nothing in this record indicates that the beeper signal was received or relied upon after it had indicated that the [container] had ended its automotive journey at rest on respondent’s premises in rural Wisconsin”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "354 U.S. 234, 250", "parenthetical": "concluding that \"to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the “chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom”), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); cf. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concluding that “to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "891 F.2d 337, 351", "parenthetical": "holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the \"chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the “chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom”), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); cf. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concluding that “to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "891 F.2d 337, 351", "parenthetical": "holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the \"chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the “chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom”), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); cf. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concluding that “to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211", "parenthetical": "concluding that \"to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the “chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom”), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); cf. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concluding that “to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "891 F.2d 337, 351", "parenthetical": "holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the \"chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the “chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom”), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); cf. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concluding that “to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "concluding that \"to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the “chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom”), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); cf. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concluding that “to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the \"chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the “chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom”), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); cf. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concluding that “to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "354 U.S. 234, 250", "parenthetical": "concluding that \"to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the “chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom”), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); cf. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concluding that “to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211", "parenthetical": "concluding that \"to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the “chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom”), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); cf. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concluding that “to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the \"chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the “chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom”), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); cf. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concluding that “to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "concluding that \"to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the “chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom”), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); cf. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concluding that “to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the \"chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the “chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom”), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); cf. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concluding that “to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the \"chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the “chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom”), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); cf. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concluding that “to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "354 U.S. 234, 250", "parenthetical": "concluding that \"to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the “chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom”), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); cf. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concluding that “to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211", "parenthetical": "concluding that \"to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the “chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom”), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); cf. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concluding that “to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the \"chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the “chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom”), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); cf. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concluding that “to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "concluding that \"to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the “chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom”), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); cf. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concluding that “to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the \"chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the “chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom”), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); cf. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concluding that “to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the \"chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the “chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom”), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); cf. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concluding that “to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "354 U.S. 234, 250", "parenthetical": "concluding that \"to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the “chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom”), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); cf. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concluding that “to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211", "parenthetical": "concluding that \"to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the “chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom”), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); cf. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concluding that “to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the \"chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the “chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom”), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); cf. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concluding that “to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "concluding that \"to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the “chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom”), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); cf. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concluding that “to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the \"chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 351 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that it was error to permit the speeches of a university president to be admitted as evidence of discriminatory animus because of the “chilling effect that admission of such remarks could have on academic freedom”), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); cf. Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concluding that “to impose any straitjaeket upon the intellectual leaders in any colleges and universities would imperil the future of our nation”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "758 F.2d 90, 90", "parenthetical": "observing that Rule 23(e) commits the form of the notice to the court's discretion", "sentence": "See Zimmer Paper Prods., Inc., 758 F.2d at 90 (observing that Rule 23(e) commits the form of the notice to the court’s discretion); Walsh v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 96 F.R.D. 632, 642-43 (D.N.J.) (same) [“Walsh v. Great Atl. & Pac.”], aff'd, 726 F.2d 956, 962 (3d Cir.1983) (same); see also Grunin, 513 F.2d at 120-21 (“[T]he mechanics of the notice process are left to the discretion of the court subject only to the broad reasonableness’ standards imposed by due process.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "513 F.2d 120, 120-21", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he mechanics of the notice process are left to the discretion of the court subject only to the broad reasonableness' standards imposed by due process.\"", "sentence": "See Zimmer Paper Prods., Inc., 758 F.2d at 90 (observing that Rule 23(e) commits the form of the notice to the court’s discretion); Walsh v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 96 F.R.D. 632, 642-43 (D.N.J.) (same) [“Walsh v. Great Atl. & Pac.”], aff'd, 726 F.2d 956, 962 (3d Cir.1983) (same); see also Grunin, 513 F.2d at 120-21 (“[T]he mechanics of the notice process are left to the discretion of the court subject only to the broad reasonableness’ standards imposed by due process.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "104 F.3d 267, 270", "parenthetical": "\"[A]n employee's subjective personal judgments of her competence alone do not raise a genuine issue of material fact.\"", "sentence": "See Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir.1996) (“[A]n employee’s subjective personal judgments of her competence alone do not raise a genuine issue of material fact.”); Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1285 (same); see also Nichols v. S. Ill. Unwersity-Edwardsville, 510 F.3d 772, 784 (7th Cir.2007) (concluding that the “subjective beliefs” of African-American plaintiffs “that they were as qualified or even more qualified” for a position upgrade than the non-African-Americans the employer selected did not create a genuine dispute as to this issue, and thus the plaintiffs failed to create a prima facie case of race discrimination)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "510 F.3d 772, 784", "parenthetical": "concluding that the \"subjective beliefs\" of African-American plaintiffs \"that they were as qualified or even more qualified\" for a position upgrade than the non-African-Americans the employer selected did not create a genuine dispute as to this issue, and thus the plaintiffs failed to create a prima facie case of race discrimination", "sentence": "See Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir.1996) (“[A]n employee’s subjective personal judgments of her competence alone do not raise a genuine issue of material fact.”); Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1285 (same); see also Nichols v. S. Ill. Unwersity-Edwardsville, 510 F.3d 772, 784 (7th Cir.2007) (concluding that the “subjective beliefs” of African-American plaintiffs “that they were as qualified or even more qualified” for a position upgrade than the non-African-Americans the employer selected did not create a genuine dispute as to this issue, and thus the plaintiffs failed to create a prima facie case of race discrimination)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "175 F.3d 889, 897", "parenthetical": "describing ministerial acts as those which \"entail no deliberation, discretion, or judicial involvement\"", "sentence": "In re Connors, 497 F.3d 314, 320-21 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Ziyambe, 200 B.R. 790, 796 (Bankr.D.N.J.1996)) (delivery of deed after foreclosure sale is “ ‘ministerial act, routinely performed, which does not affect the redemption rights of the parties’ ”); In re Carver, 828 F.2d 463, 463-64 (8th Cir.1987) (“routine certification” of non-redemption by clerk of court, where debtor failed to comply with contract for deed within redemption period, was not affirmative act required to complete running of redemption period but was instead ministerial act not stayed by 362(a)); see also Roberts v. C.I.R., 175 F.3d 889, 897 (11th Cir.1999) (describing ministerial acts as those which “entail no deliberation, discretion, or judicial involvement”); Black's Law DICTIONARY 26 (8th ed.2004) (defining “ministerial act” as “[a]n act performed without the independent exercise of discretion or judgment”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "828 F.2d 463, 463-64", "parenthetical": "\"routine certification\" of non-redemption by clerk of court, where debtor failed to comply with contract for deed within redemption period, was not affirmative act required to complete running of redemption period but was instead ministerial act not stayed by 362(a", "sentence": "In re Connors, 497 F.3d 314, 320-21 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Ziyambe, 200 B.R. 790, 796 (Bankr.D.N.J.1996)) (delivery of deed after foreclosure sale is “ ‘ministerial act, routinely performed, which does not affect the redemption rights of the parties’ ”); In re Carver, 828 F.2d 463, 463-64 (8th Cir.1987) (“routine certification” of non-redemption by clerk of court, where debtor failed to comply with contract for deed within redemption period, was not affirmative act required to complete running of redemption period but was instead ministerial act not stayed by 362(a)); see also Roberts v. C.I.R., 175 F.3d 889, 897 (11th Cir.1999) (describing ministerial acts as those which “entail no deliberation, discretion, or judicial involvement”); Black's Law DICTIONARY 26 (8th ed.2004) (defining “ministerial act” as “[a]n act performed without the independent exercise of discretion or judgment”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "38 F.3d 323, 323", "parenthetical": "pointing out that the nature of the prejudice suffered by a claimant differs in every case", "sentence": "See also Jones, 38 F.3d at 323 (pointing out that the nature of the prejudice suffered by a claimant differs in every case)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "655 F.Supp. 1348, 1352", "parenthetical": "holding that \"prejudice ... can be presumed where [claimants are] deprived of the use of [their] property by the government without justifiable cause for a period of twenty-three months\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Sharp, 655 F.Supp. 1348, 1352 (W.D.Mo.1987) (holding that “prejudice ... can be presumed where [claimants are] deprived of the use of [their] property by the government without justifiable cause for a period of twenty-three months”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "222 A.2d 848, 849", "parenthetical": "defendant briefly concealed pants, then attempted to place them with other merchandise when he noticed that he was being observed", "sentence": "See, e.g., McRae v. United States, 222 A.2d 848, 849 (D.C. Ct. App. 1966) (defendant briefly concealed pants, then attempted to place them with other merchandise when he noticed that he was being observed); People v. Baker, 365 Ill. 328, 330-332 (1936) (defendant went to rest room and hid merchandise under her coat; when questioned as she emerged, she returned to rest room and abandoned the items)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "99 Mass. 431, 432-433", "parenthetical": "\"It is not indeed necessary that the pocket-book . . . should have been removed from the pocket, if once within the grasp of the thief, to constitute larceny\"", "sentence": "Cf. Commonwealth v. Luckis, 99 Mass. 431, 432-433 (1868) (“It is not indeed necessary that the pocket-book . . . should have been removed from the pocket, if once within the grasp of the thief, to constitute larceny”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "185 Va. 335, 343-45", "parenthetical": "probation condition requiring that juveniles attend Sunday school and church for one year invalid as a violation of the juveniles' freedom of religion", "sentence": "See State v. Evans, 14 Kan. App. 2d 591, 593, 796 P.2d 178, 180 (1990) (probation condition requiring that defendant attend a specific church and perform one thousand hours of maintenance work at that church invalid where not justified by a compelling state interest); see also Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 343-45, 38 S.E.2d 444, 448-49 (1946) (probation condition requiring that juveniles attend Sunday school and church for one year invalid as a violation of the juveniles’ freedom of religion)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "14 Kan. App. 2d 591, 593", "parenthetical": "probation condition requiring that defendant attend a specific church and perform one thousand hours of maintenance work at that church invalid where not justified by a compelling state interest", "sentence": "See State v. Evans, 14 Kan. App. 2d 591, 593, 796 P.2d 178, 180 (1990) (probation condition requiring that defendant attend a specific church and perform one thousand hours of maintenance work at that church invalid where not justified by a compelling state interest); see also Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 343-45, 38 S.E.2d 444, 448-49 (1946) (probation condition requiring that juveniles attend Sunday school and church for one year invalid as a violation of the juveniles’ freedom of religion)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "38 S.E.2d 444, 448-49", "parenthetical": "probation condition requiring that juveniles attend Sunday school and church for one year invalid as a violation of the juveniles' freedom of religion", "sentence": "See State v. Evans, 14 Kan. App. 2d 591, 593, 796 P.2d 178, 180 (1990) (probation condition requiring that defendant attend a specific church and perform one thousand hours of maintenance work at that church invalid where not justified by a compelling state interest); see also Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 343-45, 38 S.E.2d 444, 448-49 (1946) (probation condition requiring that juveniles attend Sunday school and church for one year invalid as a violation of the juveniles’ freedom of religion)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "14 Kan. App. 2d 591, 593", "parenthetical": "probation condition requiring that defendant attend a specific church and perform one thousand hours of maintenance work at that church invalid where not justified by a compelling state interest", "sentence": "See State v. Evans, 14 Kan. App. 2d 591, 593, 796 P.2d 178, 180 (1990) (probation condition requiring that defendant attend a specific church and perform one thousand hours of maintenance work at that church invalid where not justified by a compelling state interest); see also Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 343-45, 38 S.E.2d 444, 448-49 (1946) (probation condition requiring that juveniles attend Sunday school and church for one year invalid as a violation of the juveniles’ freedom of religion)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "185 Va. 335, 343-45", "parenthetical": "probation condition requiring that juveniles attend Sunday school and church for one year invalid as a violation of the juveniles' freedom of religion", "sentence": "See State v. Evans, 14 Kan. App. 2d 591, 593, 796 P.2d 178, 180 (1990) (probation condition requiring that defendant attend a specific church and perform one thousand hours of maintenance work at that church invalid where not justified by a compelling state interest); see also Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 343-45, 38 S.E.2d 444, 448-49 (1946) (probation condition requiring that juveniles attend Sunday school and church for one year invalid as a violation of the juveniles’ freedom of religion)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "796 P.2d 178, 180", "parenthetical": "probation condition requiring that defendant attend a specific church and perform one thousand hours of maintenance work at that church invalid where not justified by a compelling state interest", "sentence": "See State v. Evans, 14 Kan. App. 2d 591, 593, 796 P.2d 178, 180 (1990) (probation condition requiring that defendant attend a specific church and perform one thousand hours of maintenance work at that church invalid where not justified by a compelling state interest); see also Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 343-45, 38 S.E.2d 444, 448-49 (1946) (probation condition requiring that juveniles attend Sunday school and church for one year invalid as a violation of the juveniles’ freedom of religion)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "796 P.2d 178, 180", "parenthetical": "probation condition requiring that defendant attend a specific church and perform one thousand hours of maintenance work at that church invalid where not justified by a compelling state interest", "sentence": "See State v. Evans, 14 Kan. App. 2d 591, 593, 796 P.2d 178, 180 (1990) (probation condition requiring that defendant attend a specific church and perform one thousand hours of maintenance work at that church invalid where not justified by a compelling state interest); see also Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 343-45, 38 S.E.2d 444, 448-49 (1946) (probation condition requiring that juveniles attend Sunday school and church for one year invalid as a violation of the juveniles’ freedom of religion)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "38 S.E.2d 444, 448-49", "parenthetical": "probation condition requiring that juveniles attend Sunday school and church for one year invalid as a violation of the juveniles' freedom of religion", "sentence": "See State v. Evans, 14 Kan. App. 2d 591, 593, 796 P.2d 178, 180 (1990) (probation condition requiring that defendant attend a specific church and perform one thousand hours of maintenance work at that church invalid where not justified by a compelling state interest); see also Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 343-45, 38 S.E.2d 444, 448-49 (1946) (probation condition requiring that juveniles attend Sunday school and church for one year invalid as a violation of the juveniles’ freedom of religion)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "130 B.R. 675, 675", "parenthetical": "stating that, \"[hjaving failed to notify the Bank of any breach of the Loan Agreements and having continued to accept the benefits of the agreement in the form of continuing advances from the Bank, RPC is now precluded from asserting any such breaches\"", "sentence": "See National Westminster Bank, 130 B.R. at 675 (stating that, “[hjaving failed to notify the Bank of any breach of the Loan Agreements and having continued to accept the benefits of the agreement in the form of continuing advances from the Bank, RPC is now precluded from asserting any such breaches”); cf. Whitney Inv. Co. v. Westview Dev. Co., 273 Cal.App.2d 594, 603, 78 Cal.Rptr. 302 (1969) (noting that, “[wjhile a notice of termination or cancellation of a contract for breach need not be formal and explicit, it should clearly indicate to the defaulting party that the injured party considers the contract terminated”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "273 Cal.App.2d 594, 603", "parenthetical": "noting that, \"[wjhile a notice of termination or cancellation of a contract for breach need not be formal and explicit, it should clearly indicate to the defaulting party that the injured party considers the contract terminated\"", "sentence": "See National Westminster Bank, 130 B.R. at 675 (stating that, “[hjaving failed to notify the Bank of any breach of the Loan Agreements and having continued to accept the benefits of the agreement in the form of continuing advances from the Bank, RPC is now precluded from asserting any such breaches”); cf. Whitney Inv. Co. v. Westview Dev. Co., 273 Cal.App.2d 594, 603, 78 Cal.Rptr. 302 (1969) (noting that, “[wjhile a notice of termination or cancellation of a contract for breach need not be formal and explicit, it should clearly indicate to the defaulting party that the injured party considers the contract terminated”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "130 B.R. 675, 675", "parenthetical": "stating that, \"[hjaving failed to notify the Bank of any breach of the Loan Agreements and having continued to accept the benefits of the agreement in the form of continuing advances from the Bank, RPC is now precluded from asserting any such breaches\"", "sentence": "See National Westminster Bank, 130 B.R. at 675 (stating that, “[hjaving failed to notify the Bank of any breach of the Loan Agreements and having continued to accept the benefits of the agreement in the form of continuing advances from the Bank, RPC is now precluded from asserting any such breaches”); cf. Whitney Inv. Co. v. Westview Dev. Co., 273 Cal.App.2d 594, 603, 78 Cal.Rptr. 302 (1969) (noting that, “[wjhile a notice of termination or cancellation of a contract for breach need not be formal and explicit, it should clearly indicate to the defaulting party that the injured party considers the contract terminated”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that, \"[wjhile a notice of termination or cancellation of a contract for breach need not be formal and explicit, it should clearly indicate to the defaulting party that the injured party considers the contract terminated\"", "sentence": "See National Westminster Bank, 130 B.R. at 675 (stating that, “[hjaving failed to notify the Bank of any breach of the Loan Agreements and having continued to accept the benefits of the agreement in the form of continuing advances from the Bank, RPC is now precluded from asserting any such breaches”); cf. Whitney Inv. Co. v. Westview Dev. Co., 273 Cal.App.2d 594, 603, 78 Cal.Rptr. 302 (1969) (noting that, “[wjhile a notice of termination or cancellation of a contract for breach need not be formal and explicit, it should clearly indicate to the defaulting party that the injured party considers the contract terminated”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "478 U.S. 711, 711", "parenthetical": "\"A State has a legitimate interest in forbidding sexual acts committed in public.... \"", "sentence": "Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991) (holding that a “public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality”); see, e.g., Arcara, 478 U.S. at 711, 106 S.Ct. 3172 (“A State has a legitimate interest in forbidding sexual acts committed in public.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "501 U.S. 560, 569", "parenthetical": "holding that a \"public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality\"", "sentence": "Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991) (holding that a “public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality”); see, e.g., Arcara, 478 U.S. at 711, 106 S.Ct. 3172 (“A State has a legitimate interest in forbidding sexual acts committed in public.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"A State has a legitimate interest in forbidding sexual acts committed in public.... \"", "sentence": "Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991) (holding that a “public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality”); see, e.g., Arcara, 478 U.S. at 711, 106 S.Ct. 3172 (“A State has a legitimate interest in forbidding sexual acts committed in public.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "501 U.S. 560, 569", "parenthetical": "holding that a \"public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality\"", "sentence": "Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991) (holding that a “public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality”); see, e.g., Arcara, 478 U.S. at 711, 106 S.Ct. 3172 (“A State has a legitimate interest in forbidding sexual acts committed in public.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that a \"public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality\"", "sentence": "Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991) (holding that a “public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality”); see, e.g., Arcara, 478 U.S. at 711, 106 S.Ct. 3172 (“A State has a legitimate interest in forbidding sexual acts committed in public.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "478 U.S. 711, 711", "parenthetical": "\"A State has a legitimate interest in forbidding sexual acts committed in public.... \"", "sentence": "Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991) (holding that a “public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality”); see, e.g., Arcara, 478 U.S. at 711, 106 S.Ct. 3172 (“A State has a legitimate interest in forbidding sexual acts committed in public.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"A State has a legitimate interest in forbidding sexual acts committed in public.... \"", "sentence": "Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991) (holding that a “public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality”); see, e.g., Arcara, 478 U.S. at 711, 106 S.Ct. 3172 (“A State has a legitimate interest in forbidding sexual acts committed in public.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that a \"public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality\"", "sentence": "Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991) (holding that a “public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality”); see, e.g., Arcara, 478 U.S. at 711, 106 S.Ct. 3172 (“A State has a legitimate interest in forbidding sexual acts committed in public.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "478 U.S. 711, 711", "parenthetical": "\"A State has a legitimate interest in forbidding sexual acts committed in public.... \"", "sentence": "Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991) (holding that a “public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality”); see, e.g., Arcara, 478 U.S. at 711, 106 S.Ct. 3172 (“A State has a legitimate interest in forbidding sexual acts committed in public.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that a \"public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality\"", "sentence": "Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991) (holding that a “public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality”); see, e.g., Arcara, 478 U.S. at 711, 106 S.Ct. 3172 (“A State has a legitimate interest in forbidding sexual acts committed in public.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"A State has a legitimate interest in forbidding sexual acts committed in public.... \"", "sentence": "Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991) (holding that a “public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality”); see, e.g., Arcara, 478 U.S. at 711, 106 S.Ct. 3172 (“A State has a legitimate interest in forbidding sexual acts committed in public.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that a \"public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality\"", "sentence": "Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991) (holding that a “public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality”); see, e.g., Arcara, 478 U.S. at 711, 106 S.Ct. 3172 (“A State has a legitimate interest in forbidding sexual acts committed in public.... ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "256 Iowa 801, 805", "parenthetical": "finding no jurisdictional error where the court accepted a guilty plea to assault with intent to commit rape when the greater crime of incest was charged", "sentence": "See e.g., State v. Meyers, 256 Iowa 801, 805, 129 N.W.2d 88, 90-91 (1964) (finding no jurisdictional error where the court accepted a guilty plea to assault with intent to commit rape when the greater crime of incest was charged); State v. Englebrecht, 316 N.W.2d 415, 417 (Iowa App.1981) (finding that defendant had waived any irregularity in the failure to file an amended information and thus trial court properly entered judgment of conviction and sentence on a charge greater than that alleged in the information); cf. State v. Victor, 310 N.W.2d 201, 202 (Iowa 1981) (plea of guilty to willful injury where original information alleged attempted murder)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "310 N.W.2d 201, 202", "parenthetical": "plea of guilty to willful injury where original information alleged attempted murder", "sentence": "See e.g., State v. Meyers, 256 Iowa 801, 805, 129 N.W.2d 88, 90-91 (1964) (finding no jurisdictional error where the court accepted a guilty plea to assault with intent to commit rape when the greater crime of incest was charged); State v. Englebrecht, 316 N.W.2d 415, 417 (Iowa App.1981) (finding that defendant had waived any irregularity in the failure to file an amended information and thus trial court properly entered judgment of conviction and sentence on a charge greater than that alleged in the information); cf. State v. Victor, 310 N.W.2d 201, 202 (Iowa 1981) (plea of guilty to willful injury where original information alleged attempted murder)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "129 N.W.2d 88, 90-91", "parenthetical": "finding no jurisdictional error where the court accepted a guilty plea to assault with intent to commit rape when the greater crime of incest was charged", "sentence": "See e.g., State v. Meyers, 256 Iowa 801, 805, 129 N.W.2d 88, 90-91 (1964) (finding no jurisdictional error where the court accepted a guilty plea to assault with intent to commit rape when the greater crime of incest was charged); State v. Englebrecht, 316 N.W.2d 415, 417 (Iowa App.1981) (finding that defendant had waived any irregularity in the failure to file an amended information and thus trial court properly entered judgment of conviction and sentence on a charge greater than that alleged in the information); cf. State v. Victor, 310 N.W.2d 201, 202 (Iowa 1981) (plea of guilty to willful injury where original information alleged attempted murder)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "310 N.W.2d 201, 202", "parenthetical": "plea of guilty to willful injury where original information alleged attempted murder", "sentence": "See e.g., State v. Meyers, 256 Iowa 801, 805, 129 N.W.2d 88, 90-91 (1964) (finding no jurisdictional error where the court accepted a guilty plea to assault with intent to commit rape when the greater crime of incest was charged); State v. Englebrecht, 316 N.W.2d 415, 417 (Iowa App.1981) (finding that defendant had waived any irregularity in the failure to file an amended information and thus trial court properly entered judgment of conviction and sentence on a charge greater than that alleged in the information); cf. State v. Victor, 310 N.W.2d 201, 202 (Iowa 1981) (plea of guilty to willful injury where original information alleged attempted murder)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "310 N.W.2d 201, 202", "parenthetical": "plea of guilty to willful injury where original information alleged attempted murder", "sentence": "See e.g., State v. Meyers, 256 Iowa 801, 805, 129 N.W.2d 88, 90-91 (1964) (finding no jurisdictional error where the court accepted a guilty plea to assault with intent to commit rape when the greater crime of incest was charged); State v. Englebrecht, 316 N.W.2d 415, 417 (Iowa App.1981) (finding that defendant had waived any irregularity in the failure to file an amended information and thus trial court properly entered judgment of conviction and sentence on a charge greater than that alleged in the information); cf. State v. Victor, 310 N.W.2d 201, 202 (Iowa 1981) (plea of guilty to willful injury where original information alleged attempted murder)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "316 N.W.2d 415, 417", "parenthetical": "finding that defendant had waived any irregularity in the failure to file an amended information and thus trial court properly entered judgment of conviction and sentence on a charge greater than that alleged in the information", "sentence": "See e.g., State v. Meyers, 256 Iowa 801, 805, 129 N.W.2d 88, 90-91 (1964) (finding no jurisdictional error where the court accepted a guilty plea to assault with intent to commit rape when the greater crime of incest was charged); State v. Englebrecht, 316 N.W.2d 415, 417 (Iowa App.1981) (finding that defendant had waived any irregularity in the failure to file an amended information and thus trial court properly entered judgment of conviction and sentence on a charge greater than that alleged in the information); cf. State v. Victor, 310 N.W.2d 201, 202 (Iowa 1981) (plea of guilty to willful injury where original information alleged attempted murder)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "61 V.I. 145, 149", "parenthetical": "a custody order may only be enforced through contempt proceedings when \"the order ... is clear and unambiguous\" (quoting In re Burke, 50 V.I. 346, 352 (V.I. 2008", "sentence": "In re Custody of N.A.W., 61 V.I. 145, 149 (V.I. 2014) (a custody order may only be enforced through contempt proceedings when “the order ... is clear and unambiguous” (quoting In re Burke, 50 V.I. 346, 352 (V.I. 2008))); see also Niskar v. Niskar, 136 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Tex. App. 2004) (“the trial court abused its discretion by failing to order the appellant’s possession of and access to the child in clear and unambiguous terms” because “the appellant could not successfully enforce this judgment by contempt”); Yates v. Yates, 2008 PA Super 296, 963 A.2d 535, 545 (2008) (remanding a custody order where “the trial court’s incorporation of . . . unidentified terms . . . createfd] unnecessary uncertainty”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "136 S.W.3d 749, 755", "parenthetical": "\"the trial court abused its discretion by failing to order the appellant's possession of and access to the child in clear and unambiguous terms\" because \"the appellant could not successfully enforce this judgment by contempt\"", "sentence": "In re Custody of N.A.W., 61 V.I. 145, 149 (V.I. 2014) (a custody order may only be enforced through contempt proceedings when “the order ... is clear and unambiguous” (quoting In re Burke, 50 V.I. 346, 352 (V.I. 2008))); see also Niskar v. Niskar, 136 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Tex. App. 2004) (“the trial court abused its discretion by failing to order the appellant’s possession of and access to the child in clear and unambiguous terms” because “the appellant could not successfully enforce this judgment by contempt”); Yates v. Yates, 2008 PA Super 296, 963 A.2d 535, 545 (2008) (remanding a custody order where “the trial court’s incorporation of . . . unidentified terms . . . createfd] unnecessary uncertainty”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "remanding a custody order where \"the trial court's incorporation of . . . unidentified terms . . . createfd] unnecessary uncertainty\"", "sentence": "In re Custody of N.A.W., 61 V.I. 145, 149 (V.I. 2014) (a custody order may only be enforced through contempt proceedings when “the order ... is clear and unambiguous” (quoting In re Burke, 50 V.I. 346, 352 (V.I. 2008))); see also Niskar v. Niskar, 136 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Tex. App. 2004) (“the trial court abused its discretion by failing to order the appellant’s possession of and access to the child in clear and unambiguous terms” because “the appellant could not successfully enforce this judgment by contempt”); Yates v. Yates, 2008 PA Super 296, 963 A.2d 535, 545 (2008) (remanding a custody order where “the trial court’s incorporation of . . . unidentified terms . . . createfd] unnecessary uncertainty”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "61 V.I. 145, 149", "parenthetical": "a custody order may only be enforced through contempt proceedings when \"the order ... is clear and unambiguous\" (quoting In re Burke, 50 V.I. 346, 352 (V.I. 2008", "sentence": "In re Custody of N.A.W., 61 V.I. 145, 149 (V.I. 2014) (a custody order may only be enforced through contempt proceedings when “the order ... is clear and unambiguous” (quoting In re Burke, 50 V.I. 346, 352 (V.I. 2008))); see also Niskar v. Niskar, 136 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Tex. App. 2004) (“the trial court abused its discretion by failing to order the appellant’s possession of and access to the child in clear and unambiguous terms” because “the appellant could not successfully enforce this judgment by contempt”); Yates v. Yates, 2008 PA Super 296, 963 A.2d 535, 545 (2008) (remanding a custody order where “the trial court’s incorporation of . . . unidentified terms . . . createfd] unnecessary uncertainty”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "963 A.2d 535, 545", "parenthetical": "remanding a custody order where \"the trial court's incorporation of . . . unidentified terms . . . createfd] unnecessary uncertainty\"", "sentence": "In re Custody of N.A.W., 61 V.I. 145, 149 (V.I. 2014) (a custody order may only be enforced through contempt proceedings when “the order ... is clear and unambiguous” (quoting In re Burke, 50 V.I. 346, 352 (V.I. 2008))); see also Niskar v. Niskar, 136 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Tex. App. 2004) (“the trial court abused its discretion by failing to order the appellant’s possession of and access to the child in clear and unambiguous terms” because “the appellant could not successfully enforce this judgment by contempt”); Yates v. Yates, 2008 PA Super 296, 963 A.2d 535, 545 (2008) (remanding a custody order where “the trial court’s incorporation of . . . unidentified terms . . . createfd] unnecessary uncertainty”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "61 V.I. 145, 149", "parenthetical": "a custody order may only be enforced through contempt proceedings when \"the order ... is clear and unambiguous\" (quoting In re Burke, 50 V.I. 346, 352 (V.I. 2008", "sentence": "In re Custody of N.A.W., 61 V.I. 145, 149 (V.I. 2014) (a custody order may only be enforced through contempt proceedings when “the order ... is clear and unambiguous” (quoting In re Burke, 50 V.I. 346, 352 (V.I. 2008))); see also Niskar v. Niskar, 136 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Tex. App. 2004) (“the trial court abused its discretion by failing to order the appellant’s possession of and access to the child in clear and unambiguous terms” because “the appellant could not successfully enforce this judgment by contempt”); Yates v. Yates, 2008 PA Super 296, 963 A.2d 535, 545 (2008) (remanding a custody order where “the trial court’s incorporation of . . . unidentified terms . . . createfd] unnecessary uncertainty”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "136 S.W.3d 749, 755", "parenthetical": "\"the trial court abused its discretion by failing to order the appellant's possession of and access to the child in clear and unambiguous terms\" because \"the appellant could not successfully enforce this judgment by contempt\"", "sentence": "In re Custody of N.A.W., 61 V.I. 145, 149 (V.I. 2014) (a custody order may only be enforced through contempt proceedings when “the order ... is clear and unambiguous” (quoting In re Burke, 50 V.I. 346, 352 (V.I. 2008))); see also Niskar v. Niskar, 136 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Tex. App. 2004) (“the trial court abused its discretion by failing to order the appellant’s possession of and access to the child in clear and unambiguous terms” because “the appellant could not successfully enforce this judgment by contempt”); Yates v. Yates, 2008 PA Super 296, 963 A.2d 535, 545 (2008) (remanding a custody order where “the trial court’s incorporation of . . . unidentified terms . . . createfd] unnecessary uncertainty”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "50 V.I. 346, 352", "parenthetical": "a custody order may only be enforced through contempt proceedings when \"the order ... is clear and unambiguous\" (quoting In re Burke, 50 V.I. 346, 352 (V.I. 2008", "sentence": "In re Custody of N.A.W., 61 V.I. 145, 149 (V.I. 2014) (a custody order may only be enforced through contempt proceedings when “the order ... is clear and unambiguous” (quoting In re Burke, 50 V.I. 346, 352 (V.I. 2008))); see also Niskar v. Niskar, 136 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Tex. App. 2004) (“the trial court abused its discretion by failing to order the appellant’s possession of and access to the child in clear and unambiguous terms” because “the appellant could not successfully enforce this judgment by contempt”); Yates v. Yates, 2008 PA Super 296, 963 A.2d 535, 545 (2008) (remanding a custody order where “the trial court’s incorporation of . . . unidentified terms . . . createfd] unnecessary uncertainty”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "remanding a custody order where \"the trial court's incorporation of . . . unidentified terms . . . createfd] unnecessary uncertainty\"", "sentence": "In re Custody of N.A.W., 61 V.I. 145, 149 (V.I. 2014) (a custody order may only be enforced through contempt proceedings when “the order ... is clear and unambiguous” (quoting In re Burke, 50 V.I. 346, 352 (V.I. 2008))); see also Niskar v. Niskar, 136 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Tex. App. 2004) (“the trial court abused its discretion by failing to order the appellant’s possession of and access to the child in clear and unambiguous terms” because “the appellant could not successfully enforce this judgment by contempt”); Yates v. Yates, 2008 PA Super 296, 963 A.2d 535, 545 (2008) (remanding a custody order where “the trial court’s incorporation of . . . unidentified terms . . . createfd] unnecessary uncertainty”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "50 V.I. 346, 352", "parenthetical": "a custody order may only be enforced through contempt proceedings when \"the order ... is clear and unambiguous\" (quoting In re Burke, 50 V.I. 346, 352 (V.I. 2008", "sentence": "In re Custody of N.A.W., 61 V.I. 145, 149 (V.I. 2014) (a custody order may only be enforced through contempt proceedings when “the order ... is clear and unambiguous” (quoting In re Burke, 50 V.I. 346, 352 (V.I. 2008))); see also Niskar v. Niskar, 136 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Tex. App. 2004) (“the trial court abused its discretion by failing to order the appellant’s possession of and access to the child in clear and unambiguous terms” because “the appellant could not successfully enforce this judgment by contempt”); Yates v. Yates, 2008 PA Super 296, 963 A.2d 535, 545 (2008) (remanding a custody order where “the trial court’s incorporation of . . . unidentified terms . . . createfd] unnecessary uncertainty”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "50 V.I. 346, 352", "parenthetical": "a custody order may only be enforced through contempt proceedings when \"the order ... is clear and unambiguous\" (quoting In re Burke, 50 V.I. 346, 352 (V.I. 2008", "sentence": "In re Custody of N.A.W., 61 V.I. 145, 149 (V.I. 2014) (a custody order may only be enforced through contempt proceedings when “the order ... is clear and unambiguous” (quoting In re Burke, 50 V.I. 346, 352 (V.I. 2008))); see also Niskar v. Niskar, 136 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Tex. App. 2004) (“the trial court abused its discretion by failing to order the appellant’s possession of and access to the child in clear and unambiguous terms” because “the appellant could not successfully enforce this judgment by contempt”); Yates v. Yates, 2008 PA Super 296, 963 A.2d 535, 545 (2008) (remanding a custody order where “the trial court’s incorporation of . . . unidentified terms . . . createfd] unnecessary uncertainty”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "963 A.2d 535, 545", "parenthetical": "remanding a custody order where \"the trial court's incorporation of . . . unidentified terms . . . createfd] unnecessary uncertainty\"", "sentence": "In re Custody of N.A.W., 61 V.I. 145, 149 (V.I. 2014) (a custody order may only be enforced through contempt proceedings when “the order ... is clear and unambiguous” (quoting In re Burke, 50 V.I. 346, 352 (V.I. 2008))); see also Niskar v. Niskar, 136 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Tex. App. 2004) (“the trial court abused its discretion by failing to order the appellant’s possession of and access to the child in clear and unambiguous terms” because “the appellant could not successfully enforce this judgment by contempt”); Yates v. Yates, 2008 PA Super 296, 963 A.2d 535, 545 (2008) (remanding a custody order where “the trial court’s incorporation of . . . unidentified terms . . . createfd] unnecessary uncertainty”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "75 N.Y.2d 327, 337-38", "parenthetical": "defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations", "sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, 337-38, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608 (1990) (defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations); Brown v. Dep’t of Justice, 715 F.2d 662, 667-68 (D.C.Cir.1983) (administrative hearings that precede trial on the criminal charges would “constitute improper interference with the criminal proceedings if they churn over the same evidentiary material”) (quoting Peden v. United States, 512 F.2d 1099, 1103 (Ct.Cl.1975)); see also Brown v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 897, 898, 470 N.Y.S.2d 573, 458 N.E.2d 1250 (1983) (the City of New York and the district attorneys’ offices within it are separate entities)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "60 N.Y.2d 897, 898", "parenthetical": "the City of New York and the district attorneys' offices within it are separate entities", "sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, 337-38, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608 (1990) (defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations); Brown v. Dep’t of Justice, 715 F.2d 662, 667-68 (D.C.Cir.1983) (administrative hearings that precede trial on the criminal charges would “constitute improper interference with the criminal proceedings if they churn over the same evidentiary material”) (quoting Peden v. United States, 512 F.2d 1099, 1103 (Ct.Cl.1975)); see also Brown v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 897, 898, 470 N.Y.S.2d 573, 458 N.E.2d 1250 (1983) (the City of New York and the district attorneys’ offices within it are separate entities)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "the City of New York and the district attorneys' offices within it are separate entities", "sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, 337-38, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608 (1990) (defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations); Brown v. Dep’t of Justice, 715 F.2d 662, 667-68 (D.C.Cir.1983) (administrative hearings that precede trial on the criminal charges would “constitute improper interference with the criminal proceedings if they churn over the same evidentiary material”) (quoting Peden v. United States, 512 F.2d 1099, 1103 (Ct.Cl.1975)); see also Brown v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 897, 898, 470 N.Y.S.2d 573, 458 N.E.2d 1250 (1983) (the City of New York and the district attorneys’ offices within it are separate entities)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "75 N.Y.2d 327, 337-38", "parenthetical": "defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations", "sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, 337-38, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608 (1990) (defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations); Brown v. Dep’t of Justice, 715 F.2d 662, 667-68 (D.C.Cir.1983) (administrative hearings that precede trial on the criminal charges would “constitute improper interference with the criminal proceedings if they churn over the same evidentiary material”) (quoting Peden v. United States, 512 F.2d 1099, 1103 (Ct.Cl.1975)); see also Brown v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 897, 898, 470 N.Y.S.2d 573, 458 N.E.2d 1250 (1983) (the City of New York and the district attorneys’ offices within it are separate entities)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "75 N.Y.2d 327, 337-38", "parenthetical": "defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations", "sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, 337-38, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608 (1990) (defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations); Brown v. Dep’t of Justice, 715 F.2d 662, 667-68 (D.C.Cir.1983) (administrative hearings that precede trial on the criminal charges would “constitute improper interference with the criminal proceedings if they churn over the same evidentiary material”) (quoting Peden v. United States, 512 F.2d 1099, 1103 (Ct.Cl.1975)); see also Brown v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 897, 898, 470 N.Y.S.2d 573, 458 N.E.2d 1250 (1983) (the City of New York and the district attorneys’ offices within it are separate entities)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "the City of New York and the district attorneys' offices within it are separate entities", "sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, 337-38, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608 (1990) (defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations); Brown v. Dep’t of Justice, 715 F.2d 662, 667-68 (D.C.Cir.1983) (administrative hearings that precede trial on the criminal charges would “constitute improper interference with the criminal proceedings if they churn over the same evidentiary material”) (quoting Peden v. United States, 512 F.2d 1099, 1103 (Ct.Cl.1975)); see also Brown v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 897, 898, 470 N.Y.S.2d 573, 458 N.E.2d 1250 (1983) (the City of New York and the district attorneys’ offices within it are separate entities)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations", "sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, 337-38, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608 (1990) (defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations); Brown v. Dep’t of Justice, 715 F.2d 662, 667-68 (D.C.Cir.1983) (administrative hearings that precede trial on the criminal charges would “constitute improper interference with the criminal proceedings if they churn over the same evidentiary material”) (quoting Peden v. United States, 512 F.2d 1099, 1103 (Ct.Cl.1975)); see also Brown v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 897, 898, 470 N.Y.S.2d 573, 458 N.E.2d 1250 (1983) (the City of New York and the district attorneys’ offices within it are separate entities)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "60 N.Y.2d 897, 898", "parenthetical": "the City of New York and the district attorneys' offices within it are separate entities", "sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, 337-38, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608 (1990) (defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations); Brown v. Dep’t of Justice, 715 F.2d 662, 667-68 (D.C.Cir.1983) (administrative hearings that precede trial on the criminal charges would “constitute improper interference with the criminal proceedings if they churn over the same evidentiary material”) (quoting Peden v. United States, 512 F.2d 1099, 1103 (Ct.Cl.1975)); see also Brown v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 897, 898, 470 N.Y.S.2d 573, 458 N.E.2d 1250 (1983) (the City of New York and the district attorneys’ offices within it are separate entities)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations", "sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, 337-38, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608 (1990) (defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations); Brown v. Dep’t of Justice, 715 F.2d 662, 667-68 (D.C.Cir.1983) (administrative hearings that precede trial on the criminal charges would “constitute improper interference with the criminal proceedings if they churn over the same evidentiary material”) (quoting Peden v. United States, 512 F.2d 1099, 1103 (Ct.Cl.1975)); see also Brown v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 897, 898, 470 N.Y.S.2d 573, 458 N.E.2d 1250 (1983) (the City of New York and the district attorneys’ offices within it are separate entities)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "the City of New York and the district attorneys' offices within it are separate entities", "sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, 337-38, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608 (1990) (defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations); Brown v. Dep’t of Justice, 715 F.2d 662, 667-68 (D.C.Cir.1983) (administrative hearings that precede trial on the criminal charges would “constitute improper interference with the criminal proceedings if they churn over the same evidentiary material”) (quoting Peden v. United States, 512 F.2d 1099, 1103 (Ct.Cl.1975)); see also Brown v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 897, 898, 470 N.Y.S.2d 573, 458 N.E.2d 1250 (1983) (the City of New York and the district attorneys’ offices within it are separate entities)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "the City of New York and the district attorneys' offices within it are separate entities", "sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, 337-38, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608 (1990) (defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations); Brown v. Dep’t of Justice, 715 F.2d 662, 667-68 (D.C.Cir.1983) (administrative hearings that precede trial on the criminal charges would “constitute improper interference with the criminal proceedings if they churn over the same evidentiary material”) (quoting Peden v. United States, 512 F.2d 1099, 1103 (Ct.Cl.1975)); see also Brown v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 897, 898, 470 N.Y.S.2d 573, 458 N.E.2d 1250 (1983) (the City of New York and the district attorneys’ offices within it are separate entities)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations", "sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, 337-38, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608 (1990) (defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations); Brown v. Dep’t of Justice, 715 F.2d 662, 667-68 (D.C.Cir.1983) (administrative hearings that precede trial on the criminal charges would “constitute improper interference with the criminal proceedings if they churn over the same evidentiary material”) (quoting Peden v. United States, 512 F.2d 1099, 1103 (Ct.Cl.1975)); see also Brown v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 897, 898, 470 N.Y.S.2d 573, 458 N.E.2d 1250 (1983) (the City of New York and the district attorneys’ offices within it are separate entities)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "60 N.Y.2d 897, 898", "parenthetical": "the City of New York and the district attorneys' offices within it are separate entities", "sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, 337-38, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608 (1990) (defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations); Brown v. Dep’t of Justice, 715 F.2d 662, 667-68 (D.C.Cir.1983) (administrative hearings that precede trial on the criminal charges would “constitute improper interference with the criminal proceedings if they churn over the same evidentiary material”) (quoting Peden v. United States, 512 F.2d 1099, 1103 (Ct.Cl.1975)); see also Brown v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 897, 898, 470 N.Y.S.2d 573, 458 N.E.2d 1250 (1983) (the City of New York and the district attorneys’ offices within it are separate entities)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations", "sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, 337-38, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608 (1990) (defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations); Brown v. Dep’t of Justice, 715 F.2d 662, 667-68 (D.C.Cir.1983) (administrative hearings that precede trial on the criminal charges would “constitute improper interference with the criminal proceedings if they churn over the same evidentiary material”) (quoting Peden v. United States, 512 F.2d 1099, 1103 (Ct.Cl.1975)); see also Brown v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 897, 898, 470 N.Y.S.2d 573, 458 N.E.2d 1250 (1983) (the City of New York and the district attorneys’ offices within it are separate entities)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations", "sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, 337-38, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608 (1990) (defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations); Brown v. Dep’t of Justice, 715 F.2d 662, 667-68 (D.C.Cir.1983) (administrative hearings that precede trial on the criminal charges would “constitute improper interference with the criminal proceedings if they churn over the same evidentiary material”) (quoting Peden v. United States, 512 F.2d 1099, 1103 (Ct.Cl.1975)); see also Brown v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 897, 898, 470 N.Y.S.2d 573, 458 N.E.2d 1250 (1983) (the City of New York and the district attorneys’ offices within it are separate entities)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "the City of New York and the district attorneys' offices within it are separate entities", "sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, 337-38, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608 (1990) (defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations); Brown v. Dep’t of Justice, 715 F.2d 662, 667-68 (D.C.Cir.1983) (administrative hearings that precede trial on the criminal charges would “constitute improper interference with the criminal proceedings if they churn over the same evidentiary material”) (quoting Peden v. United States, 512 F.2d 1099, 1103 (Ct.Cl.1975)); see also Brown v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 897, 898, 470 N.Y.S.2d 573, 458 N.E.2d 1250 (1983) (the City of New York and the district attorneys’ offices within it are separate entities)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "the City of New York and the district attorneys' offices within it are separate entities", "sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, 337-38, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608 (1990) (defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations); Brown v. Dep’t of Justice, 715 F.2d 662, 667-68 (D.C.Cir.1983) (administrative hearings that precede trial on the criminal charges would “constitute improper interference with the criminal proceedings if they churn over the same evidentiary material”) (quoting Peden v. United States, 512 F.2d 1099, 1103 (Ct.Cl.1975)); see also Brown v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 897, 898, 470 N.Y.S.2d 573, 458 N.E.2d 1250 (1983) (the City of New York and the district attorneys’ offices within it are separate entities)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations", "sentence": "See, e.g., People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, 337-38, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608 (1990) (defendant cannot invoke compulsory process at a pretrial hearing testing the suggestiveness of a lineup, in part because of the risk that the defendant could use such hearings to leverage favorable plea bargains or compromise ongoing investigations); Brown v. Dep’t of Justice, 715 F.2d 662, 667-68 (D.C.Cir.1983) (administrative hearings that precede trial on the criminal charges would “constitute improper interference with the criminal proceedings if they churn over the same evidentiary material”) (quoting Peden v. United States, 512 F.2d 1099, 1103 (Ct.Cl.1975)); see also Brown v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 897, 898, 470 N.Y.S.2d 573, 458 N.E.2d 1250 (1983) (the City of New York and the district attorneys’ offices within it are separate entities)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "892 F.Supp. 756, 774", "parenthetical": "\"[I]f a person were doused with chemical X and immediately thereafter developed symptom Y, the need for published literature showing a correlation between the two may be lessened.\"", "sentence": "See Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F.Supp. 756, 774 (E.D.Va.1995), aff'd in relevant part, 100 F.3d 1150, 1159 (4th Cir.1996) (“[I]f a person were doused with chemical X and immediately thereafter developed symptom Y, the need for published literature showing a correlation between the two may be lessened.”); see also Heller v. Shaw Indus. Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 154 (3d Cir.1999) (concluding that Daubert does not require a physician to “rely on definitive published studies before concluding that exposure to a particular object or chemical was the most likely cause of a plaintiffs illness”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "167 F.3d 146, 154", "parenthetical": "concluding that Daubert does not require a physician to \"rely on definitive published studies before concluding that exposure to a particular object or chemical was the most likely cause of a plaintiffs illness\"", "sentence": "See Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F.Supp. 756, 774 (E.D.Va.1995), aff'd in relevant part, 100 F.3d 1150, 1159 (4th Cir.1996) (“[I]f a person were doused with chemical X and immediately thereafter developed symptom Y, the need for published literature showing a correlation between the two may be lessened.”); see also Heller v. Shaw Indus. Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 154 (3d Cir.1999) (concluding that Daubert does not require a physician to “rely on definitive published studies before concluding that exposure to a particular object or chemical was the most likely cause of a plaintiffs illness”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "167 F.3d 146, 154", "parenthetical": "concluding that Daubert does not require a physician to \"rely on definitive published studies before concluding that exposure to a particular object or chemical was the most likely cause of a plaintiffs illness\"", "sentence": "See Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F.Supp. 756, 774 (E.D.Va.1995), aff'd in relevant part, 100 F.3d 1150, 1159 (4th Cir.1996) (“[I]f a person were doused with chemical X and immediately thereafter developed symptom Y, the need for published literature showing a correlation between the two may be lessened.”); see also Heller v. Shaw Indus. Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 154 (3d Cir.1999) (concluding that Daubert does not require a physician to “rely on definitive published studies before concluding that exposure to a particular object or chemical was the most likely cause of a plaintiffs illness”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "100 F.3d 1150, 1159", "parenthetical": "\"[I]f a person were doused with chemical X and immediately thereafter developed symptom Y, the need for published literature showing a correlation between the two may be lessened.\"", "sentence": "See Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F.Supp. 756, 774 (E.D.Va.1995), aff'd in relevant part, 100 F.3d 1150, 1159 (4th Cir.1996) (“[I]f a person were doused with chemical X and immediately thereafter developed symptom Y, the need for published literature showing a correlation between the two may be lessened.”); see also Heller v. Shaw Indus. Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 154 (3d Cir.1999) (concluding that Daubert does not require a physician to “rely on definitive published studies before concluding that exposure to a particular object or chemical was the most likely cause of a plaintiffs illness”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "124 F.3d 1467, 1467", "parenthetical": "holding that the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction to decide an alleged due process violation related to his claim for damages under a money-mandating statute", "sentence": "Holley, 124 F.3d at 1467 (holding that the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction to decide an alleged due process violation related to his claim for damages under a money-mandating statute); see also Trek Leasing, Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed.Cl. 673, 677-78 (2004) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims had pendant jurisdiction over a state law contract claim that was part of the same case as a claim over which the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b))." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "62 Fed.Cl. 673, 677-78", "parenthetical": "holding that the Court of Federal Claims had pendant jurisdiction over a state law contract claim that was part of the same case as a claim over which the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1498(b", "sentence": "Holley, 124 F.3d at 1467 (holding that the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction to decide an alleged due process violation related to his claim for damages under a money-mandating statute); see also Trek Leasing, Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed.Cl. 673, 677-78 (2004) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims had pendant jurisdiction over a state law contract claim that was part of the same case as a claim over which the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b))." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "246 F.3d 344, 355", "parenthetical": "finding that \"a time lapse of up to four months has been found sufficient to satisfy the causal connection for summary judgment purposes\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 355 (5th Cir.2001) (finding that “a time lapse of up to four months has been found sufficient to satisfy the causal connection for summary judgment purposes”) (internal citations omitted); see also Weeks v. NationsBank, N.A., 2000 WL 341257, at *3 (N.D.Tex. Mar. 30, 2000) (citing Garrett v. Constar Inc., 1999 WL 354239, at *5 (N.D.Tex. May 25, 1999)); Stroud v. BMC Software, Inc., — Fed. Appx. -, 2008 WL 2325639 (5th Cir. June 6, 2008) (finding that a three-week lapse between protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to show a causal link); Richard v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 233 Fed.Appx. 334, 338 (5th Cir.2007) (concluding that two-and-one-half months is short enough to support an inference of a causal link)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding that a three-week lapse between protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to show a causal link", "sentence": "See, e.g., Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 355 (5th Cir.2001) (finding that “a time lapse of up to four months has been found sufficient to satisfy the causal connection for summary judgment purposes”) (internal citations omitted); see also Weeks v. NationsBank, N.A., 2000 WL 341257, at *3 (N.D.Tex. Mar. 30, 2000) (citing Garrett v. Constar Inc., 1999 WL 354239, at *5 (N.D.Tex. May 25, 1999)); Stroud v. BMC Software, Inc., — Fed. Appx. -, 2008 WL 2325639 (5th Cir. June 6, 2008) (finding that a three-week lapse between protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to show a causal link); Richard v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 233 Fed.Appx. 334, 338 (5th Cir.2007) (concluding that two-and-one-half months is short enough to support an inference of a causal link)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "246 F.3d 344, 355", "parenthetical": "finding that \"a time lapse of up to four months has been found sufficient to satisfy the causal connection for summary judgment purposes\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 355 (5th Cir.2001) (finding that “a time lapse of up to four months has been found sufficient to satisfy the causal connection for summary judgment purposes”) (internal citations omitted); see also Weeks v. NationsBank, N.A., 2000 WL 341257, at *3 (N.D.Tex. Mar. 30, 2000) (citing Garrett v. Constar Inc., 1999 WL 354239, at *5 (N.D.Tex. May 25, 1999)); Stroud v. BMC Software, Inc., — Fed. Appx. -, 2008 WL 2325639 (5th Cir. June 6, 2008) (finding that a three-week lapse between protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to show a causal link); Richard v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 233 Fed.Appx. 334, 338 (5th Cir.2007) (concluding that two-and-one-half months is short enough to support an inference of a causal link)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "233 Fed.Appx. 334, 338", "parenthetical": "concluding that two-and-one-half months is short enough to support an inference of a causal link", "sentence": "See, e.g., Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 355 (5th Cir.2001) (finding that “a time lapse of up to four months has been found sufficient to satisfy the causal connection for summary judgment purposes”) (internal citations omitted); see also Weeks v. NationsBank, N.A., 2000 WL 341257, at *3 (N.D.Tex. Mar. 30, 2000) (citing Garrett v. Constar Inc., 1999 WL 354239, at *5 (N.D.Tex. May 25, 1999)); Stroud v. BMC Software, Inc., — Fed. Appx. -, 2008 WL 2325639 (5th Cir. June 6, 2008) (finding that a three-week lapse between protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to show a causal link); Richard v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 233 Fed.Appx. 334, 338 (5th Cir.2007) (concluding that two-and-one-half months is short enough to support an inference of a causal link)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "457 U.S. 922, 928", "parenthetical": "state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical", "sentence": "United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1157 n. 7, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966) (In § 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state); See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, 457 U.S. 922, 928, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749, 73 L.Ed.2d 483 (1982) (state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "In SS 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state", "sentence": "United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1157 n. 7, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966) (In § 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state); See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, 457 U.S. 922, 928, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749, 73 L.Ed.2d 483 (1982) (state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749", "parenthetical": "state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical", "sentence": "United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1157 n. 7, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966) (In § 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state); See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, 457 U.S. 922, 928, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749, 73 L.Ed.2d 483 (1982) (state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "In SS 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state", "sentence": "United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1157 n. 7, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966) (In § 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state); See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, 457 U.S. 922, 928, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749, 73 L.Ed.2d 483 (1982) (state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical", "sentence": "United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1157 n. 7, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966) (In § 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state); See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, 457 U.S. 922, 928, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749, 73 L.Ed.2d 483 (1982) (state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "In SS 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state", "sentence": "United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1157 n. 7, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966) (In § 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state); See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, 457 U.S. 922, 928, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749, 73 L.Ed.2d 483 (1982) (state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "457 U.S. 922, 928", "parenthetical": "state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical", "sentence": "United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1157 n. 7, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966) (In § 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state); See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, 457 U.S. 922, 928, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749, 73 L.Ed.2d 483 (1982) (state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "In SS 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state", "sentence": "United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1157 n. 7, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966) (In § 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state); See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, 457 U.S. 922, 928, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749, 73 L.Ed.2d 483 (1982) (state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "In SS 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state", "sentence": "United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1157 n. 7, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966) (In § 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state); See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, 457 U.S. 922, 928, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749, 73 L.Ed.2d 483 (1982) (state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749", "parenthetical": "state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical", "sentence": "United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1157 n. 7, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966) (In § 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state); See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, 457 U.S. 922, 928, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749, 73 L.Ed.2d 483 (1982) (state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical", "sentence": "United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1157 n. 7, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966) (In § 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state); See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, 457 U.S. 922, 928, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749, 73 L.Ed.2d 483 (1982) (state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "In SS 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state", "sentence": "United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1157 n. 7, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966) (In § 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state); See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, 457 U.S. 922, 928, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749, 73 L.Ed.2d 483 (1982) (state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "457 U.S. 922, 928", "parenthetical": "state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical", "sentence": "United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1157 n. 7, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966) (In § 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state); See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, 457 U.S. 922, 928, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749, 73 L.Ed.2d 483 (1982) (state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "In SS 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state", "sentence": "United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1157 n. 7, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966) (In § 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state); See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, 457 U.S. 922, 928, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749, 73 L.Ed.2d 483 (1982) (state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749", "parenthetical": "state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical", "sentence": "United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1157 n. 7, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966) (In § 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state); See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, 457 U.S. 922, 928, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749, 73 L.Ed.2d 483 (1982) (state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "In SS 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state", "sentence": "United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1157 n. 7, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966) (In § 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state); See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, 457 U.S. 922, 928, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749, 73 L.Ed.2d 483 (1982) (state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "In SS 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state", "sentence": "United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1157 n. 7, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966) (In § 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state); See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, 457 U.S. 922, 928, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749, 73 L.Ed.2d 483 (1982) (state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical", "sentence": "United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1157 n. 7, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966) (In § 1983 claims, as in Fourteenth Amendment claims, the question is whether the infringement of rights is attributable to the state); See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, 457 U.S. 922, 928, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749, 73 L.Ed.2d 483 (1982) (state action and under color of law are obviously related even if not completely identical)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "404 F.3d 1119, 1125", "parenthetical": "\"The petitioner bears the burden of proving his right, title, or interest under SS 853(n", "sentence": "Pacheco, 393 F.3d at 351; United States v. Nava, 404 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir.2005) (“The petitioner bears the burden of proving his right, title, or interest under § 853(n)(6).”). Thus, had their petition survived the government’s motion, the Watts Petitioners would have the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that they have a superior interest in the Subject Funds pursuant to Section 853(n), which they cannot do." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "459 F.3d 381, 381", "parenthetical": "\"An ancillary proceeding is evidently the only avenue for a post-indictment third-party claim to forfeited property ....\"", "sentence": "See De Almeida, 459 F.3d at 381 (“An ancillary proceeding is evidently the only avenue for a post-indictment third-party claim to forfeited property ....”) (emphasis in original); see also 21 U.S.C. § 853(k)(1) (“[N]o party claiming an interest in property subject to forfeiture ... may intervene in a trial or appeal of a criminal case involving the forfeiture of such property....”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "972 F.2d 1545, 1559", "parenthetical": "district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendant state law claims where it dismissed federal securities and RICO claims before trial", "sentence": "See Boone v. Carlsbad Bancorp., Inc., 972 F.2d 1545, 1559 (10th Cir.1992) (district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendant state law claims where it dismissed federal securities and RICO claims before trial); Urban v. King, 834 F.Supp. 1328, 1334 (D.Kan.1993) (court granted summary judgment on plaintiffs federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims); Dow v. Terramara, Inc., 835 F.Supp. 1299 (D.Kan.1993) (same); Smith v. Walsh, 833 F.Supp. 844, 853 (W.D.Okla.1993) (same); Taliaferro v. Voth, 774 F.Supp. 1326, 1333 (D.Kan.1991) (same); see also Bonger v. American Water Works, 789 F.Supp. 1102, 1107-08 (D.Colo. 1992) (court declined to exercise jurisdiction over state statutory claim where it granted summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiffs Title VII claim)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "789 F.Supp. 1102, 1107-08", "parenthetical": "court declined to exercise jurisdiction over state statutory claim where it granted summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiffs Title VII claim", "sentence": "See Boone v. Carlsbad Bancorp., Inc., 972 F.2d 1545, 1559 (10th Cir.1992) (district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendant state law claims where it dismissed federal securities and RICO claims before trial); Urban v. King, 834 F.Supp. 1328, 1334 (D.Kan.1993) (court granted summary judgment on plaintiffs federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims); Dow v. Terramara, Inc., 835 F.Supp. 1299 (D.Kan.1993) (same); Smith v. Walsh, 833 F.Supp. 844, 853 (W.D.Okla.1993) (same); Taliaferro v. Voth, 774 F.Supp. 1326, 1333 (D.Kan.1991) (same); see also Bonger v. American Water Works, 789 F.Supp. 1102, 1107-08 (D.Colo. 1992) (court declined to exercise jurisdiction over state statutory claim where it granted summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiffs Title VII claim)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "789 F.Supp. 1102, 1107-08", "parenthetical": "court declined to exercise jurisdiction over state statutory claim where it granted summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiffs Title VII claim", "sentence": "See Boone v. Carlsbad Bancorp., Inc., 972 F.2d 1545, 1559 (10th Cir.1992) (district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendant state law claims where it dismissed federal securities and RICO claims before trial); Urban v. King, 834 F.Supp. 1328, 1334 (D.Kan.1993) (court granted summary judgment on plaintiffs federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims); Dow v. Terramara, Inc., 835 F.Supp. 1299 (D.Kan.1993) (same); Smith v. Walsh, 833 F.Supp. 844, 853 (W.D.Okla.1993) (same); Taliaferro v. Voth, 774 F.Supp. 1326, 1333 (D.Kan.1991) (same); see also Bonger v. American Water Works, 789 F.Supp. 1102, 1107-08 (D.Colo. 1992) (court declined to exercise jurisdiction over state statutory claim where it granted summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiffs Title VII claim)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "834 F.Supp. 1328, 1334", "parenthetical": "court granted summary judgment on plaintiffs federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims", "sentence": "See Boone v. Carlsbad Bancorp., Inc., 972 F.2d 1545, 1559 (10th Cir.1992) (district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendant state law claims where it dismissed federal securities and RICO claims before trial); Urban v. King, 834 F.Supp. 1328, 1334 (D.Kan.1993) (court granted summary judgment on plaintiffs federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims); Dow v. Terramara, Inc., 835 F.Supp. 1299 (D.Kan.1993) (same); Smith v. Walsh, 833 F.Supp. 844, 853 (W.D.Okla.1993) (same); Taliaferro v. Voth, 774 F.Supp. 1326, 1333 (D.Kan.1991) (same); see also Bonger v. American Water Works, 789 F.Supp. 1102, 1107-08 (D.Colo. 1992) (court declined to exercise jurisdiction over state statutory claim where it granted summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiffs Title VII claim)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "47 M.J. 410, 410", "parenthetical": "plain error for expert to act as human lie detector", "sentence": "See Birdsall, 47 M.J. at 410 (plain error for expert to act as human lie detector); United States v. Garza, 608 F.2d 659, 664-66 (5th Cir.1979)(it was plain error for the prosecutor to “testify” as an expert witness and opine in closing argument as to the guilt or innocence of the accused); but see United States v. Waldman, 310 F.3d 1074, 1078 (8th Cir.2002)(where there was substantial evidence of guilt, no plain error for expert to opine that accused “had an intent to kill a policeman”)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "310 F.3d 1074, 1078", "parenthetical": "where there was substantial evidence of guilt, no plain error for expert to opine that accused \"had an intent to kill a policeman\"", "sentence": "See Birdsall, 47 M.J. at 410 (plain error for expert to act as human lie detector); United States v. Garza, 608 F.2d 659, 664-66 (5th Cir.1979)(it was plain error for the prosecutor to “testify” as an expert witness and opine in closing argument as to the guilt or innocence of the accused); but see United States v. Waldman, 310 F.3d 1074, 1078 (8th Cir.2002)(where there was substantial evidence of guilt, no plain error for expert to opine that accused “had an intent to kill a policeman”)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "310 F.3d 1074, 1078", "parenthetical": "where there was substantial evidence of guilt, no plain error for expert to opine that accused \"had an intent to kill a policeman\"", "sentence": "See Birdsall, 47 M.J. at 410 (plain error for expert to act as human lie detector); United States v. Garza, 608 F.2d 659, 664-66 (5th Cir.1979)(it was plain error for the prosecutor to “testify” as an expert witness and opine in closing argument as to the guilt or innocence of the accused); but see United States v. Waldman, 310 F.3d 1074, 1078 (8th Cir.2002)(where there was substantial evidence of guilt, no plain error for expert to opine that accused “had an intent to kill a policeman”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "608 F.2d 659, 664-66", "parenthetical": "it was plain error for the prosecutor to \"testify\" as an expert witness and opine in closing argument as to the guilt or innocence of the accused", "sentence": "See Birdsall, 47 M.J. at 410 (plain error for expert to act as human lie detector); United States v. Garza, 608 F.2d 659, 664-66 (5th Cir.1979)(it was plain error for the prosecutor to “testify” as an expert witness and opine in closing argument as to the guilt or innocence of the accused); but see United States v. Waldman, 310 F.3d 1074, 1078 (8th Cir.2002)(where there was substantial evidence of guilt, no plain error for expert to opine that accused “had an intent to kill a policeman”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "530 U.S. 238, 247", "parenthetical": "\"[29 U.S.C. SS 1132(a)] itself demonstrates Congress' care in delineating the universe of plaintiffs who may bring certain civil actions.\"", "sentence": "Harley I, 284 F.3d at 908 n. 5. Even though most fiduciaries who breach their statutory obligations to overfunded defined benefit plans are effectively immunized from liability, the Secretary of Labor and plan fiduciaries can seek redress for a breach of a fiduciary duty that is owed to an overfunded defined benefit plan, that is, they have standing to sue under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). Id.; see also McBride v. PLM Int'l, Inc., 179 F.3d 737, 742 (9th Cir.1999) (stating that 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) only allows a civil action to be brought by a participant, a beneficiary, a fiduciary or the Secretary of Labor); Tex. Life, Accident, Health & Hosp. Serv. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Gaylord Entm’t Co., 105 F.3d 210, 214 (5th Cir.1997) (stating that only the Secretary of Labor, participants, beneficiaries or fiduciaries of plans may bring suit under 29 U.S.C. § 1109); cf. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 247, 120 S.Ct. 2180, 147 L.Ed.2d 187 (2000) (“[29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)] itself demonstrates Congress’ care in delineating the universe of plaintiffs who may bring certain civil actions.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "105 F.3d 210, 214", "parenthetical": "stating that only the Secretary of Labor, participants, beneficiaries or fiduciaries of plans may bring suit under 29 U.S.C. SS 1109", "sentence": "Harley I, 284 F.3d at 908 n. 5. Even though most fiduciaries who breach their statutory obligations to overfunded defined benefit plans are effectively immunized from liability, the Secretary of Labor and plan fiduciaries can seek redress for a breach of a fiduciary duty that is owed to an overfunded defined benefit plan, that is, they have standing to sue under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). Id.; see also McBride v. PLM Int'l, Inc., 179 F.3d 737, 742 (9th Cir.1999) (stating that 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) only allows a civil action to be brought by a participant, a beneficiary, a fiduciary or the Secretary of Labor); Tex. Life, Accident, Health & Hosp. Serv. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Gaylord Entm’t Co., 105 F.3d 210, 214 (5th Cir.1997) (stating that only the Secretary of Labor, participants, beneficiaries or fiduciaries of plans may bring suit under 29 U.S.C. § 1109); cf. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 247, 120 S.Ct. 2180, 147 L.Ed.2d 187 (2000) (“[29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)] itself demonstrates Congress’ care in delineating the universe of plaintiffs who may bring certain civil actions.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "105 F.3d 210, 214", "parenthetical": "stating that only the Secretary of Labor, participants, beneficiaries or fiduciaries of plans may bring suit under 29 U.S.C. SS 1109", "sentence": "Harley I, 284 F.3d at 908 n. 5. Even though most fiduciaries who breach their statutory obligations to overfunded defined benefit plans are effectively immunized from liability, the Secretary of Labor and plan fiduciaries can seek redress for a breach of a fiduciary duty that is owed to an overfunded defined benefit plan, that is, they have standing to sue under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). Id.; see also McBride v. PLM Int'l, Inc., 179 F.3d 737, 742 (9th Cir.1999) (stating that 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) only allows a civil action to be brought by a participant, a beneficiary, a fiduciary or the Secretary of Labor); Tex. Life, Accident, Health & Hosp. Serv. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Gaylord Entm’t Co., 105 F.3d 210, 214 (5th Cir.1997) (stating that only the Secretary of Labor, participants, beneficiaries or fiduciaries of plans may bring suit under 29 U.S.C. § 1109); cf. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 247, 120 S.Ct. 2180, 147 L.Ed.2d 187 (2000) (“[29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)] itself demonstrates Congress’ care in delineating the universe of plaintiffs who may bring certain civil actions.”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[29 U.S.C. SS 1132(a)] itself demonstrates Congress' care in delineating the universe of plaintiffs who may bring certain civil actions.\"", "sentence": "Harley I, 284 F.3d at 908 n. 5. Even though most fiduciaries who breach their statutory obligations to overfunded defined benefit plans are effectively immunized from liability, the Secretary of Labor and plan fiduciaries can seek redress for a breach of a fiduciary duty that is owed to an overfunded defined benefit plan, that is, they have standing to sue under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). Id.; see also McBride v. PLM Int'l, Inc., 179 F.3d 737, 742 (9th Cir.1999) (stating that 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) only allows a civil action to be brought by a participant, a beneficiary, a fiduciary or the Secretary of Labor); Tex. Life, Accident, Health & Hosp. Serv. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Gaylord Entm’t Co., 105 F.3d 210, 214 (5th Cir.1997) (stating that only the Secretary of Labor, participants, beneficiaries or fiduciaries of plans may bring suit under 29 U.S.C. § 1109); cf. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 247, 120 S.Ct. 2180, 147 L.Ed.2d 187 (2000) (“[29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)] itself demonstrates Congress’ care in delineating the universe of plaintiffs who may bring certain civil actions.”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[29 U.S.C. SS 1132(a)] itself demonstrates Congress' care in delineating the universe of plaintiffs who may bring certain civil actions.\"", "sentence": "Harley I, 284 F.3d at 908 n. 5. Even though most fiduciaries who breach their statutory obligations to overfunded defined benefit plans are effectively immunized from liability, the Secretary of Labor and plan fiduciaries can seek redress for a breach of a fiduciary duty that is owed to an overfunded defined benefit plan, that is, they have standing to sue under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). Id.; see also McBride v. PLM Int'l, Inc., 179 F.3d 737, 742 (9th Cir.1999) (stating that 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) only allows a civil action to be brought by a participant, a beneficiary, a fiduciary or the Secretary of Labor); Tex. Life, Accident, Health & Hosp. Serv. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Gaylord Entm’t Co., 105 F.3d 210, 214 (5th Cir.1997) (stating that only the Secretary of Labor, participants, beneficiaries or fiduciaries of plans may bring suit under 29 U.S.C. § 1109); cf. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 247, 120 S.Ct. 2180, 147 L.Ed.2d 187 (2000) (“[29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)] itself demonstrates Congress’ care in delineating the universe of plaintiffs who may bring certain civil actions.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "105 F.3d 210, 214", "parenthetical": "stating that only the Secretary of Labor, participants, beneficiaries or fiduciaries of plans may bring suit under 29 U.S.C. SS 1109", "sentence": "Harley I, 284 F.3d at 908 n. 5. Even though most fiduciaries who breach their statutory obligations to overfunded defined benefit plans are effectively immunized from liability, the Secretary of Labor and plan fiduciaries can seek redress for a breach of a fiduciary duty that is owed to an overfunded defined benefit plan, that is, they have standing to sue under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). Id.; see also McBride v. PLM Int'l, Inc., 179 F.3d 737, 742 (9th Cir.1999) (stating that 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) only allows a civil action to be brought by a participant, a beneficiary, a fiduciary or the Secretary of Labor); Tex. Life, Accident, Health & Hosp. Serv. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Gaylord Entm’t Co., 105 F.3d 210, 214 (5th Cir.1997) (stating that only the Secretary of Labor, participants, beneficiaries or fiduciaries of plans may bring suit under 29 U.S.C. § 1109); cf. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 247, 120 S.Ct. 2180, 147 L.Ed.2d 187 (2000) (“[29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)] itself demonstrates Congress’ care in delineating the universe of plaintiffs who may bring certain civil actions.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "735 F.3d 628, 628", "parenthetical": "concluding that \"Title I specifically, comprehensively, and exclusively addresses disability discrimination in employment\"", "sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); Menkowitz v. Pottstown Mem’l Med. Center, 154 F.3d 113, 118-19 (3d Cir.1998) (“[I]t is evident that Congress sought to regulate disability discrimination in the area of employment exclusively through Title I, notwithstanding the broad language of Title III.”); see also Brumfield, 735 F.3d at 628 (concluding that “Title I specifically, comprehensively, and exclusively addresses disability discrimination in employment”). Moreover, because Title III permits only injunctive relief for a person in Neisler’s position, and he now works in another prison job, any claim seeking an accommodation related to the stockman position would be moot. See Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg’l Hosp., Inc., 450 F.3d 338, 342 (8th Cir.2006)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "154 F.3d 113, 118-19", "parenthetical": "\"[I]t is evident that Congress sought to regulate disability discrimination in the area of employment exclusively through Title I, notwithstanding the broad language of Title III.\"", "sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); Menkowitz v. Pottstown Mem’l Med. Center, 154 F.3d 113, 118-19 (3d Cir.1998) (“[I]t is evident that Congress sought to regulate disability discrimination in the area of employment exclusively through Title I, notwithstanding the broad language of Title III.”); see also Brumfield, 735 F.3d at 628 (concluding that “Title I specifically, comprehensively, and exclusively addresses disability discrimination in employment”). Moreover, because Title III permits only injunctive relief for a person in Neisler’s position, and he now works in another prison job, any claim seeking an accommodation related to the stockman position would be moot. See Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg’l Hosp., Inc., 450 F.3d 338, 342 (8th Cir.2006)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "154 F.3d 113, 118-19", "parenthetical": "\"[I]t is evident that Congress sought to regulate disability discrimination in the area of employment exclusively through Title I, notwithstanding the broad language of Title III.\"", "sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); Menkowitz v. Pottstown Mem’l Med. Center, 154 F.3d 113, 118-19 (3d Cir.1998) (“[I]t is evident that Congress sought to regulate disability discrimination in the area of employment exclusively through Title I, notwithstanding the broad language of Title III.”); see also Brumfield, 735 F.3d at 628 (concluding that “Title I specifically, comprehensively, and exclusively addresses disability discrimination in employment”). Moreover, because Title III permits only injunctive relief for a person in Neisler’s position, and he now works in another prison job, any claim seeking an accommodation related to the stockman position would be moot. See Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg’l Hosp., Inc., 450 F.3d 338, 342 (8th Cir.2006)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "450 F.3d 338, 342", "parenthetical": "concluding that \"Title I specifically, comprehensively, and exclusively addresses disability discrimination in employment\"", "sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); Menkowitz v. Pottstown Mem’l Med. Center, 154 F.3d 113, 118-19 (3d Cir.1998) (“[I]t is evident that Congress sought to regulate disability discrimination in the area of employment exclusively through Title I, notwithstanding the broad language of Title III.”); see also Brumfield, 735 F.3d at 628 (concluding that “Title I specifically, comprehensively, and exclusively addresses disability discrimination in employment”). Moreover, because Title III permits only injunctive relief for a person in Neisler’s position, and he now works in another prison job, any claim seeking an accommodation related to the stockman position would be moot. See Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg’l Hosp., Inc., 450 F.3d 338, 342 (8th Cir.2006)." }