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{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "359 F.3d 310, 310", "parenthetical": "asserting that \"[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "466 U.S. 648, 653", "parenthetical": "recognizing that the \"accused's right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "510 F.2d 634, 640", "parenthetical": "stressing the importance of counsel by writing that \"[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "466 U.S. 648, 653", "parenthetical": "recognizing that the \"accused's right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "359 F.3d 310, 310", "parenthetical": "asserting that \"[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing that the \"accused's right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing that the \"accused's right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "510 F.2d 634, 640", "parenthetical": "stressing the importance of counsel by writing that \"[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "359 F.3d 310, 310", "parenthetical": "asserting that \"[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing that the \"accused's right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing that the \"accused's right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "510 F.2d 634, 640", "parenthetical": "stressing the importance of counsel by writing that \"[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "287 U.S. 45, 69", "parenthetical": "noting that a criminal defendant \"requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "359 F.3d 310, 310", "parenthetical": "asserting that \"[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "287 U.S. 45, 69", "parenthetical": "noting that a criminal defendant \"requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "510 F.2d 634, 640", "parenthetical": "stressing the importance of counsel by writing that \"[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that a criminal defendant \"requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "359 F.3d 310, 310", "parenthetical": "asserting that \"[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "510 F.2d 634, 640", "parenthetical": "stressing the importance of counsel by writing that \"[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that a criminal defendant \"requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that a criminal defendant \"requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "359 F.3d 310, 310", "parenthetical": "asserting that \"[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that a criminal defendant \"requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "510 F.2d 634, 640", "parenthetical": "stressing the importance of counsel by writing that \"[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "359 F.3d 310, 310", "parenthetical": "asserting that \"[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "304 U.S. 458, 462-63", "parenthetical": "finding that the right to counsel \"embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "304 U.S. 458, 462-63", "parenthetical": "finding that the right to counsel \"embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "510 F.2d 634, 640", "parenthetical": "stressing the importance of counsel by writing that \"[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "359 F.3d 310, 310", "parenthetical": "asserting that \"[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding that the right to counsel \"embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "510 F.2d 634, 640", "parenthetical": "stressing the importance of counsel by writing that \"[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding that the right to counsel \"embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding that the right to counsel \"embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "359 F.3d 310, 310", "parenthetical": "asserting that \"[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "510 F.2d 634, 640", "parenthetical": "stressing the importance of counsel by writing that \"[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding that the right to counsel \"embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (recognizing that the “accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (noting that a criminal defendant “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (characterizing criminal defense attorneys as “necessities, not luxuries”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (finding that the right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty”); see also Rompilla v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310, 310 (3d Cir.2004)(asserting that “[a]ll other rights will turn to ashes in the hands of a person who is without effective, professional, and zealous representation when accused of a crime”)(Nygaard, J.); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1975) (stressing the importance of counsel by writing that “[wjhile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators”); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956) (noting that “[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "101 F.3d 263, 270", "parenthetical": "holding that a parent company would, at the very least, have to have been deliberately blind to its subsidiary's fraud in order to have the requisite scienter", "sentence": "See also Chill v. General Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 270 (2d Cir.1996) (holding that a parent company would, at the very least, have to have been deliberately blind to its subsidiary’s fraud in order to have the requisite scienter)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "969 F.Supp. 242, 242", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he law in this circuit is clear that a subsidiary's fraud cannot be automatically imputed to its corporate parent.\"", "sentence": "See Baesa, 969 F.Supp. at 242 (“[T]he law in this circuit is clear that a subsidiary’s fraud cannot be automatically imputed to its corporate parent.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "965 S.W.2d 852, 859", "parenthetical": "holding an affidavit containing impeachment evidence is insufficient to support the granting of a new trial", "sentence": "See also State v. Gatewood, 965 S.W.2d 852, 859 (Mo.App.W.D.1998) (holding an affidavit containing impeachment evidence is insufficient to support the granting of a new trial)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "857 S.W.2d 393, 398", "parenthetical": "\"[Af-fiant's] testimony is hearsay, useful perhaps for impeach[ment] ..., but not as substantive evidence.\"", "sentence": "State v. Westcott, 857 S.W.2d 393, 398 (Mo.App.W.D.1993) (“[Af-fiant’s] testimony is hearsay, useful perhaps for impeach[ment] ..., but not as substantive evidence.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "52 N.J. 22, 31-33", "parenthetical": "zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "105 N.J. 476, 484", "parenthetical": "neighbor's offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "neighbor's offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "52 N.J. 22, 31-33", "parenthetical": "zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "105 N.J. 476, 484", "parenthetical": "neighbor's offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "neighbor's offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "52 N.J. 212, 225-226", "parenthetical": "denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "105 N.J. 476, 484", "parenthetical": "neighbor's offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "52 N.J. 212, 225-226", "parenthetical": "denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "neighbor's offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "105 N.J. 476, 484", "parenthetical": "neighbor's offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "neighbor's offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "78 N.J. 544, 557", "parenthetical": "denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "105 N.J. 476, 484", "parenthetical": "neighbor's offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "78 N.J. 544, 557", "parenthetical": "denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "neighbor's offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "105 N.J. 476, 484", "parenthetical": "neighbor's offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "neighbor's offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "105 N.J. 476, 484", "parenthetical": "neighbor's offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "81 N.J. 597, 607", "parenthetical": "when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "neighbor's offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "81 N.J. 597, 607", "parenthetical": "when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "105 N.J. 476, 484", "parenthetical": "neighbor's offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "neighbor's offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "105 N.J. 476, 484", "parenthetical": "neighbor's offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "96 N.J. 97, 107", "parenthetical": "to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "96 N.J. 97, 107", "parenthetical": "to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "neighbor's offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "105 N.J. 476, 484", "parenthetical": "neighbor's offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "neighbor's offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land", "sentence": "Bor. Leonia, et al., 52 N.J. 22, 31-33, 243 A.2d 233 (1968) (zoning boards must review variance applications by owners of undersized, isolated lots based on acknowledged hardship); Gougeon v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 52 N.J. 212, 225-226, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) (denial of hardship variance may amount to unconstitutional restriction on the use of property); Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adj. Monmouth Beach, 78 N.J. 544, 557, 397 A.2d 646 (1979) (denial of hardship variance could constitute unconstitutional deprivation of property); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 607, 410 A.2d 1138 (1980) (when variance for a structure on an undersized lot is denied, property may be deemed zoned into inutility, calling for payment of compensation); Nash v. Board of Adjustment of Morris Tp., 96 N.J. 97, 107, 474 A.2d 241 (1984) (to avoid hardship, the fair market value of a property must be computed on the assumption that all necessary variances have been granted); Cf. Davis Enterprises v. Karpf, 105 N.J. 476, 484, 523 A.2d 137 (1987) (neighbor’s offer to purchase non-conforming lot does not vitiate hardship necessitating distinguishing previously developed from vacant land)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "111 F.2d 819, 819", "parenthetical": "explaining that view of a single revenue agent is not the same thing as \"institutional posture\"", "sentence": "See MacKenzie, 111 F.2d at 819 (explaining that view of a single revenue agent is not the same thing as “institutional posture”); see also LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 314, 98 S.Ct. 2357 (describing internal IRS review process that is both “multilayered and thorough”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "437 U.S. 314, 314", "parenthetical": "describing internal IRS review process that is both \"multilayered and thorough\"", "sentence": "See MacKenzie, 111 F.2d at 819 (explaining that view of a single revenue agent is not the same thing as “institutional posture”); see also LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 314, 98 S.Ct. 2357 (describing internal IRS review process that is both “multilayered and thorough”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "describing internal IRS review process that is both \"multilayered and thorough\"", "sentence": "See MacKenzie, 111 F.2d at 819 (explaining that view of a single revenue agent is not the same thing as “institutional posture”); see also LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 314, 98 S.Ct. 2357 (describing internal IRS review process that is both “multilayered and thorough”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "111 F.2d 819, 819", "parenthetical": "explaining that view of a single revenue agent is not the same thing as \"institutional posture\"", "sentence": "See MacKenzie, 111 F.2d at 819 (explaining that view of a single revenue agent is not the same thing as “institutional posture”); see also LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 314, 98 S.Ct. 2357 (describing internal IRS review process that is both “multilayered and thorough”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "462 U.S. 284, 284", "parenthetical": "declaring that a \"detailed description of the alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand,\" increases the reliability of an informant's tip", "sentence": "See Hansen, 782 P.2d at 130 (noting that reliability of information is enhanced if the informant personally observes the crime); see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 284, 108 S.Ct. 2317 (declaring that a \"detailed description of the alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand,\" increases the reliability of an informant's tip)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "782 P.2d 130, 130", "parenthetical": "noting that reliability of information is enhanced if the informant personally observes the crime", "sentence": "See Hansen, 782 P.2d at 130 (noting that reliability of information is enhanced if the informant personally observes the crime); see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 284, 108 S.Ct. 2317 (declaring that a \"detailed description of the alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand,\" increases the reliability of an informant's tip)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "782 P.2d 130, 130", "parenthetical": "noting that reliability of information is enhanced if the informant personally observes the crime", "sentence": "See Hansen, 782 P.2d at 130 (noting that reliability of information is enhanced if the informant personally observes the crime); see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 284, 108 S.Ct. 2317 (declaring that a \"detailed description of the alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand,\" increases the reliability of an informant's tip)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "declaring that a \"detailed description of the alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand,\" increases the reliability of an informant's tip", "sentence": "See Hansen, 782 P.2d at 130 (noting that reliability of information is enhanced if the informant personally observes the crime); see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 284, 108 S.Ct. 2317 (declaring that a \"detailed description of the alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand,\" increases the reliability of an informant's tip)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "412 F.3d 1088, 1089", "parenthetical": "noting that Zadvydas and Clark \"invite doubt as to the constitutionality of the current Cuban Review Plan\" under SS 212.12", "sentence": "See Castro-Morales v. Ebbert, 331 Fed.Appx. 191, 192 (3rd Cir.2009) (petitioner initially detained under 8 C.F.R. § 212.12, and detention continued, post-Clark, under 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)); Sanchez v. Attorney General, U.S., 146 Fed.Appx. 547, 548 (3rd Cir.2005) (petitioner detained, pre-Clark, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 212.12, and released, post-Clark, after a “repatriation review” pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 determined “no likelihood of removal and that petitioner is not a special category alien”); see also Armentero v. I.N.S., 412 F.3d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir.2005) (Ferguson, J., concurring) (noting that Zadvydas and Clark “invite doubt as to the constitutionality of the current Cuban Review Plan” under § 212.12). In fact, there are no reported cases in the five-year period since Clark was decided upholding the continued detention of Mariel Cubans under 8 C.F.R. § 212.12. While this is undoubtedly dúe, in part, to the fact that Clark mandated the release of most Mariel Cubans then-remaining in detention, it is also unquestionably true that Clark removed the distinctions among the three categories of aliens identified in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), at least insofar as post-removal order detention is concerned. Those distinctions appear to have served the basis for the separate treatment of Mariel Cubans under § 212.12, and that basis is no longer viable." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "331 Fed.Appx. 191, 192", "parenthetical": "petitioner initially detained under 8 C.F.R. SS 212.12, and detention continued, post-Clark, under 8 C.F.R. SS 241.14(f", "sentence": "See Castro-Morales v. Ebbert, 331 Fed.Appx. 191, 192 (3rd Cir.2009) (petitioner initially detained under 8 C.F.R. § 212.12, and detention continued, post-Clark, under 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)); Sanchez v. Attorney General, U.S., 146 Fed.Appx. 547, 548 (3rd Cir.2005) (petitioner detained, pre-Clark, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 212.12, and released, post-Clark, after a “repatriation review” pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 determined “no likelihood of removal and that petitioner is not a special category alien”); see also Armentero v. I.N.S., 412 F.3d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir.2005) (Ferguson, J., concurring) (noting that Zadvydas and Clark “invite doubt as to the constitutionality of the current Cuban Review Plan” under § 212.12). In fact, there are no reported cases in the five-year period since Clark was decided upholding the continued detention of Mariel Cubans under 8 C.F.R. § 212.12. While this is undoubtedly dúe, in part, to the fact that Clark mandated the release of most Mariel Cubans then-remaining in detention, it is also unquestionably true that Clark removed the distinctions among the three categories of aliens identified in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), at least insofar as post-removal order detention is concerned. Those distinctions appear to have served the basis for the separate treatment of Mariel Cubans under § 212.12, and that basis is no longer viable." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "146 Fed.Appx. 547, 548", "parenthetical": "petitioner detained, pre-Clark, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. SS 212.12, and released, post-Clark, after a \"repatriation review\" pursuant to 8 C.F.R. SS 241.13 determined \"no likelihood of removal and that petitioner is not a special category alien\"", "sentence": "See Castro-Morales v. Ebbert, 331 Fed.Appx. 191, 192 (3rd Cir.2009) (petitioner initially detained under 8 C.F.R. § 212.12, and detention continued, post-Clark, under 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)); Sanchez v. Attorney General, U.S., 146 Fed.Appx. 547, 548 (3rd Cir.2005) (petitioner detained, pre-Clark, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 212.12, and released, post-Clark, after a “repatriation review” pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 determined “no likelihood of removal and that petitioner is not a special category alien”); see also Armentero v. I.N.S., 412 F.3d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir.2005) (Ferguson, J., concurring) (noting that Zadvydas and Clark “invite doubt as to the constitutionality of the current Cuban Review Plan” under § 212.12). In fact, there are no reported cases in the five-year period since Clark was decided upholding the continued detention of Mariel Cubans under 8 C.F.R. § 212.12. While this is undoubtedly dúe, in part, to the fact that Clark mandated the release of most Mariel Cubans then-remaining in detention, it is also unquestionably true that Clark removed the distinctions among the three categories of aliens identified in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), at least insofar as post-removal order detention is concerned. Those distinctions appear to have served the basis for the separate treatment of Mariel Cubans under § 212.12, and that basis is no longer viable." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "412 F.3d 1088, 1089", "parenthetical": "noting that Zadvydas and Clark \"invite doubt as to the constitutionality of the current Cuban Review Plan\" under SS 212.12", "sentence": "See Castro-Morales v. Ebbert, 331 Fed.Appx. 191, 192 (3rd Cir.2009) (petitioner initially detained under 8 C.F.R. § 212.12, and detention continued, post-Clark, under 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)); Sanchez v. Attorney General, U.S., 146 Fed.Appx. 547, 548 (3rd Cir.2005) (petitioner detained, pre-Clark, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 212.12, and released, post-Clark, after a “repatriation review” pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 determined “no likelihood of removal and that petitioner is not a special category alien”); see also Armentero v. I.N.S., 412 F.3d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir.2005) (Ferguson, J., concurring) (noting that Zadvydas and Clark “invite doubt as to the constitutionality of the current Cuban Review Plan” under § 212.12). In fact, there are no reported cases in the five-year period since Clark was decided upholding the continued detention of Mariel Cubans under 8 C.F.R. § 212.12. While this is undoubtedly dúe, in part, to the fact that Clark mandated the release of most Mariel Cubans then-remaining in detention, it is also unquestionably true that Clark removed the distinctions among the three categories of aliens identified in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), at least insofar as post-removal order detention is concerned. Those distinctions appear to have served the basis for the separate treatment of Mariel Cubans under § 212.12, and that basis is no longer viable." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "997 F.2d 343, 345-46", "parenthetical": "explaining that district courts properly may consider conduct from dismissed counts in departing upward for inadequacy of criminal history", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ruffin, 997 F.2d 343, 345-46 (7th Cir.1993) (explaining that district courts properly may consider conduct from dismissed counts in departing upward for inadequacy of criminal history)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "109 F.3d 856, 864-65", "parenthetical": "holding that conduct contained in dismissed counts may be considered by a district court in determining whether to depart from the applicable guideline range", "sentence": "Compare United States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856, 864-65 (3d Cir.1997) (holding that conduct contained in dismissed counts may be considered by a district court in determining whether to depart from the applicable guideline range); United States v. Ashburn, 38 F.3d 803, 807-08 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc) (same); United States v. Zamarripa, 905 F.2d 337, 341 (10th Cir.1990) (same), disapproved on other grounds, Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 198, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 1118, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992); and United States v. Kim, 896 F.2d 678, 684 (2d Cir.1990) (same), with United States v. Harris, 70 F.3d 1001, 1002-04 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that conduct from dismissed counts cannot be relied upon as a basis for departure); and United States v. Castro-Cervantes, 927 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir.1990) (same)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "997 F.2d 343, 345-46", "parenthetical": "explaining that district courts properly may consider conduct from dismissed counts in departing upward for inadequacy of criminal history", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ruffin, 997 F.2d 343, 345-46 (7th Cir.1993) (explaining that district courts properly may consider conduct from dismissed counts in departing upward for inadequacy of criminal history)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "896 F.2d 678, 684", "parenthetical": "holding that conduct from dismissed counts cannot be relied upon as a basis for departure", "sentence": "Compare United States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856, 864-65 (3d Cir.1997) (holding that conduct contained in dismissed counts may be considered by a district court in determining whether to depart from the applicable guideline range); United States v. Ashburn, 38 F.3d 803, 807-08 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc) (same); United States v. Zamarripa, 905 F.2d 337, 341 (10th Cir.1990) (same), disapproved on other grounds, Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 198, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 1118, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992); and United States v. Kim, 896 F.2d 678, 684 (2d Cir.1990) (same), with United States v. Harris, 70 F.3d 1001, 1002-04 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that conduct from dismissed counts cannot be relied upon as a basis for departure); and United States v. Castro-Cervantes, 927 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir.1990) (same)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "70 F.3d 1001, 1002-04", "parenthetical": "holding that conduct from dismissed counts cannot be relied upon as a basis for departure", "sentence": "Compare United States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856, 864-65 (3d Cir.1997) (holding that conduct contained in dismissed counts may be considered by a district court in determining whether to depart from the applicable guideline range); United States v. Ashburn, 38 F.3d 803, 807-08 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc) (same); United States v. Zamarripa, 905 F.2d 337, 341 (10th Cir.1990) (same), disapproved on other grounds, Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 198, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 1118, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992); and United States v. Kim, 896 F.2d 678, 684 (2d Cir.1990) (same), with United States v. Harris, 70 F.3d 1001, 1002-04 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that conduct from dismissed counts cannot be relied upon as a basis for departure); and United States v. Castro-Cervantes, 927 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir.1990) (same)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "997 F.2d 343, 345-46", "parenthetical": "explaining that district courts properly may consider conduct from dismissed counts in departing upward for inadequacy of criminal history", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ruffin, 997 F.2d 343, 345-46 (7th Cir.1993) (explaining that district courts properly may consider conduct from dismissed counts in departing upward for inadequacy of criminal history)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "55 Fed. Reg. 11798, 11800", "parenthetical": "\"Congress intended for EPA to develop a more aggressive leaching medium for the test ....\"", "sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 6921(g) (directing EPA to make changes to the EP toxicity test “to insure that it accurately predicts the leaching potential of wastes which pose a threat to human health and the environment when mismanaged”); 55 Fed. Reg. 11798, 11800 (Mar. 29, 1990) (“Congress intended for EPA to develop a more aggressive leaching medium for the test ....”); see also Edison Electric Institute v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2 F.3d 438, 442 (D.C.Cir.1993) (“The legislative history indicates that Congress believed that EPA’s test was deficient because it was underinclu-sive in identifying hazardous wastes.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "2 F.3d 438, 442", "parenthetical": "\"The legislative history indicates that Congress believed that EPA's test was deficient because it was underinclu-sive in identifying hazardous wastes.\"", "sentence": "See 42 U.S.C. § 6921(g) (directing EPA to make changes to the EP toxicity test “to insure that it accurately predicts the leaching potential of wastes which pose a threat to human health and the environment when mismanaged”); 55 Fed. Reg. 11798, 11800 (Mar. 29, 1990) (“Congress intended for EPA to develop a more aggressive leaching medium for the test ....”); see also Edison Electric Institute v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2 F.3d 438, 442 (D.C.Cir.1993) (“The legislative history indicates that Congress believed that EPA’s test was deficient because it was underinclu-sive in identifying hazardous wastes.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "555 F.Supp.2d 580, 595", "parenthetical": "\"The 'public duty' doctrine has no application to an FTCA action\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 45-46, 126 S.Ct. 510, 163 L.Ed.2d 306 (2005) (explaining that, although a cause of action for negligence may arise out of state law, FTCA precludes assessment of the federal government's liability according to state-level standards applicable to state or municipal government entities); see also Lumsden v. United States, 555 F.Supp.2d 580, 595 (E.D.N.C.2008) (\"The ‘public duty’ doctrine has no application to an FTCA action”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "546 U.S. 43, 45-46", "parenthetical": "explaining that, although a cause of action for negligence may arise out of state law, FTCA precludes assessment of the federal government's liability according to state-level standards applicable to state or municipal government entities", "sentence": "See United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 45-46, 126 S.Ct. 510, 163 L.Ed.2d 306 (2005) (explaining that, although a cause of action for negligence may arise out of state law, FTCA precludes assessment of the federal government's liability according to state-level standards applicable to state or municipal government entities); see also Lumsden v. United States, 555 F.Supp.2d 580, 595 (E.D.N.C.2008) (\"The ‘public duty’ doctrine has no application to an FTCA action”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "555 F.Supp.2d 580, 595", "parenthetical": "\"The 'public duty' doctrine has no application to an FTCA action\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 45-46, 126 S.Ct. 510, 163 L.Ed.2d 306 (2005) (explaining that, although a cause of action for negligence may arise out of state law, FTCA precludes assessment of the federal government's liability according to state-level standards applicable to state or municipal government entities); see also Lumsden v. United States, 555 F.Supp.2d 580, 595 (E.D.N.C.2008) (\"The ‘public duty’ doctrine has no application to an FTCA action”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "explaining that, although a cause of action for negligence may arise out of state law, FTCA precludes assessment of the federal government's liability according to state-level standards applicable to state or municipal government entities", "sentence": "See United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 45-46, 126 S.Ct. 510, 163 L.Ed.2d 306 (2005) (explaining that, although a cause of action for negligence may arise out of state law, FTCA precludes assessment of the federal government's liability according to state-level standards applicable to state or municipal government entities); see also Lumsden v. United States, 555 F.Supp.2d 580, 595 (E.D.N.C.2008) (\"The ‘public duty’ doctrine has no application to an FTCA action”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "555 F.Supp.2d 580, 595", "parenthetical": "\"The 'public duty' doctrine has no application to an FTCA action\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 45-46, 126 S.Ct. 510, 163 L.Ed.2d 306 (2005) (explaining that, although a cause of action for negligence may arise out of state law, FTCA precludes assessment of the federal government's liability according to state-level standards applicable to state or municipal government entities); see also Lumsden v. United States, 555 F.Supp.2d 580, 595 (E.D.N.C.2008) (\"The ‘public duty’ doctrine has no application to an FTCA action”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "explaining that, although a cause of action for negligence may arise out of state law, FTCA precludes assessment of the federal government's liability according to state-level standards applicable to state or municipal government entities", "sentence": "See United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 45-46, 126 S.Ct. 510, 163 L.Ed.2d 306 (2005) (explaining that, although a cause of action for negligence may arise out of state law, FTCA precludes assessment of the federal government's liability according to state-level standards applicable to state or municipal government entities); see also Lumsden v. United States, 555 F.Supp.2d 580, 595 (E.D.N.C.2008) (\"The ‘public duty’ doctrine has no application to an FTCA action”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "430 F.3d 985, 987", "parenthetical": "doctrine of res judicata serves to bar a claim where there is an identity of claims, a final judgment on the merits and an identity of parties", "sentence": "See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1230 (9th Cir.1984) (action barred by res judicata can be dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915); see also Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir.2005) (doctrine of res judicata serves to bar a claim where there is an identity of claims, a final judgment on the merits and an identity of parties); Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir.2002) (dismissal for failure to state a claim is a “judgment on the merits” to which res judicata applies)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "745 F.2d 1221, 1230", "parenthetical": "action barred by res judicata can be dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. SS 1915", "sentence": "See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1230 (9th Cir.1984) (action barred by res judicata can be dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915); see also Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir.2005) (doctrine of res judicata serves to bar a claim where there is an identity of claims, a final judgment on the merits and an identity of parties); Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir.2002) (dismissal for failure to state a claim is a “judgment on the merits” to which res judicata applies)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "297 F.3d 953, 957", "parenthetical": "dismissal for failure to state a claim is a \"judgment on the merits\" to which res judicata applies", "sentence": "See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1230 (9th Cir.1984) (action barred by res judicata can be dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915); see also Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir.2005) (doctrine of res judicata serves to bar a claim where there is an identity of claims, a final judgment on the merits and an identity of parties); Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir.2002) (dismissal for failure to state a claim is a “judgment on the merits” to which res judicata applies)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "745 F.2d 1221, 1230", "parenthetical": "action barred by res judicata can be dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. SS 1915", "sentence": "See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1230 (9th Cir.1984) (action barred by res judicata can be dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915); see also Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir.2005) (doctrine of res judicata serves to bar a claim where there is an identity of claims, a final judgment on the merits and an identity of parties); Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir.2002) (dismissal for failure to state a claim is a “judgment on the merits” to which res judicata applies)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is one thing to say a person acted involuntarily, and quite another to say that the person has no memory of the event.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Vickers v. State, 653 N.E.2d 110 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (in prosecution for resisting law enforcement, defendant claimed to remember very little of the pursuit due to intoxication); cf. McClain v. State, 678 N.E.2d 104, 107 n. 5 (Ind.1997) (“It is one thing to say a person acted involuntarily, and quite another to say that the person has no memory of the event.”) (citations omitted)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "in prosecution for resisting law enforcement, defendant claimed to remember very little of the pursuit due to intoxication", "sentence": "See, e.g., Vickers v. State, 653 N.E.2d 110 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (in prosecution for resisting law enforcement, defendant claimed to remember very little of the pursuit due to intoxication); cf. McClain v. State, 678 N.E.2d 104, 107 n. 5 (Ind.1997) (“It is one thing to say a person acted involuntarily, and quite another to say that the person has no memory of the event.”) (citations omitted)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "950 S.W.2d 54, 54-55", "parenthetical": "for bad faith claim, insured must establish that insurer failed to settle the claim even though it \"knew or should have known that it was reasonably clear that the claim was covered.\"", "sentence": "See Giles, 950 S.W.2d at 54-55 (for bad faith claim, insured must establish that insurer failed to settle the claim even though it “knew or should have known that it was reasonably clear that the claim was covered.”); see also Viles, 788 S.W.2d at 567 (to determine reasonableness of insurer’s decision, court looks to facts insurer had at time it denied claim)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "788 S.W.2d 567, 567", "parenthetical": "to determine reasonableness of insurer's decision, court looks to facts insurer had at time it denied claim", "sentence": "See Giles, 950 S.W.2d at 54-55 (for bad faith claim, insured must establish that insurer failed to settle the claim even though it “knew or should have known that it was reasonably clear that the claim was covered.”); see also Viles, 788 S.W.2d at 567 (to determine reasonableness of insurer’s decision, court looks to facts insurer had at time it denied claim)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "for purposes of 17 U.S.C. SS 109, the defendant video news monitoring service \"cannot be considered a newspaper clipping service because it-does not purchase the copy that it sells to its clients\"", "sentence": "See 17 U.S.C. § 109(d) (privilege of selling copy does not \"extend to any person who has acquired possession of the copy ... from the copyright owner, by rental, lease, loan, or otherwise, without acquiring ownership of it”); Duncan, 744 F.2d at 1494 n. 6 (for purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 109, the defendant video news monitoring service \"cannot be considered a newspaper clipping service because it-does not purchase the copy that it sells to its clients”); see also United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1190-91 (9th Cir.1977) (for purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 27, predecessor to 17 U.S.C. § 109, theaters granted license to exhibit films did not own the films and so could not lawfully have sold them)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "550 F.2d 1180, 1190-91", "parenthetical": "for purposes of 17 U.S.C. SS 27, predecessor to 17 U.S.C. SS 109, theaters granted license to exhibit films did not own the films and so could not lawfully have sold them", "sentence": "See 17 U.S.C. § 109(d) (privilege of selling copy does not \"extend to any person who has acquired possession of the copy ... from the copyright owner, by rental, lease, loan, or otherwise, without acquiring ownership of it”); Duncan, 744 F.2d at 1494 n. 6 (for purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 109, the defendant video news monitoring service \"cannot be considered a newspaper clipping service because it-does not purchase the copy that it sells to its clients”); see also United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1190-91 (9th Cir.1977) (for purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 27, predecessor to 17 U.S.C. § 109, theaters granted license to exhibit films did not own the films and so could not lawfully have sold them)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "189 Ga.App. 450, 450", "parenthetical": "concluding that owner's cross-examination of materialman's general manager established that the underlying judgment against the subcontractor corporation was incorrect because the account was opened in the name of two individuals rather than the subcontractor corporation", "sentence": "Compare Tri-State Culvert, 189 Ga.App. at 450, 228 S.E.2d at 405-06 (concluding that owner’s cross-examination of materialman’s general manager established that the underlying judgment against the subcontractor corporation was incorrect because the account was opened in the name of two individuals rather than the subcontractor corporation); see also Kelly v. Pierce Roofing Co., 220 Ga.App. 891, 393, 469 S.E.2d 469, 472 (1996) (concluding that, under Tri-State Culvert, ma-terialman’s default judgment operated as an admission of the truth of the allegation that the materialman completed the work and therefore the materialman was enti- tied to summary judgment because the property owner failed “to come forward and point to specific evidence” to defeat summary judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "220 Ga.App. 891, 393", "parenthetical": "concluding that, under Tri-State Culvert, ma-terialman's default judgment operated as an admission of the truth of the allegation that the materialman completed the work and therefore the materialman was enti- tied to summary judgment because the property owner failed \"to come forward and point to specific evidence\" to defeat summary judgment", "sentence": "Compare Tri-State Culvert, 189 Ga.App. at 450, 228 S.E.2d at 405-06 (concluding that owner’s cross-examination of materialman’s general manager established that the underlying judgment against the subcontractor corporation was incorrect because the account was opened in the name of two individuals rather than the subcontractor corporation); see also Kelly v. Pierce Roofing Co., 220 Ga.App. 891, 393, 469 S.E.2d 469, 472 (1996) (concluding that, under Tri-State Culvert, ma-terialman’s default judgment operated as an admission of the truth of the allegation that the materialman completed the work and therefore the materialman was enti- tied to summary judgment because the property owner failed “to come forward and point to specific evidence” to defeat summary judgment)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "189 Ga.App. 450, 450", "parenthetical": "concluding that owner's cross-examination of materialman's general manager established that the underlying judgment against the subcontractor corporation was incorrect because the account was opened in the name of two individuals rather than the subcontractor corporation", "sentence": "Compare Tri-State Culvert, 189 Ga.App. at 450, 228 S.E.2d at 405-06 (concluding that owner’s cross-examination of materialman’s general manager established that the underlying judgment against the subcontractor corporation was incorrect because the account was opened in the name of two individuals rather than the subcontractor corporation); see also Kelly v. Pierce Roofing Co., 220 Ga.App. 891, 393, 469 S.E.2d 469, 472 (1996) (concluding that, under Tri-State Culvert, ma-terialman’s default judgment operated as an admission of the truth of the allegation that the materialman completed the work and therefore the materialman was enti- tied to summary judgment because the property owner failed “to come forward and point to specific evidence” to defeat summary judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "469 S.E.2d 469, 472", "parenthetical": "concluding that, under Tri-State Culvert, ma-terialman's default judgment operated as an admission of the truth of the allegation that the materialman completed the work and therefore the materialman was enti- tied to summary judgment because the property owner failed \"to come forward and point to specific evidence\" to defeat summary judgment", "sentence": "Compare Tri-State Culvert, 189 Ga.App. at 450, 228 S.E.2d at 405-06 (concluding that owner’s cross-examination of materialman’s general manager established that the underlying judgment against the subcontractor corporation was incorrect because the account was opened in the name of two individuals rather than the subcontractor corporation); see also Kelly v. Pierce Roofing Co., 220 Ga.App. 891, 393, 469 S.E.2d 469, 472 (1996) (concluding that, under Tri-State Culvert, ma-terialman’s default judgment operated as an admission of the truth of the allegation that the materialman completed the work and therefore the materialman was enti- tied to summary judgment because the property owner failed “to come forward and point to specific evidence” to defeat summary judgment)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "228 S.E.2d 405, 405-06", "parenthetical": "concluding that owner's cross-examination of materialman's general manager established that the underlying judgment against the subcontractor corporation was incorrect because the account was opened in the name of two individuals rather than the subcontractor corporation", "sentence": "Compare Tri-State Culvert, 189 Ga.App. at 450, 228 S.E.2d at 405-06 (concluding that owner’s cross-examination of materialman’s general manager established that the underlying judgment against the subcontractor corporation was incorrect because the account was opened in the name of two individuals rather than the subcontractor corporation); see also Kelly v. Pierce Roofing Co., 220 Ga.App. 891, 393, 469 S.E.2d 469, 472 (1996) (concluding that, under Tri-State Culvert, ma-terialman’s default judgment operated as an admission of the truth of the allegation that the materialman completed the work and therefore the materialman was enti- tied to summary judgment because the property owner failed “to come forward and point to specific evidence” to defeat summary judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "220 Ga.App. 891, 393", "parenthetical": "concluding that, under Tri-State Culvert, ma-terialman's default judgment operated as an admission of the truth of the allegation that the materialman completed the work and therefore the materialman was enti- tied to summary judgment because the property owner failed \"to come forward and point to specific evidence\" to defeat summary judgment", "sentence": "Compare Tri-State Culvert, 189 Ga.App. at 450, 228 S.E.2d at 405-06 (concluding that owner’s cross-examination of materialman’s general manager established that the underlying judgment against the subcontractor corporation was incorrect because the account was opened in the name of two individuals rather than the subcontractor corporation); see also Kelly v. Pierce Roofing Co., 220 Ga.App. 891, 393, 469 S.E.2d 469, 472 (1996) (concluding that, under Tri-State Culvert, ma-terialman’s default judgment operated as an admission of the truth of the allegation that the materialman completed the work and therefore the materialman was enti- tied to summary judgment because the property owner failed “to come forward and point to specific evidence” to defeat summary judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "469 S.E.2d 469, 472", "parenthetical": "concluding that, under Tri-State Culvert, ma-terialman's default judgment operated as an admission of the truth of the allegation that the materialman completed the work and therefore the materialman was enti- tied to summary judgment because the property owner failed \"to come forward and point to specific evidence\" to defeat summary judgment", "sentence": "Compare Tri-State Culvert, 189 Ga.App. at 450, 228 S.E.2d at 405-06 (concluding that owner’s cross-examination of materialman’s general manager established that the underlying judgment against the subcontractor corporation was incorrect because the account was opened in the name of two individuals rather than the subcontractor corporation); see also Kelly v. Pierce Roofing Co., 220 Ga.App. 891, 393, 469 S.E.2d 469, 472 (1996) (concluding that, under Tri-State Culvert, ma-terialman’s default judgment operated as an admission of the truth of the allegation that the materialman completed the work and therefore the materialman was enti- tied to summary judgment because the property owner failed “to come forward and point to specific evidence” to defeat summary judgment)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "228 S.E.2d 405, 405-06", "parenthetical": "concluding that owner's cross-examination of materialman's general manager established that the underlying judgment against the subcontractor corporation was incorrect because the account was opened in the name of two individuals rather than the subcontractor corporation", "sentence": "Compare Tri-State Culvert, 189 Ga.App. at 450, 228 S.E.2d at 405-06 (concluding that owner’s cross-examination of materialman’s general manager established that the underlying judgment against the subcontractor corporation was incorrect because the account was opened in the name of two individuals rather than the subcontractor corporation); see also Kelly v. Pierce Roofing Co., 220 Ga.App. 891, 393, 469 S.E.2d 469, 472 (1996) (concluding that, under Tri-State Culvert, ma-terialman’s default judgment operated as an admission of the truth of the allegation that the materialman completed the work and therefore the materialman was enti- tied to summary judgment because the property owner failed “to come forward and point to specific evidence” to defeat summary judgment)." }

{ "signal": "but cf.", "identifier": "28 S.W.3d 120, 120", "parenthetical": "suggesting that prejudice should be presumed when a defendant is without counsel during the entire 30-day period for filing motion for new trial, but deciding that, even if prejudice is not presumed, the deprivation of counsel during entire time for filing motion for new trial in that particular case was not harmless beyond reasonable doubt", "sentence": "See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 257, 108 5.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988) (deprivation of right to counsel subject to harmless error analysis when this deprivation did not contaminate “the entire criminal proceeding”); Massingill, 8 S.W.3d at 737 (denial of counsel during 30-day period for filing motion for new trial is not structural error and is, therefore, subject to “harmless beyond reasonable doubt” standard); but cf. Prudhomme, 28 S.W.3d at 120 (suggesting that prejudice should be presumed when a defendant is without counsel during the entire 30-day period for filing motion for new trial, but deciding that, even if prejudice is not presumed, the deprivation of counsel during entire time for filing motion for new trial in that particular case was not harmless beyond reasonable doubt)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "486 U.S. 249, 257", "parenthetical": "deprivation of right to counsel subject to harmless error analysis when this deprivation did not contaminate \"the entire criminal proceeding\"", "sentence": "See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 257, 108 5.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988) (deprivation of right to counsel subject to harmless error analysis when this deprivation did not contaminate “the entire criminal proceeding”); Massingill, 8 S.W.3d at 737 (denial of counsel during 30-day period for filing motion for new trial is not structural error and is, therefore, subject to “harmless beyond reasonable doubt” standard); but cf. Prudhomme, 28 S.W.3d at 120 (suggesting that prejudice should be presumed when a defendant is without counsel during the entire 30-day period for filing motion for new trial, but deciding that, even if prejudice is not presumed, the deprivation of counsel during entire time for filing motion for new trial in that particular case was not harmless beyond reasonable doubt)." }

{ "signal": "but cf.", "identifier": "28 S.W.3d 120, 120", "parenthetical": "suggesting that prejudice should be presumed when a defendant is without counsel during the entire 30-day period for filing motion for new trial, but deciding that, even if prejudice is not presumed, the deprivation of counsel during entire time for filing motion for new trial in that particular case was not harmless beyond reasonable doubt", "sentence": "See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 257, 108 5.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988) (deprivation of right to counsel subject to harmless error analysis when this deprivation did not contaminate “the entire criminal proceeding”); Massingill, 8 S.W.3d at 737 (denial of counsel during 30-day period for filing motion for new trial is not structural error and is, therefore, subject to “harmless beyond reasonable doubt” standard); but cf. Prudhomme, 28 S.W.3d at 120 (suggesting that prejudice should be presumed when a defendant is without counsel during the entire 30-day period for filing motion for new trial, but deciding that, even if prejudice is not presumed, the deprivation of counsel during entire time for filing motion for new trial in that particular case was not harmless beyond reasonable doubt)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "deprivation of right to counsel subject to harmless error analysis when this deprivation did not contaminate \"the entire criminal proceeding\"", "sentence": "See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 257, 108 5.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988) (deprivation of right to counsel subject to harmless error analysis when this deprivation did not contaminate “the entire criminal proceeding”); Massingill, 8 S.W.3d at 737 (denial of counsel during 30-day period for filing motion for new trial is not structural error and is, therefore, subject to “harmless beyond reasonable doubt” standard); but cf. Prudhomme, 28 S.W.3d at 120 (suggesting that prejudice should be presumed when a defendant is without counsel during the entire 30-day period for filing motion for new trial, but deciding that, even if prejudice is not presumed, the deprivation of counsel during entire time for filing motion for new trial in that particular case was not harmless beyond reasonable doubt)." }

{ "signal": "but cf.", "identifier": "28 S.W.3d 120, 120", "parenthetical": "suggesting that prejudice should be presumed when a defendant is without counsel during the entire 30-day period for filing motion for new trial, but deciding that, even if prejudice is not presumed, the deprivation of counsel during entire time for filing motion for new trial in that particular case was not harmless beyond reasonable doubt", "sentence": "See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 257, 108 5.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988) (deprivation of right to counsel subject to harmless error analysis when this deprivation did not contaminate “the entire criminal proceeding”); Massingill, 8 S.W.3d at 737 (denial of counsel during 30-day period for filing motion for new trial is not structural error and is, therefore, subject to “harmless beyond reasonable doubt” standard); but cf. Prudhomme, 28 S.W.3d at 120 (suggesting that prejudice should be presumed when a defendant is without counsel during the entire 30-day period for filing motion for new trial, but deciding that, even if prejudice is not presumed, the deprivation of counsel during entire time for filing motion for new trial in that particular case was not harmless beyond reasonable doubt)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "8 S.W.3d 737, 737", "parenthetical": "denial of counsel during 30-day period for filing motion for new trial is not structural error and is, therefore, subject to \"harmless beyond reasonable doubt\" standard", "sentence": "See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 257, 108 5.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988) (deprivation of right to counsel subject to harmless error analysis when this deprivation did not contaminate “the entire criminal proceeding”); Massingill, 8 S.W.3d at 737 (denial of counsel during 30-day period for filing motion for new trial is not structural error and is, therefore, subject to “harmless beyond reasonable doubt” standard); but cf. Prudhomme, 28 S.W.3d at 120 (suggesting that prejudice should be presumed when a defendant is without counsel during the entire 30-day period for filing motion for new trial, but deciding that, even if prejudice is not presumed, the deprivation of counsel during entire time for filing motion for new trial in that particular case was not harmless beyond reasonable doubt)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "226 N.J.Super. 416, 425-26", "parenthetical": "although reference to defendant's mug shots suggested defendant's prior involvement in criminal activity, it was not reversible error because references were \"fleeting\" and trial court gave a curative instruction", "sentence": "See State v. Porambo, 226 N.J.Super. 416, 425-26, 544 A.2d 870 (App.Div.1988) (although reference to defendant’s mug shots suggested defendant’s prior involvement in criminal activity, it was not reversible error because references were “fleeting” and trial court gave a curative instruction); State v. Miller, 159 N.J.Super. 552, 561-62, 388 A.2d 993 (App.Div.1978); cf. State v. O’Leary, 25 N.J. 104, 115-16,135 A.2d 321 (1957) (police testimony referring to photo of defendant as coming from “our gallery” did not require mistrial)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "25 N.J. 104, 115-16", "parenthetical": "police testimony referring to photo of defendant as coming from \"our gallery\" did not require mistrial", "sentence": "See State v. Porambo, 226 N.J.Super. 416, 425-26, 544 A.2d 870 (App.Div.1988) (although reference to defendant’s mug shots suggested defendant’s prior involvement in criminal activity, it was not reversible error because references were “fleeting” and trial court gave a curative instruction); State v. Miller, 159 N.J.Super. 552, 561-62, 388 A.2d 993 (App.Div.1978); cf. State v. O’Leary, 25 N.J. 104, 115-16,135 A.2d 321 (1957) (police testimony referring to photo of defendant as coming from “our gallery” did not require mistrial)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "police testimony referring to photo of defendant as coming from \"our gallery\" did not require mistrial", "sentence": "See State v. Porambo, 226 N.J.Super. 416, 425-26, 544 A.2d 870 (App.Div.1988) (although reference to defendant’s mug shots suggested defendant’s prior involvement in criminal activity, it was not reversible error because references were “fleeting” and trial court gave a curative instruction); State v. Miller, 159 N.J.Super. 552, 561-62, 388 A.2d 993 (App.Div.1978); cf. State v. O’Leary, 25 N.J. 104, 115-16,135 A.2d 321 (1957) (police testimony referring to photo of defendant as coming from “our gallery” did not require mistrial)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "226 N.J.Super. 416, 425-26", "parenthetical": "although reference to defendant's mug shots suggested defendant's prior involvement in criminal activity, it was not reversible error because references were \"fleeting\" and trial court gave a curative instruction", "sentence": "See State v. Porambo, 226 N.J.Super. 416, 425-26, 544 A.2d 870 (App.Div.1988) (although reference to defendant’s mug shots suggested defendant’s prior involvement in criminal activity, it was not reversible error because references were “fleeting” and trial court gave a curative instruction); State v. Miller, 159 N.J.Super. 552, 561-62, 388 A.2d 993 (App.Div.1978); cf. State v. O’Leary, 25 N.J. 104, 115-16,135 A.2d 321 (1957) (police testimony referring to photo of defendant as coming from “our gallery” did not require mistrial)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "25 N.J. 104, 115-16", "parenthetical": "police testimony referring to photo of defendant as coming from \"our gallery\" did not require mistrial", "sentence": "See State v. Porambo, 226 N.J.Super. 416, 425-26, 544 A.2d 870 (App.Div.1988) (although reference to defendant’s mug shots suggested defendant’s prior involvement in criminal activity, it was not reversible error because references were “fleeting” and trial court gave a curative instruction); State v. Miller, 159 N.J.Super. 552, 561-62, 388 A.2d 993 (App.Div.1978); cf. State v. O’Leary, 25 N.J. 104, 115-16,135 A.2d 321 (1957) (police testimony referring to photo of defendant as coming from “our gallery” did not require mistrial)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "although reference to defendant's mug shots suggested defendant's prior involvement in criminal activity, it was not reversible error because references were \"fleeting\" and trial court gave a curative instruction", "sentence": "See State v. Porambo, 226 N.J.Super. 416, 425-26, 544 A.2d 870 (App.Div.1988) (although reference to defendant’s mug shots suggested defendant’s prior involvement in criminal activity, it was not reversible error because references were “fleeting” and trial court gave a curative instruction); State v. Miller, 159 N.J.Super. 552, 561-62, 388 A.2d 993 (App.Div.1978); cf. State v. O’Leary, 25 N.J. 104, 115-16,135 A.2d 321 (1957) (police testimony referring to photo of defendant as coming from “our gallery” did not require mistrial)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "police testimony referring to photo of defendant as coming from \"our gallery\" did not require mistrial", "sentence": "See State v. Porambo, 226 N.J.Super. 416, 425-26, 544 A.2d 870 (App.Div.1988) (although reference to defendant’s mug shots suggested defendant’s prior involvement in criminal activity, it was not reversible error because references were “fleeting” and trial court gave a curative instruction); State v. Miller, 159 N.J.Super. 552, 561-62, 388 A.2d 993 (App.Div.1978); cf. State v. O’Leary, 25 N.J. 104, 115-16,135 A.2d 321 (1957) (police testimony referring to photo of defendant as coming from “our gallery” did not require mistrial)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "although reference to defendant's mug shots suggested defendant's prior involvement in criminal activity, it was not reversible error because references were \"fleeting\" and trial court gave a curative instruction", "sentence": "See State v. Porambo, 226 N.J.Super. 416, 425-26, 544 A.2d 870 (App.Div.1988) (although reference to defendant’s mug shots suggested defendant’s prior involvement in criminal activity, it was not reversible error because references were “fleeting” and trial court gave a curative instruction); State v. Miller, 159 N.J.Super. 552, 561-62, 388 A.2d 993 (App.Div.1978); cf. State v. O’Leary, 25 N.J. 104, 115-16,135 A.2d 321 (1957) (police testimony referring to photo of defendant as coming from “our gallery” did not require mistrial)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "315 U.S. 568, 571-72", "parenthetical": "identifying several types of statements that have \"never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem\"", "sentence": "Black, supra, 538 U.S. at 359, 123 S.Ct. at 1547-48; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (identifying several types of statements that have \"never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem\"); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2546, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 1401, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969); Janousek, supra, 871 P.2d at 1193 (person \"has no constitutionally protected right to make threats of violence to a public servant\")." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "871 P.2d 1193, 1193", "parenthetical": "person \"has no constitutionally protected right to make threats of violence to a public servant\"", "sentence": "Black, supra, 538 U.S. at 359, 123 S.Ct. at 1547-48; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (identifying several types of statements that have \"never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem\"); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2546, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 1401, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969); Janousek, supra, 871 P.2d at 1193 (person \"has no constitutionally protected right to make threats of violence to a public servant\")." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "62 S.Ct. 766, 769", "parenthetical": "identifying several types of statements that have \"never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem\"", "sentence": "Black, supra, 538 U.S. at 359, 123 S.Ct. at 1547-48; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (identifying several types of statements that have \"never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem\"); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2546, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 1401, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969); Janousek, supra, 871 P.2d at 1193 (person \"has no constitutionally protected right to make threats of violence to a public servant\")." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "871 P.2d 1193, 1193", "parenthetical": "person \"has no constitutionally protected right to make threats of violence to a public servant\"", "sentence": "Black, supra, 538 U.S. at 359, 123 S.Ct. at 1547-48; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (identifying several types of statements that have \"never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem\"); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2546, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 1401, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969); Janousek, supra, 871 P.2d at 1193 (person \"has no constitutionally protected right to make threats of violence to a public servant\")." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "871 P.2d 1193, 1193", "parenthetical": "person \"has no constitutionally protected right to make threats of violence to a public servant\"", "sentence": "Black, supra, 538 U.S. at 359, 123 S.Ct. at 1547-48; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (identifying several types of statements that have \"never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem\"); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2546, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 1401, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969); Janousek, supra, 871 P.2d at 1193 (person \"has no constitutionally protected right to make threats of violence to a public servant\")." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "identifying several types of statements that have \"never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem\"", "sentence": "Black, supra, 538 U.S. at 359, 123 S.Ct. at 1547-48; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (identifying several types of statements that have \"never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem\"); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2546, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 1401, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969); Janousek, supra, 871 P.2d at 1193 (person \"has no constitutionally protected right to make threats of violence to a public servant\")." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "142 F.3d 538, 538", "parenthetical": "where closure was brief and testimony was corroborative, \"limited likelihood that undercover officer's safety would be prejudiced ... had sufficient weight in the balance\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Artuz, 283 F.3d 492, 501-02 (2d Cir.2002) (despite officer’s dual status as both a non-undercover arresting investigator and an undercover in certain areas, closure did not involve an unreasonable application of Waller); see also Brown, 142 F.3d at 538 (where closure was brief and testimony was corroborative, “limited likelihood that undercover officer’s safety would be prejudiced ... had sufficient weight in the balance”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "283 F.3d 492, 501-02", "parenthetical": "despite officer's dual status as both a non-undercover arresting investigator and an undercover in certain areas, closure did not involve an unreasonable application of Waller", "sentence": "See Brown v. Artuz, 283 F.3d 492, 501-02 (2d Cir.2002) (despite officer’s dual status as both a non-undercover arresting investigator and an undercover in certain areas, closure did not involve an unreasonable application of Waller); see also Brown, 142 F.3d at 538 (where closure was brief and testimony was corroborative, “limited likelihood that undercover officer’s safety would be prejudiced ... had sufficient weight in the balance”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "197 F.3d 22, 22", "parenthetical": "finding termination notice valid although party failed to strictly comply with notice provision because that provision did not \"itself, confer any benefit upon either party\" and was \"merely a collateral term intended to enhance the probability that mailed notice will arrive promptly in the proper hands\"", "sentence": "Merrill, Merrill on Notice § 603, at 662-63 (1952)) (emphasis added)); see also Univ. Emergency Med. Found., 197 F.3d at 22 (finding termination notice valid although party failed to strictly comply with notice provision because that provision did not “itself, confer any benefit upon either party” and was “merely a collateral term intended to enhance the probability that mailed notice will arrive promptly in the proper hands”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "678 F.3d 115, 123", "parenthetical": "\"[Sjtrict conformity with a contract's written notice provision is not required as long as the counterparty receives substantially the same information through timely actual notice and suffers no prejudice from the non-conformity.\" (emphasis added", "sentence": "See In re Redondo Constr. Corp., 678 F.3d 115, 123 (1st Cir.2012) (“[Sjtrict conformity with a contract’s written notice provision is not required as long as the counterparty receives substantially the same information through timely actual notice and suffers no prejudice from the non-conformity.” (emphasis added)); Univ. Emergency Med. Found. v. Rapier Investments, Ltd., No. CIV.A. 97549-T, 1998 WL 34100601, at *2 (D.R.I. Oct. 16, 1998) aff'd, 197 F.3d 18 (1st Cir.1999) (“Even where a contract requires a particular method of giving notice, notice given by a different method is effective if it is actually received unless the method by which notice is given is an essential element of the transaction.” (citing 1 Maurice H." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "118 F.3d 535, 540", "parenthetical": "refusing to find waiver of waiver by the State where it presented its procedural default argument for the first time on appeal to this court", "sentence": "See Gregory-Bey v. Hanks, 332 F.3d 1036, 1043 (7th Cir.2003) (“As a procedural default is not jurisdictional, any argument that [a habeas petitioner] has defaulted his ... claim can be waived by the government.”); Hernandez v. Cowan, 200 F.3d 995, 997 (7th Cir.2000) (finding “waiver of waiver, now a well-established doctrine,” where the State failed to object to a habe-as petitioner’s failure to seek state supreme court review in his direct appeal and post-conviction proceedings); cf. Momient-El v. DeTella, 118 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir.1997) (refusing to find waiver of waiver by the State where it presented its procedural default argument for the first time on appeal to this court)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "332 F.3d 1036, 1043", "parenthetical": "\"As a procedural default is not jurisdictional, any argument that [a habeas petitioner] has defaulted his ... claim can be waived by the government.\"", "sentence": "See Gregory-Bey v. Hanks, 332 F.3d 1036, 1043 (7th Cir.2003) (“As a procedural default is not jurisdictional, any argument that [a habeas petitioner] has defaulted his ... claim can be waived by the government.”); Hernandez v. Cowan, 200 F.3d 995, 997 (7th Cir.2000) (finding “waiver of waiver, now a well-established doctrine,” where the State failed to object to a habe-as petitioner’s failure to seek state supreme court review in his direct appeal and post-conviction proceedings); cf. Momient-El v. DeTella, 118 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir.1997) (refusing to find waiver of waiver by the State where it presented its procedural default argument for the first time on appeal to this court)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "118 F.3d 535, 540", "parenthetical": "refusing to find waiver of waiver by the State where it presented its procedural default argument for the first time on appeal to this court", "sentence": "See Gregory-Bey v. Hanks, 332 F.3d 1036, 1043 (7th Cir.2003) (“As a procedural default is not jurisdictional, any argument that [a habeas petitioner] has defaulted his ... claim can be waived by the government.”); Hernandez v. Cowan, 200 F.3d 995, 997 (7th Cir.2000) (finding “waiver of waiver, now a well-established doctrine,” where the State failed to object to a habe-as petitioner’s failure to seek state supreme court review in his direct appeal and post-conviction proceedings); cf. Momient-El v. DeTella, 118 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir.1997) (refusing to find waiver of waiver by the State where it presented its procedural default argument for the first time on appeal to this court)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "200 F.3d 995, 997", "parenthetical": "finding \"waiver of waiver, now a well-established doctrine,\" where the State failed to object to a habe-as petitioner's failure to seek state supreme court review in his direct appeal and post-conviction proceedings", "sentence": "See Gregory-Bey v. Hanks, 332 F.3d 1036, 1043 (7th Cir.2003) (“As a procedural default is not jurisdictional, any argument that [a habeas petitioner] has defaulted his ... claim can be waived by the government.”); Hernandez v. Cowan, 200 F.3d 995, 997 (7th Cir.2000) (finding “waiver of waiver, now a well-established doctrine,” where the State failed to object to a habe-as petitioner’s failure to seek state supreme court review in his direct appeal and post-conviction proceedings); cf. Momient-El v. DeTella, 118 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir.1997) (refusing to find waiver of waiver by the State where it presented its procedural default argument for the first time on appeal to this court)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "821 F.2d 913, 922", "parenthetical": "violation of state law neither gives plaintiff a Section 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity", "sentence": "See, e.g., Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 922 (2d Cir.1987) (violation of state law neither gives plaintiff a Section 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity); see also Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 & n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (an official does not lose qualified immunity if her conduct violated clearly established state law where the conduct did not violate clearly established federally protected rights)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "an official does not lose qualified immunity if her conduct violated clearly established state law where the conduct did not violate clearly established federally protected rights", "sentence": "See, e.g., Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 922 (2d Cir.1987) (violation of state law neither gives plaintiff a Section 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity); see also Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 & n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (an official does not lose qualified immunity if her conduct violated clearly established state law where the conduct did not violate clearly established federally protected rights)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "821 F.2d 913, 922", "parenthetical": "violation of state law neither gives plaintiff a Section 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity", "sentence": "See, e.g., Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 922 (2d Cir.1987) (violation of state law neither gives plaintiff a Section 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity); see also Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 & n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (an official does not lose qualified immunity if her conduct violated clearly established state law where the conduct did not violate clearly established federally protected rights)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "an official does not lose qualified immunity if her conduct violated clearly established state law where the conduct did not violate clearly established federally protected rights", "sentence": "See, e.g., Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 922 (2d Cir.1987) (violation of state law neither gives plaintiff a Section 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity); see also Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 & n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (an official does not lose qualified immunity if her conduct violated clearly established state law where the conduct did not violate clearly established federally protected rights)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "an official does not lose qualified immunity if her conduct violated clearly established state law where the conduct did not violate clearly established federally protected rights", "sentence": "See, e.g., Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 922 (2d Cir.1987) (violation of state law neither gives plaintiff a Section 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity); see also Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 & n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (an official does not lose qualified immunity if her conduct violated clearly established state law where the conduct did not violate clearly established federally protected rights)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "821 F.2d 913, 922", "parenthetical": "violation of state law neither gives plaintiff a Section 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity", "sentence": "See, e.g., Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 922 (2d Cir.1987) (violation of state law neither gives plaintiff a Section 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity); see also Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 & n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (an official does not lose qualified immunity if her conduct violated clearly established state law where the conduct did not violate clearly established federally protected rights)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[Clourts have uniformly upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory control over the state constitutional right to bear arms in order to promote the safety and welfare of its citizens.\"", "sentence": "See Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1044-45 (R.I.2004) (\"Even in jurisdictions that have declared the right to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental constitutional right, a strict scrutiny analysis has ' been rejected in favor of a reasonableness test - 'the proper question is whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of police power.'\" (quoting Cole, 665 N.W.2d at 337)); see also State v. Comeau, 233 Neb. 907, 448 N.W.2d 595, 597 (1989) (\"[Clourts have uniformly upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory control over the state constitutional right to bear arms in order to promote the safety and welfare of its citizens.\"); Bleiler v. Chief, Dover Police Dep't, 155 N,H. 693, 927 A,2d 1216, 1223 (2007) (\"In light of the compelling state interest in protecting the public from the hazards involved with guns, we agree with numerous courts from other jurisdictions that the reasonableness test is the cor- ~ rect test for evaluating a substantive due process challenge to gun control legislation.\") (citation omitted). '" }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "851 A.2d 1031, 1044-45", "parenthetical": "\"Even in jurisdictions that have declared the right to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental constitutional right, a strict scrutiny analysis has ' been rejected in favor of a reasonableness test - 'the proper question is whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of police power.'\" (quoting Cole, 665 N.W.2d at 337", "sentence": "See Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1044-45 (R.I.2004) (\"Even in jurisdictions that have declared the right to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental constitutional right, a strict scrutiny analysis has ' been rejected in favor of a reasonableness test - 'the proper question is whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of police power.'\" (quoting Cole, 665 N.W.2d at 337)); see also State v. Comeau, 233 Neb. 907, 448 N.W.2d 595, 597 (1989) (\"[Clourts have uniformly upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory control over the state constitutional right to bear arms in order to promote the safety and welfare of its citizens.\"); Bleiler v. Chief, Dover Police Dep't, 155 N,H. 693, 927 A,2d 1216, 1223 (2007) (\"In light of the compelling state interest in protecting the public from the hazards involved with guns, we agree with numerous courts from other jurisdictions that the reasonableness test is the cor- ~ rect test for evaluating a substantive due process challenge to gun control legislation.\") (citation omitted). '" }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "448 N.W.2d 595, 597", "parenthetical": "\"[Clourts have uniformly upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory control over the state constitutional right to bear arms in order to promote the safety and welfare of its citizens.\"", "sentence": "See Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1044-45 (R.I.2004) (\"Even in jurisdictions that have declared the right to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental constitutional right, a strict scrutiny analysis has ' been rejected in favor of a reasonableness test - 'the proper question is whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of police power.'\" (quoting Cole, 665 N.W.2d at 337)); see also State v. Comeau, 233 Neb. 907, 448 N.W.2d 595, 597 (1989) (\"[Clourts have uniformly upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory control over the state constitutional right to bear arms in order to promote the safety and welfare of its citizens.\"); Bleiler v. Chief, Dover Police Dep't, 155 N,H. 693, 927 A,2d 1216, 1223 (2007) (\"In light of the compelling state interest in protecting the public from the hazards involved with guns, we agree with numerous courts from other jurisdictions that the reasonableness test is the cor- ~ rect test for evaluating a substantive due process challenge to gun control legislation.\") (citation omitted). '" }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "851 A.2d 1031, 1044-45", "parenthetical": "\"Even in jurisdictions that have declared the right to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental constitutional right, a strict scrutiny analysis has ' been rejected in favor of a reasonableness test - 'the proper question is whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of police power.'\" (quoting Cole, 665 N.W.2d at 337", "sentence": "See Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1044-45 (R.I.2004) (\"Even in jurisdictions that have declared the right to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental constitutional right, a strict scrutiny analysis has ' been rejected in favor of a reasonableness test - 'the proper question is whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of police power.'\" (quoting Cole, 665 N.W.2d at 337)); see also State v. Comeau, 233 Neb. 907, 448 N.W.2d 595, 597 (1989) (\"[Clourts have uniformly upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory control over the state constitutional right to bear arms in order to promote the safety and welfare of its citizens.\"); Bleiler v. Chief, Dover Police Dep't, 155 N,H. 693, 927 A,2d 1216, 1223 (2007) (\"In light of the compelling state interest in protecting the public from the hazards involved with guns, we agree with numerous courts from other jurisdictions that the reasonableness test is the cor- ~ rect test for evaluating a substantive due process challenge to gun control legislation.\") (citation omitted). '" }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[Clourts have uniformly upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory control over the state constitutional right to bear arms in order to promote the safety and welfare of its citizens.\"", "sentence": "See Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1044-45 (R.I.2004) (\"Even in jurisdictions that have declared the right to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental constitutional right, a strict scrutiny analysis has ' been rejected in favor of a reasonableness test - 'the proper question is whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of police power.'\" (quoting Cole, 665 N.W.2d at 337)); see also State v. Comeau, 233 Neb. 907, 448 N.W.2d 595, 597 (1989) (\"[Clourts have uniformly upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory control over the state constitutional right to bear arms in order to promote the safety and welfare of its citizens.\"); Bleiler v. Chief, Dover Police Dep't, 155 N,H. 693, 927 A,2d 1216, 1223 (2007) (\"In light of the compelling state interest in protecting the public from the hazards involved with guns, we agree with numerous courts from other jurisdictions that the reasonableness test is the cor- ~ rect test for evaluating a substantive due process challenge to gun control legislation.\") (citation omitted). '" }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "665 N.W.2d 337, 337", "parenthetical": "\"Even in jurisdictions that have declared the right to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental constitutional right, a strict scrutiny analysis has ' been rejected in favor of a reasonableness test - 'the proper question is whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of police power.'\" (quoting Cole, 665 N.W.2d at 337", "sentence": "See Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1044-45 (R.I.2004) (\"Even in jurisdictions that have declared the right to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental constitutional right, a strict scrutiny analysis has ' been rejected in favor of a reasonableness test - 'the proper question is whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of police power.'\" (quoting Cole, 665 N.W.2d at 337)); see also State v. Comeau, 233 Neb. 907, 448 N.W.2d 595, 597 (1989) (\"[Clourts have uniformly upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory control over the state constitutional right to bear arms in order to promote the safety and welfare of its citizens.\"); Bleiler v. Chief, Dover Police Dep't, 155 N,H. 693, 927 A,2d 1216, 1223 (2007) (\"In light of the compelling state interest in protecting the public from the hazards involved with guns, we agree with numerous courts from other jurisdictions that the reasonableness test is the cor- ~ rect test for evaluating a substantive due process challenge to gun control legislation.\") (citation omitted). '" }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "665 N.W.2d 337, 337", "parenthetical": "\"Even in jurisdictions that have declared the right to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental constitutional right, a strict scrutiny analysis has ' been rejected in favor of a reasonableness test - 'the proper question is whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of police power.'\" (quoting Cole, 665 N.W.2d at 337", "sentence": "See Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1044-45 (R.I.2004) (\"Even in jurisdictions that have declared the right to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental constitutional right, a strict scrutiny analysis has ' been rejected in favor of a reasonableness test - 'the proper question is whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of police power.'\" (quoting Cole, 665 N.W.2d at 337)); see also State v. Comeau, 233 Neb. 907, 448 N.W.2d 595, 597 (1989) (\"[Clourts have uniformly upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory control over the state constitutional right to bear arms in order to promote the safety and welfare of its citizens.\"); Bleiler v. Chief, Dover Police Dep't, 155 N,H. 693, 927 A,2d 1216, 1223 (2007) (\"In light of the compelling state interest in protecting the public from the hazards involved with guns, we agree with numerous courts from other jurisdictions that the reasonableness test is the cor- ~ rect test for evaluating a substantive due process challenge to gun control legislation.\") (citation omitted). '" }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "448 N.W.2d 595, 597", "parenthetical": "\"[Clourts have uniformly upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory control over the state constitutional right to bear arms in order to promote the safety and welfare of its citizens.\"", "sentence": "See Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1044-45 (R.I.2004) (\"Even in jurisdictions that have declared the right to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental constitutional right, a strict scrutiny analysis has ' been rejected in favor of a reasonableness test - 'the proper question is whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of police power.'\" (quoting Cole, 665 N.W.2d at 337)); see also State v. Comeau, 233 Neb. 907, 448 N.W.2d 595, 597 (1989) (\"[Clourts have uniformly upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory control over the state constitutional right to bear arms in order to promote the safety and welfare of its citizens.\"); Bleiler v. Chief, Dover Police Dep't, 155 N,H. 693, 927 A,2d 1216, 1223 (2007) (\"In light of the compelling state interest in protecting the public from the hazards involved with guns, we agree with numerous courts from other jurisdictions that the reasonableness test is the cor- ~ rect test for evaluating a substantive due process challenge to gun control legislation.\") (citation omitted). '" }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing that its \"Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence\"", "sentence": "See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44, 125 S.Ct. 738 (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir.2008) (recognizing only that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 L.Ed.2d 146 (2009)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "543 U.S. 232, 232-44", "parenthetical": "holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to trial by jury", "sentence": "See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44, 125 S.Ct. 738 (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir.2008) (recognizing only that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 L.Ed.2d 146 (2009)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "543 U.S. 232, 232-44", "parenthetical": "holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to trial by jury", "sentence": "See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44, 125 S.Ct. 738 (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir.2008) (recognizing only that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 L.Ed.2d 146 (2009)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66", "parenthetical": "recognizing that its \"Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence\"", "sentence": "See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44, 125 S.Ct. 738 (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir.2008) (recognizing only that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 L.Ed.2d 146 (2009)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing that its \"Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence\"", "sentence": "See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44, 125 S.Ct. 738 (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir.2008) (recognizing only that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 L.Ed.2d 146 (2009)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "543 U.S. 232, 232-44", "parenthetical": "holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to trial by jury", "sentence": "See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44, 125 S.Ct. 738 (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir.2008) (recognizing only that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 L.Ed.2d 146 (2009)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "530 F.3d 300, 312", "parenthetical": "recognizing only that \"the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts\"", "sentence": "See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44, 125 S.Ct. 738 (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir.2008) (recognizing only that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 L.Ed.2d 146 (2009)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "543 U.S. 232, 232-44", "parenthetical": "holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to trial by jury", "sentence": "See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44, 125 S.Ct. 738 (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir.2008) (recognizing only that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 L.Ed.2d 146 (2009)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing only that \"the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts\"", "sentence": "See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44, 125 S.Ct. 738 (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir.2008) (recognizing only that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 L.Ed.2d 146 (2009)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "543 U.S. 232, 232-44", "parenthetical": "holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to trial by jury", "sentence": "See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44, 125 S.Ct. 738 (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir.2008) (recognizing only that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 L.Ed.2d 146 (2009)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "543 U.S. 232, 232-44", "parenthetical": "holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to trial by jury", "sentence": "See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44, 125 S.Ct. 738 (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir.2008) (recognizing only that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 L.Ed.2d 146 (2009)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing only that \"the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts\"", "sentence": "See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44, 125 S.Ct. 738 (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir.2008) (recognizing only that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 L.Ed.2d 146 (2009)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing that its \"Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence\"", "sentence": "See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44, 125 S.Ct. 738 (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir.2008) (recognizing only that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 L.Ed.2d 146 (2009)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to trial by jury", "sentence": "See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44, 125 S.Ct. 738 (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir.2008) (recognizing only that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 L.Ed.2d 146 (2009)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66", "parenthetical": "recognizing that its \"Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence\"", "sentence": "See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44, 125 S.Ct. 738 (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir.2008) (recognizing only that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 L.Ed.2d 146 (2009)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to trial by jury", "sentence": "See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44, 125 S.Ct. 738 (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir.2008) (recognizing only that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 L.Ed.2d 146 (2009)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to trial by jury", "sentence": "See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44, 125 S.Ct. 738 (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir.2008) (recognizing only that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 L.Ed.2d 146 (2009)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing that its \"Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence\"", "sentence": "See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44, 125 S.Ct. 738 (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir.2008) (recognizing only that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 L.Ed.2d 146 (2009)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "530 F.3d 300, 312", "parenthetical": "recognizing only that \"the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts\"", "sentence": "See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44, 125 S.Ct. 738 (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir.2008) (recognizing only that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 L.Ed.2d 146 (2009)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to trial by jury", "sentence": "See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44, 125 S.Ct. 738 (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir.2008) (recognizing only that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 L.Ed.2d 146 (2009)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to trial by jury", "sentence": "See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44, 125 S.Ct. 738 (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir.2008) (recognizing only that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 L.Ed.2d 146 (2009)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing only that \"the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts\"", "sentence": "See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44, 125 S.Ct. 738 (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir.2008) (recognizing only that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 L.Ed.2d 146 (2009)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing only that \"the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts\"", "sentence": "See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44, 125 S.Ct. 738 (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir.2008) (recognizing only that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 L.Ed.2d 146 (2009)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to trial by jury", "sentence": "See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-44, 125 S.Ct. 738 (holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the Guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to trial by jury); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (recognizing that its “Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence”); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 (4th Cir.2008) (recognizing only that “the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 950, 173 L.Ed.2d 146 (2009)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "48 Wn. App. 831, 834", "parenthetical": "the State must establish the defendant's criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence", "sentence": "See State v. Cabrera, 73 Wn. App. 165, 169, 868 P.2d 179 (1994) (holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the Washington classification of an out-of-state conviction, the State must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence); see also State v. Herzog, 48 Wn. App. 831, 834, 740 P.2d 380 (1987) (the State must establish the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence), aff’d, 112 Wn.2d 419, 771 P.2d 739 (1989); RCW 9.94A.110." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "73 Wn. App. 165, 169", "parenthetical": "holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the Washington classification of an out-of-state conviction, the State must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendant's criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence", "sentence": "See State v. Cabrera, 73 Wn. App. 165, 169, 868 P.2d 179 (1994) (holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the Washington classification of an out-of-state conviction, the State must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence); see also State v. Herzog, 48 Wn. App. 831, 834, 740 P.2d 380 (1987) (the State must establish the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence), aff’d, 112 Wn.2d 419, 771 P.2d 739 (1989); RCW 9.94A.110." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "the State must establish the defendant's criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence", "sentence": "See State v. Cabrera, 73 Wn. App. 165, 169, 868 P.2d 179 (1994) (holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the Washington classification of an out-of-state conviction, the State must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence); see also State v. Herzog, 48 Wn. App. 831, 834, 740 P.2d 380 (1987) (the State must establish the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence), aff’d, 112 Wn.2d 419, 771 P.2d 739 (1989); RCW 9.94A.110." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "73 Wn. App. 165, 169", "parenthetical": "holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the Washington classification of an out-of-state conviction, the State must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendant's criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence", "sentence": "See State v. Cabrera, 73 Wn. App. 165, 169, 868 P.2d 179 (1994) (holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the Washington classification of an out-of-state conviction, the State must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence); see also State v. Herzog, 48 Wn. App. 831, 834, 740 P.2d 380 (1987) (the State must establish the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence), aff’d, 112 Wn.2d 419, 771 P.2d 739 (1989); RCW 9.94A.110." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "73 Wn. App. 165, 169", "parenthetical": "holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the Washington classification of an out-of-state conviction, the State must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendant's criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence", "sentence": "See State v. Cabrera, 73 Wn. App. 165, 169, 868 P.2d 179 (1994) (holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the Washington classification of an out-of-state conviction, the State must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence); see also State v. Herzog, 48 Wn. App. 831, 834, 740 P.2d 380 (1987) (the State must establish the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence), aff’d, 112 Wn.2d 419, 771 P.2d 739 (1989); RCW 9.94A.110." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "the State must establish the defendant's criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence", "sentence": "See State v. Cabrera, 73 Wn. App. 165, 169, 868 P.2d 179 (1994) (holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the Washington classification of an out-of-state conviction, the State must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence); see also State v. Herzog, 48 Wn. App. 831, 834, 740 P.2d 380 (1987) (the State must establish the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence), aff’d, 112 Wn.2d 419, 771 P.2d 739 (1989); RCW 9.94A.110." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "73 Wn. App. 165, 169", "parenthetical": "holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the Washington classification of an out-of-state conviction, the State must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendant's criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence", "sentence": "See State v. Cabrera, 73 Wn. App. 165, 169, 868 P.2d 179 (1994) (holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the Washington classification of an out-of-state conviction, the State must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence); see also State v. Herzog, 48 Wn. App. 831, 834, 740 P.2d 380 (1987) (the State must establish the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence), aff’d, 112 Wn.2d 419, 771 P.2d 739 (1989); RCW 9.94A.110." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "the State must establish the defendant's criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence", "sentence": "See State v. Cabrera, 73 Wn. App. 165, 169, 868 P.2d 179 (1994) (holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the Washington classification of an out-of-state conviction, the State must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence); see also State v. Herzog, 48 Wn. App. 831, 834, 740 P.2d 380 (1987) (the State must establish the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence), aff’d, 112 Wn.2d 419, 771 P.2d 739 (1989); RCW 9.94A.110." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the Washington classification of an out-of-state conviction, the State must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendant's criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence", "sentence": "See State v. Cabrera, 73 Wn. App. 165, 169, 868 P.2d 179 (1994) (holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the Washington classification of an out-of-state conviction, the State must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence); see also State v. Herzog, 48 Wn. App. 831, 834, 740 P.2d 380 (1987) (the State must establish the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence), aff’d, 112 Wn.2d 419, 771 P.2d 739 (1989); RCW 9.94A.110." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "48 Wn. App. 831, 834", "parenthetical": "the State must establish the defendant's criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence", "sentence": "See State v. Cabrera, 73 Wn. App. 165, 169, 868 P.2d 179 (1994) (holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the Washington classification of an out-of-state conviction, the State must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence); see also State v. Herzog, 48 Wn. App. 831, 834, 740 P.2d 380 (1987) (the State must establish the defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence), aff’d, 112 Wn.2d 419, 771 P.2d 739 (1989); RCW 9.94A.110." }