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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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clearly erroneous and, thus, will not be disturbed on appeal. Judgment affirmed. Smith, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. Decided September 8, 2011. Clegg & Petrey, John H. Petrey, for appellant. Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Stephen A. Fern, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. 1 See, e.g., Goolsby v. State, 299 Ga. App. 330, 330-31 (682 SE2d 671) (2009); 98) (2009). 20 261 Ga. 640 (409 SE2d 649) (1991). 21 Payne, 285 Ga. at 138; see Williams, 261 Ga. at 642 (2) (b). 22 Id. 23 See Davis v. State, 279 Ga. 786, 787-88 (3) (621 SE2d 446) (2005) (finding that evidence of defendant’s murder of witnesses to the murder for which he was being tried was admissible to show defendant’s course of conduct and bent of mind); Rainey v. State, 179 Ga. App. 584, 586 (4) (347 SE2d 341) (1986) ; see also McCoy v. State, 273 Ga. 568, 571 (5)
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that before a defendant is entitled to introduce evidence of the victims character for violence there must be sufficient evidence to support a finding that the victim was the first aggressor and that once the defendant testified that he was attacked and cut by the victim without provocation before using the victims utility tool to stab the victim the defendant was clearly entitled to question the victim about past acts of violence reflected in court documents from the state of oregon
B. holding that a defendant who alleges selfdefense can show through the testimony of another witness that the alleged victim had a propensity for violence thereby inferring that the alleged victim was the aggressor a defendants prior knowledge of the victims reputation for violence is irrelevant because the evidence is offered to show the conduct of the victim rather than the defendants state of mind
C. holding that uncharged sexual acts committed upon the same victim are admissible to show the conduct of the defendant toward the victim and to corroborate the evidence of the offense charged in the indictment
D. holding that evidence of assault on victim that was subsequent to the arson for which defendant was tried was admissible to show defendants bent of mind toward violence directed at the victim
E. holding evidence of sexual assault relevant to show defendants motive in kidnapping victim
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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distribution. See id. at 997 (“[T]he more similar the prior act is (in terms of physical similarity or mental state) to the act being proved, the more relevant it becomes.”). Thus, the evidence was relevant to Day’s intent and the absence of a mistake. In addition, the evidence was necessary to corroborate other testimony that had been challenged on credibility grounds, and to provide additional objective evidence that Day intended to join the charged conspiracy with the intent to distribute cocaine. Moreover, the admission of the conviction was not excessively prejudicial because the conviction involved the same type of drug and the conduct occurred in relatively the same time period as the offenses charged in the indictment. See United States v. Boyd, 53 F.3d 631, 637 (4th Cir.1995) . Further, the Government gave advance notice
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the rule 403 balancing favored admissibility where the uncharged kidnapping was not more sensational or inflammatory than the charged crimes while tending to show how the relationships formed among the conspirators
B. holding there is no unfair prejudice when the prior act is no more sensational or disturbing than the evidence admitted directly supporting the crimes with which the defendant was charged
C. holding that evidence of violent crimes and other illegal activities of defendants gang was not unduly prejudicial because defendant was not directly implicated and the evidence was probative of elements of the crimes that the defendant was charged with
D. holding that a sentence is not excessive if it is within statutory limitations and there are no facts supporting an allegation of prejudice against the defendant
E. holding that if evidence is improperly admitted but other evidence establishes essentially the same facts there is no prejudice to the accused and no reversible error
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | B | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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doctrine of ejectment, entry is not a prerequisite to the action, and if the lessee has such interest in the property as gives a present right of possession, it is immaterial whether he has entered into possession before bringing the action. The right of entry, not the entry itself — the right of possession, not actual possession — are the essentials of an action in ejectment.” Ewert v. Robinson, 289 F. 740, 750-51 (8th Cir. 1923). The notion that prior possession by a lessee is necessary to trigger the right of possession is a legal fiction unrelated to our more modern view of a lessee’s contractual rights. See Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979) (opinion by Larsen, J.); id., 486 Pa. at 298-299, 405 A.2d at 910 (Roberts, J., joined by Nix and Manderino, JJ., concurring) ; see also Albert M. Greenfield & Co., Inc. v.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding tenants leasing house by oral agreement were coinsureds both landlord and tenants had liability insurance
B. holding that a landlord may have a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its tenants in common areas
C. holding that a landlord cannot validly consent to a search of a tenants apartment despite ownership and legal authority to enter the premises
D. holding landlord and tenants obligations mutually dependent
E. holding landlord jointly liable when he knew of or acquiesced in the tenants trespass
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Silverdale, Washington, and did remain so absent until 18 June 1999. Charge Sheet. The Article 92 offense alleged that the appellant: having knowledge of a lawful order issued by CDR Steven L. Syzska, to report to the Correctional Custody Unit, an order which it was his duty to obey, did, at Naval Submarine Base Bangor, Silverdale, Washington, on or about 28 May 1999, fail to obey the same by wrongfully failing to report to the Correctional Custody Unit. Charge Sheet. Since the appellant entered unconditional guilty pleas to these two offenses at trial the issue of multiplicity is waived unless we find that the charges are facially duplicative. Lloyd, 46 M.J. at 23. When considering whether charges are facially duplicative—“that is, factually the same, 552 (N.M.Ct.Crim.App.1997). But see, United States v. Granger, 9 USCMA
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the insurer was estopped from asserting coverage defenses when it waited to file a declaratory action until 10 months after it had notice of the claim and several months after it had notice of a potential settlement of the underlying litigation
B. holding that one agreement cannot be taken to be several agreements and therefore several conspiracies because the agreement envisages the violation of several statutes rather than one
C. holding that dismissal was required where overall length of prosecution was 16 months state was responsible for 13 months of delay and six months of that delay was due to simple neglect
D. holding that an unauthorized absence of several months and missing movement were not multiplicious
E. holding one and onehalf months establishes causation while three months is too long and does not
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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argument, the Maryland and New Jersey courts here did not delegate the setting of payment schedules to probation or the Bureau of Prisons. Rather, both courts held that payment was due immediately. Thus, there was no improper delegation by the courts of their exclusive authority to determine a payment schedule. The Bureau of Prisons was merely using the IFRP to collect Bramson’s court-ordered payments. See, e.g., Matheny v. Morrison, 307 F.3d 709, 712 (8th Cir.2002) ; McGhee v. Clark, 166 F.3d 884, 886 (7th
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding ifrp does not deprive inmates of constitutional rights to due process
B. holding that court of appeals statutory jurisdiction over final orders of removal extends to reinstatement orders
C. holding the state may appeal orders of dismissal that have the same effect as orders quashing an information
D. holding that bureau of prisons may administer collection of payments through ifrp where sentencing court orders immediate payment
E. holding bop did not exceed its authority in establishing ifrp and that the program does not violate due process
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the responsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’ ” (quoting U.S. Const, art. II, § 3)). The Executive has a unique need to access the federal courts in order to fulfill this constitutional responsibility for ensuring that public rights are enforced, and such an executive enforcement action is a “Case” or “Controversy” that satisfies Article III. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 n. 4, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (confirming that the Court’s standing jurisprudence “derives from Article III and not Article II,” even when it has “an impact on Presidential powers”). Therefore, federal courts have jurisdiction over such executive actions under Article III. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 586, 15 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed. 1092 (1895) . There is only one way for a plaintiff to
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that it is not within the province of any court unless expressly authorized by law to review the determination of the political branch of the government to exclude a given alien
B. holding that when the government acts to enforce public rights the mere fact that the government has no pecuniary interest in the controversy is not sufficient to exclude it from the courts
C. holding that even assuming government was a party in interest in the delaware case and that the party in interest status was sufficient to make the delaware plan binding upon it the government did not receive adequate notice that confirmation might affect its pecuniary interest
D. holding that when the federal government puts into play a series of events which result in a taking of private property the fact that the government acts through an agent does not absolve it from the responsibility and the consequences of its actions
E. holding where 1 the government provided the defendant with all the necessary drugmaking materials 2 the government provided instructions on how to make the drugs and 3 the defendant sought out the materials and help from the undercover government agents the case set the outer limits to which the government may go in the quest to ferret out and prosecute crimes but the governments conduct did not rise to the level of a due process violation
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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continued the May 9, 2005, trial setting. The statute of limitations has expired. Estrada does not object to allowing Martinez to amend her pleading to substitute the appropriate party. Cornell and Estrada have indicated that they intend to assert the statute of limitation defense should Martinez seek to add the proper party in Estrada’s stead. LAW REGARDING ADMISSIONS AND MOTIONS TO AMEND Rule 8(d)’s purpose is to “apprise the plaintiff of the allegations in the complaint that stand admitted and will not be in issue at trial and those that are contested and will require proof to be established to enable plaintiff to prevail.” Yamell v. Roberts, 66 F.R.D. 417, 423 (E.D.Pa.1975)(citing 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fe citing Meschino v. N. Am. Drager, Inc., 841 F.2d at 435-36). Federal pleading is not a game of skill and
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that parties are bound by admissions in pleadings
B. holding that it could not disregard the express pleadings alleging negligence by specific parties
C. holding that parties are generally bound by the stipulations they agree to
D. holding that admissions purportedly made by an accused by way of his agents or attorneys in pleadings from a civil case are not admissible in a criminal case unless shown to have been authorized by him
E. holding that parties are bound by the stipulated facts in a pretrial order
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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duress, is voidable, not void, and the person claiming duress must act promptly to repudiate the contract or release or he will be deemed to have waived his right to do so.”), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 915, 103 S.Ct. 1896, 77 L.Ed.2d 285 (1983). The burden of proving ratification of an invalid release rests upon Leslie Fay. Leslie Fay also argues that Kishbaugh must be deemed to have ratified the release because he did not tender back the $10,200 he received as a result of signing it. Whether the OWBPA was intended to supplant the common law doctrine of ratification is the subject of intense debate. See Reid v. IBM Corp., No. 95 Civ. 1755, 1997 WL 357969, *14 (S.D.N.Y. June 26,1997) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)); compare Blistein v. St. John’s College, 74 F.3d 1459, 1466 (4th Cir.1996) ; Fleming v. U.S. Postal Serv., 27 F.3d 259,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that for a suit to be brought in the venue in which the contract was to be performed the contract must expressly state where the performance of the contract was to occur
B. holding that for the purposes of standing to bring an action to recover on a contract privity is established by proving the defendant was a party to an enforceable contract with either the plaintiff or a party who assigned its cause of action to the plaintiff
C. holding that a defendant who accepts the benefits of control release waives any argument that application of the control release program in the form of the forfeiture of gain time was an ex post violation because control release was enacted after the date of his or her offenses
D. holding that party to contract could not with knowledge of the fraud which had been practiced upon him take any benefit under the contract or change the condition of the property and then repudiate the contract because the taking of a benefit is an election to ratify it
E. holding adea release enforceable notwithstanding employers failure to conform the release to the owbpa because upon learning that the agreement is voidable the employee like the party who acted under duress can either avoid performance of the contract or accept its benefits and thereby ratify the contract
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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146-16-146-25). 362 . Rec. Doc. 146-7 at 5-6. 363 . Rec. Doc. 172 at 3. 364 . Rec. Doc. 118-1 at 19. 365 . Id. (citing Rec. Doc. 22), 366 . Rec. Doc. 118-21 at 1; Rec. Doc. 118-22 at 1-2. 367 . Rec, Doc. 118-37; Rec. Doc. 118-38. 368 . Rec. Doc. 118-21 at 2. 369 . Rec. Doc. 11 at 19. 370 . Rec. Doc. 146-1 at 2. 371 . Rec. Doc. 11 at 21. 372 . Id. 373 . Rec. Doc. 146 at 20. 374 . Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 2007-2441 (La. 4/8/08), 988 So.2d 186, 201, on reh’g in part (July 7, 2008) (“Louisiana courts have long held that attorney's fees are not allowed except where authorized by statute or contract.”). 375 . Rec. Doc. 146 at 20. 376 . Id. at 23, 377 . La. Rev. Stat. § 22:1973(C). 378 . Katie Realty, Ltd. v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 2012-0588, (La. 10/16/12), 100 So.3d 324, 330 . 379 . Batson v. S. La. Med. Ctr., 734 So.2d
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that fees are not recoverable for work for which the client could not be charged
B. holding payment of five dollars to other party prerequisite for recovering attorney fees pursuant to 121103b
C. holding attorneys fees not generally recoverable unless party prevails under cause of action for which attorneys fees are recoverable and damages are recovered
D. holding that a violation of 221973 may subject the insurer to penalties in an amount not to exceed two times the damages sustained or five thousand dollars whichever is greater attorney fees though are not recoverable
E. holding that a liquidated damages amount set by contract is enforceable where the amount bears a reasonable relation to the damages actually sustained
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of customs violations. These officials did not need ‘to have particularized suspicions about any person or place before searching, nor were they required to justify their actions to any authority after the search.’ The Framers found these unchecked governmental actions by the British unacceptable. To ensure that their new government would not have this type of arbitrary power, and to protect against the recurrence of these unchecked governmental actions, the Framers included the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights, granting the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” See Denise Robinson, Kaupp v. Texas: Breathing Life into the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 761 (Spring 2004). This protection was, 2 S.Ct. 587, 592, 151 L.Ed.2d 497, 506-507 (2001) . In still others, the Court has dispensed with
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an officer can stop an individual if the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is underfoot
B. holding unanimously that a warrantless search of a probationers apartment that was supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized as a condition of his probation was reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment
C. recognizing that an officer must have a reasonable articulable suspicion that the person has been is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity to frisk an individual for weapons and must have probable cause to conduct a further seizure
D. holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law
E. holding that when an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer who is already subject to a search condition pursuant to his probation agreement is engaged in criminal activity then there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the probationers privacy interests is reasonable
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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can shift the entire loss to a particular insurer notwithstanding the existence of other insurance clauses. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. American International Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2004) (interpreting Virginia law and holding that the general rule is that an indemnity agreement between the insureds shifts the entire loss to a particular insurer notwithstanding the existence of other insurance clauses). Indeed, a majority of jurisdictions to have addressed priority of insurance coverage disputes involving additional insureds have held that the downstream/subcontractor’s insurance, including its excess insurance, should pay first and before the contractor’s own primary insurance. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. RLI Ins. Co., 292 F.3d 583 (8th Cir. 2002) ; Am. Indem. Lloyds v. Travelers Prop. & Cas.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that excess policy issued to downstream contractor and covering upstream contractor as additional insured was liable before upstream contractors own insurance
B. holding in part that the liability insurance company of the subcontractor which had named the general contractor as an additional insured on the subcontractors policy was liable to reimburse the general contractor for a settlement payment the general contractor had made to the subcontractors employee
C. holding that a cardinal change provides the contractor with a legal right to avoid the contract discharges the contractors duty to perform and relieves the contractor of the default termination and its consequences
D. holding that if contractor is hable to sub that liability though not yet satisfied by payment might well constitute actual damages to the contractor and sustain their suit under rule that contractor may only sue to recover its own damages
E. holding that the government could not charge contractor excess cost of relet contract where government caused a delay in contract performance in which contractor was to use his own equipment original contractors costs increased and government refused to allow original contractor to perform at cost but allowed new contractor to use government equipment and paid new contractor a different rate
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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an employer’s agent and thus a statutory “employer” for purposes of liability, are not personally liable under Title VII and similar state laws. Wathen, 115 F.3d at 405-06. Principal Rybak and Superintendent Schlachter admittedly were Pittman’s “superiors,” but they do not qualify as statutory “employers” for purposes of federal civil rights laws. There is also a limitation on what federal civil rights claims Pittman can bring against CVCC. As an arm of the State, CVCC is immune from claims brought by Pittman pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. CVCC’s immunity stems from the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. A plaintiff is precluded from directly suing a State in federal court on these claims. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 350, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979); see also Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that 1983 does not override a states eleventh amendment immunity
B. holding that congress did not intend to disturb the states eleventh amendment protection in passing 1983
C. holding that the tia does not abrogate states immunity under the eleventh amendment
D. recognizing the eleventh amendment does not bar the united states from suing a state
E. holding that suits under 42 usc 1983 do not override state immunity
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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THE LANDLORD from any and all liability for loss, injury (including death), or damages to person or property sustained while in or on the facilities of LANDLORD, including fire .... ” (App. of Exs., tab 2.) The boat owners argue that it is not enough that the clause released the marina from all liability, it must do more by specifically referring to liability caused by the marina’s own fault. The boat owners made clear during oral argument that they do not suggest that the clause is deficient for not using the magic term “negligence,” but argue that it must refer to liability arising from the marina’s fault in some manner. We recognize that the Supreme Court of Missouri requires something more, see Alack v. Vic Tanny Int’l of Mo., Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 337 (Mo.1996) (en banc) , but we are applying federal maritime law,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that exculpatory clause in health club membership did not exculpate the facility from liability for a personal injury stemming from the facilitys negligence because the clause did not use the term negligence fault or equivalents
B. holding that the basis of liability is negligence and not injury
C. holding that a negligence claim is not a personal injury tort claim
D. holding that release unambiguously released defendants from negligence liability even though the release did not include the word negligence because there was no other rational purpose for which the exculpatory language could have been intended
E. holding that exculpatory clause in release plaintiff signed as part of a health club membership agreement was not specific enough to release club from negligence liability
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | A | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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facility in accordance with subsection (c) of this section. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(l). The EMTALA extends to anyone who seeks emergency room assistance, without distinction between persons with and without insurance. Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1040 (D.C.Cir.1991). 6 . Advantage argues in the alternative that the court “lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear any claim based on rights that P.G. Flospital may have by subrogation” because the patients did not exha (6th Cir.2002) (finding that professional medical organizations had standing to assert a § 1983 claim against state officials for violation of the Medicaid statute provisions requiring early and periodic screening; diagnosis, and treatment for Medicaid-eligible children); Mallo, 88 F.Supp.2d at 1391
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding the medicaid act permits enforcement under 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures
B. holding state is not a proper defendant under 1983
C. holding that patient could sue state agency under 1983 for breaching its obligation under the balance billing provision of the medicaid statute
D. holding that a healthcare provider in a nonmanaged care system may sue under 1983 to enforce its claim that the formula used by the state agency to calculate its reimbursements was improper under 1396abb
E. holding that 1396aa8 is enforceable by medicaid recipients under 1983
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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by a state employee. As PWR has demonstrated, Defendant was neither subjectively ignorant nor acting in reliance upon any misleading communications from the state. We elaborate below: First, Defendant did nothing to investigate Ms. Nelson’s work status, despite the fact that the accident took place at mid-day on a work day and Ms. Nelson’s declaration that she used the vehicle to drive to and from work. See PWR Resp. 7 (citing Tucker Dep. 132:24-133:2). A claim by Defendant that it “lacked knowledge or the means of knowledge of the matter in question” here would be unpersuasive, given that even the most rudimentary inquiry into the matter would likely have disclosed Ms. Nelson’s status as a state agency employee. Cf. City of Crown Point v. Lake Cnty., 510 N.E.2d 684, 687 (Ind.1987) ; see also City of Evansville v. Follis, 161
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding where terms are unambiguous any facts about the parties intent are immaterial
B. holding that both plaintiff and defendant could be prevailing parties within meaning of lease agreement because both parties achieved some judgment on the merits of their claims or counterclaims at trial
C. holding that parties are bound by the stipulated facts in a pretrial order
D. recognizing that judicial estoppel might not be applicable if inconsistent positions result from change in public policy statutory provisions or facts
E. holding that estoppel cannot be applied if the facts are equally known by or accessible to both parties
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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cargo consolidator might, as here, fail to forward the freight payment to the carrier. Under the semi-strict “assumption of risk” view — the view taken by the district court — a shipper remains liable to a carrier, regardless of the shipper’s payment to a cargo consolidator like ICTS, unless the carrier intentionally released the shipper from its duty to pay under the bill of lading. See Nat’l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Omni Lines, 106 F.3d 1544, 1546-47 (11th Cir.1997) (adopting rule of “semi-strict liability for shippers,” such that “unless the carrier intends to release the shipper from its duty to pay under the bill of lading, the shipper remains liable to the carrier, irrespective of the shipper’s payment to a [cargo consolidator]”); Strachan Shipping Co., 701 F.2d at 489-90 ; Sectr-Land Serv. v. Amstar Corp., 690 F.Supp.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that it is not
B. holding that shipper is relieved of liability only if it can demonstrate that carrier actually released it
C. holding that it may not
D. holding the order is only reviewable if actually considered by the district court
E. holding that once a mandatory choice of forum clause is deemed valid the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate exceptional facts explaining why he should be relieved from his contractual duty
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Credit Union Services. These services include, but are not limited to, the use of a share or share draft account, check cashing privileges, ATM transactions, payroll deductions, online banking, and the opening of a new account will not be permitted until the deficiency has been rectified. There will be a 10 day notice of termination sent to the member. If it is a bankruptcy, it can be sent to the attorney. 4 .Assuming the Jaspers complete their plan, BFCU will be paid a dividend of $766.83 on its $15,336.65 unsecured claim. See Order Allowing & Disallowing Claims, doc. # 44, dated December 13, 2004. 5 . BFCU does not dispute that it is a “governmental unit” within the meaning of § 525(a). See 11 U.S.C. § 101(27); T I Federal Credit Union v. DelBonis, 72 F.3d 921, 930-38 (1st Cir.1995) . For this case, the aptness of DelBonis’s
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that corporations are persons within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment
B. holding that federal credit unions are governmental units within the meaning 523a8
C. holding that the referendum powers of home rule units and nonhome rule units are the same
D. holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of 1983
E. holding individual defendants are not an employer within meaning of title vii
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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1206-07 — we are also unpersuaded. As the record shows, the advisory guidelines range that is applicable in the instant case was the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence, not the range of 57 to 71 months that would have applied without the mandatory minimum sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 5Gl.l(b) (providing that when a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable guidelines range, the statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the guidelines sentence). Thus, the government would have requested an improper sentence had it requested a sentence within the range of 57 to 71 months because the district court was not permitted to enter a sentence below the statutory mandatory minimum. See United States v. Castaing-Sosa, 530 F.3d 1358, 1360 (11th Cir.2008) . Further, although the government did not
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a motion under 5k11 permitted a downward departure from the guideline range but that the departure could not extend below the statutory minimum sentence absent an additional motion by the government under 3553e
B. holding that a sentencing court is required by 18 usc 3583g to revoke the defendants term of supervised release unless defendant could come under the exception in 18 usc 3583d
C. holding that a district court lacks authority to pierce a statutory minimum sentence under ussg 5k11
D. holding that a district court is not authorized to sentence a defendant below the statutory minimum unless the government filed a substantial assistance motion pursuant to 18 usc 3553e and ussg 5k11 or the defendant falls within the safetyvalve of 18 usc 3553f
E. holding that district court did not have authority to depart any further below the statutory minimum after granting the 3553e motion and therefore need not consider the 3553a factors
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to the first element of the mere instrumentality rule articulated in Glenn, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege that Novar exercised “complete domination and control” over Indalex so that Indalex “had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own.” Thus, while Plaintiff may have alleged that Novar exercised control over Indalex, such allegations are insufficient to show that Novar exercised “complete domination and control” over Indalex as that language is defined in Glenn v. Wagner. Further, Plaintiffs Complaint contains no allegations that Indalex was a sham corporation. See, e.g., Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 349 (4th Cir.1998) (citing B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Spencer, 268 N.C. 1, 8, 149 S.E.2d 570, 575 (N.C.1966)) ; Austin v. Granite Quarries, USA, Inc., No.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a foreign subsidiary that is not registered to do business in north carolina has no place of business employees or bank accounts in north carolina does not design manufacture or advertise its products in north carolina and does not solicit business in north carolina cannot be subject to personal jurisdiction in north carolina even if some of the companys products do enter north carolina through the stream of commerce
B. recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent was alterego of its subsidiary and was being sued for acts of its subsidiary
C. holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract
D. holding that under north carolina law a corporate parent cannot be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary unless the corporate structure is a sham
E. holding that parent is liable for acts of subsidiary under agency theory only if parent dominates subsidiary parent of whollyowned subsidiary that had seats on board took part in financing and approved major policy decisions was not liable because parent did not have daytoday control
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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law enforcement efforts. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir.1984) (en banc); see also United States v. Brooks, 367 F.3d 1128, 1133 n. 5 (9th Cir.2004) (same). “Exigent circumstances alone, however, are insufficient as the government must also show that a warrant could not have been obtained in time.” United States v. Good, 780 F.2d at 775; see also United States v. Lai, 944 F.2d 1434, 1442 (9th Cir.1991) (“Exigency necessarily implies insufficient time to obtain a warrant; therefore the Government must show that a warrant could not have been obtained in time.”); United States v. Howard, 828 F.2d 552, 555 (9th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271, 1279 (9th Cir.1986) (same); United States v. Manfredi, 722 F.2d 519, 522 (9th Cir.1983) . Our definition of exigent circumstances is
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the evidence obtained as part of an illegal stop should have been suppressed even where the defendants consented to the search
B. holding in an impliedconsent case that a warrantless police entry was unlawful in part because the police did not request entry
C. holding that in every warrantless entry into private residence state has burden to demonstrate that exigencies of situation made entry imperative
D. holding that as part of showing that a warrantless entry was imperative the government must demonstrate that a warrant could not have been obtained in time even by telephone under the procedure authorized by fedrcrimp 41c2
E. holding that the defendant failed to demonstrate government acquiescence in part because he never reported alleged gang incidents to the government and therefore could not prove that the government was even aware of a problem
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the record neither compels, nor supports, a reversal of the IJ and BIA’s decisions. Thus, we deny the petitioners’ petition for review. PETITION DENIED. 1 . Repizo also argues that the lack of corroborative evidence to support his allegations of persecution was due to ineffective assistance of counsel, and indicates that he recendy filed a motion to reopen removal proceedings with the BIA on said grounds. Since the BIA has yet to make a determination with regard to his motion to reopen, we lack jurisdiction to review Repizo's ineffective assistance of counsel claim because he has not yet exhausted his administrative remedies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 463 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir.2006)
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that we lack jurisdiction to consider claims that have not been raised before the bia
B. holding that appellate jurisdiction over final orders of removal are limited to claims that have been exhausted before the bia
C. holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review claims that have not been raised before the bia
D. holding that court of appeals statutory jurisdiction over final orders of removal extends to reinstatement orders
E. recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to the trial court for an in camera inspection to determine whether they are to be disclosed. CONCURRING: G. MURRAY SNOW, Presiding Judge and PATRICK IRVINE, Judge. 1 . A Ponzi scheme is "[a] fraudulent investment scheme in which money contributed by later investors generates artificially high dividends for the original investors, whose example attracts even larger investments." Black’s Law Dictionary 1180 (7th ed.1999). It is named for Charles Ponzi, who in the 1920s was convicted of fraudulent schemes conducted in Boston. Id. 2 . The parties agree that the Commission waived its work-product immunity with its consulting expert, the accountant, when it designated him as an expert witness. See Emergency Care Dynamics, Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 188 Ariz. 32, 33, 932 P.2d 297, 298 (App.1997) . 3 . These are only some, but not all, of the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the trial court may rely on the testimony of an expert even if the expert did not interview the mother daughter or nonocs service providers
B. holding that an expert that had provided consulting services to the defendant relating to the litigation was not precluded from serving as an expert for the plaintiff
C. holding that the state could not impeach an expert witness with evidence concerning past issues with the payment of taxes
D. holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify
E. holding that a lawyer forgoes workproduct protection for communications with an expert witness concerning the subject of the experts testimony even if the expert also plays a consulting role
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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with the merits of whether the resolution in question authorized METRO to construct a light rail line along Richmond Avenue. She argues, “This is precisely the type of situation that the Texas Supreme Court had in mind when it decided the Miranda case: ‘[i]f the evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction, and the fact issue will be resolved by the fact finder.’ ” See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227-28. We disagree. The alleged contract with the voters upon which Scarbrough bases her claims consists of Resolution 2003-93, i.e., the bond proposition itself, together with its exhibits, which the 2003 referendum approved, not extraneous documents. See Taxpayers for Sensible Priorities, 79 S.W.3d at 676 . Thus, the ripe issues raised in Scarbrough’s
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that because the record does not indicate that the extraneous documents or averments were excluded by the court we must assume that they were considered
B. holding that documents that were not created by but that were received maintained and relied upon by a business are business records under 8036
C. holding that documents that are created in the ordinary course of business or would have been created irrespective of litigation are not protected by the work product doctrine
D. holding that extraneous documents were not part of contract with voters created by voter approval of bond proposition
E. holding that the bond was intended to and did substantially comply with sjection 71323 therefore because its conditions were not broader and more protective than the statute required the contention that the bond was a common law bond failed
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the Florida homestead for the sole purpose of hindering, delaying, or defrauding her creditors. Key Bank appeals the district court’s order. II. DISCUSSION The following legal issue was the primary focus of the parties’ briefs on appeal: whether a claimed Florida homestead exemption can be successfully challenged if the home is purchased with non-exempt assets with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors in violation of Fla. Stat. § 726.105. In Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. Lang, 898 F.Supp. 883 (S.D.Fla.1995), the district court answered that question in the negative. Our research leads us to believe that this question is a significant issue of Florida law with respect to which the Florida precedent is not clear. See Butterworth v. Caggiano, 605 So.2d 56, 60 (Fla.1992) ; Palm Beach Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Fishbein,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that homestead exemption was unavailable even though claimants were living on the land and claiming it as homestead with the permission or acquiescence of the owner for they could have no homestead right or interest in land to which they had no title
B. holding that the general rule is that temporary absence from the premises will not itself cause an abandonment of the homestead but to retain the homestead exemption one leaving the homestead must in good faith intend to return albeit the intent to return need not be at any particular time in the future
C. holding that the general homestead exemption may not be invoked to defeat claims against the holder for taxes and assessments against the homestead property
D. holding that where a married debtor files an individual bankruptcy case and claims the 522b3b tbe exemption the debtor indirectly obtains the benefit of floridas constitutional homestead protection by virtue of the nondebtor spouses ability to claim the homestead exemption
E. holding that a homestead was exempt from civil or criminal forfeiture under floridas rico act because forfeitures are not mentioned either expressly or by reasonable implication in the three enumerated exceptions to floridas homestead exemption
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to recover obligations owed by SBMC. [Id. at p. 8]. In connection with these lawsuits, Plaintiffs incurred defense costs and had judgments entered against them personally after SBMC failed to pay the debts through its bankruptcy. [Adv. Doc. No. 17-1, p. 13]. The harm that Plaintiffs allegedly sustained in connection with lawsuits filed against them in their individual capacities is personal and entirely distinct from any harm suffered by SBMC. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ causes of action against Defendants for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation óf the DTPA that are based on suits filed against them by SBMC creditors are Plaintiffs’ direct causes of action that should not be dismissed. In re Skyport Global Commc’ns, Inc., 2011 WL 111427 (Bankr.S.D.Tex. Jan. 13, 2011) . c. Derivative Causes of Action The Complaint
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing the cause of action
B. recognizing cause of action for wrongful death
C. recognizing cause of action
D. holding that dismissal is proper for a derivative cause of action but not for a direct cause of action
E. recognizing cause of action for wrongful discharge
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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The second (categorical) classification traditionally “comprises cases in which the Court implements the proportionality standard by certain categorical restrictions on the death penalty,” but was recently expanded by the Supreme Court to include term-of-years sentences in narrow instances. See id. Walker asserts that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment both categorically and as-applied. A. Walker argues that his 180-month sentence categorically violates the Eighth Amendment under Graham. However, this court has concluded that Graham does not apply in cases where the defendant receives a sentence that is “less severe” than a life sentence. See United States v. Jones, 476 Fed.Appx. 651, 652 (6th Cir.2012) (unpublished); United States v. Moore, 643 F.3d 451, 457 (6th Cir.2011) . Further, this circuit’s holdings emphasize
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that sentences imposing mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on individuals who committed their crimes when under the age of 18 violates the eighth amendment to the united states constitution
B. recognizing that njeither graham nor miller explicitly apply to the functional equivalent of life without parole ie de facto life sentences
C. holding sentences of life without parole unique in their severity
D. holding that mandatory life imprisonment without parole for those under the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes violates eighth amendment
E. holding that life without parole sentences for nonhomicide offenses violates the eighth amendment
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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CURIAM. Verdell Harvey challenges the trial court’s summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Harvey’s motion contained five claims. We affirm the trial court’s rulings without discussion on four of the claims, but we reverse and remand with directions to the trial court on the fifth claim. Harvey was convicted of second-degree murder. In his motion, Harvey alleges that the trial court erred by not reclassifying this conviction from a first-degree felony to a life felony. In other words, Harvey alleges that the trial court erred by imposing a habitual offender sentence because the conviction was a life felony based on the use of a weapon. See, e.g., Nathan v. State, 689 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) . In order to enhance a conviction based on the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that under the 1991 version of the habitual offender statute defendant could not receive habitual offender sentence for life felony
B. holding that a defendant sentenced as an habitual offender who later successfully challenges one of his predicate offenses may have his habitual offender status and sentencing enhancement vacated through postconviction relief or a motion to correct erroneous sentence
C. holding that under habitual felony offender statute a sentence includes the sanction of probation
D. holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing defendant to present evidence of his subjective belief regarding his status as habitual offender because his belief was irrelevant to offense of driving as habitual offender
E. holding that defendants habitual traffic violator conviction could also serve as a predicate felony conviction under the general habitual offender statute
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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changes in the terms and conditions of employment”); Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 783 (1st Cir.1990) (“[A]n isolated sexual advance, without more, does not satisfy the requirement that an employee asserting a cause of action for hostile environment discrimination demonstrate an abusive workplace environment.”). There was no proof that Peter Rodriguez touched or physically threatened Pomales. While we do not preclude the possibility of a single-incident hostile work environment claim based on exclusively verbal conduct, successful single-incident claims typically have involved unwanted physical contact. See Barbara Lindemann & Paul Gross-man, Employment Discrimination Law at 795 n. 240 (3d ed.1996) (collecting cases). Finally, Pomales presented no h Cir.2000) . Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a single offensive racist comment was not sufficient to establish a hostile work environment
B. recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983
C. holding that evidence of a single battery and two offensive remarks over six months did not establish a hostile environment
D. holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive
E. holding that ajlthough a continuing pattern of hostile or abusive behavior is ordinarily required to establish a hostile environment a single instance can suffice when it is sufficiently egregious and holding that the plaintiff established that she suffered a sexually hostile working environment where she alleged she was raped by a male coworker
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Although the BIA noted that the ability of Padilla’s mother to remain in Honduras unharmed undermined Padilla’s CAT claim, that finding does not equate to “changed circumstances” sufficient for rebuttal. Compare Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir.1999) (well-founded fear diminished where family members continued to live in her native country), with Islami v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 391, 397 (2d Cir.2005) (requiring government to show that “country conditions have changed radically” to establish a fundamental change in circumstances sufficient to rebut the presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution (emphasis added)), overruled in part on other grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. D.O.J., 494 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir.2007), and Kone v. Holder, 596 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir.2010) . Because this presumption applies equally to
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an asylum applicant must make a showing of a particularized threat of persecution
B. holding that aliens return trip did not rebut the presumption because the government cannot satisfy its burden simply by showing that applicant enjoyed periods with no new persecution or that applicant will not perpetually be persecuted in her native country
C. holding that the government bears the initial burden of producing evidence that a third country offered the applicant some type of permanent resettlement or evidence a third country officially sanctioned the aliens indefinite presence
D. holding based on equitable estoppel principles that a municipality may not through its agents affirmatively create an objectively reasonable impression in an applicant that he has fully complied with all zoning requirements and then proceed to withdraw permission after the applicant has taken steps towards construction which result in a substantial detriment to the applicant
E. holding that the applicant failed to satisfy the statute because the applicant did not have an ownership right or access right to the reservoir site
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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state actor deprived him of a pro tected property interest without due process of law. See Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d 318, 322 (7th Cir.1996). The District argues that (1) Kiser did not have a property interest in his continued employment and, (2) even if he had such an interest, his own allegations establish that his due process rights were not violated. As to the first argument, the critical question is whether Kiser had a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to continued employment. Thornton v. Barnes, 890 F.2d 1380, 1386 (7th Cir.1989) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)). Every contract that limits the reasons an employee may be terminated creates such an entitlement. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 578, 92 S.Ct. 2701 . Kiser’s contract was to last through June 30,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that interest does not begin to accrue until the date of judgment not the date of verdict
B. holding that cbs could raise the faragherellerth defense because even though the plaintiff was sexually harassed and terminated the evidence showed that plaintiff was terminated for leaving his camera during a live broadcast
C. holding that an employment at will agreement is an enforceable contract until terminated by either party
D. holding that a plaintiff had an employment interest until the date his appointment terminated
E. holding that for causes of action not time barred as of the date of the trustees appointment the limitation period is tolled for an additional two years from the date of appointment
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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summary judgment: (1) the action was barred by the statute of limitations; (2) the action was barred by the plaintiff’s laches; (3) the plaintiff failed to exhaust his remedies under the grievance procedure of the collective bargaining agreement; (4) the Union is a necessary and indispensable party. The trial court’s ruling was based solely on the first ground, and that is our primary concern here. However, since defendant also relies on the other grounds on this appeal, we will also deal with them. Whether jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship or § 301 of the LMRA, the law of Nebraska relative to the appropriate statute of limitations applies. See International Union, United Automobile, etc. v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L. Ed.2d 192 (1966) . Nebraska has a statute of limitations of four
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding statute of limitations should not be equitably tolled for taxpayer who filed a refund claim after the applicable statute of limitations
B. holding that state court with jurisdiction over 301 claim should have applied federal labor law rather than state contract law
C. holding that absent an applicable federal statute of limitations state statutes of limitations should be applied in 301 cases if they are not in conflict with federal policy
D. holding that duress toll to statute of limitations under state law had no application to federal rico statute of limitations
E. holding that where congress does not establish a statute of limitations applicable to a federal cause of action a void which is commonplace in federal statutory law this court has repeatedly borrowed the state law of limitations governing an analogous cause of action
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the Court construes each count as if it were alleged against both Siemens and Dandekar. 3 . The Court construes Count IV as a state law claim because neither Title VII nor Section 1981 is mentioned as a basis for this count, and Plaintiff's response only proffers state law arguments. (R. 27, Pl.’s Resp. at 12.) 4 . Were the Court to consider these additional documents, the Court would need to exercise its discretion and convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 12(d). Because the Court finds that consideration of such documents would not change its analysis, however, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgement. See Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 583 (7th Cir.2009)
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment
B. holding that a court must convert a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment under fedrcivp 56 only when the jurisdictional question intertwines with the merits of the case
C. holding that district court has discretion when deciding to convert a defendants motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment
D. holding that motion to dismiss cannot be treated as summary judgment
E. holding plaintiffs reference to and attachment of franchise agreement excerpts in opposition to defendants motion did not convert motion to dismiss to motion for summary judgment because plaintiff did not introduce support for arguments beyond the allegations in the complaint
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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commitments, the City has remained determined to implement the Lodi Environmental Remediation Program without imposing the burden of Site response costs on the City's innocent taxpayers or ratepayers. Accordingly, the City has sought to borrow from the capital markets additional funds on terms that would not impact the general or special funds of the City of Lodi. To that end, the City of Lodi identified a lender that was willing to provide funds to the City of Lodi for implementation of the Lodi Environmental Remediation Program on terms acceptable to the City Council. 33 . To date, we have declined to decide whether a municipality is a "private party” or the "State,” i.e., the government, for purposes of CERCLA § 107(a)(4). See Washington State Dep’t of Transp., 59 F.3d at 800 & n. 5 . Thus, it is not clear whether Lodi would
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding agencies of state government are part of the state for purposes of sovereign immunity
B. recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state
C. holding that state agencies are treated as states under the eleventh amendment
D. holding that state administrative departments and agencies are within cerclas definition of state under 107a4 and declining to reach the question whether a municipality is the state under that provision
E. holding that the state police is a state agency
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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construe the channels of public disclosure specified in § 3730(e)(4)(A). See Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, — U.S.-,-, 131 S.Ct. 1885, 1891, 179 L.Ed.2d 825 (2011) (noting that the “sources of public disclosure in § 3730(e)(4)(A), especially ‘news media,’ suggest that the public disclosure bar provides ‘a broa[d] sweep’ ”). Courts in our Circuit, for example, have construed the term “news media” to include readily accessible websites. See United States ex rel Green v. Serv. Contract Educ. & Training Trust Fund, 843 F.Supp.2d 20, 32 (D.D.C.2012). Courts have also broadly construed the term “administrative reports” to include publiely-searchable databases. See United States ex rel. Rosner v. WB/Stellar IP Owner, L.L.C., 739 F.Supp.2d 396, 407 (S.D.N.Y.2010) . Here, the defendants argue that the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public
B. holding that a childabuse report is not a public record and therefore is not subject to public inspection
C. holding that draft pleadings are not subject to public records disclosure
D. holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant
E. holding that a public database on a city agencys website was an administrative report subject to public disclosure bar
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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negligent failure-to-warn cause of action. See Conner v. Alfa Laval, Inc., 842 F.Supp.2d 791, 796-97 (E.D.Pa.2012) (Robreno, J.) ("Products-liability theories, including strict products liability, are well within maritime law” and include "three distinct theories of liability: manufacturing defects, design defects, and defects based on inadequate warnings”) (citing East River Steamship Corp., 476 U.S. at 865, 106 S.Ct. 2295; Ocean Barge Transport Co. v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 726 F.2d 121, 123 (3d Cir.1984); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 2 (1998) (previously Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (esp. comments h and j))); Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Trust, 424 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir.2005). 13 . See, e.g., Russo v. Abex Corp., 670 F.Supp. 206, 207 (E.D.Mich.1987) ; Menna v. JohnsManville Corp., 585 F.Supp.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that section 4149 did not apply to the plaintiffs state law claims of breach of duty to protect foster care children from harm and of negligent supervision negligent entrustment and negligent failure to warn
B. holding that fifra preempts state law failure to warn claims
C. holding that a failure to warn was not a policy judgment
D. holding that causation is an essential element in failure to warn claim
E. holding that defense may only be raised in context of negligent failure to warn claims
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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our review of the summary-judgment evidence. See Science Spectrum, Inc., 941 S.W.2d at 911. These issues are encompassed by our disposition of the three specific issues that we address below, all of which Orion has supported with argument and authorities, as required by rule 38.1(h). See Tex.R.App. P. 38.1(h) (requiring that appellant’s brief contain arguments to support contentions). Because Orion has not supported its first and fifth issues with additional arguments that are independent of and distinct from its second, third, and fourth issues, we deem the first and fifth issues addressed by and disposed of by our analysis of Orion’s second, third, and fourth issues. See id,.; Henriquez v. Cemex Mgmt., Inc., 177 S.W.3d 241, 255 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) . Breach of Contract As part of its fourth
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding this court may affirm on any grounds supported by the record even if different from the district courts grounds
B. holding that summary judgment must be affirmed where multiple grounds are asserted and the appellant does not attack all grounds on appeal
C. holding broad malooly point sufficient to support contention challenging all possible grounds on which summary judgment rendered if supported by argument distinguishing malooly bros inc 461 sw2d at 121
D. holding summary judgment must be upheld if it is proper on any grounds
E. holding where movant asserts several grounds in support of its summary judgment motion and the trial court does not specify the grounds on which judgment was granted the reviewing court can affirm the judgment if any of the grounds are meritorious
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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adequately to explain the distinction it has drawn proves fatal to its regulation as applied in this case. II. Beads ISKCON also wants to go on selling two types of beads at its stand on the Mall. One type apparently serves as an instrument of prayer and meditation while the other serves to identify the wearer as a devotee of Krishna. ISKCON’s sale of the former is of no moment to the First Amendment; those beads may be an aid to spiritual activity, but they are not in themselves communicative. I presume that the Park Service could not prohibit the use of a rosary or perhaps of a prayer mat on the Mall, but that does not mean that it must also allow vendors to sell them there. See There to Care, Inc. v. Commissioner of Indiana Department of Revenue, 19 F.3d 1165, 1167 (7th Cir.1994) . The so-called identification beads, on the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that neglect was not excusable where the defendants did not do all that they were required to do after they received the summons and complaint in that they did not contact a lawyer or make any other arrangements with respect to their defense
B. holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act
C. holding a district courts failure to give a same decision instruction harmless because the evidence before the jury strongly supported the conclusion that the plaintiffs were discharged in retaliation for their overtime complaints and that they would not have been discharged had they not engaged in this protected conduct
D. holding words used in bingo game not protected because they did not convey ideas
E. holding that the presumption of uniformity gives way where the subjectmatter to which the words refer is not the same in the several places where they are used
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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from cross-industry salary surveys, the court found that this expert opinion failed to "address the main question confronting the Court — whether members of the Proposed Class are sufficiently cohesive with respect to the employment opportunities available to them.” Id. at *10. 10 . To be sure, the court in Fleischman adhered to its decision to deny class certification as to the issues of antitrust impact and damages, even after the plaintiffs in that case retained Dr. Ashenfelter as an additional expert whose benchmark analysis offered a means by which the plaintiffs could potentially establish antitrust impact and damages through common proof. This ruling, however, was based in part on procedural considerations that are not pertinent here. See Fleischman, 2010 WL 681992 at *3 . To the extent that the court further
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the plaintiffs were not permitted to present a new benchmark analysis from dr ashenfelter that rested upon previously discoverable data
B. holding that plaintiffs state claims were not preempted because defendant failed to show that these claims rested on standards other than those permitted by the fda
C. holding that the drafting history of operative language from a general liability policy is discoverable when ambiguity in policy has not been resolved
D. holding that material submitted by appellant that is cumulative of evidence previously of record is not new
E. holding that new evidence is evidence not previously of record and not merely cumulative of other evidence
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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that [section 301] creates federal jurisdiction only over parties to the contract being sued upon.” Id. at 583. Plaintiff also cites Service, Hospital, Nursing Home, and Public Employees Union v. Commercial Property Services, Inc., 755 F.2d 499, 506 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 850, 106 S.Ct. 147, 88 L.Ed.2d 122 (1985), in which the Sixth Circuit held that “a district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over a non-signatory to a collective bargaining agreement, where no rights or duties are stated in the terms and conditions of the agreement.” 755 F.2d at 506. However, in each of those cases, the plaintiff filed suit directly under § 301, seeking to recover against a non-signatory to the collective bargaining agreement, and the courts w . 1054, 1056-57 (E.D.Mich.1995) . Plaintiff has cited to no authority to the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by 301
B. holding that plaintiffs negligence claim was preempted by section 301 because employers duty to provide a safe workplace was expressly created by the cba
C. holding that plaintiffs had standing to bring section 301 lawsuit to enforce seniority rights under cba
D. holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law
E. holding state law claim preempted by 301 of labor management relations act only if application of state law requires interpretation of collective bargaining agreement
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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a composite frequency for defendant’s six-loci genotype. At the Rule 104 hearing, the defense’s expert, Dr. Shaler, did not contest the accuracy of Cellmark’s databases. Instead, he relied on them in his own statistical calculations. Although the defense still does not criticize the databases, it contends that the State’s population databases were not large enough to be an accurate sampling of the population. Post at 291, 699 A.2d at 682. In addition, the defense never sought to introduce evidence disputing the general acceptance or the mathematical soundness of the product rule. Even on this appeal, the defense does not challenge the use of the product rule. Indeed, the defense states that “everyone agrees that the product rule is absolutely valid.” The dissent, how 2d 799, 803 (1995) ; State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 317
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that calculations done by applying product rule were generally accepted in relevant scientific community
B. holding that expert opinion based on scientific technique is inadmissible unless technique is generally accepted as reliable in relevant scientific community
C. holding under the restrictive frye test that pcrstr testing is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community
D. holding that expert testimony may be admissible even if not generally accepted in the relevant scientific community provided that it qualifies in some other way as reliable under federal rule of evidence 702
E. holding that product rule method of dna statistical evidence is now generally accepted in the relevant scientific community
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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required to decide whether they had subject matter jurisdiction over those federal claims. In contrast, in the instant case, this Court’s jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship. Plaintiff has not asserted any claims under § 301. She has asserted only state law claims. The question before this Court is whether non-signatories to a CBA can invoke § 301 preemption as a defense to a plaintiffs state law claims. Several courts have held that they can. See Covenant Coal, 977 F.2d at 899-900; Dashields v. Robertson, No. 99-1124, 2000 WL 564024, at *2 n. 8 (4th Cir. May 10, 2000) (“section 301 can preempt claims against non-signatories to a collective bargaining agreement”); Mullins v. International Union of Operating Eng’rs Local No. 77, 214 F.Supp.2d 655, 668 (E.D.Va.2002). See also Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 878
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding section 301 preempted plaintiffs claim for tortious interference with contract because that claim would require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement
B. holding state law claim preempted by 301 of labor management relations act only if application of state law requires interpretation of collective bargaining agreement
C. holding state law claim substantially dependent upon interpretation of collective bargaining agreement must be dismissed for failure to use grievance procedure or as preempted by 301 of labor management relations act
D. holding that 301 preempts state claims against nonsignatories where interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is required for resolution
E. holding that the statute of limitations applicable to a section 301 suit was the same as that which applies to suits against an employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of the plaintiffs emotional distress; and (4) the distress suffered was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Buckley v. Trenton Sav. Fund Soc., 111 N.J. 355, 366, 544 A.2d 857 (1988). Defendants submit that Kounelis’s IIED claim must fail because his distress cannot be characterized as severe. Defendants assert that, despite Kounelis’s allegations of emotional distress, he has never been treated for his alleged anxiety, nor has he presented any objective medical evidence suggesting that his emotional distress was the proximate result of Defendants’ conduct. Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, neither medical treatment, nor expert testimony is necessary in order for a plaintiff to prevail on an IIED claim. Bolden v. SEPTA, 21 F.3d 29, 34 (3d Cir.1994) . Indeed, in New Jersey, there is generally no
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute
B. holding inter alia that expert testimony was not required to prove damages for emotional distress in an abuse of process claim
C. holding emotional distress is a distinct claim from wrongful death
D. holding in a fcra case that plaintiffs may not rely on mere conclusory statements rather they must sufficiently articulate true demonstrable emotional distress including the factual context in which the emotional distress arose evidence corroborating the testimony of the plaintiff the nexus between the conduct of the defendant and the emotional distress the degree of such mental distress mitigating circumstances if any physical injuries suffered due to the emotional distress medical attention resulting from the emotional duress psychiatric or psychological treatment and the loss of income if any
E. holding that expert testimony is not required to corroborate a claim for emotional distress
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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a tax return). Le Doux also challenges her liability for frivolous return penalties because she contends that she did not receive a proper Form 17 Notice and Demand. This argument is without merit. The IRS may send notice and demand on any form so long as it includes the information that 26 U.S.C. § 6303 requires. See Long v. United States, 972 F.2d 1174, 1181(10th Cir.1992)(“Not only does the IRS Manual not confer on the taxpayer a substantive right to receive a particular form, but also ‘the form on which a notice of assessment and demand for payment is made is irrelevant as long as it provides the taxpayer with all the information required under 26 U.S.C. 6303(a).’ ’’)(quoting Elias v. Connett, 908 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir.1990)); Jones v. Commissioner, 338 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir.2003); Hoffman v. United States, 209 F.Supp.2d 1089,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice
B. holding notice of balance due satisfies notice and demand requirements
C. holding such service satisfies due process
D. holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner
E. holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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are different because the obligations of the insurance company are different depending upon whether the claim is based upon a “first-party” contract or a “third-party” relationship. That is, “the theory underlying the tort of bad faith settlement of a first-party claim is that there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing” and this “covenant is dependent upon a contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the insurer.” Id. at 776. In contrast, the “theory underlying the liability” in a third-party case is predicated upon “a fiduciary relationship between the insured and insurer[.]” Id. at 772-773. The second case which convinces me that Nebraska would adopt the general rule is American Driver Svc., Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 10 Neb.App. 318, 631 N.W.2d 140 (2001) . In arriving at this decision, the Nebraska
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that no fiduciary relationship existed between insured and insurance company providing workers compensation coverage where insured sued for overpayment of premiums thus there was no basis for tolling the statute of limitations
B. holding that despite assurances from the insurance company that the insured could file the pol after femas deadline the insured could not collect because the insured was responsible for timely filing
C. holding that coverage was excluded where insured failed to notify insurance company of all operators and household members as required
D. holding that an insurance policy providing that the insurance company would pay all reasonable expenses incurred by the insured at our request emphasis omitted did not establish an agreement that the insurer would cover attorney fees and costs to the insured in a declaratory action
E. holding a personal profit exclusion applicable to an insured corporation where the purpose of the exclusion was to exclude coverage when the insured received profits to which the insured was not legally entitled
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Referring to the Standardized Civil Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 9-03 (2002 ed. rev.), which had been provided to the jurors. 7 . At the outset, we reject Ms. Blackwell’s argument that because this was a complex medical malpractice case with no fewer than four breaches of the applicable standard of care alleged, the jury was obligated to reach unanimity on each theory of breach before determining whether a particular breach proximately caused Ms. Bowman’s death. The trial court correctly noted that, by consenting to a verdict form that simply asked one single question about breach instead of requesting a special verdict form specifically addressing each of the alleged breaches, appellants forfeited this argument. See Burke v. Scaggs, 867 A.2d 213, 221 (D.C.2005) ; Nimetz v. Cappadona, 596 A.2d 603, 606-08
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding in a medical malpractice case involving several theories of liability that the appellant by not requesting a special verdict form has forfeited his right to complain on appeal that the jury might not have been unanimous in its views
B. holding that where a jury fails to return unanimous answers to some of the questions on a special verdict form the trial judge can enter judgment on the basis of the unanimous verdicts if they are dispositive of the case
C. holding that despite a jury verdict against the insured hospital for medical malpractice liability was not beyond dispute
D. holding that party did not waive right to trial by jury by requesting directed verdict
E. holding that a defendant in a medical malpractice case who acquiesced to a general verdict form despite several theories of breach could not then challenge the verdict on the basis that jurors may have relied on a theory not supported by sufficient evidence
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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436 U.S. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018; see also Board of County Comm’rs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) (citing Monell). Counties, like municipalities, cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382. The county must be the “moving force” behind the injury. See id. át 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382. The district court properly found that Fox has neither alleged nor presented any evidence that Hartrum and Van Oosterum acted pursuant to county policy or custom when they refused to return Fox’s driver’s license. No evidence indicates that this was anything more than a one-time, isolated event for which the county is not responsible. Cf. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018 . Fox also claims that Stewart failed to
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a municipality may only be held liable under 1983 for a policy practice or custom
B. holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983
C. holding that a plaintiff must identify a municipal policy custom or practice to support a claim against a municipality under monell
D. holding that a municipality may not assert the defense of qualified immunity but may be held liable under 1983 only for a constitutional deprivation inflicted by the execution of a governments policy or custom whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy
E. holding that absent a formal policy a section 1983 plaintiff must establish that the deprivation was caused by a governmental custom
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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States v. Castro, 166 F.3d 728, 731 (5th Cir.1999). The evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 n. 2 (5th Cir.2004) (en banc). Due deference is given to the credibility determinations of the district court. United States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 437 (5th Cir.2002). 3. Walker alleges that the search of her car was improper. The initial encounter with Walker was a valid stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), because the officers had information from a reliable Cl; they knew Walker had been involved in drug trafficking in the past; and they knew that she was located in a high drug-trafficking area. See United States v. Gonzalez, 190 F.3d 668, 672-73 (5th Cir.1999) . We must also consider whether the officers’
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that flight from police can help establish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop
B. holding that circumstances created reasonable suspicion for investigatory stop
C. holding that an officers reasonable mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop under the fourth amendment
D. holding that a tip may provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop
E. holding there was no reasonable suspicion which would justify an investigatory stop despite report of a domestic disturbance
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the capacity of the proposed ward. Section 684(a)(1) of the Probate Code states as much. Furthermore, given the plain wording of section 643, an applicant for guardianship is entitled to have the jury address that fact, assuming its provisions are satisfied. So, if Green was correct in his reading of section 692, then the applicant would be obligated to prove to the trial court that the proposed ward was an incapacitated person in order to win the right to prove the same thing to a jury. In short, two trials would be required; one to a trial court in order to secure one to a jury. Yet, such an inefficient and wasteful result would be absurd and hardly that intended by the legislature. See Cooper v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 985 S.W.2d 614, 617 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1999, no pet.) . Next, and again assuming the accuracy of
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing a court must look beyond the plain language of a statute when the literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result
B. recognizing the legal concept that when interpreting a statute it is presumed that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result
C. holding that we may look beyond text of statute or rule where plain language is unambiguous but would lead to an absurd result that drafters cannot have intended
D. holding that a statute cannot be construed in a manner that would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result
E. recognizing that the cardinal rule in statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature and to avoid construing a statute in a manner that produces an absurd unjust or unreasonable result
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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440 (1981); Papish v. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 669-70, 93 S.Ct. 1197, 35 L.Ed.2d 618 (1973) (per curiam). Restrictions on student speech do not violate the First Amendment when educators exercise “editorial control over the style and content of student speech” that is “school-sponsored,” provided “their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988). Here, Keefe’s speech was off-campus, was not school-sponsored, and cannot be reasonably attributed to the school. Hazelwood’s “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns” test is therefore inapplicable in this case. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405, 127 S.Ct. 2618, 168 L.Ed.2d 290 (2007) ; Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 882
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that schools failure to take steps to prevent students attempted suicide was not even close to violating this outrageousness standard
B. holding that transfer rule denying eligibility to students transferring from public to private schools did not violate the students rights to due process or equal protection of the laws as provided by the fourteenth amendment
C. holding that schools have no duty under the due process clause to protect students from assaults by other students even where the school knew or should have known of the danger presented
D. holding that hazelwood does not control this case because no one would reasonably believe that a students banner bore the schools imprimatur
E. holding unconstitutional the closing of all the schools in one county
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of Rolling v. Emrich, 122 Wis. 134, 99 N.W. 464, 465 (1904). See also Simon v. Pettit, 687 P.2d 1299, 1303 (Colo.1984) ("evidence that the city had maintained the footpaths or included them on a map of the city’s street system would be a strong indication that the paths had acquired a status as public highways”); Hatch Bros. Co. v. Black, 25 Wyo. 109, 165 P. 518, 520 (1917) (noting that “those using the road had done considerable work thereon by making dugways, constructing bridges, etc.; one witness testifying that he had spent about $500 on it about 1891”) superseded by statute as noted in Yeager v. Forbes, 78 P.3d 241, 255 (Wyo.2003). 34 . The same is true of the construction of railroads. See Jamestown & N. R.R. Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 125, 132, 20 S.Ct. 568, 44 L.Ed. 698 (1900) . 35 . SUWA quotes this Court’s Hodel decision
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that even if construction commences but it is based on an illegally issued permit no vested right is created
B. holding that railroad right of way under the act of march 3 1875 ch 152 18 stat 482 vested upon actual construction of the road
C. holding a defendant is not vested with a right to be absent from trial
D. holding that patents to lands over which rights of way created under 1875 act passed conveyed the servient estate in the right of way
E. holding in case where railroad grant was an easement and not a right of way that title vested in abutting landowner once railroad abandoned land
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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way, generally somewhat raised, especially intended for pedestrians, and adapted to their use, usually constructed in this country as a part of the street at or along the side of the part thereof especially designed and constructed for the passage of vehicles and animals, there being often, if not generally, a gutter, also constituting a portion of the street, between such parts; and when the sidewalk is spoken of as being on a specific side of a designated street, it is to be understood to be a part so reserved of that street at or along the specific side of the roadway.” Central Life Assurance Soc’y v. City of Des Moines, 185 Iowa 573, 577, 171 N.W. 31, 32 (1919) (quoting Wabash R.R. v. DeHart, 32 Ind.App. 62, 64, 65 N.E. 192, 193 (1902)) (citations omitted). This def , 561 (1936) ; City of Elmhurst v. Buettgen, 394 Ill. 248,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that sidewalk is that part of a street that has been set aside for use by pedestrians
B. holding that in a city or town a sidewalk is that part of a street or highway that is intended or used by pedestrians
C. holding that in common parlance a sidewalk is the part of the street assigned to the use of pedestrians
D. holding that sidewalk is simply a part of the street set apart for pedestrians
E. holding that sidewalk is used to designate a portion of highway that has been set aside for pedestrians as distinguished from that which is used by vehicles
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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North Carolina is commonly called an “absolute” jurisdiction, but its holdings that refusal cannot be reconsidered involve consent given outside the thirty-minute period. See Etheridge v. Peters, 269 S.E.2d 133, 136 (N.C. 1980) (finding willful refusal to submit to test after statutory thirty-minute period had expired); Seders v. Powell, 259 S.E.2d 544, 548-50 (N.C. 1979) (same). These cases do not make clear whether an operator may reconsider a refusal within the thirty-minute period. ¶ 18. The many courts that allow operators to reconsider a refusal coalesce around two rationales: (1) fairness to the operator, and (2) furthering the purpose of implied-consent statutes by encouraging the administration of chemical tests in as many cases as possible. See, e.g., Gaunt, 666 P.2d at 527 ; Moore, 614 P.2d at 935 (“We . . . decline to
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a literal interpretation should not be adhered to when it would lead to absurd results
B. recognizing rule
C. recognizing clarity afforded by absolute rule but concluding that it could lead to unnecessarily harsh and selfdefeating results
D. holding deadlines may lead to unwelcome results but they prompt parties to act and they produce finality
E. holding that a narrow interpretation of the word fraud in tolling statute would lead to absurd and unjust results
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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it did not, Connecticut law abolished the doctrine of assumption of risk when the state adopted its comparative negligence regime in 1973. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-572h(i) (“The legal doctrines of last clear chance and assumption of risk to which this section is applicable are abolished.”); Wendland v. Ridgefield Constr. Servs., Inc., 190 Conn. 791, 797, 462 A.2d 1043 (1983); Gomeau v. Forrest, 176 Conn. 523, 525-26, 409 A.2d 1006 (1979); Sabella v. Fritz, No. CV116007373S, 2012 WL 1870979, at *2 (Conn.Super. May 2, 2012) (barring assumption of risk claims “couched in negligence language”); Cahill v. Carella, 43 Conn.Supp. 168, 173, 648 A.2d 169 (Conn.Super.1994) (doctrine of assumption of risk abolished); see also Eichelberg v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 57 F.3d 1179, 1188 (2d Cir.1995) . To date, the Connecticut Supreme Court has
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing doctrine
B. holding that assumption of the risk is not an available defense for civil battery
C. recognizing primary assumption of risk as a viable doctrine
D. recognizing that the assumption of the risk operates merely as a corollary of the absence of a duty
E. recognizing connecticut general statute 52572hi and state case law had eliminated doctrine of assumption of risk
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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show that 1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; 2) DOCCS is an entity subject to the acts; and 3) he was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from DOCCS’s services, programs, or activities or DOCCS otherwise discriminated against him by reason of his disability. Id. Wright undoubtedly satisfies the first two elements: DOCCS does not dispute that Wright is a qualified individual because he suffers from cerebral palsy and scoliosis or that DOCCS is an entity that is subject to the statutes. Fulton v. Goord, 591 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 2009) (recognizing that DOCCS is subject to the ADA and RA). Both the ADA and the RA undoubtedly apply to state prisons and their prisoners. See Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998) . The parties, however, dispute the third
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding ada claim was discharged
B. holding that direct threat under the ada includes threats to self
C. holding that public accommodation within meaning of title iii of ada includes more than actual physical structures
D. holding that control over the local prisons is within the authority of the individual counties
E. holding the ada unmistakably includes state prisons and prisoners within its coverage
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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property “is not an exact science and, therefore, all that is required is that the distribution be equitable.” Kasser v. Kasser, 2006 VT 2, ¶ 30, 179 Vt. 259, 895 A.2d 134 (citation omitted). An equitable award does not, however, mean an equal one. Goodrich v. Goodrich, 158 Vt. 587, 593, 613 A.2d 203, 206 (1992). “A disparate property division is not ‘facially inequitable,’ and will not be reversed as long as the family court makes adequate findings that are supported by the evidence.” MacCormack, 2015 VT 64, ¶ 17 (quoting Wade v. Wade, 2005 VT 72, ¶ 20, 178 Vt. 189, 878 A.2d 303). Furthermore, we note that where the court finds that one party is primarily responsible for the debt, it acts within its discretion when it assigns all the debt to that party. See Wade, 2005 VT 72, ¶ 17 . We will thus uphold the family court’s
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a debt incurred for a personal family or household purpose is a consumer debt even though it is secured by the debtors real property
B. holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt
C. holding that the party challenging the dischargeability of a debt bears the burden of proving the debt nondischargeable by a preponderance of the evidence
D. holding that it was within family courts discretion to assign all debt to one party when court found that party to be at fault for debt
E. holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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5 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. See Pa. Const, sched. art. 5, § 16(f), (i). As a result, this Court concludes that regardless of how plaintiff was appointed to the position of President Judge, the holding in Blake is still applicable to the instant case. With regard to the liberty interest asserted by plaintiff, plaintiff argues that the actions of defendant constitute a liberty interest; defamation must be combined with a more tangible interest under state law, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has already held that a President Judge has no legal interest under state law in his administrative duties and responsibilities. See Petition of Blake, 593 A.2d at 1269 n. 2; see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1165, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976) ; Clark v. Township of Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 620
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that defamation by a state official alone does not violate a liberty interest of a plaintiff absent the alteration or extinguishment of a right or status previously recognized by state law
B. holding that defamation standing alone does not suffice for a stigmaplus claim there must be a right or status previously recognized by state law that was distinctly altered or extinguished
C. holding that a suspension with pay does not violate any recognized property interest
D. holding that determination of whether an official was acting on behalf of the state or the local government is determined by state law
E. holding that defamation standing alone is not sufficient to establish a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest citations omitted
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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precisely assert a paramount title to Tracts A and A2. In fact, they conceded Mother held legal title to these tracts. Rather, they asserted they held equitable title to the tracts and sought specific performance as a remedy for Mother’s alleged breach of the contracts to sell the tracts. Further, our appellate courts have traditionally viewed the main purpose of a cause of action seeking specific performance as the pursuit of equitable relief and thus have found such a claim to be equitable in nature. See Ingram v. Kasey’s Assocs., 340 S.C. 98, 105, 531 S.E.2d 287, 290-91 (2000) (applying the equitable standard of review to the findings of fact in a specific performance action); Lowcountry Open Land Trust v. Charleston S. Univ., 376 S.C. 399, 406, 656 S.E.2d 775, 779 (Ct. App. 2008) . Based on the foregoing, we view the two
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an action for specific performance lies in equity
B. holding that an employees action against her employer for negligent supervision lies not in tort but with an action for breach of contract
C. holding 1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause
D. holding that an action for the negligence of an architect in the performance of professional services is an action for breach of contract
E. holding he who seeks equity must do equity
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Court cases noted above, did not attempt to define the word “race” nor did it provide a distinction between race and national origin. In the years following the Agnew decision the Ninth Circuit has been presented with a number of cases in which plaintiffs alleging membership in distinctive groups of the population brought suit pursuant to section 1981. In each of these cases the district court had either dismissed the complaint or entered judgment in favor of the defendants. In each instance the circuit court reversed and allowed the plaintiff to sue under section 1981 without any discussion of whether the claims involved discrimination on the basis of race or national origin or of whether such distinction could be made. See Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1975) ; Sethy v. Alameda County Water District, 545
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an atwill employee may bring a cause of action under section 1981
B. holding by implication that plaintiff a brownskinned person of east indian descent had stated a proper claim under section 1981
C. holding that africanamerican plaintiffs had stated a claim under section 1981 when they were forced to prepay for food ordered in restaurant
D. holding that american indian plaintiffs had appropriately pled a claim under section 1981
E. holding that title vii precludes a claim under section 1981 for racial discrimination against a federal employee
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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presented to the courts of last resort — state and federal— will be resolved on other grounds and not by answering this debatable question about the net impact of different rules of law on freedom of expression by performing artists. A more compelling ground for resolving the issue is that legal constraints protecting freedom of expression are primarily designed as a shield, not a sword. They may be invoked generally in defense of freedom and only rarely to sustain an action for damages. The legal system stands ready to shield freedom against unlawful governmental intrusion, but reluctant to use the sword of damages to vindicate one claim of freedom by striking down another. Cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920-32, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3430-36, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982) . In a system of equal justice, a conception of
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding such damages available where local law silent on issue speculative nature of damages does not preclude recovery
B. holding that law enforcement agents speech which raised the possibility of corruption in a public agency is protected under the first amendment
C. holding that first amendment principles preclude recovery under state law for damages caused by speech or other protected conduct
D. holding first amendment claim requires actual protected conduct
E. holding that retaliatory discharge based solely on protected speech by ones spouse is actionable under the first amendment
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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(quoting United States v. Vesich, 724 F.2d 451, 454 (5th Cir.1984)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923, 107 S.Ct. 329, 93 L.Ed.2d 302 (1986). The authority for this proposition derives from the opinion in Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419 (1893), where, in interpret t have a relationship in time, causation, or logic with the judicial proceedings.” Id. at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357. We see an obvious and overwhelming nexus in time, causation, and logic between Novak's willful and repeated violations of the lawful conditions of his supervised release and the sentencing proceeding imposing those conditions in the first place. Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the pre-Aguilar analysis of our sister circuit in Haiti v. United States, 260 F.2d 744, 746 (9th Cir.1958) , and its progeny. 12 . Indeed, the government
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. recognizing the tort of interference with prospective contractual relations as a subspecies of the broader tort of interference with prospective economic advantage
B. recognizing that wrongful or malicious interference with atwill employment contract may give rise to a tortious interference claim the fact that the employment is at the will of the employer and the employee does not make it one at the will of third parties
C. recognizing the tort of wrongful interference with anothers business relations
D. holding improper conduct to be an element of the tort of intentional interference with an advantageous business relationship
E. holding that interference with terms of anothers probation was not interference with due administration of justice under 1503 reading omnibus clause of 1503 narrowly ejusdem generis to relate to conduct designed to interfere with the process of arriving at an appropriate judgment in a pending case and which disturb the ordinary and proper functions of the court
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prior litigation. See Response to Motion, dkt. no. 22, P-2 However, the Defendant contends that the issues decided by the state court are not identical to the issues concerning the nondischargeability claim because the April 4 Order did not establish the existence of an express trust. In support, the Defendant asserts, without any supporting authority, that a fiduciary relationship under § 523(a)(4) is limited to express and technical trusts. The Defendant is mistaken. The Seventh Circuit has made clear that a fiduciary duty for purposes of § 523(a)(4) also applies in circumstances which, “while not involving trusts in a formal sense, seemed to call for the imposition of the same high standard.” In re Marchiando, at 1115; see also In re McDade, 282 B.R. 650, 658 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2002) ; In re Odeh, 431 B.R. 807, 816
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that certain fiduciary duty claims did not arise out of the underlying contractual provisions
B. holding that a statutorilyimposed fiduciary obligation created an express trust fiduciary relationship for purposes of 523a4
C. holding that express warranty claims that could only arise out of fda approval are preempted
D. recognizing that fiduciary relationships may arise for nondischargeability purposes outside of express trusts
E. holding that jury verdict in prior state court fraud action including finding that debtor willfully breached fiduciary duty had preclusive effect on courts determination of nondischargeability based on defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity under 523a4
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to collect attorney’s fees, and the condo association was not “bound to accept something less than the full sum to which it was entitled.” Id. at 471. We further held that the expenditure of $46,548.64 in attorneys fees was not unreasonable to recover $1,200 in outstanding condo association fees because of the nature of the litigation. Id. However, we have also held that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in awarding a homeowners’ association only a portion of its fees where the association did not prevail on all of its claims and where the trial court conducted a thorough review of the record, which included a detailed worksheet on litigation expenses. The Ridings at Whitpain, 811 A.2d at 1116; accord Township of South Whitehall v. Karoly, 891 A.2d 780, 785 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006) . By contrast, we concluded that a trial court
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an award of attorney fees for services rendered at the instance of the custodial parent in defending an action for change of custody may be allowed even though the defense was unsuccessful and even though it was claimed that such an award violated public policy
B. recognizing discretion of district court in determining a fee award
C. holding that the ridings at whitpain does not require a reduction in an attorney fee award for an unsuccessful complaint but simply concluded that a trial court was justified in reducing the award if the record supported such a decision
D. holding that the record supported the district courts award of damages
E. holding that when an attorney fee award is made under a statute that does not define reasonable the award should be determined in light of all cetreumstances emphasis added
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890, 101 S.Ct. 247, 66 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980), rejected the Board’s conclusion that it was an unfair labor practice for an employer to discharge union officials who disobeyed a contract term requiring union officials to take positive steps to terminate contractually forbidden strikes. As the same court later noted, in a summary of the Gould decision, “where a collective bargaining agreement explicitly requires union officers and representatives to use every reasonable effort to terminate an unauthorized ‘work stoppage,’ an employer may single out for disciplinary discharge a union steward who fails to take affirmative steps to terminate that work stoppage.” Hammermill Paper Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 155, 163 (3d Cir. 1981) . The Seventh Circuit has reached the same
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that where contract does not authorize employers selective discharge of union officials discharge violates section 8a3
B. holding that discharge of employee for having distributed expired drugs at employers direction did not violate clear mandate of public policy because the discharge implicated only the private interests of the parties
C. recognizing tort of wrongful discharge
D. holding that where the immediate cause or motivating factor of a discharge is the employees assertion of statutory rights the discharge is discriminatory under section 215a3 whether or not grounds for other discharge exist
E. holding that the employers discharge of the plaintiff four months after the plaintiff filed a discrimination claim is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge
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manufacture a controlled substance. The order of the Superi- or Court affirming the judgment of sentence is vacated. This case is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County for resentencing in accordance with the terms of this Opinion. Justice TODD did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. Chief Justice CASTILLE, and Justices SAYLOR, EAKIN and BAER, and Justice GREENSPAN join the opinion. 1 . 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32) 2 . 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) 3 . 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3302 4 . 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903 5 . Additional sentences on the offenses relating to possessing drug paraphernalia and risking a catastrophe either merged with or were to run concurrently with Appellant's other sentences, and are not at issue on this appeal. 6 . Cf. Dickson, supra at 109 . 7 . The 1972 Official Comment to 18 Pa.C.S. §
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the government was required to prove that the defendant lacked a license to possess a firearm but not that the defendant possessed the firearm for any duration of time
B. holding 922g is not unconstitutional as applied to a defendant who possessed a firearm only intrastate when the government demonstrated that the firearm moved in interstate commerce
C. holding that a statute imposing a mandatory minimum sentence on a person convicted of a crime of violence if the person visibly possessed a firearm or replica of a firearm cannot be applied to a coconspirator who did not visibly possess a firearm or replica
D. holding that mandatory minimum sentence required by 42 pacs 9712a for persons who visibly possess firearm while committing certain crimes does not apply to unarmed coconspirators
E. holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used
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concluded that plaintiffs’ claims generally meet the preliminary standard set by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and the SRA, the Court must determine whether plaintiffs have pled with particularity all facts on which their beliefs about the falsity of defendants statements are formed. At this point in the analysis, the line between pleading falsity and pleading fraud becomes blurred. As defendants note, in the Second Circuit, the information and belief pleading requirement appears to be an integral part of the strong inference standard for pleading scienter. See Philip Morris, 75 F.3d at 812-813 (finding that plaintiffs’ allegations of negative internal reports failed to support claims of falsity and scienter); Wexner v. First Manhattan Co., 902 F.2d 169, 172-73 (2d Cir.1990) ; Crystal v. Foy, 562 F.Supp. 422, 424-25
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that conclusory allegation of leak of confidential information without more failed to create inference of fraudulent intent
B. holding records did not qualify as exempt confidential commercial information under exemption 4 because the information was not actually confidential
C. holding that conclusory allegation of conspiracy without supporting factual averments insufficient to state claim
D. holding that plaintiff could state a claim for conversion of confidential information
E. holding conclusory assertions of intent to cause insufficient without supporting facts
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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except as otherwise provided, be brought in the county wherein such place is situated.” Both parties agree the contract did not specify a location in which it was to be performed. Nonetheless, Abernethy claims, because the payments were to be made to him in Johnson County, the contract was assumed to be performed in Johnson County. The district court agreed with this conclusion. However, “a contract to pay at a particular place arising from implication of law is not sufficient” such that section 616.7 would apply. Bechtel v. Dist. Ct., 215 Iowa 295, 245 N.W. 299, 300 (1932). Due to the lack of specification with regard to the locality of performance, Iowa Code section 616.7 is not a vehicle through which the suit may be brought outside of Schmitt’s resident county. See id, at 300 — 01 . In addition, the district court also relied
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that an attorney approval clause in a contract for the sale of real estate was a part of that contract and would have to be satisfied for the underlying contract to be enforceable
B. holding that the place of performance governs the legality of the contract and because the contract was to be performed in mexico texas public policy against gambling was not implicated
C. holding that for a suit to be brought in the venue in which the contract was to be performed the contract must expressly state where the performance of the contract was to occur
D. holding a condition precedent is an act or event that must be performed or occur after the contract has been formed before the contract becomes effective
E. holding a contract was divisible in its nature if the intention is expressly stated in the contract
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not the Columbia County Probation and Parole Office — as a defendant, and avers that “Defendant Columbia County is a municipality within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that, at all times relevant hereto, operated the Columbia County Probation Department.” .App. 1220. However, Columbia County denied this claim in its answer, stating that “it is specifically denied that Columbia County operated the County Probation Department with respect to the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint,” and asserting that “Defendant Panetta was acting as an officer of the court, which is a branch of the state for purposes of the alleged claims.” App. 1288. This assertion'is sup ported by the rule this Court articulated in Benn v. First Judicial District of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 241 (3d Cir.2005) , which we underscored in Haybarger, 551 F.3d
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that local school boards were not entitled to eleventh amendment immunity even though entitled to sovereign immunity in the same degree as the state itself from tort suits
B. holding that judges have immunity from suit for judicial acts
C. holding that school districts do not share in the commonwealth of pennsylvanias eleventh amendment sovereign immunity because they are not alter egos of the commonwealth
D. holding that pennsylvanias judicial districts are entitled to immunity from suit under the eleventh amendment
E. holding that the department of corrections was entitled to eleventh amendment immunity from suit under section 1981
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evaluated as a whole, [it] is in substantial compliance with the applicable requirements [of the NCP] and results in a CERCLA-quality cleanup.” 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(i). See 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(4) (a party that “substantially complies” with the requirements of the NCP may pursue a cost-recovery action); Waste Management of Alameda County, Inc. v. East Bay Regional Park District, 135 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1100 (N.D.Cal.2001) (stating that the EPA shifted to this flexible “case-by-case” standard “to avoid discouraging private parties from cleaning up hazardous wastes for fear that recovery of their costs would later be precluded by less than perfect compliance with the NCP,” citing 55 Fed.Reg. 8792-94). See also Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 24 F.3d 1565, 1576 (9th Cir.1994) . Actions are not consid ered inconsistent with
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that notice not required because cercla is a strict liability statute
B. holding that strict compliance is not required
C. holding that waiver of federal tort claims act sovereign immunity is conditioned upon strict compliance with exhaustion requirement
D. recognizing that strict compliance with 1557 is required
E. holding that strict compliance with the 30180day time limit set forth in krs 4392651 is required
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2003) (emphasis added). Thus, in three different statutory provisions, Congress has provided that a court shall dismiss a prisoner’s complaint if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant. In Black’s Law Dictionary, the word “shall” is defined as follows: As used in statutes, contracts, or the like, this word is generally imperative or mandatory. In common or ordinary parlance, and in its ordinary signification, the term “ 07 S.Ct. 2415, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987) ; and Hughes v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 1301, 1302,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that administrative exhaustion is mandatory despite legislatures use of the word may
B. holding that the use of the word shall in the extradition clause and the extradition act creates a mandatory duty
C. holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language
D. holding that the word may in the declaratory judgment act does not mean shall
E. holding the word individuals is not the equivalent of the dictionary acts use of the word persons
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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actually charged “were bargain rates”). Rather, the bankruptcy court considered the quality and efficiency of counsel’s services. The court’s conclusion that $200 per hour was a reasonable rate is not an abuse of discretion. In short, the bankruptcy court and district court permissibly calculated fees and costs. As the district court noted, a recalculation may be required as a result of the remand to the bankruptcy court, but no error in the award of fees and costs appears to date. AFFIRMED. 1 . The Bank filed no cross-appeal. Therefore, the Bank's argument that we should reverse the district court’s holding that Plaintiffs held equitable title to the Property is not properly before us. See El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 479, 119 S.Ct. 1430, 143 L.Ed.2d 635 (1999) . 2 . The Bank relies on Stanley v. Crossland,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that appellate courts may uphold a trial courts ruling on any legal theory or basis applicable to the case but may not reverse a trial courts ruling on any theory or basis that might have been applicable to the case but was not raised
B. holding that the petitioner may not turn a clerical error into a windfall of rights it would not otherwise enjoy internal quotation marks omitted
C. holding that failure of an appellee to crossappeal ordinarily precludes review where an appellee seeks to enlarge his rights or lessen those of an adversary but is not a jurisdictional bar
D. holding that in the absence of a crossappeal an appellee may urge affirmance of the lower courts ruling on any basis appearing in the record but may not attack the decree with a view either to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary internal quotation marks omitted
E. holding that as to allocation of burdens it is not material that the facts of the case and the causes of the collision are peculiarly within the knowledge of the respondents we are not aware of any ground on which such an inconvenience can affect the rule of law which governs the rights of the parties internal quotation marks omitted
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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membership in a prison gang. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir.2005) (res judicata); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir.2003) (failure to exhaust). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed the due process claims because they have already been litigated by the parties or their privies in state court. See Acuna v. Kirkland, No. HC-PB-05-0005242, slip op. at 1 (Cal.Super.Ct. Oct. 6, 2006); In re Arcadio Acuna, No. HCPB06-5235, slip op. at 3 (Cal.Super.Ct. Apr. 6, 2007); see also Kay v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 504 F.3d 803, 808 (9th Cir.2007) (setting forth elements of res judicata under California law); Silverton v. Dep’t of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir.1981) . The district court properly dismissed the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding federal habeas proceeding was properly dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies when petitioners direct appeal from resentencing was still pending in state court at the time he sought habeas relief
B. holding that habeas petitioner scheduled to be executed in the state of virginia for capital murder could not raise claim of violation of his rights under the vienna convention on federal habeas review where he failed to preserve the claim by raising it in state court proceedings vienna convention does not trump subsequent federal statute requiring habeas petitioners who claim to be held in violation of treaties of the united states to develop factual bases for their claims in state court as a precondition of federal habeas review
C. holding common issue of fault was actually litigated in prior property damage suit and determined adversely to plaintiff and therefore fault could not be relitigated in subsequent per sonal injury action under issue preclusion
D. holding that because of the nature of a state habeas proceeding a decision actually rendered should preclude an identical issue from being relitigated in a subsequent 1983 action if the state habeas court afforded a full and fair opportunity for the issue to be heard and determined under federal standards
E. holding that a state habeas proceeding decided on the merits precluded a section 1983 action in federal court
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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California, Sacramento Division. In this action, plaintiffs sought to compel the BIA to issue a decision on the pending appeals. Because the BIA indicated that it would issue its decision, that case was dismissed as moot. 4 . Plaintiffs erroneously argue that this Court may apply a lesser standard than that set forth in Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., -U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 365, 375, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). In considering preliminary injunctions after Winter, Ninth Circuit cases have unanimously rejected this notion. See e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns. Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir.2009) ("To the extent that our cases have suggested a lesser standard, they are no longer controlling, or even viable.”); Stormans Inc. v. Selecky, 571 F.3d 960, 977 (9th Cir.2009) ; Cal. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 563
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that district court error was not clear error because no prior ninth circuit authority prohibited the course taken by the district court
B. recognizing that this test applies in every federal circuit save the fourth and the ninth
C. holding that the district court erred when it relied on neuschafer for the proposition that dismissal of mixed habeas petitions is not the rule in the ninth circuit
D. holding that the ninth circuit erred by failing to defer to the bias reasonable interpretation of the ina
E. recognizing that the winter court rejected the ninth circuit sliding scale test because it was too lenient
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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so severe as to alter plaintiffs working conditions. Plaintiffs deposition testimony and other evidence in the record indicates that his working environment prior to this incident was generally amicable. See Def.’s Mot., Ex. A, Jones Dep. at 52 (stating that the emp ances, including the plaintiffs and Mr. Wallace’s working relationship over the prior two years, plaintiffs failure to ever voice any complaints to management that Mr. Wallace’s behavior allegedly made plaintiff uncomfortable, and the fact that the conditions of plaintiffs working environment were not altered, there being nothing in the record indicating that prior to or after this incident plaintiff was unable to perform efficiently in his work environment due to Mr. Wallace’s conduct, see Lee-Crespo, 354 F.3d 34, 45-46 , the Court grants summary judgment to the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding single incident of sexual harassment was neither sufficiently pervasive nor severe to constitute a hostile work environment
B. holding that harassing conduct not sufficiently severe and pervasive where conduct would not have affected the work environment of a reasonable person
C. holding that a claim of constructive discharge requires a showing of harassment that is more severe and pervasive than that required to show a hostile work environment
D. holding that no hostile work environment existed where the conduct in question consists of isolated events that were not physically threatening or humiliating and in some cases were not even directed at plaintiff
E. holding that plaintiff did not establish a severe or pervasive hostile work environment where the complained of conduct was episodic but not so frequent as to become pervasive was never severe was never physically threatening though occasionally discomforting or mildly humiliating and significantly was never according to the record an impediment to the plaintiffs work performance
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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specific securities.” 241 F.Supp.2d at 220; see also id. at 221-22. In fact, the complaint specifically alleges that defendants’ misrepresentations about the source of their investment advice were intended to and did cause plaintiffs and the putative class members to pay premium brokerage commissions — commissions which accrued only upon the purchase or sale of securities. We held in Dabit that such claims are preempted by SLUSA because they allege misstatements “in connection with” the purchase or sale of securities as that term was interpreted by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 122 S.Ct. 1899, 153 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002). See Dabit, 395 F.3d at 48-49 (citing Zandford, 535 U.S. at 820, 825); accord Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 299-300 (3d Cir.2005) . The contract and negligence claims fare no
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a claim arises from the purchase or sale of a security only if there is an allegation of fraud in the purchase sale or issuance of the instrument
B. holding that a plaintiff alleging securities fraud must show that a defendant 1 made a material misrepresentation or a material omission as to which he or she had a duty to speak 2 with scienter 3 in connection with the purchase or sale of securities
C. holding that the basic elements of section 10b and rule 10b5 claims are 1 a material misrepresentation or omission 2 scienter ie a wrongful state of mind 3 a connection with the purchase or sale of a security 4 reliance often referred to in cases involving public securities markets fraudonthemarket cases as transaction causation 5 economic loss and 6 loss causation ie a causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss internal citations omitted
D. holding that slusa preempts claims which allege a material misrepresentation or omission in connection with the purchase or sale of securities whether or not that allegation is an element of or otherwise necessary to the putative state claim
E. holding breach of best execution duty is a material misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale of the securities
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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notes that pimp can be used as an insult, but can also mean “cool.” See The Online Slang Dictionary, at http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/ wrader/slang/p.html# top (visited July 29, 2002). See also http://www.slang-site.eom/slang/P.html (visited July 29, 2002) (defining “pimp” variously as “when complimenting a person on their mastery of the subject matter;” “a headhunter, recruiter, or account executive;” “a cigarette filled with tobacco or anything else you can smoke;” and to “plug, promote”). While Plaintiffs are correct that their prescribed meaning is not unreasonable, this assertion misses the point. In First Amendment jurisprudence, it is not the meaning prescribed by or the effect on the listener that controls. See e.g. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 ; NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding in a fcra case that plaintiffs may not rely on mere conclusory statements rather they must sufficiently articulate true demonstrable emotional distress including the factual context in which the emotional distress arose evidence corroborating the testimony of the plaintiff the nexus between the conduct of the defendant and the emotional distress the degree of such mental distress mitigating circumstances if any physical injuries suffered due to the emotional distress medical attention resulting from the emotional duress psychiatric or psychological treatment and the loss of income if any
B. holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute
C. holding emotional distress is a distinct claim from wrongful death
D. holding that expert testimony is not required to corroborate a claim for emotional distress
E. holding first amendment does not permit emotional distress claim for ad parody
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to others. Summary judgment dismissing Nunes’s ADA claim was therefore inappropriate. That judgment is reversed, and this case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED. 1 . The ADA mentions only threats to others, whereas the EEOC regulations expand the term "direct threat” to include threats to the disabled person herself. We have not yet ruled on whether the direct threat defense includes threats to one’s self and decline to do so in the present case because the issue was not addressed in the district court and has not been properly presented in this appeal. We note, however, that two courts in other circuits have considered this issue and have reached different results. Compare Kohnke v. Delta Airlines, 932 F.Supp. 1110, 1111 (N.D.Ill.1996) , with Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc., 97
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that threats to inflict financial or personal harm are not true threats where no ones personal safety is threatened
B. holding ada claim was discharged
C. holding that expansion of the ada to encompass threats to self is untenable because the ada mentions only threats to others
D. holding that direct threat under the ada includes threats to self
E. holding that threats standing alone constitute past persecution in only a small category of cases and only when the threats are so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm
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— CDC—to a third party — the Commonwealth — through mechanisms of depletion and nonpayment in order to evade the judgment. State postjudgment enforcement procedures, incorporated into federal procedure by Rule 69(a), classically encompass such fact patterns. And in colloquial terms, it could be thought that exercise of enforcement jurisdiction here simply protects the MD judgment. Futura draws an analogy to a situation where a judgment is entered against a corporate subsidiary and the judgment is unenforcable because the corporate parent has looted the subsidiary. In such instance, suits or enforcement proceedings against the corporate parent to enforce the judgment have been permitted. See, e.g., Explosives Corp. of America v. Garlam Enterprises Corp., 817 F.2d 894 (1st Cir.1987) ; Pan America Match Inc. v. Sears, Robuck and
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding parent corporation which controlled litigation on behalf of subsidiary bound by judgment
B. holding that parent is liable for acts of subsidiary under agency theory only if parent dominates subsidiary parent of whollyowned subsidiary that had seats on board took part in financing and approved major policy decisions was not liable because parent did not have daytoday control
C. holding that a close relationship between a parent corporation and a subsidiary may justify finding that the parent engages in business in the jurisdiction through the local activities of its subsidiary
D. holding that a parent must exercise some control over the subsidiarys activities which does not require that the subsidiary be controlled to an ultimate degree by its parent although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required the parent must have and exercise control and direction over the affairs of its subsidiary in order for venue to be proper
E. holding parent company bound in subsequent action by res judicata effect of judgment against subsidiary
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following birth, even though the initial ingestion by the pregnant woman occurred pre-birth. [¶ 15] “The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, fully renewable on appeal.” State v. Geiser, 2009 ND 36, ¶ 6, 763 N.W.2d 469. “When interpreting statutes, this Court has a duty to ascertain the Legislature’s intent.” Id. at ¶ 8. “Words used in any statute are to be understood in their ordinary sense, unless a contrary intention plainly appears, but any words explained in this code are to be understood as thus explained.” N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02. “Technical words and phrases and such others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or as are defined by statute, must be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.” N.D.C.C. § (Ct.App.2006) ; State v. Gray, 62 Ohio St.3d 514, 584 N.E.2d
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding a fetus is not a child person or individual for purposes of criminal prosecution under the reckless injury to a child statute
B. holding a mothers ingestion of a controlled substance while pregnant does not constitute child abuse as an unborn child is not a person for purposes of criminal prosecution
C. holding an unborn child is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of mistreatment of a child
D. holding ohios child endangerment statute does not apply to mothers who abuse drugs during pregnancy
E. holding an unborn viable fetus is not a human being under the new mexico child abuse statute and the mothers use of cocaine during pregnancy was not child abuse
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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claim is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. 1 . Plaintiff Toyee, while declining to concur in the relief sought by this motion pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(a) (E.D.Mich. November 7, 1994), has not submitted a response to Reno’s motion to dismiss. 2 . In his brief in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, presently pending before this court, Toyee argues that "the arrogance and intentional political posturing that defendant attributed to plaintiff on the basis of this event [the T-shirt incident] clearly contributed to the alleged "unprofessional attitude” that admittedly was the primary factor in the decision to discharge [Toyee]. (emphasis in the original) 3 . Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971)
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a federal cause of action for damages arises upon a federal agents unconstitutional conduct
B. holding that a single cause of action arises out of the same set of facts
C. recognizing an action for damages against unknown federal agents for the violation of constitutional rights
D. recognizing cause of action for damages against federal agents acting under their authority who allegedly violated plaintiffs fourth amendment rights
E. holding plaintiff may sue federal agents for money damages for violation of his constitutional rights
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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guerillas. Review of the record, however, shows that claim was sufficiently presented to the BIA. Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 321-22 (5th Cir.2009). The BIA’s decision is reviewed for substantial evidence. See Mikhael v. INS, 115 F.3d 299, 302 (5th Cir.1997); Chen v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir. 2006). Under this standard, the IA 2007) (finding proposed group of wealthy Guatemalans “not so readily ‘identifiable’ or sufficiently defined as to meet the requirements of a particular social group within the meaning of the refugee definition”) (emphasis in original). Insofar as Segovia asserts he is entitled to relief because political unrest makes it unsafe for him to return to El Salvador, his claim is similarly unavailing. Eduard v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182, 190 (5th Cir.2004) . DENIED. * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution
B. holding applicants fear of persecution cannot be based solely on general violence and civil disorder
C. holding that absent past persecution an alien can demonstrate eligibility for asylum based on a wellfounded fear of future persecution by demonstrating that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable
D. holding that general crime conditions are not a stated ground for a wellfounded fear of future persecution
E. holding that to qualify for asylum the fear of future persecution must be based on reasonably specific information showing a real threat to individual persecution not mere assertions of fear of possible persecution or speculative conclusions quoting mapouya 487 f3d at 412
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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to make public or “available” those portions of the prior art that anticipated Smarts’ patents. In other words, Smarts would have this Court foreclose Delphi as prior art based on the inadequacy of a demonstration when it is not at all clear — by Smarts’ own design — what could or should have been demonstrated, or what aspect of the Delphi software was, in fact, anticipatory. Triable issues thus exist with respect to the application of Sections 102(a), 102(b), and 102(g). It may of course be the case that, given both the nature of the prior art and the extent of Morgan Stanley’s demonstration to third parties, Delphi may not ultimately qualify as prior art under those statutory provisions. However, such issues must be left for another day. C.f Articulate Sys., 53 F.Supp.2d at 63, 75-76 . At the present time, the Defendants have
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that despite the lack of a statutory requirement that severe child abuse be shown by clear and convincing evidence due to the consequences of such a finding the clear and convincing standard must be applied
B. holding that issue of whether inventions prior demonstration constituted clear and convincing evidence of patent invalidity was close question properly put to jury
C. holding that whether adverse possession was proven by clear and convincing evidence is a factual determination made by the chancellor
D. holding that in reviewing a defendants motion for judgment of acquittal based on insanity which the defendant must prove by clear and convincing evidence the court must determine whether no reasonable jury could have failed to find that the defendants criminal insanity at the time of the offense was established by clear and convincing evidence
E. holding that fraud on the court must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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restores the contract to its original condition and places the parties in the same legal position as before the repudiation. See Restatement, supra, § 256 cmt. a (if a repudiation is nullified it eliminates all consequences of a repudiation). Thus, a retraction reinstates the obligations of the other party, including any conditions precedent, so that the performance of such conditions is once again necessary before the repudiating party can be charged with breach. Corbin, supra, § 980, at 933. However, a retraction, to be effective, must be clear and unequivocal; it may not impose new conditions not in accord with the original contract. See Pichignau v. City of Paris, 264 Cal.App.2d 138, 70 Cal.Rptr. 147, 149 (1968); Vahabzadeh v.. Mooney, 241 Va. 47, 399 S.E.2d 803, 805 (1991) . {20} Based on the evidence presented at
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that in order for a contract to be enforced it is necessary that all the essential terms of the contract must first be established by competent evidence and shown to be definite certain clear and unambiguous
B. holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal
C. holding that to be effective a retraction must meet the same standard as repudiation and therefore must be clear definite absolute and unequivocal in evincing the repudiators intention to honor his obligations under the contract
D. holding that fraud on the court must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence
E. holding that an award for punitive damages must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir.2012) (“Even when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, we must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.”). Sadeeq next contends that the ALJ erred by discounting his testimony and the written testimony of his wife regarding the debilitating effect of his heart condition and leg pain. The ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons to discount Sadeeq’s testimony and the written statements of Sadeeq’s wife regarding the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of Sadeeq’s symptoms. First, the ALJ properly found that Sa-deeq’s assertion of debilitating limitations was undermined by the medical evidence. See Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 670-71 (9th Cir.2012) . Second, the ALJ was permitted to consider
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that alj properly evaluated credibility where he cited specific instances where claimants complaints about pain and other subjective symptoms were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence of record
B. holding that the alj properly discounted a claimants testimony about the extent of his pain and limitations based on his ability to travel
C. holding that the alj properly relied on medical evidence undermining claimants subjective assessment of limitations
D. holding that evidence relied on by alj was insufficient to undermine pain allegations where medical records were replete with claimants reports of pain and of prescriptions
E. holding that an alj is entitled to make a credibility determination regarding the claimants subjective complaints after specifically addressing these complaints and reviewing the medical evidence in the record
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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Circuit Court of Appeals which concern precisely this issue. See Lebrón-Torres v. Whitehall Laboratories, 251 F.3d 236 (1st Cir.2001) and Gelabert-Ladenheim v. American Airlines, Inc., 252 F.3d 54 (1st Cir.2001). After considering Defendant’s request, at the conclusion of the August 22, 2001 Settlement Conference, the Court ordered Defendant to file its motion and legal memorandum by September 6, 2001. Plaintiffs’ response was due on September 21, 2001. Having received the parties’ submissions, the Court will now decide, in light of Lebrón and Gelabert, whether Plaintiff is substantially limited in the major life activity of “working” for the purposes of the ADA. Defendant has proceeded pursuant to Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 483, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999) to discuss the undisputed facts of the case at
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that epilepsy qualifies as a disability under the ada
B. holding evidence of a 13 permanent partial disability insufficient to establish disability for purposes of ada
C. holding that under pre1989 law there must be an individualized determination of whether an individual has an actual disability and reversing a summary judgment that held that a person did not have protected status to claim discrimination based on a back injury
D. holding that whether a person has a disability under the ada is an individualized inquiry
E. holding that an employers inquiry into the reason for an employees work absences was a permissible jobrelated inquiry under the ada
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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on Mr. Stanley’s behavior, which was also a concern of the district court, see id. Vol. 4 at 72, so this delay does not weigh against the government. In addition, the two-month delay required for the later competency evaluation that was requested by defense counsel weighs against Mr. Stanley. Mr. Stanley alleges that the substitution of district judges on October 31, 2008, caused delay, but he has not explained how the change of judge delayed his case. Consequently, this claim does not weigh against the government. Cf. Gomez, 67 F.3d at 1522 (“[D]elay attributable to an overburdened judg cooperate with his attorneys and the necessity of substituting lead counsel twice — once a month before trial — resulted in considerable delay to be weighed against him. See Britton, 129 S.Ct. at 1292 . Under these circumstances, we conclude that
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that in determining whether there exists a valid waiver of the right to counsel in the criminal setting the court may consider a defendants lack of good faith in working with appointed counsel including an unreasonable refusal to cooperate with counsel or an unreasonable request for substitution of appointed counsel and the timeliness of defendants request for new counsel particularly when a defendant makes an untimely request for new counsel under circumstances which are likely to result in a continuance
B. holding defendants right to counsel not violated despite district court denying pretrial request by the defendant to discharge his attorney where request was made on eve of trial and was openly part of attempt to have the district judge recuse himself and delay trial
C. holding delays caused by numerous defense pretrial motions and defendants motion to continue do not weigh against the government
D. holding that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion to continue for purposes of hiring private counsel on eve of trial where defendant had several months to do so and failed to articulate sufficient reasons for his dissatisfaction with appointed counsel
E. holding delays caused by defendants role in necessitating substitution of defense counsel once on the eve of trial are attributed to defendant
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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issue of liability as to their due process claim. See Order of June 6, 2002 (Docket No. 67). The plaintiffs’ second claim of political discrimination was tried before a jury from December 2-23, 2002, along with the damages phase of their due process claim. Ultimately, the jury rendered a verdict against plaintiffs, finding that defendants had not dismissed plaintiffs based on political grounds, and also awarding zero damages for the defendants’ violation of plaintiffs’ due process rights. See Verdict Forms (Docket Nos. 119-150). Notwithstanding, the Court upon entering judgment, awarded each plaintiff one dollar ($1.00) as nominal compensation for their due process claim. See Judgment of January 7, 2003 (Docket No. 152). See also Campos-Orrego v. Rivera, 175 F.3d 89, 98 (1st Cir.1999) . In their “Motion for New Trial ... ” (Docket
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that nominal damages award was appropriate where the evidence supporting the damages was speculative
B. holding that the right to nominal damages was waived in a breach of duty action when plaintiff failed to raise the issue of nominal damages until after the verdict
C. holding that when a jury finds section 1988 liability but fails to award damages nominal damages are available to plaintiff
D. holding that when plaintiff has proven injury but has failed to prove the amount of damages the plaintiff is only entitled to nominal damages
E. holding that the first amendment right to free speech is absolute and an award of nominal damages is required even if the defendant fails to object to the nominal damages instruction
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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340, 108 S.Ct. 2413. But there are actually two types of prejudice relevant to this factor: (1) trial prejudice, i.e., prejudice in the defendant’s ability to mount a defense at trial; and (2) non-trial prejudice. The Supreme Court has described the latter type of prejudice as follows: Inordinate delay between public charge and trial, wholly aside from possible prejudice to a defense on the merits, may seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends. Taylor, 487 U.S. at 340-41, 108 S.Ct. 2413 (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted); see also Moss, 217 F.3d at 431-32 . It is well established that a criminal
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that even if the district court had erred by not allowing the plaintiff leave to file a reply brief any error was harmless because it did not prejudice the plaintiffs rights
B. holding that the district court erred when it neglected to address any nontrial prejudice suffered by the defendant including the impact of his incarceration on his life circumstances
C. holding that the scope of crossexamination did not extend to any bad acts committed by the defendant during his life where defendant presented evidence of adverse circumstances that he experienced in his early childhood rather than evidence of his general good character
D. holding argument abandoned when defendant failed to cite any authority in specific support of his assertion that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial
E. holding that the district court erred when it relied on the governments representation that the property sought by the defendant had been destroyed because the government did not submit any evidence of the propertys destruction
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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if it were a search, I would find it here supported by the requisite reasonable suspicion and would therefore admit the evidence obtained from the search. Because the majority concludes that under Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution, a dog sniff of a person's automobile intrudes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy and constitutes a search, and because the majority discerns no reasonable suspicion, I respectfully dissent. I The purpose of both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution is to protect a person's legitimate expectation of privacy from unreasonable governmental intrusion. People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 139 (Colo.1983). In determining whether an expectation of privacy is legitimat ) . Hence, the United States Supreme Court and
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that a dog sniff during a legitimate traffic stop does not constitute a search because there is no expectation of privacy in contraband and a dog sniff does not violate any privacy interest
B. holding that a dog sniff of the outside of a car subsequent to a valid traffic stop did not constitute a search
C. holding that a dog sniff of a federal express package was a search
D. holding that a dog sniff of a vehicle during a traffic stop conducted absent reasonable suspicion of illegal drug activity did not violate the fourth amendment because it did not implicate any legitimate privacy interest
E. holding that a dog sniff of the area outside the door of a hotel room is not a search under the fourth amendment or the texas constitution because the dogs sniff does not explore the details of the hotel room and the sniff reveals nothing about the room other than the presence of cocaine in which there is no legitimate privacy interest
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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could not have been sexually assaulted, even though defendant planned to, and had taken substantial steps to, carry out the act. The State contends that because it was impossible for defendant to have completed the crime he had attempted, the instruction was correct. We disagree. “[C]lear and correct jury instructions are essential for a fair trial.” State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 522, 651 A.2d 19 (1994). Jury instructions constitute “a road map to guide the jury, and without an appropriate charge a jury can take a wrong turn in its deliberations.” State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2, 15, 573 A.2d 1359 (1990). “So critical is the need for accuracy that erroneous instructions on material points are presumed to be reversible error.” Ibid. Accord, State v. Rhett, 127 N.J. 3, 7, 601 A.2d 689 (1992) . Prior to the enactment of the New Jersey Code
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that instruction that omitted elements of crime that defense had conceded was error although not plain error
B. holding the denial of a proper question is always reversible error
C. holding that incorrect charges on substantive elements of a crime constitute reversible error
D. holding wrongful granting of states challenge for cause reversible error
E. holding that error in denying such challenge is reversible error without demonstration of prejudice
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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by Dixon, Todd Rounds (“Rounds”), and Camacho)); (Id. Ex. 49, ECF No. 191^2 (Declaration and Power of Attorney for Patent Application '855 signed by Camacho, Dale Johnson, and Mark Sasaki)) Those signed declarations recite that the signing parties are the only joint inventors on the '629 and '855 Patents; Lindquist is not listed as a joint inventor. Subsequently, however, Camacho and Rounds testified that Lindquist too had a role in the design of the patented invention. (Kneafsey Decl. Ex. 19, at 392-93, ECF No. 175-25); (Id. Ex. 24, at 9, ECF No. 175-30 (deposition transcript of Rounds)) “Thus, there is flatly contradictory evidence relating to the matter critical for determining whether the ['629 and '855 Patents are] invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f).” Checkpoint, 412 F.3d at 1338 . Accordingly, the Court finds there is a
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment
B. holding that unsupported allegations or denials are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of summary judgment
C. holding that a speculative affidavit which contained mere conjecture was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial
D. holding that signed declarations to the pto reciting that the signing parties are the only joint inventors despite testimony from coinventors to the contrary created a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment
E. holding that the original pto declarations create a genuine issue of material fact
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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exists a “longstanding rule requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction.” Id. Because Congress failed to articulate a “clear, unambiguous, and express statement of congressional intent to preclude judicial consideration on habeas,” the Court concluded that the IIRIRA did not eliminate habeas jurisdiction. Id. at 314, 121 S.Ct. 2271. The petitioner notes that as in St. Cyr, several circuit courts have held that because 28 U.S.C. § 2242(d) does not contain a sufficiently clear and unambiguous expression of congressional intent to limit judicial review of habeas petitions brought under the FARR Act, that provision does not strip district courts of habeas jurisdiction over FARR Act claims. See Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1182-83 (11th Cir.2004) ; Singh v. Ashcroft, 351 F.3d 435, 441 (9th
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus
B. holding that because the farr act does not expressly mention habeas corpus or 28 usc 2241 it does not eliminate habeas jurisdiction
C. holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law
D. holding plain statement rule applicable in habeas corpus proceedings pursuant to 28 usc 2254
E. holding that because 28 usc 2241 habeas corpus relief is available to review constitutional claims congress preclusion of direct appeals in iirira see tion 309c4g does not offend the due process clause of the constitution
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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406 (1994). “To satisfy the prejudice inquiry, the evidence suppressed must have been material to guilt or punishment.” Gibson, 951 A.2d at 1126-1127 (Pa.2008). As noted by Appellant, materiality extends to evidence affecting the credibility of witnesses, rather than merely to purely exculpatory evidence. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (“When the ‘reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,’ nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within this general rule.”). Moreover, we have held that the protection of Brady extends to the defendant’s ability to investigate alternate defense theories and to formulate trial strategy. See Commonwealth v. Green, 536 Pa. 599, 640 A.2d 1242, 1245 (1994) . “[F]avorable evidence is material, and
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the failure to disclose evidence known to the defense cannot form the basis of a brady violation
B. holding that defendants failure to assert the defense in any pretrial motions did not waive defendants limitations defense because the assertion of a limitations defense in the answer preserved defendants right to raise the defense both during the first trial and before the second
C. holding that the trial court did not err in its refusal to consider the borrowers defense of merger on appeal since the defense was outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court
D. holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to consider debtors claim of rescission as an equitable defense to the foreclosure action where that defense was not raised before the clerk
E. holding that courts must consider any adverse effect that the prosecutors failure to disclose might have had on not only the presentation of the defense at trial but the preparation of the defense as well
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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JJ., who dissent. 1 . The Trust had entered into a management agreement with Wolford under which Wol-ford was responsible for the contract, including its recording. LARSON, Justice (dissenting). I dissent because section 558.46 does not clearly provide for criminal, as opposed to civil, punishment. In such a case, doubts must be resolved in favor of the defendant. See Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 1059, 28 L.Ed.2d 493, 497 (1971) (“[Ajmbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.”). The majority holds that section 558.46(2) i whether a statute imposes civil or criminal sanctions, “we must seek out and give effect to the intention of the legislature.... ” Lenertz v. Mun. Ct., 219 N.W.2d 513, 515-16 (Iowa 1974) ; see 36A C.J.S. Fines § 2, at 206 (“The true
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that we may consult legislative history as an aid to the interpretation of ambiguous text
B. holding that even where there are contrary indications in the statutes legislative history we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear
C. holding that the court does not examine legislative history when the statutes text and context are not subject to more than one plausible reading
D. holding a court may consider a defendants criminal history even if that history is included in the defendants criminal history category
E. holdingafter considering the statutes whole text legislative history and purpose that a consumer fraud provision did not impose criminal sanctions
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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AND As.”). After examining the relevant regulations, we find that the status of an ANDA holder’s product as the RLD for a given prescription drug product does not alter the ANDA holder’s obligations. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s rejection of the Plaintiffs RLD theory against Mylan. 3. Remaining State Law Claims Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in dismissing their remaining state law claims including breach of express and implied warranty, misrepresentation, fraud, consumer protection, and statutory negligence. A prior panel of this Court rejected similar claims, including breach of warranty, fraud, and misrepresentation under Tennessee law in Strayhorn v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 737 F.3d 378, 391-96 (6th Cir.2013), finding t 9 S.Ct. 538, 172 L.Ed.2d 398 (2008) , where the Supreme Court found express
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the labeling act did not preempt negligent and wanton design and manufacture claims against cigarette manufacturer
B. holding that the federal insecticide fungicide and rodenticide act did not preempt plaintiffs state law claims
C. holding that the labeling act did not preempt design defect claim against cigarette manufacturer
D. holding that the federal cigarette labeling and advertising act did not preempt plaintiffs state law claims
E. holding that federal law did not preempt commonlaw fraud claim against cigarette manufacturer based on advertising of light cigarettes
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.12, 1997) (reviewing arbitration panel’s “interim order” requiring defendant to post security pending a final award); Atlas Assurance Co. of Am. v. American Centennial Ins. Co., No. 90 Civ. 5474, 1991 WL 4741, at *2-*3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.16, 1991) (confirming interim award directing defendant to fund an escrow account for the benefit of the successful party as determined in the final award); Konkar Maritime Enterprises v. Compagnie Belge D’Affretement, 668 F.Supp. 267, 272 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (confirming arbitrators’ interim order to establish jointly-held escrow account that was intended to establish “security for enforcement of an award in the event that respondent was found liable”); Southern Seas Navigation Ltd. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 606 F.Supp. 692, 694 (S.D.N.Y.1985) ; Sperry Int’l Trade v. Government of Israel,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the plaintiff must prove that the end users directly infringed its patent in order to succeed on its claim of contributory infringement
B. holding that absent a collective bargaining agreement which extends the employment period past the end of a particular voyage a seaman is entitled to unearned wages until the end of the voyage
C. holding that order reducing the notice of a claim of lien was not interim in the sense of being an intermediate step toward a further end rather it is an end in itself for its very purpose is to clarify the parties rights in the interim period pending a final decision on the merits
D. holding that interim awards of attorneys fees are inappropriate where the only relief obtained is a preliminary injunction which may be subsequently overturned on the merits
E. holding that where the statutory scheme is clear the inquiry should end
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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the trial court granted leave to file a late response, we presume that the trial court did not consider it. Envtl. Procedures, Inc. v. Guidry, 282 S.W.3d 602, 612 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). 3 . Arnold, v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dallas, 279 S.W.3d 464, 469 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.) (explaining that allegations of harm caused by overly-large implants were allegations of an error in medical judgment, not an allegation of the negligent use of tangible personal property). 4 . Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1994) (concluding that immunity is not waived for harm resulting from errors or lapses in medical documentation or failure to follow recommendations). 5 . Kertville v. Clark, 923 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex.1996) ; Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch v. Thompson, 2006
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that claims not pursued within two years of their accrual fall outside of the federal tort claims acts limited waiver of sovereign immunity
B. holding section 101106f cannot be used by employees to obtain dismissal of common law intentional tort claims because those claims could not have been brought under the texas tort claims act
C. holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver
D. holding that claim for failure to monitor patient did not fall under ttcas property waiver
E. holding that failure to administer an injectable drug is a nonuse of tangible property and does not fall under the waiver provisions of the texas tort claims act
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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110, 58 S.Ct. 803, 811, 82 L.Ed. 1202 (1938) ("[W]hether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the two States is a question of 'federal common law' upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either state can be conclusive.”). Federal common law also operates in areas “in which Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive law.” Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 640, 101 S.Ct. at 2067. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110, 109 S.Ct. 948, 954, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989) ("[C]ourts are to develop a federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA plans.” (citation and internal quotation omitted)); Nat’l Soc’y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688, 98 S.Ct. 1355, 1363, 55 L.Ed.2d 637 (1978) . 13 . See Peter Westen and Jeffrey S. Lehman,
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that district courts discretion is extremely broad
B. holding that congress expected the courts to give shape to the sherman acts broad mandate by drawing on commonlaw tradition
C. recognizing the broad power of federal courts to fashion appropriate relief
D. recognizing that congress desired a broad definition of a claim
E. recognizing that congress has the power to completely divest the courts of their sentencing discretion and that congress granted broad authority to the sentencing commission guided by specific goals and principles
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Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of the class. Although it is not necessary for the putative class representatives’ claims to be identical to those of absent class members, due process precludes certification if the named plaintiffs possess potentially conflicting interests that may impair the vigorous prosecution of the class claims. In re Baldwin-United Corp. Litig., 122 F.R.D. at 428. Where class members have conflicting interests, each group must receive its own representation; it is n onably well represent the class. The named policyholders who were defrauded share the same incentive as absent policyholders who were defrauded to establish the alleged fraud and to maximize the overall recovery. Weiss Aff. at ¶252; see also Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d at 811; New York Life, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 652, at *29 . And, there are no disparate interests to
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint
B. holding that a a representative plaintiff acts as fiduciary for the others requiring the representative to act in the best interest of class
C. holding that the claims of the class representative and class members must be based on the same legal or remedial theory
D. holding representation adequate where policyholders represented mix of characteristics representative of the mix found in the class itself
E. holding that in class action the claim or defense of the representative party must be typical of the claim or defense of each member of the class
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | D | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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QDRO. 2004 ND 58, ¶ 9, 676 N.W.2d 794. We explained the trial court correctly found the former husband in contempt for willfully violating the divorce judgment by receiving and 0 (stating trial court should take all reasonable measures to ensure that QDROs are drafted and entered as soon as possible after entry of the divorce decree). Thus, the trial court erred by shifting the responsibility for obtaining a QDRO from the trial court that entered the 1993 divorce decree to Mary Blomdahl, a party to the decree. Further, under ERISA, there is no statute of limitations for the entry of a QDRO. See Jordan, 147 S.W.3d at 260 (noting the intentional absence of a statute of limitations for the entry of a QDRO under ERISA); see also Marshall v. Priess, 99 S.W.3d 150, 157 (Tex.Ct.App.2002) ; Ochoa v. Ochoa, 71 S.W.3d 593, 596-97
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that the courts statute of limitations is jurisdictional in nature and is thus not subject to waiver or estoppel
B. holding a statute of limitations defense does not deprive court of subject matter jurisdiction to the extent the statute of limitations may be considered in any sense a jurisdictional impediment it is one which can be waived
C. holding the entry of qdro is not subject to statute of limitations on enforcement of judgments
D. holding that the statute of limitations defense does not deprive court of subject matter jurisdiction to the extent the statute of limitations may be considered in any sense a jurisdictional impediment it is one which can be waived
E. holding that the aedpa statute of limitations is not jurisdictional
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | C | casehold |
Read the following excerpt from a US court opinion:
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of the black leather jacket, which the court viewed as merely cumulative physical evidence. We conclude that in the circumstances of this case the denial of the right to present what would have been exculpatory evidence had consequences far more serious than the erroneous receipt of inculpatory evidence of only marginal probative force. Newman’s claimed lack of a Hispanic accent was apparently the only defense he had to offer. There may be cases in which the wrongful exclusion of such evidence might be considered harmless, but we conclude that this is not one of them. Although on retrial Newman will be entitled to offer a voice exemplar without waiving his privilege against self-incrimination, he will of course be required to establish its reliability. See Esdaille, 769 F.2d at 107 . Whether he is able to do so will be a matter
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What is the most suitable continuation to the opinion? Your options are:
A. holding that testimony of two experts was unreliable because they relied on the testimony of two other experts which was also unreliable
B. holding that other evidence properly admitted at trial was sufficiently strong to permit the conclusion that the improper admission of unreliable expert testimony was harmless
C. holding that testimony of defense expert on false confessions properly excluded as not sufficiently reliable
D. holding that landowners testimony based on lot method was properly excluded in condemnation case involving property that owner proposed to develop as mobile home park where subdivision development was speculative
E. holding that proposed voice exemplar was properly excluded as unreliable
Reply with [A, B, C, D, E] only. | E | casehold |