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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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presents procedural due process complaints. B. Has appellant preserved error as to his procedural due process complaints? In the argument under his fourth issue, appellant also asserts that the trial court violated his procedural due process rights because it did not conduct a hearing or give any reasons for its decision to impose Amended Conditions 18 and 19. Although appellant complains in part that the trial court did not give him a hearing or a statement of reasons, the record reflects that the trial court did' give appellant a hear x.Crim.App.1980) (explaining that appellant must request findings before failure to make them constitutes reversible error). Appellant also has waived any error to the extent that he complains the tria .W.3d 376, 379 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) . Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s fourth
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that defendant may waive miranda rights
B. holding that juveniles may waive constitutional rights
C. holding in second opinion on rehearing that procedural due process complaints are subject to waiver under ordinary preservationoferror rules
D. holding that party can waive procedural due process rights under ordinary preservationoferror rules
E. holding that an individual can waive any process to which he or she has a right
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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112 F.Supp.2d 681, 687 (N.D.Ohio 2000) (citing Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc., 83 Ohio St.3d 507, 700 N.E.2d 1247 (1998)). In making such a determination, O.R.C. § 2307.75(B) sets forth a number of factors to consider in determining the foreseeable risks associated with the design of a product, and O.R.C. § 2307.75(C) sets forth a number of factors to consider in determining the benefits of a particular design. Here, in support of the design defect claim, Plaintiff alleges that the risks of the reservoir design outweighed its benefits, especially considering the availability of alternative, safer designs. (Doc. 1). The Court finds that such allegations sufficiently assert a defective design claim under O.R.C. § 2307.75. See Boroff v. Alza Carp., 685 F.Supp.2d 704 (N.D.Ohio 2010) . Defendants’ contention that the claim in this
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding the death penalty excessive punishment for the crime of rape
B. holding that the material and moral damages caused by the unlawful death of a human being may affect several persons and in such case each acquires an independent action against the person causing the unlawful death
C. holding that if a trial court has rejected death as a possible sentence double jeopardy bars the state from seeking the death penalty at resentencing even where rejection of the death sentence was based on a legal error
D. holding that if death results requirement under 241was satisfied because death was a foreseeable and natural result of defendants actions
E. holding that allegations that duragesic has been recalled for causing death to users due to an excessive leak of fentanyl a dangerous narcotic medication into the skin and that this sort of leakage caused the death at issue is enough to give rise to a plausible inference that the foreseeable risks associated with duragesics design or formulation outweighed its benefits
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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service. Process Opp’n 19. Fujitsu requests that the Court order service on Defendants’ U.S. counsel pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3). Id. Both D-Link Corp. and ZyXEL Corp. oppose this request. Process Reply 6-7. “[Sjervice of process under Rule 4(f)(3) is neither a last resort’ nor extraordinary relief.’ It is merely one means among several which enables service of process on an international defendant.” Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir.2002) (internal citation omitted). “‘Under Rule 4(f)(3), federal courts have discretionary authority to direct service by other means not prohibited by international agreements.’ ” Nuance Commc’ns, 626 F.3d at 1239 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3)); see also Rio Properties, 284 F.3d at 1016 . Furthermore, “The choice between dismissal
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the decision whether to apply the exhaustion requirement in an erisa case is committed to the district courts sound discretion but that the district court abused its discretion by not dismissing the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
B. holding the task of determining when the particularities and necessities of a given case require alternate service of process under rule 4f3 is committed to the sound discretion of the district court
C. holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the court
D. holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the district court
E. holding that whether dismissal or transfer is appropriate lies within the sound discretion of the district court
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(“courts presume that ‘or’ is used in a statute disjunctively unless there is a clear legislative intent to the contrary”); see also American Heritage Dictionary Of The English Language 873 (4th ed.2000) (defining “or” as “[ujsed to indicate ... [a]n alternative ...” (emphasis added)); Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 817 (10th ed.1996) (defining “or” as “a function word [used] to indicate an alternative ” (emphasis added)); VII Oxford English Dictionary 166 (1933) (defining “or” as “[a] particle co-ordinating two (or more) words, phrases, or clauses, between which there is an alternative ” (emphasis added)). Congress plainly framed § 1002(21)(A)(i) in the alternative, and it further bifurcated the subsection with the parallel inclusion of the verb “exerc 15, 1421 (9th Cir.1997) . While it is not necessary to our holding, we
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that one who is named in documents as plan administrator signs documents as plan administrator and assumes discretionary authority in the administration of the pension plan is a fiduciary
B. holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty where he alleged that the plan offered funds that charged higher fees than available alternatives that underperformed during the relevant time period and that were included in the plan because of improper influence by the plans trustee
C. recognizing that benefit plans must designate a fiduciary to serve as the plan administrator
D. holding a plan administrator is a fiduciary under the disposition clause where it wrongfully disbursed the plans funds
E. holding that even if a thirdparty administrator is not a fiduciary under erisa such an administrator still has standing pursuant to 1331
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Ind. Admin. Code 1-4.” 405 Ind. Admin. Code l-l-3(a). Those provisions offer the Providers a right to request an administrative hearing on the denial before an administrative law judge (ALJ). 470 Ind. Admin. Code 1-4-3 to 1-4-5. Subsequently, they may seek an agency review of the ALJ’s decision. 470 Ind. Admin. Code 1-4-6. Finally, if still dissatisfied, the Providers may seek judicial review. 470 Ind. Admin. Code 1-4-7. Tellingly, the Providers have not challenged the adequacy of these appellate remedies, nor even acknowledged FSSA’s argument that these remedies exist. Easter House, 910 F.2d at 1405 (assuming that the state’s offered remedies were adequate because the parties gave little attention to the issue); Kauth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Ill., 852 F.2d 951, 955-56 (7th Cir.1988) . Further, there is no evidence that the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a plaintiff could not proceed on her procedural due process claim brought under 1983 because she did not show that she had exhausted her state law remedies or alleged that those remedies were inadequate
B. holding that the plaintiff has not raised a colorable claim that he was denied procedural due process because he did not allege that the available state remedies are constitutionally inadequate
C. holding that the state courts determination that the petitioner could not show prejudice because he did not allege that the witness was available to testify was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case
D. holding that we could not review an aliens colorable due process claim that an ij was not impartial because the alien raised the claim for the first time on appeal
E. holding that the defendant was denied due process because the procedural rule was not followed in any respect by the trial court
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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infants. Id. 5 . There was no such pending allegation at the time of the incident. See Def's. Mot. to Dismiss or Summary Judgment, 5. 6 . Although not styled as a Motion for Spoliation Sanctions, the Court interprets Strand’s allegations of spoliation in her Response in Opposition (ECF No. 52) as such. 7 . Initially, Strand also asserted that the Government breached its duties by failing to hire enough personnel to adequately supervise the pool field trip and failing to properly train its counselors. While it seems that Strand may have abandoned both of these theories, even if she has not, they are barred by the discretionary function exception. Staffing decisions are indisputably discretionary functions. See S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 467 U.S. at 820, 104 S.Ct. 2755 . With regard to the first step of
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a government agency seeking to enforce a prior order regarding prepetition acts of a debt or is not bound by a confirmed plan a if such agency fails to participate in the confirmation of such plan b if the obligations that such agency seeks to impose upon such debtor do not constitute claims c notwithstanding that such plan purports to treat such debtors obligations to such agency and d since it thus is not a named entity within 1141a
B. holding that the mustbill policy is a reasonable implementation of the reimbursement system and consistent with the governing statute and regulations
C. holding that agency is bound by its regulations
D. holding that section 1252a2bii barred jurisdiction of decisions specified by statute as discretionary but did not bar decisions specified by regulation as discretionary
E. holding that faa implementation of safety regulations was discretionary because in part such decisions required the agency to establish priorities for the accomplishment of its policy objectives by balancing the objectives sought against such practical considerations as staffing and funding
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(9th Cir.2004) (affirming district court’s ruling that arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable even when plaintiffs contended that they never received or saw a copy of the incorporated arbitration agreement because the arbitration agreement was easily available to the plaintiffs). According to Mr. Calderon, it is standard policy and procedure for employees of the Costa Rican Hertz licensee to give the folder jacket to the customer at the time a vehicle is rented. Calderon Declaration, ECF No. 31 at 2, ¶ 6. Thus, even if Mr. Martin did not receive it, it appears that the folder jacket was easily available to him, and he does not declare facts to suggest otherwise. Courts have enforced incorporated arbitration agreements in similar situations. See Koffler, 2011 WL 1086035, at *4 ; Wolschlager, 111 Cal.App.4th at 789-91, 4
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added
B. holding that trial court properly denied motion to compel arbitration of claims for fraud and unfair and deceptive trade practices because arbitration clause in agreement only applied to indemnification claims and there were no other arbitration clauses in agreement
C. holding under california law that a set of general terms and conditions that included an arbitration agreement and that were not provided to plaintiff but were available upon request were properly incorporated by reference into a purchase agreement
D. holding that limitation of liability provisions in arbitration agreement included in nursing homes admissions documents violated public policy and were not severable because they constituted financial heart of arbitration agreement
E. holding that an arbitration agreement is separable from the underlying agreement
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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CAÍ has presented evidence that Mr. Long and HughGM used the stolen proprietary information to steal significantly-valued contracts with Boeing, Microsoft, and other “Fortune 100 clients”. If proven, the injury to CAI in Indiana is unquestionably substantial. Moreover, Mr. Long’s contacts with CAI in Indiana, as CAI’s employee, is precisely what made his alleged scheme of fraud possible. Accordingly, Mr. Long must be held to have purposefully directed his tortious activities at Indiana. (Filing No, 56 at 25-26.) Thus, the Court affords CAI’s choice of its home forum considerable deference. In addition, when considering the convenience of the parties, courts also consider the parties’ abilities to bear the expense of trial in a particular forum. Dee Eng’g, Inc., 2003 WL 1089515, at *2-3 ; Bussell, 939 F.Supp. at 651. In this case,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the larger of the two parties was in a better position to bear the cost of litigating outside of its home forum
B. holding that phone and facsimile communications to the forum purchase orders and payments sent to the forum a choice of law clause within the contract regarding the forum state and delivery of the product within the forum state were not enough to satisfy minimum contacts
C. recognizing that where plaintiff is from the forum state and defendant is from an alternate forum each forum can claim a connection to one of the parties
D. holding that the question is not whether the party opposing abstention can demonstrate that the federal forum is a better or more convenient forum but whether the inconvenience of the federal forum is so great that this factor points towards abstention
E. holding that it is a violation of the fourth amendment for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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we know of no basis for crafting a theory of estoppel based upon sworn statements in a tax return and will not explore such a theory sua sponte. 3 . The Court stated: It may hardly be disputed that each of the strikers resisted the captain and other officers in the free and lawful exercise of their authority and command, within the meaning of § 293, or that they combined and conspired to that end, within the meaning of § 292. Deliberately and persistently they defied direct commands to perform their duties in making ready for the departure from port. Id. at 40. 4 . Backpay awards for violations of the Act would appear to be the type of non-tort recovery that is taxable. See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 337, 115 S.Ct. 2159, 132 L.Ed.2d 294 (1995) 5 . We acknowledge that, as we discuss below,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that racial discrimination is a personal injury tort
B. holding that settlement for backpay in age discrimination case was not excludable from taxpayers reported gross income because recovery for back wages does not satisfy the critical requirement of the irs tax code of being on account of any personal injury nor is it based upon tort or tort type rights
C. holding that racial discrimination is not a personal injury tort
D. holding that age discrimination is not a personal injury tort
E. holding that the united states court of federal claims does not have jurisdiction to enter declaratory judgment that taxpayers were not liable for any type of federal income tax or to issue injunction permanently removing the tax liens on property and levies on wages
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the Fifth Circuit in Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n. 2 (5th Cir.1957) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26, 78 S.Ct. 563, 2 L.Ed.2d 579 (1958)). However, “[cjertain possible consequences of a guilty plea are ‘collateral’ rather than direct and need not be explained to the defendant in order to ensure that the plea is voluntary.” United States v. U.S. Currency in the Amount of $228,536.00, 895 F.2d 908, 915 (2d Cir. 1990) (listing examples of collateral consequences, such as parole revocation, the likelihood of an unfavorable military discharge, and the potential for civil commitment proceedings). Thus, district courts need not inform a defendant of collateral consequences during the plea colloquy. See United States v. Salerno, 66 F.3d 544, 550-51 (2d Cir.1995) . The requirements of Rule 11 are consistent
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the court had no duty to warn defendants about the possibility of deportation as a collateral consequence of conviction
B. holding that enhancement of sentence after violation of probation was collateral rather than direct consequence of plea
C. holding that the sanction of deportation is a collateral not direct consequence of a guilty plea
D. holding that an enhancement in a future sentence based on the present conviction is a collateral consequence and need not be advised of by the district court in its plea colloquy
E. holding that a signed plea form without a colloquy to establish that defendant read and understood the contents of the form was insufficient to conclusively refute defendants claim that he was not advised regarding the sentence to be imposed
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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want to do anything that would distort the financials of General Reinsurance.”). Regardless of whether the final structure of the deal took shape in mid-November 2000, this evidence provides an adequate basis for a rational jury to conclude that the conspiracy to artificially inflate AIG’s loss reserves and deceive the company’s investors started with Greenberg’s call to Ferguson on October 31, 2000. Lastly, Ferguson argues that the government presented insufficient evidence that a secret side agreement ensured that the LPT was a no-risk deal, and that Ferguson knew of it and agreed to it as part of the overall deal. This argument, however, is also unavailing, in light of the evidence at trial supporting both inferences. See United States v. Jones, 393 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir.2004) . The government presented sufficient evidence
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges
B. holding that once a defendant becomes associated with a conspiracy he is responsible for all of the acts of the conspiracy even those which occurred before or after his association with the conspiracy
C. holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman
D. holding that circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a cocaine conspiracy conviction
E. holding that evidence tending to show knowing participation in the conspiracy is sufficient to sustain conspiracy conviction
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to avoid creating a protected liberty interest: "Good conduct time is a privilege and not a right.” Tex. Govt.Code § 498.003. On the other hand, the causa] relationship between a disciplinary infraction and loss of goodtime credits appears to make Texas law indistinguishable from the law at issue in Wolff. See Tex. Govt.Code § 498.004 ("If ... the inmate commits an offense or violates a rule of the division, the department may forfeit all or any part of the inmate’s accrued good conduct time.”). The Fifth Circuit has addressed the issue from a variety of angles, but no case directly addresses the issue of whether Texas prisoners have a constitutional interest in their accrued good-time credits under current Texas law. See Hallmark v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 1073, 1079-1080 (5th Cir.1997) ; Allison v. Kyle, 66 F.3d 71, 74 (5th
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that depriving inmates of statecreated right to goodtime credits in prison disciplinary proceedings requires due process
B. holding that texas parole statutes do not create a protected liberty interest under an older statutory scheme
C. holding that inmates serving life terms were not entitled to goodtime credits because state statute expressly foreclosed the granting of goodtime credits to such inmates
D. holding that there is no protected liberty interest in the restoration of goodtime credits forfeited for disciplinary infractions under an older statutory scheme
E. holding that a prisoner cannot be deprived of a protected liberty interest in goodtime credits without procedural due process
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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134 S.Ct. 2175, 2183, 189 L.Ed.2d 62 (2014) (distinguishing between statutes of limitations, which are subject to equitable tolling, and statutes of repose, which are not). In determining whether a time period set by federal law is a statute of limitations, the Court considers the “functional characteristics” of the statute, that is, whether the time period at issue serves the policies of a statute of limitations. Lozano, 134 S.Ct. at 1234-35 & n.6. A statute of limitations is generally “[a] law that bars claims after a specified period; specifically, a statute establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was discovered).” Black’s Law Dictionary 1636 (10th ed. 2014); see also CTS Corp., 134 S.Ct. at 2182 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1546 (9th ed.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale
B. holding that a plaintiffs 1983 claim accrued on the date of the alleged illegal search and seizure
C. holding that the payments accrued
D. holding that a statute of limitations creates a time limit fpr suing in a civil case based on the date when the claim accrued
E. holding that the plaintiffs cause of action accrued on the date of the repealer statute not on the date the wrong occurred despite the federal courts ruling as to the statutes unconstitutionality
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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requirements to discuss the relevant socioeconomic impacts of the RBTI. In addition, the Fifth Circuit has long held that the “[djetermination of economic benefits and costs that are tangential to environmental consequences are within th[e] wide area of agency discretion.” S. La. Envtl. Council, Inc. v. Sand, 629 F.2d 1005, 1011 (5th Cir.1980). NEPA requires, at most, “a narrowly focused, indirect review of the economic assumptions underlying a federal project described in an impact statement.” Id. See also Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 974-75 (5th Cir.1983) (finding that an agency need only consider “important” information relevant to a “significant” effect not based on “unreasonable speculation”); Town of Norfolk v. United States EPA, 761 F.Supp. 867, 887-88 (D.Mass.1991) ; Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Marsh, 655 F.2d
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that contract language referring to amount of loss authorized appraiser only to place dollar value on loss and not to determine cause of damage or other coverage issues
B. holding the aggregate value of the land and its improvements is the controlling value
C. holding that there was no evidence of market value where owners testimony affirmatively showed that it was based on personal value
D. holding determination of property value in case to decide if assessed value was excessive is not a liquidated demand where only evidence of property value was the conclusory allegation of value in plaintiffs unsworn petition
E. holding that the failure to place a dollar value on a possible decrease in property value was not unreasonable
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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duties of the Financial Aid Office. He too was not an at-will employee. Wallace State’s reasons for placing Hammons on administrative leave with full pay through her contract term and failure to renew her employment contract extended beyond issues in the Financial Aid Office, and neither Allen nor Bowie were responsible for, or in any way involved in, those other problems. Simply put, neither of these proposed comparators was “similarly situated in all relevant respects” or “nearly identical” to Hammons. See Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1091. Accordingly, the district court did not err by finding Hammons failed to meet the fourth prong of her prima facie disparate-treatment claim. IV. We likewise affirm the district court’s entry of summary 1 (S.D.Ala.1997), aff’d 140 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir.1998) . Hammons wrote the letter of grievance to the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that twentyfour days between protected activity and termination is sufficient to infer existence of causal connection
B. holding that more than a year between the protected activity and the discharge is not close enough to support the causal connection requirement
C. holding that there must be a causal connection between the advertising activity and the injury alleged in the underlying complaint
D. holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection
E. holding that a 7month time period between the protected activity and the adverse employment action is too indirect to satisfy the causal connection requirement
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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was not appropriately incorporated by reference into the '889 patent for this point and even if it had been, that Dickinson effectively teaches away from claim 13 because in deactivating those genes responsible for expressing the pathway, isobutanol production was “virtually abolished.” Id. Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the foregoing, Butamax has identified sufficient evidence that at least creates a genuine dispute of material fact. Gevo makes much of the fact that Dickinson, though cited in the '889 patent, was not cited in connection with the deactivation of this pathway and was not incorporated by reference into the patent. Nonetheless, Dickinson’s teachings still reflect what was known in the art. See Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed.Cir.2006) . Dickinson does show that persons of ordinary
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that where accessible literature sources clearly provided a description of the teachings at issue the written description requirement does not require their incorporation by reference
B. holding that words which expressly refer to adequate legal description provide nucleus of description that is legally sufficient for statute of frauds
C. holding finding of reliability not clearly erroneous despite lack of prior description
D. holding that description was sufficiently detailed
E. holding that a written description analysis occurs as of the filing date sought
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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public against the commission of other offenses during the term, and which have as their objective the deterrence of future misconduct” (citation omitted)); Baca, 90 N.M. at 281-82, 562 P.2d at 842^13 (“The broad general purposes to be served by probation are education and rehabilitation.”). {37} Our probation-related search cases are consistent with the federal law allowing warrantless searches as developed in Knights and Griffin. See Marquart, 1997-NMCA-090, ¶ 19, 123 N.M. 809, 945 P.2d 1027 (“Our ruling, however, does not prevent a court from imposing as a condition of probation that the probationer give his or her consent to reasonable warrantless searches by a probation officer to ensure compliance with the conditions of probation.”); Gallagher, 100 N.M. at 699, 675 P.2d at 431 ; Gardner, 95 N.M. at 174, 619 P.2d at 850
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that probationer failed to satisfy two of the three prongs of the donaldson test for determining if a probation condition was reasonably related to the probationers rehabilitation and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing random urinalysis as a condition of probation
B. holding that probationer failed to satisfy the donaldson test for determining if a probation condition is not reasonably related to the probationers rehabilitation and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing random urinalysis as a condition of probation
C. holding that a probationers challenge to a condition of his probation was moot in light of the supreme courts reversal of the underlying conviction and the probationers apparent completion of probation
D. holding unanimously that a warrantless search of a probationers apartment that was supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized as a condition of his probation was reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment
E. holding a warrantless probation search condition that is reasonably related to a probationers rehabilitation is a valid limitation to a defendants fourth amendment rights
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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that “evidence showing a murder ‘to have been deliberate, premeditated and wilful could be so clear and uncontroverted that a trial court could properly refuse to instruct on the lesser included offenses.’ ” Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 409, 384 S.E.2d 757, 769 (1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1063 (1990) (quoting Painter v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 360, 366, 171 S.E.2d 166, 171 (1969)). The evidence in the present case does not support the defendant’s proffered instructions. An instruction on first degree murder was not warranted because the video tape clearly established that Burnett was shot in the chest during the commission of armed robbery at the convenience store. See Bennett v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 448, 470, 374 S.E.2d 303, 317 (1988), cert, denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989) . Thus, the sole issue was whether the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that indictment for murder in the first degree charges murder by whatever means it may have been committed regardless of the theory of murder presented to the grand jury
B. holding first degree murder instruction not warranted because defendant adduced no evidence that victim was not murdered during commission of robbery
C. holding that a conviction of first degree felony murder based on the predicate felony of robbery does not establish the pecuniary gain aggravator set forth in 13703f5 with respect to the murder
D. holding that the crime of attempted first degree felony murder does not exist
E. holding that a robbery defendant was not entitled to a compulsion instruction in the absence of a claim that he or the victim was the target of a specific threat forcing the defendant to participate in the robbery
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(3) the purpose of applying the Eptam was to control weeds; (4) Dillman made an inspection of the field in question; (5) the Cobbs “relied on the expertise of... Dillman... to determine if the Eptam would or would not, in fact, control the visible weeds in said field”; (6) “it is part of... Dillman’s duty ... to make an inspection of the type of weeds and to determine what pesticide would be effec tive on them and to so advise the customer”; and (7) “[t]hat, without the consent or knowledge of [the Cobbs], [Sure Crop] applied Treflan EC to [the Cobbs’] land in question .. . Pursuant to § 2-315, implied warranties are imposed upon goods when and only when they become the subject of a contract for their sale. See, e.g., Hahn v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 625 F.2d 1095 (3d Cir. 1980) ; Dunham-Bush, Inc. v. Thermo-Air Service,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding denial of jury trial was harmless because evidence was insufficient to create issue of fact for submission to jury and insurer would have been entitled to directed verdict
B. holding trial court erred in denying defendants motion for arrest of judgment where indictment was insufficient
C. holding that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions that offered alternative theories of murder
D. holding trial court erred when it permitted jury to consider ucc impliedwarranty theories where evidence was insufficient to prove defective product at issue was sold
E. holding that to prevail on strict liability claim for a defective product plaintiff must show the product was defective when it left the defendants possession and control
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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that entire colleges should be designated as voter registration agencies. Rather, it said that disability services offices in colleges were “offices” under the Act. These smaller offices had to be designated as voter registration agencies, according to NCSD, because they were offering “programs primarily engaged in providing services” to disabled students. Second, it argued that the ADA requires colleges to provide convenient and accessible voter registration sites for disabled students. Third, NCSD went beyond its complaint and argued that the ADA requires Virginia to provide braille and large print voter registration applications for persons who are visually impaired., This third argument was apparently based on Lightbourn v. El Paso, 904 F.Supp. 1429, 1433-34 (W.D.Tex.1995) , a decision that was reversed .on appeal to
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the right to vote is fundamental
B. holding that texas secretary of state had duty to make sure local election authorities complied with ada in providing accommodations to allow visually impaired persons to vote in secret
C. holding that state may not compel political parties to allow nonmembers to vote in primary elections
D. holding that state may not compel political party to allow nonmembers to vote in its primary elections
E. holding that state and local government agencies were not persons under the fca
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that the Second District may have considered rule 3.170(g)(2)(A) jurisdictional. Rule 3.170(g)(2)(A) specifically states: (2) Unless otherwise stated at the time the plea is entered: (A) The state may move to vacate a pleá and sentence within 60 days of the defendant’s noncompliance with the specific terms of a plea agreement. The Fifth District held that rule 3.170(g)(2)(A) is not jurisdictional because it permits the time for filing to be altered. A jurisdictional rule cannot be altered by the court or by agreement of the parties. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 630 So.2d 179, 181 (Fla.1994) (“We acknowledge that the parties cannot stipulate to jurisdiction over the subject matter where none exists.... ”); Harrell v. State, 721 So.2d 1185, 1187 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) . Because this particular provision allows the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that lack of appellate jurisdiction is fundamental error
B. holding that a lack of jurisdiction is a category one claim that cannot be waived or forfeited
C. holding that lack of consent may be established by adequate circumstantial evidence
D. holding that lack of justiciable interest resulted in lack of standing to pursue claim and that lack of standing deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to act
E. holding that lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by consent
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1 . State v. Jones, Order No. 00903020716, 2009 WL 3338100 (Del.Super.Sept. 11, 2009). 2 . Williams v. State, 962 A.2d 210, 214 (Del.2008) (citing Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1284 (Del.2008)). 3 . Id. 4 . Id. 5 . 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991). 6 . Id. at 625-26, 111 S.Ct. 1547. 7 . Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 869 (Del.1999). See also Loper v. State, 8 A.3d 1169, 1173-74 (Del.2010); Moore v. State, 997 A.2d 656, 663-64 (Del.2010); Williams, 962 A.2d at 215-16; Lopez-Vazquez, 956 A.2d at 1286 n. 6; Ross v. State, 925 A.2d 489, 493-94 (Del.2007); Harris v. State, 806 A.2d 119, 124 (Del.2002); Flonnory v. State, 805 A.2d 854, 858 (Del.2001); Woody v. State, 765 A.2d 1257, 1264 (Del.2001). 8 . Williams, 962 A.2d at 215-16. See also Ross, 925 A.2d at 494 . 9 . Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101, 125
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the presence of uniformed police officers following a walking pedestrian and requesting to speak with him without doing anything more does not constitute a seizure
B. holding that without evidence of a warrant to explain the officers presence the jury would have been left scratching its collective head about what the police were doing at the defendants girlfriends apartment in the first place
C. holding that allowing suspect to speak with his wife in the presence of a police officer was not interrogation as it did not fall into any of these categories
D. holding that police procedures set forth in the transportation article requiring officers to detain and investigate drunk drivers did not provide injured pedestrian with a civil cause of action absent police assuming a special relationship
E. holding the use of deadly force standing alone does not constitute a seizure and absent an actual physical restraint or physical seizure the alleged unreasonableness of the officers conduct cannot serve as a basis for a 1983 cause of action
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to the “Special Investigations Unit” and HUB Enterprises, Inc., another company with whom Defendant had strong financial ties, to conduct an investigation. While the Court recognizes that “there is nothing procedurally improper about the úse of surveillance,” an IME or FCE would have yielded to a more complete assessment of Plaintiffs capacity and limitations. See Salomaa, 642 F.3d at 676 (“An insurance company may choose to avoid an independent medical examination because of the risk that the physicians it employs may conclude that the claimant is entitled to benefits.”) Here, the fact that a video surveillance was conducted in lieu of an IME raises legitimate questions concerning the thoroughness of the investigation. Calvert v. Firstar Fin., Inc., 409 F.3d 286, 295 (6th Cir. 2005) . In -view of Defendant’s conflict of interest,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that language approved by the court may raise questions if incorporated in a jury instruction in a case with different facts
B. holding that the failure to conduct a physical examination may in some cases raise questions about the thoroughness and accuracy of the benefits determination
C. holding that the failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waives the issue
D. holding that vindictive prosecution claims in civil forfeiture proceeding may raise due process questions
E. recognizing that a federal court may not review a challenge to a benefits determination of the office of workers compensation programs in the department of labor
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claim as "too creative for the law as it stands”); United States v. Redcorn, 528 F.3d 727, 745-46 (10th Cir.2008) (rejecting as-applied Sixth Amendment challenge). 9 . Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-50, 128 S.Ct. 586. The district court need not, however, issue a "robotic incantation[ ] that each statutory factor has been considered.” Key, 599 F.3d at 474 (quoting United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir.2006)). 10 . See United States v. Campos-Maldonado, 531 F.3d 337, 339 (5th Cir.2008) (per curiam) ("[The district court’s] individualized assess- men! 'necessarily means that [it] is free to conclude that the applicable [guidelines range gives too much or too little weight to one or more factors, either as applied in a particular case or as a matter of policy.’ ” (quotin h Cir.2007) . 17 . See Gutierrez, 359 Fed.Appx. at 541
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the trial court did not err in using the particularized factual circumstances of the case namely the victims age as an aggravating factor
B. holding that the offense of sexual battery requires the state prove the victims lack of consent regardless of the victims age and charge the jury on the same
C. recognizing that the state is entitled to prove all of the relevant ci t argues that the trial court erred by admitting the victims hearsay statements through the testimony of her children and of melvin gaither and through the admission of exhibit sixtyone the victims application for an order of protectiona hearsay statement is defined as a statement other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted tenn r evid 801c as a general rule a hearsay statement is not admissible unless it falls within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule tenn r evid 802 the following standards define our review of the trial courts rulings on the admissibility of hearsayinitially the trial court must determine whether the statement is hearsay if the statement is hearsay then the trial court must next determine whether the hearsay statement fits within one of the exceptions to answer these questions the trial court may need to receive evidence and hear testimony when the trial court makes factual findings and credibility determinations in the course of ruling on an evidentiary motion these factual and credibility findings are binding on a reviewing court unless the evidence in the record preponderates against them once the trial court has made its factual findings the next questionswhether the facts prove that the statement 1 was hearsay and 2 fits under one of the exceptions to the hearsay ruleare questions of law subject to de novo reviewif a statement is hearsay but does not fit one of the exceptions it is inadmissible and the court must exclude the statement but if a hearsay statement does fit under one of the exceptions the trial court may not use the hearsay rule to suppress the statement however the statement may otherwise run afoul of another rule of evidence if a trial court excludes otherwise admissible hearsay on the basis of rule 401 402 or 403 this determination is reviewed for abuse of discretionkendrick v state 454 sw3d 450 47980 tenn 2015 citations omitted see also state v howard 504 sw3d 260 27576 tenn 2016 we now apply these principles to evaluate each of the defendants challenges to the trial courts evidentiary rulings1 admission of the testimony of the childrenthe trial court permitted each of the children to testify about hearing the victim tell the defendant that she was going to call the police concluding that this testimony was nonhearsay offered to show the effect the victims statements had on the defendant not the truth of the victims statements that she planned to call the police the court of criminal appeals affirmed the trial courts decision hawkins 2015 wl 5169157 at 18 and we do as wellthe childrens testimony regarding the victims threats to call the police was offered to establish the effect the victims statements had on the defendant and to establish the defendant murdered her because he believed she planned to call the police this testimony was not offered to establish the truth of the victims threats as a result the childrens testimony about the victims statements was properly admitted as nonhearsay see state v venable 606 sw2d 298 301 tenn crim app 1980 clearly the statement was probative not as proof of the matter asserted therein but because of its effect on the hearer in this case the defendant supplying evidence of his motive in returning to the service station later in the day armed and threatening to kill the declarant see generally neil p cohen et al tennessee law of evidence 8017 6th ed 2011 hereinafter tennessee law of evidence discussing nonhearsay declarations offered to prove the effect on the listener2 testimony of melvin gaitherthe trial court also allowed melvin gaither to testify about the victims statements to him concerning her fear of the defendant the trial court ruled that the victims statements were hearsayoffered for the truth of the matter asserted thereinbut admissible pursuant to the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule tenn r evid 8033 the court of criminal appeals affirmed hawkins 2015 wl 5169157 at 19 and we agree that this evidence was properly admittedthe state of mind exception authorizes the admission of a hearsay statementof the declarants then existing state of mind emotion sensation or physical conditions such as intent plan motive design mental feeling pain and bodily health but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution revocation identification or terms of declarants willtenn r evid 8033 here the defendant initially told the police that the victim left home in anger following an argument with him later the defendant admitted the victim had been murdered but claimed that kt had murdered her after kt and the victim argued the defendant maintained that he had not participated in the murder at all and had only assisted kt in covering up the crime and dismembering and disposing of the victims body the defendant never recanted his statement implicating kt and denying his own involvement in the victims murder the defendants statements placed at issue the victims mental state at the time of her murder the state was entitled to establish that the victim feared the defendant not kt at the time of her murder see smith 868 sw2d at 573 ruling that the victims hearsay statements expressing fear of the defendant were admissible under the state of mind exception and relevant to reveal the falsehood of the defendants statement to the police indicating that he and his wife the victim were reconciling state v trusty 326 sw3d 582 603 tenn crim app 2010 given the proof of the onagain offagain nature of the victims relationship with the defendant we conclude that the statements she made shortly before her death about her fear of the defendant were relevant and admissible under the state of mind exception to show not only her state of mind at thetime she uttered the statements but also her probable mental state and behavior at the time of her death the trial court did not err by admitting mr gaithers testimony about the victims statements pursuant to the state of mind hearsay exception3 application for order of protectionthe defendant next challenges the trial courts admission of the victims january 15 2008 application for an order or protection the application was admitted as exhibit sixtyone through the testimony of deborah coffman a counselor and records keeper for citizens dispute a shelby county government agency that assists persons in completing the application process for orders of protection the victims application included the following statementsthe defendant had the impression that he would be moving with me and my three children when he realized he was not moving he became violent pulling my hair and hit me on my right cheek jaw with his fist he was telling my twelve year old daughter to lock herself in the bathroom and to tell the police that i pulled her hair abused her he was not arrested for his violencehe wants my twelve year old daughter to be around him often sleep with him and she has changed telling lies and disrespectful i hope he hasnt molested her he says no and she says no but both have lied so im just trying to protect me and the childreni dont want him around me or my children i dont trust himthe application also included the victims statement that the defendant had told her she was wrong for taking kt from him and that he could get the victim without even having to touch her because he could get somebody else to get the victimthe trial court admitted the application pursuant to the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule explainingand im finding just so well all understand their relationship had deteriorated to such a point the victim and the defendant that at this point i think the recordthat the state has shown by a preponderance of the evidence from this hearing that the reason for the killing the motive for the killing would be to stop her from prosecuting him for things against her and her child because shes here talking about harassing phone calls and things like that so i think tennessee rule of evidence 8046 is going to apply to this case to that extentthe court of criminal appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling hawkins 2015 wl 5169157 at 19 we also affirm the trial courts rulingthe forfeiture by wrongdoing exception authorizes the admission of a hearsay statement against a party that has engaged in wrongdoing that was intended to and did procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness tenn r evid 804b6 before admitting a hearsay statement under this exception the trial court must conduct a juryout hearing and determine that a preponderance of the evidence establishes 1
D. holding that the degree of a departure based on conduct described as a specific offense characteristic in inapplicable guidelines was reasonable when the departure amounted to an increase in offense level no greater than that provided in the inapplicable guidelines
E. holding that the departure from the guidelines was procedurally reasonable where based on 1 the vulnerability of elderly victims to fraud and 2 the likelihood that the victims modest means and advanced age produced greater psychological trauma without suggesting that an explanation of the weight of each factor was required
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interest in distributing information and stimulating debate on scientific issues allegedly resulting from the AEC's refusal to assess the environmental effects of its liquid metal breeder reactor program sufficed for NEPA standing purposes. See 481 F.2d at 1087 n. 29. This dicta in SIPI has subsequently been cited to support recognition of similar informational injuries arising from an agency’s failure to prepare an EIS. See, e.g., National Wildlife Federation, 839 F.2d at 712 (involving individual plaintiffs, not organizations). Nevertheless, a right to specific information under NEPA has so far been recognized for standing purposes only when the information sought relates to environmental inierests that NEPA was intended to protect. See National Wildlife Federation, 839 F.2d at 712 (citing SIPI); Sierra Club v. Andrus, 581 F.2d
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that beneficiaries of an estate lacked standing under rico to sue for an injury derivative of the estates injury
B. holding that elimination of a future expected benefit that has not yet accrued does not constitute an erisa violation
C. holding that an antitrust injury is an injury that is attributable to an anticompetitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny
D. holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible
E. holding that for affiants voicing environmental concerns the elimination of an opportunity to see and use an eis does constitute a constitutionally sufficient injury
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(noting the general rule that a final judgment from a lower court carries res judicata effect even though it is still subject to review by an appellate court). As to the other district court orders that Mr. Leo purports to appeal, he does little more than reprise the unfounded theme that Garmin’s lawyer is a fraud artist who fabricated evidence (an argument we rejected in Leo, 431 Fed.Appx. at 705) and question the impartiality and abilities of the district court judge who ruled against him. Ad hominem attacks on counsel and the district court do not count as legal argument, and Mr. Leo’s scant references to any legal issues fall short of his obligation to adequately frame and develop his arguments. See Exum v. United States Olympic Comm., 389 F.3d 1130, 1133-34 n. 4 (10th Cir.2004) ; see also Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux &
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding defendant failed to preserve burden of proof issue for appeal
B. recognizing that conclusory statements do not preserve an issue for appeal
C. holding that scattered statements in the appellants briefs are not enough to preserve an issue for appeal
D. holding appellants confrontation issue unpreserved for appeal
E. holding that statements in motions and briefs are not evidence to be considered in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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upon the independent justification. Contrary to the majority’s position, there is no body of law under article I, section 7 directing that any pretextual motive on the part of the officer invalidates a traffic stop based upon probable cause that a traffic infraction has been committed. Turning first, however, to other flaws in the majority opinion, the majority misstates the issue before the court, claiming that the State asks this court to approve the use of pretext to justify a warrantless seizure. Majority at 352. The State without question has not asked this court to do any such thing. The State briefed this case under the Fourth Amendment and particularly relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996) . The State did not ask for a holding that
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a traffic stop is reasonable under the fourth amendment when police have probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred
B. holding that the courts determination of whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest is an independent and objective determination and an officers own subjective reason for the arrest is irrelevant
C. holding that an officer may order a passenger out of a vehicle during a stop for a traffic infraction
D. holding that under the fourth amendment the motive of the officer when stopping a vehicle for a minor traffic infraction whether subjective or objective is completely irrelevant
E. holding that motive of officers is generally irrelevant to fourth amendment analysis
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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“‘An issue raised for the first time on appeal is not subject to appellate review because it has not been properly preserved and presented.’ ” Id. at 794 (citing Pate v. State, 601 So.2d 210, 213 (Ala.Crim.App.1992)). “[T]o preserve an issue for appellate review, it must be presented to the trial court by a timely and specific motion setting out the specific grounds in support thereof.” McKinney v. State, 654 So.2d 95, 99 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (citation omitted). Snow’s challenges to defects in the circuit court’s consideration of the presumptive sentencing standards are waivable and were, in fact, waived when Snow failed to object to those defects in the circuit court and thereby preserve his arguments for review on appeal. Compare Clark v. State, 166 So.3d 147 (Ala.Crim.App.2014) ; Hyde v. State, 185 So.3d 501
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding circuit courts decision to depart from the presumptive sentencing recommendation and impose a prison sentence was reversible error where defendant objected on the basis that the state failed to give notice of aggravating factors that would justify a dispositional departure from the presumptive sentencing recommendation and the trial court failed to state on the record a reason for its departure
B. recognizing that sentencing facts are based on the evidence and testimony presented at sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard
C. holding presumptive sentencing standards applied retroactively where defendant objected at sentencing hearing on the basis that the presumptive sentencing standards applied to his case
D. recognizing the limited appellate review of sentences imposed under the initial voluntary sentencing standards
E. holding that at resentencing the state must present evidence on an enhanced sentencing factor despite having done so at the prior sentencing hearing
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wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). In this case, plaintiff claims that prison officials filed misconduct charges against him to retaliate for filing a lawsuit forcing the DOC to recognize the NOI as a religious group as well as filing grievances alleging violations of his First Amendment free exercise rights. Because both filing a lawsuit and filing grievances are protected activities, see Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 161 (3d Cir.1997) (finding that the filing of a lawsuit is protected activity); Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir.2000) ; Rivera v. Chesney, 1998 WL 639255, *1
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding no first amendment right to file frivolous grievances
B. recognizing that prisoners undoubtedly exercise first amendment petition right when filing grievances and stating that prison officials may not retaliate against prisoners for filing grievances
C. recognizing first amendment petition right where inmate alleged retaliation for filing grievances
D. holding that an inmate has a first amendment right to file grievances against prison officials
E. holding that summary judgment was improper where genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether prison officials prevented inmate from filing grievances
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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903 n. 6 (8th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 1106, 47 L.Ed.2d 314 (1976); Henderson v. United States, 425 F.2d 134, 138 n. 4 (5th Cir.1970), we have no occasion to engage the rule of lenity. 7 . Appellant’s claim that his self-professed indi-gency affects the validity of the special assessment is not properly before us and we express no opinion on it. Absent an indication "that the government has attempted or will attempt to collect the special assessment while [the defendant] lacks the ability to pay,” United States v. Rivera-Velez, 839 F.2d 8, 8 (1st Cir.1988) (per curiam) — and there is no such indication in this record — appellant's challenge is prematurely posed. See id.; accord Pagan, 785 F.2d at 381; cf. United States v. Levy, 897 F.2d 596, 598 (1st Cir.1990)
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding to like effect with respect to a standcommitted fine
B. holding to the same effect
C. holding to like effect regarding laboratory equipment for the production of methamphetamine
D. holding to that effect with respect to rule 64
E. holding the same with respect to an apartment
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before commencement of the trial. [15] The omnibus date in this case was ultimately set for November 6, 2013. Thus, under the statute, Zamani was required to file his notice of an insanity defense by October 17, 2013. The court held a final pretrial hearing on April 16, 2014, at which it heard argument on the State’s motion in limine, and at the hearing Zamani’s counsel verbally indicated that Zamani stated that he believes he is insane. [16] As Zamani attempted a late filing of the required notice, the trial court had discretion whether to accept it. See Ankney v. State, 825 N.E.2d 965, 970 (Ind.Ct. App.2005) (“Ankney attempted a late filing of the required notice, and, thus, the trial court had discretion whether to accept it.”) (citing Eveler v. State, 524 N.E.2d 9, 11 (Ind.1988) ), trans. denied. [17] The State’s motion in
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that after the omnibus date the trial courts discretion controlled and such discretion is exercisable upon a showing of good cause by a defendant who has missed the deadline
B. holding that such a decision was within the trial courts discretion
C. recognizing that in the 1993 amendments to the rules courts have been accorded the discretion to enlarge the 120day period even in the absence of showing good cause
D. holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion
E. holding that rulings on admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion
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in part; dismissed in part by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: In these consolidated appeals, the parties appeal from the district court’s order affirming in part and reversing in part the bankruptcy courts’ orders finding that a portion of GMAC’s claims in the underlying bankruptcy proceedings are unsecured. In light of our decision in In re Price, 562 F.3d 618 (4th Cir.2009) . Because the parties have settled the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding debtors negative equity in a tradein vehicle included in amount financed created a purchase money obligation within the meaning of 11 usc 1325a 2006 we summarily affirm the portion of the district courts order at issue in no 081850
B. holding bifurcation and cramdown are unavailable because negative equity is part of purchase money security interest
C. holding that 1325a is mandatory and that the general powers of the court codified in 11 usc 105a do not permit a court to confirm a plan that does not satisfy 1325a
D. holding that there was no presumption of a gift where the wifes money was used to make the purchase but title was placed in the name of the husband and finding the facts sufficient to establish a purchase money resulting trust in favor of the wife
E. holding bifurcation and cramdown are available because purchase money security interest does not include negative equity
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necessary — for Congress to stipulate time frames in which amnesty-like provisions, such as the exception for family-smugglers, apply. See generally Mathews, 426 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478. It is also not wholly irrational for Congress to distinguish between aliens based on their family connection to legalized United States residents, in furtherance of a general amnesty scheme. B. International Law Claims Mr. Ayala-Caballero also asserts that, in making its determination the BIA failed sufficiently to consider the best interest of his citizen children. Citing a district court case for support, Ayala-Caballero asserts that this failure contravenes customary international law principles as incorporated in federal law. See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F.Supp.2d 584 (E.D.N.Y.2002) . This court’s recent decision in
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that federal common law is the law that would govern in the absence of the warsaw convention
B. holding that article 3 of the united nations convention on the rights of the child has attained the status of customary international law and is therefore incorporated in federal law
C. holding that the rights and duties of the united states on commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal law and that in the absence of an applicable act of congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards
D. holding that atca establishes cause of action for violations of international law but requiring the district court to perform a traditional choiceoflaw analysis to determine whether international law law of forum state or law of state where events occurred should provide substantive law in such an action
E. holding that trial court did not err in basing decision on local customary law rather than common law
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asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by state law. Nor has it mattered whether the States have acted through laws of broad general application rather than laws specifically directed towards the governance of industrial relations. Regardless of the mode adopted, to allow the States to control conduct which is the subject of national regulation would create potential frustration of national purposes. However, it is clear that preemption under Garmon is not “complete.” Every court to address the issue directly has reached this conclusion. See Lontz v. Tharp, 413 F.3d 435, 442-43 (4th Cir.2005) (“[Sjections 7 and 8 do not work to completely preempt the kind of state law claims that plaintiffs are pressing.”); Felix v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 387 F.3d 1146, 1165-66 (10th Cir.2004) ; Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that garmon preemption provides no basis for removal jurisdiction in federal court and observing that the lower courts are uniform in finding that garmon preemption under the nlra does not completely preempt state laws so as to provide removal jurisdiction
B. holding that gannon preemption does not constitute complete preemption for removal purposes because 7 and 8 of the nlra do not create jurisdiction in the federal district courts instead those provisions vest jurisdiction in the nlrb to determine unfair labor practices and state courts are as able to determine if jurisdiction belongs in the nlrb as are the federal district courts
C. holding that a private party may bring an action in a federal district court seeking injunctive relief on the basis of garmon preemption for only arguably protected or prohibited activity
D. holding removal and preemption are distinct concepts erisa preemption does not allow removal unless complete preemption exists
E. holding that garmon preemption is inapplicable in eases involving the americans with disabilities act
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States, 250 U.S. 273, 279, 39 S.Ct. 468, 470, 63 L.Ed. 979 (1919)), we note that in this unusual circumstance we need not find a violation of section 441b before addressing the separation of powers claim. The Supreme Court in similar situations — when plaintiffs challenged the constitutional composition or character of a tribunal — determined the constitutional status issue without reaching the merits. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 859, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 3261, 92 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986) (upholding constitutionality of CFTC’s authority to adjudicate common law counterclaims without passing on the merits of the counterclaim); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 56, 87, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 2864, 2880, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982) . Appellants claim that the composition of the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims whatsoever under the federal criminal code
B. recognizing that the claim at issue was one under state common law between two private parties the experts in the federal system at resolving common law counterclaims are the article iii courts
C. holding that a federal court may adjudicate claims for which there is no independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction if the nonjurisdictional claims are related to other claims for which the does have jurisdiction
D. holding that the bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to adjudicate common law claims violated article iii without deciding the claims
E. holding that article 2 of the ucc preempts common law claims
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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because there is no substantial question presented by these appeals, we grant Wipro’s motions to summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. Gupta’s motions for summary action are denied, as is his motion to strike Wipro’s motion for summary action in C.A. No. 15-3194. * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 1 . Gupta initially filed the complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, which, upon Wipro’s motion (which was joined by the Secretary of Labor), transferred the matter to the District of New Jersey. To the extent that Gupta seeks review of that transfer order, we lack jurisdiction. See Posnanski v. Gibney, 421 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir.2005) . 2 . Furthermore, the ARB properly concluded
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding the order is only reviewable if actually considered by the district court
B. holding the order of the circuit court did not involve the merits of the action and was therefore interlocutory and not reviewable by the supreme court for lack of finality
C. holding that when the district court improperly purported to transfer to the circuit court an action over which the circuit court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment which was void and dismissing the appeal from that void judgment
D. holding that a transfer order issued by a district court in another circuit is reviewable only in the circuit of the transferor district court
E. holding that because the circuit court did not have subjectmatter jurisdiction over the unlawfuldetainer action the district courts unauthorized transfer of the action could not transfer jurisdiction over that action to the circuit court
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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property area does not have business or pedestrian activity after 6:00 p.m. M.C. was also seen walking along the complex’s back alley while looking up at the roof for any surveillance equipment. Further, Officer Quintero saw M.C. hide behind a dumpster after he approached in his marked police K-9 vehicle and then begin to quickly walk away from Officer Quintero when he got out of the vehicle. M.C.’s actions, as observed by Officer Quintero, plus any rational inferences to be drawn from them, establish that M.C. was acting in an unusual way at the time and place the police officer encountered him, suggesting a breach of the peace was imminent. Thus, M.C.’s actions were “aberrant and suspicious criminal conduct” that law-abiding individuals do not engage in. See B.J., 951 So.2d at 103 ; G.G., 903 So.2d at 1033 (holding the first
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding the first element was proven because defendant was hiding at 130 am in the back of a pickup truck near a closed business that was the subject of a burglary call
B. holding that when defendant was guilty of burglary but the only evidence that he was armed was from his own statement existence of the firearm went only to the degree of the offense and was not as an element of proof
C. holding that defendant was still in the commission of a burglary despite its technical completion when she caused the death of three persons during a police chase that began at the scene of the burglary
D. holding that the defendant was not prejudiced by the jurys exposure to the dictionary definition of burglary because the definition referenced theft which was not an element the prosecution was required to prove
E. holding second element is met where defendant was hiding under circumstances suggesting that the police interrupted a burglary in progress and where there was a potential threat to public safety if defendant joined a crime in progress or participated in the aftermath by assisting the escape or disposing of property stolen in the burglary
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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& Son (an unincorporated division of Federal) is party to the agreements at issue in this case, the parties entered into a tolling agreement, in December 2005, dismissing without prejudice all claims against them. 4 . Captives typically buy reinsurance as a risk-spreading mechanism. See In re Petition of the Bd. of Dirs. of Hopewell Int’l Ins., Ltd., 272 B.R. 396, 400 & n. 1 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2002). Here, FFG purchased reinsurance from (or, in proper parlance, ceded it to) Federal on the Policy. Under this particular type of reinsurance (known as quota-share reinsurance), Federal agreed to cover 30% of FFG’s losses under the Policy in exchange for the same percentage of Fleet's premium. 5 . RSI's principal place of business is not entirely cl 145 Ariz. 1, 699 P.2d 376, 386 (Ct.App.1984) . 7 . The opinion does not specify whether the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an administrator that billed and collected premiums paid and adjudicated claims and shared in the insurers profits was involved in a joint venture with the insurer and therefore suscep tibie to claims of bad faith
B. holding that the employer created an erisa plan when it 1 paid for the employees insurance 2 contracted with the insurance company for coverage and eligibility requirements and 3 collected and remitted the employees dependents premiums
C. recognizing that an employer had a dual role as administrator of plan and as employer and only the role of administrator was held to a fiduciary standard
D. holding that an administrator was involved in a joint venture with the insurer and thereby exposed to bad faith liability based on evidence that the administrator collected premiums handled claims and took a commission on the premiums collected and a percentage of the renewal commissions
E. holding that an administrator who receives premiums and pays beneficiaries from its owli assets has an apparent conflict of interest
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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section 725.9 only preempted the city from enacting an ordinance regulating the dissemination of obscene materials to minors. Id. After looking at the legislative history of section 725.9, we determined section 725.9 was not limited to the dissemination of obscene materials to minors and instead restricted governmental subdivisions from enacting any local ordinances regulating conduct covered in chapter 725, now chapter 728. Id. at 374. The United States Supreme Court had come to the same conclusion when reviewing a conviction from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa for a violation of a federal statute prohibiting the mailing of obscene materials. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 293-95, 97 S.Ct. 1756, 1760-61, 52 L.Ed.2d 324, 331-32 (1977) . Accordingly, in Chelsea Theater, we held the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding section 72811s predecessor section 7259 preempted all local regulation of obscene materials and was not restricted in application to the dissemination of obscene materials to minors
B. holding that freestanding predecessor of section 7112 applies to all elements of claim remanded by the court or board
C. recognizing that application of section 507a7 should be coincidental with application of section 523a5 because of identical language in the two statutes
D. holding that fedrcivp 26b3 does not require absolute protection for opinion work product and noting that these materials may be discovered and admitted when mental impressions are at issue in the case and the need for the materials is compelling
E. holding that the plaintiff a former halliburton employee was bound to arbitrate disputes in compliance with the program in spite of his contention that he never received the program materials by mail because halliburton provided uncontroverted evidence that copies of the program materials were sent to the plaintiff in a properly addressed packet and receipt of the materials was therefore presumed
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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written judgment controlled over oral pronouncement of sentence). This is particularly true when the written order is included in the appellate record and. no issue is raised as to its accuracy. Ablon, 537 S.W.2d at 267. Oral cumulation orders entered pursuant to article 42.08 are void unless they are reflected in the written judgment. Dutton v. State, 836 S.W.2d 221, 228-29 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.); Tex. Code Crim. PROC. Ann. art. 42.08 (Vernon Supp.1997). Thus, the written order in this case controls. Appellant directs this court to the portion of the reporter’s record at which the trial court orally pronounced the sentences would run consecutively. However, the written judgment provides as follows: IT IS ORDERED by the -Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd) . In any event, even if appellant had preserved
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding cruel and unusual punishment complaint not preserved
B. holding prison officials ultimately violated the plaintiffs right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment
C. holding the constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment may be waived
D. holding that a cruel and unusual punishment claim is not jurisdictional and therefore may not be raised for the first time on appeal
E. holding that what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is a question of law
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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conflation of state procedural requirements and the 48-hour period during which a probable cause determination should be made for warrantless arrests, with the entirely independent substantive due process right to an initial appearance. Moreover, even assuming the City maintained a policy that resulted in individuals not being afforded initial appearances in a manner compliant with the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, plaintiff concedes that all new detainees who were not released on bond would be brought to Municipal Court, held on most Thursdays. All reported cases finding liability for violation of the substantive due process right to which plaintiff points have involved significantly longer periods of detention without an initial appearance. E.g., Hayes, 388 F.3d at 674-75 ; Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 577-79 (fifty-seven
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that continued detention violated due process where a moratorium on removals to haiti in the aftermath of an earthquake rendered the petitioners detention indefinite
B. holding thirtyeight day preappearance detention violated due process
C. holding that juvenile pretrial detention implicates due process rights
D. holding that detention of approximately eight months violated due process
E. holding thirty day detention beyond the expiration of a sentence constitutes a deprivation of due process
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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that the sales-tax exemption in § 40-23-4(a)(ll) facially discriminated against interstate commerce, and was thus “‘“virtually per se invalid,” ’ ” and that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to “the Department’s justification for any discriminatory treatment in assessing sales taxes.” Hoover, Inc. v. State Dep’t of Revenue, 833 So.2d at 35, 36 (quoting Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796 (1996)). The supreme court specifically stated that the Department had “completely ignore[d]” the United States Supreme Court cases relied on by Hoover for the proposition that the tax-exemption statute discriminated against interstate commerce and had, instead, relied on State v. Leary & Owens Equipment Co., 54 Ala.App. 49, 304 So.2d 604 (Civ.1974) , for its contention that taxing out-of-state
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that defendants conduct amounted to substantial and nonisolated activity within florida for purposes of general jurisdiction where its advertising strategy was designed to generate product sales in florida and its dollar volume of sales was substantial
B. holding that alabama could tax the sales of repair parts to county governments in florida when the transactions were conducted entirely within alabama
C. holding that the essential purpose of use tax is the recoupment of lost sales tax revenue
D. holding property lien for nonpayment of sales tax was beyond boroughs authority to collect sales tax
E. holding that exercising general jurisdiction over defendant was improper where its actual sales in florida were a small percentage of the total sales and therefore these sales were de minimis
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to pursue legal action.” The last letter preceded this statement with the declaration that “it is our intent to close our files and inform our client that you have refused to cooperate.” Id. at *2. The letter went on to describe possible consequences of litigation and suggested that the client obtain legal assistance. Id. The court held, however, that the letters’ references to legal action were not threats to pursue it; the letters merely communicated that litigation was one possible course of action. “Far from threatening legal action, the statement ... indicates that legal action is an option available to the creditor, who may indeed choose to take advantage of it.” Id. at *7; see Knowles v. Credit Bureau of Rochester, No. 91-CV-14S, 1992 WL 131107, at **1-2 (W.D.N.Y. May 28, 1992) . After reviewing the applicable precedent,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the statement failure to pay will leave our client with no choice but to consider legal action did not violate 1692e5 by threatening legal action because at most the language threatened that the creditor will have to consider legal action and therefore no action of any kind is threatened by defendant collection agency
B. holding the second element asks whether the action is one from which legal consequences will flow
C. holding that to establish tort liability in a negligence action there must be a legal duty on the part of the defendant to plaintiff
D. holding fda seizure action did not constitute final agency action
E. holding that when the administrative procedure is not empowered to achieve the end sought in the legal action the procedure is unavailable because it cannot accomplish the purpose of the legal action
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Vakilian v. Shaw, 335 F.3d 509, 518 (6th Cir.2003) (citing United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-29, 103 S.Ct. 3352, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983)). The acts that allegedly “deprived the plaintiff of equal protection must be the result of class-based discrimination.” Id. (citing Newell v. Brown, 981 F.2d 880, 886 (6th Cir.1992)). A plaintiff fails to state an adequate claim if his allegations are premised upon mere conclusions and opinions. Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir.1987). A plaintiff must make sufficient factual allegations to link two alleged conspirators in the conspiracy and to establish the requisite “meeting of the minds” essential to the existence of the conspiracy. McDowell v. Jones, 990 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir.1993) . Coker has failed to properly allege a
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983
B. holding that a plaintiff failed to state a claim for a breach of a joint venture agreement where it failed to allege responsibility for losses
C. holding that plaintiff failed to state a claim for conspiracy pursuant to 1985 for failure to allege a meeting of the minds
D. holding that plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to allege affirmative misconduct on the part of the government
E. holding that the plaintiff failed to allege breach of a valid and enforceable contract but stated a claim for promissory estoppel
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(quoting Smith, 461 U.S. at 55 n. 21, 103 S.Ct. 1625). Finally, Mendez clearly rejects ASARCO’s argument that $9 in punitive damages should be the constitutional limit on an award of $1 in nominal damages, instead recognizing that a higher ratio may be warranted by the need to deter future misconduct. See id. (noting that the district court held that such a small award would not be “sufficient to deter other [defendants] from engaging in similar conduct in the future,” and agreeing that the second Gore guidepost may have reduced relevance in § 1983 suits involving only nominal damages, and expressly rejecting the defendants’ contention that $18 in punitive damages was the constitutional maximum on the award of $1 in nominal damages on two claims); and compare Murray, 55 F.3d at 1453 ; Bains, 405 F.3d at 775 (post-BMW case
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that deterrence relates to reprehensibility in that the conduct must be so reprehensible as to warrant imposition of punitive damages as a further sanction to achieve punishment and deterrence
B. holding prebmw that deterrence is relevant to the determination of constitutionally permissible punitive damages
C. holding a court may not award punitive damages
D. holding that punitive damages are not fines
E. holding without discussion of the punitive damages issue that judgment for embezzlement which included actual and punitive damages was nondischargeable
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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decision included an unfavorable opinion in the form of the opinion of the Medical Doctor on the November 1983 Board panel.” R. at 8. The Board explained that “[t]he November 1983 Board panel was free to use its own medical judgment in deciding the claim, and whether the articulation of its reasons or bases for applying that judgment may not meet present standards, it is not a basis for a CUE finding in the November 1983 Board decision.” R. at 9. Although the Secretary now argues that the Board correctly found that the November 1983 Board decision “constituted a medical opinion” that weighed against the appellant’s claim, Secretary’s Br. at 10, the Court does not agree. The Court has held in other contexts that VA decisions are not evidence. See Wages v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 233, 239 . “Evidence” is “[s]omething (including
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the determination of whether a counterclaim is compulsory is made as a matter of law
B. recognizing that the determination is an equitable one
C. holding that the director of compensations determination as to whether an extraschedular rating was warranted is not evidence
D. holding that the courts determination of whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest is an independent and objective determination and an officers own subjective reason for the arrest is irrelevant
E. holding that the determination of whether an individual is an independent contractor lies in the common law and not under an express provision of the act
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(1) bear the obligation “to manage and supervise the process by which signatures for the initiative petition are obtained”; (2) “control the arguments in favor of an initiative measure,” including by serving as gatekeeper for all ballot arguments, providing arguments afforded priority status on the ballot, controlling all rebuttal ballot arguments, and retaining the ability to withdraw ballot arguments at any time; and (3) are allowed to intervene, both before and after the initiative is passed, in litigation affecting the initiated statute, and to appeal state court rulings adverse to the initiative’s validity. Perry v. Brown, 52 Cal.4th 1116, 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 499, 265 P.3d 1002, 1017-18 (2011). But see Hollingsworth v. Perry, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 2662, 186 L.Ed.2d 768 (2013) . In addition to having special duties beyond
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the authority of the official proponent to intervene in court proceedings pertaining to an initiative is insufficient without more to create article iii standing
B. holding that article iii standing is not a prerequisite to intervention
C. holding that official proponents of californias proposition 8 lacked article iii standing in federal court
D. holding that because article iii standing is jurisdictional it must be decided before other legal issues
E. holding that article iii standing is necessary for intervention
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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a. Blackwell Has Alleged a Disability Within the Meaning of the ADA Blackwell must first allege that he has a “disability” within the meaning of the ADA. Swanks, 179 F.3d at 934. The ADA defines a disability as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of [an] individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). “The operation of a major bodily function, including ... circulatory ... functions,” is a “major life activity.” Id. § 12102(2)(B). And according to EEOC regulations, the term “substantially limits” is to be “construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(B)-(E) (generally defining a broad scope for the term “substantially limits”); Green v. American Univ., 647 F.Supp.2d 21, 29 (D.D.C.2009) ; Johnson v. District of Columbia, 572
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that breathing is a major life activity within the contemplation of the ada
B. recognizing sleeping as major life activity
C. holding plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome who could not perform heavy lifting failed to meet burden of establishing substantial limitation in major life activity of work
D. holding that an individual with a condition similar to irritable bowel syndrome pleaded a disability because the functioning of the bowels is a major life activity
E. holding that reproduction is not a major life activity
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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[Adv. Doc. No. 87-1, p. 4-5J. 14 . Meter’s billing entries include: (1) .2 hours on April 7, 2010 for “[cjonference with H. Ray III regarding telephone conference and review of pleadings”; (2) 1.8 hours on April 7, 2010 for the following tasks: "[rjeview and analyze motion to dismiss; review and analyze petition”; (3) 1.2 hours on April 12, 2010 for “[cjonference with I. Wang regarding conference call to discuss complaint and motion to dismiss; conference with H. Ray III, C. Limpus and I. Wang to discuss status of case and hearing on Wednesday.” [Adv. Doc. No. 87-2, p. 3-4], 15 . See also Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717 ("The time of two or three lawyers in a courtroom or conference when one would do may obviously be discounted.”); In re Leonard Jed Co., 118 B.R. 339, 347 (Bankr.D.Md.1990) ; In re Chicago Lutheran Hosp. Ass’n, 89 B.R.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that under north carolina law a sheriff is an agent of the office of the sheriff and an officialcapacity suit against him is a suit against that office
B. recognizing that a prosecutors office is an entity and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office must be attributed to the office as a whole
C. holding that excessive use of office conferences and unnecessary duplication of effort will re suit in reduction of fees when they are unreasonable
D. holding that punishments are cruel when they involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain
E. holding that unsupported allegations by the secretary that time expended was excessive are insufficient to justify a reduction
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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cases suggest that the ADA is inapplicable to arrests because an arrest is not the type of service, program, or activity from which a disabled person could be excluded or otherwise denied a benefit. See Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir.1997) (‘We agree with the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that although ‘incarceration itself is hardly a ‘program’ or ‘activity’ to which a disabled person might wish access, ... there is no doubt that an educational program is a program, and when it is provided by and in a state prison it is a program of a public entity.)’ ” (citing Crawford v. Indiana Dept. of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir.1997)), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937, 118 S.Ct. 2340, 141 L.Ed.2d 711 (1998); Rosen v. Montgomery County Maryland, 121 F.3d 154, 157 (4th Cir.1997) ; Rylee v. Chapman, 2008 WL 3538559, slip
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding in a case involving a deaf person arrested for drunk driving that calling a drunk driving arrest a program or activity of the county the essential eligibility requirements of which in this case are weaving in traffic and being intoxicated strikes us as a stretch of the statutory language and of the underlying legislative intent
B. holding that misdemeanor drunk driving by its very nature involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injuiy to another
C. holding that police officers who instructed an intoxicated and unlicensed teenager who was a passenger in a vehicle operated by his intoxicated relative to drive the vehicle home rather than go through the effort of preparing arrest paperwork for the two intoxicated subjects were immune from liability for damages resulting from deaths of two innocent motorists and injuries to another cause by the drunk driving relative
D. holding that statute prohibiting driving while intoxicated applied to defendant driving on a private parking lot
E. holding that samples of breath taken from a breathalyzer test were only potentially useful to a criminal defendant convicted of drunk driving
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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The Second Amended Complaint also includes a cause of action for copyright infringement. Prior to trial that claim was voluntarily dismissed. 4 .The parties are in agreement that the common law claims are governed by New York law, as Defendants Belliard and Fell’s employment took place in New York, as did all of the events at issue in the case. 5 . Courts in this jurisdiction, typically in the context of settlement agreements or licensing agreements, have recognized that such agreements not to challenge the validity or enforceability of intellectual property "necessarily involve the public interest and have enforced such agreements only to the extent that enforcement does not result in a public injury.” Idaho Potato Comm’n v. M & M Produce Farm & Sales, 335 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir.2003) (discussing cases following Lear, Inc. v.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding defendants were precluded from challenging the validity of jury verdict forms for failure to have complained at trial
B. holding that the continued use of licensed trademark after termination of franchise agreement constituted trademark infringement and breach of contract
C. holding that the defendants reference to the plaintiffs trademark in the metatags of the defendants web page was a violation of trademark law
D. holding that licensee was not a registrant exclusive licensee or assignee of trademark but still had standing to assert false designation claim under 15 usc 1125a
E. holding that licensee was not estopped from challenging the validity of a trademark
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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in a couple of scrapes, but had been fine in general and not a big trouble-maker. Defense counsel wanted the sheriff to testify because he was so well liked that ‘if he could say anything nice about Nathan, it couldn’t hurt anything.’ Specifically, defense counsel thought that Colbert could ‘humanize’ Slaton and they ‘felt like [if] the jury believed that the sheriff thought he was an OK kind of guy even though he was a prisoner, the jury — that some of that might be transferred to the jury.’ “From the nature of this testimony and the remarks of counsel during the Rule 32 hearing, it is clear that defense counsel knew how Sheriff Colbert would testify and that they wanted to call him to the stand for a valid, strategic purpose. See Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir.1995). Specifically, defense counsel wanted
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that federal courts must accept the decision of the states highest court even if it is an erroneous one
B. holding that the decision to pursue an all or nothing strategy was not patently unreasonable and accordingly that counsel was not ineffective in his strategic decision not to request a jury charge as to the lesserincluded offense
C. holding that this courts review is limited to the bia decision and the portions of the ijs decision that it expressly adopted
D. holding that evidence contrary to an administrators decision does not make the decision arbitrary and capricious so long as a reasonable basis appears for the decision
E. holding that the decision of which witness to call is the epitome of a strategic decision and it is one that we will seldom if ever second guess
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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any state cause of action for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization. 390 U.S. 557, 88 S.Ct. 1235, 20 L.Ed.2d 126. Then, twenty years later, in Metropolitan Life, the Court extended the complete preemption principle to ERISA. 481 U.S. 58, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55. The Court concluded that Section 502 of ERISA possessed “that extraordinary pre-emptive power” because “the language of the jurisdiction subsection of ERISA’s civil enforcement pro visions closely parallelled] that of § 301 of the LMRA.” Id. at 65, 107 S.Ct. at 1547, 95 L.Ed.2d at 64. The Court has declined to extend the complete pre-emption doctrine beyond the LMRA and ERISA. See, e.g., Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court of Del., 366 U.S. 656, 81 S.Ct. 1303, 6 L.Ed.2d 584 (1961) . The complete pre-emption doctrine ' does not
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the court of claims did not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs first amendment claim of improper removal
B. holding that the natural gas act did not completely preempt state law claims within its scope and thus the federal court did not have removal jurisdiction over the contract price dispute filed in state court
C. holding that although the ngpa authorizes certain price ceilings for natural gas it is the gas sales contract not federal law that creates the right to receive any price at all
D. holding that fehba does not completely preempt state law
E. holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Tex. 278, 317 S.W.2d 916, 921-22 (1958), in which the supreme court held that the plaintiffs overt act in seeking out a juror and asking her to “do all you can to help me” was sufficient to demonstrate probable harm. The McCaslin court noted that “[a] juror’s disavowal of influence derived from misconduct is not a proper inquiry.” Id. at 920. Instead, the court explained, the presence or absence of injury “must be drawn from overt acts such as conversations and physical actions, i.e., what was said and done.” Id. The Losiers argue that the jurors undoubtedly knew the paralegal, Monica Lee, worked for the defendants’ attorneys because she was introduced in voir dire, and therefore the juror, Robert Mulvey, was aware of her relationship to the defendants. Cf. Mercado, 106 S.W.3d at 397 . The Losiers further contend that because the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that there could be no conscious or subconscious influence from shadow jurors contact with juror when juror was unaware of shadow jurors affiliation with a party
B. holding that trial courts denial of motion for new trial based on juror misconduct was justified where there was no evidence presented at hearing on motion that juror had knowingly concealed relevant litigation experience during voir dire and identity of juror as county court litigant was not demonstrated
C. holding that when a defendant alleges that an unauthorized contact with a juror has tainted a trial a hearing must be held
D. holding statute stating that judge could excuse jurors was violated when jury commissioners excused jurors
E. holding that rule 606b precludes a party seeking a new trial from using one jurors affidavit of what another juror said in deliberations to demonstrate the other jurors dishonesty during voir dire
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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common law of arbitration would apply to disputes arising between them. The arbitration provision at issue in this case is an “all issues” arbitration provision of the type disfavored by the Georgia common law of arbitration. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Wilbanks, 162 Ga.App. 154, 290 S.E.2d 122 (1982). Such a clause would be enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act but not under Georgia common law. Id. At the time Booth and Hume executed their employment agreement, the Georgia courts took the position that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted the state’s substantive arbitration law, at least where state law would render the arbitration agreement void. See, e.g., West Point-Pepperell v. Multi-line Indus., 231 Ga. 329, 330-31, 201 S.E.2d 452, 453-54 (1973) . Therefore, when Hume and Booth agreed that
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that wjhere such a transaction involves commerce within the meaning of the federal arbitration statute the state law and policy with respect thereto must yield to the paramount federal law
B. holding the meaning of commerce element in a different federal statute the hobbs act to be a question of law
C. holding that in diversity cases federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law
D. holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court
E. holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Court before the first appeal. In that note, the IRS stated that the return of the ADR dividends to IES’s income for tax years 1991 and 1992, should IES be entitled to its claimed capital-loss carrybacks, was not an issue on summary judgment. That was true. It would be a distortion of the IRS’s position to read that one sentence in a footnote in its summary judgment memorandum to constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of its right to raise the defenses of offset and equitable recoupment at some point later in the litigation, when the dividend income might become an issue. The government did raise the defenses, by seeking to amend its answer, when those defenses became an issue in the case after it lost on appeal. Cf. Buder v. United States, 7 F.3d 1382, 1386 (8th Cir.1993) . The other proof of waiver to which IES points
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that arguments not raised before the trial court are waived
B. holding that failure to plead affirmative defense to original complaint does not amount to waiver where defense is raised in response to amended complaint
C. holding that offset defense was waived when it was not raised until ten days before the trial date and the government never pleaded or amended its complaint to include the setoff defense
D. holding that the government did not waive an affirmative defense not pleaded in the answer because it raised the defense at a pragmatically sufficient time by listing the defense in the joint pretrial order
E. holding that the defense of insufficient process was waived because it was not raised by the defendant in its answer but later in its response to the plaintiffs request for default judgment
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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affidavit was properly stricken, the relevant facts for analyzing summary judgment are the un-controverted ones in Defendants’ motion. Thom further contends that the. district court erred in granting Officers .McGary and Bryant qualified immunity from his § 1983 claim. We review a grant of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity de novo. Curtis v. Anthony, 710 F.3d 587, 593 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). “A public official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff demonstrates that (1) the defendant violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights and (2) the defendant’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the violation. uent arrest of Thorn. See Resendiz v. Miller, 203 F.3d 902, 903 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) . Based on the totality of the circumstances
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a warrantless arrest on probable cause does not violate the fourth amendment even if state law required the police to have prior authorization
B. holding that a search of a students purse that was not based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment
C. holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment
D. holding 1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause
E. holding that a warrantless arrest does not violate the fourth amendment if at the time of the defendants arrest police had probable cause to believe that an offense has been is being or will be committed
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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with a direct right of appeal to the board of contract appeals is strong evidence of CDA coverage of a subcontractor’s claims. Id. In Johnson Controls, this court dismissed an agency board’s holding that the government, by “circumvent[ing] the independent authority of the prime contractor [such that the prime contractor] was acting as an agent of the government,” contracted with the subcontractor under the first part of the test, since the “holding, by implication, recognized that there was no direct contractual relationship between the government and [subcontractor] Johnson [Controls].” Johnson Controls, 713 F.2d at 1552-53. Also, because the contract required the contractor to obtain a Miller Act bond, the subcontractor had a recourse other than a direct appea BCA ¶ 17,604 (1984) ; McMillin Bros. Constructors, Inc., EBCA No.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding evidence of virtually identical offense was relevant to show intent among other things in trial of charged offense
B. holding that government approval of a subcontract terms giving subcontractor a right to a direct appeal to the department of energy board of contract appeals among other things manifested intent
C. holding a court must find among other things clear evidence of the existence of an oral agreement for part performance to remove the contract from the statute of frauds
D. holding that surety was liable to subcontractor on payment bond because payment bond applied to any claimant who among other things supplied materials that were reasonably required for use in the performance of the subcontract
E. holding that a subcontractors previous contractual relationship with the government the subcontracts assignment back to the government and a disputes clause expressly authorizing and directing the subcontractor to bring claims to the doe contracting officer manifested intent
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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but also extend it to proceedings involving the termination of parental rights. Even if the Minnesota courts were to adopt the doctrine of abatement, it is doubtful that the doctrine would be extended to cases involving termination of parental rights. Abatement rests primarily on the dual rationales that (1) the party in interest is no longer living and (2) his rights to an appeal cannot be vindicated. Carlin, 249 P.3d at 762; Wkitehouse v. State, 266 Ind. 527, 364 N.E.2d 1015, 1016 (1977). Here, although the child’s best interests were the central focus of the termination proceedings, appellant remains a real party in interest. The termination order concerns her constitutional rights. See generally Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212-13, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) . Appellant concedes that she faces collateral
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children
B. holding care custody and control of children is a fundamental right
C. holding that although parents have a fundamental right to the care and custody of their children they have no fundamental right to allocate support to their children as they see fit
D. recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children
E. recognizing that noncustodial parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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10, 2012: The Limitations Period Ran 134 Days The District Court determined that the limitations period ran throughout this interval. Thompson argues that the Court erred by failing to carve out a period between April 10, 2012 — when he filed an out-of-time motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s denial of his petition for certification — and May 25, 2012 — when the Supreme Court of New Jersey accepted his motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration as within time but simultaneously denied the motion for reconsideration. We agree.. The Supreme Court’s acceptance of Thompson’s motion as timely is “an important indication” that the motion was “properly filed.” Jenkins, 705 F.3d at 87; see also Fernandez v. Sternes, 227 F.3d 977, 979 (7th Cir. 2000) . Thus, we will exclude the time between the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision
B. holding that a federal court may excuse a state habeas petitioners procedural default if the petitioner can show cause for the failure to raise the claim and prejudice resulting from such failure
C. holding that if the state court addresses both the procedural default and the merits of a federal claim in the alternative a federal court should apply the state procedural bar and decline to reach the merits of the claim
D. holding that the tolling provision in 2244d2 covers the time between a lower state courts decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court
E. holding that if a state court grants leave to pursue an out of time appeal the proper period of exclusion for 2244d purposes is all time between the filing of the request to excuse the default and the state courts decision on the merits if it elects to excuse the default
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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process, “a federal court is not limited to the consideration of evidence that would be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence; any relevant material or source may be consulted.” Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 477. The Court is more than satisfied that the learned opinions of the judges of the United States Courts of Appeal are an adequate source upon which to conclude that the English system is compatible with the requirements of due process of law. See, e.g., Society of Lloyd’s v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325, 331 (5th Cir.2002) ("the courts of England are fair and neutral forums”); Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 477. 6 . This principle continues to adhere to the Uniform Foreign Money Judgment Recognition Act in other states. See, e.g., Society of Lloyd’s v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325, 332-33 (5th Cir.2002) . 7 . The weakness in this argument is further
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum
B. holding that a party relying on foreign law must plead and prove it and partys failure to do so entitles court to assume that foreign law is the same as forum law
C. recognizing that where plaintiff is from the forum state and defendant is from an alternate forum each forum can claim a connection to one of the parties
D. holding that in cases of a false conflict of law a court may apply the law of the forum state
E. holding that courts apply the procedural law of the forum and the substantive law of the jurisdiction originating the claim
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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or abuse in question. There is sufficient evidence in the record to implicate the father as the perpetrator of the abuse but not the mother. Detective LaRochelle, the lead detective investigating the allegations of child abuse, testified that he believed the father inflicted the injuries to the child, and also stated that the mother was not a suspect. After hearing from the parties and witnesses, the court concluded that the baby suffered egregious abuse and terminated the parental rights of both the father and mother. After a thorough examination of the record, we find that record is devoid of the clear and convincing evidence necessary under statute to terminate the mother’s parental rights. See R.P. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 975 So.2d 435, 436 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ; T.V. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs.,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the clear and convincing standard provides appropriate due process in cases involving parental rights
B. holding that a trial courts findings of fact based on evidence that was essentially documentary in nature will not be overturned if there is reasonable and logical support for them in the record
C. holding that a trial courts determination that clear and convincing evidence supports the termination of parental rights will not be overturned unless found to be clearly erroneous or lacking in evidentiary support
D. holding that due process allows parental rights to be terminated only upon clear and convincing evidence of unfitness
E. recognizing that the department is required to present clear and convincing evidence to support termination of a parents parental rights
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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30 ."The question under the Eighth Amendment is whether prison officials, acting with deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial risk of serious damage to his future health, and it does not matter whether the risk comes from a single source or multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (internal quotation omitted and emphasis added). Thus, the risk must be cognizable, but the consequences of that risk need not yet have materialized, in order to define the time to begin to determine whether the defendant disregarded the risk. See Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 341 (5th Cir.2004) . Rather, the defendant's action or inaction
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that prisoner stated a claim for relief under the eighth amendment for his exposure to secondhand smoke even though he reported no illness
B. holding that an inmate stated a cause of action under the eighth amendment by alleging that prison officials had with deliberate indifference exposed him to levels of ets that posed an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health
C. holding that an eighth amendment plaintiff did not have to prove that he was actually injured by exposure to raw sewage only that such exposure posed a serious health risk
D. holding that insurance coverage in the context of asbestosrelated diseases is triggered by exposure exposure in residence and manifestation
E. holding that plaintiff stated eighth amendment claim where he alleged exposure to ets causing aggravation of chronic asthma
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to induce the carrier to connect the call to the desired number and to broadcast the desired signals. Such a transmission constitutes an attempt to defraud the cellular carrier, and intent to defraud is an element, along with the involvement of an “access device,” of any violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029. We see no reason why the construction and sale of “tumbling” phones should not fall within the proscriptions of § 1029. C. “Free Riding” The defendant nevertheless attempts to analogize his devices to those in McNutt by claiming that he is merely “piggybacking” onto an an existing system and getting a “free ride” without actually imposing any costs on anyone. The Tenth Circuit accepted that characterization in extending the holding of McNutt to tumbling the ESN. Brady, 13 F.3d at 340 . The district court also seems to have been
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that restitution in the full amount of each victims losses does not exceed the statutory maximum
B. holding that batson does apply retroactively to cases pending on direct review
C. holding that the rule announced in ring does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review
D. holding that 1029 does not apply to free riding on the cellular system in part because the use did not result in direct accounting losses
E. holding that the special relationship exception did not apply because the decedent was not in defendants custody
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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predicate prior conviction for the sexual predator designation, concluding the date of sentencing was controlling. This was error. In order to be counted as a prior felony for the purpose of designating a defendant a sexual predator, “the felony must have resulted in a conviction sentenced separately, or an adjudication of delinquency entered separately, prior to the current offense and sentenced or adjudicated separately from any other felony conviction that is to be counted as a prior felony regardless of the date of offense of the prior felony.” § 775.21(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2012) (emphasis added). This means the conviction and sentence on the predicate prior felony must be entered before the current felony is committed. See id.; Sadler v. State, 112 So.3d 498, 499 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) . Applied to this case, the Orange County
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense
B. holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction
C. holding that an offender who violates section 7940115 must have a prior enumerated conviction to qualify as a sexual predator
D. holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense
E. holding that a conviction and sentence for a predicate offense that is entered after the commission of the current offense does not qualify as a prior felony within the meaning of the sexual predator statute
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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remarks does not depend on their offensiveness, but rather on their tendency to show that the decision-maker was motivated by assumptions or attitudes relating to the protected class.”). The individual who made each statement, i.e., Gold, is also the decision-maker with respect to the adverse employment acts. However, the other three factors suggest the statements are “stray comments” because, to varying degrees: their content is benign when considered in the context they were made; they are temporally remote from an adverse employment action; and/or they are unrelated to an employment decision or the decision making process. See id.; O’Connor v. Viacom Inc./Viacom Int’l Inc., No. 93 CIV. 2399 (LMM), 1996 WL 194299, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23), aff'd, 104 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 1996) . However, in considering all of the statements
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of defendant and denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment where plaintiff failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that defendant breached its duty to act in good faith
B. holding that absent a casual link between supervisors isolated racial remarks and employers decision to promote stray remarks cannot support a verdict for race discrimination
C. holding that comments which were considered by personnel board in normal course of considering employment action were relevant to establish discriminatory intent and were not just stray remarks
D. holding plaintiff failed to demonstrate pretext where employer allegedly referred to irish employees in derogatory terms and emphasizing that many courts have held that stray remarks in the workplace by themselves and without a demonstrated nexus to the complained of personnel actions will not defeat the employers motion for summary judgment
E. holding that the nonmoving party may not defeat a summary judgment motion by standing on the bare allegations in the pleadings
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Rules “shall be construed to secure the just. . . determination of every action.” The spirit of the Rules favors decisions on the merits, not technicalities, unless the result would be prejudicial to the other party. Since the first three counts of the complaint assert a right to recover jointly, justice is served by construing Rule 3 and Rule 20 as allowing the $185.00 filing fee to commence the wrongful death action. As to count four of plaintiffs’ complaint, the undisputed facts require allowance of the defendant’s summary judgment motion. Count four pleads a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a claim separate and distinct from the G.L.c. 161A, §21 wrongful death claims set fourth in the first three counts, Cimino v. Milford Keg, Inc., 385 Mass. 323, 334 (1982) . Further, in count four all the plaintiffs,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute
B. holding in a fcra case that plaintiffs may not rely on mere conclusory statements rather they must sufficiently articulate true demonstrable emotional distress including the factual context in which the emotional distress arose evidence corroborating the testimony of the plaintiff the nexus between the conduct of the defendant and the emotional distress the degree of such mental distress mitigating circumstances if any physical injuries suffered due to the emotional distress medical attention resulting from the emotional duress psychiatric or psychological treatment and the loss of income if any
C. holding that expert testimony is not required to corroborate a claim for emotional distress
D. holding emotional distress is a distinct claim from wrongful death
E. holding that act did not bar intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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should be dismissed. The Jewell case the majority cites does not support its holding. In Jewell v. Moser, 2012 Ark. 267, we said that while we have required only substantial compliance with the procedural steps of Rule 3(e) the notice of appeal did not contain a scrivener’s error because the final order was filed after the notice of appeal. Jewell, 2012 Ark. 267. The cases where we found substantial compliance dealt with ancillary procedural requirements such as the financial-arrangement language and the ordering of the trial transcript. See, e.g., Helton v. Jacobs, 346 Ark. 344, 57 S.W.3d 180 (2001) (noting that failure to include finan cial-arrangements language in a notice of appeal no longer renders that notice invalid); Phillips v. LaValle, 293 Ark. 364, 737 S.W.2d 652 (1987) . Furthermore, in Jewell, we noted that a
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that it was not fatal when the notice of appeal did not state that the transcript had been ordered when in actuality it had been ordered
B. holding appeal moot where tests that had been ordered under the preliminary injunction had already been car ried out
C. holding that where a witness had been convicted seventeen years earlier but had been given probation and had not been confined the date of the conviction controlled
D. holding that because the restitution was ordered as part of a state criminal prosecution it was excepted from discharge in bankruptcy
E. holding that state had waived argument because it could have been raised in an earlier appeal but was not and because it fell outside the scope of remand
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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terms” are merely those terms the parties “would reasonably regard as vitally important elements of their bargain.” Gen. Metal Fabricating Corp. v. Stergiou, 438 S.W.3d 737, 745 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.]. 2014, no pet.). KC Southern, as noted above, produced the settlement agreement as part of its summary judgment evidence. The agreement specifically states the parties have reached an agreement with regard to the resolution of the lawsuit, and that Chavez agreed to release all claims against KC Southern arising out of the accident for specific sums of money payable to each plaintiff. The agreement also provides for the payment of attorney’s fees. Accordingly, we hold KC Southern established as a matter of law that the settlement agreement contained “essential terms.” See id. ; see also Padilla, 907 S.W.2d at 460-61
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that chapter 8 of colorados ucc applied to the sale of shares in a corporation whose entire stock was held by one individual
B. holding that shares of stock in husbands name had not been transmuted
C. holding void shares issued in excess of the amount of common shares authorized in the articles of incorporation
D. holding in action for breach of contract caused by wrongful foreclosure and sale of shares of stock plaintiff was entitled to recover the fair market value of the stock at the time of its sale
E. holding that rule 11 agreement stating that one party would return shares of stock for a specific amount of money contained essential terms
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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state treasury from liability _”). But protection from suit under the Eleventh Amendment “does not extend to counties and municipal corporations.” Eason, 303 F.3d at 1141; see Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. at 401, 99 S.Ct. 1171(“[T]he Court has consistently refused to construe the [Eleventh] Amendment to afford protection to political subdivisions such as counties and municipalities, even though such entities exercise a ‘slice of state power.’ ”). The issue before us is “whether the [School District] is to be treated as an arm of the State partaking of the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, or is instead to be treated as a municipal corporation or other political subdivision to which the Eleventh Amendment does not extend.” Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist., 429 U.S. at 280, 97 S.Ct. 568. To determine whether an entity is an arm of
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a county is not an arm of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment
B. holding that it is not
C. holding that because hospital district is more like a municipality than an arm of the state hospital district did not have eleventh amendment immunity
D. holding that an ohio school district is more like a county or city than it is like an arm of the state and therefore it is not entitled to assert eleventh amendment immunity from suit
E. holding that the anne arundel board of education is an arm of the state for purposes of eleventh amendment immunity
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to demonstrate that he was persecuted or tortured. Although he sought medical attention each time he was released, the BIA reasoned that Arshad did not show he suffered any harm greater than the denial of proper food and sleep, as opposed to cmy food or sleep, consistent with his claim that doctors told him to merely eat well and rest. Although the experiences Ar-shad claims to have suffered are troubling, we are not compelled to disagree with the BIA’s determination that the conditions of his detentions did not rise to the level of severity described in Fatin, for purposes of withholding of removal, or to the level of torture. Likewise, we agree that Arshad’s letter of resignation does not demonstrate past persecution entitling him to withholding of removal. See Li, 400 F.3d at 168 . As the BIA and IJ noted, the letter itself
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage may constitute persecution if it threatens a petitioners life or freedom
B. holding that recidivism may support the imposition of a severe penalty
C. holding that to constitute persecution the harm must be sufficiently severe rising above mere harassment
D. holding that an asylum applicant must show at least a deliberate imposition of a substantial economic disadvantage in order for the harm to constitute economic persecution
E. holding that harm must be sufficiently severe rising above mere harassment to constitute persecution
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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6 Yates v. Brown, 235 Ga. 391, 392 (1) (219 SE2d 729) (1975). 7 Bryant v. State, 174 Ga. App. 522 (1) (330 SE2d 743) (1985). 8 Kraus v. State, 161 Ga. App. 739, n. 1 (289 SE2d 555) (1982). 9 Mohamed v. State, 289 Ga. App. 394, 395 (657 SE2d 307) (2008). 10 Hall v. State, 271 Ga. App. 302, 303 (609 SE2d 653) (2004). 11 Moore v. Caldwell, 231 Ga. 485 (1) (202 SE2d 425) (1973). 12 Brown v. Ricketts, 235 Ga. 29, 32 (218 SE2d 785) (1975). 13 Blassingame v. State, 155 Ga. App. 235, 236 (270 SE2d 399) (1980). 14 Blaylock v. State, 129 Ga. App. 230 (199 SE2d 369) (1973). 15 It is for this reason that any failure by counsel to assert such rights on behalf of a fugitive client cannot constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See Johnson v. Smith, 227 Ga. 611 (2) (182 SE2d 101) (1971) . See also Johnson v. Caldwell, 458 F2d 505
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the strickland test applies to claims that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal
B. holding that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel could not be resolved on the facts appearing in the record and that under such circumstances the defendants remedy is to file a petition for habeas corpus
C. holding that failure to file brief on appeal to bia constitutes ineffective assistance but affirming the denial of habeas because petitioner could not show prejudice
D. holding on appeal from a habeas corpus denial that counsel was not ineffective for failure to file a notice of appeal because of defendants escape
E. holding in context of sixth amendment ineffective assistance of counsel based on asserted failure of counsel to file appeal established prejudice per se for purpose of establishing habeas review jurisdiction as if proven such failure constitutes denial of a fundamental constitutional right
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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reasons, I conclude that defendant does not qualify as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). IT IS ORDERED that this matter is scheduled for SENTENCING on Thursday, November 12, 2009, at 10:30 a.m. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties file any further sentencing motions or memoranda no later than November 5, 2009. 1 . Although the two Iowa convictions were entered on the same date, the offense dates were different. Under the guidelines, sentences imposed on the same day may in some cases be counted as one sentence, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2), but the ACCA looks to the date of offense, requiring that predicate convictions be “committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). 2 . But cf. United States v. Dominguez, 992 F.2d 678, 682 (7th Cir.1993) . The CSA also forbids the distribution of a
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that possession of a controlled substance is a crime only if the defendant knowingly possesses the substance and has knowledge of the nature of that substance
B. holding that mens rea required for possession of a controlled substance is knowledge that defendant possessed a controlled substance
C. holding that the sale of a noncontrolled substance which the defendant subjectively believes to be a controlled substance can constitute an attempt to distribute
D. holding that quantity of the controlled substance does not have to be measurable to support a conviction for possession of such controlled substance particularly when the immeasurable amount of the substance is found on an implement used to consume the substance
E. holding that knowledge that a substance is a controlled substance is an element of 952
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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and assent of the parties “perform[s] a cautionary function whereby the parties’ acceptance is considered and deliberate.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Aguiar further contends that the settlement judgment entered in the dis trict court is unlawful because it constitutes a waiver of his Title VII rights that is not knowing and voluntary. He argues that the settlement judgment waives his rights because it restricts him to bringing certain claims before Magistrate Judge Katz for the next two years, and then bars him from bringing those claims at all after two years. The agreement to bring claims in a particular forum, however, is not a waiver of Aguiar’s Title VII remedies and is enforceable. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1456, 1469, 173 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) . Further, we do not read the settlement
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that age discrimination claim was subject to compulsory arbitration
B. holding that claims arising under the age discrimination in employment act may be subject to arbitration
C. holding that the faa requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists
D. recognizing parties right by contact or agreement to submit or to agree to submit controversies to arbitration
E. holding that an agreement to submit age discrimination claims to arbitration does not constitute a waiver
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(unpublished). The prior Order entered in this case on May 25, 2004 denying respondent’s initial motion to dismiss and staying the case on exhaustion grounds constitutes an interlocutory Order, which this Court is permitted to reconsider. Moreover, justification exists for reconsideration of the decision to deny the motion to dismiss given the “intervening change in the controlling law” on statutory tolling by the Supreme Court in Lawrence, which calls into question this Court’s prior ruling on the statute of limitations issue. The law-of-the-case doctrine cannot be applied under the circumstances of this case to insulate the prior ruling “from a subsequent decision by a superior court calling that ruling into question.” Kucharski v. Leveille, 478 F.Supp.2d 928, 932 (E.D.Mich.2007) , vacated on other grounds, 526 F.Supp.2d 768
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that the lawofthecase doctrine applies to preliminary injunctions and stating that tjhe exception to law of the case where evidence on a subsequent trial is substantially different is inapplicable where by the prior appeal the issue is not left open for decision
B. holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion
C. holding that application of the doctrine of law of the case is discretionary and that a district court abuses its discretion in applying the law of the case doctrine only if 1 the first decision was clearly erroneous 2 an intervening change in the law occurred 3 the evidence on remand was substantially different 4 other changed circumstances exist or 5 a manifest injustice would otherwise result
D. holding that the language of the statute and the courts duty to apply the statute as written requires the court to interpret the statute to apply when the prisoner is sentenced without regard to the institution where the prisoner is incarcerated after the sentencing
E. holding in a prisoner civil rights action that the lawofthecase doctrine does not apply to preclude reconsideration of a prior order denying a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds in light of an intervening change in the law by the supreme court which called into question the prior ruling
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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some rational basis rather than be arbitrary and capricious). Petitioner’s prior escape, his history of attempted escapes, and possession of escape paraphernalia, guns and ammunition did provide a rational basis for initially placing him in CM status and for confining him there for some period of time. However, these violations are over ten years old, and petitioner has had only one minor disciplinary infraction since. Consequently, we believe a substantial question exists on whether the Assignment Team’s assessment that petitioner remains a severe escape risk provides a sufficient rational basis to support his continued confinement in CM in the absence of any reported objective evidence other than these ten-year old violations. B. Due Process Petitioner next asserts that hi ir.1981) In Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct.
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that the due process clause protects the interests in fair notice and repose that may be compromised by retroactive legisla tion
B. holding that the fourteenth amendment protects property interests however only from a deprivation by state action
C. holding that the due process clause protects only those liberty interests created by the state
D. holding that the federal due process clause protects a state employee who under state law has a legitimate claim of entitlement to state employment
E. holding the right to marry is a central part of the liberty protected by the due process clause
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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1990 WL 84704, at *2-3. 21 . See Leighton, 1990 WL 84704, at *2-3 (dismissing current shareholder’s appeal and holding that shareholder who was not plaintiff in derivative action lacked standing to challenge or object to derivative-action settlement because shareholder did not own stock when the allegedly actionable conduct occurred); In re Beatrice Companies, Inc., Nos. 155,156, 1987 WL 36708, at *2-3 (Del. Feb. 20, 1987) (precedential order) (dismissing current shareholder's appeal and holding that shareholder who was not plaintiff in derivative action lacked standing to challenge or object to derivative-action settlement because shareholder did not own stock when the allegedly actionable V, 2009 WL 909591, at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 7, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) ; Somers v. Crane, 295 S.W.3d 5, 8, 10, 13
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that lack of standing cannot be waived and may be raised for the first time by an appellate court on its own motion
B. holding standing cannot be waived and may thus be raised at any time
C. holding issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review
D. holding that claims which were not presented to the motion court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal
E. holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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statute. Id. Based solely on his delivery of the boat within Virginia’s boundaries, the Supreme Court of Virginia held the defendant subject to personal jurisdiction in the Commonwealth. Id. at 563-64. Because the claim asserted in Peninsula Cruise was based on the defendant’s failure to pay for repairs, not the failure to deliver the boat, the case points persuasively to the conclusion that acts of contract performance may confer jurisdiction in a breach of contract action even if those acts are not specifically related to the alleged breach. This reading of Peninsula Cruise is supported by Prolinks, Inc. v. Horizon Organic Dairy, 58 Va. Cir. 17, 20 (2001), which states in dicta that Peninsula Cruise establishes that “part performance of a contract [in the pp. 935, 937 (S.D.N.Y.1985) . In this case, therefore, all of defendant’s
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding new york law may prohibit noncompete forfeiture provisions but erisa statutes allow forfeiture of all deferred compensation benefits under noncompete forfeiture provisions in a top hat plan
B. holding that plaintiffemployers claim that defendant violated noncompete agreement did not arise out of defendants businessrelated visits to new york
C. holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership
D. holding that television station was not subject to personal jurisdiction in new york under that states longarm statute since libel claim did not arise from defendants delivery of mail orders to new york
E. holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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on an oral loan payable upon demand begins to run only after there has been a breach by the debtor, i.e., the debt- or has refused to repay the loan at the time the creditor demands repayment. As noted by the Second District, this is the rule that obtains when there is a written loan agreement providing that the loan is payable upon demand, and we see no valid basis for distinguishing between the two situations. The critical feature of both forms of loans, whether oral or written, is the provision for repayment upon demand. When that provision is the same in both instances, we see no reason to have one rule that says a demand must first be made and rejected in the one instance, but not in the other. Cf. Schreiber v. Hackett, 173 Ill.App.3d 129, 122 Ill.Dec. 914, 527 N.E.2d 412 (1988) . The cases which adhere to a contrary rule
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding in an action on a verbal agreement which failed to specify time for repayment that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until reasonable time for repayment had passed
B. holding that consideration for guaranty of loan previously made was that guarantors friend the bank manager who issued the loan would not lose his job for making a bad loan
C. holding that the statute does not begin to run until at least a demand has been made upon the government but determining that the facts of that case made it unnecessary to choose between the date of demand and the date of actual payment as the triggering date for the running of the statute of limitations
D. holding that where oral loan was silent as to the time of repayment the statute of limitations began to run at the time the contract was made
E. holding that where parties to an oral loan agreed that the loan would be repaid on demand the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date plaintiff demanded repayment of the loan
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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by participating in a decision to treat all cash received from shares held by the estate in thoroughbred race horses as income rather than creating a depreciating reserve. The circuit court noted that the daughters did not raise this argument until tlieir posttrial brief; thus, it considered the argument untimely. The daughters do not respond to the reason the circuit court gave for rejecting their argument. Instead, they argue on appeal the merits of the issue, which the circuit court did not reach, and they provide no legal authority ■as to the timeliness ground on which the circuit court relied. Based on well settled principles of appellate review, we will not reverse a judgment of a trial court under such circumstances. See, e.g., Tucker v. Nichols, 431 So.2d 1263, 1264 (Ala.1983). D. Award of Attorney Fees to. the Personal
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding to warrant reversal the appellant must show both the error of the ruling and resulting prejudice
B. holding that where the appellant has failed to demonstrate error the court is not required to search the record for an error
C. holding that a valid plea requires an affirmative showing of voluntariness on the record in order to conclude that a defendant has waived his constitutional rights
D. holding that the fee applicant bears the burden of showing that an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee
E. holding that in order to secure a reversal the appellant has an affirmative duty of showing error upon the fee ord
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the age of fourteen, constituted a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). In holding that indecent assault was a crime of violence, the Second Circuit’s focused on the fact that “lack of consent [was] a requisite element of a § 13H violation.” Id. (citations omitted). The Court held that a violation of § 13H, “by its nature, presents a substantial risk that force may be used in order to overcome the victim’s lack of consent and accomplish the indecent touching.” Id. (original emphasis). “Because the victim’s non-consent is a necessary element for conviction under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 13H, we hold that petitioner was convicted of a ‘crime of violence’ within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).” Id. at 177; see also United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377, 379 (10th Cir.1993). Although the. risk of injury statute, Conn.
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a petitioners conviction for indecent assault and battery under massachusetts law constituted a crime of violence because any offense under the state statute was by definition nonconsensual and thus any violation of the statute by its nature presents a substantial risk that force may be used to overcome the victims lack of consent and accomplish the indecent touching
B. holding that a conviction for sexual assault of a child under nebrevstat 28320011 was a crime of violence because this type of contact between parties of differing physical and emotional maturity carries a substantial risk that physical force may be used in the course of committing the offense
C. holding that because the crime of rape involved a nonconsensual act there was a substantial risk that physical force may be used in committing the offense
D. holding that under iowa code 7098 the offense of lascivious acts with a child was a crime of violence because it involved a substantial risk that physical force would be used against the child victim in the course of committing the offense
E. holding that substantial evidence of rape may be found even though there was only a hearsay statement of the child victim
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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is not briefed anywhere in appellants' brief or reply brief. 6 . Rule 16 was amended effective November 1, 1999, to correspond with the 1993 amendment to rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the new procedures are applicable only to cases filed on or after November 1, 1999. See Utah R.Civ.P. 16 advisory committee note. Therefore, the applicable rule for the case before us is taken from the 1997 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. . 7 . The 1999 amendment to rule 37 is also applicable only to cases filed after November 1, 1999. See Utah R.Civ.P. 37 advisory committee note. Therefore, rule 37 of the 1997 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is the applicable rule to be applied in the case before us. 8 . See also Larsen v. Decker, 196 Ariz. 239, 995 P.2d 281, 286 (Ct.App.2000) ; McAllister v. George, 73 Cal.App.3d 258, 140
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding violation was willful and substantial
B. holding that statute does not alleviate plaintiffs burden to provide additional evidence that medical bills were reasonable and necessary
C. holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that no foundation had established bills were caused by and were reasonable and necessary results of accident
D. holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits
E. holding that abuse of discretion in denying a 60b motion is established only when no reasonable person could agree with the district court and there is no abuse of discretion if a reasonable person could disagree as to the propriety of the courts action
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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in a civil manner free of displays of force, intimidation, or strong-arm tactics. Moreover, as in Gaddy, 698 So.2d at 1155, the defendant in this case initiated the portion of the discussion that led to his confes.sion. McLeod indicated that he wanted to cooperate with Officer Burch. Thus, this case is less like Weeks, 531 So.2d at 644, where the officer’s inducement actually caused the defendant to make an inculpatory statement, and more like Gaddy, 698 So.2d at 1155, where the officer’s inducement did not actually cause the defendant to confess. Absent the exertion of physical or psychological force or any particular and peculiar susceptibility to inducement on the part of McLeod, the officer’s stating that he would make McLeod’s cooperation known to the district (1st Cir.1985)
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that agents promise to inform prosecutor of defendants cooperation does not render a subsequent confession involuntary
B. holding that confession was voluntary although agents had promised to inform prosecutor of defendants cooperation
C. holding that federal agents indication to defendant that his cooperation would be reported to the united states attorney did not make defendants confession involuntary
D. holding that cooperation was insufficient where the defendants cooperation was based on his confession to the charged crimes
E. holding that an officers promise to bring defendants cooperation to the attention of the prosecutor did not make confession involuntary
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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purpose of receiving claims from an employee covered by a group insurance policy. Our research has not disclosed any Montana case that resolves this question. Perhaps the closest case is Nautilus Ins. Co. v. First Nat’l Ins. Inc., 254 Mont. 296, 837 P.2d 409 (1992), in which your Court stated that an “insurance broker is usually regarded as the agent of the insured” and that “the determination of which party a broker is acting for as to a particular matter depends on which party requested him to do the particular thing.” Id. at 411-12. There is case law from some jurisdictions which supports the position that an employer acts as an agent for an insurance company that has issued a group policy covering employees. See Norby v. Bankers Life Co., 304 Minn. 464, 231 N.W.2d 665, 669 (1975) ; Bass v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 10
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work
B. holding that the employer may be considered the insurers agent where the employer with the consent of the insurer performs routine administrative functions such as assisting in the processing of claims
C. holding that the employer was not the insurers agent
D. holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation
E. holding that an employer who performs administrative functions under a group insurance policy as in the instant case is deemed to be the agent of the insurer citing elfstrom
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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repairs totaling $30,027.63 were necessary to make the appraisal value accurate were credible by a preponderance of the evidence." While a reevaluation of the value of the repairs and the use of an adjusted amount would not necessarily have been an abuse of discretion, we are unable to determine if the new figure was based on a reevaluation or a transcription error based on the language of the order. We remand this issue for clarification. v. CONCLUSION We AFFIRM the judgment below in all but three aspects, which we REMAND to the trial court for further proceedings to det that tort damages are separate property except where intended to replace pre-divorce lost earnings). 14 . 68 P.3d 1232 (Alaska 2003). 15 . Id. at 1235. 16 . See Hansen v. Hansen, 119 P.3d 1005, 1013 (Alaska 2005) . 17 . See id.; see also Abood, 119 P.3d at
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that separate property may become marital property if spouse donates it to marital unit with intent at time of donation that property become marital
B. holding that circuit court erred in failing to consider that marital property in the form of marital earnings was used to pay debt against nonmarital property
C. holding that assets acquired subsequent to separation are not considered marital property absent evidence that spouse used marital property to obtain them
D. holding that the trial court erred in finding that marital property was the former wifes separate property based on a nonseparation agreement in which the former husband purported to relinquish any interest in the marital property
E. holding that separate property valued at 45000 was transmuted to marital property when improved by 3800 of marital property
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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not possibly have been injured by the transfer and therefore cannot seek to set aside or disregard the conveyance. The New York courts, like courts in other jurisdictions, have seldom used the explicit “proof of injury” language in cases under the UFCA. Perhaps, as Kreditt-Finans has pointed out, this is because creditors ordinarily do not seek to invalidate transactions that cause them no injury and accordingly the question arises only infrequently. However, at least one New York appellate court has held that under the UFCA “creditors have causes of action only to the extent to which they have been damaged.” Buckley Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Goldman, 28 A.D.2d 640, 641, 280 N.Y.S.2d 876, 878 (1967). See Suffolk & Nassau Amusement Co. v. Ambrose, 145 N.Y.S.2d 424 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1955) . Moreover, numerous courts in other
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a plaintiff who has not sustained any damage as the result of a transfer of property cannot seek to set that transfer aside as fraudulent
B. holding that even though a transfer of property eg money incidentally benefits another it cannot be said as a matter of law or logic that the transaction was a fraudulent transfer as to the party benefited
C. holding that debtors cannot claim an exemption in a homestead after trustee avoided the transfer of the property as a fraudulent conveyance because the transfer by the debtors was voluntary
D. recognizing potential for fraudulent transfer in foreclosure context if debtor enjoyed significant equity in property but received little or no value from the transfer
E. holding bankruptcy courts cannot enter final judgment on fraudulent transfer claims
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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in threats or coercive conduct as those terms are recognized in our judicial lexicon. A threat is defined as a “communicated intent to inflict harm or loss on another or on another’s property, especially] one that might diminish a person’s freedom to act voluntarily or with lawful consent[J” Black’s Law Dictionary 1519 (8th ed.2004). At no point did petitioner’s statements to Sprague rise to the level of threats. Further, we respectfully disagree that petitioner was “unduly coercive.” To coerce implies the use of force or threats and we are not satisfied that petitioner’s conduct rose to the level of coercion. The petitioner was not rude or abusive or arrogant or aggressive, nor did his conduct exceed the bounds of judicial propriety. See, e.g., In re O’Brien, 650 A.2d 134 (R.I.1994) . We are mindful that we are confronted with a
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the commissions express prohibition of double counting in certain instances indicates its intent to permit double counting in other instances
B. holding prior instances of domestic assault admissible to show the nature of the parties relationship and explain what might otherwise appear to be incongruous behavior to a jury such as remaining with an abusive partner and delaying a report of abuse
C. holding that the two instances may include the charged conduct
D. holding that determination of public convenience and necessity by the public service commission was an issue of fact which warranted substantial judicial deference to the factfinding processes of the administrative agency
E. holding that multiple instances of arrogant and abusive conduct warranted a public censure
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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while we have held that “temporary swelling and irritation” constitute only de minimis injury under Norman, see Taylor v. McDuffie, 155 F.3d 479, 484 (4th Cir.1998), overruled in part by Wilkins, 559 U.S. 34, 130 S.Ct. 1175 (2010), we have also recognized that to satisfy Norman an inmate “néed not show that ... force caused an ‘extreme deprivation’ or ‘serious’ or ‘significant’ pain or injury.” Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir.1996) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992)). Moreover, on numerous occasions, applying the Norman standard, we have concluded that injuries comparable to — and arguably less severe than — those Ussery maintains he suffered were not de minimis. See, e.g., Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 448 (4th Cir.2008) ; Young v. Prince George’s Cnty., 355 F.3d 751,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the prison litigation reform act requires a prior showing of physical injury that need not be significant but must be more than de minimis
B. holding plaintiff failed to meet de minimis burden where he introduced only two isolated comments made by individuals who had no involvement in his termination
C. holding that just two uses of a taser even if only for a few seconds at a time caused more than de minimis injury when the plaintiff experieneed electric shock pain and developed a scar
D. holding that to demonstrate retaliation complainedof action must be more than de minimis
E. holding that a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury of a third person if but only if said plaintiff 1 is closely related to the injury victim 2 is present at the scene of the injury producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim and 3 as a result suffers serious emotional distress
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Nearly every case cited by the parties agrees, as does this court, that some funds must be spent on response costs prior to a declaratory judgment action being considered ripe. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has indicated that both sections 113(g)(2) and 107(a) “envision that, before suing, CERCLA plaintiffs will spend some money responding to an environmental hazard.” In re Dant & Russell, 951 F.2d at 249. Then, and only then can CERCLA plaintiffs “go to court and obtain ... a declaration that the responsible party will have continuing liability for the cost of finishing the job.” Id. at 249-50. “By requiring a plaintiff to take some positive action before coming to court,” the Ninth Circuit explains, “CERCLA ensures that the dispute will be ripe for judicial review.” Id. at 250 . See also Trimble, supra, slip op. at 10
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that because plaintiffs failed to prove that their incurred fuel characterization and loading costs would not have been incurred in the nonbreach world plaintiffs were not entitled to recovery for these costs
B. holding that where the defendants 107 claim was based on remediation costs they incurred and may incur in the future as the result of a lawsuit instituted under 107a they did not demonstrate that they incurred necessary costs of response within the meaning of 107a
C. holding that cleanup costs incurred pursuant to a consent decree were not incurred voluntarily and must be sought through a 113f contribution action
D. holding that costs are not fixed until judgment is entered and interest can only run on costs when due
E. holding that bankruptcy court could not enter judgment for 7402564 under 107a for incurred costs when such costs had not been incurred
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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for attractive nuisance. See, eg., Thomas v. Hansen, 2013 WL 4590634 (D.Utah 2013); Hill v. National Grid, 11 A.3d 110 (R.1.2011); Craig v. Bailey Bros. Realty, Inc., 304 Ga.App. 794, 697 S.E.2d 888 (2010); MacVane v. S.D. Warren Co., LLC, 641 F.Supp.2d 54 (D.Me.2009); McDaniels v. Sovereign Homes, 2006 WL 3365499 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.2006); Butler v. Newark County Country Club, 909 A.2d 111 (Del.Supr.2006); Lieding v. Blackledge, 2004 WL 1078981 (Mich.App.2004); Mason v. City of Mt. Sterling, 122 S.W.3d 500 (Ky.2003). 4 . As we have recognized, in section 13-21-115(3)(b), the General Assembly departed from the common law's "know or reason to know" formulation of licensee by adopting an actual knowledge standard. Larrieu v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 2013 CO 38, ¶ 29, 303 P.3d 558, 565, n. 9 . Section 13-21-115(3)(b)'s actual knowledge
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that our statute represents a substantial departure from the common law where landowners owed licensees a duty of care regardless of whether they had actual or constructive knowledge of dangers
B. holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution
C. recognizing duty of care owed by business invitor to invitee
D. holding that liability must be determined by the common law standards governing the duty of landowners to invitees
E. recognizing under illinois law that pharmaceutical manufacturer has duty to warn of any dangers associated with offlabel use of product if such dangers were reasonably known
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(N.D.1975). In addition, our court previously considered N.D.C.C. § 28-27-02(5), the very subsection cited by the Board, explicitly concluding the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction does not involve the merits of a claim. Schaff v. Kennelly, 69 N.W.2d 777, 779-80 (N.D.1955). Rather the denial of a motion to dismiss, like the denial of a motion for summary judgment, is “merely interlocutory and, leaving the case pending for trial, it decides nothing, except that the parties may proceed with the case.” Rude v. Letnes, 154 N.W. 2d 380, 381(N.D.1967). See also Imperial Oil of North Dakota v. Hanson, 510 N.W.2d 598, 601 (N.D.1994) (noting “[e]ven a jurisdictional reason does not normally warrant an intermediate appeal”); Newman v. Hjelle, 133 N.W.2d 549, 554 (N.D.1965) ; Beresina Sch. Dist. No. 23 v. Steinwandt, 60
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable
B. holding an order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not immediately appealable because it does not fall into one of the enumerated categories of section 143330 and such order does not finally determine anything
C. holding that a denial of a 12b2 motion for lack of personal jurisdiction on the ground of sovereign immunity is immediately appealable
D. holding that immediate right to appeal lies from denial of motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction
E. holding a decision denying a motion to dismiss an action for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction is not appealable
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of any cause or claim under the United Nations Convention Against Torture. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4). This Circuit has expressly held that the above provision of the REAL ID Act eliminates habeas jurisdiction over FARR Act claims. Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 511 (D.C.Cir.2009), reh’g denied (July 27, 2009), r Cir.2007) (distinguishing St. Cyr on the grounds that there existed “a plausible reading of the statutes before the [Supreme] Court under which habeas review ... was not barred,” whereas § 2242(d) clearly precluded “consideration of CAT and FARR Act claims on habeas review”); see also O.K. v. Bush, 377 F.Supp.2d 102, 118 n. 17 (D.D.C.2005) ; Al-Anazi v. Bush, 370 F.Supp.2d 188, 194
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand
B. holding that the farr act is expressly limited to claims arising out of a final order of removal and does not confer any legal rights outside of the removal setting
C. holding that review of an original removal decision and a subsequent removal order are distinct
D. holding that a final order of removal is sufficient by itself to establish the requisite custody
E. holding that term order of removal does not include aliens ineffective assistance of counsel claim concerning attorneys actions taken after order of removal becomes final
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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would only include true statements in a filed pleading, Pilette answered: “That’s correct. It was probably signed under oath.” JA 295. All of this is consistent with Pilette’s testimony that her notes from the meeting with Coddington and the Motion for Guidance indicate that Coddington chose only to appeal the resentencing issue. Having made that decision with respect to the initial appeal, it is difficult to see what benefit a further waiver could provide. Coddington had already waived the right to appeal the voluntariness issue, and his success on the resentencing issue would not have allowed him suddenly to insert the voluntariness issue into the appeal after the successful-and fully concluded-remand. See People v. Kaczorowski, 190 Mich.App. 165, 475 N.W.2d 861, 864-65 (Mich.1991) . D. The district court lastly determined that
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the failure to oppose a basis for summary judgment constitutes waiver of that argument on appeal
B. holding that defendants failure to appeal the voluntariness of a plea constitutes waiver of the issue on subsequent appeal
C. recognizing that failure to develop claim on appeal constitutes waiver
D. holding that failure to raise issue in brief constitutes waiver of appeal of the issue
E. holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the district court’s instructions. See Bennett, 368 F.3d at 1351. Simply put, Overton has not met his burden to show that there is “a reasonable probability ... that, but for the remarks,” the outcome of his trial would be different, and thus, he has not shown prejudice to his substantial rights. See Hall, 47 F.3d at 1098. Accordingly, we affirm. AFFIRMED. 1 . We deny Overton’s motion to file a supplemental brief to argue, for the first time, that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), applies to his case. It is well-established that we will not consider such arguments when they are not raised in the initial brief. See United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1299 n. 1 (11th Cir.2005) (citing United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir.2004) ; United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825, 830
```
What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that party waived argument by failing to brief it on appeal
B. holding that appellant waived issue by failing to raise it in opening brief
C. holding party failing to adequately brief complaint waived issue on appeal
D. holding that the defendant waived an argument by failing to raise it in his appellants brief
E. holding that defendant waived his blakely claim as issue on appeal by failing to raise it in his initial brief
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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The record supports that A Beka Books was an affiliate of PCC. Thus, under the terms of Bruhn’s contract with PCC, she was an employee of PCC even though she was assigned to work with the affiliate, A Beka Books. The only support cited by the trial court regarding its ruling that A Beka Books was Bruhn’s “actual” employer was a W-2 statement of Bruhn’s 2005 wages earned at A Beka Books, and the court’s determination that A Beka Books “is a separate legal entity from Pensacola Christian College and possesses a separate FIN/EIN number than does Pensacola Christian College.” However, the record on appeal does not support either finding. Moreover, a W-2 form is not conclusive evidence of an employment relationship. See Verchick v. Hecht Invs., Ltd., 924 So.2d 944, 945-46 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) . Rather, as this court stated in Hoar
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that plaintiffs claims were precluded by csra because actions complained of arose from federal employment relationship even though many of the alleged violations occurred after the employment relationship was terminated
B. holding that while the contract did not establish a formal fiduciary relationship the pleadings were sufficient to raise an issue as to the existence of an informal one
C. holding that w2 tax forms alone did not establish an employment relationship
D. holding that poor evaluations alone do not constitute an adverse employment action
E. holding that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish an agency relationship for service to be effective
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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CONSTITUTIONAL PRIOR RESTRAINT ON EXPRESSION? The Supreme Court in Freedman outlined three procedural safeguards that a prior restraint on protected expression must contain to obviate the dangers of censorship: (1) the burden of going to court to suppress the speech, and the burden of proof once in court, must rest with the government; (2) any restraint prior to a judicial determination may only be for a specified brief time period in order to preserve the status quo; and (3) an avenue for prompt judicial review of the censor’s decision must be available. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59, 85 S.Ct. at 739. At least some of the Freedman requirements apply to content-neutral regulations such as section 2.51. See FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 226-29, 110 S.Ct. at 605-06 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) ; see also id. at 238-39, 110 S.Ct. at 611
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the court must assume on summary judgment that the nondecisionmakerharasser relayed the plaintiffs complaints about sexual harassment to the decisionmaker even though both the harasser and the decisionmaker denied this fact the harasser was present at the meeting in which it was decided that plaintiff would be terminated he had an incentive to pass on this information and his credibility was in question as to other matters
B. holding contentneutral licensing scheme was an unconstitutional prior restraint because it violated the second freedman safeguard adequate limits on the time that the decisionmaker has to issue the license
C. holding that a contentneutral law requiring professional fundraisers to obtain a license before soliciting donations was subject to the procedural safeguards of freedman
D. holding that liability attaches if the decisionmaker merely rubber stamps the recommendation of the retaliating supervisor or if the retaliating supervisor dupes the decisionmaker into taking action or otherwise controls the decisionmaker
E. holding that where a licensing scheme is facially invalid for lack of procedural safeguards or unbridled discretion a person faced with such an unconstitutional licensing law may ignore it and engage with impunity in the exercise of the right of free expression for which the law purports to require a license
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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N.W.2d 41 (Minn.2008). Carlson—decided nearly seven years after Holmstrom v. III. Farmers Ins. Co., 631 N.W.2d 102 (Minn.App.2001), on which Pepper relies—rejected the idea that the statute is intended to define mandatory minimum coverage. 749 N.W.2d at 47. The supreme court therefore concluded that “subdivision 3a(5) constitutes a system of priorities and as such governs the source, not the scope, of coverage.” Id. at 47 n. 4. Because the policy in this case provides coverage when an insured is injured by an underinsured motor vehicle and specifically excludes vehicles that are provided liability coverage under the policy from the definition of an underinsured motor vehicle, I would conclude that Minn. Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5), does not entitle Pepper to UIM benefits. See id. at 47 . Because I believe that the plain language of
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding location of named driver exclusion in endorsement did not make it ambiguous exclusion applied to all coverage afforded by the policy including the um coverage
B. holding that the certificate of selfinsurance filed with the commissioner is the functional equivalent of an insurance policy for purposes of minnesotas nofault statutes minnstat 65b49 subd 31 2002
C. holding that policy limits are not a defense to coverage and that policy limits define the amount of coverage
D. holding that because the policy by its terms afforded the injured party no coverage neither does minnstat 65b49 subd 3a5
E. holding that an insurer which insures a tortfeasor under a liability policy has no obligation of good faith and fair dealing to an injured third party even where the injured third party also carries a separate policy with the insurer
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the purpose of proving the truthfulness of his statement, but for the purpose of rebuttal only.’ ” Id. at 412, 105 S.Ct. 2078. The trial court included a similar limiting instruction in its final instructions to the jury. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he nonhearsay aspect of [the co-conspirator’s] confession — not to prove what happened at the murder scene but to prove what happened when [the defendant] confessed — raisefd] no Confrontation Clause concerns.” Id. at 414, 105 S.Ct. 2078 (emphasis in original). Instead, the concern was that the jury might use the co-conspirator’s statement in a manner inconsistent with the Confrontation Clause, i.e., to infer Street’s guilt even though Street had had no opportunity to cross-examine the witness. I . 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) ; Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64, 74
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding previous convictions can only be used for sentence enhancement purposes under 18 usc 924e1 if the restoration of civil rights regarding such convictions expressly prohibited the possession of firearms
B. holding a sentence enhancement for two prior convictions must be based on separate criminal episodes
C. holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendants credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt
D. holding that evidence of a defendants prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt
E. holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendants credibility and not for determining guilt
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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person), with RCW 9A.32.030(l)(a) (person commits first degree murder when, with a premeditated intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes the death of such person or of a third person), and RCW 10.95.020 (listing aggravating circumstances). 5 Indeed, the trial court’s conclusion that reflection after the fact could show premeditation is probably wrong as a matter of law. To the extent that this is true, that decision is reviewed de novo. Walker, 136 Wn.2d at 771-72. Regardless of the standard applied, however, the trial court erred in concluding that the evidence did not support an inference that the shooting occurred without premeditation. 6 Br. of Resp’t at 14-15; Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 9-10. 7 Compare State v. Tamalini, 134 Wn.2d 725, 728-36, 953 P.2d 450 (1998) , with Schaffer, 135 Wn.2d at 358-59 (remanding
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that aggravated battery is a lesser included offense of manslaughter
B. holding that due process does not require a lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter where not requested
C. holding that there are no lesser included offenses of second degree felony murder because of the multiple means of committing the offense
D. holding that the defendant who was charged with felony murder was not entitled to a lesser included instruction on manslaughter because manslaughter is neither a lesser included offense nor an inferior degree crime with respect to felony murder
E. holding that a lesser crime cannot be a lesser included offense of a greater crime if the lesser crime contains an essential element not included in the greater crime
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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fact that Davis was seventeen years old at the time the murder was committed, the court finds that Davis’ sentence of death is unconstitutional. Pursuant to an Alabama statute, an individual convicted of a capital offense must be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See Ala.Code § 13A-5-39(l) (defining “capital offense” as “[a]n offense for which a[ ] defendant shall be punished by a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole according to the provisions of this article”); id. § 13A-5-40(a) (listing and defining Alabama’s capital offenses). Because the sentence of death is no longer constitutionally valid, the only sentencing alternative is life without parole. See Adams v. State, — So.2d-, 2006 WL 1216740, *1 (Ala.Cr.App. April 28, 2006) . Davis’ petition, therefore, is due to be
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a defendant must have notice that the trial court might sentence him to death
B. holding that roper did not support a similar postconviction claim and noting that roper contained obiter dictum to the effect that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole remains a permissible sentence for such offenders
C. holding that the imposition of a life sentence on a juvenile does not violate the holding of roper
D. holding unconstitutional defendants sentence of death based upon the holding in roper supra and remanding for the montgomery circuit court to set aside the defendants death sentence and to sentence him to the only other sentence available life in the penitentiary without the possibility of parole
E. holding that if a trial court has rejected death as a possible sentence double jeopardy bars the state from seeking the death penalty at resentencing even where rejection of the death sentence was based on a legal error
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